

Rediscovering *The Undiscovered Self*: Jung, situated first-person phenomenology, and WEIRD psychology.

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1. The 'both/and' approach

Let me start with two conflicting intuitions. Intuition 1: We live our lives from a first-person perspective, experiencing our thoughts and actions as our own, and needing the sense that we choose our own choices to feel happy in our individuality. We'll come back later to look a bit harder at who 'we' might be. Intuition 2: we also do and say things we didn't want or intend to in advance, and this is often a good thing, like braking before we become aware of the pedestrian stepping in front of our car. This essay will argue for a 'both/and' position in relation to these two intuitions. Following the work of the philosophers Manfred Frank (1986) and Dan Zahavi (2005, 2014, 2021), I will be emphasizing the irreducible feeling of 'for-me-ness' that accompanies my own experience. At the same time, I'll be qualifying Frank's claim that you can't get back behind the first person, an idea which he expresses with the wonderful German word *Unhintergebarkeit* or the 'non-going-behind-ability' of individuality. Instead, the 'both/and' case is that the first-person perspective needs to be approached as BOTH irreducibly immediate (mostly, in any case) for the person doing the experiencing, AND frameable, or 'gone-behind-able,' at different levels and at different timescales.

The problem with making a 'both/and' case is that it might cause me to end up with no friends in either camp. My approach is intended to acknowledge the concerns articulated by Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi about arguments comparable to the 'both/and' approach, namely Daniel Dennett's notion of 'heterophenomenology.' For Dennett, heterophenomenology 'is the study of first-person phenomena from the third-person point of view of objective science' (Dennett 2013: 342). By contrast, for Gallagher and Zahavi: 'the usual opposition of first-person versus third-person accounts in the context of the study of consciousness is misleading. It makes us forget that so-called third-person objective accounts are accomplished and generated by a community of conscious subjects. There is no pure third-person perspective, just as there is no view from nowhere' (Gallagher and Zahavi 2021: 20-21). Dennett would no doubt agree (Dennett 1995: 21). Thus the 'both/and' approach is developed to honour both intuitions: the unavoidable salience of each individual's unfolding sense of their lived experience as they reach conclusions and make decisions and mistakes, and at the same time, the necessity of standing back from this sense of salience to study it with the contingent, fallibilistic tools of empirical investigation and so 'to *explain, predict, and control* the phenomenological properties of conscious experience' (Seth 2021: 22).

A fair presentation of the 'both/and' approach must acknowledge William James who hoped to combine the lived experience of the mind as undogmatically as possible with the empirical investigation of the brain (James 1950: vol. 1, 177). Furthermore, given the historical relation between arguments for the irreducible first-personal aspect of experience and the tradition of phenomenology initiated by Edmund Husserl, we would do well to reconstruct debates between Max Scheler, Edith Stein and Gerda Walther in the 1910s and 1920s, as Niamh Burns and I have argued elsewhere (Morgan and Burns 2020), since Scheler and Walther articulated a subtle critique of the first-person perspective but didn't manage

to persuade Edith Stein, who, at the time, was working with Husserl in Freiburg. The weaknesses in the arguments of Scheler and Walther can help us today find more cogent ways of developing the difficult 'both/and' position. In this article, I want to take a different path. I will add a further constellation of ideas to the phenomenological mix, and thereby shift the ground beyond the more familiar canon of positions from Husserl to enactivism and phenomenological cognitive science (Käufer and Chemero 2021) by relating these to the work of Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961).

I will be making the case that Jung's vision of a dynamic, culturally situated individual identity offers tools for developing a 'both/and' model of first-person experience. At the same time, I shall be suggesting that his psychology, for all its cross-cultural, comparative ambitions, is WEIRD in the sense suggested by Joseph Henrich, Steven Heine and Aran Norenzayan (Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan 2010), an interdisciplinary team working at the University of British Columbia in the early 2000s: namely, marked by its origins in a society that is Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic. This historicization of Jung's approach increases its conceptual strength. By directly addressing the question of cultural traditions and making explicit some of the WEIRD conventions that underpin Jung's approach, we can arrive at a nuanced 'both/and' model of how, in a twenty-first century context, the fragile first-person phenomenology of individual selfhood can be understood in a wider context of the practices which support and constrain it. Somewhat surprisingly, the power of Jung's position derives from his careful balancing of modern empirical assumptions with figures of thought from religious traditions (compare Siderits, Thompson, and Zahavi 2011). This unusual combination allows his model to illuminate current interdisciplinary debates in the area between the cognitive sciences, phenomenology, and cultural history, and in the process to situate and relativize the inadvertent WEIRD bias of the discussions.

Jung is a problematic figure in academic debates, especially in light of his recent championing by the controversial Canadian psychologist, Jordan Peterson, author of the bestselling *12 Rules for Life* (2018). For Peterson, Jung counts as the 'psychoanalyst extraordinaire' (Peterson 2018: 180). Peterson's endorsement might seem to disqualify Jung for academics worried by Peterson's popularity and populism. Nevertheless, in the last two decades the pioneering work of the historian Sonu Shamdasani (2003, 2018, 2009) has been arguing for Jung's intellectual respectability, whilst simultaneously shifting the focus of histories of psychotherapy and depth psychology away from the figures of Freud and Jung to give broader accounts of how the theories and practices of depth psychology 'emerge from complex developments in Western thought and society, spanning many disciplines and involving many figures' (Shamdasani 2018: 3). Building on Henri Ellenberger's study of Janet, Freud, and Jung against the background of increasing interest in dynamic psychology in Europe and the United States from the late eighteenth century onwards (Ellenberger 1970), Shamdasani shows the 'widespread and far-reaching' effect that William James, among others, had on Jung as he formulated his position in the 1910s (Shamdasani 2003: 58). In addition, he suggests that the archetypal approach that Jung discovered with his experimental combination of painting and self-analysis in the 1910s can be better understood when related to other contemporary cultural experiments in Zürich, including Dada (Shamdasani 2009: 34-37).

