An Intuitionist Approach to Corruption

The role of moral intuitions and emotions on judgement and behaviour

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Abstract

In this dissertation, I develop an Intuitionist Approach to Corruption by integrating literature from political science, ethical intuitionism, moral and social psychology, and evolutionary psychology. My argument posits that intuitive processes, particularly those linked to moral intuitions and related moral emotions, play an important role in judgement and behaviour concerning corruption. Although my argument highlights the role of intuitive processes, it does not conflict with previous work that has focused on the role of reflective/deliberative processes; rather, it complements them, but it does seek to arrive at a better understanding of corruption.

I propose that corruption is widely condemned in the abstract, in part due to intuitions linked to the domain of fairness. However, in concrete situations, this condemnation does not always translate into judgments and behaviours against corruption due to other factors that can occlude it or overrun it, including self-interest and competing moral intuitions linked to domains such as group loyalty and kinship. In line with gene-culture coevolution studies, my argument also recognises that moral intuitions were initially developed to promote small-group cooperation. Only recently has this cooperation had to be extended to large societies, and for this extension to be possible, the role of both social and formal norms was key. Following this understanding, my argument focuses on two related factors that are seen as the result of these norms that allow for large-scale cooperation and that thus can correlate with individuals taking larger society as an important reference point for their judgement and behaviour: social identity and generalised trust (or trust in distant others). I posit that these factors can make the condemnation in

the abstract more likely to translate into concrete situations.

In addition to the Introduction and Conclusion, my dissertation is organised in two parts. In Part I, I present my argument in detail, while in Part II, I outline and develop my empirical approach. In the studies presented in Part II, I use a combination of qualitative and experimental methods to provide evidence for the components of my argument. Although I recognise that differentiating between intuitive processes and reflective/deliberative ones is a complicated task, these studies provide evidence for the idea that individuals also think of corruption in moral terms and that intuitive moral concerns have a role in judgement and behaviour concerning corruption.

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Contents

1 Introduction **13**

1.1 Background 14

1.2 Argument in brief 16

1.3 Broad methodological approach 19

1.4 The Chapters in brief 21

1.5 Final Remarks 24

I Theory **26**

2 Introduction to the Theory **27**

3 The Theory Building Blocks **36**

3.1 Ethical Intuitionism and philosophy's approach to intuitions 36

3.1.1 Ethical Intuitionism 39

3.1.2 Ethical Intuitionism, Deontology and Consequentialism 40

3.2 Intuitions in Psychology 43

3.3 Moral Intuitions 46

3.3.1 Moral Judgements 46

3.3.2 The Origins of Moral Intuitions 49

3.3.3 Dual-Process in Moral Judgement 53

3.3.4 Multiple vs Singular Moral Domains 56

3.3.4.1 The Moral Foundations Theory 59

3.3.4.2 Morality as Cooperation Theory 65

3.4 The Role of Emotions: Moral Emotions 71

3.5 Scale at which Intuitions are applied: The Role of Norms 78

3.5.1 Reference groups and moral judgement 81

3.5.2 The effects of social and formal norms . . . 83
3.6 Closing remarks . . . 88

4 An Intuitionist Approach to Corruption 89
4.1 The Descriptive Morality of Corruption . . . 91
4.2 Moral Intuitions and Corruption . . . 95
4.3 Social Identity and Generalised Trust in the Study of Corruption . . . 97
4.4 Types of Corruption . . . 101
4.4.1 Corruption as a Social Dilemma . . . 105
4.4.2 Corruption as a Moral Dilemma . . . 108
4.5 Moral Emotions related to Fairness . . . 110
4.6 Closing Remarks . . . 111

5 Dialogue with previous approaches to corruption 113
5.1 Approaches Focused on Reflective/deliberative Processes . . . 114
5.2 Approaches that *Partially* account for Intuitive Processes . . . 119
5.3 Approaches that take Identity into account . . . 126
5.3.1 Identities and Clientelism . . . 128
5.4 Closing Remarks . . . 130

6 Summary of Part I 131

II Empirical Studies 134

7 Empirical Approach 135
7.1 Text Analysis: how people talk about corruption . . . 137
7.1.1 News headlines . . . 137
7.1.2 Individual responses . . . 138
7.2 Focus Groups: how people talk about corruption . . . 140
7.3 Conjoint Experiment: concretising corruption . . . 141
7.4 Vignette Experiment: Bribery versus Favouritism . . . 144
7.5 Induced Emotions: Intuitive Processes as Causes . . . 146
7.6 Closing Remakrs . . . 148

8 Concretising accusations to increase concrete punishment 149

8.1 Introduction: The Punishment of Corruption . . . 150

8.2 Case: Peru . . . 153

8.3 Why can concretisation increase electoral punishment? . . . 154

8.4 Relation to previous explanations . . . 156

8.5 Study 1: Coverage of corruption in the media . . . 161

8.6 Study 2: Conjoint Experiment . . . 165

8.6.1 Results . . . 170

8.6.1.1 General Results . . . 171

8.6.1.2 Average Component Interaction Effects . . . 172

8.6.1.3 Sub-Group analysis . . . 178

8.7 Discussion and Conclusion . . . 181

9 The Role of Moral Intuitions in Corruption as a Moral Dilemma 184

9.1 Introduction . . . 185

9.2 The case: UK . . . 188

9.3 Role of intuitive processes when corruption is presented as a moral dilemma . . . 192

9.4 Study 1: Individual views of different types of corruption . . . 195

9.4.1 The experiment . . . 196

9.4.2 Results . . . 198

9.4.2.1 Importance of fairness . . . 205

9.4.3 Discussion . . . 213

9.5 Study 2: Induced Emotions in Corruption as a Moral Dilemma . . . 213

9.5.1 Pre-test questions: Social Identity and Generalised Trust . . . 215

9.5.2 The experiment . . . 216

9.5.3 Main Expectations . . . 219

9.5.4 Experiment results . . . 221

9.5.4.1 First-person vignette . . . 221

9.5.4.2 Third-person vignette . . . 231

9.5.4.3 Control Condition . . . 240

9.5.5 Post-Experiment Questions: Text analysis . . . 242

9.5.6 Discussion . . . 247

9.6 Discussion and Conclusion . . . 248

10 The Role of Moral Intuitions in Corruption as a Social Dilemma 253

10.1 Introduction . . . 254
10.2 The case: Peru . . . 256
10.3 Argument . . . 259
10.4 Study 1: Focus Groups . . . 263
10.4.1 Design . . . 264
10.4.2 Results . . . 265
10.4.3 Discussion . . . 273
10.5 Study 2: Induced Emotions in Corruption as a Social Dilemma . . . 274
10.5.1 Pre-test questions: Social Identity and Trust . . . 275
10.5.2 The experiment . . . 276
10.5.3 Main Expectation . . . 279
10.5.4 Results . . . 280
10.5.4.1 First-Person Vignette . . . 280
10.5.4.2 Third-person vignettes . . . 288
10.5.4.3 Control Condition . . . 295
10.5.5 Post-Experiment Questions: Text analysis . . . 297
10.5.6 Discussion . . . 303
10.6 Discussion and Conclusion . . . 305

11 General Conclusion 308

11.1 Findings . . . 308
11.1.1 Condemnation of corruption and competing concerns . . . 309
11.1.2 The role of intuitive processes . . . 311
11.2 Limitations . . . 314
11.3 Future Research Agenda . . . 316
11.4 Implications for other research areas . . . 319
11.4.1 Clientelism . . . 319
11.4.2 Political Violence . . . 320
11.5 Policy implications . . . 321

11.6 Closing remarks 322

A Appendix Chapter 8 **325**

A.0.1 Appendix A: Headlines 325

A.0.2 Appendix B: Proetica Survey 340

A.0.3 Appendix C: Round effect 341

A.0.4 Appendix D: Distribution of attributes 341

A.0.5 Appendix E: AMCE 342

A.0.6 Appendix F: AMCE, only pairs of "No Accusation"-Accusation 343

B Appendix Chapter 9 **344**

B.0.1 Appendix A: Distribution of responses to the Bribery scenario 344

B.0.2 Appendix B: Distribution of responses to the Favouritism scenario 345

B.0.3 Appendix C: Engagement in corruption by social norm 345

B.0.4 Appendix D: Summary of regression models- Engagement in Corruption 346

B.0.5 Appendix E: Engagement in corruption, including demographics 347

B.0.6 Appendix F: Is this practice against the law? 347

B.0.7 Appendix G: Is this practice considered corruption? 348

B.0.8 Appendix H: Measures of trust 348

B.0.9 Appendix I: Measures of social identity 349

B.0.10 Appendix J: Treatment Assignment 349

B.0.11 Appendix K: Emotional induction- first-person vignette 351

B.0.12 Appendix L: First-Person Vignette - effect of Social Identity and Trust on Accepting the Favour 351

B.0.13 Appendix M: General distribution of Judgement 352

B.0.14 Appendix N: First-Person Vignette - Effect of Social Identity and Trust on Judgement 353

B.0.15 Appendix O: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions in Judgement of Favouritism with Particularised Trust (trust in "Family") Interaction 353

B.0.16 Appendix P: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions in Judgement of Favouritism with Identifying with "Country" . . . 354
B.0.17 Appendix Q: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions in Judgement of Favouritism with Identifying with "Great Britain" Interaction . . . 355
B.0.18 Appendix R: Third-Person Vignette- Effect of Social Identity and Trust on Accepting the Favour . . . 356
B.0.19 Appendix S: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Accepting the Favour with Generalised Trust Interaction . . . 357
B.0.20 Appendix T: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions in Accepting the Favour with Identifying with "Country" and Identifying with "Great Britain" interaction . . . 358
B.0.21 Appendix U: Third-Person Vigentte, effect of Social Identity and Trust on Judgement . . . 359
B.0.22 Appendix V: Third-person vignette - Effect of emotional inducement in Judgement of Favouritism with Generalised Trust Interaction . . . 360
B.0.23 Appendix W: Third-person vignette - Effect of emotional inducement in Judgement of Favouritism with Trust in "Family" Interaction ($p<0.05$) . . . 361
B.0.24 Appendix X: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions in Judgment of Favouritism with Identifying with "Great Britain" Interaction . . . 362
B.0.25 Appendix Y: Proportion of whether accepting the favour should be considered corruption . . . 363
B.0.26 Appendix Z: First-person - Proportion of whether accepting the favour should be considered corruption by whether the favour was accepted . . . 364

B.0.27 Appendix AA: Third-person - Proportion of whether accepting the favour should be considered corruption by whether the favour was accepted 365

C Appendix Chapter 10 **366**

C.0.1 Appendix A: Focus Groups composition 366
C.0.2 Appendix B: Question to measure Trust 367
C.0.3 Appendix C: Question to measure Social Identity 367
C.0.4 Appendix D: Examples used in Guilt inducement task 367
C.0.5 Appendix E: Examples used in Anger inducement task 368
C.0.6 Appendix F: Treatment Assignment (Full sample) 368
C.0.7 Appendix G: First-person vignette- Effect of Induced Emotions on Paying the Bribe 369
C.0.8 Appendix H: First-person vignette - Effect of Social Identity and Trust on Paying the Bribe 369
C.0.9 Appendix I: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Paying the Bribe with Generalised Trust Interaction 370
C.0.10 Appendix J: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Paying the Bribe with Particularised Trust (trust in "Family") Interaction 371
C.0.11 Appendix K: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Paying the Bribe with Social Identity ("Country") Interaction 372
C.0.12 Appendix L: Distribution of Judgement 373
C.0.13 Appendix M: First-person vignette - Effect of Social Identity and Trust on Judgement 374
C.0.14 Appendix N: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Judgement with Generalised Trust Interaction 374
C.0.15 Appendix O: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Judgement with Particularised Trust ("Family") Interaction 375
C.0.16 Appendix P: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Judgement with Social Identity ("Country") Interaction 376

C.0.17 Appendix Q: Third-person vignette- Effect of Induced Emotions on Paying the Bribe . . . 376
C.0.18 Appendix R: Third-person vignette - Effect of Social Identity and Generalised on Paying the Bribe . . . 377
C.0.19 Appendix S: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Paying the Bribe with Generalised Trust Interaction . 378
C.0.20 Appendix T: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Paying the Bribe with Particularised Trust (trust in "Family") Interaction . . . 379
C.0.21 Appendix U: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Judgement . . . 379
C.0.22 Appendix V: Third-person vignette, effect of Social Identity and Trust on Judgement . . . 380
C.0.23 Appenidx W: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Judgement with identifying with "Country" Interaction ($p<0.05$) . . . 381
C.0.24 Appendix X: Effect of First vs Third person vignette on Action-based outcomes . . . 381
C.0.25 Appendix Y: Words used for word count- Moral Foundations Dictionary . . . 382

Chapter 1

Introduction

> "Millionaire salaries for the corrupt. Bullets and missiles for our people" (verse of the song "Dina asesina", which recently became the anthem of the protests in Peru)

The quote above is from a protest song in Peru, where years of political instability have led to an unsuccessful attempt coup, a highly unpopular government, massive protests across the country in demand for new elections, and at least 67 deaths. A common theme in this wave of protest, as in many others in the past, is the perils of corruption. At the same time, Peru is a country where corruption is seen as tolerated (for example, in elections) and where petty corruption practices are extended. This may lead us to think that the condemnation we see in protest songs, in public manifestations, in polls and in various studies is not sincere or is present only when people do not perceive benefits from corruption. Even when seeing this condemnation as sincere, we may be tempted to see it as one of those odd things that happen in countries seen as having high levels of corruption. However, in this dissertation, I will argue that the condemnation of corruption we see in the abstract is real and sincere. And I will show that, for some types of corruption, we see a similar dynamic even in countries viewed as having comparatively low levels of

corruption, such as the UK[1]. To study this, I focus on the judgement of corruption in general and engagement in petty corruption, the latter of which has not been broadly studied outside of developing countries. I also emphasise the factors that affect individual-level judgement and subsequent behaviour. Thus, although the idea for this dissertation was born out of what I observed and studied in my home country, Peru, its core components are not case-dependent.

In this dissertation, I propose that the "tolerance" to corruption we see in concrete situations does not erase the condemnation of corruption we see in the abstract. Many individuals who engage in corruption and "tolerate" it in practice still view it and, in some cases, even their engagement in it as wrong. I propose that one of the things that influence both the condemnation that we see in the abstract and the practical tolerance and engagement in it is a series of intuitive processes. I focus on the role of moral intuitions (hunches or feelings about where an action or situation falls on the wrong-right spectrum) in these two outcomes. Thus, I propose a complementary way of viewing judgement and behaviour concerning corruption, which rests on what I have called an Intuitionist Approach to corruption. Although complementary and not opposed to previous explanations, this approach innovates by highlighting the role of intuitive processes as causes of judgment and behaviour.

1.1 Background

Corruption, understood broadly as the use of public office for private gain (Rose-Ackerman, 1999) and as a violation of the principle of impartiality (Kurer, 2005;

[1]Although corruption in the UK seems to have increased in recent years (according to the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International), the levels are still lower than in Peru. Furthermore, while corruption is still present, the Corruption Perception Index and the Freedom from Corruption Index still rank the UK as a country with low corruption. Additionally, most cases of studied corruption in the UK correspond to grand corruption, while much of my focus is on the individual-level interaction with petty corruption

Mungiu-Pippidi and Johnston, 2017), has been the focus of much inquiry because of its negative effects across many areas. It undermines the legitimacy and proper functioning of state institutions (Anders and Nuijten, 2008; Chang and Chu, 2006; Della Porta and Vannucci, 1997; Gingerich, 2009; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Seligson, 2001, 2006), and has been associated with negative effects on economic growth (Ali and Isse, 2003; Lambsdorff, 2002, 2003; Treisman, 2000; Wei, 2000), higher rates of inequality and poverty (Gupta et al., 2002; Li et al., 2000), and low level of institutional trust (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Bowler and Karp, 2004; Canache and Allison, 2008; Morris and Klesner, 2010). Although this is an area of study with rich literature, work still needs to be done to understand better why people engage in corruption, and how this varies depending on the type of corruption scenario.

Most studies of corruption have focused on what You (2015, Chapter 6) called the "demand side" of corruption, which focuses on the role and behaviour of public officials. But I consider that more attention should be paid to the citizen side of corruption, specifically to their judgements and behaviours concerning corruption. Understanding how citizens view corruption and their own relation to it is important both because of the material and social cost of petty corruption and because, ultimately, citizens are the ones who can exert accountability towards corrupt officials. Thus, I focus on the judgement of corruption (both petty and grand) and the engagement in petty corruption (Prasad et al., 2019). Corruption is broadly perceived as a negative and judged as wrong (Marquette, 2012), as shown in surveys, opinion polls and qualitative studies. Despite this, worldwide, we see countries where both the perception of corruption as a problem and the incidence of citizen engagement in corruption is high. But even in cases in which corruption is endemic, and people are more likely to engage in petty corruption, we still see individuals holding negative views towards it (Karklins, 2005). This phenomenon is what initially drove the argument in this dissertation, which began with the question of how we can explain corruption being simultaneously "widely condemned and yet widely practised" (Hess and Dunfee, 2000, p.594)?

Although we could ignore this question — either by assuming that the condem-

nation of corruption we see in polls and surveys is purely performative and not a reflection of actual judgements and preferences as proponents of moral hypocrisy suggest (Batson, 2011; Polman and Ruttan, 2012), or by arguing that this condemnation is only present in the absence of material benefits or costs to the individual or the group (Persson et al., 2019a) — in this dissertation I propose an alternative explanation for it. I propose that the condemnation we see in the abstract is both real and honest, even in contexts where corruption is seen as systemic and engagement in it can be viewed as acceptable due to its functional role. Other studies have also highlighted this coexistence of engagement in corruption and a real condemnation towards it; for example, in her study of corruption in post-communist societies Karklins (2005, p.92) recognises that the " ambivalent nature of public attitudes towards corruption is evident [...] while there is a tendency to depict corruption as something unavoidable, many people also understand its problematic side. Many of the same people who try to justify corruption are also angry about it [...]". In general terms, I propose that to understand condemnation and engagement in corruption better, we should account for intuitive processes in addition to reflective/deliberative ones. Therefore, another question at the core of my dissertation is: what role, if any, do intuitive processes play in judgement and behaviour related to corruption? I propose that the condemnation of corruption in the abstract is partly the result of intuitive concerns linked to fairness and that in concrete situations, these intuitions may be overshadowed by others, such as those linked to in-group loyalty, which contributes to explaining engagement even among people who sincerely condemn corruption.

1.2 Argument in brief

In line with recent theories of moral psychology (Green et al., 2001; Greene et al., 2008; Haidt and Joseph, 2004; Graham et al., 2013), my argument proposes that to understand better judgment and behaviour concerning corruption, we need to also pay attention to the role of intuitive process. This differentiates my explanation from

previous ones that focused exclusively on reflective/deliberative processes (focused on conscious or as-if conscious reasoning) and saw rational conscious calculations as the main explanatory factor for corruption (Persson et al., 2019a, p.801). My argument does not discount previous explanations but seeks to complement them by filling a gap. Accounting for the role of intuitions can help us understand seemingly contradictory behaviour regarding corruption (like outright condemnation and simultaneous engagement) without assuming that people are hypocrites (Batson et al., 1999) or liars.

Therefore, I propose that people think of corruption not only in terms of benefits and cost (individual or group-based, material or social) but also in moral terms. Corruption is often evaluated in a morally descriptive way, where instances of it are seen as "right" or wrong". This positions my approach against those who viewed engagement in corruption as inherently amoral (Banfield, 1958). Under my approach, both judgement and behaviour related to corruption are not just the product of self-interest (Rose-Ackerman, 2016) or of the expectation that most people will engage in it (Teorell, 2007; Rothstein, 2011b), but also the result of intuitive processes.

In this dissertation, I focus specifically on the role of moral intuitions, which are automatic hunches and feelings about where a situation or an act falls in a right-wrong spectrum (Haidt and Joseph, 2008). As I will explain in more detail in Chapter 3, these intuitions have moral emotions as a key component, and these emotions can also act as intuitions themselves (Haidt, 2003). In accordance with moral psychology and evolutionary psychology (Haidt and Joseph, 2004; Haidt, 2003; Haidt and Joseph, 2008; Curry, 2016; Curry et al., 2019b), my approach sees these intuitions as innate and universal since they are features of human psychology that evolved to allow for life in societies. But in line both with moral psychologists (Haidt and Joseph, 2008; Curry, 2016) and proponents of the gene-culture coevolutionary theory (Henrich et al., 2010; Henrich, 2015; Henrich and Muthukrishna, 2021), my argument also acknowledge that intuitions manifest in different ways depending on a series of factors. In this dissertation, as I will further detail in Chapters 3 and 4, I focus on factors related to norms and rules that may amplify or constrain these

intuitions (Henrich et al., 2010) to different social scales. In particular, I focus on generalised trust and broad social identity as factors that can amply fairness intuitions to large-scale society.

In very general terms[2], I propose that the judgement of corruption as wrong when presented in the abstract is partly due to intuitive processes linked to the moral domain of fairness, seeing concerns linked to fairness as an innate and universal (Sloane et al., 2012; Ingram and Bering, 2010; Baumard and Boyer, 2013) [3]. However, more salient factors can override this moral condemnation in concrete situations. Importantly, I posit that although self-interest is a driver for engagement in corruption, it is not the only one. In many cases, engagement in petty corruption can be driven by other intuitions linked to domains like in-group loyalty and kinship.

One of the implications of my argument is that when potential engagement in corruption can easily be linked to other moral domains, actual engagement is more likely, and participants are also more likely to see it as morally right. This way, my argument also contributes to the explanations of the variations in the levels of prevalence and acceptability of different corruption practices. For example, in previous research, it has been shown that even in highly corrupt countries, some types of corruption are deemed more unacceptable than others, and this is partly driven by how clear the harm to third parties is (Baraybar Hidalgo et al., 2022b,a). Similarly, research has also shown that in these highly corrupt countries, practices like nepotism are seen as more acceptable than practices like bribery (Martínez and Posada, 2022), and cases of corruption where the benefits are solely individual instead of collective are also judged more harshly (Bukuluki, 2013).

Differences based on characteristics of different types of corruption are present even in cases where corruption is generally seen as low. For instance, the European

[2]The argument is discussed in more detail in Part 1 of this dissertation

[3]As I will discuss in Chapters 3 and 4, this is not to say that other moral concerns, such as those linked to respect towards authority for example, do not have a role. Rather, I focus on fairness because corruption implies in itself a violation of fairness principles when looking at broad society.

Global Corruption Barometer of 2021 (which included 27 countries in continental Europe) showed that while, on average, only 7% of respondents reported having paid a bribe, a higher average of 33% of respondents reported having used personal connections to access public services (see Figure 1 in Chapter 4). I propose that this variation in judgement and engagement, depending on the type of corruption, is partly due to the role of intuitive processes (in particular moral intuitions) in the judgment of whether something is right or wrong. Furthermore, my argument proposes that the intuitive condemnation of corruption we see in the abstract does not disappear even when individuals engage in corruption, but it can be overridden by other considerations. Nevertheless, because it does not disappear, it can be activated again.

Therefore, in terms of judgement and behaviour related to corruption, my argument provides a complementary explanation to the existing ones in the social sciences (Persson et al., 2019a; Rose-Ackerman, 2016; Teorell and Rothstein, 2015; Rothstein, 2021, 2017; Persson et al., 2019b). It is a complementary one instead of an alternative one because I also acknowledge the role reflective/deliberative processes play in judgement and behaviour. In other words, I acknowledge the role of factors highlighted by these previous approaches, such as sanctions, social norms, self-interest, etc. In this dissertation, I am not arguing that these factors do not matter or that they are less relevant than intuitions; I am simply arguing that we should also pay attention to the role that intuitive processes (such as moral intuitions and moral emotions) have in judgements and behaviour related to corruption.

1.3 Broad methodological approach

It is also important to acknowledge that differentiating between intuitive and reflective/deliberative processes when it comes to judgments and behaviour is a complex task. The judgements and behaviours that we can observe are, more often than not, a product of both processes. Thus, disentangling them is challenging and has

been a task that psychologies have tackled by using techniques that directly allow for measuring neurological and physical responses linked to these two processes. For example, an approach taken by some psychologists has focused on studying the areas of the brain that are activated when making judgements through the use of fMRI machines (Greene et al., 2001). In studies conducted using this technique, higher activation of areas of the brain related to emotions and implicit memory processing is seen as evidence of the role of intuitive processes.

In the second part of this dissertation, I employ various tools to show that individuals think of corruption in moral terms and that moral intuitions play a role in the judgement and behaviour related to corruption. These methods are experiments, text analysis and focus groups. Although some of the methods I use do not allow for the disentangling of the role of reflective/deliberative and intuitive processes, they allow me to explore other aspects of my argument. For example, I use text analysis and focus groups to study the way in which people explain their judgements of corruption and find that evaluations of fairness play a key role in these judgements. In addition, both these techniques and the use of a vignette experiment allow me to show that different types of petty corruption are subject to different judgements based on whether they can be seen as morally right under other moral concerns (for example, helping family, preventing harm) or not.

Importantly, I propose a way of directly studying the role of intuitive processes based on emotional inducements. To do this, I borrowed techniques from psychology to induce moral emotion in a way that is unrelated to the judgement of corruption (Zheng et al., 2017). Because the emotions are induced separately from the decision-making task (related to corruption), I posit that any effect of these induced emotions is evidence of the causal role of intuitive processes. This approach was employed in two studies presented in Chapters 9 and 10 of this dissertation. Although I believe that my dissertation is methodologically innovative, I also acknowledge that my methods need further refining to be better able to capture the complex role of intuitive processes. I will discuss my methodological approach in more detail in Chapter 4.

1.4 The Chapters in brief

In addition to this Introduction and the Conclusion, my dissertation consists of two parts, with a total of nine chapters. Part I of my dissertation is focused on the theory. In Chapter 2, which serves as an introduction to Part 1, I reintroduce my argument, briefly explaining its main components; this is also where I first present the main theory diagram of my dissertation. Then, in Chapter 3, I present and explain in detail each of the components of my argument, borrowing from literature in philosophy, social and evolutionary psychology and the social sciences. Following this, in Chapter 4, I explain how these components relate to the study of corruption. Finally, in Chapter 5, I discuss how my argument interacts with previous approaches to the study of corruption. Chapter 6, the final part of Part I, briefly summarises all the points of my argument.

Part II of my dissertation is comprised of an introduction and three empirical chapters. In Chapter 7, which serves as the introduction to this part, I present my empirical approach and link it to the theoretical discussion in Part I.

Then, in Chapter 8, as an extension of my central argument, I explore whether strategies that simultaneously affect reflective/deliberative and intuitive processes but make accounting for large society easier can increase the punishment towards corruption. In this Chapter, my focus is not on directly disentangling the effect of both processes but rather on testing a strategy that combines both and can feasibly be implemented in real-world settings. I focus on whether concretising accusations of corruption in an electoral setting would lead to more punishment towards the accused candidate in comparison to when the accusation is presented in an abstract manner. I propose that more direct coverage of corruption in the media, especially coverage that prioritises showing the negative externalities of corruption, would lower the likelihood of candidates accused of corruption being elected because it would make it easier for voters to account for the large societal effects of corruption. This type of coverage would facilitate the extension of the condemnation of corruption in the abstract to concrete electoral decisions, where it can otherwise be

muted by high rates of corruption or by more salient candidate features.

To test this, in Study 1, I revise how corruption was covered by the media during election periods in Peru. Then, in Study 2, I employ a conjoint experiment that simulates an election between candidates with multiple attributes. One of these attributes was an accusation of corruption that was presented either in the abstract (just the amount of money involved) or concretised through equivalences. I used two types of concretisations: one based on social goods (amount plus the equivalent in public sector salaries) and one based on material goods (amount plus the equivalent in personal luxury items). My results show that this strategy works in increasing the punishment of corruption when the accused candidate possesses favourable characteristics that would normally be weighted against the accusation. But contrary to my initial expectations, the concretisation done through material goods had the strongest effect. In the Conclusion of this dissertation, I theorise that this may have been due to a stronger emotional activation.

In Chapters 9 and 10, I focus on studying whether intuitive processes (moral emotions) can have a causal role in the judgement and behaviour concerning corruption. In Chapter 9, I focus on studying the role of intuitive processes when corruption is presented as a moral dilemma. As I detail in Chapter 4, corruption is presented as a moral dilemma when multiple conflicting moral concerns are in place. To study this, I focus on the case of corruption as favouritisms (use of personal connections to access services), which I posit presents a dilemma between intuitions linked to large-scale fairness and intuitions linked to smaller-scale group loyalty and kinship.

Chapter 9 is comprised of two studies conducted in the UK. In Study 1, I used a vignette experiment that varied on whether the participant was presented with a scenario of bribery or favouritism, both centred around access to social housing. I found that even in a country with comparatively low corruption levels, people were still willing to engage in corruption but were more likely to engage in it when it was presented as favouritism. In this study, I also conducted a text analysis on an open-ended question asking participants why engagement in these practices should or

should not be considered corruption. The results show that participants employed words related to the moral domains of fairness, loyalty and harm to explain why something should or should not be considered a case of corruption.

In Study 2, I directly tested the role of intuitive processes by inducing emotions. I induced anger and guilt using an autobiographical recall technique and then asked participants to evaluate a scenario of favouritisms similar to the one used in Study 1. I expected to find that these induced emotions would lead to less engagement and harsher judgment, with the effect of guilt being conditional on generalised trust and social identity. My results show that induced emotions significantly affected reported behaviour and judgement concerning corruption, which provides evidence in favour of thinking of intuitive processes as causes and not simply as consequences of judgement. Despite this, some of my results went against my initial expectations — for example, the induced emotions led to a higher reported engagement in corruption. As I discuss in the Chapter, this may have been due to the current housing crisis in the UK, which may have highlighted the unfairness of the context versus the fairness of not using one's contacts to obtain preferential access.

Finally, in Chapter 10, I explore the role of intuitive processes when corruption is presented as a social dilemma. In this case, the condemnation linked to fairness faces competing concerns that are not moral but rather linked to self-interest. Chapter 10 is also comprised of two studies, this time conducted in Peru.

Study 1 is based on a series of focus groups where participants were encouraged to discuss their experiences with corruption. The study's objective was to explore whether the engagement in corruption in a country with comparatively high corruption is solely based on functional and material considerations or whether there are also moral considerations in place. The results show that, while corruption is extended due to its functional role, some instances of corruption are seen as more or less morally justifiable than others. In particular, people focus on the role of "necessity" linked to helping or preventing harm to loved ones to justify their engagement in corruption. But at the same time, participants recognised the unfairness and the

possible harm to distant others as a product of this engagement.

In Study 2, I focused on directly studying the role of intuitive processes. As in Chapter 9, I also induced emotions (anger and guilt) using an autobiographical recall technique to explore their effects when evaluating a corruption scenario. The scenario presented depicted a bribery situation where the participant had to decide whether to give money or not to a public servant to expedite a bureaucratic procedure (renewal of ID). Here, I expected both emotions to have similar effects, leading to less engagement and harsher judgement towards corruption; I also expected these effects to be more salient for participants who reported generalised trust and a broad social identity (linked to identifying with the country/nation). As before, my results show that induced emotions significantly affect judgement and behaviour, although some of these effects did not match my initial expectations. For example, I found that for participants who strongly identified with the "Country", the induced emotions had a significant positive effect on the likelihood of paying the bribe. I hypothesise that this may have something to do with the unfairness signalled in the situation since, in the vignette, it is implied that other people had paid the bribe.

In the final Chapter of this dissertation (the General Conclusion), I explain how these findings relate to my main questions, discuss some of their limitations, outline areas of future research, and present the general implications.

1.5 Final Remarks

Thus, my dissertation combines insights from multiple areas of research to build a complex argument that I have denoted as an Intuitionist Approach to corruption. Still, I recognize that this is but a first step in what I hope to turn into a broader research agenda. The studies presented here have some limitations that I hope to compensate for in future research but have important implications that expand beyond corruption studies (as I will discuss in my General Conclusion). Importantly,

because some of the empirical expectations of my argument do not conflict with those of previous approaches to corruption, I recognize that I need to explore ways of more clearly differentiating what is intuitive from what is not.

Even so, I consider this a good initial step towards a broader research agenda in which more aspects of the role of intuitive processes can be studied. I hope this dissertation will not only lead to a better understanding of key aspects of corruption in the realm of politics and to the opening of new venues of research but will also contribute to studies of moral psychology by exploring the role of intuition in complex social problems like corruption, moving away from the traditional approaches that have used only philosophical thought exercises. As Haidt and Kesebir (2010) pointed out, one of the bigger challenges in moral psychology at the moment is to determine "when, where, and how reason and sentiment interact".

Part I

Theory

Chapter 2

Introduction to the Theory

As mentioned in the Introduction, my theoretical argument highlights the role of intuitive processes in the judgement of corruption and behaviour towards it, paying special attention to how normal citizens interact with corruption. I specifically focus on the role of moral intuitions, which are hunches or feelings about whether a situation or action is good or bad. Because of this, my focus is both on moral judgements and the actions that people follow. Through this dissertation, I focus on emotions as a key component of these intuitive processes in my empirical tests, but I highlight that intuitive processes go beyond emotions, as I will outline in Chapter 4. This is an important part of my argument that I aim to build on in the future since intuitive processes can have a role even when no discernible emotions are at play.

For behaviour, I focus solely on petty corruption, while for judgment, I focus both on petty and grand corruption; this is because common citizens would have little opportunity to engage in grand corruption. Although non-bureaucratic elites do have the opportunity to engage in grand corruption, most common citizens only interact with the state when accessing state services or when facing street-level bureaucrats, which renders the opportunity for engagement in grand corruption extremely unlikely. Petty corruption can be defined as the "everyday abuse of entrusted power

by low- and mid-level public officials in their interaction with ordinary citizens, who often are trying to access basic goods or services in places like hospitals, schools, police departments and other agencies" (Transparency International 2009). As Prasad et al. (2019) posit in their review of corruption studies, petty corruption (also known as bureaucratic corruption) and grand corruption are fundamentally different. The latter "involves many fewer people and much larger amounts exchanged and can be corrosive to the legitimacy of the state [...] [Still] [B]ureaucratic corruption may be worse for economic development [...] as bureaucratic corruption [petty corruption] distorts decision-making, increases unpredictability, and undermines transparency through the economy". I focus on petty corruption scenarios in two of the empirical chapters of my dissertation because this is the type of corruption in which common citizens have a plausible chance of engaging. This already differentiates my approach from those that exclusively focus on grand corruption(Mcmillan and Zoido, 2004; Olken, 2006; Rose-Ackerman, 2016).

As mentioned, for my approach, I focus on a key set of intuitions, those denoted as moral intuitions, which are the "Automatic hunches or feelings about where a situation/behaviour falls along a “good-bad dimension" (Haidt, 2008, p.188). I consider these intuitions to be particularly important for judgement and behaviour in relation to corruption because, as other studies have shown, corruption is perceived to be not only a material and social issue but also a moral one. Fundamentally, my approach to corruption focuses on descriptive morality, which is concerned with how people actually judge actions or situations in a right-wrong spectrum and not prescriptive morality. I posit that citizens sometimes engage in corruption not merely because of self-interest or because they find it socially justifiable but also because they perceive engagement as "good" from a moral standpoint. I discuss in more detail the role of morality in corruption in Chapter 4.

My argument proposes that some moral concerns are common to all societies, which helps explain why corruption presented in the abstract is widely condemned, but how these concerns manifest and towards whom varies based on different factors, among which an important one is the social scale (or groups) individuals consider

for their judgements and behaviours. I focus mainly on intuitions linked to two moral domains: fairness and in-group loyalty. Although I recognise that other intuitions linked to domains like harm or authority can also have a role, I chose to focus on those related to fairness and in-group because they have a clear link to how we evaluate corruption. Since corruption always involves favouritism (be it through personal connections or economic exchanges), it is intrinsically linked both to fairness, since favouritism is an unfair behaviour, but also to in-group, since some instances of favouritism necessitate strong personal connections and thus an in-group bias. Additionally, although moral intuitions can also be "hunches" where there is no discernible emotion involved, for my dissertation, I focus on the "feeling" component of intuitions by highlighting the role of moral emotions as key components of these intuitions and as intuitions themselves (since sometimes the automatic "feelings" is what guides judgement).

In brief, I propose that intuitive processes have a role in judgement and behaviour in relation to corruption, and accounting for this role is important to better understand corruption at the individual level, especially when looking at how citizens (as opposed to public officials) behave in relation to corruption. For instance, I posit that people can simultaneously sincerely condemn corruption when presented in the abstract and engage in it and tolerate it in concrete settings in part due to intuitive processes' role in abstract and concrete judgements and behaviour. Furthermore, I propose that the condemnation of corruption that we see in the abstract does not disappear in concrete settings but may be overrun or fade in favour of other concerns [1], and as such, it can be made salient again, which has important policy implications that I will discuss in the Conclusion.

While I propose that these intuitions play a key role in the judgement of corrup-

[1]This fading or overrun can take multiple forms, and in this dissertation, I am starting from that assumption that it fades in relation to other contextual factors that are more salient, thus proposing than in some concrete situations people focus more on this factors than in the ethical dimension. But fading can also take the form of habituation or normalization; I will discuss this more in the Conclusion.

tion and behaviour towards it, I also recognize that deliberative/reflective processes linked to more effortful conscious reasoning still play an important role. Therefore, my argument does not contradict but rather complements previous approaches to corruption. Still, acknowledging that intuitive processes play an important role in how we judge and behave towards corruption sets my argument apart from the previous standard in corruption studies, characterised by a dispassionate approach to human behaviour, seeing the phenomena of corruption as explainable solely based on the conscious choices of rational individuals (Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Klitgaard, 1988, 1998). In 1998, Kiltgaard wrote that "corruption is a crime of calculation, not passion" (Klitgaard, 1988, p.4), conceptualizing corruption as a choice consciously made by individuals that consider the risks and benefits of engaging in corruption. Although there has been a turn towards sentiment in the social sciences (Dukes et al., 2021), this turn has yet to heavily influence studies of corruption, as I discuss in Chapter 3.

I posit that when it comes to individual-level judgement and behaviour towards corruption, we can not discount "passion", and in particular, we can not discount the role of intuitive processes. Thus, I argue that there is an intuitive component to judgements and behaviours related to corruption that should be accounted for. In line with this, I argue that the condemnation of corruption in the abstract partly responds to moral intuitions innate to humans, specifically those linked to fairness. When asked about corruption in the abstract, people condemn it as wrong partly due to moral intuitions of fairness that contribute to judging it as "wrong". This intuitive condemnation may fade or be overrun in favour of other concerns in concrete settings because other moral dimensions (such as protecting or favouring one's family or group) may be more salient or because the moral dimension fades or is overrun by concerns linked to self-interest. However, I propose that the condemnation we see in the abstract can still be triggered and reinforced in concrete situations because it does not disappear. The agenda I am pursuing through this dissertation is an attempt to bring "passion" (or intuitive processes for which emotions are key) back into the study of corruption. I am denoting my argument as an Intuitionist Approach, even though I recognize the role of reflective/deliberative processes because

I seek to highlight the often ignored role of these intuitive processes.

My Intuitionist Approach to corruption relies heavily on various disciplines outside political science. Particularly on the insights from recent work in moral psychology, such as Jonathan Haidt's Social Intuitionist approach (Haidt and Joseph, 2004; Haidt, 2008, 2012), Joshua Greene's Dual-Process Theory (Green et al., 2001; Greene et al., 2018) and Oliver Scott Curry's Morality as Cooperation (Curry, 2016; Curry et al., 2019a). But it also incorporates recent work from disciplines such as neuro-philosophy (Churchland, 2019) and evolutionary studies (Henrich, 2015). In accordance with these previous works, my argument also posits that intuitive processes, such as moral intuitions, are the result of a process of evolution that accounts for the role of society-level interactions in the life of individuals (Boyer and Petersen, 2018, p.84). This process has been referred to as gene-culture coevolution (Henrich and Muthukrishna, 2021; Chudek and Henrich, 2011a), where cumulative cultural evolution shaped the environment for genetic evolution. Moral intuitions, as well as other social intuitions, were developed to facilitate cooperation and were progressively ingrained in humans through a process of group selection, where groups that were more apt in cooperative behaviour outlasted groups that were not (Chudek and Henrich, 2011a). As I will further discuss in Chapter 4, the ingrained character of these intuitions is still compatible with both individual-level and society-level variation on judgements and behaviours due to the effect that social norms and formal rules have in amplifying or constraining moral intuitions (Henrich, 2015).

Because my argument seeks to acknowledge the role of intuitive processes but not at the complete detriment of reflective/deliberative processes, it aligns better with a broader view of moral cognition. We can understand moral judgement as a "kind of cognition" (Haidt and Kesebir, 2010) that has as its domain the evaluation of individual's actions (Bzdok et al., 2012, p.789) and situations in the continuum of right and wrong. One part of it is intuitive, based on flashes of "right" and "wrong", for which emotions are a key component. The other part of moral cognition is moral reasoning, which can be defined as a "conscious mental activity that consists of transforming given information about people (and situations) in order to reach a

moral judgement" (Haidt, 2001, p.818) and on evaluating "moral judgment for its (in)consistency with other moral commitments" (Paxton and Greene, 2010). In contrast to moral intuition, moral reasoning is an effortful and intentional process that can be controlled (Bargh, 1994). I do not deny the role that moral reasoning and other deliberative/reflective processes, such as cost/benefit analysis, play in judgement and behaviour towards corruption. Instead, I aim to show that intuitive processes also play an essential part. Furthermore, my argument does not discount the role of other factors in judgement and behaviour regarding corruption. As I will discuss in detail in this chapter, my argument recognizes the role of social and formal norms in regulating judgements and behaviours in a way that does not contradict the empirical expectation of theories like Collective Action and Principal-Agent. Nevertheless, due to my focus on the role of intuitive processes, I highlight these norms' role in constraining or amplifying certain intuitions. Furthermore, I recognize that in some instances, reflective/deliberative processes may even take precedence over intuitive ones, but we still should not ignore the role of these intuitive processes.

Broadly, my argument can be summarised as follows:

Figure 2.1: Argument



As seen in Figure 2.1, my argument is complex and incorporates multiple moving

parts. The key components of my argument are as follows: (1) both intuitive and reflective/deliberative processes have a role in judgement and behaviour in relation to corruption; (2) intuitive processes can have a separate and independent role from reflective/deliberative processes and thus are worth studying in depth; (3) among these intuitive processes, moral intuitions are important for understanding judgement and behaviour in relation to corruption; (4) among moral intuitions, those linked to fairness are especially important; (5) a key component of moral intuition are moral emotions; (6) both intuitive and reflective/deliberative processes can produce judgements and behaviours that correspond to narrower or broader social scales; and (7) social and formal norms can amplify or constrain these judgments and behaviours.

Therefore, what I aim to do through this dissertation is to establish that intuitive processes can and do play a role in the judgement of and engagement in corruption. This can help explain certain features of individual-level judgements and behaviours concerning corruption. I believe that my argument proposes a novel way of understanding judgement and behaviour concerning corruption and provides a new way of explaining why people simultaneously engage in and condemn corruption without assuming that people lie in their condemnation (Batson et al., 1999; Batson, 2011; Valdesolo and DeSteno, 2007), or only condemn it only when they have nothing to gain from it. An approach to corruption based solely on reflective/deliberative processes would view the condemnation of corruption in the abstract either as performative or as conditional on the lack of material costs, while in concrete situations, the material benefits of engaging in corruption would be the primary driver of behaviour. In contrast, my argument views this condemnation of corruption as sincere, innate and able to be activated even in concrete situations through mechanisms that directly affect intuitive processes.

I argue that in concrete situations, the intuitions that contribute to the condemnation of corruption in the abstract may fade or be overrun (Tenbrunsel and Messick, 2004) in favour of other concerns (moral or material) that are more salient. Still, because the condemnation in the abstract partly corresponds to innate intuition,

it can be activated even in concrete settings. Additionally, I posit that instances of corruption where the competing concerns that drive engagement are not moral are judged as morally wrong even by those who engage in them. This distinguishes my argument from those that propose that condemnation and engagement coexist due to "moral disengagement", where people see their engagement in corruption as necessary but judge others' engagement as immoral (Marquette, 2012).

Furthermore, my argument allows for a re-conceptualization of the role of social norms and formal rules in corruption behaviour to explain individual and country-level variations regarding engagement in corruption. In accordance with the work of evolutionary psychologists, especially that of Joseph Henrich, my argument also posits that social and formal norms can expand the social scale to which moral intuitions, such as those linked to the domain of fairness, are readily appliable (Henrich et al., 2010, 2001) and are on more equal footing to intuitions related to in-group loyalty which can be drivers for corruption engagement and tolerance. This is because social and formal norms can contribute to individuals considering distant others as part of their same group, giving them a broader reference group in addition to their narrow immediate in-group. When this is the case, intuitive concerns about fairness would be more likely applied to situations or actions that affect distant others. As a proxy for these social norms and formal rules and as a way of observing individual-level variation, I focus on two factors that are the result are the result of norms and rules designed to sustain large-scale societies: broad social identity (linked to, for example, the nation or country) and generalised trust (or trust in distant others). I posit that these factors add broader society as a reference group for individual judgement and thus make fairness intuitions in relation to this broader society stand on more equal footing with intuitions applicable for narrower groups (such as those related to ingroup loyalty).

In this part of my dissertation, I explain in more detail each of the multiple components of my argument and how it relates to previous literature. In this Chapter, I have presented my argument in more detail but without delving deep into the basis of each of its components. In Chapter 2, I discuss my argument related to

previous studies of corruption, structuring the discussion between those who disregard intuitive processes and those who account for them in incomplete ways. Then, in Chapter 3, I detail each of the building blocks of my argument, which borrows insights from social and evolutionary psychology. I begin by explaining the philosophical base for intuitionist approaches. Then, I proceed to develop in more detail each of the components of my argument: (1) the importance of accounting for intuitive processes in addition to deliberative/reflective ones; (2) the importance of moral intuitions and the views regarding these intuitions (3) the role of emotions as key components of intuitions; (4) the role of formal and social norms in constraining or amplifying these intuitions. Finally, in Chapter 4, I take these building blocks and explain how they apply to the study of corruption. In this Chapter, I also explain how corruption can be presented as two types of dilemmas: a social dilemma with a trade-off between moral obligations towards large society and self-interest and a moral dilemma with a trade-off between competing moral obligations. In Part 2, I present how my empirical approach relates to my argument and present three empirical studies that aim to elucidate the role of intuitive processes in judgement and behaviour concerning corruption.

Chapter 3

The Theory Building Blocks

Having broadly presented my argument, in this chapter, I will develop in detail each of the building blocks of my argument, deconstructing the Theory diagram (Figure 2.1.) into its main components. This ties into Chapter 4, where I will explain in more detail how my theoretical approach ties to the study of corruption. This chapter is organized as follows: First, I will explain how my approach ties to the philosophy studies or morality and intuitionism; then, I will explain how insights into moral psychology give us a better understanding of the role of intuitive process; after this, I will develop the role of moral intuitions; after that, I will explain the role of emotions both as components of intuitions and intuitions themselves; and finally, I will explain how social and formal norms affect the way in which moral intuitions manifest.

3.1 Ethical Intuitionism and philosophy's approach to intuitions

Part of the basis for my Intuitionist Approach can be found in philosophy, particularly in the study of intuitions and, more specifically, of moral intuitions. Both

philosophy and psychology recognise that although fallible and subject to things like framings, intuitions play an essential part in decision-making. In both cases, intuitions are recognized as appearing as a "sense" or "feeling" (Railton, 2014), which highlights the key role that emotions play in intuitive processes. But even without discerning emotion, intuitions are characterised by the following:

> "a spontaneous sense that (i) some thought, action, state of affairs, individual, or object is right or wrong, good or bad, appropriate or inappropriate, familiar or alien, credible or dubious, promising or hopeless, reasonable or excessive, true or false, and so on [...]" (Railton, 2014)

Under this view, the initial "sense" emerges before conscious reasoning is engaged and motivates judgment in a way that is hard to overcome. In other words, the initial "sense" of a person, object or situation may guide judgment even when evidence that contradicts this "sense" emerges. This view of intuitions also aligns with what is understood as intuitions in psychology, especially regarding an "affective primacy" (Zajonc, 1980), which in recent studies in psychology has led to recognizing the role of automatic and fast judgements and to see them as the primary drivers of judgements and behaviours (Haidt, 2007) [1]. As seen in the previous definition, these "senses" can refer to multiple types of judgements (moral, social, etc.), and I will discuss this more in the next section. However, for the purpose of my dissertation, I am focusing on a sub-group of intuitions denoted as moral intuitions that refer to the sense that something or someone is "right or wrong". I focus on this sub-set of intuitions because I consider them vital for evaluating corruption and behaviours relating to it. This is because corruption can be seen as an inherently moral issue since it implies putting private interest over public one (Kreikebaum, 2008; Warburton, 1998). Thus, I focus on moral intuitions to highlight the role of

[1] As mentioned, and as I will further explain in the next section of this chapter, although I also recognize the importance of intuitions I do not see them as exclusively the primary drivers of behaviours, but rather see them as acting both independently and complementarity of reflective/deliberative processes

intuitive processes in judgement and behaviour in relation to corruption and propose an approach that combines insights from moral psychology and evolutionary psychology to explain this role.

But, before going into this, I consider it essential to explain how my approach dialogues with studies in moral philosophy. Although in some studies of moral psychology, it is assumed that intuitive judgements correspond to deontological judgements (Greene et al., 2001), it is essential to clarify that while this relation may exists(Everett et al., 2016), deontological judgements, as understood in certain areas of philosophy, would be a product of reflection and deliberation. Establishing this difference in views is essential because some studies of moral intuition in psychology use terms such as deontological and utilitarian judgement regarding intuitions and reflection/deliberation (Greene et al., 2001) without properly clarifying whether they are talking about intuitive ethics or about intuitive judgements that are closer to the "principles" established by the deontology or utilitarianism. One of the aims of this section is to clarify this distinction to prevent confusion later on.

Furthermore, it is also important to clarify that how I use moral intuitions to explain judgements and behaviour corresponds better to what has been called descriptive ethics or comparative ethics. In other words, I am trying to understand how people think of corruption in a moral sense, when they perceive an act of corruption to be "wrong", and when they perceive it to be "right", and how they act concerning these beliefs. Descriptive ethics stands opposed to prescriptive or normative ethics, which aims to establish how people should act in a given situation. In other words, I am not trying to determine what people "should" consider to be the right/wrong behaviour in relation to corruption or to classify all acts of corruption as morally wrong; rather, I am trying to see what leads acts of corruption to be seen as right or wrong. Descriptive ethics is also the field where the current intuitionist work in moral psychology can be situated. Thus, I adopt a thick conception of morality for my argument, consistent with how it has been studied in the social sciences (Durkheim, 1925).

3.1.1 Ethical Intuitionism

In moral philosophy, the role of intuitions was highlighted by those who subscribed to variations of ethical intuitionism. One of the bases for intuitionism is the work of early 20th-century philosophers such as Moore (1912) and Sidgwick (1907). This earlier version of Ethical Intuitionism can be thought of both as part of metaethical and as normative, with this second component being more prominent. In metaethics, the questions are not evaluative (is it wrong or right to do something?); they are about the "nature of values and evaluative statements" (Huemer, 2005, p.2), and because Ethical Intuitionism argued that this nature was intuitive, it can be considered a metaethical approach. Still, much of the early accounts of Ethical Intuitionism focused more on the normative aspect, trying to establish the principles that were intuitively self-evident.

The core claim of Ethical Intuitionism is that: "Normal ethical agents can and do have non-inferentially justified first-order ethical beliefs" (Cowan, 2015). According to Moore (1912), "good" is self-evident, and we perceive it via our intuitions. For Moore, intuitions were a key component of moral cognition, and he considered that moral judgments were partly based on immediate non-inferential intuitions. In other words, for ethical intuitionists, basic moral propositions are seen as self-evident, meaning they can be known without argument. It's important to clarify here that this does not mean that argumentation has no role. As Kirchin (2005) proposes in response to this criticism towards ethical intuitionists, "for those claims that one can know self-evidently, it is perfectly possible to justify them in other ways [...]". Ethical intuitionism is both realist and cognitivist. This means mainly two things: that what is "good" or moral is seen as something that can be perceived in the real world (Moore, 1912), and that moral statements express falsifiable beliefs. Intuitionism is a realist theory because it posits that "goodness" is objective, while anti-realism theorists (such as subjectivism, non-cognitivism, and nihilism) assert that it is subjective. Still, "goodness" or "rightness" being objective does not necessarily mean that there is only one "good". Since realism and pluralism are compatible, there can be multiple "goods", and these "goods" can enter into

conflict while still maintaining their quality as "goods". A way of illustrating this when thinking about corruption is the case of moral dilemmas [2], in which two or more moral "goods" enter into conflict. For example, would it be right or good for someone to pay a bribe to get medical help for a loved one? Both paying the bribe (helping and preventing harm to a loved one) and not paying the bribe (upholding the general rules of fairness and not seeking preferential access) can be considered as "right/good". Both can be equally valid from a moral standpoint, which is possible under moral pluralism and realism. Importantly, this is not the same as ethical subjectivism, which posits that there are no objective moral truths and that what is seen as morally right or wrong varies by person. In contrast to this, a realist and pluralist theory (such as intuitionism) would say that the principles of helping a loved one and upholding general fairness are both objectively "right/good"; their valuation as "good" does not depend on opinions or attitudes. Rather, it's the imperfect solution to the dilemma that can vary since individuals can uphold one principle over the other in a given situation.

3.1.2 Ethical Intuitionism, Deontology and Consequentialism

As mentioned before, the earliest versions of Ethical Intuitionism are normative or prescriptive, and this puts these views close to two distinct views of morality that have greatly impacted the study of moral behaviour: Deontology and Consequentialism. Deontology is a prescriptive or normative theory of morality that examines the action against principles and rules that should be followed (Darwall, 2003); and Consequentialism is a competing prescriptive theory that argues for producing the best consequences regardless of the means (Darwall, 2003; Pettit, 1994).

In the version of Ethical Intuitionism closer to deontology, we have W.D. Ross, who believed that principles of *Prima Facie duties*, those moral duties that are seen

[2] I will explain how corruption can be presented as a moral dilemma in more detail in Chapter 4

as binding unless they enter in conflict with each other, were intuitively self-evident. For Ross, morality was pluralistic, with many *Prima Facie duties* that could enter into conflict with each other. Later in his work, Ross developed the concept of *Actual Duty*, which referred to the specific moral obligation taking all factors into account and, for Ross, determining this *Actual Duty* required deliberation. This move towards determining *Actual Duties* placed Ross closer to deontological approaches. However, although Ross's view of morality aligns with pluralistic deontology, his approach still differs from the traditional Kantian one. As we know, Kantian deontology is based on the Categorical Imperative, according to which individuals ought to treat others as ends in themselves and not just as means. Kantian deontology is universalistic, and moral principles are based on rationality and applicable to all rational humans. For Kant, moral principles were much more rigid. For example, one of these Kantian moral principles is truthfulness, and under this view, lying would go against the categorical imperative because it involves treating others as means by utilizing their trust to deceive them. Thus, in Kant's view, lying would never be permitted, even when it helps or protects someone else, as he argued in his 1797 essay "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Love of Humanity". Ross's earlier view of a pluralistic morality evolved to an agenda more focused on determining the *Actual Duties* put him closer to Kantian deontology.

On the other hand, in a view closer to consequentialism, we have Sidgwick (1907), who, as an intuitionist, proposed a form of consequentialist-denoted Hedonic Utilitarianism. In the Hedonic Utilitarianism proposed by Sidgwick (1907), the principle determining an action's morality is maximising pleasure/happiness and minimising pain/suffering. This focus on feelings makes this principle rest in part in a set of sef-evident intuitions. However, because Hedonic Utilitarianism, as all consequentialist theories do, also posits that this maximization of pleasure has to be done at the level of the collective rather than the individual, it rests strongly on moral reasoning. For this theory, actions are evaluated as morally wrong or right based on their impact on the collective, and this evaluation is driven by reason. As such, Hedonic Utilitarianism faces some of the same challenges as general consequentialism. In particular, since it argues for the maximization of the pleasure/happiness of the

collective, there must be a method to measure and compare this pleasure/happiness, and it should be feasible to do so for all moral actions.

All in all, Ethical Intuitionism is compatible with some versions of deontology and consequentialism, at least when focusing on the normative character of these three theories. The distinction arises when we talk about the metaethical charterer of these theories since intuitionism posits that moral judgement and moral knowledge are based on self-evident intuitions, while for both deontology and consequentialism, moral reasoning is the main driving force. I believe this, the difference between the metaethics and the normative character of intuitions, is what has led to some confusion on the use of these terms in moral psychology, as I will briefly discuss in the next section while presenting Greene et al. (2001) approach to intuitionism. But in general terms, I consider explaining the use of the term deontological to be particularly significant since it is used in its metaethical sense in moral psychology without clarifying that this use is distinct from the prescriptive/normative sense, which can lead to confusion. Thus, as I have explained, although deontological refers to the inherent rightness or wrongness of an action based on principles, for Kantian moral philosophy, these principles are determined by reason, while for intuitionist moral psychology, they are self-evident evolved responses.

