What social movements ask for, and how they ask for it:

Strategic claiming and framing, and the successes and failures of indigenous movements in Latin America



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Abstract

Whether social movements can make a difference remains a perennial question of social movement scholarship. This thesis aims to make a contribution to this debate by examining the contentious collective action of indigenous people(s) in Latin America. This has the potential to enrich both the Latin American scholarship on indigenous politics, which often takes the impact of indigenous movements for granted, and the social movement scholarship on outcomes, which seems to increasingly question whether protest can have any direct impact at all. This thesis suggests that neither approach is adequate and that factors under the control of indigenous movements themselves can lead to positive outcomes. The choice of tactics, the nature of claims and the way in which they are framed, play a role, both directly and in interaction with contextual variables. Taking into account movements' strategic claiming and framing is thus crucial for understanding social movement outcomes. Few studies have been able to show the effect of framing on movement outcomes; partially at least this is because the claiming (what) and framing (how) of social movements have not been distinguished well within framing theories. To have an impact, movements need to be able to impose material and symbolic costs on their targets that exceed the cost that meeting their demand would present. This can be done through creating enough materially costly disruption—such as by using roadblocks or sustaining mobilisation—and imposing enough symbolic costs—such as making claims framed in a way that resonates with the agendas and discourses of their targets, as well as the public. Overall, this work thus suggests that despite the empirical support for the thesis that social movements tend to rely on political opportunities for securing desired outcomes, this is not inconsistent with the fact that social movements can succeed even in unfavourable political conditions. In the latter situation, if protest can impose a high enough combination of both material and symbolic costs, it can indeed matter.

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1. The puzzle of indigenous social movements in Latin America and their consequences

> *"Since the 1990s, indigenous movements have assumed increasing political importance in Latin American democracies. They have organized nationwide strikes and protests, blocked unpopular economic reforms, toppled corrupt leaders, and in some instances formed their own political parties and even captured presidencies in an effort to craft an alternative political and economic project for their respective nations" (Rice, 2012: 4).*

Recent unexpected social movements and protest campaigns, such as the *Indignados* in Spain or Occupy in the United States, challenging both globalisation and the nation-state, have captured our academic imagination. At the same time, another type of activism and collective organising has garnered attention; indigenous people(s)' social movements. The 2016 protests of the Standing Rock Native American community in the US against the Dakota Access pipeline have only brought renewed attention to other indigenous struggles across the world, from Australia to South America. At a time when we are concerned with the ability of social movement activists to offer and construct alternatives, indigenous people(s) across the Latin American continent are proposing alternative ways of 'living well' in harmony with others and with nature, as well as demanding a more equal place in the post-colonial states they find themselves in. These struggles are not exactly of the 'effervescent' nature—they are much more clearly rooted in historical struggles over land and identity—they are nevertheless also struggles against the nation-state and globalisation in their fight for control over land, political autonomy and participation, and the protection of ethnic, linguistic, and cultural reproduction.

Since it began to democratise, Latin America exploded with new forms of popular contention; the starkest example being the unexpected eruption of social movements making claims centred on indigenous identities. This emergence of identity-focused movements has enjoyed extensive attention in the Latin American literature (see for example: Albó, 2008; Dávalos, 2005; Lucero, 2008; Van Cott, 2010; Yashar, 2005). The aim of indigenous social movements, demanding both equal treatment and special rights, has been, essentially, to transform existing unequal and discriminatory social relations. But how successful have indigenous movements in Latin America been at getting their claims answered and met? This question is particularly pertinent as indigenous movements have had varying levels of success in different countries and over time. Their demands and claims[1] have been met with very different responses from the states at which they have (most often) directed them.

While some indigenous leaders have made it to the presidential palace (Bolivia) or reclaimed significant territories on behalf of their communities (e.g. Mexico, Nicaragua), other indigenous struggles were met with either little more than symbolic recognition (e.g. Guatemala) or outright repression and criminalisation (Chile). It is this aspect of indigenous

[1] The term 'demands' and 'claims' are used interchangeably in this text; perhaps it is more accurate to speak of 'demands' for protest events, and of 'claims' for social movement organisations and social movements in general.

movements—their outcomes—that has remained understudied in a systematic comparative way in the literature. This is surprising given the varied experiences of indigenous social movements in the region and the wealth of empirical case study knowledge about individual movement trajectories. Studying this aspect of indigenous movements in Latin America thus offers the possibility not only to fill this gap in the regional literature, but also contribute to the contentious debate about social movement outcomes in general.

Since indigenous peoples' social movements[2] started to appear on the social and political scene of Latin American countries in the second half of the 20th Century—in their 'modern' form at least—these countries have changed significantly in political, economic and social terms as democratisation proceeded throughout the region, and coincided with various and often dramatic economic changes. The growth of nationally-significant indigenous movements has been preceded by, and overlapped with, political and economic transformations as neoliberal economic doctrine lost sway and the 'pink tide' of left-of-centre governments[3] swept the continent. As such, it is difficult to disentangle the direct impact of indigenous movements themselves from the myriad of other factors affecting the social fabric of Latin American societies in the last three decades or so. However, on their own, the political and economic changes in the region in the last two decades cannot explain the divergent outcomes of indigenous movements.

This of course touches on one of the core questions of the academic study of collective action: do social movements *cause* social and political change, or are they simply a *symptom* of change? Even if it was possible to definitively answer this question, this thesis is certainly not trying to do so. Rather, it is attempting to respond to the developments, discussed in Chapter 2, in both the theories of social movement outcomes in the generally, largely Northern, social movement literature, and the work on indigenous movements and their consequences by Latin American and other scholars. Engaging with both, to try and make sense of the recent experiences of indigenous collective action in Latin America, provides little guidance as to whether we should think of any social movement success as largely reflective of favourable political opportunities, or whether its own strategies also matter, and to what extent. Social movements, of course, can expect greater responsivity to their demands if governments, publics and targets are already sympathetic to their claims. However, such favourable circumstances can also be a product of previous social movement activity. Moreover, even under apparently adverse conditions, there are examples of protest activity succeeding at least in some ways. What explains such cases? Is it possible to formulate a mid-range theory of social movement outcomes, and identify some mechanisms that can help explain those diverse outcomes?

To try and answer these questions, it is necessary to evaluate the impact of variables under the direct control of indigenous protesters. Indigenous movements have not only been able to mobilise their supporters to varying degrees, and have had various successes in maintaining a

[2] Defined as social movements in which indigenous peoples participated *qua* their indigenous identity (see Chapter 3).

[3] Governments challenging neoliberal economic orthodoxy with a varied range of ''left-of-centre" economic policies have come into power in most Latin American countries since the 1990s; for more detail, see for example Panizza (2009).

strong presence and influence in national politics, they have also experienced different *outcomes* in terms of gaining acceptance within the political system, new advantages both for their members and for the constituencies they represent, and access to and influence over 'national' decision making. This leads to the central research question of this thesis: *Under which conditions is the contentious collective action of indigenous people(s) in Latin America more likely to result in at least some intended change?* In order to start answering this question, we must first look at the trajectories of indigenous mobilisation in Latin America, and the varied outcomes indigenous movements have experienced.

1.1 Indigenous peoples' movements in Latin America

The 20th century rise of social movement organising centred on the ethnic-cultural identity of Latin America's indigenous people was unexpected both in its challenge to the prevalent notion of indigeneity as 'backward' and the academic assumption that 'identity politics' were confined to post-industrial societies. At the beginning of the 20th century, indigenous peoples were generally branded as peasants[4], but at the same time "were constantly reminded of their Indianness through quotidian discrimination that reinforced racial hierarchies and limited access to material resources and institutional opportunities" (Andolina *et al*., 2009: 13). Self-defined and ascribed by dominant groups, indigenous identities are associated with exclusion and oppression, as well as extreme poverty and inequality.

In spite of this, before the second half of the 20th century, indigenous people(s) in Latin America generally engaged the political arena as a social class of rural labourers/peasants (*campesinos)* or workers, rather than as members of an indigenous (cultural/ethnic/linguistic) community. Since the 1970s, however, indigenous social movements began "demanding new spaces for a dignified, differentiated participation as citizens in their national societies" *qua* their cultural identity (de la Peña, 2005: 732). While the most famous examples of extensive and nationally significant indigenous social movement activity are probably from Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico, the majority of Latin American countries have experienced some form of indigenous protest in which indigenous activists participate *as* indigenous people.

1.1.1 The history and modern emergence of indigenous mobilisation in Latin America

Even though by the 20th century most indigenous communities in Latin America were participating in local or national politics as peasants—mainly due to the privileging of class elements by states and progressive activists—the history of indigenous resistance of course dates back to colonial times, including many indigenous rebellions against both the colonial and the independent state.[5] This is perhaps the clearest in the case of the Mapuche in Chile; "unlike most indigenous peoples in the Americas, the Mapuche were never [officially]

[4] *Campesinos:* this denotes peasant or rural dweller.
[5] Such as the 18th Century Bolivian rebellion led by Tupac Katari (as mentioned below) or in Peru led by Tupac Amaru.

conquered" and were only incorporated into the Chilean state in 1881 (and then relegated to indigenous reserves (*reducciones)* at the beginning of the 20th century) (Park & Richards, 2007: 1321). The Mapuche then participated in resistance to Pinochet dictatorship, and have continued to mobilise in defense of cultural and territorial rights despite repression and criminalisation by the democratic Chilean state; still, different communities, leaders and organisations have also sometimes cooperated with the state under both dictatorship and democracy, to different degrees (Pairican, 2014; Park & Richards, 2007; Pinto Rodriguez, 2016; Richards & Gardner, 2013). In fact, it is important to note that indigenous movements in Latin America in general have had a more complicated historical relationship with the state, ranging from violent resistance and exclusion to cooperation and inclusion. This is why it is necessary to distinguish different protest movements and indigenous organisations and evaluate both their strategies and their relationship with the state.

Yet what the Mapuche case highlights is the continuity of indigenous resistance—of at least some communities and organisations—to the Chilean state. Conversely, despite the history of 'Indian' rebellions in Peru, the country has—until recently—lacked a nationally significant indigenous social movement (Felix, 2008; Wright, 2014). Instead, the tradition of organising along class-lines has persisted much longer than in neighbouring Bolivia or Ecuador, all of which have significant indigenous populations (both in number and percentage of the population) and could have been expected to experience similar developments in indigenous social movement activity.[6] In general, however, continuity mixes with discontinuity in indigenous struggles. Despite the shared memory of oppression and resistance, many indigenous communities first had to revive, reinvent and reinterpret their cultural identities, particularly in the context of demands for *authentic* indigeneity by states, NGOs and rivals alike (Andolina *et al*., 2009; Barnard *et al*., 2006; Krausova, 2012; Lucero, 2008; Valdivia, 2005).

Although modern examples of indigenous people organising politically *as* indigenous in social movements started emerging in the 1970s, such as the Bolivian *Kataristas*[7], it was not until the 1990s that indigenous protest activity in Latin America gained national and international importance as well as attention. In 1990 in Bolivia, the lowland CIDOB (Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia[8]) led a well-publicised *March for Territory and Dignity* onto the seat of government, La Paz, in defense of indigenous territorial rights, among other demands. This event kicked off a period of an unprecedented level of indigenous collective action and political organising, in which Andean and Amazonian indigenous peoples mobilised "initially to defend their local autonomy and, ultimately, to demand an equal position in the [new] democracy" (Yashar, 2005: 152). In the same year, Ecuador bore witness to the CONAIE-led (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador[9]) indigenous uprising that had "shaken the consciousness of the country's elite classes" (Becker, 2008: ix) in a "spectacular display of

[6] In fact, the lack of emergence of a strong indigenous movement in Peru has been an important puzzle to study since the growth of indigenous organising on the continent (Van Cott, 2005; Yashar, 2005).
[7] So named after the late 18th century indigenous rebellion of Tupac Katari; see Chapter 6.
[8] *Confederación de Pueblos Indigenas de Bolivia,* founded in 1982.
[9] *La Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de Ecuador,* founded in 1986.

protest" (Zamosc, 2003: 37). This 'National Indigenous Uprising' (*Levantamiento Nacional Indígena*) was rooted in the *campesino* struggles of the 1960s and the emerging indigenous campaigns of the 1970s (highland ECUARUNARI[10]) and 1980s (lowland CONFENAIE[11]), which had led to the unification of the Ecuadorean indigenous social movement in the late 1980s into the national CONAIE.

Two years later, the 500-year anniversary of the 'discovery' of the Americas was taken up by indigenous organisations across Latin America to mobilise and protest the continued oppression of aboriginal peoples. Indigenous peoples' claims of cultural recognition and political autonomy were often supplemented with demands for resource provision and land redistribution, coupling identity-focused claims with class-based demands. Ecuadorean 'Indians', for example, marched in 1992 "demanding land titling, constitutional reforms, and an end to neoliberal policies" (Burbach *et al*., 2013), while the MAS in mid-1990s Bolivia was able to mobilise indigenous and non-indigenous supporters alike (Yashar, 2005). If those developments were not noticed enough internationally, the 1994 *Zapatista* uprising certainly was; indigenous communities took up arms against the state *as* indigenous peoples, in protest at the neoliberal economic policies exemplified by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and in demand of autonomy (Harvey, 1998). Since then, the majority of Latin American countries have experienced some form of indigenous political organising, in which previously excluded and marginalised groups have participated *qua* their pre-Columbian identities.

1.1.2 Indigenous rights in international treaties and constitutional reforms: 1980s and 1990s

The height of indigenous protest activity in Latin America coincides with a period of democratisation as well as the international development of indigenous rights recognition. By 1990, the continent's states could all be considered democratic, at least in the institutional sense.[12] This coincided with a proliferation of international instruments for the protection of indigenous rights. The International Labour Organisation adopted resolution 169 in 1989, codifying numerous indigenous peoples' rights, including territorial rights and the right to prior consultation on all matters affected indigenous land and territory. This was followed in 1993 by the United Nations (UN) Declaration of Indigenous Rights and the subsequent 2007 UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples.

These international instruments, among others, have been used by indigenous activists to put pressure on Latin American governments to recognise the rights of indigenous communities

[10] *Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui* (Awakening of the Ecuadorean Indian), founded in 1972.
[11] *Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana* (Confederation of the Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorean Amazon), founded in 1979.
[12] There is, of course, an extensive literature on just how democratic Latin American states have been since the 'third wave' of democratisation (see for example: Hagopian & Mainwaring, 2005). However, despite the short-comings of democracy in the continent, the transition away from outright dictatorial regimes has undeniably been significant for social movement activity in general, and indigenous protest in particular.

(Keck & Sikkink, 1998). National indigenous movements continue to demand greater recognition of difference, greater redistribution of resources, greater political autonomy as well as greater inclusion as equal citizens. Such pressures have led to significant constitutional changes in many Latin American states, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, a period which has been termed 'multicultural constitutionalism' (Van Cott, 2002) or 'neoliberal multiculturalism' (Hale, 2002).[13] While constitutional guarantees of indigenous peoples' rights in themselves can be considered a significant progressive step, they are often not enough to guarantee for indigenous communities the enjoyment of these rights, due to problems of implementation as well as enforcement.

Moreover, the extent of constitutional guarantees is not a clear predictor of the future successes of indigenous social movement activity, especially when indigenous activists move beyond the goal of symbolic recognition to demands for the redistribution of land and resources. While the "greatest achievements in the legal recognition of autonomy occurred in Panama and Nicaragua", as well as some states in Mexico and Venezuela (Van Cott, 2010: 388), these countries have experienced widely divergent outcomes in terms of both the actual protection experienced by indigenous communities and the way that states have responded to further indigenous demands. In fact, Panama and Nicaragua represent the earliest examples of granting of territorial autonomy rights. The creation of autonomous regions in Panama (1925) and Nicaragua (1984) was followed by later provision of autonomy as part of late-20th century constitutional reforms in Colombia (1991) and Venezuela (1999) (CEPAL, 2014; Van Cott, 2001). Both Bolivia and Ecuador also promulgated important laws in relation to indigenous autonomy rights in the 1990s, but those have since been surpassed by the more radical constitutional changes in the late 2000s.

As such, constitutional advances alone—and this is not to undermine their significance—have not been enough to predict the extent of the real enjoyment of indigenous rights and the successes and failure of further indigenous social movement activity since. At the beginning of the 21st century, Mexico could be categorised as having as far-reaching a constitutional protection of indigenous peoples' rights as Bolivia. Yet since the mid-2000s, Bolivia has had a popular indigenous government in power, the *Movimiento al Socialismo*[14] (MAS), while in Mexico indigenous people continue to face both violence and state neglect despite continued indigenous protest activity since the 1994 *Zapatista*[15] uprising (Harvey, 1998; Postero, 2007).

[13] While for Van Cott, this is used simply as a descriptive term to denote the period of multicultural constitutional reforms in Latin America, Hale's terminology is intended as a critique of the short-comings of passing limited multicultural reforms during a period of neoliberal restructuring. (This debate is developed in the theoretical section of this thesis).

[14] Literally the Movement for Socialism, the official name of the social-movement-cum-party is, at least partly, due to difficulties of registration for new parties in Bolivia and the name is borrowed from a defunct ticket of a previous *Movimiento al Socialismo* party. The full official name of the party is *Movimiento al Socialismo–Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos* (Movement for Socialism – Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples). Despite the name, it should be considered both a left-wing *and* an indigenous party.

[15] The *Zapatista* movement emerged in the 1990s, most notably with the 1994 uprising headed by the *Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación Nacional* (EZLN, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation) in the predominantly indigenous Chiapas state. In the first instance, the uprising protested the Free Trade

Similarly, Colombia and Venezuela started the new millennium with similarly progressive constitutions—at least in regard to indigenous rights—but the fates of indigenous movements since have been divergent, with significant protection of indigenous rights in Venezuela counterpoised to the continued violence and insecurity suffered by indigenous Colombians (Amodio, 2007; Ulloa, 2011; Van Cott, 2001).

By the period under study, moreover, Latin American countries had relatively similar levels of constitutional protection of indigenous rights. Even in Peru and Chile—the former of which has until recently lacked a significant indigenous movement, with the latter brutally repressing its own—the indigenous right to a prior consultation regarding policies affecting their land has been officially recognised.[16] However, differences in both the experiences of those rights and of protesting against the lack of their protection persist, in terms of both contentious collective strategies used, and the outcomes experienced. This is partly due to the continued reliance of Latin American economies on extraction (e.g. Cornia, 2010), which brings to light the difficulties of implementing the right to prior consultation of indigenous communities when mineral resources are found under their land, explaining the recent rise in both the number and the intensity of conflicts over the right to natural resource extraction (CEPAL, 2014). This issue is further complicated by the fact that under many left-leaning governments in Latin America—which might be expected to be more responsive to indigenous demands—the proceeds from extractive activities are used to fund socially progressive policies (Cornia, 2010). Other factors at play include the strength, tactics and demands of the indigenous movement and the propensity of the state to accede to indigenous demands, whether because of a sympathetic government or international pressure.

1.1.3 Continued indigenous protests: 2000s and 2010s

The impact of indigenous movements on the national stages of Latin American countries has thus differed often dramatically, and it continues to do so. As such, despite constitutional reforms, the ongoing experiences of indigenous social movements in the 2000s and early 2010s must be considered; this is indeed the main focus of this thesis. This is in the context of the 'pink tide' of left-of-centre governments, flooding the continent in the early 2000s, on the ebb again in recent years (e.g. Panizza, 2009). How have they fared during this period? For indigenous movements aspiring to be a national force, a problem they have had to face is the problem of the ethnic diversity of indigenous populations and the need to unite distinct communities under an 'indigenous' banner, including non-indigenous communities. Even in Guatemala, where the large indigenous population is predominantly Maya, there are different

Agreement with the USA, but its demands range from indigenous autonomy to resource redistribution. It borrows its name for the Mexican revolutionary leader, Emiliano Zapata.

[16] The question is here whether it is respected in practice. Moreover, this touches on the notion of 'authentic' indigeneity; if the state can decide which communities are indigenous, and therefore can enjoy these rights, and which aren't, this becomes very problematic. As such, indigenous struggles are not only struggles for policy and constitutional changes, but also the meaning of indigeneity and who can claim to be indigenous and who cannot (Krausova, 2012).

ethno-linguistic groups within the Maya and it was only by the late 1980s that a 'fragile alliance' of a Pan-Mayan movement emerged (Langer & Muñoz, 2003).

Moreover, not only have indigenous people tried to influence national agendas as part of social movements, they have also, in some Latin American countries, formed ethnic parties to represent their interests on the electoral scene (Van Cott, 2005). Such parties have differed in terms of their success, but also in terms of their constituency, ranging from mono-ethnic parties through indigenous-only ones, to 'indigenous-based' parties (Van Cott, 2005: 17). The latter may emerge as an indigenous political party, but also make an appeal to a broader section of the electorate and supplement an 'indigenous agenda' with other popular demands. It is interesting to note that Van Cott's classification highlights the importance of forming broader, rather than just indigenous, alliances, since the 'indigenous-based' parties have fared the best, namely the MAS in Bolivia and—to a lesser extent—*Pachakutik*[17] in Ecuador and *Alianza Social* in Colombia.[18] Looking at the formation of political parties by indigenous social movements also brings to fore the crucial question of the movements' relationship with the state.

Not only have indigenous peoples' movements differed in their ability to become a significant national political force, they have also experienced divergent trajectories if they made it onto the national stage. Such trajectories "range from situations in which rural movements are currently fragmented and weak", including Mexico, Central America and the Southern Cone, "to situations, such as in Bolivia, Ecuador and Brazil, in which movements have been far more dynamic" and have been able to push through some pro-indigenous and pro-peasant policies (Vergara-Camus, 2013: 592). Venezuela, for example, could be seen as a case of close links between social movements and government, if not 'state-sponsored movements'. Conversely, in Brazil, indigenous organisations, the landless workers' movement (MST) and "other popular organisations…have not been part of or formed coalitions with the government or progressive parties or started parties of their own" and have thus also experienced more limited influence (Stahler-Sholk & Vanden, 2011). Ecuador could then be classed as an "intermediate case" with the indigenous movement experiencing mixed results from its involvement in institutionalised politics (Stahler-Sholk & Vanden, 2011).[19]

A way to typologise indigenous movement success would thus be to look at relations with the state; Zibechi's classification is useful here in grouping Latin American social movements into a) those that have maintained momentum in protesting against right-wing regimes, b) ones facing fragmentation in countries where left-of-centre governments have not met radical expectations and c) movements that have been able to influence policy to an important extent (Zibechi, 2007: 297-8). Cases belonging to the first category would include indigenous movements such as the *Zapatistas* in Mexico or indigenous communities in Colombia. In the

[17] The Pachakutik party, or officially *Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik* (MUPP) was established in 1995 by CONAIE.
[18] The CRIC (*Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca,* Cauca Indigenous Regional Council) created the ASI party (*Alianza Social Indígena,* Indigenous Social Alliance) in 1991, which has since gained national importance.
[19] Exemplified by the ill-fated participation in the 2000 military-indigenous 'coup' (Zamosc, 2007)

intermediate case, the Ecuadorean indigenous movement is perhaps the clearest example, with a strong indigenous movement experiencing periods of fragmentation. The last category, then, would seem to include the MAS government in Bolivia—where the popular-indigenous movement is actually in government—as well as Venezuela, where, despite the small size of the indigenous population, there have been radical advances in the protection of indigenous peoples' rights. This typology is useful in linking the relative successes of indigenous mobilisations to the nature of government in power, which highlights the importance of the political environment for movement success. This is theorised further in Chapter 2.

1.2 Research Puzzle

Yet this is also one of the main problems with both the literature on indigenous movements in Latin America and the general literature on the outcomes of social movements; arguably, too much of their explanations of movement success focus on indirect, external factors such as the nature of political opportunities. The role of movement-level variables, especially the nature of demands, for movement outcomes remains understudied. Moreover, despite ongoing efforts and recently growing interest, the question of movement outcomes in general remains relatively underdeveloped in the sociological literature on social movements and contentious politics. This is discussed further below, in Chapter 3, after Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical insight from both studies of indigenous struggles and social movements. To illustrate the phenomena under study here, three protest campaigns from the quantitative dataset (the data for which comes from local researcher reports, newswires, and other news sources) and two social movement organisations (which were studied during qualitative research in Bolivia) as examples of social movement activity, are introduced here. It is protests events and social movement organisations such as these that are the empirical focus of this work.

1.2.1 Three indigenous protest events

On November 10th, 2009, around 30 "*comunarios"*—members of a local indigenous peasant community—in Huajchillo in Bolivia's La Paz region, tore down the walls of several properties, claiming an ancestral right to the land. This followed a period of dispute, including marking the plots as belonging to the indigenous community on 2nd November and threatening an occupation. On the day of the 'invasion', the owners of the plots alerted the police and the protesters retreated. The Public Works ministry of left-wing popular-indigenous government of Evo Morales and the MAS vowed to protect private property (Los Tiempos, 2009; OSAL, 2009).

On February 22nd, 2006, around 50 Mapuche community members and activists from five indigenous communities in the Freire commune in Southern Chile blocked the North-South highway for several hours before being forced to retire by the police, in protest against plans to build an international airport on lands they claimed as ancestral (OSAL, 2006). This was the first in a month-long series of marches and road blocks, despite often heavy repression, rejecting the project and demanding land titles. On May 3rd, representatives of eleven indigenous communities from the area met with the centre-left *Concertación's* government's

representatives in the capital. Yet no agreement was reached, and even as protests against it continued, the construction went ahead and the airport was officially opened in 2014 (La Tercera, 2014).

On June 6th, 2009, Peruvian police clashed with thousands of indigenous protesters and their supporters, as they blockaded a section of a highway known as the 'Devil's Curve', near the town of Bagua in the Peruvian Amazon. Led by the indigenous leader Alberto Pizango, indigenous communities were protesting against decrees issued by Alan García's right-wing government, opening up their lands to private property and resource extraction. This deadly confrontation in which at least 33 people were killed, a culmination of months of indigenous resistance, sparked a national crisis in Peru. Further protests, violence and a state of siege eventually culminated in the decrees being repealed by the Peruvian Congress on June 19th (Hughes, 2010; Renique, 2009; OSAL, 2009).

The three protests above differ greatly in their demands, their tactics, and their outcomes. How can we explain why they experienced such different outcomes? Comparing such disparate events—united only in that they can be classed as un-conventional, contentious political activity, that they make their claims at least in part with reference to an ethnic, indigenous identity, and that they took place in Latin America—may seem too challenging. Yet it is precisely because of the heterogeneity of indigenous activism in the region that more systematic analyses are needed. This has the potential to enrich both the Latin American scholarship on indigenous politics, which often takes the impact of indigenous movements for granted, and the social movement scholarship on outcomes, which increasingly questions whether protest can have any direct impact at all. It is by examining these protest events, and more than 600 similar ones, through statistical methods that the first part of this thesis aims to do so.

1.2.2 Two indigenous social movement organisations

The second, qualitative part of the thesis investigates the trajectories of indigenous movements in Bolivia, before comparing five nationally important indigenous social movement organisations in the country. The mobilising capacity and temporary unity of these organisations in the early 2000s in Bolivia explains, at least partially, the ascendance to power of Evo Morales, the country's first indigenous president, at the helm of a popular indigenous social movement-*cum*-political party, the MAS (Yashar, 2005).

One of these organisations, the CIDOB (Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia), has been fighting for the rights of the country's indigenous peoples since the 1980s, representing the 34 indigenous groups of the Bolivian lowlands. During the neoliberal 1990s, it staged spectacular marches, bringing indigenous rights to the national political agenda. Subsequently, a series of multicultural reforms were passed in 1994 and 1996, something the CIDOB's leaders still claim as one of their major victories. It played a key role in pushing for the country's constituent assembly, which led to the passing on a new constitution in 2009, declaring Bolivia a 'plurinational' state. Yet it was not able to get many of its demands reflected in the constitutional text. Since 2011, it has renewed its resistance to the government's extractive

policies in indigenous territories, but with little effect (see Chapters 6 and 7; also, Albó, 2008; Yashar, 2005; Lucero, 2008).

Another of those five social movement organisations is the CSCIOB (Union Confederation of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia), a rural union movement of predominantly Aymara and Quechua coca-growers and subsistence farmers. Organising coca-growers against the neoliberal governments 'war on drugs' policies, it drew on both union politics and indigenous cosmovisions to mobilise massive demonstrations and road blocks that could bring the country to a standstill. Still, it gained few advantages before Evo Morales, one of the sector's leaders, was elected President; since, its proposal has been largely reflected not only in the new constitution, but perhaps more importantly also in the government implementation of its national development plans. Many of its past leaders now hold government positions, and its current ones say there is no longer any reason to protest (see Chapters 6 and 7; also, Albó, 2008; Crabtree, 2008).

How have these two organisations, which managed to unite with others to help bring a new popular indigenous government to power, fared so differently in recent years? What explains the outcomes they experienced in the early 2000s before the election of Morales? Is this simply due to the changing political environment—which they have themselves helped to shape—or have their strategies evolved over time, accounting at least in part for the diverse experiences they have had?

As such, in order to answer the questions above, within the general task of attempting to explain the outcomes of indigenous movements in Latin America, this thesis asks specifically:

- What is the role of movement-level variables, such as demands, framing, and tactics, for movement outcomes?
- In particular, does investigating the nature of demands and frames help elucidate divergent movement outcomes?
- If at all, do movement-level variables affect outcomes directly, or in interaction with external factors, such as the nature of political opportunities?

In doing so, this project undertakes three main tasks; (1) to build on the empirical and theoretical knowledge about indigenous movements in Latin America and to use it to inform the hypotheses about movement outcomes in the region, (2) to develop the theoretical discussion concerning the determinants of social movement outcomes in the general sociological literature and thus, (3) to contribute with a systematic, comparative and mixed-method analysis of cases from the Global South informed by a North-South theoretical dialogue in a scholarship that has too often focused on either on cases from 'Western' countries or single-case qualitative research, or both.

1.3 Thesis structure

This mixed-method thesis is structured in the following way. There are four empirical chapters, preceded by a theoretical framing and methodological set-up. As such, following this

introductory chapter, Chapter 2 argues that despite the proliferation of scholarly studies of indigenous movements in the Latin America, there has been a lack of systematic analyses of the determinants of their successes. It also shows that despite the renewed interest in social movement outcomes, there is little consensus in the sociological literature about their determinants and a scepticism about the direct impact of contentious collective activities. It argues that this could partly be explained by the relative lack of attention to both the content and the framing of demands in studies of movement outcomes. It draws on the insights from Latin American scholars and political philosophy to explore the different demands indigenous protesters have made—both in terms of the content of these demands and their framing—in order to develop a typology of claims and frames to be tested for their effect on outcomes.

This is followed by a methodological chapter, Chapter 3, which explains the logic of applying a mixed-methodological approach to the study of social movements and their outcomes. It highlights how despite the different methods used—multilevel logistic regression analysis of protest event data supplanted by a small-N analysis of protest campaigns, and a fuzzy set Comparative Qualitative Analysis (fsQCA) based on a qualitative process tracing investigation—this research is firmly grounded in the idea that causal explanations need to be sought and evaluated.

The first empirical chapter, Chapter 4, presents a quantitative analysis of indigenous protest event data collected for 13 Latin American countries from 2003 to 2013. Using a multilevel logistic regression, it evaluates the effect of both protest-level and country-level variables on protest outcomes, specifically acceptance and advantages. This chapter shows that, all other things—including political opportunities—being equal, protest-level variables contribute significantly to positive outcomes. They do so *both* on their own and in interaction with political opportunities. Different protest strategies influence the likelihood of being heard, and to a lesser extent of being listened to. A number of selected protest events and campaigns from the dataset are then further explored in Chapter 5. Operationalising the logic of matched cases, this chapter explores the causal mechanisms explaining the findings of the preceding chapter. This is the truly mixed method chapter of this thesis, combining the protest event data with new qualitative evidence.

Building on the insights of this chapter, Chapter 6 moves beyond protest event analysis and explores in qualitative details the recent trajectories of the indigenous (indigenous-peasant) movement in Bolivia, its different organisations and whether their strategic decisions regarding claims, frames, and tactics have led to different outcomes in terms of their access to and impact on decision-making within the changing Bolivian state, between 2000 and 2016. This process tracing of the struggles and experiences of indigenous organisations in Bolivia is built on in Chapter 7, which conducts a fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of five indigenous and indigenous-peasant social movement organisations in Bolivia. This is a less detailed, but more systematic analysis, which allows for the identification of multiple causal paths to 'success'.

Both qualitative chapters, Chapters 6 and 7, provide detailed evidence about the mechanisms linking the strategies of indigenous social movement organisations and the outcomes they

experienced. Specifically, they showed that there is an interaction between the strategies of social movement organisations (regarding the demands they make, how they ask for them, and what actions they undertake to get them) and the political environment in which they operate. This coincides with the findings of Chapters 4 and 5. As such, we can be confident that claiming and framing matters for movement outcomes, both on their own and, especially, in interaction with political opportunities. This attention to demands and claims has been missing from the social movement outcomes literature. Chapter 8, in concluding, links together the findings of this mixed method study, and argues that as the thesis chapters have shown the importance of paying attention to the nature of demands, it is necessary to rethink the concept of framing for understanding the consequences of protest in particular and social movements in general.

2. Theorising the outcomes of indigenous social movements: theories of framing meet theories of multiculturalism

> *"And even then, when the protesters succeed in forcing government to respond, they do not dictate the content of those responses. As to the variety of specific circumstances which determine how much the protesters will gain and how much they will lose, we still have a great deal to learn" (Piven & Cloward, 1979: 32).*

> *"When and how does mobilisation make a difference? When and how do activists achieve their goals? Is protest a necessary and/or sufficient condition for producing social and political change?" (Bosi et al., 2016).*

Nearly forty years after the publication of Piven and Cloward's seminal work, *Poor People's Movements* (1979), the relationship between protest and political outcomes is just as relevant and puzzling to social movement scholars as it was then. While advances have undoubtedly been made since 1979 in the study of social movement outcomes—as detailed below—this question remains a matter of fierce academic debate. In order to try and contribute to illuminating this puzzle, the current chapter reviews both the general sociological literature on the consequences of contentious collective action, works on the successes and failures of indigenous politics in Latin America, and the social movement scholarship developed by Latin American authors. Connecting the two provides a fertile ground to develop a novel theoretical framework for understanding movement outcomes, to be tested in the empirical chapters that follow.

The proliferation of indigenous peoples' social movements in Latin America has been studied extensively in the regional literature, with studies evaluating the emergence of indigenous movements (e.g. Trejo, 2012; Yashar, 2005), the dynamics of resistance and political representation of indigenous peoples (e.g. Lucero, 2008; Postero, 2007; Rodríguez Mir, 2008; Van Cott, 2005) and the multicultural reforms and other political outcomes that followed indigenous mobilisation (e.g. Hale, 2002; Puig, 2010; Van Cott, 2006).[20] Moreover, comparative works on indigenous movements and their political impact by Latin American scholars have enriched the debate, showing the importance of evolving movement strategies for explaining the outcomes of indigenous mobilisations (e.g. Aguilar & Escárzaga, 2014; Albó, 2008; Dávalos, 2005). Moreover, Latin American theorising of the relationship between social movements and the state helps elucidate the complicated relationship between social movements and national governments, especially left-of-centre governments, some of which they have helped bring to power (Albó, 2008; Svampa, 2008, 2017; Zibechi, 2007). This literature has not tended to engage with the outcomes of indigenous movements in a direct dialogue with recent advances in the sociological literature about movement outcomes. However, it has dealt with the trajectories of indigenous movements, multicultural policies and

[20] See Van Cott (2010) for a recent review of the literature on indigenous politics in Latin America.

constitutional reforms, and the relationship between indigenous movements, parties, and the state.

As such, it provides important insights about indigenous movements in Latin America that can help explain the outcomes they have experienced. Specifically, it tells us about the importance of considering both (a) the claims and frames of indigenous movements and (b) the relationship between movements and the state for evaluating movement outcomes. Despite the advances made in social movement studies since, there is analytical benefit to re-focusing on what social movements *actually asked for.* Integrating these insights with what we already know about social movement outcomes from the sociological literature is essential for understanding the successes and failures of indigenous movements in the Latin American continent, and offers to contribute to the theoretical knowledge about movement outcomes in general.

2.1 Theorising social movement outcomes

One of the main academic debates about social movements is not only whether protest matters, but also whether any 'success' is contingent on the nature of the movement, or determined by outside factors that protest participants and organisations have little or no control over. Despite a recent surge in interest in the consequences of social movements, the determinants of success of social protest remain contested (Amenta, 2014; Bosi *et al*., 2016; Giugni *et al*., 1999; Kolb & Tarrow, 2007; Suh, 2012). Many studies suggest that the direct influence of overt protest, especially on public policy, is minimal, if not sometimes counterproductive (Giugni, 2007; Olzak & Soule, 2009). Yet other recent scholarship argues that disruptive protest can have a direct impact in certain contexts (Andrews, 2001; Biggs & Andrews, 2015; Kolb & Tarrow, 2007).

Still, context matters, and the most prominent models of protest outcomes propose either indirect or joint effects (Giugni, 2007; Meyer, 2004). Giugni's analysis, for example, suggests that movements have little direct positive impact, and any effect they have on public policy "depends on the combination of overt protest activities, the type of issues they raise, and external resources such as public opinion and political alliances with institutional actors" (2007: 53). This corresponds to the proliferation of scholarship evidencing the importance of the political opportunity structure not only for movement emergence, but also movement outcomes, attempting to explain the impact of protest as an indirect or joint effect (Amenta *et al.*, 2010; Giugni *et al*., 1999; Meyer, 2004).

Indeed, since the 1990s, attention in the study of social movement outcomes has shifted away from a focus on movement- and protest-level variables—in particular the extent of disruption and organisational strength—to political opportunities in general and the policy process in particular (Bosi *et al*., 2016). As such, there is no common theoretical approach that could easily be applied to understanding the outcomes of indigenous movements in Latin America. Instead, it is necessary to test not only whether the strategies of protesters have any direct effect on securing certain outcomes, but also the extent to which the success rate of their actions depends on factors outside of their control, such as the nature of the political, mediatic, and legal environment in which they operate.

Additionally, there is little consensus on how to define or measure outcomes in the first place, and particularly what is meant by 'success' in relation to social movements. The consequences of movements that have been considered range from legislative change, organisational impact and biographical consequences for protest participants (Amenta & Caren, 2004; Giugni *et al*., 1999, McAdam *et al*, 2001) to forcing Presidents to resign (Albó, 2008; Lazar, 2008), creating alternative political spaces (Zibechi, 2012) and even 'making the future possible again' (de Sousa Santos, 2017). As such, a clear focus on a specific type of outcome is needed; here I focus on whether social movements achieved any of the 'things' they publicly asked for.

It is helpful for that purpose to return to some of the earliest (Northern) attempts to systematically evaluate the outcomes of social movements, in which Gamson (1975) developed a typology of social movement outcomes based on (1) the acceptance and (2) the advantages they receive. This would categorise movement 'success' into four possible outcomes; namely full response, pre-emption, co-optation, and collapse (Gamson, 1990[1975]: 29). While advantages might be secured, the movement organisation itself might not benefit from any acceptance by its opponents. Conversely, organisational gains (such as acceptance) do not necessarily mean either benefits for members, or positive change for further movement activity (Piven & Cloward, 1979). Looking at both acceptance and advantages highlights the importance of paying attention to both the initial state response as well as the (later) securing of specific benefits, including policy change. Initial acceptance as representatives of the constituency in question, as evidenced for example by public recognition of the legitimacy of their grievances or invitation to negotiations, can in itself be considered a success, even if more limited than advantages. Moreover, as engaged with more fully below, the concept of co-optation is complicated, and increasingly questioned by scholars from and of Latin America; "concepts such as "co-optation" … need to be thought of in their complexity as they end up being inadequate for describing what has been happening in the countries of the South" (Zibechi, 2007: 298; see also Lazar, 2017).

Looking at the attainment of both acceptance and specific advantages, rather than general 'success', is thus crucial; "success implies the attainment of specific, widely shared goals, but the goals of most social movements are contested by participants and observers" (Andrews, 2001: 72). At the same time, this approach has also led the scholarship to concentrate arguably too much on the outcome side of the equation, and less on the social movement side. Although many diverse types of consequences have now been evaluated, including biographical and intra-movement ones, legislative change remains the focus (Amenta *et al.*, 2010; Bosi *et al*., 2016; Giugni, 2007). This makes sense as we are still primarily interested in whether social movements can 'make a difference.' The challenge is, however, that more and more attention seems to be paid to the intricacies of the policy process, especially in the United States, with correspondingly less attention paid to the strategies of social movement actors themselves.

This is at odds with what may be the more relevant question for social movement activists; such as, which demand to prioritize, how to frame it and what tactic to use to advance it. Scholars cannot *a priori* decide that movement-level variables do not matter, especially when studying new cases. Moreover, sometimes what a specific campaign is asking for does not even

require any legislative change[21], nor do the programmes of specific social movement organisations necessarily reflect the specific policy developments that are often taken as a proxy measure for change deemed favourable for the whole movement. At the same time, detailed attention to the different strategies used *within* the social movement is often missing.

Perhaps going full circle, I argue that looking at both acceptance and advantages is thus still analytically valuable, as it refocuses our attention back on what the social movement in question—or its individual social movement organisations and/or protest mobilisations—actually asked for. Initial acceptance as representatives of the constituency in question "might be an important pre-condition for future impact", but in itself only represents an "extremely weak form of political change" (Kolb & Tarrow, 2007: 34).

The public recognition of the legitimacy of grievances or invitation to negotiations can in themselves be considered a positive outcome, if only very limited. What is more relevant about acceptance is its analytical usefulness, in that evidence for it can also be used to argue more convincingly that if any advantages occurred, they can be more plausibly linked, in a causal way, to the social movement or its organisations and/or activity. For example, highlighting the goals and tactics of a particular protest campaign, tracing the negotiations and public pronouncements of both challengers and targets, and showing how the meeting of some of the demands followed from negotiations, can add analytical weight to the proposition that the protest *caused*, at least in part, the outcome in question.

What is important is not only trying to find the effects (or not) of protest, but, if such effects are suggested by statistical analyses, identifying the causal mechanisms of impact (McAdam *et al*., 2001). In fact, Gamson's analysis made no assumptions "that the challenging group necessarily caused the benefits" (Gamson, 1990[1975]: 34). Still, one of the main findings of Gamson's original study is that groups that use violence are more likely to succeed, in particular in terms of receiving advantages (Gamson, 1975). This suggests that attention needs to be drawn to movement tactics. The difficulty with Gamson's work is that his random sample included groups with widely disparate goals, ranging from revolutionary groups advocating the overthrow of capitalism to sports unions, mainly negotiating better pay for members. Within such a sample, groups with 'non-displacement' demands are shown as more likely to succeed, as could be expected, but the sample diversity seems to preclude a further analysis of the importance of variation in demands. Focusing on a sample of indigenous protests and groups, despite their diversity, thus offers the potential to look in more detail at the importance of differences in both the nature of claims and the way in which they are framed; that is to say, what social movements ask for, and how they ask for it.

The academic debate on whether this matters is far from settled. Based on a re-analysis[22] of Gamson's original dataset, Goldstone (1980) posited that while challenging groups are more likely to succeed than Gamson argued, their success has less to do with factors under the groups' control, and is more easily explained by the occurrence of 'crises' in which challenging

[21] It is true that is probably much more so the case in the so-called Global South, than in the United States.

[22] As well as re-coding, including of 'outcome', which Gamson argued led to some of the differences between his and Goldstone's conclusions (Gamson, 1980).

groups are generally more likely to succeed. In both analyses, the *way* in which these factors can be linked to specific outcomes remained unexplored. It is only more recently that studies focusing in detail on the potential causal mechanisms linking social movements to specific outcomes began to emerge (Biggs & Andrews, 2015; Kolb & Tarrow, 2007). The effect of disruption is perhaps the most commonly cited mechanism; "protest is likely to generate change through disruption by threatening established actors" (Biggs & Andrews, 2015: 1). In particular, considering the economic cost of disruption and the economic cost of concession can explain how disruption affects protest outcomes (Luders, 2006; Piven & Cloward, 1979). As such, not only the level of disruption, but also its nature, must be considered as potentially explaining the outcomes of social movements.

In addition to the below discussion about the content and framing of demands, it would seem beyond doubt that the strategies of protesters and movement organisations continue to deserve attention in evaluations of movement outcomes. However, do these factors lead to certain outcomes directly, or in combination with external, contextual conditions? Or both? Therefore, the nature of variables potentially impacting movement success needs further analysis. So does the *way* in which, once identified, there variables are proposed to have led to the outcome in question.

2.2 Social movement theories from and of Latin America

This thesis proposes that a fruitful way to attempt to do so is to examine the strategic choices regarding claiming, framing and tactics of indigenous movements in Latin America. Indeed, social movement scholars from and of the region have tended to pay greater attention to the strategies of collective actors than much of the recent social movement literature from the Global North. The latter could benefit from adopting Latin American scholars' focus on the strategic choices made by the collective actors they study, rather than presenting often rather static visions of movement claims and frames. Moreover, much of the Latin American scholarship theorises the *relationship* between social movements and the state, rather than discussing political *opportunities.* This can help move forward the debate about not only whether, how also how, favourable political conditions may aid or hinder social movements in achieving intended consequences.

Studies specifically of indigenous movements in Latin America have focused, if not on explaining emergence, then on the core question of the extent to which the multicultural reforms introduced following indigenous mobilisations have had a transformative effect on the societies in which they have been implemented. This alludes to the success of indigenous movements; yet the actual mechanisms through which different outcomes came about have not been systematically studied in the Latin American context. What has been explored is the contradictory nature of the multicultural rights that have emerged (Alvarez *et al*, 1998; Escobar, 2008, 2010; Hale, 2002; Lucero, 2008; Postero, 2007). At the same time, Yashar's (2005) work explaining the emergence of indigenous movements focuses on why movements that framed their demands as *indigenous* emerged at all. It details how communities that previously framed their demands as a peasant, class-based, struggle then took up the language of indigeneity and

cultural rights in response to changes in both domestic and international political opportunities. This has also been determined by the specific histories of collective struggles in different Latin American countries; even neighbouring countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru in which we may have expected similar dynamics of indigenous politics, the trajectories of the politicisation of ethnicity have varied significantly (Albó, 2008). This highlights the strategic nature of framing and its interaction with external circumstances.

Moreover, analyses of the role of domestic NGOs and international institutions highlight how these have often privileged a more culturally-based, recognition-focused, type of indigenous demands at the expense of more class-based, redistribution-focused, claims (Andolina *et al*., 2009; Keck & Sikkink, 1998). Other qualitative studies of Latin American indigenous movements show that claims made as part of class-based, versus ethnicity-based, activism (i.e., redistribution versus recognition) can lead to different outcomes, specifically in terms of the nature of the multicultural reforms that follow indigenous mobilisation.

Studies such as Hale's and Postero's have argued that although many neoliberal governments in Latin America have also passed multicultural reforms containing cultural rights for indigenous peoples, these governments have also tended to privilege a certain kind of indigenous rights that were considered less 'threatening' (Hale, 2002; see also: Horton, 2006; Postero, 2007). This draws on the notion developed by Bolivian scholars Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui and Xavier Albó of the "permitted Indian" (*"indio permitido"*), as opposed to the "rebel Indian" (Albó, 2008; Hale, 2007; see also: Rivera Cusicanqui, 1987). While the term "permitted" referred to the propensity to use less disruptive tactics and the greater willingness to negotiate with (neoliberal) governments, it also meant privileging rights containing recognition but not redistribution. Indigenous movements demanding recognition rather than redistribution have also sometimes been labelled as more 'authentically' indigenous; this is especially problematic if the state can decide who is authentically indigenous and who is not, and thus who can make a legitimate claim to certain rights and who cannot (Hale, 2002; Krausova, 2012; Postero, 2007).

Van Cott's comparative work on multiculturalism and neoliberalism has also contributed to these debates, exploring the relationship between recognition and redistribution in indigenous movements in Latin America. It suggests that the relative prominence of these two elements in movement demands is determined largely by the relative strength of indigenous movements, local elites and the electoral left (Van Cott, 2006). However, Van Cott's research does not consider the opposite causality; does the relative strength of redistributive versus recognition-based claim affect movement outcomes? Do indigenous social and political actors strategise about which of the two to focus on more, especially when forced by external circumstances to choose? It is necessary to consider the nature of indigenous demands, and how they evolve, rather than assuming a static and homogenous view of the claim of indigenous protesters and their representative organisations.

Looking at the theorising of social movements in general by Latin American scholars is illuminating in this regard. Svampa, for example, theorises the evolving approaches of progressive collective actors in Latin America into four political-ideological groupings: "the

indigenous communitarian, the popular nationalist, the traditional left, and the "new" autonomy movements" (Svampa, 2010: 81-2). However, rather than presenting these as static categories, Svampa traces the evolving emphases of social and political actors in Latin America, both as contentious outsiders and institutionalised insiders. Moreover, not all movements of indigenous people(s) in Latin America fit squarely within the communitarian political-ideological orientation.

As will be explored in Chapters 6 and 7, indigenous social movements in Bolivia, for example, have wavered in recent years between a) the popular nationalist line, which includes elements of the traditional left, as well as anti-racism and a language of anti-imperialism and sometimes decolonisation—focusing on demands for redistribution legitimated in the language of equal rights—and b) the communitarian as well as autonomist approach, which privileges language recognition, plurinationality, territorial rights and demands for the protection of Mother Earth—recognition claims that tend to be voiced in the language of difference—and are increasingly at odds with the government of Evo Morales.

This makes sense in the context of the continued reliance on commodity extraction in spite of the 'left tide', given the political strength of what Svampa has termed the 'commodity consensus' (Svampa, 2010, 2017). Despite the consequent 'environmentalisation' of social struggles and the "eco-territorial turn" of resistance as protest against extractive industry grows across the continent (Svampa, 2017: 21), it remains theoretically fruitful to distinguish between the a) recognition/autonomy/difference and the b) redistribution/inclusion/equality strands within Latin American social movements. This applies to indigenous movements as well, and it is arguably more useful to think of two types of indigenous movements rather than the four general categories developed by Svampa. It might also be useful to think in terms of sameness versus difference (Escobar, 2008). The usefulness of this theoretical dichotomy is further discussed below.

It is relevant since, as discussed in the first part of this theoretical chapter, social movements may be able to achieve intended consequences by imposing a cost on their targets. If this is the case, then might not the cost presented by their demands also play a role? As such, it can be analytically useful to distinguish the potential costs presented by indigenous movement claims. Evaluating the current status of progressive social and political projects in Latin America, Escobar argues that:

> "The current socio-economic, political and cultural transformations suggest the existence of two potentially complementary but also competing and contradictory projects: (a) alternative modernizations, based on an anti-neo-liberal development model, in the direction of a post-capitalist economy and an alternative form of modernity .... This project stems from the end of the hegemony of the neo-liberal project but does not engage significantly with the second aspect of the conjuncture, namely, the hegemony of Euro-modernity; (b) decolonial projects, based on a different set of practices (e.g. communal, indigenous, hybrid, and above all, pluriversal and intercultural), leading to a post-liberal society (an alternative to euro-modernity). This second project stems from the second aspect of the conjuncture and seeks to transform neoliberalism and development from this perspective" (Escobar, 2010: 11).

The first 'project', as identified by Escobar, seems to desire a transformation of current economic and developmental models, implying a challenge to the existing distribution of material resources. It can thus be understood as, at its core, a redistributive struggle. The second 'project' then focuses more on the desire to challenge the cultural oppressions that are legacies of colonialism. Such visions of social change can be complementary, but as Escobar points out, are not always necessarily so. Moreover, the latter path does not *necessarily* present a challenge to the current distribution of material resources (Hale, 2011).

Indigenous mobilisations have not only claimed cultural *recognition* and political autonomy, but also resource provision and land *redistribution*. At times, indigenous movements have been able to couple demands for identity-focused recognition and class-based redistribution. In fact, most indigenous movements have "wavered between an emphasis on ethnic- versus class-based demands" (Yashar, 2005: 106). At other times, however, the identity-based focus on recognition would compete with the class-based demands for redistribution, one threatening to displace the other (Andolina *et al*., 2009; Hale, 2002). This is important, since being able to foster an "inclusive indigenous and popular identity… can be the source of considerable political strength" (Lazar, 2008: 258-9). Thus, I argue that examining the ways in which indigenous movements make strategic decisions about whether, when and how to ask for recognition and redistribution may help explain their trajectories.

2.3 Recognition and redistribution: a political-philosophical detour

This dichotomy of politics of redistribution versus politics of recognition comes from the political theory literature on both feminism and multiculturalism, and it has been applied in a number of ways to elucidate the relationship between multiculturalism on the one hand and liberalism, neoliberalism or the welfare state on the other, including in Latin America (Banting & Kymlicka, 2006; Eisenstadt *et al.*, 2013; Fraser & Honneth, 2003; Goldberg, 1994; Peeler, 2003; Van Cott, 2006; Taylor, 1994). It emerges as theorists began to notice—although largely in reference to the Global North—that "claims for social justice seem increasingly to divide into two types;... redistributive claims, which seek a more just distribution of resources and wealth,… [and] the "politics of recognition",… [in which] the goal, in its most plausible form, is a difference-friendly world" (Fraser, 2003: 7). Similarly, Iris Marion Young (2000) positions the politics of recognition and difference as a response to liberal democracy's blindness to difference and the assumption of (the need to create) undifferentiated individual citizens while racism and discrimination persist.

Applied to social movements, the recognition-redistribution dichotomy could at first glance be seen as corresponding to the typology of identity-based 'new' social movements versus class-based 'old' ones (Dalton & Kuechler, 1990; Melucci, 1980). Instead, it is a useful tool for analysing the role that class and identity play in current social movement struggles, especially recognition struggles (Hobson, 2003). Moreover, the theory of New Social Movements has been applied to the Latin American context (Alvarez *et al*., 1998), but this can arguably overstate the dichotomy of the 'old' and the 'new' in Latin American contention (Reiter, 2011). There tends to be broad agreement that rather than there being two different types of rural

movements in Latin America—class-based 'peasant' movements and identity-based indigenous movements—class and identity are very much interlinked in such struggles in Latin America (Lazar, 2008; Lucero, 2008; Postero, 2007; Yashar, 2005). Nevertheless, the distinction between class-based and identity-based demands—between redistribution and recognition—can be applied to the study of indigenous movements in Latin America not in the sense that all indigenous movements should be considered as 'new', but in allowing one to look at what kinds of demands are privileged by indigenous protesters and organisations at different times *within* the indigenous movement.

In her contribution to the recognition-redistribution debate in political philosophy, Nancy Fraser's theorising (Fraser, 1997, 2003) corresponds to the observations of scholars of Latin America that often claims for recognition cannot easily be separated from those for redistribution, especially when looking at indigenous movements as a whole (e.g. Yashar, 2005). Normatively, Fraser argues that both are needed to achieve social justice, advocating a "two-dimensional conception of justice that can accommodate both defensible claims for social equality and defensible claims for the recognition of difference" (Fraser, 2003: 9). This normative dualism does not mean that Fraser is not deeply critical of any theoretical or political attempts to collapse all justice claims into either the politics of recognition or the politics of redistribution. In fact, this is a crucial tenet of her approach.

This need for a dual lens is also reflected in the empirical experiences of indigenous movements in Latin America. While overall, both the claims for recognition in the language of difference and the politics of redistribution justified with reference to equal rights are present in indigenous politics in the region, this does not mean that both types of claims and frames are always present equally. In different countries, different times, and for different indigenous groups, one is often privileged at the expense of the other. Sometimes it is a question of co-existence and creative tension, at others of conflict and displacement. The notion of 'seeing with both eyes', discussed below in reference to the emergence of organising along the axes of both class and ethnicity in Bolivia (Albó, 2008; Rivera Cusicanqui, 1984), does not mean that at other times, indigenous social movement actors cannot struggle with 'one eye closed'.

The question of displacement is particularly relevant here, as it allows us to make clear whether we are considering the recognition-redistribution debate theoretically, normatively, or empirically. While normatively, Fraser along with many feminist theorists, such as Anne Phillips (Fraser, 2003; Phillips, 1997), might agree that both the recognition of difference and the redistribution of economic resources are necessary for achieving equality, this does not mean that empirically the two always go hand in hand. Thus, while normatively the displacement of the material by the symbolic is relatively easily dismissed, "the cultural displacing the material; identity politics displacing class; the politics of constitutional reform displacing the economics of equality" (Phillips, 1997: 1) is something of which empirical examples abound (while the reverse was arguably the case in much of the post-war Global North, and especially the so-called Second World).

This is since, despite the normative dualism of Fraser and others, which integrates recognition and redistributive goals, in the minds of social and political actors, the two can also be seen as

conflicting and/or mutually exclusive, not only mutually necessary. Moreover, powerful actors can insist on separating the two, such as resisting redistributive struggles by supporting and privileging recognition movements without any redistributive elements (Hale, 2002; Krausova, 2012). Fraser herself makes this clear in expounding the "folk paradigms" of justice—wide spread ways of understanding social justice underpinned by a certain moral grammar—in some of which recognition and redistribution can be seen as antithetical. Such "folk paradigms constitute depersonalized discursive formations that mediate moral disagreements and social protest", being formed of "transpersonal normative discourses that are widely diffused..., permeating not only political public spheres, but also workplaces, households, and civil-society associations" (Fraser, 2003: 207). These ways of understanding what is just and legitimate are both a crucial arena for, and a crucial subject of, social movement struggles. This can help explain the resonance and coherence of various claims and frames, and is returned to below.

Following the publication of Fraser's work, a fierce debate on the political philosophy of recognition and redistribution, equality and difference, emerged (e.g. Hobson, 2003; Honneth, 2003; Phillips, 2003; I. M. Young, 2000). This thesis is certainly not the place to even attempt settle such debates. Therefore, I simply try and adopt Nancy Fraser's position within the debate, and use her philosophical insights to guide my own empirical classification of different types of indigenous struggles. Only briefly do I thus engage with critiques of Fraser's political philosophy. For example, Phillips's (2003) take on Fraser's account ends up, in my view, validating the latter's argument. It shows the dangers of an identity model of recognition, while arguing that the status model of recognition—focusing on the parity of participation (Fraser) or political voice (Phillips)—can indeed recognise historically grounded differences on the way to full equality. Again, I do not wish to engage here in the normative debates about the justifiability of recognition and redistribution claims, and the legitimacy of various political struggles that contain them. The perception of legitimacy, however, matters for social movements empirically; this is why Fraser's approach is arguably so useful here.

Moreover, Phillips' account seems to flatly reject as illegitimate any claims for the distinctiveness of social groups. This may make some sense when focusing predominantly on gender, given that most feminist struggles fight for gender equality, rather than the reification of supposed differences between men and women. However, this becomes problematic when considering other types of difference, especially if it was to be applied to indigenous rights.

In another critique, Young posits that Fraser "inappropriately dichotomizes issues of culture and structure" (I. M. Young, 2000: 92). At the same time, in arguing about the how claims for cultural recognition often go hand-in-hand with struggles against unequal distribution of resources, Young actually eloquently explains the difference between the two. In reference specifically to indigenous struggles, she writes:

> "Indigenous politics certainly does entail a claim to recognition of the cultural distinctness of these groups... They demand of the societies that continue to dominate them recognition and support for their distinct cultures and the freedom to express and rejuvenate those cultures. Colonialist oppression of indigenous people has involved not only cultural imperialism, however, but at the same time and often in the same actions deprivation of the land and resources from which they derived a living" (I. M. Young, 2000: 106).

