

China's "People's Diplomacy" and the Pugwash Conferences, 1957–1964

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The "People-to-People Diplomacy" (*minjian waijiao*) or "People's Diplomacy" (*renmin waijiao*) of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has received comparatively little attention in spite of its extensive deployment throughout the Cold War. New archival source from China and elsewhere have provided opportunities to reexamine the PRC's role in the Cold War.¹ This reexamination has enriched our understanding, for example, of the Sino-Soviet alliance and the important roles of ideology and of leaders' personalities in shaping both that alliance and the PRC's foreign policy.² Less explored has been the nature of China's transnational relations. This article looks at the PRC's deployment of a select group of intellectuals to operate in the transnational sphere of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, from the first conference in 1957 through the total breakdown in Sino-Pugwash relations by 1964. These conferences, bringing together scientists from both sides of the Cold War divide to discuss the perils of nuclear weapons and warfare, illustrate how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) used "People's Diplomacy" during the first half of the Cold War. The rise and fall in the Chinese foreign policy elite's enthusiasm for the meetings shows not only how this "people-to-people" strategy functioned in practice but also how it was connected to wider ideological and power political factors.

One contemporaneous academic assessment of the PRC's "People's Diplomacy" summed it up thus: "Designed to by-pass governments, it is aimed at the development of direct relations between official or state-controlled agencies in Communist China and unofficial groups and

1. See Christian F. Ostermann, "Archival Thaw in China," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, No. 16 (Winter 2008), pp. 1–6.

2. See, for example, Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Lorenz M. Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); and Sergey Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962–1967* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009).

organizations abroad.”³ It broadly fell within the definitions of cultural and public diplomacy and was a key component of mainland China’s foreign policy strategy to circumvent its diplomatic isolation and improve its international position.⁴ As early as the 1930s, the CCP favored “people-to-people” contacts as an effective means to legitimize the party’s position in China and enhance its profile overseas.⁵ Its continued use of this strategy in the 1950s and 1960s owed much to the PRC’s international position at the time. Few countries officially recognized or had diplomatic relations with the government on the Chinese mainland after the CCP took power in 1949. Largely owing to U.S. pressure, the Nationalist government in Taiwan represented China in most mainstream international organizations, including the United Nations (UN).⁶ The PRC’s “One China” policy, which regards Taiwan as a province of China rather than a separate state, meant it would not participate—even if invited—in any international organization or gathering that included representatives from Taiwan. This further limited opportunities for international engagement. Furthermore, the PRC’s trade was severely restricted by a U.S.-led blockade to enforce the CHINCOM trade embargo, and the U.S. Seventh Fleet remained in the Taiwan Strait from the outbreak of the Korean War onward to deter any attempt by the PRC to take Taiwan and defeat Chiang Kai-shek’s government there.⁷

Recent scholarship on the Cold War has shed new light on the many ways governments engaged a wide spectrum of actors in service of their foreign policy concerns. Frances Stonor Saunders, Hugh Wilford, and Giles Scott-Smith, for instance, have shown that the United States was pursuing policies to clandestinely leverage foreign intellectuals through state-private networks and organizations such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom.⁸ The United

3. Shen-yu Dai, “Peking’s International Position and the Cold War,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 321 (January 1959), p. 113.

4. Herbert Passin, *China’s Cultural Diplomacy* (London: The China Quarterly, 1962); and Zhao Qizheng, “You minjian waijiao dao gonggong waijiao,” in Zhao Jinjun, ed., *Xin Zhongguo waijiao 60 nian* (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2010), pp. 189–192.

5. See Michael H. Hunt, *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 151–153.

6. See Rosemary Foot, *The Practice of Power: U.S. Relations with China since 1949* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 22–51; and Victor S. Kaufman, “‘Chirep’: The Anglo-American Dispute over Chinese Representation in the United Nations,” *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 115, No. 461 (April 2000), pp. 354–377.

7. See Chen, *Mao’s China*; and Shu Guang Zhang, *Economic Cold War: America’s Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–1963* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001).

8. Frances Stonor Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta Books, 1999); Giles Scott-Smith, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom*,

States was far from alone in pursuing such initiatives and, in fact, did so to combat the effects of Soviet-sponsored Communist front organizations and propaganda.⁹ Rich as this literature is, it primarily focuses on the two superpower governments' relations with non-governmental organizations in Europe. Although the PRC had neither the resources nor the reach of the United States and the Soviet Union, it was very much a "player" in this global propaganda game. Yet to date we have only a fragmentary picture of the PRC's forays in this area during the first half of the Cold War. Anne-Marie Brady has compellingly detailed how the CCP established an elaborate system to manage resident foreigners and visitors to the PRC, as well as the importance of these "foreign friends" (*waiguo pengyou*) in China's propaganda activities.¹⁰ Such activities successfully tapped into Western intellectuals' long-held fascination with China and their desire after 1949 to discover what lay behind the bamboo curtain, as can be seen in Tom Buchanan's and Patrick Wright's explorations of this dynamic among the British Left.¹¹ Chinese foreign policy-makers' agendas and interests when courting friendly foreigners were explicitly tied to the PRC's relations with the two superpowers, as Matthew Johnson has clearly shown in his deconstruction of Chinese encounters with African American activists during the first half of the Cold War.¹² Other studies have shown that scientists played a distinctive part in the Sino-American rapprochement of the 1970s.¹³ Crucially, each of these cases involved Westerners knowingly coming into direct contact with Chinese government agencies and officials at some point in their interactions. China's approach at the Pugwash conferences

the CIA and the Post-War American Hegemony (London: Routledge, 2002); and Hugh Wilford, *The CIA, the British Left and the Cold War: Calling the Tune?* (London: Cass, 2003).

9. Jeffrey Herf, *War by Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles* (New York: Free Press, 1991); and Marc J. Selverstone, *Constructing the Monolith: The United States, Great Britain and International Communism, 1945–1950* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).

10. See Anne-Marie Brady, *Making the Foreign Serve China* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003); and Anne-Marie Brady, *Friend of China: The Myth of Rewi Alley* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).

11. Tom Buchanan, *East Wind: China and the British Left, 1925–1976* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012); and Patrick Wright, *Passport to Peking: A Very British Mission to Mao's China* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010).

12. Matthew D. Johnson, "From Peace to the Panthers: PRC's Engagement with African-American Transnational Networks, 1949–1979," *Past and Present*, Vol. 218, Suppl. 8 (2013), pp. 233–257.

13. Kathlin Smith, "The Role of Scientists in Normalizing U.S.-China Relations: 1965–1979," *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, Vol. 866, No. 1 (1998), pp. 114–136; and Zuoyue Wang, "Chinese American Scientists and U.S.-China Scientific Relations: From Richard Nixon to Wen Ho Lee," in Peter H. Koehn and Xiao-huang Yin, eds., *The Expanding Roles of Chinese Americans in U.S.-China Relations: Transnational Networks and Trans-Pacific Interactions* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), pp. 207–234.

was different. Scientists from the PRC taking part in the conferences ostensibly were there in a personal capacity, a perception that Chinese foreign policy-makers took great pains to cultivate. Even if some of the other “Pugwashites” suspected that Chinese scientists toed the party line or had direct links to the PRC government, no participants other than those from the USSR could have been aware of just how deep or elaborate those connections were. Obfuscation was at the center of Chinese interactions with this international network of activist scientists dedicated to ending nuclear proliferation. Two years before giving the go-ahead for a Chinese scientist to take part in a Pugwash conference, CCP leaders had secretly committed China to the development of a nuclear bomb.

Thus, this article highlights an example of the Chinese government's attempts to use foreign individuals and networks to its own advantage. It also examines the Chinese government's interactions with international non-governmental organizations rather than individuals or nationally bounded groups. In doing so, it poses several interrelated questions. First, how did “People's Diplomacy” function in these contexts; specifically, how did Chinese scientists' coordination with government agencies and the CCP leadership shape their interactions with the conferences? Second, what did the Chinese government hope to achieve through scientists' participation and why did it abandon Pugwash as a vehicle for its “People-to-People” outreach in the West? In probing these questions, the article raises important concerns about how we conceptualize transnational relations and organizations in the Cold War when dealing with one-party regimes such as in the People's Republic of China. Articulated first and most influentially by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye and later by Thomas Risse, transnational relations are international interactions involving individuals, groups, and organizations in which at least one of the actors is non-governmental.¹⁴

Pugwash is often held up as a prime example of a transnational non-governmental organization (NGO) active during the Cold War.¹⁵ This is in large part thanks to Matthew Evangelista's analysis of how Pugwash aided Soviet “policy entrepreneurs” in their efforts to influence Soviet arms control

14. Robert Owen Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972); and Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

15. See Matthew Evangelista, “Transnational Organizations in the Cold War,” in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. 3: *Endings* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 400–421.

