‘The Attic Neighbour’: The Cleruchy in the Athenian Empire

Alfonso Moreno

‘Imperialism is not a pleasant thing’ – nevertheless, in the view famously championed by Ste. Croix and still prevalent today, imperial Athens did not exploit its allies ‘in any extensive way.’ However resented as a symbol of subjection it might have become among allies, the payment of tribute to Athens was usually neither intended nor in all likelihood even felt as economically punitive. Instead, tribute seems to have been demanded in careful proportion to – even in consideration of the long-term sustainability of – the economic resources of individual poleis, including not only agricultural production, but also pasturage, fishing, mineral wealth, and tax revenues. Furthermore, since the correct assessment of the local resources of the total of 248 states appearing at various times as tributaries of Athens was undoubtedly a complex process dependent on access to highly localised and potentially variable information, it is not entirely surprising that even the harshest-sounding of surviving Athenian decrees still gave each ally the right to appeal at Athens for more lenient treatment on economic grounds. Yet the mild (if not benign) image of Athenian imperialism yielded by focusing on this proportional and reasoned exaction of tribute can only be partial, even misleading. The monumental Quota Lists understandably draw our attention as preciousely eloquent documents of Athenian imperial finances, but they do not paint anything close to a full picture of Athenian economic exploitation and allied discontent.

A far more accurate and nearly contemporary appreciation of these twin phenomena is possible thanks to the decree of Aristoteles of spring 377 BC. This well-known document acts both as a prospectus of the Second Athenian League and as an invitation to potential new members. Quite different from a constitution, it is an informal outline of how non-Athenians were thought to remember – or to fear a resurgence of – fifth-century Athenian imperialism. The decree implicitly seeks to reassure new allies among the Greeks and barbarians that the perceived abuses of the Athenian leadership of the Delian League would not be repeated. Garrisons, governors and tribute are therefore for the future disavowed, but interestingly the mention of even such important elements of empire is only brief
and superficial (lines 22-3). By striking contrast, the abolition, both retrospective and prospective, of Athenian encroachment on the territories of its allies is given long and detailed treatment (lines 25-46). While the inscription very broadly prohibits the acquisition of ‘landed property … either private or public’ (τὰ ἐγκατήρια … ἢ ἴδια ἢ δημόσια’) ‘whether through purchase or by taking as security or by any other means’ (μήτε προμένειν μήτε ὑποθεμένειν μήτε ἄλλων τρόπων"), the type of Athenian occupation that would have been of most concern to anyone in 377 is clear from the account of Diodorus (taken, almost certainly, from the contemporary Ephorus):

... and they also passed a decree (ἐνεργείαντο) to restore the lands which had become cleruchies to their former owners, and established by law (νόμον ἐθεντο) that no Athenian should cultivate lands outside of Attica.10

Similarly, a few chapters earlier, among the causes of the Spartan ascendency of the 380s that the Second Athenian League is said to have aimed to counteract, Diodorus (Ephorus) mentions the lingering ill-repute of the Athenians for making cleruchies out of the lands of their defeated enemies.11 The Ephoran account is clearly an abbreviated and generalised form of the two technical parts of the ban, the first (retrospectively annulling any existing property claim: reflected on lines 25-35 of the prospectus) embodied in a decree (ψήφαμα), the second (prospectively prohibiting all such claims: reflected on lines 35-46) embodied in a law (νομὸς).12 As such it is actually correct: places that were not admitted to the new alliance (like Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros) legally remained cleruchies, or remained liable to be subjected to them later (like Samos and Potidaea).13 More importantly, the Ephoran account establishes what was too sensitive for official Athenian documents like the decree of Aristoteles, with their characteristic phraseological tact, to spell outright: the renunciation of encroachment on the land of the new allies was meant to apply principally to cleruchies. Therefore, if the decree of Aristoteles provides ‘comme une vision “en négatif” de la 1e Confédération athénienne’,14 it follows that the Athenian cleruchies were the most intensely and widely detested element of fifth-century Athenian imperialism.