While this is certainly the case when speaking about 'indigenous movements' overall, looking at individual indigenous protest campaigns and organisations in the empirical sections of this thesis shows that at times, recognition claims are more important than redistributive ones, and *vice versa*. Moreover, different indigenous leaders and organisations struggle for members and supporters, public opinion and international recognition by focusing on one more than the other, sometimes at the latter's expense, depending on their analysis of the needs and goals of their (purported) constituents and of the external opportunities and constraints that they face.

As such, while the implication of Phillips' argument seems be to reject the legitimacy of indigenous struggles outright, Young ends up homogenising indigenous movements, without providing any empirical evidence that the balance of recognition and redistribution is always the same for different indigenous social and political actors, in different countries and at different times. Fraser, conversely, discusses how classically redistributive struggles—such as the labour movement—can at times incorporate recognition elements, such as proclaiming working-class pride, depending on internal and external circumstances. Recognition struggles, on the other hand, may also focus on the redistribution of material resources to a lesser or greater degree. It is such a lens that helps us describe the relative prominence of recognition as opposed to redistribution in specific collective struggles.

If this explains how I typologize the *claims* of indigenous social movements, how about how they *frame* those claims? As discussed below, it is not enough to consider what social movements ask for if we are to try and understand how likely they are to achieve those goals; what might also matter is how they ask for them. How do social movement actors legitimate those claims? What are the normative claims that collective actors themselves make in the pursuit of their goals? In Nancy Fraser's words, what are the 'folk paradigms' of social justice that they refer to in trying to convince supporters, allies, targets and publics that their claims are justified, and the situation that their constituents find themselves in is unjust?

Again, the theoretical debates about liberalism, multiculturalism and feminism are informative here, as they identify the salient difference between making collective claims in the name of the right to equality on the one hand, and the right to difference on the other (Fraser, 2003; Taylor & Gutmann, 1994; I. M. Young, 2000). In his famous contribution, which coined the term the 'politics of recognition', Charles Taylor illustrates the distinction between political claims that aim for a (traditionally liberal individual) equality—in which recognition demands are seen as necessary to achieve that equality—and political struggles which seek to ensure the reproduction of group difference (and equality *between* groups).

> "For instance, some of the (apparently) most flagrant departures from "difference-blindness" are reverse discrimination measures, affording people from previously unfavored groups a competitive advantage for jobs or places in universities. This practice has been justified on the grounds that historical discrimination has created a pattern within which the unfavored struggle at a disadvantage. Reverse discrimination is defended as a temporary measure that will eventually level the playing field and allow the old "blind" rules to come back into force in a way that doesn't disadvantage anyone. This argument seems cogent enough— wherever its factual basis is sound. But it won't justify some of the measures now urged on the grounds of difference, the goal of which is not to bring us back to an eventual "difference-blind" social space but, on the contrary, to maintain and cherish

> distinctness, not just now but forever. After all, if we're concerned with identity, then what is more legitimate than one's aspiration that it never be lost?" (Taylor, 1994: 40).

This distinction between the right to equality and the right to difference thus helps distinguish the ways in which indigenous movements legitimate their claims. Again, the two are sometimes complementary, but not always. More specifically, do indigenous collective actors legitimate their claims in reference to colonial dispossession and pre-Columbian rights, that is, a *difference frame*. Or, do they focus on highlighting their right to the same material resources, and to lack of discrimination, as all other citizens of the postcolonial countries they find themselves in? The latter can be argued to be an *equality frame*. An analysis of movement frames, conceptualised in this way, has been largely missing from scholarship on social movement outcomes. One recent study of social movement outcomes, discussed below, does take this into account in reference to the women's movement in the United Stated (McCammon, 2012). As argued and evidenced below, this matters both in terms of the resonance of the frame with political agendas and public opinion, but also in terms of the internal coherence between frames and claims.

Thus, the question of whether organised political actors are seeking recognition of specific group difference or redistribution with the aim of economic equality remains a topic in academic, political and public debates. Of course, one can redistribute towards groups, and one can recognise the differences between individuals. The crucial difference, however, is whether the goal is the levelling of inequality with the aim of producing a society of equal individuals, or the recognition of group difference in view of producing a multicultural and/or plurinational society. It can of course be both, but equally these goals do not automatically go hand in hand in the real world. Moreover, in the minds of activists, publics and targets alike, these can be seen as mutually exclusive. As Young points out, critics accuse political actors struggling for the recognition of difference of promoting 'special interest' and selfish identity politics (I. M. Young, 2000). While, as Young herself describes, this is not the case for many if not most recognition focused political actors, the *accusation* by target and publics alike is in itself important for understanding the trajectories of recognition struggles.

In the case of indigenous struggles, many claims and frames are indeed focused on the recognition of a specific identity, and the assurance of the group's survival into the future (see also: Taylor & Gutmann, 1994). It is such claims that I have labelled here are recognition struggles, following Fraser's theorising of this term and its application to Latin American political struggles (e.g. Hale, 2002; Lucero, 2008; Yashar, 2005). The correspondent framing is then defined as the right-to-difference framing. Other groups fight more prominently for equal access to material resources and political power in the postcolonial states in which they live. It is those kinds of claims within indigenous movements that I consider as redistribution claims, framed in the language of equality.

Although I expected the recognition claims to correspond to a framing around difference, and the redistribution claiming to generally be legitimated in the language of equal rights, as discussed earlier, this is not necessarily the case, as shown in Chapters 6 and 7. Since this study looks at indigenous movements—defined above as movements in which indigenous people(s)

participate *as* indigenous, *qua* their ethno-linguistic identity—claims for recognition are overall always present. The question is, to what extent are demands that would require the redistribution of resources given prominence? What is more important, when faced with a choice, respect or resources? For indigenous movements, asking for respect and recognition is always part of the story. However, whether their claims also challenge the current distribution of material resources (land redistribution, provision of services, etc.), or not (inclusion of flags, symbolic recognition of diversity, etc.) arguably matters for how successful these claims are likely to be.

Following Fraser's theorising discussed above, I argue that empirically, social struggles can fall into three categories. *First*, and Fraser's ideal type, is a movement that couples demands for recognition with claims for redistribution. In this case, collective actors are asking both for respect and equal treatment, and enough material resources to be able to practically enjoy such equality. In this sense, when directed at the state, they are asking of the state to be both *enabling* and *allowing* of a dignified life. Arguably, some of indigenous peasant organisations in Bolivia analysed in Chapters 6 and 7, and hinted at in the Introduction, do precisely this. *Secondly*, a social movement may focus predominantly on recognition without requiring redistribution, or be willing to sacrifice the latter in favour of the former when faced with a (perceived) choice.

The latter is what Young above talks about as being accused of 'identity politics'. This asks the state to not homogenise and interfere; to *allow* for difference, but does not require it to *enable.* Such elements are present within indigenous movements when leaders and organisations focus on recognition at the expense of redistribution; in the empirical chapters below, two organisations in Bolivia (CIDOB and CONAMAQ) are classified as such. The struggles of such collective actors are not incompatible with 'neoliberal abandon' (Pleyers, 2017; see also Hale 2011), as exemplified by some of the victories these organisations were able to secure in 1990s Bolivia. *Thirdly*, traditional class politics tend to fight for equal access to material resources, without usually resorting to claims about identity or distinctiveness. Supporting the welfare state, their take on its role is that of an *enabling* state.

Such a classification of indigenous movement demands is also applied to the protest event analysis in Chapter 4; in this sense, it was more straightforward as single protest events tended to have a dominant demand that could be identified; see Table 1 below (p. 36) for examples of recognition and redistribution claims. One could argue that the recognition-redistribution dichotomy, in relation to indigenous movements, could more accurately be described as an autonomy-inclusion axis. However, autonomy usually also entails the redistribution of material resources as well as political power. In that sense, it presents a greater economic and sometimes political cost on the targets than symbolic recognition claims. This is crucial; starting with the recognition–redistribution dichotomy allowed me to identify the importance of the cost that meeting the demand would impose on targets, in this case the state, in Chapters 4 and 5. Then, claims for the recognition of territorial rights which include extractible natural resources are in a sense an exception that proves the rule. Protecting already granted territorial autonomy does not challenge the existing distribution of resources; however, as Latin American states have only intensified their extractive drive—especially left-of-centre governments, which have relied on income from extraction to fund their redistributive policies, as discussed above—not

exploiting mineral resources because of indigenous opposition becomes politically costly. However, they can still be classified as recognition demands theoretically.

2.4 Framing and movement outcomes: demands, claims, and frames

So how may this help us understand the successes and failures of indigenous movements in Latin America? As discussed above, social movement outcomes have been conceptualised in a variety of ways in studies of social movements and contentious politics. Investigating policy outcomes, especially, focuses on whether, through (contentious) collective action, social movements manage to get what they asked for. Although policy changes have been one of the most studied types of outcomes of social movements, as argued previously not enough attention has been paid to the nature of the demands made in shaping outcomes. If the question is whether or not social movements got what they asked for, then part of the answer must be an evaluation of what they actually demanded. On one level, this may seem to be stating the obvious. Of course, more radical—or 'displacement'—demands are, on the whole, harder to achieve than more moderate ones (Gamson, 1975). In reference to indigenous movements, demands for funds to celebrate a cultural festival or official inclusion of an indigenous symbol as a national symbol—demands of the "permitted Indian" as elaborated above—are overall more likely to be met than demands for land titles or subsoil rights to rich natural resources.

On another level, however, the "permitted" claims are also not static. What social movements ask for, and how they ask for it, must be seen as resulting from dynamic processes of strategic decision-making of social movement leaders and activists and potentially a crucial factor explaining their successes and failures. Studies of social movements moved away from looking at the nature of grievances, because movements with the same demands would often experience completely different outcomes. However, this is not to say that the nature of claims made by social movements cannot affect their chances of success, both directly and indirectly. Indeed, social movement scholarship is beginning to emphasise again the social and economic structures that protesters are struggling within, and thus the grievances they mobilise around (Caren *et al*., 2017; della Porta, 2015; Giugni & Grasso, 2015).

Refocusing attention to the nature of grievances also means we can pay more attention to the specific demands that emerge as a result, and differentiate various demands *within* one social movement. Arguably, this is what the framing perspective attempts to elucidate. Building on Goffman's classic *Frame Analysis* (1986 [1974]), the nature of diagnostic and prognostic frames, the extent of frame resonance and the dynamics of frame transformation (Benford & Snow, 1992, 2000; Snow, 2004; Snow *et al*., 2014) can all help us understand both the origins and the consequences of social movement activity. However, there is often little clarity about what these terms actually describe in relation to empirical phenomena.

2.4.1 Framing and movement outcomes

Since its emergence in the late 1990s, the framing perspective has brought to the attention of social movement scholars the "potential influence of cultural and ideational factors" (Cress &

Snow, 2000: 1064). According to its intellectual founders, framing is "an active, process-derived phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction" or, more specifically, meaning construction during social movement activity (Benford & Snow, 1992: 136; 2000). It can also be understood as "the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action" (McAdam *et al*., 1996: 6). As such, part of what social movements do is both try to resonate with, and try to influence, what Fraser calls the 'folk paradigms of justice' as argued above. What is crucial here is that framing needs to be recognised as strategic (Benford & Snow, 1988, 1992, 2000); it can also be conceptualised as "movement discursive tactics" (McCammon *et al*., 2007: 731).

Social movements, in their framing, "draw upon the larger societal definitions of relationships, of rights, and of responsibilities" (Zald, 1996: 267) in order to legitimate their demands. These definitions are, however, not static; they are contested, both within the movements and between the movement and its opponents, the public and the media (Benford & Snow, 2000; Zald, 1996). Moreover, more detailed concepts within the framing perspective, such as 'diagnostic' and 'prognostic' frames (respectively, what the problem is and what the proposed solution is), have been developed to help explain whether and how frames resonate with supporters, but also opponents and the general public (see also Bob, 2005; Cress & Snow, 2000; Kriesi, 1995).

Developed to explain social movement mobilisation, do theories of framing also help us understand movement outcomes? There is a growing concern about framing in the literature of social movement outcomes, and it highlights that the way in which movements frame their demands can affect their success (e.g. Amenta *et al*., 2010; Snow *et al*., 2014). Other studies also show, however, that framing strategies that aid mobilisation are not necessarily conducive to positive outcomes (McVeigh *et al*., 2004). This is also relevant for indigenous movements; the more recognition-focused framing that often aided their emergence in the context of proliferation of international and NGO discourses of indigenous rights that have often been rather essentialising (as discussed above; e.g. Andolina, *et al*, 2009, Hale, 2002), might also stand in their way in the future. While it may help gather sympathetic public opinion and international attention, it can also hinder indigenous movements' efforts as they try to gather broader support, especially among other indigenous groups or the non-indigenous.

It is important to note that this can also be the case with the other two main approaches to movement mobilisation, resource mobilisation and political opportunity structure; these sets of variables do not necessarily operate in the same way for mobilisation on the one hand and political outcomes on the other (Amenta, 2014; McAdam *et al*., 2001). Having acknowledged that, it is still important to bring a framing perspective into the study of social movement outcomes. As Koopmans and Statham argue in their study of the successes and failures of the far-right in Europe, to an extent both resource mobilisation and political opportunity theories "are 'contentless' in the sense that they apply to social movements regardless of their goals, ideologies and discourse" (Koopmans & Statham, 1999: 227).

Yet doing so is not a straightforward task. Reviewing the literature shows that the concept of framing can often mean many different things, both theoretically and—which is especially

problematic—empirically. Specifically, it would seem that in many studies of the importance of framing, it can refer to either (or both) the content of demands and claims (i.e. land rights, in the context of indigenous movements) and the way in which these demands are legitimated, or framed (e.g., this is a legitimate demand because of ancestral pre-Columbian rights). This distinction can be further illustrated by looking at some of the empirical examples of framing used in the literature. In an article revisiting their concept of framing, Benford and Snow (2000) highlight that at its core, framing is an interactive process of developing prognostic and diagnostic frames. Put simply, it is a process within a social movement of identifying what the problem is and what the solution should be. This appears to refer to the content of demands. At the same time, as explored above, much of the literature on framing refers to struggles of meaning, articulation and the use of language in social struggles, which, in relation to social movement demands, seems to refer more to the way in which demands are legitimated than their content. Yet it appears that the concept of framing can refer to both.

In their example of the peace movement, Benford and Snow (2000) explore how the nuclear freeze frame revitalised the peace movement, due to its external resonance, in a way that a previous focus demands such as preventing military interventions, anti-apartheid or stopping the development of chemical and biological weapons, did not.[23] When changing the *content* of the peace movement's demands from, for example, preventing military intervention to stopping the proliferation of nuclear technology, is succeeding in the latter a victory for the peace movement as a whole? Moreover, is this a change in *framing* in general, or only in the content of the demand, since it has little to do with struggles over meaning, or, more precisely, little to do with how the legitimacy of the demand is explained publicly? Conversely, in the example of master frames in the civil rights movement, the authors write about the legitimation of demands for equality with reference to the 'principle of equal rights and opportunities' regardless of race. In the first instance, the question is about changing the *content* of the movement's demands or claims; in the second, the question is about a different framing, or *legitimation*, of the same demand.

This ambiguity in the concept of framing is also reflected in the growing literature on the effect of framing on movement outcomes. In an illuminating study on the outcomes of homeless mobilisation, Cress and Snow (2000) evaluate the importance of diagnostic and prognostic frames, especially how 'well-developed' these frames were, for the successes of different homeless social movement organisations (SMOs) in the United States. Yet the examples they use to talk about framing often seem to be more about the content of demands than a change in the framing of the same demand. For example, they highlight how one homeless organisation was more successful than another because it did not focus on rights (recognition) and relief (redistribution) for the homeless in general, but only for homeless children. Presumably, however, the rights and relief that were obtained were then only for homeless children, not all homeless people. It might be that this allows the organisation to then return to its focus on all

[23] Moreover, when considering movement outcomes, this may be considered a success if the aim is increasing participation in a general peace movement, but not if the goal were any of the demands other than the freeze aim It could be that these goals are then made to seem more reasonable, or it could that they get side-lined and forgotten.

homeless people in general. Yet it could also be that shifting focus to talking about only homeless children, not all homeless people, might result in the organisation shifting its focus to only children, abandoning its work with homeless adults, especially if focusing only on children is rewarded in the political and media environment at hand. Whether that can be considered a success or failure must depend on the definition of success, but if the question is whether this organisation managed to get rights and relief for all homeless people, the answer can at best be that only partially so.

Thus, changes in framing—the legitimation of demands—can also affect the claims that can be made—the content of demands (this is further explored below). At the same time, this is not necessarily always the case; changes in the way a demand is framed can indeed lead to the original demand being met. In an analysis of the framing used by women's rights activists fighting for women's jury rights, McCammon and colleagues show evidence for the importance of framing for movement outcomes, and its interaction with the political environment (McCammon, 2012; McCammon *et al*., 2007). In this case, this research takes one single demand (women being allowed on juries) and the consequences of it being framed, or legitimated, differently. Concretely, the framing variable is whether this demand was legitimated with reference to equal rights (women have just as much right to sit on juries as men) or to the right to difference (everyone has a right to a jury of peers, and for women this means there should be women on the jury). The study found that due to the greater 'discursive resonance' of the difference frame at the time, framing the demand in this way made it more likely to be met.

The two examples above show that, in order to understand movement outcomes, attention must be paid to both the content of demands and the way in which they are framed. Being careful about this distinction allows for the evaluation of the impact of those factors on outcomes, but also of the way in which they interact. McCammon and colleagues' study is particularly pertinent here because of the two types of 'master frames'—demand legitimation—it describes. Specifically, it compares a similarity frame (equal rights) and a difference frame (right-to-difference) (McCammon *et al*., 2007).

I will show that, although the processes though which (a) the content of demands and (b) the legitimation of demands are constructed and articulated are deeply interlinked, in order to explore this relationship, and their relationship with other factors, we must conceptually separate them first. To my knowledge, this explicit distinction has so far been missing from the framing literature. This then allows for clearly defined and empirically grounded variables related to framing to be included in the analysis; that is to say a) claims (demand content) and b) frames (demand legitimation). In doing so, the evolving nature of movement claims and frames can be evaluated. Only in having made this conceptual distinction can the mechanisms of both external resonance *and* internal coherence be identified and evaluated in the empirical chapters below. Both of these mechanisms describe the appeal of the movement to constituents, potential supporters, and targets alike. Internal coherence refers to the correspondence between demand content and legitimation; lack of coherence might signal instrumentality or unreliability, while coherent framing can suggest worthiness and authenticity. External resonance then applies to both claim's content and its legitimation separately; each may be

more or less resonant with the partisanship of the government in power, legal norms, and public opinion.

2.4.2 Framing in indigenous movements in Latin America

Hinted at above, what are the different *claims* and *frames* made and used by indigenous movements in Latin America? Although one can talk about an indigenous movement in Latin America in general, in the sense of a transnational social movement for both equal treatment and the extension of special rights to indigenous peoples, indigenous protesters and social movement organisations in individual countries have made a variety of different claims over time. Looking at the nature of their demands thus gives us another dimension with which to distinguish among the different indigenous movements in Latin America. The nature of such claims has often shifted with time, most frequently in response to external, particularly political, changes.

Many indigenous SMOs have focused on a broad range of claims, while others have had a narrower focus. Individual indigenous protest events usually voice one main demand, even if that claim is part of efforts for broader change. Differentiating the demands made by indigenous social movement participants and organisations at different junctures could help to explain why some have been more successful than others. As argued above, one of the analytically most useful ways to differentiate indigenous movement demands is to look at whether they are asking for recognition or redistribution. Table 1 below enumerates some of the most common and relevant demands made by indigenous movement based on this dichotomy.

Table 1: Indigenous movement claims typology[24] (demand content)

Recognition	**Redistribution**
Protected indigenous territories	Land redistribution (land titling)
Alternative economies	Equality in the labour market
Customary law and justice *(usos y costumbres)*	Anti-discrimination laws
Binding consultation	Access to political participation
Language protection and bilingual education	Access to state services

However, as discussed above, it is not just the content of demands that matters, but also their framing, in terms of the way in which they are legitimated. As discussed above, empirically demands for recognition are likely to be framed in the right to difference, while redistribution

[24] Being on the same row of the table does not necessarily imply equivalent demands. Moreover, this typology does not consider more radical demands for regional autonomy or even statehood, which would entail both the recognition of an indigenous group as a nation and the redistribution of state territory. Such claims are rare in Latin America, and even though some radical Mapuche organisations have voiced this claim, they are quite marginalised; neither the protest event dataset nor the SMO case studies include these claims. They focus on demands that can be met within the current post-colonial states.

goals tend to invoke the right to equality. However, indigenous movements in Latin America have also used the language of difference to legitimate their claims for redistribution and the language of equal rights to frame their demands for recognition. The way in which claims for recognition and demands for redistribution can often be framed both in the language of difference and equality can best be illustrated by looking at indigenous protesters asking for land. This is shown in Table 2 below (p. 37).

It is not just the content of the demand, therefore, that needs to be considered, but also how indigenous activists go about legitimating these claims. In some cases, they talk about their rights as indigenous, pre-Columbian nations, and ask for their rightful claim as a group to land that pre-dates the post-colonial state to be recognised by the same state. In other cases, protesters draw on their shared experiences of oppression and discrimination as indigenous rural peoples, to demand that their rights be recognised as equal citizens of the post-colonial state. In both demanding the righting of the wrongs of the past and claiming equality, they demand access to land to be able to reproduce their communities, and/or the ability to fairly participate in the 'national' economy.

Table 2: Example: Land claims

		Frames	
		Right to difference	*Right to equality*
Claims	*Recognition*	A) Rights to already titled/lived-on land, legitimated by invoking ancestral pre-Columbian rights	B) Rights to already titled/lived-on land, legitimated by the right to land by those who use it
	Redistribution	C) Rights to new land titles, legitimated by invoking colonial dispossession	D) Rights to new land titles, legitimated by the inequality and poverty of rural labourers

As such, there are four potential combinations of claims and frames for indigenous movements. Table 2 illustrates these in reference to different land claims made by indigenous movements, and how they can be framed. As evidenced in the empirical chapters below, much if not most of indigenous collective action centres on land and territory. This includes, however, both demands for the protection of existing territorial titles or the recognition of rightful occupation of already-inhabited land on the one hand, and claims for land restitution and redistribution on the other. This could also be thought of as offensive versus defensive claims; it again captures whether meeting the demand would challenge the existing distribution of resources.

In the case of land claims, thus, indigenous protesters can be demanding the recognition of land rights based on the fact they use it and live on it. In that sense, they are making a claim that anyone, regardless of their identity, has a right to own the land they work. This is a recognition demand legitimated by an equal rights frame (B). In other cases, indigenous groups ask for the redistribution of new land to indigenous communities, citing the historical dispossession of those from the same ethno-linguistic group. That is a redistribution demand voiced in the

language of the right to difference (C). While such combinations are less common than the recognition-difference rights (A) and redistribution-equal rights (D) pairings, there are empirical examples of all four possible configurations in Table 2. What the former two combinations might do, however, is signal less internal coherence to constituents, supporters, opponents, and targets alike, and might be more readily attacked as inauthentic or instrumental. This is not to make any normative arguments about the legitimacy of the different claiming and framing combinations; it is rather an empirical question, and whether this matters for social movements outcomes is investigated below.

Yet it is also important to note that not all the demands listed in Table 1 can be as easily framed in either the language of group rights or equal rights, as shown for land claims in Table 2. This is important because it suggests that moving in one direction with the framing of demands in terms of their legitimation might mean that some of the demands that do not conform to the new framing are displaced at the expense of those that do more easily fit with the new frame. As such, the relationship between framing and the content of demands should be understood as interactive. The change in framing of demands can lead to changes in the content of demands, not just the other way around.

2.4.3 Claims, legitimacy and the political environment

This is because protest is not just about disruption; it is also a battle for legitimacy. But then, why does protest take the form that it does? Is it explained purely by strategic, tactical choices of protesters, or are their decisions bound by history and culture? Beyond simply looking at tactics, the literature on social movements has also concerned itself with looking at the way of 'doing' contentious politics, given a certain place and time. This includes more broadly the way in which protest is carried out and how it is legitimated. As made clear at the beginning, it is beyond the scope of this work to consider in detail the reasons for the emergence of indigenous movements in the first place. At the same time, social movement activity always involves the struggles of different actors over the legitimate representation of the movement's (purported) constituency. The literature that tries to explain the forms that social movements take is thus still another necessary starting point for a discussion of the impact of collective actors' strategies on the consequences of their contentious actions.

First classified more concretely as 'repertoires' of contention by Tarrow, this notion has remained central to the study of the evolution of social movements (McAdam *et al*., 2001; Tilly, 2006; Tilly & Tarrow, 2015); at its core, the concept is a way to look at the historical evolution of social movement strategies. More specifically, contentious 'repertoires' can be understood as "arrays of contentious performances that are currently known and available within some set of political actors" (Tilly & Tarrow, 2015). As such, repertoires "represent the culturally encoded ways in which people interact in contentious politics" (McAdam *et al*., 2001: 16). The notion of repertoires suggests that the strategies of protesters are bound to a specific time and place, limited by what actions are thought of as legitimate, acceptable, and possible at the time.

In that sense, how can it help us understand different outcomes of protest movements that might operate within the same time and place, thus presumably employing the same repertoire of contention? Firstly, the concept is useful in that it draws attention to the process of learning and evolution in social movement struggles. It also allows one to evaluate the extent to which protest action in a particular context follows a certain political ritual, embedded in culture and history, as opposed to protesters often making innovative strategic decisions each time. Of course, most cases arguably fall somewhere in between, which can be understood as "innovation within the script" (Tilly, 2006: 41). Yet this conceptualisation means the position of each episode of contention can be placed in a more or less specific spot on the continuum. More flexible and adaptive repertoires could thus be considered as 'stronger' (Tilly, 2006: 40), and could help to explain movement outcomes.

As such, since repertoires undergo innovation, the question is whether some protest groups or social movement organisations possess more flexible repertoires that more easily adapt to changing external circumstances than others. Relatedly, even when it is not possible to observe significant levels of innovation in the repertoires of contention over a certain period of time, some movements may have 'wider' repertoires than others, that is to say, the range of tactical and framing choices is wider. As such, social movements that, for example, supplement disruptive tactics with litigation can be considered as having a wider repertoire than SMOs whose *modus operandi* only includes marches and road blocks. At the same time, such movement organisations are also more likely to engage in alliance-making, seeking cooperation with other SMOs as well as NGOs, both domestically and internationally. In this sense, the flexibility and width of the repertoire of contention captures the strategic adaptability of the movement organisation (McCammon, 2012). This is important if the social movement is to be able to respond strategically to changing external circumstances, rather than falling back on the same repertoire of action even if it is no longer (thought to be) the most strategic.

An integral part of this is also the extent to which they seek alliances with actors outside the movement, and who these allies are. Of course, this is also related to the size of the movement as smaller movements have a greater need to seek alliances in the first place. However, alliance-making is also a strategic choice, and forms part of the repertoire of contention. Rather than the presence of allies in governmental or other state positions with access to decision-making, this refers to the extent to which social movement organisations have sought to make links with other non-governmental allies, including NGOs, unions or civic groups, both nationally and internationally. Movement organisations that have greater links to civil society organisations and international institutions can thus be considered as having a wider contentious repertoire, as they do not only seek to be seen as legitimate by their constituency, but also seek cooperation with other domestics as well as international actors and institutions.

Alliance-making is also deeply interlinked with demand-making, as shown in the empirical chapters below. In Bolivia just as in other Latin American countries, the development of indigenous movements has been greatly influenced by the mobilising networks and allies that aided their emergence (Postero, 2007; Yashar, 2005). Most importantly, the privileging of ethnicity-based demands as opposed to class-based demands has been heavily influenced by the nature of both initial mobilising networks and later alliances; while movements that arose

out of class-based union organising were more likely to sustain a double-focus on both recognition and redistribution (often privileging redistribution), indigenous movements subject to both domestic and international developmental and rights-focused NGOs tend to have a much a clearer recognition focus. This is largely due to the experience of transnational influences (Keck & Sikkink, 1998) exemplified in the impact of international NGOs on indigenous peoples' organising; sometimes replacing 'culturally appropriate development' with 'developmentally appropriate culture' (Andolina *et al*., 2005). The latter type of organisations also focuses much more on seeking both domestic and international legitimacy, often through the media, from NGOs and international rights organisations.

Insightfully, Haunss has made the argument that, at their core, studies about repertoires of contention, master frames or political claim-making actually address the issues of legitimacy (Haunss, 2007). Specifically, it could be argued that both navigating the conventions of contentious demand-making and seeking framing that resonates with both the wider public and specific ethical, moral and legal principles, are in fact processes concerned with specific legitimating and delegitimating strategies (Haunss, 2007: 3). The above elaboration on the claims and frames means we can evaluate the effect of both demand content and demand legitimation on movement outcomes. While some studies have explored the relationship between framing and outcomes, they have mainly found that framing can affect outcomes through its interaction with the political environment (Benford & Snow, 2000; Cress & Snow, 2000; Koopmans & Statham, 1999; McCammon *et al*., 2007). This is the external resonance described above; the potential direct effects of internal coherence remain unexplored.

In the above-mentioned study on women's jury rights, the authors found that "movement frames and the political, cultural, and juridical environment in which they are expressed *work in combination* to produce a movement's desired political outcome"; in particular, "discursive opportunity structures in the broader environment increase the effectiveness of specific movement frames" (McCammon *et al*., 2007: 726, 745). Koopmans and colleagues in their research on both Western European cultural minorities and extreme right movements, focus both on political and discursive opportunities, and their interaction (Koopmans & Statham, 1999; Koopmans *et al*., 2005). Specifically, they argue for the importance of considering the 'discursive opportunity structure', a variable which determines "which ideas are considered 'sensible', which constructions of reality are seen as 'realistic', and which claims are held as 'legitimate' within a certain polity at a specific time" (Koopmans, 2004; Koopmans & Statham, 1999: 228; Koopmans *et al*., 2005). Borrowing from the idea of frame resonance, it is useful therefore to conceptualise the external resonance of a frame.

The discursive opportunity structure can also be broadly classified as either volatile and broad or stable and narrow (Gamson & Meyer, 1996; Koopmans & Statham, 1999; McCammon *et al*., 2007); in the Latin American cases at hand it is the former rather than the latter. As such, exploring the historical conceptions of rights, citizenship, ethnicity, and class are arguably not as useful for considering different indigenous movement outcomes as more contingent factors such as the government in power, which affect discursive opportunities, as well as other political opportunities. A recent study has compared the attitudes towards the policing of protest in Latin America, showing the importance of 'dominant frames' related to whether

repressive policing is viewed as legitimate or not (Bonner, 2014). As shown in the empirical chapters below, protest repression and reactions to it can indeed matter for protest outcomes. Bonner's study, however, only compares Argentina and Chile. In this study, therefore, the relevant feature of the discursive opportunity structure is how receptive it is to demands for recognition and the right-to-difference framing versus demands for redistribution and equal rights framing. As such, the proxy for this variable is the election of a left-wing government; this is seen as affecting the general political opportunity structure in that demands for redistribution become politically more legitimate, even if public opinion in general is polarised or slower to change. When considering the opportunities provided by sympathetic public opinion as well as the broader discourses of rights (Fraser's 'folk paradigms' of justice discussed in Chapter 2), the literature discussed above refers to those as discursive opportunities. However, they can be considered as a subset of political opportunities, alongside the government partisanship, availability of allies, etc.

But then, what the term 'political opportunity structure' itself describes has been the focus of some debate (e.g. Giugni, 2009; Meyer, 2004). While different studies may have used varied measures of the political opportunity structure, these tend to include (1) the nature of the formal political institutions, their openness and levels of access, (2) stability of political alignments and cleavages, (3) availability of elite political allies and government partisanship, and (4) the willingness and propensity of the state to repress (Giugni, 2009; Kolb & Tarrow, 2007; McAdam *et al*., 2001). On the first element, the Latin American countries in question have presidential systems, although they do differ in the extent of regional centralization. The stability of political alignments is difficult to compare between countries, and is perhaps the most likely to be affected by social movement activity in the first place. As such, these aspects of the political opportunity structure are not evaluated here.[25] It is government partisanship as well as propensity for repression that are used below as variables denoting political opportunities for indigenous social movements in Latin America.

The partisanship of the government in power at the time of protest can serve as a measure of political opportunities in providing a more sympathetic executive and legislative environment as well as potential elite allies. In previous studies, for example, the percentage of Democrats in US legislature has been used as a proxy (Amenta *et al.*, 2010; Giugni, 2007) for a sympathetic political context, under the assumption that the Democratic party is more likely to be sympathetic to the protest movements under study in those cases. In this study, the left-wing dummy, denoting whether the country has a left-of-centre government in a given year, is used as both a proxy for a sympathetic political environment and the presence of potential elite allies. This makes sense given the Latin American context of presidential systems, with a strong role played by the government in both executive and legislative decisions (Linz & Valenzuela, 1994; O'Donnell, 1994).

Analyses of the impact of a left-wing executive in Latin America have proliferated since the beginning of the political 'pink-tide' of left-of-centre (LOC) governments (Panizza, 2009), but

[25] Although the below-detailed application of a multilevel model aims to estimate the extent of unobserved country differences.

mainly focusing on the advances in terms of social and economic indicators (Cornia, 2010; Huber *et al*., 2008). As discussed in the Introduction, LOC governments in Latin America came into power, if not directly on the back on popular mobilisations, then at least with the electoral support of poor and indigenous sectors. It is then plausible to propose that a left-of-centre executive might provide a more sympathetic political environment for indigenous movements than a centrist or right-wing government. At the same time, as mentioned above, Latin American scholars have highlighted the complicated relationship between Latin American social movements and the left-of-centre government they have sometimes helped bring to power (e.g. Escobar, 2010; Svampa, 2008, 2010; Zibechi, 2007, 2012). This also helps explain continued protest activity, not only indigenous, even in countries where LOC governments are in power. Paying more attention to the different claims and frames *within* indigenous movements might also help make sense of the role played by left-wing governments.

The extent to which the state is willing to repress protest activities not only affects the likelihood of protest taking place, but also of it experiencing any 'success'. The propensity for repression can also be used a proxy for the relative openness versus closedness of the institutional structure. While a moderate level of opposition or repression might induce others to support the movement and mobilise in indignation, higher levels of violence might be expected to deter future involvement. Indeed, the inverted U model features prominently in the literature, suggesting that extreme repression and low to total lack of repression are negatively correlated with social movement emergence and activity (e.g. Eckstein, 2001).

The legal system of each country also plays a role, in that particular claims and framing may have a greater salience and legitimacy than others given specific legal norms. However, as detailed in the Introduction, by the period under study, Latin American countries had relatively similar *de jure* provision for indigenous rights; it is the enforcement of those rights that varies widely. As such, a variable classifying legal norms is not included in the analyses below. Moreover, social movements themselves can effect changes to the political opportunity structure, which must not be considered as static. This can be both a reason for a certain outcome, such as advantages, but also an outcome of a social movement itself, in terms of acceptance.

2.5 Strategic claims and frames: evaluating movement outcomes

> "Social movement strategy sits at the intersection of structure and agency, as activists seek to respond to changing political and cultural circumstances and maximize their impact" (Meyer & Staggenborg, 2012: 4).

The theoretical discussions above highlight that there is still little consensus about what factors predict certain outcomes of social movements most often, or most accurately. This is especially the case for considering success; that is, whether social movements achieved what they asked for. As such, it is necessary to evaluate both movement-level (claims, framing, tactics, etc.) and country-level variables, and the potential interactions among them. In particular, the exploration of theories of indigenous politics from Latin America and the re-focusing on the importance of the strategies of protesters combine to suggest the importance of evaluating the

nature of the claims made by social movements. Combining the Latin American theorising of the different types of political projects of collective actors with the theories of framing in Northern social movement scholarship offers, arguably, a useful route to take on the perennial question of outcomes of social movement scholarship from a new perspective.

As such, the theoretical framework adapted here is one that recognises the need to pay attention to the strategies of social movements. *Firstly,* while a strategy may be misguided or ineffective, the term itself draws attention to the decisions made within social movements, rather than movements being static entities with fixed demands, frames, and tactical repertoires. Moreover, it highlights the dynamic interaction between movement-level variables and the context in which they operate. *Secondly,* looking more analytically at claims and frames allows us to evaluate both what movements ask for, and how they ask for it; those are two empirically distinct phenomena, and must thus also be differentiated conceptually.

As shown below, a successful social movement strategy takes into account the external resonance and internal coherence of claims and their framing, as well as how costly the movement's demands are as opposed to the disruption and legitimacy costs movements are able to impose on their targets. While other studies have been able to show the positive effect of disruptive tactics through cost imposition, these have not taken into account the cost that the framing strategies of movements, in their interaction with the political environment, can also impose on targets. As such, the theoretical approach here is one that takes into account the *strategic claiming and framing* of social movements. This has been missing or unclear in the extant theories of resource mobilisation, political opportunities, and framing processes, especially as applied to the study of protest outcomes. How the appropriateness of such a theoretical framework is to be tested methodologically is explained below.

3. A mixed methodological approach to analysing social movement outcomes

3.1 Defining (indigenous) social movements

The above discussion of indigenous demands highlights the heterogeneity of the contentious politics and protest activity that indigenous people in Latin America engage in. Indigeneity is both a question of ascription and self-definition. In regard to defining indigeneity, scholars tend to agree that self-identification[26] is the best measure as it avoids the ethical problems of classification (Sieder, 2002; Van Cott, 2002; Yashar, 2005). However, there are methodological hurdles in ascertaining the actual size of the indigenous population of individual countries, especially due to unreliability of census data (IADB, 2006; Van Cott, 2007). (Refer to Appendix A for further details on this classification as well as comparison with more recent census data). It is not within the scope of this research to evaluate the reasons behind this fully; what is relevant for the analyses below is the *relative* size of the indigenous population in the countries under study. Based on estimates provided by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB, 2006), the selected 13 Latin American[27] countries studied in the quantitative part of this thesis can be grouped into low, medium, and high indigenous population share (see Table 3 below, p. 45). Although these numbers are now rather dated, they are arguably most reliable and comparative for reasons discussed in Appendix A, and fall well within the 2003-2013 analysis time frame.

Indigenous movements can be identified as social movements that legitimate their demands—at least some of their demands at least some of the time—by invoking their distinct ethnic, cultural and/or linguistic identity and the rights that are internationally recognised to stem from this. Specifically, they can be defined as social movements that legitimate their claims through appeals to their status as indigenous. Thus, they are distinct from other movements, e.g. the class-based miners' movement in Potosí in Bolivia, which are composed mainly of indigenous people, but legitimate their claims exclusively with appeals to class and not cultural/ethnic identity. At the same time, *campesino* (denoting rural labourer/peasant) and indigenous identities overlap to a significant degree in most Latin American countries, and many indigenous movement organisations have wavered between identity and class foci, as elaborated on in the previous chapter. Yet it is necessary to differentiate those movements that base their demands and mobilisation on an explicit invoking of indigenous identity, at least some of the time, from those that simply happen to have indigenous participants and are not concerned at all with identity-based cultural claims and the right to difference.

[26] Moreover, political indigeneity should be seen as inherently fluid; in fact, its strategic deployment in social movement activity, and particularly the form it takes and the demands this engenders, is one of the themes of this research.

[27] How these countries were selected for the analysis is described below, but mainly has to do with data availability.

Table 3: Estimated Indigenous Populations in Latin America

Country	IADB (2006)		Classification
	Indigenous population	Population share	
Bolivia	5,914,000	71%	High share
Guatemala	8,342,000	66%	
Peru	12,696,000	47%	
Ecuador	5,556,000	43%	
Honduras	938,000	15%	Medium share
Mexico	14,049,000	14%	
Chile	1,217,000	8%	
Panama	168,000	6%	
Nicaragua	241,000	6%	
Paraguay	168,000	3%	Low share
Colombia	794,000	2%	
Venezuela	471,000	2%	
Argentina	370,000	1%	

Source: IADB (2006) (Adapted from Van Cott (2007)).

Next, social movements in general must be defined. The conceptual distinction between social, revolutionary, or nationalist movements is arguably often overstated (McAdam *et al*., 2001). Indeed, when talking about indigenous movements in Latin America, it is often difficult to clearly distinguish whether their activities account for a social, a revolutionary (as arguably took place in Bolivia), or a nationalist movement (given the often-present claims for self-determination). Indeed, this speaks to one of the potential theoretical contributions of investigating indigenous movements. Scholars interested in ethnic or nationalist movements have often had difficulties evaluating theories of ethnic and nationalist movements, due to the relative lack of interdisciplinary dialogue between the various academic traditions that have studied such movements, from risk-focused analyses of ethnic mobilisation to historically and regionally grounded case studies of nationalism. However, already in 2004, Olzak identified that an "emerging tradition in political sociology suggests that it might be useful to begin to analyze these forms together"; as a consequence of such efforts, analyses of specific ethnic and nationalist movements "might benefit directly from applications of arguments in social movement literature, rather than applying findings from specifics regional or historical accounts of a single ethnic or nationalist movement" (Olzak, 2004: 686-7). This is indeed one of the aims of this thesis.

However, I am not looking at any type of contention in which indigenous people participate. A definition of a social movement needs to be broad enough to include movements using a variety of tactics and making a variety of demands. Thus, social movements can be conceived of as collective actors (with or without organisational affiliation) engaged in "sustained challenges to power holders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those power

holders by means of repeated public displays of that populations' worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment", or 'WUNC' as Tilly's famous concept has become known in the social movement literature (Tilly, 1999: 257). Too often, the way in which social movements have been talked about in the academic literature seems to have presented them as a sort of amorphous collectivity without a clear definition, making it harder to pin down what they are and how they function. More importantly, this has resulted in obscuring the *agency* of the different *actors*, both individual and organisational, that make up any given social movement. This also means that attention to their strategies—not static, but evolving—was lacking.

Bringing attention to agency does not necessarily mean that all actions by actors are considered to be strategic decisions. For social movements, strategy can be understood as a "plan of collective action intended to accomplish goals within a particular context" (Kutz-Flamenbaum, 2012: 285; Maney, 2012). Strategies may be well or badly developed, but importantly the strategies of individual actors participating in a social movement may not be the most strategic for the movement as a whole, whether that is intentional or not. This is important to bear in mind as the actions of indigenous social movement leaders in Bolivia are discussed in Chapter 6. As such, one cannot assume that everything social movement actors and organisations do is not only strategically in the interest of achieving their stated goals, but also always the product of conscious strategizing. At the same time, a focus on strategies is analytically useful for two reasons. Firstly, it forces us to recognise the agency of movement actors, rather than seeing movements as static and un-evolving. Secondly, in doing so, the fact that movement demands are also not static and evolve must be recognised, and this shifts the attention of studies of social movement outcomes back from analysing their targets to the evolving characteristics of the movement itself.

3.2 Structural individualism and causal processes

As such, this work applies a version of structural individualism (Hedström & Bearman, 2009); this posits that explanations for specific outcomes can be found in the actions of individuals, based on the decisions they make as they are related to each other within the structures they are embedded in. It thus differs to an extent from classical methodological individualism in that a substantial part of any explanation rests in the social structures that influence and often limit the choices of individuals. What is crucial, however, is not just how structures influence individual agency, but the *perceptions* of the individual actors as to how the context in which they find themselves constraints the choices they have (Della Porta & Keating, 2008). This is why paying attention to *strategy* is central, denoting the assumption that the actors involved in social movement collective action keep making conscious decisions about the (perceived) best course of action, and this includes not just how they struggle for their goals, but also what those goals are in the first place. Collective actor's claims, frames and tactics are not static.

When looking at specific protest events, the assumption is that the characteristics of each event are a product of the collective decisions of its participants (even if it was not possible to show this due to the limited data available for each protest event and campaign coded). For the

qualitative analysis of indigenous movement in Bolivia, and its various social movement organisations, the focus is also on the strategic decisions made by their leaders in trying to explain the trajectories of those organisations, and the Bolivian indigenous movement in general. The protest events evidencing social movement activity—in the first part of the thesis, chapters 4 and 5—include contentious activity, both disruptive and peaceful, such as marches or road blocks, but not litigation, lobbying or petitions. In the qualitative analyses of indigenous movements, in particular their movement organisations—in the second part, chapters 6 and 7—a wider repertoire of contentious action is considered. Looking at elements of a social movement—protest events and social movement organisations—also makes it easier to link their characteristics and strategies to specific outcomes, both empirically and theoretically.

This thesis is particularly interested in investigating the causal mechanisms linking the nature of protest with its consequences. Specifically, it aims to uncover the details of the particular causal processes (Goertz & Mahoney, 2012) suggested by the quantitative analysis. The term causal mechanism has been increasingly used in the sociological literature (Goertz & Mahoney, 2012; Hedström & Bearman, 2009; King *et al*., 1994; Tilly, 2001), and in general denotes an effect of one variable on another which, despite producing different outcomes under different conditions, behaves with a certain regularity in similar circumstances. Rather than a variable, factor or condition in themselves, causal mechanisms can be thought of analytical tools which provide the explanation as to why A can be said to have caused B, without being directly observable. As such, self-selection, spill-over effect or signalling can thus all be considered examples of causal mechanisms (Hedström & Bearman, 2009; Mahoney, 2003).

Much of the literature on causal mechanisms, however, focuses on causal mechanism that operates at the level of the individual (Hedström & Udehn, 2009). In contrast, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly introduce the concept of causal mechanisms "to interpret collective processes like the ones involved in contentious politics" (McAdam *et al*., 2001: 25). They argue that similar causal processes operate in all kinds of contentious politics—whether contained or transgressive—such as "coalitions, strategic interaction and identity politics" (McAdam *et al*., 2001: 7). In particular, the goal of such an analytical approach is "the identification of causal chains consisting of mechanisms that reappear in a wide variety of settings but in different sequences and combinations, hence with different collective outcomes" (McAdam *et al*., 2001: 23). Causal mechanisms should be seen as the link between two variables—or causal conditions—that explains how the first caused the latter. Importantly, therefore, they can have different outcomes in different circumstances.

3.3 Operationalising social movement outcomes

How can we study the outcomes of protest events on the one hand and movement organisations on the other, together? Firstly, the definition of an outcome that is of interest here needs to capture the fact that this project intends to evaluate whether indigenous movements achieved at least some of the things that they have asked for from the states they have directed their actions at, rather than the unintended consequences of their actions, or effects on their

organisations or the biographies of participants that they did not specifically ask for. This is actually conceptually easier done for individual protest events. Although there are myriad complex reasons why a protest event might be followed by its goal being met, finding evidence for acceptance for the protest event (its participants, leaders and/or organisations) means that the advantages that follow can be more easily linked to the event causally.

As such, rather than using Gamson's four possible outcomes, this project operationalizes acceptance and advantages in an ordinal manner, resulting in three categories. An outcome such as pre-emption is therefore not considered here, as it presents some concerns about the notion of causality.[28] Firstly, the protest event might have been ignored or repressed, and met with no acceptance. Secondly, although acceptance might have taken place—evidenced by negotiations, consultation or public pronouncements admitting the legitimacy of claims—no advantages followed in the six months following the event. Thirdly, at least some of the stated goals may be met, resulting in concrete advantages. This also makes sense since having acceptance always precede advantage makes it easier to place at least some of the responsibility for the outcome with the protest event.

So how exactly can outcomes, especially advantages, be causally linked to individual protest events? The individual protest events in the quantitative dataset often had quite concrete goals, such as land rights to a specific plot or the repeal of a particularly objectionable decree. In these instances, it was relatively straight forward to evaluate if such advantages were received or not. In other cases, such as protests against the government in general, the protest event included a myriad of demands, some more concrete and some more far-reaching. In such instances, if any of the demands made could be evidenced as being met, the protest was coded as resulting in an advantage. In some cases, protests were indeed demanding legislative change, and of course other factors also play a role in determining whether a policy proposal is passed into law or not. Some of this is captured by coding the type of government in power. Other relevant factors, however, could not be evaluated in the quantitative cross-national analysis. While some of the protest events could be linked to a social movement organisation—which would then allow for the coding of the nature of the organisation or campaign, including for example lobbying efforts, etc.—for the majority of the protest events this information was not available.

Secondly, however, evaluating whether indigenous movements got from the state what they asked for essentially means evaluating the movements' relationship with the state. This is how the outcomes of indigenous social movement organisations can be evaluated; it is also how the outcomes of protest events and organisations can be integrated as evidence of outcomes of social movements. Evaluating the relationship with the state is crucial here. Indeed, as Amenta and colleagues argue, "the greatest sort of impact is the one that provides a group with continuing leverage over political processes and increases the political returns to the collective action of a challenger" (Amenta *et al.*, 2010: 290). The authors suggest that social movement scholars examining outcomes have moved away from looking at Gamson's 'acceptance' and 'advantages', and argue that "these outcomes and the idea of success generally do not correspond well to the degree of potential influence over states and political processes"

[28] Indeed, Gamson's analysis made no assumptions "that the challenging group necessarily caused the benefits" (Gamson, 1975: 34).

(Amenta *et al.*, 2010: 289-290). These two conceptualisations of social movement outcomes, however, are perfectly compatible.

Table 4: Social movement outcomes

Acceptance and advantages	State relations	
No positive outcome experienced.	No response and/or repression*.	*Exclusion*
Limited acceptance and no advantages.	Limited engagement, co-optation.	
General acceptance but no advantages.	Engagement and co-optation.	
Acceptance with limited advantages	Some impact on decision-making.	
Full acceptance and some advantages.	Inclusion into decision-making.	
Full acceptance as well as advantages.	Full inclusion, incl. state control.	*Inclusion*

Note: *The other categories can also, though increasingly rarely, be accompanied by repression.

This is shown in Table 4 above. It very much depends on how a social movement is defined or what is taken as evidence of a social movement, such as a protest event or a social movement organisation. For individual protest events, acceptance is not guaranteed[29], and logistically, it is not difficult to evidence. Advantages may be harder to trace—which means not all original protest events sampled can be included in the final analysis—but it makes sense as a definition of an outcome for protest event. One cannot talk about the ongoing influence in political decision-making of one protest event. For social movement organisations, however, one can. Moreover, the two conceptualisations can be relatively easily integrated; evaluating the nature of ongoing acceptance and the level of advantages can serve as a way to gauge the extent of influence in political decision-making.

3.4 Mixed method research

In order to try and evaluate the outcomes of indigenous social movements in Latin America in a systematic and comparative way, this thesis is thus looking both at protest events and social movement organisations, and the intended consequences of their activities. It does so, following in the growing tradition of methodological pluralism in social movement research (della Porta, 2014), using a mixed method research design. Employing mixed methods offers the potential to overcome some of the challenges of investigating the outcomes of social movements. On the one hand, quantitative approaches better allow for generalisation, while not directly providing empirical evidence of the causal mechanisms through which the proposed causal relationships operate. On the other hand, the reverse is the case for qualitative approaches, especially single case study research. Arguably, successfully employing a mixed method research design offers the chance to make full use of the strengths of each tradition, while offering the potential to transcend their limitations. In fact, due to the potential of this approach, mixed methodology has been a growing field (Small, 2011). The growth of mixed

[29] As it may be the case in most instances for social movement organisations in the U.S., for example (Amenta, 2014)

method research in the social sciences in recent years, accompanied by a growing body of methodological literature, has also identified a number of challenges of mixed method research.

It could be argued that the qualitative and quantitative traditions have distinct, and arguably incompatible, methodological paradigms (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009). Despite the so-called incompatibility thesis, there has been a recent growth of successful mixed-method studies, employing either a 'pragmatic' or a 'complementary' approach to research design. There are concerns with the pragmatic approach that methodological decisions are sometimes not explicitly justified due to epistemological tensions (Small, 2009). At the same time, the proponents of the complementary strength thesis argue that it is not necessary, or possible, to reconcile the logics of the two methodological 'worlds'; instead, the point of mixed method research is to recognise that neither approach can fully explain reality, and that combining the two helps address the weaknesses of each and thus get closer to the facts. An extension of this logic is the dialectic stance:

> "A mixed methods way of thinking rests on assumptions that there are multiple legitimate approaches to social inquiry and that any given approach to social inquiry is inevitably partial. Better understanding of the multifaceted and complex character of social phenomena can be obtained from the use of multiple approaches and ways of knowing" (Greene, 2008: 20).

For the analysis at hand, an adaptation of nested analysis for comparative research seems particularly suitable, a method which "combines the statistical analysis of a large sample of cases with the in-depth investigation of one or more of the cases contained within the large sample" (Lieberman, 2005: 435-6). Both research employing mixed methods and methodological works on the topic suggest the benefits of a multi-method approach. Moreover, its usefulness lies not just in overcoming limits of existing methods, but also in providing novel avenues for approaching more difficult questions in sociology. Although this work accepts the complementarity thesis, it does seek to integrate the different empirical chapters beyond the simple sequential design. Specifically, the unifying approach of the logic of matched cases, used particularly in Chapters 5 and 7, expands on the results of both the quantitative correlational analysis in Chapter 4 and the qualitative process tracing analysis in Chapter 6.

3.4.1 Quantitative protest event analysis

The first part of this thesis presents a cross-national quantitative analysis of protest event outcomes. The analysis is based on an original dataset of protest event data. The time period under study, 2003-2013, stems from the availability of sources, but also captures some of the high points of modern indigenous activism in Latin America. In order to evaluate whether protest can directly lead to progress being made on its goals, the analysis presented in Chapter 4 tests the impact, if any, of protest level variables on protest outcomes. To do so, information was collected not just on the frequency or intensity of protest, but on the different demands, tactics and other characteristics of each protest event or campaign. This stems from the conviction that in order to better understand protest outcomes, we need to refocus our attention 'inside' the protest event (Tilly, 2008). The analysis that follows thus focuses on whether

specific protest events and campaigns were followed by any progress on any of their claims, and whether these changes can be causally linked to the protest itself.

As such, the analysis presented in Chapter 4 is not a traditional protest event analysis (PEA) *per se* (Hutter, 2014). It can be better described as a medium-N analysis of specific protest events and campaigns as cases. Although the number of cases is thus relatively small, at the same time their characteristics are analysed in more detail. Thus, the statistical model is not investigating the impact of the number of protest events, or protest intensity, on outcomes for an entire social movement in question. Rather, it is tracing the outcomes experienced by each individual protest event or campaign in the dataset, and analysing the effect of the characteristics of those cases, and the context in which they took place, on their outcomes.

The reason that both protest *events* and *campaigns* are referred to is that the quantitative dataset includes protests as cases; this means both one-day protest events and longer lasting protest campaigns are included as observations. Under classic PEA, each day of protest might be coded as a protest event. This is not the case here. If, for example, indigenous activists set up a road block, which was later dispersed by the police, only to return the next day and the day after, and so on, this is counted as one case, one protest campaign, rather than two separate protest events. This is necessary since, if such a campaign was met with any positive outcomes, it is the impact of its intensity (including the fact activists were able to sustain ongoing mobilization, even if not continuous, on this issue) in terms of helping to explain its outcomes. If there were coded as separate events, this difference in intensity between an isolated one-day road block and recurring road blocks would not be captured.

It was possible to collect such detailed data on indigenous protests and their outcomes in Latin America between 2003 and 2013. The time period under study captures some of the high points of modern indigenous activism in Latin America, but also stems from the availability of sources of protest event data. As can be seen from Appendix B, this come from a number of sources. The bulk of data consists of an original dataset of protest events collected primarily from (1) the protest event reports by the *Observatorio Social de América Latina* (OSAL, Latin American Social Observatory)[30], which are based on newspaper and online sources[31] and (2) the *Agence France Press* (AFP) news wire, obtained through *Factiva*[32]. Large international datasets of protest events are unsuitable for this analysis, due to the reliance on English-language sources and different levels of reporting for different countries (Herkenrath & Knoll, 2011).[33]

[30] This is a project run by Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO). Accessed at: http://www.clacso.org.ar/institucional/1h.php.

[31] The AFP sources were available for 2004-2013, while the OSAL reports run from 2003 to 2012, although not all years were present for all countries.

[32] Accessed at: global.factiva.com.

[33] In their study comparing the reporting on protest events in Argentina, Mexico and Paraguay from English-language newswire and newspaper sources (that international protest events datasets such as the *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* and the *Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive* rely on), that not only was reporting on low compared to national sources in each country, but its level was also highly dependent on the country in question.

Moreover, given the focus on indigenous protest events and the detail needed in regard to demands and tactics, it was necessary to collect the data specifically for this research.[34]

This yielded an initial set of over 1000 events[35], about half of which were missing some information; various newspaper and other online sources were used to supplement this information as much as possible. Data was available for 13 South and Central American countries[36], for which there are at least 3 cases in the period at hand (refer to Table 3, p. 45, for a list of countries studied). As such, the protest event dataset is comprised of 635 cases for which enough information about the nature of the protest and its consequences could be obtained. These observations are clustered in 13 countries (with cluster size between 8 and 100 protest events). Events from countries that have experienced the most prolific indigenous protests, especially Bolivia, Ecuador, and Mexico, represent a significant proportion of the recorded events. However, running the regressions presented in Chapter 4 with these countries excluded does not have a significant impact on the results, suggesting that we can be confident the results are not simply driven by the countries that have generated many of the theories tested.

The primary source of the information for the coding of the quantitative analysis were the OSAL reports, supplemented by the AFP news wires and other online sources, especially newspaper articles, *indymedia* articles, and others. These reports were compiled as part of the OSAL project by CLACSO researchers based throughout Latin America. Those reports themselves come from a compilation of information from newswires, newspapers and other sources, although the reporting decisions are those of the researchers. Although coming from multiple sources, the data originate from news wire and newspaper articles. While the variety is likely to reduce bias of any on source[37], the need to use others' reports, news wires and online articles means that the dataset is likely to be skewed towards more successful actions, since only those deemed newsworthy tend to be reported on (Earl at al., 2004).

As such, the information coded relies on the protests making themselves 'heard' by these researchers, and in supplemented by those 'heard' by the AFP (the vast majority of the AFP reported events were indeed reported in the OSAL reports). This does skew the dataset towards already more news-worthy events. The fact that CLACSO research teams focused specifically on collective action and social movements in each country during the entire period makes it less likely that the reports were victims to the news cycle. This still leaves many, especially small, events likely unreported, and it is hard to estimate whether this under-reporting is consistent across the countries studied. The number of protest events per country were largely

[34] Other potential sources of data include police records (Maney & Oliver, 2001), but the reliability of Latin American police data is questionable and remote collection for multiple countries was not feasible.

[35] Specifically, the wires were searched, in Spanish, for a combination of the words *indigenous* OR *native* OR *aboriginal* OR *originary* AND *protest* (or their variants). The OSAL reports were searched for the same keyword, except *protest* (since they only focus on contention), as well as the names of the main indigenous groups in each country.

[36] Some countries were dropped either because they only had one or two cases in the entire period (El Salvador, Costa Rica and Uruguay) or because the OSAL report was not available in Spanish (Brazil).

[37] The duplicate rate between the Factiva and OSAL sources was about 30%.

consistent with the size of the indigenous population in each country, however. Moreover, being heard by the media does not mean that those events are also more likely to be *accepted* by their targets. And despite the shortcomings of protest event data collected from news sources, it is the best available data for protest events allowing for a systematic quantitative analysis.

To clarify, following the discussion in Chapter 2, outcomes were coded into three ordinal categories. It is more analytically useful to theorise acceptance as a precursor to advantages, and indeed the data collected support this empirically. Of the 635 protest events in the current dataset, there were none that experienced any advantages without prior acceptance. As such, the outcome of *acceptance-only* was coded when protesters were accepted as legitimate representatives, usually through invitations to negotiations, but other evidence, such as public display of sympathy with grievances or attendance at movement events by some representatives of the government or state institutions can be used as indication of acceptance. When protest was followed by the granting of at least some of the benefits that were demanded, protest events were then coded as having experienced both acceptance and advantages. This includes policy change, but also government action and implementation, as well as other advantages.

