

Immigration and Public Opinion in Europe: The Case of the 2004 Enlargement

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Abstract

After the enlargement of the European Union in 2004, large numbers of Central and Eastern Europeans moved to work in Western Europe. The aim of this thesis is to use the case of migration after the enlargement to further our understanding of the relationship between immigrant group size and natives' attitudes. Recent scholarly debates raise questions about how immigration affects European societies and the political durability of European welfare states. This research puts forward two questions: Does an increase in Eastern European immigration after the enlargement explain differences in civic attitudes in Western Europe? And second, does this relationship (if any) depend on national contextual factors? The relationship between immigration and three categories of public attitudes are examined: attitudes towards immigration, attitudes towards welfare and attitudes of trust. This thesis draws on *ethnic competition theory*, which postulates that group competition over resources provokes the natives to perceive immigration as a threat to their own or their group's interests. To test this theory, this study uses data from the European Social Survey from 2002 to 2010 to build multi-level pooled time series models. The results find only partial support for ethnic competition theory. When a greater proportion of E-8 migrants live in the country, individuals tend to have more positive views about immigration. The results also show that this positive relationship is weakened when national economic conditions are more precarious. Additionally, the results do not find that E8 migration is negatively related to Western European attitudes regarding trust or welfare. This implies that as more immigrants arrive, Europeans can potentially acknowledge immigration's economic and cultural benefits. Moreover, these results challenge pessimistic scholarly predictions that immigration erodes trust and support for welfare in Europe. This thesis offers two academic contributions. First, it considers the case of E8 migration, which has been ignored by existing comparative attitudinal studies about immigration. Second, focusing on post-enlargement migration helps this thesis to overcome common empirical obstacles such as cross-country differences in immigrant composition and admission criteria.

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Glossary

E-2 (or E2)

Refers to the two countries that became members of the European Union in 2007. These countries are, Bulgaria and Romania.

E-8 (or E8)

Refers to the eight countries in Central and Eastern Europe that became members of the European Union in 2004. These countries are: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia.

EU-15

Refers to the 15 countries that formed the European Union prior to the 2004 enlargement. These countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Greece, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

Mobility

When citizens of the European Union exercise their freedom of movement within the region by moving to take up work in another EU member country.

Post-enlargement Migration

Migration that occurred from the Central and Eastern European member states (E8) to the existing Western European member states (EU-15) after the 2004 enlargement of the European Union.

Transitional Arrangements

The transitional arrangements allow limited derogation from the principles of free movement during a transitional period agreed upon by the European Union.

1. Introduction

There has been a resurgence of scholarly interest in theorizing inter-group relations since the rise of global immigration. Originally, group threat theory emerged as an explanation of race relations between Whites and African Americans in the United States (Blalock 1967; Bobo 1983; Bobo 1988; Giles 1977; Taylor 1998). In his original work, Blalock (1967) argued that as the size of the minority group grows, the majority group will struggle against the minority for dominance. More recently, inter-group relations which have grown more complex thanks to continuing immigration in liberal democracies. Scholars continue to draw on group-threat theory to explain relations between majority Anglo-Americans and minority groups such as Asians or Hispanics in the United States (Dixon 2006; Hopkins 2010; Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo 2013; Newman and Velez 2014; Paxton and Mughan 2006). More recently, group threat theory has been applied to explain the rise of defensive public attitudes amongst European natives to mounting ethnic diversity brought by large-scale immigration (Davidov and Meuleman 2012; Florack et al. 2003; Quillian 1995; Raijman, Semyonov, and Schmidt 2003; Schlueter, Schmidt, and Wagner 2008; Semyonov et al. 2004). Examples of such defensive attitudes, which are strongly linked to immigration in the literature, include: the perceived threat of immigration (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; L. McLaren and Johnson 2007; Schlueter and Scheepers 2010; Semyonov et al. 2004), a reduction in social and political cohesion (Dinesen and Sønderskov 2012; Hooghe et al. 2009; Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston 2008; Sturgis et al. 2011), and concerns about the welfare state burden (Burgoon, Koster, and Egmond 2012; Eger 2010; Finseraas 2012; Gary P. Freeman 2009; Senik, Stichnoth, and Van der Straeten 2009; Soroka, Banting, and Johnston 2006).¹

So are race relations in the United States a harbinger of Europe's future in age of migration? The literature is still grappling with question of whether European socio-political attitudes and, in particular, those towards social policy, are becoming "americanized" due to immigration (Gary P. Freeman 1986; Glazer 1998; Taylor-Gooby 2005). For instance, America's racial and ethnic diversity are thought to have undermined broad public support for a generous welfare state (Alesina and Glaeser 2006; Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Fox 2012; Gilens 1999). Although research traditions have been based

¹ Some of these studies do not examine immigration per se but rather the ethnic diversity that exists as a bi-product of immigration.

on America's exceptional White-Black relations, some social scientists argue that these theoretical understandings of inter-group relations demonstrate that individuals have a proclivity for homogeneity and this may have general implications for the way that natives welcome immigrants in other liberal democracies (Putnam 2007; Laurence 2011a; Fieldhouse and Cutts 2010). Others remain skeptical since immigration has different attributes than American race relations since the migration setting centres more around language, culture, citizenship and national identity (Sturgis et al. 2011; Lancee and Pardos-Prado 2013; Portes and Vickstrom 2011). However, the institutional and situational differences between the European and American contexts means that the European public may not necessarily converge to the American experience.

The particularities of the European setting are salient since there has been a scholarly focus on how an individual's surroundings influence their preferences and attitudes. Although attitudes are acknowledged to reflect the consequences an individual's own circumstances (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996) or position in society (Blumer 1958), this does not explain how public attitudes vary systematically across countries, regions, municipalities, or neighborhoods. It has been put forward that this occurs due to the fact that individuals base their reactions to immigration not only on their own individual interests but also on their own group's interests (Citrin et al. 1997; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004). Regarding the impact of immigration on the national identity, national economy or welfare state, are commonly referred to as socio-tropic concerns and are distinct from self-centered concerns.

There is a general agreement that the socio-political context in which an individual lives shapes his or her socio-tropic attitudes. This has sparked a debate about to which extent these attitudes are influenced by actual occurrences in the social context, such as immigration patterns. Some scholars argue that native's defensive attitudes are a socio-tropic reaction to a "real" threat as a direct function of immigration trends. According to this logic, inter-group threat is driven by a competition over scarce resources between natives and immigrants in a society, which can be fueled by two different processes: 1) a relatively large proportion of immigrants or 2) the scarcity in resources of the society such as a rise in unemployment or an economic downturn (Dancygier and Donnelly 2013). In some cases, the impact of immigration appears to be only when there are sudden changes (Hopkins 2010; Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009; Newman and Velez 2014) or when it coincides with other social phenomena such as more precarious economic conditions (Quillian 1995).

Other scholars argue instead that defensive attitudes are a reaction to a perceived threat which, rather than a real threat, can be divorced from the reality of immigration trends. Support for this line of reasoning is also provided by the fact that the link between group size and attitudes in the evidence is tenuous at best (Hjerm 2007). This point is illustrated by geographic areas where there are defensive attitudes towards immigration but there are relatively few immigrants (Schlueter and Davidov 2013). Such discrepancies could be explained by the argument that attitudes are based on how the public imagines immigration (Blinder 2013) which are only loosely based on actual occurrences. A key challenge in this research area has been to understand how closely attitudes and immigration patterns are linked and why there can sometimes be a gap between them.

The Rising Prominence of Immigration in the Public Discourse


Immigration to Europe is not a new phenomenon, as it has evolved since the post-war period where it was viewed as a temporary solution to the labour shortages. Western European states became the new home of many displaced people following the aftermath of the war but even these were insufficient in number to meet the demand for labour. After 1945, Western European governments began actively recruiting labour from peripheral regions like Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, Turkey and Northern Africa. France and Britain brought in labourers from their former colonies, while Austria and Germany brought in guest workers. Demand for labour changed in the 1970s when the oil crisis forced the European governments to reorient their immigration policies and halt labour recruitment. This incited a shift in immigration policy, which became characterized by labour market closure and welfare protectionism. Yet, the labourers who had been admitted during the post-war boom did not return to their country of origin, to the surprise of the European governments. Immigrants were no longer *gastarbeiter* but had transitioned into long-term residents, building up communities and social networks within their host societies. From the mid 1980s into the 1990s, immigration was driven by the affirmation of human rights, and entrants tended to be admitted through family unification and asylum programmes (Castles & Miller 2008; Castles & Davidson 2000). In fact, public panic about immigrants gained momentum in the early 1990s. Western European fears of foreign labour are thought to date back to the failure of the post-war guest worker policies, which surprised Western societies with permanent settlement and family reunification in the 1980s (Castles & Miller 2008; Castles & Davidson 2000).

The renewed public interest in immigration today might be driven by the changing nature of migration. In the past few decades, migration into Europe has increased and its paths have expanded. Since the 1990's, there have been three major developments in the immigration to Europe. These are: 1) former source countries, such as Spain or Italy, have now become destination countries; 2) the enlargement of the European Union by twelve new members between 2004 and 2007; and 3) a move from permanent legal migration to irregular migration (OECD 2010). Although migration patterns vary across European countries, Castles and Miller (1998) identifies several common characteristics (S. Castles and Miller 1998, 293):

- the transformation of temporary workers and refugees into permanent settlers
- the economic and social marginalization of ethnic groups
- community formation among immigrants
- increasing interaction between ethnic groups and the native population
- the imperative for the state to react to immigration and ethnic diversity

According to the OECD (2011), the annual inflows of foreign-born have increased in the last decade in most Western European countries (with the exception of Germany and Italy). These inflows have led to a steady accumulation in the foreign-born stock in populations of wealthy democracies, as shown in Figure 1.A, Net migration is the difference between people entering the European Union and people who exit.

Figure 1.A Net Migration into the European Union, 1960-2000



Source: Eurostat, Migration Statistics

Along the rise of immigration, the civic sentiment in the host societies also shifted. The rising prominence of the immigration 'problem' in the public discourse is more than a function of the number of migrants flowing into a country. Most individuals are unaware of the official migration statistics, and the annual increases and decreases are imperceptible in daily life (Blinder 2013). Concerns about immigration form part of a heightened public perception of risk, which has brought about a rise in 'inchoate social anxieties, insecurities and fears' (Cohen 2011, xxx). This heightened perception of risk has been attributed to a sense of uncertainty about the future of European societies, their continuing demographic marginalization and a fear of them losing relevance in the global arena (Held 1999). Public alarm as a response to the rising levels of immigration can be seen as part of a wider anxiety due to the changes brought about by globalisation. 'Anxieties about Europe and migration are linked with fears of a clash of civilisations and anxieties about crime and social securities' (Denney 2009, 117). An important dimension of anxiety is the lack of accurate knowledge of the danger that is manifest. It may be that anxiety is induced by those situations that present themselves as new and thus as threatening (Delanty 2008, 677). There may also be a 'convenience' to being ignorant (Myrdal 1944) about immigration, which enables the natives to conveniently blame immigrants for economic hardship or cultural decay.

Capitalising on the public wariness and weariness of immigrants, xenophobic political platforms in Western Europe have acquired prominence. Recent surveys show that 52% of Western Europeans polled saw immigration as more of a problem than an opportunity, with the strongest

pessimism existing in the United Kingdom (68%) (German Marshall Fund 2011). The political parties have played on these growing fears, and a neo-assimilationist rhetoric has sprung up in Denmark, Switzerland, France, and Austria, amongst other countries. As demographic changes threaten the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state, migration may be a solution to rehabilitating Europe's dwindling dependency ratio. Yet, immigration is a politically contentious issue. Rising resentment against immigrants and the call to tighten immigration policy are driven by a myriad of economic, social and cultural concerns. Restricting immigration is an 'easy' way to score political points, by assuaging the widespread public anxiety about the rapid changes brought about by globalisation. Unlike the movement of goods and capital, where the barriers have been torn down, governments have erected barriers to stymie the movement of people. This has happened particularly since 9/11 (Levy 2005). Restrictive policies are consistent with the low public support for increasing the number of immigrants. However, 'given the extent of opposition to migration revealed by public attitudes in the majority of the destination countries, it is a puzzle that migration is allowed to take place at all' (Facchini and Mayda 2009, 2).

Western European governments have attempted to keep immigration under control using two main policy levers: regulating either the rules that govern the admission and selection of immigrants or the living conditions of the immigrants that are admitted (Hammar 1985). Since European welfare states are closed systems with clearly defined membership rules, they are difficult to reconcile with arriving newcomers. During the development of the welfare state following World War II, nationalism figured prominently as a way to build public support. The modern welfare state conferred legitimisation on the nation state by building loyalty and solidarity through the extension of entitlements. But as the foreign born stock increases in more homogenous societies, some argue that diversity could erode the public support for a generous welfare state. Goodhart (2004) refers to this as the 'progressive's dilemma'. In this case, the term 'progressives' refers to those who want 'plenty of both solidarity (high social cohesion and generous welfare paid out of a progressive tax system) and diversity (equal respect for a wide range of peoples, values and ways of life). But there is a tension between the two values (...) and it suggests that the Left's recent love affair with diversity may come at the expense of the values and even the people that it once championed' (Goodhart 2007, 1).

Case Study: Introducing the 2004 Enlargement

In 2004, the European Union underwent its most extensive enlargement and finally united the 'two Europes'. The number of countries and people introduced into its borders was unprecedented. This expansion opened the door to more than 70 million Eastern European neighbours. The new Eastern member states (E8 countries) included eight former communist countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia.¹ These new member countries joined the European Union's existing Western European member states (the EU-15 countries). These are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.² Since the barriers to trade and movement of capital had already been eroded prior to the enlargement, the free movement of people was the accession's most remarkable aspect (Guardia and Pichelmann 2006). These newly-minted European citizens, who had had their migration potential restricted for decades under the Iron Curtain, could now exercise their right to mobility within Europe.

This freedom of movement was not granted immediately in all cases following the enlargement. Member states were given the option of implementing transitional arrangements that would allow labour market integration to be phased in over a period of up to seven years. The EU regulations allow member countries temporarily to restrict labour migration from the accession countries,³ with the intention of avoiding a labour market shock if large wage differentials exist. Three of the 15 member states offered immediate, unrestricted access to their labour markets: Sweden, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. From 2006 to 2009, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France, Finland, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Portugal lifted their restrictions. Only two countries, Germany and Austria, opted to maintain restrictions for the maximum length of time, until 2011.

¹ Malta and Cyprus also joined the European Union in the same year.

² For the purposes of this study, the EU-15 nationals will be also be referred to as Western Europeans and the E8 will also be referred to as Eastern Europeans, although it is acknowledged that the term 'Eastern Europeans' can also be applied beyond the E8 countries and that some E8 countries can also be referred to as 'Central European'.

³ The transitional arrangements, set out in the Accession Treaty of 2003, allow limited derogation from the principles on free movement during a transitional period, which expired on 30 April 2011. The amount of time for a transitional arrangement is dictated by the '2-3-2' plan. Member states can apply restrictions for a period of two years, which may then be prolonged for another three years. These decisions are left to the national government concerned. Only if a member state can show that its labour market would be disrupted can it prolong the arrangement for the final three years (European Commission 2012).

Policies that govern immigration from within the European Union stand in sharp contrast to those that govern the admission of non-European immigration. There has been a binary development in European migration policies over the past two decades. While, on the one hand, the member states have securitized and tightened migration from outside the European Union (Buonfino 2004; Huysmans 2000; Levy 2005; Loader 2002; Puntervold Bo 2009; Hollifield 2004), governments have also increasingly liberalized the movement of labour within the region. Under the terms of the European Union, citizens can move freely within the region. This freedom of movement includes the right of EU nationals to move to another Member State, to take up employment, and to establish themselves in the host country with their family members. Mobility, as stipulated by EU law, provides the citizens of the member states with a series of formal rights and freedoms. The new EU constitution, signed in Rome in 2004, explicitly prohibits 'discrimination on grounds of nationality' and establishes the principle that 'everyone residing and moving legally within the EU is entitled to social security benefits and social advantages' (European Union 2004). Member States are precluded from directly or indirectly discriminating against migrant workers and their families on the basis of nationality (European Commission 2012).

Public Opinion and the 'Big Bang' Enlargement

The opening of accession negotiations with the CEE candidate countries in 2000 sparked public fears that labourers would then flood into the Western European countries.⁵ On the eve of the enlargement, a flash Euro-barometer study of public opinion showed that 64% of the EU-15 citizens thought that enlargement would mean that many citizens of the new member states would come to live in their country. This belief was particularly high in Mediterranean countries such as Spain (82%) and Portugal (77%) but less widespread in Sweden (46%) and the Netherlands (43%). There was also apprehension about itinerant Roma minority populations fleeing to the West from Hungary and Slovakia (Hundley 2002).

⁵ The European Commission reported that 'citizens in Member States that border on the candidate countries are more likely to harbour concerns about the implications of enlargement. Citizens in general are less concerned about enlargement itself than about concrete issues, such as unemployment, crime, and the environment' (European Commission 2001). For instance, in the United Kingdom, 3 in every 5 respondents were concerned that enlargement would mean low wage competition from workers in the applicant countries (Flash Eurobarometer 124, 2002). However, there is a dearth of detailed national opinion polls regarding enlargement, that may reflect an absence of open debate (Noelle-Neumann and Peterson 2003).

Any public uncertainty could not be eased by the EU policy-makers, technocrats and the research community, who themselves remained unsure about what kind of flows might occur as a result of the enlargement. The apparent lack of coordination between the 15 member states raised concern amongst the public that the migration flows would be diverted to those who opted not to restrict access (Boeri and Brücker 2005, 2). The positive past experiences with integrating enlargement countries proved insufficient to quell the concerns about free movement. There was too much uncertainty about such an unprecedented enlargement, in terms of both the magnitude of the population as well as the economic disparity between the two regions.


Migration flows are inherently difficult to project, a factor which was exacerbated in this case by the unprecedented magnitude of the policy change (Zaiceva 2006). Surveys in Central and Eastern Europe indicated that a notable proportion of the younger population had a desire to migrate to the West. This is unsurprising since there were numerous factors attracting them to Western Europe: better salaries, better public services, political stability and the protection of human rights. Still, predicting how many would actually migrate was difficult, since migration projections are notoriously unreliable. The EU Commission acknowledged the volatility of the migration projections of the impending enlargement (European Commission 2001). With such high levels of uncertainty, most of the European Union members (EU-15) opted to temporarily restrict migration from the new member states, with the exception of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden. This resulted in major influxes of the citizens of Poland and Baltic States to the UK and Ireland. Although Sweden also lifted its restrictions it did not experience comparable migration from E8 countries. This may be because Sweden's labour market conditions were not as favourable or because of the added burden of learning the Swedish language (Castles and Miller, 2008, 115).

Yet, in the long-term, after the transitional arrangements expired, governments were no longer able to control the admission criteria or ration social rights from E8 nationals.^{*} Kvist (2004) argues that the social policy implications of these regulations 'lie at the heart of anxieties voiced in the EU-15 member states on the potential adverse impact of enlargement' (Kvist 2004, 304). Post-enlargement migration might raise financial and political concerns about immigrants' use of state resources since E8 nationals are entitled to welfare benefits in their host societies.

^{*} According to the EU regulation 1408/71, nation states cannot discriminate against nationals from other EU countries residing within their borders. They must offer them the same social rights as their own nationals.

Despite transitional restrictions, this enlargement introduced an unprecedented number of countries and people into the European Union's mobility space. As shown in **Error! Reference source not found.** the annual rate of change of E8 nationals grew far more sharply after the enlargement in 2004 than the rate of overall foreign nationals living in Western Europe. By 2009, the acceleration of Central and Eastern Europeans arriving from E8 countries had slowed to approximately the same rate as the general migration trends. The 'shock' of migration from the East was perceptible in Western Europe. Well over half of all EU citizens believed that the 2004 enlargement was followed by significant migration flows. Only about 25% did not associate the last round of accessions with important migration flows. Thanks to this enlargement, 80% or more of Germans, Dutch and Austrians were convinced that future enlargements would result in an increasing inflow of workers from future member states (House of Lords 2006; Eurobarometer 2006).

Figure 1.B E8 vs. Foreign Stock in the EU, 2001-2009



Source: Author's own analysis of Holland et al. (2011) and OECD (2012)

Since the Eastern enlargement, the Western European governments have been cautious about welcoming Eastern Europeans. Although economists have credited the 2004 enlargement as economically beneficial, it still remains an unsung success story. Following the accession, the French complained about the influx of 'Polish plumbers', while the British media reported that the country was being 'flooded' by Eastern Europeans (Spigelman 2013). Eight years later, Ed Milliband, the leader of the Labour Party in Britain, apologized on behalf of his party for getting it 'wrong' and making the 'mistake' of immediately granting E8 nationals with labour market access (BBC 2012). The Western European member states, with the exception of Sweden, opted to restrict migration from the two most recent accession countries, Romania and Bulgaria, for a longer period than from the E8

countries. Britain is considering taking drastic measures, such as launching deterrence campaigns in Bulgaria and Romania, to stymie further migration (Travis and Syal 2013).

Yet despite the hysteria in the public debate and the strong anti-mobility rhetoric from xenophobic political parties, it is not clear that post-enlargement migration triggered a hostile reaction amongst most Western Europeans. It may be that the “backlash” appearing in the media and in the political debate has emerged from a vocal minority, rather than a broader public concern. This is because E8 migrants tend to be workers and as such they may be acknowledged as economic contributions to the society compared to non-work migrants like asylum-seekers or family migrants. For some individuals who may feel a broader European solidarity, mobility workers from new member states could be “the lesser of two evils” and if their country continues to accept foreign nationals than they feel that they would prefer these migrants to be within Europe. These sorts of more accepting sentiments about European mobility workers may have been drowned out by more the extremist views.

Research Questions and Contribution

Thus far, the impact of rapid changes in immigration patterns on public attitudes is not well understood, particularly how this impact varies across different national contexts. The interest of this study is driven by a scholarly debate about whether socio-political attitudes are, as ethnic competition theory would predict, responsive to immigration patterns. Using the 2004 EU enlargement as a case study, the central question of this research is: does the post-enlargement migration after the 2004 enlargement from the Central and Eastern European countries explain differences in Western European public attitudes?

This thesis is also interested in understanding to what extent national factors mitigate any link between post-enlargement migration and public attitudes in host societies. As previously mentioned, the contextual conditions which accompany immigration can alter its repercussions of individuals’ attitudes. There is a rich variation between the countries of Europe along a number of critical aspects: the use of transitional restrictions on mobility, the magnitude of non-European immigration, the generosity of the welfare state, as well as the prosperity of the economy. This offers an opportunity to understand if such factors could have hindered or exacerbated defensive attitudes after the enlargement.

To answer this question, this thesis will focus on the three types of attitude that are most prominently linked to immigration in both the academic and public discourse: attitudes towards immigration, welfare and trust. These attitudes have been selected as a focus of this thesis on the basis of group threat theory, which predicts these are dynamically related to extent of ethnic diversity in a society. While the former focuses on the link between the size of the group of immigrants that have been admitted and the perception of threat that immigration poses, the latter two types of attitudes focus on the knock-on impact on a host society when a given number of immigrants have been admitted.

The academic contribution of this thesis is to consider the attitudinal response in Western Europe to migration following the enlargement of the European Union in 2004. Focusing on the enlargement offers two empirical contributions. First, it helps us resolve a gap in the existing empirical research. E8 migrants are generally not included in studies that examine the effect of immigration on socio-political attitudes. Most of the research to date has focused on non-European immigration to Europe (Quillian 1995; Lahav 2004a; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002; Semyonov, Rajman, and Gorodzeisky 2006). Almost ten years after the accession, little is understood about how the public reacted to the sudden unrestricted migration from Central and Eastern Europe. Even if the significance of the enlargement has been widely recognized, there is a notable gap in our understanding of the enlargement and how we reconcile its impact on European societies. Post-enlargement migration to Western Europe exemplifies the tension between the economic benefits of immigration and the potentially adverse social and political consequences.

Secondly, it also offers methodological advantages to further the scholarly understanding of the dynamics between immigration and public opinion. The study of cross-national public opinion has proliferated recently (Norris 2009) but the existing empirical research tends to focus on cross sectional (between country) variations. This cross sectional research has furthered our understanding of the contextual and individual variation of public attitudes but fails to explain these dynamically. Although some studies examine how general immigration coincides with public opinion over time (within a single country), there is little understanding of how sharp changes in immigration patterns punctuate or shape public opinion. The comparative approach adopted in this thesis maintains an awareness of both the within country and between country variations in public attitudes. This study hopes to fill this lacuna in the body of knowledge by shifting the way in which we study comparative public opinion: by assessing the power of a rapid immigration change that occurred over many

countries. Such macro-micro linkages in the field of immigration policy and its effects on the host society are yet to be well understood, particularly comparatively.


Although the motivation for this study is largely empirically driven, it does have important theoretical implications. This thesis informs the broader theoretical debate about if public attitudes are, as group-threat theory predicts, a function of actual immigration developments. Empirical evidence thus far has cast some doubt about the relationship between how the public reacts to the perceived threat of immigration and the reality of immigration patterns in Europe. A key challenge for group threat theory has been its applicability to predict the conditions under which immigration generates a negative public reaction. Through an empirical case study, this thesis raises important questions about the boundaries of the explanatory power of this theory to interpret patterns of socio-political attitudes in the context of immigration in Europe.

This thesis also makes a non-academic contribution to the wider policy debate. Furthering our understanding of public attitudes may help to dismantle the 'cycle of hostility' towards immigration that leads to restrictionist immigration policies and diverts migratory flows to asylum-seekers or illegal migration (Canoy et al. 2006, 38). Public attitudes 'function as a counterweight to abrupt policy changes' and enable us to examine public policies not by their 'distributive effects or their economic efficiency but by their normative effects on mass publics' (Svallfors 2010, 241). It is important to further our understanding of public opinion, since the rising diversity in Europe requires public tolerance in the future.

Research Design

The main goal of this thesis is to use the circumstances of the post-enlargement migration from Eastern to Western Europe after 2004 to: 1) determine if the volume of immigration is related to public attitudes in the host societies, and 2) test whether these relationships (if any) are moderated by country-level characteristics. These are illustrated in **Error! Reference source not found.** The three varieties of public attitudes examined in this thesis have been selected since these have been theoretically predicted to be linked to immigration. The research framework acknowledges that these attitudes are shaped by both macro-level and micro-level factors. This thesis embraces the exploration of micro-macro linkages when examining the relationship between post-enlargement migration and the public attitudes in Western European receiving societies.

Figure 1.C Research Framework



Thesis Structure

This thesis is structured into seven subsequent chapters. The next chapter outlines the historical context by providing a descriptive account of the events leading up to the 2004 enlargement and the migration that followed during the post-enlargement period. The third chapter provides a review of the literature and outlines the theoretical framework of this thesis. The fourth chapter will explain the research methods. The following three chapters, the fifth, sixth and seventh chapters, will present the empirical analysis of the thesis. Following the research framework shown in **Error! Reference source not found.**, each empirical chapter will examine the relationship between post-enlargement (E8) migration and a certain type of public attitude in Western Europe: the fifth chapter considers attitudes towards immigration; the sixth chapter considers attitudes towards welfare; and the seventh chapter considers attitudes of trust. The eighth chapter will discuss the findings and draw conclusions.

2. The Case of the Enlargement

Introduction

Since its inception, Europe has left its doors open, making it possible for new countries to join. The Treaty of Rome (1957) clearly states that 'any European State may apply to become a member of the Community' (Treaty of Rome 1967: Article 234). The enlargement in 2004 was not the first. Following the five original countries that signed in Rome (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands), there were five subsequent enlargements. Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom acceded in 1973. Greece joined in 1981, followed by Portugal and Spain in 1986. A northern enlargement occurred in 1995, bringing in Austria, Finland and Sweden. The Eastern Enlargement was the fifth enlargement, admitting ten countries in 2004: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Cyprus. Since then, Bulgaria and Romania have joined as member states in 2007 and Croatia will join as a member in 2013.

The only comparable enlargement could be the accession of the southern European countries, which expanded membership to Spain, Portugal and Greece. Some parallels can be drawn between the Eastern and the Southern enlargements. In both cases, less developed economies along a border periphery were brought into the Union and this raised concerns about migration floods from these new member states (Kvist 2004). Spain and Portugal, just like the E8 countries, had recently undergone democratization. Still, the scale of the Eastern enlargement was unprecedented, with the integration of a vaster geographic region with a considerably larger population. Furthermore, the income disparity between the new and existing member countries was far more extreme.

This research examines the aftermath of a geo-political shift and so the events leading up to it should be taken into account. Taking a 'historical turn greatly enriches both the explanations that we offer for the social outcomes of interest, and the very outcomes that we identify as worth explaining' (Pierson 2004, 2). This chapter aims to describe the 2004 Eastern Enlargement of the European Union and the subsequent post-enlargement migration to Western European countries. It is organized in four parts. It begins by describing the historical context of immigration in Europe since the Second World War and how this contrasts with other liberal democracies such as the United States. Next, it presents a brief overview of the sequence of events that preceded the European Union enlargement in 2004. The next section will explain the different ways national governments embraced the transition

towards opening up their labour markets to the new member states. Then, the final section will examine the composition of post-enlargement migration and how this varied across the EU-15 host countries. The chapter will conclude by considering what can be learnt from reviewing the post-enlargement migration.

Historical Context of Immigration in Europe

Migration in Europe has been different from states with histories of immigration “settlement”. Settlement countries refer primarily to North American and Antipodean countries whose indigenous populations were almost entirely replaced through migration, particularly from European countries. Their traditions of migration play a strong role in their national narratives and arguably influence their policies towards immigrants. Until the mid-1990s, immigration in settlement countries was expected to be permanent and quickly offer a path to citizenship (OECD, 2009).

In Europe the nature of immigration has evolved through several phases since 1945. Although Europe has been a crossroads for the movement of peoples for centuries, the scale of migration to Europe has mounted and its paths have expanded in the past few decades. Migration to non-settlement countries (such as European states) experienced a surge active labour recruitment by states during the economic boom of the post-war years (Castles and Miller, 1998). However, demand for labour changed in the 1970s when the oil crisis forced European governments to reorient their immigration policies and halt labour recruitment. This incited a shift in immigration policy, which became characterized by labour market closure and welfare protectionism. To the surprise of European governments, the labourers who had been admitted during the post-war boom did not return to their country of origin. Immigrants had transitioned into long-term residents, building communities and social networks within their host societies. From the mid 1980s and into the 1990s, immigration was driven by the affirmation of human rights, and entrants tended to be admitted through family unification and asylum programmes (Castles & Miller 2008; Castles & Davidson 2000). Since the late 1990s, these countries have embraced high-skill immigration in order to remain economically competitive and compensate for their dwindling dependency ratios due to aging populations (Boswell 2007). As a result of many decades of immigration, Europe has become a multi-cultural continent, albeit reluctantly.

Table 2.1. Stock of Foreign Born as a % of Population

	1999	2008
Austria	10.8	15.3
Belgium	10.2	..
Denmark	5.6	7.3
Finland	2.5	4.1
France	7.3	8.4
Germany	12.4	..
Greece	..	..
Ireland	8.2	16.7
Italy	..	..
Luxembourg	32.8	37.3
Netherlands	9.8	10.9
Norway	6.6	10.3
Portugal	5.1	6.1
Spain	3.7	14.1
Sweden	11.1	13.9
United Kingdom	7.6	10.8

Source: OECD Migration Database 2010

The features of immigration varies between European countries since there have experienced divergent experiences with immigration since the 1970s. The differences in migration composition are understood to be due to several important factors. First, historical ties such as colonialism or political alliances can explain why certain nationalities tend to congregate in certain Western European countries. Decolonisation during the post-war period accelerated immigration due in part of to the return of colonising people of European ethnicity or treaties of independence which granted special access to labour markets to workers from former colonies (Alba and Silberman 2002). These historical ties explain why we observe in Table 2.2 immigrants in the UK are more likely to be Caribbean, Asia or east Africans, in France are more likely to be Algerians or of North Africans origin, in the

Netherlands are more likely to be of Indonesian or Surinamese origin, and in Spain are more likely to be Latin American.

Table 2.2. Composition of Immigrants by Area of Origin, 2007-2009

	EU-15	New EU	Other Europe	N. Africa/ Middle East	Other Africa	S./E. Asia	N. America/ Oceania	Latin America
Austria	17.55	18.7	51.18	3.58	1.20	5.44	1.07	1.29
Belgium	41.53	6.45	13.83	18.09	10.96	5.48	1.16	2.50
Germany	25.36	8.38	46.90	7.16	2.33	6.14	2.14	1.60
Denmark	20.05	5.39	26.27	16.12	4.76	16.75	8.04	2.63
Spain	13.83	13.76	3.89	15.13	2.86	3.28	0.65	46.60
Finland	29.86	10.51	33.75	7.16	5.08	8.89	2.73	2.02
France	27.57	2.99	6.11	40.23	12.08	6.79	1.56	2.67
Greece	5.85	12.89	61.34	11.98	1.02	4.36	2.21	0.35
Ireland	40.16	32.66	3.21	1.54	5.71	9.59	5.60	1.53
Italy	11.37	18.11	26.72	14.03	5.48	11.27	1.81	11.20
Netherlands	17.39	3.57	16.64	17.22	5.86	17.45	2.51	19.38
Portugal	18.51	3.06	8.31	0.23	45.04	1.73	2.00	21.12
Sweden	26.33	8.20	21.56	20.45	4.37	10.80	1.55	6.73
UK	18.08	13.47	3.56	4.62	16.93	29.05	7.67	6.61

Source: Dustman and Frattini (2011) These are based on country of birth with the exception of Germany which is based on nationality.

Another factor that explains patterns of nationality amongst immigrant populations in Europe is the linguistic or a geographic proximity between the sending and receiving countries. Table 2.2 shows that there is a greater tendency for North Americans to live in other Anglo Saxon countries such as the UK or Ireland. Geographic and linguistic proximity also explains a good deal of movement within European Union countries. For instance, a large proportion of immigrants in Finland are Swedish, in Belgium are Dutch, or in Germany are Austrian.

Finally, immigration policies are also thought to play a role in the different composition of immigration in Europe. There are two components to immigration policy: 1) immigration control or the rules and procedures of entry and 2) immigrant policy, that is the conditions of work, housing and social services for immigrants once they have entered (Hammar 1985, 5–7). Whilst acknowledging that each country has their peculiarities, immigration policies until the mid 1970s can be loosely categorized into one of four regimes based on their rationale for admitting and incorporating immigrants, which are also loosely correlated with the national and ethnic composition of their immigrants today (Bail 2008; Kofman et al. 2005; S. Castles and Miller 1998; Baldwin-Edwards 1997).

The first of these is the postcolonial regime which prioritized the admission of foreign nationals from former colonies to come and work to fill labour shortages (e.g. the United Kingdom). Second, the ethnic regime, which prioritizes the admission of people with ethnic origins in the country and offered employment to those with origins in foreign countries is very strict basis. According to this rationale, foreign nationals were admitted based on labour market demands and are invited as permanent guests rather than assimilated (e.g. Germany). Third, the republican regime accepts immigrants rather liberally and stresses the importance of assimilation and nation-building (e.g. France). And finally, the multicultural regime, actively offers admission to foreign nationals for humanitarian reasons such as asylum-seekers, and has a more pluralistic approach to incorporation (e.g. Sweden) It should be noted that in recent years, the heuristic utility of these regimes in explaining differences has been eroded recently since the immigration policies of European countries have undergone a process of convergence (Joppke and Morawska, 2003).

These last decades of immigration has brought racial and ethnic diversity into European countries by introducing people with different languages, and ethnicities and cultural backgrounds into its borders. This ethnic diversity is of another nature than the diversity of the United States, which has its roots in a legacy of slavery and centuries of legal segregation. In fact, it is difficult to draw a defensible analogy between race relations in the United States and immigration in Europe. This primarily because although African Americans remain *de facto* segregated from Anglo Americans through geographic location, labour market opportunities and leisure activities, they share a common language and religion and their belonging in the United States is not contested in the public debate (Pettigrew 1998; Landes 1955).

Moreover, there are also challenges to drawing parallels between immigration in the United States and in Europe. The historical context of immigration in Europe is very different from the American one which immigration was embedded in the national identity as a land of immigrants. In Europe, states have instead defined themselves “in bounded ethnic terms” so although there are similarities in the “syndrome of public opinion about immigration” in both continents, there are different myths that surround the debate (Citrin and Sides 2008, 56). In both the United States and Europe, there is a public debate about the economics of immigration and how it impacts the labour market and the welfare state. Although there have been concerns about linguistic preservation of English given the growing Spanish-speaking immigrants in the US, the preservation of cultural heritage is a more salient issue in Europe.

Additionally, there is a greater stratification of admission criteria and social rights in Europe across different groups such as EU citizens, non EU-citizens, asylum-seekers and refugees, and in some cases specific privileges for those who can demonstrate that they have ethnic origins in a certain European country. One could point out that in the United States there is instead a stratification between legal and illegal immigrants but there is certainly a less tiered approach to admission and rights compared to Europe. In sum, given the various differences between the two continents, it should not be taken for granted that theoretical insights built on inter-group relations in the United States can be applicable to the European context and vice versa.

A Brief History of East-West Migration in Europe

Westward migration from Eastern Europe can be traced back to early Christianity, with the displacement of the Goths, Huns, Altaic and Slavic populations. Eastern Europe is not the homogenous region that it was long depicted as by Western Europe and it contains many ethnic divisions. This myth of homogeneity was dispelled by the ethnic tensions that arose during the 1990s that helped to illuminate the region's ethnic heterogeneity in the eyes of the West. In fact, the languages used are extremely diverse and can be described as having a range of Slavic, Baltic, Latin, and Finno-Ugric linguistic origins. The religious composition of the population is equally diverse, consisting of Catholics, Protestants, and smaller minorities of Orthodox Christians and Muslims (Ardittis 1994, 19).

Until the collapse of the communist system, Eastern and Western Europe were considered two distinct socio-political regions. This perception dates back to the Enlightenment. In the 14th and 15th centuries, Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) served as a raw materials producer for the industrializing West. For this reason, Eastern European civilisation came to be perceived as backward and was excluded from the concept of 'western civilization' in Europe (Wolff 1996). Prior to Communism, the region bore the 'cultural imprints' of having been subject to three empires: Tsarist, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire (Tiryakian 2004, 221–2). The Cold War and Yalta agreement further entrenched the division between the two regions and established the East as a Russian periphery. It was not until the collapse of Communism in the Eastern bloc that the cultural borders were slowly redefined and it became possible to re-integrate the region into Europe. Even after the fall of Communism, Eastern Europeans were considered a 'product of the soviet system', which was distinct from the post-war system of modernity in the West (Tiryakian 2004). Although the

dichotomy between Eastern and Western Europe was a 'social construction' (Górny and Ruspini 2004, 7) it left a legacy in the mind-set of both regions. 'Decades of Communism and isolation have strongly shaped the attitudes and behavioural reflexes of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. Their differing attitudes and behaviours have nourished Western Europeans' long lasting perceptions about the East as "backward" and "less civilized" than the West and not really part of Europe' (Górny and Ruspini 2004, 7).

Military conflict, political ideology and religious antagonism, have traditionally pushed Eastern Europeans to move to Western Europe (Ardittis 1994, 15). A major wave of migration from Eastern Europe occurred immediately after the Second World War. People fled from the former Czechoslovakia, Poland and Slovenia, heading especially to the neighbouring Austria and Germany. Later, during the Cold War, the east-west migration flows were low, but did exist. Most of these flows included the repatriation of ethnic Germans from the east or political refugees and asylum-seekers during periods of crisis for the communist rule. Due to their geographical position and historical involvement in the region, both Austria and Germany absorbed a disproportionate amount of CEE migrants during the post-war period. Between 1950 and 1992, approximately 70% of all Eastern European migrants to Western Europe headed to Germany (Fassmann and Munz 1994, 532). Austria was also a popular destination, thanks to its geopolitical location along the Iron Curtain. The Austrian government offered political asylum to more than 2 million refugees during the Cold War, although some of these went on to reside in other countries subsequently (Kussbach 1992).

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and Germany's subsequent reunification brought a new openness between the CEE and Western European countries. The barriers to outward migration within the CEE countries fell, along with Communism. There was a rise in short-term movement since CEE nationals could move westwards to seek short-term work, and easily travel for up to three months (Wallace 2002). Push and pull factors, such as wage differentials or the differences in living standards between the CEE and Western Europe, spurred movement between the regions. The former political refugees of the CEE countries became 'economic refugees', in search of economic betterment (Larrabee 1992, 7). Throughout the 1990s, an increasing number of CEE nationals were present within the European Union. Meanwhile, some CEE countries, such as the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary became migration destinations for those from countries even further east, such as the Ukraine or the Balkans. Even if the leaving restrictions in CEE countries became eroded, however, Western European countries still retained their entry restrictions. Entry for CEE nationals was subject

to the discretion of the host country's visa arrangements, labour market policies, and worker recruitment schemes (Burrell 2009).

Uniting Europe: The Path to Enlargement

More than any other enlargement, the eastern enlargement is viewed historically as an expansion of norms, ideals and practices (O'Brennan 2006). The process of drawing the eight central and eastern European countries into a united Europe began as the European Union's slow and deliberate attempt to further economic development and build democratic institutions, driven by a normative imperative and the desire to secure geo-political interests (Schimmelfennig 2001). The re-unification of Germany was a pre-cursor to Europe's eastern integration. Shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the European Community established diplomatic relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Western European governments declared liberal entry arrangements essential to the young democracies of Eastern Europe (Ghosh 1994). In the 1990s, these diplomatic relations became more formalized agreements of association, known as the 'Europe agreements', paving the way for a political, cultural and economic convergence between the two regions. Promoting democracy in Eastern Europe became the Union's explicit purpose in an effort to rebuild society in the former communist countries. Programmes such as the PHARE (Poland and Hungary Assistance for Economic Restructuring) were initiated to support the transition to democracy and spur economic development in the region.

Big strides were made in 1993 at the European Council in Copenhagen when the European Union leaders formally acknowledged the potential for an Eastern enlargement. However, admission to the EU was not guaranteed but rather an incentive for these countries to embrace the adoption of EU norms. At the end of the meeting of the Council, the 'Copenhagen Criteria' established the political, economic and administrative preconditions required for EU membership. Emerging from this meeting in Copenhagen, the eastern countries could count on the promise of membership, provided that they met these conditions.

These former communist countries were eager to join the European Union for, at the very least, a few important reasons. First, joining the European Union was a symbol of cultural re-unification between the two regions of Europe. Secondly, membership could also offer the former communist bloc assurances of international security as a supplement to NATO. And, finally, accession would allow access to the Europe's free market, which would presumably lead to economic gains

(Avery 2004). Shortly after the EU initiated the process, Hungary and Poland put in the first applications for membership in 1994. By 1996, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia made submissions as well.⁷

Negotiations were opened soon after the applications were submitted. Following a request at the meeting of the European Council in Madrid in 1995, the European Commission produced a series of opinion reports on the readiness of the applicant countries to enter into negotiations in 1997. In 1998, the European Commission concluded Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia had fulfilled the obligations as set out in Copenhagen. Then in 2000, negotiations were opened with Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia,⁸ which stressed the importance of economic liberalisation, judicial and institutional reform, environmental regulation and minority rights. In 2002, the ten accession countries were approved as having met all of the EU criteria for joining. Finally, after agreeing to the terms of the negotiations, the Accession Treaty was signed in Athens in April 2003 (European Commission 2013).

Mobility: A European Right

Mobility, as stipulated by EU law, provides the citizens of member states with a series of formal rights and freedoms. The new EU constitution, signed in Rome in October 2004, explicitly prohibits ‘discrimination on grounds of nationality’⁹ and establishes the principle that ‘everyone residing and moving legally within the EU is entitled to social security benefits and social advantages’ (European Union 2004).¹⁰ The freedom of movement includes the right for EU nationals to move to another member state to take up employment and establish themselves in the host country with their family members. Member states are precluded from directly or indirectly discriminating against mobility workers and their families on the basis of nationality. EU migrant workers and their families are entitled to equal treatment not only in employment-related matters, but also with regard to public housing, tax advantages and social benefits.

The freedom of movement is a fundamental right guaranteed by EU law and has always been an integral part of Europe’s single market. The Treaty of Maastricht, in June 1992, solidified the free

⁷ Malta and Cyprus also made submissions in the same year.

⁸ Romania and Bulgaria were also deemed not to be meeting the economic and administrative criteria and subsequently their accession was delayed until a further separate enlargement in 2007.

⁹ Article I.4.


¹⁰ Article II. 34.

movement of goods, services, capital and, above all, people. Labour mobility within the region is understood to be a way of balancing out labour shortages, staving off unemployment, and mitigating the effects of an ageing working population (Dobson and Sennikova 2007, 124). The European Union continued its commitment to a single labour market by making it a central part of the Lisbon agenda in 2006 in an attempt to remove mobility barriers as a way for the EU to allocate its human capital efficiently. The Treaty of Amsterdam integrated all of the decisions concerning visas, asylum and immigration under the first pillar of the EU. The importance of these developments was pivotal: the free movement of people is argued to have transformed the EU from being intergovernmental to being supra-national institutional (Castles and Miller 2008, 196).

East-West Push and Pull Factors

Around 2004, there were several important economic factors pushing E8 nationals out of their home countries and pulling them towards Western Europe. A major pull factor on the eve of the enlargement was the wage differentials between the existing European Union countries and the enlargement countries. Figure 2.A shows that the GDP per capita in E8 countries around 2000 was less than 30% of the EU-15 levels, except Slovenia. Migrants' desire to improve their own economic circumstances (or 'maximize their utility', as an economist might put it) has been empirically proven to be a determinant of the decision to migrate (Massey et al. 1993, Massey et al. 1994). The existence of economic disparities, such as income or wage gaps, between various areas should be sufficient to generate migration flows (Castles and Miller 2008, 22). Taxation and state benefits in the west can also be considered an additional economic benefit since some argue that states with generous benefits can become 'welfare magnets', attracting more migration (Borjas 1999). However, others have shown that it is work itself, rather than generous welfare benefits, that motivates migration (Nowaczek 2010). Other labour market factors that pulled migrants from EEC countries to Western Europe include: unemployment in the sending countries, education and training output, and skill mismatches (Ardittis 1991).

Figure 2.A GDP Per Capita , E8 Countries Relative to EU-15 Average



Source: Holland et al. (2011), Ameco.
Note: Current Market Prices per head of population, EU-15=100

Non-economic factors also attracted labour movement from the enlargement countries to Western Europe. The presence of social networks in host societies is thought to be a considerable driver of further immigration (Massey et al. 1993, Massey et al. 1994). Furthermore, the ethnic and political problems in the enlargement countries were considered another motivating factor for ethnic minorities who sought greater political protection. Cultural and linguistic ties can also act as incentives or barriers. The geographic proximity of the CEE countries to Western Europe is thought to be another enabling factor since geographic proximity means that there can be lower costs associated with migrating (Wallace 1998).¹¹

At the time of the enlargement, the pull factors varied across Western Europe. The most obvious difference is that some countries (e.g. Germany or Austria) have a closer geographic proximity to the Central and Eastern European countries than others. Also, these countries had a higher stock of existing CEE nationals and therefore the existing social networks likely encourage further migration. Secondly, the EU-15 economies had differing growth rates, wages and unemployment rates.¹² Third, there is considerable variation in the generosity of social benefits across

¹¹Geographic proximity also lowers the cost for the migrant to return to his or her sending country but evidence shows that intentions of temporary migration often lead to de facto permanent settlements. This is because as young immigrants grow older, they tend to settle in the host country with their families and are invested in welfare state entitlements such as unemployment or pensions (S. Castles 2006).

¹² In 2002, the long-term unemployment rate ranged from 0.7% in the Netherlands to 5.3% in Italy. The GDP per capita (in purchasing power standards) ranged from 70.2 in Portugal to 192.2 in Luxembourg (Eurostat 2005).

Western European countries (Esping Anderson 1990, Esping Anderson 1999, Scruggs 2004). States with universal schemes could be more concerned about becoming 'welfare magnets' for certain social groups looking to take advantage of more generous social services. For example, the Finns expected that HIV-infected Estonians would get jobs in Finland mainly to access medical treatment (Kvist 2004). Given these variations in both the economic and non-economic contexts, the receiving countries had differences in the magnitude of their of 'pull' on E8 migrants.

The push factors also varied across the E8 sending countries. Income per capita, unemployment rates, and a more general measure of 'life satisfaction' are the strongest predictors of migration in the sending countries (Blanchflower, Saleheen, and Shadforth 2007). In the E8 countries, there was variation in the desire to migrate, likely due to the differences in economic and political situations. For instance, migration intentions were higher in the Baltics and Poland than in other new member states. This could be attributed to the differences in GDP and employment rates between the E8 new member states (Kahanec, Zaiceva, and Zimmerman 2009), as is shown in Figure 2.A.

The interaction between economic and non-economic migration factors makes forecasting migration flows difficult. For this reason, the OECD deems that estimating migration potential is too unreliable and does not reduce the uncertainty surrounding migration (Alecke, Huber, and Untiedt 2001). Before the enlargement, there was little consensus on migratory projections, and studies projected conflicting predictions of post-enlargement migration.³ The differences in these estimates varied considerably, probably due to the variation in their methodology and assumptions. According to Boeri and Brucker (2005), the studies that anticipated the migration potential during the run-up to the enlargement can be divided into three main approaches: 1) insights by surveying the intent to migrate in the candidate countries, 2) extrapolating from past experiences with migration following the southern EU enlargement, and 3) econometric estimates of the macro migration models, which explain migration flows or migration stocks by economic and institutional variables. The dynamic nature of the migration and its dependency on hard-to-predict economic factors and hard-to-quantify social and political factors made the labour migration implications of enlargement almost impossible to anticipate.

³ Officially, the European Commission predicted an inflow of approximately 3 million people from the 2004 enlargement plus a subsequent enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania. This figure represents about 1% of the population in the receiving countries in Western Europe (European Commission 2001).

Enlarging its borders not only increased the EU's territory but also introduced fresh complexity to the free movement of its people. As the accession negotiations progressed, the national governments of the existing member states expressed concern about the migration potential from the candidate countries. Immigration is a highly politicized topic in Western Europe, and concerns about immigrants 'taking jobs away' from the natives are a common refrain in the public discourse (Simon and Sikich 2007). The EU public also feared that E8 mobility from the E8 countries would bring a wave of Roma people, a minority group in certain CEE countries. Around the turn of the millennium, Slovakia had more than 500,000 Roma, Hungary had 600,000, and the Czech Republic had 200,000 (Tanner 2013). Western Europe has long struggled to integrate its small but established Roma populations. The size of these groups in the West rose especially in the 1990s, when Roma from the CEE countries applied to Western European countries for political asylum. As the enlargement loomed, politicians and the public expressed concern about opening their doors to more Roma who might drain their welfare systems (Petrova 2004).

Member states were given the option of implementing transitional arrangements⁴⁴ that would allow labour market integration to be phased in over a period of up to seven years. The transitional arrangements, set out in the Accession Treaty of 2003, allow limited free movement during a transitional period, which expired in April 2011. The amount of time allowed for transitional arrangements is dictated by the '2-3-2' plan. Member states can adopt the restrictions for a period of two years, which may then be prolonged for another three years. If the member states choose to abandon their national policies and implement the European Community rules, they are able to do so with a 'safeguard clause' whereby they reintroduce work permits temporarily. These decisions are left to the national governments. Only if a member state can show that its labour market would be disrupted can it prolong the arrangement for the final three years. These restrictions can only be applied to migrant workers and to obtaining access to the labour market but not to travel. According to the arrangements, once a worker has obtained access to the labour market of a particular member

⁴⁴ In the case of the E-10 accession, the transitional agreements were negotiated across a wide variety of measures, including: the free movement of labour, corporate law, agriculture, transport policy, regional policy and the coordination of structural instruments, and cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs, amongst others (Schneider 2009).

state, Community Law on equal treatment applies in terms of remuneration, other employment-related matters and access to social and tax advantages (European Commission 2001).

By the end of the negotiations, only three of the 15 member states offered the citizens in the new member states immediate, unrestricted access to their labour markets: Sweden, Ireland and the United Kingdom. Despite opening up their labour markets, Ireland and the United Kingdom chose to restrict access to social welfare benefits, imposing a minimum of a two-year residency as an eligibility requirement. Sweden, on the other hand, did not restrict access to their social welfare system and the citizens of the new member states were granted the same rights in Sweden as the citizens of the EU-15. The Swedish parliament voted to reject government proposals to limit the free movement of citizens from the enlargement countries, amid concern about preserving the Swedish social welfare state and the fear of 'social dumping' (EIRO 2004).

In December 2002, the UK government announced that they would not restrict their labour markets to E8 nationals. However, in 2003, when politicians grew concerned about a public backlash, the UK government added a special clause to the accession agreement that would require workers arriving from the E8 to register under a work registration scheme. Furthermore, registered E8 workers were not allowed to seek recourse to public benefits, such as unemployment benefit, unless they had been in continuous employment for over a year. However, they were immediately eligible for in-work benefits, such as tax credits and child benefits (Sriskandarajah and Cooley 2009, 34).

The remaining EU-15 countries opted to enact the transitional arrangements as a way of allowing their labour markets to adapt gradually and pacifying concerns about immigration. Tensions about post-enlargement migration were rising in the domestic political climates but the enlargement appeared 'unstoppable despite mounting public resentment in the existing member states' (Schneider 2009, 2). 'Restricting the access to the labour market by using the transitional arrangements (...) was also undertaken to guarantee that the immense differences in wages between the new and the old EU member states could be lessened and that the high level of unemployment in the new member states at the time of the accession could be reduced' (Heschl, 2009, 45). Countries that expect enlargement to cause 'distributional conflicts or political tensions' are then more likely to support the enactment of transitional agreements to curb the free movement of labour for a limited time after the accession (Schneider 2009). Some argue that the implementation of the transitional arrangements was a 'race to the top', with 12 out of the 15 member states reneging on their previous commitment not to restrict workers from new member states and opting to tighten restrictions (Boeri and Brucker, 2005). It is

42

likely that when Austria and Germany announced their decision to restrict access, this fuelled anxiety in the other member states that flows would be diverted to their countries.

