Abstract Of
THE ROYALIST WAR EFFORT IN WALES AND THE WEST MIDLANDS 1642-1646
By
Ronald Edmund Hutton
Submitted For
The Degree Of DPhil
In
Hilary Term 1980

The essential object of the thesis is to examine the demands made upon differing royalist leaders during the Great Civil War, and the responses of those communities to them. By doing so, it is intended to provide answers to one of the great unanswered problems of the war, the question of whether the royalists lost because they were defeated in the field or because they forfeited the sympathy of the local people upon whose support they depended. The region chosen for study comprises twenty counties within Wales, the Marches and the West Midlands, the area in which the king first gathered an army and in which his supporters staged their last stand.

The first section traces the delivery and impact of the royalist Commissions Of Array, the raising of the royal field army and the slow organisation of local communities for a prolonged war in the winter that followed. The second describes the completion of this process with the appointment of peers as regional generals. The third section is devoted to describing the machinery of royalist wartime government and the problems it faced. The fourth recounts how the noble generals came to be replaced by more experienced soldiers, led by Prince Rupert. The fifth examines the challenge offered to these men in the winter of 1644-5 by a now war-weary local population, and the manner in which the military men overcame this challenge. The last section is devoted to showing how the destruction of the royal army at Naseby freed the local population to oppose any further demands by the royalist war machine and thereby destroy the machine itself.
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This thesis is intended to examine the demands made upon differing local communities by differing Royalist leaders during the Great Civil War, and the responses of those communities to them. It is a history of two parallel struggles, the formal war between the rival partisans and the efforts of those partisans to persuade the bulk of the population to support their respective causes. By concentrating on the Royalist war effort, I hope to provide answers to one of the great problems of the war, the question of whether the Royalists lost because they were defeated in the field or because they forfeited the sympathy of the local people upon whose support they depended. The region chosen for study consists of the whole of Wales and the Marcher counties, plus Gloucestershire, Worcestershire, Warwickshire and Staffordshire, a sample of twenty counties in all. This was the area in which the King first gathered an army and in which his supporters staged their last stand. It also contains the largest surviving deposits of source material upon the local Royalist war effort.

The first section is devoted to enquiring how rival groups of partisans came to be formed in the region, and to mobilise their communities for conflict. It commences with a portrait of events in the region in the three months before the formal opening of hostilities, emphasising that outside Herefordshire, where strong Royalist sentiment existed, there is no sign of a nascent Royalist party. Men foresaw conflict between King and Parliament but showed no disposition to involve themselves. For many the moment of decision came in June 1642 when the King issued Commissions Of Array empowering certain gentry in each county to secure that county for him. The narrative continues with an analysis of the nature of the Commission and of the documents issued with it and of their impact upon the
various counties. They succeeded in producing Royalist activists almost everywhere, and in Herefordshire and most of the Welsh counties these took control. On the other hand, although Parliamentarians took control only at Gloucester and Birmingham, in most of the English counties studied the efforts of the Royalists were frustrated by the determination of the bulk of the gentry to remain neutral. In Warwickshire the rival partisans solved this problem by recruiting armies from their own incomes and fighting a dress rehearsal for the Civil War which eventually attracted the main rival field armies into the region.

The section continues by describing how the Parliamentarians conquered the south-east of the region while the King, aided by great efforts on the part of local Royalists, was welcomed to Shrewsbury. There follows an analysis of the manner in which he secured the neighbouring counties and recruited, trained, armed and paid a large army. The section ends with a description of how, after the Edgehill campaign, both sides turned to the provinces once more, to mobilise their resources more completely, for a prolonged contest. The Royalists managed to agree upon local taxes to support troops in the counties exposed to attack, although some communities responded half-heartedly. In Cheshire and Staffordshire gentry made pacts to remain outside the contest altogether. These, however, were not upheld with great determination, and after a few months of fighting a military 'front' was formed across the region.

The second section commences by recounting how, at the opening of the campaigning season of 1643, Charles appointed three Lieutenant-Generals to command troops in the region, Lord Capel, Lord Herbert and the Earl Of Carbery. These men were chosen for social prestige rather than military experience, the last two being the resident magnates of their commands. The king hoped that their personal prestige would rally men to his cause. The section is devoted to showing that these peers made disastrous commanders.
All were defeated. Herbert left his command defenceless, Capel quarrelled with the local people and lost a large area of his region and Carbery lost the entire region committed to his care. The section ends with a case study of Worcestershire, as a county of exceptional strategic importance with exceptional local source material, some of which, Henry Townshend's 'Diary', has formed the basis of general conclusions concerning the Royalist war effort. Townshend asserts that the Royalist war effort was destroyed by the military commanders, who usurped power from the local civilian leaders, alienated local people and so destroyed enthusiasm for the cause. A study of Worcestershire during 1643, when the local gentry were most firmly in control, reveals that the local people never co-operated cheerfully with the war effort and the local Royalists always relied upon military coercion to mount one.

The third section is devoted to investigating this problem more thoroughly. Its first half consists of an inquiry into the nature, functions and operation of the machinery created by the Royalists to administer the local war effort, the committees for 'guarding the county', for sequestration, accounting, impressment and the excise. The second half sets out to answer the question of why this machinery failed of its object, so that local taxes were always in arrears and troops underpaid. It examines the full range of regular and irregular impositions levied by the Royalists and sets them in the context of the perpetually disturbed military situation in this region, upon whose resources the Royalists relied. It concludes with a portrait of Staffordshire, the most fiercely-contested county of all, where civilian machinery had virtually ceased to operate and the commanders lived by force of arms. Despite these circumstances, and bitter quarrels between themselves, the Royalist governors maintained their garrisons with great success. The goodwill of the local community was ultimately dispensable.

The fourth section relates how the local war intensified
as the King replaced the defeated magnate generals with men chosen for opposite qualities, strangers to the region or younger sons who had proved their loyalty and military ability and were both aloof from local rivalries and lacking in any sentimental attachment to the people whom it was their duty to exploit. These men, Sir William Vavasour, Sir Gilbert Gerard, Charles Gerard and Lord Byron, were all clients of the King's cavalry commander Prince Rupert, and the new system of government was completed in early 1644 when Rupert took up residence in the region as its overall commander. The longest passage of the section is devoted to an assessment of Rupert in his hitherto disregarded role as an administrator. He approached the task with exceptional energy and imagination, overhauling the local administration to ensure that the new military men worked in partnership with local gentry according to an agreed system of rules. His reforms met, inevitably, with limited success, but removed a great deal of tension from local Royalist government. In the process he raised an army which almost won the war at Marston Moor. The new local generals did much to repair the damage to the local war effort sustained under the rule of the peers.

In the succeeding year, between mid-1644 and mid-1645, the Royalist leaders in the region faced more severe problems than before. The fifth section of this thesis is devoted to analysing this crisis and the manner in which the Royalists survived it. It commences by tracing the military defeats and loss of territory suffered by them in this period, commencing with the Parliamentarian offensives of early summer, accelerating after Marston Moor and continuing into the winter. It continues by examining the increasing disaffection of local populations with the Royalist cause, resulting from the chaos produced by the broken troops returning from Marston Moor and the succession of Royalist defeats which made the King's cause appear hopeless. Relations between the soldiery and civilian population worsened through the autumn, and in early 1645 disaffection took
dramatic forms. Royalist gentry in the Marches asked the King's leave to raise a local army under their own control, parallel to the regular soldiers, ostensibly to keep order but capable of overpowering the regular soldiers when its leaders wished. The King found it expedient to consent, with a few provisos. At the same time countrymen in certain areas of the Marches staged armed risings against the Royalist soldiery. These 'Clubman' associations are given close scrutiny, and are shown to have differed considerably in their aims and actions. Their similarity lies in the fact that between them they represented the most socially and economically backward areas of the Marches, lacking the gentry to intercede for them with the High Command. Thus they had no other means of stating their grievances than to enact the remedy. At the time, however, both Royalist and Parliamentarian leaders believed them to represent a general rural uprising.

The section continues by balancing these external and internal attacks upon Royalist administration by assessing its remaining strengths. Some of the local defeats were reversed. Some of the military leaders retained good relations with local gentry and worked with them to improve administration. In particular the generally under-rated Prince Maurice, sent into the region to replace his brother Rupert, worked hard to reduce antagonism between soldier and civilian. A decisive military victory, however, was required before the Royalist cause could recover prestige. This was supplied in March 1645, when Rupert brought the royal army north to join Maurice and the two princes drove back the Parliamentarians in Cheshire and repressed the most serious of the Clubman risings. The army then settled in the Marches to recruit and refresh. Documents hitherto unused prove that at this period Royalist administration functioned at least as well as ever before, with local people cowed by the proximity of the army. They amply disprove the theory that the Royalist war effort perished at this period of 'financial
thrombosis'. The other Clubmen submerged, the gentry army was never raised. When the royal army moved north through the Marches to commence the summer campaign, its course was a triumphal progress.

The sixth and final section opens with the destruction of the royal army at Naseby. The King fled to South Wales and ordered the levying of a new army in this area, hitherto least touched by the war. Instead, as Royalist defeats continued and Royalist credit declined, the Glamorganshire gentry used the King's weakness to assert control over local troops and eject the commanders imposed upon them. The reasons for this development are analysed: it is possible, but unlikely, that the gentry were compelled to resist by the populace. Unable to coerce them, the King was forced to concede their demands and then flee the region. After the fall of Bristol, when the Royalist cause seemed utterly hopeless, they declared for Parliament. Their example was followed by the other gentry of South Wales, of Monmouthshire and of south Worcester-shire. These movements have previously been classed with the Clubman risings, but are clearly distinct, being political choices made with reference to national events by the same gentry who kept their areas loyal during the earlier risings.

Only the peripheral fortresses of the Royalists now remained to be reduced. This process was rendered a slow one by the fierce resistance of the commanders and by the return of some of the gentry who had defected to Parliament to the King's cause. The closing passages of the thesis explain these developments and trace the completion of Parliament's victory to the fall of the last Royalist stronghold in March 1647.

The conclusions of the thesis may be summarised as follows. The Royalists never lost the affections of the common people because the common people were never, from the first, prepared to make the considerable sacrifices necessary to fight a prolonged Civil War. The war was commenced by a minority of partisans
who raised troops from their private resources, and continued by those troops, who coerced the local community into providing for their sustenance. The Royalists' success in the field was always vital, as the strength of their hold upon an area affected their power to exact resources from it, and because local populations withdrew support from defeated troops and co-operated more cheerfully with the victors in the hope of ending the war and its burdens. After the battle of Naseby this latter process ensured the King's defeat, but before then it had sometimes worked in the Royalists' favour. Thus the importance of the relationship between Royalist commanders and local people is considerable in considering the course of the Great Civil War. It did not, however, consist of the simple process of enthusiasm turning steadily to alienation which has been sometimes portrayed before now. Nor, in the more complex reality, were the experienced military men always the villains of the story and the local gentry the martyred heroes. The local Royalist war machine collapsed beneath the pressures of military defeat and local unpopularity, but not from mismanagement.
THE ROYALIST WAR EFFORT
IN
WALES AND THE WEST MIDLANDS
1642 : 1646

[77 1980]
This thesis is intended to examine the demands made upon differing local communities by differing Royalist leaders during the Great Civil War, and the responses of those communities to them. It is a history of two parallel struggles, the formal war between the rival partisans and the efforts of those partisans to persuade the bulk of the population to support their respective causes. By concentrating upon the Royalist war effort, I hope to provide answers to one of the great problems of the war, the question of whether the Royalists lost because they were defeated in the field or because they forfeited the sympathy of the local people upon whose support they depended. This concentration does tend to result in the Parliamentarians featuring in the thesis as dei ex machina, apparently free from the problems analysed in the case of the Royalists. To examine the Parliamentarian war effort, however, would be a thesis in itself. A great deal of recent work has in fact been done upon it, and should be read in conjunction with this study to obtain an overall picture.

The region chosen for study, defined rather awkwardly as 'Wales And The West Midlands', consists of the whole of Wales and the Marcher counties, plus Gloucestershire, Worcestershire, Warwickshire and Staffordshire, a sample of twenty counties in all. This was the area in which the King first gathered an army and in which his supporters staged their last stand. It also contains the largest surviving deposits of source-material upon the local Royalist war effort. As the thesis is preoccupied with Royalism, areas cease to be examined in it as
they fall under Parliamentarian domination. Likewise it does not deal with those areas of Gloucestershire which fell within the orbit of quite separate Royalist administrative systems based at Oxford and Bristol. Thus the area defined in the title is only a starting-point; the actual area studied at any one time is delineated by military and administrative frontiers, not county boundaries.

Where I have quoted from original sources I have modernised the spelling, though not the construction, in order to make the sense as intelligible as possible to the widest number of readers. The references provided in footnotes are intended to be used in conjunction with the bibliography, where the fullest possible information is given upon the authorship, title and location of each source.

Several people have contributed considerably not merely to the writing of the thesis but to my pleasure in the work. Most deserving of gratitude is naturally my supervisor, Professor Hugh Trevor-Roper, now Lord Dacre, who devoted so much of his permanently overstrained time to the heroic struggle to turn me into a scholar and a writer. An only slightly smaller debt is owed to Doctor John Morrill, who gave me his friendship, knowledge and opinions at each stage of my research. Likewise Brigadier Peter Young supplied hospitality and information with a gusto beyond the call of duty. A different sort of gratitude is owed to the Department of Education and Science, for supporting me for the three years necessary to complete the work. I would like to thank the Earl of
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RONALD HUTTON
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<td>National Library of Wales</td>
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<td>University College of North Wales</td>
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<td>RL</td>
<td>Reference Library</td>
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<td>RO</td>
<td>Record Office</td>
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<td>CSPD</td>
<td>Calendar of State Papers Domestic</td>
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<td>TSANHS</td>
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<td>THSC</td>
<td>Transactions of the Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion</td>
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<td>DNB</td>
<td>Dictionary of National Biography</td>
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THE ACHIEVEMENT OF CIVIL WAR

It has been the custom in recent studies of the English Civil War to stress the presence, in each locality, of a majority of neutral or vacillating men standing between the rival partisans and acting as a limiting factor upon the virulence of the war at a local level. As no direct criticism has been published of this approach to Civil War studies, it appears to have achieved the status of an orthodoxy. The object of this first section is to turn this picture inside out and enquire how, amid such a general atmosphere of moderation and hostility to the war, rival groups of partisans came to be formed at all, and to drag their local communities into conflict which the majority in those communities did not desire.

However far back into history one may postulate the origins of the English Civil War, the actual development of hostilities was extremely rapid. A civil war became physically possible only in March 1642, when Charles The First left a London dominated by his opponents to set up headquarters at York and attract supporters. In June he felt ready to call the country to arms and by August two rival armies were actually gathering and marching. The most serious of all divisions of the English people had occurred in a mere five months.

This picture becomes infinitely more striking when it is appreciated that, whatever was happening at York and London, in the region under study for three of those five months, March to June, there is almost no sign of impending civil war. In particular, with one exception, there is no trace of an emerging Royalist party. No loyal petitions were sent to the King, though two petitions, from Staffordshire\(^1\) and Herefordshire\(^2\) were sent to Parliament in May affirming support for it. The one surviving address to Charles, from Cheshire in the same month,\(^3\) merely asked him to confer with Parliament upon the realm's safety. Nor, again with one exception, has any trace survived of the growth of local groups of men hostile to Parliament and favourable to the King. This is not the result of a paucity of records. In most of the counties studied some family collections exist for the period, and they show real awareness of national events. Even in western Caernarvonshire gentry had the latest news forwarded to them by post.\(^4\) Men

1. E. 147. 17
2. E. 146. 16
3. Brit. L. 669 f 5 17
4. NLW Llanfair-Brynodol MS 34, MS 1546E (iii)
foresaw conflict between King and Parliament, but even those who were to become
ardent Royalists showed no disposition to involve themselves. They waited upon
events, with foreboding.

The exception noted above was Herefordshire, where the address sent to
Parliament aroused a great deal of hostility among a set of gentry led by Sir William
Croft of Croft Castle, who proceeded to sever ties with old friends who had pro-
moted it. By June the common people were strongly partisan, shooting images 'in
derision of Roundheads' at Croft and silencing a 'Roundhead sermon' in Hereford
Cathedral. The gentry had despatched a letter to the King assuring him of support.\(^{(1)}\)

This is not to give the impression that outside Herefordshire the whole area
was at peace; on the contrary, it was in a ferment of anxiety. From November 1641
onwards great cities like Gloucester,\(^{(2)}\) large towns like Shrewsbury,\(^{(3)}\) and small
settlements like Stratford-Upon-Avon\(^{(4)}\) were alike repairing their defences,
doubling the watch and buying weapons. This activity was not generated entirely by
fear of the growing division between King and Parliament, for in these months
Englishmen were at least as worried by the prospect of a Roman Catholic uprising
as by the possibility of civil war. In October the Catholic natives of Ireland actually
had risen in bloody rebellion, and it was feared that their co-religionists in England
might make common cause with them. The Cheshire petition to Charles was
specifically inspired by this anxiety. Throughout the region under study, which

1. Letters Of Brilliana Harley, Camden Society 1853, Nos. 143-158; HMC 14th
   Report, Appendix 2, pp. 86-92
2. Gloucester Common Council Minute Book ff 205, 207
commanded the route to Ireland, men talked of Catholic plots and in Staffordshire, Pembroke
shire and Anglesey believed that they had uncovered them. This situation does not seem an obvious prelude to civil war. Local communities do not appear to have been dividing. On the contrary they were closing ranks, against a traditional enemy.

As local Royalism does not seem to have existed in this region before the actual declaration of war except in Herefordshire, which will be analysed below, the source of its generation must lie somewhere in the maelstrom at York. There, in these months, the King and his most ardent supporters were preparing the blueprints for war and the arguments which might persuade men to fight it. This process is almost entirely mysterious, no records having survived, if any were made, to indicate the men who attended the King at particular policy decisions at this time or to indicate how those decisions were reached. Only the resulting documents still exist, in considerable numbers, to testify to their industry.

The King's first task was to establish a case against Parliament which would either win it over or win him supporters against it. From March till June he published a series of pamphlets addressed to Parliament and justifying his complaints against it in great detail. A group of declarations in July and August rounded out the Royalist case and thereafter it was repeated in simplified form in several subsequent speeches and in the preambles to most commissions and official

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1. E. 149. 25
2. HMC Portland MSS Vol. 1, p. 35
3. PRO SP 16/488/100, Certificate 31-1-42
4. All found in the British Library Thomason Tracts, esp. E.146.1,20; 147.5; 150.29; 152.2
5. Neatly (and sarcastically) summarised in E.292.27
letters signed by the King till the end of the war. The whole case had in fact the merit of simplicity. Charles' opponents stood for a reform of the Church and a limitation of his constitutional powers. His riposte was to declare himself the defender of the accustomed laws, privileges and Church, defined as those of the revered Elizabeth The First, against a clique of incendiaries. It was a position calculated to appeal to the most powerful political instinct of the average Englishman of the day, entrenched conservatism. For years his opponents had enjoyed this position, claiming, with some justice, that Charles had attempted to subvert laws, privileges and Church himself. Ultimately their distrust of him had forced them into the role of reformers, to limit his powers in both Church and State, whereupon Charles had turned the tables on them. It remained to be seen whether men would be convinced by him, and would consider the issue worth fighting for.

At any rate, by June it had at least become obvious that his arguments had failed to impress the leaders of Parliament, who would neither retract their demands nor compromise. Hence Charles' task now was to raise the provinces on his behalf, to locate men in each county of sufficient standing to accomplish the task and with the will to do so. The chosen instrument to effect this work was the Commission Of Array. This was an impressive-looking document written in Latin and in antique script upon a roll of parchment, signed by the King and impressed
with the Great Seal. One was issued for each county and major city, and each contained the names of the leading men in that county or city whom the King believed might be expected to arm for him and empowered them to take charge of it. For the area under study fifteen different Commissions Of Array have survived, in the original or in transcript. The longest, for Glamorganshire, names thirty individuals, the shortest, for Radnorshire, names thirteen. How they were chosen is not known. Presumably in most cases one or two of the men from each county had actually made the pilgrimage to York to offer their services, and advised the King upon potential allies. Certainly the Warwickshire Commission was drawn up in the presence of the two men at the head of the list. The names in some at least were public knowledge before they left York. The men were on the whole accurately chosen. Up to a third of the gentry listed in each proved hostile or indifferent in the event, but the remainder always included the men who became the Royalist leaders of their counties. The English Commissions were apparently all issued in June, the earliest, for Warwickshire, dated the 6th, but the Welsh were drawn up in August. Each was re-issued at least once in the following months, when the commissioners had gone into action, to replace those who had proved unresponsive with men who had volunteered their support.

In legal terms, the Commission Of Array was a royal instrument resting

1. Mainly in transcript, Northamptonshire RO Finch-Hatton MS 133
   For a well-preserved original, see Birmingham RL 351507
2. Finch-Hatton 133.
3. Archaeologia Cambrensis 1875, p. 203
upon an unrepealed statute of Henry The Fourth, obsolete since 1557 and revived by Charles' circle to provide some means of calling the country to arms without Parliament. Historians since Clarendon have criticised it as a dubious and antiquated legal trick unlikely to appeal to the English populace, but in fact given the bizarre nature of the whole situation, with the two traditional halves of government attempting to fight each other, it seems unlikely that any device would have fared better. Certainly in the region studied it succeeded in producing Royalist activists, while none of those who abstained gave the Commission itself as their reason for so doing. The fact that it was written in Latin made no difference to the gentry, who clearly understood it, while for the common people, who did not, the King apparently enclosed with the Commission some specific message in English to their county, making clear his needs, to be proclaimed with it. (1)

The Commission was in fact only one of a set of papers with which the High Command equipped the men named in it. The activists who set off from York to raise Worcestershire carried at least three. Firstly they had the Commission itself. (2) Then they carried a set of detailed instruction to all commissioners, as to the manner of procedure. (3) Like the manifestoes, they were calculated to appeal to public prejudice, in this case that for legalism. Those active for Parliament were to be imprisoned, but only by the JP's in the Commission. Money

1. E.g. HMC 14th Report, Appendix 2, pp. 90-1
2. Northamptonshire RO Finch-Hatton MS 133
3. Worcestershire RO 1714/899/192 ff 203-27
and armed men were to be received if offered voluntarily, only the county militia, which had a traditional duty to defend the locality, being called up. Similar instructions, with similar sentiments, seem to have been sent to most counties. Thus those to Cheshire warned commissioners to proceed tactfully with the disaffected, those to Warwickshire warned them not to enlist Catholics. The third document in the Worcestershire batch was a specific order to call up the militia, already signed and valid but with blank spaces left to write in the exact time and place of muster. This took care not to offend the sentiment of localism, directing that any disaffected captains should be replaced only with local gentry. Possibly the Worcestershire packet contained some straightforward propaganda tracts as well. At any rate one Staffordshire commissioner received a bundle through the post from the court, with instructions for dispersal.

The task of the Commissioners Of Array was two-fold. Firstly they had to 'secure' their county, which effectively meant summoning the local militia and persuading it to declare for the King. Secondly, they had to collect local contributions of armed men and money and despatch them to the King to swell the army he was beginning to raise. It remains to be seen how each set of activists fared in each locality.

In Cheshire the King succeeded in winning the support of one of the two great factions dominating county politics, that led by Earl Rivers, Lords Kilmurrey,
Cholmondeley and Brereton, Sir Thomas Aston and Sir Edward Fitton.\(^1\) Of these the most obviously committed was Aston, who had been for a year an opponent of Parliament's ecclesiastical policy,\(^2\) who was present at York in June\(^3\) and whom Charles obviously regarded as his prime supporter in the county.\(^4\) It seems safe to assume that he achieved the 'conversion', if any were necessary, of his faction. Against them the Parliamentarians could range only a few gentry around Sir William Brereton MP, a man isolated locally and suspect for his radical religious views. By the end of the summer these had given up the task of opposition and left the shire. From June to September the Royalist commissioners roved across it protected by bodies of horse, holding local musters and, despite the advice of the High Command, arbitrarily arresting ministers who refused to read Royalist propaganda in their churches and constables who failed to publicise Royalist musters.\(^5\)

All this activity failed of its object, to secure Cheshire for the King. It was thwarted not by rival partisans but by a very different force, that of militant neutralism. It pre-dated Royalist activity itself in the shire, for on 6th June, before the signing of the Commission Of Array, a Cheshire petition was printed declaring obedience to both King and Parliament.\(^6\) By 30th June the neutralists were in arms at Knutsford, to maintain that dual obedience.\(^7\) On 11th August, when Brereton and the Royalists almost clashed at Nantwich, the local gentry

1. See J. S. Morrill, *Cheshire*, pp. 16-17
2. Ibid. pp. 49-51
4. Brit. L. Add. MS 36913 ff 90-4
5. HMC Portland MSS Vol. 1, pp. 43-5; LJ Vol. 5, p. 200
6. E. 149. 30
7. Brit. L. Harl. MS 2135 f 65
produced a scheme for the demilitarisation of Nantwich hundred\(^{(1)}\) and on the 25th a manifesto was produced proposing the same for the whole county.\(^{(2)}\) A petition declaring neutrality was raised in the county in the same month and its signatures\(^{(3)}\) have been analysed\(^{(4)}\) to prove that the neutralist movement in fact centred around the Booth-Wilbraham connection, the great traditional rival faction in the county to Aston's. This amply explains the power of this movement.

Neutralism in Cheshire could indeed bear even more analysis than has been made, and this is still more true of similar movements elsewhere. Unfortunately, this is precisely the sort of analysis that this present study, which is concerned with Royalism, is not equipped to make. It must be stressed that neutralism and moderation in the Civil War covered a huge spectrum, stretching from men who obeyed the commands of both parties to those who refused the commands of both and took up arms to defend this position. To avoid at least some of the worst semantic difficulties of the subject, it is proposed here to omit the term 'moderate' altogether and to use the term 'neutralist' to denote only the latter, activist, end of the spectrum, which may be more precisely termed 'militant neutralism'.

By mid-September there were at least three such centres of militant neutralism in Cheshire. One was Knutsford, where another manifesto was subscribed, condemning the behaviour of the Royalists.\(^{(5)}\) Another was Nantwich, where the citizens had fortified themselves and the local gentry taken an oath of

1. HMC Portland MSS Vol. 1, pp. 51-2; Malbon's Diary, ed. by Lancashire And Cheshire Record Society 1889, pp. 23-5
2. Bod. L. Ashmole MS 830 ff 282-4
3. Brit. L. Harl. MS 2107
4. Morrill, pp. 58-9
5. Brit. L. Harl. MS 2135 f 100
neutrality. The third was the city of Chester itself. In July its citizens, summoned to a Royalist muster, had declared against the war and when Brereton entered the city to recruit in August they ejected him as a troublemaker. On 6th September the corporation decreed a programme of fortification against 'imminent dangers' in general. The Cheshire commissioners had not 'secured' their county. They had reduced it to chaos.

For Worcestershire Charles was able to obtain the services of the greatest magnate, Lord Coventry. He was one of ten peers who formally declared their Royalism from York in June. With him must have been Samuel Sandys MP, who countersigned the summons to the Worcestershire militia and was given command of the county volunteers. On 7th July Parliament learned that the documents had arrived in the shire and that the High Sheriff had summoned the militia. It despatched a deputation to counter these moves, armed with a declaration of their illegality. This reported back on the 13th that it had arrived at the Midsummer Quarter Sessions, the great seasonal county meeting, in time to confront the Royalists with the declaration. The assembled gentry had thereupon refused to support the Commission Of Array and the Royalists retired. The nearest the county possessed to a local representative organ was the Grand Jury, empanelled at Quarter Sessions to present matters of concern to the community. This was now utilised to declare against the Commission in the name of that community.

1. E. 118. 10
2. Brit. L. 669 f 6 55
4. Chester RO A/B/2 f 56
5. LJ Vol. 5, p. 115
6. See above, f
7. CJ Vol. 2, pp. 657, 661
8. E. 107. 32
9. Worcestershire RO 1714/899/192 ff 235-6
The Sheriff apologised to Parliament, pleading ignorance.  

Within weeks this situation was reversed. Parliament's deputation returned to London, and a strong Royalist group was privately, and mysteriously, organised. By 1st August it included notable local gentry such as Sir William Russell of Strensham and Sir Thomas Lyttleton of Frankley and had called out the militia anew.  

By the 3rd it had impanelled a new Grand Jury, at a Special Session, which issued a condemnation of the declaration against the Commission, declaring that as long as the King abided by the laws it would defend him. Twenty-seven gentry underwrote it. They included Coventry, Sandys and Russell, but most of the names do not feature again as those of activists. By the time the Commission was re-issued on 5th September however, the block of local Royalists had obviously filled out, because the commissioners represent accurately the men who would run the local war effort for the next three years. Lyttleton was obviously to the fore, because the King gave him command of the militia and summoned him to court as an adviser. The militia had itself been mustered on 12th August, and provision made to train volunteer companies.  

The effort, however, was already losing momentum. The Royalists suffered a fatal lack of arms and ammunition and of cavalry. As early as 23rd August they were forced to admit to the King that they had failed to arouse the local community and needed outside help. On 5th September, the date of

1. CJ p.684  
2. Worcestershire RO 1714/899/192 ff 237-9, 705/24/873  
3. Brit. L. 669 f 5 65  
4. Birmingham RL 351507  
5. Birmingham RL 351505; TR Nash, Collection For The History Of Worcestershire (1783), Vol.1, p.499  
7. Ibid. f 253  
8. Ibid. f 262; LJ Vol.5, pp.335-6  
10. Ibid. f 262
the new Commission, they suffered their cruellest blow. Having applied to the corporation of Worcester itself for permission to recruit and billet troops in the city, they received a polite but absolute negative. The citizens had decided it to be the nature of troops to plunder and cause trouble. Reports from elsewhere had confirmed this belief, and they were further alarmed by the appearance of strange Royalists in the city like Lord Lovelace, fleeing from Oxford before a Parliamentary advance. All Royalists were to leave Worcester immediately. And so they had to. Lovelace surrendered to Parliament in despair. There was apparently a Parliamentary group in the city but the whole tone of the reply was one of a determined neutralism. The Worcestershire commissioners were already defeated, not by Parliament but by the indifference of their own neighbours.

Events in Worcestershire had some bearing on those in Shropshire. The Commission Of Array arrived there on 24th July, delivered to the sympathetic High Sheriff, John Weld of Willey, who immediately called the men named in it together. They summoned a muster of the militia at Shrewsbury on 2nd August. However, as at Worcester, a Parliamentary deputation arrived in time to fore­stall them, by calling out the militia themselves the day before. The muster took place but was disturbed by the Mayor, who threatened to arrest the Parliamentarians as rioters, and the Royalists Sir Paul Harris and Francis Ottley of Pichford, who

1. Ibid. ff 278-92
2. E. 240. 2
3. CJ Vol. 2, pp. 761, 764
4. Staffordshire RO D593/P/8/1
brought a mob to disrupt proceedings and almost produced a riot. There was more disorder the following day, when the Parliamentarians began to drill a band of townsmen while Royalist bands trained under Sir Vincent Corbet of Moreton Corbet and the Denbighshire squire Richard Lloyd, the King's Attorney for North Wales. On the 3rd both sets of activists set out to obtain a more definite result elsewhere in the county. The Royalists were encouraged by the example of their fellows in Worcestershire, and on the 8th impanelled a Grand Jury to produce a declaration modelled on that of Worcestershire on the 3rd, to uphold the King while he upheld the law. It was underwritten by most of the future local Royalist leaders, including Harris, Corbet, Lloyd and Ottley. Of these Ottley rapidly emerged as the most active. He had been a man of no prominence before the war, and nothing is known of the motivation behind his fervent Royalism at its outbreak save that his family were devotees of Charles' Anglican Church. Yet this is amply testified to by the energy with which he set about co-ordinating activities throughout the county in August.

Again, however, the efforts of both sets of partisans foundered in a sea of local indifference. The individual Royalist activists tried to prevail upon their own neighbours, and the only resulting reports were of reluctance and hostility. Even the studiously moderate declaration of the 8th found little support. On the 16th the commissioners issued another declaration, from Much Wenlock, deploring this

1. LJ Vol. 5, pp. 269-70
2. Brit. L. 669 f 6 69
3. Owen and Blakeway, p. 430
4. TSANHS 1894, pp. 34-7
5. Ibid. esp. Fowler To Ottley, Weld to Ottley
6. HMC Portland MSS Vol. 1, p. 53
situation and beseeching the other gentry to join them, if only to obtain local peace.

A great barrier to action must have been that the principal local dignitary, Sir Richard Newport of High Ercall, favoured the role of a conciliator of the local partisan groups. Any hopes of obtaining Shrewsbury received a blow at the end of August when the corporation outlawed all partisan insignia within the town. (2)

In Staffordshire at the same period the rival activists achieved even less; in fact they themselves barely emerged. The county seemed to contain good potential for a Royalist mobilisation, as the leading magnate, Lord Paget, had joined the King in May, and also for conflict, as it had within the past year produced both a loyal address to Parliament and a petition against Parliament's Church policy. Yet neither occurred. Paget was present in the shire in August and reported as raising men and money but no general mobilisation took place. When on 2nd September the Cheshire and Shropshire Royalists wrote to the men named in the Staffordshire Commission Of Array requesting co-operation they received the stony answer that these men declined without 'greater motives of more demonstrable dangers' to raise their county. (7) Nor did Parliament find any support there.

The first unequivocal Royalist success was in Herefordshire. The early Royalist groundswell there developed fast, and by 8th July this had produced the first militantly Royalist local declaration and dispersed it as far as London. (8) Although

1. HMC 5th Report Appendix, p. 145
2. Owen and Blakeway, p. 46
3. Earl Of Clarendon, History Of The Rebellion, ed. by W. Dunn Macray (1888), V. 339
4. See above, p. 2
5. E. 150. 28
7. Ibid.
8. CJ Vol. 2, p. 661
anonymous and undated, this broadsheet\(^{(1)}\) encapsulated Charles' own self-
justifications and promises and resolved to defend him on those terms. On
15th July it was formally attested by a Grand Jury and the militia and a volunteer
band paraded at Hereford before the commissioners amid great popular rejoicing.
The local JP's and the militia were purged of Parliamentarians, and by August
soldiers and money had actually been despatched to the King\(^{(2)}\) which on receipt
were boasted as a hundred horse and £3,000.\(^{(3)}\) The lead in this work was taken
by Croft, in partnership with his old enemy Fitzwilliam Coningsby of Hampton
Court, as the county's chief notable, Viscount Scudamore, remained in London
uncommitted to either party. Coningsby acted as the county emissary to court,
and was rewarded with the appointment of High Sheriff.\(^{(4)}\)

Much of this success was due to lack of opposition. The local
Parliamentarian leaders, the Harleys, who might have raised a considerable
faction, were occupied at London leaving their castle of Brampton Bryan fortified
but isolated. One must still, however, account for the considerable popular
fervour for Royalism, on which the Parliamentarians themselves remarked. The
answer seems to lie in the Church, the most efficient mass-media system of the
age. In Herefordshire Charles' Church had produced a set of formidable ministers,
committed to the ideals of that Church. Drs. Rogers, Mason and Sherburn raised
the county for the King by fiery preaching exactly as their enemies the Puritan

1. Bod. L. Ashmole MS H. 23. 25
2. HMC 14th Report, Appendix 2, pp. 89-94
3. Brit. L. 669 f 6 64
4. Bod. L. Tanner MS 303 f 113
ministers raised the London mob for Parliament. 'I fear for my life' wrote one Parliamentarian of the Herefordshire clergy, 'these men have wrought such hatred in the hearts of the people against me'. By August anybody in Herefordshire who was either Parliamentarian or Puritan was liable to be mobbed. A crowd threatened one JP, who had refused to contribute money for the King in his very courtroom. Mason was in fact named as the author of the Royalist declaration. He certainly carried it to court, and was retained there as chaplain.(1)

This conclusion directs attention to an aspect of Royalist propaganda hitherto undisussed. Like the most effective propaganda it provided not only ideals but a bogey. Whereas Parliament branded the Royalist party, with its commitment to the evolving Anglican tradition, as Catholics, the King labelled Parliamentarians, with their commitment to further reformation, separatists and sectaries, enemies of the religious and social order. Not merely was some clause against sectaries a feature of most of Charles' declarations, but specific orders were despatched in the summer to bishops and Royalist judges to extirpate them.(2) In practice Puritans could easily be labelled sectaries and, as was no doubt hoped, the terms sectary, Puritan and Parliamentarian become interchangeable in the public mind.

This certainly happened in Herefordshire that summer, and also in Worcestershire, where the Puritan minister Richard Baxter was twice nearly lynched and commented 'If a stranger passed in many places that had short hair

1. Letters Of Brilliana Harley, Nos. 165-177; HMC 14th Report, Appendix 2, pp. 87-9
2. Ibid. p. 94, Appendix 8, p. 203
and a civil habit the rabble presently cried 'Down With The Roundheads', and some they knocked down in the open streets. (1) The new Bishop of Worcester, Dr. Prideaux, was certainly actively Royalist (2) but here the evidence for correlation between clerical, gentry and popular Royalism is missing. Nothing comparable can be produced for other counties at this period, although Royalist clergy were certainly active in Shropshire in August. (3)

In Gloucestershire the Parliamentarians closed the summer with what might be termed a potential success. The county's leading man, Lord Chandos, joined the King, but Gloucester itself followed the lead of its own MP's in standing by Parliament, although when volunteers actually began drilling in the city they created alarm. (4) Thus when Chandos came to execute the Commission Of Array on 15th August he chose to do so at Cirencester. Unhappily for him, the citizens of that town misunderstood the Commission to signify instant military rule. Perhaps they had been deliberately misinformed. When Chandos entered they barricaded their streets against horsemen and forced him to disclaim the Commission and declare instead for local peace. (5) After this experience he left the shire. The initiative lay with Parliament, but in fact at the end of August neither side had yet mustered the militia.

Parliament had special reason to be afraid of Monmouthshire, because in its centre towered Raglan Castle, seat of the Earl of Worcester and his heir Edward,

1. R. Baxter, Reliquiae Baxterianae (1696), Part 1, Section 57
2. HMC 14th Report, Appendix 8, p. 203; PRO SP 16/492/28, Nehemiah Wharton 30-9-42
3. TSANHS 1895, pp. 244-5
4. CJ Vol.2, p. 673
5. E. 113.6
Lord Herbert. Both were immediately suspect as Catholics and Lord Herbert had been a favourite and supporter of Charles. Thus upon the King's move to York Parliament set about trying to transfer the county magazine from Monmouth, which like so much of the shire the Earl directly owned, to Newport, property of the rival local magnate, the Parliamentarian Earl of Pembroke.\(^1\) In the process it encountered stiff opposition from the people of Monmouth, to whom the arms represented security although some gentry, perhaps from Pembroke's faction, supported the move.

Herbert himself, however, proved amazingly amenable. Instead of joining the King he came to London in the summer and agreed to transfer the magazine to his rival's town of Caerleon. He went to court twice, but under a pass from Parliament, and when he returned to Raglan after the second visit, in early September, he wrote to Parliament for a pass to proceed again to London.\(^2\) In fact Herbert was playing a double game, presumably intent on assisting Charles without associating himself openly with a risky venture for which he and his co-religionists might be made scapegoats. In July he had posted Charles £5,000, which paid for the King's first horse regiment, under Sir John Byron. On his journeys to court he smuggled further sums in cash and bills, and he secretly hired veteran soldiers and despatched them to the King. But of this Parliament and the public as yet knew nothing.\(^3\)

1. CJ Vol. 2, pp. 503, 527, 545, 548-9, 575; LJ Vol. 5, pp. 57-8
3. Ibid. pp. 41-2, 44-6, 330-1
Events in Wales in these months display a considerable contrast to those in the English counties studied. The divisive pattern of Royalist, Parliamentarian and neutralism or indifference does not appear; instead in most counties the entire community responded, howbeit sluggishly, to the appeals of the King and ignored those of Parliament. Some of the sluggishness may, ironically, have been the fault of Charles who does not seem to have realised the potential of Wales, for the first Welsh Commission Of Array was only signed on 28th July, and the rest followed in August.\(^1\) Significantly, most were signed following the arrival at York of a Royalist declaration in the name of all Wales on 1st August\(^2\) and of individual county resolutions in the next few days.\(^3\) Charles' slackness is the more surprising in view of the fact that individual Welshmen like Sir Thomas Salusbury MP, from Denbighshire, or Sir Edward Stradling, from Glamorganshire,\(^4\) had been joining him in June and July. Perhaps they joined him later than the English activists, or perhaps he was deliberately attending to the more exposed and dubious counties first. Salusbury's decision to offer his services is noteworthy as it has left one of the few portraits of a Royalist leader at the moment of his 'conversion'.\(^5\) It literally was a conversion; he had read Charles' declarations, pondered the role of monarchy in the Bible and in modern history, and decided for the King. The county resolutions likewise cited the King's promises as the reason for their Royalism.

Not all Wales conformed to this pattern. The Sheriffs of Pembrokeshire,

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1. Northamptonshire RO Finch-Hatton MS 133
2. E. 109.27
3. Archaeologia Cambrensis 1846, pp. 33, 327; Rushworth, pp. 643-4
4. HMC 14th Report, Appendix 2, p. 94
5. NLW MS 5390D
Carmarthenshire and Montgomeryshire maintained a civil correspondence with Parliament in August.\(^{(1)}\) In Montgomeryshire Sir John Price MP withheld the county magazine from the Royalist leader, his fellow MP Richard Herbert, though as the Prices and Herbersts were traditional enemies it is not clear whether he was acting consciously for Parliament.\(^{(2)}\) But these were the most Anglicised parts of the Principality. In Caernarvonshire Thomas Glynne, John Bodwrda and William Lloyd, leaders of a county faction, were arrested in late summer as disaffected\(^{(3)}\) and in Anglesey the dominant gentleman, Sir Thomas Cheadle, later received the same smear.\(^{(4)}\) But smear it must have been, for Cheadle was actually the man who arrested the Caernarvonshire gentry while they, rapidly released, conformed throughout the war to the Royalism of their county. All appear to have been the victims of local enmities. Particularly impressive as an example of local Royalist solidarity is the case of the Caernarvonshire MP John Bodvel. He served at London from January till June 1642 as an active Parliamentarian\(^{(5)}\) and went home in August to fortify his house.\(^{(6)}\) Once home, however, he submerged into the community, only to reappear in time as an active Royalist.

The explanation given for Royalism in Herefordshire does not fit Wales. North Wales had petitioned against Parliament's Church policy in March\(^{(7)}\) but there is no trace of intensive clerical activity there. The Welsh as a whole, like

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1. CJ Vol. 2, p. 701; PRO SP 16/491/131, Thomas Niccolls 26-8-42
3. Bod. L Tanner MS 59 & 332; Trans. Caernarvonshire Historical Society 1953, pp. 1-34; PRO SP 19/22 f 75
5. CJ Vol. 2, pp. 372-623, passim
6. Ibid. p. 701
7. E. 150, 28
Salusbury, seem to have made an essentially political choice. Wales had certainly been shown particular favour by the Stuarts, who had been suspected of partiality to it. In addition they had inherited the reverence shown by the Welsh for their own Tudor dynasty.\(^{(1)}\) This was however no blind loyalty as like the English they had reacted against the excesses of Charles' Personal Rule.\(^{(2)}\) It has been suggested that the Welsh at this period were 'too firmly schooled in monarchial instincts..... not to rally round the Crown as soon as it seemed to be in danger of becoming the direct object of attack'.\(^{(3)}\) This may be the key to the behaviour of Celtic Wales in 1642, but nothing positive can be advanced upon this question from the documents.

What had been achieved in all the counties studied by the end of the summer was not civil war. Not a drop of blood had been spilt. In most counties the King's appeals had won supporters, in some these dominated the county, but in each case where actual conflict seemed imminent between the rival partisans it had been stifled by local community intent upon its own preservation. A new factor was needed to counter this force. In Warwickshire, the last county in the sample, this factor came into play, and there was staged the dress-rehearsal for the entire English Civil War.

The greatest magnate of the county was the Earl of Northampton, who had been one of the ten peers who had declared their Royalism in June.\(^{(4)}\) He was also Recorder of Coventry, and on 25th June arrived in that city and asked the support of

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1. THSC 1948, pp. 20-56
2. Ibid. 1946-7, pp. 59-73
3. Ibid. 1945, p. 47
4. See above, p. ii.
its corporation for the King. The Mayor promised at least not to obey Parliament, and Northampton returned, satisfied, to court. At the head of this it placed Northampton's rival in the shire, Lord Brooke, a fervent Puritan and a person of national reputation.

Accounts of the following events are bedevilled by partisan lies, but careful cross-comparison and the use of manuscripts can produce a coherent narrative. In early July Brooke successfully mustered the militia in each hundred, though none answered his warrants until he re-issued them in the name of both King and Parliament. At Coventry some aldermen had organised a Parliamentarian faction, though rival aldermen organised a Royalist group and the bulk of the city remained aloof from both. Brooke arrived to hearten his party and gradually built it up to considerable strength. In late July Northampton at last returned, and found his enemies now too strong in the city to dislodge, so he ordered his own adherents to secure the county magazine, kept at Coventry. Brooke forestalled them, seized the arms himself and transferred them to Warwick Castle, his home. To safeguard them he rapidly recruited a strong private garrison by offering 4s 8d per week to each recruit. Northampton proclaimed the Commission Of Array at Coleshill and set about recruiting a private army to take the castle, which he swiftly

1. LJ Vol. 5, pp. 164-5
2. Ibid. pp. 165-6
3. E.g. E. 92. 18
4. LJ p. 195; E. 109. 3
5. Brit. L. Add. MS 11364 ff 14-15
6. CSPD 1641-3, p. 361
raised from several Midland shires by offering 2s per day.\(^{(1)}\) In the process they
brought about the appearance of a new animal upon the scene, the regular soldier,
caring nothing for a local community in which he had no place, acting only at the
will of his paymaster.

The county community as a whole held aloof from these proceedings\(^{(2)}\) and
both protagonists appealed for outside aid. Northampton failed to gain any from
other local Royalists\(^{(3)}\) but did receive a detachment from Charles' own embryo
army under the experienced soldier Sir Nicholas Byron.\(^{(4)}\) Brooke obtained some
cannon for his castle from London,\(^{(5)}\) but when he reached Banbury he found
Northampton in his path. An agreement seems to have been made, in the name of
local peace, to leave the cannon at Banbury. Local containment of the war appeared
to have succeeded yet again. Northampton however waited until Brooke had departed,
seized the guns and took them to bombard Warwick Castle.\(^{(6)}\) In that instant he
stepped over the line into civil war.

Ironically, the guns were too small to make much impact on the castle, and
as its siege dragged on through August it became a cause célèbre for both parties.
Parliament despatched to its relief part of its newly-raised field army, 3,000 foot
and 400 horse.\(^{(7)}\) Charles entered the county first, with most of his existing
cavalry, 800, and 300 foot, and made straight for Coventry to secure the city.\(^{(8)}\)

Since July the Coventry Royalists had left to join Northampton,\(^{(9)}\) and Parliamentarians

\(^{(1)}\) Sir R. Bulstrode, Memoirs And Reflections (1721), p. 72; E. 110. 8, 669 f 6 58
\(^{(2)}\) HMC 12th Report, Appendix 2, p. 320
\(^{(3)}\) Worcestershire RO 1714/899/192 ff 72-5
\(^{(4)}\) HMC 2nd Report, Appendix, p. 36; Clarendon, V. 446n
\(^{(5)}\) CJ Vol. 2, p. 685
\(^{(6)}\) Brit. L. 669 f 6 58; Clarendon V. 441n; PRO SP 16/491/105, Sir John Danvers
9-8-42
\(^{(7)}\) E. 114. 25; PRO SP 16/491/133, Nehamiah Wharton, 26-8-42
\(^{(8)}\) Clarendon V. 446n
\(^{(9)}\) Bulstrode, p. 72
had swarmed in from the county, mainly from Birmingham. Yet when Charles appeared before it on 20th August, Coventry was still officially uncommitted to either party. The corporation had not yet declared for Parliament and had apologised to Northampton about the transfer of the magazine. However, the King was informed that he would be admitted to the city, but not his army. Even to Parliament itself, the corporation insisted that it did not make this answer out of partisan loyalty, but out of fear of the plundering of the Royalist soldiers. Indeed they might well have dealt roughly with a city filled with their enemies.

Charles left his troops to besiege Coventry.

The case of Birmingham deserves further discussion. This small town is the exception to the rule developed in the previous pages, of urban indifference and hostility to the war. From the beginning to the end of hostilities it manifested a virulent and spontaneous Parliamentarianism. It was a manufacturing centre, and its behaviour has provided a main prop of the theory equating artisans with Parliamentarians. The main problem with this theory is that none of the other Black Country manufacturing towns manifested such an obvious political choice and some certainly at times helped the Royalists. The latter garrisoned Dudley Castle with the help of local 'colliers and nailers'. Irregulars from Cannock and Walsall were to help them reduce Lichfield. If it is argued in return that they may have done so under the influence of local notables, then one would like to know

1. Brit. L. Add. MS 11364 f 15
2. E.109.3
3. CJ p. 731
4. E.g E. 96.22
6. E. 115.2
7. Bod. L. MS Eng Hist c 53 f 33; E. 97.10; E. Warburton, Memorials Of Prince Rupert (1849), Vol. 2, p. 162
more about Birmingham figures such as the Mr. Porter in whose blade-mill swords were made only for the Parliament, or the minister, who preached against the Royalists. There are no easy answers to this problem; it is one which only the most painstaking local research will solve.

To return to the events at Coventry, Charles' force had been attacking the city for three days when the Parliamentarian army arrived from London. The Royalist and Parliamentarian regular armies faced each other for the first time on Southam Heath and the Royalists, being outnumbered, retired and left the shire. Northampton's little army at Warwick, abandoned, raised the siege and followed them. Coventry, having committed itself against Charles, opened its gates to the Parliamentarians, part of whom settled there as its permanent garrison.

Within a month, Warwickshire had become a county under military rule, its principal strongpoints occupied by regular soldiers responsive only to their partisan military leaders. The county community in general, for all its lack of co-operation, had been simply taken over. For the other counties in the region, the writing was upon the wall.

1. E.100.8, 96.22
2. PRO SP 16/491/133, Nehemiah Wharton 26-8-42; LJ Vol. 5, p. 321
The instrument which created the Civil War was not, ultimately, the Commission Of Array. It was a different sort of commission, issued to a single man to raise a number of regular soldiers for service under him in one of the partisan armies. Leading activists were commissioned as colonels, and then obtained commissions in turn for the senior officers of their regiments, who in turn commissioned their juniors, though it is by no means clear how much freedom each had in their choice. The normal paper strength of a foot regiment was 1,000 or 1,200 men, though rarely were units recruited to full strength.

The civilian Clarendon has left behind a persisting but misleading impression that the Royalist army was, like a feudal host, recruited from the tenants and dependents of Royalist magnates. It seems in fact to have been raised in a more 'modern' manner. A case-study may illustrate this point. In August 1642 Lord Paget was commissioned by Charles to raise a foot regiment. He put up the money for it and took a personal part in recruiting. His own lands lay in eastern Staffordshire, but he also went on a 'drive' in the south, where he seems to have had most success at Lichfield, whose powerful Dyott family co-operated with him. He also wrote to gentry in the west of the shire asking for recruits. The training and leadership of the regiment, however, was given to an experienced soldier, Richard Bolle, who appointed another veteran from outside the county, D'Ewes, as his deputy. D'Ewes in turn commissioned lieutenants

1. For a Parliamentarian view of this process, see J. Malcolm's article in the Historical Journal, June 1978, and her Brandeis PhD thesis The English People And The Crown's Cause, 1977. Much of the present section consists of an alternative presentation of the events of 1642 to Dr. Malcolm's using less partisan sources.
3. HMC 5th Report Appendix, p. 141
to beat drums in the villages and call for volunteers.\(^{(1)}\) The captains were a mixture of younger sons of Staffordshire gentry\(^{(2)}\) and of gentry of other counties.\(^{(3)}\) Presumably they took a hand in raising their own companies. By this ramshackle process the regiment was completed within a month. It is not very different from the method by which men were recruited for the British army down to the last century. A later Lord Paget was to raise a regiment for the Napoleonic Wars by similar means.

