

# **Explaining Security and Defence Integration: The Case of Europe**



**DPhil Thesis**

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## **Abstract**

What is driving the European Union (EU) to integrate in matters of security and defence? Why has the EU since the 1990s, and in fits and starts, built up defence institutions, published strategic documents, or launched security missions around the world? This dissertation suggests an answer to these questions that hinges on there being a security community in Europe within which states do not feel threatened by one another. Understanding the level of trust EU states have in one other as well as its bearing on the way they engage in negotiations about the management of their security is of fundamental importance when attempting to make sense of the emergence of the EU as a security actor.

States within Europe's security community and during the period covered by this thesis (1990-2016) suffered numerous external security shocks. These ranged from shifts in the geopolitical landscape surrounding them, to terrorist attacks to immigration crises. Shocks of this nature exposed the externalities of non-cooperation to policymaking elites in EU Member States, ultimately pushing them to seek the elevation of crisis management to the EU level. The outcome of the intergovernmental negotiations that followed each external shock depended on the degree of strategic interest overlap across EU states. This thesis makes evident that as EU integration in other fields progressed a form of spillover occurred where strategic interests converged and a common security and defence policy became an ever more attractive proposition.

The narrative suggested in the following pages also explains why EU Member States have sometimes been forced to attend to their security and defence affairs alone. This occurred when they were faced with a crisis with little impact on the strategic interests of other members of the security community. The complicated interactions between the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in turn, can also be seen through this theoretical lens and with the Alliance shielding Europeans from shocks or from the management of their consequences, therefore disincentivizing further EU integration in the field of security.

By taking the perspective of EU member states and looking at specific shocks and the reactions they produced the following pages provide an innovative take on a much-studied but poorly-understood subject. They also seek to bring together two relevant but almost entirely disconnected sets of literatures: broader international relations theory and empirical works on European security.

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## Abbreviations

|         |                                                     |
|---------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| AU      | African Union                                       |
| AFSJ    | European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice      |
| BBC     | British Broadcasting Corporation                    |
| CAR     | Central African Republic                            |
| CDU     | Christian Democratic Union of Germany               |
| CESEDEN | Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional  |
| CFSP    | Common Foreign and Security Policy                  |
| CIVCOM  | Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management |
| CLWTF   | Costs Lie Where They Fall                           |
| CMC     | Crisis Management Concept                           |
| CMPD    | Crisis Management Planning Directorate              |
| CONOPS  | Concept of Operations                               |
| COREPER | Committee of Permanent Representatives              |
| CPCC    | Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability            |
| CSDP    | Common Security and Defence Policy                  |
| CSU     | Christian Social Union of Bavaria                   |
| CV      | Condition Variable                                  |
| DSACEUR | Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe                |
| DV      | Dependent Variable                                  |
| EC      | European Commission                                 |
| ECAP    | European Capabilities Action Plan                   |
| ECC     | European Communities                                |
| ECJ     | European Court of Justice                           |
| ECOWAS  | Economic Community of West African States           |
| ECSC    | European Coal and Steel Community                   |
| EDA     | European Defence Agency                             |

|            |                                                                                                                                     |
|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| EDC        | European Defence Community                                                                                                          |
| EEAS       | European External Action Service                                                                                                    |
| EEC        | European Economic Community                                                                                                         |
| EPC        | European Political Cooperation                                                                                                      |
| EPICP      | European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection                                                                             |
| ESDC       | European Security and Defence College                                                                                               |
| ESDI       | European Security and Defence Identity                                                                                              |
| ESDP       | European Security and Defence Policy                                                                                                |
| ESS        | European Security Strategy                                                                                                          |
| EU         | European Union                                                                                                                      |
| EUFOR      | European Rapid Operational Force                                                                                                    |
| EUISS      | European Union Institute for Security Studies                                                                                       |
| EUROMARFOR | European Marine Force                                                                                                               |
| EUMC       | European Union Military Committee                                                                                                   |
| EUMS       | European Union Military Staff                                                                                                       |
| EURATOM    | European Atomic Energy Community                                                                                                    |
| FAC        | Foreign Affairs Council                                                                                                             |
| FDP        | Free Democrat Party of Germany                                                                                                      |
| FHQ        | Force Headquarters                                                                                                                  |
| FRONTEX    | European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the<br>External Borders of the Member States of the European Union |
| FYROM      | Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia                                                                                               |
| GAC        | General Affairs Council                                                                                                             |
| GAERC      | General Affairs and External Relations Council                                                                                      |
| GATT       | General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs                                                                                              |
| GCC        | Gulf Cooperation Council                                                                                                            |
| ICC        | International Criminal Court                                                                                                        |
| IDP        | Internally Displaced People                                                                                                         |

|          |                                                                  |
|----------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| IEEE     | Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos                       |
| IFRI     | Institut français des relations internationales                  |
| IMD      | Initiating Military Directive                                    |
| IR       | International Relations                                          |
| ISAF     | International Security Assistance Force                          |
| ISIS     | Islamic State of Iraq and Syria                                  |
| IV       | Independent Variable                                             |
| JHA      | Justice and Home Affairs Council                                 |
| LCC      | Land Component Command                                           |
| MINURCAT | United Nation's Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad |
| MP       | Member of Parliament                                             |
| MSO      | Military Strategic Options                                       |
| NAC      | North Atlantic Council                                           |
| NATO     | North Atlantic Treaty Organisation                               |
| NDD      | National Defence Directive (Spain)                               |
| NRF      | NATO Response Force                                              |
| NSS      | National Security Strategy                                       |
| OEEC     | Organization for European Economic Co-Operation                  |
| OHQ      | Operational Headquarters                                         |
| OpCdr    | Operation Commander                                              |
| OPLAN    | Operation Plan                                                   |
| OpsCen   | Operations Center                                                |
| PESCO    | Permanent Structured Cooperation                                 |
| POH      | Permanent Operational Headquarters                               |
| PSC      | Political and Security Committee                                 |
| PU       | Policy Unit of the High Representative                           |
| QDR      | Quadrennial Defence Review (UK)                                  |
| RoE      | Rules of Engagement                                              |

|          |                                                                               |
|----------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| SDSR     | Strategic Defence and Security Review (UK)                                    |
| SSDR     | Spanish Strategic Defence Review                                              |
| SHAPE    | Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe                                     |
| SIPRI    | Stockholm International Peace Research Institute                              |
| SNSC     | Spanish National Security Council                                             |
| SOR      | Statement of Requirements                                                     |
| SPD      | Social Democratic Party of Germany                                            |
| SSR      | Security Sector Reform                                                        |
| SSS      | Spanish Security Strategy                                                     |
| SWP      | Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik                                             |
| TAAF     | Terres australes et antarctiques françaises [French Southern Antarctic Lands] |
| TTIP     | Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership                                |
| UK       | United Kingdom                                                                |
| UN       | United Nations                                                                |
| UNIFIL   | United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon                                       |
| US / USA | United States of America                                                      |
| WEU      | Western European Union                                                        |
| WFP      | United Nations World Food Programme                                           |
| WMD      | Weapons of Mass Destruction                                                   |

## Chapter 1: Introduction

### An Unexplained Reality

Since the end of the Cold War the European Union (EU) has slowly emerged as an actor in the field of security and defence. This process has produced, as in other instances of European integration, new institutions and a growing body of common EU stances and action. These developments are as self-evident as they can be, with brick and mortar buildings being erected in Brussels, diplomats being employed by the Union, and soldiers being deployed around the world under an EU flag. From the mid-1990s to today, the Union created the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its hard-security arm, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), produced dozens of communiqués regarding security and defence issues, published a Security Strategy<sup>1 2</sup>, established economic sanctions against states as a means of coercing them, built a full-fledged diplomatic service, the European External Action Service (EEAS), and launched over two dozen training, monitoring and peacekeeping missions in places as diverse and far-flung as Chad, Bosnia, Indonesia and Afghanistan<sup>3</sup>.

The reasons that have led to a European security and defence have been studied only partially or unsatisfactorily. As Forsberg has indicated this poses a major challenge in the theoretical sense as “...the little theoretical work that exists on European defence either pre-dates the emergence of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) or does not

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<sup>1</sup> In June of 2016 the European Union published a “Global Strategy” to serve as its latest security strategy.

<sup>2</sup> The editing, citations and bibliography of this dissertation have followed Chicago style guidelines. See: The University of Chicago Press, *The Chicago Manual of Style* (London: The University of Chicago Press, 2010) and Kate L. Turabian, *A Manual for Writers for Research, Papers, Thesis, and Dissertations* (London: The University of Chicago Press, 2013).

<sup>3</sup> For a list of internal and external security areas where EU cooperation and integration has occurred see: Davis Cross, *Security Integration in Europe* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011), 7.

attempt to contribute to explanatory theorising”<sup>4</sup>. There seem to be two disconnected sets of literature on this subject. On the one hand, one finds a reduced number of scholarly works that seek to apply broader international relations theory to European security and defence<sup>5</sup>; and on the other, a corpus that sometimes engages in mid-range theorising but that in most instances focuses on empirical aspects of European security and defence. If a more comprehensive explanation about the drivers, strength and direction of European security and defence integration is to emerge these two sets of literature need to engage in a dialogue with one another. This thesis will strive to draw lessons from both in an attempt to construct a more nuanced narrative about developments in European security and defence of the last two decades and a half.

Practitioners interviewed for this thesis were particularly vague when delineating the overarching forces leading to EU action in this field. When asked if there was any structure behind EU security and defence action, Javier Solana, the European Union’s top diplomat for a decade (1999-2009), said: “You are going to find little systematization. Objectives were determined as things evolved. There was not prioritization before circumstances forced us to act”<sup>6</sup>. As we will see in future chapters he is not alone in that assessment, despite the fact that, quite evidently, the EU has developed capabilities and undertaken action in the field of security in a growingly forceful manner since the 1990s. We find ourselves, therefore, with a major puzzle in our hands, and one regarding a process that directly affects over 500 million people, and has an impact on almost all of the major security matters on the international agenda. Resolving that puzzle is the central

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<sup>4</sup> See Thomas Forsberg, “Explaining the Emergence of CSDP: Setting the Research Agenda” paper prepared for the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), Standing Group for International Relations (SGIR) Conference, (Turin: 12-15 September 2007), 1 as cited in Moritz Weiss, *Transaction Costs and Security Institutions: Unraveling the ESDP* (London: Palgrave, 2011), 5-6.

<sup>5</sup> Interestingly these more ‘theoretically-minded’ works are mostly penned by American scholars, although not exclusively (see following Chapter for a full literature review).

<sup>6</sup> Interview with Javier Solana, Madrid, 11-10-2012.

question of this thesis: *What is driving the European Union to integrate in matters of security and defence?*

The question above leads to many others. Why has Europe, a continent historically prone to conflict and war, remained largely at peace since the end of the Cold War? Or to phrase it differently: Why have states that have historically mistrusted one another decided to now cooperate so deeply and consistently? Indeed, why have sovereign states like France or Germany supported an integration process that limits their autonomy and that could lead to a significant erosion of sovereignty? Why did those states opt for the creation of more permanent arrangements at the EU level instead of ad hoc coalitions of the willing or alliances? Why did the EU emerge as a security actor when most Union Member States were already part of a large and successful defence alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)? This issue is in itself a major empirical puzzle as “...at first glance, a strengthened European pillar within NATO would have appeared to be the obvious path to European security and defence policy”<sup>7</sup>. Lastly, why have the same states that have pushed for the emergence of CFSP/CSDP remained active in the security field outside of the EU framework they themselves created, launching military interventions of their own, like for example France in Cote D’Ivoire in 2002 or more recently in Mali in 2013?

This complex map of European security and defence, with its many layers and dynamics, has made the development of a theoretical framework that can explain events on the ground extremely challenging. It also means that a relatively straightforward question, “why is the European Union slowly developing security and defence capabilities?” brings with it numerous others that need to be answered if one wants to understand the full story of European defence. This thesis is an attempt to provide answers

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<sup>7</sup> Weiss, *Transaction Costs and Security Institutions: Unraveling the ESDP*, 4-5.

to those questions and, in the process, to shine light on the drivers of security and defence integration.

## **Security and Defence Integration: Theory and Practice in Europe**

The lack of a comprehensive explanation for developments in European security and defence of the past two decades calls for a new theoretical framework to be developed. This thesis will put forward a framework and ultimately test it through the study of three specific cases: France, Germany and Spain. The sections below will look at each of the components of that framework with the goal of providing them with conceptual depth as well as anticipating some connections with the case of European security and defence integration since the 1990s.

### **A European Security Community**

This thesis posits that the very first requirement for independent political units to decide to integrate their security and defence policies is that they have ceased to see each other as security threats, and have established diplomacy and other peaceful means as the key tools with which to deal with one another. This state of affairs is what Karl Deutsch called a “security community”, and defined as a space where people are convinced “...that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of ‘peaceful change’”<sup>8</sup>. Deutsch differentiated between amalgamated and pluralistic security communities, with the former being the result of the merger of two or more previously independent political units (with the USA being a primary example), and the latter being made up of

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<sup>8</sup> Karl Deutsch, et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957), 2.

independent entities amongst which war is unthinkable (with the Sweden-Norway relationship being a case in point)<sup>9</sup>.

Many international relations scholars, and certainly most of those belonging to the realist school of thought believe that such communities cannot exist, with states being always concerned with their survival and in fear of others<sup>10</sup>. Still, a community of this nature seems to have been in place in Europe during the period under study (1990-2016) with EU Member States being consistently at peace and not behaving aggressively towards one another<sup>11 12</sup>.

Properly detecting the existence of a security community is, however, a challenging task. Peace would be a pre-requisite but other features would also have to be observed. First, threats to peace must lie beyond the boundaries of the security community. This threat perception must be contained in strategic documents, for example national security strategies, and reflected in the opinions of political elites in member states of the community. One could refer to this as the need for there to be a high level of trust among partners<sup>13</sup>. Some threats might originate in the territory of another member of the community but the member itself must not be seen as the one instigating it or being its ultimately source. The fundamental consequence of this trust is that security ceases to be a

---

<sup>9</sup> Decades later, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett provided a more elaborate framework to detect and measure the depth of pluralistic security communities. Adler and Barnett spoke of loosely-coupled security communities as those that have the minimal definitional properties of such communities: in essence, a transnational region whose members have dependable expectations of peaceful exchange. Tightly-coupled security communities, however, go further in that they have at least a “mutual aid” clause and a “system of rule that lies somewhere between a sovereign state and a regional, centralized, government”. See: Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (eds), *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 30.

<sup>10</sup> See Chapter 2 for a full literature review and in particular for realist takes on the existence of security communities.

<sup>11</sup> Members of a security community do not need to share each and every one of their strategic interests. There are security communities in the world, for example the US-Canada one whose members expect to remain at peace but have significantly different strategic interests around the world (and different security and defence policies). It is questionable whether a security community can really exist if its members have directly opposing interests but there is surely no need for their interests to fully overlap.

<sup>12</sup> Testing whether a European security community has existed and delineating its characteristics is extensively explored in Chapters 4, 4 and 6 of this dissertation.

<sup>13</sup> “Trust” here means having confidence in the peaceful intentions of other states.

zero-sum game among partners of a security community; what is good for one is not necessarily bad for the other and viceversa<sup>14 15</sup>.

Second, members of security communities should see in the community a space where their security can be forwarded. This can take the form of expressions of support for the community, of commitment to common values, or pleas for certain security issues to be dealt with at the security community level. Calling for certain important security matters to be tackled in partnership with others is a clear manifestation of the existence of a community of trust being in place<sup>16</sup>.

Lastly, members of the community must behave in a way that demonstrates they expect peace to remain in place within its boundaries. This forward-looking element of trust must again be reflected in strategic documents (which are long-term documents by definition) and in the opinion of elites. Another key indicator here would be patterns of defence spending. The military capacity of a state is a stock measure made up of past investments in security, be it in training, systems or equipment. Current patterns of spending are therefore a good window into the sort of capabilities a country wants for the future and therefore of the threats it expects to face<sup>17</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup> This definition of trust is narrower and simpler but not dissimilar from the one provided by Aaron M. Hoffman in a thorough essay on the matter where he concluded that: "Trusting relationships are behavioral manifestations of trust. They emerge when actors leave the fate of their interests to the discretion of others with the expectation that those actors will honor their obligation to avoid using their discretion in a manner harmful to the first". See: Aaron M. Hoffman, "A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 8 no. 3 (2002): 377.

<sup>15</sup> That trust is at the heart of cooperation and therefore a requirement for effective regional organisations was pointed out by Hartmut Mayer in a 2013 piece on the importance of reconciliation among former enemies: "...deep reconciliation and trust are, on the one hand, the pre-conditions for effective multilateralism and, on the other hand, the most lasting consequence of functioning institutional integration". See: Hartmut Mayer, "Thinking in Time: War Memories, post-War Responsibilities and Regional Co-operation in Europe and Asia" in *Effective Multilateralism: Through the Looking Glass of East Asia*, edited by Jochen Prantl (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), 133.

<sup>16</sup> See section below on "Intergovernmental Bargains" for a deeper analysis on the impact of collective gains mentality in complex multi-party supranational negotiations.

<sup>17</sup> Hartmut Mayer summarized the ideas above in the following way: "...below, above, within and surrounding any formal regional organization, one needs recognized and accepted patterns of practice and beliefs, deep mutual trust, a shared understanding of the challenges facing any organization and a reliable commitment to common action. General rules, procedures, norms and decision-making mechanisms,

Relations among European states studied for this thesis seem to display the characteristics described in the preceding section. Relations among them have indeed been peaceful, they have consistently considered threats to be beyond the boundaries of the EU and they have displayed a willingness to tackle security threats together.

For integration to take place, or for the aggregation of self-help at a supranational level to occur, there must be additional drivers beyond the lack of threat from other members of the community. As we will see, the evidence suggests that a two-pronged process underpins such forward movement. First comes the exposure of members of the security community to threats from without, and second, inter-governmental bargains where affected states seek cooperative solutions and common arrangements to tackle those crises (or future ones of a similar nature).

### **External Shocks**

The strategic environment inhabited by a state is essentially the addendum of security threats it faces at any given point in time. Threats range from armed conflict with other states, to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to terrorist attacks. A broad definition of threat would be any circumstance or development that puts at risk the strategic interests of a given actor<sup>18</sup>. States are sometimes exposed to specific events that seriously undermine their interests. These events, termed here “external” or “exogenous” shocks, originate outside the body politic (i.e. they are threats from without).

For external shocks to have any real bearing on state security and defence policy there must be a group or collective that connects the impact of crises with the design of policy;

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informal and formal ones, can only determine the interactions of states and institutions if they are embedded in communities of shared values and a common sense of shared historical obligations”. See: Hartmut Mayer, “Thinking in Time: War Memories, post-War Responsibilities and Regional Co-operation in Europe and Asia”, 135.

<sup>18</sup> Strategic interests are those of greatest importance to states. They feed into the planning process and end up driving the budget allocation for security and defence.

there needs to be a drive belt connecting both dynamics. That drive belt is, in the case of security and defence, composed of a reduced group of mostly domestic elites that understand the consequences of not protecting national interests properly<sup>19</sup>. Examples of such elites include policy planners as well as members of the diplomatic service or the armed forces. Businessmen will to some extent play a role, but it would be limited to those with significant interests abroad and the capacity to influence those in public office.

The process of European security and defence integration seems to have followed a logic similar to the one anticipated above: once hit by an external shock, national elites involved in security and defence policy turned to other members of the European security community for support. As a matter of fact the irregular nature of key processes of defence integration in Europe seems to respond to this very dynamic of external shocks acting as inflexion points in the path towards a unitary security and defence. Examples of external shocks abound but two have been of particular significance for European states in the last two decades: the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Those events changed the political map of Europe and brought with them numerous risks to European strategic interests. Indeed, those shocks seem to have affected all of the states studied in this thesis. As we will see, other shocks of a smaller scale hit specific states or groups of states and also produced a push for the involvement of the EU in security matters.

But, why are external shocks necessary at all when it comes to explaining security and defence integration? One of the central arguments of theories of integration is that states decide to elevate the governance of certain issues to the supranational level because of the externalities generated by not doing so. This is, for example, the case with tariff and non-

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<sup>19</sup> Andrew Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach", *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31, no. 4 (1993): 473-524.

tariff barriers, which, unless eliminated, impose costs on economic actors that operate across borders<sup>20</sup>. This is akin to saying that unless those barriers are eliminated hundreds or thousands of economic actors operating across borders will be constantly and repeatedly exposed to small shocks that hinder their interests. It is those shocks that lead economic actors to put pressure on their governments to establish supranational rules that level the playing field and reduce transaction costs. In security and defence, things work differently but do, however, follow a similar logic. The key actors are a reduced number of foreign and defence policymaking elites and the events that hinder their interests (or those of the states they represent) are security crises (or external shocks). These shocks are singular and sporadic, not constant and generalised like in the field of trade. But they play a very similar role: they expose the externalities of non-cooperation and force states to sit down and discuss the possibility of reacting in a coordinated fashion.

Whether common responses are attractive or not is ultimately dependent on the level of strategic interest convergence across members of the security community. For example, launching a common peacekeeping operation in a given country is a far more attractive proposition if the interests of a large number of actors are equally affected by instability there. Indeed, external shocks force political elites to seek the support of partners in tackling security challenges but it is the level of strategic interest overlap which ultimately determines how far cooperation or integration proceed.

### **Strategic Interests**

Given the above, it is clear that any approach to security and defence integration must bring strategic interests into the analysis. To understand the concept of strategic interests one needs, first, to have a clear idea of what strategy is. Carl von Clausewitz, arguably the

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<sup>20</sup> More on these theories, and in particular on Functionalism, in Chapter 2.

most influential modern thinker about war, defined overall strategy as “the theory of the use of engagements for the object of the War” and tactics as “the theory of the use of military forces in combat”<sup>21</sup>. Other authors have gone even further and interpreted Clausewitz’s original definition in expansive terms. This is the case of Colin Gray who sees in Clausewitz’s work a holistic approach to war where the fighting itself is secondary to prior considerations about the usefulness of the armed conflict and the resources available to pursue it. For Gray strategy is not just about the use of force to win a battle but rather “the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the *ends of policy*”<sup>22 23</sup><sup>24</sup>. Evidently, the key to good strategy is to understand what the ends of policy should be, and such ends must surely be tightly linked to the strategic interests of states: in other words, those of vital importance that might require the use of force for their protection.

Strategic interests are, ultimately, the drivers of defence policy. Rigorous planning processes start with a definition of an actor’s interests and are then followed by an analysis of the threats to those interests (which consequently determines the capabilities required for its protection). Figure 1.1 below contains a simplified depiction of a normal planning process.

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
<sup>21</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War* (Ware: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1997), 75.

<sup>22</sup> Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17.

<sup>23</sup> For more on Gray’s take on strategy see: Colin S. Gray, “Clausewitz rules, OK? The future is the past with GPS,” *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 5 (1999): 161-182.

<sup>24</sup> Liddell Hart in turn spoke of strategy as “...the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy” and defined the role of grand strategy as that of coordinating and directing “...all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war – the goals defined by *fundamental policy*” (my emphasis). See: Basil H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy: The Indirect Approach* (London: Nabu Press, 2011) as quoted in Gray, *Modern Strategy*, 18.

Figure 1.1. The Strategic Planning Process



Despite their evident centrality to defence policy, strategic interests are poorly defined in today's literature and are only vaguely referred to in most strategic documents studied for this thesis<sup>25 26</sup>. They were, however, regularly cited during elite interviews in Europe proving that they remain key drivers of policy but would benefit greatly from a better definition and quantification<sup>27 28</sup>. Also, and despite the fact that the central actors in the

<sup>25</sup> A series of studies have looked at the emergence of EU strategic thinking. Some of these are fine-grained essays about how strategic documents were drafted, who participated in the drafting and on the meaning of their content. The European Security Strategy of 2003 was a particular focus of attention for European scholars, in particular Sven Biscop and other colleagues in the Brussels academic and think tank world. See: Sven Bishop, *The European Security Strategy* (London: Ashgate, 2005) and Sven Bishop and Jan Joel Andersson, *The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a global Europe* (London: Routledge, 2008). The work by Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, on the other hand, has looked at the emergence of the EU as a strategic actor, one that can produce strategic analysis and bring the resources to bear and have the will to act; or as he would put it: puts forward clear *ends*, has the *means* to affect change and the *resolve* to act. See: Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, *The European Union and Military Force* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

<sup>26</sup> Even works that look specifically at the role played by "national interests" in the EU integration process like the book by Haaland Matlary refuse to provide concise definitions, let alone a catalogue of strategic interests of Member States. See: Janne Haaland Matlary, *European Union Security Dynamics: In the New National Interest* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009).

<sup>27</sup> For a broad (and to some extent too broad) analysis of the European strategic landscape see: Thierry Tardy, *European Security in a Global Context* (London: Routledge, 2009).

planning process in Europe are still EU Member States, very few studies have actually focused on national perspectives on CFSP/CSDP.

This thesis has followed a different path and focused heavily on the role of states in the integration process<sup>29 30 31 32 33</sup>. Over the course of the research it has become apparent that European states, and despite their apparent historical, political and economic differences, happen to share a large catalogue of interests. As a matter of fact, and as we will see in future chapters, European integration seems to be producing a convergence of interests across the continent. Over the years European states have, for example, developed a tightly intertwined economic system, which means that threats to the economy of one are now a source of worry to others<sup>34</sup>. The creation of the Schengen Area<sup>35</sup> is another important example of this process as it turned the protection of national frontiers into a common European challenge. As integration progresses in new fields, say energy policy, the incentive to cooperate on matters of security and defence will, yet again, increase, and threats to the supply or infrastructure of one state will become a threat to the rest as well.

This process of strategic interest convergence constitutes a special case of functional spillover. Indeed, integration in trade and other economic matters seems to be slowly

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<sup>28</sup> A breakdown of the concept of strategic interest was suggested in an essay published by the Istituto de Affari Internazionali. See: Manuel Muniz, *Strategy and Its Role in the Future of European Defense Integration* (Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2013).

<sup>29</sup> For a collective volume with a similar focus see: Federico Santopinto and Megan Price eds., *National Visions of EU Defence Policy* (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2013).

<sup>30</sup> Another example of scholarly work that looks at national security and defence policies in Europe: Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon, *The European Union and National Defence Policy* (London: Routledge, 1997).

<sup>31</sup> See also: Christopher Hill (ed.), *National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983).

<sup>32</sup> See: Christopher Hill (ed.), *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge, 1996).

<sup>33</sup> For an interesting take on the attitudes and policies of France, Germany and the UK towards rising powers see: Hartmut Mayer, "Declining might in the limelight: European responses to new regional powers," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 16, No 2 (August 2009), pp. 195-214.

<sup>34</sup> An excellent and readily-available tool that can be used to assess the trading patterns of states across time is the "Atlas of Economic Complexity" developed by Harvard's Center for International Development (CID) and the Macroconnections Group at MIT's Media Lab. It can be accessed here: <http://www.atlas.cid.harvard.edu/>

<sup>35</sup> The Schengen Area is the area comprising 26 European countries that have abolished internal borders.

producing an incentive in Europe for the movement towards unity in security and defence. At the very least, and as we will see, it is enabling EU Member States to make much more compelling cases for common European action when some of their interests are affected by a security crisis. The case for common reactions to external security shocks has been made repeatedly by European states, mostly in intergovernmental fora. These bargains are another central feature of the integration process.

### **Intergovernmental Bargains**

EU Member States have usually sought to elevate the management of security crises they have suffered to the EU level through negotiations with their Union partners. Negotiation analysis provides us with some useful concepts and tools when it comes to studying the features and characteristics of intergovernmental bargains. Perhaps the two that are most significant are those of Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) and Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA). A state's BATNA is essentially its fall-back option, or its alternative to arriving at an agreement with others<sup>36</sup>. Bad BATNAs lead negotiating parties to be ready to make big sacrifices because the alternative is extremely unappealing. Also, if unanimity is needed to make decisions, the strongest of all the parties' BATNAs becomes the floor of the negotiation. This is, agreements will be reached that reflect the lowest common denominator (that which all parties are allowed to accept before any one of them walks out of the negotiation).

A negotiation's ZOPA is, in turn, the spectrum of possible agreements that could settle the discussion and it is closely linked to the parties' BATNAs. A negotiation

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<sup>36</sup> In supranational negotiations of the nature described here, a state's BATNA is tackling the external shock by itself or not supporting the directly affected party. It should also be noted here that this concept of a BATNA is tightly linked to the previous one of externalities of non-cooperation. As a matter of fact, those externalities are another way of expressing an idea identical to that of BATNA: the cost of not tackling crises together.

involving parties with weak BATNAs (i.e. with parties that have a lot to gain from cooperation) will have a large ZOPA<sup>37</sup>.

Negotiation analysis is also a helpful tool when analysing the outcomes of intergovernmental bargains in a security community like the EU<sup>38</sup>. The first issue that needs to be pointed out is that in a security community parties are interested in the maximisation of collective value rather than in claiming value for themselves. This does not mean that parties are altruistic but it does mean that they do not seek to obtain relative gains (in security terms) in relation to their counterparts. This is a significant conditioning factor since it excludes aggressive value-claiming strategies. We can also safely assume that intergovernmental negotiations within this setting are transparent, with abundant exchange of information and a general desire to arrive at a Pareto-optimal outcome<sup>39</sup>. These elements are essential for the understanding of negotiated outcomes within a security community. They are also part of the reason why defence integration can only occur within the bounds of one.

So, negotiation analysis allows us to give some depth to the previously sketched process of security and defence integration particularly regarding four issues:

1. Within a security community states will not seek to obtain relative gains (in terms of security) in relation to their counterparts. Negotiations will be open, transparent and seek a Pareto-optimal outcome.

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<sup>37</sup> A large ZOPA, in turn, means that there are many possible successful outcomes to the negotiation. A narrow ZOPA means only a very limited number of outcomes are acceptable to the parties, making agreement more difficult. Some negotiations lack a ZOPA altogether, meaning that parties can sit down and negotiate but with positions so radically different that no agreement is possible. In the field of security and defence, one fundamental determinant of the scale of the ZOPA is the level of strategic interests overlap between the parties.

<sup>38</sup> There is some literature on this specific subject although it is not abundant. See: Manuel Muniz, "The Negotiation of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy" (Reading and Research Paper, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge, MA, 2010).

<sup>39</sup> For a brief note on Pareto optimality see:

[https://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Pareto\\_efficiency.html](https://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Pareto_efficiency.html)

2. The more significant the external shock, the greater the externalities of non-cooperation, and so the weaker the BATNA of the affected state(s). As BATNAs weaken, states will be more willing to make sacrifices in order to arrive at a common response.
3. In an international negotiation where all parties have veto capacity, the strongest BATNA is the one that determines the parameters, and above all the “floor”, of the agreement. Any negotiated settlement must be better for each negotiating state than their respective BATNA. This translates to agreements being built around the lowest common denominator.
4. The wider the catalogue of shared strategic interests by states the greater the ZOPA in negotiations on security and defence. The wider the ZOPA the easier it will be to arrive at negotiated agreements and, ultimately, to integration in this field.

EU intergovernmental bargains in the field of CFSP/CSDP seem to fit the characteristics defined above. The success of French, German and Spanish policymakers in getting the EU as a whole to react to threats that initially seemed to affect only them was, for example, highly dependent on there being a base of shared interests to protect. Given that in security and defence matters Member States have retained a veto capacity, it was the lowest common denominator that determined the outcome of EU intergovernmental bargains<sup>40 41 42</sup>.

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<sup>40</sup> Muniz, *Strategy and Its Role in the Future of European Defense Integration*.

<sup>41</sup> In a piece in Foreign Affairs Riccardo Alcaro and Jeremy Shapiro summarized this idea in the following way: “When there is a strong consensus, the high representative’s<sup>41</sup> role most closely resembles that of a normal foreign minister -- he or she has great leeway to devise and implement policies...when member states have conflicting interests and all care about a particular issue...the high representative is limited to proposing lowest-common-denominator options”. See: Jeremy Shapiro and Riccardo Alcaro, “High Representative, High Expectations”, *Brookings*, 4 September, 2014, accessed 15/03/2015, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/09/04-high-representative-expectations-eu-shapiro-alcaro>

<sup>42</sup> Perhaps the clearest description of this dynamic came from Bernardino Leon, Spain’s former Deputy Foreign Minister and at the time of the interview the EU’s Special Representative for the Southern

Given that these discussions occurred within a community of trust, that strategic interests are durable and that those negotiating expect to face similar future security challenges, EU states have repeatedly preferred going beyond sheer cooperation and opted for more permanent arrangements, including setting up common institutions, permanent decision-making structures and others.

The conceptual outline above paired with observations on the ground also seems to explain why some EU Member States still decide to go at it alone. There are still instances where European states have a particular interest in a country or region that is not shared by the rest. French interests in Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa are emblematic in this regard. When a crisis arises in these places, it is hard to build a European-wide consensus for action, and sometimes only national interventions are feasible. This speaks to the imperfect nature of European integration, and points to the need for further strategic interest convergence in Europe if security and defence integration is to deepen.

The tight connection between external shocks, interest, and intergovernmental bargains is also what makes the interaction between CFSP/CSDP and NATO so complex. As a matter of fact, the CSDP-NATO relationship, if scrutinized through the theoretical lens of this thesis, becomes an almost pathological one, in which the EU's emergence as a security actor is hampered by the Alliance's presence in the continent. The ability of Europeans to get the US to address their security concerns and to cover the costs of their defence has over time aborted the normal cycle of 'shocks-domestic reactions-EU negotiation' delineated in this thesis. The fact that integration in this field only started as the Cold War reached its end, and the United States started to suggest the possibility of leaving European security in the hands of Europeans, points in this direction. The handing

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Mediterranean, when he said the following: "Europe's foreign and security policy is one of consensus. On issues where Member States agree to a large extent the lowest common denominator can actually be high...where they do not, the lowest common denominator can be exasperatingly low". Source: Interview with Bernardino Leon, Madrid, 28-10-2012.

over of some security responsibilities to Europeans in the 1990s was, from this perspective, necessary for the birth of CFSP/CSDP.

### **Security and Defence Integration**

The end result of the interactions described above is “security and defence integration”. It is this study’s dependent variable. The fact that the dissertation speaks of “security and defence” and not just of “defence” or of “security” is due to the fact that the boundaries of security policy and defence policy have been redefined over the past decades and a real overlap between both areas has ensued. This has itself been produced by a number of trends including globalisation, and interdependence as well as innovation, which has led to the rise of new security threats such as terrorism, migratory flows, and cyber attacks<sup>43 44</sup>.<sup>45</sup> Any analysis that looks today at integration in this field must approach the subject from a wide angle and take into account different threats and the different tools that states have today to respond to them.

Also, when studying integration one has to outline from the beginning whether it is understood as an end state or as a process. Static definitions of integration are narrower and normally set the researcher on a path to locate certain decision-making arrangements that imply the effective cession of state sovereignty. Ceded sovereignty is what enables certain supranational institutions to formally decide on policy issues and have those decisions imposed on members of the institution. In general terms, sovereignty is considered to have been formally ceded when a state enters a legal arrangement that

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<sup>43</sup> Roland Paris, “Human Security. Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?,” *International Security* 26, no. 2 (2001): 87-102.

<sup>44</sup> Some have termed this “the emergence of the post-Westphalian state”. See: Emil Kirchner and James Sperling, *EU Security Governance* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008).

<sup>45</sup> The “broadening” of the security agenda is a fact today with numerous institutions within a state, including its defence ministry and others taking care, in a coordinated manner, of the task of protecting citizens.

allows for decisions of a supranational body to be imposed on it even if it did not participate in their making or if it disagrees with their stipulations. States retaining veto capacity over decisions taken by international organizations would equate to non-integration. Such a definition likens integration to the extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) in decision-making at supranational bodies. With QMV a state might find itself on the wrong side of a decision and yet be obliged to abide by its stipulations. This formal and juridical process of erosion of state power is to many what integration is all about<sup>46</sup>.

Figure 1.2 below shows a simplified spectrum of state relations that ranges from full autonomy to integration. As states move along the spectrum, they lose the ability to act as they wish and start to require the agreement of others to decide on policy and action. Static definitions of integration look at the boxes in that spectrum and catalogue states or groups of states depending on their ability to act autonomously in various fields.

*Figure 1.2. Simplified Spectrum of Defence Relations*



Integration defined in static terms leaves out the fundamental developments prior to the formal cession of sovereignty. The formal agreement to establish this or that decision-making procedure could be understood as the end of integration and not integration itself, which is what should be of interest to social scientists studying the processes through

<sup>46</sup> Authors that belong to the group that define integration in such narrow terms include Seth Jones or Sebastian Rosato. When speaking of defence Jones says the following: "To be clear, I use the term 'cooperation' rather than 'integration' because...behaviour has been intergovernmental, not supranational. Major foreign policy and defence decisions are still made in [national] capitals" See: Seth G. Jones, *The Rise of European Security Cooperation* (New York: Cambridge, University Press, 2007), 4-5. Rosato, in turn, defined integration as "...a form of centralized cooperation whereby states agree to joint control over their militaries or economies, or to cede authority over military or economic affairs to a supranational institution" See: Sebastian Rosato, *Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Community* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2012), 15.

which political communities become entangled with one another. This is, integration can also be understood as the process of emergence of a single actor in a given field. Scholars that understand integration in these terms are more interested in the in-between phases of Figure 1.2, in the arrows that connect the different phases of state defence relations, or the processes that take states from autonomy to cooperation or from cooperation to integration. Ernst Haas, belonged to such a group of scholars, and his definition of integration involved both understanding it as a process and looking at the loyalties and preferences of state actors<sup>47</sup>. By looking at actors within states and at their motivations, Haas saw deep integration occurring in Europe in the late 1950s, well before anyone else. That those domestic actors then decided to give their cooperation a stronger legal framework and to bind their states within it, was for Haas a natural consequence of years of interaction in European fora. It is doubtful that authors with a much narrower, legalistic and static definition of integration would have defined the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as anything more than functional cooperation. They would have, of course, missed the mark woefully because the ECSC was the first important initiative in the now decades-long European integration project, and the model followed when the European Economic Community (EEC), the predecessor of the European Union, was founded in 1957<sup>48</sup>.

Before the drivers towards integration can be fully understood one has to provide a clear depiction of what an integrated security and defence actor looks like. Here it might be best to shy away from generic definitions like the ones referenced above and instead

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<sup>47</sup> Haas famously defined integration as "...the process whereby political actors, in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states" See: Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1958), 16.

<sup>48</sup> Jolyon Howorth has famously referred to European Security and Defence integration as a "work in progress". See: Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union* (London: Palgrave, 2014), 1.

use an ideal type integrated defence actor as a benchmark. If our object of study is slowly adopting some of those characteristics we can safely say that some form of defence integration is taking place<sup>49</sup>.

Of course, the most important element of this process is the establishment of a rigorous ideal type. When attempting to assess defence integration there is little doubt that the most integrated security and defence units in the international system today are states. That makes them the perfect model around which an ideal type could be built. Modern states are constructed on the assumption that the federal or central entity will protect all its parts. This commitment to collective security, almost always reflected formally in some higher legal document like a Constitution, is the cornerstone of any form of defence integration. Also, if one looks at countries today, one sees that their common defence is arranged around a set of strategic documents (or doctrine). These strategic documents have their own hierarchy with national security strategies or white books of defence at the very top<sup>50</sup>. Topic-specific strategic documents like “cyber security strategies” also exist.

Broad commitments to common defence and top strategy documents are always accompanied in nation states by numerous institutions that deal with security and defence issues. The most central of those institutions are normally the Defence Ministry or the Ministry of the Interior, but there are also advisory bodies attached to the executive branch of government like the National Security Council in the US as well as institutions that deal specifically with lower level planning and procurement. Indeed, coordinated defence procurement is another characteristic of an integrated defence actor. Some form of target setting regarding military capabilities and coordinated purchasing of systems and equipment is commonplace in states around the world.

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<sup>49</sup> The methodology of setting an ideal type integrated actor and defining integration as the process of politics becoming more and more like it, is not alien to the field of integration studies. Haas himself used it in the 1950s and 1960s when studying the birth of new political entities.

<sup>50</sup> See for example the archive of US National Security Strategies here: <http://nssarchive.us>

Some form of common military action, or at least the capacity to perform security and defence tasks, is yet another indicator of security and defence integration. The institutions cited above should be capable of launching security and military missions in pursuit of the goals contained in shared strategic documents while making use of the capabilities obtained through common procurement processes. Additionally, states' security and defence policy is usually part of a broader foreign policy agenda, so when they act they have a wide set of non-military instruments at their disposal like development aid, a diplomatic corps, institutional development tools and others. These civilian elements can be deployed before, after, or in conjunction with military personnel and are a testament to the depth and broadness of national security actors.

A last but extremely significant characteristic of states as defence actors is that the duration of their existence is indeterminate; they are, in general terms, there to stay. The unity of China and its ability to wield military might beyond the country's borders is not dependent on a one-off desire to perform this or that function. Rather, fully integrated defence actors display a vocation of permanence. They are constituted to remain in place and to protect underlying interests of vital importance.

From the above, we can derive that integrated defence actors display, at least, the following seven characteristics:

1. A common defence clause
2. A unitary doctrine
3. Common security and defence institutions
4. Coordinated procurement
5. Joint action
6. Defence and security activities being inserted into broader diplomatic objectives and accompanied by civilian tools

## 7. A vocation of permanence

If those are the features of an integrated defence actor, then it is reasonable to define integration as the process through which others develop them. Not all need to be developed at once or at the same pace, but for integration to be truly taking place some forward movement should be evident in all seven categories<sup>51</sup>.

Of course one could argue that capable defence actors display other characteristics such as a clear and permanent command and control structure, a central political decision-making authority or permanent military forces. These are, however, not central features of defence agency in that many of them can be set up in an *ad hoc* manner and still allow for action in this field. Also, some of them are only partially possessed by states we deem perfectly capable defence actors<sup>52</sup>. The list above serves the purposes of this thesis well as forward movement in those categories is sufficient proof that there is a desire on the part of those pushing for that progress for a common security and defence to emerge.

As will be detailed in Chapter 3, the EU has seen a deepening of common arrangements along the seven integration vectors delineated above. The EU has today a common defence clause right at the heart of its legal design, it produces strategic documents, including a security strategy, has the ability to launch missions around the world and embeds its security activities in broader foreign policy objectives. Progress has been haphazard and remains imperfect in many of these areas but forward movement over the past two decades is undeniable. This suggests that there has indeed been

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<sup>51</sup> Forward movement means here changes that take a community of states closer to possessing the seven characteristics of the ideal type integrated security and defence actor.


<sup>52</sup> Some states, for example, have the capacity to mobilize forces through a draft but their permanent forces are of a very reduced size, or have very limited capacity to decide on the use of force (some even require UN Chapter VII resolutions to engage in expeditionary operations).

movement along the dependent variable of this study and that an explanation of the process and its drivers is, therefore, warranted.

### A New Narrative for Security and Defence Integration in Europe

The narrative outlined in the preceding sections and developed in the rest of the thesis is straightforward. Defence integration occurs when a security community made up of states that share strategic interests is exposed to external shocks. In theoretical terms this could be depicted as defence integration being this study's dependent variable (DV), the existence of a security community as its independent variable (IV) and both shared strategic interests, and external shocks as condition variables (CV). Figure 1.3 below shows this in a schematic fashion with 'A' being the existence of a security community, 'B' defence integration, and 'C' and 'D' the external shocks and shared strategic interests respectively.

*Figure 1.3: Security and Defence Integration in Theory*<sup>53</sup>



In principle, a security community can lead to security and defence integration, but for that to happen we need to see both external shocks hitting the community and its members sharing strategic interests. This means that the condition variables of this study also happen to be necessary conditions for integration to take place. The two figures below

<sup>53</sup> This Figure has been elaborated following the concepts and terminology proposed by Stephen Van Evera. See: Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 7-17.

show in a schematic fashion the interaction between these variables and defence integration.

Figure 1.4: Interaction between a Security Community and External Shocks


|                                              |     | SECURITY COMMUNITY<br>(NO THREAT TO ONE ANOTHER) |                           |
|----------------------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|
|                                              |     | YES                                              | NO                        |
| EXTERNAL SHOCKS<br>(THREATS FROM<br>OUTSIDE) | YES | DEFENCE<br>INTEGRATION<br>POSSIBLE               | NO DEFENCE<br>INTEGRATION |
|                                              | NO  | PEACE BUT NO<br>INTEGRATION                      | NO DEFENCE<br>INTEGRATION |

Figure 1.5: Interaction between a Security Community and Strategic Interests

|                                  |     | SECURITY COMMUNITY<br>(NO THREAT TO ONE ANOTHER) |                           |
|----------------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|
|                                  |     | YES                                              | NO                        |
| SHARED<br>STRATEGIC<br>INTERESTS | YES | DEFENCE<br>INTEGRATION<br>POSSIBLE               | NO DEFENCE<br>INTEGRATION |
|                                  | NO  | PEACE BUT NO<br>INTEGRATION                      | NO DEFENCE<br>INTEGRATION |

Now, for integration to occur, and as anticipated above, you need to have a security community in place, whose members are exposed to external shocks and have shared strategic interests. Figure 1.6 shows this theoretical narrative in a decision-tree format.

Figure 1.6: Decision Tree of Security and Defence Integration



The evidence accumulated for this thesis strongly suggests that European security and defence integration has been driven by a dynamic similar to the one described above. The empirical chapters of the thesis will look at three EU Member States and study the interplay of the various components of the theoretical narrative suggested here in an attempt to test its validity and explanatory power.

### Research Design, Case Selection and Methodology

Because of the fundamental role played by states in the approach delineated above, I chose to focus my analysis on developments in states, and in particular within three very significant ones: France, Germany and Spain.

It is important to explain here the reasons behind the selection of these three states and, also, why the UK, one of Europe's major defence actors has not been addressed directly. Any study about a field where consensus is required to take action should try to cover as much diversity of actors as possible. France, Germany and Spain are very different Member States, with different histories, military traditions, as well as EU and NATO policies. Importantly, each could be seen as representing a different set of states or of national perspectives in the CFSP/CSDP debate. Germany shares key strategic concerns with Eastern EU states such as Poland, the Baltic states, Romania and Bulgaria. Spain in turn, with interests in the Southern Mediterranean and modest defence spending, shares the outlook of Italy. France, in turn, is a more ambitious actor with interests around the world, like the UK, yet with a mixed relationship with NATO, and very committed to European integration; this last characteristic connects it well with numerous other European states that see in CSDP the future of their defence. By studying France, Germany and Spain we cover with limited time and resources an ample spectrum of EU state preferences and priorities.

The UK's relationship with CSDP, although fascinating and complex, seems to be unique in Europe. It is true that the UK was one of the states most committed to the launch of CSDP in the late 1990s; also, it has sometimes been a real spoiler of EU integration, like for example with its long-held opposition to the creation of a permanent EU military headquarter (or OHQ)<sup>54</sup>. These features make it an interesting case study but still a very peculiar and specific one. The recent decision by the UK to leave the European Union entirely only makes this point more apparent. Overall, I believe the UK should be the

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<sup>54</sup> The latest open spat about the issue of the establishment of an OHQ occurred in 2011 when the governments of Italy, France, Germany, Spain and Poland requested top EU officials to circumvent the UK's opposition the measure. See: Bruno Waterfield, "'Big five' tell Baroness Ashton to bypass Britain over EU military HQ", *The Telegraph*, 8 September, 2011, accessed 19/04/2015, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/8747399/Big-five-tell-Baroness-Ashton-to-bypass-Britain-over-EU-military-HQ.html>

focus of a singular study and not one of three states studied as a part of a doctoral dissertation on the drivers of EU security and defence.

Following the structure of the approach delineated in the preceding section, this study required, first and foremost, to ascertain whether a security community existed in Europe. This called for an in-depth analysis of multiple documents where threat perceptions are contained. The following are but a few examples of such documents:

1. International treaties and other public law arrangements between EU members states, including Union treaties
2. EU Member States' top strategy documents dating from the mid 1980s to today (2013). Examples of these include the French *Livres Blancs sur la Défense et la Sécurité Nationale* of 1994, 2008 and 2013, the Spanish National Security Strategies of 2011 and 2013, or the German 2006 and 2013 White Papers on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr (German armed forces).
3. Lower doctrinal documents with strategic content like Germany's Defence Policy Guidelines of 2003 and 2011, France's Military Programme Laws covering the period 1989-2019, or Spain's numerous National Defence Directives (1984, 1986, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012)
4. Defence budgets
5. Official statements on defence policy
6. Interviews with Spanish, French, German and US policymakers (see Appendix 1 for a list of the interviews conducted for this dissertation).

Because the 'national perspective' on CFSP/CSDP has only been used a reduced number of times in academic studies, the empirical chapters of this thesis (chapters 4-7) have relied very heavily on primary sources, such as the ones listed above. This is also

true of the NATO chapter although in both instances an effort has been made to provide abundant supporting literature. Additionally, the extensive review of scholarly work provided in the following chapter aims to embed the entirety of this study within the broader literature in a clear manner and to prove that the issues addressed here have wide-ranging theoretical implications.

Beyond primary documents, this thesis has used abundant material from semi-structured interviews in various EU Member State capitals<sup>55</sup>. In a field of policy very much driven by the action of elites, the findings from elite interviews are of particular value. Through elite interviews the following issues were evaluated: the basic threat perception of EU states, the opinion of defence policymakers regarding other EU states, the reading made by decision-makers of past and current security crises (i.e external shocks), the way NATO feeds into the expectations of national defence policies in Europe, and the specific national attitudes towards CFSP/CSDP. A majority of interviewees fell within one of the following four categories:

- Officials in national foreign affairs and defence ministries
- Officials in chancelleries or prime minister offices
- Officials with experience in EU and NATO affairs
- Politicians with responsibilities over defence policy

Close to forty structured interviews were conducted for this thesis between 2012 and 2015. All interviews were semi-structured, and lasted between 30 and 120 minutes. An

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<sup>55</sup> Other authors have preferred to conduct structured interviews and an abundant literature exists on the subject. See: Michael E. Campion, James E. Campion and J. Peter Hudson Jr., "Structured Interviewing: A Note on Incremental Validity and Alternative Question Types", *Journal of Applied Psychology* 79, no. 6 (1994): 998-1002. Semi-structured interviews, however, proved more effective in this instance due to the subject matter, the fact that interviewees would only be available for a single conversation and the importance of giving them enough margin of maneuver to express their opinions. For further reading on semi-structured interviewing see: Robert L. Peabody et al., "Interviewing Political Elites", *Political Science and Politics* 23, no.2 (1990): 451- 455.

original selection of around 10 interviewees in each capital was followed by others arranged through ‘snowballing’ (i.e. one interviewee recommending others). The original selection targeted people involved in foreign and security policy design, and also those with direct involvement in CFSP/CSDP affairs. In this process I had the support of three institutions that hosted me while in Madrid, Paris and Berlin. These were, respectively: the Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos (IEEE), Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI), and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP).

Elite-interviewing is not free of risk. Snowballing, for example, can lead to interviewing similarly-minded people. I tried to prevent this by expanding the number of interviews and by deliberately searching for individuals that might shine light on specific issues not covered by other interviewees. The material of the interviews was treated with great transparency. Almost all interviews were on the record and were recorded for greater accuracy when quoting verbatim<sup>56</sup>. The content of a single interview was never considered sufficient to establish the validity of an argument. As shown in the empirical chapters, it was the cross referencing of various interviews as well the connection with the content of formal documents that produced some of the conclusions of this thesis<sup>57</sup>.

The theoretical design suggested here also called for a rigorous analysis of how external shocks affected European states and whether they led to calls for further European integration, and how those calls were received in other EU Member States. This required connecting shocks to the specific interests being put at stake, and to the subsequent action of national elites. In essence we needed to see if the erratic progress of

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<sup>56</sup> Elite interviews conducted for this thesis were done under authorization by the Central University Research Ethics Committee of the University of Oxford (granted in the spring of 2012).

<sup>57</sup> This thesis is built on positivist assumptions about the rationality of actors and of our ability to extract valid readings from statements, speeches, interviews and other expressions of ideas and thought. There is, of course, abundant work on the role of ideas and discourse in policymaking particularly coming from the constructivist school. Of relevance here is the work by Vivien Schmidt on “Discursive Institutionalism”. See: Vivien A. Schmidt, “Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse”, *Annual Review of Political Science* 11 (2008): 303–326.

European defence integration was indeed caused by the need to have external shocks precede integration, and for strategic interest convergence to allow for consensus building in EU decision-making. For this to be studied one needs to look in detail at the following:

1. The recent history of external security shocks that affected the European states under study (Spain, France and Germany)
2. The opinions of national elites about furthering integration before and after significant external shocks
3. Decision-making at the EU level

The study of the role of external shocks was begun with some preconceptions about which of them had been significant (i.e. which had affected major national interests and had produced a policy response at the EU level). However, an effort was made to apply an objective method regarding their ultimate selection. There was no *ex ante* selection of shocks. The study of strategic documents, which preceded the interviews, already flagged certain security crises that had been significant enough to make it into formal planning documents. Elite interviews then provided abundant detail into the thinking of national elites regarding shocks suffered by their countries and the policy responses they produced. National elites were quite consistent in their assessment of crises suggesting that the shocks covered in the thesis were indeed the most significant for each of the Member States studied and for the time period selected.

However, two major security crises have not been included in this study. One is the 9/11 attacks on the United States and the other is the 2003 invasion of Iraq (also known as the Second Iraq War). There are two fundamental reasons for this omission. The first is that both crises fit very uncomfortably within the definition of external shock provided in this thesis. 9/11 was an attack on a non-EU member. It was a significant event for NATO

but the evidence suggests that it was not as relevant for the EU. This latter point, however, does not mean that 9/11 had no impact on EU security and defence, something the secondary literature has addressed generously. In some instances the case has even been made that 9/11 strengthened the case for a common European security and defence<sup>58 59</sup>. Be that as it may, it remains a relatively odd case of an attack on a non-European ally, and the repercussion it had on European security and defence does not seem to have been significant or long-lasting.

The crisis over Iraq was, in turn, fuelled by US policy towards a non-EU country. This was not a classical shock in the sense of a major threat posed to EU interests by a foe. Of course the conflict had regional implications but it cannot be compared in terms of significance for EU states, or at least in terms of perceived significance by European policymaking elites, to terrorist attacks suffered on European soil or migration waves arriving at the Union's doorsteps. There are good reasons to study the Iraq crisis not least

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<sup>58</sup> Here is what Howorth and Keeler said about this issue: "Despite the immediate phenomenon of *renationalization*, analysts and actors agree that, in the long term, September 11 made the case for ESDP even more compelling. Beyond the probe of the cameras, significant elements of integration emerged. ESDP institutional turf wars were set aside and the complex EU nexus of agencies and actors worked seamlessly together to develop a coherent political approach to the crisis. Within ten days, the main outlines had been agreed on and were articulated at the extraordinary meeting of the European Council on September 21, 2001. Beyond the expression of 'total support' for the *American people* and recognition that UN Security Council resolution 1368 made a U.S. military riposte 'legitimate,' a relatively distinct EU political agenda suggested a longer-term approach to the global crisis. First, the creation of the 'broadest possible global coalition against terrorism *under the United National aegis* (emphasis added). Second, major political emphasis on reactivating the Middle East peace process on the bases of the Mitchell and Tenet reports. Third, the 'integration of all countries into a fair world system of security, prosperity and improved development'. Humanitarian relief for Afghanistan and its neighbors became a number one priority. Europe's ESDP leaders, in various combinations, embarked on an unprecedented round of shuttle diplomacy, repeatedly visiting most countries of Central and South Asia and the Middle East in a relentless quest for dialogue. The EU, despite its obvious shortcomings, was emerging as an international actor". See: Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler, "The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy", in *Defending Europe: NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy*, ed. Jolyon Howorth and John T.S. Keeler (London and New York: Palgrave, 2003), 15.

<sup>59</sup> The EU did take note of the changing security landscape and it gave further impetus to the strengthening of the European extradition system through the European Arrest Warrant for example. A more thorough account of this can be found here: Luis Simon, *Geopolitical Change, Grand Strategy and European Security* (London: Palgrave, 2013), 109.

of all the impact it had on Europe-US and also on intra-EU relations<sup>60 61 62 63 64</sup>. Some authors have even found connections between the crisis and moves in Europe towards security and defence integration<sup>65</sup>. These however seem tenuous and not of a significance analogous to those produced by other shocks.

The second reason why 9/11 and the Second Iraq War have not been included here is one of method. Quite simply, these shocks did not figure prominently in planning documents studied for this thesis and were not brought up by policymakers during interviews. Had that been the case there would have been powerful reasons to have them included in the analysis in a more significant manner.

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<sup>60</sup> A good historical account of the Iraq crisis, with a specific focus on the role played by the French government in opposing the Bush Administration's efforts to build wide ranging support for the military intervention there is the book by Frédéric Bozo titled "Histoire Secrète de la Crise Irakienne: La France, les Etats-Unis et L'Irak 1991-2003". See: Frédéric Bozo, *Histoire Secrète de la Crise Irakienne: La France, les Etats-Unis et L'Irak 1991-2003* (Paris: Perrin, 2013). Another interesting read on this period is Gilles Delafon and Thomas Sancton's "Dear Jacques, Cher Bill...". See: Gilles Delafon and Thomas Sancton, *Dear Jacques Cher Bill* (Paris: Plon, 1998).

<sup>61</sup> A mostly historical analysis of why Germany refused to support the Iraq war can be found in the book by Dieter Dettke "Germany says NO: The Iraq war and the Future of German Foreign and Security Policy". See: Dieter Dettke, *Germany Says No: The Iraq War and the Future of German Foreign and Security Policy* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2009).

<sup>62</sup> For a take on the impact of the Iraq war on EU-US relations see: Cameron Fraser, "Transatlantic Differences on Security Perceptions and Responses" in *The Changing Politics of European Security: Europe Alone?*, ed. Stefan Gänzle and Allen G. Sens (London: Palgrave, 2007), 67-86.

<sup>63</sup> A book inspired by the Iraq crisis and that looks at transatlantic security relations more broadly is the edited volume by Geir Lundestad titled: "Just Another Major Crisis? The United States and Europe Since 2000". See: Geir Lundestad, *Just Another Major Crisis?: The United States and Europe since 2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

<sup>64</sup> Iraq did expose differences in European attitudes to the use of force and to transatlantic cooperation more broadly. This is what Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski had to say about it: "The debates over the war in Iraq [meaning the Second Iraq War] demonstrated that divisions in the transatlantic community are not just two-dimensional, with America on one side and Europe on the other. Instead, Europeans are themselves deeply divided over major questions in international politics, including attitudes towards American leadership": See: Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski, *Old Europe, new Europe and the transatlantic security agenda* (London: Routledge, 2005), 25-26.

<sup>65</sup> This is Biscop and Andersson's take on the matter: "It seems as if the intra-European crisis over Iraq finally provided the stimulus that made a breakthrough possible. On the one hand, the member states supporting the invasion would have been motivated to demonstrate that the European Union does care about the security threats perceived by the United States and that the transatlantic Alliance is viable still...On the other hand, the member states opposing the invasion would have been equally eager to show that even though the threat assessment is to a large degree shared with the United States...there are other options [beyond military action] available to deal with these threats". See: Sven Biscop and Jan Joel Andersson (eds). *The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a global Europe*, 7.

## **Chapter Overview and Dissertation Structure**

This dissertation has two objectives. The first is to provide an approach that can account for security and defence integration in the EU from 1990 to today (June 2016). The second is to, hopefully, contribute to the broader regional integration literature.

Overall, it is my contention that Europe displays today all the characteristics required for integration to occur, and that, as a matter of fact, events of the past two decades all point to integration actually taking place there, albeit slowly. Also, developments in Europe seem to fall well within the boundaries of the approach delineated above, which means there seems to be a clear process in place producing a deepening of security and defence arrangements at the EU level.

The following chapters will explore the veracity of these statements in detail. First, Chapter 2 will delve into the literature on the subject and substantiate some of the claims made throughout the thesis. Chapter 3 in turn will provide a brief historical overview of key developments in EU security and defence and show that there has indeed been a deepening of European security and defence integration over the last twenty years (i.e. movement along the dependent variable of this study). Chapters 4, 5 and 6 will, in turn, look at the cases of France, Germany and Spain. Each of these empirical chapters will assess the relations of those countries with other European partners, their reactions to external shocks and their policy towards European defence integration over time. The objective of these empirical chapters will be threefold: to test whether a security community truly exists in Europe as seen through the eyes of its protagonists, to understand how external shocks affected the defence policies of specific actors in the EU, and to see how they succeeded or failed in elevating to the EU level Europeanising the management of some of the issues that affected their security. Chapter 7 will assess the role of NATO and the US in this process and their impact on policymaking at the elite

level in France, Germany and Spain. The concluding chapter will connect all of the threads of the thesis.

## Chapter 2: Literature Review

### A Vast but Inconclusive Literature

There is a vast literature of relevance to the topic studied in this dissertation. Some has been referenced in the previous chapter but the following pages will offer a comprehensive account of work done by scholars that could shine light on the questions driving this thesis. In order to understand the process behind European security and defence integration one has to look at grand theories of international relations, regional integration theory, European integration literature as well as scholarly work in the fields of strategic studies and negotiations theory. There is also a growing literature on CFSP and CSDP that moves from the historical, to the empirical to the theoretical. The pages below will try to bring some structure to this extensive material and provide a solid justification for the design of this thesis and of the structure of the subsequent empirical chapters. In order to do so it will break down the literature into two categories: on the one hand grand theory and on the other middle-range theories and empirical studies. As will become apparent throughout this chapter, these two sets of literature speak poorly to one another, despite the fact that they both have interesting things to say about similar topics<sup>66</sup>. This thesis, will be not just an attempt to provide answers to the questions outlined in the previous chapter but, as we will see, will also strive to bring some of the elements of these two bodies of scholarly work together.

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<sup>66</sup> This gap has been identified by various scholars including Filippo Andreatta to whom: “There is a paradox in the relationship between the theoretical study of international politics and the development of a common European foreign policy...On the one hand, the study of international relations has always been considerably Eurocentric...On the other hand, the development of a common European foreign policy has been largely ignored by international relations theorists, or treated as a purely empirical event”. See: Filippo Andreatta, “The European Union's International Relations: a Theoretical View “, in *International Relations and the European Union*, ed. Hill, Christopher and Michael Smith, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 21-43. In that same text Andreatta provides a useful overview of the various theoretical lenses through which one could study CSDP.

## **Grand Theory and European Security and Defence**

International relations theory has been applied to the study of European security and defence by numerous scholars. These exercises have, on the whole, produced analyses that are sceptical about European integration in security and defence. Arguments that question that integration is truly taking place in this field have come in three different theoretical forms. First, some scholars argue that peace in Europe is directly dependent on exogenous structural determinants like the existential threat posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, or the decades-long US military presence on the European continent. If you take out those exogenous forces, the argument goes, Europeans are bound to return to old power politics. So, it is not that security and defence integration is improbable in Europe, it is that peace itself should not be taken for granted. Underpinning this argument is the idea that European states are still very much separate units with an overarching concern for survival in a system of self-help. Any appearance of integration in this field is, therefore, a mirage or an anomaly produced by external pressures that is bound to unravel.

A second set of arguments points to the failure of interdependence, the force that is understood to be behind most processes of European integration, to produce the right incentives for security and defence integration to occur. The simple idea here is that because integration in this field implies such important sacrifices of sovereignty, and because it produces only modest gains in economic efficiency, it fails to mobilize sufficient stakeholders for the integration process to succeed.

A third and last set of arguments that question the possibility of defence integration in Europe is connected to the idea of its cultural diversity. With divergent attitudes towards the use of force, or 'strategic cultures', and very dissimilar security and defence apparatuses, European states should have a very hard time agreeing on common

arrangements. How could one conceive of traditionally neutral countries like Austria or Ireland ever integrating their security and defence policies with those of others much more willing to use coercion like Poland or France? Simply put, Europe is too diverse to act with one voice in this field.

The theoretical narratives detailed above have emerged from today's major schools of international relations. Realism, liberalism and constructivism have all been used as prisms through which to study security relations among European states. Unfortunately, that theoretical wealth has brought confusion rather than clarity to the discussion. A deeper look at what each of these theoretical schools has had to say about European defence integration will, however, be a useful exercise as some of the findings made by scholars can be re-arranged and combined to produce a theoretical explanation for events in Europe of greater explanatory power.

### **Realism: Structure, Threat and Interest**

Realism looks at power relations among states in a system of self-help, and posits that power calculations are the main drivers of state behaviour. Realism is a broad and complex school of thought and some of its main exponents come to different conclusions about the drivers behind dynamics in Europe, and about the future of European defence. As we will see in the section below most have either erred on the expected outcomes, or on the causal explanation for the events that did occur there.