Without entering in significant detail into the considerable uncertainty that remains around its precise legal characteristics, the essential feature of the Athenian cleruchy always remained the dual liability to Athenian taxation and military service that came attached with the possession of the plot, or kléros.15 This unusual combination of private and public interests, no doubt emerging from the fact that cleruchies were lands captured by the state, and over which the state reserved some rights after their distribution to individual Athenians, would almost certainly have restricted the full alienability of the land. Again, the technical details are

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still obscure in detail, and need not detain us here, although it is suggestive of their fluidity that the language of the Aristoteles decree so closely connects cleruchic possession with a variety of other kinds of property interest, both public and private. If it is initially puzzling that modern accounts of Athenian imperialism ignore the full exploitative effect of the cleruchies, it becomes more understandable on the basic assumption that cleruchies were a means of providing land for the Athenian poor and usefully deploying them overseas in permanent garrisons. This notion not only removes the cleruchy to a position of relatively peripheral importance to the Athenian imperial economy, but it also coats it with the palatable dressing of democratic social justice. However, as I have argued elsewhere, the belief is without any foundation other than the opinion of Plutarch, which almost certainly retrojects a later view of Roman colonies. Against Plutarch we now have the evidence of two inscriptions yielding precisely the opposite conclusion. The first is the roster of 250 Council members from the fourth-century cleruchy on Samos in which, far from having their movements limited through garrison duty, cleruchs seem to enjoy complete freedom of movement, including of residence in Athens. The second is the Athenian Grain Tax Law of 374/3 in which, far from having dispatched their poor to Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, the Athenians are seen (on my interpretation) to have allocated these islands to a group of pentakosiomedimnoi, the highest Athenian income class, who are individually charged from 374/3 onwards to pay a large tax in kind of 500 medimnoi (over 14.25 metric tonnes) of grain per year. Both of these documents seem to cohere well with the circumstantial and prosopographical evidence of cleruchies: the Attic Stelai reveal a number of wealthy Athenians, at least some of whom must be cleruchs, with landed possessions on Euboea; similar cleruchs appear in the Chersonese and later on Samos. They probably included men of the social class of Charmides (cousin of the infamous oligarch Critias) and Ariston (father of Plato), or of one Eutherus, who (rather pitifully) complains to Socrates after the Peloponnesian War that the loss of his overseas possessions has reduced him to having to earn his living through manual labour. In addition, we now have the archaeological evidence from Vrachos, an Euboean fort securely dated to the period of the first Athenian cleruchy on Chalcis, which suggests the presence of up to 200 non-Athenian (i.e. mercenary) archers, rather than of Athenian garnisaires.

This evidence (much of it new) tilts the balance in favour of the old hypothesis that cleruchs ‘sent out’ by Athens usually returned home to live as rentiers of their overseas possessions. It also begins to reveal a very different picture of the economic role of the Athenian cleruchies: far from a mechanism intended to help the Athenian poor, or to keep them in useful employment in military colonies, they were a direct source of profit to individual Athenians as well as (indirectly) to the state. The rich pentak-
kosiomedimnos who could be asked to pay a sizeable yearly eisphora in grain to the dēmos was presumably allowed to keep a comparable amount (equivalent in value, very approximately, to something between 2,900 and 1,800 dr.) for private consumption and sale. Likewise, each of the 3,000 klēroi set up on Lesbos (the whole of the island except for Methymna) was allocated a uniform rent of 200 drachmas per year, but (except for the 300 sacred klēroi) also made their possessors liable to the usual requirements of taxation and military service (simplified by the fact that an income of 200 drachmas automatically qualified each recipient as a hoplite). This balance of private and public interests led men like Charmides jokingly to contrast his situation before and after the Peloponnesian War and the loss of the cleruchies: 'Then I used to bring tribute to the dēmos, but now the state imposes a tax and supports me.'

The overall benefit to Athens of this means of exploitation, though impossible to quantify with any precision, was huge. Tribute was 'trivial' by comparison, as Osborne rightly notes from the fact that the total yearly payment by the lessees of the 3,000 klēroi on Lesbos amounted to 100 talents, more than three times the highest tributes of 30 talents, assessed on Thasos and Aegina. Even more revealing is the fact that until 428 Mytilene had been contributing ten ships, probably the equivalent of ten talents, and that roughly three-quarters of Athens' allies paid one talent or less in tribute. I have elsewhere argued that most of Athens' substantial imports of grain in the fifth century, a yearly quantity in the vicinity of 1,300,000 medimnoi of wheat (whose total value may be roughly translated to 1,300 talents), were drawn from an empire of cleruchies, with Euboea as its crown-jewel. And it is startling to note that these figures involve only a part of agricultural resources, and should therefore be seen as a kind of minimum estimate. In short, total yearly tribute, whether it amounted to 460 talents (in 477) or 600 talents (in 432), must have paled by comparison with the Athenian exploitation of its cleruchies. More importantly, whereas tribute was (at least in theory) intended to fund the operation of an alliance, the benefits of such territorial encroachment flowed solely to an Athenian 'master race' (in Badian's words).