Ten other Royalist activists were commissioned as colonels in the region studied in August and September. Their distribution bears no relationship at all to the success of the Commissioners Of Array in the various counties. The only horse regiment was given to Aston, and mainly raised in his native Cheshire, though it included a Lancashire troop.\(^{(4)}\) Aston's partners Earl Rivers and Fitton were both given foot regiments to raise, and both apparently raised them in Cheshire, their captains being local gentry with a leaven of 'foreign' veterans.\(^{(5)}\) Salusbury was given another to raise in Flintshire and Denbighshire, and his captains were mostly local gentry, though one was an experienced outsider and the men came from as far as Anglesey.\(^{(6)}\) In north-west Wales the veteran soldier John Owen of Clennenau was given a fourth,\(^{(7)}\) and a fifth was granted to Richard Herbert in Montgomeryshire.\(^{(8)}\) Herbert Price MP was given another in Breconshire, and in Glamorganshire Stradling raised a seventh, officered mainly by his relatives although one captain may have been

\begin{enumerate}
\item HMC Portland MSS Vol. 1, p. 63
\item Like Richard Bagot, of whom more below
\item NLW Bettisfield MS 468
\item P. Young, Edgehill (1967), pp. 212-13
\item Ibid. pp. 22-3, 232
\item Ibid. pp. 227-8; NLW Wynn MS 1711
\item NLW Clennenau Letter 531
\item HMC 10th Report Appendix 4, p. 399
\end{enumerate}
from Carmarthenshire. In south-west Wales the greatest dignitary, the Earl of Carberry, was commissioned for an eighth. Lastly, a single dragoon regiment was commissioned from Sir Thomas Hanmer, a Flintshire gentleman. No Colonels seem to have been commissioned in Worcestershire, Shropshire and Herefordshire at this period, and the reasons for this are difficult to discover. It is possible that any record of the commissions there have failed to survive, but this is extremely unlikely as the records in these counties are better than elsewhere.

The execution of the Commissions Of Array was essentially a public activity, demanding an official response from each county community. The execution of the colonels' commissions was by contrast virtually a private activity, working within the community but requiring no general response from it. Paget raised his regiment in a county which had officially disowned the war, while three were recruited in Cheshire where much of the county opposed the Royalist effort. Private money was being used to attract volunteers into the service of individuals. Yet this activity was to achieve what the Commissions Of Array had failed to do, and draw most of the region into the war, by drawing the war itself into most of the region.

This process hinged upon the King himself. In mid-September Charles was in danger of being out-maneuvered. After two months' recruiting in Yorkshire and the East Midlands he had gathered round him at Nottingham five foot regiments and 500 horse. These were greatly outnumbered by the Parliamentarian field army

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1. Young, pp. 223-4; NLW Tredegar MS 911
2. NLW Bettisfield MS 111
3. PRO SP 16/492/13, 14 Sir Edward Nicholas 13/15-9-42
which had advanced to Northampton. Charles had however a potential greater strength if he could unite with the forces being raised for him to the west, the eleven regiments in Wales, Cheshire and Staffordshire, plus three in Lancashire and Sir John Byron's horse, which had been sent to occupy Oxford. He made the obvious move; on the 13th September he marched his little army westward, and on the 16th he entered Staffordshire.\(^1\)

His mission there was two-fold, to unite with Paget's regiment and to persuade the county community to enter the war. The first was accomplished,\(^2\) and to achieve the second he had called the gentry to meet him at Uttoxeter.\(^3\) The only record of that meeting is in a Parliamentary newspaper,\(^4\) which may be suspected of exaggeration. Its main import, however, is corroborated by subsequent events; the King failed to convince the gentry of the need to mobilise against Parliament. Staffordshire remained uncommitted and on 17th September the King continued to Stafford where he concerted plans for his entry into the Marches. His first concern was to send bodies of horse to extinguish by force the two centres of militant neutralism at opposite ends of the region, Nantwich and Worcester.\(^5\) His second was to discover a base within it where he might settle to collect his forces. At the start of his march he seems to have considered Chester,\(^6\) but by the time he had reached Stafford his hopes centred upon Shrewsbury, where Francis Ottley's long and careful work was at last achieving results.

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1. Ibid.
2. Clarendon VI. 62n
3. Staffordshire RO D593/P/8/1/3
4. E. 118. 28
5. WSL Salt MS 496; Warburton, Vol. 1, p. 396
6. *Archaeologia Cambrensis* 1846, pp. 33-4
A great strength of the Royalists in the northern Marches was their capacity for co-operation, which helped to compensate for their lack of numbers within each county. Brereton had commented sourly upon it in August\(^1\) and by 2nd September the leading Royalists of Shropshire, Cheshire and Flintshire were meeting weekly at Whitchurch.\(^2\) Soon they had united with Denbighshire in a formal Association.\(^3\) Nobody benefitted more from this process than the tireless Ottley, who built up personal links with fellow activists in neighbouring counties, especially Richard Herbert in Montgomeryshire and Richard Lloyd in Denbighshire, and also with the court, to which he went himself. His main contact there was Edward Hyde MP, the future historian Clarendon. From the King he obtained a commission to raise 200 men to secure Shrewsbury.\(^4\) He was concerned however to achieve results by diplomacy, and extended his contacts in Shropshire society.

A major victory must have been won on the day, its date lost, when he persuaded the respected Sir Richard Newport to appear before the Shrewsbury militia wearing Royalist emblems. He seems to have achieved this by using the fear of a Parliamentarian takeover.\(^5\) He had used the same fear in August to secure good relations with the Mayor, and maintained these while Hyde, a man of notably mild political views and with his own Shrewsbury connections, worked upon the Mayor by letter.\(^6\) It was presumably this pressure which secured the vital decision of the corporation on 15th September, to admit the King to Shrewsbury if he came there.\(^7\)

1. HMC Portland MSS Vol. 1, p. 51
2. HMC 5th Report Appendix, p. 141
3. Brit. L. Harl. MS 2173 ff 8-9
4. TSANHS 1894, pp. 41-3
5. Ibid. 1900, pp. 4-5
6. Clarendon, VI. 62n
7. Owen and Blakeway, p. 418
Nine bundles of proclamations were prepared to convince the citizens. It was a bloodless triumph, but in case it were reversed Ottley installed his soldiers in the town, together with 500 from Herbert. If any Parliamentarians were still active in the shire, they fled now.

Coventry and Uttoxeter had taught Charles caution. From Stafford he sent Hyde to ascertain the situation in Shrewsbury. Receiving Hyde's favourable report, he advance to Wellington on 19th September. There he made a speech to his army laying down rules for its discipline and confirming his commitment to the traditional Church, laws and privileges. This he had published. The next day Sheriff Weld formally escorted the King and his army to Shrewsbury, where a civic reception had been prepared. It was the first unequivocal welcome Charles had received since leaving London. Weld and Ottley had earned the knighthoods they received.

It would, however, be an empty success if Charles did not mobilise local resources swiftly. This task he undertook with determination. Upon arrival at Shrewsbury he ordered copies of his Wellington speech to be distributed to every parish in Shropshire, to be read in church along with a summons to a meeting at Shrewsbury on the 28th. On the 23rd he left his forces resting and hurried north to secure Chester. There were Royalists in the city and one of them, Orlando Bridgeman MP, the Bishop's son, had presented a Royalist declaration to the
corporation in August. However, Charles' haste in itself speaks for the likelihood that the city was still not officially committed to either party, and that when the King had written to the corporation from Stafford telling them to expect him he had no idea of the reception he might encounter. As it happened, he met with an official welcome as warm as that at Shrewsbury. It is possible that, as at Shrewsbury, the Royalists had taken over, but Charles' arrival, accompanied not by an army but only by an escort of local Royalist gentry, was not likely to provoke a city dominated by uncommitted men into excluding him. The King's behaviour was certainly tactful during his four-day stay. He thanked the corporation graciously and made another speech contrasting his own legalistic and moderate actions with Parliamentarian aggression. He reviewed the local militia, confirmed a Royalist, Thomas Leigh, as their commander, knighted the High Sheriff and left Chester garrisoned only by its own militiamen.

Towards those who had actively opposed him, however, Charles was ruthless. He ordered the confiscation of the property of the absent local Parliamentarians, in both county and city. The horse he had sent to Nantwich occupied the town and Charles fined the citizens £2,000 to be levied upon innocent and guilty alike. The leaders of the Nantwich neutrality movement were carried off to Shrewsbury and their arms and money were seized. With this example before it the other centre of militant neutralism at Knutsford seems to have submerged. Like Shropshire, Cheshire

1. CJ Vol. 2, p. 742
2. HMC 5th Report Appendix, p. 344
3. E. 119. 25; Chester RO A/B/2 f 57
6. Brit. L. Add. MS 36913 f 103
7. Shaw, Vol. 2, p. 214
8. E. 119. 25
9. Add. MS 36913 f 103; HMC 5th Report Appendix, p. 344
10. E. 119. 3; Brit. L. Harl. MS 2135 f 22
11. E. 119. 3. 119. 25
could now be said to have been 'secured' by the Royalists.

On his way back to Shrewsbury on the 27th, Charles stopped at Wrexham to dine with Richard Lloyd, review the local militia and address the assembled gentry of north-east Wales.\(^{(1)}\) His speech dwelt in some detail upon the concept of himself as a refugee from rebels who threatened not only his legal rights but the whole traditional order. Such a personal appeal, made in circumstances of genuine flight and danger, must have had a powerful impact. Like all the King's previous speeches it was immediately published and dispersed.\(^{(2)}\)

Even Charles' frantic energy was insufficient in the time available to make such a personal journey to countenance his supporters in south-east Wales. These were now fully active. On 13th September Parliament was reassured that Monmouthshire was perfectly quiet.\(^{(3)}\) A few days later Lord Herbert seized the magazine at Caerleon and declared for the King.\(^{(4)}\) A set of Protestant gentry, led by Sir William Morgan of Tredegar and his son-in-law Sir Trevor Williams, co-operated with him. Parliamentarians were disarmed and the county secured by local levies and 500 of Stradling's newly-raised foot from Glamorganshire.\(^{(5)}\) In Radnorshire the High Sheriff, Hugh Lloyd, and Charles Price MP similarly became active for the King.\(^{(6)}\) The King, unable to visit them, conceived the brilliant scheme of sending his heir, the twelve-year-old Prince of Wales, to Raglan to appeal to the Celtic nationalism of the south Welsh. The precocious boy played his

1. E. 119. 25; Archaeologia Cambrensis 1846, p. 33
2. E. 200. 61; Clarendon, VI. 67
3. CJ Vol. 2, p. 763
4. Dircks, p. 331
5. NLW Tredegar MS 911; CJ Vol. 2, p. 785
6. Ibid. p. 793
part to perfection, addressing a meeting of gentry from the whole area with great charm and closing his speech with a toast to the 'ancient Britons'. His audience showered him with promises and donations.\(^{(1)}\)

By the end of September, two weeks after the King had begun his march westward, the Royalist war effort had borne fruit in all the parts of the region where activists had appeared, save one. There, in Gloucestershire, Worcestershire and Herefordshire, disaster had occurred.

On 9th September the Gloucester MP's reported back to Parliament that they had arrived in the city, mustered the militia and raised volunteers.\(^{(2)}\) In the county at large, however, they encountered the same reluctance to enter the war that had defeated Chandos.\(^{(3)}\) Most striking, when, some weeks later, two regiments of regular Parliamentarian soldiers arrived before the city the citizens took fright at the sight of them and slammed the gates in their faces as securely as the citizens of Coventry had on Charles. Some Parliamentarians let the troops in through a postern, and once inside they 'quashed the business'.\(^{(4)}\) Gloucestershire became Parliamentarian territory, secured by a regular garrison at Gloucester.

The King did not truly 'lose' Gloucestershire, as he had not yet found supporters there, but in Worcestershire and Herefordshire were some of his most fervent devotees. Herefordshire being secure, he concentrated his attention upon Worcester. The horse he had ordered there from Stafford consisted of the best of

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1. E. 122. 14
2. HMC Portland MSS Vol. 1, pp. 61-2
4. Ibid. p. 306
his existing cavalry, under his Commander Of Horse, his nephew Rupert. On about the 20th September this linked up in Worcestershire with Sir John Byron's regiment, which had evacuated Oxford, and, its walls being ruinous, they entered Worcester and took it over.\(^{(1)}\) The result of this action was to draw down upon the city the entire Parliamentarian field army from Northampton. The motives of its commanders in marching on Worcester rather than Shrewsbury remain mysterious. Perhaps their intelligence was faulty. The result, for the local Royalists, was catastrophic. Rupert's horse retreated rapidly into Shropshire, abandoning Worcester to their enemies, who occupied the city on the 24th. On the 2nd October a detachment occupied Hereford.\(^{(2)}\) From both counties the Royalist leaders fled, or defaced their working papers.\(^{(3)}\) The most prominent, Lord Coventry, surrendered himself to Parliament.\(^{(4)}\)

This success, striking as it was, nearly lost Parliament the war. Had its army marched on Shrewsbury instead of Worcester it could have destroyed the core of the King's army while he was absent at Chester. Instead it went to Worcester, and compounded this blunder by remaining there two weeks, waiting for Charles to make a move. The motives for this immobility are even less intelligible than those for the original march. The Parliamentarian commanders seem to have had no conception of the numbers and intentions of the Royalists behind Rupert's cavalry screen, and to have lacked the will to probe them. Their strategic errors played

1. Warburton, Vol. 1, pp. 396-8; Bod. L. Firth MS C6 f 20; E. 240, 9
2. PRO SP 16/492/21, 32 Nehemiah Wharton 26/30-9-42
3. Bod. L. Tanner MS 303 f 113; Worcestershire RO 1714/899/192 ff 239-41
4. LJ Vol. 5, p. 413
directly into Charles' hands, for they granted him the precious time in which to build a full-scale army.

To construct any army required four ingredients, men, officers, weapons and money. Of these Charles certainly obtained the first, for by 13th October, when he called his forces together at Bridgnorth, they consisted of about 6,000 foot, 2,000 horse and 1,500 dragoons. (1) Earl Rivers', Fitton's, Aston's and Salusbury's regiments had now joined, and other regiments had apparently arrived from outside the region. Much of the growth, however, must have been supplied by the recruitment of regiments commissioned elsewhere from Shropshire and its area. At times complete units were added; thus Lord Willoughby's Lincolnshire regiment acquired three Cheshire companies and Fielding's Foot two Herefordshire detachments. (2) Many recruits, however, must have signed up with the agent of whichever regiment found their village first. Thus the principal officers of Blagge's Foot were all Suffolk gentry, but the regiment first appears at Shrewsbury in October, and must have been recruited from that area as Suffolk was under Parliamentarian rule. (3) The same must be true of other 'foreign' regiments which materialised at this time and place. A splendid portrait of this process at work survives from Myddle, Shropshire. (4) The Commissioner Of Array, Sir Paul Harris, called all local people to a meeting on Myddle Hill, where a recruiting agent 'with a paper in his hand and three or four soldiers' pikes stuck upright in the ground by

2. Young, pp. 55, 219, 225
3. Ibid. p. 217
4. R. Gough, Human Nature Displayed In The History Of Myddle (1834), p. 31
him' offered 4s 4d a week to volunteers. Harris was not the local landlord, nor had he been commissioned to raise a regular unit himself, nor was he even popular with the common people. Yet twenty men from Myddle, Marton and Newton signed up, thirteen of whom were to die in action, a casualty rate that exceeds these villages' losses in World War One. To border farmers 4s 4d per week was a princely sum.

The King likewise obtained a sufficient supply of trained officers to drill the men. This procedure was absolutely vital, as the practice needed to operate the cumbersome musket of the 1640's or manoeuvre with an eighteen-foot pike rendered these weapons almost useless in the hands of raw recruits. The mere experience of an engagement to men who had never known battle was so traumatic that only instilled discipline would stop them breaking at once. The immense superiority of veterans over raw troops cannot be overstressed, particularly in this war where veterans were often so scarce. In this respect the Welsh regiments had an advantage, in that the sheer poverty of Welsh agriculture had forced many gentry into the career of soldier of fortune. Owen, Herbert, Stradling and possibly Salusbury were themselves veterans, and so were many of their officers. The other regiments nevertheless managed to obtain the services of experienced men, and, as indicated earlier, all whose composition is known included one of two.

1. Ibid. p. 15
2. DWB 'Herbert Of Montgomery', 'Owen'; HMC 14th Report, Appendix 2, p. 94; Young, pp. 223-4, 227-8
The equipment of Charles' army was far less adequate. One prospective source of weapons was the local militia. Unfortunately this varied a great deal in quality, the Cheshire militia being apparently well equipped\(^{(1)}\) while that of Anglesey and Caernarvonshire was not.\(^{(2)}\) Furthermore, as the duty of the militiamen was to defend their homes they were understandably reluctant to give up their arms. Eventually it seems that only the bands of Denbighshire and Flintshire were disarmed in the region studied.\(^{(3)}\) The King apparently received a large convoy of weapons from the Continent, which had been landed at Newcastle and carried across Lancashire to Chester.\(^{(4)}\) To provide the rest of his troops he relied upon the private armouries of the gentry, which in a hitherto peaceful country must have been meagre and antiquated. Some, those of Parliamentarians and neutralists, were confiscated outright. For the contents of the others Charles could only appeal, sometimes issuing a general request to be read in all churches,\(^{(5)}\) sometimes writing pointedly to individual gentry whom he knew to be well-equipped.\(^{(6)}\) The appeals met with some response,\(^{(7)}\) but by the time the King marched many foot soldiers, particularly in the Welsh regiments, were still armed only with pitchforks and clubs.\(^{(8)}\) Charles' army upon the march must have represented a curious living museum, some parts of it resembling an army of the 1640's, the rest bearing equipment associated with the various centuries back to the Neolithic.

The final constituent was money, without which the best army would not hold

1. Chester RO C/R/6/3/2/6
2. PRO SP 16/488/100, Certificate 31-1-42
3. NLW Crosse Of Shawe Hill MS 1118; E.122.14; Clarendon VI.73
4. E.119.3, 121.3
5. Shropshire RO Box 298; E.240.37
6. HMC 5th Report Appendix, p.142
7. E.g. TSANHS 1905, p.315
8. Bulstrode, pp.75,86
together long. The sums needed to maintain the Royalist army were prodigious, especially at the attractive pay rates offered. To maintain a single foot company, minus officers, at the rate offered at Myddle required nearly £22 per week in an age when a rich man had £1,000 per year, and ready cash was notoriously scarce. Horse troops were about twice as expensive. The initial money to pay the new recruits and conduct them to the army was the responsibility of their colonels, although for Aston's horse and in the poor north Welsh counties it was raised by public subscription, not all of which was paid. Once with the King, however, the soldiers' pay was the collective responsibility of Charles' High Command. Their task involved the gathering of money, its apportioning among the various regiments and the ordering of provisions upon which the soldiers might spend some of the money to feed themselves. This last was by itself an enormous task for a large force. The little army Charles had led to Stafford required £500 worth of bread alone to feed it for three days. Apart from his food each soldier was expected to pay for his lodging, with some reluctant cottager. In practice lack of regular money meant that the soldier of this period often took 'free quarter', meaning that he paid for food and lodging with a certificate, which would be redeemed for cash by his paymaster if and when money came in. This system was universally detested among the civilian population, for the certificates were rarely redeemed, and actually illegal in England since the Petition Of Right.

1. Brit. L. Add. MS 36913 f 101; NLW Llanfair-Brynodol MS 39, Wynn MS 1711, Crosse Of Shawe Hill MS 1094, 1116
2. WSL Salt MS 402 f 204
To meet these problems Charles at Shrewsbury, debarred from regular taxation which could be levied only in partnership with Parliament, depended entirely upon expediency and generosity. Both however worked surprisingly well. The sale of a peerage to Sir Richard Newport raised £6,000, the writing of letters to local Catholics asking for an advance upon their recusancy fines produced nearly £5,000 more.\(^1\) Large sums were obtained by voluntary donation. Byron had brought back a considerable amount from Oxford University, the Prince had returned from Raglan with more, and many gifts were made by gentry from Shropshire and its region. Those who had cash sent it, in parcels of one or two hundred pounds each,\(^2\) those who had not sent their family plate to be melted down.\(^3\) Charles issued a moving appeal for such contributions to the county meeting at Shrewsbury on the 28th,\(^4\) offering to melt his own plate first, and sent individual polite requests to wealthy gentry.\(^5\) All donations were receipted, and repayment was promised. Doubtless some gentry gave out of loyalty, doubtless others were happy to purchase certificates of Royalism to be presented at court later when petitioning for favours. Thanks to these gifts, and the money confiscated from Parliamentarians and neutralists, the growth of the army continued and its morale seemed high. There seems no reason to doubt Clarendon’s statement that the soldiers 'never went above a fortnight unpaid' at this time and that money was collected above this to cover the needs of the coming march.\(^6\)

1. Clarendon VI. 65-6  
2. E.g. Staffordshire RO D593/P/8/1  
3. E.g. E. 122. 14  
5. E.g. TSANHS 1905, p. 314  
6. VI. 64, 72
Clarendon's other statement that 'there was not a disorder of name', the soldiers being 'just and regardful to the country'\(^{(1)}\) must be qualified. Individuals were plundered both by Charles' soldiers\(^{(2)}\) and by their camp-followers.\(^{(3)}\)

Plundering is a phenomenon usually associated with times of pay failure, when troops loot from necessity, but even in times of full pay some will loot from greed, and the only answer to this problem is strict discipline. Charles faced the problem responsibly. He dispersed a circular throughout his army's quarters inviting any local people who suffered injury to report it to him, whereupon he promised justice and restitution.\(^{(4)}\) Complaints were made, and when Charles marched he left six recruits to be tried like common thieves at the next Assizes.\(^{(5)}\)

All told, Charles' achievement had been spectacular. In three weeks he had gathered together an army of volunteers, supported by voluntary donations, large enough to face his opponents. He had done this in one of the poorest regions of the country, which had already sent thousands of its best men overseas to quell the Irish rebellion,\(^{(6)}\) and at harvest time when every hand was needed in the fields. It only remained from him to secure the area in his rear as he marched. He left Ottley with his men to hold Shrewsbury\(^{(7)}\) and Richard Herbert, whose regiment was not ready, to garrison Bridgnorth.\(^{(8)}\) He left Lloyd at Wrexham encouraged with a knighthood.\(^{(9)}\) At Chester he was unable to persuade the reigning Mayor to accept re-election but was satisfied with the choice of a Royalist, William Ince, as his

1. VI. 72
2. HMC 2nd Report Appendix, p. 48
3. TSANHS 1895, p. 249
4. Shropshire RO Box 298
5. E.242.2
6. 1,000 from Denbighshire alone, NLW Crosse Of Shawe Hill MS 1118
7. TSANHS 1894, pp. 45-6
8. HMC 10th Report, Appendix 4, p. 399
9. Shaw, p. 214
successor. In Montgomeryshire the High Sheriff, who had attempted to obey both parties, was punished and Sir John Price, who had resisted the Royalists, saw fit to turn Royalist himself. With north-west Wales loyal, all North Wales and its March now represented a secure Royalist base.

On 13th October Charles commenced his march towards London, although the Lancashire regiments and those of Owen, Price, Stradling and Carberry had not yet arrived. It is possible that his haste was impelled by a growing lack of provisions around Shrewsbury or by the risk of a drop in morale consequent upon inactivity. He marched to Wolverhampton and then to Birmingham. His behaviour in Staffordshire was notably harsher than it had been in the Marches; apparently the memory of Uttoxeter rankled. He sent a peremptory warrant to Lichfield for arms and money, and ordered the trial of certain persons who had offended his soldiers. Likewise he was reported to have imposed a £2,000 fine upon Birmingham, as upon Nantwich. He continued his march deeper into Warwickshire, and Stradling and the three Lancashire regiments joined, increasing the Royalist army to about 14,000 men. The sluggish intelligence system of the Parliamentarians at Worcester relayed the news of the King's advance, and they moved eastwards to intercept him, leaving garrisons in Worcester and Hereford. Like two great blind moles the rival armies quested across Warwickshire for six days, unable to locate each other, hindered perhaps by bad roads but perhaps by

1. Chester RO Cowper MS 2 ff 21-2
2. E.121. 36; PRO 16/491/131, Niccolls 26-8-42
3. Iter Carolinum
4. Rev. T. Harwood, History Of The Church And City Of Lichfield (1806), pp. 19-20
5. WSL Salt MS 562/1
6. E.242.2
7. Young, pp. 86-91, 174
8. Ibid. p. 76
the indifference of the local people. Upon the sixth day they collided, at Edgehill.

Two large areas within the region studied had now felt the impact of civil war. One had been conquered and subjected to military rule, the other had undergone the opposite experience, the construction of a field army from predominantly local resources. Yet the involvement of the whole community in the war was by no means achieved. Whole areas remained virtually unaffected by these proceedings, and nowhere had an entire population been mobilised to participate in a war effort. As yet local communities stood apart from the war, while only activists of varying levels of commitment involved themselves in it. The consequence of the Edgehill campaign was to commence this final integration.
As is well known, against all men's expectations both the battle and the campaign of Edgehill proved inconclusive. Parliament retained London while Charles settled at Oxford, a city of great public buildings set in the centre of the kingdom among rich countryside capable of supporting his army. He and his enemies had proved themselves too evenly-matched for either to achieve a decisive victory. Therefore as winter drew on both sides turned to the provinces once more, to recruit fresh strength to enable each to return to the conflict with a greater chance of success.

For Charles, the first and most obvious source of such strength consisted of the regiments which had been not fully recruited when he commenced the campaign. These joined him one by one. Price's arrived in November. Owen's experienced initial difficulties because of the shortage in north-west Wales of the money needed to raise it, but by December was at Worcester on its march. Herbert's came to Oxford about three months later, though still short of weapons. The biggest single addition to Charles's army, however, was the 2,000 foot and horse regiment which the Marquis Of Hertford brought to Oxford on 9th January. Hertford had left court in August, armed with a grandiose commission as supreme commander of all Royalist forces in south Wales and most of southern England. His mission had been to secure the West County. The resulting campaign had been a fiasco, and by late September Hertford's little army had been

1. Brit. L. Harl. MS 6804 f 197
2. NLW Llanfair-Brynodol MS 41; UCNW Baron Hill MS 5362
3. NLW Clennenau Letters, Appendix 2
4. PRO WO/55/423 ff 164-6
5. Dugdale's Diary, ed. by W. Hamper (1827), p. 46; Clarendon VI. 237; E. 245. 27
pushed back to the Bristol Channel. The only obvious escape was by boat, to Royalist Glamorganshire. Hertford took it; he and his few hundred foot landed at Cardiff and were made welcome there.\(^{(1)}\) Once safe, the Marquis was concerned to rescue his reputation by accomplishing in South Wales and its March what Charles had achieved in the north, the dual task of securing the area and drawing its resources into the field army. To this end he held musters and raised troops all through October and November. No records survive of this process, nor to illustrate how the local potentates Lord Herbert and the Earl of Carberry came to accept the authority of a superior of whose very existence they may have been ignorant. This they did, though there was certainly friction between Hertford and Herbert.\(^{(2)}\) Ultimately the Marquis' 'drive' was successful all over South Wales except in its most Anglicised portion, Pembrokeshire. From there gentry did join him,\(^{(3)}\) but some of their fellows drew the county militia into Haverfordwest, Tenby and Pembroke and appealed to Parliament for aid.\(^{(4)}\) The three towns had a long tradition of identifying with the interests of London, from where they had obtained help against their Welsh enemies in the Middle Ages. This may seem a little simplistic as an explanation for their behaviour in 1642, but no other seems admissible. At any rate the episode had no sequel, as Hertford was more concerned with the menace of his Parliamentarian neighbours to the east.

As described above, the events of September had left Parliamentarian

1. E. 121. 9; Somerset Record Society 1902, pp. 17-18
3. PRO SP 19/21 f 161, 19/126 ff 105-8
4. LJ Vol. 5, pp. 440-1
garrisons in Hereford and Worcester. Of these the most active was that of Hereford, consisting of the Earl Of Stamford and his regiment. These regular soldiers were too formidable for the Marquis to engage, but he and Herbert between them were too strong in Monmouthshire for Stamford to dislodge. Two pamphlets\(^{(1)}\) survive describing bloody victories won by Stamford over Hertford. Their vivid detail makes it natural that every historian since J.R. Phillips' standard book on the Civil War in Wales should have swallowed them whole.\(^{(2)}\) However, all Stamford's own despatches survive for the period\(^{(3)}\) and prove that the pamphlets are totally fraudulent and that the situation was one of stalemate enlivened by raiding. Stamford's raids certainly did a great deal of damage, particularly that on Radnorshire which wrecked the local Royalist effort and captured its leader, Charles Price. Time, however, was against him. The establishment of the royal army at Oxford placed Stamford and his colleagues at Worcester in a dangerous position, lying as they were between the King and Royalist Wales. In November the Worcester garrison evacuated, the local Royalists reoccupied and Stamford was left nearly encircled and unable to raise enough money locally to pay his men. In early December he retreated to Gloucester, where he left his regiment, under his lieutenant-colonel, Edward Massey, to hold the city. He himself moved on to the West Country, and never returned. Hertford occupied Hereford, and made Fitzwilliam Coningsby, who had joined him, its governor.\(^{(4)}\)

1. E. 127. 28, 128. 44
3. LJ Vol. 5, pp. 415, 425-6, 440-1, 444, 453, 475, 511
4. Bod. L. Tanner MS 303 f 113
Hertford's achievement was really a triumph of co-operation. When he
marched most of his foot consisted of Carberry's regiment, the pay for his
forces was apparently provided by Herbert, their arms had been largely
purchased from Bristol while that city was still neutral and his enemies had
retreated under the pressure of external events. Yet it was a triumph nonetheless.
Most of South Wales had been secured for the King, and protected by garrisons at
Hereford and Monmouth, and a body of troops brought from it to the King.

They did not exhaust the total of soldiers brought to Oxford from the region
that winter. Existing field regiments sent for fresh recruits from their home
areas. Colonels commissioned for new regiments at Oxford sent agents to
Shropshire and Worcestershire to find men. Field regiments originally raised
elsewhere likewise turned to this region for additions; thus the Lancashire regiment
of Sir Charles Gerard acquired a Denbighshire company. It is dubious, however,
whether all these men, even in total, managed to compensate for the drain of men
from the field army at the same period. None of the men who had volunteered to
serve the King in the autumn could have expected the war to last more than a few
months. Now, after hard fighting, they found it prolonged indefinitely. Many fled
home directly after the horrors of Edgehill, others followed to care for their
families during the winter and desertions continued in the spring as pay at Oxford
began to fall into arrears. These did more damage than a mere shrinkage of

1. Dugdale's Diary, p. 46
2. Dircks, pp. 331-3
3. CJ Vol. 2, p. 800
4. LJ Vol. 5, pp. 425-6
5. NLW LI/MB/17 f 2
6. TSANHS 1894, pp. 48, 59
7. NLW Crosse Of Shawe Hill MS 1123
8. Ibid. 1093
the army, for they carried home stories of the realities of military life, of poverty, boredom and disease, to tell potential recruits.

In this situation, it was all the more vital that the security of the Royalist base in Wales and the Marches be preserved and good communications maintained between it and the field army at Oxford which it serviced. The reoccupation of Herefordshire and Worcestershire had provided a corridor between the two, and this was enlarged in February, when at Hertford's suggestion Prince Rupert conquered eastern Gloucestershire and added it to the army's quarters.\(^{(1)}\) The task now to be accomplished was to provide some regular means of securing the counties in the corridor and upon the exposed borders of the Royalist area. As the King could not impose taxes himself to support garrisons in them, he depended upon 'voluntary' local taxes agreed within each county by his supporters.

This was accomplished in Royalist Gloucestershire on 6th February, when at Rupert's request Lord Chandos led thirteen gentry in approving a plan to raise £3,000 immediately and £4,000 per month thereafter to support occupying troops.\(^{(2)}\) The same system was already in force in Herefordshire, where Coningsby had been left by Hertford to raise a regiment of foot and one of dragoons to guard the county.\(^{(3)}\) A monthly tax was somehow agreed to support them, although until it came in he relied upon loans from Hereford citizens.\(^{(4)}\)

The best documentation of this process at work derives from Worcestershire.

2. CSPD 1641-3, pp. 442-3. Thirteen was the usual number in a Grand Jury, but there is no positive evidence that they represented one.
3. Bod. L. Tanner MS 303 ff 113-15
4. Hereford RL 3668 f 587
There Charles had placed the surviving leaders of the summer firmly in command. Russell was made governor of Worcester and High Sheriff, Lyttleton was made governor of the other walled town, Bewdley, and Sandys was commissioned to raise regiments of horse and foot. In addition Charles commissioned a Scottish veteran, Sir James Hamilton, to raise a horse regiment in the shire for the field army, appointing Russell his lieutenant-colonel to make Hamilton more acceptable to the local people. On 17th December Charles wrote to Russell telling him bluntly that the High Command had no money to spare for local forces and authorising him therefore to arrange a local 'contribution' to keep these troops from plundering. Russell called a meeting to discuss a scheme for voluntary contributions and then utilised the Epiphany Sessions to revive the summer device of employing the Grand Jury as a county Parliament. This obediently agreed that £3,000 per month would be levied from Worcestershire to pay local troops. A Treasurer was appointed to receive it and Russell to dispose of it, not in his military capacity as governor but in his civilian role as High Sheriff, head of the permanent county community. Collection was immediately commenced.

In early March Charles capped all these arrangements by reconstituting the active Royalist gentry of the 'corridor counties' Herefordshire, Gloucestershire and Worcestershire as Committees Of Safety, with precise directions as to how to regulate their taxes and garrisons. They were expected to meet at least weekly.

1. J.R. Burton, A History Of Bewdley (1883), Appendix xxxi
2. Brit. L. Add. MS 18980 ff 8-9, 20
3. Ibid.
4. Worcestershire RO 1714/899/192 f 309
5. Ibid. f 295
6. Ibid. ff 299-304
7. See below, p. 117
The King may well have been pleased with their achievements, as they had set about reorganising an area which had been drained by the Parliamentarians. These had consumed much of the available local money in their occupation and confiscated the weapons of Royalists and of the militia.\(^{(1)}\) On the other hand, the Parliamentarians may have done much to make rule by Royalist gentry palatable. They were strangers, and their troops had defaced churches, plundered and treated the local people as natural enemies.\(^{(2)}\) This conclusion seems borne out by the fact that the Royalists faced their worst problems in this period not here but in precisely those areas where the royal army had been raised in the autumn.

In Shropshire the Royalists at first attempted to defend the county by calling up all the horse traditionally owed by the gentry for its defence. The gentry failed to co-operate\(^{(3)}\) and in December a different scheme was promulgated, to raise 1,000 dragoons to defend the county by the subscriptions of thirty-three Royalist gentry, including all the local leaders. Sir Vincent Corbet, who had been captain of the moribund county horse, was made their colonel.\(^{(4)}\) Charles approved this\(^{(5)}\) and the scheme was extended to provide for the maintenance of the dragoons by a general levy upon the shire, settled by meetings within each hundred.\(^{(6)}\) Yet by January only 298 had been raised, by the money of the Royalist leaders themselves.\(^{(7)}\) The other subscriptions had simply failed to appear.\(^{(8)}\) Likewise warrants to raise more money for the militia were ignored.\(^{(9)}\)

2. Webbs, pp. 354-5; E. 121. 34; PRO SP 16/492/21, 32, Wharton 26/30-9-42
3. Shropshire RO Box 298
4. E. 130, 22
5. Brit. L. Harl. MS 6852 f 1
6. HMC 10th Report, Appendix 4, pp. 403-4
7. Brit. L. Add. MS 36913 f 116
8. TSANHS 1894, p. 64, 1895, pp. 264-5
9. Ibid. 1895, pp. 256-7
A basic problem lying at the root of such failures was that the county itself was too large a unit for the horizons of the average man. As an alternative to the grand schemes of the county leaders, local people set up their own defence systems to protect their individual settlements. Thus Bishop’s Castle corporation instituted an alarm network against plunderers (1) and the young men of Bridgnorth began to drill to protect their town. (2) This sentiment at least benefitted Ottley at Shrewsbury, where the corporation agreed to levy £450 in the winter to improve the town’s fortifications. (3) Ottley however wanted more; a commission from Charles as governor, to give him absolute power in Shrewsbury. The King was reluctant to grant this, fearing that such power would offend the corporation, the traditional rulers of the town, and disenchant them with Royalism. Ottley persuaded the corporation to recommend him, and Charles yielded in February. (4) Soon after Ottley was at odds with the corporation, having laid a tax upon the citizens without its consent. (5)

In January, at the King’s command, the Denbighshire gentry agreed to raise and maintain 400 foot to garrison Denbigh, Ruthin, Llangeriew and Llangollen. William Wynne of Llanvase, leader of the disarmed militia, was made colonel. (6) These men were raised, and armed from family magazines, mainly Wynne’s, though few munitions could be found for them. (7) The Flintshire gentry agreed to raise a local dragoon force under Sir Thomas Hanmer, though there was a notable inclination

1. HMC 10th Report, Appendix 4, p. 403
2. TSANHS 1894, pp. 74-5
3. Owen and Blakeway, p. 431
4. TSANHS 1894, pp. 55-6, 57, 71-2
5. Ibid. 1895, p. 250
6. E. 246. 16; NLW Crosse Of Shawe Hill MS 1095
7. Ibid. 1118
among them 'to stand neuters'.

This last factor was crucial in Cheshire. There the Royalists had only obtained power in the autumn by the intervention of the King's army. That army had now marched away, taking with it the troops of the Cheshire Royalists. With diminished resources they were now expected to consolidate their hold upon the county. At first they relied upon the militia and upon a mutual aid agreement with the Lancashire Royalists, who were in a worse predicament, with Parliamentarian garrisons at Manchester and Blackburn. The Lancashire connection, however, brought trouble when the Lancashire Royalist potentate, the Earl Of Derby, who was nominally Lord Lieutenant of Cheshire, commissioned Orlando Bridgeman as supreme commander there. Presumably the Earl wanted a henchman in control of Cheshire who would use its resources to aid the struggle in Lancashire. Bridgeman was not however one of the group of noblemen who had run the county since the summer, and these resented his appointment. Moreover he was a Chester man, and his rivalry with the lords represented a clash between the interests of city and county.

Bridgeman set about the work of consolidation. In Chester he was supported by a set of aldermen led by the Gamull family, who had bought trading privileges in the city which Parliament would extinguish. These obtained a corporation order on 6th December for a levy to complete the city magazine and fortifications, phrased delicately to avoid naming a particular enemy. Bridgeman and Derby seem at the

1. E. 246. 16; Brit. L. Harl. MS 6852 f 1
2. Cheshire RO DCC/47/42
3. Brit. L. Add. MS 36913 f 122
4. See above, p 32.
5. E. 84. 37; A. M. Johnson, in P. Slack and P. Clark (ed.) Crisis And Order In English Towns 1500 - 1700 (1972), pp. 206-10
6. Chester RO A/B/2 f 60
same time to have asked a local tax of the county and to have ordered the
disarmament of suspect gentry. These two manoeuvres in unison produced
disaster. The gentry concerned, led by Henry Mainwaring of Kermincham, rose
and gathered a large force, comprised of most of the former neutralists plus,
probably, anybody who did not want to pay tax. All the retrospective sources call
them Parliamentarians, as they later became, and at the time Parliament was
eager to claim them as compatriots. Doubtless there were genuine Parliamentarians
among them. But there is no evidence that at this period Mainwaring and the leaders
regarded themselves as acting for Parliament. In the summer they had been militant
neutralists, and their behaviour in December was perfectly in accord with this
position.

Mainwaring's troops rapidly over-ran eastern Cheshire, and on the 10th
they occupied Nantwich, the strategic heart of the county. A handful of regulars
might have broken them, but Bridgeman had no regular soldiers. The militia,
demoralised by the divisions in the Royalists and in the county community, disintegrated.
The Royalists were left with little more than Chester and the private
garrisons of the lords, like Earl Rivers' at Halton Castle. Their fellows in
neighbouring counties promised aid but Bridgeman, with reason, doubted their ability
to perform. His solution, produced in co-operation with one of the lords,
Kilmurrey, was to propose a proper local peace treaty to his opponents. They

1. Brit. L. Add. MS 36913 ff 122-3
2. Malbon's Diary, p. 29
3. Ibid. p. 30; NLW Crosse Of Shawe Hill MS 1114
4. Add. MS 36913 ff 122-3
5. Cheshire RO DCH/X/15/14
6. TSANHS 1894, pp. 60-2
accepted, and it was signed at Bunbury on 22nd December. Both sides agreed to
disband most of their troops and only to raise them again in unison, to escort
'foreign' soldiers of either party firmly through the county. Cheshire had
effectively contracted out of the war.\(^{(1)}\) At best Bridgeman had, after a fashion,
secured the flank of Royalist North Wales. At worst, he had bought time. The
treaty caused fury in Parliament\(^{(2)}\) and among Royalists in Cheshire and elsewhere.\(^{(3)}\)
The King, however, was persuaded to approve it.\(^{(4)}\)

Events in Staffordshire followed yet another course. Through the autumn it
had preserved the neutrality which Cheshire was struggling to achieve, apparently
without effort. Gentry sent private aid to Charles at Shrewsbury while declining to
raise their county for him.\(^{(5)}\) This position was tested in November, when a party
of Yorkshire Royalist horse under Sir Francis Wortley crossed the Staffordshire
Moorlands, the high bare area in the north-east of the county. Although barren,
this at the time harboured a thriving plebeian population, and these Wortley's
troopers plundered, to survive.\(^{(6)}\) The reaction of the county community was to
hold a Special Sessions of the Peace on 15th November, which decreed that 800 foot
and 200 dragoons should be raised in the shire to deal with any future incursions.
The order was signed by twenty-six gentry, who included most of the future local
Royalist and Parliamentarian leaders, plus Lord Paget who had so recently raised
his regiment in the shire.\(^{(7)}\) The Cheshire pact had been created to end the war

1. E.84.37
2. CJ Vol.2, pp. 916-17
4. Ibid.
5. Staffordshire RO D593/P/8/1/6, D260/M/F/1/6 f 1
6. E.127.3.126.23
7. Staffordshire RO GS/R, Special Sessions 1642 f 10
in that county. The Staffordshire pact was intended to stop it ever breaking out.

This Charles would not tolerate. On 26th November he ordered the High Sheriff to suppress the neutralist army and to garrison Staffordshire in his name instead.\(^1\) Next he selected a minor Staffordshire gentleman, Thomas Comberford of Comberford, who had joined him, made him governor of Stafford and colonel of a regiment of horse\(^2\) and sent him north around the New Year guarded by Wortley's troopers. The neutralist army ought in theory to have destroyed them, but the local people had obviously been just as lax in this matter as in any other expensive scheme, for it had not been raised. They occupied Stafford, the Mayor being favourable to them. How they won over the Mayor is not known, nor how the Mayor won over the townspeople, although his accounts contain tantalising references to payment for bundles of proclamations and to a distribution of beer among local people 'when Sir Francis Wortley was coming'.\(^3\) They were assisted also by Sir Richard Leveson MP and Sir Robert Wolsely MP, the new High Sheriff, former neutralists.\(^4\) These men may have been driven over to Royalism by Parliament, which had declared them enemies and ordered Wortley's plundering to be compensated out of Leveson's estates.\(^5\) By the end of January Comberford and Wortley were established in a fortified Stafford and the former was raising his horse with money lent by the townspeople.\(^6\)

They had forgotten the Moorlanders. These people had no intention of

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1. WSL Salt MS 342/1
2. Rev. S. Shaw, Vol. 1, p. 434; Brit. L. Add. MS 18980 f 20; Bod. L. Clarendon MS 23 f 120
3. Salt MS 402 ff 205-6
4. Ibid.; HMC 2nd Report Appendix, p. 48; Brit. L. 669 f 6 93; Staffordshire RO QS/R Epiphany 1643
5. CJ Vol. 2, p. 862; E. 242. 27
6. Salt MS 402 f 205; HMC Hastings MSS Vol. 2, pp. 90-1 n1
permitting the county to be dominated by their plunderer Wortley, allied with yet more potentially predatory horse. In early February they sent a demand to the Royalists at Stafford demanding the withdrawal of these regular soldiers and their replacement with a small garrison of local men.\(^{(1)}\) When this was rejected they rose, and assaulted Stafford. They could not take the town for lack of cannon and proper weapons, but they could prevent Comberford from fetching in supplies, and their numbers and the remarkable determination of their leaders made them formidable.\(^{(2)}\) Comberford appealed for aid to the nearest active Royalist soldier. This was Henry Hastings, a younger member of a great Leicestershire family, who had been in the summer one of Charles' most fervent, and notorious, followers. After fighting at Edgehill he had been sent home with the title of Colonel-General to secure the East Midlands, and gathered at his family castle of Ashby-De-La-Zouch a small but mobile army, which had operated as far as Cheshire.\(^{(3)}\) It had touched the fringe of Staffordshire in January, when Hastings had garrisoned Tutbury Castle against his Derbyshire opponents.\(^{(4)}\) Now he prepared to march to Comberford's aid.\(^{(5)}\) Meanwhile a third centre of Royalist power had come into being in the county, when the Derbyshire Royalist potentate, the Earl Of Chesterfield, retreated to Lichfield with a small force and settled there. Cheshire had fallen into chaos and resolved it with a neutrality pact. Staffordshire had produced a neutrality pact, and fallen into chaos.\(^{(6)}\)

1. E.89.17
2. Ibid.; E.90.11; HMC Hastings MSS 2, pp. 90-1
3. Brit. L. Add. MS 36913 ff 122-6; Burghall's Diary, ed. by T.W. Barlow (1855), p. 159
4. E.86.22
5. WSL Salt MS 550
6. For a parallel interpretation of these events, see J.T. Pickles, Studies In Royalism In The English Civil War, Manchester MA Thesis 1968, pp. 51-84. I endorse, and develop, Mr. Pickle's explanation for the Moorlander rising but differ from him in believing that the gentry had divided before that rising.
These last counties had highlighted in an extreme form a problem common to them all. It was the same that had occurred in the summer; how to make a war effort acceptable to the bulk of the population in each locality. Nobody was more conscious of this problem than the King himself. Hence his High Command was most anxious that local commanders continued to distribute the bundles of propaganda material sent to them from Oxford. They were obviously dispersed quite far, for local people in eastern Herefordshire rejected a Parliamentarian warrant because they had 'His Majesty's book' against it. Directed to the same end were letters like the one Charles wrote to Russell on 21st December ordering him to inform local people that the King well understood and regretted their sufferings at the hands of both armies in the autumn and that he promised strict attention to all laws. He meant this seriously, because Russell was ordered to ensure that the promise was kept. Similarly he issued a proclamation to troops in the 'corridor counties' instructing them to obey all regulations and behave well towards civilians.

Another proclamation publicised the fact that the Shropshire gentry who contributed to support the county dragoons were to receive a gold medal each.

Ultimately all these efforts were in vain, because nothing could induce the bulk of local people to volunteer the sacrifices necessary to fight a war which they neither wanted nor could comprehend. If any of the Royalist leaders realised this unpalatable fact they could not publicly acknowledge it. The only way out of the

1. TSANHS 1894, pp. 55-7
2. HMC 5th Report Appendix, p. 142
3. Worcestershire RO 1714/899/192 ff 309-10
4. Bod. L. Wentworth Proclamation 16
5. Ibid. 4
impasse that was ideologically safe was to ascribe the torpor of the local war effort to sabotage by concealed Parliamentarians. In the first months of 1643 the witch-hunt began. It was apparently most intense in Shropshire, where Ottley's soldiers dragged suspects to prison and then ransacked their houses. Men went in fear of being denounced by spiteful neighbours. The Shrewsbury citizens were instructed to swear individually to oppose Parliament. Refusal to swear carried the death penalty. A similar oath was imposed on Chester, where the leaders suspected the common people of being 'poisoned'. Similarly a big trial was staged at Worcester in the same period of people accused of plotting against the governor.

Whatever the Royalists had to fear from concealed foes, they certainly had reason to fear the external enemy. Strategically, Wales and its Marches now represented a vast Royalist fortress which Parliament had to break open and destroy. To accomplish this it possessed advanced bases at Gloucester and Coventry, and an isolated stronghold in Lancashire. If it could drive a corridor from Coventry to Manchester it could run troops up and down this, striking at whichever point of the Royalist area seemed weakest at any one time. The Royalists themselves, however, had an interest in aggressive strategy. They had already linked Wales to Oxford, now they needed to link it also with the North, where important munition convoys landed from the Continent and needed to be carried to Oxford. This entailed driving

1. TSANHS 1894, pp. 64, 68-9, 1895, pp. 267-73
2. PRO SP 16/497/3
3. Bod. L. Tanner MS 62 f 541
4. TSANHS 1894, p. 73; Brit. L. Harl. MS 2155 f 109
5. Brit. L. Harl. MS 6851 ff 79-94
a corridor from Shrewsbury to Newark. The two projected corridors, Royalist and Parliamentarian, crossed in Staffordshire. This unfortunate county was about to become the centre of a highly complicated and deadly game of chess, with the mastership of England as its prize.

Parliament made the first move, striking at the weakest point in the Royalist defences, Cheshire. It empowered its champion of the summer, Brereton, to wage war there, equipped him with a body of horse and sent him north on about 4th January. By the 19th he was near Stafford, and disrupted a local meeting called by Comberford. The mere news of his coming was enough to sink the Bunbury treaty. Mainwaring's group, put to the test, did not relish the prospect of helping Royalists fight Parliamentarians. They proposed individual resistance to Brereton instead, and Bridgeman lost all faith in the pact. He appealed to neighbouring Royalists for help, and by the time Brereton entered Cheshire on about 25th January had succeeded in securing Chester with about 1,000 foot, much of it from North Wales.

As it happened, Charles himself had no more faith in the Bunbury pact than anybody, and made his own move. Against Brereton's horse he decided to set Aston's, who being Cheshire men might be more acceptable to the local people than any other field army unit. Aston was made Major-General in Cheshire, ordered to link up with the Shropshire dragoons and secure the county, and despatched from

1. LJ Vol. 5, pp. 535, 538-41; E. 244. 46
2. Bod. L. MS Eng. Hist. c 53 f 6
3. TSANHS 1894, pp. 60-2
4. Ibid. pp. 64-5; NLW Crosse Of Shawe Hill MS 1095, Llanfair-Brynodol MS 45
Oxford on the 19th. By the 25th he was in Shropshire, only to find Corbet's dragoons scattered and already ordered by Charles to aid Comberford. It took him three days to remedy this situation, and by then Brereton was in Cheshire.

Both he and Aston now raced to gain Nantwich, which Mainwaring had evacuated under the terms of Bunbury. Brereton won by a margin, but the citizens, faithful to the Bunbury pact, refused to aid him. On the 28th Aston arrived, and the two forces joined battle. To steady the fresh dragoons, Aston divided them up among his horse, a fatal mistake as when Brereton charged the dragoons broke and carried the horse with them. Aston lost many men and weapons, but even more in prestige. The citizens of Nantwich threw in their lot with the victor, who fortified the town. Mainwaring's party, apparently deciding that neutralism was now untenable, joined him there and became, finally, Parliamentarian. It was a decision they later regretted, for Mainwaring himself was sacked by Parliament in 1644 for 'disservice' and most of his colleagues followed him into retirement, reinforcing the impression that their alliance with Parliament was late and hesitant.

During February both sides skirmished and attempted to gain strength. To secure his rear, Brereton established contact with the Moorlanders, who by now had been driven back by Hastings, and sent them officers to train them. Sir John Gell, the Derbyshire Parliamentarian leader, likewise wooed them, sending a cannon.

Thus an alliance began to form between Moorlander and Parliamentarian. Brereton

1. Brit. L. Add. MS 36913 ff 105-14
2. Ibid. f 123
3. Bod. L. Tanner MS 62 f 537
4. Ibid.; HMC Portland MSS Vol. 1, p. 94; Burghall's Diary, p. 159
5. CJ Vol. 3, p. 484
6. For a discussion of the motives, other than expediency, behind this alliance, see Morrill, Cheshire, pp. 65-6. I agree completely with Dr. Morrill's analysis of the neutralist movement, differing only over the date of its collapse.
7. HMC Portland MSS Vol. 1, pp. 95-6
8. E. 90. 11
was himself however in need of experienced officers and faced with the problem of welding his troops and Mainwaring's into a single force.\(^{(1)}\) His difficulties nevertheless were nothing to Aston's. This gentleman had continued with his horse to Chester, leaving Corbet's dragoons at Whitchurch to watch Nantwich. At Chester he and the lords arranged a local tax to support his horse. Unfortunately the Royalists now held only those parts of Cheshire surrounding the city, and these could not support both Aston's horse and the city garrison. Bridgeman obtained a royal warrant appropriating their money for the latter, and soon the horse were plundering to survive.\(^{(2)}\) Bridgeman compounded this action by appealing to the King for an expert to advise him upon the defence of Chester. Charles sent Sir Nicholas Byron, as he had to Warwickshire before. He arrived on 14th February, equipped with a commission as Colonel-General of Cheshire.\(^{(3)}\) Aston's authority had been divided.

On the 25th Brereton garrisoned Northwich, and cut the Royalists off completely from eastern Cheshire.\(^{(4)}\) As Bridgeman had appropriated the western districts, Aston's forces had to break through to the east to survive. By 10th March Aston had gathered some Welsh foot and some militia to join with his horse for the task. The whole force was mutinous for lack of pay, and although the foot were led by a Denbighshire veteran, Robert Ellis, neither men nor junior officers were trained. Nevertheless Aston seized Middlewich, between Northwich and Nantwich,

1. HMC Portland MSS Vol. 1, pp. 95-6
2. Brit. L. Harl. MS 2128 f 54, Add. MS 36913 ff 123-4
3. Ibid.
4. Malbon's Diary, pp. 38-9
hoping that Corbet's dragoons would keep Nantwich busy. In fact they had by now
gone home, and Aston's men were attacked upon both sides. They bolted, leaving
their weapons and Ellis to be captured.\(^{(1)}\) It was a decisive victory for Brereton,
but also for Bridgeman. Aston was ruined; he and his regiment were recalled to
the field army and never employed prominently again. His allies the Cheshire
noblemen became exiles at Bridgeman's court. Brereton had secured the county,
but Bridgeman had secured the city, and effectively covered the flank of Wales.
Neither possessed the resources to dislodge the other. It was a stalemate in some
measure honourable to both men.