Finally, it's important to mention that the normative character of Ethical Intuitionism is what has put some of its features in conflict with the study of intuitions from a psychological perspective, even when accounting for the different uses of terms like deontology. In particular, in the realm of ethical studies, there are many critiques based on the reliability of intuitions, with some contemporary experimental ethicists arguing that for moral intuitions to be considered as such, they should be immune to things like framing effects (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2006; Andow, 2018). But as Bedke (2010) argues, even if intuitions are fallible, they are still important for moral judgment. This is in line with the work of contemporary ethical intuitionists such as Huemer (2005, 2008), that argue in favour of acknowledging the unreliability of intuitions and instead study which ones are more likely to be or not reliable. But even in these more contemporary approaches from ethical studies, the

approach to morality continues to be normative, and that's an important distinction to make in relation to studies of moral psychology and social sciences more generally. In both moral psychology and social science, the approach to morality is descriptive, and although the view of intuitionism shares many characteristics with Ethical Intuitionism (such as the self-evident character of intuitions), the normative-descriptive distinction is key for how these intuitions are studied. As mentioned, in my approach, I am adopting a descriptive view of morality since I am not aiming to establish principles of how people ought to behave and what behaviours should be considered morally right but rather to study why people consider some behaviours as right or wrong and how this guides their own behaviour.

3.2 Intuitions in Psychology

Having discussed the understanding of intuition under Ethical Intuitionism and explained how this differs from the understanding of intuition for moral psychology, I will discuss intuitionism in psychology, which is the main basis for my approach. As outlined, my argument posits that intuitive processes, particularly moral intuitions, play a key role in the judgement of corruption and behaviour towards it. My argument also acknowledges that these intuitive processes can act in conjunction with deliberative/reflective ones and that there are multiple moral intuitions related to different moral domains[3].

First, it's important to clarify that although I focus on moral intuitions due to assuming them to be key for judgment and behaviour concerning corruption, other intuitions can play a role in judgements and behaviours more broadly. The idea that there is not something that can be unitarily viewed as "intuition" but rather

[3]Furthermore, as I will explain in a later section of this chapter, my argument proposes that there is a difference in how intuitions manifest when evaluating abstract scenarios and concrete situations and that this difference can be partially explained by factors related to social norms and formal rules that may constrain or amplify certain intuitions.

that there are multiple intuitions that can be organized based on domains emerged early on in studies of intuitive mechanisms (Wild, 1938). According to this view, intuitive processes have a degree of specialization, with some intuitions being developed for specific domains (like morality). Furthermore, the overlap between these different types of "intuition domains" is both explicitly and implicitly recognised in psychology literature (Gore and Sadler-Smith, 2011).

Figure 3.1: Argument: Multiple types of intuitions



Although there is no consensus on the number and classification of a group of intuitions (Wild, 1938; Gore and Sadler-Smith, 2011), researchers like Gore and Sadler-Smith (2011) differentiate between general and domain-specific intuitions, with the first ones referring to the intuitive processes as a whole and the later once referring to "specialized" intuitive processes that respond to particular demands. Gore and Sadler-Smith (2011) argue that among the domain-specific processes, we can find, in addition to moral intuitions, the following: social intuitions (automatic evaluations of other people's states, be it affective or cognitive, i.e. what do people think other people are feeling or thinking), problem-solving intuitions (that relay on

unconscious pattern recognition), and creative intuitions (that involves the "feeling of knowing" and refers to the generation of new ideas). However, other studies have included different types of intuitions in their non-unitary classifications, such as aesthetic or religious intuitions (Wild, 1938). That's why in Figure 4.1. the space for different types of intuitions is left open. It is important to clarify that while some views see moral and social intuitions as separate, others consider moral intuitions to be a subset of social intuitions (as is signalled in Figure 3.1.); I will explain this in more detail in the next section. Furthermore, it is clear that there is some overlap among social intuitions about the cognitive state of another person and moral intuitions since the former also serves to asses "rightness"; for example, if we "feel" or "sense" that a person is behaving in a purely selfish manner, this can also correspond with a "sense" that their behaviour is morally wrong.

Differentiating between these types of intuitions is outside the scope of this dissertation, which instead aims to show that intuitive processes do play a role in judgement and behaviour concerning corruption, and this helps explain the coexistence of condemnation and engagement in corruption. As said before, because I consider corruption to be a moral issue subject to moral judgment, I have chosen to focus on the subset of intuitions denoted as moral intuitions. These intuitions can be defined as "the appearance in consciousness of moral judgments or assessments without any awareness of having gone through a conscious reasoning process that produces this assessment" (Woodward and Allman, 2007). They are thus "an automatic, rapid, affect-based judgement [...]" (Gore and Sadler-Smith, 2011) about the "rightness" or "wrongness" of an act or situation. My focus on these intuitions does not mean that I believe other types of intuitions can not play a role in the decision-making process concerning corruption. Instead, I chose to focus on these intuitions because I consider them especially important due to the type of issue corruption is.

Furthermore, as we see in Figure 3.1, and as I will develop further when discussing the role of intuitions in moral decision-making, the focus on intuitions does not disregard the role of reflective/deliberative processes. As I have explained before, my argument acknowledges that reflective/deliberative processes also play a

role in judgement and behaviour in relation to corruption but focuses on intuitive processes because these have been previously neglected. In this sense, my argument aligns with the dual process theories in psychology (Kahneman, 2011; Hogarth, 2001; Chaiken and Trope, 1999; Epstein, 1994) which distinguish between judgements made through analytic conscious processes (sometimes called System 2) and those made automatically based on intuitions (sometimes called System 1). In this next section, I will detail how this relates to the study of the role of moral intuitions, going into the moral psychology literature.

3.3 Moral Intuitions

Because I consider that judgement in relation to corruption is inherently a moral judgement (Kreikebaum, 2008; Warburton, 1998) about how wrong or right an action is, I have chosen to focus on moral intuitions to delve into the role of intuitive processes in corruption judgement and behaviour. These moral intuitions, as seen in Figure 4.1., can be considered a sub-category of intuitions. In this section, I will outline how my argument interacts with the literature on moral judgment and moral intuitions.

3.3.1 Moral Judgements

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, studies on moral intuitions, both from psychology and evolutionary perspective, focus on descriptive morality as opposed to normative morality. To recapitulate, descriptive morality is concerned with what people understand as "right" or "wrong"; it does an empirical inquiry into these understandings and what shapes them. Moral psychology has been particularly concerned with moral judgements, the evaluation of an act or situation as right or wrong (Bloom, 2014), since they are a way of reaching clear information about morality in a descriptive sense without ascribing a normative quality to these

judgements.

Importantly, moral judgements are different from other types of social judgements. Multiple studies have argued that there is a difference between what is perceived as a moral transgression and what is perceived as a social transgression. Moral transgressions are defined based on how they affect the rights and welfare of others (Blair et al., 2006), while conventional social transgressions are violations of behaviour uniformities or rules that structure social interaction. Conventional transgressions are more likely to be judged as permissible or rule contingent (Nucci, 1981; Smetana, 1981; Turiel, 1983). In contrast, moral judgements are held under stronger convictions than non-moral judgements (Skitka et al., 2015) and are less likely to be compromised on (Tetlock, 2000), except for compromises made in favour of other moral obligations[4]. Moral judgements are also more motivating and legitimising of behaviour (Skitka and Wisneski, 2011) and more socially unifying (Graham and Haidt, 2010; Haidt, 2012). Although moral and social judgements can overlap since what is seen as acceptable is also often seen as "right", social judgements and social norms are more fluid and changeable than moral norms (Churchland, 2019), and a social norm that has no basis on a moral one is less likely to survive in time[5].

Recent studies of moral judgements are characterised by accounting not only for reflective/deliberative processes but also for intuitive ones, highlighting the importance of moral intuitions. This emerged as a critique of developmental moral psychology (Kohlberg, 1968; Piaget and Gabian, 1977), which dominated for a long time under the Kohlberg (1968, 1981) and Piaget (1963) developmental paradigm, according to which the key to moral judgement was deliberative reasoning shaped by experience and values. Piaget (1932) argued that our understanding of morality is developed in childhood, as kids play with each other and self-construct notions of morality. Piaget's initial argument was further developed by Kohlberg (1968),

[4]I will explain this in more detail when discussing moral dilemmas in Chapter 4

[5]Churchland (2019) for example discuss how social norms regulating things like fashion or manners are more fluid than those regulating aspects of human interaction that have a moral basis.

who created a scoring technique for morality and argued that when kids had multiple opportunities for role-taking (looking at a problem or situation from another's perspective), they became more morally advanced. For them, the first draft of the moral mind consisted only of empathy, mostly based on developing a sense of justice through an effortful process. Until quite recently, the Kohlberg-Piaget paradigm completely dominated studies of moral judgement, and what we now know as moral cognition (which includes both intuitive and reflective/deliberative processes) was known only as moral reasoning[6] and was considered by most psychologists to be a process that was not only effortful but also controllable (Colby et al., 1983; Turiel, 1983).

But towards the end of the 20th century, we began to see a turn towards models and theories that emphasised the role of automatic and non-effortful processes (among which emotions got special attention) (Greene and Haidt, 2002; Moll et al., 2003; Nichols, 2002)[7]. In contrast to developmental approaches to morality, intuitive approaches argue that moral judgements are often rapid (Haidt, 2001; Green et al., 2001; Greene et al., 2001) and automatic. Thus, moral intuition can be defined as "the sudden appearance in consciousness, or at the fringe of consciousness, of an evaluative feeling (like-dislike; good-bad) about the character or actions of a person without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion" (Haidt, 2008, p.188)[8]. As has been seen in stud-

[6]Moral reasoning can be defined as the "conscious mental activity through which one evaluates a moral judgment for its (in)consistency with other moral commitments" (Paxton and Greene, 2010)

[7]In response to the rise of Intuitionist Approaches, some developmental psychologist responded by arguing that even if moral judgements are made intuitively by adults, the moral knowledge at the base of these intuitions might have been acquired by a deliberative process in childhood, similar to maths knowledge that is acquired and then applied fast and effortlessly (Killen, 2007; Turiel, 2006). Although studies that focus on the emotional reaction of young children towards moral violations reduce the weight of this critique by showing that there seems to be an intuitive and innate moral sense.

[8]There is still debate on whether intuitions and heuristics are the same or two separate processes. However, they can be seen as different if we consider intuitions as non-inferential processes and heuristics as cognitive shortcuts based on previous knowledge (lia, 2016). Still, further work needs

ies of implicit association (Greenwald et al., 2003), they are the initial knee-jerk reactions we first experience when facing a situation with a moral component, and they can greatly influence our judgements and behaviours. In the abstract, many of our knee-jerk reactions seem to follow a series of norms corresponding to different solutions to evolutionary challenges (we get mad at perceived unfairness, avoid causing harm, etc.). But a key idea of the approach to intuitive processes that I am taking in this dissertation is that there are always exceptions to these norms when situated in the complex real world, either because intuitions related to different moral domains conflict with each other or because the noise of the social world may reduce the salience of some of these intuitions.

Related to the previous points, and before delving into the origin of moral intuitions and their role in moral judgement, it is important to clarify that although some views see moral and social intuitions as separate (see Figure 4.1. for example), this is highly dependent on what is considered social intuitions. For Gore and Sadler-Smith (2011), social intuitions are the "sense" we get of other's feelings or thoughts, while a slightly broader view would see them as the automatic processes linked to understanding and reacting to the social world (which is mainly based on the reaction to other's behaviour). In this slightly broader view, moral intuitions are a sub-set of social intuitions. This broader view is the one I subscribe to in this dissertation, but it makes little difference since the role of moral intuitions is the same in both.

3.3.2 The Origins of Moral Intuitions

The origin of moral intuitions is best understood through their evolutionary function [9]. Moral intuitions (and social intuitions more broadly) emerged as mechanisms that

to be done to either differentiate intuitions from heuristics or integrate both frameworks.

[9]Recent approaches to Ethical Intuitionism, such as Huemer (2005) also recognise the role of evolution in shaping moral intuitions.

allowed for cooperation and the preservation of society. In other words, they emerged in response to early evolutionary challenges, but this does not mean that the full array of how these intuitions manifest is determined ex-ante. The argument that I present in this dissertation is consistent with intuitive perspectives that argue for the innateness of intuitions but also acknowledge the role of social constraints in shaping how these institutions manifest. This view is known as the Interactionist Perspective because it tries to conciliate the opposing proposals of Moral Nativism, which argues that all aspects of moral intuitions are determined by evolution (Mikhail, 2020), and the Empiricist Perspective, which sees all moral intuitions as determined by cultural learning and upbringing. In contrast to these opposed extreme views, Interactionist arguments, such as the one proposed by Social Intuitionism (which I will discuss in depth in the following subsection), propose that moral intuitions are "the product of the incremental influences of many genes interacting in complex ways with their environments" (Smith et al., 2017) and argue that although there is an innate basis, how this intuitions manifest will depend on the social environment.

This view is consistent with the emerging studies of gene-culture coevolution that acknowledge the role of culture and society in humans' evolutionary process. Gene-culture evolution studies argue that at one point, cultural (social) evolution became vital for our survival, especially because humans have many biological requirements that can only be fulfilled in social settings[10]. The importance of living in social groups increased the importance of coordination for individual fitness (since individuals in groups that were more cohesive and showed more pro-social behaviour were more likely to survive). This, in turn, led to the emergence of prosocial psychology that was reinforced by social strategies that were culturally transmitted (such as punishment and reputation) (Chudek and Henrich, 2011b). As Gintis (2011) proposes, this "coevolution is responsible for the salience of such other-regarding values as a taste for cooperation, fairness and retribution, the capacity to empathize, and

[10]Examples of this costly development are the long infancy period, the high caloric demand of our brains, etc. Both Henrich (2015) and Churchland (2019) offer a nice presentation of how this process of physical and genetic evolution became entrenched with the process of social/cultural evolution.

the ability to value such character virtues as honesty, hard work, piety and loyalty". This "taste" is what moral psychology refers to as moral intuitions.

Figure 3.2: Argument: Moral Intuitions and social context



As shown in Figure 3.2. in this Interactionist Perspective, the role of social and formal norms differs in the two moments (the emergence of intuitions and the manifestation of intuitions now). In time zero, the cooperation challenges emerged due to the need to live in larger social groups of unrelated people. This need for cooperation in societies outside of the immediate family arose due to the growing needs of individual humans (such as higher caloric needs for the brain and longer gestational and infancy periods) (Henrich and Muthukrishna, 2021; Churchland, 2019). Due to the need for cooperation, social norms and formal constraints were developed to maintain it. Those groups that were better at cooperating (that developed the moral intuitions that corresponded to the pro-social norms developed in response to these cooperation challenges) were more likely to survive. After multiple iterations, moral intuitions became ingrained in our brains, becoming part of an automated innate system that contributes to judgment. In time one, we are presented with the modern changes to the social world, especially in terms of social scale, with even bigger societies with a higher degree of separation between individuals. In time one, how the evolved intuitions manifest is constrained by the social and formal norms in place. The intuitions may be the same, but how they manifest varies by context

and individual due to the constraining role of these social and formal norms.

Thus, an important feature of this view that is key to my argument is that the innate prosocial psychology, among which we find moral intuitions, does not always translate into pro-social behaviour, or at least not behaviour that would be considered pro-social at every social scale. In accordance with the view of Churchland (2019, p.173), moral norms should be thought of "not as things apart from our nature, as things foisted on our nature, but as practical solutions to common problems". These solutions become ingrained in our brains but are not expressed in the same way all the time. Socialisation still matters because our brains retain plasticity, which allows for the integration of habits, costumes and social norms. This differentiation is key because, for some individuals, some intuitions may be only salient at smaller social scales. Thus, this view, which I adopt in my dissertation, proposes that "sociality and cooperation [...] should depend on norms, practices and beliefs that amplify or suppress or innate motivations and dispositions" (Henrich, 2015, p.154). At the same time, although social norms may amplify or suppress our intuitions, it is unlikely that social norms and formal rules that completely go against those intuitions would survive in time, as Henrich (2015, p.330) argues.

Thus, even though the manifestation of these intuitions can differ in concrete situations, moral intuitions are innate and universal. As Boyer and Petersen (2018, p.84) argued, "moral intuitions about the relative wrongness of different behaviours are automatic and largely shared among human beings". We can see evidence of these intuitions by studying the behaviour of infants, for which pro-social behaviour seems to be innate and intuitive (Hamlin et al., 2007). Even so, it is important to clarify that in contrast to other innate abilities, such as language acquisition, there does not seem to be a unique "moral brain" (Young and Dungan, 2012). Rather, evidence has shown that it is likely that moral judgements involve the same brain regions used to make other types of decisions (Van Bavel et al., 2015), and the brain areas that are activated when a person is presented with moral tasks are also activated through other tasks. However, a caveat to this is those areas of the brain linked to emotions seem to activate more when making intuitive judgements (Greene

et al., 2001), which highlights the importance of emotions as both components of intuitions and intuitions themselves, as I will discuss in more detail in the next section.

3.3.3 Dual-Process in Moral Judgement

Having explained how my argument is closer to the Integrative Perspective of moral intuitions that acknowledge both social and innate factors, it is also important to discuss how my argument relates to the Dual-Process of moral judgements. As said previously, my argument aligns with Dual-Process perspectives in psychology, but in this section, I will detail how this view is viewed in studies of moral psychology.

Figure 3.3: Two broad approaches to moral judgement



As in broader psychology, moral psychology has multiple views about the role of intuitions in moral judgements. As we can see in Figure 3.3, these views can be summarized into two camps: one that corresponds to the Dual-Process model and argues that both intuitions and reflective/deliberative processes have a role in moral judgment and another that argues for the primacy of intuitions.

Among studies that argued for the primacy of intuitions, one of the most well-known is the Social Intuitionist Approach, which has been briefly discussed previ-

ously. This approach, proposed by Jonathan Haidt and colleges (Haidt et al., 2003; Haidt and Joseph, 2004; Haidt, 2008) proposes that moral judgements are primarily driven by intuitions rather than deliberate reasoning. Although I do not agree with the primacy of intuitions view of the Social Intuitionist Approach, it is important to mention that I do agree with one other key premise of this approach, related to the Integrationist Perspective, which refers to the idea that while intuitions are innate how they manifest is influenced by contextual factors, including norms, rules and values.

In the Social Intuitionist Model, the role of moral reasoning (these reflective/deliberative processes) is considered secondary to moral intuition, and it is seen as biased towards finding support for the conclusion already prompted by the intuitive processes. In this view, what we understand as reasoning or "thinking" is seen as a relatively new ability that evolved closely with language and is thus secondary to the primary process of "feeling" (Zajonc, 1980) or intuitive judgement. This is similar to other views of judgement that argue that judgement has an intuitive or automatic component and justification is a posteriori explanation for the judgement (Margolis, 1987). Thus, Haidt (2012, p.18) invites us to think about moral reasoning as "a skill we humans evolved to further our social agendas — to justify our own actions and to defend the teams we belong to [...]". In his study of moral dumbfounding, where people judged something as wrong without being able to explain this judgement (Haidt and Hersh, 2001), Haidt found that "[p]eople made moral judgements quickly and emotionally. Moral reasoning was mostly just a post hoc search for reasons to justify the judgements people had already made" (Haidt, 2012, p.114). He found this phenomenon was more common when people were presented with violations of what he calls the "purity moral foundation", which relates to concerns about both physical and spiritual purity or cleanliness. He found that when presented with these violations, individuals may view situations as morally disgusting and thus judge them as wrong without being able to provide a "reasonable" explanation. Therefore, in this view, moral reasoning plays a justificatory function in social settings (Mercier and Sperber, 2011) and people, almost as an automatic reaction, fabricate reasoning or justifications for their intuitions (Haidt, 2012). Although it

can be argued that in these cases (intuitions of purity/sanctity and feelings of disgust), intuition may have primacy, other intuitionist approaches argue that this does not always have to be the case.

As mentioned, I argue in favour of the role of intuitive process in judgement and behaviour related to corruption, but not to the detriment of reflective/deliberative processes, which positions my argument closer to the Dual-Process Theory of moral judgement (Greene and Haidt, 2002; Evans, 2007; Evans and Stanovich, 2013), developed in part based on the broader work of dual-process in psychology. This theory proposes that moral judgements (and judgements generally) are based **both** on intuitive processes and controlled reflective/deliberative processes. Although in psychology, there is not a broad consensus on how these processes interact (or even whether they interact at all), in my argument, I follow the line that proposes that moral intuitions have an effect both independently of the reflective/deliberative process and in conjunction with it (see Figure 3.3 above and Figure 2.1 of Chapter 2).

The Dual-Process Theory of moral judgement was developed through a model proposed by Greene et al. (2001), in which he argued that intuitive processes corresponded more closely to deontological type judgements, and deliberative/reflective processes corresponded more to consequentialist judgements [11]. It is important to clarify that although I agree with the premise that both intuitive and reflective/deliberative processes have a role in judgment, I do not agree with ascribing a particular type of moral judgement (consequentialist or deontologist) to each process. The link between these processes and different types of ethical judgments defined in philosophical terms is problematic since, as has been previously pointed out (Calandín, 2016) and as was briefly discussed in the first section of this chapter,

[11] The basis for this differentiation is abstract moral dilemmas based on variations of the Trolley dilemma and the Footbridge dilemma. Both are moral thought exercises in which one person is sacrificed to save others. In the first scenario, a runaway trolley is heading towards five individuals tied to the track, and the only way to save them is to reroute the trolley by pushing a lever to another track to which one person is tied. In the second one, a bystander can push a large individual off a footbridge, killing them to halt the trolley and save the five people.

the difference is not clear in practice and can only work if the term deontological is used in its metaethical sense. It is better to think of them as the difference between intuitive and effortful judgment based on moral deliberation instead (Kahane, 2012). One of the criticisms that have risen in response to this model is that it's not possible to properly differentiate between these two processes in real-world dilemmas (Zafrilla, 2021). However, studies based on fMRIs have found that they do seem to correspond to different degrees of activation in different brain areas. Although it may indeed be hard to differentiate between these processes in real-world decision-making, there is sufficient evidence to think of them as separate, which has important implications for the study of judgement and behaviour. Furthermore, Greene and colleagues recognise, as do I in my argument, that these processes can both interact and act separately.

Thus, my approach is consistent with the Dual-Process Theory but also incorporates some key elements from the Social Intuitionist Model. In both of these approaches, intuitions correspond to various moral domains; this is in contrast to other intuitionist approaches that reduce morality to a single domain, as I will discuss next.

3.3.4 Multiple vs Singular Moral Domains

Different models of morality argue for a different number of moral domains or "moralities" that underline our moral judgements. While some argue for the reduction of all moral judgements to a single morality based on harm (Gray and Wegner, 2009), my argument is closer to a pluralistic view of moralities or moral domains (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt, 2003, 2008; Curry et al., 2019a; Curry, 2016). Among these moral domains are that of fairness and in-group loyalty, which I consider play a key role in judgement and behaviour related to corruption (although other moralities also may play a role). Furthermore, although there is still debate on which domains should be considered moral domains, the main pluralistic approaches consider fairness, harm and a version of in-group loyalty and/or kinship to be among

them.

Figure 3.4: Argument: Multiple moral domains



Since there is no consensus on the total number of moral domains, as seen in Figure 3.4., in this dissertation, I chose to focus on those that I consider more relevant for moral judgements concerning corruption. I focus mostly on fairness and take in-group intuitions as competing ones because I consider these to be the more relevant ones for studying intuitive processes in judgements and behaviours concerning corruption. As I will explain in more detail in Chapter 4, corruption itself involves a violation of the principle of impartiality and engagement in behaviour that is unfair from a social perspective. But at the same time, many instances of corruption are done in favour of one's own group, which aligns with the in-group moral domain, which is why I consider intuitions linked to this domain as also important. But this does not mean that intuitions belonging to other moral domains do not have a role. As I will discuss in my Conclusion, other domains, such as harm or intuitions related to hierarchy and authority, may also interact with fairness and in-group intuitions to shape judgement and behaviour concerning corruption.

Still, it is important to acknowledge that even though I subscribe to the view of

multiple moral domains (as seen in Figure 3.4), some influential theories in moral psychology do not. Among these is the Theory of Dyadic Morality. This Theory argues that everything can be reduced to the morality of harm (Schein et al., 2016; Schein and Gray, 2015; Gray et al., 2014), and thus "preventing harm to oneself and one's kin-that is, one's genes— was likely a key motivating factor for the evolution of morality" (Schein and Gray, 2018, p.36). In this view, other moral domains (such as fairness or group loyalty and kinship) ought to be reimagined as part of the harm domain (Schein et al., 2016). Thus, this theory posits that if one thing is universal, it is the condemnation of harm, and harmful acts incite moral outrage (Hutcherson and Gross, 2011) across cultures (Shweder, 2012). According to this theory, the link between harm and immorality allows for the acquisition or learning of morality both through one's own experiences of the harmfulness of an act (Blair, 1995) and through other's accounts of harmfulness (Rottman et al., 2014). In other words, for this theory, "[t]he complementary link from immorality to harm means that judgements of immorality also cause perceptions of harm; when acts seem morally wrong, they seem harmful" (Schein and Gray, 2018, p.33). Thus, the most basic prediction of this theory is that the judgement of an act as moral or immoral is "fundamentally predicted by the amount of harm it involves (or implies)" (Schein and Gray, 2018, p.33).

According to Dyadic Morality, harm is constructed from three elements: an agent (anyone or anything that is perceived to have intention), a patient (anything perceived to have vulnerability), and their causal link (the act that can use damage) (Schein and Gray, 2015, p.24). Thus, for this theory, harm necessarily implies causation and, to a certain degree, intent. Events like natural disasters can cause harm but are not judged as immoral, while acts like murder are (Cushman, 2008). Critics of this view argue that there are harmful acts that are not seen as immoral even when the intent is clear. For example, Royzman and Baron (2002) included in their experiments instances of emotional harm (such as breaking up with someone) in which both harm and intentionality were clear, and yet the act was not judged as morally wrong by participants. In addition to this, other critics of this view argue that within some acts perceived as immoral, the link to harm is tenuous at

best. Among these critics are Haidt and colleagues and the idea of harmless wrongs discussed previously. An example of this would be people judging as morally wrong the vandalization of their national flag (Frimer et al., 2015). Furthermore, although the importance of the harm mechanisms is consistent with the research in moral psychology and moral cognition (Cameron et al., 2015), the main criticism is that not everything can be reduced to harm, and other considerations can be equally as important (Royzman and Borislow, 2022).

In contrast to the single morality view, my approach is aligned with those that consider multiple moralities that result from the evolutionary process of humans living in social settings. Here, I borrow insights from two of the main approaches to a pluralistic intuitive morality. One comes from social psychology (Moral Foundations Theory-MFT) (Haidt and Joseph, 2004, 2008; Graham et al., 2013) and the other from cultural evolution (Morality as Cooperation-MaC) (Curry, 2016; Curry et al., 2019a; Curry, 2015). Both the MFT and the MaC have a pluralistic view of morality, where there are multiple moral domains for which intuitive mechanisms evolved, but the MaC has a closer correlation with studies of gene-culture coevolution (Henrich and Muthukrishna, 2021) as I will explain.

3.3.4.1 The Moral Foundations Theory

The Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) "is a theory about the universal first draft of the moral mind and about how that draft gets revised in variable ways across cultures" (Graham et al., 2013, p.65). According to MFT, "[. . .] the moral foundations are not the finished moralities, although they constrain the kinds of moral orders that can be built" (Graham et al., 2013, p.64). In other words, although there is a common base for morality in humans, how this morality manifests can vary. The main antecedent for the MFT can be found in the work of cultural anthropologist Shweder et al. (1997) who clustered moral themes (found through intensive interview work in India) into three ethics: autonomy, community and divinity. Shweder argued that cognitive-development tradition was studying only a subset of moral

concerns, the ones that were most elaborated in secular Western societies (Shweder et al., 1997)[12].

Thus, the MFT is positioned in opposition to theories of morality that reduce the basis of morality to a single foundation (or domain), like harm. As discussed, a strategy used by proponents of the MFT to show that not all moral judgement can be reduced to harm consists in presenting people with scenarios depicting harmless moral wrongs (like consensual incest or dog-eating) (Haidt et al., 1993), that generate moral dumbfounding (Haidt and Hersh, 2001) when respondents are not able to explain why the act should be considered morally wrong. As mentioned before, the use of these "harmless" wrongs is still under debate since some argue that there could be a sampling bias in these scenarios, which are criticised as unrepresentative and "weird". For example, Gray and Keeney (2015), a proponent of Dyadic Morality, argues that such weirdness could also be affecting moral judgement. However, although that may be the case, and it is possible that too much weight is given to the study of the morality of purity, there is enough evidence (collected using instruments like the Moral Foundation Dictionary) that points towards the existence of multiple moralities. The MFT argues that the moral condemnation that intuitively arises responds to other moral foundations (or moral domains) and that, in some cases, harm is only used as justification in posthoc reasoning (Haidt and Hersh, 2001; Scott et al., 2016). Thus, although harm is an important moral domain, it is not the only one.

For something to be considered a "foundation" in Haidt's and Graham's view, it must be, on the one hand, a common relevant concern in third-party judgements and in the other hand, it has to involve immediate or automatic affective evaluations that have been shown to correspond to innate preparedness (Graham et al., 2013). This effective evaluation has often been equated to emotional responses, but as

[12]The MFT also builds on the work of Fiske (1991), who proposed moral judgements were based on the same four "relations models" that were used to think about and enact social relationships: Communal Sharing, Authority, Ranking, Equality Matching and Market Pricing.

previously mentioned, it is possible for there to be an intuitive evaluation without a discernible emotion (what has been called a "sense" instead of a "feeling"). The MFT proposes five foundations (although recently, a sixth one was added), and to each of these foundations, it ascribes a corresponding prototypical moral emotion (Haidt and Joseph, 2004). These emotions were initially just seen as being triggered when a foundation was violated, but a lot of the work based on moral intuitions and moral emotions has linked emotions as being able to affect moral judgements directly [13]. The moral foundations as proposed by the MFT are (Haidt, 2012, p.125):

- **Harm/Care:** Intuitions linked to this domain were developed to guide us away from causing direct harm. This foundation is thought to manifest in traits such as kindness. And the characteristic emotion linked to it is compassion. Although anger is also an emotion attached to it when it's "anger at the perpetrator" (Graham et al., 2013).

- **Fairness/Reciprocity:** According to Graham et al. (2013), intuitions linked to the domain of fairness relate to instinctual concerns about unfair treatment, inequality, and abstract injustices. Haidt (2007) argues that all cultures have developed virtues related to the promotion of fairness and justice. There is also evidence that humans "try to maintain fair allocations, and react most vigorously when people try to take more than a "fair" share of proceeds" (Boyer and Petersen, 2018, p.175). The emotions that correspond to this domain, according to the MFT, are anger, gratitude and guilt.

- **In-group/Loyalty:** Haidt (2012) and Graham et al. (2009) argue that humanity's history as tribal creatures has resulted in a natural inclination towards loyalty and cooperation, and in the development of tactical attachments to groups. Evidence shows that there is a strong automatic motivation to favour one's group, regardless of how artificial or spurious the group actually is (Boyer and Petersen, 2018, p.40). These groups, as I argue in this dissertation, go from narrow (immediate family and friends) to broad (distant

[13] I will delve more into this literature in a following section

others). The emotions that are seen as attached to this domain are pride and rage.

- **Authority/Respect:** According to Haidt (2012), our long history of hierarchical social interactions shaped this authority foundation. Intuitions related to this foundation push people to obey those whom they view as authorities. The emotions attached to this domain are respect and fear.

- **Purity/Sanctity:** Seen as having evolved from behaviours related to the avoidance of physical, social, and spiritual contagions. The key emotion here is disgust. In the MFT, this domain and especially the associated emotion of disgust has been given a bigger role in moral judgement since "moral disgust" can be triggered by violations of any moral norm (Tao et al., 2022). This makes it hard to distinguish whether disgust triggers intuitions related to purity or whether it just leads to harsher moral judgements regardless of the domain.

- **Liberty/Oppression:** This foundation was the last to be added, as it's based on the negative feelings that people seem to show towards those who are perceived as dominating them and limiting their freedom. According to Haidt (2012), this foundation evolved due to the "adaptive challenge of living in small groups with individuals who would, if given a chance, dominate, bully, and constrain others". This foundation has been mostly studied in the United States, where "libertarians" were shown to endorse individual liberty (in accordance with the liberty moral foundation) with more strength than other moral principles (Iyer et al., 2012). However, it is not clear how this would manifest in other contexts.

From all these foundations, I pay special attention to intuitions related to fairness as a key feature for the condemnation of corruption and to intuitions related to in-group loyalty as the main competing foundation. I propose that these domains are related to the judgement and behaviour regarding corruption in a more inherent way. As I will discuss in Chapter 4, this is because corruption involves a violation of fairness, often in favour of small-scale cooperation, which implies placing small-scale in-group loyalty above a more abstract general society. But this is not to say that

other moral domains do not have a role, and some of my empirical results do show that other moral domains such as *harm* and *authority* do seem to have a relevant role in moral judgements related to corruption. Because my argument and study are innovative and try first to establish that these intuitive processes do play a role in the judgement and behaviour related to corruption, I have chosen to focus on these two domains instead of all of them, but in further studies, I would like to explore the role of intuitions related to other moral domains (as I discuss in the Conclusion of this dissertation).

It is also important to highlight that although the MFT has become an extremely popular approach and multiple tools have been developed to study the role of these "foundations"[14], there are two main critiques that this theory has yet to overcome. The main objection, which rests on the assumption of modularity, does not affect the application of this theory in the social sciences but concerns one of the key developments in neuroscience. According to the concept of modularity, the human mind is divided into discrete, specialised modules, each of which is in charge of handling a certain category of information or performing a particular function. Thus, in this view, the mind comprises several specialised mental systems, each of which performs a specific task, such as language, perception, memory, or social cognition. Haidt and Graham (2007) makes a big claim about the domain specificity (with the domains being each of the five or six foundations) of learning modules, which is unsupported by existing evidence in neurobiology (Suhler and Churchland, 2011). The lack of modularity does not affect the innateness of moral intuitions; it simply determines that this innateness corresponds to several interacting brain areas.

The second criticism, which is more relevant to social science and moral psychology, refers to the number and selection of these "foundations" and the underdeveloped understanding of why intuitions related to these "foundations" manifest in different ways. Surprisingly, the Social Intuitionist Model, also proposed by Haidt

[14]An example of these tools is the Moral Foundations Questionaire and the Moral Foundations Dictionary (which I use in Chapters 9 and 10)

and colleagues (Haidt and Joseph, 2004), explains variations better. As mentioned, the Social Intuitionist Model explicitly recognises the role of social norms and formal rules in developing separate sets of virtues based on these innate intuitions (Haidt and Joseph, 2004). A way of overcoming this criticism would be to integrate insights from this model into the MFT in a clearer way. A way of doing this is by studying in more detail how innate morality interacts and is constrained or amplified based on social and formal norms.

In addition to this, the MFT has also been criticised based on how these "foundations" were selected. Haidt and colleagues made an initial selection ad hoc by observing how morality manifested in different contexts. This means that some candidates for "foundations" may have been left out (this is why the total number of domains is left open in Figure 3.4). In addition to this, there is also a problem with kinship morality being conflated with group loyalty. In addition to this, the distinction between these moralities can be seen as quite rigid and does not offer a solution for scenarios in which intuitions related to these domains interact. For example, as I will explain in my dissertation, some components of in-group loyalty and kinship are also related to group and kin altruism, which is a form of fairness applied to immediate groups. The MFT must acknowledge that although intuitions linked to moral domains can be universal, the target of these intuitions can vary (Suhler and Churchland, 2011).

Despite these issues, the MFT is a highly regarded theory in moral psychology, and the tools developed for its study have become widely used; some of the key ideas of this theory, such as the innates of moral intuitions, the key role that emotions play, and the importance of some of the proposed foundations or domains, have also been corroborated by studies that take a more evolutionary approach to morality. Although I recognise the shortcomings of the MFT, throughout my dissertation, I will use some of the tools developed based on it, particularly the Moral Foundations Dictionary, which is a great tool for studying the components of moral judgement based on text analysis.

3.3.4.2 Morality as Cooperation Theory

An alternative theory to the MFT that also recognises the existence of multiple moral domains is the Morality as Cooperation (MaC) theory developed by Curry (2015). This theory was developed as a way of creating a better-fitted cross-culturally universal model of human morality based on the insights of gene-cultural coevolution.

For the Morality as Cooperation theory, morality initially developed as a solution (both biological and cultural) to the problems of cooperation (Curry, 2016). According to the MaC theory, morality evolved to promote cooperation across individuals, especially when group size increased to include individuals not immediately related to each other. This morality was initially enforced by norms and, through time, became ingrained in the fabric of our brains (see Figure 3.2.). Curry et al. (2019a) finds evidence for cooperation-based morality across cultures by reviewing previous ethnographic studies of both modern and foraging societies. Furthermore, similarly to both the Moral Foundation Theory and the Social Intuitionist Approach, the Morality as Cooperation Approach also argues that although these "cooperative structures" (the moralities developed to promote cooperation) became part of our evolutionary heritage, there is still space for variation in how this morality is applied.

This theory finds seven established types of cooperation and connects each type to a specific type of morality (Curry et al., 2019a), some of which interlock with the foundations or domains proposed by the MFT. These seven types are:

- **The allocation of resources to kin**, which is connected to the morality of family values and kinship. This morality manifests in helping those considered kin. In the realm of corruption, this morality can be behind instances of nepotism or even instances of bribery where the ultimate goal of bribery is to help or protect kin. Furthermore, this is a form of small-scale cooperation that is hard to extend to larger societies because, although we can recognise ourselves as part of bigger communities, it is hard to recognise ourselves as

part of bigger "families". Thus, we may be predisposed to favour our kin above broader communities even when recognising ourselves as part of them.

- **The coordination of mutual advantage**, which is connected to the morality of group loyalty. This morality manifests in helping those considered to be part of the same group. This type of morality may be more easily extended to larger society since a key feature is recognising oneself as part of a group. If people identify themselves as part of bigger groups regardless of the physical and genetic distance between individuals, they may be more likely to help this group.

- **Social exchange**, which is connected to the morality of reciprocity. This is related to the previous morality since social exchange (and reciprocity) is conditional on group membership and group perception (people trust more those who belong to the same group). This morality is manifested in "trusting others, reciprocating favours, seeking revenge, expressing gratitude, and making amends" (Curry et al., 2019b). A mix of group loyalty (coordination) and reciprocity (social exchange) can help explain certain forms of corruption, such as influence peddling. Muthukrishna et al. (2017) presents an approach to this when discussing how corruption can be seen as cooperation at smaller scales.

- **Hawkish traits**, which manifest as being brave; and **dovish traits**, connected to respect and deferring to superiors. The display of these traits facilitates cooperative behaviour and is regarded as good depending on the situation (Curry et al., 2019b).

- **Division**, which is connected to the morality of fairness. This morality manifests as dividing resources fairly, but it's also extended to the judgement of behaviours related to this division of resources. As Curry et al. (2019b) argues, rules such as "take turns" or "I cut, you choose" are present in all human societies and speak to an innate sense of fairness (Henrich et al., 2005). I posit that when people recognise themselves as part of a group, then fairness intuitions are also more salient when evaluating behaviours or interactions that affect this group. When this group is bigger and includes distant others, then

fairness towards the groups and universalistic fairness are less likely to be in conflict.

- **Possession**, which is connected to property rights and manifests as respecting prior possession. This morality also leads to a condemnation of acts perceived to be theft, but this is partly conditional on group membership. Curry et al. (2019b), while reviewing ethnographic data of 60 societies, found that the condemnation of theft was especially strong for those that belonged to the same group (theft among group members was more likely to be condemned than theft between in-group and out-group members).

As seen in the description of the forms of cooperation and corresponding moralities identified in the MaC approach, this theory accounts for the interaction and tension between different forms of cooperation and related moralities in a clearer way than the MFT. Because of this, an important feature of the MaC approach is that it accounts for moral dilemmas in a way that MFT does not. For the MaC, moral dilemmas arise when different types of cooperation clash. An important feature that also plays a role in my argument is that this cooperation can refer to different scales. Thus, a narrow form of cooperation (linked to, for example, group loyalty or kinship) can enter into conflict with a broader form of cooperation (linked to, for example, large-scale fairness). In the words of Curry et al. (2019b, p.50):

> Moral dilemmas arise when one form of cooperative behaviour is incompatible — and comes into conflict — with another, and some decision or trade-off must be made between them. Thus, the theory of morality as cooperation also predicts that the only time a form of cooperative behaviour will be considered morally bad will be when it is pursued at the expense of some other larger form of cooperation—as in the case of thieves loyally cooperating to rob a bank. Conversely, the only time a form of uncooperative behaviour will be considered morally good will be when it facilitates some larger cooperative outcome—as in the case of a whistle-blowing employee disobeying her boss to report a crime. In

other words, cooperative behaviour will only ever be considered morally bad relative to some other, greater opportunity for cooperation.

This positions the MaC closer to theories of gene-culture evolution, where scale variation is key. Gene-culture coevolution theories propose that innate moral intuitions developed for cooperation in small-scale societies can be extended to broader large-scale societies thanks to social norms and institutions (Chudek and Henrich, 2011a). This part of the MaC and gene-culture evolution is key for my argument since I also recognise that some forms of corruption present individuals with a moral dilemma, where helping in-group members may take priority over general fairness, but this is also affected by the groups to which an individual perceives themselves to belong. In other words, I would expect that individuals who recognise themselves as part of a larger group (such as a nation) would be less likely to engage in some forms of corruption since they would recognise this as unfair towards their own group.

However, although the view of morality that the MaC proposes has been supported by evolutionary scholars, some criticisms have arisen against it. First, it has been argued that not all forms of morality can be reduced to problems related to cooperation. Bloom (2014), for example, argues that there are examples of morality outside of cooperation, such as the moral quality we ascribe to the treatment of the deceased and to behaviours related to sex. However, Bloom concedes that he perceives the morality of sex more as a biological accident. Second, the MaC has also been criticised for how it characterises harm as only relevant through the lenses of cooperation. The MaC argues that harm (like intentionally hitting someone) is not a foundational moral violation. Instead, whether harm is seen or not as a moral violation depends on the role it plays in cooperation, "uncooperative harm (battery) will be considered morally bad, but cooperative harm (punishment, self-defence) will be considered morally good [...]" (Curry et al., 2019b, p.64). However, studies of harm show that intentional harm (especially without provocation) is seen as wrong even by young babies (Bloom, 2013) regardless of the cooperative frame.

Although both of these approaches (MFT and MaC) differ in the list of moral

domains that should be considered, and both face some criticism, common ground among them does emerge. For example, both highlight fairness as a domain for moral intuitions, as well as in-group loyalty (in addition to kinship) and harm, although in this last one, the Morality as Cooperation approach provides a further caveat that harm would be subject to different moral judgement depending on whether it is cooperative (self-defence, punishment) or un-cooperative (Curry et al., 2019a).

In addition to this, and although the moral intuitions linked to these domains are universal, some of these intuitions, as portrayed by both approaches, may seem contradictory. For example, intuitions linked to fairness and intuitions linked to group loyalty and kinship may seem to contradict each other. Both MFT and MaC mention a moral domain related to group cohesion, loyalty and identity. MFT calls this domain loyalty (which is related to the maintenance of social connections based on group identity), while MaC has two domains related to this, one referred to as kinship (helping your kin) and one related to group loyalty (helping your group). This domain and the intuitions linked to it, being intuitively loyal to those closest to us and prioritising their well-being over that of distant others, may seem contradictory to domains like fairness or harm because people would seem to condone unfairness or harmful behaviour if it benefits their own group.

We can interpret this tension between group loyalty and fairness intuitions in two related ways. The MFT argues that some people prioritise some moral domains over others, resulting from factors like their personality, upbringing, and social context (Graham et al., 2009). Hence, some people would prioritise things like group loyalty over fairness when these two are in conflict. This does not mean there is no intuitive concern about fairness; it just means that the intuitions related to the group loyalty domain would be more readily triggered for these individuals. On the other hand, we can interpret this situation as a moral dilemma under the lenses of the MaC (Curry, 2016), which posits that what takes place is a dilemma between intuitions applied to different scales of cooperation. This view goes hand in hand with how this tension between intuitions linked to these two moral domains is applicable to the case of corruption, as I will discuss in Chapter 4. The trade-off means that although

people care about fairness, these concerns may be overrun by concerns related to group loyalty. This is also related to how the MaC approach views the morality of group loyalty and the morality of kinship. As shown, while the MFT groups both moralities (kinship and group loyalty) into a single one, the MaC differentiated between both, highlighting that while kinship is inherently small-scale and determined by genetic closeness, group loyalty can correspond to varied scales of cooperation. The individual's self-identification determines group loyalty, which can be reduced to small immediate groups or larger distant ones and thus can be related to larger-scale cooperation. As I will explain in a later section, in my argument, I highlight the role of context, especially on the effect of norms and rules designed to promote larger scales of cooperation since these allow people to take broader groups (such as their nation) as a reference, which reduced the tensions between group loyalty and fairness.

Following both MFT, MaC and gene-culture evolution theories, my argument posits the condemnation of corruption we see in the abstract corresponds to intuitions linked to fairness that, in concrete situations, can enter into conflict with intuitions related to group loyalty and kinship (along with other concerns such as self-interest). However, whether and how these intuitions conflict and the importance of these intuitions is partly influenced by the group we take as reference. As mentioned, identifying with larger groups, such as a nation, would increase the likelihood of moral intuitions being triggered in relation to these larger groups just as they are in relation to smaller ones. Accordingly, for example, we will be concerned with fairness in relation to this bigger group and not only with the interests of our kin and other smaller groups. I will discuss this in more detail in another section, where I will explain which factors can promote this amplification of the intuitions. But first, it is important to discuss in more depth the role of emotions in moral intuitions.

3.4 The Role of Emotions: Moral Emotions

Having explained how my approach intersects with other studies about intuitions, I will dedicate this section to discussing a key component of intuitions and what I am partly using as a proxy for intuitions in my dissertation: emotions. In this section, I will focus on the role of emotion in moral judgement and behaviour, dialoguing with other studies in psychology and evolutionary science[15].

The importance of emotions when it comes to moral judgements has been recognised both by social psychologists (Haidt, 2001) and by scholars who adhere to theories of cultural evolution. For example, according to Nichols (2002); Nichols and Mallon (2006), moral cognition depends on an "affect-backed normative theory", where emotions are a key factor in determining which norms survive and which do not. Conventional violations that elicit affective reactions are judged as less permissible than violations that do not elicit such reactions (Nichols, 2002), and moral violations tend to elicit affective reactions. This dialogues with Churchland (2019) view of (social) norms and conventions, in which those that triggered moral intuitions (in many cases moral emotions) were more likely to survive than those that did not.

[15]In Chapter 5, I will discuss how my broad argument interacts with the literature on emotions in political science

Figure 3.5: Argument



The central role of emotions in intuitionist approaches has led some to call Haidt and colleagues neo-sentimentalist (Walsh, 2021) in reference to Hume's approach to morality. Given the importance of emotions for intuitions, it bears to ask why I focus on intuitions and not frame my whole argument based on emotions. The simple answer is that, as seen in Figure 3.5., starting from the broader category of moral intuitions instead of just emotions allows me to consider in my argument that there can be intuitive judgements that are not linked to any discernible emotion. For example, if a person reads something about income inequality in another country, they may intuitively "sense" that it is unfair without this necessarily being tied to a discernible emotion. It bears to note that an emotional response may not be processed as such because it is not given a label. In other words, the person may "feel" something but not process it as an emotion because it does not correspond to a label such as anger; it just "feels" unfair. This is important for the expansion of my argument in further studies because, although in this dissertation, I focus on emotions, in other studies, it may be possible to trigger intuitive judgment through non-emotional pathways, such as using time constraints as other studies have done (Rosas and Aguilar-Pardo, 2020; Tinghög et al., 2016).

It is also important to mention that, although I concur with the intuitionist

moral psychology and evolutionary position that considers emotions as key for moral judgements, others oppose this view by arguing that information processing through reflective/deliberative pathways precedes emotions. Under this view, the emotional response is seen solely as the product rather than as a cause of moral judgement (Hauser, 2006). This interpretation of emotion as a product instead of a driver of moral judgement is closer to the more traditional version of the Appraisal Theory of Emotions (Lazarus, 1991), developed based on the work of Nico Fridja (Frijda, 1986; Frijda and Mesquita, 1994), who proposed a cognitive theory of emotions. Frijda (1986, p.71) proposed that emotions are "tendencies to establish, maintain, or disrupt a relationship with the environment" that result from subjective evaluations of a situation. In the traditional view of the Appraisal Theory, emotions are always the result of the appraisals of a situation, and in turn, these emotions promote judgement and behaviours consistent with the emotion being experienced (Keltner and Lerner, 2010). These appraisals are often seen as rapid and unconscious, but traditional appraisal theories also postulate that conscious reasoning influences appraisal and, thus, emotions.

The view of emotions under an Intuitionist framework is closer to other theories of appraisal, in particular to some of the postulates of the Appraisal-Tendency Framework (Han et al., 2007), under which emotions can "carry over" and affect the judgement of unrelated scenarios. This idea of a "carry over" effect of emotions is important because it also interlinks with the idea that emotions, particularly when studying their effects, can be divided between integral and incidental. Incidental emotions are aroused by a source unrelated to the decision-making process; in contrast, integral emotions are experienced at the moment of decision-making or immediately after and are directly related to it (Zheng et al., 2017). I consider that recent evidence of the effect of induced incidental emotions (Haidt, 2001; Greene et al., 2018) has shown that emotions can affect judgement and not only result from it. In these scenarios, incidental emotions are induced through strategies unrelated to the situation or task the individual judges, and because of this, any effect on judgment and subsequent behaviour would operate primarily through intuitive processes.

In this dissertation, especially for some of my empirical tests, I am adopting the view proposed by the Social Intuitionist Model in which emotions are a key component of moral intuitions (Haidt, 2003). Importantly, when studying emotions as part of intuitive processes and their role in judgement and behaviour, it must be noticed that while emotions can have an effect as a consequence of a conscious evaluation — i.e. people perceive and evaluate a situation, this generates an emotional response, and both contribute to judgement and behaviour — they can also have an effect on their own, as recognized by the Appraisal-Tendency Framework.

The key emotions for moral judgements are those referred to as moral emotions, which are "those that are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or the agent" (Haidt, 2003, p.853). Therefore, I focus on moral emotions (Haidt, 2003) as a key component of moral intuitions, which can act as intuitions themselves, and assume that activating these emotions would affect moral judgement through the intuitive process pathway.

Moral emotions are part of what is called social emotions, in the same way that moral intuitions can be seen as part of social intuitions, as discussed in the previous section. These emotions, as moral intuitions more broadly, evolved due to the costly nature of human development, which made life in societies essential for both individual and group fitness, creating a need for cooperation (Bartlett and DeSteno, 2006; Haidt and Graham, 2021; Graham and Haidt, 2010). Haidt (2003) initially proposed seven main moral emotions: Disgust, shame, anger, contempt, embarrassment, empathy or sympathy and guilt. However, there is no great consensus on the number of emotions that can be considered moral emotions. Some authors also add emotions like gratitude (Tangney et al., 2007), and even Haidt (2003) discusses the possibility of emotions like self-righteousness and love, among others, being part of the group of moral emotions.

For this dissertation, I am using the initial classification done by Haidt (2003), in which moral emotions are divided based on their valence (negative/positive) and focus (self/others). This classification is based on a dimensional view of emotions,

where emotions vary in one or more dimensions, which is different from discrete views of emotions, where there is believed to be a limited number of well-delimited emotions (Briesemeister et al., 2012).

The most well-known discrete view of emotions refers to what is known as the Big Six emotions (Ekman et al., 1969), also called basic emotions. Although under this view, there is no established consensus on the number of emotions that can be considered as part of the basic emotions (the number of six has been increased and reduced constantly), the general idea is that these emotions are "innate, universal, and distinct affective states which evolved to serve adaptive functions" (Piórkowska and Wrobel, 2017). In most studies of emotions, self-conscious emotions are not considered as part of the "basic" emotions because they are more complex in nature, tend to emerge later in life and are linked to the development of an image of the self (Tangney, 2001). Still, they are considered part of the social emotions and the subgroup of moral emotion because of their role in preventing anti-social behaviour (Svensson et al., 2013). Although the ability to feel this emotion seems to activate later in infancy, the preparedness for them is argued to have an evolutionary basis. For example, Trivers (1971) argued that complex social emotions like guilt and sympathy were developed to maintain cooperative relationships with nonkin.

The classification of emotions that I use as a base for my empirical tests is summarised in the Table below, adapted from Verdorfer et al. (2021) based on Haidt (2003) initial proposition. This classification also echoes categorisations suggested by other authors (Walsh, 2021).

Table 3.1: Moral Emotions

Focus	**Valence**	
	Self	**Other**
Positive	Self-approving (e.g., pride)	Other-praising (e.g., gratitude, elevation) Other-suffering (e.g., sympathy)
Negative	Self-condemning (e.g., guilt, shame)	Other-condemning (e.g., contempt, anger, disgust)

As I will present in Chapter 7 (the introductory chapter to Part II of this disser-

tation), this classification is at the centre of two empirical studies I use for Chapters 9 and 10 of this dissertation. I base part of the empirical studies on this classification because it accounts for a less-studied dimension of sentiment, which is the focus of this sentiment (self-conscious and other-focused emotions). This dimension is less studied in psychology and other social sciences in comparison to dimensions like valence, arousal (Russell, 2003) and approach-withdrawal (Harlé and Sanfey, 2010), but has been more deeply studied in moral psychology (Tangney et al., 2007).

Under the focus dimension, we can distinguish between self-conscious and non-self-conscious or other-focused emotions. Self-conscious emotions (shame, embarrassment, guilt, pride) are generated by the subject about him or herself (Zinck, 2008)[16]; and other-focused emotions (disgust, anger, contempt, empathy/sympathy) are related to judgement or evaluation of something outside the self on its qualities or on how it relates to the self. Although this is the most accepted differentiation based on focus, Walsh (2021) suggest an alternative division of emotions that also accounts for focus, considering the positive emotions (empathy, sympathy, and, in addition, concern and compassion) as prosocial emotions while suggesting that the negative emotions can be separated into self-blame (guilt, embarrassment and shame) and other-blame (disgust, anger and contempt).

As mentioned, self-conscious emotions have been comparatively less studied, but previous studies link them with moral judgement and behaviour, especially in relation to prosocial behaviour (Baumeister et al., 1994; Tangney, 2001). In this dissertation, I also explore whether the focus of the sentiment, as a moral intuition, has any effect on moral judgement and behaviour. In other words, I want to explore whether self-conscious and other-regarding emotions have a differentiated effect on

[16]Some studies have shown that the difference between shame and embarrassment can be context dependent and that in some cases embarrassment is not considered a moral emotion. In many societies, there does not seem to be a clear differentiation between shame and embarrassment (Haidt, 2003), which is partly linked to there not being different words for these two emotions. At least in Western societies, shame seems to be linked more strongly to moral violations, whereas embarrassment is more linked to violations of conventions (Keltner and Haidt, 1999).

moral judgement and if this varies depending on whether the judgement is towards oneself or others. I will discuss this in more detail in Part II when presenting my empirical approach.

Additionally, I chose to use this classification of emotions because it also accounts for valence, which has been one of the most studied dimensions in emotion research. Under this dimension, positive emotions are pleasant and thus incite people to try to maintain them (or attain them), while the opposite is true for negative emotions (Andrade, 2005). Valence is usually studied in conjunction with arousal, and the valence-arousal model is one of the most prominent in psychology (Russell, 2003). On a valence dimension, negative moral emotions such as guilt, shame, anger, and disgust have been extensively studied in relation to moral judgment. Among all these, disgust is one of the most studied in psychology and other social sciences. This emotion has also been at the centre of some studies in political behavior(Ahn et al., 2014; Aarøe et al., 2017). For example, Ahn et al. (2014) found that the brain responses of participants who were shown disgusting images were predictors for the participant's political position (either conservative or liberal)[17].

As a moral emotion, disgust is normally seen as having evolved out of the need to avoid pathogens, which later translated into avoidance of things considered sullied in a social way[18]. But there is still some debate on whether disgust relates to a specific moral domain (such as "purity/sanctity" as Haidt (2012) proposes) or whether it relates to moral judgements in a more general way, leading to harsher moral judgements regardless of the domain. For example, while Wheatley and Haidt (2005) showed that creating a link between a word and a feeling of disgust through hypnosis resulted in harsher judgements to moral vignettes, regardless of the domain specificity of these vignettes, other studies such as the one conducted by Horberg et al. (2009) found that disgust affects judgement related to behaviours in the domain of purity, but had no relation to the realm of fairness and harm. Although disgust

[17]In Chapter 5 I discuss other studies about the role of emotions in politics

[18]For a detailed review of disgust as a relevant social emotion, see (Rozin et al., 2008)

has received recent attention, it is important also to consider the role of different moral emotions. Anger and guilt have been used more broadly in studies related to fairness preferences[19] and fairness-related behaviours, which makes them key for my argument, as I discuss in more detail in the next chapter.

Therefore, in my argument, I use moral emotions as a key component of moral intuitions and consider that they can also act as moral intuitions. Furthermore, I study these emotions as causes and not simply as results of moral judgements. In two of the empirical chapters of my dissertation (Chapters 9 and 10), I focus on two moral emotions — anger and guilt — due to their established role in evaluations of fairness, which I consider key for the judgement and behaviour concerning corruption.

3.5 Scale at which Intuitions are applied: The Role of Norms

In previous sections of this chapter, I have explained how my argument interacts with studies of moral judgement and behaviour and the role that emotions play in my approach. However, I have yet to explain in detail why we see variations in judgement and behaviour if moral intuitions are understood as innate and universal. I will dedicate this section to explaining one of the factors that can explain this variation, which is an important component of my argument: the social scales (either narrow, broad or in-between) that are relevant for individual judgements and behaviours concerning corruption.