Given the emerging vision of a thinker grounded in modernist science and modernist culture on both sides of the Atlantic, it makes sense that Jung's work should be regaining its appeal. For instance, Isha McKenzie-Mavinga, an integrative transcultural therapist

synthesizing a range of traditions, proposes a Jungian attention to archetypes 'as the beginnings of exposing black Western archetypes in order to heal the impact of racism on individuals' (McKenzie-Mavinga 2016: 164). Meanwhile, the political theorist Laurie M. Johnson turns to Jung to make sense of the popularity of Jordan Peterson's 'various levels of existence, from reactive anti-social justice warrior, to Jungian biblical theorist, to self-help guru, to sometimes advertiser for right-wing organizations' (Johnson 2019: ix). In Johnson's view, the merit of Jung's approach lies in his insistence that a deep understanding of modern secular societies requires engaging with their religious roots (Johnson 2019: 18). She highlights in this respect the importance of Jung's model of the Self: 'The Self is always more than us, that is, more than our conscious ego which is the locus of experience. Hence it is suitable to say that we can have a relationship with the Self, not that we are the self' (Johnson 2019: 11). Archetypal forms of analysis with a particular focus on the Jungian model of selfhood can then be mobilized to investigate '*secular religions and ideological possession*' in the political culture of the early twenty-first century (Johnson 2019: 159). Like the work of Charles Taylor (Taylor 2007), to which she acknowledges an intellectual debt (Johnson 2019: ix), her argument demonstrates the usefulness of figures of thought originating in religious traditions for understanding contemporary culture. In a similar vein, this essay will explore how the complex 'both/and' structure of Jung's theologically inflected idea of selfhood illuminates current debates about forms of situated individual identity.

The 'both/and' approach also opens possible directions for future investigation of questions about the forms of social theory and politics associated with a commitment to the first-person perspective. The Austrian philosopher Sophie Loidolt has recently used a phenomenologically-oriented reading of the work of Hannah Arendt to explore the sort of collective intentionality, that is to say the forms of 'we,' which arise when we accept the irreducibility of the first-person perspective as axiomatic: 'only forms which do not dissolve the uniqueness of each "I" but that instead allow them to appear are regarded as authentic forms of "we"' (Loidolt 2018: 264). In her view, this will entail a politics that presupposes 'an essentially democratic form of "we," one that is agonistic but not antagonistic' (Loidolt 2018: 264). If we take a 'both/and' approach, we can move with Loidolt beyond Loidolt. In addition to underscoring an individual sense of agency and the accompanying democratic forms of collective intentionality, we can investigate the processes which scaffold individual involvement and agency on the different timescales and at the different levels. A 'both/and' approach promotes a fuller account of the framework that supports and constrains the lived experience of first-person immediacy.

So what, exactly, does Jung bring to the table?

2. (Not) going behind the first-person perspective

Jung wrote a brief and accessible summary of his model of the self at the very end of his career when he was eighty-two. His main projects in the final decade of his life were collaborating on the biography that became *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* (1961) (Jung 1983); transcribing the *Red Book*, the product of the lengthy self-analysis that he started in 1913; and writing essays for a wider public (Jung 2014: xi-xii). The public-facing essay which will be the focus of my argument here is a transatlantic product. It was first published in German in 1957 under the title 'Gegenwart und Zukunft' [Present and Future], and an excerpt was published in English in *The Atlantic Monthly* that year. The full translation was published in 1958 using a title chosen by Jung's American publisher: *The Undiscovered Self* (Jung 2014: xii). The essay continues to retain its appeal. For instance, the anthropologist

David Graeber and archaeologist David Wengrow use a quotation from it as an epigraph for their recent proposal for re-imagining the deep history of human societies (Graeber and Wengrow 2021: 1). In a similar vein, I will be showing Jung's usefulness for developing a new 'both/and' approach to understanding situated individual identities.

Along with many of his intellectual peers in Europe and North America in the first part of the twentieth century, Jung was concerned at the de-individualizing effects of a mass society. However, comparison with four related positions developed by his contemporaries shows the originality of Jung's approach and the strengths of his 'both/and' approach. It also provides a historical genealogy of related positions to which I will be returning at various points later in the argument.

The four contrasting approaches I want to present here all share the potential to develop 'both/and' positions, but the thinkers articulating them are worried, in a way that Jung doesn't seem to be, that a focus on the wider framing of individual identity will compromise the individuality they hope to defend. Thus: Martin Heidegger, writing during the Weimar Republic, attempted to conceptualize both the constraining and enabling effects of social conformity with his notion of *das Man* ('the One' or 'the They') in *Being and Time* (1927) (Heidegger 1962: 149-68), and admired Thomas Mann's *The Magic Mountain* (1924) as a comparable reflection on the forces of normalization (Arendt and Heidegger 2002: 40). Horkheimer and Adorno, writing *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1947) in Californian exile, analysed the ways in which consumer capitalism produced forms of 'pseudo-individuality,' in other words, individual identity hollowed out from the inside by the insidious effects of advertising and mass entertainment (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: 125). Auerbach, in his celebrated essay on 'Philology and World Literature' (1952) written after he took up his post at Yale, reflected on the potentially standardizing effects of a new globalized world literature (Auerbach 2014: 252-65). Finally, Arendt, in *The Human Condition* (1958) published in the same year as *The Undiscovered Self*, critically presented the homogenization she observed in the contemporary 'society of jobholders' which 'demands of its members a sheer automatic functioning, as though individual life had actually been submerged in the over-all life process of the species' (Arendt 1998: 322). In a similar vein to Heidegger, Horkheimer and Adorno, Auerbach, and Arendt, Jung was concerned that robust individual identities were being undermined by the combined forces of technology, statistical thinking, and forms of mass organization: 'we are all fascinated and overawed by statistical truths and large numbers and are daily apprised of the nullity and futility of the individual personality, since it is not represented and personified by any mass organization' (Jung 2014: 10-11).

However, while he shares aspects of the bleak analysis of his contemporaries, Jung's response to the situation is strikingly different from that of Heidegger, Horkheimer and Adorno, and Arendt (the case of Auerbach will be addressed towards the end of the argument). The other thinkers find it hard to make a conceptually consistent case for forms of individuality which resist the forces of conformity but they are also reluctant to adopt a fully-fledged 'both/and' position to get them out of their conceptual difficulties. Heidegger, in his later work, gives up on the phenomenological first-person altogether and criticizes what he takes to be the unwarranted individualism of *Being and Time* (Heidegger 2006: 26-73). Adorno can explain his own ability to see through the delusions of the culture industry only by appealing to the fortunate circumstances of his culturally privileged upbringing (Adorno 1970-: vol. 6, 50-51). He thereby adopts an 'Animal Farm' position: all individuals are equal, but some are more equal than others. Although his 'negative dialectics,' with its

technique of articulating contradictory positions, might seem perfectly suited to developing a 'both/and' approach, it often freezes into a stagnant 'neither/nor,' as Karl Popper, with his interest in exploring possibilities for the 'piecemeal' amelioration of social conditions was quick to point out (Adorno 1976: 291). Arendt avoids the tension by issuing a philosophical fiat at the start of her argument that there is a realm of human plurality that is distinct from the homogenizing and alienating effects of other sorts of human endeavour which she gives the name 'action' (Arendt 1998: 7-8). She thus preserves the realm of plurality that Loidolt justly emphasizes in her analyses but at the cost of its artificial separation from the aspects of embodied and socially scaffolded human existence that she fears compromise it.