The existing EU-15 member countries can be divided into four transitional regimes based on the agreements made from 2004 to 2006, following a categorization proposed by Traser (2006):

- *restrictive regime*: provide nationals with no further rights than citizens from non-EU countries (Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, France, Luxembourg and Spain)
- *restrictive quota regime*: rules that are similar to those of a restrictive regime but that opened up the labour market by a certain quota for nationals of the new member states (Austria, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal)
- *conditional access regime*: access to the labour markets are granted but work permits are only issued if certain conditions are met and welfare benefits are restricted. Residence permits can be withdrawn in case of unemployment (Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom)
- *community rules regime*: which immediately implement the Community rules without restriction (Sweden)

Easing into Mobility: Lifting Transitional Restrictions

In most Western European countries, the labour market restrictions on E8 nationals were lifted a few years after the enlargement. In 2006, Greece, Spain, Portugal and Finland lifted the restrictions in May, and Italy did so in July. In the following year, 2007, the Netherlands lifted restrictions in May and Luxembourg did so in November. France followed suit in July 2008 and Belgium and Denmark lifted restrictions in May 2009. Germany and Austria continued to impose restrictions until 2011, choosing to exhaust the seven-year limit (European Commission 2012). According to the accession agreements, by May 2011, the member states were required to allow the citizens of the new member states to move to, live in, and work freely in their country. A list of the year in which each country lifted the restrictions is shown in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3: Year Transitional Restrictions are Lifted on E8 Nationals

Country	Year
---------	------

Austria	2011
Belgium	2009
Denmark	2009
Finland	2006
France	2008
Germany	2011
Greece	2006
Ireland	2004
Italy	2006
Luxembourg	2007
Netherlands	2007
Portugal	2006
Spain	2006
Sweden	2004
United Kingdom	2004

Source: <http://ec.europa.eu/social>

Migration after the Enlargement: Tracking Western Migration Patterns

Quantifying the post-enlargement migration has proved challenging for researchers. Estimating migration comparatively is tricky and the nature of free movement with the European Union makes it even harder to track movements. Several countries do not report migration statistics and the ones that do so do not necessarily share the same definition of what constitutes a ‘migrant’. Also, illegal immigration is not included in the official statistics. In the case of the European Union, some of the observed migration flows after the enlargement may have been due to the legalization of people from the new member states who had already resided in the EU-15 prior to the enlargement (Anderson, et al. 2006). The data on the stock of E8 nationals living in Western Europe show in Table 2.4 has been compiled largely from the European Labour Force Survey.¹⁵

¹⁵ More information on this data can be found on page 68.

Table 2.4: Stock of E8 Nationals, 2000-2009

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2009
Austria	57,301	67,675	80,706	86,911	86,911
Belgium	15,071	34,860	47,247	51,218	51,078
Denmark	9,664	10,762	16,203	30,033	33,179
Finland	14,751	16,468	20,801	27,464	30,877
France	41,511	47,373	47,780	50,317	49,337
Germany	466,382	438,828	562,444	603,783	615,060
Greece	17,122	19,033	19,815	26,788	21,696
Ireland	15,715	23,046	118,773	189,705	178,215
Italy	41,431	67,755	94,215	128,813	137,306
Luxembourg	1,156	2,278	4,217	5,619	8,538
Netherlands	12,239	17,883	28,394	48,131	58,201
Portugal	650	1,081	1,512	2,502	2,843
Spain	34,076	55,735	103,190	137,068	139,237
Sweden	21,376	23,257	33,757	50,575	57,669
UK	102,805	180,817	448,571	806,581	14,736
EU-15	851,250	1,006,851	1,627,625	2,252,681	2,288,601

Source: Holland et. al (2011).


The number of E8 nationals living in Western European countries increased after the enlargement. Table 2.4 shows that the number of E8 nationals living in EU-15 countries increased by approximately threefold from 2000 to 2009. E8 nationals not only made up a greater share of the total population but also a greater share of the foreign population after the enlargement. The proportion of E8 nationals to all foreign nationals grew in all EU-15 countries (except for Greece). It also shows a slow and steady increase from 2000 to 2004, which then accelerated after the enlargement in 2004.

By 2008, the increase in E8 nationals tapered off. This has been attributed to the sharp economic contraction in Europe as it fell into the Great Recession. Holland et al. (2011) estimate that the net population flows from the E8 countries were approximately 50% to 65% lower than they would have been in the absence of the financial crisis. This particularly affected countries such as the United Kingdom and Spain (Holland et al. 2011, 17). Meanwhile, the economic and social conditions

in the E8 countries continued to improve, with the exception of Hungary. This narrowing of the economic disparity between the EU-15 countries and E8 countries offers another explanation for the reduction in mobility flows by 2009: the economic crisis deterred additional E8 migrants from moving west where employment opportunities were dwindling.

Although the enlargement did provide an impetus for migration, the impact of this migration was not evenly distributed across the Western European countries. The difference between the pre- and post-enlargement populations was more marked in some countries. By 2008, E8 nationals accounted for more than 10% of all foreign nationals living in Finland and the United Kingdom, and 40% of those living in Ireland. As seen in Table 2.5, the number grew most sharply in Ireland, the United Kingdom and Luxembourg. In absolute numbers, the E8 population grew the most in the United Kingdom. Austria and Germany, who still maintained restrictions on E8 mobility in 2008, nevertheless experienced some growth in their E8 populations. France experienced only a minimal increase post-enlargement but this could be attributed to the fact that their transitional restrictions remained in place throughout 2008. Overall, the growth in E8 nationals seems to have occurred in countries that had larger populations of foreign nationals. Table 2.6 shows that high immigration countries like Luxembourg or Austria are also home to larger proportions of E8 nationals. This positive correlation may be due to the fact that countries with cultural, legal, or labour market openness to foreign nationals in general attracts E8 nationals as well.

Table 2.5: E8 Nationals, Pre vs. Post Enlargement




Source: Author's own analysis, Holland et al. (2008)

The role of the transitional arrangements in diverting migration from E8 countries is not fully understood. Researchers have attempted to determine whether and to what extent the transitional arrangements were effective in attenuating the large-scale migration from the new member countries. Since the UK was among the first to open its borders, it became a magnet for E8 workers. There is consensus that the timing of the transitional agreements resulted in 'migration diversion' to countries such as the UK and Ireland from more geographically proximate countries, such as Austria or Germany (Boeri and Brücker 2005; Holland et al. 2011; Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2008; Özden and Schiff 2006). The reverse, however, is not the case: enacting transitional arrangements was no safeguard against inflows. Even countries that implemented transitional arrangements experienced an increase in their number of E8 nationals. For instance, in Germany, migration from the E8 countries increased consistently from 2004 to 2011 despite the government's restrictions. This was presumably due to the various bilateral agreements that Germany had with the new member states, allowing their nationals temporary access to the German labour market (Steinhardt 2009).¹⁸ Brenke and Zimmermann (2007) attribute this increase, despite the 'closed door' policy, to a rise in self-employment, especially

¹⁸ Germany made special allowances for some contract workers, seasonal workers, guest workers and cross-border workers.

among the Poles.^v These transitional arrangements did not prevent E8 nationals from coming but rather changed the composition of the immigrations (Kahanec and Zimmermann 2009). Zimmerman and Kahanec (2009) find that countries with transitional arrangements simply attracted older or less educated workers. The authors speculate that this is because the tradition of learning German, rather than English, is more present in older generations.

Table 2.6: The E8 Stock vs. Foreign Stock, 2008



Source: Author's own analysis, Holland et al. (2008)

Although it was a lay concern that E8 nationals would be attracted to certain EU-15 member countries that offered generous welfare benefits, there is no solid evidence that any 'welfare tourism' occurred. Brücker et al. (2009) finds that E8 migrants are less likely than natives to rely on contributory state benefits and not significantly more likely than natives to rely on non-contributory benefits (Brücker et al. 2009, 13). There is little cross-national data on the welfare use of E8 nationals in Western Europe post-enlargement, which makes it more difficult to measure the impact of welfare generosity on E8 migration, although country-specific evidence does not uncover any evidence of welfare tourism. Intuitively, this makes sense, since E8 nationals tend to be economic migrants who might be less

^v Looser restrictions were in place for self-employed individuals.

inclined to rely on welfare than other types of migrant. For instance, there was no over-representation of E8 nationals amongst welfare claimants in Sweden, one of the most generous welfare states in the EU (Gerdes and Wadensjö 2010). Moreover, there is no evidence in the UK of E8 nationals having different welfare use patterns from natives (Zaiceva and Zimmerman 2008).

Finally, most research focuses on the number of people moving from East to West but treats this migration as a permanent resettlement. However, this ignores the fact that although it is easy for E8 nationals to move to Europe to work but also easier for them to return home. The close proximity of the sending countries and the nature of EU mobility made E8 migration more temporary, and it appears to be more short-term or circular.¹⁸ For instance, about half of the Poles who arrived claimed that they intended to remain for less than three months and only about 10% expressed an intention to stay for more than a year (Blanchflower, Saleheen, and Shadforth 2007; Office of National Statistics 2006). Another study by Eglite and Krisjane (2009) found that Latvians living in Ireland and the UK expected to remain for a year or less. In some ways, European mobility workers from poorer peripheral countries have become Western Europe's new *gastarbeiter*: filling short-term labour shortages but not leading to a long-term settlement. Still, it is too soon to draw any firm conclusions about this, and the circular nature of the post-enlargement migration and long-term settlement patterns will only emerge after more time has passed.

The Composition of the Post-enlargement E8 Migration


Nationality

Prior to the enlargement, as shown in Table 2.7, the vast majority of E8 nationals living in Western Europe were Poles, who comprised more than 60% of the total, followed by Hungarians (11%) and Czechs (9%). Table 2.7 also shows that there were very few nationals from the Baltic countries living in Western Europe before 2004. For instance, Latvians comprised only 2% of all E8 nationals living in Western Europe and Estonians comprised less than 1%. A member state's geographic proximity to the new member countries can explain some of this variation by lowering the cost of migration for individuals and also increasing the cultural or linguistic proximity (Zaiceva and Zimmerman 2008). In

¹⁸ The circular nature of post-enlargement migration provides further justification for relying on migration stock figures (vs. flow figures), which are more likely to capture circular migrants.

2002, Finland, for instance, had a high representation of Estonians, who made up about 83% of their E8 foreign population. In a second instance, Austria's E8 population contained a large portion of Hungarians (24%) in the same year.

Table 2.7 E8 Nationals by Nationality, 2002



Source: Author's own analysis, Holland et al. (2008)

Following the enlargement, Poles remained the largest number of E8 nationals in the EU-15, as shown in Table 2.8. This is unsurprising, given that Poland was the most populous new member country. Also, there were economic 'push factors' around the time of the enlargement that propelled Poles to move west. For instance, unemployment in Poland had reached almost 20% (Zaiceva and Zimmerman 2008). By 2009, 65% of the E8 nationals in the EU-15 were Polish. This was especially the case in Italy and the Netherlands, where they composed about 77% and 74% of the E8 population, respectively. The enlargement changed the migration destination of Poles. Around 2000, Germany was the main destination for Poles seeking to move west. Yet from 2004 to 2006, the share of Polish migrants choosing Germany dropped by almost 20%, while it climbed by more than 30% in the UK. Table 2.10 shows that Poles mainly gravitated towards the United Kingdom. Germany remained a top destination country as well, despite the labour market restrictions that were in place there until 2011. Since most of the E8 migrants were from Poland, the Poles became the face of post-enlargement mobility in some Western European media. For instance, fears of the 'polish plumber' attracted the

French public attention in 2005 and even threatened to undermine a referendum on the EU constitution (Arnold 2005).

Table 2.8 E8 Nationals by Nationality, 2009




Source: Author's own analysis, Holland et al. (2008)

The second most common nationality for E8 migrants in Western Europe is Lithuanian. In fact, together with the other two Baltic States, migrants from these countries comprise 14% of all E8 migrants, according to Table 2.8. While Estonians migrants tended to move to Finland, while Latvians and Lithuanians tended to congregate in the UK and Ireland, as shown in Table 2.10. Around the time of the enlargement, the GDP per capita was approximately 1/5 of the average EU-15, adjusted for purchasing power parity. In fact, Latvia was the only E8 country from which inflows to Western Europe did not slow after 2008. Holland et al. (2011) attribute the Latvian anomaly to the fact that the Latvian economy was suffering a far worse downturn: GDP declined by 17.9% in 2009 and unemployment rocketed to 20%. When considering post-enlargement migration from the perspective of the sending countries, Latvia had an extraordinarily high emigration rate, as 2.4 % of the Latvian population moved to Western Europe between May 2004 and December 2005 (Özden and Schiff 2006).

There was relatively little emigration from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia after their accession. In the case of the Czech Republic and Slovenia, this could be because their employment rates were approximately the same as those in Western Europe (Holland et al. 2011). As shown in Table 2.9, employment rates were higher in the Czech Republic and Slovenia than in the

other E8 countries, such as Poland or Slovakia. However, this does not explain why there was no significant emigration from Hungary, given that their employment rates were low relative to both other E8 countries and EU-15 countries. Holland et al. (2011) suggest that this may be because many Hungarians commute to Austria to work on a daily basis, although their official residence remains in Hungary.

Table 2.9 E8 and E2 Employment Rates Relative to the EU-15 Average



Source: Holland et al. (2011)

Other Characteristics of E8 migrants


Despite the lingo-cultural heterogeneity among the E8 countries, E8 nationals share a predominantly Christian heritage with a shared geo-political position between Western Europe and the former Soviet Union. Their post-communist legacy left their national economies under-developed, with lower wages and fewer labour market opportunities than their western neighbours. As a group of migrants, they are also unified by their migration purpose: bettering their economic circumstances and thus E8 migrants tend to be economic migrants, rather than motivated by family reunification or political reasons (Eglite and Krisjane 2009).


In general, E8 migrants tend to be younger and well-educated (Eglite and Krisjane 2009; Steinhardt 2009). Galgócz and Watt (2009) report that migrating Poles tend to be aged between 20 and

39, and post-enlargement, this age structure became even younger. About 20% of the Poles who migrated post-enlargement had a university degree (Galgóczy and Watt 2009, 196). Another study reports that about half of the Poles who migrated to the UK report having a higher education degree, which is similar to the educational attainment of non-E8 foreign nationals (Drinkwater, Eade, and Garapich 2009, 86). Similar patterns are found in Ireland and Germany, where the qualifications of E8 migrants approximate those of the local population (Barrett 2010; Steinhardt 2009). Among the E8 population, workers from Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary tend to be the best-educated, but the skill profile of E8 nationals does vary across the EU-15. Countries such as Luxembourg, Denmark and Sweden tend to attract highly-skilled workers while Southern European countries, Belgium and the Netherlands tend to attract less skilled ones (Holland et al. 2011).

Although E8 migrants tended to be employed at high rates, they were more likely to fall into less skilled occupations once they arrived in Western Europe. For instance, E8 migrants in the UK were more likely to be employed than migrants from non-EU areas. The employment rate of E8 migrants in the UK was roughly 77%, which is higher rate than that of non E8 foreign nationals, which is about 64% (Drinkwater, Eade, and Garapich 2009) . Despite the higher employment rates, approximately a third of the E8 nationals living in Western Europe are employed in elementary occupations. 'Down-skilling', when migrants take jobs below their skill level, has occurred most frequently in Ireland, Sweden, Denmark and the United Kingdom (Holland et al 2011, 57).

Table 2.10 E8 Nationals by Destination and Source Country, 2009





Source: Author's own analysis, Holland et al. (2008)

Concurrent Trends in non-EU Immigration

During the years following the enlargement, there were simultaneous developments in immigration to Western Europe from non-EU countries. While these trends are not the focus of this thesis, it is important to keep other developments in immigration to Western Europe in mind since this could have implications for public opinion. First, source countries, such as Spain or Italy, continued their transition into being destination countries for immigrants as living standards improved due to economic development (Fakiolas 1995). Through the 1970s, countries such as Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland, supplied other European countries with cheap labour. From 1950 to 1970, for instance, approximately 5 million people (3% of the total population) were estimated to have emigrated from Southern to Northern Europe (Layard et al. 1992, 17). But by the turn of the millennium, these former source countries shifted from the exporting of labour to the importing of labour. Recent figures show that new destination countries report net migration figures that match, if not exceed, the traditional destination countries. By 2011, Ireland and Spain had among the highest immigration flows among wealthy democracies relative to the size of their population, while Italy had the same amount as the UK and more than Germany (OECD, 2013). Yet immigration to Southern Europe tends to be composed of mostly irregular and illegal immigration (Baldwin-Edwards 1997).

Additionally, there has been an increased securitization of immigration in Western Europe which has been also accompanied with a shaper focus on high skill immigration. Securitization occurs when immigration policy becomes an “instrument to protect the state, its society and the internal market against the dangers related to an invasion of (illegal) immigrants and asylum-seekers” (Huysmans 2000, 757). The focus on establishing a more “secure” Europe became more prominent in the discourse during the formation of the Schengen area which founded a common immigration and

border control within the EU. Moreover, the need for the State to protect the population for the threat of immigrants was heightened in the post 9/11 era when concerns prompted about a terrorist threat from members of radicalised Islamic minority groups living in Europe. This has particularly been an important public issue in Spain, the Netherlands, France and Germany who have larger Muslim populations. As a result of the securitization of European immigration policy in the last decade, there has been a tightening of granting asylum (Huysmans 2000). Yet acknowledging Europe's need for labour has lead States to focus on attracting instead seemingly more "secure" immigration such as high-skill immigrants (Mahroum 2001).

Conclusion: Looking back at the 'Big Bang Enlargement' Ten Years On

This brief overview of the European Union's 2004 enlargement has revealed a few important themes: 1) the unprecedented nature of this expansion; 2) the uncertainty of the migration implications of the accession; and 3) the member states' reliance, to different extents, on the transitional arrangements as a tool for managing migration. Looking back at what can be learnt from the 2004 enlargement is a vital exercise and highly applicable to the contemporary situation in Europe. At the time of writing, transitional arrangements still limit the mobility of Bulgarians and Romanians in some EU countries. Additionally, Croatia has just become a member in July 2013 and countries such as Serbia and Montenegro are in negotiations to become members as well.

East-west migration has been widely praised by scholars for its positive impact on the economies of both new and existing member countries. The enlargement filled the short-term labour shortages in the West and brought long-term development to the East. The free movement of people was an integral part of this economic progress. The 'brain circulation between sending and receiving countries can be expected to generate a win-win situation (...) in both sending and receiving countries' (Kahanec and Zimmermann 2009, 19). The large amount of migration did not seem to harm the economies of the host countries. Kahanec, Zaiceva and Zimmerman (2009) find that the post-enlargement migration, on aggregate, did not displace workers or lower their wages in Western Europe, although they concede that some 'crowding-out' may have occurred in some occupations or sectors (Kahanec, Zaiceva, and Zimmerman 2009, 36).

Despite the economic success story, the migration following the 2004 enlargement has not eased the national governments' apprehension about allowing labour market access to new European

citizens. 'The centrality of migration in discussions about EU enlargement, coupled with the overwhelmingly restrictive approach to the free movement of workers, highlight some inherent policy tensions within the EU around mobility and migration' (Drew and Sriskandarajah 2007). National governments are now adopting more restrictive policies following the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. Of the Western European countries, only Sweden and Finland opted for unrestricted mobility immediately after the accession.

There is also a gap between the actual economic and political success of the enlargement and its public perception in Western Europe. This could be due to the fact that it is a classic example of trickle-down policy-making, where the impetus to open up labour markets to new member countries was driven by a deep commitment to the liberal norms at the European level but not by public demand at the national level. In this instance, market forces took 'primacy' over national political forces (Favell and Hansen 2002, 708). This highlights the contradiction that is inherent in globalisation, that while economic forces have driven greater openness, national political forces have paradoxically pushed for greater closure (Hollifield 2004). There remains tension between the EU's 'structural need to enlarge', to supplement an aging population and labour market shortages, and the political resistance to migration (Favell 2008, 704; Hollifield 2004).

The effectiveness of the European Union – along with its *raison d'être* – has come under greater scrutiny since the global economic crisis. Although this should not detract from the importance of the 2004 enlargement, which finally united the two regions around its commitment to democratic and economic values. The enlargement was recognized as an important milestone when the European Union received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012. The Nobel Committee noted that 'the fall of the Berlin Wall made EU membership possible for several Central and Eastern European countries, thereby beginning a new era in European history. The division between East and West has to a large extent been brought to an end; democracy has been strengthened; many ethnically-based national conflicts have been settled' (Norwegian Nobel Committee 2012). The Nobel Peace Prize gives both scholars and the public a reminder to look at the enlargement beyond the narrow prism of individual or national interests and see the 2004 enlargement more broadly as a continent's unification under the banner of peace and prosperity.

3. Literature Review

Introduction

This chapter has several aims which are the following : 1) to survey the existing literature in the field, 2) to situate this thesis within it, 3) outline the theoretical framework of this thesis, 4) to identify gaps in the current empirical research and 5) explain how this research adds to the body of knowledge. The chapter begins by introducing the concepts used in this thesis. This will then be followed by the theoretical framework of the thesis which will be applied to each type of attitudes: immigration, welfare and trust. Based on this theory, hypotheses will be formulated for testing. Finally, the gaps in the existing literature will be explained and the contribution of this thesis will be put forward.

Conceptualizing Immigration, Race and Ethnic Diversity

Notions of immigration, race and ethnic diversity are the core concepts under-pinning the thesis. I begin with a brief discussion of these concepts since the debates in the literature are embedded in different ideas as to who counts as a migrant and what is meant by the term, immigration. Ethnic diversity and race are also central features of the immigration debate in Europe which are also intertwined with exiting social divisions of class. This thesis follows previous scholarship which sees the distinction between the natives and newcomers is a social construction rather than a matter of physical difference. According to these concepts, E8 nationals who moved to Western Europe after the enlargement are put forward in this thesis as a perceived out-group due through the social processes of immigration, racialization and ethnic division which distinguish them from the host population.

Immigrant and Immigration

The term immigrant is difficult to define clearly because it means different things, depending on the country concerned. Immigrants are assigned different categories, often based on their permission to enter. For instance, in Switzerland and Germany, immigrants are referred to as ‘foreign workers’ while in the Netherlands immigrants are sometimes referred to interchangeably as ‘minorities’. Different definitions of the term ‘immigrant’ are a reflection of the country’s immigration policy

(Hammar 2010). For this reason, immigrants are not considered foreign nationals in some countries. For instance, in France, many immigrants are naturalized French citizens but are still perceived as immigrants by the public (Lahav 2004b).

Although various definitions of the term 'immigrant' exist, this thesis must offer a single definition that functions comparatively. Here, an immigrant is defined as someone who moves to another country to live for a period of at least three months, while the term immigration refers to 'the physical entrance of immigrants' as defined, either by a single person or as a group into a country (Hammar 2010, 56). This definition includes migrants regardless of their motivation for migration (economic, family or political) but does not include individuals who are traveling through the country and do not establish a residence there.

There is often some confusion regarding the difference between a 'migrant' and an 'immigrant'. The term 'migrant' refers to a broader category of individuals who change residence, and not necessarily to an individual who moves to another country (e.g. regional migration). In the interest of simplicity, the terms 'immigrants' and 'migrants' are used interchangeably in this thesis and both refer to international migration.

The more specific term, 'E8 immigrant', refers to individuals who are nationals of E8 countries who take up residence in another country. As a group, E8 nationals are not subject to domestic immigration controls in European member states as long as transitional restrictions have been lifted. Thanks to the enlargement, the 'political-economic parameters' have been redrawn 'by setting a legal background' which gave E8 migrants greater freedom to find economic opportunity across European labour markets (Ciupijus 2011, 541). For this reason, some might say that E8 nationals are not technically immigrants but are rather European mobility workers. However, E8 nationals moving to Western Europe to live and work are considered immigrants according to the definition provided above. Moreover, different evidence shows that, from the public's point of view, they do not view a distinction between EU and non-EU immigrants (Lahav 2004b).

Ethnic Diversity

‘Ethnic diversity’ has not yet been clearly defined in the literature, which is surprising given how frequently the term is used.²⁹ Diversity occurs through ethnic cleavages which can exist along ethnic, linguistic or religious lines. Many ethnicities can co-exist within a country’s population since ethnicity and territory are not necessarily aligned in Europe, and ethnic diversity exists in each European country (Singh 2001, xix). A definition of ethnic diversity depends almost entirely on a definition of ethnicity. An ethnic group can be described as a population that sees itself as ‘bounded by common origins, shared experience and culture, and quite possibly a distinct language and practice’ (Cole 2011, 14). Implicit in this definition is ‘the idea that members and non-members recognize the distinction and anticipate that significant actions are or could be conditioned upon it’ (Fearon 2003, 198).

Ethnicity is often ‘intertwined’ with race, since ‘the physical phenotypes on which race is based are not easily distinguishable from the cultural ones’ (Gracia 2005, 34). Anthropologists who study ethnicity acknowledge its fluidity and struggle to draw strict boundaries between groups. However, if one had to draw the line somewhere, one could say that, while race is inherited,³⁰ ethnicity is learnt through language and culture (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). Although language and culture are often associated with nationality, they are not interchangeable. The main difference between an ethnic group and nationality is that the latter is constrained by a ‘political boundary’ (Cole 2011, ix). Nations rely on the ‘significance of cultural markers’ to build a sense of ‘common originary belonging’ which are then used to determine membership (Goldberg 2002, 118).

This thesis employs the ethno-linguistic definition of diversity. An ethno-linguistic family refers to an ethnic or racial group that speaks its own language or mother (primary) tongue, excluding near variants and dialects (Harding and Sokal 1988). According to this definition, linguistic groups also likely share a history and general culture. Based on the ethno-linguistic classification by Harding and Sokal (1988),³¹ the majority of E8 nationals fall into the following linguistic families:

- Baltic Europeans (Latvian, Lithuanian)
- Slavic (Polish, Czech, Slovenian, Slovakian)
- Ugric (Hungarian)

²⁹ For an overview, see Lolle and Torpe (2011).

³⁰ It is also acknowledged that race can be socially constructed whereby ‘social or cultural significance’ is granted to perceived ‘physical or physiognomic markers of cultural attitudes, habits, or behaviour’ (Goldberg 2002, 118).

³¹ This classification only considers the majority ethno-linguistic groups in E8 countries. It is fully acknowledged that E8 populations are also composed of minority ethno-linguistic groups.

- Finnic (Estonians)

Generally speaking, E8 nationals are understood to belong to a different ethno-linguistic group from their Western Europeans who belong mostly to Latin, German or Celtic ethno-linguistic groups.

Race and the Racialization of Immigrants

In popular discourse, the term 'race' is widely used interchangeably with skin' color' such as black, white, or brown, amongst others (Malik 1996, 2). Describing E8 immigrants as "white" would likely be disputed by a sociological and anthropological traditions (Omi and Winant 1986) which see race as a social construction or in political science where race is seen as having political roots, rather than biological origins (Banton 2002; Banton 1999; M. F. Jacobson 1999; R. Jacobson 2006). According to this logic, race can instead be defined as a concept that emerged as a rationalization for social differences, in particular the persistence of inequality (Malik 1996, 6).

The construct of race has been closely connected to the construct of "whiteness" which emerged from an American research tradition but has more recently been applied to European social relations (Garner 2006; Guess 2006; Delgado and Stefancic 1997; Delgado and Stefancic 2012). The concept of whiteness has been explored in various ways in the literature (for a review of this see Garner 2006) but can generally be agreed that whiteness is "disassociated from physicality" and instead is rather used to describe a social group that is "unmarked, unseen and protected from public scrutiny"(Linke 1999, 29; Dyer 1997) which operates under a normalized acknowledgement that there is superiority in being white.

Under this descriptions, immigrants are likely to be perceived as "non-white" by natives, regardless of their skin color. As Goldberg (2002) points out, 'immigrant classes may be devalued from or promoted into the relative privileges, powers and properties associated with normative middle class whiteness according to political, economic and cultural demands and interests of time and place' (Goldberg 2002, 173). This occurs often because immigrants tend to be deskilled and occupy a working class status in their new country. A classic example of this would be the derogatory perception of Irish immigrants to the United States around the turn of the 19th century (Roediger 1999). Similarly, E8 migrants moving West after the enlargement have tended to congregate in lower skilled jobs in low-wage sectors or perceived as such (Ciupijus 2011), a social marker of low, "non-white" prestige.

Conceptualising Public Attitudes

For the purposes of this research, public attitudes are defined as normative beliefs and opinions about certain subjects. They are distinct from values, which are not tied to specific objects and are also different from 'positive beliefs', which refer to beliefs about actual occurrences (Svallfors 2004, 18). Throughout this study, the terms 'public attitude', 'public opinion', 'public sentiment', 'public preference' and 'public support' are used interchangeably.² The focus of this thesis is on public attitudes (issue position) rather than the intensity with which the public cares (issue salience) about a given topic. Public attitudes can be approached in two different ways: either by looking at the aggregate-level (collective opinion) or by examining the micro-level (individual) opinion.

Changes in collective public opinion tend to manifest themselves slowly, because the forces that drive these changes are gradual. Aggregate changes are theorised to occur when social change brings about value changes that are then manifested into political attitudes, often through 'generational replacement' (Kaase 1999; Inglehart 1977). Examples of such changes include: a steady rise in income levels, increases in formal education, and the entry of women into the workforce (Page and Shapiro 1992). Therefore, an aggregate-level view of opinions tends to be far more stable than looking at the individual level (Inglehart 1985; Jones and van der Bijl 2004). Understanding the evolution of aggregate opinion is a way of tracing the 'policy mood' which connotes 'shared feelings that move over time and circumstance' (Stimson 1999, 17–18). Although collective opinion may change gradually within a country, considerable variation across different countries remains (Brooks and Manza 2007; Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Mehrtens 2004).

While, on the aggregate level, public opinion evolves gradually, at the micro-level, opinions are more impressionable. Comparative researchers are increasingly addressing the variation at both the national and individual levels. Individual attitudes are determined by a constellation of factors, the relative importance of which remains ambiguous and widely debated. While an individual's opinion is elusive to the researcher, it is equally elusive to the individual himself. As Myrdal (1944) notes, even the least sophisticated individual becomes aware of their own confusion and the contradictions between their own attitudes. Occasionally, this person may 'recognize the incongruence of [their] state of mind and find it so intolerable that the whole organization of [their] moral precepts

² Some traditionalists oppose the interchangeable use of 'public attitudes' and 'public opinion'. A review of this debate can be found in (Tourangeau and Galesic 2007).

is shaken. But most people, most of the time, suppress such threats to their moral integrity together with all the confusion, the ambiguity, and the inconsistency which lurks in the basement of a person's soul' (Myrdal 1944, xlv). The seemingly paradoxical nature of an individual's opinions can be puzzling to theorists who seek to rationalise them.

Macro-micro Linkages in Public Attitudes

Given the mercurial nature of individual attitudes, unravelling the relationship between macro-level changes and individual opinion is problematic. According to Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior (2004), the public's reaction to macro level changes appears to be formed by a complex interaction of predisposing factors and situational triggers. A situational trigger, such as a macro change, is thought to galvanize those already sensitive to a particular issue. It is also possible that it mobilizes people's opinions regardless of whether or not they were already predisposed to the problem. A distinction exists between 'galvanizing a core constituency and mobilizing a broader public'. The former increases the intensity of an attitude regarding an issue while the latter enlarges the portion of the public that feels a certain way about that issue (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004, 36).

Furthermore, it is difficult to understand the influence of macro changes on public opinion because these opinions are based on perceptions of reality rather than actual occurrences. In the case of immigration, these perceptions may or may not be accurate. There are constraints on how informed the public is about the realities of national immigration. This may be due to the fact that immigration policy-making has long been insulated from the public debate in Europe (Guiraudon 2000). Freeman (1995) argues that the public remains rationally ignorant, since 'the incentives to become informed fail to override the costs of obtaining information' (Freeman 1995, 883). Reliable statistics, particularly those regarding irregular migration, are not readily available or communicated to the public. Public confusion about the differences between legal migrants, asylum-seekers, and illegal migrants further complicates the matter. The public also tends to misunderstand immigration as a supply-driven rather than a demand-driven phenomenon (Canoy et al. 2006). This line of reasoning places the 'blame' on the immigrants themselves rather than on economic or social drivers. This complex narrative of immigration makes it difficult for the public to comprehend fully the reality of immigration.

The gap between the public perception of immigration and the reality is not yet fully understood. This is because surveys reflect an individual's positions, preferences and opinions but do not test for the respondent's actual knowledge. Despite the constraints on the public's understanding

of national immigration, the empirical evidence shows that the public is generally aware of the magnitude of immigration in their country compared to others (Lahav 2004; Schlueter and Scheepers 2010), although they tend to over-estimate the absolute amount within their own country (Citrin and Sides 2008). Freeman's (1995) concept of an 'ignorant public' is disputed by (Lahav 2004), who argues that the public is more 'sensible' and that most of the cross-country variation in perceived immigration is explained by the actual foreign-born population (Lahav 2004b, 78). Although these empirical investigations shed light on the link between the aggregate perception of immigration and the reality, the data limitations have not allowed this to be explored at the individual level of public attitudes.

Conceptualising Attitudes towards Immigration

Individuals can be resistant to immigration because they perceive it to be detrimental to their nation. This has also been referred to as 'nativism' or 'nativist resentment' (Crepaz and Damron 2008, 439) for 'taking away jobs, housing, social services' (Faist 1994, 440), although this study chooses to refrain from using such terms as they imply an element of prejudice. Although some individuals opposed to immigration are motivated by prejudice, this is not always the case. Given the politicization of the immigration debate, it is difficult to untangle an individual's opposition to immigration from xenophobic sentiments. However, this study acknowledges that opposing immigration is a legitimate policy position and is careful not to label those individuals who adopt it as prejudiced or hysterical.

This study is interested in attitudes about immigration as a phenomenon rather than attitudes about immigrants themselves. Expressing attitudes of concern about immigration can be thought of as the perception of the threat posed by the 'anticipation of negative consequences' of immigration (Renfro and Stephen 2002, 197). Expressing concern about immigration is conceptually distinct from xenophobia, prejudice or hostility towards the foreign nationals themselves. It should be acknowledged that there is conceptual overlap between the two attitudes and they tend to be correlated (Hood and Morris 1997).

Individual attitudes about immigration are thought to be both extremely rigid and extremely malleable, depending on the amount of attachment the individual feels. Prejudicial opinions can be deeply entrenched and can be described as 'an unfavourable attitude towards an object which tends to be highly stereotyped, emotionally charged and not easily changed by contrary information' (Krech, Crutchfield, and Ballachey 1962, 321). Yet more ambivalent individuals may shift their opinion with

some subtle prodding. A recent example from the Transatlantic Trends survey illustrates this point. The survey gauged how opinion about immigration would change after the respondents had been asked about the issue over the course of their interview. A portion of the respondents were asked to define immigration as ‘more of a problem’ or ‘more of an opportunity’ at the beginning of the survey. Other respondents were asked the same question at the end. A third group was asked the question twice—once at the beginning and once at the end. On average, the percentage of people who stated that immigration was ‘more of an opportunity’ at the end of the survey was seven percentage points higher than when they were asked at the beginning (German Marshall Fund 2008). This example highlights the need for the careful design of survey instruments and measurement of opinion.

The evidence shows that the size of the out-group is a predictor of the attitudes towards its members (Fossett 1984; Semyonov et al. 2000; Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2008). Yet, there is no scholarly consensus of a threshold which distinguishes individuals in an out-group from those in an in-group likely and this is likely due to the variation in group relations across social contexts. It is the difference that matters. According to Alesina et al. (2003)’s reasoning, categorization as an out-group can be based on identification either by the out-group itself or by the in-group. ‘It does not matter (...) whether ethnic differences reflect physical attributes of groups (skin colour, facial features) or long-lasting social conventions (language, marriage within the group, cultural norms) or simple social definition (self-identification, identification by outsiders)’ (Alesina et al. 2003, 165).

Despite varying experiences with immigration across Western European countries, the racialization of immigrants is nevertheless a common theme within each of them (Garner 2006). Even in European countries who have had a longer tradition of immigration such as the United Kingdom “minority ethnic immigrant populations have been traditionally perceived as ominous and invading” (Cheong et al. 2007, 34). From a conceptual perspective, all foreign nationals can be considered ‘outsiders’ in their host society due to their different status, rights and origins (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2009, 402). Following this logic, this thesis puts conceptualizes E8 migrants as out-group members in EU-15 host societies given the fact that they: 1) are not citizens, 2) have a different native language and 3) come from poorer foreign countries and 4) are members of an identifiable group.

Conceptualizing Attitudes towards Welfare

Support for Income Redistribution

Income redistribution is arguably the core function of the welfare state which can be done horizontally (over time) or vertically (across income groups). Demand for income redistribution can be understood by observing public opinion. Public support for income redistribution can be seen as being deeply rooted in an egalitarian ideology and tends to fluctuate less than attitudes about specific welfare state policies (Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003). It should be noted that income redistribution is only one element of the multi-dimensional welfare state (Bonoli 1997). Attitudes towards the welfare state can be divided along four dimensions. Following Andres and Heien (2001), these can be summarized as the following aspects of the welfare state: 1) function 2) means (actors, institutions or programmes), 3) effect, and 4) financing. This study is only concerned with the first of these dimensions, welfare state function, which concerns the role the state has in providing 'socio-economic security' or equality (Andress and Heien 2001, 339).

Welfare Chauvinism

There is an increasingly widespread perception that 'foreign nationals undermine the protective umbrella of the welfare state, to which the natives' life changes are directly linked, by abusing and misusing social benefits, claiming benefits for which they are not eligible, and taking jobs away' (Crepaz 2008, 153). Individuals who fit this description can be described as 'welfare chauvinists' who see immigrants as the illegitimate recipients of social rights (Huysmans, 2000, 767) and wish to limit the 'system of social protection for those who belong to the ethnically defined community and who have contributed to it' (Kitschelt 1997, 22). This preference is seen as distinct from the preference to exclude immigrants from entering a country in the first place (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov, 2009). Gorodzeisky and Semyonov (2009) distinguish between 'total exclusionists', who wish to restrict the social rights of all non-nationals, and 'racial exclusionists', who wish to restrict the social rights of any racial or ethnic minorities. For the purposes of this study, I refer to the concept of 'total exclusionism' but recognize that 'racial exclusionism' is a sub-category within this.

Conceptualizing Attitudes of Trust

Generalized Social Trust

Trust is a relational concept, and is considered a central component of social capital. It is defined as being 'a set of informal values or norms shared among members of a group that permits cooperation

between them' (Fukuyama 1995, 16) and is rooted in the 'expectancy of others' (Sztompka 2000, 5). Trust in others can be seen as a rational attitude based on past experiences (Hardin 2004; Hardin 2006; Levi and Stoker 2000) or a deeply rooted moral obligation (Uslaner 2002).

A scholarly distinction is made between particularised and generalised trust. Particularised (thick trust) refers to close relationships with family and friends. On the other hand, generalised (thin trust) refers to how far one trusts strangers or 'others'. Generalised social trust is based upon the belief that others can be fair and are not just out for themselves and is thought to affect social and economic activity (Fukuyama 1995; Knack and Keefer 1997; Putnam 2000). The focus of this study is on generalized social trust rather than particularized social trust.

Political Trust

Political trust can be understood as both a behaviour and an attitude, although this study focuses on the latter. As an attitude, political trust can be defined as a perception that the government is producing outcomes consistent with an individual's expectations (Hetherington 2004, 9). The presence of trust means that citizens feel that 'their own interests would be attended to even if the authorities were exposed to little supervision or scrutiny' (Easton 1957, 447). Political trust can be thought of dichotomously (whether an individual trusts or distrusts his/her government) or continuously (an individual trusts or distrusts to a certain extent) (Levi and Stoker 2000, 476).

Most scholarly discussions of political trust build upon Easton (1957), who conceptualizes political trust as two forms of support: specific support or diffuse support. Specific support is connected to the actions and performance of the political elites while diffuse support is a 'deeply ingrained' attitude about the political system and its '*modus operandi*' (Offe 2006, 30). Diffuse support provides a rationale for why citizens can maintain support for the political system as a whole, although they may disagree with a particular government policy. This support enables citizens to acknowledge the authority of political regimes with which they may disagree, and have faith that the government will still follow fair procedures. This thesis is interested in diffuse support rather than specific support.

Focusing on diffuse support puts emphasis on the individual's faith in the political system rather than the government's actual performance. This conceptualization of political trust does not refer to the degree of trust one has in a political actor, such as the president or prime minister. Instead, it can be seen as a figurative barometer that reflects how the political system is faring. Although this concept of

trust may be applicable to all levels of government, including the supra-national level, this paper only considers trust at the national level.

While there is general agreement that political trust is conceptually distinct from generalized social trust (Uslaner 2002), there is some debate about how closely the two are linked. It is conceivable that an individual could trust others yet not trust the political institutions, and vice versa. Some argue that social trust and political trust exhibit distinct patterns from each other, and so political trust cannot be treated as a variation of social trust (Kaase 1999; Newton 1999a). Yet, lately, the proliferation of cross-country attitudinal surveys has improved the measurement of political trust. More recent evidence has shown that, although there may be a theoretical distinction, in practice, individuals who are trusting of others also tend to be more trusting of their government (Freitag and Traunmüller 2009; Jagodzinski and Manabe 2004; Zmerli and Newton 2008).

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework for this thesis is borrowed from social psychology and is commonly referred to as *ethnic competition theory*. First, the general theory will be explained. Then, it will be applied to each of the three categories of attitudes examined in this thesis: 1) attitudes towards immigration, 2) attitudes towards welfare and 3) attitudes of trust. The application of these theories will then be used to generate testable hypotheses which predict attitudinal outcomes. Finally, previous empirical findings will also be explored.

Introducing Ethnic Competition Theory

Ethnic competition theory is the dominant theory in the study of immigration and public attitudes. It encompasses aspects of two theories: *realist conflict theory* and *social identity theory*. The former postulates that the size of the immigrant population is positively related to concerns about immigration. The theory is derived from the classic work of Blalock (1967), according to whom, group competition over resources provokes in-groups to perceive out-groups as a threat to their own interest. This perception is then thought to instigate individuals to express sentiments against the out-groups. According to realist conflict theory, individuals or groups compete with ethnic newcomers for scarce economic resources because they are motivated by self-interest. Experimental evidence

shows that competition between two groups increases within-group solidarity as well as inter-group hostility (Sherif and Sherif 1969; Sherif and Sherif 1979).

Realist conflict theory is combined with a theory of in-group favouritism, known as *social identity theory*, to form *ethnic competition theory*. According to *social identity theory*, individuals derive a portion of their self-identity from belonging to a group and by comparing their group to other groups. It postulates that individuals are hard-wired to consider their own group as superior to other ethnic groups (Tajfel et al. 1971; Tajfel 1982). Experimental evidence shows that individuals display strong preferences for their own group, even if their group has been randomly assigned to them (Brewer 1979). This means that individuals feel that they, or the members of their group, are entitled to any resources. It also offers an explanation of why individuals blame the out-groups (rather than their own group) for certain issues facing their society, such as unemployment, housing shortages, or crime rates.

Ethnic Competition Theory at the Macro Level

Competition over scarce resources not only occurs at the individual level but also systematically across social units (Coser 1956). This is because the demographic, economic, and political characteristics of societies shape relations between ethnic groups. Increasingly, comparative attitudinal research has borrowed from social psychology theory at the individual level and applied this to the macro level (e.g. neighbourhoods, regions, countries). Applying these micro level theories to the societal level relies on a two-step argument. First, it contends that, the larger the immigrant proportion, the greater the perceived threat. The second part of the argument contends that this perceived threat would then influence preferences about immigration. The multi-level approach in this thesis focuses on the contextual level factors rather than the individual behaviour, socio-economic characteristics or personality traits. The rationale for this is that very few people are disturbed by the presence of immigrants in their daily life. Rather, positions on immigration are connected to abstract beliefs about general societal conditions (Lahav 2004). While many people think that immigration is a problem nationally, the majority of these do not think it is an issue in their local area (Hurrell 2010).

Theoretical Expectations

Preferences to Immigration

Inter-ethnic competition theory postulates that an increase in the size of the immigrant group raises the perception that immigrants pose a threat to the natives. The theory has both economic and cultural interpretations. These interpretations, sometimes respectively referred to as *realist group conflict theory* and *symbolic group conflict theory*, can be seen as complementary (Burns and Gimpel 2000), as individuals who resist immigration tend to do so for both economic and cultural reasons (Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990a). Scholars that ascribe to *realist group conflict theory* argue that individuals are merely expressing their own or their group's economic interest (Glazer and Moynihan 1975; Olzak 1994; Crepaz and Damron 2008; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2009).²³ An economic interpretation of *ethnic competition theory* predicts that individuals will oppose immigration since they wish to curb inter-group competition for resources and ensure that provisions are kept for their group, which they perceive as superior. The perception of threat rather than the actual economic threat that immigration poses is thought to explain differences in attitudes (Olzak 1994).

The most salient aspect of competition between natives and newcomers occurs in the labour market. Since immigrants are often recruited to meet labour market shortages, this can lead to real or perceived competition for labour market opportunities. According to this reasoning, a lack of human capital accumulation, through skills and education, leads individuals to perceive that they are more vulnerable to competition against immigrants (Cook, Dwyer, and Waite 2011). The persistent belief that immigrants take jobs from locals is commonly referred to as the 'lump of labour fallacy'.²⁴ This fallacy is based on the presumption that the number of jobs in an economy is fixed, which is widely considered by economists to be a false premise (Canoy et al. 2006). Individuals can be motivated not purely by their individual self-interest but also by their group's economic interests (real or perceived), also referred to as 'sociotropic' behaviour. The empirical evidence to support this claim comes from observing patterns of voting behaviour where voters seek to maximize national prosperity (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988; D. Sears and Funk 1990). The 'voters act on their negative

²³ Security concerns may be another form of self-interest. Individuals are more likely to resist immigration if they feel it reduces their own personal safety (Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002). There is a strong perception amongst the natives that immigration increases crime and since 9/11 immigration has become linked with terrorism since the attackers were legally admitted (Canoy et al. 2006).

²⁴ Paradoxically, if migrants do not work and unemployment is rife within the migrant populations, then this can also lead to a public backlash that brands migrants as welfare dependents who do not contribute to society. In such instances, the competition for resources centres around the state resources, rather than labour market access, but follows a similar logic. Natives may be concerned that an individual's taxes will rise to pay for the immigrants' use of publicly funded services, such as schooling, health, income support and unemployment. According to Fetzer (2000), the affluent are more concerned about the services burden, whereas the less affluent are more concerned about the labour market threat.

assessments of the national economic conditions- quite apart from the trials and tribulations of their own economic lives' (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981, 132).

Economic competition between natives and immigrants may be moderated by economic conditions within the country or region. Surges in unemployment spur labour-market competition between immigrants and natives (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Money 1997). Increased inequality in the native population is also thought to reduce preferences for immigration. Higher inequality in the initial distribution of capital means that the median native is more reliant on labour income, and hence more sensitive to any adverse effects that immigration has on the labour market (Dolmas and Huffman 2004, 1129). The political and social rights of immigrants may also influence the levels of immigration resistance in the host societies. For instance, there is evidence of greater resistance to immigration in localities where immigrants have more electoral clout or the prospect of such in the future (Dancygier 2010; Dolmas and Huffman 2004).

Another scholarly interpretation sees concerns about immigration as being driven by a perception of cultural threat (Sides and Citrin 2007; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004; McLaren and Johnson 2007; Sears and Funk 1990; Fetzer 2000). This perspective contends that concern about immigration is fuelled by individuals' attachment to maintaining their native culture. This cultural attachment drives the perception that immigrants pose a direct threat to its preservation. The threat posed by immigrants may be 'symbolic in nature and may stem from concerns about the loss of certain values or way of life' (McLaren and Johnson 2007, 715). Social dominance theory tells us that natives may react with a sense of moral superiority as a justification for the subjugation of the out-groups (Sidanius 1993).

Sentiments of cultural threat could be intertwined with nature of immigration in a social context. That is to say that they are likely to differ depending on variations in migration composition, since not all ethnic diversity generates a similar public reaction (Citrin et al. 1997). Taylor (1998) uncovers that, in the United States, high concentrations of Asian Americans or Hispanics do not generate as much white antipathy as blacks. In another example, Dinesen and Sønderskov (2012) find that the share of non-western migrants is linked with lower social trust but western immigrants are not. Other empirical studies confirm that differences in public attitudes can depend on the group and their cultural distance (Citrin et al. 2009; Van Oudenhoven et al. 2002).

However, capturing the extent of cultural or ethnic diversity in a society is not straightforward. A commonly used approach is to measure a society's 'ethnic fractionalisation' (Mau
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and Burkhardt 2009; Dincer 2011; Sturgis et al. 2011; Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006b; Costa and Kahn 2003; Bjørnskov 2006). Ethnic fractionalisation measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals drawn from the national population would be from two different ethnic groups. In this measure, Alesina et al. (2003) define ethnic groups along racial and linguistic lines. But using ethnic fractionalisation as a measure is problematic, since it can reflect long standing ethno-linguistic cleavages in a country rather than changes due to new immigration. It can also capture second or third generation immigrants who may already be fully assimilated into their host society and does not identify recent newcomers (Finseraas 2012). The generalizations that may be drawn from studies that use this measure and wish to comment on the attitudinal implications of immigration are limited.

Moreover, concerns about the cultural threat of immigration does not only depend on the context but can also depend on an individual's predisposition towards cultural insecurity. Those who are more attached to their society, for example if they have a child, may be more invested in maintaining the future stability of that society and may feel that immigrants threaten to erode their culture. Paradoxically, social marginalisation may lead to a similar effect. Those who are socially or politically marginalised could be more susceptible to messages that blame immigrants for their woes (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996). Cultural insecurity can be mitigated by the ability to empathise with an immigrant's situation or understand where they come from, which helps to build sentiments of tolerance. If individuals can feel a 'cultural affinity' towards immigrants, this may help them to view immigration more positively. Cultural characteristics at the group level (e.g. community, region, or country) are also theorised to influence views on immigration. It may be difficult for an affinity to form between natives and immigrants, particularly if the natives perceive that the immigrants violate their cultural norms. The perception of norm violation further casts immigrants symbolically as an 'out-group' and different cultural experiences make it more difficult for the individuals in the host society to relate to immigrants (Fetzer 2000; Hayes and Dowds 2006). Most famously, Huntington (1996) argues that civilizations 'clash' because they have different histories, languages, religions and customs.

Attitudes towards Welfare

Competition between natives and immigrants can also arise over welfare state resources.²⁸ According to *ethnic competition theory*, in-group bias leads individuals to prefer a differential distribution of resources to their own group over out-groups (Brewer 1979; Tajfel 1970; Turner 1975; Mullen, Brown, and Smith 1992). Support for state income redistribution through taxes and transfers is thought to be influenced by either self-interest, ideological motivations, or both.²⁹ The self-interest model posits that individuals who benefit from the welfare system, known as the 'transfer classes', support redistributive policies (Andress and Heien 1999; Papadakis and Bean 1993). According to this line of reasoning, groups such as the elderly or individuals at risk of unemployment are more likely to support a welfare system that they benefit from or might do so at some point in their life course (Cook and Barrett 1992; Lipset and Marks 2001). Self-interest has also been observed as operating sociotropically; individuals can also be motivated to support redistribution if they feel this will benefit their social group, even if they do not stand to benefit personally (Svallfors 1997).

The self-interest model may be too simplistic and fails to explain, however, the wider public support by individuals who are unlikely or have yet to become welfare recipients (Vigdor 2006). Another explanation sees support for welfare redistribution as ideologically motivated (Fong 2001; Feldman and Zaller 1992). According to this line of reasoning, those who support welfare redistribution believe that others have the right to a minimum standard of living. Individuals who oppose redistribution may advocate self-sufficiency and believe that state support is either inappropriate or generates perverse incentives. The evidence shows that there is a strong association between support for redistribution and other ideological beliefs, such as egalitarianism (Arts and Gelissen 2002; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989; Linos and West 2003; Papadakis and Bean 1993).

Ethnic competition between natives and immigrants is thought to erode the ideologically motivated support for redistribution (Eger 2010; Luttmer 2001; Poterba 1997). Contextual factors can exacerbate this competition such as less resources in a society or a high amount of immigration. However, self-interest does not predict an erosion in support for redistribution amongst natives who are the net beneficiaries of welfare transfers. If anything, competition with immigrants in the labour market could even reinforce their preference for redistribution.

²⁸ This research is interested in how natives perceive welfare benefits for immigrants rather than the true cost of immigrants on the public purse. For a survey of the literature on welfare dependence of immigrants see Nannestad (2007).

²⁹ In fact, most agree that these motivations are not mutually exclusive (Jaeger 2006; Luttmer 2001; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989).

A country's ethnic diversity may have played a role in its welfare state development. Early scholars of the welfare state have considered the role of ethnic diversity when accounting for cross-national variations in post-war welfare state development (Wilensky 1974). This is explained by the fact that the strength of organised labour is theorised to account for the differences during the expansion of welfare states (Hewitt 1977; Korpi 1989; Myles 1984; Esping-Andersen 1990) which have been found to be strongly negatively correlated with ethnic and linguistic diversity (Stephens 1979). According to Stephens (1979), it is more difficult to organize workers in ethnically and linguistically diverse societies and this could explain cross-country variation in redistribution policies.

Racial polarisation is often cited as the reason why the United States failed to develop an extensive welfare state. American racial and ethnic diversity is thought to have undermined any broad public support for a generous welfare state (Alesina and Glaeser 2006; Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Fox 2012; Gilens 1999; Lipset 1959; Luttmer 2001). Alesina and Glaeser (2006) acknowledge that, although ethnic heterogeneity played a role in explaining why the United States did not develop a European-style welfare state, it is also explained by other co-existing institutional factors, such as majoritarianism, federalism, checks and balances and different beliefs about the nature of poverty. There is some indication that the American model could be applied to other contexts. For instance, ethnic diversity does seem to explain the cross-country variations in social spending (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Hero and Preuhs 2007; Hero and Tolbert 1996; Soss et al. 2001).

It remains unclear if the European context will follow the American model of welfare thanks to new waves of immigration. First, one can take issue with Alesina and Glaeser (2004, 180)'s characterization of Europe as a continent of "homogenous countries" (Pontusson 2006). This is because ethnic diversity is not necessarily a new phenomenon in Europe, where some countries have century-long ethnic divisions. For example, ethno-linguistic cleavages did not hinder democracies such as Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands from building comprehensive welfare states (Banting 2000). Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that recent immigration has become a "salient source" of ethnic heterogeneity in Europe (Brady and Finnigan 2014). Second, as Pettigrew (1998) points out, unlike the discourse that surrounds immigration in Europe, African-Americans were never accused of not belonging in the United States even by overt racists.

The last, and arguably the most persuasive, counter-argument to Alesina and Glaeser (2004) is that European institutions are different than American institutions and thus we can observe difference

outcomes. In fact, the role of ethnic heterogeneity in Alesina and Glaeser's argument has been overplayed since they also cite the expansive size of the United States, its political institutions and the success of right-wing political parties as other essential factors which explain its less expansive welfare state. As Lijphart (2009, 1) points out "there is insufficient recognition of how radically different American democracy is: it is different not just in many respects, but in most respects! "

The features of European institutions which are distinctive from American institutions may insulate it from eroding support for welfare as more immigrants arrive. First, the 'depressive effect of immigration may be offset' by multicultural policies (Kymlicka and Banting 2006, 81) or by the strength of the left-wing political parties (Taylor-Gooby 2005). Thanks to these institutional differences, immigration could have the opposite effect in Europe, and actually bolster support for welfare redistribution. In other words, European citizens may opt for 'defensive engagement', defending themselves against the erosion of their social rights during dramatic shifts in the political, economic or social spheres (Ellison 2000). Immigration could even increase the support for redistribution, especially amongst the transfer classes or those who fear an increased risk of income loss (Oorschot 2000).