Meanwhile Parliament had launched its second offensive. On 31st December
it had appointed Lord Brooke its Commander-In-Chief in Warwickshire and
Staffordshire\(^{(2)}\) and he arrived at Coventry in late February with 400 foot and 200
horse to conquer this area.\(^{(3)}\) In January the Coventry Parliamentarians had
garrisoned Kenilworth Castle to tighten their grip on northern Warwickshire.\(^{(4)}\) To
oppose them, Charles had settled Brooke's arch-enemy Northampton at Banbury with
the title of Colonel-General of Warwickshire and a powerful force.\(^{(5)}\) This dominated
the southern districts, with an outpost at Stratford-Upon-Avon. Brooke's first move
upon arrival was to take Stratford and clear Northampton's men out of the county.\(^{(6)}\)
He then garrisoned Maxstoke Castle\(^{(7)}\) and drew troops out of the existing garrisons
to recruit his foot to about 800.\(^{(8)}\) On the 28th he invaded Staffordshire.

1. Brit. L. Harl. MS 2135 f 103, Add. MS 34253 f 23; Burghall's Diary, p. 160;
DWB 'Ellis'
2. LJ Vol. 5, pp. 520-2
3. E. 91. 5
4. Dugdale's Diary, p. 47
5. WSL Salt MS 571; HMC Hastings MSS Vol. 2, pp. 94-5
6. E. 91.19, 86. 41
7. Dugdale's Diary, p. 48
8. Bod. L. Firth MS C6 f 12
There Hastings had accomplished a great deal. He had repulsed the Moorlanders, defeated incursions by Brereton and Gell, garrisoned Rushall Hall and Eccleshall Castle and persuaded some gentry to agree to a local army supported by a local tax. Charles had rewarded him by adding Staffordshire to his Midland command. Brereton and Gell however now co-operated to keep him busy while Brooke picked off the main Royalist strongpoints, beginning with Lichfield. The Earl Of Chesterfield surrendered after a week's siege, and the town received a Parliamentarian garrison. It was a triumph for Brooke, but a posthumous one, for a bullet fired from the defences had pierced his brain.

Charles determined to compound this blow to Parliament by sending Northampton to undo his deceased rival's work. The Earl drew out of Banbury two horse regiments and swept north in early March. Brooke had weakened his garrisons in Warwickshire too much for them to intercept Northampton's party. In Staffordshire Gell had taken over Brooke's army, Brereton having returned to Cheshire to face Aston. Gell's forces added to Brooke's made up about 1,000 foot and some horse, plus 300 Moorlanders, half of them armed. Hastings had more horse but fewer foot. He garrisoned Tamworth Castle to balance Lichfield, and awaited Northampton. The two united at Coleshill and attacked Lichfield. Gell in turn united with Brereton, fresh from his victory at Middlewich, and advanced. The two composite armies met near Stafford on 19th March, on Hopton Heath.

1. Hastings MSS Vol. 2, pp. 94-5; TSANHS 1894, pp. 74-5; E. 86. 41
2. Brit. L. Add. MS 18980 f 23
3. E. 86. 41, 246. 37
4. HMC 10th Report, Appendix 6, p. 95; Bod. L. MS Eng. Hist. c. 53 f 21
5. Rev. S. Shaw, p. 52; E. 91. 8, 94. 11
6. E. 247. 20, 26
Northampton charged at the head of his men, and perished fighting heroically. Like Brooke, he bequeathed victory to his followers, for Brereton and Gell, though unbroken, suffered such losses that they retreated and divided, returning to their own shires. Hastings was left in possession of the field in Staffordshire, with 1,000 superb horse, to which he added 1,000 properly-armed foot and a further 1,000 armed with clubs. (1)

Charles now played for checkmate. On 29th March he detached Prince Rupert from the field army with 1,200 horse, about 700 foot, four cannon and a huge supply of munitions (2) and sent him to join Hastings and destroy the Lichfield garrison, Brereton and Gell. (3) On his march Rupert drove a Parliamentarian force out of Birmingham. In the process the town and its people suffered so much damage that an outcry was provoked in both London and Oxford. (4) Charles felt constrained to appease civilian opinion in general by publishing a letter to Rupert ordering him to behave more gently. (5) The Prince linked up with Hastings and reduced Lichfield in two weeks. (6) Obedient to his uncle’s warning, he gave the garrison good terms, and replaced it with Royalists under Richard Bagot, late of Paget’s Foot. (7) Bagot was a local man, and therefore supposedly more acceptable to local people. He was however a younger son not a prominent gentleman, and his proved ability, rather than his standing in the community, must have weighed with Rupert.

The Prince, with a splendid army, was now ready for Nantwich. It is doubtful

1. Rev. S. Shaw, p. 54; Bod. L. Firth MS C6 f 159; WSL Salt MS 568; E. 99.18
2. Clarendon, VII. 31; Bod. L. Clarendon MS 28 f 129; PRO WO/55/1661/18
3. Clarendon, VII. 31; Hastings MSS 2, pp. 97-8; Bod. L. Firth MS C6 f 159; Warburton, Vol. 2, pp. 155-6
4. E. 100. 8; Bod. L. MS Eng. Hist. c. 53 f 31
5. E. 99. 30
6. E. 99. 28
7. PRO WO/55/423 f 15
if Brereton could have resisted him. But he was not put to the test, because at that moment Rupert was recalled. Parliament had just launched its main field army against the King, and Charles needed every available man. The Prince hastened back to the royal army with all the troops withdrawn from it that spring. Hastings, reduced to his own local force, took it to campaign in the East Midlands leaving Staffordshire secured by its Royalist garrisons. A hush settled upon the county, the contesting generals being dead or departed. For the time being the Royalists had won, and created their corridor to the North. But until they eradicated Brereton, it could never be safe.

Staffordshire, which had been the most determinedly neutral county in the region, had become its chief battlefield. All over the region overt opposition to the war, which had been so powerful and widespread, was at an end. A military 'front' had been created. Within this zone every propertied man was taxed to support the war effort, and counties behind it were expected to make regular contributions.

There had been only one decisive victor in the fighting of early 1643; the war itself.

1. Brit. L. Add. MS 18980 ff 46-52
THE GRANDEES

As the campaigning season of 1643 approached, Charles sought to crown the work of Royalist consolidation in Wales and its Marches by dividing the region into three huge areas, each in the care of a Lieutenant-General empowered to draw upon the resources of several counties to provide a strong enough force to defend all of them. For two of these he appointed the resident magnate. Lord Herbert was given south-east Wales and its March, comprising Herefordshire, Monmouthshire, Breconshire, Glamorganshire and Radnorshire. The Earl of Carbery was given the south-west, Carmarthenshire, Cardiganshire and Pembrokeshire. All the rest of the region, consisting of the six counties of North Wales plus Cheshire, Shropshire and Worcestershire, was given to a 'foreign' grandee, Lord Capel, as no comparable dominant man existed in it. The three commissions were signed on the same day, 4th April, though this does not imply that their execution ran exactly parallel. Herbert's command had long been in action when it was formalised, while Carbery's was not to be commenced for many months. Yet they must be regarded as a single system, as Charles apparently intended them to be. The Lieutenant-Generals were all great noblemen, and amateur soldiers, men who could command respect by virtue of their inherent status in the community rather than by powers conferred upon them by war. As such they represented an attempt by the King himself to limit the encroachment of the war upon traditional values.

I propose to deal with each of the three men in succession in the following three chapters, appending a fourth chapter consisting of a case-study of Worcestershire.

1. Bod. L. Dugdale MS 19 ff 11-12
With the departure of the Marquis Of Hertford, Lord Herbert was able to come into his own as a local commander. He had never been eclipsed, for even during the time of Hertford's presence the Parliamentarians had ranked them as equal enemies, and Charles had honoured Herbert by creating his father Marquis of Worcester. Further honours had included a grant of the customs of Bristol, whenever that city were captured, and the confiscated Welsh estates of his local rival, the Earl Of Pembroke. Herbert possessed, in fact, one asset which made him impossible to ignore - his family was the richest in the kingdom. As well as making his support worth cultivating in a national cause, this gave him an incomparable advantage as a local commander. On Hertford's departure, Charles immediately confirmed him as Commander-In-Chief in south-east Wales and its March, with absolute authority over Monmouthshire. The local Royalist commissioners were ordered to make some arrangement with him to deliver him money from their respective counties to support the army he would raise.

He was assisted in this enterprise by the drain of troops from the field army back to their native areas. Price's entire regiment was actually ordered home in early 1643, perhaps to alleviate the pressure on resources around Oxford, and became part of Herbert's command. The dues of the local clergy were earmarked

1. Dircks, pp. 44-6
2. HMC 3rd Report Appendix, p. 420
3. Warburton, p. 92
4. Brit. L. Harl. MS 6804 f 133
to support it. Howell Gwynne, formerly captain in Stradling's Foot, became Lieutenant-Colonel in the new foot regiment which Herbert raised for himself. The natural resources of Herbert's area represented yet another advantage. Unlike Charles in the previous autumn he possessed enough time to forge new armaments if existing weapons were in short supply. At this period there were five ironworks in Glamorganshire and Breconshire, capable of turning out twenty tons of iron per week each and more in Monmouthshire. Herbert's forces were soon acquiring newly-cast cannon, armour and pike-heads.

His only serious problems at this period derived from local rivalries. Within his own county of Monmouthshire he had trouble with Thomas Morgan of Machen, a commissioner of Array formerly in his rival Pembroke's faction, who refused to serve under him. In Glamorganshire likewise the Commission was divided against itself. The best-documented of these quarrels occurred in Herefordshire. There Fitzwilliam Coningsby had obtained leadership simply because alone of the local activists he had joined Hertford, instead of the King, at the Parliamentarian invasion, and had thus been the obvious man for the Marquis to leave at Hereford as Governor. After the Royalist reoccupation, however, all the local leaders returned, joined at last by the county magnate, Viscount Scudamore. The Viscount had so far been completely inactive in the war, marking time at London and even after joining Charles he showed a pronounced mildness towards

1. J. Duncumb, *The History And Antiquities Of The County Of Hereford* (1804), Vol. 1, pp. 245-6; Bod. L. Tanner MS 303 ff 116-20
2. Duncumb, pp. 245-6; Young, pp. 223-4
4. Bod. L. MS Eng. Hist. c 53 f 30, Tanner MS 303 f 115
6. Tanner MS 303 ff 114-15
Parliamentarians. (1) Yet having finally elected to enter the war he was not prepared to see his traditional local leadership exercised by Coningsby. First he attempted to have his rival ordered away into the field army with his newly-raised regiment. Charles and Herbert both refused to concur with this, confirming that the regiment was intended to defend Herefordshire. Next he drove a wedge between Coningsby and Herbert, persuading the Commissioners of Array to interpret Charles' instruction to give money to Herbert, by delivering him the entire county tax. With the clergy dues already given to Price, this left no public money to pay Coningsby's men. Coningsby stubbornly drew upon his own fortune and that of his officers, and in this manner recruited his regiment to 700 men, equipped them, laid up a magazine in Hereford and so remained in control there.

*By 5th February Herbert's army was sufficiently ready for him to call a council of war at Hereford in order to concert plans for a campaign. (2) Two potential opponents existed. One was at Brampton Bryan Castle, where Lady Harley, cut off from her Parliamentarian husband in London, had decided that she preferred to risk a siege rather than accept a Royalist garrison which might abuse her home. (3) A mere detachment seemed sufficient to reduce the place, and this task was given to the Radnorshire Militia, stiffened by some of Coningsby's men. The Militia, however, refused to leave its own county unless Herbert led it in person, so that Coningsby was left to undertake the work with his detachment alone. (4)

1. Bod. L. MS Eng. Hist. c 53 f 12
2. Letters Of Brilliana Harley, No. 185
3. Ibid. No. 187
4. Ibid. No. 185
Herbert himself was undertaking the other, much more considerable, enemy, the city of Gloucester. Rupert's conquest of the Cotswolds had left Gloucester in the position of an isolated but dangerous Parliamentarian enclave within the 'Cavalier Corridor' between Oxford and Wales. If it were captured, the corridor would be completely secured. Nobody was more conscious of this fact than the citizens themselves, who showed signs of wishing to forestall the inevitable siege by coming to terms with the Royalists. Unfortunately for them Edward Massey took seriously Stamford's parting instructions to him to hold the city. Instead of retreating southward he pulled back into Gloucester his outposts on its eastern side and instituted a mixture of free quarter and loans to maintain his troops indefinitely.\(^1\) Clearly he was expecting his enemy to come from the east, and to be Rupert. The only Royalists to materialise from that direction, however, were a detachment from Worcester under Russell, which occupied Tewkesbury.\(^2\) The main threat was in fact to come from the west, across the Forest of Dean, and was represented by Herbert.

Herbert invaded the Forest on 7th February\(^3\) with a force of about 1,500 foot and 500 horse, including most of Coningsby's regiment\(^4\) and, apparently, the best of Herbert's own foot and Price's. Most of the available arms in the area were given to it, including these laid up by Coningsby at Hereford.\(^5\) Coningsby, Price and the remainder of the three regiments were left behind to guard Herbert's

1. Corbet, pp. 310-11; Gloucester Council Minute Book ff 239-40
2. Corbet, pp. 310-11
3. Bod. L. Firth MS C6 f 9
4. Bod. L. Tanner MS 303 f 115
5. Ibid.
command in his absence. His brother, Lord John Somerset, led the horse of the expeditionary force\(^1\) while an English veteran soldier, Sir Richard Lawdey\(^2\) commanded the foot. At Coleford they routed Massey's western outpost, losing Lawdey, who fell in the attack.\(^3\) He was replaced by another 'foreigner', also a veteran, Sir Jerome Brett. Clarendon completely misrepresents this episode by describing the Parliamentarians as 'a rabble of country people, being got together, without order or an officer of name'.\(^4\) Corbet, who knew the men personally, makes clear that they were a body of regulars, under a Colonel Berrow.

There is now a gap in the contemporary records of over a month, and the retrospective sources telescope events to exclude this period. All\(^5\) recommence on 24th March, to portray Herbert's attack on Gloucester as deadlocked. He and his brother had left the army, which was quartered at Highnam, near Gloucester, around the mansion of Sir Robert Cooke, a Parliamentarian. Its pay was met at least partly out of a tax which had been imposed on the Forest of Dean.

Nemesis was rapidly approaching it, for it had become caught up in a complicated series of moves between King and Parliament to match those which were being enacted in the same period at the other end of the Marches, in Cheshire and Staffordshire. Just as Parliament had sent Brereton and Brooke to strike at the Royalists in that area, so on 11th February\(^6\) it made a veteran soldier, Sir William Waller, its Commander-In-Chief in Wiltshire, Gloucestershire, Worcestershire and

1. Clarendon, V. 291
3. Corbet, p. 312
4. V. 291
5. Bod. L. MS Eng. Hist. c 53 ff 27-8; LJ, Vol. 6, pp. 4-5; Brit. L. Add. MS 18980 f 30; HMC Hastings MSS Vol. 2, pp. 96-7; Corbet, pp. 313-14
6. LJ Vol. 5, pp. 602-3
Shropshire, to drive a wedge into the southern end of the region. Waller marched west with about 2,500 men. In early March he was held up in Wiltshire, but eventually emerged from there victorious, and made for Gloucester, which had already been reinforced by 200 foot sent from Bristol. His army was ferried over the Severn by Massey at dusk, and guided through the night by Cooke himself towards Highnam House. At dawn on the 25th Herbert's army there found itself caught between Massey to the east and Waller to the west, encircled and outnumbered. It fought till its ammunition ran out and then surrendered. The men were released on a promise never to fight Parliament again, but their weapons and horses were lost for ever.

Herbert's remaining soldiers in Dean fled into Monmouthshire. His family left Raglan Castle garrisoned but themselves fled as far as Swansea, intending to take ship if Waller pursued them.\(^{(1)}\) The Royalists at Tewkesbury retreated.\(^{(2)}\) The siege of Brampton Bryan was called off.\(^{(3)}\) On 4th April Waller advanced to Monmouth\(^{(4)}\) and in the succeeding days to Chepstow and Usk, the Royalists retreating before him. He failed, however, to find any supporters in Monmouthshire. The Parliamentarian press\(^{(5)}\) claimed that certain leading gentry, including Morgan of Tredegar, joined him. Corbet\(^{(6)}\) however states only that some gentry promised aid but on Waller's appearance 'did not perform' and Waller's own despatch\(^{(7)}\) speaks only of the difficulty of the terrain. In any case, the expedition had to be rapidly called off,

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1. HMC Portland MSS Vol. 1, pp. 703-4; L.W. Dillwyn, Contributions Towards A History Of Swansea (1840), p. 27
2. Corbet, p. 314; Bod. L. MS Eng. Hist. c 53 f 29
3. HMC 14th Report, Appendix 2, pp. 104-6
4. Bod. L. MS Eng. Hist. c 53 f 30
5. E. 247. 25
6. p. 314
7. LJ Vol. 6, pp. 4-5
because of the appearance of an enemy in its rear.

As ever, Charles had answered a Parliamentarian thrust with a counter-stroke. On hearing of the disaster at Highnam he detached yet another section of the field army, comparable to those sent north under Northampton and Rupert at this period. It was given to Rupert's younger brother, Prince Maurice, and he was ordered westward to deal with Waller. He advanced to Tewkesbury, which had been reoccupied by a horse brigade from the field army under Lord Grandison, presumably Maurice's vanguard. There he concerted plans to catch Waller in a pincer of the sort in which Waller himself had caught Herbert's army. On the 9th April he detached a flying column of 80 horse and 100 dragoons and sent it into Monmouthshire under Sir Richard Cave. Cave's mission was to gather the foot left behind by Herbert when he had marched on Gloucester, and close in upon Waller from the west while Maurice did so from the east. Cave managed to add some of Price's regiment to his horse, and reoccupied Monmouth on the 11th. Waller was already in retreat towards Gloucester, aware of his danger, but Maurice and Cave almost caught him between them in Dean. Aided by the terrain, nightfall and his own skill he just succeeded in cutting his way through to Gloucester.\(^1\)

There he attempted to regain the initiative by ordering Massey to storm Tewkesbury. This Massey did, advancing in the middle of the night and surprising the garrison Maurice had left there.\(^2\) Both Waller and Maurice converged upon

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1. Ibid; Duncumb, pp. 245-6; Corbet, p. 315
2. Ibid; WSL Salt MS 600
the town with their main forces and skirmished outside it.\textsuperscript{(1)} At this moment, however, Maurice was recalled to the field army, just as Rupert was from Staffordshire, to enable Charles to face the main Parliamentarian forces. Waller suddenly found himself once again master of the field in the region round Gloucester. He determined to exploit this situation by striking at Hereford.

An excellent record of the situation there has survived in the independent but totally reconcilable accounts left by two of the protagonists, Cave\textsuperscript{(2)} and Coningsby.\textsuperscript{(3)} After Waller's escape to Gloucester, Maurice had made Cave temporary Commander-In-Chief in the area of Herbert's Lieutenant-Generalsy, with instructions to unite its remaining Royalist troops into a bulwark against any further Parliamentarian incursions. Cave called a meeting of the commissioners for Herefordshire, Monmouthshire and Glamorganshire at Abergavenny, where they agreed to unite in a formal Association for mutual defence. A muster of the forces of those counties was appointed at Hereford upon 15th April. The most eminent person present at the Abergavenny meeting was Lord Herbert himself, who here re-enters the records. Precisely what the Lieutenant-General had been doing for the past month is a complete mystery. The mere fact that Maurice had needed to appoint the stranger Cave effective commander in Herbert's region indicates that the latter had been either absent or totally ineffectual.

Herbert and Cave went to Hereford together for the muster of the 15th.

1. Corbet, p. 315
2. Duncumb, pp. 245-58
3. Bod. L. Tanner MS 303 ff 113-20
About 300 soldiers came in, but in general the Royalist troops in the area proved to be demoralised and disintegrating. Even some of those who attended the muster, from Herbert's own regiment, melted away the following day. At Hereford itself the price of Herbert's aggressive strategy now became apparent. Because all the county tax had been delivered to him none had been spent on fortifying the town.

His expedition had consumed most of its munitions, arms and garrison. Coningsby had resigned the governorship in ill health and disgust, and Price was acting in his place, though this arrangement had not been officially recognised. At this uniquely unpropitious moment, on 22nd April, Maurice recalled Cave and his horse and extinguished his command, and Waller advanced.

Here, if at all, was the time for Herbert to behave like a leader. His reaction was immediate; he declared that he was going to seek aid at Oxford, told Cave to act in his stead, and vanished despite the appeals of his colleagues. Cave, likewise begged to stay, unwillingly obliged. He became the unofficial adviser of an unofficial governor, with the ex-governor Coningsby still in the town and at odds with Viscount Scudamore and the other local leaders present. Nobody had any legal control over the foot soldiers, who were completely inexperienced and rapidly became disorderly. The citizens refused to stir themselves for the stranger Cave.

The Worcestershire Royalists were busy escorting a convoy to Oxford. When Waller arrived on the 25th and blew in a gate with his cannon resistance seemed
pointless. Cave's horse marched away to join the King, the foot fled, and all the Royalist leaders formally surrendered, to save the town from a sack.

Almost without effort, Waller had captured not only Herefordshire but the entire local Royalist war machine, personified by Cave, Price, Viscount Scudamore and his heir, Coningsby and his heir, Dr. Rogers, Croft and the other active gentry. Of these, Cave and Price showed their mettle almost immediately by escaping to Oxford. The Coningsbys, Croft and the other gentry were imprisoned at Bristol until July, when Rupert stormed the city and released them. The two Scudamores were taken to London, where they gave their parole not to escape and lived quietly till the end of the war. Cave, who had shown more gallantry than anyone else in the episode, reached Oxford only to find himself court-martialled for the loss of Hereford. Coningsby, on his release, was placed under some censure for the same event. Both were exonerated but neither given any prominent position again. Lord Herbert, who deserved more blame than anybody else, was protected by his wealth and importance from official criticism and went on to further honours, as will be described. This injustice combined with the detention of the Scudamores to effect a complete change in the nature of Herefordshire Royalism. None of the original leaders of 1642 returned to the shire except Croft and some of the lesser gentry, and these never occupied a dominant position there again. Waller issued a certificate noting the meek compliance of the Mayor of Hereford with his wishes, and the citizens in

1. E. 101, 2
2. Webbs, pp. 288-9
general responded tamely to a second Parliamentarian occupation. Three rapid reversals of fortune and the removal of the leadership had completely eradicated the spontaneous Royalism of 1642. Herefordshire, which had been one of the most enthusiastic Royalist counties, was becoming one of the most exhausted.

Waller did not linger there long, as having advanced so far from Gloucester he was vulnerable to a Royalist counter-attack of the sort that had nearly trapped him in Monmouthshire. His expedition was a highly successful smash-and-grab raid and his stay at Hereford was devoted to laying his hands upon as much cash as he could extract before he retreated. He likewise issued an oath to be taken by all the inhabitants of the county by which they promised never again to oppose Parliament. Having thereby ensured as much trouble as possible for future Royalist administrations, he retired to Gloucester in early May, carrying with him the money he had collected and the remaining county munitions. On 29th May he attempted to repeat the same trick at Worcester, launching his army upon the city when Russell was absent at Oxford. The Royalists there, however, had been expecting such an attack since April and were much more numerous, united and well-supplied than those at Hereford, as will be illustrated. The assault failed, and Waller retreated to Gloucester.

From there he marched away, almost immediately, to meet a Royalist advance in Somerset. With him went the Tewkesbury garrison and many of the Gloucester

1. Hereford RL 3668
2. TSANHS 1895, pp. 316-17
3. HMC Portland MSS Vol. 1, pp. 709-10; Worcestershire RO 1714/899/192 ff 313-16
soldiers. These, like all of Waller's army, were not to return, for in July the whole force perished at the battle of Roundway Down. Massey, left behind, had the satisfaction of being officially confirmed, at last, as governor of Gloucester, though its citizens 'thought well of a man nearer home'.\(^{(1)}\) He must have had the additional satisfaction of contemplating Herbert's command, which only a few months before had seemed so formidable, defeated, exhausted and demoralised.

1. Corbet, p. 317
Arthur, Lord Capel, was born the heir of one of the richest squires in Essex and Hertfordshire. By 1640 he was the foremost man of that latter country, and its leading MP. In 1641 he joined the nascent Royalist party in Parliament, and Charles rewarded him with a peerage.\(^1\) On the coming of war he became one of the King's foremost supporters and high in his favour, being made one of the Council Of War\(^2\) and colonel of a horse regiment.\(^3\) His appointment as Lieutenant-General was public knowledge by 15th March\(^4\) and by 23rd March he was in Shropshire to take up his command.\(^5\) He had been despatched from Oxford with his own horse and sixty barrels of gunpowder, match and bullets to make that command more effective. With him was a veteran soldier, Michael Woodhouse, who had been commissioned as commander of his foot forces but whose specific mission was to raise a new foot regiment to reinforce the field army.\(^6\)

How Capel viewed his command is unknown. Objectively, it appears to have been the most daunting of the three Lieutenant-Generalscies. Its area had been drained of many military resources already by Charles' army and further recruitment in the winter. Cheshire already harboured a formidable enemy. Shropshire and Flintshire had shown a disturbing lack of enthusiasm. North-west Wales was

1. D. Lloyd, State Worthies (1670), pp. 344-6; DNB
2. Brit. L. 669 f 664
4. TSANHS 1895, p. 278
5. HMC Hastings MSS Vol. 2, p. 96
6. TSANHS 1895, pp. 300-1
notoriously poor; Anglesey had difficulty finding twenty-four men with £4 per annum for jury service, and its richest gentry could only raise £300 each at short notice. Its remoteness tended to produce a localism even more accen­
tuated than elsewhere. One of its few gentry with a wider viewpoint, John Griffith of Llyn, had suggested to the King that certain cannon existing in Caernarvonshire could be more profitably employed elsewhere. His fellow Caernarvonshire commissioners henceforth regarded him as a public enemy and talked of seizing his estates. In such an atmosphere Capel, as a stranger, was at an obvious disadvantage.

Nevertheless, he possessed certain long-term advantages which might prove potent if he were an able leader. As an outsider he at least stood above traditional local quarrels. His command already possessed a team of able local officers, Ottley, Corbet, Lloyd, Bridgeman and Sir Nicholas Byron, who were prepared to give him loyal support. The appearance of two more in north-west Wales provided him with some much-needed collaboration in that area. One of these was John Williams, Archbishop of York, one of the most adroit ecclesiastical politicians of the pre-war era. Always suspect to Charles, he had abandoned his see at the outbreak of war after a disastrous attempt to advance the royal cause in Yorkshire and fled home to his native Caernarvonshire. Once there, however, he set about trying to rebuild his career by making himself indispensable to the

1. Daud, pp. 14, 23
2. NLW Llanfair-Brynodol MSS 43, 45
Royalist war effort. The other man was Thomas Bulkeley of Baron Hill, the second gentleman of Anglesey. The principal gentleman of the island was Sir Thomas Cheadle, its High Sheriff and keeper of its great fortress, Beaumaris Castle, Bulkeley's traditional enemy. Bulkeley intended to use the war to win sufficient royal favour to topple Cheadle. (1)

Capel's other advantage was that his region contained excellent potential for the manufacture of armaments. In particular the Clee Hills and Coalbrookedale areas of Shropshire produced excellent iron, which was processed at the forges of Boulton and Leighton. (2) On Capel's arrival Ottley had already begun manufacturing muskets, and one ton of shot and one of grenades were ready at Leighton. (3) Within a month Capel had enough ordnance to present Rupert at Lichfield with three spare cannon and a convoy of shot (4) and in August a warship at Chester was equipped with four new Shropshire guns. (5) In the course of 1643 one Francis Walker cast nearly £1,000 worth of artillery in Shropshire for the field army (6) and doubtless more were made there. Shot, however, was useless without gunpowder, and of this the area was seriously short. Capel's initial convoy was rapidly dispersed to local garrisons, and to Rupert, and he had to deplete Chester's already low supply. (7) Charles ordered powder mills to be established at Chester and Shrewsbury, but these were slow to commence production. (8)

Capel's venture itself made a slow start. In late March he was forced to

1. Trans. Anglesey Antiquarian Club And Fld Soc 1945, pp. 25-37
2. W. H. B. Court, The Rise Of The Midland Industries (1938), pp. 78-82, 175
3. TSANHS 1894, pp. 71-2, 1895 pp. 288-90
4. PRO WO/55/1661/18; Brit. L. Add. MS 34325 f 32; HMC Hastings MSS Vol. 2, pp. 95-6; TSANHS 1895, pp. 290-1
5. NLW Llanfair-Brynndol MS 58
6. PRO SP 16/498/8 ff 21-2, 36-7; Brit. L. Harl. MS 6802 f 72
7. Brit. L. Add. MS 18980 f 44, 21506 f 80; Bod. L. Firth MS C8 f 120
8. NLW Croce of Shawe Hill MS 1097
return to Worcestershire to ensure that the county was well defended against Waller. By 1st April however he was at Shrewsbury, concerting plans with the Shropshire Royalists. To conciliate local opinion he published a proclamation on the 3rd promising to punish plunderers and to pay his troops out of the wealth of local Parliamentarians to ease the burden on the region. The Welsh gentry were ordered to find men for Woodhouse's new regiment, which to conciliate them was publicised as the Prince of Wales's own. To launch any expedition of his own Capel had at first only his horse, the Shropshire militia and Corbet's 100 remaining dragoons, which by the 4th he had combined into 1,400 men. These were forced into action almost immediately by the appeals of the Lancashire Royalists who were besieged by their local enemies in concert with the tireless Brereton. Rupert, now before Lichfield, ordered Capel to aid them. He established an advanced base at Whitchurch and invaded Cheshire, drawing Brereton back. Weeks of confused skirmishing ensued in the broken country between Chester and Nantwich.

By 2nd May he had gathered a large force at Whitchurch, and was replacing the militiamen in it, whom he condemned as 'soldiers of place' unfit for field service, with regulars. These included Wynne's regiment from Denbighshire and a Caernarvonshire company drawn out of the Chester garrison. Capel hoped that these would continue to be supported by their native counties, pointing

1. WSL Salt MS 487
2. TSANHS 1895, pp. 303-4
3. Brit. L. 669 f 7 1
4. NLW Llanfair-Brynodol MSS 48-50
5. WSL Sale MS 487
7. Brit. L. 18980 ff 34, 37
8. Ibid, f 44; Bod. L. Firth MS C6 f 162; TSANHS 1895, pp. 311-12; Burghall's Diary, p. 162; B. 99. 15, 101. 10
10. NLW Llanfair-Brynodol MSS, Appendix, Crosse Of Shawe Hill MSS 1098-9
out to the Welsh that they could protect their homes more effectively by keeping the enemy in the Marches. This was precisely the sort of argument that local men could not comprehend and the money ceased to arrive.\(^{(1)}\) Charles tried to assist by granting Capel the rents of his North Welsh estates. The tenants agreed to pay four years' dues in advance, but this money came in slowly.\(^{(2)}\) At Shrewsbury Capel did persuade the corporation to vote £500 for his army, £130 for the town defences, which were still ruinous in places, and a regular £120 per month to pay the garrison.\(^{(3)}\) When however he asked the town to raise a dragoon troop to add to that garrison, as with Corbet's force, most sponsors defaulted.\(^{(4)}\)

The reluctance of the north-west Welsh at least to endorse a policy of self-defence at a distance was not entirely narrow-minded. One of the great strategic failures of the King at the opening of the war had been his inability to secure the Navy. Hence Parliament commanded the seas, and although none of its warships had yet appeared off the coast of North Wales the area was vulnerable to a seaborne attack. Capel himself was aware of the danger, and in May attempted to meet it by arranging the repair of the great medieval castles of Conway, Beaumaris and Caernarvon.\(^{(5)}\) Here Bulkeley and the Archbishop seized their chance. The inevitable clash between the former and Cheadle had come, with Cheadle refusing to act with Bulkeley's faction among the commissioners and preparing to denounce them to the King. Williams recommended to Bulkeley that he pre-empt his rival by

1. Ibid; Llanfair-Brynodol MS 57
2. Bod. L. Dugdale MS 19 f 14; NLW Crosse Of Shawe Hill MS 1123
3. Owen and Blakeway, p. 434; Gough, p. 74
4. TSANHS 1895, p. 311
5. UCNOW Bangor MS 1921 f 35
joining himself in presenting Capel with a quantity of gunpowder. Capel was suitably grateful. The two men became contacts of his and of his officers in their area, and recommended by them. Williams was allowed to repair Conway Castle at his own expense, and his nephew was eventually appointed governor. Bulkeley was first allowed to erect a fort, then created a Viscount for his services and finally given charge of Beaumaris Castle. His rival was for ever eclipsed.

They chose their present well, for in May Capel had desperate need of powder. Brereton had begun to run circles round him. Firstly Capel made a rather half-hearted assault on Nantwich. Brereton left the town strongly defended to keep him busy and slipped into Staffordshire. There he contacted a group of local Parliamentarians who had by now emerged in the county, reinforced them and encouraged them to attempt Stafford. Comberford was absent, the Royalists were expecting nothing after the past month's relative peace, and the attack was made at 3 a.m. The town fell almost without a blow, although the castle held out. A garrison of local Parliamentarians was installed, and Brereton and the remainder swept on through the county, capturing Royalist convoys. Hastings, who might have counter-attacked, was busy in the East Midlands and Brereton swiftly returned to keep Capel busy. In June the Coventry Parliamentarians reduced Tamworth Castle and carried munitions to secure Stafford. Its castle

1. Ibid; UCNW Baron Hill MSS 5364-5
2. Bishop Hackett, p. 210
3. Archaeologia Cambrensis 1917, Supplement, p. 296
4. Bod. L. Dugdale MS 19 f 48
5. Burghall's Diary, p. 164; E. 103. 10
6. Rev. S. Shaw, p. 55; Burghall's Diary, p. 163; E. 103. 8, 104. 16
7. Dugdale's Diary, p. 52; WSL Salt MS 402 f 206
was evacuated by the Royalists in July.\(^{(1)}\) Parliament had at last achieved its corridor to Lancashire, though the Royalist one to Newark was not severed while Bagot held Lichfield. Staffordshire had ceased to be a county community. It had become a military crossroads, through which rival convoys were run from one fortress to another.

Back in Cheshire in late May Brereton continued to torment Capel. On the 21st he marched to help the Lancashire Parliamentarians finally defeat their opponents. When Capel lumbered after him, he suddenly dodged past Capel’s army and destroyed its base at Whitchurch and another recently established at Market Drayton, plundered the homes of local Royalists and returned to Nantwich loaded with captured weapons and money.\(^{(2)}\) The episode must have been particularly damaging to Capel’s prestige in Shropshire, and a Parliamentarian newspaper\(^{(3)}\) claimed that a faction there subsequently petitioned the King to replace him with the local Lord Newport, the same who had bought his peerage in October, though there is no confirmation of this. Capel himself attributed his failures to the quality of his troops, and appealed to Rupert, fruitlessly, for musketeers from the field army.\(^{(4)}\) The Parliamentarian press\(^{(5)}\) claimed repeatedly that he had been reduced to pressing men to fill up his own army and this does seem to be proved by one of Ottley’s papers\(^{(6)}\) which complains of disorderly conscripts.

On 12th June Parliament trebled Capel’s problems by ratifying two grand

1. Burghall’s Diary, p. 166
2. Ibid. p. 164; E.105. 8, 55. 4; TSANHS 1895, pp. 325-6
3. E. 104. 16
4. WSL Salt MS 488
5. E.249. 3, 56. 2
6. TSANHS 1895, pp. 324-5
The young Earl of Denbigh was made Commander-In-Chief in Warwickshire, Staffordshire, Worcestershire and Shropshire, and voted £6,000. Sir Thomas Myddleton MP, an Anglicised Welshman with estates in Denbighshire, was made Sergeant-Major-General in North Wales and he and his friends advanced £5,000 to equip an invasion force. If these two co-operated successfully with Brereton, Capel's command would be annihilated. Conscious of this, he spent June attempting a consolidation of his existing territory. Shrewsbury had already been placed in the charge of a committee consisting of Ottley and other local activists plus a professional sailor-turned soldier, Sir John Mennes, who had accompanied Capel from Oxford. A county tax of £4,500 per month was at last imposed on Shropshire, though as might be expected only a portion came in. Every Shropshire gentleman was ordered to equip two horsemen and send them to Capel's army by 19th June, or be deprived of Royalist protection against plunderers. He instituted a standing committee at Shrewsbury consisting of one commissioner from each county in his command to improve liaison within it. He sent letters countersigned by the King to the Welsh counties ordering them to settle local taxes to support home guards. He was reported as planting a new garrison in Oswestry, to guard the approaches to Wales. At Chester a citizen regiment had been raised by Alderman Francis Gamull MP, and on 6th June Bridgeman and Mayor Ince called up every able-bodied man.
As always, expensive local defence schemes produced disappointment and acrimony. The Caernarvonshire commissioners declined to join the liaison committee. The Denbighshire gentry refused to impose a local tax, believing the Crown rents and proceeds of Parliamentarian estates sufficient to support the county troops. Those of Flintshire followed suit. The Denbighshire commissioners had indeed sufficient difficulty in calling up their existing militia, for whom they had now made new weapons. Disorderly meetings, their purpose now unknown, had to be suppressed in Anglesey. By late July Capel was complaining that his main enemy was not Parliament but local indifference. He obtained a letter from the King authorising him to punish any gentry who seemed slack in supporting him, and published it. On the 27th he ordered every man in his region to take on oath to oppose Brereton and Myddleton. The High Command expressed concern that Ottley showed more attention to reprinting and dispersing Royalist pamphlets. A fresh purge of secret enemies was instituted. Some victims offered themselves, such as one John Jones at Flint who was pedantic enough to challenge the legal right of the Royalists to impose local taxes. It was only a matter of time before the local commissioners broke down the door of his lodging and dragged him to jail. At least one loyal Royalist, however, found himself confronted with some of Capel's soldiers who informed him that they regarded him as a suspect, took his horses and had to be bribed not to plunder his house.

1. Llanfair-Brynodol MSS 55-6
2. Crosse Of Shawe Hill MS 1123
3. HMC 4th Report Appendix, p. 263
5. HMC 5th Report Appendix, p. 420
6. HMC 4th Report Appendix, p. 263
7. Crosse Of Shawe Hill MS 1108
8. HMC 2nd Report Appendix, p. 61
9. TSANHS 1895, pp. 344-5
11. TSANHS 1895, pp. 347-8
parishioners of Clungunnis got rid of their parson, who had supported traditional religious customs of which they and Parliament disapproved, by denouncing him as a Parliamentarian. (1)

Capel's new concentration on defence at least spared him further military humiliations. He was able to destroy a party of Brereton's men who raided inland Flintshire in June. (2) Brereton wasted the summer in an abortive attack on Chester and a siege of Eccleshall Castle, though he did reduce Halton Castle, one of the remaining outposts of the Cheshire Royalists. (3) Time however was on his side, for he needed only to await Myddleton and Denbigh. By the end of July Myddleton was in Staffordshire with a small army, seven cannon and forty carts of munitions. (4) Brereton went to meet him. This was Capel's last chance to attempt Nantwich, and he took it. He despatched a hurried and rather vague appeal to the commissioners of north-east Wales and Shropshire for carts, workmen and irregular soldiers, which they tried desperately to oblige. (5) The irregulars, armed with clubs, he expected the gentry to recruit among their tenants, and some did; thus Sir Henry Thynne of Cous Castle brought thirty. (6) By these methods he assembled a large but motley force and on 4th August attacked the town. After his cumbersome preparations it could not but be ready for him, Brereton had left it well-defended and Capel's semi-feudal army cannot have been of high quality. Not surprisingly, the assault failed. (7) It was an expensive failure. The cost of the expedition was

1. Ibid. pp. 349-50
2. E.59.8; Burghall's Diary, p. 165
3. Ibid. p. 166; TSANHS 1895, pp. 343-6; Bod. L. Ashmole Pamphlets 391.2
5. Crosse Of Shawe Hill MSS 1109, 1111, 1113
6. Ibid; PRO SP 23/195 f 144
7. Malbon's Diary, pp. 67-70
divided among the various counties, and the shore of Denbighshire alone came to £162.\(^{(1)}\)

Nevertheless the immediate consequences were undramatic. The Earl of Denbigh was delayed in taking up his command by a charge of disloyalty\(^{(2)}\) and he launched no campaign that year. Brereton and Myddleton united on the 10th,\(^{(3)}\) but they could not push westward until they had reduced Eccleshall Castle, which guarded the approaches to Shropshire. This they besieged fruitlessly through August until Hastings, in whose command it lay, relieved it. He was however beaten back in the process of revictualling it and left a Danish mercenary as its new governor. The garrison refused to serve a stranger and deserted, leaving the wretched Dane to surrender on the 29th.\(^{(4)}\) The siege had nevertheless provided Capel with time for further defensive measures. The Denbighshire gentry at last agreed to a tax, howbeit temporary and very localised, to support 224 musketeers to guard the bridges of the river Dee.\(^{(5)}\) At Chester Bridgeman now possessed a second experienced soldier,\(^{(6)}\) Sir Abraham Shipman, to assist him, and this gentleman ordered the garrisoning of Hawarden Castle to cover the approaches to Flintshire.\(^{(7)}\)

The loss of Eccleshall, however, had exposed Shropshire. This was all the more serious because Parliament now sent to join Brereton and Myddleton its Shropshire gentry adherents who had fled to London a year before. One of them,

1. Crosse Of Shawe Hill MS 1112
2. E.67.7, 669 f 7 35
3. Burghall's Diary, p. 167
4. Ibid; Bod. L. Firth MS C7 ff 296-7
5. M. Mahler, pp. 165-6
7. NLW Add. MS 520D
Thomas Mytton, had raised a foot regiment there, and this he brought north in August with his colleagues.\(^{(1)}\) On 9th September Brereton, Myddleton and Mytton advanced into Shropshire, and on the 11th they settled Mytton's regiment in the town of Wem, which they all spent the rest of the month fortifying.\(^{(2)}\) Capel did not possess the strength to attack them. Woodhouse had at last raised his foot regiment, to a strength of 700, but it was urgently required for the field army, and he led it there.\(^{(3)}\) At the battle of Newbury he was knighted for his courage.\(^{(4)}\)

At the end of September, however, the King's campaign ended, and he was able to revert to his traditional tactic of balancing an enemy reinforcement with one of his own. Woodhouse's regiment was withdrawn from his army again. Richard Herbert was made governor of Ludlow\(^{(5)}\) and his regiment likewise detached. Both were armed and given large supplies of munitions from the Oxford magazine\(^{(6)}\) and sent to join Capel. In Worcestershire they seem to have been joined by a former field regiment, Sir John Beaumont's, which had been guarding that county. Capel's dream of a force of field army regulars was now answered. He gathered round them the best of his existing troops, such as Wynne's regiment, to make up a total force of 3,000 by 14th October. He was sufficiently confident then to refuse reinforcements he had previously begged from Hastings.\(^{(7)}\)

On the 18th he took the field with all his troops and six cannon. Avoiding the Parliamentarian concentration at Wem he moved up to Whitchurch and from there

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1. CJ Vol. 3, p. 155; E. 250. 5
2. Burghall's Diary, pp. 168-9
4. Shaw, p. 216
5. Bod. L. Dugdale MS 19 f 30
6. PRO WO/55/459 ff 477-82
7. HMC Hastings MSS Vol. 2, pp. 104-6
attacked Nantwich. As usual he was repulsed, and Brereton and Myddleton marched to relieve the town, leaving only Mytton and his 300 foot to hold Wem. Capel fell back to Whitchurch and then suddenly dashed upon Wem. It was a manoeuvre worthy of Brereton himself, and indicative that Capel was learning generalship. Unfortunately it failed. Against all expectation, Mytton's garrison fought so ferociously that they held off the Royalists until Brereton and Myddleton returned. For Capel it was more than a failure, it was a catastrophe. Wynne and Beaumont were killed, the Royalist army fled, battered, back to Shrewsbury. Shropshire, which had been a Royalist stronghold, was now divided territory and the Parliamentarians were left masters of the field.\(^{(1)}\)

This victory was precisely what the Parliamentarian leaders had been needing. Myddleton at least had imagined that upon their appearance the local people would throw off the Royalist yoke and flock to their banners. In reality, they had proved as indifferent to Parliament's cause as they had to Capel's. Not a single man had come in from Shropshire to Wem. In Wales Myddleton's own tenants cited Capel's Royalist oath as their reason for refusing to join him. In truth, had men flocked in he could not have paid them. The money with which he had left London was now spent, and the Royalists had already squeezed Shropshire so thoroughly that none could be found around Wem. The only solution seemed to lie in the conquest of more territory, and this was now made possible.\(^{(2)}\)

1. E. 71.1, 71.16; HMC Portland MSS Vol. 1, pp. 141-3
2. Ibid. pp. 134-5, 141-3
With Capel's defeated army in southern Shropshire, the obvious point to attack seemed north-east Wales. Denbighshire was now defended by some horse under Mark Trevor, a local man but a veteran soldier recently returned from Ireland, and some foot, perhaps the remnants of Wynne's, under Ellis, Aston's commander at Middlewich, who had been freed by an exchange of prisoners. Flintshire had at last raised a home guard, under Roger Mostyn of Mostyn and a Colonel Davies. Both counties, however, were demoralised by the death of Wynne. In early November Brereton collected detachments from his allies in Lancashire and Staffordshire to make up a field army of about 1,500 regulars plus some Cheshire militiamen. He and Myddleton left Mytton to hold Wem, with an outpost at Tong Castle to increase his hold on north-east Shropshire. They then stormed Holt Bridge and crossed the Dee into Denbighshire, Trevor and Ellis fleeing before them. Myddleton was left at Wrexham to recruit, and Brereton went on to occupy all the strongholds of Flintshire. The troops of Mostyn and Davies dissolved and Howarden Castle, caught unsupplied, surrendered. Chester was thus encircled, and Brereton prepared to besiege it. The Royalists possessed no hold in north-east Wales now except Holt Castle, which was already besieged. Their frontier was withdrawn to Denbigh and Conway. At the former William Salusbury of Rug repaired the castle and the Merionethshire Royalists promised 100 musketeers to protect the country at his rear. Conway Castle was strongly fortified now by Archbishop Williams.

1. DWB 'Trevor'
2. Archaeologia Cembrensis 1846, p. 35
3. E.77.33
Behind these strongpoints they hoped to hold the north-west, but this was a barren area compared with that which had been lost. Nor could they do anything to help Chester. (1)

One factor in their predicament was certain; that they expected no help at all from Capel. A Parliamentarian newspaper (2) reported that the citizens of Shrewsbury had clashed with his soldiers after the Wem disaster because he had refused to punish a trooper who had commandeered a horse from a leading citizen. This is substantiated by a blunt remark of Archbishop Williams, (3) that Capel now dared not leave Shrewsbury for fear that the townspeople would destroy the Royalist garrison as soon as he departed. Williams went on (4) to say some hard things in general about him, accusing him of cowardice and strategic ineptitude. He had, in fact, by now acquired a military reputation similar to that of the Grand Old Duke Of York, and like that gentleman, had an unfortunate propensity for becoming the subject of popular ballads. The best of these runs:

'The Lord Capel with a thousand and a half
Came to Barton Cross and there they killed a calf
And staying there till the break of day
They took their heels and fled fast away, (5)

This sort of jingle is a more potent slur than any formal propaganda. It outlives generations. It was a dramatic sign, if any were needed, of how deep Capel’s failure ran.

1. HMC Portland MSS Vol. 1, pp. 151-3; E. 77. 27, 77. 10; NLW Clennennau Letter 538; Archaeologia Cambrensis 1846, p. 35; Bod. L. Carte MS 7 ff 424, 523
2. E. 77. 2
3. Bod. L. Carte MS 7 f 424
4. Ibid. f 523
5. Burghall’s Diary, p. 164
Of all the region under study, south-west Wales is the area most destitute of Civil War records. Not a single relevant family collection survives, and for information upon local Royalism the historian depends entirely upon scanty and ambiguous corporation documents and reports made to the rival High Commands. Thus Richard Vaughan, 2nd Earl of Carbery in the peerage of Ireland, must remain the most shadowy of the three Lieutenant-Generals. He was the greatest resident magnate of the south-west, seated at Golden Grove in Carmarthenshire, and must therefore have played a considerable role in early Royalist activity in that region. Yet so impoverished are the records that his name does not feature in connection with the Civil War until 10th January 1643, when a regiment raised by him appeared at Oxford with Hertford. Even then he does not appear to have accompanied his soldiers in person, because his brother, Henry Vaughan, was given a knighthood upon the regiment's arrival, presumably for leading it to the King. Thereafter it was certainly designated 'Vaughan's'.

Royalist interest in Carbery's region seems to have quickened in late March at about the time of his actual appointment as Lieutenant-General. On the 24th Charles knighted two Cardiganshire gentry at Oxford, Walter Lloyd and Francis Lloyd MP, and on 1st April he expelled five Pembrokeshire gentry from the county bench, replacing them with Carbery and other Royalists. Identical instructions

1. See Chapter 3.
2. Shaw, p. 215
3. Ibid; DWB
4. Bod. L. Dugdale MS 19 f 11. The most prominent of those expelled were Sir Hugh Owen and Griffith White, of whom more below
5. Brit. L. Harl. MS 6852 ff 63-4
were issued to the commissioners of the Earl's area to those issued to Herbert's, ordering them to provide him with money for a local army. The only extant local source for this period, the Haverfordwest Mayor's Accounts,\(^1\) seems to show a corresponding activity in the area itself, for on the 29th March Carbery sent the town corporation a letter. Its import is unknown, but some weeks after the Earl himself visited the town and was entertained. The corporation subsequently wrote a loyal letter to him at his base at Carmarthen. A little time later, on 6th June, the local Parliamentarian gentry visited the town and were accorded an equal welcome.

Scanty as this information is, it does suggest strikingly that in south-west Wales, a year after the formal outbreak of war, civil war had still not been properly achieved. The area contained both Royalists and Parliamentarians, who were aware of each other's existence but preferred not to acknowledge the reality of conflict. Even more strikingly, the rival High Commands were certainly aware of this situation but did nothing about it. Charles, as said, knew the names of his opponents in Pembrokeshire. Parliament received a petition for aid from these men in May, and gave orders in principle for an expeditionary force to be sent to the county.\(^2\) In practice, however, neither party sent any troops there, or urged its local supporters to greater efforts. It appears that at this stage of the war they were both too busy with more considerable strategic objectives to be much concerned

1. Archaeologia Cambrensis 1915, pp. 3-4
2. CJ Vol. 3, p. 109
with what was, or rather was not, happening at the far end of Wales.

This situation began to alter as the summer wore on. Firstly Lord Herbert and his commanders in south-east Wales took to blaming the presence of Parliamentarians in Pembrokeshire for the laxity of the war effort in their own region. But more fundamentally, the entire strategic situation was altering.

Despite their mutual efforts of the previous winter King and Parliament were proving too evenly balanced for yet another year for either to defeat the other. Thus each began, as in the previous autumn, to make an effort to recruit new strength for the next year. This time each went beyond the English provinces. Parliament signed a treaty with the Scots, who had their own quarrel with Charles, to purchase an army from them. Charles in turn took steps to withdraw to England the army he had sent to quell the Irish rebellion in 1641. His deputy in Ireland, the Marquis of Ormonde, was instructed to arrange an armistice with the rebels, which he achieved in September 1643. The troops sent in 1641 could now be shipped back across the Irish Sea. This operation made that sea, and the harbours facing it, of great importance. Pembrokeshire projected into its centre, and whoever controlled this county was suddenly in a position to influence the entire course of the war.

Lord Herbert seems to have commenced moves for an offensive there in July, when he suggested to Rupert that an easy way to win the area would be to break Parliament's control of the sea itself, upon which its supporters in Pembrokeshire

1. E.g. Brit. L. Add. MS 18980 f 91
2. Ibid. f 94
depended for relief. The Prince's capture of Bristol had given the Royalists a small fleet, and Herbert proposed that this be used for the purpose. Some of it was, for in August Parliament published a letter\(^{(1)}\) from the captain of one of its warships, reporting that he had called at Milford Haven on the 7th to find two Bristol ships moored there under a newly-appointed Royalist admiral, Barnabas Burley. These had just arrived and were in the process of calling upon the local gentry to join them. The Parliamentarian took them by surprise, captured Burley and his ships, and instructed the gentry to remain loyal to Parliament.