Jung's line of argument assumes a contrasting model of individuality; a proto-'both/and' position. Drawing on anthropology and the study of religion, he proposes a phenomenological universal: 'the empirical awareness, the incontrovertible experience of an intensely personal, reciprocal relationship between man and an extramundane authority which acts as a counterpoise to the "world" and its "reason"' (Jung 2014: 15-16). Early in his career, Heidegger had explored a comparable 'phenomenology of religious life' (Heidegger 1995: esp. 67-105), but he later moved away from what he took to be theologically-inflected forms of argument (Caputo 1993). Given its religious inflection, Jung's alternative might seem no more secure than the approaches of Heidegger, Adorno, or Arendt. However, questions of theology should not distract us from Jung's productive 'both/and' strategy. On the one hand, Jung appeals to the irreducible sense of first-person experience that is the foundation of phenomenological arguments from Husserl's *Ideas* (1913) to the current work of Dan Zahavi (2005, 2014) and Shaun Gallagher (Gallagher 2005; Gallagher and Zahavi 2021). On the other hand, he suggests that the challenge for this first-person perspective is that of coming to terms with something which outstrips, precedes, and radically questions its self-evidence and self-containment. The first-person perspective, for Jung, is both irreducible and fragile. He thus makes the first-person perspective the core of his argument, whilst simultaneously framing it within a larger dynamic process of which it is a part and by which it is disrupted. Religion, for Jung, comes to mean the variety of historically attested practices by which people attend to the tensions between first-person experience and the dynamic forces (about which more soon) which move through it, constitute it, and disrupt it: 'Religion, as the careful observation and taking account of certain invisible and uncontrollable factors, is an instinctive attitude peculiar to man, and its manifestations can be followed all through human history' (Jung 2014: 17-18). This is a novel approach. We don't need to subscribe to Jung's claim that religion is 'an instinctive attitude particular to man.' It is enough to register multifarious forms of religious practices as a frequently occurring social tool for navigating the tensions of the 'both/and' position.

Jung's first-person perspective is a response to something experienced as coming from inside but also transcending the first-person. First-person experience with a fuzzy border was already an integral part of Husserlian phenomenology: 'All actual experience refers beyond itself to possible experiences, which themselves again point to new possible experiences, and so on in infinitum' (Husserl 1931: 149). But for Jung, the self-transcending first-person perspective is the only perspective available to us, yet it is agglomerative, inconsistent, and unreliable. For this reason, dialogue, and in particular the conversation with the therapist, is central to Jung's model. We need other people to help us manage the unstable and incomplete nature of our own perspective on our experience and so to develop our own 'both/and' habits to honour but also to relativize the first-person perspective. Neither party is in control of the dialogue: 'The doctor is confronted with facts

which are not of his choosing and which he probably never would choose if he were a free agent. It is the sickness or the patient himself that puts the crucial questions—in other words, Nature experiments with the doctor in expecting an answer from him. The uniqueness of the individual and of his situation stares the analyst in the face and demands an answer' (Jung 2014: 36). In theory at least, this dialogue is an open-ended, collaborative process of discovery. As Jung described it in an essay from the 1930s on the practical application of dream analysis: 'The doctor should regard every such dream as something new, as a source of information about conditions whose nature is unknown to him, concerning which he has as much to learn as the patient. It goes without saying that he should give up all his theoretical assumptions and should in every single case be ready to construct a totally new theory of dreams' (Jung 2001: 11).

Taken at his word, Jung offers an undogmatic, dialogue-based model of collaborative improvisation and mutual development. At the same time, vindicating Gallagher's and Zahavi's concerns about the socially situated nature of the scientific practices of heterophenomenology, Jung does not, as we shall see, seem sufficiently conscious that his view is itself palpably shaped by his own context and biases. Nonetheless, one of the methodological implications of the 'both/and' approach is that the situatedness of any given approach need not disqualify its (necessarily historically situated) insights. Moreover, Jung has something to add to the mix which recent dialogical models of cognition do not fully include. Before we go on to see in more detail how Jung's dynamic 'both/and' approach productively relates to current understanding of the embodied brain, a short comparison with the dialogical model of human cognition developed recently by the philosopher Hugo Mercier and cognitive scientist Dan Sperber can help us see why it's useful to keep Jung in the conversation, despite the historically situated nature of his insights.

Recent work in cognitive science parallels the insights Jung drew from his narrower experience in the field of therapeutic practice. For a number of contemporary researchers, as for Jung, the very limits, instability and narrowness of the first-person perspective can be positively mobilized by dialogue (Schilbach et al. 2013). Indeed, in the arguments of Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber, the differing perspectives of cognitively biased individuals spur each other on in a process of joint discovery which neither party could achieve on their own. Dialogue becomes the dynamic medium through which a 'both/and' position can be adopted, as individual insights are honoured and simultaneously questioned, transformed and held to account. Thus, the explanations we give to each other of our behaviour oversimplify and distort, but that turns out in the end not to matter: 'Invocations and evaluation of reasons are contributions to a negotiated record of individuals' ideas, actions, responsibilities, and commitments. This partly consensual, partly contested social record of who thinks what and who did what for which reasons plays a central role in guiding cooperative or antagonistic interactions, in influencing reputations, and in stabilizing social norms' (Mercier and Sperber 2017: 127). Left to their own devices, individuals, in Mercier's and Sperber's view, will not even have a clear view of the degree to which they conform to behavioural stereotypes, suggesting an even bleaker view of a hollowed-out individuality than that which so worried intellectuals of the mid-twentieth century such as Heidegger, Horkheimer and Adorno, and Arendt. But the narrow and conflicting varieties of conformity of such individuals can qualify and challenge each other. Mercier and Sperber thus arrive at an open-ended plurality—comparable to that which Arendt created by philosophical fiat—but which they instead get to via an empirically grounded account of the limits of individual reasoning.

Jung's 'both/and' position includes an element that gets lost along the way in Mercier's and Sperber's account. In their argument, individuals are blissfully unaware of their individual 'myside bias' (Mercier and Sperber 2017: 218) until rudely disabused of their conviction by their interlocutor. In Jung's model, disruption comes from within the unstable first-person perspective, as a disturbing behaviour pattern, a dream, or an illness, which prompts humility and self-questioning. Jung's first-person perspective includes an awareness of fragility and ephemerality. I will be arguing that both views can be accommodated by being combined into a more complete model. But to do so we need to further explore how Jung imagines his internally fragile and unstable first-person perspective. As we shall see, the inconsistencies and limitations of Jung's account of the problem can help us move towards a more historically nuanced version for us to combine with the cheery cantankerousness celebrated by Mercier and Sperber.

