

THE PAPAL SCHISM, THE EMPIRE

AND THE WEST, 1159-1169

Thesis submitted for


the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

by

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Abstract

This thesis is a study of the diplomacy of the first decade of the papal schism which began in September 1159. Normally, medieval diplomacy is extremely difficult to reconstruct, at least before the thirteenth century. The bare mentions of embassies in narrative sources force the historian to fill out the story by conjectures about motive and intention, and thus to risk imposing an anachronistic or alien political consciousness on his protagonists. The 1159 schism can be studied without this risk, since much of the diplomacy can be reconstructed not only from chronicle evidence but also from the exceptionally large number of surviving letters. Both as individual letters and as collections these provide evidence of a quantity and quality which completely transforms the picture available from narrative sources alone; these are nonetheless essential for establishing a chronology and for filling out the gaps where the letters fail. The two main things to be explained are, first, why and how the schism began, and, second, why it lasted for so long.

On the death of Hadrian IV on 1 September 1159 the cardinals were divided. Many were for Roland, the chancellor (Alexander III), but some favoured Octavian, cardinal priest of St. Cecilia (Victor IV). The two parties had been in existence before the election. They were opposed not on any long-term ecclesiastical issue, but on an immediate political one: the attitude to be taken by the papacy to the king of Sicily and to the emperor. The treaty concluded at Benevento in 1156 between Hadrian IV and William I of

Sicily had led to a reversal of the alignments traditional in the generation following the Concordat of Worms of 1122, when the papacy had tended to look to the emperor for protection against Sicily and the Romans. Octavian and his supporters wished to go back to these, while the majority saw the emperor, Frederick Barbarossa, as the main danger, and looked to Sicily and to the Lombard communes as allies. Both parties were able to stage some sort of election ceremony, and each appealed to Frederick for help against their rival. Frederick's response was to cite both candidates to an ecclesiastical meeting at Pavia, which he had called in his capacity as emperor. When this met, in February 1160, only Victor and his representatives were present, and this, coupled with Victor's previous friendly relations with Frederick and the German church and the proof produced at the council that Alexander and his supporters had engaged in a simoniacal conspiracy, secured Victor's recognition by the imperial church.

Alexander had however been much more active in making his case in France and England. He had sent several letters announcing his election and giving his version of events, and had also appealed to influential personas such as Louis VII's brother Henry, bishop of Beauvais, and his queen. Victor had sent no letters to the west; his case was not put there until imperial ambassadors arrived in the spring of 1160 bringing an encyclical from the council of Pavia. By the time the English and French churches met to discuss the schism, the points made in this encyclical had already been refuted both by Alexander and by his supporters in the west. The western churches consequently recognized Alexander at councils held at

London, Neufmarché, and Beauvais, in June and July 1160. Their decision was influential; it was followed by the churches in the Iberian peninsula, Ireland, Scotland, Norway, and, after a short delay, Hungary. The Latin kingdom of Jerusalem also recognized Alexander, and so did Sicily, and, later, Byzantium. Only Barbarossa's satellites, Poland and Denmark, followed the decision taken at Pavia, and Denmark had defected by the middle of the decade. The antipopes were to win no new adherents, except briefly in the late 1160s, when Raymond, count of Toulouse, went over to them.

Nevertheless, there was considerable scope for diplomacy on both sides. Frederick at Pavia had attempted arbitration, in a style which Henry II and Louis VII could not and did not emulate. This meant that he was committed to take positive action to secure recognition for the pope his assembly had chosen. But equally, Henry and Louis - the crucial men - were less bound to stand or fall by Alexander. There was less passion in their initial decision, and they could be won over. Frederick was naturally the active one on his side, rather than the antipopes themselves. They disposed of few resources, and did not in any case have a sufficiently independent position to manoeuvre on their own, even if they could have afforded the cost of embassies. On the other side, Alexander had various options. He could negotiate directly with Frederick and try to reach a compromise. He could win over enough of the imperial church, especially the Germans, to make Frederick's persistence in schism impossible. Finally, he could - not alone, but with suitable allies - confront Frederick militarily.

In spite of all the possibilities for change, the schism in 1169 was much where it was at the end of 1160. Frederick had come near to winning over Louis VII in 1162 after Alexander had fled from Italy to France, when he persuaded Louis to produce Alexander at a grand meeting of the clergy of the two kingdoms at which the two popes would put their cases. But Alexander would not co-operate, Louis met with opposition from his own clergy, and Frederick and his diplomats mishandled the affair. Frederick came near to winning over Henry II in 1165, but Henry, in spite of his difficulties with Becket and Alexander, was unwilling to go over to the antipopes with all the difficulties that that would entail, unless it proved absolutely necessary, and in the event the mere threat to do so was enough for his purposes. Further attempts to woo both western rulers in 1168 and 1169 brought Frederick no success. Nor had he been able to resolve the schism by force; Alexander evaded capture by the imperial armies in 1162 and 1167, and Sicily, his ultimate refuge, was untouched by Barbarossa, though threatened on several occasions. Frederick had however been able to preserve the essentials of his power and capacity for further action. The hold of the antipopes on the Italian and Burgundian churches was only slowly broken by Alexander and his supporters, and could be restored easily enough. In any case these were relatively unimportant. Frederick was much more dependent on the German episcopate, especially for soldiers for his Italian campaigns, and if Alexander could have won their support Frederick's position would have been seriously weakened. But although there was some support for Alexander in Germany, especially in the province of Salzburg, it never

turned into active opposition to Frederick. Those bishops who felt sufficiently strongly about the schism to defy the antipopes openly were forced into exile or submission with little difficulty, while Frederick managed to keep the less committed from action by a judicious mixture of force, as seen in his edict against the Cistercians, in the compulsory episcopal consecrations which followed the council of Würzburg in 1165, and in the ravaging of Salzburg after 1166, and tolerance. He was also skilful in his timing of diplomatic initiatives; the German episcopate were never able to feel for long that they were locked into a schism from which no attempts were being made to extricate them. The most serious crisis of confidence, after Victor's death, was overcome by promises and threats at the council of Würzburg, when the prospect of being joined by the English church helped to calm the German bishops. In any case, such support as Alexander had in Germany was spontaneous; he was able to do little to organize resistance there.

It was not only in Germany that Alexander had had little success. His position was secure enough in 1169, but it had not advanced much. Direct negotiation with Frederick, attempted in 1162, more forcefully in 1163, and under duress in 1167, had produced no results; neither side could be brought to countenance the loss of face involved in backing down from the positions they had taken up. And up until 1169 Alexander had not yet succeeded in assembling an alliance which could confront Frederick in the field. Papal agents were certainly instrumental in the formation of the league of Verona in 1164, which marked the revival of resistance to Frederick's rule in Italy, but on his return there in 1166-7 Frederick was able to

deal with the Lombards easily enough, and only the plague which destroyed the imperial armies at Rome in August 1167 prevented a complete imperial victory in Italy. The Byzantine emperor, Manuel Comnenus, was the only ally Alexander could find in the 1160s with the resources to take Frederick on, and he was unable to persuade the Sicilians, the Lombards, and, in the end, himself, that it was desirable to call Manuel in, though he came near to doing so in 1163-4 and 1166-7.

The failure of either side to resolve the schism, either by force or agreement, can largely be attributed to the looseness of contemporary diplomatic structures. The schism was a diplomatic problem; it was not as such a division which went deep into mens' hearts, though the loathing which western intellectuals felt for the tyrant Frederick was real enough. It was the kind of problem which could be settled politically rather than by a general change of outlook (differing in this respect as in others from the Investiture Contest), and both the talent and the techniques to reach a settlement were available. What was lacking was a suitable framework. The dividing lines of the schism happened to coincide with existing dividing lines. It was not so much that there was positive hostility across these, as that there was little or nothing. The Empire and the two western kingdoms were culturally, politically, even genealogically, distinct, while the German church was of all the important national churches of Europe the least subject to papal control. Neither side had anything to offer the other, or much to threaten the other with. This was why Frederick was in

the end unable to detach either Louis or Henry from Alexander, but equally why neither would act against Frederick on Alexander's behalf. Louis could not be persuaded to join with Byzantium and Sicily in an anti-imperial alliance in 1163-4, or even to do much to help Alexander's supporters against the schismatics in Burgundy. The German episcopate sometimes felt uncomfortable, but Frederick could manage them, and the lay princes of the Empire were doing much better under Barbarossa than their great-grandfathers had been under Henry IV, and showed no signs of wishing to stage another Tribur or Forchheim. Even the Cistercians, who had declared for Alexander at the beginning of the schism, and in the opening years looked like playing an important role, drew back from the dangers of concerted action. In these circumstances it is not surprising that inertia prevailed, and that the lines of the schism, once drawn, changed little. Once Alexander allied with the anti-imperial opposition in Italy, both he and Frederick would have to negotiate, but at the end of the 1160s this opposition had only just begun to organize itself properly, and its military capacity was still in doubt. The schism persisted not because anyone wanted it to - though as a second best to peace with the papacy it was convenient to Frederick - but because no-one could give or get terms good enough to make it worth while to end it.

Preface

The only previous study of the 1159 schism is Max Meyer's Göttingen dissertation of 1871. The subject has however been very fully treated by historians; Giesebrecht, Hauck, Haller and Rousset de Pina have all given it considerable space in their general works, and in any case Meyer's short work, which concentrated mainly on the documents relating to the schismatic election, had scarcely superseded the remarkably thorough biography of Alexander III by Hermann Reuter. In this century the work of Ohnsorge and Preiss in particular has added to our knowledge, and several articles dealing with particular aspects of the schism have appeared since I began work in 1968. In spite of this, the present study can be justified on three grounds. First, it treats the schism as the central object of attention. Second, it makes use of the very rich letter-collections of the period, not just for their individual letters, which have of course been extensively utilized by earlier historians, but also for the evidence provided by the collections as collections.¹ Third, it treats the history of the schism mainly as a problem of diplomacy and communications; careful attention to the techniques of contemporary diplomacy and the conditions under which men and news travelled offers insights not only into particular episodes of the schism, but also into the failure of those concerned to resolve it.

1. Holtzmann 1930, 384-5 had already pointed out that this was a prerequisite for any new study of the schism. In my footnotes I have frequently given ms. references for letters. This is not fetishism; it has been done either because the text I refer to or quote from is the ms. text, this thesis having been largely written away from an adequate library, or because the information that a letter is in a particular collection is part of the argument. I have always given a reference to a published text as well.

Originally I intended to cover the whole period of the schism, but this turned out to be too much, and the thesis now ends with the failure of the negotiations between Frederick Barbarossa and Alexander III in 1169 and the bull Non est dubium which sealed the alliance between the papacy and the Lombard League. This is not an arbitrarily chosen date; from 1170 the history of the schism has to be written much more from the records preserved in Italian communal archives, and less from letter-collections, and the treatment would necessarily have to be rather different. The form is narrative, though there are three chapters which deal with the schism in the outlying regions of Christendom, in Germany, and on the Franco-Imperial border. The main focus of attention is the diplomatic relations between Frederick and his antipopes, Alexander, and the Big Four: France, England, Sicily and Byzantium. I have been careful to depict these relations fully; when a diplomatic exchange did not seem to lead anywhere or was obscure, I have not usually tried to link it with the more well-known by conjecture. The reasons for this abstention are given in the final chapter, which is a general examination of the diplomacy of the schism.

I owe thanks to numerous people. In the academic year 1969-70 I spent nine months at the Institut für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung in Vienna on a scholarship from the Leverhulme Foundation. I am grateful to the trustees of the Foundation, and to all at the Institut, especially Professor Heinrich Appelt, Dr. Rainer-Maria Herkenrath, and Dr. Günther Hödl, for their help. Mrs. Anne Duggan of King's College, London, kindly allowed me to

read and refer to her thesis on the Becket letter-collections.
Above all, my thanks go to Karl Leyser, who for nearly seven
years has been an inspiring and exacting supervisor.

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List of abbreviations

Secondary works other than those listed below are cited by the Harvard system: author's surname and year of publication, with a distinguishing suffix if necessary. Full details are given in the bibliography.

A	Vienna, Nationalbibliothek, ms. 629
<u>AA SS</u>	<u>Acta Sanctorum</u> , Antwerp, etc., 1643ff.
<u>Abh., n.F.</u>	<u>Abhandlungen der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, philosophisch-historische Klasse, neue Folge</u> , Berlin, 1897ff.
<u>Abh., d.F.</u>	<u>Abhandlungen...</u> , dritte Folge, Berlin 1931ff.
B.L.	London, British Library
B.N.	Paris, Bibliothèque nationale
Boso	Boso, 'Vita Hadriani IV' and 'Vita Alexandri III', in <u>Le Liber Pontificalis</u> , edd. L. Duchesne et al., 3 vols., Paris, 1886-1955, ii, 388-446
<u>DA</u>	<u>Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters</u> , Weimar, etc., 1937ff.
Dölger	<u>Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des oströmischen Reiches</u> , ed. F. Dölger, Munich, 1925 [cited by no.]
Duchesne	A. Duchesne, <u>Historiae Francorum Scriptores</u> , iv, Paris, 1640
<u>EHR</u>	<u>The English Historical Review</u> , London, 1886ff.
<u>Gall. Christ.</u>	<u>Gallia Christiana</u> , 16 vols., Paris, 1715-1865
Gams	P. B. Gams, <u>Series episcoporum ecclesiae catholicae</u> , Regensburg, 1873-96
<u>Germ. Pont.</u>	<u>Germania Pontificia</u> , ed. A. Brackmann, 4 vols., Berlin, 1911-35
<u>Gesta</u>	<u>Otonis episcopi Frisingensis et Rahewini Gesta Frederici seu rectius Cronica</u> , ed. F.-J. Schmale, (Ausgewählte Quellen zur deutschen Geschichte des Mittelalters, 17, 1965)
Giesebrecht, v, vi	W. von Giesebrecht and B. von Simson, <u>Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserzeit</u> , vols. 5, 6, Leipzig, 1880, 1895
H	Hannover, Niedersächsisches Landesbibliothek, ms. XI 671

- Haller J. Haller, Das Papsttum: Idee und Wirklichkeit, vol. 3, Munich, 1965 (Rowohlt edition in 5 vols.)
- Hauck A. Hauck, Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands, vol. 4, 4th edn., Leipzig, 1913
- It. Pont. Italia Pontificia, edd. P. Kehr and W. Holtzmann, 9 vols., Berlin, 1906-62
- JL P. Jaffé, Regesta Pontificum Romanorum..., 2nd edn. revised by S. Löwenfeld, 2 vols., Leipzig, 1885-8 [cited by number for documents, page for events]
- MGH Monumenta Germaniae Historica
- Const. Constitutiones et acta publica, Hannover, 1893ff.
- LdL Libelli de Lite, Hannover, 1891ff.
- SRG Scriptores rerum germanicarum in usu scholarum, Hannover, 1840ff.
- SS Scriptores in folio, Stuttgart and Hannover, 1819ff.
- SS, n.s. Scriptores, nova series, Berlin and Cologne, 1922ff.
- Materials Materials for the History of Archbishop Thomas Becket, edd. J. C. Robertson and J. B. Sheppard, 7 vols., Rolls Series, 1875-85
- NA Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde, Hannover 1876-1935 [cont. as DA]
- Nachr. Nachrichten der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, philosophisch-historische Klasse, Göttingen, 1894ff.
- P Valenciennes, Bibliothèque municipale, ms. 482
- PG J.-P. Migne, Patrologiae cursus completus...series graeca, 162 vols., Paris, 1857-66
- PL idem, series latina, 221 vols., Paris, 1844-64
- QFIAB Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken, Rome and Tübingen, 1898ff.
- R Arras, Bibliothèque municipale, ms. 964
- RHF Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, edd. M. Bouquet et al., Paris, 1738ff.

Reuter	H. Reuter, <u>Geschichte Alexanders III. und der Kirche seiner Zeit</u> , 3 vols., Peipzig, 1860-4
<u>Rolls Series</u>	<u>Chronicles and Memorials of Great Britain and Ireland during the Middle Ages</u> , 99 vols. in 244, London, 1858-96
St.	K. F. Stumpf-Brentano, <u>Die Reichskanzler, vornehmlich des X., XI. und XII. Jahrhunderts</u> , Innsbruck, 1865-83, ii [imperial regesta: cited by no.]
Sudendorf	H. Sudendorf, <u>Registrum, oder merkwürdige Urkunden für die deutsche Geschichte</u> , 3 vols., Jena and Berlin, 1849-54
<u>T.a.q.</u>	<u>Terminus ante quem</u>
<u>T.p.q.</u>	<u>Terminus post quem</u>
Tengnagel	S. Tengnagel, <u>Vetera monumenta contra schismaticos</u> , Ingolstadt, 1612
UB	Urkundenbuch
V	Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, ms. Reginensis Latinus 179

Chapter one

The papal election of 1159

This thesis is a study of the diplomatic history of the schism of 1159. An account of the election has no necessary place in it, since decisions on obedience were taken at best on what men thought had happened, not on what did. What follows serves two purposes: it helps to show that neither the schism nor Alexander's success can be attributed to deep ideological divisions within the church;¹ and it shows that there is more truth in the Victorine picture of the schism than earlier historians have been willing to allow,² which is not only of interest in itself but also important for the decision taken by the imperial church at Pavia in February 1160.

Hadrian IV died early on 1 September 1159 after a short illness, probably a throat infection.³ As usual, the curia had left Rome for the summer, and was at Anagni at the time. The cardinals began the tractatio immediately, but were unable to agree. The chancellor Roland and some others were for Bernard, bishop of Porto, who had been designated by Hadrian. Another party of ten led by Imar, bishop of Tusculum, favoured Octavian, cardinal priest of St. Cecilia.⁴ At this point, members of the

1. Schmale 1961, has recently tried to show that the schism of 1130 can be so explained.

2. E.g. Reuter, i, 486ff.; Pacaut 1956, 103-5. In what follows I have preferred letters of eye-witnesses and the testimony produced at the councils of Pavia and Beauvais over chronicle evidence and letters which merely retail second-hand information.

3. Hödl 1969, 430 and note 252.

4. Report from Frederick's legates in Rome, quoted by Eberhard, bishop of Bamberg in a letter of Sept. 1159 to Eberhard, archbishop of Salzburg (A, ff. 27v-28v = Tengnagel, pp. 391-2). The report dates from before 4 Sept., since it says that Hadrian has not yet been buried, and thus shows that there was an attempt to elect at Anagni as well as later at Rome.

Roman senate arrived and threatened to prevent Hadrian's burial unless the cardinals returned to Rome and set about the election of a new pope.¹ The cardinals complied. Before leaving they made a pact that no-one should be elected except unanimously; lacking unanimity, they should consider candidates other than cardinals, and if this also failed, no-one was to take further steps without unanimous agreement.²

Hadrian's body reached Rome on 3 September.³ The cardinals, fearing disturbances, took refuge in various fortified houses. On the next day, after burying Hadrian, they met in St. Peter's to begin the election. They deliberated until 6 September.⁴ Bernard had either stood down or lost his following; the two candidates were now Roland and Octavian. On 6 September Octavian's supporters tried to break the deadlock. They proposed first that the Rolandists should elect a pope from among the Octavianists or vice versa, and when this was rejected suggested that the second stage of the pact be invoked and external candidates considered.⁵ The Rolandists

1. Gesta, iv, 62, p. 636 (letter of the Victorine cardinals to the princes of the empire); ibid., iv, 76, pp. 664/6 (letter of the canons of St. Peter's to the council of Pavia).

2. Gesta, iv, 62, p. 636; 76, p. 666. The speech made by Victor's defender at the council of Pavia (MGH, Const., i, 260 no. 186) goes further: '...ab omnibus...compromitteretur, quod sine consensu omnium nullus eligeretur, etiamsi duo...dissentirent.' This is probably tendentious.

3. Allowing three days for the news of his death to reach Rome, the Romans to reach Anagni, and the body to be taken back to Rome.

4. Gesta, iv, 61, p. 626 (Alexander's election encyclical); ibid., iv, 62, pp. 636/8. The disagreements over the place of the election (ibid., iv, 76, p. 666) must have happened before the funeral.

5. Gesta, iv, 76, p. 666; MGH, Const., i, 260 no. 186. I have combined the two accounts.

agreed to this, but then tried to stage a coup by enmantling Roland. Rumours of this reached both Octavian and the populace, for the former returned quickly and, invoking the pact, forbade the proceedings. When this failed he seized the mantle from Roland and tried to enmantle himself. The Romans then broke into the church and prevented countermeasures; the Rolandists had to stand by while Octavian was proclaimed Pope Victor.¹

Boso, the chamberlain of Hadrian, who had organized the papal consolidation of territorial rights in and around Rome, was of Roland's party, and the guards of the munitiones beati Petri had remained faithful to him. To these fortifications the Rolandists withdrew, to be besieged for over a week.² Perhaps Roland considered submission at this point, for the Victorines produced several stories at the council of Pavia which seem more like distortion than pure invention.³ He did not do so, nor did he accede to suggestions from Victor's supporters that the whole election be repeated.⁴ On 13 or 14 September he and

1. The question of the mantle was crucial for both sides. The Alexandrines claimed that Victor snatched the mantle while Roland was making a proper show of refusal (Gesta, iv, 61, pp. 626/8). The Victorines claimed that Roland had never been enmantled (MGH, Const., i, 260-1 no. 188 cc. 1, 6, 7[acta of the council of Pavia]).

2. Gesta, iv, 76, p. 666. For Boso see Geisthardt 1936, 42-61.

3. MGH, Const., i, 262f. no. 188 cc. 5-9.

4. Mentioned in a letter from Fastrad of Clairvaux to Omnebonum of Verona describing the testimony offered at the Anglo-French council of July 1160 (A, ff. 51v-52v = Tengnagel, pp. 412-4).

his party tried to escape but were captured and taken to the region across the Tiber where Victor had influential supporters. Only on 15 or 16 September under cover of a riot stirred up by the Frangipani could Roland leave the city.¹ On 20 September he was consecrated as Alexander III at Nimpha by four of the six cardinal bishops and the suburbican bishops of Terracina and Segni.²

Meanwhile Octavian had also left the city, probably under the protection of Frederick's legates. He had much difficulty in finding bishops to assist at his consecration. Probably he had been slow in sending messengers round, as he was later to be fatally slow in sending legates to the churches of England and France. Only on 4 October, at Farfa, was he consecrated, by his one supporter among the cardinal bishops, Imar of Tusculum, and the bishops of Ferentino and Melfi. A week earlier, Alexander III had excommunicated him and his followers.³

When Hadrian died there were at most thirty-one 'curial' cardinals. Two of these, Rudolf, deacon of St. Lucia in Septisolis and Guido/Milo, deacon of St. Maria in Aquiro, had not been active for some time before the election.⁴ A third, Henry, priest of Sts. Nero and Achilles, may not have returned to Rome in time for the election.⁵ Leaving out the two candidates there were between

1. Gesta, iv, 61, p. 630: see Boso, p. 399; Hauck, 243 note 4.

2. JL 10584; see below, p. 14 note 5.

3. Annales Ceccanenses, MGH, SS, xix, 284; JL 10601-2.

4. Zenker 1964, 141, 178. I have equated the Guido who appears in 1157 with the Milo who subscribed JL 10624 and the letter Moe-
rore simul (J.M.Watterich, Pontificum Romanorum...vitae, Leipzig, 1862, ii, 493ff.) in the spring of 1160.

5. Holtzmann 1930, 395.

twenty-six and twenty-nine cardinals who could have taken part in the election. Some reconstruction of the 'voting' is possible, but the evidence does not always allow us to distinguish between electors and supporters. The Victorine party is the clearer. We have a letter from four Roman subdeacons to a fifth studying at Paris written shortly after the election. This names Imar of Tusculum, Guido, priest of St. Maria Transtiberim, John, priest of Sts. Martin and Silvester, and an unspecified deacon as known supporters of Octavian, William, priest of St. Peter ad Vincula and Raimund, deacon of St. Maria in Via Lata as alleged supporters. The rest were with Roland.¹ The letter from Victor's electors is headed by the names of five cardinals: Imar, Guido, John, Raimund, and Simon, abbot of Subiaco and cardinal deacon of St. Maria in Dominica.² If we assume that the unnamed deacon of the first letter was Simon, this leaves only William not mentioned in both sources; it was claimed at the council of Pavia that he too had elected Victor, a claim which William, who was present, did not deny.³ Simon and Raimund later defected to Alexander, the latter allegedly under compulsion.⁴ Three further electors were claimed at Pavia: Cencius, deacon of St. Adrian, who was said to have sent a chyrograph to the council saying that he had elected Victor, and Gregory, bishop of Sabina and Ardicio, deacon of St. Theodore, who were said to have been bribed by the Alexandrines.⁵

1. Luchaire 1899a, 103-4 no. 24.

2. Gesta, iv, 62, p. 634.

3. MGH, Const., i, 267-8 no. 190.c..5.

4. Zenker 1964, 140f., 180.

5. MGH, Const., i, 268 no. 190 c. 5.

These are naturally doubtful, but added to the six we already have they do make the total up to the nine claimed by the Victorines both in the letter from his electors and at the council of Pavia.¹

Twenty-three names appear at the head of the letter from Alexander's cardinals to Frederick, including Rudolf of St. Lucia.² These, plus the six named above and the two candidates, make thirty-one, which reduces to thirty because William of Pavia appears twice. One could assume that Alexander was elected by twenty-two cardinals, Victor by five or six, with William either neutral or changing sides after the election, and Guido/Milo not taking part. But the list of names is not above suspicion. There are reservations about William and Rudolf, and, if the letter was a letter from Alexander's electors,³ about Henry of Pisa.⁴ One might also wonder about Julius, bishop of Porto, who was not at Alexander's consecration.⁵ Moreover, only fourteen cardinals are found subscribing to Alexander's first two bulls, and this, at a time when no legations had yet been sent out and Alexander and his supporters were in exile, is surely remarkable.⁶ It is still more remarkable that of the cardinals mentioned in a hostile context by the canons of St. Peter's or excommunicated by Victor IV after the council of Pavia

1. Gesta, iv, 62, p. 638; MGH, Const., i, 266 no. 190 c. 2.

2. Gesta, iv, 63, p. 640.

3. Rahewin has abbreviated the letter, so it is impossible to tell. The distinction between 'electors' and 'supporters' is an anachronism, but convenient.

4. Above, p. 12 note 5.

5. Gesta, iv, 61, p. 630, lists him among Alexander's consecrators but this is not supported by the other versions of this letter, nor by the parallel transmission of this one in A, f. 30v.

6. JL 10593, 10594. For the legations see Ohnsorge 1928, 162-6.

only two, Henry of Pisa and Bonadies, priest of St. Grisogoni, are not found among these fourteen.¹ The Victorines may well have been right when they said that fourteen cardinals elected Roland, i.e. were for him at the time of the election.² But ex post facto the Alexandrines were justified. Only three cardinals - Imar, Guido, and John - stuck to Victor. The rest went over to Alexander, though one or two delayed for some time.³

Neither of the groups of electors, in so far as they can be distinguished, had any particular characteristics. Victor's three firm supporters were all fairly senior, but so were many of Alexander's supporters.⁴ Victor can be found acting together with individual supporters during earlier pontificates, but not in any consistent pattern.⁵ There were important issues in the internal politics of the church in the 1150s, but the groupings of 1159 did not reflect different attitudes to these, nor age-sets.

1. Compare the witness lists of JL 10593-4 with the cardinals named in Gesta, iv, 76 and iv, 82, p. 702 (a letter from Henry, provost of Berchtesgaden to Eberhard of Salzburg in which those excommunicated by Victor are named).

2. Gesta, iv, 62, p. 638.

3. Cencius, significantly, did not subscribe until 22 Feb. 1162 (JL 10698; JL 10663 is misdated, cf. It. Pont., vi, 268 no. 13). He is not known to have undertaken any legation for Alexander which would explain this long gap (cf. Ohnsorge 1928, 162-6).

4. Zenker 1964, gives the dates of promotion of all the cardinals.

5. E.g. he supported King Stephen together with Guido of Crema (John of Salisbury, Historia Pontificalis, ed. M. Chibnall, Edinburgh, 1956, p. 45); he supported the archbishop of Tyre against the Hospitallers together with John of Sts. Martin and Silvester (William of Tyre, Historia, xviii, 8, Recueil des historiens des Croisades, Historiens occidentaux, i, Paris, 1844, p. 830); he supported Simon in his election to abbot of Subiaco (Zenker 1964, 141); he was on legation to Frederick with William of Pavia in the summer of 1159 (Gesta, iv, 62, p. 636; see Zeillinger 1964).

Both sides had their explanation for the schism; both were essentially right. The Alexandrines presented Victor as an ambitious man who had invaded the see of St. Peter with the help of powerful friends and family connexions.¹ He certainly had considerable support in and around Rome. His own family held the two castles of Monticelli and Palumbaria which dominated the northern approaches to Rome, and he had political and family connexions with several Roman families, including the prefects De Vico, the Boboni, and the Tebaldi.² It is at first surprising that a man so obviously connected with the older nobility should also have been able to command popular support. The explanation is that Alexander was just as much the candidate of a section of the nobility,³ and that the commune of Rome was no longer the extreme populist body which it had been in the 1140s. It had been broken between 1152 and 1155 by Eugenius, Hadrian, and Frederick Barbarossa.⁴ The

1. Watterich, ii, 495 (second letter of the Alexandrine cardinals); echoed by John of Salisbury (Letters, edd. W.J. Miller, H.E. Butler, C.N.L. Brooke, Edinburgh, 1955, i, 210 no. 124), Arnulf of Lisieux (Letters, ed. F. Barlow, Camden Third Series, 61, 1939, pp. 44-5 no. 29), and Robert of Torigny (Chronica, ed. R. Howlett, Rolls Series, 1889, p. 205).

2. On Octavian's family see Kehr 1926; Schwarzmair 1968. The nobles who supported him are listed in the acta of the council of Pavia (MGH. Const., i, 263 no. 188 c. 15) and in the witness-list of an imperial Legatenurkunde issued by Otto of Wittelsbach at Farfa around the time of his consecration (L.A. Muratori, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, Milan, 1726, II/ii, 678).

3. Especially of the Frangipani and Pierleoni: Schwarzmair 1968, 79. He took refuge in Terracina, a town dominated by the Frangipani since the late 1140s (Gregorovius 1896, 501) and was consecrated by the bishop of Terracina (JL 10589). See also above, p. 12.

4. Greenaway 1931, 143-4, 157.

higher nobility came to dominate the city again, while the senate lost prominence.¹ Some of these men were associated with the rapprochement between the papacy and Sicily, and benefitted from Hadrian's extension of control over the patrimonium; others, including the future supporters of Victor, looked to Frederick, and in 1158 and 1159 tried to repair the breach in relations of 1155, when the Romans had attacked Frederick's army after his coronation.² An imperial embassy sent in reponse was still in Rome when Hadrian died.³

The Alexandrines complained that the members of this embassy, especially Otto of Wittelsbach, helped to secure Victor's election; after Frederick had declared for Victor they claimed that the embassy had acted on his orders.⁴ Certainly Victor had long enjoyed good relations with Frederick and the Germans.⁵ Frederick in turn encouraged him: while he was on legation to the imperial court in the summer of 1159 Frederick granted the county of Terni to him and his brothers as an imperial fief, and at the same time issued a privilege to the canons of St. Peter's, who later supported Victor.⁶ But it is unlikely that Frederick's embassy, whatever part they played, acted on instructions. Hadrian's death was sudden and unexpected; Frederick, who was at Crema, could not have got any

1. The Frangipani and Pierleoni appear as consuls in 1162: below, p. 85 ; the quiescence of the senate in this period can be seen from the documents published in F. Bartolini, Codice Diplomatico del Senato Romano dal MCXLIV al MCCCXLVII, Rome, 1948 .

2. Vincentii Pragensis Annales, MGH, SS, xvii, 673; Sudendorf, ii, 133 no. 54.

3. Gesta, iv, 49-50.

4. Holtzmann 1930, 397, 399-400; JL 10627.

5. Zenker 1964, 66-9.

6. Zeillinger 1964.

instructions to his legates before the third week of September, by which time the essential actions had already been taken. But it is probable that Otto of Wittelsbach helped Victor to conquer parts of the patrimonium with Frederick's knowledge. Certainly he was never punished for it.¹ And no doubt Otto, who had already clashed with Roland at Besançon in 1157, felt secure in doing what he could to prevent Roland's election.

The Alexandrine explanation then has much truth in it: Victor was able to invade the papacy because of collusion on the part of the emperor and support from his friends and relations in Rome. The Victorines had a different explanation which legitimized Victor's claim. They said that there had been a pact between Hadrian, William of Sicily, and the rebellious cities of Milan, Piacenza, Brescia, and Crema, which was aimed against Frederick. As additional security, the cardinals were included; some of them took oaths to support the pope to the death, and, should Hadrian die, only to allow one of the sworn to be elected. The first mention of this pact comes in the letter of the Victorine cardinals: having sent Octavian off on a legation to Frederick, the pro-Sicilian cardinals swore with Hadrian to excommunicate Frederick, which they had previously urged unsuccessfully should be done '*aliqua occasione assumpta*', and to elect only one of their number should Hadrian happen to die. The surrounding bishops were similarly bound not to consecrate any pope '*nisi in quem Sicula secta consentiret*'.² Much the same story is told in the speech made by

1. Hadrian's death: above, p. 9 . Frederick at Crema: St. 3864ff. Crema-Rome is nearly 700 km., which would be ten days' journey even for a lightly travelling messenger. Otto: Holtzmann 1930, 397, and below, p. 24.

2. *Gesta*, iv, 62, pp. 634/6.

Victor's defender at the council of Pavia, though the nature of the conspiracy is here left more vague.¹ At the council the charge seems to have been broadened to include conspiring with the rebel cities in Lombardy.² This version is expanded in two later narrative sources, the Chronicon of Burchard of Ursperg,³ and the Gesta Federici I Imperatoris in Lombardia, where the conspiracy is presented as a bilateral agreement between Hadrian and the four Lombard towns (Sicily is not mentioned); the towns swore not to make peace with Frederick without the permission of Hadrian or his catholic successor, and Hadrian agreed to excommunicate Frederick within forty days, though he died before this could be done.⁴

It is clear that the curia had been divided in the late 1150s over the attitude to be taken towards Sicily. Frederick had made a bilateral treaty with Eugenius III in March 1153 and renewed it with Hadrian IV in early 1155, by which the pope undertook to crown Frederick and support him against his enemies in return for help against the Romans and in recovering and defending the terras sancti Petri, in other words checking the northward expansion of the kings of Sicily.⁵ Frederick was unable to keep his side of the bargain, and Hadrian, after joining in an abortive

1. MGH, Const., i, 258-60 no. 186.

2. MGH, Const., i, 263 no. 189 (Frederick to Eberhard of Salzburg); ibid., 267 no. 190 c. 5 (encyclical of the council of Pavia); Gesta, iv, 81, p. 696 (Eberhard of Bamberg to Eberhard of Salzburg).

3. 2nd. edn. by O. Holder-Egger and B. Simson, MGH, SRG, 1916, p. 39.

4. Ed. O. Holder-Egger, MGH, SRG, 1892, pp. 38-9.

5. Rassow 1961, 115-20, is the best text of the original treaty; Zatschek 1930, 49-51, of the renewal.

attack on the Sicilian kingdom with Byzantium and Sicilian exiles, was forced to come to terms with William I in the bilateral treaty of Benevento on 18 June 1156.¹ Frederick's reaction was very hostile, possibly because in the treaty Hadrian recognized Sicilian possession of lands in Marsia which Frederick regarded as imperial territory.² The cardinals may not at first have approved of the treaty, but Frederick's attitude, confirmed by the incident at Besançon in October 1157, forced them to look more favourably towards Sicily. As early as the spring of 1157 there is evidence of a split within their ranks. Hadrian bought the castellum of Montelibretti in April 1157. The papal capellanus who was installed as castellan undertook to serve the pope, and, should the cardinals be divided on the pope's death, to follow the candidate elected by the sanior et melior pars.³ The implications of this are seen in another of the documents relating to the transfer of the castle, whereby the owner made the castle over to Hadrian to do as he wished with, except that he might not let it come into the hands of Oddo Bobone or any of his relatives.⁴ We know that Oddo later supported Victor - he wrote as Victor's seneschal to Louis VII⁵ - and it would seem that the nascent anti-imperial party were trying to secure their position territorially. The Victorines claimed

1. MGH, Const., i, 588-91 nos. 413-14.

2. This is the thesis of Clementi 1968, questioned by Hoffmann 1971, 89-90 note 334. Frederick's reaction: Gesta, iii, 20, p. 438.

3. Liber Censuum, edd. P. Fabre and L. Duchesne, Paris, 1910, ii, 127 no. 24.

4. Ibid., i, 394 no. 111.

5. RHF., xvi, 29 no. 94.

at the council of Pavia that after the incident at Besançon there was a Sicula secta at the curia,¹ and this seems a plausible claim when we consider the above evidence, and the fact that Hadrian helped to mediate a peace between Manuel Comnenus and William I in 1158.²

Whether there was an actual pact, as the Victorines claimed, is more doubtful. Relations between Hadrian and Frederick deteriorated rapidly from the autumn of 1158 on,³ and the curia may well have been considering excommunicating Frederick by the summer of 1159. But though they would have needed Sicilian support in doing this, there is no apparent reason why William I should have offered it. Frederick was occupied in Lombardy; the last thing William wanted was to give him a reason to move southwards. An alliance between the curia and the Lombards seems more likely, but here it is significant that this was not part of the Victorines' original accusation.⁴ The inference is that the Victorines, themselves more concerned with the change of attitude towards Sicily, worked in this new accusation when they realized that the Lombards and not Sicily were now Frederick's main concern. The letters sent by Alexander to the Lombards after his election lent

1. MGH, Const., i, 259 no. 186 c. 7.

2. Rassow 1961, 77.

3. Gesta, iv, 18-22, 34-6.

4. Above, pp. 18-19.

colour to the accusation.¹ But if the Victorines were wrong in the details of their accusations they were right in the substance. There was a group of cardinals at the curia who were no longer prepared to maintain good relations with the empire on any terms, and were willing to look elsewhere for help. The death of Hadrian gave Victor and his supporters an opportunity to change this, but though his support in Rome enabled him to be elected, it was not strong enough to crush Alexander. The schism would have to be settled by the outside world.

1. MGH, Const., i, 267 no. 190 c. 5.

Chapter two

The councils of Pavia and Beauvais

With the consecration of Victor a disturbed and violent papal election had become definite schism. Neither pope was strong enough to stay in Rome. Victor, probably in the company of Otto of Wittelsbach, moved southwards to Segni after his consecration at Farfa; this might be interpreted as an attack on Alexander, but the latter's itinerary shows that at the same time as Victor was moving south, Alexander felt safe enough to leave Terracina for Ninfa, thence to Anagni.¹ Already he had begun to appeal to the churches of Christendom. On 26 September he sent the letter Eterna et incommutabilis to Syrus, archbishop of Genoa and his suffragans, informing him of the divided election. This was followed on 5 October by a new recension sent to several recipients which took the story up to Alexander's excommunication of Victor on 27 September. A final recension bearing general encyclical addresses was sent out on various occasions from mid-October onwards.² The sending of Wahlanzeigen was not unknown in the twelfth century, but it was not normally done systematically, and often popes wrote only to personal friends, or to communities with which their dead predecessor had been closely associated, to ask for their prayers.³ There were certainly no established rules governing the choice of recipients. Even in the special circumstances of the schism of 1130 neither Innocent nor Anacletus made any systematic attempt to send letters to every bishop, or even every province.⁴ Alexander made a more determined effort than any

1. JL, ii, 147-8, 419.

2. See appendix b, pp. 232-5, for details.

3. Gutmann 1931, 36-50.

4. Only JL 7407, 7410, 7413 of Innocent's letters are genuine: see Schmale 1954.

of his predecessors, but his coverage was still patchy. Some of the versions - that for Scotland, for example - were clearly sent because there was a suitable messenger available.¹ The fact that the bishops of Paris and Bologna received copies, while some important bishops and archbishops apparently did not, suggests that Alexander intended to appeal to the 'public opinion' formed by the new intelligentsia in the church, rather than to those with political weight. No king received a copy of Eterna, and those prelates who had the ears of kings were not singled out for special treatment either.

Alexander did at least make his case known, and early. Victor did not. He probably lacked the resources (Alexander, as former chancellor, would have taken most of the chancery with him), and his first announcements of his election were poor compared with Alexander's. All that have survived are a letter from him and a letter from his electors to the princes of the empire, and a fragment of a letter to Rainald, archbishop of Cologne.² He apparently made no attempt to communicate with the west.³ This may have been out of deference to Frederick, or simply because he had no-one to take his letters. Whatever the reason, it was a serious omission. Alexander's case went by default at the council of Pavia; Victor's equally went by default in the crucial months in 1160 before the western churches reached their decision.

1. Barrow 1960, 14.

2. JL 14426; Gesta, iv, 62; JL 14425.

3. No Wahlanzeige from Victor has survived in an English or French ms.; since other letters from him have, this cannot be due to squeamishness about preserving such things. The council of London apparently only had the encyclical of the council of Pavia before it: see below, pp. 228-31.

Election encyclicals to distant parts of Europe were a long-term diplomatic investment. The immediate object of attention for both sides was Frederick, the advocatus sancte Romane ecclesie, who had the duty of defending the rightful pope against the schismatic intrusus. He knew that schism was likely before 16 September. On that date he wrote to Eberhard of Salzburg, saying that there had been a divided election, and asking Eberhard not to give his support to either of the two popes before a general decision should have been taken.¹ A letter from Eberhard of Bamberg which accompanied it shows that at that time it was thought in the imperial camp that the two candidates were Bernard of Porto and Octavian.² Frederick also informed Eberhard that he had sent Peter, bishop of Pavia, to inform the kings of England and France of the schism, and to make peace between them so that a common decision could be reached.³ So far, whatever his agents might be doing, Frederick himself was behaving correctly.

The final stage in the schismatic election, Victor's consecration on 4 October, would have become known to Frederick sometime during the third week of October. He decided that it was his duty to summon a council, or rather a meeting, at which the causes of the two popes could be judged. This was not just his decision; he acted on the advice of his bishops.⁴ He justified it by refer-

1. MGH, Const., i, 252f: no. 181.

2. A, ff. 27v-28v = Tegnagel, pp. 391f. no. 37.

3. Each had asked for his assistance earlier in the year; Gesta, iv, 24, pp. 568/70.

4. MGH, Const., i, 253 no. 182, 254 no. 183.

ring to the 'decretis Romanorum pontificum et statutis ecclesie'.¹ He may have thought that the provisions of the Concordat of Worms for the settling of disputed elections could apply to the papacy;² otherwise it is impossible to say what he had in mind. This does not mean, though, that his action was unjustifiable. As advocatus of the Roman church, he had a duty to protect the pope; but there were now two popes, each of whom had been consecrated and had excommunicated the other.³ Whatever Frederick's personal inclinations might have been, he could not choose alone. He needed a decision of the church to act on. At first sight it might seem that the assembly he summoned was a Hofgericht, not a council. The summonses to Pavia call the meeting a 'curia et conventus'.⁴ But this can be explained as a tactful avoidance of the word concilium, a meeting which only a pope could call. The 'iustitia' which was to be dispensed at Pavia was not Frederick's, but 'Dei et ecclesie'.⁵ Rahewin makes Frederick refer to the precedents of Constantine, Theodosius, Justinian, Charles and Otto,⁶ but the parallels are rather with Lothar, Louis VI and Henry I in 1130 and 1131. The citation of the two popes appears to go beyond this, but was obvious and logical, since they could attend without difficulty.

1. MGH, Const., i, 253 no. 182, 254 no. 183.

2. Frederick and Rainald later claimed, in anger, that only the emperor was concerned with papal elections, since Rome was on imperial territory: Saxo Grammaticus, MGH, SS, xxix, 114.

3. Rahewin stresses this: Gesta, iv, 64, p. 644.

4. MGH, Const., i, 253 no. 182, 254 no. 183, 255 no. 184.

5. Ibid., 256 no. 184.

6. Gesta, iv, 64, p. 644; iv, 74, pp. 660/2. Ullmann 1973, 295, is more confident than I should care to be that Rahewin was actually quoting Frederick's own words and thoughts.

This is to sketch out the role laid down for Frederick by the traditions of his office. But the question remains, was Frederick merely using this role to promote Victor? The Alexandrines maintained - after the council had been held - that Frederick had shown partiality from the beginning. Otto of Wittelsbach had violently invaded the patrimonium; Frederick's legates had greeted Roland as chancellor but Victor as pope, and so forth.¹ To these charges can be added evidence not available to them: Frederick's diplomata for the canons of St. Peter's and for Octavian's family, issued in the summer of 1159.² The modern consensus is that Frederick maintained an appearance of neutrality throughout the autumn, an appearance belied by the actions of his legates, which reveal a determination to see Victor succeed which showed itself at Pavia.³ Even those writers who reject some or all of the details supplied by the Alexandrines have spoken of 'apparent neutrality', the implication being underlying partiality.⁴ The implication is probably justified, but it does not follow that Frederick had no grounds for his partiality other than those of power politics, or that the council of Pavia was simply an instrument of his will.

The bishops Daniel of Prague and Hermann of Verden were entrusted with the mission of summoning the two popes to the council, which was fixed for 13 January 1160.⁵ They probably set out in

1. Gesta, iv, 63, pp. 642/4; Holtzmann 1930, 399; Watterich, ii, 496ff.

2. Zeillinger 1964.

3. Cf., e.g., Rousset de Pina 1953, 54.

4. Hauck, 247-9; Hampe-Baethgen 1969, 171 (whence the quotation).

5. Gesta, iv, 64, p. 644.

the second half of November.¹ Victor accepted the summons; Alexander did not. Boso gives a text purporting to be his reply, but this has been shown to be a concoction from contemporary documents.² But though the words used may have been different, Boso probably gives the gist of the reply. Frederick had no right to call a council, and in any case the Roman church could not be judged by anyone. Besides this public response there was a more conciliatory one. The cardinals offered to call a council at Rome 'si circa factum nostrum corrigendum aliquid videretur, prompto animo correcturi'. The imperial legates demanded pledges and hostages, whereupon the negotiations were broken off.³ But not completely. The legation which Alexander sent to France in December 1160 was apparently empowered to go to the council at Pavia. Difficulties over safe-conducts prevented its appearance there.⁴ The problems faced by the Alexandrines are succinctly stated in the letter written by the Alexandrine cardinals in the spring of 1160: they had to defend the libertas ecclesie and at the same time not to appear arrogant.⁵ In the end, libertas ecclesie seemed more important. But Alexander may still have hoped that Frederick would support him, since with one exception he waited until after the council had declared for Victor before sending out legates to plead his

1. Victor was at Segni on 28 Oct. (JL 14426) and at Vetralla, 30 km. SSW of Viterbo, on 5 Dec., when he had presumably received the summons and was moving towards Pavia. If Alexander's legation to France be taken as a reaction to Frederick's summons, then this too suggests that it arrived at the end of November, since the letters of credence (JL 10600) are dated 12 Dec.

2. Holtzmann 1930, 390-1.

3. Watterich, ii, 497.

4. Holtzmann 1930, 394.

5. Watterich, ii, 497.

case.¹

The council had to be postponed to February because the siege of Crema had taken longer than expected.² Bishops from Lombardy, Burgundy, and Germany were present, together with observers from various other kingdoms. Frederick made a short opening speech and then withdrew. The council deliberated for a week. It had before it witnesses from the Roman clergy and nobility, an affidavit from the canons of St. Peter's, and three of Victor's cardinals, as well as a copy of Eterna and of the letter which Alexander's legates sent from Genoa.³ William of Pavia was also present in an ambiguous role. What seems to have swayed the council most was the fact that Victor had submitted to its judgement, while Alexander had not, either in person or through representatives. Some of the Lombard bishops said that Alexander ought to have been cited three times, but the Germans replied that holding and attending councils was an expensive business, and if Alexander did not choose to respond to a preremptory summons that was his affair.⁴ Important also was Victor's prior enmantling; it was claimed that Innocent had been preferred to Anacletus for this reason.⁵ Finally, there was the proof that Roland and his supporters had taken part in a conspiracy against Frederick and the empire. The stress laid on this argument at the council has often been

1. Ohnsorge 1928, 162-6.

2. Rahewin says it began on 2 Feb. (Gesta, iv, 72, p. 660); Henry of Berchtesgaden, who was present, says 5 Feb. (Gesta, iv, 82, p. 698).

3. Gesta, iv, 76-7, MGH, Const., i, 265ff. no. 190. For the Alexandrine writings see below, pp. 32-5 and Holtzmann 1930, 394.

4. Vincent of Prague, Annales, MGH, SS, xvii, 679. For the meaning of preremptory in this context, see Erdmann 1944, 283.