As the end of the Cold War approached, many predicted the return of power politics to the European continent. Offensive realists like John Mearsheimer repeatedly said that the collapse of the Soviet Union would allow the US to reassess its priorities and to reduce its presence in the European theatre, which would, in turn, lead to a return of balance of

power politics to the region<sup>67 68</sup>. Indeed without the ever-present American ‘night watchman’, Germany would rise militarily once again, and France and the UK would be forced to contain it<sup>69</sup>. Mearsheimer was convinced in 1990 that such a dynamic had been set in motion and would lead to tensions and possibly war: "The point is clear: Europe is reverting to a state system that created powerful incentives for aggression in the past"<sup>70</sup>. To make matters worse, and as anticipated by Hillary Clinton in 2011 and later confirmed by President Obama’s 2012 Strategic Guidance, the United States is now slowly shifting its strategic attention from the Middle East and Europe towards East Asia<sup>71 72</sup>. From an offensive realist perspective those changes are bound to weaken NATO and to leave Europeans to their own devices, which should mean growing tensions and conflict.

Other authors like Sebastian Rosato, writing a decade after the end of the Cold War, and with the evidence that Europe had remained at peace through the 1990s and early 2000s, attempted to explain developments in Europe through a theory of institutions. Rosato justified European integration in broad terms as a reaction to the scale, intensity, and span of the Soviet threat faced by Europeans<sup>73</sup>. For him “the making of the EC is best understood as a response to the post-war distribution of power” and the fact that “...none of the states east of the Elbe could balance Moscow by itself”<sup>74</sup>. Rosato agrees with Mearsheimer that the end of the Cold War meant the almost inevitable halt, and the

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<sup>67</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” *The Atlantic Monthly* 266, no. 2 (1990): 35-50.

<sup>68</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” *International Security* 15, no. 1 (1990): 5-56.

<sup>69</sup> For another structural realist take on the role of Germany after the Cold War see: Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 61-70.

<sup>70</sup> Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” 2.

<sup>71</sup> Hillary Clinton, “The EU in Foreign Policy: a Military or Civilian Power?,” *Foreign Policy*, February 6, 2011, Accessed 14/03/2015, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas\\_pacific\\_century](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century)

<sup>72</sup> United States Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*, (Washington DC, 2012).

<sup>73</sup> Sebastian Rosato, *Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Community*.

<sup>74</sup> Sebastian Rosato, “Europe’s Troubles: Power Politics and the State of the European Project,” *International Security* 35, no. 4 (2011): 47.

probable unravelling, of the European project. The fact that the EU was still alive and well when Rosato was writing was explained by him as a mere consequence of the succession of “prosperous years” in Europe and the resilient nature of European institutions<sup>75</sup>. Of course, he had little faith in integration in security and defence ever occurring in Europe. Writing in 2011 he said “my theory predicts that the Europeans are unlikely to take any real steps toward establishing a political or military community as long as there are no significant changes in the balance of power”<sup>76</sup>.

A number of authors of the realist school have, however, accepted that some form of institutionalized defence cooperation has actually emerged in Europe, and that it is here to stay. Robert Art, for example, has spoken of a soft ‘power balance’ emerging between the EU and the US with the Atlantic Alliance as its main theatre<sup>77 78 79</sup>. Seth Jones, following a logic not dissimilar from that of Art, concluded in his 2007 book titled “The Rise of European Security Cooperation” that Europeans decided to cooperate on security issues almost entirely due to structural reasons, and, in particular, because of the effects of US hegemony<sup>80</sup>. In his book, Jones asks four key questions: Has there been a significant increase in security cooperation among EU states since the Cold War? If so, why? What are the future prospects for security cooperation in Europe? And lastly: What are the

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<sup>75</sup> For an extensive discussion about Rosato’s arguments see: Ulrich Krotz, et al. “Correspondence: Debating the Sources and Prospects of European Integration,” *International Security* 37, no.1 (2012): 178-199.

<sup>76</sup> Rosato, “Europe’s Troubles: Power Politics and the State of the European Project,” 48.

<sup>77</sup> Robert Art, “Europe Hedges its Security Bets,” in *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, ed. T.V. Paul, James Wirtz & Michael Fortmann (San Francisco: Stanford University Press, 2004), 179-213.

<sup>78</sup> For another take on the issue of EU integration as an act of balancing US hegemony, as well as a detailed analysis on how those dynamics played out across different EU Member States see: Dirk Peters, *Constrained Balancing: the EU's Security Policy* (London: Palgrave, 2010).

<sup>79</sup> Tom Dyson and Theodore Konstadinides also applied a Neorealist framework to European Defence Cooperation, presenting evidence that CSDP is a “...case of ‘reformed’ bandwagoning on US power: a means with which to gain greater influence within the Atlantic Alliance while filling the gaps in European Security left by a United States focused on extending its global primacy”. See Tom Dyson and Theodore Konstadinides, *European Defence Cooperation in EU Law and IR Theory* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013), 3. Their prediction is that “CSDP will remain intergovernmental and characterized by a significant level of national duplication in force structures, military capabilities as well as the retention of substantial national defence industrial capacity” (*Ibid*, 3).

<sup>80</sup> Seth G. Jones, *The Rise of European Security Cooperation*.

implications for American-European relations? He is convinced cooperation is taking place in Europe and that it will deepen in the future. His explanation for this goes back to the impact of unipolarity on Europe, both enabling Europeans to project power abroad and encouraging them to reduce their dependence on the US. Naturally, he concludes that this trend is bound to lead to tensions across the Atlantic, and a weakening of European-US cooperation.

Defensive realists like Stephen van Evera, or Stephen Walt have arrived at yet different conclusions about developments in Europe and the forces driving them. Van Evera has famously spoken of Europe being “primed for peace” due to the decline of militarism, nationalism and offensive dominance. With European states not posing a serious threat to one another, they are unlikely to descend into war<sup>81</sup>. Walt, on the other hand, does not see conflict in Europe as a probable occurrence, but is highly sceptical of European ability to construct a strong common defence. In an August 2011 piece in *Foreign Policy* he pointed to four factors that threatened European integration:

...the lack of an external enemy, which removes a major incentive for deep cooperation, the unwieldy nature of EU decision-making, where 27 countries of very different sizes and wealth have to try to reach agreement by consensus, the misguided decision to create a common currency, but without creating the political and economic institutions needed to support it, and nationalism, which remains a powerful force throughout Europe and has been gathering steam in recent years.<sup>82</sup>

In that same piece Walt commented that transatlantic relations would not degenerate into conflict but quite simply wither away due to a lack of a common threat.

Other realist authors like Adrian Hyde-Price or Barry Posen have argued that European defence cooperation is the consequence of the policies of large Member States like the UK and France who want to use the EU as a tool to increase their power and

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<sup>81</sup> Stephen Van Evera, “Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War,” *International Security* 15, no. 3 (1990): 7-57.

<sup>82</sup> Stephen Walt, “The coming Erosion of the European Union,” *Foreign Policy*, August 18, 2011. Accessed 14/03/2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/08/18/the-coming-erosion-of-the-european-union/>

influence. For Hyde-Price and Posen there is a future for European defence but it is tightly linked to the desire and ability of a reduced number of member states to push their particular agenda forward<sup>83 84 85</sup>.

Despite the differences across realist thinkers described above, most of them construct their analysis of European defence on three fundamental ideas: the structure of the international system, the nature and magnitude of threats faced by Europeans, and, lastly, the particular interests of European states. Furthermore, there is in almost all of them an underlying narrative that says that European states are still separate units that could become security threats to one another, and possibly attempt to balance each other<sup>86</sup>. For some, strong structural forces, mainly those of bipolarity during the Cold War and unipolarity during the 90s and early 2000s, have kept such a diverse group of states together, and, quite extraordinarily, pushed them towards cooperation. But once those forces are removed, the Union becomes an unstable arrangement. Even those like Walt, Posen, or van Evera that expect Europe to be at peace for the foreseeable future, and that allow for certain fluidity in the system with alliances emerging and collapsing based on the interest and power calculations of European states, have, overall, little faith in a stable European defence cooperation being established.

For most of the authors cited above the European Union is, at best, an unstable arrangement, and at worst an anomaly produced by decades of tensions derived from the Cold War. The disappearance of the Soviet Union, the US 'pivot' to other geographic areas of the world, and the tensions emerging from the natural diversity among European

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<sup>83</sup> Adrian Hyde-Price, "Normative Power Europe: A Realist Critique," *Journal of European Public Policy* 13, no.2 (2006): 217-234.

<sup>84</sup> Barry Posen, "ESDP and the Structure of World Power," *The International Spectator* 39, no. 1 (2004): 5-17.

<sup>85</sup> Barry Posen, "European Union Security and Defense Policy: A Response to Unipolarity?," *Security Studies* 15, no. 2 (2006): 149-186.

<sup>86</sup> John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 377-380.

states all point in one direction: disintegration. Not all go as far as to suggest that economic integration and peace in the continent are at risk, but all of them agree that cooperation on matters of defence is weak and facing close-to-insurmountable challenges<sup>87 88</sup>.

Abstracting from the richness and complexity of realism here are some of its main predictions regarding European defence:

1. A diminishing US military presence in Europe after the end of the Cold War will lead European states to feel threatened by one another, which will in turn lead to balance of power politics, and possibly war.
2. The demise of the Soviet Union will eliminate the overriding motivation for European defence cooperation, leading to disintegration, growing tensions within Europe, and possibly war.
3. US hegemony since the end of the Cold War will incite Europeans to balance American power and to develop exclusively European defence cooperation, leading to the weakening of NATO and growing tensions across the Atlantic.
4. Having left behind a protracted period of nationalism, militarism and offensive dominance, Europe will enjoy a long peace with the possible establishment of ad hoc alliances for military action.

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<sup>87</sup> For an analysis of the impact of Eurozone crisis on Europe's foreign policy see: Jan Zielonka, *European Foreign Policy and the Euro-crisis* (Florence: European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, 2013).

<sup>88</sup> Scholars, who do not necessarily subscribe to the realist school, see in the on-going Eurozone crisis the first instance of a process of political unravelling. Nicholas Walton's and Jan Zielonka's 2013 edited volume titled "The New Political Geography of Europe" speaks of a reshuffling of Europe's political landscape that is leading, precisely, to disintegration. See Nicholas Walton and Jan Zielonka (eds.), *The New Political Geography of Europe* (Brussels: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2013). The volume's authors identify four worrying developments: growing disaffection of elites with the European project, emerging tensions between the periphery of the Union and its core, divisions at the very core between France and Germany, and, lastly, a deepening of disagreements regarding the future of Europe. Seeing the Eurozone crisis as a watershed moment for the Union has slowly become a common interpretation of events in Europe from 2008 to 2013. Some see the possibility of states renationalizing entire areas of policy (like for example monetary policy) and a return to power politics in Europe, at the very least in the economic sphere. See Sebastian Dullien, "Why the euro crisis threatens the EU single market", *European Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Memo 64*, October 8, 2012, Accessed 15/03/2015.  
[http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/why\\_the\\_euro\\_crisis\\_threatens\\_the\\_eu\\_single\\_market](http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/why_the_euro_crisis_threatens_the_eu_single_market)

5. In an attempt by middle-sized powers to increase their influence and power, larger EU states will push for European defence cooperation and will use it to pursue their particular interests.

Developments on the ground, however, seem to defy the predictions above. To start off with, Europe has quite evidently been mostly at peace since the end of the Cold War. Offensive realists would have a hard time justifying this long period of stability, but even harder for them would be to explain the unstoppable process of disinvestment in defence that Europe has undergone since the 1980s. The UK, France and Greece are today the only EU countries that spend over 2% of GDP on defence, a goal originally agreed upon by all NATO members (2013 data)<sup>89</sup>. France, a historically generous spender on defence, has seen its defence budget fall quite markedly in the last few years from 3.6% of GDP in 1988 to 2.6% in 2010 to 2.2% in 2013. Other partners that have seen an even steeper decline include Spain and Ireland that spend today less than 1% of their GDP on defence matters. The only major defence spender in Europe that has not recently fallen prey to budget cuts has been Germany, which in 2013 spent more on conventional capabilities than any other state in Europe. These dynamics defy the logic of European powers returning to a pre-Cold War balance of power, let alone that of Europeans containing German resurgence. Rather the opposite is happening, with many calling for German leadership not only in CSDP, but in EU affairs more broadly. Particularly poignant were the words of the Polish Foreign Minister in Berlin in 2011: “I will probably be the first Polish foreign minister in history to say so, but here it is: I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity”<sup>90</sup>.

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<sup>89</sup> For detailed information on defense spending in Europe see the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database here: <http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+military+expenditure+database+1988-2013.xlsx>

<sup>90</sup> Radek Sikorski, “Poland and the future of the European Union” (Speech delivered by the Foreign Minister of Poland, Berlin, Germany, 28 November, 2011).

The rapid decline in military capabilities also runs contrary to the argument that Europeans are attempting to balance US hegemony. A RAND report from 2012 titled “NATO and the Challenges of Austerity” analysed the rapid decline in defence spending of the UK, France, Italy, Spain, Poland and the Netherlands and its impact on force readiness and deployability<sup>91</sup>. Since the end of the Cold War, defence spending in Europe has fallen by 20% in real terms while the combined GDP of the European members of NATO has increased by 55%. NATO Europe<sup>92</sup> contributed only 21% of NATO’s total budget in 2011<sup>93</sup>. It is true that these figures spell trouble for European military might, and for the robustness of the transatlantic partnership, which, as former US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates said, faces “the very real possibility of collective military irrelevance”<sup>94</sup>. But what they surely do not show is any willingness on the part of Europeans to balance the United States. On the contrary, Europe seems quite comfortable with its transatlantic dependence. This has been backed by numerous interviews conducted for this thesis, where policymakers across the continent expressed comfort with having the US fill their countries’ capability gaps and remain the key guarantor of European territorial integrity.

It remains true, however, that some authors like van Evera and Walt correctly predicted a long peace in Europe. Their analysis, though, only allowed for sporadic defence cooperation based on specific, singular and static interests. But since the 1990’s Europeans have not only refrained from attacking one another or cooperated on an ad hoc basis, but rather seem to have consciously and decidedly moved towards arrangements that resemble integration. Steps might have been modest and haphazard but they all point

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<sup>91</sup> Stephen F. Larrabee et al., *NATO and the Challenges of Austerity* (Santa Monica CA: National Defence Institute, RAND Corporation, 2012).

<sup>92</sup> Meaning the combined European members of NATO.

<sup>93</sup> Figures from: Anders F. Rasmussen, “NATO After Libya,” *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 4 (2011): 2-6.

<sup>94</sup> Robert M. Gates, “The Security and Defence Agenda (Future of NATO)” (Speech delivered by the Secretary of Defence”, Brussels, Belgium, 10 June, 2011).

in the same direction: first through the re-launching of the Western European Union (WEU), then through the launch of the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy in the mid 90's, and finally with the creation of the Common Security and Defence Policy in the early 2000's. Moreover, CSDP has not been a project monopolized by two or three large member states. Numerous countries participated in and financed CDSP missions, usually well over a dozen (See Table 1.1 below for a list of CSDP operations, their nature, scale, and number of states involved). Although large states, like France, did shoulder a significant part of the costs derived from CSDP operations, there is no indication that this was accompanied by a hijacking of this area of policy for their own ends.

It is plainly clear that the realist studies cited here have missed the mark when analysing European defence. Some were simply wrong on their predictions while others were capable of explaining only certain developments but not others, which weakens the overall strength of their claims and causal argumentation.

Table 2.1: CSDP Missions: 1999-2013<sup>95</sup>

| Military + Civilian-Military              |                                                                                                                    |                     |            |              |                          |                           |
|-------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|------------|--------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| Operation                                 | Objective                                                                                                          | Budget              | UN Mandate | N° Countries | Type of mission          | Personnel                 |
| <u>Concordia</u> (FYROM 2003)             | Ensure a secure environment to facilitate the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement                                | € 6.2m + clwtf      | No         | 26           | Berlin Plus              | 400                       |
| <u>Artemis</u> (DRC 2003)                 | Stabilization of security conditions and improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia                        | € 7m                | Yes        | 17           | Autonomous (OHQ France)  | 1,800                     |
| <u>EUFOR Althea</u> (BiH 2004-)           | Contribute to a secure environment with objective of signing the EU AA                                             | CLWTF               | Yes        | 33           | Berlin Plus              | 7,000                     |
| <u>EUFOR DRC</u> (DRC, 2006)              | Securing the region during elections, in cooperation with Congolese authorities and MONUC                          | € 149m              | Yes        | 18           | Autonomous (OHQ Germany) | 2,000                     |
| <u>EU Support Amis II</u> (Sudan '05-'07) | Support the AU's efforts to address the crisis in Darfur                                                           | € 1,9m              | Yes        | 15           | Civilian-Military        | 31 police + 27 military   |
| <u>EU Support AMISOM</u> (Somalia, '07)   | Support the AU in setting up a Strategic Planning and Management Unit (SPMU)                                       | € 1m                | Yes        | 9            | Civilian-Military        | 4                         |
| <u>EUFOR TChad/RCA</u> (Chad, '08-'09)    | Protect civilians, contribute to the delivery of humanitarian aid and protect UN personnel                         | € 1m + € 1bn clwtf  | Yes        | 26           | Autonomous (OHQ France)  | 3,700                     |
| <u>EUNAVFOR Atalanta</u> (Somalia, '08-)  | Provide protection to vessels chartered by the WFP for Somalia as well as merchant vessels; bring an end to piracy | €8.4m + €400m clwtf | Yes        | 21           | Autonomous (OHQ UK)      | 2,000                     |
| <u>EUTM Somalia</u> (Uganda, '10-)        | Help strengthen the Somali Federal Government                                                                      | €4.8m               | Yes        | 12           | Autonomous (OHQ Uganda)  | 74                        |
| <u>EUTM Mali</u> (Mali, '13-)             | Support the rebuilding of the Malian armed forces                                                                  | €23m                | Yes        | 23           | Autonomous (OHQ Mali)    | 550 (instructors + staff) |

<sup>95</sup> Source: Manuel Muniz, "ESDP & NATO: The First Ten Years, 1999-2009" (Reading and Research Paper, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge, MA, 2010). The 2has been updated for this study on October 2013 with data from the EU's External Action Service website at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations.aspx?lang=en>

| Civilian                                            |                                                                                                                    |                        |                                         |
|-----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
| Operation                                           | Objective                                                                                                          | Type of mission        | Personnel                               |
| EUPM (BiH, 2003-2011)                               | Support local police capacity and fight organized crime                                                            | Police                 | 258 police experts                      |
| EUPOL Proxima (FYROM (2004-05)                      | Consolidate law and order; reform of the Interior Ministry; promote integrated border management                   | Police                 | 200 police experts                      |
| EUJUST THEMIS (Georgia 2004-05)                     | Support reform of the judicial system                                                                              | Rule of Law            | 10 civilian experts                     |
| EUPAT (FYROM 2005-06)                               | Support the development of an efficient police service. Continuation of Proxima                                    | Police                 | 30 police experts                       |
| EUPOL KINSHASHA (DRC 2005-07)                       | Monitor, mentor and advise the IPU until national elections                                                        | Police                 | 30 police experts                       |
| EUJUST LEX (Iraq, <b>2005-</b> )                    | Support to criminal justice system; training of judges and senior police                                           | Rule of Law            | 60 civilian experts                     |
| EUSEC RD CONGO (DRC, <b>2005-</b> )                 | Assist in security sector reform                                                                                   | Security Sector Reform | 48 civilian experts                     |
| AMM Monitoring Mission (Aceh 2005-06)               | Monitor the implementation of the peace agreement signed by Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement in August of 2005 | Monitoring             | 80 unarmed personnel                    |
| EUBAM Moldova and Ukraine (Mol-Ukr <b>2005-</b> )   | Prevent smuggling and customs fraud by providing advice and training                                               | Border Assistance      | 130 experts + 70 staff                  |
| EUBAM RAFAH (Palestinian Territories <b>2005-</b> ) | Monitor the operations of the border crossing point at Rafah (Gaza)                                                | Border Assistance      | 22 police experts                       |
| EUPOL COPPS (Palestinian Territories <b>2006-</b> ) | Provide support to the Palestinian Authority in establishing effective policing                                    | Police                 | 86 unarmed experts                      |
| EUPOL RD CONGO (DRC <b>2007-</b> )                  | Provide advice on police reform and broader SSR efforts                                                            | Security Sector Reform | 38 EU staff + 19 local staff            |
| EUPOL AFGHANISTAN (Afghanistan <b>2007-</b> )       | Develop the capacity to build and maintain a civil police service                                                  | Police                 | 502 police experts                      |
| EULEX Kosovo (Kosovo <b>2008-</b> )                 | Assist the Kosovo institutions; fight against corruption and crime.                                                | Rule of Law            | 1,550 EU experts + 1,176 local staff    |
| EU SSR Guinea-Bissau (G. Bissau 2008-10)            | Assist authorities in the implementation of the National SSR strategy                                              | Security Sector Reform | 8 EU staff + 13 local staff             |
| EUMM Georgia (Georgia <b>2008-</b> )                | Monitor the implementation of the six point Agreement of 2008                                                      | Monitoring             | 300 EU staff + 100 local staff          |
| EUCAP Nestor (Horn of Africa <b>2012-</b> )         | Support development of maritime capacity in Horn of Africa and Indian Ocean                                        | Capacity Building      | 100 international staff                 |
| EUCAP Sahel (Niger <b>2012-</b> )                   | Improve the capacity of Nigerien security forces in the fight against terrorism                                    | Capacity Building      | 50 experts                              |
| EUAVSEC South Sudan (South Sudan <b>2012-</b> )     | Support for the strengthening of security at Juba International Airport                                            | Aviation Security      | 44 international staff + 20 local staff |
| EUBAM Libya (Libya <b>2013-</b> )                   | Support Libyan authorities in developing border management and security                                            | Border Assistance      | 110 international staff                 |

**Liberalism: Interdependence and its Limits**

Arguably, the two most successful grand theories of European integration belong to the liberal school, and are functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. Both have been quite accurate in their anticipation of numerous events in Europe, but both run into serious difficulties when assessing developments in the field of security and defence. Despite their differences, these two theories are constructed around similar assumptions about state behaviour, as well as the belief that integration in defence should either follow the rules and procedures of integration in other fields or not occur at all. Overall, both theories fail to grasp the direction, tempo and intensity of moves in Europe towards (or away from) defence integration. In order to arrive at the reasons behind the failure of these theories it is important to look at their origins and basic tenets.

***Functionalism***

The birth of functionalism dates back to the late 1940s and 1950s, and is associated with the names of David Mitrany, Ernst B. Haas and Karl Deutsch<sup>96 97 98</sup>. Although these authors approached the subject in a slightly different manner it is fair to say that they all posit that interactions across borders in Europe and the dynamics they generate end up leading to integration. For some functionalists, the most important driving factor of this process is trade. Slowly, individuals and corporations exposed to the costs and inefficiencies of international trade in Europe start to put pressure on policymakers so that supranational rules and institutions are established and the externalities of cross-border economic transactions are reduced. Haas calls that pressure group of businessmen, labour associations, consumer associations and other non-governmental actors the “transnational

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<sup>96</sup> David Mitrany, *The Functional Theory of Politics* (London: St. Martin's Press, 1975).

<sup>97</sup> Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*.

<sup>98</sup> Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*.

society”. Thanks to their action, national politicians and civil servants would slowly understand the need for norms that regulate transnational commerce and would cede national sovereignty to higher institutions like the EU for their creation and implementation. Once those institutions are set up they also play a role in solidifying integration, and in actively supporting the further pooling of sovereignty.

Mitrany, on the other hand, approached the subject from a normative perspective and spoke of the need to construct a “working peace”. Indeed he said that peace “is more likely to grow through doing things together in workshops and marketplaces than by signing pacts in chancelleries”<sup>99</sup>. Deutsch, in turn, emphasized that constant interaction between different European peoples would slowly generate a common identity and would lead to the formation of a shared political community. This approach is of course not dissimilar from constructivism, and shares with it assumptions about the process of socialisation and identity formation.

Functionalism sits somewhere between liberalism and idealism. It emphasizes the importance of interdependence and institutions when studying European integration, but some of its leading authors also speak of identity formation, cultural exchange and the bounded rationality of state actors. As a matter of fact, in his later years, Haas himself referred to functionalism as being connected to broader constructivist theories. It is, however, rigorous to place this school within the wider brand of liberalism, because of the central role of interdependence in its formulation and causal analysis, as well as its overall belief in self-interested and rational actors driving the integration process.

A key element of functionalist theory is that of “spillover”. Functional spillover occurs when the integration/harmonization of one policy area generates the need to

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<sup>99</sup>David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966), 25. As quoted in Walter Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration. Europe and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 21.

integrate an adjacent one. After the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the newly founded European Economic Community (EEC) quickly started to work on the elimination of trade quotas and tariff barriers. Once that work had been completed it became evident that there was a need to reduce non-tariff barriers too, so new powers were given to the EEC. Functionalists would say this process has repeated infinite times and has led Europe towards a full-fledged single market with common institutions that regulate matters ranging from trade to energy to consumer protection.

After the Empty Chair Crisis of the mid 1960's, Haas and others began to doubt the validity of their own propositions. De Gaulle's insistence on a more intergovernmental EU led many to question the strength of functionalist assumptions<sup>100 101</sup>. The theory entered a dormant period only to be revived in the 1990's after the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty had again proven Europe's willingness to move towards unity. The neofunctional school, led fundamentally by Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, quickly pointed to the fact that integration had continued even if events on the surface did not give any signs to that effect<sup>102 103 104</sup>. Other studies like the seminal book by J.H.H. Weiler "The Constitution of Europe" argued that some European institutions, mainly the European Court of Justice (ECJ), had slowly but surely expanded the powers of the EU even during a period when Member States had been reluctant to proceed with the formal integration process<sup>105</sup>.

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<sup>100</sup> Ernst B. Haas, *The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory* (Berkeley: Institute for International Studies, 1975).

<sup>101</sup> Ernst B. Haas, "Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration," *International Organization* 3, no. 2 (1976): 173-212.

<sup>102</sup> Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, *European Integration and Supranational Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

<sup>103</sup> Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet, "Neo-functionalism and Supranational Governance", in *The Oxford Handbook of the European Union*, ed. Erik Jones, Anand Menon and Stephen Weatherill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 18-33.

<sup>104</sup> Wayne Sandholtz, Alec Stone Sweet and Neil Fligstein, *The Institutionalization of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

<sup>105</sup> Joseph H.H. Weiler, *The Constitution of Europe. Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor? And Other Essays on European Integration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

In the late 1990s Walter Mattli added an additional layer to functionalist theory<sup>106</sup>. Using tools belonging to the field of political economy, Mattli concluded that: “the two main economic explanations [for integration] are customs union theory and optimal currency area theory” and then added:

..as the removal of trade barriers increases the mobility of capital, labour and consumers, regional differences in taxes and the supply of public goods can induce migration in any of these categories. This raises the potential for fiscal spillover across borders, creating incentives for redefining the assignment of fiscal policy tasks across different levels.<sup>107</sup>

Overall, neofunctionalism gives greater importance to the role played by already constituted institutions than its predecessor. This is clear from Sandholtz and Stone Sweet’s insistence that “increasing exchange provokes behaviours and processes that are decisively shaped by the institutional context of the EC, and these processes tend to produce or reinforce supranational rule-making”<sup>108</sup>. Or as they added a few years later: “European integration is largely the product of a basic kind of Haasian feedback loop” with the following basic elements: “(1) actors and groups with transnational goals and interests (which we label ‘transnational society’) (2) *supranational organizations with autonomous capacity to resolve disputes and to make law*, and (3) the rule system (or normative structure) that defines the polity” (my emphasis)<sup>109</sup>.

### ***Liberal Intergovernmentalism***

Liberal intergovernmentalism was to truly contest the predominance of functionalism in European integration studies. Developed by Andrew Moravcsik in the 1990s<sup>110 111</sup>, and

<sup>106</sup> Walter Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration, Europe and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

<sup>107</sup> Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration, Europe and Beyond*, 19-20.

<sup>108</sup> Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, *European Integration and Supranational Governance*, 2.

<sup>109</sup> Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, “Neo-functionalism and Supranational Governance,” 20.

<sup>110</sup> Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach”.

<sup>111</sup> Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998).

building on Robert Keohane's functionalist regime theory<sup>112</sup>, liberal intergovernmentalism posits that integration follows a two-phased process, which begins with national preference formation and ends with an international bargain among states. The overall goal pursued by states in such bargains is the management of interdependence. When addressing European integration specifically, Moravcsik said that "...the EC (European Community) can be analysed as a successful intergovernmental regime designed to manage economic interdependence through negotiated policy co-ordination"<sup>113</sup>. By placing less emphasis on the role of a transnational society and on supranational institutions, and by looking in more detail at the part played by states and preference formation within them, Moravcsik claims to have developed a more nuanced theory than functionalism.

Liberal intergovernmentalism is built around three key assumptions: rational state behaviour, a liberal theory of national preference formation, and an intergovernmentalist analysis of interstate negotiation<sup>114</sup>. Individuals and corporations put pressure on their governments to move in certain directions and these abide by those preferences in a rational pursuit of state interests. If domestic constituencies have clearly defined preferences, governments are left with a smaller margin of manoeuvre internationally. For liberal intergovernmentalism, domestic preferences are the engine of integration. Those

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<sup>112</sup> Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

<sup>113</sup> Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach," 474.

<sup>114</sup> A specific sub-strand of theoretical scholarly work termed "constrained intergovernmentalism" was developed by Catherine Gégout in the 2000s. Gégout claims that CFSP outcomes cannot be explained without a reference to the United States or the European Commission, meaning that they "bind" Member States when decisions are being made about CFSP. According to her: "Constrained intergovernmentalism points to three forms of constraint which act on state preferences before, during, and after the negotiations process, and in consequence on EU foreign policy-making. There is an external constraint on CFSP, which is the power of the United States...The European Commission exercises an internal constraint. Whenever the first pillar is directly or indirectly involved in the CFSP system, the Commission is able to transform the outcome of CFSP decisions to fit its own preference. Finally, there is a legal constraint which comes from the *acquis* of the European Union". See Catherine Gégout, *European Foreign and Security Policy: States, Power, Institutions and American Hegemony* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 177. This is a mid-range theoretical argument that adds some nuance to grander intergovernmentalist theories.

preferences are constantly being shaped by economic interdependence and relentless exposure to the shortfalls of lacking supranational policy co-ordination.

At the international level, negotiations take place between states with different interests. Negotiation analysis helps Moravcsik reach some basic conclusions about that process, for example, that the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) is perhaps the most important element shaping the outcome of international bargains. If states have an attractive BATNA they will be unwilling to pay a high price for a negotiated settlement. If their BATNA is weak then an agreement will be easier to reach as states will be encouraged not to leave the negotiating table without a deal. In negotiations with weak BATNAs the zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) will probably be wider, and therefore, agreements more probable.

Moravcsik summarized his theory in the following way:

The liberal intergovernmentalist view seeks to account for major decisions in the history of the European Community by positing a two-stage approach. In the first stage, national preferences are primarily determined by the constraints and opportunities imposed by economic interdependence. In the second stage, the outcomes of intergovernmental negotiations are determined by the relative bargaining power of governments and the functional incentives for institutionalization created by high transaction costs and the desire to control domestic agendas.<sup>115</sup>

### ***Conclusions on Liberalism and Its Insights into European Integration***

Functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism have different ambitions when it comes to explaining European defence. Many scholars, some of them declaredly functionalist, have expressed doubts that functionalism can be applied successfully beyond the realm of economic integration. Stanley Hoffmann famously said that integration in the realm of “high politics”, meaning defence, diplomacy and monetary affairs, would not take place in Europe<sup>116</sup>. Mattli later stated that “the context in which successful integration operates is

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<sup>115</sup> Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach,” 517.

<sup>116</sup> Stanley Hoffmann, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The fate of the Nation-State and the case of Western

economic, social and technical, that is it is nominally apolitical”<sup>117</sup>. Sandholtz and Stone Sweet similarly pointed to the fact that “there are few societal transactions that are impeded by the absence of a common foreign and security policy” so there is really no incentive to integrate that policy area<sup>118</sup>.

Liberal intergovernmentalism has, however, claimed to be a much broader theory, capable of explaining developments in almost all fields of policy, including defence. When speaking of liberal theories of integration, Moravcsik pointed to three possible factors for or against European integration: “federalist (or nationalist) beliefs, national security concerns and economic interests”<sup>119</sup>. About national security concerns he said the following:

...(they are) premised on the view of economic interdependence and common institutions as means of reinforcing peaceful accommodation among democratic states with a historical legacy of conflict, assuming a common front against the anti-democratic Soviet Union, or guaranteeing political support for specific, democratically legitimate national projects, such as German unification.<sup>120</sup>

Such a definition is, of course, somewhat narrow, but liberal intergovernmentalism has also spoken of the importance of interests when trying to understand national policies in Europe regarding EU integration.

For the sake of clarity it is best to look at the claims of both liberal theories separately, and see how they fare when compared to recent developments in European defence. Here are some of their predictions in abstract terms:

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Europe,” *Daedalus* 95, no.3 (1966): 862-915.

<sup>117</sup> Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration. Europe and Beyond*, 26

<sup>118</sup> Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, *European Integration and Supranational Governance*, 14.

<sup>119</sup> Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach,” 484.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

**Functionalism:**

1. Cross-border interactions will make the externalities of non-cooperation palpable to domestic and international actors, leading to a “transnational society” putting pressure on governments to establish supranational regulations and institutions.
2. Once established, international institutions will push for further integration as a means of expanding their mandate.
3. Integration will naturally “spillover” into areas of policy adjacent to those already integrated.

**Liberal-Intergovernmentalism:**

1. Cross-border interactions will make the externalities of non-cooperation palpable to domestic actors, who will put pressure on national governments to reach agreements on international policy coordination.
2. The nature of the field of policy and of the externalities produced by non-integration will shape domestic preferences, and therefore, state behaviour in inter-state bargains.
3. Integration in defence will be mainly driven by either the desire for peace (and prosperity) in a given region or by the objective to forward domestic interests.

Although the claims of these two theories are not identical they both have as their core assumption the idea that economic interdependence will be the main driver of integration. For many functionalists this force is simply not strong enough to produce integration in defence matters. For liberal intergovernmentalists it just might. What both theories fail to do is to connect economic interdependence to outcomes in security and defence policy. Does economic entanglement among states increase the attractiveness of defence

integration? What are the mechanisms that lead security and defence elites to ‘connect the dots’ and to be aware of the economic externalities of non-integration in security and defence? It might well be the case that, indeed, as economic interdependence grows among states the incentive to protect common interest through common action grows. This could mean that a certain functional spillover can occur from economic to security integration. However, neither functionalism nor liberal intergovernmentalism provide a full explanation as to how such a process would work.

What is more, it seems that the very peculiar nature of policymaking in the field of defence renders the causal analysis of these theories invalid. For example, both theories claim that the cost of non-integration (or non policy coordination as liberal intergovernmentalists would term it) is felt by broad sections of society, be it domestic or international. While on economic matters large groups of individuals and corporations are exposed to the externalities of non-integration, for example through the suffering of cross-border tariff barriers, in defence this is not the case. Only a small group of policymakers, military officers and diplomats is exposed to strategic planning and to the consequences of poor security and defence policy coordination. These are mostly national actors and can hardly be defined as a broad “transnational society”<sup>121</sup>.

Additionally, the externalities of non-cooperation in defence are only felt sporadically and when a state faces a security crisis. Preference formation regarding defence policy, therefore, only moves forward in fits and starts and is usually driven by major security crises rather than by the constant interaction of economic forces. This not only means that the key driver of integration for functionalists and liberal intergovernmentalists,

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<sup>121</sup> Although, some authors have claimed that with the expansion of the security agenda to include issues that go beyond territorial defence a new set of actors have entered the debate; including “...NGOs, the media, the clergy, women’s groups and so forth”. See Janne Haaland Matlary, *European Union Security Dynamics: In the New National Interest*, 3-4. It might indeed well be the case that such an expansion in the number of actors in this field is occurring but this thesis has not found any evidence that they are truly significant in the integration process.

widespread support for certain integrative measures, is not as significant when speaking of defence matters, but also that both theories skim over what could be the most important driver of integration in that field: external shocks.

A quick look at the history of European defence integration reveals that indeed external shocks have been central to moves towards further unity. The most emblematic examples, as we will see in detail in the empirical chapters (Chapters 4, 5 and 6), were the end of the Cold War and the subsequent disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Particularly traumatic for Europeans was the conflict in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995, and the realization that they could not take care of a security (and humanitarian) crisis occurring in their backyard. It is fair to say that the determination to give the EU a security dimension and to pool military resources through CSDP was a direct consequence of that failure. There were, furthermore, smaller and country-specific external shocks that also shaped national policy towards European security and defence.

Liberal intergovernmentalism and functionalism also assume that the consensus regarding the desirability of economic growth and prosperity is directly translatable to other fields. Economic integration moves forward because interdependence forces economic actors to demand policy co-ordination. There is an implacable logic to economic actors sharing similar motivations when lobbying political elites: more perfect markets. Whether security and defence elites across Europe see defence policy co-ordination as a default positive outcome is an entirely different matter. As mentioned before, economic interests can surely, and probably, enter the calculations of states when deciding on their defence policies, but there are other issues that require assessment too. Proof of this fact is the slow pace at which capabilities and procurement processes are being pooled in Europe. In a 2012 report titled “The EU between Pooling & Sharing and Smart Defence” Giovanni Faleg and Alessandro Giovannini state in the very first page that:

Although multilateral cooperation is proven more efficient than the status quo through the lens of economics, and a set of external stimuli would facilitate deeper military integration, [we acknowledge] that a fully-fledged EU defence market remains difficult to attain due to short-term political and strategic considerations.<sup>122</sup>

The fact that the economic logic of cooperation has not been able to trump the natural tendency in European capitals not to cede powers on security and defence matters is a sign that other drivers are at play. These drivers go beyond economics and include issues of a political nature. This thesis has referred to them as “strategic interests”. These are a very specific set of interests that combine some of an economic character with others like the size and location of pockets of expatriated population, or longstanding cultural connections with certain states. They are repeatedly referred to in national strategic documents and domestic elites tend to use them as guiding principles when deciding on issues of security and defence.

As we will see throughout the thesis, liberal intergovernmentalism is the theory that comes closest to providing a detailed picture of developments in European security and defence. It accepts the importance of national interests as drivers of policy, and it understands the two-phased nature, domestic and intergovernmental, of the negotiations that have produced security and defence integration at the EU level. Still, its lack of emphasis on the specific nature of strategic interests and its omission of the role of external shocks in the field of security have weakened the explanatory power of the theory.

### **Constructivism: The Role of Strategic Culture**

By questioning the rationality of state actors, on which realism and liberalism are built, constructivism brings a whole new perspective to integration studies. Alexander Wendt summarized this innovative perspective by stating that constructivism is radically different

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<sup>122</sup> Giovanni Faleg and Alessandro Giovannini, *The EU between Pooling & Sharing and Smart Defence* (Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies, 2012).

from rationalism where “processes and institutions change behaviour but not identities and interest”<sup>123</sup>. For constructivists, institutions are not mere bargaining grounds where rational actors engage and negotiate on the basis of pre-constructed interests and identities. Those interests and identities shift as the interaction takes place.

Many within the constructivist school have focused their work on the role of agency, mainly that of norm entrepreneurs, in the shaping of the international system<sup>124</sup>, while others have looked into the role of structure and how that in turn affects norm and identity creation<sup>125</sup>. The constructivist school has produced a significant amount of knowledge regarding concepts like the “life cycle” of ideas, the influence of “epistemic communities”, “discourse enmeshment”, “socialisation”, “emulation” or “shame and censure”. The common denominator of constructivists has been the search for norm creation in somewhat institutionalised environments. It is natural, therefore, that the European Union has become a major testing ground for constructivist theory<sup>126</sup>.

For pure constructivists, integration, be it in Europe or anywhere else, is all about socialisation and the creation of common ideas and identities. In the field of defence that process is linked to the concept of strategic culture. Strategic culture is, of course, something that requires a definition. Early attempts at capturing the concept include Stanley Hoffmann’s affirmation that different historical experiences and overall divergent cultural heritage constitute “limits that affect freedom of choice”<sup>127</sup>. Or as Jack Snyder said regarding Soviet attitudes towards nuclear policy:

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<sup>123</sup> Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 392.

<sup>124</sup> Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917.

<sup>125</sup> Jeffrey Checkel, J. (Ed.), *International Institutions and Socialization in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

<sup>126</sup> Thomas Christiansen, Erik Jorgensen and Antje Wiener, *The Social Construction of Europe* (London: Sage Publications, 2001).

<sup>127</sup> Stanley Hoffmann, *Decline or Renewal? France since the 1930s* (New York: Viking Press, 1974), 368 as quoted in Sten Rynning, “The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?,” *Security Dialogue* 32, no. 4 (2003): 487.

Individuals are socialized into a distinctively [national] mode of strategic thinking. As a result of this socialization process, a set of general beliefs, attitudes and behavioural patterns with regard to nuclear strategy has achieved a state of semi permanence that places them on the level of ‘culture’ rather than mere ‘policy’.<sup>128</sup>

Other authors that do not belong to the constructivist school, like Sten Rynning, defined strategic culture as the compilation of beliefs and ideas a country has regarding the use of force, and attempted to assess its internal dynamics and external manifestations<sup>129 130</sup>. This definition of strategic culture as a state’s attitude towards the use of force is the one I find most useful for the purpose of this study.

Some authors have focused on how strategic culture evolved over time. Azar Gat, for example, has famously spoken about how the West has shown a preference for the use of economic sanctions, blockades, aerial and naval actions as well as limited “surgical” operations by highly mobile and technologically superior forces. In his book “A History of Military Thought” he concludes that “given the nature of modern Western societies, of their foreign affairs, strategic requirements, and cultural sensibilities, this way of war-making appears to be their norm, as much as all-out war was for their predecessors”<sup>131</sup>. Not dissimilar have been the studies on the emergence of a “European way of war” and its impact on Europe as a defence actor<sup>132</sup>. Anne Deighton’s work on the European Union’s approach to the use of force is of particular interest as it points to a growing willingness on the part of the EU to use force since the end of the Cold War and to the emergence of certain preferences in EU defence such as that for multilateral military action<sup>133</sup>.

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<sup>128</sup> Jack L. Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Options* - Project Air Force Report (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1977), v

<sup>129</sup> Rynning, “The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?”, 479-496.

<sup>130</sup> Per M. Martinsen, “Forging a Strategic Culture: Putting Policy into ESDP,” *Oxford Journal on Good Governance* 1, no. 1 (2004): 61-66.

<sup>131</sup> Azar Gat, *A History of Military Thought. From the Enlightenment to the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 828.

<sup>132</sup> Steven Everts et al., *A European Way of War* (London: Centre for European Reform, 2004).

<sup>133</sup> Anne Deighton, “The European Union, Multilateralism, and the Use of Force,” in *The Changing Character of War*, ed. Hew Strachan and Sibylle Scheipers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 315-332.

The debate about European defence integration has been highly influenced by discussions about the different strategic cultures in Europe. Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards were amongst the first to apply the concept to European integration. They started by defining strategic culture more tightly, as “...the institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part of the accepted range of legitimate and effective policy instruments,”<sup>134</sup>. In 2006 they concluded that there were “signs that a [common] strategic culture is already developing through a socialization process considerably accelerated by the institutional arrangements put in place in the EU since the decisions of the European Council in December 1999<sup>135</sup>,<sup>136</sup>. This idea was reiterated in a 2005 piece, which served as a progress report on the EU’s emergence as a defence actor<sup>137</sup>.

A number of further studies looking into strategic culture convergence in Europe have been published since the early and mid 2000s<sup>138</sup>. Christoph Meyer’s work is particularly worthy. Meyer studied the emergence of a true European strategic culture through multiple interactions of European national policymakers in EU institutions like the Political and Security Committee. He broke down the concept of strategic culture into four types of norms (or “value dimensions”) that could be better observed and tracked:

(i) goals for which the use of force is considered legitimate...(ii) the degree to which force has to be domestically and internationally authorized...(iii) the way in which force can be used...(iv) norms relating to the way in which a state should co-operate with other states and/or alliances...<sup>139 140</sup>.

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<sup>134</sup> Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, “Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy: the beginnings of a European Strategic Culture,” *International Affairs* 77, no. 3 (2001): 588

<sup>135</sup> Cornish and Edwards are referring here to the 1999 Helsinki European Council that was a stepping stone in the process of formalizing the many of the up-until-then informal agreements on how to forward a common European security and defence. Among the many issues addressed in Helsinki was the creation of a “capabilities list” that would eventually be used to build a European Rapid Reaction Force.

<sup>136</sup> Cornish & Edwards, “Beyond the EU/NATO dichotomy: the beginnings of a European Strategic Culture,” 588.

<sup>137</sup> Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, “The Strategic Culture of the European Union: A Progress Report,” *International Affairs* 81, no. 4 (2005): 801-820.

<sup>138</sup> Christoph O. Meyer, *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, 5

Meyer's remains one of the most rigorous attempts at defining the dependent variable in studies about strategic culture. By looking at mediatized crisis learning (i.e. the learning across Europe derived from poorly managed security crises) Meyer sees moderate convergence across his four value dimensions.

Confusingly, however, other scholars, both constructivists and from other schools of thought, have pointed to persistent (and even growing) strategic diversity in the EU<sup>141</sup> <sup>142</sup> <sup>143</sup> <sup>144</sup> <sup>145</sup>. Authors like Julian Lindley-French have expressed serious concern about the ability of the EU to act internationally without a coherent strategic culture. Writing in 2002 he described the situation in Europe as a "...strategic schizophrenia," that is "...undermining European defence". He also indicated that, for European defence to work, it "...would need to be based on a consensus over threat and Europe's security intentions, and to be supported by the military means with which to fulfil it. In today's Europe that is nigh impossible. Consequently, European defence is failing"<sup>146</sup>. Lindley-French was among a group of scholars and practitioners that in the early 2000s suggested the drafting of a European strategic concept. Some saw in the European Security Strategy of 2003 (ESS) a reaction to those requests. However, the ESS called for the development of "...a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention"<sup>147</sup>,

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<sup>140</sup> For a shorter and earlier version of Meyer's work see: Meyer, "Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms," *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 4 (2005): 523-549.

<sup>141</sup> Julian Lindley-French, "In the Shade of Locarno? Why European Defence is Failing," *International Affairs* 78, no. 4 (2002): 789-811.

<sup>142</sup> Rynning, "The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?," 479-496.

<sup>143</sup> Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Vintage Books, 2004).

<sup>144</sup> Martinsen, "Forging a Strategic Culture: Putting Policy into ESDP".

<sup>145</sup> Hieko Biehl, Bastian Giegerich and Alexandra Jonas, eds. *Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent* (Potsdam, Germany: Springer VS, 2013)

<sup>146</sup> Lindley-French, "In the Shade of Locarno? Why European Defence is Failing," 789.

<sup>147</sup> European Council, *European Security Strategy. A Secure Europe in a Better World* (Brussels: EU, 2003), 11.

confirming that such a culture did not exist at the time, and that it would not be forwarded in any way by the strategy itself.

Apart from basic differences in their attitudes towards the use of force, many European states seem to disagree on the appropriate framework for military action. Some, like the UK and Denmark, have a clear preference for NATO when it comes to both territorial defence and foreign military operations, while others like France, Belgium or Spain have historically argued in favour of the EU becoming the main framework for security and defence in Europe's neighbourhood. Jolyon Howorth has referred to this divide as "the Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma" and has attributed to it the impossibility of a common European defence policy during the Cold War<sup>148 149</sup>.

Authors like Olivier de France and Nick Witney have tried to categorize EU Member States based on the nature of strategic documents they produce. In a 2013 Policy Brief for the European Council on Foreign Relations they concluded that there were at least five different categories within which European states fall: strategists, globalists, localists, abstentionists and drifters<sup>150</sup>. The UK and France barely made it into de France and Witney's "strategists" category, and the fact that they did is only because their national security strategies did a good job at connecting threats with means. The national security documents of "globalists" like Spain and the Netherlands addressed only broad and global trends with little connection to the planning or capability development process. "Localists" tended to look solely at operational issues like territorial defence, leaving unattended broader trends in world affairs like the rise of China or the Arab Spring. Lastly, "abstentionists" were countries that had forgone strategic thinking, like Austria or

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<sup>148</sup> Jolyon M. Howorth, "The Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma: France, Britain and ESDP," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 3, no. 1 (2005): 39-54.

<sup>149</sup> For an in depth analysis of varying European strategic cultures, and in particular of differences regarding attitudes towards the United States and NATO see Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski *Old Europe, new Europe and the transatlantic security agenda*.

<sup>150</sup> Olivier de France and Nick Witney, "Europe's Strategic Cacophony", Brussels: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2013.

Belgium, while “drifters” were those that had simply allowed time to pass without updating their strategic posture, with Greece being the most significant case. de France and Witney’s overall assessment was that Member States’ national defence strategies were mostly myopic and, above all, cacophonous<sup>151 152</sup>.

It is evident that studies on strategic culture produce some highly complex and to some extent contradictory findings about European security and defence. However, the debate about the nature of culture and ideas regarding the use of force attracted scholars from various schools of thought, and significantly enriched the study of European defence. Abstracting from the complexity of that debate, here are some of the predictions regarding security and defence in Europe that emanated from it:

1. Differences in strategic cultures within Europe will prevent European defence integration, and, above all, common action.
2. Differences in attitudes towards NATO and CSDP will be significant and lead to paralysis as well as to the failure of exclusively-European (i.e. with no American participation) defence initiatives.
3. Constant interaction and learning through shared crises will lead to the convergence of European strategic cultures, thus enabling further cooperation and possibly integration.
4. Shared experience will allow for the emergence of a European strategic culture that will serve as the basis for a common defence.

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<sup>151</sup> For a longer and in-depth comparative study of top strategy documents from the EU’s 27 Member States by the same authors see: Olivier de France and Nick Witney, *Étude Comparative des Livres Blancs des 27 États membres de L’Union Européenne: Pour la définition d’un cadre Européen*, (Paris: Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l’École Militaire, 2012).

<sup>152</sup> See Annika Bergman and John Peterson, “Security strategy, ESDP and non-aligned states”, in *Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations*, ed. Roland Dannreuther and John Peterson (New York: Routledge, 2006), 147-164, for yet another exposé on the various divisions within Europe between ‘Ins and ‘Outs’ of NATO, ‘Small’ and ‘Large’ Member States, ‘Aligned’ and ‘Non-Aligned’ states and others.

Although constructivist studies have brought rigor to the study of strategic culture, most suffer from important deficiencies. The first is perhaps one of definition and measurement. Almost none of the studies on European strategic culture suggest a tight definition of their dependent variable, let alone its breakdown and measurement (with Meyer's being one of the few exceptions). But even the studies that deal with this issue with the utmost rigor suffer from another flaw. Indeed, most struggle to connect differences, similarities, convergence or divergence in strategic culture with patterns of action. Simply put, it remains unclear how strategic culture affects state behaviour, let alone aggregate action within a supranational institution like the EU. In a widely cited article, Alastair Iain Johnston attempted to construct a model that enabled the measurement of variance in state behaviour according to changes in strategic culture<sup>153</sup>. The model in question suggested comparing the action patterns of states to an ideal 'realist behaviour' (which served, therefore, as the study's null hypothesis). Johnston's piece generated a great deal of backlash with many questioning the possibility of any sort of measurement of culture<sup>154 155 156</sup>. The idea of constructing a perfectly realist behaviour as a null hypothesis proved to be itself controversial. The truth of the matter is that without a clearer connection between strategic culture and state behaviour, constructivist studies on European defence have been deprived of the central role they might have otherwise played.

The problem above is exacerbated by the fact that observations on the ground seem to point to much greater divergences in strategic culture in Europe than those captured by the cited literature and yet to clear moves towards deeper defence cooperation. So if neutral

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<sup>153</sup> Alastair I. Johnston, "Thinking About Strategic Culture," *International Security* 19, no.4 (1995): 32-64.

<sup>154</sup> Colin S., Gray, "Strategic culture as context: the first generation of theory strikes back," *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 1 (1999): 49-69.

<sup>155</sup> Alastair I. Johnston, "Strategic cultures revisited: reply to Colin Gray," *Review of International Studies*, no. 25 (1999): 519-523.

<sup>156</sup> Stuart Poore, "What is context? A reply to the Gray-Johnston debate on strategic culture," *Review of International Studies* 29, no. 2 (2003): 279-284.

states like Austria, Finland or Ireland have managed to collaborate closely with others with a long history of military engagement around the world like the UK and France, they must have had motives different to strategic culture.

This means that the more significant the differences in strategic culture across Europe, the less important they become as conditioning factors if cooperation or even integration are actually taking place (i.e. if those processes can plough ahead without the need for strategic culture parity). And cultural differences in Europe are indeed widespread and substantial. Europe contains not just different approaches to the use of force but also varying opinions about the efficacy of force more generally<sup>157</sup>. For some European states, coercion in international affairs is something of the past, while for others military might is necessary and a source of national pride. Countries like France want to see an active CSDP capable of deploying peacekeeping missions around the world, and undertaking more kinetic operations too. The French measure success in the ability of the EU to sustain action and have direct impact on the ground. As an interviewee from the French Foreign Office said to me: “We are not in the business of setting up a crisis management tool. We want a strong and capable CSDP”<sup>158</sup>. Germany, on the other hand, is far more interested in longer-term stabilization efforts, most of which do not even require the deployment of military personnel<sup>159 160 161</sup>. For numerous German policymakers interviewed as part of this research, progress in CSDP was measured in the density of institutions created and the

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<sup>157</sup> For a succinct take on these differences see: Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, 5-6.

<sup>158</sup> Interview French Foreign Ministry official (not for attribution), Paris, 25-06-2012.

<sup>159</sup> See book by Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, *Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005) for a detailed analysis of German strategic culture, its impact on the Bundeswehr and its recent evolution.

<sup>160</sup> For an interesting book on the strategic cultures of Germany and Japan and the prevalent antimilitarism in both countries see: Thomas Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

<sup>161</sup> The role of “guilt” has also been the focus of abundant study, particularly as it pertains to Germany and the legacy of the Second World War. The connection between guilt, strategic culture and, ultimately, strategic posture is studied in detail by Thomas U. Berger, *War, Guilt and World Politics after World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 35-82, for a look at the specific German case study.

depth of common strategy documents agreed upon, rather than in the EU's ability to deploy military missions (See Appendix 1 for a full list of interviewees). The differences between France and Germany are only two of the most significant in Europe, but with 28 Member States<sup>162</sup> the EU is a truly large forum with very diverse actors, each with somewhat different goals for CSDP. And yet, despite these differences, when push came to shove European states managed to create common institutions and decide on common action.

On top of discrepancies regarding when and how force should be used, European states differ greatly regarding the legal and institutional setup of their defence apparatuses. It is, of course, open to discussion if differences in institutional arrangements are to be considered part of a state's strategic culture, its outcome, or something altogether different. Be that as it may, it suits the purposes of the argument to mention such differences here because, as we will see, that disparity has not prevented Europeans from cooperating in defence matters. So not even an expansive interpretation of strategic culture allows for it to provide a causal explanation for events on the ground in Europe.

Two good case studies of these institutional design differences are again France and Germany. This is not only because of their scale and importance within the EU but also because of the wide gap that separates their institutional arrangements. In France it is the President of the Republic that retains full control of the strategy drafting process. He is also empowered to authorize the use of force with almost no intrusion from Parliament. By virtue of Article 35 of the French Constitution the President of the Republic is authorized to initiate military action without the need to inform Parliament until three days after the fact. Only if the mission extends beyond four months does Parliament have the prerogative to vote formally on it. This means that, for the vast majority of operations

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<sup>162</sup> As of June 2016.

France is involved in, Parliament plays a minimal role. Consequently, the French President is one of the European leaders with the greatest autonomy to decide on matters of war, meaning France's overall culture of military engagement is matched by the ability of its President to agree swiftly and decidedly on the launch of CSDP missions at the European Council.

The German Chancellor is, instead, tightly bound by the country's Basic Law, or Constitution, as well as by Parliament when it comes to deciding on the use of force<sup>163</sup>. Germany is constitutionally forbidden from using force outside of a 'treaty organization', as Article 80a of its Basic Law states. This conditionality was meant to limit German military engagement outside of the UN and NATO frameworks. Besides, every operation requires approval by a qualified majority of parliament; and scrutiny by the legislature is rigorous both before and after the mission is authorized.

Despite institutional disparities, Europeans have managed to agree on common action. Naturally, when CSDP is discussed in European fora, German leaders need to be very careful with what they sign on to and with the tempos agreed upon. If it is to act at all, Germany needs time and deep reflection. But EU action with German participation is by no means impossible. Germany's Constitutional Court has, in a somewhat broad interpretation of Article 80a of the German Constitution, allowed the government to commit forces to EU and NATO deployments. As for the issue of German parliamentary approval of EU military engagement, it has to be pointed out that it has been granted every single time a German government has requested it. This is not to say that there is a low threshold for the approval of military action in Germany but rather that action under an

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<sup>163</sup> See 1949 German Constitution: <https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf>

EU flag with German participation is possible<sup>164</sup>. Not only is it possible but it looks like it is also becoming easier over time<sup>165</sup>

It is undeniable that there are divergent strategic cultures in Europe. Europeans are divided regarding when and how force should be used, as well as under what institutional framework. Some see coercion as a thing of the past and have decision-making structures that make it very hard to authorize the use of military force, while others have a centralized system that can swiftly and easily decide upon military action. And yet decisions in EU bodies about defence matters have not only been possible but also common. Although it is only reasonable to expect differences in strategic culture to have an impact on the progress of European defence integration, it seems unwise to consider them the central determinants of that process.

### **Conclusion to Grand Theory Literature**

The broader theoretical literature of relevance to European security and defence is truly diverse. Table 2.1 below is a schematic representation of the arguments described in this section. The right hand column titled ‘Observations on the Ground’ contains a compilation of developments on the ground that fit with what the different theories predicted (in green) and what seem to contradict them (in red).

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<sup>164</sup> See book by Tom Dyson, *Politics of German Defence and Security Policy Leadership and Military Reform in the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2008) for a nuanced take on German strategic culture and how it played a modest constraining role in the country’s ability to act militarily when material factors and domestic politics called for it.

<sup>165</sup> See the work by Kerry Longhurst, *Germany and the Use of Force: The Evolution of German Security Policy 1990-2003* (Manchester: University Press, 2005), in particular chapter 4 titled “The momentum of change” pp. 77-97. Longhurst makes the point in this book that Germany’s ability to use force has grown significantly since the end of the Cold War

**Table 2.2: European Defence Integration: Grand Theory and Reality**

| <b>REALISM</b>                                           |                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
|----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Proponent(s)</b>                                      | <b>Determinants of Evolution</b>                                                                                                                                                                           | <b>Predictions</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | <b>Observations on the Ground<sup>166</sup></b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| J. Mearsheimer                                           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦End of the Cold War and demise of the Soviet Union</li> <li>♦Diminishing US military presence in Europe</li> <li>♦German ambitions of regional hegemony</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦European states become a threat to one another</li> <li>♦Balance of power politics re-emerges in Europe</li> <li>♦German rearmament</li> <li>♦German containment and conflict</li> </ul>                                                                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Europeans cooperate more closely on defence</li> <li>•Defence spending falls markedly</li> <li>•Germany does not rearm</li> <li>•Europe remains at peace</li> </ul>                                                                                                        |
| S. Rosato                                                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦End of the Cold War and demise of the Soviet Union</li> <li>♦Disappearance of existential threat to Europe</li> </ul>                                              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦Integration loses its driving motive (Soviet threat)</li> <li>♦Integration unravels</li> <li>♦Growing tensions and possibly conflict</li> </ul>                                                                                                                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Integration is forwarded in almost all fields of policy</li> <li>•Europeans cooperate more closely on defence</li> <li>•Europe remains at peace</li> </ul>                                                                                                                 |
| R. J. Art<br>S. G. Jones                                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦US hegemony</li> <li>♦European desire to balance US power</li> </ul>                                                                                               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦Europeans decide to balance against the US</li> <li>♦EU defence strengthened via spending and cooperation</li> <li>♦The transatlantic partnership and NATO are weakened</li> </ul>                                                                                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Europeans cooperate more closely on defence</li> <li>•Defence spending falls markedly</li> <li>•Europeans remain committed to the Atlantic partnership</li> </ul>                                                                                                          |
| S. M. Walt<br>S. van Evera                               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦More peaceful attitudes of European states</li> <li>♦New perceptions of threat within Europe</li> <li>♦Disappearance of existential threat to Europe</li> </ul>    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦Defence spending in Europe falls</li> <li>♦Europe lives through a long period of peace</li> <li>♦The transatlantic partnership and NATO are weakened</li> <li>♦Europeans cooperate on defence only sporadically</li> </ul>                                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Defence spending falls markedly</li> <li>•Europe remains at peace</li> <li>•Europeans remain committed to the Atlantic partnership</li> <li>•Europeans cooperate ever more closely on defence</li> </ul>                                                                   |
| A. Hyde-Price<br>B. R. Posen                             | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦US hegemony</li> <li>♦Loss of power and influence by European states</li> <li>♦Desire of key European states to remain influential</li> </ul>                      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦Large member states push for defence integration</li> <li>♦EU defence is instrumentalized by large member states</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•France and the UK become the main supporters of CSDP</li> <li>•EU defence responds to the needs of many member states</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                           |
| <b>(NEO)FUNCTIONALISM / LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM</b> |                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| K. Deutsch<br>E. B. Haas<br>D. Mitrany                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦Economic interdependence</li> <li>♦Preferences of transnational constituencies</li> <li>♦Desire of institutions to broaden their mandate</li> </ul>                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦Externalities of non-integration are regularly felt</li> <li>♦A 'transnational society' pushes for more integration</li> <li>♦Supranational institutions call for further integration</li> <li>♦Initial integration orderly 'spills over' to other areas</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Externalities are only felt through external shocks (crises)</li> <li>•No strong transnational society emerges in defence field</li> <li>•EU institutions play a small role in furthering integration</li> <li>•Defence integration advances in fits and starts</li> </ul> |
| A. Moravcsik                                             | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦Economic interdependence</li> <li>♦Preferences of domestic constituencies</li> <li>♦Major inter-state bargains</li> </ul>                                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦Externalities of non-integration are regularly felt</li> <li>♦Domestic constituents push for more integration</li> <li>♦National interests are key drivers of integration</li> <li>♦Inter-state bargains become central to integration</li> </ul>                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Externalities are only felt through external shocks (crises)</li> <li>•Domestic constituencies remain small and passive</li> <li>•CFSP emerged as means of protecting national interests</li> <li>•Inter-state bargains are central to the emergence of CSDP</li> </ul>    |
| <b>CONSTRUCTIVISM</b>                                    |                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| J. Lindley-French<br>P. M. Martinsen<br>S. Rynning       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦Differences in strategic culture across Europe</li> <li>♦Rigidity of strategic culture</li> <li>♦Predominance of NATO in European defence</li> </ul>               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦States will have different objectives for CSDP</li> <li>♦NATO will be a cause of division within Europe</li> <li>♦Defence cooperation will be difficult</li> <li>♦EU defence integration will be weak at best</li> </ul>                                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•States have different declaratory policies towards CSDP</li> <li>•NATO and CSDP coexist peacefully</li> <li>•European states cooperate on defence regularly</li> <li>•Integration advances through action &amp; institutions</li> </ul>                                    |
| P. Cornish<br>G. Edwards<br>C. Meyer                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦Dynamism of strategic culture</li> <li>♦Day-to-day defence collaboration</li> <li>♦Collective learning through security crises</li> </ul>                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦European states will collaborate with one another</li> <li>♦European strategic cultures will slowly converge</li> <li>♦Defence integration will be possible but slow</li> </ul>                                                                                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•European states cooperate on defence regularly</li> <li>•Strategic cultures remain mostly divergent across Europe</li> <li>•Integration advances through action &amp; institutions</li> </ul>                                                                              |

<sup>166</sup> In red are events that do not seem to coincide with the expectations of proponents; in green those that do. See Conclusion for a more detailed analysis.

It is quite clear that grand theories of international relations struggle to coherently account for the developments in European defence of the past two decades. As previously indicated, the two main liberal theories of integration, functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, fail to capture the details and particularities of events in this field. Liberal intergovernmentalism comes closest but has not developed a detailed methodology to be applied to security and defence integration. Most realist approaches are, on the other hand, sceptical of the future of EU defence. Some, like Posen or van Evera have spoken of the possibility of a peaceful Europe, while very few allow for a sustainable defence cooperation to emerge in the continent. Lastly, constructivist approaches have almost exclusively dealt with the issue of strategic culture in Europe. Despite some constructivist works finding moderate cultural convergence across European states, most have failed to connect developments at the strategic culture level with specific events on the ground, let alone produce a compelling and complete argument for the evolution of CFSP/CSDP.