We therefore come to the dark side of this form of imperialism, and to its violent cost to non-Athenians. In some cases, as in Lesbos, a cleruchy entailed the complete expropriation of the land from its former owners, who then became mere hirelings (πελαταί), satisfying with their yearly rent of 200 drachmas the income requirements of their foreign landlords. The same passage of Thucydides specifies that this treatment was in lieu of tribute, and this fits the widespread (and probably correct) assumption that the imposition of a cleruchy on a part of the territory of an ally was accompanied by a partial waiver of tribute, as in the cases of Andros, Naxos, Carystos and the Thracian Chersonese in the mid-fifth century. But it could be far worse in other cases, where expropriation came with the removal of the original population. More than two decades after the
Peloponnesian War (in 380) Greek opinion still evidently associated Athenian cleruchies with emptied landscapes and exiled locals, even if the depopulation of entire states (as if by some natural cause) could be manipulated by Isocrates into a cynical justification for the settlement of Athenians. But the mass exile of the Histiaeans in 446, and the genocide of the Melians in 416/15, even if exceptionally brutal, are well-attested examples of what seems to have been a policy of depopulating landscapes (so that, for example, in the case of Melos, the land is transferred from a population of c. 5,000 to 500 Athenian cleruchs), presumably in order to maximise the exploitation of a surplus produced by a labour force of slaves or local dependants. Samos from 365/4 fits the same pattern: the Athenians 'expelled all the Samians' (πάντας ἐξεβαλον), no doubt a large population (calculated as 30,000-50,000 for 494 BC), and divided the land among three cleruch contingents, one numbering a mere 2,000.

Curiously, this last episode seems to have made the phrase Αττικῷ πάροικος proverbial for the noxious neighbour. The proverb thus claimed that a predilection for encroachment on neighbouring lands, surrendered by force in 405 and solemnly disavowed in 377, was an incurable addiction, almost a part of the national character of the Athenians. As is usual with proverbs, a blunt truth lies behind this one. The Athenians could well regard the cleruchy as an ancestral institution, devised in the time of Solon and since then a companion to their city's political and social prosperity. The earliest cleruchies after Salamis – Peisistratid Sigeion and Lampsacus, Philaid Chersonesus and Lemnos and Imbros – were quasi-private outlets for the ambitions of the Athenian elite, where they could exploit serf-like populations in ways forbidden in Attica after the Solonian reforms, while increasing their resources for largesse and political influence back at home.

Thus were established the peculiar characteristics of the Athenian cleruchy, which distinguish it sharply from the tradition of Greek apoikiai: the interaction (as seen above) of private and public interests that resulted in the state's permanent claim on the income and manpower of its settlers; the tradition of dependence on Athens that resulted in a cleruchic landscape imagined as an actual extension of Attica (ἡ χώρα τῶν Ἀθηναίων), complete with a transplanted geography. Thus also was founded the relationship dynamic between cleruch and local population: as Zelnick-Abramovitz has noted in an important article, the local man killed by Euthyphro's father on the family's klēros on Naxos is called a πελάτης, literally 'neighbour', but the same word used by Aristotle (alongside ἐκτημὼρος) to describe the status of the poor in pre-Solonian Attica, a condition amounting to slavery (δούλεια) for themselves and their families, and famously entailing the payment of part of the produce of the land. Noting, on the other hand, that Hesychius equates the term κληρονόμος with δεσπότης, Zelnick-Abramovitz identifies the relationship of cleruch and local as essentially one of vassalage, and thus persuasively suggests
that the widespread hatred felt by the Greeks was based on far more than economic exploitation: ‘the gravest injury was to the concept – real or imagined – of freedom, ἐλευθερία.’