5. Gesta, iv, 81, p. 696 (Eberhard of Bamberg to Eberhard of Salzburg); MGH, Const., i, 268 no. 190 c. 5.

used as a proof that the council was completely under Frederick's control.¹ But if the proof of the conspiracy was convincing (now obviously impossible to determine) there were good canonical grounds for rejecting Alexander's election because of it. The conspiracy was simoniacal, and an abuse of the rights of the electors; an established canonical maxim said that whoever abused a privilege should lose it.² In the end, although some were still reluctant to make a final decision, it was decided to accept Victor on 9 February.³ On 11 February he was fetched from the monastery where he had been awaiting the council's decision, and formally adored by the council. Frederick acknowledge him, and as a sign of this performed the officium stratoris for him. On the following day Victor excommunicated Alexander and his supporters.⁴ An encyclical giving the decision of the council, the grounds for the decision, and the names of those who were present and consented was drawn up, and copies of it were taken to the other kingdoms of Europe by imperial legates: Daniel of Prague to Hungary, Hermann of Verden to Spain, Rainald of Cologne to France and Garsidonius of Mantua to England.⁵

The decision taken at Pavia could not be ignored, but the council was not sufficiently large or representative to be able to settle the schism. Much still depended on the reactions of the other national churches, especially those of France and England.

1. Rousset de Pina 1953, 56 is again a good example.

2. Gregory the Great, quoted by Gratian, D. 74 c. 7 and C. 11 q. 3 c. 63.

3. There is confusion over the length of time the council sat; cf. Reuter, i, 508. I follow Henry of Berchtesgaden, Gesta, iv, 82, p. 700, whose date is confirmed by the dating clause of St. 3883.

4. Gesta, iv, 82, p. 700; MGH, Const., i, 268-9 no. 190.

Frederick had already seen this. He tried to mediate between France and England, and later he invited various rulers to send representatives to the council of Pavia.¹ Many of them did so, but their representatives were not empowered to act, merely to observe, and their masters would only agree to consider, not to follow, the decision taken at Pavia.² Alexander had also taken some steps to secure support in France; he wrote to Henry, bishop of Beauvais, Louis VII's brother, and to Constance, his queen, perhaps also to Philip of L'Aumône.³ From March onwards letters from both sides began to arrive in the west. The Pavia encyclical was answered by two letters from the Alexandrines. One was written by Philip of L'Aumône and sent out under his name and those of Henry and Otto, Alexander's legates to France.⁴ It rebuts the Pavia encyclical point by point. From Italy Alexander's cardinals sent the letter Merore simul, which goes over the ground covered by

[p. 31 note 5] Gesta, iv, 82, p. 702; Vincent of Prague, Annales, MGH, SS, xvii, 679. Helmold, Cronica Slavorum, 3rd edn. by J. M. Lappenberg and B. Schmeidler, MGH, SRG, 1937, p. 190, says that the embassy to England was undertaken by Adolf, count of Holstein, and Rainald of Cologne. Probably these two and Garsidonus went together to France, prepared to split up if necessary.

1. MGH, Const., i, 253 no. 182, 255 no. 184. The letter to Henry II has survived (ibid., 254 no. 183) and a comparison of this with the wording of Saxo Grammaticus (MGH, SS, xxix, 111) shows that Waldemar of Denmark must also have received one.

2. Eberhard of Bamberg said this explicitly of the kings of England and France (Gesta, iv, 81, p. 698); for the others, see below, pp. 51, 56.

3. JL 10595, 10596. The letter to Philip is implied in his letter to Alexander (PL, 200, 1359-61), but this may be a reference to Eterna, which survives in Philip's collection (below, pp. 225, 233).

4. RHF, xv, 753-6 no. 11.

Eterna and adds a graphic description of the events at Pavia.¹

Alexander himself sent out a new set of letters on the schism at the end of March and beginning of April.² Support for him was already gathering in France and England. Peter of La Celle wrote a fiery letter to Henry of Beauvais urging him to do what he could for Alexander.³ Arnulf of Lisieux, on hearing of the schism, wrote to the cardinals and to Alexander offering support and advice.⁴ Replies to the Pavia encyclical were composed by Aelred of Rievaulx, Arnulf of Lisieux, and John of Salisbury. Aelred's letter like all his other is lost.⁵ Arnulf's is known to have made a considerable effect at the council of London in June 1160. It drew on Eterna, and on Alexander's letter to Arnulf of 4 April, but added a good deal of its own.⁶ The council of Pavia was attacked on its weakest front, the source of its power of jurisdiction. Arnulf borrowed from Alexander's letter to play on the fears of the English clergy. Octavian had been invested with ring and staff by Frederick, who intended to subjugate all kingdoms to his power. John of Salisbury's letter, a brilliant piece of rhetoric, was addressed to Master Ralph of Serre, one of the archbishop of

1. Watterich, ii, 493ff.

2. JL 10627-9.

3. RHF, xvi, 176 no. 18; since it does not mention Frederick, it may have been written before the news of Pavia had reached the west.

4. Letters, ed. Barlow, nos. 23, 24.

5. It is recorded in J. Bale, Index Britanniae Scriptorum, edd. R. L. Poole and M. Bateson, (Oxford, 1902), p. 13. See also Aelred's sermon, PL, 195, 675.

6. Letters, ed. Barlow, no. 28. For its effect see Gilbert Foliot's letter to Alexander III, The Letters and Charters of Gilbert Foliot, edd. A. Morey and C. N. L. Brooke, Cambridge, 1967, no. 133 p. 176.

Rheims' familia. It is not found outside John's own collection, and there is no independent evidence for its effect as there is with Arnulf's letter, but it must have added to the volume of propaganda put out by Alexander and his cardinals, and helped to circulate the points made by them.¹

The cumulative effect of all this must have been considerable, and it put the Victorines seriously at a disadvantage. Alexander had been able to make his case in the west in the autumn of 1159, in the encyclical Eterna. The Pavia encyclical arrived fairly late, and at the same time too soon. The kings of England and France could not come to a decision on the schism until they had first made peace, and this did not happen until May.² By that time Alexander and his supporters had had time to digest the Pavia encyclical and compose effective replies to it. This was the easier because the Pavia encyclical came from a completely different ecclesiastical world from that of the west. The points it made were the wrong ones, and they were made in the wrong way. To the council, it was an additional reinforcement of their recognition of Victor that Frederick and his princes had acknowledged him and that Frederick had performed the officium stratoris. If this meant anything to western churchmen it was something rather sinister; Alexandrine propaganda was able to put a gloss on it by referring to Frederick's Salian ancestry, to Wibert of Ravenna,

1. Letters, edd. Miller, Butler, Brooke, no. 124. For the texts used by John see ibid., p. 204 note 1: the two letters from Alexander's cardinals of 1160 should perhaps be added. It is worth noting that many of these propaganda letters had a wider circulation than their manuscript transmission would imply; e.g. Merore simul survives in only one ms., B.L. Royal 9 B xii (see below, p. 230), but another copy must have been used for the account of the schism given in the universal chronicle of St. Martin of Tours (cf. MGH, SS, xxvi, 462-3)

2. RHF, xvi, 21 no. 80.

and by inventing stories about Victor's investiture with ring and staff.¹ To the council it was self-evident that the procedure to be followed was a judicial one; the two parties were cited, witnesses were heard, and a judgement given, and given in a form which deliberately imitated the election of a pope.² Though the substance of what happened in the west was no doubt similar, much greater care was given to avoid the appearance of judgement.³

Not only did Alexander win the war of propaganda, he also gained the support of the Cistercians and Carthusians, two of the most well-organized forces in the western church. The Vita S. Anthelmi records Anthelm's labours on behalf of Alexander, and says that the Carthusians (and the Cistercians) accepted Alexander before the church as a whole; this seems to be borne out by the presence of Carthusians as a group at the Anglo-French council of July 1160.⁴ The Vita's statement about the Cistercians is supported by another chronicler, and there are some indications that the Cistercians met in the early summer of 1160 and decided for Alexander. Besides a rather doubtful seventeenth-century source,⁵ we have two Cistercian sermons which might be associated with such a meeting. The first was preached by Geoffrey of Auxerre, 'dominica ante rogationes qua canitur Vocem Iucundi-

1. Frederick's proavi: JL 10627. Wibert: letter of Philip, Henry and Otto (cit. above, p. 32, note 5), p. 756. Investiture: JL 10627. Examples of this technique could easily be multiplied.

2. MGH. Const., i, 268 no. 190 c. 7.

3. Theobald to Henry II, John of Salisbury, Letters, edd. Miller, Butler, Brooke, i, 216 no. 125: '...non quidem iudicatum est quia nec licuit...'. .

4. AA SS. Iunii, v, 232; Fastrad of Clairvaux to Ommibene of Verona, A, f. 52v = Tengnagel, p. 414 no. 60.

5. See Preiss 1934, 39 and note 11.

tatis'.¹ The council referred to is probably that of Pavia, and the sermon would have been delivered on 1 May 1160, apparently to a gathering of Cistercians. There is also a sermon by Aelred, which, if it was delivered and is not a 'literary' sermon, was probably given at about the same time.² There is then a presumption that the Cistercians, or a substantial body of them, had decided to support Alexander by the summer of 1160, and this is reinforced by the number of individual Cistercians who came out early for Alexander: Philip of L'Aumône, Aelred of Rievaulx, Henry of France.

Alexander, then, had a definite advantage by the time the kings of France and England came to make up their minds. But it was not an overwhelming one. Frederick was on good terms with Henry, if not with Louis, and Theobald of Canterbury at least was worried by this.³ There were supporters of Victor in both kingdoms, as well as those who simply wished to defer a decision.⁴ Moreover,

1. Leclercq 1954a, 198-200.

2. PL, 195, 455-61. This is an exposition of Isaiah xv, and calls Frederick Moab; the only other contemporary use of this parallel is in the letter of Alexander's cardinals (Watterich, ii, 498): 'In his autem et ambitionem illius [Octavian] et Moab [so B.L., ms. Royal 9 B xii, f. 4va, not malam as Watterich] superbiam cognoscences...'. Aelred may have taken his idea from this letter.

3. John of Salisbury, Letters, edd. Miller, Butler, Brooke, i, 202 no. 122, 204 no. 123. See also Arnulf of Lisieux, Letters, ed. Barlow, p. 33 no. 24. Most of the evidence for the earlier relations between Frederick and the two rulers is in Gesta, iii, 7, 14; see the forthcoming (1975) article by K. J. Leyser in EHR.

4. The bishops of Durham and Winchester were said to favour Victor (John of Salisbury, ed. cit., 215 no. 124). In France, Cluny was Victorine (below, pp 186-7), and Manasses, bishop of Orleans, was said to be (RHF, xv, 765-6 no. 23 and below, p. 92). For general references to Victorines and those who favoured delay, see Lambert of Waterloo, MGH, SS, xvi, 534; Fastrad of Clairvaux, A, ff. 51v-52r = Tengnagel, pp. 412-3 no. 60.

neither king had yet declared for Alexander, whatever enthusiastic supporters might claim.¹ When the clergy of the two kingdoms met in the summer of 1160, the issue was still undecided. Their meetings have been frequently discussed. The basic problem is the number and date of the councils, and the date and place at which the two kings recognized Alexander. The English and French chronicle evidence is fairly unanimous: somewhere on the border between Normandy and the Île-de-France, either at Beauvais or at Neufmarché, the two kings met with their clergy in July, and after deliberating for some time agreed to recognize Alexander.² The confusion has arisen for three reasons. First, the letters which refer to the council, unlike the chroniclers, do not say when or where it took place.³ This would not matter but for the fact that Gerhoch of Reichersberg, in his De Investigatione Antichristi, says that he has heard while writing the news that a council had just been held at Toulouse, at which the kings of England and France, with a hundred prelates, agreed to accept Alexander.⁴ Thirdly, Arnulf of Lisieux says in a letter to the English church that the French church had decided for Alexander, but that Louis had committed the decision to Henry II.⁵ It has therefore been possible to posit either a joint council which met in October 1160 at Toulouse and recognized Alexander or separate recognition by Henry followed by Louis in the autumn of 1160.⁶ This has been

1. Arnulf of Lisieux, ed. cit., pp. 33 no. 24, 42 no. 28.

2. Cheney 1969, 483-5.

3. Ibid., 481-3

4. MGH, LdL, iii, 365-6.

5. Ed. cit., p. 42 no. 28.

6. Cheney 1969, 488-97, summarizes these views.

thought necessary because Henry was supposed to have used the uncertainty of the situation to extract a dispensation from Alexander's legates for the marriage of his son to Louis' daughter, a marriage which by an agreement of 1158 confirmed in the peace of May 1160 gave Henry possession of three important castles in the Vexin. This marriage took place on 2 November, and it seems improbable that Henry could have got his dispensation in this way if he had recognized Alexander four months earlier at a solemn council.¹ Recently the problem has been studied by Mrs Cheney, who has shown that traffic between England and the curia was in full flow by October, and that Henry must therefore have recognized Alexander in July, since people would hardly have dared to go to Rome without his permission; she has also shown how improbable it is that the two kings should have held a council at Toulouse - Gerhoch must be mistaken.²

Mrs Cheney's reconstruction of the events is undoubtedly correct. After peace was made in May, Henry summoned a council of the English clergy, which met in London at the end of June.³ This considered the documents issued by both sides⁴ and decided in favour of Alexander, sending this advice privately to Henry. The two kings then called councils of their continental clergy, which met in mid-July, at first separately and then together at Beauvais, where the legates from Alexander, Victor, who had sent the

1. Marriage: Ralph of Diss, Ymagines Historiarum ed. W. Stubbs, Rolls Series, 1876, i, 304. Treaty: RHF, xvi, 21-3 no. 80.

2. Cheney 1969, 474-9, 490. For a possible explanation of Gerhoch's mistake, see Classen 1973, 222-3.

3. Barlow 1936, 265.

4. See Foliot to Alexander (cit. above, p. 33 note 6), and below, pp 228-31.

two cardinals John and Guido, and Frederick were also present. There was a debate between Guido and William of Pavia, who had joined Alexander's two other legates, at the end of which Guido was trapped into contradicting himself. The impression made by this was so great that the archbishop of Rouen and the bishop of Le Mans recognized Alexander forthwith. For this they incurred Henry's anger and had to be saved by Becket; but Henry was not objecting to recognition of Alexander so much as to premature recognition without his permission. The final result, which was largely due to Henry, was the recognition of Alexander by both kingdoms. The imperial legates had been sent away hopeful,¹ and a public declaration for Alexander was then made.²

Mrs Cheney thinks that it was Henry who was mainly responsible for Alexander's recognition, and this is supported by several contemporary or near-contemporary sources. In her view Henry was intent on securing the dispensation, and stage-managed the whole affair so as to put the maximum pressure on Alexander's legates. Now it is certainly true that Arnulf of Lisieux wrote to the other cardinals to excuse their action in granting the dispensation, and implied that by doing so they had gained, through Henry, the whole of the west, but Mrs. Cheney herself points out that Arnulf's letters are not straightforward, and her interpretation presents some difficulties. It is not clear why Henry should have waited for four months before using the dispensation if it had been gained secretly from the legates; the dangers of a leak and of counter-

1. 'Spe concordie' is Lambert of Waterloo's phrase (MGH, SS, xvi, 534). Rainald at least had left earlier; he was at Erfurt on 25 Jul. (Annales S. Petri Erphesfurtenses maiores, ed. O. Holder-Egger, MGH, SRG, 1899, pp. 57-8).

2. Cheney 1969, 480-7.

action by Louis would have increased with delay. Nor can one visualize how Henry could have negotiated for the dispensation at a joint council with both kings present without Louis' getting to hear of it. In fact it is very likely that the dispensation was issued with Louis' consent. The treaty of 1160 contains a clause providing for the early marriage of the children if the church would give its consent. This cannot have been slipped past Louis, since like other twelfth-century rulers he did not negotiate his own treaties without advice. Moreover, the text of the dispensation is preserved in a St. Victor manuscript, and almost certainly found its way there from Louis' chancery.¹ Had Louis been unaware of its existence before the marriage, neither the cardinals, who issued it, nor the archbishop of Rouen, who received it, would have been likely to send a copy to Louis after the marriage had taken place. Louis was annoyed when the dispensation was used, but this was not because it had been issued but because it was used in changed circumstances. Louis remarried on the death of his second wife in the autumn of 1160, taking as his bride Adela of Champagne. She was the sister of Theobald of Blois, who had recently become Henry's ally; the marriage was the signal for Henry to attack Theobald's castle of Chaumont, and the fragile peace between the two kings broke down.² Henry promptly put the dispensation into effect, married the two children, and persuaded the Templars who were holding the castles until the terms of the

1. See below, p. 219.

2. Ralph of Diss, *el.cit.*, i, 303; Lambert of Waterloo, *ed. cit.*, 533; Roger of Howden, *ed. W. Stubbs, Rolls Series*, 1868, i, 218; Boussard 1956, 417-9.

to hand them over

treaty were fulfilled. Louis' annoyance at the turn of events was sufficiently great for both Alexander and Cardinal Hyacinth to write soothing letters to him, and for Arnulf of Lisieux to write to the other cardinals to justify the legates' action, but he allowed the legates to crown his new queen, and did not expel them from his lands.¹

If Alexander's recognition was not organized by Henry to procure the dispensation, we need an alternative explanation. Henry, because of his friendly relations with Frederick, was the key figure; Louis could not afford to risk a Staufen-Angevin alliance with papal backing, and had to await Henry's decision. But Henry himself was not a free agent. He could insist that no public recognition of either pope be made without his consent, but he could not easily impose an unwanted pope on his churches. The council of London had decided for Alexander; the French bishops under his control, to judge by the behaviour of the archbishop of Rouen and the bishops of Le Mans and Lisieux, were also in favour of Alexander. By recognizing Victor Henry could please Frederick, but this could not necessarily be turned to hard political advantage, and might well create problems. By recognizing Alexander Henry could be fairly sure of securing a pope agreeable to Louis, since Alexander had strong support in France, including Louis' influential brother Henry, bishop of Beauvais,² and such a

1. JL 10644; RHF, xvi, 24 no. 84; Arnulf of Lisieux, Letters, ed. Barlow, pp. 49-50 no. 29; Chronicon S. Petri Vivi Senonensis, RHF, xii, 284. Janssen 1961, 69, cites a letter from Ernisius, abbot of St. Victor, to Cardinal Otto (RHF, xvi, 25 no. 85) to prove that the legates were asked to leave, but Ernisius did not become abbot until 1162 (Bonnard 1904, 209-10). For the real context of this letter, see below, p. 81.

2. To whom Alexander attributed much of the credit for his recognition: JL 10636.

pope, or his representatives, could issue a dispensation which would give him three valuable castles. In the end, then, it is to the English and French clergy, not their kings, to whom we must look for an explanation of Alexander's recognition. Some of their support was perhaps due to friendly contacts with Alexander in his days as a brilliant master or as chancellor,¹ but the most important factor seems to have been the superiority of Alexandrine propaganda. Victor paid the price of delay, and of concentrating his attention on Frederick.

1. On Alexander's earlier career see Pacaut 1956, 51-105.

Chapter three

The obedience of Christendom

The schism was not simply the concern of the three most powerful rulers in Western Christendom. Between the outbreak of the schism and the meeting at St.-Jean-sur-Laône in 1162 other rulers and their churches had decided for one pope or the other, with or without reference to the decisions taken at Pavia and Beauvais. Normally historians pass lightly over these other decisions, which is probably fair; less is known about them, and it is in any case hard to imagine that anyone except churchmen of the countries concerned attached the same importance to the obedience of, say, Norway or Poland as to that of Louis VII or Henry II. But these decisions were important cumulatively,¹ as the lists given by both sides on numerous occasions show. The Victorines began at Pavia, claiming Denmark, Poland, Bohemia and Hungary as well as the empire.² In the summer of 1160 Frederick produced a list in a letter to Peregrine of Aquileia: '*...iam quoque multa regna, Hyspaniae, Ungarie, Dacie, Boemie, comes quoque Barzelonensis et comes Sancti Egidii cum tota Provincia et Burgundia ei [Victor] obediunt*'.³ There is some indication that the council which met under Frederick and Victor at Lodi in June 1161 put out an official communiqué which made claims about Victor's obedience.⁴ A similar document may be suggested as the source for the list given by Hugh of Cluny in his sad letter to Gilbert Foliot in

1. The *Annales Egmondani*, *MGH, SS*, xvi, 461, say worriedly: '*Preter Germanos enim omnes Theutonici et omnia regna mundi Alexandro adhaerunt...*'.

2. *MGH, Const.*, i, 269-70 no. 190. See below, pp. 240-1

3. *Ibid.*, 274 no. 196.

4. The two main accounts of the council (below, p. 67 note 5) agree sufficiently to suggest that they used a common source.

the summer of 1163. This consists mostly of different provinces of the empire, but includes also Hungary and 'Rossia', by which Hugh might have meant either Poland or Ruthenia.¹ After the death of Victor IV the imperialists, faced with declining support for their popes, put out no further claims, except in the brief period after the council of Würzburg in May 1165, when it was thought that Henry II had been won over.² Alexandrine claims begin with a letter from Eberhard of Salzburg to Roman of Gurk; typically, Eberhard is interested in the decisions of bishops, not of rulers.³ Arnulf of Lisieux was the first to give a list of kingdoms acknowledging Alexander.⁴ He was followed by Alexander himself in a letter to Eberhard of Salzburg in early 1161.⁵ After that, Alexandrine claims became rarer. Cardinal Hyacinth gave a list of Alexander's obedience in a letter to Gerhoch of Reichersberg in 1164, but by that time the need was not felt much. Alexander himself, writing to Anthelme, Carthusian prior of Arvières, at much the same time, simply said that Frederick was the only prince not to acknowledge him.⁶ This was not quite true, but it was true enough.

These claims are interesting in themselves, but scarcely do

1. Materials, v, 31 no. 20.

2. MGH, Const., i, 314ff. nos. 223-5.

3. A, ff. 34r-v = Tengnagel p. 393 no. 38. See below, p. 48.

4. Letters, ed. Barlow, pp. 49-50 no. 29.

5. A, ff. 49r-50r = JL 10645, 20 Jan. 1161. See below, p. 64.

6. Classen 1960, 394 no. 141; JL 11003, Feb. 26 (1164).

justice to a fluid situation. The problem lay in the nature of recognition, or, as contemporaries usually put ^{it} ~~k~~, reception. Both Victor and Alexander affected to treat it as an irrevocable act, but so long as there were two even faintly plausible candidates this was precisely what it could not be. At Pavia, some bishops consented 'salva in posterum catholice ecclesie censura',¹ and this reservation was to some extent in everyone's mind; for this reason the voices heard at Pavia and Beauvais urging delay were heard in other courts and councils where a decision had to be taken. However, most countries and churches did manage to decide and to stick to their decision; only Denmark, and perhaps Hungary, changed sides.

The first country to decide, even before Pavia, was the Norman kingdom of Sicily, which recognized Alexander immediately and permanently. Romoald of Salerno records that William I sent Alexander an embassy on his consecration.² Certainly the recognition must have been prompt, since Alexander apparently did not need to send either a copy of Eterna or legates to Sicily.³ The cardinals' conspiracy, if it existed, would explain this, but there was in any case no likelihood that William would accept Victor, or that Victor would want recognition from a man whose right to rule

1. Gesta, iv, 82, p. 702.

2. Chronicon, MGH, SS, xix, 430.

3. For Eterna see below, pp. 232-5. Ohnsorge 1928, 91-3, thought that legates were sent, but the absence of cardinals from bullae maiores is not enough to prove this, especially since we do not know what led cardinals to sign or not to sign particular privileges, and also since such documents are rare for the early period of Alexander's pontificate. Less formal contacts are not excluded however, and are indeed probable.

he himself did not recognize. There is no sign that the Sicilian opposition was Victorine, though by weakening William's position it was objectively so. As in the 1140s and 1150s, Sicilian exiles looked to Byzantium for assistance.¹

Byzantium itself was very important. The degree of control which Manuel Comnenus could exercise over the Greek church may not have been great enough to force through the necessary changes in doctrine and rite required for reunion with the Latins, but he could certainly decide which pope should be recognized. The prestige such recognition would bring was important for both sides, but for Alexander it could also mean money. Both popes therefore sent legations early on in the schism. Barbarossa sent an embassy after the council of Pavia which consisted of Henry, duke of Carinthia, the notary Henry of Wiesenbach, and Neimerius, the son of a former doge of Venice. Rahewin tells us that this was a response to a petition from Manuel concerning certain cities in the Pentapolis and Apulia, and suggesting plans against William of Sicily. He places the legation however at the end of a long list of missions sent out after Pavia, and there is no doubt that it was also intended to try to secure Manuel's adhesion to Victor IV.² The legation returned before the end of 1160, with no apparent success.³ Alexander also sent an embassy at about the same time, consisting of Ardicio, cardinal deacon of St.

1. Chalandon 1907, ii, 294, says that the conspiracy against the admiral Maio in 1161 was Victorine, but gives no reference. Sicilian exiles and Byzantium: JL 11117; Boso, p. 415.

2. *Gesta*, iv, 84, pp. 704/706.

3. Henry of Wiesenbach appears in some unpublished charters of the bishop of Würzburg in 1160: Hausmann 1956, 140, 157.

Theodore and the bishop of Tivoli.¹ It too had no success. Even to accept Ohnsorge's suggestion that by negotiating with Alexander's legates Manuel recognized Alexander de facto would be to go too far.² The rumour recorded by the notary Burchard in 1161 that Alexander had written to Manuel promising him 'vanitates vanitatum' shows that Manuel wanted to be paid well for his recognition of Alexander.³ Burchard was probably referring to Alexander's second legation to Byzantium, which consisted of Bonadies, cardinal priest of St. Chrysogon and Henry, archbishop of Benevento, and left in the summer of 1161.⁴ We hear no more of the legation or of the 'emptinesses' which Alexander offered - presumably a hint at translatio imperii - but Manuel was probably by now informally committed to Alexander, even if official recognition took a little longer. When Byzantine legates appeared in France in the summer of 1163 they were accredited to Alexander as well as to Louis.⁵

Byzantium's recognition was of political importance; that of the Latin church in the kingdom of Jerusalem was important because of the antiquity and prestige of the churches of Antioch and Jerusalem. Helmold, for example, when listing those who obeyed Alexander, began with these before going on with an 'also'

1. Ohnsorge 1928, 70-1.

2. The sources he cites in support of an early recognition by Manuel come from later in the decade, and as he himself points out, Alexander does not mention Byzantium in his letter to Eberhard of Salzburg (JL 10645), though his legates had returned by then.

3. Ed. Güterbock 1949, 57.

4. Ohnsorge 1928, 72-6.

5. See below, p. 113.

to the kings of France, etc.¹ Eberhard of Salzburg was also impressed by the fact, as he supposed, that Alexander had consecrated 'Ierosolimitanui archiepiscopum Cesariensem' together with a French archbishop and two other bishops, very early in the schism.² Alexander himself, writing to Eberhard, placed the decision of the Latin church at the head of his list.³ In view of the importance which was clearly attached to this church, it is surprising how long it took Alexander to make contact with it.⁴ Boso says that John, cardinal priest of Sts. John and Paul left for the east after the council of Pavia, but when he appears at the other end of the Mediterranean in the pages of William of Tyre it is in a chapter beginning 'per eosdem dies' and following on a chapter recording events of October 1160.⁵ He was made to wait at the coast while a council met to decide what action to take, though he was apparently able to get a copy of Eterna into the kingdom.⁶ Though the general feeling of the council was one of wait and see, Peter of Tyre strongly advocated Alexander, while others recalled the services done by Octavian for the kingdom.⁷

1. Cronica Slavorum, ed. Schmeidler, i, 91, p. 176.

2. Letter to Roman of Gurk, A, f. 34r = Tengnagel, p. 393 no. 38. This was written in late January 1160 (Hödl 1969, 435), at which time only Milo of Théroutanne had been consecrated by Alexander (cf. Alexander's own letters, JL 10618, 10749).

3. JL 10645.

4. No Victorine legation is known. The privilege for the Holy Sepulchre issued on 15 Oct. 1159 (JL 10593) cannot prove anything about an earlier recognition of Alexander by the Latin church.

5. Boso, p. 403; William of Tyre, Historia, xviii, 29.

6. Below, p. 234

7. For these, see above, p. 15 note 5.

Baldwin III in particular feared both the danger of dividing the church and of being mulcted by the legate. Eventually it was decided to recognize Alexander, to whom a letter was sent off,¹ and John was allowed into the country. Baldwin's fears of taxation were justified, according to William of Tyre. The money collected was very welcome to Alexander, however, who may well have used it to buy his way back into Rome for his short-lived triumph in 1161, just as a second legation by John in 1162-4 helped finance his later return in 1165.²

Going north from the Mediterranean we come to the group of kingdoms which were to a greater or lesser extent satellites of Barbarossa's empire: Hungary, Bohemia, Poland, and Denmark. Bohemia seems to have been Victorine at least for the first decade of the schism.³ Poland probably was also: the Pavia encyclical claimed the consent of the archbishop and duke of the Poles, and a dux Polonorum was present at the council of Lodi.⁴ Certainly Alexander is not known to have sent any legates there until after the schism.⁵ But in any case Polish relations with the papacy at this period were minimal; the importance of the schism was pro-

1. A, ff. 50v-51r = Tengnagel, pp. 410-11 no. 57, from Amalric of Jerusalem and his suffragans. This letter is doubly unique: it is the only instance in the 1159 of formal reception by a church, not a ruler (except for the council of Pavia, which was rather different), and it is the only occasion on which the 1059 election decree was referred to.

2. Ohnsorge 1928, 68, has pointed out the connexion between the second return to Rome and John's second legation, but not the earlier one. On these events, see below, pp. 66-7, 137-8.

3. Ohnsorge 1928, 105-7.

4. MGH, Const., i, 270 no. 190; for Lodi see below, p. 67 note 6.

5. Ohnsorge 1928, 105.

bably less there than anywhere else in Europe.¹

Like Boleslaw IV and his nephews, Géza II of Hungary was a satellite of the empire, but he was in a stronger position than they were. While Poland and Denmark had a potentially partible kingdom, the Hungarian tradition was for a single son to succeed, rival brothers and nephews suffering exile or worse. This gave Byzantium and less frequently the western empire the opportunity to intervene in Hungarian politics in support of exiled claimants, but on the whole it enabled the Hungarian king to face his outside enemies with greater resources and less internal division. Although Géza had submitted to Barbarossa in 1158, promising tribute and military service in Italy,² he was still a rex, a man whom Frederick could call an (ex-) amicus, even while expecting 'voluntas obsequendi'.³ Accordingly, he was sent a legate after the council of Pavia to ask for his confirmation of the decision to recognize Victor. His own legates had taken part in the council. Frederick's legate was Daniel, bishop of Prague, who had already been concerned in the negotiations of 1158. Géza received Daniel well, but said that he could not recognize Victor without first consulting his clergy and his magnates. If Daniel cared to wait, he might take the reply with him; otherwise it could be sent by letter.⁴ One good reason for Géza not to have thrown in his lot with Victor immediately was the presence of legates of Alexander's at

1. Völker 1930, 39.

2. Gesta, iii, 15, iv, 24; Vincent of Prague, Annales, MGH, SS, xvii, 667. Géza wanted to buy off support for his brother Stephen.

3. Cf. Burchard, ed. Güterbock 1949, 56, with Gesta, iv, 86.

4. Vincent of Prague, p. 679.

his court.¹ I do not know why Alexander should have favoured Géza with a legation;² there were no contacts between the Hungarian church or ruler and the curia in the previous decade, except for the provinces of Spalato and Zara. Here, although Géza ruled as king of Croatia and Dalmatia, and was not without influence on the church, he faced competition from Venice and Byzantium. The archbishops of Spalato especially looked to the curia as a result.³ But even if it is not clear why Alexander sent a legation it is certain that he did. The result was that at this stage Géza committed himself to neither pope, while allowing Frederick to think that he favoured Victor. The two legates arrived back at the curia at the end of 1160. The next year Peter and possibly Julius returned with a pallium for the archbishop-elect, Lucas of Gran. At the same time (summer of 1161) he or they concluded a concordat with Géza which gave him the same powers as the treaty of Benevento had done to William I of Sicily in 1156. Following this, Géza recognized Alexander, and wrote to him, to Eberhard of Salzburg, and to Louis VII to say so.⁴

1. Ohnsorge 1928, 110-1: Peter of St. Eustace and Julius of Praeneste.

2. Ohnsorge's idea that Alexander wanted to 'encircle' the Empire is an interesting demonstration of the effect of World War I on German medievalists.

3. Absalon of Spalato was a Hungarian, and Géza issued a privilege to him in 1159 (Holtzmann 1926, 413 note 1). But papal legates seem to have appointed his successor without consulting Géza: cf. JL 10669 and Ohnsorge 1928, 112. The archbishop of Zara favoured Victor, loc. cit.

4. To Eberhard, A, ff. 55v-56r = Tengnagel, pp. 429-30 no. 68; to Louis, V, ff. 41v-42v = RHF, xvi, 27 no. 89.

A letter to Alexander is mentioned in Lucas of Gran's letter to Eberhard of Salzburg (next page, note 2).

Ohnsorge and Holtzmann thought that Géza recognized Alexander at the end of 1160 on hearing the news of the 'council of Toulouse'.¹ It is true that in his letter to Louis VII he talks of

Alexandrum, quem universalis ecclesia et vestre regie dignitatis auctoritas confirmavit et confirmatum recepit, sicut per nuntios meos mandastis, confirmavi recepi et ab hoc nullo modo dissentire proposui,

but it does not follow from this that his reaction to the news was instantaneous. There are two arguments in favour of 1161. The first is a letter from Lucas of Gran to Eberhard of Salzburg in which, styling himself electus, he says that he has persuaded Géza to declare for Alexander; this must have been written after 27 April 1161, when Lucas' predecessor Martirus died.² Lucas could perhaps have used his influence before he became archbishop, but we know from Burchard that Siegfried, provost of Paderborn, was sent as an imperial legate in the summer of 1161 to Géza to arrange a marriage between Géza's daughter and the son of Ludwig of Thuringia, to get Géza to send archers to Italy, and 'de negotio ecclesie'. Only after he returned, having been 'non bene susceptus...non bene dismissus', was Géza's hostility clear to the imperial court.³ Géza will then have remained outwardly neutral until some time in the second half of 1161, and then have declared for Alexander. Obviously the concordat sealed his choice,

1. Ohnsorge 1928, 114; Holtzmann 1926, 407.

2. A, ff. 56r-57r = Tengnagel, pp. 431-2 no. 70; Hödl 1969, 463.

3. Burchard, ed. Güterbock 1949, 56. Burchard implies that Siegfried had returned to the imperial court after he had i.e. after Christmas 1161.

but Victor could presumably have offered it as well,¹ and had he done so the main danger for Géza in recognizing him - imperial control over the Hungarian church - would have been removed. Géza's letter to Louis, which asks for an alliance against Frederick, and also that Louis should let him know that he still supported Alexander, suggests that he recognized Alexander with some hesitation; certainly he did not do so just to break with Frederick, with whom he was on fairly good terms. Apart from the possibility, not to be ignored, that Géza recognized Alexander simply because he felt that he was the rightfully elected pope, or because his clergy thought so, there is a partial explanation in the legations sent by the two sides. Alexander sent cardinals; Frederick and Victor, an imperial bishop. If Géza wanted a concordat, the cardinals could arrange, or promise to arrange it; Daniel of Prague, not standing in the same relation to Victor, could not decently do so. After 1161 Hungary remained Alexandrine, though the civil wars which followed the death of Géza in 1162 gave Frederick openings which Alexander viewed with some concern.²

Denmark stood in much the same relation to the Empire as Hungary; a kingdom of some power and independent standing, whose rulers were more or less devoted to the emperor according as they

1. The echoes of the Sicilian concordat which struck John of Salisbury (Materials, vi, 254, 310) and Gerhoch (MGH, LdL, iii, 385), though not, curiously, Burchard (Güterbock 1949, 57) might have made such a move either embarrassing or repugnant to him.

2. Pelow, p. 108 ; Ohnsorge 1928, 117ff.

needed his help against their relatives or rivals. The wars of succession of the 1150s, in which both Conrad III and Barbarossa had been asked to mediate, ended on 23 October 1157 at the battle of Grathehede, in which Sven was killed and Waldemar victorious.¹ In spite of being undisputed ruler, Waldemar felt sufficiently insecure to ask Barbarossa for confirmation of his kingship at Augsburg in August 1158, and to make an alliance with Henry the Lion in 1159.² Relations between the church of Denmark and that of the Empire were still not finally settled. Culturally the ties were close: Eskil, archbishop of Lund, for example, though he had close ties with St. Victor and with Peter of La Celle, had had his education in Saxony.³ But the claims of Hamburg-Bremen to primacy over the Scandinavian churches had not been given up even after 1153, when Nicholas of Albano, later Hadrian IV, set up Lund as an independent metropolitan. It has often been suggested that the capture of Eskil of Lund by brigands on imperial territory in 1157, which set the stage for the beneficium incident at Besançon, was instigated by either Frederick or Hartwig of Bremen, and while this cannot be proved it is plausible. Eskil was finally released, but Barbarossa confirmed the forged privilege of Louis the Pious for Hamburg-Bremen in 1158, thus maintaining old claims.⁴ Waldemar,

1. Quistgaard Hanssen 1966, 57.

2. Gesta, iii, 28; Helmold, Cronica Slavorum, ed. Schneidler, i, 87.

3. Quistgaard Hanssen 1966; Weibu⁶⁻⁷²ll 1931, 270-1.

4. Seegrün 1967, 176f.; Quistgaard Hanssen 1966, 59-60; Heine-meyer 1969, 164, 233-4; Koudelka 1960, 121; St. 3802.

then, owed something to Frederick; the Danish church on the other hand, and especially the archbishop of Lund, feared the ambitions of the archbishop of Bremen. This division was to reveal itself in the Danish attitude to the schism.

Like the other rulers who were said to have consented to the decision taken at Pavia, Waldemar had to be asked, in effect, to ratify it. The legate sent was Christian, provost of Merseburg. According to Saxo, he secured Waldemar's conniventia, but failed to win over Eskil.¹ This fits in with what we know from other sources. Barbarossa claimed Denmark's adherence to Victor in his letter to Peregrine of Aquileia in the summer of 1160,² and Danish legates were probably present at the council of Lodi.³ At the same time, we know that Alexander confirmed the privileges of Lund in the second year of his pontificate.⁴ By 1161 Eskil of Lund had gone into exile and schismatics had begun to appear in Waldemar's entourage; probably in the second half of the year a Victorine cardinal was able to hold a synod in Denmark.⁵ Only after the proceedings at St.-Jean-sur-Laône, unflatteringly recorded by Saxo, did Waldemar begin to move away from the anti-

1. For Pavia see below, pp. 240-1 ; for Christian's legation see Saxo Grammaticus, MGH, SS, xxix, 110. JL 14436 gives an indication of the date of the legation, not to be had from Saxo's confusing narrative.

2. Above, p. 44.

3. Below, p. 67 note 6.

4. Diplomatarium Danicum, I Raekke, 2 Band (1053-1169), edd. L. Weibull with N. Skyum-Nielsen, Copenhagen, 1963, no. 141.

5. Quistgaard Hanssen 1966, 62-3; Seegrün 1967, 179-80. I am not sure where to place Saxo's curious story about the chancellor Ralph's legation to Frederick and Victor (ed. cit., 111, 113).

popes, and with Waldemar the Danish church. By about 1165 Denmark had gone over to Alexander; the schismatic bishops Occo of Schleswig and Livo of Odense - the latter had been consecrated by Victor IV at Dôle in 1162 - fled to Germany, and Eskil returned from exile. The change seems to have had more to do with the connexions between the French and Danish churches than with any action on Alexander's part.¹

The northern and north-western fringes of Europe were Alexandrine from the start. The antikings of Norway, who were supported by Waldemar of Denmark, may have been Victorine,² but King Inges, who died on 3 January 1161, was Alexandrine, and Eynstein, archbishop of Nidaros, was consecrated by Alexander late in 1160. Any interruption in Alexandrine obedience that may have existed ended in 1164, when the papal subdeacon Stephen was sent to Norway to crown Magnus, son of Earl Skakke.³ Sweden was still to some extent a missionary district; it has been argued that it was to ward off the danger from Bremen that Alexander made Uppsala a metropolitan see in 1164. There is no sign that it was Victorine either before or after.⁴ Scotland and Ireland were also Alexandrine from very early in the schism.⁵

1. Quistgaard Hanssen 1966, 66-72; JL 11304-5. Cistercian influence seems to have been especially important (cf. Preiss 1934, 254-5).

2. Akerbus Morena, ed. Güterbock, p. 139 note 3.

3. Seegrün 1967, 183-7.

4. Seegrün 1967, 194-7. On the church organization before 1164 see Kumlien 1968 and JL 9937-8: there was some church organization, but not of a kind which would have demanded a legation from either pope.

5. Barrow 1960, 14; Falkenstein 1972, 117-8. The Cistercians were especially important in the Irish church: *ibid.*, 129. See also JL 10645, 20 Jan. 1161: 'tota occidentalis ecclesia'.

The Spanish churches all acknowledged Alexander as pope from the start of the schism, surprisingly, since one might have expected that Spain, with five rulers and a fine collection of running disputes over primacy and jurisdiction, would be an obvious area for offers and counter-offers. But although Alexander is not known to have sent a Wahlanzeige, nor, unlike Victor, a legate,¹ the Spanish episcopate immediately sought his jurisdiction,² and their kings recognized him, although how and when is largely unknown.³ Later on Spanish money helped to save Alexander from the financial difficulties he found himself in, and Spanish bishops attended the council of Tours in 1163 in considerable numbers.⁴ Only Raymond-Berengar IV of Barcelona, who held Aragon in keeping for his son, may have acknowledged Victor; at least he received and preserved a copy of the Victorine encyclical Schismaticorum sectas of November 1160.⁵ Kehr however thought that in spite of the pressure put on him by Barbarossa he managed to avoid declaring for Victor IV, unlike his nephew of Provence; certainly his son who succeeded him as ruler of Aragon in 1162 was on good terms with Alexander.⁶

1. Säbekow 1931, 51 (but Victor's legate was Hermann of Verden, not Albert of Verdun: see Wurst 1972, 94-100). Alexander did send a letter to John of Toledo in April 1160 similar to those sent at around that time to Eberhard of Salzburg and Arnulf of Lisieux (cf. JL 10629 with 10627-8).

2. JL 10609-11, 10634.

3. Ferdinand of Leon wrote to Alexander (A, ff. 51r-v = Tengnagel p. 412 no. 59); letters from the other rulers are not known.

4. Ohnsorge 1928, 34 note 102; below, pp. 243-9.

5. JL 14441, 10 Nov. 1160.

6. Kehr 1926b, 64-6; P. Kehr, 'Papsturkunden in Katalonien, ii', Abh., n.F., 18(1925), 393 no. 108.

By the end of 1160 the whole of Christendom, except for the Empire, Bohemia, Poland, and Denmark, had either declared for Alexander or was about to do so. The reasons for the decisions, where they can be known or guessed at, varied; but we can see two general causes at work. The first is the superiority of Alexander's diplomacy and propaganda over that of Victor and Frederick; it was not so much that his was good as that theirs was worse. The second was the influence of the Cistercians.¹ Neither of these causes was at work everywhere, but they had the overall effect that we have already noted in the decisions taken by the French and English churches.

1. Besides their effect in Denmark and Ireland (above, p. 57) it should also be noted that Lucas of Gran, who claimed credit for persuading Géza II of Hungary to recognize Alexander (above, p. 53), was on close terms with the Cistercian Eberhard of Salzburg.

Chapter four

Barbarossa and the schism, 1160-1162

Between the summer of 1160 and the fall of Milan in March 1162 both sides were waiting for the decisions of other national churches, but they were not completely passive. The most important events of this period were Frederick's attempt to repeat the council of Pavia on a broader basis in order to secure Victor's general recognition, and the development in the eastern Alps of an Alexandrine party within the empire. Neither as it turned out brought the schism to an end, but both were thought to be important at the time, and the second had lasting consequences.

The nucleus of the Alexandrine party in the empire was Salzburg. Eberhard had decided before the council of Pavia met that Alexander was the rightful pope. This decision must soon have become known to Alexander, since at the beginning of April 1160 Eberhard was sent a copy of the new encyclical Pro illis tribulationibus, although he had not had one of Eterna.¹ The letter again rehearsed the story of the schism and the events leading up to it, but the main point of the letter came at the end. Frederick and Octavian had been excommunicated on Maundy Thursday, with their supporters, and Eberhard was released from his oath to Frederick and ordered to give the tyrant neither aid nor counsel in his oppression of the faithful. This had little effect on Eberhard, who apparently took little trouble to make Frederick's excommunication known,² and ignored it in his direct dealings with him.

1. On Eterna, see below, pp. 233-4. The letter is in A, ff. 43r-44v = JL 10628. Alexander's information on Eberhard's position was perhaps derived from contact between William of Pavia and Henry of Berchtesgaden at the council of Pavia (see above, p. 30).

2. It was not widely recorded in the Empire north of the Alps; but see Gerhoch, MGH, LdL, iii, 367, and the Annales Egmondani, s.a. 1159, MGH, SS, xvi, 461.

These began soon after Alexander's letter had arrived. Frederick had written to Eberhard and those of his suffragans who were not at Pavia (Gurk, Brixen, Freising) immediately after the council asking for their acceptance of its decisions, but had taken no further action.¹ In the summer of 1160 he began to raise more troops for a final attack upon Milan. On 25 July at Erfurt Rainald of Cologne persuaded numerous princes to swear a new expeditio.² This gave Frederick an opportunity to twist Eberhard's arm. Between July 1160 and March 1162, when Eberhard, under safe-conduct, finally presented himself at Frederick's court in time to see the imperial triumph over Milan, there was an intermittent struggle between the two over the supply of troops. This was naturally bound up with Eberhard's attitude to the schism, since there was, or was thought to be, a connexion between the Lombard rebellion and Alexander. One might imagine that Frederick wanted not so much the troops Eberhard could contribute as Eberhard's own presence, in order to associate him with Frederick's activities in Italy and with his support for Victor. But it would not have been surprising to find Eberhard trying to avoid military service and Frederick trying to exact it even if the schism had not been an issue between them.³ The expenses of imperial expeditions were often crippling for bishops; at the same

1. MGH, Const., i, 263f. no. 189.

2. Annales S. Petri Erphesfutenses Maiores, ed. Holder-Egger, pp. 57-8.

3. Cf. Frederick's letter to Peregrine of Aquileia, A, ff. 42r-v = MGH, Const., i, 274-5 no. 196: '[tu] certus existens, quod nulli principum expeditionem remitteremus, quamvis multi querant absolvi, et quicumque remanebit, contra nostram voluntatem remanebit.'

time the conceptual division of their bishoprics into spiritualia and regalia produced by the Investiture Contest had made it harder for them to avoid the obligations which in imperial eyes they owed than it was for lay princes. Eberhard himself later claimed exemption on the grounds that he was a monk and hence not bound to personal attendance on military expeditions, and also that the regalia which bound him to serve were no longer in Salzburg's possession. He did not approve of the Milanese rebels,¹ so these objections may have been real rather than mere excuses, but both sides were also fencing with each other over the schism.

Frederick wrote to Eberhard at the end of August. He denounced the contumacy of the Milanese, and asked Eberhard to present himself at Pavia on 30 April 1161, 'cum milicia'.² Eberhard also acquired Frederick's letter to Peregrine of Aquileia - as Frederick may have intended - which gave much fuller details of the progress of Victor's cause, and laid more stress on the importance of universal participation in the forthcoming expeditio.³ Eberhard was thus left with a clear decision to make, and plenty of time in which to make it. So far as we know, he did not communicate with Frederick.⁴ But he got in touch with Alexander soon

1. Classen 1960, 206.

2. A, ff. 42v-43r = MGH, Const., i, 273-4 no. 195. Acerbus Morena, in Ottonis Morenae et continuatorum Historia Frederici I, ed. F. Güterbock, MGH, SS, n.s., vii, p. 138, says that the council of Cremona/Lodi was originally planned to be held at Pavia. Victor's invitation, JL 14445, only mentions Cremona, but Acerbus might be referring to the meeting above. Was Frederick trying to trick Eberhard into attending a Victorine council?

3. Above, p. 62 note 3; on the letter's presence in A, Hödl 1969, 443-4.

4. A has some known omissions; see below, p. 225 . Other unknown ones are certainly possible.

after this.¹ Perhaps he wanted advice. Alexander's reply offered no specific guidance on the Milanese expedition, though verbal advice may have been entrusted to Eberhard's messenger. It summarizes the history of the schism briefly, and added that the eastern Church (i.e. Jerusalem), England, France, and Spain had all recognized Alexander. Eberhard was to strengthen the faith of his suffragans and of neighbouring bishops, and to try to recall Frederick to the Church; he was also to keep Alexander informed by letter. Copies of three letters from Henry II, Ferdinand II of Leon, and the patriarch of Jerusalem and his suffragans went with the letter, as did an accompanying letter from Hubald, bishop of Ostia, and possibly also Fastrad of Clairvaux' account of the Anglo-French council which recognized Alexander.²

Alexander obviously relied on Eberhard to spread the news of his widespread reception. We know from the reaction of Gerhoch that he did.³ A propaganda campaign of this kind was particularly necessary because Victor had taken the diplomatic offensive. A lengthy encyclical Schismaticorum sectas was issued by him in the autumn of 1160, and found its way to France and northern Spain.⁴ Its theme was not so much the history of the schism, though

1. Not earlier: JL 10630 is a phantom, cf. JL 12222 and Germ. Pont., i, 35 no. 111. Alexander's reply, A, 49r-50r = JL 10645, 20 Jan. 1161 gives a t.a.q. of early Dec. for the messenger's departure from Salzburg to the curia, but an earlier date is likely.