[19]Social preferences, although recognized as emerging very early on infancy (Decety et al., 2021) have normally been studied from the reflective/deliberate process side, by arguing that these preferences require a conscious constraining of selfish impulses. But I, as researchers in social and moral psychology have done, posit that there is an important intuitive component for these preferences.

This variation in how intuitions manifest has also been recognised and partially explained by two of the intuitionist approaches previously discussed. In the Social Intuitionist Approach (Haidt, 2001), variation is explained by focusing on how social norms and interactions between individuals shape how moral intuitions manifest over time. For example, although moral intuitions related to the purity domain are universal, in some contexts, social norms would make these intuitions relevant for judging how people dress (for example, based on religious norms), while in other contexts, this would not be morally relevant. In turn, the Morality as Cooperation approach (Curry, 2015) explains this variation by focusing on the way norms allow (with more or less success) for the construction and maintenance of bigger societies and thus for larger scales of cooperation. In this way, for some social groups, the regulation of how people dress may help solve cooperation challenges by promoting cohesion, while in other social groups, it does not, and this is also likely to change over time. These explanations for variation are complementary since both highlight the role of norms and social interactions in shaping how and when moral intuitions manifest.

My argument does something similar, but it focuses on one of the consequences of social and formal norms that can shape how and when these intuitions manifest: the social scale that is relevant for the individual. As I will posit in this section, whether individuals take as reference only their narrow groups or also account for broader groups is, in part, the result of social and formal norms that emerged and developed in ways that promote cooperation and maintain bonds in larger societies[20].

Therefore, I argue that one factor that affects what intuitions manifest and how they do so is the societal scales individuals account for when making judgements, in other words, what reference group the individual takes as relevant when evaluating a situation. When judging a behaviour or situation, people may take their immediate

[20]This consequence (the building of cooperation at large scales) may have been unintended or intended. For example, the teaching of foundational myths of the nations explicitly aims to build a national identity and promote cooperation at a larger scale. Still, other institutions and norms may have led to this as an unintended consequence.

narrow society (kin and close others) as their sole focus or account for a broader society (distant others). For individuals whose only frame of reference is their narrow society, intuitions related to what has been understood as ingroup morality would be more salient and guide how other intuitions operate. In other words, for these individuals who have only a narrow group as a relevant reference, ingroup morality trumps the other moralities as traditionally understood (since fairness and harm moralities, for example, have normally been viewed as more universalistic). On the other hand, for individuals who also have broader society as a reference, intuitions related to other moralities would be on a more similar standing since, in a way, these individuals also consider distant others as part of their "group". The effect of social scale as part of my argument was shown in the argument summarising figure at the beginning of this chapter (Figure 2.1), but Figure 3.6 offers more detail on how this scale correlates with the groups one can recognise to be part of.

Figure 3.6: Argument: Social scale



As shown in Figure 3.6, taking a broader social group as a reference does not mean that the immediate group stops being relevant, but it does mean that other broader groups gain relevance for judgement and behaviour. Thus, in my argument, although morality related to group loyalty can be one of the main drivers towards

tolerance of and engagement in corruption (as I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 4), how this morality operates is highly dependent on the group or groups individuals consider themselves to be part of. These groups can be broader or narrower, and individuals can simultaneously consider themselves part of multiple groups (as seen in Figure 3.6). Furthermore, although intuitions related to group loyalty can conflict with others, such as those related to fairness or harm in a broader sense (concerns about fairness and avoidance of harm in general, both towards close and distant others), this is more likely to be the case for individuals who only recognise themselves as part of narrow groups (such as their family or close friends). This is because, as mentioned, for individuals who also consider broader groups as relevant, other moral intuitions (like those related to the domains of fairness or harm) would be on a more similar standing. I posit that this is because these individuals would also consider distant others as part of their group. For individuals who only take narrow groups as a reference, concerns about general fairness or avoidance of harm would have less weight when compared to concerns about their immediate group. This part of my argument dialogues with studies of the role of ingroup identity and social identity, as I will explain in this section.

3.5.1 Reference groups and moral judgement

The importance of group identity has been at the centre of other studies of moral judgment (Cikara et al., 2010; Nilsson et al., 2016). In these studies, ingroup and outgroup morality are not only seen as separate moralities but also as a way of understanding how different moralities manifest depending on the target of the judgement. These studies have also pointed out that the morality that is more salient for an individual depends on whether they are making judgments about people in their ingroup or outgroup. For example, in a study about intergroup violence, Leidner and Castano (2012) proposed a process of "moral shifting", where "the accessibility and importance of moral foundations shift" when people judge moral violations

committed by ingroup members[21]. For Leidner and Castano (2012), the shift is from intuitions liked to the moralities of fairness and harm that could lead to condemnation of the ingroup to those linked to the moralities of (ingroup) loyalty and authority, which allow for the preservation of group bonds. This idea of "moral shifting" presents a complement to the research focused on "moral disengagement", which is understood as a mechanism that allows people to support acts that go against their held moralities while still maintaining a moral image of themselves (Bandura et al., 1996). Moral disengagement as a mechanism is more likely when people judge the actions of someone in their ingroup (Branscombe and Miron, 2004). However, in contrast to the moral disengagement approach, the moral shifting approach posits that it is not that the moral character of an action is ignored but rather that it is shifted to be interpreted under another moral domain. This places it closer to the argument I am proposing for the study of corruption since I posit that, in some cases, people engage in corruption not because they ignore the moral nature of their acts but rather because of it. Thus, as I will explain in the next section, although corruption can be condemned on a moral basis, it can also be justified under a moral basis pertaining to a different domain. Furthermore, I think this idea of moral shifting can be extended to consider whether individuals modify their behaviour and their judgement of themselves (not only of others) based on whether they perceive those affected by actions as members of their group. While I agree with the concept of moral shifting, I argue that we need to consider that what is called ingroup identity is not static but rather malleable.

In relation to the latter point, the malleability of ingroup identity and the role it can have on judgement and behaviour has been best summarised by the Common Ingroup Identity Model, proposed by Gaertner et al. (1993). In this model, individuals' perceptions of group boundaries are malleable and can be transformed to be more inclusive. The innovation of the Common Ingroup Identity Model is that it proposes that it is possible to create more inclusive group identities since social identities are seen as malleable due to them being more binding than exclusionary. These

[21]This shift is also framed as part of the intuitive automatic processes.

features allow ingroup identity to be malleable while also allowing for variations in the scale of who we consider to be members of the ingroup and outgroup. I propose that increasing this scale towards broader society contributes to social intuitions (among which are moral intuitions) being more applicable to this larger group. It has been shown that considering others as members of our own group decreases the psychological distance between the "us" and "them", and this leads to an increase in the scale to which pro-social behaviour is applied (Gaertner et al., 1993). This idea of the relation between social scale and how intuitions, such as that of fairness, operate has some backing from previous experimental studies. For example, both in dictator (Hoffman et al., 1996) and ultimatum games (Bolton and Zwick, 1995), decreasing social distance (by having the player meet, see each other and/or communicate) increased offers made by the allocators. Of course, other mechanisms may be behind such effects, be it reflective/deliberative ones (meeting may have increased the expectation of retribution or punishment by the other players) or intuitive ones (after having met the person, feelings of shame may be more likely to arise when thinking of making unfair offers). Nevertheless, there is evidence pointing to the importance of common identities and how these identities are malleable and can be made to include broader ones and not just narrower ones.

3.5.2 The effects of social and formal norms

Thus, who we take as a reference group affects how and when intuitions manifest. And who we take as a reference group depends on the social scale relevant to our judgements and decisions. While we are built to account for a narrower society (those who are kin or whom we interact with on a daily basis), having a broader society as a reference group is more complex. In conjunction with both intuitionist moral psychology Haidt (2003); Curry (2016) and studies of gene-culture coevolution (Henrich et al., 2010; Henrich, 2015; Henrich and Muthukrishna, 2021) I acknowledge that how intuitions manifest and where they manifest is dependent on contextual factors, specifically on those that allow for having larger society as a reference point. Some of the gene-culture coevolution studies that focus on the role of norm-psychology

posit that cooperation and pro-social behaviour in large-scale complex societies are possible due to:

> "[...] norms and institutions [that] effectively sustained successful interaction [...] well beyond individuals' local networks of kin[...] It [was] these particular norms and their gradual internalisation [...] that recalibrate our innate psychology for life in small-scale societies in a manner that permits successful larger-scale cooperation [...]" (Henrich et al., 2010).

For my dissertation, I am taking norms (both social and formal norms) as factors that can help increase the scale to which moral intuitions are applicable by creating affinity with broader groups in addition to immediate ones. In turn, this would make moral intuitions that are normally seen as more universalistic (such as those linked to the domains of fairness) more applicable to the judgement of situations that involve distant others and would also make it more likely for individuals to account for distant others in their judgements and behaviours.

Previous studies have focused on the long-term effects of the development of institutions, understood both as formal norms or laws and informal rules, that facilitate large-scale cooperation and "enhance fairness among strangers" (Henrich et al., 2010). Among these institutions, studies have focused, for example, on religion (Schulz et al., 2019; Norenzayan and Shariff, 2008), and markets (Henrich et al., 2010). a Although most work has focused on the long-term legacies of early onset institutions and norms (such as religions or agricultural practices), there is reason to think that institutions developed for the maintenance of nation-states also contribute to the facilitation of large-scale cooperation (Stearns, 2007).

I propose that it is also possible to think of the effects of these institutions at the individual level since there is a degree of variation in how individuals observe and internalise these rules and norms (Henrich et al., 2010). There are multiple reasons why these norms designed to build and sustain cooperation at larger social scales are not homogenously internalised. For example, Graham et al. (2009) recognise the

role of upbringing in shaping how we view ourselves in relation to distant others. However, we can also look at variations in the reach of these norms through a given territory. For instance, the way institutions function cross-nationally can lead to different degrees of trust among individuals (Jamal and Nooruddin, 2010), which in turn affects the degree to which large-scale society is relevant for decision-making. Due to this, it is worthwhile to focus on the effect of these formal and social norms designed to promote cooperation instead of the norms themselves.

Therefore, I also propose that the effect of norms and rules can be studied at the individual level by focusing on one of their effects concerning social scale variation: the related factors of broader social identity and generalised trust. These factors are connected to norms and rules developed to promote large-scale cooperation (like nation-building norms, religion, and others) and have usually been studied at the aggregate level. But I consider that there is variation at the individual level associated with how individuals relate to these norms and rules, as the MFT recognises when it acknowledges the role of upbringing and social context (Graham et al., 2009).

I decided to focus on the role of self-reported social identity and trust in others for two of the empirical studies I conducted in this dissertation (Chapters 9 and 10). I have done so under the assumption that these two related factors closely reflect the key effect that institutions and norms designed to promote large-scale cooperation have at the individual level. Both a higher level of generalised trust (trust in distant others) and a broader social identity correspond with having a larger social group as a reference, as illustrated in Figure 3.6. Individuals with these characteristics would have as a reference for their judgements not only their immediate narrow groups but also broader distant ones. I propose that this would allow for moral intuitions, such as those linked to the domain of fairness, to trigger concerns about distant others in concrete situations in addition to the always salient concerns for proximate others. They would mitigate the effects of what has been usually understood as ingroup morality, which can often lead to behaviour that may be fair in a small-scale society (towards our kin or close friends) but unfair at a large-scale one (towards distant others). Importantly, both social identity and generalised trust are related since

broader social identities correlate with higher levels of trust in distant others.

I interpret social identity as it has traditionally been studied, which corresponds to the Social Identity Theory initially proposed by Tajfel and Turner (2001), who defined social identity as the component of an individual sense of self that is derived from the membership or belonging to a group. This theory is consistent with the idea of multiple malleable identities since, as explained by Gaertner et al. (1993, p.6), "intergroup bias frequently takes the form of ingroup enhancement rather than outgroup devaluation [and] group formation brings ingroup members closer to the self, while the distance between the self and the outgroup (or non-ingroup members) remains relatively unchanged". In other words, Social Identity Theory recognised that individuals could have multiple identities strongly defined by the perception of who is in their group and who belongs to the outgroup, and their social identity is the product of all these identities that are more or less active in different situations. Thus, each person's identity is composed of multiple identities, which vary in how broad or narrow they are. For example, people can simultaneously have a social identity linked to their family, their gender, their religion, and their nation.

Although I consider social identity important for my argument, it is also true that these identities can be activated and deactivated depending on the situation; thus, it is possible that while an individual would report having a broader social identity, in certain situations, the narrow identities are the ones that are activated (Turner, 1987). A way of further verifying that a broader social identity can be present even in concrete interaction is by looking at levels of trust related to different scales of group identity. This is because, as mentioned previously, among those who share an identity, there is also expected to be a higher level of trust (Hollinger, 2006). Thus, it is expected that higher levels of trust towards distant others would correlate with a stronger broader social identity linked to distant communities.

Trust in others can also be viewed as a scale that goes from generalised trust, linked to the perception that most people can be trusted, which is manifested in trust in strangers or distant others, to particularised trust, defined as the trust built

"in interaction with personally known trustees with whom we have substantive, first-hand experience" (Wamsler, 2023). Group-based trust can be seen as a midpoint between generalised and particularised trust since it refers to individuals' trust towards distant and proximate others who share their same group identity (Wamsler, 2023), which can be linked to a political party, a religion, or even something like a football team. Thus, I would expect that the intuitive condemnation of corruption would translate into concrete situations more easily for those individuals reporting higher levels of generalised trust and those with broader social identities to which group-based trust applies. These people, who identify and trust distant others, do so partly as the result of norms designed to promote a larger scale of social cohesion and cooperation.

To sum up, because social identity corresponds with the group with whom we identify, which in turn is related to how much we care for others and how much we trust others, I propose that for individuals with a stronger [22] broader social identity (for example, a stronger national identity) and higher levels of trust in distant others (generalised trust), other moral intuitions would be on more similar standing to intuitions linked to group-loyalty when making judgements and decisions. This is because these individuals would share an identity with distant others, and "[t]o share an identity with other people is to feel solidarity with them; we owe them something special, and we believe we can count on them in ways that we cannot count on the rest of the population." (Hollinger, 2006, p.23). For my dissertation, this means that I would expect people with higher levels of generalised trust and a broader social identity to be more likely to condemn corruption and less likely to engage in it.

[22]By stronger here, I mean vis a vis other individuals, not necessarily vis a vis other social identities. Because multiple social identities can coexist, individuals can have both a strong small-scale identity linked to their immediate community and a stronger broader large-scale identity linked to a more distant community such as the nation

3.6 Closing remarks

In this Chapter, I have explained in more detail each of the components of my argument. To summarise: (1) I take a descriptive view of morality that is concerned with how and why people judge situations and behaviours as "right" or "wrong"; (2) to study these judgements, I take a Dual-Process approach to moral judgements, that while acknowledging the role of intuitive processes does not discard the role of reflective/deliberative process; (3) and I also adopt a pluralistic view of morality, where moral intuitions can pertain to multiple moral domains; (4) I also highlight the role of emotions both as components of intuitions and as intuitions themselves, but recognize that there can be a "moral sense" separate from discernible emotions; (5) finally, I explain how factors associated to norms designed to maintain large scale cooperation can affect the way in which these intuitions manifest. In the next Chapter, I explain in more detail how these components relate to the study of corruption.

Chapter 4

An Intuitionist Approach to Corruption

In the previous chapter, I explained all the components of my argument, which are shown in the argument summarising figure also presented in Chapter 2.

Argument



I have explained that I subscribe to a dual-process approach to moral judgement,

in which intuitive processes have a role in conjunction with deliberative/reflective processes, and to a view of multiple moralities that posits that there are multiple relevant moral intuitions corresponding to different moral domains. I have also explained that emotions are a key component of these moral intuitions and that while they can act as moral intuitions themselves, not all moral intuitions are linked to a discernable emotion (which is why I focus on intuitions instead of emotions directly). Finally, I have explained how variations in the way in which moral intuitions manifest can be explained by the social scale individuals take as reference for their judgements and behaviours. Throughout the previous chapter, I have briefly mentioned how each of the components relates to the study of corruption, but in this chapter, I will delve deeper into this.

I posit that judgement and behaviour concerning corruption are best explained by also accounting for the role of intuitive processes (in addition to the already accounted-for role of reflective/deliberative processes). Thus, I propose that although conscious evaluation does have a role in how people judge and behave in relation to corruption, intuitive processes, in particular moral intuitions, should also be accounted for. As I will show and discuss in more detail in the following chapter, many of the studies that ask why people engage in corruption and why they tolerate it have focused on conscious self-interest (Miller, 2006). Under this view, people and organizations engage in corruption due to a conscious (or as-if conscious) cost-benefit analysis, which includes factors like the risk of being caught, the rate of corruption in a country (if most people or organizations engage in corruption, not doing the same could have a cost), and the benefits one expects to receive from engaging in corruption. Thus, as mentioned in the Introduction and Chapter 2, and as I will further discuss in Chapter 5, traditional approaches to corruption have seen engagement in it as the result of calculation (Klitgaard, 1988, p.4), where the decision is a conscious one in which intuitive factors play little to no role. However, I posit that in corruption, as in many other areas[1], our decisions are not driven

[1]In Chapter 5 I will present how approaches that account for intuitive processes, especially emotions, have become more prominent in other areas of study such as those related to partisanship.

solely by conscious (or as-if conscious) calculations and not solely by self-interest as traditionally understood.

In this chapter, I will discuss why I consider there is a moral aspect to corruption that is important to understand behaviour and judgement related to it. Then, I will discuss in more detail why I consider moral intuitions to be important for the study of corruption. Following this, I will argue that the social scale or groups that are relevant for an individual help explain the different ways in which moral intuitions manifest in relation to corruption scenarios. Finally, I will propose that corruption can be presented to individuals as either a social or a moral dilemma and posit that engagement is both more likely and justifiable when corruption is presented as a moral dilemma.

4.1 The Descriptive Morality of Corruption

At the core of my approach is the idea that people also think about corruption in moral terms, evaluating their actions and the actions of others regarding corruption in a right/good-wrong/bad continuum. As explained in Chapter 3, the view of morality I adopt is descriptive, meaning that I am concerned with how and why people place actions and situations in this continuum, in contrast to a prescriptive view of morality, which would be concerned with trying to establish the moral principles that should guide every action or judgement.

This view of corruption in terms of morality is consistent with how other studies have described the way in which people view and interact with corruption. For example, while highlighting a similar question to one of my own, Smith (2010, p.5) wrote that "people frequently condemn corruption and its consequences as immoral and socially ruinous, yet they also participate in seemingly contradictory behaviours that enable, encourage, and even glorify corruption". In other words, Smith (2010) also noticed that while corruption is condemned everywhere, people still engage and

tolerate it.

Thus, I propose that engagement does not erase condemnation, and this is important, since, as Miller et al. (2001, p.15) put it, "[i]f citizens were as happy to tip an official with ten per cent of the bill as they are to tip a waiter in a restaurant then democratic theories would also be a lot less concerned about whether officials took bribes from their clients". People are not "happy" to engage in corruption, they do it either way, but the continuous presence of condemnation is important because it makes the questions about engagement and tolerance somewhat more complex than initially thought. This is because citizens' interaction with corruption is coloured not only by material motivations but also by moral ones. I propose that this engagement responds in part to either the overruling of moral condemnation by more salient contextual factors (that can lead to people prioritising self-interest) or the existence of competing moral concerns that are highlighted by how the situation is presented.

But it's important to mention that while there are those, such as myself, who propose that corruption in the abstract is morally condemned everywhere, there are others who argue for a relativist approach and see condemnation and engagement in corruption as culturally dependent. Culture is a nebulous concept, being initially defined as "that whole complex which included knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, law, customs and any other capabilities and habits acquired by a man as a member of society" (Tylor, 1924, p.1). This nebulous definition has led to mixed evidence on the role of "culture" in corruption, depending on whether we consider culture as values, social identity, or social norms [2].

Part of the relativist argument is that what is corruption in one context cannot be considered as such in another. This relativist approach has argued that something

[2]Note that how culture has been understood in political science and how it is understood in evolutionary approaches is different, although both widely consider culture to be a system of shared beliefs, customs, artefacts, norms and values; for evolutionary approaches culture is mostly seen as an adaptive mechanism

is only classified as corruption, and thus as wrong, when there is a clear difference between public and private spheres, and that this difference is contingent on culture, which in turn makes corruption contingent on culture (Zyglidopoulos et al., 2009; Fisman and Miguel, 2007; Hofstede, 2005). They posit that in societies where this difference is absent, "[...] [c]itizens expect that personal ties with officials are needed to get anything done and think it quite appropriate to reward helpful officials with gifts and tips" (Rose-Ackerman, 1999, p.106). The issue with this view is that corruption in itself implies a differentiation between public and private, which is why giving a tip to a waiter is not the same as giving a tip to a public official. Corruption necessarily involves public goods, be it money or services. People giving others preferential treatment or access in private settings can still be viewed as wrong but under different lenses. If a private person chooses to hire family and friends in their private business instead of holding an open competition, this may be viewed as unfair by some but not as widely because it is also viewed as their prerogative. Public servants and public offices are seen to serve and belong to the collective, so preferential treatment and access in those cases are more widely condemned, at least in the abstract.

The cultural relativist view assumes that in some cultures, people do not find corruption to be wrong. In this context, the condemnation of corruption would partly respond to moral hypocrisy Batson et al. (1999); Batson (2011), where people want to seem moral by condemning corruption (because of the international consensus against it), while in reality, they prioritize their interest and do not really view corruption as condemnable. But as Rothstein proposes, high levels of particularisms and endemic corruption do not make people more likely to justify corruption morally, even if it does make them more likely to accept it as a fact of their lives (Rothstein, 2011a). Thus, even when corruption is systemic, it is still condemned Morris and Klesner (2010); Widmalm (2005); GUPTA (1995), which goes against a relativist view of corruption. In reality, there is a difference between what is considered good and what is considered needed. Although both things can often overlap, this does not always have to be the case. Engagement in corruption can be considered needed without being considered good, and when this engagement is considered good, it

often correlates more clearly with other moral concerns (such as ingroup loyalty).

The idea that the condemnation of corruption is something present in all cultures and that engagement responds to other factors is also supported by those who view engagement in corruption purely as a conscious, rational decision. For example, some of Robert Klitgaard's recent work acknowledges that how norms are implemented and internalised plays a bigger role in understanding cross-country variation in levels of corruption than the diffuse concept of "culture" (Klitgaard, 2020). He strongly posits that "[a]ll governments have laws against bribery, extortion, and related practices. No culture or religion endorses corruption. Condemning corruption is virtually universal" (Klitgaard, 2020, p.133). And argues that small variations in condemnation of corruption respond to the differences in what is perceived to be public goods, but as soon as something is understood to be public (and thus belonging to the collective), preferential access to it is always judged as wrong. But he still sees engagement in corruption as the result of exclusively reflective/deliberative processes in which "each person is doing is a self-interest calculation of benefits and costs, of risks and rewards [...] [focused] on the consequences of actions: the social benefits or costs, not just the personal ones"(Klitgaard, 2020, p.149). This is in contrast to my own argument and is more in line with Collective Action approaches to corruption, which I will discuss in more detail in the next chapter.

In contrast to Klitgaard (2020) proposal and to culturalist views of corruption, I argue that the condemnation of corruption is not merely performative, nor is it exclusively the result of reflective/deliberative processes. In other words, people do not condemn corruption in the abstract only to be seen as subscribing to socially desirable ideas. Neither is it simply a response to conscious concerns about other factors, such as personal or group benefits. As I will show in Part II of this dissertation, when people condemn corruption, they cite reasons related to fairness and concerns about the treatment of others that transcend efficient concerns, not only concerns about cost or losses for themselves or their group. Conversely, when people engage in corruption, they also cite moral concerns about the well-being of those in their group, not only utilitarian or functional concerns. Furthermore, fac-

tors that should not affect the reflective/deliberative processes, such as incidental emotions, do affect how people judge and behave in relation to corruption, which provides evidence for the need to account for these intuitive processes in addition to reflective/deliberative ones.

4.2 Moral Intuitions and Corruption

In relation to corruption being also viewed under moral terms, in this dissertation, I propose that corruption is widely condemned in the abstract because it elicits an intuitive reaction linked to the moral domain of fairness. However, the social world is not abstract, and this intuitive condemnation can be overrun or fade when the connection between corruption and rules of impartiality is muddled due to contextual factors and when the condemnation is overrun by other concerns, be they moral or otherwise.

I argue that corruption goes against the intuitive moral concerns pertaining to the domain of fairness when it is presented in the abstract because "[d]emocracy is founded on the principle of political equality, and public-sector corruption is founded on the principle that the state will treat its citizens arbitrarily and unequally [...]" (Miller et al., 2001, p.13). Thus, my view that corruption judgement and behaviour are closely determined by intuition linked to the domain of fairness aligns with Kurer (2005) idea of corruption as a violation of the "impartiality principle" (Mungiu-Pippidi and Johnston, 2017), in which public goods and services are expected to be of equal access to all citizens (Klitgaard, 2020). As mentioned, corruption itself only exists once there is a separation between private and public, and once something is public and recognised as belonging to the collective, preferential access to it is seen as unfair when judgment is not muddled by contextual factors. Furthermore, my argument proposes that even when people engage in corruption themselves, if this engagement is not tied to other moral concerns, they are likely to keep viewing corruption as wrong, making a difference between acceptability or justifiability and

moral wrongness.

In line with the studies of moral psychology, I argue that intuitive concerns for fairness are both universal (Turiel, 1983; Sloane et al., 2012; Ingram and Bering, 2010; Baumard and Boyer, 2013; LoBue et al., 2010) and innate. This has been shown in several studies of infant and child behaviour. For example, in a study about "tattling", Ingram and Bering (2010) found that preschool children reported unfair behaviour even when they were not directly affected by it. This condemnation of unfairness is also shown in adults, and there is evidence that it is linked with intuitive processes (particularly emotions). For instance, Sanfey et al. (2003) found that the brains of players who received unfair offices in an ultimatum showed activation in brain areas related to emotional-intuitive cognition as well as reflective effortful cognition.

The universality of fairness concerns has also been recognised by social science studies that focus on the role of social preferences. In these studies, social preferences are understood as concerns different from personal pay-off, including pro-social preferences (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Fehr and Krajbich, 2014), among which we find preferences for fairness. The role of these concerns about fairness was repeatedly established in lab settings, where they overrode mechanisms like utility maximisation based on material pay-offs (Güth et al., 1982; Hoffman et al., 1996; Bolton and Zwick, 1995). Although some studies recognised these preferences as emerging very early in infancy (Decety et al., 2021), they have normally been studied from the reflective/deliberate process side by arguing that these preferences require a conscious constraining of selfish impulses. In contrast to this view, I propose that innate intuitions corresponding to evolved psychology are an important component of these preferences.

Furthermore, although I highlight the importance of fairness intuitions, I also recognise that intuitions linked to other moral domains can also have a role in judgements and behaviours related to corruption. In this dissertation, I am focusing on intuitions linked to the domain of ingroup loyalty since they are more prominent

when individuals take small society (immediate ingroups) as their sole reference point for their judgements and behaviours, and thus, also when individuals are more likely to engage in corruption. This is an extension of the trade-off argument presented by Dungan et al. (2014), which I will discuss in more detail when presenting corruption as a moral dilemma in another section. But there is a lot of evidence of how ingroup loyalty (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Anduiza et al., 2013; Blais et al., 2017; Chang and Kerr, 2009; Tverdova, 2011) can shape how people interact with corruption, the caveat is that many of the previous studies have focused solely on how these identities affect reflective/deliberative processes and the judgement of corruption based on group-based benefits. I posit that although these processes are important, there are also intuitive concerns linked to group loyalty that shape how we interact with corruption.

Finally, although I focus mainly on the moral domains of fairness and ingroup loyalty, other intuitions can also have a role, as briefly mentioned in Chapter 3. As I will discuss in the Conclusion of this dissertation, there are other intuitions linked to other moral domains, such as harm or hierarchy/authority, that can also play a role in judgements and behaviours related to corruption.

4.3 Social Identity and Generalised Trust in the Study of Corruption

As previously outlined, I propose that intuitions linked to the domain of fairness contribute to explaining the broad condemnation of corruption in the abstract. But whether these concerns manifest in concrete situations depends on a number of factors, specifically those that relate to the norms and rules that allowed for the domestication of "our innate psychology for life in ever-expanding populations" (Henrich et al., 2010) as I will explain in this section.

I propose that acknowledging the different applicability of moral intuitions de-

pending on factors related to the social scale (or group) that individuals take as relevant helps explain how people can simultaneously condemn and engage in corruption without necessarily lying to others or themselves. If individuals only focus on their immediate ingroup, then intuitions of fairness related to a broader distant collective would not be as salient. In the abstract, this does not matter because individuals can easily perceive corruption as unfair towards the collective (large society), and thus, intuitions related to fairness play a role. But in concrete situations, where other factors occlude or overrun the view of the broader society, for individuals that only have immediate groups as their reference point, the fairness concerns towards broad society, and thus the fairness intuitions, are less likely to be triggered.

The importance of the social scale that individuals take as a reference point has been recognised in one way or another, even in classical studies of corruption. For example, when talking about societies where strong interpersonal relationships are seen as key, Rose-Ackerman (1999, p.106) wrote that "citizens expect that personal ties with officials are needed to get anything done and think it quite appropriate to reward helpful officials with gifts and tips." I posit that while these acts are seen as ingroup loyalty in concrete settings, they can still be viewed as unfair in the abstract. Nevertheless, if the effects on the collective are highlighted (as I do in Chapter 8), or if the individual already has a strong affiliation with a broader group (as I test in Chapters 9 and 10), then they are more likely to view this exchanges as unfair even in concrete situations.

This goes in line with work discussed in Chapter 3, in particular work from evolutionary psychologists like Henrich and Muthukrishna (2021) and Schulz et al. (2019) who have shown that corruption can also be understood as the result of the tension between small and large scale cooperation. The prioritising of small-scale society over the large-scale one, which is at the core of many instances of corruption (influence peddling, cronyism, nepotism, etc.), can, in turn, be explained by evolutionary features such as inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism. What we see in contexts in which corruption is low can be understood as large-scale cooperation, driven in part by the identification with distant others and the breaking down of original kin

networks (Schulz et al., 2019). In these societies, individuals consider large-scale society as a relevant group for their judgements and behaviours, in addition to their immediate group, and thus, intuitions related to large-scale fairness are more likely to arise when faced with a corruption scenario.

As explained in Chapter 3, I focus on the effects of these norms instead of on the norms themselves because individuals can internalise them in different ways. While norms that promote larger-scale cooperation usually vary cross-nationally (norms like religion, institutions that promote national identity such as education, etc.), the effect of these norms varies individually. Thus, for my approach, especially for the empirical studies presented in Chapters 9 and 10, I focus on broader social identity and generalised trust because I consider that these two factors reflect the effect of cooperation-enhancing institutions and norms at the individual levels.

My main focus is on social identity, which is the component of an individual sense of self that is derived from the membership or belonging to a group (Tajfel and Turner, 2001). But because, as discussed in Chapter 3, an individual's social identity is comprised of multiple identities in a continuum of narrow to broad (see Figure 3.6) that are more or less salient in different contexts, I use generalised trust as a way of further measuring identification with a broader society. As I argued in Chapter 3, a broader identity also corresponds to higher levels of trust in distant others (Hollinger, 2006).

The importance of trust in political behaviour and corruption has also been recognised in previous studies, although these studies have focused on aggregate levels of trust at the country level. Trust seems to be the favourite component of social capital (Putnam, 1993) for political scientists, who focus especially on measures of generalised trust as opposed to particularised trust. In various studies, generalised trust has been shown to correlate with lower corruption levels (Uslaner, 2008; Bjørnskov, 2007; Uslaner, 2004).

In addition to this, other studies have also established that levels of generalised

trust correlate with inequality levels (Uslaner, 2008), supporting the idea that generalised trust is lower when distant others become more different. In the studies I will present in Chapters 9 and 10, I will measure both reported engagement in and judgement of corruption and social identity and trust using scales employed in country-level studies (borrowed for the World Value Survey). I expect that this will give some evidence on whether the correlation between generalized trust/broader identities and lower levels of corruption that previous studies found is present or not at the individual level.

My argument, therefore, posits that while the condemnation of corruption in the abstract is something universal and is linked to shared moral institutions pertaining to the fairness domain, the condemnation of corruption in concrete situations would depend on other factors. In this dissertation, I focus on social identity and trust, which I take as a result of norms (both social and formal) that can promote cooperation on larger scales and thus increase the likelihood that individuals would also account for larger society in their judgements and behaviour. Thus, for my argument, the condemnation of corruption we see in the abstract is more likely to be translated to concrete situations for individuals that report a broader social identity (linked to the nation or even broader groups)[3] and have higher levels of generalised trust (trust in distant others), since for them intuitions linked to fairness in a broader sense (large scale society) would be as salient as intuitions related to narrower group-loyalty or kinship. In Chapter 7, I will present the measurements of trust and identity that I will be using, which are borrowed from the cross-national World Value Survey.

[3]This identity can be expressed in addition to narrower identities linked to family or immediate community as discussed in Chapter 3

4.4 Types of Corruption

While I also propose that variations in engagement and judgement of corruption at the individual level are partly explained by the way in which individuals internalise norms designed to promote cooperation at larger scales, which I measure through social identity and generalised trust, I also acknowledge that different types of corruption are likely to trigger different types of intuitions.

All types of corruption involve particularism, understood as preferential treatment over universal principles (Klitgaard, 2020), but this particularism is structured in different ways. Mungiu-Pippidi (2015) proposes to separate "vertically structured favouritism (clientelism, patronage), horizontally structured favouritism (negative social capital networks, “old boy networks”), kinship-motivated particularism (nepotism, ethnic favouritism), but also embezzlement, bribery, and extortion". It is important to mention that these categories are not set; some practices can fit into different groups depending on things like scale and motivation. Because I focus on the citizen side of corruption, I decided to focus on petty bribery and favouritism instead of categories like clientelism and patronage, where public officials often have a bigger role, and there is an electoral dynamic that scapes the scope of my study. Nevertheless, practices like clientelism do present citizens with corruption scenarios in which identities can play an important role, as I will discuss in the next chapter, and this posits an interesting avenue for research.

On the one hand, favouritism, understood as using personal connections to get access to services, is a form of "quiet corruption", which is understood as the "various types of malpractice of frontline providers (teachers, doctors, inspectors, and other government officials at the front lines of service provision) that do not involve monetary exchanges" (Bank, 2010, p.2). Because it is "quiet corruption", it has been less studied than bribery, and the focus of these studies has been on countries with high levels of corruption, where favouritism was argued to correspond to culturally dependent practices.

Bribery is a clearly delimited activity that involves the "explicit exchange of money, gifts in kind, or favours for rule breaking or as payment for benefits that should legally be costless or be allocated on terms other than a willingness to pay" (Rose-Ackerman, 2016, p.8). In contrast, favouritism is a broader category that can include practices like cronyism, nepotism, influence peddling, exchange of favours and some instances of public service fraud. Favouritism thus includes a variety of practices, but what they all have in common is that in these practices, because of the inherent closeness between participants, engagement in corruption can be consistent with the moral domain of ingroup loyalty and kinship.

I proposed that while bribery can be understood as more vertically structured (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015), on account of the disparity relation between the public official and the citizen, favouritism, understood as the use of personal contacts to access state services, can be understood more as either horizontal or kinship (group) motivated favouritism (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015), on account of the personal connection between the citizen and the official. Among corruption studies, the practice of bribery is perhaps the one that has received the most interest (Noonan, 1987; Klitgaard, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Klitgaard (1988, p.23). But favouritism without material exchanges (such as in influence peddling, nepotism, or cronyism) posits interesting cases of study because they, on themselves, imply a closeness between participants, which I posit will increase the salience of ingroup loyalty and/or kinship concerns and intuitions linked to them.

In general, I would expect that individuals would be more likely to engage in petty corruption when it is presented as favouritism instead of bribery. This expectation is based on the proposition that favouritism inherently presents individuals with a moral dilemma, where there are at least two competing concerns: general fairness and ingroup loyalty/kinship. This also matches what seems to happen across countries. For example, in Figure 4.1., we can see that in the 2021 version of the EU Barometer, respondents across European countries reported engaging in favouritism (use of personal connections to access state services) at a much higher rate than in bribery, even in cases that are usually seen as having low levels of corruption (such

as Sweeden).

Figure 4.1: Engament in favouritism and bribery



Thus, I propose that the difference between which intuitions can be triggered by different types of corruption also would contribute to explaining what we see in Figure 4.1., where favouritism is shown to be a more widespread type of corruption that we see even in low-corruption countries and shows no correlation with bribery (in the sense that high levels of favouritism do not always correlate to high levels of bribery) (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013). Although I recognise that other factors can also affect this, since favouritism can also be harder to detect and penalise due to the lack of material exchanges, I propose that intuitions linked to group loyalty and kinship do contribute to making people both more likely to engage in favouritism than in bribery, and also makes them more likely to justify it morally.

In line with the previous discussion, I argue that petty corruption scenarios can be presented to people as either a social dilemma, where there is a tension between general fairness and self-interest, or as a moral dilemma, where there is a

tension between general fairness and other moral concerns. I consider that bribery is often presented as a social dilemma, while favouritism without material exchanges is often presented as a moral dilemma. But, these dilemmas are prototypical since the difference between both is not always clear in real-world scenarios. For example, individuals can engage in bribery driven by moral concerns, such as kinship (for example, getting medical help for a family member), in which case this scenario would better correspond to a moral dilemma. But because bribery, in contrast to favouritism, does not inherently imply a degree of closeness between the actors involved, and thus, it's not inherently linked to the moral domain of ingroup loyalty, it is still the best option for studying corruption as a social dilemma.

For my empirical study of judgement and behaviour related to corruption as a social dilemma (Study 2 in Chapter 10), I focus on presenting a scenario where self-interest would be the most likely motivator for engaging in corruption. I consider that accounting for self-interest as something separate from morality is important. Some authors that subscribe to ethical egoisms argue that selfishness in itself is a moral duty Sidgwick (1907). However, as an ethical philosophy, egoism is problematic because it does not find strong empirical backing since people often engage in costly self-sacrificing behaviour. Furthermore, we can not reduce all instances of corruption to a moral dilemma since it may be a stretch to do so in some cases. For example, a situation in which an individual is faced with the choice between paying a bribe to get faster treatment or letting a family member suffer can clearly be framed as a moral dilemma. In contrast, a situation in which an individual has to decide to pay a bribe to get an administrative procedure done faster would be harder to frame as such. In the first case, engaging in corruption can be seen as morally right because doing so corresponds to concerns linked to other moral domains, like kinship. In the second case, engaging in corruption may be seen as acceptable (because it's a common practice, for example), but I propose that most people would not judge it as morally wrong.

The idea of viewing corruption as a dilemma for which judgement and behaviour can be affected by intuitive moral concerns is consistent with previous studies of

human behaviour. These studies have argued that moral judgement and behaviour can be partly explained by moral hierarchies, in which some motivations are deemed more important than others (Hahn et al., 2019, p.510) due to contextual factors. People may be concerned with more than one motivation at any given time, but their behaviour and judgements are often driven by the most salient one (at a sub-conscious level) or the one they consider most important (at a conscious level) (Tamborini, 2013). This is often viewed from a reflective/deliberative side, where the individual consciously forsakes a moral motivation in favour of another, be it moral or otherwise, but there is also an intuitive side to this. When facing a corruption dilemma, there is also an intuitive activation, strongly linked to emotions, that pushes us towards one of the possible solutions.

A dilemma, whether social or moral, always has an imperfect solution; people either go against their moral concerns or their self-interest or against one of their moral concerns in favour of another. Thus, my argument posits that intuitions play a role in traditional corruption scenarios, which often depict a social dilemma where direct self-interest plays a key role, and other types of corruption scenarios, where the tension between two different moral domains may make corruption be seen as morally right. In both of these cases, moral intuitions linked to the domain of fairness that led to the condemnation of corruption in the abstract are still present, but in concrete situations, these moral intuitions may not be as salient or activated. However, because the intuitions are still present, I argue that they can still be reinforced and made more salient.

4.4.1 Corruption as a Social Dilemma

As mentioned, corruption has been mostly studied as a social dilemma where there is a conflict between self-interest and collective interest. The focus has often been on the public official side of corruption, where the official prioritises self-interest in lieu of the collective one (Blau, 2009). In psychology, these social dilemmas are often thought of in relation to time, where "short-term self-interest is at odds with

longer-term collective interest" (Van Lange et al., 2013), they can also be thought of as simply individual self-interest at odds with collective interest, the latter of which is tied to concerns about distant others.

Traditionally, the view of corruption as a social dilemma has focused on the cost of the collective engagement in corruption. There is a collective efficiency loss related to widespread corruption that also affects individuals. Furthermore, if everyone engages in corruption, an individual is at higher risk of becoming a victim of corruption. This victimhood can be in a personal sense when, for example, they have to wait longer to access state services or are not able to access them without incurring extra expenses due to a need to bribe. However, it can also be collective when public works are not done properly or in time due to efficiency losses. At the same time, individuals have a personal incentive to engage in corruption, especially in a context when there is an empirical expectation that everyone else would do the same (Bicchieri and Ganegonda, 2016). Thus, in corruption as a social dilemma, citizens face two competing demands: one towards the collective related to general fairness and one towards themselves, which has been viewed traditionally as a form of selfishness.

My approach to some types of corruption as social dilemmas is close to the Collective Action approaches that I will discuss in more detail in the next chapter (Persson et al., 2013; Ostrom, 2000). However, my view of corruption as a social dilemma has four key differences with the Collective Action Approach. First, people have moral concerns related to corruption, in addition to material and social ones, as discussed in the first section of this chapter. Second, when people account for group-based interest instead of just their individual interests, it is likely that corruption is presented as a moral dilemma, where ingroup loyalty and kinship are pertinent concerns[4]. Third, and related to the previous point, not all scenarios of corruption,

[4]As mentioned, the difference is sometimes hard to establish in real-world cases since how the scenario is interpreted can vary by individual. For example, an individual bribing a traffic policeman not to have their car impounded due to a traffic violation may generally be seen as a social dilemma, but if the individual considers that their car is indispensable to work and feed

even in countries with endemic corruption, are presented as social dilemmas; the existence of competing moral concerns makes some of these scenarios be presented as moral dilemmas (which I will explain more in the next section). Finally, intuitive processes, and not just reflective/deliberative ones, play a role in how people judge and behave concerning corruption as a social dilemma.

Different forms of corruption can be viewed as a social dilemma, and clientelism is often viewed as such. Clients who receive direct benefits from the incumbent have personal incentives to maintain them in office even when this allocation of benefits is unfair to the collective. However, as I will discuss in the next chapter, in some cases, when clientelism reinforces group identities, tolerance of it and engagement in it can be the result of viewing corruption as a moral dilemma.

Among the different modalities of petty corruption, I propose that bribery is more easily framed as a social dilemma. This is because bribery does not necessarily imply a closeness between participants, nor does it necessarily rest on shared identities. This reduces the likelihood that concerns related to ingroup loyalty or kinship would be at play. As mentioned, this is not always the case since people can engage in bribery to help others in their group, but bribery scenarios are more easily framed as a tension between individual self-interest and fairness at the collective level.

Thus, I posit that at the individual level, bribery is often presented to people as a social dilemma where there is a "conflict between self-interest and social value" (Li et al., 2015). But traditionally, this dilemma has been viewed as the tension between individual rationality and collective rationality (Kollock, 1998), where the engagement in corruption is rational for the individual but irrational at a collective level since it implies the eroding of fair public institutions that benefit everyone. In contrast to this, I propose that part of the social value that people confer on the absence of corruption is partly driven by innate concerns about fairness. This is not

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their family, they may perceive it as a social one. Nevertheless, as explained, bribery scenarios are more likely to be seen as social dilemmas.

unsubstantiated since other studies have found that individuals do make a moral judgement of corruption in conjunction with one driven by social efficiency concerns. For example, Arvate and Mittlaender (2017) found that people were more likely to condemn corruption under moral concerns than they were to do so under efficiency concerns.

Thus, studying bribery as a social dilemma under an Intuitionist framework is interesting because the decision to engage in bribery has often been viewed as purely rational, solely as the result of reflective/deliberative processes. As Prentice (2017) posits, "it appears on the face of things that consciously selfish decisions account for much bribery demanding and receiving". But my approach posits that there is an intuitive component linked to fairness concerns towards the collective, to the judgement and behaviour concerning bribery.

4.4.2 Corruption as a Moral Dilemma

My argument also posits that sometimes corruption can be presented to individuals as a moral dilemma. As discussed, this presents an innovation to the view adopted by Collective Action approaches since I separate self-interest from group-based interest, the latter of which has a moral component and is linked to an intuitive morality of ingroup loyalty and kinship.

This goes in line with some of the studies focused on moral trade-offs (Dungan et al., 2014, 2015; Waytz et al., 2013; Dungan et al., 2014). These studies propose that sometimes corruption implies a trade-off between competing moral concerns, such as fairness (which they classify as a norm that applies universally regardless of group membership) and loyalty (which they classify as a group based norm). For example, for Dungan et al. (2014), there is a moral trade-off between the two moral domains because "fairness demands that people across all groups be treated equally, whereas loyalty demands that one's own group is given special treatment" (Dungan et al., 2014). As Dungan et al. (2017, p.86) puts it, "corrupt behaviour

is not necessarily solely selfish, it can be other serving towards members of one's group [...] a powerful source of corruption arises not from being good so to speak and being selfish, but instead a tension between conflicting moral norms". Thus, there is a difference between engaging in corruption to help oneself and engaging in it to help someone in our group, with the latter being related to ingroup and kinship morality.

Nevertheless, some have viewed this ingroup morality as just another manifestation of selfish behaviour that acts solely through the pathways of moral reasoning. For example, Valdesolo and DeSteno (2007) incorporates ingroup concerns into their study of moral hypocrisy by exploring how the mechanisms that guide the preservation of self-image can also be applied to ingroup members. This view is consistent with the view of people as moral hypocrites that only performatively endorse moral norms to appear moral to others but prioritise self-interest above everything else (Batson et al., 1999; Batson, 2011). But the argument I am proposing is closer to that of Dungan et al. (2017), which views both moral concerns as sincere but differently activated and applied and views ingroup favouritism as a form of morality with an evolutionary basis and corresponding moral intuitions.

The role of ingroup and kinship morality in corruption shouldn't be surprising since our base intuitions evolved in response to long-term evolutionary challenges that mainly centre on the development of societal cooperation, and as mentioned, at the end of the day, "corruption, cronyism, or nepotism is really just cooperation on a smaller scale, often among relatives, friends and reciprocal partners, at the expense of cooperation on a larger, impersonal scale" (Henrich and Muthukrishna, 2021, p.2019).

Therefore, I propose that corruption presents a moral trade-off between the morality of ingroup loyalty and the morality of fairness because "fairness demands that people across all groups be treated equally, whereas loyalty demands that one's own group is given special treatment" (Dungan et al., 2014). The tension between ingroup and fairness also contributes to explaining why some forms of corruption,

such as those that rest on close interpersonal relationships, seem more acceptable than others, such as those that rest purely on material exchanges. When corruption is based on close interpersonal bonds, then moral concerns related to ingroup loyalty and kinship are also present, and intuitions related to these concerns would also play a role in judgement and behaviour. I agree with Dungan et al. (2014)'s premise, which is partly why I take fairness and ingroup loyalty as the two most relevant moral domains for the judgement of corruption and behaviour related to it, but I condition the effect of intuitions linked to these moral domains on whether individuals only recognize themselves as part of a narrow immediate group or also as part of broader ones.

4.5 Moral Emotions related to Fairness

Finally, it is important to reiterate that to study the role of intuitive processes, I am focusing on the role of moral emotions in this dissertation. In line with the discussion of Chapter 3, I am focusing on moral emotions as a proxy for moral intuitions for two of my empirical studies (in Chapters 9 and 10). Specifically, I will be focusing on the role of incidental (not task-related) guilt and anger. Although, as mentioned previously, there is no consensus on whether emotions can be linked to distinct moral domains, guilt and anger seem to affect fairness judgements to a higher degree than other emotions. This is not to say that these emotions wouldn't also affect judgements in other domains or that other emotions (like disgust) wouldn't affect judgements in the fairness domain, just that these emotions have been shown to be strongly linked to fairness judgement.

Thus, while the link between these two emotions and fairness judgements/behaviour has been outlined by the Social Intuitionist Model (Haidt, 2003; Haidt and Joseph, 2004), it also finds support in other empirical studies. For example, in one of the first major qualitative studies of anger and its triggers, Hall (1899) found that reported experiences of anger were associated with unfairness and not just with personal

grievances as initially thought.

More recent neurological studies have also shown evidence for this link between fairness and emotion. For example, in a study of decisions in an ultimatum game, Sanfey et al. (2003) found that unfairness generated a strong activation in areas of the brain linked with emotion.

Furthermore, among emotions, negative moral emotions have been more associated with the domain of fairness than positive emotions. For example, Liu et al. (2016) finds that induced negative emotions, but not positive emotions, lead to higher rejection of unfair offers. Anger has been shown to lead to higher rejection of unfair offers (Liu et al., 2016), and guilt seems to increase one's own moral behaviour (Polman and Ruttan, 2012). For example, Baumeister et al. (1994) found that when employees were given a higher salary than they deserved, they experienced guilt and took a lower salary in subsequent work to achieve a fairer allocation. It was also demonstrated that high-power individuals were willing to help low-power individuals because of guilt and, similarly, that lucky people were willing to help unlucky people as a result of guilty feelings.

Thus, although my decision to focus on the role of anger and guilt was driven by the classification of moral emotions proposed by Haidt (2003), this decision is substantiated by the findings of other empirical studies that have found associations between these emotions and fairness.

4.6 Closing Remarks

In this chapter, I have explained in more detail how the components of my intuitionist approach (presented in Chapter 3) apply to corruption. I have proposed that corruption is also thought of in moral terms, which makes morality an important factor for judgements and behaviours related to it. I have argued that intuitions, in

particular moral intuitions, also play a role in these judgments and behaviours and that how these intuitions manifest is shaped by the social scale individuals take as a reference point and by the way in which corruption is presented (a social or a moral dilemma). In the next chapter, I will discuss in more detail how my argument is positioned in relation to previous studies of corruption.

Chapter 5

Dialogue with previous approaches to corruption

Having presented the main components of my Intuitionist Approach and how it relates to the study of corruption, I will dedicate this section to explaining how my argument relates to previous approaches to corruption. I propose that my argument presents a more comprehensive approach to individual-level corruption than previous ones, but it does not contradict many of the key insights and empirical expectations of previous studies.

First, as previously mentioned, my focus on the individual level judgement and behaviour concerning corruption already distances my argument from those that focus on institutional determinants of corruption such as levels of democracy, inequality, and wealth, among other factors (Rose-Ackerman, 2006; Della Porta, 1999; Treisman, 2000). Although part of my argument does rest on the effect of both formal and social norms, this is still concentrated on how individuals internalise or not these effects and how this constrains their judgement both through a reflective/deliberative and intuitive pathway.

However, there are other studies that have approached corruption based on

individual-level models of behaviour, and this section is mostly focused on discussing how my argument differs from these studies. This is broadly organised into two groups: those approaches that only account for reflective/deliberative processes and those approaches that account for intuitive processes but only as connected to reflective/deliberative. These approaches differed from my argument since I posit that part of the individual level judgement and behaviours concerning corruption is driven by intuitive processes that can act separately from reflective/deliberative ones. Furthermore, because my argument also posits that how these intuitions manifest is partially driven by the social reference individuals account for — either only immediate narrow groups or broader, more distant groups — in this section, I will also discuss how other approaches to corruption have accounted for social identities.

Thus, since my argument is partly based on a Dual-Process approach to moral judgement and behaviour, I consider that my argument provides a more comprehensive Dual-Process approach to corruption, while previous ones have only provided partial approaches either by discounting the role of intuitive processes or buy fully subordinating them to reflective/deliberative ones.

5.1 Approaches Focused on Reflective/deliberative Processes

As mentioned before, most previous studies on corruption have exclusively focused on deliberative/reflective processes. Thus, these approaches fit into a partial model of corruption that solely accounts for reflective/deliberative processes, as shown in the figure below.

Figure 5.1: Partial model 1



Importantly, among studies that have focused solely on the role of reflective/deliberative processes, we find those that aligned with the two dominant approaches to corruption, the Principal-Agent and the Collective Action approaches, since both "assume rational calculations as the driver of individual and collective action [...]". (Persson et al., 2019a, p.801), and account for factors such as social norms solely through the lenses of cost-benefit calculation.

Until recently, corruption had been mostly studied through the principal-agent paradigm (see, for example, Golden (2012); Lambsdorff (2002); Rose-Ackerman and Søreide (2011)). According to this approach, the principal delegates power to the agent to fulfil the principals' goals, and corruption emerges due to the agent prioritising self-interest (Klitgaard, 1988). As Cox and McCubbins (2007) notes, politics can be understood as a series of nested and sequenced principal-agent relationships, with the first principals being the citizens. Studies based on the Principal-Agent approach have focused almost exclusively on the behaviour of public officials and on the incentives that can drive their engagement in corruption. These studies have mostly focused on bribery schemes and approximating the public cost of those schemes (Djankov and Sequeira, 2010; Mcmillan and Zoido, 2004; Olken, 2006). In this view, approaches to tackle corruption, including petty corruption, have focused directly on altering the balance of this mostly material cost-benefit analysis (Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001; Rauch and Evans, 2000;

Rose-Ackerman, 2016; Reinikka and Svensson, 2005; Adserà et al., 2003) [1]. The engagement in corruption is mostly studied from the public official side, while the citizen side is reduced to the study of factors that can affect the punishment of corruption. Thus, in these studies where the citizen is characterised as the principal, the main focus has been on mechanisms that affect punishment towards corruption officials (Persson, 2000), with an emphasis on information mechanisms linked to monitoring, whistleblowing, transparency and auditing. These strategies are presented under the assumption that vast and accessible information would increase the likelihood of detecting corruption and that once it is detected, it would be punished.

My approach differs from the Principal-Agent one in two ways. First, I focus more on the citizen side of corruption, acknowledging that common citizens are also active participants in corruption, particularly in petty corruption. Second, I propose that both engagement in corruption and the punishment of it are not only determined by material cost and benefits and access to information. Although I agree with the importance of information, I posit that one of the reasons why more information does not always translate into punishment rests on the role of intuitive processes. In particular, I argue that how the information is presented matters and that some ways of presenting this information are more likely to increase the salience of the intuitive condemnation of corruption (as I explore in Chapter 6). Additionally, I speculate (based on results from Chapters 7 and 8) that corruption would also be more tolerated when it is related to competing moral intuitions or when the general unfairness of the context is what shapes how these intuitions are applied. In general, the Principal-Agent approach has been criticised for not being suitable for a context in which corruption is systematic and endemic since it seems to assume principled principals (Marquette and Peiffer, 2018) and does not account for the fact that there can be social norms (and I argue, moral norms) that also favour corruption behaviours. Furthermore, this approach views engagement in corruption as purely selfish when, in reality, a great part of it (especially in petty corruption scenarios)

[1]For example, some of this work, such as that of Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) focus on how civil service salaries can increase or curb petty corruption

can be morally motivated. For example, engaging in bribery or favouritism with the goal of helping kin is corruption, but at the same time, it can be seen as the "right" thing to do.

An alternative approach to corruption that has been seen as more suited for a context where corruption is systemic and endemic is the Collective Action approach [2]. Corruption in the Collective Action approach can be considered a "second-order" collective problem (Ostrom, 1998), where the solutions to corruption are undermined by the expectations that others would act corruptly (Teorell, 2007; Rothstein, 2011b). Thus, "systemic corruption generates norms and incentives that reinforce perverse equilibria" (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2023, p.21).

For this approach, in societies with high levels of corruption, people find themselves in a society-wide coordination game in which "the choice of an actor to engage in corrupt behaviour results [in part] from a fundamentally interdependent and societally contingent risk–return calculus" (Corbacho et al., 2016, p.3) in which the individual takes into account beliefs about what other actors would do when faced with a similar decision (Della Porta, 1999; Persson et al., 2013; Heidenheimer, 2002). Thus, under this perspective, the individual is focused not only on their own interest but also on their family or immediate constituent group, for example, a political party (Casado-Aranda et al., 2020), and also accounts for the expected behaviour of others (social norms). Studies that adhere to the Collective Action approach have proposed different solutions to the problem of corruption: big bang reforms that are only possible after a big shock that can modify elite behaviour and preferences, enlightened leadership, incremental reforms and anticorruption crusades (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2023, p.21).

Largely, my approach is closer to the Collective Action one because, in both, it is possible to assume that most people would condemn corruption but still engage

[2]Both approaches can also be seen as complementary, as Marquette and Peiffer (2018) proposes, and applicable to different types and scales of corruption

in it. The key difference is that in the Collective Action approach, the decision of whether to engage or not in corruption is a conscious (or as-if conscious one), where people weigh their condemnation of corruption against the potential costs or benefits of engaging in it.

For the Collective Action approach, punishment of corruption and engagement in it results solely from reflective/deliberative processes. In a context where individuals expect most people to engage in corruption, punishing it and absenting from it would have more costs than benefits; under this approach, petty corruption (especially in countries where corruption is endemic) can have a functional role (Marquette and Peiffer, 2018). While I agree with this, I argue that an important part of the equation we are ignoring is that there are intuitions linked to these behaviours that can act as guides towards or away from them. I argue that our fairness intuition would lead most people to condemn corruption (viewing it as "bad") in the abstract, but this condemnation would not always translate to a concrete situation.