Although an ordinal model would thus provide the parsimonious analysis, it was necessary to use a number of separate binary models in order to evaluate this ordinal relationship while not losing important detail. In fact, experimenting with an ordinal model shows that the data violate the proportional odds assumption (Agresti, 2013). In such cases, utilising the ordered logistic model would produce incomplete or spurious results (Cole *et al*., 2003), and would obscure the possibility that different factors may explain the difference between failure and any success, and between acceptance and advantages.

In seeking to test both the direct-effect, indirect-effect and joint-effects models of social movement influence, both protest-level and country-level determinants are tested, as well as their interactions. As such, a multilevel random intercept model is used, in order to account properly for the effects of country level variables as well as acknowledging the potential dependence of cases within countries (Hedeker, 2008). While not allowing for the slopes in the model to vary—as it is not hypothesized that the predicted relationships vary substantially across countries and there are not enough cases—the variation in intercept is allowed, leaving space for potentially heterogeneous country effects to be accounted for (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012).[38]

Still, it is necessary to evaluate whether the application of a multilevel model is justified. The intra-class correlation (ICC) captures the extent to which the data exhibits a multilevel structure; in a two-level hierarchy of individuals nested within groups, the ICC equals "the proportion of variance that is accounted for by the group level" (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). In a null model of the data at hand, about 17% of the residual variance can be attributed to the group level, in this case the country level. With nearly a fifth of variance at the lower level—the protest level—accounted for by differences between countries, a multi-level model is

[38] Constricting the model in this way is also necessary due to the relatively small number of cases.

justified. Moreover, comparing the ICC between different models allows one to check how much unexplained variance remains. While the introduction of further variables always reduces deviance, saturating, and over-specifying the model by simply adding further variables reduces efficiency and prevents the finding of a parsimonious yet detailed explanation. This is where looking beyond deviance at the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is useful, since these measures capture model fit, but also "penalise us for including too many variables" (Pardos-Prado, 2014).

This quantitative analysis of the outcomes of protest events provides cross-national comparisons of the indigenous movement in Latin America. It also allows for the comparison of the relative effects of direct versus indirect effect of protest-level variables on movement outcomes. This is thanks to the correlational logic of the multi-level regression logistical analysis. As such, however, it can supply only limited insight into the combinations of conditions that lead to positive outcomes. This is why this thesis employs a sequential mixed method design, in which Chapter 5 looks even further 'inside' a select number of protests from the quantitative dataset, and follows this up with a qualitative analysis in Chapter 6, the findings of which are systematised using fuzzy set Comparative Qualitative Analysis in Chapter 7. In doing so, the thesis tries to both supplement and further test the findings of the quantitative analysis presented in Chapter 4. It is the application of Qualitative Comparative Analysis that requires further introduction first, however.

3.4.2 Qualitative Comparative Analysis

In order to start uncovering these mechanisms and processes, Chapter 7 applies the technique of fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) for Bolivia, systematising the qualitative findings of the process tracing analysis carried out in Chapter 6. Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) was pioneered by Charles Ragin, developed in order to systematise the comparative analysis of small- and medium-*N* studies (Ragin, 1987, 1989, 2008). It is a method that allows for the search of necessary and sufficient conditions, even for medium-*N* studies. It can identify which conditions, or crucially *combinations* of conditions, are either necessary or sufficient for an observed outcome. It "allows for identification of the multiple and conjunctural causes of some event when comparing a relatively small number of cases… [it] is conjunctural in its logic, examining the various ways in which specified factors interact and combine with one another to yield particular outcomes" (Cress & Snow, 2000: 1097).

It highlights the often-implicit set-theoretic nature of social scientific—particularly qualitative—hypotheses (Ragin, 2008). Sets should not be seen as purely descriptive—e.g. indigenous movements are a subset of social movements in general—but also as explanatory (Ragin, 2008). As such, QCA allows for the study of asymmetric, non-correlational relationships.[39] As an example, a correlational analysis can suggest that smoking increases the risks of cancer; this does not mean, however, that each individual smoker will get cancer. In

[39] For example, if one was to argue that all third-wave democracies with parliamentary systems failed, then this can be expressed as the fact that parliamentary third-wave democracies are a subset of failed democracies.

fsQCA, however, for a condition to be considered necessary for a certain outcome, it has to be present in all the cases in which this outcome is observed, and none of the cases in which the outcome is absent. As such, it can be said to be non-correlational.

The most important contribution, however, is that it permits the formulation for various combinations of causal mechanisms leading to the same or similar outcome. Given 'causal heterogeneity', different 'causal recipes' can be formulated explaining divergent paths to the same consequence (Ragin, 1989, 2008). This is particularly important as correlational techniques tell us little about the direction of causality. When conducting QCA, the researcher looks for analytical relationships based on set-theoretic principles, including subset relations (necessity and sufficiency), set intersection (cases as configurations), set union (different causal paths) and truth tables (causal complexity), among others.

This means comparing cases that ideally differ on only one variable (or causal condition), and seeing whether this impacts the outcome to be explained. This is the logic of matched cases, which also guides the mixed-method analysis of Chapter 5. As such, the number of conditions that can be evaluated, given the number of cases available, is of particular methodological concern (just as it is for statistical correlational analyses). In order to specify clearer guidelines for researchers, Marx and Dusa (2011) developed benchmarks for the number of cases required given the number of causal conditions tested. Specifically, they investigated the lowest number of cases necessary for a certain probability that the same explanatory model could not have been developed based on random data (Marx & Dusa, 2011: 111). In other words, a 10 percent test indicates that there is only a 10 percent chance that "other models with completely different explanatory conditions would equally generate high consistency scores or would not show any contradictions" (Rihoux *et al*., 2013: 180). For four causal conditions, for example, the recommended minimum number of cases would be 13 (at the 10 percent level) (Marx & Dusa, 2011).

For the purposes of QCA, cases can either be described by crisp sets (dichotomous, 0 or 1) or calibrated into fuzzy sets (any values between 0 and 1), denoting the extent of membership in the set in question. Utilising fuzzy set QCA (fsQCA) "allows the researcher a greater precision in the operationalization of conditions, and it increases the analytical leverage", as well as minimising the effects of coding errors (Maggetti & Levi-Faur, 2013: 199). For fuzzy sets, the process of calibration is crucial. Firstly, the researcher must choose which cut off points to use, e.g. 0.0 – 0.2 – 0.4 – 0.6 – 0.8 – 1.0 or 0.0 – 0.25 – 0.5 – 0.75 – 1.0, etc. The 0.5 mark is particularly tricky, as it denotes that the case is as much a member of the set in question as it is not. It depends on theoretical and empirical considerations whether such a conceptualisation is justified. Fuzzy set calibration allows for both the interpreting of variation, *i.e.* which variation is relevant (a concern for qualitative approaches) and the relative placement of cases (which matters for quantitative studies) (Ragin, 2008). Calibration requires prior external empirical knowledge about the cases, and the criteria for membership must be explicitly stated.

A QCA analysis is then carried out in a number of steps (Maggetti & Levi-Faur, 2013; Ragin, 2008). Firstly, a truth table is created, describing the possible configurations of causal conditions and their representation in the data. Secondly, through the process of Boolean algebra minimisation, conditions that have no impact on the outcome (*i.e.* the outcome is

present regardless of whether the condition is present or absent) are eliminated. Different solutions must be compared, based on how the logical remainders (configurations of conditions with no empirical cases) are dealt with: the "parsimonious solution is based on simplifying assumptions, the intermediate solution is based on theoretically meaningful simplifying assumptions (easy counterfactuals) and the complex solution does not assume any simplifying assumptions" (Maggetti & Levi-Faur, 2013: 200). Both the parsimonious and intermediate solutions need to be either theoretically or empirically justified; at the same time, conditions that occur in all three solutions are most convincing as part of the explanation; they can be considered its core elements, while suggesting that we are less certain about conditions that are not present in the parsimonious solution (Maggetti & Levi-Faur, 2013). The ultimate solution of one or more causal configurations (or causal paths) is then tested for consistency (how well it explains the data) and coverage (how much of the data it explains).

This method has in recent years been criticised, leading to a lively academic exchange on the topic. Critics have argued, in particular, that the algorithms used are often unreliable and that the method is hampered by the limited diversity issue (Collier, 2014; Lucas & Szatrowski, 2014; Seawright, 2014). Proponents, on the other hand, have rallied to the method's defense (Fiss *et al*., 2014; Ragin, 2014; Vaisey, 2014).[40] The main algorithm used, Quine-McCluskey, is relatively uncomplicated, and produces the same results if one compared every two-case combination, under the logic of matched cases, manually. Limited diversity of real-world data—the fact that not all of the potential causal combinations can be observed and thus evaluated—is not so much a problem for the method, but something that needs to be acknowledged. What this means that even though one might have 20 cases, if they only represent 10 different combinations of causal conditions, they effectively represent only 10 cases for the purposes of evaluating whether the analysis is over-specified or not.

Moreover, just like any methodological approach, it has both advantages and drawbacks. While the positives are exalted, the potential pitfalls of the analysis do also need to be addressed. In fact, in response to this methodological debates QCA proponents have devised new tools to check both the validity and the reliability of the method. For example, this includes paying attention to the number of cases analysed compared to the number of conditions included in the analysis; just like a correlational analysis, QCA can be over-specified (Marx & Dusa, 2011). Traditional statistical methods have also been criticised in that small changes in model specifications can lead to different results. As such, these are not necessarily problems specific to QCA, and they are addressed in both the quantitative and qualitative part of this thesis by paying close attention to testing the validity and reliability of the results. QCA, specifically, checks both the 'coverage' and the 'consistency' of the causal combinations it suggests (see Chapter 7).

The number of applications of QCA in the social sciences has continued to grow, increasingly rapidly in recent years (Rihoux & Marx, 2013; Rihoux *et al*., 2013). Such studies have ranged in the number of cases studied and the number of causal conditions evaluated; while the majority of studies had a medium-*N*, the number of explanatory conditions generally ranged

[40] In fact, the authors of the initial critique, (Lucas & Szatrowski, 2014), were then accused of incorrect simulations and that their evaluations were not replicable (Vaisey, 2014).

between four and six (Rihoux *et al*., 2013). This is because with more conditions, the solutions become more difficult to interpret, with increasing numbers of 'logical remainders'. With four dichotomous conditions (crisp sets), there are 16 possible combinations of those conditions. Such combinations that are not represented in any empirical cases are called logical remainders; though these cannot always be avoided, a large number of such remainders complicates the analysis and undermines the explanatory power of the proposed solution (Marx & Dusa, 2011; Ragin, 2008; Ragin & Rihoux, 2009; Rihoux *et al*., 2013). This is an extension of the logic of 'matched cases'; in order to properly evaluate which conditions are necessary and/or sufficient for a particular outcome, ideally cases with just one difference regarding the explanatory variables in question are needed.

The ability to uncover multiple causal paths—or causal recipes—is of particular relevance to the study of social movement outcomes, since most of the conditions that affect outcomes are also likely to interact with each other. This conceptualisation violates the independent variable assumption of standard statistical analyses. Indeed, social movement scholars have in recent years applied QCA to the study of social movement outcomes; following the pivotal application of QCA to the outcomes of homeless mobilisation (Cress & Snow, 2000), the method has also been applied in three recent monographs (Kolb & Tarrow, 2007; McAdam & Boudet, 2012; McCammon, 2012).

The two latter studies in particular show evidence for the effect of movement-level variables—movement strategies—for movement outcomes, but also their interaction with contextual variables. Specifically, McAdam and Boudet find that although mobilisation was neither necessary nor sufficient, it "figures prominently in the recipe" explaining a positive outcome (McAdam & Boudet, 2012: 184). Perhaps even more relevant for this project, however, was McCammon's findings about the importance of activists' strategic actions, specifically 'strategic adaptation', for movement outcomes (McCammon, 2012). Like McCammon's study, this thesis aims to bring back movement leaders and activists "as *active agents* in the study of movement outcomes" (McCammon, 2012: 11). While both studies bring attention to movement-level variables and the need to consider them as product of strategic decision-making, neither pays attention to the role of claim-making within the movements they study.

3.5 Setting the stage for empirical analyses

Integrating the theoretical and methodological discussions above, the empirical chapters thus explore the outcomes of social movements both quantitatively and qualitatively, by examining both protest events and social movement organisations. The rich literature on social movements provides insights about the role that mobilising structures, political opportunities and framing processes play for both the rise and fall of social movements (McAdam *et al*., 2001). As explored in the previous theoretical chapter, however, this literature does not consistently take into account the strategic claiming and framing of social movements. Each of the four empirical chapters that develops specific hypotheses to be tested, especially as the findings of each chapter inform the hypotheses of the next. Overall, however, each chapter investigates the extent to which strategies at the movement level—claims, frames and tactics—matter for

movement outcomes, and whether any influence they have can is direct, or is only produced in interaction with contextual variables. It does so using a variety of methods, as explained above, approaching the question of the successes and failures of indigenous movements in Latin America from a number of both theoretical and epistemological angles. In doing so, it hopes to contribute to the understanding of indigenous collective action in the region, and the question of protest outcomes in general.

4. The cost of protest: Nature of demands, political opportunities, and protest outcomes in 13 Latin American countries

4.1 Introduction

In order to begin the mixed method analyses that form the empirical bulk of this thesis, this chapter presents a quantitative analysis based on an original dataset of indigenous protest activity in 13 Latin America countries, between 2003 and 2013. As detailed in Chapter 2, while contentious action continues to attract academic attention, whether it matters remains equally contentious. This is especially true in studies of and from the Global North; in scholarship from the Global South, at the same time, there has been a paucity of quantitative and cross-national studies evaluating social movement outcomes. This chapter aims to fill this gap, and present the first set of findings to be further tested in the mixed method Chapter 5 and the following two qualitative chapters.

In particular, this chapter focuses on the impact of protesters' strategies, especially demands and tactics, might have on the outcomes of social movement action, either directly or in conjunction with contextual state-level factors. As such, it evaluates the direct-, joint and indirect-effect models of movement influence. The findings challenge the prevalent notion that protest-level variables have little direct impact on protest outcomes, and that if protest has any effect, this comes about only as a result of supportive political opportunities and/or public opinion. In contrast, this research shows that both the types of demands included under an indigenous banner and the tactics employed to claim them matter to an important degree. This is particularly the case when 'success' is defined even as just acceptance, not only as advantages. However, this is not to say that country-level variables do not matter. The political environment, in particular, is found to have a significant effect on the likelihood of success, and does matter more for securing advantages than protest-level factors. There is also some evidence for the importance of public opinion, especially when considering whether 'successful' cases experience acceptance only or also advantages.

4.2 Hypothesizing protest outcomes

As argued in the theoretical chapter above, the two literatures relevant to the study of successes and failures of indigenous movements in Latin America—research on specific indigenous struggles on the one hand and scholarship on social movements in general on the other—largely fail to explain the *divergent* outcomes of different indigenous movements across the continent. While the former has paid attention to the heterogeneity of indigenous struggles, when they have succeeded in any way it has often attributed this to their mobilising capacity. This stands in stark contrast to the latter literature, which—despite a recent resurgence of interest in social movement outcomes—has struggled to find evidence for any direct effects of social movements. Drawing on the conclusions of the theoretical chapter—specifically the need to

bring attention back to the nature of movement demands—this chapter proposes a number of hypotheses to explain movement outcomes based on the insights of both of those literatures. These are then tested in a statistical analysis carried out on indigenous protest events from Latin America.

The richness of social movement theories generally and theories of indigenous politics specifically provide a myriad of potential independent variables that could explain the divergent outcomes experienced by indigenous movements in Latin America. Both direct impacts and indirect or joint relationships are often complex, and many questions pertaining to the outcomes of social movements can only be answered by in-depth qualitative investigations. Such analyses, however, lack a systematic look at the problematic; in contrast, the following investigation of protest events focuses on a few select variables, but with the advantage of a statistical analysis. This section below thus develops the hypothesis to be tested empirically below.

4.2.1 Direct effects

Demands

As argued above, analyses of the effect of protest-level variables have paid relatively little attention to the role that demands, or claims, play for social movement outcomes. In particular, the differentiation of demands made within the same movement needs to be taken into account. Combining the already reviewed insights of framing theory and the distinction between politics of recognition and redistribution, the content of the demands of different indigenous protest events can be introduced into the analysis, and evaluated for its impact on protest outcomes. In particular, the distinction between redistribution and recognition claims is applied to the analysis below (see also Table 1, p. 36). Drawing on Chapter 2, it can be hypothesized that indigenous protest events that make only demands in terms of recognition are more likely to succeed than ones with redistributive goals, as recognition-type claims such as language recognition or territorial protection are less threatening to the existing distribution of resources; in imposing a lesser economic cost on the state, they might be more likely to succeed (Luders, 2006).

As also discussed in Chapter 2, this is of course complicated by the continued extractive nature of Latin American economies, which sometimes makes territorial protection a hard-to-achieve priority.[41] This highlights the importance and contentious nature of land in Latin America, which can be captured by including a measure of whether indigenous demands relate in any way to land ownership. Still, demanding a state not take an action (a defensive claims) as opposed to proactively redistributing resources (an offensive claim) might make a significant difference in success rates. This then relates to other aspects of the demands that indigenous protesters make, in particular in relation to the state. As discussed above, although the existing literature shows how hard it is for social movements to directly influence legislative change,

[41] In fact, as discussed in Chapter 5, recognition claims against extractive industry can be thought of as the 'exception that proves the rule'; in presenting too a high a cost on the states they target, unlike most other recognition claims.

there are other ways in which the state can positively respond to protest demands. This is particularly relevant in the region under study, due to the strongly executive nature of Latin American states (O'Donnell, 1994). As such, a control is included denoting whether meeting the demands of a particular protest would require new legislation.

> **H1a:** Redistributive demands are less likely to be met, compared to those that focus on recognition only.
>
> **H1b:** Claims concerning land are also harder to meet, compared to demands not related to land.

Tactics

Protest participants not only have to rally around a specific cause, but also choose specific tactics to advance that cause. The first question will be how many people they manage to mobilise at any one time. While it may seem intuitive that the greater the levels of mobilisation, the more likely demands are to be met, this is not always the case in practice. The level of mobilisation, in terms of the number of participants as well as duration, is a principal factor in determining the strength of a movement. Yet mobilisation can take many different forms, just as for example the civil rights movement in the US employed a wide range of tactics, including litigation and sit-ins (McAdam, 1999). Indigenous movements in Latin America have supplemented the most frequent tactic of mobilising in large marches with building pressure on states through cooperation with international organisations, bringing their own legal cases against states or private corporations, as well as occupying land and blocking roads.[42]

Not just the tactic itself, but the level of disruption is important. As discussed above, disruption is one of the most cited movement-level explanations for movement success (Biggs & Andrews, 2015; Kolb & Tarrow, 2007; Luders, 2016). For Bolivia's highland indigenous movements, it seems that the use of disruptive tactics was indeed crucial to create such political instability, that the popular-indigenous MAS social movement-cum-political party rose to power. On the other hand, the use of violence by the Mapuche in Chile has been met by repression and few positive outcomes. Of course, this could be determined by the differences in the size of the indigenous population, and of the movement itself. Indeed, in Gamson's study, it was larger groups that were both more likely to employ violence, and to also experience more positive outcomes if they did.

> **H2:** The more intense the protest activity, in terms of disruption, duration and number of participants, the more likely it is to experience positive outcomes.

[42] Although for the purposes of the quantitative analysis below, only contentious protest events, such as marches or occupations, are considered as examples of protest events. Tactics such as litigation or lobbying are not considered as contentious protest events.

4.2.2 Indirect or joint effects

Yet the impact of protest-level variables, if any, might be mediated through contextual variables (indirect effect) or be produced by their interaction (joint effect). Indeed, the prominence of indirect-effect models in recent scholarship on social movements suggests that analyses of the direct relationship between protest strategies and protest outcomes often yield few convincing results (Amenta *et al.*, 2010; Giugni, 2007). While not necessarily dismissing the importance of movement demands and tactics outright, it is important to consider whether their effect might lie in interaction with other variables, most commonly the political environment or public opinion. Other country-level differences, especially the nature of the indigenous constituency in each country, must also be controlled for.

Political opportunities

Perhaps the most often cited contextual effect on protest outcomes lies in the nature of the political environment or, more specifically, the political opportunity structure. Contextual is perhaps not the right word, as social movements can influence the very same political opportunities that affect their chances later. Even though it is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore this potential feedback further, the importance of time cannot be understated, and this is further discussed below. As explained in Chapter 2, it is the propensity for repression and government partisanship that are used as independent variables here.

As elaborated above, it is plausible to propose that a left-of-centre executive would provide a more sympathetic political environment for indigenous movements than a centrist or right-wing government.

> **H3:** Overall, indigenous protest is more likely to have positive outcomes under left-wing governments.

Yet is it that social movements impact political opportunities, and it is then those political opportunities that may lead to certain outcomes in relation to the movement? Or is it the interaction between protest strategies and the political environment that matters? While the former may also be the case, it is not possible to evaluate this empirically by analysing individual protest events. In the case of the latter hypothesis, the empirical evaluation is more straightforward and causality more plausible to suggest with the data at hand. Moreover, it also allows us to consider social movements not as homogenous and static, but as made of heterogenous demands, some of which get privileged under different political circumstances at the expense of others.

In the case of Latin American indigenous movements, this has already been explored. The implication of Hale's 'neoliberal multiculturalism' thesis is that indigenous movements which combine recognition and redistribution demands—especially if they focus more on the latter—are more likely to be successful within a more left-wing political environment (Hale, 2002). As such, the interaction between a left-wing environment and the prominence of redistribution demands might shed some light on movement success. We might expect that protests with redistributive goals might be more likely to succeed under a sympathetic government.

H4: Redistribution-oriented protests are more likely to succeed under left-of-centre political regimes than in other political contexts.

Repression

In the cases at hand, lack of repression is not necessarily considered a deterrent to movement success, as the research is dealing with the outcomes of movements that have already emerged. However, large amounts of repression, such as experienced by the Mapuche movement in Chile (Stahler-Sholk *et al.*, 2008), are likely to undermine the potential of indigenous protests to achieve positive outcomes. The use of repression may also indicate that the protest is more radical—in claims and in tactics—and thus already less likely to achieve its goals.

H5: Repressive regimes are likely to reduce the likelihood of success.

Public opinion

A protest might also be expected to be more successful if the 'framing' of its demands (both their content and the way in which they are legitimated) are more in line with current public opinion. This 'frame resonance' can thus expected to positively influence protest outcomes. Although public opinion data specifically relating to attitudes to indigenous peoples and struggles in Latin America is difficult to find, some cross-continental surveys can be used approximate public attitudes. It is only possible to get a snapshot of the differences in attitudes towards indigenous people in the early 21th century in the countries under study. In particular, the 2009 *Latinobarómetro* survey[43] examines both the extent to which citizens in each country report experiencing discrimination, and their perception of what proportion of the population is being discriminated against. While these are by no means perfect measures of public support for indigenous protest, they can be used as proxies for the potential public support for indigenous movements. While this is complicated by the specific history of ethnic relations in each country, it offers the best available way to capture an aspect of the political environment and to test its significance for protest activity in the quantitative cross-national analysis.

H6a: Countries with a greater share of citizens reporting racist attitudes might be less likely to have more successful indigenous protests.

H6b: Indigenous protest activity might be more successful in countries where a greater percentage of the population acknowledges a problem of discrimination.

4.2.3 Controls

Indigenous constituency and allies

The size of the indigenous population might be a decisive factor in affecting movement outcomes, either in itself or interaction with other variables. Despite the difficulties in regard to defining indigeneity—discussed in Chapter 3—the selected 13 Latin American countries are grouped into low, medium, and high indigenous population share (see Table 3 in Chapter 3, p.45, and Appendix A). Yet even in countries with larger indigenous populations, the outcomes

[43] These questions were unfortunately only asked in 2009, not in other years.

have been divergent, for example in Bolivia compared to Ecuador and Guatemala. One could expect that in countries with smaller indigenous populations, indigenous movements might encounter less opposition, as their demands—if implemented—would affect the whole 'national' society to a lesser degree, even if they demanded redistribution rather than just recognition[44] (see Van Cott (2002) on constitutional reforms). It could also be, however, that the lack of a majority is likely to impel a movement towards more limited demands as they are likely to rely more on persuasion over coercion. Conversely, the larger the indigenous share of the national population, the more the inclusion of redistributive demands might be necessary for movements to succeed (Lucero, 2013; Martínez Novo, 2013; Postero, 2007). Such is the case of Bolivia, for example, where self-identifying indigenous persons span across the peasant, working and middle classes, and to gather broad support among their potential constituency, movements arguably need to encompass a variety of demands, rather than just focusing on the recognition of difference and specific group identity.

> **H7:** The larger the indigenous share of the population, the more likely are indigenous protesters to succeed.

In cases of smaller indigenous movements, at the same time, it is more important for them to seek allies, even though this is not to say that alliances might not a useful resource for all movements. These allies might be local or international NGOs, and research suggests that such alliances tend to lead to recognition being favoured over redistributive claims (Andolina *et al*., 2005). Conversely, indigenous movements might seek alliances either with other popular sectors, in which case we might expect a more class-oriented agenda, or with local or regional political elites; in the latter case, the experience of Bolivia suggest this favours the predominance of recognition-focused demands (Krausova, 2012; Yashar, 2005). For the quantitative analysis that follows, a measure of alliance-making is taken as the presence of non-indigenous supporters at the specific protest event.

> **H8:** Indigenous protest events with non-indigenous supporters taking part are more likely to succeed.

Time

As already hinted at above, the role of timing might need further attention. The potential interrelatedness of different independent variables means that it is also essential to consider the importance of time. Successes in previous years might affect the political opportunity structure for new protests. The extent of opportunity provided for indigenous movements can thus also conceivably depend on how long indigenous struggles have been going on for in a given country, under the assumption that, for sustained campaigns at least, the longer a struggle goes on, the harder it will be for goals to be met since the more easily attainable demands are more likely to have already been granted. This is suggested by the 'protest cycle' approach (Tarrow, 2011). Moreover, the transformative approach suggests change takes place in moments of

[44] Of course, this is not the case when, even if the indigenous population is relatively small, those sections of the population demand land rights in areas rich in natural resources. However, apart from such cases, this might be particularly relevant for the relative strength of recognition versus redistribution elements in the movement demands.

heightened contention (McAdam & Sewell, 2001). Advances in neighbouring countries might make success easier to attain through diffusion (Biggs & Andrews, 2015; Keck & Sikkink, 1998); it is unfortunately, not possible to test this with the current data, as it cannot capture diffusion.

Yet, to what extent are the 'protest cycle' and the 'transformative' perspectives useful for understanding the outcomes of individual protest events and campaigns? Do all movements follow the same trajectories (della Porta, 2013)? These questions cannot be fully answered in this chapter, and are more fully explored in the chapters that follow. Nevertheless, time does need to be taken into account for protest event analyses too. [45] It is plausible to expect that the previous successes and failures of indigenous movements will affect the chances of further protest. In particular, if many demands have already been met, further protest may face increased obstacles.

> **H9:** The rate of 'success' in the previous year negatively affects the chances of a positive outcome, for a protest event in the same country.[46]

4.3 Methodology

4.3.1 Analysing protest outcomes

The quantitative analysis presented here thus forms the first part of a mixed-method study into the outcomes experienced by indigenous movements in Latin America. It is based on an original dataset of indigenous protests from 13 Latin American countries between 2003 and 2013. In particular, it introduces detailed information about each protest, and evaluates if and how protest-level variables affect the chances of a positive outcome. Going perhaps full-circle in relation to the debates about how to best define 'success' for social movements following Gamson's original work, a positive outcome is defined as either just acceptance, or acceptance followed by advantages. An advantage was defined as follows; to "treat even the most minor goal achievement as success while failure meant no progress on any of the group's efforts" (Gamson, 2014). As developed in Chapters 2 and 3, firstly, the protest event might have been ignored or repressed, and met with no acceptance. Secondly, although acceptance might have taken place–evidenced by negotiations or consultations, for example–no advantages followed the event (at least not in the subsequent 6 months). Thirdly, at least some of the stated goals may be met, resulting in concrete advantages. As discussed above, having acceptance always precede advantage makes it easier to place at least of the responsibility for the outcome on the protest event. It is thus more useful to theorise acceptance as a precursor to advantages, and indeed the data collected support this empirically. A more detailed discussion of the statistical methodology employed below is presented in Chapter 3 above.

[45] This is particularly important as survival analysis is not useful in this case, as there would be no common starting point (T0) and the outcome of interest is not the amount of time to an outcome, but whether different types of outcomes (acceptance and advantages) are achieved.

[46] Unfortunately, given the nature of the data, it is not possible to take cross-country diffusion into account.

4.3.2 Describing indigenous protest in Latin America

Before delving into the analyses below, what does the protest event dataset tell us about the nature of indigenous protest activity in Latin America in descriptive terms? A compilation of indigenous movement activity during a 11-year period in 13 Latin American countries, while by no means exhaustive, nevertheless offers an unparalleled opportunity to investigate the kinds of demands indigenous protesters are likely to make, how they are likely to make them and what kinds of responses they might expect, both in general as well as from individual countries. See Appendix B for a more detailed description of variables, including coding and sources.

Protest characteristics

The dataset captures the frequency of indigenous protest events, which are not evenly distributed across the eleven-year period. As shown in Figure 1 below (p. 67), indigenous protest activity peaked during the middle of data collection period, corresponding to the height of indigenous mobilisations in Latin America, especially in Bolivia and Ecuador. From a peak from 2006 to 2008, the frequency of indigenous protests appears to have been on a declining trend.[47] Although there has been a recent growth of anti-extraction indigenous contention across the continent—including countries with left-of-centre governments—the spread of the 'pink tide' of left-wing government in the first part of the decade likely accounts for the decrease in indigenous protest activity.[48]


When looking at protest activity, tactics are the most commonly considered variables when evaluating success. The level of mobilisation is undeniably an important measure to consider, and even though more reliable that single newspaper or newswire sources, the data analysed here still do not offer certainty as to the accuracy of the figures reported, sometimes even reporting multiple figures as organisers and authorities tend to disagree on the magnitude of protest (Earl *et al*., 2004).[49] Still, it is possible to compare the relative size of the protest; while whether the protest was attended by ten thousand or eleven thousand is not assumed to make a significant difference for the protest's outcomes, attendance by *ten thousand* versus *ten* people is.

[47] Although for 2013, this is also due to the fact that only AFP data was available. At the same time, for 2003, only OSAL data were available.

[48] Please refer to Appendix C for a closer look at the frequency of indigenous protest events by individual countries.

[49] As such, the estimated number of participants at the protest events coded ranges from 2 to 100,000, with a mean of just over 3,000 participants. This means that there is wide range of values, as well as some outliers.

Figure 1: Frequency of indigenous protest events (LA 2003-2013)



Source: Author's dataset of indigenous protest events in 13 Latin American countries, 2003-2013. N=635.


Since indigenous protest events also varied significantly in duration, Figure 2 below (p. 68) shows the total number of days of indigenous protest activity, rather than just the number of individual protest events (as shown in Figure 1 above). A data dispersion issue arises for both variables. The majority of events were attended by a thousand people or less, but some protests were reportedly attended by a hundred thousand people or more. The majority of events lasted under a week (such as demonstrations and road blocks), but some continuous protest activity took place for more than a year (such as land occupations). This is addressed by applying a logarithmic conversion to both variables in the models below. Of relevance is also the extent to which indigenous protesters used disruption to achieve their goals. The majority of protests employed some measure of non-violent disruption (55%), while 8% used violent tactics, involving violence against persons or damage to property. The rest (37%) are non-disruptive, including mainly stationary demonstrations or pre-agreed marches.

Then, it is illuminating to look at the kinds of demands most commonly made by indigenous movements in the dataset at hand. Of the 635 cases, 52% included some redistributive elements in their demands, while 91% included at least some recognition demands. This makes sense since indigenous movements are about indigenous people mobilising *qua* their ethnic identity.[50] This shows that not all indigenous protests make redistributive demands, making it an interesting aspect of indigenous protest activity to analyse. As mentioned above, inextricably linked to indigenous movements is the issue of land, though not all indigenous movements have made land-based claims. In fact, just over half (53%) of indigenous protests

[50] This highlights that recognition-redistribution should not be considered a simple dichotomy in indigenous protest and most indigenous contentious activities are going to include some recognition-oriented goals.

have had land related objectives, and of those, 43% pertained to protection of existing territorial rights, while 57% have demanded the titling of new land (either state or privately owned).

Figure 2: Number of indigenous protest days (LA 2003-2013)



Countries and outcomes

As discussed above, the differentiation of positive outcomes into acceptance and advantages is useful in bringing extra nuance to the consideration of the consequences of protest activity. In the current dataset of Latin American indigenous protest events, the rate of achieving advantages is 25%. Looking only at protests that led to concrete advantages would thus suggest that three quarters of protest events end in failure. Yet as can be seen in Table 5 below (p.69), the most common outcome—although by a small margin—of indigenous protest was in fact just acceptance (acceptance not followed by advantages), occurring in 38% of cases. While this is perhaps not best labelled as 'success', since no concrete advantages followed[51], neither should it be considered as simply failure, such as either being ignored or repressed (as occurred in the remaining 37% of cases). Having a place at the negotiating table, for example, with the state publicly acknowledging the legitimacy of your demands, can be considered a positive outcome in itself. It might also to contribute to a positive political atmosphere for consequent indigenous organising, even if it cannot be easily linked with future advantages (Koopmans & Statham, 1999).

Considering the importance given to country-level variables in the subsequent analysis, it is also necessary to examine the distribution of cases among the 13 Latin American countries, as well as the variation in 'success' rate. As can also be seen from Table 5 below, there is variation in the number of cases *per* country; this is broadly aligned with secondary sources on the

[51] At least not in the six months following the protest event.

intensity of indigenous protest activity in these countries and as such suggests a lack of significant sample bias (Van Cott, 2010; Yashar, 2005). The overall success rate within each country is also broadly in line with what we know from the secondary literature about indigenous movements and policy change in Latin America (as discussed above).

As could be expected (Richards & Gardner, 2013; Stahler-Sholk & Vanden, 2011), Chile exhibits the lowest success rate, with nearly 70% of events experiencing no positive outcomes. Venezuela, on the other hand, has the highest success rate; even though there are only 8 cases, Venezuela is known for one of the most pro-indigenous constitutional reforms in the continent (Van Cott, 2002), despite (or perhaps thanks to) the low indigenous population share. Countries with a high indigenous share, such as Bolivia and Ecuador, which have made important advances in terms of indigenous rights in the last decade, also exhibit high success rates (83% and 76% respectively). In both countries, moreover, acceptance *as well as* advantages seem to be the most common outcome, while for example in Peru and Guatemala indigenous protesters are more likely to get acceptance only, rather than advantages. This is also visualised in Figure 3 below (p. 70).

Table 5: Outcomes of indigenous protest events by country


Country	Number of events	No positive outcome	Acceptance only	Acceptance + advantages
Argentina	34	**35.3%**	29.4%	**35.3%**
Bolivia	100	17.0%	35.0%	**48.0%**
Chile	61	**68.9%**	27.9%	3.3%
Colombia	53	**43.4%**	37.7%	18.9%
Ecuador	62	24.2%	32.3%	**43.6%**
Guatemala	72	41.7%	**52.8%**	5.6%
Honduras	23	**47.8%**	30.4%	21.7%
Mexico	86	**54.7%**	38.4%	7.0%
Nicaragua	17	29.4%	29.4%	**41.2%**
Panama	41	**51.2%**	41.5%	7.3%
Paraguay	40	10.0%	**50.0%**	40.0%
Peru	38	18.4%	**47.4%**	34.2%
Venezuela	8	0.0%	37.5%	**62.5%**
Total	635	36.9%	**38.3%**	24.9%

Source: Author's dataset of indigenous protest events 2003-2013.
Note: most common outcome in each country in bold.

This corresponds to what we know about the success of indigenous activism in those countries from the secondary literature (see for example: Albó, 2008; Felix, 2008; Peeler, 2003; Postero, 2007; Stahler-Sholk & Vanden, 2011; Van Cott, 2002, 2010; Yashar, 2005; Zamosc, 2007). This is visualised in Figure 3 below (p. 70), which shows the number of indigenous protests in each country by the outcomes they experienced. Looking at individual countries also provides evidence for the usefulness of coding 'acceptance' as an intermediary outcome. The clearest example is the experience of the Mapuche struggle in Chile, which has been consistently

criminalised by the Chilean state (Richards & Gardner, 2013; Stahler-Sholk & Vanden, 2011). This can be contrasted with the trajectory of indigenous mobilisations in Guatemala, where despite the comparative lack of concrete advantages, indigenous protesters are routinely invited to negotiations in a climate which recognises, at least *de jure*, the legitimacy of indigenous rights (Hale, 2002; Peeler, 2003). If only advantages were considered as 'success', the failure rate would be quite similar in both countries; 97% in Chile and 94% in Guatemala. However, if acceptance is included as part of 'success', the failure rate for Guatemala suddenly drops to 42%, while in Chile it remains the highest in Latin America at 69%.

Figure 3: Outcomes of indigenous protest by country (LA 2003-2013)



4.4 Analysis

As discussed above, making a distinction between a) no positive outcome, b) acceptance, and c) advantages, allows one to look at the causes of complete failure separately from the determinants of securing advantages once protesters' demands are accepted as legitimate. In other words, the explanation of why sometimes states ignore or repress protest and at other times engage with protesters are likely to (at least sometimes) be quite different from those influencing whether the promises made are actually implemented. In this way, the different types of determinants can be explored in building a model that is then compared to results when the definition of 'success' is changed. The impact of different definitions of 'success' is also further explored later.

4.4.1 Movement-level determinants

Demands

One of the core interests of this research is to evaluate the impact of variables that are under the protesters' control, on protest outcomes. The first model (Model 1 in Table 6 below, p. 75)[52] suggests that protest strategy can in fact be consequential. This challenges the current prevalence of studies concluding that protest tends to have little direct effect on policy and other outcomes (Giugni, 2007; McAdam & Su, 2002; Olzak & Soule, 2009; Suh, 2012). Partially, at least, the lack of attention paid to demand-making could explain this.

To clarify, the demands of protest events, specifically, were coded according to their reporting in the OSAL reports, the AFP, and other online sources, which often included direct quotes from protest leaders and/or participants, and/or reporting of written manifestos. This has meant that the sources of information for each protest did vary, however; for some protest, there was a report in the OSAL, an AFP newswire, and it was possible to find both interviews with leaders and manifestos published in online newspapers. As such, the sources for the 'nature of demands' were triangulated as much as possible. For other events, it was not possible to do so, and the coding had to rely on either the OSAL or the AFP reporting. This is a general problem with the use of newswire/newspaper sources, and as discussed in Chapter 3, I countered this by both a) relying on the OSAL sources as much as possible (which are already triangulated by a group of researchers) and b) looking for further online sources on each protest event.

In terms of the results, in particular, the inclusion of redistributive demands in indigenous claims is negatively correlated with securing any positive outcomes; in fact, making redistributive claims halves the odds of success. In Model 1, for an indigenous protest event (with duration and number and nature of participants being held equal, as well as whether road blocks were used[53]), asking for something requiring redistribution (rather than just recognition), decreases the log odds of success by 0.85. Concretely, holding all the other covariates constant, the relative predicted probability of 'success' for indigenous protests asking for redistribution is about 59%, while for those without such demands climbs to 77% (if the other protest-level variables are held at their mean).[54] There is thus evidence in support of Hypothesis 1a.

Overall, in Model 1, the average probability of experiencing at least acceptance is 67%. It must be noted that the predicted probabilities reported here and below thus refer to the comparison of the predicted success of one case relative to another—and to the average probability—rather than the actual probability; as such, they show how various factors influence the *relative* probability of success.

[52] Please refer to Appendices D and E for summary statistics and a correlation matrix of the variables used.

[53] As in, did delivering the demand require legislative change, or could it be met through bureaucratic implementation, executive action, or local government intervention. It was hypothesized that demands requiring the passing of new legislation would indeed have lower chances of 'succeeding', and this variable is thus introduced here as a control.

[54] In Model 4, which also includes country-level variables, this is 57% and 75%, respectively.

Thus, demands requiring a certain redistribution of material resources can more often expect to be met with a negative response that those simply asking for symbolic identity recognition; this builds on the idea that goals which would impose an economic cost on the state are less likely to be met (Luders, 2006; Piven & Cloward, 1979). As such, the economic cost could be considered as a potential mechanism explaining the link between protest demands and tactics on the one hand and outcomes on the other. This can be evidenced, for example, by comparing the relative successes of culturally-oriented Maya activists in Guatemala, compared to the repression of indigenous struggles for land redistribution in the same country (Hale, 2002; Peeler, 2003).

Of course, there are also other than just economic costs that are posed by protest and impact its chances of success; in particular, the political cost of meeting the demand weighed against the political cost of not meeting it. As such, it is not just whether the demand would require redistribution, implying an economic cost, that might affect its chances of being met. The analysis also suggests that it depends on the kind of economic cost to the state. Asking for the distribution of state resources, rather than land or other benefits, seems to increase the chances of success (although this variable is not included in the final analyses presented here). This is likely due to the strongly executive nature of Latin American states (O'Donnell, 1994), which make resource allocation easier to carry out simply through executive actions or local government decisions, than other changes, which might require the passing of new national legislation. The policy change control captures this.

The issue of land is particularly thorny in Latin America and at the centre of much of social protest (Eckstein, 2001); and disputes over land and territory are more often than not the reason for ethnicity-based mobilisations in Latin America (53% of protests in this dataset were related to land issues in one way or another). This might be expected to be a crucial factor, given its importance for indigenous struggles and the fact that land-related goals might be harder to secure. However, in this case the inclusion of land related demands has no statistically significant effect on protest outcomes. This seems to reject Hypothesis 1b. Arguably, however, this is due to the fact that the *relevant* difference is already captured by the redistribution variable, distinguishing between indigenous demands for new land titling (redistribution) challenging the existing land distribution, as opposed to the protection of existing territories (recognition).

Indeed, the analysis shows that ethnicity-based protest demanding recognition, that is the protection of existing rights, from the state is more likely to succeed; this can again be explained by considering the economic cost to the state. At the same time, demands for recognition without an element of redistribution are also more likely to be seen as legitimate and more accepted—often made by indigenous communities considered more 'authentically' indigenous [55] (Andolina *et al*., 2009; Hale, 2002). In that sense, a lower economic cost might

[55] The notion of authenticity draws on my MPhil research in Bolivia, and refers to some indigenous communities and activists being often considered—by the public, the media and/or the state—as more *authentically* indigenous than others, and thus more legitimate claimants of indigenous rights.

also imply a lower political cost; the two cannot always be separated in practice, even if making this distinction is analytically useful.

The case of recognition-only demands can be illustrated, for example, by the large-scale indigenous protests that took place throughout Colombia during October and November 2008.[56] Indigenous activists demanded greater autonomy and protection of territorial rights in a series of protest activities, including national-scale marches and road-blocks. The initial large-scale protest in October culminated in negotiations and agreements with President Alvaro Uribe; this was also helped by the long duration of the protest. However, by mid-November indigenous people were on the streets again due to the lack of implementation of the promised measures. Thus, despite acceptance, in the form of negotiations and well as a written accord, the protesters did not—within six months of the beginning of the protest—experience any positive advantages. This highlights the importance of examining both different types of 'success' and the effect of state-level variables, both of which are addressed below, but also the role of strategy and tactics.

Tactics

If the cost of meeting protesters' demands plays a role in influencing how their target responds, what about the cost imposed by the protest itself? Indeed, and in support of recent studies discussed above (e.g. Biggs & Andrews, 2015), there is also convincing evidence for the effect of protesters' tactical choices on outcomes. For every doubling in the number of protest participants, the odds of experiencing a positive outcome increase by a factor of 1.1, and for every doubling of days of protest, those odds increase by a factor of 1.3. While the magnitude of the effect may seem small, it is important to bear in mind the range of protest event size and duration, range from events lasting less than a day with fewer than 10 participants, to protests lasting months or with hundreds of thousands of protesters. Specifically, the relative predicted probability of success for a protest attended by less than ten people is 49%, *ceteris paribus,* compared to 62% for protests of around 1000 participants and nearly 70% for protests with more than 100,000 protesters.

Thus, the intensity of the protest event is important, but including a composite measure of duration, size and disruption actually confuses the interpretation rather than simplifying it. This means that formulated as such, Hypothesis 2 would have to be rejected. However, the duration of the protest event increases the odds of success significantly. In order to interpret these results more easily, the analysis was also carried out creating five groups for duration; this shows that, for example, the predicted probability of a positive outcomes for an event that only lasted 1 day is on average 55%, while for a protest lasting between a week to a month the probability rises to 75%. The characteristics of the protest participants might also matter, especially whether there are of non-indigenous allies (be they peasant, working class or environmental activists). This was used as a proxy for alliance-building, but appears to have little impact on

[56] Led by *Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia* (Colombian National Indigenous Organisation).

experiencing positive outcomes, at least in this instance when considering individual protest events. Hypothesis 8 thus could not be confirmed.

The duration and size of a protest activity is closely linked to the tactic used—even if some indigenous marches took months while some occupations only lasted a day—and so impact of tactics must also be evaluated. The one tactic shown to have significantly better outcomes than the reference tactic (a demonstration) is the erection of road blocks. Given the low infrastructural development of Latin American countries, this makes sense if again the economic cost imposed on the state is considered. Rather than just disrupting transport and trade for the state, moreover, road blocks are highly disruptive to a large number of ordinary citizens, putting extra pressure on the state to cede to protesters' demands.

Yet while road blocks may be effective due to the disruption they cause in Latin American countries, including a general level of disruption, rather than specifically road blocks, suggests that overall, disruption is negatively correlated with success. While an inverted-U relationship may have been expected when comparing peaceful, disruptive, and violent protest, this is not supported by the data at hand. A simple dichotomous measure of disruption captures the correlation best, showing that that the use of disruptive measures, all else being held constant, somewhat increases the chances of failure. This can be at least partially explained by the fact that undertaking a disruptive protest suggests an acknowledgment on the part of the protesters' that more peaceful protest will not be enough. More costly goals are more likely to be demanded using disruptive measures.[57] At the same time, the state's propensity for repression must be taken into account, and the fact that greater disruption on the part of the protesters makes it more likely for the state to use force. Repression, however, is not clearly linked to failure, as discussed below and in the following chapter, which looks deeper 'inside' selected protest events and campaigns.

4.4.2 Country-level determinants

Indigenous population share

Although the multilevel model helps capture country differences that may impact the experiences of indigenous protesters, what effect, if any, do country-level variables have? Before introducing measures of political opportunities and public opinion in Models 3 and 4, Model 2 (also shown in Table 6, p. 75) controls for the indigenous population share in each country and whether the protest took place in an urban or rural location. This shows the effect of demands and tactics more clearly. As hypothesized above, since this study deals with protest in which indigenous people engage *as* indigenous people, *qua* an ethnolinguistic identity, it would seem likely that the size of the indigenous population in each country might reasonably affect the outcomes of indigenous protest activity. In fact, the analysis suggests that in countries with a medium indigenous population share, indigenous protest has somewhat lesser chances of success than in both low- and high-share countries. Hypothesis 7 is thus partially supported.

[57] Indeed, asking for redistribution triples the odds of using a disruptive tactic, all of the other variables in Model 4 being held equal.

Table 6: Determinants of indigenous protest outcomes: Latin America 2003-2013

Dependent variable: Any positive outcome (acceptance only or acceptance followed by advantages)												
Independent variables:	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
Protest level:	Odds	S.E.	P>|z|	Odds	S.E.	P>|z|	Odds	S.E.	P>|z|	Odds	S.E.	P>|z|
Demand: Redistribution?	0.427	0.088	0.000 ***	0.439	0.091	0.000 ***	0.444	0.093	0.000 ***	0.445	0.092	0.000 ***
Requiring policy change?	0.459	0.092	0.000 ***	0.447	0.090	0.000 ***	0.449	0.091	0.000 ***	0.420	0.083	0.000 ***
Duration *(log2)*	1.237	0.064	0.000 ***	1.261	0.066	0.000 ***	1.272	0.067	0.000 ***	1.253	0.064	0.000 ***
Number of participants *(log2)*	1.137	0.044	0.001 ***	1.105	0.045	0.015 *	1.115	0.046	0.009 **	1.117	0.044	0.005 **
Road block?	1.472	0.348	0.102	1.887	0.488	0.014 *	1.895	0.496	0.015 *	2.064	0.532	0.005 **
Non-indigenous participants?	0.978	0.212	0.919	0.904	0.200	0.647	0.944	0.211	0.796	0.921	0.205	0.711
Urban?				1.799	0.409	0.010 **	1.757	0.401	0.014 *	1.887	0.421	0.004 **
Country level:												
Indigenous population share				0.981	0.041	0.636	0.999	0.037	0.983	0.940	0.022	0.009 **
Indigenous population share2				1.000	0.001	0.480	1.000	0.001	0.790	1.001	0.000	0.013 *
Left-of-centre government?							1.901	0.476	0.010 **	1.601	0.340	0.027 *
Success rate in previous year							1.714	0.690	0.181	2.364	0.847	0.016 **
Racism: Share minding indigenous as neighbours										1.063	0.015	0.000 ***
Discrimination: Perceived level of discrimination										1.132	0.036	0.000 ***
Intercept	0.904	0.394	0.816	0.753	0.410	0.603	0.312	0.187	0.051	0.001	0.002	0.000 ***
Country (random intercept)	0.785	0.206		0.702	0.196		0.599	0.186		0.000	0.263	
Model fit:												
Significance (Wald chi2)		49.58 ***			55.89 ***			65.05 ***			104.4 ***	
Intraclass correlation		15.77			13.04			9.83			0.00	
AIC (corrected)		739.0			737.3			732.4			725.4	

Notes: Ni=635 (Level 1: protest events), Nj=13 (Level 2: countries). Random intercept multilevel logistic regression (integration points: 40). P-value: ***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05.

This could be explained by arguing that in countries with low indigenous share, the cost of meeting demands to the government is relatively small (such as in Venezuela), while in countries with a high indigenous share, the indigenous population can put significant pressure on the state (such as in Bolivia) and impose a high enough economic and political cost to force concession. It is in the countries which have a significant, but relatively small indigenous population that the cost to the state is higher, but the exertable pressure lower. This corresponds to what we know about the successes of indigenous movements from the qualitative literature, in particular the constitutional extension of indigenous rights (Van Cott, 2002). Experimenting with an interaction between the indigenous population share and the type of demands made, however, did not yield any statistically significant results. Moreover, whether the indigenous population is predominantly rural or urban could play an important role. Whether protest was taking place in an urban area, including the capital, as opposed to rural areas, was used as a proxy, although of course it could also be evidence of a tactic; rural indigenous people may march onto the capital and then engage in further protest activity there. Either way, protesting in an urban area does indeed increase the odds of success.

Repression

Neither of the models above, however, have considered the importance of political context on movement outcomes or the indirect or joint effects of movement strategies on advantages through interaction with variables relating to political opportunity. Perhaps one of the most common immediate responses to protest activity, apart from none, is repression. The extent to which the state is willing to repress protest is not only relevant in itself, but can also serve as a proxy for the institutional openness of the state in general. However, evidencing this in a way relevant to this analysis appears more complex in the Latin American context than expected. Utilising the CIRI Physical Integrity Index[58] (Cingranelli *et al*., 2014) data for each year and country under study suggests no clear relationship between the level of repression in the country and protest outcomes. Partly, at least, this is due to the fact the index does not capture the propensity to repress ethnic mobilisation in particular; while Chile ranks highly in this index, we know that the Chilean state has repressed indigenous mobilisations heavily. Conversely, while in Guatemala the protection of citizens' physical integrity is low overall, the use of state force against indigenous protest is comparatively less common.

One can also look at the repression experienced by each individual protest. Of the 635 cases at hand, about two-thirds (66%) experienced no repression, while 30% experienced some form of mild or moderate repression, such as the use of tear gas or other dispersion tactics. Lastly, 4% of indigenous protest events, 23 cases, were met with severe repression, including serious injury and even loss of life of some the participants as well as mass arrests. In 78 cases (12%), the protesters also experienced non-state violence. While there is negative correlation between repression and positive outcomes, initial repression does not preclude a positive outcome. In this sense, rather than a useful predictor of an outcome, it is more an indicator of how costly the protest and its demands are. At the same time, even for costly protests, repression can

[58] Please see Appendix B for further information on variables used.

galvanise new public support for the protest, increasing its outward legitimacy, and could in certain situations directly help protesters achieve their aims (this is discussed below).

Another way to look at the level of protection of the right to protest in particular and physical integrity in general is by examining the incidence of non-state violence.[59] Just as repression, non-state violence is negatively correlated with positive outcomes. In highly violent countries, such as Colombia (the negotiations for the peace process began in 2012), it could be moreover be argued that violent non-state actors, such as paramilitaries, take on some of the repressive roles of the state (with more or less tacit state support) (Zamosc, 1989). However, in this sense both repression and non-state violence can be seen more as an outcome than a predictor, and there is not enough data to create a measure of propensity to repression by country and year. As such, this is not included in the models shown here, and Hypothesis 5 could be neither confirmed nor rejected.

Sympathetic government

The second and perhaps more relevant element of political opportunity can be considered to be the partisanship of government at the time of the protest. The main measure of political environment included in this analysis is the presence of a left-of-centre government in power. This country-level dummy varies by year, with about half of the country-year cases having a left-wing government in power during the period under study. While at the beginning of the period, only five of the 13 countries had elected a left-of-centre (LOC) president, in 2013 by contrast 10 of the countries had a left-of-centre executive. Having a sympathetic political environment is one of the most commonly used examples of conditions that might lead to protest success when considering an indirect-effects model (Giugni, 2007), as explained above.

Model 3 (also in Table 6, p. 75) thus introduces this key explanatory variable at the country level; whether there is a left-of-centre government in power. The changes in political opportunities provided by different governments do indeed have a significant effect for indigenous protests, nearly doubling the chances of experiencing a positive outcome. Indeed, the analysis shows that in a left-wing political environment, indigenous protests are indeed more likely to gain positive outcomes, doubling the odds of success. This presents strong evidence in support of Hypothesis 4. In particular, the relative predicted probability of experiencing positive outcomes for indigenous protest events, *ceteris paribus*, is 71% under a left-of-centre government in power, compared to 56% without a left-wing executive (based on Model 4). However, rather than just meaning that under LOC governments, indigenous protests are just generally more likely to succeed, it is interesting to look at the interaction between protest-level variables with the left-wing dummy. This appears to be important when looking at the inclusion of redistributive goals in movements demands (shown in Table 7 below, Figure 4, p. 79, and Table 8, p. 80).

[59] This was also coded at the protest-level, and includes both violence experienced by indigenous protesters as well as in general non-state violence against the indigenous communities in question, up to six months prior to the protest.


Table 7: Indigenous protest outcomes: Left-wing govt. & redistribution

Dependent variable: Any positive outcome (acceptance only or acceptance followed by advantages)						
Independent variables:	Model 4			Model 5		
Protest level:	Odds	S.E.	P>|z|	Odds	S.E.	P>|z|
Demand: redistribution?	**0.445**	**0.092**	**0.000 *****	**0.307**	**0.082**	**0.000 *****
Requiring policy change?	0.420	0.083	0.000 ***	0.421	0.084	0.000 ***
Duration *(log2)*	1.253	0.064	0.000 ***	1.259	0.065	0.000 ***
Number of participants *(log2)*	1.117	0.044	0.005 **	1.126	0.045	0.003 **
Road block?	2.064	0.532	0.005 **	2.056	0.529	0.005 **
Non-indigenous participants?	0.921	0.205	0.711	0.968	0.217	0.885
Urban?	1.887	0.421	0.004 **	1.879	0.420	0.005 **
Country level:						
Indigenous population share	0.940	0.022	0.009 **	0.941	0.022	0.010 *
Indigenous population share2	1.001	0.000	0.013 *	1.001	0.000	0.015 *
Left-of-centre government?	**1.601**	**0.340**	**0.027 ***	**1.037**	**0.297**	**0.899**
Left*Redistribution interaction				**2.367**	**0.911**	**0.025 ***
Success rate in previous year	2.364	0.847	0.016 *	2.356	0.847	0.017 *
Racism	1.063	0.015	0.000 ***	1.063	0.015	0.000 ***
Discrimination	1.132	0.036	0.000 ***	1.128	0.036	0.000 ***
Intercept	0.001	0.002	0.000 ***	0.002	0.002	0.000 ***
Country (random intercept)	0.000	0.263		0.000	0.213	
Model fit:						
Significance (Wald chi2)		104.4 ***			108.9 ***	
Intraclass correlation		0.00			0	
AIC (corrected)		725.4			722.4	

Notes: N_i=635 (Level 1: protest events), N_j=13 (Level 2: countries). Random intercept multilevel logistic regression (integration points: 40). P-value: ***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05.

Without a left-wing government in power, making redistributive demands is negatively correlated with gaining both acceptance and advantages, though neither relationship is particularly strong. Conversely, under a left-of-centre government, the probability of gaining advantages is nearly twice as high for protest events with redistributive claims than those without (compare Models 4 and 5, the latter of which introduces this interaction, in Table 7 above). Specifically, as shown in Figure 4 below, the odds of gaining both acceptance and advantages are about 2 times higher under a left-wing government than under a centre-right or right-wing regime. The chances of gaining acceptance only are somewhat higher under LOC governments, but whether their demands include redistribution appears irrelevant in this case.

Figure 4: Interaction between left-wing govt. and redistributive demands 1



Moreover, Table 8 below shows the predicted probabilities of experiencing any positive outcomes when including an interaction between the left-wing and the redistribution dummies in Model 5, although it is important to note that the conclusions from this interaction need to be considered as more tentative due to the relatively small number of cases. As such, there is tentative evidence in support of Hypothesis 4. Compared to redistributive demands being made in a country without a left-of-centre government, indigenous protest with redistributive demands in a left-wing political regime nearly treble the odds of success. In fact, the relative predicted probability of gaining any positive outcome is 66% when redistributive demands are made under left-wing executives, compared to 48% under right-wing regimes; compare this to the average predicted probability of success of 63% for the dataset as a whole. At the same time, when not making redistributive demands, the impact of the political environment seems to be minimal (although this is only a tentative finding at this point, the same result is obtained by carrying out the fsQCA in Chapter 7).

This is evidenced by the advances in land redistribution in Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela since the elections of left-of-centre presidents[60], for example, compared to the repression of indigenous movements asking for land titling in Colombia and Mexico, and to a lesser extent

[60] In Bolivia, Evo Morales came to power as head of MAS in 2006, followed by Rafael Correa in Ecuador in 2007. In Venezuela, the Socialist Party (PSUV) has been in power since 1998.

in Honduras and Guatemala[61] (Crabtree & Chaplin, 2013; Stahler-Sholk & Vanden, 2011; Vergara-Camus, 2013; Zibechi, 2007). This could simply be due to left-wing leaders responding to their constituencies or acting based on principle, privileging more class-based indigenous organising (Hale, 2002). The political cost of not meeting demands that ideologically resonate with the government's position could potentially be higher than the cost of meeting the demand. Building on the idea of discursive resonance (Koopmans & Statham, 1999), this suggests that a mechanism of claim resonance might help explain protest outcomes.

Table 8: Interaction between left-wing govt. and redistributive demands

Predicted probability of success: Redistributive demands and left-wing govt (Model 5)

	Redistribution = 0	Redistribution = 1	Total
Left-of-centre = 0	70.7%	48.2%	59.3%
Left-of-centre = 1	71.3%	65.7%	68.5%
Total	70.9%	56.0%	63.1%

Source: Author's dataset of indigenous protest activity in Latin American 2003-2013. P-value for redistribution*left interaction when included in Model 5 = 0.025 (significant at the 95% level).
Note: Outcome 0 = no positive outcomes, outcome 1 = acceptance or acceptance and advantages.