policy after Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).¹⁶ But, as Patricia Clavin has rightly observed, it is highly problematic to view “non-governmental organizations as closed categories,” given the ease with which individuals may move between different types of NGOs.¹⁷ The case of Chinese scientists at Pugwash shows how ambiguous individuals’ roles in NGOs can be. The Chinese participants were overtly acting as members of an international network of activists while at the same time covertly representing the interests of a government. This is, in a sense, an inverted affirmation of Evangelista’s arguments about the importance of domestic structures. Rather than activists exploiting domestic structures to influence a government, China’s involvement in the early Pugwash conferences shows a government influencing activists via domestic structures. Various aspects of this government influence can be seen throughout three phases of China’s relations with Pugwash. At the early conferences, CCP officials successfully relied on scientists to build networks of contacts among activist scientists, while also working to improve the PRC’s image and position abroad. In these early years, the PRC’s pursuit of nuclear weapons capabilities remained inconspicuous enough in its development and sufficiently secret to avoid facing the difficult questions and potential problems raised by the contradiction between these two undertakings. Having Chinese scientists publicly associated with disarmament could not hurt them at that point. As time progressed, however, both ideological considerations and international political developments increasingly caused CCP officials to reevaluate the value of Pugwash. Their abandonment of Pugwash as a vehicle for “People’s Diplomacy” in the early 1960s came as the PRC’s relations with the two superpowers deteriorated and it moved closer and closer to testing its first nuclear bomb.

The Early Success of “People’s Diplomacy”: The First and Second Pugwash Conferences, 1957–1958

The initial two Pugwash conferences—the first held in Pugwash, Nova Scotia, in July 1957, and the second in Lac Beauport, Quebec, in March 1958—were prime examples of “People’s Diplomacy” in action. Thus, these conferences

16. Matthew Evangelista, *Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).

17. Patricia Clavin, “Defining Transnationalism,” *Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (2005), p. 438.

allow us to assess the theory and practice of this transnational foreign policy strategy, which encompassed each detail from the careful selection process used in choosing China's candidate, through to the preparation of the delegate by CCP cadres, the delegate's activities at the conferences themselves, and, finally, his reports back on the event and those in attendance. The careful selection process, which included extensive vetting, indicates that political suitability was far more important than specific scientific knowledge in the PRC's choice of its representative. Furthermore, evident throughout this process is the degree to which the successful execution of the "people-to-people" strategy relied not on the coordinated efforts of government agencies but on the efforts of the individual scientists. This phenomenon was a product of and made possible by the organization of science in China during this period. The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) was a crucial intermediary between the CCP's foreign policy elite and individual scientists. Founded on 1 November 1949 as a government agency answerable to the State Council, CAS was an agency of the party-state. Included among its core responsibilities was the political education of China's scientific community.¹⁸ The CCP's leadership over and role in CAS reflected the party's drive to politicize and remold all aspects of society in "New China," as well as its wariness about the loyalty and reliability of a scientific elite that had been overwhelmingly educated in Western Europe and North America.

This period saw numerous domestic campaigns and upheavals, in which most intellectuals and scientists were no more protected than other groups. However, some scientists and technicians had a greater measure of safety owing to their involvement in military projects or national security, particularly China's nuclear and satellite programs.¹⁹ From 1949 on, the CCP became increasingly embedded in all aspects of educational and scientific life, exerting both ideological and practical control over teaching, research, institutional organization, and international exchange.²⁰ Given the steady integration of

18. Cong Cao, "The Changing Dynamic between Science and Politics: Evolution of the Highest Academic Honor in China, 1949–1998," *Isis*, Vol. 90, No. 2 (June 1999), pp. 302–03; and Shuping Yao, "Chinese Intellectuals and Science: A History of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS)," *Science in Context*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (September 1989), pp. 449–451.

19. Evan A. Feigenbaum, *China's Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to the Information Age* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 20–21; and Zuoyue Wang, "Physics in China in the Context of the Cold War, 1949–1976," in Helmuth Trischler and Mark Walker, eds., *Physics and Politics: Research and Research Support in Twentieth Century Germany in International Perspective* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010), pp. 251–276.

20. See Hans Kühner, "Between Autonomy and Planning: The Chinese Academy of Sciences in Transition," *Minerva*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1984), pp. 13–44; Laurence A. Schneider, *Biology and Revolution in Twentieth-Century China* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), pp. 141–164; and Zuoyue

Chinese science with the party-state in the 1950s, the extension of an invitation in 1956 to the geologist Li Siguang (Li Sze-kwang) to participate in the first Pugwash conference was an official matter, subject to guidance and approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the State Council. The British philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russell sent the initial invitation directly to Li, who was then serving as vice president of the CAS and was also nominally serving as a vice president of the World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW), through which he was known to two of Russell's co-organizers, C. F. Powell and Eric Burhop. The invitation was not Russell's first attempt to solicit Li's involvement in anti-nuclear weapons activism. In April 1955, Russell had written to Li as part of his drive to secure eminent scientists' signatures from around the world for the Russell-Einstein Manifesto.²¹

The first meeting of what would become the Pugwash conferences was proposed for December 1956 in India and later switched to the Canadian estate of industrialist Cyrus Eaton, in Pugwash, Nova Scotia.²² Neither India nor Canada was a realistic destination for Li. In his late 60s, he was not in good health and spent much of 1957 convalescing from kidney disease.²³ A further complication was his direct connection to China's secret nuclear weapons program. In January 1955, he had codelivered a presentation to CCP Chairman Mao Zedong and the Politburo that proved critical in convincing party leaders of such a program's viability.²⁴ With Li not a viable option to represent China at Pugwash, Chinese MFA officials looked to another scientist with ties to the WFSW and extensive experience representing China overseas.

Wang, "U.S.-China Scientific Exchange: A Case Study of State-Sponsored Scientific Internationalism during the Cold War and Beyond," *Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Fall 1999), pp. 249–285.

21. Bertrand Russell to Compton, Siegbahn, Kuang, and Skobel'tzyn [copy], 5 April 1955, in File 2, Box 1.36, RA1, Bertrand Russell Archives (BRA), William Ready Division of Archives and Research Collections, McMaster University. The manifesto highlights the peril of nuclear warfare and calls for a gathering of scientists to discuss the issue. See Sandra Ionno Butcher, "The Origins of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto," Pugwash History Series No. 1, Council of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, May 2005.

22. Unaddressed letter to potential delegates, 29 August 1956, in "Cyrus Eaton" File, RA3 Rec. Acq. 174, Box 1.43, BRA; and "List of Scientists to Be Invited," in "Cyrus Eaton" File, RA3 Rec. Acq. 174, Box 1.43, BRA. On the venue change, see Andrew Brown, *Keeper of the Nuclear Conscience: The Life and Work of Joseph Rotblat* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 130, 135–136.

23. Ma Shengyun and Ma Lan, eds., *Li Siguang nianpu* (Beijing: Dizhi chubanshe 1999), pp. 232, 242.

24. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 37–39; and Shu Guang Zhang, "Between 'Paper' and 'Real' Tigers: Mao's View of Nuclear Weapons," in John Lewis Gaddis, Ernest R. May, and Jonathan Rosenberg, eds., *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 203–204.

Zhou Peiyuan (Chou Pei-yuan) was an ideal candidate. Like Li, Zhou had extensive academic connections in the West, having studied at the University of Chicago and the California Institute of Technology in the 1920s. By 1956–1957, he was one of the most prominent theoretical physicists in China and had recently been appointed vice president of Peking University. From the early 1950s onward Zhou had been either a member or a leader of delegations to various scientific “friendship” and peace conferences, and, like Li, he maintained international scientific contacts through the WFSW. Finally, he had been involved in promoting the PRC’s peaceful development of nuclear energy after it became a signatory to the Agreement on Soviet Aid for the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy in 1955. This gave him ample experience to ensure he would be “on message” at Pugwash.²⁵ That both candidates shared so many similarities in their previous state-sponsored activism underscores the degree to which Chinese officials saw Pugwash as being a forum at which they could strengthen and reinforce China’s “peace” credentials above all other factors.

The Chinese government took great care in vetting those who took part in overseas activities not just to ensure a good fit for each event but also because CCP leaders had an uneasy relationship with the intellectual class. The irony of “People’s Diplomacy” was that it so heavily relied on intellectuals with extensive contacts and experience in the West—the very factors that made these intellectuals ideologically suspect in the eyes of the CCP. The first Pugwash conference occurred in the middle of one of the greatest political upheavals involving intellectuals in the PRC’s first decade. Premier Zhou Enlai, who took the time to meet with Zhou Peiyuan prior to his departure, had the final say on the physicist’s appointment.²⁶ His decision had significant weight insofar as Zhou Peiyuan was the PRC’s sole representative at the two other Pugwash meetings in which the Chinese participated in the 1950s (1958 and 1959), and he led their delegation to the 1960 conference in Moscow.