Overall it is fair to say that looking at the abundant theoretical literature on the subject one gets the sense that EU security and defence is either highly improbable, unsustainable or outright impossible. Those that have predicted something different, like Seth Jones or Christoph Meyer, have done so only in modest terms and using a logic and a set of tools that led others to predict the exact opposite. Simply put, we have not been able to find a coherent theoretical narrative that can explain developments in European defence since the end of the Cold War. This dearth of theory has left the field of European defence truly void of an overarching explanatory framework.

## **Middle Range Theories, Empirical Literature and European Security and Defence**

In addition to the grand theoretical literature described above, scholars have produced abundant mid-range theoretical works as well as detailed empirical studies that are of value to this thesis. This second body of scholarship, although not completely disconnected from the first, has a different character, is normally penned by European researchers, and has only a relative interest in addressing broader theoretical issues. As we will see, it is incorrect to completely deprive it of theoretical depth but it is evident from the start that it is not interested in engaging in a dialogue with most of the authors cited in the preceding section of this dissertation or with some of the broader theoretical issues raised by them<sup>167</sup>.

### **Europe, External Shocks and Domestic Preference Formation**

As indicated before, there is an important gap in the literature when it comes to addressing and testing some of the fundamental arguments put forward by realists authors when describing the state of European defence. This gap in the literature has been detected by scholars like Luis Simon, who described it in the following terms: “[my book] aims to bridge the emphasis on national power and systemic factors displayed by realist and geopolitically inspired analysis of European security...and the abundant empirical work on specific initiatives, institutions, capabilities or missions conducted by CSDP and NATO experts...”<sup>168</sup>. The approach used by Simon to bridge that gap is similar in many respects to the one suggested in this thesis: he looks at major EU states and the interplay between

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<sup>167</sup> See the edited volume by Xymena Kurowska and Fabian Breuer (eds.), *Explaining the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy: Theory in Action* (New York: Palgrave, 2012), which is an attempt to provide the field of CFSP/CSDP studies with theoretical depth although, curiously, it contains no analysis on neofunctionalist or liberal intergovernmentalist approaches to security and defence integration.

<sup>168</sup> Simon, *Geopolitical Change, Grand Strategy and European Security*, 7.

the geopolitical environment they inhabit and the evolution of CSDP and NATO. The geopolitical environment, which is his study's independent variable, is broken up into two distinct periods: post-September 11 (2001-2005) and post-Iraq (2005-2010). The author then looks at developments within each of those periods and the impact they had on the grand strategy of large EU states, which is mostly understood in the book as the content of their top security documents.

Simon makes a significant contribution to the literature and truly builds a first bridge across the gap between the CFSP/CSDP literature and broader realist theoretical works of International Relations. Importantly, he adds a great deal of detail to the strong relationship between changes in the geopolitical environment inhabited by European states and their attitudes towards a common foreign and security policy<sup>169 170</sup>. He also outlines the inhibiting role played of NATO when looking at the process of emergence of CSDP, something this dissertation will build on in its penultimate chapter. In many respects this thesis is, therefore, a natural continuation to Simon's work.

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<sup>169</sup> Simon is by no means alone in identifying external shocks as a driver of security and defence policy in Europe. Many others have done so. See Arjen Boi, Magnus Ekengren and Marl Rhinard, *The European Union as Crisis Manager: Patterns and Prospects* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) and Bastian Giegerich, *European security and strategic culture* (Baden: Nomos, 2006), 54.

<sup>170</sup> Another author that has looked at the impact of external shocks on EU security and defence integration is Bastian Giegerich. His 2006 book titled "European Security and Strategic Culture: National Responses to the EU's Security and Defence Policy" looks at "...the tension between pressures emanating from the external environment as expressed through ESDP [CSDP] on the one hand and the norms flowing from national strategic cultures on the other" (See: Giegerich, *European security and strategic culture*, 45). His chapter on "The Crises of the 1990s" is a useful and detailed account of the various shocks suffered by European states in that period (Ibid., 54-58). Interestingly, and despite addressing a topic that has been closely associated with constructivism, Giegerich chooses a positivist approach and this is reflected in his locus of analysis: specific EU states, the strategic documents they produce and the opinions expressed by their political elites. The major difference between Giegerich's study and the one presented here is that he is interested in understanding the extent to which national strategic cultures conditioned individual state approaches to CSDP, while this thesis tries to assess the overall process that has led to the emergence of the EU as a security actor. Giegerich remains sceptical about the emergence of a common European strategic culture and prefers to speak of "compatibility" and certain areas of "overlap". He ultimately concludes that: "Most likely, convergence [of strategic cultures] – a necessarily long-term process – will be driven by four factors. First, a growing pool of shared experiences in difficult crisis management situations...Second...once the rhetoric of shared risks becomes a reality with implications for policy-makers, this analytical similarity will greatly facilitate further convergence...Third, force projection has to be accepted as the determining purpose of the armed forces throughout EU member states...Finally, a genuinely common strategic culture has to be built on the notion of the EU as a legitimate framework for the external use of military force" (Ibid., 202).

However, Simon's book has three important shortcomings. This first is that he fails to answer the following question: Why would developments in the European geopolitical landscape lead to growing levels of cooperation and not to conflict? This very peculiar dynamic is left unexplored. As we will see later on in this thesis, one has to understand the very particular nature of relations among EU Member States, and the fact that those states do not pose a threat to one another, to be able to make sense of their reactions to external developments. This is an issue of particular importance when addressing the assumptions in the broader realist international relations literature. As anticipated in the Introduction to this thesis, the existence of a security community in Europe is perhaps the single most important determinant of CFSP/CSDP integration: It is, indeed, an insufficient driver but a necessary one.

The second weakness of Simon's work is one of design, which, ultimately, results in one of content. Oddly, Simon decides to treat the geopolitical landscape inhabited by European states as his study's independent variable, despite having expressly made the point that it is changes in that environment that drive policy design in those states. By granting it that artificially static nature in the work's design he misses the opportunity to truly unpack it and look at specific crises or shocks and the reactions of EU Member States. Instead he chooses to look at long sweeps of history and tries to extract trends or common characteristics of those periods. This of course, leads to the third area where the book falls short: what are the specific mechanisms by which those changes in the external environment find their way to national foreign and security policy, and, also, how do then states display those preferences at the EU level? Why do we need these changes in the environment for cooperation/integration to occur in this field? These very important questions receive only partial answers in Simon's work.

The work done by Emil Kirchner and James Sperling might give us a hint as to what actually drives domestic policy preference formation in EU Member States, and, particularly, what encourages national elites to elevate the management of certain crises to the European level. In their book “EU security governance” Kirchner and Sperling look at “the structural mechanisms transmitting endogenous and exogenous shocks throughout the EU” and the consequences of that transmission<sup>171</sup>. According to them the “...inability of the individual states to mitigate the shocks unilaterally has created the impulse to elevate the EU as the actor responsible for coordinating if not assuming the security responsibilities once the uncontested preserve of states”<sup>172</sup>. This inability is produced by what they refer to as the ‘Post-Westphalian’ character of the EU, or the fact that sovereignty within its borders has been compromised and qualified, and “security goals have increasingly become preoccupied with matters of protecting existing levels of economic welfare as well as the social fabric from external disruptions”<sup>173 174 175</sup>. For Kirchner and Sperling what is driving security cooperation in Europe is therefore “...the loss of sovereignty attending Post-Westphalian states...” which has “...created and alternative form of statecraft (civilian power) and has produced an emergent civil order in the geopolitical space defined by the EU”<sup>176</sup>.

Of course, some of the key manifestations of the EU as a security actor have been the numerous CSDP missions that have been launched since the early 2000s. There is an extensive literature on those missions too. The work of Alexander Mattelaer, for example,

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<sup>171</sup> Kirchner and Sperling, *EU Security Governance*, 2.

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>174</sup> For a broader reflection on the interdependence brought about by globalization and the way it has impacted the role of states, making them more permeable to external threats, and forcing them to establish networks of cooperation to tackle external and internal threats see: Anne Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004).

<sup>175</sup> Some have looked at the fusion of the external and internal dimensions of security as it regards to counterterrorism policy. See: Malcolm Anderson, “Internal and External Security in the EU: Is There Any Longer a Distinction?”, in *The Changing Politics of European Security: Europe Alone?*, ed. Stefan Gänzle and Allen G, Sens (London: Palgrave, 2007), 31-46

<sup>176</sup> Kirchner and Sperling, *EU Security Governance*, 3.

looks at the political dynamics behind European decisions to launch EU, UN or NATO operations, and how those processes impacted the strategic content of the operations themselves. Mattelaer's fine-grained study concludes that the complex intergovernmental nature of European interactions in this field truly detracts from the strategic coherence of the missions ultimately launched and almost by default limits their goals to deterrence and capacity building. This is a bold assertion as it essentially claims that European security and defence policy is almost a mere reflection of, or a "window" into, as the author would say, internal decision-making procedures<sup>177 178</sup>.

The book by Benjamin Pohl, titled "EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management: Power, purpose and domestic politics", on the other hand, looks at the processes that led to the launch of EU operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Chad in the 2000s. Pohl tests what he considers to be the four theoretical propositions about the ultimate reason for the launch of CSDP operations: "...first, the desire to balance the world's preponderant power, the US...second, an expression of the EU's conception of its own role as a 'normative power'...third, a means of achieving 'closer union' within the EU...or fourth, that they might serve to improve governments' domestic political position by offering them a framework for 'doing something'"<sup>179</sup>. Pohl focuses on the missions because he considers these to be the fundamental expression of CSDP, rather than less relevant policy statements that do not materialise in specific actions. He concludes that it is the fourth proposition, that CSDP missions are a product of domestic political dynamics, which has more explanatory power: "The importance of domestic political calculations

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<sup>177</sup> Alexander Mattelaer, *The Politico-Military Dynamics of European Crisis Response Strategy* (New York: Palgrave, 2013).

<sup>178</sup> A particularly worthy case of an analysis of CSDP operations, the decision-making process behind their launch and their impact once in motion is the book by Roy Ginsberg and Susan Penksa, *The European Union in Global Security; The Politics of Impact* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012). After looking at various CSDP operations they conclude that: "A CSDP operation is launched when member states calculate that it is in their political interest to have an EU-level, member-state-controlled, CSDP operation where there is political visibility for the EU and a perceived need for a union-level response to insecurity" (*Ibid*, 61).

<sup>179</sup> Benjamin Pohl, *EU Crisis Management Operations* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 4.

was...demonstrated by the fact that national positions on the four CSDP operations corresponded to domestic considerations and priorities”<sup>180 181 182</sup>. Unfortunately Pohl does not explore how those preferences are shaped or, importantly, what sparks specific national interest in certain missions or, as he puts it: “how and when (anticipated) domestic expectations trigger action by policy-makers”<sup>183</sup>. Additionally, the book does not address the intergovernmental negotiations that follow specific national actions or policies in this field. The fact that the EU as a whole was engaged in operations around the world is surely a sign that at least in those instances there was some overlap across domestic political preferences that enabled joint action. How that came about is a major unanswered question in the literature. Pohl’s work, however, is extremely useful in emphasising the importance of understanding domestic policy preference formation and the role of member states in the emergence of CFSP/CSDP.

A more detailed study of these issues is provided by Eva Gross in her book “The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy”<sup>184</sup>. Gross claims that EU Member States straddle three potentially conflicting commitments when deciding how to respond to international crises. Those conflicting commitments are the product of domestic politics, transatlantic relations and, lastly, European entanglement. Responses to crises are therefore mediated by those commitments in each Member State and produce different

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<sup>180</sup> Pohl, *EU Crisis Management Operations*, 180.

<sup>181</sup> Christopher J. Bickerton approached the topic in a similar manner although he concluded that perhaps the single most significant driver of EU integration in the field of security and defence is the desire for what he terms ‘functionality’. He concludes the following: “As with other areas of EU policymaking, from agriculture to consumer regulation, foreign policy cooperation is oriented as much towards the balancing of the positions of different actors within the Union as it is to securing specific outcomes in theatres across the world. This internal *functionality* is tied to the underlying political struggle between member states and EU institutions, which has been the leitmotif of European integration since its earliest days”. See Christopher Bickerton, *European Union Foreign Policy*, London (Palgrave, 2011), 121-122.

<sup>182</sup> For an interesting study on the importance of national preferences when looking at the European policy of a Member State (in this case Italy) see: Filippo Andreatta, “Italian Foreign Policy: Domestic Politics, International Requirements and the European Dimension”, *European Integration* 30, no. 1, (2008): 169–181.

<sup>183</sup> Pohl, *EU Crisis Management Operations*, 184

<sup>184</sup> Eva Gross, *The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy* (London, Palgrave, 2009).

outcomes, sometimes leading to joint EU action, others to UN or NATO operations, and others to no action at all. Gross looks at a number of crises in detail, and arrives at the conclusion that the growing number of Brussels-based institutions working on foreign and security policy is exerting increasing adaptation pressures on EU Member States. This despite the fact that in most instances what explained the foreign policy preference of EU states was mostly domestic political considerations<sup>185</sup>. Gross' study is of particular interest to this thesis for a number of reasons. To start off with, it focuses on national responses to external shocks, something this dissertation will also do. It also places a great deal of emphasis on domestic preference formation, a sometimes-overlooked feature in the CSDP literature, which tends to focus on the emergence of "EU preferences".

The literature cited above fails to provide a comprehensive narrative for the emergence and expansion of CFSP/CSDP. It does, however, shine light on numerous aspects of the process, points to some of its central features and pinpoints some important areas where integration studies should focus moving forward. Here is a summary of the issues flagged by the literature regarding external shocks and the formation of state preferences in Europe:

1. Changes in the external environment are central to the process of European security and defence integration but it is unclear how those changes impact actual policy formation.
2. External shocks have led to cooperation rather than conflict but the underlying reason for this is left unexplored by the literature.
3. Domestic preference formation is of fundamental importance when trying to understand the emergence of CFSP/CSDP.

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<sup>185</sup> Gross, *The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy*, 154.

4. NATO is a central actor in European security not least of all because of its impact on domestic preference formation. Its role in the integration process is, however, not fully understood.

All of the elements above have been included and addressed in the theoretical design of this thesis and will be explored in the empirical chapters. The role of external shocks is a central feature of this dissertation although their impact is hard to understand if one does not look at the EU as a security community. This is, in fact, one of the most overlooked issues of the mid-range and empirical literatures on CFSP/CSDP. It is, quite simply, impossible to understand developments in Europe of the last twenty years without a clear understanding of threat perceptions within Europe. And despite this, there is scarce literature on Europe as a security community. The following chapters will make a contribution in this area and, in particular, will provide evidence from three very important Member States of the extent to which security relations among EU states have changed since the end of the Second World War. Domestic preference formation, is on the other hand, looked in detail in the following pages including through interviews with key actors in pivotal moments of the EU integration process.

### **Policymaking Elites and Intergovernmental Bargains in the European Union**

The role of elites in security and defence integration processes is something the empirical literature has covered in detail. This is particularly true when speaking about EU elites in the CFSP/CSDP integration process. Hylke Dijkstra believes that delegation to EU officials by EU Member States occurs because “...EU bureaucracies make CSDP policy-

making more efficient”<sup>186</sup>. This efficiency is at odds with national sovereignty or as Dijkstra puts it: “There exists...a clear trade-off between the anticipated efficiency gains of delegation and the anticipated sovereignty costs. As a result, the member states almost always delegated fewer tasks to the EU-bureaucracies than was functionally optimal”<sup>187</sup>. The influence of EU officials once they have been appointed is produced by their central location in the decision-making machinery, and their content-specific knowledge. It is of course significant and relevant to understand how these actors operate and the tensions between delegation and efficiency but Dijkstra’s book is relatively light on the explanation of why or how the actual delegation occurs. He does look at specific missions and is therefore already hinting that the delegation occurs through crises but this is not clearly spelt out.

Other authors have looked in detail at the role played by epistemic communities in security and defence integration in the EU. Perhaps the most articulate case is that of Mai’a K. Davis Cross who, in her book “Security Integration in Europe: How Knowledge-based Networks Are Transforming the European Union”, looks at the role of professional diplomats, top-level military officers, technology experts, police officers, defence experts, defence industry professionals, scientists, and think-tank researchers in the policymaking process at the EU level. Davis Cross looks at both what she terms the “internal” and “external” dimensions of security integration, with the former being mostly about “...counterterrorism, upholding fundamental human rights, finding common approaches to legal and illegal immigration, harmonizing asylum procedures, protecting the EU’s external borders, sharing law enforcement information, agreeing on minimum standards of justice and fighting cross border crime, drugs, and illegal trafficking in humans” and the

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<sup>186</sup> Hylke Dijkstra, *Policy-Making in EU Security and Defence: An Institutional Perspective* (London: Palgrave, 2013), 10.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

latter “member states’ commitment to come to each other’s aid in the event of an attack, the sanctions or restrictive measures that the EU imposes on third countries in an effort to prevent human rights abuses and violations of democratic norms, and crisis management and conflict prevention operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy”<sup>188</sup>. Her conclusion is that “European security integration is occurring largely through the diplomatic dialogue and agency of key transnational knowledge-based networks, known as epistemic communities”<sup>189 190</sup>.

Davis Cross’ work brings a great deal of detail into the role of these communities and how they help shape policy. However, and as this thesis will show, she seems to underestimate the role of external shocks, particularly regarding their function as a catalyst for what she would term ‘external security integration’ (i.e. the deepening of integration in CSDP). She is even critical of previous literature on epistemic communities that placed an emphasis on the role of new threats or crises in the integration process in large part because she believes uncertainty is a built-in feature in the international system: “While crises may provide the space for epistemic communities to be heard as decision makers search for new answers to problems, crises are not necessary”<sup>191</sup>.

The lack of interest in external shocks in Davis Cross’ work is likely to be connected to the overall suspicion in her work of the role of Member State’s preferences in the integration process. Indeed, she believes these are only part of the story. She phrases this clearly in the following way: “To the extent that political will is needed to move

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<sup>188</sup> Cross, *Security Integration in Europe*, 7

<sup>189</sup> A similar study, and one that questions some of the assumptions of this thesis about the role of states and national interests in the emergence of CSDP is the book by Lisa Watanabe titled “Securing Europe: European Security in an American Epoch”. In that book Watanabe concludes: “[European] Cooperation does not necessarily derive from a convergence of pre-defined national positions, but may also emerge out of gradual, iterative action. Europeanization in connection to the ESDP and JHA has been driven less by periodic, intergovernmental summits in which states acting as monolithic entities bargain than by transnational policy practitioners within decentralized policy arenas”. See: Lisa Watanabe, *Securing Europe: European Security in an American Epoch* (London: Palgrave, 2010), 12.

<sup>190</sup> Cross, *Security Integration in Europe*, 3

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*, 32

integration forward, that will does not emanate primarily from member states. Rather, explaining European security integration requires looking to the group dynamics, relationships, procedural norms, identities and world views with key epistemic communities”<sup>192</sup>. However, and as this thesis will show, Member State action was central to the most significant integrative measures agreed in the EU. Once initial steps were taken it could well be the case that epistemic communities emerged and gave further shape to the process but it seems clear from the research conducted for this thesis that Member States preferences, and Member State reactions to crises provide very useful insights into the first phases of security and defence integration in Europe.

Additionally, very little has been written on the role of national policymakers in the integration process in this field. There is therefore a contribution to be made to the field by studying how external shocks shaped the thinking of national elites and how they in turn proceeded to negotiate at the European level the various positions that ultimately led to the emergence of CFSP/CSDP.

The decision to institutionalize cooperation at a supranational level, on the other hand, seems to have taken place in Europe on the basis of the assumption that future cooperation will be desirable. According to Moritz Weiss this decision is taken by national decision-makers with bounded rationality and by taking into account the relative magnitude of transaction costs associated with deciding on multilateral responses to security needs. If the transaction costs of operating under NATO or of having to come to specific arrangements every time a crisis occurs are high, EU Member States will prefer “far-reaching institution-building [at the EU level] in terms of substantive scope and institutional depth”<sup>193</sup>. Weiss’ hypotheses are three:

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<sup>192</sup> Cross, *Security Integration in Europe*, 215

<sup>193</sup> Weiss, *Transaction Costs and Security Institutions: Unraveling the ESDP*, 11

1. “The more costly a state assesses the transactions with respect to the provision of European security, the more it will prefer to build institutions in this domain”
2. “The more a state regards the EU as a relatively effective institution for the provision of European security, the larger the substantive scope it will prefer for it in military planning (given the state’s membership in both NATO and the EU)”
3. “For a state, the higher the combination of uncertainty and involved asset specificity within the ESDP, the more depth and thus bindingness it will prefer with respect to the institutional arrangement”<sup>194</sup>

Weiss’ work provides valuable insights into some of the concepts contained in this thesis such as how states make assessments about their BATNAs when entering these sorts of negotiations. Some authors have also suggested that once those institutions are in place they produce additional integrative dynamics. Michael Smith’s book on the subject for example, advocates that institutions, once created, have a life of their own and allow for the advancement of cooperation in ways that the founders of the institutions could not have anticipated<sup>195</sup>. This thesis will not focus on those dynamics in part because in CFSP/CSDP intergovernmental bargains seem to be the fora where truly significant integrative measures are decided upon but this does not in any way deny the role of institutions once created.

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<sup>194</sup> Weiss, *Transaction Costs and Security Institutions: Unraveling the ESDP*, 42

<sup>195</sup> In his book “Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy” Michael Smith concludes that: “The case of EU foreign policy thus demonstrates that institutions can be designed and developed to encourage international cooperation in ways that go beyond transaction-costs approaches, or beyond bargaining, in two senses: beyond the great history-making decisions of intergovernmental conferences which often involve institutional reform, and beyond the *quo pro quo* policymaking negotiations which take place within many other international institutions. International mechanisms are the filter through which external and internal demands are focused on the EU...”. See Michael Smith, *Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 12.

## The Role of NATO

There is also abundant secondary literature on NATO, its history, and its impact on European security and defence<sup>196</sup>. Many authors have questioned the future of the Alliance. Some because its *raison d'être* was lost once the Soviet threat was removed in the 1990s<sup>197</sup>; others because of the imbalance across the Atlantic and inability of Europeans to share enough of the security burden<sup>198</sup>; and others due to the growing capabilities gap emerging in the Atlantic<sup>199</sup>. Part of the literature is, however, optimistic about the future of the Alliance<sup>200</sup>. The source of this optimism varies with some authors pointing to strong institutional dynamics within NATO that are keeping it alive and well, others focusing on the existence of an Atlantic community of values that call for cooperation and others focusing on the transformation of NATO from a defence alliance to an organisation tasked with keeping global security<sup>201</sup>.

A separate strand of literature that began almost as soon as the Saint Maló declaration was issued in 1998 has looked at NATO-EU or NATO-CSDP relations<sup>202</sup>. Here again one finds conflicting analyses. Some believe that the birth of CSDP will be positive for

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<sup>196</sup> For a comprehensive history of NATO since the end of the Cold War see: David Yost, *NATO's Balancing Act* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2014) and for a summary of NATO-EU relations in that period look specifically at Yost, *NATO's Balancing Act*, 253-261.

<sup>197</sup> See: Richard Rupp, *NATO after 9/11.7: An Alliance in Continuing Decline* (New York: Palgrave, 2006) or Alexander Moens, Lenard J. Cohen and Allen G. Sens, *NATO and European Security: Alliance Politics from the End of the Cold War to the Age of Terrorism* (Westport: Praeger, 2003).

<sup>198</sup> See: Ted Galen Carpenter, *Beyond NATO: Staying out of Europe's Wars* (Washington DC: Cato Institute, 1994).

<sup>199</sup> See: Daniel S. Hamilton, *Transatlantic Transformations: Equipping NATO for the 21st Century*, (Washington DC: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), particularly Chapter 4 by Yves Boyer, "The Consequences of U.S. and NATO Transformation for the European Union: A European View", 75-90.

<sup>200</sup> See here: Sten Rynning, *NATO Renewed: the Power and Purpose of Transatlantic Cooperation*, New York: Palgrave, 2005 or Philip H. Gordon (ed.), *NATO's Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997).

<sup>201</sup> Some studies have also provided specific details about Alliance politics, like that of Paul Cornish, which looked at the internal evolution of NATO since the end of the Cold War. See: Paul Cornish, *Partnership in Crisis: the US, Europe and the fall and rise of NATO* (London: Pinter/RIIA, 1997).

<sup>202</sup> For a comparison of US reactions to the European Defence Community of the 1950s and to CSDP see David Armitage, *A Comparative Analysis of US Policy Toward European Defense Autonomy* (New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2008).

transatlantic relations as it will allow for better burden sharing across the Atlantic and hence assuage American frustration regarding the provision of security in that space<sup>203 204</sup>.

A significant portion of EU integration literature has looked at US-Europe relations through a different lens and has located in it the ultimate origin of the EU defence project. This is particularly true of the work done by Stephanie Anderson. In her book “Crafting EU Security Policy: In Pursuit of a European Identity” she claims that “The ESDP is not to defend Europe, but rather, to unify the citizens of Europe. Economic prosperity has not been enough to cement support for the integration project...Europeans have been most unified when they have opposed unpopular US foreign policy, whether it be the Vietnam War, Pershing missiles, or the war in Iraq. Using the United States as the ‘other’, Europeans are able to gloss over their differences and see themselves as the same”<sup>205</sup>.

A sizable number of scholars have also pointed out the fact that NATO is a narrower defence alliance, while CFSP/CSDP are part of a much broader project of a political nature. This complicates relations between the two: “The complicated relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is not due to the fact that two affiliated organizations are both trying to provide security policies in the same Euro-Atlantic area. Rather, the most revealing difficulties in their relationship derive from the fact that ESDP is part of a larger quest by European elites to create a more unified and single political identity for

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<sup>203</sup> See: Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenge* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003) or Michael Quinlan, *European Defence Cooperation* (Washington DC,: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001).

<sup>204</sup> For an interesting example of the debate on the impact of CSDP on NATO see the last two chapters of Jolyon Howorth and John T. S. Keeler, *Defending Europe: The EU, NATO and the Quest for European Autonomy*. Those two chapters are titled “Why ESDP is misguided and dangerous for the Alliance” and “Why ESDP is Necessary and Beneficial for the Alliance”.

<sup>205</sup> Stephanie B., Anderson, *Crafting EU Security Policy: In Pursuit of a European Identity* (Boulder, Co. Lynne Rienner, 2008), 7.

Europe”<sup>206</sup>. This dynamic is in fact so serious that, for Alexander Moens, “...rather than looking for closer cooperation between the two, we can expect a prolonged status quo until the momentum for more EU integration returns in Europe. At that point, European elites will try to mould ESDP more closely into the community method and further weaken Atlantic security ties”<sup>207</sup>.

Lastly, some have focused on trying to have both organizations co-exist which would, in essence, equate to limiting the scope of development of CSDP. Here is how Robert Hunter phrased it: “There needs to be a wholehearted unambiguous European adherence to the principle that the Headline Goal Task Force will act only ‘where NATO as a whole is not involved’”<sup>208</sup>. He then added: “There needs to be reaffirmation of the cardinal NATO principle that risks are to be shared by all allies and that there must not emerge, formally or informally, a ‘division of labor’ between NATO and ESDP, except in relatively marginal operations outside of Europe”<sup>209</sup>.

Overall, one gets the sense that there is a high level of confusion about the role of NATO in the emergence of CFSP/CSDP and about the relationship the two institutions should have. This is almost certainly related to the fact that we seem to lack a comprehensive theoretical explanation for the emergence and deepening of CSDP. Without such a narrative it is extremely difficult to understand the full role of NATO. The following pages, and in particular the penultimate chapter of this thesis will try to flesh out the nature of the NATO-EU relationship as well as its impact on the evolution of both institutions.

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<sup>206</sup> Alexander Moens, “The Challenges and Limits of NATO-ESDP Synergy”, in *The Changing Politics of European Security: Europe Alone?*, ed. Stefan Gänzle and Allen G. Sens (London: Palgrave, 2007), 180-201.

<sup>207</sup> Moens, “The Challenges and Limits of NATO-ESDP Synergy”, 181.

<sup>208</sup> Robert Hunter, *The European Security and Defence Policy: NATO's Companion or Competitor* (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 2002), xviii.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid.

**Conclusion to Middle Range Theoretical and Empirical Literature**

As anticipated at the beginning of this section, a lot of scholarly work has been done on CFSP/CSDP. Many of these studies would fall under the category of middle-range theories as they bring different determinants and approaches to bear, while others are simply empirical studies that describe or catalogue events in Europe's recent history. The contributions made by this literature are on the whole of very high value for this dissertation and its insights have affected both the design and the methods used throughout it. It is still the case, however, that a perhaps more comprehensive narrative can emerge from the re-arrangement of the various pieces described above. The next pages are an attempt at precisely that.

**Conclusion to Literature Review**

A study of the available literature confirms that a new explanation for European security and defence integration is warranted. Such an explanation should take into account the observations from broader theoretical studies as contained in Table 2.2 above as well as the various insights from the middle-range and empirical literature described in the preceding section. Overall, the literature suggests that European security and defence integration is, to say the least, an odd occurrence. Developments in the external environment of the past two decades have produced intense cooperation and some form of integration but it is unclear why that is the case. It is not only unclear but also at odds with most realist assumptions about state behaviour. One could therefore try to build a bridge between the extensive realist literature on the subject and developments on the ground. As will be explored in the following chapters it might well be that what bridges that gap is the existence of a security community in Europe. Realists may be missing the mark because they assume that European states still feel threatened by one another.

Also, although the importance of the external environment is stated by numerous authors the mechanisms through which that environment makes itself felt within EU Member States, and the processes that led those states and their elites to formulate specific policy proposals at the EU level is only partially explored. There seems to be, here again, a space for a valuable contribution to be made through the study of specific external shocks and their impact on, first, national policymaking and, ultimately, EU policy.

The literature does confirm that the various pieces of the theoretical puzzle studied in this dissertation are the appropriate ones. Indeed, although the literature has struggled to provide a valid overarching framework that can explain the emergence of CFSP/CSDP, if one takes different elements from different authors and combines them in an innovative way, an apparently more nuanced explanation can be developed. First, one has to get a clear sense of the nature of relations of EU states. Second, it is important to look into how external shocks shaped Member State policy. Third, intergovernmental bargains are a key element of European integration in this field and should therefore be studied. And, lastly, the role of NATO needs to be better understood, in particular, regarding how it impacts domestic preference formation in EU Member States.

The following chapter will look at the history of cooperation and integration in this field in order to test whether there has indeed been movement along this study's dependent variable as well as to search for further detail behind that process. The empirical chapters will then test the various propositions outlined in the Introduction.

## **Chapter 3: EU Security and Defence Integration: Tempo and Characteristics**

### **Introduction**

The Introduction and Chapter 2 have established the question this thesis is addressing, the shortcomings of the available literature, and have put forward a possible explanation for security and defence integration in Europe. The current chapter will try to elucidate if there has indeed been any forward movement in the European security and defence integration process. In theoretical terms, therefore, this chapter is aimed at ascertaining whether the emergence of CFSP and CSDP can be considered a manifestation of security and defence integration, or, to put it differently, if over time there has been a deepening of this study's dependent variable.

For the above to be assessed we will need to look at both past and present provisions ruling CFSP/CSDP. This should enable us to better understand the tempo, direction and current arrangements of security and defence in Europe. The ultimate objective is to see if Europe has developed characteristics akin to those of the ideal type integrated security and defence actor defined in the Introduction: security and defence action that is part of a broader diplomatic agenda and is accompanied by civilian measures, a common defence clause, common institutions and procurement processes, a unified doctrine (or strategy), and a vocation of permanence.

The most appropriate way to proceed is to take each of the characteristics of integration and look at their evolution (or lack thereof) in the European case.

## A Common Defence Clause

That European states had a tacit defence commitment to one another was understood to be the case almost since the founding of the European Economic Community (EEC), the predecessor of the EU, in 1957. The Western European Union (WEU), a military alliance between Western European States, had had a common defence clause at its heart since 1954, and its membership was almost identical to that of the EEC. Over the years wide NATO membership, with its Charter Article 5 stipulations, strengthened the idea that Europeans were obliged to defend one another if attacked. It was however the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 that spelled out this commitment in no uncertain terms introducing a mutual defence clause into the *acquis communautaire* (the EU normative framework). Article 47.2 of the current Consolidated Treaty of the European Union, therefore, reads as follows:

If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter<sup>210</sup>.

The EU has now also incorporated a “solidarity clause” to its Treaties that aims to address instances where states are the victims of a terrorist attack or a natural disaster. This clause is contained in article 222 and stipulates that:

The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States to (a) prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack; (b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster.<sup>211</sup>

Additionally, some EU states have also incorporated references to these EU-wide commitments into their national strategic documents. That is the case of France, which in

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<sup>210</sup> Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Functioning on the European Union (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2010), Article 42.7.

<sup>211</sup> *Ibid.*, Article 222.1.

2013 included the following statement in its highest strategy document, the White Paper on Defence and National Security:

...the probability of direct military aggression against another European country must be taken into account in the global range of risks and threats. In this event, France will comply with its commitments, in respect of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and Article 42.7 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union.<sup>212</sup>

## A European Security and Defence Architecture

It took many years for the European Union to formally address security and defence issues, let alone have a dedicated architecture to deal with issues arising in that area of policy. For decades the EU was an organisation that dealt exclusively with economic matters. With time, however, an EU security and defence institutional architecture emerged. A look at the history of EU development reveals how at first very simple mechanisms of inter-governmental consultation on foreign policy, security and defence gave way over time to more formal arrangement that today include numerous bodies and institutions that meet on a regular basis and produce a constant stream of documents and action<sup>213</sup>.

In October of 1970 the Foreign Ministers of the members of the European Communities (ECC), the successor of the EEC and predecessor of the EU, met in Luxembourg and approved a report that called for

...greater mutual understanding with respect to the major issues of international politics by exchanging information and consulting regularly; and to increase their solidarity by working for a harmonization of views, concertation of attitudes and joint action when it appears feasible and desirable.<sup>214</sup>

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<sup>212</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc sur la Défense et la Sécurité Nationale* [French White Paper on Defence and National Security] (Paris, 2013), 51.

<sup>213</sup> For a good historical account of developments in the CFSP/CSDP field in Europe see, for example: Trevor Salmon and Alistair J.K. Shepard, *Toward a European Army* (Boulder: Co, Lynne Rienner, 2002), Richard G. Whitman and Sven Biscop, *The Routledge Handbook of European Security* (London: Routledge, 2012) or Asle Toje, *The European Union as a Small Power after the Post-Cold War* (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2010).

<sup>214</sup> European Council, *Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the Problems of Political Unification* (Luxembourg: EU, 1970).

Foreign Ministers would start meeting every six months under the umbrella of what became known as the European Political Co-operation (EPC). The first EPC meeting took place on November 19<sup>th</sup> 1970 and Ministers discussed the issue of the Middle East Peace Process.

For the next two decades the EPC was all the European project had in terms of foreign policy structures. Although the Single European Act of 1986 codified the EPC process and the role and function of the European Council, the Act did little to change some of its key arrangements. EPC remained a largely informal system of Foreign Ministers meeting and discussing in somewhat broad terms issues of importance on the international agenda.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s would change this state of affairs radically. The new European security landscape, full of uncertainty and risks, led European states to reconsider the role played by the EU in world affairs<sup>215</sup>. The Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 was the main tool used to institutionalize this desire for a greater EU role in foreign affairs. Maastricht's article 24.3 read as follows:

The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interest of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.<sup>216</sup>

Maastricht's Article 24 marked the very first time there was talk of security in an EU Treaty.

Maastricht, indeed, anticipated much of the EU's security and defence architecture. It called for the EU to have both a more general foreign policy arm, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and another focused on security and defence, the Common Security and Defence Policy. This latter element, CSDP, was, however, left undeveloped during the early and mid-1990s. The Saint Maló Declaration of 1998, the Cologne European Council of 1999, the Nice Treaty of 2001, and ultimately, the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 would all

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<sup>215</sup> A detailed look at this period as seen by important Member States will follow in the empirical chapters.

<sup>216</sup> Treaty of Maastricht on European Union (Maastricht, 1992), Article 24.3.

contribute to the completion of the design of CFSP and CSDP laid down at Maastricht. The Western European Union would slowly be phased out, and all its competences incorporated to the EU. The 1990s essentially produced, therefore, the incorporation of a defence alliance into the EU.

This succession of declarations, summits and treaties also produced a complex web of institutions that were capable of dealing with all sorts of security and defence issues. At the head of that edifice the EU placed a High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy who since 2009 also runs the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Union's foreign relations office and diplomatic corps<sup>217</sup>. The High Representative reports directly to the Heads of State and Government at the European Council, or to their Foreign Ministers when these meet at the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). The FAC is the body that deals with most CFSP/CSDP issues. Some of the FAC's most important competences are the establishment of economic sanctions against third states, the launch of EU missions or the ratification of new EU strategic documents.

Under the FAC one finds a central body in the CSDP architecture, the Political and Security Committee (PSC)<sup>218</sup>. Like so many of these new security and defence institutions the PSC was created by the Treaty of Nice. Article 25 of that Treaty said:

A Political and Security Committee shall monitor the international situation in the areas covered by the common foreign and security policy and contribute to the definition of policies by delivering opinions to the Council at the request of the Council or on its own initiative. It shall also monitor the implementation of agreed policies.<sup>219</sup>

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<sup>217</sup> For a detailed account of the design of the position of High Representative and of the way in which the first two holders of that office, Javier Solana and Catherine Ashton, performed their duties see: Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Boquet and Carolin Rüger, *The High Representative for the EU Foreign and Security Policy - Review and Prospects* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011).

<sup>218</sup> See the work of Ben Torna for a historical analysis of the evolution of committees (or "comitology") in the field of CFSP: Ben Torna, "Committees in Common: Committee governance and CFSP" in *Committee Governance in the European Union*, eds. Christiansen Thomas and Emil Kirchner (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 145-160.

<sup>219</sup> Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts (Nice, 2001), Article 25.

Beyond this advisory role the PSC also exercises “under the responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations”<sup>220</sup>. The Committee is composed of 28 (as of June 2016) permanent national representatives, with the rank of ambassador, and was at the time of its founding supposed to meet twice a week in Brussels. However, by 2005 the PSC was meeting an average of 15 times per month. Beyond the ambassadors, the Committee has representatives from the European Commission and the Council Secretariat that attend its meetings as observers. It also has a Politico-Military Working Party that helps with all issues of a military technical nature, including the connection with NATO and the use of NATO assets when necessary.

The PSC has been described by Christoph Meyer as “the work-horse in CSDP decision-shaping and control”<sup>221</sup> as it deals with all issues related to the “external” agenda of the EU and works on others related to planning, preparing and supervising operations.

Below the Council and the PSC the EU has numerous other institutions and bodies. The most significant are the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS). The EUMC is the EU’s highest military body, is composed of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of all the Member States, and meets formally at least once every two years. Military Representatives of the Chiefs of Defence Staff meet on a more regular basis. The EUMC’s main function is to provide military advice to the European Council, through the PSC. Below the EUMC is the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), composed of over 150 officers from all Member States. It works under the PSC for all issues of a political nature and under the EUMC for all military matters. It is the only permanent military structure of the EU to date (June 2016). The fact that these bodies directly employ military personnel is not a trivial one because as Javier Solana pointed out when interviewed for

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<sup>220</sup> Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts (Nice, 2001), Article 25

<sup>221</sup> Meyer, *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture*, 116.

this thesis the EU had never done this before: “When I arrived at the EU in 1995 there was not a single military officer working there...and it took some time to convince people that we needed to integrate the military aspect as part of our political-security dimension”<sup>222</sup>. There are indeed today active military personnel working for the EU and populating numerous institutions that deal with security and defence matters; something unheard of for close to fifty years of European integration history.

There are still other institutions that contribute to the process of forming and implementing the EU’s foreign and security policy. The European Council Secretariat, for example, helps with the legal aspects of drafting and executing CFSP decisions. The rotating EU Presidency, which changes every six months and allows every Member State to act as President of the Union for that period, performs some foreign policy functions and, above all, produces a set of conclusions which serve as a good indication as to what the EU has accomplished in terms of CFSP as well as desired future steps. The European Parliament, on the other hand, carries a light supervision of CFSP activities and must be kept informed at all times.

One of the new capabilities that the EU developed in the late 1990s and early 2000s was that of launching both civilian and military operations. EU civilian and military missions have a similar approval process and the EU has made use of this capability numerous times since 2003 when the first operations were deployed in the Balkans.

The planning process for military missions, the most kinetic and therefore politically sensitive missions the EU can launch, is put in motion by the PSC. The PSC, the various Council Working Groups, the European Council Secretariat and the External Action Service all perform monitoring functions, which enables them to detect situations that might require EU action. Member States also actively bring issues to the attention of the

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<sup>222</sup> Interview with Javier Solana, Madrid, 11-10-2012

PSC through their national representatives there, an issue confirmed in numerous interviews conducted for this thesis<sup>223</sup>.

It is important to note here that once the decision has made to launch an operation the European Council has to appoint an Operation Commander (OpCdr) and assign an Operations Headquarters (OHQ) for the mission. Here the European Council has four potential avenues to follow. The first, under an agreement reached with NATO in 2003 called Berlin Plus, would have the EU use Alliance assets extensively, including those for planning and conducting the operation. Under Berlin Plus the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) would give the EU all the planning capability it could need and the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) would take operational command of the mission. CSDP Operations CONCORDIA and EUFOR Althea have taken place under Berlin Plus arrangements.

The second option, in this case for an ‘autonomous’ EU mission, would be to use one of the national Operational Headquarters that a number of EU countries have made available for such a purpose. So far five EU member States have offered Headquarters for the EU to use: France, Germany, Italy, Greece and the UK. Those headquarters can be “internationalised” in order to accommodate CSDP personnel. This formula has been used for CSDP missions like Artemis in Congo or EUNAVFOR Atalanta in Somalia.

The third option derives from a compromise reached in the European Council of December 2003 and allows for the use of an EU Operations Centre (OpsCen) in Brussels. The OpsCen can be activated by a Council Joint Action and serve as the OHQ for operations of up to 2,000 troops plus civilian experts.

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<sup>223</sup> For a detailed account of how CSDP missions are launched see: Jochen Rehl and Hans-Bernhard Weissert, eds., *Handbook on CSDP: The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union*, (Vienna: Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, 2010), 60.

A last and final option is to establish an Operations Headquarters in the field, close to where the mission is being executed. This option has only been used a small number of times since 2010 but it seems to be growing in popularity, particularly for smaller missions that have a training component and profit from having the OHQ in proximity to where the mission's tasks are being performed. Between 2010 and 2014 two EU military missions with OHQs on site were launched: EUTM Somalia (OHQ in Kampala, Uganda) and EUTM Mali (OHQ in Bamako, Mali).

Depending on the command and control option selected by the Council an Operation Commander is selected from either the NATO command structure or from that of an EU Member State.

The last major Treaty to be approved by EU Member States was the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon. Lisbon not only created the EEAS but it also made the High Representative a Vice President of the European Commission and it gave a broader and more robust mandate for CSDP. Its Article 28B empowered the Union to use “civilian and military means” in the pursuit of the following tasks:

...joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.<sup>224</sup>

In essence, Lisbon increased CSDP's scope to include a set of new expeditionary operations, including some that fall on the higher end of the force spectrum.

Lastly, Lisbon developed the concept of “Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence” (PESCO), which is a framework under which Member States can enhance their cooperation on matters related to defence and move forward at a faster pace than the rest. It is available for countries with higher military capabilities and with the willingness to

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<sup>224</sup> Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities (Lisbon, 2007), Article 28B.

cooperate in a stronger and more determined manner. Enabling a two-speed integration process has been a path commonly used in Europe to allow for a set of states to plough ahead while others that are more reluctant wait. Allowing such a mechanism in the realm of defence was an ambitious step, although as of 2016 it has yet to be used<sup>225</sup>.

It is clear from the above that over the years the EU has developed an intricate institutional architecture capable of dealing with matters of security and defence<sup>226</sup>. It might not be as intricate or as complete as the one found in advanced modern states but it is quite clear that there has been a deepening of common arrangements when it comes to security and defence institutions in Europe. The ones in place today are capable of, among other things, launching common military missions around the world. They have also been capable of producing strategic documents and common positions.

## European Security Strategy

In 2003, and for the first time since its birth in 1957, the Union produced a document where major threats were pointed out and some guidance on possible lines of action was laid down. The EU said in its 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) titled “A Secure Europe in a Better World” that it faced five major threats: international terrorism, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, failed states and organized crime<sup>227 228</sup>. In 2008 an Implementation Report was also produced that captured

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<sup>225</sup> For an in-depth analysis on the lack of success of Permanent Structured Cooperation see Nick Witney, *Re-energising Europe's Security and Defence Policy* (Brussels: European Council on Foreign Relations, 2008)

<sup>226</sup> Perhaps the best available text on EU security and defence institutional architecture is the CSDP Handbook published by the European Security and Defence College in 2010 and again in 2012. These handbooks contain references to the history of CSDP, the strategic documents that have been produced in Europe in the past two decades and information on the Union's decision-making procedures. See: Rehl and Weisserth, *Handbook on CSDP: The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union* and Jochen Rehl and Hans-Bernhard Weisserth, eds., *Handbook on CSDP: The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union* (Vienna: Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, 2012)

<sup>227</sup> European Council, *European Security Strategy. A Secure Europe in a Better World*, 2003.

developments in the field and assessed how far ESS implementation had gone in the space of five years<sup>229</sup>. Despite the evident shortcomings of these two documents, with extremely broad definitions of the EU's interests and abstract stipulations about common action, it remains the case that Europe began a process of strategic reflection in the early 2000s that is still ongoing and that had real impact on the way the EU acts internationally. This is the opinion of Sven Biscop and Joel Andersson who have written extensively about the subject:

The ESS has certainly not disappeared [as some had predicted]...Quite the contrary, it is omnipresent in EU discourse. In many policy documents and decisions on different aspects of foreign policy, especially those relating to the CFSP and its military dimension, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the guidelines fixed by the ESS are constantly being referred to. They also serve as the connecting thread throughout the trainings organised by the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) for practitioners from the Member States. In the decision-making process, Member States as well as the European institutions make good tactical use of the ESS: the more convincingly a proposed initiative can be linked to it, the more difficult it is to oppose<sup>230</sup>.

Not only is the process delineated above ongoing but evidence suggests that it is widening. Since the mid 2000s the EU has developed a number of regional initiatives like the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, or the Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel<sup>231 232</sup>. These 'strategies' are meant to fit under the ESS and to give structure to the Union's activities in those parts of the world.

Calls for a review of the ESS have been mounting since it was published. Some of these calls have come from important Member States like France that would like to see Europe engage in a new strategic debate. France has repeatedly called for the drafting a European White Book of Defence. The world of academia and think tanks has also

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<sup>228</sup> For an analysis of the content of the ESS see Sven Biscop, "Main Themes of the ESS and Key Messages for CSDP" in *Handbook on CSDP: The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union*, ed. by Jochen Rehl and Hans-Bernhard Weissert (2012), 20-22.

<sup>229</sup> European Council, *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World* (Brussels: EU, 2008).

<sup>230</sup> Biscop and Andersson, *The EU and the European Security Strategy: Forging a global Europe*, 2.

<sup>231</sup> European Council, *Council conclusions on the Horn of Africa* (Brussels: EU, 2011).

<sup>232</sup> European External Action Service, *Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel*, (Brussels: EU, 2011).

contributed numerous thought pieces on the subject<sup>233 234 235</sup>. Interestingly, these demands for greater strategic reflection on the part of the Union are as much a criticism of the outdated nature of the ESS, as they are a testament to the high standards that are now demanded of the EU.

At the time of writing of this thesis the EU approved yet another major security strategy titled “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy”. It is intended to serve as an update of the 2003 ESS<sup>236</sup>.

## Common Planning and Procurement

EU institutional developments of the late 90s and early 2000s were accompanied by an effort to generate the capabilities required for action. In the 1999 Helsinki European Council, EU countries agreed on what became known as the Helsinki Headline Goal (or “Goal”). The Goal called for the Union to be able by 2003 to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty<sup>237</sup>, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level, up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons<sup>238</sup>.

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<sup>233</sup> Sven Biscop, *Raiders of the Lost Art: Strategy-Making in Europe*, (Brussels: EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations, 2012).

<sup>234</sup> Daniel Keohane, “Does the EU Need a New Foreign Policy Strategy?,” *International Relations and Security Network*, October 21, 2013, accessed 16/03/2015, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=171319>

<sup>235</sup> Manuel Muniz, “France: The Frustrated Leader” in *National Visions of EU Defence Policy*, eds., Federico Santopinto and Megan Price (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. 2013), 6-26.

<sup>236</sup> For more information see: <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union>.

<sup>237</sup> The Petersberg Tasks are the range of missions that may be carried in the name of the EU. They were set out in the Petersberg Declaration adopted at the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union in June 1992. See: Council of Ministers of the Western European Union, *Petersberg Declaration* (Bonn: WEU, 1992). With the incorporation of the WEU into the EU, CFSP/CSDP inherited those tasks. The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 was used to incorporate the Petersberg Tasks into the *acquis communautaire*. See: Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities (Amsterdam, 1997), Article 17.2. The Petersberg tasks included: humanitarian and rescue tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including

The Santa Maria da Feira Council extended an invitation to EU candidates and to non-EU NATO members to help in the achievement of the Helsinki Headline Goal by developing capabilities that could be used in CSDP missions. In the year 2000 the EU held a “Capabilities Commitment Conference” where EU governments pledged to make some of their capabilities available to the EU: the total offered and included in CSDP’s “Force Catalogue” amounted to 100,000 troops, 400 aircraft and 100 ships. These numbers led many to believe that the Goal would be achieved but it was soon discovered that European capabilities needed to improve qualitatively as well as quantitatively.

To meet the qualitative shortfall a European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) was launched in the Laeken European Summit of 2001<sup>239</sup>. The ECAP focused on a number of areas where significant improvements were required, namely air-to-air refuelling, nuclear, biological and chemical protection, special operations forces, theatre ballistic missile defence, attack and support helicopters, and intelligence and surveillance. Two years later, in 2003, the EU formally expressed its conviction that it had operational capability across the full range of tasks it wanted to perform<sup>240</sup>. Some shortfalls were still pointed out in the realm of both tactical and strategic capabilities, implying that risks could arise in higher intensity operations. A Capability Development Mechanism was established to serve as a follow-up of the ECAP and to allow for the tackling of pending and future shortfalls.

Efforts in capability development were indeed maintained and regularly updated throughout the 2000s. In 2004 the EU decided to adapt its Headline Goal to the new security situation. The European Council of June of that year endorsed the idea of developing capabilities more apt for irregular conflicts, such as those of Iraq or

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peacemaking, joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, and post-conflict stabilisation tasks.

<sup>238</sup> European Council, *Presidency Conclusions* (Helsinki: EU, 1999).

<sup>239</sup> European Council, *Presidency Conclusions* (Laeken: EU 2001).

<sup>240</sup> European Council, *Presidency Conclusions* (Brussels: EU 2013).

Afghanistan, and drafted the Headline Goal 2010<sup>241</sup>. Member States committed themselves to being able, by 2010, to “respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union”<sup>242</sup>. Forces would need to be deployable ten days after a decision by the European Council and should be ready to perform missions that are beyond the Petersberg Tasks such as disarmament operations, supporting third countries in combating terrorism or security sector reform (SSR).

In December 2008, EU governments agreed to a “Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities”. The declaration went back to the 2010 Headline Goal and insisted that these called for the EU to be able to perform simultaneously<sup>243</sup>:

- Two major stabilisation and reconstruction operations, with a suitable civilian component, supported by up to 10 000 troops for at least two years;
- Two rapid-response operations of limited duration using inter alia EU battle groups;
- An emergency operation for the evacuation of European nationals (in less than ten days), bearing in mind the primary role of each Member State as regards its nationals and making use of the consular lead State concept;
- A maritime or air surveillance/interdiction mission;
- A civilian-military humanitarian assistance operation lasting up to 90 days;
- Around a dozen CSDP civilian missions (inter alia police, rule-of-law, civilian administration, civil protection, security sector reform, and observation missions) of varying formats, including in rapid-response situations, together with a major mission (possibly up to 3000 experts) which could last several years.

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<sup>241</sup> European Council, *Presidency Conclusions* (Brussels: EU, 2014).

<sup>242</sup> European Council, *Presidency Conclusions* (Brussels: EU, 2004).

<sup>243</sup> European Council, *Presidency Conclusions* (Brussels: EU, 2008)

In terms of specific military capabilities, attention shifted to the Battlegroup Concept. A Battlegroup is a 1,500 strong unit, with appropriate support, at a high state of readiness, which allows it to deploy in less than 15 days, and with a broad range of capabilities, including those appropriate for high-end fighting. These units can be formed by one nation or by a group of nations (including non EU countries in the mix). The EU is supposed to be capable of deploying two Battlegroups simultaneously for up to 120 days. Today (2016), two are on standby at any given moment.

The 2010 Headline Goal also called for the strengthening of the European Defence Agency (EDA), an intergovernmental institution created in 2004. The EDA is today an indispensable part of the European capability-development apparatus. It not only makes regular assessments of the state of military capabilities across Europe and recommendations on their upkeep and enhancement through its Capability Development Plan, but it also promotes the development of common procurement programs, and the improvement of European defence R&D<sup>244 245</sup>.

Evidently the EU has displayed a long-running concern for capability development and common procurement. As in other areas of security and defence, efforts have become more institutionalised as the years have gone by with the EDA as the most significant exponent of the process.

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<sup>244</sup> For a monograph on the history and development of the EDA see: Alain de Neve, *L'Agence Européenne de défense et la coopération dans le domaine capacitaire* (Paris, L'Harmattan, 2010).

<sup>245</sup> For an analysis on the progress of pooling and sharing in Europe see: Giovanni Faleg and Alessandro Giovannini, *The EU between Pooling & Sharing and Smart Defence* (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2012).

## Missions and Operations

Between 2003 and 2013 the EU launched thirty crisis management operations and missions around the world (see Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 for a full list of operations from 1999 to 2013). Missions ranged from purely civilian endeavours such as rule of law missions like EULEX Kosovo, to military ones like EUNAVFOR Atalanta, a naval operation launched in 2008 to fight piracy off the Horn of Africa. Overall the catalogue is long and diverse<sup>246</sup>. The Balkans and Africa saw the highest concentration of EU operations. High Representative Solana has been quoted repeatedly as saying that for CSDP to consolidate it needed to launch a new mission every six months. These missions remain one of the most important manifestations of CFSP/CSDP. Many will be the object of further analysis in the country chapters.

## Broader Foreign Policy

The European integration process had a certain outward looking vocation from the beginning. This vocation was for many years directed at promoting trade deals with other nations or interacting with them on a commercial basis. The existence of this “civilian” dimension meant that by the time security and defence issues were incorporated into the catalogue of EU action the institution had a long tradition of international engagements, a defined character and even an established *modus operandi*. So when CFSP/CSDP emerge they do so within an established international actor with a history and a wide range of civilian tools at its disposal.

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<sup>246</sup> A book on the first ten years (1999-2009) of CSDP missions and operations was published by the European Unions Institute for Security Studies in 2009. See: Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane, *European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)* (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2009). This book contains information on all missions launched up until that point. What is evident is that the European Union is capable of launching a wide range of missions and crisis management operations. It has done so, actively, since the early 2000s.

The founding by the Six of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in April of 1951 led to the pooling of coal and steel resources and to placing their management in the hands of a Higher Authority. It is interesting to note that Article 6 of the ECSC's Treaty already contained references to how the new organisation would have a specific international character: "In international relations the Community shall enjoy the legal capacity it requires to perform its functions and attain its objectives"<sup>247 248 249</sup>. The ECSC soon developed Association Agreements with a number of nations, allowing them to enter the "single market" generated by the Six. On September 1952 an agreement of that nature was reached with the United Kingdom and a representation was established in London; the man heading the delegation quickly became known as the "first European Ambassador".

The design of the European Economic Community in the late 1950s also contains hints about the international character of the emerging political community. The first Commission of the EEC had two of its nine portfolios dedicated to international affairs: "external relations" and "overseas countries and territories". The EEC Treaty Preamble stated that the Community was born "...desiring to contribute by means of a common commercial policy, to the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade"<sup>250</sup>. In turn, articles 113 and 238 empowered the EEC to conclude international treaties and association agreements with third countries. The Community was explicitly charged with maintaining relations with the UN, the GATT, the Council of Europe and the OEEC. As a matter of fact the Community quickly assumed responsibility for representing all of its members in the Dillon and Kennedy GATT rounds and signed association agreements

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<sup>247</sup> Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (Paris, 1951), Article 6

<sup>248</sup> Article 3 of the ECSC, on the other hand, indicated that: "the institutions of the Community shall...promote the growth of international trade and ensure that equitable limits are observed in export pricing"

<sup>249</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>250</sup> The EEC treaty also limited the capacity of Member States to act within international organisations. Its article 116 read as follows: "Member States shall, in respect of all matters of particular interest to the common market, proceed within the framework of international organisations of an economic character only by common action". See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Preamble

with Greece (1962), Turkey (1964) as well as the Yaoundé Convention (1964), which established an association with 18 African states. The Customs Union was fully enacted on July 1968. By 1988 the Union had concluded Association Agreements with all the States of the Mediterranean basin, finalised the third Lomé Convention with 75 states in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, had established Co-operation Agreements with the States of the Andean Pact and the States of Central America, the ASEAN states and the Gulf Co-Operation Council, and created a framework of bilateral agreements with other Asian and Latin American countries.

By the early 1970s the EEC was ready to both widen and deepen its international agenda. In October of 1972 the Heads of State and Government of the EEC stated that:

Europe must be able to make its voice heard in world affairs, and to make an original contribution commensurate with its human, intellectual and material resources. It must affirm its own views in international relations, as befits its mission to be open to the world and for progress, peace and cooperation...and to promote a better international equilibrium, respecting the principle of the Charter of the United Nations.<sup>251</sup>

The Copenhagen Report on the “European Identity”, published in December of 1973, went even further and established a number of principles that would lead European foreign policy. These were the following: a strong defence of representative democracy, promotion of the rule of law, defence of social justice and the upholding of human rights<sup>252</sup>. The Report also called for the opening of membership to all of those who shared those ideals and for the maintenance of historical ties with territories beyond Europe.

By the time of the signing of Maastricht Treaty in 1993 the European integration project had already produced a complex and multifaceted international actor. What Maastricht did was introduce talk of security into EU treaties, and expand the catalogue of EU action abroad to include security and defence matters. The Common Foreign and Security Policy would indeed emerge as a broad policy instrument with numerous

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<sup>251</sup> Statement from the Paris Summit 1972. Statement made by the Heads of State and Government of the Nine (Paris, 1972).

<sup>252</sup> Declaration on European Identity (Copenhagen: EU, 1973).

domains of action. This was its original catalogue of competences established already in the 1992 Lisbon European Council<sup>253</sup>:

- Strengthening democratic principles and institutions, and respect for human and minority rights.
- Promoting regional stability and contributing to the creation of political and/or economic frameworks that encourage regional cooperation.
- Contributing to the prevention and settlement of conflicts.
- Contributing to a more effective international coordination in dealing with emergency situations.
- Strengthening existing cooperation in issues of international interest such as the fight against arms proliferation, terrorism and the traffic in illicit drugs.
- Promoting and supporting good government.

As indicated in previous sections of this chapter, European failures in the Balkans in the 1990s led many to reconsider the role the EU should play in security matters and to move from the pre-eminently civilian actor designed until Maastricht to one with more hard power capabilities. Many attributed the failures of the 1990s to the Western European Union (WEU). The WEU, formed in 1954, was an early attempt at a European defence alliance. Article V of the Modified Treaty of Brussels which founded the WEU said the following:

If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.<sup>254</sup>

Not only did the WEU have at its core this common defence clause, but its Article III allowed for its members to undertake joint action if they felt their security was under

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<sup>253</sup> European Council, *Presidency Conclusions* (Lisbon: EU, 1992), Annex I, Point 10.

<sup>254</sup> Modified Treaty of Brussels (Brussels, 1954).

threat<sup>255</sup>. Despite the WEU's early ambitions, it was NATO, which was to monopolize European common security for the following decades.

It was not until the Cold War approached its end that the WEU was “re-activated”. Foreign and Defence Ministers of WEU Member countries met at Rome in 1984 and recognised the “necessity to strengthen western security, and that better utilization of WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe but also to an important improvement in the common defence of all the countries of the Atlantic Alliance”<sup>256</sup>. Furthermore, they reaffirmed that the WEU Council could “pursuant to Article VIII (3) of the modified Brussels Treaty, consider the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world”<sup>257</sup>.

Between the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the 1998 Saint Maló Declaration EU leaders slowly realised that if the EU was to develop as a full-fledged security actor the WEU would have to give way. At first some form of co-existence was attempted with the Member States of the WEU pledging at Maastricht on December 10<sup>th</sup> 1991 “to develop WEU as the defence component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance”<sup>258</sup>. But it was soon evident that the WEU was only capable of playing a small role in the management of the Balkan Wars. The decision was made then to dissolve the organization and bring its expertise and institutional arrangements into the EU.

After the Saint Maló declaration of 1998 and the subsequent European Councils that endorsed the Franco-British position, it was decided that the few WEU missions still

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<sup>255</sup> Article VIII (3) of the Modified Brussels Treaty reads: “At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability”.

<sup>256</sup> Council of Ministers of the Western European Union, *Rome Declaration* (Rome: WEU, 1984).

<sup>257</sup> *Ibid.*, Footnote 2.

<sup>258</sup> European Council, *Declaration on the Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance* (Maastricht: EU, 1991).

ongoing would slowly be phased out and CSDP would take over. The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 led to the final dissolution of the WEU. This process of merger meant that the EU, a much larger, diverse and eminently civilian organization, incorporated into its structure a military alliance with a common defence clause, and a history, albeit modest, of military deployments.

Over the years the EU, a prominently civilian institution, has both developed its own security and defence arm, CFSP/CSDP, and absorbed other institutions of a military character, like the WEU. The end result has been the emergence of a comprehensive actor, that brings to the table both civilian and military means. It regularly couples crisis management operations with development aid or partnerships with host countries. The depth and breadth of its resource catalogue makes it radically different from a military alliance.

### **Vocation of Permanence**

The fact that CFSP/CSDP is now so institutionally bound to the broader European unification project means that its fate and that of the EU are almost one and the same. Not a single person interviewed for this thesis expressed any doubt that CFSP/CSDP would continue to exist in the future. What is more, the overall opinion was that it had increased in significance in the past two decades and that it was bound to do so further in the coming years. As Bernardino Leon pointed out when interviewed for this thesis:

When I was first Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (2004-2008) and then Secretary General of the Prime Minister's Office in Spain we did not have a common foreign and security policy in Europe like we do today. We did not yet have the Lisbon treaty, or the European External Action Service etc.<sup>259</sup>

This feeling of forward momentum is very present when studying CFSP/CSDP history. When asked if she saw a future where we have 28 different European defence policies and

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<sup>259</sup> Interview with Bernardino Leon, Madrid, 28-10-2012

defence budgets, Constanze Stelzenmüller, one of the pre-eminent experts on European and transatlantic security replied: “Absolutely not”<sup>260</sup>.

### **Conclusions: An Integrating Security Community**

It is evident from the analysis above that there has been forward movement towards European security and defence integration since the 1970s, but specially since the end of the Cold War. That is also the conclusion of most of the authors reviewed by Ulrich Krotz and Richard Maher in a well rounded piece published in *World Politics* in 2011. For Krotz and Maher themselves “...for the first time Europe appears to be an increasingly cohesive political unit that is looking outward”<sup>261</sup>.

Given the above it would be unwise to consider the emergence of Europe’s Common Security and Defence Policy a simple or haphazard occurrence of cooperation. Rather, CFSP/CSDP seems to be the consequence of, and a stepping-stone in the process of, European security and defence integration. Indeed the EU has now a common defence clause (equivalent to Article 5 of NATO’s Charter), numerous and complex defence institutions like the Political and Security Committee (PSC) or the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), some joint procurement initiatives structured around the European Defence Agency (EDA), a common doctrine, a rich history of direct military action with over two dozen missions deployed around the world since 2003, and a clear vocation of permanence. Additionally, the EU is today a capable international civilian actor, with a large diplomatic corps, the European External Action Service, and with numerous tools at its disposal including the world’s largest development aid budget, security sector reform task forces, border control assistance personnel, police training

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<sup>260</sup> Interview with Constanze Stelzenmüller, 04-04-2013

<sup>261</sup> Krotz and Maher, “International Relations Theory and The Rise of European Foreign and Security Policy,” 554.

schemes, “twinning programs” aimed at improving specific aspects of governance in host countries and many others. All of the above makes the EU a multifaceted actor that is incomparable to any other international security institution. Even NATO, one of the world’s oldest and most advanced military alliances, falls short on some of the areas catalogued above, particularly that of bringing broader diplomatic objectives and civilian tools to its endeavours.