Moreover, in many cases the same indigenous movements demanding redistribution were instrumental in bringing the left-of-centre government to power, such as in Bolivia, and not attending to their grievances could be politically costly. This mechanism could be complemented by indigenous activists also engaging in strategic claim-making and including more class-based goals when a LOC executive is in power (Andolina *et al*., 2009).[62] What this does highlight, however, is that there is an important interaction between movement-level and country-level variables that can help elucidate protest success and failure.

Time

Models 4 and 5 above (see Table 7, p. 78) also control for the overall success rate of indigenous protest in the previous year.[63] Although protest activities in the dataset in each individual country are not necessarily part of the same movement, at least not over the entire 11-year period, the achievements of previous indigenous struggles are undeniably of significance to subsequent struggles. On average, the success rate in the previous year (in the same country) increases the odds of success, and it does so particularly when considering gaining advantages. This is contrary to what was expected, weakening Hypothesis 9.

[61] Both Colombia and Mexico have had right-wing executive throughout the period understudy (although in Mexico this is somewhat complicated by the strong federal system, in which some more left-wing state governors have gone against national policies). Honduras and Guatemala have mostly had right-wing governments between 2003 and 2013, with brief left-wing interludes.
[62] It is impossible to disentangle the specific causality with the current quantitative dataset, but this will be further investigated in the qualitative part of this project.
[63] For each country, the average success rate over the subsequent years was imputed for the first year of the period.

As such, it challenges both the 'protest cycle' and 'transformative' perspectives on social movements, discussed above. What this dataset evidences are smaller protest events that continue to proliferate throughout the period of eleven years in question. This highlights that we should indeed be paying more attention to the characteristics of even small protest events, rather than focusing primarily on large-scale iconic instances of mass mobilisation (Biggs, 2016). Even when the nature of the political environment as well as the various protest-level characteristics are accounted for in the multivariate regression analysis, the previous year's successes are still shown to influence the likelihood of success, although to a lesser extent. This might suggest that there is a cumulative power of dissent; in other words, that repeated protests may have an incremental impact of securing positive outcomes. Yet more research is needed in this regard.

Public opinion

The behaviour of the political establishment is not the only aspect of a conducive political environment. The first full model (Model 4, Table 6, p. 75) thus also brings in variables related to the nature of public opinion, based on data from the *Latinobarómetro* survey from 2009. This can only provide a snapshot of public opinion in each country, but it is arguably the best measure relating to attitudes towards indigenous people and indigenous political activity in Latin America currently available. The 'racism variable' serves as a proxy for the prevalence of racist attitudes in each country, and is based on the percentage of respondents who said they would mind having an indigenous person as a neighbour. In an initial analysis, the level of racism was surprisingly correlated with positive outcomes for indigenous people, providing evidence against Hypothesis 6a.


However, accounting for the indigenous population share, this effect largely disappears, suggesting that in the Latin American countries with larger relative indigenous populations, racism may be more endemic. Moreover, it could potentially be a sign of polarisation as a result of higher indigenous movement activity which then also leads to positive outcomes, but it is not possible to test this with the current data. The other public opinion variable denotes the average percentage of the population in each that is perceived as being discriminated against. The results suggest that the higher the recognition of discrimination, the more likely are indigenous movements to experience positive outcomes, supporting Hypothesis 6b.

Model 4 summary

Model 4 is thus the first model to introduce all of the explanatory and control variables used. Other variables, such as whether demands related to land (as discussed above), initial repression or non-state violence, which were not found to improve the models, are not used in the models presented here. As such, it takes into account protesters' demands and tactics, political opportunities and public opinion, as well as controlling for the indigenous population share and previous indigenous movement successes in each country. In doing so, it underscores even further the effect of protest-level variables. While the nature of demands as well as the intensity of protest continue to have statistically significant effects on protest outcomes, so does the tactic used. This is visualised in Figure 5 below (p. 82). Specifically, the use of road blocks has a positive effect, compared to all other tactics, such as demonstrations, marches, and

occupations. According to Model 4, the use of road blocks more than doubles the odds of experiencing a positive outcome; the relative predicted probability of success for an indigenous protest using road blocks, *ceteris paribus*, is 73%; without this tactic, the chances of success drop to 60%. (Interaction terms between the use of road blocks to (a) ask for redistribution and (b) under a left-of-centre government are not statistically significant.)

Figure 5: Predicted probabilities by predictors (Model 4)



It also is illuminating here then to look at what interpreting the intercept shows about the chances of 'success' for individual indigenous protest events and campaigns. What kind of indigenous protest in Latin America is the least likely to succeed? An indigenous protest event, (1) which contained a demand for redistribution that would require legislative change in order to be met, (2) was short in duration, small in size and used a protest form other than a road block, (3) took place in a rural area of a country with a low indigenous share of the population, and (4) in which indigenous protests had low levels of success in the previous year and which at the time of the protest had a right-wing government in power, is in all probability doomed to failure, with chances of success of less than 0.01%. This is the least likely setting for an indigenous protest event to experience a positive outcome.

It is important to note here that once all country-level variables are introduced in Model 4, the need for a multilevel model disappears; the ICC is close to zero, and there is no statistically significant difference between the multilevel logistic model and a one-level logistic regression. However, this is only the case when a positive outcome, a success, is defined as *either* (a) acceptance without advantage and (b) acceptance followed by advantage, as is the case in

Model 4. That is to say, when any positive outcome is defined as success. Yet when only gaining advantages is defined as success, and when the factors leading to just acceptance as opposed to also advantages are compared, the ICC rises above zero again.

As such, even though Model 4 could be replaced by a single-level logistic regression, the results of a multi-level regression are presented instead in order to allow for comparison with the other models presented below, for which a multi-level model is justified. This fact is, however, useful for post-estimation. Model 4 is the first full model, before the introduction of interactions, to evaluate the impact of all the explanatory and control variables. Due to the complexities of conducting post-estimation for the two-level models, some post-estimation techniques had to be applied to the single level version of Model 4. For example, this suggests that 72% of the data was correctly predicted in the single-level logit model.

4.4.3 Comparing outcomes

Until now the analysis has focused on identifying the determinants of gaining either acceptance only or acceptance and advantages, as opposed to no positive outcome. However, it is plausible that the factors predicting failure in this way might be different when failure is defined as anything short of gaining advantages. Moreover, once protests gain acceptance, the factors deciding whether they can follow this up with securing concrete advantages may differ to those determining complete failure (McAdam & Su, 2002). Table 9 below (p. 84) compares three models, each with a different definition of 'success'. Model 5 is the final model taken from the previous analysis, where success is defined as any positive outcome. Next, Model 6 considers only advantages as 'success', while acceptance only is included with failure. The last model, Model 7, restricts the dataset to only those cases that did achieve something positive, and considers acceptance as failure and advantages as success.

Comparing the first two models produces fairly similar results that do however differ in some important respects. Claim-making and tactics still affect the outcome, but to a much lesser extent. The effect of claim-making in particular appears to disappear, when not considering it in interaction with the political environment as discussed below. Considering tactical choices, the results also diverge. The use of a specific tactic no longer seems to make a difference. The same goes for the positive effect of the number of participants.

So, while being costly in terms of putting up road blocks and/or mobilising in large numbers might force the state to negotiate, it would appear other factors are at play in determining whether the government keeps its promises. Conversely, the positive effect of duration is amplified, if anything, suggesting sustained protesting is generally effective at securing positive outcomes, including advantages. What comparing the three models with different definition of success shows most clearly, however, is the importance of both the nature of the political environment and public opinion. This provides the greatest support for the indirect model of protest influence (Giugni, 2007; Meyer, 2004). In Models 6 and 7, the importance of a left-wing executive is much greater for securing advantages, increasing the odds of success three-fold.


Table 9: Comparing determinants of different outcomes: Indigenous protest in Latin America 2003-2013

	Model 5			Model 6			Model 7		
Dependent variable:	Failure 0 Acceptance 1 Advantages 1 (N_i=635)			Failure 0 Acceptance 0 Advantages 1 (N_i=635)			~~Failure~~ Acceptance 0 Advantages 1 (N_i=401)		
Independent variables:	Odds	S.E.	P>|z|	Odds	S.E.	P>|z|	Odds	S.E.	P>|z|
Protest level:									
Demand: Redistribution?	0.307	0.082	0.000 ***	0.366	0.136	0.007 **	0.455	0.184	0.051
Requiring policy change?	0.421	0.084	0.000 ***	0.428	0.111	0.001 **	0.550	0.159	0.039
Duration *(log2)*	1.259	0.065	0.000 ***	1.365	0.075	0.000 ***	1.339	0.085	0.000 ***
Number of participants *(log2)*	1.126	0.045	0.003 **	1.024	0.050	0.625	0.971	0.052	0.579
Road block?	2.056	0.529	0.005 **	1.091	0.312	0.762	0.781	0.247	0.434
Non-indigenous participants?	0.968	0.217	0.885	1.045	0.287	0.873	1.090	0.331	0.777
Urban?	1.879	0.420	0.005 **	1.092	0.278	0.731	0.751	0.216	0.321
Country level:									
Indigenous population share	0.941	0.022	0.010 *	0.915	0.043	0.057	0.921	0.042	0.071
Indigenous population share2	1.001	0.000	0.015 *	1.001	0.001	0.133	1.001	0.001	0.163
Left-of-centre government?	2.367	0.911	0.025 *	1.482	0.542	0.282	1.320	0.507	0.470
Left*Redistribution interaction	2.367	0.911	0.025 *	4.836	2.225	0.001 ***	5.680	2.935	0.001 ***
Success rate in previous year	2.356	0.847	0.017 *	2.277	1.146	0.102	2.106	1.065	0.141
Racism	1.063	0.015	0.000 ***	1.095	0.033	0.002 ***	1.085	0.031	0.005 **
Discrimination	1.128	0.036	0.000 ***	1.171	0.070	0.009 **	1.159	0.069	0.013 *
Intercept	0.002	0.002	0.000 ***	0.000	0.000	0.000 ***	0.001	0.001	0.003 **
Country (random intercept)	0.000	0.213		0.539	0.264		0.481	0.265	
Model fit:									
Significance (Wald chi2)		108.9 ***			74.91 ***			54.52 ***	
Intraclass correlation		0.00			8.13			6.56	
AIC (corrected)		722.4			572.5			462.4	

Notes: N_i for level 1: protest events; N_j=13, for level 2: countries. Random intercept multilevel logistic regression (integration points: 40).
P-value: ***p<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05.

At the same time, it is also interesting to consider how protest- and country-level variables interact to produce different outcomes. This is particularly clear in the interaction between redistributive demands and a left-of-centre executive. In Model 5, the odds of gaining any positive outcome for protest making redistributive demands under a left-wing government (compared to making recognition demands under a centre/right government), are doubled. However, for gaining advantages the odds increase five-fold in Model 6 (comparing advantages to any other outcome) and in Model 7 they increase nearly six-fold (comparing acceptance and advantages). This is visualised in Figure 6 below. This suggests that while protesters' choices about demands and tactics in themselves have an effect on positive outcomes, this is largely the case for gaining acceptance; for securing actual advantages, the nature of the political environment becomes more relevant.

Figure 6: Interaction between left-wing govt. and redistributive demands (2)



Moreover, comparing the models also shows the increased importance of public opinion. Although the increase in the odds ratio is relatively small, this makes a bigger difference since both measures are continuous. In particular, the measure of the perceived level of discrimination might be used as a proxy for sympathy with indigenous movements. However, both measures vary a lot by country, and since data are only available for the year 2009, can be considered only crude measures of public opinion at best.[64] As such, the conclusions about the effect of public opinion on protest outcomes in this study can only be tentative.

[64] Unfortunately, neither the *Latinobarómetro* nor the LAPOP surveys collect public opinion data on questions relating to indigenous movements, multiculturalism, or ethnic rights consistently across countries and years.

4.5 Discussion: Protest outcomes

The results outlined above present insights regarding the determinants of success for protest activity based on the evidence from Latin American indigenous movements. The analysis presented in this chapter provides evidence for both the direct- and joint-effect models, highlighting how protesters' choices about demands as well as tactics interact with country-level variables in order to affect the outcomes of protest events. In particular, the importance of making certain types of demands and the intensity of protest are good predictors of protest outcomes. Moreover, the interaction between demands and the political environment suggests that the likelihood of success for redistributive protests increases under a left-wing political regime. This shows the need to pay attention to the strategic claim-making of movements; the intricate interplay between social movements making strategic choices about the demands to prioritise in order to meet at least some of their aims, and those in control of the state decision-making power at the time privileging certain kinds of indigenous demands and organisations over others.

At the same time, the analysis shows that conclusions about the determinants of protest success are somewhat contingent on how 'success' is defined (Giugni *et al*., 1999; McAdam & Su, 2002). Comparing the predictors of complete failure, acceptance or advantages shows that protesters' decisions about demands and tactics matter to a great deal, especially for being hears. Conversely, once protest has received at least a modicum of acceptance, political opportunity and public opinion become much more decisive in predicting whether concrete advantages follow, even though sustaining protest for longer periods of time is also shown to have a *direct* effect. In particular, the presence of a left-of-centre executive greatly increases the chances of gaining advantages. This highlights the importance of considering the effect of political opportunities (Meyer, 2004), while not minimising the significance of movement-level variables. Public opinion also matters, especially for gaining advantages; however, the lack of comparative public opinion data makes this only a very tentative conclusion.

Of course, when people turn out to protest, their only goal is not to meet with state representatives and have concrete proposals met. Attending a protest can also be a show of solidarity, an emotional response, a desire to have one's voice heard; often, people are willing to expend energy and take risks even if they think that the chances of getting their demands met are low. Yet at other times protesters vow not to go home until their goals are achieved. Sometimes, protest can make a difference. Different protest strategies influence the likelihood of being heard, and to a lesser extent of being listened to. For the latter, external circumstances do matter more. The most important findings of this chapter show how protest-level and external factors interact for securing advantages.

Yet the quantitative analysis above inevitably presents a rather partial look at indigenous protest outcomes. In attempting to look more 'inside' protest events than traditionally done in protest event analyses, the quantitative analysis of the protest events presented in this chapter treats these as individual observations. This means that the impact of characteristics of each protest can be evaluated. At the same time, this means that the role of waves of protests (Biggs, 2005) and periods of 'heightened contention' (Tarrow, 1993) cannot be taken into account, nor can it capture cross-country diffusion. It also does not capture 'turning points', such as when

repression turns public opinion in support of previously seemingly less legitimate protests. This is why the analysis presented here is followed by looking even further 'inside' the selected protest events and campaigns in Bolivia and Peru.

The period under study also presents some limitations, the 2003-2013 period for the data collection being determined mainly by the availability of the OSAL reports. This misses important indigenous mobilisations, such as the emergence of the Zapatistas in Mexico and the more recent protests against extraction, including those in Bolivia discussed in the quantitative parts of this thesis. Still, the question is whether and how this affects the results of the quantitative analysis. It is of course impossible to say so with any certainty, and this arguably limits the generalisability of these findings even for Latin America, l*et al*one beyond.

Only cursorily can it be said that, for the Zapatista case, the cost their disruption was able to impose due to their unexpected mobilising capacity in 1997 was a at least a part of the story (Harvey, 1998; Trejo, 2012). For the recent rise of anti-extractive protests, those in Bolivia are covered in the qualitative part of this thesis below. That analysis, presented in Chapters 6 and 7, suggests that strategic decisions about when and how to disrupt and/or persuade matter—such as when to make use of their mobilising capacity, when to seek alliances and how to frame their demands—but also that if one factor was to be singled out for its impact, it is again favourable political opportunities. This is consistent with the findings of the quantitative analysis presented in this chapter, even though the qualitative analysis covers a broader time period (2000-2016).

Furthermore, the coding of 'advantages' could be seen as somewhat generous; even if laws are enacted or decrees repealed—which could be counted as fulfilling the movements' demands—this often gives us little certainty about practical consequences in terms of implementation. Still, it would be hard to argue that, for example, the passage of a law that a protest campaign or social movement organisation has fought for should be not considered a 'success'. Moreover, the protest event analysis only finds moderate evidence for the direct effect of protest strategies; for even this arguably generous definition of advantages, to gain these protesters still have to rely on favourable political opportunities more than on their ability to disrupt and convince on their own.

Additionally, one has to take into account both the particular nature of indigenous struggles as ethno-linguistic movements and the characteristics of Latin American states, if any generalisations beyond this region and this type of movement are to be made. Nevertheless, the findings of this chapter can be used as hypotheses to be tested for other cases of movement; this is especially the case in regard to the findings about the impact of demand-making, which have been largely missing from quantitative analyses of social movement outcomes. Other factors, such as economically costly disruption and favourable political opportunities, which have been tested in other studies, are here confirmed to play a crucial role. As such, this chapter tried to be both theory-confirming, and theory-generating.

Moreover, the chapters below shift their focus from studying probabilistic correlations to searching for causal mechanisms, mechanisms that aspire to identify general causal links between a variable and an outcome, under concrete conditions; if those are correctly specified, the mechanisms are no longer tied to a movement or region. What this chapter does arguably

show is that although political opportunities (of course) matter, a) indigenous protesters' ability to put pressure on their targets by both what they ask for (claims) and how they ask for it (here, tactics) can matter, b) it is only by looking at the latter, especially claims, that the way in which the former, that is political opportunities, impact chances of success for indigenous movements in Latin America becomes clearer.

5. Cycles of protest and repertoires of contention: looking 'inside' indigenous protest campaigns

5.1 Introduction

The preceding chapter explored the characteristics of a sample of ethnicity-based indigenous protest events and campaigns in Latin America. Following a critique of traditional protest event analyses for not paying enough attention to the characteristics of individual protests (Hutter, 2014; Tilly, 2008), the analysis above attempted to look a little more 'inside' individual protests, while carrying out a quantitative protest event analysis. It did so in order to evaluate whether protests' internal characteristics—their intensity, tactics, and claims—impact their chances of experiencing any intended positive outcomes, either directly or in interaction with external factors. It found, in particular, that it is necessary to consider the nature of claims made by indigenous activists and what kind of tactics they employ, in order to understand the divergent outcomes of indigenous protest activity. Moreover, the presence of a sympathetic government is also a significant explanatory factor, both in and of itself and in interaction with the demands made.

In particular, it showed that making redistributive demands and using tactics such as road blocks has an impact on protest's chances of success, both directly and in interaction with external factors. The analysis also highlighted how the importance of claim-making can be heightened under particular conditions. Specifically, indigenous protests making redistributive claims have a much higher likelihood of success under left-of-centre governments, while under right-wing regimes their success rate is reduced. Yet what is the mechanism through which this observed relationship might function? The previous chapter proposed that this may be explained by considering the cost of meeting the demand (redistribution is costlier to meet than recognition) versus the cost of not meeting it (continuing road blocks, for example, also impose a high cost) for the government. Yet, does the cost-benefit analysis tell the whole story? Do other characteristics of the protest event and its demands, including their framing (legitimation), make a difference? The protest event dataset did not include enough information on each protest to delve deeper into these questions or to test whether the proposed causal mechanisms can in fact explain the correlations observed. As such, this chapter looks even 'deeper' inside a number of indigenous protests from Bolivia and Peru, taken from the quantitative dataset analysed above, in Chapter 4. These are selected based on a number of criteria as discussed below, explored in more detail, and analysed according to the logic of matched cases and within-case process tracing (Brady & Collier, 2010; Collier, 2011; George & Bennett, 2005; Ragin & Rihoux, 2009).

By looking at protest events rather than social movements as a whole, the preceding chapter also makes a case for the importance of studying smaller events, both empirically and conceptually. While it may seem that one small victory of one protest matters little if the social movement in general is not advancing, it is important to think about the context in which the indigenous protests analysed here take place. This is in a context of internationally mandated indigenous rights being constitutionally recognised across Latin America, as discussed in the

Introduction. In spite of this, indigenous communities continue to have to fight for those rights to be respected, and about how those rights should be operationalised and implemented in the first place. As such, indigenous protests continue to proliferate throughout the region. Yet this seems to challenge both the 'transformative moments' and 'protest cycles' theories of social movements. As such, before analysing in more detail the selected indigenous protests, this chapter first discusses the concepts of protest cycles and transformative moments in social movement studies in more detail. It does so to show how looking even further 'inside' protests can help us better understand social movement outcomes.

5.2 Protest cycles and transformative moments

The narrative of Latin American popular and indigenous protest in the last two decades, retold so frequently in recent academic writing (e.g. Postero, 2007; Rice, 2012; Yashar, 2005), would seem to suggest that the level of mobilisation is the single most important factor deciding whether protest is successful or not. It is, moreover, told as a story of dramatic protest cycles and key transformative moments (McAdam & Sewell, 2001; Tarrow, 1993, 1994). Both the trajectories of social movements and the transformative effect of particularly disruptive moments of protest have always been of great interest to social movement scholars. There is no denying that social movement activity goes through highs and lows, and can at times converge in mass protest activity or episodes of "continuous streams of contention" (McAdam *et al*., 2001: 24). Undeniably, some periods of social upheaval can lead to significant changes in the political landscape, even challenging the very notion of what is possible. Such 'transformative' events represent a significant breaking point, changing cultural meaning and political significance (McAdam & Sewell, 2001).

As such, the point of the scholarship interested in the trajectories of social movement activity, regardless of the particular term used, has been to try and establish whether there is some regularity to these highs and lows, as the term protest cycles suggests, such as "moving from innovation to institutionalization and radicalization" (della Porta, 2013: 2). However, the trajectory of a particular protest cycle is not necessarily the same as in Tarrow's original Italian example (Tarrow, 1989). Not all protest actions can easily be placed within a clear protest cycle and might be more isolated. Yet, what this conceptualisation does highlight is the importance of the role of the state in influencing the trajectory of social movement activity. Rather than assuming that the state always responds predictably—meeting less radical demands at first, then repressing the radical sections of the movement that remain—it is more analytically fruitful to see the relationship with the state as a factor that can have different consequences under different circumstances, ranging from institutionalisation and co-optation to radicalisation and decline.

At the same time, given the prevalence of protest event datasets in the study of social movements, it is surprising that studies continue to focus simply on the frequency of protest events (Biggs, 2016). Specifically, Biggs' analysis shows that we cannot just consider the number of protest events without looking at their characteristics, such as their size; five protest events attended by a hundred people in total are less likely to have an impact than one demonstration attended by tens of thousands. The quantitative analysis in the preceding chapter shows that even smaller protest events can sometimes have at least some of their goals met,

depending on their own strategies and external circumstances. As such, simply counting the number of protest events and using their frequency as an explanatory variable is not sufficient. It is necessary to look 'inside' the protest events themselves. As the preceding chapter shows, protests that can all be considered as part of the 'indigenous movement' often have very different claims and use a variety of distinct tactics to make them.

As such, rather than focusing on the 'moments of madness' (Zoldberg, 1972 in Tarrow, 1993: 281) of iconic protests, it is important to also study both longer periods of contention and the significance of individual protest events. Tarrow himself, who first conceptualised 'protest cycles' as a "phase of heightened conflict and contention across the social system" (Tarrow, 1994:153), warned about overemphasising the significance of moments of greater contention. "Historical memory always foreshortens histories of collective action into long, shallow valleys and short, pointed peaks that punctuate them"; the reality is of more gradual change, with more elevated ground at times rather than steep peaks (Tarrow, 1995: 288). Yet still, even in times of 'valleys', can protest not make a difference? Studying even smaller, more isolated protests in times of low social movement activity can arguably still tell us much about social movements, and has been systematically understudied.

Moreover, the statistical analysis in Chapter 4 suggests that successes in previous years actually have a positive impact on the chances of future protest success. This challenges both the 'protest cycle' and the 'transformative events' hypotheses about the importance of time for social movement outcomes. Rather, it suggests that protest may have a cumulative effect, and may have this effect beyond periods of 'heightened conflict'. Moreover, the notion of 'transformative events' seems to single out disruption as having a significant impact on outcomes. Conversely, the results of the preceding chapter focusing on individual protest events—summarised above—suggest that while disruption is important, it is also the nature of demands as well as the characteristics of the political environment that play a role for protest outcomes. The analysis below thus follows in the logic of the preceding chapter and moves beyond focusing on peaks of mobilisation and iconic moments of contention.

5.3 Methodology

5.3.1 Searching for causal mechanisms

This chapter therefore offers the opportunity to look even more deeply 'inside' some of the indigenous protests studied in the previous chapter. It does so, *firstly*, in order to evaluate what differentiates protests that experienced some positive outcomes from the ones that did not, even under apparently comparable external circumstances. *Secondly*, and perhaps even more importantly, it traces *how* the factors identified as significant may have led to the observed outcomes. As such, it seeks to identify the causal mechanisms helping to explain the correlated outcomes and explanatory variables identified in the preceding chapter.

As discussed in the theoretical and methodological chapters of this thesis, the general turn towards the importance of causal mechanisms in the social sciences has also been reflected in social movement studies. Recent works have identified a number of mechanisms potentially linking social movement activity to specific outcomes. Perhaps the most commonly identified

mechanism is that of disruption (Biggs & Andrews, 2015; Kolb & Tarrow, 2007). In a study evidencing the positive effect of sit-ins on desegregation, Biggs and Andrews argue that "protest is likely to generate change through disruption by threatening established actors" (2015: 1).

At the same time, Kolb identified five mechanisms to link social movements with specific political outcomes, namely "disruption, public preference, political access, judicial and international politics" (Kolb & Tarrow, 2007: 13). The author highlights that this does not necessarily apply beyond the Western cases studied, but what is relevant is the focus on causal *mechanisms*. Yet there is a further, conceptual issue, here. Identifying 'disruption' or 'public preference' as causal mechanisms seems to miss some of the analytical benefits that causal mechanisms are supposed to provide (Hedström & Bearman, 2009; McAdam *et al*., 2001). Causal mechanisms are meant to be the 'steps in between', causally *linking* explanatory factors and outcomes variables. The level of disruption or the nature of public opinion, for example, are more usefully conceptualised as factors that may or may not contribute to a specific outcome. Yet they do not explain *how* this contribution works.

To illustrate, it is worth engaging with Luders' work on the women's movement and feminist mobilisation in the U.S in more detail here. According to this research, considering the cost of disruption weighed against cost of concession can help explain how disruption affects protest outcomes (Luders, 2006, 2016). This would seem to explain the findings of the preceding statistical analysis. Demands for redistribution were found to have a negative effect; it could be argued that, all else being equal, the higher the material cost of implementing specific demands would be, the less likely the government is to concede to them. At the same time, disruptive tactics, specifically the use of road blocks, were found to have a positive impact in the preceding chapter. This makes sense given the relatively low infrastructural development of Latin American countries, where blocking a major highway can cause significant disruption to traffic and trade. As such, the mechanism of material cost—weighing the cost of meeting the demand against the cost of not meeting it—could explain the findings. It also illustrates the logic of a causal mechanism; it leads to different outcomes depending on other conditions or combinations with other mechanisms. For example, the hypothesised mechanism of material cost can have a positive impact on outcomes when a *tactic* imposes a high cost, yet a negative effect when meeting a *demand* would imply a high cost.

Yet arguably, such an explanation gives too much weight to economic, rational choice, calculations. Politics is not of course just about material cost-benefit decisions. It is also, among other things, about representation and legitimacy. As discussed in Chapter 2, social movement activities have at their core struggles over legitimacy (Haunss, 2007). In Tilly's (1999) definition of social movements used in this work, collective actors also need to display 'worthiness'. During times of contention, protest activists struggle to maintain themselves as legitimate representatives of their constituencies. As such, mechanisms related to legitimating strategies could explain protest outcomes, at the relational, meso-level of analysis. In fact, Tilly usefully distinguished different types of causal mechanisms: "environmental, cognitive, and relational" (Tilly, 2001: 24). The mechanism of economic cost would also fit into the relational type, explaining the outcomes of interactions between collective actors and state representatives.

At the environmental macro-level, mechanisms relating to the role of networks and alliances, and the social and political context in general, might also play a role. The behaviour of allies, opponents and targets alike sets the context in which protest takes place, and mechanisms such as signalling or brokerage could explain specific results (McAdam *et al*., 2001; Tilly, 2001). Additionally, the spatial context of contention, protest strategies, and outcomes in neighbouring locations could explain impact through diffusion (Biggs, 2005; Biggs & Andrews, 2006). Finally, micro-level, cognitive mechanisms could also link explanatory variables and observed outcomes. Individual level mechanisms are indeed garnering particular attention within analytical sociology (Hedström & Bearman, 2009).

Mechanisms involving emotions could help explain protest outcomes; although these can be difficult to study for social scientists, social movement scholars are increasingly interested in the role of emotions in social movement participation (Goodwin & Jasper, 2006; Jasper, 2011). Hope, solidarity, or moral outrage, for example, can be important for protesters to mobilise and maintain pressure. This in turn can help convince their target of the willingness to continue protesting, as well as affecting the target decision makers' emotions at the same time. Identifying causal mechanisms signifies detailing the 'cogs and wheels' of causation, but at the 'modest' level of medium scale explanations, not grand theories (Hedström & Bearman, 2009; Tilly, 2001). As such, many other specific causal mechanisms might be at play, depending on the cases in question.

5.3.2 Cases: protest events and campaigns

This chapter thus has two main aims. It explores a number of selected protest events and campaigns from the quantitative dataset analysed in the previous chapter. Expanding on the limited amount of information coded about these protests in the statistical dataset, further qualitative information from online, newspaper and secondary sources was collected in order to be able to tell the story of these protests and situate them within the wider context in which they took place, something which could only be done by looking at government partisanship and rather crude measures of public opinion in Chapter 4. *Firstly*, this within-case analysis means that the relationship between the variables identified as significant in the previous chapter can be explored in more detail, aiding in the identification of the potential causal mechanisms linking them together in a causal sequence.

Secondly, this also gives further information about the kind of cases of protest events that were analysed statistically in the preceding chapter, and the fact that further information was collected about them from new sources means the validity of the coding and the reliability of the sources in the protest event dataset used in the previous chapter can be checked. Ten events from the dataset were selected at random, and their coding was checked against a much more thorough set of sources, including the secondary literature. Checking the coding of all the variables for those ten cases, there was a 95% coding reliability. From those ten randomly selected events, the protests in Peru and Bolivia were then selected for a yet further examination below, a) due to the availability of secondary information and b) according to the logic of matched cases. As such, this chapter builds directly on the results of the preceding statistical analysis by looking further 'inside' the protest events under study.

In a sense, this chapter presents a mixed-method analysis of the outcomes of indigenous social movements in Bolivia and Peru. More accurately, perhaps, it blurs the boundaries between the qualitative and quantitative logics. In doing so, this chapter combines both quantitative and qualitative data on protest events and campaigns. Rather than just employing a simple sequential research design—in which the first methodological approach informs the second approach, but the methods can be completely different—this chapter integrates its elements by applying the logic of matched cases (Ragin, 2008) to both the quantitative, protest event, data and the qualitative data used to elaborate on these cases. The logic of matched cases means picking cases that are as similar as possible—ideally only varying on one condition—and evaluating whether they have the same outcomes. This is also the basic logic underpinning the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA, which is used to compare five indigenous SMOs in Chapter 7), but it also applies below to a comparison of protest events from the quantitative protest event dataset analysed in Chapter 4.

As such, this chapter uses cases from the quantitative protest event dataset to illustrate the findings of that chapter and to test their explanatory power, for a number of selected cases from Peru and Bolivia. It starts with an analysis of an indigenous protest campaign in Peru, which was coded as two protest events in the quantitative dataset. This is a famous case, described already to some extent in the secondary literature. This is followed by a comparison of three protest events from Bolivia. These are useful examples to a) illustrate both the coding approaches used and the predictive power of the statistical models, and more importantly, b) explore the causal mechanisms that might help explain the link between the predicted explanatory variables and the observed outcomes in Chapter 4. Further qualitative information about the indigenous protests was collected through online, newspaper, and secondary sources, allowing for a process tracing analysis of the sequence of events 'inside' them. Then, applying the logic of matched cases, the factors that eventually led to the outcomes at hand are detailed.

5.4 Looking 'inside' indigenous protest: Peru

5.4.1 The Devil's Curve

On June 6th, 2009, Peruvian police clashed with indigenous protesters (and their supporters), as the latter blockaded a section of a highway known as the 'Devil's Curve', near the town of Bagua in the Peruvian Amazon. This resulted in a violent and deadly confrontation. Although estimates about the number of people killed vary, the Ombudsman's office (*Defensoría del Pueblo*) released a statement in 2009 confirming that 23 police officers and at least 10 civilians were killed, both indigenous and non-indigenous (Defensoría, 2009).[65] Sparking a political crisis in Peru, the massacre became a symbol of the economic reliance on primary resources extractivism and the state repression that often accompanies it, but also of the power of indigenous and local resistance to this version of development.

[65] Indigenous and other social movement organisations, both Peruvian and international, dispute these numbers; other sources put the civilian death toll at anything from 40 to upwards of 50 indigenous and other local protesters (Hughes, 2010; Renique, 2009).

Although identity-based organising in Peru emerged relatively recently (as opposed to rural class-based organising), indigenous struggles have been growing in importance in the country, especially in the Amazonian region (Felix, 2008; Hughes, 2010; Wright, 2014). Just as other Latin American countries, Peru is a signatory to the International Labour Organisation's convention 169 (ILO 169), which codifies indigenous rights and in particular establishes the right to prior consultation on any measures affecting indigenous community territories. Yet, as discussed in Chapter 1, this legal protection is often not enforced in practice.

This particular example of an indigenous protest campaign can serve as a useful illustration to test the validity and reliability of the sources used for the protest event dataset and its coding, as this infamous case has been covered extensively in the media and analysed in academic research (Arce, 2014; Bebbington, 2012; Crabtree, 2012; Hughes, 2010).[66] Thus, it is possible to check its coding with little ambiguity, as well as to assess how accurate the prediction based on the models developed is, given what actually happened in this case. The sources used in the below discussion were not used in the coding of this protest, and thus the accuracy of the coding also checks the reliability of the Factiva and OSAL sources.[67] This case was thus selected, due to its notoriety, as both a good example to check the statistical data and a perfect opportunity to look much 'deeper' into the case than the limited number of variables coded for the PEA allowed.

In this instance, then, indigenous communities were protesting the lack of consultation in national decrees that affect their territories. In 2008, President Alan García passed a number of decrees as part of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States, including laws allowing for further exploration of the Amazon. Some of the decrees were declared unconstitutional by the Ombudsman's office, as they opened up indigenous community lands for exploration, exploitation and extraction without consulting the communities, thus contravening ILO 169. Specifically, Decree 1090 was challenged as unconstitutional by the Ombudsman, and declared so by a legislative commission on May 19th, in the middle of the second wave of protests. The decrees remained in force regardless.

Protests against them had started already in August 2008, demanding their repeal, the respect for indigenous territories and upholding of the right to consultation. They were spearheaded by Alberto Pizango, leader of AIDESEP (The Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest, *Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana*), the coordinating umbrella organisation of indigenous communities in Peru's Amazon region (Crabtree & Crabtree-Condor, 2012: 54). Founded in 1980, and bringing together sixty-five indigenous federations and six regional organisations, it aims to, among other goals, "guarantee conservation and development of the cultural identity, territory and values of all the Amazon indigenous peoples" (Hughes, 2010: 86).

While the 2008 mobilisations were initially met by acceptance in the form of a dialogue between the government and AIDESEP, the promises were not delivered (this protest event is also included in the dataset and discussed below). This explains why AIDESEP declared a

[66] It has even been the topic of a feature-length documentary film, 'When Two Worlds Collide' (2016).
[67] This was also checked by selected 10 cases at random from the dataset, and checking their coding from online and secondary sources other than Factiva and OSAL (see the Appendix for more details).

'national strike' on April 9th, 2009. Indigenous communities across the region began organising blockades of major roads, accompanied by occupations of oil company installations. One of those was the road block at 'Devil's Curve' near Bagua. Following the high death toll that resulted from its repression, protest spread to further indigenous communities and solidarity marches were organised across the country. In response, the government declared a state of siege in the area, but disruptive collective action only intensified and continued to spread across Peru. Eventually, on June 19th, the decrees in question were officially repealed by the Peruvian Congress.

5.4.2 A success?

How good is this a case illustrating a 'positive outcome'? The most controversial decree (1090) was indeed repealed, and both the President and the Prime Minister publicly acknowledged that the indigenous communities in question should have been consulted, as mandated by international law. On June 15th, 2009, following the Bagua massacre, the nation-wide mobilisations in support of the indigenous struggles, and the international outcry against the government repression, Prime Minister Yehude Simon met with representatives of indigenous communities, as well as four government ministers and the governors of the Amazonian regions (PIP, 2009). On June 17th, the Prime Minister submitted to Congress the proposal to repeal Law 1090, in a room full of indigenous leaders. Congress then quickly voted in favour of this proposal, thus repealing the decrees, including Decree 1090, on June 19th, 2009. The Prime Minister apologised for the repression and lack of consultation, and then resigned.

Still, taking a step back, was this a success? While the Prime Minister resigned, it is important to note that Peru has a presidential system; although Alan García's reputation may have been damaged, he remained in the Presidential Palace. According to Paredes, the mobilisation had overall "mixed results"; the prior consultation of indigenous communities over extractive and other projects affecting their lands and territories under the García Presidency was not guaranteed and private companies continued to make advances, even if the decrees that would have made this expansion easier had been repealed (2011: 131). At the same time, this was clearly a "major victory" for AIDESEP and Alberto Pizango (Hughes, 2010: 90). The indigenous organisation and its leader publicly displayed its mobilising capacity and its ability to force the government to not only backtrack on decrees jeopardising indigenous land rights, but also to publicly recognise their right to consultation.

Moreover, soon after his election in 2011, Alan García's successor in the Presidential office, Ollanta Humala, signed into effect the Law of Prior Consultation at a ceremony in Bagua itself. Although its implementation continues to be somewhat limited, it is nevertheless an important victory for the indigenous movement in Peru and for AIDESEP in particular (Arce, 2014). More importantly, given the way a 'positive outcome' has been conceptualised in this thesis, the decrees themselves *were* in fact repealed following the protests and acceptance in the form of negotiations, including joint media statements. When repealing the decrees, the Prime Minister explicitly acknowledged the indigenous protest as the reason for the repeal. As such, despite later developments, this is coded as a positive outcome (both acceptance and advantage) in the indigenous protest event dataset analysed above.

Before turning to evaluating the causal mechanisms at play in this case, it is useful first, having collected all the extra data about this case, to use it to check the predictive power of the statistical models developed in the preceding chapter. Based on the statistical analysis in Chapter 4 (specifically Model 5 in Table 7, p. 78), an event such as the 2009 protest campaign in the Peruvian Amazon, had a relative predicted probability[68] of experiencing at least acceptance of 84%, and a 43% chance gaining concrete advantages too.

As a reminder, overall, the predicted likelihood of getting at least acceptance is 67%, and getting advantages 25%, for the whole dataset; as such, according to Model 4, an event like the Bagua protest had above average odds of success. That is to say, a mobilisation that lasted for more than a month (nearly three months in this case), had around 10,000 participants, asked for the recognition of existing rights without the redistribution of new resources, was supported by non-indigenous allies, and took place in a rural setting while a right or centrist government was in power at the national level. The odds for the 2008 precursor campaign—which was met by acceptance but no advantages—were also predicted quite well by the model; according to Model 5, a protest event with characteristics similar to those of the 2008 protest had a relative predicted chance of a gaining any advantages of only 17%, that is below average.

5.4.3 Searching for causal mechanisms

The statistical models developed in the previous chapter thus predict the relative chances of success for the individual protests rather well, but in what way do they explain why the AIDESEP-led popular-indigenous uprising in Peru in 2009 achieved the outcomes that it did, and why that differed to those experienced by the precursor 2008 mobilisation? The two mobilisations had the same demands and took place under the same right-wing government of Alan García, making them perfect for comparison under the logic of matched cases. Claim-making alone, either directly or in interaction with political opportunities, cannot account for divergent indigenous protest outcomes. What other factors might help explain the different consequences of these two protests? Of course, the negative outcome of the first mobilisation influenced the emergence of the latter. But since the interest here in outcomes once the protest emerges, this is less relevant analytically. What is important is the sequence of events leading to the positive outcome in the second case, and the exploration of the difference between the two protest campaigns. This follows below, by evaluating potential cognitive, relational, and environmental causal mechanisms.

Firstly, then, can cognitive, individual-level, mechanisms explain the differential outcomes of these two indigenous protest campaigns in Peru? AIDESEP, with its charismatic leader, Alberto Pizango, framed their demands to protect the indigenous territories in question as a fight not only to protect ancestral lands and the environment, but also as a struggle to protect the very survival of the communities. This was clearly a right-to-difference framing. This was also the case in the first, 2008, mobilisation, but since negotiations were established quite quickly, the moral outrage among the communities themselves dissipated to an extent. In the second case, President Alan García's government made clear its intention not to cede to indigenous demands, and he raised tensions even further by describing indigenous protesters'

[68] This is based on the fixed part of Model 5 only.

as backward, comparing them to dogs, and accusing them of trying to hold back the development of the country (Bebbington, 2012; Hughes, 2010; Schmall, 2011).

The legitimate outrage felt against the government arguably played a significant role in maintaining the mobilisation; by the time of the Bagua repression, the road blocks at the 'Devil's Curve' had already been in place for two months, along with other protests in the area as part of AIDESEP's 'national strike' declared in April 2009. It was in this context of heightened collective outrage that the government sent in the police to clear the road block with violent repression, leaving as already discussed at least 33 people dead. As the violence intensified, news spread via radio to other indigenous communities, suggesting that the death toll was much higher, fuelling fear and panic in the region (Hughes, 2010; PIP, 2009). This sparked further protests, road and river blockades, and oil installation occupations.

Alan García, in response, declared an emergency and a 'state of siege', accusing the protest participants of being terrorists and comparing them to the Shining Path.[69] Invoking parallels to this organisation is particularly damaging in Peru, as the memory of its violence and brutality is still relatively fresh in the public mind. Regardless, ultimately public opinion turned against García (PIP, 2009; Schmall, 2011). He lost the battle over legitimacy in this case. Thus, it would seem that emotions—in terms of moral outrage over what seems to be unjustified and unjustifiable government actions—indeed played an important role in the escalation of this indigenous mobilisation, which allowed the pressure on the government to mount. However, it is not easy to evaluate the role of individual-level cognitive mechanisms with the kind of information available about the protest events in questions from online and secondary sources.

What the above discussion highlights, however, is both the role of public opinion and the actions of the government. Public opinion and political opportunities are, as discussed in other parts of this thesis, the most often cited external factors influencing the outcomes of social movement mobilisations. As such, it is crucial, *secondly,* to evaluate the role that environmental causal mechanisms may have played. As discussed above, it would indeed seem that they had a significant impact. The fact that negotiations followed the first mobilisation without giving it a chance to escalate also meant that the first protest campaign did not gather much public and media attention. Perhaps more importantly, it was not until the heavy and deadly repression at Bagua that public outrage against the government spread across the country, damaging its moral legitimacy, and gaining public sympathy for the indigenous protesters. Consequently, in the second case, public opinion changed, and solidarity marches were organised across the country (Hughes, 2010; Schmall, 2011). This is of course extremely relevant; yet it is still necessary to delve deeper into *how* changes in public opinion in turn influenced executive and legislative decisions.

The same logic applies to looking at the importance of potentially changing public opportunities. As highlighted above, the two cases were chosen for comparison since they took place under the government of the same APRA political party, historically left-of-centre, but

[69] The Shining Path was a Maoist guerrilla group operating in the Peruvian countryside in the 1980 and into the early 1990s, although it also staged urban attacks. Even though it established a support base in part of the countryside, its brutality seems to have prevented it from gaining broader popular support, as did the government's brutal counter-insurgency strategy. This is also of course a subject of academic debate (Eckstein, 2001).

under García substantially more right-wing and orthodox in its economic policy. At the time of the protests, thus, both the President and the Prime Minister Yehude Simon belonged to the same political party. However, as the conflict ensued, the political constellation of power was itself affected. The decrees in question were part of the executive's agenda; Congress gave the President the power of decree for six months in order to implement the free trade agreement with the United States. As such, the Peruvian Congress initially supported the decrees. Yet as the political crisis deepened, the legislative branch began to distance itself from the executive.

The day before the Devil's Curve massacre, Congress voted not to repeal Law 1090, but only since the executive actually intervened in proceedings, exploiting procedural loopholes in order to prevent proper debate (Hughes, 2010). Ultimately, as discussed above, it was the Prime Minister who submitted the proposal to repeal the decrees to Congress. Considering it was the President that ordered the police intervention at Bagua, the executive's legitimacy was significantly undermined, which explains the subsequent division within the state. This in turn contributed to a positive outcome for the indigenous protest in the end. This corresponds to the notion that elite conflict makes it easier for social movements to succeed (e.g. Kolb, 2007). However, it is important to note that it was the indigenous mobilisation itself that contributed to this conflict, providing evidence of a joint effect.

Indeed, struggles over legitimacy are central to both institutional politics and contentious protest; in a way, both can be seen as sites of battles of positions. In the 2009 cases, the highly disruptive mobilisation was met with state repression, which sparked further protests and solidarity, only further undermining the government's legitimacy. Still, given this sequence of events, what explains most succinctly and parsimoniously the difference between these two related indigenous protest campaigns in the Peruvian Amazon? The search for causal mechanisms should not result, as argued above, in a list of complex case-specific descriptive explanations. It should, through first evaluating such explanations, search for more general, medium-level, causal explanations. Such causal explanations should be able to explain *how* changes in public opinion or political constellations led to observed outcomes. Thus, a turn to relational, meso-level mechanisms is necessary.

Moreover, investigating relational mechanisms helps highlight the importance of protest tactics. Although AIDESEP's Alberto Pizango had also declared a 'national strike' in 2008 already, the disruption was much more limited in scale, with some boats belonging to oil companies captured and one lot occupied in the region. In Bagua, a group of indigenous protesters attempted to occupy a municipal building, but were prevented from doing so by the police, with eleven people injured (AFP, 2008). Road and river blockades were not employed at this time, not leading to shortages that would put both material and *symbolic* pressure on the government, as happened in the protest campaign a year later. In the 2009 case, AIDESEP managed to mobilise significantly more indigenous communities and their local supporters to block roads and rivers and occupy oil installations, to impede the flow of both traffic and crude oil. By June 5th, the day of the Bagua massacre, some of these blockades had already been in place for more than two months.

The intensity of the protest was thus higher, with a higher cost imposed on the government in not meeting their demands. The problem was that meeting their demands also had a high cost, as the García administration made resource exploration in the Amazon the key element of its

development policy, and the high price of crude oil made extraction particularly lucrative at that time. In a sense, then, protests about extraction are the 'exception that proves the rule' about the impact of recognition- versus redistribution-type claims, that is the finding of the previous chapter that on average, demands for recognition (of existing land rights in this case) tend to be easier to achieve than demands for redistribution. This is due to the high economic and political cost implied in not expanding resource extraction in the current political and economic climate in Latin America, for both right and left governments.

The combination of a high-cost demand and a high-cost protest thus resulted in government repression. Yet this only increased the disruption of protests in neighbouring areas as indignant indigenous communities intensified their resistance. This suggests that a growing wave of protests can indeed make it more likely that the demands of the original protest be met, something which could not be captured by the analysis in Chapter 4 (Biggs, 2005). As outraged citizens all across the country also joined protests in solidarity, the public legitimacy of the protest thus increased. Thus, the political cost of not attending to AIDESEP's demands grew significantly, while the cost of meeting the demand remained the same; as the cost of disruption also increased, the Peruvian Congress eventually intervened and repealed President García's decrees. The comparison of the two indigenous protest events from Peru thus identifies two related mechanisms, the imposition of a material cost and the imposition of a symbolic cost by. That is, the weighing of the cost of meeting the demand for the protest target compared to the cost of not meeting it, given the strategies of the protesters, political calculations and public opinion, helps explain how targets are likely to respond. These two costs combined into the overall *political* cost of meeting the demand versus not meeting it.


The following section returns to the statistical analysis in the previous chapter, but this time only for the cases from Bolivia. This allows for a deeper exploration of the relationship between protest-level and contextual variables, without potentially distorting country differences. It concludes with a comparison of three protest events from Bolivia, which allows for the synthesis of the results of the preceding statistical analysis with the findings of the matched-cases comparison of indigenous protest in Peru above.

5.5 Road blocks?: Indigenous protest in Bolivia

In the protest event dataset analysed in the previous chapter, events from Bolivia represent the largest number of cases, with 100 indigenous protest events between 2003 and 2013 coded. As discussed above, this number may seem rather low, given the rebelliousness of Bolivia's indigenous communities, but reflects the fact that detailed information was collected about each protest event or campaign, and only those whose outcomes could be ascertained at least to some extent are included. Figure 7 below (p. 101) shows the trajectory of indigenous activism in Bolivia; from a peak in the early 2000s, indigenous activism slowly declined following the election of the Morales administration in 2006, reaching a low following the enactment of the 2009 constitution. Since 2011, however, the frequency of indigenous protest

has picked up again, corresponding to the distancing of some indigenous movements from the government and renewed protest.[70] This is explored in detail in Chapters 6 and 7.

Figure 7: Indigenous protest events in Bolivia 2003-2013



Looking just at the cases from Bolivia, it is clear that while the pattern of correlations between positive outcomes and both protest- and country-level variables is broadly similar to the cross-national analysis, there are also some interesting differences. One of the greatest differences is the magnitude of the positive effect of the use of road blocks as the main protest tactic. Although the positive impact of the road block tactic on outcomes is statistically significant for the entire 13-country protest event dataset—and this is the case even when Bolivian cases are excluded—for Bolivia the magnitude of the effect is much larger (based on Model 5, Table 7, p. 78). Of the 100 cases of indigenous protest in Bolivia, there are only three that used the tactic of road blocks that did not experience any positive outcomes (overall, road blocks were used in 35% of events). This gives further empirical weight to the hypothesis that the impact of disruption can be explained by the mechanisms of cost imposition. Bolivia is the least infrastructurally developed country of the 13 analysed, which means that a relatively low number of protesters can bring the country to a standstill with roadblocks, making ignoring the protest particularly politically costly.

The overall predicted probability of success in Bolivia is among the highest in the region; 81% according to Model 5. For protests that use road blocks, this climbs to 89%, while falling to 77% for events in which indigenous protesters employed a different tactic, such as a march, demonstration, or occupation. For gaining concrete advantages, however, the use of road blocks becomes less important. This corresponds to the findings of the statistical analyses in the previous chapter, which show that while protest tactics significantly impact the changes of

[70] Note that the drops both in 2003 and 2013 are a virtue of data availability, rather than reflecting actual decreases in indigenous protest activity.

experiencing acceptance, for gaining concrete advantages country-level variables, especially political opportunities, become more important. As such, as developed in that chapter, the use of a costly tactic may force the state to negotiate, but does not necessarily mean the demands will be met. Other factors become more important at that stage.

This is particularly the partisanship of the government in power, and Bolivia is one of the best examples of the difference that the election of a left-wing executive can make for indigenous movements. The experiences of the indigenous movement in Bolivia before and after the 2005 election of Evo Morales, the country's first president of indigenous origin, are complex and are explored in significant detail in Chapters 6 and 7. Suffice to say at this point that before 2005, indigenous protests experienced fewer positive outcomes overall; some recognition demands were met, but redistribution-oriented indigenous actors were either ignored or repressed. After 2005, significant recognition and redistribution claims were met, even if redistributive demands were privileged. Still, movement strategies mattered both before and after 2005, and especially since 2011, as some of the most important indigenous organisations in the country joined the opposition against Morales.

This can be illustrated by conducting a statistical analysis of the Bolivian indigenous protests from the protest event dataset analysed in Chapter 4. (As above, this is done by analysing a single-level logit model, using the same variables as Model 4 in Table 6, p. 75, except the public opinion ones.) As the left-wing government of Evo Morales came into power, the relative predicted probability of experiencing a positive outcome rose from 68% on average under the previous right-wing governments, to 85% after 2005. As discussed above, the nature of political environment is particularly important for gaining concrete advantages. Indeed, with the average predicted probability of securing any advantages being 48% for Bolivia between 2003 and 2013, it was 14% before 2005, dramatically rising to 62% with the election of Evo Morales. The sample for Bolivian indigenous protest events is too small to state this as anything but a tentative prediction (descriptively, the rate of gaining advantages for indigenous protest in Bolivia was 18.5% before 2005, and 59% after). However, it does reflect the findings of the cross-national analysis.

The mechanisms that can help explain experiencing positive outcomes—and gaining advantages in particular—still need to be explored further. Through a comparison of three protest events in Bolivia drawn from the quantitative protest event dataset, the importance of a) the road block tactic and b) the political environment is evaluated more fully. In doing so, moreover, the section below discusses both the most important variables from the quantitative analysis and those that were missing. It thus proposes the causal mechanisms linking protest- and country-level variables with more specific outcomes, setting the stage for their evaluation in the qualitative analyses that follow.

5.5.1 Three indigenous protest events

In order to illustrate this more fully in the case of Bolivia, three most similar cases of indigenous protest activity are described below, which differ specifically on the use of the road block tactic and their outcomes. Such a comparison again operationalises the logic of matched cases (Ragin, 2008). To account for the variation in the political environment, only cases subsequent to the

election of Evo Morales' left-of-centre government were considered. Within these cases, the most similar instances were selected; those that asked for redistribution, lasted three days or less, with less than 100 participants. All three protest events related to land claims, in particular the demand for land titling (rather than just the protection of existing land rights). According to the statistical analysis carried out in the preceding chapter, these protests should have relatively similar chances of 'success'. They are similar in all the variables that were shown to matter in the preceding chapter, except for the differences in tactics, that is whether they used road blocks or not. Still, for the two that did use road blocks, one experienced only acceptance whereas the third was coded as having gained some advantages. As such, how can the different outcomes of these three events be explained?

Huajchillo: no positive outcome

In the first case, on 10th November 2009, around 30 "*comunarios"*—members of a local indigenous peasant community—in Huajchillo, La Paz, tore down the walls of several properties, claiming an ancestral right to the land (Los Tiempos, 2009; OSAL, 2009). This followed a period of dispute, including marking the plots as belonging to the indigenous community on 2nd November and threatening an occupation. On the day of the 'invasion', the owners of the plots alerted the police and the protesters retreated. This was met by neither acceptance, nor advantages, on the part of the state (nor repression). The minister for public works had stated three weeks earlier in relation to this case that "no kind of land invasion outside of the legal framework will be tolerated", and the government stuck to this position (OSAL, 2009). As such, the (left-of-centre) government vowed to protect private property; the protesters did not experience even a modicum of acceptance, even though they were not repressed (Los Tiempos, 2009; OSAL, 2009).

Copacabana: Acceptance

The second case is very similar to the first; it involved a land dispute of a nationally relatively minor significance, in which a group representing a local indigenous peasant community claimed ancestral rights to land owned by others. It took place in the town of Copacabana in September 2006. In this case, the land was owned by the Church, specifically the Franciscan order, and the Church's legal title to the plot in question had recently been confirmed (AFP, 2006; Los Tiempos, 2006). About 100 indigenous (Aymara) protesters blocked routes connecting Bolivia and Peru for seven days, before agreeing to suspend the measure and attend negotiations on 6th September 2006. This followed their eviction from the plots in question, which they had occupied the previous month (AFP, 2006). Although the situation was not resolved in the six months following the event, the Ombudsman's office (*Defensoría del Pueblo)* organised a series of negotiations with the protesters (Los Tiempos, 2006). While their demand was not met (as far as the available data suggests), and thus they did not experience any advantages, their protest was met with acceptance on part of representatives of the (left-of-centre) state.

El Choré: Advantages

In the final example, indigenous and peasant protesters blockaded a major road in Santa Cruz for three days in July 2007, demanding the initiation of a process of land title regularisation

and/or redistribution (*saneamiento)* in a disputed area of the El Choré forest reserve in the northern part of the Santa Cruz region. Starting on 4th July, the road block left "stranded nearly a thousand trucks transporting merchandise between the eastern and western parts of the country" before an agreement between the protesters and the left-of-centre government was reached three days later (AFP, 2007).[71] This stated that all those with a pre-1996 occupation had a legitimate claim, and the process of land titling was initiated. While it is impossible to determine whether the titles for the exact lands asked for (such precise information is not available) were actually regularised, we do know that the government agency—specifically the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA, *Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria*)—has made significant progress in land titling and redistribution in the El Choré area, even if the process remains unfinished and frequently conflictual (Achtenberg, 2013a; Crabtree & Chaplin, 2013). Moreover, beginning the process of land title regularisation should be considered an advantage in its own right, following the initial acceptance in the form of a signed agreement.

On a side note, this protest event highlights perhaps most clearly the complexity of rural identity politics in Bolivia, which will be explored below. The El Choré forest reserve continues to be a source of local disputes, as old and newer settled communities struggle for land rights. Newly arrived Aymara and Quechua settlers from the highlands are generally portrayed by the media and their opponents as peasants, but not indigenous. Yet often they argue what Thomas Grisaffi has used as title of a recent paper: we are indigenous, we are *originarios,* 'we just aren't from here' (Grisaffi, 2010). Some indigenous peasant activists even accuse indigenous communities in possession of ancestral land titles as 'being the new landowners' (*latifundistas)* (Crabtree & Chaplin, 2013: 22) as landless families and communities try to settle in protected indigenous territories. On the other side of this are of course the established indigenous communities within protected territories, sometimes in voluntary isolation, fiercely defending their land against incursions from both landless settlers (indigenous or not) and hydrocarbons exploration. Struggles like this are taking place across Bolivia, and the El Choré dispute is just one example showing how the well-known TIPNIS case, discussed below, is far from the only site of dispute between different indigenous and rural communities and their organisations in the country.

5.5.2 Explaining outcomes

What, then, explains the differential outcomes of the three indigenous protests above? All three asked for land, specifically land redistribution, lasted a week or less with less than 100 participants or less, used a disruptive tactic and took place with a left-of-centre executive in power. According to the results of the preceding chapter, all those factors except the left-of-centre government makes the protests events on average less likely to succeed. At the same time, that analysis also shows that asking for redistribution under a left-of-centre executive is more likely to lead to positive outcomes. This can help us understand the context of those events, but clearly does not explain why these three events specifically experienced such

[71] There were other indigenous protests, including those using road blocks, taking place in Bolivia around the time of this protest, to which the government responded differently (AFP, 2007); however, these did not have redistributive land related demands.

different outcomes. How can we explain that the first experienced no positive outcomes, the second just acceptance, and the third received both acceptance *and* advantages?

Tactics

All three protests used a disruptive tactic; yet, in line with the quantitative results, this on its own does not appear to have a positive impact on results. Rather, it is the nature of disruption, in particular its ability to impose an economic cost, that explains to an important degree the divergent outcomes of these three protest events. This is why it is specifically the use of the road block tactic that makes a difference for the outcomes experienced. Moreover, its heightened impact in a country like Bolivia, with relatively low infrastructural development, only supports the hypothesis that this causal relationship operates through the mechanism of the imposition of an economic cost. Another difference, although relatively small, between the first cases and the other two is the duration of the protest. This would suggest that while road blocks in their own right have a strong impact on outcomes, it is also the length of the disruption that matters (and this is also supported by the quantitative findings). This provides further evidence for the hypothesis for the role of the causal mechanism of a cost calculation by the target, in that protest events which impose a material cost for a longer period of time[72] have a greater likelihood of experiencing a positive outcome.