Zhou Peiyuan’s key political liability was that his ties to the United States extended beyond his time as a student. In 1936–1937 he had undertaken

25. See “Yuanzining de jiben yuanli yu heping yongtu,” in *Zhou Peiyuan wenji* (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2002), pp. 19–25; and Zhou Peiyuan, “Shijie yiwang aihao heping renmin de zhengchuan yuanwang,” *Renmin ribao* (Beijing), 27 January 1955, p. 4. Under this agreement, which was part of the Soviet response to Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace strategy, the USSR provided support for the PRC’s ostensibly peaceful nuclear programs. Nevertheless, as David Holloway has shown, Soviet leaders were well aware that the Chinese aspired to build their own nuclear weapons. See David Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 348–355.

26. Zhou Ruling, “Zhou Peiyuan he Pagewoshi kexue he shijie shiwu huiyi,” *Kexue wenhua pinglun*, Vol. 2, No. 6 (2005), p. 80.

a year's sabbatical from teaching at Tsinghua University to visit the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey, and in 1945–1947 he had worked on U.S. military research projects at the California Institute of Technology. His love of America, and his military research in particular, featured prominently in Zhou's self-criticisms during the Ideological Reform and Study Movement in the early 1950s.²⁷ However, he managed to overcome this problematic past by building a reputation for loyalty and political reliability. Rather than being a victim of the Anti-Rightist Campaign like so many of his fellow intellectuals, he was an active participant.²⁸ Although he did not become a member of the CCP until 1959, he was by the mid-1950s becoming one of the PRC's most important figures in the small number who regularly interacted with foreign scientists and international organizations. By the time of the First Pugwash Conference, he was not only an honorary secretary of the WFSW but was the federation's primary point of contact for its sixteenth executive council meeting and tenth anniversary celebrations, which were held in Beijing in April 1956.²⁹

Intellectuals with strong historical ties to the West were best positioned to provide a positive picture of the PRC when interacting with foreign colleagues. China's foreign policymakers hoped that such interactions would generate sympathy for the PRC among attendees at events such as Pugwash and, more broadly, improve China's image overseas. But "People's Diplomacy" was a delicate balancing act that relied on the cooperation and loyalty of the intellectuals chosen to conduct it.

The Delegate's Preparation by the PRC

The intellectuals responsible for undertaking "people-to-people" contacts were not simply left to their own devices. They received extensive preparation and guidance from party cadres. As with any PRC delegate to an international meeting, the MFA ensured that Zhou Peiyuan arrived at Pugwash

27. Zhou Peiyuan, "Jianjue gaizao sixiang, wei chedi gaige gaodeng jiaoyu er fendou," *Guangming ribao* (Beijing), 3 November 1951, p. 3; and Zhou Peiyuan, "Pipan wo de zichan jieji de faxiu sixiang," *Guangming ribao* (Beijing), 8 April 1952, p. 3.

28. Mary Brown Bullock, "American Science and Chinese Nationalism," in Gail Hershatter et al., eds., *Remapping China: Fissures in Historical Terrain* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 218–219. Bullock's biographical sketch remains the most comprehensive English-language profile of Zhou's life and work. Although Bullock focuses on Zhou's U.S. connections, she also includes brief discussion of his early interactions with Pugwash.

29. See correspondence between Zhou and various members of the WFSW senior leadership, 9 January–15 February 1956, in MSS.270/12/2/2/5, World Federation of Scientific Workers Archive (WFSWA), Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick.

conferences thoroughly versed in the PRC's official positions on issues that might arise. He received extensive political and diplomatic briefings prior to his arrival in Canada on 6 July 1957, having met MFA staff who briefed him on international law and nuclear weapons policy. During a stopover in London en route to Canada, Huan Xiang, the Chinese chargé d'affaires stationed in the United Kingdom, provided an additional political briefing.³⁰ Such was also the case before Zhou attended other Pugwash conferences. For example, in early March 1958, the International Activities Steering Committee of the Central People's Government instructed the MFA Party Leadership Group that officials were to help Zhou prepare before his departure at the end of that month for the second Conference on Science and World Affairs.³¹ This briefing was based on the provisional agenda included with the initial invitation, and it laid out authorized positions on all the major topics for discussion, along with their connections to wider Chinese concerns such as UN representation and the U.S. presence in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.³² By the time of the Moscow conference in 1960, the CAS had not only requested a specialist from the MFA to help Zhou and the three other Chinese delegates with preparation and research for the conference's discussion topics but had also arranged for Zhang Zongan, a specialist on disarmament who had worked for party and military propaganda departments, to accompany them.³³ Her unofficial presence in Moscow underscores the CCP leadership's determination to ensure that their country's representatives were fully prepared to articulate official Chinese policies.

The CCP's preparation and guidance also extended to shaping delegates' correspondence, statements, and papers for the conferences. These were largely planned and vetted by MFA officials. At Pugwash, statements and papers not only reached fellow delegates but also had the potential to reach a wider audience through the media. Although reporters were not allowed into the conference sessions, information still got out, and it was therefore important for the Chinese delegates to hew firmly to the party line. For instance, a *New York Times* reporter, Raymond Daniell, produced a series of articles based

30. Zhou Peiyuan, "Chuxi Luosu guoji kexue huiyi gaishu," November 1957, in 113-00315-01, CFMA.

31. CCP Central Committee International Activities Steering Committee to MFA Party Leadership Group, copied to CAS PLG, 8 March 1958, in 113-00315-02, CFMA.

32. "Guanyu taolun 'dangqian yuanzi junbei jingsai xingshi de weixian yiji xiaochu ci zhong weixian de tujing he banfa' de huiyi ge xiang yiti de fayan tigang," March 1958, in 113-00315-02, CFMA.

33. CAS PLG to Foreign Culture Committee, "Wei chuxi Pugehuaxu huiyi han," 19 August 1960, in 113-00339-01, CMFA; and "Canjia di liu jie Pugehuaxu huiyi—dashiji," January 1961, in 113-00339-02, CFMA.

on conversations he had with scientists at Pugwash for the 1957 conference, including Zhou Peiyuan.³⁴ Zhou's paper delivered to the second conference, which touted the PRC's policies and initiatives in population control, agriculture, and industrialization, was also subsequently reprinted in its entirety in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*.³⁵ The conferences thus provided a platform for Chinese representatives to make a case for the PRC's policies that might reach a variety of audiences. With China's presence at the conferences arousing interest and coverage by both general and specialist media in the West, the CCP had to shape its scientists' interactions in order to ensure, to the greatest extent possible, that the messages being communicated were appropriate.

"People's Diplomacy" in Action

A major attraction of "People's Diplomacy" over other strategies for winning hearts and minds was its personal and interactive elements. By taking part in these conferences, Zhou Peiyuan could actively engage with his fellow delegates on many of the major PRC foreign policy concerns of the time, debate those with whom he disagreed, and potentially win people over with his intelligence and charm. The Pugwash conferences provided Zhou with ample opportunities to do just that. For example, at the 1957 conference he had a spirited exchange with Leo Szilard, an outspoken U.S. nuclear physicist of Hungarian origin. Their debate centered on the conflict between the CCP and the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), along with the U.S. presence in the Taiwan Strait. This topic of conversation allowed Zhou to mount a robust defense of the "One China" policy and condemn U.S. military support for Chiang Kai-shek.³⁶ This was one of many times when Zhou actively engaged with attendees on such issues and tried to win them over to the PRC's own viewpoint. Such discussions were an important part of China's presence at the conferences and a core feature of "People's Diplomacy." Through Pugwash, Zhou helped the PRC make its case for condemning the U.S. presence

34. See, for example, Raymond Daniell, "Scientists Wary on Giving Data on Nuclear Perils to the World," *The New York Times*, 11 July 1957, pp. 1, 6. This coverage was highlighted in Zhou's internal report on the conference. Zhou Peiyuan, "Chuxi Luosu guoji kexue huiyi gaishu," November 1957, in 113-00315-01, CFMA.

35. Chou Pei-yuan, "Population, Production, and Birth Control," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 14, No. 8 (October 1958), pp. 325, 333; and "Population, Production and Birth Control," 7 April 1958, in 113-00315-02, CFMA.

36. Zhou Peiyuan, "Chuxi Luosu guoji kexue huiyi gaishu," November 1957, in 113-00315-01, CFMA.

in Asia and support for Taiwan, as well as the ongoing U.S. efforts to block the PRC from gaining UN membership. He gave voice to the PRC's struggle for diplomatic recognition and legitimacy as a world power, and his presence at the early Pugwash conferences proved an effective means of improving the PRC's image and counteracting negative views of the Communist state.