It also evident that European integration in this field is not perfect or complete. There still need to be improvements in the institutional ability of the EU to launch and sustain missions abroad, with unanimity still being a requirement for action beyond Europe’s borders, and the strategic posture of the Union is still prey to the internal divisions within Europe, for example those between states that look towards the Eastern flank and those that look towards the South, Africa and the Middle East.

However, it is undeniable that there is a certain momentum in the process of emergence of the EU as a security and defence actor. There must be powerful forces pushing European states to behave in this manner. Such a deep, multi-faceted and long-lasting process must surely be the result of strong underlying trends. The following three chapters will look at three European states in detail in an attempt to understand how they have approached the subject of EU security and defence over the past two decades.

## Chapter 4: France and European Security and Defence

### Introduction

During the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century France was a central player in the emergence of at first a western European defence alliance around the Western European Union and later an EU security and defence capability. France was a founding member of the WEU and of the EU itself, and was among the strongest supporters of the establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and of a Common Security and Defence Policy. Since the launch of CFSP and CSDP, France has consistently backed both, be it through active support and participation in EU operations, by calling for the creation of new EU institutions in this field, or by demanding greater strategic depth to EU action.

The reasons that led France to behave in the way described above are contested. For some, French support for a 'Europe of Defence'<sup>262</sup> is only a means of projecting French power, and of getting other European states to share the burden of protecting its national strategic interests. For others it is an expression of commitment to the European political project, which would be incomplete without a security and defence dimension. And for others, it is a way of constructing a global player capable of balancing US hegemony. The confusion about France's motives for supporting CSDP mirrors that surrounding the broader issue of the emergence of the EU as a security and defence actor<sup>263</sup>.

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<sup>262</sup> An originally French expression, l'Europe de la défense, that has now become commonplace in European discourse when referring to the EU's aspirations to create a credible security and defence capability.

<sup>263</sup> In the French case this confusion might also be a product of a much broader debate about the country's role in the world and the legacy of Gaullism. Gaullism, the foreign policy pursued by General de Gaulle, and in particular its final phase, which ran from 1958 to 1969, defended the independence of France, the pursuit of national interests abroad, and the primacy of the nation-state. A significant amount of literature exists on de Gaulle's foreign policy and its impact on transatlantic relations, NATO and European integration. This is only indirectly relevant for this dissertation, which is primarily concerned with events that took place over 30 years after the departure of de Gaulle from power. For some historical background on this period, however, see: Maurice Vaisse, *La grandeur: Politique étrangère du general de Gaull* (Paris: CNRS, 2013), Charles G. Cogan, *Oldest Allies, Guarded Friends: The United States and France Since 1790* (Westport: Praeger, 1994), Frédéric Bozo, *Two Strategies for Europe: de Gaulle, the United States and the Atlantic Alliance* (Langham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), Frédéric Bozo, *La France et l'OTAN: De la Guerre Froide au Nouvel Ordre Europeen* (Paris: Masson, 1991), Michael M. Harrison, *The Reluctant Ally: France*

This chapter will look at the history of French attitudes towards EU security and defence, as well as the country's various efforts, some successful and others not, to promote CFSP/CSDP. Overall, however, it seems clear that France's policy in this area falls within the parameters of the theoretical framework suggested in this thesis. Indeed, France displays characteristics typical of a state that lives in a security community. This sense of belonging is itself expressed with extraordinary clarity in top strategic documents. The country has also been exposed to various external shocks, the response to which it has tried to Europeanize<sup>264</sup>. Depending on the interests affected by the shock, France has found more or less support for common EU action in other European partners.

What makes France a particularly interesting case study is not just its scale as a defence actor<sup>265</sup> but also the fact that it has strategic interests all around the globe. This latter element, underpinned by France's colonial history and overseas possessions, has meant that in many instances the country finds itself engaged in conflicts far from Europe where very few other EU states have anything at stake. This seems to be particularly true in the Maghreb/Mashreq where France has had a longstanding presence and where it would like to see a far more active EU than the majority of its European allies. The country has therefore failed to get the EU engaged in conflicts there and has been forced to find other avenues to tackle crises in places like Libya or Mali, sometimes by going at it alone or through 'coalitions of the willing'. In areas of greater European consensus France has been very successful in pushing CFSP/CSDP forward.

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and *Atlantic Security* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1981) and Philip H. Gordon, *A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

<sup>264</sup> To "Europeanize" means here to elevate the management of an issue to the level of the EU. Europeanizing a given issue might mean different things depending on the issue itself, but in all cases cited here it is equivalent to speaking of European integration in security and defence. This is so because Europeanization produces a deepening of common arrangements along the seven vectors of integration described in the Introduction.

<sup>265</sup> France was during the period covered in this thesis the top defence spender in Europe together with the UK.

Interestingly the French seem to have themselves arrived at an explanation for the process behind European defence integration that is similar to the one suggested in this thesis:

The slow progress of the European defence and security policy shows that national perceptions cannot be transformed by institutions alone....It can only be created through democratic debate, a common political will, shared experience and an awareness that we all have interests and strategic priorities in common.<sup>266</sup>

Indeed, it is through external shocks and the subsequent intergovernmental bargains that France has tested the extent to which its interests overlap with those of other EU states. That process has slowly produced an accumulation of shared experiences and of common institutions; as well as frustration when achieving a European consensus, was not possible.

France is also convinced that the current strategic landscape will call for greater EU unity in this field:

...the refocusing of American policy [away from Europe], the deterioration of public finances in Europe and the common nature of the threats and risks to which we are exposed...increase the need for EU Member States to take the collective action enabling them to wield greater influence on their environment<sup>267</sup>

As the landscape worsens, making external shocks more probable and serious, France believes Europeans will discover the extent to which their strategic interests have converged and will be pushed to act together.

## **France in Europe: A Security Community**

A look at France's attitude towards its European neighbours is an essential piece of the puzzle we are addressing in this thesis. Understanding whether France lives in a European security community is important when trying to assess the country's policy towards EU security and defence. Looking at the strategic documents produced by France over the last two decades, as well as analysing the opinions expressed by policymaking elites, can

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<sup>266</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc sur la Défense et la Sécurité Nationale* [French White Paper on Defence and National Security], 2013, 17.

<sup>267</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

provide a good overview of the country's perception of its neighbours and of European defence.

France's strategic planning process is straightforward. The President retains full control of the elaboration of France's White Papers on Defence and National Security, of which the country has produced a number since the early 1970s. These have served as France's top strategy documents containing its basic strategic outlook, including key interests, threats and security and defence priorities. This thesis calls for an in-depth look at the 1994, 2008 and 2013 White papers. Other less relevant documents and strategies also exist, like the National Strategy for Oceans, the White Paper on French Foreign Policy, the White Paper on Domestic Security and Terrorism or various specific studies ordered by the French President on matters pertaining to security. These will not be directly referenced in this chapter because French White Papers tend to be so thorough that their study provides abundant insights into France's policy in this field.

The fundamental questions this section wants to answer are the following: do French strategic documents reveal that the country has lived in a European security community since the early 1990s? Do the opinions of French security and defence policy elites tell us something about France's perception of other EU Member States? Is that perception in any way connected to actual policies of the French government regarding European defence?

Here is a set of preliminary conclusions regarding France's strategic posture:

1. Threat Perception: Threats to France lie outside the borders of the European Union. The EU has served as a means to push security threats outside its boundaries and to ensure relations among its members are conducted according to the rules of peaceful exchange.

2. Strategic Overlap: EU strategy is constructed on values and principles that France shares.
3. France's Global Presence equals a European Global Presence: French possessions in the Maghreb, Mashreq, the Caribbean and even East Asia are part of the European interest catalogue and should be protected by Europe as a whole.
4. Europe as a Solution: Most of the security and defence challenges France faces have a European solution. Europeanizing the management of these security and defence issues is therefore the adequate policy.

The following sections will look at each of the four points above in greater detail.

### **Threat Perception**

French strategic documents have in general terms been quite clear and consistent regarding the threats faced by France. The 1994 White Paper enumerated them starting with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, followed by terrorism, religious extremism, drug trafficking, threats to strategic communications, and the inadequacy of global security governance institutions<sup>268</sup>. As in the case of other EU countries looked at in this thesis, those threats are not originated in or, even more importantly, generated by other Union Member States.

The 2008 French White Paper elaborated by the Sarkozy Administration would make the most rigorous attempt to date at defining the strategic landscape inhabited by France and at delineating the threats faced by the country. The Paper argues that globalisation and interdependence have blurred the lines separating external and domestic threats and led to high levels of uncertainty. As pointed out by President Sarkozy in the Paper's Foreword: "the traditional distinction between domestic security and foreign security has blurred"

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<sup>268</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc sur la Défense* [French White Paper on Defence], 1994, 14-22.

forcing France to “treat defence policy, domestic policy, foreign policy and economic policy as part of a whole”<sup>269</sup>. That blurring of the frontier of security means for France that some threats are now internal or domestic. Home-grown terrorism would fall within this category. What is relevant for this thesis is that the origin of those threats is not found in other EU Member States, or to phrase it differently, that European partners’ have no agency in the worsening of France’s security situation. Rather, and as we will see, the contrary is true: EU partners are seen as allies in addressing these new challenges.

There were in 2008 some specific sources of concern for France. They could be divided into four categories:

1. Strategic Uncertainty Associated with Globalization
2. Shift in the Strategic Centre of Gravity towards Asia
3. Existence of Four Critical Areas for the Security of France: the “arc of crisis” from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Near East, and Asia
4. Developments of New Vulnerabilities for the European Territory

Figure 4.1 below shows these four categories and the threats that fall within each of them in a schematic fashion. All of the more conventional threats enumerated there emanate from outside the boundaries of the EU. France was yet again very explicit about this in its 2013 White Paper: “France no longer faces any direct, explicit conventional military threat against its territory”<sup>270</sup>. France is not only aware of how extraordinary it is not to feel threatened by its immediate neighbours but also of the fact that such a state of affairs is constitutive of a new political reality; One where the pooling of power becomes far more attractive as a means to tackling common threats.

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<sup>269</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc sur la Défense et la Sécurité Nationale* [French White Paper on Defence and National Security] (Paris, 2008), 9.

<sup>270</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2013, 13.

Figure 4.1: French 2008 White Paper: Trends and Threats<sup>271</sup>

Francois Léotard, the French Defence Minister at the time, had the following to say about this in the Preface to the 1994 White Paper:

My belief is that France should be exemplary. Not a France within a Concert of powerful Nations, like the one that existed in the 19<sup>th</sup> century; but a France within Europe. The European project will not succeed if France does not contribute actively to its construction and it makes the necessary sacrifices. *Not by playing one country against another, but by forwarding, for the first time in the tormented history of this old continent, a pooling of our power in service of the construction of a common European defence and a common security for its states.* This ambition is at the heart of this new White Paper and will be central to the choices made by the French Government in the future (my emphasis).<sup>272</sup>

This is not dissimilar from what was later said in the 2013 Paper, which added an important note on the origins of that “security community”:

Unlike many other countries, for the first time in its history [France] has the good fortune to find itself – along with European partners – in an exceptional climate of peace and stability. It

<sup>271</sup> Figure from Muniz, “France: The Frustrated Leader,” 12.

<sup>272</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 1994, Foreword.

is a member of the European Union, *a political entity that has made any prospect of internal conflict quite unthinkable* (my emphasis)<sup>273</sup>.

France's account of its belonging to a European security community is perhaps the most articulate of all the ones studied in this thesis. Its origins and consequences are detailed in formal documents in the clearest of terms<sup>274 275</sup>. France is even aware of the fact that the sheer existence of a community does not guarantee integration. For that to occur there need to be threats to shared interests and events that push for the pooling of power. So, does France believe it shares strategic interests with its European partners?

### Strategic Overlap

French strategic documents contain numerous statements that reveal the country sees its fundamental values as almost identical to those of the European Union. The 2008 French White Paper referenced the 2003 European Security Strategy and indicated that the principles contained there were shared by France<sup>276</sup>. This notion of Europe representing the deepest of French values is central to understanding why France feels so at ease pushing for further European integration. The country's 2013 White Paper returned to this idea in its early pages when it said:

The internal success of the European Union is not just a crucial factor for the political and economic future of France; it is also a cornerstone of its security, as it helps to build a world that reflects its values<sup>277</sup>.

It is however not only values that France shares with its European partners but also many of its strategic interests. According to France's 1994 White Paper: "The security of

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<sup>273</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2013, 13.

<sup>274</sup> France is convinced that the fact that conflict is unthinkable in Europe is a consequence of the existence of the EU: "The European Union is a unique venture...it brings together a number of nations that wish to preserve their national identities whilst remaining determined to manage their differences by focusing on negotiation and the rule of law rather than the use of force". See: French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2013, 16

<sup>275</sup> See also: "Thanks to the creation of the European Union, [France's] relationship with its western neighbours is no longer based on the balance of power as a means of guaranteeing peace". See: French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2013, 33

<sup>276</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2008, 76.

<sup>277</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2013, 16.

the European continent, *and therefore that of France*, is dependent on the capacity of western Europe to become a pole of integration and stability”<sup>278</sup> (my emphasis). A few pages later the following is stated: “...the interests of France and its Western neighbours and partners are hardly separable” followed by:

...the importance of the open process of defence integration within the framework of the European Union cannot be overstated. It can not be excluded that in the long-term...France’s conception of its vital interest will itself converge with that of its neighbours.<sup>279</sup>

The convergence anticipated in 1994 seems to be confirmed by France’s 2008 White Paper. Chapter 2 of the Paper, dedicated to an analysis of the consequences of the changing security landscape, contains numerous references to how both France and Europe should react together to those changes. Or, to put it differently, how both France and the EU are affected in similar ways by certain risks. When speaking about security risks emerging from Africa the 2008 White Paper said: “France and Europe cannot turn their backs on the continents closest to them”<sup>280</sup>. When addressing the possibility of tensions emerging in East Asia the Paper reads as follows: “Major conflicts in Asia would directly affect the interests of France and Europe”<sup>281</sup>. A few pages later the White Paper suggests that “France and Europe” should be prepared to tackle the risks emerging from the growing range of ballistic missiles in the hands of unfriendly states, as well as to protect “French and European communities abroad”<sup>282</sup>. This way of describing France and Europe as being on the same boat and defending the same interests is pervasive in French strategic documents.

In an interview with General Henri Bentégeat, a former head of the French armed forces, in 2012 he expressed the conviction that France’s objectives within CFSP/CSDP were those of the EU as a whole. When asked if he had ever received pressures from

<sup>278</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 1994, 23.

<sup>279</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 1994, 24-25.

<sup>280</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2008, 43.

<sup>281</sup> *Ibid.*, 46.

<sup>282</sup> *Ibid.*, 53.

France to act in certain ways during his tenure as Chairman of the European Union's Military Committee, a position he held between 2006 and 2009, he had the following to say:

Of course I did receive some pressures...but this was not really a problem because in most cases it was the French interest to push for the EU's ambitions. It would have been much harder for me if I had been the Director General of the EUMS at the time [British General David Leakey] because he got a lot of pressure from London to pull out of missions, to slow the process of decision making, or not to push at all on HQ matters<sup>283</sup>. For me it was much easier.<sup>284</sup>

In the eyes of General Bentégeat France forwarded its national interests by supporting EU integration; they were one and the same thing<sup>285</sup>. This seems to be in line with what was formally expressed in the country's top strategy documents. In 1994 the country's White Book said:

The maintenance of France's standing in the world is to a large degree dependent on its ability to influence European integration...Our defence policy will therefore focus on the one hand the progressive development of a European defence capacity, and on the other the construction of a security space that covers the entire continent.<sup>286</sup>

Given France's strong belief in the overlap between its interests and those of the Union as a whole, this desire to construct a strong EU is not a means of turning Europe into a proxy for French influence. Rather, French elites seem to be convinced that what is good for their country is good for the EU too.

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<sup>283</sup> By "HQ matters" General Bentégeat is referring to the ongoing debate in the European Union about the establishment of a Permanent Headquarters in Brussels under EU control. France has been a long supporter of the initiative which would give the EU a much greater autonomous military planning and execution capacity.

<sup>284</sup> Interview with Henri Bentégeat, Paris, 03-07-2012

<sup>285</sup> Alvaro de Vasconcelos, a former Director of the EU's Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) suggested in an interview that this way of seeing things is very pragmatic and is connected to the fact that France understands its standing on the world stage as dependent on the strength of the EU: "France and Great Britain have a strategy for maintaining a strong political and military profile internationally...For France this means the European Union, because France knows better than Great Britain that the glorious times of the past when France could go at it alone are over". Source: Interview with Alvaro de Vasconcelos, Paris, 07-06-2012

<sup>286</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 1994, 26.

### France's Global Presence equals a European Global Presence

France has over the past decades insisted on the fact that it is a global actor with a global presence. This global presence, France believes, is something that the EU as a whole should share and protect.

Africa, in general, but particularly the Maghreb and Mashreq have been central to French strategic planning of the past two decades. Of the broad space covered by those two regions, it is perhaps the southern Mediterranean that has figured most prominently in French strategy. Already in the 1994 White Paper it is clearly stated that France had major interest in the “Mediterranean Basin”; interests that are European too. This was later developed in the 2008 and 2013 editions of that same document:

The very close human bonds established with the countries of the Mediterranean's southern shores and the dense web of trade and exchanges make the Mediterranean Sea a strategic space...In this respect, the Maghreb (North Africa) has a particular importance for France *and for Europe*, notably given the unstable conditions following the Arab revolutions...The Sahel, from Mauritania to the Horn of Africa, together with part of sub-Saharan Africa, are also regions of priority interest for France due to a common history, the presence of French nationals, the issues at stake and the threats confronting them (my emphasis)<sup>287</sup>

France has repeatedly used the expression “arc of crisis” to refer to the area stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean and which includes countries such as Mauritania, Libya, Somalia, Afghanistan or Pakistan. For France, security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century will be highly dependent on developments in this region of the world. Particularly important will be guaranteeing security and stability in the Middle East, a region where France itself has direct presence. First, through its defence agreements with Qatar, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates, and second through its joint military base in Abu Dhabi.

France is also ‘present’ in the Caribbean, the Pacific, the Indian Ocean and even the Poles. As expressed in its 2013 White Paper that ‘presence’ exists “thanks to the overseas territories which – in addition to their economic and strategic importance – provide a special relationship with countries far away from Europe, making us a recognized partner

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<sup>287</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2013, 53-54.

– and often the only European one – for numerous regional organizations”<sup>288</sup>. French overseas possessions include French Guiana in The Antilles, New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis et-Futuna in the Pacific, Reunion Island and Mayotte in the Indian Ocean, the Isles Eparses (Scattered Islands) near Mozambique, the Archipelago of Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon located close to the Arctic or the French Southern Antarctic Lands (TAAF). There are interests to protect in all of these places including an extensive exclusive economic zone, fishing interests, shipping lanes, the Kourou Space Centre in Guiana and over three million French citizens.

Asia is also cited in French strategic documents as a region that should figure prominently in European strategy. When speaking about areas of possible French military intervention the 2008 White Paper indicated that “the main sphere follows the contours of the principal risks, from the Atlantic to the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean, from where extensions of our presence towards Asia are possible”<sup>289</sup>. And later added: “a major crisis in Asia would have considerable economic, commercial and financial consequences for Europe”<sup>290</sup>.

It is evident from the analysis above that France sees itself as a global security player. In keeping with the overall narrative of its top strategy documents the country insists that this is a vision Europe as a whole should share. However, and as we will see later in this chapter, this is a truly expansive interpretation of Europe’s strategic vision. The difficulties France has faced when attempting to build a common European reaction to shocks in some of the regions cited here is a testament to the extent to which French strategic perceptions do not fully overlap with those of its European partners.

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<sup>288</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2013, 13.

<sup>289</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2008, 67.

<sup>290</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2013, 32.

## Europe as a Solution

It is clear from French strategic documents and from the opinion of its security policymaking elites that the country is convinced it lives in a European community where threats come from without. Just as for other EU states this has led France to believe that its security is better protected in partnership with other EU states. When enumerating the country's strategic priorities the 2008 White Book lists, first "to defend the population and territory of France" and second "to contribute to European and international security"<sup>291</sup>. France is aware that most of its security challenges are better tackled in conjunction with its European allies: "Our partners are, first and foremost, the Member States of the European Union, whose common destiny France has shared for more than half a century"<sup>292</sup>. Even more explicit was the reference to this issue in the 2013 White Paper:

France shares the majority of the threats and risks facing it with its European partners, *the pragmatic corollary of this fact being that our action will be more effective if we are able to respond to them together* (my emphasis).<sup>293</sup>

The general statements above are followed in French strategic documents by numerous suggestions as to how to actually tackle challenges in cooperation. France's 2013 White Paper has an entire chapter, number 7, on the "Resources Required to Implement Strategy". There one can see numerous areas where France would like to see enhanced cooperation with EU partners. When it comes to protecting the French territory, France believes in supporting "the development of the integrated marine surveillance by the European Union to enhance our knowledge of and capacity to analyse activities taking place in these environments"<sup>294</sup>. When speaking of the protection of France's air space the White Paper says: "France will, moreover, ensure that defence and security are taken into

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<sup>291</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2008, 58.

<sup>292</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2013, 11.

<sup>293</sup> *Ibid.*, 62.

<sup>294</sup> *Ibid.*, 98.

account in the ‘Single European Sky’<sup>295</sup> project’<sup>296</sup>. In the fight against cyber-threats, “France supports the implementation of a European policy aimed at strengthening protection against cyber-risks for essential infrastructure and electronic communications networks”<sup>297</sup>. And in the fight against human and drug trafficking France suggests, “reinforcing the capabilities of the European border management agency (FRONTEX), which must be developed in keeping with the need to control the use of our resources”<sup>298</sup>. Additionally, France expressed in 2013 a desire to “seize the opportunities arising from the review of the Stockholm Programme<sup>299</sup> in 2014 to promote a European security project”<sup>300</sup>.

France has historically been surprisingly detailed when it comes to enumerating the ambitions it has for CFSP/CSDP. The best example of this was the long list of objectives for CSDP it listed in its 2008 White Paper. Here they are in a schematic form<sup>301 302</sup>:

1. Building an intervention capacity of 60.000 men capable of being deployed in a distant theatre, with the necessary air and naval components, for a year.
2. Having the capacity to conduct two or three peacekeeping or peacemaking operations simultaneously, for a significant duration, together with several more minor civil operations, in different theatres. This would require:
  - a. Making good the currently most obvious shortcomings in Europe’s capacity to intervene in distant theatres. Mainly by:

<sup>295</sup> In 2004 the EU was given powers to create a single air traffic management system within the borders of the Union. More information here:

[http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/single\\_european\\_sky/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/single_european_sky/index_en.htm)

<sup>296</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2013, 98.

<sup>297</sup> *Ibid.*, 102.

<sup>298</sup> *Ibid.*, 103.

<sup>299</sup> The Stockholm Programme is the EU’s framework project for the areas of Justice, Freedom and Security and it encompasses promotion of internal security through the promotion of cross-border measures to fight crime

<sup>300</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2013, 106.

<sup>301</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2008, 82-91.

<sup>302</sup> This abbreviated list follows the format used in: Muniz “France: The Frustrated Leader”: 15-16.

- i. Pooling and sharing key capacities like strategic and tactical transport aircraft, in-flight refuelling, air mobility capabilities, and aero-naval capabilities. Pooling of support activities, in particular for jointly built weapons systems.
    - ii. Creating more robust means for the civil management of crisis, particularly regarding the capacity to provide post conflict support.
    - iii. Taking into account the growing role of reserves.
  - b. Boosting capabilities for analysis and anticipation
  - c. Enhancing the capacity to plan and conduct European operations, mainly by establishing a permanent and autonomous strategic planning capability.
3. Overhauling the funding of military operations, effectively ending with the “cost lie where they fall” principle, and creating a significant budget for the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
  4. Improving the training of EU officers and personnel through joint training programs
  5. Consolidating Europe’s defence industry, and furthering the work of the European Defence Agency.

France also suggested a number of other reforms of the EU in 2008, including enhancing EU-wide cooperation in the fight against terrorism, the development of European civil protection mechanisms and securing Europe’s strategic lines of supply, including the trade routes that go through the Suez Canal, Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Lastly, France proposed in 2008, and would again in 20113, the drafting of a European White Paper on Defence and Security as a natural follow-up to the 2003 European Security Strategy.

The detailed and expansive nature of France's proposals make it the most ambitious of all the countries studied in this thesis when it comes to CFSP/CSDP. France seems to understand it inhabits a European security community, where threats come from without and where security and defence integration is a desirable outcome.

## **France, External Shocks and the Evolution of European Security and Defence**

The preceding section makes the case that France inhabits a European security community. France believes no threats to its security come from other EU partners, with whom it shares fundamental values. The country is convinced that its security is better protected in cooperation with them. The fact that France equated its global presence to a 'European' global presence, already hinted at another interesting feature of French strategic posture. France is convinced that its national strategic interests overlap almost perfectly with those of other EU states, making them by default 'European interests'. This has meant that whenever France suffered an external shock it not only turned to its European partners for cooperation but also that it expected very willing interlocutors.

If France was right in considering its interests identical to those of the EU as a whole it should have been very successful in Europeanizing the management of numerous security challenges. An analysis of external shocks and their consequences for France and for EU defence should help us shine light on this issue. Here is a list of four such shocks as well as their consequences:

1. Collapse of the Soviet Union and Conflict in the Balkans: led, first, to French support for the development of CFSP and its inclusion in the Maastricht Treaty, and, second, to the signing of the Saint Maló Declaration of 1998, the further

- development of CSDP as well as important French contributions to numerous EU missions in the Balkans.
2. Instability in the Sahel: led to France calling for and taking the lead of an EU operation in Chad (EUFOR TChad).
  3. Piracy off the Horn of Africa: led to French calls for the launch of an anti-piracy mission in the Indian ocean and for the establishment of a strategy for the development of Somalia.
  4. Charlie Hebdo and November 2015 Paris Terrorist Attacks: led to French calls for further European security integration and the enhancement of EU anti-terrorism tools.

### **The Collapse of the Soviet Union and Conflict in the Balkans**

France's support for a European security and defence policy cannot be understood without a reference to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. At the time of the fall of the wall France was a member of the two most important military alliances in the north Atlantic, the Western European Union and NATO. The WEU had not been a particularly active organisation before 1989 and France had only participated in one of its missions, the mine clearance operation in the Strait of Ormuz know as "Cleansweep". The early 1990s saw a surge in WEU operations, mostly in the Balkans, although throughout this period France, and other members, started to call for the transfer of some its security and defence powers to the European Union.

What initiated the change in France's policy towards the WEU and what fuelled its desire to provide the EU with a security and defence dimension were the events of 1989. Those events and the ones that followed in the Balkans, called for the emergence of a comprehensive actor in Europe that could bring to the table both military and civilian

tools<sup>303</sup>. Only the EU could develop into such an actor and bring stability to the Balkans. France decided it would support the construction of the Europe of Defence around the EU's civilian structures.

France's 1994 White Paper was itself an exercise of strategic reflexion caused by the fall of Communism. This new landscape called for a Europe ready to take on new security responsibilities. This was expressed in the document's Foreword, signed by at-the-time Prime Minister Édouard Balladur:

[France's defence] depends on the maintenance of international stability, and the prevention of crises, both in Europe and beyond, which if left unchecked could hinder our interests and national security...To achieve this we need to develop autonomous capabilities and to work proactively to create a European capability in the future.<sup>304</sup>

This statement was followed by an even clearer call for European integration in defence matters:

Our defence policy must contribute, through the full entry into force of the Treaty of the European Union, to the construction, step by step, of a common European defence. The political character of the EU must be reaffirmed in the field of defence. This objective, aimed at consolidating Western Europe as a pole of integration and stability, constitutes a major political and strategic objective for France.<sup>305</sup>

By 1994 France was, therefore, openly calling for the EU to develop activities in the field of security and defence, an area of policy previously monopolised by the WEU and NATO. This support would materialize in French support for the Maastricht Treaty where most of the basic elements of CFSP were laid down.

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<sup>303</sup> The failure of the 1994 Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, also known as the Balladur Plan, was an important driver of the policy change in France. The Plan, put forward by French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur had attempted to resolve some of the contentious issues on Eastern and South Eastern Europe through preventive diplomacy. Its failure helped consolidate the idea that the EU needed more forceful peace enforcement tools.

<sup>304</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 1994, Foreword.

<sup>305</sup> *Ibid.*

As other European states at the time, France was in the early 1990s worried about possible instability in Central and Eastern Europe<sup>306</sup>. It would be the Balkans, however, where the ability of Europeans to maintain security in their own continent would be tested.

The inability of Europeans to take care of security in their back yard became very apparent to French policymaking elites and shaped their policy markedly. As expressed by de Vasconcelos, a former Director of the European Union Institute for Strategic Studies (EUISS): “The lessons of Bosnia are essential when studying the emergence of CSDP. In Bosnia Europe was powerless and humiliated by the Serbs. The French and the British both took the lesson from Bosnia to a stronger EU was needed”<sup>307</sup>. That “lesson” led to French support for further European defence integration as expressed in the 1998 Saint Maló Declaration. Saint Maló was to bring the necessary political impetus to finish the blueprint set up at Maastricht. The French government, together with that of Great Britain, stated there that:

In order for the European Union to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance [meaning NATO] as a whole is not involved, the Union must be given the appropriate structures and capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning.<sup>308</sup>

In the months that followed, France was capable of building a European consensus around the need to push for the full development of CFSP/CSDP<sup>309</sup>. The final declaration of the Helsinki Summit celebrated in 1999 said the following: “The EU is determined to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to

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<sup>306</sup> This was expressed in the 1994 White Paper in the following way: “Central and Eastern Europe are heading towards a dangerous instability...Questions of minorities and borders have reappeared in Europe”. Source: French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 1994, Foreword, 12.

<sup>307</sup> Interview with Alvaro de Vasconcelos, Paris, 07-06-2012

<sup>308</sup> Joint Declaration on European Defence, declaration by the Government of France and the United Kingdom (Saint Maló, 1998).

<sup>309</sup> The 1998-1999 crisis in Kosovo and the subsequent military intervention, also by NATO, was another important reminder for France about the need to strengthen the EU’s security and defence arm. For an analysis of the impact this crisis had on French EU policy see: Michael Brenner and Guillaume Parmentier, *Reconcilable Differences: US- French Relations in the New Era* (Washington: Brookings institution, 2002), 62-68.

launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises”<sup>310</sup>. By then what had been a French project, a Europe of Defence, had become a European one. The consequences of these developments are not to be underplayed as they lead to the creation of numerous institutions at the EU level, including the all important position of the High Representative of the EU for Foreign and Security Policy<sup>311</sup>, as well as to a number of CSDP operations to which France was also an important contributor.

France indeed played a major role in the launch and execution of all of the EU’s missions in the Balkans of the 2000s. This was the case in both military operations such as Concordia or EUFOR Althea, and others of a civilian nature like EUPM, EUPOL Proxima or EUPAT<sup>312</sup>. As described above, the country’s support and participation in these missions was tightly connected to the security shocks suffered in the late 1990s and early 2000s and the need to bring stability to the Balkans. The reason why France was so successful in getting other EU states to sign up to its ambitions as expressed in Saint Maló was a direct consequence of an intense strategic overlap with other Union partners. As we will see in the following chapters, many EU states, including Germany and Spain, saw the collapse of the Soviet Union as a source of risk and many drew the same lessons as France from the failures of the Balkans of the 1990s: Europe had to build better institutions for the management of security and defence matters and had to be capable of deploying peacekeeping missions in its immediate neighbourhood. It was those shocks and the consensus that followed that led to the establishment and development of CFSP and CSDP.

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<sup>310</sup> European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*. (Helsinki: EU, 1999).

<sup>311</sup> See Chapter 3 for a full account of the institutional development spurred by the Maastricht Treaty and the Franco-British Saint Maló accord.

<sup>312</sup> See Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 for details on these missions

**Instability in the Sahel**

The early 2000s saw the start of one of Africa's bloodiest civil conflicts. Rebels in the eastern Sudanese province of Darfur rose against government troops and security forces and their allied Arab militias, also known as the Janjaweed. What started in 2003 as a localised revolt quickly evolved into open conflict with accusations of ethnic cleansing being levelled against the Sudanese government, and with the International Criminal Court (ICC) indicting the country's president, Omar al-Bashir, for crimes against humanity. Millions of people had to flee their homes and move to neighbouring countries like Chad or Central African Republic (CAR).

The French government was among the most vocal in its criticism of the actions taken by the Sudanese government during this period. After his appointment as French Foreign Minister in May of 2007, Bernard Kouchner made the Darfur conflict a central piece of French foreign policy. In the beginning the French called for the establishment of "humanitarian corridors" running through Chad and into Darfur. These corridors, essentially lines of communication protected by French and EU troops, would allow for the delivery of aid, and for the free movement of refugees out of the conflict areas. The proposal, however, soon encountered serious opposition from aid groups working on the ground that thought such a move would make them indistinguishable from Western military personnel and therefore a more probable target of aggression. The Chadian government did not in turn welcome the idea as it had serious doubts about the efficacy of the corridors. In June of 2007 the French government abandoned the proposal and started looking for other options.

This is when France, in agreement with the UN, suggested launching an EU bridging operation in the East of Chad to provide protection for the over 200.000 refugees living there. The goal of the mission would be to protect those refugees from the attacks of rebels

crossing from Sudan (mostly Janjaweed) for a period of 12 months and to prepare the ground for a more durable UN operation that would take over thereafter. The assessment of people who were on the ground in Chad at the time confirms that the French were right to call for a mission of this nature: “Clearly there was at that time [2007] a difficult situation in both Darfur and Chad. There were groups of bandits who were supported by the Sudanese who were harassing the population in the South East of Chad. There was a clear threat to the population there”<sup>313</sup>. It was also the case that most European governments were appalled by events in Darfur and were hoping to at the very least provide some help to the refugees on the Chadian side of the border.

In late 2007, and after months of negotiations, the EU agreed to launch one of its largest military operations to date, EUFOR TChad. It would be a close to 4000-strong force, deployed directly in the conflict region of Eastern Chad and would have as its mandate the protection of the local population and refugees from the attacks of bandits and Janjaweed. The mission would run for a period of 12 months and then be succeeded by a UN operation. In legal terms the mission was launched under the auspices of the same UN Security Council Resolution that saw the birth of United Nation’s police and military training Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). As planned, albeit with slight delays in the deployment due to problems with logistics and transportation of the required equipment and personnel to the remote theatre of operations, the mission ran its months of operations with overall success. On March of 2009, exactly 12 months after the Initial Operational Capability of EUFOR TChad had been declared a UN mission took over its responsibilities.

The narrative above seems to fall within what the theory suggested in this dissertation would predict. An external shock, in this case the crisis in Darfur, affected the strategic

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<sup>313</sup> Interview with Jean Philippe Ganascia, Paris, 25-06-2012

interests of an EU Member State, France, who, in turn, attempted to elevate the issue to a European level. In 2007 France found other EU states willing to share the burden of a common response to this threat and the result was a European operation that tackled the issues that all states involved found most egregious or damaging to their interests. In the case of Darfur/Chad the shared interests were the stability of the region and the upholding of certain human rights, particularly those pertaining to non-combatants and the protection of refugees.

However, a closer look at the details behind the launch and execution of EUFOR TChad reveal that France had a much harder time than expected getting this mission off the ground. France ended up providing the mission's Operational Headquarters, which were set up at the French base of Mont Valerien, the Force Headquarters in Chad, as well as the Force Commander. As described by the French officer appointed as Force Commander, General Jean Philippe Ganascia:

...no other country had the same will as France to participate in that mission, specially those who could contribute significantly in terms of staff, communications etc., like Germany, Great Britain or Spain. So France ended up providing most of these...By now [late 2007] we had a French Force Commander, a French Force Headquarters, and an OHQ located in France, close to Paris in Mont Valerian...and in Chad a French mission already deployed [Epervier<sup>314</sup>], from which I would take some of the land forces, and that would go on providing air support with French resources. So French air transport, and air reconnaissance if needed, and the platform for transit.<sup>315</sup>

Already in its planning phase the Chad mission was looking more French than properly 'EU'.

Problems then emerged in the force planning phase. Not enough troops were being offered by EU Member States to staff the mission in a way that would enable it to fulfil its mandate. General Ganascia remembered that period very well when interviewed for this thesis:

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<sup>314</sup> See below for details on Epervier

<sup>315</sup> Interview with Jean Philippe Ganascia, Paris, 25-06-2012

In the Concept of Operations it was specified that we needed a force of 4600 troops...Then we had the first force generation conference, and the second, and the third. Nobody was contributing. I attended the third conference and I was very impressed. General Nash<sup>316</sup> chaired the session and asked all of the country representatives there for their proposed contributions. Then there was silence. Nothing.<sup>317</sup>

This was occurring in late 2007 and early 2008 weeks before the mission was supposed to be deployed. There was a real sense in Brussels that things could derail. It was at this time when “the French Minister of Defence went to President Sarkozy and said to him ‘Sir we are about to be unable to launch the mission because we don’t have the forces’”<sup>318</sup>. The French had already agreed to provide one full battalion and they were hoping others would chip in. When it became apparent that would not happen “the President [Sarkozy] agreed to put on the table what was needed for the mission, which resulted in France providing 56% of the troops on the ground...This was not at all the idea in the beginning. Not at all.”<sup>319</sup>

Why would other EU states not be willing to support a mission that in principle allowed for the protection of common interests? Why did France struggle in its pursuit to build a European consensus around EUFOR TChad? The most important factor driving this dynamic was that French interests did not fully overlap with those of its EU partners. As a matter of fact, in Chad, and in many other places in Africa, France has a set of very particular interests that range from the protection of allied governments, to the maintenance and safety of its military bases and deployments, to the safeguarding of large pockets of expatriate population. As anticipated above, France does indeed have a particularly large global presence, and this extends to Africa where historical links also make the country a more significant player than many of its other EU allies. All of these differences played an important part in the design and execution of EUFOR TChad.

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<sup>316</sup> The EUFOR TChad Operations Commander

<sup>317</sup> Interview with Jean Philippe Ganascia, Paris, 25-06-2012

<sup>318</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>319</sup> Interview with Jean Philippe Ganascia, Paris, 25-06-2012.

France has had a long and enduring connection to Chad. A former French colony, France was for over three decades since Chadian independence in the 1960s the country's most important aid donor and strategic partner. In the mid 1980s France acted on a defence agreement signed with Chad and helped push back Libyan forces threatening to take over the capital N'Djamena. In order to do that France launched operation Epervier in 1986. The operation remained formally active until 2014 but there remains today a permanent French military presence in N'Djamena that provides intelligence and other forms of support to Chadian forces in their fight against various anti-government insurgencies and terrorist organisations<sup>320</sup>.

Insurgencies against the Chadian government have been so significant that many refer to the period between 2005 and 2012 as the Chadian Civil War. That war was fought mainly between government forces and Muslim rebels from the north and east of Chad, as well as from Sudan. Allegations of support for these insurgents from the Sudanese government led to the expulsion from Chad of all Sudanese diplomats and to the break up of relations between the two states in 2008. This happened right after a rebel offensive almost led to the fall of N'Djamena. Epervier's role in fighting back that important offensive was not minimal as French forces provided up-to-date intelligence and reconnaissance information to the Chadian military. Officers on the ground at the time confirmed that "Epervier provided intelligence and logistical support to the Chadian army"<sup>321</sup> and that "sometimes Epervier had to fight the rebels directly. For example in February 2008 they wanted to take the airport and we could not allow it. It was our evacuation route etc."<sup>322</sup>. These statements are a testament to how French military

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<sup>320</sup> In August of 2014 Operation Epervier formally concluded and was superseded by Operation Barkhane, with headquarters also in N'Djamena and with the broader goal of fighting Islamic terrorism in the Sahel.

<sup>321</sup> Interview French Army officer (not for attribution), Paris, 07-12-2012

<sup>322</sup> *Ibid.*

presence in Chad helped shape events there and in many ways aided President Déby's government in its struggle against regional militias.

It is therefore not surprising that when in 2007 EU partners were asked to consider a CSDP operation within Chadian territory there was certain suspicion about French objectives. Would an EU operation in any way protect the Déby government? Would it further French policy in the region rather than that desired by a majority of EU states? These fears were reinforced by the fact that President Déby of Chad only accepted an EU mission if it had a French Force Commander at its head. That Commander, General Jean Philippe Ganascia, would deploy under an EU flag to Chad in early 2008, and had himself doubts about the real objectives of the French government when insisting on the launch of EUFOR TChad:

There was also, although this is my own opinion, the objective to protect the Déby government. This was of course not what was said to me. The formal objective was to protect the local population...but the French government understood the mission would act as a deterrence force that would protect the Chadian government.<sup>323</sup>

General Henri Bentégeat, Chairman of the EU's Military Committee between 2006 and 2009 and a former Chief of the French Armed Forces expressed a similar view:

Chad was French triggered. It was an idea of Kouchner. It was mainly humanitarian oriented but not solely because when it comes to France and Chad there is a long history and deep military cooperation. So the motivation for the mission could be broken up in the following way: 70% due to humanitarian reasons, pure Kouchner, and 30% because of the Chadian-French military cooperation.<sup>324</sup>

With these precedents and with the clear feeling in EU circles that French intentions were not solely humanitarian it is not surprising that the proposal for EUFOR TChad was received with certain scepticism in EU bodies:

At the PSC we had the traditional reaction. Germany was quick to say it had no interest in the mission, it would not pay and it would not participate etc. Germany has always been the strongest opponent to any EU action in Africa. The reason is very simple: when it comes to intervention in Africa Germany is very suspicious of French, British, Portuguese or Belgian

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<sup>323</sup> Interview with Jean Philippe Ganascia, Paris, 25-06-2012

<sup>324</sup> Interview with Henri Bentégeat, Paris, 03-07-2012

‘post-colonial interests’. They are much more open to cooperation if it is in the Balkans or even in Afghanistan.<sup>325</sup>

The execution of EUFOR TChad also reflected some of the tensions that existed between French objectives and those of other European partners. Shortly after the first EU officers and troops had arrived in Chad, and as referenced above, the capital N’Djamena was attacked by rebels. This episode became known as the Second Battle of N’Djamena and it forced EUFOR TChad’s Force Commander to decide whether to intervene in the conflict or to limit his force’s action to the east of the country as originally intended. Here is how General Ganascia recalled events of February of 2008 during our interview:

Shortly after we arrived in Chad, rebels attacked N’Djamena...I was asked what our role would be. I had to be very strict. We were not to be concerned by the rebels except if they attacked the refugee camps in the Eastern part of the country...And that was the start of the gap that emerged between me and some other French officers...although I got complete support from my foreign officers...I think that if I had said something different then maybe the force would have never been fully deployed. I am sure some European countries would not have sent their troops if they had learnt that our mission was supporting the Déby government against the rebels.<sup>326</sup>

I believe this is not what France expected from me. I guess some people were expecting me to be a lot more supportive of the Déby government and to prevent the rebels reaching the capital. They entered twice after February. When they were a threat to the camps we reacted but not to their attempts to reach the capital. Déby made a statement at the time saying that EUFOR was ‘useless’, which demonstrated in my mind that there had been an agreement somewhere that our force would prevent rebels from entering the country and being a threat to the government. Which was not at all what my mandate said. Other European countries were not expecting me to do that.<sup>327</sup>

The frustration of Déby cited by General Ganascia was a central component of a 2008 exchange the Chadian President had with General Bentégeat, at the time the EU’s top military officer:

I had a meeting with President Déby of Chad at around the midpoint of the EU’s mission in his country. He was very unhappy with what the force was doing....But Déby must have expected this. France had had a long policy of not actively supporting the government.<sup>328</sup>

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<sup>325</sup> Interview with Henri Bentégeat, Paris, 03-07-2012

<sup>326</sup> Interview with Jean Philippe Ganascia, Paris, 25-06-2012

<sup>327</sup> *Ibid.*,

<sup>328</sup> Interview with Henri Bentégeat, Paris, 03-07-2012

It is unclear the extent to which France itself felt disappointed with how EUFOR TChad was being conducted. General Ganascia was confident that his country would have liked to see things evolve in a different way. A number of specific episodes illustrated this:

Three months before the rainy season Bernard Kouchner visited Chad. He said to me that he thought EUFOR would be a success if it managed to help in the return of Internally Displaced People (IDP). That was not my mission's objective. It was pushing me beyond my mandate which was just protecting refugees...This was only a French objective not European...So I decided I would not follow any guidance any more.<sup>329</sup>

Ganascia summarized it all in the following way:

France was disappointed to discover that in an EU operation even if you have the lead, the operational headquarters close to your Ministry of Defence and so on and so on, once the operation is launched it is no longer yours.<sup>330</sup>

The Chad mission is an important case study because it shows that inability of large Member States to design CSDP at their will, the importance of compromise, and the centrality of strategic interest overlap if a mission is to be fully supported by other EU allies. The fact that the EU has not acted more regularly and forcefully in Africa is a direct consequence of there not being sufficient shared interests to protect. This is the reason why security shocks from this part of the world have not produced a deepening of European defence integration equivalent to that produced by the end of the Cold War and the crises in the Balkans<sup>331</sup>.

### **Piracy Off the Horn of Africa**

The early to mid-2000s were a period of growing instability in the Horn of Africa. The Somali Civil War, a conflict that has raged since the late 1980s, had by the late 2000s produced a situation close to state failure in Somalia. Government forces, with African Union (AU) and US support had been battling various rebel groups with connections to

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<sup>329</sup> Interview with Jean Philippe Ganascia, Paris, 25-06-2012

<sup>330</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>331</sup> See Chapter 5 for an analysis of German reactions to the 2011 crisis in Libya and 2014 crisis in Mali. In both instances one can see the lack of desire on the part of other European partners to see the EU involved in high end, costly, operations in the region.

radical Islam and al Qaeda for many years; the most significant of those insurgent movements, at least in the latter part of the conflict, had been Al-Shabaab. One of the many consequences of the ongoing conflict was the collapse of the local economy and the fishing communities along the Somali coast. This, together with widespread opposition from Somali fishermen to the use of their waters as international trade routes, produced a growth in the numbers of piracy incidents off the coast of Somalia starting in the mid-2000s. Piracy not only targeted international mercantile vessels but also World Food Programme (WFP) maritime convoys transporting food and other basic products to Somalia. The terrible humanitarian repercussions of these actions led France, Denmark and the Netherlands to offer the provision of a military escort to WFP shipments in and out of Mogadishu port from November of 2007 to June of 2008; this multinational operation became known as Alcyon.

However, by late 2008 pirate activity off the coast of Somalia had reached such an intensity that it made it not only a threat to WFP activities but also to international fishing and trade in the Gulf of Aden. A report by Chatham House of that year pointed to growing numbers of merchant ship hijackings and suggested that if left unaddressed piracy would force shipping companies to deviate cargo from its normal route through the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Suez to the Cape of Good Hope. This latter possibility would cost billions of Euros to shipping companies and ultimately European consumers who would have to face higher prices for many of their imported goods<sup>332</sup>.

France was acutely aware of these risks. It had experienced first hand the rise in piracy off Somalia. In the spring of 2008 the French luxury yacht, *Le Ponant*, was hijacked by pirates there. Its 30-strong crew was taken hostage and were only released after the payment of a 2 million dollar ransom. After the release of the hostages France used special

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<sup>332</sup> Roger Middleton, *Piracy in Somalia: Threatening global trade, feeding local wars* (London: Chatham House, 2008).

forces to apprehend the pirates and bring them to justice. In early September 2008 Somali pirates captured yet another French pleasure yacht, the *Carre d'As IV*, with its two passengers, and demanded a one million Euros ransom and the liberation of the six pirates apprehended during the *Le Ponant* operation. President Sarkozy ordered a successful assault on the yacht, which ended with the release of the prisoners and the arrest of all the pirates except one that was killed during the operation. All of these actions made France in 2008 “the country that has taken the most robust stand against piracy off Somalia”<sup>333</sup>.

France began that year a long and successful campaign to expand the scope of intervention in the area as well as to involve the EU in the running of anti-piracy operations there. In June of 2008 France co-sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 1816 that allowed foreign navies to enter Somali waters “for the purposes of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea” (United Nations Security Council 2008). This resolution was pivotal to the intervention the EU would later undertake in the Gulf of Aden. In December of 2008 the EU Council approved the launch of an anti-piracy mission called EUFOR Atalanta. It was the first EU maritime operation, had an ample mandate that allowed for the use of force, and involved the use of high-end naval forces. France made a significant contribution to the mission in the form of a frigate, a patrol plane that operated from the French base at Djibouti, as well as overall logistical support.

The fact that France succeeded in elevating this issue to a European level had a lot to do with the fact that the strategic interests hindered by Somali piracy were shared by other EU states<sup>334</sup>. Spain had a particularly strong interest in seeing a mission such as Atalanta launched. The country wanted a stable Somalia that did not serve as a safe haven for international terrorism. It had also very concrete fishing interests in those seas, and a large

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<sup>333</sup> Middleton, *Piracy in Somalia: Threatening global trade, feeding local wars*, 8.

<sup>334</sup> Damian Helly “EU NAVFOR Somalia: The EU military Operation Atalanta” in *European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, ed. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane, 391-402. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2009.

fleet of fishing boats that were exposed to the risk of hijacking. As a matter of fact, a Spanish fishing boat, the Playa de Bakio, was captured by pirates on the 20<sup>th</sup> of April of 2008 off the coast of Somalia. The crew of 26 was held hostage for close to a week until ransom was paid. The incident received wide media attention in Spain and led to concerns about the safety of the country's fishing activities in the region. Spain was an early supporter of UN initiatives to allow for a military intervention in the Gulf of Aden, and later contributed with assets and personnel to Atalanta.

Another EU state that was supportive of the launch of this mission was the UK. According to de Vasconcelos: "Atalanta is a good example of a mission with a clear military objective...There was a strong lobby on the part of the British to get this off the ground"<sup>335</sup>. Beyond the clear objective of making WFP deliveries more secure it would also allow the protection of trade routes of great importance to the UK. The British government offered to provide the mission's Operational Headquarters, which would ultimately be located in Northwood, near London, as well as various capabilities including a frigate.

EUNAVFOR Atalanta is one of the cases that best fits the theoretical framework suggested in this thesis. It is the joint response by EU states to a threat that affected them all. For some this was a humanitarian problem while for others it also had an economic dimension. For the strongest of supporters, piracy off the coast of Somalia, was a multifaceted and very entrenched challenge that threatened to destabilise the region further and to, in the process, cost dearly to European governments, private businesses and consumers. The final mission mandate approved in late 2008 captured all of these concerns and had a broad mandate: protect vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) and other vulnerable shipping, deter and disrupt piracy and armed robbery at sea, monitor

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<sup>335</sup> Interview with Alvaro de Vasconcelos, Paris, 07-06-2012

fishing activities off the coast of Somalia, as well as support other EU missions and those of international organisations aimed at strengthening maritime security and capacity in the region such as the African Union's Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

### **Charlie Hebdo and November 2015 Paris Terrorist Attacks**

On the 7<sup>th</sup> of January 2015, France suffered one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in the country's recent history. Two armed men entered the offices of satirical cartoon magazine Charlie Hebdo and killed twelve of its reporters and staff. Parallel but coordinated attacks in the Paris region caused the deaths of another five people. In total between January the 7<sup>th</sup> and January 9<sup>th</sup> of 2015 20 people died in Paris in acts of terrorism and the police interventions that followed.

The terrorists were French citizens with connections to radical Islamic movements Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The two attackers of Charlie Hebdo magazine, Chérif and Saïd Kouachi, had connections to Djamel Beghal a French-Algerian citizen, associated with al Qaeda in Iraq, who had been convicted in 2005 of planning an attack on the US embassy in Paris. It was reported that Saïd Kouachi had spent months in 2011 in Yemen receiving military training with the local al Qaeda branch, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Due to their acquaintances, networks in the region and the statements the attackers made during the attacks themselves<sup>336</sup> it was soon apparent that the assailants had been radicalized by events in the Middle East, particularly the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the ongoing war in Syria.

Although these events are too close to the writing of this thesis, making it difficult to provide a full account of their consequences, it is important to note that what followed seems to fall within the parameters suggested by the theory delineated in the Introduction

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<sup>336</sup> The Kouachi brothers identified themselves during the attack as members of al-Qaeda in Yemen.

and in Chapter 2 of this thesis. On the 11<sup>th</sup> of January 2015, four days after the Charlie Hebdo attacks started, and only two days after the terrorists had been killed by French security forces, the Ministers of the Interior of close to a dozen EU Member States, issued a statement showing solidarity with the French people and calling for a number of measures to be implemented. Most of those measures entail the full use of already existing EU tools, their enhancement or even the creation of new ones. In broader terms, the Charlie Hebdo attacks led EU Interior Ministers to call for the further empowerment of the Union as a counter terrorism actor. Here are some excerpts from that statement:

...the EU should consider strengthening targeted actions designed to raise awareness and promote the respect of fundamental rights and values, including the *development of an EU communication strategy* as foreseen by the Council conclusions on the *development of a renewed European Union Internal Security Strategy*...

...We are working to reduce the supply of illegal firearms throughout Europe. This is a priority under the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats. As part of this work we are improving intelligence sharing amongst Member States and increasing the number of joint firearms operations across Europe. *This cooperation will be increased....*

...We are determined to implement all measures that may be helpful with respect to the sharing of intelligence information on the different forms of the threat, notably foreign terrorist fighters, on knowledge of their movements, and the support they receive, wherever they are, with a view to improving the effectiveness of our fight against these phenomena. To that end, *we want to underscore our determination to use fully the resources of Europol and Eurojust....*

...We are further convinced of the crucial and *urgent need to move toward a European Passenger Name Record (PNR) framework*, including intra-EU PNR. We are prepared to move forward, adopting a constructive approach with the European Parliament...(my emphasis).<sup>337</sup>

All of the issues touched upon in the statement cited above were later developed in detail in an informal Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA) meeting that took place in Riga on

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<sup>337</sup> Statement of Ministers of the Interior. Statement by the Ministers of the Interior and/or Justice of France, Latvia, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom, and of Sweden (Paris, 2015).

the 29<sup>th</sup> of January 2015. Their interior and justice ministers of the EU agreed to push forward all of the initiatives anticipated in the wake of the Paris attacks<sup>338</sup>.

On the 19<sup>th</sup> of January foreign ministers of EU Member States met in Brussels for a Foreign Affairs Council. The Council dedicated part of its proceedings to discussing events in Paris and the consequences of the Charlie Hebdo attack. The EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, said after the meeting: "For the first time, there was a real awareness that we need to work together to fight a common threat. We took a decision within the Foreign Affairs Council to cooperate in a much more active way than it has been the case so far."<sup>339</sup>

The summary of the meeting issued by the EU added:

Action should be taken on different levels, from the security level – enhanced exchange of information, not only between the member states, but also with partner countries, and exchanges of best practices will be part of that – to reinforced cooperation with Arab and Mediterranean countries on countering terrorism and redoubling efforts to deal with open conflicts and crises.<sup>340</sup>

Some media organizations picked up on the direct link between the attacks in Paris and these renewed efforts to enhance EU anti terrorism policy. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), for example, reported on the Foreign Affairs council with an article titled “Charlie Hebdo attack spurs EU anti-terror 'projects'”<sup>341</sup>. EurActiv, a Europe-wide news organization, reported that the EU was considering incorporating an enhanced intelligence dimension to its foreign representation offices<sup>342</sup>.

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<sup>338</sup> Dimitris Avramopoulos, “*Speech of Commissioner Avramopoulos: Discussions in fighting terrorism at the informal JHA council in Riga*” (Speech delivered by the EU Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Riga, January 29, 2015).

<sup>339</sup> European Foreign Affairs Council, *Outcome of the Council Meeting* (Brussels: EU, 2015), 3.

<sup>340</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>341</sup> BBC, “Charlie Hebdo attack spurs EU anti-terror 'projects'”, *BBC News* (January 19, 2015), accessed 19/04/2015, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30875705>

<sup>342</sup> EurActiv, “EU considers foreign 'security agents' to counter terrorism”, *EurActiv.com*. (January 20, 2015), accessed 19/04/2015, [http://www.euractiv.com/sections/security/eu-considers-security-agents-counter-terrorism-311398?utm\\_source=EurActiv+Newsletter&utm\\_campaign=6721e4cb4e-newsletter\\_daily\\_update&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_term=0\\_bab5f0ea4e-6721e4cb4e-245507873](http://www.euractiv.com/sections/security/eu-considers-security-agents-counter-terrorism-311398?utm_source=EurActiv+Newsletter&utm_campaign=6721e4cb4e-newsletter_daily_update&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_bab5f0ea4e-6721e4cb4e-245507873)

As we will see in the chapter on Spain (Chapter 6), there have been other instances of terrorist attacks in Europe that have produced a flurry of EU counterterrorism institutional and capability development. France itself has suffered other terrorist attacks since Charlie Hebdo and reactions have been similar to the ones delineated above<sup>343</sup>. This willingness to look for European solutions to what could be understood as national crises has to do with the interconnectedness across EU Member States and the feeling that strategic interests are widely shared among Union members. A threat to one becomes, therefore, a threat to all. In the specific case of terrorism, European states have a shared concern about citizens that travel to the Middle East to fight in conflicts there. Many fear that those citizens will then return to their home countries radicalized and willing to perpetrate acts of terror. With the abolition of internal borders brought about by the Schengen Treaty European citizens can travel freely within the EU<sup>344</sup>. Those willing to commit acts of terror are, therefore, a threat to all Member States.

### **Conclusions: External Shocks and French EU policy**

France has, overall, managed to be extraordinarily successful in forwarding European security and defence integration. This was surely the case in the 1990s and early 2000s when it was the main promoter of CFSP/CSDP and of EU engagement in the Balkans. It was also the case during the late-2000s and the building of a European reaction to piracy off the horn of Africa. The events following the Charlie Hebdo and November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, in turn, seem to point to a strong European response that will produce new EU counter terrorism institutions and procedures. All of these cases display

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<sup>343</sup> Another major terrorist incident in France that took place after Charlie Hebdo was the November 2015 coordinated attack at the Bataclan Theatre and the St. Denis stadium. The event and its reactions were still being analyzed at the time of writing of this thesis so analysis on them can only very superficial. It is evident, however, that French authorities have, once again, sought the support of European partners in trying to tackle the challenge of terrorism.

<sup>344</sup> See Jörg Monar, *Institutional Dimensions of the European Union's Area of Freedom, Security and Justice* (Peter Lang, 2010) for an extensive analysis of the birth and development of Schengen.

the same characteristics: a crisis that affected French interests which led the government to search for a European reaction. That search produced a common response because other partners were willing to contribute as a means of protecting their own interests. Over time this cycle has produced the birth of numerous institutions and of a long track record of French-triggered EU action in the field of security.

The case of EUFOR TChad seems to deviate significantly from the narrative delineated above. Rather than succeeding in bringing a wide range of countries on board and truly Europeanizing the management of the Darfur/Chad crisis, France ended up having to take on most of the responsibilities and covering most of the mission's costs. However, rather than nullifying the theory suggested in this dissertation events leading up to and the execution of EUFOR TChad allow us to explore some of its nuances. Events in Darfur in the early and mid-2000s called for some form of intervention. They affected the interests of a number of EU states, including those of France. The consensus in Europe was that this was a humanitarian crisis and that the EU should help by providing assistance and protection to the civilians and refugees living in eastern Chad. France, however, had a greater interest than the rest in deploying a mission there. The origin of that divergence was France's long history in the region and its open desire to see a stable Déby government. The goal of providing some form of support, however weak, and which General Bentégeat quantified as constituting 30% of France's motivation to launch EUFOR TChad, was simply not shared by the rest of Europe. This issue clearly drove a wedge between EU partners and led to resistance by many EU states to having the mission's mandate and scale expanded to cover issues of host country government stability. It also meant numerous EU states refused to make large contributions of troops or equipment leaving the capability shortfall to be covered by France. Once launched, the

execution of the mission, as was to be expected, was respectful of its mandate and remained close to what the consensus of European states considered appropriate.

The Chadian case is a perfect example of the lowest common denominator being the determinant of EU security and defence action. Anything that deviates from that common denominator is to be covered by the states most interested and not the Union as a whole. The further away the particular interests of a state are from those of its EU partners the more attractive the option of going at it alone becomes. This means that France will have problems Europeanizing the response to some of the security crises it will face in the future. Despite what French strategic documents say, the country's global presence sets it apart from many of its European allies.

There are some references within French strategy that reveal that planners are aware of this divergence in priorities and goals but try to play down their significance:

Not all our partners and allies give the same weight or strategic importance to Europe's eastern neighbours, the Mediterranean or the part of Africa from the Sahel to Equatorial Africa. However, for France there is no doubt that these regions are of priority interest for the whole of the European Union.<sup>345</sup>

France seems to be in denial, however, of the scale of the strategic divergence in Europe. Particularly when it comes to differences of opinion in Europe about the need to play an active military role in the Sahel and Northern Africa. France was a firm believer, for example, that the Arab Revolutions that started in 2011 and that led to the toppling of the governments of Tunisia, Libya and Egypt called for concerted EU action. France's 2013 White Paper, for example, said that:

...owing to the geographic proximity, to the depth of the human relations and to the strength of the economic and energy ties between Europe and the southern shores of the Mediterranean, the Arab revolutions pose an ever greater challenge for Europe.<sup>346</sup>

The 2013 Paper even suggested that these events could be as significant for Europe as the end of the Cold War: "In some respects, the issue is similar to the challenge presented by

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<sup>345</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2013, 55.

<sup>346</sup> *Ibid.*, 32.

the successful return of the former communist countries into the European democratic fold at the end of the Cold War<sup>347</sup>. These are, in the eyes of France, developments that call for a push for European security and defence integration of equal force to that which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union.

However, external shocks have time and time again tested France's ability to get the EU involved in direct military engagement in Africa. The results have not been too encouraging. In Chad France was forced to shoulder a larger than expected part of the EU's effort. In 2013 the EU refused to launch a military operation in northern Mali to fight Islamic terrorists threatening to topple the government. France ended up launching its own mission, Operation Serval, which had no formal EU support. This followed yet another failed French attempt to get the EU to take part in the operation against the Gadhafi regime in Libya in 2011.

France's inability to get the EU to act in a more decisive manner in the Sahel and in the Southern Mediterranean has led the country to disappointment regarding European defence. Writing in 2012 the former French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine had the following to say about years of French efforts to construct a common European defence: "...the actual results achieved from the efforts made over twenty-five years, especially by France...are ultimately very disappointing"<sup>348</sup>. He then added: "Not a single European country has backed France's ambitions and her conception of the Europe of Defence"<sup>349</sup>.

Libya was a particularly painful experience for the French in part because many believed CSDP had been born to tackle crises of that nature. In the words of Jolyon Howorth:

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<sup>347</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2013, 10.

<sup>348</sup> Hubert Védrine, *Report for the President of the French Republic on the Consequences of France's Return to NATO's Integrated Military Command, on the Future of Transatlantic Relations, and the outlook for the Europe of Defence* (Paris, 2012), 14.

<sup>349</sup> *Ibid.*, 17.

You cannot overstate to what extent the Libya mission was exactly what CSDP had been striving to get itself ready to do since the Balkans<sup>350</sup>. Exactly 20 years. It was not even seriously considered. It could have been under Berlin Plus with American input. Again this was exactly why Berlin Plus existed. There were people in France that thought it should have been done as a CSDP mission. I think Sarkozy did.<sup>351</sup>

Zaki Laïdi from Sciences Po in Paris confirmed this feeling of frustration with CSDP emerging out of the failure to engage in Libya: “The truth of the matter is that France has been extraordinarily disappointed by the Europeans in Libya”<sup>352</sup>. Although opinions such as Védérine’s or Laïdi’s have not yet made it all the way to French formal strategic documents and are not pervasive in policymaking circles it is the case that they are now far more common than in the early 2000s.

Beyond the frustration generated by the unwillingness to act in northern Africa, French policymakers seem to be concerned with the EU’s inability to take on hard security tasks. As expressed by a top foreign policy official during an interview in Paris in 2012: “We are not in the business of setting up a crisis management tool...[but] the EU refuses to take on a natural military responsibility”<sup>353</sup>. Or as summarized by Professor Laïdi:

The problem with CSDP is that as long as you are dealing with humanitarian or peacekeeping missions there is no major disagreement but when you come to combat operations, like in Libya, it is another story. There is no example of an EU mission that included combat operations. Maybe Somalia [EUNAVFOR Atalanta] but then again EU action is not against a state but non-state actors. In that sense it is not a surprise that the EU refused to commit itself to the Libya mission.<sup>354</sup>

However, the fact that France was capable of successfully pushing for EU integration and action on so many other fronts, including the launch of kinetic operations such as Atalanta, is a testament to the real possibilities of forwarding CFSP/CSDP where consensus exists. But when it comes to Africa most EU Member States believe that their interests are properly served through a softer policy of development and smaller, less-kinetic,

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<sup>350</sup> For a longer analysis from Jolyon Howorth on the 2011 Libya intervention and its implications for CSDO see: Jolyon Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 137

<sup>351</sup> Interview with Jolyon Howorth, Paris, 02-07-2012.