Perhaps paradoxically, these traditions existed – indeed flourished – under a democracy or underwent only superficial changes. Although the dependence on imported grain by the dēmos demanded an articulated ideology of public control, the cleruchic project always remained a public/private quid pro quo. There always remained, in particular, the guiding presence of the Athenian elite in the extension and exploitation of cleruchies and their resources. Just as the Philaidai had led the conquest of the Thracian Chersonesus, Lemnos, and Imbros before the Persian Wars, it was Cimon who led cleruchies to Eion and Scyros in the early years of the Delian League. It was Cimon also who recaptured the Thracian Chersonesus, previously lost to the Persians, an action in which he was later followed by Pericles and (in the fourth century) Timotheus. And to give a final example, it was a descendant of Cimon, a Miltiades of Lakiadai, who in spring 324 sailed to the Adriatic ‘in order that the dēmos may for all future time have their own commerce and transport in grain’.

Even the daughter of this Miltiades, named Euthydice, came to play a role: through her marriage to Ophellas, the general of Ptolemy I and later tyrant of Cyrene, she involved the Athenians in her husband’s failed invasion of western Libya in 309: ‘they hoped to set up a cleruchy on the most fertile part of Libya and to plunder the wealth of Carthage.’ Here Euthydice was following in the footsteps not only of her family, but also of Alcibiades, who had famously promised Carthage and the West to the Athenians in 415.

If we can follow a fundamental continuity in the Athenian obsession with cleruchies from the Archaic period onwards, we have still to find its deeper origins. I have elsewhere suggested that seventh-century Sparta’s annexation of Messenia, the distribution of this large region in the form of klēroi, its farming by its former and thenceforth enslaved owners, and the contributions of its produce to the Spartiate common mess (σωστία), all provide an important part of the context for understanding the Athenian cleruchy. Perhaps more important, however, was the perception that the Athenians could look to cleruchies to engineer solutions to recurrent crises. Thus may have been regarded the earliest growth of the cleruchy at Salamis and Sigeion in the Solonian period, and its contribution in easing the pressures on land and labour that afflicted Attica at the time. Later, at the time of the Cleisthenic revolution, the cleruchy became not only a democratic project, but also a solution to a military and political crisis. Ehrenberg’s suggestion that the Cleisthenic catchword isonomia was understood as ‘equality of distribution’ (from ἰσονομία) may not have sounded implausible to the 4,000 Athenians receiving klēroi on the land of defeated Chalcis in 506, at a time when Athens was under military threat on every side. Nor is it unlikely that the mechanism of distribution was
from the start the lot (klēros), thus cementing a perceived affinity between this means of selection, the distributed parcels (klēroi), and the democracy itself. Later, at the height of the Athenian Empire, the cleruchy evidently provided a solution to the problem of food supply to an overpopulated capital. The control of Euboea by the dēmos seems to have become a kind of comic topos, with Pericles using geometry (a ‘democratic and useful scheme’) to partition the land, and allowing the demos to become ‘like a wild horse’ that ‘no longer dared to obey, but bit Euboea, and leapt on the islands’. The irony of this great democratic project was, as we have seen, that it required the systematic enslavement of non-Athenian Greeks. But after 404, when Athens’ problem became its very survival as a player in Greek politics, the Athenians once again looked to the cleruchy. The recognition in the King’s Peace of 387 of Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros as Athenian possessions was an undoubted success, and henceforth, these islands were to play an increasingly important role. It is probably no coincidence that Callistratus of Aphidna, who devised the tributary mechanism (σύνταξις) of the Second Athenian League by c. 373, was the nephew of Agyrrhios of Collytus, the proposer of the Grain Tax Law of 374/3: their two projects surely went hand in hand.

With a former tax in cash now changed by Agyrrhios to a much heavier tax in kind, Athens again looked to its cleruchies for resources, but likewise signalled to prospective members of the alliance that it would intensify its exploitation of its ancestral possessions (or of non-members of the League) rather than looking to the allies, a reassuring move. However well-intended (or ambitious), it is in hindsight plain to see in this plan a serious overestimate of Athens’ capacity to recover its power while relying mainly on its own resources. The promises of Callistratus and Agyrrhios were not easy ones to keep, and ended disastrously in the Social War, on the one hand, and in conflict with Alexander, ostensibly over the cleruchy on Samos, on the other.