The early Pugwash conferences also allowed Zhou to strengthen and extend his existing network of contacts sympathetic to China. This politically inspired and highly strategic form of networking was a core aspect of "People's Diplomacy." One reason CCP officials were hopeful about the opportunity presented by the first two Pugwash meetings was that many of the key figures involved were either members of the WFSW or had friends who were affiliated with the organization, which had a long track record of being sympathetic to CCP interests. Founded in 1946, the WFSW was an outgrowth of efforts among far-left scientists in Britain and France to promote international scientific cooperation. They subscribed to the assertion in the preamble of the WFSW constitution that "scientists have . . . a responsibility greater than that of the ordinary citizen in maintaining stable political relations between nations."³⁷ As an international organization linking national associations of scientific workers, the WFSW aspired to be both a federation of national trade unions as well as a body that promoted international scientific cooperation, and, unlike many international scientific organizations, it included Chinese representatives from the PRC rather than Taiwan.³⁸ Contacts with leftist scientists through the WFSW was likely advantageous to Zhou at Pugwash meetings. For instance, following a stopover in London, Zhou spent the second leg of his trip to the first conference traveling with C. F. Powell, a Bristol-based physicist and radical leftist. Powell had long been a senior figure in the WFSW and had traveled to Beijing for the federation's two events held there in April 1956.³⁹ Thus, not only was Zhou familiar with many of the scientists who attended the early Pugwash meetings, he counted a good number of them among his friends and acquaintances. These connections provided a foundation for solidifying relationships and for establishing new ones.

37. "What Is the WFSW?" in File A.130, DM 517, Cecil Frank Powell Papers, Special Collections of the University Library, University of Bristol (UK).

38. David Horner, "The Cold War and the Politics of Scientific Internationalism: The Post-war Formation and Development of the World Federation of Scientific Workers, 1946–1956," in A. Elzinga and C. Landström, eds., *Internationalism and Science* (London: Taylor Graham, 1996), pp. 132–161; and Patrick Petitjean, "The Joint Establishment of the World Federation of Scientific Workers and of UNESCO after World War II," *Minerva*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (2008), pp. 247–270.

39. Chou P'ei-yüan to Bertrand Russell, 5 July 1957, in File 2, Box 1.38, RA1, BRA.

The success of this transnational strategy heavily relied on both the background and the personality of the individual responsible for enacting it. Appearances were important in “People’s Diplomacy,” and Zhou Peiyuan was always impeccably dressed, charming, and well spoken. After the first conference, Anne Eaton, the wife of funder Cyrus Eaton, described Zhou as “a most urbane man who bows frequently, speaks perfect, soft, English and is at home in Shakespeare as in his own literature. I find this considerably humbling.”⁴⁰ She was not the only person charmed and disarmed by Zhou. Ruth Adams, who worked for the Pugwash Secretariat, had a similar experience when Zhou struck up a conversation about her hometown of Chicago during a break in the first conference.⁴¹ Zhou’s friendly persona was entirely in keeping with what the MFA wanted him to exude at the conference. He was expected to be seen cooperating with the Soviet delegates, expressing support for them in formal sessions, and exchanging information with them during the intervening periods. At the same time, he was to avoid giving the impression that the Communist attendees were an unapproachable “small circle” set apart from others.⁴² Chinese officials aimed both to maintain an impression of Sino-Soviet solidarity at the Pugwash conferences and to present a positive image of China as open to contact, cooperation, and peaceful coexistence.

The Role of After-Event Reports

Chinese representatives’ responsibilities to the party and government ministries were not finished when a conference was concluded. Their preparation of confidential after-event reports and analyses was the final key piece of their participation. This activity had two sides, one that benefitted the report’s writer and another that benefitted party-state officials. First, the reports provided an opportunity for the writer to frame his or her actions in a way most palatable to officials. For example, in confidential reports on the Pugwash Conferences for the MFA and CAS, Zhou Peiyuan downplayed his interactions with U.S. delegates. Engaging in overseas activities involved a high level of personal risk, and Zhou took pains to show he had followed the policy dictum that “we will not take the initiative to find them, but if they take

40. Letter from Anne Eaton to her father after the first Pugwash meeting, reprinted in “Pugwash Beginnings,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (April 1978), p. 38.

41. Sandra Ionno Butcher, “The Women of Pugwash” (paper presented at “Being the Change: Building a Culture of Peace” conference in Pugwash, Nova Scotia, 10 July 2010).

42. Zhou Peiyuan, “Chuxi Luosu guoji kexue huiyi gaishu,” November 1957, in 113-00315-01, CFMA.

the initiative to approach us we will not avoid them.”⁴³ After the first Pugwash conference, he claimed that U.S. delegates were the most challenging group with whom to engage.⁴⁴ This perhaps reflects more his awareness of the audience for whom his reports were written than the reality. Other evidence suggests he had substantial contact with U.S. participants.⁴⁵ Adams’s and Eaton’s personal anecdotes also suggest a warmer relationship than Zhou could safely reveal. Having encountered problems in the past because of his connections to the United States, and having witnessed the state of affairs for intellectuals in the aftermath of the Hundred Flowers campaign, Zhou would have been well aware of the potentially negative repercussions of giving any impression of having easy or frequent contact with scientists from the United States. When Zhou Ruling recounts her father’s interactions with Pugwash, she highlights the great pressure involved in the conferences and the anxiety this caused him.⁴⁶ If CCP officials suspected that he had misrepresented PRC policy or made errors in judgment or ideology, the personal and professional consequences could have been dire.

For party cadres and MFA officials, on the other hand, Zhou’s reports were a vital source of information about the event and its attendees. These were important documents from which not only to gather intelligence but also to make decisions about future activities and initiatives. Declassified MFA documents relating to Pugwash do not suggest that scientific intelligence gathering was the CCP’s central concern at the conferences. Nevertheless, it was a factor. For instance, in Zhou Peiyuan’s report on the 1957 meeting highlighting the state of research on fallout among the nuclear weapons states, he advocated for China to consider additional research on radiation hazards, especially radioactive fallout, stating that the conference’s discussion had shown that China lagged behind other countries in this controversial and developing field—one potentially relevant to the PRC’s own nuclear development.⁴⁷ In particular, Zhou observed that A. M. Kuzin of the Soviet delegation made use of Western countries’ fallout data in his paper but did not cite Soviet data. Zhou wrote that Soviet scientists had to possess similar data from their own

43. “Guanyu tong Meiguo ren jiechu qingkuang de baogao” (Top Secret), January 1961, in 113-00339-02, CFMA.

44. *Ibid.*

45. Bullock, “American Science and Chinese Nationalism,” p. 219.

46. Zhou Ruling, “Zhou Peiyuan he Pagewoshi,” pp. 90–91.

47. Zhou Peiyuan, “Chuxi Luosu guoji kexue huiyi gaishu,” November 1957, in 113-00315-01, CFMA.

nuclear tests.⁴⁸ These observations, underlined in the MFA's copy of the report, show that the meetings provided opportunities for a degree of scientific "surveillance" about other countries' nuclear knowledge and policies, including China's allies.

These reports were also influential in CCP leaders' decision-making and planning about other transnational activities. Information about Chinese delegates' informal conversations with other Pugwash attendees shows how such meetings could help build a network of sympathetic foreign intellectuals over the long term. Substantial sections of each report were dedicated to profiles of the delegates, noting their background, politics, and opinions about the PRC. Based on this information, MFA officials came to understand that many of the attendees would not be easily won over, helping them to prepare their approach to future conferences. Zhou Peiyuan's reports on the 1957 Pugwash and 1958 Lac Beauport meetings helped shape CAS party officials' views in subsequent discussions with the State Council Foreign Affairs Office about Chinese involvement in the conferences. From the reports, CAS officials concluded that the large U.S. and British presence at Pugwash meetings meant that the majority of participants held either moderate or somewhat center-right political beliefs. Even if it would not be possible to "win over" the moderates quickly, antiwar discussions at the conferences helped to reinforce moderates' beliefs and perspective, making them potentially more receptive to the PRC's positions.⁴⁹ These discussions could not have occurred without the information Zhou managed to gather.

One tangible offshoot of these conclusions was the decision to build on the connections Zhou had made, perhaps by cultivating the individuals' interest in China, with an eye to using that interest to help propagate a sympathetic view of the PRC, the CCP, and Chinese policies not only within the scientific community but also potentially among a wider audience. As Anne-Marie Brady has shown, sympathetic foreigners were a vital component of the PRC's Cold War foreign relations in practice, and the CCP developed a substantial network of institutions and mechanisms to manage them.⁵⁰ For instance, when speaking to Zhou Peiyuan during breaks at the first and second Pugwash conferences, the Australian physicist Mark Oliphant expressed

48. Ibid.

49. CAS to State Council Foreign Affairs Office, "Qingshi chuxi di san ci zai Weiyena juxing de 'yuanzi shidai de weixian he kexuejia zai zhe fangmian suo neng zuo de gongzuo' huiyi," 5 June 1958, in 113-00315-03, CFMA.