The incident is substantiated by the accounts of that universal alehouse Haverfordwest corporation,\(^{(2)}\) which entertained some refugees from one of Burley's ships. Parliament's reaction was to order\(^{(3)}\) that a squadron of its ships should henceforth call regularly at the Haven.

The only hope now for a Royalist occupation of the area lay in an overland attack, and here Carbery was at last called upon to fulfil his role as Lieutenant-General. In many ways it was not an easy role. His area was notably lacking in military resources, possessing no iron and little money. In the 1570's the average subsidy money paid by a gentleman in Surrey had been 25s, and in Rutland 40s. In Carmarthenshire it had been 14s and in Cardiganshire 9s.\(^{(4)}\) On the other hand, if the example of Haverfordwest were general, the very indifference of the area to the war might work to Carbery's advantage, for its communities might prefer to submit

1. E.65.29
2. Archaeologia Cambrensis 1915, p.4
3. Bod. L. Tanner MS 61 f 315
to his authority rather than endure bloodshed. This possibility the Earl set out to exploit, and in the first six months of his campaign secured most of his objectives by an expenditure of ink rather than blood.

This process commenced on 18th August when he summoned the Pembroke and Tenby and to raise £2,000 to pay his forces. Their only caveat was that he appointed as governors of the two towns men acceptable to the local community. Within two weeks Tenby was Royalist. On the 30th its Mayor and thirty-one leading citizens signed a second declaration promising to obey Carbery and refuse to assist Parliament. The Parliamentarians were later to attribute this capitulation to the machinations of a local gentleman, Roger Lort of Stackpool Court. He was said to have been Hertford’s Treasurer in the winter and to have led the Pembroke and Tenby until that individual had decided to receive the Royalists.

Haverfordwest, as anticipated, presented even less difficulty. On 3rd September its corporation wrote to the Royalists at Tenby informing them that all known Parliamentarians had withdrawn to Pembroke. On the 4th they received a letter from Carbery, on the 5th the Mayor attended him at Tenby and a few days later

1. PRO SP 16/497/148
2. Bod. L. Z1.17.16
3. PRO SP 19/126 ff 105-8
the Earl entered Haverfordwest, to a great welcome. He was accompanied by
a foot company under a captain Butler, perhaps a member of the local gentry
family of that name. This remained to garrison the town, and a levy of £100
was ordered from the citizens. On 3rd October the newly-knighted Sir Francis
Lloyd arrived from Oxford, received the money ordered for the garrison and set
about repairing the fortifications. (1)

This left only Pembroke, by now regarded as the main Parliamentarian
centre, and here the evidence becomes problematical. It hinges upon three
bulletins in the official Royalist newspaper, 'Mercurius Aulicus'. The first, (2)
dated 24th October, is a reprint of yet another declaration, drawn up by Carbery
and signed by all the principal Pembrokeshire gentry, promising to victual neither
Parliamentarian ships nor the town of Pembroke. Appended was a report that the
corporation of Pembroke, on receiving this missive, had promised Carbery to
keep their town for the King and give no aid to Parliament. The second (3) is the
newspaper's New Year's Eve roll-call of the year's Royalist conquests, which
includes Pembroke. The third (4) is a report that Pembroke had reneged on its
promise, so that on 11th January 1644 Carbery commenced measures to besiege
it.

By themselves, these reports tell a coherent story, but it is one that has
never been included in a history of the war. The reason for this is that they have

1. Archaeologia Cambrensis 1915, pp. 4-6; NLW Haverfordwest Borough Records
Nos. 709. 1-2
2. E.75.13
3. Corpus Christi Library, Oxford, Mercurius Aulicus, The First Week 1644
4. E.32.17
never recovered from their condemnation by J. R. Phillips, author of the classic work on the war in Wales. Phillips treated them with suspicion as they appear in a partisan source, which is perfectly correct, but as such he rejected them out of hand, which is not. His objection to the declaration was that it contains the names of former Parliamentarians, and to the other two items that since Pembroke remained Parliamentarian it could never have passed through a stage of being Royalist. In fact, a good case can be made for accepting their evidence as genuine.

Firstly, there is the sequence of military events. From August to October Carbery had conducted an intensive, if bloodless, campaign to secure the strong-points of Pembrokeshire. They had been secured, in succession, and Pembroke was the logical culmination of the campaign. The declaration reprinted by 'Mercurius Aulicus' would be a stratagem typical of Carbery, and appears at precisely the time one would expect it. The same newspaper had earlier accurately reported the capitulation of Tenby and Haverfordwest, events corroborated by independent evidence. Furthermore, on 17th November Charles appointed (1) Carbery governor of Milford Haven, the great inlet dominated by Pembroke. As the King did not appoint men governors of fortresses yet unconquered, he must have believed the Haven to have been Royalist, and as he only accepted official reports of conquests, he must have been informed of its submission by Carbery himself. There is evidence (2) that Carbery was at Oxford in this period, and he would hardly have left his command

1. CSPD 1641-3, p. 499
2. PRO SP 19/126 ff 105-8
if his work had been uncompleted. On 25th October he had been promoted to an English peerage, and this reward likewise would suggest a total success.\(^{(1)}\)

Further, if he had not believed that Pembroke was Royalist, it would be difficult to explain his inactivity between October and January.

What precisely, then, could have happened in Pembroke? The answer seems to lie in the changing nature of the local Parliamentarian leadership. The gentry who had signed the original plea to Parliament in November 1642\(^{(2)}\) were Sir Richard Philips of Picton Castle, Wogan of Whiston and an individual signing himself simply 'Owen', who was probably the single most important local gentleman, Sir Hugh Owen MP. By 1643 both High Commands identified the Parliamentarian leaders as Owen and Griffith White. Of these, Philips, Owen and White appear among the signatories of the declaration against Pembroke. Owen certainly later joined the King at Oxford.\(^{(3)}\) None of them feature again as Parliamentarian leaders. Instead, in January 1644, the entire local resistance to the Royalists becomes personified in one man, John Poyer. He was a very distinguished citizen of Pembroke, Mayor the previous year and captain of the town militia for sixteen years,\(^{(4)}\) but his name does not so far feature in the war. From 1644 onwards, however, his name is synonymous with the Parliamentarian cause in Pembrokeshire, although as his correspondence in the Bodleian's Tanner Manuscripts makes clear he had many enemies within his own party, and his own town. In 1648, when he was on trial for his life, some of these

1. Bod. L. Ashmole MS 832 ff 194-5
2. See Chapter 3
3. PRO SP 19/21 f 98
enemies published an indictment\(^{(1)}\) of his career. This stated that Payer had originally achieved dictatorial power in Pembroke by quarrelling with the reigning Mayor, gathering a mob and seizing the castle. A. L. Leach, in his standard history of the war in Pembrokeshire, attributes this incident to 1642, but the statement itself gives no date, and if Leach's solution is correct, then it is odd that Payer goes unmentioned until 1644.

All this evidence suggests a particular sequence of events, that in October 1643 Pembroke, like the two other towns, succumbed to the pressure of Carbery's diplomatic campaign and repudiated Parliamentarianism. This action was carried out, as at Haverfordwest and Tenby, by the corporation led by its Mayor. At Pembroke, however, one extraordinarily powerful and politically conscious personality, Payer, overthrew this decision upon his own initiative. In doing so, he brought about, at last, the true opening of civil war in south-west Wales.

It opened, as said, upon 11th January, with a gesture typical of Carbery, yet another declaration signed by local gentry, this time from the whole area. It was produced at Carmarthen, and authorised the Lieutenant-General to employ the militia of all three counties in reducing Pembroke and to assess their gentry for horse to the same purpose. Carbery's succeeding actions, and their result, are portrayed only in the reports of his Parliamentarian enemies\(^{(2)}\) but these are detailed and corroborated by subsequent events. To reduce the town he possessed

1. E.436.7
2. E.42.13, 14, 19
the militia and whatever regulars he might raise, plus cannon and munitions from Bristol and the services of an engineer and of his brother Henry, both detached from the field army. The £2,000 he had requested had been raised, and collected by Lort,\(^1\) and he had received a further £400 from the Treasury at Oxford.\(^2\)

A local tax of £4,000 was now agreed by his counties to support his army in the future.\(^3\) The tactics by which he employed these resources were ones of attrition. Rather than risk a direct assault upon Pembroke, he put his troops into Haverfordwest, Tenby and every castle and mansion around his objective, and into a new fort constructed upon the opposite side of Milford Haven. By this blockade he hoped to starve out Payer.

At this moment, on 23rd January, the long-awaited Parliamentarian naval squadron sailed into the Haven, six warships under Captain Swanley. Swanley considered the situation and offered to evacuate Payer. His offer was refused. Payer had found a soldier, Rowland Laugharne, a local man and a Parliamentarian who had once served abroad under the Earl of Essex, now Parliament's Commander-In-Chief.\(^4\) Even with 200 armed seamen borrowed from Swanley, Laugharne had only 300 soldiers, but he was determined to take the offensive. Numerically, the Royalists outnumbered him, but he possessed the classic advantage of interior communications and could pick off the encircling garrisons one by one. This is precisely what occurred. He began with the nearest Royalist mansions and

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1. PRO SP 19/126 ff 105-8
2. PRO SP 16/498 f 38
3. NLW Add. MS 4849D; Bod. L. Firth MS C7 f 14
4. Dodd, p. 37
proceeded on 22nd February to cut off and storm the fort across the Haven. The shock of this was so great that Carbery's principal officers evacuated Haverfordwest, retreating to Carmarthen. Laugharne was able to clear the remaining enemy garrisons from the Haven, and on 6th March he attacked Tenby. His troops assaulted by land while Swanley's ships attacked from the sea, and between them the town was stormed. The last of Carbery's garrisons in Pembrokeshire now surrendered, and Laugharne tendered to the inhabitants of the county an oath to serve Parliament.

A Cardiganshire Royalist, John Vaughan of Trawscoed, drew the appropriate conclusion, that the disaster had resulted from Carbery's tactics of attrition. His dispersal of troops to garrisons had left no mobile field force to relieve those garrisons if the besieged took the offensive, because he had discounted the possibility of their being reinforced from the sea. Unfortunately, the results of that miscalculation were still in operation. All Carbery's regular soldiers had been disarmed, leaving him with no forces with which to wage war. The local people were too impressed by his defeat to lend him further aid. Not merely Pembrokeshire but his whole command was open to his enemies. His reaction was that of Bridgeman in December 1642, to offer a local peace treaty. The time for such local initiatives, however, was over, and the offer was rejected. Carbery himself was recalled to Oxford and accused of misconduct. He was exonerated but never took

1. Bod. L Firth MS C8 ff 340-1
2. Ibid. f 342
3. Ibid: NLW Add. MS 48490; Brit. L. Harl. MS 6802 f 129
up his command again. His officers, including Sir Henry Vaughan and Lloyd, returned to Oxford with him. The ambitious Lort defected to Parliament.\(^{(1)}\)

In April Laugharne prepared to conquer all south-west Wales. He offered a formal alliance to the gentry of Carmarthenshire and Cardiganshire, which they refused. On the 11th he mustered the Pembrokeshire militia outside Haverfordwest, only to learn that it refused to do more than defend its own county. This failure left him only with his regular force, by now recruited to nearly 800 foot and 140 horse, many of them formerly Carbery's soldiers. Small as it was, his opponents were even weaker. The Mayor of Carmarthen had 100 foot to hold his town, and Vaughan of Trawscoed was trying to fashion the remaining Cardiganshire militia into a garrison for Cardigan. Their main hope lay in Herbert Price, who had wintered at his native Brecon with his regiment, 400 strong, and 150 horse. Price came to Carmarthen, full of hopes of a general Royalist counter-offensive against Laugharne. He found, however, that the local gentry were too demoralised by Laugharne's victories to aid him. He may well have been reminded of the situation at Hereford a year before, and when Laugharne's superior forces advanced upon Carmarthen he withdrew. The town, and county, fell to Laugharne. Soon Cardigan followed.\(^{(2)}\)

A few months before, Carbery, alone of the three Lieutenant-Generals, had seemed to have achieved a total success, and redeemed the King's choice of these

1. PRO SP 19/126 ff 105-8
2. Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 ff 123, 145, 149; Bod. L Firth MS C7 ff 46, 100
grandees as his local commanders. Now his military career, like theirs, had culminated in disaster. Although the most delayed of the three failures, it was the most absolute, for he had lost not merely an army, or a county, but the entire area committed to his care.
Although Worcestershire was nominally included in Capel's command, there are good reasons for treating its fortunes in this period, and those of its leading Royalist Sir William Russell, as a separate study. Firstly, as shown Capel barely concerned himself with the county, being pre-occupied with North Wales and its March. Secondly, the Civil War material for Worcestershire is unusually rich, and as such deserves a treatment in depth. Thirdly, the Worcestershire Royalists occupied a position of peculiar responsibility and difficulty, for their county was the vital centrepiece of the Cavalier Corridor between Oxford and Wales. Up it travelled the regiments marching to assist beleaguered Royalists in the northern Marches. Down it passed the recruits to fill up the field army and the armaments from the Shropshire furnaces to equip it. It was moreover an industrial area in itself. There were notable ironworks around Dudley and Stourbridge, especially at the latter where the Foley family were founding a celebrated industrial fortune. Their works were reported to have been employed in casting bullets for the Royalists as early as August 1642, and they accepted subsequent commissions. Brereton captured some Foley cannon-balls bound for Lichfield in 1643 and a hundred were ordered by the King for Sudelcy Castle in 1644. Between them the Worcestershire and Shropshire forges produced tons of pig-iron, pike-heads, cannon-balls and grenades, and many cannon,

1. Court, pp. 24-5
2. E.115.2
3. Rev. S. Shaw, p. 55
4. Brit. L. Harl. MS 6802 f 114
which were carried from Worcester to supply the field army at Oxford. From February to June 1643 alone five such convoys made the journey. Russell spent £1,074 upon the manufacture and transport of armaments in the course of his governorship.

But fourthly, the nature of the Worcestershire material poses a particular, and vital, historical question. By far the most important Worcestershire source is the so-called 'Diary' of Henry Townshend of Elmley Lovett, a mixture of transcripts of documents and personal notes left by one Royalist commissioner. The notes are mainly in the form of a journal of current affairs, sometimes national and sometimes local, recorded without overt comment. There is, however, one exceptional outburst, occurring in the papers from the very end of the war. It is Townshend's verdict upon that war, and his own part in it:

"And those not only in the first commission but also in this last hath continued very sedulous to preserve their county from tyranny and oppression of the soldier. Though all in vain. The powers of punishment lying in the Governor as Commander-In-Chief, and the commissioners being only as councillors and subordinates, few barbarousness, plunderings, nay high insolencies against the commissioners themselves punished.....all those which generally lie under the obedience of the Parliament, the soldiers are regulated, punished by their Committees. The country people live in quietness and safety, paying their contribution and taxes, which is to

2. Townshend ff 344-5
3. Worcestershire RO 1714/899/192
them beyond all other considerations".\(^{(1)}\)

This may be paraphrased as follows; the local Royalist war effort depended upon the civilian commissioners, drawn from the local gentry. Effective power was however increasingly concentrated in the hands of the military commanders and their troops, whose excesses alienated the support of the local community, thereby cutting off support for the Royalist war effort at its roots and rotting it from the inside. It is tempting for the historian to extend this picture, and suggest that it may represent a convincing explanation for the failure of the whole Royalist cause, and the outcome of the Civil War. Not surprisingly, this explanation has been put forward, particularly in one recent thesis,\(^{(2)}\) which relies heavily upon Townshend.

In many ways, the whole of the present work is intended to test such a view of the war. Because of the peculiar importance of Townshend in propagating such a view, however, I propose to investigate his particular assertions in detail in this section, by investigating Worcestershire itself in the period in which the commissioners including Townshend, enjoyed their greatest local power.

Russell was the man upon whom the responsibilities of Worcestershire's position lay most heavily. He occupies a fitting place in the age of the three grandees, for like them he was a man without military experience, given great powers by virtue of his permanent standing within the community. As governor of Worcester he was responsible for the defence of the shire, and as High Sheriff he was responsible for

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnotesize{1. ff 733-4}
\end{itemize}
its expenses, for he received the local tax. Those expenses were considerable. Apart from the armament convoys he had to pay for the recruitment and maintenance of Hamilton's horse, in which his own troop alone cost £52 per week and for a dragoon regiment. (1) Huge sums were also paid to support Royalist regiments passing through the county, £100 to Owen's in December, £200 to Maurice in April. (2) Russell met all these expenses, and others, but very few of them from the new local tax. Some money was gained from that collected, but not delivered, for pre-war taxation interrupted by the war, (3) but the bulk of it represented ad-hoc donations from Royalist sympathisers. (4) This was a wasting asset, and unless the regular tax were soon collected in full, expenditure would soon exceed income.

This became the principal pre-occupation of the Committee of Safety which Charles commissioned in March, (5) and on which Russell collaborated closely with his fellow commissioners, including Townshend. The local tax was found to be hampered firstly by particularist sentiments even within the county unit. Thus Russell had to refuse a petition from Worcester to pay for its own expenses and contract out of the general tax, although he attempted to conciliate the city by permitting it to raise its share in the manner of a municipal levy. (6) Secondly, there were the inevitable disputes concerning alleged inequalities in the assessment of the tax. (7) But the most serious problem was that the bulk of the tax was simply

2. Ibid. xxx-xxxi
3. PRO SP 16/493/9
4. Russell MSS, pp.xxx-xxxi; HMC 14th Report, Appendix 8, p. 203
5. See Chapter 3
6. Chamber Order Book 2 f 214
7. Bod. L. Rawlinson MS D924 ff 153-4
not being paid, and the summoning of individual defaulters did little to remedy this problem. (1) Charles, in the proclamation accompanying the constitution of the Committees of Safety, had granted the commissioners emergency powers to ask the governors of Hereford and Worcester to send soldiers to demand arrears. On 30th March they enacted these, and directed Russell to sent out his horse, the officers to be responsible for the collection of the money. (2) In doing so they signed the death warrant of their own, civilian, control of the war effort. Charles' hopes of an administration acting in co-operation with the community had been still-born. The civilians had proved themselves incapable from the beginning of ruling without the assistance of the sword.

The need for money became greater in the course of the summer, when the High Command began to manipulate the county's manpower resources in such a way as to place a greater strain upon it. Hamilton's horse and dragoon regiments, now complete, and a foot regiment he had also raised in the shire, were ordered into the field army. (3) To compensate, Russell was commissioned to raise completely fresh regiments of horse and foot in his own name, which he did by August although not to the strength of Hamilton's. (4) By this time Sandys had also raised his horse and foot regiments, to full strength, and a few dragoons. How all these were recruited or fitted into the payment system is not known. The Sandys family fortune played a part, and the captains of the three regiments included Sandys' uncles John

1. Ibid. ff 150-4; Townshend f 344
2. Bod. L. Rawlinson MS D924 f 152
3. Richard Symonds Diary, ed. by Camden Society 1859, pp. 11-13
4. Ibid; Townshend ff 379-80; Bod. L. Dugdale MS 19 f 16
and William and his nephew Thomas. His brother Martin commanded yet another regiment, raised out of the Worcester citizens to defend the city, although this was obviously a part-time force as its members were only half exempt from paying tax, and regulars wholly were. Russell's regiments were regarded as a permanent defence for the county, but Sandys' were frequently deployed with the field army. In addition to all these soldiers, a field army regiment under Sir John Beaumont, the same who was to fall at Wem, was ordered into the county in April to reinforce it against Waller, and remained there.

Paying these men and fitting the various units into pay arrangements would have been difficult work even if the local tax were regularly paid and administration orderly. As it happened, the former was in arrears and the latter disrupted by Waller's presence at Gloucester, which kept the Worcestershire Royalists in a state of emergency for two months. His attack when it came revealed grave weakness in the fortifications of Worcester and an expensive programme of fortification had to be commenced to which the whole county contributed labour and money. Under these conditions the soldiers' pay must have been chaotic, and it is not surprising to find the King writing an angry letter to the commissioners - his first - on 15th June, noting that the Worcestershire troops were unpaid and disorderly.

The events of late summer could not have improved the situation. As will be more fully described below, the King launched a major attack on Gloucester in

1. Symonds, pp. 11-13
2. Chamber Order Book f 215
3. Russell MSS p. xxxii
4. Townshend ff 344, 349-51
5. Ibid ff 313-15
6. Ibid. f 316
7. Worcestershire RO 3762/8 f 185; Birmingham RL 398329-30
8. Townshend ff 334-5
August, using the entire field army and several local detachments, including Russell's and Sandys' regiments.\(^1\) When the Parliamentarians achieved their famous relief of the city in September this huge composite army, numbering up to 20,000 men, retreated into Worcestershire for over a week, waiting to pounce on the relieving force as it re-emerged. The county had to find tons of bread and cheese to feed it,\(^2\) and apparently failed because the hungry troops took to sheep-stealing.\(^3\) Local commerce was completely disrupted. To pay the army Charles asked for a loan of £7,000 from Worcester and its county, raised by extra taxation. The commissioners replied that under prevailing conditions they dared not impose such taxation on the county.\(^4\) The city corporation offered to try to raise £2,000 and did try,\(^5\) but could not find the money, an unfortunate sequence of events as the High Command had a long memory for promises.\(^6\)

Charles' patience with the Worcestershire Royalists, wearing thin in June, could not have been improved by this experience. One more straw was needed to break it, and in October the commissioners provided that. They quarreled amongst themselves. The dispute is rather mysterious. It took the form of an attack upon Russell by Sandys and Sir Ralph Clare of Kidderminster.\(^7\) The charges themselves are not enlightening, as they are very wild and comprise every public vice a man can possess, from trivial misdemeanors to capital offences. There is no evidence to show how the commissioners as a whole divided. It was not a straightforward clash

1. PRO WO 55/1661 f 19, 55/459 f 400
2. Townshend ff 317-18; Birmingham RL 398331
3. Bod. L. MS Eng. Hist. c 53 f 71
4. Townshend ff 320-2
5. Corporation Order Book ff 217
6. See Chapter 12, p 173
7. Townshend ff 349-51
between the civilian and military arms, as Sandys and Russell were rival colonels. Sandys complained that Russell paid his own regiments but not Sandys', while Sandys' men refused to recognise Russell's authority. Resentment of Russell had been certainly brewing among the commissioners as early as March, when they had commented adversely upon the new importance to which he, who had been their equal, had been raised by his twin posts of High Sheriff and governor. Perhaps the clash represented pre-war rivalries. Russell had been an enemy of Sandys' distant cousin Sandys of Fladbury. Russell came from south Worcestershire and his opponents from the north, and there was, and remains, a traditional rivalry between the two regions. But the documents of the incident themselves suggest that the terrible administrative problems of the year, and the pressure of royal displeasure, had simply been too much for the amity and understanding between the local leaders. Russell, being the most isolated of them by his position, had suffered worst.

As a result of the dispute the High Command agreed to an inquiry into Russell's accounts. What they thought of the resulting report is not recorded. To a modern scholar its most striking features are the emphasis upon 'the great arrears' on the local tax, the huge amount of this tax, probably the bulk, that was collected by Russell's soldiers and the large quantity of this that was immediately used by them for their own support, without coming into account. The Royalist

1. Ibid. ff 353-8
2. Brit. L. Harl. MS 6851 f 135
3. Bod. L. Rawlinson MS D918 f 145
4. PRO SP 16/325/5
5. Townshend ff 342, 365-73
troops in Worcestershire had been living virtually sword to mouth. The whole
document, though it occurs among Townshend's papers, is an indictment of his
view of the war. It proves, together with the sources cited earlier, that there
never was an ideal period when beneath the rule of their commissioners 'the
country people' of Worcestershire lived 'in quietness and safety, paying their
contribution and taxes', for the military to destroy. The taxes never were pro-
perly paid, because 'the country people' would not pay them. The soldiers always
took a large proportion of their money by force, because the commissioners
themselves told them to do so. If the troops were insolent to the commissioners,
it was because they had no reason to be grateful to them.

The affair ruined Russell. The charges against him were dismissed, and
he kept his regiments and his place among the commissioners, but the King clearly
felt that under the circumstances his continuation as governor was impossible.
He faded into the background of the local war. His fall provides a fitting epitaph
to the whole age of the grandees, to which he belonged. The justification for the
appointment of these inexperienced men as local commanders was that their
traditional position in society seemed a means by which to win the co-operation of
that society in the war effort, and so to win the war itself. This expectation had
been disappointed. Their rule had represented a succession of military disasters,
and left local society demoralised, divided and hostile to the war. They had proved
a false solution to the central problem of how the war could and could not be fought.

It is with the precise nature of this problem that the next section of this work will be concerned.
THE ROYALIST WAR EFFORT
8: THE MACHINERY

A proper history of local Royalist administration will never be written, because the documents upon which to base it have not survived. In contrast with the hundreds of leaves of Parliamentarian committee papers preserved in the Public Record Office and elsewhere, for the entire region studied, generally considered to contain the greatest number of records of the Royalist war effort, I can discover only three items to illustrate the machinery by which that effort was carried on. One is the Docquet Book Of The Clerks Of The Chancery, containing a list of the various kinds of committee set up and the dates of their creation, although not the names of all their members. The second consists of a set of minutes kept of meetings of the Worcestershire Committee 'for the guarding the county' in March and April 1643 containing the names of those present, the business discussed and the decisions made. The last is the Order Book Of The Glamorganshire Committee 'for the guarding the county, comprising the instructions issued by that body between July 1643 and November 1644. It is proposed here to combine these sources with all the incidental evidence in other Royalist documents to produce at least a summary of the existing knowledge upon the subject, a skeletal portrait which may be revised if further evidence materializes or that surviving is better interpreted.

The basic instrument of all local Royalist administration was the Commission

1. Bod. L. Dugdale MS 19
2. Bod. L. Rawlinson MSS D918, D924
3. NLW LL/MB/17
of Array, which merely empowered the recipients to raise the armed men of their county for the King and imprison his opponents. In effect however it created a wartime administration, for it defined a set of men whom the King could entrust with tasks concerning the war effort as they arose. Commissions of Array continued to be reissued for the north Welsh counties until April 1644. (1) In north and southwest Wales, Cheshire and Shropshire they seem never to have been superseded and, under the more cumbersome title of 'Commissioners of Array and Of The Peace', the men named in them remained the rulers of their counties throughout the war by authority of the Commission, carrying out specific tasks upon an ad-hoc basis, according to specific orders. They were obliged to requite a quorum of three at their meetings, but not to meet within any fixed period nor to keep a record of the business transacted.

Elsewhere the Commissions of Array were replaced by a more precise instrument. In early March 1643, as said, (2) the Royalist leaders in Worcestershire and Gloucestershire were reconstituted by new commissions (3) as committees 'for the guarding the county'. These were distinguished from the old Commissions of Array by a new set of instructions as to administrative procedures with which they were associated, (4) by their higher quorum of five and by the direction that the commissioners should meet at least weekly and in a fixed place. As these new bodies were not in themselves given any special designation, I have attempted to underline

1. Dugdale MS 19 f 74
2. Above, p. 50
3. Dugdale MS 19 ff 6-7
4. Ibid. Townshend, ff 329-32
their special characteristics by coining for them the name 'Committees of Safety'.

On 16th June such new committees were commissioned for Herefordshire and the other counties in Lord Herbert's command\(^{(1)}\) as part of an attempt to strengthen it after the disasters of the spring. These commissions were associated with a further formalisation, that the commissioners keep a written record of their transactions.

In view of the less nebulous nature of the Committees of Safety it seems no coincidence that, as said above, they rather than the Commissioners of Array have left the only records of actual transactions. Both these seem to indicate that the new Committees were active and important bodies. That of Worcestershire sat twice as often as was ordered, with never less than eight commissioners present. Russell, Clare and Sir Rowland Berkeley of Cotheridge, who represented some of the oldest and wealthiest members, were the only regular attenders and in all some fourteen gentry took part, so that a large proportion of local Royalist leaders were actively involved. It is possible that after the initial period of its existence, which its minutes represent, the interest of its members waned, but a letter of August 1644\(^{(2)}\) was signed by nine of them in their official capacity. The Order Book of the Glamorganshire committee show that it met almost daily in the summers of 1643 and 1644, although less frequently in the intervening winter.

By contrast, in North Wales, the Commissioners of Array had occasional

1. Dugdale MS 19 ff 19-21
2. Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 222
difficulty in finding a quorum, but this was partly a consequence of the sub-

division which primitive communications forced upon them. Thus in Denbighshire

five commissioners met at Denbigh and four at Ruthin, while a tenth, who lived

between these places, attended both gatherings. In Anglesey likewise four met

at Beaumaris and two at Newborough, a situation which sometimes produced problems

such as the occasion in April 1643 when an invitation from one set to the other for a

general conference arrived after the date intended for the meeting itself. Even in

more advanced areas some form of regional delegation of tasks was necessary. The

Glamorganshire Committee of Safety sat at Cardiff, and had to entrust all matters

concerning the Swansea area to three 'western gentry'. Its sibling at Worcester

broke into sub-committees to enable its members to decide disputes concerning the

monthly tax arising in their respective native districts.

This last comment indicates the main purpose of all these committees. Though

the task of the Commissioners of Array was to 'secure' their counties and those of

safety were established to 'guard' them, both became in essence financial bodies. They

had direct control of the militia, but the realities of warfare meant that the defence of

the county would come to depend on regular soldiers, over whom the commissioners

as a body would exert power indirectly, through their function as the troop's paymasters.

This role is made clear in the instructions issued by the King to the Committees of

Safety, which are almost entirely concerned with financial duties.

1. NLW Crosse Of Shawe Hill MS 1103
2. Bod. L. Firth MS C6 f 122
3. UCNW Baron Hill MSS 5362, 5364
The greatest of these was to confer with local garrison commanders to ascertain how much money their soldiers needed and then to supply it out of the county tax. A set of Townshend's papers\textsuperscript{1} illustrate the process by which this tax was, officially, levied in Worcestershire, and the more incidental evidence from elsewhere indicates that the Worcestershire procedure was general for the region. A meeting of gentry initially agreed that a local tax would be levied. The Clerk of the Peace thereupon wrote to the various High Constables of the county to notify them of the fact. They in turn wrote to the village constables, informing them of the sum due from each village. These men then called upon the most respected villagers to assess themselves and their neighbours to determine how that sum would be shared out among each inhabitant. The proceeds were to be delivered by the assessors to the constable, who would hand them over upon a fixed day to his High Constable at Worcester. Each High Constable gave them to the Receiver, who gave them finally to the High Sheriff, a Royalist commissioner. The commissioners in time compiled a register of the tax owed by each settlement.\textsuperscript{2}

Villagers who felt themselves unfairly assessed were instructed to pay the sum demanded for two months and then sue the commissioners for redress.\textsuperscript{3} Such complaints became a major problem of the Commissioners of Array or Safety in Worcestershire,\textsuperscript{4} Glamorganshire\textsuperscript{5} and Monmouthshire\textsuperscript{6} and were probably so everywhere.

1. ff 299-307
2. Ibid. ff 433-42
3. Birmingham RL 398279
4. Rawlinson MS 0924 ff 152-4
5. LL/MB/17 ff 76-8
6. HMC 7th Report, Appendix, p. 689
The second duty specified in the royal instructions was to call the wealthier local men together and appeal to them for voluntary donations, which were then to be forwarded to the King at Oxford as local expenses ought to be met from the tax. This was the means by which the field army had been paid in the autumn, and for the first year of the war it continued a very effective source of money. Russell's accounts, (1) audited in November 1643, showed such donations to have represented by far his largest single means of income. They also powerfully suggest that little of this money could have been sent to Oxford, as his other sources of income had yielded so little that without it he could not have hoped to have met his expenditure.

The third important duty given to the new Committees of Safety concerned what was officially only a potential source of income; they were expected to make a list of active local Parliamentarians, with the value of their estates, and to await further instructions upon the matter. The coy tone of this direction indicates the marked reluctance which the King displayed to order a general seizure of his opponent's estates, presumably as this would represent an assault upon private property. His local supporters had no such qualms concerning such an obvious check upon their opponents' resources; in January 1643 the Herefordshire Royalists distrained Lady Harley's rents (2) and Ellis seized Myddleton's family castle at Chirk. (3) Such practices first became officially recognised upon both sides in Cheshire, where the two parties were locked in their first protracted local struggle,

1. Townshend, ff 344-7
2. Letters of Brilliana Harley, No. 174
3. Archaeologia Cambrensis 1846, p. 34
needing every resource. In early February the Royalists there were reputed to be seizing the estates of those who refused their Oath.\(^1\) Parliament riposted by granting its supporters in Cheshire and Lancashire the right to 'sequester' Royalist estates, meaning to divert their proceeds into Parliamentarian funds.\(^2\) By 8th March Charles had given the Cheshire Royalists an equivalent power.\(^3\) Within a month seizure of Parliamentarian property was sufficiently common all over the northern Marches for Capel to order it to cease without his personal command. He did however sanction sequestration in principle by promising that he would pay his troops from the proceeds.\(^4\) In July the Glamorganshire Committee of Safety issued an order\(^5\) for the seizure of the estates of all disaffected persons, and the sale of their goods.

Nevertheless, a Royalist counterpart to the Parliamentarian Sequestration Ordinance was never issued. The King granted such powers piecemeal. In July he instructed the leading Royalists of Carbery's command to make a list of their enemies' estates in south-west Wales, but warned them to dispose of them only 'as His Majesty from time to time under his Sign Manual shall direct'.\(^6\) In September he gave the same power to Russell and some other Worcestershire commissioners and in October to certain members of the Committees of Safety in Herbert's command.\(^7\) Not till January 1644 was a Royalist committee, that of Gloucestershire, empowered to seize estates at its own will.\(^8\) By then, however, the Royalists in Glamorganshire had

1. Bod. L. Tanner MS 62 f 541
2. CJ Vol.2, pp. 966-7
3. LJ Vol.5, pp.669
4. See Chapter 5
5. LL/MB/17 ff 17-23
6. Dugdale MS 19 f 24
7. Ibid. ff 29, 32-3
8. Ibid. f 50
been freely disposing of sequestered property for months. Either they had taken these powers without reference to the court or had been granted them by a royal letter which has not survived. Whether by the one means or the other, the sequestration of their opponents' estates seems to have become a general activity of local Royalists by 1644.

If the legal basis of Royalist sequestration machinery is obscure, the machinery itself is even more so. In March 1644 Charles set up a separate committee to carry out the seizure and administration of estates in Worcestershire, composed of gentry quite different in identity and junior in rank to the Committee of Safety.¹ This distinct body endured till the end of the war.² Similarly a separate committee existed in Cheshire.³ Both, perhaps significantly, were counties where the local Royalist leaders had been divided amongst themselves. In Glamorganshire, by contrast, the Committee of Safety continued to handle all business concerning sequestrations, and there and in Monmouthshire and Radnorshire the King contented himself with instructing certain existing commissioners to report to him upon how the profits were being employed.⁴ No evidence upon this question exists for the other counties in the region.

It is almost unnecessary to say that, with the sequestration machinery itself so shadowy, the question of its efficiency is unanswerable. It can at least be said that its profits were never the largest source of income to the Royalists in any county.

1. Ibid. f 62
2. Townshend ff 654-5
3. Brit. L. Harl. MS 2135 ff 9-10
4. Dugdale MS 19 ff 50-1, 89
Nor were the Royalists impressed with the proceeds of sequestration. The Glamorganshire Committee of Safety commented sourly upon the 'noise' of expectation concerning these proceeds, compared with the money that actually emerged. (1) The warrants of Russell's committee were opposed by his enemies on the Committee of Safety because of alleged technical errors. (2) The Cheshire sequestration committee reported that only four of its members were prepared to devote any time to its work, and the estates under its care produced little, because Sir Nicholas Byron claimed some rents as his private perquisites while others had been adroitly signed away by their Parliamentarian owners to younger sons who were technically loyal Royalists. (3)

Nevertheless, Royalist sequestration activity was not totally ineffectual, nor given the Royalists' chronic shortage of funds, were the sums raised insignificant.

The separate Worcestershire sequestration committee was diligent and bold enough to detect some rents assigned from one Parliamentarian's estate to a member of the Committee of Safety, and demand them from him. (4) The Glamorganshire Committee of Safety took care to exploit the natural resources of sequestered lands, such as coal deposits. (5) The Royalists gained £2,250 from the Harley estates in 1643 (6) and £600 from the Warwickshire manors of the Earl of Middlesex, which lay in disputed territory. (7) Russell received a total of £761 from 'delinquents' in the same year, and a considerable quantity of corn and other provisions. (8)

1. LL/MS/17 f 9
2. Townshend f 358
3. Brit. L. Harl. MS 2135 ff 9-10
4. Townshend, ff 47-50
5. LL/MB/17 f 66
6. Letters of Brilliana Harley, Appendix 3.4
8. Townshend ff 346, 368
It is equally difficult to make any definite comment upon the severity of Royalist sequestration procedure. The King certainly urged his commissioners to proceed humanely, sequestering only half the possessions of offenders and leasing these where possible to the existing tenants. (1) He intervened personally to protect the annuity held by a spinster in the Herefordshire estates of the Earl of Essex. (2) Given their need for money, it is doubtful whether his servants were so scrupulous. The charity normally offered by them to the owners of sequestered estates was that of making peace with the payment of a fine. Thus the aged Sir Edward Powell, immobilised by infirmity in London, lost his Herefordshire lands to the sequestrators and only retrieved them by paying the equivalent of eighteen months' rent. He never regained the goods confiscated from the manor house. (3) The Glamorganshire Committee of Safety took £6,000 from three men as bonds for their good behaviour. (4)

In this connection it is interesting to consider the belief that the surviving sequestration records can throw light upon the motivation behind the war. It has been pointed out (5) that the Glamorganshire Committee states that most of the owners of sequestered property in the county were 'separatists and non-conformists' (6) and argued from this that religious conviction determined political allegiance in the Civil War. There is a great deal of evidence for this equation in the case of individuals, some of which has been cited earlier, but there is a danger involved in

1. Brit. L. Harl. MS 2002 ff 68-70
2. Webbs, Vol. 1, p. 352
4. LL/MB/17 f 73
5. C. M. Thomas, University of Wales MS Thesis 1963
6. f 23
using the Glamorganshire Order Book to support it. As stressed above, religious non-conformity was in itself equated with Parliamentarianism by the Royalists. The Order Book makes reluctance to 'become conformable to the Church government' in its existing form an automatic ground for sequestration. Thus any man who supported ecclesiastical reform in Royalist territory was vulnerable to the sequestrators, whether he actively supported Parliament or not. This interpretation would explain the willingness of certain Glamorganshire non-conformists to promise co-operation with the Royalists in order to regain their property. It is supported also by Richard Baxter, who claimed that his Puritan father was maltreated by Royalists in Shropshire although he was 'so far from meddling on either side, that he knew not what they were doing'.

The meeting of Charles' Royalist Parliament at Oxford in early 1644 gave three more duties to his local supporters. One arose from a legal device employed by this body to vote the King money without calling into question its right to impose taxation; the writing of letters endorsed with the Privy Seal to wealthy Royalist gentry all over England requesting the loan of a specific sum of money, assessed in accordance with the individual's reputed means. These 'Privy Seal letters' were expected to raise a total of £100,000 to pay the field army for the coming campaigning season. The High Sheriff of each county was requested to forward the proceeds to Oxford. In December he was given the more strenuous duty of interviewing those gentry who

1. Chapter I, f 17-18
2. f 73
3. ff 46, 73
4. Reliquae Baxterianae, Part 64
6. Dugdale MS 19 ff 69, 71
had not given the money, who were apparently numerous, and reporting their excuses.\(^1\)

All these efforts would be useless, however, if there were no field army left. By the winter of 1643-4 pay failures and hard service had produced a worse rate of desertion than ever before,\(^2\) and ensured that there would be few volunteers to replace those who had fled. Impressment had begun piecemeal in the summer, granted by Charles to individual colonels such as the new Earl of Northampton in May\(^3\) or employed by the Glamorganshire commissioners to find men for the Gloucester campaign in July.\(^4\) In December the King officially constituted the most important existing commissioners of Herbert's command and of Staffordshire as impressment committees, with a quorum of three, to recruit men for their respective areas.\(^5\) Likewise he ordered the commissioners of North Wales to fill up Ellis' regiment, specifying the quota of men due from each county.\(^6\) The work of the Royalist Parliament was to make this system universal. On 11th March it voted that 6,000 foot soldiers should be impressed instantly to fill up the field army.\(^7\) A fixed quota of conscripts was demanded from each Royalist county, and impressment committees were set up in each. Their full membership is not recorded, but they included the leading Commissioners of Array or Safety.\(^8\) Likewise in April Charles ordered the local armies of South Wales to be filled up, specifying both the number of men from each county and the size of the county taxes.

1. TSANHS 1896, pp. 258-60
3. Dugdale MS 19 f 16
4. LL/MB/17 f 27
5. Dugdale MS 19 ff 42-3
6. NLW Add. MS 520D f 37
7. Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 73
8. Brit. L. Harl. MS 6804 f 142; Dugdale MS 19 ff 63-5
to be raised to pay them.\(^{(1)}\) The results of this activity will be considered later.

Finally, the Royalist M.P.'s resolved to follow the example of their enemies in London and impose an excise upon merchandise, the proceeds to be sent to the central Treasury at Oxford. New committees of three men were empowered in May 1644 to administer the tax in the English counties, Wales having presumably too little trade to make the machinery worthwhile.\(^{(2)}\) They were composed of minor gentry, and aldermen of the cities where the tax was liable to produce most. Worcestershire alone possessed two committees, one for Worcester itself and one for the county. The latter, unlike all the other Excise committees, consisted of important members of the county's Committee of Safety. Not even circumstantial evidence survives to explain this anomaly. There is equally little information upon the overall profitability of the tax; it definitely raised large sums in Worcester in 1644\(^{(3)}\) but seems to have failed in unspecified other counties.\(^{(4)}\) Its political consequences will be considered in a later chapter.

By June 1644 the complexity of local administration had increased to a degree that made some form of regulating mechanism desirable, particularly in financial matters. Hence Charles borrowed another idea from his enemies, that of setting up a new committee in each county to check the accounts of all money received and spent in his service.\(^{(5)}\) The potential of such an institution for creating ill-feeling seems obvious, but Charles apparently deliberately defused it by selecting its membership

\[1. \text{Ibid. f 77} \]
\[2. \text{Ibid. ff 79, 83-4, 91} \]
\[3. \text{Bod. L. Firth MS C7 f 209} \]
\[4. \text{Firth MS C8 f 334} \]
\[5. \text{Dugdale MS 19 ff 86-7, 89, 91} \]
in every case from existing Commissioners of Array or Safety. Even this precaution sometimes failed, for example in Montgomeryshire where the accounts committee was comprised entirely of members of Sir John Price's faction, to the fury of the rival Herbert bloc.\(^1\) In Glamorganshire by contrast the accounts were taken with apparent goodwill on the part of all concerned, and published to the county community in general at each Quarter Sessions.\(^2\) As quarrels tend to leave traces it is likely, but not certain, that Glamorganshire was the more typical example.

This, then, is all that can at present be said about the mechanisms which legalised that collection of tasks comprising the war effort. The most striking impression gained is how great a burden the system placed upon a few individuals, the activists who had responded to the original Commissions of Array. The isolation of these men is easily camouflaged by the role they were to play in the second half of the war, soon to be portrayed, when they would appear the representatives of their local communities against outsiders and defenders of the interests of those communities. Indeed, they represented a social elite, each being a wealthy landed gentleman and the head, or heir, of his family.\(^3\) The war had indeed made them the legal leaders and guardians of communities which they had been born to lead. Yet, at least in the English counties, they represented only a fraction of the gentry who had been the natural leaders of those counties before the war. They were

1. Firth MS C8 f 334; See Chapter 1, p 21
2. LL/MB/17 f 61
3. See Appendix 1
exceptional men, who had, from loyalty or ambition or both, made a commitment which most of their colleagues had avoided or opposed. In doing so they had risked ruin or a death on the scaffold, and they were indeed to lose huge sums of money and their local and national power as the consequence of their choice. For a time, however, that choice won them an absolute predominance within their counties, and when wielded by men like Ottley and Russell that power could fall heavily indeed upon their former neighbours. It was the double tragedy of these Royalist commissioners that not merely would they lose the war but that before they did so the war itself would render them impotent. They had become entangled in a machine which did not answer to the realities of that war. Their power was about to fall to a different sort of man, whom these realities had themselves produced.
9 : THE TASK

The intention of the following chapter is to answer a question developing out of the previous two, why the machinery constructed for the maintenance of the war effort failed to achieve its purpose, so that wherever there is evidence the local taxes imposed are invariably shown to have fallen into arrears almost from their inception.

The best approach to this problem is to consider Clive Holmes' study of the Parliamentarian Eastern Association, the great supply-base of the Parliamentarian war effort just as the area studied here supplied Charles' army. For the present purpose, the most significant of Professor Holmes' discoveries is that local indifference to the war effort and huge arrears upon the county taxes were as much a feature of wartime administration in the Eastern Association as in the Royalist counties. This picture is duplicated in Professor Everitt's famous book upon Parliamentarian Kent. The difference between the Royalist counties studied here and Kent and East Anglia is that in the latter the arrears were eventually gathered in by the steady work of the county committees, so that in the long term the taxes were paid in full. Thus the machinery designed to maintain the Parliamentarian army performed its task in these counties once it had been given the time and the lack of disturbance to settle down. The beginning of this process can be seen in Royalist Worcestershire in the peaceful early months of

1. The Eastern Association In The English Civil War (Cambridge 1974)
2. See above, p. 1
1643. On 25th May, the total tax due from January to April was more than half unpaid. That for January, however, was by then only £657 short of the £3,000 demanded, while the February tax was £954 in arrears, and the arrears increased until April, when only £54 of the tax due that month was yet paid. These figures suggest that the arrears were being slowly made up month after month just as they were in the Parliamentarian areas cited. In the Royalist counties, however, this process seems to have been interrupted, and the taxes never made up in total. It is not difficult to suggest an explanation for the difference. One need only imagine the Parliamentarian commissioners attempting to settle down to work in an Eastern Association with strong Royalist garrisons at Norwich and Ipswich, continually raided from the East Midlands, subject to the constant passage of Parliamentarian armies and with a Royalist navy dominating its coasts.

The general military insecurity of the Royalist areas produced certain specific problems to bedevil the work of administrators. The first was the irregular levy. The eventualities of war ensured that the commissioners had frequently to impose emergency taxation to raise sums for specific purposes, over and above the regular county tax which was solely for the soldiers' pay. Thus the Worcestershire hundred of Doddingtree paid extra levies in 1643 to help cover the costs of the armament convoys to Oxford, the carriage of the mint installed at Shrewsbury to Oxford and improvement of the fortifications of Worcester. Such extra taxation removed much

1. Townshend, f 344
2. Birmingham RL 398331
of the money which would otherwise have gone to the regular tax.

Secondly, there was the emergency system of free quarter, described earlier. It was suggested then that the Royalists managed to avoid this system in the opening moves of the war, although this belief is challenged by one Parliamentarian newspaper which accused the royal army of having taken free quarter at Wolverhampton on its march. A partisan assertion of this sort cannot be accepted without supporting evidence, but within a few months the local soldiers in Worcestershire were definitely using the system because the arrears in their pay resulting from the slow appearance of the local tax had made this necessary. By May 1643 Charles was granting the right to take free quarter to newly-commissioned colonels who lacked the money to make the initial payments to the regiments they were to raise. In August it had become the practice of the field army on campaign. Thereafter, as shall be seen, it became virtually the rule in every county where there was a large number of soldiers, despite perpetual attempts to eliminate it. Occasionally these attempts were successful, such as in Shropshire in March 1644, but the victory was invariably temporary.

At first sight the unpopularity of free quarter with both local people and the military commanders seems puzzling. It does not appear in itself a harmful system if the tickets given for it were discharged as the rules demanded. In the more turbulent areas they were probably not, but the accounts of the garrison at Ludlow,

1. Chapter 2, p 40
2. E. 124. 14
3. Bod. L. Rawlinson MS D924 f 149
5. Dircks, pp. 329-30
6. See Chapter 13, p. 130
7. Shropshire RO, Box 298
set in a relatively peaceful Royalist district, show that there free quarter was regularly imposed and then paid off in full when more money came in. The vice of the system, however, was the same as that of the irregular levies; the cost of supporting a soldier frequently consumed all the available cash which a villager had to spare for the county taxes, particularly as troops sometimes demanded a high standard of accommodation. Hence several petitions survive such as that from Lennox Beverley in Cheshire, who had been so impoverished by quartering some of Capel's soldiers as well as paying tax that he was incapable of supplying any more money to the Royalist war effort. Free quarter, made necessary by the arrears upon local taxes, could itself become an impediment to the elimination of those arrears.

Free quarter at least left intact the mechanisms which produced money at village level. The consequence of the third spanner in the works of Royalist administration, the conscription of materials of war, was to remove these. From the beginning Charles had granted the officers of his field army rights of compulsory purchase of horses for the cavalry and horses and carts for the baggage train. So many horses were conscripted from Stafford during the King's stay there in 1642 that the corporation begged him to prevent any more being taken. Three weeks later Charles decreed the death penalty for any former owner attempting to retrieve his horse or cart from the new baggage train. On the army's march in October

1. Brit. L. Harl. MS 2135 ff 40-3
2. Chester Archaeological And Historic Society Transactions 1914, p.151
3. WSL Salt MS 402 f 204
4. PRO 55/457/60 f 1
Rupert seized more horses for his cavalry, at least three, at Penkridge, without payment, for the owner issued a complaint.\(^1\) When Charles ordered Aston to Cheshire in January 1643 he empowered him to conscript horses there to mount a new dragoon regiment.\(^2\) In March a hundred draught horses were demanded from Worcestershire for the field army.\(^3\) Horses and carts continued to be conscripted throughout the war in every part of the region where troops were stationed at the opening of a campaign. By April 1644 the governor of Lichfield was unable to seize horses in response to an order from Rupert because so few remained in Staffordshire.\(^4\) Attempts to settle a regular postal service between Oxford and the Midlands failed because the horses were usually conscripted on the way.\(^5\)

Horses and carts were the most obvious targets upon a farm for the military, but soldiers in the course of their duty did other damage to the basic resources of the countryside. A widow at Ludlow lost all the turf from her meadow, dug up to improve the fortifications of the castle.\(^6\) At Shrewsbury Capel's horse overgrazed and ruined the town pastures.\(^7\) In Monmouthshire other Royalist cavalry destroyed a year's crop of hay by grazing their mounts upon growing grass.\(^8\) Soldiers gathering provisions carelessly took breeding animals from farmyards.\(^9\) Such exactions not only struck at the roots of a local economy but unlike a tax they were capricious, striking one individual rather than another according to whether or not

1. Staffordshire RO Q/SR Epiphany 1643 ff 11-12
2. Brit. L. Add. MS 36913 f 112
3. Townshend, f 333
4. WSL Salt MS 479
5. HMC Hastings MSS Vol. 2, pp. 109-10
6. Shropshire RO Box 298
7. TSANHS 1896, pp. 223-4
9. Brit. L. Harl. MS 2135 ff 54-8
the troops picked on him. If a man were unlucky in this respect, the consequences could be frightful. One poor wretch near Ludlow lost his three horses in succession and then had his spade taken to dig new fortifications, leaving him with no means of breaking his land, a family to support, the local tax to pay and a soldier to feed and accommodate. (1)

All these problems were magnified when an army entered a district. Initially the royal army itself was maintained by a special levy upon each area in which it quartered. Thus tiny Hatherton paid £1 towards the up-keep of Charles' army encamped around Wolverhampton in 1642 (2) and the various Worcestershire hundreds contributed money to his forces quartered in the county in September 1643. (3) Those towns which were honoured by a visit from the King or an important general fared rather worse, as etiquette demanded a handsome reception for their guest; even the modest settlement of Walsall presented Rupert with £20 in gold when he entered it in October 1642. (4) To provide for smaller forces on their march, Charles gave their commanders rights of free quarter, the certificates of which were to be redeemed by the local Royalist commissioners. Kidderminster paid Aston's regiment £28 on its journey to Cheshire, and presented the bill to Russell. (5) The total sum of money spent in this way could be considerable in a 'corridor county' like Worcestershire; Russell spent in all £1, 813 in assisting the passage of 'foreign' troops in 1643, (6) and all this came ultimately from the pockets of the county. Furthermore individual

1. Shropshire RO Box 298
2. Staffordshire RO D/260/M/PV/1
3. Birmingham RL 398331
5. Townshend, f 325
6. Ibid. f 346
generals imposed their own extra levies. Droitwich spent £312 on clothing regiments passing north in November 1643\(^{(1)}\) and Charles demanded a thousand pairs of stockings from Evesham for his army in June 1644.\(^{(2)}\)

All these exactions had some claim to legality, although in the case of conscription of horses that legality could be very dubious indeed. In addition, wherever troops were stationed or passing the countrymen ran the risk of being robbed by the soldiers for their private profit. This straightforward plundering could do terrible damage to a district. Townshend believed that the depredations of 700 horse sent to cover Worcester during the campaign of September 1643 caused more expense than the food bill for the entire field army then quartered in the shire.\(^{(3)}\) Aston's horse, returning disgraced from Cheshire, pillaged the Droitwich and Bromsgrove area so savagely that it was completely unable to pay its monthly tax. In this case the Worcestershire commissioners complained to the King, and some of those robbed went to Oxford to reclaim their property from Aston's troopers, but there is no sign that these efforts met with any success.\(^{(4)}\)

Nor was plundering necessarily associated with troops crossing a strange county on their march, for as seen above Aston's horse and the local soldiers of Worcestershire robbed their own shires. Thus another vicious circle was set up within administration, for looting rendered the countryside incapable of paying the tax upon which the soldiers' pay depended, and pay failure drove the soldiers

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1. Worcestershire RO 3762/8 f 185
2. Christ Church Oxford, MS 164 f 25
3. f 316
4. Brit. L. Harl. MS 6804 ff 139-40
to loot. All these depredations were the work of 'friendly' soldiers; in addition
counties on the border of the Royalist area suffered severely from Parliamentarian
invasions specifically designed to destroy Royalist resources. Furthermore, the
breakdown of order produced a new threat to property in the shape of Royalist
deserters or ordinary criminals who wandered the countryside, sometimes in bands,
demanding money and supplies on the pretence of being soldiers.\(^{(1)}\)

Quite apart from all the specific tribulations listed above, the war produced
a general loss of wealth in the Royalist counties studied. The importance of London
in the English economy of the time meant that when Charles finally prohibited trade
between Royalist and Parliamentarian areas in October 1643\(^{(2)}\) he left the former
with very little commerce at all, while his enemies preserved the capital's links
with the eastern counties and foreign countries. Attempts to develop Bristol as an
alternative entrepot were foiled by the Parliamentarian hold on Gloucester, which
jammed the whole great trading system based on the Severn Valley. The most notable
casualty of this situation, as will be seen later, was the North Welsh cattle trade,
which had produced the little wealth that region possessed. Even local commerce
was disrupted by the war, because fairs and markets provided tempting targets for
plundering soldiers.\(^{(3)}\) The mere presence of the field army near Evesham in
September 1643 was enough to produce the cancellation of its fair.\(^{(4)}\)

The central problem of the Royalist base in Wales and its Marches was

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1. Bod. L. Wentworth Proclamation 66; TSANHS 1895, pp. 324-5
3. E.g. E. 256, 6; Staffordshire RO Q/SR M. 1647 f 11; Bod. L. MS Eng.
   Hist c 53 f 36
4. Ibid. ff 72-3
therefore that it was not merely a base but a battlefield in itself, and its wealthiest
counties were also the most disturbed. This problem worsened as the
Parliamentarian pressure upon the area increased. It ensured that the initial
conception of the Royalist administration as entirely based upon committees of local
gentry suffered ever greater impediments and produced a growing need for a different
model. By late 1643 such a model was in action in Staffordshire, which represented
the shape of things to come for the whole region as Warwickshire had done in 1642.