<sup>352</sup> Interview with Zaki Laïdi, Paris, 02-07-2012

<sup>353</sup> Interview with Foreign Ministry official (not for attribution), Paris, 25-06-2012

<sup>354</sup> Interview with Zaki Laïdi, Paris, 02-07-2012

operations<sup>355</sup>. The consensus around this approach is captured by the EU's 'Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa' and 'Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel', which emphasize stability through economic development, and prioritize intervention through economic and civilian aid rather than military means<sup>356 357</sup>. The fact that other EU states are not willing to assume the risks that come with military engagement is directly connected to the nature and intensity of their interests in the region. For EU states without large pockets of expatriated population, military bases or defence agreements with states in the region, committing to military operations in Africa is not an attractive proposition. In negotiation terms there is no ZOPA in EU-wide negotiations that includes intervening in northern Africa through direct military action.

The conclusions are therefore quite clear. Shocks that have affected common interest have enabled France to build strong coalitions for institutional development and for direct action. This was surely the case with Saint Maló and with operations in the Balkans and the Gulf of Aden. It is also the case when speaking of a common counter terrorism policy and efforts. In other areas, France has had much more trouble in bringing partners on board in large part because they do not share the country's strategic interests, or at least not their intensity, and are not willing to support strong military action in places like the Sahel. Here France has been forced to search for other arrangements that have included unilateral action, and using NATO as an umbrella for military intervention.

## Chapter Overview

France is evidently convinced it inhabits a European security community. The country sees no security threats emerging from other EU partners. It also believes that it shares its

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<sup>355</sup> See Chapter 5 on Germany for a fuller account of resistance in other EU Member States to CSDP engagement in both Libya (2011) and Mali (2013)

<sup>356</sup> European Council, *Council conclusions on the Horn of Africa*.

<sup>357</sup> European External Action Service, *Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel*.

entire interest catalogue with other EU partners and is therefore convinced that most of its security challenges are to be tackled within the Union's framework. Unsurprisingly, France has by default turned to its European partners for help whenever it has suffered an external shock.

Those shocks have been repeatedly interpreted by policymaking elites in Paris as fundamentally detrimental to European security as a whole. This understanding of events was proven to be correct in a number of cases, where France was capable of building a strong EU consensus around the need to strengthen EU defence, be it through the creation of new institutions, the launch of security operations or the elaboration of new security documents. Cases of shocks that led to successful French calls for further integration include the fall of the Soviet Union, the conflicts in the Balkans, piracy in the Indian Ocean and the fight against terrorism. European states, on the whole, saw these issues in very similar terms to Paris and were happy to enter into arrangements to tackle them together. In other instances, however, particularly those that involved African states with which France has deep historical ties, the French have found themselves alone in calling for decisive EU military action. This seems to be a direct consequence of the gap that exists between French interests and those of other EU states in Africa, and something that has forced France to provide for their protection outside of EU frameworks.

## Chapter 5: Germany and European Security and Defence

### Introduction

Germany has been one of the central players in European security and defence since the country's foundation in 1871. Its central role in both the First and Second World Wars in the 20<sup>th</sup> century marked the country's strategic outlook, particularly since 1945 when Germany was divided and occupied by the Allies. West German defence entered then a dormant period with the dissolution of the Armed Forces, and only began a slow awakening in the late 1950s with the creation of the Bundeswehr (the Armed Forces) and the incorporation of the country to NATO. Still, Germany remained a reluctant security actor for the next four decades, with a reduced army, mostly constructed through conscription, and with no foreign engagements<sup>358 359</sup>.

German security concerns up until 1989 were centred on addressing the Soviet existential threat and providing internal security. The end of the Cold War and the reunification of the country were pivotal moments for Germany. Not only did these developments turn a united Germany into an even more central player in European affairs and therefore one with greater responsibility, but they also opened a new geopolitical landscape where the country and its allies would have to tackle new threats. This truly significant external shock, which for Germany had an "internal" component in the reunification of the eastern and western parts of the country, has marked the evolution of German security and defence ever since. The first palpable consequence of this shock for security and defence policy was the slow start of Bundeswehr foreign engagements, with the first such operation being launched in 1994.

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<sup>358</sup> For a brief history of German defence and the creation of the Bundeswehr see: German Federal Ministry of Defence, *The Bundeswehr on Operations*, (Berlin, 2009).

<sup>359</sup> For a more nuanced breakdown of the different phases in German foreign and security policy since 1990 see Hartmut Mayer, "Declining might in the limelight: European responses to new regional powers," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 16, No 2 (2009): 200-203.

Since the 1990s Germany has slowly assumed a greater responsibility in the security and defence realm. This has mostly occurred under the NATO umbrella but growingly also under the EU's CFSP and CSDP. Germany was not only one of the important signatories of the Maastricht Treaty, which gave the EU its foreign and security dimension, but also a pivotal actor in the consolidation of CSDP at the 1999 Cologne European Council Summit. With a constant support for the further institutional development of CFSP/CSDP Germany has remained at the core of this area of EU policy since its founding. Additionally, Germany has taken part in, and sometimes taken the lead of over a dozen EU missions, and was between 1999 and 2009 the second largest contributor of troops and personnel to CSDP operations, surpassed only by France<sup>360 361</sup>.

It is easy to forget how remarkable all the developments pointed out above are. In the past two decades Germany transitioned from a state with only a territorial defence posture and capabilities to one that participates in stabilisation, border control or even peacekeeping operations in places as far flung as the Balkans or the Horn of Africa. Germany has not only not drifted away from the European project, or balanced against some of its former partners like some predicted<sup>362</sup> but it has doubled down its efforts to further European integration. This has included a clear commitment to developing CSDP further, be it through a new European Security Strategy, the establishment of a permanent European Operational Military Headquarter or by supporting the assumption by the EU of more security responsibilities in the Balkans.

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<sup>360</sup> Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane, *European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)* (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2009): 414-415.

<sup>361</sup> See Wolfgang Wagner, "Missing in Action? Germany's Bumpy Road from Institution-Building to Substance in European Security and Defence Policy" in *Germany's EU Policy on Asylum and Defence: De-Europeanization by Default*, ed. Gunther Hellmann (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2006), 91-155.

<sup>362</sup> See the Chapter 2 and particularly the section within the literature review dedicated to Offensive Realism and its claims about the future of European defence.

The following pages will explore what led Germany to behave in this way and how changes in its security environment led it to repeatedly call for more EU integration, including the field of security and defence.

### **Germany in Europe: A Security Community**

Before one can begin to answer the question ‘does Germany inhabit a European Security Community?’ it is important to note three particular characteristics of German security and defence policy. The first is that Germany has a set of constitutional arrangements that impose limits on the sort of military activities the country can undertake. This is enshrined in articles 24, 26 and 80a of Germany’s Basic Law (or Constitution), which establish among other things that the country is constitutionally barred from taking unilateral military action. Germany can only act in self-defence or as part of multilateral initiatives. The multilateral frameworks most used by Germany have historically been NATO, the UN, the OSCE and, growingly, the EU; and in all but one case in operations with a UN mandate<sup>363</sup>. Any study of German defence must therefore refer to the country’s Constitution and to at the very least acknowledge its role in limiting the options available to the country’s government when designing its security policy.

Furthermore, some knowledge of Constitutional jurisprudence in this field is fundamental in understanding constraints on the German executive. The 1990s saw a heated legal debate about whether Germany could contribute with armed military personnel to foreign missions. Some argued that such a move would go against the pacifist nature of the German Basic Law, including its Article 26 that formally criminalized any preparation for ‘aggression’. Ultimately the German Constitutional Court issued a number

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<sup>363</sup> That case was the NATO intervention in Kosovo in the mid 1990s, developed in some detail below.

of rulings that paved the way for German participation in missions abroad and enshrined the powers of the German Parliament (or Bundestag) to decide on intervention.

The centrality of the Bundestag when agreeing on security and defence policy engagement is the second characteristic about Germany that should be kept in mind when studying the country's track record in this realm. Indeed the German Basic Law and its jurisprudential interpretation impose a number of taxing procedures before the use of force can be agreed upon. Most of these oblige the government to ask Parliament for the approval of a mission as well as maintain intense consultations with the Bundestag's all mighty Defence Committee throughout the duration of the operation. Although Parliament has never denied approval for an operation requested by the government, even for those with clear kinetic components such as NATO's International Assistance Force deployed in Afghanistan (ISAF) or CSDP's EUNAVFOR Atalanta off the coast of Somalia, it is still the case that the Executive needs to be very aware of parliamentary dynamics and concerns. Markus Woelke, interviewed for this thesis in 2013 and at the time Deputy Head of the CSDP Division within the German Foreign Ministry summarized the limitations imposed by parliamentary oversight over foreign engagements in the following terms:

Parliamentarians always say: 'we never stopped anything'. Of course, they have never said 'no'. The things that have officially been put forward have been agreed upon but only because a consensus of all parties had been built in advance. This is an incredible limitation. We are not capable of acting quickly and you can't imagine the critical questions you get in committee every week. *Parliamentary work takes up 25% of or time here: committee work every week, parliamentary questions every week and if an issue gets tough like Mali<sup>364</sup>, then you have, coalition meetings, 3,4,5,7 parliamentary meetings going on every week for which you have to prepare...* (my emphasis).<sup>365</sup>

Admiral Kähler, at the time of the interview Director of Security Policy at Germany's Federal Ministry of Defence, also touched upon this during our meeting and indicated that

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<sup>364</sup> Woelke is referring here to intense parliamentary debates that took place in Germany in 2013 when a possible EU military intervention in Mali was being considered in order to stop the advance of various Islamist groups towards the capital Bamako.

<sup>365</sup> Interview with Markus Woelke, Berlin, 04-04-2013

although Parliament had never denied the government the authorisation to act militarily it had come very close during the NATO intervention in Kosovo:

There was only one situation where there was a close vote. That was when we had the Social Democrat-Green government and the vote on Kosovo<sup>366</sup>. Kosovo was also an interesting case because basically we said we needed a United Nations mandate to cover everything. The inability of the UN Security Council to arrive at a consensus on Kosovo led to a debate in Germany, particularly within the Green Party. The Foreign Minister at the time said 'It doesn't matter what we do here. If we do nothing we are guilty and if we do something we are guilty as well and I prefer doing something than doing nothing'...Finally there was no UN backing for NATO's intervention in the Balkans. That was the only case. It might happen again but it is not what we want. In general Germany wants to have the backing of the United Nations.<sup>367</sup>

As we will see in later sections of this chapter the fact that Germany has strict procedures and a high threshold for the approval of the use of force has not led to a total inability to act. As a matter of fact and as pointed out by Jorn Hasler, an advisor on security and defence policy to the parliamentary group of the Free Democrat Party (FDP):

We [meaning Germany] are engaged in Atalanta, in Kosovo as lead nation, we are the third largest nation in Afghanistan<sup>368</sup>... We have six to seven cells already engaged in international missions, permanently. That means 7,000 soldiers in missions. 7,000 soldiers in preparation, 7,000 soldiers resting...<sup>369</sup>

What parliamentary oversight does mean however is that any research conducted around this issue has to draw heavily from interactions with Members of Parliament (MPs) and people who work for parliamentary committees or the parliamentary groups of political parties. It also means that understanding party dynamics, and those of coalition-building is far more important in Germany than in other EU states where the Executive plays a much larger role in deciding security and defence policy and action.

The third and last element to keep in mind when studying German defence policy is that navigating German strategic planning is not as straightforward as it is in other countries such as France or Spain. The German Government has not produced an

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<sup>366</sup> Kähler is referring here to the decision by Germany to participate in the NATO campaign in Kosovo of 1998.

<sup>367</sup> Interview with Thorsten Kähler, Berlin 12-04-2013

<sup>368</sup> Hasler is referring to Germany's contributions to EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EULEX Kosovo and NATO's ISAF mission in Afghanistan.

<sup>369</sup> Interview with Jorn Hasler, Berlin, 10-04-2013

overarching security strategy since the end of the Second World War. There is no centralised strategic planning process in Germany or a National Security Council that brings to the table the various actors in the field. This has a lot to do with German political culture, which prizes decentralisation of tasks to Ministries, as well as with coalition dynamics. When asked about why the country does not have an overarching security strategy, Bernd Weber, a senior MP in Angela Merkel's Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and the Speaker of the Parliamentary Group's Working Group on Defence Policy, said:

Something like this [a National Security Strategy] should be done in the Chancellor's office. The problem is that between the Ministry for External Affairs and the Ministry of Defence there are some problems. The Ministry of Defence is nowadays [2013] led by a person of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany / Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CSU) while the External Office is led by the smaller party, the liberals...Our key problem is that there has not been a clear understanding between the Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Defence for the last thirty or forty years.<sup>370</sup>

The Chancellery has so far refused to mediate between these two powerful ministries and has therefore stayed away from the controversial task of producing an Executive-drafted security strategy. As indicated by Ulrich Finkebusch another FDP parliamentary advisor:

Our Government is very decentralized. We don't have a White House. We don't have a National Security Council. The fear of the ministries is that once you set your mind to writing a comprehensive strategy there will be political forces of gravitation that will suck everything into the centre. They are afraid that Merkel's Advisor on Foreign and Security Policy might turn into a leader for a new National Security Council which would then give direct orders the ministry, defence department, interior, and development.<sup>371</sup>

The consequence of this has been the production of a number of diverse strategy documents, most of them authored by the Defence Ministry<sup>372</sup>. There have been nine White Papers "On the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr", dated 1970, 1971/1972, 1973/1974, 1975/1976, 1979, 1983,

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<sup>370</sup> Interview with Bernd Weber, Berlin, 11-04-2013

<sup>371</sup> Interview with Ulrich Finkebusch, Berlin, 10-04-2013

<sup>372</sup> The German Foreign Office has also produced a number of documents with a 'strategic' content, setting out policy goals and objectives the latest of which is the "2014 Review: Crisis-Order-Europe" published in February of 2015. See: German Foreign Office, *Conclusions from Review 2014* (Berlin, 2015).

1985, 1994 and 2006<sup>373</sup>, and which serve as the highest strategy documents in Germany. This thesis will draw from the 1994 and 2006 editions as they are the ones that cover the period from the end of the Cold War to today. There are also a number of Defence Policy Guidelines, produced too by the Defence Ministry, and meant to fall right under the White Papers in the strategic pyramid. This thesis will draw extensively from the ones published in 1992, 2003 and 2011.

Additionally, Germany has produced a fascinating collection of coalition agreements dating back to the 1950s. These are in some instances quite extensive documents that outline the program of the coalition government about to take office. Of relevance to this thesis are the ones that cover the period from 1990 to 2017. There were seven coalition governments in that period with their respective agreements. Below is a list of them with the parties involved and the name of the German Chancellor leading the coalition:

- 1990 – 1994: Coalition between the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) / Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CSU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP). Chancellor: Helmut Kohl (4<sup>th</sup> Kohl Government)<sup>374</sup>
- 1994 – 1998: Coalition between the CDU/CSU and the FDP. Chancellor: Helmut Kohl (5<sup>th</sup> Kohl Government)<sup>375</sup>
- 1998 – 2002: Coalition between the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and Alliance 90/The Greens. Chancellor: Gerhard Schröder (1<sup>st</sup> Schröder Government)<sup>376</sup>
- 2002 – 2005: Coalition between the SPD and Alliance 90/The Greens. Chancellor: Gerhard Schröder (2<sup>nd</sup> Schröder Government)<sup>377</sup>

<sup>373</sup> A new White Paper is scheduled to be published in the month of July of 2016.

<sup>374</sup> CDU/CSU and FDP, *Koalitionsvereinbarung für die 12. Legislaturperiode des Deutschen Bundestages* [Coalition Agreement for the 12th legislative period of the German Bundestag] (Bonn, 1991).

<sup>375</sup> CDU/CSU and FDP, *Koalitionsvereinbarung für die 13. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestages* [Coalition Agreement for the 13th legislative period of the German Bundestag], (Bonn, 1994).

<sup>376</sup> SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, *Aufbruch und Erneuerung – Deutschlands Weg ins 21. Jahrhundert* [Awakening and renewal - Germany's path into the 21st century] (Bonn, 1998).

- 2005 – 2009: Coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD: Chancellor Angela Merkel (1<sup>st</sup> Merkel Government)<sup>378</sup>
- 2009 – 2013: Coalition between the CDU/CSU and the FDP: Chancellor Angela Merkel (2<sup>nd</sup> Merkel Government)<sup>379</sup>
- 2013-(2017): Coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD: Chancellor Angela Merkel (3<sup>rd</sup> Merkel Government)<sup>380</sup>

The agreements listed above cover the period under study in this thesis. They also cover the governments of three different chancellors, Kohl, Schröder, and Merkel, and almost all of the possible major party configurations available in contemporary Germany. This should give our findings more resilience.

Interestingly, and despite the apparently haphazard and decentralised nature of strategic planning in Germany, a structured study of German security and defence documents, coupled with extensive elite interviewing, reveal a surprising coherence and consistency in Germany strategic thinking. The Defence White Papers, for example, despite being formally authored by the Defence Ministry, were the product of a collective effort of many Ministries and departments. Admiral Kähler, an active participant in the elaboration of the 2006 White Paper, summarized this as follows:

People say it is only a ‘Defence White Paper’, but I worked on that issue in 2006 and this was a ‘Government’ paper. It was agreed by all ministries. Basically, what you find in there is a common view on defence and security issues by all ministries...I worked on some wording with

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<sup>377</sup> SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, *Erneuerung – Gerechtigkeit – Nachhaltigkeit. Für ein wirtschaftlich starkes, soziales und ökologisches Deutschland. Für eine lebendige Demokratie* [Renewal - Justice – Sustainability. For an economically strong , socially and ecologically Germany . For a vibrant democracy] (Berlin, 2002).

<sup>378</sup> CDU/CSU and SPD, *Gemeinsam für Deutschland - mit Mut und Menschlichkeit. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD* [Together for Germany - with courage and humanity. Coalition agreement between the CDU, CSU and SPD] (Berlin, 2005).

<sup>379</sup> CDU/CSU and FDP, *Wachstum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt. Der Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und FDP* [Growth. Education. Cohesion. The coalition agreement between the CDU, CSU and FDP] (Berlin, 2009).

<sup>380</sup> CDU/CSU and SPD, *Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten* [Shape the future of Germany] (Berlin, 2013).

the Minister for Foreign Affairs and with the Ministry of Development. This was really a common paper.<sup>381</sup>

Additionally, German Defence Guidelines and party coalition agreements have managed to remain extremely well connected to the White Papers and to keep a high degree of consistency throughout the years. So, despite its limitations, Germany has managed to produce quite a coherent set of strategic documents that cover a wide spectrum of security issues.

The next pages will look in depth at German threat perception, as portrayed in those documents and as depicted by its policymaking elites, and will try to elucidate both if the country belongs to a European security community and if that belonging affected the way it conducted its security and defence policy. A preliminary set of conclusions are anticipated here:

1. Threat Perception: Threats to Germany lie outside the borders of the European Union. The EU has pushed security threats outside its boundaries and ensured relations among its members are conducted according to the rules of peaceful exchange.
2. Strategic Overlap: EU strategy is constructed on values and principles that Germany shares.
3. Europe as a Solution: Most of the security and defence challenges Germany faces have a European solution. Europeanizing the management of these security and defence issues is therefore the adequate policy.
4. France as a Privileged Partner: The Franco-German relation is one of the pillars of German stability and prosperity, the engine of European integration, and therefore a valuable component of Germany's security and defence policy.

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<sup>381</sup> Interview with Thorsten Kähler, Berlin 12-04-2013

Although the four points above are interconnected it is useful, as in other chapters, to divide them for the sake of clarity. The combination, ultimately, makes a compelling case for the existence of a European security community and for a strong German commitment to it. Germany has turned to that community time and time again to see its strategic interests protected and forwarded. The next pages will look in further detail at each of those points.

### Threat Perception

German security documents are full of references to other European states and to the community of trust shared with them. Such references become recurrent in the 1990s as the Cold War came to an end. For many European states the collapse of the Soviet Union meant the disappearance of an existential threat. What is interesting is to see the extent to which Germany felt at ease with its new situation and the degree to which it considered its immediate neighbours to be trusted partners and allies. In the German Defence Policy Guidelines of 1992, published only three years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, one could already read: “Germany is no longer a front-line state. Instead, it is now surrounded by allies and friendly partners”<sup>382 383</sup>.

One could argue that German threat perception in the 1990s was conditioned by its recent history and that it felt so secure only because a truly existential threat, that posed by the Soviet Union, had just vanished. Maybe as that became the ‘new normal’ Germans would learn to be worried about other threats, perhaps some of which could come from

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<sup>382</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien* [Defence Policy Guidelines] (Berlin, 1992), 5.

<sup>383</sup> Two years later, in 1994, the German White Paper added: “The danger of large-scale aggression threatening our existence has been banished. Germany’s territorial integrity and that of its allies does not face an existential military threat for the foreseeable future”. See: German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage und Zukunft der Bundeswehr* [White Paper on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and The Situation and Future of the Bundeswehr] (1994), 13.

former partners and allies in the confrontation with the Soviets such as France. However, strategic documents from the 2000s insist on the same message as those of the 90s: “At present and in the foreseeable future, there is no apparent conventional threat to the German territory”<sup>384</sup>. Or again in 2011: “A direct territorial threat to Germany involving conventional military means remains an unlikely event”<sup>385</sup>. The message is therefore clear: Germany inhabits a region of peace and stability where security threats do not originate in its neighbours. This is proof of the existence of a strong European security community. This feeling of safety feeds into defence planning and force structures and led in 2011 to calls for a reduced force structure: “Since a direct conventional attack on German territory has become unlikely, the previous personnel strength that was exclusively reserved for such an event is no longer needed”<sup>386</sup>.

Germany has over the years produced a number of documents where important threats to the country are enumerated. The most extensive of such exercises was the one done for the 2006 White Paper and the threats cited there include globalisation and its consequences, terrorism, proliferation of weapons, regional conflicts, illegal arms trade, fragile states, threats to transportation routes, energy security, migratory flows, and pandemics<sup>387</sup>. None of those threats originate in other EU Member States. This is stated in the document itself: “The new risks and threats to Germany and Europe have their origin in regional and global developments, often far beyond the European area of stability”<sup>388</sup>. A similar list is provided in the 2011 Defence Policy Guidelines, the most recent formal German defence document used in this study. There Germany enumerates the following

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<sup>384</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien* [Defence Policy Guidelines (Berlin, 2003), 7.

<sup>385</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien* [Defence Policy Guidelines (Berlin, 2011), 1

<sup>386</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>387</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr*, [White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr] (Berlin, 2006), 17-20.

<sup>388</sup> *Ibid.*, 22.

“risks and threats”: failing and failed states, international terrorism, cyber attacks, pandemics, climate change and threats to the free use of the global commons<sup>389</sup>. These all lie beyond the borders of the EU, which for Germany “...stands for political stability, security and prosperity in Germany as well as its other member states”<sup>390</sup>.

It is important not to forget the theoretical significance of the fact that Germany, a country at the very heart of the European continent, and one of the clear protagonists of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century’s Concert of Europe, where fundamentally fearful states sought peace through balance of power politics, is today so at ease with its neighbours and so willing to share sovereignty with them. This is in historical terms a radically new situation that lies at the heart of German EU policy and of the country’s support for the emergence of CFSP/CSDP.

### **Strategic Overlap**

The content of the German Constitution is of fundamental importance when trying to understand the country’s policy towards Europe. This is so because the pillars upon which German policy has been built since the end of the Second World War were enshrined in the country’s Basic Law. One of those pillars was the forwarding of European integration, making the construction of a peaceful, democratic and united Europe Germany’s ultimate political goal. This ‘overlap of vocation’ or ‘convergence of destiny’ has led Germany to constantly support EU integration including on matters of security and defence.

The Germany born after the Second World War, and as described in the 1949 Basic Law approved in Bonn, had as its most important guiding policy objective to promote peace from within a united Europe. The first line of the Basic Law’s Preamble, located on the very first page of that document, reads as follows: “Conscious of their responsibility

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<sup>389</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *The Bundeswehr on Operations*, 2-3

<sup>390</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik*, 2006, 7.

before God and man, inspired by the determination to promote world peace *as an equal partner in a united Europe*, the German people, in the exercise of their constituent power, have adopted this Basic Law” (my emphasis)<sup>391</sup>. A “united Europe” means for Germany the furthering of integration within the EU. As specified in Article 23.1 of the Basic Law:

With a view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany shall participate in the development of the European Union that is committed to democratic, social and federal principles, to the rule of law, and to the principle of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of protection of basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law. To this end the Federation may transfer sovereign powers by a law with the consent of the Bundesrat (i.e. German Senate).<sup>392</sup>

What these two excerpts from the Constitution mean is that it is part of the post-1945 German ethos to pursue further European integration.

This European commitment, driven by a belief that European integration is Germany’s destiny, has been a constant in German policy since the late 1940s. It is repeated in numerous security documents like in the Defence Policy Guidelines of 2006; “Germany’s security is inseparably linked to the political development of Europe”<sup>393</sup>. And it was renewed as recently as 2013 when the CDU and the SPD laid down their coalition agreement, ratified by 504 members of parliament (out of 631), and which read: “The work of European unification remains Germany’s most important task”<sup>394</sup>. If one defines a security community as a space in which different units do not feel threatened by one another, then this expression of commitment to the construction of a common political project, including through the handing of sovereignty to supranational bodies, must surely be a strong indicator of the existence of one.

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<sup>391</sup> Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Preamble

<sup>392</sup> *Ibid.*, Art 23.1

<sup>393</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik*, 2006, 5.

<sup>394</sup> CDU/CSU and SPD, *Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten*, 2013, 101.

## Europe as a Solution

Germany perceives that strong interdependence is driving its need to cooperate with other European states on matters of security<sup>395</sup>. Germany has been very aware that most of its fundamental problems can only be tackled in coordination with other European nations, which is the very definition of interdependence. This was explicitly stated in the 1994 White Paper:

In the future, the lesson learned in Western Europe over the past decades will apply to the whole of Europe, namely that the resources available nationally are inadequate to solve the major political problems. In Europe, the classic responsibilities of the state - welfare, security and progress - can no longer be accomplished on a purely national basis, but require international cooperation.<sup>396</sup>

The 2005 CDU/CSU – SPD coalition agreement made abundant references to this effect. The sections of the agreement on security and defence began with a reflection about the fact that “Numerous domestic issues have to be resolved at a European level”<sup>397</sup>. But then the references just pour in page after page: “In order to combat the causes of migration, we want to step up and coordinate cooperation in all areas of policy with migrants’ states of origin and transit countries and support this course of action at the European level”, “the Federal Government is working towards a Europe-wide refugee policy”, “the Federal Government will call...for the EU visa information system planned for 2006 to be shaped accordingly”, “in the sphere of internal security, we will canvass for all Member States to participate in the successful cooperation under the Prüm Agreement<sup>398</sup>”, “the legislative

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<sup>395</sup> See for example: “Germany’s security is inextricably linked to political developments in Europe and throughout the world...Increased international integration in all areas is resulting in growing interdependence between states, which is increasingly affecting their respective security policies”. See: German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien*, 2011, 5.

<sup>396</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheit*, 1994, 16.

<sup>397</sup> CDU/CSU and SPD, *Gemeinsam für Deutschland*, 2005, 114.

<sup>398</sup> The Prüm Convention was a treaty signed in 2005 to step up cross border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism, crime and illegal immigration. Germany was among the original signatories together with Austria, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Spain. The Treaty is open to all of the members of the EU.

process to implement the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant<sup>399</sup> will be initiated as soon as the Government has been formed”, “we support the implementation of the European Security Strategy”<sup>400</sup>.

This way of seeing things has led to sustained and strong support in German strategic documents for further EU security and defence integration. Expressions to this effect are contained in strategic documents and in almost all of the country’s coalitions agreements since the 1990s. Examples include the 2002-2005 SPD-The Greens agreement where one can read the following: “We want CSDP to continue to develop. This includes increased integration of our armed forces and armaments industries, including through the pooling of skills...”<sup>401</sup>. Interviews conducted in Berlin for this dissertation confirmed that, indeed, German elites are very supportive of forwarding CFSP and CSDP.

### **A Privileged Partnership with France**

German strategic documents make constant references to the country’s privileged relationship with France. France is clearly placed at a slightly higher level than other European partners, particularly when it comes to defence cooperation. In his Foreword to the 1994 German White Paper, the then-Defence Minister Volker Rühe, said: “Together with the armed forces of France and other European countries, the Bundeswehr is the driving force behind the establishment of a European defence”<sup>402</sup>. Also in 1994 the Coalition agreement signed between the conservatives of the CSU led by Helmut Kohl and the liberals of the FDP established as their central European policy: “...to consolidate the European Union through the full application of the EU Treaty [Maastricht Treaty] and

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<sup>399</sup> The European Arrest Warrant is a pan-European arrest warrant that enables a Member State to request the arrest and transfer of a criminal from any other state of the Union. The European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision, which set the basic features of this tool, came into force in early 2004.

<sup>400</sup> CDU/CSU and SPD, *Gemeinsam für Deutschland*, 2005, 112-120.

<sup>401</sup> SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, *Erneuerung – Gerechtigkeit – Nachhaltigkeit*, 2002, 79.

<sup>402</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheit*, 1994, 2.

its provisions in internal and external affairs. Here, Franco-German cooperation will be a core element supporting the European integration process”<sup>403</sup>.

This special Franco-German relationship has consolidated over the years. A especially important milestone was the Élysée Treaty of 1963 that led to regular high level meetings between French and German policymakers. This Treaty remains important for German strategic planners today as indicated in the 2011 Defence Policy Guidelines: “Franco-German relations play a pivotal role owing to their special nature, underlined by the Élysée Treaty and their unique closeness”<sup>404</sup>. In the field of defence it is the Weimar Triangle initiative, launched in the early 1990s that has been the clearest manifestation of the Franco-German privileged partnership. Under the Weimar Triangle initiative both the Heads of Government and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany and Poland have met numerous times to discuss issues of security and defence policy. In German strategic documents the Weimar Triangle first comes up in the 2005 CDU-SPD coalition agreement: “German-French cooperation and the important momentum it creates remain vital and will serve the interest of our partners within the European Union...We intend to further intensify form of cooperation such as the Weimar Triangle”<sup>405</sup>, and is reiterated in the 2009 coalition agreement that brought together the CDU and the FDP to form the second Merkel government.

The truth of the matter is that no other EU state gets a more privileged treatment than France in German strategic planning. Not event he UK, which is the other large defence spender in Europe. When asked about the possibility of the UK leaving the EU Joaquim Spatz, a Liberal MP and at the time of the interview a Member of the Bundestag’s

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<sup>403</sup> CDU/CSU and FDP, *Koalitionsvereinbarung*, 1994.

<sup>404</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien*, 2011, 8.

<sup>405</sup> CDU/CSU and SPD, *Gemeinsam für Deutschland*, 2005, 121.

Defence Committee, provided an answer that illustrates the extent to which Germany's relationship with France is different to that which it has with Great Britain:

We keep it in mind [the possibility of the UK ceasing to be a member of the EU], but its not decisive. We have now launched the Weimar Initiative<sup>406</sup>. Now it's Weimar Plus Plus (Plus Spain, Plus Italy). That means it is five out of the six big countries in the European Union.<sup>407</sup>

What seems to be decisive for Germany in terms of defence is to keep a privileged partnership with France. The ultimate reason why this is significant is that Franco-German relations have historically been extremely difficult with a long list of conflicts between the two countries. The fact that since at least the end of the Cold War these two states have viewed each other as trusted partners has enabled the consolidation of the EU, and made CFSP/CSDP possible<sup>408</sup>.

## **Germany, External Shocks and the evolution of European Security and Defence**

It is clear from the section above that Germany is convinced it lives in a space of peace where force is no longer used to solve disagreements with neighbours. Threats to German security lie outside the bounds of the EU and the country wants to see the European integration project prosper. As we will see, this feeling of community has led Germany to turn to its European partners in search for common responses to common challenges. Just like France, Germany began that search with full conviction that a common approach would be better than one where EU states act alone. According to Germany collective action through the EU is better not only in collective terms but also in terms of the

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<sup>406</sup> The Weimar Initiative or Triangle is a cooperation initiative set up by France, Germany and Poland to work together on security and defence issues. Members of the Triangle meet in summits, at either the Heads of Government and State level, or the Foreign Ministers level.

<sup>407</sup> Interview with Joachim Spatz, Berlin, 19-04-2013

<sup>408</sup> The Franco-German relationship has of course been extensive and complex. The sections above seek only to portray its importance in German strategic thinking and the extent to which it contributed to Germany's perception of the community of trust and security it inhabits in Europe. For a extensive collection of excellent thought pieces on this relationship see the Franco-German Relations Program at the German Council on Foreign Relations: <https://dgap.org/en/think-tank/program/fr-de-relations>

interests of each individual state. This was stated in the country's 1992 Defence Policy Guidelines in the following way:

Political integration within the European Union is a prerequisite for a sustainable European security architecture. The Union does not only pursue unity, freedom and prosperity. It also allows for Europeans to uphold their interests and act together to defend them.<sup>409</sup>

The same idea was again reiterated in the 2003 Defence Policy Guidelines: "German security policy gains additional options for action in a unified Europe"<sup>410</sup>. Over time the EU has itself produced a number of strategy documents with German input and approval. Those documents, such as the 2003 European Security Strategy, are very much in line with German strategic thinking<sup>411</sup>.

However, and in stark contrast to France, Germany understood that although "[its] national interests can best be asserted in a capable European Union" and that "Europe can exert its influence most effectively if it speaks with one voice", that exercise required a "*constant conciliation of interests between all member states* as well as a culture of dialogue that permits open exchange..." (my emphasis)<sup>412</sup>. That exercise of conciliation of interests was mentioned numerous times during interviews in Berlin and it presupposes that there are indeed differences in strategic outlook across Member States. Those differences have become apparent through crises and the supranational negotiations that followed.

Since the late 1980s Germany itself suffered a number of significant external shocks or security crises. These shocks produced major shifts in the strategic landscape and affected important German strategic interests. Most shocks led to clear German calls for further EU security and defence integration, or to open support for EU leadership, and some seem to have produced different reactions in Germany and in some of the country's

<sup>409</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien*, 1992.

<sup>410</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien*, 2003, 7.

<sup>411</sup> See for example: "The ESS is in accord with the goals and interests of German security policy". See: German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik*, 2006, 34.

<sup>412</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik*, 2006, 33.

allies. Understanding how and why these differences came to be should help us have a better understanding of the apparently disordered process of EU integration in this field.

Four security crises have been particularly significant for Germany and for EU security policy. Here is a preliminary list with a brief note on the consequences of each crisis:

1. Collapse of the Soviet Union and Conflict in the Balkans: led to the re-unification of Germany, to German support for the development of CFSP and its inclusion in the Maastricht Treaty, and, lastly, to the first German missions abroad since the Second World War.
2. The Eurozone Crisis: a shock with a security dimension for Germany that led to further economic integration, particularly to the deepening of the European Monetary Union and the creation of a Banking Union.
3. Instability in the Sahel, Horn of Africa and the Southern Mediterranean: led to German calls for the EU to take the lead in cases where some of its major interests were affected, and to German opposition for European action in conflicts where Europe-wide interests were not at stake.
4. Ukraine Conflict: is leading to concerted German efforts to build a common European position including through the imposition of EU sanctions and the promotion of a high level dialogue with Russia.

The next pages will look at each of the cases delineated above, how they affected German security and their consequences.

### **The Collapse of the Soviet Union and Conflict in the Balkans**

The end of the Cold War had a truly transformative effect on Germany. It not only allowed for the re-unification of the country and the normalisation of relations with its Eastern neighbours but it also forced the start of a slow process of strategic definition: What would Germany's role be in this new Europe? Now that the existential threat of the Soviet Union had been banished what were Germany's interests and how could they best be forwarded? These were only some of the important questions that Germany faced in the 1990s. The most important of those questions was, however: what sort of power did Germany want to be? Bernd Weber the Speaker of the CDU-CSU Parliamentary Group's Working Group on Defence Policy said the following about that period in German history:

Until the early nineties, German strategic military thinking was strictly limited – limited to the inner German border – let's say to the Iron Curtain which divided Germany. Strategic thinking was made by the United States of America and others who dominated Germany since the end of the Second World War. In the 1990s we found ourselves in a new situation: an economically strong country, and militarily strong too. So with a certain military strength in this very uncertain time, and in an environment with countries with very difficult situations.<sup>413</sup>

For Weber the events of 1989 and the early 1990s in the Balkans marked a turning point for German strategic posture:

A form of re-education of Germany took place after the Second World War and mostly at the hands of the United States of America. That re-education basically said 'never again should a military operation be started from German soil'. And we were very reluctant to specify our national interests until the early nineties, until the change of the political security situation in Europe with the fall of the Iron Curtain. Still today we have difficulties doing that. Countries without such a traumatic history have no problem in saying 'Okay, these are my national interests'. The UK of course, France, Italy – they have no problems doing this. But we do.<sup>414</sup>

The end of the Cold War literally shocked the German political system into thinking about these issues, determining the country's interests and deciding whether to act when those interests were put at risk.

In parallel to the political debate about the role a re-unified Germany should play in European defence the 1990s saw the start of a long and intricate legal dispute about what

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<sup>413</sup> Interview with Bernd Weber, Berlin, 11-04-2013

<sup>414</sup> *Ibid.*,

the country was constitutionally allowed to do in this realm. Indeed, the crises of the period and the repeated requests for German support coming from European partners and NATO produced a heated debate about what the country's Constitution allowed the government to do, as well as how far its alliance commitments could go. When the ruling CDU/CSU suggested in the early 1990s that Germany should contribute assets to various ongoing operations, including UNMISOM II in Somalia, as well as NATO and WEU operations in the Balkans, other German political parties decided to take their opposition to the Constitutional Court. The decision of the Court regarding these matters came on the 14<sup>th</sup> of July 1994 and stated in no uncertain terms that Germany's Basic Law, particularly its articles 24, 59 and 87a, did not preclude it from acting with allies abroad as long as Bundestag approval had been procured. This decision set an important precedent as it opened the door to German contributions to WEU operations, and, later, EU ones. It also allowed Germany to participate in a wide range of operations, dissipating the notion that the country was an exclusively civilian actor. Most importantly, this decision and others that followed moved the debate on German security policy from the Constitutional Court to the Executive and to Parliament.

The German government was quick to begin laying down the new parameters of the country's security and defence, and it started by reaffirming Germany's commitment to Europe. The very first point of the country's 1994 White Paper reads: "Europe has now the historic opportunity to grow together into a free and unified continent"<sup>415</sup>. The end of the Cold War opened for Germany not only the possibility of national re-unification but also that of broader and deeper European integration.

However, the collapse of the Soviet Union also brought with it numerous security challenges, and many in areas of great importance to Germany: Central, Eastern and

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<sup>415</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheit*, 1994, 3.

South-Eastern Europe. The new democracies in this part of Europe were a source of both hope and of concern for Germany from the moment of their inception. In 1994 Chancellor Kohl expressed this in the clearest of terms: “Today, the most effective way of serving stability on our continent is to support the fledging democracies of Central, Eastern and South-eastern Europe”<sup>416</sup>. Those fledging democracies were facing very serious problems already in 1994, a reality addressed by Germany:

Europe is experiencing the simultaneity of integration and stability on the one hand and disintegration and instability on the other. While the complex system of interrelationships is being gradually deepened in the West, old ties are breaking up and new conflicts are breaking out in the East, even involving the use of brute force in some regions.<sup>417</sup>

It would be the Balkans where the greatest threats to European peace and stability would come from. In 1991 Croatia and Slovenia started their fight for independence from Yugoslavia. Before the decade was over Bosnia and Kosovo would follow suit. Germany was acutely aware of the challenge this process of disintegration posed: “Now that the East-West conflict has been overcome, historical conflicts that were suppressed under communist rule are breaking out again with a vengeance. As a result, civil wars, domestic and regional conflicts are once again possible in Europe”<sup>418</sup>. The implications of this new instability in Europe were numerous but for the EU the most important was that it called for the creation of a common security and defence capacity. This new capacity was to be born with full German support. Germany’s 1992 Defence Policy Guidelines had already stated that “every war or civil war in Europe has unacceptable consequences...To prevent this...requires above all a strong European crisis and conflict management capability. This includes the provision of appropriate military capabilities”<sup>419</sup>. In 1994 the German Ministry of Defence had insisted that:

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<sup>416</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheit*, 1994, 1.

<sup>417</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>418</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheit*, 1994, 20

<sup>419</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien*, 1992, 9.

...what is needed [to tackle these wars in Europe] is thus not only political measures to promote stability among neighbours throughout Europe and to prevent new regional arms races, but also, and above all, *a pronounced crisis and conflict management capability* (my emphasis).<sup>420</sup>

The fact that Germany was calling so clearly for a new crisis and conflict management capability meant, of course, that what was available at the time was not sufficient. This was a veiled criticism of NATO and, particularly, the WEU. The WEU, which was until the late 1990s the only exclusively-European security and defence organisation, had proved its limitations when it failed to tackle the various conflicts that erupted in the Western Balkans. According to German top strategic planners: “The tragedy in the former Yugoslavia illustrates that the states of Europe are not yet adequately prepared for, in particular, ethnically rooted war risks and domestic conflicts”<sup>421</sup>. In order to be well prepared for such conflicts in the future Germany believed that a security and defence capacity within the EU was needed. That would of course mean the development of CFSP/CSDP.

During the following decade the Balkans continued to be a source of concern for Germany, as well as a constant reminder of the need for Europeans to do more together in the region<sup>422</sup>. In 2005 the incoming German government led by Angela Merkel made its priorities clear in the coalition agreement between the CDU and the SPD, and insisted once again in the centrality of the Balkans: “Germany has a vital interest in the permanent stabilisation of the western Balkans”<sup>423</sup>. This has now been a constant in German security and defence policy: for two decades instability in the Balkans negatively affects German interests and calls for action; that action in turn should be undertaken under the EU umbrella.

<sup>420</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheit*, 1994, 20.

<sup>421</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>422</sup> In 2003 and after a number of years of European engagement in the region Germany thought that further common action in the Balkans was required: “The persistently unstable security situation in the Balkans continues to call for special commitments to be made by the European nations” See: German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien*, 2003, 6.

<sup>423</sup> CDU/CSU and SPD, *Gemeinsam für Deutschland*, 2005, 128.

Given the above one should not be surprised by the impact the end of the Cold War had on German security policy and by how its consequences, particularly the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, led the country to support the emergence of a strong security and defence capacity at the EU level. Germany was not only a strong supporter of the Maastricht Treaty that led to the birth of CFSP, but also a pivotal player in the launch of CSDP, which, as many interviewees of this thesis said, materialised in the Cologne European Council of 1999 during the German Presidency of the EU. German participation in the first CSDP operations, most of which were launched in the Balkans in the early and mid-2000s was also noteworthy. Germany made contributions to the EU operations Concordia in FYROM, launched in 2003, and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina, launched in 2004, as well to the various civilian operations in the region<sup>424</sup>.

That Germany found so many willing partners in other EU states to act decisively in the Balkans was a consequence of the fact that many saw a clear interest in seeing stability return to the region. There was at the time of Maastricht and in the years that followed a clear consensus in Europe that all Member States had a direct interest in putting an end to the security crisis in the Balkans and that the best way to do so was through the creation of strong EU institutions that could take on the challenge.

### **The Eurozone Crisis**

One of the main theoretical arguments of this dissertation is that it was through shocks and crises that Europe moved forward with security and defence integration. Those shocks revealed the level of strategic interest overlap across EU Member States as well as the attractiveness of furthering integration and of acting together. What is interesting is that in

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<sup>424</sup> According to a study by the European Union Institute for Security Studies Germany was one of the most active contributors of personnel to early CSDP operations, particularly in the case of Althea launched in Bosnia and to which Germany assigned 1242 troops, more than three times the French contribution. See: Grevi, Helly and Keohane *European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, 414.

the case of Germany, many referred to the Eurozone crisis as a security challenge. This had to do with Germany's history and with the fact that since the Second World War, European integration has been an integral part of German foreign policy. For Germany a stable and united Europe is a central security policy objective. Anything that threatens that unity is, therefore, a security challenge. This is precisely how Karl Kaiser, the Director of the Program on Transatlantic Relations at Harvard University and a former Director of the German Council on Foreign Relations, defined the launch of the Euro from the German perspective:

The creation of the Euro and the concomitant abandonment of the dominant position of the Deutsche Mark was very much seen in terms of continuing the process of Europe's political integration. *Chancellor Kohl even argued that the Euro is necessary to prevent the recurrence of war in Europe.* During the later Eurozone crises German behavior was very much shaped by the conviction that without the Euro Europe would fail, a development totally unacceptable to Germany as contrary to a central element of its national interest (my emphasis).<sup>425 426</sup>

The economic crisis Europe went through in the period running from 2007 to, at least, 2014, produced such internal instability in EU Member States that many in Germany thought it had security implications. The FDP Parliamentary group adviser Jorn Hassler was one of those people:

What is the frame of German security policy? What is the basic tenet of a liberal security policy?...Obviously this is not military alone. Its much larger today. It is foremost to get under control the financial crisis of Europe. Because in Cyprus or in Greece or in Spain or Portugal, what you have are instabilities within sound democratic communities if the welfare is in danger...That is the reason why we said: "ok the priority that Germany gives to solve the Euro crisis is an active part to solve a security problem for Europe also".<sup>427</sup>

The financial crisis also had a strong domestic security dimension in Germany as it impacted economic growth and ultimately led to reduced resources to be directed to defence spending. Admiral Thorsten Kähler, Director of Security Policy at Germany's Federal Ministry of Defence, described this in the following terms:

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<sup>425</sup> Interview with Karl Kaiser, Cambridge MA, 15-03-2015

<sup>426</sup> Hartmut Mayer, a German academic, seems to agree, as in his eyes recent developments linked to the Eurozone crisis are a real threat to the otherwise very successful European reconciliation process and therefore to the sustainability of the European security community: See: Hartmut Mayer, "Thinking in Time: War Memories, post-War Responsibilities and Regional Co-operation in Europe and Asia," 150.

<sup>427</sup> Interview with Jorn Hasler, Berlin, 10-04-2013

What I see is that, especially when I look to Germany, ‘military’ is one dimension of our understanding of security. That means it’s not *the* dimension...We see that we have to maintain a credible military. That is clear. But on the other hand we see that the Euro has to be saved. If we do not succeed in saving the Euro it will have consequences for our economy. Not only on the German economy but also on all the European economies in the long run. The amount of tax we can get, the amount of money the government can spend depends on economic growth.  
<sup>428</sup>

As anticipated in the Introduction of this thesis the argument could be made that the definition of what falls under the rubric of security has been expanding in parallel to growing globalisation and interdependence across states. German strategic documents are full of references to the fact that internal and external security, or domestic and external action, are now one and the same thing. For Germany, however, these internal problems of Europe are particularly worrying. Jorn Hassler explained at length the origin of Germany’s ‘inner thinking’ or the country’s obsession with European continental security:

The strength of this ‘inner thinking’ of Germany has its origins in our history. When we became one nation we started two wars in Europe. If you have a look at the strategic planning for the first or second world wars you see that its not only inner centric, but Euro centric...We were a pure continental power...focussed on just ourselves and Europe. After the drama of the Second World War where our country did terrible things and ended in shambles, we said that our peace and democracy laid in Europe. Peace in Europe is essential for us. That explains the strategic thinking in Germany. The priority for us is the Euro Crisis and not Mali <sup>429 430</sup>.

Hassler later insisted:

We have a vital interest in the stability of Europe. In the beginning a united Europe was for the French and the British a way to bind Germany and to keep us all close. For us [Germans] its more like a guarantee of our freedom and liberty and of peace. For us it is a vital interest. We see Europe threatened by the economic crisis. It is our first priority to solve that. <sup>431</sup>

Interestingly, German policy during the Eurozone crisis has not departed significantly from the theoretical propositions of this thesis. European Member States having been hit by an economic crisis have met and tried to arrive at a common solution. In those conversations it became apparent that European states had a shared interest in solving the crisis and that the cost of not tackling the issue in a coordinated manner was extremely

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<sup>428</sup> Interview with Thorsten Kähler, Berlin 12-04-2013

<sup>429</sup> Hassler is referring here to the security crisis in Mali in 2013, when Islamist militants threatened to topple the Government.

<sup>430</sup> Interview with Jorn Hasler, Berlin, 10-04-2013

<sup>431</sup> *Ibid.*

high. Although no specific figures were ever provided it was clear since the beginning of negotiations on the Eurozone crisis that a possible breakup of the Monetary Union would be extremely costly for all parties<sup>432</sup>. Germany has been willing to provide financial resources to shore up the finances of other Euro members and has accepted the creation of new EU institutions to deal with bank regulation, supervision and resolution. Numerous interviewees of this thesis seemed to agree that there was indeed strong parallelism between developments in monetary, banking and fiscal integration and that in security and defence. Joaquim Spatz, a liberal MP, had the following to say about this:

Europe can only take steps if there is pressure from outside. A crisis is needed to move forward, like the financial crisis, which is leading us to more financial cooperation. Maybe we need a crisis like that in the foreign and defence field to be able to do on the ground what we in our minds know we should be doing.<sup>433</sup>

Ulrich Finkebusch, an advisor to the FDP's parliamentary group, commented on the extent to which going from crisis to crisis had kept EU leaders focused on finding better ways to cooperate and integrate policies. This was particularly true of the Eurozone crisis:

I think right now we're stumbling from one crisis to the next. From Portugal to Cyprus, back to Portugal, to Spain to Italy. It's a different country every month. This keeps people so busy on the top level that yes we might need a crushing defeat or a crushing catastrophe at some point to really ring the bell on us.<sup>434</sup>

When asked about the apparent need for crises if Europe is to forward integration, Admiral Kähler said:

Crises, despite the fact that I don't want any, have sometimes pushed developments. I think the money umbrella for the Euro would not have been installed without a crisis so there is some bitter truth in that: A crisis always fosters development.<sup>435</sup>

Kähler later commented: "Europe is evolutionary and revolutionary; ideas come up with external pressure"<sup>436</sup>. At this point, Bjoern Seibert, at the time a Desk Office at the

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<sup>432</sup> Manuel Muniz and Jose Carlos Alcazar, "The European Dilemma: the Monetary Union and the Road Ahead," *Politics in Spires*, 2 May, 2012, accessed 20/03/2015, <http://politicsinspires.org/the-european-dilemma-the-monetary-union-and-the-road-ahead/>

<sup>433</sup> Interview with Joachim Spatz, Berlin, 19-04-2013

<sup>434</sup> Interview with Ulrich Finkebusch, Berlin, 10-04-2013

<sup>435</sup> Interview with Thorsten Kähler, Berlin 12-04-2013

<sup>436</sup> *Ibid.*

Defence Ministry's CSDP Branch, and present during the interview with Admiral Kähler added:

You cannot take decisions at the national level any more because you do not have the capability. Through crises you are forced to think about what you can do. If you think about the Eurozone crisis: none of the institutional developments would have taken place if we had been able to manage its consequences individually [at a national level].<sup>437</sup>

In the case of the Eurozone crisis, a situation perceived as a security shock by some European states led to further economic integration. And, although it must be noted that there were strong and persistent arguments made throughout the Eurozone crisis about the economic logic of further integration<sup>438</sup>, security considerations seem to have played a role in the thinking of German policymaking elites. What this small case illustrates is that security shocks can actually lead to integration in fields normally considered non-security such as banking supervision. It also points to the blurring of the distinction between 'security' and 'non-security' shocks. If rioting in Athens is a direct source of concern for Germany and therefore an element to take into account when designing Eurozone institutions and policy, then we have effectively witnessed a case of a security shock producing integration in a 'civilian' area of government. If the argument suggested in this thesis is correct then such crises will lead to supranational discussions regarding how to best tackle them and, if sufficient EU states are affected, to the furthering of integration<sup>439</sup>.

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<sup>437</sup> Interview with Bjoern Seibert, Berlin 12-04-2013

<sup>438</sup> Manuel Muniz and Jose Carlos Alcazar, "The European Dilemma: the Monetary Union and the Road Ahead".

<sup>439</sup> Another process of this nature that seems to be underway is that of the development of the Energy Union. It seems, from a preliminary analysis of developments on that front that the overdependence on Russian gas by certain EU Member States, mostly the Baltics and Eastern European countries, has led them to call for a deepening of energy interconnectedness within the UE, which would in turn provide greater guarantees to their energy supply. If this issue moves forward it will have been yet another case of a security shock, the re-ordering of relations with Russia in light of the Ukraine crisis, leading to integration in a 'non-security' field: energy infrastructure and markets.

**Instability in the Sahel, Horn of Africa and the Southern Mediterranean**

Germany has been accused numerous times of not supporting the efforts of other European states in the Southern Mediterranean, the Sahel or in Africa more broadly. The charge is that there is a lack of German willingness to act or to take on the natural responsibilities of an important EU partner. This has led, the argument goes, to German opposition to various CSDP operations in the region, a lack of support for the ones that were actually launched and a general disengagement from African affairs. In broader terms this lack of support is caused by German unwillingness to construct a truly strong EU security and defence actor, and has therefore condemned CSDP to smaller peacekeeping and civilian operations<sup>440</sup>.

There could be some truth to the claims above, particularly regarding German participation in CSDP operations in Africa. German contributions to CSDP missions in the region have been consistent and not insignificant but they have never reached the scale of those of countries like France or even Spain. Plus, when Germany has led in this region it has not been without controversy. In 2006 the German government agreed to provide the OHQ for CSDP operation EUFOR DRC, deployed in Congo under a UN mandate and with the objective of providing stability during the electoral process underway there. When news of this arrived from Brussels they produced a huge uproar in Germany. Some of the French officers interviewed for this thesis and involved in the launch of the mission remembered the controversy generated by what in their eyes was an important but nonetheless modest contribution on the part of Germany to a soft peacekeeping mission. General Bentégeat, who at the time of the launch of EUFOR DRC was the Head of the

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<sup>440</sup> See Chapter 4 on France for quotes to this effect coming from Paris.

French Armed Forces and who would in November of 2006 become Chairman of the EU's Military Committee, had the following to say about this:

When President Chirac convinced Angela Merkel to take the lead in Congo in 2006 the reaction in Berlin was incredible. The news was like a bombshell hitting the German military: 'The French have succeeded in putting this burden on us! They want to use us for their colonial activities there' they said<sup>441</sup>.

Admiral Kähler confirmed that indeed that decision caused a great stir in Germany:

I remember a discussion about our operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo when we tried to stabilize the situation in the capital around the time of the election campaign. We provided the OHQ and we provided some forces on the ground and so there were people in Africa for a limited time. It was a high debate about what should we do in Africa.<sup>442</sup>

General Bentégeat found the reaction disproportionate, and the allegations coming from Berlin that France supported the mission in Congo due to postcolonial interests unfair:

This was absolutely not true. When it comes to Congo France has almost nothing in terms of cooperation and absolutely no economic interest, which is not true for other countries like the UK, Belgium or Canada. Congo was a UN triggered mission.<sup>443</sup>

In 2011 and 2013 two crises in Africa forced Europeans to once again discuss possible avenues for common action in the region. In 2011 UN Security Council Resolution 1973 had called for the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya in an attempt to prevent further civilian casualties in the conflict between the Gadhafi regime and the popular uprising that had begun earlier that year. Of particular worry to the international community was the situation of Benghazi, a rebel city surrounded by Gadhafi forces. Germany was not only one of the five UN Security Council members that abstained from voting in favour of Resolution 1973, together with China, Russia, India and Brazil, but it also quickly became apparent that the country was unwilling to see EU capabilities and structures used during the allied intervention that followed. This set Germany in clear opposition to France and the UK, who had sponsored the UN's Resolution and were

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<sup>441</sup> Interview with Henri Bentégeat, Paris 03-07-2012

<sup>442</sup> Interview with Thorsten Kähler, Berlin 12-04-2013

<sup>443</sup> Interview with Henri Bentégeat, Paris 03-07-2012

pushing for swift action in Libya. Ultimately it was NATO that took the responsibility of implementing UNSCR Resolution 1973 with the EU only agreeing on a smaller humanitarian assistance mission to be deployed at a later stage<sup>444</sup>.

In 2013, in turn, European states were faced with the threat of the toppling of the Malian government by Tuareg insurgents. This Islamist insurgency had taken hold in the north of the country and was fast advancing towards the capital, Bamako. UNSC Resolution 2085 of December 2012 called for swift action to help restore Mali's constitutional order and territorial integrity. The UN called for African Union (AU) and Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) ownership of operations but the Malian government asked France for further assistance in January of 2013. At the time of that request the EU had two Battlegroups with German, Polish and French components on standby. French worries about the necessary speed at which the intervention had to be agreed upon and executed, together with overall German reluctance to participate in the mission led to France taking the lead outside the EU framework. In the end French operation Serval was launched in early January 2013 with support from other European states, including Germany. Building consensus around a strong EU intervention in Mali had not been possible. The French Defence Minister at the time, Jean-Yves Le Drian said the following on the record:

The President of Mali requested our help on the 10th of January [2013]. The decision to intervene was taken on the 11th at 12:30; I was there. Our forces began to arrive at 17:00 that day. What would you have done? Consult the 27 [Member States]? All of that is blah blah blah from the opposition. 150 years will have to pass before the Europe of Defence has the capacity to act swiftly. Europe would need a united government, a European parliament and a common military authority. I do not know if we will ever see that.<sup>445</sup>

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<sup>444</sup> That mission was called EUFOR Libya and was officially approved by the European Council in April of 2011 although it was never formally deployed. In 2013 the EU launched EUBAM Libya, a small civilian CSDP operation aimed at helping with border protection efforts.

<sup>445</sup> Michel Cabirol, "Mali : 'quand l'Europe de la Défense aura la capacité d'intervenir immédiatement, ce sera dans 150 ans !' (Le Drian)," *La Tribune*, (7 February, 2013), accessed 19/04/2015, <http://www.latribune.fr/entreprises-finance/industrie/aeronautique-defense/20130207trib000747460/mali-quand-l-europe-de-la-defense-aura-la-capacite-d-intervenir-immEDIATEMENT-ce-sera-dans-150-ans-le-drian.html>

Despite the accusations against Germany of incapacity to act decisively in Mali or in Africa more broadly, the empirical research developed for this thesis suggests that German policy is actually coherent and tightly connected to the lack of national interests in that area of the world. A close look at German strategy actually shows that the country has repeatedly stated that its security priorities do not lie in Northern Africa. This was true in 1994 when the country's White Paper said:

Germany is not impacted by all risks to the same extent. Its security is directly affected by how the situation in Central, Eastern and South-eastern Europe develops. It is indirectly affected by unstable conditions in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and South-western Asia.<sup>446</sup>

This assessment of threats coming from Africa had not changed in 2006. When the new White Paper was published that year it listed all the partners with whom Germany wanted to build closer ties in order to promote security; Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia, the broader Middle East, Israel, the Asia-Pacific region, Japan and China were all mentioned before any reference to Africa is made<sup>447</sup>. This is not a random occurrence but rather a pattern in German strategic thought. It had already happened in 2005 when the coalition agreement between the CDU and the SPD, which produced the first Merkel government, listed all non-EU partners with whom Germany wanted to strengthen relations. After Russia and Ukraine came a long list that included Israel, countries in the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America. Only then was Africa cited and only in passing. Although the agreement did admit that “developments in our neighbouring continent of Africa confront us with important humanitarian tasks and affect our strategic and political interests”<sup>448</sup>, it was evident that that part of the world was not a priority for German security, or at least not as central as it was to French, Spanish or other European states' planning.

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<sup>446</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheit*, 1994, 28.

<sup>447</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik*, 2006, 47-49.

<sup>448</sup> CDU/CSU and SPD, *Gemeinsam für Deutschland*, 2005, 129.

In 2013 the coalition agreement between Angela Merkel's Christian Democrats and Peer Steinbrück's Social Democrats captured the long-held German belief that the EU as a whole should be engaged as little as possible in conflicts outside its neighbourhood:

We want joint European deployments for upholding and reinforcing Europe's security to be predominantly carried out within our geographical neighbourhood. Deployments outside this neighbourhood should increasingly be transferred to regional partners and organisations, such as the African Union, ECOWAS or the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).<sup>449</sup>

This not only makes it clear that Germany is unwilling to see the EU act in far away places like East Asia, but also that the Middle East and Africa are beyond what the country sees as Europe's 'neighbourhood'. Those are areas where Germany would agree to back small-scale intervention but always as long as there is abundant input from local partners.

Germans interviewed for this thesis limited the possibility of significant German engagement in Africa to very serious security threats, in particular to those linked to terrorism. Bernd Weber a senior conservative MP and an expert on security and defence matters said on this issue:

Our interests are limited to preventing North African terrorist groups from reaching Europe. This is our common interest, not only Germany's but also Italy's, France's or anyone else's. It is in everyone's interest to keep terrorists on the other side of the Mediterranean sea.<sup>450</sup>

Such a constricted policy in Africa puts Germany at odds with some of its EU colleagues. This is particularly the case regarding those that have numerous interests in the region or that border the Mediterranean. In Paris, Madrid or Rome the alarms will have gone off well before Germany is concerned with developments in places like Mali or Chad. Germans themselves are quite aware of this, particularly those that have had direct experience of military action in the region like Admiral Kähler who had the following to say:

I operated in the Mediterranean during the second half of last year [2012], commanding a NATO force there. I was clearly confronted with all the problems of that area and how they

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<sup>449</sup> CDU/CSU and SPD, *Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten*, 2013, 108.

<sup>450</sup> Interview with Bernd Weber, Berlin, 11-04-2013

look from the French perspective, or the Spanish perspective, or the Italian...Some EU states see the problems stemming from developments in North Africa very clearly.<sup>451</sup>

For many German policymakers French insistence on intervention in Africa and on tailoring CSDP to the needs of that region of the world is a policy mostly driven by two factors. The first is strong French national interest in Africa, mostly linked to the country's history. That is what Bernd Weber said during our interview in Berlin in 2013:

I think the French approach to European defence policy is mainly directed or concentrated on the African continent. They have a colonial past, a history there. We, however, have had a very low profile in Africa and a very short colonial history...In my opinion they want to use European Union military operations to solve problems they created decades ago. And this is also part of the thinking in Italy regarding Ethiopia or the Horn of Africa, or of Belgium and the UK, which also have a colonial past.<sup>452</sup>

The second is a lack of resources on the part of France (and others) to act unilaterally, and a desire to unload that burden onto other EU partners. There were numerous references during interviews in Berlin to how other EU partners want to be active players in the field of security and defence but then have Germany pay. This is particularly worrying for Germans, specifically regarding France because they see how such a practice could lead to them picking up the bill for interventions in which they had no interest in the first place.

German lack of desire for intervention in Africa is therefore a consequence of the country's reduced strategic interests in that region, and of the suspicion generated by calls for action that come from partners that have had a much longer history and presence there. The Mali case is particularly useful in demonstrating this because on a superficial analysis it seems to display the ideal characteristics for an EU intervention: a humanitarian and state capacity problem in need of a 'comprehensive approach' in a country not far away from the Mediterranean. However, a deeper look at developments on the ground shows that discussions surrounding Mali laid bare the cleavages that have made robust joint EU action in Africa so rare.

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<sup>451</sup> Interview with Thorsten Kähler, Berlin 12-04-2013

<sup>452</sup> Interview with Bernd Weber, Berlin, 11-04-2013

When asked why Germany had refused to support the launch of an EU mission in Mali in 2013 Bernd Weber said:

The French had certainly some other issues to consider [when deciding how to tackle the situation in Mali] – the uranium mines in Niger<sup>453</sup> and the French citizens living in the region. These are certainly reasons to intervene from a French point of view, but it cannot be that the French alone decide when they want to intervene and all the others have to follow.<sup>454</sup>

The issue of the French uranium mines in the region kept on coming up in interviews in Berlin. A high-ranking Chancellery official had the following to say about it:

Lets talk about Mali. Is the protection of the Uranium mines a European interest? Is it a German interest to defend French Uranium mines in Niger? No. Its not our political goal. But, is it a German interest to defend against terrorism that could also reach Germany? Yes. So, we supported the French in Mali<sup>455</sup> not because we believe uranium is going to be important for our energy simply, which we don't, but because terrorism concerns all of us.<sup>456</sup>

Concerns about a potential terrorist attack coming from an Islamist-controlled Mali are not as pressing as those produced by the need to protect pockets of expatriated population from an armed militia or to keep essential economic interests safe from acts of sabotage or theft. This was very evident when talking to French and German policymakers about the intervention in Mali. For the French it was essential to provide security and stability there, particularly in Bamako. For many German policymakers however, the fall of Mali would have consequences that they could probably live with. Jorn Hasler, and FDP parliamentary advisor on security and defence said the following during our interview:

What if the intervention in Mali had not happened? Mali would have perhaps been lost to the Islamists. Would that have been an immediate security danger for Europe? We had briefings from our services that said these were regional issues that if left alone would become bigger problems...but not in the next few weeks because they [meaning the Islamists] also had to stabilise things.<sup>457</sup>

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<sup>453</sup> Weber was referring here to French mining interests in Niger, mainly the Uranium mines in the towns Arlit and Akokan, some 900 kilometers north east of the capital Niamey and currently exploited by French state-owned company Areva. Areva's two mines in the region, exploited by its subsidiaries SOMAIR and COMINAK, are some of the most important sources of uranium for the French civilian and military nuclear industries.