50. See especially, Brady, *Making the Foreign Serve China*.

a keen interest in visiting China.⁵¹ Zhou noted this in his report and observed that it was partly stoked by Oliphant's friendship with Michael Lindsay, who had spent time with Communist guerrillas during the Second World War and had retained good connections with the CCP after 1949.⁵² These characteristics made the Australian physicist a potential asset, albeit one that did not pay immediate dividends. Not until the autumn of 1964 did Oliphant travel around China with three other Australian scientists, visiting laboratories, institutes, and universities in a trip he later described in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. His meeting with Zhou Peiyuan at Peking University, during which the two discussed Chinese education and science policy, was the centerpiece of both the visit and the resulting article.⁵³ Oliphant's example was typical of how such visits came about, their highly orchestrated nature, and their ultimate reliance on friendships and professional contacts with key Chinese intellectuals, such as Zhou Peiyuan. In an era when China's activities in international science were extremely limited, the Pugwash conferences provided an opportunity for Chinese officials to garner useful information about well-connected foreign intellectuals and cultivate their interest in visiting the PRC.

The Chinese presence at the first two Pugwash conferences was a demonstration of "People's Diplomacy" working as intended. Zhou occupied an ambiguous position at these gatherings. Although he was ostensibly invited as an individual and seemingly acting as an independent figure, he was anything but that. CCP and government officials were involved at almost every stage of the process, helping to shape his interactions through their selection and preparation processes in order to gain advantage from his attendance. Zhou's participation shows the importance of the collaborative relationship between a select group of prominent foreign-educated intellectuals, government-affiliated organizations, and, ultimately, CCP leadership in the PRC's Cold War transnational interactions.

51. Zhou Peiyuan, "Chuxi Luosu guoji kexue huiyi gaishu," November 1957, in 113-00315-01, CFMA; and Zhou Peiyuan, "Di er ci Pugehuaxu (Pugwash) guoji kexuejia huiyi jiyao" (Secret), April–May 1958, in 113-00315-02, CFMA.

52. Lindsay had fallen out of favor with the CCP by this point for his vocal criticisms of their conduct and policies after coming to power. See Michael Lindsay, *China and the Cold War: A Study in International Politics* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1955). For more on his time in China, see the account written by his wife, Hsiao Li Lindsay, *Bold Plum: With the Guerrillas in China's War against Japan* (Morrisville, NC: Lulu Press, 2007).

53. Mark Oliphant, "Over Pots of Tea: Excerpts from a Diary of a Visit to China," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 22, No. 5 (May 1966), pp. 36–43.

Ideology, Power Politics, and Back Channels: The Changing Role of “People’s Diplomacy” in Pugwash 1958–1960

These transnational activities did not occur in a vacuum. They were explicitly tied to the PRC’s evolving international position and were ultimately subject to the CCP’s wider foreign policy priorities and decisions. This is clearly reflected in the PRC’s shifting involvement in Pugwash after the first and second conferences. Even after seemingly positive experiences at these events, the PRC’s honeymoon with Pugwash came to an abrupt end not six months after the Lac Beauport conference of March 1958. Chinese policy-makers’ last-minute decision not to participate in the next gathering, held in Vienna in September 1958; their reluctant return to the Pugwash fold in Baden, Austria, in June 1959; and their reappearance at the Moscow conference in November–December 1960 all demonstrate that attendance at Pugwash was dictated more by current ideologies and power politics than by a desire to engage with the nuclear disarmament program.

Officials’ Growing Reservations and China’s First Withdrawal from Pugwash

By mid-1958, Chinese officials were concerned that Pugwash conferences were evolving into a forum friendlier to Anglo-American than Sino-Soviet interests. In June 1958 they were still supportive of Chinese involvement, although the CAS analysis of the conferences that had been transmitted to the State Council Foreign Affairs Office argued that the United States might be trying to put the conferences “in the service” of U.S. policy. Chinese officials felt that China could counter this growing influence through continued participation that would enable delegates to promote PRC policies, support China’s allies, and attack U.S. positions.⁵⁴ Liao Chengzhi, then vice minister in the Foreign Affairs Office, agreed with these conclusions and approved China’s participation on condition that the scientists traveling to Vienna be vetted first by CAS’s Party Leadership Group (PLG) to ensure their political suitability. For Chen Yun, first vice premier of the State Council and the CAS

54. CAS to State Council Foreign Affairs Office, “Qingshi chuxi di san ci zai Weiyena juxing de ‘yuanzhi shidai de weixian he kexuejia zai zhe fangmian suo neng zuo de gongzuo’ huiyi,” 5 June 1958, in 113-00315-03, CFMA.

PLG, the likelihood of conflict with U.S. conference participants made this factor the most important consideration in their selection.⁵⁵

Extensive preparatory discussions between officials in CAS, MFA, and the State Council resulted in both Chen Yun and Liao Chengzhi giving their assent, and in the summer of 1958 Zhou Peiyuan accepted his invitation to attend the Vienna conference.⁵⁶ However, Chinese scientists' participation was ultimately dictated by both ideological and foreign policy considerations. China's last-minute withdrawal from the Vienna conference fell into both categories. Mao Zedong, the driving force in shaping China's foreign relations, placed increasing emphasis on ideological purity in the PRC's international interactions in 1957 and 1958, coinciding with the radicalization of domestic policy reflected in the Great Leap Forward and Anti-Rightist Campaign.⁵⁷

Consequently, when Russell publicly came out in opposition to Chinese- and Soviet-supported policies and organizations, the PRC withdrew from Pugwash. Although Russell was not the only leading intellectual involved in organizing the Conferences on Science and World Affairs, his association with the Vienna conference was particularly strong insofar as it was the first one he could attend in person.⁵⁸ In the months preceding the conference, he had made public moves to put space between himself and the Communist world. In particular, he criticized and cut ties with organizations such as the World Peace Council that were dominated by the Soviet Union.⁵⁹ The CAS PLG later cited internal concerns about Russell's association with the Pugwash conferences as the primary motivation behind China's last-minute withdrawal. These objections centered on Russell's "reactionary politics" and recent "attacks on the socialist system" after the executions of Imre Nagy and Pál Maléter for their roles in the 1956 Hungarian uprising.⁶⁰ The PRC had endorsed the Soviet invasion of Hungary in November 1956 to crush a supposed "counterrevolutionary rebellion," and Chinese leaders called for harsh measures against Nagy and others who had led Hungary's short-lived revolutionary government.⁶¹ The PRC's reason for supporting the Soviet Union's

55. CAS to Vice Premier Chen, 10 June 1958, in 113-00315-03, CFMA.

56. Marginalia by Zhou Enlai on CAS PLG to Foreign Cultural Relations Committee, "Wei chuxi Pugehuaxu huiyi han," 19 August 1960, in 113-00339-01, CFMA.

57. Chen, *Mao's China*, p. 73.

58. Russell's health made travel to Canada for the previous two meetings impossible.

59. See, for example, "Russell Scores Reds," *The New York Times*, 10 July 1958, p. 12.

60. CAS PLG to Foreign Cultural Relations Committee, "Wei chuxi Pugehuaxu huiyi han," 19 August 1960, in 113-00339-01, CFMA.

61. Chen, *Mao's China*, pp. 155–157; and Lüthi, *Sino-Soviet Split*, pp. 60–62.

installation of a new government headed by János Kádár, under which the treason trials and executions were conducted, was clear: In 1957, China not only provided the new regime with long-term loans but also offered a warm welcome to a Hungarian delegation headed by Kádár.⁶² Russell's public stand against the Kádár government contributed to a changing view within the CCP's higher echelons about Pugwash and its value for China's strategic aims. This shift and the decision against further participation suggest that party leaders saw Pugwash primarily as a vehicle for staking out broad positions on international politics rather than focusing narrowly on nuclear policy or scientific intelligence.

At the time of the Vienna conference, held 14–20 September 1958, the PRC was almost a month into its military standoff with Chiang Kai-shek's U.S.-backed forces. Mao's unilateral initiation of the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis dramatically heightened Sino-American tensions and put further considerable strain on Sino-Soviet relations.⁶³ All of these factors made it hard for Chinese scientists either to argue at Pugwash that the PRC was the aggrieved party in the dispute with Taiwan or to persuade conference participants of China's wider commitment to peace. Such a task would have been further hindered by the increasing dominance of U.S. voices in the Pugwash conferences. The twenty U.S. delegates attending the 1958 Vienna conference would have far outnumbered China's proposed delegation of three. Because of Chinese leaders' sensitivities over the U.S. presence at these gatherings, the timing of the Vienna conference was a major disincentive for Chinese participation.