Can imperialism ever be a pleasant thing? To be sure, even the Athenian cleruchic project had its benefits, a few of which extended to non-Athenians. Most important of these was the peace and stability of the Aegean under the empire. Trade flourished under the protection and stimulus of Athenian power. The Athenian need to protect the city’s cleruchies through fortifications, especially maritime, is a phenomenon most extensively apparent on fifth-century Euboea, and one that would have contributed indirectly to the safety of all adjacent routes. The right of intermarriage (εὐγαμία) that the Athenians granted to all Euboeans, may qualify as another potential benefit, and one that (if it had been more widely used) might have provided Athenians with a sustainable way of running and preserving the cleruchic project. But this instance of intermarriage remained only a small and exceptional breach of well-entrenched Greek attitudes towards citizenship, as well as of the Athenians’ perceived entitlement to the exclusive enjoyment of their power. In the end Athens’
cleruchic programme was so invidious, it simply became unsustainable. Just as the Spartans exploited this sentiment to present themselves as the liberators of Greece at the opening of the Peloponnesian War, Alexander did the same at Olympia, more than a century later, in promulgating the restoration of the Samian exiles and the abolition of the Athenian cleruchy. And so, within a few decades of each other, the Athenian cleruchy (and alongside it – not by coincidence – the democracy) went the way of Spartan Messenia.

Notes
1. I am much indebted to the patience and help of the editors, especially Robert Parker, in the writing of this paper.
3. See Meiggs (1972) 272: ‘The chief grievances of the allies in the period before the Peloponnesian War were not economic.’
5. IG I 1 71 (= ML 69), ll. 20-2 (as restored); see further Meiggs (1972) 240-1.
6. IG II 43 (= RO 22).
7. IG II 43, ll. 27-9; see also ll. 36-7.
8. IG II 43, ll. 39-41.
9. FGrHist IIC (Komm. 64-105) 28.
10. Diod. Sic. 15.29.8: ἐγιστεῖν δὲ καὶ τὰς γεγομένας κληρουχίας ἀποκαταστήσας τοῖς πρῶτοι κυρίοις γεγονόσι, καὶ νόμον ἐθεντο μηδένα τῶν Ἀθηναίων γεωργεῖν ἐκτὸς τῆς Ἀττικῆς.
11. Diod. Sic. 15.23.4: ... Ἀθηναίοι δὲ διὰ τὰς τῶν καταπολεμημένων κληρουχίας ἔδοξον ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν.
14. Gauthier (1973) 170. See also Cargill (1981) 146: ‘Disavowal of ownership of real property in allied territories is the most thoroughly spelled-out promise of the decree of Aristoteles.’
15. As set out since the sixth century in IG I 1 (= ML 14), ll. 2-3 ([Ἀθένες]ιοι τελευ καὶ στρατεύεσθαι), and apparently followed thereafter, most visibly (in the case of taxation) in the Grain Tax Law of 374/3; see Meiggs (1972) 121; Moreno (2007) 102.
17. See Ste. Croix (1972) 43: ‘Some thousands of individual Athenians, doubtless mainly poor ones, profited from colonies and cleruchies, in which they received parcels of land, or from which (like the Lesbian cleruchs in 427, Thuc. III 50.2) they drew regular rents’; Meiggs (1972) 260-1: ‘The thetes and to a lesser extent the zeugitai found new opportunities overseas. ... Soon after the middle of the century the policy of settling poorer Athenians overseas was more widely extended in a series of cleruchies. ... The cleruchs farming their lots could become potential hoplites and would at the same time act as garrisons of cities whose loyalty was unreliable.’ On cleruchs as garnisaires, see Hornblower (2002) and in OCD 348; and especially Salomon (1997).
18. Moreno (2007) 93. Support for Plutarch’s idea has usually been found in the amendment to the decree establishing a cleruchy at Brea (IG I 46.43-6 = ML 49.39-42), which excludes members of the two highest property classes from the allotment, but this seems far more like a peculiar afterthought to a decision that originally included no such restriction, than the expression of the norm. On the other hand, nothing in my argument requires a restriction in the allotment of lands to the poor: I simply assume (and, in any case, the large numbers of cleruchs attested require this) that all Athenian citizens (see n. 34 below) came to assume participation in the allotment of klêroi as a democratic right. In many cases receipt of land would have required a change of income class, as in the case of Anthémion the son of Diphilus from thete to knight, recorded by [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 7.4, with Rhodes, CAAP ad loc.; see further Moreno (2007) 143 and p. 216 above.


23. The evidence is collected and discussed in Moreno (2007) 91-3; on Eutherus, see also Zelnick-Abramovitz (2004) 335: ‘Eutherus is the kind of man who is not accustomed to work, and certainly not as a hired labourer.’