2. For all these see Hödl 1969, 454-7. Eberhard had his own contacts with Omnebene of Verona, however, (see his letter to Roman of Gurk, A, ff. 34r-v = Tengnagel, p. 393 no. 38, and note the presence in A of JL 10719 to Omnebene, ff. 58r-v), and need not have acquired Fastrad's letter from Alexander, though its position in A suggests that he did.

3. Classen 1973, 222-3.

4. JL 14441, 14443.

that was dealt with, as the character of Roland and his followers, and the way in which they had turned the papacy into an arbitrary and venal court of justice. This was a line of attack likely to be received with some sympathy. There are also hints of other diplomatic activity by Victor in the same period. A legate visited William, count of Montpellier, with a letter from Victor warning him to avoid contact with the schismatics;¹ the legate was perhaps on his way to France or Spain. All this was no doubt meant to prepare the west for Victor's and Frederick's new council. This was announced in a letter sent from Turin on 16 January 1161.² The surviving version is addressed to Eberhard of Salzburg, but we know that other copies were sent to recipients within the empire, and presumably to people outside as well, though there is no evidence for this.³ Victor said that he intended to summon clergy from the whole world

quorum consilio et auctoritate rete Petri exuberantia malorum aliquatenus scissum resarciatur, et unitas ecclesie domino cooperante consolidetur.

This time the error made before Pavia was not repeated; ample time was given for the recipients of the summons to prepare their journey to Cremona.

1. JL 14440; see Janssen 1961, 123.

2. JL 14445.

3. Knowledge of the encyclical seems to be shown by the Annales S. Petri Erphesfurtenses Antiqui, in Monumenta Erphesfurtensia saec. XII. XIII. et XIV., ed. O. Holder-Egger, MGH, SRG, 1899, p. 20. See also the undated charter of Bishop Werner of Minden, pledging tithes to raise money 'cum apostolici Victoris auctoritas simul et imperatoris Friderici imperiale mandatum nos ad consilium in Italiam evocasset' '[for consilium read concilium?]' in H. Erhard, Regesta Historiae Westfaliae accedit codex diplomaticus, 2 vols., (Münster, 1847-54), ii, 91 no. 318, and below, p. 168.

This was a serious threat to Alexander. To counter it, the consecration of a few bishops was not enough, nor the conquest of the patrimonium.¹ He took care to strengthen his links with his supporters in France. On 3 February he took the unusual step of including political instructions in an ordinary rescript addressed to Henry of Beauvais.² On 6 March, Nicholas, the former secretary of St. Bernard, was sent a letter asking him to continue his good work on behalf of the church and exhort other men, both lay and ecclesiastical, to persevere in their devotion and fidelity to the Roman church.³ Additional letters, which have not survived, were sent commending him to the archbishops of Rheims and Sens, and to Count Henry of Troyes. As late as 7 April, Henry of Beauvais was being sent similar instructions about his brother in a mandate ordering him to deal with the schismatics at Cluny.⁴

Alexander also made preparations to return to Rome. He was still at Anagni, where he had been since November 1159, on 1 June;⁵ on 14 June he was able to write in triumph to Henry of Grado that he had been received at Rome on 6 June and had celebrated mass at the Lateran on the following Sunday.⁶ Whatever Alexander's election encyclical may have claimed about acclamation

1. JL 10618; Annales Ceccanenses, MGH, SS, xix, 285, s.a. 1160.

2. JL 10652.

3. JL 10658. See Talbot 1954, 85. The fact that the letter survives in R (ff. 23ra-rb) suggests that Nicholas did what was asked of him.

4. JL 10660.

5. It. Port., vi/2, 306 no. 10.

6. A, f. 44v = JL 10666. Henry of Grado must have forwarded a copy to Eberhard: see Hödl 1969, 444.

by the people of Rome in September 1159, it had not been as impressive as Victor's; now this defect had been remedied, and, claimed Alexander, the collapse of the schismatics was so complete that there was little likelihood of their cause being revived. In a sense, Alexander had indeed scored a triumph. His entry into Rome preceded Victor's council, which had been postponed and transferred from Cremona to Lodi because of the siege of Milan.¹ But whether he was able to return because his enemies were absent,² because he was able to buy his way back,³ or because there had been changes in Roman politics, he was not able to stay for long. As early as 27 June he was at Praeneste; Victor's supporters had rallied and driven him out.⁴

Victor and Frederick finally opened their council at Lodi on 21 June. Attendance from the Empire was quite good, but no new recruits to Victor's cause were won, and it was not the general council that had been hoped for. Legates from most of the kingdoms of Europe except the Iberian ones are said to have attended, but we know nothing more about their activities.⁵ The Alexandrine sympathies of the province of Salzburg were clearly shown

1. Annales S. Petri Erphesfurtenses Antiqui, ed. Holder-Egger, p.20.

2. Kehr 1926a, 84-5.

3. See above, p. 50. JL 10655-6 and a similar letter cited by Šabekow 1931, 52, all asking for money, may show that Alexander had been collecting resources, or simply that he was short of money.

4. Kehr 1926a, 68-9, 84-5; Boso, p. 403.

5. Acerbus Morena, ed. Güterbock, p. 139, records 'littere excusatorie' from the kings of Norway, Denmark, Hungary and Bohemia. The Erfurt annals (cit. note 1) have legates from the kings of France, England and Poland. The king of Poland was at the council (St. 3911) and Güterbock 1949, 10 note 1 has suggested confusion between this and the Pavia council. On the other hand Burchard reported at the end of 1161 that Henry II was about to [cont. p. 68]

by the absence of Eberhard and his five suffragans.¹ The council reaffirmed the legitimacy of Victor and proceeded to excommunicate and depose some Italian bishops for their opposition to him.² Victor's pontificate was a reality, but it was not enhanced by the council.

After the council, Frederick's attention, in so far as it was not devoted to the reduction of Milan, turned to the eastern border of his empire. The patriarch of Aquileia, Peregrine, had died on 8 August, and as his successor Ulrich of Treviso, a relative of Frederick's, had been chosen.³ There was also the problem of Salzburg, and a marriage alliance and troop contingent to be arranged with the king of Hungary. All these matters were given over to the imperial notary Burchard, and he has left a full report of his legation in a letter to Nicholas, abbot of Siegburg.⁴ He accompanied the new patriarch, who had been invested by Frederick after a promise to obey Victor as pope, to his see. Ulrich however pretended to be ill, and went down by boat to Venice, avoiding Victor, who was at Reggio. At Venice, he made contact with Hildebrand, cardinal priest of the basilica of the Twelve Apostles, Alexander's representative in northern Italy,⁵ *'de coadunanda ecclesie*

[p. 67 note 5 cont.] conclude an alliance with Frederick, and that his *nuntii* were at the imperial court (Güterbock 1949, 58). This if true might suggest that Henry sent observers to Lodi, and it is in any case quite likely that he and Louis did so.

1. See below, pp. 157-61, for German attendance at the council.
2. Acerbus Morena, ed. Güterbock, p. 140.
3. Not to be confused with Bishop Ulrich of Treviso.
4. Güterbock 1949, 51-8.
5. On him see Kehr 1924, and below, p. 75.

Dei' through intermediaries, while Burchard did his best to cover up this breach in Victor's support by spreading rumours that Frederick had ordered this to be done by Ulrich to test and deceive the other side.¹ He later managed to persuade Ulrich at least to write to Victor promising obedience.²

Eberhard of Salzburg had not come either in April or in June to the imperial court. Frederick had sent him a mandate after the council of Lodi ordering him to present himself with the bishop of Brixen at Cremona on 8 September without excuse or delay.³ Eberhard replied that the wars in his province made it impossible for him to come so soon - a reference to the feud between Henry the Lion, duke of Bavaria, and Hartwig, bishop of Regensburg - but if the emperor would guarantee him safe-conduct (a protection against the fighting in the feud, not against mishandling at the imperial court) he could still come late, and he was sending his messenger to find out if this was possible.⁴ Eberhard's excuse was perfectly respectable, but hardly enough for a reply to a summons '*remota omni occasione et dilatione*', and the broad hint at the end of his letter shows that he had other reasons for not coming

1. Güterbock 1949, 52-3. Kehr 1924, 233, and Ohnsorge 1928, 46-7, offer differing but speculative interpretations of this incident.

2. I take the sentence beginning '*Unde coactus...*' on p. 54 of Güterbock's edition to refer to Ulrich, as does Güterbock himself, p. 19; as there is a preceding lacuna one cannot be quite sure.

3. A, f. 45r = MGH, Const., i, 275-6 no. 197. For the date see Hödl 1969, 444-5; I do not see why he thinks the September meeting was to be a Kirchenversammlung, since Frederick simply says '*ut... tuam...presentiam...nobis et curie nostre exhibere non differas*'.

4. A, f. 45v = MGH, Const., i, 276 no. 198, sent not later than early August (Hödl 1969, 445).

as well. When Burchard set out therefore, Frederick armed him with a mandate in much stronger terms. Not only did Frederick wonder greatly at Eberhard's conduct, but it seemed extraordinary to all the princes of the empire. The 'imperialis munificentia' had greatly favoured Salzburg in the past, and the obligations thus incurred could not be redeemed 'qualiscunque pecunia' but only by personal service. Eberhard was charged on his fealty to present himself at Verona on 23 April with an adequate militia and to promise to Burchard that he would do so; if not¹

scire te volumus, quod nos...cum consilio principum et religiosorum ita de Salzburgensi ecclesia ordinabimus, ut et honor Dei et religio non imminuatur et debitum servitium imperio de cetero rationabiliter exsolvatur.

Since Eberhard had already been told that the princes of the empire disapproved of his conduct, this was tantamount to threatening to deprive him of the regalia by a judgement of the princes in the imperial court and have him deposed, no doubt with Victor's consent and assistance.² The same threat was repeated in a letter to Roman, bishop of Gurk, also carried by Burchard. Roman was asked to use his influence with Eberhard and to assist Burchard in his mission. One may doubt whether he did, in view of the fact that Roman passed the letter on to Eberhard. Indeed, though the tone of the letter to Roman is more friendly than that of the letter to Eberhard, it was probably intended as a reminder to him that 'tua

1. A, f. 46r = MGH, Const., i, 276-7 no. 199.

2. Hödl 1969, 446 note 344 is more cautious.

3. A, f. 46v = MGH, Const., i, 277-8 no. 200; Hödl 1969, 446-7.

res agitur'. Although Eberhard's suffragans were not as openly opposed to Victor as he was, except for Hartmann of Brixen,¹ they were clearly moving in that direction, as their absence from Lodi shows. Conrad of Passau and Albert of Freising were neutral; Conrad had been among the few bishops who gave their consent with reservations at Pavia, as had Hartwig of Regensburg.² Roman had not been at Pavia or Lodi, and as Eberhard's Eigenbischof and correspondent he may very well have shared Eberhard's view on the schism.

Eberhard did not react quietly. When handed the mandate by Burchard he openly showed his Alexandrine sympathies.³ He had already written to Ulrich of Aquileia to arrange a meeting at Villach.⁴ Burchard, mistrusting both, went to Villach as well, but before that took the precaution of sending a messenger to Frederick's court for further letters and instructions. At the installation of the new duke of Carinthia, at which both Eberhard and Ulrich were present, Burchard produced letters addressed to the vassals and ministeriales of Salzburg, ordering them to warn the archbishop that he should render unto Caesar the things which were Caesar's. Eberhard

stans...super lapidem signo crucis signatus, spiritus sanctum ex se locuturum palam profitebatur; et erat verbum de papa.

1. Vita Eberhardi, MGH, SS, xi, 81, c. 8; cf. also Frederick's earlier request to Eberhard that he should bring Hartmann with him (above, p. 69 and note 3).

2. Gesta, iv, 82, p. 702; Classen 1960, 203.

3. Güterbock 1949, 54: 'Qui cum sit religiosus antistites et delirus senex, partim bene partim male respondit; nam et ipse Rolandinus est.'

4. Güterbock 1949, 54-5. Eberhard's letter is lost, but mentioned in Ulrich's reply, A, f. 54v = Tengnagel, p. 427 no. 64. See Hödl 1969, 459-61.

Burchard replied, and prided himself on having won over or at least made indecisive those who had been set against him by the archbishop's words. 'Omnes autem de precipitatione archiepiscopi ad Rollandum indignantur pariter et doleant.'¹ And indeed even those who sympathised with Eberhard might well have felt that open defiance of Frederick was untimely and dangerous. When the shouting was over, Eberhard sent messengers to Frederick to find whether the service demanded could be commuted for a money payment, and Burchard also returned to Italy to report.

Eberhard's position was clear in theory, though in practice extremely difficult to maintain. He was prepared to give unto Caesar the things which were Caesar's, and unto God the things which were God's, but reserved for himself the right to decide which was which. He was not prepared to oppose Frederick actively - about this time he tactfully declined an alliance offered by Géza II of Hungary² - but equally he was not prepared to do anything to support Victor. Ulrich's position was much more ambiguous. Eberhard wrote to Hildebrand and Alexander on Ulrich's behalf in the autumn of 1161, but the best that he could say was that Ulrich should not be required to come forward as an open supporter of Alexander at this time (i.e. by going to Alexander for the pallium) since if left in quiet he could establish his position,

1. Güterbock 1949, 55. The letters (previous page) to the clergy and ministeriales of Salzburg have not survived, but were no doubt similar to those addressed to Eberhard and Roman earlier (above, p. 70) which use a similar phrase.

2. Hödl 1969, 462-4; Classen 1960, 206.

and meanwhile he was catholic in heart.¹ In fact Ulrich kept his heart concealed until the end of the decade; apart from his need to preserve Frederick's favour, the old rivalry between his see and the patriarchate of Grado was a hindrance to his full recognition of Alexander.² Many of his suffragans favoured Alexander, the most conspicuous exception being Garsidonus of Mantua, but this had little to do with Ulrich, and the decisions had often been taken before he became patriarch.³

Eberhard's messengers took with them a letter to Frederick to explain his action.⁴ That Salzburg had been liberally endowed by past emperors he did not deny, but most of these endowments had been seized by others, 'apud nos tantum remanentibus cartulis et privilegiis cum non multis possessionibus.' He had hoped to be excused from the expedition by a money payment; if the previous offer had been inadequate, more would be forthcoming (rather inconsistent, this, with the plea that Salzburg had been denuded of property). Personal attendance was difficult. He was old, and bound by his monastic profession. The bearer of the letter would seek to commute attendance on the expedition for some other service.

Quocunque vero Deus, in cuius manu corda regum sunt, animum vestrum inclinaverit, nos tamen pro debito nostro salutem et honorem vestrum semper optabimus.

1. A, f. 54 v = Tengnagel, p. 427 no. 65 (to Hildebrand), ff. 54v-55r = Tengnagel pp. 428-9 no. 66 (to Alexander). For dating see Hödl 1969, 457-62 (on line 5 of p. 460 read 75 for 74).

2. Dunken 1931, 73 and note 117.

3. His suffragans were Padua, Vicenza, Verona, Treviso, Belluno, Feltre, Mantua and Concordia. On the first four see below, pp. 241-2 ; on Concordia see Hödl 1969, 458 and note 406; on Mantua, above, p. 31;

4. A, f. 53r = MGH, Const., i, 278 no. 201.

The closing sentence was not only a conventional humilitas topos appropriate for a letter to a prince, but also a shading of the closing sentence in Eberhard's earlier letter. Even if Frederick remained, in Eberhard's eyes, schismatic, he would still recognize and serve him as emperor, so far as this was possible.

Frederick's reply was carefully phrased. He had had a report from Burchard on his legation,¹ and now realized the strength of Eberhard's convictions. The reply rejected the offer of a money payment, reproached Eberhard for his unrestrained language, and insisted on his presence at the imperial court. But the reason for the request was now different. There was no further talk of military service. Instead, Frederick offered veiled hints that he might be willing to follow Eberhard's advice on the schism:²

Inter anxias et innumeras tribulationes, quibus exigentibus peccatis hominum iam diu universalis laborat ecclesia, consilium religionis tue multo tempore requisivimus, ut discretio tua, quæ directo tramite ad summum bonum attingere nititur, iter salutis nobis ostenderet et ab errore minus eruditum animos declinaret.

Letters from the chancellor Ulrich and from Eberhard of Bamberg accompanied this; both said much the same thing, but Eberhard's rather more fully. There was a real hope that the schism might be ended through a new council, and for this Eberhard's advice was necessary. The emperor's anger against him had cooled, but he must come. There was no question of his having to show obedience to

1. Güterbock 1949, 55-6.

2. A, f. 47r = MGH, Const., i, 278-9 no. 202.

Victor or being impeded in any way. Eberhard of Bamberg added that the bishops of Brixen and Gurk should also be brought to the meeting.¹

It was not only directly from Frederick and his court that Eberhard heard news of a council at this period. A letter from him to Hildebrand tells us that Ulrich of Aquileia and Cono of Concordia had approached him, claiming that Frederick wanted to settle the schism 'per viros religiosos' and that Hildebrand had encouraged them in this, but that they were doubtful whether the matter should be done per concilium an per consilium, i.e. by formal judgement of a church assembly or by private agreement, and had left this for Eberhard to decide. For his part, Eberhard thought that no action should be taken without informing the pope, and that Hildebrand should not trouble himself overmuch, since Ulrich had thrown himself wholeheartedly into the business.² At about the same time he wrote to Henry of Grado,³ asking him to join in the movement for peace in the church. In early February Henry replied: he had not been able to attend the meeting because of opposition from Ulrich, but he had seen Hildebrand and Cono, who had said that they would proceed with all speed in the matter according to Eberhard's will and advice.⁴

1. A, ff. 47r-v = Tengnagel, p. 404 no. 50, (from Eberhard of Bamberg), f. 47v = Tengnagel, pp. 404-5 no. 51 (from Ulrich). For the date (January 1162) of all these letters to Eberhard, Hödl 1969, 448.

2. A, f. 55v = Tengnagel, p. 429 no. 67. The letter might also mean that Hildebrand should not hesitate to involve himself; the translation above agrees better with Eberhard's reservations about first telling Alexander, but see Ohnsorge 1928, 47.

3. Lost; implied in Henry's reply (see next note).

4. H, f. 531r = Sudendorf, ii, 139-40 no. 56. The date is given by the last sentence, in which Henry says he has heard that Alexander has arrived at Genoa (21. Jan. 1161: JL, ii, 155).

Other indications of a general council or rather of a plan for one are not hard to find. Gerhoch had heard of them;¹ Burchard knew of them, though he regarded the triumph of Victor as a foregone conclusion, either because of the absence of the other side, or because if they did come they would condemn themselves out of their own mouths.² But Frederick's own intentions (and they are crucial here) disappear in the fantasies of enthusiastic Alexandrines and Victorines.³ The self-important Ulrich probably helped to inflate the balloon;⁴ but there was more to it than that, for Eberhard of Salzburg was taken in. When he saw the letters sent out by Frederick summoning the imperial princes to the meeting at St.-Jean-sur-Laône, at which Victor was to be recognized, he was surprised at Frederick's change of heart.⁵ Perhaps Frederick had real plans for a council; perhaps they were merely a device for getting Eberhard to attend his court without too much loss of face for either side. At any rate the plans disappear after the spring of 1162. Their last echo is in a letter of 16 March 1162 from Alexander to Eberhard of Salzburg, but this merely says that

1. Classen 1960, 205. Gerhoch's wishes for a 'generalius concilium' than either Pavia or Toulouse to decide on the schism (MGH, LdL, iii, 366) may have been fathered by these rumours.

2. Güterbock 1949, 57-8.

3. Ohnsorge 1928, 44 note 146. See also Classen 1960, 206: 'The letters...conceal the details of the plans; no-one risked putting his secret thoughts on paper.'

4. Ohnsorge 1928, 44-9, 154-60.

5. Letter to Roman of Gurk, A, ff. 58v-59r = Tengnagel, pp. 436-7 no. 75: '...colligere potestis quantum mutata sit voluntas domni imperatoris ab eo statu in quo eum dimisisse putabamus.'

Alexander has heard that Eberhard has been summoned to Frederick 'pro facto ecclesie' and asks him to urge Frederick to repent. For Alexander, spontaneous reconciliation with the church could be rewarded by forgiveness of past sins and offences and future honour, but there was no question of discussing the papal election again, either in a council or otherwise, and no mention of an accredited bearer who might have brought qualifying verbal instructions on such matters.¹ By the time the letter reached Eberhard he had probably already met Frederick, outside the ruins of Milan. The annales of Reichersberg and a letter from Eberhard himself to Gottfried, abbot of Admont, describe the anticlimatic meeting.² There was no talk of a council, merely a frank and friendly exchange of views. As Eberhard had been promised,³ he was not compelled to show obedience to Victor, and indeed was able to treat the two Victorine cardinals who were present at the meeting with contempt. Eberhard's letter does not present quite such a negative impression of the meeting as the Reichersberg annals do; evidently he felt that Frederick's complaisance was something in itself,⁴ and we have seen that he was disappointed by Frederick's seeming change of heart later in the year.

1. A, ff. 53v-54r = JL 10702. Cf. Classen 1960, 208.

2. MGH, SS, xvii, 468-9 (col 2); A, ff. 48v-49r = Tengnagel, p. 406 no. 53. On the date of the meeting (26 March) and the people who accompanied Eberhard (apparently Hartmann of Brixen, Roman of Gurk, and Gerhoch) see Classen 1960, 207-8 and Hödl 1969, 450-3.

3. Eberhard's first letter to Gottfried of Admont, A, f. 48r = Tengnagel, p. 405 no. 52 refers to a promise by Frederick; all that we have are the promises in the letter from chancellor Ulrich (above, p. 75 note 1).

4. '...nichilque super hoc gravaminis a domno imperatore sustinimus.', Eberhard to Gottfried (as note 2); a faint air of surprise.

That the plans for a council were not discussed when Eberhard met Frederick is not perhaps surprising. Milan had fallen, and on the day that they met Alexander was on his way to France.¹ These two events changed the diplomatic map. Salzburg and Aquileia lost their importance for the time being, and all that remained of the diplomacy of 1161-2 was strong if passive support for Alexander in the eastern corner of the Empire. The plan for a council would be taken up again by Frederick in the summer with a rather different flavour, as will be seen in the next chapter.

1. See below, p. 80.

Chapter five

The meeting at St.-Jean-sur-Laône

In January 1162 Alexander and his curia left Rome, which was becoming dangerous as a result of Christian of Buch's attacks on the patrimonium. Sicily may have been his original destination, but with the collapse of resistance to Frederick in northern Italy Sicily was not very safe. In any case the Sicilian galleys sent to pick him up were wrecked in a storm, and he was finally picked up by a Pisan galley. The consuls of Pisa refused him admission to the city, and he was forced on to Genoa, where he arrived on 21 January. With the fall of Milan on March 1 Genoa was no longer safe. Frederick demanded the surrender of Alexander, and the Genoese, faced with an alliance between Frederick and their rival, Pisa, had to make peace. They submitted on 8 April; a fortnight earlier Alexander had left for France, on 25 March.¹ His departure had been anticipated by Frederick. Sometime between January and March he sent a letter to Hugh of Champfleury, Louis' chancellor, warning that Alexander was about to leave for France and threatening unpleasant if unspecified consequences if he or any of his pseudo-cardinals or nuntii should be favourably received there.² Louis responded; the one remaining cardinal in his dominions, who had in any case asked leave to return to Alexander, was asked to do so without delay, though he was given a safe-

1. Reuter, i, 185-6, 192-3; Bernardi Maragonis Annales Pisani, MGH, SS, xix, 247.

2. RHF, xvi, 202 no. 10. Rainald also wrote, ibid., no. 11. A likely date for the sending of these letters is mid-February, since a letter was sent by Victor IV to Louis VII (JL 14459) on 11 Feb. 1162, saying that he hoped Louis would turn from the advice of 'pravi homines' and recognize him, especially as they were now related by marriage (Louis had married Adela of Champagne of the house of Blois, who were related to Victor: above, p. 40 and Kehr 1926a, 56-7). The same bearer probably carried all three letters as well as a letter from Otto Bobone, Victor's seneschal, to Louis (RHF, xvi, 29 no. 94).

conduct was granted.¹ Partly this reaction was one of fear,² but Louis also felt that he had not done as well out of the recognition of Alexander as Henry II had, and there had already been signs in 1161 that he was growing restive.³ He began negotiations with Frederick. These negotiations, which were to lead to the abortive meeting of 29 August at the bridge of St.-Jean-sur-Laône, have been discussed most recently by Heinemeyer 1964 and Schmale 1968. They present difficulties, mainly of motive and intention as revealed in the chronicle evidence. I shall first deal with the exchanges of letters and legates between the various interested parties in the summer of 1162, eschewing chronicle evidence as far as possible, and then deal with the meeting and the chroniclers' interpretations of it.

Louis began by sending Henry, count of Troyes, a relative of Victor's, to Frederick. As we shall see, the chronicles differ on when this happened and how many journeys Henry made. If we assume that the letter sent by Frederick to Hugh of Champfleury was the immediate cause of Louis' action, and accept mid-February as a date, then there is perhaps just enough time for Henry to have gone to Frederick, returned, and gone back again to Frederick

1. Ernisius, abbot of St. Victor, to Cardinal Otto, RHF, xvi, 25 no. 85.

2. John of Salisbury in a later letter said that after the fall of Milan Frederick 'magis deditionem quam confoederationem legationibus missis videretur offerere': Materials, v, 377 no. 194.

3. Above, pp. 41 and note 1, 66, 67 note 5. See also the letter, hard to date, from Peter of Pisa to Alexander III (RHF, xv, 780 no. 46) which warns that all is not well in spite of his efforts with Louis on Alexander's behalf.

again before 31 May, on which date Frederick wrote to Louis to thank him for sending Henry,¹ but one journey only seems more probable. Frederick's letter is couched in very general terms; it talks of the restoration of friendship between the 'cognata regna', and ends

Sane quaecumque necessaria sunt ad conservandum inter nos mutue dilectionis integritatem cum dilecto consanguineo nostro, fidei tuo H[enrico] comite Trekarum amice et plenarie ordinavimus et sicut conductum est inviolabiliter observare curabimus.

As Schmale has pointed out, this sentence must refer to the arrangements for the meeting at St.-Jean-sur-Laône. Henry the Lion and Waldemar of Denmark were present at the meeting in August with armies; these would have taken time to raise, and the end of May is about the last practicable time when the mandates could have been sent out. This date is also confirmed by the Gesta Abbatum Trudonensium, and by a letter from Henry of Rheims.²

Alexander was apparently unaware of the contacts between Frederick and Louis, or at least chose to behave as if he were unaware of them. He wrote to Louis on 20 April announcing his arrival and friendly reception by the magnates of S.E. France, and promising a legation of cardinals in the near future.³ Ten days later Otto had arrived from the north, bringing news which caused Alexander to change his plans. Instead of the cardinals, Pontius,

1. MGH, Const., i, 289 no. 207.

2. Schmale 1968, 334-6, and for Henry of Rheims' letter, below, p. 86 note 4.

3. JL 10720.

abbot of Grandselve, who had arrived to collect the pallium for Henry of France, newly-elected archbishop of Rheims, was sent back with the pallium and with instructions to go to Louis, together with Henry and two other Cistercian bishops, Amaury of Senlis and Godfrey of Langres. He took with him letters for Henry, Hugh of Champfleury and Queen Adela, as well as for Louis himself.¹ Our knowledge of the itineraries of Louis and Henry is not sufficiently precise to enable us to say how long the legation would have taken to reach Louis. Henry was presumably at Rheims - at any rate he was not with Louis if a phrase in Alexander's letter to him can be taken literally - and Louis seems to have spent the whole of the first half of 1162 within the Paris-Orleans-Chartres triangle.² Even if all the members of the legation acted in great haste, they could scarcely have reached Louis before about 20 May. What they were meant to do does not emerge from Alexander's letters. Presumably Louis was to be soothed, and reminded at the same time of his duty to St. Peter and his Vicar, but there is no sign of how Alexander thought he was to fulfil it. One of the things to settle would have been where Alexander was going to stay.³ We next find Alexander holding a meeting at which numerous visiting bishops were present. Octavian and his supporters were again excommunicated. This was a bold move, given that Alexander's position in France was

1. JL 10710-13.

2. Cf. JL 10710: '...et ad carissimum in Christo filium nostrum Ludovicum...accedens[Henry]'; Luchaire 1885, 246ff.

3. Boso, p. 405.

still insecure, but Alexander took care to publicize it; letters reporting it were sent to Omnebene of Verona and Syrus of Genoa.¹

In the first half of June Louis responded to Alexander's legation of April by sending Theobald, abbot of St. Germain-des-Prés and Cadurc, Louis' cleric and former chancellor. Alexander replied in a letter of 10 July; he thanked Louis for his letters - now lost - which he had received with great joy, and after expressing surprise at the failure of Pontius to inform Louis fully of his wishes, entrust these to Louis' legates, while promising a legation of two cardinals in the near future who would explain matters more fully. The letter finishes with a long reminder of Louis' duty to St. Peter.² One would expect this to have been carried back by Louis' legates, but since one of these reached Clermont on his way back on 20 July this seems unlikely.³ The question would be of minor interest but for Hugh of Vézelay's claim that the legation was badly received by Alexander, and that this provoked Louis into making a binding agreement with Frederick.⁴ If this was the course of events - and apart from other inconsistencies in Hugh's account which will be discussed below, it is worth pointing out that the St. Germain continuator of Aimon

1. JL 10719, 17 May 1162, to Omnebene; JL 10729, 7 June 1162, to Syrus. The meeting was on 15 May. Omnebene passed his letter on to Eberhard, since it is now in A, ff. 58r-v; this suggests instructions to publicize it.

2. JL 10740.

3. Aimoni continuatio Sangermanensis, MGH, SS, xxvi, 152. If he had left Montpellier on or after 10 July his speed of travel would have been more appropriate for a courier than an ambassador, which seems improbable for a sick man. JL 10740 may have been taken by Peter, dean of St. Aignan's, Orleans, who received letters of commendation for Henry and Hugh and a mandate for Louis VII on July 14 (JL 10743-5); on his role as mediator, see above, p. 81 note 3.

4. MGH, SS, xxvi, 146.

knows nothing of a poor reception of the legates - then Louis would have heard of it before receiving the soothing letter of 10 July. Even so, he cannot have heard before about the third week in July. This would hardly leave time for a fresh legation to Frederick in Lombardy; it certainly does not leave time for Louis to have contacted Alexander and told him of what he was planning, for Alexander knew of the meeting proposed as early as 24 July.¹

By early July news of the meeting was beginning to spread. Sometime during the summer a bundle of letters was sent to Louis by various prominent Romans, asking him to deny authoritatively that he was about to recognize Victor.² Eberhard of Salzburg also heard rumours, and wrote anxiously to Henry of Rheims, saying

1. JL 10750 to Hugh of Soissons. Schmale 1968, 343-4, ignores this chronological difficulty in saying that Louis sent a second legation to Alexander. He was misled by a letter from Godfrey, former bishop of Langres (V, f. 169v = Duchesne, 674 no. 306 = RHF, xvi, 31 no. 102) which has bedevilled the historiography of these negotiations. It speaks of missions to the pope, letters to him which some abbots have not shown him, etc., and seems to fit admirably into the summer of 1162. But Godfrey did not retire until 1163. Alexander talks of a bishop, not a bishop-elect, of Langres in Apr. and Sept. 1162 (JL 10710-13, 10761) and we know that Godfrey's successor was still archbishop-elect of Besançon on 24 Sept. 1162 (Gall. Christ., xv, 48-9). A copyist's error is unlikely; V has many missing and some false initials, due to the slovenliness of the rubricator, but its scribes got their titles right. The letter is probably to be connected with the fall of Godfrey of Clairvaux in 1165, on which see Preiss 1934, 84-94.

2. Otto and Cencius Frangipani, Romanorum consules, to Louis VII, RHF, xvi, 32 no. 105; Rectores Romanae fraternitatis to Louis VII, RHF, xvi, 33 no. 106 (these two largely share the same wording); Jordan, Peter and Gratian 'et cetera de domo Petri Leonis', Romanorum consules, to Louis VII, RHF, xvi, 33 no. 107. None of these is dated, but Henry of Troyes' legation of ?May, mentioned in the first two, is a t.p.q. A date in June-July is likely.

that the supporters of Octavian were claiming that the French church was going to repudiate Alexander and accept Victor. Although he knew that the enemies of truth were full of lies and deceit, he feared for the effect of this news on the weak, and asked Henry to deny it. Henry replied that the French church was constant in its support of Alexander and that Louis '*plusque caput sui amputari asserit quam resiliat ab eo quod iuste et honeste incepit.*'¹ This exchange of letters probably occurred early in the summer.² By early July Henry of Rheims had secured a copy of one of Frederick's invitations to the council, which said that Louis had promised to recognize Victor. He wrote an angry letter to Louis asking what was happening, and quoting a large part of Frederick's letter, adding: '*A quo vero nobis hoc sit significatum nec habemus nec debemus vobis intimare.*'³ He wrote also to his colleagues of Tours and Sens, again including a lengthy quotation from Frederick's invitation, and asking them to meet him at Paris on 31 July, with their suffragans, to discuss ways and means of persuading Louis to change his mind.⁴

Sometime between 10 and 24 July Alexander learned of the proposed meeting between Frederick and Louis, or possibly learned

1. A, f. 57r = Tengnagel, p. 432 no. 71, f. 57r = Tengnagel, p. 433 no. 72.

2. Eberhard does not mention Frederick's letters, of which he later secured a copy: see below, p. 221

3. RHF, xvi, 30 no. 101. See below, p. 221.

4. Colker 1961, 477-8. The time that would be needed to arrange such a meeting gives a *t.a.q.* of early July for Henry's receiving a text of Frederick's invitation, and confirms Schmale's conclusion that the mandates were sent out in the second half of May. See above, p. 82 note 2.

for the first time that it was to discuss the schism and the election.¹ We do not know who his informant was. Shortly after 16 July he left Montpellier and began to move north in readiness for a meeting with Louis at Clermont. This was to discuss - perhaps inter alia - the election at Chalons-sur-Marne.² The legation of cardinals promised on 10 July does not seem to have materialized.³ Alexander prepared his ground by writing to Hugh of Champfleury and to Henry of Rheims. Both prelates were asked to do their best to prevent the meeting between Louis and Frederick, and Henry was asked to meet Alexander in advance at Clermont; there are hints in Alexander's letter at strained relations between him and his royal brother.⁴ King and pope met near Clermont in mid-August.⁵

1. JL 10750, 24 July 1162, is the first letter to mention the meeting; there is no hint (pace Ohnsorge 1928, 53 note 179) of it in JL 10740 of 10 July.

2. Alexander was still at Montpellier on 16 July: JL 10748. The meeting at Clermont: JL 10752. Presumably this had been arranged by Louis' embassy of early July - so Schmale 1968, 342 note 138 - but in JL 10752 Alexander refers to numerous letters from Louis and Henry of Troyes on the subject of the bishopric of Chalons.

3. Both Boso, p. 405 and Hugh of Vézelay, MGH, SS, xxvi, 146 mention here a legation consisting of Bernard of Porto and Hyacinth, but there is probably confusion with the proposals of April (cf. JL 10710-13). The bullae maiores for the months of July and August are too few to confirm or deny the reports.

4. R, f. 5va = JL 10752: 'Ad hęc quam decet honestatem et prudentiam tuam memorato filio nostro regi familiariter adherere et ita efficere ut consilio tuo sicut facere consuevit plurimum acquiescat rogamus...ut ad eum accedas et ita te ei consiliarium et familiarem exhibeas quod consilium tuum in his que ad deum ad profectum et exultationem ecclēsię et regni sui pertineant libenti admittat et te more solito carum circa se habeat et acceptum.' In context this refers to the Chalons affair rather than the meeting with Frederick, but it could naturally apply to both.

5. JL, ii, 160-1.

With the meeting between Alexander and Louis we reach the stage where the chronicle evidence must be taken into account. Not only do their accounts of the negotiations disagree, their explanations of motives and intentions do as well. To try to 'extract the common core'¹ is not entirely satisfactory, for it assumes that whenever a writer lies or distorts this will be obvious from the discrepancies with other accounts, and this ignores the fact that they are telling or trying to tell a coherent story and even their 'true' or common statements will have a place in the structure of their story and be coloured by it. Our task is made harder by the fact that although Helmold,² the Chronica Regia Coloniensis³ and others⁴ give some account of the meeting, and Saxo Grammaticus⁵ a full narrative of the council held afterwards by Frederick and Victor at Dôle, only Boso⁶ and Hugh of Vézelay⁷ offer the whole story. Both of these, as will be seen, were strongly Alexandrine, and aimed to present Louis VII, who by the time they wrote was Alexandrine also, in the best possible light.

1. Both Schmale 1968, 355, and Heinemeyer 1964, 175, use this phrase.

2. Cronica Slavorum, ed. Schmeidler, i, 91, pp. 177-8.

3. Ed. G. Waitz, MGH, SRG, 1880, pp. 112-3 (recensions 1 and 2).

4. Notably Lambert of Waterloo, MGH, SS, xvi, 535; Acerbus Morena, ed. Güterbock, 164-5.

5. MGH, SS, xxix, 113-5.

6. Pp. 405-8.

7. MGH, SS, xxvi, 146-8.

Boso's story is simple. After arriving in France, Alexander sent Bernard of Porto and Hyacinth to Louis to discuss where Alexander should stay. They were well received by Louis, and on their return to Alexander all rejoiced. At the end of June (?)¹ Alexander left Montpellier for Clermont, where he arrived on 14 August. Meanwhile, Frederick, fearing the triumph of Alexander and the loss of emperorship, was considering ways of getting at him. He summoned Henry of Troyes and arranged a plot with him. Primed by Frederick, Henry came to Louis and said that the emperor wished to arrange a meeting between Louis and himself together with the great men of their kingdoms, both lay and clerical, and the two popes. There, after a thorough hearing of the way in which the two had been elected, the most suitable action could be taken. Louis agreed, not seeing any harm in the proposal; Henry of Troyes returned to Frederick and took an oath on Louis' behalf. The day of the meeting approached; Frederick drew near with a great army. Louis stopped on the way to talk with Alexander at Souvigny, and although Alexander refused to come to the meeting, 'for it seemed completely improper...that the pope and the First See should undergo any human judgement', he finally agreed to send five cardinals to represent him and prove the canonicity of his election.² He himself left for Déols.

Louis arrived at the bridge over the Laône; Octavian, seeing his unexpected arrival, began to fear for his position and accused Frederick of going back on what had already been de-

1. 'In proximo mense Iunii'.

2. Compare Acerbus Morena's report, loc. cit., that each side would choose five men to judge the election.

oided and approved by him. Frederick, embarrassed, sent messengers to Louis asking him why he had not brought Alexander. Louis replied that although he had reasonable excuses for not having done so he would nevertheless hurry to bring Alexander and his cardinals. He then sent reliable messengers to Alexander asking him to come with his cardinals if he did not want Louis held prisoner by the emperor according to the terms of the agreement Louis had made. It seemed that Alexander had the alternatives of allowing the liberty of the church to be lost by submitting to human judgement, or, if he failed Louis, risking capture by Frederick's formidable army. But God helped: the king of England promised to come to Louis' support, and a food shortage in the imperial camp forced Frederick to leave. In order to find a more respectable excuse for going, he sent his chancellor Rainald to Louis to say that the judgement of a papal election pertained as of right only to imperial bishops, but that it seemed good and just that Louis and his bishops should come and hear their decision '*tanquam amicum et socium*'. Louis asked whether the kings of France were excluded from Peter's flock and left, in spite of attempts by the imperialists to soothe him and bring him back. Immediately he summoned an army and had the weak places of his realm fortified. Meanwhile Alexander's delegates returned, giving thanks for their deliverance, while Frederick, covered in confusion, had to return to Germany for lack of food.

Hugh of Vézelay's account is more complicated. The story opens with the church rent by schism, and Henry of Troyes favouring the imperial side. Louis sent Theobald and Cadurc to meet Alexander, who received them '*minus optato*'. Theobald died on the

way back to Louis at Vézelay. Louis, angry, regretted having accepted Alexander and rejected Victor. He sent letters 'super hec verba' (presumably, though not certainly, Alexander's brusque handling of Louis' legates) by Manasses, bishop of Orleans, to Henry of Troyes, who at the time was on a journey to the emperor. Henry, pleased at the opportunity,

...suggessit imperatori, ut iniret colloquium cum rege, adunatis utriusque regni optimatibus et aeclesiasticis viris, contestatus iureiurando, quod rex, audita utriusque apostolici electionis examinatione, iuxta discretionem personarum utriusque regni staret consilio suo, videlicet Henrici comitis. Et indictum est colloquium apud Lovigennam vicum citra Ararim fluvium intra fines regni Francie. Et statutum est, ut Alexander catholicus et Victor scismaticus colloquio adessent et de sua electione in conspectu totius aeclesiae conferrent.

When Alexander heard of this, he sent Bernard and Hyacinth to Louis to calm him down. Louis and Alexander 'convenerunt ergo' (one of Hugh's typical non sequiturs) at Souvigny. Louis tried to persuade Alexander to come at least as far as Vergy, a strongly fortified castle, but Alexander refused, and Louis left for the meeting, still unaware of the terms made by Henry of Troyes, and angry with Alexander for not wanting to attempt to defend his cause.

When Louis arrived at Dijon, Henry appeared and explained the terms of the agreement: suitable men both lay and ecclesiastical were to be chosen from each side, and whichever of the two candidates' elections should be found to be sanior should be approved and the other quashed. If either of the popes should fail to turn up, both rulers would recognize the other. If Louis 'noluerit nec predictis pactionibus acquiescere nec arbitrio iudicium assensum prebere', Henry would in future hold those lands which he held from Louis' fisc from the emperor. Louis, astonished,

asked by whose authority he had done this. Henry replied that he had done it on Louis' own instructions, as brought to him by Manasses of Orleans. Manasses attempted to wriggle out of this: *'timore regis dissimulare cepit, occultans machinationes quibus Henricum ad hoc induxerat.'* Henry then produced the letter Louis had sent, which told of Alexander's rejection of Louis' legates, and gave Henry permission to make any arrangements he liked for a meeting, *'certus quod rex per omnia consilio suo stareat.'*

At this point the French heard that Victor was not with the emperor, but they were forestalled by Frederick, who brought Victor smartly on to the bridge at midnight and then withdrew. The next day Louis moved towards the bridge as if hunting, and sent on legates, including Joscius of Tours and Maurice of Paris as well as William, abbot of Vézelay. These met legates sent by Frederick, including Henry. They asked for a delay, since Louis had not known until then of the conditions of the meeting (allegedly because Frederick had made Henry swear not to reveal them). The request was denied. Louis returned to Dijon, and Alexander's representatives, thinking all was over, returned to Vézelay. Louis set the defences of his borders in readiness. The next day however, early in the morning, Henry appeared again before Louis, and pointed out that the terms of the agreement were still unfulfilled, and that he would have to go over to the emperor with all his lands. However, he had succeeded in gaining a delay of three weeks from the emperor,

ea conditione quod rex datis obsidibus polliceretur imperatori ad diem se venturum et Alexandrum adducturum atque ibidem causam utriusque auditorum et iudicio proborum virorum imperii et regni pariturum, aut certe se ipsum tradere vinctum imperatori apud Crisopolim, que est urbs nobilis Bisuntinorum. Et acquievit rex, et defecit spiritus eius, et tediatus est animo pactusque est ita se facturum, datis obsidibus - duce Burgundie, - comite Flandrensi et Guilelmo comite Nivernensi.

All the clergy were worried, and offered up prayers that the liberty of the church might be preserved and the king delivered from the machinations of his enemies. But when Louis went to the appointed meeting-place, the emperor let Henry of Troyes down, and sent Rainald to the meeting. When the agreement which Henry 'ex ore imperatoris proposuerat regi' (this ought to refer to the arrangements for delay mentioned immediately above, but it seems from what follows to mean the original arrangements made by Henry) ^{was read out} / Rainald denied that his master had ever intended to associate anyone with him in judging the Roman church, which was his sole prerogative. Louis, hearing this, pointed out that the terms of the treaty were being altered, and on being assured by Henry that he was now free from the obligations of the treaty turned and fled, pursued by the imperial legates who begged him to return and all would be put right. Hugh ends his narrative with another typical non sequitur:

Sic soluto conventu, rex in regnum suum rediit. Alexander autem catholicus papa veritus indignationem regis Ludovici, transiit in Aquitaniae metropolim urbem Bituricorum et in Dolense monasterium quod est apud Castrum Radulphi, ibique hiemavit.

Boso and Hugh differ in details considerably, but they tell an essentially similar tale. Louis, the simple man, 'sicut verus Israelite in quo dolus non est' as Boso remarks,¹ succumbs to the

1. P. 406.

trickery of Frederick and Henry of Troyes, and is only saved by God's providence, which produces help from Henry II, famine for Frederick and his army, and a mental blackout for Rainald of Cologne. Now this cannot be true. It is not, perhaps, hard to believe that Henry of Troyes could have furthered his own plans while on a legation from Louis. But it is hard to believe that Louis knew little or nothing of what was going on until he reached the meeting-place and met Henry.¹ Not only is this a priori improbable, the letters sent to Louis by the Roman nobility and Henry of Rheims make it almost an impossible suggestion. Henry's letter says, clearly enough:²

Vehementer ammiramur et vehementius perturbamur in his que significata sunt nobis comitem scilicet Henricum sacramenta firmissimasque securitates ex parte vestra sicut dicitur imperatori dedisse quod illum Octavianum generaliter cum ecclesia Gallicana in apostolicum debeatis recipere.

The letters from the Romans³ say as much, if more politely. And at some time, presumably before the meeting since it is hard to see what point there would have been in giving them to Louis afterwards, Louis came into possession of three mandates sent out by Frederick to summon his magnates to the meeting.⁴ The one addressed to Eraclius of Lyons contains the following passage:⁵

1. Here I agree with Heinemeyer 1964, 164; Schmale 1968, 338-9, is unconvincing.

2. V, f. 38r = RHF, xvi, 30 no. 101. Note that Henry of Troyes is not mentioned in the copy of Frederick's invitation available to Henry of Rheims.

3. Above, p. 85 note 2.

4. See below, pp. 221-2.

5. V, f. 50v = MGH, Const., i, 291 no. 210.

Comes siquidem Henricus Trecensis cum ad curiam nostram in legationem domni sui regis Francorum venisset et reverendum patrem nostrum papam Victorem humili veneratione honorasset studiose a nobis postulavit quatenus ad colloquium inter nos et eum regem habendum accederemus.

True, the terms of the agreement between Frederick and Henry of Troyes, as reported by Hugh, do not appear in any of these letters. But Louis and his advisers, who are reported by both Hugh and Boso to have been very alert at the meeting, on the look-out for any possible breaches of the terms of the treaty by Frederick, must have been very inattentive not to have gathered from these letters that something was wrong - if, that is, Louis had no intention of deserting Alexander.

Moreover, both Boso and Hugh are misleading about the start of the negotiations. Boso was writing some three years later, and was not with Alexander for most of the summer,¹ which may explain why he depicts completely untroubled relations between Alexander and Louis on Alexander's arrival in France. There is no mention of Otto's sudden return from the north, or of the fact that Bernard and Hyacinth did not go to Louis.² In other words, Boso either does not know or does not wish to know that Henry was sent to Frederick by Louis. Hugh's account equally gets things wrong. Henry of Troyes simply happened to be on a mission to Frederick, when Louis heard of the repulse of his legates by Alexander. Louis immediately wrote to Henry instructing him to make what treaty

1. The opening section of the Vita Alexandri was written probably in 1165-6; see Duchesne's introduction, p. xl, and p. 412. Boso was in Liguria for most of the summer: Ohnsorge 1928, 55 note 190.

2. In April at any rate; see above, pp. 82-3, 87.

he wished with Frederick; this as we have seen is chronologically impossible,¹ and Hugh is inconsistent with what he says later. Alexander's repulse of the legates so infuriated Louis that he regretted not having recognized Victor, but after Bernard and Hyacinth had been sent to him he calmed down enough to meet Alexander and try to persuade him to come to the meeting. At the meeting Louis had apparently so completely forgotten his anger with Alexander and the letter he wrote to Henry that he had to be reminded of it, and although he had just been trying very hard to persuade Alexander to come to the meeting, he was amazed to discover that one of the conditions that Henry had arranged was that Alexander must be produced at the meeting. Again, after the imperial legates had refused any delays, Louis returned to Dijon and started preparing for war, but he was persuaded to arrange a further meeting with the imperialists under very unfavourable conditions, simply to avert the danger that Henry of Troyes might go over to Frederick. Although according to Hugh it was Henry who had got Louis into his unenviable position² he was so alarmed that he agreed to give three other high-ranking hostages and to try to carry out the original treaty even though he knew that Alexander would not come to the meeting.