Yet, if the nature of disruption illuminates why the first event experienced no positive outcomes, while the second and third events experienced at least some, what explains the second one experiencing only acceptance with the third one also gaining some advantages? The results of the cross-country analysis highlight the importance of the political environment in predicting whether a protest event, once met by acceptance, is also likely to experience advantages or not. While not denying this, the cases above suggest that this may be more complicated. All three events took place after the election of the MAS into power, which has overall privileged redistributive claims. Indeed, the quantitative analysis, carried out in the previous chapter and illustrated above with the three protest events from Bolivia, shows that under left-of-centre government, making redistributive claims significantly improves the likelihood of positive outcomes. However, in the two cases at hand, this is not the decisive factor.

Claims and frames

Firstly, although in the three cases the content of the demand is the same—redistribution, specifically land titling—the demand legitimation, or framing, differs. In the first two cases, the claim for land redistribution is legitimated by invoking ancestral rights to the land, that is, the right to difference. In the third protest event, however, the same demand was framed in the language of equal rights, arguing for the right to land for all indigenous rural labourers, rather than because of the specific communities' ancestral right to the territory in question. It was the third protest event that was met with actual advantages. This highlights that there is not only an interaction between claiming (content of demand) and political opportunities—as

[72] Since this also shows mobilising capacity and determination, showing that similarly disruptive protests might be expected if after initial acceptance, advantages do not follow.

demonstrated in the previous chapter and further explored below—but also between framing (legitimation of demand) and political opportunities.

In other words, framing also matters (Benford & Snow, 2000; Cress & Snow, 2000; McCammon *et al*., 2007); but this only becomes clear once claims and frames are conceptually separated. It was not possible to evaluate the latter fully in the preceding chapter, as many of the protest events lacked information on both the content of the demand and the way in which it was legitimated, on both claiming and framing. The three Bolivian protest events highlighted above suggest, however, the importance of the interaction between framing and the political environment. The fact that the demand of the third protest event was framed in the language of equal rights means it was more resonant with the discourse of the MAS government, which has made prominent the element of redistribution and equal rights in its conception and implementation of indigenous rights.

Alliances


Secondly, another factor that appears to have made the crucial difference for the three protest events is a related factor, that of alliances. Although the presence of a left-of-centre government was used as a proxy for the presence of sympathetic allies, the cases above show that a more detailed look is necessary, than was possible in Chapter 4. In particular, in the *El Choré* case the indigenous peasant unions that organised the road blocks were directly allied to the governing MAS (AFP, 2007). In the Copacabana case, the *comunarios* were not members of any wider regional or national movement organisations. This brings attention to the issue of alliance-making, as part of a wider repertoire of collective action. It was not possible to fully evaluate this in the quantitative cross-country analysis; although a measure of whether non-indigenous or other non-affiliated supporters attended the event, and their characteristics if so, was included, this did not appear to be associated with outcomes in the multilevel regression model. Moreover, it was not possible to evaluate the issue of repertoires of contention more broadly, as this concept relates more to social movement campaigns or organisations, rather than individual protests. As such, the configurational analysis that follows in the Chapter 7 evaluates the SMOs in relation to their propensity for alliance-making and the nature of their contentious repertoires.

5.6 Discussion: Into protest events, and back

The findings of the cross-national analysis in the preceding chapter, in combination with the analysis of matched protest events in Peru and Bolivia, thus show the importance of protest-level variables for explaining protest outcomes. They show convincingly the effect of both the type of disruption and the content of claims on positive outcomes, if these can impose costs on targets that are (deemed to be) greater than the costs of meeting the demand. The framing of demands, moreover, can also impact outcomes based on its external resonance, be it in relation to political partisanship or public opinion. The external resonance of frames can thus impact outcomes through the imposition of symbolic cost. Protest can impose both tangible and legitimacy costs; while some tactics, such as road blocks, tend to be highly costly regardless of government partisanship or public opinion, the cost of various claims and their framing will depend on such circumstances.

These effects, along with the mechanism suggesting how they operate, are shown in Figure 8 below (p. 107). Specifically, the lower the material and symbolic cost of meeting the demand for the target, the higher the chances of a positive outcome. The higher the material cost of disruption, the higher the chances of a positive outcome. The more resonant the demand framing given political opportunities and/or public opinion, the higher is the symbolic cost of not meeting the demand. In other words, the higher would be the political cost of not meeting the demand. This facilitates acceptance, and in interaction with political opportunities and public opinion, determines the final political cost of meeting the claims versus not meeting it. If the latter outweighs the former, then advantages are likely to be secured.

Figure 8: Protest events and positive outcomes



All of the three movement-level factors can have a direct effect of leading to advantages, but this effect is smaller in magnitude; the larger effect is on acceptance, which is more likely to lead to advantages in interaction with beneficial political opportunities and public opinion. Still, the claim and frame resonance provided by such opportunities is not enough to explain protest outcomes. What this chapters also suggests is that even under seemingly unfavourable conditions—such as the Bagua case in Peru—protest can make a difference. This particular case suggests that in such situations, if an indigenous protest can *combine* the imposition of *both* high material and high symbolic costs, it is likely to secure at least some advantages. Still, this needs further exploration. While the protest event analysis shows convincingly the effect of type of disruption and claiming on outcomes, the effect of framing is, for now, rather more tentative. The impact of these three protest-level variables, particularly framing, is thus further evaluated in the qualitative analysis of Bolivian indigenous social movement organisations below.

As such, this chapter sought to being to propose causal mechanisms linking both protest-level and contextual variables to observed protest outcomes**.** It did so by expanding on the results of the preceding statistical analysis through a more detail exploration and matched-cases comparison of selected indigenous protest events and campaigns from the quantitative indigenous protest event dataset collected by the author. The causal mechanisms of material and symbolic costs are identified by comparing protests that took place under similar circumstances but experienced different outcomes. Theoretically, these causal mechanisms stem from combining the insights of Luders' (2006) 'cost mechanism' and Koopmans' (1999) 'discursive resonance'. Empirically, they highlight the importance of protest-level variables, and of considering both the claims and frames of protesters. In that sense, the analysis brings agency and protest strategy to analytical prominence. It does so by drawing attention to the cost calculations involved in social movement activity.

However, while both social movements and their targets are proposed to engage in cost calculation, the chapters above were not able to provide any evidence of such strategic decisions. Moreover, they have focused on the cost calculations of the target, going against the author's own recommendation to refocus from targets back to social movements themselves. This will be remedied in the following chapters. These are guided by a concern for exploring the extent of strategic decision-making of indigenous social movement actors, and evaluating whether it has any impact on movement outcomes. To do so, the subsequent two empirical chapters explore the trajectories of indigenous mobilisations and the evolving role of social movement organisations, something that was not possible by looking at individual protest events. They do so, *firstly*, for Bolivia as a case, and *secondly*, for a number of indigenous SMOs within Bolivia.

The current chapter thus also hoped to highlight the importance of smaller events and continuous resistance. What does studying the specific outcomes experienced by individual protest events or campaigns tell us about the successes and failures of the indigenous movement in Latin America? Although battles may be won, the war can still be lost. Yet there is no such thing as *the* indigenous movement. If there was, its overall goal would probably be the constitutional codification of indigenous rights, and that has already happened across the continent. The problem is not only that these are often not protected in practice, it is also that indigenous organisations and leaders, in different places and at different times, do not necessarily agree on how those rights should be protected, and even what *kinds* of rights indigenous people(s) should have to begin with. As such, within one country, region or local area, different indigenous communities, and their local, regional and national leaders, often have conflicting goals. The struggle is not only about securing indigenous rights, but also about what indigenous rights should mean and who gets to claim to speak for indigenous people(s) in the first place.

This highlights the importance of paying more attention to smaller events, ongoing transitions, and continued everyday resistance, as many Latin American scholars have long insisted (e.g. Svampa, 2008; Zibechi, 2012). Even if the war is won (indigenous rights codified), battles may continue and be lost (e.g. specific land rights unrecognised); for the indigenous community in question, the latter may affect their daily lives more than the former. Both are important, but social movement studies have focused on key legislative and constitutionals reforms to the detriment of analysing the outcomes of specific protest campaigns. The analysis of examples from the protest event dataset in this chapter thus provided further empirical evidence for the conclusions of the cross-national quantitative analysis conducted in the previous chapter.

More importantly for this chapter, however, the analysis presented here singles out both the causal conditions that (a) were suggested by the quantitative analysis and could be confirmed and (b) those that could not be tested in the multilevel regression model, but are found to play a role both in the literature and the examples above. The potential role of such conditions, especially the latter, needs to be explored further. As such, the Qualitative Comparative Analysis that follows in Chapter 7 concentrates on (1) the content and legitimation of demands, (2) mobilising and disruptive capacity, (3) the nature of contentious repertoires, and (4) the presence of a left-of-centre executive. Before turning to the QCA, however, it is first necessary to trace the trajectories and dynamics of indigenous social movements in Bolivia, in order to

explore the paths from indigenous protest to specific outcomes in an in-depth qualitative investigation.

6. Bolivia's indigenous movement(s): Strategic claims and frames

6.1 Introduction

The two preceding empirical chapters investigated the characteristics, contexts, and consequences of specific indigenous protest events and campaigns in Latin America from 2003 to 2013. Following up a statistical analysis of 635 protest events from Latin America with a process-tracing within-case comparison of two protests from Peru and three protests from Bolivia, they were able to show that protest indeed can matter. Specifically, the analyses explored how the internal characteristics of protests can impact outcomes, rather than contextual variables being solely responsible if outcomes are positive. The chapters argued for the importance of studying protest events and looking 'inside' them—unlike traditional protest event analyses—in order to try and understand when and how contentious collective actions experience intended consequences.

Still, how do the findings of the previous chapters help us understand the successes and failures of indigenous movements in Latin America, let alone of social movements in general? The following two chapters try to answer this question by looking at the indigenous movement—if it is indeed possible to speak of one movement—in Bolivia. This chapter utilizes in-depth qualitative knowledge to explain the dynamics and trajectories of Bolivian indigenous organising, before the next chapter turns to conducting a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) of Bolivian social movement organisations to try and uncover the *causal paths* leading to divergent outcomes experienced by different indigenous collective in the region.

What is crucial to bear in mind for the Bolivian case is that these are not just struggles of indigenous communities, statically defined against the *mestizo* (mixed) or white urban residents and elites. They are also struggles about what indigeneity is, and who gets to claim to be indigenous in the first place (Barnard *et al*., 2006; Burman, 2014; Grisaffi, 2010; Postero, 2017). Such struggles are not unique to Bolivia, but they are particularly heightened in this country; this issue is also incredibly complicated, and not the focus of the current work. However, one of the main arguments that is emerging out of this study of indigenous movements in the Latin America in general and in Bolivia in particular is that, as part of social movement studies, it is necessary to consider the *strategy* of social movement organisations and protest participants alike. Given this agential lens, it would not make sense to also not consider identity as a strategy. Even though, as the renowned Bolivian Aymara intellectual and activist, Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, put to me: "putting on a poncho does not make you an Indian" (informal interview, 9th October 2016), it might be what it takes to lead an indigenous movement and even to lead it to success.

6.2 Methodology

6.2.1 Defining success, again

If, in the protest analysis above, a positive outcome was defined as acceptance followed by advantages, how can a 'success' be conceptualised, in a similar vein, for indigenous movements in general? The definition of outcomes here relates to the theory of protest cycles (della Porta, 2013; Tarrow, 1995, 2011). This concept, although criticised above for underplaying the importance of individual protests and ongoing resistance even at times of 'low' mobilisation, is useful for theorising the relationship between social movements and the state. In Bolivia, the notion of protest cycles may be even harder to apply than in other, especially 'Western' cases, since the distinction between the state and social movements has been significantly blurred in recent years. Still, from the point of the view of the social movement organisations in question, thinking in terms of protest cycles means the current context (since 2009) can be characterised as one of partial institutionalisation and side-lining of more radical demands. As such, if the interest is in examining the outcome of the indigenous movement in Bolivia in general—in relation to their goals and intended consequences—then the evolving relationship with the state and ongoing influence on decision-making needs to be evaluated.

For protests, the causal links between strategies and specific outcomes was the weighing, by targets, of the political cost of acceding versus not acceding, given the material and symbolic costs protesters were able to impose. For social movements in general, however, and social movement organisations in particular, it is analytically more useful to explain whether they have managed to gain and maintain *ongoing* influence on and access to decision making. This is related to acceptance and advantages—as discussed in both the methodology chapter (Chapter 3) and below in Chapter 7. In a sense, *influence* measures both acceptance and advantages.

The strength, variety and contradictory experiences of indigenous movements make Bolivia a perfect case for in-depth investigation in that the widest range of the different ways in which indigenous organisations have behaved in Latin America is represented, while the fact they are nested in one country controls for differences between countries as potentially explanatory factors. Moreover, the 2000-2016 period of study allows for the evaluation of movement success before and after the election of a left-of-centre government. To an extent, Bolivia can be seen as an exceptional case of a nationally successful indigenous movement. This presents some analytical problems in terms of generalising the results of this chapter beyond Bolivia.

It could lead to the conclusion that it is the relative size of the indigenous population that matters the most for indigenous movement outcomes. Indeed, with more than half of the population self-identifying as indigenous, it is easier to mobilise large sections of the population under an indigenous banner and thus exert enough pressure on the national political scene. Yet a quick glance at other Latin American countries suggests that, in and of itself, having a large indigenous population is neither necessary nor sufficient. Guatemala has the second highest indigenous population share in Latin America, and despite active indigenous movements, has experienced few advantages. In contrast, the indigenous share of the

population in Venezuela is one of the lowest in the continent, yet the country has achieved some radical advances in the protection of indigenous rights. While the quantitative analysis suggests that indigenous population share is important, it is clear that in and of itself, it cannot explain the divergence of movement outcomes. Other factors, including both movement strategies and the partisanship of government, have been shown to play a role.

6.2.2 Data & methodology

The original qualitative data used in the following two chapters comes from field research conducted in Bolivia between August and November 2016, in the cities of La Paz, El Alto, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba, and their outskirts. This research consisted in conducting semi-structured interviews with social movement activists and indigenous organisations' representatives, as well as NGO workers and politicians. This was combined with participant observations at different gatherings and workshops of different indigenous organisations and activists, and the collection of SMO institutional material. In total, 28 semi-structured interviews were conducted, as well as seven participant observations. (The analysis below also draws occasionally on fieldwork data collected in Bolivia in summer 2011 for the MPhil in Latin American Studies degree at the University of Oxford). Guided by the principle of the process tracing method (Brady & Collier, 2010; George & Bennett, 2005), this chapter traces the trajectories of different indigenous collective actions in order to try and identify the causal chains explaining *how* protest level variables impacted, if at all, the outcomes experienced by the indigenous movement in Bolivia.

In Chapter 7, the detailed insights of the current chapter are systematised by carrying out the fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) of five indigenous social movement organisations in Bolivia, detailed below. This was necessary in order to gather data that can evidence the mechanisms through which indigenous social movement organisations can experience positive outcomes. The data used for both this chapter and Chapter 7 thus come from (1) semi-structured interviews with leaders and activists of SMOs and (2) SMO institutional materials, complemented by (3) newspaper sources available online and (4) the secondary literature. Specifically, the field research collected data to answer the questions relating to the outcome variables and the hypothesised causal conditions that may influence them.

The five most important—and most studied—indigenous social movement organisations in Bolivia are the CSUTCB, CSCIOB, CNMCIOB-BS (*Bartolinas*), CONAMAQ and CIDOB.[73] These represent the five largest, nationally important indigenous movement organisations in the country. Moreover, they capture the diversity of indigenous organising in Bolivia in including both recognition-focused organisations as well as more class-based movements, in both lowland and highland parts of the country. This is particularly relevant in Bolivia (and in the Andean region of Latin America in general), where historical and socio-economic factors have arguably led to important differences in social and ethnic relations within countries

[73] CIDOB (Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia), CONAMAQ (National Council of *Ayllus y Markas de Qullasuyu*), CNMCIOB-BS (National Confederation of Peasant Indigenous Originary Women of Bolivia-*Bartolina Sisa*), CSUTCB (Unified Union Confederation of Bolivian Rural Workers), and CSCIOB (Union Confederation of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia).

(Klein, 2003; Soruco, 2008). This allows for the comparison of similarly large and similarly nationally important organisations that however represent different indigenous constituencies, have historically employed different organising strategies, and have experienced different outcomes, over time and in relation to each other. The following section presents an overview of indigenous organising in Bolivia, drawing on both the secondary literature and on the author's MPhil research. This sets the stage for the much more in-depth qualitative analysis developed in section 6.4.

6.3 Trajectories of indigenous organising in Bolivia

Bolivia is now known internationally for the intensity of its social movements, with protesters, including indigenous activists, being "able to effectively shut down the entire country until their demands are met" (Rice, 2012: 68). Indeed, by the early 2000s, the Bolivian indigenous movements were considered among the strongest in the region, with the greatest likelihood of further successes (Yashar, 2005; Lucero, 2005). This was mainly because of the strength of indigenous mobilisations and temporary unity, in spite of underlying ongoing divisions and conflict. Still, despite the strength of indigenous mobilising, it has never been possible to speak of one indigenous movement in Bolivia (Yashar, 2005; Lucero, 2005; Postero, 2007). There was a period of relative unity of indigenous struggles beginning with the establishment of MAS (*Movimiento al Socialismo,* Movement to Socialism), a self-proclaimed party of social movements, and leading up to the historic victory of this indigenous popular electoral alliance in 2005.

The MAS has a complicated history as a 'political instrument' of social movement organisations in Bolivia. Since the MAS victory in 2005, the five organisations that formed a Unity Pact in the early 2000s to throw their weight behind MAS and Morales now tend to claim MAS as "theirs" (Garcés, 2010; García Yapur *et al*, 2015). These are the five organisations studied here, namely the **CIDOB** (Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia, *Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia*), **CONAMAQ** (National Council of *Ayllus* and *Markas* of *Qullasuyu*, *Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas de Qullasuyu*), **CNMCIOB-BS** (National Confederation of Peasant Indigenous Originary Women of Bolivia-Bartolina Sisa, *Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Indígenas Originarias de Bolivia-Bartolina Sisa, **a.k.a. Bartolinas***), **CSUTCB** (Unified Union Confederation of Bolivian Rural Workers, *Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia*), and **CSCIOB** (Union Confederation of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia[74], *Confederación Sindical de Campesinos Interculturales Originarios de Bolivia*). These organisations—the former two, so-called twins, emerging from church- and NGO-supported indigenous organising and the latter three, the 'triplets', from indigenous peasant unions—are the five social movement organisations in Bolivia studied below. For clarity, the CIDOB and CONAMAQ are referred to subsequently as 'indigenous' organisations and the CSUTCB,

[74] The CSCIOB was previously known as the Confederation of Colonizers, referring to landless individual and families migrating internally in search of land (often ex-miners or peasants from areas with scarce arable land).

CSCIOB and the Bartolinas as 'indigenous-peasant'.[75] To understand their role in the formation of the MAS, it is necessary to sketch this complex history first.

There is some disagreement in the academic literature regarding both *how* and *when* the current governing party in Bolivia was founded. In a 2009 book on the origins of the MAS, including life histories of former and current MAS representatives, the Bolivian academic Moira Zuazo traces the origins of the MAS-IPSP thus:

> "In the 6th Congress of the CSUTCB in 1994, the proposition of the need to create a political instrument of the peasants (campesinos) was approved. Fulfilling this resolution, the Land, Territory and Political Instrument Congress took place in Santa Cruz in March 1995, attended by the … CSUCTB, … FNMCB-BS [Bartolinas], … CSCB [later CSCIOB], and … CIDOB. In this Congress, the MAS-IPSP is born under the name Assembly for the Sovereignty of the People (Asamblea por la Soberanía de los Pueblos), ASP. … The ASP did not manage to register with the National Electoral Court, which led to the later adoption of a new name." (Zuazo, 2009: 37-8)

Others trace the origin of the MAS, first as ASP, specifically to the very same Congress and these four organisations (four of the five studied here), including a volume on the trajectories of Bolivian social movements edited by Latin American scholars Maristella Svampa, Pablo Stefanoni, and others, including *Grupo Comuna* intellectuals (Artaraz, 2012: 45; Do Alto, 2007: 39; Oikonomakis & Espinoza, 2014: 293-294; Svampa & Stefanoni, 2007).

Still, the story of MAS emergence is indeed complex. "The MAS was born many times", argues Bolivian political scientists; the MAS acronym was born in 1987, when an unrelated party under the acronym of MAS-U was registered (Komadina & Komadina, 2007: 21). This was defunct by the 1990s, but the name remained registered. The next birth of the MAS was the above-mentioned social movement Congress in 1994 called *Land, Territory and Political Instrument*, in which an electoral vehicle, the ASP, was formed. The 'last birth', then, was "a little before the 1999 municipal elections", in which the MAS already participated officially as

[75] The complexity of ethnic self-identification in Bolivia should be obvious by now. It complicates the telling of the story of five social movement organisations studied here, and of Bolivian social movements in general. The names of some of the organisations have been changed during the time period studied, often to resonate more with both domestic and international discourses about indigenous rights and rural struggles. For example, the CSCIOB changed its name from the Union Confederation of Colonizers of Bolivia ('colonizer' was the name given by the state to predominantly Aymara and Quechua landless migrants, often ex-miners, that the state encouraged to migrate from the mountains to the valleys and lowland parts of the country in second part of the 20th century) to Union Confederation of Intercultural Communities of Bolivia. The organisation's membership still represents the same kind of constituency. If the definition of 'indigenous' was their mother's or grandmother's native language being one other than Spanish, the vast majority of CSCIOB's (and CSUTCB's and Bartolinas') leaders and members would certainly be 'indigenous'. If indigenous means living according to specific non-Western non-capitalist cultural practices stemming from a particular indigenous cosmovision, and in particular holding land in common rather than in private property, then these same members (even if they self-identified as Aymara or Quechua, or spoke one of these languages as their mother tongue) would not be 'indigenous.' But then, according to the latter definition, many of the member communities of the CIDOB would not be classed as 'indigenous' either, such as the Guaranís that Nancy Postero so eloquently wrote about, living in the suburban areas of Santa Cruz (2007). In this sense, perhaps 'indigenous' is not the best term here. Still, it is used by the organisations and activists discussed here themselves, and it allows for this research to be connected to other works on rural movements for land and anti-colonial and anti-discrimination struggles across the world.

MAS (Komadina & Komadina, 2007: 21-6). At the same time, MAS—in most accounts still officially known as ASP—presented candidates for the 1995 municipal elections (Albó, 2008: 62; Postero, 2017: 32). And as such it is also sometimes reported as being founded in 1995 (Burbach *et al*., 2013; Klein, 2003). It then became officially MAS-IPSP (Movement to Socialism-Instrument for the Sovereignty of the People, *Movimiento al Socialismo-Instrumento por la Soberanía de los Pueblos*) in either 1997 (Crabtree & Chaplin, 2013: 7), 1998 (Fabricant & Gustafson, 2011: 24, note 1), 1999 (Do Alto, 2007) or sometime before the 1999 elections (Albó, 2008: 63; Komadina & Komadina, 2007: 22).

The more important question, however, is the question of *whose* 'political instrument' this can be said to be. The MAS is often represented as simply an electoral vehicle of the coca growers' unions, at least initially. Most accounts, however, have also recognised the ability of the MAS to unify diverse political interests, moving beyond a sectoral agenda and representing broad coalitions based on both class and ethnicity (Crabtree & Chaplin, 2013; Lazar, 2008; Postero, 2017; Van Cott, 2005; Yashar, 2005). This emerges, at least partially, from the *Katarista*[76] political movement's insistence of seeing with 'both eyes'; that is struggling against both material dispossession and cultural oppression (Albó, 2008; Rivera Cusicanqui, 1987; Svampa & Stefanoni, 2007). "The MAS has continued that [*Kataristas'*] syncretic appropriation of political traditions, drawing on trade unionism, populism, and indigenous democratic values and practices" (Lazar, 2008: 174).

In that sense, exactly who established the MAS initially may be less relevant, and claiming ownership of the now-governing political organisation is certainly a strategy of all the social movement organisations I studied. Still, many recent accounts recognise that regardless of this tendency, the role of social movement organisation beyond those of the *cocaleros* in the formation should be recognised. Thomas Grisaffi states that "MAS was established by the National Peasants Confederation (CSUTCB), the Coca Growers Federations, the Union of Colonizers and the Peasant Women's movement 'Bartolina Sisa'" (Grisaffi, 2017: 61, note 2). This refers back to the 1995 Congress mentioned above; it is certain that the "triplets" participated in this Congress, and as shown above some accounts also place the CIDOB there. This makes sense since, as detailed below, the latter organisation has historically had two dominant factions, one willing to form alliances with the indigenous-peasant organisations, and the other not. And while CONAMAQ was not present by most accounts, it threw its support behind the MAS later, and signed the Unity Pact along with the other four organisations studied here. As such,

> "the MAS did not begin only as a project of the Six Federations of Chapare. It was first conceived as the political instrument of the Indigenous-campesino movement of Bolivia… After the elevation of Evo Morales to the leadership of the Six Federations in 1996, the

[76] So named after the late 18th century indigenous rebellion of Tupac Katari, this movement, started by educated urban Aymaras, quickly spread throughout rural unionism and was a dominant ideological current within the CSUTCB when it was founded in 1979 (Albó, 2008: 38; Klein, 1992: 273; Rivera Cusicanqui, 1984: 140-4). The Kataristas were thus a wider movement, the more radical wing of which was led by Felipe Quispe; with Alvaro García Linera, they briefly fought as part of the EGTK (Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army, Ejército Guerrillero Túpac Katari) (Postero, 2017: 28). The appeal of Katarismo remains, as "despite the fact that many of its leaders were educated urban Aymaras, its rhetoric appealed to indigenous peoples as noble peasants with an alternative social, political, and economic logic based upon either the ayllu or the peasant union" (Lazar, 2008: 231).

> cocalero movement would fight for the leadership of that political instrument, for which until then there were three candidates: Alejo Véliz Lazo, a Quechua ex-secretary general of the CSUTCB and first leader of the ASP; Felipe Quispe, the mallku (leader) of the Aymaras of the Altiplano; and Evo Morales, the leader of the cocaleros of Chapare. Thanks to the latter's electoral success in the municipal and national elections of 1995 and 1997, Evo Morales and the cocaleros of Chapare managed to win the internal battle for the leadership and control of the MAS-ISP" (Oikonomakis & Espinoza, 2014: 293-294).

Although Evo Morales emerged as a *cocalero* leader and eventually became the "instrument's" leader, this does not mean that the MAS was a simply and only an electoral wing of the coca growers' unions; Morales' leadership was a result of internal power struggles (see also: Do Alto, 2007: 39-40). "The MAS organisation, consequently, is umbilically connected to the historical moment of the reorganisation of peasant and indigenous movements, based in seemingly contradictory positions; resist [national] neoliberal policies and participate in local democratic spaces" (Komadina & Komadina, 2007: 26-27). To describe it simply as a *cocalero* electoral vehicle would miss, arguably, the continued importance of its complicated emergence.

The MAS, as a social movement-*cum*-political party (Yashar, 2005), was thus established as an instrument to gain political power through elections; it is primarily a political party, but one formed by social movements, in which their leaders took front-running positions, and which has maintained close links and organisational connections with its mother organisations. When MAS and Evo Morales, Bolivia's first indigenous president, as its leader, won the elections in 2005, they were able to push for a popular process of re-writing the constitution, which culminated in plebiscite-approved new constitutional text in 2009. Throughout this process and since then, these SMOs have maintained a complex relationship with MAS, and have enjoyed different levels of influence on decision-making since then election of MAS both over time and compared to each other. These indigenous social movement organisations are crucial for understanding the experiences of indigenous protest in Bolivia, even if their protagonism was not always straightforward, as detailed below. *Firstly,* the trajectories of indigenous and peasant social movements in Bolivia are explored by tracing the role of these five organisations. *Secondly,* in the following chapter, these organisations, their strategies, and their experiences are analysed using fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis.

6.3.1 Unity and conflict: Indigenous SMOs and the MAS

The diversity of indigenous organising in Bolivia and the divisions that came with it were significantly—even if temporarily—eclipsed by the beginning of the 21st century. In the early 2000s, the *Pacto de Unidad* (Pact of Unity) between highland and lowland indigenous organisations was first formulated, bringing together the five SMOs under study: CSUTCB, CIDOB, CONAMAQ, the CSCIOB and the *Bartolinas.* The so-called Unity Pact was created formally in 2004, although it had been years in the making. Its concrete foundations were already laid during the 2002 indigenous *March for the Constituent Assembly,* discussed below. The coming together of these five Bolivian indigenous organisations in the early 2000s showed their ability to eclipse their differences, even if temporarily, in order to develop a common agenda and a common strategy of struggle.

It was already in the 1990s that indigenous and peasant social movement organisations in Bolivia have tended to converge at specific times, often in both demands and tactics. Yashar documents how the CIDOB had already reached out to the CSUTCB in the 1990s in order to form an alliance (Yashar, 2005). Then, during the 500-year remembrance of the 'discovery' of the Americas in 1992, the fourth Indigenous Congress took place, amid the participation of the CSUTCB, the CIDOB, the 'colonizers' confederation (the precursor of the CSCIOB), as well as other rural indigenous and/or peasant organisations and with NGO and Church support (García Linera *et al*., 2010). Although the Unity Pact is unprecedented in its programmatic convergence, the history of Bolivian social movements is filled with strategic coming together and renewed distancing of the different organisations that figure in indigenous mobilising, and rural collective action in general.

It was out of these evolving alliances of indigenous and union activists that MAS emerged, and it was the climate of discontent with the Sánchez de Lozada presidency, unfulfilled promises of previous multicultural reforms (Postero, 2007) as well as economic austerity in the early 2000s that helped bring MAS to power. This period of heightened protest activity was exemplified by a number of large scale protests, dubbed 'wars'; namely, the Water War against water privatisation in 2000, the Gas War in 2003, both against the proposed sale of gas to Chile and more broadly for hydrocarbons nationalisation, followed by the second Gas War in 2005 (Arbona, 2007; Lazar, 2008; Rice, 2012; Spronk & Webber, 2007). These mobilisations drew "upon a diverse array of actors, including indigenous peoples, students, workers, artists, intellectuals, neighborhood associations, religious groups, and sectors of the middle class" (Rice, 2012: 73). These popular struggles succeeded in the de-legitimation of the state authorities and the wave of disruption in 2003 eventually led to the resignation of President de Lozada, and President Mesa in 2005.

The political crisis following the resignation of de Lozada allowed the MAS movement to unify popular economic and cultural demands under a progressive popular-indigenous banner (de la Cadena & Starn, 2007; Lucero, 2008; Postero, 2007). This period of heightened political uncertainty and sustained social protest culminated in Evo Morales' election as the first indigenous president of the country in 2005 in a landslide victory. In a sense, then, the iconic—and perhaps exceptional case of Bolivia—could be seen as corresponding to a protest cycle (Tarrow, 2011), with a peak in the early 2000s and a gradual decline since. However, it is more empirically correct (based on the protest event dataset analysed in Chapters 4 and 5) and analytically useful to see the dramatic events leading up to the election of Evo Morales as part of an ongoing struggle, and to see the current phase as another phase of indigenous activism, rather than a period of decline. What is useful in this context is to consider the case of Bolivia is the wider context of Latin America's 'epochal change', and thinking of it as an ongoing 'transition' (Svampa, 2008, 2017). This is supported by the fact that the number of indigenous protest events in Bolivia has been increasing in recent years.

Despite the advancements resulting from the election of the MAS government, the conflicting conceptions of indigeneity and indigenous rights evident in the 1990s persist to this day, as evidenced by the partial break-up of the Unity Pact several years after MAS gained executive power. These divisions already became apparent as the organisations participated in the drafting of the new 2009 constitution in the country's Constituent Assembly (Schavelzon,

2012). Yet they became starkly clear in 2011 following the well-publicised TIPNIS march against the building of a new major road through a national park and an indigenous territory, in which both CIDOB and CONAMAQ have participated (Achtenberg, 2013c; McNeish, 2013). This conflict broke out in 2011, when the government announced plans for a major road through the TIPNIS indigenous territory, and has been ongoing. The other three organisations continue to, by and large, support the Morales administration. Felipe Quispe, the ex-leader of the political party MIP (*Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti*, Pachakuti Indigenous Movement) and a prominent Aymara nationalist and critic of the Morales administration, continues to lead a more ethnicist indigenous movement (Dunkerley, 2007: 4; Van Cott, 2003); but this has since remained largely on the sidelines of national indigenous political activity.

Thus, in spite of this period of unity of indigenous movements in Bolivia, contradictions about the meaning of indigeneity and the content of indigenous rights within the Morales administration have since emerged, leading to renewed protest activity since 2011 by some of the prominent indigenous organisations in the country. Partly, the separate historical traditions of political organising in the highland and lowland parts of the country made themselves apparent in indigenous struggles (Klein, 2003; Lucero, 2008; Postero, 2007; Soruco, 2008; Yashar, 2005). As such, different indigenous SMOs have experienced different trajectories, and diverse outcomes.

6.3.2 Indigenous movements: Successes and failures

Given this long-standing history of struggle of indigenous movements, what successes beyond the inauguration of an indigenous president in 2006, and the codification of a 'plurinational' state in 2009, did these movements experience? In 1990, the CIDOB-led *March for Territory and Dignity* kick-started a period of multicultural reforms. Although the immediate reaction of the then president Jaime Paz Zamora was initial rejection mixed with limited acceptance of the protesters' goals, it was not until the 1994 reforms of Sánchez de Lozada's first presidency, at the head of a right-wing executive, that some of their demands were met. This far-reaching set of reforms was primarily concerned with implementing orthodox economic policies (Dunkerley, 2007; Kohl, 2010). In the neoliberal spirit of minimising the role of the state, however, the reforms also focused on decentralisation, including allowing for the establishment of indigenous local governance, bilingual education, and indigenous territories.

The recognition of indigenous territories (*Tierras Comunitarias de Origen*, TCOs) during the 1990s, in particular, was an important step in the legitimation of indigenous peoples' claims over ancestral land. Moreover, indigenous *usos y costumbres*[77] were recognised as legitimate forms of community self-government. As such, these reforms presented a significant development in the codification of indigenous rights in Bolivia (Van Cott, 2002). At the same time, they were primarily concerned with the symbolic recognition of indigenous identities, rather than any redistributive reforms. The latter would have gone against the neoliberal logic of the right-wing de Lozada government, while a limited recognition of multicultural diversity, including some local autonomy measures, resonated with the government's agenda of limiting

[77] Indigenous 'customs', or traditional decision-making practices; in this context used to signify the legal recognition of indigenous practices of community self-governance.

the role of the state. Moreover, the reforms were very much framed in the language of cultural rights to difference rather than equal rights.

Crucially, given these reforms took place four years after the rather lukewarm reception of indigenous peoples' large-scale mobilisation in 1990, it is important to consider the role indigenous activism played in bringing these reforms about. This is also important for understanding the impact of these reforms, and explaining subsequent indigenous protest. This is explored in more detail below. On an introductory level, it suffices to say that existing research tends to highlight the top-down nature of the reforms, and this is borne out by fieldwork research carried out for the MPhil thesis on multiculturalism in Bolivia in the summer of 2011 (Gustafson, 2006; Krausova, 2012; Lucero, 2008, 2013; Postero, 2007). At the same time, the CIDOB leadership in particular was often invited to negotiations during this period and the 1994 reforms did reflect much of CIDOB's programmatic agenda, as also detailed below. Even if indigenous movements at the time were not included directly in decision-making, the reforms took place, at least in part, in response to the mounting pressures of indigenous mobilisations.

What is also important is that the TCOs were designed for "indigenous and native" peoples, not for "peasants" (*campesinos)* (Lucero, 2008: 137). In practice, this meant that some land titling did take place, especially in the lowland parts of the country, meeting some of the central demands of the communities represented by the CIDOB for recognition of their rights to the land they already lived on, and had lived on for a long time (sometimes decades, sometimes centuries). At the same time, this was mainly in areas that had already been recognised as national parks, thus not challenging the existing distribution of land and the historical regime of land ownership. The neoliberal multicultural reforms positioned the CIDOB as the 'permitted Indian' (see Chapter 2), unlike the indigenous peasant organisations, such as the CSUTCB (see also: Albó, 2008; Hale, 2002, 2004). They "reconfigured a bifurcated state-indigenous relationship in which lowland CIDOB would gain from its more conciliatory posture and the conflictual CSUTCB would continue to lose" (Lucero, 2008: 137).

Although recognising indigenous rights in principle, the reforms failed to bring about the structural change necessary for their practical enjoyment for all indigenous groups in the country. Coupled with continued lack of political rights and empowerment for indigenous communities and the lack of land redistribution, the reforms had uneven and often limited impact on the lived experiences of the diverse indigenous peoples in Bolivia. After the passing of the reforms of the Morales government discussed below, indigenous leaders and NGO activists alike remembered the 1994 reforms as top-down, not taking into account the actual forms of both autonomy and inclusion, both recognition and redistribution, that indigenous communities were demanding; indigenous rights were talked about, but not enforced (Krausova, 2012).

Despite this, their importance in setting out the legal framework for indigenous rights and introducing a modicum of recognition should not be underestimated. Moreover, in opening up new spaces for organising, these reforms also contributed to the subsequent indigenous mobilisations (Silva, 2009; Yashar, 2005). Some of the demands of the recognition-focused organisations, in particular the CIDOB, were in fact met by these reforms. Despite their shortcomings, they must thus be considered as a positive outcome, at least for the CIDOB. Despite the relatively low ongoing influence of indigenous movements on decision-making

during this period, the marchers organised by the CIDOB were met with acceptance and some advantages.

Already, it should be clear how difficult it is to speak of one indigenous movement in Bolivia. Its different factions make different claims, employ different frames, and use different tactics to try and achieve them. As shown below, the level of cohesion of the indigenous movement does make a difference for its outcomes. This is also included in the QCA analysis in Chapter 7 as the 'alliance-making' variable; rather than considering the cohesion versus the fragmentation of the movement as a whole, it captures the propensity of the five organisations to seek greater cohesion within the indigenous movement as a whole.

6.3.3 The MAS and the 'Process of Change'

The accession of MAS to power, followed by a constituent assembly that culminated in the passing of a new constitution in 2009, then stands in contrast to the previous period considering the direct role that indigenous movements played in influencing the legal framework for indigenous rights. The election of its leader, Evo Morales, as the country's first indigenous President can be seen as one of the greatest successes of indigenous movements on the continent. As detailed below, this electoral victory rode on a wave of years of indigenous and popular protest in the country. Following the election, a new constitution was drafted in a constitutional assembly and approved in a referendum in 2009, and various laws responding to the demands of indigenous movements were enacted.

Morales has since been re-elected twice as President of Bolivia, and as of this writing in 2018, is positioning himself to stand again, despite losing in a referendum in 2016 in which he sought constitutional change to extend Presidential limits. By contrast, the constituent assembly taking place between 2007 and 2009 was, despite its often confusing and conflictive nature, an impressive exercise in participatory democracy (Postero, 2010), with representatives of social movements elected as delegates alongside more established party politicians. This inclusive but contentious process culminated in a new constitution, approved in a national referendum in 2009. A radical document codifying indigenous rights for recognition and difference *and* equal rights to redistribution, it set the stage for the complex process of implementation that followed. The constitution also introduced the term *indígena-originario-campesino* (indigenous-originary[78]-peasant)[79], seeking to officially unify indigenous and popular (rural) sectors, but also a source of conflict *within* the indigenous movement, as explored below.

The party's 2006 National Development Plan codified in the 2009 Bolivian constitution, the 2010 and 2015 election manifestos, as well as the 2010 and the 2015 development plans, represent the policy proposals of the Morales administration, many of which have been passed into laws (Bolivia, 2009; MPD, 2006). In relation specifically to the demands of the five

78 The term *originario* can be seen as analogous to the concept of "first nations" in Canada or 'aboriginal' in Australia, and is translated here as 'original' for the lack of a better word. There seems to little difference in Bolivia in the usage of the terms 'indigenous' versus 'originary', except that the lowlands identity-based organisations tend to use the word 'indigenous' while the highland ones seem to prefer the term 'originary'.

79 A unifying symbol like this was required in a country like Bolivia, divided across class, ethnic and rural-urban lines, in order to construct the Grasmcian 'people' for the MAS movement to represent

indigenous organisations under study, the documents focus on four main policy issues: (1) recognition of diversity, (2) fighting discrimination, (3) land redistribution, and (4) autonomy. Many of the analyses of the Bolivian constitution since focus on the symbolic recognition of diversity, including the adoption of indigenous principles such as *vivir bien* (living well)[80] (Cunha Filho & Santaella Gonçalves, 2010; Postero, 2010). The symbolic importance of the coca leaf was recognised, and the Morales administration designated a proportion of land already used for growing coca as legal, while continuing to crack down on illegal patches used for cocaine production (although the extent to which the latter has been successful or even a priority for the government remains questionable (Crabtree & Chaplin, 2013; Grisaffi, 2017)).

The administration was also able to pass a law for the greater inclusion of indigenous people in local politics; the *Law of Citizen Associations and Indigenous Peoples* includes a guaranteed number of seats for indigenous communities in local elections, allowing the selection process for the candidates to take place in accordance with traditional rules (*usos y costumbres*) (CNE, 2010).

In terms of combating the pervasive racism experienced by indigenous people, the *Law against Racism and all forms of Discrimination* (2010) is another example of successful implementation in that it operationalises a broad definition of what counts as discrimination and sets up a regulatory body and framework for evaluating and prosecuting acts of discrimination and/or racism by private as well as public institutions and individuals (Krausova, 2012: 61). Another concrete example of implementation is land redistribution.[81] The 2006 *Agrarian Reform* law enables the state to expropriate private land if there is evidence of employment regulations being broken, and then redistribute this land.[82] It also sets a legal framework for the expropriation of private land that is not 'performing a social function' so that it can be redistributed to indigenous communities with no access to land (Krausova, 2012: 63).

Although incomplete and replete with ongoing contestations, advances of the MAS government in meeting the demands of indigenous social movements, some of which are listed above, can then in one sense be considered a victory for all five cases under study here, in that it was their alliance and continued protest that significantly contributed to both the election of MAS and the shape of the constitutional and policy reforms that followed. This was achieved both as a result of participating in large scale disruptive protests leading up to a period of political crisis and in the more institutionalised constituent assembly that followed. How can we then distinguish the level of success for the five different indigenous movement organisations?

[80] Also referred to as *buen vivir*. Specifically, Article 8 of the 2009 constitution states that the State assumes and promotes as the ethical-moral principles of the plural society: ama qhilla, ama llulla, ama suwa (don't be lazy, don't be a liar, don't be a thief), suma qamaña (to live well), ñandereko (harmonious life), teko kavi (good life), ivi maraei (land without evil) y qhapaj ñan (noble path or life). This a combination of Aymara, Quechua and Guaraní ethnical principles (Bolivia, 2009; Krausova, 2012; Postero, 2010).

[81] Although it has been criticised as not far-reaching enough, especially by lowland indigenous movements, it is the most radical land reform in Bolivia since the 1952 revolution.

[82] This is arguably a necessary provision when in certain remote areas of Bolivia, rural labourers continue to live in conditions not dissimilar to servitude (AICHR, 2009).

It is by examining the evolution of the relationship between social movements and the state, in this case particularly the executive, that the relative successes of each indigenous movement organisation can be measured. This is one way through which the influence of social movements on policy change, implementation and executive action can be evidenced, and it is especially useful when looking at social movement organisations over a longer period of time. Under this lens, the reforms of 1994, due to their top-down nature, must be considered less of a success than the reform of the late 2000s. It is also the divergent relationship with the state that explains how the various indigenous movements have fared after both sets of reforms. It is also necessary to look at the level of acceptance of each indigenous movement by the state, rather than just the advantages experienced. Doing this enlightens the more recent trajectories of indigenous collective action in Bolivia, which is the main focus of this chapter. Moreover, it shows the importance of the interaction between demands and the political environment.

As the sections below highlight, it has been the more redistribution focused organisations, also known in Bolivia as the "triplets"—CSUTCB, CSCIOB and the *Bartolinas*—that have experienced a high level of influence on decision-making, with high acceptance as well as significant advantages. This makes sense as their privileging of redistributive demands and of equal rights framing resonates more with the political agenda of the Morales administration. The recognition-focused "twins"—CIDOB and CONAMAQ—have experienced fewer positive outcomes. Their right-to-difference framing is now less politically resonant, and although they continue to make the on-average less costly recognition claims, these include a very costly demand: the stopping of extraction in protected indigenous territories. As such, particularly in the case of CIDOB, it could be argued that it was more 'successful' before the MAS came into power, and especially in 2011.

6.3.4 Continued indigenous protest

Since the codification of the 2009 constitution and the policies that followed, the Unity Pact of popular and indigenous social movements has entered a period of crisis. After leaving the pact, both CONAMAQ and CIDOB have each effectively split into two organisations, one pro- and one anti-government (Achtenberg, 2014; Zibechi, 2014). To an extent resurrecting the alliance, this has also highlighted the opposition within these indigenous organisations to the recent policies of the Morales administration. One of the main reasons for this is the state's continued reliance on the extractive industry, including to fund progressive programs. The focal point of this opposition has been the indigenous communities and environmental activists protesting against the planned road through TIPNIS indigenous territory.

The *Isiboro Sécure* Indigenous Territory and National Park (*Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure*, TIPNIS) was created as a TCO in 1990, a first response to the 1990 March before the 1994 reforms could be finalised. In 2011, the Morales government announced plans for the construction of a highway linking the Cochabamba and Beni departments, a section of which would run through the TIPNIS territory. The 2011 *March for Territory, Dignity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples of the East* was organised by CIDOB, CONAMAQ and the TIPNIS leadership. In calling for the protection of the indigenous right to self-government and territory, included the right to binding prior consultation as mandated by the

ILO 169 resolution, they also drew on the legitimacy of the historic lowland march of 1990 (Krausova, 2012). This was followed by another march in June 2012 (Achtenberg, 2012).

It is important to point out the relative exceptionality of Bolivia as a predominantly indigenous country, but the conflict also highlights the contradictory notions of what an *indigenous* identity, especially a political one, really means. Indeed, "the TIPNIS struggle revealed anew the complex and often contradictory dynamics of indigeneity in Bolivia" (McNeish, 2013: 222). It could be argued that in Bolivia, the MAS has managed to create a *political* indigeneity as a relatively heterodox label, taken up by various social forces, which has remained quite inclusive. However, this unifying political label has not been able to subsume the conflict between the commitment to protecting the Mother Earth on the one hand, and the reliance on extractive industries to fund the state on the other.

This fragmentation within the indigenous movement shows that the unity of cultural and material focused indigenous organising—the combining of *both* recognition and redistribution demands *and* of difference and equality framing—that helped bring the MAS/Morales government to power, has now largely been eclipsed in Bolivia. In this context, the government has privileged redistributive claims at the expense of demands for recognition. This is further evidence for the importance of the political environment. Still, within the context, have the strategies of the different actors within the indigenous movement themselves played no role in the bringing about the outcomes they have experienced?

6.4 Tracing indigenous struggles and outcomes in Bolivia

Having reviewed the recent history of indigenous and popular organising in Bolivia, this section now turns to a qualitative, within-case analysis of indigenous movement(s) in the country. It does so in order to trace the evolving demands and strategies of indigenous social movement actors, in a time frame broadly reflecting that of the quantitative cross-national analysis described in the first part of this thesis. As such, the analysis below focuses on evaluating the successes and failures of the indigenous movement between 2000 and 2016, focusing on three distinct periods of indigenous struggles. Although this is properly elaborated in the theoretical and methodological sections of this thesis, the qualitative process-tracing investigation here is primarily concerned with (1) the indigenous movement's relationship with the state, (2) the evolution, if any, of its strategies, in terms of claiming, framing, and tactics, and whether changes in (2) can explain developments in (1). To do so, it asks specifically the following questions:

1. Have both indigenous protests and indigenous SMOs experienced more or less *acceptance* and *advantages*?
2. Have indigenous social movement actors gained any access to, and *influence* on, institutionalised spaces of decision-making?
3. Have their *claims* and *frames* changed over this period?
4. Have their *tactics* changed, both in terms of their contentious repertoire, and the tactics they use most often?

Attempting to answer these questions by looking at three periods of recent indigenous organising in Bolivia means that the extent to which claims, frames, and tactics—movement-level factors that were found to be significant in the preceding chapters—have an effect of experiencing greater levels of both acceptance and advantages for the indigenous movement in the country can be evaluated. If any, is the effect of these movement-level variables both direct and dependant on external factors, as also found in the previous chapters? Taking a deeper qualitative look at a longer period of indigenous collective action also allows for the consideration of how far the concepts of (1) repertoires of contention, and (2) co-optation in particular and (3) protest cycle in general, help in both defining and explaining protest outcomes.

6.4.1 Indigenous challenges to neoliberal multiculturalism: 2000-2005

As discussed above, the neoliberal multicultural reforms presented a number of positive outcomes for the indigenous movement in Bolivia, at least for the lowland organisations (esp. CIDOB) that spearheaded a number of spectacular marches from the lowland Santa Cruz to the highland seat of government, La Paz. It is crucial to understand the way in which these reforms are remembered today by indigenous leaders and activists in Bolivia, in order to put in perspective both their current political struggles, and the cycle of protest and rebellion of the early 2000s. This was echoed during the field research I conducted in 2016. One thing is clear, however; despite political divisions and conflict, the 2009 constitution was hailed by all sides as the greatest victory of the indigenous and popular struggles in Bolivia.

What is illuminating is that the indigenous representatives I interviewed in 2011 in Santa Cruz, just as the TIPNIS conflict broke out, spoke precisely about how the 1994 and 1996 reforms were top down, imposed from above. Even if critical of some aspects of the Morales administration at the time, they saw the 2009 constitution as an unprecedented victory. Suby Picaneray, the Ayoreo Representative in the Santa Cruz Departmental Legislative Assembly (ALD) elected by *usos y costumbres*, argued that in spite of the promise of the 1994 reforms, "before [the 2009 constitution] we were not being taken into account" (Interview with Suby Picaneray, 13 September 2011).

Just as many other indigenous leaders and other activists and NGO workers I interviewed in both 2011 and 2016, he highlighted how the TCO system did not exactly meet the needs of the communities, who lacked decision-making powers over the legal framework of the TCO, and over which communities would be considered as legitimately able to claim TCO territorial rights in the first place. Antonia Irayigra Iraipi, a Gurayo Santa Cruz ALD member elected through direct vote on the MAS ticket, had told me the next day in 2011 that, while the 1994 reforms as well as the TCOs were top-down, with the 2009 constitution, the content of 'indigenous rights' reflects the demands of the communities themselves (Interview with Antonia Irayigra Iraipi, 14 September 2011). Rodolfo Lopez, the Head of the Indigenous Group in the ALD and the Chiquitano representative selected by *usos y costumbres*, "argued that the 1994 constitutional reform "was not real inclusion", the TCO framework was "imposed from above", and that it is only now that indigenous representatives can put forward political proposals of their own and have control over the content of indigenous rights" (Interview with Rodolfo Lopez, 13 September 2011) cited in (Krausova, 2012: 58).

As such, before the escalation of the TIPNIS conflict later in 2011, and the increasing fragmentation and weakening of the country's lowland indigenous movement, it seems that the advances under the Morales administration were seen more positively by indigenous leaders themselves than they are by many now. Given that much of the qualitative tracing below relies on the narratives of both historical and current leaders, activists, and NGO allies, this presents some methodological challenges. However, this is mitigated by a) reconstructing the story of indigenous struggles in Bolivia from a variety of sources, and b) viewing leaders' and activists' narratives as part of their political strategy, which is in itself illuminating given the agential and strategy-focused lens of this study.

A story of marches

To tell the story of the centrality of the indigenous movement to popular resistance in Bolivia in the early 2000s, it is necessary to highlight how this draws on a rich history of mass marches originating in the lowland parts of the country. What is also crucial, however, is that despite the important organising and framing efforts of the lowland indigenous organisations, without which these historic marches would likely not have set off, indigenous and indigenous-peasant groups from all over the country contributed to these significantly. Although the story of indigenous organising in Bolivia is so often told as a story of lowlands versus highlands, it is in the interaction between these sections of the indigenous movement that the role of strategy and leadership becomes much clearer. It also brings to light internal divisions and struggles over both positions and meanings within the different organisations of the movement, challenging the rather static view of two homogenous indigenous movements in Bolivia, one from the tropical lowlands, the other hailing from the highland mountains.

The first, historic, mass indigenous march left the Bolivian lowlands in 1990, known as the *March for Territory and Dignity*. Already mentioned above, this famous historic march was led by the lowland CIDOB, but with the support of local indigenous organisations from across the country. Introduced above, the CIDOB confederation exemplifies the diversity of indigenous communities in the lowlands and has focused predominantly on demands for ancestral land rights and indigenous autonomy (Yashar, 2005). These demands for recognition have generally also been claimed in the language of the group right to difference, drawing on the notion of ancestral, pre-Columbian rights.

This growth of indigenous movements focusing primarily on indigenous cultural issues also spread to traditionally more union-organised highlands at the same time; a growth of the *ayllu*[83] movement saw the establishment of CONAMAQ (National Council of *Markas* and *Ayllus* of Qollasuyo) in 1997. This organisation focuses predominantly on the revival of Aymara, Quechua and Uru culture and autonomy in the highlands, challenging to an extent the CSUTCB dominance in that part of the country (Albó, 2008; Fontana, 2014; Lucero, 2008). CONAMAQ has continued to employ a clearly group rights-focused discourse, even if its demands contain more redistributive elements than those of the CIDOB. Lucero traces how the concept of

[83] The *ayllus* were the "basic units of the archipelago like communities" in the Bolivian highlands before European colonisation began. Many survived in various forms until today, mainly due to the uneven spread of the colonial and post-colonial state. A larger community unit made-up of a number of *ayllus* is called a *marka* (Lucero, 2008: 37).

'territory', which is central to the way CIDOB and CONAMAQ talk about their land demands, was actually first elaborated by a UN Working group, before being adapted by the lowland indigenous organisations and the NGOs that support them (Lucero, 2008: 168). Before discussing the other indigenous organisations in more detail below, the history of CIDOB needs to be told first.

The very existence of the CIDOB as a confederation of regional indigenous organisations, themselves made up of different communities and different ethno-linguistic groups, needs to be considered a success in its own right, in the face of the diversity and heterogeneity of indigenous peoples in the Bolivian lowland East. Yet, by 2016, the organisation seemed almost non-existent. There is a pro-government CIDOB, whose offices in Santa Cruz were almost empty and its representatives unreachable on the three occasions I visited and called. The CIDOB's past leaders—many of whom I interviewed at a meeting in Santa Cruz discussing their strategic options in the face of fragmentation and division—are vocally in opposition to Morales' 'indigenous' government. CIDOB's constituent organisations—this includes the APG (Assembly of the Guaraní People), the CPESC (Coordinator of Ethnic Peoples of Santa Cruz), the OICH (Chiquitano Indigenous Organisation), CEPIB (Central of Indigenous Peoples of Beni), CPMB (Central of Mojeños of Beni), but also many others—are now often in conflict with each other, some supporting the government, while others are in fierce opposition.

Sometimes the latter also means alliances with the opposition Governors of Santa Cruz and other lowlands departments, who were previously the 'common enemy' that the indigenous and popular movements united against in the early 2000s. Moreover, in the face of the lucrative benefits promised by natural resource exploitation, as discussed above, sometimes leaders and communities do not agree with some of the historical leaders' complete rejection of extraction in their territories; this was discussed by lowland indigenous leaders during a workshop in Santa Cruz discussed below and in numerous interviews I conducted, including with Marcial Fabricano, a long-time indigenous leader also introduced below. In her new book, Nancy Postero (2017) also recounts similar stories, especially in relation to the Guaraní in Santa Cruz, with whom she has worked for decades.

As such, it is hard now to speak of one indigenous movement even in the Bolivian lowlands. How did such a pivotal organisation for the Bolivian indigenous movement become so weakened? The changing external resonance of its claiming and framing—as a result of, most importantly, changes to government partisanship—is clearly at least part of the story. This supports the findings of the protest event analyses above. Moreover, its mobilising capacity has declined over the years, and so has its propensity for making alliances. The former reflects the statistical significance of protest duration for outcomes, and by extension the finding that the cost that a protest/organisation is able to impose matters. The latter—alliances—was only tentatively explored in the protest event analysis, but is investigated much more below. Yet is this the whole story? Are other movement-level and contextual variables, and interactions between them, also relevant?

As highlighted above, the 1990 march brought indigenous issues in Bolivia to the national and international political agenda, and inaugurated the above-discussed period of neoliberal multiculturalism in Bolivia. This was to be the first in, to date, nine mass marches originating from the lowlands under CIDOB's leadership (as of August 2017, there may be a 10th in defense

of the TIPNIS, but this remains uncertain). In 1996, at the height of neoliberal multiculturalism, the second march departed as the *March of the Century*; and in this one, most of the main indigenous organisations in the country participated.

In contrast to the 1990 march, since indigenous territorial claims and rights to TCOs had already been recognised in its aftermath in 1994, the 1996 march showed a greater synthesis of indigenous and popular demands, calling in particular for access to land for all indigenous *and* peasant communities, the creation of national agencies for the development of indigenous, peasant and 'colonizer' (migrating peasants, especially coca-growers, predominantly Aymara and Quechua) communities, as well as expansion of political rights and other demands. Although the CIDOB as an umbrella federation always played a role in these mobilisations, it was usually specific communities and CIDOB's constituent organisations that took a leading role in each individual march. Moreover, different indigenous groups were not always in agreement about protest strategy. Despite the relative success and relative unity of the 1990 march, already in the second mobilisation in 1996, divisions were becoming more apparent.

On October 18th, 2016, I spoke to Hernán Avila, Executive Director of CEJIS (Centre for Judicial Studies and Social Investigation, *Centro de Estudios Jurídicos e Investigación Social*), an important NGO based in Santa Cruz that has long accompanied indigenous struggles in Bolivia. This interview took place three days before the '*Encounter of Indigenous Leaders of TCOs/TIOCs of the Lowlands'*, which I also attended and discuss in the last section of this chapter.[84] When I asked Hernán about the fragmentation of the indigenous movement, he argued that despite the period of *apparent* unity that helped bring the Morales administration to power and to pass the new constitution, the divisions that have now resurfaced so forcefully are long standing, and already apparent during the 1996 indigenous march:

> "The CIDOB was divided. One of the factions was very close to the neoliberal Goni [Sánchez de Lozada] government, but the other faction was critical. The latter was the part that sought alliances with peasants and originarios [highland indigenous represented by CONAMAQ]. This was something which the former faction, the majority of the leadership of the CIDOB, criticised, saying they are indigenous and would not make alliances with anyone. But behind this protectionist discourse was their lack of appreciation, let's put it that way, for the indigenous of the highlands. In reality they were replicating the discourse of the lowland elites" (Interview with Hernán Avila, October 18th, 2016).

It is indeed important to bear in mind the historical and cultural differences between the lowland and highland parts of the country; even though they should not be overstated, reflecting on them is necessary in order to understand the context of indigenous collective strategies in this demographically heterogenous postcolonial country. While the 2009 Constitution

[84] The TCO was the term used for protected indigenous territories, literally Indigenous Community Lands *(Tierras Comunitarias de Origen)*, in the 1994 multicultural reforms. In contrast, the 2009 constitution introduced the term TIOC, or Indigenous Originary Peasant Territory (*Territorios Indígenas Originarios Campesinos*). This stems from the unification in the constitutional text of indigenous (group, identity-based) rights and indigenous-peasant (equal, class-based) rights. Although, this unity of demands was apparent already in the 1996 March, it has also been the source of fragmentation since 2009 as competing claims for land between neighbouring communities cannot easily be resolved any more.

recognizes 36 indigenous nations in Bolivia, 34 of these inhabit the country's lowlands.[85] Some of these groups continue to live lives relatively unintegrated into the economic, political, and social life of the country. In contrast, in the highlands the Aymaras and the Quechuas actually represent the majority of the population, and have historically engaged in sedentary peasant agriculture, producing for the national market, and organising in union-style representative bodies. In the lowlands, in contrast, indigenous groups have sometimes lived in voluntary isolation, but had mostly been treated as debt-peonage labourers on large landholdings (*haciendas*). This is due to the fact that the 1952 agrarian revolution and land reform only had a significant impact in the highlands. Thus, the historical relation to the land has been different for indigenous groups in the two parts of the country, and correspondingly their demands in relation to land have generally differed (Crabtree & Chaplin, 2013; Soruco, 2008).