As described above, the result of the Parliamentarian campaign in May had
been to turn Staffordshire into a no-man's land of rival fortresses. As such it posed
all the problems of Royalist administrators elsewhere in an extreme form. The
Royalist garrisons relied for their payment upon villages from which the local tax
was regularly demanded for the garrisons of their enemies. In this situation,
although the county was officially governed by the usual set of committees, Royalist
administration became in practice conducted by the military governors of the main
garrisons themselves, Tutbury Castle, Lichfield and Dudley Castle.

Each of these garrisons possessed a distinct origin and identity. Tutbury,
as said, had been garrisoned by Henry Hastings in January 1643. Its governor was
always one of Hastings' own officers and the fortress represented part of his personal
military empire in the Midlands. It was given the tax of Totmanslow Hundred for its
support. Lichfield was governed by Richard Bagot, appointed as described by Rupert,
and given Offlow Hundred to support itself. Bagot recognised Hastings' authority as Colonel-General but conducted his daily affairs without reference to his superior. Dudley was properly speaking outside Hastings' control as it stood in a tiny detached portion of Worcestershire, and the castle was garrisoned at the King's command in March 1643 with Worcestershire soldiers.\(^1\) Its position on a fictional island, however, made nonsense in this case of the county unit as the basis of wartime administration, and Charles soon allotted it the western Staffordshire hundreds of Seisdon and Cuddleston\(^2\) and neighbouring portions of Parliamentarian Warwickshire\(^3\). The situation of Dudley Castle would probably have led in any circumstances to confusions in the chain of military command.

The personality of its governor, Thomas Leveson, ensured that these confusions would become a national issue.

Leveson was the squire of Wolverhampton,\(^4\) and locally notorious before the war as a man of dangerous temper and devout Catholic faith. When the great fear of a Catholic rising swept England in 1642, one of the principal measures taken by the Staffordshire gentry to secure their county was to confiscate Leveson's weapons when he sent them to an armourer to be repaired.\(^5\) Leveson's reaction was to thrash the unfortunate armourer and flee to France, abandoning his wife, with whom he was apparently on no better terms than with anybody else.\(^6\) By May 1643, however, this alarming individual was back in England and successfully

1. Brit. L. Harl. MS 6851 ff 140, 155
3. HMC Hastings MSS Vol. 2, p. 104
4. Rev. S. Shaw, p. 168
5. HMC Portland MSS Vol. 1, p. 700
6. LJ Vol. 5, p. 469
ingratiating himself with Charles at Oxford, for he was commissioned to raise a foot regiment. In June the same gentry who had tried to disarm him the year before received, with feelings which can only be imagined, a royal letter instructing them to regard Leveson as their protector. In July he was formally confirmed as governor of Dudley Castle.\(^1\)

Almost immediately he quarreled with Bagot. The latter had already suffered a diminution in the resources for his garrison by the allotment of portions of Offlow Hundred to hard-pressed Tutbury and the garrison Hastings had put into Rushall Hall. Now his soldiers, attempting to gather money from his remaining villages, found themselves clashing not only with Parliamentarians from Stafford and Tamworth but Leveson's troops, all on the same errand. Both he and Leveson complained to the King, who, failing to persuade them to settle the dispute themselves, referred it in October to their immediate commander, Hastings. Hastings' own reputation at this period was higher than ever at court, where he enjoyed the powerful friendship of Rupert, and he had just been created a peer. Leveson also stood very well with Charles, because his campaigns in Staffordshire since his appointment had made him a Royalist hero. Accordingly, the King recommended that Hastings settle the argument in his favour, and this the Colonel-General did, to the fury of Bagot.\(^2\)

The latter had at least the satisfaction of seeing his own quarrel rapidly

1. Rev. S. Shaw, pp.144-5
2. Hastings MSS 2, pp.106-116
submerged in a much bigger dispute between Leveson and Hastings themselves. There had already been tension between these two in the autumn, created by Dudley’s strategic position upon the borders of four counties, which resulted in orders often being sent to Leveson direct from the King to intervene in one or the other. If such an order conflicted with a direction from Hastings, duty and his desire for local independence both prompted Leveson to disregard the Colonel-General. The crisis was precipitated in January when the King made Leveson High Sheriff of Staffordshire in an effort to strengthen his hold on the south-west of the county with the Sheriff’s ancient power to call up all able-bodied men at will as the "perre comites" in a local emergency. Leveson issued his warrants to muster the local population, only to see them disregarded because they had been declared invalid by Hastings, who saw them as a negation of his own authority in the county. Leveson lost his temper, complained to the King and wrote a furious letter to Hastings, who reacted by mobilising a faction in the Royalist Parliament to obtain a declaration negating Leveson’s authority as Sheriff.(1)

The King’s reaction was to refer the whole problem to Rupert,(2) who called the parties concerned to a conference to remove all grounds for dispute.(3) There southern Staffordshire and northern Warwickshire were formally divided into separate hunting-grounds for Leveson and Bagot. Somehow the former was reconciled with Hastings, and in April 1644 Charles was able once more to ask the

1. Ibid. pp.106-22; Rev. S. Shaw, pp.145-6; WSL Salt MSS 545,550
2. NLW Bettisfield MS 113
3. WSL Salt MS 551
Colonel-General to arbitrate impartially between Leveson and Bagot in another quarrel, arising from alleged infringements of Rupert's judgement.\(^1\) Further clashes occurred between the two governors until early 1645, but by then they had become capable of ending them without outside interference.\(^2\)

At first sight Staffordshire seems to have represented an appalling failure of Royalist administration. The impotence of the normal administration controlled by civilians had left all local government to the military commanders, who had between them produced total anarchy, expending as much energy against each other as against the enemy. Yet the true significance of the county is that it represented, incredibly, a success story for the Royalists. Despite every apparent disadvantage - the collapse of the formal administration, the competition of Parliamentarian garrisons and their own mutual animosity - the governors of the Staffordshire fortresses fulfilled their duty, to preserve their strongholds and to maintain, and even increase, their local power. By December 1643 Bagot had obtained only £384 in total from the local tax to which he was entitled, to set against an expenditure of £8,727 and the garrison's pay was in serious arrear.\(^3\) By November 1645 the same garrison was being paid regularly every three weeks, and the proceeds of the tax represented seven-eighths of the expenditure.\(^4\) Rupert had fixed the total strength of the garrison at 400 soldiers.\(^5\) In December 1643 it consisted of 300 foot and 200 horse and in November 1645 the foot alone totalled 466. Leveson's garrison

1. Brit. L. Harl. MS 6802 f 55
2. WSL Salt MS 556. All these quarrels are more fully described by J.T. Pickles in his thesis, cited earlier, pp. 119-31. Unlike myself, Mr. Pickles regards them as an unqualified disaster for the Royalists.
5. Hastings MSS 2, pp. 115-16
seems similarly to have increased in size, and like Lichfield it became powerful enough not merely to hold its own locally, but, as will be seen, to add hundreds of men to the field armies on campaign. Some Lichfield soldiers detached for such service were reported to be mutinous because of the 'plenty and ease' to which they were accustomed.\(^1\)

Scores of such garrisons were to sprout all over the region studied from the end of 1643, produced by the intensification of the local war effort by both parties. By the end of the war thirty-one had been erected in Shropshire alone. As the military 'front' moved, new garrisons were created but few existing strongholds were evacuated. Each major fortress threw out minor garrisons to strengthen its hold upon local resources, until in some areas they interlocked like spiders' webs upon an autumn field. Thus from Dudley Leveson put troops into the great houses of Chillington, Lapley and Patshull\(^2\). The governors sent out warrants for the local tax, and for horses, carts and provisions, exactly as the commissioners would in more peaceful counties, and expected the local constables to deliver the proceeds directly to them.\(^3\) If the constables did not respond, they ordered out their troops to enforce these warrants just as governors in sheltered areas often, as seen, ended up doing for the commissioners. A great deal of wealth was accumulated in addition to this by raiding enemy territory, which represented the principal activity of garrisons in the frontier zone. These raids could extend very

1. Ibid. pp.111-12
2. E.77.33, 81.19, 258.25; Rev. S. Shaw Vol.2, p.145
3. E.g. Ibid. Vol.1, General History, pp.60-1
far, and bore no relation to the actual distance of strongholds from each other.

Parliamentarian Edgbaston Hall, whose men pillaged as far as Bewdley and Evesham was almost visible from Dudley Castle. The Coventry garrison complained to Parliament that Royalists were levying money up to its very walls. Birmingham suffered from its famous zeal for Parliament by being repeatedly plundered. Merchants upon the road were particularly favoured targets, and Hastings, Bagot and Leveson became known in the Parliamentarian press as 'the Rob-Carriers'.

At times relations between rival garrisons almost assumed the status of a great game. Parliamentarians from Stafford captured Bagot's favourite horses when they were being exercised, whereupon he offered £1,000 for their return. On another occasion the governor of Tamworth Castle formally challenged Bagot to battle by letter; the Royalist kept the appointment but the Parliamentarian lost his nerve. Nevertheless the pattern of raid and counter-raid was a deadly business. The object of each frontier garrison was to destroy the enemy's resources and protect its own, including the intangible resource of its prestige among the neighbouring population. 'The country observes the enemy to have the field from us', wrote one Parliamentarian governor, 'and being clodheads merely sensible and sensual, suppose it will ever be so, and look not beyond the present, so that they will do nothing for our warrants'.

1. E.46.10
2. E.75.13
3. E.6.12
4. E.269.5
5. HMC 4th Report Appendix, p.275
of this sort of sparring would (literally) get his name into the newspapers and earn favour from his superiors and supplies for his garrison. The interminable struggles between garrisons became indeed the staple material of the newspapers of both parties, and fulfilled a vital function. If the general military news were bad or inconclusive it was only necessary to extol some brilliant exploit by a local governor to give the impression that the cause was still victorious. In this manner the activities of a ridiculously small and remote place like Rushall could assume the same importance in the minds of readers in London and Oxford as even more remote garrisons at Rorke's Drift and Lucknow would in the minds of a later generation of Englishmen.

There is one more consideration to be made upon the military governors; that they generally found their work rewarding. Not even in their worst rages did Bagot and Leveson contemplate resigning their pasts, nor is there any recorded case of a governor voluntarily doing so. They had achieved something which most men desire but few obtain; power over all they surveyed. The only possible brake to this power was a distant High Command which demanded only that they wield their rule effectively. To enforce his will each possessed a body of regular soldiers, which he led in person and maintained like a private army. They resided in great castles and mansions, to which the local population brought tribute. They had become warlords, masters of chunks of territory which they ruled by the skill of
their swords. They were English gentry turned feral, spiritual descendants of the robber barons of the Middle Ages.

These men represented in miniature the solution which the High Command came to apply to the problems of the local administration. Charles had originally envisaged his war effort as being maintained by local populations working voluntarily under their natural leaders, their own gentry. By the end of 1643 he had abandoned this notion, and begun to commit the provinces one by one to the care of men of the sort who were ruling in Staffordshire. These new appointees had two qualifications, that they had already proved their loyalty and military skill in the field, and that they were not the natural leaders of the areas with which they were entrusted. The Commissioners of Array or Safety were all, as said, the heads or heirs of great families in the counties which they ruled. By the end of 1644 every county in the region was in the power of military men who were with one exception either younger sons or gentry from districts distant from those placed beneath their rule. The exception was the Heathcliffe of Staffordshire, Thomas Leveson, a perfect parody of the traditional picture of a paternalistic country gentleman. The solution to the problem of Royalist administration was in fact unpleasantly simple; that the local populations had to be squeezed and squeezed again without mercy until they were forced to disgorge the money and provisions which the war effort needed but which they could not afford to supply. Local gentry would hesitate
to ruin their neighbours; geographical and social outsiders would not suffer this handicap. They served the war itself, and their only loyalty was to their commanders.
THE WARLORDS
Sir William Vavasour was the younger son of an important gentleman of Yorkshire and Lincolnshire. He presumably had some military experience before 1640, when he was already a knight and commander of a regiment in the Scottish war. On the outbreak of civil war he was made a member of the Council of War and Lieutenant-Colonel of the royal Lifeguard, but this promising career was interrupted when he was captured at Edgehill. In April 1643, however, he escaped and arrived at Oxford to a hero's welcome. This publicity added to his experience ensured him rapid employment; he was made a baronet and in June given the task of rebuilding Lord Herbert's demoralised command.

Charles' regard for Herbert and his family fortune was too great to permit the Lieutenant-General to be publicly disgraced. He retained his command, and Vavasour was given the rank of Colonel-General under him, with the understanding that the latter would do all the actual work. Charles did his best to provide an adequate legal framework for the task. The Commissioners of Array in the five counties were, as described, reconstituted as Committees of Safety. To provide the nucleus of a new local army the Herefordshire commissioner Henry Lingen and the Monmouthshire commissioner Sir Trevor Williams were authorised to raise new foot regiments and Vavasour commissioned to raise his own regiments of horse and foot. To fill the vacuum left in Herefordshire by the capture of its local leaders Lingen was also elevated to High Sheriff.

In late June Vavasour settled down to work at Hereford, aided by Lingen and his fellow

2. E.99.22
3. Bod. L. Dugdale MS 19 ff 20, 26
4. NLW Add. MS 4849D
5. Dugdale MS 19 ff 19, 20, 23
commissioner Sir Walter Pye, (1) and within a month he had collected and armed 1,200 foot and over 200 horse. (2) Despite this progress his relations with the commissioners in general had already been soured, over the vital question of finance. They had agreed local taxes for their counties, that for Hereford alone being £1,200 per month, (3) of which a proportion was to be sent to a central fund to support the Colonel-General's field army and the rest used to keep local garrisons. In his first month in command little more than £100 in all had come in to the central fund, and to keep his new army off free quarter Sir William relied upon Herbert's famous fortune, which was at last showing signs of strain, and loans from Hereford citizens. (4) In Glamorganshire at least this was clearly not the fault of the commissioners, who worked hard to raise money and speed men to Hereford. What had defeated them was the quagmire of local indifference in which they had to work. The local tax came in slowly, the sequestration of estates produced too little to redress the balance and even so prominent an individual of the Bishop of Llandaff, whose career was threatened by Parliament, defaulted upon the supplies charged upon him. Eventually the soldiers sent to Vavasour were, again, supported by private loans. (5)

The Colonel-General decided that a victory was needed to restore the faith of the local population in the Royalist cause. A soft option seemed to be at hand in the shape of Brampton Bryan Castle, where Brilliana Harley was still obstinately in control. Siege was laid upon 26th July, although it proceeded slowly because Vavasour lacked the heavy cannon necessary to bombard the walls, as he had not the money to pay for their casting. (6)

1. HMC 14th Report Appendix 2, p. 111
2. Brit. L. Add. MS 18980 f 90
3. Letters of Brilliana Harley, No. 201
4. Add. MS 18980 f 91; Hereford RL 3668 f 607
5. NLW LL/MB/19 ff 3-17
6. Brit. L. Add. MS 18980 ff 95, 97; HMC Marquis of Bath MSS, pp. 1-7
Within two weeks Sir William himself had departed, as Lord Herbert before him, for the much greater project of reducing Gloucester. The fall of Bristol on 23rd July had left the city completely isolated, with no powerful Parliamentarian strongholds nearer than Plymouth and Southampton. For long it had represented an appalling nuisance to the Royalists, endangering their links with Wales, pinning down the South Welsh army, destroying the Severn trade and preventing them from properly exploiting the riches of Gloucestershire. After the storming of Bristol its reduction would seem almost an anti-climax, but Charles took no chances. In early August he mobilised against Gloucester the biggest collection of troops he ever commanded in the field, comprising the entire royal field army plus most of the local soldiers of Worcestershire and of Vavasour's command. The effect upon the citizens was unequivocal. In the words of Massey's chaplain, they all turned 'infidels'. Massey concurred with this, calculating that not one in ten of them was still 'cordial' to his cause. Yet his soldiers remained loyal, and he prepared, as he had in February, to do his duty.

The King relied upon starvation and mining to reduce the city, and gave to Vavasour's army the role of closing up its western side. Sir William left Lingen with 700 men to carry on the siege of Brampton Bryan, and joined the King with 300 horse and 1,200 foot, mainly pikemen. Pye commanded the horse and the faithful Herbert Price helped lead the foot. This force was increased to 2,000 within a few days by the arrival of the Glamorganshire militia under its High Sheriff, Richard Bassett, whom Charles rewarded with a knighthood.

1. Corbet, p. 319
2. Bod. L. Tanner MS 61 f 197
4. NLW LL/MB/19 ff 25, 29
To maintain Sir William's army in the field required a constant flow of money, weapons and recruits from his counties which their commissioners were hard put to supply. In Glamorganshire an order of the Committee of Safety to its 'western gentry' to impress and arm eighty men from their hundreds met first with a plea to remit the order and then the reply that they could find only sixty suitable recruits, and even the loss of these weakened the local economy. Moreover only twelve could be armed, and these only with staves. The commissioners at Cardiff had to use their own family armouries to provide weapons. To provide money they tried desperately to hurry the collection of the county tax and improve the profits of sequestration, but remained perpetually short of the quantity needed. As Charles described the Glamorganshire commissioners as 'a president to others in testifying their zeal', their fellows in Vavasour's command must have fared worse. Herbert certainly claimed later that his own fortune had been employed, yet again, to support Sir William's army before Gloucester.

The siege of Gloucester has become part of the national epic. The story is well known of the terrific fight which Massey, with his 1,500 men, put up against Charles' huge army all through August until Parliament, reeling from its defeats, took heart and determined to fight on. Less publicised, but equally heroic, was the resistance at Brampton Bryan, where Lingen besieged Lady Harley. Still lacking heavy guns, he adopted the futile tactic of trying to frighten the formidable Brilliana into surrender, so that almost as many messages were exchanged as shots. Both sieges were raised in early September by the appearance

1. See above, Ch. 8, p. i21
2. LI/MB/17 ff 25-45
3. Dircks, pp. 328-30
4. HMC Marquis of Bath MSS, pp. 1-22
of the Parliamentarian army sent to relieve Gloucester. Charles retired, as said before, into Worcestershire, taking Vavasour's army with him. Lingen retired to cover Hereford, harassed by parties which the triumphant Lady Harley sent out to beat up his quarters. The King sent a consignment of munitions to Hereford, and ordered the commissioners of south-east Wales to call up all local men and move this irregular force into Monmouthshire to protect their region. He himself waited to pounce upon the Parliamentarians as they re-emerged from Gloucester. A week later they did, dashing for London, and Charles' army, including Vavasour's troops, streamed off in pursuit.

This pursuit, and the campaign of 1643, culminated in the appalling and indecisive carnage of Newbury, in which Vavasour's men suffered as badly as any others. To his army, returning exhausted to its native region in October, was given the task of bottling up Gloucester through the winter, in the hope that a blockade might slowly starve Massey out. There was a genuine possibility that this might occur; the Parliamentarians who had relieved the city had estimated that a further 1,000 foot and £8,000 would be needed to keep it through the winter and not till February was any such supply convoy ready to leave London.

Initially, however, there was a danger that Sir William's command would itself be too demoralised after the recent fighting to make such an effort. He put 400 Welsh foot into Tewkesbury to fortify the town, but upon the first sally of the Gloucester garrison these mutinied and fled homeward. Herbert now retired altogether to the court, leaving

1. Ibid. pp. 26-7
2. PRO W. O. 55/459 ff 464-5
3. LI /MB/17 f 42
4. Ibid. ff 50, 51, 61
5. Vol. 6, pp. 218-19
6. Commons' Journals Vol. 3, p. 392
7. HMC Portland MSS Vol. 1, pp. 133-4; LI /MB/17 f 48
Vavasour without his local prestige to bolster his own authority and refused any control over the Lieutenant-General's own regiments, left at Raglan. The Glamorganshire commissioners found it necessary to cut the county tax from £1,000 to £800 per month in December, and by January the King had written several letters of castigation to them concerning their neglect of the payments due from them to support Vavasour's army. The Colonel-General himself was completely hoodwinked by a false offer from one of Massey's men to betray Gloucester. In his efforts to co-operate with what he believed to be the strategem of the spurious traitor Vavasour marched around the city in January according to the directions of Massey himself, permitting the latter to take in supplies in safety and producing a rift between Sir William and Local Royalists like Pye, to whom he could not confide the reasons behind his curious manoeuvring. At length Massey published the whole affair, and made his enemy a national laughing-stock, a blow from which Vavasour's reputation never recovered.

Nevertheless, not all Sir William's endeavours at this period were as fruitless. Lingen raised a horse troop to guard Herefordshire and Hereford was garrisoned with 700 foot. A new garrison was put into Goodrich Castle to strengthen the line of the Wye. In the Forest of Dean Vavasour acquired a powerful ally in Sir John Winter, a Catholic courtier whose proprietorship of the Forest had been withdrawn by Parliament just before the war. The King had not recognised the confiscation, and in September 1643 winter finally fortified his mansion at Lydney in the Forest for the Royalists. Charles added
Dean to Vavasour's command, and authorised the settlement of a local tax there to support Winter's newly-raised troops, who were stiffened with the loan of Herbert's horse regiment. Sir John soon proved himself a master of the art of garrison warfare, and his raids upon the Gloucester area seriously reduced Massey's mobility. In December Charles gave the commissioners of Vavasour's command, powers to press soldiers for his army, and two of them, Pye and Croft, raised new foot regiments. A Colonel Wroughton raised some horse. In the same month units of the royal Irish army, released by the truce described earlier, arrived at Bristol, and three were assigned, after much haggling, to Vavasour's army. They consisted of about 100 horse and two foot regiments under Sir William St. Leger and Nicholas Mynne, who had been Vavasour's Lieutenant-Colonel in 1640. These men represented a real windfall, being veterans accustomed to hard service. They made a proper blockade of Gloucester possible.

On 1st February Vavasour mustered his whole army, about 2,600 strong, at Hereford and marched to Tewkesbury, equipped with a convoy of munitions from the Oxford magazine. There he left Pye's foot and Wroughton's horse to garrison the town. On the 2nd he continued westwards to Newent, and entrenched Mynne's foot in that town and neighbouring mansions. He retained St. Leger's, Croft's and Lingen's foot and the Irish horse, reinforced by horse lent by Winter, as a mobile force and led it to operate between Gloucester and Warwick. Massey put detachments into four great houses in the Vale of Gloucester to preserve this rich area to feed the city. Though food continued to enter Gloucester, however, the encircling

1. Brit. L. Harl. MS 6852 f 222; Corbet, pp. 331-2
2. Ibid.
3. See above, Ch. 8, p. 124
ring of Royalists ensured that money ran short, and Massey's soldiers began to desert. (1)

At the approach of the new campaigning season, the High Command made a considerable administrative effort to ensure that this situation continued into the summer. On 24th March Charles appointed Winter Commander-in-Chief of all Royalist forces in Dean, under Vavasour, and ordered the commissioners of Herefordshire and Monmouthshire to pay him £800 per month to add to the meagre tax which the Forest could supply. All Gloucestershire was added to Vavasour's command, and he was given the task of blocking up Gloucester from the east as Winter would from the west. (2) On 7th and 12th April the committee of Lords Commissioners appointed by Charles to supervise the needs of his Oxford base produced two reports upon measures to ensure the continuation of the blockade if Vavasour's army were called away. Tewkesbury and Lord Chandos' family castle of Sudeley were to be garrisoned by local recruits stiffened by a few of Vavasour's existing soldiers. Chandos was to raise the men for Sudeley and another powerful local gentleman, Sir Humphrey Tracey, those for Tewkesbury. Chandos was already colonel of a horse regiment, and this was to be quartered in the northern Cotswolds with three new troops commissioned from local gentry to range the area between the two garrisons. All these soldiers were to be supported by the tax of the hundreds in which they were stationed, plus the proceeds of local sequestrations and a dole of £320 from the Oxford Treasury. (3) In this manner it was hoped to release Vavasour's field army from the blockade, replacing it with local men led by local gentry and paid by local money.

The defect of the scheme was that it was too late. All through March the High Command

1. Corbet, p. 333-5; Bod. L. Clarendon MS 27 f 73; Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 ff 29, 45; Bod. L. Rawlinson MS D395 f 17
2. Brit. L. Harl. MS 6852 ff 54-62
had infuriated Vavasour by issuing him with conflicting orders, in obedience to which he and his army indulged in much fruitless marching in the Cotswolds. He was at least able to maintain the pressure on Gloucester, and block the way of Parliament's convoy of supplies, which had by now reached Warwick and was awaiting an opening for its final dash. At the end of the month, however, the great Royalist defeat at Cheriton in Hampshire made Charles call Vavasour's army into his own to protect Oxford. It became a permanent part of the royal field force. Its disappearance left the country between Warwick and Gloucester open, and the Parliamentarian convoy got through, followed by a regiment of horse, while the Lords Commissioners were making their reports. Sudeley was duly garrisoned and Chandos' horse stationed nearby as the reports dictated, but it was a classic case of closing the stable door after the horse had bolted. Massey was now strong enough to take the offensive and in mid-April he attacked Mynne at Newent. In this emergency Vavasour, though not his army, was sent back to the area. Massey's assault had been repulsed, but Sir William nevertheless ordered Mynne to withdraw to Ross-on-Wye and fortify himself there to protect Herefordshire. The Colonel-General himself settled at Hereford to enact a grand scheme for a new local army and new campaigns.

In reality his command was already extinguished, destroyed by court politics. Since December it had become obvious to everybody that Lord Herbert had retired permanently from the local war, and sooner or later would be replaced as Lieutenant-General by a commander prepared to do some fighting. A field of three candidates rapidly emerged;

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1. Bod. L. Rawlinson MS D395 ff 172-3, Firth MS C7 f 13; Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 76
2. Ibid. ff 76, 144; Brit. L. Harl. MS 6802 f 62; Bod. L. Firth MS C7 f 13
3. Corbet, pp. 344-5; Bod. L. Clarendon MS 27 ff 74-5; Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 144
4. Ibid. f 156
Chandos, Viscount Conway and Vavasour himself. Sir William was at several disadvantages in this contest, being of inferior birth, of tarnished reputation as a general and possessing powerful enemies. The most powerful of these was Herbert himself, whose enmity was engendered directly by his equivocal military position, whereby he commanded in theory and Vavasour in practice. The High Command found it expedient to send orders directly to Sir William, whereas Herbert, disregarding the realities of warfare, felt they ought to proceed through himself. The crisis came when the King ordered the Colonel-General to appoint one man to command his horse and the Lieutenant-General ordered him to appoint another. Vavasour naturally obeyed the royal order and Herbert never forgave him.\(^{(1)}\) Almost as inevitable was the enmity of Winter and Mynne, who criticised Sir William for misunderstanding the strategic situation and neglecting their needs, errors arising naturally from the size of the operation needed to contain Gloucester compared with the paucity of the Colonel-General's resources.\(^{(2)}\) Against these Vavasour could muster the support of the Glamorganshire commissioners, who hated Herbert, and the powerful Tracy family in Gloucestershire, who presumably wished to assert their local independence against Chandos.\(^{(3)}\) In addition he possessed one trump card, the friendship of Prince Rupert.

Vavasour determined to utilise his advantages and negate his weaknesses by promoting a subtle scheme to obtain the overall command for Rupert himself, preserving his own power as Colonel-General intact as Rupert's deputy. In the early months of 1644 he mobilised a

\[\text{Pythouse Papers, p. 16; Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 134}\]
\[\text{Bod. L. Clarendon MS 27 ff 73-5}\]
\[\text{Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 16}\]
lobby at court and in his counties to achieve this effect, to which Rupert consented.\(^{(1)}\) Half the plan was achieved, and Rupert replaced Herbert. The latter, however, laid down two conditions for his voluntary resignation.\(^{(2)}\) One was that his own home of Raglan Castle and the nearby fortress of Goodrich should remain under his personal command, supported by the local tax of the surrounding hundreds and outside the jurisdiction of his successor. The other was that Vavasour should be sacked. Both were granted, and Sir William never held another command. The King asked Rupert to appoint a new Colonel-General, remarking that Chandos seemed the most highly favoured candidate at court.\(^{(3)}\) Rupert respected military realities more than court opinion, and chose instead the most experienced soldier upon the spot, the newcomer and outsider Nicholas Mynne. The effect upon Chandos and Conway was dramatic; within two months both had abandoned the Royalist cause and surrendered to Parliament.\(^{(4)}\)

Vavasour's command had lasted nearly a year. If he had not improved the overall strategic position of his counties he had at least left them better defended. The military developments in this period were minimal, however, compared with the political. Sir William had taken command as a glorified example of the expert adviser, as Sir Nicholas Byron had been in Warwickshire, subordinate to a local potentate and using local resources upon his behalf. Mynne took command as the deputy of a foreign-born professional soldier, using troops raised and trained elsewhere to defend an area from which the greater local leaders had retired and the lesser remained as subordinates.

\(^{(1)}\) Ibid. ff 16, 112  
\(^{(2)}\) Bod. L. Firth MS C8 f 337  
\(^{(3)}\) Brit. L. Harl. MS 6802 f 111  
\(^{(4)}\) Lords' Journals 6, pp.518, 578-9
11 : BYRON

Sir John Byron was the head of a distinguished military family seated at Newstead in Nottinghamshire. Sir Nicholas was his uncle, and his brothers Sir Richard, Sir Thomas and Sir Gilbert all fought in the Royalists cause. He had learned soldiering in the Netherlands in the 1630's, and served Charles against the Scots in 1640. On the outbreak of civil war he became, as said, Colonel of the first horse regiment raised for the royal army, and for his services as a cavalry commander Charles rewarded Sir John and his heirs in October 1643 with the peerage which was to end two centuries later at Missolonghi. A month later he was en-route for Chester with an army.

This expedition had begun as a project for the reconquest of Lancashire. When the Royalists had been defeated there in May two of their leaders, Lord Molyneux and Sir Thomas Tilley, had escaped from the debacle with two horse regiments and one of foot. After long wanderings these had joined Charles' army and served with it through the Gloucester campaign. At the onset of winter the High Command considered whether these troops, now quartered in Hampshire, might not be better employed in an attempt to regain their native county. The disappearance of these three regiments would reduce the burden of the field army on southern England while not significantly diminishing that army's strength, as after their long service they represented its weakest units. Charles asked Rupert to recommend a commander for the enterprise, and the Prince suggested Byron. The latter was permitted to add his own horse, themselves much reduced in numbers, to

1. DNB 'Byron'
2. Bod. L. Ashmole MS 832 ff 191-4
the expeditionary force. (1)

Even before this force departed, its object had become more complex. On 11th November the news of the Parliamentarian invasion of north-east Wales, and Capel's impotence to stop it, reached Oxford. Charles ordered Byron to muster his little army immediately and to assist the Lieutenant-General in defeating the invaders while en-route to Lancashire. (2) Byron appointed Evesham as his rendezvous, and his troops received there a large convoy of weapons and munitions from the Oxford magazine. (3) On 30th November they reached Shrewsbury, comprising 1000 horse and 300 foot. (4)

Events had by then moved ahead of both him and Capel, propelled by the appearance of a new and formidable Royalist army literally out of the sea. It represented the first of the shipments of Irish army units which Charles had ordered the Marquis of Ormonde to despatch to England following his truce with the Catholic rebels. The regiments posted in Munster were destined for Bristol, and landed there as described. Ormonde's own Leinster army was ordered to take ship for Chester. (5) These soldiers would, Ormonde warned, require a great administrative effort from the English Royalists whom they were to assist. There were no ships at Dublin capable of transporting troops, so that these would have to be sent from England. Furthermore the civil war had cut off the supplies from England upon which the Irish army had depended, and its soldiers were underpaid, underclothed and underfed. If these wants were not supplied when they returned to England, their loyalty could not be guaranteed. (6)

1. Pythouse Papers, p. 2; Brit. L. Add. MS 18980 ff 144, 145, 147
3. PRO W. O. 55/459 ff 621, 625; Bod. L. Rawlinson MS 395 f 3, MS Film 191 f 100
4. TSANHS 1896, p. 205; Bod. L. Carte MS 7 f 555
5. Brit. L. Harl. MS 2135 f 16
6. Bod. L. Carte MS 7 f 192
The High Command accordingly took measures to ensure their transportation and refreshment. A fleet of seven Bristol ships under Captain Baldwin Wake was despatched to Dublin to carry the troops over. A proclamation was issued declaring the Irish currency in the soldiers' pockets to be legal tender in England. As Capel had already drawn heavily upon the resources of north-east Wales for his campaigns, it was decided to squeeze those of the north-western counties to supply the troops when they arrived. The commissioners of Anglesey, Caernarvonshire and Merionethshire were accordingly instructed to provide a total of 1300 suits and a proportionable number of shoes and stockings, plus food or money to maintain 4000 men for a fortnight. That ambitious duo Thomas Bulkeley and Archbishop Williams, swiftly ingratiated themselves with Ormonde as they had Capel, and set about assisting Bridgeman in collecting these supplies. The Marquis reciprocated by sending cannon and powder from his stores to all three to strengthen their respective strongholds of Beaumaris, Conway and Chester.

On 15th November Wake's ships appeared off the Flintshire coast, carrying 1500 of Ormonde's soldiers under the command of Sir Michael Erneley. They comprised most of the foot regiments of Erneley himself, Sir Fulke Hunckes, Richard Gibson, Sir Robert Byron and Colonel Langley, plus some horse led by John Marrow. On the 16th they came ashore. Brereton, preparing to besiege Chester, received the appalling news that hundreds of crack troops were pouring onto the neighbouring beaches to avenge the raw local levies he had just defeated. He attempted to persuade Erneley and his officers to

1. Ibid. ff 389, 409-10, 412  
2. Bod. L. Wentworth Proclamation 43  
3. Bod. L. Rawlinson MS D924 ff 145-6; NLW Clenaenau Letter 539  
4. Bod. L. Carte MS 7 ff 393, 409-10  
5. Ibid. ff 14, 192, 255-6, 424, 462, 564  
6. Ibid. ff 533, 647
defect to Parliament and the local population to resist the newcomers. When both efforts
failed he and Myddleton fled back into Cheshire, leaving only a garrison in Howarden
Castle to show for their recent victories. Erneley marched triumphantly to Chester,
leaving a detachment to reduce Howarden, which surrendered after twelve days.\(^1\)

In early December Byron, Capel and Erneley, each with his own army, met at
Chester. They became the subject of a debate concerning their respective commands,
conducted and decided hundreds of miles away at Oxford. It had originally been intended
that Ormonde, himself a distinguished general, would cross with his army and lead it to
the King. By 29th November, therefore, a commission had been prepared at Oxford appoint­
ing him Commander-in-Chief of all the forces he was sending into England, plus the existing
Royalist forces in the area of Capel's command, where he was to land.\(^2\) Doubts arose,
however, whether the Marquis would not be better employed in Ireland, where his authority
and experience were unique, than in England where another able general could do as well.
The King eventually decided to instruct him to remain at Dublin, and to appoint Byron to
lead the troops sent over.\(^3\) Byron had originally been sent north with the title of Field
Marshal in Capel's counties and in Lancashire, which empowered him to lead his expedition
but kept him firmly subordinate to Capel when in his area and to the northern Royalist leader,
the Marquis of Newcastle, when in Lancashire.\(^4\) It was now decided to replace the dis­
credited Capel as Lieutenant-General with Ormonde, who would delegate his command to
Byron as Field Marshal.\(^5\) The new commission was sealed on 19th December\(^6\) and

\(^1\) Ibid. 8 ff 91-2
\(^2\) Ibid. 7 f 680
\(^3\) Ibid. 8 ff 112, 482-90
\(^4\) Ibid. 7 ff 637-8
\(^5\) Ibid. f 529
\(^6\) Bod. L. Dugdale MS 19 f 44
by it Byron became effective commander of North Wales and its March as well as leader of Ormonde's army. Capel arrived back at court on the same day, to an official welcome. Like Herbert, his noble status insulated him from censure and he was soon given high civilian appointments, though no more military commands.

While this dispute was conducted, the local Royalist civilian administration was achieving one of its rare triumphs, in providing for the newly-arrived soldiers at Chester. The lynch-pin of this effort was Bridgeman, who made a personal tour of North Wales to ensure that the supplies ordered were gathered. He was able to provide Erneley's men with all the shoes and stockings they required and obtained cloth to cut into clothing for them. To pay them he raised £1000 upon his tour and more money thereafter. In early December the remainder of Sir Robert Byron's regiment and Henry Warren's, another 1300 foot, crossed from Dublin to Chester and Bridgeman had clothing, shoes and stockings waiting for them when they arrived. He ensured that these men, like Erneley's, received some regular money during their stay in Chester. By these efforts the newly-arrived troops were kept relatively well-behaved and loyal to the Royalist cause despite attempts by Brereton to win them over. Byron's army also appears to have been provided for although Capel's clearly represented a strain upon resources in addition to the other soldiers, as the Corporation presented the Lieutenant-General with £100 worth of the city plate as (successful) bribe to remove them. The only administrative failure of the entire operation concerned Wake's fleet, which was intended by the Royalist leaders at Chester

1. Bod. L. MS Eng. Hist. c 53 f 106
2. Bod. L. Carte MS 7 ff 637-8
3. Brit. L. Harl. MS 2135 f 18; Bod. L. Carte MS 7 ff 637-8, 8 ff 3, 7
4. Ibid. 8 ff 211-12
5. Ibid. 7 ff 637-8
6. Chester RO A/F/26/4; HMC 3rd Report, Appendix p. 259
to take in supplies from Anglesey. (1) The island's gentry, led by Bulkeley considered themselves incapable of providing the quantity of victuals Wake required, and the burden of maintaining his crews was given to Ormonde. (2) This was a minor flaw in an otherwise impressive achievement, for which Bridgeman was justly rewarded with the post of Attorney to the Court of Wards. (3) The appointment marked a shift in his career, for in January he departed to take his seat in the Royalist Parliament and never returned to the local war. He had no personal need to do so, for in a sense Bridgeman's war was already won, having secured him the pleasures of a life at court.

On 12th December Byron took the field, his army being refreshed and the burden upon Chester becoming serious. Reinforced by local soldiers, his army and the men from Ireland made up a splendid force of 4000 foot and 1000 horse, almost all veterans. This scored a remarkable initial success on the 13th, when a small detachment surprised and took the impregnable castle of Beeston. Its fall exposed all southern Cheshire, where the Royalist army stormed the lesser garrisons with a ferocity that earned its commander the nickname of 'the bloody bragchio' in the Parliamentarian press. Brereton obtained reinforcements from Manchester and on the 26th he offered battle at Middlewich, where he had routed Aston. If he had hoped that the place preserved some luck for him he was wrong, for Byron's men destroyed his army with almost contemptuous ease. All the fruits of a year's hard and patient fighting were now lost, as the Royalists over-ran all Cheshire. Brereton and some of his adherents fled to Manchester. The remaining Parliamentarians retired into

1. UCNW Baron Hill MS 5367
2. NLW MS 1546E (iii); Bod. L. Carte MS 8 ff 211-12
3. Ibid. 8 f 137
Nantwich, which was soon their only hold in the shire. The town proved too well-defended to be stormed, and Byron settled down to besiege it.\(^{(1)}\)

During this triumphant progress the High Command was attempting to strengthen the Royalist area in Byron's rear. In December it ordered the commissioners of North Wales to impress 1250 men to repair the broken foot regiment of Robert Ellis, which was intended to guard the area. When they failed to provide this number, they received a royal rebuke.\(^{(2)}\) When Capel had retired to Oxford he had left his army in Shropshire to protect mid-Wales and its March. Charles ordered Bridgeman's former military advisers, Shipman and Sir Nicholas Byron, to proceed to the area to provide for its needs, and those of the local garrisons such as Shrewsbury.\(^{(3)}\) As his reward, Sir Nicholas was to be appointed the first military governor of Chester, which had had protected for a year as the servant of the Corporation.\(^{(4)}\) It must have been a bitter blow to him that although his commission as governor was signed he never took it up. On 14th January he was escorting some munitions from Shrewsbury to his nephew's army when a Parliamentarian party from Wem surprised and captured him.\(^{(5)}\) In this fashion another familiar figure vanished from the local war.

Meanwhile Parliament was taking its own measures to oppose Byron. On learning of Brereton's defeat it had ordered to the area its nearest field army, that in Lincolnshire under Sir Thomas Fairfax. After a difficult march Fairfax's men arrived in Staffordshire in early January, only to be harassed by Byron's horse, which he had sent out under Marrow.

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1. Ibid. ff 211-12, 464-5; Burghall's Diary, p. 172; E. 81.19, 30.7, 29.7, 29.9. These events and those preceding and succeeding them, are described in detail and with verve by J. Lowe, in the Trans. Lancashire and Cheshire Historic Society 1959, pp. 47-76. I differ from Dr. Lowe on several small points, mainly resulting from my use of the original Carte MSS where he has confined himself to the selection in publication.
2. NLW Add. MS 520D f 37; TSANHS 1896, pp. 206-7; See above, p.
3. HMC 3rd Report, Appendix P. 259
4. Bod. L. Dugdale MS 19 f 43; Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 2
5. E. 33.20; Carte, Letters, pp. 40-2
to attack the approaching Parliamentarians. Sir Thomas turned north, and joined Brereton and his Lancashire compatriots at Manchester, where he settled down to the difficult task of combining their quarrelsome forces with his own. (1) In the interim Byron continued to besiege Nantwich, and by late January the town's fall was daily expected. When this occurred, the Field Marshal intended to fulfil his original design and recover Lancashire, securing all north-western England. (2) It is possible that the High Command had always intended the troops from Ireland to join him for this task. (3) Any discussion of the objectives of Charles and his councillors, however, is always bedevilled by their inclination to rapid changes of purpose, as seen in the matter of Ormonde's command and in the complaints of Vavasour. This in turn tended to create confusion among their subordinates. For example, Byron was convinced that he was eventually destined to fight the Scottish army invading England to support Parliament. (4) The King, on the contrary, had already ordered the Marquis of Newcastle, who was facing the Scots, to leave Byron's army in Lancashire and not to call it to his aid. (5)

To forestall any further moves by Byron whatsoever, and to save Nantwich, Fairfax led his composite army into Cheshire and arrived outside the town on 25th January, to find his opponents awaiting him. The ensuing battle was the biggest to be fought in the region. Fairfax's army was larger but Byron's of better quality, and the struggle was hard and protracted. In the end it was Byron's men who broke. The best study of the battle (6) attributes this result to a sally by the Nantwich garrison upon the Royalist rear, while

1. Ibid. pp. 36-40; HMC 10th Report, Appendix 4, pp.68-9; Somers Tracts Vol.5, pp. 387-8; Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 8
2. Ibid. f 2
3. See, for example, Bod. L. Carte MS 7 ff 637-8
4. Ibid. 8 f 444
5. Brit. L. Harl. MS 6988 ff 166-7
noting that the ultimate fault lay with Byron himself, whose control over his men was much laxer than that of Fairfax. Sir Thomas is indeed often acclaimed as the best general of the entire war, whereas Lord Byron, as shall be seen later, was found wanting in other actions.

During the next month Fairfax patiently reduced all the new Royalist garrisons which had been created in eastern Cheshire and northern Staffordshire during the brief period of Royalist superiority. Brereton and Myddleton journeyed to London to obtain new materials with which to rebuild their battered armies. Byron retired to Chester with the remnant of his own consisting of all the horse and over a thousand foot. Although they were enough to ensure the safety of the city, there was no possibility of the Field Marshal taking the offensive again for a long period. All his officers except his brother Sir Robert had been captured, and the troops were demoralised. Their situation was worsened by the fact that the corporation of Chester had not been expecting their return, Bridgeman and Sir Nicholas Byron were both gone, and attempts to provide money and supplies for the soldiers were correspondingly chaotic. The soldiers, in turn, behaved badly and were soon hated by the citizens.

Lord Byron's campaign was nevertheless, like those of Vavasour, not totally devoid of effect. While the Royalists held Beeston Castle their enemies would find it difficult to dominate western Cheshire once more and menace Chester and North Wales. Byron himself retained a body of seasoned troops to provide the foundation of a new army. Yet, as with

1. Burghall's Diary, pp. 177-8; E. 252. 20, 33. 31, 33. 33
2. Bod. L. Carte MS 9 f 81; Carte, Letters, pp. 39-40; Brit. L. Harl. MS 2135 ff 40-3, 54-8
Vavasour, the most important developments of this period were ultimately concerned with internal power. At Chester the native-born Bridgeman had been replaced as the leading figure by the Field-Marshal, an outsider. Although local gentry still controlled Shropshire, the King had entrusted the hastening of supplies there to two other 'foreign' military men. One Shropshire squire delivered a prophetic comment upon the latter development:

'this day we were all summoned to Ludlow by a sole commissioner cased with a colonel; if this may pass for current certainly the Array is extinct, and we are all slaves to the Generalissimo.' (1)

1. TSANHS 1896, p. 209
Sir Gilbert Gerard was a younger son of the Gerards of Halsall, a family of soldiers as distinguished as the Byrons. They were seated in Lancashire, and there Sir Gilbert raised a foot regiment at the opening of the Civil War and led it to the royal army. At least six other members of his family served in that army with him. He himself made his name in January 1643 by his defence of the Buckinghamshire village of Brill. In November the King, vexed by the quarrels of the Worcestershire Royalists and faced with the problem of finding a successor to Russell as governor of Worcester, determined to appoint an outsider to the post. He asked Rupert to recommend a capable officer, and the Prince suggested Sir Gilbert. He took up residence at Worcester a month later.

The feelings of the Worcestershire commissioners regarding his appointment may be likened to those of the frogs in the fable, who upon complaining of being ruled by a log found themselves ruled by a water-snake instead. Gerard found them as mutually hostile as ever, but unanimous in their resentment of himself. The High Command itself guaranteed his unpopularity by associating him with additions to the already considerable burdens upon the county. Firstly, it decided to increase the military strength of Worcestershire, and the obstacles in the path of any convoy attempting to break through to Gloucester, by moving units of the field army into the shire. Sir Gilbert's own regiment accompanied him to Worcester, while a Yorkshireman, Henry Washington, was made governor of Evesham and settled there with his dragoon regiment. Aston's horse were also

2. Brit. L. Add. MS 18980 f 154
3. Bod. L. Firth MS C6 f 52
quartered in the Evesham area. Washington was reinforced by the local soldiers of Sandys and the former field regiment of the deceased Beaumont, now led by his Lieutenant-Colonel, Godfrey. Russell’s regiments apparently remained near Worcester. In addition Sir Gilbert raised some new horse in his own name.

At the same time as the High Command provided Worcestershire with more soldiers to pay for, it attempted to tap the county’s financial resources for its own ends. Gerard was instructed to put pressure on the corporation of Worcester for the £2,000 loan it had promised the King in September. He did so, and became much resented in the city. The corporation was forced to send a deputation to the King asking him to reduce the amount demanded to £1,500 and presenting him immediately with £200, raised by a frantic appeal to the wealthier citizens. In addition the royal Ordnance Department ordered Gerard to continue the convoys of iron from Worcester to Oxford, which had been halted by the growing scarcity of horses and carts, and to raise £600 in the shire for the Department’s needs. Both these demands were fulfilled in January.

During the same period the resources of the county were being depleted by enemy activity. A party of Parliamentarians settled near Alcester in November and began living off south-east Worcestershire. The local Royalists were too divided to agree upon a leader to mount an expedition against them. In December some colleagues of theirs, under Colonel John Fox, established themselves near Birmingham, and commenced raids on the north-east. Gerard found the Royalists at Worcester barely capable of defending

1. Ibid. f 279; Corbet, p. 334; E.45.12
2. Bod. L. MS Film 191 f 101; PRO W.O. 55/459 ff 643-5
4. Brit. L. Add. MS 18980 f 165
5. Corporation Order Book 2 f 219
6. PRO W.O. 55/459 f 659; Bod. L. Rawlinson MS D395 ff 98-9
7. Dugdale’s Diary, pp. 55-6
8. Ibid. p. 57; E.79.8, 37.1, 252.14
themselves, let alone counter-attacking; the fortifications were in disrepair, the regular garrison reduced to 200 foot by lack of pay and the citizen regiment slovenly and inefficient. (1)

All these problems combined to reduce Sir Gilbert to frustration and fury after a month as governor. He had arrived with dreams of raising 2,000 more soldiers and conquering Warwickshire. (2) Instead the most he could accomplish was to drive the enemy from the Alcester area in January, (3) for his troops rapidly became immobilised by lack of money. Only a tenth of the county tax, which was intended to support these soldiers, was gathered in December and January, with the result that the men received one week's pay in six. (4)

This situation produced a very dangerous impasse in relations between the governor and the commissioners. The latter believed that there were now too many soldiers in the shire for local resources to support, while Gerard believed that the answer lay in more ruthless exploitation of these resources. He concluded that the local Royalist leaders were themselves the main obstacle to efficient administration, and wrote ominously to Rupert, 'I confess myself altogether ignorant of the commissioners' powers, but if nothing can be done without them, I believe His Majesty's business will not be much advanced'. (5)

The approaching clash between governor and commissioners was not to occur. Gerard's command, like Byron's, was about to be subjected to the administrative acumen of a much greater personality than either, one who was to rationalise and control the changes taking place in local Royalist government.

1. Brit. L. Add. MS 18980 f 165; Bod. L. Firth MS C6 f 58
2. Ibid. f 52
3. Dugdale's Diary, p. 59
4. Bod. L. Firth MS C6 f 52
5. Ibid.
Prince Rupert was a younger son of the Rhenish Wittelsbachs, the most illustrious ruined family of his age. As such, it was a natural development that he would become a professional soldier, and he embraced that career from early adolescence. Nonetheless when he joined his uncle in 1642 he was still only twenty-three, and although he had seen action he had not yet held a major command. It appears that his appointment as Charles' Commander of Horse was a gesture of courtesy, extended to him as the King's closest full-grown male relative present at the time. If this were the case, Rupert soon proved himself worthy, commencing a string of brilliant actions which have established him as one of history's great generals. To the Parliamentarian pamphleteers he became a terrifying barbarian, with an uncanny taste in disguises and strange pets.

Like many men of genius, the Prince was clearly conscious of his talents and proud of them. This self-confidence combined with his youth and an over-serious nature to produce an inability to react reasonably to any disagreement with his views. At court, where his birth and his position both made him automatically a major figure, such a trait won him almost as bad a reputation among many Royalists as among the enemy. One of those alienated was Clarendon, who portrayed him in his History as a rough, blunt soldier with contempt for the opinions of any civilians from Clarendon downwards. Since then, although each generation pays yet more tributes to Rupert's personal dash and military brilliance, this character-study has received little amendment. The purpose of the present section is
to test it, by studying the Prince in his hitherto disregarded role as a wartime administrator.