3. The Brain from Inside Out

Jung's account of a dynamically unstable, first-person perspective can be explained by his theory of instinct. Instincts, in Jung's account, are responses that have co-evolved with the affordances of the environment:

Instinct is any thing but a blind and indefinite impulse, since it proves to be attuned and adapted to a definite external situation. This latter circumstance gives it its specific and irreducible form. Just as instinct is original and hereditary, so, too, its form is age-old, that is to say, *archetypal*. [...] These biological considerations naturally apply also to *Homo sapiens* [...]. The fact that our conscious activity is rooted in instinct and derives from it its dynamism as well as the basic features of its ideational forms has the same significance for human psychology as for all other members of the animal kingdom. Human knowledge consists essentially in the constant adaptation of the primordial patterns of ideas that were given us a priori. (Jung 2014: 49)

Jung's model of instincts is compatible with recent accounts of the brain that emphasize self-organization, both in the development of the organ itself and in its endogenous firing patterns. As the French cognitive scientist Stanislas Dehaene summarizes: 'even before birth, the foundations of our core brain circuits arise through self-organization' (Dehaene 2020: 78). At birth, as a result of this powerful combination of genes and self-organizing dynamics,

the baby's cortex is folded almost like an adult's. It is already subdivided into specialized sensory and cognitive areas, which are interconnected by precise and reproducible bundles of fibers. It hosts a collection of partially specialized modules, each of which project a particular type of representation onto the outside world. [...] From our evolution, we inherit a set of fundamental rules from which we will later select those that best represent the situations and concepts that we will have to learn in our lifetime. (Dehaene 2020: 79)

György Buzsáki, a specialist in the inner rhythms of the brain with a lab at NYU, suggests that this process of selection occurs through action in the environment. Constructing an argument that parallels the enactive models proposed by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (2016) or Alva Noë (2009), but 'from a neurocircuit perspective' (Buzsáki 2019: 105), Buzsáki employs the useful analogy of a dictionary to describe his 'preconfigured yet flexible brain'

(Buzsáki 2019: 333): 'the preformed brain is an already existing dictionary, although its numerous word and sentences are initially meaningless' (Buzsáki 2019: 343). Active exploration of the environment allows the brain to calibrate its endogenous 'nonsense words' with the world and so ground them with meaning: 'Even an inexperienced brain has a huge reservoir of unique neuronal trajectories with the potential to acquire real-life significance. But only exploratory, active experience can attach meaning to the largely preconfigured firing patterns of neuronal sequences' (Buzsáki 2019: 347).

Viewed alongside Jung's archetypal instincts, this model has a number of aspects that can help to add empirical detail to the developing 'both/and' approach and in particular to understanding both the salience and the fragility of the first-person perspective. As Dehaene suggests, the self-organizing structure of the brain and the concomitant patterns of neuronal firing have been honed over evolutionary time by interaction with environmental affordances. At the same time, the patterns of folding and firing—that is to say, the functional organization of the individual brain—will be unique: 'Repeated imaging of the same people shows that such differences are highly reliable, reflecting stable differences in functional brain architecture' (Mitchell 2018: 25). In the process of development, an individual's personal dictionary will then be grounded by their interaction with the shared natural and social environment. Our idiosyncratic firing trajectories will become coupled with a cultural environment through the process of repeated exploratory engagement. As Buzsáki notes (Buzsáki 2019: 137), this model has parallels with that of the later Wittgenstein, for whom meaning is grounded by our participation in a shared 'form of life' (Wittgenstein 2009: 94 [§241]). In Wittgenstein's version, what happens inside the individual, or, to use his famous analogy to describe the privacy of inner experience, whether there is a 'beetle' inside each individual's box, does not matter. What is important are the shared habits which underpin our communication (Wittgenstein 2009: 106 [§293]). The insights of Jung, Dehaene and Buzsáki helpfully qualify Wittgenstein's position while losing nothing of its insistence on the foundational role of shared cultural habits. Jung's inner sense of a disruptive and disrupted calling combined with the self-organizing endogenous brain activity that is the focus of Dehaene's and Buzsáki's state-of-the-art cognitive neuroscience, suggest a nuanced view of, on the one hand, a unique, but nevertheless evolutionarily adaptive inner life, and, on the other, an activity-induced coupling with the affordances of the nurturing social environment. The result is a socialized identity that nevertheless retains its own personal dynamic; combining conformity, inner restlessness, and an awareness of contingency.

Seen in this light, Jung's archetypal instincts can be understood as adaptive patterns of firing which, in each individual life, find their specific form through interaction with the cultural environment. However, the cultural affordances through which we give meaning to this inner dynamism can get out of synch with inner life. Conflicts can arise between different cultural affordances and the amount of attention or value given to the different affordances can become imbalanced, leading Jung to conclude: 'If the flow of instinctive dynamism into our life is to be maintained, as is absolutely necessary for our existence, then it is imperative that we should remould these archetypal forms into ideas which are adequate to the challenge of the present' (Jung 2014: 49). Jung's model thus gives us an emphatic first-person orientation, but one which acknowledges the limited, fragmented form of this first-person experience and the degree to which it finds structure only through active engagement with the environment. The ongoing exchange between individuals and their social setting is never stable, but ever-changing, requiring adjustment, learning and

new improvisations. These occur through interactions with others, and through the piecemeal adaptation of neuronal rhythms. Psychologist Lisa Feldman Barrett uses the metaphor of ‘curating’ to describe this process: ‘You can curate new experiences. You can try new activities. Everything you learn today seeds your brain to predict differently tomorrow’ (Barrett 2020: 78). Indeed, the cognitively inflected Jungian model that I am developing is compatible with Feldman Barrett’s constructionist account of emotional responses. Complex neuronal patterns gain meaning as we re-encounter comparable situations. What Buzsáki’s ‘neurocircuit perspective’ further emphasises is that there will already be neuronal patterns both before and while we construct a predictive model of the world through exploration and trial and error. This self-organization requires some minimal evolutionary preparation but doesn’t need the taxonomy of basic emotions which the neuro-psychoanalyst Mark Solms wants to unite with predictive processing accounts of the brain (Solms 2021: 105-20), and which Barrett’s meta-analyses have called in question (Barrett 2017). All we need for a situated understanding of emotional life is an evolutionarily shaped brain architecture that is already dynamic and active *in utero* (Buzsáki 2019: 77-78) and which learns to couple its dynamism with the world by exploring the cultural affordances it contingently encounters.