One should be careful not to present a static and homogenous picture of collective indigenous claim-making in the two parts of the country. These historical developments, however, are important for understanding the difficulties the distinct indigenous movement organisations in Bolivia have faced in trying to overcome their differences, and this includes racism not always exclusive to white and *mestizo* elites. For example, an anonymous interviewee, an Aymara MAS activist, referred to lowland indigenous groups as 'savages' when talking to me in 2011; a key historical leader of the CIDOB, at the same time, referred to Aymara and Quechua migrants to the lowlands in a public social media post as 'locusts'. As also explored in my MPhil thesis, discriminatory language like this is not unusual in Bolivia among different indigenous groups, as well as undoubtedly among the white/mixed elites (Fabricant, 2009; Grisaffi, 2010; Krausova, 2012). This makes it all the more remarkable that these divisions were at one point eclipsed, even if only temporarily and imperfectly.

Perhaps the best example of unity before the MAS victory in 2005 is another march setting off from the lowlands, in 2002. On May 13th that year, the denominated *Fourth Historic March of Indigenous Peoples of the Bolivian Lowlands* set off from Santa Cruz on its 370-mile journey to La Paz, following in the footsteps of the 1990 march. Officially titled the *March for Popular Sovereignty, Territory and Natural Resources* in the march's declaration, its main demand was the conformation of a Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution and 're-found' Bolivia "in defense of our rights and those of all Bolivians", with the direct participation of social organisations without the exclusive mediation of political parties (2002; see also Garcés, 2010). The declaration of the march participants represents the high point of the Unity Pact. It is signed by all of the national organisations that would later sign the Pact, as well as their regional federations and organisations of the landless peasant movement.

As such, it was not just an 'indigenous' march, but a mass, multisectoral mobilisation of all types of rural social movements. Both this march and the Pact emerged out of the so called *East Block* (*Bloque Oriente*), an alliance of indigenous and peasant groups that grew out of the cooperation between the sympathetic CIDOB faction, CONAMAQ, and the landless and peasant organisations (indigenous and non-indigenous, now often adopting the label 'intercultural', including CSUTCB, CSCIOB and the *Bartolinas*) in the eastern lowland

[85] This includes the Guaraní, the Chiquitanos, the Ayoreos, the Mojeños, to name only the ethno-linguistic groups that have been historically the most politically organised, as can be seen from the discussions of CIDOB's constituent organisations.

regions of the country, before becoming a national alliance. Substantially, the march called for access to land for all indigenous, peasant and landless communities, through redistribution of all state-owned lands and through ceasing to favour extractive industry, cattle ranchers and (illegal) loggers at the expense of local communities, as well as the recognition of existing protected indigenous territories (TCOs) and the guarantee of the ILO 169 mandated right to prior consultation for indigenous communities. As such, it combined the demands for both recognition and redistribution, and demanded them in the language of both difference and equality. This unity of the movement could then, at least partly, explain how the central demand—that for the establishment of a Constitutional Assembly—was indeed eventually met.

Yet despite this height of unity, divisions were still lurking in the background. On behalf of CIDOB, the march declaration was signed by its then secretary for land and territory, Bienvenido Zacu, not its president at the time, Marcial Fabricano. The CPESC also signed and participated in the march, as did other indigenous and indigenous-peasant organisations. At the same time, the CIDOB faction aligned with Fabricano, supported by many of the local lowland indigenous organisations, set out on a separate march after the *Bloque Oriente* march had left, causing confusion among the indigenous and peasant participants of both marches. Amid these parallel actions, "Marcial Fabricano left to negotiate with the government on behalf of the 'two marches'; this caused a lot of upset among those marching" (Garcés, 2010: 31).

When I interviewed both of these historic indigenous leaders in 2016, these divisions were manifestly at the forefront of indigenous politics in the country, not in the background. However, both were also eager to reminisce about the context of 2002. Bienvenido Zacu is now trying to establish his own NGO in Santa Cruz, but is a long standing Guarayo authority and indigenous rights activist. He started as a leader in his own Guarayo community, before taking leadership positions in various local indigenous organisations and ultimately joining the CIDOB cadres in 1998. Being the secretary for Land and Territory for CIDOB in 2002, he remembers strongly supporting the call for a Constituent Assembly. In order to achieve this, it was necessary to cooperate with other indigenous and peasant organisations, he argues forcefully; first in the lowland parts of the country as part of the East Block, and then nationally as part of the Unity Pact. This is reflected in the declaration accompanying the march, which talks of the rights of "all Bolivians", reflecting the inclusion of an equal rights framing. Yet he recalls that CIDOB's President at the time did not agree:

> "It was funny, we almost fought physically with Marcial, the President… 'why are you doing this? [he said], you are giving away the flag of the indigenous movement to the peasants!'" (Interview with Bienvenido Zacu, 19th November 2016).

He highlights—and on this he and Marcial Fabricano agree—that the call for the Constituent Assembly was an authentic demand of the indigenous movement, and argues that the *campesino* (peasant) organisations just appropriated this demand for their own agenda. Regardless, both lowland and highland indigenous and indigenous-peasant organisations were in general coming closely together at this time, leading to the official signing of the Unity Pact in 2004, after years of coalition-building and coordinating efforts.

As the 2002 march proceeded, attended by some of the constituent organisations of the CIDOB, such as the CPESC, and the Mojeños, as well as the landless movement, the intercultural

organisations and indigenous-peasant unions, the NGO activist Hernán Avila (introduced above) recalls that the CIDOB faction led by Marcial Fabricano was negotiating directly with the Goni (Sánchez de Lozada) administration. This strategic position of the CIDOB leadership—to negotiate rather than protest—emerged from the political experiences of the 1990s. During that time, the CIDOB was choosing to negotiate with the government and work on the implementation of the 1994 multicultural reforms, with only two mass indigenous marches in this period, those in 1990 and 1996 discussed above. This is how Marcial Fabricano recalled rural struggles in Bolivia in the late 1990s and early 2000s:

> "The peasants were always creating disruption, and when they put up road blocks, it was to our disadvantage. We were in the process of taking forward the regularisation of the TCO titles, but they put up road blocks and it made things worse for us. So, in December 1999 we evaluated and decided that the peasant movement was to an extent hampering our demands on the state. The government could take it easy and say: 'We can't continue working on this, there are road blocks!'" (Interview with Marcial Fabricano, 21st October 2016).

As such, he not only saw the indigenous and peasant struggles as separate, but believed they should have remained so.

Yet the march also revealed the differences between the Unity Pact and the coca growers' (*cocalero*) unions—through which Evo Morales rose as a leader, and which form part of the CSCIOB but maintain a high level of autonomy—that are now patently and tragically obvious. As an observer, Hernán told me how initially, as the march neared the Chapare coca growing region, the position of the *cocaleros* was not clear. What happened in the end was that "they gave us oranges, mandarins, and said: 'Continue forward. But we are not going to march with you, because we believe it is necessary to take power through elections, we don't need to change the constitution, we need to take power" (Interview with Hernán Avila, October 18th, 2016). Indeed, the coca-growers federation chose the electoral route to 'take over the state', while the Unity Pact organisations, specifically the CIDOB and CONAMAQ, always had a more long-term vision of fundamentally reforming the structure of the state (Garcés, 2010; Grisaffi, 2017). This did not prevent, however, from supporting the MAS in the mid-2000s alongside with the "triplets".

Overall, the 2002 march was generally considered a success by its organisers and participants that I interviewed. An agreement was signed with the government on 21st June 2002, after a month and a half of marching. The proposed reforms, the new Forestry Law and the Agrarian package laws, designed to open up indigenous territories to resources extraction and halt redistribution of state-owned lands, were either scrapped or put on hold. At the same time, the broader demand for the establishment of a Constituent Assembly—in which social movements could participate without the mediation of political parties—was not met directly. What the march did was force the government, eleven days before a general election, to pass the Law of Constitutional Reform (*Ley de Necesidad de Reforma de la Constitución)*, which promised a Constituent Assembly. "It is impressive that it was these small peoples from remote corners of the country that who laid the foundational stone for the new edifice of the entire country" (Albó, 2008: 71). It was to a great extent their impressive alliance-making abilities at this time that

helps explain this unexpected success, as well as the contingent fact that the government was happy to promise a Constituent Assembly when it knew elections were around the corner.

Applying the definition of success operationalised in the preceding chapters, the protest was thus met with acceptance and some advantages. The impressive level of mobilisation, rivalling that of the 1990 march in both numbers and duration, contributed to this relative success. However, the demands of the march were costly both materially and symbolically for the right-wing, economically orthodox government in power at the time. They did not resonate well with the government's agenda and political rhetoric. As such, the advantages experienced were only limited. This corresponds to the findings of the statistical protest event analysis that while movement-level variables alone can explain acceptance, contextual variables, such as government partisanship, become more decisive for explaining advantages.

It is also important to highlight that Evo Morales came second in the 2002 general elections, showing himself to the entire country as a viable candidate. Moreover, this meant that Evo was now the leader of opposition, as head of the MAS representatives, those of Felipe Quispe's MIP, and their allies. This altered the political opportunity structure for the indigenous peasant movements studied, as even before the momentous 2005 election, they had powerful allies in Parliament. Moreover, this period also showed the ability (informal but important) of coordination between these newly elected representatives and the social movements they had emerged from. When their legislative proposals were blocked in Parliament, they resorted again to blocking streets and roads (Albó, 2008: 73).

At the same time, a story of 'wars'

The lowland indigenous mobilisations and their culmination in the formation of the Unity Pact were happening at the same time as the now-famous Water and Gas 'Wars', the mass mobilisations against water privatisation in 2000 and for gas nationalisation in 2003 and 2005. Although these protests started with water and gas, on both occasions they quickly gripped the entire country and turned into a collective rejection of neoliberal economic policies and a public show of the popular sectors' demand for a political voice. In the latter case, the Gas War brought the country to a standstill and forced the resignation of the President, Sánchez de Lozada in 2003, and Carlos Mesa in 2005. This paved the way for the rise of MAS as a vehicle for that disenfranchised popular voice, and its eventual electoral victory in 2005. This is the story, the story of the strength of popular sectors in Bolivia, that has been retold so frequently in the academic literature on Bolivian social movements, as discussed above.

Perhaps paradoxically, given it was these mobilisations that seemed to have resulted directly in the election of a popular-indigenous government, the role of the social movement organisations analysed here was not as straightforward as might have been expected. Just as in the case of the CIDOB above, the CSUTCB, the CSCIOB and the *Bartolinas* were important collective actors in the 'Wars'. Still, the trajectories of these historic mobilisations are worth exploring in more detail in order to analyse the complexity of the strategic decisions made by these organisations amid mass popular unrest. First, however, a quick introduction of these three organisations is necessary. These have generally coincided in their demands, and have been dubbed the "triplets" in Bolivia for their coordination and their continued closeness with the MAS. The other Unity Pact organisations, known as the "twins", that is the CIDOB and

CONAMAQ, have in turn coincided more in their goals, and especially so in recent years as they have left, at least a faction of each, the Unity Pact.

The CSUTCB is among the earliest 20th century[86] examples of an indigenous social movement organisation in Bolivia, emerging out of the experience of indigenous peasant union organising. Founded in 1979, the CSUTCB was originally a highland Aymara peasant union, organising along both class- and ethnic-lines (Yashar, 2005). It was created as a successor to the CNTCB (National Confederation of Rural Labourers of Bolivia) "under Katarista hegemony; it immediately rejected the PMC [Military Peasant Pact] and became the main organisation of practically all of the rural labourers" (Albó, 2008: 38; see also: Rivera Cusicanqui, 1984: 140-4). Although founded under the influence of *Katarismo* which combined a class-based focus with an identity lens, by the 1980s this influence had diminished, and its focus turned towards more material demands again. It has since expanded its focus on recognition and the right to difference again, as well as spreading to other parts of the country and growing its membership among other indigenous communities. As such, the CSUTCB has made largely redistributive claims, with some focus on recognition. Although adopting the indigenous *wiphala* flag as one its symbols, its discourse predominantly features references to equal rights and material justice rather than cultural claims and the right to difference.

The women's indigenous peasant federation, a parallel organisation to the CSUTCB, is called the CNMCIOB-BS, formally established in 1980. The organisation and its members are generally referred to in Bolivia as the '*Bartolinas*', following the organisation's use of Bartolina Sisa's name, the 18th century indigenous rebel leader and wife of Tupac Katari.[87] It emerged out of seeking women's own spaces of political representation within male-dominated union structures, in response "to the sexism of their own comrades" (Interview with Walter Limache, 5th October 2016; García Linera *et al*., 2010; Rousseau & Hudon, 2017).

Apart from access to political spaces, both within social movement organisations and in national politics in general, this federation's primary goal has been the equal treatment and equal access to productive land for indigenous women, that is the right to property and to land independently of husbands and male relatives. This has been guaranteed in the new 2009 constitution, and implemented under the Morales administration. Despite persistent sexist attitudes, indigenous women in the countryside can now own land and businesses independently, and in fact many women-only cooperatives have been set up in the highlands (Crabtree & Chaplin, 2013). Moreover, many indigenous women now hold national political positions, including as members of parliament, senators, regional representatives, and many others, a situation almost unimaginable in Bolivia before 2005. "It is difficult to overstate the tremendous positive effects this revaluing of indigenous identity has had in Bolivia…This opening of doors has also had tremendous class effects" (Postero, 2017: 181).

[86] There is, of course, a long history of indigenous resistance to the colonial as well as post-colonial state (see Klein, 2003, for example).

[87] Although the organisation was established by indigenous peasant women, who felt their interests could not be fully represented in the 'macho' CSUCTB, the taking up of Bartolina Sisa's name in relation to the CSUTCB's Tupac Katari symbolises a reaffirmation of the Andean indigenous notion of *chachawarmi*, or gender complementarity.

I interviewed two leaders of the indigenous peasant women's movement from the Santa Cruz department, during a training workshop for female leaders organised by the departmental federation in October 2016, with support from the central government. Both María Muñoz, the Executive Director of the Departmental *Bartolina Sisa* Federation in Santa Cruz, and Felipa Merino, Santa Cruz departmental senator for MAS and the federation's ex-director, told me that access to property rights, political posts and anti-discrimination laws are considered within the indigenous women's federation as the greatest successes, fruits of years of struggle. Although she thinks that the vice-presidential posts should have been offered to a female leader—to "accompany Evo", according to the Andean indigenous logic of gender 'complementarity'[88]—she was clear that many of the central goals of the organisations have been, or are in the process of being, met (Interview with María Muñoz, 22nd October 2016).

This leaves the CSCIOB to be introduced. Like the CSUTCB, the CSCIOB arose out of a combination of union discipline and rural communitarianism (García Linera *et al*., 2010). Without the strong *Katarista* current, however, it is the organisations with the least identity-based demands on the five SMOs studied here. At the same time, the protection of coca growing opportunities is one its main demands, and this is justified by invoking the cultural and spiritual significance of the coca leaf to Andean cosmovisions. It emerged out of the migration from the highland regions in the country to the lowlands and the valleys, the so-called colonisation process, established initially as the National Confederation of Colonisers in 1970. As such, the *cocalero* (coca growers') movement, which began growing in the Bolivian valleys from the 1970s onwards, forms an integral though autonomous part of the CSCIOB.

The story of the rise of MAS and Evo Morales to power would thus not be comprehensible without mentioning the coca growers' unions that he rose through to, first, the leadership of the CSUTCB, and then MAS presidential candidate. Although the coca growers have used reference to the symbolic importance of the coca leaf for Bolivia's indigenous groups, they have not often made their claims specifically in reference to the ethnic identity of their members. Moreover, the coca growers' federations in the Chapare region do not represent national organisations; rather, leaders rise through their ranks to national positions in the CSCIOB or sometimes the CSUTCB. As such, they are not one of the organisations directly under study here, but a quick glance at the particularities of their evolving relationship with the MAS administration and the state can help elucidate the overall relationship this 'social movement government' in fact has with social movements and their organisations in the country.

The coca-growers are directly represented by the various Tropics Federations (*Federaciones del Trópico),* which have converged in the formation of the Coordinating Committee (*Comité de Coordinación*) in 1991 under the leadership of Evo Morales (Gabriel & López y Rivas, 2005). At the same time, these federations also officially form part of the CSCIOB confederation, despite their relative decision-making autonomy. Practically, the same types of migrant indigenous peasant communities are represented by both the CSCIOB and the coca-growers' federations, but not all CSCIOB communities are engaged in coca cultivation. More importantly, they have differed in their strategies, particularly regarding the question of how to

[88] See footnote 87 above.

engage with the political system in general, and the established political parties in particular. As discussed above, while the *cocalero* leadership chose the pursue the direct electoral route, throwing their disruptive weight behind Evo Morales and the MAS, the main faction within the CSCIOB along with the other four organisations decided to sign the Unity Pact and struggle for a reform of the political system through the proposed Constituent Assembly, *as well as* supporting MAS as a means to that end.

Having introduced the three organisations that have featured prominently in the two popular 'Wars', what role have their strategies—both tactical decisions and claiming and framing—played in these mobilisations? María Muñoz, the Santa Cruz *Bartolina* leader introduced above, exalted the under-appreciated but vital role indigenous women have played in popular mobilisations in Bolivia. "Our veteran female leaders [*antiguas dirigentas*]", she told me, "led the water war" against water privatisation in Cochabamba (Interview with María Muñoz, 22nd October 2016). The regional Santa Cruz branch of the Bartolinas thus highlighted the dynamics of trying to maintain organisational strength and independence, while remaining supportive of the government they had helped bring to power. Just like the current leaders of the CSUTCB and the CSCIOB, they remember the struggles, "*luchas*", against the neoliberal governments. The role of local women, especially the Aymara and Quechua women, in the Cochabamba water is indeed clear (Crabtree & Chaplin, 2013).[89] What is less clear is the role the indigenous social movement *organisations* under study here have played.

In the case of the Water War, it was a local committee, the *Coordinator in Defense of Water and Life* (*Coordinadora en Defensa de Agua y Vida*), that united residents against the single issue of the privatisation of the local water provision. This story has been re-told frequently in the academic literature (Albó, 2008; Crabtree, 2005; García Linera *et al*., 2010; Postero, 2007; Svampa & Stefanoni, 2007; Webber, 2007; Yashar, 2005). Under the government of Hugo Banzer, the ex-dictator from the times of the so-called Peasant Military Pact in the 1970s, and under the guidance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the local water management was signed off to a subsidiary, Aguas del Tunari, of the multinational Bechtel. New tariffs were announced, on average tripling the cost of water. This was in a situation of water scarcity; the company announced that households with unpaid bills will have their already limited supply cut off.

At the same time, the scope of the 2000 water privatisation law technically gave private providers a monopoly over the water supply, and residents and community leaders spread concerns that even the collection of rain water might be regulated, banned, or taxed. This moral outrage fuelled the popular protests. Although this emerged as a rather localised grassroots struggle on a single issue, many of the local indigenous peasant leaders that took part in the Coordinator were also members of the *Bartolinas* and the CSUTCB. As such, the national representatives of those organisations then had little choice but to join the lead as the protests spread. In additions, the coca-growing sectors joined the protests with their demands against coca eradication, rural teachers' unions hunger struck for a pay rise and Cochabamba residents, including students, set up barricades across the city. Thus, the uprising quickly spread with

[89] In fact, Cochabamba remains the focal point of female indigenous struggles in Bolivia, as of 2017, in opposition to Morales administration (see Krausova, 2017).

protests and especially road blocks affecting the entire country. Banzer then declared a national emergency, and police and military repression ensued (e.g. Crabtree, 2005).

So what role did the organisations under study play in the Bolivian Water War? The SMOs that most participated in this struggle were the CSUTCB and the *Bartolinas*. Both organisations (and this goes for the CSCIOB as well) have an organic structure, with the bases sending representatives to higher administrative levels of the union, and with the top leadership being elected at a national congress every few years. However, the internal debates within the organisation, and the ultimate goals and strategies chosen at any given time, do not necessarily represent the demands of all the bases, but are a product of deliberations between representatives of different regions, the leadership and other interests that may be represented through certain members, such as those of other organisations, NGOs, or the state. The organisations' decision-making processes are thus by no means always straightforward. This, however, has not prevented them from fulfilling their protagonist role in Bolivian popular struggles.

A key example of this is indeed the CSUTCB's role in the 2000 'Water War'. As protest spread, CSUTCB managed to "offer a discursive and symbolic basis capable of articulating a tiredness of the liberalising economic attempts and a defense of the collective community heritage as part of historical ethno-national struggle for emancipation and self-government" (García Linera *et al*., 2010: 122). Since 2000, the more ethno-centric leadership by Felipe Quispe of the CSUTCB started to come under pressure, with a faction affiliated to Evo Morales proposing a more clearly class-based response to Quispe's Aymara nationalism. This is detailed in García Linera's, Chávez León's & Costas Monje's work on social movements in Bolivia (2010), Álvaro García Linera being a member of the influential group of Bolivian intellectuals, *Grupo Comuna,* and serving his third term as Vice-President of Bolivia alongside Evo Morales in 2018. Throughout 1999, the authors recount, Felipe Quispe, then still leader of the CSUTCB, organised an awareness-raising campaign about the government plans to privatise water provision. This was crucial in spreading collective awareness and debates about the topic across the country.

When in 2000, the national CSUTCB mobilised and set up road blocks against the Water Law, they were quickly called off after negotiations between the government and the national CSUTCB leadership. However, grassroots protests kicked off in Cochabamba, spearheaded by the Coordinator (Crabtree, 2005). Regional CSUTCB branches mobilised again; the protests spread to other parts of the country, and in the end the national executive had to return to the lead of the mobilisations. "It was the breath of this alliance… [that] gave it its strength. Yet this was a spontaneous movement with a dynamic of its own, not the result of any premeditated political strategy" (Crabtree, 2005: 28). The violent repression of the protests only intensified them (in a now sadly familiar refrain), and eventually forced negotiations leading to an accord, with the Water Law proposal scrapped.

A similar story unfolded in 2003 in the so-called Gas War, except that the role of the CSUTCB was rather different. Initial national calls for mobilisation in August 2003 went unanswered by the bases, at least initially; it was not until September of that year that Felipe Quispe's leadership managed to mobilise CSUTCB members (García Linera *et al*., 2010). These joined the protests by other sectors, especially those of neighbourhood associations and street traders

in El Alto, as well as labour unions and students (Lazar, 2008). It was thus that the 'War' for gas kicked off.

What was crucial, as discussed in both chapter 5 and below in chapter 7, was the ability of disparate sectoral demands to unite behind a common agenda, in this case opposition to the sale of natural gas to Chile. This was cemented further after violent repression by the state, now remembered as *Octubre Negro* (Black October). The 'Gas War' was thus a "highly contingent coming together of different sectoral interests that exploded into something much more once the government ordered the army to kill the demonstrators" (Lazar, 2008: 20). Moreover, the story of the 'Gas War' also supports the findings of the preceding analyses in that El Alto's position controlling much of the access to La Paz meant blocking such strategic roads imposed a high enough economic cost that the government was forced to either negotiate or repress (Crabtree & Chaplin, 2013). Tragically, it chose the latter, the political cost of which was in turn too high as well, and forced the President, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, to resign and flee the country.

In focusing on the role of the CSUTCB in the Gas War, there is little space here to discuss the importance of other social sectors that were crucial during the mobilisations of 2003, namely the neighbourhood associations (FEJUVE), the COB and its regional branch, street traders associations and students (Albó, 2008; Crabtree & Chaplin, 2013; Lazar, 2006, 2008). The Gas War was indeed a multisectoral mobilisation, successful at least in part as it was able to paralyse the city of El Alto, and thus access to the seat of government, La Paz. CSUTCB, specifically the faction led by Felipe Quispe at the time, did, however, play an important role in mobilising Aymara peasants, and embarking on a costly hunger strike provided further legitimacy to the protests:

> "One of the most important groups was that of the La Paz sector of the principal peasant union of Bolivia, the CSUTCB… The national CSUTCB was led by Felipe Quispe, known as the 'Mallku' …. One part of the La Paz sector of the CSUTCB blockaded the roads leading into the metropolitan area of El Alto and La Paz while 500–1000 peasants joined the Mallku in a hunger strike in the offices of a radio station in El Alto, which began on 10 September 2003 and lasted for over a month" (Lazar, 2006: 183-4).

Similarly, in the already-cited *Sociology of Social Movements in Bolivia*, the origin of the Gas War is traced to a march called by the La Paz departmental branch of the CSUTCB, "coordinated with the CSUTCB led by Felipe Quispe", demanding progress on the broad set of CSUTCB's demands, the release of an imprisoned leader, as well as "that natural gas be industrialised rather than sold" abroad; "faced with the lack of response from the government of Sánchez de Lozada… the leaders decided to begin a hunger strike in the premises of Radio San Gabriel" (García Linera *et al.*, 2010: 128). The role of leaders and organisations during such periods of 'heightened contention' (Tarrow, 1994: 153) tends to be contested. This is especially true in Bolivia, reflected in both the common retellings of the Gas War and in the general "discourse of trade union and community leaders… that leaders do not lead, they implement the decisions of their grass roots" (Lazar, 2008: 235). As I argue throughout, however, this does not mean that organisations and the strategic choices of their leaders do not play a role.

In this case, the role of the organisation is perhaps more straightforward that during the 'Water War'; CSUTCB's hunger strike for gas nationalisations and the sector's demands in general sparked road blocks with a broader political agenda that in turn joined other independent protests and helped the emergence of a popular general strike in La Paz, El Alto, Cochabamba, and other cities. The CSUTCB has had the capacity to paralyse the country with road blocks, mobilising thousands of its constituents for significant periods of time, and has thus been able to force governments to change laws and decrees. With its ability to both lead and join (*sumarse*) broader mass mobilisation, it was even able to force presidents to resign. Thus, at a time when the CIDOB was, despite its internal fights over strategy, preferring to negotiate, the CSUTCB and the *Bartolinas* (as well as the CSCIOB and the *cocaleros*) were much more confrontational. These strategic differences stem from the differences between the mobilising capacity of the different organisations, but also reflect a different conceptualisation of relationship with the state and the tactical choices that stem from that.

Contentious repertoires and strategic claims and frames

What do these experiences of the five indigenous social movement organisations before the election of Evo Morales in 2005 tell us about their internal features, their strategies, and their successes and failures under a right-wing government? How can we detail and compare their characteristics in order to try and understand the outcomes they experienced during this time period, and beyond? Do the findings of the previous two chapters—that protest succeeds through imposing political costs both directly as a result of its strategies (tactics, claims and frames), and a result of how those strategies interact with the external (political) environment—help us explain the pre-2005 outcomes of the indigenous movement in Bolivia as whole, and of its most important organisations?

At the same time, do other concepts from the social movement literature, such as those of protest cycles and repertoires of contention, help or hinder such an analysis? This particular period of recent indigenous and popular struggles in Bolivia provides particularly useful insights regarding the notion of contentious repertoires. Protest cycles in general and the concept of co-optation in particular are discussed in more detail in relation to the post-2005 stages of indigenous mobilisations in the country. Looking at this initial period (2000-2005) has also allowed for a more detailed analysis of the importance of both the claims and frames employed by the different organisations, setting the stage for evaluating their strategies after the election of Evo Morales, and especially during 2016 when the field research was carried out.

Let us start with the CIDOB again. Its historical role in the many indigenous marches starting from the Bolivian lowlands, and the decision-making and conflicts within its leadership, show the extent of its strategic adaptability, or lack thereof, at various times. It paints a much more complicated picture than predicted. The organisation does not have as wide *and* flexible a repertoire of contention as was expected for an organisation with such international support and domestic importance. For an organisation representing a large number of indigenous groups that however only make up a small percentage of the country's population—it only represents lowland indigenous communities, not the Aymaras and Quechuas who by most accounts make up the majority of the highland population—the need for both a wide and *more flexible* repertoire of contention might have been expected.

These demographic characteristics mean the CIDOB is in a position of relative weakness, representing lowland indigenous groups in a country where their demands are not only in conflict with the landed elites, but also as is clear now, often contrary to the claims of some of the Aymara and Quechua organisations in the country (the "triplets", but not CONAMAQ). In this sense, their experience in times of fragmentation is more similar to the experience of indigenous movements in countries where the indigenous groups represent only a small portion of the population. During times of unity, however, they benefit from campaigning and mobilising in country with such a high indigenous population share overall.

When the relationship between the indigenous population share and the successes of indigenous movements is analysed in the preceding quantitative chapter, it suggests that in countries with both low and high indigenous population share, the demands of indigenous protest are more likely to be met, all other factors being held equal. It is for countries with a comparatively medium indigenous population share that indigenous claims are less likely to be met. Does this help explain the experience of the CIDOB? It does if we try to make sense of this quantitative finding by considering the mechanism of cost imposition again.

It is hypothesised that when indigenous people represent a small percentage of the population, their demands tend to impose a lower political cost on the state to be met. Conversely, for countries with high or even majority indigenous share, while the costs of meeting their demands are higher, so is their ability to mobilise enough of their constituency to impose—or threaten to impose—an even higher cost with their protest. For the CIDOB, the latter is the case when it allies with the other indigenous and indigenous-peasant organisations in the country. For the former case, this is also true apart from the cases when the CIDOB campaigns alone against natural resource exploitation in indigenous territories—a materially costly demand indeed—and this is becoming more and more its focus.

Taking this into account, do the strategies of the CIDOB itself not have an effect on the outcomes it has experienced? The CIDOB, as described above, indeed has a wide repertoire of action, as it has been able to combine disruptive protest with negotiations and seeking international support. While this may be the case for its tactics, it is less so when considering its claiming and framing. In particular, its framing strategy has remained rather inflexible. This highlights the different strategic choices the CIDOB has made in comparison with other identity-based social movement organisations in Bolivia, but also at different points throughout its trajectory. The leadership of Marcial Fabricano represents the period of perhaps the lowest strategic adaptability for the CIDOB, a time when it was as 'stubborn and ethnocentric' as CONAMAQ has been accused of being, by both its opponents and even at times its Pact of Unity allies (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2008).

Thus, in contrast with the literature on repertoires of contention to date, discussed in more detail below, the *width* and *flexibility* of repertoire of contention do not necessarily go hand in hand. CIDOB could be considered the organisation with the *widest* repertoire of those studied here, as it has always coupled domestic disruption and negotiation with international alliances and litigation. Yet that does not mean that its claiming and framing adaptability has been as flexible in responding to changing external circumstances as the other organisations, especially the CSUTCB. Although the latter may have a *narrower* repertoire of contention, utilising mainly mass demonstrations and road blocks, it has been much more flexible in terms of its claiming

and framing, shifting from recognition claims and the right to difference, to class-based goals and an equality framing, and back, as a strategic response to external political circumstances and opportunities.

The concept of the repertoire of contention has generally referred to the tactical arsenal that a specific movement uses in a particular place and time. The repertoire has thus been conceptualised as the types of collective actions that are (seen as) available to social movements, their organisations, and their activists. However, this definition of the repertoire of contention misses two important elements that not only form a crucial part of a strategic arsenal of social movements, but can also help us better understand different movement outcomes. Firstly, it presents a descriptive and rather static view of the tactical decisions of social movements; within the available types of actions (actions thought of as feasible or even possible at the time), social movement actors will make strategic choices in response to both internal dynamics and external conditions.

As such, a focus on strategy and decision-making is missing from the traditional definition of repertoire of contention. Secondly, the concept misses out on how movement claims and frames can also be a site of strategic decision-making—a site of struggle over demand content and legitimation—rather than a static given. As this thesis shows, which claims get privileged at certain times, and how they are framed, can not only impact movement outcomes, but is also part of the movement's strategy. Thus, the repertoire of contention can be re-conceptualised by a) recognising it as a site of strategic decision-making and b) adding choices about the content and legitimation of demands—claiming and framing—to this 'site'. In doing so, it becomes much clearer why the five indigenous social movement organisations in Bolivia have faced varied consequences at different times.

In particular, the CSUTCB and the other indigenous-peasant organisations have been employing both equality and difference rights frames, asking for both recognition and redistribution, with different extent of emphasis on each throughout their recent trajectories. The CIDOB, conversely (as well as CONAMAQ, which has done so to an even greater degree), have remained firmly rooted in the difference frame, even as their primary demand for recognition and territory as differentiated citizens are coupled with demands for access to education and health provision as equal citizens. In that sense, the CIDOB and CONAMAQ ask for both recognition and redistribution, but only by using the right to difference frame. As such, not only have they not been able to adapt their framing enough to changing external conditions, there also appears to be a certain tension between some of their claims and the frame they use to legitimate them.

Conversely, the CSUTCB, the *Bartolinas,* and especially the CSCIOB, have always had redistributive, class-based demands. What sets them apart from the miner's unions, for example, is that they have legitimated those demands both in terms of equality and difference. Thus, the claims for land redistribution or coca legalisation—legalisation of the 'sacred leaf'—have been made in reference to both class inequality and cultural discrimination. However, the organisations' demands have not included calls for autonomy; they demand to be treated as equal citizens, rather than fighting for special rights and ethnic self-determination.

Then, the supposedly 'peasant' demands for access to land and to not be discriminated, and the and the 'indigenous' demand to be recognised as different and granted special rights, along with the demands for control over natural resources (both national control and autonomous indigenous control), especially water and gas, thus for a time in the early 2000s fused in an overarching claim for sovereignty of the communities, *both* as economically rural producers and ethnically as pre-Columbian peoples. In this sense, the more local demands of small-scale producers for access to productive land and better market conditions, fused with the radical goals of Aymara nationalism, and a popular rejection of neoliberal privatisations, then became signified by the demand for control over natural resources.

However, with the Morales government's gas and water nationalisations—in the case of gas, partial 'nationalisation' with the majority of royalties retained by the state through the Direct Hydrocarbons Tax (IDH, *Impuesto Directo a Hydrocarburos*) (Postero, 2017: 97)—and support for rural production, the more radical elements of demands for autonomy and sovereignty for indigenous peoples—exemplified in the altiplano by Felipe Quispe's Aymara nationalism and reflected in much of CIDOB's and CONAMAQ's claim-making—got side-lined and lost broader popular support.

The main obstacle for CIDOB and CONAMAQ is thus the fact that as the equal rights frames of the larger organisations for access to the state and to land, and laws against discrimination, have largely been met, or are seen as being in the process of being adequately addressed by the "triplets" as discussed below, there is now a waning popular support for a right-to-difference framing. This is especially the case as the indigenous organisations and communities that have not benefitted as much under the Morales administration, often represented by the now opposition CIDOB and CONAMAQ, tend to ask for both recognition and redistribution, albeit in the language of difference. In fact, the government-supporting "triplets" have been able to use the equality frame against them, arguing that in a situation of reduced but persisting widespread poverty and inequality, the popular sectors should be united together in a fight for equal rights for everyone, not 'special' rights for specific ethno-linguistic groups.

This, of course, ignores the legitimacy of claims of ethno-linguistic communities for, if not self-determination, then at least conditions in which cultural and linguistic difference can be materially reproduced, as discussed in Chapter 2. It does, however, highlight that the relationship between the content of demands and their legitimation is worth exploring, and that it is analytically useful to separate these two inter-related but logically distinct elements of framing in the first place. A mismatch between claims and frames might make it harder for social movements to gather broader popular support, media, and public sympathy, by potentially making their struggle seems less legitimate, or 'worthy' in Tilly's sense (1999).[90]

This conflict over framing thus weaves itself throughout the entire history of indigenous social movements in Bolivia studied here. Still, as is already clear from the discussion above, there were periods of greater and lesser unity of the popular sectors in Bolivia. Before the election of the Morales administration in 2005, it was easier for social movements to unite against the 'common enemy' of neoliberalism, a sentiment echoed in interviews with past and present

[90] This draws on Tilly's (1999) famous definition of social movements, used in this thesis, and further discussed below.

indigenous SMO leaders in Bolivia. Still, the extent of the current fragmentation and debilitation of a part of the indigenous movement in the country was not immediately obvious in the first term of the MAS government. When the process of the Constituent Assembly began, the social movement organisations under study here were still very much united in their proposal. It was in the process of drafting the text of the new constitution, and the concession made by the MAS delegates in response to the pressure of the right-wing opposition, that the divisions between the organisations came to the fore again, this time apparently to stay.

6.4.2 Indigenous representation and re-founding the republic: 2006-2010

After the election of MAS as the majority party and Evo Morales as the country's first indigenous President in 2005 with unprecedented popular support[91] and following years of popular protest, the MAS/Morales government started to work on implementing its promises. As detailed above, it managed to meet many of those. One of the most important promises, and also the biggest challenges, was the popular demand for a Constituent Assembly. The subsequent process of the constituent assembly between 2006 and 2009 "*was* the civil society mobilized, articulated, which helped achieve a constitution with so many rights" (Interview with Hernán Avila, 18th October 2016). The constituent process was responding to the long-standing demand of indigenous social movement organisation in Bolivia—particularly CIDOB and CONAMAQ, as discussed above—to 're-found the republic'.

Civil society and popular sector organisations thus participated in the drafting of a new constitutional text, to be 'consensual' and to then be approved by a country-wide referendum. Unsurprisingly, already the procedures of how such a radically transformative task was to be carried out became an issue of contention. Much has been written—by both Northern and Bolivian scholars—on Bolivia's constitutional reform, and the contradictions of a supposedly post-multicultural, plurinational constitution, which promises both recognition of previously discriminated groups and a faired redistribution of the country's resources, and includes both individual and collective rights, both the right to equality and the right to difference, but without necessarily integrating them or providing tools to resolve tensions between them (e.g. Albro, 2010; Crabtree & Whitehead, 2008; Garcés, 2013; Postero, 2017; Schavelzon, 2012; Schilling-Vacaflor, 2011). Though this is crucial for understanding the different framing used by the SMOs under study, the interest in this section is on the role of the Unity Pact organisations within the constituent process itself, and subsequently in the MAS government.

Being such a long-standing demand of social movements in Bolivia, the formation of the Constituent Assembly became one of the central goals of the Unity Pact coalition. The formation of the Pact itself stemmed not only from a desire to unify and coordinate the organisations' struggles, but also reflected a distrust of traditional political parties and a desire to do politics 'by other means' (della Porta, 2015; Lazar, 2017; Mainwaring *et al*., 2006). These organizations "chose to create their own political instrument to bring them together and use it in order to make decisions horizontally and avoid the hierarchy of political parties" (Pinto,

[91] For the presidential election, this was the first time in decades that a candidate had won a majority of votes, with Morales securing 54% of votes; traditionally, when no candidate had a majority, the Bolivian Congress would make the final designation.

2016: 75). This meant that one of the coalitions' core demand was for a constituent process without political party mediation, that is with direct citizen participation.

The indigenous movement's proposal (specifically that of the *Bloque Oriente*) centered on fundamentally reforming the nature of the political system, ideally removing or at least reducing the intermediary power of political parties. However, this did not happen in practice; by the time the constituent assembly process took off the ground, Evo Morales' MAS had a majority in Parliament and managed to make sure that participation in the assembly would be via political parties, rather than directly (Garcés, 2010, 2013; Schavelzon, 2012). The social movement leaders, indigenous and non-indigenous alike, that had helped bring Morales to power thus could not participate directly as representatives of their respective organisations, but had to do so as MAS delegates.

Although this did not prevent the passing of one of the most radical constitutional texts in the world, it began the side-lining of the social movement organisations from direct, unmediated, participation in both national politics and the MAS' internal decision-making processes. As both Yashar and Van Cott have argued in their classic studies, indigenous movements have reasons to be careful about their relationship with the political party system (Van Cott, 2005; Yashar, 2005). Yashar in particular highlighted the fundamental problems of joining electoral politics for indigenous movements. Firstly, most experienced leaders join the state, and potentially leave the organisations weaker. Secondly, the usually small number of elected representatives find it hard to get their communities' and organisations' agendas pushed through as a minority; this is precisely what happened to former CIDOB leaders when they became Parliament members, as Bienvenido Zacu recounts below.

As such, thirdly, engaging in electoral politics is likely to cause internal division (Yashar, 2005). This is all true in the recent Bolivian context. However, Yashar's discussion seems to assume that there is little division within indigenous organisations unless they start to engage in electoral politics. As described above, this has certainly not been the case. Rather, it is more useful to think about electoral politics as another space to which social movements' diverse strategies can be applied, and where the extent to which they have been successful in getting their stated goals met can be evaluated. This is, however, complicated by the complex and often unclear relationship between the MAS and the social movements that helped bring it to power.

Rhetorically, Morales has always insisted that MAS is a tool of the social movements that established it, an 'instrument of the people', rather than a traditional political party. The indigenous and indigenous-peasant social movement leaders that now hold positions in the government insist on the same; this was made clear to me in interviews and in a collection of histories of indigenous peasant leaders recently published by the Centre for Social Investigation (CIS)[92] in La Paz, titled: "We're not from MAS, MAS is ours" (García Yapur *et al*, 2015).[93] The 2016 National Development Plan of the Morales administration echoes the 2009

[92] This new research centre was established in 2015, and is partially funded by the Bolivian government, specifically by the Vice-Presidency.

[93] At the same time, the title was a source of much ridicule by social movement leaders *without* positions in the government, as well as many civil society and academic observers.

Constitution in arguing for the need of a strong civil society in Bolivia and for "strengthening democratic participation". Specifically, it states that:

> "The third government term is focused on consolidating the Plurinational State and the Democratic Cultural Revolution, via strengthening the integral State and the concept of Living Well, where there is a connection and coordination between the different levels of government and the Bolivian people, where all are part of the State, in which there is strong leadership of social organisations, and plurinationality, democratic autonomy, and economic sovereignty are strengthened" (MPD, 2016: 2).

The relationship between MAS and social movements in Bolivia is undoubtedly more complicated than that of a standard political party would be with civil society and social movements. It has been described as a 'social movement-*cum*-political party (Yashar, 2005), but has MAS in power been a 'social movement government'? The above-mentioned collection, featuring semi-structured interviews, interwoven into life histories, of twenty-one indigenous peasant leaders of the "triplets" male and female, tells the story of continued struggle over which claims to focus on, how to frame them, and crucially perhaps, how exactly to carry out the desired political work (García Yapur *et al*, 2015). Just as in the interviews I conducted, the collection makes it clear that there is often confusion and disagreement about what the relationship between their social movement organisations and "their" government should be, how leaders should be selected and what the role of the grassroots (*bases*) should be in daily governance.

Access, co-optation, or institutionalisation?

Amaru Villanueva, director of the CIS in 2016, highlights how social movement organisations in Bolivia, specifically those of the Unity Pact, continue to have an impact on government decisions:

> "When they formed this government, they ceded terrain, in the sense that they are now part of the apparatus of power. Therefore, instead of automatically going out on the streets, protesting, blocking roads, … [now] they have channels, this is very important, they have direct channels to decision-makers. And it is difficult to know exactly what these channels are, because they are not documented; it is possible that many leaders can directly call the president and say: 'We are not going to accept this', so the issue is resolved behind the scenes before turning into a public conflict. In that case, the social movement will have had an impact, but not through the traditional channels of public protest" (Interview with Amaru Villanueva, 29th September 2016).

This suggests that social movement organisations in Bolivia—both their current representatives and their past leaders—can exercise a certain pre-emptive veto power. In fact, this has been documented in terms of how miner's unions in Bolivia effectively have a veto over MAS government policy regarding mining (Okada, 2016). Still, the miners in Bolivia have not lost their mobilising capacity.[94] It is this *combination* of access to decision making and the threat

[94] In fact, in early 2016, there were massive miners' mobilisations, including road blocks. This quickly escalated into violent confrontation, and tragically, a government minister sent to negotiate was taken as a hostage, and later found killed (2016). This significantly damaged the miners' legitimacy, and the protest actions were suspended. Still, they had reminded the government of their mobilising capacity,

of protest that can explain how so many of indigenous and popular social movements' demands have indeed been reflected in both the constitutional text and subsequent government policy.

Yet such an access to the government does not function through newly established formal channels, but rather ongoing personal contacts between the new executive and their former 'brothers in arms'. None of the social movement leaders and politicians I interviewed in 2016, including those currently serving as MAS representatives, could provide any concrete examples of clear rules managing the relationship between MAS and Bolivian social movements, except to often say that there was always consensus, and even that it was not necessary to have such rules since MAS *was* the social movements. The leaders of the CSUTCB, CSCIOB and the *Bartolinas* consistently refer to MAS as their child, with female leaders often saying they have 'given birth' to MAS and to the government (numerous interviews, 2016; García Yapur *et al*, 2015).

There is one way in which the MAS administration has attempted to institutionalise the social movement participation in its government, which is through the establishment of the CONALCAM (*Coordinadora Nacional para el Cambio,* National Coordinator for Change). This is ostensibly a forum for the Unity Pact organisations to meet, usually monthly, discuss their proposals, and evaluate government policy. Again, this is a space where real debate can take place and through which popular sectors' demands can be articulated to the inner MAS circle. What is less clear is if such debate really takes place. Critics have accused both social movement leaders, those now within the government and those outside but loyal to the government, of just 'raising their hands' (*levantamanos*) in support of whatever decisions the government has already made (numerous interviews, 2016).

At times, the forum *has* been used to exert government control and show the extent of loyal social movement support in the face of any dissent; "in the government's manoeuvres with recalcitrant social movements, CONALCAM has served as officialdom's loyal 'shock troops'" (Prevost *et al*., 2012: 82). Indeed, since 2005, the social movements closest to the MAS government, the "triplets", have used their mobilising capacity to publicly display their strength and support for Morales and his administration. They have done so throughout the Constituent Assembly, in reaction to opposition to the process itself of established centre-right political parties and regional elites. More recently, they have drawn on this mobilising capacity, even if reduced somewhat compared to the early 2000s, in response to 'internal' dissent from increasingly critical indigenous social movement organisations, like the CIDOB and CONAMAQ.

Moreover, the CONALCAM has been described as only a space for 'showing off' the plurinational and indigenous nature of MAS to the media, without any real debate (numerous interviews, 2016). The MAS is certainly concerned with presenting both a left-wing and a pro-indigenous image. When I visited the La Paz offices of the CSUTCB in November 2016, a call to participate in a MAS congress was stuck to the wall; not only did this state that attendance for the Unity Pact organisations, and their numerous affiliates, was compulsory, but also stipulated in a prominent place in the letter that attendees are required to 'bring their flags and

and given they have the support of the Bolivian Workers' Central (COB, the largest union in the country), the Mining Law that was passed still largely corresponds to the sector's demands.

dress in traditional clothing'. This indeed shows that reunions with social movement organisations are also about spectacles of indigeneity (Fabricant, 2009; Fabricant & Postero, 2014; Postero, 2017), as a way to reinforce the MAS legitimacy as both an indigenous government, and a government of social movements.

Yet this does not mean they cannot function as spaces for debate and opportunities for social movements to put forward organisation-specific proposals at the same time. Seeking external legitimacy is not necessarily mutually exclusive with internal democracy. Moreover, as explored above, it is analytically useful to conceptualise social movements as struggles for legitimacy, especially if their successes and failures are to be better understood. Racism and discrimination in Bolivia have obviously not disappeared over night, but the idea that indigenous rights are legitimate has grained incredible traction in Bolivian politics. Public discourse in Bolivia has shifted so much since 2006 that even the right-wing opposition elites use the language of multiculturalism and indigenous rights when they attack the government, as detailed in my MPhil thesis (Krausova, 2012; see also: Fabricant & Postero, 2014). As such, struggles over who can legitimately claim to be indigenous is at the core of struggles over access to both political representation and material resources.

Still, the problem remains that this unprecedented access to the spaces of decision-making has not been institutionalised. Van Cott, for example, highlighted that even when designed clearly, new institutions can easily get infused with traditional practices, and the formal rules are circumvented by traditional ways of doing things (Van Cott, 2008). MAS has indeed brought the traditions of Bolivian indigenous-peasant unions with it to power. The insistence on loyalty and consensus could be seen as a form of Leninist 'democratic centralism'; even when there is debate, once a decision is reached—usually the majority decision rather than necessarily a consensual one—this is fiercely imposed. What seems to be the case is that the President and the MAS leadership have at best a) not thought it necessary to formalise the relationship between the MAS party in government and the social movements that have brought them to power, since, as they proclaim, they 'are' the social movements, and at worst b) left rules deliberately vague in order to be able to exploit this ambiguity to consolidate their power.

Without gaining access to such informal and ad-hoc spaces of decision making within the executive, it is difficult to evaluate how representative this is of the general relationship between social movements and the government they helped bring to power. However, the notion that a) social movement leaders do have access to spaces of decision-making, but b) decisions are not necessarily reached by consensus, but rather made by Morales and the MAS core, was repeated over and over again in interviews as well as meetings and workshops I attended, and in the Bolivian academic literature on the topic (Garcés, 2013; García Yapur *et al*, 2015; Zegada & Komadina, 2014). It is also not implausible, given that Morales knows these leaders personally after years of struggle, but has now gained a position of power.

In itself, the radically increased political representation within the state of indigenous, *campesino,* and other previously excluded constituencies is an incredible achievement. In addition to the success of symbolic representation itself, Zegada and Komadina (2014) describe real instances of the incidence of decision-making of those representatives within the Plurinational Assembly, despite a strong control by the MAS caucus and its party whips. It is true that leaders of social organisations that are now part of the governing party face this tension

between their obligations to the bases and the loyalty to MAS. This situation of little institutionalisation does create tensions between the responsibilities to the organisation and the government. There is undeniably a tension between social movement leaders' loyalties to their organisations, their constituencies and 'their' government. However, this is a tension inherent to liberal representative democracy, and individual leaders have to decide in specific cases as to how to balance those two responsibilities. At the same time, being part of the government or the MAS majority in the Assembly gives SMO leaders unprecedented access to decision-making on behalf of indigenous peasant organisations.

This experience of SMO access to spaces of decision-making thus, arguably, challenges the standard dichotomous conceptualisation of state-civil society relations, and questions the notion in social movement studies that inclusion always means co-optation. That, again, is a static view that does not take into account the interactions between agents. The fact that SMO leaders—especially of the "triplets"—have taken up government positions would suggest that these organisations have been co-opted. Yet, under Gamson's influential classification of movement outcomes—by which the definition of positive outcomes used here is inspired—co-optation means acceptance of the organisation as legitimate, but without any kind of advantages (Gamson, 1975). However, it is undeniable that under the administrations of the MAS, the five organisations of the Unity Pact have benefited from a number of achievements reflecting their programmatic agenda, in terms of political participation, the constitutional text, and its implementation, as discussed above. Then, it is difficult to speak of co-optation if at least *some* of the demands of *all* the organisations have been met.

In addition, such an interpretation is stuck in the dichotomous logic of 'civil society v. the state'. In the current MAS administration, leaders, and activists of the organisations themselves are part of the state, and those who were elected tend to still insist they consider this a major success. Although this means also having to face the challenges of public administration, this tends to be seen also as a positive outcome. Thus, 'co-optation' can also be a way of getting advantages for members, and the results of this integration into the state will depend on the internal structure of the organisation. In researching unions and the relationship with the state, Sian Lazar highlights that more research needs to be undertaken into how this interaction works in specific cases, and without understanding more fully the experiences of so-called co-opted leaders, "we should not take co-optation for granted as either inevitable or inevitably bad for workers and union members" (Lazar, 2017: 12).

The CSUTCB and the CSCIOB, in particular, make a forceful argument about how they considered being part of the state's bureaucratic apparatus one of their main victories as social movement organisations. I interviewed Victor Cabezas, the General Secretary of the CSCIOB, on 4th November 2016, and Hugo López, Secretary for Participation and Social Control of CSUTCB, three days later. On both occasions, in their respective La Paz offices, the leaders insisted that this, that is participation in government, is what they had fought for (Interview with Victor Cabezas, 4th November 2016; Interview with Hugo López, 7th November 2016). In an interview given in 2013, Juan Cruz de la Villca, who had risen through the ranks of both the COB (*Central Obrera Boliviana*, Bolivian Workers' Central) and the CSUTCB to serve in the Morales administration, including as the 'Chief of Strengthening of Social Organisations' at the Vice-ministry for Social Movement Coordination, stated that:

> "The one thing we had all been conscious of was that throwing stones from the outside would not do anything to those inside, so we had to get inside, in the political arena, at the same level as them" (Juan Cruz de la Villca in García Yapur et al, 2015).

The access gained to the spaces of decision-making is unprecedented for indigenous peasant leaders in a post-colonial country like Bolivia. As such, they have focused on getting their demands pushed through the Bolivian state institutions, moving, as put by Morales himself, from 'protest to proposal' (*de la protesta a la propuesta*). This presented a number of challenges for social movement leaders without much experience of formal, institutionalised politics, however. Walter Limache, director of *Programa NINA,* a leadership training program in La Paz that many of the social movement leaders that are now in government passed through, described hearing about the first weeks of the Morales administration in 2006 in the following way:

> "Once the comrades are already in the space of public administration, they evaluate and say: Damn!, … it is no longer enough to be a good leader, responsible and transparent, but is also going to be necessary to possess certain elements, certain instruments, of public administration… Taking power has not just meant taking the seat. For example, in relation to this, David [Choquehanca, foreign secretary under Morales], told me… I think about nine days into being in power… I say: 'How's it going?' 'Hm', he says, 'we're only administering, we haven't been able to change anything… I can't even change my driver'." (Interview with Walter Limache, 5th October 2016).

The emphasis on learning how to do public administration, however, has meant that efforts to transform the institutions of the state in a more profound, radical way have all but vanished. Thus, this new wave of incorporation (Rossi, 2017) appears to be just that, rather than an actual transformation of the institutions of the state as many had hoped. Raquel Gutiérrez, a Mexican activist and intellectual, former Bolivian guerrilla fighter and the ex-wife of Morales' vice-president, García Linera, argues that there is indeed "a distinct discourse, but … not a renewed way of doing politics" (Gutiérrez, 2017). As discussed above, plans for systems of direct representation have dissolved, and the access of the social movement organisations to decision-making is mediated by the MAS political party.

The promise of direct democracy remains unfulfilled, "rather than something that they have actually operationalized in their current political practice" (Grisaffi, 2017: 61). The MAS has been behaving much more like a traditional political party than it had promised to (Grisaffi, 2017; Zegada & Komadina, 2014). Formal rules for managing the relationship between MAS and the social movements that created it were not established once MAS became the governing party. There is no legal framework requiring the party, for example, to obtain formal consent of the Unity Pact organisations before making political decisions. Thus, despite the fact many of the demands of the SMOs under study have been met though constitutional reform, legislative change, and implementation, *and* they continue to have unprecedented *access* to spaces of decision-making, their *impact* on those decisions is more complex and less significant than might be expected under a so-called 'social movement government'.

Inclusions and exclusions

As mentioned above, the extent to which social movement organisations can be said to have been co-opted will also depend on their internal dynamics, not just external opportunities. Exploring the internal strength of the organisations under study, it would be hard to deny that they have been weakened, to different degrees, since 2009, at least if their capacity to mobilise in opposition to the government is taken as a measure of 'strength'. Many of their leaders with the experience of popular struggles became part of the government, leaving their organisations with younger and less experienced, or less competent, leaders.

> "The social force, its main leaders, moved on to form part of the state bureaucracy. As this happened, their organisations are with their wings clipped, with new unexperienced leaders, without the valour or the possibility to confront or to critique or to appeal to their older leaders, who are within the government, always thinking that they are their allies" (Interview with Hernán Avila).

This combination of loyalty to the government and loss of the most experienced leaders has indeed weakened Bolivia's indigenous social movement organisations, especially compared to the height of mobilising capacity they had in the early 2000s.

The organisations themselves are aware of this, however, and have been devising strategies to respond to this unintended consequence of helping bring to power a government of their own choosing (numerous interviews, 2016). This is also not something that they have not had to face before, as under the opportunities provided under the Law of Popular Participation from 1994, many SMO leaders, especially of the CSUTCB and CIDOB, took up positions within municipal government; this also robbed the organisations of the most experienced leaders, but also provided new learning experiences and greater possibilities of implementation (Albó, 2008: 51). For example, when I visited the departmental branch of the *Bartolinas* in Santa Cruz introduced above, their office was hosting a leadership workshop for leaders, activists, and new members alike. This was organised with the support of the above-mentioned senator Felipa Merino, as well as congresswoman (MAS) Isabel Ortega, formerly Vice-minister for Indigenous Justice ('Indigenous Originary Peasant Justice). Isabel Ortega, in fact, was leading the workshop, sharing her experiences from years of struggle as a Quechua peasant woman.[95]

It is also crucial, at this point, to highlight that this description of experiences of access to decision-making applies much more to the 'triplets' (the CSUTCB, CSCIOB and the *Bartolinas*), than it does to the 'twins' of CIDOB and CONAMAQ. Moreover, even the *Bartolinas* complained to me that the President should consult them more (Interviews with María Muñoz, Felipa Merino, 22nd October 2016). Although the CSUTCB and CSCIOB in particular see their bureaucratic participation positively, there are current and former members of all five of the indigenous SMOs studied, who complain that those who truly have struggled,

[95] In fact, just like Evo Morales, Isabel Ortega moved from the Quechua highlands to Aymara valleys, and has thus been described as both Aymara and Quechua, and involved in combined indigenous peasant struggles. The Bolivian example thus brings to fore the question of what 'indigeneity' means. Clearly an 'Indian' to the white and *mestizo* elites he displaced, Evo Morales is accused by indigenous opponents of instrumentally using indigenous symbols, without 'really' being 'Indian', at least not anymore.

the so-called organic members, are being marginalised by 'invited' technocrats (numerous interviews, 2016; Garcés, 2010; García Yapur *et al*, 2015; Schavelzon, 2012; Zegada & Komadina, 2014). In its concern with expanding the state, effective governance and the implementation of public policies—although those are arguably legitimate aims in their own right (Kohl & Bresnahan, 2010)—the governing party has indeed limited internal spaces of debate.

In this pursuit of bureaucratic efficiency, the "new 'invited members' began to occupy parliamentary positions, which indicated a step away from the initial government's direct identification with indigenous-popular movements" (Dinerstein, 2015: 161). As a result, "the inclusion of hitherto underrepresented sectors of society has also produced new exclusion, as not all of these sectors have been represented equally" (Schilling-Vacaflor, 2011: 11). This relates back to Yashar's point, about if and how minority representatives, despite their access to spaces of political decision-making, can get their agendas reflected in government policy. This has been an obstacle that the CIDOB and the CONAMAQ, despite their participation in the constituent assembly, have not been able to overcome. After the 2005 election, many CIDOB and CONAMAQ leaders took up positions within the MAS government. However, their experience has largely been disappointing; as the government has not pushed for a more radical transformation of the state and the economy, especially the latter's reliance on primary resource extraction, the interests of those two organisations have been increasingly side-lined.

CIDOB's Bienvenido Zacu, for example, recounted how he served as a MAS Parliament member in the first Morales administration, but felt he was simply expected to the vote for whatever the government proposed (Interview with Bienvenido Zacu, 19th October 2016). This limiting of spaces of internal debate, explored above, has been a much bigger problem for the CIDOB and CONAMAQ since their demands are increasingly at odds with MAS policy, unlike the demands of the CSUTCB, CSCIOB and the *Bartolinas*. Consequently, Bienvenido Zacu decided to leave and return to Santa Cruz to organise in his local community and in cooperation with the now-opposition CIDOB.