In Europe, the evidence of diversity-induced welfare erosion is mixed (Anderson & Paskeviciute 2006; Newton 1999). Preferences for redistribution in Europe vary systematically across countries but scholars see this as embedded in their institutional arrangements (Feldman and Zaller 1992; Rothstein 1998; Larsen 2006). The debate continues about the role of ethnic diversity in explaining this variation. Eger (2010) finds evidence in Sweden that the recent increases in immigration have had significant negative effects on support for the welfare state. On the other hand, Larsen (2004) finds that, in Denmark, public support for immigrants' entitlement to social assistance or unemployment benefits has not decreased from 1993 to 2004 despite a sharp increase in the volume of immigrants arriving.

Another interpretation of *ethnic competition theory* (which is not necessarily mutually exclusive of the former), predicts that increases in immigration or less prosperous social conditions could also intensify feelings of welfare chauvinism. The theory predicts that, under the most extreme form of ethnic competition, the in-group members will wish to block the out-group from accessing the state resources entirely. The belief in group superiority then leads people to attach positive attributes to the

individuals of their own group and negative attributes to individuals of the out-groups (Tajfel 1978).²⁷ This reinforces the individual's position that resources should be disproportionately distributed to their own group and away from the out-groups. The evidence to support in-group favouritism comes largely from experimental studies in social psychology (Sherif and Sherif 1979; Brewer 1979; Brewer and Campbell 1976; Brown 2010; Billig and Tajfel 1973) as well as sociology (Blalock 1967). Welfare chauvinism is a demonstration of this behaviour, whereby individuals express the wish to restrict non-nationals from accessing the state resources. This desire is thought to be intensified when resources are scarce (Schlueter and Scheepers 2010; Brown 2000; Struch and Schwartz 1989).

There is evidence to suggest that a positive link exists between immigration and welfare chauvinism. The prevalence of welfare chauvinism in Western Europe has been documented (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2009; Mau 2012) and is thought to occur in ethnically heterogeneous societies that display lower levels of support for welfare redistribution, exhibit reduced levels of social trust, and spend less on social welfare programmes than homogenous societies (Freeman 2009). Welfare chauvinism is prominent in media reports and the political rhetoric claims which propagate fears of welfare tourism. The term welfare tourism refers to the notion that immigrants are attracted to locations that offer more generous welfare benefits. These countries are sometimes referred to as 'welfare magnets' (Borjas 1999). Although there is little empirical evidence to suggest that this might be the case (Bay and Pedersen 2006), the myth persists in the public debate in many welfare states. Moreover, attitudes about immigrants' welfare cannot be explained by the different patterns of immigrants' actual receipt of welfare benefits (Koning 2011).

Attitudes of Trust

Ethnic competition and a perception of threat can breed mistrust between groups but also within ethnic groups. Ethnic homogeneity is thought to ease cultural distance and allows for shared norms and familiarity (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Fukuyama 1995; Messick 2001). This rests on the assumption that humans have a tendency for homophily - a preference for being surrounded by people who share similar traits (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). Immigration can build divisions in society across ethnic, religious, linguistic cleavages and make it less likely that an

²⁷ For a discussion of its application to political phenomena, see Huddy (2001) and for a more detailed explanation of social identity theory and empirical support, see Brown (2000).

individual will trust strangers since they are less likely to feel a familiarity with them (Miller 1995). A recent study on the United States by Putnam (2007) has ignited a scholarly debate around this topic. Putnam (2007) concludes that diversity produces 'bad race relations' or ethnically-defined group hostility.²⁸ He goes on to suggest that the inhabitants of diverse communities 'withdraw from collective life' as the generalized distrust produced by the out-groups then turns into a distrust of the in-group members as well (Putnam 2007, 150–151). According to this rationale, natives are threatened by immigrants since they compete for resources, which then breeds mistrust between the groups. A more sizable immigrant population increases the likelihood that a stranger will be a member of an out-group which can influence the extent to which an individual trusts society in general.

Although Putnam (2007) acknowledges that immigration is not 'identical' to ethnic diversity, he notes that mounting immigration is furthering ethnic diversity in Europe and predicts that this will decrease generalized social trust in host societies (Putnam 2007, 140). There have been objections to generalizing Putnam (2007)'s claims on conceptual grounds; that he and the subsequent literature engaging in the debate often makes leaps between social cohesion with other related but distinct concepts such as social trust and social capital (Hooghe 2007). Other scholars object to his methodological approach and particularly his neglect of the role of income inequality (Portes and Vickstrom 2011) or segregation (Uslaner 2012) in societies which may be the underlying mechanism for the erosion of social cohesion rather than diversity. Questions have also been raised about the applicability of his findings at the community level to other levels of analysis such as regions or countries (Morales 2013).

The existing evidence to support Putnam (2007)'s findings in Europe is mixed. Cross national studies show that highly trusting societies tend to be more ethnically homogenous (Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006b; Delhey and Newton 2005). Some studies do not support his theory (Dinesen and Sønderskov 2012; Gijsberts, Van Der Meer, and Dagevos 2011; Gesthuizen, Van Der Meer, and Scheepers 2009; Ivarsflaten and Strømsnes 2010; Sturgis et al. 2011), while others find that linguistic and ethnic heterogeneity are shown to reduce interpersonal trust in Europe (Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006a; Hughes, Campbell, and Jenkins 2011). Hooghe et al. (2009) do not find that measures of migrant stock or ethnic fractionalization are significantly associated with social trust.

²⁸ This is contested by Uslaner (2001) who argues that Putnam's conclusions are 'misplaced' and rather, low levels of trust between groups in diverse areas should be attributed to segregation or poor integration (Uslaner 2011, 223).

Although the authors find that only 2 indicators of diversity out of the 26 are significant (the inflow of foreign workers and the increase in the flow of foreign workers), these effects become non-significant when the authors remove Germany and Italy as outliers. The authors conclude that the negative relationship between ethnic diversity and generalized trust does not hold across Europe.

Ethnic competition theory can also predict a reduction in political trust, but this conclusion remains contested. For some theorists, differences in political performance, such as immigration policy, does not explain differences in political trust over time or space. Instead, cultural theories explain political trust as exogenous to political performance.²⁹ Cultural theories can be presented at either the micro level or the macro level. At the micro level, social-psychological theorists treat political trust as an individual personality trait, where 'political trusters' are individuals who feel that the government is responsive and just. On the other hand, political cynics are people who feel that the government is unresponsive and corrupt, and that politicians merely pursue their own self-interest. These personality traits are thought to have their roots in socialization and cultural norms. Some argue that political trust is driven by macro level cultural factors and point to shared norms and heritage as the explanation for this (Putnam 1993; Scharpf 1999), but cultural theories ignore the institutional context within which individuals or societies operate. The socio-political empirical evidence challenges the notion that political trust can be explained by micro cultural factors. (Newton 1999b) does not find evidence that political trust is based on personality type or other social variables (education, community participation, income or life satisfaction).

On the other hand, institutional theories postulate that political trust is endogenous and driven by institutional factors (North 1990; Mishler and Rose 2001; Arneil 2006). According to these theories, institutions shape the extent to which they (or the political actors within them) are regarded as trustworthy. Within institutional theories, some scholars stress the importance of institutional performance (output theories) (Evans and Whitefield 1995; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Catterberg and Moreno 2006), while others stress the importance of institutional design, such as its procedural fairness (input theories) (Rothstein 1998; Lijphart 1971; Tyler 2000). The argument that immigration can affect the amount of political trust is supported by the theory of institutional performance. North (1990) finds that a lack of political trust is due to political factors rather than social or economic ones. If

²⁹ This categorisation of the theories of political trust has been adapted from (Mishler and Rose 2001).

we accept that immigration policies and the resulting immigration flows are political factors , we would then expect this to be linked to political trust.

According to this line of reasoning, rising immigration would reduce the degree of political trust amongst individuals who prefer a reduction in immigration. The idea is that individuals who prefer less immigration will feel that the government failed to produce an outcome that is consistent with their expectations. McLaren (2012) suggests when individuals perceive that immigration has poses a threat to their society, governing institutions may be 'called into question and they may blame the elites for allowing immigration to occur at all' (McLaren 2012, 168). But Putnam's (2007) argument is that an increase in immigration would reduce trust in political institutions for individuals, not only those that have anti-immigration attitudes.

The lion's share of the literature on immigration and political trust focuses on the political trust of the immigrants themselves, rather than that of the natives (Fennema and Tillie 1999; Michelson 2003; Togeby 2004; Wenzel 2006). A handful of studies have pursued the link between political trust and immigration. The evidence that these studies have uncovered is mixed. Eisenberg (2007) does not find evidence that ethnic diversity weakens political trust in Canada. McLaren (2012) finds that concerns about immigration have negative effects on political trust in Europe, despite the power right-wing parties. McLaren (2012) corroborates those findings when looking solely at Britain and also finds that the perception that the government has not handled immigration effectively further erodes political trust. Such effects are seem to be conditioned by institutional factors (Rahn and Rudolph 2005). Thus far, the limited evidence uncovered in Europe indicates that there could be a negative link between immigration and political trust.

Other Determinants of Public Opinion

There is a general agreement in the existing literature that public attitudes cannot be considered bi-variately, particularly since all evidence points to the fact that they are multivariate. It is also recognized that both the institutional and the individual level determinants simultaneously shape public opinion.

Individual Level

Individuals' attributes play an important role in determining their levels of trust and their attitudes towards immigration or welfare. As argued in the seminal work by Blumer (1958), an individual's

position within their own group can heighten their perception of threat from out-groups. Accordingly, an individual's level of education is a strong predictor of their attitudes. Higher education, in particular, is consistently a determinant of more positive feelings towards immigrants but researchers disagree about the causal mechanism. Some postulate that education gives individuals a stronger foothold in the labour market and allows them to be less concerned about competing with immigrants. Others argue that education builds tolerance and liberal multicultural norms (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Andress and Heien 1999). Higher levels of education are also associated with higher social trust (Fukuyama 1995), political trust (Lauren M. McLaren 2012; Sturgis et al. 2011) and less support for income redistribution (Fong 2001).³⁰ Education is also a proxy for an individual's skill level which can affect their security in the labour market and influences attitudes about immigration and welfare (Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda 2006; Kesler and Bloemraad 2010; Burgoon, Koster, and van Egmond 2010; Fong 2001).

Other individual-level determinants of public attitudes found in the empirical research include age (Dincer 2011; Stegmueller et al. 2011; Mishler and Rose 2001; Sturgis et al. 2011) and gender (Gijsberts, Van Der Meer, and Dagevos 2011; Ivarsflaten and Strømsnes 2010; Rehm 2005; Citrin et al. 1997). Furthermore, there is evidence that political ideology (McLaren 2001; Jaeger 2006), and urban/rural location (Dincer 2011; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002; Delhey and Newton 2005; Mishler and Rose 2001) also play a role. Individuals who belong to minorities or who have faced discrimination appear to be less trusting but more supportive of immigration (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002). The presence of a child in the home is shown to be a predictor of support for income redistribution (Eger 2010; Stegmueller et al. 2011). Finally, individuals' general life satisfaction (McLaren 2012) and whether they voted for a party that won or lost an election explain differences in political trust (Anderson and Guillory 1997).

Country Level

As social units, economic and social contexts in a country are believed to produce 'feedback effects' that shape public sentiment (Reitz 1988; Quillian 1995; Davidov and Meuleman 2012; Esping-Andersen 1990; Larsen 2006; Pierson 1995). Several studies show that attitudes vary across EU-15

³⁰ Better educated individuals are thought to be less supportive of income redistribution than less educated individuals because they are less exposed to labour market risks (Rehm 2009).

countries even when controlling for compositional effects (Mayda 2006; Rustenbach 2010). Economic conditions are thought to exacerbate the perceptions of competition between immigrants and natives (Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006). For instance, cross-country comparisons reveal that the wealth of the national economy is an important determinant of public attitudes and the level of unemployment as economic indicators that can explain attitudinal variations (van der Waal et al. 2010; Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009; Mishler and Rose 2001). During times of high national unemployment, people tend to be more supportive of welfare redistribution, particularly unemployment benefits (Ivarsflaten and Strømsnes 2010; Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Blekesaune 2007). Inequality is shown to reduce trust and increase support for redistribution (Finseraas 2006; Dincer 2011; Kesler and Bloemraad 2010). Other country-level factors also play a role. The type of welfare regime as well as the level of social spending have also been shown to influence the perception of immigrants, trust and welfare (Kitschelt 1995; Larsen 2006; Svallfors 1997). The evidence for whether or not generalized trust determines an individual's attitude to welfare redistribution is mixed. Uslaner (2005) finds that it does determine support while Jensen (2011) finds that it does not. Finally, the efficacy of the government is an explanatory factor of political trust (Mishler and Rose 2001).

Gaps in the Literature

The patterns of individual attitudes towards immigration, trust and welfare in Europe are complex. What are the general conclusions that can be drawn from the literature? Europe is facing increasing ethnic heterogeneity due to immigration; *ethnic competition theory* predicts that receiving societies will resist immigration; and more ethnically heterogeneous societies tend to be less trusting and have less welfare redistribution. But the picture that surfaces from empirical studies is more complex and does not show a widespread confirmation for predictions.

Thus, a few debates relevant to this thesis have emerged. First, scholars disagree over whether the public's reaction to immigration is economically or culturally motivated. Economic self-interest does not seem to explain the whole story. Yet, the symbolic power of immigration and the perception of a cultural threat are difficult to untangle empirically from the economic justifications. Secondly, the impact of increasing immigration on public attitudes remains a widely debated topic. The empirical support shows that ethnic diversity can explain cross-geographical differences in attitudes. However, there remains disagreement over the implications of these findings. In particular, scholars still

disagree about the extent to which findings from the exceptional American case can be extrapolated and if this can predict how rising diversity will shape public opinion in Western Europe. For the most part, the existing literature does not capture variation across both time and space nor account for variations in national immigration policies

Variation across both Time and Space

The existing evidence usually falls into one of three approaches. First, most of the comparative analysis tends to be cross-sectional in nature, looking across many countries at a single time point (Svallfors 1997; Hooghe et al. 2009; Bauer, Loftstrom, and Zimmerman 2000; Branton and Jones 2005; Bjørnskov 2006; Crepaz 2008; Berg and Hjerm 2010; Malchow-Møller et al. 2007; Mayda 2006; McLaren 2004; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002; Oorschot 2000). Some examine cross-sectional variation at the sub-national level instead (Laurence 2011a; Ivarsflaten and Strømsnes 2010; Reeskens and Hooghe 2009). A cross-sectional approach gives us only a 'snapshot' and does not account for the dynamics of public attitudes. It only attempts to explain cross-country differences, not within-country change.

Second, some researchers opt for longitudinal studies of aggregate opinion in single countries (van der Waal et al. 2010; Eger 2010; Jaeger 2006; Dinesen and Sønderskov 2012), particularly if richer data are available for that country. Yet, a single country approach limits our understanding of how a country's context influences individual attitudes. Since most studies examine variations only in either time or space, this limits their external validity. Only a handful of studies fall into a third category which incorporates both time and space (McLaren 2012; Finseraas et al. 2012; Rustenbach 2010).

Variation in Entry Criteria and Other Immigration Policies

The immigration policies in European countries vary considerably for immigrants from outside of Europe. National particularities in immigration policies within EU member states have been documented (Geddes 2003b; Hammar 2009; Hollifield 1997; Sainsbury 2006). Member states maintain a strong control over the regulation of immigration, despite EU harmonization (Geddes 2003b). Most notably, there is the contrast between the legacies of the post-colonial immigration regimes and guest-worker regimes. In a post-colonial regime (such as Britain or France), immigration was never an active labour market goal but has been tolerated for in the interest of preserving an empire. In a guest-

worker regime, on the other hand, (as in Austria or Germany), the state brought in labour from abroad and then was obligated to accept a more permanent settlement when the workers opted to stay rather than return home (Joppke 2000). The legacies of these different regimes persist today in the inclusion, welfare and citizenship policies (Dancygier 2010). There is also thought to be a difference between the 'strong' immigration policies in northern European countries and the 'weak' ones in southern countries. Southern European countries are often characterised as having lax immigration controls, with a high proportion of irregular migrants and intermittent regularisation schemes, while Northern countries tend to have consistent migration schemes and criminalise irregular migration (Brochman 1993; Baldwin-Edwards 1997). This variation in the national immigration policies has the potential to affect both immigration composition and shape the public's attitude about immigrants and how their host society receives them (Fetzer 2000). This contextual level variation in the national immigration policies is not accounted for in previous empirical studies and potentially biases the results.

Research Approach

This study contributes to the literature by using a case study to overcome some of the deficiencies in the previous empirical studies. It will do so by examining the case of the post-enlargement migration. It offers a unique opportunity for an observational study on how attitudes are linked to contextual-level changes in immigration. The ways in which this study addresses the gaps in the literature will now be explained. First, it examines variations across both time and space. Thanks to the availability of repeat attitudinal surveys, this study is able to examine attitudes from 2002 to 2010 in 15 European member states. Since this is not a longitudinal study, it is impossible to analyse changes in an individual's opinion. However, we can investigate if attitudes across time and space differ significantly from one another.²⁸ This allows us go above and beyond the cross-sectional, 'single snapshot' to a 'several snapshot' approach. The 'several snapshot' approach improves the external validity of the study, since the results will indicate a broader trend rather than a single occurrence.

Second, it maximizes the similarity of the immigration entry criteria across European countries. This is because E8 nationals are not subject to domestic immigration controls and instead are free to move to other European countries under the European Union laws. By law, member states must open up their labour markets to the nationals of other member states. Existing member states

²⁸ See Chapter 4 for a full discussion of the approach.

have the option to enact transitional arrangements after an accession but these are only temporary. Furthermore, according to EU law, member states cannot discriminate between their own citizens and other EU citizens when it comes to social rights, once transitional arrangements have been lifted. These conditions minimize the differences across countries in terms of entry and labour market access which could affect how the host societies view migration, trust and welfare. However, it is important to note that while focusing on the similarities in EU immigration after the enlargement, the broader nature of immigration (composition, admission criteria and categories, immigration and immigrant policies) still varies between European countries. Moreover, this thesis also acknowledges that focusing on the enlargement is not a panacea as discussed in Chapter 2 since the intensity of E8 migration as well as the national and skill composition of E8 migrants still varied somewhat between countries.

This thesis is grounded in ethnic competition theory which predicts that immigration spurs competition and will prompt natives to exhibit bias towards the out-groups. This is exacerbated by in-group bias, which increases the in-group's demand for exclusionary policies (restricted entry and/or social rights) to protect themselves from the competition. This theory predicts that the size of the out-group leads the members of the in-group (natives) to wish to restrict out-group access and erodes aspects of civic sentiment – namely interpersonal trust, political trust and support for redistribution. From this, 4 hypotheses are put forward to be examined throughout the three empirical chapters. These are summarized below in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Summary of the Research Hypotheses

#	Hypothesis
1	A high proportion of E8 nationals in the host society is associated with the following public attitudes: a greater perception of threat posed by immigration, a reduced support for income redistribution, stronger attitudes of welfare chauvinism, and reduced social and political trust.
2	A rapid increase of E8 nationals in the host society is associated with the following public attitudes: a greater perception of threat posed by immigration, a reduced support for income redistribution, stronger attitudes of welfare chauvinism, and reduced social and political trust.
3	The hypothesized relationships between E8 migration and public attitudes (Hypotheses 1 and 2) about immigration is stronger in host societies with poor macro-economic conditions.
4	The hypothesized relationship between E8 migration and public attitudes about immigration (Hypotheses 1 and 2) is stronger in host societies with a high proportion of foreign nationals of any nationality.

4. Methods

The Case of the 2004 Enlargement: The Methodological Rationale

The goal of this thesis is to understand the relationship between post-enlargement migration and public attitudes in the Western European host societies. It also seeks to understand whether this relationship is mediated by national factors such as economic conditions, immigration policy, or welfare spending. The question is comparative in nature. Ideally, comparative research should minimise country similarity in all aspects while maximising the variation along the variables of interest (Lijphart 1971), although maximising similarity across countries when studying the link between immigration and public attitudes is challenging. As we have seen in Chapter 2, previous empirical studies, as a general rule struggle to examine attitudes across both time and space and take into consideration the address the in immigration policy (both entry criteria and social rights) across countries.

Using the case of post-enlargement migration can help us to overcome the empirical obstacles that plague comparative attitudinal research.³² Selecting a group of migrants from a specific geographic area can minimise cross-country variation in migration. Although there exists (linguistic and cultural) diversity within the E8 migrant groups, they share a similar a post-communistic cultural heritage, and economic motivations for migration.³³

Furthermore, the case of post-enlargement migration enhances the similarity of the immigration policies. The entry-level criteria and the social rights of immigrants are determined by the EU rather than the national government. Under EU law, existing member states must give the nationals of the new member states access to their labour markets. Furthermore, according to EU law, member states must offer EU citizens the same social rights as their own citizens. Although, immediately following the enlargement, EU-15 national governments were given the option to restrict admission, this was only for a finite period of time and not available to them as a long-term solution.³⁴ Achieving cross country-similarity of entry criteria is extremely rare since there are usually country differences in domestic immigration policies.

³² See Chapter 3 for a review of these obstacles.

³³ See Chapter 2 for an explanation of the E8 migrants' characteristics.

³⁴ See Chapter 3 for a discussion of transitional agreements.

Data

This study relies on secondary data rather than primary data. Primary data are collected by the researcher whereas secondary analysis involves the reanalysis of existing data for the 'purpose of answering an original research question' (Glass 1976, 3). Primary data has notable merits. For instance, the data can be tailored specifically to the research question and the researcher can be fully involved and aware of how they have been collected. Yet secondary data offers this study three important advantages that primary data cannot as outlined by Boslaugh (2007). First, there is the advantage of economy. Time and resources are saved by relying on data that are already collected. Clearly, the resource constraints of this study would not allow a large cross-national attitudinal survey to be collected.

The second advantage is the breadth that secondary data can offer. To maximise the external validity of this study, a representative sample is necessary from each country. Having many observations per country per year (more than 1,000) helps to approximate a random sample and avoid the bias that may arise from using individual observations. Furthermore, as this study focuses on the enlargement, it requires the breadth of time, going back as many years as possible. Secondary data also offer the advantage of leveraging the expertise of other researchers. In this case, various types of cultural and linguistic expertise are needed to design and administer the survey in 15 countries.

The source of attitudinal data is the European Social Survey (ESS) because it is best-suited to the research questions of this thesis. In recent years, there has been a burgeoning of comparative attitudinal surveys (Norris 2009). Several potential sources of data were considered for this analysis, including the European Values Study, the World Values Study, the International Social Survey Programme, and the Transatlantic Trends Study. These surveys were unsuitable for the purposes of this study since they lacked some or all of the following features: 1) questions of interest are asked repeatedly over time, 2) frequent survey waves, 3) a suitable time frame, and 4) extensive coverage of the EU-15 countries. Given these criteria, the ESS was selected as the best source of attitudinal data for this study.

The ESS is a 26-country repeat cross-sectional survey that has been released every two years since 2002. The survey is funded jointly by the European Commission, the European Science Foundation and academic funding bodies in each participating country. Individual countries participate according to clear, defined requirements drawn up by a central coordinating team. The design of the survey is considered a gold standard in the field of comparative attitudinal research

(Norris 2009). Its questionnaire includes both core and rotating modules, covering a range of social topics. The ESS occurs fairly frequently (biannually) and has a nationally representative random sample for each European member state.

The questions on the ESS are translated to have not only linguistic equivalence but also functional equivalence. Functional equivalence refers to the existence of 'similar relationships between objects in different settings' (Deth 1998, 6). Achieving a pseudo-functional equivalence is essential but often lacking in comparative research (Jowell 1998). The survey population covers people aged 15 and older, with no upper age limit, who are resident in the country, regardless of their nationality, citizenship or legal status. The sample was selected by strict random probability methods at every stage and the respondents were interviewed face-to-face. The minimum effective sample size was (for full responses) set at 1,500 (or 800 where the population is less than two million inhabitants) in each participating country. The best sampling design is determined as appropriate for each country. Non responsiveness is critical for the representativeness of a target population. For this reason, the minimum target response rate was set by the ESS at 70%.

I have gathered and pooled macro-level variables together with the ESS micro data. These indicators have been compiled from various sources which include the World Bank, the OECD and Eurostat. A list of these indicators and their provenience is provided in Table 4.1. A further description of their measurement is presented in the following section.

Table 4.1 Macro Level Data Sources

Variable	Source
E8 stock	Holland et al. (2011)
GNI per capita	World Bank
GDP, growth	OECD
income inequality	EuroStat
unemployment	OECD/ILO
social protection	Eurostat
quality of governance	WGI

Measurement

Independent Variables

The first independent variable is the volume of E8 migration as a proportion of the total population. Population stock figures are used since they are better harmonised than flow data. This data were taken from (Holland et al. 2011), a report carried out on behalf of the Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion Directorate General of the European Commission. The authors rely on annual data from Eurostat's Population Statistics on population stock by country of citizenship. Complete time series from 1997 to 2009 are available for 6 of the EU-15 countries: Denmark, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Finland and Sweden, and fairly comprehensive information is available for Belgium, Italy, Austria and Portugal. Missing observations for Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal were supplemented by the authors using the OECD International Migration Database (which showed a strong correlation with the Eurostat population statistics). Further missing observations were filled in using the Labour Force Survey (primarily for France and the UK). The remaining observations were supplied by 'assuming a constant growth rate between two stock values or else using the average rate of change in stocks from the host country to the other EU host countries for which data was available' (Holland et al. 2011). The E8 stock compiled by Holland et al. (2011) is available annually from 2000 until 2009. Since stock amounts were not available for 2010, I have generated estimates by assuming that the rate of change between 2008 and 2009 remained constant from 2009 to 2010. A description of this data is available in Chapter Two in Table 2.4.

Two different measures of the stock are used to construct the baseline models, depending on the type of model specified. For the pooled time series cross sectional models, the annual amount of E8 stock is measured. This amount is calculated as a percentage of the total population of the EU-15 member countries. For analysis where only single year cross-sectionals are available, the percentage change in E8 stock from the year of the enlargement (2004) until the year of the survey wave is used.

Table 4.2 E8 Annual Rate of Increase, by country and year

Country	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010*
Austria	4%	14%	7%	8%	-4%
Belgium	14%	93%	-11%	23%	0%
Denmark	2%	8%	25%	38%	10%
Finland	6%	4%	14%	15%	12%
France	3%	28%	26%	21%	-2%
Germany	3%	-9%	17%	2%	2%
Greece	30%	14%	-4%	36%	-19%

Ireland	7%	-14%	154%	22%	-6%
Italy	-15%	22%	18%	10%	7%
Luxembourg	-3%	45%	21%	15%	52%
Netherlands	9%	36%	22%	32%	21%
Portugal	15%	25%	17%	-2%	14%
Spain	44%	31%	46%	8%	2%
Sweden	-7%	10%	26%	20%	14%
United Kingdom	-7%	10%	26%	20%	14%

The second independent variable is the rate of change in the stock of E8 nationals (as a proportion of the national population). This intends to capture the speed of the migration after the enlargement rather than its magnitude. The rationale for investigating this aspect of E8 migration is that there may be that in some Western countries there were relatively few Central and Eastern Europeans but a rapid rate of increase in this population after the enlargement may still spark ethnic competition and have implications for public opinion. This variable is shown in Table 4.2 and is taken by measuring the annual percentage increase in E8 stock in the previous year.

The extent to which these variables operationalise ethnic competition is debatable, but the data limitations have prevented researchers from developing more sophisticated measures. Nevertheless, when comparing the extent of ethnic competition across countries remains somewhat problematic as an aggregate measure. Using this aggregate measure masks important systematic differences in the degree of ethnic competition which can occur disproportionately in certain geographic areas, occupational sectors, or low skilled professions. Regrettably, the volume of E8 migration is not available at disaggregated levels across countries and thus this thesis is unable to explore trends at lower units of analysis.

One could also conceivably measure the volume of E8 migration in a slightly different way: the proportion of E8 nationals as a proportion of the foreign population, rather than as a proportion of the total population. While this variable could yield some interesting findings about the relationship between E8 migration and public attitudes, there is little theoretical basis for its investigation. This is because it does not necessarily accurately measure the extent of ethnic competition posed by post-enlargement migration. Measuring the independent variable as a proportion of all foreign nationals would make the measure relative to general volume of immigration into the country which can fluctuate a good deal (unlike the total population where changes occur more gradually). To illustrate this point, let us consider an instance where both E8 migration and general immigration were growing at the similar rapid rate. In this case, the rise stock of E8 nationals would be masked by the concurrent

increase in general immigration and make the variable appear to be stable over time despite an actual increase. For these reasons, the stock of E8 nationals is measured as a proportion of the total population and the only as a proportion of the foreign population as a robustness check.

Dependent Variables

This study identifies six individual-level dependent variables which are obtained from the European Social Survey. Each empirical chapter examines two of these civic attitudes as dependent variables. Summary statistics for these dependent variables are shown in Table 4.3. Further descriptive statistics will be presented in the three empirical chapters.

Immigration Preferences

Two variables are identified to measure individual attitudes towards immigration. These are based on the following survey questions:

- 1) Attitudes towards the economic aspect of immigration: ‘Would you say that it is generally good or bad for [country’s] economy that people come to live here from other countries?’ The respondents are then prompted to select values from 0 (bad for the economy) to 10 (good for the economy).
- 2) Attitudes towards the cultural aspect of immigration: ‘Would you say that it is generally good or bad for [country’s] culture that people come to live here from other countries?’ The respondents are then prompted to select values from 0 (bad for the culture) to 10 (good for the culture).

Although there is some correlation between the two attitudes (pairwise correlation=0.6), they are kept separate in this study for the benefit of comparing how they might respond differently to changes in out-group size. Similar measures have been used to capture attitudes towards immigration in past empirical studies (Sides and Citrin 2007; McLaren 2012; Senik, Stichnoth, and Van der Straeten 2009; Masso 2009). The measures are treated as continuous variables rather than ordered categorical variables, for ease of interpretation.[»]

[»]As rule of thumb, ordinal variables with four or more categories may be treated as a continuous variable because the scale used to gather responses can be considered to represent an underlying continuous variable (Johnson and Creech 1983; Zumbo and Zimmerman 1993; Hox 2010).

These particular questions on the European Social Survey intentionally use vague wording, deliberately avoiding the word “immigration” in order to minimize priming the respondent to think of a certain kind of foreigner. This also improves the functional equivalence of the term across countries, since the term immigration can mean different types of foreign nationals in different countries, often reflecting the national discourse and immigration policies.

Despite these advantages in the wording of the question, quantifying attitudes towards immigration in this manner is not without drawbacks. It is true that quantitative social scientists commonly use surveys to glean an individual’s attitudes and preferences. Yet despite their widespread use, responses to surveys are an imperfect measure of and as Zaller and Feldman (1992) point out, answering questions does not necessarily mean revealing true preferences. Survey questions do not only measure public opinion but also shape it by framing the issues, ordering the alternatives, and setting the context around the question (Zaller and Feldman 1992, 582). This is because since respondents can be sensitive to the context in which questions are asked. E.g. to priming effects from previous questions (D. O. Sears and Lau 1983; Lau, Sears, and Jessor 1990). Additionally, there is also evidence that responses are subject “interviewer effects” whereby individuals wish to appear social desirable to the interviewer and respond in a manner than they believe would be appealing to him or her (Streb et al. 2008; Davis and Silver 2003).

In the case of attitudes towards immigration, there is no way to know what kind of immigration comes to mind (illegal, refugees, geographic location) when the respondent answers the question. It is known from both qualitative and quantitative research that the way that the public “imagines” immigration can be different between individuals (Schildkraut 2003) and can also vary systematically between countries (Citrin and Sides 2008). This can be problematic since the type of immigration or immigrants that come to mind has been shown to determine their preferences for immigration (Blinder 2013). Although this issue may have been somewhat remedied by avoiding the term immigration, we cannot rule out the possibility that there systematic differences between both individuals and countries can still occur when referring to “people from other countries.”

Trust

- 1) Social trust: Generalized social trust is measured using the following survey question: ‘Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too

careful when dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can't be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted'. The respondents are then prompted to select values from 0 to 10. Similar measures were used in a number of studies (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010; Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Dinesen and Sønderskov 2012). The responses are treated as a continuous variable.

- 2) Political trust: The measure for political trust is an indexed score based on three questions that appear on the survey. The respondents are asked 'Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out'. Responses between 0 ('no trust at all') and 10 ('complete trust') are captured for three different institutions: the country's parliament, politicians and political parties.

These three indicators have a Cronbach's alpha of 0.83. Similar measures have been used in previous empirical work (McLaren 2012a; McLaren 2012b). The responses of the three indicators are averaged (each is weighted equally) and are treated as a continuous variable in the analysis.

Welfare

- 1) Support for income redistribution is based on the responses to the following question: 'The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels'. The respondents are given the option to choose between the following answers: agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly (with values of 1 to 5 respectively). Similar measures have been used in previous empirical studies (Jaeger 2006; Rehm 2005; Finseraas 2006). The responses are treated as a continuous variable and the coding has been reversed for ease of interpretation.
- 2) Welfare chauvinism: The extent of an individual's welfare chauvinism is based on his/her response to the following question: 'Thinking of people coming to live in [country] from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as the citizens already living here? Please choose the option on this card that matches your view most closely'. The respondents are asked to choose between the following responses: 1) immediately upon arrival, 2) after living in this country for a year, whether or not they have worked, 3) once they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year, 4) once they have become

citizens of this country, or 5) they should never get the same rights. Similar questions have been used in previous empirical studies as a measure for welfare chauvinism (Ervasti and Hjerm 2012; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2009; van der Waal et al. 2010).

The responses to this question cannot be treated as continuous since it is unclear if the units between them are equidistant. Still, the variable cannot be treated as a simple categorical variable since there is an underlying order to the responses. Therefore, in this study, the variable is transformed into a binary variable with two outcomes: 1) welfare chauvinistic and 2) not welfare chauvinistic. Individuals who responded with values of 4 or 5 (citizen-based rights or complete exclusion) are coded as ‘welfare chauvinistic’ while all others are coded as ‘not welfare chauvinistic’.

Table 4.3 Summary Statistics of the Dependent Variables

Attitudinal Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
economic impact of immigration	120,748	5.0	2.4	0	10
cultural impact of immigration	121,121	5.7	2.5	0	10
income redistribution	125,687	3.7	1.2	0	5
welfare chauvinism	24,088	3.1	1.0	1	5
social trust	125,296	5.2	2.4	0	10
political trust	93,042	4.1	2.1	0	10

Country Level Control Variables

It is known that an individual’s opinion is based on his or her own predispositions but also on his or her social and political environment. To address this, a series of control variables are introduced in the empirical analysis to account for differences in the national contexts which have a theoretical basis for influencing public attitudes. These variables are included since they are understood to heighten or lessen the extent of inter-group competition between natives and immigrants in a society. One set of control variables pertain to the resources in society (unemployment, wealth, social spending). 36 The other set pertains to contextual characteristics which determine the size of out-group(s) in the country

* In the case of political trust, the quality of the political governance is also included as a collective political factor.

(E8 mobility restrictions, total foreign nationals). In addition to their inclusion as control variables, these contextual variables are also tested to see if they have multiplicative effects with the independent variables.

E8 Mobility

This variable attempts to capture the extent of the transitional restrictions placed on E8 migrants after the enlargement. We follow an approach adopted by Holland et al. (2011). First, countries are given a value of 1 when there are no mobility restrictions in place and a value of -1 when these are in place. If a country lifted restrictions in the middle of the year, then they are given a weighted value of 1 depending on the number of months for which no restrictions were in place. For example, a country that lifted restrictions in June would be given a value of 0.5 whereas one that did so in September would be given a value of 0.75 for that year. Each country's value is then further transformed into a relative value by taking the difference between the host country value and the EU-15 mean value for that given year. This value is then multiplied by the host country's share of the EU-15 population, which gives us the index score. This calculation compensates for the fact that more populous countries have the potential to absorb higher numbers of immigrants than less populous ones. This means the mobility restrictions carry more weight in countries that have the ability to accommodate a larger share of immigrants. The resulting index scores are shown in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4: Mobility Index Scores, 2002-2010

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010
Austria	0.00	-0.008	-0.019	-0.030	-0.036
Belgium	0.00	-0.011	-0.025	-0.039	0.007
Denmark	0.00	-0.006	-0.013	-0.020	0.004
Finland	0.00	-0.005	0.009	0.008	0.004
France	0.00	-0.065	-0.149	-0.002	0.043
Germany	0.00	-0.085	-0.193	-0.297	-0.356
Greece	0.00	-0.011	0.019	0.016	0.008
Ireland	0.00	0.017	0.012	0.006	0.003
Italy	0.00	-0.060	0.075	0.087	0.040
Luxembourg	0.00	-0.00	-0.001	0.001	0.00
Netherlands	0.00	-0.017	-0.038	0.024	0.011
Portugal	0.00	-0.011	0.018	0.015	0.007
Spain	0.00	-0.044	0.075	0.066	0.031
Sweden	0.00	0.037	0.025	0.013	0.006
UK	0.00	0.248	0.168	0.089	0.042

Economic Wealth

The measure for economic wealth is gross national income (GNI) converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. GNI is the sum of the value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus the net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. GNI is similar to gross national product (GNP), except that it includes indirect business taxes. The GNI for year country/year comes from the World Bank and is shown in Table 4.5. As alternative measures of economic wealth, the country GDP and its rate of growth are also tested to confirm that this does not alter the results.

Table 4.5: GNI per capita (\$ppp), 2002-2010

Country	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010
Austria	30090	32600	36190	39700	39790
Belgium	30450	31520	34520	37530	38290
Denmark	30390	32430	36720	40460	41100
Finland	27580	30090	33450	38280	37070
France	27830	28520	31970	34740	34750
Germany	27070	29930	34230	37590	38100
Greece	21480	23720	26220	28600	27630
Ireland	27660	31540	37290	37040	33540
Italy	26760	27430	30490	33010	31810
Luxembourg	47730	56750	59710	67130	61240
Netherlands	32230	34070	39100	42000	41810
Portugal	18840	19640	22270	24050	24590
Spain	23700	25600	29830	32240	31800
Sweden	29160	32490	36160	41000	39730
UK	29310	32210	35210	36670	35840

Source: OECD, 2012

Unemployment

National unemployment rates have been compiled for this study from the World Bank and the International Labour Organization for the years 2000 to 2008 and are shown in Table 4.6. The 2010

figures have been obtained from the OECD database. Unemployment refers to the share of the labour force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. The labour force is defined as the total number of people employed and unemployed. The unemployed comprise persons aged 15 to 74 who were 'without work during the reference week; are available to start work within the next two weeks; and have been actively seeking work in the past four weeks or had already found a job to start within the next three months' (OECD 2012).

Table 4.6: *Unemployment Rate (%)* in EU-15 countries, 2002-2010

Country	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010
Austria	4.0	4.9	4.7	3.8	4.4
Belgium	7.5	8.4	8.2	7.0	8.3
Denmark	4.6	5.5	3.9	3.3	7.4
Finland	9.0	8.8	7.6	6.3	8.4
France	8.7	9.2	8.8	7.4	9.3
Germany	8.6	10.3	10.3	7.5	7.1
Greece	10.3	10.5	8.9	7.7	12.5
Ireland	4.2	4.5	4.4	6.0	13.6
Italy	9.2	7.9	6.8	6.7	8.4
Luxembourg	2.6	5.1	4.7	5.1	4.4
Netherlands	2.6	4.6	3.9	2.8	4.5
Portugal	5.0	6.7	7.7	7.6	10.8
Spain	11.4	11.0	8.5	11.3	20.1
Sweden	5.5	6.2	7.0	6.1	8.4
UK	5.1	4.6	5.3	5.3	7.8

Source: OECD, 2012

Stock of Foreign nationals

To measure all foreign immigration, this study uses the number of foreign residents as a percentage of the population which is shown in Table 4.7. Migration statistics can broadly be categorised as either the stock of foreign nationals (the number of foreign nationals living in a country at a given time) or the flow of immigrants (the number of foreign nationals taking up residence in a given year). Researchers often tend to prefer using immigration inflow since it is a more accurate portrayal of contemporary immigration flows as opposed to the accumulation historical patterns. However, in

practice, comparativists often run into problems since the data are not well harmonized across countries. In fact, the principal challenge in the study of comparative migration is that the term ‘immigrant’ is not uniformly defined. In fact, records of migration often represent the legal or immigration policy framework of the country which do not adhere to international standardizations. European countries seldom have tools specifically designed to measure the inflows and outflows of the foreign population, and national estimates are generally based on population registers, residence permit data, or special surveys.

To capture the extent of migration at the national level, this thesis relies on measure of the annual stock of foreign nationals. This is done primarily due to convenience and the lack of reliable cross country measure for immigration inflows. This measure is used but with the acknowledgement of its limitations, which are several. First, because of the variety of sources, different populations may be measured since the criteria for registering the population and the conditions for granting residence permits vary across countries (OECD, 2012). This population may include persons born abroad who retained the nationality of their country of origin but also second and third generation individuals who were born in the host country. Another limitation of this measure is that the population of foreign nationals depends on a number of factors: the history of migration flows, natural increases in the foreign population, and naturalization. The nature of the legislation on citizenship and the incentives for foreign nationals to naturalize both play a role in determining the extent to which native-born persons may or may not be considered foreign nationals (OECD, 2012).

Table 4.7 Stock of Foreign Nationals (% of population), 2002-2010

Country	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010*
Austria	8.5	8.6	8.9	9.3	10.0
Belgium	8.1	8.0	8.4	9.0	9.8
Denmark	4.8	4.8	4.8	5.3	5.6
Finland	1.7	1.8	1.9	2.2	2.5
France*	.	.	5.5	5.7	5.7
Germany	8.3	7.6	7.5	7.5	7.5
Greece	3.8	4.6	4.9	6.3	7.0
Ireland	5.2	.	6.9	.	.
Italy	2.6	4.0	4.8	6.3	7.3
Luxembourg	38.0	39.6	41.1	43.0	41.1
Netherlands	4.3	4.2	4.0	4.1	4.2
Portugal	4.1	4.5	4.1	4.1	4.2
Spain	6.4	8.6	10.0	12.1	12.1

Sweden	5.0	4.8	5.0	5.5	6.1
United Kingdom	4.2	4.5	4.9	5.5	5.9

Sources: Author's own analysis, OECD, 2012

Individual Level Controls

The following is a comprehensive list of the individual-level control variables used in this study and explains how they have been measured. Not all individual-level controls are applicable to each empirical chapter and therefore only a subset may be used. The relevant individual-level control variables for each model will be outlined in the subsequent empirical chapters. The means for each country during the time period (2002-2010) are shown in Table 4.8.

Age

The respondent is asked to state his/her year of birth. The respondent's age is calculated by the European Social Survey to be their age at the time of the survey.

Gender

The gender of the respondent is coded as a dummy variable, where males are coded with a value of 0 and females with a value of 1.

Education

The respondent is asked 'How many years have you spent in full-time education?' The number of years provided by the respondent is used as the value for this continuous variable.

Urban/Rural

In the survey, the respondent is asked 'Which phrase on the card best describes the area in which you live?' The respondent is given a choice between the following responses: a big city, the suburbs or outskirts of a big city, a town or small city, a country village, a farm or home in the countryside, and don't know. For this study, dummy variables are introduced to indicate if a respondent lives in an urban or rural area. Respondents who live in a country village, a farm or in a home in the countryside are assigned a value of 1 to indicate they are living in a rural area and the other respondents are assigned a value of 0 to indicate that they are living in an urban or suburban area.

Political Orientation

This variable measures whether an individual leans to the left side of the political spectrum. To measure this tendency, the following survey question is asked: ‘In politics, people sometimes talk of ‘left’ and ‘right’. Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?’ The variable is treated as a continuous variable in this study.

Low Income

This measures if the individual perceives their income as being inadequate. Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household’s income nowadays? 1. Living comfortably on present income. 2. Coping on present income. 3. Finding it difficult on present income. 4. Finding it very difficult on present income. This measure is then transformed into a binary variable. Individuals who respond that it is difficult or very difficult to live on their present income have been assigned a value of 1 while those who have not are assigned a value of 0. I use the respondents’ perception of their income even if it is not ideal since the data on the respondents’ actual income is only available at the household level and has too many missing observations (approximately 50 per cent). Relying on perceived income rather than actual income also improves comparability across countries. For instance, the socio-economic circumstances of the same income categories can vary greatly between countries.

Media Engagement

This is measured by including the following question on the survey that captures how attentive the individual is to political media coverage: ‘On an average weekday, how much of your time watching television is spent watching news or programmes about politics and current affairs?’ The respondents are given the option to choose between 0 (‘no time at all’) and values of up to 7 (‘more than three hours’). This variable is treated as continuous.

Table 4.8 Summary Statistics, individual level controls, 2002-2010

Country	age	gender	edu	rural	income	outsider	political	media	native
Austria	44.9 (17.7)	0.5 (0.5)	12.2 (3.1)	0.4 (0.5)	0.2 (0.4)	0.2 (0.4)	4.7 (0.2)	1.7 (1.1)	0.8 (0.4)
Belgium	45.9 (18.6)	0.5 (0.5)	12.3 (3.7)	0.5 (0.5)	0.2 (0.4)	0.3 (0.4)	4.9 (0.2)	1.9 (1.2)	0.8 (0.4)
Denmark	48.2 (17.9)	0.5 (0.5)	13.1 (4.6)	0.3 (0.5)	0.1 (0.2)	0.2 (0.4)	5.4 (0.2)	2.3 (1.3)	0.9 (0.3)
Finland	47.6 (18.9)	0.5 (0.5)	12.5 (4.2)	0.4 (0.5)	0.1 (0.3)	0.3 (0.4)	5.7 (0.2)	2.1 (1.2)	1.0 (0.2)
France	48.5 (18.2)	0.5 (0.5)	12.2 (4.1)	0.4 (0.5)	0.5 (0.5)	0.2 (0.4)	4.8 (0.2)	2.1 (1.3)	0.8 (0.4)
Germany	47.8 (17.9)	0.5 (0.5)	13.1 (3.4)	0.3 (0.5)	0.2 (0.4)	0.3 (0.4)	4.5 (0.2)	1.8 (1.1)	0.8 (0.4)
Greece	48.5 (18.5)	0.6 (0.5)	10.3 (4.5)	0.3 (0.4)	0.5 (0.5)	0.3 (0.5)	5.5 (0.2)	1.8 (1.5)	0.8 (0.4)
Ireland	46.9 (17.9)	0.6 (0.5)	13.0 (3.6)	0.5 (0.5)	0.2 (0.4)	0.4 (0.5)	5.3 (0.2)	2.1 (1.5)	0.9 (0.4)
Italy	46.9 (17.8)	0.5 (0.5)	10.7 (4.9)	0.3 (0.5)	0.2 (0.4)	0.2 (0.4)	4.8 (0.2)	2.1 (1.3)	1.0 (0.2)
Luxembourg	43.5 (18.1)	0.5 (0.5)	11.9 (4.1)	0.5 (0.5)	0.1 (0.3)	0.1 (0.4)	5.1 (0.2)	1.9 (1.3)	0.5 (0.5)
Netherlands	49.2 (17.5)	0.6 (0.5)	13.0 (4.2)	0.4 (0.5)	0.1 (0.3)	0.3 (0.4)	5.2 (0.2)	2.2 (1.3)	0.8 (0.4)
Portugal	51.26 (19.5)	0.6 (0.5)	7.4 (4.9)	0.3 (0.5)	0.4 (0.5)	0.3 (0.4)	4.9 (0.2)	2.1 (1.4)	0.9 (0.3)
Spain	46.5 (18.9)	0.5 (0.5)	11.3 (5.4)	0.4 (0.5)	0.2 (0.4)	0.3 (0.5)	4.5 (0.2)	1.8 (1.2)	0.9 (0.3)
Sweden	47.2 (18.9)	0.5 (0.5)	12.4 (3.6)	0.3 (0.5)	0.1 (0.3)	0.2 (0.4)	5.2 (0.2)	2.0 (1.1)	0.8 (0.4)
UK	49.0 (18.8)	0.5 (0.5)	13.0 (3.7)	0.2 (0.5)	0.2 (0.4)	0.3 (0.5)	5.1 (0.2)	2.1 (1.5)	0.8 (0.4)

Labour Market Status

A control variable is also introduced to control for the insider/outsider status of an individual in the labour market. This variable is introduced as a categorical variable and is measured as follows: labour market insiders are given a value of 0, labour market outsiders are coded as 1, and individuals who are not active in the labour market (e.g. full time students, housewives, disabled people, or retired people) are coded as inactive with a value of 2.

This measure is an indication of the instability and vulnerability of this individual's position in the labour market which could influence his or her perception of threat posed by immigration as well as their attitudes towards welfare preferences. Following (Emmenegger, 2010), I identify labour market outsiders to be individuals that are in part-time (less than 30 hours per week) or fixed term employment or individuals who are unemployed at the time of the survey. Unfortunately, there is no information in the European Social Survey on whether an individual is involuntarily in part-time work or has chosen to work fewer hours. Given that child-care responsibilities are a common rationale for opting for part-time work (Buehler, O'Brien, and Walls 2011), this operationalization of part-time workers only includes those who do not currently have a child living in the household². This is a rather crude measurement and there could be voluntary part-time workers without children living in the home and vice versa. Nevertheless, I proceed with this measure as a pragmatic solution to the problematic issue of not being able to differentiate between voluntary and involuntary part-time work.

Migrant Background

It is also known that individuals who have a migrant background can be less threatened by immigration than individuals with a "native background". In this study, an individual is classified as having a migrant background if they were born in a foreign country or one of their parents was born in a foreign country. This is measured as a dummy variable where the value of 0 indicates that the individual does not have a migrant background while the value 1 indicates that he or she has a

² We assume that all fixed term work is involuntary.

migrant background. It could arguably be important to also include individuals who are third generation immigrant (i.e. their grandparent was born in a foreign country), but this could unfortunately not be included since data is not available on the birth country on family members other than parents. The individual's ethnic group, country of birth is not captured given that the composition of migrants and minority groups attributes vary across European countries and therefore it is not possible to construct a reliable comparative measure.³⁸

Omitted Variables

A few variables could not be included due to a lack of data availability. In this section, the relevance of these variables is acknowledged and the practical reasons for their exclusion are explained.

Religion

An individual's religious affiliation has been shown to be associated with support for income redistribution (Stegmueller et al. 2011). However, in the ESS, a large number of responses regarding religious affiliation are missing (more than 50,000). Given the lack of information provided in the survey, this variable is not included in the analysis. Therefore, it is possible there are differences in religious affiliation across countries (such as stronger religious affiliation in the Southern European countries) and this could result in compositional effects when comparing attitudes across countries. As an alternative measure the extent to which an individual reports being a religious person is used rather than their affiliation.

Media Coverage

There is empirical evidence that public attitudes are shaped by media coverage (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Vreese and Boomgaarden 2011). The media influence attitudes by using its priming, framing or agenda-setting powers (Benson 2002; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007; McCombs and Shaw 1972).

³⁸ Although I recognize that it could be of scholarly interest to investigate how being born in a certain country (or being a national thereof) could impact their attitudes and preferences, this level of detail goes beyond the scope of this thesis which focus on the link of macro-micro linkages in attitudes, rather than the micro-level determinants.

Many events do not directly or immediately affect ordinary citizens and therefore do not speak for themselves. These cannot have much of an impact on public opinion unless they are reported on by the media, so that people are aware of them. However, the difficulty and time consuming nature of quantifying media coverage into a functionally equivalent variable has kept researchers from including it in their analyses. The result is that the role of the media is often ignored in most cross country comparative studies. Instead some studies focus solely on the role of the media in one or two countries (Benson 2002).

This study acknowledges the importance of the media, and for practical reasons constructs a crude measure to control for its influence. A control variable is introduced that captures the extent to which an individual reports following the media (see previous section for a more detailed description). However, it remains a limitation that there could be systematic differences in the way the immigration debate is framed by the media or the frequency with which the subject is covered between countries and this could bias the results. However, this bias is acceptable limitation in comparative attitudinal empirical studies, since no studies have been found that construct a comparable and replicable contextual variable for media coverage.

Redistribution

A country's redistribution is typically calculated as the difference between the GINI coefficient before taxes and transfers minus the GINI coefficient after taxes and transfers. Using pre-/post-measures of inequality is problematic because it tends to be more biased towards welfare states with flat rates and proportional taxation (Bergh 2005). Due to a change in EU-SILC in the mid-2000s, data prior to the mid-2000s cannot strictly be compared with those from the mid-2000s onwards. Given these issues, a measure for redistribution is not included in this analysis. Instead, a measure of income distribution after taxes and transfers is used, following approaches applied in previous empirical research (Finseraas 2006; Dallinger 2010).

Social Class

An individual's social class is not captured included in the analysis in this study. I have done so rather as a deliberate choice not due to lack of data. In fact, I do have information on the individual's occupation which in a preliminary analysis (not shown here) I coded according to ISCO-88 skill classifications. The rationale for not including social class is that I argue that labour market vulnerability is more accurately captured by labour market status (insider, outsider or not active) and

educational attainment rather than differentiating between occupational classes. Moreover, since the importance of these structures and consequences for class consciousness varies greatly within European countries (Myles and Turegun 1994), a comparative measure of social classes may be less appropriate to include in this study.

Missing Data

Missing observations are a common problem when using large statistical surveys (Madow, Nisselson, and Olkin 1983). The approach to missing data in this thesis follows a procedure 'based on completely recorded units' (Little and Rubin 2002, 19), which confines the analysis to cases where all variables are reported. This approach does have some noted advantages. Not only it is simpler, but it also avoids introducing a mis-specified imputation model (Little and Rubin 2002).

Omitting incomplete responses from the sample also has some disadvantages. It is possible that this could bias the results, particularly if there is no systematic reason for these missing values. Dropping missing responses relies on the assumption that there is no systematic bias in the missing answers. Moreover, if country data are unavailable (either attitudinal or macro-level indicators) for a certain year, the country cannot be included in that time period. This is particularly problematic in single period cross-sectional models, since the country must be dropped altogether from the analysis. For example, this occurs for the 2008 wave, during which Austria, Italy and Luxembourg did not participate in the ESS. However, dropping missing cases can still be justified provided that it does not compromise precision or introduce bias (Little and Rubin 2002), so this thesis must attempt 'to make plausible assumptions of this kind' although the influences of these biases will not be 'completely testable' (Snijders and Bosker 2011, 132) and remain a limitation.

Empirical Strategy

The European Social Survey is not a longitudinal study and thus does not track the same individuals over time. Instead, different individuals are sampled within the same countries in the same fashion at different points of time. Repeat cross-sectionals are very common in attitudinal research and reliable large sample cross-country longitudinal studies are virtually non-existent. Studies that use longitudinal data are often assessing only a single country (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Palmer

1996). Although repeat cross-sectionals are not statistically ideal, they do have the advantage of avoiding attrition-related issues that longitudinal studies often face. Researchers who use repeat cross-sectional data will probably select one of the following approaches: OLS regression, pseudo-panel or aggregate analysis, structural equation modelling, or multi-level analysis. The trade-offs between these methods will now be briefly discussed as well as the decision to select multi-level modelling in this study.