The source of the confusions and inconsistencies in the accounts of Boso and Hugh is clear: a compound of misinformation

1. Above, pp. 82, 84-5.

2. At one point Hugh implies that Henry in turn had been manipulated by Manasses of Orleans: above, p. 92. Manasses and Vézelay were on bad terms: Schmale 1968, 351 note 190.

and a desire to save Louis' face. Better to appear as someone who is deceived by schismatics than as someone who knowingly makes agreements with them. Louis' face in fact needed a good deal of saving. If he was simply being tricked by Frederick and Victor and Henry, why did he keep the negotiations so secret? As late as 10 July Alexander could write a friendly letter to Louis without any mention of the proposed meeting, and the argument from silence is surely valid here. At about the same time Henry of Rheims was writing to Louis in a way which suggests that he had only just heard not only of the terms of the meeting but of the meeting itself. Henry's refusal to reveal the source of his information to Louis and the hints in Alexander's letter to Henry of 1 August do not themselves constitute proof that there was an estrangement between the two brothers which extended to Louis' rejection of the pope Henry supported, but this is possible, and Peter of Blois, admittedly writing some thirty years later, thought that Louis was at least vacillating between the two popes.¹

1. See above, pp. 86-7. When Richard I was held captive by Henry VI, Peter of Blois made Eleanor of Aquitaine write in a letter to Celestine III (PL, 206, 1264): 'Cum enim praenominatus Fredericus fautor schismaticae dissensionis et auctor contra Alexandrum III canonice sicut scitis electum in partem apostatae Octaviani conjurasset, atque sub illa schismatis concussione generaliter ubique terrarum ecclesia laboraret, reges Franciae et Angliae variis ex utraque parte legationibus tentabantur. Cumque sententia regis Franciae consiliorum varietate, cui faveret parti, fluctuans dubia vacillaret, rex Henricus dolens Christi tunicam diutius scindi, primus Alexandro papae consensit, multaque cautela trahens regem Francorum pariter ad consensum apostolicum et suis munivit consiliis, et firmavit auxiliis, et sic navem Petri jam sub certo discrimine naufragantem in securo littoris statione locavit. Haec apud castrum Radulphi vidimus...'. The last sentence shows that it is 1162 and not 1160 that is being referred to (cf. above, p. 93). For the auxiliis, see below, p. 100.

Frederick's behaviour must also be considered. In the spring of 1162 he had a triumphal position in Italy. Milan had fallen, and the other hostile towns were quick to submit. An expedition against William of Sicily had been arranged.¹ Yet we are asked to believe by Boso and Hugh, and by Schmale, who largely follows them, that Frederick abandoned all this and summoned an imposing assembly of imperial princes and client kings to Burgundy simply in the hope of tricking Louis into surrendering or abandoning Alexander. It is dangerous to suppose that the rationality of twelfth-century politicians was the same as our own, but even so the picture is an improbable one.

It is easier to point to inconsistencies in contemporary narratives and the attempts of modern historians to make something of them than to provide plausible alternatives. Any account of the details of the agreements and the course of the meeting (or meetings) is likely to be a more or less arbitrary selection of a 'kernel of truth' from the various accounts. It is particularly unfortunate that the letters fail us when we reach the meeting, and that we have no surviving letters from Louis which bear on the negotiations. But a possible account would go something like this. Louis took the opportunity offered by Frederick's approaches to reopen the decision of 1160. Possibly he had some intention of recognizing Victor. The choice of Henry of Troyes may suggest this, since he was a relative of Victor's; so may Louis' apparent lack of reaction to Frederick's claims that he would recognize Victor.

1. Treaty between Frederick and Pisa, 6 April 1162, MGH, Const., i, 284 no. 205.

Henry of Troyes arranged a meeting on terms which were current practice in the mid-twelfth century - arbitration by viri probi chosen by both sides.¹ But difficulties began to crop up. Louis' episcopate probably disapproved of the proposals; Alexander certainly did, and he refused to come. Louis was now in a position where it seemed likely that he would have to recognize Victor and at the same time not be followed in this decision by his own church. When he arrived at St.-Jean-sur-Laône he was already looking for a way out of his dilemma. He first attempted to repudiate Henry's actions, but Henry also had face to save, and was able to show that he had not exceeded his instructions.² Then there were rumours that Victor also had not come to the meeting, but these too proved useless. Finally Louis had to ask for a delay in order to fetch Alexander. Hugh offers details of the terms on which this was granted, but it would be unwise to trust them, especially as he can be shown to be wrong in details.³ Alexander's letter to Louis of 17 September implies that the terms granted had put Louis in some danger.⁴

Frederick and his court however were suffering from a food shortage.⁵ They decided to cut their losses and hold a synod. Rainald was sent to ask Louis if he would like to attend. Louis

1. Heinemeyer 1964, 156-71, discusses this in some detail, but presses the sources too hard. See also below, p. 207.

2. See above, pp. 91-2. Hugh distorts the chronology and significance of this in order to shift the blame on to Frederick, Henry, and Manasses.

3. Below, p. 100.

4. JL 10757.

5. Schmale 1968, 361 and note 229.

refused. Rainald, piqued, said that it wasn't any of Louis' business in any case, and Louis angrily withdrew. This would have been in the first week of September.¹ On 7 and 8 September a council was held by Frederick and Victor at Dôle, at which Victor was again confirmed as pope, and Rainald repeated the arguments he had used to Louis, with embellishments.² Louis prepared for the worst, as did Alexander. Fortunately Henry II, with whom Alexander had already been in touch since his arrival in France, was prepared to come to Louis' aid with a large army.³ But the attack by Frederick which was feared did not happen; hunger had driven him away.⁴ The fate of the hostages given by Louis is not known; to be more exact it is not known whether he did in fact give hostages. Of the three mentioned by Hugh of Vézelay there is information only about Odo of Burgundy, with whom Louis stayed during the final stages of the negotiations, and he certainly did not go into captivity.⁵ Henry of Troyes did act on his guarantee, but only on a small scale. Not 'everything he held from the royal fisc' was transferred to Frederick, but only nine castles, none of which were held from Louis. Henry was not in captivity long, for he issued a charter in September.⁶

1. Schmale 1968, 363-3, assumes that Frederick held the synod and then sent Rainald to meet Louis at the end of the three week period mentioned by Hugh. This does not seem plausible.

2. St. 3965, 3967; Saxo Grammaticus, MGH, SS, xxix, 113-5. Rainald's views are brilliantly discussed by Kirfel 1959, 20ff., 47, 63ff.

3. JL 10757 and above, p. 97. Earlier contacts: Janssen 1961, 78.

4. He had left by 24 Sept.: St. 3969.

5. He issued a charter to Cîteaux in September (J. Marilier, Chartes et documents concernant l'abbaye de Cîteaux, 1098-1182, Rome, 1961, p. 128 no. 162) and Alexander's letter to Louis of 22 Sept. implies that he is a free agent (JL 10761).

Even in a period of intense activity like the schism, medieval diplomacy can rarely be seen to have turning-points. The meeting at St.-Jean-sur-Laône was as near as the diplomacy of the schism came to such a point; it more than cancelled out the prestige won for Frederick and Victor by the fall of Milan. Relations between Alexander and the western rulers, which should have been destroyed, were strengthened by it; the meeting between Alexander, Louis, and Henry at Coucy-sur-Loire shortly afterwards gave symbolic expression to this.¹

[p. 100, note 6] Benton 1959, 32-40.

1. Robert of Torigny, ed. Howlett, p. 215. John of Salisbury later reported Frederick as saying 'ex quo Latonam venit, ut regem Francorum et Gallicanam ecclesiam separaret a fide, et in suam heresim perverteret, ut adorarent idolum suum, successus ejus relapsi sunt, et quae eum extulerat, in depressionem ipsius coepit fortuna fluctuare...' (Materials, v, 377 no. 194).

Chapter six

From St.-Jean-sur-Laône to the death of Victor IV

a. The Council of Tours

Alexander left Déols for Tours at the end of September. In the course of the next few months we find him in close contact with both Louis and Henry of Rheims. On 26 October he wrote to Henry, asking him to carry out an unspecified request which would be conveyed by the abbots of L'Aumône and Foigny.¹ This may have had nothing to do with the schism, but Alexander and Philip of L'Aumône were certainly in touch over the schism at about this time, for a letter from Eberhard to Alexander of this period is in Philip's collection. Henry was also asked to show his devotion by looking after Otto, son of Cencius Frangipani, whom Alexander had recalled from Germany. It is tempting to suppose that Otto was an Alexandrine spy within the Empire, but in fact he was only a boy at the time, staying with relatives.² Only a week later Alexander again wrote to Henry asking him to go to Louis and support the proposals which his legate, Bernard of Porto, was to make to the king. The letter was not one of credence for Bernard himself, but was brought on in advance to Henry by a magister W., who also informed Henry orally of what was at stake.³ Bernard himself took a letter to Louis dated the next day. The nature of his proposals is not specified in the letter, Alexander

1. JL 10770.

2. Cf. Translatio S. Annonis archiepiscopi, MGH, SS, xi, 516 c. 3; Alberic of Trois-Fontaines, Chronicon, MGH, SS, xxiii, 840, s.a. 1150; JL 10939.

3. JL 10772, 1 Nov. 1162.

confining himself to the statement that if the king would agree to them he would be the more grateful '*quanto ex his mater tua sacrosancta Romana ecclesia maioris accipiet pacis et prosperitatis augmentum.*'¹

Bernard was probably sent to sound out Louis about holding a council. By 7 December plans were sufficiently advanced for Alexander to be able to write to Alfonso II of Aragon asking him to allow the clergy of his kingdom to attend without hindrance.² The next day Alexander took the opportunity offered by the presence of legates of Louis at the curia to send a letter to Louis confirming his intention to hold a council.³ Requests similar to that made to Alfonso were sent to Henry II and to a king in Ireland.⁴ Henry II needed a charter of non-prejudice before he would agree.⁵

The council met on 19 May 1163 and was an impressive gathering. At least four of the five Iberian kingdoms sent bishops, and the majority of English and French bishops were there. But

1. V, ff. 117v-118r = JL 10773, 2 Nov. 1162. Janssen 1961, 81 and note 18, is wrong in saying that this letter actually mentions plans to hold a council.

2. Kehr, 'Papsturkunden in Katalonien', 381-2 no. 95.

3. JL 10789, 8 Dec. 1162. In this letter Alexander says that he had originally informed Louis of his plans through bishop Maurice of Paris. There is no reference to Bernard.

4. Falkenstein 1972, 117-8.

5. JL 10834, 18 March 1163.

the council showed just how little progress Alexander's cause had made in the empire. Only one German bishop was at the council, and a handful from the Alpine provinces of the kingdom of Burgundy and from Italy, the latter mainly exiles.¹ Like the council of Lodi, the council of Tours proved only what was already known. Nevertheless, it showed a remarkable degree of self-confidence. It legislated for the Church Universal in a manner characteristic of papal councils outside Rome since the time of Leo IX.² Octavian and his supporters were excommunicated once again - this being the main point for contemporary annalists in England and France³ - and one of the conciliar canons declared their ordinations invalid. Frederick's case is unclear, and the ambiguity was probably deliberate, since Alexander was to negotiate with Frederick later in the year.⁴ Yet the sermons preached at the council do not suggest that those present were particularly aware of the schism, or of diplomatic difficulties. Geoffrey of Auxerre, now abbot of Clairvaux, did not mention it at all.⁵ Arnulf of Lisieux' sermon is frequently cited by historians for its 'if only' praise of Frederick, a favourite theme among Anglo-Norman writers,

1. See appendix d, below, pp. 243-9 , for those present.

2. J. D. Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum...collectio, xxi, Venice, 1776 , 1176-81. The canons printed ibid., 1182-4 do not belong to the council: see Brooke 1957, 471-3.

3. Sigeberti Gemblacensis continuatio Aquicinctina, MGH, SS, vi, 409; Chronicon Willelmi Godelli, ibid., xxvi, 198; Annalium Uticensium continuatio, ibid., xxvi, 507; Annales Gemmeticenses, ibid., xxvi, 508; Ex Annalibus Melrosensibus, ibid., xxvii, 435.

4. Hauck, 271 and note 4 argued from the Anchin chronicler that Frederick was deliberately not excommunicated at Tours, and this is supported by the Melrose Annals and JL 10869 (argument from silence). Yet Frederick was excommunicate already, and clearly a fautor of Victor; the precise significance of renewing or not renewing excommunications in such circumstances needs clarifying.

5. PL 184, 1095-1102; see Leclercq 1952, 287, for date and author.

and has even been quoted as an expression of the council's hopes for peace.¹ But Arnulf's claim that according to²

veteras...historias, certum erit, praedecessores eius
imperium non de alio jure, quam de sola sanctae Romanae
ecclesiae gratia percepisse...

would hardly have been welcome to Frederick; Alexander had shown himself much more sensitive to the scars left by Besançon in the letter he had written to Eberhard of Salzburg the previous year: 'Proposuas...ei[Frederick]...ut beneficiorum Dei non exhibeat se ingratum.'³ It is not surprising that the council left little trace in the empire, being noticed only at Reichersberg.⁴

b. Alexander and Frederick, 1163-4.

On 18 September 1162, after the collapse of negotiations between Frederick and Louis, Alexander again wrote to Eberhard of Salzburg. The letter opens with a long paragraph of thanks for past and exhortations to future support, with apologies for failure to write to Eberhard before. Eberhard is asked to come to Alexander to consult, or, if this should not be possible, to send a messenger 'consilio cuius in agendis ecclesie vice tua commodius perfruamur.' If Eberhard sees a suitable opportunity he is to seek out Frederick and try to persuade him to accept Alexander as pope. Should Frederick show a sincere desire to do this, Eberhard

1. Hauck, 271; for other examples of the theme see Haller, 372.

2. Mansi, op. cit., 1173.

3. A, f. 54r = JL 10702, 16 Mar. 1162.

4. MGH, SS, xvii, 470. There is also a report in Romoald of Salerno, MGH, SS, xix, 433.

can freely offer on Alexander's behalf both amnesty for the past and honour in the future.¹ These were essentially the same instructions as those of 16 March,² except for the request for a visit or messenger. They hardly amount to a formal diplomatic mission, and it is likely that Alexander was simply using a convenient messenger to get a letter to Eberhard.³ Eberhard's reply is a variation on the topos of St. Peter's boat, with no concrete information,⁴ but the fact that it exists shows that Eberhard did not himself go to Alexander. Alexander's next known contact with Germany was a letter to Albert of Freising in early 1163 asking him to visit him.⁵ More important was the mission of Witer, a monk from Morimund, who took letters to Eberhard and Gerhoch in March 1163. The letter for Eberhard was addressed to the faithful in the regnum Teutonicum ordering them to obey him as legate. He was also given the important power of absolving schismatics who returned to the fold, without reference to the pope.⁶ Probably there were also instructions for Eberhard to make contact with

1. A, ff. 60r-v = JL 10758.

2. Above, pp. 76-7

3. Two days later Alexander issued a privilege for the Augustinian house of St. John in Kaltenbrunn, which still adhered to the 'deposed' Ulrich of Halberstadt, who himself is found in the province of Salzburg in 1163 and presumably had contacts with Eberhard before then. Cf. JL 10759, 10771 and below, p. 110. Both Ohnsorge 1928, 58-9 and Hauck, 270 saw JL 10758 as a deliberate and rapid response to the changed situation after St.-Jean-sur-Laône.

4. P. f. 84v = Germ. Pont., i, 29 no. 92; for dating see Hödl 1969, 469 and note 473.

5. Germ. Pont., i, 335 no. 27, correctly dated by Preiss 1934, 63.

6. Classen 1960, 381 no. *113; JL 10824, 28 Feb. 1163. How important this grant was can be seen from John of Salisbury's letter to Gerard la Pucelle, Materials, vi, 430-1 no. 418.

Frederick, for shortly afterwards we find Eberhard visiting Frederick's court together with Hartmann of Brixen and Gerhoch. Nothing came of this, though the Reichersberg annals were careful to stress the honourable reception given to Eberhard and his companions by Frederick.¹ Alexander perhaps received a report on this from the two bishops, for his next letter to Eberhard was also addressed to Hartmann of Brixen.² It may have been brought back by Albert of Freising on his return from the council of Tours. Apart from briefly reporting the splendour of the council and the solemn excommunication of Octavian and his supporters, Alexander wanted Eberhard to hinder Frederick's plans in Hungary. The death of Géza II in 1162 had produced civil war between Géza's son Stephen, a minor, and two successive uncles, who invaded the country with Byzantine support. The main defenders of Géza's son seem to have been the higher clergy, including Lucas of Gran, whom Eberhard was specifically asked to help. The danger was that either the young Stephen, supported by Alexandrine prelates, would be defeated, and thus Hungary would be lost to Alexander, or he would have to accept Frederick's help in order to survive. Indeed, both Stephen and the second of his uncles (also confusingly called Stephen) had appealed to Frederick, as had the nobility of Hungary, and Frederick sent a legation consisting of Henry of Wiesenbach and Henry count of Dietz to Hungary, though he took no further action.³

1. Classen 1960, 211.

2. JL 10869, 29 May 1163.

3. Holtzmann 1926, 413-7; Ohnsorge 1928, 117. Hausmann 1956, 159-60, suggested a date of 1164 for the legation, but he produces no evidence from the career of Henry of Wiesenbach to rule out the spring of 1163 and in view of Alexander's letter this seems more likely.

When Witer of Morimund returned in July 1163 Alexander decided to approach Frederick directly. Presumably he had brought back sufficiently good news of the meeting between Eberhard and Frederick in April for this to seem worthwhile.¹ An imposing embassy, consisting of the cardinals Albert and Otto of St. Nicholas, the bishops Henry of Troyes (a member of the Sponheim family and hence a distant relation of Frederick's) and the exiled Peter of Pavia (both Cistercians), and a master Roland, arrived at Nürnberg in August. Only the bishops were allowed to meet Frederick. Their mission was to bring Frederick to Alexander's obedience, and to prove that Alexander was the canonically elected pope. This proof would include - an important concession from Alexander - clearing the Roman church from the charge of conspiracy with Sicily. Frederick seized on this opening for a judicial review of the election, and offered arbitration. Two neutral men were to be chosen, who would choose seven advisers, either from the Latins or the Germans. All would be bound by oath to hear the case again, consider it carefully, and then the two, with the advice of the seven, would give their judgement in favour of one or neither of the popes.² Albert

1. Alexander wrote to Louis to inform him of Witer's arrival and to pass on letters to him from Welf VI, marquis of Tuscany and Spoleto (RHF, xvi, 54 no. 173) thanking Louis for his support of Alexander on 28 July (JL 10917). The day before that the two cardinals sent on the embassy subscribed for the last time (Ohnsorge 1928, 59 note 206). The coincidence is striking enough to suggest a connexion between Witer's return and Alexander's embassy.

2. Albert of Freising to Eberhard of Salzburg, Sudendorf, i, 67 no. 24. Cf. Ohnsorge, loc. cit., and Classen 1960, 212.

of Freising did not think that Alexander would agree to this. But after the legates returned to Alexander in September there was still enough hope of success at the curia to justify sending a fresh embassy. This set out in November or December 1163, and consisted of Peter of Pavia once more with the cardinals William of Pavia and Hyacinth. Again, we know of this legation from a letter, this time from Ulrich, bishop of Treviso to Eberhard of Salzburg, Ulrich of Halberstadt, and Roman of Gurk. The relevant passage in the letter, as so often in the Hannover manuscript, is corrupt:¹

De ecclesia hoc certum habeo, quod Papiensis expulsus et domini Jac[inctus] atque Wil[elmus] cardinales Segusam venerant et conductum veniendi ad curiam expetebant. Quibus fuit obviam transmissus archicancellarius, comes Blandratus, ut si iuxta conductum et statutum venissent, confidenter ad curiam accederent; alias enim summa horum creditur, quod nusquam cassaretur.

The last eight words are hard to make sense of.² All that can be said about this second legation is that it arrived and failed.³ Frederick may have thought that he had reached some measure of agreement with the first legation; certainly he let Gerhoch think so.⁴ But the phrase 'conductum et statutum' in Ulrich's letter may mean no more than the terms he had proposed in August.

1. H, f. 527 = Sudendorf, ii, 142ff. no. 59. On the dating of this letter and hence of the embassy see appendix e, pp. 250-1.

2. There may have been some confusion by the copyist with the next letter in H (and therefore probably in his exemplar; see below, pp. 224-5), f. 528 = Sudendorf, i, 81 no. 36, which refers to a disputed election at Bremen in 1169.

3. Cf. JL 11003 and appendix e.

4. Classen 1960, 212 and note 108.

There were no more official contacts between Alexander and Frederick before Victor's death in April 1164,¹ but an unofficial attempt was made by Anthelme, prior of the Carthusian house of Arvières, to persuade Alexander to clear himself of the charges made by the imperialists and submit to an examination of his election. Alexander replied politely refusing.² Since Arvières was a foundation of the count of Savoy, who was at this time not on good terms with Frederick,³ it is unlikely that anything lay behind the attempt except the *'piam simplicitatem et simplicem pietatem'* acknowledged by Alexander. There were to be no more direct negotiations between the two sides until 1169, apart from an ultimatum from Frederick in 1167.⁴ From the secure position demonstrated by the council of Tours, Alexander had gone as far as he could, or needed, and for Frederick this was not enough. Only independent arbitration, not a negotiated surrender, would avoid the loss of face involved in repudiating the decision to call the council of Pavia and the line taken there and reaffirmed at Lodi.⁵

c. Alexander, Louis, and Manuel Comnenus, 1163-5

During the period when he was negotiating with Frederick,

1. Peter of Pavia did not return with the other legates, but remained at Chiusa; see appendix e. He may have continued to negotiate with Frederick, but may equally simply have been hoping to return to his see, from which he had been expelled (Dunken 1931, 60).

2. JL 11003, Feb. 26 1164.

3. Previté-Orton 1912, 297, 326-31.

4. Below, pp. 146, 152-4

5. For the different interpretation of these two embassies offered by Ohnsorge 1928, see below, p. 121 note 1.

Alexander was also engaged in a complicated quadripartite negotiation between himself, the kings of France and Sicily, and the Byzantine emperor. The initiative came from Manuel Comnenus, but was probably the result of the rather obscure negotiations between him and Alexander's legates in 1160-2;¹ certainly the curia was quick to try to exploit his approach. The first news of Manuel's embassy is in a letter from Hubald of Ostia to Louis VII of late June or early July 1163. A messenger sent by the Pisans to Alexander had told how he had seen at Messina a large ship with legates from the emperor of Constantinople. William I asked what their purpose was; they replied that they had been sent to the king of France with many costly gifts. On hearing this, William had provided ten galleys to convey them to Montpellier. The Pisan believed that they had already arrived. At first Hubald had not believed this, but the Pisan had offered to swear to it in the presence of other Pisans. Hubald had therefore written to Louis 'tempestative' so that he might decide whether or not to send someone to Montpellier. If Louis should already have heard about the embassy, Hubald asked to be informed of what he had decided.²

Hubald implied that he did not know what the embassy had come for; but this is probably disingenuous. The care taken to show that the king of Sicily was well-disposed to the mission - as we shall see, he was both a key figure and not very enthusiastic - suggests this; so does Hubald's own admission that he had written

1. See above, pp. 47-8.

2. V, f. 151r = RHF, xvi, 50 no. 164. Manuel's legates arrived at Montpellier 'ad Iulii initium': see their letter to Alexander (p. 113 note 2). Hubald's letter was probably sent at about the same time, certainly before Alexander's letter to Louis of 15 July (JL 10906).

immediately to Louis. Alexander himself treated the embassy as an important one. He sent a messenger to meet the Byzantine legates, and caused them considerable embarrassment by trying to persuade them to go to Alexander first and then to Louis. This was against their instructions, and they wrote a plaintive letter to Louis asking him to arrange that these could be carried out without offending the pope.¹ At the same time they wrote politely to Alexander claiming that they were too exhausted to make the journey from St. Gilles,²

Unde sanctitatem vestram obnixe flagitamus ut laboris nostri egritudini compatiendo quod et qualiter sit agendum nobis insinuetis. Habemus enim quedam persone vestre dictu accomoda et ad utilitatem respicientia quod non licet alteri nisi vestre sanctitati intimare et nobilissimo regi Frantie.

The embassy had a double purpose. It was to negotiate with Louis and Alexander. The fact that the legates were under instructions to see Louis first does not disprove this, or show that Alexander butted into a negotiation to which he was not intended to be party. Etiquette would have required such an order (host before guest). So would the negotiations with Alexander. Manuel's legates talk of Alexander as pope, but Manuel still had formally to recognize him.³ A visit to Alexander by his ambassadors either in Louis' company or under his auspices would not have prejudiced this bargaining position in the same way as a direct visit. And given the subject of the negotiations - translatio imperii⁴ - Louis'

1. V, f. 193v = RHF, xvi, 54 no. 178.

2. V, f. 182v = RHF, xv, 800 no. 90.

3. Above, pp. 47-8; below, p. 119

4. Below, pp. 121-2.

assistance and cooperation were essential. Alexander was a guest in his kingdom, and one who had already caused him some embarrassment. Should Manuel's negotiations with Alexander succeed then Louis would be exposed to Frederick's anger, since it would not necessarily be possible for Alexander to return immediately. Louis himself can have been of little interest to Manuel. A military alliance, frequently assumed,¹ was out of the question. Byzantium and Sicily operated in the Mediterranean with fleets and a diplomacy of bribery, either in cash or in trading concessions. Louis had neither a fleet nor large amounts of cash,² and the Capetians were not a Mediterranean power. In so far as Louis was directly useful to Manuel, it was because he had, or might be thought to have had, influence in Sicily. If Manuel wanted recuperations in Italy, the agreement of William of Sicily was highly desirable. Peace had been concluded between the two powers in 1158, but relations were not good. They were described by the Byzantine chronicler Nicetas as lukophilia, false friendship.³ Louis had had an alliance with Roger II of Sicily in 1149-50, and William's queen was of French descent;⁴ Louis might perhaps be useful as a mediator.

1. Giesebrecht, v, 425-9; Haller, 132-3. The account in Ohnsorge 1928, 125-45, which did so much to establish a chronology and to put the undated letters into a proper context, is hampered by the assumption that Louis was Manuel's main concern.

2. Benton 1967. The money which the Byzantine legates were to bring to Louis (below, p. 120) need not have been a subsidy for sending troops to Italy; it was more probably to give Louis the means to defend himself against Frederick, or simply a douceur.

3. Parker 1956, 87; Chalandon 1907, ii, 254, 300.

4. Chalandon 1907, ii, 148-9, 176 and note 2.

Reconstruction of the diplomacy which followed the arrival of Manuel's legates is not easy, and is made more difficult by the absence of surviving letters from Louis and by the gradual drying up of the St. Victor collections in 1164-5.¹ There is always the danger of hidden arguments from silence. Alexander wrote to Louis on 15 July forwarding the letter he had received from the Byzantine legates. The arenga of the letter is a captatio benevolentiae of a type not uncommon in Alexander's letters to Louis.² Louis' services to Alexander had been so outstanding that Alexander found it unthinkable not to consult with him on all important matters which concerned the welfare of the church, knowing that Louis' zeal was no less than his own. Accordingly he was sending the letter the Byzantine legates had sent him, by messengers who would explain certain things which should not be entrusted to a letter. He asked that they should be favourably heard, and that Louis should reply by them, indicating his intentions. For Alexander's sake he was also to send legates with a safe conduct who would go with Alexander's own messengers to meet Manuel's ambassadors.³ Louis must have responded to this last request, for on 20 August Alexander wrote to him again, thanking him.⁴ The five weeks' gap between this letter and that of 15 July does not show any hesitation on

1. Below, p. 219.

2. Compare the earlier JL 10891, 11 June 1163.

3. V, ff. 107r-v = JL 10906.

4. V, ff. 115r-v = JL 10927.

Louis' part in doing what had been asked,¹ for the purpose of this second letter was not primarily to thank Louis but to settle the reception of the Byzantine embassy. One of the legates was ill at St. Gilles; the other was on his way to Alexander. He wanted to meet Alexander and Louis together to explain the purpose of his mission. Alexander, though welcoming a meeting with Louis, thought that Louis should take counsel '*qualiter super hoc tibi sit procedendum et quid in hoc facto honori et excellentie tue debeat convenire et secundum quod honori tuo noveris expedire procedas.*' Whatever Louis decided, he was to let Alexander and the Byzantine legate know by letter, quickly. Only five days later Alexander again wrote to Louis. The Byzantine legate was near at hand, and as Alexander had previously explained, he wished to meet Alexander and Louis at Bourges. Alexander however felt that the legate should see Louis first, '*ne si forte ad nos hac occasione venires ei occurrere quodammodo videreris.*' After that, if Louis thought it advisable, they could all three meet together. Accordingly, Alexander had asked the legate to visit Louis first, and he asked Louis to receive him graciously and give careful attention to what he had to say. '*Si autem tibi fuerit aliquid nobis esse significandum poteris cum tibi placuerit indicare*';² evidently Alexander had

1. So Ohnsorge 1928, 137. He is led into this assumption by an earlier piece of mistaken chronology. For him, the letter from the Byzantine legates to Alexander (above, p. 113) was wrung out of them by the officious papal messenger after it had seemed that Louis was going to ignore them. This is chronologically impossible; the legates arrived at the beginning of July, and by 15 July Alexander could forward their letter to Louis. It follows that they asked for Alexander's help immediately, and also that there is no evidence that Louis was at first unwilling to see them.

2. V, ff. 108v-109r = JL 10930.

sorted out the important questions of protocol with the Byzantine legate, and no longer needed to hear rapidly from Louis.¹

If Alexander could say that the Byzantine legate was near Bourges on 25 August, he will have reached Louis in the first week of September.² By 16 October Louis had received the Byzantine legates formally and had written to Alexander to tell him so. The delay was probably due to waiting for the other Byzantine legate, who had remained ill in the south, for Alexander in his reply speaks clearly of legates. According to Alexander Louis and his magnates expressed their joy at the honour and reverence shown to the papacy by Manuel

iudicantes eos de cetero super aliis que attulerant negociis
audiendos nec alieis [sic ms.; alias Duchesne] iudicatis
eorum verba a consueta clementia tue mansuetudinis audienda.

Alexander, who in his arenga had already given Louis, from a papal point of view, a quasi-imperial position by calling him 'sacrosancte Romane ecclesie...quodammodo...baiulus', went on to thank Louis and to say that he would pass on to Louis the reply to the legates which he and his cardinals should have decided on.³

Louis continued to behave friendly to the legates. He sent letters to Manuel confirming that the Western church had

1. For Ohnsorge 1928, 137-8, these procedural objections are a mere cover for Alexander's real intentions: since he knew how unwelcome the Byzantine alliance was, he wished to avoid appearing at the meeting and having to support the Greeks. Alexander's letter did precisely that, using language near to that appropriate for a letter of credence; and the underlying assumption that Louis was hostile is unproven.

2. Luchaire 1885, 66, gives Louis' itinerary.

3. V, ff. 111r-112r = JL 10948, a reply to a lost letter from Louis. Alexander seems to imply that he has also met the legates; possibly this was at the meeting with Louis at which Alexander had asked Henry of Rheims to be present in a letter of 10 Sept. (JL 10940).

solemnly recognized Alexander and asking Manuel to do the same.¹ The text of Alexander's letter of 16 October seems garbled, but it implies that Alexander felt he had little to worry about.² On 9 November Alexander wrote to the master of the Hospital forbidding him either to dismiss or to recall one of Manuel's legates, Peter, prior of the Hospital at Constantinople. Since this survives in the St. Victor collections, Louis must have asked Alexander to grant the dispensation, a further proof of his good-will.³ Shortly after this the legates must have left for home. The next we hear of them is in a letter from two of Louis' legates. They had arrived at St. Gilles on the day appointed, and had had frequent conversations with one of the Byzantines 'super inposito negotio et itinere nostro'. He had finally said that they would remain there at least until 6 January,

Itaque inpositi negotii ulla dilatio in nobis affuisse ne dubitetis. Premissis vero addimus quoniam nos moram facientes [sic] ad honorem tui ut in tanto negotio oportet nobis impendere.

The letter concludes by asking Louis to send letters without delay to the king of Sicily.⁴ A letter from the two Byzantine legates to Louis was probably sent at the same time, though it may be slightly later. It expresses regret that Louis had not given

1. See p. 119.

2. The repetition in 'iudicantes...audiendos...iudicastis...audienda' is uncharacteristic of the papal style, and the meaningless 'alieis' of the ms. suggests that something is wrong. Ohnsorge 1928, 139, basing himself on Duchesne's 'alias' and assuming it to mean elsewhere interprets the letter as thanking Louis for not putting off hearing the proposals of the legates until some other time. This is consistent with his general interpretation, but 'alias' often means simply 'otherwise' in medieval Latin.

3. V, f. 123v = JL 10956. See below, p. 222.

4. V, f. 218v = RHF, xvi, 57 no. 187.

letters of credence to the king of Sicily for his legates, and asked for them by return of messenger ¹

quia vos bene scitis quoniam nos ituri et reversuri sumus per ipsum cum pecunia et per aliam viam ire non reverti possumus [possimus V] et istud negotium est regis Sycilie sicuti imperatoris et bene scimus quia vos diligitis eum.

From two subsequent letters we learn that Louis recalled his legates and the Byzantines returned home accompanied by legates from the count of Toulouse and from Alexander.² As far as Louis' side of the negotiations is concerned the story ends here. Only the letter from Louis reached Manuel, to judge from Manuel's reply, so clearly Raymond of Toulouse's appeal for discreet and faithful legates by whom great things might be accomplished² fell on deaf ears. Manuel's reply arrived in January 1165 via Henry, archbishop of Benevento and was passed on to Louis by Alexander, with covering letters from himself and Hubald of Ostia.³ After a captatio benevolentiae which refers to the friendship begun on the Second Crusade [sic !], to Manuel's recent marriage to Louis' relative, Mary of Antioch, and to his recognition of Alexander as pope on Louis' recommendation, the real point is reached:

Si autem vobis placet diligentius de vestre nobilitatis ac de sanctitatis eius voluntatibus per internuncios vestros iniunctum habentes de omnibus huiusmodi negotio pertinentibus loqui et audire et operam dare his que locuta fuerint et confirmata nostro imperio insinuare, paratam invenient tranquillitatem nostram ad hoc peragendum.

1. V, f. 195r = RHF, xvi, 56 no. 185.

2. R. de Balneo to Louis VII, V, ff. 188r-v = RHF, xvi, 56 no. 186; Raymond of Toulouse to Louis VII, V, ff. 187v-188r = RHF, xvi, 56 no. 184.

3. V, ff. 44r-46r = Dölger 1445 (for dating see Ohnsorge 1928, 124-6); the accompanying letters from Alexander and Hubald are in V, ff. 122r-v, 151v-152r = JL 11150 (26 Jan. 1165) and RHF, xvi, 81 no. 248 respectively.

Manuel has not himself sent legates because of the difficulty in finding men of suitable rank; an earlier ambassador had set off, but had had to turn back for lack of permission to pass through Sicily. The letter ends by asking Louis again to reply by letter or legate, a request also made by Alexander and Hubald.

Louis is not known to have replied in any way, and the argument from silence is probably valid here.¹ After Alexander had returned to Italy in the summer of 1165 Louis would have been far less relevant to the negotiations between Manuel and Alexander, and the Byzantines concentrated their attention on Sicily and the Lombard towns. We do not know why he drew back in 1164, or indeed what he drew back from. Agreement had apparently been reached at one time. Manuel's legates could write to Louis, 'you know that we are to go and return through Sicily with money', and Manuel's own later request for men who could 'speak and listen and give effect to what will have been discussed and agreed', though formulaic, also suggests annoyance that effect had not been given to what had been discussed and agreed. The decision to recall the legates seems to have been a sudden one. There is no evidence for any hesitation on Louis' part until the turn of the year; as

1. Though the absence of any of Louis' letters and of papal letters to Louis after 1165 (see below, p. 219) must leave some doubt. Ohnsorge 1028, 78 note 48, argued that the next surviving letter from Louis to Manuel (Materials, vii, 145-6 no. 697) refers so closely to Manuel's letter of 1165 that it can only be the answer to it; yet it is to be dated to 1169 and is 'politically irrelevant'. It follows that Louis did not reply immediately to Manuel's letter. In fact the connexions between the two letters are not great, and the absence of any mention of Manuel's letter in Louis' suggests if anything that a reply to it had already been sent. It is worth noting that the salutatio '...ei fideliter et feliciter adhaerere qui regna largitur et transfert imperia' suggests that Louis was at least au fait with the later negotiations between Manuel and Alexander (below, pp. 139-49), but for the reasons given above he is not likely to have played an important part in them.

late as December 1163 his legates were writing to him to apologize for the delay and to say that it was not their fault. Then they were recalled. Neither an 'anti-Byzantine' party at Louis' court, nor Louis' vacillatory nature, nor his supposed preference for a negotiated peace between Alexander and Frederick seem particularly satisfactory explanations;¹ more likely, though still entirely conjectural, is Louis' unwillingness to get entangled at a time when the Becket dispute was beginning to have its effects on Anglo-French relations. The decision, once taken, does not seem to have been reversed, or even reconsidered. The visit of Ardicio, cardinal deacon of St. Theodore, to Henry of Rheims may have been part of an attempt by Alexander to get it reversed, but if so it was unsuccessful.²

Alexander's negotiations with Manuel had a longer life. Alexander's letter to Manuel, if there was one, has not survived, but a letter from William of Pavia to Manuel has.³ The meat of the letter is in the opening:

1. All three are offered by Ohnsorge 1928, 125-45. There is no evidence that Alexander was influenced by Louis in opening negotiations with Frederick in 1163; to judge from his well-preserved letters to Louis, he does not even seem to have told him that he was doing so, not even in, e.g., JL 10917 (see above, p. 109 note 1) where he might have been expected to do so.

2. Ohnsorge 1928, 142. A letter from Alexander to Henry of Rheims (JL 11009, 17 Mar. 1164) refers to 'colloquia' being held by Louis at which matters important to the church were discussed. These could have been about Byzantium (so Ohnsorge, loc. cit) but the Becket dispute and the peace proposals made by Henry to Louis are equally likely (cf. Eyton 1878, 70-1 and John of Poitiers' letter to Becket, Materials, v, 115 no. 60). A disagreement and reconciliation between Louis and the pope are mentioned in a letter to Becket of about this time, but the cause is not stated (Materials, v, 116 no. 61)

3. B.N., ms. 14615 = Duchesne, 490. Its survival in the St. Victor collections is explained by Alexander's promise to Louis. See above, p. 117, and also below, p. 222.

Ex imperialibus gestis et ipsorum augmentis operum cognoscentes quantis honoribus praedecessorum vestrorum reverentia Christianorum omnium matrem sacrosanctam Romanam ecclesiam sublimaverit quantisque donaverit privilegiis, intuentes etiam quanta eidem ecclesiae a barbarorum tyrannide fuerint inflicta gravamina ex quo imperatorium nomen ab illis noscitur usurpatum merito excellentiam vestram singulari quadam intentione stabilitate optamus atque indeficientibus incrementis semper in melius promoveri.

What follows is vague talk about the desirability of an alliance between Manuel, Louis, and Alexander, and about William's attempts to bring this about. But the opening shows that the curia were still prepared to offer the 'vanitates vanitatum' which Burchard had heard of in 1161¹ to Manuel. In the next four years discussions of a translatio imperii were to become an increasingly important part of the diplomacy of the schism.²

1. Above, p. 48.

2. See below, pp. 139-49

Chapter seven

The council of Würzburg

Victor IV died after a short illness on 20 April 1164. Becket's informant at Alexander's court reported madness and delirium for the fortnight preceding his death, and Boso later claimed that a death-bed repentance was prevented by his entourage.¹ From the other side, there are reports of miracles at his death-bed from sources as widely dispersed as Lombardy, Saxony and Lotharingia.² He may in fact have had a small posthumous cult; the monastery at Lucca in which according to Becket's messenger Victor had been buried at the sword's point after the canons of St. Fredian had refused him burial left his body undisturbed after the defeat of the imperialists in 1167-8 and even after the end of the schism in 1177, and Clement III had to order its exhumation when he visited Lucca in 1187.³ Some contemporaries obviously saw his pontificate in a rather different light from the Alexandrines and the modern historians who have followed them. Inevitably, he had cooperated with Frederick to the extent of losing his independence, and had been unable to deal with those opponents whom Frederick chose to protect, such as Eberhard of Salzburg and Ulrich of Treviso. But then his predecessors had also been unable to touch those whom the emperor delighted to honour. His proclaimed intention to turn the papacy back from bureaucracy and centralization seems to have been

1. Materials, v, 90-1 no. 53; Boso, p. 410.

2. Acerbus Morena, ed. Güterbock, p. 175; Annales Palidenses, MGH, SS, xvi, 91; Annalium Laubiensium Continuatio, MGH, SS, iv, 24.

3. JL, ii, 535.

4. For Eberhard see above, p. 77; for Ulrich, Sudendorf, ii, 143 no. 59.

realized for the areas of his obedience, but only because those areas were in any case less addicted to appeals to the pope. He did little other than reward his supporters.¹ But his pontificate was convincing enough not to arouse general opposition within the empire, and he evidently enjoyed a prestige which, as we shall see, his successors were unable to command. Godfrey of Viterbo later said of him that it is fatal to die before one's rival, and this may stand as an epitaph.²

Victor was succeeded by one of his electors, Guido of Crema, who took the name of Paschal III. The circumstances of his election provide one of the cruxes of the schism. Was he chosen with Frederick's consent, and indeed on Frederick's orders, or did Rainald of Cologne forestall any moves towards ending the schism by having a new pope elected on his own initiative? Little can be gained from essentially circular arguments about the supposed character and policies of the protagonists.³ Even if Frederick did not authorize the election, he accepted it; by the autumn of 1164 he had already gone so far as to refuse Conrad of Salzburg the regalia unless he received the pallium from Paschal.⁴

The death of Victor was especially unfortunate for Frederick, as it coincided with the first stirrings of opposition in Italy,

1. Cf. JL 14443 and Haller, 124-6, with a rather different appraisal. Grants of episcopal insignia to abbots: JL 14430, 14436, 14449, etc.

2. Hauck, 272 and note 4.

3. Cf. Haller, 135: 'Über Vorgänge dieser Art Gewissheit zu erlangen, sind schon die Zeitgenossen meist ausserstande.' For references and a discussion, see Hauck 272-3 and Herkenrath 1962, 239-46, who ascribe responsibility to Frederick and Rainald respectively.

4. See below, p. 174.

which had been quiescent since the fall of Milan in 1162. The league of Verona, an alliance between Venice, Verona, Vicenza, and Padua, emerged as openly hostile to Frederick in May 1164, though it had evidently been formed before then, to judge from the hints dropped by Alexander.¹ The bishops of the three mainland cities had already been in contact with Alexander,² but the moving spirit in the formation of the league was Venice. Relations between her and Barbarossa had been poor since 1162 at least. Negotiations for a settlement in March 1164 had broken down, and Venice had used Byzantine subsidies to form the league.³ It revealed the growing unpopularity of Frederick's rule, not only in its formation, but in his allies' reaction. Ferrara and Mantua had to be specially rewarded with privileges, and even Pavia and Cremona showed themselves less than enthusiastic.⁴ An attack on Verona after negotiations with the league had failed had to be abandoned, and Frederick returned to Germany to seek reinforcements.⁵

It was not only in northern Italy that Frederick and Paschal experienced difficulties; the Romans too were moving away from the antipopes. The to-and-fro of Roman politics of which the schism

1. JL 11017, 15 Apr. 1164, to Henry of Rheims.

2. Below, pp. 241-2.

3. Kehr 1924, 237ff.: Baer 1887, 17-22.

4. Ferrara and Mantua: St. 4015, 4016. Pavia and Cremona: Materials, v, 90 nō. 53, and Acerbus Morena, ed. Güterbock, pp. 175-6. Boso, p. 412, and John Cinnamos, PG, 133, v, 9, suggest that Cremona joined the league, which seems premature.

5. Baer 1887, 24; Acerbus Morena, loc. cit. Rainald of Cologne tried to secure military assistance from the Burgundian bishops in July 1164; Materials, v, 120 no. 61.

may in part have been an expression had continued through the early 1160s. Alexander had been able to return in 1161, only to be driven out again; in 1162 the Frangipani and Pierleoni, his supporters, are found styling themselves consuls and senators, which may show another swing back to Alexander.¹ The prefect of Rome and other nobles who were allegedly present at Paschal's election at Lucca need not have been exiles,² but Alexander had certainly gained ground in Rome by 1164. In the summer of that year a messenger of Becket's wrote from the papal court that the Romans had taken an oath to Pope Alexander.³ Boso also reports this, and connects it with the death of Alexander's vicar in Rome, Julius of Praeneste, and his replacement by John, cardinal priest of Sts. John and Paul, who was able to buy the allegiance of the Romans and win back St. Peter's and the county of Sabina.⁴ The last piece of information is especially significant; the Sabina had been the source of Victor's support in Latium, and it was a bad sign for Paschal that it was no longer secure.

These growing difficulties meant that Frederick needed once again to go on to the diplomatic offensive, doubly so because with the death of Victor IV there were growing signs of opposition to the schism even in Germany.⁵ The first sign of these new moves

1. Above, pp. 66-7, 85.

2. As Haller, 134, supposed.

3. Materials, v, 120 no. 61.

4. Boso, p. 412. Ohnsorge 1928, 68, suggests plausibly that he had acquired the money on his legation to the Latin Kingdom between 1162 and 1164.

5. Mentioned by Frederick himself in his encyclical from the council of Würzburg, MGH, Const., i, 315 no. 223; for details see below, pp. 156-81.

is a series of letters from William of Montferrat, an ally of Frederick's, to Louis VII. As usual we do not have Louis' replies, and no other source mentions the exchanges. Between October 1164 and early 1165 William negotiated with Louis, with Frederick's approval, probably about the schism. He used as intermediary, among others, the abbot of the Cistercian monastery of Lucedio. This was a Montferrat Hauskloster, but Peter of Pavia, who had been summoned to Frederick on Victor's death,¹ had formerly been abbot there, and there may have been a connexion between Frederick's meeting with Peter and William's negotiations with Louis.² We do not know any more about these negotiations, but they do give a rather different context from that usually assigned to the much better known exchanges which resulted in the presence of legates of Henry II at the council of Würzburg in 1165. It is generally held that Frederick and Rainald took advantage of Henry II's difficulties with Becket, and consequently with Louis VII and Alexander III, to try to detach the English king from Alexander.³ In fact it was probably Henry II, not Frederick, who opened negotiations, while Frederick and Paschal were trying to win over both western rulers.

By the time of Victor's death, the quarrel between Becket and Henry II was well advanced. The first stage had ended at

1. Materials, v, 90 no. 53.

2. Preiss 1934, 34 and note 47, 66-7.

3. Cf. e.g. Hauck, 276; Haller, 142.

the council of Clarendon in January 1164. A period of intensive diplomacy at the papal court at Sens followed, complicated by overlapping disputes between Becket and other English prelates. Henry was annoyed by Alexander's refusal to confirm the constitutions, and by being outmanoeuvred in an attempt to short-circuit Becket's power: the legatine powers granted to his ally Roger of York were so restricted that he returned the letters granting them in disgust.¹ He was also angered by the interest which Louis VII took in the affair.² It is not surprising, then, that Henry, while negotiating with Alexander, should also have approached Frederick. John Cumin was sent on an embassy to Frederick in 1164, and Frederick replied by sending Rainald of Dassel at the turn of the year.³ The immediate purpose of the exchanges was a marriage alliance. It was proposed that Henry the Lion should marry Henry II's daughter Mathilda, and that Frederick's eldest son should marry Eleanor.⁴ Observers of Henry thought he was trying to secure a military alliance against Louis;⁵ he was probably dangling adherence to Paschal as a bait. Whether the imperialists were trying for the same things is far less certain. Not only had Frederick contacted Louis through William of Montferrat, but there were other approaches to Louis from the imperialists in 1164 and 1165. Rainald of Dassel put out a feeler to Henry of Troyes while returning to Germany in the summer

1. Materials, v, 85-7 no. 50 (=JL 11004), 84 no. 49 (= JL 11005), 91 no. 53, 95 no. 54.

2. Cf. Becket's letter to Louis, ibid., 80-1 no. 46.

3. See below, appendix f, pp. 252-4.

4. Baaken 1968, 59, 70-1.

5. See appendix f.

of 1164.¹ Christian of Buch, Frederick's chancellor, wrote to Louis about the spoliation of imperial merchants by the viscount of Macon, and this implies a messenger at least, though possibly the merchants themselves did their own delivery.² Finally, there are two letters from Paschal III, one to Louis VII and one to his consiliarius, Bouchard le Ventre,³ asking them to withdraw their support for Roland. The fact that the existence and importance of the counsellor were known by Paschal implies earlier contacts. On the evidence, then, the imperialists were at least as interested in Louis as in Henry. But Henry was able to turn the situation to his own advantage. He had already succeeded in frightening Louis.⁴ When Rainald returned to the west in April 1165, Henry was able to prevent him from seeing Louis. Rainald had to content himself with an apology to Louis for not coming, and a promise that Frederick would send an embassy after the coming meeting at Würzburg.⁵ Only English envoys attended the council.

The results of the council, which met at Whitsun, were clear. Frederick swore to recognize Paschal and his successors, never to recognize Roland or his successors, and not to seek or accept release from his oath. The lay princes of the Empire swore not to

1. Materials, v, 120 no. 61.

2. RHF, xvi, 97 no. 104. Hägermann 1968, 235, dates the piece to October 1164 x October 1165 on the strength of the intitulatio.

3. JL 14486-7, dated to 13 April 1166, but 1165 is as possible and more probable (cf. Haller, 375). For what little is known of the influential Bouchard see Luchaire 1892, 323.

4. John of Salisbury talked with Louis in Jan. 1165 and found him less willing to support Becket than before; Materials, v, 162 no. 85. Robertson dated this to May, but the reference to the feast of the Purification as forthcoming places it in January.