In the Jungian, ‘both/and’ model I am developing here, the human starter kit comes with evolutionary priming, including the assumption that there will be massive sculpting of our responses as we interact with a culturally scaffolded environment. Jung’s position acknowledges the adaptive alignment of individual and environmental affordances. One advantage of this model in comparison to many influential mid-twentieth-century rivals is that it suggests, at some deep level, that we are at home in the world, challenging Heidegger’s declaration, in *Being and Time*, that: ‘From an existential-ontological point of view, the ‘not-at-home’ must be conceived as the more primordial phenomenon’ (Heidegger 1962: 234). This change also affects how we think about the stand-off between the individual and the technologically saturated mass society that so concerned Heidegger, Horkheimer and Adorno, Auerbach and Arendt. Nevertheless, as Jung thinks about the potential for individual development, he adds a further twist to the ‘both/and’ approach which, as we will see now, has an upside and a downside, and which draws attention to the importance of considering the rhetorical tools with which we conceptualize human identity. The ‘both/and’ approach helps us to take into account the historicity of the very language through which first-person immediacy is experienced and understood.

4. Models of the Mind

In Jung’s account, the process of adaptive learning introduces an element of disjunction, even as it allows for a reciprocal, nurturing exchange between the dynamic individual and their environment:

Nothing estranges man more from the ground-plan of his instincts than his learning capacity, which turns out to be a genuine drive for progressive transformation of human modes of behaviour. It, more than anything else, is responsible for the altered conditions of his existence and the need for new adaptations which civilization brings. It is also the ultimate source of those numerous psychic disturbances and difficulties which are occasioned by man’s progressive alienation from his instinctual foundation, i.e., by his *uprootedness* and identification with his conscious knowledge of himself, by his concern with consciousness at the expense of the unconscious. (Jung 2014: 57)

Jung's diagnosis of the contemporary situation pulls in two directions. On the one hand, he acknowledges that learning is part of the human starter kit. On the other, he posits a tension between 'the ground-plan' of human instincts and our 'learning capacity.' Such a stark nature/nurture division is likely a hang-over from Jung's engagement with the binary oppositions that structure the thought of Schiller and the younger Nietzsche (Shamdasani 2003: 75-76). But more recent archaeological evidence radically questions Jung's nature/nurture binary. The very genus *Homo* developed in a technologically mediated way through the control of fire and the consequent development of cooking, which opened the path to the calory-rich diet demanded by the bigger, energy-consuming human brain (Wrangham 2009; Herculano-Houzel 2016). Cooking is not the only necessary innovation. The social technology of cooperative breeding is also important (Hrdy 2009), as is a 'positive feedback loop between ecological cooperation, cultural learning, and environmental change' (Sterelny 2012: 3). These recent accounts share a view of humans developing as a species precisely because of their technologically scaffolded, learning-dependent relation to their shared environment. There isn't a 'natural' *Homo* separable from nurture and culture. The 'ground plan' includes technological scaffolding. As the archaeologist Ian Hodder insists, *Homo sapiens* can't be imagined independently of their entanglement with 'things', which is his Heideggerian term of art for the technological, cultural, and conceptual artifacts alongside which humans develop in complex forms of interdependence: 'Humans depend on things that depend on humans; humans are both dependent on things and drawn into caring for them' (Hodder 2018: 79).

Jung's sketch of 'uprootedness' ignores the element of technological scaffolding and cultural learning that is a necessary part of being a large-brained primate who eats cooked food. Does this mean that we should simply abandon the attempt to rescue a Jungian version of the 'both/and' approach? Yes and no. Jung's account of cultural embeddedness has two sides; a good dynamic side contrasted with a supposedly static conformity which is interesting to us because of the tropes by which it is articulated. On the one hand, his attention to a sense of inner calling and to the felt connection to 'God' (Jung 2014: 64), makes space in his theory for a nuanced account of an individualized, but nevertheless flawed first-person perspective. This is what allows for the dynamic. On the other hand, the tools with which he conceptualizes both the current dysfunction of the dynamic psyche and his preferred solution show how Jung's attempts to understand and transform his situation are filtered, as they inevitably will be, through the habits of thought in which he was educated. The tool by which Jung hopes to diagnose and overcome the problem ('uprootedness') is shaped through and through by the very culture he strives to transcend. Is this cultural shaping of critical tools an insoluble problem? To use the memorable phrase of the writer and critic Audre Lorde, must we assume that 'The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House' (Lorde 2019: 103-06)?

The contingent scaffolding environment with which our dynamic engagement with the world progressively couples us will inevitably exhibit local biases. The 'both/and' approach helps us to situate and relativize such biases. Indeed, Lorde's own essay can be read from this perspective as showing a possible path forward: a version of the back and forth of the critical engagement that we have already seen in Mercier's and Sperber's evolutionary account of reason. Lorde is herself a key transatlantic figure whose visiting professorship at the Free University in Berlin from 1984-1992 was transformative for

German cultural discourses (Dagmar 2014). Thus it is fitting that her challenging essay should help us come to grips with the historical biases of Jung's approach.

Lorde urges her reader to 'reach down into that deep place of knowledge inside herself and touch that terror and loathing of any difference that lives there' (Lorde 2019: 106). The 'deep place of knowledge' might seem to reintroduce the sort of magically pristine, non-conformist subject who, in different ways, undermines the arguments of Heidegger, Horkheimer and Adorno, and Arendt. But in Lorde's essay that's not the case. First, because it requires Lorde's clear critique of her interlocutor's biases to prompt the insight (the essay is explicitly dialogical). Secondly, because, as recent empirical work confirms, we do not need to assume a monolithic, all or nothing, non-conformist or conformist individual. When an individual considers an issue, they do not use all the information available to them. They draw on a selection which is partly the random product of the 'cycle of thought' they have just gone through (Chater 2018) and partly cued by the current situation (Sharot 2017: 183-84). Primed by a novel situation, in this case Lorde's essay, different aspects of our predicament will show up as salient. The idea of the 'master's tools' can thus be read as a provocative metonymy which can in some circumstances create space for a re-application of the very intellectual tools on which it shines its sceptical light. For this reason, we will often benefit at the level of cultural discussion from the sort of challenging dialogue that Mercier and Sperber argue is the shared context in which forms of reasoning evolved. We don't just think for ourselves we think with other people.