<sup>454</sup> Interview with Bernd Weber, Berlin, 11-04-2013

<sup>455</sup> The official was referring here to German contributions to French Operation Serval. Germany helped with the transportation of equipment to Bamako, air-to-air refueling as well as by providing engineering and medical support staff.

<sup>456</sup> Interview with German Chancellery official (not for attribution), Berlin, 19-04-2013

<sup>457</sup> Interview with Jorn Hasler, Berlin, 10-04-2013

The fact that France has interests in Africa that are deeper or more significant than those of Germany does not mean that it should simply allow for those interests to be hindered. Germans were understanding and supportive of French desire for action in Africa. Intervention in Africa is no longer a zero sum game for European states as it was for centuries. In the case of Mali one party was not trying to prevent the other from acting; the disagreement originated, quite simply, in the unwillingness of one country to act in a circumstance the other thought required common action.

Germany is indeed quite comfortable allowing others to take the lead in places such as Mali. Admiral Kähler summarized this succinctly:

Some nations have to take the lead. France fortunately has taken the lead in Mali and others were able to follow. I have no problem if somebody takes the lead and others follow a bit later, but we don't want for the leader to turn and say "where are the others?".<sup>458</sup>

Jorn Hassler phrased this in a similar way:

Of course we did not criticise the French mission because France has 6,000 living people in Mali and it had to intervene. It also had the means to be quick and to go in and stop the invasion from the South...That was ok for us because France was leading and because they had the interests in Mali. Or rather, they had more interests than we did.<sup>459</sup>

Germany was not only willing to let the French take the lead in Mali but also supported a smaller EU mission, EUTM Mali, launched there in February of 2013 with the aim of training the Malian security forces. Germany was the third largest contributor of military personnel to that EU operation after France and Spain. That mission had contributions from close to two-dozen EU Member States and proved that certain types of action, in certain areas and with certain goals, can truly garner Europe-wide support. As revealed by Markus Woelke, at the time of the interview the Deputy Head of the CSDP Division at the German Foreign Office: "The EU's mission in Mali would have been launched even if a French operation had not been launched in advance...My first proposal to do something

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<sup>458</sup> Interview with Thorsten Kähler, Berlin 12-04-2013

<sup>459</sup> Interview with Jorn Hasler, Berlin, 10-04-2013

with the French in Mali was in May. May last year [2012]...”<sup>460</sup>. What this suggests is that France’s Operation Serval was simply too ambitious to be of interest to other EU partners. Very few shared France’s urgency or its assessment of the significance of the threat for Europe. EUTM Mali seemed to fit the overall European perception much better and to protect the general EU interest more appropriately. Had the national interests of more EU Member States been similar to those of France, for example with many European states having large numbers of citizens living in Bamako, we would have probably seen a much more forceful EU reaction, perhaps similar to EU engagement in the Balkans. Instead, we saw a French Operation of a scale and force that allowed for the protection of French interests and in parallel a more modest but more widely supported EU state capacity-building mission.

The point made above is central to this thesis: EU action is possible in areas where there are shared interests that need protection. Shocks or security crises that threaten those interests have produced common reactions, the development of new institutions and in general terms a deepening of security and defence integration. If a shock affects EU states disproportionately what the Malian case shows is that the most affected state(s) will have to act outside the EU framework. Other German contributions to CSDP development and action in Africa have been quite consistent with this narrative. As Jorn Hasler pointed out: “We [Germans] do our thing in the European training mission in Mali<sup>461</sup> and we are also engaged in Somalia<sup>462</sup>. We *are* already engaged in the region...Germany is now at the core of CSDP”<sup>463</sup>. Germany is indeed quite active in Africa but in the areas it considers important. The protection of trading routes is, for example, a key German interest. The

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<sup>460</sup> Interview with Markus Woelke, Berlin, 04-04-2013

<sup>461</sup> Hasler is referring here to UTM Mali.

<sup>462</sup> Hasler is again referring here to EUNAVFOR Atalanta and to the EU’s Training Mission in Somalia (UTM Somalia), launched in 2010 with the aim of training Somali security forces. Germany has contributed to both mission with personnel and financial resources.

<sup>463</sup> Interview with Jorn Hasler, Berlin, 10-04-2013

country sees itself as a trading powerhouse with an economy that is very dependent on free trade: “Germany, whose economic prosperity depends on access to raw materials, goods and ideas, has an elementary interest in peaceful competition of thoughts and views, an open world trade system and unrestricted transportation routes”<sup>464</sup>. This made it easy for Germany to back EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EUCAP Nestor as well as other missions that are aimed at tackling the origins of piracy in the Horn of Africa. In the case of the various missions aimed at building Somali state capacity and as indicated by Admiral Kähler: “We [meaning Germany] are there to stabilise Somalia because that is in our own interest...”<sup>465</sup>.

The various cases of actual, as well as failed, EU intervention in Africa help reinforce the theoretical propositions of this thesis. Security crises in Africa have led affected EU states to suggest the Europeanization of responses to them. That has, in turn, produced supranational negotiations where the strategic interest overlap of EU states was put to the test. EU Member States have on the whole expressed concern about crises in Northern Africa spilling over into Europe, particularly through terrorist networks aiming to carry out attacks on European soil. Missions aimed at capacity building there have therefore garnered wide-ranging support. Similarly, missions aimed at reducing piracy off the Horn of Africa, a real threat to the trade routes that feed European markets that run through the Strait of Oman, and the Suez Canal, have also received significant support from EU states. Other operations, whose speed, scale and forcefulness are justified by the need to protect interests different from those shared by a multiplicity of EU states have been far less successful in getting support from Union partners.

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<sup>464</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik*, 2006, 17.

<sup>465</sup> Interview with Thorsten Kähler, Berlin 12-04-2013

**Ukraine Conflict**

In late February of 2014 a wave of anti-government protests in Ukraine led to the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovich. That popular movement, the Euromaidan, opposed measures by the President to weaken ties with the EU and, in particular, the freezing of the negotiations for a Ukraine-EU Association agreement. Instability in Eastern Ukraine followed the collapse of the government. Of particular intensity was the unrest in Crimea, where the regional Parliament called for a referendum on independence from Ukraine and on subsequently joining Russia to be held on the 16<sup>th</sup> of March. Official results claimed a majority had voted in favour of interdependence, which ultimately led to the accession of Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation on the 18<sup>th</sup> of March. That same month saw the start of armed opposition to the new Ukrainian central government in the eastern region of Donbas. Armed conflict ensued with numerous casualties on both sides and allegations by the Ukrainian government of Russian active support for the separatists.

Events in Ukraine are chronologically very close to the time of writing of this thesis. Any analysis produced here is therefore dependent on information from primary sources, mostly press reports, and of new interviews conducted for this section of the dissertation. Although this makes the findings less robust it is extremely important that developments in Eastern Europe since 2014 are accounted for in a thesis about European security and defence. It is also appropriate that the country perspective used to look at events in Ukraine is that of Germany. Germany is one of the EU Member State most affected by developments there, and it is Germany's reaction to them that will determine whether CFSP/CSDP emerges with more or less strength out of this.

When trying to understand Germany's reactions to developments of 2014 and 2015 in Eastern Europe it is important to remember that maintaining good relations with Russia has been central to German strategic planning for decades. Ever since the end of the Cold

War German strategic documents have insisted on the importance of Russia and the need to both help in its transition to democracy and treat it as a partner. This was the case in 1994 when Germany's first post-Cold War White Book said:

The success of this [Russian] domestic reforms and the incorporation of Russia into the overall European system are major challenges facing the international community... Good Russo-German relations are an important element for the future European system of security and stability.<sup>466</sup>

Relations with Russia were central to the various coalition agreements signed by German governments in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Both governments headed by Gerhard Schroeder were constructed on coalitions that had expressed a genuine desire to build good relations with Russia. The 1998 SPD-The Greens agreement said: "The partnership with Russia, which is institutionalised in the NATO-Russia Council, is to be further developed and strengthened in the interest of European security"<sup>467</sup>. Its 2002 successor spoke of wanting to use "the European Union, the Atlantic Alliance and the G8 to develop a robust and sustainable security partnership with Russia"<sup>468</sup>. In the 2006 White Paper, approved during Angela Merkel's first mandate as Chancellor, Russia also figured prominently with Germany calling for the strengthening of the NATO-Russia Council and the reinforcement of the spirit of dialogue between the two parties.

Stability in Ukraine has also been particularly important for Germany. In the early 1990s Ukrainian independence from the Soviet Union was seen by Germany as a turning point for East European geopolitics:

In Eastern Europe, a new regional power has come into existence in the shape of Ukraine. By virtue of its size, location, and its economic and military potential, it will have an influence on the development of security and stability in Central Eastern Europe and beyond. The Federal Government considers a democratic, economically sound and independent Ukraine to be a factor of European stability.<sup>469</sup>

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<sup>466</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheit*, 1994, 17.

<sup>467</sup> SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, *Aufbruch und Erneuerung*, 1998.

<sup>468</sup> SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, *Erneuerung – Gerechtigkeit – Nachhaltigkeit*, 2002.

<sup>469</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheit*, 1994, 17.

By 2006 Germany was formally speaking of deepening dialogue with Ukraine, including through NATO, where accession was being discussed:

NATO has maintained a special partnership with Ukraine since the conclusion of the NATO-Ukraine Charter in 1997. This partnership is an important contribution to supporting the country's defence sector reforms and its political transformation. The main fields of cooperation are laid down in the 2002 NATO-Ukraine Action Plan. Since 2005, the Alliance members and Ukraine have been conducting an intensified dialogue on accession issues.<sup>470</sup>

Membership of Ukraine in the EU was another issue that Germany has been willing to consider since the mid-2000s. Although EU accession is not formally suggested in German strategic documents it is evident in all of them that at the very least a privileged partnership with Ukraine is desired. In the 2005 coalition agreement between the CDU and the SPD the following was stated: "We are committed to implementing the path towards deepening and strengthening relations between the EU and Ukraine set out in the EU action plan adopted on 21 February 2005"<sup>471</sup>. We are in favour of Ukraine finding its place in Europe"<sup>472</sup>.

Given the theoretical propositions of this thesis one would expect Germany to be hit particularly hard by events in Ukraine of 2014 and 2015, and to turn almost by default to its EU partners in an attempt to build a common response. It seems that indeed that was what Germany did. Since early 2014 the German government has been a central player in the building of a European consensus around how to tackle the situation in Ukraine and how to deal with Russia. The imposition of a series of EU sanctions on Russia, at first as a reaction to the annexation of Crimea and later as a consequence of perceived continued Russian support for the Donbas separatists, shows the degree to which Germany has been successful in constructing a united EU front<sup>473</sup>. It has to be noted that given the unequal

<sup>470</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik*, 2006, 26.

<sup>471</sup> This is referring to the EU-Ukraine Action Plan endorsed by the EU-Ukraine Council on the 21<sup>st</sup> of February 2005, and which had as its core the promotion of cooperation between the two parties in the field of freedom, security and justice.

<sup>472</sup> CDU/CSU and SPD, *Gemeinsam für Deutschland*, 2005, 129.

<sup>473</sup> The European Union had as of February 2015 imposed three rounds of sanctions on Russia targeting its military, financial sectors and establishing travel bans on members of the government.

distribution of the costs of those sanctions across EU states, it is a significant success to have managed to keep all Member States united on this issue. Europe has set a precedent for common action against Russia. Karl Kaiser, an expert on Europe-Russia relations summarized recent German policy regarding Ukraine in the following terms:

When the Ukraine crisis broke Germany had become the undisputed leader of the EU and the Chancellor was the person who conducted the most regular dialogue with President Putin. Her strategy, which was also the strategy of her coalition partner, the SPD, combined a strong EU response (with several members extremely reluctant who had to be convinced and pressured bilaterally to go along with a sanctions policy) with actions agreed upon bilaterally with President Obama. It worked.<sup>474</sup>

As we will see in Chapter 7 dedicated to NATO, Germany has also turned to the Alliance in the management of security crises, including that in the Ukraine. As Karl Kaiser pointed out

Germany [has also] actively supported a revival of NATO, in Wales<sup>475</sup>, through trips to Baltic countries, participation in rotation of forces there, and the strengthening of Szczecin command<sup>476</sup>. The shock [in Ukraine] led to both a stronger EU sanctions policy and to European measures inside NATO.<sup>477</sup>

As detailed in Chapter 7 the extent to which the management of the Ukraine crisis is unloaded onto NATO was determined by the degree of strategic interest overlap between Europeans and Americans and on the willingness of the US to take on the burden of confronting Russia. For the time being it is sufficient to point out that the crisis has produced a much-enhanced EU sanctions policy and a united European front in the dialogue with Russia.

### **Conclusions: External Shocks and German EU policy**

As discussed above, Germany has been exposed to a number of serious external shocks since the late 1980s. When those shocks affected important German interests they led to

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<sup>474</sup> Interview with Karl Kaiser, Cambridge MA, 15-03-2015

<sup>475</sup> Kaiser is referring here to the Wales NATO Summit that took place in September of 2014 and where the situation in Ukraine was extensively discussed.

<sup>476</sup> Kaiser is referring here to the strengthening of NATO's Multinational Corps Northeast based in Szczecin, Poland.

<sup>477</sup> Interview with Karl Kaiser, Cambridge, MA, 15-03-2015

calls from Berlin to build new EU institutions in the field of security and defence, and sometimes for direct EU action. Germany's support for CFSP and CSDP is a consequence of the end of the Cold War; German insistence on and participation in EU operations in the Balkans was a product of insecurity in the region. The Eurozone crises has, in turn, proven that a certain form of spillover from security to 'non-security' integration can occur, or at the very least that security concerns can be among the factors that lead EU Member States to consider further integration in other realms. Lastly, the ongoing crisis in Ukraine seems to have produced a determined German push towards the construction of a united European front, and the imposition of EU sanctions on Russia.

Very different German reactions were produced by the various security crises in Northern Africa and the Sahel since the year 2000. Germany was overall reluctant to see the EU assume significant security responsibilities in the region, except in certain cases like fighting piracy off the Horn of Africa. Whether Germany supported intervention in this or that conflict, or whether an external shock led to strong German support for further EU security and defence integration, was dependent first and foremost on the German strategic interests at stake. If major interests were affected, Germany proceeded to defend in supranational fora, mainly the European Council and the PSC, the need for joint EU action.

What has determined the outcome in negotiations that precede any EU decision on the subject has been the degree to which other EU Member States have agreed with Germany's assessment of developments on the ground. This is identical to saying that the determinant of EU-wide negotiations on security and defence matters has been the degree of strategic interests overlap across EU states. States with similar strategic interests have reacted similarly to crises. Germany has itself been well aware that interests drive security

and defence policy: “Action in the field of security policy must be based on interests. Interests determine priorities for action”<sup>478</sup>.

The fact that the European Union has not yet had a structured and sustained debate about which interests are truly shared by everyone in the Union and which remain strictly national has been a source of tension in the EU<sup>479</sup>. This is exacerbated by the fact that Europe seems to be divided into two camps: one made of Member States that are concerned primarily with threats coming from the East (i.e. Eastern Europe and Russia) and another that is concerned with threats coming from the South (i.e. Northern Africa). This was described by Admiral Thorsten Kähler in the following terms:

What we see in Europe is that we have sovereign states. We have different national interests. France has, perhaps, a different view on the North African rim to Germany which sits in the north...In the north there is the necessity to talk to the Russians to keep them closer to Europe and not allow them to drift away. If you ask the Polish, they will say “Russia is closer to us than North Africa”<sup>480 481</sup>.

It also happens that two of the most important states in the EU project, Germany and France sit on different sides of the East-South European divide. It is understandable therefore that Germany tends to disagree with France when it comes to intervention in Africa. Jorn Hasler pointed to how the tendency of French policymaking elites to portray their national interests as EU ones, a trait of French defence policy also highlighted in this thesis, had generated a great deal of frustration in the German security establishment:

When a French interest is touched it suddenly becomes a European interest. They said that Northern Africa is a deep European interest. But Germany is not really interested in Africa, because we have to cope with Russia. European security without Russia is impossible, as well as against it. The French and Spanish would then say, ‘Well Russia is at peace and we now

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<sup>478</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheit*, 1994, 20.

<sup>479</sup> Until recently the European Security Strategy remains the only exercise of this nature and it does not attempt to provide a catalogue of EU interests.

<sup>480</sup> Interview with Thorsten Kähler, Berlin 12-04-2013

<sup>481</sup> This same idea was reiterated by Colonel Tettweiler in a separate interview: “If you are an eastern European country you might say ‘the main threat for me is a Russian attack’...South European countries wouldn’t share that view and they’d say “What? You are crazy. The Russians are not going to attack us. The European Union is facing the threat of immigration from the Southern Mediterranean”. Source: Interview Falk Tettweiler, Berlin, 17-04-2013

have other problems to cope with. We need to focus on the Mediterranean and Africa'....In Libya<sup>482</sup> these differences were brought to the surface. We have completely different perceptions of security risks...These things need to be solved at the political level first. Our politicians are the ones that need to decide if a certain interest is really a European one, or more of a national one.<sup>483</sup>

There is, however, no formal mechanism in Europe for this political debate to occur. Normally a structured strategic planning process would allow for similarities and differences to emerge and for common ground to be found. In Europe, however, strategic planning at the supranational level is still thin and Member States only engage in discussions about their security and defence priorities when faced with a crisis. This is what Joachim Spatz, a senior FDP Member of Parliament had to say about this:

We have to discuss what's within the basket [of common interests] and what's outside...The time should be now but the discussion is not taking place unfortunately. *So we are forced to learn scenario to scenario* [i.e. from crisis to crisis]. Libya was one. Iraq was another. Even something like the vote in the UN General Assembly on the status of Palestine. There are European states with totally different positions: approval, opposition and abstention (my emphasis).<sup>484</sup>

Some have argued that the effects of falling defence budgets will accelerate this process as it will make it hard for EU Member States to act by themselves. This was addressed by Falk Tettweiler:

What we learnt from the cuts in the budgets is that those countries who were used to launching missions on their own will not be able to do it now. They will have to ask their partners. I think that's obvious.<sup>485</sup>

Joaquim Spatz, a member of the Bundestag's Defence Committee referred to this in the following terms: "We have pressure from our budget situation. So, we are forced, or even condemned, to be successful in incorporating our defence into developing a more integrated foreign defence and security policy"<sup>486</sup>. He then expanded on how this same dynamic affected other EU states:

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<sup>482</sup> Hasler is referring here to the debate at the UNSC regarding Resolution 1973, and the subsequent discussions in Europe a possible EU intervention in the Libyan conflict.

<sup>483</sup> Interview with Jorn Hasler, Berlin, 10-04-2013

<sup>484</sup> Interview with Joachim Spatz, Berlin, 19-04-2013

<sup>485</sup> Interview with Falk Tettweiler, Berlin, 17-04-2013

<sup>486</sup> Interview with Joachim Spatz, Berlin, 19-04-2013

We had a discussion within our defence committee [meaning the Bundestag's Defence Committee] about the French White Book. One of the experts that talked to us said that the level of ambition of the French White Book [the 2013 edition] is the level the country could afford. As long as France can afford it they will have an attitude like that [meaning of acting 'unilaterally' like in Mali]. I think, however, that in the future they will have less resources and they will have to come up with more effective communication and inclusive decision-making. That's the simple truth...This problem is also faced by Germany or the Brits...The Brits talk about sovereignty. But, what kind of sovereignty?! If you are forced to build an aircraft carrier with the French...What kind of sovereignty do you have if in a comparatively short campaign in Libya you run short of ammunition? Everybody has to understand that by cooperating we can meet our level of ambition. And no one should expect the hundreds-of-years-old military philosophies of Paris, London, or Berlin, to be elevated piece by piece to the European level. We all have to come together. This will not be the French way. It won't be the German way. It won't be the Swedish way. It will not be the British way. It will be the European way. We have to come to this conclusion.<sup>487</sup>

In between the lines of the quote above one can read that it will be the lack of resources combined with security crises that will make everyone realise of the need to come together and negotiate common reactions. For the build up of the political will necessary to agree on integrative measures, national political elites have to feel significant pressure. Budget cuts per se are not sufficient if they are not followed by cases where strategic interests are put at risk and common action is required to protect them. This was also pointed out by Colonel Tettweiler during our interview at the German Defence Ministry:

I'm not sure if the current crisis is building up pressure to cooperate. It makes it more attractive to cooperate but I do not agree that cuts in defence spending pressure us to cooperate. It is political will that leads to cooperation. We still have not had the strategic discussions for integration to make sense...We do not know what we, as European states, want to do with our militaries<sup>488 489</sup>.

What this chapter shows is that indeed in areas where Germany has shared important interests with other States it has been willing to go along in tackling security crises and also been quite successful in building coalitions for action.

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<sup>487</sup> Interview with Joachim Spatz, Berlin, 19-04-2013

<sup>488</sup> Interview Falk Tettweiler, Berlin, 17-04-2013

<sup>489</sup> According to many of the people interviewed for this thesis in Germany the outcome of a fruitful EU discussion about the Union's security priorities would necessarily include a compromise between those looking East and those looking South. According again to Colonel Tettweiler: "...we should look at both regions [the East – including Russia and the Balkans- and Africa]...I think there is the feeling that both the Balkans and Africa are important. Why shouldn't we produce a document where we say "ok this is where the strategic interests of the European Union lie".

## **Chapter Overview**

It is clear from a study of German security doctrine and from interactions with foreign and defence policy officials in Berlin that Germany feels it belongs to a European security community. There is a very strong sense in Germany that for the first time in a very long time the country is surrounded by friends and allies, and that all threats come from outside of the boundaries of the EU. The military forces of other EU states are quite simply not a threat to Germany as suggested by some of the authors reviewed in the Introduction to this thesis. This was captured by Karl Kaiser:

It is an essential characteristic of Europe's security community that the military armament of neighbours has never been seen as a threat to one's own security but on the contrary as an asset in the common defence against an outside threat. Thus the French or British nuclear deterrent was never seen by Germany as a threat against itself.<sup>490</sup>

Germany also shares key values and interests with other EU Member States and sees the EU project as one of the greatest contributors to its security. This has over the years led Germany to call for further European integration in almost all fields including security and defence.

Generic calls for integration have been punctured by episodes of greater determination and support for further integrative measures. It so happens that those moments were preceded by external security crises that affected fundamental German security interests. Even in areas of the world where one would not expect Germans to be engaged, such as the coast of Somalia, have seen active German military participation under an EU flag. The feature that has been common to all of these instances where Germany requested further EU integration is that they all posed a threat to important national interests.

Because Germany believes that EU integration will eventually produce very strong interest convergence across Member States German perceptions of CSDP are somewhat

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<sup>490</sup> Interview with Karl Kaiser, Cambridge, MA, 15-03-2015

teleological. The end result is very clear for most German policymakers: a well integrated CFSP/CSDP that can take care of crises in Europe's neighbourhood. Here is Admiral Kähler's take on the matter:

My motto, my credo, is that "If you fight, you can lose. If you don't fight, you have already lost". So keep on struggling for your ideas...But in the end we will get there [a unified European defence] because there is no alternative. The alternative is 27 little dwarves [referring to 27 EU Member states] walking around in the world of giants.<sup>491</sup>

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<sup>491</sup> Interview with Thorsten Kähler, Berlin 12-04-2013

## Chapter 6: Spain and European Security and Defence

### Introduction

Spain joined the European Union in 1986 just over a decade after the death of Francisco Franco, the dictator that had ruled the country since the late 1930's. Four years earlier, in 1982, Spain had joined NATO and become ever more clearly aligned with the anti-Soviet bloc, although it had already been for decades a stable American military ally. Spain's democratic constitution had been approved only in 1978 and had been put to the test in 1981 when a group of military officers stormed Congress and held both the legislative and the executive hostage in an attempt to bring back authoritarian rule. That coup d'état, known as the "23 F" because it took place on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of February, failed in part because of the already very powerful allure of EU membership for a democratic Spain<sup>492 493</sup>.

The case of Spain is of particular interest for our study for a number of reasons. The first is that it is a medium-sized country in terms of defence spending, which is a category rarely looked at in CFSP/CSDP studies but to which other significant states such as Italy, Poland, Sweden, and Greece belong. Additionally, Spain has a moderate threshold for the use of force (i.e. sits somewhere between more "activist" countries like France and others more on the "pacifist" end of the spectrum like Germany). Spain also belongs to the group of states that came out of fascist dictatorships in the 60s and 70s to join the EU. In that regard at least it is a peripheral country, not part of the founding six, and a latecomer to the European project. Some of these elements might have a real bearing on its perception of other EU Member States and on the way it defines its own security. These are all

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<sup>492</sup> For an extensive collection of essays on the history of Spanish foreign policy see: Jose Maria Beneyto and Juan Carlos Pereira (eds), *Historia de la politica exterior espanola en los siglos XX y XXI* (Madrid: CEU ediciones, 2015).

<sup>493</sup> For a piece on the history of Spanish-European relations see: Antonio Moreno Juste, "España en Europa: sistemas internacionales, politica exterior y construcción europea", in *Historia de la politica exterior espanola en los siglos XX y XXI (Volume I)*, edited by Jose Maria Beneyto and Juan Carlos Pereira, 619-651 (Madrid: CEU ediciones, 2015).

dimensions in which our case study countries of Spain, France and Germany vary greatly: a variance that should give our findings greater breadth and resilience. Lastly, there is a real contribution to be made to European security and defence studies by looking at Spain. Almost nothing of relevance, and definitely very little in English, has been written about this country's attitudes and policies towards CSDP/CFS<sup>494 495</sup>.

### **Spain in Europe: A Security Community**

One of the theoretical issues this thesis tries to elucidate is if EU Member States, including Spain, live today in a European security community, and whether such a community has been in place for at least the past two decades. In order to see whether Spanish attitudes towards its fellow EU members comply with what one would expect if a security community was in place I suggest we look at the content of Spanish strategy documents from the 1990s until today, the country's defence spending and the opinion of Spanish elites regarding the origin and intensity of security threats to which their state is exposed.

Spanish security and defence elites are on the whole willing to provide insights on their field of expertise<sup>496</sup>. It is much harder, however, to collect and order Spanish strategic documents in part because the country has produced so many of them. From the early 1990s to today Spain has issued over a dozen of such documents making it hard to know where to start any study on the subject. Some examination reveals structure in this otherwise overwhelming volume of information. Figure 6.1 below shows this complicated

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
<sup>494</sup> A noteworthy exception is the work done by Charles Powell on Spanish contributions to EU policy. See: Charles Powell, "Fifteen years on: Spanish membership in the European Union revisited", paper presented at Center for European Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge MA, November 2001 and Charles Powell, "Spanish Membership of the European Union Revisited" in *Spain and Portugal in the European Union*, edited by Paul Christopher Manuel and Sebastian Royo (London: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 2005): 123-140.

<sup>495</sup> A comprehensive compilation of essays on the developmet of CFSP/CSDP produced and published in Spain (but not centered on Spain-CSDP relations) is: Jose Maria Beneyto, *La Unión Europea como actor global. Las nuevas dimensiones de la política exterior europea* (Spain: Biblioteca Nueva, 2001)

<sup>496</sup> Appendix 1 contains a full list of people interviewed for this thesis, many of whom are Spanish

landscape in a schematic fashion that the Spanish defence establishment likes to call the “Strategic Pyramid”.

*Figure 6.1: Spain’s Strategic Pyramid*



Since 2011 Spain has a Spanish Security Strategy (SSS) that sits on top of all other strategic documents, and contains the ‘strategic security outlook’ of the country. That outlook is, in essence, a broad view of the security landscape inhabited by Spain and a list of threats to its interests. In theory, although not always in practice, it should also provide some indication of the desired path (or paths) of action to protect/promote national interests. The security strategy is drafted by the government with most of the process falling in the hands of the Presidency of the Spanish Government (or Prime Minister’s Office). It is meant to have a lifespan of around ten years. A reviewed version of the 2011 document was published in 2013, a good eight years before schedule, but in part as a natural response to significant developments in the strategic landscape, most notably the Eurozone Crisis and the Arab Spring.

In the year 2013 Spain also created a National Security Council (SNSC) that serves as the nation’s highest body of strategic planning. It meets ordinarily every six months, and brings together the Prime Minister and some senior members of the cabinet, including the

Foreign, Defence and Finance Ministers. The functions of the SNSC include guaranteeing the proper development of the Spanish Security Strategy, coordinating the country's broader security policy, and producing an Annual Report on National Security, with the first edition of the latter being published in mid-2014<sup>497</sup>.

Below the security strategy and the Annual Report on National Security lie all of the documents that define Spain's narrower 'defence strategy'. At this level what is tackled is what could be termed 'classical' defence matters like territorial defence or expeditionary operations as well as the structure and functions of the armed forces. The drafting of these texts falls mostly on the hands of the Defence Ministry. At this level of the pyramid we find a one-off White Paper on Defence published in 2000, a Strategic Defence Review (SSDR) of 2003<sup>498</sup>, and a number of National Defence Directives (NDD) that are put out roughly every four years and lay out the security and defence policy of each new government. So far Spain has produced the following NDDs: 1980, 1984, 1986, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012<sup>499</sup>.

Lastly, the very bottom of the pyramid is constituted by Spain's 'military strategy', in essence a compilation of reflections about the armed forces. Spain has only one document of this kind, the Spanish Military Strategy published in 2003<sup>500</sup>.

As one descends the pyramid, the area of analysis narrows and moves from broader security issues to much narrower ones that pertain almost exclusively to defence and the role of the armed forces. All of these documents are meant to be connected to one another by both setting certain goals and enabling the attainment of those of the higher strategic

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<sup>497</sup> Spanish Department of National Security, *Informe Annual de Seguridad Nacional* [Annual Report on National Security] (Madrid, 2014).

<sup>498</sup> A new Strategic Defence Review is scheduled to be published in 2015.

<sup>499</sup> The furthest back we shall go in this study is the 1992 National Defence Directive approved by the last Felipe Gonzalez government. Beyond that point, the role played by the EU in security and defence was so minimal that any study of national attitudes towards other European states and their impact on the pursuit of a common defence becomes less fruitful.

<sup>500</sup> This document was de-classified in 2004.

documents. In this sense the Military Strategy is, for example, supposed to lead to a more effectively designed and trained armed forces that are then capable of fulfilling the tasks asked of them in Spain's 'defence strategy'. Figure 6.2 below shows this process in a schematic fashion.

Figure 6.2: Spain's Strategic Model<sup>501</sup>



The fundamental questions this section should answer are the following: Do Spanish strategic documents reveal that the country has lived in a European security community since the early 1990s? Do the hundreds of pages elaborated by the Defence Ministry, the Prime Minister's Office, and the National Security Council give us any clues regarding Spain's attitudes towards its neighbours, the threats it faces and its desired strategies to tackle them? Do the opinions of Spanish security and defence policy elites tell us something about Spain's perception of other EU Member States?

Here is a preliminary set of (interconnected) observations derived from the study of official documents and policies in Spain, as well as from the content of numerous interviews conducted in the country:

<sup>501</sup> Spanish Defence Ministry, *Estrategia Militar Española: Nuevos Retos, Nuevas Respuestas* [Spanish Military Strategy: New Challenges, New Demands] (Madrid, 2003), 14.

1. Threat Perception: threats to Spanish security do not come from other EU partners. Threats originate outside the bounds of the EU, in other regions of the world, and affect both Spain and other EU partners in similar ways.
2. Strategic Overlap: what is good for other European states in terms of security is good for Spain. Spain does not gain from the insecurity of other EU partners and as time has gone by Spanish strategic texts have cited EU security documents and initiatives more regularly and extensively.
3. Europe as a Solution: almost every Spanish security problem, and definitely the most salient ones like terrorism, migration flows and territorial defence, require a collective European response. European security and defence is the solution to some of the most acute Spanish security challenges.
4. The UK and Gibraltar: Spain has expressed numerous times a worry about the arrangements over Gibraltar, with British possession of “the rock” being seen as a limitation on Spanish sovereignty.

Despite the long time that separates the first and last documents analysed here, the volume of documentation studied, the diversity of people interviewed, and the significant changes in the security landscape in the period covered, the characteristics identified above have remained in place from start to finish. This is true of documents spanning the last twenty years, and covering four different Spanish governments of varying ideology and configuration<sup>502</sup>, and opinions expressed by interviewees that have spent decades working within the Spanish civil service, military and government in various capacities. Furthermore, points 2 and 3, describing a common European defence as a solution to

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<sup>502</sup> Felipe Gonzalez's (socialist) from 1982 to 1996, Jose Maria Aznar's (conservative) from 1996 to 2004, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero's (socialist) from 2004 to 2011, and Mariano Rajoy's (conservative) from 2011 – current (2014).

Spanish security problems, and relying on EU strategy when drafting Spanish one, have grown in intensity since the mid 1990s to today.

### **Threat Perception**

Almost all of the Spanish strategic documents enumerated above contain some direct or indirect reference to the threats faced by the country. Some are more specific than others but they all have something in common: threats to Spain do not originate in other EU Member States. A look at the documents that addressed this issue most extensively will add depth to this statement.

The White Book of Defence published in the year 2000 was a one-off exercise carried out by the Defence Ministry headed at the time by Minister Eduardo Serra. It was, in essence, a 264-page-long reflection on the country's defence, as well as on the present and future of the Spanish armed forces. The factors that created the need for a White Book were, in the words of Minister Serra himself: "the social evolution of Spain, strategic changes in the international environment, and the important transformation of the Armed Forces"<sup>503</sup>. Indeed, the two decades that preceded the drafting of the White Book had seen the transition of Spain from an autocracy to a democracy, the country's joining of NATO and the EU, the professionalization of its armed forces, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the rise of new security threats. Spain was, therefore, in dire need of strategic reflection that went beyond the four-year span of National Defence Directives. The analysis of threats faced by Spain contained in the White Book leaves no doubt as to their origin and location: all of them lie outside the bounds of the European Union. Some of the threats enumerated in the text include the proliferation of WMD, the weakness of states emerging from the collapse of the Soviet Union, or the demographic explosion in certain

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<sup>503</sup> Spanish Defence Ministry, *Libro Blanco de la Defensa*, [White Book of Defence] (Madrid, 2000), 18.

parts of the world. None, however, pertain to other EU partners, who are seen as natural allies in the pursuit of common goals<sup>504</sup>.

In the year 2000 Spain also published a short NDD, which called for the start of a review process that would lead to the 2003 Strategic Defence Review (SSDR). Just over 350 pages long, the SSDR remains Spain's most extensive review of its defence to date. It is in many respects a reaction to the instability that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1990s, as well as the rise of global terrorism as epitomised by the 9/11 attacks. A long list of threats to Spain is included in the SSDR<sup>505</sup>:

1. Terrorism<sup>506</sup>
2. Proliferation of WMD
3. Threats to Spanish territorial integrity, including the African outposts of Ceuta and Melilla
4. Insecurity of the global commons
5. Uncontrolled migratory flows
6. Environmental degradation
7. Cyber attacks

The 2008 NDD called for the elaboration of a national security strategy, which would lead to the 2011 Spanish Security Strategy (SSS). The drafting of this document was coordinated by Javier Solana de Madariaga, former European Union High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. The threats faced by Spain are addressed in its

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<sup>504</sup> Spanish Defence Ministry, *Libro Blanco*, 2000, 33-36.

<sup>505</sup> Spanish Defence Ministry, *Revision Estrategica de la Defensa*, [Strategic Defence Review] (Madrid, 2003), 49-51

<sup>506</sup> Termed in the text "external terrorism" in order to differentiate it from that of Basque separatist group ETA, of an "internal" or "domestic" nature and to be tackled through civilian, judicial and policing means rather than through defence policy.

early pages and deviated only to a very modest extent from those contained in the SSDR<sup>507</sup>; here they are in an abbreviated version:

1. Armed Conflict
2. Terrorism
3. Organized Crime
4. Economic and Financial Insecurity
5. Energy Dependency
6. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
7. Cyber Threats
8. Migratory Flows
9. Emergencies and Natural Disasters

It is evident from the list above that all major threats to Spain as captured by the 2003 SSDR and the 2011 SSS lie outside the EU. Both documents suggest that even threats that can emerge from internal (or European) actors, like for example economic and financial instability, are to be addressed collectively by EU partners.

In late 2011 Spain elected a new government. The conservative Mariano Rajoy won the elections against the socialists with an ample majority. His government quickly set about the task of updating the country's strategic documents. By July of 2012 a new National Defence Directive had been approved, followed by a new Spanish Security Strategy in May of 2013<sup>508 509</sup>. In September of 2013 the newly-created National Security Council was tasked with the elaboration of the very first Annual Report on National

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<sup>507</sup> Spanish Government, *Estrategia Española de Seguridad: Una Responsabilidad de Todos* [Spanish Security Strategy: A Collective Responsibility] (Madrid, 2011), 2-4.

<sup>508</sup> Spanish Government, *Directiva de Defensa Nacional* [National Defence Directive], Madrid, 2012.

<sup>509</sup> Spanish Government Presidency, *Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional: Un proyecto compartido* [National Security Strategy: A Shared Responsibility], Madrid, 2013.

Security, which was finally approved in mid-2014<sup>510</sup>. So in three years Spain produced three important security documents<sup>511</sup>. How did they portray the strategic position of the country and its perception of other EU countries?

The 2013 SSS reinforced the idea that Spain does not view its European neighbours as sources of threat. With unusual detail and structure, Spain's current Strategy enumerates the twelve major threats/risks to Spanish security and elaborates on their origin, structure, content, as well as strategies to tackle them:

1. Armed Conflict
2. Terrorism
3. Cyber threats
4. Organized Crime
5. Economic and Financial instability
6. Energy Vulnerability
7. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
8. Irregular Migratory Flows
9. Espionage
10. Emergencies and Catastrophes
11. Vulnerability of Maritime space
12. Vulnerability of critical infrastructures and basic services

The list above is similar to that of the 2003 Strategic Defence Review and the 2011 SSS. What makes the 2013 document unique is that it has an entire section on each of the threats as well as their origin, structure and content. Out of that section, a clear narrative emerges: threats lie outside of the bounds of the EU.

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<sup>510</sup> Spanish Department of National Security, *Informe Annual de Seguridad Nacional* [Annual Report on National Security].

<sup>511</sup> As well as a number of other more specific or sectoral strategies. See: Spanish Government, *Estrategia de Ciberseguridad Nacional* [National Cybersecurity Strategy] (Madrid, 2013) and Spanish Government, *Estrategia de Seguridad Marítima Nacional* [National Maritime Security Strategy] (Madrid, 2013).

Beyond the broader attitude of friendship and partnership towards European allies, the 2013 SSS mentions specific Member States with which Spain wishes to have a tighter relationship:

The current geopolitical context increases the strategic importance of Spain and underlines the necessity to tighten our links to Portugal; together with the need to forward European integration further, and to increase our strategic cooperation with France. These are all key elements for Spain's stability and security.<sup>512</sup>

The clear narrative coming out of Spanish strategic documents about the origin and intensity of security threats to Spain is further strengthened by patterns in Spanish defence spending. Spain reduced its military spending as a percentage of GDP markedly since the 1980s. In 1988 the country was spending 2% of GDP on defence (or the equivalent of 15.831M USD). By 2013, that figure had decreased to 0.9% of GDP (or 12,765M USD<sup>513</sup>). The decrease in threat produced by the collapse of the Soviet Union was in no way replaced by threat coming from other continental powers. Additionally, Spain's response to the Eurozone crisis, was to reduce defence spending further. From 2008 to 2013 Spain reduced its annual defence spending by over 6 Billion USD. This is hardly the behaviour of a state that is fearful of its neighbours or anticipating aggression.

Elite interviews conducted for this thesis reinforced these findings with not a single interviewee pointing to other EU partners as a threat to the country's security. The quotes used throughout this chapter are a testament to the widespread and deep-seated belief in Spanish policymaking circles that the country is indeed part of a European security community built on trust and expectations of peaceful exchange.

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<sup>512</sup> Spanish Government Presidency, *Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional*, 2013, 13.

<sup>513</sup> According to SIPRI and in Constant 2011 USD:

<http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+military+expenditure+database+1988-2013.xlsx>

### Strategic Overlap

From an analysis of Spanish security documents, one gets the clear sense that Spain does not only not feel threatened by other EU states, but in many instances actually equates its security to that of the European collective<sup>514</sup>. Spain's 1992 National Defence Directive, for example, reiterated time and time again that the greatest challenges to the country's security, of which the proliferation of nuclear weapons after the collapse of the Soviet Union is the most salient, are only to be dealt with effectively in partnership with other European states, with whom it has developed a level of "interdependence" that calls for cooperation<sup>515</sup>. This idea of an intense strategic interdependence existing in Europe was to remain a constant feature of Spanish strategy documents. It is indeed restated in the 1996 NDD approved by Spain's new cabinet. Led by Jose Maria Aznar, this was the first democratically elected conservative government in Spain since the death of Francisco Franco. The very first page of the document says the following: "(We) Start this analysis from the knowledge that our security is irrevocably linked to that of our (European) neighbours..."<sup>516</sup>. Spain saw security in 1996 as a collective European endeavour, not as a zero sum game to be played by Member States.

The main consequence of this 'collective' approach to security is, of course, that EU Members are expected to tackle challenges together. The 2003 SDDR addressed the issue in the following way: "Spain's national security is primarily and intrinsically linked to that of the European continent. In this regard, Spain wishes to contribute directly to safeguarding and expanding peace and stability in Europe"<sup>517</sup>.

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<sup>514</sup> For an analysis on how integration in Europe affected Spanish foreign and security policy and led to a convergence of both interests and value see: Jose Maria Beneyto "La política exterior Española en el nuevo escenario mundial" in *Política exterior Española un balance de futuro*, ed. Jose Marfa Beneyto y Juan Carlos Pereira, 45-47 (Madrid, Nueva Biblioteca, 2011).

<sup>515</sup> Spanish Government, *Directiva de Defensa Nacional* [National Defence Directive] (Madrid, 1992), 2

<sup>516</sup> Spanish Government, *Directiva de Defensa Nacional* [National Defence Directive] (Madrid, 1996), 1

<sup>517</sup> Spanish Defence Ministry, *Revision Estrategica de la Defensa*, 2003, 37.

The 2004 NDD, drafted by the newly-elected Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero government, insisted on the centrality of peace in Europe and on Spain's commitment to collective security there: "In matters of security and defence, Europe is our area of priority; we are Europe and our security is irrevocably tied to that of the continent"<sup>518</sup>. Having just suffered a major terrorist attack, the "11-M" bombing of commuter trains in the centre of Madrid, this NDD focuses primarily on the threat posed by international terrorism. In the fight against terrorism, the Spanish government saw the need for multilateral action with European partners, particularly through concerted conflict prevention, "a very taxing task that no European state can tackle alone"<sup>519</sup>. This same message is expressed concisely in the 2008 NDD produced by the second Zapatero government: "(Spain's) National security is intrinsically and inevitably linked to the security of Europe. It is *for this reason* that Spain pushes for a strong European security and defence policy, with the required civilian and military capabilities..." (my emphasis)<sup>520</sup>.

It is evident from the analysis above that Spain did not just have a high degree of trust in the intentions of other EU partners, but also a deep commitment to the attainment of common goals.

It was noted above that the SSS (both the 2011 and the 2013 editions) suggested a similar list of threats to that of the Strategic Defence Review. But more interesting is the fact that the threats enumerated there are almost identical to the ones contained in the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003<sup>521</sup>. In strategic terms, this means that there now seems to be a formal overlap of the Spanish and the wider European threat perceptions. Threats not only lie outside of the EU's borders for Spain, but they also happened to be

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<sup>518</sup> Spanish Government, *Directiva de Defensa Nacional* [National Defence Directive] (Madrid, 2004), 3.

<sup>519</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>520</sup> Spanish Government, *Directiva de Defensa Nacional* [National Defence Directive] (Madrid, 2008), 5.

<sup>521</sup> European Council, *European Security Strategy. A Secure Europe in a Better World*, 2003, 3-5

shared by the EU as an organisation. As we will see, this overlap has grown since 2011 and is now explicitly alluded to in Spanish strategic documents.

The 2013 Security Strategy demonstrates that there is, indeed, a growing strategic overlap between national and EU-wide strategic outlooks. As the EU slowly develops its set of strategic documents and initiatives, these become more regularly cited in Spanish ones. Not only is the 2003 European Security Strategy mentioned repeatedly in the 2013 Spanish text, but there are also references to other strategic documents produced by the EU, such as its Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction<sup>522</sup>, the European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy<sup>523</sup>, the New Lines for Action by the European Union in Combating the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems<sup>524</sup>, or even to EU initiatives like the European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPICP)<sup>525</sup>. It is not that these documents and initiatives are simply mentioned, they are used as building blocks for Spanish strategy. This is what the 2013 SSS had to say at the very beginning of its analysis of the threat of WMD proliferation: “as the EU recognised in 2003 in its Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, *which Spain fully endorses and supports...*” (my emphasis)<sup>526</sup> and what it says a few pages later about the all-important fight against terrorism: “Following a similar structure as that adopted in the EU’s Counter Terrorism Strategy...”<sup>527</sup>. As in other areas of European integration, we are witnessing in the field of security the imbrication of national and supranational ideas and strategies.

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<sup>522</sup> European Council, *Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction* (Brussels: EU, 2003).

<sup>523</sup> European Council, *European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy* (Brussels: EU, 2005).

<sup>524</sup> European Council, *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World*, 2008.

<sup>525</sup> Link to the EPICP website:

[http://europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/justice\\_freedom\\_security/fight\\_against\\_terrorism/133260\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_terrorism/133260_en.htm)

<sup>526</sup> Spanish Government Presidency, *Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional*, 2013, 30.

<sup>527</sup> *Ibid.*, 41.

If other European Union Member States are not a threat, threats from outside call for common action, and specific threats to Spanish security are better tackled in conjunction with EU partners, it should come as no surprise to see Spain's top Strategy equating the country's and Europe's security: "To forward European integration is the greatest guarantee of Spanish security and prosperity"<sup>528</sup>. A few pages later this crystalizes into a determined support for a common European defence:

...the safety of Spain will be strengthened if the EU becomes a global actor. For this to be possible it is necessary that the European External Action Service (EEAS) develops fully so as to represent Europe around the world, that the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is provided with the necessary military means, and that the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) is given the capabilities it requires.<sup>529</sup>

The various traits and features of Spanish attitudes towards other EU Member States all point to there being a European security community in place. At least it seems evident that Spain is convinced it lives in one.

### **Europe as a Solution**

Unsurprisingly, Spain is convinced that the best way to tackle the security challenges it faces is to do so together with other EU partners. This is, of course, strongly connected to the strategic interdependence addressed above.

In chapter 4 of Spain's 2013 Security Strategy, titled "Strategic Lines of Action", separate sets of actions are suggested to tackle each of the threats that Spain faces. From armed conflict, to cyber security, to maritime security, the SSS suggests actions that could see the country's interests forwarded and its security upheld. It is interesting to see that in most areas, cooperation within the EU, in its many shapes and forms or with other EU partners, is mentioned.

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<sup>528</sup> Spanish Government Presidency, *Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional*, 2013, 2.

<sup>529</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

In the fight against terrorism, for example, the SSS says the following: “...Spain will push for concerted action of democratic states— preferably through common action within the EU...”<sup>530</sup>. When speaking of economic and financial security, the SSS has as its fifth strategic line of action to: “Contribute to the effective economic and financial governance of the EU, so as to guarantee the sustainability and good functioning of the European Monetary Union and the strength of the Euro. Spain will actively cooperate in the construction of a common European economic government...”<sup>531</sup>. When addressing the need to have a stable and reliable energy supply: “Spain will push for a common European energy policy that develops stronger interconnectivity across Member States...A fully integrated European electricity and gas market is a guarantee of energy supply, security and quality”<sup>532</sup>. Or when speaking of the need to protect Spain from migratory flows, the 2013 SSS says the following: “Spain should control access via its external borders through the European Union’s Integrated Management of External Borders”<sup>533</sup>. Every Spanish security problem seems to have, at least in part, a European solution. This will come across even more clearly in the following sections where Spanish reactions to security shocks are studied in greater detail.

### **The UK, Gibraltar and European Defence**

There is, however, a specific case that needs to be addressed before this section is closed, and that is Spain’s relation with the UK. As research on Spanish defence policy progressed, it quickly became apparent that the country’s relationship with Great Britain did not comply fully with the pattern observed in relation to other EU Member States.

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<sup>530</sup> Spanish Government Presidency, *Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional*, 2013, 41.

<sup>531</sup> *Ibid.*, 44.

<sup>532</sup> *Ibid.*, 45.

<sup>533</sup> *Ibid.*, 47.

Spain's relations with the UK have over the last two decades, and quite possibly longer, been burdened by the dispute over the possession of Gibraltar<sup>534</sup>. The 2003 Spanish Strategic Defence Review catalogued the "recuperation" of Gibraltar, at the time, and currently [2015], under UK sovereignty<sup>535</sup>, as a "strategic interest". The fact that this issue appeared in a strategic review suggests that it was viewed not only as a diplomatic or economic matter but one with perhaps defence implications. The wording used in the SSSDR is also blunt and describes the UK's presence in Gibraltar as "external" and "imposed on Spain": "This [presence] produces negative effects for our population, territory, maritime boundaries, and therefore interests of all kind, on top of reducing Spain's international standing"<sup>536</sup>. Regaining possession over Gibraltar appears to have been relatively important for the Jose Maria Aznar government, particularly during its second term, but it disappears from Spanish security documents for about a decade. One needs to wait until 2013 and the approval of a new Spanish Security Strategy, drafted by another conservative government, to see this issue come up again: "The British colony of Gibraltar is an anomaly in today's Europe and a source of tension between two partners and allies. It creates security problems of various sorts for both Spain and Europe..."<sup>537</sup>.

General Miguel Ballesteros, Director of Spain's Institute of Strategic Studies (IEEE), a think tank within the Centro de Estudios Superiores de la Defensa Nacional (CESEDEN), Spain's War College, summarized the problem in the following way:

For most Spaniards Gibraltar is a sentimental issue...Strategically, however, the matter is a far more significant one. It is a limitation of our sovereignty. Businesses establish themselves in Gibraltar because they pay no taxes there but then operate in Spain. Spain declares its territory free of nuclear weapons but then the 'Tireless' arrives at Gibraltar port for repairs, and if there

<sup>534</sup> For a history of Spanish-UK relations with a focus on Gibraltar see: Carolina Labarta Rodriguez-Maribona "Reino Unido y España: unas relaciones marcadas por el contencioso territorial", in *Historia de la política exterior española en los siglos XX y XXI (Volume 2)*, edited by Jose Maria Beneyto and Juan Carlos Pereira, 619-651. Madrid: CEU ediciones, 2015.

<sup>535</sup> It should be noted here that Spain "lost" Gibraltar to Great Britain in the early 18<sup>th</sup> century with the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht that put an end to the Spanish War of Succession.

<sup>536</sup> Spanish Defence Ministry, *Revisión Estratégica de la Defensa*, 2003, 133.

<sup>537</sup> Spanish Government Presidency, *Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional*, 2013, 14.

is a leak of radioactive material Spaniards would suffer as much as the people of Gibraltar<sup>538</sup>. This despite the fact that the territorial waters were never handed over to the British under the Treaty of Utrecht. Something similar is true when talking about the airport. The isthmus was never given away at Utrecht, but the British built an airport there during the Spanish Civil War. We now find ourselves unable to build an airport of our own near Gibraltar because flight paths would not be safe.<sup>539</sup>

It seems, however, that the dispute over Gibraltar is not significant enough to call into question the existence of a European security community. This is due to three fundamental reasons. The first is that as General Ballesteros himself did point out:

The issue of Gibraltar has not impeded us from talking to the British, who would probably return the territory happily if it was not for the fact that it would complicate matters for them in some other colonies and territories...So, is this significant enough to go to war over it? No.<sup>540</sup>

The second, is that, as discussed above, the debate over Gibraltar and whether it should return to Spain or not comes and goes from Spanish strategic documents. It is simply not a recurrent or stable issue but rather one that seems to be dependent on who is in power, with conservative governments being more belligerent about it than socialist ones. This hints that it is probably more a political interpretation of the situation on the ground than a product of long term Spanish strategic posture.

Thirdly, it is a small anomaly within EU internal relations. No other Member State studied in this thesis expressed similar concern for the posture of other EU state. Simply put this is quite probably an exception and not a particularly significant one.

A related problem of greater significance is the UK's policy towards CSDP and the reactions it generates in other EU partners. In the semi-structured interview format used for this thesis there were a number of occasions when the conversation veered towards the UK and its role in Europe. In all such instances, interviewees portrayed Britain as an obstacle in the path to a more integrated European defence. The following statements are but a few of the large collection of critical comments about British policy towards CSDP

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<sup>538</sup> The "Tireless" was a third Trafalgar-class nuclear submarine of the UK's Royal Navy. In 2000-2001 it spent close to 12 months in the port of Gibraltar undergoing repairs of a leak in the nuclear reactor's primary cooling circuit.

<sup>539</sup> Interview with Miguel Ballesteros, Madrid, 30-10-2012

<sup>540</sup> *Ibid.*

made by Spanish interviewees: “Europe has the desire to revive the Roman Empire, but the UK is preventing it”<sup>541</sup> or “a united Europe in defence is only possible with the UK out of the EU”<sup>542</sup>. Particularly frustrating for Spanish policymakers, and more so for those dealing with CSDP matters in Brussels, has been the repeated use by the UK of its veto power to prevent either new EU institutions from being developed or operations being launched: “In CSDP, everything is decided through consensus. Consensus means ‘right to veto’ ...and the British have used this many times”<sup>543</sup>.

In the eyes of Spanish policymakers British opposition to a stronger EU defence is driven by two main issues. The first is a particular way of seeing relations with other EU Member States, for some reminiscent of times when security in Europe was about relative gains rather than collective ones<sup>544</sup>. The second is its desire to prevent any damage to the transatlantic link: “The UK is a real Trojan horse in the EU. It opposes whatever actions it believes could hinder the transatlantic link”<sup>545</sup>. It is interesting to note that comments of this nature were not made of any of the other over two-dozen members of the EU, and that other Member States had a similar opinion of UK policy in Europe<sup>546</sup>. The evidence suggests, therefore, that the British case is a real exception to the norm in Europe and one which should probably receive more attention in future research. This is particularly true after the decision by the British people to leave the European Union, expressed in a referendum on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of June of 2016. Britain leaving the EU, or Brexit as it has come to be known, could well reinforce the feeling indicated above that the UK was never really part of the European security community or it could actually lead to a situation where the

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<sup>541</sup> Interview with Juan Martinez Nunez, Madrid, 30-10-2012

<sup>542</sup> Interview with Fernando Lista Blanco, Madrid 31-10-2012

<sup>543</sup> Interview with Carlos Cordon, Madrid, 29-10-2012

<sup>544</sup> See for example: In Europe, the UK goes its own way. More so in foreign and security policy, where they even have a veto power”. Source: Interview with Fernando Lista Blanco, Madrid 31-10-2012

<sup>545</sup> Interview with Carlos Cordon, Madrid, 29-10-2012

<sup>546</sup> See Chapters 4 and 5, as well as section in the Introduction where the case is made to not look into UK perspectives on CSDP.

country is quite simply excluded from it. It is simply too early to tell but the initial reaction of the Spanish government right after the referendum result was to offer co-sovereignty to Gibraltar in an attempt to pull this EU-loving territory from UK control<sup>547</sup>.

## **Spain, External Shocks and the evolution European Security and Defence**

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, Spain has long been a supporter of a common European security and defence. The origin of this constant, or ‘background’, support is to be found in the feeling of belonging to a European security community and in the conviction that Spain’s security is furthered by European integration. This latter point, already introduced in the section above, was succinctly expressed by a former Spanish Deputy Foreign Minister: “Spain is a middle-sized power. When there are important crises Spain needs European support”<sup>548</sup>.

If one looks at the history of Spanish policy towards CFSP/CSDP one finds, however, that support has not been linear. It has been marked by periods of greater intensity. Those fits and starts have tended to coincide with significant episodes in the country’s security and in particular with what this thesis refers to as ‘external shocks’. In particular, Spain’s recent history seems to contain four shocks that in one way or another led the country to call for greater European security and defence integration:

1. Collapse of the Soviet Union and Conflict in the Balkans: led first to Spanish support for the development of CFSP and its inclusion in the Maastricht Treaty. Second, to determined Spanish support for the further development of CSDP as

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<sup>547</sup> Manuel Muniz and Bernardo Navazo, “Brexit and the Perverse Geopolitics of Leaving the European Union”, *Atlantic Council*, July 9, 2016. Accessed 07/20/2016. <<http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/brexit-and-the-perverse-geopolitics-of-leaving-the-european-union>>

<sup>548</sup> Interview with Bernardino Leon, Madrid, 28-10-2012

- called for by the Saint Maló Declaration of 1998 and to the country's contribution to numerous CSDP missions in the Balkans.
2. 11-M Terrorist Attacks: led to Spanish calls for the establishment of an EU counterterrorism policy and the development of EU tools to fight this threat.
  3. Immigration Crisis of 2006: led to Spanish calls for a stronger EU anti-immigration policy, stronger common border controls, and the deployment of a Frontex mission in the Southern Mediterranean and Western Atlantic.
  4. Arab Spring: led to Spanish calls for a common EU policy towards the Southern Mediterranean as well as to the country's support for various CSDP missions in the region.

### **The Collapse of the Soviet Union and Instability in the Balkans**

Events in the late 1980's and early 1990s in Europe made Spain a committed supporter of an EU security and defence capability. That commitment was a prominent feature of the Spanish 1992 and 1996 NDDs. Here is one of many instances of that support being expressed:

(Spain should) push for initiatives that lead to the accumulation of security and defence competences at the European Community level, which at the moment means supporting the role played by the Western European Union (WEU) in the full development of the EU.<sup>549</sup>

It should be remembered that in 1992 the Maastricht Treaty was still being negotiated and that all "European" security and defence activities were concentrated in the WEU. Essentially, what Spain's 1992 NDD was saying, therefore, was that the country wanted a strong EU to be born out of Maastricht: one that inherited WEU powers (i.e. security and defence capabilities).

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<sup>549</sup> Spanish Government, *Directiva de Defensa Nacional*, 1992, 4.

What was driving Spain's blunt support for a Europe of defence in the 1990s? The answer is found at the very opening of that same NDD: "...changes in the political systems of Central and Eastern European states and the Soviet Union"<sup>550</sup>. Javier Solana, not only the EU's top diplomat for a decade (1999-2009), but also Spain's Foreign Minister when the Maastricht Treaty was being negotiated, referred to the importance of the collapse of the Soviet Union when it comes to understanding the emergence of CSDP: "CSDP has the tools that Europeans deemed necessary to deal with the consequences of the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the end of a number of empires, mainly the Soviet one, and to some extent others in Africa"<sup>551</sup>.

Spain found widespread support for its desires in other EU partners. The shock produced by the sudden end of the Cold War and its potential consequences for stability in Central and Eastern Europe led many European states to worry and to adopt very similar positions regarding the future of the EU. As every other major EU treaty, Maastricht had to be approved by unanimity of Union Member States.

The Balkans would soon become the real source of security problems and conflict in the decade that followed the end of the Cold War. And as this thesis would suggest, those events led a number of European states to call for greater EU integration on matters of defence. The White Book Spain published in the year 2000 could not have stated the matter more clearly: "(these developments) emphasize the need for Europe to strengthen its security and defence in its geopolitical environment, seriously threatened by the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo"<sup>552</sup>. This same argument is repeated a few pages later in the White Book's third chapter, titled "Spain's Defence Policy", under the sub-header "Relevant Geopolitical Spaces" and its first section titled "European Vocation": "The crises of

<sup>550</sup> Spanish Government, *Directiva de Defensa Nacional*, 1992, 2.

<sup>551</sup> Interview with Javier Solana, Madrid, 11-10-2012

<sup>552</sup> Spanish Defence Ministry, *Libro Blanco*, 2000, 42.

Bosnia and Kosovo have led us (Europeans) to the conviction that Europe must have a system of security and defence capable of tackling the threats we might face”<sup>553</sup>. Javier Solana summed up this way of viewing the birth of CSDP in the following manner:

This (CSDP) emerges out of the breakup of Yugoslavia. That is what pushes us to strengthen our capabilities, and to take our relationship with the region beyond commerce. *Without that ‘shake up’ its almost impossible to understand the emergence of the EU’s hard security dimension* (my emphasis).<sup>554</sup>

Spain was supportive of the conclusions of the Saint Maló declaration of 1998 that called for the strengthening of CSDP and the EU’s hard security capabilities. When European leaders met in Cologne in June of the following year, Spain was one of the key backers of the institutionalisation of Saint Malo’s conclusions and the further development of CSDP. This was the consensus that emerged out of that 1999 European Council meeting of which Spain was an active participant:

We, the members of the European Council, are resolved that the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage. To that end, we intend to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence.<sup>555</sup>

It is evident from the above that the conflicts in the Balkans led to the emergence of an EU security and defence. Spaniards were key players in that process by connecting ‘external shocks’ to their policy preferences and by supporting a greater EU role in the region. As we have seen in previous chapters, a similar dynamic existed in other EU Member States.

Spanish support for CSDP was consistent throughout the 2000s, both in words and deeds. In the 2004 NDD, Spain outlined “seven vectors for defence policy”. The very first of them read as follows:

To significantly develop the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union through Spain’s commitment to the Helsinki 2010 Headline Goal, our contribution to the Battlegroups, as well as through our participation in the European Capability Action Plan and the European Defence Agency.<sup>556</sup>

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<sup>553</sup> *Ibid.*, 64.

<sup>554</sup> Interview with Javier Solana, Madrid, 11-10-2012

<sup>555</sup> European Council, *Presidency Conclusions*, Cologne, 1999.

<sup>556</sup> Spanish Government, *Directiva de Defensa Nacional*, 2004, 6-7.

Spanish support for CSDP operations in the Balkans was a constant feature of the country's defence policy, and Spanish troops and capabilities were deployed in numerous places. The Balkans saw a particular concentration of EU missions, as one would have expected. Spain has contributed to each and every one of the CSDP military operations there to date (2016).

### **11-M Terrorist Attacks**

The 2000s saw Spain push for the 'Europeanization' of specific areas of security. Some analysis reveals that such moves were, again, preceded by security crises. In the year 2004, for example, Spain suffered one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in its history. On the morning of the 11<sup>th</sup> of March, several explosions at commuter trains approaching the Atocha train station in Madrid took the lives of 191 people and injured over 1,800. Although it was at first unclear whether it had been orchestrated by the Basque separatist group ETA, authorship of the attack was quickly attributed to al Qaeda. Spain quickly turned to other European states for support in the fight against this growing international threat. The 2004 NDD contained numerous references to the need to counter global terrorism and to do it in collaboration with partners:

The fight against these new threats, particularly terrorism, should be central to the strategy of international organizations of security and defence. Europe too must tackle them with determination if it does not want to become an easy target. In that effort Europe can count on Spain's explicit and determined support...<sup>557</sup>

Numerous interviews conducted for this thesis confirmed that Spain has wanted to enhance European powers in the fight against terrorism, a consequence of its many years of fight against ETA and also the 11-M experience. Spain played a key role in calling and providing content for the EU Council Declaration of the 25th of March of 2004 on "Combating Terrorism" which opens with the following lines: "The European Council,

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<sup>557</sup> Spanish Government, *Directiva de Defensa Nacional*, 2004, 2.

deeply shocked by the terrorist attacks in Madrid, expresses its sympathy and solidarity to the victims, their families and to the Spanish people”<sup>558</sup>. That declaration called for the inclusion of a solidarity clause in EU treaties which would finally be included in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty and which reads as follows:

The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the means at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States.<sup>559</sup>

The 2004 EU Council Declaration on Combating Terrorism also requested the full development of EU initiatives linked to the fight against terrorism, such as the EU Directive on Compensation to Crime Victims, the European Arrest Warrant, the establishment of Eurojust<sup>560</sup> or the creation of a European Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator within the Council Secretariat. All of these issues would be developed further in the EU’s Counterterrorism Strategy approved in 2005<sup>561</sup>. Of course the list provided here is not a complete one and the EU’s counterterrorism apparatus is today highly complex and brings together legislative, institutional and financial capabilities. Suffice to say here that the 11-M terrorist attack in Madrid and subsequent action on the part of the Spanish government led to the significant enhancement of those capabilities, and that as anticipated by this thesis it led to a clear deepening of EU integration.