OLS Regression

An OLS regression that includes both micro and macro level indicators is the most straightforward approach but it has its limitations. Employing a simple OLS empirical strategy would alter the scope of the analysis from individuals to the average opinion. This is not a problem per se but it does not suit the nature of the research question of this thesis, which is concerned with individual rather than collective opinion. Relying on OLS would thus result in a 'shift of meaning' whereby aggregated variables 'have a theoretically different meaning at the level of aggregation than at their original level' (Snijders 2012, 39).

Secondly, an OLS approach would also ignore the two stage sampling design of the attitudinal data. In the case of the European Social Survey, the population of the countries selected is not random (being based on geographic location) but, within these countries, a random sample is taken. A further complication is the fact that the data are not longitudinal in nature but rather a repeat cross-sectional survey at the country level which has been pooled into a time series. Pooled time-series regressions can violate OLS assumptions and produce biased, inefficient or inconsistent results (Beck and Katz 1995).

A more sophisticated OLS approach could employ a regression discontinuity research design, which aims to identify the causal effects of a sharp change in the explanatory variable in the form of a cut-off or a threshold. This empirical strategy would then compare observations that are close to both sides of the threshold. Using a regression discontinuity design, it might be possible to compare differences in attitudes before the lifting of the transitional restrictions (control group), to those immediately after (treatment group). But this is problematic since this approach does not take into account the steady immigration which occurred years after the enlargement. This tests the effect of the policy change but not of the immigration itself, which was not one marked event but a change in immigration patterns which built momentum in the years after the enlargement. Moreover, a

regression discontinuity is a successful strategy when there are observations close to the threshold. Unfortunately, the attitudinal data from ESS is only available every two years, which is a great limitation to the precision of such a threshold and this type of empirical approach.

Aggregate or Quasi Panel

Another approach is to aggregate attitudes at the national level and use these to construct a panel at the country level across time. Panel data examine two sources of variance by comparing between and within units of analysis. The advantages of this approach are that it allows for country and time fixed effects. However, this approach could also lead to committing an ecological fallacy when examining the results. Furthermore, aggregate public opinions tend to be very stable and it would probably fail to uncover much variation over a short time period.

In some instances, researchers subdivide the aggregate measures to build a pseudo-panel and track 'cohorts' over time (Deaton 1985). In this case, a cohort is defined as being a group with a fixed membership. Cohorts usually refer to 'generational cohorts', that is individuals who experience time at the same interval. However, cohorts can be defined based on other criteria, provided that they are time invariant to create what is often referred to as a synthetic cohort design. Examples of such characteristics would be the year of birth of the respondent, skill level, educational attainment or gender. A quasi-panel has advantages over a panel that is aggregated to the country level since it addresses the underlying micro-economic dynamics. Moreover, it has the advantage of also introducing country fixed effects, which can control for omitted variable bias at the country level.

While, a synthetic cohort design has proven to be a powerful method for some researchers of public attitudes (Jæger 2013), it is not necessarily the most suitable empirical strategy for this study. First, this empirical approach shifts the unit of analysis from the individual to a the socio-demographic group. To proceed with an such a unit, there needs to be a theoretical justification or a sensible reason that these groups of individuals would have similar attitudinal reactions to an increase in E8 migration. But in the case of the attitudes in this study, there is little theoretical coherence for creating cohorts based on time-invariant characteristics age or gender in order to explore the attitudinal implications of immigration. While there maybe a justification for creating cohorts based on occupational class, there are pragmatic issues since it would likely mean dropping individuals not active in the labour market (as is the case in Jæger 2013) which is more than half of the sample. Likewise, generating cohorts using educational attainment would mean dropping young adults that

may still be in education (such as those between the ages of 18-27). Moreover, one could argue that occupational class or educational attainment are not necessarily time invariant and that the composition of who belongs in these categories may have shifted throughout the time period in the sample. There is also the further complication that the European Social Survey offers a short time horizon, and thus the numbers cohorts within a time/country point would small and are at risk of not being a reliable sample size.

Structural Equation Modeling

Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) is a method of multivariate analysis which tests whether a set of variance (or covariance in a matrix) fits a designated structure. One of the main advantages of using SEM is the ability to include latent variables that may otherwise be difficult to measure. However, SEM is cumbersome for time series and clustered data. It is sometimes used in attitudinal research for single time period, cross-sectional data (Andress and Heien 2001). Since this study is interested in variation across time, SEM is overly-complicated. Furthermore, SEM is better suited to revealing the relative importance of different determinants rather than exploring the power of a single independent variable, as is the aim of this study.

Multi-level Modeling

The most suitable approach for this study is multi-level modeling. What distinguishes multi-level regression from OLS regression is that the slopes and intercepts do not need to be fixed and can vary across groups or contexts. Multi-level modeling assumes that there is a function between the higher-level and lower-level variables. It is an applied form of a random coefficient regression model that includes fixed effects for the individual and random effects for the group level (often referred to as 'mixed effects'). Multilevel modeling gives researchers substantial leverage in overcoming the usual problems associated with either ignoring multiple levels of data or combining them (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). This form of analysis has proven to be a sound methodology for analysing the separate effects that each of these sources of variation may have on the dependent variable. Finally, multi-level analysis also helps to avoid committing an ecological fallacy (Hox 2010).

In this study, the use of a multi-level approach is justified by the inherently nested structure of public attitudes. Multi-level analysis is the most common approach taken in comparative public attitudinal research (Crepaz 2008; McLaren 2003; Oorschot 2000; Stegmueller et al. 2011; Gorodzeisky and

Semyonov 2009; Laurence 2011a; Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006a). This is because multi-level analysis allows us to compare individual level attitudes cross-nationally. Adding a multi-level component allows the intercepts and slopes to vary across countries and time. Contextual factors are used as the independent variables in multi-level models to explain the variability in the level-one dependent variables. They explain the variability in the random intercepts and slopes and help us to understand why the relationships differ from group to group (Bickel 2007). Since multi-level modelling does not require balanced data, we can allow the number of available measurements to be uneven for all individuals. Also, multi-level regressions do not assume equal numbers of observations, or fixed measurement occasions, so respondents with missing observations pose no problem and can remain in the analysis (Hox 2010).

We know that the perception of threat can be more prevalent in individuals with certain characteristics. Social scientists have explored the link between micro and macro characteristics and have found evidence that changes in immigration patterns (“situational triggers”) can have disproportionate impacts on individuals with certain attributes (predisposing factors”) (Quillian 1995; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004). While I suspect that E8 migration could increase the perception of threat amongst some individuals who have a greater propensity to feel the threat more acutely due to their level of education or weak labour market position, or general psychological disposition, I am regrettably not able to investigate this with the data at hand. The measurement of these interactions require a minimum of about 25 level two variables, in this case countries. So unfortunately with only 15 countries in this study, interactions between country and individual level variables would not be reliable or meaningful.

Model Specification

Mixed effect random-intercept multi-level models with maximum likelihood estimators are specified in this study. Random slopes are not permitted since the number of the groups is relatively small (15).[»] Two kinds of model are specified in this analysis: pooled time series cross-section and single time point cross-sectional. They are estimated using a similar procedure. The models are given by the equation shown below where *i* represents individuals and *j* represents countries:

[»] The rule of thumb is that 20 or more groups would allow you to use random effects (Snijders 2012).

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \sum_{p=1}^P \gamma_{p0} X_{p0j} + \sum_{q=1}^Q \gamma_{0q} Z_{qj} + U_{0j} + \varepsilon_{ij}.$$

Presentation of Results

The analysis is concerned with presenting three main aspects of the results: the substantive effect, the statistical significance, and the robustness of the coefficients. Any significant or pertinent results are shown in the tables in the empirical chapters. The results are presented as unstandardised coefficients⁴⁰ with the reported p-values. The first step is to investigate how large the inter-level correlation is in the null model. A relatively small correlation justifies a single level analysis, knowing that the standard errors would be offset by only a negligible amount.⁴¹ Next, blocks of variables are introduced in a step-wise fashion. When all of the control variables have been introduced, a baseline model is established. Then, interaction terms are introduced and the results are then compared to the baseline model.⁴² Finally, a series of robustness checks are presented to test the sensitivity of the results.

Robustness

Testing the reliability of the results in comparative quantitative analysis is an important step before drawing any conclusions. 'Analysts of cross-national data should suspend the belief initially in any major cross-country differences they discover. All too often, such differences turn out to be impostors - the result of a poor translation, a subtly different show card, a variation in sampling coverage, or a particular cultural cue that subtly alters the meaning of the variable in that country' (Jowell 1998, 175).

⁴⁰ Standardising the coefficients provides a means of scaling the effect of the units into comparable units of standard deviation (Snijders, Bosker, and Bosker 2011, 53). Often social scientists present standardised variables if the units of analysis are difficult to interpret or to highlight the relative magnitude of the coefficients. However, the standardisation of the coefficients is acknowledged by statisticians as being controversial (Bring 1994). In fact, standardisation may make coefficients even more difficult to interpret and do not add any meaning to the analysis (King 1986).

⁴¹ 5 and 25 per cent of the variation should exist at the higher level (Snijders 2012).

⁴² Cross-level interaction terms are not permitted with random intercept models.

To avoid reporting spurious conclusions, a series of robustness checks are run to examine the reliability of the results. Checks are conducted to test the results' robustness to sensitivity to the following:

- additional regressors
- time, place and weighting
- measurement of independent variable
- model specification
- influential countries

Limitations

There are several limitations to the methods employed in this thesis. To understand these limitations, the methods will be evaluated in terms of their accuracy, parsimony, generality, and ability to establish causality. These criteria follow a framework of the aspects required for a rigorous social inquiry constructed by Przeworski & Teune (1970). Each of these will be discussed in turn below.

Accuracy

The accuracy of this analysis faces several challenges. First, ascertaining the true attitudes of individuals from comparative surveys is an imperfect science. Measuring public attitudes is difficult since they tend to be elusive (Jowell 1998). Responses are self-reported and this must be accepted as a limitation. Some respondents may have been primed by previous questions in the wave's rotating module. The challenges facing this study are similar to those for other studies that rely on large-N attitudinal data sets. They must be accepted as a broader limitation of quantitative attitudinal research.

Secondly, the harmonisation of immigration statistics is riddled with inconsistencies. The measurement of migration figures varies across countries. Governments rely on different sources and categorise migrants differently and rarely include irregular immigration. An attempt has been made in this study to minimise cross-country differences by using foreign-stock figures (vs. the inflow of foreign nationals). However, the stock of foreign nationals remains a crude measure since it can also capture second or third generation residents who may be dual citizens. In this case, we must recognise

differences in equivalency, as these are a common limitation when using comparative immigration data.

Finally, changes in the amount of E8 stock might not necessarily indicate new arrivals. The figures could reflect migrants who were irregularly present and became regularised after the enlargement. Nor is the presence of E8 stock in EU-15 populations necessarily indicative of permanent settlement.

Parsimony

Parsimony is the principle that selects the explanation that requires the fewest assumptions. Striving for parsimony is particularly important in a quantitative study since the inclusion of additional regressors reduces the number of degrees of freedom of the model. Yet, the cross-sectional nature of the data (as opposed to a panel) requires the inclusion of variables to control for between country differences. Thus, the specified models in this analysis could be crowded with many control variables. For this reason, variables that are not significant, such as those introduced in the exploratory analysis, are generally omitted from the baseline models.

Generality

This criterion refers to the 'range of social phenomena' to which this study is applicable (Przeworski and Teune 1970). In this study, generalisations must be made cautiously. The rare circumstances of the enlargement that allow for a rich comparative study make it difficult to apply its conclusions to other situations. Given the similar shared characteristics between E8 migrants and their host societies, the findings of this study may be inapplicable to the migration of peoples with greater cultural differences. However, one might be able to generalise the findings of this study to inter-regional migration and migration to Europe from countries such as Russia, the Ukraine or Latin American countries.

The conclusions based on these results can only be drawn at the country-level and not at the municipal or neighbourhood level. By studying changes at the national level, we can avoid issues of self-selection that often occur at the community level (Rustenbach 2010; Laurence 2011a). Yet, there is no way to control for the fact that some respondents live in localities that are more densely populated with E8 migrants than others. It is impossible to conduct the analysis using smaller geographic units since data on E8 populations are unavailable at the regional level.

Causality

There are three main markers of causality: 1) temporal order (the cause must precede the effect), 2) co-variation (predictor and outcome variables correspond in variation), and 3) coherence (predictor variables conform to theoretical coherence) (Rindfleisch et al. 2008). Although this study investigates these three markers, its causal power remains limited. Since the data are pooled and cross-sectional, we cannot assert a change of opinion (causality). Instead, we can draw conclusions about the differences between individuals across space and time (association). Thus, this approach cannot conclusively eliminate the possibility of a reverse relationship between the migration of E8 nationals and the views of natives. Some studies have overcome this limitation by using instrumental variable estimations (Jaeger 2006; McLaren 2012). Potential instruments for this study have been investigated but, unfortunately, no suitable instruments were found. Attempts are made in each empirical chapter to discuss the potential for reverse causality and to consider, from a logical point of view, the plausibility of its occurrence. Furthermore, the confounding factors included in the regression are only the observable ones for which comparative data are readily available. This means the unobservable factors cannot be accounted for. The lack of consistent data across space and time means that certain control variables cannot be introduced into the model.

5. Immigration

Chapter Overview

This first empirical chapter aims to understand if the volume and the rate of the migration from Central and Eastern Europe can explain the variations in public sentiment towards immigration across the Western European host countries over time. Two research questions are examined in this chapter: Have the increases in E8 migrant populations been associated with public concern about the impact of immigration on the national culture or economy in Western Europe? And, is this relationship (if any) moderated by national economic factors or the presence of other foreign nationals?

As presented in Chapter 2, ethnic competition theory predicts that an increase in the relative size of an out-group population as well as a surge in the pace of this increase poses a perceived threat to individuals in an in-group living together in a society. Based on this theoretical framework, I expect that individuals living in a country with a large group of E8 nationals, or a rapidly growing group of E8 nationals, or both, are more likely to perceive immigration to be a threat to their society. I also expect that certain national contextual factors can moderate the relationship between the size and rate of increase in E8 nations, namely that it would be exacerbated by precarious economic conditions or a large number of other foreign nationals. This prediction is guided by the rationale that the perception of the threat of immigration can be heightened by a shortage in economic resources or by a larger size of the immigrant population in general.

The results in this chapter simultaneously consider two levels of analysis: the individual (level 1) and the country (level 2). This chapter utilizes micro attitudinal data from the five biannual rounds (2002-2010) of the European Social Survey, pooled with national contextual level data. Two independent variables are explored in this study, the volume of E8 migration (relative to the size of the national population) and the rate at which it increases annually. The focus of this chapter is on the relationship between these independent variables and public attitudes towards immigration. These attitudes have been separated into two dependent variables: individual's perception of whether immigration is bad for the national economy[⦿] and their perception of whether immigration is bad for

[⦿] This has been measured based on the responses to the following survey question: 'Would you say that it is generally good or bad for [country's] economy that people come to live here from other countries?' The respondents are then prompted to select values from 0 (bad for the economy) to 10 (good for the economy).

the national culture.“ Recall, these two variables have been kept as separate since they each describe a conceptually different attitude and are only loosely correlated (pairwise correlation = 0.6).

The empirical strategy is to use multi-level modelling to take into account the nested structure of the data. The independent variable, along with the control variables, is modelled on each dependent variable. Blocks of control variables are introduced in a step-wise fashion, beginning with the estimation of the ‘null’ model (Model 0). The null model does not include any explanatory variables in order to establish the general variance of national differences for both dependent variables. Then, blocks of control variables are introduced, which build up to a baseline model. After the baseline models have been presented, the interaction effects are introduced and the robustness of the findings is tested.


This chapter is presented in five parts. First, the descriptive results are outlined. This is then followed by two sections, which present the regression results. The first section presents the OLS regression results, whereas the second section presents the results from the multi-level models. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the results presented in this chapter.

Descriptive Results

Western Europe’s aggregate opinion on immigration has remained stable over the last decade. The mean response for the entire period, that is from 2002 to 2010, is 4.9, on a scale of 10. In other words, on an aggregate level, Europeans seem to feel ambivalent about the impact of immigration on their economy. **Error! Reference source not found.** shows that the perceptions of the economic impact of immigration were at the lowest in 2004, the year of the enlargement.

“ This has been measured based on the responses to the following question: ‘Would you say that it is generally good or bad for [country’s] culture that people come to live here from other countries?’ The respondents are then prompted to select values from 0 (bad for the culture) to 10 (good for the culture).


Figure 5.A Aggregate Opinion. Economic Impact of Immigration



Note: Population weights applied


Europeans tend to be more positive about the cultural impact of immigration than its economic impact. Across all waves of the survey and all countries included, the average response regarding the cultural impact of immigration was 5.6, which is notably higher than the responses regarding the economic impact. In **Error! Reference source not found.**, the aggregate cultural scores are fairly stable and vacillate only between scores of 5.7 and 5.5. Support for the cultural benefit of immigration also dropped between 2002 and 2004.

Figure 5.B Aggregate Opinion, Cultural Impact of Immigration



Note: Population weights applied


Figure 5.C Distribution of Attitudes, Economic Impact of Immigration



Error! Reference source not found. shows the distribution of the responses across a scale of 0 (bad for the economy) to 10 (good for the economy). A response of 5 was by far the most frequent response, indicating that immigration is perceived to have a neutral effect on the economy. A greater number of respondents believe that immigration is bad for the economy (score of 0 or 1) than the number who believes that it is good for the economy (with a score of 9 or 10). When looking at the year of the enlargement, in 2004, we see a decrease in the frequency of scores of 5 and an increase in negative responses (scores of 0-4).

The majority of respondents in Europe (51%) feel that immigration does more good than harm to their country's culture. According to **Error! Reference source not found.**, the majority of Europeans feel that immigration has either a neutral or positive impact on society. The median response was a 6, indicating a positive position on the cultural impact of immigration. In 2004, the distribution of support for the cultural benefit of immigration falls a bit lower until 2010.

Figure 5.D Distribution of Attitudes, Cultural Impact of Immigration



There is variation across countries when comparing aggregate attitudes towards immigration. As shown in Table 5.1, the member states that have the least favourable view of the economic impact of immigration are the Belgians and British, followed by the French and the Portuguese. The Germans, Danish, Spanish, Finnish, Irish and Dutch all had more positive views of the economic impact of immigration than the average. Amongst the countries examined, it is the Swedes who view the economic impact of immigration most positively. According to Table 5.2, the scores for the cultural impact range from 5.2 to 7.1 on a scale of 1 to 10. Of the countries examined, the British felt the least supportive of the cultural impact (5.0), followed by Portugal (5.2) and France (5.3). Finland and Sweden view the cultural impact of immigration the most positively, with average scores of above 7.

Table 5.1 Mean Attitudes of the Economic Impact of Immigration

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2002-2010
EU Average	5.0	4.7	4.9	5.0	4.9	4.9
Austria	5.6	4.9	5.3	.	.	.
Belgium	4.6	4.4	4.7	4.8	4.5	4.6
Denmark	4.8	4.8	5.4	5.3	5.2	5.1
Finland	5.3	5.1	5.4	5.5	5.2	5.3
France	5.1	4.7	4.8	4.9	4.7	4.8
Germany	5.2	4.5	4.8	5.3	5.2	5.0
Greece	3.6	3.9	.	3.5	.	.
Ireland	5.0	5.8	6.1	5.0	4.4	5.2
Italy	5.3	.	.	.	.	.
Luxembourg	6.8	6.0	.	.	.	.
Netherlands	4.8	4.6	5.1	5.4	5.2	5.0
Portugal	4.8	4.4	4.9	5.0	4.7	4.8
Spain	5.4	5.6	5.7	5.2	5.0	5.3
Sweden	5.5	5.0	5.4	5.5	5.9	5.4
UK	4.4	4.6	4.5	4.7	4.5	4.6

Source: Author's own analysis of the European Social Survey, Rounds 1-5. Question: Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries? 0 represents 'bad for the economy' and 10 represents 'good for the economy'.
Note: The EU average includes 11 countries show here but does not include Austria, Greece, Italy or Luxembourg, since information is unavailable for all five rounds of the survey. Population weights applied.

Aggregate opinion fluctuates across countries over time. As shown in Table 5.1, some countries grew to be more positive about the economic impact of immigration while others grew more negative. When comparing the responses from 2010 with those from 2002, a handful of countries felt more favourably (Danish, Dutch and Swedish) in 2010 than they did in 2002. In France and Spain, the respondents felt less favourably in 2010 than in 2002. Belgium, Finland and Portugal also experienced decreases, albeit only slight ones. Germany did not experience a change, with a mean score of 5.2 on a scale of 10 in both 2002 and 2010. Ireland stands out as the most volatile with strong increases in

sentiment from 2002 to 2006 and then a sharp decrease from 2006 to 2010 when it eventually fell to a 4.4, a trend which could arguably coincide with its economic downturn.

Most countries also experienced a drop in aggregate support for the cultural benefit of immigration. As shown in Table 5.2, Finland, Belgium, Germany, France, United Kingdom and Ireland all experienced drops in aggregate support. On the other hand, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden experienced slight increases in aggregate support for the cultural benefit. Spain did not experience any change, with a mean score of 5.9 in both 2002 and 2010.

Table 5.2 Mean Attitudes, Cultural Impact of Immigration

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2002-210
EU -Average	5.7	5.5	5.5	5.7	5.5	5.6
Austria	5.8	5.3	4.8	.	.	.
Belgium	5.8	5.7	5.8	5.9	5.5	5.7
Denmark	5.8	5.8	6.1	6.0	6.1	6.0
Finland	7.3	7.0	7.1	7.3	6.8	7.1
France	5.2	5.1	5.2	5.5	5.2	5.3
Germany	6.2	5.8	5.6	6	5.8	5.9
Greece	3.6	3.8	.	3.5	.	.
Ireland	5.6	5.8	5.9	5.7	5.3	5.6
Italy	5.3	.	.	.	.	.
Luxembourg	7.1	6.5	.	.	.	.
Netherlands	6.0	5.8	6.1	6.1	6.1	6.0
Portugal	5.2	4.6	5.3	5.7	5.3	5.2
Spain	5.9	5.9	5.8	5.7	5.9	5.8
Sweden	7.1	7.0	6.9	7.0	7.2	7.0
UK	5.2	5.0	4.8	4.9	5.0	5.0


Source: Author's own analysis of the European Social Survey, Rounds 1-5.

Note: The EU average includes 11 countries show here but does not include Austria, Greece, Italy or Luxembourg since they did not participate in all five rounds of the survey. Population and design weights applied

There appears to be a slightly positive relationship between the percentage of E8 stock (independent variable) and the sentiment that immigration benefits the national economy (dependent variable).

Error! Reference source not found. plots the mean values for each country in a scatter plot.


Figure 5.E E8 Stock vs. Economic Impact of Immigration



Three countries stand out from the group. First, Ireland has an extraordinary number of E8 nationals. Yet, the Irish perceive the economic impact of immigration more positively (5.2) than the EU-15 average (4.9). From 1998 to 2008, Ireland experienced both a period of rapid growth and immigration is thought to have had a played an important role in supporting this economic growth (Barrett and Bergin 2007). Secondly, the Luxembourgish see the economic impact of immigration more positively than those from the other European countries, but Luxembourg's immigration patterns are particular. It has the highest density of immigrants among all EU members: according to Eurostat (2012), for every 1,000 people living in Luxembourg, 33 of these were foreign nationals who tend to be highly skilled and culturally similar to natives. Strong economic conditions and low economic inequality have also been cited as explanations for why the Luxembourgish perceive immigration so positively (Fetzer 2011). Finally, Greece stands in stark contrast to Luxembourg, where the public is far less enthusiastic about the economic contribution of immigration. Greece is a relatively new destination country for immigrants and has a legacy of being a country of emigration. The anti-immigration sentiment is thought to be linked to an underexposure to immigrants and a

prevailing sense of Greek nationalism that venerates their ancient past (Tsimouris 2012). Native contact with immigrants tends to be rarer in Greece than in other parts of Europe (Semyonov and Glikman 2009) and there is a high proportion of irregular migrants (Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini 2011). In sum, Ireland, Luxembourg and Greece are notably different from the rest of the EU but, even when they are removed from the analysis, the descriptive relationship between the E8 stock and perceptions about immigration still remains slightly positive.


Figure 5.F E8 Stock vs. Cultural Impact of Immigration



There also appears to be a slightly positive relationship between the percentage of E8 stock and the sentiment that immigration benefits the national culture. **Error! Reference source not found.** plots the mean values for each country in a scatter plot. The Greeks seem equally sceptical of the cultural benefits of immigration as they are of the economic benefits. Ireland shares the same mean attitudinal response (5.6) as the overall EU average, despite having an extraordinary proportional amount of E8 citizens.


A further check must be conducted to confirm that the relationship between E8 migration and attitudes about the impact of immigration is, in fact, a linear one. To do so, a graphical method is used where the residuals (e)⁴⁵ are plotted against the independent variable (x), the proportion of E8 nationals. The goal of the exercise is to confirm the linear relationship if the residuals fluctuate randomly around zero without any semblance of a pattern. If this is the case, then standard residuals should be uncorrelated with the independent variable and is evidence of a linear relationship (Chatterjee and Hadi 2013). The plots in **Error! Reference source not found.** and **Error! Reference source not found.** show that the plotted values that fall randomly⁴⁶ around the zero line and this evidence supports the appropriateness of a linear regression model in the next section.

Figure 5.G Residual Plot Linearity Test, Economic Impact of Immigration



⁴⁵ A residual is the difference between the observed value of the dependent variable and the predicted value.
⁴⁶ The values do not show attributes of a curvilinear relationship which are demonstrated by U-shapes or inverted U-shapes.

Figure 5.H Residual Plot Linearity Test, Cultural Impact of Immigration



OLS Results

Before employing a multi-level strategy, the analysis is first conducted for each country using a traditional OLS regression. This exercise will help to inform the results of the multi-level analysis conducted in the following section by providing an understanding of the compositional effects of the individuals in various countries in the sample. The results for the relationship between E8 stock and attitudes towards immigration are shown in Table 5.3 while Table 5.4 shows the relationship with the annual rate of increase of E8 stock rather than the relative amount in a given year.

E8 Nationals and the Public Perception of Immigration from an Economic Point of View

When looking within most countries over time, there is no significant relationship between the number of E8 nationals living in the country and attitudes about the impact of immigration on the national economy. Table 5.3 shows that the relationship is not significant in: Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden and the United Kingdom. In some of these countries (Belgium, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom) the results in Table 5.4 show that there also does not appear to be a relationship between the rate of increase of E8 nationals living in the country and attitudes about the economic benefits of immigration.

Standing apart from the other countries, we observe that on Denmark and the Netherlands, the proportional amount of E8 nationals in the population is associated with the perception that

immigration is more economically beneficial. In the case of Denmark we also observe in Table 5.4 that the rate of increase in E8 nationals is also positively associated with this attitude. Both Denmark and the Netherlands also received considerable increases in their E8 populations relative to their national population size, tripling in the six years following the enlargement. The positive association does not appear to be explained by a similar skill composition within these countries. For instance, as discussed in Chapter 2, the Netherlands tended to attract lower skilled E8 workers while Denmark tended to attract the higher skilled. The positive association with these changes and public opinion may be explained by the fact that, in all three of these countries, public opinion about immigration increasingly improved from 2002 to 2010.^e This positive trend in these two countries runs counter to the overall trend in Western Europe, which was growing slightly more negative throughout the decade.

Table 5.3 shows that only two countries show a negative and significant association between post-enlargement migration and public sentiment about immigration from an economic point of view. The first of these countries is France. Unlike its neighbours, France actually received a proportionally smaller number of E8 nationals. As the enlargement was broadening Europe, immigration was becoming a fiercely contentious political issue in France. The French vocalized their concerns about the new waves of Muslim immigrants as the Maghreb youth rioted across Paris (BBC 2005) and the possibility of Turkey's accession into the EU was met with public outrage (Franck 2005). It is therefore unsurprising that, from 2002 to 2010, the average French opinion about the economic benefits of immigration was falling. The second country with a negative association is Luxembourg, which is a particular case when it comes to immigration. As noted before, Luxembourg has the highest proportion of foreign nationals in its population (over 30%) and these tend to be highly skilled. Still, too much emphasis cannot be put on the results from Luxembourg since it only participated in two rounds of the survey (2002, 2004) and there is no micro-data on Luxembourgish attitudes after the EU enlargement.

In a small handful of countries, although the rate of change in E8 nationals, rather than the absolute size of the group, appears to go hand-in-hand with a greater concern about the economic impact of immigration. In Table 5.4, we see that in Austria, Germany and Greece there is a negative

^e Time fixed effects cannot be introduced into the OLS models due to collinearity.

and significant relationship between the rate at which presence of E8 nationals increased in their societies and the perception that immigration is economically beneficial. In the case of Austria and Germany, this could be because these two countries already had the most sizeable populations of E8 nationals prior to the enlargement due both to their geographical positions and their historical ties with central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, this could explain why the rate of increase in E8 nationals shows a negative relationship with immigration attitudes while their proportion in the national population does not. Finally, it should also be mentioned that too much cannot be inferred from the results pertaining to Greece since it only participated in three of the five rounds of the European Social Survey.

In Finland and Spain we observe in Table 5.4 that the opposite trend: rapidly growing E8 populations are associated with more positive attitudes about the cultural impact of immigration. This finding is particularly interesting since it runs counter to the predictions of ethnic competition theory that a fast accumulation of an immigrant group is associated with more defensive attitudes amongst the natives. While both the Finnish and the Spanish attitudes show a correlation with the rate of increase in E8 nationals, they do not appear related to the relative size of group of E8 nationals living in their country. But given the simplistic nature of these within country regressions which do not account for general time trends or other national contextual factors, we cannot infer too much from these results. For instance, Finnish people have generally grown more positive about the cultural benefits of immigration and this could be another explanation for the association. Although such a general trend is not the case in Spain, the association could be driven by mitigating economic factors which worsened and slowed the rate of E8 population growth after 2006.

E8 Nationals and the Public Perception of Immigration from a Cultural Point of View

When looking at attitudes regarding the cultural impact of immigration in Table 5.3, only two countries show there to be a negative association with the proportion of E8 nationals living there: Austria and Luxembourg. In the case of Luxembourg and Austria, the same caveats described above apply. But we should also bear in mind that Luxembourg and Austria only participated in two rounds of the ESS survey (where is most other countries participated in five) and too much weight cannot be placed on these regressions which only include two time points.

In some countries, although the number of E8 nationals is not associated with attitudes about the cultural impact, the rate at which they are increasing does. In Belgium, Portugal and Greece, in years in which there was a more rapid accumulation of E8 nationals living in the country compared to the previous year, natives felt that immigration posed more of a cultural threat. Although the relative number of E8 nationals in Portugal was the smallest in all of the countries, the rate at which this group increased does show a negative relationship with attitudes about the cultural impact of immigration amongst the Portuguese. A possible explanation is that the Portuguese were increasingly grappling with became a new destination country for immigration and that there was a great deal of sensitivity of the implications for their national culture during the early 2000s as the rate of E8 was growing. But unfortunately, this cannot be verified by the data since within country regressions cannot address other contextual changes in the country that are simultaneously occurring. In Belgium, the relationship may only be coincidental since it could likely explained by the fact that increases in their E8 population spiked sharply in 2004 (an increase of 93% over the previous year) which happened to be the most year Belgians, following a European-wide trend, felt the most negatively about immigration.

The remaining countries show that there is no association between the way an individual perceives the cultural impact of immigration and the proportion of E8 nationals living in the country. The one exception is Denmark, where as E8 populations grew, the host society simultaneously felt more positively about how immigration influences the national culture. However, since time fixed effects are collinear with E8 migration, this keeps them from being included in the within-country OLS regressions. This means that the positive relationship between E8 migration and Danish sentiment about the cultural impact of immigration could be driven by a general trend in attitudes over time rather than by E8 migration itself. This seems likely since the Danish was on the rise: the mean response increased from a score of 5.8 in 2002 to 6.1 in 2010, as shown in Table 5.2.

However, it should be noted that in most countries the rate at which the population of E8 nationals increased does not appear to be related. In Table 5.4 we observe that there is not a significant relationship in Austria, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom). But we do observe an exception in Ireland, there was a positive association between a rapid increase in post-enlargement migration (rather than the absolute size of the group) and the sentiment that immigration is culturally beneficial amongst the Irish public. This is yet another puzzling finding given that it runs contrary to the expectations of ethnic competition theory. Given

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the simplistic approach of within-country regressions, one can only speculate as the contextual explanations for this association. In the case of Ireland, one explanation may be an inverse relationship between increases in the rate of increase in the E8 population the foreign population in general. For instance, in 2006, Ireland experienced its most rapid annual increase in E8 population growth (154% over the previous year) which also simultaneously experiencing a the sharpest decrease in the rate of increase in general foreign population (-13%) of the period examined. If the general foreign population is shrinking, when the E8 population in growing, this could explain why public concerns about the cultural impact of immigration are less pronounced.

Table 5.3. E8 stock regressed over attitudes that immigration is economically or culturally beneficial (OLS regression)

Country		Economic Benefit		Cultural Benefit	
		Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Austria	log E8stock	-0.76	0.96	-2.83*	0.29
	intercept	1.25	4.59	-8.37	1.15
	R-squared	0.08		0.15	
	N	5215		5222	
Belgium	log E8stock	0.08	0.08	-0.11	0.11
	intercept	4.58	0.61	5.07	0.56
	R-squared	0.08		0.11	
	N	7782		7784	
Denmark	log E8stock	0.40*	0.14	0.19*	0.06
	intercept	7.86	0.61	6.81	0.26
	R-squared	0.09		0.14	
	N	6852		6932	
Finland	log E8stock	0.13	0.24	-0.35	0.28
	intercept	4.34	1.36	3.98	1.62
	R-squared	0.08		0.12	
	N	8937		8962	
France	log E8stock	-2.53**	0.28	0.12	0.49
	intercept	-13.63	2.11	6.26	3.65
	R-squared	0.15		0.18	
	N	7970		7986	
Germany	log E8stock	1.06	0.48	-0.49	0.56

Greece	intercept	9.37	2.27	2.3	2.73
	R-squared	0.09		0.11	
	N	12235		12405	
	log E8stock	-0.83	0.42	-0.71	0.22
	intercept	-0.94	2.00	0.13	1.12
	R-squared	0.08		0.07	
Ireland	N	5317		5279	
	log E8stock	-0.08	0.32	-0.02	0.11
	intercept	4.35	1.57	4.36	0.42
Luxembourg	R-squared	0.05		0.07	
	N	6148		6137	
	log E8stock	-1.12*	0.05	-0.82*	0.01
Netherlands	intercept	-0.35	0.44	1.83	0.07
	R-squared	0.05		0.05	
	N	2182		2232	
	log E8stock	0.39*	0.09	0.09*	0.03
	intercept	7.43	0.41	6.85	0.21
	R-squared	0.09		0.11	
	N	8776		8836	
Portugal					
	log E8stock	0.01	0.18	0.24	0.23
	intercept	4.97	1.53	7.47	2.05
	R-squared	0.08		0.07	
Spain	N	6470		6419	
	log E8stock	-0.31	0.18	-0.13	0.06
	intercept	4.43	1.21	6.23	0.38
Sweden	R-squared	0.10		0.10	
	N	7410		7399	
	log E8stock	0.48	0.29	-0.07	0.15
United Kingdom	intercept	6.27	1.73	4.62	0.91
	R-squared	0.10		0.11	
	N	8189		8333	
	log E8stock	-0.01	0.04	-0.20	0.05
	intercept	4.22	0.40	3.60	0.34
	R-squared	0.09		0.10	
	N	9262		9276	

Table 5.4. E8 annual rate of increase regressed over attitudes that immigration is economically or culturally beneficial (OLS regression)

Country		Economic Benefit		Cultural Benefit	
		Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Austria					
	log E8 rate	-0.50**	0.03	-0.38	0.34
	intercept	3.71	0.26	4.25	0.38
	R-squared	0.09		0.14	
	N	5215		5222	
Belgium					
	log E8 rate	-0.18	0.06	-0.10*	0.01
	intercept	3.72	0.07	5.31	0.12
	R-squared	0.08		0.11	
	N	4557		4574	
Denmark					
	log E8 rate	0.23**	0.04	0.11**	0.02
	intercept	6.09	0.29	5.96	0.21
	R-squared	0.09		0.14	
	N	6852		6932	
Finland					
	log E8 rate	0.20*	0.06	-0.03	0.12
	intercept	4.08	0.22	5.87	0.34
	R-squared	0.08		0.11	
	N	8937		8962	
France					
	log E8 rate	-0.15**	0.01	0.00	0.03
	intercept	4.34	0.20	5.66	0.28
	R-squared	0.15		0.18	
	N	6437		6451	
Germany					
	log E8 rate	-0.19***	0.01	-0.1	0.07
	intercept	3.49	0.40	4.3	0.25
	R-squared	0.09		0.11	
	N	9868		9997	
Greece					
	log E8 rate	-0.49**	0.03	-0.32*	0.07
	intercept	3.63	0.53	4.19	0.17
	R-squared	0.08		0.07	
	N	5317		5279	
Ireland					
	log E8 rate	0.40	0.09	0.14*	0.02
	intercept	5.00	0.43	4.35	0.44
	R-squared	0.11		0.09	
	N	4370		4372	

Netherlands	log E8 rate	0.03	0.26	-0.08	0.11
	intercept	4.90	0.72	6.12	0.33
	R-squared	0.08		0.11	
	N	8776		8836	
Portugal	log E8 rate	-0.48	0.27	-0.86*	0.17
	intercept	3.94	0.69	3.62	0.45
	R-squared	0.08		0.07	
	N	5058		5010	
Spain	log E8 rate	0.24**	0.03	0.02	0.03
	intercept	6.75	0.20	7.08	0.39
	R-squared	0.11		0.10	
	N	7410		7399	
Sweden	log E8 rate	0.15	0.34	-0.18	0.07
	intercept	3.80	0.88	4.65	0.26
	R-squared	0.09		0.11	
	N	6419		6528	
United Kingdom	log E8 rate	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.05
	intercept	4.272	0.23	4.69	0.19
	R-squared	0.09		0.10	
	N	9262		9276	

Note: Italy and Luxembourg not included because due to participation in too few ESS rounds.

Multi-level Results

Null Models and Individual Controls

Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 report the coefficients for the null model and introduce individual-level controls for the dependent variables. Model 0a displays the results of the null model for the first dependent variable, attitudes towards the economic impact of immigration. Model 0b shows the results of the null model for the second dependent variable, attitudes towards the cultural impact of immigration. The null models (0a and 0b) show variations in attitudes to be mostly at the individual level but also at the country-level. Model 0a shows that approximately 5.6% of the variation in attitudes regarding the economic impact of immigration is at the country level. This is higher when it comes to attitudes about the cultural benefits of immigration (10.8%). In both cases, a variation greater than 5% at the country level justifies the use of multi-level modeling (Snijders, Bosker, and Bosker

2011). Moreover, the intercept is highly significant, demonstrating that opinions about the economic impact of immigration differ significantly across Western Europe.

Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 also report the results when including individual-level controls.* In terms of fit statistics, the tables show that including E8 stock, individual controls and time fixed effects in Models 1a and 1b show an improvement in model fit when compared with the null models. This is indicated by a higher pseudo-likelihood and by a reduction in residual variance. The results in Model 1a, the proportional size of the E8 stock in a host country shows a positive and but not significant association with attitudes towards the economic impact of immigration ($\beta = 0.01$). In Model 1b, we also do not yet observe a significant association between E8 stock and attitudes towards the cultural impact of immigration. This means, that accounting for the individual characteristics of national populations and time trends, there is no evidence of a relationship between the extent of post-enlargement migration and public sentiment about the benefits of immigration.

We do observe, however, an early indication that there may perhaps be a slightly positive but significant relationship between the rate at which E8 migration occurred and public attitudes. Table 5.5 shows that when taking into account individual characteristics and general time trends, the coefficient for *log E8 rate* is positive and significant ($\beta = 0.07$, $p < 0.00$) in Model 2a. Likewise, in Table 5.6, Model 2b shows us that *log E8 rate* is positively and significantly associated with perceptions of the cultural impact, albeit to a slightly lesser extent ($\beta = 0.03$, $p < 0.05$). But since these models are only an initial step in the analysis since they do not include national contextual controls, most notably the size of the population of the E8 nationals in a given country before E8 nationals were granted mobility within Europe after the enlargement. Thus, the seemingly positive relationship between the rate of E8 migration and perceptions that immigration is beneficially still requires corroboration through further analysis which will be explored in the next section which takes into account other simultaneous phenomena occurring within countries.

In Table 5.5 and Table 5.6, Models 1a and 1b also confirm that an individual's characteristics are closely linked with the way in which they perceive immigration.* First, women tend to view the economic aspect of immigration more negatively but the cultural aspect of immigration more positively than their male counterparts. Table 5.5 shows that being a woman tends to be, on average,

* Given the high number of missing values, household income is not included as a control variable.

* The findings refer to Western Europe as a whole. As we saw in the previous section, the significance and substantive effect of these individual-level characteristics can vary within each country.

associated with a 0.30-point lower score when asked about the economic benefits of immigration ($\beta = -0.30$, $p < 0.00$). This is consistent with previous research can be explained by the fact that European women tend to be more economically vulnerable than their male counterparts (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010). On the other hand, we see that, in Table 5.6, being a woman is associated with a slightly higher score (0.06) when asked about the cultural benefits of immigration ($\beta = 0.06$, $p < 0.01$). The findings that men tend to be more culturally threatened by immigration than women is consistent with other empirical findings, such as those by Pichler (2010) and is likely due to gender socialization.

Including individual characteristics in the model shows us that being older, on the one hand, associated with a more positive view on the economic impact of immigration ($\beta = 0.00$, $p < 0.00$) but a more negative view about the cultural impact of immigration ($\beta = -0.01$, $p < 0.00$). The coefficients are relatively minuscule since the “effect” of being a year older is negligible. But this is not to say that the results should be dismissed since although there are minimal differences between individuals with a single year of age, these then become much larger when speaking about differences between generations. While it has been acknowledged that older people are more concerned about the erosion of their country’s heritage as their country becomes more diverse due to immigration, their paradoxically more positive perception towards the economic benefit of immigration has not been fully explored in the existing research. One could imagine that there is an explanation based on self-interest when considering attitudes towards the economic impact. Namely, older people are more likely to be more established in their labour market position (or even not active if they are retired) and thus may feel personally less economically threatened by immigration. Moreover, it could also be argued that some older people may be aware of the dwindling dependency ratio in an ageing society and understand that the fiscal sustainability of their pension system could depend on an influx of young foreign workers.

Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 reveal that being more educated is strongly linked with more positive views about immigration. The amount of education an individual has received is significantly and positively associated with attitudes about the economic impact of immigration ($\beta = 0.13$, $p < 0.00$) and the cultural impact of immigration ($\beta = 0.13$, $p < 0.00$). In other words, for each additional year a respondent has spent in full-time education, he/she will perceive both the economic and the cultural benefits of immigration 0.13 points higher on a scale of 0 to 10. This result is consistent with the previous literature on the individual determinants of attitudes (Mayda 2006; Facchini and Mayda 2012) and stresses the importance of education in explaining differences in opinion on immigration.

I also find that an individual's vulnerability in the labour market is a significant predictor of how beneficial they perceive immigration is for their society. The vulnerability of an individual's status has been operationalized as their status as a labour market insider versus that of an outsider (working on a fixed term contract, involuntarily part-time, or experiencing unemployment). Labour market insiders act as the reference category when the variable is introduced into the model and individuals are not active in the labour market and thus cannot be categorized as insiders or outsiders are included as a separate category using a dummy variable. We see in Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 that labour market outsiders are far more negative about the impact of immigration on the economy ($\beta = -0.10$, $p < 0.00$) but do not have significantly different attitudes about the cultural impact. Those who are not active in the labour market are more positive than insiders, even when taking gender and age into account ($\beta = 0.10$, $p < 0.00$). A utilitarian interpretation of this result could be that since those who are not active in the labour market are not in direct competition with foreign nationals for employment and thus do not perceive immigration as economically threatening.

There is no evidence of increased media exposure tainting individual's views on immigration. The results shown in Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 reveal that spending more time watching television is actually associated with a more positive view about both the economic and the cultural aspects of immigration. For each additional hour that a respondent watches TV per day, he/she, on average, rates both the economic and cultural impact of immigration 0.06 points higher ($\beta = 0.06$, $p < 0.00$). From this analysis, it is impossible to glean if more TV exposure actually makes individuals more positive about immigration. Such a conclusion might only be drawn by using experimental designs. It is possible that selection bias is occurring, where individuals who are more open-minded about the benefits of immigration are more likely to tune in and watch politics on television.

Political affiliation is another important individual characteristic that is strongly tied to attitudes towards immigration. Recall that political affiliation is measured using a scale of 0 (extreme left wing) to 10 (extreme right-wing). Individuals who are ranked as more politically right-winged tend to have more negative views about immigration. In Table 5.5 and Table 5.6, we observe that, for each unit that an individual ranks further to the right, he or she scores the economic benefits of immigration 0.09 points lower ($\beta = -0.09$, $p < 0.00$) and the cultural benefits 0.14 points lower ($\beta = -0.14$, $p < 0.00$). This is an unsurprising finding, given that, in Europe, most parties with anti-immigration rhetoric tend to be on the extreme right of the political spectrum.

The location (urban vs. rural) where an individual lives also explains attitudes towards immigration. According to the results shown in Table 5.5 and Table 5.6, living in a rural area is negatively associated with acknowledging the economic benefits ($\beta=-0.14$, $p<0.00$) and the cultural benefits ($\beta=-0.11$, $p<0.00$) of immigration. The reasons for this are not fully understood in the literature nor can they be explored in the data at hand since the distribution of E8 nationals between rural and urban areas in a country is unknown. One could speculate that this is due to less prevalent appreciation of cosmopolitan values (such as multiculturalism) in rural areas or to be because since immigrants tend to congregate in cities rather in rural areas reducing social opportunities to build solidarity between immigrants and natives.

Individuals with a migrant background feel much more positively about the role of immigration in their society. According to Table 5.5 and Table 5.6, natives are notably less likely to acknowledge the economic benefits ($\beta=-0.57$, $p<0.00$) as well as the cultural benefits of migration ($\beta=-0.56$, $p<0.00$) than those with migrant backgrounds. This may be because individuals with a migrant background identify less strongly with the country's native population (in-group) or feel solidarity or empathy towards the other foreign nationals (out-group) and are in favour of admitting them to the country.

Table 5.5 Multi-level Null Model and Individual Controls, Economic Impact of Immigration

	Model 0a		Model 1a		Model 2a	
	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.
Intercept	5.05	0.15	4.86	0.22	4.92	0.15
E8 stock			0.01	0.02		
E8 rate					0.07***	0.01
Ind. Controls						
female			-0.30***	0.01	-0.30***	0.01
age			0.00***	0.00	0.00***	0.00
education			0.13***	0.00	0.13***	0.00
native			-0.57***	0.02	-0.59***	0.02
labor market (ref=insider)						
outsider			-0.10***	0.02	-0.11***	0.02
not active			0.10***	0.02	0.08***	0.02
rural			-0.14***	0.01	-0.14***	0.02
political orientation			-0.09***	0.00	-0.09***	0.00
tv exposure			0.06***	0.01	0.06***	0.01
Explained Variance						
country variation	0.32	0.12	0.31	0.11	0.26	0.10

residual variation	5.30	0.02	4.83	0.02	4.80	0.02
Log pseudolikelihood	-272987.24		-228658.68		-197678.58	
Time Fixed Effects	No		Yes		Yes	
N	120748, 15		103618, 15		89688, 14	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Table 5.6 Multi-level Null Model and Individual Controls, Cultural Impact of Immigration

	Model 0b		Model 1b		Model 2b	
	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.
Intercept	5.72	0.22	5.86	0.27	5.74	0.23
E8 stock			0.03	0.02		
E8 rate					0.03*	0.01
Ind. Controls						
female			0.06***	0.01	0.06***	0.01
age			-0.01***	0.00	-0.01***	0.00
education			0.13***	0.00	0.13***	0.00
native			-0.56***	0.02	-0.58***	0.02
labor market (ref=insider)						
outsider			-0.03	0.02	-0.04	0.02
not active			0.01	0.02	0.00	0.02
rural			-0.11***	0.01	-0.12***	0.02
political orientation			-0.14***	0.00	-0.14***	0.00
tv exposure			0.06***	0.01	0.06***	0.01
Explained Variance						
country variation	0.74	0.27	0.66	0.24	0.69	0.26
residual variation	5.45	0.02	4.82	0.02	4.81	0.02
Log pseudolikelihood	-274641.75		-229583.81		-198556.45	
Time Fixed Effects	No		Yes		Yes	
N	121121, 15		104086, 15		90069, 14	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Macro Level Controls and Baseline Models

First, Table 5.7 shows the relationships between contextual variables and attitudes towards the economic impact of immigration. Next, Table 5.8 shows the relationships between the contextual variables with the second dependent variable, individual attitudes towards the cultural impact of immigration. Models that are denoted with an 'a' refer to the first dependent variable (attitudes about

the economic impact of immigration) and those with a 'b' refer to the second dependent variable (attitudes about the cultural impact of immigration).

An individual's opinion about the economic impact immigration is strongly linked to the national economic conditions, as expected according to *ethnic competition theory*. The results show that living in a country with a greater GNI per capita is associated with having a more positive outlook about immigration in Model 5a ($\beta=0.00$, $p<0.01$) and Model 6a ($\beta=0.00$, $p<0.00$). Similarly, Models 5a and 6a also show that, when unemployment is higher, individuals tend to see immigration as more harmful to the economy ($\beta=-8.00$, $p<0.00$ and $\beta=-6.50$, $p<0.00$). This linkage can also be attributed to the 'lump of labour' fallacy, which in this context is a pervasive public belief that immigrants 'take jobs away' from natives. This is widely referred to as a fallacy in economics since it relies on the (often) false assumption that the employment opportunities in an economy are fixed.

Not surprisingly, the results find that economic conditions don't have as much of an impact on the way the public sees immigration from a cultural point of view. In Table 5.8 we see that GNI per capita and the national unemployment rate are not associated with attitudes towards the cultural impact of immigration. These results further reinforce the understanding that attitudes about the economic impact of immigration are distinct from those about the cultural impact and thus have different national contextual determinants.

The degree to which national governments restricted E8 mobility (*mobility*) also appears to be a factor. Recall that higher values of the *mobility* index indicate looser restrictions on E8 nationals entering and working in that country. The results in Models 5 (a and b) and 6 (a and b) show that living in countries with looser restrictions on E8 labour is associated with more positive attitudes about the economic aspect (Model 5a: $\beta=0.29$, $p<0.05$, Model 6a: $\beta=0.78$, $p<0.00$) as well as the cultural aspect (Model 5b: $\beta=0.47$, $p<0.00$, Model 6b: $\beta=0.65$, $p<0.00$) of migration. There is reason to suspect that these results may be driven by reverse causality. It is plausible that, in countries with individuals who are more open to immigration, governments were more likely to open up their borders quickly to these new European citizens. This is supported by the cases of Sweden and Ireland, which were among the very first to open up their labour markets to E8 nationals after the enlargement in 2004. On average, the Swedes feel very positively about the cultural benefits of immigration and the Irish feel fairly positive about its economic benefits. The case of the United Kingdom, however, seems to be an exception. Although it was one of the first countries to open its borders, its public remains the second most resistant to immigration in Western Europe. In sum, although a positive link between

allowing E8 mobility and individual opinions about immigration is uncovered, the causal direction remains uncertain.

Importantly, when taking into account confounding national circumstances, I find a significant and positive link between the extent of E8 migration and public views of immigration in the Western European host societies. In Table 5.7 and Table 5.8, Models 5a and 5b show the baseline models, which include individual controls and all contextual-level controls combined together into a single model with time fixed effects. The results can be interpreted as meaning that, as the E8 population increases by 100%, the individuals living in those Western European host societies felt about 0.33 points more positively about the economic impact of immigration and 0.17 points more positively about the cultural impact on a scale of 0 to 10. The results also show that including all of the contextual variables together in the baseline model reduces the country-level variation and slightly improves the log pseudo-likelihood.

A critical understanding of the results also means understanding not only their statistical significance but also the magnitude of the relationships. ‘Causal efficacy’, as advanced by Abelson (2012) is one way of evaluating this and is done so by considering the a ratio of the size of the effect to the size of its cause.⁸ If putting the coefficients for the relationship with attitudes regarding the economic impact of immigration ($\beta=0.27$) and the cultural impact ($\beta=0.07$) in this perspective, the magnitude of the relationship appears relatively small to the change in the independent variable, which is a 100% increase in the proportion of the country’s E8 nationals. I have calculated the Coehn’s F^2 effect size to be 0.13 for the economic impact attitude and 0.14 for the cultural impact variable, which are both considered to be small according to Cohen’s (1988) guidelines. Sometimes, even a small causal efficacy ratio can be justified if the dependent variable is difficult to influence (Prentice and Miller 1992). But this is not the case in this study, where attitudes towards immigration appear to be also driven by several other macro-economic factors such as the national unemployment rate. This means that though the coefficient may be statistical significant and theoretically meaningful, E8 migration is not a primary factor which explains most differences in attitudes.

The results between post-enlargement migration and attitudes towards immigration run counter to trends observed about immigration more generally. If we turn to the results which measure

⁸ The terms ‘effect’ and ‘cause’ are used to accurately describe the concept but are used loosely here because of the problems determining causality in this study. Rather, in this study this is interpreted to mean the independent and dependent variable.

the relationship between the size of the total foreign population (but not including E8 nationals) we observe an opposite trend. When it comes to non-E8 foreign nationals, the results follow the predictions of ethnic competition theory: that is living in a country with a larger relative share of foreign nationals in the population is associated with more negative views about the impact of immigration on the national economy (Model 5a: $\beta=-0.62$, $p<0.00$; Model 6a: $\beta=-0.43$, $p<0.00$) and culture (Model 5b: $\beta=-0.54$, $p<0.00$; Model 6b: $\beta=-0.38$, $p<0.00$).

However, the results do not confirm the hypothesis that the rapid growth of E8 nationals in Western European societies were associated with more negative perceptions of immigration. Although there is a slightly negative association ($\beta=-0.02$), it does not achieve significance when introduced into Models 6a or 6b. This is even the case when taking into account the initial size of the E8 population in 2002 prior to the enlargement. The fact that these results uncover a relationship between attitudes and the stock of E8 migrants but not its annual rate of increase underscores the point that the size of an immigrant population is a separate phenomenon from the pace of immigration.