In other words, for Collective Action approaches, corruption is mostly presented as a social dilemma, where individuals weigh personal or group-based interest against their condemnation of corruption. On the other hand, my argument proposes that corruption can sometimes be presented as a moral dilemma, particularly in cases where individuals consider group interest since group loyalty intuitions can be at play. I also propose that in cases in which corruption is presented as a moral dilemma, curbing engagement in it is harder because it is aligned with our moral intuitions, and thus, it can be more easily justified from a moral standpoint.

Furthermore, my argument also accounts for the role of norms and incentives but rather focuses on how these factors can constrain or amplify moral intuitions [3].

[3]This is not to say that these factors do not also affect conscious evaluations. As mentioned, my argument provides an extension rather than a rebuttal to previous approaches. Social norms can operate both in intuitive and reflective/deliberative processes.

Studies that align with the Collective Action approach account for the role of social norms but only through their effect in reflective/deliberative processes, assuming that they affect a conscious or as-if conscious evaluation of the utility of engaging in corruption. For example, Zaloznaya et al. (2018) accounts for factors such as attitudes/beliefs about the acceptability of corruption and how they relate to the perceived risk of engaging in corruption and the benefits of it but do so by only accounting for reflective/deliberative pathways. Even when accounting for social norms, Zaloznaya et al. (2018) only do so by viewing them as factors that allow individuals to better weigh the consequences of their engagement in corruption. Similarly, Tavits (2010) argues that people develop an understanding of corruption as right or wrong by modelling others' behaviour but argues that this only matters because of the subsequent cost-benefit analysis, in which believing others are not likely to engage in corruption reduces the likelihood of one's own engagement because the risk and benefits become more uncertain. While this certainly may play a role, my argument posits that we should also account for the moral intuitions surrounding corruption and how it may "feel" wrong or right to engage in it in a given situation.

Thus, although many of my argument's empirical implications do not necessarily contradict those of previous studies, I consider that my approach offers a more comprehensive model for understanding corruption judgement and behaviour at the individual level.

5.2 Approaches that *Partially* account for Intuitive Processes

In contrast to the previously discussed approaches, some studies of corruption (although still very few) have accounted for the role of intuitive processes, in particular emotions, but only in relation to the reflective/deliberative processes. I consider this to be a partial approach to corruption judgement and behaviour since these studies

only account for intuitive processes that are either the result or are directly linked to reflective/deliberative processes, as seen in the figure below, without accounting for the independent role intuitive processes can have.

Figure 5.2: Partial model 2



As mentioned in Chapter 2, my argument posits, in accordance with the Social Intuitionist Model, that emotions are a key component of moral intuitions (Haidt, 2003), to the point that sometimes emotions can serve as moral intuitions (Keltner et al., 2006). An important point, as shown in Figure 2.1., is that moral intuitions can have an effect separate from defective/deliberative processes, not only in relation to them, as I test in Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation.

Although the interest in the role of intuitive processes, especially emotions, among political scientists and social scientists more broadly has exponentially increased in recent years, to the point in which some wonder if we are now in an "affective era" (Dukes et al., 2021), the role these processes play in corruption judgment and behaviour is still understudied[4]. Furthermore, although there is a recent turn to observe emotions not just as a result of reflective/deliberative process (As in

[4]A couple of detailed reviews on the role of emotions in politics are provided by Marcus (2000) and Marcus (2023)

Figure 3.2.) but also as having an independent role (as in my argument presented in Figure 2.1.), this new wave has yet to touch studies of corruption, where engagement and judgement are mostly seen as still seen solely as the results conscious (or quasi conscious) rational processes.

The recent focus of political science studies on the role of emotions has been mostly on areas such as partisanship and polarization (Gervais, 2017, 2019), campaigning and voting behaviour (Brader, 2005; Stolwijk et al., 2017; Roseman et al., 2020), non-electoral political participation and mobilization (Lamprianou and Ellinas, 2019; Valentino et al., 2011), and information seeking and sharing (Lamprianou and Ellinas, 2019; Valentino et al., 2008; Hoewe and Parrott, 2019; Lerner et al., 2003). Most political science studies of the role of emotions have subscribed to the Appraisal Theory of Emotions or, more recently, to the Affective Intelligence Theory, and quite a few borrow parts of both to construct their argument[5].

As explained in a previous section, the original version of the Appraisal Theory of emotions (Lazarus, 1991) sees emotions exclusively as the result of the appraisal of a situation, seeing them as the result of cognitive appraisals. In other words, when a person appraises a situation or issue, this generates an emotional response, and both things affect judgment. Under this theory, the difference in the appraisal gives rise to distinct emotions, which in turn can affect judgment. Thus, emotions are the result of cognitive appraisal in a process such as the one shown in Figure 3.1. In this view, reflective/deliberative processes precede emotions. Due to this, it is not surprising that this work has focused on the role of integral emotions, which are generated by stimuli related to the judgement task. In other words, Appraisal Theories focus on "influences of subjective experiences that are relevant to present judgement and choices" (Lerner and Keltner, 2000). Much of the political science work that uses the appraisal framework has focused on how emotions can affect how

[5]For example, (Valentino et al., 2011) borrows from the Appraisal Theory the idea that same valence emotions can have different causes and effect, and from the Affective Intelligence Theory the idea that incidental emotions can also have an effect in judgement tasks.

political parties or politicians are viewed. For example, Gervais (2017) explores how instances of contra-attitudinal elite incivility (statements made by party leaders) generate anger, which leads to less support for partisan compromise. Similarly, Roseman et al. (2020) finds that individual feelings of contempt (as well as anger) towards candidates affect voting intention.

Although, as previously mentioned, not much work has been done on emotions and corruption, there is an interesting study that uses some of the proponents of Appraisal Theory to study corruption. Jaber-López et al. (2014) studied the emotional arousal generated through a bribery game and the correlates of it with behaviour. They used a bribery game and measured emotional reactions through physical arousal using skin conductance response, and they found that higher emotional arousal was associated with responses that deviated from purely utility maximisation. Here, although there is a correlation between emotions and behaviour related to corruption, emotion is seen only as the result of the decision-making process and the subsequent behaviour and not as a component and cause of it.

A more recent theory, but one that has got traction in the study of emotions in political science is the Affective Intelligence Theory (Marcus, 2000; Marcus et al., 2011, 2000), which proposes that individuals "use their emotions to help manage their attention to the political world" (Marcus et al., 2011), guiding how and when these individuals make decisions and seek information. This theory views emotions as structured along a disposition-surveillance system. Emotions that correspond to the disposition system lead to a more automatic judgment largely based on heuristics, while emotions that correspond to the surveillance system lead to more time-consuming deliberative/reflective judgements.

Initially, the Affective Intelligence Theory was proposed to explain the role of emotions on voting behaviour, particularly to understand where voters are more likely to rely on heuristics and when on conscious rationality (especially where they are more likely to seek and be receptive to new information). Although the use of this theory has expanded beyond the arena of voting behaviour, the core of organizing

emotional responses along the disposition-surveillance spectrum has remained the same.

The Affective Intelligence Theory is closer to the approach I take in this dissertation since it proposes that "emotional evaluations of and reactions to symbols, groups, and events, are generated before conscious awareness" (Marcus et al., 2000), but it differs on the way it approaches emotions. While my argument, in accordance with Social Intuitionism and other approaches that take moral emotions as their focus, views different emotions as corresponding to intuitions developed through evolutionary challenges (mainly related to social cooperation), the Affective Intelligence Theory reduces all emotions to either anxiety (which encompasses emotions such as fear, worry, and anxiety) or enthusiasm. All emotional reactions interpreted as "anxiety" correspond to the surveillance system, while all emotions interpreted as "enthusiasm" correspond to the disposition system. For the Affective Intelligence Theory, emotions interpreted as anxiety will lead people to rely more on the reflective/deliberative processes; they would lead people "to stop relying on habit and focus more on conscious reasoning and contemporary assessment" (Vasilopoulos, 2019), while I consider that these emotions can affect how the reflective/deliberative processes perform.

Studies of political behaviour under the Affective Intelligence Theory have focused on how anxiety (surveillance) and enthusiasm (disposition) affect the way in which people process new information and evaluate political candidates (Groenendyk, 2016; Albertson, 2015; Redlawsk et al., 2010). As before, there are few works that use this framework to study corruption. A notable exception is a study by Birch et al. (2017), who propose a theoretical model for the role of anger and anxiety in perceptions of politicians' integrity and found that those respondents who reported feelings of anger or anxiety when evaluating politicians (in France) varied in their judgement of politicians, with reported anxiety being associated with harsher negative evaluation of politicians that engage in self-serving behaviour.

Another relatively new perspective that combines some of the insights from (Mar-

cus et al., 2000) theoretical development and relates it to the use of multiple distinct emotions as done by traditional Appraisal Theories is the Appraisal Tendency Framework (Lerner and Keltner, 2000), whose main innovation is the proposal that emotions can have "carry-over effects". These carry-over effects mean that emotions generated by tasks or situations that are unrelated to the situation that is being judged can still affect this judgement and, thus, behaviour. In other words, it focuses on the role of incidental emotions, on "the sometimes puzzling influence of subjective emotional experiences that should be irrelevant to present judgements and choices" (Lerner and Keltner, 2000). The focus on incidental emotions, as I'll discuss in more detail in Chapter 4, better elucidates the way in which intuitive processes can and do have an independent role in judgement and behaviour.

The findings of studies that align with the Appraisal Tendency Framework highlight how intuitive processes can be seen as relevant for judgment in a way that is more independent of reflective/deliberative processes. For example, in a recent study about the role of emotions in political participation, Lamprianou and Ellinas (2019) finds that eliciting incidental anger and shame affects whether people seek information and report intent to be politically active. But, to my knowledge, there is not any work that has been applied to the study of corruption, with the exception of the work of Huang et al. (2016), who focused on how emotions reported in relation to the physical environment affected perceptions of corruption. Although Huang et al. (2016) study does not induce emotional states directly, the idea that emotional states affect how information is processed is compatible with my argument, in which intuitive and deliberative processes are related. Nevertheless, this study focused on perceptions of corruption and not on judgement and behaviour in relation to it.

Additionally, there is also another line of studies in which the focus is not so much on emotions generated either integrally (related to the judgement task) or incidentally (unrelated to the judgement task) but rather on the psychological disposition to feel these emotions. This line focuses on personality traits, specifically on emotional proneness, and studies their correlation with judgement and behaviour.

In the realm of corruption, an interesting study is that of (Hu et al., 2023), which showed that individuals who are prone to feel guilt are less likely to engage in bribery (this effect increases when harm towards others is made salient). This aligns with previous findings that associated guild process with a lower likelihood of an individual engaging in unethical behaviour (Cohen et al., 2012). My argument does not account for personality traits, and I consider that some of these studies take an over-deterministic approach to behaviour, but I acknowledge that it's still a developing research agenda and, as I will discuss in conclusion, it is one that I would like to explore further.

Finally, it is important to mention that there are a few studies that tackle corruption under an intuitionist framework. One example of this is the recent work by (de Oliveira Leite et al., 2020), which suggests that perceptions of corruption may be more related to what they called individualising foundations (harm and fairness) but not to binding foundations (in-group, authority, purity). My study also differentiates between the intuitions linked to the domain of fairness and those linked to group loyalty and kinship. But in contrast to de Oliveira Leite et al. (2020), I focus not on perceptions of corruption but on judgement and behaviour in relation to it. Furthermore, I do not employ a division of intuitions in individualising and binding but rather focus on how the social scale (or group) that individuals take as reference matters to how these intuitions manifest.

Another study that uses an intuitionist framework is that of Dungan et al. (2014), which is a bit closer to my approach. Dungan et al. (2014) also studied corruption as a dilemma, but exclusively as a moral dilemma, focusing solely on the tension between competing moral domains (loyalty vs fairness). The focus of their studies was the practice of whistle-blowing, which illustrated the tension between loyalty (to one's group that is committing the wrongdoing) and fairness. They conducted three studies: one in which participants recalled and explained their own experiences with whistleblowing, one in which participants filled out moral questionnaires about making a whistleblowing decision and a final one in which they attempted to manipulate the moral intuitions linked to these two domains (fairness and loyalty)

and see if there was an effect on the whistle-blowing decision. This last study is closer to my own approach, but I found one main issue with their experimental manipulation. For this study, their manipulation consisted of asking participants to write essays about the importance of fairness over loyalty or vice versa. While the authors took this to influence whistleblowing decisions in an intuitive manner, I consider that this type of intervention acts more as a prompt for the type of answer the participants think the experimenter expects.

Thus, although there is a vast literature on the role of emotions in political judgement and behaviour, which has seen a particular resurgence in recent years, and although many of these new studies view emotions (and thus intuitive processes) as having an effect both independently and in relation to reflective/deliberative processes, very little of this work has focused on the study of corruption. The few studies that focus on emotions and corruption (Jaber-López et al., 2014; Birch et al., 2017) adopt a mix of the postulates of the traditional Appraisal and Emotional Intelligence Theories and study emotions generated only by stimuli related to the judgement task or focus solely on how this emotional states can affect information seeking and processing.

5.3 Approaches that take Identity into account

To conclude this section, it is important to discuss how my argument dialogues with previous studies of corruption that have focused on the role of group identity. This is important because part of my argument posits that the role of intuitions linked to fairness and competing intuitions linked to group loyalty and kinship would differ depending on an individual's social scale reference — whether they only account for their immediate narrow group or also for a broader distant one. In the realm of political science, a large number of studies have focused on group-based identities, where the reference group is a midpoint between narrow immediate groups (family and close friends) and distant broader groups (nation, humanity).

In most cases, these group-based studies have focused on identities related to party and ethnicity. All of these identities are components of an individual's social identity (Tajfel and Turner, 2001), which is understood as the component of an individual sense of self that is derived from the membership or belonging to a group. When narrower identities are salient and generalised trust (trust in distant others) is lower, moral intuitions linked to group loyalty and kinship are also more likely to be salient vis-a-vis intuition connected to fairness at a larger social scale. In this dissertation, I focus on the narrower (family) and the broader (country/nation) identities, but as mentioned, previous studies have focused on the role of group-based identities that are situated in the middle.

There is a variety of studies that focuses on how partisanship affects individual responses to corruption (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Anduiza et al., 2013; Blais et al., 2017; Chang and Kerr, 2009; Tverdova, 2011), where a partisan identity that matches that of the candidate seems to attenuate the effect of an accusation of corruption (Anduiza et al., 2013; Solaz et al., 2019). Ethnicity (Banerjee and Pande, 2007), among other types of identities, have led to similar results. What is more, in-group loyalty has been shown to lead to less severe punishment of corruption even when the group identity is based on something so irrelevant as a favourite painter (Solaz et al., 2019). This has also been studied by organisational scholars, who have shown that organisations may develop an inside culture of solidarity with corrupt members (Katz, 1977).

The bulk of these studies have focused on how shared group identities can make individuals more tolerant of corruption, but few studies have focused on how identities can affect engagement. In general, these studies find that people are less likely to denounce or punish members of their own group, both because of reflective/deliberative processes (concerns about the social cost of doing so, for example) and intuitive processes (Dungan et al., 2014). But importantly, because the intuitive condemnation of corruption in the abstract, which is linked to fairness, does not simply disappear in favour of intuitive concerns linked to domains like in-group loyalty and kinship, I argue that tools designed to make intuitions related to fairness

more salient would increase the likelihood of punishing corruption, even when the perpetrator shares one of the individuals social identities.

5.3.1 Identities and Clientelism

Furthermore, while party and ethnic group identities can be associated with corruption, leading to less condemnation and more engagement, these identities do not result from corrupt particles themselves, and thus, it is likely that if people strongly identify with broader communities, they would be more likely than those who don't to condemn corruption even in cases where the corrupt agent is a person from their own party or ethnic group. However, there is another facet to this relationship, where corruption can either create or reinforce certain identities. Here, the literature on clientelism offers interesting nuances to my argument.

Clientelism is broadly defined as the targeted giving of goods and services in exchange for political support, based on a patron-client relationship which may or may not be mediated by brokers (Stokes et al., 2013); in other words, it is the "exchange of selective benefits for political alliance" (Lawson and Greene, 2014). From the citizen side, at first sight, clientelism presents a social dilemma where the individual weights these "selective" benefits against more universalistic fairness in the provision of goods and services; but in reality, because clientelism often provides group-based benefits, it often presents individuals with a moral dilemma, between the in-group-loyalty that would lead them to support incumbents that give benefit to their group, and broader fairness concerns.

Furthermore, studies have shown that clientelistic exchanges are often maintained through reciprocity (Lawson and Greene, 2014). As I have discussed, for intuitionist approaches, such as the Morality as Cooperation Approach, reciprocity is linked to group membership, with the morality of reciprocity being manifested in "trusting others, reciprocating favours, seeking revenge, expressing gratitude, and making amends" (Curry et al., 2019b).

Although I could not find previous studies with clear evidence of clientelism creating group identities that have corruption in their foundation, there is evidence that points towards the idea of clientelism reinforcing corruption through identity. While this is not vastly different from my argument, in which in-group loyalty concerns can surpass universalistic fairness concerns, it does provide an interesting caveat when in-group identities are such that the out-group is seen as undeserving of universalistic fairness, as may be the case in some cases of ethnic-based clientelism.

Regarding this second point, from earlier on, studies have shown that in cases where ethnic identities are a salient component of social identities, incumbents are likely to favour co-ethnic in the distribution of benefits (Przeworski et al., 1999; Kramon and Posner, 2013; Bates, 1973), particularly in cases where economic inequality is high, since this contributes to different ethnic groups having less preference for more universalistic distributive politics (Wang and Kolev, 2019). This provides an interesting caveat for my argument.

As discussed, I consider in-group loyalty in reference to groups (such as family or friends) that, although related to intuitions that favour particularism instead of universalism, do not trigger intuitions that directly oppose universalism. In other words, in my argument, favouring one's family or friends responds in part to intuitions of in-group loyalty, which can surpass intuitions of fairness in some concrete situations, but it's not a function of intuitions that directly oppose fairness. Individuals can see it as morally right to help their family or friends and still consider it morally right for there to be a fair and impartial distribution of goods, which presents them with a moral dilemma, a conflict between multiple moral concerns, as I have discussed in Chapter 4.

But in some cases of ethnic-based clientelism, the in-group intuitions triggered in relation to ethnic identities can directly oppose universalistic fairness intuitions. Co-ethnics can see distribution towards another ethnic group as morally wrong, and this eliminates the moral dilemma. While self-interest may be part of the reason why individuals support co-ethnic incumbents that engage in clientelism, another

part of the explanation may rest on the way moral intuitions are triggered by this group division. If an individual believes that non-co-ethnics are inherently different and less deserving, then clientelism would not be seen as morally wrong, especially in the context of relative economic deprivation, which would reinforce the in-group and out-group divide (Yıldırım, 2023).

I believe this view of others as "undeserving" of fair treatment is possibly in some contexts in which ethnic divisions are strong and salient for politics, but this goes beyond the scope of this dissertation. Here, I am focusing on in-group identities that do not necessarily lead to a view of the outgroup as inherently different and less deserving. In my study cases and the identities I focus on, I expect that people may favour their family or friends but still recognise that distant others deserve a fair allocation and access to public resources. Still, it is possible that in cases of strong ethnic division, people may favour their co-ethnics and see the distant non-co-ethnic others as different and undeserving, and I recognise that this has important implications for the role of moral intuitions in the study of clientelism.

5.4 Closing Remarks

In this Chapter, I have explained how my argument relates to previous studies of corruption and how it contributes to the literature on the subject by (1) focusing on the understudied citizen side of corruption, (2) accounting for intuitive processes in addition to reflective/deliberative ones, (3) viewing emotions, and intuitive processes more broadly, as having an effect in judgement and behaviour both independently and in conjunction with reflective/deliberative processes, and (4) accounting for the role of identity in an innovative way that views social identity as collection identities that fall into a continuum that goes from narrow/immediate to broad/distant. In the next chapters of this section, I will discuss my argument in more depth.

Chapter 6

Summary of Part I

In this Part of my dissertation, I have presented my argument and its basis, further explained how it applies to the study of corruption, and discussed how it relates to previous studies of corruption. I expect that this discussion has served to situate my approach in relation to moral, social, and evolutionary psychology studies and clarify each component's role in my argument. Furthermore, I trust that my discussion of alternative approaches to corruption has situated my argument in relation to previous work in political science.

To summarise, I propose an Intuitionist Approach to corruption, and my argument posits that:

1. To understand judgements and behaviours in relation to corruption, we need to account for intuitive processes in addition to reflective/deliberative processes
2. Intuitive processes, for which emotions are key, play an important role in the judgement of corruption and the behaviour in relation to it.
3. Among this intuitive process, moral intuitions, which refer to the hunches or evaluative feelings of "right or wrong", are particularly important for judgements and behaviours related to corruption.

4. There are multiple moral intuitions that correspond to different moral domains (pluralistic view of morality) and some moral emotions are strongly associated with these domains.

5. Moral intuitions are innate and universal and evolved as solutions to cooperation problems to allow for life in societies.

6. Corruption is widely condemned in the abstract partly due to moral intuitions linked to the domain of fairness.

7. This condemnation in the abstract does not always translate into concrete settings because of competing moral intuitions and other non-moral concerns. In particular, I propose that engagement and tolerance of corruption can be strongly linked to intuitions of in-group loyalty or kinship.

8. Corruption, at least petty corruption, is presented to citizens as either a social dilemma with a trade-off between self-interest and fairness or a moral dilemma with a trade-off between fairness and other moral concerns, such as ingroup loyalty.

9. Which and how intuitions manifest partly depends on factors related to the social scale that individuals take as their reference point. Individuals who also take larger society as a reference point are more likely to manifest intuitive fairness concerns even when facing concrete corruption scenarios.

10. For variation at the individual level, it's important to focus on the effect of norms designed to promote larger-scale cooperation and thus allow individuals to more easily have a broader society as a reference point in addition to their immediate ingroup.

11. Two related factors that show the effects of these norms are social identity and generalised trust. Individuals who have a broader social identity in addition to narrower ones and who report higher levels of generalised trust are more likely to account for larger society when facing corruption scenarios and, thus, more likely to manifest intuitive fairness concerns.

In Part 2 of this dissertation, I will present a series of empirical studies that aim to test various components of my argument.

Part II

Empirical Studies

Chapter 7

Empirical Approach

In Part I, I presented my Intuitionist Approach to corruption and discussed each of its components in detail. In Part II, I will present three chapters (with a total of six studies) that test different components of my argument.

As mentioned in the Introduction, directly observing the role of intuitive processes in judgement and behaviour is a complicated task because the judgements that people report and the behaviour we observe are often the results of both intuitive and deliberative/reflective processes, as presented in my argument summarising figure (Chapter 2), which I am also placing here.

Argument



As we can see in the figure above, although intuitive processes and reflective/deliberative processes can have separate independent effects on judgement and behaviour, they also act in tandem, and thus, it is hard to clearly distinguish between both empirically.

Nevertheless, there are ways of testing and observing several of the components of my argument. As mentioned in the Introduction, I use a mix of qualitative work and experiments. The methods I use are text analysis (in all of the chapters), focus groups (in Chapter 10), a conjoint experiment (in Chapter 8), a vignette experiment (in Chapter 9), and two experiments with induced incidental emotions (in Chapter 9 and 10). In this introductory chapter to the empirical part of my dissertation, I will explain the logic behind each of these methods, explaining which components of my argument they allow me to test. I will also present the general components of the treatments and analysis, while in each of the empirical chapters, I will present the specific design related to the cases.

7.1 Text Analysis: how people talk about corruption

All three of my empirical chapters employ text analysis, but the purpose of this analysis and the way in which it was conducted vary by study.

7.1.1 News headlines

In Chapter 8, this analysis is done in Study 1. This study was based on newspaper headlines retrieved from Google News using the Python package BeautifulSoup. These headlines were obtained by searching for the term "corruption", constraining the date range to three electoral periods in Peru. The goal here was to establish how the media covered corruption during political campaigns, which related to Study 2 of the same chapter, where I used a conjoint experiment that simulated an electoral choice. Looking at how the headline portrayed corruption allowed me to establish whether coverage of corruption presented it only on general terms or delved into the consequences and costs of corruption. I considered this important for my argument since part of my explanation as to why people tolerate corruption in concrete settings rests on the fact that other more salient contextual features can occlude the innate unfairness and consequences of corruption. Thus, for this study, I argued that if the way in which the media covers corruption is too general, then this can contribute to tolerance in concrete situations.

In this chapter, the text analysis was done manually by classifying the headlines based on whether they mentioned corruption (or similar words such as influence peddling or bribes) and/or electoral campaigns, candidates or elections. As a second step, the headlines were classified manually to account for mentions of (1) amounts involved in corruption (money related to bribes, malversation, etc.), (2) the actors directly involved in corruption (mentions that use names instead of general terms such as "an official", or "a policeman), (3) the sanctions that were given (any penalty,

be it a fine or prison sentence), (4) and the negative externalities (mentions of harms towards others or social costs of corruption).

The classification for this study was done manually and without automation through a dictionary because the search was only able to retrieve 222 results, and of those, only 44 directly mentioned corruption[1]. Due to this, it was possible to conduct a manual classification. Furthermore, some of these features would have been hard to capture through a dictionary. For example, a dictionary of the negative externalities would include mentions of "others" or "society/societal", but these are very general terms. If the sample had been larger, a dictionary approach would have been more efficient, but since the sample was small, I preferred to do the classification manually.

7.1.2 Individual responses

In Chapters 9 and 10, I used text analysis to analyse the open-ended responses included in three surveys, two in the UK and one in Peru. In Study 1 of Chapter 9, participants were presented with either a scenario of petty bribery or favouritism, and towards the end of the survey, they were asked if they believed the practices they were presented with should or should not be considered corruption. In Study 2 of Chapter 9, where participants were presented with a favouritism scenario, they were also asked an open-ended question requesting them to evaluate why engaging in favouritism in the situation presented would be wrong or right. In Study 2 of Chapter 10, where participants were presented with a bribery scenario, the same question was asked, and participants were required to evaluate whether engaging in bribery in the situation presented would be wrong or right. In all three studies, I used the same dictionary but conducted the analysis in a different manner due to the lack of a validated version of the dictionary in Spanish.

The goal of this analysis was to see whether the way in which people talk (or, in

[1]The full list of retrieved headlines can be found in Appendix A of Chapter 8

this case, write) about corruption is coloured by morality, as I would expect based on the discussion presented in Chapter 4. I wanted to see whether people used words related to certain moral domains (in particular, fairness and ingroup loyalty) when evaluating whether something is corruption and when evaluating whether engagement in certain forms of petty corruption should be considered wrong or right. This allowed me to determine if, in accordance with my argument, people also think of corruption in moral terms and whether this moral evaluation is different from an acceptability evaluation.

To analyse the responses to these open-ended questions, I used the latest version of the Moral Foundations Dictionary (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2012; Hopp et al., 2020)[2]. This new version of the Moral Foundations Dictionary divided words into "virtues" and "vices" as associated with each of the main five moral foundations: care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and sanctity (more detail in each foundation is given in Chapter 3).

To analyse the responses to these open-ended questions in Studies 1 and 2 of Chapter 9, where the case was the UK, I used the *quanteda R package*, which included this latest version of the Moral Foundations Dictionary. Through the **liwcalike()** function, *quanteda* allows for the use of dictionary-based approaches to extract content in a way that is similar to the LICW (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count) software. In this case, the use of the Moral Foundations Dictionary facilitates extracting moral content and detecting differences in moral language. By taking each response as a "segment", **liwcalike()** function calculates a series of metrics based on this, including the number of words related to the dictionary that is being used for the analysis. When there are multiple "segments", the LICW function calculates the percentage of the total word in each segment that matches the words in the dictionary. Later, this percentages are aggregated into an average.

For Study 2 of Chapter 10, where the study was conducted in Peru, I conducted

[2]This version is often called the Extended Moral Foundations Dictionary

a count analysis using the *stringr R package*. This count analysis picked how many of the "segments" or respondents' answers mentioned words related to the different foundations. Although I used the same dictionary, I manually translated the words in the dictionary from English to Spanish since there is no validated version of the updated dictionary in Spanish. Due to the absence of a validated Spanish version, I also decided against conducting the analysis using *quanteda* since, although the software does allow for the inclusion of new dictionaries, the way of calculating the averages was programmed for the original English version only.

7.2 Focus Groups: how people talk about corruption

In Study 1 of Chapter 10, I used focus groups to understand further how people view corruption and their relation to it. For this study, I conducted a series of six focus groups in Peru. As with the text-analysis method, the goal of the focus groups was also to see how people talk about corruption and what considerations play a role in the individual's decision to engage or not in corruption.

Although the focus groups did not allow me to differentiate between reflective/deliberative and intuitive processes, they did allow me to glimpse at the justifications people provide for engaging in actions judged as wrong in the abstract. Thus, these focus groups allowed me to see how people verbalise their acceptance and condemnation of corruption and get insight into how they see their own experiences with it. This is important because, by prodding people on their own engagement in corruption in a social setting, I was able to find whether justifications were based only on the functional aspect of corruption or whether there is also a moral component.

I decided to use focus groups because they have been shown to be more useful than other strategies, such as direct interviews, for eliciting feedback when discussing

sensitive topics (Madriz, 1998; Cyr, 2015). This is due to the fact that this method allows us to access the mental processes underlying a preference or judgement (Bratton and Liatto-Katundu, 1994) by a dialectic process in which participants explain and defend their preferences or judgements in a social setting (Kidd and Parshall, 2000).

The discussion during the focus groups was loosely structured based on a guide that tackled the main point to be discussed. First, participants were asked to define corruption in their own words. Then, they were asked about their own experiences with corruption, either as victims or participants. To prompt discussion around this sensitive topic, I (as the moderator) started by sharing my own experiences. The participants were then asked to explain their behaviour and the experiences they recounted. They were also asked to explain their behaviour and to evaluate the behaviours recounted by the other participants. During the discussion, it was expected that other topics relevant to my argument would emerge, such as their experiences with corruption while trying to access health services, which was a salient topic due to the pandemic. The guide was loosely structured to allow for participant discussion so as not to transform the focus groups into a group interview.

7.3 Conjoint Experiment: concretising corruption

In Chapter 8, the main study was centred around a conjoint experiment in which there was variation in the way an accusation of corruption was presented. Participants were presented with a pair of randomly constructed candidate profiles, where one of the items in the profile was an accusation of corruption (whether there was one and how it was presented). Although the accusation was the same (accepting bribes) and involved the same amount of money, in some of the profiles, the accusation was presented in a general way that mentioned only the amount of money involved, while in others, the accusation was concretised by signalling the negative externalities of corruption either through social or material costs.

The logic behind this experiment is based on the idea that, as discussed in Part 1, when people face corruption in concrete settings (such as an election), other factors may contribute to the occluding or overruling of the condemnation of corruption that is present in the abstract. In line with my discussion about the role of social scales, I also propose that accounting for corruption in concrete settings is additionally challenging for individuals because they need to have the collective as a relevant group in addition to their immediate group. Accounting for large-scale society in concrete decisions is hard, especially because the negative externalities of corruption are removed from an individual's reference point (the immediate effect it may have in their life), which means they need to think of them at higher levels of abstraction (Burgoon et al., 2013). This is very demanding for most individuals unless a strong broad-social identity is already present.

As mentioned in Part 1, part of my argument relies on the idea that the way in which moral intuitions manifest is partly dependent on the reference groups the individuals consider important for judgment. In this study, I do not control for identity, but I argue that concretising accusations of corruption would make it easier for all individuals to account for the effects of corruption in a large society, thus translating the abstract condemnation of corruption into concrete action.

This resonates with what Gonzalez Ocantos et al. (2014) argued for the case of vote buying. For them, electoral corruption can be characterised as a collective action problem where the benefits of a corrupt exchange are enjoyed at the individual level while the negative externalities are born by the collective. They highlight that this problem is compounded by the fact that negative externalities (e.g. low-quality democracy, diminished electoral accountability, long-term economic effects, etc.) are often very abstract. As a result, individuals are more critical of vote buying when the collective negative externalities are made clearer. In this case, I am not focusing on clientelism but rather on the accusations of corruption related to bribery and how the way they are presented affects how people respond towards the candidates. I believe this focus on accusations of bribery for electoral decisions is important since, in some countries, accusations of corruption against candidates are common, but

their effect is not always as expected by theories of accountability, as I will discuss in Chapter 8.

I included this concretisation strategy inside a conjoint experiment because this design allowed me to mimic an election more closely (Hainmueller et al., 2014; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015). Conjoint experiments are better equipped to illustrate the trade-off citizens make when choosing a candidate since it is a technique "for handling situations in which a decision maker has to deal with options that simultaneously vary across two or more attributes" (Green et al., 2001). Thus, in a conjoint setting, respondents consider profiles that include various attributes and pick one candidate over another based on their preferences and the weight they assign to each attribute.

The use of conjoint experiments to mimic electoral decisions has been shown by other studies that have also tackled the complexity of voting for a candidate accused of corruption (Breitenstein, 2019; Franchino and Zucchini, 2015; Klašnja et al., 2020). For example, Franchino and Zucchini (2015) compared whether the respondents valued candidates differently and whether the accusation of corruption was presented as an investigation or as a conviction. Similarly, Breitenstein (2019) compared whether respondents valued the accusations differently if made by other parties or a judge.

But while others have used corruption to study the effect of corruption accusations on candidate choice, I believe my experiment is the first to approach the issue through a concretisation of the accusation. The closest previous study would be the one conducted by Klašnja et al. (2020), who provided a frame of "positive" externalities by linking the accusation of corruption to job creation. However, my strategy did not directly link the concretised accusation itself to any direct outcome. It simply provided an equivalence of the money involved in terms of material or social goods.

7.4 Vignette Experiment: Bribery versus Favouritism

In Study 1 of Chapter 9, I conducted a vignette experiment in which participants were presented with one of four corruption scenarios. The scenarios were mostly the same; all four were written in the first person ("imagine that you...") and focused on access to social housing. However, they varied in two key ways: the type of corruption and the social norms (expectations about others' behaviour) that were signalled.

In half of the vignettes, participants saw a scenario of bribery, where an official asked them for money in exchange for preferential access to social housing. In the other half, participants saw a scenario of favouritism where an official with a personal connection to them offered them preferential access to social housing. The goal of this experiment was to see whether people responded differently to different types of corruption. This relates to my proposal that types of corruption where closeness between participants is expected, such as favouritism, would be seen as more acceptable. As discussed in Chapter 5, I argue this is the case because the familiar or personal bonds between participants contribute to intuitive concerns about group loyalty that would increase engagement in this type of corruption and make it seem more acceptable to participants.

Additionally, half of the vignettes signalled a social norm against corruption ("most people would not pay the bribe/accept the favour), while the other half signalled a social norm in favour of corruption ("most people would pay the bribe/accept the favour"). This is related to the role of social norms, or the expectation about how others would behave when facing a similar situation, which has been highlighted by Collective Action Approaches to corruption. Although I also account for the role of norms in my argument, I believe a stronger effect would be shown based on the type of corruption due to the role of intuitions related to ingroup morality.

Vignette experiments have been vastly used in the social sciences to explore how individuals respond to fictional scenarios (Atzmüller and Steiner, 2010; Barter and

Renold, 2000; Jenkins et al., 2010). They "consists of a collection of vignettes, that is, a set of systematically varied descriptions of subjects, objects, or situations in order to elicit respondents' beliefs, attitudes, or intended behaviours" (Steiner et al., 2017, p.52). Although this technique was initially developed to be used in structured (and semi-structured) interviews, along with focus groups (Bloor and Wood, 2006), it has also been used in survey studies where this technique is often referred to as factorial survey (Steiner et al., 2017). Vignettes have the advantage of being more realistic and concrete than traditional survey questions (Steiner et al., 2017). In my case, instead of asking people if they think people are more likely to engage in favouritism or bribery, I presented them with a situation in the subject (themselves, since the question is in the first person) is given the opportunity to engage in bribery or favouritism, and then ask them what they would do in that situation.

In the context of interviews, vignettes are often used in the third person because it is believed that doing so "can be advantageous in research on sensitive topics where the participant may not feel comfortable discussing their personal situation and may conceal the truth about their own actions or beliefs" (Gourlay et al., 2014). While it is true that presenting vignettes in the third-person can be useful for sensitive topics, I argue that this can make vignettes susceptible to what is known as "Actor-observer bias", in which people attribute one's own actions to external causes while attributing others' actions to internal ones. Thus, for example, if an individual is faced with a bribery scenario in which they themselves engage in bribery and then they are asked why they would do so, they may justify their behaviour using external factors such as necessity, the context, etc. In contrast, if the individual is asked about another person's engagement in bribery, they may attribute this behaviour to internal causes such as personal moral failure. In fact, studies about the neurological correlates of the behaviour of individuals facing moral dilemmas do show that this bias is more common when facing third-person dilemmas (Avram et al., 2014). Because I am interested in how people view their actions, I presented the vignettes in the first person.

7.5 Induced Emotions: Intuitive Processes as Causes

In Study 2 of both Chapters 9 and 10, I conducted another vignette experiment, but here, the main experiment manipulation was the emotional induction that was done before the task was presented.

In these studies, participants were presented with a scenario of bribery (Chapter 10) or favouritism (Chapter 9). Part of the treatment was that participants were presented with these scenarios either in the first or the third person. This is because, as mentioned, people are expected to judge others more harshly than themselves since they attribute others' behaviours to internal virtues or failures while attributing their own to external factors (Avram et al., 2014). This leads to people having a positive bias regarding the self (Valdesolo and DeSteno, 2008; Polman and Ruttan, 2012), where they see themselves as more moral than others even when engaging in the same act. I wanted to study whether something similar could be found for the judgement of corruption and thus decided to present half of the vignettes in each study in the first person and half in the third person.

In both studies, participants were induced to either anger or guilt or were asked to perform another non-inducing task that served as a control. The goal of this treatment was to establish that moral emotions, and thus intuitive processes more broadly, could have distinct effects separate from the reflective/deliberative processes. Because emotions were induced in a task-unrelated way, I propose that any effect shows that emotions (and intuitive processes more broadly) should be studied as important causes of behaviour and judgements concerning corruption in a way that is not always fully dependent on reflective/deliberative processes.

As I discussed in section 4 of Chapter 3, emotions can be divided based on the way they are elicited as either integral (task-related) or incidental (task-unrelated). I chose to focus on incidental emotions because, as Siedlecka and Denson (2019) proposes, inducing emotion instead of just measuring in connection to the task is the best method for determining emotions' causal influence.

This separates my studies from those that focus solely on integral emotions, as some studies of fairness have done (Sanfey et al., 2003; Reuben and van Winden, 2010). I argue that using only integral emotion would not be useful for testing the role of intuitive processes in judgement related to corruption since, in this case, the emotions are the result of the decision-making process and, thus, the result of both intuitive and deliberative/reflective processes.

In contrast, focusing on incidental emotion is a better strategy to establish the causal influence of these emotions Siedlecka and Denson (2019), and intuitions more broadly, in judgement and behaviour concerning corruption. Because these emotions are induced through strategies unrelated to the situation or task the individual judges, any effect on judgement and reported behaviour would be evidence of the separate effect of intuitive processes. Thus, my design follows the work of moral psychologists who have manipulated incidental emotions (task unrelated) to study their effect on moral judgements (Haidt, 2001; Greene et al., 2018).

As mentioned both in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, I focused on inducing two emotions, one self-conscious and another non-self-conscious, which have been previously linked to fairness: guilt and anger. For the emotional inducement, I chose to use the autobiographical recall technique, in which participants are asked to recall a situation in which they felt the emotion being induced. In autobiographical recall, participants directly recall situations that caused them to feel the emotions that are being studied. This technique is exempt from one of the main shortcomings of the other emotional inducement methods: that the respondents may interpret the stimuli in different ways (Lerner and Keltner, 2001). This technique is also helpful because, as explained in Chapter 4, I am also interested in the role of self-conscious emotions, and these emotions are hard to elicit through images due to them being generated by the subject about him or herself (Zinck, 2008). Although this technique has been vastly used in psychological studies conducted in lab settings, its use in surveys has been more limited. Still, there is evidence that even in a survey setting, this technique is useful in eliciting emotional states (Mills and D'Mello, 2014).

7.6 Closing Remakrs

This chapter has introduced the empirical strategy that I followed in this dissertation and how this strategy relates to my argument. As seen, I use a combination of experiments and qualitative methods that allow me to study various components of my argument with the goal of providing evidence of the role of intuitive processes, especially moral intuitions, in judgement and behaviour related to corruption. None of these studies are designed to test the full complexity of my argument on their own, but they are designed to test its components. In the Chapters that follow, I present these studies and their main findings, situating them in the cases and their particularities. Throughout these chapters, I will refer the reader to this introduction for more detail on the general aspects of the methodological approaches.

Chapter 8

Concretising accusations to increase concrete punishment

As presented in Part I, my argument posits that intuitive processes (for which moral emotions are a key component) play an important role in judgements and behaviours concerning corruption. I also propose that these processes act in conjunction with conscious deliberative/reflective processes, which have been the focus of many of the studies on corruption, as presented in Chapter 5.

A key idea based on my argument is that the condemnation of corruption we see in the abstract, which I posit is in part the result of intuitions linked to the fairness domain, does not disappear in concrete settings but can be overrun by more salient concerns. Thus, I propose that this condemnation can be made salient in concrete settings through mechanisms and strategies designed to increase the salience of the fairness intuitions that contribute to the condemnation in the abstract. As I will explore in Chapters 9 and 10, this can be done by directly affecting the intuitive processes through strategies that induce moral emotions linked to the fairness domain.

However, in this Chapter, I will explore a more indirect strategy centred on con-

cretising corruption. I consider that this strategy could be more easily implemented in an aspect of corruption that is extremely important for democracy: the electoral punishment of corruption. I propose that concretising accusations of corruption should lead to an increased punishment of the candidates accused since, as outlined in the previous chapter, concretising accusations of corruption would make it easier for all individuals to account for the effects of corruption in a large society.

Although the strategy I propose affects both reflective/deliberative and intuitive processes, without clearly discerning their separate effects, the results point towards the importance of making the effects of corruption, often relegated to broad distant society, more salient in concrete seating. Furthermore, as I will briefly discuss in the final section of this Chapter and in more detail in the Conclusion of this dissertation, this concretisation may have a stronger effect when it also elicits emotional responses.

8.1 Introduction: The Punishment of Corruption

The Democratic Theory assumes that voters will punish corrupt politicians when given the opportunity to do so (Elliott, 1997; Schumpeter, 1975), but electoral accountability for corruption sometimes fails. Even in developed democracies, citizens often fail to punish corruption and sometimes even re-elect incumbents accused of corruption (Carlson and Reed, 2018; Chang et al., 2010). Here, I posit a new and complementary explanation to the already existing ones, centred on components of my previously presented Intuitionist Approach to corruption.

I propose that part of the explanation for this apparent tolerance of corruption can be found in how corruption accusations are reported by the media, especially during electoral campaigns. I argue that while most people would condemn corruption in the abstract, as has been shown in surveys and qualitative studies of cases of high corruption (Karklins, 2005; Baraybar Hidalgo et al., 2022b; Baraybar Hidalgo and Dargent, 2020), this abstract condemnation does not always translate to

concrete condemnation (electoral punishment), because in concrete scenarios other factors may overrun it. In concrete scenarios, like in elections, other candidate characteristics may be more salient, especially if the accusations of corruption do not receive coverage by the media or if this coverage is only presented in general terms. Importantly, I propose that this condemnation does not disappear and can be activated in multiple ways. Here, I focus on the way in which accusations of corruption are presented, proposing that a concrete accusation that highlights the negative externalities of corruption can make people account for larger-scale social concerns more easily and thus increase the likelihood of punishment.

Thus, I posit that the way the information is presented matters because it can help translate the condemnation of corruption we see in the abstract into an actual punishment of corruption at the polls. I argue that concretising accusations of corruption through equivalences will increase punishment towards accused candidates due to its effects both on deliberative/reflective and intuitive processes. I posit that what this concretisation does is help individuals account for large-scale society in a way that is normally hard to do in concrete situations. The importance of the social scale individuals take as a reference has been highlighted as part of my argument in Part I, but accounting for large-scale society is hard to do, as discussed in Chapter 7. Concretising the accusation can make this easier and thus increase condemnation on average, and not just among people who have strong, broader identities (linked to the nation, for example), as my argument proposes. Importantly, my strategy concretises accusations based on equivalences that make general reference to either social or material goods without either linking the accusation to the loss of these goods directly or to a direct effect of corruption on the individual as a way of ameliorating the effects of self-interest.

To explore whether concretising accusations of corruption leads to higher electoral punishment, I first carried out a revision of the media coverage of corruption (headlines of a national newspaper) during the year before three elections. I found that the coverage of corruption during the year before an election was very general. The coverage did not directly mention previous accusations against candidates, and

it did not cover the consequences or effects of corruption. Then, as my main empirical test, I designed and ran a conjoint experiment fielded in 2019 in which I presented the accusations of corruption against the candidates either in an abstract or concrete manner. The experiment results show that people are likely to condemn corruption when information about it is provided, and this condemnation increases when the accusation is concretised. Furthermore, the results show that concretised accusations of corruption had a significantly different effect than abstract accusations when controlling for the most favourable attributes of a candidate. In other words, concretising the accusations of corruption leads to individuals being less likely to vote for a candidate, and this effect is stronger in cases where the candidate had characteristics that made them more favourable.

These findings are in line with my argument that concretising the accusations increases condemnation vis-à-vis other factors that are usually more salient in concrete settings (like other preferred characteristics for a candidate). But contrary to my initial expectations, the concretisation done through equivalence to social goods (and that highlighted the negative externalities of corruption to a larger society) was not the one that had the strongest effect. Surprisingly, a stronger and clearer effect was seen when the concretisation was done through equivalence to material goods. In the final section of this Chapter, I speculate that this may have been the case due to emotional responses, and then I discuss this further in the Conclusion.

In the next sections of this chapter, I will first briefly present my case. Then, I will present how components of my Intuitionist Approach apply to the case of electoral punishment of corruption and discuss how this relates to other studies. Finally, I will present my empirical evidence and discuss the results.

8.2 Case: Peru

To explore how concretisation can affect electoral punishment of corruption, I focus on the Peruvian case, in which corruption is widely recognised as a problem in the abstract but still extensively practised and tolerated. According to the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), Peru has consistently ranked high in the Latin American region in terms of corruption being perceived as one of the country's main problems (Carrión et al., 2018; Zechmeister et al., 2017). According to the 2018 Americas Barometer, Peruvians also ranked second in considering that corruption is the main problem in the country, and 53% of respondents thought that all or almost all of the "President and officials" were involved in corruption (noa, 2018). Nevertheless, Peruvians also condemn corruption even when admitting to engaging in it (Baraybar Hidalgo et al., 2022b, 2016).

But even though there is a high abstract condemnation of corruption, in the sense that it is seen as a problem, in practice, we see candidates accused of corruption receiving high percentages of the vote. For example, in the 2016 General Election, Keiko Fujimori won the first round of the presidential election, even though she had been under investigation for corruption (she later lost the second round to Kuczynski). Similar cases are also seen in local elections. For instance, in the regional elections in the department of Amazonas in 2022, five of the eight candidates had been involved in corruption scandals, and the two candidates who went to the runoff had strong antecedents of corruption. Thus, Peru is an interesting case to study the effects of concretising the accusations of corruption since candidates with corruption antecedents have performed well in previous elections.

8.3 Why can concretisation increase electoral punishment?

Accounting for corruption when making concrete voting decisions is complex, especially when corruption is endemic. Previous explanations have pointed this out by arguing that in the context of high corruption, accusations stop mattering for individual decision-making because they become a constant (Pavao, 2018) or the condemnation of corruption disappears in the face of benefits associated with it (Persson et al., 2019a; Lazar, 2005; Manzetti and Wilson, 2007).

While this may be true, I contend that people do not stop caring about corruption, even in these contexts of high corruption. In accordance with my general argument, I posit that how we judge corruption is partly a function of moral judgement, comprised of deliberative/reflective and intuitive processes (Greene et al., 2001). A key point of my argument is that the condemnation in the abstract we see in surveys and other studies is genuine and reflects actual, partly intuitive, concerns. As I have explained in Chapter 4, I posit that this condemnation in the abstract responds in part to a moral judgement of corruption that is heavily driven by moral intuitions (Haidt, 2007; Greene et al., 2001), in particular those related to the fairness domain. However, the condemnation of corruption in the abstract is hard to translate to concrete situations (such as when making an electoral decision) because other more salient concerns may overrun it. Thus, I propose that moral judgment in the abstract and in concrete situations is subject to different constraints.

When corruption is presented in the abstract, it is easy for moral intuitions that were developed to maintain altruism and cooperation in societies (Rand et al., 2012) to lead to its condemnation because corruption is intuitively seen as something unfair and even harmful. In the abstract, individuals judge corruption as wrong in part because it "feels" wrong, and I posit that this is mostly due to fairness concerns; in other words, corruption often "feels" unfair in the abstract. There is an automatic hunch that makes it seem wrong that someone gets more than others without reason

or that someone benefits privately from an office in which they are supposed to serve the public[1].

Despite this, in concrete situations, this condemnation of corruption may be overrun or fade (Tenbrunsel and Messick, 2004) in favour of other concerns. In societies where corruption is endemic, voters may be more likely to focus on other candidate characteristics. As discussed in Chapter 7, it is challenging for individuals to focus on the collective while making concrete decisions; this is made even more complicated in the case of corruption because the negative externalities of corruption are removed from an individual's reference point (Gonzalez Ocantos et al., 2014). But crucially, my argument posits that even when concerns towards the collective are occluded or overrun by other factors, the condemnation of corruption that we see in the abstract is still there and can be made more salient by employing different strategies.

Here, I propose that presenting corruption accusations in a way that concertises them, especially through equivalences that highlight negative externalities of corruption, facilitates the punishment of corruption. This strategy would act through both the deliberative/reflective and intuitive processes. On the one hand, it can also highlight the costs of corruption in a way that affects conscious evaluation by making it easier to evaluate these costs in relation to the possible benefits of voting for a preferred candidate. On the other hand, it can make it easier for individuals to account for the effects of corruption on the collective and thus trigger the intuitive condemnation we see in the abstract. I argue that this is the case because concretising accusations in a way that highlights negative externalities would make it easier for individuals to account for large-scale society, therefore "amplifying" their innate fairness disposition (Henrich, 2015, p.154). I propose that when individuals are able to account for the effects of corruption towards large-scale society in an eas-

[1]Although I focus on the intuitions related to fairness, in accordance with the view of multiple moral domains (Graham et al., 2013; Haidt and Joseph, 2008; Curry, 2015; Curry et al., 2019a), my argument recognizes that the judgement of corruption in the abstract may also be influenced by intuitions related to domains such as harm.

ier manner, they will be more likely to judge corruption as wrong, even in concrete seatings where other factors often take priority due to the abstractness of the effects of corruption.

In this chapter, I am not discounting the role of these reflective/deliberative processes. Rather, I am arguing first that the condemnation of corruption in the abstract responds in part to intuitive concerns linked to fairness, which helps explain why we see a condemnation of corruption in the abstract even in societies where corruption is endemic (Karklins, 2005; de Sardan, 1999). Second, I propose that this intuitive condemnation does not disappear when facing concrete situations like electoral decisions. While this condemnation can be overrun by other factors (such as one's preferred characteristics of a candidate), I argue that because it does not disappear, it can be activated. The mechanism I propose in this chapter focuses on making it easier for individuals to perceive the effects of corruption in large-scale society. As I mentioned in Chapter 4, an individual's social identity is composed of various identities linked to group membership, and while individuals can have both narrow and broader identities linked to different degrees of social scale, broader identities are harder to build and maintain. By concretising accusations in a way that highlights negative externalities, I aim to make concerns that lead to the condemnation of corruption in the abstract more easily applicable in concrete evaluations by making it easier for individuals to account for large-scale society.

8.4 Relation to previous explanations

When it comes to the punishment of corruption, my argument complements previous explanations for the absence of electoral punishment towards corruption, which favoured an approach centred on reflective/intuitive processes by recognizing that the capacity of voters to either punish or reward corrupt politicians depends on their ability to assign responsibility correctly (De Vries and Solaz, 2017), and on their willingness to act upon that judgement (Hellwig et al., 2007, p.68).

Some of those explanations have been based on a Principal-Agent approach (Golden, 2012; Lambsdorff, 2002; Rose-Ackerman and Søreide, 2011), that, as discussed in Chapter 5, places the citizens in the role of the principal and the politicians in the role of the agent. Here, the agent may face different incentives to deviate from the principal's interest and engage in corruption. Still, the principal can hold the agent accountable if sufficient access to information allows for monitoring or auditing of the principal (Persson, 2000). Studies under this approach argue that if information about corruption is provided, the principals (citizens) would vote out candidates accused of corruption. This has led to a plethora of studies focused on how the availability of information affects responses to corruption (Chang et al., 2010; Chang and Kerr, 2017; Ferraz and Finan, 2008; Kornai and Rose-Ackerman, 2004; Reinikka and Svensson, 2004).

My argument posits that while information may increase the punishment of corrupt candidates, this is not always the case because other concerns or factors may overrun or dim the condemnation of corruption. I propose that presenting the accusation of corruption in a way that makes it easier to link corruption to its effects on the collective would also make it easier for individuals to account for the larger society, which should increase the likelihood of punishment, especially when the candidate is seen as a favourable one by the individual.

As discussed in Chapter 5, another main approach to corruption is the Collective Action Approach, which, for the case of electoral punishment, argues that in context with endemic corruption, voters may not vote against corrupt politicians due to factors linked to expectations about others' behaviour (Bauhr and Grimes, 2014). Under this approach, some studies have argued that corruption becomes both acceptable and expected behaviour in contexts of high corruption and, thus, is not an important factor in deciding whom to vote for. Furthermore, people may tolerate corruption because it is perceived as functional in these high corruption cases or because they perceive social benefits from it (like in the case of clientelism). Thus, they may trade in their condemnation of corruption in exchange for benefits for themselves or their group.

In this line, some studies have argued that this acceptance of corruption rests on the perceived social benefits that may arise from it (Lazar, 2005). These perceived social benefits can vary and are not exclusively related to clientelism (Manzetti and Wilson, 2007), but also to broader economic performance. However, how economic performance mediates the effect of corruption accusations is not completely clear. While some studies find that good economic conditions reduce the likelihood of an incumbent being electorally punished for corruption (Klašnja and Tucker, 2013; Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga, 2013), this effect can respond to a general favourability towards the incumbent when economic times are good. In Peru, there is no immediate reelection (neither for national nor local offices), which makes it harder to link tolerance for corruption with past economic performance. Candidates accused of corruption often faced this accusation about an office held either at another level of government (for example, moving from a local to a regional office) or more than one electoral term in the past (since there is no immediate reelection). Some also face accusations related to campaign financing, even if they had not held office in the past, or accusations related to people in their close circle who have held public office.

A related but more plausible explanation focuses on corruption being perceived as an acceptable strategy in high-corruption countries, which can lead to it becoming part of the social noise and stop mattering for the decision-making process. In the electoral realm, a high incidence of corruption may lead citizens to prioritise other concerns as they cannot use corruption to distinguish between good and bad candidates (Pavao, 2018, p.966). Thus, according to this view, the acceptance of corruption can also be explained by how voters perceive the alternatives. For example, Kurer (2001, p.78) argues that voters may condemn corruption because it violates the principle of impartiality but simultaneously tolerate it because there is no perceived alternative. Similarly, Pavao (2018) shows that corruption stops being a relevant concern when all candidates in an election are perceived as corrupt. Therefore, these studies argue that in contexts where corruption is widespread, it stops being a salient issue and becomes more part of the background.

In this chapter, I posit that while it is true that if all candidates are accused of corruption, corruption becomes a non-relevant factor, elections in which all the candidates are accused are rare. Studies have shown that candidates who have not been accused of corruption often receive less electoral support than candidates who have been accused of it because of other characteristics that lead to them being perceived as less competent (del Mar Martínez Rosón, 2016). Similarly, other candidate characteristics (things like gender, age, and profession) can make non-accused candidates seem less favourable than accused ones.

Another group of studies of electoral tolerance towards corruption focus on the role of social identities. As discussed in Part I, a social identity is part of the individual sense of self that's derived from group membership. People can hold multiple social identities (Tajfel and Turner, 2001), and some of them are broader than others. As discussed in Chapter 4, identity also plays a role in how people judge and behave in relation to corruption. Peru poses an interesting case in relation to identity since broader identities, which are associated with higher levels of trust in distant others (Hollinger, 2006) and lower levels of overall corruption, are seen as generally weak. At the same time, Peru is a case in which the quintessential political identity, partisanship, is usually absent due to the weakness of the party system (Muñoz Chirinos, 2018), but other identities like gender or geographical provenance may still play a role.

When it comes to the electoral punishment of corruption, various studies have pointed out that an individual is less likely to punish corruption when the accused candidate shares a social identity with them. For example, people who identify and support an incumbent do not see their evaluation as affected by corruption (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003). As mentioned, the quintessential identity for these studies is the party identity, which has been shown to work under the same logic as other social identities (Fowler and Kam, 2007). For example, multiple studies argue that partisanship affects individual responses to corruption (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Anduiza et al., 2013; Blais et al., 2017; Chang and Kerr, 2009; Tverdova, 2011), and show that a partisan identity that matches that of the candidate may attenuate

the effect of an accusation of corruption (Anduiza et al., 2013; Solaz et al., 2019). In a survey experiment carried out in Spain, Anduiza et al. (2013) showed that people were less likely to punish corruption when the accusation was made against candidates who were members of their own party. Partisan identity has also been shown to affect how much people trust the sources of the accusations. If the source of the corruption accusation is perceived as aligned against their party, they are less likely to trust them, which affects how they respond to the accusation (Botero et al., 2015; Eggers, 2014).