China's Return to Pugwash and Power Play with the Cold War Superpowers

Soon thereafter, however, the PRC did return to Pugwash at the request of the Soviet Union. Numerous high-profile events in 1959 had highlighted Sino-Soviet tensions, such as the withdrawal of Soviet advisers from China, the CCP's critical stance toward Nikita Khrushchev's visit to the United States, and Soviet criticism of Beijing's handling of both the Tibetan rebellion and Sino-Indian border incidents.⁶⁴ Yet neither side was prepared to abandon the

62. Andrew Felkay, "Hungarian Foreign Policy in the Kádár Era," *Hungarian Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2003), pp. 80–82; and János Rádányi, "The Hungarian Revolution and the Hundred Flowers Campaign," *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 43 (September 1970), pp. 124–128.

63. Chen, *Mao's China*, pp. 163–204; and Lüthi, *Sino-Soviet Split*, pp. 80–113.

64. See Chen Jian, "The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Summer 2006), pp. 54–101.

Sino-Soviet alliance, so the disputes were interspersed with overtures intended to bolster the faltering alliance and maintain the appearance of unity.⁶⁵ One such positive move was the USSR's request that the PRC resume relations with Pugwash so that both countries had scientific representatives at the meeting.⁶⁶ Zhou's presence in Baden in the summer of 1959 had the explicitly political purpose of demonstrating Sino-Soviet solidarity. Taken alongside CAS's assessment in June 1958 of the importance of showing support for China's allies and attacking its enemies at the meetings, these transnational activities were explicitly tied to the PRC's relations both with its principal ally during the 1950s, the Soviet Union, and its principal opponent, the United States.⁶⁷ This was especially apparent in the PRC's approach to the Baden conference in June–July 1959 and, above all, the Moscow conference in November–December 1960.

More so than any previous Pugwash meeting, the Sixth Pugwash Conference held in Moscow in late November and early December 1960 was overtly shaped by power politics. The PRC's two intertwined concerns at this conference were its relations with the two Cold War superpowers. The internal Chinese governmental debate about the PRC's participation in the 1960 Moscow conference was defined by the continued deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations and both states' periodic attempts in public to downplay disunity in the face of mounting evidence to the contrary. The Moscow conference came at a critical moment for Chinese interests: eighteen months after Khrushchev ended Soviet assistance for the Chinese nuclear weapons program and shortly after he ordered the withdrawal of Soviet advisers from China. Moscow, moreover, was playing host not only to the Pugwash conference in November 1960 but also to a major summit of international Communist parties mere weeks beforehand. At a similar gathering in Romania in June 1960, Soviet and Chinese representatives had engaged in bitter exchanges, culminating in Khrushchev's condemnation of Mao's ideology and leadership. With the Chinese economy in chaos after the disastrous Great Leap Forward, Mao hoped to use the earlier Moscow summit to repair the relationship enough to allow

65. Shu Guang Zhang, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance and the Cold War in Asia, 1954–1962," in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. 1: *Origins* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 367–368. See also Lüthi, *Sino-Soviet Split*, pp. 114–156.

66. CAS PLG to Foreign Cultural Relations Committee, "Wei chuxi Pugehuaxu huiyi han," 19 August 1960, in 113-00339-01, CFMA.

67. CAS to State Council Foreign Affairs Office, 5 June 1958, in 113-00315-03, CFMA.

some level of Sino-Soviet cooperation.⁶⁸ Consequently, Chinese delegates to the gathering of parties—including Liu Shaoqi, then chairman of the PRC, and Liao Chengzhi, one of the key decision-makers on Chinese involvement in Pugwash—sought to dispel any suggestion that the CPSU and the CCP were no longer fraternal allies.

China's delegation of four scientists and intellectuals to the Pugwash conference that followed the Moscow summit of Communist parties was intended to reinforce the image of unity, thereby demonstrating that China's involvement was not just a means of providing cover or gathering intelligence for its nuclear weapons program. CCP officials were nevertheless concerned that they might not be able to sustain an image of Sino-Soviet solidarity at the Pugwash conference if Chinese scientists took part but were unable to present a suitably rosy image of collaboration with their Soviet colleagues. The PRC Foreign Ministry was keen to avoid anything that might expose divisions in the presence of Western delegates.⁶⁹ In light of these complexities, Chinese officials initially thought about politely declining the invitation. However, CCP leaders worried that doing so might leave China open to criticisms and challenges. They worried that not participating—after having dispatched delegates to previous conferences—might be interpreted as an indicator of a breakdown in Sino-Soviet relations and could potentially leave the PRC open to the criticism that it no longer wished to discuss peace. Faced with these alternatives, the CAS PLG advised: "We believe if the decision is taken to participate in this meeting, the first [priority] ought to be to select very politically [reliable] scientists to participate in order to guarantee victory in this assignment."⁷⁰ Because of the high profile of the occasion, hosted by China's supposed closest ally, officials in Beijing authorized a delegation of four be dispatched to Moscow rather than the single representative sent to previous conferences. As had been the case throughout the PRC's involvement in Pugwash, Zhou Peiyuan was officials' first choice and was designated the leader of the delegation. The three other intellectuals approved by the Foreign Ministry were Zhou's former student and scientific administrator who was now working in the CCP's Propaganda Department, Yu Guangyuan (Yu Kwang-Yuan); the

68. Li Danhui, "Cong fenlie dao duikang (1960–1978)," in Shen Zhihua, ed., *Zhong Su guanxi shi gang: 1917–1991 nian Zhong Su guanxi ruogan wenti zai* (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2011), pp. 322–23; and Odd Arne Westad, "Introduction," in Odd Arne Westad, ed., *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), p. 26.

69. MFA, "Guanyu canjia Pugehuaxu huiyi de qingshi baogao," 18 November 1960, in 113-00339-02, CFMA.

70. CAS PLG to Foreign Cultural Relations Committee, 19 August 1960, in 113-00339-01, CFMA.

architect and engineer Zhang Wei (Chang Wei); and the editor and translator Feng Binfu (Feng Ping-Fu). All were members of the CCP who, like Zhou, had extensive experience acting on behalf of the party in interactions with foreign scientists and international scientific organizations, particularly the WFSW. None of these men had a deep background in either the science of nuclear weapons or the intricacies of disarmament policy. The PRC's priorities lay in other areas. The most important consideration in choosing them was that CCP leaders believed they would faithfully represent the party's interests.

For China, the Moscow Pugwash conference in December 1960 was not only about patching its divisions with the Soviet Union but also about shaping its relations with the United States. The conference proved noteworthy as an occasion for geopolitical maneuvering and informal diplomacy because of the recent election of John F. Kennedy as the new U.S. president. Sino-American relations had been at low ebb at the end of the Eisenhower administration, with few lines of communication available other than the Warsaw ambassadorial talks (and after the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis, even those meetings had not seen appreciable progress).⁷¹ Chinese officials hoped that the Pugwash meeting in Moscow might prove to be an alternative means of building bridges with the incoming Kennedy administration. Such an idea was made more credible by Kennedy's suggestion during the election campaign that even though China was not yet a nuclear weapons state, the upcoming test ban talks could be an avenue for wider communication with the PRC.⁷²

According to the Chinese delegates' report, a senior U.S. scientist approached Zhou Peiyuan on the first day of the conference, saying he was close to Kennedy and that the president-elect was interested in discussing ways to bring about an improvement in Sino-American relations.⁷³ The delegate in question was Jerome B. Wiesner, the acting head of the Department of Electrical Engineering at MIT and scientific adviser to both the Eisenhower and the Kennedy administrations. According to later accounts by Chinese delegate Yu Guangyuan and Zhou Ruling, Wiesner told Zhou he was in Moscow in part to make discreet contact with the Chinese side.⁷⁴

71. See Yafeng Xia, *Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks during the Cold War, 1949–1972* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006), ch. 4.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 110; and Foot, *The Practice of Power*, p. 36.

73. "Guanyu tong Meiguo ren jiechu qingkuang de baogao" (Top Secret), January 1961, in 113-00339-02, CFMA.

74. Yu Guangyuan, "Enshi he zhanyou," in *Kexue jujiang shibiao liufang* (Beijing: Zhongguo kexue jishu chubanshe, 1992), pp. 80–86; and Zhou, "Zhou Peiyuan he Pagewoshi," p. 90–91. This interaction is also mentioned briefly in Wang, "U.S.-China Scientific Exchange," p. 251.

Wiesner also met for lunch on the first day of the conference with Zhang Zongan, a disarmament specialist who had been sent to Moscow to advise the Chinese delegation. The two men discussed issues relating to Taiwan and disarmament.⁷⁵ Following the encounter with Wiesner, Zhou immediately requested further instructions from his superiors. Because senior CCP officials Liu Shaoqi and Liao Chengzhi had not yet departed Moscow following the recently concluded Communist parties' summit, Zhou's request received swift attention. Liu and Liao approved further contact so long as it was done discreetly.⁷⁶ Pugwash was therefore more than just a forum for the PRC to posture and propagandize; it had evolved into a potential site for back-channel diplomacy with the United States.