A reading of Jung's model thus need not be distracted by the unhelpful dichotomy he elaborates of a 'ground plan' of instincts v. 'uprootedness.' Rather, the very prominence of this dichotomy can usefully draw our attention to the structuring topoi through which we model the mind, and so help us heed the neuroscientist Grace Lindsay's warning to resist the 'aesthetic' allure of overly tidy one-size-fits-all solutions: 'When studying such a product of natural selection, scientists aren't entitled to simplicity. Biology took whatever route it needed to create functioning organisms, without regard to how understandable any part of them would be. It should be no surprise, then, to find that the brain is a mere hodgepodge of different components and mechanisms' (Lindsay 2021: 360-61). This pluralism of approach and concomitant attention to structuring topoi will be especially useful when it comes to making claims about the totality; that is to say, about what, from our partial perspective, seems universal, such as the inevitable salience of the first-person perspective. Heidegger, Horkheimer and Adorno, and, paradigmatically, Arendt in her book entitled *The Human Condition*, were all relatively unreflecting in the way they invoked broad, totalizing categories. Auerbach, as we will see, tackled the problem head-on. A particular passage from Jung's *The Undiscovered Self* neatly illustrates the difficulties to be navigated.

5. Jung's topos of the micro- and macrocosm in a wider context

We have already observed Jung's argumentative choices being limited by the tendency to construct binary oppositions ('ground plan of instincts' v. 'uprootedness'). Another powerful figure is that of the microcosm and the macrocosm, which Jung unapologetically celebrates in a gendered language that in the 2020s does not necessarily help his case:

Resistance to the organized mass can be effected only by the man who is as well organized in his individuality as the mass itself. I fully realize that this proposition must sound well-nigh unintelligible to the man of today. The helpful medieval view that man is a microcosm, a reflection of the great cosmos in miniature, has long

since dropped away from him, although the very existence of his world-embracing and world-conditioning psyche might have taught him better. Not only is the image of the macrocosm imprinted upon his psychic nature, but he also creates this image for himself on an ever-widening scale. He bears this cosmic “correspondence” within him by virtue of his reflecting consciousness on the one hand, and, on the other, thanks to the hereditary, archetypal nature of his instincts, which bind him to his environment. (Jung 2014: 43)

In this passage, Jung is going beyond the package of self-organization and active engagement with the cultural environment that underpinned his model of instinct. In the self-organization-plus-environmental-exploration model there is no macrocosm or totality. Admittedly, the endogenous firing patterns that will be contingently coupled with the environment have been shaped by an evolutionary past. But if we don't think evolution is teleological, this shaping process will be an accumulation, rather than a totality—a ‘kludge’ to use the neuroscientist David Linden's phrase in *The Accidental Mind*: ‘a design that is inefficient, inelegant, and unfathomable, but nevertheless works’ (Linden 2007: 6); ‘a mere hodgepodge’ (Lindsay 2021: 361). The habits of interaction that we learn will similarly be an accumulation, one example of which may be the tool—useful in some circumstances but not in all—of stepping back to imagine a totality. We can agree with Jung that instincts ‘bind [an individual] to his environment’ (Jung 2014: 43). But about the wider claims of ‘cosmic “correspondence”’ between macro- and microcosm, we can only ask what function the micro/macro heuristic might play for Jung's argument, and whether there are other ways of fulfilling the same task. Jung's aim is to strengthen the position of the individual, what he calls: ‘resistance to the organized mass’ (Jung 2014: 43). The path he takes here, however, differs from the one we have seen in his account of the patient-doctor dialogue, in which he suggested that open-endedness and methodological pluralism underpin the on-going process of discovery. By contrast, here he is fixing in advance a certain structure (macrocosm = microcosm) although it is unclear where one could be standing to test this idea. It would require a meta-perspective on the whole course of history; an idea that William James, to pick a figure important for Jung's intellectual development, directly questioned in his preface to *The Will to Believe* (1897): ‘There is no possible point of view from which the world can appear an absolutely single fact’ (James 1992: 448). As we have seen Gallagher and Zahavi insist: ‘there is no view from nowhere’ (Gallagher and Zahavi 2021: 21).

Jung is not alone among mid-twentieth-century thinkers in imagining that micrological details will reveal the secrets of the macrological whole: Adorno shared the same hope (Adorno 1970-: vol. 6, 35; Jay 1984: 272) albeit hedged about with dialectical qualifications that the whole he rhetorically mobilizes is simultaneously inaccessible (Jay 2020: xii). But being in fine company is no substitute for a good argument. Jung hopes to strengthen the individual by having their inner structure echo the structure of the wider totality. He apparently can't see another way of combating what he takes to be the normalizing effects of statistical ‘knowledge’ which overrides individualizing ‘understanding’ (Jung 2014: 37). Or rather, when he does imagine an alternative, he does so only at the price of giving up the certainty supplied by the rhetorical matching of the microcosm and the macrocosm. Towards the very end of *The Undiscovered Self*, he sums up what we can expect from individuals using the therapeutic dialogue to explore their fractured sense of calling: ‘What does lie within our reach, however, is the change in individuals who have, or create

for themselves, an opportunity to influence others of like mind. I do not mean by persuading or preaching—I am thinking, rather, of the well-known fact that anyone who has insight into his own actions, and has thus found access to the unconscious, involuntarily exercises an influence on his environment' (Jung 2014: 76).

Jung here imagines a network of involuntary influences, based on being 'of like mind' and interacting with each other. The effects are cumulative and long-term; Jung thinks in terms of 'hundreds of years' (Jung 2014: 76). He hasn't entirely given up hope of foreseeing the direction of travel and being able to diagnose the 'unconscious *Zeitgeist*' which 'compensates the attitude of the conscious mind and anticipates changes to come' (Jung 2014: 77). The habit of thinking in terms of totality is hard to break, and is, in any case, not necessarily a bad thing: it can give a temporary sense of orientation and motivation. More significantly, it exists alongside other conceptual habits which pull productively in other directions, such as Jung's commitment to a methodologically open-minded therapeutic dialogue and his idea of instincts coordinated with affordances but still requiring learning and adaptation. From a methodological point of view, it is perhaps useful to understand Jung as a bricoleur, pulling together different tropes, lines of argument and practical rules of thumb, more than as a system-builder. His choice of tools and practices is limited by the context he acts in, as is the case for all of us. He works to be consistent but doesn't himself occupy a privileged position from which he could finally assess the coherence of the topoi and tools he has combined.