5. See appendix f, p. 254.

elect any successor to Frederick who would not accept a similar condition being imposed on him. The bishops swore to recognize Paschal, and those who were still only electi had to show the strength of their conviction by accepting consecration. A similar oath was imposed on all clerics with their vassals and ministeriales; failure to take it within six weeks of being instructed to do so by the competent authority meant deprivation of office and property, and exile. Finally, the legates of the king of England swore on his behalf (in one version, also on that of his barons) that he too would recognize Paschal as pope.¹

It is less clear how these results were arrived at. No chronicler or annalist records more than what is known from Frederick's encyclicals.² But we have a letter sent to Alexander which gives an account of the council itself, full of detail.³ On the first two days of the council, 23 and 24 May, the emperor and his bishops discussed making peace with Alexander. Then Rainald appeared. He conceded that some German prelates had accepted Alexander, but said that he had now won over fifty bishops

1. MGH, Const., i, 314-20 nos. 223-5.

2. Cf. Annales Reichenpergenses, MGH, SS, xvii, 471-2; Annales Ratisbonenses (Prüfening codex), MGH, SS, xvii, 587; Annalium Laubensium continuatio, MGH, SS, iv, 24; Appendix ad Rahewinum, in Otto of Freising and Rahewin, Gesta Friderici I. imperatoris, 3rd edn. by G. Waitz and B. von Simson, MGH, SRG, 1912, 348.

3. Materials, v, 184-8 nos. 98. The next piece is a shorter version of the first, presumably circulated by the Alexandrines, who are referred to as 'nos' where the first piece has 'vos'. That it is a mere condensation can be seen from the following:

no. 98

Hi sunt archiepiscopi qui
juraverunt: Magdaburgensis
et Farburgensis, sub condi-
tione tamen praenominata.
Coloniensis autem et duo
suffraganei eius absolute
juraverunt.
=====

no. 99

Magdaburgensis archiepiscopus...
abjuravit... Postmodum Bremensis
duoque alii suffraganei eius jura-
verunt...
=====

who would follow Paschal at Henry's bidding. The archbishop of Magdeburg then unkindly suggested that Rainald should receive episcopal ordination, which he had not yet done, to remove any suspicions. Rainald demurred, whereupon the emperor turned on him and accused him of treachery, of having secured the election of Paschal on his own initiative and contrary to the instructions he had been sent. He compared him unfavourably with Conrad of Mainz, whom Rainald had accused of treason, but who on Octavian's death had given Frederick the advice not to create a second danger for himself after God had liberated him from the first one. Rainald yielded, and then all took the oath, with an addition, suggested by Wichmann of Magdeburg, that if both popes should die, and the two groups of cardinals were able to agree on a candidate, the emperor could accept him, provided (a further addition, by Rainald) that the election was made with his consent. The bishops said that they would prefer to abandon their regalia, but they were told that they must swear. A list of those who swore then follows; some are said to have sworn only on condition that they might at any time yield the regalia and be free from their oath.

The report is certainly self-contradictory to some extent, as the foregoing summary shows. There is an inconsistency in those recorded as present and absent: we are told, first that the bishops of Verdun and Freising were excused the oaths because their archbishops were absent, and then that neither the archbishops of Trier and Salzburg nor any of their suffragans were present. There has accordingly been a tendency to reject the report in whole or in

part, because of these and other internal inconsistencies.¹ But rejection presents its own problems. Whoever the author was,² he was able to produce a reasonably credible story. If it is invention, it reflects to a remarkable extent the problems which we know agitated the German episcopate. The debate on ordination of electi is echoed by Frederick's promise that³

electos...qui sub eo[Paschal]...consecrationem receperunt
vel adhuc receperint honore aut ordinibus suis pro eius
obedientia privari numquam permittemus.

The proposal that those who did not wish to obey Paschal might yield the regalia instead is reflected in an annalist's report that Albert of Freising swore to obey Paschal for so long as he wished to retain the regalia.⁴ In fact, the report presents two main difficulties: the unwillingness of the bishops to accept Paschal - as seen in their discussion of peace with Alexander at the beginning of the council, and their willingness to yield the regalia - and Frederick's accusations against Rainald.

That Frederick and his bishops should have discussed peace with Alexander before Rainald's arrival was dismissed as 'highly improbable' by both Giesebrecht and Hauck.⁵ It is true that if

1. Giesebrecht, v, 463-6 and vi, 442-4, was cautious; Hauck, 276-7 ('Wiedergabe von Sakristeiklatsch'), and Haller, 143-4 and 375 ('...ganz unglaublich, wie es Spionen- und Agentenberichte öfters sind'), were more positive.

2. Giesebrecht and Hauck, loc. cit., discussed the question of authorship, very inconclusively; there are too many possibilities.

3. MGH, Const., i, 315-6 no. 223.

4. Appendix ad Rahewinum, edd. Waitz and Simson, pp. 347-8.

5. Giesebrecht, vi, 443; Hauck, 276 note 4.

the purpose of the report was to throw the blame for the continuation of the schism on Rainald or the English legates then its author would have done well to suggest that but for these wicked men the unity of the church might have been restored. Yet such a discussion is not really improbable either from the bishops' or Frederick's point of view. The bishops may not have been, as a body, enthusiastic secret supporters of Alexander, but they wanted security of tenure. The increasing numbers of bishops who had remained unconsecrated showed how far Victor and still more Paschal had become from providing this expectation.¹ Frederick needed the bishops' support, and could not neglect their fears. If Rainald's visits to the west had produced nothing he would in any case have had at least to consider talks with Alexander. The bishops' proposal to give up their regalia rather than swear has also aroused incredulity. Few if any of them afterwards sought dispensation from Alexander from the oath they had been forced to take, so their conscientious objections to the oaths cannot have been very strong.² But many, according to the report, did swear to obey Paschal only for as long as they wished to hold the regalia, and this is perfectly credible. Frederick had been driven to '*insolita sacramenta*',³ to order the bishops-elect to receive ordination, to promise that the bishops would not suffer for their obedience to Paschal, all

1. See below, pp. 169-72.

2. Possibly Nicholas of Cambrai and Conrad of Lübeck did so; see below, pp. 173, 184.

3. His own words, MGH, Const., i, 317 no. 223.

in order to soothe the fears of the bishops. But they were still insecure - Frederick's promise not to let them suffer from their reception of orders under Paschal shows how much all the oaths lacked conviction - and by keeping open the possibility of an episcopal strike, which is what a renunciation of the regalia by any large number of bishops would have meant, they gave themselves an additional guarantee. It was insecurity rather than suppressed sympathies for Alexander which led to this; here the report is misleading. The conscientious objectors were mostly not at the council.

Frederick's accusations against Rainald are in a rather different category. They are not central to the account of the council, and may have been a piece of embroidery designed to show Rainald in the worst possible light.¹ But they are not inherently incredible, provided a distinction is drawn between remarks made in the course of a tense and important political debate and considered judgements. This is not to say that Rainald was responsible for Paschal's election. Any number of circumstances might have made the accusation a possible one in the heat of argument without making it objectively true.

Würzburg looks like a hardening of the schism, but the very comprehensiveness of the oaths, the desire to burn all possible bridges, show how impossible it was for Frederick to do what he seemed to be doing, to reject, that is, for all time the possibility of a compromise with Alexander. Had Alexander reacted too

1. Hauck, 276 note 4.

severely, then Henry II might really have been driven into the arms of Frederick and Paschal, though it is unlikely that he would have brought fifty bishops with him.¹ But Alexander took care not to make a scene. He wrote soothingly to Louis VII on the subject,² and even protected those immediately concerned, John of Oxford and Richard of Ilchester, from Becket, until a time when their excommunication did not have the same diplomatic consequences. Henry was allowed the feeblest of excuses,³ and Alexander had his reward. As early as the summer of 1165 it was clear that Henry was not going to defect,⁴ though defection remained a useful threat. What Würzburg did mean was that for a time negotiations between Frederick and Alexander were ruled out, just when Frederick's position in Italy was beginning to weaken.

1. Shaw 1951, shows how much less control Henry had over the bishops in the southern half of his empire than he had in England and Normandy.

2. JL 11215, 30 June 1165.

3. Foliot to Alexander, Materials, v, 206 no. 198: 'Imperatorem illum, etsi schismaticum noverit [Henry], a vobis tamen excommunicatum esse usque hodie non rescivit.'

4. Herbert of Bosham, Materials, v, 285-6 no. 146.

Chapter eight

From Würzburg to the bull Non est dubium

The return to Rome had been prepared for Alexander in 1164.¹ It was some time before he decided to go. It was not the fickleness of the Romans which deterred him. He had risked a return under similar conditions in 1161, and could quickly move south to Sicily should it become necessary. But the return journey itself was no longer easy. Frederick was in Germany, but Christian of Buch, now archbishop-elect of Mainz, was in Tuscany with an army, and the maritime republics controlled the sea west of Italy. In the end Christian's army decided matters. His successful campaign in the autumn and winter of 1164-5 had forced the Romans to reconsider their allegiance; short of food, they asked for a truce until 29 September, after which they would swear obedience to Paschal if Alexander had not come.² Alexander and his curia began to move south in April 1165, not without regrets and doubts.³ The transport problem was overcome with the help of the Hospitallers and the Narbonnais, but attacks by Pisan galleys prevented Alexander from setting off in mid-August in time to reach Rome by the end of September. When he did leave France it was for Sicily,⁴ no doubt because he was no longer certain of his reception at Rome. But when he did finally reach Rome on 23 November he was received with great ceremony, and he lost no time

1. Above, p. 127.

2. Annales Ceccanenses, MGH, SS, xix, 285; John of Salisbury to Becket, Materials, v, 219 no. 115. For chronology see Partner 1973, 204-5.

3. Itinerary in JL, ii, 191ff. The regrets are mentioned in a letter from Cadore to Louis VII, V, ff. 244r-v = RHF, xvi, 122 no. 372.

4. Romoald of Salerno, MGH, SS, xix, 434; Boso, pp. 412-3; JL 11238 to Henry of Rheims, 10 Sept. 1165; JL 11242 to the clergy of Maguelonne, 4 Dec. 1165.

in passing the news on to his supporters in France.¹

The return was a triumph, and a longer-lived one than that of 1161, but whatever its propaganda effect,² it meant that Alexander could no longer enjoy the security which he had had in France. His position in Rome was unstable,³ and he was open once more to direct action by Frederick. This is reflected in the diplomacy of the schism; the emphasis shifts back to the Mediterranean, to Sicily and Byzantium, though the Becket dispute meant that Alexander could not ignore the west and that there were still openings there for Frederick. The legates Alexander had sent to Byzantium, Ardicio and Henry of Benevento, returned in 1165, the latter in January, the former in July together with Byzantine legates.⁴ Possibly Ardicio returned later in the year,⁵ to continue negotiations. At any rate Manuel's ambitions in the west remained. A council was held at Constantinople in March 1166 to settle a christological dispute; not only did the inscription erected in Hagia Sophia to commemorate it claim for Manuel rule over all of Constantine's dominions, but

1. JL 11240 to Henry of Rheims and suffragans, 24 Nov. 1165. Henry in turn circulated the letter: it is found in P, ff. 84v-85r, and in a Vaucler ms., Laon, Bibliothèque Municipale, ms. 56, f. 105r.

2. Boso, p. 413.

3. JL 11256 to Henry of Rheims, 18 Jan. 1166.

4. For Henry see Classen 1970, 266-8, and above, p. 119. For Ardicio, see Ohnsorge 1928, 142. The Byzantine legates are mentioned in the letter of Cadurc cit. above, p. 137 note 3: 'Noscat discretio vestra quod domnus papa in proximum debet ire ad Podium [which he reached on 30 June: JL 11215] et nuncios imperatoris ibi debent [sic] expectare'. Giesebrecht, vi, 445, thought that these must be from Frederick, and supported this with a reference to JL 11215, which refers to 'novis illis, que de Alamannia nuper venerunt.' But there is no apparent reason why Frederick should have sent an embassy to Alexander after the council of Würzburg.

5. He disappears again from the subscriptions to bulls between 3 Aug. 1165 (W. Wiederhold, 'Papsturkunden in Frankreich, iv', *Nachr.*, 1907, Beiheft, 123f. no. 41) and 16 April 1166 (JL 11269).

Manuel also took care to discover the western position on the disputed point before the council.¹ In the summer of 1166 Alexander sent a new legation to Constantinople. Manuel wrote in September to inform the Armenian patriarch Nerses IV of this, and to suggest that he should send representatives to discuss the problem of church union.² The historical basis for the dialogue between Manuel and some cardinals recorded in Andronicos Kamateros' Hiera Hoplotheke may well have been this legation, since the work also includes a dialogue between Manuel and representatives of the Armenian church.³ The dialogue as given by Andronicos makes Manuel begin by recalling old imperial rights over Rome and Italy and expressing readiness to accept the Latins' request for help against the oppressor. First, however, he would like to discuss the question of reunion. The cardinals reply that they had thought of political union as being the first step, but they would be pleased to talk about the ecclesiastical question. This fits in well with the situation in 1166. Manuel was tied down in Hungary and Serbia,⁴ and needed some guarantee that he would get a return on any assistance offered to Frederick's opponents in Italy. Alexander could well do without the

1. The inscription is published and discussed in Mango 1963. For the council see Cinnamos, vi, 2. Classen 1955, 363, denied any connexion between Manuel's western ambitions and his attitude at the council, but it is clear from Cinnamos' account that Manuel's opponent Demetrios put his opinion forward as an anti-Latin view. Manuel would certainly have wanted to avoid making any new obstacles to reunion, and according to Hugo Eterianus asked before the council began 'quid super exorto dogmate Romana dictaret ecclesia' (Dondaine 1958, 481).

2. Darrouzès 1965, 74.

3. Unedited; summarized by Hergenröther 1869, 811-4, and Darrouzès 1965, 72-7.

4. Cf. Dölger 1462, 1472-5.

problems of doctrine and discipline which reunion would entail, but needed practical political support badly in view of Frederick's forthcoming expedition to Italy.

The outcome of Alexander's embassy must have been favourable, for preparations for both ecclesiastical and political union went ahead. The new king of Sicily, William II, was offered not only a renewal of the peace of 1158 but also a marriage alliance with Manuel's only child Maria, with the prospect of ultimate union of Sicily and Byzantium under William or his children. The offer was the more significant as Maria was already betrothed under a similar arrangement to Béla III of Hungary. Manuel must have expected real benefits from Sicily to compensate for the loss of an advantageous position in Hungary. It is not hard to see what these were. First, diplomatic help from William II, or rather from his government, in winning over Alexander; second, help in any reconquest of Italy which the Byzantines might attempt - William as the ultimate beneficiary would have an incentive to give this.¹ Approaches were made to the Lombard towns, and the Milanese received subsidies for the rebuilding of their town.² And in the early summer of 1167 Byzantine legates appeared at Alexander's court. Manuel offered union of the churches under the pope, and asked³

ut quia occasio iusta et tempus opportunum atque acceptabile obtulerat, Romani corona imperii a sede apostolica sibi redderetur, quoniam non ad Frederici Alamanni set ad suum ius asserit pertinere.

1. Parker 1956, gives a fuller account of the proposal and its background, stressing Sicily's diplomatic rather than her military importance.

2. Classen 1958, 80; Classen 1970, 271.

3. Boso, p. 415. His phrase '...ut sub una divine legis observantia et uno Ecclesie capite uterque clerus et populus...subsisteret', leaves unclear how far Manuel was prepared to accept papal primacy.

To secure this, he promised so much gold and silver, and so many men, that he could easily have taken not only Rome but the whole of Italy. The proposal is described by Boso as very difficult and worthy of much thought, but Alexander was prepared to send back legates, Hubald of Ostia and John of Sts. John and Paul, who returned with Manuel's ambassador to discuss the proposal further.¹

These negotiations ultimately failed, as will be seen, and it has usually been supposed that Manuel's demand for the imperial crown was too much for Alexander.² Yet it seems that Alexander came very near to a deposition of Frederick in these years. Boso, writing the early part of the Vita Alexandri in 1165-6, attributed Frederick's diplomacy in the summer of 1162 to fear of deposition;³ this might be a poor indication of what moved Frederick in 1162, but it shows what ideas were current at the curia in the middle of the decade. More concrete evidence comes from a letter of 31 May 1167 from Alexander to the consuls of Brescia, sent shortly after his legates had departed for Constantinople. He praised the Brescians for fighting for their own liberty and that of the church, and for allying themselves with others to do so. An indulgence was offered to those who persevered. All those bound by oath to 'F. tyranno aut fautoribus eius' were absolved so that they could fight for

1. Boso, p. 415. For the date (May 1167) see Ohnsorge 1928, 81-3, 146-8. Ohnsorge says that Bernard of Porto was sent also at a slightly later date, but this is a false inference from the dedicatory preface of Hugo Eterianus' De sancto et immortali Deo.

2. E.g. by Ohnsorge 1928, 82, 84-5. That 'corona imperii' can have a metaphorical meaning as early as the twelfth century has been shown by Classen 1964, but I do not see how Alexander could have performed a translatio imperii without a coronation.

3. See above, p. 89.

Alexander, St. Peter, patria and libertas, for no-one is bound by fealty to an excommunicate until he returns to the Catholic church.¹ This is not in itself evidence of a deposition by Alexander; it is merely a repetition of what had occurred in 1160.² But the repetition here confirms in part a well-known passage in a letter of John of Salisbury's:³

...vicarius Petri...Italos, et omnes qui ei[Frederick]ex causa imperii et regni religione jurisjurandi tenebantur astricti, a fidelitate ejus absolvit...Abstulit ei etiam regiam dignitatem, ipsumque anathemate condemnavit, et inhibuit auctoritate Dei ne vires ullas amodo in bellicis congressionibus habeat, aut de Christiano aliquo victoriam consequatur, aut alicubi quiete et pace gaudeat, donec fructus poenitentiae condignos operetur. In quo secutus est exemplum Gregorii Septimi...Hoc enim Itali audito, ab eo discedentes, reaedificaverunt Mediolanum, schismaticos expulerunt, catholicos re-duxerunt episcopos, et apostolicae sedi unanimiter adhaeserunt.

This was taken at its face value by earlier historians, but has been discounted since Giesebrecht argued that it was unsupported by any other source and that John himself wrote to Alexander in 1167 in a way which hardly implies that he thought Frederick had been deposed by Alexander.⁴ John's evidence is certainly not good; it is true that he usually though not always calls Frederick 'exaugustus'

1. P. Kehr, 'Nachträge zu den Papsturkunden Italiens, vii', Nachr., 432-3 no. 11.

2. See above, p. 61.

3. To William Brito, Materials, vi, 298-9 no. 350.

4. Reuter, ii, 243-4 and Vignati 1866, 116, accepted it. Giesebrecht, v, 565-6 and vi, 335, quoted the phrase in the letter to Alexander (Materials, vi, 311 no. 354): 'ut et vos, qui gladium Dei videtis eductum in capita tyrannorum, in eos gladium Petri exeratis.' In context this is an incitement to punish Henry, and offers no very strong inference about what John thought Alexander had done to Frederick.

after 1167,¹ but several passages in his letters suggest that he thought that God had deposed Frederick in effect, by means of the plague of August 1167.² Moreover, the expulsion of the schismatic bishops clearly followed the disaster to Frederick's armies, not any action taken by Alexander.³ And although Alexander calls Frederick an excommunicate and denies him the imperial title in his letter to the consuls of Brescia this does not support John's statement. The papal chancery had fluctuated between imperator and dictus imperator in the early years of the schism, but imperator was not used for Frederick between 1164 and 1176.⁴ Similarly, although Frederick was spared excommunication at the council of Tours, the earlier excommunications of 1160 and 1162, and he was certainly regarded as an excommunicate after Würzburg.⁵

Nevertheless, there is something in John's statement. The key is Italy. John stresses that the Italians have been absolved from their oaths, and Alexander's letter, though it does not say so explicitly, implies as much by its reference to those who fight for their patria. Now there is plenty of evidence that in the twelfth century the imperial title was seen by popes and curialists not simply as conferring the advocatia over the Roman church but as legitimizing German rule over Italy. Rahewin, for example, in his

1. Exaugustus: Materials, vi, 240 no. 328, 279 no. 341, etc.; tyrannus: ibid., 426 no. 417, 499 no. 457, etc.; imperator: ibid., 403 no. 409 (here probably for the sake of variation), 459 no. 434.

2. Cf. the passage quoted in note 4, p. 143, and the letter to Baldwin of Norwich, Materials, vi, 240 no. 328.

3. Güterbock 1926, 393ff.; Dunken 1931, 78f.

4. Imperator is not used between JL 11003 and JL 12743. It had been used freely before 1164, as had dictus imperator: cp. JL 10627, 10702, etc. with JL 10750, 10757.

5. Cf. Foliot's letter to Alexander, cit. above, p. 136.

account of the incident at Besançon in 1157,¹ says that the unfavourable interpretation of the papal letter was the more readily believed

quod a nonnullis Romanorum temere affirmari noverant imperium
Urbis et regnum Italicum donatione pontificum reges nostros
hactenus possedissee.

If the imperial title conferred the right to rule over Italy, then a ruler who had been deprived of that right could not be emperor.

So far this merely goes to explain why John should have made a mistake; but though he may have erred in interpreting the actions actually taken by Alexander as a deposition, he was probably justified in doing so, to the extent that Alexander himself probably saw depriving Frederick of rule over Italy as the first step in deposing him.² Certainly several people thought that the kingdom of Italy was vacant at the end of the 1160s; Henry II, as well as Manuel, was thought to have designs on it.³ But if Alexander was moving towards a deposition in 1167 he could only have been doing so with the intention of making Manuel emperor. The obvious step of simply

1. *Gesta*, iii, 12, pp. 414/6. Arnulf of Lisieux' sermon at Tours (above, p. 106) and Herbert of Bosham's tactless speech to Henry II in 1166 (cf. Smalley 1973, 63) can probably be interpreted in this sense.

2. The conceptual separation of the regnum Teutonicum from the empire goes back to Gregory VII (Müller-Mertens 1970, 144, 148-71) and was put into practice in the concordat of Worms. No twelfth-century pope actually said that rule over Italy went with the imperial title, but many of their actions implied such a belief. For example, the papal legate who was present at the election of Conrad III in 1138 promised papal assent and that of the Italian cities (Otto of Freising, *Chronicon*, ed. A. Hofmeister, *MGH, SRG*, 1912, vii, 22, p. 343).

3. Discussed with some exaggeration by Hardegen 1905. Warren 1973, 220-1, dismisses them, but they were accepted by Davis in his review of Hardegen, and Previté-Orton 1912, 341, makes the telling point that if Henry had had no ambitions in Italy then in the marriage-treaty made with Amadeus of Savoy for his son John in 1173 'the bride's dowry would never have been a string of castles leading to the Passes'.

leaving the empire vacant was impossible militarily - Alexander needed protection from Frederick if he was going to depose him - and psychologically. Not for another century would popes come to feel that no emperor was the best emperor. The letter to the consuls of Brescia shows that Alexander had not given up hope of Frederick, but the history of Gregory VII, known to others besides John of Salisbury, shows that penitent rulers did not have to be restored.

Deposition was not an option open only to Alexander. Frederick's Italian expedition of 1166-7 was aimed at Sicily, but this meant that it was aimed at Alexander as well, for if the Norman kingdom fell Rome would be untenable, and a second escape from Italy extremely difficult. As it was the unexpected and unplanned victory by Rainald and Christian over the Romans at Tusculum on 29 May 1167 opened the way to Rome and the possibility of the via facti. When this failed, Frederick tried the via cessionis; in reply to a feeler put out by Alexander through Conrad of Mainz, he offered to force Paschal to resign if Alexander would also do so, so that a third pope could be elected unanimously.¹ This was essentially the same response as Frederick had made to Alexander's embassies in 1163. He was willing to settle the schism, but only if this could be done without loss of face.² Alexander was fortunately spared a decision. The money sent him by William II of Sicily bought temporary support in Rome, and before Frederick could press

1. Boso, p. 417. Note that Frederick's proposal agrees with the suggestion of Wichmann of Magdeburg made at Würzburg (above, p. 132).

2. See above, pp. 109-111.

his proposals Alexander had escaped to Benevento. Frederick had to be content with a coronation of his wife in St. Peter's.¹ The via facti remained open, but not for long. The plague which destroyed the imperial army in August 1167 ended any possibility of capturing Alexander. By September Frederick was moving rapidly northwards, leaving Paschal at Viterbo. On 1 December Venice and rather more than a dozen mainland cities joined together to form the Lombard League.² The object of the league was to resist anyone who wanted to exact more from the towns than they had given between 1125 and 1152. An important clause provided for the equal division of any subsidies which might come from Manuel or William, after deduction of expenses. The league did not mention Alexander in the treaty, but an incident on Frederick's return to Germany shows that rectors and curia were in close alliance. Frederick, pursued by the Lombards, was held up at Susa by the count of Savoy. While William of Montferrat was negotiating with the count for him, Frederick pretended to be willing to make peace with Alexander through the mediation of the Cistercians and Carthusians. 'Omnes qui verba haec audierunt exhilarati sunt, et Lombardi jam coeperunt mitius agere, sperantes hominem esse conversum.'³ As it turned out, he was not, but clearly the Lombards already thought of Alexander's cause as inextricably bound up with their own; we have already

1. Chronica Regia Coloniensis, ed. Waitz, p. 118.

2. Frederick's flight: Acerbi Morenae continuatio anonymi, ed. Gütterbock, pp. 208ff. Lombard League: C. Manaresi, Gli atti del comune di Milano fino all'anno MCCXVI, Milan, 1919, pp. 83-6 no. 50, especially clauses 1 and 12.

3. John of Salisbury to Baldwin of Exeter, Materials, vi, 401-5 no. 409. The quotation is from p. 403.

seen that this view was held at the curia.

The disappearance of imperial power from Italy, even if a temporary one, meant an end for the time being of Manuel's hopes for a reconquest of Italy with papal and Sicilian assistance. The Sicilian court allowed the marriage proposal of 1166-7 to drop 'propter multa capitula quae interveniebant.'¹ The Lombards had earlier been interested in Manuel's support: subsidies for the league were hoped for, and the Milanese not only accepted money to help rebuild their city, but were prepared to swear fealty to Manuel.² But when the league was renewed in March and again in May 1168 the earlier clause about subsidies from Manuel was dropped.³ When the sebastos Jordan arrived at Benevento in May 1168 as an ambassador from Manuel to Alexander, he found that he had been overtaken by events. The negotiations of the previous year must have gone a long way towards success. Alexander had considered deposing Frederick. Manuel was sufficiently confident to have a chrysobull drawn up ready for acceptance by the pope.⁴ But Alexander refused his offer tactfully, claiming that such a transaction might be

1. Romoald of Salerno, MGH, SS, xix, 436; cf. Parker 1956, 90-2. The date is uncertain, but by 1169 Manuel was taking precautions against Sicily (Dölger 1492)

2. Classen 1958, 80, 84.

3. Manaresi, Atti, 91-2, 93-6 nos. 63, 65.

4. Leo Tuscus, ed. Dondaine 1953, 127. Dondaine 1953, 84, dates this to 1175-6, which is improbable. Classen 1955, 344-5, suggests 1167. Leo's description of the document tallies with what we know about Byzantine treaties with foreigners; cf. Dölger and Karayannopoulos 1968, 90-1, 95.

regarded as simoniacal and that¹

...oviantibus sanctorum Patrum statutis assensum prebere sub huiusmodi conventionibus non possumus nec debemus, quia ex officio nobis a Deo commisso pacis auctores nos esse convenit ac custodes.

Alexander did not break off contact with Manuel; two cardinals were sent back with Jordan, and negotiations 'pro ecclesiarum et imperii reconciliatione' (Leo Tuscus) continued during the following years.² But translatio imperii was shelved. Without the proposed marriage alliance the Sicilians would not have it, and the Lombards no longer needed it. Alexander had reasonable grounds for hoping that terms could be made with Frederick, in spite of the deception of early 1168.³ And he had still better grounds for hoping that the schism could be ended by the via facti. Paschal III had returned to Rome early in 1168; by the summer he was virtually a prisoner, and it was hoped that the senatorial elections in November would complete the transfer of Rome's allegiance from Frederick and Paschal to Alexander. If Paschal could be captured, Frederick would have to try to come to terms.⁴

1. Boso, pp. 419-20; see also Dondaine 1953, 127.

2. Cf. Ohnsorge 1928, 86-9; Ohnsorge 1958, 398-401; Hofmann 1953.

3. His reply to Jordan as given by Boso suggests this, and there were hopes of reconciliation in the circles around Conrad of Salzburg at this time (Sudendorf, i, 68-9 no. 25).

4. John of Salisbury to Baldwin of Exeter, Materials, vi, 405 no. 409, 480-1 no. 447. The date of late July given by Robertson for the second letter is too late: the new legation of Simon and Bernard announced by Alexander on 25 May (JL 11405: this date must be adhered to rather than the 25 Dec. given by some mss. and defended by Foreville 1943, 190, for Simon and Bernard were present at Montirail on 6 Jan. 1169, and could not have been if their commission had been issued only twelve days earlier), and the meeting at La Ferté Bernard on 1 July are not mentioned in it. Mid-June seems a reasonable date, and the report of Paschal's position would then be as of May 1168, when Alexander was receiving Jordan. John may have been a little optimistic: Calixtus was elected to succeed Paschal in the autumn of 1168 by all the Romans except the Frangipani, according to the Appendix ad Rahewinum, ed. Waitz and Simson, p. 351.

If Frederick had abandoned the via facti, the old tactic of agreement with Henry II and/or Louis VII still remained. Frederick had been disappointed in Henry after the council of Würzburg, but in the following year hopes were again aroused when Henry wrote to ask for a safe-conduct for his legates to Rainald. They were going to Italy to demand that Alexander should depose Thomas and declare his acts invalid.¹ Contact with Frederick and the antipope continued in 1167 and 1168. John Cumin paid a brief visit to Paschal at Viterbo in the spring of 1167.² The marriage arranged between Mathilda and Henry the Lion in 1165 was solemnized in 1168, the princess having left for Saxony in the autumn of the previous year.³ The marriage between Frederick, Frederick's eldest son, and Henry II's daughter was left uncompleted. Since Frederick was only three, a papal dispensation would have been required, as in 1160, and Henry would not have wished to commit himself to Paschal III so definitely. But it was still planned, as we learn from a letter from Henry to the cardinals of Alexander.⁴ In the spring of 1168 Henry's envoys again sought out Frederick. John of Salisbury interpreted this, probably correctly, as a device for putting pressure

1. Materials, v, 438-9 no. 213.

2. JL 11348 to William of Pavia and Otto of St. Nicholas, 7 May 1167; John of Poitiers to Becket, Materials, vi, 146 no. 283.

3. Eyton 1878, 108-9.

4. Materials, vi, 79-80 no. 255. Robertson's date of 1166 is probably too early, since in the letter Henry accuses Alexander of calling him an 'ecclesiae persecutorem'. T.a.q. is 1170, when the marriage project was abandoned.

on Louis VII, and added that Frederick's weakness made it backfire, since the French could see that Frederick was no threat.¹ But Alexander was still frightened of an Anglo-German alliance in the summer of 1168.²

In the spring of 1168 Frederick also began to sound out Louis. The intermediary was Henry of Troyes, whose messengers to Frederick returned with duplicate letters, one of which Henry passed on to Louis.³ By the summer Louis was hinting that the advances of the imperialists were attractive in view of Alexander's apparent commitment to the cause of Henry II.⁴ In the autumn Frederick decided that a full-blooded embassy to the west might yield results, especially if it could mediate between Henry and Louis. Instead of winning over one of them, as in 1162 and 1165, he would try to secure both, as Peter of Pavia had been intended to do in 1159. The legates, Henry the Lion, Philip, archbishop of Cologne, and Christian of Mainz, set out at the beginning of October. They returned in

1. John of Salisbury to Baldwin of Exeter, Materials, vi, 402-3 no. 409.

2. JL 11397 to Becket, 19 May 1168.

3. I combine John of Salisbury (cit. note 1) with a letter from Henry to Louis (V, f. 210v = RHF, xvi, 68 no. 215); the date of the latter is established by a reference in it to William of Nevers' pilgrimage to Jerusalem (cf. William of Tyre, xx, 3).

4. Louis to Alexander, Materials, vi, 460 no. 435; to Hubald of Ostia, ibid., 467 no. 439. T.p.g. is the arrival and publication of the now undated JL 11392 in France, since Louis in his letters complains about it. This was shortly before the meeting between Louis and Henry at La Ferté Bernard on 1 July (see John of Salisbury to John of Poitiers and to Master Lombard, Materials, vi, 417 no. 411 and 458 no. 434). T.a.g. is Alexander's reply of 9 October, JL 11409. (see JL, ii, 723, for correct date). Louis says that he has not joined and will not join the schismatics, but putting pressure on Alexander by rival approaches to others was a common tactic in the Becket dispute: both Louis and Henry approached William in early 1168 (Materials, vi, 406 no. 409).

November with no results. Henry and Louis could not be persuaded to make peace, and although Louis, or those around him, toyed with the idea of a Franco-German alliance, in the end the legates resorted to threats, which got them nowhere.¹

Probably there was never any likelihood of this embassy's succeeding; to have won over the west at so late a date would have meant overcoming a great inertia. But not until its failure was known to Frederick did he try again for a reconciliation with Alexander. Paschal had died in September, and his supporters had elected John, former abbot of Strumi and cardinal bishop of Albano, to succeed him.² Frederick may have recognized him,³ but even so it was a propitious time to approach Alexander. Early in 1169 he summoned the abbots of Clairvaux and Cîteaux to him, and in March they set off for Benevento accompanied by Eberhard of Bamberg. Eberhard was detained by the Lombards, but the two abbots reached the curia. Although they had been supposed to return before Whitsun, they were still there on 19 July.⁴ In August 1169 John of Salisbury reported that Frederick had proposed that Henry VI

1. Annales Cameracenses, MGH, SS, xvi, 545-6; Chronica Regia Coloniensis, ed. Waitz, p. 120. Franco-German alliance: Becket to Alexander, late Dec. 1168, Materials, vi, 487 no. 450. Threats: Appendix ad Rahewinum, ed. Waitz and Simson, p. 350 (cf. also Ger-vase of Canterbury, ed. Stubbs, i, 206).

2. JL, ii, 429.

3. The letter from Calixtus to Frederick printed by Brackmann 1967, 463, implies that he did, but may be a Stilübung. Ohnsorge 1929b, 21f., brings further evidence, not entirely conclusive. Holtzmann 1930, 404-5, argues that recognition was at first withheld, and cites the following negotiations, and in particular a phrase in a letter from the two abbots to William of Sens which he discovered (printed ibid., 408-9) which talks of the dangers of renewal of the schism should the negotiations not succeed by Whitsun 1169. Whichever view is accepted, it is certain that Frederick could have dropped Calixtus III in 1169 had he wanted or needed to do so.

4. JL 11633 to the chapter of the Cistercians.

should be consecrated by Catholic bishops and recognized as emperor [to-be ?] by Alexander, while Frederick himself would not be bound to recognize any pope unless he so wished. These terms would have been accepted were it not for Frederick's additional demand that those who had been ordained by the 'schismaticis haeresiarchis' (probably Rainald and Christian, since only a few prelates were consecrated by the anti-popes themselves)¹ should be allowed to retain their positions.² Whatever Frederick's proposals were, they certainly cannot have taken this form. On 19 July negotiations were still going on; on 15 August Henry VI was crowned king at Aachen by Philip of Cologne, who was certainly not a Catholic bishop.³ The coronation must have been arranged soon after Henry's election in early June,⁴ but if Frederick had really hoped for Alexander's assent to some such scheme as John describes (and in 1169 there was no reason for bogus negotiations as there had been in early 1168)⁵ he would surely have waited to hear from him. It is probable, though, that one of the difficulties was, as John says, the problem of the schismatic ordinations. These had been condemned at the council of Tours, and Alexander would have found it difficult simply to set the condemnation aside. When the schism was finally ended in 1177 it took a general council to deal with the schismatically ordained bishops.

1. See the next two chapters.

2. Materials, vii, 7 no. 532 to Baldwin of Exeter.

3. Chronica Regia Coloniensis, ed. Waitz, p. 120.

4. Holtzmann 1930, 406.

5. See above, pp. 147-8.

Late in 1169 or early in 1170 Eberhard of Bamberg was finally able to get through to Alexander with proposals from Frederick. What these were we do not know, but we know that the rectors of the Lombard League were also at the negotiations, and that the negotiations failed. In the letter Non est dubium which Alexander sent to the league on 24 March 1170 we can see the transformation which the formation of the league had brought to the schism. The negotiations are briefly dealt with, and then Alexander continues with detailed instructions: interdict for cities who refuse to obey the rectors, a trade embargo and blockade for the Tuscans should they refuse to join the Lombards.¹ This close partnership between Alexander and the Lombards meant that the schism would have to be settled in Italy, by cold steel or at the conference table. There was still a place for the wider diplomacy characteristic of the 1160s, but it was no longer of central importance.²

1. JL 11747.

2. On the diplomacy of the 1170s outside Italy see Preiss 1934, 128-55; Ohnsorge 1958.

Chapter nine

Obedience in the Empire, i: Germany

In spite of the impressive appearance of the council of Pavia, the adherence of the imperial church to Victor and his successors was not complete and never became so. Tracing the fluctuations in obedience to the antipopes is of interest in itself, and also illuminates the positions of Frederick and Alexander. The German church was of greatest importance; Frederick could ignore defections in Italy and Burgundy, but not in Germany. It is all the more surprising to see how few positive steps Alexander took to undermine support for the antipopes. The fact that he did not is useful, since the waverings of the German episcopate provide a good indicator of the changes in the attitude of the German political community to the antipopes, an indicator undisturbed by outside influences, except in the west of the kingdom, which is covered more fully in the following chapter.

It is possible to show how far the antipopes were recognized in Germany by hunting through the fragments of information on bishops and monasteries in charters and chronicles.¹ To do this diocese by diocese would take too long, and would also be unsatisfactory because of the gaps in the record. Obviously some cases must be considered singly, but it seems best to concentrate on those pieces of evidence which tell us about the attitudes of the German church as a whole. The first of these is the attendance of bishops at the councils of Pavia, Lodi, and Dôle (St.-Jean-sur-Laône); there is no information available for Würzburg. For Pavia we have the

1. See Hauck, 256-61, 268-73 for an approach along these lines, made less valuable by use of evidence taken from the whole of the 1160s and even later, and by eclecticism. Preiss 1934, 187-255, deals thoroughly with the German Cistercians (see also below, appendix g, pp. 255-63). Jordan 1939, 54ff., and Wolfram 1883, deal with the episcopate.

witnesses-list of the encyclical issued by the council.¹ For Lodi and Dôle we have witness-lists from Frederick's charters.² The result can be set out conveniently in tabular form.³

	Pavia	Lodi	Dôle
MAINZ			
Mainz			
Arnold	P		
Conrad		P ⁴	P
Augsburg			
Conrad	P	(P)	P
Bamberg			
Eberhard	P	P	P
Chur			
Adelgot	A		
Egino		A	A
Constance			
Hermann	A	(P)	P
Eichstätt			
Conrad	A	A	A

1. MGH, Const., i, 269-70 no. 190; on its reliability see appendix c, pp. 236-42.

2. Lodi: St. 3905 (see note 3), 3907, 3911-13; Dôle: St. 3965, 3967-8.

3. P = present; A = Absent. Bishops found in St. 3905 only are recorded as probably present (P) at Lodi, since although it was issued some two weeks before the council met it is improbable that the bishops returned to Germany during that period, and if its evidence is admitted then we have the 'decem suffraganei Mogontinae sedis of the Annales S. Petri Erphesfurtenses Antiqui, ed. Holder-Egger, p. 20.

4. See below, p. 167.

	Pavia	Lodi	Dôle
Halberstadt			
Ulrich	Λ	(Λ) ¹	(Λ) ¹
Gero		(P)	P
Hildesheim			
Bruno	Λ	Λ	
Hermann			P
Olmütz			
John	Λ	Λ	Λ
Paderborn			
Bernard	Λ		
Evergis		P	P
Prague			
Daniel	P	Λ	P
Speyer			
Günther	Λ	P	
Ulrich			(P) ²
Strassburg			
Burchard	P	P	
Rudolf			(Λ) ³
Verden			
Hermann	P	P	P
Worms			
Conrad	P	P	P

1. See below, p. 166

2. As imperial chancellor; he was elected bishop later in the year (Hauck, 956).

3. Not yet elected (Hauck, 957)?

	Pavia	Lodi	Dôle
Würzburg			
Henry	A	P	P
COLOGNE			
Cologne			
Rainald	P	P	P
Liège			
Henry	A	P	P
Minden			
Werner	A	P	A
Münster			
Frederick	A	P	A
Osnabrück			
Philip	A	A	P
Utrecht			
Godfrey	P	P	P
TRIER			
Trier			
Hillin	A	P	P
Metz			
Stephen	A	A	A
Toul			
Henry	P	A	A
Verdun			
Albert	P	P	(A) ¹

1. Perhaps already dead (Hauck, 964)?

	Pavia	Lodi	Dôle
SALZBURG			
Salzburg			
Eberhard	Λ	Λ	Λ
Brixen			
Hartmann	Λ	Λ	Λ
Freising			
Albert	Λ	Λ	Λ
Gurk			
Roman	Λ	Λ	Λ
Passau			
Conrad	P	(P?) ¹	Λ
Regensburg			
Hartwig	P	Λ	Λ
BREMEN			
Bremen			
Hartwig	P	Λ	P
Mecklenburg			
Bruno	Λ	Λ	Λ
Oldenburg/Lübeck			
Gerold	Λ	Λ	P ²

he/ 1. Conrad is not listed in St. 3905, 3907, 3911-13, but his see was the beneficiary of St. 3905, and may have come to receive it in person; if so he would presumably have stayed for the council. But the absence of the other Salzburg suffragans suggests that he did not. On his attitude to the schism see above, p. 71, and below, pp. 174ff.

2. Not listed in Frederick's charters, but said by Helmold, Cronica Slavorum, ed. Schneidler, i, 91, pp. 177-8, to have been at Dôle.

	Pavia	Lodi	Dôle
Ratzeburg			
Everod	Λ	Λ	Λ
MAGDEBURG			
Magdeburg			
Wichmann	P	A	P
Brandenburg			
Wigger	Λ ¹		
Willemar		P	P
Havelberg			
Walo	P	A	P
Meissen			
Gerung	Λ	Λ	Λ
Merseburg			
John	Λ	Λ	P
Zeitz			
Berthold	Λ		
Uto		Λ ²	P
RHEIMS			
Cambrai			
Nicholas	Λ	Λ	(P?) ³

The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from this evidence is that the province of Salzburg did not recognize Victor, something

1. Already dead (Hauck, 970)?

2. Not yet elected (Hauck, 972)?

3. St. 3964 implies that Nicholas was not at the imperial court on 4 Sept., but the Gesta Pontificum Cameracensium, MGH, SS, vii, 508, say that he went. He is not listed in the charters.

which is well enough known from other sources. Not all the other persistent absentees are so easily explained. Ulrich of Halberstadt and probably Stephen of Metz were Alexandrine,¹ but the same cannot be said of the bishops of Eichstätt, Chur, Meissen and Olmütz.² The figures do however give a general index of the state of feeling in the German episcopate. Pavia was attended by sixteen out of forty-two or forty-three, Lodi by between sixteen and twenty out of forty-two or forty-three, and Dôle by twenty-three or twenty-four out of a possible forty to forty-two. These are impressive figures compared with the usual episcopal attendance at one of Frederick's Hoftage. They look less impressive when compared with the attendance of the Iberian bishops at the council of Tours: twenty-one out of a possible thirty-five.³ This is noticeably better than the attendance at Lodi, and slightly better than the attendance at Dôle (attendance at Pavia cannot fairly be compared because of the short notice given). Not only did the Spanish bishops come further in many cases, certainly further than the German bishops had to travel to attend the council at Dôle, they had little more than their respect for Alexander to propel them, since it is unlikely that their rulers positively made them go. The German bishops on the other hand were attending papal councils by imperial

1. See below, pp. 166, 185.

2. For Egino of Chur, see below, p. 170 Gerung of Meissen promised to go on the expeditio sworn in 1160 (for ref. see above, p. 62) but does not seem to have done so, and was not in evidence at Lodi.

3. See appendix d, pp. 243-9.

order, or at least by pressing imperial invitation.¹ In view of this, the attendance figures do not suggest great enthusiasm for Victor, though the German bishops were in any case less papally-minded than their Spanish colleagues, and allowance must also be made for this.

The extent and intensity of the antipopes' obedience in Germany can also be gauged by a study of the recipients of their surviving privileges and the impetrants of their surviving mandates. The transmission is obviously fragmentary: apart from the usual thinning processes of rats, flood, fire, and war, there is a strong possibility that such documents were deliberately destroyed, or at least not carefully preserved, after 1177. The material for Paschal III and Calixtus III is too small to allow any conclusions, but Victor's output was more substantial, at least in the first three years of his pontificate.² It was largely restricted to certain types of recipient and certain areas. The bishops who received privileges and mandates from Victor came from the north and west.³ The regulars were mostly Benedictines, though the Premonstratensians and other canons in Lotharingia, especially in the diocese of Liège, were also prominent.⁴ Only one privilege sur-

1. For Pavia and Dôle see MGH, Const., i, 253 no. 182, 290-2 nos. 208-10. For Lodi see above, p. 65.

2. Peters 1971, 281, also notes a decline in interest in the antipopes as sources of privilege and jurisdiction after 1162.

3. Mainz: JL 14437; Hildesheim: JL 14429, 14442; Halberstadt: JL 14461; Liège: JL 14482; Trier: JL 14453-6; Verdun: JL 14431; Bremen: JL 14432-3; Magdeburg: JL 14430.

4. Lotharingian Premonstratensians: JL 14473, 14475; Ramackers, 'Papsturkunden in den Niederlanden', 224 no. 93, 230 no. 98, 232 no. 100. Ibid., 233 no. 101 is for the Augustinian house of Flône. For a schismatic Premonstratensian across the border in the diocese of Troyes, see JL 12059.

vives for a Cistercian house, Marienthal in the diocese of Halberstadt, where the debt Bishop Gero owed to Victor may have played a special part.¹ This kind of evidence again confirms the lack of support for the anti-popes in the south-east.²

The third kind of evidence comes from historical writing. It is not easy to handle. The schism was frequently recorded in annals and chronicles, but we can rarely know if it was recorded sufficiently soon to be evidence of immediate reaction. Risks can be minimized by using only those works which survive in an original, with frequent changes of hand.³ Only a few annalists accepted Victor. The annals of Neresheim (diocese of Augsburg) describe the schism as being between Octavian and Roland, which suggests neutrality, but entries for 1164 and 1167 imply a position favouring Frederick and his popes.⁴ The annals of Disibodenberg (Mainz) again describe the schism in almost neutral terms, but do seem to accept the decision of Pavia.⁵ Only the annals of Parc and the related annals of Floreffe, and the rather later annals of Magdeburg and Pöhlde seem in no doubt.⁶ Compilations made at Zwettl, Kremsmünster, and Klosterneuburg (all Passau) refrain from judgement, perhaps following the attitude taken by their diocesan at Pavia.⁷ But neutrality

1. Preiss 1934, 230.

2. The one exception is JL 14427 for Oberaltaich (Regensburg).

3. Information on this can be found in the editorial introductions in MGH, SS; all following references are to these editions unless otherwise stated.

4. x, 23.

5. xvii, 29.

6. Parc: xvi, 606; Floreffe: Köllner 1972, 45 (note that both houses are Premonstratensian and in the diocese of Liège). Magdeburg: xvi, 191; Pöhlde: xvi, 91-2, a short treatise on Victor's election and pontificate.

7. ix, 540, 545, 615 (codex A).

in describing the schism, usually shown in the way the two papal candidates were named, was not confined to houses whose diocesans were neutral; it was the commonest reaction.¹ At the other end of the scale, open hostility to Victor is rarer than open support. It can be found only in the annals of St. Rupert's, Salzburg, which are not certainly contemporary, and of St. Emmeram, Regensburg.² The decline in support for Victor's successors showed itself not so much in hostile references to their election as in silence. Few writers recorded the accession of Paschal, and fewer still that of Calixtus.

All three kinds of evidence show a lack of enthusiasm for Victor and uncertainty about the rightful position as being general within the German church. Positive support for Frederick and Victor seems to have come especially from the north-west (Liège and Cologne) and from Swabia, though here the bishops of Chur, Eichstätt and Constance and the houses in their dioceses seem rather to have avoided Victor. But there was little opposition to Victor at first, except in Salzburg. Only after Frederick had failed to

1. St. Stephen, Freising, xiii, 54; Deutz (Cologne), xiv, 572; Heilbronn (Eichstätt), xvi, 14; Egmond (Utrecht), xvi, 461; St. Vincent, Metz, iii, 158; Lobbes (Liège), iv, 23 (here the account of the schism is neutral, but miracles are reported at the death-bed of Victor. On the other hand, the reaction to the council of Würzburg is definitely hostile); Scheftlarn (Freising), xvii, 336; Prüfening (Regensburg) xvii, 587; Afflighem (Cambrai), vi, 404; Anchin (Cambrai), vi, 397; St. James, Liège, xvi, 641 (again an interesting case: codex 1 is neutral, but the later codex 2 is Victorine).