His assumption of that role commenced on 6th January 1644, when he was commissioned to replace the distant Ormonde as commander of the army, and the region, at that time commanded in practice by Byron. To raise him in status above other regional commanders he was given the title of Captain-General. He appears to have been impelled into a local command by the hostility he had aroused, as described, at court, for Clarendon imputed to him 'a desire to command a body apart from the King's army, upon some private differences and dislikes'. Byron's victorious progress relieved the Prince initially of the need for any hasty departure to take up the commission, but his defeat at Nantwich altered the strategic situation completely. It created an urgent need for exactly such a powerful controlling figure as Rupert to repair the defences of North Wales and its March. With this task in mind his commission was enlarged on 5th February to empower him to create and dismiss both civilian commissioners and military officers within his counties. The following day he left Oxford to take up the command, accompanied by his own crack horse regiment and some foot.

From the beginning the Prince approached the role of administrator with an unprecedented energy and breadth of vision. Before he departed he despatched letters to the commissioners of every county in his command. Those of Cheshire, Shropshire and Worcestershire were ordered to call meetings of their respective communities to discuss administrative problems, and those of the Welsh shires were ordered to appoint representatives

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1. Bod. L. Dugdale MS 19 f 48
2. VII. 403n
3. Dugdale MS 19 f 55
4. Bod. L. Carendon MS 28 f 129
to attend the Prince at these meetings. (1) At the same time letters were sent to military
governors such as Ottley at Shrewsbury, (2) demanding a report upon the condition of their
garrisons.

Quite apart from these formal measures, Rupert gained a great deal of information
from proteges of his own whom he had sent ahead of him into the area. These already
included Gerard at Worcester and Byron at Chester, and in January he despatched to
Shrewsbury the two experienced soldiers who had served Capel, Woodhouse and Mennes,
to prepare the town for his coming. The reports of all four men were strikingly similar,
conveying a sense of an approaching collapse of the local war effort which they attributed
to the ineptitude of the local leaders. Gerard's letters upon this theme have been quoted.
Byron rapidly developed a hatred of local people in general, referring to Ottley as 'an old,
doting fool'. (3) At Shrewsbury, Mennes and Woodhouse found both Capel's horse and
Ottley's 300 foot ready to disband for lack of pay, no money forthcoming and the townspeople
obviously hostile. They attempted to introduce a new efficiency at once, hanging a guard
for sleeping on duty and attempting to hang the town marshal for allowing a prisoner to
escape. Ottley and the Royalist gentry responded by refusing to admit Mennes and Woodhouse
to their meetings and appealing to Rupert for the marshal's life. Mennes in turn fulminated
to Rupert against 'the insulting people, who now tell us their power, and that three of the
Commissioners of Array may question the best of us, from which power good Lord deliver
me'. (4) In this matter the local people were certainly legally correct, but then Rupert's

1. WSL Salt MS 551
2. Owen and Blakeway, Vol. 1, p. 439
3. Bod. L. Carte MS 9 f 123; Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 8
4. Ibid, ff 25, 27, 28; Bod. L. Firth MS C6 f 71
officers might claim with equal justice that the legal authorities had failed in their duty.

This was the devil's brew that Rupert inherited. Given his character as portrayed by Clarendon and the reports received from his henchmen, it would seem reasonable to expect him to have solved these problems by a ruthless assault upon the commissioners and their powers. Instead, he attempted a complete overhaul of the administration in partnership with them. He arrived at Worcester on 8th February, and on the 10th, presumably after the county meeting, issued a proclamation 'with the consent of the Commissioners'. It enacted a suggestion of theirs, which Gerard had ridiculed, that the number of soldiers in the county be reduced to a level which it could support. There were to be 2,000 foot and 500 horse, and to pay them properly the monthly tax was to be raised to £4,000 for three months and then reduced to the old level, or lower if possible. Free quarter and plunder were to be ended on pain of court martial, and a Council of War was to sit weekly at Worcester to hold the courts martial. The prices to be paid for fodder and victuals were also fixed and so were the days on which garrisons were supplied, to ensure that their governors kept good accounts.

In addition the Prince ordered specific measures to improve the county's security. He decreed a new programme of fortification for Worcester, requiring 300 workmen. Evesham, and Sandys' foot regiment which held it, were put under a Warwickshire gentleman, John Knotsford, freeing Sandys to lead his horse regiment. These directions could not have pleased the citizens of Worcester who paid for the fortifications, and definitely displeased

1. Bod. L. Clarendon MS 28 f 129
2. Worcestershire RO 705/24/876
3. Chamber Order Book 2 f 220
4. Symonds, pp. 11-12
Sandys. Nor could the administrative reforms solve the problem of arrears upon the tax, for all the factors contributing to those arrears remained. Nevertheless they completely removed the friction between Gerard and the commissioners, and produced an energetic drive to collect the tax both in county and city. The Council of War sat, and executed plunderers. A dramatic display of regular justice was made at the Easter Assizes, when Sandys' brother Martin, colonel of the city regiment, was tried under civilian law for the murder of a fellow officer.

On 15th February Rupert advanced to Bridgnorth, and installed as governor another experienced soldier, Sir Lewis Kirke, a Londoner recently knighted for his performance as acting governor of Oxford. On the 19th, he reached Shrewsbury. By this time the local Royalists had stated their case to him by letter, to balance the complaints of Mennes and Woodhouse. The root of the trouble lay in the fact that on Capel's departure the gentry had agreed to support his horse, 300 strong, for only a month longer. Upon the expiry of that time they had refused to pay more, leaving the Royalist commissioners to attempt to support them from their private incomes. These had proved so inadequate that the regiment had dwindled to 70 men.

Rupert's solution was another large-scale reform, of which however only traces survive in the sources. To cope with the shortage of cash at Shrewsbury he ordered the garrison to be paid in kind. The county tax was in future to consist of a levy of 6d. in the Pound on all men's estates 'without partiality or excuse'.

1. Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 85
2. Ibid. ff 68, 85; Chamber Order Book 2 ff 220-1
3. WSL Salt MS 518
4. Bod. L. MS Eng. Hist. c309
5. Shaw, p. 215; Harleian Society, Vol. 17, p. 33; Bod. L. Clarendon MS 28 f 129
6. Ibid.
7. Bod. L. Firth MS C6 f 80
8. Bod. L. MS Eng. Hist. c 53 f 122
9. TSANHS 1896, p. 240
10. HMC 6th Report Appendix, p. 472
shire was vested in a new commission, on which Mennes sat with the local leaders, although Ottley remained governor of Shrewsbury. This was to oversee all branches of administration and keep regular accounts. It set to work, and by March had eliminated free quarter in the county.

One incident at this period illustrates both the scrupulous fairness and the ruthless efficiency of Rupert's regime. Apley Castle was a mansion dominating the northern approaches to Shrewsbury, and Capel had installed a garrison there. Its misbehaviour caused the owner to complain to the Commissioners of Array, who promptly threw him in prison, where he languished until Rupert arrived. The Prince appointed his Commissary-General to hear the case. The unfortunate gentleman was released and given the choice of garrisoning his home with local men, accepting some of Rupert's, or blowing it up. He chose the first, but soon lost the mansion to a sally from Wem. He was given no second chance. Rupert's officers recaptured his home and destroyed it.

To represent him in North Wales the Prince appointed the local dignitary Sir Thomas Hanmer, balanced by another able outsider who had accompanied Rupert from Oxford, Dudley Wyatt. These met the commissioners of each county and agreed new local taxes. Rupert came to Chester on 11th March for two days, but his only recorded action there was to block the appointment of its MP, Sir Francis Gamull, as governor, which had been urged upon the King by the Royalist Parliament. Byron objected bitterly, arguing the dilatoriness of local leaders in enforcing military measures, and Rupert persuaded Charles

1. TSANHS 1898, pp. 158-60
2. Ibid. 1896, pp. 223-4
3. PRO SP 23/2 f 86
4. TSANHS 1896, pp. 223-4
5. HMC 6th Report Appendix, p. 472
to refuse the commission.\(^{(1)}\)

While occupied in the mobilisation of local resources, the Prince was already laying the basis of a much greater project, the construction of a new field army. To this task the provinces could supply men and money, but to complete it he required the weapons, munitions and legal powers that only the High Command could donate. To obtain them involved prevailing, at a distance, in the tangled politics of a court where vital decisions turned upon whoever held the King's ear at the critical moment. Rupert's principal enemies there consisted of Lord Digby, the Secretary of State, and Lord Ashburnham, the Treasurer. To plead his case, he was represented by Lord Jermyn, the Queen's favourite, and a clever Welshman, Arthur Trevor, who sometimes worked for Digby.

In February and March the odds in this struggle were weighted against Rupert, as the court's attention was focused upon rebuilding the royal army itself, blockading Gloucester and mounting an important offensive in Hampshire. The royal Ordnance Department could not supply Rupert as well as these projects.\(^{(2)}\) Meanwhile his arch-enemy Digby was active. He failed in an attempt to poison Ormonde's mind against the Prince\(^{(3)}\) but did succeed in obtaining for himself and Ashburnham the ransoms of Parliamentarians captured in Rupert's territory, which had been promised to Rupert for his troops.\(^{(4)}\) When the Prince attempted to consolidate his power in Wales by obtaining the old office of President of the Principality, Digby protested that the appointment could not be bestowed without its patent, which was conveniently mislaid.\(^{(5)}\) In this delicate situation Rupert's fiery temper proved an obstacle

1. Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 53; Bod. L. Firth MS C6 f 81, Clarendon MS 28 f 129; Warburton, Vol. 2, pp. 375-6
2. Pythhouse Papers, p. 52; Bod. L. Rawlinson MS D395; PRO W. O. 55/459
3. Bod. L. Carte MS 9 f 254
5. Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 ff 19, 44
in itself. He destroyed in a fit of pique an attempt by Trevor to bring about a rapprochement with Digby.\(^{(1)}\) Trevor himself, a born intriguer, involved the Prince in a new and probably unnecessary quarrel by convincing him that the lack of response from the Ordnance Department was entirely due to the enmity of its keeper, Lord Percy.\(^{(2)}\)

In some measure these disappointments were balanced by the acquisition of two foot regiments under Robert Broughton and Henry Tillier and a horse regiment led by Sir William Vaughan. These seasoned soldiers numbered 1,200 foot and 300 horse and represented the last major consignment of troops sent by Ormonde. Wake's fleet carried them over to North Wales in February, and as the Chester area was burdened by Byron's battered army they marched to Shrewsbury and joined Rupert.\(^{(3)}\) These units, with his initial force and detachments from Leveson, Bagot and Hastings, represented the troops which he took to relieve Newark in March. The town, key to the Royalist East Midlands, was besieged by a powerful army, and the King ordered Rupert to its aid.\(^{(4)}\) He relieved it on 21st March, in one of the most brilliant actions of the war, and returned triumphant to Shrewsbury on 4th April.\(^{(5)}\)

During March and early April the Prince's officers won several minor victories to parallel his major success. They were aided by the departure of Fairfax for Yorkshire and the absence of both Brereton and Myddleton in London. The only Parliamentarian leader remaining was Mytton, and he was defeated by Rupert in a skirmish before the latter's departure for Newark. He sallied out again, but on 25th March Ellis and the newly-arrived

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1. Warburton, Vol. 2, pp. 384-5; Bod. L. Carte MS 10 f 263
2. Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 95; Pythouse Papers, p. 52
3. Bod. L. Carte MS 8 ff 555-6, 9 ff 87-8, 215, Clarendon MS 28 f 129; Firth MS C6 f 11; Warburton, Vol. 1, p. 494
4. Pythouse Papers, p. 5
5. Bod. L. Clarendon MS 28 f 129
Vaughan beat him decisively at Lilleshall. By mid-April every Parliamentarian garrison in Shropshire except Wem had fallen, and Wem itself was blockaded and its troops deserting.\(^1\) Gerard took the field, defeated his enemy Fox on 24th March, and reconquered northern Worcestershire.\(^2\) Byron raided the Nantwich area, fortified Bangor-on-Dee to strengthen the defences of Wales, conquered inland Flintshire and moved into Shropshire to live off the country around Wem.\(^3\) Woodhouse attacked Brilliana Harley's fortress of Brampton Bryan. Lady Harley herself, her health undermined by her trials, had died in the winter but her garrison was thriving and had put an outpost into Hopton Castle. Woodhouse stormed Hopton and reduced Brampton by mining. Both castles were destroyed. The custom of war permitted Woodhouse to do what he wished with the prisoners from Hopton, and he chose to kill them all.\(^4\)

Newark was as great a defeat for Lord Digby as for Parliament. Rupert became the hero of the court and Charles was disposed to refuse him nothing. The Prince was made President of Wales and the areas hitherto commanded by the defeated Carbery and the supine Herbert were added to his command. Within this huge region, all Wales and the Marches, he was given absolute control of all civilian and military appointment and half the 'Privy Seal Letter' money, £12,000 in all.\(^5\) The speculation of courtiers in the ransoms of Parliamentarians from that area was stopped.\(^6\) The Ordnance Department dispatched a large convoy of munitions to Shrewsbury.\(^7\) Rupert now possessed the materials with which to construct his army.

1. Ibid; E. 39. 3, E. 42. 26, E. 43. 18; Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 62; Bod. L. Firth MS C7 f 91; HMC Earl of Denbigh MSS Vol. 1, pp. 77-8
2. E. 42. 26; WSL Salt MS 518
3. Burghall's Diary, p. 178; Archaeologia Cambrensis 1846, p. 36; Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 118
4. HMC Marquis of Bath MSS, pp. 28-38
5. Bod. L. Dugdale MS 19 f 69; Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 ff 107-8, 113-14
6. Ibid. f 86
7. PRO W. O. 55/459 ff 52-3; Pythouse Papers, p. 53
One major problem remaining was that of its destination. Charles had apparently considered that the new force should quarter in the Marches to defend them and to reinforce the royal army if needed. Rupert himself considered invading East Anglia. Byron, however, was anxious that the Prince should complete the task in which Byron had been interrupted, the conquest of all north-western England. He convinced Rupert, and visited Oxford in late April to prevail upon Charles. He was aided by the importunities of two other generals, the Earl of Derby who begged aid for his besieged mansion of Lathom in Lancashire, and the Marquis of Newcastle who was himself besieged in York. When the pressure upon York tightened the King agreed to let Rupert relieve both places, providing he left behind 2,000 foot to assist the royal army.

The Prince commenced further administrative work to secure his command in his absence. He visited Worcester on 6th May to confer with Gerard and the commissioners. They had hit upon the idea of using the county Grand Jury not, as before, as a formal mouth-piece but as a genuine sounding-board for local opinion. The Easter Sessions had produced a number of ideas for improving Rupert's New Deal, and Rupert approved them in a proclamation. Treasurers appointed by the commissioners were to receive lists of the sums due to each garrison and visit the governors on a fixed day each week to go over their accounts with them. Soldiers were only to collect arrears if accompanied by the civilian tax collector, the local constable.

At Shrewsbury the Prince ordered the committee he had appointed in February to settle

1. Ibid. p. 16; Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 130
2. Bod. L. Carte MS 10 f 263
3. Pythouse Papers, pp. 8-9; Dugdale's Diary, p. 65; HMC 9th Report, Appendix 2, p. 434; Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 136; Bod. L. Firth MS C7 ff 77, 103, C8 ff 261-3, Carte MS 9 ff 464-5
4. Clarendon MS 28 ff 129
5. Townshend ff 450-2
an arrangement with the corporation to support a garrison increased to 800 foot.\(^{(1)}\) Ottley was at last deprived of his governorship, for unknown reasons, and replaced by one of Ormonde’s colonels, Sir Fulke Hunckes. Kirke was left at Bridgnorth, Woodhouse made governor of Ludlow and Shipman of Oswestry. Rupert appointed his friend and Serjeant-Major, Will Legge, governor of Chester with Gamull made Lieutenant-Governor to placate him. To administer Royalist Cheshire and north-east Wales the Prince created a committee on which Legge and Gamull sat with the local leaders, specifying that Legge’s absence from any meeting automatically rendered it illegal. Marrow’s horse were left to patrol the area, and a suburb of Chester was destroyed upon Rupert’s express order to improve the city’s defences.\(^{(2)}\) To secure mid-Wales he made Richard Herbert governor of Aberystwyth Castle and, uniquely, left his father in command of the Herbert family castle of Montgomery instead of putting in a proved soldier. Presumably this was a gesture of favour to Richard.\(^{(3)}\) Horse were sent to quarter in Montgomeryshire to force it to pay its tax.\(^{(4)}\) In Lord Herbert’s counties Rupert placed Mynne in control, as shown above, with the able Lingen given Goodrich Castle.\(^{(5)}\) His disposal of Carbery’s command will be discussed in the next section.

North-west Wales gave particular cause for alarm. A Parliamentarian fleet had, belatedly, appeared off the coast to prevent Ormonde sending over any more troops, and aroused fears of a seaborne invasion.\(^{(6)}\) The internal condition of the area was also alarming. In Anglesey the feud between Bulkeley and Cheadle had flared up again.\(^{(7)}\) Archbishop Williams

1. TSANHS 1896, p. 242
3. HMC 10th Report, Appendix 4, p. 339; Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 67
4. HMC 6th Report Appendix, p. 472
6. Bod. L. Carte MS 11 f 16; UCNW Baron Hill MS 5368. No such invasion occurred; reports on Parliamentarian pamphlets of a capture of Caernarvon in April 1644, which Phillips took literally, are certainly a mistake for Carmarthen.
7. Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 77
delivered a petition from the Caernarvonshire commissioners to the King in April, complaining of the condition of that county. Its problems were two-fold. Firstly, the cessation of the cattle-trade with London and the already considerable drain of men into the Royalist armies had impoverished its gentry. Secondly, those gentry were now divided because the local MP's John Bodvel and William Thomas had used their position in the Royalist Parliament to obtain commissions to raise foot regiments. The two men had turned the new regiments into local power blocs by filling them with their own local supporters, who they insisted were now exempted by military status from the power of the commissioners.

Rupert faced these problems. He ordered a report to be made upon the real possibility of a seaborne attack, which concluded that there was reason for concern. He sent a special questionnaire to the Sheriff of Anglesey to determine the island's state of defence. A monthly tax of £200 was agreed there, at Rupert's new rate of 6d. in the Pound from all men, half to be paid in kind. Bulkeley and his friends fortified Holyhead and Ormonde managed to send over a few horse to patrol the island. The Prince ordered the repair of Harlech Castle and commissioned as governor William Owen, a local man but one who had proved himself in the field army where his brother John was a colonel. As Commander-in-Chief of the three counties he appointed Mennes. Clearly aware of both the poverty of the inhabitants and their suspicion of strangers, he ordered Sir John to 'deal very gently and civilly' with them and to employ them as garrisons for the coastal strong-points.

1. NLW Llanfair-Brynodol MS 62
2. Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 97
3. Bod. L. Clarendon MS 23 ff 122-3
4. Bod. L. Carte MS 10 f 439
5. NLW Clennenau Letters 537, 542. See above, Ch.2
6. Carte MS 10 f 601
In this manner Rupert placed each county in his command in the control of men whom he believed able and disinterested, aloof from both local interests and local animosities. To prevent them from succumbing to the vices of despots, and to prevent the alienation of the local leaders, he defined the powers of his new commanders within a framework of rules which ensured the local gentry a considerable share in government. This represented a revolution in wartime administration, and the most rational possible solution of the crisis in that administration which had confronted the Prince on his appointment.

Three case-studies illustrate the virtues and the limitations of Rupert's rule. The first is from Myddle, Shropshire, where the Prince entered an inn. He drank some ale, praised it, paid the landlord handsomely and exhorted his soldiers to follow his example. They listened and when he had departed they drank the inn dry and paid nothing. The second is from Worcester, where Henry Townshend, the Commissioner of Safety, presented Rupert with a petition complaining of a dispute with the sequestration commissioners. The Prince was in such a hurry that he galloped off with the paper unread, but a few days later Townshend received a letter signed in Shrewsbury, bringing the case to the notice of the sequestrators and ordering them to account to Rupert for their decision. It is an anecdote worthy of Plutarch. Yet two years later Townshend had still not obtained satisfaction.

The third is from Caernarvonshire. Rupert's chaplain, wishing to make a donation to his master at no cost to himself, adroitly signed over to him £50 lent by his wife six years

1. Gough, p. 32  
2. Townshend ff 649-50  
3. Ibid. ff 551-3, 679  
4. NLW Wynn MS 1728-36
before to the Caernarvonshire commissioner Owen Wynn. Rupert bombarded Wynn for two months with increasingly threatening demands until the wretched gentleman, lacking the cash, was forced to sign away two family annuities. The episode does reveal the Prince's desperate need for money to pay his troops, but it also raised doubt as to whether such a sum was worth the damage done to the Royalist cause by this hounding of a loyal local leader.

This last anecdote sheds light upon an obscure but possibly important phenomenon. The Royalist clergy had, as shown, been important agents in promoting the King's cause, and also represented a considerable source of funds. Thus it became a source of concern to Rupert that by 1644 the growing impoverishment of the provinces had resulted in increasing non-payment of tithes and fees by parishioners to their priests. The complaints of the clergy caused him to issue a proclamation ordering the dues to be paid on pain of court martial. This situation may have produced a rift between the established Church and local populations, weakening the political influence of the Royalist clergy. No firm evidence, however, exists upon the matter.

By May Rupert's new army was ready. It lay in two divisions, formed around the two existing forces of Byron at Chester and Rupert at Shrewsbury. Both had been recruiting hard for two months. In part their strength had been increased by the arrival of units from elsewhere. Rupert's own excellent foot regiment had come up from winter quarters at Bristol. Agents had recruited a new foot regiment for Byron in Ireland, which had crossed to Chester

1. Eg. HMC 14th Report, Appendix 8, p. 203
2. NLW Wynn MS 1733, and see NLW Rhual MS 177
3. Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 62
before the Parliamentarian fleet arrived. In addition, men were obtained by drawing
them from existing garrisons, a policy with, as shall be seen, fatal repercussions. The
largest single detachment of garrison troops was the body of horse, a few hundred strong,
which Leveson led to Rupert from Dudley Castle. Finally, new recruits were obtained
from North Wales and its March. Some were certainly pressed, this work being undertaken
alongside the pressing of men for the royal army ordered in March, although the agents
of individual regiments in that army were stopped. Others may have joined voluntarily,
and 'Mercurius Aulicus' boasted that many volunteers had come to the Prince since his
victory at Newark, anxious to serve under a general who would win them booty. The news
of Newark had certainly been carefully publicised by Rupert's governors with bonfires and
other celebrations. By 5th May Byron had 500 new- raised men in his force. These
recruits were apparently divided among existing regiments, as Brigadier Young's analysis
of Rupert's army at Marston Moor reveals no regiments raised since 1643. On the other
hand, Capel's horse regiment under Mark Trevor, which had been 30 strong in February,
owned 400 troopers. These conclusions do much to weaken the thesis of Sir
Charles Firth, that the Royalists' failure was partly due to their practice of recruiting
strength by commissioning new regiments rather than filling up those already in existence.

In mid-May Rupert and Byron called their troops, dispersed to quarters, to their
colours. On the 16th Rupert's division left Shrewsbury. On the 18th Byron's division
joined it at Whitchurch, the combined forces numbering 2,000 horse and more than 6,000

1. Bod. L. Carte MS 9 f 544
2. P. Young, Marston Moor (1970), pp. 54-6, 94-7
3. Archaeologia Cambrensis 1846, p. 37; Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 62. See above, Ch. 8
4. Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 77
5. E. 43. 18
6. Add. MS 18981 f 103
7. Bod. L Firth MS C7 f 103
8. Young, pp. 54-6, 94-7
9. Ibid.
10. Cromwell's Army (1902), pp. 25-8
11. HMC 14th Report Appendix, p. 265
foot. They invaded Parliamentarian Cheshire, and detachments closed up the enemy garrisons while the rest of the army scattered to plunder, reuniting at pre-arranged places. On the 25th the whole force reached Stockport and stormed the town, pushing on into Lancashire on its road to York, and Marston Moor. (1)

1. Bod. L. Clarendon MS 28 f 129; Carte MS 10 f 664; Brit. L. Egerton MS 785 f 102; Chester RO CR63/2/19
Charles Gerard was Sir Gilbert's eldest nephew, and the head of the Gerards of Halsall. He learned soldiering in the Netherlands and, like his uncle, raised a foot regiment in 1642 and led it to the royal army, where he was commissioned to raise a horse regiment in addition. Rupert thought highly of him and in May 1644 employed his new authority of President of Wales to appoint him Carbery's successor as commander in the south-west. The commission itself has not survived, but it seems to have allotted Gerard all South Wales and Monmouthshire, leaving only Herefordshire and Gloucestershire to Mynne from Vavasour's command. This enlargement of Carbery's former area was necessitated by the fact that by this date the Royalists held nothing west of Aberystwyth, Brecon and Swansea, so that Gerard needed the resources of south-east Wales to counter-attack.

On 8th May he left Oxford with his regiments of horse and foot, and Carbery himself, to act as adviser. He entered Wales, and within a few weeks increased his force to 1,000 foot, 700 horse and 200 dragoons. Although small, this army was nevertheless more powerful than Rowland Laugharne's, and the latter did not await its impact. He abandoned Cardiganshire and Carmarthenshire, pulling back his soldiers into Tenby and Pembroke where the Parliamentarian navy could reinforce them.

These tactics placed Gerard in a difficult position. Carbery's defeat had proved the futility of attacking the Pembrokeshire seaports while Parliament

1. For reasons I am unable to discover, Warburton Gardiner and Dame Veronica Wedgwood consistently refer to him as 'Sir Charles'
3. Brit. L. Add. MS 18980 f 20
4. Pythouse Papers, p.8
5. NLW L1/MB/17 f 72
6. Phillip's belief that Cardiff had also fallen, based on E.4.12, is disproved by WSL Salt MS 517. See also E.51.7.
7. Dugdale's Diary, p.67
8. WSL Salt MS 517
controlled the sea. On the other hand he could not tie his field regiments down indefinitely to the frustrating task of waiting for Laugharne to emerge, like a cat watching a mousehole. Yet if he returned to the royal army with his troops, his enemy would simply sally out and re-occupy the whole south-west. The solution to the problem was obvious but difficult; to strengthen the local Royalists until they could hold Laugharne without aid.

He commenced this work in a manner worthy of Rupert, by ordering reports upon the munitions and weapons existing in his counties.\(^{(1)}\) Upon his departure from Oxford the King had equipped him with a powerful administrative weapon, in the form of orders to the commissioners in his counties to press 2,450 new foot soldiers to defend themselves, specifying the monthly taxes needed to pay them.\(^{(2)}\) In view of their inability to provide Vavasour with the men and materials he required in 1643, the consternation provoked in the local gentry by these new demands may be imagined. Gerard at first found them 'very willing', but the deterioration in his relations with them is plain. The best evidence for the process is from Glamorganshire,\(^{(3)}\) where on 31st July the commissioners, led by Sir Nicholas Kemeys, a local potentate and the governor of Cardiff, wrote to Gerard protesting their inability to supply the men he demanded. Gerard's response was ruthless; he held Kemeys personally responsible for that inability, and replaced him as governor with an outsider, Sir Timothy Tyrrell. The recruits, and money, were subsequently produced in full.

In this manner Gerard filled every town and castle in Cardiganshire and

1. NLW Ll/MB/17 f 44
2. Ibid. f 72; Bod. L. Dugdale MS 19 f 77
3. NLW Ll/MB/17 ff 81-5
Carmarthenshire with soldiers. Laugharne Castle alone was given 200 foot.\(^{(1)}\) There the owner was left as governor, and Gerard seems generally to have permitted local gentry control of their fortresses. Cardiff was as said an exception, Carmarthen, under a Colonel Lovelace, was another,\(^{(2)}\) and Aberystwyth Castle was a third. Roger Whitley, a captain in Gerard's horse regiment,\(^{(3)}\) was installed there, replacing Richard Herbert who was moved to a command in Monmouthshire, perhaps on the Roman principle whereby men from one end of an empire were sent to hold down those at the opposite end. He accepted this posting without complaint, but Gerard was unable to secure similar co-operation from the best resident local soldier, Herbert Price. Price was affronted by being placed beneath the authority of the stranger Gerard, and demanded at least the position of second-in-command. Gerard was unwilling to displace his existing officers, and begged Rupert to provide some other reward.\(^{(4)}\) The Prince obliged and Price became governor of Brecon.

In October Gerard considered his task complete. He had constructed a formidable bulwark against Laugharne, and destroyed the latter's resources by laying waste Pembrokeshire with a savagery which produced horror in the Parliamentarian press.\(^{(5)}\) One Royalist commissioner enriched himself by dealing in the plundered cattle brought back to Carmarthen.\(^{(6)}\) He took his army eastwards, and rejoined the King on 6th November, in time to assist him in bringing the royal autumn campaign to a successful conclusion.\(^{(7)}\)

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1. E.256.44  
2. E.4.12  
4. WSL Salt MS 517  
5. E.13.19, 16.8, 252.53  
6. PRO SP23/109 ff 10-12  
7. Christ Church MS 164 f 143
WARLORDS AND CIVILIANS

Between mid-1643 and mid-1644, the experienced soldiers sent from the field army into the provinces had done much to repair the damage to the local war effort sustained under the rule of the grandees. In the succeeding twelve months they were to face a new crisis in that war effort considerably more severe than that which they had inherited and to survive it. The complexity of this story is so considerable that to tell it with greatest clarity I propose to subdivide the forthcoming section not by chronology nor by geography, but by theme. The first chapter will describe the military reverses suffered by the Royalist generals, the second will examine the civilian reactions provoked by these reverses and the third will analyse the response of the generals to the civilian initiatives.
AFTER MARSTON MOOR

On 2nd July 1644, on a stormy evening at Marston Moor, Prince Rupert almost won the Civil War for the King. Instead, by midnight, his army lay in heaps upon the moor, or fled terrified through the lanes beyond. Its destruction represented the failure of a great gamble. To construct this army Rupert had drained his command of seasoned troops, new levies and money. If it had won the war, this fact would not have mattered. With its defeat, the consequences became disastrous.

Rupert's departure from the Marches coincided with a new series of Parliamentarian thrusts into them. The Earl of Denbigh, Parliament's general in the West Midlands, had been immobilised at Coventry all winter by quarrels with the local leaders, who refused to allow him to denude Warwickshire of troops to make up a field army. By May, however, he had obtained the necessary powers, and raised a horse and a foot regiment of his own, with which he plundered north-east Worcestershire. Myddleton came up to join him with an army recruited in the London area, and on 10th May they marched out of Coventry and joined some Staffordshire detachments. With this composite force, 750 horse and 1050 foot, the Earl determined to complete the conquest of Staffordshire. On the 29th he bombarded Rushall Hall into surrender and then moved on to attack Dudley Castle, which had been weakened by the departure of Leveson and much of the garrison with Rupert. Its remaining troops nevertheless resisted fiercely, and in June the siege was abandoned under pressure of

1. See Chapter 5, p 97
2. E.G. Bod. L. Tanner MS 62 f 422; HMC 4th Report Appendix, pp.262-4
3. CSPD 1644, pp.111-12, 124, 161-2; E.46.10
4. CSPD 1644, pp.161-2; E.46.25
5. CSPD 1644, pp.177-9, 193-4; E.46.28, 252.32
external events. The royal army itself had suddenly arrived in the area.

In May also, after bitter quarrelling, Parliament had persuaded its leading generals, Essex and Waller, to co-operate in a pincer movement to crush the Royalist capital of Oxford. Charles escaped the trap at the last instant and fled west with about 7,000 men, pursued by Waller. He entered Worcestershire on 5th June and hurried across it, smashing the bridges behind him and snatching Knotsford’s garrison out of Evesham. On the 6th he reached the temporary safety of Worcester and paused there a week while Waller encamped to the east awaiting his next move. The King's secretary maintained that during its rest at Worcester the royal army was well paid and fed which indicates a colossal burden placed upon the city and its neighbourhood. Certainly £1,000 was demanded from the city and supplies levied as far as Shropshire. The eastern districts, which had recently been plundered by Denbigh and by Fox, were forced to support the Parliamentarians. Charles exercised his horse by sending them to drive Denbigh from the siege of Dudley, only to see the Earl join his army to Waller's. One of the strongest episodes of the war now occurred; Charles, who had hitherto displayed no talent as a general, began to behave with some strategic skill. Deceiving his enemies with a feint, he dashed out of Worcester on 16th June, recrossed the Avon valley and returned to Oxford to gather troops, leaving Waller and Denbigh far behind and bewildered. On his march he broke the remaining bridges and exacted money and footwear from Evesham on the excuse that it had admitted

1. Christ Church, Oxford, MS 164 ff 20-22
2. Ibid. f 22
3. Corporation Order Book 2 f 222
4. TSANHS 1896, p.247
5. E.46.10
6. CSPD 1644, pp.235-7
Waller's army. The campaign had resulted in an embarrassment for Parliament, but the true cost had been to the Worcestershire countryside.

Meanwhile, the ring of Royalist strongpoints constructed to contain Gloucester had been fractured. Massey had already struck at these in May, when he destroyed the small garrisons immediately to his west, at Westbury and Newnham. On his way north pursuing Charles, Waller had attacked Sudeley Castle. As the High Command had ordered, it had been garrisoned with local levies, and being inexperienced they surrendered at the first bombardment. Massey came to meet him, storming Tewkesbury and destroying the remnants of what had been Beaumont's regiment. The Gloucester garrison could now range unchecked, and while Waller and Denbigh oppressed eastern Worcestershire Massey plundered the south.

After Charles' escape Waller marched east after him. Denbigh turned back into Staffordshire. There he received an appeal from Mytton to assist an attack upon Oswestry. The town guarded the approaches to mid-Wales, and much of its garrison had gone with Rupert. Moreover at that moment its governor, Shipman, was absent. Denbigh agreed, and on 23rd June they stormed the town. Denbigh left Mytton there as governor, and marched into Cheshire to rejoin Myddleton, who had been gathering the local Parliamentarian forces into a body capable of pursuing Rupert. The loss of Oswestry not only exposed mid-Wales but severed direct communications between Shrewsbury and Chester. The two veterans Rupert had left to guard these places, Hunkes and Marrow, determined to join forces and

1. Ibid, p.247; Christ Church, Oxford, MS 164 ff 24-5
2. E.46.19
3. Corpus Christi Library, Oxford, Mercurius Aulicus, The 24th Week 1644
4. Corbet, p.349
5. E.53.3; HMC 4th Report Appendix, p.267; CSPD 1644, pp.284, 286, 331
retook the town. This scheme was ruined by the ambition of Marrow, who attempted to win the sole glory, attacked Oswestry singlehanded, and was taken by surprise on 3rd July by Myddleton, racing to the town's aid before Huncles could arrive. Marrow's force was routed, and Myddleton and Denbigh took advantage of this victory to conquer south-western Cheshire. The Earl now left Myddleton at Nantwich to project an invasion of Wales, and retired to Stafford to await further employment. When this came, it consisted of a high civilian role, that of heading an embassy bearing terms to the King. His horse regiment, however, remained behind and joined the Warwickshire Parliamentarians in ravaging eastern Worcestershire again.

Even in areas untouched by the enemy, this period witnessed problems in administration. In north-east Wales the new-levied soldiers in the local forces showed a natural tendency to slip away to their homes. In the north-west Mennes apparently regarded himself as an exile upon a barbarian shore, and the local people returned the compliment by proving 'lax and rotten' in his service. In particular, he was unable to persuade them to enlist as garrisons for the coastal castles, and eventually Ormonde had to send 300 foot under Colonel Thomas Trafford over from Ireland to perform the task. These - the last significant shipload of veteran troops - escaped the Parliamentarian fleet, but on their arrival Mennes, whose nerves were clearly frayed, promptly quarrelled with Trafford. He also lost patience with Archbishop Williams, whose usual desire to make himself indispensable inevitably involved meddling in everything Mennes did.

1. E.54.16; PRO SP 16/502/51; CSPD 1644, pp.337-9
3. Ibid. p.268
Instead Sir John befriended a local gentleman of little prominence, Robert Jones, who benefitted from his favour by imposing licenses on coastal traffic from which Jones reaped a percentage of profit.\(^{(1)}\)

On 25th July Rupert returned to Chester, bringing with him an unknown number of soldiers, the wreckage of his army.\(^{(2)}\) He settled down to build a new army around them, proceeding with his usual thoroughness. An inquiry was ordered into financial problems in his command, and answers provided to the problems discovered.\(^{(3)}\) All local officers were ordered to specify the quantities of money in their hands at that moment.\(^{(4)}\) Those gentry who had not yet paid their 'privy seal letter' money were instructed to disgorge it. They included Bulkeley, who may have been starting to find his newly-won prominence a little inconvenient.\(^{(5)}\) New levies of foot soldiers were ordered.\(^{(6)}\) The Prince himself ensured that the Excise was imposed upon Chester, and pulled down many houses there to strengthen the fortifications.\(^{(7)}\)

These efforts proved futile. The new levies showed no willingness to enlist under a defeated general, and deserted almost as fast as they arrived.\(^{(8)}\) Rupert could in any case not find the arms and ammunition to equip them.\(^{(9)}\) Some of his veteran officers demanded passes to find better employment abroad; one, like a true professional, sailed to London and joined Parliament.\(^{(10)}\) These blows seem to have broken the Prince's spirit; on 20th August he abandoned the task, left Chester with his own regiments and marched into Wales. On the 25th he reached Monmouth, and the next day crossed to Bristol and settled there.

1. Bod. L. Carte MSS 10 ff 294,462,601, 11 ff 46,246, 12 f 519; Carte, Letters, pp.52-4
2. Bod. L. Clarendon MS 28 f 129
3. Bod. L. Firth MS C8 f 334
4. HMC 2nd Report Appendix, p.86
5. UCNW Baron Hill MS 5372, Bangor MS 1921 f 36
7. Ibid. p.394
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid; Bod. L. Carte MS 12 f 140
10. Bod. L. Rawlinson MS A147; The officer, Sir John Hurry, had defected to Rupert's army from Parliament in 1643, and was to change sides again.
to recruit instead. (1)

His departure coincided with fresh disasters. Since June Massey had plundered almost at will in Gloucestershire but had been held off Herefordshire by the energy of Nicholas Mynne. On 4th August Mynne laid a trap for his enemy at Red Marley, by which he hoped to catch him between the Hereford forces and a Royalist detachment coming from Worcester. It was almost the end of Massey, but instead it was the end of Mynne, for Massey attacked him before the Worcester force arrived, killed him and destroyed his regiment. (2) Herefordshire was now open to Massey's raids. Rupert's response was to send Vavasour back there as governor of Hereford (3) and request a report on the condition of the county. (4) As in the case of the financial report, its authors are unknown. It revealed a picture of unpaid soldiers living on free quarter because half of the local tax, instead of passing to the Treasurer, went direct to local leaders such as Pye and Croft, who presumably pocketed it as even their own regiments had dwindled to a few men. Vavasour never took up his governorship, presumably because of Lord Herbert's enmity, and instead on 10th September Rupert appointed Viscount Scudamore's younger brother Barnabas. (5) Although a local man, he was of no consequence in the community and doubtless earned the post by his service under Rupert in Staffordshire in 1643 (6) and as Mynne's Major-General in the past months. (7) To Monmouth the Prince appointed a distinguished field army colonel from Somerset, Sir Thomas Lunsford. (8)

In late June Brereton had returned to Nantwich, equipped with extensive

1. Bod. L. Clarendon MS 2 f 129
2. Corbet, pp. 352-3; CSPD 1644, pp. 396-8; Bod. L. Tanner MS 61 f 106
3. Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 235
4. Bod. L. Firth MS C8 f 328
5. Webb's, Vol.2, p. 80
6. TSANHS 1895 ff 291-3, 315
7. Corpus Christi Library, Oxford, Mercurius Aulicus, 'The 21st Week' 1644
8. Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 231
new powers and £1,500, (1) and set to work strengthening his forces. The day
after Rupert left Chester, the impulsive Marrow made a raid on Northwich, and
was trapped and killed by Brereton together with his horse regiment. (2) That
same night 2,000 more Royalist horse, under Sir Marmaduke Langdale, arrived in
Cheshire. They represented the cavalry of the Royalist Northern Army, who
after Marston Moor had attempted to patch together some local resistance to
the victors, and failing in this had decided, rather than to surrender, to
attempt an epic march to join the King. They crossed into Cheshire exhausted
and badly shaken by the mauling they had just received from a Parliamentarian
army in Lancashire. (3) They quartered for the night at Malpas, and when they
had settled to sleep Brereton came upon them. Langdale was wounded, and his
horse driven demoralised into North Wales. (4) At Chester Rupert's two
protégés, Byron and Legge, quarrelled with each other, (5) the city Royalists
resented the refugees from the county whom they were supporting (6) and the
citizens demonstrated against the Excise. (7) Brereton was able to move his
outposts up to Taruin, a few miles from the city. (8)

Under these circumstances Myddleton felt able to launch the invasion of
mid-Wales he had been planning since the fall of Oswestry. On 4th August he
had joined Mytton to raid Welshpool and rout Rupert's horse regiment, which had
been quartered there trying to gather cloth to re-equip the Prince's remaining
foot soldiers. (9) This reconnaissance served to prepare the ground for the
advance he commenced with his small army on 3rd September. On the 5th he

1. L.J. Vol. 6, pp. 449, 479, 486-8
3. Ibid; Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 ff 227-8; Bod. L. Firth MS C7 f 146
4. WSL Salt MS 486
5. Bod. L. Carte MS 12 f 519
6. Chester RO AlB12 f 68
7. Brit. L. Stowe MS 190 f 18
8. Malbon's Diary, p. 145
9. E.6.23; CSPD 1644, pp. 405-6
captured a convoy of powder at Newtown sent north by Rupert to supply Chester, and advanced upon Montgomery Castle. This fortress, reputedly impregnable, had been one of the few left in the hands of its owner, Lord Herbert of Chirbury, who betrayed this trust by surrendering upon the first summons. He was escorted happily into retirement at London, out of reach of the enraged Royalists, who included his son Richard.

Richard and other local leaders reacted immediately, by uniting under two veterans from Ireland, Sir William Vaughan and the recently-exchanged Sir Michael Erneley, who were superintending the defence of Royalist Shropshire. They raised a force by detaching troops from garrisons, caught Myddleton's army at Montgomery and broke it, driving the foot into the castle and the horse, with Myddleton, to Oswestry. They then settled down to starve out the castle.

Myddleton sent an appeal to Brereton, and to the Parliamentarian army in Lancashire. These united to make up a force of 3,000 and arrived at Montgomery on the 18th, only to find that Byron had just arrived from Chester with more troops to swell the Royalist army to 2,000 foot and 1,500 horse. A pitched battle ensued. The Royalists seemed on the verge of victory when Ellis' inexperienced local foot regiment suddenly broke, spreading panic through their army. The result was catastrophic. Only a hundred Royalist foot escaped death or capture, and those last included most of the veterans from Ireland who had survived Marston Moor.

Archbishop Williams considered the defeat worse than that at Marston Moor.

1. Ibid, p.538; E.256.2; Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 ff 245, 253
2. See Chapter 13
3. NLW Herbert MSS, Series 2, No.9 f 3
4. Ibid f 4; Firth MS C7 f 167
5. Archaeologia Cambrensis 1846, pp.37-8; Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 ff 245, 253
6. L.J. Vol.6, pp.713-15; Bod. L. Carte MS 12 ff 185, 360-1
7. Ibid f 519
and in strictly local terms he was correct. It reduced the Royalists to the condition of remaining in their fortresses awaiting siege. Brereton and the Lancashire army returned northward to reduce Liverpool, garrison the Wirral and tighten the pressure upon Chester. Myddleton was joined at Montgomery by Sir John Price, who had already changed sides in 1642. Together they paraded to Newtown and received the submission of the local gentry. Myddleton next decided to secure his communications by taking the Red Castle, near Welshpool. Its owner, Lord Powys, unlike Lord Herbert of Chirbury, refused surrender, but his fortress was weaker than Montgomery and contained only sixty soldiers. On 2nd October Myddleton blew in the gates and stormed it. All eastern Montgomeryshire was now his, and he proceeded to raid Denbighshire and Radnorshire, capturing Royalist gentry.

Meanwhile the melancholy pilgrimage of the Northern Horse continued. Regrouping after their shock at Malpas, they were propelled south by Myddleton's advance. In early September they crossed Herefordshire, and then Worcestershire, hoping to reach Oxford on their march to the King. At Evesham, however, they found Massey's army in their path, determined to prevent them from reinforcing Charles. Demoralised, they retreated into Herefordshire. Rupert conceived the plan of shipping them over the Severn, and sent a party to fortify Beachley as a bridgehead from which they could disembark. The Northern Horse accordingly streamed south. Their persecutor Massey arrived at Beachley first, driving them back into Monmouthshire. He next turned north parallel to them, and on 23rd

1. CSPD 1644, p.524, 1644-5, pp.6-7
2. See Chapter 2, p.45
3. CSPD 1644, p.534
4. Ibid. 1644-5, pp.3-4
5. Ibid. p.34; E.12.8, 14.6
7. Ibid; Corbet, pp.356-7; Bod. L. Firth MS C7 ff 178-9; Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 261
September appeared outside Monmouth. Lunsford had not yet arrived, the fortifications were neglected and one of the officers decided to profit from an unpromising position by turning traitor. He let Massey's men into the town, and it fell. The Parliamentarians now held a crossing of the Wye, and began raiding Monmouthshire. (1) A full-scale invasion was only prevented by the appearance of Charles Gerard and his army, returning from south-west Wales. Massey retired to Gloucester, and Gerard and the Northern Horse were able to march to Worcester together, and from there to Oxford and the royal army. But Massey's garrisons remained in Monmouth and the Forest of Dean. (2)

Parliament was engaged at the same time in destroying the work Gerard had left behind him in south-west Wales. In late summer 120 foot under a Colonel Beale had been despatched by sea from London. In October this landed at Pembroke, and emboldened Laugharne to take the field. He advanced upon Laugharne Castle, and stormed it on 2nd November. The Royalists destroyed their other fortresses in south-western Carmarthenshire in order to concentrate in Carmarthen to hold the town. (3) Beale left Laugharne to recruit and marched across Cardiganshire to join Myddleton, who met him at Lampeter. The local Royalist commissioner Rowland Pugh raised a force of local people to attack them, but Myddleton and Beale easily dispersed these and burned Pugh's home. They went on to destroy Abbey Cwmhir, the principal Royalist strongpoint in Radnorshire, on 4th December. (4) On the 24th Laugharne, ignoring Carmarthen,

1. Corbet, p.357; Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 237; CSPD 1644-5, p.31
2. Ibid; pp.42, 52-4; Bod. L. Firth MS C7 f 209; Christ Church, Oxford, MS 164 ff 141-3
3. E.256.44
came up to attack Cardigan. The town fell, and an attempt to relieve it was defeated.\(^{(1)}\) Myddleton took the opportunity to ravage northern Cardiganshire, burning the great houses.\(^{(2)}\)

Any hope that Rupert might return to redeem the situation was destroyed on 30th November, when the Prince was promoted to command the royal army itself.\(^{(3)}\) In his place, his brother Maurice was sent into the Marches. His commission has not survived, but it certainly included North Wales, Cheshire, Shropshire, Staffordshire, Herefordshire and Worcestershire. To underpin his authority in North Wales, Colonel John Owen, a local man but a fervent Royalist and proved soldier, was knighted and sent to Conway in December with a commission as governor of the town. His real mission, as the local gentry realised, was to represent the interests of the High Command in the area.\(^{(4)}\)

Prince Maurice left Oxford on 14th January,\(^{(5)}\) with a body of troops which included his own regiments of horse and foot. For a month he remained in Worcestershire and then marched north towards Cheshire, where the position of the Royalists had further deteriorated. In November Brereton had laid siege to Beeston Castle\(^{(6)}\) and commenced a blockade of Chester. In January a sally by the garrison was heavily defeated.\(^{(7)}\) The Denbighshire Royalists, fearing that their lines were over-extended, withdrew their garrisons from Bangor and other places on the Dee, and burned them.\(^{(8)}\) This availed them little, as Brereton sent a strong party into the county which garrisoned Wrexham, sacked other towns and drove off cattle.\(^{(9)}\)

\(^{1.}\) E.25.17 258.22
\(^{2.}\) Cambrian Quarterly Magazine 1829, p.61
\(^{3.}\) Bod. L. Dugdale MS 19 f 96
\(^{4.}\) HMC 2nd Report Appendix, p.86; NLW Wynn MS 1746; Shaw, p.219
\(^{5.}\) Dugdale's Diary, p.77
\(^{6.}\) Malbon's Diary, p.152
\(^{7.}\) E.26.9; CSPD 1644-5, pp.255, 257-60
\(^{8.}\) Archaeologia Cambrensis 1846, p.38
\(^{9.}\) Malbon's Diary, pp.159-60
At this moment Maurice arrived at Shrewsbury with a force swollen by the Worcestershire troops. He settled there to call in detachments from the main garrisons of Shropshire and Staffordshire, which when collected and combined with the best soldiers of the Shrewsbury garrison, increased his army to 2,000 men. With these he entered Denbighshire in mid-February, only to find that Brereton had also called in aid from neighbouring counties and was awaiting him with a larger army. The Prince outmanœuvred his adversary, and entered Chester on the 20th. He strengthened the city's defences, only to have to retreat into Denbighshire again as Brereton came up. He was in Denbighshire attempting to devise some plan of action, when the appalling news reached him that Shrewsbury had fallen. The Parliamentarians at Wem, learning that the garrison had been depleted, had attacked the town before dawn on 22nd February, broken through a side-gate and caught most of the defenders sleeping. The prisoners included leaders of 1642 such as Sir John Weld and more recent commanders, such as Erneley. All the lesser Royalist garrisons in central Shropshire were hurriedly evacuated.

The loss of Shrewsbury was the last of the succession of disasters which commenced with Rupert's departure on the York March, and the most crushing to the Royalists. It demoralised the King's negotiators at the Uxbridge peace talks and depressed Charles' own spirits. Yet by this stage in time it is doubtful whether the military defeats, serious though they were, represented the principal anxiety of the High Command. A crisis had arisen within territory yet in Royalist hands, which threatened to destroy the royal cause from within.

1. E.258.22
2. Malbon's Diary, pp.161-2; E.258.25; Bod. L. Carte MS 14 f 102
3. E.271.2, 270.33; Burghall's Diary, p.184
4. Clarendon, VIII.239, 253
(16) THE MARCHER ASSOCIATION AND THE CLUBMEN

From the opening of the war Royalist commanders had, as illustrated, repeatedly complained of the indifference and hostility of local populations. In the late summer of 1644 these complaints took on a new urgency. One reason for this development lay in the pressure upon local resources produced by the troops which accompanied or followed Rupert from the North. The Prince scattered these to quarters in Wales and the Marches, while he gathered new recruits at Chester and Bristol. The inhabitants of the areas assigned for their support, who had been reluctant enough to sustain local garrisons, were openly hostile to these strangers. Gibson's foot regiment, sent to Conway in August, was shut out by the citizens. It quartered at Caernarvon instead, in an atmosphere of open animosity, until after a month it was recalled to Chester. Some horse and foot under a John Van Bynissy were sent into eastern Shropshire. The horse were allotted quarters near Wenlock, where the countrymen refused to feed them, while the foot were sent to Bridgnorth, only to suffer the fate of Gibson's for despite the orders of the governor, Kirke, the townsmen closed the gates to them.

The greatest sufferings were those of the hapless Northern Horse, who drifted into one local administrative system after another. In Herefordshire they consumed the money and supplies needed by Scudamore for his local garrisons. At Worcester Sir Gilbert Gerard apparently took steps to prevent this occurring, for the northerners complained of his meagre hospitality.

1. Bod. L. Fairfax MS 32 f 85; NLW Wynn MS 1740; Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 296
2. Ibid. f 216
3. Herefordshire RO LC Deeds 325
In Monmouthshire, where they lingered longest, their reception was proportionately worse; the countrymen in the areas assigned by the local leaders to support them rose up and attacked them when they requested supplies, and the gentry, including some Royalist commissioners, refused to punish the insurrectionaries. (1)

The impact of Rupert's defeated forces, however, merely served to worsen a situation already deteriorating. The Royalist defeats of the summer and autumn served to reproduce upon a grand scale the phenomenon already noted as operating upon the fortunes of local garrisons, the tendency of local people to withdraw support completely from defeated troops. This was a rational action, calculated to hasten the end of the war, and its destructive effects, in their locality. It ensured that the broken troops would be denied the resources to recover.