27. Thuc. 3.50 with Moreno (2007) 95. Units of the Athenian army or cavalry formed from cleruchs seem to have been designated by the name of the land whose rent qualified them for service, for example, ‘Histiaeans’, ‘Lemnians’, ‘Imbrians’, etc.: see Moreno (2007) 102-3.


30. Thuc. 3.3.4 with Nixon and Price (1990) 139: ‘it is likely that one trireme was the equivalent of a talent of tribute’; 143: ‘most of the contributors (71 per cent of 205 contributors in 441 BC) paid one talent or less’.


32. See p. 211 above.

33. Thuc. 1.96.2; 2.13.3.

34. See Badian (1993) 19 with Hornblower (2002) 36: ‘Only Athenian citizens could profit by allotments of land as ‘cleruchs’ (literally allotment-holders) and it may be more than chance that the qualifications for Athenian citizenship are more closely defined at about this time (451): citizen descent was now required on both sides;’ and Moreno (2007) 300, connecting the scrutiny of the citizen registers (διαγραφήματα), mentioned in connection with the grain distribution of 445, with the distribution of klêroi on Euboea one year earlier.

35. Thuc. 3.50. On the use of the word πελαττίς to denote these hirelings, see Zelnick-Abramovitz (2004) 336-42 and below.

36. See Meiggs (1972) 121-3, 530.


38. Likewise, Andros and Naxos, each a considerable island, are partly converted into cleruchies of 250 and 500 Athenians, respectively (Plut. Per. 11.5-6); the whole of the polis of Mytilene, occupied by at least 20,000 inhabitants, is subsumed into the 3,000 klêroi on Lesbos; see Moreno (2007) 317-18 for a full
discussion. On the issue of labour and surplus in the cleruchies, see Moreno (2007) 111-12, 316-17, 320-1.


40. Duris FGrHist 76 F96; Craterus FGrHist 342 F21: Κρατερός δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν εἰς Σάμον πειραμέντων Ἀρθηνήνεσα ἐποίκον τὴν παρουσίαν εὐρήθησα. Αὐτοὶ γὰρ μεταπειραμένοι εἰς Σάμον καὶ ἑκεῖ κατακυκλώσαντες τοὺς ἐγχαρίους ἐξέσωσαν. The proverb appears also in Arist. Rhet. 1395a18.


43. Zelnick-Abramovitz (2004) 339, citing [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 2.2: ἂν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ πολιτεία τοῖς τῇ ἄλλῃ ὀλιγαρχικῇ πάσῃ, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐδούλευον οἱ πένητες τοῖς πλουσίοις καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες, καὶ ἐκαλοῦντο πελάται καὶ ἐκτήμοροι· κατὰ ταύτην γὰρ τὴν μίσθωσιν ἠγαύοντο τῶν πλουσίων τοὺς ἑγγούς. That the man is a Naxian seems likely from the meaning of the word πελάτης as 'neighbour' or 'the other' in Plato (outside Euthyphro) and previous literature: see Zelnick-Abramovitz (2004) 339-41.

44. Hsch. s.v. κληρόνος.


46. See e.g. the opening of the Grain Tax Law of 374/3: ὅπως ἃν τῷ δήμῳ σίτος ἢ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ. Ar. Vesp. 715-18 provides an interesting glimpse of the conflict; for discussion of this and other examples, see Moreno (2007) 96-7, 303-8.

47. IG II 1629 (= RO 100), ll. 217-20; on this Miltiades, who is referred to as an oikist (ll. 142, 161, 224), see Davies (1971), 309.


52. See Ehrenberg (1940) 293-301; discussed by Vlastos (1953) 346-7n.36. The alternative and today preferred meaning of 'equality under the law' is equally possible: the power of a good political catchword lies in its signifying different things to different people!

53. On the perceived connection between the lot and democracy see Headlam (1933) 12-17.


55. Plut. Per. 7.6; on these passages see Moreno (2007) 96-7.

56. Xen. Hell. 5.1.31.

57. Theopomp. FGrHist 115 F98; for the date see RO 101.

58. On the fortification of cleruchies, see Moreno (2007) 126-40.

59. Lys. 34.3.

60. Thuc. 2.8.4; Diod. Sic. 17.109.1.

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9. ‘The Attic Neighbour’


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