2. ix, 776; xvii, 587.

win general acceptance for the decision taken at Pavia did the sense of no longer being at one with the rest of the church make ecclesiastics uneasy. But this unease was present very early.¹ It is probably responsible for a curious story which occurs in several independent sources, though mostly rather late: the schism arose because the pope and his cardinals had wanted to excommunicate Frederick for his unlawful divorce and second marriage.²

Outside the province of Salzburg the decision of Pavia was rejected only in Halberstadt. Bishop Ulrich was the first episcopal casualty of the schism, and the only one, apart from Conrad of Mainz, outside Salzburg to suffer for it. He had already incurred the enmity of Frederick and Henry the Lion, and his deposition in the summer of 1160 was due as much to this as to support for Alexander. Probably it was already decided at Pavia, as the price of Henry the Lion's support for Victor.³

Reuter thought that the unfortunate Arnold of Mainz was more literally a victim of the schism.⁴ In July 1160 he was murdered by the citizens and ministeriales of Mainz. This was shocking, but not surprising, since he had spent most of his pontificate in

1. See above, p. 44 note 1.

2. Annales Palidenses, MGH, SS, xvi, 91; Sigeberti Continuatio Aquicinctina, ibid., vi, 407-9; Nicholas of Amiens, RHF, xiv, 22; Chronicon S. Clementis Mettense, MGH, SS, xxiv, 501. See Allport and Postman 1948, 37, 121: rumour is often an attempt to make the half-known and half-understood coherent and intelligible.

3. Bogumil 1972, 235-43; Jordan 1970, 228, 235. Rahewin's version of the Pavia encyclical (Gesta, iv, 80, p. 694) carefully claims that only fourteen of Arnold of Mainz' suffragans were present; this was probably aimed at Ulrich.

4. Reuter, i, 134ff.

conflict with them. It might seem superfluous to look to the schism for an explanation, especially since none of the narrative sources mention it in connexion with the murder.¹ But the St. Victor collections contain a letter from Berthold of Zähringen to Louis VII, written on behalf of Rudolf, Berthold's brother and the bearer of the letter and asking Louis to use his influence with Alexander for the rightfully elected archbishop of Mainz.² Rudolf had been elected by the rebel clergy and citizens of Mainz after the murder. In their haste to secure a powerful patron they forgot a promise made in 1157 not to elect without imperial consent, and Barbarossa quashed the election at the council of Lodi, appointing Conrad of Wittelsbach instead. The letter to Louis was written some time after this, probably in 1162.³ One can scarcely argue from it that the Mainz rebels had been Alexandrine in 1160, though Alexander does seem for a time to have accepted Rudolf's claim.⁴

Another letter, from the Ebrach collection, has also been used to prove a connexion between the schism and the murder. Abbot

1. See Reuter, loc. cit., and Giesebrecht, v, 366-70 and vi, 419, for an account of the murder and the events leading up to it, with full references.

2. V, ff. 201v-202v = RHF, xvi, 34 no. 112.

3. Berthold speaks of Frederick's 'nostri generis odium', which suggests the autumn of 1162, when Berthold had lost the regalia in Geneva through a decision of the imperial court, and had the humiliation of seeing his sister Clementia divorced by Henry the Lion (Giesebrecht, v, 342, 347-8; vi, 416, 418).

4. Rudolf stayed with Alexander until 1167, when he made his peace with Frederick and accepted the bishopric of Liège (Chronica S. Petri Erfordensis Moderna, ed. Holder-Egger, p. 185, sub 1168). Conrad was excommunicated, presumably as an intrusus, at the council of Tours, and only after he himself had defected did Alexander drop Rudolf (Hauck, 271 note 4; below, p. 173).

Eberhard of Eberbach wrote to his fellow-Cistercian Adam of Eberbach in the spring of 1161 to ask what he should do as a Cistercian abbot who had received a compelling summons to Victor's council at Cremona (the one subsequently transferred to Lodi).¹ To offend the emperor would be dangerous, especially with the troubles at Mainz so close at hand,

illi de civitate Sil(ehofen) leviter deprehenderint nos quoquomodo cum sibi contraria parte consentire. Causantur autem consentire, si prediote vocationi noluerimus obedire, et manus suas, quas hucusque vix continuerunt, absque mora ad diripiendas res nostras extendent.

'Those of the city of Silehofen' are Arnold's relatives, the suffragans of Mainz, and some of the Thuringian nobility, who had put forward a candidate in opposition to Rudolf of Zähringen in the person of Christian of Buch. Christian we have already met on a legation to Denmark on Victor's behalf;² he was obviously closely associated with Victor, and hence prepared to call any refusal to attend the council of Cremona a sign of support for the other side in the Mainz dispute, especially since his party had already seen signs of Eberhard's sympathy for Rudolf. It does not follow from this that Arnold's murderers were Alexandrine, even if their candidate later sought support from Alexander.³ The judgement of Giesebrecht and Hauck that the Mainz rebellion had nothing to do with the schism must stand;⁴ the hints that the two

1. Ohnsorge 1929a, 6f., 32 no. 3.

2. Above, p. 56.

3. According to the Vita Arnoldi they claimed to be acting on Frederick's orders: Jordan 1939, 75.

4. Giesebrecht, vi, 419; Hauck, 269 note 7.

parties were afterwards prepared to use the schism to further their ends are however additional proof that attitudes to the schism were uncertain, and that there was no real consensus.¹

A good index of the enthusiasm of the German episcopate for the antipopes which goes beyond 1162 is to see how willing newly-elected bishops were to be consecrated. We have some information, even if not always very precise as to time (episcopal charters are not always frequent, and the imperial chancery was very slack about giving bishops the title electus), for all except Richard of Verdun (elected in 1163)², Peter of Toul (1163 x 1165), and Hugo of Verden (1167). Three bishops were elect at the outbreak of the schism, Albert of Freising (1158), Rainald of Cologne (1159) and Henry of Würzburg (1159). Of these, Albert had certainly been consecrated by 1160, since he dedicated a church at Scheftlarn in that year.³ Henry of Würzburg was consecrated in the autumn of 1159 by Arnold of Mainz, probably before the news of the schism had reached Germany.⁴ Rainald remained unconsecrated until September 1165, but this may have been as much from a need to retain the income from the provostships he had held before his election to an archbishopric in poor economic shape as from any desire to keep an escape-route open.⁵

1. Cp. by contrast the situation in Spain, above, p. 58.

2. Dates of election etc., are taken from Hauck, 950-72, unless otherwise stated. Dates in () are those of election.

3. Wolfram 1883, 95. The passage he quotes from the Appendix ad Rahewinum does not show that Albert was consecrated by Christian of Mainz in 1165-7 but simply that he held ordinations after being freed from the oath taken to Paschal at Würzburg by Paschal's death, as did Hartwig of Augsburg, who had been consecrated by Christian.

4. Giesebrecht, v, 364.

5. Herkenrath 1962, 292.

Some of the bishops elected in the early years of the schism were consecrated with no more than the usual delay. Willemar of Brandenburg (1160) and Uto of Naumburg-Zeitz (1161) were both consecrated by Wichmann of Magdeburg in 1161.¹ Evergis of Paderborn was also consecrated in 1161.² But already some were avoiding consecration. Egino of Chur (1160) remained unconsecrated until 1167.³ Conrad of Mainz, his metropolitan, remained unconsecrated until after he had gone over to Alexander in 1165.⁴ From 1162 we can see an increasing reluctance. Apart from Conrad of Lübeck (1164), consecrated by Hartwig of Bremen,⁵ no further consecrations are known to have taken place until 1165.⁶ Even the measures taken at Würzburg do not seem to have had immediate effect. Several bishops elected before 1165 managed to delay consecration until

1. Hoppe 1965, 39.

2. Wolfram 1883, 79-80.

3. Büttner 1972, 254-7. I am not however convinced that Barbarossa left Egino alone for reasons of Alpenpasspolitik, or that Egino finally consented to consecration because he had been impressed by the canonization of Charlemagne.

4. Annales Reicherspergenses, MGH, SS, xvii, 472.

5. Helmold, ed. Schmeidler, ii, 97, p. 190

6. Hermann of Hildesheim (1161) was still electus in Aug. 1163 (cf. K. Janicke, UB des Hochstifts Hildesheim..., Berlin, 1896, i, 319 no. 334) but no longer in Aug. 1166 (ibid., 322 no. 337). The inference that he was consecrated after Würzburg seems reasonable. Ulrich of Speyer (1162) remained electus throughout his short episcopate (Wolfram 1883, 72). Rudolf of Strassburg (1162) was not consecrated until 1167 (Germ. Pont., iii/3, 15 no. *40). Dietrich of Metz (1163) avoided consecration altogether, and so probably did Peter of Toul and Richard of Verdun, though there is no proof. Godfrey of Speyer (1164) is said to have remained elect until his death in 1167 by Wolfram 1883, 73, but in a charter of c. 1166 he styles himself humilis dispensator where earlier he had used electus (cp. F. X. Remling, UB zur Geschichte der Bischöfe von Speyer, Mainz, 1852, i, 112 no. 100 with 111 no. 90) which may suggest intervening consecration. Rupert of Passau (1164) and Alexander of Liège (1164) were consecrated at and after the council of Würzburg respectively (Annales Reicherpergenses, loc. cit.; Knipping 1901, no. 824).

1167 or after, and of the six bishops elected in the nine months following the council only two - Herold of Würzburg (1165) and Otto of Constance (1165 x 1166) - were certainly consecrated before 1167. Christian of Mainz and Eberhard of Regensburg remained unconsecrated until 1167; Otto of Brixen and Albo of Passau, until their resignations in 1169.¹ After 1167 the gap between election and consecration seems to have narrowed, perhaps because Frederick was again in Germany. Only Radbod of Speyer and Cuno of Regensburg (both 1167) remained unconsecrated for long.² Philip of Cologne and Hartig of Augsburg (both 1167) were consecrated within the year, while Rudolf of Liège was consecrated in 1169.³ Of the four bishops elected in 1169 only one, Henry of Passau, managed to avoid rapid consecration.⁴

1. Herold: Wendehorst 1962, 169. Otto of Constance was consecrated before 7 Nov. 1166, since he dedicated a church on that date (Ladewig 1895, no. 1007). Christian and Eberhard: Vincent of Prague, Annales, MGH, SS, xvi, 683. Eberhard was only consecrated deacon according to this report, which refers to March 1167, but the Chronica Regia Coloniensis, ed. Waitz, p. 118, records a mass promotion by Paschal III on 30 July at Rome. Eberhard was certainly there, since he died of the plague a few days later (Giesebrecht, v, 559). Otto of Brixen: Wolfram 1883, 92; Albo: Classen 1960, 306 and note 37.

2. Radbod was still electus in 1174 (Wolfram 1883, 147). Cuno was offered the choice of consecration or resignation in 1169 (Appendix ad Rahewinum, edd. Waitz and Simson, p. 350) and must have chosen consecration while in some way securing Alexander's consent or connivance, since in 1173 he is found consecrating the new bishop of Passau with Alexander's permission (Germ. Pont., i, 172 no. *51).

3. Philip: Knipping 1901, no. 913; Hartwig: Appendix ad Rahewinum, loc cit.; Rudolf: Moreau 1945, 65.

4. Wolfram 1883, 101; he remained unconsecrated. The others were Arnold of Trier, consecrated by 1171 (Wolfram 1883, 55-6); Baldwin of Bremen, who also received the pallium from Calixtus III (Glaeske 1962, 179-80); Ludwig of Münster, consecrated soon after his election (cf. Erhard, Regesta...Westfaliae, ii, 108-9 nos. 342, 344).

It is obvious that bishops were increasingly unwilling to be consecrated; the speeding-up in the second half of the decade was achieved only by coercion. This was true even though there is little evidence for elections without Frederick's knowledge and consent. Many of those elected, not always the most cooperative ones, were his relatives.¹ There are other indications of dissatisfaction besides this. The evidence of chronicles and charters has already been noted. The council of Würzburg and the reaction to it tell the same story. Frederick himself wrote in his encyclical that many had had doubts about Paschal,² and the comments of annalists show that these were not ended, either by the council or by the compulsory oath-taking which followed it.³ The canonization of Charlemagne at the end of the year made little impression. This is not to say that the position of the antipopes was irreversible. They continued to issue privileges and mandates, and to send legates. Calixtus even had a case of heresy in the diocese of Liège referred to him, a remarkable display of respect.⁴ No doubt had Frederick been able to produce a really impressive triumph, the reputation of the antipopes would have improved.⁵ The victory at

1. Jordan 1939, 126; Hauck, 290-2.

2. MGH, Const., i, 319 no. 225: 'negocio domini Paschali papae, quod in cordibus multorum dubium habebatur...'.

3. See the references above, p. 131 note 2. Even the Chronica Regia Coloniensis, ed. Waitz, p. 116, is matter-of-fact rather than enthusiastic. Oath-taking: MGH, Const., i, 318-21 nos. 225-6.

4. Moreau 1945, 66-7.

5. Frederick put the capture of Milan on a par with the councils at Pavia, Lodi, and Dôle (MGH, Const., i, 315 no. 223). The distribution of relics from Milan helped; cf. Knipping 1901, no. 804 for the wide and deep impression made by the translation of the Magi to Cologne, and Chronica S. Petri Erphesfurtensis Moderna, ed. Holder-Egger, p. 182, for the transfer of Sts. Gervase and Prothasius to Halberstadt.

Rome in July 1167 and the ceremonies which followed it - Paschal's consecration of several electi, his coronation of Beatrix¹ - would have been just such a triumph, had the plague not struck. For Alexandrines, the hand of God had destroyed the wicked, just as it had appeared at the outset of the schism to brand Victor's pontificate by seeing that he put on the papal mantle back to front, and even those less committed might well find confirmation for their doubts.

All this, however, is far from saying that the adherents of Alexander increased among the episcopate. Conrad of Mainz went over to Alexander early in 1165.² So, a little later, did Conrad of Lübeck, turned Alexandrine through the hostility of Henry the Lion.³ For both it meant exile. Siegfried, the defeated candidate in the disputed election at Bremen in 1168-9, though at first of trying to get help from Alexander, but dropped the plan and accepted the bishopric of Brandenburg from Frederick in 1172.⁴ Only in such border areas as Cambrai and the province of Trier did Alexandrinism take hold.⁵ Rumours of the conversion of Wichmann of Magdeburg and Rainald of Dassel, or of the wholesale defection of the Saxons from Frederick, remained rumours.⁶

Even in the province of Salzburg Alexander lost ground under

1. Chronica Regia Coloniensis, ed. Waitz, p. 118.

2. I owe this information to the kindness of Dr. R-M. Herkenrath of Vienna, who is preparing an article on the subject.

3. Helmold, ed. Schmeidler, ii, 105, pp. 205-7. The editor dated this to 1167, which seems too late to me.

4. Glaeske 1962, 184.

5. See below, pp. 183-6

6. Wichmann: Materials, v, 159 no. 82; Hoppe 1965, 42, 47-50. Rainald: Materials, vi, 31 no. 234; Herkenrath 1962, 361ff.; Saxony: Annales Ratisbonenses (Prüfening codex), MGH, SS, xvii, 587 sub 1167.

heavy pressure from the imperialists, especially after the death of Eberhard of Salzburg in June 1164. As in 1161-2 Frederick was at least as much concerned with the regalia of the archbishopric and its consequent obligations as with the schism itself, but the effects on Alexandrines were no less serious for this. Eberhard was replaced by the bishop of Passau, Conrad, who was Frederick's uncle. He had remained neutral as bishop of Passau,¹ but the chapter of Salzburg insisted that he should support Alexander openly like his predecessor. Frederick was no longer willing to leave Salzburg's allegiance undecided. Conrad was told to acknowledge Paschal, and when he refused was in turn refused the regalia, first at Pavia in September and then again at Bamberg in November 1164. To this second meeting Frederick had also summoned the clergy and ministeriales of Salzburg to discuss Conrad's election, presumably with the intention of putting pressure on Conrad by implying the possibility of a new election by the competent persons in presentia imperatoris.² Conrad was not deterred. In March 1165 a monk brought him a pallium from Alexander, and he stayed away from the council of Würzburg.³ Frederick now began to impose Paschal on the province by force. He proceeded up the Danube in

1. See above, pp. 71, 164; also the Annales Reicherspergenses, MGH, SS, xvii, 471.

2. For the meetings see ibid., and MGH, Const., i, 314 no. 222. Conrad had hopes of acting as mediator between Frederick and Alexander (cf. Rüdiger of Zwettl to Conrad, Sudendorf, ii, 145-6 no. 61, dated by Preiss 1934, 194 and note 4). His principles were not so high that he refused to act together with the arch-schismatics Rainald of Cologne and Gero of Halberstadt in witnessing a confirmation of an exchange between Oberzell and Naumburg (Heidingsfelder 1915, 138 no. 439).

3. Germ. Pont., i, 31 no. *99; Materials, v, 187 no. 98.

the summer of 1165. Rudolf of Passau, consecrated at Würzburg, was made to enforce the Würzburg oaths in his diocese. At Vienna Eberhard, elect of Regensburg, and Henry, duke of Austria and the brother of Conrad of Salzburg, took the oaths.¹ The enforcement of the oaths was not complete, and Alexandrines remained, but the fate of Gerhoch and of Martin of Kremsmünster shows that they had a considerable effect.² Among the bishops, only Gurk under Roman and Henry remained Alexandrine. Albert of Freising had to submit,³ and although Rudolf of Passau's successor Albo and Otto of Brixen remained unconsecrated, they do not seem to have been regarded with favour by Alexander's supporters.⁴ Salzburg, however, remained Alexandrine, and suffered for it. Conrad was summoned to a series of Hoftage from Michaelmas 1165 onwards. He appeared at the third, held at Nürnberg on 14 February 1166. Each side accused the other of unlawful behaviour. Frederick said that Conrad had received neither the spiritualia from Paschal nor the regalia from himself; Conrad replied that he had been canonically elected and had been thrice unlawfully refused the regalia, 'pro eo, quod nollet, cum nec deberet, recipere Paschalem.' Significantly, there was no attempt to accuse Conrad of an offence he had certainly committed,

1. Annales Reicherspergenses, MGH, SS, xvii, 472.

2. Martin resigned rather than swear (Bernardi Historia Cremifanensis, MGH, SS, xxv, 633 and note +). For Gerhoch see below, pp. 177-8.

3. Appendix ad Rahewinum, edd. Waitz and Simson, p. 348 sub 1166.

4. For Albo see Classen 1960, 306 and note 37. Otto is not mentioned in the correspondence of the Salzburg Alexandrines, which offers a reasonable argument from silence, since he was forced to resign by Frederick in 1169 (Appendix ad Rahewinum, p. 350).

being translated without papal approval. The issue was the regalia as much as the schism. The final blow came at Laufen on 29 March. Attempts at mediation by Henry of Austria failed, and Salzburg was thrown to the wolves.¹ Conrad survived, though he had to leave Salzburg itself. By no means all those who might have joined in the attack did so, and the vassals of Salzburg defended the church.² Alexandrinism was persecuted, but not destroyed. But Conrad was no more prepared to take positive action against Frederick than his predecessor had been. When Ulrich of Aquileia wrote offering an alliance in 1168, Conrad consulted Sigbot, provost of Salzburg, who wrote back advising caution, lest Ulrich should draw Conrad into an alliance with the Lombards. Ulrich could offer little help, and the emperor could easily accuse Conrad of conspiring with his enemies. If however (and Sigbot clearly thought this unlikely, to judge from the tone of the letter) 'bellum Dei et ecclesiae fortiter agere disponatis' then by all means join with Ulrich.³

The bishops were the most important group in deciding the fate of the antipopes in Germany. The lay princes might have been significant, as they had been under Henry IV and Henry V, but few showed any interest in the schism. Ottakar of Styria is said to

1. Annales Reicherspergenses, MGH, SS, xvii, 473; Classen 1960, 282-4.

2. An indication of how much trouble Frederick would have faced had large numbers of bishops resigned the regalia, as they threatened to do at the council of Würzburg.

3. Sudendorf, i, 68-9 no. 25. The date lies between Frederick's return to Germany in the spring of 1168 and Conrad's death on 28 Sept. 1168. Conrad's successor, Adalbert of Bohemia, was also Alexandrine, but his story belongs to the 1170s.

have been Alexandrine, but died in 1165 before such convictions were really put to the test.¹ Only Welf VI was really prominent as a supporter of Alexander, and his power lay more in Italy than in Germany. He did secure letters from Alexander III freeing his Hauskloster of Steingaden from the need to receive ordinations, etc., from the schismatic bishops of Augsburg, and he wrote to Alexander and to Louis assuring them of support,² but this was all. Nor can much weight be put on the letters from Berthold of Zähringen and Louis of Thuringia to Louis VII.³ Hauck's judgement that after 1162 'auch auf die Treue der Fürsten kein Verlass mehr war'⁴ is a gross exaggeration; they continued to supply troops for the Italian expeditions and to attend Frederick's court, and if they fought among themselves it was not because of the schism.

Frederick was perhaps helped by the absence of a network of intellectuals in Germany bound by ties of cultivated amicitia and formal letter-writing such as was capable of providing a kind of public opinion in England and northern France. Rather, there were a number of small groups and isolated individuals, whose impact could not be great. The most important of these was the circle around Gerhoch of Reichersberg.⁵ Gerhoch was deeply disturbed by the schism. It was a further proof that the abominatio desolationis

1. Classen 1960, 279 and note 29.

2. Germ. Pont., ii, 76 no. 4; above, p. 109 note 1.

3. Berthold: above, p. 167; Louis: RHF, xvi, 42 no. 136. Like Berthold, Louis was probably piqued at the rejection of his candidate (Christian of Buch) for Mainz.

4. Hauck, 270.

5. For what follows, see Classen 1960, 193-215, 272-307.

of Revelations could be seen as having been fulfilled in the pride and avarice of the Romans. Victor was unattractive: he had been elected by a minority, and rejected by the English, French, and Spanish churches. Gerhoch's brothers, at odds with their bishop, Conrad of Augsburg, had been persecuted in Victor's name. Alexander however had been rejected by the council of Pavia, and the accusations of simoniacal conspiracy made against him by the imperialists were the more serious in that he had refused to answer them. It was not until the end of 1163, after Alexander had offered to clear himself from the accusations, that Gerhoch finally decided to acknowledge him as pope. Even as late as 1166, when he wrote his letter-treatise Opusculum ad Cardinales, the matter was still troubling him. Gerhoch was one of the few Alexandrines who both acted on and suffered for their beliefs. He denounced Paschal in Frederick's presence, at some risk to life and limb, and in 1167 was driven from Reichersberg into exile. But it is characteristic of the schism in Germany that the persecution was due as much to a property dispute between Reichersberg and a Bavarian noble as to Gerhoch's Alexandrinism.

Other intellectuals from the south-east reflected the prevailing uncertainty. Boto of Prüfening, a writer very characteristic of the monastic spirituality of Germany at the time, wrote that it was impossible to decide which of the two claimants was in the right.¹ Rahewin seems to have changed his mind. The last book of the Gesta Frederici, whether deliberately or simply as a result of the documents available to Rahewin, gives an account of the early

1. In a homily on Ezechiel written probably late in the 1160s. See Endres 1905, 638-43.

months of the schism favourable to Victor, though Rahewin himself deliberately refrained from judgement.¹ But it ends for no apparent reason immediately after the council of Pavia; Eberhard of Salzburg's attitude to the schism may have had something to do with this.² If Rahewin is really the author of the Dialogus de pontificatu sanctae Romanae ecclesiae, as Böhmer thought, then by 1162 he had come full circle.³ The visionaries were divided. Elisabeth of Schönau was prepared to say definitely that Victor was the rightful pope, though her brother Eckbert was more cautious.⁴ Hildegard of Bingen, who probably enjoyed a wider reputation, did not utter on the subject, and indeed deliberately refused to do so: 'de schismate ecclesiae non iubet me Dominus loqui.'⁵ It has been argued that her attitude to Frederick and his popes hardened after the death of Victor IV, but this, though it would be paralleled in many of her contemporaries, is really only a circular inference from undated and obscure letters to Frederick which may have nothing to do with the schism.⁶ Nor in view of the way in which the largest collection of her letters was edited by her associates can inferences safely be drawn from, for example,

1. Gesta, iv, 59, p. 620.

2. Gillingham 1968.

3. Böhmer 1896. Apart from Gerhoch's writings and the miniature treatise embedded in the Annales Palidenses (MGH, SS, xvi, 91-2), this is the only libellus from Germany which deals with the schism.

4. Hauck, 257. Cf. also John of Salisbury to Becket, Materials, v 219 no. 115: German prophetesses have inflamed the schismatics. This cannot have been Hildegard, since John continued to hold her in esteem: ibid., vi, 179 no. 296.

5. Quoted by Widmer 1955, 259.

6. For letters and argument see Schrader and Führkötter 1956, 124-31.

the apparent absence of any letters to Rainald of Cologne.¹

There remain the religious orders. Few of these had sufficient corporate personality in the 1160s to need or be able to take a collective decision. Of those that had, the Premonstratensians seem to have divided on national lines, but this was a division that existed before the schism.² The Hospitallers simply recognized the actual situation, and got privileges and mandates from both popes.³ I assume without direct proof that the Templars also did so. The Carthusians were Alexandrine,⁴ but were not important in Germany, though numerous in Burgundy. The largest order, the Cistercians, were the ones in theory most able to make a collective decision which would be significant. In practice it seems that the German Cistercians, with a few exceptions, tried to avoid either open opposition to the decision of the general chapter, or open hostility to Frederick. They succeeded for a time, but became a special target after Würzburg, though even then without great losses.⁵

The esteem in which the antipopes were held in Germany was not high after the opening years of the schism. The failure of the meeting at St.-Jean-sur-Laône, and still more the death of Victor IV and the election of Paschal III, shook ecclesiastical

1. As Widmer 1955, 288, attempts to do. For the editing of Hildegard's collection see Schrader and Führkötter 1956, 154ff., 170.

2. See above, pp. 163 note 4, 164 note 6; JL 10697, 11663.

3. J. Delaville le Roulx, Cartulaire général de l'ordre de S. Jean de Jérusalem, 1100-1310, Paris, 1894, i, nos. 281, 290, 292-4.

4. See above, p. 35.

5. Preiss 1934, 187-255; appendix g, pp. 255-63 below.

confidence. Logically, those who accepted Victor ought to have had no qualms about accepting a successor chosen by Victor's cardinals, but they did, and the fact that Paschal was consecrated not by a bishop of Ostia but by Henry of Liège, who died soon after, cannot have improved his position.¹ Yet it was at best a passive resistance which was offered. Few were prepared to be martyrs, and few, Frederick included, were prepared to make martyrs. Frederick might claim that refusal to accept his popes would, after the decision of Würzburg, be much more dangerous than before,² but the victims of the schism both before and after 1165 were those who were unfortunate enough to have enemies who could use the schism as an excuse. The exception was Salzburg, but even here there was only a more conspicuous kind of passive resistance, countered by treatment which was relatively mild. Salzburg never became 'ein Herd gegnerische Bewegung' to Frederick, pace Haller.³ All overtures from Alexander and others to ally with the Hungarians or the Lombards were ignored, as was the excommunication of Frederick, whom neither Eberhard nor Conrad avoided or refused support or obedience to, for that reason at any rate. It was this atmosphere of tolerance which prevented Alexander from gaining anything more than a small number of spontaneous adherents.

1. The Annales Reicherspergenses, MGH, SS, xvii, 470, make this point explicitly; but it will not have been lost on others.

2. 'Favor enim illorum [sc. Alexander and his party] etsi hactenus aliquo modo visus est venialis, in posterum prorsus erit irremissibilis', MGH, Const., i, 316 no. 223.

3. Haller, 123.

Chapter ten

Obedience in the Empire, ii: the Franco-Imperial border

Alexander and his supporters had little success in winning adherents in Germany, though spontaneous obedience was not uncommon. Their failure may be more readily understood when the Franco-Imperial border is studied, a region which I take to include the western frontier of the regnum Teutonicum, comital and regnal Burgundy, and Provence. Here they were considerably more active, and yet although there was a steady decline in support for the antipopes here as elsewhere, it can rarely be ascribed directly to Alexandrine proselytizing.

The centre of interest at the northern end of the border was the bishopric of Cambrai. Politically it was an imperial bishopric, though very much under the influence of the counts of Flanders, who were Alexandrine; ecclesiastically it was part of the Alexandrine province of Rheims. The continuator of the Gesta Pontificum Cameracensium thought that Nicholas successfully met these conflicting claims on his loyalties.¹ But early in 1164 or 1165 Alexander threatened Nicholas with excommunication, in spite of intervention by Louis and Henry of Rheims,² and although Nicholas took the oath at Würzburg, Frederick also had cause to complain about the slack administration of the oaths in the diocese of Cambrai.³

1. MGH, SS, vii, 507-8.

2. JL 11107, 27 Jan. 1164 x 1165 to Louis VII. The earlier year is more probable, since the letter mentions the abbot of St. Germain-des-Prés as a messenger and he was at Alexander's court in early Jan. 1164 (cf. JL 10994). Earlier Nicholas had been in unruffled contact with Frederick (St. 3964, 1162) and Alexander (JL 10841, 1163), and had consecrated a church with some Alexandrine bishops in 1164 (Lambert of Waterloo, Annales Cameracenses, MGH, SS, xvi, 536, sub 1164).

3. John of Salisbury says he took the oath, Materials, vi, 431 no. 318; Frederick's complaint is MGH, Const., i, 320-1 no. 226.

By the time of his death on 1 July 1167 he had probably returned to communion with Alexander.¹ He was succeeded after a disputed election by the young and disreputable Peter, brother of Philip of Flanders, thanks to Frederick and to Beatrix whose cousin he was. He remained elect until his reemergence into secular life in 1175.² The diocese became increasingly Alexandrine under the influence of Henry of Rheims and Philip of L'Aumone, and it was probably for this reason that Peter, who took little interest in his bishopric, resisted a proposal by Philip of Cologne to have it transferred to his province on the grounds that Rheims was schismatic.³

It was not only in Cambrai that Henry of Rheims' influence was felt. His collection contains letters from Alexander asking him to take action over clerics and property in several western dioceses in the Empire: Liège, Metz, Toul, Verdun, and elsewhere, as well as letters to others on similar subjects.⁴ Liège remained a

1. In the letter cit. p. 183 note 3 John of Salisbury says that Henry of Rheims did not dare to restore Nicholas to communion without papal approval; no letter from Alexander giving this has survived, but since Alexander later referred to Nicholas (JL 14359) without calling him a schismatic it is likely that he did allow him back. On the other hand Alexander's letter of 2 Mar. 1166 x 1167 (Ramackers, 'Papsturkunden in den Niederlanden', 254 no. 119) appoints the bishop and dean of Arras as judges-delegate in a dispute between Afflighem and Vlierbek, both in Cambrai. The diocesan did not have to be a judge-delegate, but to appoint the bishop of Arras would be an odd move, in view of the past histories of the bishoprics, if Cambrai was functioning normally.

2. Lambert of Waterloo, pp. 540ff.; Gesta Pont. Cam., pp. 508-9.

3. For Henry and Cambrai see JL 11453, 11669, etc. Philip's interest is shown by the survival of Frederick's mandate (cf. p. 183 note 3) in his collection (P, ff. 85r-v). For the proposed transfer see JL 14495 and Lambert of Waterloo, p. 546.

4. JL 10783, 11571 (Liège); 11687 (Metz); 11922 (Toul); 10939, 12123 (Verdun); 10788, 11292, 11478, 11571, 11578 have more general reference. For letters to others cf. JL 10697, 12059. All are or were in R; examples could be multiplied, especially from the 1170s.

centre of support for the antipopes, but the province of Trier became increasingly Alexandrine, and the supposition that this was due to French influence is plausible.¹ Hillin of Trier had not appeared at Pavia; like his suffragan of Metz, he had to be spoken for by the bishops of Toul and Verdun.² By the summer of 1160 Fastrad of Clairvaux was able to think that he was in communion with Alexander,³ but he was present at Lodi next year, and was rewarded with several privileges from Victor.⁴ Later he seems to have drifted away from the antipopes, but although he was said not to have been at Würzburg there is no evidence of any contact between him and Alexander.⁵ His suffragans also inclined towards Alexander. Stephen of Metz died 'catholicus' in 1162, though Alexander thought he had been schismatic for a time.⁶ Albert of Verdun, a former imperial capellanus, was a supporter of Victor, but retired to the Alexandrine monastery of St. Vannes to die. His successor Richard was certainly in contact with Alexander, and remained elect throughout his pontificate.⁷ Little is known of

1. Freiss 1934, 246.

2. Gesta, iv, 82, p. 702.

3. A, f. 52v = Tengnagel, p. 414 no. 60.

4. JL 14453-6, 25 July 1161. The legateship for Germany conferred by Hadrian IV (JL 10094) was not renewed.

5. Hilpisch 1955, 17ff.; Gesta Trevirorum, MGH, SS, xxix, 380-1, are full of praise for Hillin's caution.

6. Gesta episcoporum Mettensium, MGH, SS, x, 545, c. 1; JL 11687, which clearly refers to Stephen despite the 'O.' of the printed editions and of R, f. 43va.

7. Hausmann 1956, 296-7; Jordan 1939, 100. For Richard see JL 10939, 11971 (possibly addressed to his successor); Hauck, 269.

the attitudes of Dietrich of Metz and of Henry and Peter of Toul, though Dietrich and Peter probably remained unconsecrated even after the council of Würzburg.¹

Further south Henry of Rheims was also involved in the restoration of Cluny to Alexander's obedience. It had refused admission to Alexander's legates in 1160, perhaps from unwillingness to take sides; but the Cluniac and Victorine Imar of Tusculum took up residence there and its attitude hardened. Already in December 1160 William of Pavia had deputed Peter, abbot of St. Martial in Limoges to go to Cluny and sort matters out, but he fell ill and resigned before he could do so. Henry of France was then called in '*qui propter germanitatem Ludovici regis tutius ad partes illas accedere...posse videbatur.*' Henry did not rely too much on germanitas; armed with a papal mandate he advanced cautiously as far as Lucey. When Hugh of Cluny failed to appear he was excommunicated.² Only in 1162 was an Alexandrine abbot elected, Stephen of St. Michael, Chrysa.³ Even then Hugh may not have left immediately; we find him writing to Foliot to congratulate him on his translation to London in early 1163.⁴ He describes Cluny's unenviable position: on the one side, Alexander's cardinals, backed by Louis, threatening curses and worse unless Alexander was obeyed; on the

1. Above, p. 170 note 6. Alexander was in early contact with monasteries in the diocese of Toul: cf. JL 10843, 10850, both of 1163. JL 11922 shows that there were still schismatics there at the end of the decade.

2. Hugh of Vézelay, MGH, SS, xxvi, 145; JL 10660, 10661, both 7 Apr. 1161; Janssen 1961, 70.

3. Robert of Torigny, ed. Howlett, p. 213.

4. Materials, v, 30-2 no. 20. For Hugh's later history see Hägermann 1969.

other side, the count of Mâcon and the archbishop of Lyons. The line taken by Cluny reflects the relative strengths of Frederick and Louis in the area; we shall see later how Alexandrines tried to use the danger of imperial power to persuade Louis to work on their behalf.

In Burgundy proper the turning-point in the schism seems to have been the meeting at St.-Jean-sur-Laône. After that date, support for Alexander grew steadily, while previously there had been relatively little. It was helped by the activities of Peter of Tarentaise, Anthelme, prior of the Chartreuse and then bishop of Belley, and other Alexandrines; by Alexander himself, who took more interest in the area than in Germany; and by Louis VII, whose help was enlisted by the Alexandrines, though to little purpose. The growth of Alexandrinism is the more significant as Barbarossa and his supporters were also active in the region; it was not achieved without opposition.

In the province of Besançon positive support for the antipopes was at its strongest. Here alone do we find them issuing mandates and privileges.¹ Ortlieb of Basle, a close associate of Frederick, was present at Pavia, and assented to its decisions on behalf of his metropolitan Humbert.² He was also at Lodi in the following year,³ and further evidence for Victorinism in the province is

1. JL 14435, 14446, 14474, 14478-9; Germ. Pont., ii, 159 no. *3, 288 no. 5 (Victor IV); JL 14490 (Paschal III).

2. MGH, Const., i, 270 no. 190 (only in Rahewin's version, but Humbert's assent is confirmed by Gesta, iv, 81-2).

3. St. 3913.

seen in the consecration of Landerich of Lausanne by Humbert in 1161, and the expulsion of the Alexandrine archbishop-elect Walter from Besançon in 1162-3.¹ Humbert was finally replaced by another former imperial capellanus, Herbert, who was a strong supporter of Barbarossa and the antipopes, taking his support, unusually, as far as active persecution of Alexandrines.² In Basle also, Ortlieb's successor Ludwig continued to support the antipopes, being consecrated by Paschal III in 1167 and receiving a privilege from him.³ In Lausanne and Geneva however there was increasing support for Alexander after 1162, expressing itself in cooperation with Peter of Tarentaise. Alexander felt able to send Peter of Pavia on a legation to Lausanne at the end of 1165.⁴ Peter of Tarentaise's own province was Alexandrine, in so far as popes counted for anything there. Ludwig of Sion, who died in 1160, was a schismatic,⁵ and Peter alone attended the council of Tours,⁶ but Amadeus of Sion recognized Alexander, and Anthelme of Belley was consecrated by him in the autumn of 1163.⁷ William of Maurienne too was probably Alexandrine, though there is no indication

1. Hellmann 1900, 46; Hausmann 1956, 270.

2. Hausmann 1956, 271; Preiss 1934, 179 note 11; Mariotte 1973, 304-6; Fournier 1891, 42 note 3. See also JL 13670. Mariotte points out that Herbert, unusually, was not a local, and was imperial legate for the region; clearly Barbarossa's man.

3. JL 14490; Germ. Pont., ii/2, 226 no. *22.

4. Preiss 1934, 172, 179-81.

5. Preiss 1934, 173 note 22.

6. See below, p. 248

7. JL 10836 (Amadeus); JL, ii, 174 (Anthelme).

of his attitude until the end of the decade.¹

The region around Mâcon and Lyons was the one most fiercely contested by imperialists and Alexandrines. Stephen of Cluny corresponded regularly with Louis, urging him to make his presence felt in the area. In 1163 he commended the newly-elected bishop of Mâcon to Louis, and in the course of his journey to Tours visited Louis to suggest a Burgundian expedition.² In 1165 a renewed appeal was made by Peter of Pavia, Stephen of Cluny, and Stephen of Mâcon.³ They asked Louis to come to Burgundy, or at least to send representatives, not to fight against schismatics but to fulfil his duty of protecting churches, and also to prevent the Empire from gaining ground. But support for the faithful against the schismatics was clearly implied, especially since Gerard of Mâcon, their chief target, was Barbarossa's brother-in-law.⁴ Lay writers also appealed to Louis' expansionary instincts. Three letters from around 1163 will illustrate this. In the first, Mary of Burgundy wrote to Louis asking him to help her find a wife for her son:⁵

Sciatis cum in alio regno filius meus uxorem habere posset ego multo magis volo eum in vestro regno uxorem ducere quam in alio.

1. When he received a privilege from Alexander, JL 11507.

2. Stephen of Cluny to Louis, V, f. 168v = RHF, xvi, 134 no. 406, and V. ff. 159v-160r = RHF, xvi, 130 no. 398: 'Inde est quod non semel et scriptis et viva voce celsitudini vestre suggesti ut terre nostre que finibus imperii collimitatur cito consuleretis...'. His presence at Tours is recorded by Hugh of Vézelay, MGH, SS, xxvi, 149.

3. See their letters to Louis, V, ff. 143v-144r = RHF, xvi, 132 no. 402; ff. 178v-179r = RHF, xvi, 130 no. 399; ff. 147r-v = RHF, xvi, 131 no. 401, respectively. Verbal similarities show that the letters were written at the same time, and this must have been during Peter's legation in late 1165 (above, p. 188 note 4)

4. Kienast 1974, 213.

5. V, f. 222v = RHF, xvi, 67 no. 213.

In the second, Guido, count of Forez reproached Louis for not telling him of his expedition into the Auvergne:¹

Ego tamen iam vobiscum in exercitu vestro essem nisi comes Girardus [of Mâcon] et Lugdunenses scismatici cum armata manu in terram meam venissent. Venerunt autem non solum ut me si potuerunt exheredent verum etiam ut comitatum meum qui de corona vestra est ad imperium Teuthonici transfferant.

This was defensive; but in a third letter Raymond of Toulouse, announcing the betrothal of his son to the heiress of the Dauphin in 1163 wrote:²

Ex hoc enim comitatus quondam Dalfini comitis, licet ad jurisdictionem imperatoris pertineat, regni vestri incrementum quasi quidem portus erit et porta.

There were, then, plenty of people willing to encourage Louis to move south-east, and Louis had good reason to take their advice.³

The interest he showed in the area was reflected in the attention Barbarossa paid to it.⁴ The expedition to St.-Jean-sur-Laône was among other things a show of force in the region. So was Rainald of Cologne's journey home in 1164.⁵ Both sides had their contacts: Barbarossa wrote to Henry of Troyes in 1165 telling him to warn Louis against attacking the (French) duke of Burgundy, 'noster obligatus',⁶ while Alexander wrote to Louis and Henry of Rheims in 1164 keeping them informed of Rainald's progress through Burgundy

1. V, ff. 207v-208r = RHF, xvi, 49 no. 161.

2. V, ff. 221v-222r = RHF, xvi, 70 no. 220; for date see Kienast 1974, 212 note 521.

3. See Pacaut 1964, 187ff.

4. Kienast 1974, 202, points out how much time Barbarossa devoted to Burgundian affairs, unusually for an emperor.

5. Materials, v, 120 no. 61.

6. V, ff. 229r-v = RHF, xvi, 691 no. 16. Its presence in V shows that Henry did pass it on. For date see Kienast 1974, 216 note 533.

and suggesting counter-measures.¹ All this makes it hardly surprising that Barbarossa visited Burgundy in 1166 when Louis' expedition began the reassertion of Capetian power in the region.² For Louis the expedition was a considerable success, but except in so far as Cluny and Mâcon were protected from Gerard of Mâcon's Brabantines, it did little to aid the Alexandrine cause. To see why, we must turn to the archbishopric of Lyons.

Lyons was the only diocese in its province which lay in the Empire; its four suffragans were French and firmly Alexandrine.³ Eraclius was represented at Pavia, and attended the council at Dôle;⁴ he certainly did not attend Tours, and had no contact with Alexander.⁵ But he or someone in his entourage provided Louis with a copy of Frederick's mandate summoning him to St.-Jean-sur-Laône.⁶ This suggests neutrality or reserve, and this was continued by Drogo, the former archdeacon, who succeeded him on his death in 1163, and seems at first to have managed the remarkable feat of being recognized by Alexander, Louis, and Frederick. Alexander wrote to an elect of Lyons, who can only have been Drogo, in the

1. JL 11033, 11045.

2. Büttner 1968, 104. On the expedition and its importance for Louis see Perrat 1932; Duby 1953, 538ff.; Pacaut 1964, 189-90; Kienast 1974, 213ff.

3. All four were at Tours: see below, p. 246.

4. Pavia: same evidence as for Humbert of Besançon (above, p. 187 note 2); Dôle: St. 3967.

5. Tours: below, p.246. The statement in Gall. Christ., iv, 125, that he recognized Alexander rests on a misreading of the addresses of JL 12460 and 12523.

6. See below, p. 222.

summer of 1164.¹ Louis wrote to Humbert of Beaujeu asking him to acknowledge Drogo; Humbert wrote back to Louis to say that he had not yet met Drogo but was about to do so, and would gladly perform Louis' request.² The archbishop is not named, and it has been thought that Drogo's later rival Guichard is referred to,³ but we know that Humbert did meet Drogo, and there are verbal similarities between Humbert's letter and a letter from Drogo to Louis which make it probable that the two were in contact.⁴ Frederick's recognition is implied in Robert of Torigny's confused notice of the event, and Drogo was certainly at his court in 1166.⁵ At first, then, Drogo's path was smooth. The bishop of Mâcon, whom we have already met in the company of the Alexandrines Peter of Pavia and Stephen of Cluny, was still in contact with Drogo in 1165,⁶ but

1. Cf. JL 11045. The chapter of Lyons later claimed that Alexander had recognized Drogo (letter to Louis, V, ff. 166v-167r = RHF, xvi 125 no. 386) and this is also presupposed by Stephen of Cluny in a letter to Louis (see p. 193 note 3).

2. Louis' letter is implied in Humbert's reply, V, ff. 209v-210r = RHF, xvi, 134 no. 407.

3. E.g. by Reuter, ii, 154; Kienast. 1974, 213 note 524.

4. The meeting is recorded in the Notitia foundationis of Belleville (ed. Perrat 1932, 91ff., here 95) as occurring between Sept. 1164 and Mar. 1165 (a.D.inc. 1164, ind. 13). Drogo's letter is V, f. 144v = RHF, xvi, 88 no. 270. The words used are not the same as Humbert's, but both letters begin by thanking Louis for his letters and both end by warning him against flatterers who might try to turn him against them.

5. Robert, ed. Howlett, pp. 216-7, says that William of the White Hands (presumably an error for Drogo) was elected 'conniventia Frederici imperatoris' and went over to Frederick when he could not get the support of Louis in recovering Lyons from Guido of Forez (note that Robert thinks that Lyons 'ad regnum Franciae pertinet'). Drogo was a witness to St. 4073 and 4074, both of 1166.

6. Perrat 1932, 95: he consecrated the abbot of Belleville 'rogatu domni Drogonis'.

for reasons not now known a party was growing among the Alexandrines which favoured Guichard, the Cistercian abbot of Pontigny and a friend of Becket's. Early in 1165 John of Salisbury wrote to Becket not to forget the Lyons affair.¹ On 8 August 1165 Alexander consecrated Guichard; soon afterwards Becket wrote to Louis on his behalf.² Becket tempted Louis with the prospect of winning Lyons, and Stephen of Cluny also held out hopes,³ but Louis did nothing to help Guichard on his expedition in 1166, no doubt out of annoyance at having his earlier support thrown over by the Alexandrines as well as fear at provoking Barbarossa. Drogo remained in possession, in spite of excommunication by Alexander, and only with the general collapse of imperial and schismatic power after August 1167 could Guichard take his see.⁴ The interest of Alexandrines in Burgundy continued after Alexander had returned to Italy,⁵ but the successful planting of an Alexandrine archbishop in the see of Lyons was their main triumph. Louis could not be drawn into a general crusade against the schismatics.

Further south the schism was little felt. Here, more than

1. Materials, v, 165 no. 85: 'Praeterea nolite oblivisci verbum Lugdunense, unde sollicitastis dominum Henricum Pisanum.' For date see above, p. 130 note 4.

2. Materials, v, 199f. no. 105.

3. V, ff. 159v-160r = RHF, xvi, 130 no. 398: 'Est aliud quo ad partes nostras vester adventus nobis et toti regno pernecessarius foret. Electionem domni Drog(onis) archidiaconi de novo cassavit et cum vestri sint et comes Forensis et domnus Hu(mbertus) de Bello Ioco et plurima pars clericorum ecclesie corone vestre faveant ad bonum et honorem vestrum et regni restitui res posset in melius.'

4. Alexander's excommunication of Drogo is JL 11324 to Henry of Rheims and suffragans (another example of Henry being used as Alexander's representative for border affairs), 6 Mar. 1166x 1167. The return is mentioned in two letters from John of Salisbury, Materials, vi, 238 no. 327 and 279 no. 341.

5. Cf. JL 11832 to Becket, 10 Sept. 1170.

elsewhere, ecclesiastics valued their comfort and did nothing which might upset it; in an area where no important power was continuously active, local feuds were more important than European ecclesiastical politics, and small concessions could preserve this happy state of affairs. Thus a good case could be made out for the antipopes' having strong support in the area. The archbishops of Arles and Vienne sent representatives to Pavia;¹ the archbishop of Vienne and the bishops of Cavaillon, Grenoble and Avignon were at Lodi; the archbishops of Grenoble, Gap, Viviers, and Avignon were at Dôle, the bishop of Die having visited Frederick shortly before.² Of these, Avignon, Grenoble, Arles, and Vienne received privileges from Frederick in the 1160s, as well as the bishops of Apt and Marseilles.³ But there is plenty of evidence of recognition of Alexander, much of it from the same men. The bishop of Gap and the archbishop of Embrun were at Tours;⁴ no-one attended from the province of Arles or Vienne, but the archbishop of Arles received a mandate from Alexander, and acknowledged his pontificate in a notitia of a case settled by himself and his suffragans of Carpentras and Toulon, the bishop of Die received a privilege from Alexander in 1165, and several bishops from the province of Vienne

1. MGH, Const., i, 269 no. 190.

2. Fournier 1891, 37-8.

3. St. 3908, 3909, 3910, 3911, 4012b, 4073, 3962, 4013.

4. See below, p. 248.

wrote to Alexander in 1164 about the affairs of the Carthusians.¹ If there is a pattern in this, it is a familiar one: support for the antipopes declined after 1162. Though even before this Alexander had some following in the area: in 1161 he issued a privilege for St. Peter's, Vienne.² Only in the bishopric of Grenoble and the counties of Toulouse and Provence did the schism have a certain importance. The bishop of Grenoble like others on the border seems to have been under pressure from both sides in the early years of the schism.³ Later he was deposed, and a new bishop consecrated by Alexander, but attempts to remove him failed, especially after Raymond of Toulouse, whom the Carthusians had asked Louis VII to persuade to act in the matter, himself went over to Paschal III.⁴ His defection was at first regarded as serious by Alexander, but after a short time he was prepared to grant Louis' request and lift the interdict on Toulouse,⁵ and by the summer of 1168 Raymond was apparently no longer regarded as schismatic.⁶ In Provence, the death of Raymond Berengar, who had been bound to the antipopes by a treaty with Barbarossa of 1162, in 1166, was followed by a take-over by the Alexandrine Alfonso II of Aragon, without

1. Arles: 'Wiederhold, 'Papsturkunden in Frankreich, iv', 125 no. 43, and C. U. J. Chevalier and J.-H. Albanès, Gallia Christiana Novissima, Avignon, 1899, ii, 79 no. 163; Die: JL 11170; Vienne: cf. JL 11019.