By the autumn of 1644 the Royalists in the Marches were caught in this downward spiral. In August Kirke sent out his garrison from Bridgnorth to demand the local tax, which had been unpaid since Denbigh's victorious invasion. The troops were overpowered at Shifnal by countrymen led by a local gentleman, disarmed and sent back pelted with insults. (2) At Shrewsbury Hunckes had earned the enmity of the local gentry by 'being too much a soldier', and Rupert replaced him in August with his fellow officer Erneley, who found the population markedly hostile. (3) In Monmouthshire in early September a new drive to raise the local tax produced £30 out of the £1,000 due. (4) In late

1. Ibid, ff 268, 294; Bod. L. Firth MS C7 ff 183, 215
2. Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 225
3. Baxter, Part 1, Section 67; Bod. L. Carte MS 12 f 140: Add. MS 18981 f 233
4. Ibid. f 251
October Sir John Winter called a meeting of gentry at Chepstow to discuss defensive measures, but they would not consent to any scheme involving expenditure of money, so none was adopted. (1)

The great defeat of Montgomery had a particularly destructive effect upon local support. From Shrewsbury Ernley reported 'the edge of the gentry very much blunted'. (2) From Ludlow another officer commented that 'the malignancy which has lain in many men's hearts has now burst forward to a manifest expression'. (3) Woodhouse found his garrison there refused supplies by the neighbouring people. (4) In the cities of the Marches discontent also sharpened noticeably at this period, and the new Excise became a particular target for popular hatred. At Chester the Royalist candidate for the office of Mayor, Lieutenant-Governor Gamull, was heavily defeated to cries of 'No Gamull, No Excise', and an alderman elected who had opposed its introduction. (5)

At Worcester the corporation defiantly elected as Mayor a man to whom the King himself objected, justifying their action on the grounds that nobody had complained against him locally. (6)

Against this background, the High Command had particular reason to be wary of a movement which began with a meeting of the Shropshire Royalist gentry on 12th November. They resolved that, being weary of war, they would join with other counties in writing to Parliament demanding that it make peace with Charles. (7) At the same time Sir Gilbert Gerard and the Worcestershire commissioners decided to call a huge county meeting to discuss local problems, the

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1. Ibid. ff 308-9
2. Ibid. f 299
3. Warburton, Vol.1, p.530
4. Ibid. p.526
5. Brit. L. Stowe MS 190 f 18; Chester RO A/F 27/2-4
6. Corporation Order Book 2 f 223
7. Montgomeryshire Collections 1886, Supplement, No.11
qualification for attendance being that of the parliamentary franchise. (1)
The meeting took place on 6th December, and produced a decision to join
Shropshire in directing Parliament to make peace, and to enforce this demand
by associating with Shropshire and other Royalist counties to produce a huge
new force of local people capable of keeping local order and warding off all
Parliamentarian attacks. (2)

In this, as the Shropshire declaration acknowledged, they were following
the example of the Royalist gentry of Somerset. In July the King had crossed
that county to attack a Parliamentarian force, and decided to reinforce his
army by raising the local 'posse comitatus'. (3) The attempt proved a total
failure, for the countrymen assembled, cheered the King and then went home.
Nevertheless the incident inspired some local gentry to the idea emulated by
those of the Marches, of demanding that Parliament make peace and raising a
huge posse comitatus to enforce the demand. Charles approved the scheme, and
by winter Somerset, Devon, Dorset and Cornwall had associated to enact it. (4)
In the Marches themselves such levies of local men had been employed in the
course of the war. The Worcestershire posse comitatus had been called out
against Waller in 1643. (5) In March 1644 the Royalist gentry of the Ludlow
region had summoned the posse in order to choose fifty men from it to form a
permanent irregular defence force. (6)

If feasible, the creation of such local armies contained both a consid-
erable advantage and a considerable danger to the King's cause. It offered an

1. Townshend ff 463-4
2. Ibid. ff 767-8, 771-3
3. See Chapter 9
4. Christ Church, Oxford, MS 164 ff 44, 48-51, 115-24; Clarendon, VIII.255-6
5. Birmingham RL 398282, 298325-6
6. Shropshire RO Box 298
opportunity to turn war-weariness into a lever to eject Parliamentarian troops from large areas of England. On the other hand, it also equipped local men with a powerful weapon which they could easily turn against the regular Royalist troops whom they so clearly regarded as a burden. The King's reply to the proposal made at Worcester was accordingly guarded. He gave permission to associate and to form an army providing its chief officers were regular soldiers appointed by Prince Maurice. On receiving this reply, the Royalist JPs and the Grand Jury of Worcestershire wrote to the Shropshire commissioners in the name of their community proposing association. By 11th January the Royalist gentry of the two counties had formally combined with those of Staffordshire and Herefordshire, and presented further requests to the King. They asked that the new army elect its own officers, be subject to civil law and be supported by the proceeds of sequestered estates in their counties.

By this time the potential dangers of the Association had become very apparent to the Royalist officers. Its claim of sequestered estates represented a considerable blow to the regular garrisons, which certainly in north-west Wales, Monmouthshire, Shropshire and Cheshire and probably everywhere, had come to depend ever more heavily upon their proceeds as the yield of the local tax diminished. Moreover the relations between the local gentry and the military commanders had deteriorated further since the autumn, particularly in Shropshire. There Shipman had aroused the

1. Townshend ff 769-70
2. Ibid. ff 776-7
3. Ibid. ff 779-87
4. Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 296
5. Ibid. f 324; NLW Herbert MSS Series 2, 12 f 35
6. TSANHS 1896, p.254
7. Chester RO A/B12 ff 70-1
wrath of the gentry by imprisoning the servants of one of their number who had neglected to pay his 'Privy Seal letter' money. Kirke called them 'rotten ashes'. Dudely Wyatt called them 'mutinous spirits' and labelled the new Association an attempt 'to thrust out the soldier'. Erneley complained that the concern of the gentry for the new Association had removed any interest they might have had in his (Shrewsbury) garrison, so that no money was delivered to it at all. Woodhouse noted that the project of the Association roused the countrymen around Ludlow to great excitement, much of it openly hostile to his troops. In Herefordshire Barnabas Scudamore wanted to arrest gentry and release them only when they paid their share of the local tax. At Worcester Sir Gilbert Gerard, who had maintained excellent relations with the gentry since February 1644, died in mid-January, leaving Maurice to find a successor.

Nevertheless, on 15th February Charles gave the Association permission to proceed. He may have considered the dangers of refusing it greater than those of permitting it. In addition he may have been reassured by the presence among the leaders of the Association of former Royalist heroes such as Ottley and Russell. The list of commissioners appointed to run it was headed by the Earls of Shrewsbury and Ardglass, noblemen who had hitherto played no part in the war but were unlikely to favour Parliament because both were Roman Catholics. At any rate the royal assent was qualified; Maurice was still to supply the commanders of the new army and vet all inferior officers proposed

1. NLW Herbert MSS Series 2, 12 f 36
2. Brit. L. Add. MS 18982 f 36
3. Ibid. f 16
4. TSANHS 1896, pp.270-1; Bod. L. Firth MS C5 f 303
5. Ibid. f 332
6. Brit. L. Add. MS 18982 f 33
7. WSL Salt MS 556
8. Bod. L. Dugdale MS 19 f 102
9. TSANHS 1896, pp.267-8, 272
10. Townshend f 776
and one of the first tasks of the Association would be to impress 600 men for the field army. At a local level its powers were nevertheless enormous; it was granted the proceeds of sequestrations, could impose a local tax of its own and could call up any man aged 16 to 60. In Worcestershire at least the commissioners set to work immediately, sending out warrants to every village naming all able-bodied men in their parishes and to receive instructions to organise them. (1)

In setting to this work the local gentry had forgotten a lesson that they should have learned two winters before, (2) that the county was too wide a unit for the political horizon of the countryman. Then, elaborate schemes for the defence of counties had come to nothing, while men attended instead to the protection of their own settlements. This was to recur now, and the intensification of the local struggle was to ensure that it would take a dramatic form. The same months that witnessed the creation of the Association saw the appearance of militant neutralism for the first time since 1643, and with a difference. Then it had been a movement conceived and led by prominent gentry. Now it was a spontaneous outburst of peasants, led by men of no social significance, the so-called 'Clubmen'.

Clubman movements were to appear in many areas of southern England in the course of 1645, but the authorities upon them (3) all agree that those in the Marches were the earliest. The first notice of them appears in a report from Wem dated 18th December 1644, reprinted in a Parliamentarian newspaper. (4) It

1. PRO SP 16/506/55
2. See Chapter 3
4. E.258.6
announced that the countrymen of the Shropshire hundreds of Clun and Purslow had risen 1200 strong to resist the plundering of the Royalist colonel Vangeris. They were led by the parson of Bishop's Castle and some very minor gentry called Jeremy Powell, Richard Heath and Francis Harris, and demanded the reposting of Vangeris, compensation for the goods taken and the evacuation of the local Royalist garrisons of Stokesay Castle and Lea Hall. Another group of local men had collected at nearby Leintwardine and was preparing to join them. Other notices of a rising in Shropshire appear in later Parliamentarian journals but are considerably less precise and detailed than this. Part of it is authenticated by two letters from Woodhouse. The first, dated 31st October, complains of the looting of the area by Vangeris, whom Rupert had sent with some horse to protect it, and announces the garrisoning of Lea Hall. The second, dated 22nd February, refers to a 'rebellion' in his area in the recent past, while a letter from Ermeley on 3rd January speaks of 'seditious people in the county who have mustered three thousand' and whom the Parliamentarians hoped to assist. No sequel is recorded to the affair; Vangeris was reposted, but the two garrisons remained.

The Worcestershire Clubmen are slightly better documented, as two of their own declarations were reprinted by a Parliamentarian newspaper, on 11th and 18th March. The first is found also among Townshend's papers and in another journal. The second is so circumstantial in its local detail that it also seems a genuine source.

1. E.g., E.23.8
2. Bod. L. Firth MS C7 f 224
3. Firth MS C6 f 332
4. Ibid. f 303
5. Corbet, p.367
6. E.274.2, 274.24
7. ff 793-6
8. E.258.36
The first is a declaration drawn up on Woodbury Hill on 5th March by men claiming to hail from 'North-West Worcestershire', presumably the area defined by the county boundary and the rivers Severn and Teme, with Woodbury rising in its centre. It was presented to the Royalist High Sheriff, Henry Bromley, by Charles Nott, the parson of Shelsley Beauchamp. It recognised the Sheriff and the Grand Jury as the only legal authority in the county. It declared to them that the countrymen of the region were forming a league to enforce the Worcestershire Royalists' own recent proclamation (1) for the discipline of their troops and the regulation of the county. Apart from this they stood to defend the Protestant religion, the known laws of the land and the honour of the King.

The second is also a declaration, this time undated. The newspaper claimed that it emanated from the same group as the first, described by it with sweeping vagueness as 'the Worcestershire Clubmen', but it obviously did not. It was produced at Malvern Link by the inhabitants of Great Malvern, Mathon, Cradley, Leigh Sinford, Suckley and Ponick (Powick?). These villages effectively define the area of the Malvern Hills, not far away from the Woodbury region but quite distinct from it. Like the former paper it proclaimed the establishment of a league for mutual defence, this time to enforce the orders for behaviour of troops laid down by the Royalist Parliament.

These two documents represent all the reliable evidence surviving upon the Worcestershire Clubmen. Parliamentarian journals (2) reported risings in

1. See Chapter 17, pp 227-8
2. E.g. 274.2
other parts of the shire, but the details they give of these are vague and display an ignorance of local geography. There is no trace of such other movements in the relatively ample local Parliamentarian and Royalist records, and had they taken place in the more accessible parts of the shire it is difficult to account for this silence. In this context the two declarations present a paradox. They define a distinct topographical region, the hills of the west of the county, probably at that period the wildest and most remote part of Worcestershire and certainly the least exposed to the war. It lay off the main routes by which Royalist armies crossed the county, which insulated it from most of the extra levies noted earlier, and from plunder. It was also the only part of the county which had escaped devastation by the Parliamentarians in 1644. Altogether the Clubman areas of 1645 must have represented a haven of peace compared with the rest of Worcestershire, and the defensive leagues appeared where they were apparently least needed.

This problem is intensified when it is observed that these leagues do not appear to have been provoked directly by military outrages of the sort that they were formed to counter. The Woodbury declaration certainly states that its association represented a formalisation of local informal self-defence measures undertaken at previous moments of emergency. However, it does not specify the date of those measures, and it is extremely unlikely that they needed to be enacted in the period immediately preceding the formation of the leagues in early March 1645. This was not, as one would expect, a time of

1. See Chapter 9
unusually severe marauding by Royalist or any other soldiery. The Royalists were in possession of the whole shire, having defeated all enemy raiders the previous autumn.\(^1\) Worcestershire was thus enjoying a period of relative calm, with the Royalists pressing no more heavily upon one part of it than another. In the month before the meeting at Woodbury there were in fact very few Royalist soldiers present in the shire to oppress it, because most of its troops were absent with Maurice. The permanent Royalist garrisons were at Worcester, Evesham, Bewdley and Hartlebury Castle, none of which were in the Clubman areas. Nor would January seem to have been a month of exceptional outrages, for that had been the time of Maurice's arrival in the shire, and the Prince had carried out an energetic drive to discipline the soldiery.\(^2\)

If the idea that these Clubman leagues were a mechanical reaction to increasing military depredations does not stand up, neither does the explanation for their inception offered by the Parliamentarian press. It claimed that the associations were provoked by new warrants for the county tax sent out by the Royalists at Worcester.\(^3\) This is improbable because the Royalist documents prove that no alteration in the size or nature of the tax was made at the time and moreover the Royalists would have been unlikely to have attempted anything adventurous when Maurice had drained the county of troops and Worcester itself was crippling short of munitions.\(^4\) The basic objection to this explanation, however, is that the actual Clubmen manifestoes are concerned with the problem of order, not with taxation. They both appear to

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1. See Chapter 17, p. 224
2. Ibid., p. 227–f
3. E.g. E.271.17
4. Brit. L. Add. MS 18982 f 31
accept the principle and practice of the tax. The Royalist proclamation which the Woodbury league was committed to enforce laid down precise directives for its assessment and collection.

There does in fact seem to be only one explanation which can answer the objections raised to the others and also account for the location of the leagues in their particular part of the county. If correct, it is an extremely ironic one, for it suggests that the Worcestershire Clubmen were provoked into action not by the Royalist military establishment but by an organisation which ought to have represented an ally against it, namely the gentry Association. Its demands, promising universal enlistment and a second burden of taxation, must have been a particular shock to remoter areas which may not have fully understood its purpose.

In this context the Clubman declarations require a second scrutiny. The broad principles of the Woodbury league, to defend Protestantism, laws and King, are not very significant. They are lifted almost word for word from the Royalist declarations of the opening of the war, and may have served as a guarantee of the authors' continuing Royalist sympathies. More immediate to the local situation is the bitter hostility of both groups to soldiers of any kind and for any purpose. The Malvern league in particular refused membership not only to local men turned soldiers but to any who were marked for enlistment, which boded extremely ill for the Association. Both are equally bitter against Catholics, the traditional bogeys of the English populace. The
extraordinary venom of the declarations against the Catholics, and their demands that local commissions be purged of them, seem at first sight puzzling, as Catholics were never prominent in the Royalist civil and military administration of the shire. The puzzle is resolved when it is realised that the name at the top of the signatures to the Association's warrants is that of the Catholic Earl of Shrewsbury. The gentry who elected him had apparently forgiven him his religion, but the backwoodsmen of the leagues did not. The mere existence of such local associations for self-defence in fact negated the very purpose of the Association.

Whatever their purpose, no evidence survives to show the Worcestershire leagues in action. In this they form a striking contrast to the Herefordshire Clubmen, the last and most aggressive of the Marcher risings. The best account of it is contained in John Corbet's history of his commander Massey's campaigns. He relates that in March 1645 Massey advanced into Herefordshire and found 'multitudes of the country people appearing in arms'. He heard that Scudamore, sending for hay and contribution to his garrison, was so far denied by the country, that it came to blows'. His troops killed some local people and carried others to Hereford as prisoners. This provoked a mass rising of countrymen, who marched on Hereford and besieged it several days. They demanded the release of the prisoners and compensation for the slain, and an exodus of all regular Royalist soldiers from the county, leaving the local people to defend themselves against any

1. pp.367-9
invaders. Massey asked them to join forces with him, but they refused when
he insisted they swear to serve Parliament and pay money to his troops, pro-
claiming their principle aim to be to 'secure the country from contribution
and quarter' for any regular soldiers. Massey, unwilling to turn them against
himself, retired to Ross-on-Wye. Scudamore came to terms with the Clubmen,
and they dispersed.

This narrative is corroborated in every detail by other sources. Most of
its information is found in a despatch from Massey himself, dated 22nd March. (1)
He enclosed a list of the Clubmen's demands, dated the 19th, which accord with
those cited by Corbet. (2) Among Scudamore's own papers is preserved a procla-
mation he issued against the Clubmen on the same date (3) offering mercy if they
handed over their leaders, disbanded and paid the local tax in future. It
names the seat of the rising as Broxash Hundred, at Marden and Cowarne, and
the leaders as Thomas Careless, Thomas Wooten, two members of the Walwyn family
of Cowarne and a Lawrence of the same village. All these names are obscure,
none being of gentry. It is certain that in the previous month Scudamore,
having driven Massey's outposts from the county, (4) was interested in a new
effort to collect the tax. (5) By 3rd March the Clubmen were active, for
Scudamore wrote to Rupert that day reporting that agitators were raising the
countryside against his troops, inspired by the rising in Shropshire. (6)
Finally, a letter survives from the King to Scudamore, dated 25th March,
approving the terms the latter had made with the rebels. (7)

1. Brit. L. Egerton MS 787 f 93
2. Ibid.
4. Brit. L. Add. MS 18982 f 31
5. Ibid. f 33
6. Bod. L. Firth MS C6 f 342
7. Brit. L. Add. MS 11043 f 22
It is obvious, as Scudamore's letter illustrates, that all three Clubman movements cannot be divorced from their context among the general fever of anti-military feeling among the countrymen of the Marches at this period. Nevertheless it is equally clear that they differ too greatly from each other in their nature and aims to be regarded as a unified movement. Further, one of their main similarities is that each represented only a portion, and a similar portion, of their respective county communities. The Worcestershire Leagues, as shown, were formed in the western hills. The Shropshire Clubman hundreds comprised the south-western corner of that county, equally rugged country and empty of garrisons and moving soldiers until Myddleton's conquest of Montgomeryshire a few months before. Broxash Hundred is in the north-east of Herefordshire, also hill country and also empty of garrisons and hitherto sheltered from the war, which had affected the southern half of the county. Indeed Scudamore may have been concentrating upon it because the wealthier southern areas had become so exhausted. Hence the Clubman areas of the Marches were precisely the most socially and economically backward.

This conclusion is reinforced when an examination is made of certain developments in the more accessible areas. In north-west Wales tension between the unpaid soldiers and the civilian population became intense during the winter, and prompted the gentry, led by Archbishop Williams, to petition Rupert to permit the cattle trade with the Midlands to reopen, so that more money would enter the area.\(^1\) In December the inhabitants of the Clwyd Valley of

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\(^1\) Warburton, Vol.3, pp.55-6
Denbighshire petitioned Byron for an end to free quarter and the supremacy of martial over civil law and for permission to raise a civilian force to repel Parliamentarian raids. (1) In March, emboldened by the Herefordshire rising, the gentry of the whole county repeated these requests, with the statement that the new force would also be used to discipline the regular soldiers. (2) In the same month one of Rupert's officers, attempting to escort a convoy of powder across Monmouthshire, reported that the countrymen there, excited by the example of the Herefordshire Clubmen, were on the verge of rising against the Royalist soldiers. 'Here be two or three constables deserve hanging', he snarled, 'and I had done it ere this, if I had but a party to defend me from their Welsh bills'. (3) Lord Herbert, however, prevented an outbreak by promising to present their grievances to the King in person, and did. They consisted of the usual demands for an end to free quarter and irregular exactions, which Herbert proposed could be achieved by concentrating all troops in two major garrisons, permitting a simplification of the system of supplies. (4)

The difference between these protests and those of the Clubmen is plain; the latter, in their poor and backward regions, lacked the gentry who could act as intermediaries between the countrymen and the High Command. They had no other means of stating their grievances than to enact the remedy, and thus their actions were notably more extreme although their basic sentiments rarely were. This conclusion parallels Professor Underdown's definition of the

1. NLW Wynn MS 1744
2. Brit. L. Sloane MS 1519 ff 76-7
3. Warburton, Vol.2, pp.385-7; Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 83 (Both misplaced among documents of 1644)
Somerset Clubmen as 'the Country, shorn of its upper echelon of politicised
gentry'. (1)

The distinctions between the different Clubman groups and between the
Clubmen and the rural population as a whole are certainly more apparent now
than they were to both Royalist and Parliamentarian leaders in March 1645.
The Parliamentarian press had obvious reason to present the Clubman risings
as part of a general popular uprising against the iniquities of Royalist
military rule, and did. But the Royalists were seriously frightened. Byron
believed that the 'infestation' of Herefordshire would spread everywhere. (2)
'I fear all Wales will be in rebellion,' wrote Rupert himself, and, his
nerves frayed by another winter of court politics, believed in a huge pro­
vincial conspiracy against his regular army, abetted by his civilian enemies
at court. (3) In Monmouthshire Sir Trevor Williams, one of the original
Royalist leaders, despaired sufficiently of his cause to write to Parliament
offering to betray the county. (4) To many it must have seemed as though the
whole structure of Royalist power in the region was about to crash in ruin.

1. Somerset, p.98
2. Brit. L. Sloane MS 1519 ff 76-7
3. Staffordshire RO D(W) 1778 I; ff 41, 45
4. CSPD 1644-5, p.356
The preceding chapters have been concerned with the external and internal disasters to the Royalist war effort in the autumn and winter of 1644-5, and it was this, negative, aspect of the picture which as shown most impressed contemporaries. Yet parallel to this recession were positive omens, which indicated that some strength survived in that effort.

Most obviously, the Parliamentarian thrusts of the autumn were slowly halted and sometimes reversed. By early 1645 Myddleton's advance into mid-Wales had stopped. To his west and south rose the barren Berwyn Mountains and Kerry Hills. To his north he had run into the ring of powerful castles constructed by Edward I to hold down North Wales, which now acted as a defence for the Royalist lands within it. He assaulted two of these, Chirk and Ruthin, and was beaten off. To his east Sir William Vaughan cut him off from his Shropshire colleagues by putting his horse regiment into Shrawardine Castle and the other fortresses of western Shropshire. From these Vaughan led his troopers against Parliamentarian quarters with such ferocity that he became known to his enemies as 'The Devil of Shrawardine'. Within these limits Myddleton found the country too poor to support more than a tiny army, and his men grew idle, underpaid and demoralised.

In Worcestershire and Monmouthshire the Royalists counterattacked. In the former the local troops took the field in October, drove all enemy soldiers out of the county and plundered Warwickshire in vengeance. At Monmouth the new Parliamentarian garrison became demoralised by the quarrels of its leaders and the

1. Bod. L. Carte MS 12 f 519; MS displayed at Chirk Castle
2. Symonds, p.256; Gough, p.15; Mrs F. Stackhouse - Acton, The Garrisons Of Shropshire During The Civil War (1867), pp.72-3
3. Brit. L. Add. MS 11331 f 48; Bod. L. Tanner MS 60 f 41
4. E.13.18, 14.42, 16.3
hostility of the citizens, who preserved their loyalty for their Royalist master the Marquis of Worcester. When in November the governor drew out most of the garrison to attack Chepstow, a Royalist party from Raglan Castle attacked Monmouth and recaptured it with the citizens' aid.\(^{(1)}\) In December the King sent his field army into the Cotswolds to live off the supplies upon which Massey's army at Gloucester depended. Within a month the latter's men began to mutiny and desert.\(^{(2)}\) He retained his garrisons in Dean and kept the Royalist outpost at Lydney in check\(^{(3)}\) but was incapable of taking the offensive. Any hope of relief from Warwick was ended when Rupert put three foot regiments under Sir Henry Bard, another of his proteges,\(^{(4)}\) into Campden House on the Warwickshire border.\(^{(5)}\)

Similarly not all Royalist administration showed only signs of lassitude and collapse. On leaving Worcester in June Charles, realising the exposed position of the county, had given Gerard the powers of a military despot to defend it, commanding the commissioners as he wished.\(^{(6)}\) These were precisely the powers Sir Gilbert had longed for in January.\(^{(7)}\) Rupert, however, had obviously taught him much, for what he proceeded to enact, on 22nd July, was another complete overhaul of the administration in partnership with the commissioners of the sort instituted by the Prince.\(^{(8)}\) The county tax had now been reduced as Rupert promised to its former level, and the fixed number of troops was now reduced proportionately, to one foot regiment of 1,000 under Gerard and one horse regiment of 400 under Sandys. These were to be formed by an

1. Corbet, pp.361-2; HMC 14th Report, Appendix 2, pp.130, 134-5; Camden Miscellany 2, pp.9-10
2. CSPD 1644-5, pp.238-9, 267-9
3. Corbet, pp.365-7; Bod. L. Firth MS C6 ff 117, 346
5. Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 338; Bod. L. Fairfax MS 32 ff 89-90, Firth MC C6 ff 306-8
7. See Chapter 12, p. 174
8. Townshend ff 387-9
amalgamation of existing units, with a clear command structure established and the county divided into specific districts to support each company. Half the tax could be paid in kind. Gerard and the commissioners were to discuss current matters together on a fixed day each week.

It is unclear how far this local New Model Army was formed. Sandys, Knotsford and Gerard certainly pooled their various regiments, but Russell's horse and foot preserved their separate identity in the shire. The reform certainly did cement good relations among the local leaders. In August Gerard wrote warmly to Rupert of the commissioners, and the defeat of the Parliamentarians in October was achieved by the former rivals Sandys and Knotsford, working in partnership.

In Monmouthshire likewise schemes were enacted to solve administrative problems. After the recapture of Monmouth Charles Gerard returned to the shire with his army to stabilise the local government. After an initial squabble over precedence with Sir John Winter, the two settled down together to work with the commissioners upon a reform programme, which was duly published on 11th December. Its novel feature was that all arrears upon the county tax would be commuted for a single payment of £1,000. Thereafter £1,600 per month was to be levied for four months, half to be paid in provisions. Free quarter and extra levies were to be ended. This arrangement must have been interrupted by the disturbances noted above, but progress was nonetheless made on the garrisons. Sir Thomas Lunsford arrived at Monmouth at the end of February and

1. E.g. CSPD 1644, pp.512-13
2. Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 222
3. Ibid. f 326; Brit. L. Egerton MS 785 f 95
4. Brit. L. Add. MS 18981 f 332, Add. MS 5716 f 11
5. Hereford RL Webb MS 1 ff 129, 167-9
set 200 workmen to labour repairing the fortifications.\(^1\) Lord Herbert used his influence to assist Sir Thomas in recruiting his garrison to 1,800 men.\(^2\)

The task of Maurice was to follow the example of his brother Rupert, a year before, in making this process of military and administrative recovery general. At first sight he seems a poor candidate for the task. All his life he was Rupert's understudy. Rupert went through every action miraculously unscathed, Maurice generally came out wounded. Rupert had an impregnable constitution, Maurice nearly died of camp fever. Rupert stormed cities, Maurice failed to take the ridiculously small seaport of Lyme Regis. Clarendon portrayed him as a military boor, with a notable capacity for alienating local populations. Rupert's most sycophantic biographer, Warburton, had nothing but contempt for Maurice.

The local records suggest that the reputation of Maurice, even more than that of his brother, deserves reassessment. On entering into his new command he recognised the potential dangers of the Association to his regular army\(^3\) and determined to reduce antagonism between soldiers and civilians. As early as January the Shropshire gentry noted his remarkable willingness to satisfy all local grievances\(^4\) and on the 17th the Prince expressed to them his desire to 'ease and cherish' their county, doing justice to both soldier and civilian.\(^5\)

On arrival at Worcester he enquired into all orders made for the regulation of the county hitherto. By 7th February he had read and assimilated them all. The level of the tax and number of troops were left as fixed, but all disciplinary

1. Brit. L. Sloane MS 1519 f 60
3. Brit. L. Add. MS 18982 f 27
4. TSANHS 1896, pp.266-7
5. Ibid. pp.268-9
rules for the soldiers and all the tariffs for purchase of supplies were reissued as a comprehensive set. It added up, in fact, to a Charter of Rights, stating exactly what soldiers and civilians had a right to expect from each other in all matters. To enforce it the commissioners were to be equal partners with the army, sitting in all courts martial with equal votes and having equal power with the governor of Worcester over all civil matters. He provided for musters of the Association army, which were to be held before the heads of the military and civil machines, the governor and High Sheriff. Finally he asked the Grand Jury to approve the whole package and it did, making its own minor amendments. (1) In place of the deceased Gerard, he appointed Sandys governor, a proved soldier but a local man popular with the gentry. (2)

For all these efforts Maurice's work of restoration would not be significant unless he recreated confidence in the royal cause with a military victory, and this, as seen, he was unable to do in January and February. In an attempt to reverse the sequence of defeat, the King eventually reverted to his tactics of two years before, of sending detachments of the field army into the Marches to counter each enemy thrust. His response to the fall of Shrewsbury was to send Rupert himself to aid his brother. The Prince gathered most of the royal army, 2,000 foot and 1,000 horse, from its Cotswold quarters and united with Charles Gerard who marched his army from Monmouthshire. Their departure permitted Massey the sally into Herefordshire on which he met the Clubmen. (3) On 9th March Rupert and Gerard united at Bridgnorth with the 2,000 Northern Horse, who having recovered

1. Townshend ff 499-516
2. Ibid. ff 728-9; Brit. L. Add. MS 24023 f. 24
3. Brit. L. Egerton MS 787 f 83; Corbet, p. 267
their morale in winter quarters at Oxford were just returning triumphant from a daring raid into Yorkshire. Together they advanced across Shropshire, emboldening the local Royalists to reoccupy mansions a few miles from Shrewsbury, such as High Ercall. During their advance Maurice had gained strength from other sources. He had called up the soldiers of north-west Wales under Sir John Owen, who had advanced to Wrexham and helped the Prince push Brereton's men out of Denbighshire. Ormonde had managed to send a few more foot over to Chester.

On 15th March the two princes united their composite armies near Ellesmere and advanced to the relief of Chester and Beeston Castle. Brereton, as ever, knew when the time had come to run. He called off both sieges, pulled his men back into his strongholds in central Cheshire and bombarded Parliament with appeals for help. The princes remained in western Cheshire about a week. They burned Brereton's evacuated outposts, demolished any potential strongpoints near Beeston and forced the locality to provide supplies and money for the castle, and for their army. Owen's men returned to Caernarvonshire, the detachments from the Marcher garrisons dispersed to their fortresses and Gerard marched into mid-Wales. To replace them, new men were levied in Denbighshire to hold the crossings of the Dee while to fill up their own army Rupert and Maurice drew all the surviving veterans from Ireland, 1,200 strong, out of Chester, and recruited 1,000 more men from the local population. The success of this recruiting testifies to the new repute of the royal cause.

1. Bod. L. Clarendon MS 28 f 129
2. Ibid; Bod. L. Tanner MS 60 ff 11, 52
3. NLW Clennenau Letters 551-62, Llanfair-Brynodol MSS 64, 66; Archaeologia Cambrensis 1846, p.38
4. Bod. L. Carte MS 14 ff 166, 362
5. Bod. L. Clarendon MS 28 f 129; Burghall's Diary, p.184; Staffordshire RO D (W) 1778 I; f 42
6. Brit. L. Egerton MS 787 f 83; CSPD 1644-5, pp.350-1
7. E.260.12; Bod. L. Carte MS 14 f 295; Malbon's Diary, pp.167-8; Brit. L. Add. MS 11331 f 47
8. NLW Clennenau Letter 563
9. Brit. L. Egerton MS 787 f 88
10. Ibid. f 73; E.260.12
11. NLW Clennenau Letters 554-60
12. PRO SP 16/507/35
13. Brit. L. Egerton MS 787 f 83
next objective of the princes was clear. Having humiliated the external foe, the time had come to repress internal opposition. Their formidable army, containing at least 5,000 seasoned soldiers, turned south upon Herefordshire, and the unsuspecting Clubmen.

There seems little doubt that Scudamore never intended to keep the terms he had made with the countrymen. The terms themselves only survive reprinted in Parliamentarian journals, which disagree upon the details. They seem to have fallen short of the Clubmen's demands, promising only release of prisoners, compensation for those killed and remittance of a month's tax. Whatever they were, Scudamore made them to buy time, for the royal letter in reply to his despatch announcing the incident praises his 'discreet answers' and assures him Rupert will come to his aid. Rupert and Maurice duly arrived at Bromyard at the end of March, and the Clubmen, emboldened by their success against Scudamore's soldiers, rose to fight them. The Royalist regulars made short work of their opponents. Some of the Clubmen leaders fled to Massey, others were captured and hanged. The Royalists described this operation as 'freeing the people' from the grip of agitators. Doubtless this echoes the tendency of ruling groups throughout history to ascribe all popular uprisings to the work of a few unrepresentative incendiaries, but the harshness of the treatment prescribed in the Worcestershire declarations for local men not wishing to join the Clubman leagues does lend some truth to the view. It reminds the historian that the Clubmen leaders, like the Royalist commissioners, seem to have been unusual

1. E.260.4, 6, 8
2. Brit. L. Add. MS 11043 f 22
3. Bod. L. Clarenson MS 28 f 129
4. Brit. L. Egerton MS 787 f 16
5. E.277.13
6. Clarendon MS 28 f 129
individuals within their communities, and to identify the Clubmen with the entire rural population of their locality may be an error.

The princes' army settled down in Herefordshire to, as Rupert put it, 'refresh after the Dutch fashion', to levy money, supplies and men as it pleased, as if from a conquered territory. The Royalist commanders had managed to overcome the humiliation of the dawn capture of Shrewsbury by believing that it had been betrayed by the citizens. To prevent such a fate befalling Chester, Maurice imposed an oath upon all the inhabitants to oppose Parliament. In April this oath was imposed upon Herefordshire, with the addition of a clause against Clubman leagues. It was to be administered by the Royalist commissioners to every man in the county, and any refusing it were to be enlisted in Rupert's army. In early May the same oath was extended to Worcestershire, Monmouthshire and south-east Wales.

Worcestershire like Herefordshire was ordered to provide the princes' army with money, food, horses and carts. The warrants for these commodities were issued by Maurice and the proceeds delivered to him directly, without passing through the civilian administration at all. This does not imply that the princes had abolished the rule of law; on the contrary, Maurice's 'Charter' was still enforced in Worcestershire, and Rupert wrote to Owen ordering him to ensure that his troops behaved well towards the local people and collected no more money than those people had agreed to provide. Herefordshire was being punished precisely because it had broken the law as the Royalist generals saw it.

1. Staffordshire RO D(W) 1778I; f 44; E.260.27; Corbet, p.369
2. E.g. Brit. L. Add. MS 18982 ff 36, 40
4. E.260.25
5. Corbet, pp.370-1; Townshend ff 537-40
6. Ibid. ff 519-20, 531-2
7. NLW Clennenau Letter 563
This example worked powerfully. In March the Herefordshire rising had inspired other counties to revolt, in April its fate produced the opposite effect. The Worcestershire Clubmen submerged, and disturbances among countrymen in other counties ceased. So did any talk of the gentry Association in Shropshire, Herefordshire and Worcestershire. Only in Staffordshire in April did the new commissioners for the Association press ahead with their plans of the winter. They won the support of Bagot, but this was enough to alienate Leveson, who tore up their warrants. At this point a peremptory letter arrived from Rupert ordering them to proceed no further. The position of the regular Royalist soldiers was now so strong that they no longer needed to tolerate potential rivals.

This sequence of events presents a curious semantic problem when one deals with the Marcher Clubmen. If one adopts a purely local viewpoint, then they represent an eminently sensible reaction to the war, to set up workable local mechanisms for the preservation of the countryside from plunder. Compared with them, the Association was a cumbersome and over-ambitious project. Moreover their broad principles, of opposition to Catholicising tendencies and to illegal and arbitrary acts, were only those of the national opposition to Charles I's regime before the war. On the other hand, if one adopts any wider view they represented all the shortsightedness and ignorance of truly backward people. They destroyed the chances of the only body potentially powerful enough to exert any proper control over an undisciplined regular soldiery and to preserve local

1. WSL Salt MS 502
order. Guided by intense localism and (in the case of the Worcestershire leagues) a religious prejudice which had in the circumstances of wartime both become outdated, they played into the hands of the regular military establishment.

The same course of events renders untenable the belief that the Royalist cause perished of 'financial thrombosis' because in early 1645 Charles signed away the financial resources of the provinces, which had supported his army, to the new gentry Associations. This theory is fundamentally unsound, because the provinces studied had never contributed any money even in principle to the royal army except the donations of 1642, the 'Privy Seal Letter' money, the proceeds of Excise and sequestration and irregular levies on campaign. As shown earlier, the donations soon ceased, half the 'Privy Seal' money went to Rupert and the proceeds of sequestration frequently remained in the provinces. The final disproof of this view, however, is that during this critical period of 1645 the Association in fact never came into being, while the royal army was quartered in the provinces exacting resources more ruthlessly than ever before.

A final problem requires solution, whether the same period witnessed a genuine recovery of Royalist administration, or whether, as the Parliamentarian journalists insisted, the Royalist counties had become a wilderness in which soldiers fought countrymen for whatever they could seize. The answer is provided by some transcripts of lost documents preserved at Hereford. The first set is particularly interesting, as it represents the warrants of the governor

1. J.S. Morrill, Provinces, p.114
of Lea Hall, one of the garrisons which the Shropshire Clubmen had demanded be evacuated. As one would expect, in the winter the governor had great difficulty in having his warrants for money obeyed, and at one point threatened to 'burn all the books and make you pay all anew'. By April, however, all arrears had been paid, and the money was coming in regularly. The second set is the accounts of the Receiver of the county tax for Skenfrith Hundred, Monmouthshire. In the first three months of 1645 the hundred does not even seem to have been assessed for the tax, but by April it was being paid in full. These documents suggest that the local administration was probably working better after the crushing of the Herefordshire rising than ever before.

The princes proceeded to use Herefordshire as the springboard for the forthcoming campaign. A new press of men had been ordered from the Welsh shires, (1) and the recruits arrived in Herefordshire to be refreshed like the veterans at the expense of the hapless county. A very detailed Parliamentarian report speaks of 1,000 new-raised men quartered in the villages of Bodenham, Moreton-on-Lugg and 'Rosemaund' (Maund Bryan?), in the former Clubmen area, in late April. (2) The new men seem, again, to have been added to existing regiments. They were exercised in some successful skirmishing with Massey in Dean. To strengthen Monmouthshire and shorten their lines, the Royalists withdrew their remaining troops in the Forest behind the Wye. Stoically, Sir John Winter burned his own mansion of Lydney to prevent his enemies garrisoning it. The whole Forest was plundered bare, money, food, cattle and iron being carried off to the army. (3)

1. NLW Clennenau Letter 571
2. E.260.27
3. E.281.13, 20; E.260.20, 23, 36; Corbet, pp.369-71; Bod. L. Clarendon MS 28 f 129
By early May all was prepared. The princes' army moved eastwards, and the King westward to meet it. They united at Evesham on the 9th. The foot were now 5,000 strong, the horse 3,300.\(^{(1)}\) To these were immediately added Sir Henry Bard's 300 foot from Campden House, which he razed to prevent occupation by Parliamentarians and most of the garrison of Evesham.\(^{(2)}\) The first objective of the King was Chester, which the tireless Brereton, profiting from the princes' retirement, was again blockading. Legge had been promoted to the governorship of Oxford itself, and Byron at last confirmed as governor of Chester as well as Field Marshal of North Wales. He now appealed to the King for relief, and the royal army moved north.\(^{(3)}\)

Its progress was triumphant. It fanned out across eastern Worcestershire, and from Worcester Sandys' horse, 150 strong, and the foot regiment of the deceased Sir Gilbert Gerard came to swell it.\(^{(4)}\) On the 11th a general rendezvous was held at Bromsgrove in order to attack a Parliamentarian garrison recently installed in north-east Worcestershire. It surrendered after two days. All the mansions of the region, potential garrisons, were destroyed.\(^{(5)}\) The royal army entered Shropshire, and Vaughan's 400 horse poured out of their garrisons to join it.\(^{(6)}\) On the 22nd it entered Staffordshire, and learned that its mere approach had achieved the relief of Chester. Brereton had called off his men for the third time and retired to his main garrisons.\(^{(7)}\) From Montgomery came equally good news. Myddleton had committed the great castle to the renegade Sir John Price. This opportunist now regretted his defection and

1. Symonds, pp.65-6
2. Ibid; Walker, p.126
3. Pro Fs 65/35755
4. Symonds, pp.166, 181; Bod. L. Clarendon MS 28 f 129; Roy, DPhil Thesis 1963, p.218
5. Walker, pp.126-7; Symonds, pp.166-7
6. Ibid. p.181; Bod. L. Clarendon MS 28 f 129
7. Walker, p.127; Bod. L. Tanner MS 60 f 159
turned Royalist again, bringing the fortress with him. Thus the great defeat in September was bloodlessly reversed. The Parliamentarians at Nantwich, Wem and Stafford cowered in their garrisons. Charles decided to march to Newark and review his opportunities. Leveson and Bagot joined him with 350 horse and some foot and his army moved eastwards out of the region.

Meanwhile Charles Gerard had been duplicating in Wales the achievements of Rupert and Maurice in the Marches. On leaving them in mid-March he had moved into Montgomeryshire, arresting Jeremy Powell, a leader of the Shropshire Clubman rising, on his way. He settled at Newtown for a month to rest his army and levy supplies and recruits to what had become enemy territory. One Parliamentarian newspaper claimed that the local Royalist Richard Herbert had resigned his place in Gerard's army in protest at his commander's ruthless methods, and as Herbert did serve under Gerard and his own estates lay in the area, the report may be true. At any rate these methods paid off. After a month Gerard was ready to strike and did so, with terrifying speed, towards Pembrokeshire. He crossed a hundred miles of mountains in a week, caught Laugharne's army by surprise at Newcastle Emlyn on 23rd April, and tore it apart. The following day he pushed on to Haverfordwest, stormed the town and plundered it. This manoeuvre outflanked Laugharne's garrison at Cardigan, forcing it to evacuate by water to Pembroke. The next day he stormed Picton Castle, and four days later Carew Castle. These fortresses, and Haverfordwest, were strongly garrisoned. Gerard dared not attempt Pembroke and Tenby, but he

1. Ibid. f 154 Carte MS 14 f 609; Brit. L. Add. MS 11331 f 114
2. HMCTlst Report, p.9
3. Symonds, p.181; Roy, p.218
4. Brit. L. Egerton MS 787 f 73
5. Ibid; Archaeologia Cambrensis 1846, p.39; E.260.10
6. E.260.13
7. E.286.17; E.284.23.20; Archaeologia Cambrensis 1915, pp.7-8
8. E.286.17, 288.48
did not need to, for with Haverfordwest and the two castles held against him Laugharne was now bottled up in his coastal towns like some maleficent djinn. Gerard settled down to recruit again, and by mid-May was able to leave powerful garrisons in Pembrokeshire while retaining a field force of 2,000 foot and 700 horse. (1) This he led back into England, to further swell the numbers of the royal army and assist it on its triumphant course.

1. Bod. L. Carte MS 14 f 609; Brit. L. Add. MS 11331 f 130
THE FAILURE OF THE ROYALISTS
On 14th June 1645 the royal army committed suicide at Naseby. Intoxicated by its victories, it charged uphill into an army twice its size led by Parliament's two best generals. At Marston Moor the fall of night had permitted many foot soldiers to get away. At Naseby, in the brilliant noontide, there was no escape. Among those captured or killed were the last of the foot who had followed the King since September 1642 and the last of the veterans sent over by Ormonde.

The King, Rupert, Maurice and the horse got away, and fled west towards the Marches. In Staffordshire they returned Bagot's and Leveson's horse to their garrisons. The King noticed that Bagot was wounded in the arm;\(^{(1)}\) in reality he was dying. The situation which faced the refugees in the Marches was not inviting. As had happened the year before, the withdrawal of garrison troops into the field army for the campaign had greatly improved the position on the local Parliamentarians. The new weakness of the Evesham garrison had tempted Massey, and he stormed the town on 26th May, severing the Cavalier Corridor between Oxford and Wales.\(^{(2)}\) The departure of Vaughan's horse had emboldened the Shropshire Clubmen to reappear in the west of the county, withholding the money owed to garrisons and opposing the soldiers sent to collect it.\(^{(3)}\) This encouraged the Shropshire Parliamentarians in turn to take Stokesay Castle, an outpost of Woodhouse's garrison at Ludlow. Woodhouse summoned aid from Monmouth, Worcester and Hereford, but this composite army was defeated in a straight fight on 9th June. Among the slain was Croft, the local leader of 1642. The triumphant

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1. Symonds, p.195
3. Hereford RL 3668 f 573
Parliamentarians rounded upon the western Shropshire castles of Caus and Shrawardine, and obtained the surrender of the few men Vaughan had left inside. They had gone on to besiege High Ercall. (1) At Montgomery Sir John Price, who had changed sides three times already, defected a fourth time on receiving news of Naseby, and returned the castle to Parliament.

Even in North Wales, shielded from attack, problems had appeared. Mennes had at last been released from his command there in May, and made Admiral of the non-existent Royalist navy, which effectively meant recall to court. It was intended to replace him with Sir Richard Cave, as a partial rehabilitation for this commander after his disgrace in 1643, (2) but Cave, ever the unlucky hero, perished at Naseby. (3) In the resulting vacuum a natural antipathy between Sir John Owen, a born fanatic, and Archbishop Williams, a self-seeking politician, grew unchecked. The former governed the town of Conway and the latter held the castle, so that friction was constant. At length the Archbishop's habit of cultivating every local gentleman, whatever his political record, became too much for Sir John. In April he tried to arrest Williams on a charge of corruption (4) and on 14th May seized Conway Castle and installed his own men. Williams complained to the King, (5) and Owen responded dramatically by charging his enemy with treason. (6) In Anglesey Viscount Bulkeley, whom the Archbishop had helped into office, was being taught more of the vicissitudes of leadership. In February he had received a furious letter from Maurice, who had been informed that Beaumaris Castle, lodged in Bulkeley's care in 1643, was still ruinous. The

1. E.290.11, 292.15; Malbon's Diary, pp.176-7
2. See Chapter 4, p.77
3. Brit. L. Add. MS 11331 f 139; Bod. L. Carte MS 14 f 609
4. Ibid. f 411; PRO S.P. 16/507/13
5. Bishop Hacket, pp.218-19
6. NLW Clennenau Letters, Appendix
Viscount replied that the local gentry, who were supposed to pay for the repairs, had contributed nothing, and that he had been unwilling to coerce these men, his friends and neighbours. Maurice's response was to send Bulkeley's nephew, a hot-tempered man and a devoted Royalist who had already quarreled with his uncle, to Beaumaris with orders to hang anybody who obstructed the refortification needed.\(^{(1)}\)

A parallel confrontation to that between Williams and Owen seemed probable.

Nevertheless, the Royalist lands of Wales and the Marches still possessed formidable resources. The Marches were still full of Royalist strongholds held by men of the calibre of Byron and Scudamore. After three years of repeated fortification their defences had become formidable. Few vantage points remained to an attacking enemy. The suburbs of Worcester and Chester had been razed in 1643 and 1644, and in May 1645 Scudamore demolished those of Hereford\(^{(2)}\) while Kirke immolated the principal buildings of Bridgnorth to strengthen the castle.\(^{(3)}\) To the burning mansions left in the wake of the royal army in May, Woodhouse added the great houses of the Ludlow area. Even the home of the Royalist Croft family was fired.\(^{(4)}\) Each Marcher garrison stood within a widening circle of ashes.

Behind this grim barrier stretched South Wales, the richest part of the Principality, almost wholly Royalist and barely touched by the war. Charles determined to settle there and attempt to repeat his success at Shrewsbury in 1642.

On 19th June the King and his exhausted cavalry reached Hereford\(^{(5)}\) and rested there ten days, during which Charles Gerard came up with his army.

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1. UCNW Baron Hill MSS 5375-8
2. Archaeologia 1857, p.215
3. Rev. G. Bellet, Antiquities of Bridgnorth (1856), pp.144-6
4. Symonds, p.203
5. Iter Carolinum
Maurice and his regiments were sent to hold Worcester. He had an immediate quarrel with the bellicose governor Sandys, but managed to settle this and to begin raising men and money. Vaughan was sent to restore the situation in Shropshire. 'The Devil of Shrawardine' struck the county with the impact of a hurricane. His horsemen found the local Parliamentarian army besieging High Ercall and destroyed it. Its recent conquests were recaptured or evacuated and the prisoners helped ransom some of the Royalist foot captured at Naseby. In Herefordshire Charles knighted the local leader Lingen and appealed to the gentry for donations of money. Even now personal loyalty to the monarch was so strong that he received many, even though at the same moment the horses of his soldiers were eating up the growing grass upon which much of the local economy depended. Some gentry were commissioned to raise new regiments to defend the county. On 23rd June a Council of War at Hereford decided to raise 10,300 new foot to replace those lost at Naseby. Of these 800 were to come from North Wales and the rest from South Wales and its March. Three days later Rupert departed with a detachment of troops to govern Bristol. On 3rd July Charles himself moved to Raglan Castle to be entertained by the Marquis of Worcester until his new army was ready.

In early July the recruits began to come in. They never arrived in the numbers requested, and those who came deserted as soon as an opportunity occurred. Money to pay them proved as difficult to find as ever. Nevertheless many new soldiers were raised, and dispersed into the garrisons of

1. HMC 9th Report, Appendix 2, p.437; E.292.15
2. Chamber Order Book 2 ff 231; Townshend ff 541-3
3. E.262.23, 25; E.296.33
4. Symonds, p.205; E.292.15, 262.20
5. Brit. L. Add. MS 11043 f 31
6. Ibid. f 35
8. Bod. L. Clarendon MS 28 ff 129
9. Iter Carolinum
10. Brit. L. Add. MS 11043 ff 37, 39, Harl. MS 6852 f 279
11. Ibid. ff 101, 103, 113
South Wales to await the summons to muster in the field. The gloomy files of pressed men, hurried along under guard, became a folk memory in Herefordshire.

In Worcestershire the Foley furnaces turned out arms for them. 'We shall have an army fit to fight for a Kingdom' wrote Digby on 10th July.

A week later the mood of the Royalists had already begun to darken. On the same day on which Digby made his boast the New Model Army, which had beaten Charles at Naseby, shattered the West Country Royalists at Langport. On the 23rd it took Bridgewater, which had been believed impregnable. At the same time Parliament decided to destroy the embryo royal army in South Wales by calling against it the army of its Scottish allies, which had been reducing Carlisle. The Scots arrived at Aloester on the 7th, and pushed westwards to attack Hereford.

Scudamore destroyed all the remaining defensible mansions near the town, pulled back his outposts and prepared for the siege. By the 25th it had begun.

While Scudamore bought him time, Charles attempted to strengthen the defences of the counties in which his new army was taking shape. On the 17th he and Gerard met the Glamorganshire commissioners at Cardiff and instructed them to raise 1,000 men in a week, gather the arrears upon the county tax and increase the level of that tax to an unprecedented £1,250 per month. The following day he returned to Raglan and issued parallel orders to the Monmouthshire commissioners, which differed only in that the new tax was to be £1,200 per month. On the 25th he met the Monmouthshire commissioners again at Usk to review the men he had ordered raised. They presented him with a proposal to raise the entire male population

3. PRO S.P. 16/498/8 ff 47-8
5. Dugdale's Diary, p.77; Bod. L. Wood Pamphlets 378.18
6. Brit. L. Add. MS 11043 f 43
7. E.262.34
8. Brit. L. Harl. MS 6852 f 285
9. Ibid. f 292
of the county in irregular regiments, one to be stationed in each hundred under an individual commissioner. If the Scots invaded Monmouthshire, these irregulars would harrass them and destroy their foraging parties, operating a guerrilla warfare to wear the enemy down. It was to represent a defence in depth. (1)

Charles approved the scheme. In doing so he created precisely the phenomenon which he and his officers had feared in the spring, at the inception of the Marcher Association, an irregular local army capable of imposing its will upon his regular troops. Perhaps he believed that his own presence at the head of the regulars, and the fact that the enemy were foreigners, would guarantee local loyalty. Perhaps the proximity of the Scots, and the need to protect his new army, forced his hand. Whatever the reason for his disregarding his former fears, they were about to be realised.

On the 29th he proceeded to Cardiff to review the 1,000 men he had ordered from Glamorganshire. He found not 1,000 but about 4,000, drawn up under the local gentry in an atmosphere of barely-concealed menace. They requested the replacement of Gerard's governor of Cardiff, Tyrrell, with a local man. Charles agreed. The gentry and their irregular soldiers withdrew four miles from Cardiff and encamped. On the 30th they requested official recognition for their troops and on the 31st recognition of the right of these troops to elect their own officers. These points were conceded. On 1st August they took the ominous name, 'the Peaceable Army', implying their separation from the Royalist cause, and

1. Ibid. f 302
requested that all remaining commanders in the county be replaced with local gentry, that arrears upon the tax be remitted and that the tax be reduced to a level suitable to the wealth of the county rather than the needs of the regular soldiers.\(^{(1)}\)

Charles and his cortège were amazed by this reaction, having expected loyalty and obedience.\(^{(2)}\) The reasons for it are still disputable. The most interesting explanation is that put forward by a Parliamentarian newspaper.\(^{(3)}\)

It claimed that the Glamorganshire commissioners had raised the new soldiers ordered by Charles on the 17th, whereupon the recruits had mutinied and demanded the removal of the foreigner Tyrrell, whose troops had plundered their farms to enforce the tax. The gentry, fearing a popular uprising, agreed and raised more men to put pressure on the King.