Table 5.7 Multilevel Models with Contextual Controls, Economic Impact of Immigration

	Model 3a coef (se)	Model 4a coef (se)	Baseline Models	
			Model 5a coef (se)	Model 6a coef (se)
Intercept	4.54 (0.37)	4.09 (0.36)	4.93 (0.43)	1.42 (0.48)
Contextual Variables				
log E8stock	0.25*** (0.03)		0.33*** (0.03)	
log E8rate		0.07*** (0.01)		-0.02 (0.01)
2002 E8 stock		0.04 (0.02)		0.15*** (0.02)
mobility restrictions	0.07 (0.13)	0.37* (0.16)	0.29* (0.14)	0.78*** (0.16)
log foreign stock	-0.64*** (0.09)	-0.35* (0.09)	-0.62*** (0.09)	-0.43*** (0.10)
unemployment			-8.00*** (0.57)	-6.50*** (0.62)
GNI per capita			0.00** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)
Explained Variance				
country variation	0.67 (0.25)	0.43 (0.17)	0.63 (0.24)	0.59 (0.25)
residual variation	4.79 (0.02)	4.78 (0.02)	4.78 (0.21)	4.77 (0.02)
Time Fixed Effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
Individual-level controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Log pseudolikelihood	-214597.76	-187782.03	-214479.32	-187651.99
N	97427, 15	85275, 14	97427, 15	85275, 14

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Table 5.8 Multilevel Models with Contextual Controls, Cultural Impact of Immigration

	Model 3b coef (se)	Model 4b coef (se)	Baseline Models	
			Model 5b coef (se)	Model 6b coef (se)
Intercept	5.21 (0.38)		5.21 (0.45)	3.29 (0.47)
Contextual Variables				
log E8 stock	0.17*** (0.03)		0.17*** (0.03)	
log E8rate		0.01 (0.01)		-0.02 (0.01)
log 2002 E8 stock		0.10*** (0.02)		0.15*** (0.02)
mobility restrictions	0.47*** (0.13)	0.58*** (0.16)	0.47*** (0.14)	0.65*** (0.16)
log foreign stock	-0.52*** (0.09)	-0.37*** (0.10)	-0.54*** (0.09)	-0.38*** (0.09)
unemployment			0.41 (0.57)	0.61 (0.61)
GNI per capita			0.00 (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)
Explained Variance				
country variation	0.80 (0.29)	0.74 (0.28)	0.82 (0.31)	0.51 (0.19)
residual variation	4.78 (0.02)	4.77 (0.02)	4.78 (0.02)	4.76 (0.02)
Time Fixed Effects	yes	yes	yes	yes
Individual-level controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Log pseudolikelihood	-215523.61	-188462.44	-215523.25	-188439.24
N	97909, 15	85657, 14	97909, 15	85657, 14

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

The influence of E8 migration across the distribution of attitudes

It may very well be that the attitudinal “impact” (I use the term impact loosely in full recognition that I can only demonstrate association with the data at hand) of Eastern migration can be different depending how individuals perceive immigration. Or put another way, the contextual significance of E8 migration for public, both in magnitude and direction, could be different across the spectrum of public opinion. The analysis in the previous section only measured how the volume and pace of E8 migration was related to the way a person with an average (mean) opinion. But what about those individuals who are not reflective of the typical opinion? What about individuals who have more strong opinions about immigration and its impact on their society?

In this section, I explore how the relationship between E8 migration and attitudes varies across the attitudinal spectrum. In order to do so, I run the analysis but segment the respondents of the European Social Survey into two sub-populations: those who feel that immigration is a threat to

their society (scores 0-10) and those who feel that it is beneficial (scores 6-10). Although one could conceivably sub-divide these groups into more and less extreme attitudes, this is not done to preserve the large size of the sub-populations. This exercise is conducted twice for each of the dependent variables: attitudes about the cultural impact of immigration and attitudes about the economic impact of immigration.

The results suggest that the positive relationship between post-enlargement migration and the public perceptions that immigration is beneficial for the economy is concentrated amongst individuals who are more positive about immigration. When conducting the analysis on sub-groups, Table 5.9 shows that there is a positive and highly significant relationship amongst the group of individuals who feel that immigration is economically beneficial ($\beta=0.17$, $p<0.00$) but not amongst individuals who feel that immigration is threatening even when taking into account confounding socio-demographic characteristics. When it comes to attitudes about the cultural aspect of immigration, there does not appear to be a differential relationship in Table 5.10 when comparing individuals who feel immigration is culturally beneficial with those that feel it is culturally threatening.

Table 5.9 Multilevel Results: The influence of E8 stock across the distribution of attitudes towards the economic impact of immigration

	Beneficial for Economy		Threat to Economy	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	8.73	0.32	0.39	0.36
log E8 stock	0.17***	0.03	-0.05	0.03
Explained Variance				
country variation	0.15	0.06	0.04	0.02
residual variation	1.19	0.01	1.75	0.01
Individual Controls	yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-58580.00		-58392.56	
N	38907, 15		34385, 15	

* $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.00$

Note: Those that feel neutrally about immigration have not been tested due to collinearity with the constant.

Table 5.10 Multilevel Results: The influence of E8 rate across the distribution of attitudes towards the economic impact of immigration

	Beneficial for Economy		Threat to Economy	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	6.97	0.34	0.59	0.38
log E8 rate	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01
Explained Variance				
country variation	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.03
residual variation	1.17	0.01	1.74	0.01
Individual Controls	yes		yes	
Contextual Contros	yes		yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-51242.33		-51016.52	
N	34173, 14		30053, 14	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: Those that feel neutrally about immigration have not been tested due to collinearity with the constant.

The rate at which E8 migration occurred (rather than the size of the E8 population) may be a negative predictor amongst individuals believe that immigration is culturally beneficial. The results in Table 5.12 show a that there is a slightly negative and significant ($p<0.05$) relationship between a rapid increase in E8 nationals and attitudes about the benefits of immigration on the national culture but only amongst individuals who feel that that it is beneficially. There is no evidence that such a relationship occurs when conducting the analysis amongst individuals who feel that immigration is culturally threatening. This means that there is no evidence that E8 migration explains cross country /time differences in negative perceptions. It should also be noted that these findings pertain only to the rate of E8 increases since we see in Table 5.11 that a similar pattern does not emerge when looking at the relationship with the size of the E8 population.

Table 5.11 Multilevel Results: The influence of E8 stock across the distribution of attitudes towards the cultural impact of immigration

	Beneficial for Culture		Threat to Culture	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.

Intercept	7.46	0.51	2.24	0.71
log E8 stock	0.02	0.04	-0.02	0.05
Explained Variance				
country variation	0.42	0.16	1.06	0.43
residual variation	3.17	0.02	4.81	0.04
Individual Controls	yes		yes	
Contextual Contros	yes		yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-80815.17		-74236.15	
N	40474, 15		33663, 15	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: Those that feel neutrally about immigration have not been tested due to collinearity with the constant.

Table 5.12 Multilevel Results: The influence of E8 rate across the distribution of attitudes towards the cultural impact of immigration

	Beneficial for Culture		Threat to Culture	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	7.40	0.31	1.08	0.42
log E8 rate	-0.02*	0.01	0.00	0.01
Explained Variance				
country variation	0.05	0.02	0.05	0.02
residual variation	1.34	0.01	1.74	0.02
Individual Controls	yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-74536.59		-37114.45	
N	47643, 14		21873, 14	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: Those that feel neutrally about immigration have not been tested due to collinearity with the constant.

Interaction effects of national context

The next part of the analysis explores the importance of the national context in moderating the relationship between E8 migration and Western European attitudes towards immigration. The

contextual-level control variables are multiplied with the independent variables and introduced into the model as interaction terms.³³ In Table 5.13 and Table 5.14, each interaction term is introduced into two separate models. Models with the first dependent variable, attitudes about the economic impact of immigration, are denoted with an 'a'. Again, models with the second dependent variable, attitudes about the cultural impact of immigration, are denoted with a 'b'.

The condition of the national economy moderates the extent to which E8 migration has shaped the attitudes about the role of immigration in Western European economies, but the way in which this occurs is not straightforward. On the one hand, some economic factors exacerbate the relationship while others lessen it. In Table 5.13 and Table 5.14, Models 8a and 12b shows that there is a highly significant negative association with *logE8stock*unemployment* ($\beta=-2.75$, $p<0.00$) as well as *log E8 rate*unemployment* ($\beta=-1.22$, $p<0.00$). This can be interpreted as meaning that the positive link between the magnitude and pace of E8 migration and attitudes about immigration is lessened when unemployment is higher. This finding about unemployment confirms predictions by ethnic competition theory, which expects that individuals will be more skeptical of immigration in times and places where the economic resources are constrained.

To a certain extent, the wealth of the economy shows the opposite trend and is not always consistent with the predications made by ethnic competition theory. In Table 5.13, Models 7a shows that there is a highly significant negative association with *logE8stock*GNI* ($\beta= -0.09$, $p<0.05$). This means that, when the national economy is wealthier, there is a less positive link between E8 migration and attitudes about the economic impact of immigration. This is also the case with the second dependent variable, attitudes about the cultural impact of immigration in Model 7b ($\beta=-0.35$, $p<0.00$). Ethnic competition theory would expect the opposite result: that as the economic resources are less prevalent, the individuals in that group are more concerned with admitting individuals into the country. On the other hand, when examining how economic wealth interacted with the pace of E8 migration, the findings in Models 11a and 11b are consistent with the theoretical expectations: attitudes are more positive about immigration in countries with a rapidly growing E8 population when economic conditions are more prosperous.

³³ Interaction terms with individual control variables could not be explored because the number of level-2 groups (countries) is insufficient ($n=15$).

There is a slight indication that the relationship between post-enlargement migration and perceptions of immigration depended on general immigration trends. The results in Model 9a and 13a in Table 5.13 and Table 5.14 show that the interaction terms *logE8stock*log foreign stock* and *logE8rate*log foreign stock* show a negative and significant coefficients ($\beta=-0.11$ and $\beta=-0.05$). This can be interpreted to mean that individuals the positive link between the number and rate of increase in E8 nationals living in the country and attitudes about the economic impact immigration is eroded in countries where there are large foreign national populations.

The national restrictions placed on immigration may also be an important national contextual factor which moderates the relationship between immigration and public attitudes. In the case of migration from the East, the results show that the increased restrictions placed on E8 mobility during the transitional period intensified the positive relationship between the number of new Europeans and public attitudes about immigration. The results show that this is the case for both public sentiment about the impact of immigration on the national economy in Model 10a ($\beta=-0.49$, $p<0.05$) and culture in Model 10b ($\beta=-0.84$, $p<0.00$). Similarly, in Table 5.14 we observe in Models 14a that a faster rate of increase in the E8 population is a negative moderator as well ($\beta=-0.05$, $p<0.00$). That is to say that individuals living in a country with a large or growing number of E8 nationals and loose restrictions on mobility is likely to feel more negative about immigration than an individual living in a country with a large number of E8 nationals but tighter restrictions on mobility.

Table 5.13 Multilevel Regression with Interaction Terms, the impact of E8 stock on Attitudes towards Immigration

	economic (a)		cultural (b)	
	coef	SE	coef	SE
Models 7a-b				
log E8 stock	1.31**	0.45	3.89***	0.45
GNI per capita	0.00*	0.00	-0.00*	0.00
log E8 stock*GNI	-0.09*	0.04	-0.35***	0.04
intercept	5.27	0.47	6.50	0.47
Level 1 Variance	0.68	0.26	0.73	0.27
Level 2 Variance	4.78	0.02	4.77	0.02
Models 8a-b				
log E8 stock	0.46***	0.04	0.24***	0.04
unemployment	-23.96***	3.09	-8.74**	3.10
log E8stock*unemployment	-2.75***	0.52	-1.57**	0.53

intercept	6.55	0.52	6.14	0.54
Level 1 Variance	0.44	0.17	0.74	0.28
Level 2 Variance	4.77	0.02	4.78	0.02
Models 9a-b				
log E8 stock	0.02	0.14	-0.01	0.14
log foreign stock	-1.25***	0.29	-0.88**	0.29
log E8stock*log foreign stock	-0.11*	0.05	-0.06	0.05
intercept	3.01	0.95	4.14	0.95
Level 1 Variance	0.64	0.24	0.78	0.30
Level 2 Variance	4.78	0.02	4.78	0.02
Models 10a-b				
log E-8 stock	0.38***	0.04	0.25***	-0.04
mobility restrictions	-2.50*	1.17	-4.29***	1.17
log E8 stock*mobility restrict.	-0.49*	0.21	-0.84***	0.21
intercept	5.5	0.50	6.23	0.51
Level 1 Variance	0.6	0.24	0.80	0.30
Level 2 Variance	4.8	0.02	4.78	0.02

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: Includes year fixed effect, individual-level controls and contextual level controls

Table 5.14 Multilevel Regression with Interaction Terms, the impact of E8 rate on Attitudes towards Immigration

	economic (a)		cultural (b)	
	coef	SE	coef	SE
Models 11a-b				
log E8 rate	-0.75***	0.11	-0.60	0.11
GNI per capita	0.00***	0.00	0.00***	0.00
log E8 stock*GNI	0.00***	0.00	0.00***	0.00
intercept	-0.36	0.55	1.87	0.53
Level 1 Variance	0.64	0.26	0.48	0.18
Level 2 Variance	4.77	0.02	4.76	0.02
Models 12a-b				
log E8 rate	-0.00	0.03	0.07*	0.03
unemployment	-7.42***	1.38	-3.96**	1.37
log E8stock*unemployment	-0.24	0.33	-1.22***	0.33
intercept	1.53	0.50	3.79	0.49
Level 1 Variance	0.57	0.24	0.50	0.19
Level 2 Variance	4.77	0.02	4.76	0.02
Models 13a-b				
log E8 rate	-0.30***	0.05	-0.32***	0.05
log foreign stock	-0.95***	0.15	-1.04***	0.14

log E8stock*log foreign stock	-0.05***	0.01	-0.03**	0.01
intercept	0.85	0.80	1.06	0.79
Level 1 Variance	0.61	0.26	0.62	0.25
Level 2 Variance	4.72	0.03	4.63	0.03
Models 14a-b				
log E8 rate	-0.04**	0.01	0.00	0.01
mobility restrictions	1.04***	0.19	0.39*	0.18
log E8 stock*mobility restrict.	0.05**	0.02	-0.05**	0.02
intercept	1.52	0.48	3.21	0.47
Level 1 Variance	0.55	0.23	0.51	0.19
Level 2 Variance	4.76	0.02	4.76	0.02
Models 15a-b				
log E8 rate	0.19***	0.02	0.11***	0.02
2002 E8 stock	0.01	0.02	0.06***	0.02
log E8stock*log 2002 E8stock	16.19***	1.51	10.18***	1.51
intercept	1.53	0.47	3.34	0.48
Level 1 Variance	0.49	0.20	0.61	0.23
Level 2 Variance	4.76	0.02	4.76	0.02

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: Includes year fixed effect, individual-level controls and contextual level controls

Robustness Checks

To ensure that the findings of this chapter are not spurious, they were subjected to a series of robustness checks. Four series of robustness checks are shown. These check the sensitivity of the results to the following: 1) time, place and weighting; 2) independent variable measurement; 3) model specification; and 4) influential countries. The purpose of these exercises is to increase the confidence in the empirical conclusions of this chapter and better understand their limitations.

Sensitivity to Time, Place and Weighting

As a first step, robustness checks are used to test the sensitivity of the results to the data sampling. Table 5.15 and explores the sensitivity of the results concerning the positive relationship between E8 migration and attitudes towards the economic impact of immigration. We observe that the positive link between E8 stock and attitudes about immigration is robust this series sensitivity checks. To

ensure that shifting attitudes during the recession has not biased the results, In Table 5.15 and Table 5.16, checks Ia and Ib only include four waves of the survey and drop observations from 2010.² Here, we observe in both models that the coefficients for *log E8stock* remain positive and significant. We also observe that the coefficients for *log E8 stock* remain positive and significant when including country fixed effects in Checks IIa and IIb, which also controls for differences in the historical or institutional factors across countries in Check II a. Checks IIIa and IVa also confirm the finding that there is no evidence of a relationship between the rate of E8 migration and public sentiment towards this issue.

Table 5.15 Robustness Check: Time and Place, Economic Impact of Immigration

	Check I a		Check II a		Check III a		Check IV a	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	4.76	0.50	4.70	0.35	0.37	0.55	1.19	0.43
log E8 stock	0.35***	0.04	0.35***	0.03				
log E8 rate					-0.01	0.02	-0.03	0.01
Explained Variance								
country variation	0.85	0.33	0.00	0.00	0.96	0.40	0.00	0.00
residual variation	0.33	0.02	4.77	0.02	4.83	0.03	4.77	0.02
Individual Controls	yes		yes		yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes		yes		yes	
Weights	no		no		no		no	
Time Fixed Effects	2002-2008		2002-10		2002-2008		2002-10	
Country Fixed Effects	no		yes		no		yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-178745.32		-214422.14		-158549.21		-187598.64	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Table 5.16 Robustness Check: Time and Place, Cultural Impact of Immigration

	Check I b		Check II b		Check III b		Check IV b	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	5.07	0.50	4.74	0.35	3.49	0.53	2.77	0.43
log E8 stock	0.15***	0.04	0.17***	0.03	0.00	0.02	-0.02	0.01
Explained Variance								
country variation	0.87	0.33	0.00	0.00	0.61	0.24	0.00	0.00
residual variation	4.83	0.02	4.78	0.02	4.82	0.03	4.76	0.02
Individual Controls	yes		yes		yes		yes	

² 2009 could not be dropped since the ESS is only conducted biannually and no attitudinal data was gathered in that year.

Contextual Controls	yes	yes	yes	yes
Weights	no	no	no	no
Time Fixed Effects	2002-2008	2002-10	2002-2008	2002-10
Country Fixed Effects	no	yes	no	yes
Log pseudolikelihood	-179484.12	-215464.06	-159193.06	-188387.59

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

The next series of sensitivity checks examine the results year by year to identify how the relationship between E8 migration and public opinion about immigration evolved over time. In Table 5.17, Table 5.18, Table 5.19 and Table 5.20, we observe the relationship between the number of E8 nationals and the rate at which they increased and public attitudes about the impact of immigration are not consistently in direction or significance over time. In the case of attitudes towards the economic impact shown in Table 5.17 and Table 5.18, no significant relationships with E8 migration are observed before 2008 which might indicate a lag effect. The implication of these results is that in a given year, the proportion of E8 stock does not necessarily explain cross-country differences in attitudes about immigration.

Table 5.17 Year by Year, E8 Stock and the Economic Impact of Immigration

	2002		2004		2006		2008		2010	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	3.06	2.11	1.17	2.37	11.45	3.39	-4.19	2.99	-0.64	3.24
log E8 stock	-0.16	0.15	-0.25	0.14	0.26	0.18	-0.38*	0.17	-0.13	0.17
Explained Variance										
country variation	0.28	0.11	0.16	0.07	0.18	0.07	0.17	0.07	0.13	0.06
residual variation	4.78	0.05	5.07	0.05	4.90	0.05	4.58	0.05	4.36	0.05
Individual Controls	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-48027.88		-43505.22		-44698.04		-42327.169		-35643.07	
N	21805, 14		19497, 12		20185, 12		19410, 11		16530, 10	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Table 5.18 Year by Year, E8 Rate and the Economic Impact of Immigration

	2002		2004		2006		2008		2010	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	4.26	3.05	4.87	1.64	7.64	2.25	-5.16	1.61	5.76	1.75

log E8 rate	-0.24	0.20	-0.27	0.19	0.15	0.21	0.09	0.16	0.37***	0.09
Explained Variance										
country variation	0.22	0.10	0.15	0.06	0.21	0.09	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.02
residual variation	4.75	0.05	5.02	0.05	4.93	0.05	4.56	0.05	4.36	0.05
Individual Controls	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-40008.88		-38141.06		-41046.52		-39204.48		-28997.981	
N	18190, 11		17130, 11		18510, 11		17998, 10		13447, 8	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

The lack of a significant relationship when disaggregating the results by year is somewhat puzzling since the results pooling the years together shows a positive relationship between E8 stock and attitudes towards immigration. This means that disaggregating the analysis by year does not give us a clear picture of the evolution of the relationship between E8 migration and public opinion. Too much importance cannot be placed on the results from a single year since there is a consensus that they are inferior to a pooled time series cross-sectional analysis which include more units of observation in a single model (Aldrich and McGraw 2011). What we can conclude from this sensitivity analysis is that a positive relationship between post.-enlargement migration and public opinion about immigration in the host societies only hold when looking at variation in these attitudes across time and space but not across space alone.

Table 5.19 Year by Year, E8 Stock and the Cultural Impact of Immigration

	2002		2004		2006		2008		2010	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	3.06	2.11	-2.65	3.40	0.52	4.74	-11.37	4.16	-4.98	4.59
log E8 stock	-0.16	0.15	-0.19	0.20	0.00	0.25	-0.50*	0.24	-0.13	0.24
Explained Variance										
country variation	0.53	0.20	0.34	0.14	0.36	0.15	0.33	0.14	0.27	0.12
residual variation	4.69	0.04	4.96	0.05	4.89	0.05	4.69	0.05	4.48	0.05
Individual Controls	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-48316.96		-43500.30		-44804.16		-42703.37		-35989.83	
N	22030, 14		19582, 12		20237, 12		19472, 11		16588, 10	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Table 5.20 Year by Year, E8 Rate and the Cultural Impact of Immigration

	2002		2004		2006		2008		2010	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	-3.93	3.80	-0.16	2.63	0.86	3.00	-14.24	1.38	0.71	2.72
log E8 rate	-0.55*	0.25	-0.08	0.30	0.09	0.28	0.40**	0.14	0.50**	0.14
Explained Variance										
country variation	0.35	0.15	0.39	0.17	0.38	0.16	0.04	0.02	0.11	0.05
residual variation	4.66	0.05	4.90	0.05	4.94	0.05	4.72	0.05	4.39	0.05
Individual Controls	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-43500.30		-38057.50		-41205.84		-39662.54		-29166.97	
N	18340, 11		17174, 11		18572, 11		18063, 10		13508, 8	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Table 5.21 The Economic Impact of Immigration, Sensitivity to Weighting

	Check Va		Check VIa	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	4.85	1.44	1.30	1.68
log E8 stock	0.34*	0.14		
log E8 rate			-0.02	0.06
Explained Variance				
country variation	0.63	0.21	0.63	0.32
residual variation	4.77	0.17	4.76	0.19
Individual Controls	yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes	
Weights	yes		yes	
Time Fixed Effects	yes		yes	
Country Fixed Effects	no		no	
Log pseudolikelihood	-214423.29		-187612.93	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

When testing the results applying sample weights in Table 5.21 and Table 5.22, the direction of the coefficients remains consistent.. Following similar results in the baseline model, Check Vb and Check VIb continue to show coefficients which are not significant. However, in Check Vb the coefficient significance of coefficient is eroded when weights are used in the analysis. Although this does not mean we should immediate discredit the findings in the baseline model since the direction of the

coefficient is maintained, it does give reason to question the reliability of the coefficient for E8stock when estimating the relationship for attitudes for the cultural impact of immigration. I proceed with the remaining robustness checks, keeping in mind that this positive and significant coefficient may not be robust.

Table 5.22 The Cultural Impact of Immigration, Sensitivity to Weighting

	Check Vb		Check Vib	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	5.15	1.50	3.18	1.11
log E8 stock	0.17	0.15		
log E8 rate			-0.02	0.04
Explained Variance				
country variation	0.81	0.35	0.51	0.17
residual variation	4.78	0.25	4.76	0.27
Individual Controls	yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes	
Weights	yes		yes	
Time Fixed Effects	yes		yes	
Country Fixed Effects	no		no	
Log pseudolikelihood	-215515.61		-188432.75	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Sensitivity to Independent Variable Measurement

Next, a series of robustness checks are applied to see if the findings are sensitive to the way in which the independent variable is measured. As discussed in detail in the Methods chapter, the independent variable thus far has been measured in two ways: 1) as the E8 migrant stock as a percentage of the national population and 2) the annual rate of increase in E8 migrant stock over the previous year. As a first test, the models are run with a slightly different independent variable as an alternative: the E8 migrant stock as a percentage of the foreign population. The results in Table 5.23 show that the number of E8 nationals as a proportion of the total foreign nationals in a population also shows a positive and significant association with both dependent variables. This provides further encouragement that the results presented in this chapter are not only due to a particular measurement of the independent variable.

A second exercise tests the sensitivity of the results to the composition of E8 migration. As seen in Chapter Three, there was some variation in E8 migration across the EU-15 where different kinds of E8 nationals migrated to different Western European countries. For instance, Finland experienced a higher proportion of Estonian migrants while the Irish experienced a higher number of Poles. In order to test for any bias due to the national composition of E8 migrants, the model is run using only one E8 nationality: Polish nationals. The Poles, due largely to Poland being the most populous country in the E8 and to their propensity to migrate westwards, became the most recognizable ‘face’ of the E8 enlargement migration for the Western European public. To ensure that the results are not biased by the differing compositions of E8 nationals across the EU-15, Table 5.23 shows the results when the number of Poles as a proportion of the total national population is used as the independent variable. The results show that the coefficients remain positive and significant. This can be taken as some reassurance that the results presented in this chapter are not driven by different composition of E8 nationalities between countries.

Table 5.23 Robustness Checks, Independent Variable Sensitivity

	Economic Impact				Cultural Impact			
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	4.50	0.50	5.09	0.42	5.16	0.51	5.59	0.43
log E8 per foreigner	0.36***	0.04			0.22***	0.04		
log Pole stock			0.32***	0.02			0.16***	0.02
Explained Variance								
country variation	0.70	0.27	0.63	0.23	0.86	0.33	0.75	0.28
residual variation	4.73	0.02	4.77	0.02	4.69	0.02	4.77	0.02
Individual Controls	yes		yes		yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes		yes		yes	
Weights	no		no		no		no	
Time Fixed Effects	yes		yes		yes		yes	
Country Fixed Effects	no		no		no		no	
Log pseudolikelihood	-179757.45		-209298.52		-180108.17		-210379.68	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Sensitivity to Model Specification

This section tests the sensitivity of the results to the model specification. As mentioned in the Methods Chapter, the dependent variables are treated as continuous variables since they have more than five response categories that are spaced evenly and the underlying variable is assumed to be continuous. However, to ensure that this assumption is not influencing the results, the models are tested but this time treating the dependent attitudinal variables as ordinal categorical variables. Table 5.24 and Table 5.25 show the results of generalized ordinal logistic regressions.³³ In Table 5.24, the results confirm a general positive relationship between E8 migration and attitudes about immigration. However, the results also show that the strength and significance of this relationship varies across the distribution of attitudes. There is an indication that the positive relationship between E8 migration and attitudes is stronger for individuals who feel already more positively about immigration. For instance, in the model for attitudes towards the economic impact of immigration, the coefficient ranges from 0.05 for individuals who respond with a value of 0 (on a scale of 0 to 10) to 0.52 for individuals who respond with a value of 9. We thus observe that the impact becomes stronger and more positive as attitudes are more positive. In second model which shows similar results for the attitudes about the cultural impact of immigration. Next, in Table 5.25, the results show that the coefficients continue (for the most part) to be negative and insignificant across the distribution of the dependent variable. This exercise has shown that there is mostly a positive relationship between E8 migration and attitudes about immigration, it also shows that the strength of this relationship may vary depending on to what extent the individual is already concerned about immigration. It is encouraging that it confirms the results presented in the last section in which the analysis was conducted on two attitudinal sub-populations.

³³ A generalized ordinal logistic regression has been used rather than a simple ordinal logistic regression since a test revealed that the model violated the assumption of proportionality. Unfortunately, STATA does not allow for generalized ordinal models to be adapted for multi-level analysis so a single-level analysis has been conducted. As a further check, a multi-level ordinal logistic regression was run and the results still showed a positive and significant relationship with the independent variable (results not shown).

Table 5.24 Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression, E8 stock and Immigration

Response (0-9)	Economic Impact		Cultural Impact	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
0 (bad)				
logE8stock	0.05	0.14	0.11	0.14
intercept	-2.08	1.33	-0.60	1.17
1				
logE8stock	0.13	0.14	0.11	0.17
intercept	-0.77	1.25	-0.14	1.42
2				
logE8stock	0.15	0.10	0.04	0.17
intercept	-0.85	0.94	-0.82	1.29
3				
logE8stock	0.18	0.10	0.06	0.14
intercept	-0.94	0.81	-0.85	1.03
4				
logE8stock	0.23*	0.10	0.06	0.16
intercept	-0.64	0.76	-0.74	1.11
5				
logE8stock	0.33**	0.11	0.13	0.13
intercept	-0.35	0.80	-1.03	0.91
6				
logE8stock	0.43**	0.13	0.17	0.10
intercept	-0.08	1.04	-0.72	0.93
7				
logE8stock	0.44***	0.12	0.20*	0.08
intercept	-0.38	1.20	-0.40	1.00
8				
logE8stock	0.52***	0.10	0.19*	0.09
intercept	-0.88	1.22	-0.22	1.26
9 (good)				
logE8stock	0.51***	0.15	0.18	0.12
intercept	-0.03	1.44	-1.24	1.28
Individual Controls	yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes	
Country Fixed Effects	yes		yes	
Time Fixed Effects	yes		yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-205060.98		-204358.66	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Note: Standard Errors Adjusted for Clusters in Each Country

Table 5.25 Generalized Ordered Logistic Regression, E8 rate and Immigration

Response (0-9)	Economic Impact		Cultural Impact	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
0 (bad)				
logE8rate	-0.06	0.07	-0.06	0.05
intercept	-4.03	1.62	-2.51	1.48
1				
logE8rate	-0.04	0.06	-0.04	0.05
intercept	-2.95	1.28	-1.55	1.30
2				
logE8rate	-0.01	0.05	0.00	0.04
intercept	-2.59	1.18	-1.31	1.14
3				
logE8rate	0.00	0.05	0.01	0.03
intercept	-2.39	1.11	-1.13	1.00
4				
logE8rate	-0.01	0.05	0.00	0.03
intercept	-2.34	1.11	-1.18	1.16
5				
logE8rate	-0.02	0.05	0.00	0.03
intercept	-3.18	1.55	-2.31	0.92
6				
logE8rate	-0.04	0.05	-0.01	0.04
intercept	-4.31	1.88	-2.56	1.11
7				
logE8rate	-0.05	0.05	-0.03	0.04
intercept	-4.62	2.21	-2.34	1.39
8				
logE8rate	-0.03	0.05	-0.03	0.05
intercept	-4.73	2.62	-2.16	1.66
9 (good)				
logE8rate	-0.01	0.06	0.01	0.05
intercept	-3.90	2.55	-2.54	1.85
Individual Controls	yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes	
Country Fixed Effects	yes		yes	
Time Fixed Effects	yes		yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-179537.88		-204358.66	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Note: Standard Errors Adjusted for Clusters in Each Country

The next series of robustness checks examine if the positive link between E8 migration and public attitudes to immigration are biased by influential countries. In this case, there is no concern that the results are biased by extreme cases of individuals since, as the number of observations is over 90,000, so this is not a risk. Instead, this exercise tests if a certain country in the sample is driving the results. In order to test this, the analysis is re-run, each time dropping a country from the analysis. The series of tests shown in *Table 5.26* confirms the robustness of the results concerning both dependent variables. The coefficients for logE8stock range from 0.20 when dropping Ireland or to 0.50 when dropping the UK from the analysis. However, the tests raise questions about the robustness of the results concerning the second dependent variable, attitudes about the cultural impact of immigration. The results in *Table 5.26* show that significance of the coefficient is eroded when dropping Ireland from the analysis. This may be because the Irish tend to view immigration more positively than even considering that Ireland has experienced the largest relative amount E8 migration. But these results show that the particularities of Ireland are distorting the results to falsely show a general positive relationship between E8 migration and attitudes about the cultural impact.

Table 5.27 conducts the same sensitivity checks for the second independent variable, the pace at which E8 migration increased. These checks reveal a great deal of fluctuation in both the direction and the significance level of the coefficients for log E8 rate when certain countries are excluded from the analysis. This is the case for both dependent variables and confirms that the lack of relationship between the rate of E8 migration and public attitudes about immigration is not due to the inclusion of a particular influential country.

Table 5.26 Robustness Check for Influential Countries, E8 Stock and Attitudes Towards

	Immigration			
	economic impact		cultural impact	
	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.
w/o Austria				
log E8 stock	0.32***	0.03	0.12***	0.03
intercept	4.83	0.44	4.85	0.46
level 1 variance	0.67	0.26	0.89	0.35
level 2 variance	4.75	0.02	4.73	0.02
w/o Belgium				
log E8 stock	0.35***	0.03	0.16***	0.03
intercept	5.13	0.45	5.11	0.46
level 1 variance	0.70	0.27	0.85	0.33
level 2 variance	4.81	0.02	4.80	0.02
w/o Denmark				
log E8 stock	0.33***	0.03	0.17***	0.03
intercept	5.07	0.44	5.50	0.46
level 1 variance	0.63	0.25	0.87	0.34
level 2 variance	4.78	0.02	4.77	0.02
w/o Finland				
log E8 stock	0.33***	0.03	0.17***	0.03
intercept	5.25	0.44	5.52	0.46
level 1 variance	0.63	0.24	0.78	0.31
level 2 variance	4.83	0.02	4.94	0.02
w/o France				
log E8 stock	0.34***	0.03	0.17***	0.03
intercept	4.94	0.45	5.19	0.47
level 1 variance	0.67	0.26	0.87	0.34
level 2 variance	4.78	0.02	4.72	0.02
w/o Germany				
log E8 stock	0.28***	0.03	0.12***	0.03
intercept	4.02	0.48	4.55	0.50
level 1 variance	0.66	0.26	0.86	0.34
level 2 variance	4.72	0.02	4.72	0.02
w/o Greece				
log E8 stock	0.31***	0.03	0.17***	0.03
intercept	5.22	0.45	5.23	0.45
level 1 variance	0.60	0.24	0.61	0.24
level 2 variance	4.70	0.02	4.72	0.02
w/o Ireland				
log E8 stock	0.20***	0.04	0.05	0.04
intercept	4.28	0.46	4.67	0.49

level 1 variance	0.78	0.32	1.22	0.48
level 2 variance	4.75	0.02	4.74	0.02
w/o Italy				
log E8 stock	0.34***	0.03	0.17***	0.03
intercept	4.91	0.44	5.23	0.45
level 1 variance	0.65	0.25	0.85	0.33
level 2 variance	4.78	0.02	4.77	0.02
w/o Luxembourg				
log E8 stock	0.35***	0.03	0.18***	0.03
intercept	3.91	0.45	4.48	0.45
level 1 variance	0.66	0.26	0.58	0.22
level 2 variance	4.74	0.02	4.75	0.02
w/o Netherlands				
log E8 stock	0.32***	0.03	0.17***	0.03
intercept	5.17	0.45	5.26	0.47
level 1 variance	0.60	0.24	0.87	0.34
level 2 variance	4.90	0.02	4.90	0.02
w/o Portugal				
log E8 stock	0.39***	0.03	0.20***	0.03
intercept	5.16	0.43	5.62	0.44
level 1 variance	0.44	0.17	0.62	0.24
level 2 variance	4.78	0.02	4.80	0.02
w/o Spain				
log E8 stock	0.33***	0.03	0.18***	0.03
intercept	4.73	0.46	4.73	0.49
level 1 variance	0.51	0.20	0.91	0.36
level 2 variance	4.80	0.02	4.78	0.02
w/o Sweden				
log E8 stock	0.34***	0.03	0.17***	0.03
intercept	4.91	0.46	5.22	0.47
level 1 variance	0.73	0.29	0.77	0.30
level 2 variance	4.80	0.02	4.82	0.02
w/o UK				
log E8 stock	0.50***	0.04	0.38***	0.04
intercept	6.72	0.55	7.37	0.56
level 1 variance	0.74	0.29	1.00	0.39
level 2 variance	4.74	0.02	4.67	0.02

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: Includes year fixed effect, individual-level controls and contextual level controls

Table 5.27 Robustness Check for Influential Countries, E8 Rate and Attitudes Towards

	Immigration			
	economic impact		cultural impact	
	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.
w/o Austria				
log E8 rate	-0.01	0.013	-0.03*	0.01
intercept	1.24	0.48	2.76	0.48
level 1 variance	0.53	0.22	0.50	0.20
level 2 variance	4.74	0.02	4.71	0.02
w/o Belgium				
log E8 rate	-0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.01
intercept	1.30	0.51	3.17	0.49
level 1 variance	0.72	0.32	0.57	0.23
level 2 variance	4.78	0.02	4.77	0.02
w/o Denmark				
log E8 rate	-0.04**	0.01	-0.04**	0.01
intercept	1.12	0.50	3.22	0.49
level 1 variance	0.70	0.31	0.57	0.23
level 2 variance	4.77	0.02	4.75	0.02
w/o Finland				
log E8 rate	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
intercept	2.15	0.51	4.00	0.50
level 1 variance	0.69	0.31	0.45	0.18
level 2 variance	4.83	0.02	4.95	0.03
w/o France				
log E8 rate	-0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.01
intercept	1.41	0.50	3.38	0.48
level 1 variance	0.65	0.28	0.55	0.22
level 2 variance	4.77	0.02	4.72	0.02
w/o Germany				
log E8 rate	-0.04**	0.01	-0.02	0.01
intercept	-0.68	0.58	2.47	0.54
level 1 variance	0.93	0.39	0.53	0.21
level 2 variance	4.72	0.02	4.71	0.02
w/o Greece				
log E8 rate	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.01
intercept	3.29	0.53	3.81	0.53
level 1 variance	0.36	0.15	0.34	0.14
level 2 variance	4.68	0.02	4.70	0.02
w/o Ireland				
log E8 rate	-0.05***	0.01	-0.04**	0.01
intercept	1.77	0.48	3.56	0.48

level 1 variance	0.49	0.20	0.59	0.24
level 2 variance	4.74	0.02	4.72	0.02
w/o Italy				
log E8 rate	-0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.01
intercept	1.42	0.48	3.29	0.47
level 1 variance	0.59	0.25	0.51	0.19
level 2 variance	4.77	0.02	4.76	0.02
w/o Luxembourg				
log E8 rate	-0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.01
intercept	1.49	0.48	3.30	0.48
level 1 variance	0.56	0.23	0.54	0.21
level 2 variance	4.74	0.02	4.75	0.02
w/o Netherlands				
log E8 rate	-0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.01
intercept	1.71	0.53	3.25	0.53
level 1 variance	0.56	0.25	0.54	0.22
level 2 variance	4.91	0.03	4.91	0.03
w/o Portugal				
log E8 rate	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01
intercept	2.00	0.49	4.14	0.51
level 1 variance	0.46	0.20	0.59	0.24
level 2 variance	4.77	0.02	4.78	0.02
w/o Spain				
log E8 rate	-0.07***	0.01	-0.03*	0.01
intercept	0.50	0.55	2.75	0.51
level 1 variance	1.02	0.48	0.53	0.21
level 2 variance	4.79	0.02	4.77	0.02
w/o Sweden				
log E8 rate	-0.05***	0.01	-0.03*	0.01
intercept	0.80	0.50	2.89	0.48
level 1 variance	0.72	0.31	0.48	0.19
level 2 variance	4.79	0.02	4.79	0.02
w/o UK				
log E8 rate	0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.01
intercept	-0.08	0.58	2.44	0.52
level 1 variance	1.08	0.47	0.44	0.18
level 2 variance	4.72	0.02	4.64	0.02

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: Includes year fixed effect, individual-level controls and contextual level controls

Discussion

This chapter set out to understand if E8 migration post-enlargement determined public sentiment about immigration in the host societies. It has examined how the amount and speed of post-enlargement migration relates to public perceptions about the impact of immigration on the national economy and culture. Based on the theoretical predictions grounded in *ethnic competition theory*, it was expected that both the magnitude and the rate of post-enlargement migration would have heightened the public's perception that immigration was a societal threat. This chapter used micro-data from the European Social Survey from 2002 to 2010 to build multi-level pooled time series models. First, the relationship between post-enlargement migration and attitudes about immigration in the Western European host societies has been examined. Then national economic conditions and immigration trends were interacted with E8 migration volume to test their impact as moderators.

The analysis presented in this chapter only finds partial support for *ethnic competition theory*. In fact, the central finding, that there is no evidence that E8 migration predicts negative sentiments about immigration in the EU-15, shows the opposite of its theoretical expectations. Contrary to expectation, I have uncovered strong evidence that having a greater proportion of E8 migrants living in the country is associated with having more positive views about how immigration affects their nation's economy.⁵⁴ Interestingly, this positive relationship is stronger and more significant for individuals who are more positive about immigration rather than those who are more skeptical. Given that that comparative attitudinal data is not available longitudinally, I am not able to understand if E8 migration actually caused individuals to personally change their opinion about immigration. But my findings do hint that any increasingly positive perceptions about immigration are more likely to have occurred amongst individuals who were more positive about immigration to begin with, rather than changing the minds of individuals who are concerned about immigration.

One explanation for this could be that the positive relationship could be explained the fact that an increase in the share of immigrants increases contact between immigrants and natives, which works to minimize the perception that immigration poses a threat (Allport 1954). Allport's (1954) work has founded the basis of what is now commonly referred to as inter-group contact theory, and often juxtaposed to expectations of ethnic competition theory. Regrettably, I have a limited in its

⁵⁴ There is also some evidence of a similar trend for attitudes regarding the cultural impact of immigration but this finding does not hold when Ireland is dropped from the analysis.

ability to empirically test for inter-group contact as the operating mechanism between E8 migration and positive attitudes about immigration. Practically speaking, information is not available on the respondent's contact with immigrants and the nature of this contact. From a theoretical perspective, it is not clear that the relationship between E8 migrants and Western European natives is a suitable case for the theory. For contact between groups to build a positive rapport, Allport (1954) is careful to point out that it can only occur under certain conditions, namely that the groups have personal contact which allows them to cooperate towards common goals under the protection of equal status and the sanction of authority. While the data is not available on the nature of personal contact with immigrants, one might also argue that E8 migrants do not have equal status as natives since, for instance, they are not able to participate politically in host countries. Although the results found in this chapter are consistent with the predictions of inter-group contact theory, there is little evidence that contact is the operating mechanism given data limitations and the complexities of post-enlargement migration.

While increasing numbers of E8 nationals shows a positive link with attitudes about immigration, the rate at which E8 nationals became more present in Western Europe does not appear to have mattered for public opinion. The findings in this chapter point to the relative size of the immigrant group as being more salient than the rate at which the group's size increases. It is unclear whether these results confirm previous studies since the existing comparative research has tended to focus on the impact of the former, and has been slower to examine the impact of the latter. But the divergent patterns uncovered in this chapter underscore the notion that the speed of increase in the out-group is conceptually distinct than the relative size of the out-group and merits investigation in its own right.

Yet some, there is some indication that ethnic competition theory does explain part of the story about the socio-political implications of post-enlargement migration. Namely, I do find that certain conditions of the national context can heighten or weaken the perception that rising immigration poses a threat. This is particularly the case when it comes to the macro-economic context, where it appears to weaken any positive link between immigration trends and attitudes during precarious economic times. These findings are consistent with the findings of previous scholars who found that economic sluggishness can fuel inter-group competition and prompt the natives to resent immigration (Quillian 1995; Pichler 2010). I also find that immigration restrictions heightened the impact while a general amount of immigrants dampened it...consistent with comp.

theory. What remains debatable is if these national contextual factors actually heighten a real threat posed by immigration or merely operate by drawing more attention to the boundaries between natives and immigrants when resources are more scarce.

It cannot be forgotten that E8 immigration occurred across Western European countries who had varying degrees of experience living side-by-side with foreign nationals. As E8 migration was increasing, migration from outside the European Union also continued to rise during the same period. Again, I find that the general migration patterns were a critical contextual factor which heightened the perception of threat brought by E8 migration. Interpreting these findings through ethnic competition theory, it may be that the greater number of foreign nationals heightened the perception of competition between natives and foreign nationals which was compounded by post-enlargement migration. The results also show that E8 migration tended to have a more positive effect on public opinion in countries who maintained tighter transitional restrictions on access to their labour markets. Although it is not possible to show causal pathways with the data at hand, it would be consistent with ethnic competition theory that the public's perception of immigration threat is mitigated somewhat through stricter immigration policies.

My findings underline the need for scholars to distinguish between attitudes towards the cultural and economic implications of immigration since they exhibit different patterns. For instance, the controls for individuals' characteristics reveal that women are more likely to acknowledge the cultural benefits of immigration than their male counterparts but not its economic benefits. Likewise, the older people are, the more likely they are to acknowledge the economic benefits of immigration but tend to be more skeptical about its cultural impact. These differences call on researchers to exercise nuance when considering why some individuals oppose immigration that there may be different latent constructs within measures of attitudes towards immigration.

These results, based on multi-level regressions, speak to the relationship between E8 migration and the average Western European sentiments about immigration. However, since the results point to the average association across Europe, it does not follow that these positive associations are observable within each country. Put another way, an increase in E8 migration did not necessarily make it more likely that in each EU-15 country, individuals tended to have a more positive view about immigration. When conducting the analysis within each country (albeit with a crude OLS

regression),⁸⁸ the results reveal that similar patterns are not observed within all Western European host societies.

The variation in the composition of E8 migration in host countries could lead to different socio-political outcomes. There is still the possibility for that differences in relationship between post-enlargement migration and attitudes could be attributable to differences in the attributes of E8 migrants. While E8 migrants tend to share a similar regional provenance, a post-communistic heritage and economic motivations for migration, systematic differences in E8 populations still exist in Western Europe as discussed in Chapter 2. It is unfortunate that the lack of available comparative data on age and skill level over time has not made it possible to examine this empirically in this analysis. While, the purpose of this analysis has been to uncover a general cross-country link between post-enlargement migration and public attitudes, there is certainly a great deal to be learned about the impact of E8 migration within each host country's context. Although ethnic competition theory has been adapted to explain relations between natives and immigrants, it has not been extended to explain how the composition of the immigrant group itself is a factor in fueling the perception of competition. The case of the E8 migration studied here hints that highly skilled, economic migration can actually have the opposite result: it can actually be accompanied by a more positive perception of immigration. Based on this, I might speculate that this positive link could be stronger in countries where there with a composition of E8 populations that were particularly highly skilled and who were able to find a sure footing in the labour market.

Moreover, there is also some indication the positive relationship is not applies to all Western Europeans. Initial evidence presented in this chapter showed that the positive relationship between E8 migration and attitudes about the economic impact of immigration may be stronger for those feel more positively about immigration than those who are more concerned about immigration. In sum, although the results of this chapter point to a general trend of a positive relationship between E8 migration and attitudes about immigration, it is very likely that this trend is not present to the same extent in all countries nor across all individuals.

Putting the role of E8 migration trends aside for a moment, it is undeniable that most of the reasons that people feel differently about immigration are found in their own attributes rather than

⁸⁸ As previously discussed, these results are limited by the fact that time fixed effects and controls for national contextual factors could not be included.

attributes of their social environment. Only a small proportion of variation between Europeans' attitudes towards immigration is driven by national-level factors rather than individual characteristics. In this chapter we have confirmed the familiar story that individuals who are less educated, do not have a migrant background, live in rural areas, with right-wing political affiliations, and are labour market outsiders tend to be more concerned about immigration. These results are consistent with those of previous empirical studies (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Mayda 2006; Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris 2008). It is a pity that with the structure of the data at hand I am not able to examine how the characteristics of individuals interacted with E8 migration to explain attitudinal variation. At this point, the results only allow us to speculate that individuals who are younger, less educated and labour market outsiders tend to have a vulnerable foothold in labour market are more likely to perceive a heightened threat from labour from the new European countries.

I will conclude by underscoring that the empirical analysis shown here has only been able to demonstrate evidence of association, rather than causation since the study relies on repeat cross-sectional attitudinal data. Although there is evidence of a positive relationship between E8 migrants and the way that natives perceive immigration, the causal direction cannot be proven. One might argue that causation can flow the other way: publics with more positive perceptions about immigration could have attracted a greater number of E8 migrants to come and reside in their country. Still, such a reverse causality appears unlikely and does not have theoretical support. The descriptive statistics refute this notion since we find that, for example, the British are among the most negative about immigration in Europe even though Britain had the highest inflow of Eastern Europeans after the enlargement. Moreover, although a more open access to labour markets does encourage immigration, there is no evidence in the international migration literature that public opinion in the host country is itself a determinant of immigration.

6. Welfare

Chapter Overview

This second empirical chapter examines if migration from the E8 countries into the EU-15 after the enlargement has shaped public opinion about welfare provision. This chapter does not intend to show that patterns of immigration are the only drivers of public opinion about the welfare state. Rather, it explores aspects of such opinions linked to migration that have yet to be understood from the empirical evidence. Two main research questions are put forward in this chapter: Have the increases in E8 migrant populations been associated with differences in public attitudes about welfare in Western Europe? And, is this relationship (if any) moderated by national contextual factors? Two types of attitude are explored in this chapter: general support for income redistribution and welfare chauvinism.

The theoretical framework for this chapter is grounded in ethnic competition theory, which seeks to explain why a broad range of anti-immigrant attitudes and preferences for exclusion can vary across social units. It postulates that competition over scarce resources is a trigger for in-group bias, which is when individuals feel a sense of familiarity or attachment to other individuals in their group and prioritize the preferences of their own group over those of the outside groups (Allport, 1954). In-group bias would then predict that individuals in the in-group would wish to prevent the distribution of resources to the out-group. The theory also predicts that a decrease (real or perceived) in the distribution of society's resources, such as a reduction in labour market opportunities or an increase in the number of people using the resources, would heighten competition between groups.

This chapter continues to examine two levels of the comparative analysis of attitudes: the individual (micro level) and the country (macro level). This chapter continues to utilize micro attitudinal data from the five biannual rounds (2002-2010) of the European Social Survey, pooled with national contextual level data. Again, this chapter uses the same two independent variables as in the previous chapter: the volume of E8 migration and the rate at which it increased. When used in models that rely on all five rounds of the survey, this is taken to be the stock of E8 nationals as a percentage of the total national population. In models that rely on a Round 4 (2008) cross-sectional survey, this measures the percentage change in E8 stock from the year of the enlargement (2004) until 2008 as a percentage of the total population.

The first dependent variable is an individual's attitude towards income redistribution, as expressed by the survey respondents. The variable is measured using responses to a question that featured in the core module of the European Social Survey. Responses are available for all five rounds of the survey and have been pooled into a time-series cross sectional dataset. Opinions about redistribution are based on the following question: 'The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels'. The respondents are given the option to choose between the following answers: agree strongly, agree, neither agree or disagree, disagree, or disagree strongly. The responses are given values of 1 to 5 respectively. In this study, the coding of these variables has been reversed so that higher values represent greater support for income distribution and lower values represent reduced support. These are treated as continuous variables in this analysis.* According to this measure, higher scores are indicative of greater support for income redistribution.

The second dependent variable is the extent of an individual's welfare chauvinism. This is based on responses to the following question: 'Thinking of people coming to live in [country] from other countries, when do you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as the citizens already living here? Please choose the option on this card that most closely matches your view'. The respondents are asked to choose between the following responses: 1) immediately upon arrival, 2) after living in the country for a year, whether or not they have worked, 3) once they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year, 4) once they have become a citizen of this country, or 5) they should never get the same rights. Responses 4 and 5 are considered to be indicative of welfare chauvinism whereas responses 1, 2, and 3 are not.

The empirical approach in this chapter continues to employ random-intercept multi-level models to account for the clustering at the national level. As a preliminary step, before applying the multi-level techniques, the relationships between the independent variable and the two dependent variables are first measured for each of the countries in the sample using OLS regression. Then, the next section employs multi-level models. This begins by estimating the null model and then introducing time fixed effects and individual controls. Next, the contextual level controls are introduced into the model one-by-one to build a baseline model for each of the two dependent variables. Then, the contextual variables are interacted with the independent variable (*E8 stock*) to

* Ordinal variables can be treated as continuous if there are more than five categories. This is also because the scale used to gather the responses can be considered to represent an underlying continuous variable (Johnson and Creech 1983; Zumbo and Zimmerman 1993).

understand if they are moderating variables. Finally, robustness checks are run to determine the reliability of the findings.

This chapter is presented in five parts. First, the descriptive results are outlined. This is then followed by two sections, which present the regression results. The first section presents the OLS regression results whereas the second presents the multi-level regression results. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the results presented in this chapter and a summary of the chapter.

Descriptive Results

In general, Europeans tend to be fairly supportive of income redistribution, a sentiment that has remained stable throughout the last decade. **Error! Reference source not found.** shows that support in Western Europe has slightly increased from 2004 (3.7) to 2010 (3.8). The mean response from 2002 to 2010 is 3.7 on a scale of 5. **Error! Reference source not found.** shows the distribution of these values across the various response categories over time. This shows us that very few Europeans (approximately 3%) strongly disagree with the government's role in redistributing income. Moreover, the distribution of the responses has also remained relatively stable over the last decade.

Yet, the aggregate public support for redistribution varies across Western European countries. Table 6.1 shows the descriptive statistics for support for income redistribution in EU-15 countries. More expansive welfare states, such as Denmark and Sweden, exhibit less support for income redistribution than the EU-15 average. Southern countries show more support than the EU-15 average. These findings are unsurprising since inequality is higher in southern countries, which has been found to be a predictor of support for income redistribution (Finseraas 2006). From 2002 to 2010, Germany, Ireland, and Spain showed the greatest increase in aggregate support. Meanwhile, Finland and France and the United Kingdom experienced a small decline in support for income redistribution.

Figure 6.A Aggregate Public Opinion about Income Redistribution





Figure 6.B Distribution of Attitudes (%) towards Income Redistribution



The prevalence of the second attitudinal dependent variable, welfare chauvinism, also varies across Western European countries. The mean amounts of welfare chauvinism per country are displayed in Table 6.2. Higher values indicate more chauvinistic views (i.e. that immigrants should be given social rights under stricter conditions). Overall, we see that Europeans tend to be slightly welfare chauvinistic, expecting immigrants to have worked and contributed to the tax system before gaining social rights. Greece displays the highest level of chauvinism (3.51), followed by the United Kingdom (3.32), while the Netherlands (3.25), Sweden (2.78), Portugal (2.90) and Denmark (2.97) display the lowest levels of welfare chauvinism. The most typical response in the EU-15 was that immigrants

should obtain rights to social benefits and services 'after they have worked and paid taxes for at least a year' (score of 3.0). However in Denmark,³⁷ Finland, the Netherlands and Greece, the most frequent response was that these social rights should be conditional on citizenship (score of 4.0). Unfortunately, the changes in this attitude over time cannot be explored since the question was only asked in Round 4 (2008) of the survey.

Table 6.1 Mean Support for Income Redistribution

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010
EU-15	3.70	3.69	3.71	3.75	3.78
Austria	3.53	3.62	3.70	-	-
Belgium	3.67	3.64	3.75	3.75	3.77
Denmark	2.80	2.83	3.01	3.02	2.96
Finland	3.95	3.77	3.89	3.92	3.91
France	4.13	4.21	4.08	4.04	4.08
Germany	3.40	3.38	3.53	3.66	3.71
Greece	4.20	4.32	4.37	-	-
Ireland	3.66	3.63	3.57	3.76	3.94
Italy	3.91	-	-	-	-
Luxembourg	3.36	3.43	-	-	-
Netherlands	3.37	3.42	3.44	3.39	3.44
Portugal	4.13	4.05	4.08	4.16	4.32
Spain	3.75	3.85	4.05	3.87	4.01
Sweden	3.58	3.63	3.65	3.65	3.60
United Kingdom	3.45	3.50	3.42	3.49	3.44

Note: Sample weights applied. For EU-15 estimates, population weights applied

³⁷ The Danish descriptive results are particularly intriguing. Although the mean response is quite low (3.0), the most frequent response (36%) is a value of 4 (that immigrants should be given access to social benefits and services 'only after becoming a citizen'). However its mean value is lowered by the high frequency of the lower values. 14% of the Danes surveyed felt that immigrants should obtain rights 'immediately upon arrival' (score of 1). 16% of Danes feel that immigrants should be granted social rights after a year of living in Denmark, regardless of whether they have worked (score of 2). The second most popular response in Denmark (32%) was that immigrants should obtain social rights after they have worked and paid taxes in the country for a least a year (score of 3). Only 2% of Danes felt that 'immigrants should 'never get the same rights' (score of 5).

**Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics of Welfare Chauvinism,
2008**

	mean	s.d.	mode	obs.
Belgium	3.19	-0.93	3	1737
Denmark	2.97	-1.08	4	1549
Finland	3.26	-0.90	4	2153
France	3.01	-1.02	3	2033
Germany	3.14	-1.01	3	2665
Greece	3.51	-1.12	4	1982
Ireland	3.15	-0.86	3	1748
Netherlands	3.25	-0.95	4	1741
Portugal	2.90	-0.90	3	2013
Spain	3.05	-0.99	3	2453
Sweden	2.78	-1.11	3	1721
United Kingdom	3.32	-0.92	3	2293
EU-15	3.14	-0.90	3	24088

Note: Sampling weights applied. Population weights applied for EU-15 values.

Most Europeans feel that welfare benefits for immigrants should be conditional on labour market participation rather than length of residence. This sentiment exhibits the willingness to share common resources with immigrants provided that the system is perceived as ‘playing fair’ where immigrants ‘show a willingness to reciprocate when it their turn to make a contribution’ (Miller 2006, 334). Table 6.3 displays the distribution of welfare chauvinism across European countries. Relatively few Europeans feel this (approximately 9%) and very few also feel that social rights should never be extended to those born outside the country (approximately 6%), although the distribution of these attitudes does vary across Europe. Greece has the greatest proportion (approximately 19%) of very extreme welfare chauvinists who believe that immigrants should never gain access to welfare state resources, regardless of their length of residence or whether they acquire citizenship. This can be contrasted by attitudes in Sweden, where only about 1% of people feel this way. In fact, about 20% of the Swedes interviewed felt that immigrants should be given welfare rights unconditionally. These findings highlight that there are differences in welfare chauvinism between European countries.


Table 6.3 Distribution of Welfare Chauvinism, 2008

Not chauvinistic	Chauvinistic
------------------	--------------

	unconditional	residence	works	citizen	never
Belgium	6	10	48	29	6
Denmark	14	16	32	36	2
Finland	5	12	37	43	3
France	12	11	47	26	5
Germany	9	12	43	30	7
Greece	9	4	34	34	19
Ireland	5	10	56	22	6
Netherlands	8	10	36	44	3
Portugal	10	12	60	15	4
Spain	10	9	53	21	7
Sweden	20	16	32	32	1
UK	6	5	49	31	9
EU-15	9	10	44	30	6

The mean amounts of support for redistribution by country are plotted against the volume of E8 stock for each year of the ESS survey in **Error! Reference source not found.** The scatter plots show a negative descriptive relationship between E8 stock and support for redistribution. The southern European countries (Portugal, Greece, Italy and Spain) have low proportions of E8 nationals but high average support for income redistribution. The inverse is true in countries such as Great Britain, Ireland or Germany: these countries have a relatively high proportion of E8 nationals but a lower public support for income redistribution.


Figure 6.C E8 Stock vs. Attitudes about the Income Redistribution



Note: R-squared=0.28


Descriptively, there is a positive correlation between the mean amount of welfare chauvinism in an EU-15 country and the increase of E8 nationals in the national population stock post-enlargement. **Error! Reference source not found.** plots these values and shows that there is a positive correlation between the two. For instance, countries like the Netherlands and United Kingdom experienced a high percentage of growth in their E8 population in the four years following the enlargement and simultaneously have a high degree of welfare chauvinism. The one exception is Greece, which has a high average of welfare chauvinism despite having the third lowest increase in E8 stock. Too much cannot be inferred from these descriptive results since they do not control for the compositional effects of the country populations or confounding institutional factors. In the next section, a regression analysis is used to take this multivariate aspect into account.

Figure 6.D E8 Stock Increase vs. Welfare Chauvinism



To confirm that the relationship between E8 migration and attitudes towards welfare are linear, the residuals are plotted against the independent variable. **Error! Reference source not found.** confirms that the relationship between E8 migration and support for income redistribution is linear since there the plotted values do not show a clear pattern around the zero line such as a u-shape or inverted u-shape pattern. This evidence supports the appropriateness of a linear regression model in the next section. The relationship between E8 migration and attitudes of welfare chauvinism is not tested for linearity since the variable is dichotomous.

Figure 6.E Residual Plot Linearity Test, Support for Income Redistribution



OLS Results

E8 immigration and attitudes about income redistribution by country

As in the previous chapter, the analysis is first conducted in each country using a traditional OLS regression before employing a multi-level strategy. The goal of this analysis is to inform the results of the multi-level analysis conducted in the following section by illuminating any potential compositional effects of the countries in the sample. The results when looking at the relationship between E8 migration and individual attitudes towards income distribution within each country over time are shown in Table 6.4. This exercise cannot be replicated for the second dependent variable, attitudes towards welfare chauvinism, since there the data is from a single year cross-sectional survey that occurred as a rotating module of the European Social Survey.

The results reveal that, in parts of Western Europe, there is an indication of a positive and significant relationship between the number of E8 nationals and an individual's opinion about the government redistributing income. Table 6.4 shows that the relationship is positive and significant in Austria, France, Germany, and Portugal. In Austria and Germany this may be explained by a general trend of increasing support for income redistribution over time, as described in Table 6.1 rather than attributable to a greater amount of E8 workers. On the other hand coefficients are significant and positive in Portugal ($\beta=0.15$) and France ($\beta=0.54$), which have not experienced an increase in support

for redistribution over time, hinting that that this may be a positive relationships between these variables in these countries.

A clear pattern between the rate at which E8 migration occurred and public support for income redistribution does not emerge. In fact, in most countries, there does not appear to be a link between the rate of increase and public attitudes about redistribution. Significant relationships are only observed in a handful of countries and the findings are inconsistent. In Table 6.4 we observe that there is a negative and significant relationship in Belgium but a positive and significant relationship in Denmark and France.

Conducting the analysis in each individual country is only a preliminary exercise and conclusions should be drawn with great caution. The results presented in Table 6.4 do not control for any confounding contextual level factors such as unemployment rates nor for any overall trend in attitudes that may be occurring over time (time fixed effects) due to issues of collinearity. For instance, positive coefficients could be due to a coincidental slight increase in attitudes about income redistribution in some countries while they experienced a simultaneous increase in the number of Eastern European migrants there. Despite these important limitations to this part of the analysis, the results highlight how the link between E8 migrant group size and attitudes varies across the countries included in the sample. For this reason, in the next section, I will employ multi-level analysis to address the clustering of attitudes about welfare in each country and account for confounding national contextual factors.

Table 6.4 OLS Regression by Country, Attitudes Towards Income Redistribution

Country		OLS I		OLS II	
		Coef	S.E.	Coef	S.E.
Austria					
	log E8 stock	0.56*	0.10		
	log E8 rate			0.01	0.08
	intercept	6.70	0.66	4.07	0.21
	R-squared	0.03		0.03	
	N	5439		5439	
Belgium					
	log E8 stock	0.02	0.04		
	log E8 rate			-0.08*	0.01
	intercept	4.13	0.23	3.81	0.04
	R-squared	0.06		0.06	
	N	7881		4642	
Denmark					
	log E8 stock	0.07	0.04		
	log E8 rate			0.06***	0.01
	intercept	4.10	0.22	3.81	0.06
	R-squared	0.11		0.11	
	N	7060		7060	
Finland					
	log E8 stock	0.03	0.14		
	log E8 rate			0.06	0.07
	intercept	4.16	0.84	4.15	0.23
	R-squared	0.12		0.12	
	N	9032		9032	
France					
	log E8 stock	0.54**	0.08		
	log E8 rate			0.04**	0.01
	intercept	8.54	0.62	4.83	0.09
	R-squared	0.08		0.08	
	N	8039		6499	
Germany					
	log E8 stock	0.91***	0.07		
	log E8 rate			-0.07	0.03
	intercept	8.70	0.41	3.88	0.11
	R-squared	0.08		0.07	
	N	12599		10155	
Greece					
	log E8 stock	0.15	0.11		
	log E8 rate			-0.04	0.04

Ireland	intercept	5.44	0.57	4.42	0.16
	R-squared	0.01		0.01	
	N	5433		5433	
Luxembourg	log E8 stock	0.02	0.03		
	log E8 rate			-0.02	0.02
	intercept	3.87	0.20	3.66	0.10
Netherlands	R-squared	0.02		0.03	
	N	6260		4447	
Portugal	log E8 stock	0.03	0.01		
	log E8 rate			.	.
	intercept	3.71	0.04	.	.
Spain	R-squared	0.03		.	
	N	2333		.	
Sweden	log E8 stock	0.01	0.02		
	log E8 rate			-0.04	0.04
	intercept	4.06	0.10	3.92	0.09
United Kingdom	R-squared	0.12		0.12	
	N	8954		8954	
Ireland	log E8 stock	0.15*	0.04		
	log E8 rate			-0.29	0.14
	intercept	5.65	0.35	3.76	0.28
Luxembourg	R-squared	0.01		0.01	
	N	6959		5433	
Netherlands	log E8 stock	0.07	0.05		
	log E8 rate			-0.01	0.03
	intercept	4.60	0.43	4.16	0.12
Portugal	R-squared	0.03		0.03	
	N	7685		7685	
Spain	log E8 stock	0.04	0.02		
	log E8 rate			0.03	0.01
	intercept	4.13	0.13	3.96	0.05
Sweden	R-squared	0.14		0.15	
	N	8503		6647	
United Kingdom	log E8 stock	0.00	0.02		
	log E8 rate			0.00	0.01

intercept	4.06	0.13	4.05	0.05
R-squared	0.07		0.07	
N	9407		9407	

Note: Individual Controls Included

Multi-level Results

Null Models and Individual Controls

Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 report the coefficients for the null model. They both demonstrate the need for a multi-level empirical strategy. Model 0a show the results of the null model for the first dependent variable, attitudes about the government redistributing income. Model 0b displays the results of the null model for the second dependent variable, attitudes towards welfare chauvinism. The null models (0a and 0b) show the variation in attitudes to be mostly at the individual level but also at the country-level. Model 0a shows that approximately 8% of the variation in attitudes about income redistribution is at the country level. This is lower when it comes to attitudes of welfare chauvinism (5%). In both cases, a variation of 5% or more at the country level justifies the use of multi-level modelling (Snijders and Bosker 2011). Moreover, the intercepts are highly significant, demonstrating that opinions about income redistribution and welfare access for immigrants differ significantly across Western European countries.

Income Redistribution

Models 1a and 2a introduce controls for trends in public opinion about income redistribution over time.^{*} Introducing these controls improves the model fit, as is apparent from the increase in log pseudo-likelihood. It should be noted that Model 1a shows a reduction in the number of observations. This is largely due to missing answers to the ring-wing political affiliation question on the European Social Survey (approximately 14,000 observations).

^{*} Time trends are not possible for attitudes of welfare chauvinism since only cross-sectional data are available from Round 4 (2008).

Individual characteristics are important predictors of how individuals feel about income redistribution. There appears to be considerable support for the self-interest model, where individuals who are more likely to benefit from income redistribution are more likely to support it and vice versa. Models 1a and 2a in Table 6.5 shows the results when individual controls are introduced. Women, older people, being a labour market outsider, and having a low income are all associated with preferring the government to redistribute income. This is expected since these social groups tend to be the recipients of income redistribution.

Model 2a also shows that being a native (that is, not having a migrant background) is associated with a significant and positive attitude about income redistribution ($\beta=0.05$, $p<0.00$). This is probably due to natives having the predominant European cultural belief about the role of the government in providing welfare, which may be less prevalent amongst those born in other countries or with foreign parents from countries that are less accustomed to governmental redistribution (Luttmer and Singhal 2011). This explanation is grounded in the argument that support for welfare redistribution is based on norms and socialization patterns rather than self-interest.

Table 6.5 Multilevel Regression, Individual Controls and Fixed Time Effects, Income Redistribution

	Model 0a		Model 1a		Model 2a	
	coef	s.e	coef	s.e	coef	s.e
Intercept	3.71	0.09	3.69	0.11	4.01	0.09
log E8 stock			-0.05***	0.01		
log E8 rate					0.00	0.00
gender			0.11***	0.01	0.12***	0.01
age			0.00***	0.00	0.00***	0.00
education			-0.02***	0.00	-0.02***	0.00
labor market (ref=insider)						
outsider			0.05***	0.01	0.05***	0.01
not active			-0.08***	0.01	-0.08***	0.01
right-wing			-0.10***	0.00	-0.10***	0.00
rural			0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
low income			0.19***	0.01	0.19***	0.01
native			0.05***	0.01	0.04***	0.01
tv watch			0.03***	0.00	0.03***	0.00
Explained Variance						
country variation	0.11	0.04	0.08	0.03	0.09	0.04

residual variation	1.26	0.01	1.10	0.00	1.10	0.01
Time Fixed Effects	No		Yes		Yes	
Individual Controls	No		Yes		Yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-193144.23		-156341.94		-135052.57	
N	125687, 15		106494, 15		92095, 14	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

There is a negative relationship between education and support for income redistribution. Table 6.5 shows that, for each additional year that an individual spends in full-time education, he/she is likely to score income redistribution 0.02 lower on a scale of 1 to 5. This relationship occurs even when controlling for income and political left-right affiliation. As mentioned previously, the explanation of this trend, as observed in the literature, is that individuals with higher educational attainment are more secure about their labour market position and feel less at risk of unemployment than those with lower levels of education (Iversen and Soskice 2001; Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm 2006).

Although contextual controls have yet to be introduced, there is initial evidence that higher levels of E8 migration may be a factor in explaining why some individuals are less supportive of income redistribution. According to Model 2a in Table 6.5, individuals living in countries with higher proportional numbers of E8 migrants feel more negatively about income redistribution even when controlling for individual characteristics and time trends. In other words, for each 100% increase in E8 migrants in the national population, individuals living the Western European societies are predicted to feel 0.05 points lower about income redistribution on a scale of 1 (most negative) to 5 (most positive). This finding is significant at the highest level of statistical significance ($p<0.001$), and is particularly interesting since the results of the OLS regressions for each country in the previous section found that there was either a positive relationship between E8 stock and public support for income redistribution, or none at all. As mentioned previously, the OLS regressions could not control for the fact that attitudes towards income redistribution were growing increasingly more positive in Western Europe from 2002 to 2010. However, caution should be exercised before drawing further conclusions. For instance, Model 2a does not consider other confounding national contextual factors, such as economic conditions or other immigration trends, which can also affect the way that an individual feels about income redistribution. The next section will examine if this negative relationship persists even when these other contextual factors are considered.

The statistical significance of the coefficients is not the only way to evaluate these results and the importance of the findings should also be considered in the size of the coefficients and the substantive impact. Discerning the substantive impact can be tricky when the units between the covariates are not comparable. In order to compare the impact of the size, I calculate the Cohen's f to be 0.14, which indicates a fairly small effect size.⁸

Welfare Chauvinism

The propensity for an individual to exhibit welfare chauvinism can also differ across different socio-economic groups. There is a debate in the literature about whether differences between an individual's inclination towards being welfare chauvinistic represents an economic or a cultural cleavage. The results here show support for both of these characterizations. Table 6.6 introduces a series of individual characteristics as controls, most of which are indicative of cultural cleavages but economic differences still remain a factor.

Women ($\beta = -0.09$, $p < 0.01$) are less likely to be welfare chauvinistic, which is consistent with previous findings (Mewes and Mau 2013). It can probably be explained by the fact that women tend to have more egalitarian beliefs and are more supportive of social policies in general (Svallfors 1997; Edlund 1999). They also are less likely to belong to right wing populist parties (Norris 2005; Koster, Achterberg, and Waal 2013) which tend to have welfare chauvinistic platforms.

Table 6.6 also confirms that more educated people ($\beta = -0.04$, $p < 0.00$) are less inclined to be welfare chauvinistic. This supports previous empirical findings which argue that this is driven by the cultural insecurity of lower educated individuals (van der Waal et al. 2010). It has also been suggested that educated individuals tend to be more libertarian, while less educated individuals tend to be more authoritarian (Stubager 2008; Altemeyer 1981).⁹ These personalities tend to occur disproportionately amongst lower educated individuals, and in the field of social psychology they have been linked to xenophobia, anti-Semitism, racism and a variety of other hostile attitudes towards the out-groups (Adorno 1950). In fact, this may be an indication of a value conflict, rather than an economic difference, between individuals of differing levels of education.

⁸ Cohens F^2 is a suitable size effect measure for multilevel models (Selya et al. 2012).

⁹ The concept of an 'authoritarian personality' originates from the seminal work in psychology by Adorno (1950). and in the context of immigration can be seen as cognitively rigid individuals who are 'personally defensive' and place an unusually high importance on law and authority (Quinton, Cowan, and Watson 1996, 2206).

An person's economic situation appears to be highly relevant to their preferences for redistribution. The results show that individuals with lower incomes or those who do not participate in the labour market are more likely to be oppose providing immigrants with swift access to social benefits ($\beta = 0.15$, $p < 0.00$, $\beta = 0.09$, $p < 0.05$). These findings is likely to be motivated by self-interest, since individuals with lower incomes or who are not in employment are more likely to need welfare state resources themselves. Immigrants tend to be in direct competition with low-wage earners (Quillian 1995, 590). Those individuals in more precarious economic conditions may perceive a greater threat from immigration, which motivates them to wish to restrict immigrants' access to welfare resources (Mau 2012).

Natives (individuals who do not have migrant backgrounds) are more likely to be welfare chauvinists ($\beta = 0.61$, $p < 0.00$), probably due to their higher level of identification with the in-group than those with migrant backgrounds, giving them a greater propensity to wish to exclude the out-group members from the group resources. This is also heightened if a person feels that immigrants are net beneficiaries of rather than net contributors to the welfare state. Individuals who saw immigrants as net contributors were statistically less likely to be welfare chauvinistic ($\beta = -0.15$, $p < 0.001$). This control variable is included to control for the perception that immigrants rely on welfare disproportionately, which may also vary systematically across countries.

An individual's political values are strong predictors of welfare chauvinism. People who place themselves more towards the right of the political spectrum are more likely to be welfare chauvinistic ($\beta = 0.08$, $p < 0.00$). This is unsurprising, since many extreme-right political platforms in Europe stand not only for restricting immigrants from entering the country but also for restricting their access to state resources such as social benefits. It could be the case that individuals who feel very strongly that immigrants should not access social services and benefits are more likely to associate themselves with the political right, which is closer to their issue position. On the other hand, it is also possible that individuals who are affiliated with the political right have absorbed the anti-immigrant political rhetoric that casts immigrants as welfare scroungers and underserving of state resources.

The amount of change in E8 migration after the enlargement does not show any evidence of explaining the cross-country differences in welfare chauvinism. The independent variable, *E8stock change*, does not achieve any statistical significance when introduced in Model 2b. Furthermore, its introduction does not reduce the country-level variation and only improves the model fit very

slightly, as shown by the log pseudo-likelihood. This casts doubt on the fact that E8 migration is a factor behind explaining differences in welfare chauvinism.

Table 6.6 Multi-level Regression, Individual Controls, Welfare Chauvinism

	Model 0b		Model 1b	
	coef	s.e	coef	s.e
Intercept	-0.65	0.13	-0.72	0.35
E8 stock change			0.00	0.01
Individual Controls				
gender			-0.09**	0.03
age			-0.00**	0.00
education			-0.04***	0.00
labor market (ref=insider)				
outsider			-0.02	0.03
not active			0.09*	0.04
right-wing			0.08***	0.01
rural			0.08	0.03
low income			0.15***	0.04
native			0.61***	0.05
tv watch			0.02	0.01
country variation				
icc	0.05		0.06	
Log pseudolikelihood	-15688.12		-13289.81	
N	25026, 12		21379, 12	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Macro Level Controls and Baseline Models

The models in Table 6.7 and Table 6.10 introduce macro contextual variables to control for other contextual explanations of the two attitudes of interest. The research scope of this chapter focuses only on the relationship between a single contextual factor, E8 migration, and attitudes towards welfare. As previously mentioned, it does not endeavor to explore all individual and contextual covariates. Although it is not directly interested in the association of these confounding contextual factors, some of these findings are noteworthy and will also be described in this results section. Recall that if a potential contextual control variable is not significant, it is noted that the variable did not achieve

significance but the results of these tests are too numerous to show in the tables. Only contextual factors that achieve significance are included as controls and shown in the tables.

First, Table 6.7 shows the relationships between contextual variables and individual attitudes of income redistribution. Next, Table 6.10 shows the relationships between these same contextual variables with the second dependent variable, attitudes of welfare chauvinism. Models labelled with an ‘a’ refer to the first dependent variable (income redistribution) and those with a ‘b’ refer to the second dependent variable (welfare chauvinism). Only significant contextual variables are introduced into the model, to remain as parsimonious as possible and to preserve the degrees of freedom.

Income Redistribution

There indication of a negative relationship between the amount of Eastern European immigration post-enlargement and the support for income redistribution in Western Europe. In Table 6.7, Model 5a shows the baseline model when all of the significant contextual variables are introduced simultaneously. Here, the coefficient for *log E8stock* is found to be significantly and negatively associated with attitudes. In other words, a doubling of the number of E8 migrants is associated with a 0.05 lower preference for redistribution on a scale of 1 to 5, even when taking into account individual characteristics and confounding national socio-economic factors. Yet a significant relationship is not found when examining the rate of increase (*log E8rate*) in Model 6a. ^a The first of the baseline models (5a) does show an improvement in model fit, as evidenced by the improvement in log pseudo-likelihood, and a reduction in country-level variation. It should also be noted that the significance of the coefficients for *GNI* and *log foreign nationals* is eroded when all contextual factors are included simultaneously.

Table 6.7 Multilevel Regression, Contextual Controls, Income Redistribution

	Baseline

^a The extent that a country spends on social spending is not included here since in these model since it did not show evidence of being a predictor attitudes nor did including it alter the results presented here.

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	Model 3a		Model 4a		Model 5a		Model 6a	
	coef	s.e	coef	s.e	coef	s.e	coef	s.e
Intercept	3.60	0.16	3.793	0.16	3.43	0.20	3.67	0.22
log E8 stock	-0.05**	0.01			-0.05**	0.01		
log E8 rate			0.00	0.01			-0.01	0.01
Contextual Controls								
GNI per capita					0.00*	0.00	0.00	0.00
unemployment					-0.44	0.27	-0.64*	0.29
log foreign nationals	-0.04	0.04	-0.08	0.04	-0.03	0.04	-0.08	0.04
mobility	-0.41***	0.06	-0.40***	0.07	-0.39***	0.06	-0.35***	0.07
Explained Variance								
country variation	0.08	0.03	0.09	0.03	0.10	0.04	0.11	0.04
residual variation	1.10	0.00	1.10	0.01	1.11	0.00	1.10	0.01
Individual Controls	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Time Fixed Effects	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-147330.77		-128759.03		-147325.86		-128755.70	
N	100233, 15		87647, 14		100233, 15		87647, 14	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

This negative relationship is observed for the average opinion about income redistribution above does not appear to hold true when looking at individuals who have more strong opinions. In order to examine the relationship between E8 migration and support for government redistribution across the distribution of attitudes, I have conducted the analysis separately for two sub-populations: individuals who oppose redistribution and individuals who support redistribution. The results shown in show that for certain groups along the continuum of opinion actually show an opposite relationship: whereby living in a country with a greater amount of E8 nationals goes hand-in-hand with feeling more supportive of redistribution. In Table 6.8, the results show that the relationship between the number of E8 nationals living in the country is slightly but significantly positive amongst individuals who are supportive of redistribution ($\beta=0.02$, $p<0.01$). Interestingly, Table 6.9 shows that the rate of increase in E8 populations has a positive relationship but in the other group, individuals who are against redistribution ($\beta=0.01$, $p<0.05$). Although a significance level at the 0.05 level is reason to hesitate, it may be that the weaker significance level is driven by the smaller sample size in this group ($n=14,110$).

Table 6.8 Multilevel Results: The influence of E8 stock across the distribution of attitudes towards income redistribution

	Supports Redistribution		Against Redistribution	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	4.30	0.10	1.71	0.13
log E8 stock	0.02**	0.01	0.00	0.01
Explained Variance				
country variation	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
residual variation	0.22	0.00	0.14	0.00
Individual Controls	yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-44288.38		-6902.03	
N	68003, 15		15959, 15	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: Those that feel neutrally have not been tested due to collinearity with the constant.

Table 6.9 Multilevel Results: The influence of E8 rate across the distribution of attitudes towards income redistribution

	Supports Redistribution		Against Redistribution	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	4.01	0.11	1.78	0.16
log E8 rate	0.00	0.00	0.01*	0.00
Explained Variance				
country variation	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
residual variation	0.22	0.00	0.14	0.00
Individual Controls	yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-38490.48		-6017.83	
N	59121, 14		14110, 14	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: Those that feel neutrally have not been tested due to collinearity with the constant.

Welfare Chauvinism

The cross-country variation in welfare chauvinism appears to be driven primarily by the compositional effects of their population's socio-demographics. a person's own characteristics rather than the social context in which they live. This can be observed in Table 6.10, where we see that contextual level variables do not appear to be predictors of differences in welfare chauvinism between European countries. In particular, there is no evidence that the change in E8 national populations in Western European societies is connected to the prevalence of welfare chauvinism. This finding contradicts ethnic competition theory, which predicts that individuals are more likely to wish to restrict immigrants from accessing resources when the size of the immigrant group poses more of a threat.

Table 6.10 Multilevel Regressions with Contextual Controls, Welfare Chauvinism

	Model 3b		Model 4b		baseline Model 5b	
	coef	s.e	coef	s.e	coef	s.e
Intercept	-1.29	1.09	-1.91	1.34	-1.42	2.19
E8 stock change	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.01
GNI per capita			0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
unemployment			-5.27	6.66	-6.85	8.65
log foreign nationals	-0.17	0.35			0.11	0.34
mobility	-0.46	1.75			0.73	1.40
Explained Variance						
country variation	0.24	0.10	0.13	0.05	0.14	0.06
Individual Controls	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Time Fixed Effects	No		No		No	
Log pseudolikelihood	-12370.618		-13286.54		-12367.62	
N	19823, 11		21379, 12		19823, 11	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: does not include Austria, Italy or Luxembourg since they did not participate in this round of the survey.

Interaction effects of national context

The next part of the analysis explores the importance of the national context in moderating the relationship between E8 migration and Western European attitudes about the welfare state. The contextual-level control variables are multiplied with the independent variables and introduced into the model as interaction terms.⁴⁸ In Table 6.11, the interaction terms are introduced into the models to explain the first dependent variable, attitudes about income redistribution. These models are denoted with the letter 'a'. Models that show the relationships between contextual variable interactions with the second dependent variable, welfare chauvinism, are shown in Table 6.13 and denoted with the letter 'b'.

Income Redistribution

The relationship between post-enlargement migration and preferences for income redistribution appear to depend on the context of immigration in their country. The contextual factors pertaining specifically to E8 migration are important moderators. First, when interacted the strictness of the mobility restrictions appears to moderate post-enlargement migration but it is unclear in which direction. In Table 6.11, we see that when interacted in log E8 stock it is negative and significant ($\beta = -0.23$, $p < 0.05$), but when interacted with log E8 rate in Table 6.12, it is positive and significant ($\beta = 0.05$, $p < 0.00$). Also, we see that the overall number of foreign nationals in the population makes a difference. All other factors being equal, an individual living in a country with a quickly growing amount of E8 nationals and a higher amount of foreign nationals has a preference for less income redistribution than an individual living in a country with a quickly growing population of E8 nationals but a lower amount of other foreign nationals. This relationship could also depend on the number of E8 nationals which lived in the country before the enlargement which appears in Model 14a to be a positive moderator of the rate of increase on preferences for redistribution.

As expected, the economic situation of the country plays a role in how E8 migration is related to what extent the public has a preference for income redistribution. Following the expectations of

⁴⁸ Interaction terms with individual control variables could not be explored because the number of level-2 groups (countries) is not sufficient ($n=15$).

competition theory, a higher unemployment shows a depressive effect on the relationship between the rate of increase and support for income redistribution in Model 12a while it does not appear to be significant when interacted with the stock of E8 nationals in Model 8a.

On the other hand, the country's economic wealth moderates the stock of E8 nationals but not the rate at which it increases.. Model 7a shows that individuals living in wealthier countries with higher levels of E8 nationals are less supportive of income redistribution than individuals living in poorer countries with higher levels of income redistribution. The results are also contrary to the theoretical expectations of competition theory since it shows that have more economic resources in the society heightens the perception of threat rather than weakens it.

Table 6.11 also allows us to observe the robustness of the log E8stock coefficients when introducing additional terms into the model. The results raise concerns that the negative relationship between E8 migration and support for redistribution presented in the baseline model might be spurious. The coefficients for log E8stock vacillate between from being significantly positive in Model 7a to being significantly negative in 8a depending on which interaction terms are included. Similarly, the coefficients for *log E8rate* show significant and positive results in Model 12a but are negative in Model 11a and 13a. The robustness of these parameters will be further explored in the next section, which will expose the findings to a series of sensitivity checks. The relationship may also depend on how many E8 nationals lived in the country before the enlargement which as shown in Model 14a can positively moderate the relationship with preferences for redistribution.

Table 6.11 Multilevel Regression with Interaction Terms, E8 Stock and Redistribution

	redistribution (a)	
	coef	SE
Models 7a		
log E8 stock	0.48*	0.21
GNI per capita	0.00	0.00
log E8 stock*GNI	-0.05*	0.02
intercept	3.61	0.22
Level 1 Variance	0.13	0.05
Level 2 Variance	1.11	0.00
Models 8a		
log E8 stock	-0.05*	0.02
unemployment	-0.49	1.45
log E8stock*unemployment	-0.01	0.24

intercept	3.43	0.25
Level 1 Variance	0.10	0.04
Level 2 Variance	1.11	0.00
Models 9a		
log E8 stock	0.06	0.07
log foreign stock	0.19	0.14
log E8stock*log foreign stock	0.04	0.02
intercept	4.10	0.44
Level 1 Variance	0.10	0.04
Level 2 Variance	1.11	0.00
Models 10a		
log E-8 stock	-0.03	0.02
mobility restrictions	-1.71**	0.55
log E8 stock*mobility restrict.	-0.23*	0.10
intercept	3.71	0.23
Level 1 Variance	0.11	0.04
Level 2 Variance	1.10	0.00

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: Includes year fixed effect, individual-level controls and contextual level controls

Table 6.12 Multilevel Regression with Interaction Terms, E8 Rate and Income Redistribution

	redistribution (a)	
	coef	SE
Models 11a		
log E8 rate	-0.02**	0.01
mobility restrictions	-0.16	0.09
log E8 rate*restrictions	0.03***	0.01
intercept	3.68	0.22
Level 1 Variance	0.09	0.04
Level 2 Variance	1.10	0.01
Models 12a		
log E8 rate	0.05***	0.01
unemployment	-3.54***	0.65
log E8rate*unemployment	-0.79***	0.16
intercept	3.96	0.23
Level 1 Variance	0.10	0.04
Level 2 Variance	1.10	0.01
Models 13a		

log E8 rate	-0.09*	0.04
log foreign stock	-0.15**	0.05
log E8rate*log foreign stock	-0.03*	0.01
intercept	3.52	0.23
Level 1 Variance	0.10	0.04
Level 2 Variance	1.10	0.01
Models 14a		
log E8 rate	0.00	0.01
2002 E8 stock	-0.02	0.01
log E8rate*log 2002 E8stock	0.01**	0.00
intercept	3.35	0.25
Level 1 Variance	0.10	0.04
Level 2 Variance	1.10	0.01

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: Includes year fixed effect, individual-level controls and contextual level controls. Interaction with GNI not included since model does not converge.

Welfare Chauvinism

There is no evidence that national contextual factors, when interacted with the growth in E8 nationals in the population, can explain the differences between the welfare chauvinism in various European countries. Table 6.13 shows in Models 7b and 8b that the amount of economic wealth nor unemployment act as moderators. Models 9b and 10 b also show that transitional restrictions on E8 nationals and the presence of other foreign nationals in the country are also not significant when interacted with changes in E8 population size. It is also important to note that including interaction terms shows that in Models 7b and 9b there is a negative and significant relationship between E8 stock and welfare chauvinism. But given the few degrees of freedom at the Level 2 of analysis it is unlikely that this is an indication of a robust relationship. The reliability of these results will be further explored in the next section.

Table 6.13 Multilevel Regression with Interaction Terms, Welfare Chauvinism

	welfare chauvinism	
	coef	SE
Models 7b		
change E8 stock	-0.23***	0.05
GNI per capita	-0.00**	0.00
change E8 stock*GNI	0.00	0.00
intercept	6.56	2.42
Level 2 Variance	0.05	0.02
Models 8b		
change E8 stock	0.12	0.08
unemployment	116.02	70.52
change E8stock*unemployment	-1.87	1.07
intercept	-12.40	6.56
Level 2 Variance	0.11	0.05
Models 9b		
change E8 stock	-0.03***	0.00
log foreign stock	0.26**	0.09
change E8stock*log foreign stock	0.00***	0.00
intercept	4.08	0.77
Level 2 Variance	0.01	0.00
Models 10b		
change E8 stock	-0.01	0.01
mobility restrictions	-3.19	3.55
change E8 stock*mobility	0.13	0.11
intercept	-1.05	2.09
Level 2 Variance	0.12	0.05

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: Includes individual-level controls and contextual level controls

Robustness Checks

Following the same procedure as in the previous empirical chapter, the findings in this chapter will now be subjected to a series of robustness checks to determine their reliability. Four series of robustness checks will be shown. These check the sensitivity of the results to the following: 1) time, place and weighting; 2) independent variable measurement 3) model specification; and 4) influential countries. The purpose of these exercises is verify the findings of this chapter.

Sensitivity to Time, Place and Weighting

The first series of robustness checks is put in place to test the sensitivity of the results to the data sampling. First, the results outlined in the previous section make use of all of the available data from the European Social Survey. The first check tests to see if any relationship between the independent and dependent variable existed in 2002, prior to the enlargement, to rule out the counter-argument that there may be omitted variable bias. The second check drops data from 2010 to understand if the results still hold when attitudinal data from a year of the global recession are dropped. Next, a series of robustness checks aims to test the sensitivity of the results to including weights and country fixed effects in the model.

The previous negative relationship between E8 migration and support for redistribution is found to be highly sensitive. Table 6.14 and Table 6.15 show the various coefficients for *logE8stock* and *logE8rate* when measured under different model conditions. The results of the sensitivity tests shown in Table 6.14 raises doubts that the negative link uncovered between E8 migration and preferences for redistribution may not be reliable. The coefficient continues to remain negative when the 2010 data are dropped from in Checks Ia and Ib and when country fixed effects are introduced in Check IIa and Check IIb. However, the results also appear sensitive to the weighting of the sample in Check IIIa when the significance of the coefficient eroded although the coefficient maintains a similar size and direction.

Table 6.14 Robustness Checks, E8 Stock and Income Redistribution

	Check Ia		Check IIa		Check IIIa	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	3.61	0.21	3.56	0.15	3.51	0.31
log E8 Stock	-0.03*	0.02	-0.04**	0.01	-0.05	0.04
Explained Variance						
country variation	0.11	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.05
residual variation	0.94	0.00	0.94	0.00	1.11	0.05
Individual Controls	yes		yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes		yes	
Weights	no		no		yes	
Time Fixed Effects	2002-2008		2002-10		2002-10	
Country Fixed Effects	no		yes		no	
Log pseudolikelihood	-114283.92		-137276.99		-127266.81	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: country fixed effects does not include Austria

In the next series of checks, the models are run separately for each year in Table 6.16 and Table 6.17 to identify how the cross-country differences may have evolved over time. Although the time-pooled analysis in the baseline model shows a significant and negative relationship between E8 stock and support for redistribution, there does not appear to be a relationship when disaggregating the results by year in Table 6.16. One possible explanation is that there was that in a single year, E8 stock did not explain cross country differences in redistribution preferences. Another explanation may be that by relying on fewer observations, the standard errors becomes larger and erodes the significance level compared to the baseline.

Table 6.15 Robustness Checks, E8 Rate and Income Redistribution

	Check Ib		Check Iib	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	4.01	0.25	3.43	0.19
log E8 Rate	-0.02**	0.01	-0.02**	0.01
Explained Variance				
country variation	0.11	0.04	0.00	0.00
residual variation	0.94	0.00	0.93	0.00
Individual Controls	yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes	
Weights	no		no	
Time Fixed Effects	2002-2008		2002-10	
Country Fixed Effects	no		yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-101222.41		-119848.61	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: country fixed effects does not include Austria. Results with weights could not be shown since model would not converge.

Smaller sample sizes does not appear to be a problem when disaggregating the relationship for each year for E8 rate in Table 6.17. Here we observe that in certain years there was a positive and significant relationship between the rate at which E8 stock was increasing and support for redistribution. The fact that this relationship existed in 2002, however, does indicate that this relationship is unlikely connected to the enlargement since it did not occur until 2004. In fact, disaggregating the results by year does not reveal a coherent pattern or evolution of the relationship over time.

Table 6.16 Robustness Check, Year by Year, E8 Stock and Redistribution

	2002		2004		2006		2008		2010	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	3.25	1.13	2.90	1.49	4.76	1.63	2.90	1.29	3.36	1.83
log E8 stock	-0.08	0.07	-0.10	0.09	0.03	0.09	0.00	0.07	-0.10	0.10
Explained Variance										
country variation	0.06	0.02	0.06	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.02
residual variation	1.20	0.01	1.16	0.01	1.10	0.01	0.99	0.01	1.03	0.01
Individual Controls	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-34467.38		-29932.94		-30442.29		-28021.02		-24257.95	

N	22786	20036	20724	19823	16864
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*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Table 6.17 Robustness Check, Year by Year, E8 Rate and Redistribution

	2002		2004		2006		2008		2010	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	6.00	1.22	4.05	0.99	4.28	1.05	3.43	0.88	3.18	1.33
log E8 rate	0.16*	0.08	-0.03	0.11	0.00	0.10	0.18*	0.09	0.04	0.07
Explained Variance										
country variation	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01
residual variation	1.19	0.01	1.14	0.01	1.10	0.01	1.01	0.01	1.05	0.01
Individual Controls	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-28582.70		-26120.41		-27954.02		-26058.38		-19857.59	
N	18949		17592		19040		18297		13769	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Sensitivity to Independent Variable Measurement

The next series of robustness checks aim to test the sensitivity of the results to the measurement of the independent variable. In the above results section, the independent variable has been measured in two ways. For those models that employ attitudes towards income redistribution as the dependent variable, the independent variable is operationalized as the proportion of E8 nationals in the total population for that given year. Due to fact that data on welfare chauvinism, the second dependent variable, were only available from a single round of the survey (2008), an alternate specification was used. In that case, the independent variable was measured as the percentage increase in E8 nationals from 2004 to 2009. To understand whether these limitations are skewing the results, the results are rerun with two alternative independent variables: the proportion of E8 migrants in the foreign population and the proportion of Polish nationals in the national population. The latter exercise selects Polish nationals since they were the most numerous of all E8 nationals and received the most widespread public attention in the media post-enlargement. Finally, although the relationship

between the independent and dependent variables has been tested for linearity, the quadratic term of the independent variable is also introduced as a check.

The results that measure the relationship between E8 migration volume and income redistribution are not found to be sensitive to the measurement of the independent variable. In Table 6.18, three measurements of the independent variable are introduced. First, in Model VIa, the results show that the quadratic term of *log E8stock* is not significant. This is intended to test how the results respond if the relationship have been treated correctly as linear rather than curvilinear.⁶ Check II measures the independent variable as the proportion of E8 nationals in the foreign population, rather than the total population of the country. The results show that an increase in E8 nationals as a proportion of the foreign population is also associated with a decrease in attitudes towards income redistribution. Finally, Check III tests the sensitivity of the results to the national composition of E8 nationals by testing the results using only Polish nationals. When using the proportion of Polish in the national population, the coefficients remain negative and statistically significant below the $p < 0.05$ level. In sum, the direction and significance of the independent variable is maintained despite the changes in its measurement. These tests can provide confidence that any results are not due to a particular measurement of the independent variable.

However, the results that measure the relationship between E8 migration volume and welfare chauvinism are found to be sensitive to the measurement of the independent variable. Model Ib in Table 6.19 shows that the result when the independent variable is measured to be the proportion of all foreign nationals rather than the proportion of the entire population. When measured in this way, there appears to be a positive and significant relationship between the number of E8 nationals living in the country (as a proportion of the population for that year) and welfare chauvinism ($\beta = 0.32$, $p < 0.05$). Check V uses a measure of E8 nationals as a percentage of foreign nationals and Check VI tests for the sensitivity of the results to the national composition of E8 migration by using the number of Polish nationals as a percentage of the population as a measure. Both of these checks also point to a positive and significant relationship between the E8 nationals living in the country and the dependent variable, welfare chauvinism.

⁶ Although the results suggest that there could be a negative relationship between the quadratic term of *logE8stock* and attitudes of income redistribution, further robustness checks (results not shown) reveal that it is sensitive to an influential country: if Ireland is omitted from the analysis, the significance of the quadratic term is eroded. Moreover, tests of linearity conducted in the beginning of the chapter confirmed a linear relationship.

Table 6.18 Robustness Check, Sensitivity to Independent Variable, Income Redistribution

	Check I		Check II		Check III	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	3.62	0.19	3.40	0.23	3.26	0.19
log E8 Stock ²	0.00	0.00				
log E8 per foreigner			-0.07***	0.02		
log Pole stock					-0.08*	0.01
Explained Variance						
country variation	0.10	0.04	0.09	0.04	0.09	0.04
residual variation	1.11	0.00	1.10	0.01	1.11	0.01
Individual Controls	yes		yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes		yes	
Time Fixed Effects	yes		yes		yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-147329.58		-123443.28		-143908.92	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Table 6.19 Robustness Check, Sensitivity to Independent Variable, Welfare Chauvinism

	Check IV		Check V		Check VI	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	1.24	2.38	2.38	1.73	-1.22	1.83
log E8 stock	0.32*	0.14				
log E8 per foreigner			0.51***	0.12		
log Pole stock					0.36*	0.15
Explained Variance						
country variation	0.11	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.10	0.04
Individual Controls	yes		yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes		yes	
Weights	no		no		no	
Log pseudolikelihood	-12366.17		-9704.20		-12365.98	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Sensitivity to Model Specification

The next series of robustness checks aim to understand if the results presented in this chapter are sensitive to the treatment of the dependent variables and the model specifications. Recall that, in the results presented in the above section, the two dependent variables are treated differently. The first dependent variable, attitudes towards income redistribution, was treated as a continuous variable. The second dependent variable, welfare chauvinism, was treated as a dichotomous variable (i.e. either welfare chauvinistic or not welfare chauvinistic).

In both instances, the decision to treat the dependent variables in such a fashion was debatable. First, the attitudes towards income redistribution are a continuous variable despite only being on a scale of 1 to 5. Given that the rule of thumb states that, for an ordinal variable to be treated as a continuous variable, it must have at least five categories, the sensitivity of the results of this decision will be tested. The results pertaining to attitudes towards income redistribution were re-run employing a multi-level ordinal logistic model which treats the dependent variable as an ordinal categorical model. Second, the baseline models pertaining to welfare chauvinism have dichotomized the variable. This has been done to overcome the problematic nature of the variable which has categorical responses which are somewhat ordered in nature.. Due to the complex nature of this variable and the obscure definition of welfare chauvinism in the literature, the sensitivity of the results to the dichotomization of the variable should be tested. To test this, the results employ a multi-level multinomial logistic regression, which treats the dependent variable as pure categorical outcomes.

The results in Table 6.20 confirm that individuals who are moderate in their views on income redistribution had a negative and significant association with E8 stock than those who had more extreme views. This result is slightly different than the results in the previous section which split the sample into sub-populations. Nevertheless, it does confirm that the associations with E8 stock are heterogeneous depending on an individual's preferences for income redistribution. In Table 6.21 and Table 6.22, the results confirm that there is no significant relationship between the rate of increase in migration and attitudes towards income redistribution or welfare chauvinism.

Table 6.20 Generalised Ordinal Logistic Model, E8 Stock and Income Redistribution

Response (0-9)	income redis.	
	Coef.	S.E.
0 (bad)		
logE8stock	-0.17	0.16
intercept	1.70	1.82
1		
logE8stock	-0.28*	0.13
intercept	2.11	1.18
2		
logE8stock	-0.21**	0.08
intercept	1.20	0.35
3		
logE8stock	-0.17*	0.07
intercept	1.16	0.52
4		
logE8stock	0.08	0.06
intercept	-1.00	0.67
Individual Controls	yes	
Contextual Controls	yes	
Country Fixed Effects	yes	
Time Fixed Effects	yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-131329.32	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Note: Standard Errors Adjusted for Clusters in Each Country

Table 6.21 Generalised Ordinal Models, E8 rate and Income Redistribution

Response (0-9)	income redis.	
	Coef.	S.E.
0 (bad)		
logE8rate	0.12	0.10
intercept	5.66	1.47
1		
logE8rate	0.05	0.04
intercept	4.35	1.43
2		
logE8rate	-0.01	0.03
intercept	1.67	1.06
3		
logE8rate	-0.05	0.03
intercept	1.21	0.97
4		
logE8rate	-0.04	0.02
intercept	-2.27	0.54
Individual Controls	yes	
Contextual Controls	yes	
Country Fixed Effects	yes	
Time Fixed Effects	yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-114878.58	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Note: Standard Errors Adjusted for Clusters in Each Country

Table 6.22 Robustness Check, Multinomial Logistic Regression, Welfare Chauvinism

	Residency Condition		Work Condition		Citizenship Condition		Never	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	0.54	1.38	2.92	1.36	-0.80	1.36	-0.15	1.44
log E8stock	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
Explained Variance								
country variation				0.20 (0.07)				
Individual Controls				yes				
Contextual Controls				yes				
Log pseudolikelihood				-23437.66				

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: Unconditional is the reference category

Sensitivity to Influential Countries

The next series of tests aim to understand if the results presented in this chapter are sensitive to the country outliers. The number of individual-level observations is sufficient to avoid outlying observations from skewing the results. However, given the small number of level-2 country observations (15), tests must be run to determine if observations in a single country are distorting the results. In order to test this, the analysis is re-run, each time dropping a single country from the analysis.

Table 6.23 Robustness Check for Influential Countries, Redistribution

	Drop One Check I		Drop One Check II	
	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.
w/o Austria				
log E8 stock	-0.03*	0.01		
log E8 rate			-0.01*	0.01
intercept	3.57	0.19	3.53	0.21
level 1 variance	0.10	0.04	0.11	0.04
level 2 variance	0.93	0.00	0.92	0.00
w/o Belgium				
log E8 stock	-0.03*	0.01		
log E8 rate			-0.01*	0.01
intercept	3.58	0.19	3.55	0.21
level 1 variance	0.10	0.04	0.10	0.04
level 2 variance	0.93	0.00	0.93	0.00
w/o Denmark				
log E8 stock	-0.04**	0.01		
log E8 rate			-0.02**	0.01
intercept	3.53	0.18	3.47	0.20
level 1 variance	0.06	0.02	0.06	0.03
level 2 variance	0.92	0.00	0.91	0.00
w/o Finland				
log E8 stock	-0.05***	0.01		
log E8 rate			-0.02***	0.01
intercept	3.57	0.19	3.34	0.22
level 1 variance	0.09	0.04	0.11	0.04
level 2 variance	0.94	0.00	0.94	0.00
w/o France				
log E8 stock	-0.04**	0.01		
log E8 rate			-0.02**	0.01
intercept	3.49	0.19	3.43	0.21
level 1 variance	0.09	0.04	0.10	0.04
level 2 variance	0.93	0.00	0.93	0.00
w/o Germany				
log E8 stock	-0.03*	0.01		
log E8 rate			-0.01	0.01
intercept	3.77	0.20	3.88	0.23
level 1 variance	0.09	0.03	0.08	0.03
level 2 variance	0.92	0.00	0.92	0.00
w/o Greece				
log E8 stock	-0.04**	0.01		
log E8 rate			-0.01	0.01
intercept	3.47	0.19	3.45	0.24
level 1 variance	0.07	0.03	0.07	0.03
level 2 variance	0.96	0.00	0.96	0.00
w/o Ireland				

log E8 stock	-0.03	0.02		
log E8 rate			-0.01*	0.01
intercept	3.59	0.19	3.46	0.21
level 1 variance	0.10	0.04	0.11	0.04
level 2 variance	0.94	0.00	0.94	0.00
w/o Italy				
log E8 stock	-0.04**	0.01		
log E8 rate			-0.02**	0.01
intercept	3.53	0.19	3.49	0.21
level 1 variance	0.09	0.04	0.10	0.04
level 2 variance	0.94	0.00	0.94	0.00
w/o Luxembourg				
log E8 stock	-0.04**	0.01		
log E8 rate			-0.02**	0.01
intercept	3.52	0.19	3.48	0.21
level 1 variance	0.10	0.04	0.10	0.04
level 2 variance	0.93	0.00	0.93	0.00
w/o Netherlands				
log E8 stock	-0.03*	0.01		
log E8 rate			-0.02**	0.01
intercept	3.46	0.19	3.29	0.23
level 1 variance	0.08	0.03	0.10	0.04
level 2 variance	0.93	0.00	0.92	0.00
w/o Portugal				
log E8 stock	-0.07***	0.01		
log E8 rate			-0.02***	0.01
intercept	3.46	0.19	3.47	0.22
level 1 variance	0.08	0.03	0.10	0.04
level 2 variance	0.96	0.00	0.95	0.00
w/o Spain				
log E8 stock	-0.03*	0.01		
log E8 rate			-0.01	0.01
intercept	3.46	0.20	3.46	0.22
level 1 variance	0.09	0.03	0.10	0.04
level 2 variance	0.95	0.00	0.95	0.00
w/o Sweden				
log E8 stock	-0.04**	0.01		
log E8 rate			-0.01*	0.01
intercept	3.58	0.20	3.50	0.22
level 1 variance	0.10	0.04	0.10	0.04
level 2 variance	0.96	0.00	0.95	0.00
w/o UK				
log E8 stock	-0.04*	0.02		
log E8 rate			-0.01*	0.01
intercept	3.66	0.23	3.96	0.23
level 1 variance	0.09	0.04	0.08	0.03
level 2 variance	0.93	0.00	0.92	0.00

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

The results pertaining to income redistribution depend on which countries are included in the analysis. Table 6.23 shows that, when dropping countries one at a time from the analysis, this impact the relationship between *log E8stock* and attitudes of income redistribution. If Ireland is dropped from the analysis, the significance of the negative coefficient is eroded to above the 0.05 p value. It is not surprising that Ireland acts as an influential country in the analysis since it by far the sharpest growth of E8 nationals across Western Europe and its extreme values of E8 stock are a compelling argument for its consideration as an outlier.

The results pertaining to welfare chauvinism are also sensitive to outliers, probably due to the small number of countries included in the analysis. First, Austria, Italy and Luxembourg cannot be included since they did not participate in the European Social Survey in 2008. Moreover, there are no data on the stock of foreign nationals is available for Ireland and therefore the country must also be dropped from the sample. This then brings the number of level-2 observations down to 11. This small number of level 2 observations is likely to bias the results and make them highly sensitive to the inclusion of some countries. In Table 6.24, we find that there can be a significant and negative relationship between the change in E8 stock post-enlargement and the prevalence of welfare chauvinism in the host societies but that this depends on which country is included in the analysis. The results of this exercise tell us that when dropping Germany, Greece or Spain from the analysis, the significance is eroded.

Table 6.24 Robustness Check for Influential Countries, Welfare Chauvinism

	Drop One Check III	
	coef.	s.e.
w/o Austria		
E8 change	-0.01	0.01
intercept	-1.42	2.19
level 2 variance	0.14	0.06
w/o Belgium		
E8 change	-0.01	0.01
intercept	-1.08	2.35

level 2 variance	0.15	0.07
w/o Denmark		
E8 change	-0.01	0.01
intercept	-1.42	2.19
level 2 variance	0.14	0.06
w/o Finland		
E8 change	-0.01	0.01
intercept	4.97	4.20
level 2 variance	0.12	0.06
w/o France		
E8 change	-0.02*	0.01
intercept	-0.33	2.07
level 2 variance	0.11	0.05
w/o Germany		
E8 change	-0.02*	0.01
intercept	-0.33	2.09
level 2 variance	0.11	0.05
w/o Greece		
E8 change	0.00	0.00
intercept	-4.64	1.37
level 2 variance	0.04	0.02
w/o Ireland		
E8 change	-0.01	0.01
intercept	-1.42	2.19
level 2 variance	0.14	0.06
w/o Italy		
E8 change	-0.01	0.01
intercept	-1.42	2.19
level 2 variance	0.14	0.06
w/o Luxembourg		
E8 change	-0.01	0.01
intercept	-1.42	2.19
level 2 variance	0.14	0.06
w/o Netherlands		
E8 change	-0.01	0.01
intercept	-1.59	2.31
level 2 variance	0.15	0.07
w/o Portugal		
E8 change	0.00	0.00
intercept	1.86	0.83
level 2 variance	0.01	0.01
w/o Spain		
E8 change	-0.01	0.01
intercept	-1.21	2.65
level 2 variance	0.15	0.07
w/o Sweden		
E8 change	-0.01	0.01
intercept	-2.20	2.26
level 2 variance	0.13	0.06

w/o UK		
E8 change	-0.01	0.01
intercept	-1.58	2.20
level 2 variance	0.14	0.06

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: Includes year fixed effect, individual-level controls and contextual level controls

Discussion

This chapter set out to explore whether E8 migration post-enlargement shaped the public attitudes about welfare provision in the host societies. First attitudes towards the government's role in redistributing income which is a core function of the welfare state. To capture these public sentiments, this chapter used micro-data drawn from the core questionnaire of the European Social Survey from 2002 to 2010 to build multi-level pooled time series models. The second dependent variable is public attitudes towards the social rights of immigrants and, more specifically, the exhibition of welfare chauvinism. For this variable, the chapter used micro data from a rotating module of the European Social Survey conducted in 2008 to build a single-year cross-sectional modal. First, the relationship between post-enlargement migration from Eastern Europe and the two attitudes about welfare were examined. Then, contextual variables were interacted with E8 migration volume to test their impact as moderators.

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, this chapter fails to uncover a universal link between post-enlargement migration and attitudes about welfare in Western Europe. Initially, there appeared to be superficial support for the prediction that a higher level of E8 migrants goes hand-in-hand with a drop in support for income redistribution but further tests revealed this support to be unreliable, and weak at best. Moreover, it does not appear that the speed at which E8 national populations grew has impacted preferences. But these findings are applicable to the European population in general and measure the relationship for the average citizen. By separating the public into two sub-groups, individuals who oppose and individuals who support immigration it is clear that the role of E8 migration varies across the attitudinal continuum. This is to say, that although there is a weakly negative relationship in general, it is appears that E8 migration bolstered support for income redistribution among those who are already prefer income redistribution. One interpretation might be that E8 migration generated a boost in support amongst its core supporters. However, without a

longitudinal panel of attitudes which follows individuals over time, this remains merely a possibility since cannot be conclusively shown empirically.