2. Chevalier 1913, no. 4129.

3. Fastrad of Clairvaux (A, f. 52v = Tengnagel p. 414 no. 60) records the Carthusians as pleading for the bishop of Grenoble at Beauvais in 1160.

4. Carthusians to Louis VII, V, ff. 181v-182r = RHF, xvi, 128 no. 395; JL 11332, 29 Apr. 1166 x 1167. This is the t.a.q. for Raymond's defection, t.p.q. being the birth of Philip Augustus, 8 Aug. 1165, mentioned in the Carthusians' letter.

5. JL 11489, 12 Mar. 1168 x 1169; the earlier year is more likely.

6. He is called simply comes Tolosanus in JL 11418, 27 Aug. 1168.

any noticeable increase in support for Alexander in the area.¹

The border was much more open to Alexander's supporters than Germany, yet apart from the case of Lyons there is little evidence that they helped significantly in the shift towards Alexander, which seems to have been a natural growth. Men had to live with their neighbours, churches to preserve their property; few could afford to move away from consensus and give others opportunity to accuse and attack. A final example will illustrate this. Few churchmen were more devoted supporters of Alexander than Peter of Celle, who had been among the first to rally to his cause.² Yet in his capacity as abbot of St. Rémi of Rheims he had to try to preserve his abbey's property in the empire, and this meant submitting to judgments ordered by Frederick and Paschal and carried out by Philip of Heinsberg (the later archbishop of Cologne), and trying to make use of men of dubious reputation like Gerard la Pucelle in order to protect his church's interests.³ In these circumstances only a general drift to Alexander was possible, and this makes the failure of an Alexandrine party to gather steam in Germany, where the pressures against were stronger, more understandable.

1. Kehr 1926b, 64-6; Kienast 1974, 211 note 20.

2. See above, p. 33.

3. Ramackers, 'Papsturkunden in den Niederlanden', 249 no. 114; John of Salisbury to Gerard la Pucelle, *Materials*, vi, 181 no. 296.

Chapter eleven

The diplomacy of the schism

The schism of 1159 began with a divided election on the death of Hadrian IV. It became a reality only after the councils of Pavia and Beauvais, when each of the two parties could claim a substantial measure of support. In the next decade, neither side was able to make inroads into the other's position sufficiently serious to end the schism by fait accompli or negotiation, though each side repeatedly tried to do so. It is time to try to explain why this should have been so.

The main chance to end the schism came at Pavia. Alexander would have had little difficulty had Frederick and the imperial church recognized him. But they had good reason not to. He was contumacious, and justified this in a highly question-begging way by claiming papal immunity from judgement. And there was evidence, overwhelming in the absence of any representative of Alexander to put his case, that his election had been simoniacal. The decision was an embarrassing one, but it was taken, and it followed logically that Frederick, who had summoned the council, should try to get the other national churches to approve the decision. Again, had they done so, Victor would probably have had little difficulty. Alexander would have become the Anacletus of the 1160s.

It is usual to explain the decision taken at Beauvais (the crucial one) as being the result of the clergy's support for Alexander and Henry's and Louis' unwillingness to see a pope controlled by the emperor at the head of their own churches.¹ Alexander was certainly supported by the bulk of the English and French clergy.

1. E.g. Hauck, 255-6; Hampe-Baethgen 1969, 172; Ullmann 1972, 193-4; Kienast 1974, 199-200.

This support, though passionate in many cases, was given for legal rather than ideological reasons. Neither of the candidates stood for a particular approach or doctrine. Haller has demolished Hermann Reuter's view of Alexander as a Gregorian with his usual incisiveness.¹ Victor had no special views, apart from believing in the need for cooperation between emperor and pope.² It is true that he indulged in anti-curial rhetoric,³ but this was hardly a positive programme. He and his successors stood in a very different relation to the churches of their obedience from that in which Alexander stood to his, but this reflected their different prestiges, and the fact that the German church had been less subject and amenable to papal discipline than other churches even before the schism, rather than any conscious decision not to exercise available authority taken by the antipopes. Nor did the immediate political issue from which the schism developed arouse the conscience of the western churches. Barbarossa was no doubt unattractive, especially after Pavia, which gave Alexander and his propagandists the opportunity to paint a very unflattering picture of him.⁴ But few churchmen in England and France can have thought that either rebellious communes or the Sicilian king, whose father had perpetuated the previous schism, and who himself had concluded a concordat with Hadrian regarded in the west as a model of what

1. Haller, 124-5, 372. Pacaut 1956, 405, at the end of a long study of Alexander as a man of system, is forced to admit that 'd'un façon générale, Alexandre III n'expose pas clairement ses idées.'

2. Cf. the fragmentary JL 14481.

3. JL 14441, 14443.

4. See above, pp. 32-5.

relations between regnum and sacerdotium should not be,¹ were in themselves causes to be supported. If they later seemed to be Good Things, that was because they opposed the tyrant who was perpetuating the schism. Alexander received clerical support in England and France by default; disposing of superior resources, he was able to get his case across before the Victorines had been heard, and that meant that the objections to his election voiced at Pavia were bound to appear as the feeble excuses of a partisan minority, especially since they were brilliantly refuted as such by Alexander and his supporters.²

The argument that kings feared an extension of imperial power is less convincing. The danger was certainly pointed out to them in 1160, but neither then nor later did it stop them considering accepting the pope whom Frederick supported. They chose Alexander because it was the easiest thing to do; because their clergy on the whole wanted it; and because it cost them nothing and gained them a great deal. Frederick was a prestigious figure, but not one of great importance. They did not attach much significance to their decision; unlike Frederick, they made few attempts to proselytize.³

Once the two popes each had supporters, the schism might have been resolved in a number of ways. Frederick came near to capturing Alexander in 1162 and 1167, and Alexander to capturing Paschal in

1. Materials, vi, 160 no. 287, 254 no. 331, 310 no. 354.

2. Above, pp. 32-5.

3. Henry is not known to have done anything. Louis wrote to Géza of Hungary (above, p. 53) and Manuel (above, pp. 117-8); the letter to Manuel at least was sent at Alexander's request. For Louis' reluctance to act in Burgundy, see above, pp. 191-3.

1168,¹ and the via cessionis was also regarded as a possibility in the imperial camp.² Alexander and his supporters won some converts in the Empire, in Italy and on the fringes of Germany, but they were unable to undermine Frederick's power in the centre. John of Salisbury, familiar with the history of Gregory VII and Henry IV, watched anxiously for history to repeat itself and civil war break out in the Empire, but he waited in vain.³ The main possibility was a diplomatic resolution of the schism. Kings and emperors had decided in 1160;⁴ they could change their minds, and both Frederick and Alexander used diplomacy to try to make them do so. They failed. Two explanations suggest themselves: that the diplomatic techniques available were inadequate; that there were irreconcilable political or ideological hostilities to be overcome.

The diplomacy of this period does at first sight seem very fumbling and primitive. The most obvious deficiency lay in the lack of information. Rumours were the main source, and these were inevitably garbled, and often weeks or even months old because of the slowness of travel. Yet this was in principle no more a drawback than it is for modern diplomats, except that they get theirs more quickly.

I went about saying that rumours were just as important, just as significant, just as - in the last analysis - 'valid' as 'facts'. This shocked people horribly, although if you pressed them and asked whether it was not true that ninety per cent of 'information received' by such serious persons as

1. See above, pp. 80, 146, 149.

2. See above, pp. 109, 146.

3. Materials, vi, 30 no. 234, 415 no. 410, 443 no. 426.

4. It is significant that three of the four versions of Eterna sent with general addresses were addressed to churchmen within national, not ecclesiastical, boundaries. See below, p.233.

Ambassadors and Chiefs of Police really consists in significant rumours which can be interpreted by the person who knows enough rumours they were usually bound to admit that this is indeed the case.

What is here¹ said to be true of modern journalism is true, mutatis mutandis, of twelfth-century diplomacy. Anyone who knew enough rumours and had a knowledge of dispositions was in a reasonable position to work out what was going on. Rumours - well-founded and otherwise - were abundant during the schism. Many letter-writers included them (though one should not be misled by the brevitas topos which was a popular ending for letters into thinking that writers necessarily knew more than they chose to set down). Information could be gleaned from travellers of various sorts: soldiers,² scholars,³ merchants,⁴ pilgrims,⁵ litigants. In normal times the papal curia and such regular meetings as the chapters of the Cistercians and Premonstratensians and royal crown-wearings must have functioned as a kind of clearing-

1. C. Cockburn, I, Claud..., (Harmondsworth, 1967), pp. 147-8.

2. John of Salisbury got information from soldiers returning from Sicily, Materials, vi, 3 no. 227.

3. For the career of Gerard la Pucelle, who went to Cologne during the schism, see Kuttner and Rathbone 1949, 296-8; for an Italian scholar travelling to Cologne from France, see Luchaire 1899a, 66-8, 105-6 no. 33. Numerous English and French clerics studied at Bologna, and German students were increasing at Paris.

4. There was probably already a courier service from northern Italy to the fairs of Champagne, according to Face 1958, 436.

5. Cf. Annales S. Dionisii, MGH, SS, xiii, 718: a master Rainald brought relics of the 11,000 virgins from Cologne to St. Denis in 1168. For Albert of Freising's pilgrimage to Compostella in 1163 and the news he brought back, see Sudendorf, i, 66-7 no. 24.

house for news, though during the schism the effectiveness of these at least for spreading news about the schism must have been reduced. It was not impossible to be well-informed. When Eberhard of Salzburg heard disturbing rumours in the summer of 1162 he knew whom to write to in France about them,¹ just as Paschal III knew who was important at the court of Louis VII.² The letters of John of Salisbury show just how much even a relatively obscure cleric cut off from the corridors of power could find out by keeping his ears open, and more important men also took care to listen to rumours.³ What the diplomats of the schism lacked was a knowledge of the dispositions of the other side. They knew enough rumours, but not how to interpret them. The letters of the Becket circle illustrate this. They collected and exchanged rumours both about the schism and about their more immediate concerns, but they were able to interpret and evaluate rumours about the courts of Louis, Henry, and Alexander, whereas they were at sea with rumours from the Empire.

The more formal communication of news, desires, and intentions between diplomatic principals was of course hampered by the slowness of travel. Letters often had to wait for a bearer who could be trusted. It has been claimed that 'there was a class of professional couriers...men of efficiency and remarkable endurance'⁴

1. See above, pp. 85-6.

2. See above, p. 130.

3. In November 1162 asked Henry of Rheims to collect and report frequently on 'rumores Teutonicos' (JL 10788).

4. C. N. L. Brooke, in the introduction to John of Salisbury, Letters, edd. Miller, Butler, Brooke, i, p. xlv.

and there are occasional references to such men,¹ but they could not be used for diplomatic correspondence. This needed men of status who could in their persons guarantee the authenticity of the letters they brought. When they did not obviously have such status, they were given it artificially in the letter itself, which would stress their closeness to their principal, their knowledge of his mind, and their enjoyment of his trust.² A suspicious or unknown bearer cast doubt upon the letter he brought; to use such a man deliberately was an insult.³ The use of men of rank, who travelled at a stately pace and were expected so to do,⁴ meant long delays. These affected all who engaged ⁱⁿ diplomacy impartially, but they gave it a peculiar flavour, for although communication between distant principals took a long time, negotiation and politicking at the courts of rulers took no longer than in any other era. The meeting at Venice which finally settled the schism, perhaps the largest diplomatic gathering in Europe before the conferences at Münster and Osnabrück in the 1640s,⁵ took no longer to settle the schism than the conferences at Versailles in 1815 and 1919 did to make peace. The Becket dispute dragged on for seven years, but the conferences which met to settle it lasted no longer

1. JL 11009 asked Henry of Rheims to reply by the cursor who brought the letter; St. 4079 refers to a certain Warnelot who had taken prisoner a papal and imperial cursor. I am not sure whether cursor means a specialized carrier of letters or is simply an alternative word for nuncius.

2. Cf., e.g., JL 10891, 14439, both to Louis VII.

3. Hoffmann 1964, 141-3, 145-7. In 1158 Hadrian sent letters to Frederick by an 'indignus et vilis nuntius' who disappeared before they could be read; he meant to be offensive (Gesta, iv, 18, p. 550).

4. Mattingly 1955, 36; the evidence is from a later period, but fits well with the speed of travel of twelfth-century ambassadors, which was not high.

5. For a list of participants with their attendant retinues, see Historia Ducorum Veneticorum, MGH, SS, xiv, 84-9.

than the negotiations which end a strike in the twentieth century. Very often, then, ambassadors journeyed and returned to find their arrangements no longer relevant in a changed political scene.¹ Yet these difficulties were still present in late medieval and early modern Europe, and did not prevent diplomacy from flourishing then. The invention of the resident ambassador did not make such a flourishing possible, for such men were rarely entrusted with full powers to negotiate, and had to refer back to their principals constantly.² Full powers - the granting to an ambassador of authority both to negotiate and conclude an agreement - were an obvious way of shortening the delays imposed by difficulties of communication. They were well-known in the twelfth century,³ but were scarcely used in the diplomacy of the schism.⁴

Yet for all the disadvantages they worked under diplomats were not fumbling or incompetent. Diplomatic skills were recognized; there were as yet no career diplomats, but the same men were used over and over again.⁵ Ambassadors had a defined role, in spite

1. See above, pp. 139-49, for the negotiations between Manuel and Alexander in 1166-8, and, more conjecturally, p. 99 for St.-Jean-sur-Laône.

2. Mattingly 1955, 42.

3. Queller 1967, 15-29, thought that they began to be used only near the end of the century, as a result of the revival of Roman law and the consequent development of a theory of representation. In fact they can be found as early as the ninth century (the story in Nit-hard, Histoire des fils de Louis le Pieux, ed. P. Lauer, Paris, 1926, iv, 3, implies their use), and are common in the twelfth (cf. e.g. Sudendorf, i, 62 no. 22, where Frederick gives full powers to his ambassadors to Hungary, and Manuel's request to Louis to send legates with such powers, above, p. 120).

4. Henry of Troyes may have had them in 1162. The two letters from Alexander to Eberhard in that year are too generally phrased to be taken as examples (see above, pp. 76-7, 106-7).

5. Frederick used Rainald of Cologne in 1160, 1162, and 1165 for embassies to the west. For specialization among [cont. p. 206]

absence of any clear terminology which distinguished them from ordinary messengers.¹ There were established protocols for their conduct and their reception ; they had to be received by the person to whom they were accredited formally and in public, and they had to seek his leave before they could depart.² Such protocol was not mere ceremony. Its proper observance was in itself a diplomatic act; it showed goodwill, and failure to observe it showed the reverse.³ There were also established techniques. Treaties were not formless and ad hoc, but had a diplomatic of their own.⁴ Ambassadors carried instructions, presumably in writing. None of these has survived, but their very existence implies a certain sophistication.⁵ The letters which accredited them also followed established patterns.⁶ There was little in

[p. 205 note 5 cont.] cardinals, see Ohnsorge 1928, 142; Zenker 1964, 234. There are signs already of the figurehead ambassador accompanied by professionals, increasingly common in the next two centuries (Cuttino 1971, 140); Barbarossa's embassies to Constantinople in 1160 and Hungary in 1163 or 1164 (see above, pp. 47, 108) might be interpreted in this way, with the protonotary Henry of Wiesenbach the real negotiator in each case.

1. Queller 1967, 3-5.

2. For formal reception see above, pp. 117-8. Leave to depart: Lambert of Waterloo, Annales Cameracenses, MGH, SS, xvi, 545.

3. See above, pp. 116-7, for Alexander's care in the reception of the Byzantine legates in 1163, and p. 53 for Siegfried of Paderborn's poor reception in Hungary in 1161. Romoald of Salerno, himself a diplomat, always says that ambassadors were 'honorifice recepti' in his chronicle (MGH, SS, xix, 429ff., passim).

4. See Heinemeyer 1957, and Dölger and Karayannopoulos 1968, 95-104, for Byzantine treaties; Riedmann 1972 (not seen by me), for Barbarossa's treaties with the Italian cities; Chaplais 1971, for English treaties.

5. For references to instructions see Rainald of Cologne's letter to Louis VII (below, p. 254) and the Byzantine legates' letter to Louis (above, p. 113); also Materials, v, 59 no. 36.

6. Chaplais 1971; Menzel 1892, 6-12.

the way of international law,¹ but this has never been of great value for the conduct of diplomacy, and its absence was amply compensated for by the use of arbitration. This was used judicially by the higher nobility in France² and elsewhere, and in disputes between Italian cities;³ by the time of the schism it was in general use in international relations,⁴ and it is not surprising that Frederick suggested that the schism should be referred to it.⁵

If we accept that contemporary diplomacy could work, that in spite of a certain improvisatory quality about it men knew how to carry it out and were aware of a wide range of technical devices which could on occasion be of service, then we must also accept that the schism was not perpetuated through simple lack of means to reach a solution. The other possibility I have suggested is political or ideological hostility. For permanent political hostility there is no evidence. Both Louis and Henry were willing to talk with Frederick, and vice versa, and although nothing in the end came of it when they did, there is no reason to suppose that this was because of any permanent or even temporary anti-Hohenstaufen policy, or because Frederick was hostile to the western powers.

1. Ambassadors were generally held to be inviolate. The idea that Roman law under the emperor and the pope was the international law of the Middle Ages, propagated by Hayes 1922, and Wright 1930, and accepted by Mattingly 1955, 18-9, and Hexter 1961, 35, seems to me a scholarly myth. Janssen 1964, esp. 591-8, offers a more subtle analysis.

2. Bongert 1949, 106-7, 159-80.

3. Frey 1928.

4. De Taube 1932, 78-103; Ganshof 1970, 136-7.

5. See above, pp. 89, 99, 109.

There is some sign that Anglo-Imperial relations were more cordial in general than Franco-Imperial ones, but this may be an optical illusion due to the perspectives of the Becket circle. Even Frederick and Alexander were prepared to talk, and the political constellations in Italy and the Mediterranean were very shifting and uncertain. Nor can one really speak of ideological hostility. It is true that Frederick and Rainald were given to tactless remarks about the status of other rulers, but a recent study has shown just how little coherent ideology lay behind these.¹ There was a little more feeling in the other direction; Germans were not overlooked in the west, and the pretensions which went with empire were both known and resented.² Between Frederick and Alexander, and Frederick and Manuel, there were more permanent ideological disputes, but even these were usually indulged in at times of political hostility, or when nothing really turned on the outcome; they could be and were dropped if necessary.

Neither diplomatic incompetence nor deep-rooted political or ideological opposition can wholly explain the failure of contemporary politicians to settle the schism. These things perhaps explain some episodes, but not the cumulative record of failure. This can be understood only by looking at the diplomatic system as a whole; not the nuts and bolts, but the machine. Diplomatic relations may be divided into three Ideal Types, à la Weber. The first is Clausewitzian. War is a continuation of diplomacy by other means, and vice versa. Diplomacy is characteristically about alliances,

1. Kirfel 1959.

2. Kienast 1974, 390-4. John of Salisbury provides rather too much of the evidence, however.

rule over territory, and the obtaining of information. Treaties are frequent, there is usually a set of rules of conduct, with at least a normative assurance that they will be kept, and the symbolic expressions of power, though important, are a means to an end rather than an end in itself. Diplomatic contacts between the various members of the system are frequent, and espionage is common; the members think about and are aware of each others' intentions continually. The second type is hegemonial: the relations between an imperial power and surrounding states in various degrees of dependence. Rome's relations with her client states in the first and second centuries A.D. and the 'family of princes' established by Byzantium in the Balkans and Russia in the Middle Ages are examples.¹ The characteristic object of diplomacy in this type is the protection of frontiers, and seeing that protocol is observed. This symbolic expression of the realities of power helps to make the client states part of the empire to the barbarians beyond, while remaining little more than barbarian to the inhabitants of the empire itself, thus enabling the hegemonial power to have its cake and eat it. It can also be a device whereby a member of a system of the first type can conceal from itself its loss of a genuine hegemony; this was increasingly true of Byzantium in this period. The third type is really an anti-system; it occurs when powers are aware of each other's existence, but are not sufficiently important to one another to clash, except very occasionally. Here if diplomacy has any material objectives they are such things as the

1. Obolensky 1971, gives a brilliant account of the working of such a system.

protection of travellers (merchants and pilgrims) and the occasional exchange of brides, but much more important usually is the role played by the exchange of gifts and embassies (and brides) in the internal politics of members of the system; they help to promote the self-esteem of rulers and the esteem in which they are held by their political community. The prominence of embassies in the biographies of Charlemagne by Einhard and Notker is no accident,¹ nor is Hincmar of Rheims' listing of 'receiving important visitors from abroad' among the duties which the king is to carry out in person.²

These three types are not mutually exclusive. This is not simply because Types or Forms can never be observed pure in the material world, but also because of shifts between form and reality inherent in diplomacy itself. China in the Chou period offers a neat illustration of this. It used to be thought that this was a case of the 'centrifugal tendencies of feudalism' at work, since the separate principalities into which China was divided were described as having lower ranks than the Chou state itself and as owing allegiance to its ruler, an allegiance which he was increasingly powerless to enforce. Recent work³ has shown that if there was a feudal decentralization it took place very early;

1. Einhard, Vita Karoli Magni, 6th edn by O Holder-Egger, MGH, SRG, 1911, c. 16. Note that in his account of the last Merovingians, ibid., c. 1, one of the last vestiges of royal power remaining to them is the solemn reception of ambassadors. Notker, Gesta Karoli Magni Imperatoris, ed. H. Haefele, MGH, SS, n.s., xii, II, 5-8.

2. De Ordine Palatii, MGH, Capitularia Regum Francorum, ii, 517ff., c. 35.

3. Walker 1953.

for most if not all of the Chou period the principalities were sovereign states, and thought of themselves as such. But the 'feudal' way of perceiving the diplomatic system was retained because it provided a rhetoric which was exploited within the system, as well as providing a mechanism for uniting against the barbarians outside. There is similarly an ambiguity about so common a diplomatic practice as gift-giving, which could be exploited by Charlemagne's biographers or the Mongol Khan.¹

If we consider the diplomacy of western Europe in the mid-twelfth century in the light of this typology we can see that as a whole it was of the third type.² Diplomacy was a matter of symbols and embassies: it emphasized the status quo rather than serving as a means for getting things done or changed. There were of course sub-systems of the first two types within the overall system. Angevin and Capetian rulers, or those of Barcelona, Aragon and Castile,³ were more continuously in contact; negotiations, embassies with a purpose, treaties, and the ultimate sanction of 'modern' diplomacy, war, were common currency. Further east, both eastern and western empires had states on their borders which could be treated as client states when the constellation of forces was propitious. But the links between east and west were few. The

1. See Einhard, c. 16, and Joinville, Life of St. Louis, tr. M. R. B. Shaw, Harmondsworth, 1963, pp. 287-8.

2. For a brief general survey see Ganshof 1970, 95-167, though here inevitably compression gives a misleading impression of coherence and purposiveness.

3. On this system see Higounet 1951.

princes on the border, who might have acted as links, tended to look either towards the emperor or towards the king in Paris (or Rouen) but not both simultaneously. Normally, what cohesive force needed was supplied by the occasional exchange of embassies and brides, and the sense of belonging to a universal body, the corpus Christi, and owing some kind of allegiance to the pope as the head of that body. None of this could provide the closer links required for forcing through a settlement of the schism by diplomatic means. The exchanges of brides which went on were of no real use for this. They were not marriage alliances, though contemporaries sometimes behaved as if they were. They were like shares on which a high value is set but for which there is little demand; any attempt to cash them would show how little they were really worth, as Henry the Lion found out in 1179-82. And of course the sense of common membership of the church was of little help in a situation where the unity of that church was at issue. The schism went on for so long not because of the incompetence of the diplomats, but because the absence of any contacts or ties apart from those of formal diplomacy made it impossible for either side to bring sanctions to bear on the other.¹ To talk of a European

1. It is for this reason, I suspect, that Barbarossa (MGH, Const., i, 289 no. 207), Victor (JL 14459) and Paschal (JL 14486) in their letters to Louis laid stress on very tenuous ties of consanguinity; it was all they had.

system of states at this time¹ is an anachronism. There was no such system; and this explains why known diplomatic techniques like arbitration and full powers were either not used in the schism, or if used were ineffective. Such techniques require a context of continuous contact; the negotiating parties must have a reasonable knowledge of the others' intentions, and a clear view of their own aims.

No-one wanted the schism prolonged, but no-one needed to end it except on their own terms; there was no pressing need to accept someone else's terms rather than wait. Neither side had enough to offer the other, and inertia, which increased as the schism went on, was sufficient to maintain the status quo. Only when a force great enough to overcome the inertia appeared, in the form of the papal-Lombard alliance, and it became clear that the alliance could not be divided, was the schism brought to an end.

1. As do Holtzmann 1955; Jordan 1954, 295-7.

Appendices

Appendix a: Letter-collections.

It is possible to reconstruct the diplomatic history of the schism largely because of the great number of surviving letters. The importance of these letters individually is clear enough. They offer objective evidence of the information available to the writer and recipient, and of the writer's desires and intentions. Although in the form in which they have come down to us they are rarely dated, it is usually possible to give them an approximate date by well-established techniques. Events mentioned whose date is otherwise known often help; so, used carefully, do arguments from silence. The itinerary of the writer offers a further guide, if known; it is of particular importance in dating papal letters, but can be of service also in dating private letters when these form part of an exchange of letters. If one letter in such a sequence can be dated, some indication of the dates of other letters in the sequence can be obtained simply by considering how far apart the two correspondents were and calculating how long letters would take to pass between them.¹

Very often the individual letter can be considered without reference to the context in which it has survived, but sometimes this context is of importance. The ways in which a medieval letter can survive are numerous: as original (rare); in a letter-collection; as an isolated copy in the fly-leaf or other blank folio of a manuscript; embodied in the text of a chronicle or saint's life. All possibilities can help to show who had access

1. Ludwig 1897 is still indispensable for this; his figures, which I have used, are a normal daily maximum of 30 km for travellers, though lightly-loaded messengers could achieve 50-60 km in a day.

to the letter and hence to the information in it. With letter-collections especially, it is important to know who was responsible for their compilation, and what sources he had access to; this can throw light not only on individual letters but on the circles of friendship and influence to which the compiler belonged. The following notes are not intended to be comprehensive studies of the letter-collections used for the thesis, merely to underpin some of the inferences drawn in the main text. Hence the extent of the treatment does not necessarily reflect the general importance and size of the collection.

The St. Victor letter-collections

There were originally at least two late twelfth-century letter-collections compiled at St. Victor. One of these has survived in the original.¹ Of the other(s) we have two fragments bound into composite St. Victor manuscripts,² and some seventeenth-century transcripts.³ These were made from a manuscript which is

1. V; on its history see Luchaire 1899a, 31ff., Falkenstein 1972, 107-13, who points out that it is itself a composite ms. of at least three collections bound together.

2. B.N., mss. 14876, ff. 116r-123v, 15135, ff. 86r-95v; on these see Laehr 1931.

3. B.N., mss. 14615, ff. 289r-372r, 14664, ff. 97r-136r, published in part and listed by Luchaire 1899a, 99-146, with further texts in Luchaire 1899b. Further transcripts are found in the writings of John of Toulouse (see Luchaire 1899a, 43-5), but these reveal no new letters; the letters published by Luchaire 1899a, 146-50 nos. 219-24 are all taken from B.N., ms. 15135, except for no. 221, which is a duplicate of no. 193 from ms. 14664.

now lost.¹ It is clearly important to know how much has survived. Luchaire listed 221 items from the two seventeenth-century transcripts.² Of these, nos. 204-218 were taken from a decretal collection in St. Victor,³ nos. 95-99 bis from a collection of Ivo of Chartres' letters, and a further thirty-five items from a collection put together by Master Hilary of Orleans.⁴ It is likely that these last two groups were not in the lost manuscript. That leaves 164 items which probably did come from it. If, as seems likely, it had the same format as V and the two fragments, it would not have contained more. On the other hand there are signs that parts of a letter-collection have been lost. The two fragments discussed by Laehr were already separated from their parent collection in 1513.⁵ The second, and larger, was originally the twelfth and perhaps last quire of a manuscript.⁶ This may indicate its present position in B.N., ms. 15135, but if it does not then something must be missing. Even if we assume that it was once, along with the first fragment, attached to the lost manuscript JJ 23, one quire must still be missing, since the seventy-four folios which the letter-collection in JJ 23 had in 1513 would have consisted of nine quires. If the two fragments were part of a third collection then the loss will have been much greater. For our purposes this

1. In the 1513 catalogue of St. Victor (B.N., ms. 14767, ff. 151v-152r) it was listed as no. JJ 23, a composite ms., with the letters on ff. 161-232, ff. 232-4 being blank. Luchaire 1901, proved that the transcripts in B.N., mss. 14615, 14664, were taken from JJ 23.

2. Nos. 1-218 plus 93 bis, 98 bis, and 99 bis.

3. B.N., ms. 14938; see Laehr 1931, 402 note 4.

4. See Häring 1973.

5. B.N., ms. 14876 was catalogued in its present form as no. KK 7; 15135 as JJJ 24 (B.N., ms. 14767, ff. 113r, 219r-v).

6. Laehr 1931, 405-6.

is not so serious as it might seem, since it is clear that the collections apart from V contained predominantly monastic correspondence. However many letters have been lost, it is not likely that the loss of Louis VII's correspondence is very great.

There are few overlaps between the surviving remains of the collections,¹ but they were clearly put together at much the same time by the same people,² and they draw on a common stock of material. This came from three identifiable sources. The first of these is St. Victor itself, which supplied both collections with correspondence relating to the affairs of the monastery and its inhabitants. The second is Hugh of Champfleury, bishop of Soissons from 1159 to 1175 and chancellor to Louis VII from 1150 to 1172, who retired to St. Victor to die. The final source is the chancery of Louis VII. The second and third sources cannot be distinguished completely, but this does not matter.³ What we need are the answers to two questions. First, how complete are these collections as a record of Louis VII's correspondence? Second, how did certain letters not addressed to or sent by Louis or his circle, but clearly of diplomatic rather than monastic importance, find their way into the collections?

1. B.N., ms. 15135, f. 90v no. 10 is an incomplete version of V, f. 248v no. 517.

2. Falkenstein 1972, 111 note 16.

3. Some of the letters relating to Hugh's personal affairs clearly came directly from him. Louis' official correspondence may have done also (so Luchaire 1899a, 31) but in view of the connexions between St. Victor and the chancery (Falkenstein 1972, 107 note 1; Gasparri 1968, 297-300; Gasparri 1973, 14, 43-5, 47, 49-50) other explanations are possible. There is however no problem in distinguishing between those letters which came from Hugh as Hugh and those which came from Hugh as chancellor.

The collections certainly do not contain all of Louis' correspondence. The majority of letters which do not obviously come from the first two sources are addressed to Louis or people closely associated with him; the collections contain only a small number of letters from him. The only other collections containing letters from Louis are those associated with the Becket circle, and these naturally contain only letters which touch upon Becket's problems. In effect then we know a great deal about the letters written to Louis but almost nothing about his replies. Just how full our knowledge of the incoming correspondence is cannot be known. Even assuming that we have all or almost all of the letter-collections as they originally existed, these need not have contained all of Louis' incoming correspondence in the period between 1155 and 1170, from which the vast bulk of the surviving letters come.¹ There is however one indication that the collections are fairly complete in this respect: very few *deperdita* can be deduced from the surviving letters (apart, that is, from letters written by Louis). I have found none in the course of my work, to which a substantial proportion of the letters from the third source are relevant. Even though not all *deperdita* will have been revealed in this way it is still likely that few other letters were addressed to Louis, at least before 1165.

There are some letters in the collections whose presence is not immediately explicable. The important ones for us are: the dispensation issued by the legates of Alexander III in 1160 for the

1. The terminal dates given are approximate; certainty will have to await the new edition of the collections by Dr. Ludwig Falkenstein of Aachen. Papal letters to Louis break off in 1165 (Falkenstein 1972, 123-4).

premature marriage between Henry II's son and Louis VII's daughter; a group of letters sent by Barbarossa inviting princes of the Empire to the meeting at St.-Jean-sur-Laône; and two letters connected with the negotiations between Alexander, Louis, and Manuel Comnenus in 1163. The essential question here is whether these found their way into the collections via Louis' chancery, or via St. Victor.

The dispensation¹ was issued to Hugh, archbishop of Rouen, who performed the marriage ceremony. There are two possible ways in which St. Victor might have acquired a text: from the cardinals or from Hugh. The cardinals figure frequently in the St. Victor collections, but the letters from them were either addressed to members of the monastery or of the royal household. There is no obvious reason why they should have supplied St. Victor directly with the text of a letter which did not concern the house. Nor is it easy to see why the archbishop of Rouen should have sent such a politically sensitive document to St. Victor. There was some contact between St. Victor and the Norman church, especially during the abbacy of Achard, who subsequently became bishop of Avranches, but it is not of a kind which would explain the presence of this dispensation in the letter-collections.² The dispensation is likely therefore to have reached the collections via the royal chancery, though whether that was itself supplied by the cardinals or by Hugh of Rouen must be left open.

1. V, ff. 30r-31r = RHF, xv, 700 no. 14. See above, pp. 39-41.

2. See Luchaire 1899a, 107 no. 37, 115 no. 58, 118 no. 63, 120 no. 71, 138 no. 171.

V contains three letters of Frederick addressed to an unnamed archbishop, to Eraclius, archbishop of Lyons, and to Matthew, duke of (upper) Lotharingia.¹ All are summonses to the meeting at St.-Jean-sur-Laône. Again, it is difficult to see how these letters could have found their way directly to St. Victor, which had only tenuous connexions with the Empire.² How Louis' chancery acquired them is also unclear. For the first letter there are possibilities in Henry of Rheims and Eberhard of Salzburg. We know that Henry had a copy because he wrote indignant letters to his brother and to the archbishops of Sens and Tours in which Frederick's letter is quoted more or less in extenso. The letter from Henry to Louis is in V,³ but the text of Barbarossa's first letter in V cannot simply be derived from this, since it has a salutatio and a sentence at the end missing from Henry's letter. Henry might however have given Louis a full text of Barbarossa's letter after sending his own. Eberhard was probably not the source of supply for either Henry or Louis, although he wrote to Henry in the summer of 1162 about the meeting at St.-Jean-sur-Laône,⁴ since the copy in the letter-collection associated with him⁵ has a different addressee and a sentence at the end missing from the text in V and from the transcripts in Henry of Rheims' letters. Louis' chancery may well

1. V, ff. 47r-48v = MGH, Const., i, 290-1 no. 208, ff. 50r-51r = ibid., 291-2 no. 210, ff. 51r-52r = ibid., 291 no. 209.

2. Though Christian of Mainz is commemorated in the abbey's obituary (A. Longnon, Obituaires de la province de Sens, Paris, 1902, I, i, 579).

3. See above, p. 86.

4. See above, pp. 85-6.

5. A, ff. 59r-60r; on this ms. see below, pp. 224-5.

have acquired Barbarossa's first letter from the same source which gave it the other two to Eraclius and Matthew. The three letters occur close together in V, and in a section which is not, as the large final section of V is,¹ arranged by grouping letters from the same senders or classes of senders. They may have been so grouped in the materials from which V was compiled. Alexander had supporters in Burgundy, even though Eraclius and Matthew are not known to have been among them,² and these could have secured copies of the letters and passed them on to Louis.

The remaining group of letters dates from 1163-4. The first is from Alexander III to the master of the Hospital in Constantinople, asking him not to take any action against the Hospitaller who served as Manuel Comnenus' legate to the west in 1163-4;³ the second is a letter from William of Pavia to Manuel Comnenus.⁴ The letter from Alexander almost certainly found its way into the collections via Louis' chancery: there is no evidence of any connexions between St. Victor and the Hospitallers, and the letter is found in V in the middle of a long group of letters from Alexander to Louis. The letter from William might have come via St. Victor, with which William had ties,⁵ but it is more probable that a copy of the letter was sent to Louis, as Alexander promised to do.⁶

1. Falkenstein 1972, 109-114.

2. For Eraclius, see above, p. 191; for Matthew, see Duvernoy 1904, 47-8.

3. V, f. 123v = JL 10956.

4. B.N., ms. 14615, ff. 317v-318r = Duchesne, 490.

5. Cf. Luchaire 1899a, 123-4 no. 87.

6. JL 10948.

Henry of Rheims' collection (R)

In its original form R contained well over 500 letters, mostly papal letters from the period 1155-1175. It is now in a somewhat mutilated condition, but Martène and Durand published it in the early eighteenth century when it was apparently still complete.¹ Most of the letters are from Alexander III to Henry of France, both as bishop of Beauvais and as archbishop of Rheims, but it also includes other papal letters, earlier materials from the Rheims archives, a few private letters to Henry, an even smaller number of letters from him, and one or two odd items such as the treaty between Barbarossa and Louis VII made at Vaucouleurs in 1171.² The manuscript clearly has a Rheims origin; Ramackers suggested that it was put together after Henry's death from materials assembled by him.³ The collection shows just how important Henry was for Alexander's relations with the French church. It contains not only letters addressed to Henry, but also letters to his chapter, abbots in his province, and suffragans.⁴ Either

1. Veterorum monumentorum...amplissima collectio, Paris, 1724, ii, 622-1011. A full description of the present contents is given in J. Ramackers, 'Papsturkunden in den Niederlanden', Abh., d.F., 8(1933), 18-22.

2. R, f. 61vb = MGH, Const., i, 331f. no. 237.

3. Op. cit., 17-8. The provenance is St. Vaast, Arras, but it was not there in the twelfth century according to the catalogue in Grierson 1940.

4. E.g. R, f. 22rb = JL 11142, to the chapter; JL 10697, 11663 (no longer in R) to the abbot of Prémontré; JL 11417 (no longer in R) addressed to the bishops of Soissons, Amiens, and Laon.

Henry was supplied with copies of papal letters, for distribution or reference, by the curia, or else he kept an extraordinary degree of control over the affairs of his province. As it existed in the time of Martène and Durand R was probably a fairly complete record of papal letters to Henry; I have found only one papal mandate addressed to Henry not in the collection, and this may simply never have been presented by its impetrant.¹ But just as the St. Victor collections reveal little of Louis' outgoing correspondence, a deficiency not remedied greatly by other collections, so the Rheims collection tells us little of Henry's outgoing correspondence,² a serious drawback.

The Salzburg collections (A and H)

These two collections contain materials relating to the schism collected by Eberhard of Salzburg and his successors. A was published in full though rather inaccurately by Tengenagel, and has recently been extensively studied and commented on by Dr. Günther Hödl of Salzburg, who is preparing a new edition for the MGH.³ His conclusions are that the collection was compiled at Admont from materials collected and supplied by Eberhard, stored and collected more or less in chronological order. Up to September 1162 it is a reasonable record of the schism as it affected Salzburg,

1. JL 10731 (see JL, ii, 731) for St. Bertin. JL 11171 implies an earlier letter to Henry which has not survived.

2. RHF, xvi, 177-201, contains 20 surviving letters of Henry, to which should be added the letter discovered and published by Colker 1961, 477-8.

3. Hödl 1969, 1970. I am grateful to Dr. Hödl for supplying me with offprints of these articles.

though there are some *deperdita* and it does not have some letters which have survived elsewhere.¹ From 1162 until Eberhard's death some Salzburg material is in H, but other letters survive elsewhere,² and it would seem that Eberhard ceased to collect letters so carefully, perhaps because he was no longer at the centre of the diplomacy of the schism as he had been between 1160 and 1162. H is a large composite manuscript of the sixteenth century, which was put together by Flaccius Illyricus and his fellow-workers as a preparation for the *Magdeburg Centuries*. The fourth and fifth sections of the manuscript contain copies of some of the letters in A, together with a further series clearly relating to the affairs of the province and archbishopric of Salzburg under Eberhard's successors Conrad and Adalbert. Presumably these were taken from a Salzburg letter-collection which is now lost. From the way in which the sixteenth-century copyists treated A we can assume that their copy of the lost collection followed the order of the manuscript, but that they only copied such letters as seemed at a fairly casual glance relevant to their interests, which were the nature of papal power over the church and church-state relations. H probably gives an incomplete picture of the schism in the province of Salzburg.³

1. Hödl 1970, 164-6, 187.

2. A letter from Eberhard to Alexander survives in P (see below, p. 226), while JL 10824 and 10869 survive in the original.

3. It is not, for example, possible to reconstruct Conrad's difficulties with Frederick from the letters in H as Eberhard's can be from A (cp. above, pp. 61-78, with pp. 173-6). On H see Hautaler 1894 and Martin 1927.

Philip of L'Aumône's collection (P)

P is a late twelfth-century letter-collection from St. Amand, containing letters by Fulbert of Chartres, Ivo of Chartres, Peter of Celle and some thirteenth-century additions consisting of letters dealing with the Holy Land.¹ Apart from these additions it seems to have been put together at the same time, to judge from the hands and the style of rubrication. In the middle of the section containing letters of Ivo of Chartres,² there is a different collection derived from various sources, totalling forty-five³ letters. Nos. 12-17, 19-21 concern the schism:

12. Frederick I to Count Ivo of Soissons, ff. 77v-78r (MGH, Const., i, 281 no. 204).
13. Alexander III to the clergy of France, ff. 78v-80v.⁴
14. Encyclical of the council of Pavia, ff. 80v-83r.⁵
15. Hadrian IV to Frederick I, f. 83v.
16. Frederick I to Hadrian IV, ff. 83v-84r.⁶
17. Eberhard of Salzburg to Alexander III, f. 84v (Germ. Pont., i, 29 no. 92).

1. M P. Campagne, the curator of the library at Valenciennes, informs me that the class-mark 622 sometimes assigned to P is incorrect, and that it should be 482. I am grateful to him for supplying me with microfilms and a foliation; for descriptions of the ms. see Mangeart 1860, 436ff., Lièvre 1894, 391ff.

2. Folios 9r-70r, 96v-109r.

3. Not forty-four as Mangeart and Lièvre have; they overlooked no. 17.

4. See below, p. 233.

5. See below, p. 236.

6. On nos. 15 and 16, propaganda pieces, see Höing 1957.

19. Alexander III to Henry of Rheims and suffragans, ff. 84v-85r (JL 11240)
20. Frederick I to Nicholas of Cambrai, ff. 85r-v (MGH, Const., i, 320-1 no. 226)
21. Alexander III to William of Rheims and suffragans, ff. 85v-86r (JL 12893)

Nos. 22-45 of this section are letters from the collection of Philip, abbot of L'Aumône, beginning with the letter Apud sapientie filios written by Philip with the cardinals Henry and Otto in the spring of 1160 in answer to the encyclical of the council of Pavia.¹ The question is whether the letters referring to the schism should be associated with Philip of L'Aumône, whose collection follows them, or whether it has some other origin. In view of the very active role played by Philip during the schism,² it seems to me most probable that they owe their presence collection to him. The fact that the manuscript comes from St. Amand is easily explained. Philip had close relations with that monastery, corresponding with its abbot and writing a Vita of its patron saint.³ What could be more natural than that the monks of St.

1. Edited from this manuscript by C. de Visch, Bibliotheca scriptorum ordinis Cisterciensis, (Dunes, 1649), 336-52. In the fuller edition by P. Tissier, Biblioteca Patrum Cisterciensium, (Bonnefontaine, 1660), iii, 237-52, based on a Clairvaux ms. now at Troyes, Bibliothèque municipale, ms. 444, ff. 106ra-113ra and using also a Foigny ms. which I have not been able to trace as well as the edition by de Visch, they are nos. 4, 12-20, 25; de Visch no. 12; 24; de Visch nos. 14, 15; 21-3, 5-7, 9-11.

2. See above, pp. 32, 103, 184.

3. De Visch, ed. cit., nos. 14, 15; AA SS, Februarii, i, 857-73.

Amand, when compiling a collection of letters to serve as an exemplar for purposes of dictamen, should use a collection made by their colleague, friend, and neighbour? It is true that the letters relating to the schism are not found in the other surviving manuscript of Philip's letters, but since that has different letters in a different order and clearly represents another stage in the formation of the collection, this is not conclusive.¹ There is no reason why the letters on the schism should have been collected at St. Amand itself; its abbots are not known to have taken any part in the politics of the schism, and its contemporary annals do not even record the schism.² One might postulate a completely different origin for the letters, but Occam's razor suggests Philip.³

Becket and related collections

The collections compiled by Becket, Foliot, and their associates, and the two collections of John of Salisbury's letters have, as collections, little importance for the history of the schism, though the individual letters are often invaluable.⁴ The presence in them and some smaller English collections of materials on the schism does however call for some comment. Materials on the

1. Troyes 444 has thirty letters, only twenty-one of which are in P. For the order, see previous page, note 1.

2. Annales Elnonenses Minores, MGH, SS, v, 11-17.

3. The other letters in this section of P were either generally available, as with the papal letters nos. 2-7 and the letter of the Carthusians, no. 1, or else were available in St. Amand itself, as with nos. 8-11. I am unable to account for the presence of no. 18, a letter on heretics in Périgeux written by a monk called Herbert.

4. Duggan 1971, analyses these collections fully, and gives details of the mss. and of earlier literature on the subject.

opening of the schism are found in an Ely manuscript of the Becket collection, which has Eterna in the version for Theobald and the encyclical issued by the council of Pavia, as well as a mandate from Henry II to Theobald about the schism issued in December 1159.¹ The largest Foliot collection has Frederick's letter to Henry II sent in the opening months of the schism.² Some smaller collections offer rather more. The most important of these is B.L., ms. Cotton Faustina B i, ff. 2-11, which was originally part of a Byland manuscript of St. Bernard's letters, now B.L., ms. Royal 8 F xv.³ The quinternion contains six letters at the beginning relating to the opening of the schism, and nine more relating to the Becket dispute. The nine letters are all common ones, found not only in the main collections but also separately and in Roger of Howden and Ralph of Diss.⁴ This collection thus may but need not be an abridgement of some larger Becket collection, now lost. The first six items constitute a small dossier on the schism: in order, they consist of Alexander's encyclical Eterna in the version for the clergy of England; the Pavia encyclical; a

1. Oxford, Bodleian Library, ms. Rawlinson Q.f.8. For the two encyclicals see below, pp. 232 and 236; for the mandate and the collection as a whole, see Saltman 1949.

2. Oxford, Bodleian Library, ms. Cave e Musaeo 249, f. 71r = MGH, Const., i, 254-5 no. 183.

3. Gilson 1907, 144-5.

4. Duggan 1971, 389-90, 392-3, 418ff. The two papal letters JL 11835 and 11836, nos. 7 and 8, ff. 6r-7r, occur in many other manuscripts as separate items, e.g. JL 11835 is found in Oxford, Jesus College, ms. 47, f. 2, and in B.N., ms. 14664 ff. 133v-135r. The letters from Louis VII, William of Sens, and Theobald of Blois to Alexander III calling for vengeance on Henry II (nos. 12-14, ff. 10v-11r) also circulated widely, as can be seen from their presence in the Foliot collections (cf. Duggan 1971, 342).

letter from the cardinals to Frederick Barbarossa;¹ Frederick's letter to Henry II; a letter from Arnulf of Lisieux to Alexander III;² a letter from Philip of L'Aumône to Alexander III.³ It is possible that this part of the collection is connected with Aelred of Rievaulx; we know that Abbot Roger I of Byland was closely associated with him, and that he played an important part in the early months of the schism.⁴ B.L., ms. Royal 9 B xii also has a small collection on ff. 2-5 not connected with the main body of the manuscript (Pseudo-Isidore in Lanfranc's abridgement): Eterna in the version for Theobald of Canterbury; Frederick's letter to Henry II; and the letter Merore simul sent out by Alexander's cardinals in 1160. A third manuscript, B.L., ms. Cotton Otho C xiv, ff. 90ff., attached to a collection of Grosseteste's letters, is a thirteenth-century collection containing three groups of material: letters about the disputed election of St. William of York; letters about the election of Bishop Robert II of London and the affairs of St. Paul's; and a third group dealing with the schism, with a separate rubric to that effect.⁵ This consisted of Eterna in the

1. Ed. Holtzmann 1930, 398-400.

2. Letters, ed. Barlow, no. 24.

3. PL, 200, 1359-61.

4. See above, p. 33, and Grill 1967. For Roger of Byland see The Life of Ailred of Rievaulx by Walter Daniel, ed. and tr. F. M. Powicke, Edinburgh, 1950, pp. 59f., 63f.