Other identities have also been shown to affect how an individual responds to candidates accused of corruption. For example, ethnicity can attenuate the effect of accusations of corruption in ethically polarized contexts (Banerjee and Pande, 2007). Moreover, a shared narrow identity can lead to a less severe punishment of corruption even when this identity is artificially constructed based on something as irrelevant as a favourite painter (Solaz et al., 2019).

In relation to these studies, I propose that these social identities can make people less likely to punish corruption in two ways, one that is part of my argument and another that is out of the scope of this dissertation. On the one hand, in accordance with my arguments, narrower social identities can make concerns related to ingroup loyalty take precedence over concerns about general fairness. On the other hand, a strong identity linked to things like ethnicity may erase the moral dilemma by correlating to a belief that others are not as deserving of fair treatment, as discussed in Chapter 5. I do not focus on the latter because my argument was not developed with strong ethnic divisions in mind, but it can be an avenue of research for scholars of ethnic division.

Thus, I propose a complementary argument to these previous explanations by focusing on a strategy designed to make it easier for individuals to account for the large-scale societal effects of corruption, which I propose would trigger the intuitive condemnation we see in the abstract. I propose that one of the reasons why individuals sometimes vote for candidates accused of corruption is that the con-

demnation of corruption that is seen in the abstract can be occluded or overrun by other more salient factors in concrete decision-making scenarios. I argue that more direct coverage of corruption in the media and coverage that concretises accusations, particularly by showing the negative externalities of corruption, can lead to a lower rate of candidates accused of corruption being elected.

8.5 Study 1: Coverage of corruption in the media

As mentioned, my main test consists of a conjoint experiment that simulated an electoral decision, where the accusation of corruption was either presented abstractly (with just a reference to the amount of money involved) or concretely (with material and social goods equivalence). But before going into the main empirical test, I look at the way in which corruption is covered by the media in Peru. To do so, I decided to focus on headlines by one of the main newspapers in the country, "El Comercio", in three periods: the year before the Presidential Elections of 2016 (01-04-2015 to 30-04-2016), the Regional Elections of 2018 (1/10/2017-30/10/2018), and the Presidential Elections of 2021 (01-04-2020 to 30-04-2021)[2].

I focused on "El Comercio" because it is one of the main newspapers in the country, and it is also the oldest (it was established in 1839). It is seen as a serious and independent publication, although there were accusations of partiality during the 2021 elections (since the editorial line seemed to position against the then-candidate Pedro Catillo). Furthermore, "El Comercio" also owns a series of other newspapers, including "Ojo" and "Trome" that follow the same editorial line but make it more accessible to the public (they are what is called a "Diario Chica", which is a type of tabloid). To study the coverage, I scraped Google News results for headlines that mention the word "corrupción" (corruption in Spanish), constraining the search by

[2]The Presidential Elections of 2016 took place on April 10, the Regional Elections of 2018 took place on October 7, and the Presidential Elections of 2021 took place on April 11

source (*elcomercio.pe*) and date range [3]. I decided to focus on the headlines because they were easier to extract, especially in the absence of an accessible digital archive. Furthermore, other studies that take media coverage as a source have also used headlines as their main material (Palomino Quispe and Lovón Cueva, 2022; Liu, 2023). Headlines in Peru often have both a main headline and a "sub-headline" and thus tend to be longer than in other countries[4]. I decided to focus on the three elections mentioned because my main empirical test, a conjoint experiment, was run in 2019. Furthermore, the sample of headlines was itself limited since El Comercio and other Peruvian newspapers do not keep an accessible digital archive [5], and focusing on multiple electoral perioding increased my sample (the full sample of headlines can be seen in Appendix A).

First, it's important to highlight that even though I used the search term corruption, many of the headlines retrieved either did not mention it explicitly or were from a completely different topic. In the table below, I summarise the results based on the number of headlines the search produced, how many directly mentioned corruption or related terms (like bribe or extorsion), and how many of them directly referred to the elections or the candidates[6].

[3]I decided to scrape the Google News results instead of the results from the official webpage of El Comercio because although the digital achieve is well maintained, they do not provide an updated API key, and its search function does not allow setting a date range.

[4]People also tend to consume news based on headlines; a common practice in the country is to read the newspapers put out by the newsstands near the bus stops. Because this reading is done quickly while waiting for the bus, headlines are often what sticks.

[5]There is a historical archive, but it only covers historical photos and front pages)

[6]More detail on the classification can be found on Section 1 of Chapter 7.

Table 8.1: Headline classification - corruption and elections

	Number of results	Mentions corruption or similar words	Mentions elections or candidates
Presidential Elections of 2016 (01-04-2015 to 30-04-2016)	26	2	3
Regional Elections of 2018 (1/10/2017-30/10/2018)	100	79	3
Presidential Elections of 2021 (01-04-2020 to 30-04-2021)	96	38	5

As we can see in Table 8.1., although there are various mentions of corruption in the headlines obtained through the search, very few of them actually refer to the election or the candidates specifically. Some of the references to elections are not even about the Peruvian elections but about others (for the 2018 search, there were references to the Brazilian and Mexican elections). Those headlines that do mention the candidates or the election do so mostly in general terms. For example, "Verónika Mendoza announced her pre-candidature for the presidency" (18/08/2015). In some cases, the headline refers broadly to the ways in which candidates propose to tackle corruption, for example: "Lima's Mayorial Office: six candidates proposals about corruption" (7/10/2018). Almost none of the headlines directly link corruption with electoral coverage. One exception is this: "Individuals convicted because of corruption will be able to run in the 2021 elections following the reform blockade in Congress" (05/07/2020).

So, all in all, the press coverage of corruption appears unrelated to the press coverage of the elections. The coverage of corruption during the electoral periods was low, with almost no mentions of the candidates and the past or current investigations they were subject to. To further explore this, I also studied the specific characteristics of the press coverage of corruption. I found that in the 222 headlines recovered, most of the coverage of corruption did not link corruption directly to specific actors. Furthermore, the coverage was also general in the sense that there was little mention of the consequences and costs of corruption. Most of the headlines

that mentioned corruption did so broadly, mentioning things like: "Corruption, the main problem in Peru" (22-04/2018), "The fight against corruption" (16-04-2018), "78% of Peruvians are tolerant towards corruption" (10/12/2015), or "More than a hundred corruption cases were opened during the first month of the state of emergency" (15/04/2020). A few of them were more specific, mentioning investigations, sanctions, amounts, or the actors involved, as we can see in the table below.

Table 8.2: Headline classification - sanctions, amounts, actors, and externalities

	Number of results	Mentions investigations	Mentions sanctions	Mentions actors	Mentions amounts	Mentions externalities
Presidential Elections of 2016 (01-04-2015 to 30-04-2016)	26	1	0	3	0	0
Regional Elections of 2018 (1/10/2017-30/10/2018)	100	2	4	32	5	3
Presidential Elections of 2021 (01-04-2020 to 30-04-2021)	96	8	7	34	4	0

It is important to clarify that many of the references to actors did not mention a specific person, and none of them, except for one, alluded to candidates. The exception is a headline recovered in the time frame of the 2021 Presidential Election, where one of the candidates accused of corruption was put under investigation. The headline was: "The Public Prosecutor's Office initiates a preliminary investigation against George Forsyth for contracts awarded to his friend in La Victoria. [a district in Lima]" (01-02-2021). The other mentions of the actors involved were mostly general, for example: "A Police Commander is sentenced to effective imprisonment for corruption" (16-05-2018), or "The Public Prosecutor's Office formalized the investigation against officials for the case of overpricing of mechanical ventilators" (06-05-2020).

Furthermore, it is important to mention that almost none of the headlines made reference to the externalities of corruption. There were only three exceptions from the sample, all of them in the time frame of the Regional Elections of 2018. One of them made reference to a possible positive externality: "Does corruption favour economic growth?" (14-03-2018). The other two focus on negative externalities, but

one of them was about Mexico and the role of corruption in the 2017 earthquake. The one focused on Peru was about the role of corruption in environmental conservation: "Corruption is the main threat to conservation in Peru." (21-06-2018).

This look at the headlines obtained by searching for the word corruption during electoral timeframes shows two main things. First, there seems to be very little coverage of corruption in relation to electoral campaigns or candidates, which could point towards a lack of visibility of corruption accusations in relation to the candidates. It is important to remember that even as early as the Presidential Election of 2016, before the explosion of the Lava Jato case that ended up implicating many salient politicians (Gonzalez Ocantos and Baraybar, 2019, 2021; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2023), there were corruption investigations against the main candidates. Alejandro Toledo, for example, was already under investigation along with his wife for illicit enrichment (the case "Ecoteva"). Thus, it was surprising that none of the headlines recovered mentioned this investigation. Second, when corruption is mentioned in the headlines, it is done in a general manner. Even when mentioning specific cases or examples, the actors involved are mostly not named, and there is almost no mention of the costs of corruption or its negative externalities. In contrast to how the coverage seems to be (at least in one of the national newspapers), I propose that presenting accusations of corruption in a way that concretises them by highlighting their negative externalities would make people less likely to vote for candidates accused of corruption.

8.6 Study 2: Conjoint Experiment

To test whether concretising the accusations of corruption increases the punishment towards it, I used a Conjoint Experiment [7]. I partnered with Proética, the local

[7]The experiment was pre-registered in the EGAP registry under the Registration ID 20190604AD. It received ethical approval from the Central University Research Ethics Committee (CUREC) under the reference number SSHDPIRC1A19053

chapter of Transparency International, to implement my experiment in the 2019 edition of the National Survey on Perceptions of Corruption. The survey was conducted face-to-face using smartphones between October 31st and November 12th. The sample included voting-age male and female residents in urban areas, including Lima (the capital city) and the other 17 major cities. The sampling was based on the sampling frame of homes constructed by the National Institute of Statistics. The resulting sample included 1857 respondents (Appendix B).

As presented in Section 3 of Chapter 7, conjoint experiments are particularly useful in revealing citizens' preference regarding candidates (Hainmueller et al., 2014; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015) because they mimic the electoral decision more closely than other types of experimental survey designs. This is because conjoint experiments are more equipped to capture the trade-offs and prioritisations citizens make (both consciously and intuitively) when choosing a candidate[8].

My experiment consisted of a Forced Choice Conjoint, in which participants saw four pairs of candidate profiles with the following explanation: "Imagine that tomorrow there is a Presidential election. Below, you are going to see the profiles of two candidates. Please look closely at the profiles and decide which one you are most likely to vote for." Following each pair of profiles, respondents were asked [1], "For which candidate would you vote for?" [9].

Thus, participants were asked to choose four times between two different pairs of hypothetical candidates. To ensure the round number did not affect the responses, I tested for the round effect (the results are in Appendix C), which showed that rounds had no significant effect on the responses.

[8]More detail on the use of conjoint experiment and how it relates to my argument can be found in Chapter 7

[9]Along with this, there was also a Rating Based outcome, where participants were asked how much they liked each profile, but the results do not differ greatly, and the Forced Choice allows for easier interpretation.

I randomly varied the candidate's profile along five independent attributes and two interacting attributes (to see the distribution of these attributes in the universe of profiles, see Appendix D). For my study, the most important attribute was "Accusation." This attribute had four versions: one negative (no accusation) and three positive (accusation). The three accusation versions were: 1) abstract accusation (just the amount of money embezzled); 2) accusation concretised based on social goods (amount plus the equivalent in public sector salaries); 3) accusation concretised based on material goods (amount plus the equivalent in personal luxury items). The phrasings used were: "Was accused of receiving 20 million soles in exchange for a public contract", "Was accused of receiving 20 million soles (the equivalent to the annual salaries of all the public school teachers in the country) in exchange for a public contract", and "Was accused of receiving 20 million soles (the equivalent to three private jets) in exchange for a public contract". The accusation presented with only the amount of money involved is an abstract one on account that such a large number (20 million) is outside of what can be accurately perceived by the human brain (Boyce-Jacino et al., 2022). I chose to present two types of concretisations because I wanted to see whether the concretisation that linked corruption to its social costs had a consistently stronger effect on the likelihood of punishing candidates accused of corruption.

In addition to the "Accusation" attribute, I included six additional ones. One of them was "Source", which had four levels. One contained no information about the source and only appeared when the "Accusation" attribute level was "No accusation". The other three attributes were "The Lava Jato Team", "The Prosecution", and "The media". The inclusion of the Lava Jato Team as one of the sources was of particular importance for another project that traced the origins and the effects of the Lava Jato investigation in Latin America (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2023).

The other five attributes corresponded to candidate characteristics, which could be salient when making an electoral decision. One was "Experience", which referred to the candidate's previous experience in office, and its levels were none or either positive or negative past experience. A second attribute, "Comes from", referred

Table 8.3: Attributes and levels

FEATURE	LEVEL
Age	35
	45
	65
Gender	Female
	Male
Experience	Experience – negative
	Experience – positive
	No experience
Position	More state intervention in the economy
	Less state intervention in the economy
Comes from	Lima
	Provinces
Corruption Accusation	No accusation
	Amount equivalent in luxury items (private planes)
	Amount equivalent in teachers' salaries
	Only amount
Source of Accusation	Lava Jato Team
	Prosecution
	Media
	No information (when there has not been an accusation of corruption)

to whether the candidate was from Lima or one of the provinces, an important political cleavage in Peru (Tuesta Soldevilla, 2017). The third attribute signalled the candidate's policy "Position". To keep things simple, I provided information about the candidate's general ideological profile, mainly whether they believe the state should have a bigger/smaller role in the economy. This attribute reflected one of the main points of interest in the coverage of past presidential elections. It is also commonly used by Peruvian pollsters to measure ideology (especially in the absence of established parties). Finally, I included attributes related to age and gender.

Respondents saw eight randomly constructed candidate profiles (four pairs). Figure 1 shows an example of what the respondents saw.

Figure 8.1: Example of pair of profiles

Attribute	Candidate A	Candidate B
Age	35	65
Gender	Female	Female
Where are they from	From Lima	Not from Lima
Position	The state should have a bigger role in the economy	The state should have an smaller role in the economy
Experience	Was previously a mayor and his performance was bad	No previous experience
Accusation	Was accused of receiving 20 million soles in exchange of a public contract	Was accused of receiving 20 million soles **(the equivalent to the annual salaries of all the public school teachers in the country)** in exchange of a public contract
Source	Media	Lava Jato Team

I expected that respondents would be less likely to choose candidates accused of corruption, regardless of the way in which the accusation was presented. As we have seen, the coverage of corruption during elections is low and diffuse (focused on general aspects and not concrete cases). Thus, I expected that any accusation presented directly in relation to a candidate would lead to higher rates of punishment. But I also expected concretised accusations to have a stronger effect than the accusation in which only the amount of money involved is mentioned.

Furthermore, I expected that among the two concretised accusations, the one using social goods as a concretisation equivalence would have a stronger effect than the one using material goods. I consider that this type of concretisation highlights more clearly the social costs, which would incite people to place their judgements in a larger-scale societal framework, which in turn would trigger the condemnation we see in the abstract. Thus, I expected the accusation concretised through equivalence to teachers' salaries to have a stronger impact on the likelihood of not choosing a candidate than the accusations concretised through equivalence to planes. As I will discuss in the final section of this Chapter, this expectation was not fulfilled since the concretisation done through equivalence with material goods had a stronger and

more distinct effect. I hypothesize that this is due to a stronger emotional response to this concretisation.

Finally, I expected the concretised accusations to have a stronger effect when presented alongside other attributes that made the candidate more favourable. This is because, as mentioned before, one of the factors that can lead this condemnation of corruption to fade in concrete electoral decisions is that other candidate characteristics are seen as more salient. I expect that concretising the accusation of corruption will increase its salience, which is especially important in scenarios where it would otherwise have low salience, such as those in which the preferred characteristics of a candidate are present.

8.6.1 Results

The two main quantities of interest in a conjoint experiment are the Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) and the Marginal Means. The AMCE is the degree to which a value of an attribute (the attribute level) increases or decreases the favorability towards a conjoint profile relative to a baseline, averaging across all respondents and all profile features. The Marginal Mean, by contrast, is the level of favorability towards a profile that has a particular feature level, marginalizing across all other features. The AMCE is based on the Marginal Mean since it is equivalent to the average marginal effect of each attribute level for a model in which each attribute is turned into a matrix with one level left out as a reference category (Leeper et al., 2020, p.210). In this section, I will go through the general AMCE results and then through the Average Component Interaction Effects, which are the effects of a tribute while holding the levels of another attribute constant. Finally, I will conduct a subgroup analysis based on some respondents' characteristics.

8.6.1.1 General Results

First, we look at the general results by focusing on the Average Marginal Component Effects. As shown in Figure 8.2., and as expected, people prefer a candidate not accused of corruption. This tells us that higher coverage of the accusations of corruption, especially close to an election, may lead to higher rates of electoral punishment. Furthermore, compared to the baseline of "Only Amount", respondents are less likely to pick a candidate when the accusation is either "Equivalent Teachers" or "Equivalent Planes". While this difference between the abstract ("Only Amount") and the two concertized accusations is not statistically significant, the directionality of the effect is as expected[10].

[10]The table of results can be found in Appendix E. An additional test was performed by subsetting the data to only those pairs of candidates in which one profile had the level "No Accusation" and the other had one of the three levels that depicted an accusation (abstract and the two concretised one). The directionality of the results and the size of the effect did not vary much, so I decided to keep the full sample. The results of this additional analysis can be found in Appendix F

Figure 8.2: Average Marginal Component Effects



An interesting part of the results is that both types of concretisation move in the same direction and with the same strength. This is contrary to my expectation of societal concretisation having a stronger negative effect (on the likelihood of picking a candidate) than material concretisation. To explore this further, I decided to conduct further analysis focusing on interactions between attributes and sub-groups.

8.6.1.2 Average Component Interaction Effects

Besides the general results, I also considered it relevant to look at the effect of concretising the accusation while considering other candidate characteristics. For this, I calculated the Average Component Interaction Effects (ACIE), which is the effect of an attribute while holding the levels of another attribute constant. Here, I

focused on those characteristics that made the candidate more favourable, as seen in the general results. As seen in Figure 8.2., on average, people would prefer a candidate that is younger (35 or 45 years old) instead of an older one (65 years old), male, not from Lima (which means not from the capital city of the country), with a more interventionist economic approach, and with good previous political experience.

Figure 8.3: ACIE by the candidate's age



Figure 8.4: ACIE by the candidate's gender



Figure 8.5: ACIE by whether the candidate is from Lima



Figure 8.6: ACIE by the candidate's economic position



As we can see in the previous figures, when the profile showed a candidate's feature that was seen as favourable, the concretised accusation had a stronger effect. For example, when looking at the ACIE of the different levels of "Accusation" by holding the attribute of whether the candidate was from Lima or not as constant (Figure 8.5.), we see that in the cases in which the candidate is said to be "Not from Lima," the concretisation of corruption that used equivalence to material goods had a negative effect that was significantly different from the abstract accusation. We also see that when the candidate was said to be from Lima, there was no significant difference between the abstract and concretised accusations. Similar results were found when accounting for other candidates' preferred characteristics, like being middle-aged (Figure 8.3.), male (Figure 8.4.), or in favour of a bigger role of the state in the economy (interventionist) (Figure 8.6.). This shows how an accusation of corruption is presented matters, especially when evaluating candidates with other characteristics that make them more favourable.

I posit that concretising the accusation led to more punishment in these cases be-

cause it made it easier to account for the effects of corruption at a larger societal scale and thus made it easier to translate condemnation into a concrete situation. I posit that this effect was driven both by intuitive processes and reflective/deliberative processes. The effect of this concretisation was particularly prominent when controlling for other candidate features that would have normally overshadowed the accusations of corruption. As we saw in Figure 8.2., the features previously mentioned made respondents more likely to pick a candidate, which shows that they matter when making a decision (although their effect was smaller than that of the features of "Accusation"). Interestingly, the significant difference between the abstract accusation and the concretised ones is only seen when the concretisation was done through equivalence to material goods. This is contrary to my initial expectation about the concretisation based on equivalence to social goods, which I expected to have a stronger negative effect on the likelihood of choosing a candidate.

There is one exception to the pattern mentioned before. This exception is seen on the ACIE of "Accusation" based on the attribute of "Experience", which captures whether the candidate had previous political experience in office and whether this experience was good or bad. Based on the previous pattern, I expected to find that the effect of concreting the accusation was stronger and statistically different from the abstract accusation when the level of "Experience" was set to "Good previous performance" since this was the level that had the strongest positive effect according to the general results. However, as we can see in Figure 8.7. when holding previous candidate experience as constant, the way in which the accusation is presented matters more in cases in which we don't have any previous information about the candidate's performance.

Figure 8.7: ACIE by the candidate's previous experience



This may be because previous performance is weighted particularly heavily when choosing a candidate, as seen in Figure 8.2., and as expected by previous accounts of tolerance towards corruption. The importance of a candidate's previous performance is also highlighted by the fact that when the candidate is said to have had a previous bad performance, no level of accusation of corruption had a significant effect. Based on this and the general results (Figure 8.2.), we can say that a candidate is unlikely to be elected when past performance is bad, regardless of other factors. While this may be seen as discouraging, it also suggests an interesting avenue for future research, where the focus can be on clarifying the link between corruption and bad performance. In other words, a way of reducing the instances in which people trade-off between performance and corruption (del Mar Martínez Rosón, 2016) could be focusing on the ways in which corruption affects performance in ways that are not always clearly visible, and maybe doing so with an added component designed to trigger emotional reactions as to contribute to intuitive condemnation.

8.6.1.3 Sub-Group analysis

Another important type of analysis is the Sub-Group analysis, in which we look at the responses based on respondents' characteristics. Here, we focus on the effects based on participant characteristics instead of the attributes shown to them. To conduct this analysis, I will rely on the Marginal Means, which captures "the level of favourability toward profiles that have a particular feature level, ignoring all other features" (Leeper et al., 2020). This level of favourability is analysed in reference to the level of favorability obtained by other features and the grand mean. In a Forced Choice Conjoint, where participants are equally likely to choose either option from a pair in a forced choice task if they think both options are attractive or if they are making random selections, the grand mean is 0.5 since this would be the likelihood of choosing either option[11].

I examined the results based on three demographic features: age, gender, and socio-economic status. I wanted to see whether the level of favourability given to the profiles based on the way the accusation of corruption was presented varied according to these participant characteristics.

[11]The AMCE has also been used to determine preference heterogeneity based on respondents' characteristics, but this use is not ideal when it comes to sub-group analysis (Leeper et al., 2020) because we cannot interpret causality in non-randomized features and because the AMCE is highly dependent on the baseline level used for each attribute

Figure 8.8: Marginal Means by respondents age



Figure 8.9: Marginal Means by respondents gender



Figure 8.10: Marginal Means by respondents socio-economic status



While I did not have strong empirical expectations for response variations based on these features, some interesting things emerged. As we saw in the previous figures, the concretised (material) accusation was different from the global mean only for male respondents, those younger (18-24 and 25-39), and those of lower socio-economic status. While the concretised (social) accusation was only different from the global mean for the older respondents (40 or more). These variations are interesting even if the marginal means of the concretised accusations were not significantly different from the marginal mean of the abstract accusation. All in all, these results also point towards a bigger role of concretisation done through equivalence to material goods when it comes to the effect on the favourability of a candidate.

8.7 Discussion and Conclusion

As we have seen in this chapter, information does matter for the electoral accountability of corruption, as predicted by studies aligned with the Princial-Agent approach to corruption. However, in accordance with the caveat proposed by my argument, the way in which information is presented can strengthen this effect, especially when the candidate is shown as possessing desirable characteristics outside of the accusation.

Through my empirical analysis, I found evidence for this. The results of the conjoint experiment show that accusations of corruption would make voters less likely to select a candidate. This is important because, as I found, the coverage of corruption during election periods seldom mentions candidates that have been associated with it, even when there are open investigations against the candidates. For example, in the 2016 Presidential election, Alejandro Toledo and Alan Garcia (both former presidents running in the election) were investigated for illicit enrichment. Still, there was no mention of this in the headlines recovered.

However, although information matters, other favourable candidate characteristics can overshadow the accusations. In those cases, the concretisation of the accusation has a stronger effect, as proposed by my argument. Although in the general results (Figure 8.2.), the difference between the concretised accusations and the abstract one was not significant, the directionality of my intervention was as expected. The non-significant difference in these general results may partly respond to the context in which the survey was fielded. Whilst the coverage of corruption during electoral years was low, it is likely that the issue of corruption and its consequences was still salient in the minds of respondents. This is because of the Lava Jato investigation, which had brought to the forefront the scale and reach of corruption in politics (Gonzalez Ocantos and Baraybar, 2019, 2021; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2023). Even though the coverage of corruption did not seem high during the electoral years, the coverage of the Lava Jato investigation, both in the printed press and in other media, would still have made corruption and its consequences

a salient issue. My treatment was based on the expectation that concretising an accusation of corruption would make it easier for respondents to account for the large-society effects of corruption and thus increase the salience of the accusation vis a vis other factors, making it easier for the condemnation of corruption that we see in the abstract to translate to the concrete electoral decision. Nonetheless, because corruption and its effects were abnormally salient during the time the experiment was fielded, one could almost expect the concreated accusation to have the same effect as the abstract one on the likelihood of punishing corruption.

Still, the analysis based on ACIEs gave stronger evidence towards my argument. There, we saw that concretised accusation had an effect that was significantly different from the abstract accusation when the level of the other attributes was held constant at the most favourable one (the one that would increase the likelihood of participants choosing the candidate)[12]. Contrary to my initial expectations, the concretisation based on material equivalences had the most distinct effect. A potential explanation for this is that this concretisation triggered a stronger emotional response, as I will discuss in the Conclusion.

Finally, it is important to restate that my chosen strategy does not directly distinguish effects related to reflective/deliberative processes and those related to intuitive processes. A strategy seeking to affect intuitive processes directly would have focused on, for example, inducing emotions or imposing time constraints on decision-making. However, these strategies would be hard to apply in real electoral settings. It is unlikely that any strategy designed only to trigger intuitive processes would be applicable in a real electoral context. To study the separate role of the intuitive process in electoral decision-making, a potential strategy would be to conduct a controlled lab experiment in which participants can be induced into emotional states directly and then have people evaluate candidates based on differ-

[12]An exception was seen in the attribute of "Experience", where we did not see this difference between abstract and concrete accusation except for when the candidate was said to have no previous experience.

ent characteristics or by creating a setting in which the evaluation is done under time constraints. A further avenue for research, not related to distinguishing these processes but to study the role of moral judgement more broadly, would be to ask people to explain their voting choices since I would expect moral consideration to be more salient among participants that evaluate candidates accused of corruptions, as was found by previous research (Arvate and Mittlaender, 2017).

Still, for real-world applications, changing how corruption accusations and scandals are presented is more doable and does seem to affect responses to these accusations, especially when they are presented alongside favourable candidate characteristics. In the dissertation's Conclusion chapter, I will further discuss this strategy's potential policy implications.

Chapter 9

The Role of Moral Intuitions in Corruption as a Moral Dilemma

In Chapter 8, I explored how strategies that targeted both reflective/deliberative and intuitive processes could increase the punishment towards corruption in concrete settings (an election), thus translating the condemnation of corruption that we see in the abstract into a concrete decision and action. In this and the next chapter, I explore how intuitive processes can affect judgement and corruption-related behaviour in more detail. To do so, I focus on studying corruption dilemmas.

As outlined in Chapter 4, my argument posits that the condemnation of corruption in the abstract is partly due to moral intuitions linked to the domain of fairness. However, in concrete settings, this condemnation does not always translate into punishment due to competing concerns, some moral and others linked to individual self-interest. Thus, as Section 4 of Chapter 4 explains, corruption is often presented to individuals as a social or moral dilemma. In this chapter, I will focus on the role of intuitive processes when corruption is presented to the individual as a moral dilemma, where competing concerns are linked to other moral domains. To study this, I focus on petty corruption as favouritism in the UK.

I find that people react differently to different types of corruption, being more likely to engage in favouritism than bribery. Furthermore, intuitive processes have a distinct effect on judgements and reported behaviours concerning corruption as favouritism.

9.1 Introduction

In this chapter, in line with my general argument, I argue that how people respond to corruption as a moral dilemma is partly a function of intuitive processes, in particular of moral intuitions, which are automatic hunches of "good/right" and "bad/wrong" (Haidt, 2003), for which moral emotions are a key component. As explained in Chapter 3, I subscribe to a pluralistic view of moral intuitions and consider that moral intuitions are related to various moral domains like fairness, harm, in-group loyalty, kinship, etc. Furthermore, although they are shared among humans, how intuitions manifest varies depending on factors such as the group individuals take as a reference point and how corruption is presented. In this case, I am proposing that when it comes to corruption as favouritisms, there is a trade-off between intuitions linked to the domain of fairness and those linked to the domain of loyalty (group loyalty and kinship)[1].

At their core, all instances of corruption are instances of favouritism since they imply a violation of the impartiality principle (Kurer, 2005, p.230). Still, most studies have focused on cases in which money is exchanged, such as bribery[2]. In this chapter, I focus on favouritism as an instance of petty corruption distinct from bribery, where personal contacts determine access to services[3]. I argue that in these

[1]More detail on this can be found in Section 4 of Chapter 4.

[2]Another activity where money is involved but the relational aspect (the interaction between participants) is weaker is embezzlement.

[3]This type of favouritism would fall under nepotism (kinship) or cronyism (close others outside of kin). Still, I decided against using those terms because they have often been associated with state officials hiring family and friends or giving them public contracts. Because here I focus on

cases, corruption is presented to potential participants as a moral dilemma, where they face a trade-off between concerns linked to fairness at a larger social scale [4], that would push them away from corruption, and other moral concerns more salient at a smaller societal scale related to domains like in-group loyalty and kinship.

Whether these intuitions linked to fairness lead to less engagement and a harsher condemnation of corruption in concrete situations would depend in part on whether individuals have a larger society as a relevant group for their social identity. As I have discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, an individual's social identity comprises many group-based identities that can be broader or narrower (Figure 3.6.). As explained in those chapters, I focus on the effects of norms designed to promote larger-scale cooperation, particularly generalised trust and a broader social identity, to account for this identification. Thus, I propose that individuals with higher levels of generalised trust (trust in distant others) and a broader social identity (such as a national identity) would be more likely to translate the condemnation of corruption in the abstract into concrete settings.

As discussed in Chapter 4 (and as shown in Figure 4.1.) I argue that favouritism is a more prevalent type of corruption worldwide (compared to bribery) because engagement in it is more linked to other moral intuitions, in particular to those related to the moral domain of group loyalty and kinship(Haidt, 2007; Curry et al., 2019a). Because favouritism is often presented as favours between people who share a social connection, part of the acceptance towards it and the prevalence of this practice respondents to the role these moral intuitions play in judgement.

I argue that when faced with a scenario of favouritism, individuals face a moral dilemma, which arises when one form of moral behaviour conflicts with another, and a trade-off must be made between them. These dilemmas often arise when there

petty corruption and the use of personal connection to access services, I decided to use the more general term of favouritism.

[4]Concerns linked to harm at a larger social scale potentially would have a similar effect, as I will discuss in the Conclusion of this dissertation

is a conflict between moral behaviour pertaining to large-scale society and moral behaviour pertaining to small-scale society (Curry et al., 2019b). Additionally, I propose that the engagement and judgement of corruption in these dilemmas is not only a function of deliberative/reflective processes but also of intuitive processes for which emotions are a key component.

Thus, I expect that when corruption is presented as favouritism, which represents a moral dilemma, most people would be willing to engage in corruption because of the salience of intuitions linked to group loyalty and kinship. But at the same time, I expect that people who have a larger society as a relevant group for their social identity (those who have higher levels of generalised trust and a broader social identity) would be less likely to engage in corruption and would judge the engagement more harshly. Furthermore, I propose that intuitive condemnation linked to the fairness domain can be activated by mechanisms designed to affect the intuitive processes directly.

To study this, I focused on the UK, a comparatively low-corruption case[5], where I conducted two studies. Study 1 consists of a vignette experiment fielded through YouGov in March 2023. In this experiment, participants were presented with a bribery or a favouritism scenario based on access to social housing. They were asked to evaluate both scenarios and report how they would behave in each. Then, in an open-ended question, they were asked to explain why they would or would not consider the situation an act of corruption. The results showed a distinct variation in the reported behaviour when the participants faced bribery or a favouritism situation, with the latter leading to more participants reporting they would engage in corruption. The analysis of the open-ended question also revealed that people framed their response based on the moral domain of fairness to a higher degree than other moral domains like loyalty or prevention of harm. Furthermore, among those who considered the action to be an act of corruption, the open-ended question

[5]As mentioned, although there have been scandals of grand corruption in the UK, it is still seen as a country with comparatively low levels of corruption.

revealed that the concerns based on fairness were focused on fairness towards others.

Study 2 also consists of a vignette experiment, this time fielded in June 2023 using LimeSurvey in a non-representative sample of Prolific respondents. The experiment was based on a scenario similar to the one used in Study 1, but in this case, I included an emotional induction (based on the autobiographical recall method) before the participants were presented with the vignette. This emotional induction was used to establish whether intuitive processes have a distinct role in judgement and behaviour concerning corruption as a moral dilemma. The results show that induced emotions do affect behaviour, although in ways distinct from my initial expectations. Furthermore, they show that induced emotions affect how favouritism is judged, but only when these induced emotions interact with measures of social identity and trust, which supports my argument about the role of features that correspond to larger society being relevant for some individuals' social identity. Finally, the analysis of the open-ended question in Study 2 showed that when evaluating favouritisms, people are more likely to mention words related to the moral domain of group loyalty, while when defining corruption, they are more likely to mention words related to the domain of fairness. This is in line with my broad expectation of the role of different moral domains in abstract and concrete judgements.

In what follows, I will briefly present my case and explain how my general argument (presented in Part 1) relates to the study of corruption as a moral dilemma. Then, I will present the two studies and a general discussion based on the results.

9.2 The case: UK

I propose that corruption as a moral dilemma is more easily studied in low-corruption countries, where the link between corruption and intuitions concerning fairness is more apparent due to the presence of norms and rules that allow for the expansion of moral concerns towards larger society (as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4). In

low-corruption countries, we tend to see higher levels of generalised trust (the belief that most people can be trusted) and a broader social identity encompassing distant others. As I explained in Chapter 3, these factors result from norms and rules that permit larger-scale cooperation and would "enhance fairness among strangers" (Henrich et al., 2010). Furthermore, low-corruption countries tend to have more established formal constraints for corruption practices, making people more prone to outright discard engagement in practices like bribery. In these cases, I would expect that most people would not engage in corruption unless it is presented as a moral trade-off. Furthermore, the trade-off scenario must have a certain level of feasibility, where although there is a risk of detection, the person still has the option to engage in favouritism. This is important because, as explained in Part I, while my argument highlights the role of intuitive processes, it also recognises that of reflective/deliberative processes, and thus, risk and costs associated with engagement in corruption can also affect it.

Therefore, to test the role of moral intuitions on judgement and behaviour related to corruption, I focused on the UK case, which has traditionally been viewed as a low-corruption country. Additionally, even though there have been grand corruption scandals in recent years, petty corruption has been less studied, and data on petty bribery in this country is outdated compared to the EU. Thus, this chapter can also provide pertinent case insights.

Although the United Kingdom is generally viewed as a low-corruption country, perceptions of corruption have increased in recent years. For example, in the latest Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International) of 2023, the UK scored 73 [6]; while it is the country's lowest score since the index began, the UK still ranks among the twenty less corrupt countries in the world[7].

As mentioned, there is not a lot of data on petty corruption in the UK. The

[6]In the CPI, a score of 0 means a highly corrupt country (high perceptions of corruption), while a score of 100 represents a very clean county.

[7]The global mean is around 43

country was not in the 10th edition of the Global Corruption Barometer (2021), and in the previous 2017 edition, where the UK was included among the EU and Central Asian countries, the questions about engagement in bribery or the use of personal connections were not asked in the UK. The latest study for which data about the UK was available is the 8th edition of the Global Corruption Barometer of 2013. In the report, 71% of respondents believed that personal contacts were important (37%) or very important (%34) to get things done when dealing with the public sector. However, only 5% of respondents reported paying a bribe. In this edition of the Barometer (2013), respondents were not asked about their use of personal connections, just about their perception of the need to use them.

When it comes to the other two variables that I believe how and which intuitions manifest in judgement and behaviour related to corruption- trust and social identity- the country-level data for the UK presents a country where generalised trust is relatively high and where there seems to be a strong identification with the national identity.

In the last Word Values Survey (WVS) wave (2017-2022), 43.4% of British respondents reported believing that most people could be trusted[8]. This is above the average of around 23%[9]. Regarding the scale of trust, in the WVS (2017-2022), 80.2% of the British respondents declared completely trusting their family, 20.9% their neighbourhood, 49.8% people they know personally, and 2.1% people they met for the first time. These results show that there may be a difference between generalised trust in the abstract (the belief that most people can be trusted) and concrete generalised trust (trusting strangers), as I will discuss in the Conclusion chapter of this dissertation.

[8]This is the measure of generalised trust, which asks people whether they believe most people could be trusted or whether they needed to be careful when dealing with other people,

[9]The UK percentage is only surpassed by the percentages in Switzerland (57.1%), Sweden (62.8%), Norway (72.1%), New Zealand (56.6%), the Netherlands (57%), Finland (68.4%), Denmark (73.9%), Canada (46.7%) and Australia (48.5%).

Also, in the WVS (2017-2022), the results from the UK sample showed that 74.1% of respondents felt "very proud" or "quite proud" to be nationals of their country (this is a bit of a fall from the previous wave where both categories amounted to 84.7% of respondents). In this latest wave, 73.5% of respondents also reported feeling "close" or "very close" to their country[10]. The case of the UK also posits a differentiation between national and supra-national identities that is not as easily observed in other cases since individuals can identify either with their countries or with Britain as a whole. According to data from the 2021 census, 54.5% of people identified only as British (which was a rise from the 2011 census in which only 19.1% identified as such), and 14.9% identified only as English (which was a decline from the 2011 census in which 57.7% identified as such), this seem to indicate a rise of the British identity vis a vis the identity of the country-level nation. It is likely that part of the rise in British identity is due to Brexit, but the Office for National Statistics also attributes this increase to a change in the order of the options between the 2011 census and the 2021 census[11].

In general, in the UK, there seem to be different levels of generalised trust depending on the measure (trust in distant others or people they don't know) that coexist with different levels of national identification depending on the reference group (British or country-nation). As discussed in Part 1, these mixed results in two measures that should be related (social identity and generalised trust) are one of the reasons I chose to account for both and not just one or the other.

Having explained why the UK is a good case for studying the role of intuitive processes in cases of corruption as a moral dilemma and having presented some of the

[10]this question was not asked in previous waves, so it's not possible to know if there has been significant variation

[11]The statistic bulletin of the Office for National Statistics wrote: "While the increase in the number of usual residents describing their national identity as "British" and the fall in the number describing their national identity as "English" may partly reflect true change, it is most likely to be a result of the changes to the question structure where "British" became the top response option in 2021 for England only."

country-level characteristics in relation to corruption, social identity and generalised trust, I will now explain how my general argument relates to this.

9.3 Role of intuitive processes when corruption is presented as a moral dilemma

I argue that the higher levels of favouritism compared to bribery are partly due to competing intuitions related to different moral domains. In favouritism, which includes practices such as nepotism and cronyism, the behaviours that would normally be seen as morally wrong when observed from the outside can be viewed by the individuals participating in them as morally right due to the role of intuitions linked to group loyalty and kin. After all, at the end of the day, "corruption, cronyism, or nepotism is really just cooperation on a smaller scale, often among relatives, friends and reciprocal partners, at the expense of cooperation on a larger, impersonal scale." (Henrich and Muthukrishna, 2021, p.2019). At the same time, I acknowledge that higher levels of favouritism compared to bribery also respond to the difficulty of regulating such behaviour. While my argument focuses on the role of intuitive processes, it does not discard the role of reflective/deliberative processes and thus also acknowledges that factors like the risk of detection also play a role. While bribery, the direct exchange of money for preferential access to service, is more easily regulated (although these regulations are differently enforced), favouritism is harder to regulate because it does not rest on a transactional interaction but rather on social bonds, for which, even though regulations exist, the behaviour in practice is harder to curb. Thus, both the intuitive side (the moral intuitions) and the reflective/deliberative side (cost of engaging in the practice and risk of detection) interact in determining how corruption is judged and whether an individual would engage in it.

In line with this, for Study 1 of this chapter, I compare individuals' responses to petty bribery and favouritism scenarios. I propose that people will see favouritism

as more acceptable than bribery and thus be more likely to engage in it. Further, I propose that both of these scenarios can still be viewed as corruption even by those who engage in them since the condemnation of corruption does not fully disappear.

Then, in Study 2, I test my proposal that moral judgement of petty corruption as favouritism is partly driven by intuitive processes, in particular moral intuitions. To recapitulate, moral intuitions can be defined as "the sudden appearance in consciousness, or at the fringe of consciousness, of an evaluative feeling (like-dislike; good-bad) about the character or actions of a person without any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of search, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion" (Haidt and Joseph, 2008, p.188). A key component for these intuitions is moral emotions, and in some cases, emotions act as moral intuitions themselves (Haidt, 2001). Here, I am focusing on emotions that are linked to the moral domain of fairness since I argue that corruption in the abstract is often judged as wrong due to concerns about fairness (as explained in Chapter 4).

As outlined in Chapters 3 and 4, anger and guilt are the two main moral emotions when it comes to judgements pertaining to the fairness domain. This does not necessarily mean that other emotions won't affect judgements of fairness (for example, it has been argued that disgust leads to harsher moral judgement in general), but as previously discussed, there is extensive evidence that both anger and guilt play an important role in judgements related to fairness[12]. I chose to focus on both emotions because I hypothesise that due to anger being an other-focused emotion and guilt being a self-conscious emotion (Zinck, 2008), they may have different effects on behaviour and judgement concerning favouritism.

I would expect anger to substantially affect the moral judgement of others' behaviour, leading to harsher moral judgements. But I would expect the role of guilt to be more complex. As de Hooge et al. (2007) and Feng et al. (2017) argue, the pro-social effect of guilt as a moral emotion is not a given in complex social inter-

[12]See Section 4 of Chapter 3 and Section 5 of Chapter 4

action. Guilt can lead to behaviour that is not pro-social at a larger societal scale. For example, de Hooge et al. (2011) argued that feelings of guilt could lead to a distribution skewed towards those perceived as victims. Following that insight, Feng et al. (2017) argue that in multi-party interactions, we could see a tradeoff between fairness intuitions and harm intuitions, with guilt playing a role in both since people could feel guilt towards the victims, and that would lead to unfair allocations. This differential effect of guilt has been hypothesised by Köbis et al. (2016), who proposed that when a corruption situation presents "a moral tradeoff between fairness principles [...] and loyalty principles", the individual for whom loyalty principles are more important can feel guilty for not engaging in corruption. This is because guilt, as a self-conscious emotion, is felt about our own behaviour in relation to others. However, which "others" are relevant in a given situation varies. In other words, it matters towards whom we feel this guilt (Ketelaar and Tung Au, 2003). Thus, in cases of moral trade-off, guilt could lead to large social-scale fairness for those who identify with distant others but to small-scale fairness (and large social-scale unfairness) for those who solely identify with their immediate narrow communities.

Thus, and as outlined in Chapters 3 and 4, I propose that how and when these intuitions manifest is linked to generalised trust and broad social identity. As I explained in Chapter 3, these two factors can be considered effects of the norms and rules designed to promote cooperation at larger scales. To briefly recapitulate, generalised trust is understood as trust in distant others (Wamsler, 2023) and social identity is understood as a component of an individual sense of self that is derived from the membership or belonging to a group (Tajfel and Turner, 2001). Both factors are correlated, but the way they are traditionally measured does not necessarily reflect this relation, which is why it is important to account for both. Because I am focusing on moral dilemmas, I expect these two related factors to be particularly important for the effect that induced guilt has on judgement and behaviour related to corruption due to the reasons outlined previously.

Thus, I argue that the use of personal connections to access state services violates the norms of fairness, which is one of the norms most commonly upheld at a

basic intuitive level (Haidt, 2003; Curry et al., 2019a; Cappelen et al., 2016), and this contributes to corruption being condemned in the abstract. However, when corruption is presented as a moral dilemma, as is often done with favouritism scenarios, this condemnation does not always translate into actual punishment due to competing moral concerns. This can lead to engagement in certain forms of corruption being seen as simultaneously morally right (because of moral concerns related to loyalty and kinship) and wrong (due to moral concerns related to fairness). I propose that, as in any moral judgement situation, the judgement and behaviour concerning corruption as favouritism is partly driven by intuitive processes, mainly moral intuitions. Furthermore, I argue that the role of these institutions interacts with factors linked to the effect of norms and rules designed to promote cooperation at larger scales; in particular, I focus on generalised trust and social identity.

9.4 Study 1: Individual views of different types of corruption

As I have discussed, when it comes to petty corruption, there are two main types of practices: bribery (which involves the direct exchange of money or gifts for preferential access to services or a preferred outcome) and favouritism (which involves using personal connections to get preferential access to services or a preferred outcome). I posit that the latter is often presented as a moral dilemma since it involves a conflict between general norms of fairness and norms related to in-group loyalty and kinship.

In my first empirical test, I wanted to explore whether reported individual engagement in corruption varied depending on the type of corruption (bribery vs favouritism). Based both on the European Global Corruption Barometer data (the latest versions of which did not include data from the UK)[13] and on my own argument (that views favouritism as more aligned with moral concerns), I expect people

[13]See Figure 4.1.

to be more willing to engage in favouritism than in bribery.

I also wanted to explore whether social norms played a strong role in low-corruption environments since they have been a key component of the study of corruption in high-corruption environments. I expected people to be more willing to engage in either type of corruption if they were given information that signalled the social acceptability of such engagement. But I also expect this effect to be weaker than that of the type of corruption. I expected this because the type of corruption would affect both the deliberative/reflective processes since I expect favouritisms to seem more feasible than bribery, and the intuitive processes, since I expect favouritisms to be more linked to moral intuitions that operate at more narrow social levels. On the other hand, social norms would act mostly through reflective/deliberative pathways by signalling the viability and acceptability of engaging in corruption (although social norms may also amplify or constrain intuitions, I do not explore this here).

Finally, I expected that at least some individuals would cite moral reasons in their judgment of whether the situation should be or not be considered corruption, and I expected the mention of words related to the moral domain of fairness to be higher according to my view that condemnation of corruption is highly linked to intuitions pertaining to this domain.

9.4.1 The experiment

To test this, I conducted a vignette experiment, where participants were randomly presented with one of four vignettes depicting a situation where the participant is applying for social housing. I picked this scenario because it was one of the few in which I could find some evidence of the presence of petty corruption in the UK

(Barrington and Maxwell, 2013; Rahman, 2022) [14]. All the vignettes had a common setup:

> "Imagine that you have applied for social housing. Because of the demand, the application is taking a long time".

But they vary in two ways. First, they vary in the type of corruption. For half of the vignettes, this was favouritism:

> "An official at the local council housing association turns out to be a distant family member. When they find out you are applying, they offer to speed up your application as a favour."

For the other half, it was bribery:

> "An official at the local council housing application says that they can speed up the process if you were willing to give them compensation."

Second, they vary on the signalled social norm for that type of practice. Half of the vignettes signal that it would be socially acceptable:

> "Most people would accept the offer."

While the other half of the vignettes signalled that it would not be acceptable:

[14] I believe that the lack of evidence for other scenarios corresponds more to a lack of research than to an absence of petty corruption.

"Most people would decline the offer."

Thus, the experiment had a total of four branches that combined these two treatments. This experiment was run through YouGov as part of the Oxford UniOM scheme[15]. The final data included 2214 observations. It was a representative sample, and it also included questions related to demographic features such as age, gender, level of education, social class, and region, and questions about respondents' political interests and how they voted at the 2019 General Election and at the EU Referendum. Unless otherwise specified, all results for this study are calculated by accounting for survey weights.

9.4.2 Results

First, it was important to determine whether people report they would be more likely to engage in corruption when this was presented as a type of favouritism (using personal connections to access a service) or bribery. As mentioned before, previous surveys show that even in low-corruption countries, petty corruption still takes place. Among those, people seem to engage more in favouritism than in bribery. In my experiment, I wanted to see whether this was also true for the UK.

To do this, I focused on the outcome question for both types of corruption scenarios. The outcome question for the bribery was, "How much, if any, compensation would you be willing to pay?" where the participant could pick an amount of money that went from 0 to "more than a £1000") [16], and for the favouritism scenarios, the outcome was "How willing would you be, if at all, to accept the favour?", where the participants respondent in a scale from 1 ("I would not accept the favour") to 6 ("I

[15]The experiment received ethical approval from the Central University Research Ethics Committee (CUREC), under the reference number SSHDPIRC1A23006

[16]The weighted distribution of responses to this question is included in Appendix A

would accept the favour) [17]. For ease of analysis, I re-coded the outcomes to create a new variable for engagement, coded as one if people reported that they would pay anything (any value bigger than zero) or would at all be willing to accept the favour (anything more than 1 in the scale). [18]. Then, I graphed the percentages of engagement by each type of petty corruption modality.

Figure 9.1: Engagement in Corruption by Type of Corruption



Note: The lines represent a CI calculated at 95%

As we can see in Figure 9.1., the results show that people would be more likely

[17]The weighted distribution of responses to this question is included in Appendix B

[18]I also conducted a parallel analysis under a different codification, with a more restrictive condition for engagement, where the variable was coded as one if the participant reported that they would pay more than £10 and would be more willing to accept the favour (anything more than 2 in the scale), the results were not very different so they were not included here, but the full data set and the code of the analysis is available upon request

to engage in corruption when the situation is presented as favouritism than when it is presented as bribery [19]. To explore whether this effect was significant, I implemented a logistic regression, using the *survey* package from R, for the outcome of Engagement in Corruption on the type of corruption and the social norm signalled in the vignette.

Figure 9.2: Engagement in Corruption by Social Norm and Type of Corruption



Note: The results are from a logistics regression

As we can see in Figure 9.2.[20], both **types of corruption (bribery or favouritism)** and the signalled **social norm (in favour and against)** are a strong predictor for the likelihood of engaging in corruption. The type of corruption being set to favouritism, taking bribery as the baseline, is associated with an increase of 2.01 in the log odds of engaging in corruption in a model that also includes the variable

[19]In Appendix C, we can see that there is also a difference in the engagement in corruption depending on the social norm singled in the vignette. But as expected, this difference is much smaller

[20]See Appendix D for the table of results

of social norm. In a model in which the only regressor is the type of corruption, the scenario being one of favouritism, taking bribery as the baseline, it is associated with an increase of 1.98 in the log odds for engaging in corruption (see Appendix D).

On the other hand, signalling a pro-engagement social norm (taking the against-engagement social norm as the baseline) is associated with an increase of 0.56 in the log odds for engaging in corruption. The results are significant at the 95% level, and they also hold when including other demographic variables in the model [21]. Furthermore, the effects of **type of corruption** and **social norm** seem independent. As shown in Figure 9.3., when I included an interaction term in the regression, the effect of both variables remained essentially the same, and the interaction term was not significant at the 95% level[22].

[21] See Appendix D for the table of the results and Appendix E for the graphic of the regression, including age, SES, and gender

[22] The results are included in the table in Appendix D

Figure 9.3: Engagement in Corruption by Social Norm and Type of Corruption including an interaction term



Note: The results are from a logistics regression

Thus, people are more likely to engage in corruption when it is presented as favouritism. Furthermore, even though we also saw that social norms signalling does matter as predicted by the Collective Action Approach to corruption, their effect was smaller and seemingly independent than that of the type of corruption.

Although I did not directly test for mechanisms related to the Principal-Agent Approach, one of the post-treatment questions asked respondents whether any laws forbade this engagement in corruption. Part of the Principal-Agent approach argues that weak institutional frameworks can lead to officials engaging in corruption. I posit that believing that there are laws against engagement in corruption gives information about the individual perception of the strength of the institutional framework that regulates corruption. Thus, those respondents who did not engage in corruption should also be more likely to report believing that there are laws against this engagement. As shown in Figure 9.4., there is a variation in the percentage of

people who reported engaging in corruption when divided by whether they believed there were laws against such behaviour. But because the question was asked after the respondents said whether they would engage, the results are just descriptive [23].

Figure 9.4: Mean engagement in Corruption by believing that the engagement is against the law



Note: The lines represent CIs constructed at the 95%

We can see something similar when participants were asked whether the practice they saw on the vignettes (favouritism or bribery) should be considered an instance of corruption. The logic here is similar; I would expect participants who said they would engage in corruption to be less likely to believe that the instance they evaluated was one of corruption (either the bribery or favouritism scenario). Figure 9.5. shows that participants who answered "Yes" to this question also had a lower engagement mean. As in the previous case, this is only descriptive. [24]. In this case, we should also consider the high number of respondents who considered this an act

[23] I regressed whether they believed the behaviour was against the law on the engagement in corruption, type of corruption and social norm. The results are in Appendix F)

[24] I regressed the outcome of the question of whether it "should or should not be considered an instance of corruption?" on the engagement in corruption; the results can be seen in Appendix G.

of corruption. To illustrate, of the 1255 respondents who considered it to be an act of corruption, 572 previously said they would engage in it, in contrast to the 212 respondents who did not consider it to be an act of corruption, where 198 said they would engage in it. Thus, as I expected, a considerable proportion (almost half) recognise these acts as corruption, even among those who engage in bribery or favouritism.

Figure 9.5: Mean engagement in Corruption by believing that the action is an instance of corruption



Note: The lines represent CIs constructed at the 95%

Up until this point, the results have confirmed that even in comparatively low-corruption environments, people would be willing to engage in petty corruption. This engagement is more heavily affected by the type of corruption (favouritism vs. bribery) than by social norms, and these two things seem to affect engagement independently.

9.4.2.1 Importance of fairness

Although I did not directly test the role of intuitions in this study, towards the end of the survey, participants were asked why they believed the practices they were presented with should or should not be considered corruption. I used the most recent version of the Moral Foundations Dictionary (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2012), included in the *quanteda R package*, to perform a text analysis of the responses to this open-ended question.

First, I wanted to see if, in general, these answers made more reference to words related to the foundation of fairness over the other foundations. I used the **liwcalike()** function from the *quanteda package* to perform an LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count) analysis based on the Extended Moral Foundations Dictionary (Hopp et al., 2020). In the dictionary, we can find categories that correspond to the five original foundations of Graham et al. (2013): care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and sanctity. For each of these, the dictionary provides associations for "virtue" and "vice", which are positive and negative words associated with each foundation. Thus, for example, in the category of "fairness/virtue", we might find words like "fairness", while for that of "fairness/vice", we might find words like "unfairness".

The open question of why the situation presented in the vignette should or should not be considered corruption was answered by 1674 respondents. I transformed these responses into a separate corpus, keeping each entry associated with the participant's ID for later analysis. All the non-responses were coded as missing and excluded from the analysis. It is also relevant to notice that words associated with the domain of "sanctity" will tend to be overcounted, both because this domain is associated with any time of moral judgement and because that category includes words like "corrupt" in the Extended Moral Foundations Dictionary.

Figure 9.6: Means of proportion for different moral domains



As shown in Figure 9.6., participants used words associated with fairness at a higher rate than words associated with any other moral domains. Words related to the sanctity or purity domain, which involves moral judgements based on "uncleanness" or "impurity", are the second most used ones, which can be linked to the idea that this domain is generally related to all moral judgements to a certain degree, and to the fact that words like "corrupt" and "corruption" are included in that domains dictionary. Furthermore, when I divided responses by the type of corruption participants evaluated (bribery versus favouritism), words related to fairness were still the most used. Still, they are slightly more used in favouritisms scenarios, which is surprising because they were the ones in which people were more willing to engage.

Figure 9.7: Moral Foundations Word Propotion by Type of Corruption



As shown in Figure 9.7., the proportion of words related to the moral domain of fairness is much higher in cases where the participant evaluated a scenario of favouritism. This is the case for both "vice" and "virtue" fairness words, although the difference is much bigger for "vice" words. Furthermore, we can also see that participants used words related to the domain of "loyalty" (which refers to in-group and kinship) in a higher proportion when they saw the favouritism scenario. We see something similar, with the proportion of words linked to the moral domain of harm, although the difference between the two types of corruption is smaller. This is in accordance with my argument that some instances of corruption (especially those presented as favouritism) are viewed as moral dilemmas in which there are conflicting moral intuitions. In particular, the results suggest that intuitions related to small group interactions, like loyalty, also have an important weight. Interestingly, we can also see that the words related to the moral domain of "authority", which refers to respect towards hierarchical structures and concerns about prestige and reputation (Haidt, 2008), were used in a higher proportion by participants that evaluated the bribery scenario. This may be because these participants were less likely to engage in bribery and used reasons related to obeying rules to explain why the engagement would be an instance of corruption.

To further explore how the proportion of words related to different moral domains varied by types of corruption, I decided to see whether there were differences when accounting for participants' reported engagement in corruption. To do so, I split the data set based on the outcome of the question of engagement (accepting the favour or paying the official), although it is important to notice that the text data of the open question (Do you think [paying or accepting the favour] should or should not be considered an instance of corruption?) was collected towards the end of the study and made reference to an evaluation of corruption and not necessary of the action (engaging or not) itself.