If this report is true, it represents a decisive intervention by the common people in the Great Rebellion. There are, however, grounds for doubting it. Firstly, one of Charles' officers noted that the gentry made popular unrest their reason for disaffection, with the comment that the excuse was palpably untrue.\(^{(4)}\) Secondly the circumstantial evidence is hostile. The Parliamentarian press had as said before every reason for reporting spontaneous popular revolts against Royalist atrocities. When the same 'Peacable Army' rose against Parliament in 1646\(^{(5)}\) the same press ascribed this event to the machinations of a few gentry. Furthermore the gentry had, as shown earlier, their own quarrel with Gerard and Tyrrell. They had found the comparatively modest demands of

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1. Ibid. ff 305, 308; Symonds, p.215; Walker, pp.116-18
2. Brit. L. Add. MS 21506 f 38
3. E.298.15
4. PRO S.P. 16/510/78
5. See below, p 258
Vavasour and Gerard difficult to meet, and could hardly have reacted cheerfully to the unprecedented burden imposed by Charles. At the same time the credit of Charles' cause was evaporating. He had lost Bridgewater and was clearly incapable of relieving Hereford, and immediately after the 'Peaceable Army' first appeared bad news arrived from Pembrokeshire. The djinn has escaped his bottle.

In mid-July Gerard's officers at Haverfordwest had sent out men to destroy the growing corn around Pembroke. Laugharne had to fight or starve, and on 1st August attacked his enemies on Colby Moor and broke them after a hard battle. He took Haverfordwest and began to reduce the remaining Royalist garrisons in Pembrokeshire. Charles could spare no men to stop him.

At Cardiff the hapless monarch conceded most of the gentry's demands. He replaced Tyrrell with the local Sir Richard Bassett, whom he had knighted at the siege of Gloucester. He replaced Gerard as commander in South Wales, although not with a local man but with Lord Astley, the tough old veteran who had commanded the foot in the royal army. Gerard was richly compensated with a peerage, Astley's former post and permission to berate the local gentry in public for their disloyalty. The tax was not reduced, nor its arrears remitted, but Charles agreed not to press for its collection.

This done, the King left the area. He had lost faith in the project of completing a new army. Instead he seemed likely to be caught between the Scots and Laugharne, amid a population already wavering in its loyalty. He determined to join his only undefeated army, in Scotland, and on 5th August gathered his

1. HMC Portland MSS Vol.1, pp.255-6; E.297.7, 298.6
2. Brit. L. Harl. MS 6852 ff 308, 312; Walker, pp.116-18; NLW Add. MS 4849D
remaining field troops and marched to Brecon. The governor there was his old supporter Herbert Price, a local gentleman but unpopular because he had gathered money efficiently to pay his garrison. The townspeople requested his removal and Charles, now ready to concede anything, took Price back into his army.\(^{(1)}\) He continued through Radnor, Ludlow and Bridgnorth to Staffordshire. There he drew more troops out of the garrisons\(^{(2)}\) and completed his sequence of surrenders to local demands by agreeing to let the Marcher Association be put into action as soon as possible.\(^{(3)}\) By 13th August he had left the region.

Within three weeks he had returned, the Scottish project having proved as much a mirage as the new army. In his absence, however, the situation in South Wales and its March had slightly improved. Astley had found the gentry as unhelpful as expected. Not only had they made no effort to assist Hereford but those of Glamorganshire, finding that Bassett took his duties as military governor of Cardiff seriously, forced him to deliver the town to the 'Peaceable Army'. Some began to correspond with Parliament.\(^{(4)}\) On the other hand Laugharne was still held up outside the Pembrokeshire castles and the Scottish army outside Hereford was disintegrating. Much of it had gone home to counter the Scottish Royalists and the remainder were demoralised by Scudamore's desperate resistance. Charles saw his opportunity; having returned from the North to Oxford he gathered all his available horse, 3,000 strong, and advanced upon Hereford. The Scots did not await him, but raised the siege and fled on 2nd September.\(^{(5)}\)

1. Iter Carolinum; Symonds, pp. 208, 242, 263
2. WSL Salt MS 109
3. TSANHS 1896, pp. 285-6; Bod. L. Firth MS C8 f 13
4. Ibid. ff 14, 16; E.296.24; PRO S.P. 23/189 f 162, 16/510/78
5. Iter Carolinum; HMC Portland MSS Vol.1, pp. 271-3
Their departure made possible a more ruthless policy towards South Wales, the destruction of dissent and the enforced completion of the new army abandoned a month before. Charles entered Hereford in triumph on the 4th, knighted Scudamore and his Lieutenant-Governor and ordered the confiscation of the estates of gentry who had co-operated with the Scots. A new press of men commenced in the county. The King despatched Gerard to Shropshire and Langdale to Glamorganshire with cavalry to brow-beat the gentry, while he himself entered Monmouthshire on the 7th to deal with the men Astley had marked down as disaffected. Five were arrested, the most prominent being Sir Trevor Williams, who had contacted Parliament as early as March. The lesser gentry were imprisoned, but Williams was bailed at the plea of the Marquis of Worcester's family. At Cardiff Langdale faced the 'Peaceable Army' and forced it to agree to disband, and to provide 1,000 recruits and money for the regular army. The royal cortège were beginning to celebrate when news arrived of the worst disaster since Naseby. Rupert had surrendered Bristol.

The blow was threefold. Firstly, it cost Charles the second city of his realm and exposed the whole West Country. Secondly, his rage was so great that he dismissed Rupert, whereupon Maurice and Gerard resigned in sympathy. Thirdly, the news impelled Charles to recall Langdale and move northward to Hereford, whereupon the 'Peaceable Army' and Sir Trevor Williams immediately declared for Parliament. Parliamentarian troops crossed from Bristol to Cardiff, Williams raised his own force in Monmouthshire, based upon the irregular regiment he had

1. Symonds, p.233; Walker, p.129; Brit. L. Add. MS 11043 ff 45, 49
2. See Chapter 16, p. 27
3. Symonds, pp.233-9; Walker, pp.129-30
commanded since the July agreement, and a new Parliamentarian army under
Sydenham Poyntz arrived in Herefordshire, ordered to pursue and capture Charles
himself. (1) Charles revived his scheme of fleeing to Scotland. En route, he
determined to repeat his success before Hereford by relieving his principal
stronghold at the other end of the Marches, Chester.

In May Byron had warned the King that Brereton would soon attack the city
again, and he devoted the summer to strengthening its resources. Finding Chester
itself incapable of providing money for fresh fortification, he met the com-
mmissioners of North Wales at Denbigh in June and persuaded them to provide a
monthly levy of cash to the city, on condition that free quarter be ended.
Charles almost wrecked this scheme in July by sending Langdale's Northern Horse
to live off free quarter in the north-west while he raised his new foot soldiers
in the south. Byron made a journey to Raglan to obtain their recall and by
August the new money was coming in. Bulkeley's nephew had left Anglesey, his
work complete. The feud between Owen and the Archbishop was cooled by a message
from Charles ordering them both to behave. When Parliamentarians from Montgomery
invaded Merionethshire in August, Owen gathered the local troops and chased them
out. Byron returned to Chester in early September with the money he needed and
the local troops of north-east Wales, leaving the area relatively united behind
him. (2)

This labour was needed, for Brereton had been equally busy. He had spent
the summer amassing units from several neighbouring counties to combine with his

1. Ibid; Symonds, p.239; Camden Society N.S. 60, pp.64-5
2. Bod. L. Rawlinson MS B210 f 55, Carte MS 15 f 133, Firth MS C7 f 338; NLW
   Clennenhau Letters 584-93; Archaeologia Cambrensis 1846, pp.40, 333-4
original army into a force big enough to defeat any local Royalist army. By early September, after much wrangling, this was ready, and opened a full-scale siege of Chester. This had been in progress two weeks when Charles appeared from the south with his cavalry. Brereton drew off his troops onto Rowton Heath, and the royal army attacked him there on the 23rd. It had, however, discounted the army of Poyntz, who came up on its heels and joined Brereton. Charles' men were routed and driven into Wales. For four days the King rested in Denbighshire to gather stragglers, and then he marched eastwards to Newark and left the region for ever.\(^{(1)}\)

With his departure, and the risings in Glamorganshire and Monmouthshire, his supporters in South Wales began to collapse county by county, like dominoes. Massey had at last left Gloucester, promoted to command a field army, and been replaced by another capable soldier, Thomas Morgan. Hearing of William's rebellion in Monmouthshire, Morgan marched west to capture the Royalist garrisons caught between himself and the rebels. On 10th October he joined forces with Williams and bombarded Chepstow Castle into surrender.\(^{(2)}\) They then attacked Monmouth, which surrendered on the 24th. There followed a crisis when Williams' irregulars marched home, proclaiming that they 'did not come to keep garrisons', leaving their leader and Morgan to hold the town with the latter's few regulars. Reinforcements, however, arrived from Gloucester, all known Royalists in the town were expelled and only Raglan Castle was left Royalist in the county.\(^{(3)}\)

Meanwhile Laugharne was advancing eastwards. In September he reduced the

1. Iter Carolinum; E.303.18; Symonds, p.242; Walker, pp.140-1
2. HMC Portland MSS Vol.1, pp.288-7; Bod. L. Tanner MS 60 f 440
3. Ibid; E.307.14, 308.19
last Pembrokeshire strongholds. In the same month risings in Cardiganshire occurred against the Royalist troops, who abandoned Cardigan. With Glamorganshire now Parliamentarian, Carmarthenshire was in a vice. Carmarthen itself was undermanned and the garrison lacked arms because the weapons destined for it had been seized at Cardiff. The gentry petitioned Charles for aid without success, and when Laugharne advanced in early October they decided that resistance was pointless. They dismissed the officers Gerard had left to hold Carmarthen and handed town and county over to Laugharne on the 12th.

Breconshire and Radnorshire now stood alone. The most prominent Royalist left in these counties was Howell Gwynn, who had been Lord Herbert's Lieutenant-Colonel. He is reputed to have commented 'Heigh God, Heigh Devil, I will be for the stronger side'. The citizens of Brecon demolished their own fortifications and on 23rd November the gentry of the county formally declared for Parliament. The Radnorshire gentry followed suit. Only Aberystwyth Castle held out for the King in all South or mid-Wales now, and Laugharne laid siege to it.

The last of the shock-waves of despair broke in southern Worcestershire. There the countrymen met on Breedon Hill on 11th November for a conference with the Parliamentarians from Evesham. They agreed to pay no more money to the doomed Royalists at Worcester and to form an irregular army in imitation of that of Williams to help finish them off. They elected as their commander Edward Dingley, who had been an active Royalist Commissioner of Safety. Larger meetings were held in subsequent weeks and the army took shape.

1. Brit. L. Harl. MS 6852 f 319
2. PRO S.P. 16/510/101
3. E.307.15
4. PRO S.P. 23/109 ff 10-12
5. Symonds, p.263
6. E.311.9
7. HMC Portland MSS Vol.1, p.315
8. E.310.6, 309.23
In the public and private writings of the war all irregular troops, whether employed privately or by the opposed factions, are referred to indiscriminately as 'clubmen', a testimony to their primitive equipment. This usage, together with a superficial similarity, has lead historians(1) to class the 'Peaceable Army' and those of Williams and Dingley with the Marcher peasant risings of early 1645 for which the term Clubmen is generally adopted. The difference however is clear. The earlier risings were directed against soldiers in general, without reference to the overall military situation. The later were directed against Royalist soldiers, in partnership with Parliament, and inspired directly by Royalist defeats and loss of credit. The earlier were characterised by their lack of powerful gentry leadership. The later occurred in precisely the areas which had remained quiet earlier, led by the same prominent gentry who had kept them quiet. They acted as individuals, to salvage their fortunes from the collapse of the royal cause. But they also acted as leaders, to protect their communities from the demands of men who would waste their resources in prolonging a fruitless war and from the destruction consequent upon a hopeless resistance.

This was not, of course, appreciated by the dedicated Royalists, those few men to whom the general cause outweighed the local interest and the greatest sacrifices were well spent. To them, the decision of these defectors represented the vilest treachery. The reaction of the die-hards is best captured in a declaration of Sir Henry Bard, issued at Worcester on 1st November, reprinted in a Parliamentarian newspaper(2) and often quoted out of context. It was directed

1. Notably Dr. Manning and Mr. Lynch
2. E.266.24
to the countrymen of south Worcestershire, whom Bard had governed in his period at Camden House and who were now making the overtures to the garrison of Evesham which were to culminate in the pact on Breedon Hill. He declared that when at Campden he had regarded arrears upon the local tax as inevitable. Now, however, he believed them to be the product of disaffection, so he ordered them to bring six months' tax to Worcester in a week, failing which he told them 'you are to expect an unsanctified body of horse among you, from which if you hide yourselves (as I believe each of you hath his hole) they shall fire your houses without mercy, hang up your bodies wherever they find them and scare your ghosts into your drabbling garrison'.

Five months before, Charles had set out to raise a new army in the parts of his territory which had been most protected from the war and which could therefore be expected to respond most fulsomely to his demands. Now only his peripheral fortresses were left to him. He had made a mistake to be repeated by later, greater monarchs in 1918, of forgetting that revolution usually begins among the reserves, while the front-line troops remain loyal longest.
By December 1645 it had become obvious to most observers that the King was losing the war in England. In Scotland too his adherents were now defeated. There remained Ireland, the one kingdom where Parliament and its allies had made little progress. The Royalist Ormonde held Leinster, while the interior was controlled by the Catholic rebels, officially neutral in the struggle between King and Parliament. If Charles could persuade them to enter the war on his behalf, their thousands of experienced, fanatical warriors could reverse the decision in England. To this end he had appointed their co-religionist Lord Herbert a special emissary to them in March 1645. By the end of the year these negotiations seemed about to succeed and an Irish army was reported ready to cross to Chester and North Wales.\(^1\) To receive it, Charles needed to maintain his existing garrisons there, and in the West Midlands, to provide the bridgehead for its campaign.

The man selected for this task was Lord Astley. On 6th December he was commissioned as Lieutenant-General of Worcestershire, Staffordshire, Herefordshire and Shropshire. His orders were to strengthen the garrisons in those counties and to work with neighbouring generals such as Henry Hastings to relieve Chester. In addition he was to raise 2,000 new foot by 1st April and march them to Oxford, to be combined with troops withdrawn from garrisons to make up a new English field army.\(^2\) He was instructed to collect arrears of taxation, eliminate free quarter, prevent countrymen from forming irregular armies for any purpose, discipline the

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1. For these intrigues, see Harleian Miscellany, Vol. 4, pp. 494-9, Vol. 8, pp. 490-505
2. Bod. L. Dugdale MS 19 f 113, Clarendon MS 26 f 79
soldiers and work with and honour the civilian commissioners. The military governors and the commissioners were encouraged to take an active and creative role in assisting him.\(^1\)

The task appeared even more daunting than Astley's summer command over the wavering Welsh gentry. Chester itself had been closely besieged since Rowton Heath. Attempts to storm it had failed, but food was running low in the city. Its great outpost at Beeston Castle had been starved out in November. From North Wales Byron's brother Sir Gilbert and a mercenary from Lorraine, Vicomte St. Paul, made attempts to harry the besiegers, but the city could clearly not hold out much longer.\(^2\)

In other Royalist garrisons serious quarrels had broken out. At Bridgnorth the remaining Royalist Shropshire gentry, including Ottley, had taken refuge, and were soon at odds with the hot-tempered governor Kirke.\(^3\) At Worcester the equally irascible Sandys had quarreled with the commissioners over the demands he made for his garrison.\(^4\) At Dudley, Leveson had renewed his vendetta against the commissioners for the gentry Association.\(^5\) At Lichfield Henry Hastings had taken advantage of Bagot's death to reassert his authority in Staffordshire, which had waned in the past year. When Rupert appointed a field army veteran as the new governor, Hastings persuaded Charles to put pressure on the Prince to withdraw him.\(^6\) Hastings' own candidate, Bagot's younger brother Henry, was duly installed, and ruled Lichfield under Hastings' tutelage until December.\(^7\) Then they quarreled, and Henry and the local gentry ejected Hastings from the town.\(^8\) He

1. Townshend ff 811-17
2. HMC Portland MSS Vol.1, pp.288-327; NLW Clennau Letters 598, 616; Burghall's Diary, p.185; Bod. L. Rawlinson MS B210 ff 57-62
3. TSANHS 1846, pp.293-4
4. Townshend ff 728-9; Corporation Order Book 2 f 237; E.313.29
5. WSL Salt MS 545
6. Ibid. 497, 550
7. Harwood, pp.40-47
8. CSPD 1645-7, p.305; Symonds, p.277; E.315.5
retired to his family castle at Ashby, and after a month made peace with Parliament. (1)

If the garrisons were in turmoil, the countryside was in chaos. In October, from Newark, Charles had despatched Sir William Vaughan to Denbighshire with the title of General of Horse for North Wales, and its March, equipped with all the remaining cavalry from the old field army except the Northern Horse. 'The Devil's' mission was to harass the outposts and foraging parties of the besiegers of Chester until they abandoned the siege for lack of supplies. Vaughan arrived at Chirk on 26th October and by calling in garrison troops increased his force to 800 horse and 280 foot. Brereton, however, hearing of this muster, despatched Mytton to attack him with a much larger force. He caught Vaughan's army at Denbigh on the 31st and shattered it. (2)

The broken horse scattered over Shropshire, Herefordshire and Worcestershire Vaughan spent two months trying to weld them together with more garrison troops for a fresh attempt, but both the available men and his reputation had perished at Denbigh. (3) In this period the troops wandered at will, harassed by parties from local enemy garrisons. The greatest casualty of these episodes was the man who had raised Cheshire for the King in 1642, Sir Thomas Aston, who took his death wound in a skirmish near Bridgenorth. (4) The local Royalist soldiers made the field troops unwelcome, for they consumed local supplies. (5) No commander remained in the area capable of allocating quarters to them. Maurice had kept it in relative order until September, and earned great popularity among the local

1. E.506.13
2. PRO S.P. 16/511/2; E.308.14; Symonds, pp.256-8
4. Ibid. p.306; E.309.24
5. Symonds, p.263
people, but then he had resigned. Inevitably, Vaughan's men misbehaved. They took free quarter by force. They held local gentry to ransom, including the commissioner Sir Ralph Clare and the ironmaster Foley. They insulted local soldiers and civilian officers who attempted to control them.

Equally naturally, the plundered countrymen reacted violently. The former Clubmen of south-western Shropshire, learning from the example of the South Welsh irregular armies, made common cause with the Shropshire Parliamentarians to destroy Royalist raiders. On 6th December the Clubman league of north-west Worcestershire resurrected in its original, neutral, form. It declared against all plundering soldiers and against Catholics and established an elaborate warning system.

As if this situation were not enough, Astley's assumption of his command coincided with another major disaster. Among the mansions Scudamore had destroyed in the summer had been that of Sir James Bridges. Bridges took the loss of his home so badly that he went to Parliament and offered to arrange the betrayal of Hereford. Parliament approved, detached 1,000 foot from its New Model Army under Colonel John Birch, and sent them to Gloucester to reinforce Morgan. Bridges meanwhile suborned two discontented officers in the Hereford garrison. On 16th December Morgan and Birch sallied out from Gloucester, announcing that they were taking up winter quarters in Herefordshire. They camped, and then after nightfall moved on Hereford. Bridges' contacts opened a gate, and the town fell. Scudamore escaped with a few soldiers to Worcester, where he was court-marshalled for

1. PRO S.P. 16/510/140
2. Townshend ff 545-7
3. HMC Portland MSS Vol.1, p.264; E.297.4
4. Townshend ff 801-4
negligence. He was sentenced to death, although the penalty was suspended. Birch was made governor of Hereford and the whole county, save Goodrich Castle, passed to Parliament.\(^{(1)}\)

Astley arrived at Worcester on Christmas Day\(^{(2)}\) and spent the next month touring his command. He gathered Vaughan's horse into a body and kept them with him.\(^{(3)}\) At Worcester he asked the Grand Jury to reissue Maurice's 'Charter', gave the commissioners equal power in military as well as civil matters and recognised the right of countrymen to resist plundering soldiers. This pleased the civilians but plainly infuriated Sandys, who resigned his governorship and retired to the lesser garrison of Hartlebury Castle, kept by his uncle. Astley then ordered the collection of £2,000 of arrears upon the local tax and offered to withdraw all troops from the countryside if the gentry would guarantee the tax. They refused, and free quarter remained.\(^{(4)}\) In Sandys' place the Lieutenant-General left the distinguished field officer Henry Washington. At Bridgnorth the quarrel was decided for him, as Kirke was captured by an enemy party.\(^{(5)}\) Astley replaced him with Sir Robert Howard, a local gentleman who had commanded a field regiment. At Lichfield he recognised neither Hastings nor Henry Bagot as commander, but installed another celebrated field army colonel, Sir Thomas Tildesley, with Bagot as his deputy. Sir William Blakiston, of the Northern Horse, was put in charge of Tutbury Castle.\(^{(6)}\)

As he settled each garrison, he detached troops for the relief of Chester. By late January he had prepared about 2,000 horse and 1,500 foot, too small a force

1. Camden Society 1873, pp.23-30; L.J. Vol.8, pp.59-60; E.314.12; Archaeologia Cambrensis 1871, pp.298-9
2. Symonds, p.277
3. Ibid.
4. Townshend ff 819-26
5. Brit. L. Add. MS 11333 f 192
to relieve the city by itself but formidable in co-operation with the army expected from Ireland.\(^{(1)}\) Then the bombshell broke. The Irish army was not coming, because Ormonde and the Protestant Irish would not accept the terms the Catholics demanded in return for it.\(^{(2)}\) Byron gave up hope. His soldiers were dying of hunger and the citizens beginning to rebel. On 2nd February he surrendered Chester to Brereton.\(^{(3)}\)

Nonetheless the Royalists did not despair. In October Charles had ordered and empowered Byron to retire to Caernarvonshire if he surrendered Chester. There he could make a stand protected by the great castles of Edward I, and await the Irish.\(^{(4)}\) This Byron now did. There was a chance that Ormonde and the Catholics would reach an agreement. Astley returned to his alternative project of raising a new field army in his command. Both gained strength from a phenomenon resulting from the very shrinkage of Royalist territory. As a fortress surrendered, its troops were usually permitted to march away to join a friendly garrison. Thus Byron and Astley received a steady stream of hardbitten veterans from lost strongholds eager for employment.\(^{(5)}\) Furthermore both must have been encouraged by developments in Glamorganshire. The gentry who had defected in the summer seemed to be reversing their decision.

Parliament had received these new adherents with official warmth but little trust. It had recognised the 'Peaceable Army' and commissioned a local gentleman, Bussy Mansell, as its commander, but the key fortresses of Cardiff and Swansea were garrisoned by English regulars with English governors.\(^{(6)}\) Administration of

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1. HMC Hastings MSS Vol.2, p.137; E.320.20; TSANHS 1896, pp.295-6; PRO S.P. 16/513/7, 23
2. Bod. L. Tanner MS 60 f 386
3. Ibid. f 393; E.320.1; Bod. L. Rawlinson MS B210 ff 62-5
4. PRO S.P. 16/511/2
5. E.g. Bod. L. Tanner MS 59 f 10; NLW Wynn MS 1763; Brit. L. Lansdowne MS 93 f 171
6. E.310.5
the county was vested in a committee from which the leading gentry were delibera-
tely excluded. A heavy local tax was imposed and the traditional Prayer Book outlawed in accordance with Parliament's religious reforms. By December the local leaders were seriously discontented. Charles had threatened the local economy and offended localist sentiment. Parliament did both these things and menaced the social and religious order as well.\(^1\)

The spark to ignite this situation fell from Monmouthshire. In December Charles commissioned Lord Herbert’s youngest brother, Lord Charles Somerset, as his general in Monmouthshire.\(^2\) Lord Charles commenced his military career by leading the garrison of Raglan in a series of savage raids, in which he levied money and men and punished anybody who had aided the Parliamentarians.\(^3\) In mid-January he launched a full-scale campaign and destroyed the new Parliamentarian garrisons of western Monmouthshire. Many formerly Royalist gentry who had defected with Williams turned Royalist again or let Lord Charles' troops pass unopposed. Some attempted to betray Monmouth. Williams himself retreated, appealing for aid.\(^4\) By early February Lord Charles had reached the borders of Glamorganshire.

On 6th February Bussy Mansell mustered the 'Peaceable Army' to fight Lord Charles in Parliament's name. To his surprise it mutinied and arrested him and the other gentry who still favoured Parliament. In his place it elected Edward Carne, a former Royalist officer whom Parliament had appointed High Sheriff. It then declared that it would ally with the Royalists to expel the Parliamentarians, after which the Royalists, like all 'foreign forces', would depart. These aims

1. HMC Portland MSS Vol.1, pp.348-50; Bod. L. Tanner MS 60 ff 482, 590
2. Bod. L. Dugdale MS 19 f 113
3. E.325.8, 313.4; Portland MSS Vol.1, pp.320-1
4. E.322.2, 20; Tanner MS 60 f 440
were entirely compatible with its declarations to Charles. It occupied Cardiff and besieged the castle, from which the Parliamentarian governor sent for help, commenting that the real aim of the Glamorganshire gentry was that 'this county should be independent from England, both King and Parliament'.\(^{(1)}\) Militant neutralism had reappeared with vehemence.

Parliament could not afford to ignore this challenge, which might inspire the bulk of the population of South Wales, if not England, to a similar rising. Laugharne marched from Aberystwyth and Williams, reinforced by some of Morgan's soldiers, from Chepstow. Williams broke through the Raglan Royalists and united with Laugharne to make a force of 1,400 men. On the 18th they attacked Carne's larger army outside Cardiff. The battle illustrated again the impotence of irregulars faced with regulars. The 'Peaceable Army' had won its previous victories by menaces, and faced with a determined enemy it fired one volley and then fled. The Parliamentarians bombarded Cardiff town into surrender and relieved the castle. They then set about hunting down Carne. He attempted to muster his troops once more, but his enemies caught him in the process and finally dispersed them. Carne himself surrendered soon after. Laugharne granted generous terms to the rebels to encourage their continued submission, promising the use of the old Prayer Book and demanding merely that they promise to muster again only if ordered by Mansell.\(^{(2)}\) He returned to besiege Aberystwyth Castle and eventually reduced it.\(^{(3)}\) Morgan and Williams pushed Lord Charles Somerset back to Raglan. The last Royalist offensive of the war and the last assertion of militant neutralism had both ended.

1. Portland MSS Vol.1, pp.348-50
2. Ibid. pp.351-2; Tanner MS 60 f 484; E.325.17
3. E.335.3
Astley set to work all the harder to raise his new regulars, while securing the surviving Royalist territory in his command. He raided Parliamentarian territory to obtain money. He caught the irregular army of south Worcestershire besieging Madresfield Court, a new Royalist garrison in the Malvern Hills, and dispersed it. He dealt with complaints of maladministration, in at least one case deciding for the plaintiff. He seems to have called in garrisons of isolated fortresses such as Chirk Castle to swell his army. By mid-March that army was ready, about 3,000 strong. His territory, which he had inherited in chaos, was restored to some sort of responsible government, an achievement marked shortly after his departure by a council of war at Worcester. It was held by governor Washington and his principal officers to try a local gentleman who had killed a fellow officer who had attempted to rob him during the period of disorder. Despite its military complexion, the court decided unanimously for acquittal.

The last act of the Royalist tragedy opened in mid-March, when Astley entered hostile territory with his vital army on its march to Oxford. This was a moment the Parliamentarians had been dreading, and awaiting. Instantly Morgan and Birch left their respective garrisons, united their troops and followed him. Hunter and hunted crossed the Vale of Evesham and entered the Cotswolds, the two Parliamentarians harrying the Royalist and attempting to slow him up until reinforcements arrived. They succeeded, for Brereton hurried down from the north and joined them. Together, they overwhelmed Astley's army at Stow-on-the-Wold on

1. CSPD 1645-7, pp. 361-2; E.506.12
2. E.506.10, 322.2, 24
3. Townshend ff 551-3, 651-6, 679
4. Archaeologia Cambrensis 1846, p.41
5. Birmingham RL 347159, 382035
21st March and captured Astley himself.\(^1\) The last battle of the war had fought.

Few doubted that it was the coup de grace. Within six weeks the King himself had surrendered to his enemies. Nothing remained for Parliament's troops but to reduce the surviving Royalist fortresses. Each local army was allotted particular garrisons to destroy. The Shropshire forces were left to take Bridgnorth. Their former colleague Thomas Mytton, who had quarreled violently with them,\(^2\) was sent into North Wales to attack Byron and reduce the castles. Brereton was sent against Lichfield, Dudley Castle and Tutbury Castle. Birch was ordered to take Ludlow and Goodrich Castle. Morgan was left to tackle Raglan Castle, Hartlebury Castle and Worcester.

Mytton's task was the most important, as while Byron held north-west Wales a bridgehead for Irish Royalist troops still existed. Byron himself had been working hard to preserve it. On his arrival in Caernarvonshire on 5th February he paused at Conway and wrote ahead to the local gentry, courteously requesting quarters for the troops he had brought from Chester.\(^3\) These agreed, he contacted the governors of the local fortresses to arrange deployment of their troops with his to construct a local army.\(^4\) He wrote also to Ormonde urging him to hasten the Irish.\(^5\) His prospects of success were enhanced by the strength of the medieval fortresses ringing his territory. Mytton, despite great efforts, spent three months reducing the most easterly, Ruthin and Hawarden, which were by no means the most formidable.\(^6\)

1. Camden Society 1873, pp.31-7; E.506.22
2. Bod. L. Tanner MS 60 ff 444, 461
3. NLW Wynn MS 1763
4. NLW Clennenau Letters 608,10
5. Bod. L. Carte MS 16 f 517
6. Tanner MS 60 f 534; E.333.9
Yet Byron's efforts were paralysed almost immediately by the hostility of the local community. For all his tact he was inevitably resented as a foreigner. (1) Furthermore, they could not share his hopes, for the prospect of having to support an army of savage Irishmen filled them with horror. While Byron begged Ormonde to send troops, they begged the Marquis to withhold them. (2) Some began to incline towards the solution of their brethren in the south, of making their own terms with Parliament. Immediately after his arrival Byron uncovered a plot to betray Caernarvon. (3) In October the Anglesey gentry had forced Viscount Bulkeley to accept one of their number, David Lloyd, as governor of Beaumaris Castle. Byron attempted to replace him with Bulkeley's son Richard, who had served ably in the field army, but the gentry refused to accept Richard. Lloyd wrote secretly to Parliament requesting negotiations. (4) Parliament sent a former Royalist commissioner, Sir Robert Eyton, to the area to nurture the growing opposition to Byron. (5) By March the rupture between the Anglesey gentry and the Field Marshal was obvious. They intercepted his letters to Ormonde (6) and when the Marquis did send a few soldiers to Anglesey these men were disarmed and expelled. Byron had himself rowed over Menai Strait to protest, and was almost assassinated by unknown gunmen on the shore. (7) Bulkeley proved a man of feeble character, neither encouraging nor reproving his neighbours, and Byron described him as 'the drunken Lord'. His ally Archbishop Williams appeared by contrast 'a mixture of a madman and a knave'. (8) The Archbishop was in fact adhering consistently to his single

1. Carte MS 16 f 521
2. Ibid. f 655, MS 17 f 1
3. Carte MS 16 f 517
4. Ibid. ff 684-5; NLW Wynn MS 1765; UCNW Baron Hill MS 5380; CSPD 1645-7, pp. 344, 372-3, 382-3
5. Ibid. p.414; Brit. L. Add. MS 11332 f 113
6. Bod. L. Carte MS 16 f 682
7. Ibid. ff 684-5
8. Carte MS 17 f 166
political and moral principle, of self-advancement. He cultivated Byron and wrote to Ormonde about him in terms of worried concern.\(^{(1)}\) He wrote to Bulkeley advising him to keep independent of both Byron and the gentry.\(^{(2)}\) And, of course, he wrote to Parliament offering his services\(^{(3)}\) and to Royalist military governors encouraging them to defect.\(^{(4)}\)

In mid-April Mytton, having reduced Ruthin Castle, decided to put the secret promises of the gentry to the test, and advanced directly upon Byron, ignoring the intervening fortresses. Byron, unable to raise a field force capable of meeting him, supplied the local garrisons, particularly that of Sir John Owen at Conway, and shut himself up in Caernarvon.\(^{(5)}\) Archbishop Williams wrote Owen a sugary letter promising assistance\(^{(6)}\) and then went to Mytton's camp and joined him, followed by the other Caernarvonshire gentry.\(^{(7)}\) Owen reacted by leading his men in a last furious sally to devastate their lands.\(^{(8)}\) Mytton ignored him and struck at his main opponent, Byron. By early May Caernarvon was closely besieged. Byron's spirit was broken. He had no wish to withstand another terrible and hopeless ordeal such as he had endured at Chester. He gave Ormonde a month to send an army, and then surrendered and passed overseas.\(^{(9)}\) His war was at last over.

During the siege of Caernarvon, Mytton opened negotiations with the Anglesey gentry. They were protracted only by that gentry's desire to obtain the best possible terms. A moment of drama occurred when young Richard Bulkeley seized Beaumaris Castle from his rival Lloyd, but it soon became apparent that he had done so simply to strengthen the position of his family in winning pardon from

1. Carte MS 16 f 521
2. Carte MS 17 f 98
3. CSPD 1645-7, p.376
4. Bod. L. Tanner MS 60 f 379; E.340.21
5. NLW Clennenau Letters 611, 615; Cambrian Quarterly Magazine 1829, p.66
6. Brit. L. Lansdowne MS 93 f 171
7. Tanner MS 59 ff 332, 612
8. NLW Wynn MS 1819, Clennenau Letters 617, 621
9. Carte MS 17 f 301; E.340.17, 509.14
Parliament. On 14th June, ten days after Byron's departure, the whole island formally surrendered to Mytton. The last compact bloc of Royalist territory had been shattered. Its individual fortresses could be reduced at leisure.

In the Midlands and Marches the remaining Royalist governors displayed a mixture of reactions to their predicament. Leveson at Dudley Castle, Blakiston at Tutbury Castle, Woodhouse at Ludlow and Sandys at Hartlebury Castle decided rationally that further resistance was pointless. They surrendered immediately, or after a short siege, on good terms. Leveson's easy escape produced fury among the local people, who having been forced to serve him for three years were deprived even of the satisfaction of seeing him endure the rigours of a siege. He galloped away amid 'many thousand curses', with a Parliamentarian escort to protect him from being lynched. He was never forgotten nor forgiven, and his malevolent ghost is still believed to haunt the now ruined castle.

At Bridgnorth Sir Robert Howard, Ottley and the other Shropshire gentry behaved with something approaching hysteria. On 29th March their enemies attacked the town and stormed it, penning them into the castle. From there they issued warrants to the townspeople demanding money. The townspeople, not surprisingly, replied that with Parliamentarian troops among them they could not provide it. The Royalists' answer was to fire grenades into the town, which being built of wood was soon an ocean of flame. Yet only three weeks after this atrocity they made terms.

The remaining governors settled down grimly to fight. To spare them further

1. NLW Wynn MSS 1789-99, Carreglwyd MS 2/242; HMC 5th Report Appendix, p.420; Archaeologia Cambrensis 1917, Supplement, pp.296-8
3. Staffordshire RO D.260/M/F/1/6 f 8
4. Bod. L. Tanner MS 59 ff 10, 28.9
5. E.335.2
suffering the captive Charles issued a general order to them on 10th June, directing them to surrender. Only the governor of Oxford obeyed. In at least one case, that of Lichfield, the garrison seem to have doubted the authenticity of the document and cherished a pathetic belief that they would be relieved. But elsewhere the Royalists seem to have possessed no illusions concerning their isolation. Indeed, the note sounded in their replies to their besiegers is of lonely and defiant pride. The very defection and submission of most of their comrades seemed to strengthen their own determination to testify to the intrinsic worth of their cause. They required an act of expiation, and chose the most primitive and vital of such acts, the shedding of blood.

The last Royalist warlords behaved like madmen, or heroes. At Goodrich Lingen fought until the castle was beaten into rubble about his ears, only capitulating in July when the walls finally collapsed. Tyldesley gave up Lichfield the same month, after three months under attack. The weight of the New Model Army itself was required before the Marquis of Worcester surrendered Raglan Castle or Washington Worcester. Starvation alone forced the remainder to capitulate. Roger Mostyn gave up Flint Castle in August. William Salusbury, nicknamed 'Old Blue Stockings', held Denbigh Castle until the King sent him a personal message to desist in October. Owen at Conway ignored alike the cannon of Mytton and the entreaties of Archbishop Williams until November. Sir Richard Lloyd, who had first led the Denbighshire gentry for the King, withstood a year's siege at Holt Castle, surrendering in January 1647. Last of

1. Tanner MS 59 f 319
2. E.341.6
3. See Tanner MS 59 f 286; Birmingham RL 595611 ff 248.9
4. E.349.2
5. E.345.2
6. E.342.16, 350.18
7. Townshend ff 561-631, 686-752
8. HMC Portland MSS Vol.1, p.389
9. T. Pennant, Tours in Wales (1810), Appendix 8
10. ; Brit. L. Lansdowne MS 93 ff 173-5; NLW Clennenau Letters, Appendix
11. CSPD 1645-7, pp.514-15
all, Owen's brother William gave up Harlech, 'the castle of lost causes', on 15th March 1647.(1)

Most of the civilian Royalist commissioners made their peace with Parliament, usually upon payment of a fine, and retired to their manor-houses. Fourteen years of political impotence and humiliation awaited them until with the Restoration those who survived were restored to something like their pre-war position and saw the triumph of the ideals for which they claimed to have fought. Most of the military leaders went abroad, to serve other monarchs or follow an impoverished court in exile. Few returned. Vassour and Vaughan fell in battle. Maurice drowned at sea. Astley, Byron and Leveson died in foreign beds. Only Rupert, Gerard, Langdale and Owen returned to honours at the Restoration and none became a statesman of the first rank. Yet they achieved their own immortality, on the canvases of Victorian artists, in the weekend recreations of modern brigadiers and in the memories of the country people. Other ghosts than Leveson's stalk their battered fortresses. Across Shropshire hillsides the phantoms of Vaughan's horsemen are still reputed to canter. The reputation of Scudamore's soldiers, the Red Men of the Dusk, is only now dying in rural Herefordshire. It is hard to say who have been the ultimate victors.

1. NLW Clennenanau Letters, Appendix
CONCLUSION

In Wales, the Marches and the West Midlands at least the English Civil War did not arise, inevitably, from any fundamental social, economic, religious or even political cleavage within local society. It was an artificial insemination of violence into the local community. The traditional rulers of England, King, Lords and Commons, betrayed the first duty of government, to promote the order and security of the governed. Instead they set leading men of each county against each other, to the ruin of themselves and their community.

From the beginning some communities recognised and resisted this process. When the King and Parliament initially appealed to the region to support their respective claims they evoked a positive response in certain areas. In Herefordshire and most of Wales the majority of the community displayed loyalty to the King, while Birmingham strongly supported Parliament. On the other hand, in almost all the English counties attempts to evoke general enthusiasm for either cause met with indifference or open hostility. Hence the Royalist army began virtually as a private enterprise, like a joint stock company, the money donated by individual partisans being used to attract recruits into regiments led by prominent Royalists.

It is difficult to determine any single motive behind the decision of the Royalist activists to commit themselves to the royal cause. They varied in status from powerful nobles to middle-rank gentry, and the degree and duration of their enthusiasm also varied greatly between individuals. As far as can be ascertained their commitment to Royalism was a personal decision, made in response to the King's declarations.

The failure of Charles' army to win a decisive victory in the autumn of 1642 resulted in attempts by the Royalists to harness the resources of the territory they controlled by laying general impositions upon the communities within it. This process escalated with the continuation of the war until by early 1644 every county held by the Royalists was expected to contribute large quantities of men,
money and supplies to their cause. To encourage local men in this effort, the King was initially careful to leave the region in the hands of local gentry, with overall command invested in generals appointed for their social prestige rather than their military experience. By early 1644 this policy had proved a disaster. Not only did the inexperienced generals suffer defeat and the gentry quarrel amongst themselves but the provinces consistently failed to provide the support needed. This was partly the result of the unprecedented weight of the burdens imposed in relation to the limited resources of the communities, which were further decreased by the number of Parliamentarian enclaves in Royalist territory which ensured that the richer Royalist counties suffered the destructive effects of continual warfare. It may also, however, be attributed to the reluctance of most men to make personal sacrifices to promote this war.

The King's reaction was to invest local power in men selected for their military ability and their lack of any previous contact with the areas they commanded. They could be expected to be aloof both from local hatreds and from any loyalty to the communities they had to exploit. This policy was generally successful. The new commanders regained much of the ground their predecessors had lost and the most important, Rupert, displayed a considerable talent for administration. In the process he raised and equipped an army which may have come near to winning the war at Marston Moor.

During the following winter the new military men met with a considerable hostile reaction from the communities they governed, resulting not merely from growing war-weariness but from recent Royalist defeats which produced administrative chaos and a loss of faith in the King's cause. Some gentry sought to raise an army capable of controlling the regular troops, while countrymen in the remoter areas staged armed uprisings. The King's generals eventually oversaw this challenge, repressing the uprisings and the scheme of the gentry, and utilising their victory to exploit certain areas more successfully than ever before. By the summer of 1645 they had restored confidence in their cause and
put a formidable army into the field.

The events of the spring made clear the lesson that ultimately it did not matter if the local population were alienated from the royal cause, as long as the King possessed an army with which to terrorise the provinces into providing him with the materials of war. At Naseby, however, that army was destroyed. The King was forced to appeal for fresh sacrifices from the wealthiest remaining communities in his territory while depriving him of the means to coerce them into making the sacrifices. The communities concerned chose instead to ally with Parliament in evicting the King's forces. This subtraction of support ensured that the Royalists were incapable of resisting their enemies and were overwhelmed.

The military history of the Great Civil War retains its value in the sequence of events described above, as battles did decisively affect the course of these events. Yet their significance is lost without an understanding of the other war, fought between the partisans of both causes and the bulk of the population, which they attempted to press into service. In the last analysis it was the local community, not Parliament, which defeated Charles I, not from hatred of his cause but from hatred of the war itself.
APPENDIX

ROYALIST CIVILIAN COMMISSIONERS

The names of Royalist civilian commissioners in the region can be located in the following sources:

Northamptonshire RO Finch-Hatton MS 133
Brit. L. Harl. MSS 6804 f 107
Bod. L. Dugdale MS 19
Carte MSS 8 f 155
NLW Wynn MS 1712
IL/MB/17 ff 23, 48, 81
Llanfair-Brynodol MS 51
Crosse Of Shawe Hill MS 1112

Worcestershire RO 1714; 399/192 ff 329-32
Birmingham RL 351507
UCNW Baron Hill MSS 5364, 5369
TSANHS 1898, pp.158-9
M. Mahler, A History Of Chirk Castle And Chirkland (1912), pp.164-5

Put together, these provide the following sample of names:

Cheshire.........23
Herefordshire....22
Monmouthshire....31
Shropshire.......41
Staffordshire....26
Warwickshire....23
Worcestershire...35
Anglesey..........8
Caernarvonshire...13
Denbighshire......34
Flintshire.........21
Glamorganshire....34
Merionethshire....18
Montgomeryshire...15
Radnorshire.......14

The following number of these names can be located in the works of biography, topography and genealogy listed in the secondary sources in the bibliography:

Cheshire.........19
Herefordshire....21
Monmouthshire....15
Shropshire.......30
Staffordshire....26
Warwickshire....23
Worcestershire...35
Anglesey..........4
Caernarvonshire...7
Denbighshire......26
Flintshire.......12
Glamorganshire...29
Merionethshire....7
Montgomeryshire...9
Radnorshire.......8
Wherever a Commissioner Of Array, Safety, Impressment or for Taking Accounts can be identified by this process he is a prominent gentleman or the heir of one. Where a name cannot be located in the works of topography or genealogy used it seems invariably to result from the lack of a detailed work to cover the home area of the individual concerned, so that I have had to remain content with national sources in which only the greatest gentry would appear. The Commissioners Of The Excise, by contrast, seem to have been genuinely obscure individuals. This is hardly an unexpected discovery, as the King would hardly have been likely to entrust the tasks of the Commissions Of Array, Safety or Impressment to men without power in their communities.

The secondary sources used for this purpose were those of Cockayne, Dugdale, Duncumb, Earwaker, Keeler, Ormerod, Nash, Rev J. Shaw, W. A. Shaw, Tucker, the Victoria County Histories and the DNB and DNB. For details of all these, see below.
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200.61 His Majesties Speech to the Inhabitants of Denbigh....
242.2 Certain Special and Remarkable Passages
242.24 Perfect Diurnall 4 issues 31 Oct-24 Nov 1642
246.6 " 4 issues 31 Jan-27 Feb 1643
247.20 Mercurius Aulicus 12th week 1643
247.25 Certaine Informations 8 Apr 1643
249.3 Perfect Diurnall 8 May 1643
250 " 4 and 11 Dec 1643
252 " 25 Dec 1643, 2 Apr 1644
254 " 19 and 26 Aug 1644
256.2 " 9 Sep 1644
256.44 Perfect Occurrences 6 Dec 1644
258.6 " 20 Dec 1644
258.22 Perfect Diurnall 10 Feb 1645
258.25 " 17 Feb 1645
258.36 " Passages 5 Mar 1645
260.4 " Occurrences 26 Mar 1645
260.8 " Passages 2 Apr 1645
260.12 " " 9 Apr 1645
260.13 " Occurrences 11 Apr 1645
Perfect Passages 16 Apr 1645

" Declaration 26 Apr 1645

" Passages 27 Apr 1645

" Occurrences 25 Apr 1645

" Passages 7 May 1645

" Occurrences 4 July 1645

" Passages 11 July 1645

" Passages 21 July 1645

Mercurius Aulicus 12-19 Dec 1645

" Passages 14 Jan 1646

" Passages 26 Feb 1646

A True and Full Relation of the Taking of Shrewsbury

A Diary 21-28 Feb 1645

Kingdom's Weekly Intelligencer 11-16 Mar 1645

18-25 Mar 1645

Mercurius Aulicus 17-20 Apr 1645

" 20-27 Apr 1645

" Kingdom's Weekly Intelligencer 17-20 May 1645

Mercurius Aulicus 18-25 May 1645

" 25 May-3 June 1645

Intelligence from Shropshire of three great Victories...

Kingdom's Weekly Intelligencer 25 June-2 July 1645

The King's Cabinet Opened

True Informer 18 Aug 1645

Mercurius Aulicus 15-20 July 1645

Cittie Scout 19 Aug 1645

A True Relation of the late successe...in Pembrokeshire...

Parliament's Post 11 Aug 1645

The King's Forces totally Routed...on Routon Heath...

Two Letters from Colonel Morgan....

Major General Laughorn's Letter....

A True Relation of a great Victory....near Denbigh

A Full Relation of the Desperate Design....for the betraying of Monmouth

Weekly Account 12-19 Nov 1645

Scottish Dove 12-19 Nov 1645

Weekly Account 19-26 Nov 1645

Moderate Intelligencer 15 Nov 1645

A Declaration of the County of Brecknock...

Mercurius Civicus 11-18 Dec 1645

Kingdom's Weekly Intelligencer 18-25 Dec 1645

Articles for the surrender of Chester....

Mercurius Academicus 7th week 1646

Civics 5-12 Feb 1646

Veridicus 13 Feb 1646

A great Overthrow....by Lieutenant-General Laughorne, Colonell Morgan and Sir Trevor Williams

Moderate Intelligencer 24 Apr 1646

Mercurius Civicus 16-27 Apr 1646

Letters between Sir William Brereton and Sir Thomas Tildsley....

A Letter....concerning....the siege before Raglan Castle....

Articles for the Delivering up of Lichfield Close....

The Strong Castle of Gothridge taken by Colonell Birch....

An Exact Relation....of Raglan Castle, touching the surrender thereof

Perfect Diurnall 16 Feb 1646

23 Feb 1646

" Occurrences 27 Mar 1646
Bodleian Library
The Wentworth Proclamations
Ashmole Pamphlets H.23.25 Declaration...of the County of Hereford
Zl.17.16 Declaration...of Tenby

Corpus Christi College Library, Oxford.
Complete set of Mercurius Aulicus

Most of the partisan tracts listed above are exceptionally dangerous sources to employ. Each generation of historians discovers more information within them to be misreported, deliberately distorted or completely fallacious. The present thesis contributes its own quota to these categories. Hence I have observed the following general rule when admitting information from them: to accept only those assertions which are corroborated by a hostile or neutral source or which can contribute no benefit to the teller. I relax this rule in the case of official despatches which are reprinted in full in a newspaper giving name of author, date and location, and for Parliamentarian newspapers after December 1645, when the obvious defeat of the Royalists made misrepresentation unnecessary and I can detect no cases of it.

More trustworthy are the extract quoted from

The Harleian Miscellany (London 1810)

Somers Tracts (A Collection Of Scarce And Valuable Tracts....
1811, volume 5,
pp. 263-75, Iter Carolinum (A Journal of the King's Marches)
296-375, John Corbet, A History Of The Military Government Of
Gloucester (Although not trustworthy in its general reflections upon the nature of the war, the factual information provided in this narrative is corroborated by every other source.)
375-98, Short Memorials Of Thomas Lord Fairfax, Written By
Himself
(3) Reports Of The Historical Manuscripts Commission

Second Report (1871), Appendix
pp. 48, 49 Wrottesley Family Papers
pp. 36 Lyttleton Family Papers
pp. 63, 67 Papers Of Denbighshire Commissioners Of Array

Third Report (1872), Appendix
pp. 259 Dod Family Papers

Fourth Report (1874), Appendix
pp. 259-76 Earl Of Denbigh's Papers

Fifth Report (1876), Appendix
pp. 141-2, 175 Sir Richard Leveson's Papers (Originals in Staffordshire RO, catalogued D866)
pp. 344-5 Lord Cholmondeley's Papers
pp. 414, 420 Papers Relating To Anglesey

Sixth Report (1877), Appendix
pp. 472 Papers Relating To Cheshire And Montgomeryshire

Seventh Report (1879), Appendix
pp. 689 Papers Relating To Herefordshire And Monmouthshire

Ninth Report (1883)
Appendix 2, p. 437 Horison Collection

Tenth Report (1885)
Appendix 4, p. 373 Lord Kilmurrey's Papers
pp. 375 Leighton Collection
pp. 394, 399 Richard Herbert's Papers
pp. 403-4 Corporation Of Bishop's Castle's Papers
pp. 430-6 Corporation Of Bridgnorth's Papers
Appendix 6, pp. 86, 95 Bouverie Collection

Twelfth Report (1890)
Appendix 2, pp. 68-141 Harley Family Papers
Appendix 9, pp. 12-14 Marquis Of Worcester's Papers

Thirteenth Report (1891)
Appendix 1, 'Portland MSS, Volume 1', The Clerk Of Parliament's Papers

Fourteenth Report (1896)
Appendix 4, p. 62 Kenyon Collection
Appendix 8, p. 203 Worcester Cathedral Chapter's Papers

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Hacket, John, Bishop Of Lichfield, *Scrinia Reserata* (A life of Archbishop Williams) (London 1692)


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(5) Editions Of Documents

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Day, W.A. (ed.) The Pythouse Papers (London 1879) (Some more of Prince Rupert's papers. Some are mis-dated and placed out of context by the editor)

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Journals Of The House Of Lords, Volumes 4-7

Rushworth, John (ed.) Historical Collections (London 1659-1701) (A great range of official documents)

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(6) Documents Edited By Historical Societies
And Journals

Archaeologia

Archaeologia Cambrensis
1846 (No.1), pp.33-42 Robert Williams (ed.) The notebook of William Maurice
Ibid. pp.326-33 Papers of Viscount Bulkeley
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1873 T.W. Webb (ed.) 'A Military Memoir Of Colonel John Birch Written By Roe His Secretary'
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Shrewsbury Corporation Records
1905 (3rd Series, No.5) Rev. J.R. Hurton (ed.) Humphrey Walcot's Papers

Worcestershire Historical Society
1915-20 J.W. Willis-Bund (ed.) Henry Townshend's 'Diary' (I have expressed my reservations about this edition earlier, but the work remains valuable not merely for the accuracy of transcription but also because in the introduction are reprinted papers of Sir William Russell, now lost.)
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MAPS

--- County boundary (slightly simplified)

- Town, village or city

▲ Castle

• Mansion

○ Natural Feature