This can be contrasted with the experiences of indigenous representatives in regional assemblies, where in some cases they were not elected on the MAS ticket, but directly by their respective communities through traditional election methods (*usos y costumbres*). In the Santa Cruz departmental assembly, for example, the indigenous representatives actually remained independent of MAS, forming their own caucus. (Interviews with some of these representatives in 2011 are described above, p. 190). This has meant that they have been able to use strategic alliances with both the left-wing MAS and the right-wing VERDES party to push for their demands. Although this does not mean they have been able to get aspects of their agenda met successfully, they have maintained a more strategic political independence than the CIDOB and CONAMAQ national leaders could within the MAS (Krausova, 2012; Postero, 2017; Zegada & Komadina, 2014).

As such, the protest cycle conceptualisation—suggesting the inevitable decline of social movements through simultaneous co-optation and radicalisation—can only help us so far in understanding the ongoing impact of social movements on government decision-making in Bolivia. The early 2000s in Bolivia defied the protest cycle expectations, and the formation of the MAS administration challenged the notion that social movement activity will decline after

any access to the spaces of decision making have been gained, and that this implies co-optation on the one hand and radicalisation on the other. This radicalisation then leads to the eventual demise of collective action, as it puts potential members, activists, and allies off from participating.

On one level, this is true in Bolivia today, as discussed above. Many protest leaders have now been 'co-opted' into government positions. While many of their demands have been met, more radical transformations of the state or the economy have not taken place. Those who have been disappointed by such developments have remained, in many cases choosing to remain, outside of the spaces of decision-making. On another level, however, this misses the ongoing, everyday collective agency and strategic decision-making of leaders and activists on both sides of the institutionalisation barricade. This is illustrated below by tracing the strategies of indigenous collective actors in Bolivia since 2011, and in particular the experiences of the CIDOB and the CONAMAQ.

6.4.3 Indigenous resistance to an indigenous government: 2011-2016

> "The Bolivian proceso de cambio has not resolved the structures of racism it promised to overcome… The MAS state systematically privileges extractivist development over the desires of lowlands indigenous communities… And despite its discourse of decolonization, the MAS state has utilized co-optation, police violence, and legal mechanisms to silence its opponents, including indigenous groups. Thus, the accomplishments of the Bolivian process of change must also be measured in relation to these ongoing exclusions" (Postero, 2017: 181).

As discussed above, CIDOB and CONAMAQ have left the Unity Pact; in actuality, they have split into two organisations, one in support and one in opposition to the government. The opposition, so-called *organic*, organisations have maintained more legitimacy, especially internationally, thanks to their independence from the government, and an increasingly environmentalist stance. This is particularly the case given the TIPNIS conflict (also introduced above), which kicked off in 2011, and which represents the turning point in the relationship between Bolivian social movements and "their" government, and the beginning of the fragmentation discussed below. This highlights the contradictory notions of what *indigeneity* means, as already touched on. Moreover, it shows the need to insist on differentiating political indigenous identities, which are now taken up both in support and in opposition to the MAS government. The long-standing antagonisms between indigenous social movement organisations, subsumed to an impressive extent by the Unity Pact, have resurfaced forcefully.

As Walter Limache points out, before the early 2000s, these SMOs pursued their own agendas, reflecting the demands of their specific, even if overlapping, constituencies:

> "Social organisations in Bolivia, mainly the peasant and indigenous organisations,… before Evo ascended to government, had their own agendas related to the claims on their rights, necessities; it was a sectoral demand, that is to say, the CSUTCB as peasants on one side, the Bartolinas, did their own thing, the interculturales [CSCIOB], which before was the Union Confederation of Colonizers of Bolivia, the CONAMAQ…, and the CIDOB, which includes the indigenous peoples of the lowlands. All of these included in their mobilisations their sectoral demands, that is to say, just their own. And of course, one of

> those demands was access and titles to land. They fought among themselves for access to natural resources" (Interview with Walter Limache, 5th October 2016).

Following the unity of the late 2000s, it was with the first TIPNIS mobilisation in 2011, detailed below, where these long-standing divisions within the indigenous peasant movement emerged again, this time apparently to stay. Since then, clashes between pro- and anti-government indigenous and popular sectors underscore "a disheartening trend toward creating an Indigenous project 'from above', one that generates new Indigenous exclusions and that makes decolonization an even more elusive goal" (Lucero, 2017: 315).

On 15th August 2011, the eighth indigenous March left Trinidad, marching across the country to La Paz in defense of the TIPNIS territory. It was led by the TIPNIS leadership including Fernando Vargas and Adolfo Moya, CIDOB representatives under the presidency of Adolfo Chávez, as well other lowland indigenous organisations, with the support of CONAMAQ, headed then by Rafael Quispe. This was in response to the government announcement that it plans to build a road through the territory, in order to connect the Beni and Pando departments (construction on parts of the road outside of the protected territory had already begun by then). After the intention to march was announced earlier in the month, a series of negotiations with government ministers was organised, with CIDOB's Adolfo Chávez at this time, as well as the CEPIB and various other regional organisations. Following these talks, Hernán Ávila form the CEJIS NGO recalls that it seemed the march would be called off in early August;

> "They were signing an agreement... So, with a colleague, we went to look for the President of TIPNIS, Adolfo Moya… We went to look for him and found him filling up with gasoline at a station, and we said: 'Look, it's being decided, what are you doing here?' We had this idea that the government had sent a plane for him and already taken him to La Paz, and that's why he was not present. But he said: 'Don't worry, I'm on my way'. And it turns out the CPMB had already agreed with the TIPNIS leadership to march, on the 15th. So, Adolfo Moya arrives, … saying: 'You can negotiate as much as you like, but you will not negotiate the TIPNIS. That is our decision. And if you want, negotiate with the minister, do what you like, but we, on 15th August, as TIPNIS, are going to march.' And so, this was the end, the negotiations fell apart. So, Adolfo Chávez, who was orchestrating this whole agreement, having a good political instinct, immediately comes to the other side, saying: 'Comrades, prepare the canoes, on the 15th we leave, no one can stop us!' And that's how it happened." (Interview with Hernán Ávila, 18th October 2016, Santa Cruz).

I was not able to speak to Adolfo Chávez as his whereabouts were unknown at the time of my field research.[96] However, this is consistent with the historical conflict within the CIDOB about strategy, in terms of whether to pursue negotiation or more disruptive tactics. This time, however, an alliance with the indigenous-peasant SMOs was not on the table. Instead, the "triplets", especially the CSCIOB, were vocally in favour of the road, and tragically mobilising against the lowland indigenous marchers. Still, on August 15th that year, hundreds of TIPNIS residents and their NGO and environmentalist supporters set out on the 370-mile journey to La Paz. Throughout the march, Hernán Ávila and a report on the TIPNIS struggle produced by the

[96] As detailed below, Adolfo Chávez is out of the country (as of 2016), fleeing politically-motivated corruption charges.

Santa Cruz NGO CIPCA (Lopez Rivas *et al*., 2010) recall that negotiations were taking place and messengers from the government kept bringing offers in exchange for the suspension of the mobilisation.[97]

Still, the march was strong enough to continue ahead, until at Chaparina, near Villa Tunari, its route was blocked by local coca-growers, resulting in a standoff lasting a number of days. Eventually, the then Minister of the Interior, Sacha Llorenti, arrived at the location in order to negotiate. Indigenous women participating in the TIPNIS march attempted to use him as a human shield in order to break through the (Aymara and Quechua) coca-growers' road block. This was unsuccessful, but all sides were invited to a negotiating table the next day. While the indigenous marchers were apparently considering whether to join this negotiation, armed police stormed their camps early in the morning next day, injuring at least 70 protesters and arresting others.

This unexpected repression from a supposedly social movement government sparked national outrage, and Morales quickly declared that he had no knowledge of such plans and that 'rogue' police officers had acted without official backing. Even two years after the incident and a number of investigations, the responsibility for the repression remained unassigned (Achtenberg, 2011, 2012, 2013b). For the analysis at hand, what matters is how this affected the trajectory of the march. The national and international outcry, and the refusal of the TIPNIS defenders to abandon the march onto La Paz, eventually forced the government to pass Law 180, which proclaimed the TIPNIS territory 'untouchable' (*intangible*).

This can be compared to the trajectory of the Bagua protests in Peru, discussed in Chapter 5. In both cases, it was not until state repression sparked domestic and international outrage, and galvanised broader support for the indigenous protesters, that a positive outcome was experienced. Repression imposes a high symbolic cost on the government, only increased by the fact that makes continued protest in the face of repression seem more legitimate and the protesters more worthy. Though in neither case the immediate government action (repeal of decrees in the Peruvian case and passing of Law 180 in Bolivia) necessarily resolved the issue permanently, it can still be seen as a concrete advantage, and thus a positive outcome in relation to the specific protest events in question.

For the CIDOB and CONAMAQ, the TIPNIS battle in 2011 may have been won, but since 2016 they appear to be losing the war. Although Law 180 was passed, proclaiming the TIPNIS as 'untouchable', a controversial consultation was carried out in the communities by the government (Achtenberg, 2013c; Postero, 2017). Its conclusion was that the majority of the indigenous communities within the TIPNIS supported the road project, in exchange for government investment in expanding access to basic services. However, the government made it clear that *without* giving consent to the road, it will not provide basic services for the communities (Teijeiro Villaroel, 2011).[98] Such governmental strategies and the pre-existing

[97] According to Hernán Avila, participants were allegedly also being offered cash to return to their communities, and as the march went on, many apparently took these offers up. This may have exacerbated the fact that the march was already relatively small.

[98] Moreover, the TIPNIS leadership, headed by Fernando Vargas in 2011, accused the government of dividing the communities by providing material gifts to select community leaders in exchange for their support.

divisions within the communities themselves, further weakened the TIPNIS resistance, and the indigenous movement as a whole.

As such, the government exploited, rather than trying to surpass, this false dichotomy; it could have opened a space of dialogue and arrive at a proposal that ensures the self-determination to indigenous communities and their territories, while allowing the development of the region. In that sense, the state has seen the indigenous right to consent in a negative way, like a right to a veto, rather than as an opportunity to rethink the relationship between state and society (Garcés, 2013). The government and indigenous social movement organisations have failed to truly combine the policy of recognition and redistribution, instead of insisting on dichotomising them. The future of the road remains uncertain, although as detailed below, the government has, as of August 2017, repealed Law 180 and thus TIPNIS' 'untouchability'.

Of CONAMAQs

In the tracing above, CONAMAQ as an organisation has been explored the least. Known in Bolivia as one of the "twins", CONAMAQ indeed has more in common with the CIDOB—generally demanding recognition and autonomy in the language of difference—than with the "triplets". At the same time, it is in a more complicated position than CIDOB. Representing highland Aymara communities, it competes for support and legitimacy with the more redistribution/equal rights focused activism in the highlands, especially that of the CSUTCB and the *Bartolinas*.

The neoliberal reforms of the 1990s provided the impetus for the movement to reconstitute the *ayllu* in the highlands, as only communities considered authentically indigenous by the state could obtain TCO status, and only one form of local organising, either the union or the *ayllu*, would be recognised by the state. As such, communities that had for decades combined traditional Andean structures of authority with union organising now had to officially choose. This took place in a context of the spread of a movement to reconstitute the *ayllu* system, which emerged in the 1980s. The historically uneven penetration of unionism in parts of the Bolivian highlands has meant that elements of the *ayllu* community governance system survived in certain places, either preventing the adoption of union-style practices of the CSUTCB, competing with them, or merging in various ways. This provided a fertile ground for the emergence of the more recognition-focused CONAMAQ in challenge to the CSUTCB.

Such local conflicts over authority and representation, however, have been present in one way or another since the 1952 revolution; what gave the impetus for the formation of the CONAMAQ were the efforts of Aymara intellectuals and the support provided to them by international funders, such as Oxfam and the Danish NGO IBIS (Albó, 2008: 54-56). In particular, the 'Oral Andean History Workshop' (THOA, *Taller de Historia Oral Andina*), founded as a research-*cum*-activist group in 1983 by the students of the Aymara activist and intellectual Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, her being one of its first leaders, played a crucial role in the movement and in the foundation of CONAMAQ in 1997 (Albó, 2008; Criales & Condonero, 2016: 166; Lucero, 2008; Stephenson, 2002). The Aymara intellectuals and activists involved in THOA "promoted encounters with traditional leaders and in various places managed to get the leaders to restructure their local unions as *ayllus*" (Albó, 2008: 55). As

such, they played an important role in the establishment of a nationally representative organisation with enough politicised *ayllus* to represent.

CONAMAQ's main aims, then, have been to struggle for the recognition and self-determination of highland indigenous nations (especially the Aymara) and their territory, through the re-establishment of the *ayllu* government system and the protection of Mother Earth (numerous interviews, 2016; García Linera *et al*., 2010). This provided the organisation with greater authenticity in front of transnational funders, but presented challenges of representation due to the uneven spread of actually existing *ayllus*, presenting obstacles for the organisation's struggle to become a national force in its own right.[99]

Moreover, CONAMAQ's claim to the 'authenticity' of leadership has thus been challenged more, by its purported constituencies and opponents alike; to counter this, the organisation has in recent years focused more and more on its environmental agenda. This makes sense at a time when they have been marginalised by a government that continues to rely on an extractive economy, while proclaiming that it protects the Mother Earth and employing the same symbols of (highland) indigenous identity in public spectacles as CONAMAQ.

This was evident at an event organised by CEDIB (Bolivia Centre for Documentation and Information, *Centro de Documentación e Información Bolivia*) on November 10th and 11th, 2016, in the city of Cochabamba. Organised in Bolivia's 'city of eternal spring', and the stage of the 2000 Water War, the event was called 'Water and Energy for Life' and brought together academics, civil society organisations and social movements to discuss and develop strategies for dealing with climate change and achieving water sovereignty in Bolivia.[100] Cristóbal Huanca and other highland indigenous authorities were also there, representing the 'organic' CONAMAQ. They contributed with impassioned speeches about the need to protect Mother Earth, and what the rest of Bolivia can learn from an indigenous cosmovision about living in harmony with nature.

Another example of the ways in which indigenous activists are organising in opposition to a supposedly indigenous government in 2016 was a meeting of the 'organic' CONAMAQ, in a classroom of the San Andrés University in La Paz, on November 4th, 2016.[101] At this meeting of about 15 highland indigenous authorities, both men and women, the main topic was the disappointments of the Morales government. These leaders had fought in the struggles of the early 2000s, and many had served in the MAS administration. They agreed, however, that it

[99] Still, even if the *ayllu* had been more widespread as an organisational form throughout the Bolivian highlands, CONAMAQ's ethnicist view of an indigenous (Aymara) identity would arguably also pose a challenge. Its view of an Aymara identity is not just tied to language or provenance, but it is tied, like Felipe Quispe's vision, to a particular lifestyle. Aymaras that move to the city, take up union positions or make other choices that take them away from their rural communities and the obligations they are supposed to perform there are considered 'sell outs' or 'traitors'. In this understanding, being an 'Indian' is tied to a particular lifestyle and specific cultural practices, with language or experience of discrimination not enough to allow one to claim an indigenous identity. As such, this is a political vision that is difficult to 'sell' even to many Aymaras, let alone the country as a whole.

[100] This was at the time when one of the worst draughts in Bolivia for years was beginning to hit the country.

[101] This is due to the fact that the 'organic' faction was forcibly removed from their offices La Paz offices in 2013 by the police; this was done with explicit government support and in order for the pro-government 'official' CONAMAQ to be able to claim the offices as theirs (Achtenberg, 2014).

was no longer possible to have a "real debate" as part of the government, which is why they chose to return to their communities and continue their struggle from without.

At this meeting, I also interviewed Cristóbal Huanca, the leading authority of the 'organic' CONAMAQ in 2016. This was one day after I had spoken to Gregorio Choque Quispe, the leader of the 'official' CONAMAQ, the faction affiliated to the government, in their La Paz office. In fact, both men introduced themselves using the same traditional Aymara title, that of the *Arquiri Apu Mallku*. Before delving into their differences, it is important to note that their *demands* are very similar. Both leaders spoke of three main claims of the organisations they represent: (1) recognition of the right to ancestral territory and self-governance, (2) respect for the internationally-recognised regime of indigenous rights as set out by the ILO 169, and (3) a guaranteed percentage of the Direct Hydrocarbons Tax (IDH), implemented by Morales, for indigenous communities.

As such, the content of the demands of both 'CONAMAQs' centres on recognition, but also involves an element of redistribution in making a claim for the resources from hydrocarbon exploration. As detailed above, in the early 2000s the demand for control over the profits from natural resource exploration was indeed the central goal of popular demands, and a unifying symbol for indigenous, peasant and urban social movement organisations. And this goal remains reflected in the current agendas of all the indigenous social movement organisations studied here.

What the two factions of CONAMAQ thus differ on is not the actual content of their demands, and mostly not their framing either, but their strategies to try to secure those goals, related to their evaluation of the successes and failures of the Morales administration. Gregorio Choque Quispe, of the pro-government faction, highlights that the MAS government has made possible the political participation of indigenous peoples in Bolivia, with "public policy that now gives us our rights… the struggle has cost us, but at least we have advanced" (Interview with Gregorio Choque Quispe, 3rd November 2016). He also argues that much progress has been made in terms of access to education and health services for indigenous communities, along with anti-discrimination legislation.

At the same time, he admits that much more could have been done by the current administration. Moreover, when asked what he considers the biggest achievement of CONAMAQ throughout its history, he is clear that this was the ratification of the ILO 169 and the recognition of indigenous rights—especially territorial rights—as part of the multicultural reforms in the 1990s. As such, the main focus of the organisation is, and has consistently been, the demand for recognition with some redistribution, legitimated by an almost exclusively right to difference framing. As discussed for the CIDOB above, such framing is logical since the organisation's main stated goals revolve around recognition. However, the organisation does also have redistributive goals, even though these are still justified though the language of difference. Can this be understood as a lack of *coherence* between some of the demands of the organisations and the way in which it legitimates them, and might this have any negative consequences for the way in which it is perceived by constituents, supporters, targets and opponents?

This was also reflected in the language used by Cristóbal Huanca, the Mallku of the 'organic' CONAMAQ. Yet while the content of the demands may be more or less the same, for Huanca the hard-won rights in the constitution are being violated by the Morales administration, especially the right to local autonomy, including the right to practice indigenous justice. This is unlike Choque Quispe, who, while agreeing that much more implementation of the constitution is necessary, is rather more optimistic about the government's ability to make progress on these issues in the future. On the question of indigenous autonomy, progress has indeed been very slow, but the first indigenous autonomous territory has indeed been established and legalised in 2017, in Charagua in the lowlands. It is not without its contradictions, of course (see Postero, 2017), but it is still an advance. Still, like the other CONAMAQ authorities, Cristóbal Huanca thus explains that he has chosen to continue the fight "from the outside", because those who are part of or loyal to the Morales administration, including the 'official' CONAMAQ, "simply approve [government laws and decrees]; they don't have their own proposals in the face of the so-called process of change" (Interview with Cristóbal Huanca, 4th November 2016).

He also argues that the Morales administration is able to control many indigenous leaders with threats of prison, in the wake of the large corruption scandal involving the Indigenous Development Fund (*Fondo Indígena,* FONDIOC). In 2013 a corruption scandal erupted, when it emerged that many development projects, funded and marked as finished in the Fund's books, never took place. As a result of the discovery of these 'ghost' projects, a number of social movement leaders with positions in the Fund were arrested and some have been sentenced on corruption charges (Achtenberg, 2016; Flores, 2017; Gustafson, 2016). The Fund was set up by the MAS administration to distribute the IDH hydrocarbons revenue directly to indigenous and peasant communities. Representatives of the five indigenous organisations under study here were given positions within the Fund, in order to propose, approve and fund projects in their respective communities. This was a central demand of the five organisations analysed here, including CIDOB and CONAMAQ.

At the same time, many of the indigenous leaders, activists, and NGO workers I interviewed in 2016, including Cristóbal Huanca, accused the government of exploiting the scandal to control indigenous leaders—those who have not been arrested but worked in or benefited from the Fund—with threats of prosecution on corruption charges unless they remain loyal. Adolfo Chávez, CIDOB's President since 2006 and a fierce critic of the government since the explosion of the TIPNIS conflict, left the country following corruption charges related to the Fund in 2015. Seeking protection from political persecution in neighbouring Latin American countries, he has served as 'organic' CIDOB's President in exile since then.

This is has affected not only the "twins". Damián Condori, a former General Secretary of the CSUTCB and MAS member, imprisoned between 2015 and 2017 as part of the Indigenous Fund scandal, is now a potential candidate for the BSM (*Bolivia Somos Todos,* We Are All Bolivia) formed by dissident MAS members. In a 2013 interview, he had this to say about the relationship between the CSUTCB and MAS:

> "Why do we say that the CSUTCB is the father of the Political Instrument? In a Congress about Land and Territory, in Santa Cruz, in this national event, the Political Instrument was born, and this is why we say that we do not have any other political instrument except the MAS. Another thing is to distance ourselves from the MAS saying that it no longer takes

> us into account, when we should be able to have control over it, and this is what is missing for us. That is to say, we are the owners of the MAS, not the leaders; the leaders [including Morales] are our representatives, but there is still confusion on this topic" (Damián Condori in García Yapur et al, 2015: 119).

During the field research in 2016, there was a definite sense of fear in Bolivia that being in opposition to the Morales administration was potentially dangerous, even for the seasoned leaders and activists that fought to bring the government to power. Rather than providing opportunities for internal debate and strengthening of the 'process of change', dissent has certainly been discouraged, if not actively persecuted. In this context, the two CONAMAQ factions continue to share the same goals and to an extent framing, although unsurprisingly their tactics are diametrically opposed. Moreover, internally their claiming and framing do not seem to always go easily hand-in-hand.

Of CIDOBs

Another example of how indigenous leaders are strategising in recent years was the already mentioned '*Encounter of Indigenous Leaders of TCOs/TIOCs of the Lowlands'*, in Santa Cruz, taking place on 21st and 22nd October 2016. This meeting of current indigenous representatives from all the lowland departments and the movement's historical leaders, all of which are now generally in opposition to the MAS government, was supported by both CEJIS and *Fundación Tierra* (Land Foundation), NGOs that continue to be among the foremost civil society organisations accompanying and supporting indigenous struggles in Bolivia. They have played a particularly important role in providing resources and technical support for the lowland indigenous organisations, shaping to an extent the framing of the indigenous movements in this part of the country (Andolina *et al*., 2009; Yashar, 2005). They have aided indigenous leaders in forming transnational links and helped the discourse of indigenous rights, as defined by international norms, to proliferate. The continued support organisations like this provide was evident during this *Encounter*.

At this meeting, both current community representatives and past leaders[102] discussed the future of the 'indigenous movement' in Bolivia. Representatives of the TIPNIS, TIM (Indigenous Multi-ethnic Territory), APG, CENAMIB[103] and other lowland indigenous communities and organisations were present, as well as past CIDOB presidents and a high number of female indigenous leaders. The venue and the accompanying technical support were provided by CEJIS and *Fundación Tierra*, whose representatives also provided a large amount of information to the attendees about the state of land titling in Bolivia, the extent to which indigenous territories are being protected or not, and the expansion of forestry and mining

[102] The leaders, or authorities (*autoridades)*, rejected the term 'ex-leader'; even if they were not currently representing a specific indigenous community or organisation, they said 'once an indigenous leader, always an indigenous leader'. In this sense, the position corresponds more to the term 'elder' than 'representative', as they are not selected through a vote, but rather gain their position through traditional indigenous community methods *(usos y costumbres).*

[103] National Confederation of Indigenous Women of Bolivia (*Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Indígenas de Bolivia*); this recently established women's wing of the CIDOB—in parallel to the complementarity of the *Bartolinas* to the CSUTCB—is not analysed here fully as it was only founded in 2007 (Rousseau & Hudon, 2017).

concession throughout the country. Alcides Vadillo, a long-time head of the *Fundación*[104], introduced the *Encounter* with a presentation about the state of land and territory in the country. In particular, he summarized how now, that is in 2016, there were 55 TIOCs in the lowlands and 135 in the highlands, representing 31% of land in the country, while 26% was fiscal land. The main problem is that some of the fiscal land includes national parks and other protected areas, some of which have indigenous communities living in them (some without an official TIOC), and these lands are being opened up to commercial exploration and extraction.

Moreover, even the validity of some TIOC titles is being questioned, and land invasions of landless families and communities into already established TIOCs is apparently not being addressed anymore.[105] One way in which this has been happening is the government supporting the creation of so-called General Plans of Forest Management (*Planes Generales de Manejo Forestal*) in the TIOCs, which allows for them to be opened up to logging and other forms of resource extraction. This is important as these 'management plans' are being put into the hands of the indigenous communities themselves, and are creating conflict within them as to how to best manage the territory. Alcides argued that this is causing divisions as wealth disparity begins to emerge in the communities, which also struggle internally over whether to accept and how to use compensation offered by private companies, with state support, to exploit the resources within the TIOCs.

Marcial Fabricano also spoke of how loggers visited one Guaraní community and convinced many young men, "our own blood", to go work with them.[106] This is nothing new; rather it is an ongoing struggle for indigenous communities how to deal with the rich natural resources in their territories (Bebbington, 2012), and an ongoing debate for indigenous and environmental rights activists, supporters and academics alike. This thesis is certainly not the place to try to settle such debate, even if that was possible; rather, it focuses on the agency of indigenous individuals when making their voices heard through protest and mobilisation, and the strategic decisions of their leaders. The *Encounter* thus highlights the divisions within the indigenous movement in Bolivia, reflecting the divisions that exist in local indigenous communities.

[104] The Foundation's offices were ransacked and Alcides himself was publicly denounced in Santa Cruz, at the height of the region's right-wing anti-government separatist struggle in 2009, for his work supporting indigenous and peasant land rights in Bolivia.

[105] This is the purview of the National Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA); it does continue to investigate and resolve cases of land invasions. However, just as the pace of land redistribution has slowed down in Bolivia in recent years, so has the ability of the Institute weakened in its capacity to discipline the land occupations, especially when government affiliated SMOs are disputing each other's claims. Still, it is clear that the already-granted protection of many TCOs is being questioned.

[106] This quote above about 'our blood' also reflects the framing of indigenous rights that was used at this event. It reflects the distinction made by scholars of nationalism between an ethnic national identity (jus sanguine, law of blood) and a civic national identity (jus soli¸ law of the land). The former means one has to be born into the nation, whereas in the latter living within the national territory and following the laws of the land is meant to be enough to be a citizen. This insistence on group rights based on an ethnic identity and the inviolability of ancestral territories makes sense when the integrity of those territories is being threatened and the authority of traditional elders questioned. At the same time, it is problematic in its essentialising of indigeneity, ignoring power relations and power struggles within indigenous communities, and the agency of the community members themselves.

Indeed, some of the younger indigenous leaders attending, interestingly especially the younger female leaders, listed 'productive development' and access to services as the top demands of their communities, and did not categorically reject resource extraction. The inability of many of the old-guard indigenous leaders present at this workshop to convince some in their own communities to reject any forms of resource exploitation in their territories, is telling of the extent to which indigenous politics in the country is now fragmented and divided, and once strong and unifying leaders and organisations if not disarticulated, then certainly weakened.

Overcoming fragmentation through new framing?

What, then, might be in store for indigenous and other popular social movements in Bolivia? The indigenous movement as a whole is now fragmented, and the CIDOB and CONAMAQ weakened and disarticulated. Yet there are attempts to overcome this fragmentation, and the potential of this should not be underestimated. It is also an environmental agenda in resistance to extraction that seems to be the key focus of such attempts since 2016. The government's most recent National Development Plan also stipulates that when tensions between development and the rights of the Mother Earth emerge, the government needs to consult the bases through their social movement organisations, and find consensus (MPD, 2016). The rhetoric that the government seeks consensus is also maintained by the CSUTCB and CSCIOB, as well as numerous government officials, including vice-ministers (numerous interviews, 2016). As discussed above, however, no formal mechanisms have been institutionalised to seek such consensus, even if it was possible to reach one and the government was actually interested in obtaining it.

When asked about whether the government seeks consensus from social organisations, Cristóbal Huanca of the 'organic' CONAMAQ had this to say:

> "This is really a lie. When the government defends Mother Earth, it's just talk for abroad, but here in Bolivia it doesn't defend Mother Earth. There is mining and oil extraction, which harms Mother Earth, and natural parks are being licensed off" (Interview with Cristóbal Huanca, 4th November 2016).

For Cristóbal, just like it was for the opposition leaders of the lowland indigenous movement, the focus of demands is predominantly recognition, although the redistribution (such as access to hydrocarbons extractive revenue, the IDH, to fund 'productive projects') is still part of the agenda. Since 2011, it has been strategically useful for CONAMAQ, like CIDOB, to not only insist on this right to difference frame, but also adopt a more environmentalist legitimation of their claims. As such, Cristóbal Huanca highlighted to me how important the protection of Mother Earth is, and that his organisation is against all types of natural resource extraction in the communities. At the same time, however, the claim for redistribution of revenue from natural resource extraction (through the IDH and Indigenous Development Fund) also remains a central demand of CONAMAQ for him. This could be seen as a certain lack of *frame coherence*[107].

[107] The term *frame coherence* has not been, to my knowledge, used in the sociological literature to refer to the internal consistency of social movement frames. While the term frame *resonance* is common in

Framing demands for access to revenue from extraction in the language of protecting Mother Earth from extraction can undermine the worthiness of the organisation, making it more open to delegitimising tactics from targets and opponents alike. Such frame incoherence could also be detected in the deliberations of past CIDOB leaders and other lowland indigenous authorities at the workshop in Santa Cruz detailed above. Though this contradiction is arguably not irresolvable, the fact that it is not being addressed makes it easier for opponents to attack the organisations framing by invoking equal rights (of all Bolivians). As such, the framing used now by CIDOB and CONAMAQ no longer resonates not only with the MAS administration's policies, but also some of their own goals.

Both CONAMAQ and CIDOB are unsurprisingly disappointed that despite the years of struggle, their communities have not been given the local autonomy necessary to make decisions for themselves. This disappointment is so deep that some leaders have argued that the neoliberal multiculturalism of the 1990s had provided better opportunities for autonomy and self-determination. In fact, many of the indigenous authorities and former leaders present at the Santa Cruz encounter highlighted that the 1994 multicultural reforms served their purposes better. Marcial Fabricano, for example, discussed how the constitution then recognised the multi-ethnic and multicultural nature of Bolivia, which "was sufficient, already we were recognised" (Interview with Marcial Fabricano, 21st November 2016). This was echoed in an interview with Celso Padilla, a Guaraní elder and another past leader of CIDOB. During the years of both the dictatorship and the neoliberal governments, he argued, the indigenous people of the lowlands had their own indigenous governments that were 'left alone'; the government did not interfere in their affairs (Interview with Celso Padilla, 20th October 2016).

Still, as discussed above, the lowland indigenous communities and many of their leaders also make demands for access to education and basic services and the opportunity to participate in 'productive development', rather than autonomy without any state provision or protection. As such, neoliberal abandon or turning into 'isolated islands' (Pleyers, 2017) is not what CIDOB and CONAMAQ are demanding. At the same time, this contradiction is exploited, if not deliberately exacerbated, by the government. This puts their organisations in a difficult position, as the MAS government reinforces the notion that there are only two options, *either* autonomy without any state support or safeguards, *or* services and infrastructure funded by resources extraction in indigenous territories. It is in this context of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion that continuing indigenous resistance to an 'indigenous' government takes place.

Afterword: 2017

In July 2017, as the 'untouchability' of the TIPNIS territory was brought into debate again by pro-government and pro-road social movement organisations, the President declared on July 25th that the road will be built, 'sooner or later' (Razon, 2017). In August 2017, Law 1080 was repealed by the government in order to allow for the construction of the highway to resume, and indigenous and environmental resistance is growing again. The conflict is intensifying as these pages are written, with new indigenous leadership, especially female leadership, taking

the framing literature, this refers to the external correspondence between the framing of the movement and its targets, not the internal consistency of the movement's frames themselves.

the lead (Krausova, 2017). This may be a way to further challenge the problems of power and voice gender inequalities within indigenous communities, as well as reinvigorating and potentially reunifying indigenous collective action in Bolivia. This, however, remains to be seen.

CIDOB and the TIPNIS leadership are thus organising again, calling for mass resistance and potentially planning another lowland march. At the same time, on September 8th, 2017, 'organic' CONAMAQ co-signed the Achocalla Manifesto, with other indigenous authorities, leaders and representatives of various social organisations joined together in a 'Platform for Agrarian Debate', as part of the *'Movement for Dignity and Hope for the TIPNIS and for Protest'*. The document announces its support for popular and indigenous resistance to the extractive and developmental projects proposed in the TIPNIS park and TCO, the proposed Bala and Chepete mega-dams, among other struggles (Achtenberg, 2017). It condemns government policies as neo-colonial, despite the MAS' socialist and communitarian rhetoric. At the same time, it calls for the unity of social movements in Bolivia, given the "corrupt actions of national leaders that have sold themselves to the government for personal gain and left the bases defenceless", so that they can push for "social, economic and environmental policies to benefit the great majority of those most in need" (CONAMAQ, 2017).

This is revealing for many reasons, but especially the last quote. Historically, CONAMAQ's framing, in terms of the language legitimating its demands, has consistently made reference to the ancestral rights of indigenous communities, as pre-Columbian peoples. As such, the organisation's framing, much like that of the CIDOB, has tended to be that of the right to difference. Their opponents and targets, including since 2011 Evo Morales himself, have used this to accuse them of not caring about the interests of all 'Bolivians'. Even if there is little merit to this accusation given the legitimacy of indigenous rights internationally, it does expose the tension between the right to equality and the right to difference in terms of practical implementation. As discussed above, it arguably presents a *frame incoherence,* especially when asking for redistribution but justifying this through the language of difference. The above declaration's wording about the 'benefit for the majority in need' is a wording of equal rights, however, rather than the right to difference. Perhaps CONAMAQ's new leaders have noticed the strategic advantage of a more coherent framing?

6.5 Discussion: Claiming and framing during a 'process of change'

The so-called process of change in Bolivia, on the shoulders of indigenous and other popular social movements, sought to re-structure the state, by delegitimising its perceived neo-colonial structure and corrupt political parties. In doing so, it created a vacuum in which—at least so it seemed to the country's social movements—anything was possible. However, as this 'anything' was not well defined, the weight of much of the status quo prevailed, at least in the institutional and economic structures of the state. This is not to say that nothing has changed and the indigenous movements in question had not won anything; that much should be clear by now. However, a radical transformation into a de-colonised, communitarian state has certainly also not taken place. As such, Bolivia's story is very much a story of great change, and at the same time and perhaps unsurprisingly, a story of unfulfilled expectations (Dinerstein, 2015; Grisaffi, 2017; Lazar, 2008).

This chapter has traced the strategies—the claims, frames, and tactics—of indigenous movements in Bolivia, trying to link these to the outcomes they have experienced before, during and after the constituent assembly process that promised to radically reform the republic after Evo Morales was elected President in 2005. In doing so, it has sought to explore the extent to which the strategic choices of movement actors, regarding both their demands and the way in which they frame them, can help explain the successes and failures that the indigenous movement in general, and its constituent organisations in particular, have experienced. It has sought to follow-up the findings of a cross-national study of the outcomes of protest events in Latin America with an in-depth, qualitative investigation of the success of indigenous social movements in Bolivia. Focusing on cases from one country provides space for an in-depth investigation of the trajectories leading to different outcomes for different indigenous actors in the country.

It found further evidence for the importance of paying attention to demand-making by social movements, and how this interacts with their tactical strategies regarding disruption, mobilisation, alliances, and contentious repertoires. This included reconceptualising contentious repertoires, in order to pay attention to both their width and their flexibility, showing that they matter, but also that they do not necessarily go hand in hand. Moreover, it showed in further detail that the relationship between indigenous movements and left-wing governments is not straightforward. As shown by the quantitative analysis in Chapter 4, *ceteris paribus*, indigenous movements are more likely to achieve their goals under left-of-centre governments.

However, the analysis also found that there is a statistically significant interaction between movement demands and the political environment, even if in Chapter 4 this finding was rather tentative. That is to say, indigenous protests with *redistributive* demands seem to be much more likely to achieve their goals under a left-of-centre government, than under a right-wing government. It is proposed that this can be explained by the fact that redistributive claims resonate more with the political agenda of left-wing governments. For recognition-oriented collective action, at the same time, the political environment matters less. This is borne out by the qualitative analysis presented in this chapter, which shows that it is not only the resonance between movement demands and government partisanship that matters, but also with the way in which demands are framed.

Crucially, this chapter showed that further attention needs to be paid to the internal dynamics of indigenous movements' framing strategies, suggesting that this matters for their outcomes. The chapter suggested that there can sometimes be an inconsistency—an incoherence—between an indigenous organisation's main demands, and the language that it uses to claim them. That is to say, sometimes there is a discrepancy between *what* they are asking for and *how* they are asking for it; two elements of framing that are often conflated in the literature but that I argue here need to be conceptually separated in order to get a better understanding of the relationship between framing and social movement outcomes.

In the cases at hand, this was illustrated in that indigenous leaders and organisations sometimes ask for recognition using the language of equal rights, and at other times demanding redistribution invoking the right to difference. The chapter also tried to explain how this creates, at least seemingly, an internal incoherence. It is proposed that the authenticity of the

groups' struggle is easier to attack by its opponents, and to dismiss by its targets. If a group claims it has legitimate demands based in their ethno-linguistic difference (group right to difference), why should the rest of the country's citizens pay to also fund this groups' basic services, education, etc. (redistribution), or so an attack might go. This is not to say this is a legitimate criticism; the argument here is that it might make it more difficult for the indigenous collective actor to be seen as legitimate itself. However, does this really matter for social movement outcomes? If so, how? This needs to be evaluated further, and is indeed explored below in Chapter 7.

As such, this chapter has also highlighted that indigenous movements in Bolivia have demanded both recognition and redistribution, framed both in the language of equality and difference. As Sian Lazar highlights, collectively organised groups are claiming to have citizenship rights, but citizenship of where? Of what political community? (Lazar, 2013). And this is of course particularly pertinent to indigenous struggles. Theoretically, the new 2009 constitution clearly presents a challenge to liberal notion of rights (Alvarez *et al*., 1998; Postero, 2010, 2017; Yashar, 2005). Practically, however, since it combined both liberal and communitarian, representative and direct, visions of democracy, both individual and group rights, both the right to equality and to difference, it leaves unprecedented opportunities for political actors to define democracy and rights themselves, and struggle with other political actors about these definitions.

Given that the structure of the state does not appear to have been significantly altered, it is the political actor that can muster a political majority within the representative institutions of the central state that still seems to have the greatest power to impose their definition. This is still the MAS government of course, which is not afraid to use both persuasion and repression. The constitution does, however, allow other political actors to insist that their definition is just as legitimate, and it is up to other institutions, in particular the constitutional court and the electoral court, to decide about such claims. In a political situation where the MAS government has focused on policies of redistribution and the narrative of equal rights—albeit in a symbolically indigenous guise—asking for redistribution by invoking difference, rather than equality, seems to have proven to be counter-productive.

7. Indigenous social movement organisations in Bolivia: multiple paths to success

7.1 Introduction

The preceding chapter explored in detail the trajectories of indigenous collective organising in Bolivia. It showed that paying attention to the role of strategy in general and claiming and framing in particular can help explain the successes and failures of specific movement organisations, and by extension of the indigenous movement as a whole. Yet does this mean that there is a 'recipe for success' for indigenous movements? The preceding chapter discussed and compared the five most nationally important indigenous social movement organisations in Bolivia, in order to trace their evolution and experiences in the last fifteen years or so. At the same time, a systematic comparison of characteristics and outcomes experienced by those organisations was not the main aim of the previous chapter. What it did, however, was to set the stage for such an analysis, specifically for the application of the fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) that is developed in this chapter.

Social movement organisations are not static and homogenous entities, and the same goes for indigenous social movement organisations in Bolivia. Outwardly, they seek legitimacy to speak for their constituents, presenting themselves as the true representatives of a unified constituency, fighting for an uncontested set of goals, justified in an authentic language of rights and grievances. Yet as they do so, inwardly, they are also sites of internal debates, conflicts and struggles over how to do the very same. This much should be clear from the previous chapter. This chapter now turns to developing a comparative coding of the internal characteristics of the five indigenous social movement organisations under study. The nature of the political environment in which they operate is also coded. Crucially, and with some difficulty, a definition of a successful outcome is operationalised—using the insights of the conceptualisation of 'acceptance' and 'advantages' developed for the quantitative analysis—as 'influence on decision-making'. As explored in the previous chapter, this is complicated to measure, as access does not necessarily equal influence. As such, the reflection of the organisation' demands in government policy must also be taken into account. This is further explained below.

The insights of the preceding quantitative cross-national analysis of indigenous protest in 13 Latin American countries (Chapter 4), the mixed-method analysis of Bolivian and Peruvian protest events (Chapter 5) and the qualitative look at the trajectories of indigenous social movements in Bolivia (Chapter 6), have thus all set the stage for the fuzzy set Comparative Qualitative Analysis (fsQCA) that follows below. This method provides a systematic, comparative way through which to try and find the causal conditions—and their combinations—that can be argued to have led to outcomes observed for the indigenous social movement organisations under study. As discussed in Chapter 3, the fsQCA method is a way to apply a systematic comparative analysis to small- and medium-N qualitative data, using the methodological logic of matched cases. The data used here is thus the same field research data, collected in Bolivia in 2016, that is explored, explicated and evaluated in the previous chapter,

Chapter 6. As thus discussed above, it is based on a) semi-structured interviews with movement leaders and activists, past and present, other civil society actors and government representatives, as well as b) participant observation of a number of encounters and workshops organised or attended by representatives of the organisations under study.

This analysis finds two separate causal *paths* that seek to explain how the different indigenous SMOs in Bolivia, at different times, experienced varied levels of influence on government decision-making. Both paths show the importance of internal SMO characteristics, as well as interactions among them and with the political environment. The *first* causal path shows the need to legitimate redistributive demands with an equal rights framing, but also that given redistribution demands are more costly, necessitates a left-wing government in power. While the frame coherence discussed in Chapter 6 is part of this causal recipe, it is not sufficient. The interaction between demands and political environment is also crucial, as found in the quantitative analysis in Chapter 4. This path can be called the path of *claim and frame resonance*, as its success can be explained to a large extent by the resonance of the organisation's claiming and framing to the political agenda of the government in power. In the *second* causal path, framing coherence is also present. This is achieved as recognition demands are framed in the language of the right to difference; but again, this alone is not sufficient. For organisations of this type, having a wide contentious repertoire and a high propensity for making alliances is necessary in order to experience positive outcomes. This also corresponds to the findings above, especially those of Chapters 5 and 6, which highlight the importance of having a wide and flexible contentious repertoire, including the ability to seek and navigate strategic alliances. This causal recipe can be termed that of *tactical repertoires.*

These are two complex paths; the analysis also identifies more parsimonious solutions, which, despite some simplifying assumptions, shows the most commonly necessary causal conditions: higher propensity for forming alliances, and the presence of a left-wing executive. This confirms both (a) the findings of the comparison of protest events in Bolivia in Chapter 5 that alliances make a difference for protest outcomes and (b) the finding that overall, government partisanship is one of the most consistently significant factors affecting the chances of success for indigenous movements in Latin America.

7.2 Theoretical and methodological set-up: Looking for causal conditions

The theoretical grounding of the analysis that follows has been established in the preceding chapters. The findings of Chapters 4 and 5 suggest what protesters ask for, how they ask for it, and what tactics they use, impact their chances getting at least some of what they asked for. They also show that political opportunities matter. Building on this, the discussion in Chapter 6 of the trajectories and dynamics of indigenous organising in Bolivia shows the importance of 1) claiming and framing, 2) disruption and mobilising capacity, 3) contentious repertoires, 4) alliance building, and 5) the political environment, for explaining the outcomes experienced by those movements.

It was not possible to fully evaluate the impact of contentious repertoires or alliance-making on protest event outcomes in the first two empirical chapters, both due to lack of data and the

fact that these concepts relate more to social movement organisations and social movements in general, than individual protest events. As such, the preceding Chapter examined the evolution of the indigenous movement's contentious repertoire in Bolivia. The Qualitative Comparative Analysis of the indigenous SMOs in this chapter then evaluates the nature of the five indigenous and indigenous-peasant organisation's contentious repertoires as a potential causal condition, taking into account the width of the repertoire of contention (as shown in Chapter 6, the width and flexibility of contentious repertoires do not always go hand in hand).

Moreover, in showing the ups and downs of indigenous SMOs, it highlights the difficulty in generalising both movement tactics and its relationship with the state over a number of years. As such, in order to be able to evaluate the causal path(s) to success, it is necessary to look at indigenous SMOs in Bolivia before and after the 2005 election, which brought the popular-indigenous MAS and Evo Morales to power. This is not enough, however, as the relationship between Bolivian social movements and their government has since evolved again, and became increasingly oppositional since the eruption in 2011 of the TIPNIS conflict. As such, in the fsQCA below, the five indigenous SMOs are separated as cases into three periods delineated in the preceding chapter: A) 2000-2005, B) 2006-2010 and C) 2011-2016.

This allows for the coding of the nature of their demands, their framing, their mobilising capacity, the width of their contentious repertoires, and their propensity for alliances, not only relative to each other but capturing the ways in which these have evolved over time. It also corresponds broadly to the time period of the quantitative analysis in Chapter 4. This calibration of the hypothesised causal conditions for the QCA analysis that follows is detailed below (see Tables 10 and 11, pp. 260 and 267 respectively, with further details about the coding in Appendices F and G).

7.2.1 Defining a positive outcome, one last time

Just as in the preceding chapter, the analysis consists of an in-depth investigation of indigenous social movements in Bolivia. For this purpose, success is not defined as experiencing acceptance or advantages in regard to specific demands, but rather the level of ongoing influence on national decision-making processes. This is related to acceptance and advantages—as discussed in the methodology chapter and shown in Table 10 below (p. 167)—in that, in a sense, it measures both acceptance and advantages. This is necessary when looking at outcomes for a movement organisation, rather than individual protest events.

Moreover, over the period under study, all five organisations have experienced at least some acceptance by the government. Thus, one must also look at the advantages experienced and rather than simply looking at policy—which is often difficult to link with the specific efforts of a single SMO—it is necessary to evidence the level of influence the movement organisation continues to exert on government decision making specifically. This could also be conceptualised as the extent to which the SMO in question is experiencing no influence and complete exclusion from decision-making at the state level at the one extreme and both inclusion into government and veto power over policy at the other. As such, both full non-membership (0) and full membership (1), as shown in Table 10, should be considered more ideal types.

In this sense, the five indigenous and indigenous-peasant social movement organisations in Bolivia are coded according to the nature of their interaction with state institutions, ranging from exclusion to inclusion (Stahler-Sholk & Vanden, 2011; Vergara-Camus, 2013; Zibechi, 2007). However, this also takes into account the extent to which the organisation's agenda continues to be reflected in government policy, and whether the organisation's influence can prevent government actions that go directly against its interests. What has been the relationship between this organisation and the state since 2003? Has this relationship undergone significant changes during this period? Have the representatives of this organisation participated in any (1) negotiations, (2) consultations and/or (3) meetings with representatives of the government in particular or the state in general? Have the demands of this organisation been reflected in any (1) policy changes, (2) policy implementation and/or (3) executive actions? How each of the organisations have fared in this regard is discussed in detail in the previous chapter.

Table 10: Outcome calibration

Coding	Acceptance and advantages	State relations: Influence	
0.0	No positive outcome experienced.	No response and/or repression*.	*Exclusion*
0.2	Some acceptance and no advantages.	Limited engagement, co-optation.	↕
0.4	Some acceptance but few advantages.	Engagement and co-optation.	
0.6	Full acceptance with limited advantages	Some impact on decision-making.	
0.8	Full acceptance and some advantages.	Inclusion into decision-making.	
1.0	Full acceptance as well as advantages.	Full inclusion, incl. state control.	*Inclusion*

Note: *The other calibration categories up to 0.6 can also be accompanied by repression.

Certainly, in the case of Bolivia, the organisations under study have generally not experienced either extreme, but fall somewhere in between. This coding is shown in Table 11 below (p. 171), with 'INF' standing for 'influence on decision making'. The exception to this is the experience of the CSCIOB during the neoliberal period, which as an organisation did not play much of a role in the successful Water and Gas, and which was criminalised by the government as part of its 'war on drugs' efforts. As discussed, the two other redistribution-focused organisations (CSUTCB and *Bartolinas*), were largely unsuccessful before the election of Evo Morales, but did play a role in those 'wars' and did attend negotiations with the neoliberal governments on a number of occasions.

At the same time, the recognition-focused CIDOB could claim some advantages from the neoliberal period, especially the granting of territorial rights to indigenous communities claiming ancestral rights. It still had limited influence on national decision-making, and so did CONAMAQ, which due to its more radical demands and opposition to both the neoliberal regime and recently also the MAS administration, has experienced the least positive outcomes of the five indigenous SMOs under study, in all three of the time periods. (For the last period, I am including only the 'organic' CIDOB and CONAMAQ in the analysis, as these have a greater continuity of leaders and more external legitimacy than the pro-government split off factions).

7.2.2 Claiming and framing

As developed in the theoretical chapter of this thesis and operationalised in the preceding empirical chapters, it is analytically fruitful to examine the nature of indigenous protesters' demands. This is not just to say that less radical demands are more likely to be met; instead, it highlights the state's role in privileging certain sections of the indigenous movement as well as the strategic choices of indigenous protesters themselves. Specifically, for the 635 indigenous protest events analysed in Chapter 4, differentiating whether protesters mainly demanded just recognition as opposed to also redistribution had an impact on securing those outcomes (both in terms of just acceptance and acceptance followed by advantages). The recognition-redistribution dimension is of particular relevance—as explored fully in the theoretical chapter of this thesis—due to both the magnitude of the effect and the importance of this variable in existing research on indigenous politics in Latin America and especially in Bolivia (e.g. Hale, 2002; Postero, 2007).

Since the cases are all *indigenous* social movement organisations, it would be difficult to argue that some of them are not concerned with recognition. In the quantitative analysis, it was possible to identify individual protest events that focused almost solely on redistribution, although such events were still rare. When speaking about the indigenous movement organisations, demands for recognition are always present, if to greater or lesser extent. The focus here is thus on the extent to which the SMOs add redistributive demands to their goals, and how prominent these are. Moreover, as also discussed earlier, it is not only the content of demands, but the way in which they are legitimated, or framed, that can make a difference to movement outcomes. This effect can be also be either direct or indirect, that is mediated by political opportunities. Thus, the extent to which the organisations legitimated their demands in the language of equal rights, as opposed to the right to difference, is coded.

Specifically, what are the stated goals of this organisation? Since 2000, what aims have been the main focus of mobilisations which this organisation either organised or participated in? What language is most commonly used to justify demands, i.e. reference to cultural rights and the right to difference, or reference to class inequality and equal rights? As discussed above, CSUTCB has made largely redistributive demands, with reference to equal rights. The same goes for the *Bartolinas*, except they are more concerned with recognition than the CSUTCB, because they also demand recognition as indigenous women. The CSCIOB also focuses on redistribution, even more so than the CSUTCB, but their discourse features a little more prominently references to cultural rights and the right to difference. The CIDOB demands predominantly recognition, in the language of the right to difference. The CONAMAQ also employs a right-to-difference focused discourse, but its demands are more redistributive than those of the CIDOB. As can be seen from Table 11 below (p. 171), demand content and demand legitimation also change in their interaction with the political environment. As explicated in the previous chapter, they are not static for each SMO; this is a crucial point to make.

7.2.3 Size and mobilising capacity

Although, as argued above, disruption should not be considered as the only or deciding factor when evaluating social movement success, nor can it be ignored as a potential explanatory

condition. The quantitative analysis in Chapter 4 provides apparently conflicting evidence about the impact of disruption on protest outcomes. On the one hand, the analysis suggests that a general measure of disruption is somewhat negatively associated with experiencing a positive outcome. On the other, the use of a particular disruptive tactic, road blocks, was shown to have a significant positive effect on outcomes. It was hypothesised that this causal relationship operated through the mechanism of cost imposition. In that sense, it could be argued that it is not just the level of disruption, but disruption with a significant cost—blocking a nationally important throughway and trade route versus, for example, conducting a peaceful demonstration or a private land occupation—that makes a difference for protest outcomes.

It is difficult to operationalise the level of disruption for a social movement over a longer period of time; all of the SMOs included in the current analysis had significant peaks of high levels of disruption. As such, in the analysis that follows, this is operationalised as mobilising and disruptive capacity. How large was the largest mobilisation that this organisation has led during the period under study? How many offices does it have in the country? What share of the populations does it (claim to) represent? Looking at indigenous social movement organisations over a period of years means it is not possible to look simply at the use of road blocks. However, the size of the movement and its mobilising capacity can be used as a proxy for its ability to inflict a greater economic cost on the state through the use of disruptive tactics. This also corresponds to the impact of organisational viability (Cress & Snow, 2000; McAdam *et al*., 2001). All the indigenous social movement organisations in Bolivia under study certainly had viable organisations. However, focusing the attention on organisational capacity instead draws attention to the importance of organisations for building and maintaining mobilising capacity.

This relates to the capacity for disruption, but also the extent to which the organisation can threaten disruption. Although there can be mass mobilisation in which pre-existing organisations do not play a crucial role, the cases in Bolivia show that even at times of heightened national mobilisation and disruption—which certainly also drew on participants that were not necessarily affiliated to a social movement organisation—the role of SMOs in initiating protest, influencing its trajectory and making sure clear and concrete demands are articulated is important (Lazar, 2008; Yashar, 2005). While the CSCIOB has certainly exhibited the greatest ability to mobilise activists and supporters, including for highly disruptive protests, the CSUTCB also has a relatively large mobilising capacity. The mobilising capacity of the *Bartolinas* is not as great, but it is important to remember than in terms of large-scale mass disruption, they have generally coordinated their efforts with the CSUTCB. At the same time, CIDOB, while representing most low-land indigenous groups and despite the spectacular marchers it has been able to spearhead, is still limited in terms of its mobilising capacity and organisational size by its regional basis. And this is even more true for the highland CONAMAQ, which competes with CSUTCB in the Bolivian highlands.

This still leaves the question of repression: why would the government not just opt to repress the protest, if it were imposing a too high a cost? The cross-national analysis in the previous chapter showed the difficulty in evaluating the state's propensity for repression; measures such as the CIRI index[108] were not able to capture the level of repression experienced by indigenous

[108] The CIRI Physical Integrity Index (Cingranelli et al., 2014).

social movements in individual countries. Moreover, the analysis also showed that experiencing repression does not necessarily mean protesters will not experience any positive outcomes as well. Initial repression by the police does not necessarily mean the national government is unwilling to negotiate. Heavy repression can also galvanise media attention and public support, helping the movement's cause, as documented particularly in Chapter 5. For social movement organisations as a whole, it is difficult to include a single measure of propensity for repression in the analysis. However, the presence of a sympathetic government in power can be used as an imperfect proxy for propensity for repression, assuming that the government is less likely to use repression against groups or movements it is allied with—or whose claims and frames resonate with its political agenda—even when they use more disruptive protest tactics. This is returned to further below.

7.2.4 Repertoires and alliances

As theorised in Chapter 2, and traced empirically in Chapter 6, the evolving nature of a social movement organisation's repertoires of contentious action also influences its ability to get its demands heard and answered. The repertoires of contention used by indigenous social movements in Bolivia are complex combinations of historically and culturally grounded modes of struggle and innovative tactics inspired by experiences from other countries and encouraged by the spread of modern communication technologies. Yet these factors have not necessarily interacted in the same ways for each individual social movement organisation. What kinds of tactics has this organisation used since 2003? Does it employ a large repertoire of tactics (ranging from disruption to legal action, for example) or does it mainly focus on one or two tactics (e.g. marches and road blocks)? Smaller, more recognition focused SMOs such as CIDOB and CONAMAQ, tend to have a much wider repertoire (even though not necessarily as flexible, as shown in Chapter 6) than the more tactically-traditional redistribution-focused movements such as the CSUTCB, CSCIOB and the *Bartolinas*. Both CIDOB and CONAMAQ supplement common tactics such as marches, demonstrations and sometimes road blocks with litigation and both domestic and international media campaigns.

This is related to, but conceptually distinct, from the propensity to cooperate with other social movements, as well as both domestic and international NGOs. To what extent has this organisation established and maintained both national and international alliances? Approximately what share of the organisations' time and resources are spent of alliance-making, i.e. participating in events co-organised with other organisations, including traveling abroad? The complex and ever-changing nature of alliance between the five SMOs is detailed in Chapter 6. Despite their larger size, and what was expected given the secondary literature on the topic, the indigenous-peasant SMOs actually had a greater interest in seeking and maintaining domestic alliances. At the same time, CIDOB has been more active in seeking international alliances as well as employing a wider range of protest tactics than CONAMAQ. The latter two organisations have also cooperated more closely with both domestic and international NGOs and other non-contentious social actors. As such, while size and focus on recognition might be associated with a particular kind of protest action repertoire, it does not necessarily mean that such SMOs will automatically have wider and more flexible repertoires.

To an extent, there is also an interplay between (1) the size of the movement and its mobilising capacity, (2) the extent to which it focuses on redistribution alongside recognition, and (3) its repertoire of contention and its alliance seeking practices. Smaller indigenous movements often focus more on recognition demands, utilising their wider repertoires to seek international legitimacy and allies. Conversely, larger movements are more likely to rely on their mobilising capacity and to seek to extend it by striving for popular-indigenous coalitions, which are facilitated by a focus on redistributive claims instead of a sole recognition orientation. These relationships also of course interact with the political environment, with movement leaders and activists making strategic choices about the focus of their demands, their tactics and their legitimacy framing based on (perceived) political opportunities at any given time. However, these interactions are complex, cannot be assumed to always play out in the same way, and thus also cannot be collapsed into one measure (they are not indeed not perfectly correlated in the fsQCA dataset below).

7.2.5 Left-wing government

It is also necessary to try and capture the evolution of individual indigenous social movements in response to changing political opportunities. In order to ascertain the effect of the political environment in particular, it is ideal to be able to evaluate the movement organisation's strategies before and after the election of a left-wing executive; in this case, the popular-indigenous MAS, is coded. Further, however, the cases are split into the three periods outlined in the previous chapter, to account not only for the election of MAS in 2005, but the changes to the relationship between the government and social movements following the constituent assembly and specifically since the TIPNIS conflict broke out in 2011.

Table 11: Coding of Bolivian indigenous SMOs (fuzzy set dataset)

	Causal conditions						Outcomes
Case	**RED**	**EQU**	**SIZ**	**REP**	**ALL**	**LEF**	**INF**
CSUTCB-1	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.2
CSUTCB-2	0.8	1.0	0.6	0.2	0.6	1.0	0.8
CSUTCB-3	0.8	1.0	0.6	0.4	0.4	1.0	0.8
CSCIOB-1	0.8	0.6	1.0	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.0
CSCIOB-2	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.2	0.4	1.0	0.8
CSCIOB-3	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.4	0.2	1.0	0.8
CIDOB-1	0.2	0.0	0.4	1.0	0.6	0.0	0.6
CIDOB-2	0.4	0.0	0.4	0.8	0.8	1.0	0.6
CIDOB-3	0.2	0.0	0.2	1.0	0.4	1.0	0.4
CONAMAQ-1	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.4	0.0	0.2
CONAMAQ-2	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.6	1.0	0.6
CONAMAQ-3	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.6	0.4	1.0	0.2
Bartolina-1	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.2
Bartolina-2	0.8	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.6	1.0	0.8
Bartolina-3	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.4	1.0	0.6

The hypothesised mechanisms of material and symbolic cost imposition relate to the impact of claiming and framing strategies on outcomes in interaction with the political environment. As such, for the QCA analysis in the current chapter, the contribution to a causal recipe for success of both the nature of claiming and of framing, and the left-of-centre measure, will be evaluated. In particular, it is hypothesized that a) making redistributive demands and b) making them in the language of equality, under a left-of-centre government is at least part (of at least one) of the causal configurations leading to the experience of positive outcomes.