The Chinese delegates pressed Evgenii K. Fedorov and Aleksandr V. Topchiev, senior members of the Soviet delegation from the Soviet Academy of Science, for information about the U.S. delegates.⁷⁷ The Chinese focus on the U.S. delegation and its ties to the incoming Kennedy administration, as well as their perception of this as raising the prospect for a tangible shift in Sino-American relations, is also reflected in their production of an additional after-conference report exclusively dedicated to the subject of Sino-American interaction. The Chinese attendees prepared this document, designated "Top Secret," for the CAS PLG and MFA, along with the three high-ranking members of the State Council responsible for making decisions about the PRC's involvement in the Pugwash conferences: Liao Chengzhi, Chen Yun, and Zhou Enlai. The report noted that the large U.S. delegation was far from homogeneous and that, as the Soviet participants noted, it contained differences of opinion. Crucially, an identifiable group of "science politicians with close ties to the government [was] responsible for a special mission"—a mission to conduct informal diplomacy of the sort encapsulated by Wiesner's approach to the Chinese.⁷⁸ In addition to Wiesner, the report cited Walt Rostow, Paul Doty, Harrison Brown, and H. Bentley Glass, whom the Chinese took to be the leaders of the delegation. They felt this group of scientists with political connections was especially noteworthy because:

75. "Canjia di liu jie Pugehuaxu huiyi—dashiji," January 1961, in 113-00339-02, CFMA.

76. Zhou, "Zhou Peiyuan he Pagewoshi," p. 91.

77. "Baifang Sulian kexueyuan fuyuanzhang Tuopuqiefu tongzhi tanhua jilu," 26 November 1960, in 113-00339-02, CFMA; "Tanhua jilu," 1 December 1960, in 113-00339-02, CFMA; "Tanhua jilu," 3 December 1960, in 113-00339-02, CFMA; and "Tanhua jilu," 15 December 1960, in 113-00339-02, CFMA.

78. "Guanyu tong Meiguo ren jiechu qingkuang de baogao" (Top Secret), n.d., in 113-00339-02, CFMA.

In the [U.S.] delegation's own words: "Kennedy greatly values scientists."

After Kennedy comes to power, he will choose among this group to take up official posts. He will also likely make use of them for unofficial diplomatic activities. This time he dispatched this group to Moscow for his own activities.⁷⁹

The Chinese side thus treated the U.S. delegation's political connections as evidence that the scientists present at the conference were to some degree acting on behalf of the U.S. government. This was an instance of the Pugwash conferences acting as a site for back-channel or second-track diplomacy. This interpretation reflects the long-standing view within Chinese political circles that, like them, the United States sought to exploit the conferences for political gain.

This early moment of contact proved to be a false dawn, however. Wiesner did not raise the subject again during the conference. Instead, he became antagonistic. His conference paper outraged the Chinese delegates because it described China as militant and called for U.S.-Soviet cooperation to contain the PRC.⁸⁰ This prompted a blistering response from Zhou, who in his closing remarks to the general assembly publicly condemned Wiesner's assertions.⁸¹ The strength of Zhou's response can be seen as a reflection of the Chinese side's disappointment at this seeming about-face, not to mention the concern that, given Wiesner's connections to the White House, his opinions and proposals might come to be reflected in the incoming Kennedy administration.⁸² Above all else, their exchange conclusively and publicly put to rest any private hopes Chinese leaders might have had for back-channel Sino-American dialogue through the Pugwash conferences.

79. Ibid.

80. For the text of his paper, see Jerome B. Wiesner, "Comprehensive Arms-Limitation Systems," *Daedalus*, Vol. 89, No. 4 (Fall 1960), pp. 915–950. In the context of the Second Pugwash Conference, Wiesner later said that he and others "stayed close to the positions of our own countries." See Jerome Wiesner, "Memoirs," in Walter A. Rosenblith, ed., *Jerry Wiesner: Scientist, Statesman, Humanist—Memories and Memoirs* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), pp. 261–262. This seeming about-face was likely a consequence of his desire to hew close to the official line at the Sixth Pugwash Conference as well, particularly after having come under attack (while being considered as an adviser to President Kennedy) for being too obliging to Soviet interests. See Zuoyue Wang, *In Sputnik's Shadow: The President's Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2008), pp. 185, 193.

81. Zhou Peiyuan, "Dui 'caijun wenti he Zhongguo kexuejia de kanfa' yi wen de buchong," n.d., in 113-00339-02, CFMA; and Zhou, "Zhou Peiyuan he Pagewoshi," p. 91.

82. Yet the episode was not detrimental to Wiesner's relationship with Zhou in the long term. According to Wiesner, the two had many positive and constructive conversations in the 1970s and 1980s. Wiesner, "Memoirs," pp. 262–263. Thus, although state structures impeded Chinese scientists' range of action with regard to the Pugwash conferences during this early period, the conferences nevertheless facilitated and strengthened private connections between scientists.

Nor were Chinese hopes revived once Kennedy assumed power in January 1961. No softening of U.S. rhetoric or policy toward the PRC could be discerned in the new administration.⁸³ Even though China's efforts ultimately came to nothing, the level of attention paid by Chinese delegates and officials demonstrates the degree to which the CCP viewed Pugwash attendees within the frame of international politics and the conferences as a site for maneuvering, particularly in relation to the Soviet Union and the United States. The Chinese had viewed the early Pugwash conferences as a forum to demonstrate Sino-Soviet solidarity and as a means to attack U.S. policies. The 1960 conference became, by contrast, a potential site for backroom rapprochement with the United States. The ultimate failure of this attempt does not detract from the larger significance of the Moscow conference as a forum for such interaction.

Chinese Withdrawal from Pugwash, 1961–1964

Chinese foreign policy officials' role in determining Chinese scientists' involvement in the conferences resulted in the PRC, at first, distancing itself and then opting for a complete withdrawal from the Pugwash conferences in the 1960s. The archival evidence available in the PRC for this final period of its interaction with the early Conferences on Science and World Affairs is less extensive than that for the late 1950s, and the documents that have been released are in some cases partly redacted. Nevertheless, it is still possible to draw some conclusions about the reasons for Chinese officials' abandonment of Pugwash as a forum to advance their interests. This change came down to shifts in strategic interests resulting from China's ever-increasing tensions with both Cold War superpowers and its successful nuclear weapons test in October 1964.

China's withdrawal was initially gradual and can be seen as a logical extension of Chinese officials' increasing wariness about the conferences from mid-1958 onward. However, in 1961 it was neither apparent—nor, indeed, inevitable—that the Chinese absence from Pugwash would continue for decades. The immediate issue for China that year was that the seventh and eighth meetings were to be held in the United States. As early as December

83. See Evelyn Goh, *Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974: From "Red Menace" to "Tacit Ally"* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 17–45. For more on the early development of the rhetoric of totalitarian expansionism under the Truman administration, see Selverstone, *Constructing the Monolith*, pp. 54–72.

1960, the Chinese side had been concerned that the U.S. government would refuse to grant visas for the PRC's delegates while issuing them to the Soviet delegates, in line with U.S. non-recognition policies and restrictions on travel to and from the PRC.⁸⁴ A refusal of visas to China but not the Soviet Union would have fed into the increasingly potent Sino-Soviet rivalry and undercut China's attempts to show, through its presence at international conferences, that it was an important world power. The Pugwash Continuing Committee sought to reassure the Chinese that visas would not be a problem, but the PRC's scientists nevertheless declined their invitations to the two 1961 conferences in Stowe, Vermont.⁸⁵ Although the stated reason for their non-attendance is compelling, other political explanations are possible. In the context of deepening Sino-Soviet tensions, China's failure to make a back-channel breakthrough with the United States at the 1960 Moscow conference further diminished the Pugwash conferences' political returns to the PRC. Once Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union had agreed to a moratorium on nuclear weapons tests, China's nuclear ambitions—its weapons program was moving ever closer to the testing phase—made the anti-nuclear weapons orientation of the Pugwash conferences increasingly problematic. For the PRC, the conferences now posed greater risks of political embarrassment and isolation, outweighing any potential gains. The political calculus used by CAS officials to justify involvement in 1958 no longer led to the same conclusions in 1961.

The Pugwash Continuing Committee was keen to have Chinese representatives back at the conferences after their absence in 1961, however. The initial, formal letter of invitation from Secretary General Joseph Rotblat proposed that CAS dispatch a Chinese delegation of up to twelve members to two upcoming conferences in the United Kingdom. The Pugwash Continuing Committee also tried to apply pressure by having the Soviet chemist and committee member Aleksandr V. Topchiev write personally to Guo Moruo, the president of CAS, urging the PRC to participate.⁸⁶ For CCP officials, however, the Pugwash conferences no longer held the propaganda value of other international activities and events. This shift in priorities can be seen in the fact that the PRC's go-to representative for the conferences, Zhou Peiyuan, was already scheduled to attend the WFSW Seventh General Assembly, at

84. "Tanhua jilu," 3 December 1960, in 113-00339-02, CMFA.