5. The manuscript was damaged by water in 1731 and is now almost unreadable, but its contents were listed by Smith 1696, 73f., and Eterna and the Pavia encyclical were published from it by E. Brown, Fasciculus rerum expetendarum..., London, 1681, ii, 549ff.

version for Theobald; the Pavia encyclical; the shortened version of the anonymous account of the council of Würzburg;¹ and an 'Epistola Friderici Romani Imperatoris de electione et confirmatione sui apostolici missa cunctis fidelibus ad confirmationem electionis eiusdem'.²

No two of these manuscripts have the same contents, but their material overlaps considerably. I suggest that what we have are traces of the dossier of documents which lay before the council of London when it met in June 1160 to consider the schism.³ If this is so, it provides further proof that Victor did not himself send letters to the west on his election, for taken together these manuscripts contain quite a large dossier including some fairly unimportant letters;⁴ it is improbable that a letter from Victor, had one been before the council, would have been left out of all of them.

1. Materials, v, 188-91 no. 99. See above, p. 131.

2. Smith 1696, 74; presumably this is MGH, Const., i, 314-6 no. 223, which in the Becket collections is addressed to cunctis populis through a scribal error.

3. See above, p. 38.

4. E.g. the letters from Arnulf and Philip, and Frederick's letter to Henry II, none of which would be very relevant. The main omission is Arnulf's letter to the English church (above, p. 33).

Appendix b: Alexander's election encyclical

The letter Eterna et incommutabilis has survived in a number of versions in three recensions. The list in JL is incomplete and contains some dubious entries. The following list is complete to the best of my knowledge. Manuscripts have been cited only when the text has not been published, or where more than one manuscript has the same version.

The first recension survives in only one version, that addressed to Syrus, archbishop of Genoa, and his suffragans.¹ The second, brought up to date to include Alexander's excommunication of Victor, exists in six versions: one in which the recipient's name has been omitted;² one addressed to Gerald, bishop of Bologna, and the doctors and clergy of the city;³ one addressed to the abbot and monks of St. Denis;⁴ one addressed to Peter, bishop of Paris;⁵ one addressed to Theobald, archbishop of Canterbury, and his suffragans;⁶ and one addressed to Arnold of Mainz and his suffragans.⁷ The third recension was expanded at the end to tell

1. Cafari Annales Genoenses, MGH, SS, xviii, 28-9; JL 10584, 26 Sept. (1159).

2. Milan, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, ms. C 103 supra, ff. 1r-v; JL 10586, 4 Oct. (1159). As this is an English ms. (cf. Morin 1932) this may be the same as JL 10590 (below, note 6), since the different date could easily be a scribal error.

3. Gesta, iv, 62, and A, ff. 28v-31v; JL 10587, 5 Oct. (1159).

4. JL 10588, 5 Oct. (1159).

5. Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, ms. Lat. 6024, ff. 149va-150va, and Cambridge, Trinity College, ms. R. 9. 17, ff. 72v-74v; JL 10589, 5 Oct. (1159).

6. B.L., ms. Royal 9 B xii, ff. 2ra-2vb, ms. Cotton Otho C xiv, ff. 191r-192v, Oxford, Bodleian Library, ms. Rawlinson Q.f.8, ff. 2v-5r, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, ms. Lat. 103, ff. 114ra-vb; JL 10590, 5 Oct. (1159).

7. P. Kehr, 'Nachträge zu den Papsturkunden Italiens, I', Nachr., (1905), 338-41 no. 12; JL -----, n.d. (text incomplete).

about Victor's consecration and to sketch the role of Inar of Tusculum and the emperor in this. It exists in four versions, all with a general address to the clergy of a particular region or kingdom: Scotland,¹ France,² England,³ and Northern Italy.⁴

Two other versions were listed by JL. A Bec continuation of the chronicle of Robert of Torigny gives an excerpt from a version of Eterna allegedly sent to Henry II.⁵ The fragment is so small that it is impossible to compare it textually with any of the surviving versions, but it cannot have been sent to Henry II, as the recipient is addressed as vos.⁶ Whether the fragment derives from one of the surviving versions or from another now lost cannot be said. A version addressed to Eberhard of Salzburg was printed by Harzheim, but the manuscript he cited has the version addressed to Peter of Paris, and as his text corresponds very closely to this it is clear that he simply changed the address.⁷ Since the collection associated with Eberhard has

1. B.N., ms. Nouv. acq. Lat. 692, ff. 60v-62v (the text is inserted into John of Hexham's chronicle); JL -----, 29 Oct. (1159)

2. Ramackers, 'Papsturkunden in den Niederländen', 217-22 no. 90; JL -----, 19 Oct. (1159).

3. B.L., ms. Cotton Faustina B i, ff. 2ra-vb; JL 10602, n.d. (JL give early Dec., but only because of the similarity of the letter to JL 10601, the only other version of this recension known to them).

4. JL 10601 (= JL 10603; see It. Pont., v, 64 no. 223), 13 Dec. (1159).

5. JL 10591.

6. Arnulf of Lisieux says that Henry received letters from the pope setting out his case and copies were sent to England (Letters, ed. Barlow, no. 27 p. 36) This was probably the version addressed to Theobald, since that was the one available at the council of London (above, pp. 228-31). Theobald took some time to receive this letter (cf. John of Salisbury, Letters, ed. Miller, i, 202 no. 122); Henry may well have intercepted it and sent it on later.

7. JL 10592, allegedly from Vat. Lat. 6024 (see above, p. 232 note 5).

the version addressed to Gerard of Bologna,¹ it seems improbable that Eberhard received a version of his own. JL also recorded as a *deperditum* the letter said by Boso to have been sent by Alexander to Frederick in September or October 1159, and imply by their grouping of it with the other surviving versions of Eterna that it too was a copy of the encyclical.² This is rather unlikely. No twelfth-century pope would have lightly taken the step of notifying an emperor of his election, a practice reminiscent of the bad old days, and it was probably for precisely this reason that Alexander's electors wrote to Frederick.³

Apart from the chroniclers who actually give a text - Rahewin, Cafari, and the anonymous continuators of John of Hexham and Robert of Torigny, no chronicler appears to have used Eterna for his account of the election.⁴ The only other *deperditum* known to have existed is a version sent to the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. Patriarch Amalric refers in his letter to Alexander announcing the Latin church's decision to letters sent by Alexander about his election, and Amalric's phrasing suggests that he had a text of Eterna available.⁵ The council of Pavia had access to a copy, since it is quoted briefly in its encyclical,

1. Above, pp. 224-5, 232.

2. JL *10585.

3. Gesta, iv, 63, which draws on Eterna.

4. The author of the Gesta Federici I Imperatoris in Lombardia, p. 39 may have used a text of Eterna, though his editor, Holder-Egger thought not (p. 39, note 1).

5. A, ff. 50v-51r = Tengnagel, pp. 410-11 no. 57. Compare:

Amalric
Audita...temeritate Oct(av-
iani) scilicet et pseudofra-
trum suorum I(ohannis) et
G(uidonis)...

Eterna
...tres falsi fratres...Octaviano
scilicet, Iohanne de Sancto Martino
et Guidone Cremense

but this was probably either the version addressed to Gerard of Bologna or the one addressed to Arnold of Mainz.¹ There are not therefore so many *deperdita* that we have to suppose that there were once many more versions of Eterna which have not survived. We have already seen that Eberhard of Salzburg probably did not receive a version, and letter-collections associated with Louis VII, Hugh of Soissons, and Henry of France suggest that these men did not either.² There were almost certainly versions which have not survived or not yet been rediscovered - Spain, for example, is an obvious gap - but the versions which have survived or left some trace of their existence are likely to be a substantial proportion of those sent out.

1. MGH, Const., i, 267 no. 190 c. 5.

2. Above, pp. 217-19, 223-4 , for the question of *deperdita* in these collections.

Appendix c: Quia sedis and the problem of attendance at Pavia

The encyclical issued by the council of Pavia to announce its decision, Quia sedis apostolice, exists in two versions. One is found in Rahewin, the other in various manuscripts.¹ The differences between the two are considerable: not only are there minor variations in wording throughout, but Rahewin's version does not have c. 2 and the long and important c. 5, in which various claims are made for the adherence of cardinals to Victor and an attempt is made to prove the existence of a conspiracy between Roland and his supporters and Frederick's enemies. In Rahewin's version the conspiracy is dealt with in the short c. 9, not found in the other version. The most important difference is in the witness-lists. Rahewin's version has a much shorter list, though it does have some names not in the list of the longer version.

Only the longer version was in general circulation. The figure of 153 prelates consenting in person or through legates and letters, which it alone gives, is quoted by various chroniclers and by Fastrad of Clairvaux.² The longer version was the one used

1. The edition in MGH, Const., i, 265-70 no. 190 is a conflation of the two versions showing the differences clearly. I use its chapter-divisions, which are not in the mss., for convenience. Rahewin's version is in Gesta, iv, 80, pp. 686/96; the longer version is in P, ff. 80v-83r; B.L., mss. Cotton Faustina B i, ff. 3ra-4ra, Cotton Otho C xiv, ff. 192v-194v; Oxford, Bodleian Library, ms. Rawlinson Q.f.8, ff. 5r-8v. The English mss. lack c. 6, and presumably have a common source. There is also an incomplete copy, giving only the protocol and an abbreviated c. 1, in Brussels, Bibliothèque Royale, ms. IV 8, f. 63r, from the abbey of St. Ghislain.

2. Monachi Sazaviensis Continuatio Cosmae Pragensis, MGH, SS, ix, 161; Ex Annalibus Winchecumbensibus, MGH, SS, xvi, 481; A, f. 52v = Tengnagel, p. 414 no. 60.

by the cardinals Henry and Otto and by John of Salisbury in their polemical replies to it, and Otto Morena quoted from it in his account of the council.¹ We cannot even assume, as Weiland did, that the longer version was for foreigners, while Rahewin had the version for the Empire, since the longer version was known in Lombardy, Bohemia, and Lotharingia. Three possibilities remain: that the text was abbreviated by Rahewin; that Rahewin's version is the draft used to prepare the final version, supplied to Rahewin by, say, the imperial chancery; that Rahewin's version was the one approved by the council and the longer version was interpolated by enthusiastic partisans of Victor either at the council or shortly afterwards. The first of these can be ruled out. Rahewin is careless in his transcription of documents,² but he is not known actually to have rewritten one, nor is there any reason apparent why he should have done so here. Meyer favoured the third possibility, and was followed by Hauck, who pointed out that cc. 2 and 5 disturb the sequence of argument between cc. 1-3 and 4-6 respectively, which suggests insertions in a finished text rather than correction of a draft, and also that the version offered by Rahewin is free from polemic and as such would have had more chance of being accepted by the council.³

1. Meyer 1871, 39; John of Salisbury, Letters, edd. Miller, Butler, Brooke, i, 210 no. 124 (referring to c. 5 of the encyclical).

2. Cf. Gesta, iii, 11, 20 with MGH, Const., i, nos. 164, 167; see also Gesta, iv, 81 (but for an argument that the omission of a sentence is here deliberate, Gillingham 1968, 300-2). See also Hödl 1970, 153-6.

3. Meyer 1871, 36ff.; Hauck, 253 note 1.

None of these arguments is conclusive. The point about acceptability to the council implies unprovable assumptions about the tone of the council and the way in which documents such as this were composed and approved. That c. 2 interrupts the sequence between cc. 1 and 3 is questionable; it seems to me to fit there logically. Certainly c.5 interrupts the continuity of argument between cc. 4 and 6; but continuity would be restored if the order ran 4,6,5,7, and it is possible, if we assume Rahewin's version was a draft, that the scribe who prepared the final version for transmission inserted c. 5 in the wrong place.¹ On balance it seems best to assume that Rahewin's version is a draft, especially since it lacks a protocol, as one would expect a draft to do.

Even if the longer version is an official one, rather than unofficially altered and interpolated, it still does not follow that its witness-list is a truthful one. The fullest report of the participants independent of the encyclical is by Henry of Berchtesgaden in a letter to Eberhard of Salzburg.² Nearly fifty bishops, he says, were there, including the five archbishops who head the longer version of the encyclical, as well as legates from the kings of France and England, and from the archbishops of Arles, Lyons, Vienne, Besançon, and Trier, and the archbishop-elect of Ravenna. A great part of the bishops of Lombardy were also

1. Or that the copyist of P, the only ms. to have cc. 4, 5, and 6, mistranscribed his text, but this seems less likely.

2. Gesta, iv, 82, pp. 698/702.

present. This agrees well with the witness-list of the longer version, the only differences being that the archbishop of Salzburg is added, the archbishops of Lyons and Besançon are omitted, and the kings of England and France are not mentioned, probably because their legates were there only as observers.¹ Our other evidence for the make-up of the council comes from Alexandrine sources, who owed their information to William of Pavia. Fastred of Clairvaux contrasted the 153 bishops said to have consented by the encyclical with the forty-four actually present, and said that these had been summoned one by one to Frederick and asked to consent to Victor's recognition. Only twenty would do so, one of those refusing being Peter of Pavia.² Alexander's cardinals similarly claimed in Merore simul that only six or seven Italian bishops had consented.³

There are really two separate questions: who was present, and who consented? There seems to be no doubt that the one patriarch, four archbishops and thirty-nine bishops listed in the longer version of the encyclical were actually there. William of Pavia's evidence is not enough to be set against the independent agreement of the witness-list and Henry of Berchtesgaden. They were said to have consented because by coming to it and therefore

1. Gesta, iv, 81, p. 698.

2. A, f. 52v = Tengenagel, p. 414 no. 60. The tendentiousness of this can be seen from the fact that Peter of Pavia was in France at the time (above, p. 26).

3. Watterich, ii, 496. The agreement with Rahewin's version of the witness-list is probably coincidence.

recognizing its authority they were committed to its decision, whatever it was. This is why the reservations of some bishops were not noted in the encyclical (though there were obvious reasons for not doing so in any case).¹ It is also why those who merely sent letters and legates were said to have consented; by doing so they had recognized the council. Eberhard of Salzburg illustrates this. He had originally approved of the plan to call a council.² On his way there he heard news which decided him for Alexander. Claiming to be ill, he excused himself from the council, sending Henry of Berchtesgaden as his representative.³ A garbled sentence in the letter from Eberhard of Bamberg to Eberhard of Salzburg suggests that Henry did not commit Eberhard to a decision,⁴ but from the council's point of view Eberhard was already committed.⁵

In view of this there seems no reason to doubt the claims about distant archbishops and rulers who are said to have recognized Victor through letters and legates, especially since many of them are subsequently found as Victorines.⁶ They will at least

1. Cf. Gesta, iv, 82, 702: the patriarch of Aquileia and the bishops of Bamberg, Passau, and Regensburg consented 'salva in posterum catholice ecclesie censura'.

2. MGH, Const., i, 257 no. 186, a letter from Frederick to Eberhard, implies as much.

3. A, ff. 34r-v = Tengnagel, p. 393 no. 38.

4. Cf. Gillingham 1968, 300-2.

5. This was not an idiosyncratic view; it is expressed in Hugh of Vézelay's report on the council of Tours, MGH, SS, xxvi, 149: 'Italiae vero non minima pars affuit, partim scripto, partim sua presentia.' See also below, p. 248 line 3.

6. See above, pp. 50-7, /^{185, 194} The Danish bishop of Ribe was at Pavia, perhaps as a representative of Waldemar.

have sent the letters and legates alleged. At the same time the list of those present should not be taken as a guide to Victor's later obedience, especially in Italy.¹ Many of the Italian bishops listed are subsequently found in Frederick's entourage: the bishops of Trent, Padua, Feltre, Treviso, Mantua, Faenza, Lodi, Fermo, Tortona, Acqui, Asti, Vercelli, and Como all appears as witnesses or recipients of his charters in the next few years.² But this is no proof that they supported Victor.³ The bishop of Tortona was in contact with Alexander by 1162; so was the bishop of Aosta, listed as present at the council.⁴ Even before the council Eberhard of Salzburg had heard that the bishops of Padua, Verona, and Vicenza did not want to recognize Victor,⁵ but the first two were at Pavia. By 1161 they were certainly Alexandrine; John of Padua had been chased from his bishopric by Frederick and Victor,⁶ and all three were addressed by Alexander in his letter to Patriarch Henry of Grado and others of June 1161 announcing his return to Rome,⁷ as was the bishop of Treviso, who, though

1. For Germany, see above, chapter 9.

2. Cf. St. 3892, 3896, 3904, 3929, 3950, 3963; Bellini 1954, 256-9 (a charter of 8 Jan. 1954 for Commacchio); St. 4008.

3. Omnibene of Verona shows this: he was Alexandrine (above, pp. 64, 84, and note 7 on this page) but is called 'dilectus et fidelis noster' by Frederick in 1162 (MGH, Const., i, 280 no. 203).

4. JL 10698x; It. Pont., vi/2, 166 no. *2.

5. A, ff. 34r-v = Tengenagel, p. 393 no. 38. Date: Hödl 1969, 435. This is probably the source of Gerhoch's statement (MGH, LdL, iii, 365) that three Italian bishops had refused to accept Victor.

6. Haverkamp 1970, 458.

7. JL 10666. Since none was a suffragan of Henry, Alexander presumably thought of them as his supporters; the information could have come from Cardinal Hildebrand, Alexander's representative in northern Italy (above, pp. 68, 75).

at Pavia is later found in contact with Alexandrine circles in Salzburg and Aquileia.¹ But none of this should lead to mistrust of the witness-list as a record of those present; if it is a fabrication, why does it not include other Italian bishops, especially those of Tuscany? The list is disingenuous, rather than dishonest, but it was made to look increasingly untruthful because of the failure of other churches to follow its lead, and the subsequent growth of support for Alexander even within the Empire.

1. Above, p. 110.

Appendix d: Bishops attending the council of Tours

The text which follows was noticed briefly by W. Holtzmann, who suggested that it might refer to the council of Tours.¹ It is found on f. 16v of B.L., ms. Cotton Vitellius A xvii, a Chichester manuscript. Ff. 1-16r contain the annals known as Annales Cicestrenses,² and the list, which is written on parchment prepared for a continuation of the annals, is in a hand very similar to those which made the entries in the annals for the early 1160s, and especially to the hand which made the last contemporary entry in 1164. This suggests that the list is of bishops who attended the council of Tours, which is recorded in the annals s.a. 1162; confirmation of this is provided not so much by the complete absence of German bishops, who might have been left out through scribal error, as by the small number of Italian bishops attending, who are almost all lumped under the single heading of 'Lumbardia' rather than distributed under provinces. No other twelfth-century council (and the number of Spanish bishops shows that the list must refer to a twelfth century council) of this size was attended by so few Italians.

The list is not a completely reliable guide to attendance at the council. This is not surprising; we know that there are quite considerable discrepancies between the various official lists of those who attended the Fourth Lateran Council,³ and

1. 'Papsturkunden in England, i', Abh., n.F., 25/i(1930), 92.

2. F. Liebermann, Ungedruckte Anglonormannischen Geschichtsquellen, (Strassburg, 1879), pp. 84-96.

3. Linehan 1971, 4 and note 4.

the present list is not an official one: it lacks a protocol, and the distinction between bishops who were immediately subject to Rome and bishops who were cardinals is unlikely to have been the work of a curial writer.¹ Two bishops known fairly certainly to have been at the council are not in the list: Albert of Freising and David of St. David's.² But the essential accuracy of the list is confirmed by Boso, who says that 124 bishops attended the council, while the list has 122.³

1. Compare the list of those present at Lateran III, printed in Mansi, xxii, 215ff, 239f., (better text in B.N., ms. 14938, ff. 263va-266va) which begins 'De provincia Romana' and lists both cardinals and immediate bishops together.

2. Albert himself said that he was at the council: Sudendorf, i, 66 no. 24. David of St. David's was said to have gone by Gerald of Wales, De jure et statu Meneviensis Ecclesiae, in Opera, ed. J. S. Brewer, Rolls Series, 1863, iii, 155 and Ralph of Diss, ed. Stubbs, i, 310. Peter of Mondoñedo appears in the list as the archbishop-elect of Compostella; see below, p. 247 note 2.

3. Boso, p. 408. Hugh of Vézelay, MGH, SS, xxvi, 148-9 is obviously exaggerating: there were not as many as 105 bishoprics in the various provinces of Gallia, and what he has to say about contingents from Sicily and the Latin church in the east are not supported by Romoald of Salerno (MGH, SS, xix, 433) or William of Tyre. The figure of 500 in the Annales Reichenpergenses, MGH, SS, xvii, 470, clearly includes abbots as well.

B.L., ms. Cotton Vitellius A xvii, f. 16v

The list is not headed or rubricated. The words 'De provincia Turonensi' etc. are set off by punctuation and position on the page.

De provincia Turonensi. Ipse archiepiscopus et cum eo suffraganei¹
eius videlicet Cenomannensis episcopus, Redonensis, Andegavensis,
Nannetensis, Venetensis, Corisopitensis, Leonensis, Trecorensis,
Briocensis, Maclomensis; Electus Dolensis.²

De provincia Cantuariensi. Ipse archiepiscopus et cum eo episcopi³
Lundoniensis, Eliensis, Salesberiensis, Norwicensis, Cicestrensis,
Rofensis, Exoniensis, Coventriensis, Landavensis, episcopus de
Sancto Asaf; Electus Wigorniensis.

De provincia Bituricensi. Ipse archiepiscopus et cum eo episcopi⁴
Claromontensis, Catracensis, Rutinensis, et Mimatensis.

De provincia Burdegalensi. Ipse archiepiscopus et cum eo epis-
copi⁵ Agennensis, Engolismensis, Xantonensis, Pictaviensis, Petra-
goricensis.

1. All his suffragans were present.

2. Roger was elected in March 1161 (Robert of Torigny, ed. Howlett, p. 210) and in view of the conflict with Tours (cf. JL 10671) may well not have been consecrated by May 1163. The date of his successor John's accession is not certain: cf. Gams, 547.

3. The bishops of Winchester, Lincoln and Bath are known not to have attended (Ralph of Diss, ed. Stubbs, i, 310). Bangor and Hereford were vacant: Powicke and Fryde 1961, 275, 229; for St. Davids see previous page note 2.

4. Missing: Albi (vacant? - cf. Gams, 484), Limoges.

5. All his suffragans were present.

De provincia Eboracensi. Ipse archiepiscopus et cum eo episcopus Dunelmensis.¹

De provincia Remensi. Ipse archiepiscopus et cum eo episcopi² Suessionensis, Laudunensis, Noviomensis, Tornacensis, Ambianensis, Morinensis, Belvacensis, Silvanectensis.

De provincia Rotomagensi. Ipse archiepiscopus et cum eo episcopi³ Caracorensis, Parisiacensis
(Ebroicensis, Lexoviensis, Constantiensis, Sagiensis et Abrincensis.

De provincia Senonensi. Ipse archiepiscopus et cum eo episcopi⁴ Aurelianensis, Autisiodorensis, Nivernensis, Meldensis, et Trecentensis.

De provincia Lugdunensi⁵. Episcopi Eduensis, Lingonensis, Matisconensis, et Cabilonensis.

De provincia Ausitanensi⁶. episcopi Bigoritanus, Contienarensis, Lasturrensis, Adurensis, Aquensis, Baionensis, Basatensis et Lactorensis.

De provincia Toletanensi . Ipse archiepiscopus et cum eo episcopi⁷ Segobiensis et Seguntinensis.

1. Carlisle was vacant: Powicke and Fryde 1961, 212. For Scottish bishops see below, p. 249.

2. Missing: Arras (but Godescalc may have resigned, cf. JL 10788, 10854), Cambrai. Chalons was vacant (Gams, 534; JL 10752, 10910).

3. Missing: Bayeux, but Philip had already visited Alexander, cf. JL 10719, 10729.

4. All his suffragans were present.

5. For Eraclius of Lyons see above, p. 191.

6. Missing: Auch (William died on his way to the council, cf. Sudendorf, i, 67 no. 24), Cominges, Oleron.

7. Missing: Osma, Palencia.

De provincia Compostellanensi.¹ Ipse electus Compostellanus²
et cum eo Avisensis et Cauriensis episcopi.

De provincia Bracharensi.³ Episcopi Lucensis, Asturicensis et
Zamorrensis.

De provincia Tarragonensi. Ipse archiepiscopus et cum eo epis-
copi⁴ Calagoritanus, Pampilensis,⁵ Titasonensis, Cesaraugustanus,
Ausonensis, Dertusanus, Grundensis, Urgellensis et Barchilonensis.

1. Missing: Salamanca, Lisbon. The 'Avisensis' is probably the bishop of Avila, not the bishop of Viseu, since no other Portuguese bishop attended. The copyist was not at home with S. French and Iberian place-names. Nothing is known of any dispute between Alexander and Sancho I, however, so Viseu cannot be ruled out.

2. There was a consecrated archbishop, Martin. The elect bishop here is a rival, Peter, bishop of Mondoñedo, introduced by Ferdinand II of Leon after he had quarrelled with Martin (López Ferreiro 1901, 270-80). Alexander detained him after the council (cf. Albert of Freising's letter, Sudendorf, i, 67 no. 24) and he resigned his claim in 1164-5 (JL 11138). He appears as bishop, not archbishop, in the Dedicatio ecclesiae S. Germani a Pratis, RHF, xiv, 426-7, because the writer was clearly more interested in his ability to assist at a dedication, which depended on his having been consecrated, than in his rank.

3. Missing: Braga (Alexander confirmed Eugenius III's privilege for Braga on 16 Aug. 1163, Erdmann, 'Papsturkunden in Portugal', 233 no. 63 - does this indicate that John of Braga had been at Tours?). Of the suffragans mentioned in the privilege, Tuy, Orense, Coimbra, and Portugal were absent, Vallibria and Britania are the same as Mondoñedo, for which see note 1, and Egítania was a mere claim at this point (cf. Gams, 100).

4. Missing: Llerida, Huesca.

5. There were two rival candidates for the see of Pamplona, one consecrated by Tarragon, the other by Toledo. This is presumably the Tarragonese candidate, Raimund. Both were deposed at the council. See Goñi Gaztambide 1965, 278-82.

De provincia Narbonensi. Ipse archiepiscopus et cum eo episcopi¹
 Carcasonensis, Agathensis, Uteticensis, Magalonensis, Helenensis,
 Lucdenensis; duo, Burrensis, Neumasensis episcopi per nuncios.
 De provincia Aquensi. Ipse archiepiscopus et cum eo episcopi²
 Regensis, Foroiuliensis, Vapincensis et Abritensis.
 De provincia Ebredunensi. Ipse archiepiscopus et cum eo episcopi³
 Antinopolitanus et Senecensis.
 De provincia Tarentasiensi.⁴ Ipse archiepiscopus.
 De Lombardia. Archiepiscopus Mediolanensis,⁵ Papiensis,⁶ Ver-
 onensis,⁷ et Taurinensis.⁸
 De Hispania.⁹ Legionensis, Burgensis, Anitiensis et Signinus¹⁰
 episcopi.

1. All present, except for Toulouse, which was vacant (Gams, 638).

2. Missing: Sisteron.

3. Missing: Digne (? - cf. Gams, 545), Glandèves, Vence.

4. Missing: Sion, Belley (vacant? Anthelme was consecrated on 8 Sept. 1163: JL, ii, 174), Maurienne.

5. In exile; see Bernardi Marangonis Annales Pisani, MGH, SS, xix, 247.

6. In exile; see above, pp. 188, 239 note 2.

7. Omnebene is not known to have gone into exile, and must have travelled from Italy to attend the council.

8. Probably William, not his rival Charles who seems to have been Victorine. See Hellmann 1900, 46-8; Previté-Orton 1912, 326, 331, 335-6; Haverkamp 1970, 464.

9. Should read 'De provincia Romana'; the compiler was misled by the two Spanish bishops. Le Puy was the only immediate French see; Oviedo is the missing Spanish one, but Bishop Gonzalo had already come to Alexander for consecration in 1162 (JL 10729). Numerous Italian ones were absent.

10. One of Alexander's consecrators (JL 10589) and later found with him in France (Janssen 1961, 83; RHF, xiv, 426-7).

De Scotia. Dunkeldensis^e episcopus venit.¹

De curia.² Hostiensis, Portuensis et Albanensis episcopi.

1. Missing: Aberdeen, Brechin, Caithness, Galloway, Glasgow, Ross, Sodor. Moray and probably St. Andrew's and Dunblane were vacant (Powicke and Fryde 1961, 295, 286, 300). This says little about the attitude of Scotland to the schism, which was definitely pro-Alexander: Barrow 1960, 14.

2. Sabina and Tusculum were vacant (JL, ii, 145), and Julius of Preneste was acting as papal vicar in Rome (Zenker 1964, 43).

Appendix e: The date of Alexander's second embassy to Frederick

The date of this embassy depends on the date assigned to a letter from Ulrich of Treviso to Eberhard of Salzburg and others, which is our sole source for it.¹ Sudendorf dated it to November 1163, presumably because the letter mentions Victor's arrival at the imperial court in Lodi.² Giesebrecht and others put forward several arguments for dating the letter to April 1164;³

1. That Ulrich of Aquileia was at Lodi in November 1163, but the letter implies that he is absent.⁴

2. That Peter of Pavia, mentioned in the letter as one of Alexander's legates, is known to have got in touch with Frederick on the death of Victor IV on 20 April.⁵

3. That Alexander in a letter of 26 February 1164 talks of only one embassy of cardinals having been sent to Frederick, and therefore the second embassy must fall after this date.⁶

None of these arguments is conclusive:

1. Ulrich's letter says '*... deprecor, quatinus nunc in praesentia domini Aquil(eiensis) electi et aliorum principum, quos convenire vobiscum audivimus...*'; this need not imply that the patriarch was not at Lodi when Ulrich wrote.

1. Sudendorf, ii, 142-4 no. 59.

2. Cf. Acerbus Morena, ed. Güterbock, pp. 172-3.

3. Giesebrecht, vi, 427; Ohnsorge 1928, 62 and note 215. These are followed by Dunken 1931, 69; Preiss 1934, 65.

4. Sudendorf, ii, 144.

5. Materialia, ii, 90 no. 53.

6. JL 11003.

2. Peter of Pavia was in Lombardy in April 1164, but it does not follow that he was not there five months before. Moreover, the letter to Becket does not say that cardinals were with him.

3. Alexander simply says '*...cardinales, quos hoc anno ad eius [Frederick's] presentiam destinavimus, quos quidem nec videre dignatus est...*', which could cover any number of embassies.

There seems no good reason, then, for not dating Ulrich's letter to between early November, which is when Victor arrived at Lodi, and 20 January 1164, when Ulrich of Aquileia was to meet Eberhard.¹ Alexander's second embassy probably left Sens in early November, and was back by the beginning of the year.²

1. Sudendorf, ii, 141 no. 57.

2. William and Hyacinth subscribed on 23 Oct. (JL 10951) and again on 3 Jan. 1164 (P. Kehr, 'Papsturkunden in Navarre und Aragon, ii', *Abh., n.F.*, 22(1928), 424 no. 101). They may have subscribed to a bull of 28 Nov. 1163 (H. Meinert, 'Papsturkunden in Frankreich, i', *Abh., d.F.*, 4(1931), 281 no. 90), for which the subscriptions have not been printed. The subscriptions also show that they cannot have gone in March-April, since both subscribed on 27 March (Erdmann, 'Papsturkunden in Portugal', 237 no. 66) and again on 17 Apr. (JL 11018) which leaves too little time for them to have gone from Sens to Susa, sent to Frederick at Pavia for a safe-conduct, been refused, and returned to Sens. Further confirmation that the spring date is wrong comes from the itinerary of Rainald of Cologne, who was sent to meet them; he was at the imperial court from Oct. 1163 to March 1164, but in April was in Tuscan (Herkenrath 1962, 224, 233-4).

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4. Sudendorf, ii, 144.

5. Materials, iv, 90 no. 53.

6. JL 11003.

Appendix f: Anglo-German embassies, 1164-5

In an undated letter from one of Becket's messengers at the papal court it is said that Alexander and the curia were unwilling to do anything to offend Henry for various reasons, among them 'quod Joannes Cumin tamdiu apud imperatorem moratur.'¹ Robertson placed the letter 'soon after the council of Westminster, October 1163'. Most of the events recorded in the letter do not provide a point of reference from which to date it (some, such as the capture of Radicofani by the imperialists, are usually dated to 1163, but apparently on the strength of this letter). But there are indications which point to a time around the council of Northampton. Louis VII is said to be at Soissons.² Becket's exile is regarded as a possibility. The curia are worried at not having had a messenger from Henry II for a long time, and at Henry of Troyes' refusal to see them.³ I therefore place John Cumin's visit to Frederick in the second half of 1164. It is true that the Pipe Roll for 1163-4 mentions gifts for an imperatrix,⁴ but these are more likely to have been for Henry's mother than for Frederick's wife, and in any case leave either 1163 or 1164 open.

The letter to Becket gives no hint as to who began negotiations. Another letter, from the St. Victor collections, suggests

1. Materials, v, 59 no. 36.

2. Luchaire 1885, 66: Louis was at Soissons in the last two months of 1164. An unrecorded visit in late 1163 is quite possible, however.

3. He had been approached by Rainald in the summer of 1164; see above, pp. 129-30.

4. Classen 1960, 278 note 26.

that Henry was the initiator. This is from Mathilda, countess of Boulogne, to Louis VII, and runs as follows:¹

Presentie vestre innotescat Henricum regem Anglie ad imperatorem suos nuntios legasse. Certum enim est illum omnia [omniter V; communiter Duchesne] impetrasse quod voluit. Imperator autem se adeo regi exhibuit benivolum ut cum nuntiis suis redeuntibus suos ad eum mittere non pigritatus est. Quod fecisse duxerit optimum ne predictus rex illum adversus vos in subsidio esse devotum dubitet. Nuntii equidem redeuntes per meam terram transierunt, et ego eis locuta fui et bene ex verbis eorum attendi quod rex Anglie malum vestrum perquirere nocte dieque non cessat.

This letter can probably be dated to the turn of 1164-5,² and if this is accepted it is much easier to reconstruct the chronology of Rainald of Cologne's visit to Henry II in the spring. The Pipe Roll evidence shows that he crossed to England at Dover and travelled as far as Berkshire, presumably to visit Eleanor and her daughters.³ It would be difficult to fit such a journey into his visit to Henry in the spring, since on 10 April he was at Floreffe, near Namur,⁴ and he was back at Würzburg on 24 or 25 May, having visited Henry II in Normandy in the meantime, and according to his

1. V, ff. 211r-v = Duchesne, 712 no. 408 = RHF., xvi, 144 no. 437.

2. Matilda was countess of Boulogne between 1160 and 1170 (Robert of Torigny, ed. Howlett, 207, 246). During that time Henry was in England only between Jan. 1163 and March 1166, with a brief visit to the continent between Feb. and May 1165 (Eyton 1878, 77, 79). But a date after July 1165 seems unlikely, since in that month Louis VII took back his sister Constance, who had been repudiated by Raymond of Toulouse (Pacaut 1964, 192), and she then laid claim to Boulogne as the widow of Stephen's son Eustace (cf. Alexander III's letters on the subject, JL 11417-18; these date from 1168, but the suit for dower had presumably been started some time before then). Mathilda would not have been well-disposed towards Louis after this, and indeed Henry II thought it worth while to approach her husband with a view to an alliance in 1166 (Materials, vi, 73 no. 253). T.p.q. is thus Jan. 1163; t.a.q., Feb. 1165. It seems best to apply Occam's razor and connect the letter with John Cumin's visit to the imperial court in 1164.

3. Eyton 1878, 78, 81.

4. Knipping 1901, no. 816.

own account¹ spent a considerable time there. It is easier to suppose that he made two journeys to the west, the first to England at the turn of 1164-5,² and the second to Normandy in April and May. He intended to visit Louis also on the second journey, but Henry was able to prevent this. He had himself met Louis at Gisors on 11 April, and a further meeting was arranged to be held a few days later at Pontoise. When Henry learned that Alexander was also going to be there he refused to come.³ This would not be surprising if Rainald was by this time with him. But it prevented Rainald from seeing Louis, since his instructions were to approach Louis only with Henry. All Rainald could do was to write to Louis asking him for the sake of the consanguinity between him and Frederick not to seem to undermine the imperial corona and honor by supporting Alexander; after the forthcoming meeting at Würzburg Frederick would send Rainald or other important ambassadors to consult with Louis. There is no reason to suppose that the regret Rainald expressed was insincere.⁴

1. 'Tantum enim moram penes regem Anglorum pro negotio eodem fecimus quod ad prefixum nobis terminum vix ad domum meum poterimus pervenire.' Letter to Louis VII, V, ff. 228v-229r = RHF, xvi, 120 no. 369. Rainald's late arrival at Würzburg (above, p. 131) shows that this was not simply a diplomatic excuse.

2. He was back at Goslar on 2 Feb. (Knipping 1901, no. 815). Two journeys by Rainald would also explain the discrepancy in the chronicle evidence noted by Eyton 1878, 78 note 4.

3. Foreville 1943, 169. Rainald blamed Henry for not letting him see Louis: '...rege Anglorum difficultatem temporum pretendente...!'

4. Gervase of Canterbury, ed. W. Stubbs, Rolls Series, 1879, i, 206, appears to have conflated either St.-Jean-sur-Laône or the embassy of 1168 (see above, pp. 151-2) with the one of 1165 in his story of the archbishop of Cologne's vilification of the French king. The story in the Annales Magdeburgenses, MGH, SS, xvi, 192, that Rainald was prevented from seeing Louis by the bishop of Beauvais (Henry of France?) and that this caused a 'dissensio' between Henry and Louis probably refers to 1160.

Appendix g: Frederick's edict against the Cistercians

The fragment (henceforth called E) to be discussed here was first published by Dom J. Leclercq.¹ It survives at the end of a Vatican manuscript containing the book of Isaiah with the glossa ordinaria and some historical notes. On the last folio, in two columns, are written, first Eterna in the version for Theobald, and then E, in the same hand but with a change of ink.² Leclercq thought that E was a postscript to Eterna, but this is impossible.³ The reference in E to the 'imperialis eminentia' shows us where to look for its authorship: either to Victor and his successors, or to Frederick, who is known to have issued an edict against the Cistercians for their support of Alexander III.⁴ At no other time between 1098 and circa 1225, the latest possible date for the manuscript, were the Cistercians in opposition to both pope and emperor.

It cannot be proved definitely that E is part of the edict issued by Frederick, rather than part of a similar edict issued by Victor or his successors, but the balance of probability favours an imperial rather than a papal origin. The cursus is not used,

1. Leclercq 1954b, 68-9.

2. Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, ms. Lat. 103, f. 114; on the ms. see Valtasso and Franchi 1902, 97.

3. None of the other copies of JL 10590 has the fragment (see above, p 232 note 6); papal letters do not have postscripts; Alexander could not have known anything about the English Cistercians' attitude to the schism on 5 Oct. 1159, when JL 10590 was sent out.

4. See below, pp. 257ff.

contrary to what one would expect in a papal document of this period,¹ and there are no references to Beatus Petrus or the sacro-sancta Romana ecclesia. E is also terse by comparison with other letters issued by Victor's chancery. The point has been reached by the third (incomplete) sentence, which is working up to the measures to be taken. Victor's other productions are slower-moving than this.² Positive evidence for an imperial origin is harder to produce. E is too short to allow much comparison with imperial documents, and in any case the technique of Diktatvergleich gives uncertain results when applied to letters and mandates.³ There are parallels in papal documents and elsewhere to 'unitatem ecclesie' and 'tamquam vagabundus...discurrere', but they have no great force.⁴ Two phrases deserve discussion. In the first sentence, the Cistercians are said to rage against 'nos et unitatem ecclesie'; in the third, the 'apostolica dignitas et imperialis eminentia' is said to be offended by their blind obstinacy. Since the unitas ecclesie must correspond to the apostolica dignitas, the nos probably corresponds to the imperialis eminentia. Certainly a man whose diplomata use the phrase 'nos et imperium' in all its

1. Poole 1912, 76ff.

2. Cp. JL 14443, 14445, 14481. No comparable letters have survived from Paschal or Calixtus.

3. Appelt 1967, 5.

4. 'Unitas ecclesie' is found in Victor's letter to Eberhard of Salzburg, JL 14445, but the phrase is an obvious one. 'Tamquam vagabundus...discurrere' is found in Alexander's letter to Henry of Rheims, JL 11272, but I suspect that the phrase comes from some commentary on the Rule of St. Benedict. Compare 'huc atque illuc discursitarent' in a letter of Wibald of Stablo's describing some rebellious monks (P. Jaffé, Monumenta Corbeiensia, Berlin, 1864, 204 no. 126).

cases,¹ and in whose circle the idea was current that regnum/imperium and ecclesia/sacerdotium were equal and co-operating partners who had received their powers directly from Christ,² could easily have spoken of himself and the unity of the church in one breath.³

The existence of Barbaro^ssa's edict is known from a sentence in Helmold's Cronica Slavorum, with some supporting evidence from two thirteenth-century sources.⁴ Helmold has a chapter on the course of the schism from 1159 up to the meeting at St.-Jean-sur-Laône. He begins by listing all the kingdoms who declared for Alexander,

Insuper Cisterciensis ordo eidem universus accesserat, in quo sunt...inestimabilis numerus. Hii singulis annis celebrant concilium apud Cistercium et decernunt ea, quae utilia sunt. Horum invincibilis sententia vel maximas vires addidit Alexandro. Quam ob rem iratus Cesar proposuit edictum, ut omnes monachi Cisterciensis ordinis, qui consistebant in regno suo, aut Victori subscribebant aut regno pellerentur; itaque difficile relatu est, quot patres, quanti monachorum greges, relictis sedibus suis, transfugere in Franciam.

There follows a description of the expulsion of Alexandrine bishops from Lombardy and elsewhere, and then an account of the fall of Milan and the meeting at St.-Jean-sur-Laône. Giesebrecht argued.

1. Cf. St. 3817a, 3901, 4027, etc.

2. Gesta, iii, 13, pp. 418/20; iv, 34, p. 584; iv, 66, pp. 646/8.

3. He used the phrase 'hostes ecclesie Dei et nostri' to describe the schismatics (i.e. supporters of Alexander) in the encyclical from Würzburg, MGH, Const., i, 316 no. 223 c. 6, which is a close if not an exact parallel.

4. Preiss 1934, 46-7 note 45, 179-80 note 11.

on general grounds that the edict was issued after the council of Würzburg, since Frederick tolerated Alexander's supporters north of the Alps before that date.¹ Ohnsorge, followed by Preiss, argued against this that Helmold's chapter was a chronological account of the schism, and that therefore the edict would have been issued in 1161, since in the narrative it precedes the fall of Milan.² But we should consider the purpose of Helmold's chapter before accepting this argument. It is there not because he was concerned with the schism as such, but because some of the main protagonists in his chronicle, Henry the Lion, Hartwig of Bremen, and Gerald of Lübeck, attended the meeting at St.-Jean-sur-Laône. In describing this Helmold naturally has to explain why such a meeting took place at all, and this leads him into giving a brief history of the schism. It is not however a chronological account. In his first sentence he mentions the adherence of Waldemar of Denmark to Alexander III; Waldemar did not accept Alexander until 1165 or 1166.³ Helmold brings in the Cistercians because of the importance he thought they had had in frustrating the meeting at St.-Jean-sur-Laône, and this naturally leads him to talk of Frederick's measures against them. All we can learn from Helmold is that the edict had been issued by the time he wrote his chapter, between 1165 and 1167.⁴

1. Giesebrecht, v, 474; vi, 445.

2. Ohnsorge 1929a, 8-10; Preiss 1934, 46-7.

3. Above, p. 57.

4. Schmeidler in his introduction to Helmold, p. ix, says that book I was written between 1163 and 1167, and nearer to the latter date. T.p.q. is Waldemar's adherence to Alexander.

Ohnsorge argued further that a letter written by Nendinus of Neuburg to Olricus of Herrenalb (both men Cistercian abbots) at the end of 1161 showed that an edict had already been issued by Frederick at that time:¹

...dum princeps et imperator noster non solum potestatibus humilioribus, verum etiam regnis et regibus exterminium minatur, qui sentientes cum Alexandro domno V. in soliditate gradus apostolici obviare conantur.

An earlier letter written to Nendinus by an abbot F. (possibly of Baumgarten in the diocese of Strassburg) says:²

Hinc nacta occasione [the decision of the Cistercian general chapter for Alexander] crudelis iam ordini nostro incumbit persecutio, adeo ut trans Rhenum quorundam bona totaliter publicentur, grangie diripiantur, cunctaque, que eis constant, pro voluntate conprovincialium distrahantur, quia videlicet domno.V. in confirmatione apostolicae dignitatis contraire videntur...

Neither of these passages is conclusive evidence of measures directed against the Cistercians from above. The first passage refers to the belligerent attitude of Frederick's court at the time;³ the second uses 'publicentur', confiscation, rhetorically not technically, and probably has in mind the difficulties experienced by Eberbach in the dispute over the archbishopric of Mainz.⁴ Frederick himself said in the encyclical from Würzburg that although support for Alexander had previously been a venial

1. Ohnsorge 1929a, 8-10; text *ibid.*, 30-1 no. 2

2. Ohnsorge 1929a, 29 no. 1.

3. See Burchard, ed. Güterbock 1949, 56-8; John of Salisbury, cit. above, p. 81.

4. See above, p. 168.

offence it would now be unforgivable.¹ This would not have been said if four years earlier Frederick had acted publicly against those Cistercians who favoured Alexander. Those who suffered in this early period from the schism did so not just because they supported Alexander, but because they had powerful enemies as well.²

The manuscript transmission of E helps to prove that a date of 1165-6 for the edict is correct. For this purpose it does not matter whether E is part of an imperial or of a papal document, since Barbarossa and his antipope would have acted simultaneously, as they did on other occasions.³ The important point is that the same scribe entered both JL 10590 and E; JL 10590 can therefore be used to show how and through whom E found its way into the manuscript. JL 10590 was readily available in England,⁴ but it is improbable that any English bishop would have been interested in the fate of Cistercians in the Empire, and no English Cistercian monastery had a German daughter-house. Becket on the other hand would certainly have been interested in the edict, and would clearly also have had access to JL 10590. He retired to the Cistercian abbey of Pontigny after going into exile, and stayed there until November 1166, when Henry II finally brought pressure to bear on

1. MGH Const., i, 316 no. 223 c. 6.

2. See above, pp. 166, 178.

3. Cf. St. 3915, which threatens imperial sanctions, and those of St. Peter, against transgressors, and the charter of Werner of Minden cit. above, p. 65 note 3.

4. See above, pp. 228-31.

the Cistercians to expel him.¹ Becket used his influence at the curia to support the candidacy of his host, Abbot Guichard, for the imperial archbishopric of Lyons,² and he and his circle took a considerable interest in the progress of the schism and the attitude of the imperial church towards Alexander. After the council of Würzburg, at which Henry II's legates had helped to continue the schism, any information which showed the consequences of their actions would have been useful ammunition for Becket. There were many ways in which he or his circle could have acquired E; apart from his hosts, the most likely possibility is Peter of Pavia, who was himself a Cistercian, undertook a legation to Burgundy on Alexander's behalf at the end of 1165, and is later found in correspondence with Becket after his own return to Italy.³ If transmission via Becket is accepted, then it is much more likely that the edict was issued after the council of Würzburg, in 1165 or early 1166. It would have been of interest to him and his friends then, but hardly so if by the time he arrived at Pontigny it was already three years old.

E breaks off before the measures to be taken are reached. Hel-
mold and the Chronicon Claravallense say that the Cistercians were

1. Hill 1971, 71.

2. Above, pp. 192-3.

3. Preiss 1934, 179-80; Materials, vi, 144-5 no. 182.

presented with the alternatives of exile from the empire or submission to the antipope.¹ The reference in E to the rule of St. Benedict suggests that it was also intended to enforce the observance of stabilitas loci. The 'duplex contritio' was probably both to have to take the oath to Paschal III and to remain at home, perhaps even to swear to do so. This would have given Frederick a convenient additional weapon against those Cistercians who acted as Alexander's messengers.² Whatever the measures, the effects of the edict were not great, being felt most in Burgundy; possibly the edict had special reference to this area.³ But it is still of some interest to know that Frederick did take particular measures against the Cistercians; it shows that those chroniclers who blamed the Cistercians for Alexander's success were echoing resentment felt at the imperial court.⁴

1. For references see p. 257 note 4.

2. See above, pp. 107-9.

3. Preiss 1934, 170-83; JL 13670.

4. Preiss 1934, 52 notes 75-6.

Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, ms. Lat. 103, f. 114vb

Cisterciensium tunicas, sub quibus sancte religionis putabatur latere sinceritas, contra nos et unitatem ecclesie furere diutius quam oportuerit hucusque patiencia nostra toleravit. Cum enim in claustris assidue sua et aliorum peccata deberent deflere et pro pace ecclesie Deum iugiter exorare, ipsi, velud filii seculi et discordie amatores, varias deceptionis species assumentes, ultra omnes mortales tamquam vagabundi huc atque illuc ceperunt discurrere, et scismaticorum erroribus fomenta prestantes pacem ecclesie conati sunt omnimodis pervertere, altare contra altare constituere. Quia igitur apostolica dignitas et imperialis eminentia predictorum monachorum ceca intencione offenditur, et eorum malitioso studio pax utriusque cotidie impeditur atque turbatur, necesse est duplici contritione conterantur, ut saltem beati Benedicti regulam, quam superbie spiritu...

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