The existence of cross-country differences in welfare chauvinism cannot be explained, even in part, by migration from the East after the 2004 EU enlargement. However, post-enlargement migration did not occur in a vacuum but in conjunction with other simultaneously occurring national phenomenon such as economic trends and other immigration patterns. It appears that E8 migration may have a compounding effect in being associated with a greater prevalence of welfare chauvinism in countries that have larger foreign national populations. While the results do not show much evidence of ethnic competition, this particular finding is consistent with the theoretical prediction that an increase in the size of an out-group heightens the perception of threat.

These findings likely hinge on the nature of E8 immigration compared to other immigration trends. E8 nationals were primarily economic migrants, who finally were granted the freedom to pursue better wages and an improved standard living in Western Europe. So although they may have posed a threat to natives in certain sectors of the labour market, they are more likely to contribute taxes to the state and less likely to present a welfare services burden than non-economic migrants. Moreover, the age, skill and nationality profile of E8 migrants is different across Western European countries. While there is not sufficient data to explore the attitudinal impact of variation in E8 composition, one could speculate that higher skill migration and younger age profiles of E8 migration would be perceived as posing less of a threat than lower skilled or older E8 nationals who could be perceived as placing a greater burden on welfare provisions.

Although there is no solid evidence of a general relationship between immigration and European attitudes about welfare, the findings do not rule out the possibility that such a relationship could exist within certain countries. When running the analysis within each country one-by-one (albeit with a crude OLS regression), the relationship between E8 migration and attitudes towards income redistribution is heterogeneous. For instance, although there is a weakly negative relationship between E8 migration shows and support for income redistribution in Europe overall, the relationship shows the opposite direction in Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Portugal. The heterogeneity of the relationship between immigration and attitudes of welfare is consistent with the findings of Senik, Stichnoth, and Van der Straeten (2009) and that the relationship may not be monotonic (Lindqvist and Östling 2013).

These findings inform the recent scholarly debate about the political durability of the welfare state in European societies in an age of migration. Some scholars argue that immigration increases ethnic diversity and erodes ideologically motivated support for income redistribution (Gary P. Freeman 1986; Alesina and Glaeser 2006; Mau and Burkhardt 2009). Much of this evidence is based on the American experience, where diversity is theorised to have hindered the development of a generous welfare state. Whether or not Europe will embrace a more Americanised version of welfare is widely debated in the literature (Taylor-Gooby 2005; Geddes 2003a; Larsen 2011). The empirical findings of this chapter contribute to this debate by casting further doubt that European mobility is eroding the public appetite for a generous welfare state in Europe. Based on the lack of evidence, this chapter confirms previous studies which argue that it would be premature to declare that increasing certain types of immigration will bring about a 'crisis' for the European welfare state (Hjerm and Schnabel 2012; Banting 2005; Castles 2002).

So what has buoyed public support for income redistribution despite the acceleration of immigration from Eastern Europe post-enlargement? Despite the mounting immigration, welfare state scholars have documented that there is no evidence of a 'race to the bottom' since welfare spending continues to rise (Ferrera and Rhodes 2000; Taylor-Gooby 2001; Kuhnle 2004; Scharpf and Schmidt 2000). Yet, the findings in this chapter do not corroborate Taylor-Gooby's (2005) argument that left-wing politics have counter-acted the effects of immigration to preserve the European welfare model from becoming more Americanized. A potential explanation of this would be the European cultural attachment to generous welfare functions, such as income redistribution (van Oorschot 2007). Another explanation may be found in the nature of E8 migration. It might be E8 migrants are not perceived to be 'different' enough in EU-15 societies to induce a decline in support for income redistribution. This may be because Central and Eastern Europeans are not physically dissimilar to the natives of Western Europe. Furthermore, E8 nationals share certain general European norms and values. It may also be that the effects of the E8 migration on welfare attitudes are imperceptible across a span of eight years and could have a gradual effect as E8 nationals establish themselves in their host societies.

Considering contextual variation in attitudes is still important since it helps us to understand the national factors that contribute towards the preferences for redistribution or the incidence of welfare chauvinism. Without discounting the importance of the national context, it is important to stress that most of the variation in individual attitudes about welfare is driven by differences between individual characteristics, rather than country factors. Significant individual-level determinants are

used as control variables in the multi-level analysis and their the association of the individual-level characteristics with attitudes of income redistribution and welfare for immigrants was as expected. The results support both scholarly arguments that individual attitudes about income redistribution are motivated by self-interest as well as personal values. On the other hand, economic interest does not appear to explain why some individuals are chauvinistic about welfare while others are not. Instead the findings here hint that the emergence of welfare chauvinism is primarily cultural cleavage in society rather than an economic one. This would then imply that individuals would prefer to restrict immigrants from welfare provisions not due to an economic threat but rather motivated by social reasons such as values of fairness or a perception of cultural threat posed by immigration.

The importance of individual characteristics likely suggests that there is an interaction between the social unit in which immigration occurs and the personal attributes of the person in crystalizing his or her attitude. Unfortunately, with the data hand, this interaction cannot be investigated. One could speculate that the individuals in more precarious economic circumstances, such as less educated or earning less, may feel threatened by E8 migration and this could translate the demand for greater protection in the form of income redistribution. Likewise, more economically advantaged people who have a more sure footing in the labor market could be more concerned about a potential financial burden of immigrants on the welfare state rather and therefore prefer less income redistribution.

In light of these findings, it is important to consider how indicative are the attitudes towards income redistribution of attitudes towards other, broader welfare state functions, such as health or education. The analysis in this chapter has only examined support for a single, albeit central, component of the welfare state: income redistribution. The functions of the welfare state extend well beyond income distribution and this study does not address the impact of immigration on these other functions. (Eger 2010) finds that immigration erodes public support for a generous welfare state in Sweden when looking at support for universal welfare benefits (such as education and health) rather than means-tested benefits such as income redistribution. Such lines of questioning deserves further attention but, unfortunately, given the limitations of the survey questions on the ESS (as well as other comparative attitudinal surveys), it proved impossible to investigate them further here.

The findings of this chapter also help to inform the debate regarding the link between immigration and welfare chauvinism in the host societies. First, findings in this chapter are at odds with scholars who argue that welfare chauvinism is a bi-product of rising migration to Europe (Achterberg, 211

Houtman, and Derks 2011; Freeman 2009; Van Oorschot, Achterberg, and van der Waal 2001; van der Waal et al. 2010; Mau 2012). For instance, Kitschelt (1995) describes the prevalence of welfare chauvinism as a 'rational' reaction to ensure the preservation of social resources. While 'racists and cultural-ethnic particularists turn only against immigrants from a different culture than citizens of the national club, sober calculating welfare chauvinists oppose any kind of immigration, no matter whether they belong to a different or the same ethnicity as actual citizens' (Kitschelt 1995, 262). If this argument were to hold true, then E8 migration would certainly explain the differences in welfare chauvinism since European mobility migrants have easier access to social rights than non-European migrants. In fact, for this reason, one would then expect the reaction to E8 migration to be even more powerful. Yet the evidence does not find any link between changes in E8 migration and the variation in welfare chauvinism across different countries. This would then imply that welfare chauvinism is perhaps linked to the deeply rooted xenophobia and cognitive rigidities that are not dictated by immigration patterns.

According to these results, Europe can avoid a progressive's dilemma. Rising diversity may not come at the expense of generous social provisions if Europeans manage to prevent immigrants from accessing them. We have seen here that the American example does not necessarily apply to Europe. Immigration itself may not threaten the political viability of welfare states. This chapter contends that the rapid accumulation of E8 migrants in Western Europe has not undermined support for welfare in general. Support for income distribution was unchanged despite the E8 migrants' special entitlement to social benefits and employment opportunities under EU law. However Eastern European migrants share some common characteristics with their host populations. Whether or not the share of non-western migrants, with more distinctive racial and religious profiles, will undermine the European welfare states remains beyond the scope of this chapter. Is the US model a harbinger of Europe's welfare state future? The answer may depend on who is admitted to Fortress Europe.

7. Trust

Chapter Overview

The case of migration to Western Europe after the European Union's 2004 enlargement presents an opportunity to study the relationship between immigration and political trust in host societies. Theoretically, we would expect an increase in migration to trigger a decline in trust within host societies by lowering in-group solidarity. This chapter sets out to address two research questions: Does post-enlargement migration volume explain differences trust across time and space in Western Europe? And second, have national contextual factors moderated this relationship (if any)? Two types of trust are examined: generalized social trust and political trust.

This chapter continues to examine two levels of the comparative analysis of attitudes: the individual (micro level) and the country (macro level). It continues to utilize micro attitudinal data from the five biannual rounds (2002-2010) of the European Social Survey, pooled with national contextual level data. The independent variable in this study is the volume of E8 migration which is taken to be the stock of E8 nationals as a percentage of the total national population. The first dependent variable in this chapter is generalised social trust at the individual level. The variable is measured using the following question from the European Social Survey: 'Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful when dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can't be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted'. The respondents are then prompted to select values from 0 to 10. The second dependent variable is political trust, at the individual level. This variable is an index created from three measurements: trust in parliament, trust in politicians and trust in the political parties. The respondents are asked to rate their trust in each institution on a scale of 0 (most untrustworthy) to 10 (most trustworthy). Since these three measurements do vary together (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.89$), they are treated as a singular outcome variable.

The empirical strategy in this chapter is to use a multi-level approach, which is justified by data clustered at the national level. The independent variable, along with the control variables, is modeled on the dependent variable (political trust). Blocks of control variables are introduced in a


step-wise fashion beginning with the estimation of the 'empty' model (Model 0). This model does not include any explanatory variables in order to establish the general variance of cross-country differences for both dependent variables. After the baseline models have been introduced, the interaction effects between the independent variable and institutional variables are examined.

Following the structure of the previous chapters, this chapter is presented in five parts. First, the descriptive results are outlined. This is then followed by two sections, which present the regression results. The first section presents the OLS regression results whereas the second section presents the multi-level regression results. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the results presented in this chapter and a chapter summary.

Descriptive Results

The aggregate level of social trust in Western Europe has remained stable over the last decade. As shown in Figure 7.A, the mean response from 2002 to 2010, is 4.9 out of 10. In other words, on an aggregate level, Europeans seem to feel lukewarm about how trusting one can be of strangers. It is also interesting to note that feelings of inter-personal trust have risen throughout the first decade of the new millennium. Likewise the distribution of attitudes has also remained stable over these years as shown in Figure 2.A.

Figure 7.A EU-15 Aggregate Attitude, Generalised Social Trust



Although there was an increase in social trust in Europe in general, this trend did not occur within each country. In most countries, the aggregate level of social trust has fluctuated slightly between the biannual rounds of the survey. Table 7.1 plots the mean levels of social countries for each Western European country across the time period. The results show that, in some European countries, it is higher in 2010 than it was in 2002. This is the case in Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. However, in Denmark, Ireland, Portugal, and France, there was less social trust in 2010 than there was in 2002.


Table 7.1 Mean Responses, Social Trust

	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010
EU-15	4.8	4.9	5.0	5.0	5.0
Austria	5.1	5.1	5.1	.	.
Belgium	4.8	4.8	5.0	5.1	5.0
Denmark	7.0	6.8	7.0	6.9	6.8
Finland	6.5	6.5	6.6	6.4	6.5
France	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.3
Germany	4.6	4.8	4.7	4.8	4.6
Greece	3.6	3.9	.	3.9	.
Ireland	5.5	5.9	5.3	5.4	.
Italy	4.5	.	.	.	.
Luxembourg	5.2	5.0	.	.	.
The Netherlands	5.7	5.8	5.7	5.9	6.0
Portugal	4.0	3.9	4.1	3.6	3.7
Spain	4.9	4.9	5.1	4.9	5.1
Sweden	6.1	6.1	6.3	6.4	6.3
United Kingdom	5.1	5.1	5.4	5.3	5.4

Note: Sample weights applied. For EU-15 estimates, population weights applied

There is also considerable variation in the relative amount of social trust across Western Europe. Table 7.1 shows that at, on average, Northern Europe tends to be most trusting of others while Southern Europe, France and Germany tend to be less trusting. In Figure 7.B, the results show that the most common response to the question was a value of 5, the halfway point, indicating a rather ambivalent response. The highest amount of social trust reported is in Denmark and Finland where the most common responses were values of 8, which is notably higher than the most popular response in other countries. The lowest levels of social trust are found in Greece and Portugal. Since social trust fluctuates only by a very small amount, these differences persist throughout the time period examined.

Figure 7.B Distribution of Social Trust in Western Europe



Aggregate political trust was also fairly stable in Western Europe from 2004 to 2008, but dipped in 2010. Figure 7.C

Figure 7.C EU-15 Aggregate Attitude, Political Trust

shows the average political trust in the EU-15 in the years following the enlargement. This stability over six years is unsurprising since changes in political trust are known to be gradual. The dip in 2010 is probably attributable to the global recession which plunged many European countries into economic turmoil. Governments struggled to cope with the economic difficulties which probably

explains the lower levels of political trust at the end of the decade. The lower score in aggregate political trust in 2010 is likely due to an increase in less trusting attitudes at the lower end of the distribution as shown in Figure 7.D.

Figure 7.C EU-15 Aggregate Attitude, Political Trust




Table 7.2 Mean Political Trust in Western Europe


	2004	2006	2008	2010
EU-15	3.9	3.8	3.9	3.7
Austria	3.8	3.9	.	.
Belgium	4.4	4.6	4.2	4.1
Denmark	5.9	5.9	5.9	5.4
Finland	5.3	5.3	5.3	4.8
France	3.7	3.6	3.8	3.5
Germany	3.5	3.5	3.8	3.6
Greece	4.0	.	2.8	.
Ireland	4.3	4.2	3.4	.
Italy	.	.	.	.
Luxembourg	5.3	.	.	.
The Netherlands	4.7	5.1	5.3	5.3
Portugal	2.6	3.0	2.8	2.3
Spain	4.2	4.0	3.9	3.2
Sweden	4.6	4.9	5.1	5.5
United Kingdom	3.8	3.7	3.8	3.7

Note: For EU-15 estimates, population weights applied

Although political trust dipped in 2010 in most European countries, this was not a universal trend according to Table 7.2. In some countries (Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands), the amount of political trust was higher in 2010 than in 2008. In fact, Sweden shows a steadily increasing trend in aggregate political trust from 2004 to 2010. On the other hand, Greece experiences a sharp drop in political trust from 2004 to 2008, where it drops to 2.8, probably due to its financial crisis. Overall, the cross-country variation in political trust persists over time, with countries such as Portugal and

Germany⁶⁴ maintaining lower levels and countries such as Denmark and Finland maintaining higher ones.

Figure 7.D Distribution of Political Trust in Western Europe



⁶⁴ The low levels of political trust in Germany are not a result of the lower trust in the former communist East Germany, as a recent study found the levels of political trust in East and West Germany to be indistinguishable (Campbell 2004). Rather, one can surmise that the lower level of political trust might be explained by its past experience with totalitarian regimes.

Table 7.3 Mean Political Trust by Type of Trust

	Parliament	Politicians	Parties
EU-15	4.8	3.9	3.8
Austria	4.9	3.3	3.3
Belgium	4.7	4.2	4.1
Denmark	6.2	5.5	5.5
Finland	5.8	4.8	4.9
France	4.4	3.4	3.3
Germany	4.4	3.4	3.3
Greece	4.4	3.2	3.1
Ireland	4.5	3.7	3.7
Italy	4.8	3.5	-
Luxembourg	5.7	5.0	5.0
Netherlands	5.2	5.0	5.1
Portugal	3.6	2.3	2.2
Spain	4.9	3.3	3.2
Sweden	5.8	4.6	4.7
United Kingdom	4.3	3.6	3.6

Note: sampling weights applied


Overall, Europeans tend to be more trusting of their parliaments than they are of their politicians or their political parties. This is also the case when looking at each country individually in Table 7.3. Of all the Western European countries, the Swedes have the highest trust in their parliament but the Danes have the highest trust in their politicians and their political parties. Portugal has the lowest amount of political trust across all three components of the index. Political trust is also very low for the political parties in Greece and Spain.

Figure 7.E shows a very slight positive relationship between the size of the E8 stock and political trust in the EU-15.⁴⁸ It shows that the Nordic countries and the Netherlands have the higher levels of political trust as well as a moderate proportion of E8 nationals. Countries with higher proportions of E8 nationals, like the United Kingdom, Germany and Austria, have lower levels of

⁴⁸ Given that Ireland has a far larger number of E8 nationals as a proportion of their population, the results were rerun without Ireland. When not including Ireland, the relationship is more strongly positive.


political trust. Still, this descriptive analysis is limited because it does not control for the socio-demographic compositional effects and other contextual level variations that might explain cross-national differences.

Figure 7.E Mean E8 stock vs. Social Trust, 2002-2010



Note: R-squared=0.25

Figure 7.F Mean E8 stock vs. Political Trust, 2002-2010



Notes: Note: R-squared=0.13 Italy is not included.

There appears to be a strong positive relationship between the percentage of E8 stock in the national population and the aggregate level of social trust. plots the mean values for each country in a scatter plot. Here, we see that countries with low levels of generalised social trust such as Portugal, Greece, Italy, and France also have lower proportions of E8 nationals living there. Denmark and Greece stand out as the countries with the highest and lowest average levels of social trust, respectively. Again, Ireland is found to stand out along the X-axis, with a large proportion of E8 migrants. When Ireland is removed from the graph, the relationship still remains positive.

Next, it is necessary to check that the relationship between post-enlargement immigration and trust is, in fact, linear. To do so, the residuals are plotted against the independent variable for both social trust (Figure 7.G) and political trust (Figure 7.H). In both tables, the plotted values display a random pattern around the zero line, confirming that the relationships are linear.

Figure 7.G Residual Plot Linearity Check, Social Trust





Figure 7.H Residual Plot Linearity Check, Political Trust



OLS Results

E8 immigration and trust by country

Following a similar procedure as in previous empirical chapters, the analysis is first conducted for each country of interest using traditional OLS regression before employing a multi-level strategy. This exercise will help to inform the results of the multi-level analysis conducted in the following section by providing an understanding of the compositional effects of the individuals in various countries in the sample. The link between post-enlargement migration and the first dependent variable in this chapter, social trust, in each country is shown in Table 7.4 and Table 7.5. Next, the results showing the link with the second dependent variable, political trust, are shown in Table 7.6 and Table 7.7

Social Trust

The link between E8 migration and social trust varies across countries and the results are mixed. Table 7.4 and Table 7.5 show that in most countries, there was no apparent association between social trust and the magnitude or the rate of the migration. However, in a handful of the host countries examined, the proportional amount of E8 nationals in the population is associated with higher levels of social trust. Table 7.4 shows that these countries are: Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. This group of countries is puzzling since there appears to be few common threads between

them that might explain this positive relationship. Foremost, these countries do not share any geographic association. Second, although the UK received the greatest influx of E8 nationals (over 600,000), the three other countries received relatively fewer in both absolute and proportional terms.

Additionally, although the UK and Sweden were both among the first countries to open their borders to E8 nationals in 2004, Netherlands and Belgium did not open theirs until 2007 and 2009 respectively. The positive association with between E8 migration and social trust may be explained by the fact that, in all four of these countries, social trust grew increasingly more positive from 2002 to 2010, as described in Table 7.1. Of these four countries, we find that that the speed of the migration (E8 rate) is only significant in Table 7.5 in the Netherlands. Due to the limitations of single-country regression, time fixed effects cannot be applied to take overall time trends into account.⁴⁶ These will be introduced in the next section when multi-level models are applied.

Political Trust

When examining each country individually, no clear pattern in the relationship between E8 migration and political trust emerges. When conducting the analysis within each country, most results do not uncover any relationship between the proportion of E8 nationals in the national population and the individual tendency towards political trust. Table 7.6 and Table 7.7 shows a superficial indication of a negative relationship in Greece which is likely to be coincidental since Greece experienced only a slight and slow increase in the number of E8 nationals that happened to coincide with the emergence of the government's debt crisis which highlighted institutional incompetence. The negative relationship between E8 migration and political trust in Greece, political trust declined from 2002 to 2010, while incidentally E8 migration was increasing. It is also difficult to get an accurate picture of social trust in Greece since it only participated in three of the five survey waves.

There also appears to be a negative relationship between the rate of increase in France and political trust, which is surprising since the magnitude of E8 migration to France was low relative to the size of its population.⁴⁷ While it cannot be ruled out that speed of E8 migration accompanied a decline in political trust, it is more likely that this is a coincidental finding. This is more likely to be due to a coincidence that the greatest increases in migration from E8 countries occurred in 2004 and

⁴⁶ Time fixed effects cannot be introduced into the models due to issues of collinearity.

⁴⁷ Due to issues of collinearity between E8 stock and political trust, we are not able to test the model for France in Table 7.6.

2006. Around 2004, France was in the midst of a heated debate about the passing of the European Union constitution and there was a general public panic about the possible accession of Turkey. Meanwhile, in 2006 there were riots in major French cities such as Paris and a general civic unrest surrounding labor market legislation and migrant integration. There is reason to believe that these results are distorted by simultaneous events that occurred in France in those years where such public debates and the clumsy management of the riots could have been the reasons driving French decline in political trust in those years.

On the other hand, in some countries, there is a seemingly positive relationship between post-enlargement migration and political trust. According Table 7.6 the magnitude was positively associated with social trust in the Netherlands, and Sweden while Table 7.7 shows us that the speed was positively associated with social trust Belgium, Ireland, and Spain. In the case of Belgium, Sweden and the Netherlands, this relationship is also likely to be coincidental: E8 migration was increasing at a steady rate as political trust was growing. However, this is not the case for Ireland and Spain where trends in trust follow a similar trend as post-enlargement migration trends over time, hinting that there may be a more meaningful relationship to explore in the next analysis. Still at this point, the findings from the individual country regressions are merely superficial since they cannot control for the aggregate trends in political trust over the time period concerned.

Table 7.4 E8 Stock Regressed on Social Trust, OLS

Country		Social Trust	
		Coef	S.E.
Austria	log E8stock	-0.28	0.11
	intercept	3.32	0.71
	R-squared	0.02	
	N	5415	
Belgium	log E8stock	0.22*	0.05
	intercept	4.56	0.49
	R-squared	0.05	
	N	7879	
Denmark	log E8stock	-0.05	0.10
	intercept	4.99	0.52
	R-squared	0.05	

	N	7048	
Finland	log E8stock	-0.11	0.07
	intercept	4.54	0.42
	R-squared	0.02	
	N	9027	
France	log E8stock	-0.26	0.33
	intercept	1.03	2.43
	R-squared	0.04	
	N	8034	
Germany	log E8stock	-0.12	0.37
	intercept	3.03	1.82
	R-squared	0.03	
	N	12587	
Greece	log E8stock	0.15	0.33
	intercept	4.33	2.04
	R-squared	0.03	
	N	5432	
Ireland	log E8stock	-0.10	0.11
	intercept	3.68	0.26
	R-squared	0.02	
	N	6235	
Luxembourg	log E8stock	-0.06	0.14
	intercept	3.23	0.86
	R-squared	0.04	
	N	2321	
Netherlands	log E8stock	0.17*	0.05
	intercept	5.69	0.24
	R-squared	0.04	
	N	8948	
Portugal	log E8stock	-0.28*	0.07
	intercept	1.39	0.80
	R-squared	0.03	
	N	6937	
Spain			

	log E8stock	0.05	0.03
	intercept	4.91	0.37
	R-squared	0.02	
	N	7667	
Sweden			
	log E8stock	0.20**	0.04
	intercept	5.64	0.39
	R-squared	0.04	
	N	8484	
United Kingdom			
	log E8stock	0.10*	0.03
	intercept	4.36	0.22
	R-squared	0.03	
	N	9394	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00. Includes individual controls

Table 7.5 E8 Rate Regressed on Social Trust, OLS

Country		Social Trust	
		Coef	S.E.
Austria			
	log E8rate	0.05	0.05
	intercept	4.81	0.21
	R-squared	0.02	
	N	5415	
Belgium			
	log E8rate	-0.07	0.08
	intercept	3.06	0.27
	R-squared	0.05	
	N	4640	
Denmark			
	log E8rate	-0.02	0.03
	intercept	5.24	0.39
	R-squared	0.05	
	N	7048	
Finland			
	log E8rate	-0.03	0.05
	intercept	5.07	0.20
	R-squared	0.02	
	N	9027	
France			
	log E8rate	0.00	0.01
	intercept	3.02	0.17
	R-squared	0.03	
	N	6495	
Germany			
	log E8rate	-0.01	0.03
	intercept	3.64	0.17
	R-squared	0.03	
	N	10143	
Greece			
	log E8rate	-0.21	0.09
	intercept	3.12	0.48
	R-squared	0.03	
	N	5432	
Ireland			
	log E8rate	0.02	0.01
	intercept	4.01	0.42

	R-squared	0.02	
	N	4427	
Netherlands			
	log E8rate	0.15**	0.03
	intercept	4.81	0.17
	R-squared	0.04	
	N	8948	
Portugal			
	log E8rate	0.10	0.25
	intercept	3.99	0.61
	R-squared	0.03	
	N	5413	
Spain			
	log E8rate	0.00	0.02
	intercept	4.62	0.23
	R-squared	0.02	
	N	7667	
Sweden			
	log E8rate	0.17	0.17
	intercept	4.94	0.20
	R-squared	0.04	
	N	6636	
United Kingdom			
	log E8rate	-0.03	-0.03
	intercept	3.74	0.26
	R-squared	0.03	
	N	9394	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00 Includes individual controls.

Table 7.6 E8 Stock Regressed on Political Trust, OLS

Country		Political Trust	
		Coef	S.E.
Austria			
	log E8stock	0.04	0.05
	intercept	3.11	0.21
	R-squared	0.02	
	N	3520	
Belgium			
	log E8stock	-0.58	0.34
	intercept	0.70	1.86

Denmark	R-squared	0.03	
	N	6322	
	log E8stock	-0.23	0.26
	intercept	3.63	1.46
Finland	R-squared	0.04	
	N	5586	
	log E8stock	-0.63	0.38
	intercept	1.05	2.18
Germany	R-squared	0.05	
	N	7122	
	log E8stock	0.56	0.26
	intercept	5.82	1.33
Greece	R-squared	0.02	
	N	9793	
	log E8stock	-2.87*	0.14
	intercept	-15.29	0.91
Ireland	R-squared	0.12	
	N	3473	
	log E8stock	-0.32	0.17
	intercept	1.90	0.93
Netherlands	R-squared	0.06	
	N	4535	
	log E8stock	0.45*	0.10
	intercept	7.02	0.61
Portugal	R-squared	0.05	
	N	6685	
	log E8stock	-0.32	0.17
	intercept	-0.46	1.42
Spain	R-squared	0.04	
	N	5520	
	log E8stock	-0.70	0.37
	intercept	-0.10	2.51
	R-squared	0.04	
	N	6155	

Sweden			
	log E8stock	0.75*	0.20
	intercept	7.83	1.15
	R-squared	0.06	
	N	6461	
United Kingdom			
	log E8stock	-0.05	0.04
	intercept	2.94	0.61
	R-squared	0.02	
	N	7475	

Note: Italy not included because it only participated in one round. France and Luxembourg not included due to collinearity with E8 migration and individual characteristics. Includes individual controls.

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Table 7.7 E8 Rate Regressed on Political Trust, OLS

Country		Political Trust	
		Coef	S.E.
Austria			
	log E8rate	-0.01	0.01
	intercept	2.92	0.04
	R-squared	0.02	
	N	3520	
Belgium			
	log E8rate	0.16*	0.00
	intercept	4.23	0.12
	R-squared	0.02	
	N	3121	
Denmark			
	log E8rate	0.25	0.15
	intercept	5.30	0.30
	R-squared	0.05	
	N	5586	
Finland			
	log E8rate	-0.07	0.12
	intercept	4.36	0.51
	R-squared	0.05	
	N	7122	
France			
	log E8rate	-0.50*	0.16
	intercept	1.37	0.27
	R-squared		

	N		
Germany			
	log E8rate	-0.09	0.04
	intercept	2.83	0.36
	R-squared	0.03	
	N	7393	
Greece			
	log E8rate	-1.05*	0.05
	intercept	0.94	0.12
	R-squared	0.12	
	N	3473	
Ireland			
	log E8rate	0.45**	0.00
	intercept	3.31	0.09
	R-squared	0.09	
	N	2778	
Netherlands			
	log E8rate	-0.56	0.41
	intercept	3.45	0.86
	R-squared	0.04	
	N	6685	
Portugal			
	log E8rate	0.23	0.48
	intercept	2.96	0.83
	R-squared	0.04	
	N	4075	
Spain			
	log E8rate	0.27*	0.07
	intercept	4.68	0.36
	R-squared	0.05	
	N	6155	
Sweden			
	log E8rate	0.16	0.34
	intercept	3.91	0.75
	R-squared	0.05	
	N	6461	
United Kingdom			
	log E8rate	-0.01	0.02
	intercept	3.18	0.48
	R-squared	0.02	
	N	7475	

Note: Italy not included because it only participated in one round. France and Luxembourg not included due to collinearity with E8 migration and individual characteristics. Includes individual controls

Multi-level Results

Null Models and Individual Controls

Table 7.8 and Table 7.9 report the coefficients for the null model and introduce individual-level controls for each of the dependent variables. Model 0a displays the results of the null model for the first dependent variable, generalised social trust. Model 0b shows the results of the null model for the second dependent variable, political trust. The null models (0a and 0b) show the variation in attitudes to be mostly at the individual level but also at the country-level. Model 0a shows that approximately 5.6% of the variation in generalised social trust is at the country level. This is higher when it comes to political trust (10.8%). In both cases, as in the previous empirical chapter, a variation greater than 5% at the country level justifies the use of multi-level modelling (Snijders, Bosker, and Bosker 2011). Moreover, the intercepts in both null models are highly significant, demonstrating that social and political trust differs significantly across Western European countries.

The next step is the introduction of time fixed effects. The purpose of time fixed effects is to control for general trends in attitudes, which occur over time. Model 1a in Table 7.8 shows that the year dummy variables all have positive coefficients compared to the reference category, which is 2002. The year 2006 has the strongest coefficient, indicating that social trust did not increase steadily over time. Model 1b in Table 7.9 shows that, after 2008, political trust appears to begin to decrease. In 2008 and 2010 political trust was significantly lower than political trust in 2004 which is the reference category. The significance of the time dummy variables in both models further affirms the need to include time fixed effects in all subsequent models.

The majority of variation in social trust between individuals is driven by individual characteristics rather than country-level factors. In Table 7.8, Model 3a introduces significant individual-level predictors as the control variables. It shows that men, older people, and those living in rural areas tend to be more trusting of strangers in Western Europe. First, being a woman is associated with being 0.06 points less trusting of others on a scale of 0 to 10 ($p<0.00$). It remains unclear why women tend to be less trusting than men. Delhey and Newton suggest that women may

be more likely to face gender discrimination which has placed limits on women's social success and life satisfaction (Delhey and Newton 2003, 100). Second, older individuals also tend to be more trusting of other people ($\beta = 0.00$, $p < 0.00$). This could be because trusting attitudes are found to be a factor explaining longevity (Barefoot et al. 1998). It also finds that Western Europeans living in rural areas tend to be more trusting of other people than those living in suburban or urban areas ($\beta = 0.09$, $p < 0.00$). An explanation might be that urban living tends to be more impersonal and individualistic. Modern urban life has become increasingly characterized by 'more amorphous and loose-knit associations' (Newton 1999b, 19).

Europeans with higher amounts of human capital or economic capital tend to be more trusting of others. For every additional year spent in education, an individual is predicted to be 0.09 points more trusting than others on a scale of 0 to 10 ($p < 0.00$) in Table 7.8. Moreover, those who are not in stable employment and are "outsiders" in the labour market are also less likely to exhibit trust ($\beta = -0.13$, $p < 0.00$). The importance of education and economic resources in establishing social trust in individuals has been documented in the empirical literature and found to be especially relevant to those from less developed countries (Dinesen 2011).

Having a migrant background predicts that an individual will be less trusting of other people. Individuals who are native to the country are defined as having been born in the country to parents who have both been born there as well. Table 7.8 shows that those who meet this criteria are 0.18 points more trusting of other people on a scale of 0 to 10. This provides further confirmation of the scholarly argument that generalised social trust has strong cultural foundations (Uslaner 2002; Dinesen 2011).

Table 7.8 Multi-level Regression, Individual and Time Controls, Social Trust

	Model 0a		Model 1a		Model 2a	
	coef	s.e	coef	s.e	coef	s.e
Intercept	5.18***	0.22	5.12***	0.22	3.96	0.21
Individual Controls						
gender					-0.06***	0.01
age					0.00***	0.00
education					0.09***	0.00
labor market (insider=ref)						
outsider					-0.13***	0.02

not active				0.05**	0.02
rural				0.09***	0.01
native				0.18***	0.02
right-wing				-0.00**	0.00
tv watch				-0.02**	0.01
Time Fixed Effects (ref=2002)					
2004			0.07***	0.02	0.11***
2006			0.11***	0.02	0.11***
2008			0.08***	0.02	0.06**
2010			0.09***	0.02	0.06**
Explained Variance					
country variation	0.75	0.27	0.74	0.27	0.60
residual variation	4.92	0.02	4.92	0.02	4.63
Log pseudolikelihood	-277650.46		-277631.91		-232427.15
N	125296		125296		106318

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: In Model Xa, the fixed effect for 2010 has been omitted due to collinearity

The majority of variation in political trust between individuals is also driven by micro-level rather than macro-level explanations. In Table 7.9, Model 2b introduces significant individual-level predictors as the control variables. Similarly to social trust, individuals who are male, educated, ideologically right-winged and not vulnerable in the labor market are more trusting of political institutions. However, as a determinant, age does not follow the same patterns as social trust: older people are more likely to distrust political institutions than younger people.

Table 7.9 Multi-level Regression, Individual Controls and Time Fixed Effects, Political Trust

	Model 0b		Model 1b		Model 2b	
	coef	s.e	coef	s.e	coef	s.e
Intercept	4.24***	0.23	4.29***	0.23	3.28	0.21
Individual Controls						
gender					-0.07***	0.01
age					-0.00*	0.00
education					0.04***	0.00
labor market (insider=ref)						
outsider					-0.07***	0.02
not active					0.24***	0.02
rural					-0.07***	0.01

native				-0.11***	0.02
right-wing				0.08***	0.00
tv watch				0.07***	0.01
Time Fixed Effects (ref=2002)					
2004		0.02	0.02	0.23***	0.02
2006		-0.06**	0.02	0.25***	0.02
2008		-0.22***	0.02	0.16***	0.02
Explained Variance					
country variation	0.72	0.27	0.72	0.27	0.60
residual variation	3.89	0.02	3.87	0.02	3.68
Log pseudolikelihood	-195215.18		-195124.48		-166565.74
N	93042		93042		80417

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Individuals who live in the rural areas of Western Europe exhibit less political trust than those who live in the suburban or urban areas. Table 7.9 shows that individuals living in rural areas are predicted to report a degree of political trust that is 0.07 points lower on a scale of 0 to 10. This is probably due to differences in political behavior and the tendency to participate less in politics (Sylvester and McGlynn 2010).

Macro Level Controls and Baseline Models

Next, macro contextual variables are introduced to control for other contextual explanations of social and political trust. First, Table 7.10 and Table 7.11 show the relationship between contextual variables and generalised social trust (models denoted 'a'). Then, Table 7.14 and Table 7.15 show the relationship between these same contextual variables with the second dependent variable, political trust (models denoted 'b'). In each case, the results are shown for sub-populations across the distribution of trust (e.g. trusters vs. distrusters).

Social Trust

The results show that migration from Central and Eastern Europe post-enlargement has not eroded social trust in Western Europe. Table 7.10 Multilevel Models with Contextual Controls, E8 Stock and Social Trust shows that the amount of E8 stock in the national population is not significantly related to social trust. There is no support for the hypothesis that a higher amount of E8 stock would be associated with less trusting of strangers in the host society. The results also confirm that there is

insufficient evidence that the number of foreign born individuals (of any nationality) is a contextual determinant of social trust. The implication of this is that there is also no evidence to support ethnic competition theory even when considering the general foreign-born population.

Table 7.10 Multilevel Models with Contextual Controls, E8 Stock and Social Trust

	Model 3a		Model 4a		Model 5a	
	coef	s.e	coef	s.e	coef	s.e
Intercept	4.18	0.35	3.84	0.35	4.39	0.42
log E8stock	0.02	0.03	-0.03	0.02	0.02	0.03
Contextual Controls						
GNI per capita			0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
unemployment			-0.08	0.55	-0.04	0.56
mobility	0.12	0.13			0.10	0.13
log foreign nationals	0.03	0.09			0.03	0.09
Explained Variance						
country variation	0.60	0.22	0.63	0.23	0.62	0.23
residual variation	4.61	0.02	4.63	0.02	4.61	0.02
Individual Controls	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Time Fixed Effects	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-218478.42		-232426.47		-218477.9	
N	100064, 15		106318, 15		100064, 15	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Although the magnitude of E8 national populations do not appear to be linked to social trust, the rate at which these populations increased does seem to have had some importance. There is evidence that the annual rate of increase in E8 populations is significantly and negatively associated with social trust in host societies ($\beta = -0.05$, $p < 0.00$). Nevertheless the coefficients are relatively small, given that this can be interpreted to mean that if the annual rate of increase doubles, this is accompanied by a decrease of 0.05 points in political trust points on a scale of 0 to 10.

Table 7.11 Multilevel Models with Contextual Controls, E8 Rate and Social Trust

	Model 6a		Model 7a		Model 8a	
	coef	s.e	coef	s.e	coef	s.e
Intercept	3.57	0.35	3.73	0.36	3.44	0.47
log E8rate	-0.04**	0.01	-0.04***	0.01	-0.05***	0.01
Contextual Controls						
GNI per capita			0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
unemployment			-0.26	0.58	-0.44	0.59
mobility	0.25	0.15			0.29	0.15
log foreign nationals	-0.12	0.09			-0.12	0.09
Explained Variance						
country variation	0.60	0.23	0.60	0.23	0.57	0.22
residual variation	4.58	0.02	4.60	0.02	4.58	0.02
Individual Controls	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Time Fixed Effects	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-190792.9		-200614.45		-190792.45	
N	87496, 14		91942, 14		87496, 14	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Table 7.12 Multilevel Results: E8 stock across the distribution of social trust

	Social Trusters		Social Distrusters	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	4.41	0.55	4.83	0.82
log E8stock	0.00	0.04	-0.04	0.06
Explained Variance				
country variation	0.74	0.28	0.63	0.27
residual variation	4.27	0.03	4.65	0.03
Individual Controls	yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-111299.26		-92048.13	
N	51881, 15		42071, 14	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: Those that feel neutrally about immigration have not been tested due to collinearity with the constant.

Since the baseline models only capture the coefficient for an individual who is averagely trusting of others, it does not tell us if this relationship holds for individuals who have more extreme values of trust. In order to assess this, the same analysis is conducted but this time, separating individuals into two sub-populations according to how much they trust other people. The results show that the link between rapid increases in E8 migration and decreases in social trust is more prominent amongst individuals who are trusting rather than amongst those that tend to be distrusting. In Table 7.13, we observe that the negative relationship is only significant amongst people

were trusting of others rather than individuals that were not. On the other hand, there is no evidence that the extent of post-enlargement migration predicts whether an individual living in that country will be more or less trusting of people. In Table 7.12, we observe that the coefficients for log E8stock are not significant when testing the model on two sub-populations: people who tend to trust others and people who tend not to trust. It therefore seems that the lack of relationship between post-enlargement migration and social trust holds true across the spectrum of trust.

Table 7.13 Multilevel Results: E8 rate across the distribution of social trust

	Social Trusters		Social Distrusters	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	2.59	0.65	4.21	0.83
log E8 rate	-0.11***	0.02	0.00	0.02
Explained Variance				
country variation	0.56	0.25	0.50	0.21
residual variation	4.22	0.03	4.65	0.03
Individual Controls	yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-97918.81		-79568.72	
N	45774, 14		36353, 14	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: Those that feel naturally about immigration have not been tested due to collinearity with the constant.

Political Trust

Post-enlargement migration has been accompanied by a general increase in political trust in Western Europe. The results in Table 7.14 show that the independent variable, log E8stock, has a significant and positive association with the dependent variable, political trust ($\beta = 0.32$, $p < 0.00$) even when controlling for other national contextual factors. This can be interpreted as meaning that a doubling of the percentage of E8 nationals in the population goes hand in hand with a 0.10-point increase in political trust on a scale from 0 to 10. This, in fact, contradicts the prediction of ethnic competition theory, that an increase in diversity leads to a reduction in trust in political institutions. This finding is also robust to the introduction of various contextual variables. The significance of the log E8stock coefficients is only revealed when controlling for the size of the foreign national population and

mobility restrictions on E8 nationals. Finally, we also observe a similar relationship when looking at how the rate of increase in the size of the population is linked to this type of trust in Table 7.15.

Table 7.14 Multilevel Models with Contextual Controls, E8 Stock and Political Trust

	Model 3b		Model 4b		Model 5b	
	coef	s.e	coef	s.e	coef	s.e
Intercept	-0.52	0.53	0.60	0.45	-1.11	0.60
log E8stock	0.21***	0.04	-0.01	0.03	0.32***	0.04
Contextual Controls						
GNI per capita			0.00	0.00	0.00***	0.00
unemployment			-4.41***	0.55	-3.03***	0.57
mobility	-0.42**	0.14			-0.37*	0.14
log foreign nationals	-1.87***	0.122			-1.53***	0.12
Explained Variance						
country variation	1.97	0.77	0.38	0.15	0.69	0.29
residual variation	3.64	0.02	3.67	0.02	3.63	0.02
Individual Controls	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Time Fixed Effects	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-156045.56		-166453.41		-156004.21	
N	75559, 14		80417, 14		75559, 14	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

The macro-economic situation of a country appears to play a part in how much individuals trust their government. One might interpret GDP and the unemployment rate as measures of political performance, thereby bolstering political trust by improving the national resources. The results reveal that GDP is positively related to political trust. According to Model 5b in *Table 7.14* there is a positive association between national GDP and an individual's inclination to trust his/her country's political institutions ($\beta = 0.00$, $p < 0.00$). Similarly, there is a negative association between the national unemployment rate and political trust in Model 8b. In other words, an individual is less likely to trust his/her political institutions when he/she lives in a country with a higher level of unemployment ($\beta = -3.37$, $p < 0.00$). This follows the understanding that individuals would have less confidence in countries where the political institutions struggle to foster a job-creating economy. Clarke et al. (1993) suggest

that this may be because unemployment, or the threat of becoming unemployed, can diminish an individual's 'self-esteem and personal efficacy', which could then 'undermine people's confidence in their ability to effect major political and social change, and heighten anxiety about the consequences of any such changes' (Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg 1993, 1002).

Table 7.15 Multilevel Models with Contextual Controls, E8 Rate and Political Trust

	Model 6b		Model 7b		Model 8b	
	coef	s.e	coef	s.e	coef	s.e
Intercept	-2.18	0.56	-1.68	0.50	-4.31	0.58
log E8rate	-0.01	0.01	-0.11***	0.01	-0.08***	0.01
Contextual Controls						
GNI per capita			0.00***	0.00	0.00***	0.00
unemployment			-5.21***	0.56	-3.37***	0.61
mobility	-0.71**	0.21			-0.43*	0.22
log foreign nationals	-2.09***	0.13			-1.53***	0.13
Explained Variance						
country variation	2.62	1.03	0.79	0.32	0.49	0.23
residual variation	3.62	0.02	3.64	0.02	3.62	0.02
Individual Controls	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Time Fixed Effects	Yes		Yes		Yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-138281.88		-144809.9		-138230.79	
N	66994, 14		70095, 14		66994, 14	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Other characteristics of immigration at the national level also appear to be linked to political trust within these countries. For instance, the degree of mobility that EU-15 governments gave to E8 nationals post-enlargement is weakly connected to the degree of political trust in the host population. Model 3b in Table 7.14 shows a slightly significant and negative relationship between mobility and political trust ($\beta=-0.42$, $p<0.01$). Similarly, the overall proportion of foreign-born individuals in the population is an important negative factor for political trust ($\beta=-1.53$, $p<0.00$). These relationships are also confirmed when testing the relationship between E8 rate and political trust in Table 7.15.

Table 7.16 Multilevel Results: E8 stock across the distribution of political trust

	Political Trusters		Political Distrusters	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	6.52	0.40	-0.44	0.43
log E8 stock	0.09**	0.03	0.01	0.03
Explained Variance				
country variation	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.01
residual variation	0.77	0.01	1.84	0.01
Individual Controls	yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-35241.44		-72656.87	
N	27309, 14		42129, 14	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: Those that feel neutrally about immigration have not been tested due to collinearity with the constant.

Post-enlargement migration appears to have been a strong predictor of political trust amongst individuals who are trusting rather than those who are not. In order to test the heterogeneity of the relationships amongst individuals along the continuum of political trust, the analysis is run amongst two distinct sub-populations: those who trust political institutions and those that do not. In Table 7.16 we can observe that the positive association between E8 stock and political trust is found in the population that is trusting of political institutions but not in the population that is distrusting. Likewise, in Table 7.17 show that the significant relationships exist amongst those who are more trusting of political institutions but not amongst people who are distrusting.

Table 7.17 Multilevel Results: E8 rate across the distribution of political trust

	Political Trusters		Political Distrusters	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	-1.10	0.43	5.65	0.35
log E8 rate	-0.08***	0.01	-0.02	0.01
Explained Variance				
country variation	0.05	0.02	0.03	0.01
residual variation	1.82	0.01	0.78	0.01
Individual Controls	yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-62565.94		-32706.76	
N	36408, 14		25208, 14	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Interaction effects of national context

The next part of the analysis explores the importance of the national context in moderating the relationship between E8 migration and social and political trust in Western Europe. The significant contextual-level control variables are multiplied with the independent variables and introduced into the model as interaction terms.^a The models in show the results of the analysis with the first dependent variable, generalized social trust, and are denoted with an 'a'. Models with the second dependent variable, political trust, are denoted with a 'b'.

The extent to which the post-enlargement migration shaped social and political trust in the Western European host societies depended on concurrent economic conditions. Following theoretical expectations, in Table 7.18 we see that a greater proportion of E8 nationals is associated with higher social trust ($\beta = 0.21$, $p < 0.00$) and in Table 7.20 we also see that this is also the case with political trust. ($\beta = 0.46$, $p < 0.00$). Put another way, a higher amount of E8 nationals in the country is associated with higher social and political trust in wealthier countries than in less wealthy countries.

Unemployment also shows evidence of moderating post-enlargement migration although in direction of the coefficient is somewhat puzzling. In Table 7.18, Table 7.20, and Table 7.21 we observe that the coefficients for interaction $\log E8stock$ and $\log E8rate$ with the unemployment rate are positive. This can be interpreted to mean that in countries with a high or quickly increasing amount of E8 nationals and high unemployment, people are more likely to be trusting than in countries with lower unemployment. Since this is contrary to the theoretical expectations and existing evidence, I can only speculate that this finding might be driven by the nature of E8 migration. Since E8 nationals tended to be economically motivated, it may follow that their increased presence in the country could be a symbol of a future economic improvement. Or, it may also be that E8 nationals were attracted to Western European countries with cultures of high social trust or more trust-worthy political institutions.

In some cases, other immigration patterns of the country interact with post-enlargement migration to explain people's differences in political or social trust. First, the degree to which national

^a Interaction terms with individual control variables could not be explored because the number of level-2 groups (countries) is not sufficient ($n=15$).

governments opened up their labour markets to E8 nationals can exacerbate the relationship between the volume of E8 nationals and the degree of political trust in host societies as shown in Table 7.20 ($\beta = -1.10$, $p < 0.00$). Put another way, a high amount of E8 nationals in a country with high restrictions is associated with a lower amount of political trust than a country with looser restrictions. Second, we know that E8 migration did not happen in a vacuum but occurred simultaneously with migration to Europe from all over the globe. When interacting $\log E8stock$ with the proportion of other foreign nationals in the population, we find this has a positive and significant relationship with political trust ($\beta = 0.64$, $p < 0.00$). However, we do not observe that the presence of other foreign nationals is a moderator for social trust.

Table 7.18 Multilevel Regressions with Interaction Terms, E8 Stock and Social Trust

	social trust (a)	
	coef	SE
Models 9a		
log E8 stock	-2.24	0.44
GNI per capita	0.00	0.00
log E8 stock*GNI	0.21***	0.04
intercept	3.63	0.47
Level 1 Variance	0.92	0.35
Level 2 Variance	4.61	0.02
Models 10a		
log E8 stock	-0.037	0.04
unemployment	7.70*	2.99
log E8stock*unemployment	1.33***	0.50
intercept	3.59	0.51
Level 1 Variance	0.58	0.22
Level 2 Variance	4.61	0.02
Models 11a		
log E8 stock	0.01	0.14
log foreign stock	0.01	0.28
log E8stock*log foreign stock	0.00	0.05
intercept	4.32	0.92
Level 1 Variance	0.62	0.23
Level 2 Variance	4.61	0.02
Models 12a		
log E-8 stock	-0.02	0.04
mobility restrictions	2.75*	1.14
log E8 stock*mobility restrict.	0.47*	0.20
intercept	3.82	0.49
Level 1 Variance	0.62	0.23
Level 2 Variance	4.61	0.02

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: Includes year fixed effect, individual-level controls and contextual level controls

Table 7.19 Multilevel Regressions with Interaction Terms, E8 Rate and Social Trust

	social trust (a)	
	coef	SE
Models 13a		
log E8 rate	-0.06***	0.01
mobility restrictions	0.46*	0.18
log E8 rate*restrictions	0.03	0.02
intercept	3.49	0.47
Level 1 Variance	0.59	0.23
Level 2 Variance	4.58	0.02
Models 14a		
log E8 rate	-0.01	0.03
unemployment	-2.22	1.33
log E8rate*unemployment	-0.48	0.32
intercept	3.63	0.49
Level 1 Variance	0.58	0.23
Level 2 Variance	4.58	0.02
Models 15a		
log E8 rate	-0.43**	0.10
GNI per capita	0.00	0.00
log E8 stock*GNI	0.00	0.00
intercept	2.49	0.53
Level 1 Variance	0.55	0.21
Level 2 Variance	4.58	0.02
Models 16a		
log E8 rate	0.06	0.07
log foreign stock	-0.04	0.11
log E8rate*log foreign stock	0.04	0.03
intercept	3.57	0.48
Level 1 Variance	0.56	0.22
Level 2 Variance	4.58	0.02

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: Includes year fixed effect, individual-level controls and contextual level controls

Table 7.20 Multilevel Regressions with Interaction Terms, E8 Stock and Political Trust

	political trust (b)	
	coef	SE
Models 9b		
log E8 stock	4.50***	0.53
GNI per capita	0.00***	0.00
log E8 stock*GNI	0.46***	0.05
intercept	-2.87	0.72
Level 1 Variance	2.34	1.00
Level 2 Variance	3.63	0.02
Models 10b		
log E8 stock	0.08	0.06
unemployment	27.84***	4.38
log E8stock*unemployment	5.35***	0.75
intercept	-4.67	0.83
Level 1 Variance	1.63	0.69
Level 2 Variance	3.63	0.02
Models 11b		
log E8 stock	2.32***	0.25
log foreign stock	2.11***	0.46
log E8stock*log foreign stock	0.64***	0.08
intercept	9.83	1.47
Level 1 Variance	0.71	0.28
Level 2 Variance	3.63	0.02
Models 12b		
log E-8 stock	0.48***	0.05
mobility restrictions	-6.68***	1.31
log E8 stock*mobility restrict.	-1.10***	0.23
intercept	0.52	0.68
Level 1 Variance	0.68	0.24
Level 2 Variance	3.63	0.02

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: Includes year fixed effect, individual-level controls and contextual level controls

The results of the interaction effects raise some concerns about the robustness of the coefficients presented in the baseline models. Recall that in the baseline models, I found that there was a highly positive and significant relationship between the proportion of E8 nationals in the population and political trust. I also found that the higher rates of E8 migration were negatively associated with both social and political trust. During the exploration of the interaction effects, it is possible to observe the behavior of the coefficients when new parameters are introduced into the model to understand if they

remain consistent. In Table 7.19, the significance of the coefficient for *logE8rate* is eroded in Models 14a and 16a. Similarly, in Table 7.20, the significance of *logE8stock* is eroded in Model 10b. In Table 7.21, we do find confirmation that coefficients continue to be negative even when additional parameters are introduced into the model. The models may be unstable when introducing additional macro-level parameters since the number of countries is so few and the erosion of significance could be due to the lack of degrees of freedom. Still, the erosion of the significance of coefficients is reason for hesitation and their robustness will be further tested in the next section.

Table 7.21 Multilevel Regressions with Interaction Terms, E8 Rate and Political Trust

	political trust (b)	
	coef	SE
Models 13b		
log E8 rate	-0.57***	0.14
GNI per capita	0.00***	0.00
log E8 rate*GNI	0.00***	0.00
intercept	-4.53	0.57
Level 1 Variance	0.35	0.15
Level 2 Variance	3.62	0.02
Models 14b		
log E8 rate	-0.34***	0.03
unemployment	8.24***	1.34
log E8rate*unemployment	3.17***	0.33
intercept	-6.19	0.60
Level 1 Variance	0.35	0.15
Level 2 Variance	3.62	0.02
Models 15a		
log E8 rate	0.42***	0.08
log foreign stock	-1.04***	0.13
log E8rate*log foreign stock	0.18***	0.03
intercept	-3.80	0.56
Level 1 Variance	0.31	0.13
Level 2 Variance	3.62	0.02
Models 15b		
log E8 rate	-0.08*	0.02
mobility restrictions	-0.41	0.25
log E8 rate*restrictions	0.00	0.02
intercept	-4.29	0.61
Level 1 Variance	0.49	0.23
Level 2 Variance	3.62	0.02

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: Includes year fixed effect, individual-level controls and contextual level controls.

Robustness Checks

To ensure that the findings in this chapter are not spurious, they will be subjected to a series of robustness checks. A series of five robustness checks will be shown. These check the sensitivity of the results to the following: 1) time, place and weighting; 2) dependent variable measurement; 3)

independent variable measurement; 4) country outliers; and 5) model specification. Each series of checks will first be displayed for the first dependent variable, generalized social trust, then the second, political trust. The purpose of these exercises is to create further confidence in the empirical conclusions of this chapter.