That this was possible and that other EU partners were willing to go along with it had, of course, a lot to do with there being a general consensus in Europe that this was a threat that affected numerous states. This feeling of shared interests and a shared threat was then tragically proven correct when London suffered a major terrorist attack in the summer of 2005. As indicated in Chapter 4, France would later suffer its own terrorist attacks in early

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<sup>558</sup> European Council, *Declaration on Combating Terrorism* (Brussels: EU, 2004)

<sup>559</sup> Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Functioning on the European Union, 2010, Art 222.

<sup>560</sup> Eurojust is the EU’s agency that promotes cooperation on criminal justice matters across Member State jurisdictions.

<sup>561</sup> European Council, *European Union Counter Terrorism Strategy*.

2015 and in 2016, which would lead, yet again, to calls for the further enhancement of the EU's power in the field of counter-terrorism.

### **Immigration Crisis of 2006**

Another security shock suffered by Spain during this period was the immigration crisis of 2006. That year there were record numbers of illegal immigrants, mostly from Sub Saharan Africa, attempting to reach the Canary Islands by boat, as well as others trying to jump the 'fence' that separates the Spanish African outpost of Melilla from Morocco. Bernardino Leon, Deputy Foreign Minister of Spain at the time, and later Special Representative of the EU for the Southern Mediterranean, had the following to say about those events:

Immigration has always been a central issue in Europe. We [Spaniards] tried to Europeanize immigration policy as much as possible during my tenure...The crisis of immigration began in 2006 with the attempt of a large number of Sub-Saharan Africans to jump the fence. We quickly suggested a dozen measures together with the Moroccans...This was a real crisis. There were days when we had 3000 people trying to reach the Canary Islands by boat. So we asked Frontex<sup>562</sup> to assume as a first important task the control of European frontiers in the Atlantic. Europe accepted and a large mission was launched.<sup>563</sup>

Although Frontex does not formally fall within the umbrella of CFSP/CSDP some of its tasks have a clear security dimension. This was surely the case of Europe's mission "Hera", and particularly of "Hera II", launched in the Eastern Atlantic Ocean in 2006, with the following mandate:

Perform surveillance of the Atlantic maritime borders of the European Union, with the prime objective of preventing the loss of immigrants' lives at sea and assisting Spain in dealing with the migration situation in the area of the Canary Islands and to fight against organize crime on illegal migration.<sup>564</sup>

That Spain was capable of turning this "domestic" issue into a European-wide one was a consequence of the existence of the Schengen Area. The birth of the Schengen Area

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<sup>562</sup> For more on Frontex, the EU agency for the management of immigration, asylum and security: <http://frontex.europa.eu>

<sup>563</sup> Interview with Bernardino Leon, Madrid, 28-10-2012.

<sup>564</sup> More information on the Hera missions here: <http://frontex.europa.eu/news/longest-frontex-coordinated-operation-hera-the-canary-islands-WpQlsc>

dates back to the mid 1980s when a reduced number of EU Member States decided to abolish borders between them and to create, in effect, a single common frontier. By 2006 the Schengen Area had 26 members, with a population of over 400 million, and had become an integral part of the EU architecture. Out of the current 28 EU Members States, 22 are part of the Schengen Area, and most of the others are legally bound to join in the coming years.

One of the consequences of the establishment of the Schengen Area, is what this thesis would term a spillover from non-security integration to the security realm. Any threat to the border of a Schengen Member State seems to have now become a threat to the rest. What was born out of a desire to eliminate barriers to internal travel has now become a major driver of a common security policy. The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, also known as Frontex, was born in mid-2005 precisely to protect the common external border. When Spain suffered the immigration crisis of 2006 it had an easy task in building a European consensus around a response by Frontex. Any illegal immigrants reaching Spanish soil would in effect be reaching EU territory and be capable of traveling within the entire Schengen Area without the need of going through a single passport check. What would have been a national crisis a decade or two before was in 2006 one that called for collective action<sup>565</sup>. This was a clear case of an external shock affecting a Member State, shaping its policy, leading it to call for a common European response and, almost directly, to the EU expanding its security and defence activities.

The more recent migration crisis that saw extraordinary numbers of refugees arriving in Europe's shores in 2015 and 2016 from war-torn countries such as Afghanistan, Syria

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<sup>565</sup> In 2013 and 2014 Italy suffered a very similar crisis with immigrants trying to reach the Mediterranean island of Lampedusa from Northern Africa. Most of these immigrants were coming from conflict-torn countries such as Libya or Syria. In mid-2014 the EU agreed to launch a Frontex mission in the Southern Mediterranean called Triton.

or Libya seems to have produced a similar response to the one studied above. Although political tension has increased within Europe regarding the numbers of refugees to be accepted by each Member State<sup>566</sup>, the truth of the matter is that the EU has now deployed an operation in the Mediterranean to address the issue, EUNAVFOR Med Sophia, and has formally decided to convert Frontex into a full fledged European Border and Coast Guard with a broader mandate and greater capabilities<sup>567</sup>. The writing of this dissertation is of course too close to these events for a full analysis of their consequences but it seems evident that they are producing what one would have expected were the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis to be correct. An external shock hit some members of the European security community, in this instance border states such as Greece and Italy, as well as others on the routes of migrants and destination countries like Germany and Sweden. That shock led to pressures to integrate certain areas of security and defence policy and new action and institutions were born out of the process. One would expect that future shocks of this nature will continue to produce such pressure and ultimately lead to the perfection of the EU's border management system as well as to further deepening of the common asylum policy.

### **The Arab Spring**

The various popular uprisings that shook the Arab world in late 2010, and known as the Arab Spring, took Spanish strategic planners by surprise. In a matter of months, the political landscape of the Southern Mediterranean had changed markedly. This had direct security implications for Spain ranging from immigration to energy supply and to the safety of key trade relations with the states affected. Spain's 2013 SSS tackled this issue

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<sup>566</sup> It should be noted that similar tensions were seen in the United States of America regarding which states would take Syrian refugees.

<sup>567</sup> For a detailed timeline of actions undertaken by the European Council on this matter see: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressures/history-migratory-pressures/>

extensively, and when it came to enumerating possible responses to events in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt it had the following to say: “Spain must forward the common security in the Mediterranean not only bilaterally, but also through supporting and leading initiatives within broader frameworks, like the Union for the Mediterranean, Europe’s Neighbourhood Policy and others...”<sup>568</sup>. This response is yet again in line with what one would expect of a state living a security community. Once hit by an external shock, it seeks the cooperation of its community partners.

Spain was successful in building a European consensus around the need for a common diplomatic response in large part because other important EU Members States were also affected by the Arab Spring and had similar interests at stake. This desire of EU Member States to elevate the management of the situation to the EU level was indeed confirmed by Bernardino Leon, who, at the time of this interview in late 2012, was the EU’s top foreign policy official dealing with the Arab Spring:

I saw this as a great opportunity and I said to Ashton<sup>569</sup>: ‘now is the time for Europe to lead on this (the Arab Spring). There are countries, France, Spain or Italy that have strong positions. But they are all interested in seeing a European position emerge’... The end result has been that the EU has led in this region as is today the most important external actor there.<sup>570</sup>

Acting in the region has meant utilising the EU’s soft power, mainly development aid, and supporting institutional development.

Interestingly, some Spanish interviewees were of the opinion that more forceful action should have been undertaken by the EU in this region. In this regard, Spanish views about security in the Southern Mediterranean were similar to those of French policymaking elites. For example, many Spaniards believed that the EU’s inability to tackle the security crisis in Libya and the need to ask for NATO/American support was a clear sign of failure: “Libya is proof of how the EU must evolve. It needs to be politically and militarily

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<sup>568</sup> Spanish Government Presidency, *Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional*, 15.

<sup>569</sup> Leon is referring here to Catherine Ashton, at the time High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

<sup>570</sup> Interview with Bernardino Leon, Madrid, 28-10-2012.

capable of undertaking a mission of that nature in the future without American support”<sup>571</sup>. Others said that because “stability in the Sahel is essential for the EU as a whole, including Spain and France”<sup>572</sup> trouble in that region would “...galvanize the EU to act collectively there”<sup>573</sup>.

As was to be expected Spain supported EU action in Africa consistently since the early 2000s. The country participated in all of the EU missions deployed there between 2004 and 2014 and also contributed to non-EU efforts like French Operation Serval in Mali<sup>574</sup>. When it comes to Africa, Spain’s case is not dissimilar from that of France. Shocks coming from that region have led Spain to call for a common EU response. As Chapter 4 showed, whether those calls were received with sympathy depended on the strategic interests at stake and the sort of response being called for.

### **Conclusions: External Shocks and Spanish EU policy**

Beyond the major events cited above, research done for this thesis revealed many other minor issues that led Spanish policymakers to push for common European action. For example, and as explored in Chapter 4, Spanish support for the EU’s Atalanta Operation off the coast of Somalia increased markedly after the Spanish fishing vessel *Playa de Bakio* was hijacked by pirates in 2008. The capture of the *Alakrana* in 2009<sup>575</sup> intensified Spanish support for EUNAVFOR further. This is in line with the overall reactive nature of CSDP operations. These are there to tackle situations where the interests of a group of EU Member States are affected. As Javier Solana put it: “Our missions were *a response to*

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<sup>571</sup> Interview with Philippe Berenguer, Madrid, 30-10-2012.

<sup>572</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>573</sup> Interview with Juan Martinez Nunez, Madrid, 30-10-2012.

<sup>574</sup> Spain contributed with transport capabilities to Operation Serval and was later the second largest contributor of troops to the EU’s training mission in Mali, EUTM Mali launched in early 2013.

<sup>575</sup> More on this:

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/somalia/6515533/Somali-pirates-threaten-to-kill-crew-of-Spanish-vessel-if-demands-are-not-met.html>

*circumstances* in places where Europe believed it should have a responsibility”<sup>576</sup> (my emphasis).

The analysis contained in the previous pages outlines, therefore, what could be termed a ‘narrative’ of European security and defence integration as seen through the Spanish case. This narrative suggests that EU Member States, like Spain, have in general terms supported EU security and defence integration across the board because of the prior existence of a European security community. That broad backing, by itself too weak to overcome the natural resistance to giving up security and defence powers, was punctuated by episodes of intense and specific backing for certain integrative measures. Those episodes were, in turn, preceded by external shocks or security crises, which exposed Spain to serious risks. Spanish political elites have confirmed time and time again that, indeed, their thinking was affected by external security events. The ability of Spanish elites to build a European consensus around certain common measures was then highly dependent on the impact that those external shocks had had on other EU Member States. If the strategic interests of other EU Member States were also being negatively affected by the shock in question, Spain was normally successful in getting them to back its desired policy, be it the creation of a new EU institution, the drafting of a common strategy, or the launch of a CSDP mission. This was confirmed by Spain’s Defence Minister himself who, when interviewed, said he was convinced of the convergence of Spanish and ‘European’ interests, and of the need to protect them through common action. He added that this would become evident through common experiences (not all of them positive) in the European neighbourhood.<sup>577</sup>

The list of instances used in this chapter and in previous ones to explore the validity of the theory suggested in the Introduction is not a comprehensive one. Many smaller

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<sup>576</sup> Interview with Javier Solana, Madrid, 11-10-2012.

<sup>577</sup> Interview with Pedro Morenés, Madrid, 30-11-2012

shocks are surely missing as well as the connection between them and the specific policies advocated by the Spanish government to address them. However, a strong case can be made that Spain was motivated to push for European integration by specific crises. Certainly, my research has not revealed a single instance of major Spanish support for the furthering of EU defence that was disconnected from one.

## **Chapter Overview**

This chapter has elucidated a number of important issues, given further nuance to the theory developed in chapter 1, and provided us with a solid case study, that of Spain, which seems to confirm the validity of the explanation of European security and defence integration suggested in this thesis. Spain, indeed, lives in a European security community. Its elites and the security documents they produce confirm that: threats to Spanish security lie outside the bounds of the EU, the country is more concerned with collective security gains in Europe than with relative ones, Spanish security problems tend to find European solutions, and, as time has gone by, Spanish strategy has become ever more dependent on EU strategic thinking. Belonging to a European security community has produced a constant or ‘background’ level of support for EU security and defence.

However, that support increased markedly after Spain was hit by certain shocks or security crises. In the past two decades, four such crises stand out: the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Balkan wars that followed the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, the 11-M terrorist attacks in Madrid, and the 2006 immigration crisis. A fifth shock, that of the Arab Spring and its consequences, affected Spain more severely than some other EU partners which ultimately produced a more timid response than the one desired by Spain.

As one would expect if this thesis’ theory were correct, external shocks led Spanish policymakers to request EU support. Spain was successful in ‘Europeanizing’ issues in

instances where there were other EU states affected by those shocks. As time has gone by this has produced an accumulation of power at the EU-level, be it through the building of institutions, the accumulation of strategy drafting competences in Brussels, or the growing practice of having EU missions around the world.

The following chapter will look at the interaction between European defence and NATO and will be followed by the thesis' Conclusions.

## **Chapter 7: The US, NATO and European Security and Defence**

### **Introduction**

No analysis of European security and defence can be complete without reference to the transatlantic partnership and NATO. Since the end of the Second World War the US presence in Europe was one of the central pieces in the puzzle of the Cold War, and it determined the defence policy of Western Europe. With the end of the end of the Warsaw Pact NATO started a slow expansion eastwards and its current membership almost perfectly overlaps with that of the EU <sup>578</sup>.

As discussed in the Introduction of this thesis the way NATO interacts with the EU or with CFSP/CSDP has been the subject of heated controversy. Some authors have claimed that balance of power politics was extirpated from Europe through the overwhelming US presence in the continent, others that the birth of an autonomous European security and defence would not have been possible without decades of cooperation within NATO. Others have seen NATO as an obstacle in the path towards more European integration.

Given that this dissertation aims to test the process through which CFSP/CSDP has emerged it is of fundamental importance that its interactions with NATO are looked into in detail. Does the Security Community that EU Member States inhabit extend to the other side of the Atlantic and include the US? When hit by a security crisis do European states turn to NATO in search for an organisation that can deal with its consequences? In instances where they have, have Europeans been successful in getting US engagement? Has this changed since the end of the Cold War? Are Europe-wide interests close to those of the US?

In the current strategic landscape with growing instability in the Southern Mediterranean, the crisis in Ukraine, as well as the announced US Pivot to Asia it is

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<sup>578</sup> See Appendix 2 for a map of security institutions in Europe and their membership

extremely important to understand the dynamics behind US engagement in European security and their impact on EU defence. This chapter will draw from insights obtained from empirical research conducted in France, Germany and Spain in an attempt to shed light on this important issue.

### **A Transatlantic Security Community?**

Chapter 5 of this thesis showed that Germany sees itself as part of a European security community. That fits well in the theoretical framework described in this thesis. It is that feeling of belonging to a group of friends and allies that led to strong German support for integration in Europe. The German case, however, also displays certain characteristics that, to some extent, do not fit that framework so cleanly. The most important is perhaps the fact that Germany has such a strong bond with the United States that it could be argued that it sees itself as part of a transatlantic security community rather than an exclusively European one.

In the Foreword of the 1994 German White Paper Chancellor Helmut Kohl seems to have conceded that indeed the US is part of that community when he equated in importance for Germany both European integration and the transatlantic link:

After decades of painful division, we have regained the unity of our fatherland in peace and freedom. Here, too, a decisive factor was that the Federal Republic of Germany unwaveringly adhered to the two mainstays of its foreign and security policy – the political unification of Europe and the transatlantic partnership and friendship with the United States and Canada.<sup>579</sup>

References to the transatlantic partnership as a central pillar of German security policy are pervasive in the country's strategic documents. Particularly common is the use of expressions such as the following: "The transatlantic partnership remains the foundation

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<sup>579</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheit*, 1994, 1.

of Germany's and Europe's common security. The North Atlantic Alliance will continue to be the cornerstone to Germany's future security and defence policy"<sup>580 581</sup>.

Karl Kaiser, a long-time researcher on transatlantic relations, also expressed a firm belief that the: "the security community [inhabited by Germany] is genuinely Atlantic, i.e. it includes the US"<sup>582</sup>. And added: "An Atlantic civilization has emerged in which war among its members has become unthinkable"<sup>583</sup>. The message coming from Germany is therefore clear, the US is a trusted partner that poses no security threat to Germany. War with America is unthinkable, which is the essence of a security community.

Does the fact that German elites believe so strongly in a transatlantic security community mean that one truly exists? Does this invalidate the theoretical arguments forwarded by this thesis? Should external shocks lead to security integration in the Atlantic space given there seems to be a security community in place? All of these questions need to be addressed before we can proceed with further analysis on NATO and the CFSP/CSDP-NATO relation.

There are here two important observations to be made here. First, although many EU Member States feel that a strong partnership with the US is in their national interest it is uncommon for European states to define their relation to the US in terms as exalted as those used by Germany. Germany's particular approach to this issue has a lot to do with the country's history since 1945. Article 87, paragraph 2, of the German Basic Law, which as discussed in Chapter 5 limits the country's ability to act unilaterally, was a clear attempt to limit German military action to NATO. The Bundeswehr itself was "designed from the outset to be embedded in the alliance"<sup>584</sup>. As German Army divisions, Air Force wings

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<sup>580</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik*, 2006, 7.

<sup>581</sup> Or as indicated in 2011: "The North Atlantic Alliance remains the centrepiece of our defence efforts".

See: German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien*, 2011, p. 6.

<sup>582</sup> Interview with Karl Kaiser, Cambridge MA, 15-03-2015

<sup>583</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>584</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *The Bundeswehr on Operations* 2009, 9.

and Navy vessels were procured they were automatically assigned to NATO. This was the case for many decades, making Germany's military, effectively, an offspring of the Alliance. As described by a report produced by the German Ministry of Defence in 2009 marking the 15th anniversary of the first Bundeswehr mission, itself a NATO operation:

...right from the start, its integration into the international structures of NATO played an important role in the shaping of the Bundeswehr. The Bundeswehr thus dispensed with a traditional military command structure such as a national general staff, as most of the military formations were assigned to NATO and operational command and control in a state of defence would have been assumed by NATO HQs.<sup>585</sup>

This is of course an oddity in the European landscape, with no other state having such a wide-ranging commitment to NATO or such a hierarchical dependency for such a long time.

It is far more common for EU Member States to see the US as an alliance partner rather than a full member of a 'Euro Atlantic' security community. Security documents throughout Europe as well as policymaking elites refer differently to the US and to other EU Member States, with the latter receiving special treatment as partners and colleagues in a common political project. France and Spain, two important actors in EU security and defence, have repeatedly expressed their full commitment to political integration in Europe, which they see as their countries' destinies. The US is an important ally for both states but there is no talk of that relationship being more than a partnership that is there to act in case common interests are put at risk.

It is still the case that EU Member States do not see any major security threats emerging from the United States. At least in this narrow sense of security community (i.e. the lack of threat) one can argue that there is one in existence in the Atlantic space. However, it would be a mistake to confuse it with the depth of the community now in place in Europe. This is how France's latest White Book on Defence captured this distinction, and in particular the differences between NATO and the EU: "NATO is a

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<sup>585</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *The Bundeswehr on Operations* 2009, 13.

political-military alliance, whereas the European Union is, for its members, a global project with political, economic, commercial, diplomatic and military dimensions”<sup>586</sup>. If the Atlantic community is one where threat is non-existent, the European one is that and more.

This leads us to the second important point to be made about the transatlantic partnership and its impact on European security and defence. Developments of the past two decades as well as empirical work developed for this dissertation suggest that there is a significant gap between American and European strategic interests. That divergence is caused by differences in the location and the intensity of strategic interests. Differences in intensity of interests are particularly noteworthy because they are sometimes not clearly identified but they lead to variance in policy goals and in the means used to attain them. In instances where the US and a collective of European states have had shared interests the creation of a common front was an effective option. In other scenarios, where interests or their intensity have diverged, both sides of the Atlantic have adopted different policies and tactics<sup>587</sup>. Security challenges emerging from Northern Africa and the Balkans have since the end of the Cold War deserved limited US attention, forcing Europeans to assume greater responsibility in these areas, and to do so together. As seen in previous chapters EU action has been most common in precisely these two areas of the world.

Germany is again in this regard somewhat of an outlier in Europe as it seems to be convinced that its interests overlap almost entirely with those of the US. Germany listed in 1994 as one of its five most important strategic interests “The lasting transatlantic alliance, based on a community of values and similar interests, with the United States as a world

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<sup>586</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2013, 59.

<sup>587</sup> It needs to be noted here that when referring to Europe I am speaking of the majority of EU Member States. There are of course divisions within the EU itself and some states tend to find themselves agreeing more than others with US policy and objectives. This does not invalidate the argument as the divergence between the US and certain Member States is reflected at the EU level.

power, for the potential of the USA is indispensable for international stability”<sup>588</sup>. And in 2006 the country’s Defence Policy Guidelines added:

The friendly relations between Germany and the United States of America have developed historically; they are based on common cultural roots, and are an expression of a community of shared values and interests that has proved its worth time and again.<sup>589</sup>

In 2013 the two largest parties in Germany, the CDU and the SPD, stated in their coalition agreement that “The transatlantic partnership is based on a foundation of shared values and interests, and today therefore holds the key to freedom, security and prosperity for all”<sup>590</sup>. Karl Kaiser conceded some differences in tactics across the Atlantic but not on the basic goals of policy:

Germany’s strategic interests are very similar to the US, though throughout the postwar period as on contemporary issues there are tactical differences, e.g. on dealing with Russia, but in essence the long term interests are similar and considered as such by the German political class.<sup>591</sup>

However, the distinction between US and European interests is far more apparent for other EU Member States. Hubert Védrine’s report to French President Francois Hollande in 2012 referred to that distinction in no uncertain terms:

It must be clearly stated that NATO will remain an Alliance around the world’s leading military power, the United States, with whom we share fundamental values, *but whose orientations and policies may vary considerably from our own every two or four years*...Vigilance means that we must take care that the Alliance remains a military alliance, focused on collective defence, acting as little as possible as a political and military alliance (my emphasis).<sup>592</sup>

Just as EU Member States were brought closer together through economic and political integration the transatlantic partners were pulled apart by the end of the Cold War, which eliminated the common enemy, as well as by the rise of China, which is seen through radically different lenses by Europe and the US<sup>593</sup>. Unsurprisingly EU Member States have actually seen eye to eye on some of the most pressing security issues of the

<sup>588</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheit*, 1994, 27.

<sup>589</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik*, 2006, 24-25.

<sup>590</sup> CDU/CSU and SPD, *Deutschlands Zukunft gestalten*, 2013, 108.

<sup>591</sup> Interview with Karl Kaiser, Cambridge, MA, 15-03-2015

<sup>592</sup> Védrine, Hubert, *Report for the President of the French Republic*, 19.

<sup>593</sup> More on the rise of China and its implications for transatlantic relations further in this chapter.

past twenty years. Be it in the Balkans, Ukraine or the fight against illegal immigration, most EU states have agreed to work together. EU integration seems to be slowly spilling over into security and defence matters, for example through the establishment of a common border due to Schengen. This entanglement has produced a convergence of strategic interests within the EU that has not occurred at the transatlantic level where a deep free trade agreement, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), is only now being discussed.

The relevance of NATO for US strategic thinking is a good proxy for the level of strategic interest overlap between the US and its European allies. And as pointed out by Jolyon Howorth, a Professor at Yale and Bath universities and an expert on European security and defence:

NATO is not central to American strategic thinking. It has been there for a long time and it serves as a means of transmitting American strategic preferences to the Europeans. But 93% of American troops never go anywhere near NATO. This is not to say it is irrelevant. But despite all the spin I do not think the Americans see NATO as something fundamental. They would have wished NATO to become a 'meaningful global alliance' in the kind of liberal democracy sense, but it was never going to do that. The Europeans were opposed<sup>594</sup>.

It is unlikely that Germany and other EU states that place such great importance on the transatlantic link will see their hopes for cooperation with the US fulfilled. Some German policymaking elites are already aware of this risk. When asked if US interests could be opposed to those of Germany Joaquim Spatz said:

Maybe not opposed, but not the same or in the same intensity as the US. [In some instances the US and Europeans will have different positions regarding an intervention] Libya was just short of being a case of this<sup>595 596</sup>.

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<sup>594</sup> Interview with Jolyon Howorth, Paris, 02-07-2012

<sup>595</sup> Interview with Joachim Spatz, Berlin, 19-04-2013

<sup>596</sup> This issue of US-European interests not overlapping perfectly was also addressed by Ulrich Finkebusch: "One case in point that illustrates our interests are not always identical: The Caucasus and our dependence on oil and gas. The US will be happy on their own with fracking, so they won't need any foreign oil be it from the Caucasus or the Persian Gulf. We, the Europeans, are still very much interested in building the Nabucco pipeline and getting all these countries into our field of influence. We just have a much stronger interest. The US may not be counter to our interest but we have a much stronger interest in the Caucasus". Source: Interview with Ulrich Finkebusch, Berlin, 10-04-2013

Constanze Stelzemuller, in turn, insisted that European and US interests overlap but are perhaps of different intensity in a number of places:

There are very few areas in the European periphery where America does not have a first or second order strategic interest. Middle East number one and North Africa number two. They may be less interested in Eastern Europe from Belarus to Ukraine to Georgia these days [2013] than in the previous administration but they're still not disinterested. Sahel to the extent that it becomes a retreat for Al Qaeda franchises to trickle upwards or who attack American deployed forces or bases. So I think you are almost always going to have a situation where American interests are touched. So you are always going to want to consult the Americans and as Europeans want to ensure they are not going to be very unhappy with what you are doing but I think it is going to be less and less likely than they are going to give any input either in terms of participation or assets. That's the new thing that we have to learn to manage.<sup>597</sup>

Irrespectively of the extent of the security community European states inhabit it seems clear that when shocks hit them they are going to find much more willing interlocutors in other EU colleagues than in the other side of the Atlantic<sup>598</sup>. It is the combination of a true security community and of strategic interest overlap that will produce integration in this field. A security community by itself is only a guarantee of peace in a given space but does not necessarily lead to cooperation, let alone some form of integration.

## **Europe, the US and NATO**

The empirical research conducted for this thesis provided interesting insights into the multifaceted Europe-US relationship. The existence of NATO and its interactions with CFSP and CSDP have been particularly complex and sometimes difficult to analyse in a systematic way. It is unclear if NATO and CSDP are complementary, redundant or in competition. In a changing security landscape the function of each institution is also shifting which makes arriving at a clear framework of analysis for that partnership almost impossible. The study of the strategic postures and the opinion of policymaking elites in France, Germany and Spain, three very important EU and NATO members has shed some

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<sup>597</sup> Interview with Constanze Stelzenmüller, 04-04-2013

<sup>598</sup> See Figures 1.4 and 1.5 in Chapter 1 for a depiction of the interaction between a security community, external shocks and strategic interests that helps navigate the arguments made here.

light on these issues. Four important observations with implications for the theory suggested here can be made:

1. From Confusion to Coexistence: most EU states were unsure about how NATO and CFSP/CSDP should interact with many finally settling for coexistence of both as an adequate arrangement.
2. Division of Labour: German, Spanish and French policymakers have in general terms expressed an interest in seeing NATO take care of continental defence in Europe while CSDP could take on peacekeeping and peacemaking operations in the EU neighbourhood.
3. Transatlantic Free Riding, Burden Sharing and the US Pivot Away from Europe: European states have greatly benefited from the American security umbrella. This rational policy has enabled them to invest less in their security and defence. The US is today operating under both severe budget constraints and a shifting strategic landscape. These developments are putting pressure on Europeans to take care of security matters in their neighbourhood.
4. The US as a Spoiler of EU Security and Defence Integration: The US presence in Europe has allowed Europeans to free-ride on American defence spending and to avoid having to negotiate common European solutions to common challenges. This presence seems to have aborted the integration cycle described in this thesis. The birth of CFSP/CSDP and its relatively modest development can be explained precisely as a consequence of a reduction of US interest in European security.

### **From Confusion to Coexistence**

Almost all EU Member States seem to have problems when it comes to defining the way the EU and NATO should interact. In the early 1990s, and as indicated before, most EU

Member States were preoccupied with managing the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union, particularly the conflicts that erupted in the former Yugoslavia. This was the preeminent security issue for Europeans at the time, and something to be addressed collectively. It was, however, unclear if it should be the Western European Union, the nascent CFSP, NATO or even the UN with European assets that should deal with all these emerging security issues. What was finally decided was to refer to all of those institutions in key security documents.

Spain's 1996 National Defence Directive, for example, read as follows: "Spain will contribute to the definition of a defence policy within the European Union that is compatible with NATO, and it will actively participate in the development of the WEU, increasing its political and operational capabilities"<sup>599</sup>. Which institution would do what and when was not specified. As CSDP gained in both institutional and operational capacity it became ever more pressing to define its role and functions, as well as its relationship with NATO. Spanish strategic documents however opted once again to refer to both and to call for their coexistence without adding much detail to how that should be arranged. The 2003 Security Defence Review recognized the strategic significance of CSDP and suggested that it might lead to some European "autonomy":

With this new institutional capacity [CSDP] the EU becomes a truly strategic actor, altering to some extent the strategic landscape: there is now not only an Atlantic dimension to security, manifested in NATO, but also the possibility of the Europeans developing their own missions autonomously.<sup>600</sup>

And yet, that autonomy and a prominent NATO should live side by side:

Despite the above, Spain is aware that the Atlantic Alliance is still today the backbone of European defence, and that the objective of a European defence led by Europeans rather than hinder transatlantic relations should be to reinforce them. This is why Spain also wishes to see an enlarged and transformed NATO, with greater military capabilities and ready to tackle the new global threats like terrorism.<sup>601</sup>

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<sup>599</sup> Spanish Government, *Directiva de Defensa Nacional*, 1996, 3.

<sup>600</sup> Spanish Defence Ministry, *Revision Estrategica de la Defensa*, 2003, 38.

<sup>601</sup> Spanish Defence Ministry, *Revision Estrategica de la Defensa*, 2003, 37.

How the two organizations should relate to one another remained unclear, even after the signing of the Berlin Plus agreement in 2002<sup>602</sup>. Instead of providing any strategic guidance as to how the two organisations should interact, Berlin Plus contained a narrow set of instructions for the use of NATO assets during EU operations. So, the 2000s saw no improvement in the clarity of European thinking about this issue. Documents of all kinds continued to reference both institutions as absolutely complimentary, but without any explanation of how that complementarity would work, as well as to their membership as being almost one and the same thing<sup>603</sup>. When Spain's current Defence Minister was asked how CSDP and NATO should interact he simply said: "As they have done until now, with complementarity...We need to be aware that both institutions have different strategic concepts, which might overlap greatly, but they also have their differences...For this reason each can have somewhat differentiated objectives and yet coexist"<sup>604</sup>. The differences in strategic outlook are, however, unclear, and when asked if participation in CSDP and NATO were of "identical" importance to Spain, Morenés replied that "membership in both organizations *is an indivisible whole* for Spain, that allows us to opt for different solutions to different problems" (my emphasis)<sup>605</sup>. Some people like Captain Carlos Cordon of the Spanish Navy were more open and blunt about the open ended nature of Spanish policy towards CSDP and NATO: "Are we pro-European, or pro-NATO? I do not know. I have never known. We have had no consistency here"<sup>606</sup>.

France's take on this subject has not been much sharper with a clear confusion about the role to be played by NATO and CSDP. This has been particularly acute since 2009

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<sup>602</sup> Berlin Plus was a comprehensive package of agreements signed by the EU and NATO in 2002. Their fundamental aim was to allow the two organizations to cooperate more closely, mainly by giving the nascent CSDP access to NATO capabilities.

<sup>603</sup> This was clearly the case again of Spain's latest National Defence Directive (2012): "Members of the EU and NATO – and Spain among them – will have to arrive at the right means to project their action abroad given that remaining concerned only with territorial defence is not an option". See: Spanish Government, *Directiva de Defensa Nacional*, 2012, 4.

<sup>604</sup> Interview with Pedro Morenés, Madrid, 30-11-2012.

<sup>605</sup> Interview with Pedro Morenés, Madrid, 30-11-2012.

<sup>606</sup> Interview with Carlos Cordon, Madrid, 29-10-2012.

when President Sarkozy decided France should return to the Alliance's integrated military command<sup>607</sup>. In 2012 former Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine produced a report for President Francois Hollande on France's relationship with NATO and on the consequences of Sarkozy's 2009 decision<sup>608</sup>. In that report Védrine makes an overall positive assessment of the decision pointing out some significant successes on the part of France like the appointment of a French General to the position of Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, the increased engagement of French troops and officers in NATO structures and the country's influence on Alliance grand strategy. He is less optimistic when assessing France's influence over the specific strategy followed in the Afghanistan operation, or the impact membership will have on the French defence industry.

Védrine's analysis is particularly interesting for the purposes of this study because it serves as a window into the thinking behind France's return to NATO during the Sarkozy years. In Védrine's words: "The newly elected President [Sarkozy in 2007] argued that, since France is one of the leading contributors [to NATO], she should have a real say in planning and carrying out operations, and furthermore, by returning to the integrated military command, France would mitigate her Allies' mistrust concerning its Europe of Defence initiatives"<sup>609</sup>. Sarkozy himself expressed this eloquently during his speech in the US Congress on the 7<sup>th</sup> of November 2007: "the more successful we are in establishing a European defence, the more France will be resolved to resume its full role in NATO"<sup>610</sup>. In 2008 he made the link between the evolution of France's commitment to NATO and the progress of European defence even more explicit:

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<sup>607</sup> For a historical account of French NATO policy before the decision by President Sarkozy to rejoin the integrated military command of the Alliance see Anand Menon, *France, NATO and the Limits of Independence 1981-97: The Politics of Ambivalence* (London: Macmillan, 2000)

<sup>608</sup> Védrine, *Report for the President of the French Republic*.

<sup>609</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

<sup>610</sup> Nicolas Sarkozy, "Speech by President Sarkozy Before Congress," (Speech by President Sarkozy, Washington D.C., 7 November, 2007).

Today, the White Paper Commission...found that there is nothing to stop us from participating in NATO military structures, since, to my mind, there can be no progress on France's integration into NATO unless there is first progress on the Europe of Defence.<sup>611</sup>

This way of connecting the future of NATO and CSDP has only deepened the confusion between the nature of each organisation and the way they should interact.

NATO itself has not been free from this lack of clarity. In a clear concession to Sarkozy and his efforts to bring France back into the Alliance the 2009 NATO Summit produced a declaration which contained the following reference to the Europe of Defence: "NATO recognises the importance of a stronger and more capable European defence, and welcomes the EU's efforts to strengthen its capabilities and its capacity to address common security challenges that both NATO and the EU face today"<sup>612</sup>. This support, as well as the overall desire to keep the Alliance well connected to CSDP was reaffirmed by NATO in its 2012 Summit declaration: "NATO and the European Union (EU) share common values and strategic interests, and are working side by side in crisis management operations. We are therefore determined to improve the NATO-EU strategic partnership, as agreed by our two organisations"<sup>613</sup>. That partnership is of course a reference to Berlin Plus and the missions both institutions have executed together.

This lack of clarity has lived side by side to the general feeling in Europe that NATO is of high value and something that should be kept in place. This was best captured by Vedrine's comments on the matter: "Europeans are deeply attached to the Alliance, starting with the countries that France thinks of first each time she attempts to revive the Europe of Defence, namely the United Kingdom and Germany"<sup>614</sup>. Ultimately, therefore, most European states have decided to call for the coexistence of both NATO and CFSP/CSDP.

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<sup>611</sup> Sarkozy, "Speech by President Sarkozy Before Congress,"

<sup>612</sup> North Atlantic Council, *Strasbourg / Kehl Summit Declaration*, (Strasbourg and Kehl: NATO, 2009).

<sup>613</sup> North Atlantic Council, *Lisbon Summit Declaration*, (Lisbon: NATO, 2012).

<sup>614</sup> Védérine, *Report for the President of the French Republic*, 13.

How that coexistence is managed in an efficient and sensible way has been the cause of debate. At least according to the people interviewed for this thesis there is a strong logic behind the notion of having CSDP be the basis of a ‘European pillar’ within NATO. This is what Joaquin Spatz, a senior German MP, said: “The best scenario would be that the Europeans or the European Union would develop its common foreign, defence, and security policy within the CSDP framework and then within NATO”<sup>615</sup>. This idea of the EU and NATO having to evolve in parallel and without competition is repeated in almost all German security documents<sup>616</sup>. Jorn Hasler, a German parliamentary advisor on matters of security and defence added some nuance to this notion of a European defence within NATO:

I see CSDP as the European Pillar within NATO...I see that we already have the military headquarters [SHAPE]. We already have one language [English]. We already have the procedures to work together militarily. We also have the NATO consultation procedures. But to really help the Americans we should have a stronger pillar of Europe within NATO and that could be CSDP. Then you can have CSDP missions without NATO assets, but still use NATO’s headquarters.<sup>617</sup>

Constanze Stelzenmüller went as far as to suggest that CSDP could only really develop within NATO:

I think that NATO is the house of CSDP, with a guest-room for the Americans. That’s the truth! You just have to look at the practice and European military collaboration is most real when it is organised by NATO, but the unspoken assumption, and one I think we can no longer rely on blindly, is that you will always have Americans at the table to say this is how it should be done.<sup>618</sup>

However, even if coexistence is managed and CSDP and NATO live side by side the question of who gets to do what would persist. When would the totality of NATO, meaning all its European and American members, engage in direct action and when would CSDP be the one to take on that burden? What would each organisation be for? It seems

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<sup>615</sup> Interview with Joachim Spatz, Berlin, 19-04-2013

<sup>616</sup> In Germany’s 2006 White Paper it is stated unequivocally: “The EU and NATO are not competitors; both make vital contributions to our security”. See: German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik*, 2006, 7

<sup>617</sup> Interview with Jorn Hasler, Berlin, 10-04-2013

<sup>618</sup> Interview with Constanze Stelzenmüller, 04-04-2013

that most EU Member States and definitely most of the people interviewed for this thesis saw a certain division of labour emerging between the two organisations.

### **Division of Labour**

The most nuanced answers to the question of how CFSP/CSDP and NATO could coexist referred to the need for some form of division of labour between the two organisations to be established. This was the answer of Spain's Defence Minister, Pedro Morenés, who believed NATO brought certain capabilities to the table that enabled it to do things the EU could not. CSDP, or the EU as a whole, in turn, would provide a set of civilian and development tools that the US military lacks, which would make it a good partner in complex and comprehensive operations, be it in Afghanistan, the Sahel or the Balkans. In the words of a top Spanish navy officer: "NATO can take care of the hard end of the force spectrum, missions etc, and the EU can take care of softer elements of security"<sup>619</sup>.

Spain's White Book published in the year 2000 attempted to be more specific about this division of tasks between the EU and the Alliance. At one point it suggests that collective defence would fall to NATO, while CSDP and the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI)<sup>620</sup> would be tools to increase Europe's contribution to transatlantic burden sharing:

The (collective) defence of Europe will continue to rest on NATO and, consequently, the development of the European Security and Defence Identity will bring greater responsibility to Europeans...or to put it differently, it will demand a greater commitment on the part of Europeans regarding their own defence.<sup>621</sup>

This idea of CSDP being a tool to strengthen European defence but of doing so within the NATO framework would become a recurrent one in Spanish security documents.

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<sup>619</sup> Interview with Carlos Cordon, Madrid, 29-10-2012.

<sup>620</sup> ESDI was a European "pillar" built within NATO. It was meant to bring Europeans together and help them coordinate their efforts within the Alliance.

<sup>621</sup> Spanish Defence Ministry, *Libro Blanco de la Defensa*, 2000, 50.

Interestingly this same notion of both cooperation and division of labour between the EU and NATO has also developed in German security documents. The division is not clearly delineated and in some instances both institutions seem to be called to do the same things. However, Germany seems comfortable with NATO taking on the responsibility for continental defence of Europe. In the 2011 German Defence Policy Guidelines this is expressed quite clearly: “Against this backdrop the Bundeswehr assumes the following interconnected tasks: territorial defence as collective defence within the North Atlantic Alliance...”<sup>622</sup>. The same idea was repeated numerous times in interviews in Berlin:

Hard core territorial defence of NATO countries will still be the main business of NATO. I don't think the US will disengage fully from Europe. They would probably not disengage from territorial defence, but from everything on the outer perimeter of it like keeping things in order and calm in the neighbourhood, like Libya.<sup>623</sup>

For Germany it is the defence of that perimeter which would be the natural task of the EU. The EU's CSDP would be better suited to more civilian tasks like stability operations, border management, state capacity building and other such missions<sup>624</sup>.

In 2013 Jasper Wieck, at the time of the interview Head of the Defence and Security Policy Division within the German Foreign Ministry, captured the German position on this in the following quote:

We want NATO to remain strong, to remain the pillar of our defence and life insurance, but also a tool for international crisis management when this becomes complex and difficult...We would never exclude that in the future, the EU could be able to do more robust things. There should be no stop signs. This would hamper any productivity in the medium term, but we would say the added value of the EU is its comprehensive approach and to link all the various crisis management instruments we have into an all-encompassing approach.<sup>625</sup>

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<sup>622</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien*, 2011, 9.

<sup>623</sup> Interview with Ulrich Finkebusch, Berlin, 10-04-2013

<sup>624</sup> A perfect summary of this ‘German’ understanding EU-NATO relations was provided in the country's 2006 White Paper: “The Strategic Partnership between NATO and the EU is a vital pillar of the European and transatlantic security architecture...[NATO] has comparative advantages when it comes to complex military crisis management operations requiring robust and proven military structures, procedures, forces and capabilities for combat and stabilisation tasks...The EU, on the other hand, has a much broader spectrum of capabilities at its disposal, making it well suited for operations and missions that call for the joint employment of civilian and military assets. It is hence important to develop the different profiles, areas of expertise and strengths of the EU and NATO with the aim of complementarity and to use them as efficiently as possible”. See: German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik*, 2006, 40-41.

<sup>625</sup> Interview with Jasper Wieck, Berlin, 05-04-2013

The message is clear, for Germany NATO should take care of its Article 5 commitments and, in rare circumstances, of hard peacekeeping or peacemaking. The rest should fall in the hands of the EU, particularly if it is called for in Europe's neighbourhood.

France has been the EU Member State that has most repeatedly called for a clear delineation of EU/NATO relations. As early as 1994, when CFSP was in the design phase and defence activities in Europe were still in the hands of the Western European Union, France was already asking for a relationship between the two to be built in a way that "...avoided the dependence of one on the other, as well as a wasteful overlap of functions"<sup>626</sup>. Both institutions should however be capable of coexisting and fulfilling different roles: "Renewal of NATO and strengthening of the European Union are two aspects of a single approach"<sup>627</sup>. Or to put it differently: "NATO and the EU are not in competition"<sup>628</sup>.

In order to navigate the discussion about what each organisation should do, France suggested in 2008 avoiding two extremes. One would "see the European Union simply as the civil arm of NATO...the Union's aims are obviously much larger than that. It has a global political mission and its action covers a broad spectrum, including military affairs"<sup>629</sup>. The other extreme "expects the European Union to take on the collective self-defence of its members. However, common defence is the prime function of NATO"<sup>630</sup>. For France, therefore, the Alliance should remain the central pillar of collective defence.

So, what is NATO for? According to Jolyon Howorth:

We have been asking that question for 30 years. My answer is that it should come back to Europe and become an instrument for the stabilization of the European neighbourhood, and one in which Europeans will increasingly take responsibilities of control and command, that will, in turn, allow the Americans to go off to Asia and the Middle East.<sup>631</sup>

<sup>626</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 1994, 34.

<sup>627</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2008, 93.

<sup>628</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2013, 61.

<sup>629</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2008, 95.

<sup>630</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>631</sup> Interview with Jolyon Howorth, Paris, 02-07-2012

The three EU and NATO Member States studied in this thesis seem to agree. NATO should have as its core function the territorial defence of its members. In terms of action beyond collective defence the three states studied in this thesis agree that NATO should intervene where key Alliance interests are at stake; this of course means acting in instances where US interests are also present and in need of protection.

There are, however, important limitations to NATO's ability to act beyond the realm of territorial defence. These have not made NATO action impossible in the past two decades, as the ISAF mission in Afghanistan or Unified Protector in Libya prove, but there are truly daunting challenges when that action is to be undertaken together with the EU.

The most significant of those challenges is the Turkish-Cypriot dispute which has blocked any formal contact on security and defence matters between NATO and the EU since 2004. The division of Cyprus into two separate states in the 1970s, with the Turkish Republic of Cyprus in the North, and the Republic of Cyprus in the south, and the entry in 2004 of the latter state into the EU has made CSDP-NATO relations extremely difficult<sup>632</sup>. Turkey, an important NATO member, is today the only country to have recognised the Turkish Republic of Cyprus as an independent state, and refuses to have a direct dialogue on security issues with the government of the southern part of the island. This effectively means that Turkey refuses to see NATO engage in a dialogue with an EU Member State, which has produced deadlock in CSDP-NATO affairs. It is not a coincidence that the last Berlin Plus operation was launched in 2004<sup>633</sup>, before Cypriot accession to the EU.

Many of the interviewees for this thesis were perfectly aware of the difficulties posed by the Cyprus-Turkey standoff. Captain Cordon of the Spanish Navy summarized this problem succinctly: "The accession of Cyprus to the EU makes any future Berlin Plus

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<sup>632</sup> For a good overview of Turkish-EU relations and the impact of the Cyprus issue on them see: Natalie Martin, *Security and the Turkey-EU Accession Process: Norms, Reforms and the Cyprus Issue* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

<sup>633</sup> That mission was EUFOR Althea.

agreement impossible”<sup>634</sup>. Having both organisations take care of different threats but in a coordinated manner seems, therefore, an unlikely scenario. Asked about how the European pillar within NATO would work, a high ranking German Chancellery official said: “The thing is, whenever there needs to be a common [meaning EU-NATO] decision taken the Turkey/Cyprus issue comes into play. We think we need to overcome this blockade and we need to be able to have a Berlin Plus mission again”<sup>635</sup>. The German government has indeed been one of the many in Europe to have repeatedly expressed a desire to “remove obstructions to co-operation between the EU and NATO...”<sup>636</sup>. Believing an obstacle needs to be removed is of course different from actually having a clear policy in place to remove it. In this regard European strategy seems to be lacking a clear set of policies or actions that could end the CSDP-NATO deadlock. Admiral Kähler of the Germany Navy was convinced it made no sense to have CSDP and NATO develop in parallel and not in a closely coordinated manner, but he was not able to move beyond the enunciation of the political challenges facing cooperation:

You mentioned the blockages which exist between the two organisations and which really hamper their cooperation. Why do we need two different long term force planning processes? Why do we need that? We need only one. Why do these organisations hide their books from one another? That’s not necessary but we understand the political gameplay behind it which is very difficult.<sup>637</sup>

So, and to conclude, according to numerous European policymakers the core function of NATO is territorial defence and hard security operations in circumstances where European and American shared interests are at risk. NATO’s value added resides in its ability to act and in the capabilities it can bring to bear. Although on paper this seems to work quite well for most of the parties involved, the Turkey-Cyprus dispute makes the EU-NATO

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<sup>634</sup> Interview with Carlos Cordon, Madrid, 29-10-2012

<sup>635</sup> Interview with German Chancellery official (not for attribution), Berlin, 19-04-2013

<sup>636</sup> CDU/CSU and FDP, *Wachstum. Bildung. Zusammenhalt*, 2009, 143.

<sup>637</sup> Interview with Thorsten Kähler, Berlin 12-04-2013

dialogue almost impossible, and forces both institutions to remain, at least for the time being, separate and focused on different challenges.

### **Transatlantic Free Riding, Burden Sharing and the US Pivot away from Europe**

Empirical research developed for this thesis has also confirmed the suspicion that there is a significant level of European free-riding on American defence spending. Not only is it significant but it is also consciously accepted by European elites. This was acknowledged by numerous interviewees, albeit not without a certain degree of shame. Admiral Ignacio Horcada of the Spanish Navy, for example, recognised that the level of dependency on US capabilities meant that Europe was probably unable to undertake a major operation without American support:

The military capabilities are not there in Europe. This is the case with air-to-air refuelling, intelligence, and target selection, which were in the case of Libya<sup>638</sup> for example, entirely in the hands of the Americans. And those capabilities are essential for conducting military operations.<sup>639</sup>

Colonel Falk Tettweiler, replied the following when asked about the consequences of the announced US pivot to Asia:

It's a serious issue because the US has always been willing to help out with capabilities. Why should you spend so much money, we're talking about billions of euros, to establish a capability you could have from the US anyway? It's not 'free riding', its just rational.<sup>640</sup>

As a matter of fact, almost all of the people interviewed for this thesis in Germany, France and Spain agreed that a US re-balancing to Asia would mean Europeans would need to reinforce their defence, effectively accepting that the current levels of spending are only sustainable because of US commitment to fill gaps in capacity.

The US has been aware of this free-riding problem for many years, which led American administrations, including Clinton's, Bush's and Obama's, to call for more

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<sup>638</sup> Admiral Horcada was referring here to the intervention in Libya of 2011, led by France, the UK and other allies, which was eventually unified under NATO mission "Unified Protector".

<sup>639</sup> Interview with Igancio Horcada, Madrid, 07-10-2012

<sup>640</sup> Interview with Falk Tettweiler, Berlin, 17-04-2013

effective burden sharing across the Atlantic. One of such calls came from the US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates in 2011:

In the past, I've worried openly about NATO turning into a two-tiered alliance: Between members who specialize in 'soft' humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks, and those conducting the 'hard' combat missions. Between those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership – be they security guarantees or headquarters billets – but don't want to share the risks and the costs. This is no longer a hypothetical worry. We are there today. And it is unacceptable.<sup>641</sup>

According to the US it is time for Europeans to do more. That could be within NATO or in CSDP but it must surely produce a fairer distribution of security costs across the Atlantic. CSDP itself was controversial in its early years as some in DC saw it as a threat to the transatlantic link but US policy towards it has evolved over the years and is now one of open support<sup>642</sup>.

The United States has now officially stated both open support for the further development of CSDP and also pleaded for greater transatlantic burden sharing. These were positive or pro-active policies aimed at getting Europeans to do more in tackling security challenges in their neighbourhood. The Americans have, however, also started a 'negative' process of pivoting away from Europe, or of disengaging from the management of security crises that would have in the past been tackled by them or by NATO with large US input. This 'negative' policy has created a vacuum that needs to be filled. The ones best positioned and with the greatest interest in doing so are European states. According to Joseph Nye: "America's view is that in Europe's own neighbourhood, the Balkans and North Africa, Europe should be taking the lead. They have strong national interests to do

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<sup>641</sup> Gates "The Security and Defence Agenda (Future of NATO)."

<sup>642</sup> The main reason behind this change has been according to Harvard Professor Joseph Nye the growing need for burden sharing across the Atlantic: "The general feeling in the US in the 1990s was that the Europeans were not up to it [an autonomous defence] and the French were trying to weaken NATO. My impression is that this has changed considerably. The Americans now [2012] want the Europeans to do more, there is no longer the worry of France undercutting NATO...Instead of worrying about competition from Europe, Americans now worry about Europe not being able to do enough...This was even the case before the current financial crisis which has made this change even more apparent". Source: Interview with Joseph S. Nye, Cambridge, MA, 18-06-2012.

so”<sup>643</sup>. This is particularly true in certain parts of Africa. According to French General Ganascia, an officer with multiple deployments in Africa “NATO’s mission is not to go to Africa...that is for Europeans to do on their own”<sup>644</sup>.

A relevant example of US disengagement in African issues was the American policy of ‘leading from behind’ in Libya in 2011. According to both formal documents and official interviews in France the Libya case could be a template for future US policy in Africa: “the circumstances of the operations conducted in Libya and Mali could provide a template for situations where American interests are less directly involved”<sup>645</sup>. Joseph Nye believes so:

[Americans] will probably avoid calling it ‘leading from behind’, but the idea of the US organizing a collective response rather than doing it all by itself is something that the Americans are going to want to do more. Not just with the Europeans but they are the ones with the greatest capacity.<sup>646</sup>

The most significant drivers of this US pivot away from Europe are the need to reduce American defence spending and the rise of China, which is forcing the Pentagon to focus its attention and resources in East Asia. German policymakers were acutely aware of this shift in American priorities:

There is a tendency in American thinking to look more and more to Asia. It doesn’t mean that Europe doesn’t play any role – an economic role of course, also in the future – but this is a clear signal and indication for us that we have to do more to solve our problems alone, without the US. This could be, I think, the biggest challenge for European security policy in the future<sup>647</sup>  
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Although some analysts have called for a “European pivot to Asia”<sup>649</sup>, it remains unlikely that Europeans and Americans will ever see eye to eye on this issue. Abundant research

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<sup>643</sup> Interview with Joseph S. Nye, Cambridge, MA, 18-06-2012

<sup>644</sup> Interview with Jean Philippe Ganascia, Paris, 25-06-2012

<sup>645</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2013, 30.

<sup>646</sup> Interview with Joseph S. Nye, Cambridge, MA, 18-06-2012

<sup>647</sup> Interview with Bernd Weber, Berlin, 11-04-2013

<sup>648</sup> These factors of change have also been acknowledged in some of Europe’s top strategic documents like the French White Book of 2013: “The United States are cutting back on military spending and partly refocusing their military efforts on the Asia-Pacific region”. See: French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2013, 1.

<sup>649</sup> Karl Kaiser and Manuel Muniz, “Why Europe, too, needs an Asian ‘pivot’,” *Europe’s World Journal* 24, (2013): 92-96.

done on transatlantic security relations as part of an EU-funded project called Transworld produced significant evidence that if the US was indeed to “pivot” to Asia, and to give its new strategic engagement in the region a military dimension, it will do so without European support<sup>650</sup>. Of all the issues studied by researchers across Europe and the US as part of Transworld, and as illustrated by the findings of one of the largest elite surveys conducted on transatlantic relations to date, the nature of China’s rise is a disputed matter across the Atlantic. American elites tend to see it more as a military threat than their European counterparts<sup>651</sup>.

The country perspective used throughout this thesis confirms the Transworld findings, with EU Member States displaying a clear reluctance to engage in East Asian security issues. Spain is a good case in point, with ‘Asia-Pacific’ only being referenced a limited number of times in its 2013 security strategy, and always advocating for a common EU stance on the matter<sup>652</sup>.

Strategic planners in Germany have coincided with the opinion of their Spanish counterparts. As expressed by Joachim Spatz, a German MP, “I think Asia will not be our interest, or first priority”<sup>653</sup>. Colonel Falk Tettweiler agreed:

I don’t think the probability of that happening is too high. I think the probability is much higher that there will be some division of labour between the US and the Australians, in the Pacific and the European Allies in the Atlantic.<sup>654</sup>

When asked if he could see Germany or Europe engaged in security issues in Asia a high ranking German Defence Ministry official replied: “*We strategically don’t have an interest there in terms of defence.* In terms of market and financial interests, we certainly

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<sup>650</sup> See: <http://www.transworld-fp7.eu>

<sup>651</sup> Anne Marie LeGloannec and Manuel Muniz, *Redefining the Transatlantic Security Relationship* (Rome, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Transworld, 2014).

<sup>652</sup> As indicated to me by Admiral Martinez Nunez, one of Spain’s top military planners: “There is a strong divergence in the importance given to the rise of Asia in the US and Europe. The cause behind this is, effectively, Europe’s underestimation of its importance”. Source: Interview with Juan Martinez Nunez, Madrid, 30-10-2012

<sup>653</sup> Interview with Joachim Spatz, Berlin, 19-04-2013

<sup>654</sup> Interview with Falk Tettweiler, Berlin, 17-04-2013

do have. We probably have more than the US but in old classical security terms Asia is not central to us” (my emphasis)<sup>655</sup>. This same idea was reiterated by an official at the German Chancellery:

EU-Asia relations are mainly of a commercial or economic nature and not really security or defence related. That’s really entirely up to the Americans. They are evidently moving in that direction by having new military bases and a clear presence in Asia Pacific. We don’t have anything similar to that now. On the North Korean issue, for example, Europeans are not involved.<sup>656</sup>

Not surprisingly the EU as such has not been extremely active in Asia. As expressed by Alvaro de Vasconcelos:

The European Union is a regional actor and that region includes Africa. Solana was very interested in the Aceh mission. He went to Indonesia and he wanted to show the flag. It was a small mission. It was an interesting diplomatic coup. But in the EU when people think of security policy they think of neighbourhood and Africa. This defines the EU as a regional actor.<sup>657</sup>

Indeed the only CSDP mission to date to have been deployed in Asia was the 80-strong civilian operation launched in Aceh, Indonesia, in 2005 to monitor the peace agreement signed by the government and the Free Aceh Movement earlier that year. And even that small operation was seen in Brussels and in many European capitals as an anomaly and a ‘coup’ by Javier Solana, who wanted to take the EU beyond the borders of its close neighbourhood<sup>658</sup>.

The pivot, or the shifting of US attention towards geographic areas different to Europe, be it the Middle East or East Asia, was seen by most interviewees as a structural issue that would not be reversed by developments in Ukraine of 2014 and 2015. As indicated by Karl Kaiser the crisis in the Ukraine has forced the US to “reluctantly reengage in Europe, but the ISIS reaction absorbs more domestic and security

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<sup>655</sup> Interview with German Ministry of Defence official (not for attribution), Berlin, 17-04-2013

<sup>656</sup> Interview with German Chancellery official (not for attribution), Berlin, 19-04-2013

<sup>657</sup> Interview with Alvaro de Vasconcelos, Paris, 07-06-2012

<sup>658</sup> *Ibid.*

resources...the pivot to Asia has been slowed down but will remain a strategic goal of the US”<sup>659</sup>.

### **The US as a Spoiler of EU Security and Defence Integration**

It is clear from the section above that US and European security priorities have evolved in different directions over the past two decades. Since the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the existential threat posed by the Soviet Union, the transatlantic partners have undergone a process of strategic interests re-definition. Structural shifts seem to be pulling the US away from Europe. Europeans are therefore bound to find themselves alone in places like Africa, the Balkans or Eastern Europe where many of their strategic interests lie. All of this is occurring within an unequal partnership that has seen significant free riding on the part of Europeans but with a major partner, the US, seriously cutting back on its defence spending.

What are going to be the consequences of this process? How will this ‘negative’ policy of US disengagement in European affairs affect EU integration and CFSP/CSDP? What can previous instances of US disengagement from European security tell us about the future of CFSP/CSDP?

A two-pronged answer is required to answer the questions above. The first part has to do with the US’ ability to actively influence European defence. Here it should be noted that the US has been capable of aborting EU defence integration processes when it opposed them, and of actively excluding EU action when it did not consider it appropriate.

When looking at the origins of European defence Javier Solana remembered an episode which illustrated this ability of the US to put a stop to European integration:

...[back in 1998] the most pro-European [Member States] wanted everything, including the EU permanent headquarter. But the Americans did not. And so they prevented this from happening.

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<sup>659</sup> Interview with Karl Kaiser, Cambridge, MA, 15-03-2015

They thought they had already taken a big step with Berlin Plus, that we were going too fast, and that we could find ourselves not being capable of managing things well or creating a certain power vacuum.<sup>660</sup>

Therefore, the US had the capacity, at the very least throughout the 1990s and 2000s, to block the development of CSDP both directly, and indirectly by encouraging key EU Member States to oppose certain measures.

Also, there is a consensus in Europe that if the United States is determined to act in a certain region of the world it will take precedence over the EU. This is particularly true when speaking of security and defence. Although interviewees were reluctant to refer to it in these terms it seems that there are no-go zones for the EU:

If the US considers a given conflict of sufficient importance to be involved directly, the ability of the European Union of being involved is diminished. Lebanon is here a case. The US did not want a EU mission there so it did not happen. This is an area of the world where the US plays a very important role. Solana thought there could be an EU mission there. He engaged himself in trying to make it happen and he lost.<sup>661</sup>

As pointed out by Jolyon Howorth during our interview in 2013: “Would the European Union get involved in issues of a direct strategic interest to the United States without their permission or in an autonomous way? The answer is no. Very clearly no”<sup>662</sup>. Howorth suggested that if the US wanted to prevent CSDP action from taking place it would communicate with European states on a bilateral basis and impede any EU-wide consensus regarding action in areas of its strategic interest.

This leads directly to the second prong of the answer to the questions that opened this section. There is strong evidence to suggest that the US policy of leaving Europeans to deal with security crises on their own or with much reduced American support has been one of the main drivers behind common EU action. As Howorth himself put it:

The absence of the United States is a driver. Many of the things the EU does in this field [of security and defence] are things the US does not want to do or does not want to touch. As far as the missions are concerned this absence is a driver. These are almost by definition things the

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<sup>660</sup> Interview with Javier Solana, Madrid, 11-10-2012.

<sup>661</sup> Interview with Alvaro de Vasconcelos, Paris, 07-06-2012

<sup>662</sup> Interview with Jolyon Howorth, Paris, 02-07-2012

US does not want to do. Now, whether there was active pressure on the part of America that is a different story. It was definitely the case in Libya.<sup>663</sup>

Indeed, the emergence of a power vacuum in Europe's neighbourhood has been a far more powerful driver of European collective action than US calls of the late 2000s to that effect. Or to put it in more controversial terms: the US' presence in Europe, particularly its involvement in security matters through NATO, seems to have been a true spoiler of EU security and defence action and, ultimately, integration. These claims can be further substantiated by a closer look at how Member States have interpreted the US shift in strategic attention away from Europe as well as the reaction to crises where the US refused to intervene.

All three EU Member States studied in this thesis have openly and repeatedly warned about the dangers of America pivoting away from Europe. According to French strategic documents of the 1990s America's attention would shift away from Europe due to the end of the Cold War<sup>664</sup>.

Germany, for example, repeatedly stated in the early 1990s that effective burden sharing across the Atlantic meant that Europeans would have to get their act together about a common security and defence policy. In 1992 the German Defence Guidelines captured this as follows:

In the United States it has become common for key political figures to call for the available national resources to be invested on tackling internal needs. This means reducing attempts to influence international politics. Overseas 'commitments' must be justified. In view of these developments, it is necessary to give relations between North America and Europe new content and to develop a partnership of equals.<sup>665</sup>

Of course a partnership of equals could only be achieved through the strengthening of common European defence mechanisms. This was clearly stated in 2006:

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<sup>663</sup> Interview with Jolyon Howorth, Paris, 02-07-2012

<sup>664</sup> This was clearly stated by French strategic planners in 1994: Today, while still maintaining their basic commitments, the US is assessing the implications of the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. This is leading to a reduction in the US presence in Europe and their willingness to engage in European problems, in light of a more restrictive interpretation of their national interests. See: French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 1994, 34.

<sup>665</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Verteidigungspolitischen Richtlinien*, 1992.

In future, the European Union itself must contribute to its security to a greater extent than in the past. *Only a strong, united Europe capable of action on security matters can help to shoulder responsibility in overcoming the challenges to collective security.* The development of the European Security and Defence Policy as an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is an expression of this awareness...(my emphasis).<sup>666</sup>

Quite evidently a large part of the support for a united European defence in Paris, Berlin and Madrid came from the realisation that the US would eventually leave European security in the hands of Europeans, and that the health of the transatlantic partnership was in large part dependent on how EU Member States managed that responsibility. Perhaps the clearest consequence of that European consensus was the birth of CFSP/CSDP and the launch of the first EU missions in the Balkans. Some of the people involved in policymaking at the time remember how things played out: “I remember in the early nineties, that the elder Bush, President Bush, told us ‘Europe now has to take more responsibility over security matters’. We then developed the idea of a European CSDP”<sup>667</sup>.

If fears of an American shift in strategic attention were caused in the 1990s by the end of the Cold War, those of the 2000s have been fuelled by concerns about the effect of defence budget cuts on US posture as well as the impact of the rise of China. For France the shift of US attention to East Asia has been particularly worrying. That shift would make American support for operations in the European neighbourhood far rarer and therefore call for more exclusively-European engagements. Beyond basic collective defence of allied territory France is today convinced that the US will be in general terms unwilling to engage in military operations: The bottom line for France is quite clear: US strategic shifts as well as budgetary pressures are forcing Europeans to take on new security responsibilities<sup>668</sup>.

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<sup>666</sup> German Federal Ministry of Defence, *Weißbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik*, 2006, 33.

<sup>667</sup> Interview with Bernd Weber, Berlin, 11-04-2013

<sup>668</sup> For example: “Other than in the case of legitimate defence of an ally, the US could become more selective about its external commitments as a result of financial constraints...”. See: French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2013, 29.