We have seen how Jung, when read critically, offers a nuanced, dynamic and rhetorically self-aware model of identity which opens up a path beyond the stark opposition between individual and mass society that he (also) shared with Heidegger, Horkheimer and Adorno, and Arendt. I promised earlier that we would return to Auerbach's way of dealing with the problem and now is the time to make good that promise before drawing some provisional conclusions. Auerbach articulated an approach comparable to Jung's in his essay on 'Philology and World Literature' (1952). Writing in the post-war era, Auerbach is aware that 'world literature,' as a category, goes far beyond the Western canon, even if this canon is taken to stretch capaciously from Homer's *Iliad* and the book of *Genesis* to Virginia Woolf's *To the Lighthouse* (1927) as it did in his monumental study *Mimesis* (1946), written in exile 'in Istanbul between May 1942 and April 1945' (Auerbach 1968: ii). While he acknowledges the expanded global canon, Auerbach simultaneously notes increasing processes of standardization on both sides of the Iron Curtain that threaten to incorporate and so irrevocably transform 'the Muslim, South Asian, or Chinese traditions' (Auerbach 2014: 254). In such a case, 'the idea of world literature would simultaneously be realized and destroyed' (Auerbach 2014: 254). The task Auerbach sets himself is then twofold: to find a methodology for a context in which an overview is impossible whilst at the same time resisting the process of global normalization. The result is his celebrated idea of the *Ansatzpunkt*: 'the place from which one should approach the material (*Ansatzpunkt*)' will be 'a product of personal intuition' (Auerbach 2014: 260). 'It is essential to understand that a general, synthetically framed interest, project, or problem is not enough. It is much more important to locate a partial phenomenon that is focused and concrete as possible and that can be described with technical philological terms' (Auerbach 2014: 262).

Like Jung, Auerbach starts from the first-person perspective: a hunch, that we follow up with the training and tools available to us. In Auerbach's argument, 'technical philological terms' play the same functional role as a religious vocabulary in Jung's. The hunch appears

for us because we have a vocabulary and training that make it salient. The 'master's tools' can be constraining, but they are also the means by which things variously show up for us. In parallel ways, Jung's religious and Auerbach's philological approaches thus focus their attention on the striking detail. However, an important difference is that Auerbach does not claim to know where the detail will lead him. The 'general, synthetically framed interest' has been renounced; the spell of the micro/macro heuristic broken. The hunch may lead further: 'the possibility of illuminating areas further afield must also exist, such that one could ultimately study the history of the entire world on the basis of wherever it is one starts' (Auerbach 2014: 263). But this commitment does not arise from a belief in totality so much as from an acknowledgment of shared finitude, of the planet itself: 'our philological home is the earth' (Auerbach 2014: 264).

Auerbach's personal *Ansatzpunkt* will be prone to bias and might seem a rearguard action; a last-ditch attempt to fight the 'un-Goethean' tendencies of the 1950s (Apter 2013: 195-96). But even as, in *Mimesis*, Auerbach focuses on the European canon, he does not, in the view of Edward Said, 'simply admire the Europe he has lost through exile but sees it anew as a composite social and historical enterprise, made and remade unceasingly by men and women in society' (Said 1983: 24). As Auerbach uses his initial hunch to forge connections, he draws attention to the situatedness and contingency of his arguments, and, indeed, begins the analysis in *Mimesis* with a comparative study of the simplifying narrative topoi or 'legends' by which historians make sense of recalcitrantly complex material: 'To write history is so difficult that most historians are forced to make concessions to the technique of legend' (Auerbach 1968: 20).

The comparison with Auerbach thus complements the Jungian 'both/and' approach in several ways. First, the inadequate first-person perspective, with its lack of self-transparency and restlessness, is accepted as the place we inevitably start; indeed, the very recalcitrance of first-person experience becomes potentially productive as our puzzlement leads us beyond ourselves. Secondly, this starting point will show up to us through the contingent vocabularies in which we are trained (religious, psychological, philological). These vocabularies are to some extent the 'master's tools,' as Lorde suggested. But they nevertheless consist in aggregates, with different elements pulling productively and/or painfully against each other. Thirdly, as we use our tools and training to make associations, we are not pursuing magically coherent connections but forging links, establishing relationships, and acknowledging commonalities, in pursuit of a more livable 'kludge.' Auerbach's philology retains the same problematized first-person perspective as Jung and expands the range of tools that might be available for the work of responding to the hunch. At the same time, the dialogical, interactive aspect of this work is more explicit in Jung than in Auerbach. Auerbach's philological 'skill,' despite his awareness that 'conceptual clichés lie in wait' (Auerbach 2014: 264) itself risks falling prey to the cliché of the brilliant lone scholar, contradicting Auerbach's insight that the task at hand is finally planetary not individual.

In sum: reading *The Undiscovered Self* through the lens of contemporary neuroscience and using the comparison with Auerbach to strengthen elements of pluralism and rhetorical self-awareness in Jung's late essay, we arrive at a 'both/and' model of individual identity which adds a further nuance to the situated, enactive self of twenty-first-century cognitively inclined phenomenology. Dan Zahavi has recently noted 'growing consensus that it makes sense to distinguish, at the very least, a more primitive experientially grounded self from a more normatively enriched and extended self' (Zahavi

2021: 9). My sketch of a cognitively inflected Jung suggests that pressure can be put on the 'primitive experientially grounded self.' For Jung, the first-person perspective is a grounding, but it also prompts questions about what grounds the grounding, opening the way to an investigation of the ways the first-person perspective is curated on different timescales: those of evolutionary, cultural, and ontogenetic development, but also that of the present unfolding situation with its shifting salience cues. This curated self can be constraining, as we take on habits and assumptions unawares, as Heidegger, Horkheimer and Adorno and Arendt all suggested. But it also opens the way for the situated re-shaping of what shows up as self-evident or 'experientially grounded.'

We thus arrive at a flexible, situated model of individual identity, which acknowledges both experiential primacy and the instability of the 'I'. But isn't this repeated focus on the first-person perspective a quirk of a Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic view of the world, that is to say: a bit WEIRD? As a way of drawing out consequences and further lines of investigation, I want to finish by situating Jung's agglomerative first-person perspective in a longer historical narrative to demonstrate its WEIRDness, and, finally, to ask if that matters.