Sensitivity to Time, Place and Weighting

Following a similar procedure as the two previous ones, a series of robustness checks are first used to test the sensitivity of the results to the data sampling. The checks in Table 7.22 and Table 7.23 confirm that the findings about social trust presented in the results section. The second check drops data (both macro and micro) from 2010 to understand if the results are the same when attitudinal data are dropped for the year of Europe's economic difficulty. Check Ia in Table 7.22 confirms that there is still no significant relationship between *logE8stock* and individual social trust while the results in Table 7.23 confirms that there is a negative relationship with *log E8rate*. Next, country fixed effects are introduced to control for immeasurable country-level factors such as culture and immigration history. These are not included as the baseline model since it introduces too many Level 2 variables into the model and threatens the degrees of freedom. However, they are included as a check to ensure that omitted country fixed effects in the baseline are not producing misleading results. Checks IIa and IIb show that there are no changes in the results, even when introducing country-fixed effects.

Table 7.22 Robustness Checks, E8 Stock vs. Social Trust Sensitivity

	Check Ia		Check IIa		Check IIIa	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	3.91	0.46	4.31	0.34	4.40	0.56
log E8 Stock	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.06
Explained Variance						
country variation	0.56	0.21	0.00	0.00	0.61	0.21
residual variation	4.69	0.02	4.61	0.02	4.60	0.18
Individual Controls	yes		yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes		yes	
Weights	no		no		yes	
Time Fixed Effects	2002-2008		2002-2010		2002-10	
Country Fixed Effects	no		yes		no	
Log pseudolikelihood	-182415.09		-218420.39		-218369.83	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: country fixed effects does not include Ireland or Greece due to multicollinearity

Then we observe in Check IIIa that there is still no relationship even when applying sampling weights or population weights.. The coefficients remain insignificant in Check IIIa and significant in Check VIa when population weights are applied. Population weights correct for the over-sampling of individuals from smaller countries in the European-wide survey sample. By applying population weights, one can ensure that the findings are generalizable to Europe as a whole. In sum, there is no evidence that weighting the sample alters the results presented in the baseline models.

Table 7.23 Robustness Checks, E8 Rate vs. Social Trust Sensitivity

	Check IVa		Check Va		Check VIa	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	3.25	0.51	3.53	0.42	3.45	0.33
log E8rate	-0.04**	0.01	-0.04**	0.01	-0.04*	0.02
Explained Variance						
country variation	0.54	0.22	0.00	0.00	0.58	0.20
residual variation	4.66	0.02	4.58	0.02	4.57	0.20
Individual Controls	yes		yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes		yes	
Weights	no		no		yes	

Time Fixed Effects	2002-2008	2002-2010	2002-10
Country Fixed Effects	no	no	no
Log pseudolikelihood	-161407.03	-190739.41	-190715.02

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: country fixed effects does not include Ireland or Greece due to multicollinearity

Table 7.24 Robustness Check, Year by Year, E8 Stock and Social Trust

	2002		2004		2006		2008		2010	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	-0.10	2.57	-0.26	2.62	-1.64	3.86	-2.30	3.38	-3.56	3.27
log E8 stock	0.12	0.17	0.09	0.16	-0.03	0.20	0.05	0.20	0.27	0.17
Explained Variance										
country variation	0.32	0.12	0.20	0.08	0.23	0.10	0.22	0.09	0.13	0.06
residual variation	4.94	0.05	0.08	0.05	4.59	0.05	4.41	0.04	4.21	0.05
Individual Controls	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-50462.97		-43982.47		-45123.49		-42809.83		-36017.75	
N	22740, 14		20006, 12		20675, 12		19802, 11		16841, 10	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Next, we proceed by disaggregating the result by year in order to observe any differences in the relationships over time. The results in Table 7.24 do not reveal any differences within the individual years and the coefficients for *log E8 stock* remain insignificant.

Table 7.25 Robustness Check, Year by Year, E8 Rate and Social Trust

	2002		2004		2006		2008		2010	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	-6.48	2.72	-0.52	1.83	-1.46	2.44	-5.65	3.08	-4.58	2.13
log E8 rate	-0.49**	0.18	-0.29	0.21	-0.12	0.22	0.16	0.31	0.06	0.11
Explained Variance										
country variation	0.18	0.08	0.19	0.08	0.25	0.11	0.20	0.09	0.06	0.03
residual variation	4.98	0.05	4.72	0.05	4.57	0.05	4.32	0.05	4.17	0.05
Individual Controls	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes		yes		yes		yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-42058.81		-38575.29		-41390.27		-39335.62		-29340.15	
N	18918, 11		17562, 11		18991, 11		18278, 10		13747, 8	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Meanwhile, the results in Table 7.25 shows that a negative and highly significant relationship existed in 2002 between E8 rate and Western European social trust, prior to the enlargement ($\beta=-0.49$ p<0.00). The results can be interpreted as meaning that individuals living in countries with increasing proportional amounts of E8 stock prior to the enlargement were less trusting than those living in countries with lower amounts. Recall that the baseline model, which looks at the relationship between the two variables from 2002 to 2010, shows a negative and significant relationship between the post-enlargement migration rate and social trust. Therefore, there might be a couple of explanations for the results of the robustness check in Model Ia. The first explanation is that the relationship between E8 stock and political trust is by an omitted variable that could not be included in the model, such as culture or historical experience with immigration. A second explanation might be that, although the increase in E8 nationals in the national population was negative prior to the enlargement, it no longer stayed negative post-enlargement. This might be because, prior to the enlargement, E8 nationals tended to live in nearby countries such as Austria or Germany but, post-enlargement, new countries began to host large communities of E8 nationals such as Ireland or the United Kingdom. It is impossible to pinpoint which explanation is more accurate from this limited data but it can be concluded from this robustness check that there is no evidence to support the notion that the post-enlargement migration was accompanied by a reduction in social trust in Western European societies.

Table 7.26 Robustness Check, Year by Year, E8 Stock and Political Trust

	2004		2006		2008		2010	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	-3.05	2.79	-4.36	4.19	-5.40	3.08	-6.83	2.92
log E8 stock	-0.01	0.17	-0.21	0.22	-0.20	0.18	-0.08	0.15
Explained Variance								
country variation	0.23	0.09	0.28	0.11	0.18	0.08	0.11	0.05
residual variation	3.71	0.04	3.61	0.04	3.46	0.04	3.61	0.04
Individual Controls	yes		yes		yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes		yes		yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-40397.34		-41579.52		-39596.26		-34085.96	
N	19464, 12		20162, 12		19407, 11		16526, 10	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: No Observations for 2002

Conducting the same exercise for political trust, the results change when disaggregating the analysis for each year. In Table 7.26, the year-by-year results do not show any evidence of a positive and significant relationship between E8 stock and political trust as was found in the pooled time series model. In fact, the results do not find that E8 population size was a determinant in cross-country variation in political trust in any particular year of the sample. Likewise, Table 7.27 also contracts the results of the pooled time series model which showed a negative relationship between E8 stock increase and political trust. Instead, when looking at the single years individually there no evidence of a relationship at all. The only exception in 2010, when the opposite relationship is found: a higher rate of increase in the E8 population is associated with higher levels of politically trust, even when controlling for GNI and the unemployment rate. This may be because an increase in E8 migration may be associated with economic improvements (not captured by the variables in the model) which are instead the driving force behind this relationship.

Table 7.27 Robustness Check, Year by Year, E8 Rate and Political Trust

	2004		2006		2008		2010	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	-2.71	1.64	-1.03	2.60	-6.57	2.70	-1.55	1.32
logE8rate	-0.15	0.19	-0.08	0.24	0.42	0.27	0.33***	0.07
Explained Variance								
country variation	0.15	0.06	0.28	0.12	0.15	0.07	0.02	0.01
residual variation	3.69	0.04	3.62	0.04	3.43	0.04	3.60	0.04
Individual Controls	yes		yes		yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes		yes		yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-35377.92		-38172.97		-36584.05		-27752.38	
N	17064, 11		18501, 11		17962, 10		13467, 8	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: No Observations for 2002

Sensitivity to Independent Variable Measurement

A series of robustness checks were conducted to understand if the findings are sensitive to the independent variable measurement. As explained in the Methods chapter, the independent variable is measured as the E8 migrant stock as a percentage of the national population. Following a similar approach as in the previous empirical chapters, the quadratic term of the independent variable is

introduced as a check, although the relationship has already been determined as linear in previous tests and for this reason the quadratic term is only included as a check. The models are then re-run with a slightly different independent variable: the E8 migrant stock as a percentage of the foreign population. The final test uses the proportion of Polish nationals to understand if the results might be biased by the varying national composition of E8 migrants in different countries (e.g. Poles in the UK but Estonians in Finland).

The results of this series of robustness checks show that both models predicting social trust are highly sensitive to the measurement of the independent variable. In Table 7.28, the models, which show the relationship between *log E8stock* and generalized social trust, reveal that the coefficients are sensitive to the measurement of the independent variable. Check Ia shows a positive and significant relationship when the independent variable is introduced in its quadratic form ($\beta=0.00$ $p<0.05$). In other words, when the relationship is treated as non-linear, the curve appears to be convex. A positive and significant relationship is also shown in Check IIa when the independent variable is measured as the proportion of Poles in the national population of the host country ($\beta=0.06$ $p<0.05$), but Model IIa does not confirm these results. Instead, when measuring E8 nationals as a proportion of the foreign population, the coefficient turns negative and is no longer significant. The results of this series of tests confirm that the coefficients measuring the relationship between *log E8 stock* and generalized social trust are not robust.

Testing the sensitivity of the models predicting political trust to the measurement of the independent variable also reveals robustness concerns. In Table 7.29, the three models show three different relationships depending on how the independent variable is measured. When using the quadratic term of the *E8 stock* as in Check Ib, the relationship is negative and significant ($\beta=0.01$ $p<0.05$). This indicates that, when treating the relationship as non-linear, the curve is concave and significant. In Checks IIb the proportion of E8 stock in the foreign population as a measurement and the relationship is positive and significant. A similar relationship is confirmed when using the measure for the proportion of Poles in the national stock, Model Check IIIb, the coefficient is higher and is also positive and significant ($\beta=0.51$ $p<0.00$). These results generally confirm a positive and significant relationship between post-enlargement migration and political trust but hints that it may be non-linear.

Table 7.28 Robustness Check, Sensitivity to Independent Variable, Social Trust

	Check Ia		Check IIa		Check IIIa	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	5.78	0.38	5.56	0.41	5.97	0.38
log E8 Stock _i	0.00*	0.00				
log E8 per foreigner			-0.03	0.03		
log Pole stock					0.06*	0.03
Explained Variance						
country variation	0.84	0.34	0.72	0.30	0.68	0.28
residual variation	4.42	0.02	4.34	0.02	4.40	0.02
Individual Controls	yes		yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes		yes	
Weights	no		no		no	
Time Fixed Effects	yes		yes		yes	
Country Fixed Effects	no		no		no	
Log pseudolikelihood	-224018.56		-184695.36		-216272.17	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Table 7.29 Robustness Check, Sensitivity to Independent Variable, Political Trust

	Check Ib		Check IIb		Check IIIb	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	-2.17	0.56	-3.30	0.71	0.43	0.63
log E8 Stock _i	-0.01***	0.00				
log E8 per foreigner			0.28***	0.06		
log Pole stock					0.51***	0.04
Explained Variance						
country variation	0.54	0.24	0.52	0.22	1.07	0.46
residual variation	3.64	0.02	3.62	0.02	3.63	0.02
Individual Controls	yes		yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes		yes	
Weights	no		no		no	
Time Fixed Effects	yes		yes		yes	
Country Fixed Effects	no		no		no	
Log pseudolikelihood	-156023.23		-128852.11		-153389.52	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Sensitivity to Dependent Variable Measurement

The next section tests the sensitivity of the results to the specification of the dependent variable. In the baseline results, political trust was measured as an index variable composed of three parts: trust in parliament, trust in politicians and trust in political parties. As a check, the index is decomposed and each of the index components is treated as a dependent variable. Table 7.30 shows that there is a positive relationship (albeit of varying strengths) between log E8stock trust in parliament ($\beta=0.09$ $p<0.05$), trust in politicians ($\beta=0.23$ $p<0.00$) and trust in political parties ($\beta=0.17$ $p<0.00$). There is also confirmation in Table 7.31 that there continues to be a negative and significant relationship between E8 rate and political trust when disaggregated the components of political trust. From this exercise, we can gain confidence that the results pertaining to political trust are not sensitive to how political trust is indexed.

Table 7.30 Sensitivity to DV, E8 Stock and Political Trust

	Parliament		Politicians		Poltiical Parties	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	1.70	0.42	1.20	0.40	-0.43	0.64
log E8 Stock	0.26***	0.03	0.28***	0.03	0.31***	0.05
Explained Variance						
country variation	0.37	0.14	0.40	0.15	0.74	0.33
residual variation	4.94	0.02	4.45	0.02	4.23	0.02
Individual Controls	yes		yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes		yes	
Weights	no		no		no	
Time Fixed Effects	yes		yes		yes	
Country Fixed Effects	no		no		no	
Log pseudolikelihood	-218461.70		-215116.81		-163854.3	

* $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.00$

Table 7.31 Sensitivity to DV, E8 Rate and Political Trust

	Parliament		Politicians		Poltiical Parties	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
Intercept	-2.51	0.48	-2.25	0.42	-3.13	0.62
log E8rate	-0.10***	0.01	-0.08***	0.01	-0.05**	0.02

Explained Variance						
country variation	0.57	0.24	0.22	0.09	0.56	0.28
residual variation	4.94	0.02	4.44	0.02	4.22	0.02
Individual Controls	yes		yes		yes	
Contextual Controls	yes		yes		yes	
Weights	no		no		no	
Time Fixed Effects	yes		yes		yes	
Country Fixed Effects	no		no		no	
Log pseudolikelihood	-191170.38		-188127.87		-145152.60	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Sensitivity to Outliers

The next series of robustness tests aims to understand if a single country in the data drives the results presented in this chapter. The results are protected from outlying individual-level observations by the law of large numbers, but the number of level-2 country observations (15) are relatively few and therefore tests must be run. These tests will help to determine if observations related to a single country are distorting the results. In order to test this, the analysis is re-run, each time dropping a country from the analysis.

The results of this sensitivity check confirm the results presented in the baseline models. The relationship between E8 stock and social trust continues to be insignificant in Table 7.32 and the relationship with political trust continues to be positive (coefficients ranging from 0.13 when dropping Spain to 0.54 when dropping Portugal). We also see that the relationship between E8 rate and social trust continues to be negative and significant in Table 7.33 with coefficients ranging from -0.06 when dropping Austria to -0.03 when dropping Portugal. Finally, the coefficients for log E8 rate and political trust continue to be positive and significant.

Table 7.32 Check for Influential Countries, E8 Stock

	Social Trust		Political Trust	
	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.
w/o Austria				
log E8 stock	0.01	0.03	0.33***	0.04
intercept	4.28	0.43	-1.00	0.61

level 2 variance	0.68	0.26	0.73	0.32
w/o Belgium				
log E8 stock	0.05	0.03	0.28***	0.04
intercept	4.59	0.44	-1.41	0.61
level 2 variance	0.65	0.25	0.71	0.32
w/o Denmark				
log E8 stock	0.02	0.03	0.39***	0.04
intercept	4.21	0.42	-1.93	0.60
level 2 variance	0.46	0.18	0.56	0.24
w/o Finland				
log E8 stock	0.00	0.03	0.32***	0.04
intercept	4.25	0.42	-0.69	0.61
level 2 variance	0.53	0.20	0.57	0.25
w/o France				
log E8 stock	0.01	0.03	0.38***	0.04
intercept	4.32	0.44	-0.76	0.60
level 2 variance	0.61	0.24	0.61	0.26
w/o Germany				
log E8 stock	0.02	0.03	0.18***	0.05
intercept	4.33	0.46	-3.22	0.76
level 2 variance	0.62	0.24	0.82	0.37
w/o Greece				
log E8 stock	0.04	0.03	0.17***	0.04
intercept	4.31	0.43	2.63	0.67
level 2 variance	0.52	0.20	0.83	0.38
w/o Ireland				
log E8 stock	0.05	0.03	0.33***	0.04
intercept	4.54	0.43	-1.01	0.60
level 2 variance	0.64	0.24	0.67	0.30
w/o Italy				
log E8 stock	0.02	0.03	0.33***	0.04
intercept	4.40	0.43	-1.11	0.60
level 2 variance	0.66	0.25	0.69	0.29
w/o Luxembourg				
log E8 stock	0.02	0.03	0.31***	0.04
intercept	4.24	0.44	-1.20	0.58
level 2 variance	0.64	0.25	0.43	0.17
w/o Netherlands				
log E8 stock	-0.02	0.03	0.21***	0.05
intercept	4.56	0.44	-0.55	0.61
level 2 variance	0.72	0.28	0.53	0.25
w/o Portugal				

log E8 stock	0.05	0.03	0.54***	0.05
intercept	4.46	0.43	-0.43	0.66
level 2 variance	0.67	0.26	1.45	0.65
w/o Spain				
log E8 stock	0.03	0.03	0.13***	0.05
intercept	4.58	0.46	-4.05	0.70
level 2 variance	0.67	0.26	0.57	0.29
w/o Sweden				
log E8 stock	0.03	0.03	0.30***	0.04
intercept	4.67	0.44	-1.29	0.67
level 2 variance	0.62	0.26	1.50	0.66
w/o UK				
log E8 stock	-0.04	0.04	0.19***	0.05
intercept	3.57	0.53	-5.21	0.82
level 2 variance	0.66	0.25	0.49	0.21

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: Includes time fixed effects, individual-level controls and contextual level controls

Table 7.33 Check for Influential Countries, E8 Rate

	Social Trust		Political Trust	
	coef.	s.e.	coef.	s.e.
w/o Austria				
log E8 rate	-0.06***	0.01	-0.09***	0.01
intercept	3.24	0.48	-4.35	0.59
level 2 variance	0.60	0.24	0.55	0.26
w/o Belgium				
log E8 rate	-0.04**	0.01	-0.10***	0.01
intercept	3.53	0.48	-4.36	0.59
level 2 variance	0.62	0.25	0.59	0.29
w/o Denmark				
log E8 rate	-0.05***	0.01	-0.09***	0.02
intercept	3.24	0.46	-5.24	0.58
level 2 variance	0.42	0.17	0.33	0.15
w/o Finland				
log E8 rate	-0.04***	0.01	-0.07***	0.02
intercept	3.33	0.49	-3.99	0.61
level 2 variance	0.50	0.20	0.37	0.17
w/o France				
log E8 rate	-0.05***	0.01	-0.07***	0.01
intercept	3.46	0.48	-4.38	0.58
level 2 variance	0.56	0.23	0.41	0.19
w/o Germany				
log E8 rate	-0.06***	0.01	-0.13***	0.02
intercept	3.08	0.53	-6.12	0.63
level 2 variance	0.52	0.21	0.69	0.31
w/o Greece				
log E8 rate	-0.04***	0.01	-0.04*	0.01
intercept	3.49	0.53	0.99	0.72
level 2 variance	0.50	0.21	0.84	0.40
w/o Ireland				
log E8 rate	-0.05***	0.01	-0.08***	0.01
intercept	3.42	0.47	-4.31	0.59
level 2 variance	0.61	0.25	0.55	0.26
w/o Italy				
log E8 rate	-0.05***	0.01	-0.08***	0.01
intercept	3.43	0.47	-4.32	0.58
level 2 variance	0.57	0.22	0.49	0.23
w/o Luxembourg				
log E8 rate	-0.05***	0.01	-0.08***	0.01
intercept	3.45	0.47	-4.31	0.57

level 2 variance	0.62	0.25	0.41	0.17
w/o Netherlands				
log E8 rate	-0.06***	0.01	-0.08***	0.02
intercept	3.64	0.52	-3.20	0.62
level 2 variance	0.63	0.25	0.32	0.14
w/o Portugal				
log E8 rate	-0.03***	0.01	-0.05**	0.02
intercept	3.84	0.49	-4.20	0.64
level 2 variance	0.60	0.25	1.01	0.54
w/o Spain				
log E8 rate	-0.06***	0.01	-0.10***	0.02
intercept	3.49	0.50	-6.31	0.59
level 2 variance	0.62	0.25	0.25	0.11
w/o Sweden				
log E8 rate	-0.06***	0.01	-0.14***	0.02
intercept	3.40	0.48	-4.55	0.67
level 2 variance	0.56	0.23	1.29	0.60
w/o UK				
log E8 rate	-0.04**	0.01	-0.03*	0.02
intercept	3.24	0.53	-7.56	0.66
level 2 variance	0.58	0.24	0.46	0.20

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.00

Note: Includes time fixed effects, individual-level controls and contextual level controls

Sensitivity to Model Specification

This final robustness check tests the sensitivity of the results to the model specification. As mentioned in the Methods Chapter, the dependent variables in this chapter (social trust and political trust) have been treated as continuous variables. The justification for this is that they have more than five response categories that are spaced evenly and the underlying variable is assumed to be continuous. However, to ensure that this assumption is not distorting the results, the results are shown with the dependent attitudinal variables treated as ordinal categorical variables. The results in Table 7.34 and Table 7.35 show that, when treating attitudes of social trust as a ordered categorical variable, there is, for the most part, no significant relationship between the two variables of interest, across the range of

responses.⁴⁹ E8 stock only has a negative association amongst least trusting individuals (value=0) and the results for E8 rate show a somewhat incoherent pattern where only individuals who report values of 1 and 7 have negative associations. Since the results from the ordered logistic regression differ from those treating the dependent variable as continuous (no significant relationship was found), it still raises questions about the general application of ethnic competition theory to individuals across the distribution of attitudes.

⁴⁹ Generalized ordered logistical models have been used rather than simple ordinal logistical models since the model violated the assumption of proportionality

Table 7.34 Generalized Ordinal Logistic Model, E8 Stock and Social Trust

Response (0-9)	Social Trust	
	Coef.	S.E.
0 (no trust)		
logE8stock	-0.23**	0.08
intercept	2.38	1.06
1		
logE8stock	-0.07	0.06
intercept	2.81	1.09
2		
logE8stock	0.01	0.04
intercept	1.20	0.82
3		
logE8stock	0.05	0.03
intercept	0.51	0.76
4		
logE8stock	0.02	0.03
intercept	-0.17	0.50
5		
logE8stock	0.00	0.07
intercept	-1.67	0.58
6		
logE8stock	0.06	0.09
intercept	-1.92	0.76
7		
logE8stock	0.10	0.08
intercept	-2.70	0.71
8		
logE8stock	0.09	0.09
intercept	-4.98	0.93
9		
logE8stock	0.22	0.12
intercept	-5.54	1.12
Individual Controls	yes	
Contextual Controls	yes	
Time Fixed Effects	yes	
Country Fixed Effects	yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-208028.72	

Table 7.35 Generalized Ordinal Logistic Model, E8 Rate and Social Trust

Response (0-9)	Social Trust	
	Coef.	S.E.
0 (no trust)		
logE8rate	-0.05	0.04
intercept	2.38	1.34
1		
logE8rate	-0.06*	0.03
intercept	1.02	0.53
2		
logE8rate	-0.03	0.02
intercept	-0.21	0.55
3		
logE8rate	-0.04	0.02
intercept	-0.98	0.44
4		
logE8rate	-0.03	0.02
intercept	-1.08	0.42
5		
logE8rate	0.00	0.02
intercept	-1.40	0.43
6		
logE8rate	-0.01	0.03
intercept	-1.84	0.62
7		
logE8rate	-0.05**	0.02
intercept	-3.71	0.63
8		
logE8rate	-0.01	0.03
intercept	-4.89	1.08
9		
logE8rate	-0.03	0.04
intercept	-7.47	1.63
Individual Controls	yes	
Contextual Controls	yes	
Time Fixed Effects	yes	
Country Fixed Effects	yes	
Log pseudolikelihood	-181588.07	

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Discussion

This chapter has set out to accomplish two tasks. First, it has examined if there is a relationship between immigration volume and trust, both social and political, across time and space, by considering the case of immigration from Europe's new Central and Eastern European members to

Western Europe following their accession, which is the central topic of this thesis. As a second task, this chapter then examined whether the relationship between E8 migration and trust (social and political) is moderated by national contextual variables. Following a similar strategy as in previous empirical chapters, five rounds of micro-level data from the European Social Survey were pooled with macro-level variables to build a comparative longitudinal approach using multi-level modelling.²⁶⁶ First, the relationship between post-enlargement migration from E8 countries and the generalized social trust in Western European host societies was addressed. Then, national contextual factors were interacted with E8 migration volume to test for their impact as moderating variables. The same steps were repeated for the second dependent variable, political trust.

It is often assumed that social or economic cleavages such as inequality or language can make individuals less trusting of others in that society. By this logic, scholars wonder if ethnic cleavages brought about by migration to Europe are following a similar pattern. In the current literature, the diversity brought by immigration to Europe's traditionally homogenous societies is 'routinely treated as a crucial problem, since it can undermine the normative consensus' (Hooghe 2007, 709).

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, however, this chapter does not find a universal link between immigration and two forms of trust, social trust and political trust. I do not find evidence that the magnitude of E8 stock is, as theoretically expected, negatively related to social or political trust in Western European host societies. First, it finds no significant relationship between the relative number of E8 nationals living in Western Europe and the proclivity to trust strangers. Second, in the case of political trust, the results even indicate the opposite of what was expected: higher levels of E8 migration were associated with higher levels of political trust across time within the EU-15 countries. It appears that this relationship occurred primarily amongst individuals who tended to be already quite trusting of political institutions. While we cannot establish changes in opinion given that this is not a longitudinal study, this hints at the possibility that higher populations of E8 trust may have galvanized political trust amongst those already inclined to trust rather than "converting" people who are distrusting.

²⁶⁶ In the case of political trust, this was only four rounds.

Instead, the findings show that the magnitude of the immigration and the speed of the immigration are differentially related to trust. I only find support for ethnic competition theory when looking at the latter: the relationship between the speed of migration and trust. There is evidence that the annual rate of increase in E8 nationals in the host population is both a negative predictor of social and political trust. It should be noted that the power of this relationship is relatively small given the size of the coefficients. Moreover, there is also an indication that this relationship is heterogeneous across different groups of individuals. Although the data at hand does not allow the exploration of cross-level interactions, the results have been presented across sub-populations according to different levels of trust. From this, there is an indication that the negative relationship is more likely to exist amongst trusting individuals (rather than distrusting individuals) in the case of both political and social trust.

The case of post-enlargement migration also confirms widely held claims in the literature that the context in which immigration occurs has implications for its relationship with trust in society. The results showed that national contextual factors moderated the relationship between post-enlargement migration (macro level) and social or political trust (micro level). The economic conditions or other patterns of immigration that are occurring simultaneously have interacted with E8 migration and this has implications for social and political trust in these host societies. However, the findings are not always consistent with the theoretical expectations of ethnic group competition theory, and this may be due to the fact that the results are actually subject to reversal causality. It may well be that societies that tend to be wealthier and less restrictive for immigration in general are what attracted E8 migrants in the first place.

It is likely that post-enlargement migration has heterogeneous relationships across the countries although this cannot be explored with the data at hand since little information is known about the changes of composition of E8 nationals across countries over time. There is reason to speculate that there has been compositional differences in E8 populations across Western Europe and that this has implications for the social and political trust. Countries that have attracted more highly skilled E8 nationals may have had more positive relationships with political trust since this could be perceived by the public as a consequence of economic prosperity. Similarly, countries that have had increases in populations that have a longer tradition of residing in their country: for instance Estonians in Finland or Slovenians in Austria, there may be a less negative implications for trust

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during a rapid increase since the public may already be familiar these groups. It may be that this greater familiarity can stem off a public panic that occurs when there is a surge in a new group of migrants, as occurred in the United Kingdom when it experienced a growth of Poles and Baltic nationals.

Several limitations and caveats to these findings should be noted. First, as with all findings in this thesis, it would be misleading to consider the experience of post-enlargement migration as indicative of all forms of migration. Although mentioned previously several times, it should be reemphasized that the particularities of post-enlargement migration offer the conditions fruitful for observational study but limit its generalizability. In this case, E8 migrants might not be perceived as sufficiently 'different' in EU-15 societies to induce a decline in social or political trust. This may be because Central and Eastern Europeans are not physically dissimilar to the natives of Western Europe. Furthermore, E8 nationals share certain general European norms and values.

These results should also be carefully considered in light of the unit of analysis selected in this chapter. First, taking countries as the unit of analysis may obfuscate the relationship between immigration and political trust that occurs at other levels. This paper has focused on immigration at the national level and has not considered the sub-national or municipal level due to data availability. However, a different unit of analysis might yield different results. For example, Rahn and Rudolph (2005) find that racial fractionalization is a negative predictor of political trust across municipalities in the United States. Putnam (2007) also finds that respondents living in more diverse neighbourhoods are less likely to trust local government but not the national government. This implies that people are able to 'distinguish the effects of local diversity on local institutions from the effects of non-diversity at the national level' (Putnam, 2007: 167). Moreover, the empirical evidence regarding social trust and immigration confirms different stories across the units of analysis. In Europe, studies examining immigration patterns at the national level tend not to find evidence of a link between immigration and social trust (Gesthuizen, Van Der Meer, and Scheepers 2009; Hooghe et al. 2009; Kesler and Bloemraad 2010). On the other hand, there is evidence that examining the local level may uncover a relationship (Dinesen and Sønderskov 2012; Sturgis et al. 2011; Pennant 2005; Laurence 2011a). These disparate findings may be because the public is aware of increasing migration in their neighbourhood but not at the national level.

Other potential objections to these findings would be that such measures of social or political trust are too crude and this could dilute any significant findings. The difficulty in capturing trust – both in people or institutions – using survey measures has been acknowledged as flawed despite its ubiquitous use (Nannestad 2008). ‘The validity of the responses as indicators’ (...) is the ‘Achilles heel of empirical research’ that relies on large surveys to measure trust (Nannestad 2008, 417). Nannestad (2008) rightfully points out that the question that is used in the European Social Survey is very vague about how ‘widely’ people are expected to be trusting. For instance, the broader context of whom they are being asked about trusting is unclear: is it their neighbourhood, their country, or people all over the world? Some scholars have gone as far as saying that the existing research on trust suffers from such flaws in its conceptualization and the operationalization of its measurement that it ‘cannot play a very constructive role in explaining social behaviour’ (Hardin 2006, p.74). These weaknesses, although duly acknowledged, are not unique to the analysis of this chapter but form part and parcel of any research that employs representative surveys.

Finally, it is also possible that insufficient time has elapsed for the post-enlargement migration to influence the social or political trust in Western European host societies. Although *constrict theory* links diversity with a lack of trust, it fails to address how these interact dynamically over time. It is also possible that the effects of E8 migration on political trust are imperceptible within the span of eight years and could have a gradual effect as E8 nationals establish themselves in their host societies. Despite these caveats and limitations, the findings in this chapter fit quite well with some of the previous empirical studies that focus on Europe. These findings are not fully in support of *constrict theory*, put forward by Putnam (2007), which provides a rational explanation for the decay of social and political trust in diverse societies. The results in this chapter stands in stark contrast with some previous empirical studies which find that ethnic diversity goes hand-in-hand with reduced social trust (Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006b; Dincer 2011; Dinesen and Sønderskov 2012), but previous empirical research on trust and diversity in Europe ‘admittingly contradictory’ (Nannestad 2008, p.431) and some studies find that ethnic diversity does not erode social trust (Uslaner 2002; Bjørnskov 2006, 17; Putnam 1993; Dinesen 2011). Rather, the findings provide support for alternative claims that it is rapid changes in populations of immigrants, rather than their sheer presence, that are more detrimental to trust. As Hooghe (2007) notes, ‘societies differ not just with regard to timing and the intensity of diversity trends but also with regard to the way they manage forms of diversity’ (Hooghe

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2007, 723). Differences in the timing and intensity of migration are likely also compounded by differences in trust across countries are also driven by cultural or historical differences (Uslaner 2002; Bjørnskov 2006, 17; Putnam 1993), which could explain why the patterns observed in the United States are not fully corroborated in Europe.

It is possible that these different patterns could be explained by the fact that Europeans are motivated to trust for different reasons from Americans. The approach in this chapter, as with many studies which examine the macro-micro linkages pertaining to trust, expected people's trust to respond rationally to the changes around them, rather than being driven by norms. Recall that a rational conceptualization assumes that trust is driven by the trustworthiness of the object. It relies on the idea that individuals feel that for 'us to trust you we must believe your motivations towards us are to serve our interests, broadly conceived, with respect to the issues at stake' (Hardin 2006, 68). On the other hand, others argue that trust could be seen as being morally driven and not based on a strategic calculation (Uslaner 2002, 3). The idea that trust in Europe could have stronger roots in morality rather than being dictated by rationality could explain why it has not been altered by macro-level changes, such as higher E8 population sizes in their societies.

These results imply that the greater presence of foreign nationals does not lead societies to 'hunker down' in Europe and casts doubt on the applicability of constrict theory to non-American contexts. But the findings in this chapter do underscore the necessity for social scientists studying the attitudinal impact of immigration on trust to distinguish between the multi-dimensional features of immigration. Until now, the literature has tended to focus on the size of the out-group relative to the in-group as a negative predictor of social and political trust. But in this study it can be observed that features of immigration such as the speed or time at which it occurs in addition to other compositional features can have important – and even opposite- implications for trust in societies. This is particularly illustrated by this chapter's paradoxical finding that a greater size of E8 nationals is positively associated with greater political trust while a higher annual increase of E8 nationals is negatively associated with political trust. Still on the balance, there is an overall indication that post-enlargement migration had a positive bearing since political trust is notably more positively related to the size of the E8 population than negatively related to its rate of increase.

8. Conclusion

Summary of Research Approach

The rising political saliency of immigration in Europe has put pressure on governments to contain immigration (Akkerman 2012), but Europe's commitment to mobility stands in sharp contrast to its admission policies for non-European immigrants. In particular, Europe's decision to allow the free movement of individuals from the new Eastern member states is a remarkable occurrence. The expansion of the European Union along its eastern front opened up the doors of fortress Europe to 75 million of their Eastern European neighbours. The new member states (the E8) included eight formerly communist countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia (as well as Malta and Cyprus). From 2004 to 2011, the Western European members lifted restrictions on their labour market to E8 nationals. This immigration liberalization is widely attributed to Europe's deep commitment to integration (O'Brennan 2006) rather than public popularity. Therefore, the 2004 enlargement offers the opportunity to identify specific groups of immigrants and study the public reaction against the backdrop of varying national contexts in Europe.

Taking the case of the 2004 enlargement as a point of departure, this thesis set out to understand if the post-enlargement migration can explain the public sentiment existing within the host societies. The central research question of this thesis was: Does the migration after the 2004 enlargement from the Central and Eastern European countries explain differences in public attitudes in the Western European host societies? The thesis is also interested in understanding the extent to which national factors play a role in exacerbating or hindering any link between post-enlargement migration and public attitudes. The relationship between immigration and three categories of public attitudes has been examined: attitudes towards immigration, attitudes towards welfare and attitudes of trust.

This thesis aims to shed light on the relationship between immigrant group size and public attitudes in the host societies. It does so by focusing on post-enlargement immigration to Western Europe. This study makes two original contributions to the body of knowledge. First, it focuses on Eastern European migration, which has been largely ignored in the literature. Most studies consider the threat posed by non-European migration and omit post-enlargement migration. This omission

might be explained by the difficulty in categorizing Eastern Europe, which has been politically and socially constructed as separate from Western Europe, rather than a separate geographic area.

Second, this study has furthered the empirical understanding of the linkages between immigration and attitudes in Europe. Focusing on the case of the enlargement allows a finer harmonization between the variation in the immigrant composition in different European countries. Although there is heterogeneity within the E8 nationals, they generally share a degree of similarity due to their religious, racial, and post-communist political heritage. Cross-country similarity is further maximized by EU regulations which harmonize the admission criteria and curb differences in social rights rationing. Another advantage of this study is that it has examined the relationship between immigration and public attitudes over an eight year period rather than just a single year. The empirical advantages of this study avoid confounding factors such as cultural, racial and religious differences, which have proved to be shortcomings in previous research as noted in a review of the comparative attitudinal literature by Ceobanu and Escandell (2010) .

This thesis has drawn on *ethnic competition theory*, which offers a psychology of inter-group relations. Briefly, the theory postulates that group competition over resources provokes the in-groups to perceive the out-groups as a threat to their own (or their group's) interest. Although it originated from social psychology, ethnic competition theory is the most widely recognized theory when it comes to macro-level studies on the effects of immigration on public attitudes. Its application to the macro level assumes that the proportion of immigrants present in a given population is a measure of how acutely the natives perceive a threat. Based on *ethnic competition theory*, three general predictions have been made: 1) natives would wish to restrict immigrants from entering their society; 2) natives would wish to restrict the distribution of the state resources in general or from favouring immigrants; and 3) natives would become less trusting of strangers and political institutions. Furthermore, any conditions in the country that would heighten the level of competition by reducing the amount of resources in the society (e.g. worsening macro-economic conditions, less social spending, or a greater overall amount of foreign nationals), would further heighten some sentiments.

This study employed data from the European Social Survey from 2002 to 2010 to build pooled time series models. Attitudinal (micro) data were pooled with national contextual (macro) data. To account for the clustering of public attitudes by country in Europe, a multi-level empirical strategy was adopted. Multi-level modelling allows this study to consider both the different attitudes of

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individuals (micro-level) as well as the different attitudes of the public in European countries (macro level). The empirical procedure was as follows: first, the relationship between post-enlargement migration from Eastern Europe and attitudes in Western European host societies has been examined (descriptively and with multi-level modelling). Then, contextual variables were interacted with E8 migration volume to test their impact as moderators. Finally, a series of robustness checks was conducted to test the validity of the findings.

Summary of the Findings

Differences in opinion between individuals are mostly explained by an individual's own characteristics. An individual's level of education, age, ideological inclination and satisfaction with the political and economic context explain most differences in opinion. The 'winners' in society, that is the better educated, more satisfied individuals, tend to be more open to immigration, more trusting of strangers and more trusting in government. An individual's orientation on the political spectrum is also closely related to their attitudes: right-winged individuals tend to be less open to immigration admission and would prefer to ration immigrants' social rights. This study has also observed divergent attitudes between individuals who do not have immigrant backgrounds (natives) compared with those who do. Natives are more likely to prefer to restrict immigration admission and support governmental redistribution (as long as immigrants' social rights are rationed), and are more trusting of strangers. These findings highlight the importance of such socio-demographic factors in explaining attitudes towards immigration, welfare and trust.

Although Europe is a relatively small continent, united with supranational institutions, public attitudes do vary systematically across European countries. This study can confirm that countries are powerful social units and that the individuals living within them share certain attitudinal inclinations. The attitudes examined by this study tend to cluster by country, which accounts for about 5-10% of the variation between individuals. Economic conditions, social spending, and broad immigration trends are linked with public sentiment. Other aspects, such as culture and history, are difficult to measure but are likely also to form part of the explanation. The different national contexts in Europe and the variation in attitudes across them provide an intriguing setting for the comparative study of the effect of immigration on the host societies.

This thesis has not found universal support for *ethnic competition theory* in the case of post-enlargement migration to Western Europe. This rejection of ethnic competition theory is important as it is the central tenet of a scholarly field studying the attitudinal implication of immigration²⁷. Opening up borders with a less economically developed periphery on the East has not led to a widespread public backlash against immigration in the West. In fact, the opposite is found to be the case. A higher proportions of nationals of the new member countries has gone hand-in-hand with more positive views about immigration amongst natives. This finding supports predictions by an opposing theory, *inter-group contact theory*. Recall that inter-group contact theory predicts that greater contact with immigrants under certain conditions would lead to increased tolerance. Instead of a rise in E8 nationals furthering competition and provoking natives to restrict immigration, it has ushered in more openness to the benefits of immigration. E8 nationals are skilled economic migrants to Western Europe, filling labour shortages, which might have helped the natives to regard immigration as more economically beneficial. Moreover, the cultural distance between Western and Eastern Europeans is much closer than that between Europeans and non-European migrants, explaining why natives have come to see immigration as more culturally positive during times of high E8 migration. However, this positive relationship between post-enlargement migration and attitudes towards immigration was found to be eroded when the national economic conditions were more precarious. This provides partial support for *ethnic competition theory*, since scarce economic resources could generate a perception of threat.

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, there is no indication that ethnic competition between E8 nationals and natives has eroded other forms of civic sentiment in Western Europe. This thesis has not found a link between immigration and public attitudes of welfare or trust, nor that this is moderated by national contextual factors. Although an influx of E8 nationals increased the ethnic diversity in Western Europe, the public demand for income redistribution, trust in strangers, and trust in political institutions have not been changed. Moreover, individuals living in countries with more E8 nationals are not more likely to wish to restrict immigrants from accessing social rights. The results

²⁷ The characterization of ethnic competition theory as the central tenet is based on a review of the literature by Ceobanu and Escandell (2010).

clearly demonstrate that post-enlargement migration has not lead to the expected attitudinal reactions in Europe.

Internal Validity

The conclusions of this study are restricted by a series of caveats. The findings of this thesis will now be discussed in light of these limitations.

Time

First, this study is limited by the fact that the post-enlargement migration has happened relatively recently. This study focused on an eight year period, from 2002 to 2010. Although changes in public attitudes towards immigration were immediately perceptible, insufficient time may have passed for broader civic sentiment to be impacted. Changes in the public sentiment regarding trust and welfare may be conceptualized as attitudes but they also reflect the underlying values. Value changes can be gradual rather than immediate, even taking as long as a generation to shift (Inglehart 1977). The latest data available from the European Social Survey were for 2010. The analysis in this study would have been improved by the addition of data relating to a few additional years, since it would have observed attitudinal patterns in Austria and Germany after they lifted restrictions in 2011.

Although this study spans an eight year time frame, the pooled cross-sectional structure of the data does not allow for the relationship between the dependent variable and public attitudes to be understood dynamically. To understand the dynamics between these two social phenomena, one would need to have either panel data (for the aggregate level) or longitudinal data (for the individual level) for a certain period of time. The data used in this study follows the same countries over time but not the same individuals. For this reason, the lag effects of post-enlargement migration have also not been examined.

Level

The concentration of E8 nationals in the population and other contextual level factors introduced in this study have been examined at the national level. This is due to issues of data availability, which limits any valid data to the country level alone, but taking countries as the unit of analysis may

obfuscate the relationship between immigration and public attitudes. This may be particularly true when it comes to attitudes of trust. Previous studies focusing on the neighbourhood level have uncovered a negative effect of ethnic diversity on either social or political trust (Putnam 2007; Laurence 2011a). A more recent study by Burgoon, Koster, and Egmond (2012) consider immigration at the occupational level: the authors find that the presence of immigrants in the individual's occupational sector can heighten the threat that natives feel.

This could also explain the lack of any link uncovered between immigration and attitudes about welfare. Immigrants' use of social services may be more perceptible at the neighbourhood or municipal level. Moreover, the national contextual factors introduced as controls could also vary considerably within countries at lower levels of analysis. For instance, in some countries, there is a large degree of regional inequality (e.g. Italy or Germany) where GDP per capita or unemployment can vary considerably within the unit. Therefore, any conclusions must be restricted to the national level and cannot be extrapolated to lower units of analysis.

Comparability

Although attempts have been made to make post-enlargement migration comparable across Western European countries, some differences remain. Harmonizing international migration data is very complex since countries use different practices for data gathering, and immigration categories are not a standardised (OECD, 2012). As noted before, isolating a certain group of immigrants (E8 nationals) has made the composition of immigrants across different countries more similar than in previous studies. However, this group of E8 nationals is not homogenous and there are differences in the composition of E8 nationals between Western European countries. As noted in Chapter 3, E8 nationals from certain countries and with certain skill profiles migrated systematically to different host countries post-enlargement. However, due to the data limitation and in the interest of parsimony, this study considered the inflow of E8 nationals as a single group.⁷²

⁷² The number of Poles is used as an alternative measure of the independent variable as a robustness check but not in the main analysis.

Measurement error

Since this thesis does not find universal support for ethnic competition theory, one could ask if this might be due to the nature of the explanatory variable. The explanatory variable in this thesis is the number of E8 nationals as a proportion of the national population. However, it is unclear whether this proportion is equivalent to the extent of ethnic competition as perceived by the public.²³ This is further complicated by the fact that the threat (or contact) with E8 nationals is not uniform across a country but may be more intense in certain geographic areas, such as particular regions or neighbourhoods (as mentioned previously) and certain sectors and occupations of the labour market. Although there are flaws in the operationalization of the theory, this thesis has followed the procedure used in many previous empirical studies: relying on the proportion of immigrants as a measure for ethnic competition is a common strategy studies (Kreuter, Presser, and Tourangeau 2008).

Some measurement error may have occurred in the specification of the dependent variables, which use survey responses to capture individuals' attitudes. The self-reported nature of the responses may not accurately reflect how individuals feel. This is because individuals participating in the surveys can provide the responses that they believe the person administering the survey wants to hear. For example, an individual may feel that it is not socially acceptable to admit to preferring less immigration, although that is their true preference, and may alter their responses under the pressure of social desirability{Citation}.

Causality

The data limitation only permits this thesis to draw conclusions about the differences between public attitudes rather than changes in attitudes. A change in attitudes would only be possible to conclude if the same respondents were followed over time (a longitudinal survey design). There are questions regarding the causal direction in the positive relationship between post-enlargement migration and attitudes about immigration (Chapter 5). This thesis cannot prove that contact with immigrants is the operating causal mechanism. Unfortunately, the European Social Survey fails to provide information about the respondent's contact with immigrants. However, due to the lack of data, the existence or

²³ This measure is also used as an operationalizing of inter-group contact theory in Chapter 5.

nature of the contact with E8 migrants cannot be conclusively to have been empirically established at the individual level.

Although it is impossible to ascertain causal linkages on the basis of significant associations, the reverse is possible: it can reject causal linkages based on the absence of association. That is because a significant association is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for establishing causality. For this reason, the findings in this study conclude that post-enlargement migration has not affected the attitudes towards welfare or trust in the Western European host societies.

External Validity

The generalizability of the findings of this thesis faces a few challenges. First, the conditions of EU mobility and its regulations are particular to Europe. These regulations harmonize the admissions criteria and the provision of social rights to nationals of the new member states. On the other hand, in the case of non-EU immigration, national governments have greater authority over the admission criteria and access to social rights. Furthermore, the characteristics of E8 migrants render it unclear whether these findings are generalizable to other migrant populations. Immigrants who have a greater cultural distance from their host societies could generate a different public reaction. It is possible that the findings of this thesis would not hold when considering immigrant populations that migrate for political or family reasons rather than economic ones. It is also possible that E8 migrants are not perceived as 'visible' enough in EU-15 societies to trigger public resistance. This may be because Central and Eastern Europeans are not physically dissimilar to the natives of Western Europe and share general European norms and values.

The concept of the visibility of difference between the majority group and the minority group is a complex one. The physical appearance of a group can fuel prejudice and intolerance and has been debated in literature about inter-group relations (Park 1928; Dignan 1981; Pettigrew and Meertens 1995). The cleavage between 'whites' and 'blacks' is a visible one in the United States. When applied to other countries, extent of visibility of an out-group may have different attitudinal responses. For example, Stolle et al. conduct their analysis looking only at 'visible' minorities in Canada and do find evidence of a negative link between their population size and trust in communities. Still, it remains unclear if E8 migrants represent a visible minority or not, particularly if we accept the fluid concept of

race put forward by Goldberg (199) which mixes class, taste, norms are subtle signals rather than clear physical differences which divide a majority from a minority.

Still, the case of post-enlargement migration does offer some insight that can be applied to other contexts. In some ways, the European Union has offered researchers a 'policy laboratory' where the effects of supranational changes can be followed in varying national contexts. Such findings could apply to other geographic locations. For instance, parallels have been drawn with other situations of regional integration, such as Mexico and the US (Favell 2008). The lessons of post-enlargement migration can offer an alternative model to those based on the US experience. More obviously, the findings of this thesis could be applied to future EU enlargements. As the European Union continues to grow in size, more nationals of new member countries will be able to live and work in Western Europe. Bulgarians and Romanians (E2 countries) joined in 2007 and Croatia is about to join in 2013. There has been talk of Turkey also joining the European Union, which has raised considerable public concern, but this may be a remote possibility since Turkey's human rights standards are far from those of the EU and the EU financial crisis in turn has made the option of membership less appealing to Turks.

Implications

Three major implications for the academic literature emerge from the findings of this research. The first is that mounting immigration does not necessarily drive concern about immigration. Inflammatory political rhetoric and alarmist media coverage portray concern about immigration as a commonly held attitude, but this is misleading since Europeans, in general, feel ambivalent about immigration. In this instance, the post-enlargement migration has not brought widespread public distress about immigration. Instead, this thesis has observed the opposite outcome: post-enlargement migration has been accompanied by a greater recognition of the economic and cultural benefits of immigration. The emerging picture from these findings casts serious doubt on the idea that an increase in immigration will spark anti-immigration sentiment in Europe. The findings of this thesis are at odds with (Olzak 1994) who argues that there is a negative relationship between the size of the ethnic group and the extent of the inter-group competition based on her comprehensive study of American cities. Yet, when deconstructing the national composition of immigrant populations and focusing on a single group in this thesis, a different picture emerges: certain forms of immigration (e.g.

economic migration from culturally proximate locations) do not trigger anti-immigration sentiment. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the findings in this thesis have demonstrated the potential for tolerance in Europe, particularly if the economic conditions are prosperous. This has important political implications for the policy-makers who feel pressure to resort to strict immigration admission criteria as a way of shoring up public support. Instead, this thesis offers reassurance to policy-makers who struggle to contain the volume of migration in a globalized world.

Second, the implications for the political sociology of the welfare state are that Europe may escape an 'Americanisation' of public attitudes despite its mounting immigration. The findings of this thesis stand in opposition to those of prominent studies by Putnam (2007) and Alesina and Glaeser (2006), which claim that ethnic diversity is incompatible with trust (social and political) and public support for expansive welfare systems. In both of these studies, the American experience is treated as a model for Europe as it grapples with integrating its newcomers. Instead, the results of this thesis imply that rising national immigration does not necessarily lead societies to 'hunker down' in Europe. Despite the increasing political salience of immigration, national immigration changes do not appear strongly to influence attitudes towards trust or welfare. This study joins a bevy of others (Larsen 2006; Dinesen and Sønderskov 2012; Gijsberts, Van Der Meer, and Dagevos 2011; Gesthuizen, Van Der Meer, and Scheepers 2009; Ivarsflaten and Strømsnes 2010; Hooghe et al. 2009; Sturgis et al. 2011) that do not find evidence for the Americanisation of attitudes in Europe and is yet another empirical study that rejects such claims. Cultural or historical differences US and Europe could be a difference as good patterns of racial segregation (Uslaner 2012). It is another reminder that among scholars there is 'insufficient recognition of how radically different [America] is: it is different not just in *many* respects, but in *most* respects' (Lijphart 2009, 1).

Finally, although European welfare states face the common challenge of immigration, there is likely that this will be met with divergent policy responses and public reactions. Although this thesis has not found compelling support for predictions of ethnic competition theory in the case of the E8 enlargement across Europe generally, it has uncovered heterogeneous patterns of relationships between immigration and attitudes within individual European countries. Varying public responses in Europe could bring variation in policy responses to immigration, particular in social policies which are largely 'politically determined' (Nannestad 2007, 529). For instance, diverse responses have been observed in immigrants' social rights (Sainsbury 2006). Still it remains unclear if these divergent

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policy responses are driven by different constellations of immigration and welfare regimes or by differing public sentiment. It is also difficult to predict, based on the findings of this thesis, what implications increasing immigration has for social policies in European welfare states. This is because although there is clearly a link between public opinion and social policies, the endogenous nature of this relationship obfuscates a clear understanding and traditional welfare state scholars have emphasized institutional differences rather than public attitudes to explain divergent responses across welfare states (Myles 2006). The implications of the findings of this thesis concur with Myles (2006) call for welfare state scholars to take public opinion, particularly divergent trends between countries, more seriously in comparative studies.

Further Research

This thesis points to three areas for future research which will further scholarly understanding. First, greater attention should be paid to the composition of immigration and how this varies across different countries. Too many studies simply apply a universal variable (e.g. proportion of non-EU foreign nationals) across countries without taking into account the heterogeneity of migration flows. The results of this thesis underscore the need to move beyond a 'one size fits all' explanation for all forms of immigration. Comparative studies need to devise a more nuanced measure that takes into account the fact that immigration composition differs from one country to the next (e.g. by nationality, race, religion, skill, or reason for migration). Unbundling these different aspects of immigration and their relationship with attitudes will provide a clearer picture of how European sentiment is changing (if at all). This approach will not only improve the methodological soundness of comparative attitudinal studies but might also yield some fruitful insights into which aspects of immigration trigger a public backlash.

Second, a thorough investigation should be made into the inter-connectedness of the attitudes presented in this study. This thesis has examined attitudes towards immigration, welfare and trust as separate entities since this was more suitable for answering the research question, but the reality is probably that there are links between these three attitudes which may mediate or moderate the impact of immigration. This thesis can confirm that there are linkages between attitudes towards immigration, trust and income redistribution. For instance, individuals who are less trusting of people

are also more likely to oppose immigration and those who oppose immigration are less likely to trust in political institutions. Still, the linkages between these attitudes which are seemingly interrelated in a complex web needs that needs to be unravelled. This was not feasible in this observational study,²⁴ since the linkages between attitudes are best understood through experimental research (e.g. embedded into surveys), which is more adept about identifying causal direction between attitudes and the 'channels through which they operate' (Stichnoth and Van der Straeten 2009, 376). Some promising experimental research on the role of attitudes in mediating the relationship between immigration and other attitudes has been made in political science, such as research by Valentino, Brader, and Jardina (2013) However, the silos of academic disciplines have kept the study of different attitudes separate as well. For instance, for the most part, attitudes of political trust are studied by political scientists, while attitudes of trust are studied by sociologists, and attitudes towards welfare are studied by welfare state scholars. There is certainly a strong need for an experimental research design which pulls together strands across academic disciplines to provide a broader picture to understand the mediating effect of various attitudes on others during conditions of rising immigration.

Finally, the attitudinal implications of future European Union integration should be followed in order to understand if these display the same patterns as those described in this thesis. There will be plenty of opportunities for researchers to do so. The opening up of the Western European labour markets to Bulgaria and Romania is underway and Croatia will become a member in 2013. The case of Bulgarian and Romanian migration could be a particularly interesting case for future research since they have large Roma populations. Western Europe has long struggled with the integration of the Roma minority groups and, if these groups grow in size, this could have a negative impact on the public perception of immigration in the affected areas.

In sum, this thesis has made an original contribution to the literature by examining the attitudinal implications in Western Europe after the rapid immigration from new EU member states. To date, E8 migration has been ignored in comparative studies that sought to understand the link between immigration and public attitudes. Increased migration from the East a major development in

²⁴ The role of attitudes as moderating the impact of immigration on other attitudes is not possible in this research design since cross-level interaction terms are not possible due the small number of level-2 units.

migration to Western Europe, which continues to 'shake the cosiness of homogenous communities' but this thesis concurs that 'the dangers that associated with this trend are illusory' (Portes and Vickstrom 2011, 474–475). It is commonly acknowledged that the Eastern Enlargement brought peace to Europe and prosperity to the new member countries. Yet what has been learned from this thesis is that the growing presence of Central and Eastern Europeans, has not ruffled public opinion in Western Europe and public opinion remained tenaciously resilient. This scholarly research might ease widely held concerns about the future of European civic sentiments in an era of global migration.

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