Figure 9.8: Moral Foundations Word Propotion by Type of Corruption and Engagement



In Figure 9.8., we can see some interesting things. For example, on average, both participants who did and did not engage in corruption in the favouritisms scenario used a higher proportion of words related to the domain of "fairness vice". Thus, regardless of whether the respondents reported that they would engage in the action themselves, they cited reasons related to (un)fairness to explain why the action should be considered an instance of corruption. This is interesting because it means that even when people themselves report that they would engage in corruption, they cite fairness as a reason to justify why it should be considered corruption. For example, among those participants who said they would accept the favour in the "favouritism" scenario (n=694), the majority still considered that the action of accepting constituted an act of corruption (n=359). When asked why it should be

considered corruption, they cited reasons such as "Unfair action, unfair for other people not related to someone working in the council" (participant ID: 677) or "It is unfair on people in front of you in the queue" (Participant ID:215) and variation of this unfairness towards distant others (people they did not personally know).

This points towards one of the elements of my argument, which proposes that in abstract evaluations of an act of corruption (like when asked whether an action should be considered corruption), people are more likely to condemn corruption based on fairness considerations applicable to broader social levels. However, this condemnation would not always coincide with concrete actions since other concerns (including concerns about fairness at a more narrow social level) can overrun or occlude this condemnation.

As a final test for this element, I conducted a simple word counting analysis using the *stringr R pacakge* to extract words from the entries. I created a variable called **Fairness keywords**, with a value of 1 if the entry mentioned any of the words included for this foundation in the Extended Moral Foundations Dictionary (Hopp et al., 2020). If the entry did not mention any of those words, the value of the variable was set to 0. I proceeded to do the same for the entries that mentioned the words "other/others" and for entries that mentioned the word "family". And then proceeded to calculate the number of entries that mentioned any of the words related to fairness plus the word "others" and the number of entries that mentioned any of the words related to fairness plus the word "family". The results can be seen in the following table:

Table 9.1: Word counting in Open answer entries

Words	Number of entries
Words related to fairness	548
"Other/others"	162
"Family"	62
Fairness + "Others"	81
Fairness + "Family"	14

As we can see, of the respondents that made reference to fairness, more of them did so in conjunction with the words "other/others" than with the word "family". To see whether the "Mentions of fairness and other/others" varied depending on whether the respondent reported engaging in corruption and whether they believed the action should be considered corruption, I calculated the mean of these mentions based on these factors. We can see the results in the figures below[25]:

[25]We should consider that the means are low because there were fewer responses to the open question than to the questions of engagement and corruption, and of those responses, I only consider those that mentioned "fairness and other/others".

Figure 9.9: Mean of entries that mention "fairness and other/others" by reported engagement



Note: The lines represent CIs constructed at the 95%

Figure 9.10: Mean of entries that mention "fairness and other/others" by believing that the action is an instance of corruption



Note: The lines represent CIs constructed at the 95%

As we can see in Figure 9.9., there is no significant difference between the mentions of "fairness and other/others" based on the reported engagement in corruption. Both people who reported that they would and wouldn't engage in corruption were similarly likely to mention "fairness and other/others" when explaining why the act should be considered corruption. Unsurprisingly, as seen in Figure 9.10., those who considered the act to be an act of corruption were significantly more likely to mention "fairness and other/others" than those that do not consider it as such (none of the respondents who did not consider the act to be corruption mentioned "fairness and other/others" when asked to explain why).

I believe that this provides some evidence that when something is evaluated as corruption, it is likely done so due to fairness concerns at a larger societal scale that involves distant others. The results also point toward the idea that judgement and action can be seen as independent from each other.

9.4.3 Discussion

This study has shown that even in comparatively low-corruption environments, people still engage in petty corruption. Although this is an experiment and, as such, there may be questions of external validity, the fact that the results follow a similar pattern as those found in national surveys of similar contexts (the EU Corruption Barometer) can give us confidence that the patterns and differences can be trusted. In the UK, as in other countries, people seem more willing to engage in favouritism than bribery, but this engagement does not entirely erase condemnation.

Thus, even when engaging in acts like bribery and favouritism, people still consider it to be corruption, and among the reasons that people cite to consider it as such, fairness is essential. The distribution that we see of the mentions of words related to fairness echoes previous findings when it comes to corruption perception and engagement. For example, while looking at the 2013 European Quality of Government Index data, Mungiu-Pippidi (2015, Chapter 1) found that those who paid bribes were more likely to perceive unequal treatment than those who did not. My results show that when asked whether something is corruption, people who would engage in corruption also perceive it as unfair and are willing to declare it as such, even when there are no real social benefits to do so. In the context of an anonymized survey, participants have little incentive to condemn corruption performatively. Yet, we see this condemnation even among those who previously professed that they themselves would engage in it.

9.5 Study 2: Induced Emotions in Corruption as a Moral Dilemma

As mentioned, the key point of my argument is that judgement and engagement concerning corruption are the results not only of reflective/deliberative processes but also of intuitive processes. I consider this coexistence of intuitive and reflec-

tive/deliberative processes as key to explaining why people can sincerely condemn corruption and still engage in it. The condemnation of corruption in the abstract partly responds to intuitions linked to the domain of fairness. However, in concrete settings, this abstract condemnation does not always translate to punishment and abstention from engagement in corruption. In this chapter, I argue that in cases in which corruption is presented as a moral dilemma, the engagement and leniency towards corruption partly respond to the role of competing moral intuitions and how these intuitions interact with other factors.

My argument focuses on two factors: the individual's level of generalised trust and the social identity (in particular, having a broad social identity). This is because I propose that the way fairness intuitions operate also depends on the scale of the groups we recognise ourselves as part of. As I explained in Chapters 3 and 4, I see these factors (generalised trust and broader social identity) as the result of norms designed to promote cooperation at larger scales and thus expect that individuals who report generalised trust and identify with a broader group would be more likely to have broader society groups (their nation, for example) as part of their social identity.

Thus, for my second empirical test, I designed an experiment aimed at looking at the effect of induced moral emotions on judgement and behaviour concerning corruption as a moral dilemma, where the intuitive condemnation of corruption is in direct conflict with intuitions related to group loyalty and kinship. In this study, I also wanted to see whether the effect of the induced emotions varied depending on the existence of a broader social identity and on generalised trust (or trust in distant others). I expect that individuals who report generalised trust and a broader social identity would be more likely to condemn corruption and would be more susceptible to the effects of the induced emotions. I expect this to be the case because these individuals would have a stronger concern regarding broader society, and while other factors can overshadow this concern, it is more susceptible to being reactivated than in individuals who are only weakly concerned about broader society.

This experiment[26] was run through LimeSurvey using a non-representative balanced (by gender) sample of 1803 subjects from "Prolific" [27]. The participants were told that the experiment would last around 8 minutes [28]. Before starting the experiment, participants filled out a consent form, where they were assured that no identifying information would be collected. They were also informed about how the data collected would be stored and used.

After consenting to participate in the study, participants were asked to answer a series of demographic questions, including age, gender, education and income.

9.5.1 Pre-test questions: Social Identity and Generalised Trust

Before beginning the experiment, participants were asked questions designed to establish the presence of generalised trust and social identity levels. In an effort to create some distance between these questions and the experiment, some of the demographic questions (those pertaining to education and income) were asked after participants answered these pre-treatment questions.

To measure their level of generalised trust, participants were asked to fill out a short version of the interpersonal trust questionnaire included in the World Value Survey (see Appendix H). I decided to focus on generalised trust and a form of particularised trust (trust in "Family). I initially planned to conduct a similar analysis using other measures of trust in distant others. Still, either because of the way they were phrased or because of actual attitudes, the results for these measures

[26]This study received Ethical Approval by the DPIR Departmental Research Ethics Committee (DREC), reference number: SSH DPIR C1A 23 006. It was also pre-registered in EGAP, Registration ID:20230619AA

[27]The survey was 91.8% White, it only included respondents who had UK nationality and had English as their first language

[28]Previous to the study, I conducted a short pilot using a sample of 60 respondents from Prolific to estimate the time.

were too skewed to allow for proper analysis[29]. Due to this, I chose to focus on the trust in "Family", which had a higher variation in responses. The trust in "Family" is considered a particularistic sort of trust based on close bonds and proximity. I expected it to have the opposite effect of generalised trust, thus leading to more reported engagement in favouritism.

To determine whether they had a broader social identity, participants were asked to fill out a modified version of the Identification With All Humanity Scale, designed by (McFarland et al., 2012). The scale was modified to include "family" as a group below "community" and to include a level for "British" identity as different from "English" identity (see Appendix I). I focused on the answer to the question: "Identifying with a group means feeling part of it and caring and showing concern about its members. How much do you identify with each of the following?". And on the answer related to the groups of "Country" and "Great Britain" [30], which reflected a broader social identity. I did not focus on the narrower identities because, as mentioned in this Chapter and in Part I, people have multiple social identities, and the narrower ones are more common and salient. Thus, the variation of interest for my argument is based on broader identities, which people may or may not have.

9.5.2 The experiment

Participants were allocated randomly to one of six conditions, each of which combined the treatments **induced emotions** and scenario of personal versus impersonal corruption. There were three groups in the **induced emotions** treatment: one induced towards a self-referential emotion (guilt), another induced towards a

[29]For example, for the question about how much they trusted different groups, out of the 1803 respondents, only 47 reported trusting "People you just meet" *very much or completly*, only 67 reported the same for "People that shared your nationality", and only 53 reported so for "People of other nationalities".

[30]I recoded these variables. They were coded as 1 for those who strongly or completely identified with these groups and 0 otherwise

non-self-referential emotion (anger), and a third group that served as the control group and received no treatment (they were asked to write out their daily routine). There were two groups in the scenario treatment: one received the vignette in the first person, and the other received it in the third person. I use this difference between the first and the third person in the vignettes because, as discussed in Chapter 7, people may evaluate their own behaviour differently from the way they evaluate the behaviour of others[31].

As discussed both in Part I and in Chapter 7, the best method for determining emotions' causal influence is to induce them instead of just measuring them in connection to the task Siedlecka and Denson (2019). Thus, I consider that any effect of the **induced emotions** on judgement and behaviour would be evidence that intuitive processes (and not just reflective/deliberative processes) have an important role in corruption that should be accounted for. Because I am focusing on corruption when presented as a moral dilemma, I expect these induced emotions to lead to different results depending on individual levels of generalised trust and social identity.

As discussed in Chapter 7, to induce the emotions, I chose to use the autobiographical recall technique, in which participants are asked to recall a situation where they felt the emotion being induced. Participants viewed the following emotion-inducing prompts:

- Guilt inducement (T1): Now, I would like you to recall a situation in which you have felt very guilty about something you have done. Please describe the situation in the space below and focus on what you did that made you feel very guilty, and try to remember how you felt in that moment.
- Anger inducement (T2): Now, I would like you to recall a situation in which you have felt very angry about something that happened to you. Please de-

[31] See section 5 of Chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion of how first and third person vignettes may lead to different results.

scribe the situation in the space below and focus on the people or actions that made you feel very angry, and try to remember how you felt at that moment.

- Control condition (C): Now, I would like you to recall and write your usual daily routine. It's ok to list or just mention what you normally do on an average day.

After the emotional inducement, participants saw one of two vignettes. These vignettes portrayed a similar situation to the one used in Study 1, where a person has the opportunity to use personal connections to obtain faster access to social housing. The situation is modified slightly to highlight the role of competing moral concerns. In this case, the other concerns correspond to the domain of group loyalty and kinship (although harm is also highlighted, but only in relation to group loyalty and kinship).

The vignettes varied on whether the participants were asked to imagine themselves in the situation or to imagine someone else facing that situation. This aimed to explore the role of moral emotions linked to the same moral concern when evaluating the self and others. I expected that participants would judge themselves less harshly than they would judge others (Valdesolo and DeSteno, 2006). But at the same time, I expected the self-conscious emotion of guilt (T1) to have a more substantial effect on self-behaviour and self-judgement, while the other-focus emotion of anger (T2) to have a more significant effect on the judgement of others. Thus, the participants were randomly assigned to see one of the following vignettes:

- First-person (T3): Imagine that you have applied for social housing. Because of the demand, the application is taking a long time. You are concerned because the current house you and your family are in has a mould problem. A member of your family is an official at the local council housing association. When they find out about your application, they offer to speed up your application (by putting it before others) as a favour.

- Thrid-person (T4): Imagine a person who has applied for social housing. Because of the demand, the application is taking a long time. They are concerned because the current house they and their family are in has a mould problem. A member of their family is an official at the local council housing association. When this family member finds out about their application, they offer to speed up their application (by putting it before others) as a favour.

The full experiment had six branches, as we can see in the table below:

Table 9.2: Treatment combinations

Situation vignette/ Emotional Inducement	First Person (T3)	Third Person (T4)
Guilt inducement (T1)	T1 + T3	T1 + T4
No inducement (Control)	C + T3	C + T4
Anger Inducement (T2)	T2 + T3	T2 +T4

The experiment had three primary outcomes. The first was an action-based outcome (would you/the person accept the favour?). The second one was a moral judgment outcome (on a scale of wrong to right, how would you judge accepting the favour?). The final one was an open question, where people were asked to justify the previous moral judgement (please explain in your own words why you believe it would be wrong/right to accept the favour). In the final part of the survey, participants were asked whether accepting the favour was engaging in an act of corruption and to define corruption in their own words.

9.5.3 Main Expectations

The main comparisons that I am interested in are variations on reported self-engagement in corruption based on induced emotions, variations on the judgement

of both self-engagement and others' engagement based on induced emotions, and the varied effect of emotional induction depending on the participants' reported generalised trust and social identity. I consider that if the induced emotions affect judgement and behaviour, this provides evidence that intuitive processes, not just reflective/deliberative processes, are relevant for the study of corruption.

As previously mentioned, because the vignette presents participants with a moral dilemma, I expected the induced emotions to have different effects. In particular, I expected that the self-conscious emotion of guilt (T1) would lead to higher engagement in corruption and more lenient moral judgement towards it for those participants who only report narrower social identities and who report higher levels of particularised trust. This is because I expect that for these participants, concerns related to ingroup loyalty and kinship would be especially salient, and thus guilt may act to motivate fairness for the ingroup even when this means unfairness towards the collective.

Thus, my expectations were as follows:

- H1: **Induced anger** (T2) will lead to harsher moral judgement in the third-person vignette (T4)
  - H1a **Induced anger** (T2) will lead to harsher moral judgement also in the first-person vignette (T3) but to a smaller degree than in the third-person vignette (T4).
  - H1b **Induced anger** (T2) will lead to less engagement in corruption, but to a smaller degree than **induced guilt** (T2) in the first-person vignette.
  - H1c: For respondents with a high level of generalised trust and a stronger broader social identity, the **induced anger** (T2) effect will be more likely to lead to less engagement in corruption and harsher judgement towards it.
- H2: The effect of **induced guilt** (T1) will vary depending on the respondents' level of trust and strength of broad social identity

  - H2a: **Induced guilt** (T1) will lead to less engagement in corruption and to harsher moral judgement compared to **control** (C) in the first-person vignette (T3) for participants with higher levels of generalised trust and a stronger broad social identity.
  - H2b: **Induced guilt** (T1) will lead to more engagement in corruption and to more lenient moral judgement compared to the **control** (C) in the first-person vignette (T3) for participants with lower levels of generalised trust and a weaker broad social identity.

- H3: In the **control** (C), harsher moral judgement is expected for the third-person vignette (T4) than for the first-person vignette (T3)

9.5.4 Experiment results

After cleaning the data, I verified that the randomization was done correctly (see Appendix J)[32]. As a first step, I subsetted my main database into two based on whether the vignette shown was in the first-person (T3) or in the third-person (T4) to facilitate the analysis of the role of emotional inducement.

9.5.4.1 First-person vignette

First, I ran a logistic regression using the *stats R package* for the action-based outcome ("Would you accept the favour?", 1=Yes, 0=No) on the induced emotions. As mentioned, I expected that for participants who saw this vignette, induced anger (T2) and induced guilt (T1) would reduce the likelihood of accepting the favour, and this would vary depending on generalised trust and social identity.

[32]Because I used an autobiographical recall technique to induce emotions, where participants were free to write as much or as little as they wanted, I create a second data set based on the condition that participants used at least a 100 characters in their answer to see if that affected the results (how participants were divided into treatments under this condition is also in Appendix J)

Figure 9.11: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Accepting the Favour



Note: the results are from a logistic regression

As we see in Figure 9.11., the results go against my initial expectations. To recapitulate, I expected both induced emotions to lead to less engagement in corruption in the first-person vignette, with induced guilt having a stronger effect than induced anger. Although induced anger significantly affects the likelihood of accepting the favour, this effect goes in the opposite direction to what I expected. For participants who saw the first-person vignette, induced anger led to them being more likely to accept the favour, and induced guilt had no significant effect. Specifically, being induced to anger in comparison to being in control led to an increase of 0.449 in the log odds of accepting the favour (the table with the results can be seen in Appendix K).

As I will further discuss, this may be due to the case used in the vignettes. The vignette I used focused on access to social housing due to it being one of the few cases

in which I could find evidence of petty corruption in the UK[33]. The issue is that the UK is currently experiencing a housing crisis. The perceived scarcity and general unfairness of the situation may lead to fairness intuitions being more salient towards the individual's own situation. Thus, induced anger may have led the participants to subconsciously focus on their own personal situation and on how engaging in favouritism may rectify the unfairness of the situation for themselves while disregarding general fairness. Thus, it is possible that this emotional inducement led participants to focus on the general unfairness of the current housing market and how it affects the individual instead of the expected fairness of respecting the queue in social housing. Furthermore, we see that both induced emotions had the same directionality but that the effect of guilt was not significant. This is also contrary to my initial expectations since I expected induced guilt to have a stronger effect on behaviour due to its self-conscious nature. It is possible that the focus on the individual's own situation in relation to the housing crisis led to more evaluative emotions like anger having a stronger effect.

To further explore this, I ran a similar analysis of the effect of induced emotions when interacting with the previously introduced measures of social identity and generalised trust. As mentioned, I focus on generalised trust, a version of particularised trust (trust in "Family), and two versions of broad social identity: identifying with the country and with Great Britain. Accounting for these four factors in my analysis also allowed me to explore the effect of both induced emotions, especially of induced guilt, which I expected to vary depending on them. Before the analysis, I regressed the outcome (accepting the favour) on these four factors to see whether they had any effect on their own. None of these factors had a significant effect on accepting the favour for those respondents who saw the first-person vignette (see Appendix L for the results).

First, I included an interaction term between the treatment of induced emo-

[33]As mentioned before, this is likely due to lack of research instead of due to an absence of petty corruption

tions and the variable of generalised trust. This is a dichotomous variable, where one means that the respondents considered that most people could be trusted. As mentioned, my expectation is that the effect of induced guilt would vary depending on the level of generalised trust. For people who believe that most people can be trusted, I expect the induced guilt to decrease the likelihood of accepting the favour. I believe this to be the case since generalised trust would reflect the effect of norms and rules that amplify moral intuitions so that people would also consider distant others in their actions.

Figure 9.12: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Accepting the Favour with Generalised Trust Interaction



Note: the results are from a logistic regression

As we can see in Figure 9.12., although the differences are not significant, we do see that for those respondents who reported believing that most people could be trusted, the induced emotions had a negative effect on the likelihood of accepting the favour, and this effect was stronger for induced guilt. Although the results are not significant, the directionality of the effect aligns with my argument, which considers that the group of references would be key to determining the effect of the emotional

inductions used as proxies for moral intuitions.

Figure 9.13: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Accepting the Favour with Particularised Trust (trust in "Family") Interaction



Note: the results are from a logistic regression

As we can see in Figure 9.13, for respondents who reported having a high level of particularised trust (trust in their "Family"), the effect of the induced emotions on the likelihood of accepting the favour was positive, although non-significant. This goes in line with what was previously discussed about the role of having a smaller social scale as a strong reference point.

Figure 9.14: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Accepting the Favour with Social Identity ("Country") Interaction



Note: the results are from a logistic regression

Figure 9.15: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Accepting the Favour with Social Identity ("Great Britain") Interaction



Note: the results are from a logistic regression

Then, I proceeded to run a similar analysis, but this time, I included an interaction term between the induced emotion and the measures of broad social identity (strongly identifying with "Country" and "Great Britain"). As we can see in Figures 9.14 and 9.15, the results of the interaction are non-significant. However, we see a similar change in directionality as with the measures of trust. For those who strongly identified with their country, induced guilt reduced the likelihood of accepting the favour, and for those who strongly identified with Great Britain, both induced anger and induced guilt reduced the likelihood of accepting the favour.

Having analysed the effect of the emotional inductions on the likelihood of accepting the favour, I will now analyse whether these induced emotions had any effect on how accepting the favour was judged. Recall that this judgement was based on the question, "On a scale of wrong to right, how would you judge accepting the favour?" The scale went from 1=completly wrong to 5=completly right (the distribution of

the answers can be seen in Appendix M, mean=2.6, mode=2). To recapitulate, I expected induced anger to lead to harsher moral judgement; I also expected induced guilt to lead to harsher moral judgement, but only for participants with generalised trust and a strong, broad social identity. I conducted a series of linear regressions to analyse the effect of the induced emotions on judgement. First, let us look at the general results of the effect of the induced emotions on the judgement outcome for those participants who saw the first-person vignette.

Figure 9.16: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Judgment of Favouritism



Note: the results are from a linear regression

As we can see in Figure 9.16., neither induced emotion significantly affected how the action was judged, which goes against my initial expectations. This may be because participants are less likely to be influenced when it comes to self-judgement; in other words, people in general may judge themselves less harshly than they would judge others. However, this may also be because this act is generally judged as wrong, as we saw in the distribution of judgment (Appendix M). As shown in Study 1, people tend to judge corruption (including favouritism) as wrong. As we will see

further on, the second explanation becomes more plausible when we see the results in the Control Condition section. Those results show that being assigned to a first-person or third-person vignette had no effect on judgment. So, it is not a matter of self versus other judgment; rather, people judge engagement in corruption as wrong regardless of whether they are evaluating it as active participants or observers.

I also conducted the same analysis as with the action-based outcome by including interactions with trust and social identity measures. As before, I regressed these factors on the outcome. In this case, I found that generalised trust positively affected the judgement of favouritism for those who saw the first-person vignette (Appendix N). As before, I focused on generalised trust and particularised trust (trust in "Family").

Figure 9.17: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions in Judgement of Favouritism with Generalised Trust Interaction



Note: the results are from a linear regression

Figure 9.18: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions in Judgement of Favouritism with Particularised Trust (trust in "Family") Interaction



Note: the results are from a linear regression

As shown in Figure 9.17, although the results are not significant, the interaction with generalised trust changes the directionality of the effects, which corroborates my initial expectations. For people who report believing that most people could be trusted, the induced emotions negatively affected the judgement of favouritism. What is more interesting is what we see in Figure 9.18, where we see that for participants who reported a strong particularised trust (trust in their "Family"), the induced guilt led to a more positive judgement of favouritism (see Appendix O for the table of results). This corroborates my initial expectation that induced guilt would lead to more lenient judgment for participants who have narrower groups as a strong reference point. This again goes in line with the idea that moral intuitions operate at different levels. For people who trust and feel close to their family, guilt induction leads to a more lenient judgement of favouritism, likely because they view the scenario as more justifiable from a smaller social scale perspective.

Finally, when it comes to the role of social identity, we see a similar result in the judgement outcome as in action-based outcomes. For respondents that strongly identified with their country or Great Britain, the effect of the emotional induction on judgement was negative (leading to harsher moral judgment), although not significant (the results can be seen in Appendix P and Q).

9.5.4.2 Third-person vignette

Now, I will look at the effect of the induced emotion on those participants who viewed the third-person vignette. An important caveat here is that because participants were asked about the actions of another person, the action-based outcome can be reinterpreted as judgment. In the action-based outcome ("Would the person accept the favour?"), the respondent is judging whether, in that situation, a person would or would not accept the favour.

As a first point of analysis, I ran a logistic regression of the action-based outcome on the induced Emotions. Although this outcome is taken as a form of judgment (and thus, according to my initial expectation, induced anger should have a stronger effect), I did not have set expectations for the effect of the induced emotions in this case. As we can see in Figure 9.19., neither induced emotion had an effect on whether the respondent believed the other person would accept the favour. But interestingly, and in contrast with the results from the first-person vignette, the induced emotions had a negative effect. Although the results are not significant, they may indicate that people are less likely to think others will engage in corruption. This may be reinforced by the induced emotions in participants with higher levels of trust in distant others and who identify with broader groups.

Figure 9.19: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Accepting the Favour



Note: the results are from a logistic regression

As in the previous section, I also included interactions with the measures of trust and social identity. I regressed the action-based outcome on these measures and found that none of them significantly affected the likelihood of believing that the other person would accept the favour (see Appendix R for the results).

Figure 9.20: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Accepting the Favour with Generalised Trust Interaction



Note: the results are from a logistic regression

Figure 9.21: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Accepting the Favour with Particularised Trust (trust in "Family") Interaction



Note: the results are from a logistic regression

The results for the interaction with particularised trust (trust in "Family") were not significant (Figure 9.21). But, as we can see in Figure 9.20, for those respondents who believed that most people could be trusted, the effect of both induced emotions on believing that the person would accept the favour was negative, and the effect of guilt was significant ($p<0.1$) (see Appendix S for the table of results). This means that for people who reported generalised trust, the induced guilt led to them being less likely to expect others to engage in corruption. Both emotions have a similar effect size when interacting with generalised trust. The effect we see may be due to an interaction between the belief that the UK is a country where corruption is low and the belief that most people could be trusted not to engage in corruption. In this case, generalised trust and the induced emotion interact to reinforce the notions of fairness at a broader level.

I also ran a similar set of regressions, but this time, I included an interaction

term between the induced emotions and the measures of broader social identity. As before, I focused on whether respondents strongly identified with their "Country" and/or "Great Britain."

Figure 9.22: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions in Accepting the Favour with Social Identity ("Country")



Note: the results are from a logistic regression

Figure 9.23: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions in Accepting the Favour with Social Identity ("Great Britain")



Note: the results are from a logistic regression

As we can see in Figure 9.22. and Figure 9.23 (see Appendix T for the table of results), for people who strongly identified with their "Country" and "Great Britain", induced guilt had a significant negative effect on the belief that the person in the vignette would accept the favour. As discussed before, as was the case with generalised fairness, it is likely that the broader identities and the induced emotion interact to reinforce the notions of fairness at a broader level. While it is possible the stronger effect that we see when interacting with identifying with "Great Britain" may also be driven by nationalism (as different from patriotism or national pride), where respondents place "Great Britain" above other nationalities and thus are less likely to believe that people from "Great Britain" would engage in corruption. I contend that this effect is less likely because, as we saw in Appendix R, these factors related to trust and social identity do not directly affect the belief that others would engage in favouritism. These identities only affect expected behaviour when they interact with the induced emotions.

Now, I will do the same analysis but with a focus on the judgment outcome. Here, I expected induced anger to lead to a harsher moral judgement of favouritism. Additionally, I expected the effect of induced guilt to be conditional on trust and social identity. I expected that for people with generalised trust and a strong, broad social identity, induced guilt would lead to a harsher judgement of favouritism. While for people with high particularised trust and a weak broad social identity, I expected induced guilt to lead to a more lenient judgement of favouritism.

Thus, I first regressed the judgement outcome (where one is "completely wrong" and five is "completely right") on the induced emotions. As we can see in Figure 9.24., neither induced emotion had a significant effect on how accepting the favour was judged, which goes against my initial expectations. As hypothesized in the previous section, this may be due to the fact that favouritism (and corruption in general) tends to be judged as wrong even by those who engage in it.

Figure 9.24: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions in Judgment of Favouritism



Note: the results are from a linear regression

I proceed with the analysis, including interactions between the induced emotions with trust and broader social identity. As before, I regressed the outcome on these factors and found that none of them had a significant effect on the judgement outcome in the third-person vignette (see Appendix U for the results).

As a first step, I included interactions for generalised trust and a form of particularised trust (trust in "Family"). Neither yielded significant results (see Appendix V and W for the results), which goes against my initial expectations.

Figure 9.25: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions in Judgment of Favouritism with Social Identity ("Country") Interaction



Note: the results are from a linear regression

Figure 9.26: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions in Judgment of Favouritism with Social Identity ("Great Britain") Interaction



Note: the results are from a linear regression

As we can see in Figure 9.25, the interaction between induced emotions and whether the participants strongly identified with their "Country" had no significant effect on the judgement outcome. But, as we see in Figure 9.26, there is a significant negative effect on judgement outcomes when the induced emotions interacted with whether the participant strongly identified with "Great Britain" (see Appendix X for the results) — for respondents that strongly identified with "Great Britain", induced and had a significantly negative effect on the judgement of favouritism. For these respondents, the induced anger led to a harsher judgement of favouritism. It is interesting that this effect is only significant for the social identity linked to "Great Britain" and not for "Country", although, for the latter, we see the same directionality. This is partly in accordance with my initial expectation of a broader social identity correlated with individuals having a broader society as a reference group. As argued, I propose that this makes moral concerns related to fairness more applicable to this broader society, thus mitigating the effect of other factors like

competing intuitions (or even situational unfairness). Although originally, I only expected guilt to have a different effect based on factors related to identity and trust; it makes sense to think of them affecting the effects of both induced emotions. This result is even more interesting because neither the induced emotion nor the strong identification with "Great Britain" had a significant effect on judgment on their own.

9.5.4.3 Control Condition

Finally, I wanted to see whether there was a broad difference in the action-based outcome (accepting the favour) and the judgment outcome (judging favouritism as right or wrong) depending on whether the participant saw the first-person vignette (T3) or the third-person vignette (T4).

For the action-based outcome (accepting the favour), I wanted to see whether, in general, people were more willing to believe that others would accept the favour in comparison to acknowledging that they themselves would accept the favour. For the judgement outcome, I wanted to see whether the action of accepting the favour was judged as more wrong by those participants who saw the third-person vignette in comparison to the first-person one, as an approach based on moral hypocrisy would expect. As discussed in Chapter 4, proponents of moral hypocrisy argue that people judge others under harsher moral standards than the ones used for themselves. And thus, corruption is only condemned when it the individual is only a distant observer.

Figure 9.27: Effect of First vs Third person vignette in Accepting the favour



Note: the results are from a logistic regression

Figure 9.28: Effect of First vs Third person vignette in Judgment of Favouritism



Note: the results are from a linear regression

As we can see in Figure 9.27, there is no significant variation in the judgement outcome based on whether the respondents saw the first or third-person vignette. However, as seen in Figure 9.28, respondents who saw the third-person vignette were significantly more likely to believe that the favour would be accepted. This is in line with positive self-bias since respondents are more likely to believe others would accept the favour in that situation than they are to believe they themselves would do so. This positive self-bias differs from moral hypocrisy since it centres on expectations about behaviour but not the moral judgement of the actions. Interestingly, these results partly contradict studies of moral hypocrisy Polman and Ruttan (2012), that posit that people would judge others more severely than they would judge themselves. Although the question of judgement was general (asked about the action and not the person), the fact that we don't see any difference in it based on whether participants saw the first-person vignette or the third-person one points towards a lack of hypocrisy in the judgements. Polman and Ruttan (2012) also posit that guilt would ameliorate moral hypocrisy while anger would exacerbate it, but we do not see any significant effect of the induced emotions on judgement without interacting them with trust and social identity. This suggests that moral hypocrisy may either be absent or much weaker than previous studies expected and that, if it does exist, moral emotions' effect on it may be conditional.

9.5.5 Post-Experiment Questions: Text analysis

As in Study 1, I also included open-ended questions in this study. The first referred to the moral judgement of accepting the favour, while the second asked participants to define corruption in their own words. This allowed me to compare whether concrete judgments and broader definitions used words referring to different moral domains.

The question about the moral judgement of accepting the favour was: "Please explain in your own words why you believe it would be wrong/right to accept the favour". In the previous study, we saw that fairness was a key concern for the

people's answer to whether an act should be considered corruption. In this study, I did not ask participants to explain why it would be corruption, but rather why accepting the favour would be wrong/right. This changes the focus of the question to a more concrete evaluation of the vignette shown, and the results reflect this.

Figure 9.29: Mean proportion of words based on Moral Domains



As we can see in Figure 9.29., to explain why it would be wrong or right to accept the favour, respondents used a higher proportion of words related to care (virtue) and loyalty (virtue), which aligns with my argument about how this type of corruption (favouritism) triggers moral concerns linked to ingroup loyalty and kinship. The high proportion of words related to harm may be due to how this domain interacts with ingroup loyalty and kinship. In the vignette, participants are told that the house they and their family live in has a mould problem. Thus, participants can view accepting the favour (and skipping the queue for social housing) as moral since it would place their family in a better environment. Because of the role of this group-based (family) concern, I wanted to see whether the proportion of words used changed depending on whether the question was presented in the first or the third person.

Figure 9.30: Mean proportion of words based on Moral Domains - First versus Third person vignettes



As we can see in Figure 9.30., despite the minimal variability, we can see that there is a higher mean proportion of words related to the domains of loyalty and care for those respondents who saw the first-person vignette. For words related to the domain of fairness, there is a higher mean proportion for those respondents who saw the third-person vignette. This shows that fairness may be more important for judgement when respondents think about the actions of others, in comparison to when they think about their own actions [34].

Finally, in this case, as in Study 1, people were asked whether accepting the favour should be considered corruption. In addition to this, they were asked to define

[34]I did not include an analysis of the open-ended question based on the induced emotions because I did not expect the effect of the induced emotions to carry on for the post-experimental questions of justifying judgement and defining concepts.

corruption in their own words. The answers to the question of whether accepting the favour should be an act of corruption inclined towards yes (Yes=978, No=825, the proportion graph can be seen in Appendix Y). As expected, there is a higher proportion of people who responded that it should not be considered corruption among those who said they would accept the favour, as we can see in Figure 9.31.[35]. Still, around half of the respondents who reported they would accept the favour said this action should be considered corruption. This is similar to what was found in Study 1.

Figure 9.31: Favouritism is corruption - proportion based on whether the Favour was Accepted



Note: the results are from a linear regression

Following the question of whether accepting the favour should be considered corruption or not, I asked participants to define corruption in their own words. I conducted a text analysis similar to the one done in the previous case.

[35]This difference holds when considering whether the vignette shown was in the first or third person; see Appendix Z and AA

Figure 9.32: Definition of corruption - mean proportion of words related to Moral Domains



Note: the results are from a linear regression

Unsurprisingly, for the definition of corruption, there was a higher mean proportion of words related to the fairness domain. As we see in Figure 9.32., there was also a higher mean proportion of words related to the sanctity domain, which captures words related to behaviours considered disgusting or impure. As mentioned, this higher mean proportion of words related to sanctity is due in part to the fact that the dictionary includes words like "corruption" and "corrupt" in this domain. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 3, disgust (and the sanctity domain more broadly) has been argued to be related to moral judgements in general. The results show that participants who define corruption using moral terms do this mainly based on fairness considerations.

9.5.6 Discussion

The results have shown that most people judge engaging in favouritism as wrong and would recognise it as corruption. This applies even to many of the individuals who said they would engage in favouritism. Importantly, my results show that intuitive processes, such as moral emotions, do have a role in affecting judgement and behaviour, although this role did not fully meet my expectations. Nevertheless, my results evidence the need to think of emotions and intuitive processes more broadly as having a distinct effect separate from that of reflective/deliberative processes. In other words, this study evidences a need to think of emotions and other intuitive processes as causes and not just consequences of judgment and behaviour.

Although the directionality was not as expected, the treatment of induced anger positively and significantly affected the outcome of engagement in favouritism (first-person vignette). Even though this effect was contrary to my initial expectation, as I previously speculated, this may be due to the current housing crisis in the UK. This situation may make the unfairness of the context more salient than the fairness of not skipping the queue for social housing. Previous research has shown that anger is associated with a rejection of unfairness (Liu et al., 2016), and this may be the mechanism at play here.

Interestingly, although the results are not significant, we did see that when interacting the induced emotions with generalised trust, these induced emotions (in particular guilt) led to less engagement in favouritism. I expected these factors to be associated with individuals having a broader society as an important reference group. For these individuals, concerns towards the collective would be more ingrained and thus would be more easily re-activated; furthermore, this concern towards the collective would moderate the impact of situational unfairness. This result (the interaction with generalised trust) is indicative that the mechanism I suggested may be at play, at least for reported behaviour in the case of favouritism.

Additionally, while I did not find any significant effects for the interactions be-

tween induced emotions and measures of trust and social identity on the likelihood of accepting the favour, it is possible that, in general, the action-based effects are harder to capture in a survey (which makes the effect of anger discussed previously even more remarkable). Still, the change in directionality of the effect of induced emotions when interacted with the measures of trust and social identity was as expected, and thus, I believe these results open the door for further research with the use of other techniques.

Finally, in relation to judgement (third-person), my results show that induced emotions had no effect on their own, which I attribute to favouritism largely being judged as negative. Even so, when I included interactions between the induced emotions and the measures of broad social identity ("Great Britain" and "Country"), these emotions had a significant negative effect on the moral judgements towards the engagement in favouritism, which matches my initial expectation. Interestingly, there were no significant effects for the interaction with generalised trust. Furthermore, when analysing judgement in the third-person vignettes, we saw that interacting the induced emotions with identifying with "Great Britain" led to stronger effects than when interacting them with "Country". It is possible that currently, "Great Britain" is a stronger broader identity in a way not captured by my measuring tool. This makes sense if we remember the results from the 2021 Census, discussed in the Case section of this chapter, where we saw that more people in the UK identified as British than with their country-based identities.

9.6 Discussion and Conclusion

In this chapter, I have focused on studying two features of my argument. First, in Study 1, I attempted to establish whether some forms of corruption are seen as more acceptable than others and whether this is due in part to how they trigger concerns related to different moral domains. And then, in Study 2, I studied the role of intuitive processes more directly through the use of induced emotions.

The results of Study 1 showed that even in comparatively low-corruption countries, people are willing to engage in petty corruption, and this engagement is higher when corruption is presented as favouritism than when it is presented as bribery. Furthermore, people are still likely to judge engagement in these practices as corruption, even when they participate in them. This reinforces the idea that action and judgement are subject to different constraints but respond to a common set of moral concerns for which intuitions are a key component. Thus, as I argue, engagement in corruption does not mean that the condemnation of it is not sincere.

As the text analysis done in Study 1 showed, when explaining why engagement in bribery or favouritism should or should not be considered corruption, participants generally referred to words related to the domain of fairness. But they also made reference to domains like "loyalty" and "harm", especially when the situation they were presented with was one of the favouritisms (this was further confirmed in Study 2). Thus, the result shows that fairness concerns interact with other concerns in a way that likely relates to the social scale that an individual takes as a reference point. It would be interesting to explore this further, maybe by using vignettes that vary on whether they highlight the effect of corruption on general fairness or on individual/group-based fairness.

Furthermore, the difference in the judgement of favouritism versus bribery shown in Study 1 leads me to wonder whether instances of corruption (or even political wrongdoing more generally) committed by high-level officials would also be judged differently depending on whether they are framed as linked to morals concerns or as simple self-interest. As shown both in Studies 1 and 2, people think about corruption in moral terms[36]. Furthermore, the results of Study 1 suggest that for some individuals, the moral judgement of corruption is independent of their understanding of formal rules. Something similar was suggested by Allen and Birch (2015), who point out that scandals involving politicians are likely to be morally judged

[36]This is in the descriptive morality sense; see section 1 of Chapter 3 for a more detailed explanation.

by citizens even when they do not involve legal wrongdoing. Thus, future research could explore which moral considerations are likely to incite public moral anger (or even a more complex emotion like moral outrage).

In Study 2, I attempted to establish that intuitive processes have an effect on judgement and behaviour related to corruption, separate from the effect of reflective/deliberative processes. Although some of my results went against my initial expectations, they are still promising and a good starting point for further research. As mentioned, induced emotions (particularly anger) affected corruption-related behaviour, which highlights the importance of studying emotions (and intuitive processes more broadly) as causes and not simple consequences. I consider further studying the effect of intuitive processes on political behaviour an intriguing research area. As previously mentioned, it may be worth considering studying this using other methods that allow direct observation of the actions instead of having participants report them, as I will discuss in the Conclusion chapter of this dissertation.

Additionally, the results of Study 2 confirmed my expectation about how the role of intuitive processes (moral emotions) would be highly dependent on factors that reflect the role of the norms and rules that were designed to maintain larger societies. As mentioned, I focused on broad social identity and generalised trust, proposing that these factors are associated with individuals having a broader society as an important reference group. This, in turn, would affect how moral intuitions manifest. I found that when respondents identify with broader communities (such as their country or Great Britain in general), the induced moral emotions lead them to be less likely to believe others would engage in favouritism and to judge the engagement in it more harshly. I believe this further highlights the importance of studying intuitive processes and opens the door for further research on how these processes and identities interact.

In particular, the differences observed when the induced emotions interacted with "Country" or "Great Britain" showed that the broader group an individual

identifies with matters. While it is possible the stronger effect that we see when interacting with identifying with "Great Britain" may also be driven by nationalism (as different from patriotism or national pride), where respondents place "Great Britain" above other nationalities and thus are less likely to believe that people from "Great Britain" would engage in corruption. I contend that this effect is not likely because, as seen in Appendix R, these factors related to trust and social identity do not directly affect the belief that others would engage in favouritism. These identities only affect expected judgement and behaviour when interacting with the induced emotions.

Still, it is possible that identifying with "Great Britain" is capturing something additional, such as the participant's position on the Brexit referendum. While I cannot know whether part of the effect of the interaction between induced emotion and identifying with Great Britain is due to its association with participants' positions on Brexit, it is possible that there is something there, although how would this affect the outcomes is not clear, since while nationalism has been associated with a "pro-leave" position on Brexit, the broader social identity of "British" has been associated with a "pro-remain" position. For example, Chan et al. (2020) found that "Brexit-support is higher among people for whom being British is important", but at the same time, found that when looking at social identity, "those who claim to be English only and, to a smaller degree, those who identified as English and British are indeed more pro-Leave than those who say they are as just British". Thus, while it is outside the scope of my argument, it may be interesting to look at Brexit's position as a separate component of an individual's social identity and see whether this affects judgement and behaviour concerning corruption.

Finally, I believe that the case used in the vignettes may have had some unintended effects, particularly related to the induced anger and the reported behaviour (first-person vignette). As I mentioned in the previous section, I decided to use the case of social housing in the UK because I found evidence of petty corruption there and thus believed it would make the vignette more plausible. However, it is possible that induced anger led to more engagement in favouritisms because of the current

housing crisis. The lack of social housing, and affordable housing in general, highlights the consequences of an unfair system and may have directed participants to subconsciously respond to this unfairness by advancing their interests when induced to anger. Thus, the situational unfairness may have prompted fairness intuitions to be constrained to the concrete situation. Still, this opens a compelling venue for future research, similar to the one proposed before, in which the effect of intuitions could be studied in reference to framings that highlight the existence of social unfairness and its individual-felt effects versus those that highlight an individual's concerns about social fairness.

Chapter 10

The Role of Moral Intuitions in Corruption as a Social Dilemma

In the previous chapter (Chapter 9), I explored the role of intuitive processes, specifically moral emotions, on judgement and reported behaviour concerning corruption when presented as a moral dilemma. In this chapter, I will explore the role of these processes when corruption is presented as a social dilemma, where individuals face a tradeoff between fairness at a larger social scale and their self-interest. To do this, I focus on the case of Peru and use a combination of focus groups and an experiment with a structure similar to the one used in Chapter 9.

I find that when people recount their experiences with corruption, they highlight not only functional concerns but also moral ones, as predicted by my argument. Furthermore, as in the previous chapter, I also find that induced emotions affect judgement and behaviour concerning corruption, further showcasing the need to account for intuitive processes as causes and their role separate from reflective/deliberative processes. Nevertheless, as in the previous chapter, some of my results went against my initial expectations, as discussed in the last section of this chapter.

10.1 Introduction

As mentioned in the Introduction and Chapter 2, my argument proposes that to fully understand judgement and behaviour concerning corruption, it is necessary to account for intuitive processes, not just reflective/deliberative ones. For my argument, I focus on the role of moral intuitions and moral emotions as a key component of them. Furthermore, I argue that at the individual level, instances of petty corruption are often presented as a dilemma, either a moral one when there is a tradeoff between different moral concerns, or a social one, where there is a tradeoff between concerns linked to fairness at a broader social scale and individual self-interest (more detail on this can be found on Chapter 4). In this chapter, I focus on corruption as a social dilemma.

When corruption is presented as a social dilemma, there is a tradeoff between the moral condemnation of corruption linked to intuitive fairness concerns pertaining to large-scale society and concerns linked to our own self-interest. To test my argument about the role of moral intuitions in judgements and behaviours concerning corruption as a social dilemma, I conducted two studies: a series of focus groups and an experiment where I induced moral emotions (similar to Study 2 of Chapter 9). For these studies, I focus on the case of Peru, a case with comparatively high levels of corruption. In this country, both the perception and incidence of corruption are high. And although people express anger over corruption scandals (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2023, p.189), and voters seem willing to punish corruption when the information is presented directly in an experimental seating (Vera, 2019)[1], we still see tolerance toward it and engagement in it in practice.

First, in Study 1, I used focus groups to explore whether condemnation of corruption is present at the individual level, even in cases where corruption levels are high. I also explored whether people were likely to cite competing moral concerns for engaging in corruption, even in a case where corruption is often seen as functional.

[1] I also found something similar in Study 2 of Chapter 8.

Although data from surveys such as the Perceptions of Corruption from Transparency International show that people view corruption as a problem, I wanted to explore whether this negative view was also present in how people define corruption and to see whether, in cases of high corruption, people recognise the unfairness linked to corruption when prodded about their own behaviour. The focus groups show that people have a negative view of corruption and recognise its negative aspects even when admitting their own engagement in it. It also shows that people are more likely to engage in bribery and corruption more broadly if it is linked to a competing moral concern, such as preventing harm to someone close to them. This reinforces some of the findings discussed in Chapter 9.

Second, in Study 2, I conducted an experiment very similar to the one used in Study 2 of Chapter 9, but here, I used a vignette depicting a bribery scenario. I did so because, as explained in Chapter 4, bribery is more easily portrayed as a social dilemma since it is possible to disentangle the engagement from other moral concerns. While favouritism has an innate moral component linked to ingroup loyalty and kinship due to the existence of closeness between participants, bribery does not. This does not mean that some instances of bribery cannot be judged as morally right (for example, paying a bribe to get medical attention for a loved one). It simply means that because the component is not inherent to the action, it is possible to disentangle them. Because I focus on bribery, the Peruvian case is particularly useful since, in this case, petty bribery is seen as common (Baraybar Hidalgo et al., 2022b), and engagement in bribery can be plausibly viewed as not linked to predictable sanctions to minimise the role that deliberative evaluations of risks have on judgment and action.

As in Chapter 9, for Study 2, I induced incidental anger and guilt since both emotions have been linked to moral intuitions pertaining to the fairness domain, and their incidental form allows us to study the effect of intuitive processes as separate from reflective/deliberative ones. Also, as in Chapter 9, I include measures for generalised (and particularised) trust and social identity. I include these measures because, in accordance with my argument, I see them as the result of norms

designed to promote cooperation at larger scales. My results show, as in Chapter 9, that the induced emotions have an effect, although not quite as expected. In terms of behaviour, the induced emotions are associated with more engagement in bribery, but only when interacted with generalised trust and broad social identity. This goes against my initial expectations since I expected these induced emotions to lead to less engagement based on their hypothesised role in the condemnation of unfairness. However, it is possible that the results are due to the contextual unfairness inadvertently signalled in the vignettes, as I will discuss in the last section of this chapter. In terms of judgement, the general results match my expectations more closely, with induced emotion leading to harsher judgements towards bribery. Surprisingly, induced guilt had a stronger effect than induced anger, which provides evidence for the need to study the role of self-conscious emotion in social behaviour.

In what follows, I will first present my case and briefly explain how my broader argument relates to the study of corruption as a social dilemma. Afterwards, I will present my two empirical studies and discuss the main results.

10.2 The case: Peru

As mentioned before, I decided to focus on the case of Peru because I want to focus on corruption as a social dilemma, where self-interest is weighed against moral concerns when it comes to corruption. For this type of dilemma, a bribery scenario is the best tool since it can be easier to disentangle from other moral concerns in a way that forms of corruption linked to favouritism can't. Peru is classified as a highly corrupt country with a long history of corruption (Quiroz, 2008). If we look at Figure 1, the latest version of the Global Corruption Barometer for Latin America and the Caribbean, we see that in the region, Peru has the highest perception of corruption and the third-highest percentage of citizens who report having paid a bribe. It is likely that the latter may be even higher due to under-reporting because of social desirability bias (Baraybar Hidalgo et al., 2022b).

Figure 10.1: Caption



Furthermore, a case like Peru is ideal for studying bribery since it is a high corruption case where there is not a high risk of detection or an excepted predicted sanction for the engagement in petty bribery. In most instances, petty bribery is not detected or sanctioned. A small caveat is that in Peru, a modification of the Penal Code (through the Legislative Decree 1351) in 2017 established sanctions for citizens who gave bribes to policemen. Although some citizens have been detained, in practice, the detainments are still not extended enough to consider the risk predictable. Furthermore, the sentences have been of a suspended character for those who have been sentenced, which means that the sentenced does not go to prison as long as they pay financial reparations[2]. In addition to this, at the moment, this only applies to bribes paid or offered to policemen, not to any other kind of public server.

[2]The first sentence I could find in relation to this modification was in 2020. See: Public Ministery, 20/10/2020. In: https://www.gob.pe/institucion/mpfn/noticias/309044-sentencia-a-conductor-por-entregar-coima-a-policia

In addition to this, although the incidence of corruption is high, we can still see that most people in Peru still view corruption as something negative. In the last survey of Corruption Perception In Peru conducted by Proetica in 2022 (Proética, 2022), 86% of respondents reported believing that corruption had a negative impact in their daily lives, and 57% considered it to be one of the main problems in the country [3]. At the same time, the survey found that 12% of respondents admitted to having paid a bribe in the last 12 months. This percentage is not far from the 13% that reported the same in 2019 (Proética, 2019), but still surprising considering that the 2019 Global Corruption Barometer (Pring and Vrushi, 2019) found that 30% of respondents in Peru declared having paid a bribe in the last 12 months. The difference is big, but part of it could be attributed to different surveying techniques [4]. Other results do not vary as much, suggesting that the willingness to admit paying a bribe is more sensitive to timing and context. Nevertheless, we see relatively high engagement in corruption while at the same time seeing that most people do view it as a problem.

In Peru, high engagement in corruption has been studied through the lens of its role in everyday interactions. For example, previous anthropological work (Ludwig, 2008) showed that in Peru, corruption often has a functional role, similar to what Karklins (2005) found for post-communist societies. According to this view, petty corruption, such as petty bribery, facilitates access to state services in a context where fair treatment from the state can not be assumed. I posit that functional consideration may play a role, but corruption is also seen as a moral issue (as argued in Chapter 4), and thus, moral concerns can also affect judgement and behaviour concerning corruption through both intuitive and reflective/deliberative pathways.

As mentioned, I use two factors to account for the role of norms designed to pro-

[3]With "delinquency or insecurity" being the only option that ranked higher with 60% of respondents considering it one of the three main problems

[4]They used different surveying agencies, and the timing of the surveys was different, with Proetica fielding its survey towards the end of the year (October-November), while Global Barometer fielded its survey at the start of the year (January-February)

mote cooperation at larger scales and thus can affect the reference group individuals take into account: generalised trust and social identity (more detail on the choosing of these factors can be found in Chapter 3 and 4).

Regarding trust, the last WVS wave (2017-2020) showed that only 4.2% of respondents reported believing that most people could be trusted. In terms of trusting specific groups, 72.7% reported they could completely trust their families, but only 4% reported they could completely trust the people in their neighbourhood, 5.8% reported they could trust people they knew personally, and just 0.3% reported they could trust people they meet for the first time.

Finally, when it comes to social identity, in the last wave of the World Value Survey (2017-2020), 93.4% of respondents reported feeling "Proud or Very Proud" of their nationality, and 88.2% reported feeling "Close or Very Close" to their country. I believe these high percentages may be a product of the way in which the question was presented since participants were asked, "How proud are you to be of the nationality of this country?" and this phrasing can lead to an emotional response or to a desirability bias (desire to seem patriotic) that can affect the responses. Nevertheless, even if those percentages correspond to the country's general attitudes, there would still be variation at the individual level that would be relevant to my argument.

10.3 Argument

To briefly recapitulate my base argument, I propose, in line with the Dual Process Theory of moral judgement (Greene and Haidt, 2002; Greene et al., 2001), that how we judge and act towards corruption is not solely a function of reflective/deliberative processes, which have been at the centre of corruption studies (Persson et al., 2019a), but also of intuitive processes. As outlined in Chapter 2, in this dissertation, I focus on a particular set of intuitions, denoted as moral intuitions, which are automatic

hunches or feelings about whether something is right or wrong (Haidt and Joseph, 2008). A key component of these intuitions are emotions, which can function as intuitions themselves (Haidt, 2003). I also posit that although moral intuitions are innate and universal, how these intuitions manifest is affected by context (Haidt and Joseph, 2004), especially by factors related to promoting cooperation at higher scales (Henrich et al., 2010). As in the previous chapter, here I will also focus on two related factors: social identity and generalized trust.

I argue that the condemnation of corruption we see in the abstract is largely the result of innate moral concerns linked to the domain fairness (Haidt, 2001; Curry et al., 2019b). However, this abstract condemnation does not always translate into concrete punishment and abstention because, in a concrete setting, there are competing immediate concerns. In this chapter, I am focusing on a non-moral competing concern linked to self-interest. Importantly, because I posit that this condemnation can fade in favour of other concerns but does not disappear, I propose that the condemnation can be re-triggered so that it applies even in concrete settings.

I believe that accounting for self-interest as something separate from morality is important. As explained in Chapter 4, some authors subscribed to ethical egoisms and argued that selfishness in itself is a moral duty Sidgwick (1907); but this proposition does not find strong empirical evidence. Furthermore, I consider that in situations in which group interest is at stake, the situation can still be seen as a moral dilemma due to the morality of group loyalty. Thus, as explained in Chapter 5, my approach to corruption as a social dilemma differs from that of the Collective Action approach since I see self-interest and group-based interest as potentially separate. Related to this, I argue that we can not reduce all instances of corruption to a moral dilemma, especially in the case of bribery. While some cases of bribery are more easily recognised as a moral dilemma, others are not. For example, a situation in which an individual has to decide to pay a bribe to get an administrative procedure done faster would be harder to frame as a moral dilemma because there is no direct competing moral concern (for example, no clear, direct benefit or prevention of harms towards those in the ingroup). In such a case, engaging in corruption may

be seen as acceptable (because it's a common or functional practice, for example), but most people would not judge it as morally right.

Additionally, I posit that engagement in corruption and, more importantly, how this engagement is judged is not only based on the functional role of corruption (Torsello and Venard, 2016). While it is true that in cases like Peru, citizens often are forced to rely on practices like bribery to access necessary state services, it is possible to distinguish between an engagement in corruption that is morally justifiable and an engagement that is not. As Bauhr (2016, p.563) proposes, we can distinguish between "need corruption", where "the citizens engage in corruption [...] to receive fair treatment", and "greed corruption", where they engage in corruption "to receive special illicit advantages". I distinguish more broadly between instances of corruption that can be morally justified, such as when corruption is presented as a moral dilemma (as studied in Chapter 9), and instances of corruption that are morally condemned even if they are seen as acceptable or functional practices.

As discussed in Chapter 9, when corruption is presented as a moral dilemma, individuals can morally justify their own engagement in corruption based on moral concerns that compete with fairness at a larger scale, such as in-group loyalty or kinship. However, when corruption is presented as a social dilemma, I propose that it should not be seen as justifiable under moral considerations, even when it is seen as functional. This would include using bribes to expedite bureaucratic procedures for which one could reasonably wait or bribing a policeman to avoid a sanction. In these cases, corruption presents people with a social dilemma where self-interest conflicts with broader concerns linked to fairness. Some cases of favouritism can be seen under the umbrella of functional but avoidable, such as using one's contacts to get a state job without having the qualifications. The issue with favouritism, as discussed, is that the implied closeness between participants tends to make these situations be seen as moral dilemmas.

To further study this distinction between functional features and moral factors of judgement and behaviour in relation to corruption, I conducted a series of focus

groups where participants were first prompted to define corruption in the abstract, and then they were encouraged to discuss their own experiences with corruption. Then, to study the role that intuitive processes can have when corruption is presented as a social dilemma, I used a similar experiment to the one presented in Study 2 of Chapter 9. Here, I also used an autobiographical recall technique to induce incidental (Zheng et al., 2017) guilt and anger, which have been linked to fairness evaluation (**?**Hall, 1899; Liu et al., 2016; Nelissen et al., 2007; Polman and Ruttan, 2012). These emotions correspond to two different types of evaluations, with guilt being a self-conscious emotion and anger being an other-focused emotion (Zinck, 2008). In their incidental form, emotions are aroused by an unrelated source to the process of decision-making. Thus, inducing emotion and later seeing how it affects judgement and behaviour gives emotions a causal role, which contrasts with the views of them being solely consequences of the decision-making process (Hauser, 2006). Thus, I posit that changes in judgement and reported behaviour based on the induced emotions provide evidence towards the role of intuitive processes.