85. Joseph Rotblat, *Scientists in the Quest for Peace: A History of the Pugwash Conference* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1972), p. 47.

86. Rotblat to CAS President [Chinese translation], 6 March 1962, in 113-00422-01, CMFA; and Topchiev to Guo Moruo, [Chinese translation], March 1962, in 113-00422-01, CMFA.

which he would be selected as one of the federation's new vice chairs. Zhou had written to Rotblat as early as 24 January to inform him that he would not be able to attend the UK Pugwash meetings that September.⁸⁷ The CAS and the Foreign Cultural Relations Committee did consider sending scientists to the 1962 meetings, but months in advance CAS concluded that, of the few scientists who would be available, none were "suitable for this kind of work."⁸⁸ As with previous conferences, senior officials deemed it vital that individuals taking part in international activities be both unfailingly loyal to the CCP and have prior experience in such activities. Their conclusion underscores not only the small size of the pool of scientists whom CCP cadres considered reliable and experienced enough but also the degree to which they now regarded the Pugwash conferences as politically challenging events to navigate. In the absence of suitable candidates, the safest option was not to send anyone. China's non-participation shows just how far the Pugwash conferences had slid down the list of priority activities for CCP foreign policy officials by the early 1960s.

The 1960 meeting in Moscow marked the beginning of what would be a 25-year "hiatus" for Chinese participation in Pugwash. In the 1960s, the foreign policies pursued by the PRC continued to become ever more radical, emphasizing struggle and conflict rather than the peaceful coexistence line that featured prominently during the 1950s.⁸⁹ The mid-1960s saw the Sino-Soviet split harden and then fracture and the dramatic escalation of U.S. military operations in Vietnam.⁹⁰ Domestically, both the CCP and the intellectual establishments were under pressure from Mao's Socialist Education Movement, the dramatic if ultimately unsuccessful campaign that acted as a precursor to the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. By 1964, Mao had become convinced that the United States and the Soviet Union were conspiring to launch attacks on China. This was also the year the PRC joined the "nuclear club." The first Chinese nuclear weapons test, on 16 October, made clear that China's stance on nuclear weapons had changed. This change also confirmed that the PRC had been developing nuclear weapons throughout the entire period when its scientists had been involved in Pugwash. Such

87. Referenced in Rotblat to Zhou Peiyuan, [Chinese translation], May 1962, in 113-00422-01, CMFA.

88. CAS to Foreign Cultural Relations Committee, "Ni bu canjia di jiu, shi liang jie Pugehuaxu huiyi de qingshi," 29 June 1962, in 113-00422-01, CMFA.

89. See Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1970).

90. See Chen, *Mao's China*, pp. 205–237; and Radchenko, *Two Suns*, pp. 165–200.

duplicity made Beijing's position vis-à-vis the Conferences on Science and World Affairs difficult, to say the least.

The Pugwash Continuing Committee's one brief post-1960 point of contact with the PRC occurred a few months before the October 1964 test and perfectly captured how disconnected China's strategic interests were from the aims of the Pugwash conferences. The committee had sent a copy of the eleventh Pugwash meeting—held in Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, in September 1963—to Liu Shaoqi earlier in 1964 in the hopes of keeping the Chinese engaged with the Pugwash process.⁹¹ The report, however, had the opposite effect. The MFA flagged concerns about China's impending acquisition of nuclear weapons raised by members of the conference's working group on the consequences of nuclear proliferation. Chinese Foreign Ministry officials also pointed to perceived criticisms of the PRC contained in conference papers as evidence of the conferences' anti-China bias.⁹² Although several options were considered, ranging from ignoring the document to making a formal reply, officials settled on having Zhou Peiyuan send a letter of protest to Rotblat. The letter, which went through numerous drafts altered by ministry officials and Zhou Enlai, encapsulates the PRC's position as it proceeded to join the "nuclear club."⁹³ The final draft claimed the Chinese government had been "viciously attacked and slandered" by the working group, as well as in the Soviet and Yugoslav delegates' statements. The letter went on to argue that the proceedings showed that the Pugwash conferences had "clearly become a means for the Soviet Union and United States to collude together to monopolize nuclear weapons, implement the policy of nuclear blackmail, spread the disarmament delusion, and act as a cover for American imperialism."⁹⁴ These accusations reflected Mao's fears of U.S.-Soviet collusion against China and his new rhetoric about encouraging wider adoption of nuclear weaponry in order to shift the balance of power away from the superpowers. The accusations were repeated by Chinese representatives attending other international events in 1964 and 1965.⁹⁵ Although the PRC continued to pursue "People's Diplomacy" through other organizations and at other events, China's nuclear

91. Rotblat to Liu Shaoqi, 11 June 1964, 113-00475-01, in CMFA.

92. MFA to Zhou Enlai, "Guanyu chuli di shiyi ye Pugehuaxu huiyi jilu de qingshi baogao," 13 June 1964, in 113-00475-01, CMFA.

93. MFA to Zhou Enlai, "Guanyu han fu Pugehuaxu huiyi jixu weiyuanhui mishu zhang de qingshi baogao," 8 August 1964, in 113-00475-02, CMFA.

94. Zhou Peiyuan to Joseph Rotblat, revision of draft dated 7 July 1964, in 113-00475-02, CMFA.

95. Lewis and Xue, *China Builds the Bomb*, p. 195; and Pierre Biquard to WFSW Executive Council, 16 December 1965, in MSS.270/12/6/6, WFSWA.

weapons policies—and its standing in the world—had changed by 1964 to an extent that eliminated the Pugwash conferences as an option in the eyes of China's foreign policy elite.

Conclusion

The PRC's short period of participation in the Pugwash conferences was an attempt to exploit connections between members of its intellectual class and potentially sympathetic members of the international scientific elite. Participation was intended to obscure China's nuclear ambitions, increase its influence among the global Left, and generally improve its image overseas. Even though Chinese scientists may have claimed to be interacting with other Pugwashites in a personal capacity in the late 1950s and early 1960s, their actions were in fact highly choreographed and constrained by CCP officials. The substantial level of Chinese governmental involvement and scrutiny placed severe limitations on the possibility that transnational peace activism might influence the PRC during this period. More broadly, it shows how some members of transnational non-governmental organizations inhabited multiple, ambiguous roles, ostensibly engaging in transnational activism as individuals while in reality doing so at the behest of a government.

The Pugwash example, both in the involvement of high-ranking CCP foreign policy officials and in Chinese scientists' explicitly political activities at the conferences, demonstrates that transnational relations mattered to the Chinese government and that interactions with foreign groups and individuals were an important part of the PRC's foreign relations during the first half of the Cold War. Recent works by historians such as Chen Jian, Lorenz Lüthi, and Sergey Radchenko have shown how ideology and personality in the CCP's highest organs shaped China's Cold War.⁹⁶ But the Pugwash conferences reveal that, although leaders may have determined policy, implementation of the policy was heavily dependent on a range of elite professionals whose primary role and identity were not those of a foreign policy professional. Indeed, China's involvement in the Pugwash conferences is an example of how "People's Diplomacy" deployed politically reliable but well-connected intellectuals to exploit transnational networks and interest groups.

Such activities were used as a cover for Chinese development of nuclear weapons by providing counternarratives and misinformation about the PRC's

96. Chen, *Mao's China*; Lüthi, *Sino-Soviet Split*; and Radchenko, *Two Suns*.

true nuclear ambitions and policies. This became clear as China's crash program of nuclear weapons development neared fruition and the PRC abandoned its policy of "People-to-People Diplomacy" in the case of Pugwash. However, these connections raise more questions than currently available archival material can easily answer. A more nuanced analysis of China's relationship with transnational NGOs, including the Pugwash conferences and the WFSW, is probably infeasible until the PRC declassifies more of its documents. Further research into these activities can provide new insights into the China's transnational relations during the Cold War. Such relations, including with the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, were an arena for the Chinese government to pursue agendas beyond just the scientific. The PRC's aims also included building a sympathetic network of influential Westerners and enacting relations with the two Cold War superpowers.

Finally, the PRC's early involvement in Pugwash demonstrates the importance of governments in transnational activities. The Pugwash conferences were always a forum for individual scientists to meet and interact with their peers across Cold War divides, and some scientists used the conferences as a tool to influence and shape government policies. However, the domestic circumstances, connections, and multiple professional identities of those scientists, including state influences or ties, must also be considered. Domestic structures, specifically the presence of CCP officials within the CAS, and the close cooperation between it and other state organs, such as the MFA and State Council, meant that the party-state's influence on Chinese scientists' international activities was as extensive as it was inevitable. The Chinese case demonstrates that even though state influence may not have been consistently obvious or overt, it was present in the Pugwash meetings nevertheless. This is not to reduce Pugwash scientists—including Chinese scientists—to being mere ciphers of the party-state agenda. Rather, it underscores that governments can influence transnational actors and are transnational actors in their own right.

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