6. A wider context for the 'both/and' approach: how WEIRD is Jung?

Perhaps unsurprisingly, given that he was the son of a protestant pastor (Bishop 2014: 25), Jung's model of an introspective but agglomerative self stands in a tradition which runs from Paul and Augustine and reaches a radical climax in Luther. In *De Servo Arbitrio* [On the Bondage of the Will], the polemic against Erasmus first published in December 1525, Luther counsels individuals against trusting their 'own powers, counsels, efforts, will and works,' since such self-confidence leads only to self-deception and the vain-glorious hope that the individual's planned actions might discover 'a position, an occasion, a work which shall bring him final salvation' (Luther 2012: 100). For Luther, even a 'primitive experientially grounded self' has no reliable access to its own motivations or intentions, and, despite Luther's own skill as a writer and debater of free will, the one true agent he acknowledges is 'God alone' (Luther 2012: 100). Luther thus radically individualizes our relation to God, whilst at the same time questioning the very possibility of intentional agency. My will is individual but not my own. Jung's view is not quite so bleak. But, like Luther, he relativizes the claims of our first-person view of our own predicament and finally endorses an attitude he finds best captured in a formulation of Paul's in Galatians 2:20, 'Yet not I live, but Christ liveth in me' (Jung 1928: 246).

Joseph Henrich has reconstructed the long historical process by which views of this sort move from being the attitude of a minority first-century sect (Paul) or of an early fifth-century intellectual elite criticizing religious competitors like Manicheism or the Goths' brand of Arian Christianity (Augustine), to being so widespread an attitude that: 'If Charles V had executed Luther immediately at the Diet of Worms in 1521 (snuffing out the Protestant Reformation), something like Protestantism would have soon sprung up to take its place' (Henrich 2020: 424). 'What Protestantism did in the 16th century was to sacralize the psychological complex that had been percolating in Europe during the centuries leading up to the Reformation' (Henrich 2020: 416). This psychological complex is shaped by the deep change in marriage and family structure which, after the fall of the Roman empire, was initiated by the Latin Church and Frankish rulers beginning in the sixth century. It had the unintended cumulative effect of displacing the intense kinship structures that have been the dominant civil institutions through human history and across the globe. Modern WEIRD

institutions, habits, and assumptions, including the assumption that stable individuals will have consistent dispositions across different situations (Henrich 2020: 386): ‘represent cumulative cultural products—born from a particular cultural psychology—that trace their origins back over centuries, through a cascade of causal chains involving wars, markets, and monks, to a peculiar package of incest taboos, marriage prohibitions, and family prescriptions [...] that developed in a radical religious sect—Western Christianity’ (Henrich 2020: 485).

We can see then that the embattled individual portrayed by Heidegger, Horkheimer and Adorno and Arendt whose fragile intuitions are unpacked and strengthened by the philological or psychological-religious expertise of Auerbach and Jung has a deep and ambivalent history. Its development is better explained by the spread of Cistercian monasteries (Henrich 2020: 370-71) or by the distance of a particular community from Wittenberg, the epicentre of the Reformation (Henrich 2020: 11-12), than by larger claims about the necessary structure of human experience. Henrich marshals empirical research and big data to re-tell and differentiate Weber’s thesis of the religious origins of the modern ‘rationalization of conduct’ (Weber 2001: 100). Moreover, as well as historicizing apparently self-evident aspects of individual psychology, his account questions the very role of individuals in the process. Renaissance and post-renaissance individuals were not ‘self-fashioning’ (Greenblatt 1980); their individuality was an unplanned by-product when the Western Church ‘inadvertently induced a series of social and psychological shifts’ (Henrich 2020: 253): ‘people are terrible at designing well-functioning formal institutions *de novo*. But, because this same process was occurring in many different European towns and cities, from northern Italy to England, cultural evolution could do the work. When a community or organization stumbled onto an effective combination of new formal institutions, norms, and beliefs, they prospered and consequently expanded by attracting new members’ (Henrich 2020: 253-54).

Henrich’s engaging summary of a decade of research in the wake of his coining the acronym WEIRD with his colleagues Heine and Norenzayan in 2010 can help to advance a Jung-inspired, ‘both/and’ differentiation of first-personal experience. Jung’s attention to religious vocabularies helped him zero in on the instability and dynamism of the first-person perspective. The dynamism can in part be explained by recent work on the coupling of endogenous brain activity with the affordances of the social environment. The consequent image of a curated cultural world which we actively construct and predict for ourselves explains both the rigidity of the social environment and a contrasting scope for training new habits. Henrich’s argument then further situates the situated ‘both/and’ self. It raises what Nietzsche would call genealogical questions about the value of certain values themselves (Nietzsche 1988: 253), such as ‘individualism, independence, nonrelational morality, impersonal prosociality (equality of strangers), nonconformity, resistance to tradition, guilt over shame, hard work, self-regulation, the centrality of mental states in moral judgments, and the molding of one’s disposition to a chosen occupation’ (Henrich 2020: 416). In other words, by considering the timescale of the cultural *longue durée* that nestles between the slow evolutionary timescale of biological mechanism and the immediacy of currently valid canons of argument, Henrich’s arguments allow the self-evidence of the ‘more primitive experientially grounded self’ to be interrogated, as it were, with higher resolution, and encourages us to combine cognitive science and phenomenology with a long cultural history of forms of human identity. This, in turn, opens the way for a pluralistic conversation about

possible forms of human identity and the sorts of long-term, cultural habits which establish ways of translating between them.

The emphasis on cultural translation takes us with Jung beyond Jung. Jung is sometimes diffident about making systematic claims. Writing a brief preface in 1952 to Frieda Fordham's *An Introduction to Jung's Psychology*, he emphasizes the lack of unity in his theoretical writings: 'As I cannot claim to have reached any definite theory explaining all or even the main part of the psychical complexities, my work consists of a series of different approaches, or one might call it, a circumambulation of unknown factors' (Fordham 1966: 11). This humility is contradicted by his claim, in *The Undiscovered Self*, that the individual bears a 'cosmic "correspondence" within him' (Jung 1970: 278). But Jung is more convincing where he is making exploratory connections than when he is overestimating the similarities that his comparisons make visible. The passage in which he cites Paul's epistle to the Galatians continues: 'Or I might invoke Lao-tzu and appropriate his concept of Tao, the Middle Way and creative centre of all things. In all these the same thing is meant' (Jung 1928: 246). Henrich's work encourages us to attend to ways in which the 'same thing' might not be meant, and to try to understand the factors which lead to the different varieties (Slingerland 2014: 18). Jung's work shows us the fruitful instability which religious vocabularies introduce into the phenomenology of the first-person perspective. Auerbach encourages us to make global connections, but to refrain from imagining that we could arrive at a total overview, a caution which William James would endorse. Lorde draws attention to potential biases of the tools that we use both to notice salient details and to connect them. Henrich encourages us to develop interdisciplinary collaborations to investigate the long-term changes in religious and family institutions and the way these shape for better and for worse the very immediacy of our first-person sense of self. Together, these figures help us to formulate a nuanced 'both/and' position, which takes seriously the first-person sense of lived experience, but stands back simultaneously to sketch the wider genealogies of which it is a part.

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