Developments in the strategic posture of the United States such as the ones described above have produced two clear policy reactions in France. The first has been to call for a fairer distribution of the security burden across the Atlantic as a means of having a more balanced partnership with the US: “[France’s] aim is to forge a renewed strategic partnership between Europe and the United States: the Atlantic Alliance needs a European Union capable of shouldering a growing share of the burden in the stabilisation of external crises”<sup>669 670</sup>.

The second has been to strive for European “autonomy”, or independence from the US security umbrella as provided mostly by NATO. This also means for France that the EU’s security and defence dimension should be strengthened<sup>671</sup>. The fact that this had not been self-evident before was for France a consequence of the effectiveness of the American security umbrella that shielded Europe from the security crises that could have led to the build up of the necessary political will to unite. In 2012 former French Foreign Minister Védérine captured this idea in the following way:

...no further effort on military capabilities will be forthcoming from Europeans unless a spirit of defence is revived and this spirit will not be revived unless the United States invites Europeans to take on more responsibilities. *In a way, the Alliance is the victim of its own success in Europe. It has deterred aggression and protected Europe so well that her spirit of defence has been dulled* (my emphasis).<sup>672</sup>

Interestingly, top German policymakers expressed opinions that are almost identical to those of their French counterparts<sup>673</sup>.

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<sup>669</sup> French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2008, 96.

<sup>670</sup> France’s 2008 White Paper insisted on this notion of burden sharing across the Atlantic: “Renewal (of NATO) should entail a better sharing of responsibilities among Americans and Europeans”. See: French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2008, 101.

<sup>671</sup> As indicated in the 2013 White Book: “In a strategic context in which Europe is expected to shoulder greater responsibility for its own security, a move towards more collective EU response will require pooling of resources and strong, coordinated commitment from all its Member States”. See: French Presidency, *Livre Blanc*, 2013, 11.

<sup>672</sup> Védérine, *Report for the President of the French Republic*, 21.

<sup>673</sup> Joaquim Spatz, a German MP, member of the Bundestag’s Defence Committee, and at the time of the interview the Foreign Policy Spokesperson for the FDP, indicated that the US would probably not disengage from European defence altogether but that the pivot to Asia did call for a fairer burden sharing arrangement across the Atlantic: “We must not overestimate what is going on. I think Europe, and Germany, will remain good partners for the US. However, the pivot affects the debate on the strategic position of Europe. We will

The view that budgetary pressures in the US coupled with the rise of security challenges in East Asia would lead to greater security responsibilities for Europe was indeed widespread in Germany. It was clearly shared by Admiral Kähler who had a firm belief in the future of NATO but also on the need for Europeans to construct a stronger pillar within the Alliance:

So [Obama] is saying ‘we have a limited amount of money and we need to decide where to put it for the next decade or next 50 years’. That strategic decision has been made: he is looking at the Pacific. The Pacific Coast of the United States is nearly as long as the Atlantic Coast so therefore they have two interests. They have always had two fleets – the Pacific Fleet and the Atlantic Fleet. There is a shift. So basically the requirement for the Europeans to do more is there and what we think in Germany is this could be done through the European Union. *That means strengthening the common security and defence policy* (my emphasis).<sup>674</sup>

When asked if the US rebalancing will put more pressure on Europeans to do more a German Defence Ministry official replied:

Absolutely and especially because the US is not going to lead interventions in the future. That is more the take on Libya. They didn’t participate for a number of reasons; they did not want to lead. They gave us the means and capabilities, so, a NATO/US command in Naples, but not US leadership.<sup>675</sup>

He then added: “The US pivot will call for an awakening of Europe”<sup>676</sup>.

For many German analysts, just as for those in France and Spain, recent experiences in Libya and Mali were clear precedents of future US policy towards crises in Africa. One of them was Jasper Wieck who said quite clearly:

...the US is now saying ‘militarily we would not risk the life of a single American soldier on North African soil.’ Look at Mali. Maybe 10 years ago the US would have intervened...Now they know they have the French who need to protect a much bigger interest there and so they just stepped aside. So I think that’s the pivot already playing out.<sup>677</sup>

But perhaps the most comprehensive analysis came from Constanze Stelzenmüller, at the time of the interview Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, and

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have to learn that the US will not help Europeans in every single instance...We will have to learn that our capability gap will not always be automatically filled by the US”. Source: Interview with Joachim Spatz, Berlin, 19-04-2013

<sup>674</sup> Interview with Thorsten Kähler, Berlin 12-04-2013

<sup>675</sup> Interview with German Ministry of Defence official (not for attribution), Berlin, 17-04-2013

<sup>676</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>677</sup> Interview with German Chancellery official (not for attribution), Berlin, 19-04-2013

currently [2015] at the Brookings Institution. Stelzenmüller said that the lessons from the US' decision to 'lead from behind' in Libya were important and that they were only the beginning of a deeper and more structural change:

I think Libya is not the new normal. Libya is the interim stage to the new normal; meaning that Libya is the case where the Americans reluctantly and unhappily lent us [Europeans] their assets when it became clear that we didn't have enough to do it ourselves. I think the new normal is going to be that the Americans are going to say 'Look, we don't want to lend you our assets as we have barely enough assets of our own and we're using them somewhere else so we couldn't lend them to you even if we wanted to, but our public and Congress are also saying, let them do this themselves.' That in my view is the new normal. That's a pretty important new shift in the strategic environment. Massive.<sup>678</sup>

One of the major consequences of American unwillingness to intervene in Africa will be to force Europeans to have a debate about their strategic interests there, and the extent to which they overlap. The discussion about Europe-wide strategic interests is according to Joaquim Spatz one that Europeans should be having now:

Maybe there are spheres of interest that only France has. They can cover those for themselves...Within the sphere of 'common interests' we all stand together. [In order to decide what those common interests are] we have to talk about this step-by-step and country-by-country and interest sphere by interest sphere. It's a difficult conversation but inevitable.<sup>679</sup>

When asked what would prompt such a debate he answered in a way that could well summarize one of the central findings of this thesis: "Probably *facing a risk which is important enough to damage Europe but not important enough to force to US to come to save us*" (my emphasis)<sup>680</sup>. So, for Europeans to sit down and truly discuss their shared interests, a fundamental step in CFSP/CSDP consolidation, the US must truly leave security matters in their hands.

We come, therefore, to one of the central points of this thesis: by shielding Europeans from security risks and by allowing them to free ride on the transatlantic security umbrella, the US has effectively aborted the integration process that could lead to a stronger CFSP/CSDP, and ultimately to a much more balanced transatlantic security

<sup>678</sup> Interview with Constanze Stelzenmüller, 04-04-2013

<sup>679</sup> Interview with Joachim Spatz, Berlin, 19-04-2013

<sup>680</sup> *Ibid.*

partnership. Importantly, not having to suffer the consequences of security shocks has led to a dearth of supranational dialogue in Europe on what constitute EU-wide interests and on the tasks the Union should take on. The few instances where Europeans have actually been forced to meet, discuss and agree on common action happen to be those where the US decided not to take the lead, or not to participate at all. Europeans themselves seem to be quite aware of this<sup>681</sup>. Some of the most experienced analysts of European defence are of the opinion that unless the US is serious about allowing the Europeans to take care of their security CSDP will not take off the ground. According to Jolyon Howorth:

If the Americans are serious about the Europeans taking responsibility for their own neighbourhood, and this is a huge if, but they say they are, they have been banging on about this for decades now, 'the Europeans should do this', 'do Libya', 'do Bosnia', 'do the Balkans', then they should logically welcome enabling the Europeans through NATO to actually do that. Because in my view, and having spent twenty years working on this, CSDP is not going anywhere on its own. It has a very real glass ceiling. And it is a very low ceiling.<sup>682</sup>

## Conclusions

There are good reasons to believe that a transatlantic security community truly exists. This was indeed anticipated by Deutsch and others<sup>683</sup>. Given the 'modest' level of institutional entanglement across the Atlantic, and following Adler and Barnett's work, it would be fair to describe that community as loosely-coupled<sup>684</sup>. Although the level of commitment to the Atlantic partnership is not identical across Member States it is still the case that all of the ones studied here display the same characteristic: threats come from many parts of the world but not the United States. Sometimes these states have had serious disagreements

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<sup>681</sup> Markus Woelke, one of Germany's top diplomats working on EU security and defence described this in the following terms: "I am a little pessimistic right now and to move forward with integration we will probably need outside pressure. In a certain way, we need the Americans to make us do it. Not just in Libya, but also Kosovo. The Americans need to say: 'this should not be a NATO mission, Europeans should do it directly'. But this will be a real challenge. Then we would have to build the OHQ because we could not use SHAPE, and we would need to develop real civil-military cooperation". Source: Interview with Markus Woelke, Berlin, 04-04-2013

<sup>682</sup> Interview with Jolyon Howorth, Paris, 02-07-2012

<sup>683</sup> Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*.

<sup>684</sup> Adler and Barnett eds., *Security Communities*.

with the US over policy, or ‘tactics’, but these disagreements, emerged from differences in the location or intensity of certain strategic interests and not from a zero-sum interpretation of events where one party would see its security hindered by the actions of the other.

Having different interests is, however, significant, particularly when speaking of security and defence integration. It is usually these interests that determine policy and that if shared with others encourage leaders to agree on the setting up of common institutions and on common action. Previous chapters have shown that differences of this kind exist in Europe but that EU members actually share a large and growing catalogue of them, and have managed to agree on common strategic documents and common action more often than not<sup>685</sup>. There is evidence to suggest that this convergence has been caused by European integration like for example through the establishment of the Schengen area which turned the protection of borders, traditionally a national concern, into a supranational issue. In this regard there seems to be a certain form of spillover from ‘non-security’ integration into the field of security and defence.

Things are significantly different at the transatlantic level with important disparities in terms of strategic interests. Unless there are major changes to the strategic landscape, or a very determined effort to bring European and American strategic interests closer together by forwarding integration in other fields, these differences will persist and they will stand in the way of more determined transatlantic security cooperation. Yet, the opposite seems to be occurring. The interest divergence across the Atlantic has grown since the end of the Cold War when both Europeans and Americans faced a common enemy, the Soviet Union. Since then the most significant geopolitical development has been the rise of

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<sup>685</sup> According to Karl Kaiser: “Over the years there has been a convergence of interests with the EU partners, made easier by the French return to an Atlantic orientation” Source: Interview with Karl Kaiser, Cambridge, MA, 15-03-2015

China, which happens to be interpreted in very different ways on both sides of the Atlantic; In the US it is viewed as a possible threat to the country's interests in East Asia but in most European capitals it is seen as an economic issue, with few security implications. The US 'pivot' to Asia is but one example of how the transatlantic partners are going to find themselves disagreeing on policy. It is unlikely this will produce major clashes between them or openly opposing policies but it will surely make active security and defence cooperation, let alone integration, less attractive.

Defence budget cuts in the US are also significant because they are forcing Americans to reconsider their priorities and to focus resources where they are truly needed. That has so far been in places different to Europe or its immediate neighbourhood. Given the free-riding problem within the transatlantic relation, where Americans have shouldered most of the burden for many decades, cuts to US defence spending have meant growing pressure on Europeans to do more. General Bentégeat, a former Head of the French Armed Forces, commented on this and on its implications for Europeans in the following terms:

50% of the financial resources and 75% (almost 80%) of the military capabilities of NATO come from the US. NATO without the US is nothing. With the US it has real meaning and real effectiveness. It can only work under US leadership. The very existence of the EU and CSDP serve the purpose of enabling European nations to deal with security issues without this US lead whenever it is useful or required. That is it.<sup>686</sup>

The bottom line is that the divergence in transatlantic strategic interests, made apparent by the rise of China and US budget constraints, has made US engagement in important security issues for Europeans less likely. As recognised by many interviewees a "new normal" is emerging in transatlantic affairs where Europeans are forced to take care of their security on their own or with reduced US support. In this environment Europeans will be forced to sit down and have a deep and structured dialogue about what their interests are and how far common action should go. Past experiences suggest this process will speed up the consolidation of CFSP/CSDP.

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<sup>686</sup> Interview with Henri Bentégeat, Paris 03-07-2012

## **Chapter 8: Conclusion**

### **Restating the Puzzle**

European security and defence integration is a young but complex field of study. CFSP and CSDP, the clearest manifestations of an emerging European security and defence were only born in the mid-to-late 1990s depriving researchers of a long track record to look at. Additionally they are the construct of close to 30 states, that operate in a highly institutionalized environment but that remain to a large extent independent actors. Some of these states seem to be very different from one another with different histories, strategic cultures, institutional arrangements and, importantly, diverse interests. Many of those states have been the protagonists of some of the world's most destructive confrontations. Since the end of the Second World War, itself a war that started in Europe, the US has had a constant and very significant military presence first in Western Europe and after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the entire continent. NATO a powerful defence alliance with over half a century of history has its headquarters in Brussels only a few miles away from the main buildings of the EU.

Why would states that have had such long histories of conflict with one another decide to bind their destinies in a common EU defence project? How could an island nation like Ireland with a long track record of neutrality, ever be a part of a defence union that includes states like France or Poland, with continental exposure and long histories of military engagement? Why would the Nordic countries or the Baltic States, with an overriding concern for security to their North and East and with a clear focus on Russia, decide to tie their security and defence to that of others like Spain or Italy far more interested in developments in the Southern Mediterranean, including tackling illegal immigration coming from Africa or avoiding state failure in the Sahel? Additionally, why

would any European state that is a member of NATO, a powerful and capable alliance, be willing to consider any other framework for security and defence activity?

A common European security and defence looks so unlikely that one is forgiven for believing it is actually impossible. However, since the late 1990s the EU, an eminently civilian organisation, has developed characteristics that resemble those of modern security actors: A common defence clause, a unitary doctrine, common security and defence institutions, coordinated procurement mechanisms, joint action, defence and security activities being inserted into broader diplomatic objectives, and a clear vocation of permanence. The launch of CFSP and later CSDP were perhaps the clearest manifestations that this process is indeed taking place, albeit slowly and in a haphazard way.

Studying the process and circumstances that led to the creation of some of Europe's security and defence institutions, to the drafting of some of its strategy documents or the launch of its missions can help us find answers to the questions that opened this chapter. In the process we might also be able to build bridges and connect the very different literatures on the subject.

## **Thesis Findings and Observations**

The findings of this thesis can be broken down into two large sections. The first is what this research has revealed European integration *not* to be. By discarding previously suggested dynamics and causal mechanisms we can reduce the confusion surrounding this field of study. The second section will lay out the 'positive' findings of this thesis, or rather, the true dynamics that seem to be behind European security and defence integration.

**What European Security and Defence is Not**

Given all that has been said about European defence integration by other scholars and by numerous practitioners it is useful to enumerate the characteristics that the process lacks. The best way to do so is to go back to the literature on the subject and compare our observations on the ground with some of the propositions suggested there .

Table 2.2 introduced in chapter 2, and copied below, provided a snapshot of the grand theory literature on European security and defence. It divided scholars into schools of thought, summarized their arguments as well as their predictions about European defence. Table 2.2 also anticipated a set of findings based on preliminary ‘observations on the ground’. Some of those observations seemed to contradict the propositions of the literature. The mid-range theory and empirical literatures also made important claims about the integration process. The sections below will look in more detail at how this thesis’ findings seem to disprove the suggestions of part of the literature. In the process it will also contribute to providing structure to the empirical findings of the thesis.

**Table 1.2: European Defence Integration: Theory and Reality**

| <b>REALISM</b>                                           |                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
|----------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Proponent(s)</b>                                      | <b>Determinants of Evolution</b>                                                                                                                                                                           | <b>Predictions</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | <b>Observations on the Ground<sup>687</sup></b>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| J. Mearsheimer                                           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦End of the Cold War and demise of the Soviet Union</li> <li>♦Diminishing US military presence in Europe</li> <li>♦German ambitions of regional hegemony</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦European states become a threat to one another</li> <li>♦Balance of power politics re-emerges in Europe</li> <li>♦German rearmament</li> <li>♦German containment and conflict</li> </ul>                                                                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Europeans cooperate more closely on defence</li> <li>•Defence spending falls markedly</li> <li>•Germany does not rearm</li> <li>•Europe remains at peace</li> </ul>                                                                                                        |
| S. Rosato                                                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦End of the Cold War and demise of the Soviet Union</li> <li>♦Disappearance of existential threat to Europe</li> </ul>                                              | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦Integration loses its driving motive (Soviet threat)</li> <li>♦Integration unravels</li> <li>♦Growing tensions and possibly conflict</li> </ul>                                                                                                                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Integration is forwarded in almost all fields of policy</li> <li>•Europeans cooperate more closely on defence</li> <li>•Europe remains at peace</li> </ul>                                                                                                                 |
| R. J. Art<br>S. G. Jones                                 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦US hegemony</li> <li>♦European desire to balance US power</li> </ul>                                                                                               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦Europeans decide to balance against the US</li> <li>♦EU defence strengthened via spending and cooperation</li> <li>♦The transatlantic partnership and NATO are weakened</li> </ul>                                                                                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Europeans cooperate more closely on defence</li> <li>•Defence spending falls markedly</li> <li>•Europeans remain committed to the Atlantic partnership</li> </ul>                                                                                                          |
| S. M. Walt<br>S. van Evera                               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦More peaceful attitudes of European states</li> <li>♦New perceptions of threat within Europe</li> <li>♦Disappearance of existential threat to Europe</li> </ul>    | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦Defence spending in Europe falls</li> <li>♦Europe lives through a long period of peace</li> <li>♦The transatlantic partnership and NATO are weakened</li> <li>♦Europeans cooperate on defence only sporadically</li> </ul>                                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Defence spending falls markedly</li> <li>•Europe remains at peace</li> <li>•Europeans remain committed to the Atlantic partnership</li> <li>•Europeans cooperate ever more closely on defence</li> </ul>                                                                   |
| A. Hyde-Price<br>B. R. Posen                             | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦US hegemony</li> <li>♦Loss of power and influence by European states</li> <li>♦Desire of key European states to remain influential</li> </ul>                      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦Large member states push for defence integration</li> <li>♦EU defence is instrumentalized by large member states</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                         | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•France and the UK become the main supporters of CSDP</li> <li>•EU defence responds to the needs of many member states</li> </ul>                                                                                                                                           |
| <b>(NEO)FUNCTIONALISM / LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALISM</b> |                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| K. Deutsch<br>E. B. Haas<br>D. Mitrany                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦Economic interdependence</li> <li>♦Preferences of transnational constituencies</li> <li>♦Desire of institutions to broaden their mandate</li> </ul>                | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦Externalities of non-integration are regularly felt</li> <li>♦A "transnational society" pushes for more integration</li> <li>♦Supranational institutions call for further integration</li> <li>♦Initial integration orderly "spills over" to other areas</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Externalities are only felt through external shocks (crises)</li> <li>•No strong transnational society emerges in defence field</li> <li>•EU institutions play a small role in furthering integration</li> <li>•Defence integration advances in fits and starts</li> </ul> |
| A. Moravcsik                                             | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦Economic interdependence</li> <li>♦Preferences of domestic constituencies</li> <li>♦Major inter-state bargains</li> </ul>                                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦Externalities of non-integration are regularly felt</li> <li>♦Domestic constituents push for more integration</li> <li>♦National interests are key drivers of integration</li> <li>♦Inter-state bargains become central to integration</li> </ul>                   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Externalities are only felt through external shocks (crises)</li> <li>•Domestic constituencies remain small and passive</li> <li>•CFSP emerged as means of protecting national interests</li> <li>•Inter-state bargains are central to the emergence of CSDP</li> </ul>    |
| <b>CONSTRUCTIVISM</b>                                    |                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| J. Lindley-French<br>P. M. Martinsen<br>S. Rynning       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦Differences in strategic culture across Europe</li> <li>♦Rigidity of strategic culture</li> <li>♦Predominance of NATO in European defence</li> </ul>               | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦States will have different objectives for CSDP</li> <li>♦NATO will be a cause of division within Europe</li> <li>♦Defence cooperation will be difficult</li> <li>♦EU defence integration will be weak at best</li> </ul>                                            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•States have different declaratory policies towards CSDP</li> <li>•NATO and CSDP coexist peacefully</li> <li>•European states cooperate on defence regularly</li> <li>•Integration advances through action &amp; institutions</li> </ul>                                    |
| P. Cornish<br>G. Edwards<br>C. Meyer                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦Dynamism of strategic culture</li> <li>♦Day-to-day defence collaboration</li> <li>♦Collective learning through security crises</li> </ul>                          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>♦European states will collaborate with one another</li> <li>♦European strategic cultures will slowly converge</li> <li>♦Defence integration will be possible but slow</li> </ul>                                                                                     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•European states cooperate on defence regularly</li> <li>•Strategic cultures remain mostly divergent across Europe</li> <li>•Integration advances through action &amp; institutions</li> </ul>                                                                              |

<sup>687</sup> In red are events that do not seem to coincide with the expectations of proponents; in green those that do.

***There is No Balance of Power Politics in Europe***

One of the central findings of this thesis is that European states do not seem to feel threatened by one another and are not engaging in balance of power politics. This has been true at least between the early 1990s and 2016, the period under study in this dissertation. France, Germany and Spain have repeatedly expressed in their top strategy documents that threats to their security come from beyond the boundaries of the EU. Policymaking elites around Europe expressed the same belief during interviews. Not a single European interviewee of the ones listed in Appendix 1 believed other EU states were a threat to their country's security. The end of the Cold War did not produce German rearmament or any other policy aimed at protecting itself from other EU member like some had predicted. On the contrary, European defence spending patterns of the last twenty years show a region reaping the 'peace dividend' of the post Cold War era, and focused on developing capabilities apt for expeditionary operations beyond the EU's border

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***Internal Peace in Europe is Not Dependent on US Presence***

The reality described above has been unaffected by decisions on the part of the United States to engage more or less in European security. It is doubtful, therefore, that, at least since 1990, this state of affairs has been produced by the US security presence in Europe, or by US hegemony more broadly. EU states seem to have genuinely ceased to see each other as security threats and there is therefore no need for a US 'night-watchman' or 'pacifier' to keep the peace in Europe. What is more, instances where the US expressed a

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<sup>688</sup> The impact of the Ukraine Crises and of the worsening of relations with Russia on defence spending is still to be seen. A March 2015 announcement of a boost in German defence spending for the next five years is directly connected to new threats to its East, reinforcing the idea that for Germans all threats come from beyond the boundaries of the EU. See: Sabine Siebold, "Germany to boost mid-term defense spending," *Reuters*, 17 March, 2015, accessed 19/04/2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/17/us-germany-defence-budget-idUSKBN0MD1T420150317>

willingness to leave Europeans to themselves did not produce a weakening of that community but rather determined efforts to deepen common security and defence arrangements. This is not to say that the Europe-US partnership is irrelevant or of no interest to Europeans. It does mean, however, that the notion of EU Member States needing American hegemony to remain at peace seems misguided in light of developments of the past two decades.

***European Security and Defence is Not Born Out of Competition with the US***

A number of authors mentioned in Chapter 2 of this thesis were convinced that EU defence would emerge as a means to balance the US. US hegemony, the argument went, is a threat to Europeans and would eventually corner them into a balancing policy. However, most decisions to forward European security and defence integration were taken for other reasons, mostly specific to Europe, and, if at all, with an eye on pleasing the US, or demonstrating that Europeans can be reliable allies. This thesis has not found evidence of an EU state being interested in opposing US policy in broad terms. But, even if it had, the empirical work developed as part of this dissertation shows that such a stance would quite probably fail to build a European consensus<sup>689</sup>. Numerous individual EU states, Germany being a prime example, are committed to the transatlantic partnership and agree with US policy on a number of fronts. The EU as a defence project has therefore not been constructed around notions of balancing the US.

Furthermore, Europeans seem to be comfortable free-riding on the American security umbrella, even if that has sometimes meant less autonomy. This was expressed by policymaking elites across Europe but particularly in Germany. The US pivot to Asia and other policy adjustments that could lead to a reduced American presence in Europe were

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<sup>689</sup> Perhaps a good case of this is the European division over the Iraq policy of the George W. Bush Administration.

not seen as positive developments by European elites, or as small victories in the battle for “autonomy”, but rather as real challenges for a region that has felt at ease depending on the security provided by America and NATO. This is a clear indication that Europeans have no intention of hedging against the US.

The corollary to the observations above is that CSDP is not born in opposition to NATO. CFSP/CSDP seems to emerge out of specific needs of Europeans, some of which are actually connected to a decrease in NATO’s (and the US’) willingness to engage in conflicts in Europe’s neighbourhood. This has allowed for the coexistence of both institutions for many years, and even for cooperation.

### ***European Security and Defence is Not Monopolised by Large Member States***

Given the way EU foreign action is constructed, with the need to have a framework nation that provides the CSDP mission OHQ, and with cost lying where they fall, large Member States are fundamental for the proper functioning of this area of policy. A way to categorize states as “Large” or “Significant” in this field would be to look at the ones that have offered national headquarters as EU OHQs in case of operations abroad. These states are: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain. We know, therefore, that having one of these states on board is an operational requirement for CSDP missions. It is also true that having the approval and support of larger Member States makes CFSP/CSDP action more robust. But, that large Member State participation is necessary is not equivalent to it being sufficient.

The emergence of CFSP and CSDP, although supported by large EU Member States such as France, Germany or the UK was built on an EU-wide consensus. This is a legal requirement given that EU treaties where CFSP had to be inserted could only enter into force if ratified by all of the members of the Union, and that consensus at the European

Council is needed for all significant decisions in this field. But it is also a political reality, with support for CFSP and CSDP being widespread across EU states. Some EU missions, for example, have counted on the participation of over twenty states, with all of them agreeing to provide capabilities and shoulder part of the financial burden.

The fact that France had so much trouble getting the EU to act in places such as Chad, Mali or Libya, is evidence of the inability of large Member States to design this area of policy according exclusively to their preferences. Additionally, in instances where a large Member State pushed its partners to act decisively in a region they did not consider central to their security it usually ended up covering most of the mission's expenses itself and yet losing control of the operation once launched<sup>690</sup>. CFSP/CSDP therefore only truly functions when supported by a large number of EU Member States.

### ***Integration in Security and Defence Has its Own Dynamics***

This thesis has revealed that the process of emergence of CFSP/CSDP was different to that of other EU institutions. So different that it probably needs its own theoretical framework if we are to understand its underlying dynamics. The most significant difference is perhaps that the externalities of non-integration in security and defence are only felt sporadically and through external shocks. This makes this area of policy radically different from others like for example trade policy where externalities, say those caused by tariff barriers, are felt constantly and through the sheer act of trading across borders. Additionally, the actors exposed to those externalities are, in security and defence matters, domestic elites that suffer first hand the consequences of security crises. There is, therefore, no “transnational society” pushing for security and defence integration but rather a small group of national

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<sup>690</sup> See section on EUFOR TChad in Chapter 4 on France

elites that in fits and starts have called for the elevation of the management of certain security issues to the European level.

This distinct process is even visible in the area of pooling and sharing of capabilities where one would expect a purely economic logic to prevail, particularly during a time of economic scarcity. And yet, although the coordination of procurement at the supranational level is economically beneficial, there are other elements to consider before states give up powers in this field. The most important is that the cost of a poor procurement policy is only really felt through an external shock and the inability to tackle its consequences.

### ***Already Constituted Institutions Do Not Play a Central Role***

Functionalism and neofunctionalism both spoke of the importance of already constituted institutions in the forwarding of the integration process. If this was an accurate assessment when speaking of security and defence integration we would have seen the EU's High Representative and the institutions in Brussels playing a far more important role in the process than we have. Observations on the ground point to Member States remaining central in all decisions pertaining to CFSP/CSDP. Policy preferences are set in Member States and are then transmitted to national representatives at the PSC or the European Council. Major decisions are taken by unanimity and by either national Foreign Ministers or Heads of State and Government. This is not to say that the High Representative, the EEAS or the many other EU bodies that work on security and defence are irrelevant. They are effective enablers of discussions and executors of agreed decision but operate within the boundaries of what Member States have empowered them to do<sup>691</sup>. Has this meant that

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<sup>691</sup> In early 2015 Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, called for the creation of a European army. EU representatives can make such calls and ask Member States to consider them but decisions of this nature will ultimately be made by the European Council. See: Andrew Sparrow, "Jean-Claude Juncker calls for EU army," *The Guardian*, 8 March, 2015, accessed 19/04/2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/08/jean-claude-juncker-calls-for-eu-army-european-commission-military>

the integration process has stalled? The evidence suggests not. The ownership of the process by Member States has not meant that it has not advanced, produced new institutions, new strategic documents or new international engagements. It does mean, however, that any theory of integration in this field should place agency at the hands of states.

### ***Strategic Culture is Not The Determining Factor***

Although the strategic cultures of France, Germany and Spain are different, these countries have found ways to cooperate on security and defence issues on a regular basis. CFSP/CSDP is itself a testament to the ability of states with varying strategic cultures to build common institutions and agree on common action. The case of Germany is perhaps the most important as it is the state studied here with the most restrictive strategic culture. Germans have a strongly pacifist culture that is manifested institutionally in the country's Constitution and the limits it imposes on overseas intervention. And yet, over the past two decades Germany has gone from having a strictly territorial defence posture, and armed forces that were under NATO command, to deploying troops in Afghanistan, Mali or the Gulf of Aden within the UN, NATO and EU frameworks. Instances where Germany decided not to intervene or opposed EU action were ones where its strategic interests were not at stake. Interviews conducted for this thesis confirmed time and time again that if major German interests, like for example the security of trading routes, are at stake the country is more than willing to act with determination.

The issue of culture and its role in EU defence takes us therefore to another finding of this thesis: how far EU action in this field goes seems to be determined by the level of strategic interest overlap of states. The degree to which altruism plays into the EU's ability to act is reduced to small decisions and possibly small CSDP operations. For large

commitments, states, at least the ones studied here, referred to their national interests and the way they would be helped by this or that action. This did not prevent integration from proceeding. It does mean however, that it has been circumscribed to areas where there is a strong interest overlap across states. As demonstrated in the empirical chapters and as further developed below, this fact has limited the extent to which CFSP/CSDP has developed. It also means that culture, identity and other such constructs are probably not central to the early stages of security and defence integration.

### ***It is Not just about Defence***

Although a lot of the literature opted for a much narrower approach, this thesis has looked at security and defence integration in broad terms. Not limiting the analysis to what in the past was referred to as “defence”, and which meant almost exclusively interstate armed conflict, has proven to be the correct decision. European states have themselves transitioned in the past twenty years to a much broader definition that included elements of pure security policy<sup>692</sup>. The drafting of the latest French, German or Spanish top strategy documents involved almost all government departments and representatives from all of the branches of the security forces. According to the strategic documents of these states, globalisation and interdependence have changed the face of security and defence, and blurred the distinction between internal and external security. New threats call today for comprehensive solutions both within one’s borders and beyond.

This expansion or broadening of the security agenda has two important and connected implications. The first is that the authors that were sceptical about defence integration occurring in Europe might today have different opinions in light of the new boundaries of the field. The literature has been very sceptical of the EU sending soldiers to fight a

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<sup>692</sup> It is interesting to note how strategy documents have themselves changed name over the last two decades with most transitioning from “Defence” strategies to “National Security” ones.

conventional war and has always seen that as a task to be performed by either Member States or NATO. However, if they had known that modern militaries would also be used for disaster relief, peacekeeping, border management or training missions their assessment of the EU's ability to integrate in this field might have been different. The second consequence is, of course, that it is foolish to disregard these developments only because they do not fall within what one could term classical defence. Is it irrelevant that the EU as a whole deployed four thousand soldiers in Chad in 2008 in a peacekeeping operation? Evidently not, even if the mission did not involve conventional combat against the armed forces of another state. Is it wise not to include the imposition of sanctions by the EU on third states in our definition of foreign security and defence action? Again the answer would be no, as sanctions represent today true security policy statements and are an expression of strategic posture. These smaller steps, be they modest missions or sanctions, or a coordinated anti-terrorism policy, represent the elevation to the European level of the management of security challenges that worry states, and could therefore constitute the path to full integration across the spectrum of defence activities, including, eventually, territorial defence.

### **Security and Defence Integration: Key Findings**

Not all the literature reviewed in this dissertation missed the mark. As a matter of fact the theoretical explanation of EU integration suggested in this thesis was built on concepts and ideas found in the international relations theory and the regional integration literatures. Particularly useful was the concept of security community and how it helps understand dynamics in regions where balancing behaviour is not the norm. Functionalism, in turn, provided valuable insights regarding the concepts of externalities in regional integration, and functional spillover. Liberal Intergovernmentalism with its

emphasis on a two-tiered integration process, a first phase of domestic preference formation followed by an intergovernmental bargain, provided this thesis with a valuable conceptual framework. This study is, in turn, clearly a positivist one with a belief in rational actors capable of establishing a fluid dialogue with one another about shared strategic interests, another notion very much embedded in liberal intergovernmentalism. Lastly, negotiation analysis and its insights into complex multiparty negotiations provided the conceptual underpinning of much of the analysis about supranational negotiations contained in this thesis.

Some of the empirical and the mid-range theoretical literatures cited in chapter 2, in turn, provided important building blocks to this thesis' design. As anticipated there, many of the insights of those scholars were essential when first addressing the overarching questions of this thesis. Combining the concepts and insights of pre-existing literature, and completing abundant empirical research in EU Member States has yielded a set of conclusions that if put together amount to a plausible theoretical explanation of European security and defence integration. The sections below will address the four central findings of this thesis and how they relate to the broader theory suggested in this dissertation. Here are those findings in a schematic fashion:

1. The existence of a European security community that enables and underpins EU security and defence integration.
2. The centrality of external shocks to the process of security and defence integration. These shocks expose national elites to the externalities of ineffective security and defence arrangements and kick start the intergovernmental dialogue that precedes integration.

3. The importance of strategic interest overlap for the integration process and the fact that over time European states seem to share a growing catalogue of such interests.
4. The role of the United States and NATO as shields against external shocks and therefore as spoilers of EU security and defence integration.

### ***A European Security Community Exists and Enables Integration***

As anticipated above, a security community seems to be in existence in Europe. The strategic documents of all three states studied here stated that threats to their security did not originate in other EU Member States, that the EU was built on values they shared and that EU cooperation was the most effective way to solve their problems. This intense partnership across states, as well as between states and the EU, has made war in the European space unthinkable and has led EU states to call repeatedly for the elevation of security policy to the European level.

It is important to note here that the existence of a security community has not just led to peace in Europe. It also seems to be the fundamental reason why EU states have turned to one another whenever they faced a crisis. It was that trust in one another that led EU states to consult each other after suffering a crisis, and therefore served as the fuse to the process of EU security and defence integration. This fact is alluded to in a number of European strategic documents and was confirmed in numerous interviews. It was ultimately also that trust that created the right environment for transparent debates about desired common measures and that prevented zero-sum negotiations where value claiming would have impeded wide ranging agreements. Table 8.1 below shows this thesis' observations regarding the existence of a European security community.

Relations between Spain and the UK, and in particular the issue of sovereignty over Gibraltar, seem to fall outside the parameters one would expect to see if a security community was truly in place. Some Spanish security documents refer to the prolonged UK control of Gibraltar as a security problem and some interviewees equated it to a violation of Spanish sovereignty. This issue, however, comes and goes from Spanish strategic documents, does not seem significant enough to put into question the otherwise very healthy Spain-UK partnership, and remains a true outlier in intra-European Union relations<sup>693</sup>.

**Table 8.1: Belonging of Studied Countries to a Security Community**

| <i>Propositions Underlying Theory of Security and Defence Integration</i>   | <i>Country</i> | <i>Consistent with the existence of a Security Community?</i> |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| At peace with other members of the community                                | France         | Yes                                                           |
|                                                                             | Germany        | Yes                                                           |
|                                                                             | Spain          | Yes                                                           |
| Threats to security lie exclusively outside the boundaries of the community | France         | Yes                                                           |
|                                                                             | Germany        | Yes                                                           |
|                                                                             | Spain          | No (Gibraltar)                                                |
| Shared values with other members of the community                           | France         | Yes                                                           |
|                                                                             | Germany        | Yes                                                           |
|                                                                             | Spain          | Yes                                                           |
| Elevation of the management of security to the community level              | France         | Yes                                                           |
|                                                                             | Germany        | Yes                                                           |
|                                                                             | Spain          | Yes                                                           |
| Expectation of peace to remain in place within the community                | France         | Yes                                                           |
|                                                                             | Germany        | Yes                                                           |
|                                                                             | Spain          | Yes                                                           |

The possibility of there being a transatlantic security community has also been explored in this thesis. Although I have not attempted to test this hypothesis, which would have required extensive empirical work in the United States, it is still the case that at least the three EU states studied here made no indication that they felt threatened by the United

<sup>693</sup> So much so that they could cease to be “intra-EU” relations if the UK is to finally leave the European Union.

States. German strategic documents and German elites, in turn, expressed in explicit terms that the space of peace constructed after 1945 included the United States of America. There is also, however, circumstantial evidence to suggest that the level of strategic interest overlap between both sides of the Atlantic is not as extensive as that which exists within Europe. This has now manifested itself in a number of instances where Europeans sought American cooperation but the US was unwilling to provide it. Many of the people interviewed for this thesis saw the US pivot to Asia or US reluctance to take the lead of operations in Libya (2011) or Mali (2013) as proof of this interest divergence. These differences are probably what will make transatlantic security and defence remain at the level of cooperation and not produce the flurry of measures, institutions and action we have witnessed at the EU level. The idea of NATO and CSDP being different constructs with a different depth was explicitly contained in a number of national documents cited in this thesis, and was reiterated in numerous interviews.

### ***Shocks Led States to Attempt to Europeanize the Management of Security***

The empirical chapters of this thesis showed that reactions to external shocks by EU states have on the whole been consistent with the theory laid down in Chapter 1. These shocks not only reminded national policymakers of their interests but also kick-started an intergovernmental dialogue on what to do together to address them. The founding of CFSP, the launch of CSDP, as well as the numerous EU actions undertaken abroad have all been reactions to specific security crises that affected EU Member States<sup>694</sup>. This was also the case of instances where EU powers on border control or counter-terrorism policy were enhanced.

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<sup>694</sup> A recent case is Italy's and Malta's request in April of 2015 for an expansion of the EU's presence in the Mediterranean to both control and assist illegal immigrants trying to reach Europe's shores from Northern Africa. This request followed the death of over 700 migrants attempting to travel from Libya to Italy. See: BBC, "Mediterranean migrant crisis: EU sets out measures," *BBC News* (April 20, 2015), accessed 21/04/2015, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-32383126>

Table 8.2 below contains a summary of the theoretical expectations and empirical findings of this thesis in relation to external shocks.

**Table 8.2: Summary of Theoretical Expectations and Research Findings From Cases**

| <i>Crises</i>                                                  | <i>Reactions</i>                                                                                                                                                | <i>Theory explains national reactions?</i> | <i>Outcome expected by author?</i> |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| <b>FRANCE</b>                                                  |                                                                                                                                                                 |                                            |                                    |
| Collapse of the Soviet Union & Conflict in the Balkans         | French support for the development of CFSP, including at the Saint Maló summit of 1998 and to French contributions to CSDP operations in the Balkans            | Yes                                        | Yes                                |
| Instability in the Sahel                                       | French calls for EU operations in the region including one in Chad, EUFOR TChad, of which France took the lead                                                  | Yes                                        | <b>No</b>                          |
| Piracy off the Horn of Africa                                  | French calls for a greater EU strategic vision in the region and to direct French support for the launch of the European antipiracy operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta | Yes                                        | Yes                                |
| Charlie Hebdo Terrorist Attack                                 | French calls for further EU security integration and the enhancement of EU antiterrorism tools                                                                  | Yes                                        | Yes                                |
| <b>GERMANY</b>                                                 |                                                                                                                                                                 |                                            |                                    |
| Collapse of the Soviet Union & Conflict in the Balkans         | German support for the development of CFSP and to German contributions to CSDP operations in the Balkans                                                        | Yes                                        | Yes                                |
| The Eurozone Crisis                                            | German support for the deepening of economic integration and the launch of a European banking union                                                             | Yes                                        | <b>No</b>                          |
| Instability in the Sahel, Horn of Africa and the Mediterranean | German support for the EU to take the lead in conflicts where major German interests were at stake                                                              | Yes                                        | <b>No</b>                          |
| Ukraine Conflict                                               | Concerted German efforts to build a united EU front including through the imposition of sanctions on Russia                                                     | Yes                                        | Yes                                |
| <b>SPAIN</b>                                                   |                                                                                                                                                                 |                                            |                                    |
| Collapse of the Soviet Union & Conflict in the Balkans         | Spanish support for CFSP/CSDP and participation in CSDP missions in the Balkans                                                                                 | Yes                                        | Yes                                |
| 11-M Terrorist Attack                                          | Spanish calls for an EU counterterrorism policy and for better EU tools in this field                                                                           | Yes                                        | Yes                                |
| Immigration Crisis of 2006                                     | Spanish calls for EU anti-immigration policy and Frontex missions in the Western Atlantic                                                                       | Yes                                        | Yes                                |
| Arab Spring                                                    | Spanish support for a common EU policy towards the Southern Mediterranean as well as to participation in various CSDP missions in the region                    | Yes                                        | Yes                                |

Some of the shocks looked at in previous chapters produced outcomes that were not expected and that revealed nuances within the theory that were not at first apparent. For example, the inability of France to construct a more forceful EU reaction to crises in the Sahel, be it in Chad in 2008 or in Mali in 2013, revealed that the strategic interest divergence in Europe is more significant than at first anticipated, and that it has meant that sometimes certain states are forced to take on missions autonomously and outside the CSDP framework. The empirical findings from Germany reinforced this point by showing that, indeed, security crises in Africa are perceived very differently in Paris and in Berlin, making, therefore, an EU consensus on how to tackle them a very difficult endeavour.

Additionally, German reactions to the Eurozone crisis revealed that sometimes non-security shocks, in this case a sovereign debt crisis, had been interpreted by domestic elites as a security challenge. Security considerations had therefore informed policy and led to a stronger case being made in favour of further economic integration. This was unexpected and shows how intertwined security and non-security integration are.

### ***Strategic Interests are Central to EU Security and Defence Integration***

Strategic interests are central to the theoretical explanation to integration suggested in this thesis. It is not sufficient to be part of a security community for integration to proceed; states would also have to suffer shocks and to come to agreements on how to react to them based on their catalogue of shared interests. These interests are significant and long-lasting which means that any overlap is bound to remain in place for a long time. This is what makes integration truly interesting for states.

Previous chapters have shown that EU Member States have managed to come to numerous agreements regarding their common security and defence, and that those agreements were, indeed, arrived at after a discussion on the shape and depth of the basket


of common interests. Some missions and actions that were not undertaken failed precisely because EU states had divergent interests. This is to say, the lack of strategic overlap has also been an explicit cause of EU non-integration.

However, because the EU lacks a structured strategic dialogue or planning process, this discussion among Member States had to be had every single time a decision regarding CFSP/CSDP was to be taken, be it at the European Council or the PSC level. More often than not European states found that they shared basic interests and agreed on common action. Action was usually less ambitious than what the most interested parties would have desired and more forceful than the least interested ones had wished for. In any event EU security and defence action has never truly deviated from the ‘common ground’ of the protection of shared interests.

Figure 8.1 below shows an abstract depiction of the strategic interests of four states: France, Germany, Spain and the United States of America. The areas of overlap constitute either the natural remit of the EU (CFSP/CSDP) or NATO. It seems from the empirical research conducted here that the level of overlap of strategic interests of EU Member States is significant, making the management of threats those interest a prime responsibility of CFSP/CSDP.

Not every strategic interest is shared by EU Member States. As discussed in the empirical chapters, France has a large catalogue of interests in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and the Pacific that are disconnected from those of its European colleagues. Spain, in turn, has territorial outposts in Northern Africa that need protection and that are outside what the EU as a whole would want to be involved in.

Figure 8.1: US-European Strategic Interest Map



The United States, for its part, has important shared interests with each and every EU Member State and the area where all of these overlap is what constitutes the natural responsibility of NATO. As revealed by the empirical research conducted for this thesis that area of overlap is mostly related to territorial defence as stipulated in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In terms of action beyond collective defence the three states studied in this thesis seem to agree that NATO should intervene where the shared interests of Alliance members are at stake. However that will not produce a very large catalogue of interventions in part because the US has many security interests and concerns of its own, mostly in Asia Pacific.

Figure 8.1 is here only to provide a snapshot of some of the arguments made in this thesis. One can disagree with the level of overlap of Europeans interests or of these with those of the US. It could also be argued that the graph above shifts over time, with the US pivot to Asia moving the country leftwards on the diagram and reducing the area of overlap with European allies. What seems to be the case is that EU states, at least the ones studied in this thesis, have a lot more in common with each other than with the US, and that the level of strategic interest overlap in Europe is creating an incentive to integrate

national security and defence policies. In negotiation terms this is equivalent to saying that the ZOPA for EU action is far wider than that for NATO action.

Jorn Hasler interviewed for this thesis in 2013 described a possible way of thinking about European integration that captured both the centrality of interests in the debate and the importance of their overlap across EU states when thinking of security and defence integration:

Perhaps we should see this in terms of three circles. First, “In which instances are our national interests 100% European interests?”. We have to have a really good discussion with our partners in Europe...We would say that the homeland defence of Europe is a European interest. If someone in Europe is threatened directly then it should not be a problem to “send everything”...Second we have “vital zones”. These could be the Mediterranean and North Africa, for example...Then there would be a third circle where we should be serious and frank with each other: “ok, beyond North Africa, it’s not a European vital interest”.<sup>695</sup>

In the areas where EU states do not share interests, or what Hasler termed the “third circle”, European states might find themselves having to act alone or with local partners.

Now, this thesis provided some evidence that EU integration had produced a certain convergence of strategic interests across EU Member States. This was caused by the spillover of integration from ‘non-security’ fields to others with security implications. The most emblematic case of this process was Schengen, that turned a whole range of previously national problems into supranational ones, notably border protection and the fight against terrorism<sup>696</sup>. Although Schengen was designed primarily as a tool to perfect the European single market by eliminating internal borders, it has now forced European governments to find common solutions to shared problems. The implications of this are wide-ranging and extend to common border protection, constructing common policies in the fight against terrorism or even to tackling state failure in Northern Africa, the Sahel and the Middle East. The consequences of mismanaging crises in this region of the world are now a worry to all EU states and not only to those with direct exposure to the Eastern

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<sup>695</sup> Interview with Jorn Hasler, Berlin, 10-04-2013

<sup>696</sup> Given that terrorists can now travel across Europe and given that they primarily target civilians, they pose an almost identical threat to each and every member of Schengen.

and Western Mediterranean. There are, however, other instances of spillover that were not properly explored here but that could turn out to be very significant in the integration process. These include the pooling of energy supply risks produced by an Energy Union with a common energy market and infrastructure, the increased interdependence produced by the creation of a Banking Union, or the convergence of strategic economic interests caused by Europe's common trade policy. In all of these instances EU Member States might find themselves sharing key interests which will make integration on the face of threats an attractive proposition.

### ***NATO and the US as Spoilers of Integration***

If shocks are central to integration because they produce intergovernmental bargains where EU states can discuss common action and decide to further security and defence integration, then having an external actor shield the EU from shocks could abort the entire process. In the case of Europe that actor seems to be the US. By being present in Europe, and by taking responsibility for the management of conflicts where Europeans had interests at stake, the US has allowed them to free-ride on its security efforts. On the part of Europeans this free-riding is, of course, a rational policy and many of the people interviewed for this thesis recognised as much.

There is now abundant evidence to suggest that US calls for more effective transatlantic burden sharing have been far less effective in getting Europeans to cooperate than the actual leaving of security matters in their hands. It is this latter policy of forcing Europeans to deal with security challenges in their near neighbourhood in the 1990s that produced the first burst of support for a common EU security and defence, and that led to the founding of CFSP/CSDP. Also, worries about the consequences of the US shift in strategic attention to Asia have been more acute in European capitals than the concern

generated by repeated comments by US Secretaries of Defence about the need for Europeans to be more effective security players. The experience of Libya and the US “leading from behind” was again regularly cited in European capitals during the interviews conducted for this thesis as a clear sign that the EU would have to develop a stronger security and defence arm<sup>697</sup>. The quote that perhaps captures best this state of affairs is the one provided by Joachim Spatz when asked about what could drive the EU to greater security and defence integration: “...*facing a risk which is important enough to damage Europe but not important enough to force to US to come to save us*” (my emphasis)<sup>698</sup>. The less the US “saves” Europeans the greater the incentive will be for them to do more together.

Interestingly, not a single person interviewed for this thesis suggested that the US pivoting away from Europe called for stronger national defence policies. There were different suggestions provided by different interviewees but they all revolved around some form of EU defence integration. Some suggested a stronger CFSP/CSDP could then form the basis of a European pillar within NATO, others that it should be a stand alone institution with sporadic contact with the Alliance.

## Unanswered Questions and Future Lines of Inquiry

This dissertation provides answers to some questions, leaves others unanswered and generates new lines of inquiry. The most important unanswered questions are connected to developments that are still ongoing. What will the consequences of the Eurozone crisis be for European integration and therefore for the strategic interests of EU Member States?

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<sup>697</sup> As Jolyon Howorth has put it: “The realization, across the EU, that the US is likely to maintain its low profile approach to European security, if not actually to institutionalize ‘leading from behind’ [the tactic employed by the Obama Administration in Libya and which implied a reduced US involvement in the conflict], was a major wake-up call that posed uncomfortable questions for Europeans”. See: Howorth, *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*, 140.

<sup>698</sup> Interview with Joachim Spatz, Berlin, 19-04-2013

How structural will America's pivot to Asia be? How long lasting will the US' commitment to NATO prove to be? Is Russia's revisionism in Eastern Europe a feature that will survive President Putin and change the nature of relations between the EU and Russia? How deep and prolonged will the current migration crisis be? Will the UK finally leave the European Union and under what conditions? The answers to these questions will all have an impact on the future of CFSP/CSDP.

The analysis contained in this thesis has looked at a period in European history when EU integration was deepened. From the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in the early 1990s to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU went through a marked period of both enlargement, with new Member States being admitted to the Union, and of deepening with new powers being accumulated in Brussels. However, if the Eurozone crisis was to spiral out of control, causing perhaps the exit of some of its members from the monetary union or even from the EU itself, it might pose a real threat to the strategic interest convergence witnessed over the past decades. Additionally if anti EU movements in Member States were to reach power and decide to dismantle some of the previously agreed EU institutions and frameworks the direct consequence would be to reduce to attractiveness of deepening security and defence integration. Joint border management would be a direct victim of a dismantling of Schengen, for example. The point is therefore clear: security and defence integration does not occur in a vacuum and is connected to developments in other areas of policy. A deepening of European integration will increase the chances of spillover into security and defence, while disintegration will have the opposite effect.

Another important open question is the robustness of the US pivot to Asia. Given that we do not know if China's economic and military rise will continue at the pace witnessed in the past two decades, or that we ignore the degree of Chinese revisionism in East Asia,

it is impossible to foresee how US policy for the region will look like. Without knowing this it is hard to tell the degree to which US attention to Europe will decline and shift to other areas of the world.

Similarly, events in Ukraine of late 2014 and early 2015 could hint at a new, and much worsened, security relationship between the EU and Russia. Again, the intensity and duration of this shock, as well as NATO's willingness to bear the brunt of this threat, could be real determinants of CFSP/CSDP's future.

What this dissertation suggests is that if EU integration does not unravel, the US pivot away from Europe is truly structural, and Russian revisionism in Eastern Europe continues, European states will opt for the strengthening of CFSP/CSDP. Or in theoretical terms if a security community with members that share strategic interests is hit by a significant external shock and is not allowed to free-ride on the security provided by a third party, the outcome will be to deepen security and defence integration.

Beyond the open questions delineated above, this dissertation has also identified new lines of inquiry. Perhaps the most significant issue that should be explored in the future is the level of strategic interest overlap across EU Member States. This would help us understand both the spillover into security and defence produced by EU integration and the strength of forces driving the process. This thesis has used the information contained in national strategic documents and insights from elite interviews to construct an informal catalogue of states' interests. This is an effective but imperfect process. Just as states do not feel the externalities of non-integration until hit by an external shock, it also happens that strategic planners sometimes discover the strategic interests of their countries only when these are put at risk. Strategic planning is a notoriously imperfect process, with vague definitions of interest. This means that relying solely on what strategic planners already know is, paradoxically, not ideal.

A more rigorous way to proceed would be to develop a strategic interest model that measured interests of EU states in as a quantitative way as possible. A model like that could follow the blueprint suggested by me in an article of 2013 (See Appendix 3)<sup>699</sup>. The overall design of the model should enable researchers to capture the ‘objective’ interests of states, such as the location of pockets of expatriated population, key economic interests around the world and others. If measured in this way we could anticipate which types of shocks would produce the greatest incentive for Europeans to integrate. We could also look at historical strategic interest distribution and analyse the extent to which European strategic interest have converged over time.

Additionally, further analysis could be done on the supranational negotiation side of the theory suggested here. It would be relatively straightforward, for example, to focus on negotiations within the PSC and test the various suggestions made here about countries’ BATNAs, ZOPAs and their connection to national strategic interests. Particularly interesting would be to look at how certain shocks affected different EU states, and how differences in the cost of certain EU policies are negotiated within the Union. A good case study could be that of sanctions imposed by the EU on third states. Sanctions affect not only the country being sanctioned but also those imposing them. If the implementer of the sanctions is the EU a sub-level of analysis emerges: the impact of sanctions on individual Member States. A study on these would be an interesting window into the distribution of costs within the EU of the Union’s security and defence policy.

The role of the UK in European defence, its belonging to a European security community, and its future within CSDP and the broader EU are an entire separate issue that has only be skimmed over in this thesis but that should receive further attention. The content of some of the interviews conducted for this thesis suggests that some Spanish,

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<sup>699</sup> Muniz, “Strategy and Its Role in the Future of European Defense Integration”.

French and German policymakers see the UK as an outsider to the EU project and an oddity within the post-1945 European system. It might even be the case that the UK is simply not part of a European security community. These issues require further research and could help explain why the UK has had such a different European policy to that of other states. The decision taken by the United Kingdom on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of June 2016 to leave the European Union only emphasizes the need to look in detail at this very particular case and to understand whether we are witnessing the beginning of a new dynamic in EU relations; perhaps even one of disintegration.

The British question opens up another possible line of inquiry: the origin of Europe's security community. This dissertation has only looked at developments since the end of the Cold War and has found a strong connection between the lack of feeling of threat among states and their willingness to integrate their security and defence. I have not looked, however, at the period between 1945 and 1990, when arguably the European security community was born. Something must have changed in Europe in that time for it to leave behind the constant state of war that characterised its previous centuries. There are powerful reasons to believe that the change was brought about by the creation of the EU and its rule-bound environment. Some German and French strategic documents studied here specifically alluded to this. However, scholars have suggested that it was actually the creation of NATO and the US's overwhelming presence in Europe that produced the long peace necessary to consolidate friendly relations among former enemies. Perhaps it was the combination of both. What is clear is that there is an interesting line of inquiry to be pursued regarding this issue, one with important implications for other regions of the world trying to emulate the European experience.


## **Chapter Overview**

Overall this dissertation has provided some structure to a field, that of EU security and defence, characterised by disorder and confusion. It has attempted to bridge the gap between separate literatures that seemed to speak to different audiences and from different perspectives but on the same topic. The very first person to be interviewed for this thesis was Javier Solana, the former High Representative of the EU. In that interview Solana expressed doubt that there was any system or order in EU foreign action. He said, as cited earlier, that the EU had simply reacted to developments on the ground in a haphazard way. This vision of CFSP/CSDP as almost an accidental top down construction highly dependent on entrepreneurial European elites is widespread in EU policymaking circles. The truth of the matter, however, seems to be that although action was reactive, and although further integrative measures were only agreed upon under pressure, they proceeded according to some rules. There seem to be phases and order in the process. Shocks preceded action and agreement was only possible on issues on which a consensus across Member States existed. Member State perceptions and positions, specifically when talking about CFSP/CSDP, were highly dependent on the layout of national strategic interest. Given EU decision-making procedures it was almost always the lowest common denominator that determined the outline of common decisions, which is equivalent to saying that the party with the strongest BATNA is the one that sets the floor of the negotiation. This was true of agreements that led to the creation of new institutions, the approval of new strategic documents or the launch of missions around the world. All of this evolved in an extraordinary environment of mutual trust, or what this thesis has termed a European security community.

This thesis has provided evidence that the emergence of CFSP and CSDP in Europe is part of a broader and ongoing process of security and defence integration. CFSP

action does not happen in a vacuum and is not the result of *ad hoc* cooperation. Rather, it occurs within a resilient security community of states that have over decades integrated many areas of policy, including their borders, their trade policy, and their currency. Integration seems to follow the decision tree suggested in Figure 1.6 in the Introduction and copied again below.

*Figure 1.6: Decision Tree of Security and Defence Integration*



It should be noted that CFSP and CSDP are still areas where decisions are taken by unanimity. In this sense there has been no formal cession of sovereignty to the EU by Member States. It is also true that CSDP military missions are paid for by the states that take part in them, and that there is no permanent EU planning capacity or a permanent

military capability. However, these shortcomings seem to be a product of the point at which the integration process is rather than a constant feature. Depending on developments in the security environment inhabited by Europeans, the speed of integration in other fields, and US security policy, some of these issues could change fairly swiftly.


Be that as it may, providing an overarching structure to the process allows us to understand the momentum of change, and to focus on what is truly important: the level of strategic interest convergence across states, and the frequency and intensity of external shocks they suffer. Placing such emphasis on external shocks and their role in this process allows us to view the US-Europe security partnership from a new angle, and to conclude that it could be acting as a real spoiler to further EU security and defence integration.

The theory suggested here and the empirical work developed over the past five years are surely not definitive. They represent an attempt at bringing order to a field in need of a more comprehensive theoretical framework of analysis and a small contribution to the field of security and defence integration studies.

## Appendices

### Appendix 1: Interviews conducted

| INTERVIEWS          |                     |                                                        |                                                                                                           |             |
|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| SURNAME             | NAME                | INSTITUTION                                            | POSITION                                                                                                  | INTERVIEWED |
| Ballesteros         | Miguel Angel        | Spanish Army                                           | General / Director Instituto Espanol de Estudios Estrategicos (IEEE)                                      | 30/10/12    |
| Bentégeat           | Henri               | French Army / European Military Committee (EUMC)       | General (Ret) / Head of the French Chiefs of Staff and EU Military Committee                              | 03/07/12    |
| Berenguer           | Philippe            | Spanish Navy                                           | Joint Chiefs of Staff / Strategy and Planning Division                                                    | 30/10/12    |
| Brantner            | Franziska           | European Parliament                                    | Member of Parliament / The Greens                                                                         | 19/04/13    |
| Breijo Claur        | Andres Amable       | Spanish Defence Ministry                               | Admiral / Former Director of EUNAVCO                                                                      | 31/10/12    |
| Cordon              | Carlos              | Spanish Navy                                           | Captain / Director Armed Forces Language School                                                           | 29/10/12    |
| de Vasconcelos      | Alvaro              | European Union Institute for Strategic Studies (EUISS) | Director                                                                                                  | 27/06/12    |
| Dominguez Bascoy    | Jeronimo            | Spanish                                                | Admiral / Director of the Military School of Legal Studies                                                | 07/11/12    |
| Finkenbusch         | Ulrich              | German Parliament                                      | FDP Parliamentary Group / Adviser for Foreign Policy                                                      | 10/04/13    |
| Ganascia            | Jean-Philippe       | French Army                                            | Brigadier General (Ret) / EUFOR Tchad Force Commander                                                     | 25/06/12    |
| Hasler              | Jorn                | German Parliament                                      | FDP Parliamentary Group / Adviser for Security and Defence Policy                                         | 10/04/13    |
| Helly               | Damien              | European Union Institute for Strategic Studies (EUISS) | Senior Research Fellow                                                                                    | 03/07/12    |
| Horcada             | Ignacio             | Spanish Navy                                           | Admiral                                                                                                   | 07/11/12    |
| Howorth             | Jolyon              | Yale University                                        | Visiting Professor                                                                                        | 02/07/12    |
| Kähler              | Thorsten            | German Ministry of Defence                             | Rear Admiral / Director of Security Policy                                                                | 12/04/13    |
| Kaiser              | Karl                | Harvard University                                     | Director of the Program on Transatlantic Relations                                                        | 15/03/15    |
| Laïdi               | Zaki                | Sciences Po                                            | Research Professor                                                                                        | 02/07/12    |
| Lebeouf             | Aline               | Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI) | Research Fellow                                                                                           | 12/06/12    |
| Leon                | Bernardino          | European External Action Service                       | EU Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean                                                  | 28/10/12    |
| Lista Blanco        | Fernando            | Spanish Navy                                           | Admiral / Former Member of EUMC and EUMS                                                                  | 08/11/12    |
| Martinez Nuñez      | Juan Francisco      | Spanish Navy                                           | Admiral / Joint Chiefs of Staff                                                                           | 30/10/12    |
| Martinez Valero     | Valentin            | Spanish Army                                           | General                                                                                                   | 10/09/12    |
| Morenés             | Pedro               | Spanish Defence Ministry                               | Minister                                                                                                  | 31/10/12    |
| Nye                 | Joseph              | Harvard University                                     | Distinguished Service Professor                                                                           | 18/06/12    |
| Overhaus            | Marco               | Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP)                | EU External Relations Division                                                                            | 19/04/13    |
| Seibert             | Bjoern              | German Ministry of Defence                             | Desk officer, CSDP Branch                                                                                 | 12/04/13    |
| Solana              | Javier              | European External Action Service                       | Former High Representative of the EU                                                                      | 10/11/12    |
| Spatz               | Joachim             | German Parliament                                      | FDP Parliamentary Group / Member of the Bundestag EU and Defense Committees / Foreign Policy Spokesperson | 19/04/13    |
| Stelzenmuller       | Constanze           | The German Marshall Fund Berlin                        | Senior Transatlantic Fellow                                                                               | 04/04/13    |
| Tettweiler          | Falk                | German Ministry of Defence                             | Lieutenant Colonel / Desk Officer / Security and Defence Policy Department                                | 17/04/13    |
| Weber               | Bernd               | German Parliament                                      | CDU-CSU Parliamentary Group / Speaker of the Working Group on Defence Policy                              | 11/04/13    |
| Wieck               | Jasper              | German Foreign Office                                  | Director / Head of Defence and Security Policy Division                                                   | 05/04/13    |
| Woelke              | Markus              | German Foreign Office                                  | Deputy Head / Division CSDP                                                                               | 04/04/13    |
| Zimmermann          | Volker              | German Parliament                                      | CDU-CSU Parliamentary Group / Member of the Defence Working Group                                         | 11/04/13    |
| Not for Attribution | Not for Attribution | French Foreign Ministry                                | Directorate of the European Union                                                                         | 25/06/12    |
| Not for Attribution | Not for Attribution | French Army                                            | High Ranking Officer / Operation Épervier                                                                 | 07/12/12    |
| Not for Attribution | Not for Attribution | French Army                                            | High Ranking Officer / EUFOR Tchad                                                                        | 26/06/12    |
| Not for Attribution | Not for Attribution | German Ministry of Defence                             | Security and Defence Policy                                                                               | 17/04/13    |
| Not for Attribution | Not for Attribution | German Chancellery                                     | Security Policy                                                                                           | 19/04/13    |

**Appendix 2: Map of Security Institutions in Europe**

**Appendix 3: Strategic Interest Model<sup>700</sup>**

| <b>Strategic Interests</b>          |                                                                                                                 |                                                                                                                                                        |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Interest</b>                     | <b>Components</b>                                                                                               | <b>Sources</b>                                                                                                                                         |
| <i><b>Institutional / Legal</b></i> | Treaty Density<br>Diplomatic Relations<br>Institutional Presence on the Ground                                  | Treaties and Agreements<br>Diplomatic Contacts<br>Institutional Presence on the Ground                                                                 |
| <i><b>Political / Cultural</b></i>  | Historical ties<br>Cultural Connection (Language)<br>Symbolic Importance                                        | Historical Documents and Official Statements<br>Parliamentary Debates<br>Interviews with Policy Makers<br>Public Opinion                               |
| <i><b>Economic</b></i>              | Trade Density<br>Special Economic Interests<br>Economic Presence in the Country<br>Size of Expatriate Community | Trade Data<br>Economic Indicators (FDI)<br>Information on Expatriate Community                                                                         |
| <i><b>Military / Security</b></i>   | Geo Strategic Importance<br>National Security Goals<br>Security Obligations<br>Military Presence                | Doctrine and Historical Documents<br>Parliamentary Debates<br>Official Statements<br>Interviews with Policy Makers<br>History of Military Intervention |

<sup>700</sup> Muniz, “Strategy and Its Role in the Future of European Defense Integration”.

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