In this Chapter, I also account for the role of social identity and generalised trust. As previously mentioned, these factors can be seen as a result of the norms and rules that allow for cooperation at larger scales (Henrich et al., 2010). I propose that a strong, broader social identity and higher levels of generalised trust are associated with individuals considering large society as a relevant reference group, which amplifies the fairness intuitive concerns (Henrich, 2015, p.154), to include this large society. Because in this chapter, I study corruption as a social dilemma and not a moral one, I did not expect guilt (self-conscious) and anger (other-focused) to have a different effect depending on the interaction with these factors. Rather, I expect that these factors would increase the effect of the induced emotions. Thus, I expect that, for those people with a stronger broader social identity and a higher level of generalised trust, the effect of the emotional inductions in reducing the engagement in corruption and increasing the condemnation towards it will be stronger. I argue that this would be the case because, for these individuals, concerns towards the collective would be more ingrained and thus would be more easily re-activated even in concrete settings. As I will discuss in the final section of this Chapter, my results

do not fully match the expected directionality, but I believe they can be explained based on perceived contextual unfairness.

10.4 Study 1: Focus Groups

Study 1 consists of a series of focus groups conducted in the city of Lima, Peru. Through these focus groups, I wanted to explore further whether people condemn corruption in the abstract, even in high corruption cases. Furthermore, I wanted to see whether, when probed about their own corruption engagement, participants would make reference only to the functional nature of corruption or would also make reference to fairness or other moral concerns.

As presented in Chapter 7, I decided to use focus groups because they have been shown to be more useful than other strategies for eliciting feedback when discussing sensitive topics (Madriz, 1998; Cyr, 2015) since participants can explain and defend their choices and ideas regarding these topics in a more horizontal setting while feeding into the group discussion. Although focus groups cannot help me distinguish between the role of reflective/deliberative and intuitive processes, they do allow me to glimpse at the justifications people provide for engaging in actions judged as wrong in the abstract. This is important because by prodding people on their own engagement in corruption in a social setting, I can establish whether justifications are based only on the functional aspect of corruption or whether there is also a moral component.

This is in line with some of my previous work, where focus groups were also an important tool to establish individual views on corruption (Baraybar Hidalgo et al., 2022b, 2016). In a study about social Desirability Bias, for which my coauthors and I conducted a series of focus groups in 2017, we found that when asked about corruption in the abstract, participants overwhelmingly associated it with negative valuations, "adjectives that were repeated were wrong, illicit, amoral, double moral.

Participants also condemned corruption since they saw it as a practice associated with selfishness or convenience."(Baraybar Hidalgo et al., 2022b, p.29). What is more, when asked about what components were needed for corruption, most people mentioned that there needed to be "bad people", showing a negative moral judgement of corruption when presented in the abstract. However, when asked to recount a concrete situation, there was a scale of acceptability that was dependent mostly on the degree of necessity (of the person who engaged in corruption) and the level of harm (towards third parties).

For this study, I expect participants to view corruption in the abstract as negative. When recounting their own experiences of corruption, I also expect that participants will see them as more justifiable when competing moral concerns favour the engagement in corruption, such as helping a person close to them. On the other hand, I expect that participants will judge engagement in corruption more harshly when this engagement is driven solely by self-interest and when the actions directly harm someone, thus increasing the intuitive condemnation that is linked to fairness by also increasing the salience intuitions related to the harm domain.

10.4.1 Design

I conducted six focus groups between the 22nd and the 25th of March, 2022. The recruitment was done by a social scientist who had worked in the Fieldwork area of the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (PUCP), with whom I coordinated two months prior to fielding the focus groups. She used a Recruitment Checklist and a Consent Form provided by me [5]. The focus groups were conducted in person, and all participants were asked to wear masks and to keep their masks on (and were provided extra masks) to ameliorate the risk of COVID-19 infection (in addition, all participants presented their vaccination certificates when recruited). The groups

[5]The Focus Groups received ethical approval from the DPIR Department Research Ethics Committee (DREC), reference number SSH DPIR CIA 22 014

were divided based on gender and socioeconomic status under the assumption that people would be more likely to express their opinions freely and honestly when among peers and differences in gender and economic status would restrain people from freely expressing their opinions (The composition of the groups can be found in Appendix A).

10.4.2 Results

To determine whether the participants had a negative view of corruption in the abstract, in the first section of the focus groups (after the introductions), I implemented an exercise in which the participants were asked to write three words or short phrases that came to mind when they heard the word "corruption". They were told not to put their name in their submissions, that all would be anonymous (the answers would not be read aloud to the rest of the group), that there were "no correct answers", and to write the first things that came to their minds.

Female D/E	Male D/E	Female C	Male C	Female A/B	Male A/B
Steal/ Rob	Steal/ Rob	Dishonourable act	It's the abuse of power in exchange of a benefit	Lack of respect	Severe problem in our country
Shameless	Rat	Public functionaries	Nepotism	Little value to common good	The main reason why we distrusts politics
Without principles	Politics	Politics	Lie	Selfishness	Selfishness
Stealing	Bribe	Politician	Mob	Lie	Distorted vision/ amplified of the problem by society

Table 10.1 continued from previous page

Falsify	Influence peddling	Congressperson	Bribery	Delay development	Seed that is difficult to eradicate
Lies	Personal benefits	Public service	Inmoral	Greed	Simplification of the political arena
Steal/ Rob	President	Structure	Criminal	Congressperson	Bad
Politicians	Mayors	Intersection	High commands	Peruvian Society	Illegal
President	Police	Levels	Money	Sadness	Illegal
Steal the money of people that are doing their work	Steal/ Rob	Steal/ Rob	State-business	Fujimori	Central government
Steal/ Rob	Steal	Delincuencia	Abnormal functioning	Society Decline	Judiciary
Crime	Scandal	Bad	Lie	"It didn't fall, it collapsed" [1]	Police
Steal/ Rob	Corrupt	Public functionaries	Intention		Negative concept
Do "work related favours"	Thief	State			Different types
Crime	Shameless	Money			Negative consequences
Steal/ Rob	Thief	Criminal act			
Its not good, corruption is bad for all of us	Bad	Steal/ Rob			
	Shameless	Politics			

As we can see in the table above, when asked about what came to mind when hearing the word “corruption”, all the participants mentioned at least one negative valuation (associated with words like theft, crime, shameless, etc.). When not referring to these inherently negative concepts, people used words related to innocuous concepts that are associated with corruption, such as state, functionaries, or money. Thus, in the abstract, all participants perceive corruption as something negative.

Interestingly, two distinct types of valuations emerged as associated with corruption. On the one hand, the second most written answer (14 of the 93 answers, or 14 of the 32 participants that completed the exercise) was “Steal/Rob” (or a variation of such words, like “stealing” or "thief"). Although it is not surprising that corruption is associated with the act of stealing, of taking something without having a legal right to it, it was surprising to find that this response came almost exclusively from those of lower socio-economic status. I reckon that this is due to two main factors: First, people in lower SES may associate corruption with the concrete actions that are commonly reported in the media, which are, in general, variations of the act of stealing (public officials “pocketing” taxes or companies overcharging the state); and second, the abstract concept of corruption may be concreted in the actual act of stealing because it’s the closer concept people find to capture the violations to the notion of fairness.

On the other hand, the most written type of answer (16 of the 93 answers or 16 of the 32 participants) referred to the negative consequences of corruption (societal harm, scandal). These answers were almost exclusively concentrated among respondents of higher socio-economic status. In this case, it is possible that people from higher SES are conscious of corruption as a problem but do not feel the need to concretise it through a specific practice; rather, they focus on the abstract negative consequences. It is also interesting that the references to consequences made by those respondents relate to concerns at a larger societal scale. Among these answers, we have, for example: “little value to the common good”, “the reason why we distrust politics”, or "society decline". Although this was not measured during the focus groups, it would be interesting to see if these responses are not a function of

SES but rather of the potential association between SES (mainly through factors like education[6]) and factors like higher levels of generalised trust and a stronger identification with the nation.

This exercise shows that a negative view of corruption is common in all focus groups, regardless of gender or SES. Having established this, I wanted to explore how participants talked about their experiences with corruption and how open they were in describing having partaken in or having witnessed a corruption exchange. In particular, I was interested in seeing how they responded when prodded about their reasons for engaging in corruption and whether they viewed this engagement as completely acceptable. To do this, the rest of the focus group session was largely centred on a discussion of the participants' previous experiences with corruption.

When asked whether they had participated in or witnessed corruption, most of the participants were very open in discussing their experiences, even citing experiences that constituted severe crimes. Interestingly, in most cases, those who recalled corruption situations in which they were active participants were males. In contrast, females seemed more likely to recall situations in which they witnessed corruption but were not active participants. This may be related to gender-driven social desirability bias that I do not explore in this diseeration[7]. We can see an example of this in the following quotes:

> "I worked, I was a legal representative of the AFP's [the private pension fund managers], in the year 2007, and every month the AFPs made a 'bag' [like a communal fund] to send to the congressmen from the commission of social security so that they do not alter the law, and I saw this across seven years [...]" (Male C)

[6]Education was one of the filters used to determine the SES of the participants. The participant filter and consent forms are available upon request

[7]In a previous study, my coauthors and I found that men sometimes overreport their past experiences with corruption, possibly due to a desire to see as more risk-taking (Baraybar Hidalgo et al., 2022a)

> "When I was in the "combi" [informal public transport], the police stopped the driver and... you could clearly see that between his papers he was also giving him money [...]" (Female DE)

But even when talking about their own experiences or things they witnessed, some people were able to recognise that corruption was still something negative, and they did so without being prodded to do so by me. Some of the participants were open in their view that corruption, regardless of the scale, was negative, even though there could be different evaluations of the act of corruption. They also attributed engagement and tolerance of corruption to personal shortcomings, reinforcing that the condemnation of corruption we see in the abstract is present even in concrete settings and even when people engage in it. We can see some examples of this in the following quotes:

> "It's just that, any act, any act of corruption... Is basically... Regardless of how small or insignificant, it starts with an act that... technically, we could say, has a consequence in the future, right? Maybe in the future, they could engage in other types of acts that are way more immoral" (Male AB)

> "It's clear that we are lacking the character to denounce corruption. We stay silent and are also accomplices of corruption." (Female C)

This self-recognition of wrongness is interesting because it may point towards a way to overcome ethical fading. Ethical fadings can be defined as the "process by which the moral colours of an ethical decision fade into bleached hues that are void of moral implications." (Tenbrunsel and Messick, 2004, 224)[8]. Here, the ethical

[8]In Tenbrunsel and Messick (2004), they do not clarify whether this deception is the result of a conscious or unconscious process. I take it to be an unconscious one. Although the conscious process can play a role when people attempt to justify their action as not going against moral behaviour.

components of a situation are not consciously ignored; rather, they become less salient due to situational factors [9]. It is possible that when engaging in the actions they described, the moral condemnation of corruption was overrun or faded in favour of other concerns, not because this condemnation was not sincere or did not exist, but because of "situational and institutional forces" (Palazzo et al., 2012). It is possible that the ethical implications of their engagement in corruption became clearer once they were asked to remember it and discuss it in the focus group settings. The intuitionist approach I am proposing is compatible with arguments that centre on ethical fading and moral blindness, seeing them as the result of unconscious processes since I argue that innate fairness concerns linked to the condemnation of corruption in the abstract sometimes can be overrun by other concerns or fade in concrete situations.

However, even though corruption was recognised as wrong, some participants were eager to justify their engagement in corruption through different means. As expected, some of the justifications that initially emerged when participants were prodded about their experiences with corruption were aligned with the view of corruption as functional and with the view that there are social norms in favour of corruption (which is an expected and common behaviour). For example, one of the participants recounted how her uncle used his contacts within the Interior Ministry to get out of a traffic ticket. While she recognised that as a "bad" action, when asked why she did not consider denouncing the action, she explained that the practice was seen as normal.

> "I did not think about it... What happens is that I believe that here in Peru, it's quite normal. If one has a family member in a Ministry, for example, I call them... you know what... could you get me a job there if he is the director or something, and it's normal, you are going to get

[9] This is related to the concept of ethical blindness, defined as"[people behaving] unethically without being aware of it—they may even be convinced that they are doing the right thing. [being] only later that they realise the unethical dimension of their decision" (Palazzo et al., 2012)

the job [...]" (Female AB)

This idea of corruption being seen as "normal" appeared frequently, and it was often quoted initially when participants were prompted to talk about why they engage in corruption and why others do the same.

> "It's just that...I have done it, right? There was no other way. There was no other way...It's a way of getting there faster, right? And if everyone else is doing it... I, too, right? But that is wrong; it is still wrong." (Male AB)

Nevertheless, not all justifications referenced the functional role of corruption; indirectly, participants also referenced competing moral concerns. For example, participants reported that corruption was justifiable in cases of particular need and pointed out that they engage in corruption not out of an everyday "need" but rather out of a particular "need". This type of need-based justification emerged, especially when we discussed instances of corruption during the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, one of the participants argued that: "What happens is that sometimes it is the necessity that the person is facing what pushes them..." (Male DE), and something similar was expressed by most participants in all focus groups when it came to evaluating corruption situations that emerged during the pandemic.

This kind of need-based justification only applied to the citizen side of the equation; the public servers and officials were mostly viewed as people who were trying to maximise their income. One of the participants, while talking about paying money to get access to an ICU bed, said, "I do believe it is an act of corruption, but it is conditioned by necessity, and that is the case in many situations [...]" (Male C). But then he clarified that this only applied to those who were "buying" access to the ICU bed or the medicine, not those who were selling it.

In the discussion about participants' engagement in corruption during the pandemic, there was an overlap between functional and moral concerns. From their

side, as citizens, the engagement in corruption to access care during the pandemic was seen as functional and morally justifiable because it was done to prevent harm to loved ones. For example, when talking about the people who used contacts to get access to ICU beds or oxygen, one participant said, "I don't think its corruption, it's a form of helping, because of necessity, it's a life you are saving [...]" (Male DE). Other participants made a distinction between engaging in corruption and being "corrupt" when the engagement was done out of necessity: "[...] there are people that out of necessity have to engage in corruption, so it seems bad to call that person corrupt [...]" (Female C).

This overlap of moral concerns with other types of concerns also emerged when participants were asked to judge corruption situations by evaluating the experiences recalled by others. Participants were asked to explain whether they considered some of the previously recalled engagements in corruption as more acceptable and why that was the case, and in some of the responses, we can see the salience of moral concerns.

> "Yes, in that moment, I don't believe people think stuff like... yes, I am going to buy an ICU bed [from a hospital]; in that moment, you don't think of it like that. But maybe later, on reflection, you do think to yourself that maybe you were taking the bed from someone else, harming someone else [...]" (Female AB)
>
> "I don't think you can say there is something good when talking about corruption, because at the end, the benefit is something you take but that someone else loses, especially when it involves the State [...], and if you engage in it, do it, but knowing that its corruption" (Female C)
>
> "[...] Then... it would be good to have, in quotation marks, a scale. How much harm are you causing, how many people are you going to harm with this act of corruption? [...]" (Male AB)
>
> "That's the problem in Peru, we are used to that...what would happen if it was your mother who was sick and the doctor came and kicked her

out to give the bed to his family member. . . you could say that, no, it is the preference, it his family member, but... [. . .]" (Male DE)

Interestingly, as seen in the quotes above, when participants were prodded about situations in which corruption could be justified out of necessity, they recognised that even in those situations, corruption could be judged as wrong because it harms someone or is inherently unfair.

10.4.3 Discussion

First, through these focus groups, I was able to show that people have a negative view of corruption, even in a context where it is seen as systemic and endemic. All participants had a negative view of corruption when evaluating it in the abstract. Even so, all participants admitted to having either participated in or witnessed instances of corruption. The quotes show that, while being candid about their own engagement in corruption, participants also cared about the possible harm their actions may cause and the opportunities they may have taken away from others.

Thus, the results show that although in a high-corruption context, petty corruption practices may be seen as functional, even in those instances, people recognise that some practices are more morally justified than others. Specifically, when people view engagement in corruption as necessary to protect people close to them, they are less likely to judge it as morally wrong. One of the participants, for example, argued that there should be a difference between engaging in corruption and being "corrupt" due to the role that other concerns, such as the prevention of harm towards loved ones, can have on the decision to engage in corruption. Furthermore, the results show that participants recognised the effect that their own engagement in corruption could have on distant others.

Finally, as mentioned at the start of this section, it is impossible to distinguish between the role of intuitive and reflective/deliberative processes through focus groups

since they only give access to verbalized judgements and justifications. But even so, I believe that some of the things that emerged during the discussion showed that the condemnation of corruption was still present even when people recalled their own engagement in it, and this condemnation was closely linked to moral concerns. Therefore, although much of the discussion in the focus groups was consistent with previous approaches that linked both societal expectations and functionality of corruption practices, I believe that some of the things that emerged point towards the importance of moral concerns. In other words, people may consciously think about the social norms in place (for example, when they believe practice is seen as normal) and about the functional nature of corruption, but this does not mean that the intuitive condemnation of corruption automatically disappears, and this shows in the concerns linked to both general fairness and harm towards distant others, which did emerge during the discussion.

10.5 Study 2: Induced Emotions in Corruption as a Social Dilemma

For my second empirical test, I designed an experiment aimed at looking at the effect of intuitive processes on judgment and behaviour, for which I used induced moral emotions. This experiment had the same basis as the one presented in Chapter 9. For this experiment, I induced the emotions in an incidental manner (no task-related exercises) and considered any effect these induced emotions have on judgment and behaviour to be evidence that intuitive processes (and not just reflective/deliberative processes) have a role in judgments and behaviours related to corruption. Importantly, some of my expectations are different for this case. Since here I am focusing on corruption as a social dilemma, I did not expect the directionality of the effect of induced guilt to vary depending on social identity and trust.

The survey was designed and run in LimeSurvey using the platform *Encuestame.pe*, which recruits Peruvian participants through Facebook. The initial target

sample was 1800 respondents, but due to a lag in recruitment and to an issue with participants abandoning the survey [10] I was only able to collect 1722 responses[11].

Participants were told that the survey would last around 10 minutes [12]. Before starting the experiment, participants filled out a consent form[13], where they were assured that no identifying information would be collected. They were also informed about how the data collected would be stored and used[14].

After consenting to participate in the study, participants were asked to answer a series of demographic questions, including age, gender, education and income.

10.5.1 Pre-test questions: Social Identity and Trust

As in the previous experiment (Chapter 9), participants were asked questions designed to establish their generalised trust and social identity levels at the beginning of the experiment. To create some distance between these questions and the experiment, some of the demographic questions (those pertaining to education and income) were asked after participants answered these pre-treatment questions. The questions used to measure Trust can be seen in Appendix B, and those used to measure Social Identity can be seen in Appendix C.

[10]Through the surveying agency, I was informed that some participants abandoned the survey due to a loss of internet connection, but others left the survey voluntarily.

[11]This number is of the responses to the experiment; some of the participants abandoned the survey without completing the post-experiment questions.

[12]The surveying agency recommended increasing the expected time by a couple of minutes compared to the one run in the UK (Chapter 9) since most respondents fill out these surveys on their phones, which may take longer

[13]This study received Ethical Approval from the DPIR Departmental Research Ethics Committee (DREC), with the reference number SSH DPIR C1A 23 006. It was also pre-registered in EGAP, Registration ID:20230619AA

[14]Because of the way *Encuestame.pe* works, I had to collect the emails of the participants, but they were assured that this information would be eliminated from the dataset.

10.5.2 The experiment

As in the experiment presented in Chapter 9, participants were allocated randomly to one of six conditions that combined the treatments **induced emotions** and scenario of personal versus impersonal corruption. There were three groups in the **induced emotions** treatment: one induced towards a self-referential emotion (guilt), another induced towards a non-self-referential emotion (anger), and a third group that served as the control group and received no treatment (they were asked to write out their daily routine). There were two groups in the scenario treatment: one received the vignette in the first person, and the other received it in the third person.

In line with what Siedlecka and Denson (2019) proposed, I also use induced incidental (no task-related) emotions to test the causal effect of emotions and intuitive processes more broadly. To induce these emotions, I used (as in Chapter 9) the autobiographical recall technique, where participants are asked to recall a situation in which they felt the emotion being induced (Lerner and Keltner, 2001; Mills and D'Mello, 2014). However, I modified this technique to add an example of the expected type of answers by request of the surveying agency. It could be argued that these examples acted as an imagery-based inducement for emotions (Siedlecka and Denson, 2019) or a vignette-based inducement for emotions (Wingenbach et al., 2019). Although the examples were short, and the autobiographical recall component was maintained since people were still asked to write about their own recollections, it is possible that these examples acted as further inducements. Because of this, I took care in selecting examples that did not make reference to issues related to fairness. The examples used for the guilt inducement task (T1) are in Appendix D, and the ones used for the anger inducement task (T2) are in Appendix E.

Participants viewed the following emotion-inducing prompts for the autobiographical recall task:

- Guilt inducement (T1): Now, I would like you to recall a situation in which you have felt very guilty about something you have done. Please describe the situation in the space below and focus on what you did that made you feel very guilty, and try to remember how you felt in that moment. If you can not recall a past situation, you can describe an imaginary one.

- Anger inducement (T2): Now, I would like you to recall a situation in which you have felt very angry about something that happened to you. Please describe the situation in the space below, focus on the people or actions that made you very angry, and try to remember how you felt at that moment. If you can not recall a past situation, you can describe an imaginary one.

- Control condition (C): I would like you to recall and write your usual daily routine. It's ok to list or just mention what you normally do on an average day.

After the emotional inducement, participants saw one of two vignettes depicting a bribery scenario presented as a social dilemma. In the vignettes, engaging in bribery would respond to personal interest. To guarantee that, I ensured the vignette did not directly signal any competing moral concerns. As in Study 2 of Chapter 9, the vignettes varied on whether they were presented in the first or third person. Thus, the participants were randomly assigned to see one of the following vignettes:

- First-person (T3): Imagine that you are in line to renew your ID card. The line is long, and you have been waiting for over an hour. While waiting, you notice that one of the administrative attendees occasionally approaches some of the other people in the queue. Sometimes, one of those people follows the attendee inside, and then that person leaves the administrative office. After another hour of waiting, many people are still ahead of you in the line. One of the attendees approaches you and takes you aside. The attendee tells you that if you give them a little money, they will take you inside and expedite your ID renewal.

- Thrid-person (T4): Imagine that there is a person in line to renew their ID card. The line is long, and they have been waiting for over an hour. While waiting, the person notices that one of the administrative attendees occasionally approaches some of the other people in the queue. Sometimes, one of those people follows the attendee inside, and then that person leaves the administrative office. After another hour of waiting, many people are still ahead of them in the line. One of the attendees approaches and takes the person aside. The assistant tells them that they will take them inside and expedite their ID renewal if they give them a little money.

The full experiment had six branches, as we can see in the table below:

Table 10.2: Treatment combinations

Situation vignette/ Emotional Inducement	First Person (T3)	Third Person (T4)
Guilt inducement (T1)	T1 + T3	T1 + T4
No inducement (Control)	C + T3	C + T4
Anger Inducement (T2)	T2 + T3	T2 +T4

As in Chapter 9, the experiment had three primary outcomes. The first was an action-based outcome (would you/the person give that money to the attendee?). The second one was a moral judgment outcome (on a scale of wrong to right, how would you judge the action of giving that money to the attendee?). The final one was an open question, where people were asked to justify the previous moral judgment (please explain in your own words why you believe it would be wrong/right to give that money to the attendee). In the final part of the survey, participants were asked whether paying the attendee (engaging in bribery) was engaging in an act of corruption. Here, I did not ask the participant to define corruption due to concerns from the surveying agency about the number of open-ended questions.

10.5.3 Main Expectation

In contrast to the study in Chapter 9, my initial expectations were based on the strength of the effect and not on the directionality. Because the situation presented did not posit a moral dilemma, I expect induced guilt (T1) to have a stronger effect on the outcome for participants who saw the first-person vignette (T3) and induced anger (T2) to have a stronger effect on the outcome for participants who saw the third-person vignette (T4). As in the previous experiment, I expect a broader social identity and generalised trust to increase the effect of the induced emotions. In more detail, my main expectations are as follows:

- H1: **Induced anger** (T1) will lead to less engagement in corruption and harsher judgment towards it compared to **control condition**(C) when the corruption social dilemma is presented in the **first-person** (T3).
- H2: **Induced guilt** (T1) will lead to less engagement in corruption and harsher judgment towards it compared to **induced anger** (T2) when the corruption social dilemma is presented in the textbffirst-person (T3).
- H3: **Induced anger** (T2) will lead to harsher judgment towards corruption compared to **induced guilt** (T1) when the corruption social dilemma is presented in the **third-person** (T4).
- H4: The dilemma presented in the **third-person** (T4) will elicit harsher moral judgments than the dilemma presented in the "first person" (T3) in the **control condition** (C)
- H6-heterogeneous effects: For H1 to H3, the induced emotions will have a stronger effect among those participants that report higher levels of generalised trust and a broader social identity

10.5.4 Results

After cleaning the data, I checked that the randomization was done correctly (see Appendix F). As a first step, I subsetted my main database into two based on whether the vignette shown was in the first person (T3) or the third person (T4) to facilitate the analysis of the role of induced emotions.

10.5.4.1 First-Person Vignette

In regards to the first-person vignette, I expected both induced emotions to lead to less engagement and harsher judgments towards bribery. I also expected induced guilt (T1), as a self-conscious emotion, to have a stronger effect than induced anger (T2). Furthermore, I expected these effects to be stronger for people with a broad social identity and generalised trust. To explore this, I used the *stats R package* and conducted a series of logistic and linear regressions.

Figure 10.2: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Paying the Bribe



Note: The results are from a logistic regression

As we can see in Figure 10.2., there is no significant effect of the induced emotions on the likelihood of paying the bribe (the results table can be seen in Appendix G). When looking at the distribution of responses, of the 617 respondents who saw the first-person vignette, only 47 said they would pay the bribe. Even though the phrasing of the vignette and the outcome questions did not directly mention bribery (it just said: "Give that money to the attendee"), it is possible that the exchange of money marks the situation as clearly one of bribery and thus makes people less likely to engage in it (or to report engaging in it). It is also possible that people, in general, are less likely to engage in corruption when it is presented as a social dilemma.

As in the previous chapter, I also wanted to explore whether this engagement varied depending on generalised trust, a form of particularised trust (trust in "Family), and broad social identity. As mentioned in Chapter 9, I focus on only the broad social identity (Country) because people can simultaneously hold multiple identities. As a first step, I regressed the outcome on these factors and found that none had a significant effect on the likelihood of paying the bribe (see Appendix H).

As previously, I expected that factors like generalised trust and broad social identity would reflect the effect of norms and rules that amplify moral intuitions so that people would also consider distant others in their actions. However, as seen in Chapter 9, the effect of these factors may be more complex since contextual or situational fairness may affect how these factors operate.

First, I included interaction terms between the induced emotions and my measures of trust. The measure of generalised trust is based on whether the participant reports believing that most people can be trusted. As in the previous study, other measures of trust in distant others did not report enough variation to be used[15]. The measure of particularised trust (trust in "Family"), while skewed towards positive,

[15]Of the 1722 respondents, only 44 reported trusting people they had just met, and only 177 reported trusting people that shared their nationality.

does offer some variation[16].

Figure 10.3: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Paying the Bribe with Generalised Trust Interaction



Note: The results are from a logistic regression

[16]Of the total of 1722 respondents, 1230 reported having higher levels of trust towards their "Family" and 492 reported otherwise

Figure 10.4: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Paying the Bribe with Particularised Trust (trust in "Family") Interaction



Note: The results are from a logistic regression

As we can see in Figure 10.3., for those participants who reported generalised trust (believing that most people could be trusted), induced anger has a positive and significant effect ($p<0.1$) on the likelihood of paying the attendee (see Appendix I for the table of results). This is the opposite effect of what we saw in Chapter 9, but I speculate that the reason for this may be similar to the one used to explain why anger in the favouritism scenario led to a higher likelihood of accepting the favour. This relates to the unfairness of the contextual situation, as I will discuss in the final section of this chapter.

What is a bit more puzzling is that the induced emotions had a similar effect for those who reported having strong trust in their "Family" (Figure 10.4.), except in this case, it is the treatment of induced guilt the one that has a positive and significant ($p<0.05$) effect on the likelihood of paying the bribe (see Appendix J for the table of results). This aligns with my initial expectations based on the social

identity related to narrower groups. It also shows that self-conscious emotions may have a stronger causal effect towards behaviour among individuals with stronger bonds and trust with their families. However, it is puzzling that both generalised and particularised trust lead to similar results. As I will discuss in the Conclusion chapter, this may be due to these measures, borrowed from the WVS, actually capturing abstract and concrete trust, and these two things may act differently.

Finally, I also included an interaction between the induced emotions and the social identity of "Country". This was based on the answer to the question: "Identifying with a group means feeling part of it and caring and showing concern about its members. How much do you identify with each of the following?".[17].

Figure 10.5: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Paying the Bribery with Social Identity ("Country") Interaction



Note: The results are from a logistic regression

[17]I recoded these variables. They were coded as 1 for those who strongly or completely identified with these groups and 0 otherwise

As we can see in Figure 10.5, similar to what we saw with generalised trust, the induced emotions had a positive effect among participants who strongly identified with the "Country". In this case, both induced guilt ($p<0.05$) and induced anger ($p<0.1$) had a significant effect on the likelihood of paying the attendee. Thus, for those respondents who reported strongly identifying with their "Country", induced guilt (in comparison to the control) led to an increase of 1.85 in the log odds of paying the attendee, and induced anger led to an increase of 1.35 in the log-odds of paying the attendee[18].

In this case, I speculate that what matters is the valence of the emotion since both induced anger and guilt seem to have a similar effect size. It is possible that for people who identify strongly with their "Country" (and thus maybe have positive expectations about people) and find themselves in a context where unfair behaviour is signalled, negative emotional inducement leads to more engagement in corruption to balance the scales.

Having analysed the effect of the emotional inductions on the likelihood of paying the bribe, I will now analyse whether these induced emotions had any effect on how paying the bribe was judged. The judgment outcome was based on the question, "On a scale of wrong to right, how would you judge paying the attendee?" The scale went from 1=completly wrong to 5=completly right (the distribution of the answers can be seen in Appendix L, mean=1.2, mode=1). To see the effect of the induced emotions on this outcome, I conducted a series of linear regressions.

[18]The table with the results can be seen in Appendix K

Figure 10.6: First-person vignette - Effect of Emotional Inducement on judgment



Note: The results are from a linear regression

As we can see in Figure 10.6, neither of the induced emotions significantly affected how participants who saw the first-person vignette judged paying the bribe. As discussed in Chapter 9, this may be due to the action being generally judged as negative. In this case, the global judgment outcome was even more negative than in Study 2 of Chapter 9 (where the focus was on favouritism). In this study, most participants answered that paying the attendee would be completely wrong. As in the previous analysis, I also included interactions between the induced emotions and the measures of social identity and trust to see if they altered their effect (the effect of these factors on judgment can be seen in Appendix M).

Figure 10.7: First-person vignette - Effect of emotional inducement on judgment with Generalised Trust Interaction



Note: The results are from a linear regression

As we can see in Figure 10.7., for those participants who reported having generalised trust, induced guilt had a negative and significant ($p<0.1$) effect on judgment (see Appendix N for the table of results). This means that for those participants who reported believing that most people could be trusted, induced guilt led to a harsher moral judgment of paying the bribe. This aligns with my initial expectations, and it is interesting that we only see an effect when self-conscious emotion is induced. Recall that here, we are evaluating judgment for those who saw the first-person vignette and who were likely judging the action based on self-evaluation. As we will see further on, neither induced emotion significantly affected judgment when the participants saw the third-person vignette.

When interacting with particularised trust ("Family") and broad social identity

("Country"), none of the results were significant [19].

10.5.4.2 Third-person vignettes

Now, I will look at the effect of induced emotions on how individuals judge others' engaging in bribery. Here, I focus on those participants who saw the third-person vignette. I expected both induced emotions to lead to harsher judgments towards engagement in bribery. I also expected induced anger (T2) to have a stronger effect than induced guilt (T1). Furthermore, I expected these effects to be stronger for people with a broad social identity and generalised trust.

As explained in Chapter 9, an important caveat here is that due to being asked about the actions of another person, the action-based outcome can be reinterpreted as a form of judgment. In the action-based outcome ("Would the person pay the attendee?"), the respondent is judging whether, in that situation, a person would or would not give the payment to the attendee.

As before, I start by analysing the results of a logistic regression of the action-based outcome on the induced emotions.

[19]The results can be seen in Appendix O and P

Figure 10.8: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Paying the Bribe



Note: The results are from a logistic regression

Recall that, in Chapter 9, when participants were presented with the favouritism scenario in the third person, the induced emotions led to a negative but not significant effect on believing that the person in the vignette would accept the favour. Here, we can see the opposite effect (Figure 10.8.). Both induced emotions had a positive effect on believing that the other person would pay the bribe, and both effects were significant (anger at $p<0.01$ and guilt at $p<0.05$) [20]. In contrast to the first-person vignette, over half of the participants expected the other person to pay the attendee[21]. This shows that, at a baseline, people in Peru are more likely to believe that others will engage in corruption. I believe that this contributes to the alternative explanation that people may be focusing more on the unfairness of the context instead of the unfairness of the individual action.

[20]The table with the results can be found in Appendix Q

[21]Out of the 588 participants who saw the third-person vignette, 296 said they would expect the person to pay the attendee

As in the previous case, here I also included interactions between the induced emotions and the measures of broad social identity and trust (the effect of these measures on the outcome can be found in Appendix R). I first looked at the interaction between the induced emotions and the measures of generalised and particularised trust but found no significant results for the interactions. However, for people who reported having strong trust in their "Family", induced anger decreased the likelihood of believing the other person would pay the bribe (the results can be found in Appendixes S and T).

Figure 10.9: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Paying the Bribe with Social Identity ("Country")



Note: The results are from a logistic regression

Interestingly, in Figure 10.9. we can see that for participants who reported strongly identifying with the "Country", the induced emotions positively affected the likelihood of believing the other person would pay the bribe (although the results are not significant). The logic here may be similar to the one discussed before. Participants who strongly identify with the "Country" may expect more fairness and thus may be more sensitive to the unfairness of the situations. It is also possible

that because Peru is seen as a high-corruption country, strongly identifying with the "Country" leads to people expecting more corruption either way. But, as seen in Appendix R, identifying with the country doesn't, by itself, have an effect on the likelihood of believing the person would pay the bribe. We only see an effect when interacting with the induced emotions.

Finally, I conducted the same analysis, focusing on the moral judgment of the action. In this case, because the results are from the third-person vignette, they are more indicative of judgment towards others, and I expected induced anger to have a more significant effect. As before, these results were based on linear regression.

Figure 10.10: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Judgment



Note: The results are from a linear regression

As we can see in Figure 10.10., for the third-person vignette, induced guilt had a negative and significant ($p<0.05$) effect on how participants judged the action of paying the attendee (see Appendix U for the table of results). In other words, in comparison to the control, induced guilt leads to participants judging the payment of the bribe more harshly. This is interesting because, as we saw in Figure 10.6.,

neither emotion significantly affected judgment when the vignette was presented in the first person.

This result is also surprising because I expected induced anger to have a stronger effect when it came to the judgment of others. In Figure 10.10., we can see that although the effect of induced anger is also negative, it is not significant. I don't have a clear explanation as to why the self-conscious emotion (guilt) has a stronger effect than the other-focused one (anger) in the judgment of others. However, as we will see when accounting for the interactions with trust and social identity, induced guilt seems to have a strong negative effect by itself. It is possible that induced guilt leads to the person judging more harshly what others do in the present because this emotion is usually evoked through self-reflection about something one has done in the past.

As before, I included an interaction between the induced emotions and the trust and social identity measures. Also, as previously, I first regressed the outcome of judgment on these factors (the effect of these factors on judgment can be found in Appendix V).

Figure 10.11: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Judgment with Generalised Trust Interaction



Note: The results are from a linear regression

Figure 10.12: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Judgment with Particularised Trust (trust in "Family") Interaction



Note: The results are from a linear regression

As we can see in Figure 10.11. and Figure 10.12. the inclusion of interactions with both generalised and particularised trust changes the directionality of the effect of guilt (it becomes positive), but this change is not significant. Importantly, in both cases, the effect of induced guilt by itself continues to be negative and significant. In addition, as we see in Figure 10.11., for those participants who reported having generalised trust, the effect of induced anger on judgment is also positive, although not significant. But for those who reported having strong trust in their "Family", the effect of anger is negative, although not significant. It is possible that, as mentioned, those participants who report believing most people can be trusted are more sensitive to the unfairness of the situations and, thus, more lenient when judging how others behave.

I also conducted the same analysis with interactions between the induced emotion and the measure of broad social identity, but in that case, I found no significant

effects (the results for this can be found in Appendix W). In general, the interactions of the induced emotions with a broad social identity only affected reported behaviour (Figure 5) but not judgment (Appendix M and W).

10.5.4.3 Control Condition

Finally, I wanted to see whether there was a broad difference in the action-based outcome (paying the bribe) and the judgment outcome (judging paying the bribe as right or wrong) depending on whether the participant saw the first-person vignette (T3) or the third-person vignette (T4).

For the action-based outcome, I wanted to see whether, in general, people were more willing to believe that others would pay the bribe than to acknowledge that they themselves would do so. For the judgment outcome, I wanted to see whether the action of paying the bribe was judged as more wrong or right based on whether the participant saw the first-person vignette or the third-person one.

Figure 10.13: Effect of First vs Third person vignette on Paying the Bribe



Note: the results are from a logistic regression

Figure 10.14: Effect of First vs Third person vignette on Judgment



Note: the results are from a linear regression

As we can see in Figure 10.14., there is no significant variation in the judgment outcome based on whether the respondents saw the first or third-person vignette. However, as seen in Figure 10.13., people are more likely to believe that others would pay the bribe than they are to acknowledge that they would do so themselves (see Appendix X for the results table). As discussed in the previous Chapter, this is in line with positive self-bias, but the results based on judgment also contradict studies of moral hypocrisy Polman and Ruttan (2012) since people are not more likely to judge the engagement of corruption as wrong or right based on whether they approached the action as participants or as observers.

10.5.5 Post-Experiment Questions: Text analysis

In the previous chapter, I used the newest version of the Extended Moral Foundations Dictionary (Hopp et al., 2020) to conduct a text analysis of the open-ended answers to the question: "Please explain in your own words why you believe it would be wrong/right to give that money to the attendee". In this Chapter, I was not able to do the same because there is not a validated version of this dictionary in Spanish, and there is no version in Spanish integrated with the *quanteda R pacakage*. Due to this, I decided to conduct a simple count analysis based on a translation of the original Moral Foundations Dictionary (Graham et al., 2009). The words used in Spanish can be found in Appendix Y.

I used the *stringr R package* to determine how many text entries in the open-ended question mentioned any words related to each of the foundations. Out of the 1722 participants, 1109 answered the open-ended question. We can see the results in the table below:

Category	Number of entries that mention any of the words
Fairness (virtue)	277
Fairness (vice)	53
Harm (virtue)	25

Table 10.3 continued from previous page

Harm (vice)	14
Loyalty (virtue)	14
Loyalty (vice)	2
Authority (virtue)	372
Authority (vice)	36
Purity (virtue)	176
Purity (vice)	0

As we can see, of those entries that make reference to words associated with the different moral domains included in the Moral Foundations Dictionary, most made reference to fairness and authority, both in their "virtue" category (positive valuation)[22]. It is worth noticing that in this case, for the moral evaluation of accepting the bribe, most people used words related to the domain of authority in addition to fairness, which contrasts with what I found in Chapter 9, where for evaluating the engagement in favouritism (accepting the favour), most people used words related to the domain of loyalty in addition to fairness.

I also wanted to see whether the mention of these words varied depending on whether the participant was shown the first or third-person vignette and on whether the participant reported that they would engage in bribery (in the first-person vignette).

[22]As mentioned in the previous Chapter, purity related words tend to be overrepresented.

Figure 10.15: Responses that used words related to Fairness (Virtue) by Vignette



Note: The lines represent CIs constructed at the 95%

Figure 10.16: Responses that used words related to Authority (Virtue) by Vignette



Note: The lines represent CIs constructed at the 95%

As we can see in Figure 10.15., the number of entries where words related to fairness (virtue) were used did not vary depending on whether the participant saw the first-person or the third-person vignette. However, there was a difference in the number of entries that used words related to authority. In that case, when the vignette was presented in the third person, a higher number of responses used words related to authority. This means that words related to authority were used more when participants evaluated the actions of others. It is possible that fairness concerns are more salient when evaluating one's own actions, and the actions in that case are seen as being self-regulated. Conversely, it is possible that when evaluating the actions of others, individuals expect these actions to be guided by concerns related to the domain of authority and, thus, more related to the obedience to norms and rules that externally regulate behaviour.

Then, I wanted to see whether the number of entries that used words pertaining

to these two domains (fairness and authority) varied depending on whether the person said they would pay the bribe or not (first-person).

Figure 10.17: First-person: Mentions of Fairness (Virtue) words by respondents they Paid the Bribe



Note: The lines represent CIs constructed at the 95%

Figure 10.18: First-person: Mentions of Authority (Virtue) words by whether respondents Paid the Bribe



Note: The lines represent CIs constructed at the 95%

As we can see, words associated with these two moral domains are more likely to be mentioned in entries written by participants who reported they would not pay the bribe. This result is interesting and makes sense; people who evaluate the action in terms of moral concerns are less likely to engage in corruption, but the results should be taken cautiously since most people declared they would not pay the bribe. As shown in Figure 10.19, most people who saw the first-person vignette declared they would not pay the bribe; also, most considered the act of paying the bribe an act of corruption.

Figure 10.19: First-person: Paid the Bribe and Paying Is Corruption



Note: The lines represent CIs constructed at the 95%

10.5.6 Discussion

The results show that most people report they would not pay the bribe themselves but expect others in that situation to do so. Furthermore, paying the bribe was generally judged as wrong by most participants (mean=1.2, mode=1, 1="completely wrong"). This offers an interesting contrast to what was found in the studies of Chapter 9, where people were more willing to engage in favouritism and were more lenient with their judgements (although they still judged engagement as wrong).

These results also show that induced emotions have a causal effect on reported behaviour and judgment when corruption is presented as a social dilemma. This further reinforces the need to think of emotions and intuitive processes more broadly as relevant factors for the study of corruption. Furthermore, it also highlights the need

to study emotions and intuitions more broadly as causes that can affect judgement and behaviour independently from reflective/deliberative processes.

Nevertheless, it's important to recognise that some of the results do not align with my initial expectations. For example, we saw that for participants who strongly identified with the "Country" and reported generalised trust, the induced emotions had a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of paying the bribe. Initially, I expected that for participants who strongly identified with this broad identity, the induced emotions would have a negative effect on behaviour since this identity is associated with having a larger society as a reference group (as explained in Chapters 3 and 4).

However, as previously mentioned, this unexpected result may be due to the situation's inadvertently signalled unfairness and the different connotations attached to the broader social identity. In the vignette shown to participants, it is signalled that other people waiting in the queue had paid to expedite their ID card renewal process. I included this information to signal social acceptability, minimize the social desirability bias, and increase the likelihood of people reporting that they would engage in bribery. But this information may have had another effect. If people identify with the "Country" and believe that most people can be trusted, and then they face a situation that shows people using bribes to get ahead, the induced anger may push them to punish or rectify this perceived unfairness (Liu et al., 2016). Under the experimental conditions, the only way of rectifying this would be for them to engage in bribery (thus evening the playfield). In future studies, it would be interesting to explore whether participants would be more likely to denounce this unfairness as a way of rectifying it.

Finally, when it comes to the outcome of judgment (in the third-person vignette), we saw that the induced emotions led to participants expressing harsher moral judgments towards the action of paying the bribe. This aligns with my initial empirical expectations, although I expected induced anger to have a stronger effect than induced guilt, which was not the case. Interestingly, when I included an in-

teraction between induced emotions and the measure of generalised trust, the effect of the induced emotions on judgment changed. In particular, for those respondents who reported believing that most people could be trusted, the induced anger had a positive and significant effect on judgment, meaning that it led to a more lenient judgment of paying the bribe. As before, this may be related to the perceived unfairness of the situation. Those participants who report trusting others may also be more sensible about the unfairness of the situation (other people paying the bribe).

Overall, the results show that induced emotions affect judgment and reported behaviour, which provides evidence for the causal role of intuitive processes. However, many of the results go against my initial expectations, which leads me to question how the measures of generalised trust and social identity interact with signalled situational unfairness and how this affects the way in which intuitions manifest.

10.6 Discussion and Conclusion

In this Chapter, I have studied corruption as a social dilemma in a case of comparatively high corruption (Peru). My goal in this chapter was two-fold. First, I wanted to establish that even in high-corruption countries, where engagement in petty corruption is usual and serves, in many cases, a functional role, people still evaluate some instances of corruption as more morally reprehensible than others. Then, I wanted to study whether intuitive processes have a causal role in behaviour and judgement related to corruption when it is presented as a social dilemma.

To do so, first, I conducted a series of focus groups in Study 1, where participants were encouraged to discuss their own experiences with corruption. Through the discussion, some common themes emerged. First, there was a generalised view of corruption as negative in the abstract. Second, most people were willing to admit to engaging in corruption and partly justified this by citing reasons linked to the functionality of corruption and its normalization in Peruvian society. And

third, people who engaged in corruption also considered that some instances of corruption were more acceptable than others. In particular, participants signalled that "necessity" justified corruption, especially when this "necessity" related to helping or preventing harm towards loved ones. They also recognised that corruption generated unfair outcomes and could harm other people. Thus, the results show that functionality and moral evaluations are not mutually exclusive. Some instances of corruption can be seen as both functional and morally justifiable, while others are only seen as functional. This echoes the findings from Study 1 in Chapter 9, where we saw that favouritism was seen as more acceptable than bribery.

Then, I conducted a similar experiment to the one presented in Study 2 of Chapter 9. The difference was that, in this case, the scenario used was one of bribery to present corruption as a social dilemma. In general, people were less likely to report that they would engage in corruption in this scenario than in the favouritism scenario presented in Chapter 9. Furthermore, this bribery scenario was also judged more harshly. In the favouritism scenario of Chapter 9, most people considered that engagement in it was "partially wrong", whereas, in this bribery scenario, most people consider engagement in it to be "completely wrong".

As previously presented, my results show that induced emotions significantly affect judgement and behaviour, thus showing that emotions and intuitive processes, more broadly, should be thought of as causes and not just consequences of judgement and behaviour. Even though this was encouraging, it is important to recognise that many of my results did not align with my initial expectations. I propose that these results show that contextual fairness may be important to how intuitions manifest. Because the scenario chosen inadvertently signalled contextual unfairness (other people engaging in bribery), I propose that the induced emotions led to more engagement in bribery because they prompted a sort of "balancing fairness". As Zerilli (2005) proposes, in some cases, the engagement in corruption can be seen as fair itself because it is linked to issues such as the restitution of past wrongs. I speculate that, in this case, the induced emotions may be triggering this type of fairness behaviour. Still, at this point, this is just speculation, but it is something

that I would like to explore more in the future.

At the same time, there is another factor that I initially did not consider while designing the vignettes that may have had a role in the outcomes, which is the conformity bias that is highly linked to in-group morality. As discussed, in-group morality can override other moral concerns. But related to this, people have a strong desire to fit into a group, and if they see others engage in corruption, then it is possible that they would be more likely to do so themselves, especially if they consider those observing the act as part of their same group (Gino et al., 2009).

Finally, it was also interesting to see that the effect of the measures of social identity and trust also interacted with the induced emotion in ways contrary to my initial expectations. In particular, while induced emotions lead to a harsher judgement towards engagement in bribery as initially expected when these emotions interacted with generalised trust, they led to more lenient judgements. As before, I consider this to be partially driven by the unfairness inadvertently signalled in the vignette.

All in all, I believe that there is still much to explore about the role of fairness intuitions in social dilemmas. In particular, it seems that whether the situation signals unfairness may play an important role in how these intuitions operate. In further iterations of this study, it would be interesting to manipulate these signals to see if they actually affect how the induced emotions operate.

Chapter 11

General Conclusion

In this final chapter of my dissertation, I will explain how my findings relate to my main questions, discuss some of the limitations of this dissertation, outline a future research agenda, present some implications for other research areas, and conclude by presenting some policy implications. As presented in my Introduction, my dissertation was based on two related questions: How can we explain the coexistence of condemnation of and engagement in corruption? And what role do intuitive processes play in the judgement of and engagement in corruption? In a general sense, my dissertation proposed and developed an alternative way of thinking about how individuals respond and relate to corruption, which I have called an Intuitionist Approach. This approach is not opposed but complementary to other approaches found in corruption studies, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.

11.1 Findings

Although each empirical chapter of Part II of this dissertation ended with a discussion of the results pertaining to the specific case, the type of study and their relation with the broader argument, in this section, I will briefly present how these findings

relate to the questions that motivated this dissertation and to the main components of my argument.

11.1.1 Condemnation of corruption and competing concerns

Regarding the first question, my Intuitionist Approach proposes that the condemnation of corruption that we see in the abstract is sincere and partly responds to intuitive concerns linked to fairness. I argue that in concrete settings, this condemnation can be overrun by other concerns, which can be both moral or non-moral. But importantly, I propose that this condemnation is still present and can be activated.

Some evidence of this was found in Chapter 8, where the concretisation of the accusations of corruption increased their weight in an electoral setting. In that chapter, I argued that the concretised accusations facilitated the translation of the condemnation in the abstract to concrete situations because they made it easier for individuals to account for the larger society.

Additional evidence of the condemnation still being present even when individuals engage in corruption was found in Study 1 in Chapter 9, where around 45% of the respondents that engaged in corruption still declared that they considered those actions to be an act of corruption. Something similar was found in Study 2 of Chapter 9, wherein the post-experiment analysis of the scenario of favouritism, I found that close to half of the people who said they considered accepting the favour (engaging in favouritism) to be an act of corruption had previously declared that they would accept the favour. This was also evidenced in Study 2 of Chapter 10, wherein the post-experiment questions revealed that most participants considered paying the attendee to skip the queue to be an act of corruption. Further evidence for this was found in Study 1 of Chapter 10, where the focus group's discussion analysis showed that people could recognise the moral implications of their own engagement in corruption when prodded about it.

All this shows that a non-negligible proportion of people condemn corruption even when they engage in it. These findings point away from the "moral disengagement" hypothesis, where people see their own engagement in corruption as necessary but judge others' engagement in it as immoral (Marquette, 2012); and supports my argument since it provides evidence of the (moral) condemnation of corruption being present even in concrete settings and in people who engage in corruption. Still, I recognise that more work needs to be done to determine the best mechanisms to activate this condemnation in concrete situations.

As mentioned, part of my answer to the question of how we can explain the coexistence of condemnation of and engagement in corruption centres on the role of competing concerns present in concrete settings. I posit that corruption often presents people with a social dilemma, where the competing concerns are non-moral (linked to self-interest), or a moral dilemma, where the competing concerns are moral (often linked to group loyalty and kinship).

Some evidence about the role of competing concerns was found in Study 2 of Chapter 8, where the effect of the concretised accusation was only significant in cases where the candidate had other favourable characteristics, which showed that concretisation increased the salient of the accusation vis a vis other concerns linked to favourable candidate characteristics.

Clearer evidence was found in Study 1 of Chapter 9, where participants were much more willing to engage in favouritism than in bribery, which I argued was due to competing moral concerns inherently linked to favouritism (related to domains like group loyalty and kinship). Furthermore, the text analysis of the question of why engagement in corruption (bribery and favouritism) should or should not be considered corruption showed that while people used words related to fairness at higher rates, they also used words related to harm and loyalty, which provided evidence about the role of competing moral concerns.

In addition to this, when comparing how people judged corruption in Study 2

of Chapters 9 and 10, we saw that while in Chapter 9, most participants considered the engagement in favouritisms to be "partially wrong", in Chapter 10, most participants considered the engagement in bribery to be "completely wrong". This further reinforces the idea that different types of corruption are viewed and judged differently, which I argue is partly due to the role of competing moral concerns.

Finally, additional evidence was found in the focus group discussions of Study 1 in Chapter 8, in which participants recognised that some forms of corruption, driven by the need to help a loved one, could be considered as "right" while others could not. The discussion was especially interesting because although corruption emerged as functional, the mentions of concerns about others showed that the functional role of corruption was not the only thing that mattered for behaviour and for how that behaviour was judged.

I believe all this provides some evidence that there are moral concerns associated with corruption. This provides new insights considering that the traditional view of corruption sees it as being determined by material interest (Klitgaard, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 2016) and expectations about others' behaviour (Teorell, 2007; Rothstein, 2011b). My approach complements these previous studies since I do not posit that these other factors don't matter. Rather, I argue that there are moral corners (driven by intuitions) that also have a role. Importantly, the expectations about others' behaviour may be key for explaining some of the results of Chapter 10, where induced emotions led to more engagement in bribery among those participants who reported having a broad social identity (linked to "Country"). As I explain in that chapter, a possible explanation for these results may be the signalled unfairness of others' behaviour (the vignette signalled that other people had paid the bribe).

11.1.2 The role of intuitive processes

Regarding the second question, focused on the role of intuitive processes, in Study 2 of Chapter 9 and Study 2 of Chapter 10, I found induced moral emotions (guilt

and anger) had significant effects on both engagement and judgement of corruption. This shows that intuitive processes matter and ought to be studied as causes and not simply as consequences of judgement and behaviour. Furthermore, the effects found for induced guilt give evidence towards the importance of considering more complex emotions in the study of politics. Nevertheless, I have to recognise that many of my initial expectations in terms of the directionality of the effects were not met.

I initially expected that activating this intuitive process through moral emotions linked to fairness intuitions would lead to less engagement and harsher moral judgements of corruption. In the general analysis, I found that when corruption was presented as a social dilemma (Chapter 10), neither induced emotion had an effect on the engagement in corruption, although induced guild did lead to harsher moral judgements, which matched my expectations. I speculate that the low reported engagement in behaviours like bribery may have partially driven the lack of effect on engagement. As I will discuss in the next section, this type of behaviour may be better studied through other methods.

On the other hand, when corruption was presented as a moral dilemma (Chapter 9), induced anger led to more engagement in corruption, and neither induced emotion (by themselves) significantly affected judgment. This goes against my initial expectations, especially in regard to the role of these induced emotions in engagement. However, I speculate that the positive effect of anger may be due to the case used in the vignettes, which was related to access to social housing. The UK, which was the case study in Chapter 9, is currently experiencing a housing crisis, so I hypothesise that the perceived scarcity and general unfairness may have contributed to constraining fairness intuitions and the effect of anger. In such a context, individuals may view engaging in favouritism as a way of rectifying the unfairness of the context for their group (their family).

Finally, regarding the role of intuitive processes, I also expected that the effect of these induced moral emotions would be conditional on generalised trust and broad

social identity. As I explained in Chapters 3 and 4, these factors can be seen as the results of norms and results designed to favour cooperation and larger scales and thus correlate with individuals having a larger society as a relevant reference group, which can make fairness intuitions more easily triggered by things that affect this larger society.

These expectations were largely met when corruption was presented as a moral dilemma (Chapter 9). There, I expected induced guilt to lead to less engagement and harsher judgement among participants with high levels of generalised trust and a broad social identity, whereas I expected it to lead to more engagement and more lenient judgements in the opposite case. Although the results showed no significant effects on the engagement outcome, I saw the expected change in directionality. For the outcome of judgement, I did find that among those participants who strongly identified with "Great Britain", the induced anger led to a significantly harsher moral judgement of favouritisms (without the interaction, the induced emotion had no effect), which matched my initial expectations.

When corruption was presented as a social dilemma using a bribery scenario (Chapter 10), I expected that the induced emotions would have a stronger negative effect on engagement and judgement among those participants who had reported having generalised trust and a broader social identity. In this case, many of the interactions' effects went against my initial expectations. For example, among participants who strongly identified with the "Country", induced guilt had a positive and significant effect on the engagement outcome.

I found a similarly puzzling effect regarding judgement, where among those participants who reported generalised trust, induced anger led to more lenient judgements towards engagement in bribery. Although this goes completely against my initial expectation, I hypothesise that this can be explained by the unfair behaviour inadvertently signalled in the vignette, where it was implied that other people had previously paid the bribe. I believe that accounting for this can help provide a possible explanation for these effects. In the case of engagement, people who identify

strongly with their "Country" (and thus maybe had positive expectations about other people) and find themselves in a context where unfair behaviour is signalled, fairness intuitions may lead to more engagement in corruption to balance the scales. In the case of judgment, it is possible that participants who report having generalised trust are similarly more sensitive to the unfairness signalled in the situations and, thus, more lenient when it comes to judging how others behave.

11.2 Limitations

My approach offers an innovative way of viewing condemnation and engagement in corruption, and my empirical chapters have provided evidence of the importance of considering the factors and processes I highlight in my argument. Nevertheless, I recognise that my study has a number of limitations, both in the theoretical discussion and the empirical strategy.

In terms of theoretical discussion, I acknowledge a need to engage more with the social science literature on social preference, which I have only approached briefly in this dissertation. Social preferences have been seen as learned and acquired in early life, but I posit that an important component of them is evolved moral intuitions. Furthermore, in this dissertation, I have taken individuals at a baseline, assuming that the induced emotions would have a similar effect on most people and, thus, that fairness intuitions manifest in similar ways for most people when controlling for context. However, I recognise that I should try to better integrate my approach with studies of preferences, virtues, and personality more broadly. Several studies focus, for example, on guilt-proneness (Hu et al., 2023; Levine et al., 2018) and how it may affect moral behaviour, and I ought to explore how my approach relates to this and other studies.

In addition to this, I recognise that although my approach is complementary and not contradictory to other approaches to corruption, I need to develop further how

my empirical expectations interact with those of other theories. In particular, I have to explore further how the role of signalled situational unfairness interacts with the role of social norms or empirical expectations about others' behaviour, highlighted by the Collective Action approach to corruption. Would signalled unfairness matter in a context in which the empirical expectation is that most people would not engage in bribery? or did it matter particularly for the Peruvian case because there is an expectation that other people would engage in bribery? These are aspects that I need to explore further.

In terms of my empirical strategy, I recognise that my research could have benefited from the use of techniques designed to observe behaviour directly. Initially, I planned to conduct short observational studies in Peru in public spaces where petty corruption is common, such as waiting rooms in public hospitals. I wanted to use these studies to establish things like whether it is more common for citizens to offer bribes or for public servants to ask for them, whether the words used had any moral significance, and whether people signalled necessity when asking for preferential treatment. I planned to use that information to later design my survey-based experiments and maybe even to design a field lab experiment. Sadly, I planned this when I was applying for the DPhil in early 2020, and a few months later, any in-person fieldwork became impossible due to the pandemic. Still, I would like to continue working on this topic and design better ways of measuring the behaviour directly.

Finally, although I found significant effects for the role of induced emotions on judgement and behaviour related to corruption, which gives evidence towards the role of intuitive processes as causes and not simply as effects, the directionality of some of these effects and the lack of effects in some instances (like in the outcome of engagement in the bribery scenario), shows that the role of intuitions and how they interact with the factors I assumed would lead to them being applied to the larger society is more complex. My results show that it's important to account for situational fairness (and unfairness) and how this interacts with identity and trust. In the discussion sections of Chapters 9 and 10, I detailed some possible ways of

doing this, one of which would be to interact the induced emotions with framing effects that highlight either situational or action-based (engagement in corruption) unfairness.

11.3 Future Research Agenda

I plan to continue studying the role of intuitive processes in judgement and behaviour related to corruption and other political issues. I want to do this both through a causal intuitionist approach, where I try to set the role of intuitions as causes of judgement and behaviour (similar to what I have tried to do in Study 2 of Chapters 9 and 10), and through a more integrated moral judgement approach that focuses not on disentangling these processes (reflective/deliberative and intuitive) but on studying the role of moral evaluation and moral concerns on judgement and behaviour.

Focusing on intuitive processes as causes, I would like to study intuitive processes outside of emotions. For example, I would like to study whether time constraints lead to more or less engagement in corruption depending on whether the scenario is presented as a moral or a social dilemma. Specifically, I wonder if individuals would be quicker to engage in corruption when moral concerns linked to ingroup loyalty are salient due to it "feeling" right without a discernible emotion at play.

I would also like to explore the multiple roles that the same emotion can have on judgement and behaviour. Some of the puzzling effects found in Study 2 of Chapters 9 and 10 highlight the need to further study the role of induced emotions as part of a broader agenda of studying the role of intuitive processes. In particular, I consider that these results call to attention the need to explore the complex role of moral emotions. As Suhler and Churchland (2011) posit in their criticisms of Moral Foundation Theory, emotions such as anger can also be deployed in the service of intuitions linked to domains outside of fairness. It would be compelling to investigate

whether induced anger (or guilt) can have markedly different effects if the situation under evaluation is framed to highlight different moral domains, such as harm or authority.

Furthermore, my results highlight the need to include complex self-conscious emotions in the study of political judgement and behaviour. These emotions are harder to elicit, but their effects can be distinct from basic emotions, and thus, it is worth studying them. In particular, I would like to study political judgements and behaviours by attempting to induce positive self-conscious emotions such as sympathy, which is seen as a key emotion for social bonds.

In addition to this, I consider that for a future agenda, it would be worth studying the same dilemmas presented in Chapters 9 and 10 but using different techniques. For example, for future research, I would like to adapt the study of corruption as a social dilemma into a lab setting, where I could simulate the real self-interest-focused benefits of paying the bribe. It would be interesting to see whether induced emotions have any effects under these conditions.

In terms of a more integrative approach to moral judgement, I would like to further explore the concretisation strategy used in Chapter 8. Interestingly, although in this chapter, I expected the concretisation based on equivalence to social externalities to have the strongest effect, the results showed that it was the concretisation done through material equivalences the one that had the strongest impact. I believe that the emotional reactions to this concretisation may be the reason for this. As discussed, moral emotions are an important part of intuitive processes (Haidt, 2003; Keltner et al., 2006). It is possible that a more effective way of increasing the salience of the condemnation of corruption in concrete situations would be through equivalence or information designed to purposely trigger this emotional component. And to elicit an emotional response, it may be better to focus on signalling the potential harm of corruption instead of the unfairness of it. In this dissertation, I have approximated the role of intuitions linked to the domain of "harm" only tangentially, but this is a promising avenue for future research. Thus, I would like to

work on developing better concretisation strategies to increase the punishment of corruption.

I would also like to integrate my approach better with the literature on social preferences, virtues and personality. Specifically, I would like to study whether some of the findings of studies on corruption that have used guilt proneness measures (Hu et al., 2023), such as the Guilt and Shame Proneness scale, apply in different contexts.

Additionally, I would like to explore how moral language can be used to mobilise, paralyse and disinform citizens and whether there are any patterns in the moral domains of the words used by different social and political leaders. There is an emerging area of research that incorporates moral language analysis with emotional language analysis (Takikawa and Sakamoto, 2020), and it's an area that I would like to explore in the future. In particular, I would like to study whether discourses using the same emotions but making reference to different moral domains have different goals and effects.

Finally, I would like to continue studying the role of generalised trust in judgement and behaviour. As seen, to test part of my argument, I included measures of trust and social identity since I consider these to be factors that reflected the effect of norms designed to promote cooperation at a larger scale. But it bears to wonder whether the measures used were ideal. I borrowed these measures from the WVS and found that even when respondents reported high levels of generalised trust (the belief that most people could be trusted), this coexisted with low levels of trust in people who shared their nationality, people they had just met, and people in their communities. Something similar was found while looking at the WVS data, although the difference was smaller than in my samples. In the discussion of Chapters 9 and 10, I speculate that the measures of trust I included in my studies may be capturing two different things. Thus, I speculate that this difference between generalised trust and trust in people who share a nationality or were part of the same community can be due to the WVS capturing two different types of generalised trust, one concrete

and one abstract. The question about whether "most people can be trusted" could be capturing an abstract type of generalised trust, while the specific question about "trust in people you just meet" or "trust in people in your community" could be capturing a concrete type of generalised trust. In future studies, I would like to explore whether this has any implications for the way in which generalised trust has been studied in politics by looking in more detail at studies that have used the WVS data more to see if the results hold when we account for the concrete types of generalised trust.

11.4 Implications for other research areas

In addition to the personal research agenda presented in the previous section, I consider that my argument and findings have implications for other research areas, both inside and outside studies of corruption. Here, I will discuss possible implications for the study of clientelism and political violence.

11.4.1 Clientelism

When it comes to the studies of corruption, an important caveat of my argument is that it was designed with engagement in petty corruption in mind. Although I focus on the judgement of grand and petty corruption, the engagement part of my studies is exclusively focused on petty corruption, and more specifically on bribery and favouritism, the latter of which was understood horizontally (with closeness between participants). Thus, other types of corruption, such as clientelism, escape the scope of this dissertation, but my argument still has important implications for the study of it.

As discussed in Chapter 5, clientelism is defined as the "exchange of selective benefits for political alliance" (Lawson and Greene, 2014). Many of the implications

of my argument are applied to the study of clientelism if we see it as individuals being subject to a tension between their narrower group that benefits from the targeted benefits and fairness concerns towards broader society. In this sense (as discussed in Chapter 5), clientelism can be seen, at least by the citizens that benefit from it, as a moral dilemma instead of just a social one. Thus, clientelism studies could benefit from also considering the way in which in-group morality can make clientelism seem both acceptable and "right" and how this impacts the way in which citizens respond to "patrons", especially in electoral settings.

Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 5, my argument also has interesting implications for ethnic-based clientelism (Przeworski et al., 1999; Kramon and Posner, 2013; Bates, 1973), which could interest scholars in both ethnic and clientelism studies. As mentioned, for a moral and social dilemma to exist, people need to view corruption as morally wrong. I posit that this is the case worldwide due in part to intuitive concerns related to fairness. However, some types of corruption, such as ethnic-based clientelism, may not be subject to the same concerns. As discussed in Chapter 5, if an individual sees part of the broader society as underserving of fair treatment, then the dilemma may disappear, and not only may clientelism be seen both as acceptable and right, but a co-ethnic incumbent that refuses to provide targeted benefits may be seen as behaving in a morally reprehensible manner. In societies where ethnic divisions are strong and salient, it is possible that individuals from a group may view incumbents from their group as morally obligated to provide exclusionary benefits since members of the outgroup may be seen as undeserving. This has important implications for studies about tolerance and engagement in clientelism and for studies about ethnic division more broadly.

11.4.2 Political Violence

Additionally, I believe that some of the components of my argument have important implications for studies of political violence, specifically for studies that focus on individual reactions to acts of violence.

I consider this to be the case because individual reactions to political violence have been shown to be strongly driven by emotions. For example, there have been recent studies on how different emotions can be elicited by terrorist attacks depending on whether individuals support the current political system or not (Vasilopoulos and Brouard, 2020), on how emotions elicited by portrayals of terrorism colour individual policy demands on how to respond to this acts (Matthes et al., 2019), and how different emotions affect threat level evaluation (Lerner et al., 2003).

In these studies, intuitive processes (emotions) are taken as the result of reflective/deliberative processes (how the terrorist attack is evaluated based on the information provided). I consider that this area of literature could also be enriched by taking intuitive processes as causes by themselves and not only in relation to reflective/deliberative processes. For example, would high levels of anger due to factors such as the economic situation or unrelated political scandals affect how people react to terrorist threats/attacks? As in my dissertation, disentangling these two processes in a real-world setting would be complicated, but doing so in an experimental setting could have important implications for understanding political behaviour in the aftermath of violence.

11.5 Policy implications

As mentioned throughout this dissertation, I aimed to show that intuitive processes can have an effect on judgement and behaviours concerning corruption, even when separate from reflective/deliberative processes. While I consider this to have important implications for how we study corruption, I recognise that in real-world settings, these two processes (reflective/deliberative and intuitive) are hard to disentangle. Nevertheless, I consider that some of the features of my argument have important real-world policy implications, even if, in those cases, we can only look at both processes together.

The clearest policy implication relates to the studies presented in Chapter 8, where the goal was not to distinguish between intuitive and reflective/deliberative processes but rather to see whether strategies aimed at affecting both could enhance the punishment of corruption. My results showed that people were more willing to tolerate corruption when candidates were seen as efficient (having a good performance record). While this may be seen as discouraging, it also suggests an interesting avenue for policy, where the focus of anti-corruption efforts can be on clarifying the link between corruption and bad performance. In other words, a way of reducing the instances in which people trade-off between performance and corruption (del Mar Martínez Rosón, 2016) could be focusing on the ways in which corruption affects performance in ways that are not always clearly visible. Campaigns designed to highlight corruption's inefficiencies may make this tradeoff less likely. Additionally, these anti-corruption campaigns could be more successful if these inefficiencies are highlighted in a way that is designed to trigger emotional responses. Corruption can be concretised in ways that directly link it to consequences that incite anger and moral outrage. Thus, instead of saying "the equivalent to X number of schools", a different phrasing could be "the money could have been used to build X number of schools, which could have educated X number of children".

The studies included in this dissertation show that people think of corruption in moral terms and manifest a sincere condemnation of it. Any strategy designed to make this condemnation more easily applicable to concrete settings could contribute to reducing engagement and tolerance for corruption. The way in which we talk about corruption matters, and anti-corruption campaigns should aim to highlight the social and human costs of corruption instead of only the material ones.

11.6 Closing remarks

To conclude, my dissertation has outlined a complex theory to explain the coexistence of condemnation and engagement in corruption and the role that intuitive

processes can have on it. It has provided empirical evidence for various components of my arguments and has highlighted the need for further research on the role of intuitive processes in political judgement and behaviour.

Determining how intuitive processes operate in politics is a complex task since, as we have seen, expectations about how some of these mechanisms operate may not hold when accounting for the complexity of social settings. However, I believe that my results have given evidence to the need to continue to think about emotions (and intuitions) as causes and not simply as consequences. By focusing on incidental instead of integral emotions, I consider that my dissertation provides evidence of the causal role of emotions in a way that has not previously been done in corruption studies.

Furthermore, my findings show that people think and speak of corruption in terms of descriptive morality, and part of the reason why corruption is widely condemned is linked to concerns related to fairness (and not just efficiency). Thinking about the moral component of corruption has important implications, especially when it comes to the study of petty corruption. As I have shown, engagement in some instances of corruption may seem acceptable (in practice) and condemnable (morally) simultaneously, while engagement in others is seen as both acceptable in practice and as morally right. To curb corruption, we also need to consider the moral dimension and how certain types of corruption may be harder to eradicate because they are based on an ingroup or kinship morality. In addition, my discussion and results in Chapter 9 highlighted the need to study atypical cases of petty corruption. Although most of the studies centred on these practices have focused on high-corruption countries, there is evidence that some modalities of petty corruption (linked to favouritism) are extended even in comparatively low-corruption countries and merit studies under these conditions, too.

As a final note, I consider that it would be interesting to see studies of moral psychology move towards studying the role of these intuitive processes in real-world dilemmas such as the ones presented in this dissertation. Further collaboration

between moral psychologists and social scientists may push towards these types of studies. Up to this point, most studies that attempt to distinguish the role of intuitive processes from that of reflective/deliberative processes have focused on how people evaluate dilemmas based on thought experiments. The social world is much more complex than what thought experiments allow for, and if we really want to understand descriptive morality, we need to start studying how these different processes act when framed by this complexity. This is especially important for moral judgements related to politics, which is inherently situated in the complex social world.

Appendix A

Appendix Chapter 8

A.0.1 Appendix A: Headlines

Table A.1: Headlines of "El Comercio" that mention corruption during electoral years

Headline	Date
Dictadura madura, corrupción segura, por José Ugaz	02-Oct-17
Venezuela: Detienen a un antiguo gerente de PDVSA por caso de corrupción	04-Oct-17
Sentenciados por corrupción deben más de S/2.500 millones al Estado	08-Oct-17
Terremoto en México: Corrupción fue clave en el nivel de destrucción, según expertos	10-Oct-17
Vladimiro Montesinos: un rosario de sentencias [INFORME]	14-Oct-17
Investigación no halló evidencias de corrupción en Graña y Montero	02-Nov-17
Reportan fraude de US$6 millones en la Cruz Roja	04-Nov-17

Table A.1 continued from previous page

Los príncipes, empresarios y políticos detenidos por corrupción	05-Nov-17
Al Capone: "Debemos mantener a EE.UU. libre de corrupción" [ENTREVISTA]	06-Nov-17
Jaime Salinas y la insurgencia legítima, por Francisco Miró Quesada Rada	09-Nov-17
El multimillonario hermano de Bin Laden entre los detenidos por corrupción	12-Nov-17
Odebrecht: el mayor caso de soborno continental llega al cine	02-Dec-17
Empresarios y corrupción en la historia del Perú, por Carlos Contreras	09-Dec-17
Corrupción, regulación y lógica perversa, por A. de la Torre	12-Dec-17
IPAE: "Intentaremos que empresas tengan ISO antisoborno"	17-Dec-17
Perdón y gran corrupción, por José Ugaz	01-Jan-18
Hijo de Michelle Bachelet no será juzgado por corrupción	02-Jan-18
Hermano de "Artemio" prófugo tras ser acusado de corrupción	18-Jan-18
Papa sobre la corrupción: "Es la destrucción de la persona"	22-Jan-18
Multitud dominicana marcha contra la corrupción de Odebrecht	28-Jan-18
La robot humanoide Sofía colapsa cuando le preguntan por la corrupción	31-Jan-18
Violencia y corrupción, los protagonistas del carnaval de Río de Janeiro	11-Feb-18
Tumbes: sentencian por corrupción a alcalde de San Jacinto	22-Feb-18

Table A.1 continued from previous page

Los falsos indignados, por Carlos de la Puente	12-Mar-18
¿La corrupción favorece el crecimiento de las economías?	14-Mar-18
¿Decepción?, por Gonzalo Portocarrero	28-Mar-18
Empresas ingresan a la era 'compliance'	02-Apr-18
Huancayo: detienen a alcalde de San Jerónimo por presuntos actos de corrupción	04-Apr-18
"El mecanismo": ¿Cómo es la serie de Netflix que enfadó a Lula da Silva?	05-Apr-18
¿Cuál es la "maldición" de los presidentes de Corea del Sur?	08-Apr-18
La oscura historia de la policía más corrupta de Estados Unidos	10-Apr-18
Gobernabilidad democrática vs. corrupción, por Martín Vizcarra	13-Apr-18
La corrupción, el principal problema del Perú	22-Apr-18
Lucha contra la corrupción II: la estrategia, por Francisco Miró Quesada Rada	26-Apr-18
¿Corrupción positiva? ¡Vamos hasta el fondo!, por José Ugaz	07-May-18
Qué es la "gran corrupción" y cómo América Latina se volvió símbolode este problema	07-May-18
Condenan a prisión efectiva a comandante PNP por corrupción	16-May-18
Cusco: capturan a ex alcalde de Vilcabamba acusado de actos de corrupción	18-May-18
Poder Judicial: funcionario es intervenido cuando recibía coima de S/750	18-May-18
Áncash: condenan a 6 años de prisión al alcalde de Aczo por corrupción	22-May-18

Table A.1 continued from previous page

¿Cuánto afecta la corrupción a la economía peruana?	29-May-18
YouTube: Los lujos de la esposa del político más corrupto de México | VIDEO	30-May-18
Hallan irregularidades en las licitaciones de dos puentes de Emape	01-Jun-18
"Luis Miguel, la serie" retrata una época de corrupción	10-Jun-18
Essalud nombra a gerentes investigados por corrupción	19-Jun-18
"La corrupción es la principal amenaza para la conservación en el Perú"	21-Jun-18
Madre de Dios: funcionarios habrían pedido montos de hasta S/20 mil a mineros ilegales e informales	24-Jun-18
Lula favorito para las elecciones en Brasil a pesar de estar preso	28-Jun-18
Elecciones en México: desigualdad y violencia, lo que impulsó a AMLO	01-Jul-18
Más responsabilidad penal empresarial, por Dino Carlos Caro Coria	10-Jul-18
CNM: claves para entender los nuevos audios sobre el escándalo	16-Jul-18
Profesores de colegio en Piura enseñan a sus alumnos a rechazar actos de corrupción	17-Jul-18
Lula recuerda desde la cárcel el "importante ejemplo de Nelson Mandela para Brasil"	18-Jul-18
Fe y Alegría: alumnos protestaron tras casos de corrupción [VIDEO]	19-Jul-18
Tumbes: piden prisión preventiva para funcionarios de Educación por corrupción	20-Jul-18

Table A.1 continued from previous page

El espíritu de la corrupción, por Carlos Meléndez	21-Jul-18
Cecilia Bracamonte:"La corrupción me tiene asqueada"	23-Jul-18
"La coima": una obra de teatro sobre la corrupción en Perú	23-Jul-18
Viaje al interior de una mente corrupta, por Umberto Jara	24-Jul-18
Piura: desfile escolar por Fiestas Patrias destacó mensajes contra la corrupción	25-Jul-18
FODA del nuevo Martín Vizcarra, por Fernando Cáceres	25-Jul-18
Detienen a ex funcionario del MEF por presunto caso de corrupción y lavado de activos	28-Jul-18
Editorial: Corrupción y educación	30-Jul-18
Informalidad y corrupción, por Claudia Cooper	01-Aug-18
La corrupción y el derecho laboral, por Germán Lora	01-Aug-18
Corrupción K: Claves sobre el escándalo de las coimas millonarias en Argentina	02-Aug-18
Corrupción | ¿Cuál fue el primer caso documentado en el mundo?	05-Aug-18
Lo obvio, pero desatendido, por Wilson Hernández	07-Aug-18
Susana Baca llora al hablar de recientes casos de corrupción en el Perú	08-Aug-18
Festival de Cine de Lima: peruano compite con retrato de la corrupción en el sistema judicial	08-Aug-18
Los abogados y la corrupción, por Fernando del Mastro	09-Aug-18
Los cuadernos de la corrupción 'k', por Jan-David Gelles	11-Aug-18

Table A.1 continued from previous page

#NiUnaMenos: las postales de la marcha contra la violencia de género y la corrupción	11-Aug-18
Piura: separarán de sus funciones a tres fiscales involucrados en casos de corrupción	14-Aug-18
Elías Cuba: organización criminal empezó con la campaña del 2014, afirma fiscal	15-Aug-18
Argentina: Ex piloto de los Kirchner relató el traslado de bolsos en avión presidencial	16-Aug-18
La ley y la función paterna, por Eduardo Gastelumendi	19-Aug-18
Disponen acción penal contra fiscales de Piura y juez de Sullana	21-Aug-18
Corrupción K: Colgaron una maleta en la estatua de Néstor Kirchner en Santa Cruz	22-Aug-18
¿En qué consiste el escándalo de corrupción que pone en jaque a Cristina Kirchner?	24-Aug-18
Moody's: corrupción y luchas políticas internas son desafíos para el Perú	28-Aug-18
Stella Durán, la gurú de la estética con negocios en Perú capturada por corrupción	30-Aug-18
¿Cómo castigar a los corruptos?, por José Ugaz	03-Sep-18
¿El poder corrompe el comportamiento humano?	03-Sep-18
El 70% cree que no hay avances en lucha contra corrupción	04-Sep-18
Odebrecht habría transferido US$1.3 mlls. a Humala cuando ya era presidente	05-Sep-18
Martín Vizcarra: La principal reforma contra la corrupción es la educación	06-Sep-18
Corrupción K: Buscan dinero enterrado en propiedad del empresario Lázaro Báez	09-Sep-18

Table A.1 continued from previous page

Corrupción en el sector privado, por Vicente Zeballos	11-Sep-18
Ex presidente de El Salvador Antonio Saca es condenado a 10 años de cárcel por corrupción	12-Sep-18
Así se realizó la marcha contra la corrupción en Arequipa | FOTOS	13-Sep-18
Martín Vizcarra: "Las obras se pueden hacer pero sin corrupción"	13-Sep-18
La fauna de la corrupción en China, por Patricia Castro Obando	15-Sep-18
Cristina Kirchner muestra cómo quedó su casa de El Calafate tras allanamiento | Video	16-Sep-18
Panadería San Jorge: Corrupción dificulta expansión de las empresas a provincias	21-Sep-18
Esther Capuñay: "Una ciudad iluminada podrá reducir la inseguridad"	26-Sep-18
¿Quiénes son los políticos percibidos como los más corruptos?	03-Oct-18
Asbanc: Uso del efectivo en gran medida genera mayor corrupción	06-Oct-18
Pensar la corrupción	07-Oct-18
Alcaldía de Lima: la propuestas de seis candidatos sobre corrupción	07-Oct-18
El 78% de los peruanos son tolerantes con la corrupción	10-Dec-15
Verónika Mendoza lanzó su precandidatura a la Presidencia	18-Aug-15
"Hay mucho por investigar sobre el gobierno actual"	21-Jul-15
Audiencias Públicas de El Comercio | Blog	04-Nov-15

Table A.1 continued from previous page

Petroaudios: 6 puntos claves para entender el caso	16-Feb-16
Poder Judicial confirma sentencia contra ex alcalde de Huamanga	23-Jun-15
TV en Serie | Blog	08-May-15
Huellas digitales | Blog	30-May-15
Fiscal acusa a Gregorio Santos de recibir coima de S/.100 mil	12-Jun-15
Huellas digitales | Blog	17-May-15
FODA electoral, por Patricia del Río	08-Oct-15
Kame House | Blog	06-Mar-16
"El precio de la historia": Chumlee y otros escándalos de la TV	14-Mar-16
Wilfredo Oscorima fue capturado gracias a sistema de recompensa	28-Mar-16
Coldplay en Lima: nuestra crónica del concierto en el Nacional	06-Apr-16
Vía China | Blog	08-Apr-16
Alan García, el candidato colosal, por Alfredo Torres	10-Jan-16
Narcos vs. El Patrón del mal: ¿qué serie de Escobar es mejor?	13-Sep-15
Mistura: caos vehicular ocasiona peleas entre conductores	06-Sep-15
Huellas digitales | Blog	14-Sep-15
Mario Vargas Llosa según 5 personajes que acompañaron su vida	28-Mar-16
El neoliberalismo en el Perú, por Gonzalo Portocarrero	09-Mar-16
Cuida tu salud | Blog	22-Jun-15

Table A.1 continued from previous page

'El Chapo' Guzmán escapó de la cárcel por este túnel [VIDEO]	14-Jul-15
"Ven, baila, quinceañera": mira un adelanto de la telenovela	12-Sep-15
Facebook: sujeto vende su bebé a US$ 25 mil por red social	07-Apr-15
El líder de la corrupción	17-Oct-20
Coronavirus en Perú: denuncian casos de corrupción en Huánuco, Junín y Amazonas	08-Jun-20
Coronavirus en Perú: detectan 32 presuntos casos de corrupción en sector salud durante estado de emergencia	09-May-20
Encuesta El Comercio-Ipsos: La corrupción es el principal problema para los peruanos	30-Apr-20
Yonhy Lescano: "La corrupción se combate como yo lo hice en el Congreso, en luchas solitarias contra mafiosos"	09-Mar-21
Más de cien casos de corrupción se abrieron en el primer mes del estado de emergencia	15-Apr-20
Otra millonaria compra policial embarrada por las sospechas de corrupción	20-Aug-20
El 24% cree que el próximo presidente debe priorizar la lucha contra la corrupción	27-Oct-20
La cultura de la corrupción: otra pandemia por erradicar	21-Jun-20
¿Con qué hechos de corrupción se vincula a Enrique Peña Nieto, expresidente de México?	11-Jul-20
Procuraduría anticorrupción: hay más de 300 jueces y fiscales investigados por corrupción	04-May-20
La larga lista de políticos en prisión por casos de corrupción y otros ...	30-Apr-20

Table A.1 continued from previous page

Día Internacional contra la Corrupción: ¿Cómo es que la pandemia de COVID-19 ha "facilitado" este flagelo?	09-Dec-20
Contraloría revela que región La Libertad perdió más de 600 millones de soles por corrupción	07-Sep-20
Municipalidades y COVID-19: casi 1.000 denuncias por corrupción ...	20-Oct-20
Cantv y las empresas estatales venezolanas, corrupción a pie de calle	28-Dec-20
Condenados por corrupción podrán postular en las elecciones 2021 tras bloqueo de reforma en el Congreso	05-Jul-20
Alcalde de Arequipa será juzgado por tercera vez por presunto caso de corrupción en su gestión en Alto Selva Alegre	29-Jan-21
Arequipa: Fiscalía investiga 30 casos de corrupción registrados durante la cuarentena	21-May-20
The Weeknd: "Los Grammy siguen corruptos. Me deben a mí y a mis fans la transparencia"	25-Nov-20
Fiscalía interviene la Dirincri por presuntos actos de corrupción en compras durante emergencia	26-Apr-20
Cátedra Bicentenario: especialistas disertarán sobre la historia de la corrupción en el Perú	22-Sep-20
Exmagistrado de la JNE seguirá procesado por presunto acto de corrupción	26-Sep-20
Ecuador solicita a Interpol el arresto del expresidente Rafael Correa, condenado por corrupción	07-Oct-20
Puno: rondas campesinas entregan a cuatro policías acusados de incurrir en corrupción	15-May-20
Fact-checking: Pedro Castillo sobre la sentencia de Vladimir Cerrón, líder del partido Perú Libre	04-Apr-21

Table A.1 continued from previous page

The Weeknd anuncia un boicot a los Grammy tras acusarlos de "corrupción"	11-Mar-21
Justicia de Ecuador ratificó 8 años de cárcel para Rafael Correa por corrupción y no podrá participar en las elecciones	08-Sep-20
Tragedia en Beirut: corrupción, ineptitud estatal e intereses ...	09-Aug-20
Alertan que ley del Congreso que sanciona especulación y acaparamiento generaría informalidad y corrupción	06-Jun-20
Elvia Barrios: "Hay algunos focos localizados de corrupción que tenemos que identificar"	08-Dec-20
General PNP investigado por presunta corrupción y jefe de campo en la represión de marchas de noviembre entre los primeros vacunados en la policía	09-Mar-21
Socios del Dinamo Bucarest luchan por salvar al club de la corrupción y el COVID-19	28-May-20
José Li Bravo y una gestión municipal en Breña empañada por ...	03-Aug-20
El rey Juan Carlos I, en el ojo de la tormenta por un escándalo de corrupción, anuncia que se va de España	03-Aug-20
Elvia Barrios nueva presidenta del PJ: "Seremos implacables en la lucha contra la corrupción"	05-Dec-20
El insólito 45 aniversario de la proclamación del rey Juan Carlos I de España, envuelto en escándalos de corrupción | FOTOS	21-Nov-20
Keiko Fujimori y un fact checking a sus declaraciones sobre las condenas de su padre	03-Mar-21

Table A.1 continued from previous page

Anonymous amenazó con revelar pruebas de la red de corrupción policial de los Estados Unidos tras muerte de George Floyd | VIDEO	02-Jun-20
Najib Razak, exprimer ministro de Malasia, es condenado a 12 años de cárcel por millonario desfalco	28-Jul-20
Diez libros que los peruanos debemos leer para entender al Perú de hoy | FOTOS	18-Nov-20
Jhovan Tomasevich: "Si ganara las elecciones, convertiría Palacio en un museo"	10-Mar-21
Teniente PNP era proveedor de su institución	23-May-20
Fiscalía inicia investigación preliminar contra George Forsyth por contratos a su amigo en La Victoria	01-Feb-21
Intervienen Municipalidad de Magdalena por presuntas compras irregulares durante emergencia por COVID-19	02-Oct-20
George Forsyth tras confirmarse que sigue en carrera: "Es un día muy importante"	06-Mar-21
Vacancia: ¿uso o abuso?	09-Nov-20
Debate Presidencial 2021: Ollanta Humala planteó acabar con el Club de la Construcción y Pedro Castillo propuso "muerte civil"	31-Mar-21
Vizcarra sobre señalamientos de colaborador eficaz: "Cuando toco a Odebrecht viene este tipo de titular"	11-Oct-20
Fiscal investiga contrataciones de familiares de Mirian Morales, secretaria general de Palacio	02-Jul-20
Coronavirus en Perú: coronel PNP Harvey Colchado exhorta a la ciudadanía a quedarse en casa	20-Apr-20

Table A.1 continued from previous page

Fallas en Ley de Contrataciones con el Estado están más vinculadas al factor humano	01-Aug-20
Fiscalía interviene instalaciones del Hospital Sergio Bernales en Comas | FOTOS	09-Jun-20
Fiscalía formalizó investigación contra funcionarios por caso de sobrevaloración de ventiladores mecánicos	06-May-20
El lujoso palacio de Putin de 18 mil metros cuadrados construido ...	01-Feb-21
¿Cómo informa el mundo sobre la vacancia de Vizcarra y la toma de poder de Merino?	10-Nov-20
Fiscalía realizó diligencia en sede de la Contraloría por adquisición de mascarillas y alcohol	08-May-20
Piura: dictan 18 meses de prisión preventiva para alcalde de la Municipalidad de Veintiséis de Octubre	23-Dec-20
Nombran a Mariela Rodríguez Jiménez como nueva fiscal provincial para el Equipo Especial Lava Jato	08-Jan-21
Oficialismo tumba en Cámara de Diputados iniciativa de juicio político al presidente de Paraguay	17-Mar-21
Ventanilla: así se extrajeron casi S/4 millones de la municipalidad ...	28-Mar-21
Martín Vizcarra: ¿Qué consecuencias legales podría tener por ...	13-Feb-21
Cajamarca: Fiscalía interviene la Diresa por la presunta sobrevaloración de 60 mil pruebas rápidas	11-Jun-20
Paraguay registra triple récord en el peor momento de la pandemia por coronavirus	10-Mar-21

Table A.1 continued from previous page

Cusco: alcalde de Canchis es acusado por presunto cobro de coimas para direccionar licitaciones	04-Dec-20
Por qué Álvaro Uribe es tan poderoso en Colombia y qué significa su histórica detención preventiva	05-Aug-20
Tacna: investigan a proveedores del municipio de Ilabaya son por uso de boletas fraguadas	02-Jan-21
Un país normal: el fin de la excepción peruana, por Carlos Ganoza Durant	11-Apr-21
Fiscalía sustenta hoy pedido de prisión preventiva para director de Aviación Policial y otros 10 investigados	07-Sep-20
Piura: investigan Hospital de Chulucanas por la presunta compra irregular de respiradores	25-May-20
Lambayeque se asfixia por el mal manejo de desechos hospitalarios de COVID-19	09-Jun-20
Martín Vizcarra: estos son los argumentos de la jueza para rechazar la prisión preventiva	19-Mar-21
"Monarca", la serie mexicana del momento: una entrevista con Daniela Schmidt, la gobernadora Pilar Ortega	14-Jan-21
Walter Aduviri: el suspendido gobernador regional de Puno salió en libertad	11-Dec-20
Mininter: renuncia jefe del gabinete de asesores Juan José Santiváñez	05-May-20
Tomás Gálvez: ¿Quién es el fiscal supremo suspendido por el caso Los Cuellos Blancos del Puerto?	14-Jul-20
Renato Cisneros: los libros que el escritor peruano recomienda en el Día del Libro	23-Apr-20
Impedimentos para postular: dictamen fue mejorado, pero aún requiere ajustes, según penalistas	01-Jul-20

Table A.1 continued from previous page

Cinco son multitud, por Carlos Basombrío Iglesias	21-Oct-20
Amado Enco renunció a la Procuraduría Anticorrupción	28-Oct-20
Fabiola Torres: "La salud pública es un tema de todos, no solo de los médicos" | ENTREVISTA	12-Jun-20
INPE investiga si hubo "falla o vulneración" de bloqueadores de celular en el penal Miguel Castro Castro	14-Apr-21
Humberto Acuña: PJ ratifica condena de 3 años contra congresista y lo inhabilita	02-Sep-20
El escándalo 'Richard Swing' y su impacto político para el ...	04-Jun-20
El Perú inspira esperanza y optimismo al 46% de la población	28-Jul-20
Elecciones 2021: El Comercio publica la visión del país de 15 candidatos presidenciales	08-Feb-21
Bad Bunny pide a Puerto Rico no conformarse con ayuda de EE.UU. por el COVID-19	16-Apr-20
Congresista Moisés González fue sentenciado a cuatro años de prisión suspendida por colusión	08-Jan-21
Asesino confeso de la periodista Daphne Caruana en Malta es condenado a 15 años de cárcel	23-Feb-21
Ministra de Cultura: "Las pérdidas en el sector cultural por la pandemia se calculan en 1000 millones de soles" | Entrevista	27-May-20
Lambayeque: dictan 24 meses de prisión preventiva contra gobernador regional Anselmo Lozano	13-Feb-21
Paraguay: Nuevas protestas frente a residencia presidencial para pedir la renuncia de Abdo Benítez | FOTOS	07-Mar-21

Table A.1 continued from previous page

Humberto Acuña: ¿Cuál es el futuro del congresista tras sentencia del Poder Judicial?	05-Sep-20
Elvia Barrios afirma que "el Poder Judicial enfrenta serios problemas de legitimidad"	04-Jan-21
Contraloría de la República: Solo cuatro de siete partidos políticos ...	31-Mar-21
Cara y Sello: ¿Qué responsabilidades enfrentan los involucrados en el "Vacunagate"?	19-Feb-21

A.0.2 Appendix B: Proetica Survey

The sample was of 1857 surveys distributed in the Lima zones: north, centre, south, and east. The total error margin was +/- 2.3 The Survey had a design stratified by clusters, homes, and people. The sampling was stratified in multiple stages.

Zone	Sample	Cities
North Coast	209	Piura, Chiclayo, Chimbote, Trujillo
Center Coast (inc. Lima Metropolitana)	608	Lima, Callao, Cañete
South Coast	200	Arequipa, Ica
North Sierra (mountains)	208	Cajamarca, Huaraz
Center Sierra (mountains)	203	Huancayo, Huánuco
South Sierra (mountains)	205	Cusco, Juliaca, Ayacucho
East	224	Iquitos, Pucallpa
Total	1857	

A.0.3 Appendix C: Round effect

	Resid. Df	Resid. Dev	Df	Deviance	F	Pr(>F)
1	14843	3333.38322349871	NA	NA	NA	NA
2	14804	3324.25622337369	39	9.127000125015	1.04219272053643	0.398000390797047

This output represents the analysis of the deviance table for two different models. Model 1 is the normal regression model at the base of the conjoint analysis. Model 2 is that model but includes an interaction term for each attribute with the "Round" of the conjoint. Since there is no statistically significant improvement in the fit of Model 2 compared to Model 1, we can conclude that there are no significant "Round" effects.

A.0.4 Appendix D: Distribution of attributes



A.0.5 Appendix E: AMCE

Feature	Level	Estimate
Age	35	0.00000
Age	45	0.00025
Age	65	-0.02383*
Gender	Female	0.00000
Gender	Male	0.02656**
From Lima	From Lima	0.00000
From Lima	Not from Lima	0.01401
Position	Interventionist	0.00000
Position	Liberal	-0.02502**
Experience	No previous experience	0.00000
Experience	Bad previous performance	-0.07191***
Experience	Good previous performance	0.06034***
Accusation	Abstract accusation	0.00000
Accusation	No accusation	0.23000***
Accusation	Concrete accusation (material)	-0.01690
Accusation	Concrete accusation (social)	-0.01754
Source	Media	0.00000
Source	Lava Jato Team	-0.13725***
Source	Prosecution	-0.10066***
Source	No accusation	0.00000

Table A.2: Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCE) for various factors. $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$.

A.0.6 Appendix F: AMCE, only pairs of "No Accusation"-Accusation



Appendix B

Appendix Chapter 9

B.0.1 Appendix A: Distribution of responses to the Bribery scenario



B.0.2 Appendix B: Distribution of responses to the Favouritism scenario



B.0.3 Appendix C: Engagement in corruption by social norm



B.0.4 Appendix D: Summary of regression models- Engagement in Corruption

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Intercept)	-0.91***	-0.63***	-0.84***	2.45***
	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.56)
Social Norm (in favour)	0.56***		0.42**	0.59***
	(0.12)		(0.15)	(0.12)
Type (Favouritism)	2.01***	1.98***	1.87***	2.05***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.12)
Social Norm (in favour):Type (Favouritism)			0.31	
			(0.24)	
Age				-0.12***
				(0.02)
Age^2				0.00***
				(0.00)
Gender (Male)				0.02
				(0.12)
SES				0.01
				(0.04)
N	1746	1746	1746	1746

B.0.5 Appendix E: Engagement in corruption, including demographics



B.0.6 Appendix F: Is this practice against the law?

	Against the Law (Yes vs. No)	Against the Law (Knows vs. Doesn't)
(Intercept)	2.31***	0.68***
	(0.19)	(0.10)
DidEngageA	-1.34***	-0.33**
	(0.20)	(0.12)
Social Norm (in favour)	0.13	-0.09
	(0.17)	(0.11)
Type (Favouritism)	-0.63***	-0.30*
	(0.19)	(0.12)
N	1011	1746

B.0.7 Appendix G: Is this practice considered corruption?

	Is corruption (Yes vs. No)	Is corruption (Knows vs. Doesn't)
(Intercept)	4.29***	2.66***
	(0.32)	(0.18)
DidEngageA	-2.60***	-1.00***
	(0.29)	(0.19)
Social Norm (in favour)	-0.07	-0.36*
	(0.17)	(0.15)
Type (Favouritism)	-0.86***	-0.33*
	(0.20)	(0.16)
N	1467	1746

B.0.8 Appendix H: Measures of trust





B.0.9 Appendix I: Measures of social identity



*1. Identifying with a group means feeling part of it and caring and showing concern about its members. How much do you identify with each of the following?

	Not at all	Just a little	Somewhat	Quite a bit	Very much
Family members	○	○	○	○	○
People in your community	○	○	○	○	○
People in your country	○	○	○	○	○
People in Great Britain	○	○	○	○	○
All humans everywhere	○	○	○	○	○



*2. How much would you say you care (feel upset, want to help) when bad things happen to ...

	Not at all	Just a little	Somewhat	Quite a bit	Very much
Family members	○	○	○	○	○
People in your community	○	○	○	○	○
People in your country	○	○	○	○	○
People in Great Britain	○	○	○	○	○
All humans everywhere	○	○	○	○	○

B.0.10 Appendix J: Treatment Assignment

Table B.1: Treatment Assignment (full sample)

Treatment	Number of participants assigned	Female	Male
CT3	294	153	140
CT4	313	159	154
T1T3	282	146	136
T1T4	308	139	168
T2T3	316	158	158
T2T4	290	145	145

Table B.2: Treatment Assignment (autobiographical recall >100 characters)

Treatment	Number of participants assigned	Female	Male
CT3	230	123	106
CT4	258	130	128

Table B.2 continued from previous page

T1T3	202	105	97
T1T4	239	107	131
T2T3	260	134	126
T2T4	241	123	118

I conducted a chi-square test on the variable capturing the random assignment (for the full sample). The chi-square test indicated no significant deviation from the expected probabilities in the distribution of treatment assignments (x-squared= 3.1531, df = 5, p = 0.6764). The proportions of treatment assignments in each category ranged from 0.1564 to 0.1753.

I also conducted the same analysis for the sample, where the participants provided a response of at least a hundred characters in the autobiographical recall task. The chi-square test indicated a slight departure from the expected probabilities in the distribution of treatment assignments, although the effect was not statistically significant (r-squared = 9.4545, df = 5, p = 0.09225). Still, in the analysis, I used the full sample. (**I conducted the same analysis, lowering the threshold to 50 characters, and the results showed no significant deviation from the expected probabilities in the distribution of treatment assignments**

B.0.11 Appendix K: Emotional induction- first-person vignette

	Model
(Intercept)	1.40***
	(0.15)
Anger	0.44*
	(0.22)
Guilt	0.26
	(0.22)
N	892
AIC	796.97
BIC	811.36
Pseudo R^2	0.01

B.0.12 Appendix L: First-Person Vignette - effect of Social Identity and Trust on Accepting the Favour



B.0.13 Appendix M: General distribution of Judgement



B.0.14 Appendix N: First-Person Vignette - Effect of Social Identity and Trust on Judgement



B.0.15 Appendix O: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions in Judgement of Favouritism with Particularised Trust (trust in "Family") Interaction

	Estimate	Std. Error
(Intercept)	2.91***	(0.19)
Anger	-0.26	(0.26)
Guilt	-0.43	(0.26)
Particularised Trust (Family)	-0.41*	(0.20)
Anger × Particularised Trust (Family)	0.39	(0.27)
Guilt × Particularised Trust (Family)	0.55	(0.28)
N	892	
R^2	0.01	

B.0.16 Appendix P: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions in Judgement of Favouritism with Identifying with "Country"



B.0.17 Appendix Q: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions in Judgement of Favouritism with Identifying with "Great Britain" Interaction



B.0.18 Appendix R: Third-Person Vignette- Effect of Social Identity and Trust on Accepting the Favour



B.0.19 Appendix S: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Accepting the Favour with Generalised Trust Interaction

Table B.3: Summary of Model 1

	Estimate	Std. Error
(Intercept)	2.60***	(0.33)
Anger	0.55	(0.53)
Guilt	0.27	(0.49)
Generalised Trust	0.28	(0.47)
Anger × Generalised Trust	-1.12	(0.70)
Guilt × Generalised Trust	-1.15	(0.65)
N	911	
AIC	471.02	
BIC	499.91	
Pseudo R^2	0.03	

B.0.20 Appendix T: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions in Accepting the Favour with Identifying with "Country" and Identifying with "Great Britain" interaction

	Model 1	Model 2
(Intercept)	2.70*** (0.27)	2.66*** (0.26)
Anger	0.10 (0.39)	0.21 (0.38)
Guilt	0.06 (0.38)	0.13 (0.38)
Social Identity (Country)	0.18 (0.58)	
Anger × Social Identity (Country)	-0.70 (0.78)	
Guilt × Social Identity (Country)	-1.41* (0.71)	
Social Identity (Great Britain)		0.43 (0.64)
Anger × Social Identity (Great Britain)		-1.33 (0.83)
Guilt × Social Identity (Great Britain)		-1.80* (0.77)
N	911	911
AIC	469.02	465.21
BIC	497.91	494.10
Pseudo R^2	0.03	0.04

B.0.21 Appendix U: Third-Person Vigentte, effect of Social Identity and Trust on Judgement



B.0.22 Appendix V: Third-person vignette - Effect of emotional inducement in Judgement of Favouritism with Generalised Trust Interaction



B.0.23 Appendix W: Third-person vignette - Effect of emotional inducement in Judgement of Favouritism with Trust in "Family" Interaction (p<0.05)



B.0.24 Appendix X: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions in Judgment of Favouritism with Identifying with "Great Britain" Interaction

	Model 1
(Intercept)	2.55*** (0.07)
Anger	0.08 (0.10)
Guilt	0.09 (0.10)
Social Identity (Great Britain)	0.18 (0.16)
Anger × Social Identity (Great Britain)	-0.62** (0.24)
Guilt × Social Identity (Great Britain)	-0.11 (0.22)
N	911
R^2	0.01

B.0.25 Appendix Y: Proportion of whether accepting the favour should be considered corruption



B.0.26 Appendix Z: First-person - Proportion of whether accepting the favour should be considered corruption by whether the favour was accepted



B.0.27 Appendix AA: Third-person - Proportion of whether accepting the favour should be considered corruption by whether the favour was accepted



Appendix C

Appendix Chapter 10

C.0.1 Appendix A: Focus Groups composition

Table C.1: Summary of Recruitment by SES, Gender, and Age

SES	Recruitment	Groups	Participants	Date
A/B	Men aged 18-35 and 36+	1	5	22/03/22
A/B	Women aged 18-35 and 36+	1	6	22/03/22
C	Men aged 18-35 and 36+	1	6	23/03/22
C	Women aged 18-35 and 36+	1	6	23/03/22
D/E	Men aged 18-35 and 36+	1	6	24/03/22
D/E	Women aged 18-35 and 36+	1	6	25/03/22

C.0.2 Appendix B: Question to measure Trust



*6. En general, ¿crees que se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas o que no se puede ser demasiado cuidadoso al tratar con otras personas?

Elija una de las siguientes opciones.

- Se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas
- No se puede ser demasiado cuidadoso al tratar con otras personas

*7. ¿Cuánto confías en cada uno de estos diferentes grupos de personas?

	Nada en absoluto	Poco	Algo	Bastante	Plenamente/Completamente
Personas en tu familia					
Personas en tu vecindario					
Personas a las que conoces personalmente					
Personas que conoces por primera vez					
Personas de tu misma nacionalidad					
Personas de otra nacionalidad					

C.0.3 Appendix C: Question to measure Social Identity



*4. Identificarse con un grupo es sentirse parte del grupo, y querer y preocuparse por sus miembros ¿Cuánto te identificas con cada uno de los siguientes grupos?

	Nada	Un poco	Algo/en cierta medida	Bastante	Completamente
Miembros de mi familia					
Personas en mi comunidad					
Personas en mi país					
Personas en el mundo					

*5. ¿Cuánto dirías que te importa (te sientes molesto, deseas ayudar) cuando le ocurren cosas malas a...

	Nada	Un poco	Algo/en cierta medida	Bastante	Completamente
Miembros de tu familia					
Personas en tu comunidad					
Personas en tu país					
Personas en el mundo					

C.0.4 Appendix D: Examples used in Guilt inducement task

"A friend entrusted me with a very important personal secret, and I shared it with someone else in a moment of weakness. My friend found out and felt hurt. I felt guilty for betraying their trust."

"I remember that during a heated argument with a loved one, I ended up saying hurtful and offensive things. I felt very guilty for hurting my loved one."

C.0.5 Appendix E: Examples used in Anger inducement task

"I found myself trapped in a traffic jam. While waiting patiently, an impatient driver behind me started honking repeatedly and hurling verbal insults. It made me feel very angry."

"During a work meeting, I had an important proposal to present. However, one of my colleagues constantly interrupted and belittled my ideas. Their attitude and lack of respect made me feel very angry."

C.0.6 Appendix F: Treatment Assignment (Full sample)

Table C.2: Full sample

Treatment	Number of participants
CT3	302
CT4	297
T1T4	306
T1T4	268
T2T3	280
T2T4	269

I conducted a chi-square test on the variable that captures the random assignment. The chi-square test indicated no significant deviation from the expected probabilities in the distribution of treatment assignments (x-squared= 4.9477, df = 5, p = 0.4223). The proportions of treatment assignments in each category ranged from 0.1556 to 0.1777.

C.0.7 Appendix G: First-person vignette- Effect of Induced Emotions on Paying the Bribe

	Estimate	Std. Error
(Intercept)	-2.64***	(0.23)
Anger	0.08	(0.33)
Guilt	0.26	(0.31)
N	883	
AIC	474.55	
BIC	488.90	
Pseudo R^2	0.00	

C.0.8 Appendix H: First-person vignette - Effect of Social Identity and Trust on Paying the Bribe



C.0.9 Appendix I: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Paying the Bribe with Generalised Trust Interaction

	Estimate	Std. Error
(Intercept)	-2.42***	(0.24)
Emotional Induced Anger	-0.19	(0.36)
Emotional Induced Guilt	0.14	(0.33)
Generalized Trust	-1.77	(1.04)
Anger × Generalised Trust	2.00	(1.17)
Guilt × Generalised Trust	1.24	(1.18)
N	883	
AIC	474.45	
BIC	503.15	
Pseudo R^2	0.02	

C.0.10 Appendix J: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Paying the Bribe with Particularised Trust (trust in "Family") Interaction

	Estimate	Std. Error
(Intercept)	-2.13***	(0.37)
Anger	0.05	(0.50)
Guilt	-0.86	(0.63)
Particularised Trust (Family)	-0.75	(0.48)
Anger × Particularised Trust (Family)	-0.05	(0.67)
Guilt × Particularised Trust (Family)	1.52*	(0.74)
N	883	
AIC	473.16	
BIC	501.86	
Pseudo R^2	0.02	

C.0.11 Appendix K: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Paying the Bribe with Social Identity ("Country") Interaction

	Estimate	Std. Error
(Intercept)	-2.33***	(0.25)
Anger	-0.28	(0.39)
Guilt	-0.34	(0.39)
Social Identity (Country)	-1.23	(0.64)
Anger × Social Identity (Country)	1.35	(0.80)
Guilt × Social Identity (Country)	1.85*	(0.76)
N	883	
AIC	473.51	
BIC	502.21	
Pseudo R^2	0.02	

C.0.12 Appendix L: Distribution of Judgement



C.0.13 Appendix M: First-person vignette - Effect of Social Identity and Trust on Judgement



C.0.14 Appendix N: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Judgement with Generalised Trust Interaction

	Estimate	Std. Error
(Intercept)	1.20***	(0.05)
Anger	-0.04	(0.07)
Guilt	0.16*	(0.07)
Generalised Trust	0.12	(0.10)
Anger × Generalised Trust	0.12	(0.15)
Guilt × Generalised Trust	-0.27	(0.14)
N	831	
R^2	0.01	

C.0.15 Appendix O: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Judgement with Particularised Trust ("Family") Interaction



C.0.16 Appendix P: First-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Judgement with Social Identity ("Country") Interaction



C.0.17 Appendix Q: Third-person vignette- Effect of Induced Emotions on Paying the Bribe

	Estimate	Std. Error
(Intercept)	-0.32**	(0.12)
Emotional Induced Anger	0.50**	(0.17)
Emotional Induced Guilt	0.43*	(0.17)
N	829	
AIC	1145.02	
BIC	1159.18	
Pseudo R^2	0.02	

C.0.18 Appendix R: Third-person vignette - Effect of Social Identity and Generalised on Paying the Bribe



C.0.19 Appendix S: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Paying the Bribe with Generalised Trust Interaction



C.0.20 Appendix T: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Paying the Bribe with Particularised Trust (trust in "Family") Interaction



C.0.21 Appendix U: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Judgement

	Estimate	Std. Error
(Intercept)	1.25***	(0.04)
Anger	-0.06	(0.05)
Guilt	-0.13*	(0.05)
N	753	
R^2	0.01	

C.0.22 Appendix V: Third-person vignette, effect of Social Identity and Trust on Judgement



C.0.23 Appenidx W: Third-person vignette - Effect of Induced Emotions on Judgement with identifying with "Country" Interaction (p<0.05)



C.0.24 Appendix X: Effect of First vs Third person vignette on Action-based outcomes

	Estimate	Std. Error
(Intercept)	-2.52***	(0.13)
Vignette Third Person	2.50***	(0.15)
N	1712	
AIC	1622.48	
BIC	1633.37	
Pseudo R^2	0.31	

C.0.25 Appendix Y: Words used for word count- Moral Foundations Dictionary

Category	Words in Spanish
Fairness_-virtue keywords	"justicia", "equidad", "igualdad", "imparcialidad", "honestidad", "rectitud", "imparcialidad", "derechos", "transparencia", "igualitarismo", "no discriminación", "inclusión", "solidaridad", "dignidad", "respeto", "responsabilidad", "proporcionalidad", "coherencia", "correcto", "razonable"
Fairness_-vice keywords	"injusto", "desigual", "sesgo", "injusto", "injusto", "intolerante", "discriminatorio", "desproporcionado", "inequitativo", "prejuicio", "desonesto", "sin escrúpulos", "desvincular", "preferencia", "favoritismo", "segregación", "exclusión"
Harm_-virtue keywords	"seguro", "paz", "compasión", "empatía", "simpatía", "cuidado", "cuidado", "proteger", "escudo", "refugio", "amistad", "seguridad", "beneficio", "defensa", "guardar", "preservar"
Harm_vide keywords	"harmar", "sufrir", "guerra", "guerras", "guerrero", "belicoso", "pelear", "violencia", "hacer daño", "matar", "mata", "asesino", "asesinado", "asesinato", "poner en peligro", "cruel", "brutal", "abuso", "dañar", "arruinar", "arrasar", "detrimento", "aplastar", "atacar", "aniquilar", "destruir", "aplastar", "abandonar", "despreciar", "deteriorar", "explotar", "explota", "explotado", "explotando", "herir"

Table C.3 continued from previous page

Loyalty_-virtue keywords	"juntos", "nación", "patria", "familia", "familias", "familiar", "grupo", "leal", "patriota", "comunal", "comuna", "comunitario", "comunismo", "camarada", "cuadro", "colectivo", "conjunto", "unidad", "unir", "compañero", "gremio", "solidaridad", "devoto", "miembro", "clic", "cohorte", "aliado", "iniciado"
Loyalty_-vice keywords	"extranjero", "enemigo", "traicionar", "traición", "traidor", "traicionero", "desleal", "individual", "apostasía", "apóstata", "abandonado", "desertor", "desertar", "engañar", "despreciar", "impostor", "malhechor", "espía", "secuestrar", "renegado", "terrorista", "inmigración"
Authority_-virtue keywords	"obedecer", "obediente", "deber", "ley", "legal", "legal", "deber", "honrar", "respeto", "respetuoso", "respetado", "respeta", "orden", "padre", "madre", "materno", "cuidar", "madres", "tradición", "jerarquía", "autoridad", "permitir", "permiso", "estatus", "rango", "líder", "clase", "burguesía", "casta", "posición", "cumplimiento", "mando", "supremacía", "control", "sumisión", "lealtad", "servir", "cumplir", "deferencia", "deferir", "reverenciar", "venerar", "cumplir"
Authority_-vice keywords	"desafiar", "rebelde", "disentir", "subvertir", "faltar al respeto", "desobedecer", "sedicioso", "agitador", "insubordinado", "ilegal", "sin ley", "insurgente", "amotinado", "desafiar", "disidente", "infiel", "alienar", "desertor", "hereje", "inconformista", "oponerse", "protestar", "rechazar", "denunciar", "remonstrar", "motín", "obstruir"

Table C.3 continued from previous page

Purity_-virtue keywords	"piedad", "piadoso", "pureza", "puro", "limpio", "estéril", "sagrado", "casto", "santo", "santidad", "santo", "saludable", "celibato", "abstención", "virgen", "vírgenes", "virginidad", "virginal", "austeridad", "integridad", "modestia", "abstinencia", "sobriedad", "recto", "límpido", "inmaculado", "doncella", "virtuoso", "refinado", "decencia", "inmaculado", "inocente", "prístino", "iglesia"
Purity_vice keywords	"disgusto", "depravado", "enfermedad", "impuro", "contagio", "indecente", "pecado", "pecaminoso", "pecador", "pecados", "pecado", "pecaminoso", "puta", "prostituta", "suciedad", "impiety", "impío", "profano", "grosero", "repugnante", "enfermo", "promiscuo", "obsceno", "adúltero", "depravado", "contaminar", "vagabunda", "prostituta", "impura", "intemperante", "licencioso", "disoluto", "inmundicia", "basura", "obsceno", "relajado", "mancha", "mancha", "manchar", "degradar", "profanar", "perverso", "mancha", "explotar", "pervertir", "miserable"

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