Table 12: Truth Table for Bolivian indigenous SMO data

Causal conditions						Outcome	Cases
RED	**EQU**	**SIZ**	**REP**	**ALL**	**LEF**	**INFLUENCE**	
1	1	1	0	0	1	1	CSUTCB-3, CSCIOB-2, CSCIOB-3
1	1	1	0	0	0	0	CSUTCB-1, CSCIOB-1, BARTOLINA-1
0	0	0	1	1	1	1	CIDOB-2, CONAMAQ-2
0	0	0	1	0	1	0	CIDOB-3, CONAMAQ-3
1	1	0	0	0	1	1	BARTOLINA-3
1	1	0	0	1	1	1	BARTOLINA-2
1	1	1	0	1	1	1	CSUTCB-2
0	0	0	1	1	0	1	CIDOB-1
0	0	0	1	0	0	0	CONAMAQ-1

Table 11 above shows the fuzzy set coding for the five indigenous social movements organisations, where RED stands for redistributive demands, SIZ signifies mobilising capacity, REP denotes repertoire flexibility, ALL signifies propensity for alliance-making, LEF stands for left-of-centre government, and INF stands for success as defined above in terms of influence on state decision-making. The five indigenous SMOs are also coded into three time periods; 1 (2000-2005), 2 (2006-2010) and 3 (2011-2016. It is not possible to present a truth table with the fuzzy set data shown in Table 11, which will be used for the fsQCA analysis below. However, if the data is converted into a crisp set (only 0 or 1), then a truth table can be shown, classifying the SMOs according to their characteristics and the outcomes—influence on decision-making—they have experienced. This is shown in Table 12 above.

7.3 Results: Identifying causal recipes

The fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis carried out on the dataset in Table 11 (p. 171) provides supporting evidence and qualifies the findings of the preceding chapters, while uncovering the causal paths to movement success that could not be evidenced only through a cross-national quantitative analysis in Chapter 4 nor the mixed-method and qualitative tracing in Chapters 5 and 6. As discussed in Chapter 3, the most significant contribution of the method is the ability to explore different causal paths to success.

In fact, the analysis identified two causal paths to indigenous social movement success. Table 13 below (p. 173) shows the complex solution when fsQCA is applied to the fuzzy dataset; * signifies the logical AND, while upper-case signifies this condition is present in the solution,

while lower-case signifies negation, or the absence of the condition in the solution. For the first causal path, this means that the combination of making redistributive demands in the language of equal rights, not employing a wide tactical repertoire, and operating under a sympathetic government (left-of-centre executive), leads to experiencing positive outcomes in terms of influence in state decision-making. This is influence at calibration level 0.6 or above, meaning experiencing at least some impact on decision-making (see Table 10, p. 167; detailed coding and results are shown in Appendices F and G). This causal combination fits the cases of the CSUTCB, the CSCIOB and the *Bartolinas*.

The second causal path, representing the CIDOB and the CONAMAQ, is combining making recognition demands[109], framed in the language of the right to difference, despite—or because of—a small mobilising capacity, with a wider repertoire and a higher propensity for seeking alliances. For the second solution, whether a left-of-centre government is in power seems to make little difference. This makes sense given how the two organisations that represent the 'successful' cases for this causal recipe—CIDOB before 2011 and CONAMAQ only during 2006-2011—have fared under the Morales left-of-centre administration since 2011, as detailed in Chapter 6.

Table 13: Causal paths to a positive outcome (fsQCA, complex solution)

Causal configurations (recipes)	Cases (<0.5 membership)*	Coverage	Consistency
REDISTRIBUTION * EQUAL * repertoires * LEFT +	CSUTCB-2, CSCIOB-2, CSUTCB-3, CSCIOB-3, Bartolina-2, Bartolina-3	0.59	1.00
redistribution * equality * size * REPERTOIRES * ALLIANCES	CIDOB-1, CIDOB-2, CONAMAQ-2	0.46	0.85
Complete solution		0.92	0.92

Source: Author's dataset of indigenous SMOs in Bolivia, split into the 3 time-periods (1=2000-2005, 2=2006-2010, 3=2011-2016). Note: *Ordered by degree of membership. Using fsQCA software 3.0 (Ragin, 2008), available at http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml.

The findings support the conclusions of the preceding chapters; movement-level strategies (claims, frames, and tactics) contribute to getting positive outcomes. Both the content of demands and the way in which they are legitimated matters. The political environment also matters, but only for one of the causal recipes. This challenges the predominant importance given to the political environment; although it is still relevant, especially when discussing the more 'parsimonious' solution below. Rather than just focusing on the solutions as a combination of factors, as implied by the Boolean operator AND (*), it is also possible to interpret these causal conditions in a logical sequence.

As such, the first causal path of, that of *claim and frame resonance*, suggests that for redistribution focused indigenous movements, it is necessary to follow an equal-rights framing

[109] Since the negation of redistribution denotes a greater focus on recognition as opposed to redistribution.

for legitimating their demands, and make demands under a sympathetic left-of-centre government. This is consistent with the findings of the previous chapters. Firstly, it shows the interaction between demands and their framing, and supports the notion that *framing coherence* has a positive impact on movement outcomes, rather than just the content of the demand—the nature of the claim—on its own, as was shown in the quantitative analysis in Chapter 4. Moreover, it suggests that there is an interaction between a) claims and the political environment and b) frames and the political environment. The former was suggested already by the quantitative analysis in Chapter 4, and is confirmed here. We can thus be quite confident about this causal connection. The latter was proposed in Chapter 5, and corresponds to the notion of frame resonance. This means that there needs to be a resonance in framing for a government, even though it might already be sympathetic to movement goals, for the SMO to experience a positive outcome.

Lastly, the first causal path suggests that *not* employing a wide repertoire helps achieve greater access to decision making. This may seem counter-intuitive, but makes sense if having a narrower repertoire of contention means focusing on a specific set of tactics. In this case, it means particularly the use of road blocks, which have already been shown to have a positive effect in Chapter 4. This is why it is surprising that having a large mobilising capacity does not figure in the explanation for the first set of cases. It would seem from the preceding chapters that part of the explanation for the success of redistribution-focused indigenous movements in Bolivia has been their ability to build broad-based popular support and mobilising capacity that extends beyond their core constituency (Postero, 2007; Yashar, 2005).

This is consistent with the findings of Chapter 4; given the high economic cost presented by redistributive demands, it is necessary for movements to be able to mount large-scale disruptive protests with a high economic cost to the government. However, this is not shown here. What can explain this discrepancy in the QCA analysis is a) the fact the CSUTCB and CSCIOB have maintained a large mobilising capacity throughout, even during the first, neoliberal, period where their successes were limited. Moreover, it can be explained by b), the inclusion of the *Bartolinas*, whose impact in terms of their mobilising capacity has depended more on their coordination with the CSUTCB, then their own relatively smaller size. Moreover, it suggests that under unfavourable political conditions, disruption and the ability to impose a high material cost, such as with the use of road blocks, are not enough. This is not to say that there cannot be direct effects: in those cases, it would seem as shown in Chapter 5, protests need to be able to *also* impose a high enough symbolic cost.

Conversely, smaller and more recognition-focused indigenous movements—more recognition-focused due to the size of their constituency but also smaller as they may find it harder to foster broader national coalitions—need to focus more on working with other social movements with local and international NGOs, environmental activists and global human rights organisations (Andolina *et al*., 2009; Lucero, 2008). This is shown in the second causal recipe, which has been termed that of *tactical repertoires*. As such, building and maintaining strong and varied alliances and developing and utilising a wide repertoire of contentious action seems to matter for the success of recognition-oriented indigenous organisations. Furthermore, what the second

causal solution shows again is the importance of having congruent framing, that is legitimating recognition goals with a right to difference frame.[110]

These two causal combinations of the solution presented above are part of the complex solution as a result of a minimisation procedure, without any simplifying assumptions; this produces the same results as if each case was compared with another, one that only differs on one condition according to the logic of marched cases, manually (this means that conditions which are present both in the cases of success and failures are eliminated from the recipes). Yet, the fsQCA analysis also provides different kinds of solutions, including a more parsimonious one. The complex solution shown in Table 13 above (p. 173) has a consistency of 92%, suggesting it fits the cases at hand well enough to be considered robust (the usual threshold in QCA is 80%). Its coverage of the data is also high, at 94%. (This is also due to the fact that a fuzzy set dataset is used, rather than a crisp one; changing the dataset to a crisp one (coding at only 0 or 1), the solution has a coverage of 100%.) The benefits of a complex solution lie in its level of detail, as well as the fact that there are no simplifying assumptions (counterfactuals) used to reach it. At the same time, it is interesting to look at the parsimonious solution in this case, because of what it tells us about the importance of the political environment (see Appendix G for a comparison of the complex, intermediary and parsimonious solutions). This is shown in Table 14 below.

Table 14: Causal paths to a positive outcome (fsQCA, parsimonious solutions)

Causal configurations (recipes)	Cases (<0.5 membership)*	Coverage	Consistency
ALL	CIDOB-2, CSUTCB-2, CIDOB-1, CONAMAQ-2, Bartolina-2	0.73	0.77
repertoires*LEFT	CSUTCB-2, CSCIOB-2, CSUTCB-3, CSCIOB-3, Bartolina-2, Bartolina-3	0.65	0.96
REDISTRIBUTION*LEFT	CSCIOB-2, CSCIOB-3, CSUTCB-2, CSUTCB-3, Bartolina-2, Bartolina-3	0.78	0.91
EQUAL*LEFT	CSUTCB-2, CSUTCB-3, CSCIOB-2, CSCIOB-3, Bartolina-2, Bartolina-3	0.68	0.93
Complete solution		1.00	0.76

Source: Author's dataset of indigenous SMOs in Bolivia, split into 3 time periods (1=2000-2005, 2=2006-2010, 3=2011-2016). Note: *Ordered by degree of membership. Using fsQCA software 3.0 (Ragin, 2008), available at http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml.

The most parsimonious solution shows a combination of four causal recipes, three of which combine either demand content, demand legitimation or repertoires with the nature of the political environment. This corresponds to much of the literature on social movement outcomes, which often attributes most of the explanation for movement success to the presence of sympathetic allies or a sympathetic legislature (Giugni *et al*., 1999; Meyer, 2004). In the

[110] This is shown by the fact that although these two causal conditions are largely correlated in the dataset, in terms of the set-theoretic analysis that is fsQCA, both conditions are necessary together.

case of Bolivia, it is also interesting to point out the potential effect of social movement activists becoming members of parliament or the government; such an intersection (Böhm, 2015) can also help explain why the presence of a sympathetic government has such influence on the outcomes of social movements. The fourth solution, then, shows the importance of alliances. This makes sense given that the five organisations experienced the greatest level of influence during the constituent assembly period, at which time their Unity Pact was still strong and consequential. Moreover, CIDOB and CONAMAQ have never stopped working on broader, including international alliances, and have re-focused on this specifically since 2011.

As also shown in the quantitative analysis in Chapter 4, the results here highlight the interaction between demands and the political environment. The need for redistributive movements to operate under a left-of-centre government in order to experience some success was predicted by the preceding analysis, and is confirmed here. For recognition-focused movements, the story is a little more complicated. While one of the organisations (CIDOB) did well under the previous right-wing period, the other did relatively badly during both the neoliberal and the MAS regimes (CONAMAQ). As discussed above, this could be attributed due to the latter's more radical demands for autonomy and more exclusionary Aymara nationalism. This has meant that apart from the brief period of unity surrounding the MAS victory, CONAMAQ has largely been in opposition to both right-wing and left-wing governments.

7.4 Discussion: Pathways to success

This chapter sought to follow-up the findings of a cross-national study of the outcomes of protest events in Latin America with an in-depth, qualitative investigation of the successes and failures of indigenous social movements in Bolivia. Focusing on cases from one country provides space for an in-depth investigation of the causal conditions and paths leading to social movement success. It found further evidence for the importance of paying attention to both claim-making and framing by social movements, and how this interacts with their strategies regarding disruption, mobilisation, alliances, and contentious repertoires. Moreover, rather than just evaluating the importance of these factors, this chapter was able to uncover that there are in fact, at least in the case of Bolivian indigenous movements, two separate paths to achieving at least some influence on government decision making.

Specifically, in building on the findings of the other empirical chapters presented in this thesis, this chapter was able to identify two causal pathways to success, one in which (1) *claim and frame resonance* is sufficient, and the other in which (2) *tactical repertoires* make a difference regardless of political opportunities. While frame coherence is a necessary condition for both of these pathways, it is not sufficient. However, in this case the fsQCA is too blunt a tool to capture the finer variation in claims and frames, such as explored in Chapter 6 in reference to CONAMAQ recent experimentation with different frames. As such, it cannot be concluded that frame coherence is a necessary condition for movement success; further research is necessary in this regard. For the first causal path, the resonance between the claims and the political environment is also necessary; together, these factors are sufficient to explain positive outcomes for the redistribution-focused social movement organisations studied. In the second causal recipe, the nature of the government partisanship does not play a decisive role. What matters is the tactical use of both a wide repertoire of contentious actions and an ability to make

strategic alliances. This confirms the findings of the previous chapters in that a) claiming and framing resonance matters, and b) tactics matter, for social movement outcomes.

The results of the fuzzy Qualitative Comparative Analysis also show that the change in political environment makes a much bigger difference for redistributive movements than for recognition ones. This effect was also shown in the previous chapters. These results underpin the complicated relationship of recognition-focused indigenous movements and both the left and the right in Latin America, especially as anti-extractive protests are picking up pace across the region. The experience in Bolivia is similar to other Latin American countries, whereby the initial support for left-wing governments and experience of acceptance, some advantages and access to national decision-making was soon followed by disenchantment for some indigenous movements, where reforms were not seen as going far enough or where the continued economic reliance on natural resource extraction clashed with promised protection of indigenous territories. At the same time, while recognition demands may have been met to a certain degree under right-wing governments, these often lacked enforcement or any redistributive components (Hale, 2002).

A limitation of the fsQCA analysis presented here is that it is over-specified. In particular, given that there are six causal conditions, the recommended amount of cases is 25 (Marx & Dusa, 2011). The five indigenous social movements, split into three periods, represented only 15 cases. Moreover, the observations of the five organisations in different time periods are of course not independent of each other, although their strategies and successes do differ often significantly. This is not so much an issue in terms of the explanatory power of the analysis for the Bolivian cases; both the consistency and the coverage of the complex causal concoctions discussed above are very high. What this means, however, is that it makes it hard to generalise beyond the Bolivian case based on this analysis only.

At the same time, the findings are largely consistent with the results of the quantitative analysis carried out on indigenous protest events in 13 Latin American countries in Chapter 4 and the mixed-method look ‘into’ protest events in Bolivia and Peru in Chapter 5. As such, there is reason to believe that similar causal recipes might operate in other cases of identity-based mobilisation. Moreover, the cases of indigenous organisations in Chile are being added to this analysis as part of a postdoctoral project; the experience of the Mapuche indigenous movement in Chile being the least likely to fit an explanation developed based on the Bolivian case; as should be clear from the discussion in Chapters 1 and 4 in relation to Chile, this is the perfect setting to truly test the findings of this chapter.

8. Conclusion

In the age of Occupy, the Arab Spring, and the Trump- 'Brexit' wave, both identity politics and class-based movements have attempted to offer a progressive way forward and a solution to both inequality and discrimination. Yet, even if uniting at times, their legitimising logics of their framing tend to differ. While the former rests on the notion of the (often collective) right to difference, the latter is based on the notion of (usually individual) equal rights. Those framing logics are of course not incompatible, and arguably both are required to achieve the goal of both material and cultural equality (Fraser, 2003). They can, however, stand in tension to each other when both material resources and spaces of representation are limited (C. Young, 1976).

In the new millennium, indigenous peoples have continued to mobilise across the world, for both equal treatment and special rights. Their demands range from access to land and spaces for cultural reproduction, to having a political voice and equality, and they have often differed in the way they have framed their struggles. Although predominantly legitimated in the language of the right to difference, some collective indigenous actions have also employed the equal rights frame. While this distinction is well established in the political theory literature (Fraser & Honneth, 2003), scholars have simply tended to say that Latin American indigenous movements use both frames, and tend to make both class-based and identity-based claims, demanding both inclusion and autonomy (Dinerstein, 2015; Postero, 2007; Yashar, 2005).

As detailed above, this is not the case when comparing different indigenous movements at different times, and especially when looking at specific protest events and individual social movement organisations. Is this a strategic choice, or a reflection of the structural conditions and international narratives within which indigenous activists and organisations operate? More importantly for the thesis at hand, does this matter? Does it affect the likelihood of an indigenous movement failing as opposed to succeeding, and does studying claims and frames as strategic help us make sense of Latin America's indigenous movement outcomes?

Whether protest can succeed remains a perennial question in the study of social movements. Yet it is surprising that much of the recent, specifically Northern, scholarship on social movements' intended consequences—whether the individuals and groups involved in collective action got what they demanded or not—has in many cases stopped paying attention to what those collective actors actually demanded. This is particularly a problem for protest event analyses; lumping all protests on a specific issue together (e.g. all environment-related protests) and then seeing if their frequency had an impact of specific legislation or spending (e.g. government spending for the Environmental Protection Agency in the US) a) does indeed make it difficult to show any intended causal effect, and b) impossible to say it was an intended consequence, given it is unclear how many of the activists and groups involved actually have this as a stated goal in the first place. This makes the frequent finding that such protests had little impact somewhat unsurprising.

It is, however, not convincing evidence that protest does not matter, and that *tactics* and the characteristics of both the *claims* and the *frames* of collective actors do not matter, for social movement outcomes. While as detailed in Chapter 2 the mainly US-focused, largely quantitative literature within 'Northern' social movement studies has thus been unfairly

pessimistic about social movement impact, the more qualitative Southern scholarship on social movements in South America has been often perhaps too optimistic about the power of social movements. It has generally assumed that if the stated goals of mobilisation were later reflected in policy change, the mobilisation must have caused this change, without exploring in much detail the mechanisms through which such a causal relationship might have operated.

Of course, indigenous movements fare better in particularly favourable circumstances. However, even under seemingly unfavourable political conditions, indigenous struggles can sometimes be linked to positive outcomes. Moreover, factors under the control of indigenous movements themselves, such as the choice of tactics, the focus of demands and the way in which they legitimate them, are shown to have an impact on the chances of experiencing positive outcomes. This thesis has sought to contribute to elucidating this puzzle by combining the methodological strength and the empirical richness of those two scholarly strands—attempting, above all, to put their theoretical insights into a North-South dialogue—by conducting a mixed-method analysis of the successes and failures of indigenous collective action in Latin America.

8.1 Integrating the quantitative and qualitative results

This mixed methodology not only allowed the empirical chapters to approach the question from different empirical angles, but also using different epistemological approaches to social scientific inquiry. Still, subscribing to the complementarity thesis in mixed method research, it posits that both qualitative and quantitative analyses can build on each other to paint a more complete picture of the reality we try to study. As such, following the preliminary results of the quantitative analysis in Chapter 4, each chapter builds on the findings of the preceding one, thus aiming to refine and strengthen them further.

Chapter 4 analysed the determinants of success for protest activity based on the evidence from Latin American indigenous movements, that is indigenous protests from 13 Latin American countries between 2003 and 2013. It provided evidence for both the direct- and joint-effect models; it shows that protesters' choices about claims *and* tactics impact outcomes directly. Having less costly demands—such as claims that do not require redistribution—and employing more costly tactics—such as erecting road blocks and being able to sustain mobilisation for longer—significantly increases the chances of gaining acceptance, and to a lesser extent of securing advantages. The chapter also shows how these protest-level factors interact with country-level variables in order to affect the outcomes of protest events. Specifically, exploring the interaction between claims and political opportunities suggests that the likelihood of success for redistributive protests increases under a left-wing political regime.

This shows the need to pay attention to the strategic claim-making of movements; the intricate interplay between social movements making strategic choices about the demands to prioritise in order to meet at least some of their aims, and those in control of the state decision-making power at the time privileging certain kinds of indigenous demands and organisations over others. It suggests that the external resonance of protest claims increases the chances that those claims will be met with a positive response, even if only acceptance. Thus, the analysis also shows the importance of defining 'success'. In order to be accepted as legitimate by targets, especially invited to negotiations, protesters' decisions about demands and tactics matter a

great deal. However, once protest has received at least a modicum of acceptance, political opportunity and public opinion become much more decisive in predicting whether concrete advantages follow. In particular, the presence of a left-of-centre executive greatly increases the chances of gaining advantages. Public opinion also matters, especially for gaining advantages; however, the lack of comparative public opinion data made this only a tentative conclusion.

Chapter 5 built on the findings of the preceding chapter; in doing so, it provided some checks for the reliability of the statistical analysis, as well as looking deeper 'into' a selected number of protest events from Bolivia and Peru, in order to explore *how* the correlations found in Chapter 4 might be explained. It found that disruption can have a positive impact, even for securing advantages; what matters is the material cost that the disruption is able to impose. This is why the spread of further disruptive protest in support of AIDESEP across Peru in 2009 meant that the cost of not acceding became too high, especially when it became clear that further repression was no longer politically an option. The latter was also important in this case, as the public outcry against the heavy repression significantly increased the symbolic costs the continued protest was able to impose. Thus, even with a pro-extractive right-of-centre government in power, being able to combine high material and symbolic costs seems to have helped this particular indigenous protest campaign gain concrete advantages.

Similarly, for the Bolivian protests compared in the same chapter, their ability to impose a material cost mattered; this is why it is specifically again the erection of road blocks that made a difference for the outcomes they experienced. It also confirms that the duration of protest matters, in that protest events which are sustained for a longer period of time have a greater likelihood of experiencing a positive outcome. In combining quantitative and qualitative evidence, the chapter was also able to discuss the nature of the frames used by the protesters, not just the claims they made. In showing that although in the three Bolivian cases the content of the demand was the same—redistribution, specifically land titling—the demand legitimation, or framing, differed. Although similar in other variables—according to the logic of matched cases—the protest that was followed by actual advantages employed framing that was more resonant with the left-wing popular-indigenous government of Evo Morales (right to equality) as opposed to the other two protests (right to difference framing).

This highlighted that there is not only an interaction between claims and political opportunities, but also between frames and political opportunities. This chapter thus found evidence for frame resonance, not just claim resonance. And lastly, another factor that appears to have made the crucial difference for the three protest events is a related factor, that of alliances. Thus, it again shows that political opportunities, of course, matter. In building on the findings of the previous chapter, this mixed-method chapter was thus able to identify three causal mechanisms, proposed to explain *how* the identified variables led to the outcomes observed. Firstly, different levels of disruption, different claims and different frames are able to impose difference material and symbolic costs on targets. This effect can be direct, but is also, and more importantly, mediated by political opportunities, which ultimately determine the relative balance of the political costs of meeting the protesters' claims against not meeting them and facing continued mobilisation.

Chapter 6 then moved squarely into the qualitative realm with a process tracing analysis of the recent trajectories of the Bolivian indigenous movement. As such, it was able to trace the strategies of different indigenous collective actors over time, showing their evolution in the

context of internal struggles and changing external opportunities. It found further evidence for the importance of paying attention to both claiming and framing strategies of social movements. It also showed how this interacts with their strategic choices regarding disruption, mobilisation, alliances, and contentious repertoires. This included reconceptualising contentious repertoires as not always static or slowly evolving, in order to pay attention to both their width and their flexibility. At the same time, it showed in further detail that the relationship between indigenous movements and left-wing governments is not straightforward.

While the quantitative analysis is Chapter 4 found that overall, indigenous protests in Latin American have tended to be more successful under left-of-centre government, it also showed that this depends on the nature of their claims. That is, what they ask for matters. Then, Chapter 5 suggested that is also matters how they ask for it; their frames. Chapter 6 then showed how the claiming and framing strategies of indigenous social movement organisations in Bolivia—the five analysed using fsQCA in chapter 7—evolved over time, and how their external resonance given changing government partisanship is a large part of their stories of success and failure.

At the same time, in examining their claims and frames, Chapter 6 also discovered a certain framing incoherence. Sometimes, indigenous leaders and organisations asked for recognition using the language of equal rights, and at other times demanding redistribution invoking the right to difference. It was proposed that the authenticity and legitimacy of the groups' struggle might be easier to attack by its opponents, and to dismiss by its targets, if their framing is seemingly incoherent. However, this was little more than a tentative observation; it is the systematic fsQCA analysis in Chapter 7 that allowed for this question to be explored further, and for the results of the preceding chapters to be both confirmed and qualified.

Lastly, then, *Chapter 7* built on the findings of all the preceding empirical chapters. Employing fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis as a way to systematise the comparison of the five Bolivian indigenous social movement organisation in three different time periods, it was able to identify two causal pathways to success. The first path, that of *claim and frame resonance*, suggests that neither claim resonance—whether the content of demands resonates with government partisanship—and frame resonance—whether demand legitimation does—are on their own sufficient. It seems that both are needed, in tandem, if an indigenous movement is to hope for success. However, this does not mean that under unfavourable political circumstances—when adjusting claiming and framing would mean losing both core goals and authenticity—indigenous collective actors cannot gain some political influence and impact government decision-making. In these cases, what matters is the width of their contentious repertoires and, relatedly, their ability to seek alliances. This strategic adaptability is crucial when political opportunities are stacked against them. This is the second causal pathway identified, that of *tactical repertoires*.

The chapter also provides the opportunity to return to the question of frame *coherence.* In both pathways, there is coherent framing. However, this is neither sufficient on its own, nor does the coding in this case allow for this to be tested fully, as the finer variations in claiming and framing could not be captured by the analysis. Overall, this chapter thus also supports the findings of the previous chapters. The benefit of the fsQCA method is that it allows for the systematisation of qualitative findings; as such, it presents the analysis from Chapter 6 in a more succinct way. It shows again that the political opportunity structure matters, and the most

common route for gaining advantages is through a joint effect; claiming and framing in a politically resonant way. However, it also suggests that not all is lost under unfavourable political conditions; having enough tactical flexibility can also lead to advantages.

Overall, the four empirical chapters show that both the direct-effect and the joint-effects models of movement success have merit. There is a consensus in the social movement literature that the political opportunity structure matters for movement outcomes (Bosi *et al*., 2016; Kolb & Tarrow, 2007). Yet this is almost by definition; of course, the presence of political *opportunities* makes it more likely for movements to experience positive outcomes. The more pertinent questions are, arguably, the following. *Firstly,* can social movements make a difference even in seemingly unfavourable circumstances? *Secondly,* in both cases, through what mechanisms might they have an impact? In answer to the first question, this thesis suggests that they can, such as shown in case of the Bagua protests in Peru in Chapter 5 and the recognition-focused indigenous SMOs in Bolivia in Chapters 6 and 7.

To do so, movements need to be able impose a material and symbolic cost on their targets that exceeds the cost that meeting their demand would mean. This can be done through creating enough materially costly disruption—such as by using roadblocks or sustaining mobilisation for a longer period of time—and imposing enough symbolic costs—such as making claims framed in the language that resonates with the agendas and discourses of their targets, as well as the public. As such, the latter also includes cases when public opinion turns due to heavy repression, as indeed happened in the Peruvian case. In answer to the second question, the analysis thus shows that the *combination* of high enough material and symbolic cost is necessary. As shown in Chapter 7, despite the high mobilising capacity of the CSUTCB and the CSCIOB in Bolivia before the election of Evo Morales, it was not enough as despite the material cost they were able to impose with their road blocks, they were generally not able to impose enough of a symbolic cost and present their struggles as legitimate and 'worthy' enough during the neoliberal period.

As such, this thesis aims to show that despite the overwhelming empirical support for the thesis that social movements tend to rely on political opportunities for securing desired outcomes, this is not inconsistent with the fact that social movement can at times succeed even in apparently unfavourable political conditions. Through a mixed-method analysis of indigenous movements in Latin America, it attempted to show this, and explain how this can happen; namely, when movements are able to impose a high enough combination of material and symbolic costs on their targets. The strategic adaptability of protesters, leaders and social movement organisation helps this happen, and this includes strategic choices about what to ask for (claims) and how to ask for it (frames), not just tactics. It also shows that paying attention to the evolving strategies of social movement actors is crucial for understanding this.

On a broader level, this thesis also seeks to make a contribution to the understanding of citizen power and participation in democracies. Although analysing instances of collective action, it posits that even for studies of protest, political parties or other examples of collective undertakings, the focus on the agency of the individuals within them, and the choices they make, is essential. As such, it argues for the importance of investigating political agency and the ability of citizens to impact decision-making (Lazar & Nuijten, 2013). Although it may seem counter-intuitive, we need to bring the individual back into the study of collective action;

looking at the strategic choices of leaders as different factions compete within a movement is an example of an agential lens (Bosi & Davis, 2017).

This is highlighted in particular in Chapter 6, as it traces the evolving strategies of indigenous leaders in Bolivia. It is also assumed in Chapters 4 and 5, when the mechanism of a *cost imposition* is identified; this is not just about the ability of movements to impose material and symbolic costs, but also about the strategic calculations of the protest targets. Yet this is not to argue that individual decisions can account for the entirety of the explanation of the successes and failures of social movement activity. Individuals are part of wider structures, made explicit through the ways in which they are related to each other (Hedström & Bearman, 2009).

As such, agency needs to be understood as embedded in wider social structures. This is clear when discussing indigenous movements, as the bonds of culture and ethnicity play a significant role in explaining the nature of indigenous peoples' collective action. At the same time, even within the same ethno-linguistic groups, leaders and activists have made different choices. This is made particularly clear in Chapters 6 and 7, when it is found the *internal coherence* of a frame with the content of the demand it legitimates matters for movement outcomes, not just the *external resonance* that has already been identified in the framing literature. Both these causal mechanisms—frame coherence and frame resonance—help explain how the different combinations of internal and external variables impact movement outcomes. Moreover, both highlight the strategic decisions that protest leaders and activists make, but also show the impact of these actors' embeddedness in wider social structures.

8.2 Limitations

The empirical research presented in this thesis has thus sought to evaluate the relative importance of movement-level and contextual variables for movement outcomes. In particular, it was able to explore the role of the demands that movements make (claiming), how they make them (tactics), how they make them out to be legitimate (framing), and how these factors interact among themselves and with contextual factors. In terms of contextual factors, the nature of political opportunities was explored in detail. Various measures of public opinion were also included; however, given that neither data capturing change in public opinion over time nor data directly capturing attitudes to indigenous rights was available for the purposes of this research, any conclusions about the role of public opinion are only tentative. This is problematic as one of the causal mechanisms tentatively suggested to play a role—that of internal coherence—relies on how movements are perceived externally as a result of their framing strategies. As such, and as discussed above, the interaction between public opinion and movement strategies needs much further research. In doing so, the analytical usefulness of the mechanism of *frame coherence* can be tested further.

A further limitation—in addition to the chapter specific limitations discussed in each chapter—is the overrepresentation of cases from Bolivia, a potentially exceptional case of indigenous movement success. Moreover, the specific and complex historical developments in the politicisation of both class and ethnicity in this Latin American country might there in other Latin American countries, there might be less diversity of indigenous claims and frames, potentially questioning how useful looking at strategic claiming and framing is for trying to

understand ethno-linguistic mobilisations in other countries. However, this is countered by the fact that the statistical analysis in Chapter 4 analyses indigenous protest events from 13 Latin American countries. Moreover, for future research, adding the case of Chile[111] will make the QCA analysis in Chapter 7 more robust. Adding further qualitative cases—such as Chile as the 'least likely' case of exhibiting the same dynamics as Bolivia—will provide the results of that particular chapter, and the thesis overall, with more power of generalisation.

Overall, the thesis tries to investigate the strategies and outcomes of indigenous movements in Latin America, but in paying attention to divergent and evolving strategies, it also needed to look specifically at different instances of protest and different collective actors, so that this strategic heterogeneity at different times and in different countries could be captured. In doing so, it arguably loses some sight of the broader trajectories of indigenous movements; it cannot capture the importance of waves of protests, nor cross-country diffusion (Biggs, 2005; Biggs & Andrews, 2006). Moreover, the availability of the quantitative data also means that much of the recent wave of protests against extraction is missing from the analysis, except in the Bolivian chapters. Moreover, the increasingly protagonistic role of indigenous women could not be fully captured in the analysis, including more recently established indigenous women's organisations in Bolivia beyond the *Bartolinas.*

A more general question remains: to what extent does the analysis of indigenous movements in Latin America help us better understand the outcomes of social movements in general? Indigenous movements blur the line between social movements and nationalist movements; how far can we generalise to other, more traditional types of social movements? Moreover, the historical specificities of identity politics in the Latin American region must be acknowledged in any follow-up studies. However, this thesis used the examples of Latin American indigenous movements in order to try and uncover specific *causal mechanisms* explaining outcomes. In specifying the conditions under which such mechanisms operate, these can be considered as *general* causal explanations of how a certain predictor led to an observed outcome. As such, they can be applied to other contexts, if similar conditions can be identified. How *useful* these mechanisms are for understanding diverse social movement contexts beyond the cases studied here will need to be tested in the future.

8.3 Future research: Being costly, seeming 'worthy'?

This thesis thus presented a mixed-method study of indigenous movements in Latin American and their successes and failures. Moreover, within each approach, it also used different methodological tools to answer the same question, adding reliability to the results. Each chapter expands on the findings of the previous, making this a coherent project and strengthening its explanatory power. The analysis of an original cross-national dataset of protest activity in the quantitative part of the thesis allowed for a systematic investigation of the relationships between the strategic choices protesters make, the political environment they encounter and the outcomes they experience.

[111] In fact, this is the exact aim of a further study, designed to build on this doctoral thesis, as part of a fellowship at the Institute of Latin American Studies at the University of London and research project at the University of Oxford, funded by the British Academy and Leverhulme Small Research Grant.

As such, it offered insights about the general patterns of indigenous social movement activity in Latin America and its results, rather than potentially case-contingent explanations. This is a particular worry for single-case studies of indigenous protest activity in Latin America, as much of the literature has focused on individual countries with large and relatively successful indigenous movements, drawing conclusions from potentially exceptional cases; though as discussed above, this work is not entirely free of this criticism either. At the same time, much of the sociological research on social movements has been confined to cases from the United States and Europe. Focusing on protest events in Latin America challenges this in both testing and developing theories of social movement outcomes in a new setting.

Still, the mechanisms proposed to explain the successes and failures of social movement activity might not seem to form a coherent explanatory framework. The cost imposition mechanism is tied to the cost calculation of the target, and implies a rational choice approach to explaining collective action and its outcomes. As suggested above, applying costly disruption as well as tactically adapting one's repertoires in order to maximise the cost that can be imposed can *directly* on targets. The causal paths of claim and frame resonance, conversely, are not only about the symbolic and material costs that protesters can apply on their targets; their *resonance* tells us about the effectiveness of focusing on specific demands and using certain frames within a particular political context. They tell thus us not about what is materially and economically costly, but what is costly symbolically and legitimacy-wise.

In a way, this goes back to how social movements are defined in the first place. Much of the literature either talks about the 'women's movement' or the 'environmental movement', before focusing on either counting protest events or looking at the trajectories of specific movement organisations (I have also done both here, although I have tried to expand the way in which protest events are studied). Even if there is little agreement on how to best study social movements, Tilly's famous definition, which this thesis also started off with, permeates the literature. To recapitulate, it defines social movements as "sustained challenges to power holders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those power holders by means of repeated public displays of that populations Worthiness, Unity, Numbers and Commitment", or 'WUNC', as it has become known in the social movement literature (Tilly, 1999: 257). However, most of the scholarship on social movements focuses on the *sustained challenges*, rather than the *displays.* The element of communicative performances crucial to social movements actions, and to Tilly's analyses of contentious politics, has been side-lined (Collins, 2010). As such, the role of displaying by movements of certain characteristics to both their targets, the general public and potential supporters, remains understudied.

A recent working paper does try to fill this gap by examining the role of the social movement 'WUNCness'—it indeed points to the usefulness of paying renewed attention to Tilly's original definition; however, it provides few answers as to *how* displaying WUNC might lead to positive outcomes, and what 'worthiness' might mean empirically, for that matter (Wouters & Walgrave, 2017). I argue that it is by paying renewed attention to the role of social movement claiming and framing strategies that this could be fruitfully brought again into the studies of social movement outcomes. First, however, how useful is the concept of WUNC in the first place, and how can we analyse it? Three of these factors can be measured relatively easily for social movement organisations, and to a lesser extent for individual protest events. Numbers

here are discussed as protest participants or a movement organisation's mobilising capacity, while unity is analysed in the qualitative tracing of the indigenous movement in Bolivia. Commitment, arguably, could be measured by the propensity to use disruptive tactics as well as to maintain a protest event for a substantial period of time, as well as mobilisation in the face of (the threat of) repression.

All of these factors are usually discussed in social movement studies, and included in the analyses presented above. Worthiness, however, remains rather elusive. And its original definition does not help. In *Regimes and Repertoires*, Tilly proposes that worthiness can be evidenced by "sober demeanor; neat clothing; presence of clergy, and dignitaries, and mothers with children" (Tilly, 2006: 54). In an earlier article, Tilly likens worthiness to 'respectability' (Tilly, 1998), while it has also been reconceptualised as being 'dignified' (Wouters & Walgrave, 2017). This is still rather vague, and only focuses on the behaviour of social movement participants during a particular collective action.

What it draws attention to, however, is that behaviour at a protest events and the choices of social movement organisations, can display certain characteristics. While this may be intentional, even unintentional actions might be seen as indicative of a particular characteristic by movement constituents, audiences, and targets alike. While being 'respectable' is positive for Tilly, carrying out sustained disruptive action can also show commitment; this adds the potential costs of continued and future protest to the cost already imposed by the action itself, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. The nature of movement framing can also send certain signals to targets, opponents, and supporters alike. While there may be a large, united number of people showing willingness to sacrifice for a cause, is this enough to convince constituents, publics, and targets alike that their cause is *legitimate*?

If even ostensibly sacrificial tactics are seen as purely instrumental, or 'fake', rather than authentic, then this may communicate a lack of commitment to onlookers (Biggs, 2014). I propose that the same argument can be made for framing, in that the internal coherence of a movement's frames can affect the extent to which a movement is considered as 'worthy'. As such, the importance of displays can be made explicit in the study of social movements, and this means paying attention to both the strategic choices of certain tactics or framing made by social movement leaders and organisations. Not all social movement actions are of course intended to be displays of 'WUNCness' to movement targets, opponents, and the general public. Thus, it is more applicable, I argue, if we re-define worthiness as *authenticity*, when authenticity is opposed to instrumentality. Struggles that are perceived as more authentic—in that their framing is seen to reflect a genuine need—are thus arguably seen as more legitimate, and thus more worthy. This is one way in which *framing theory*, I posit, can make a significant contribution for our understanding of social movement outcomes.

As shown in the empirical chapters of this thesis, the notion of *authenticity* is particularly relevant for indigenous movements, as the very question of gets to claim an indigenous identity and thus the legitimacy to represent indigenous constituencies is a crucial part of indigenous movement struggles. The analysis also argues that strategic choices about claims and frames can help or hinder the legitimacy-seeking work of social movements. In this vein, it also wonders if the *coherence* between movement claims and frames matters, it that it may affect how legitimacy movements are perceived to be. It was not able, however, to investigate this

fully, and more research is needed in this regard. This would arguably be a fruitful avenue to further a North-South theoretical dialogue, putting discussions of public display and performance of indigenous collective actors in Bolivia, for example (e.g. Fabricant & Gustafson, 2011; Fabricant & Postero, 2014; Goldstein, 2004; Postero, 2017) in conversation with the general social movement work on displays and signals (e.g. Biggs, 2014; Ahlquist & Levi, 2013, Collins, 2010; McAdam *et al*, 2001; Tilly, 1998, 2006).

Some of the social movement literature does mention in passing the importance of a 'coherent' frame (Cress & Snow, 2000; McVeigh *et al*., 2004), but as explored in Chapter 2, fails to take into account the difference between the content of the demand and the way in which it is legitimated. If this distinction is not explored, what can 'coherence' mean in terms of framing? How can it be measured or evaluated? This thesis has argued that in order to try and do so, the internal dynamics of framing must be investigated, and the content of demands (claims) must be conceptually distinguished from the way in which they are legitimated (frames).

Movements' strategic choices about the tactics and framing they employ impact the political cost they can impose (or threaten to impose) on their targets, both materially and symbolically. Disruptive tactics sustained over a period of time, and mobilising capacity in general are crucial to this. The political resonance of both the content and the legitimation of demands also matters, as governments are more likely to accede to demands that resonate with their public political agenda. However, social movements are also about displaying 'worthiness', or legitimacy, to potential supporters and the public at large. The strategic decisions regarding framing impact movement's legitimacy, not just in the extent to which they resonate with public opinion or political agendas; the internal coherence of framing might also send signals about the authenticity of the movement. Disaggregating the *what* and the *why* of framing, and paying renewed attention to the worthiness of social movements, might thus aid such future research on social movements and their consequences. In general, studying the internal dynamics of social movements, what they ask for and how they ask for it, can thus help understand their intended consequences. Attention to this has been largely missing from the scholarship on social movement outcomes.

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See appendices A-E

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Qualitative data

List of interviews (28) and participant observations (A-G)

1. Rodrigo Siles, Ministry of Development and Planning, 28th September 2016, La Paz

A. *Vice-ministry for Decolonization, 29th September 2016, La Paz:*

2. Felix Cardenas Aguilar, Viceminister
3. Guillermo Aluce, Coordinator of the Vicemistry

4. Amaru Villanueva, CIS, 29th September, 2016, La Paz

5. Wilfredo Plata, Fundación Tierra, 3rd October 2016, La Paz

6. Walter Limache, Programa Nina, 5th October 2016, La Paz

B. *Colectivo Ch'ixi, 9th October 2016, La Paz@*

7. Beatriz Chambilla, political scientist and activist
8. Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, renowned sociologist and activist

9. Juan Carlos Pinto, Vicepresident's Office, 10th October 2016, La Paz

10. Ruth Bautista, sociologist, 11th October 2016, La Paz

C. *"13 Años del Guerra del Gas: Homenaje y Memorias", 17th October 2016, El Alto:*

11. Pablo Velazques, MINKA
12. Felipe Quispe, Aymara leader, formerly CSUTCB

13. Hernán Avila, CEJIS, 18th October 2016, Santa Cruz

14. Bienvenido Zacu, activist, CIDOB, 19th October 2016, Santa Cruz

D. *20th – 21st October: Forum of Indigenous Authorities de TCOs/TIOCs, Santa Cruz, organized by CEJIS and Fundación TIERRA:*

15. José Bailaba, CIDOB
16. Celso Padilla, CIDOB
17. Pablino Parapaino Castro, CIDOB
18. Marcial Fabricano, CIDOB

E. *22nd October: Bartolina Sisa Workshop, Santa Cruz:*

19. María Muñoz, Executive Director of the Departmental *Bartolina Sisa* Federation, Santa Cruz
20. Felipa Merino, Santa Cruz departmental senator for MAS
21. Isabel Ortega, MAS Parliament representative

22. Gregorio Choque Quispe, CONAMAQ (ofic.), 3rd November 2016, La Paz

F. *Meeting of 'organic' CONAMAQ, 4th November 2016, La Paz:*

23. Cristóbal Huanca, *Tata Mallku*, CONAMAQ (org.)

24. Victor Cabezas, General Secretary, CSCIOB, 4th November 2016, La Paz

25. Hugo López, Secretary for Participation and Social Control, CSUTCB, 7th November 2016, La Paz

G. *"Agua y Energía para la Vida", Cochabamba, CEDIB, 10th – 11th November 2016*

26. Cancio Rojas, CONAMAQ
27. Cristóbal Huanca, CONAMAQ

28. Leonilda Zurita, MAS Legislator, Cochabamba Regional Assembly, 10th November 2016

Appendices

Appendix A: Indigenous population size in Latin American countries

There are various difficulties in attempting to estimate the actual size of the indigenous population in each relevant Latin American country. National censuses generally tend to underestimate it, often to a significant degree, among other factors "because of problems associated with geographic isolation, methodological limitations in the design and use of census tools, and a lack of trust in census agencies" (IADB, 2006). The question formulation in particular can play an important role, especially whether the response options include the *mestizo* ('mixed') category or not. For example, the Bolivian census from 2001 suggests that around 3,145,000 (62%) of the population above the age of 15 identifies with an indigenous or Afro-Bolivian *pueblo,* while according to the 2012 Census, this percentage is 41% (2,807,000). This exemplifies the problem of relying on national census, as at least in the case of Bolivia, the indigenous population is considered to a majority of the national population, based on data from a variety of agencies as well as from the academic literature.

Table 1b below shows available data for the Latin American countries of interest, adapted from an Inter-American Development Bank report (2006; cited in Van Cott, 2007). The estimates are often higher (sometimes substantially) than national census estimates also shown in table 1, although some of the more recent censuses in some of the countries with smaller indigenous populations suggest a larger indigenous population than the IADB estimate. However, it is also important to bear in mind that the censuses often ask quite different questions in each country in relation to indigeneity. For example, the estimate from the 2011 Uruguayan Census is very different to the IADB estimate; yet the census used a question about ancestry (and respondents could pick more than one category), which in most likelihood brings the estimate to a much higher number than the number of self-identifying indigenous people. The issue with estimating the indigenous population is not just methodological or contingent on the question formulation or focus (i.e. language versus self-identification); at different junctures, identifying (or not) as indigenous might also be a political decision. However, for the purposes of this study, what is important is the relative size of the indigenous population, especially the population share, compared to other Latin American countries. Clearly, neither measure in Table 1b is perfect, but the IADB estimates are based on a variety of data sources and having used a unified methodology for all countries, it is useful for comparison. Since the main interest for this research is the relative size, and on the other hand all estimates are imperfect, the best solution seems to be to put the countries into three broad categories of high, medium, and low indigenous population share.

Table 1b: Estimated Indigenous Populations in Latin American Countries

Country	IADB (2006)		National censuses			Classification
	Ind. Pop.	Share	Ind. Pop.*	Share	Year	
Bolivia	5,914,000	71%	2,807,000	41%	2012[1]	High share
Guatemala	8,342,000	66%	4,433,000	40%	2002	
Peru	12,696,000	47%	3,919,000	16%	2007[2]	
Ecuador	5,556,000	43%	1,028,000	7%	2010[3]	Medium share
Honduras	938,000	15%	472,000	6%	2001	
Mexico	14,049,000	14%	6,913,000	7%	2010[4]	
Chile	1,217,000	8%	692,000	5%	2002	
El Salvador	429,000	7%	13,000	<1%	2007	
Panama	168,000	6%	418,000	12%	2010	
Nicaragua	241,000	5%	444,000	9%	2005	
Paraguay	168,000	3%	113,000	2%	2012[5]	Low share
Colombia	794,000	2%	1,265,000	3%	2005	
Venezuela	471,000	2%	725,000	3%	2011	
Costa Rica	36,000	1%	104,000	2%	2011	
Argentina	370,000	1%	955,000	2%	2010	
Uruguay	1,000	<1%	164,000	5%	2011[6]	


Source: IADB (2006) (Adapted from Van Cott (2007)); National Censuses.

Notes: *Rounded to the nearest thousand. [1]This was limited to population aged 15 years and above. The same measure (even though the question was slightly different) was 3,154,000 persons in 2001, representing 62% of the population. [2]Based on question about childhood language. [3]This would be 9.5% if including those who identified as Afro-Ecuadorean. [4]Based on ability to speak an indigenous language. [5]Prelimiary results. [6]Indicates reporting of indigenous ancestry (respondents could choose more than one ancestral category).


Appendix B: Variables and Coding

Variable	***Description***	***Coding***	***Source***	***Type***
Dependent variable:				
Outcome	State response to protest event (acceptance after event occurrence, advantages with 6-month lag)	0=none, 1=acceptance, 2=acceptance + advantages	Newswire and newspaper sources (plus policy documents and secondary literature)	Ordinal
Independent variables:				
Model 1: Movement Level				
Redistribution	Do demands include redistributive elements?	0=no, 1=yes	Newswire & newspaper	Dummy
Autonomy	Demands concerned primarily with autonomy, as opposed to inclusion?	0=no, 1=yes	Newswire & newspaper	Dummy
Land	Is the main focus of demands land ownership?	0=no, 1=yes	Newswire & newspaper	Dummy
Policy change	Main demand requiring policy change (versus e.g. executive action)?	0=no, 1=yes	Newswire & newspaper	Dummy
Disruptive	Were main tactics used disruptive?	0=non-disruptive, 1=disruptive or violent	Newswire & newspaper	Dummy
Tactics	Main tactic used	1=demonstration, 2=march, 3=road block, 4=occupation, 5=other	Newswire & newspaper	Nominal
Duration	Duration of protest event	Number of days (log)	Newswire & newspaper	Cont.
Participants	Number of participants recorded (approximate)	Number of participants (log)	Newswire & newspaper	Ordinal
Supporters	Presence of other non-indigenous participants	0=no, 1=yes	Newswire & newspaper	Dummy
Repression	Was protest met with state repression?	0=no, 1=yes	Newswire & newspaper	Dummy
Violence	Experienced non-state violence?	0=no, 1=yes	Newswire & newspaper	Dummy
Model 2: Nature of indigenous constituency				
Indig. share	Indigenous population share	Percentage	Secondary lit., IADB	Cont.
Model 3: Political Environment				
Left-wing	Left-of-centre-wing government	0=no, 1=yes	Secondary literature, newspaper sources	Dummy
Repressive regime	Level of state repression	0=worst physical integrity, 8=best	Cingranelli and Richards' physical integrity index.	Ordinal
Model 4: Public attitudes				
Racism 1	Xenophobic and racist attitudes	Percentage of respondents in country responding 'yes'.	*LB* survey (2009): *"Would you mind having an indigenous person as a neighbour?"*	Cont.
Discrimination 2	Perception of discrimination	Average response for country.	*LB* survey (2009): *"How many people (%) in (country) do you think are discriminated?*	Cont.


Appendix C: Frequency of indigenous protest events by country



Source: Author's dataset of indigenous protest events in 13 South and Central American countries, 2003-2013. N=635.



Source: Author's dataset of indigenous protest events in 13 South and Central American countries, 2003-2013. N=635.



Source: Author's dataset of indigenous protest events in 13 South and Central American countries, 2003-2013. N=635.

Appendix D: Descriptive statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Outcome (any positive)	635	0.63	0.48	0	1
Redistribution	635	0.52	0.50	0	1
Autonomy	635	0.55	0.50	0	1
Policy change	635	0.36	0.48	0	1
Duration (log)	635	1.04	1.43	0	6.47
Tactics	635	2.64	1.20	1	5
Participants (log)	635	6.50	1.83	0.69	11.51
Supporters	635	0.38	0.48	0	1
Urban	635	0.59	0.49	0	1
Indigenous share	635	29.87	27.47	1	71
Left-of-centre	635	0.47	0.50	0	1
Previous success	635	0.62	0.29	0	1
Racism	635	12.97	9.33	3.51	38.67
Discrimination	635	42.33	4.84	31.75	51.49

Appendix E: Correlation matrix

	Outcome	Redistri-bution	Autonomy	Policy change	Duration	Tactics	Partici-pants	Supporters	Urban	Indigenous share	Left-of-centre	Previous success	Racism	Discrimina-tion
Outcome (any positive)	1													
Redistribution	-0.09	1.00												
Autonomy	0.06	-0.52	1.00											
Policy change	-0.19	-0.03	0.19	1.00										
Duration (log)	0.18	0.13	-0.01	-0.05	1.00									
Tactics	0.04	0.20	-0.07	-0.11	0.34	1.00								
Participants (log)	0.08	0.08	-0.01	0.13	-0.02	-0.36	1.00							
Supporters	-0.02	0.29	-0.26	0.10	-0.08	-0.16	0.28	1.00						
Urban	0.05	-0.04	-0.05	0.05	-0.16	-0.38	0.27	0.13	1.00					
Indigenous share	0.16	0.07	-0.13	-0.06	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.29	-0.09	1.00				
Left-of-centre	0.15	-0.08	0.03	-0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.13	-0.09	0.02	0.08	1.00			
Previous success	0.22	0.07	-0.05	-0.14	0.06	0.14	-0.06	0.01	-0.01	0.26	0.32	1.00		
Racism	0.11	-0.03	0.05	0.01	0.08	0.03	0.00	0.09	-0.13	0.13	0.14	0.10	1.00	
Discrimination	0.19	0.15	-0.18	-0.12	0.08	0.08	0.11	0.17	-0.01	0.70	-0.09	0.23	-0.21	1.00

N=635

Appendix F: fsQCA Conditions, Cases and Calibration

Success

- *Have the representatives of this organisation participated in any (1) negotiations, (2) consultations and/or (3) meetings with representatives of the government in particular or the state in general?*
- *Have the demands of this organisation been reflected in any (1) policy changes, (2) policy implementation and/or (3) executive action?*
- *To what extent has the organisation been able to impact decision-making at the state level?*

Outcome calibration

Coding	Acceptance and advantages	State relations: Influence	
0.0	No positive outcome experienced.	No response and/or repression*.	*Exclusion*
0.2	Some acceptance and no advantages.	Limited engagement, co-optation.	
0.4	Some acceptance but few advantages.	Engagement and co-optation.	
0.6	Full acceptance with limited advantages	Some impact on decision-making.	
0.8	Full acceptance and some advantages.	Inclusion into decision-making.	
1.0	Full acceptance as well as advantages.	Full inclusion, incl. state control.	*Inclusion*

Note: The other calibration categories can also be accompanied by repression, though these become less likely as one moves closer to 1.

Demand content: redistribution

- *Do the stated goals of the organisation focus solely on recognition, or do they prioritise redistribution?*
- *Since 2003, which type of demands has been the main focus of mobilisations which this organisation either organised or participated in?*

Coding	Description	Cases
0.0	Demands focus almost purely on recognition.	
0.2	While focusing predominantly on recognition, some redistribution demands are made.	CIDOB-1,3
0.4	Demands for recognition are supplemented with demands for redistribution, though the former is more prominent.	CIDOB-2, CONAMAQ-1,2,3
0.6	Demands for recognition are supplemented with demands for redistribution, though the latter is more prominent.	CSUTCB-1, Bartolina-3
0.8	Focus is mainly on demands for redistribution, with some attention paid to demands for recognition.	CSCIOB-1, CSUTCB-2,3, Bartolina-1,2,
1.0	The vast majority of demands is for redistribution.	CSCIOB-2,3

Demand legitimation: equal rights

- *What language is most commonly used to justify demands, i.e. reference to cultural, group rights or equal rights and redistributive justice?*

Coding	Description	Cases
0.0	Almost all demands are legitimated with reference to group rights.	CIDOB-1,2,3
0.2	Demands are predominantly legitimated in the language of group rights, but some equal rights discourse is also present.	CONAMAQ-1,2,3
0.4	Both group rights and equal rights discourse are present, though the former is more prominent.	
0.6	Both group rights and equal rights discourse are present, though the latter is more prominent.	CSCIOB-1, Bartolina-3
0.8	Demands are predominantly legitimated in the language of equal rights, but some group rights discourse is also present.	CSCIOB-2,3, CSUTCB-1, Bartolina-1,2
1.0	Almost all demands are legitimated with reference to equal rights.	CSUTCB-2,3

Size and mobilising capacity

- *Relative to the other SMOs under study, how large is the SMOs capacity for mobilisation?*
- *Does it seek to represent a large section of the country's population, or only local or regional constituencies?*

Coding	Description	Cases
0.0	Small, nationally only marginally significant SMO, representing	CONAMAQ-3
0.2	a relatively small constituency with a low mobilising capacity.	CONAMAQ-1,2, CIDOB-3
0.4	↕	CIDOB-1,2, Bartolina-2,3
0.6		CSUTCB-2,3, Bartolina-1
0.8	Large, nationally greatly significant SMO, representing a	CSUTCB-1, CSCIOB-2,3
1.0	relatively large constituency with a high mobilising capacity.	CSCIOB-1

Repertoire of contention

- *Does the SMO employ a wide contentious repertoire (ranging from disruption to legal action, for example) or does it mainly focus on one or two generally disruptive tactics (e.g. marches and road blocks)?*

Coding	Description	Cases
0.0	The SMO has a narrow repertoire, employing mainly	
0.2	one or two tactics.	CSCIOB, CSUTCB-2
0.4	↕	CSUTCB-1,3, Bartolina
0.6		CONAMAQ,
0.8	The SMO has a wide repertoire, supplying disruptive	CIDOB-2
1.0	tactics with negotiation, lobbying or petitions	CIDOB-1,3

Alliances

- *To what extent does the organisation seek external—non-governmental—support? This can be either international (i.e. international human rights organisations or NGOs) or national (i.e. the courts or national NGOs).*

Coding	Description	Cases
0.0	The SMO is unlikely to form alliances with other SMOs	
0.2	and both domestic and international NGOs.	CSCIOB-1,3
0.4	↕	CSCIOB-2, CSUTCB-1,3, Bartolina-1,3, CONAMAQ-1,3, CIDOB-3
0.6	↕	CSUTCB-2, Bartolina-2, CIDOB-1, CONAMAQ-2
0.8	The SMO has formed alliances with other SMOs and/or	CIDOB-2
1.0	domestic and international NGOs.	

Left-wing government

- Left-of-centre executive in power: 1
- Centre or right-wing executive in power: 0

Indigenous SMOs in Bolivia (fuzzy set data)

	Causal conditions						Outcomes
Case	RED	EQU	SIZ	REP	ALL	LEF	INF
CSUTCB-1	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.2
CSUTCB-2	0.8	1.0	0.6	0.2	0.6	1.0	0.8
CSUTCB-3	0.8	1.0	0.6	0.4	0.4	1.0	0.8
CSCIOB-1	0.8	0.6	1.0	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.0
CSCIOB-2	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.2	0.4	1.0	0.8
CSCIOB-3	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.4	0.2	1.0	0.8
CIDOB-1	0.2	0.0	0.4	1.0	0.6	0.0	0.6
CIDOB-2	0.4	0.0	0.4	0.8	0.8	1.0	0.6
CIDOB-3	0.2	0.0	0.2	1.0	0.4	1.0	0.4
CONAMAQ-1	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.4	0.0	0.2
CONAMAQ-2	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.6	0.6	1.0	0.6
CONAMAQ-3	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.6	0.4	1.0	0.2
Bartolina-1	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.0	0.0
Bartolina-2	0.8	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.6	1.0	0.8
Bartolina-3	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.4	1.0	0.6

Truth Table for Bolivian indigenous SMO data (crisp set)

Causal conditions						Outcome	Cases
RED	EQU	SIZ	REP	ALL	LEF	INFLUENCE	
1	1	1	0	0	1	1	CSUTCB-3, CSCIOB-2, CSCIOB-3
1	1	1	0	0	0	0	CSUTCB-1, CSCIOB-1, BARTOLINA-1
0	0	0	1	1	1	1	CIDOB-2, CONAMAQ-2
0	0	0	1	0	1	0	CIDOB-3, CONAMAQ-3
1	1	0	0	0	1	1	BARTOLINA-3
1	1	0	0	1	1	1	BARTOLINA-2
1	1	1	0	1	1	1	CSUTCB-2
0	0	0	1	1	0	1	CIDOB-1
0	0	0	1	0	0	0	CONAMAQ-1

Appendix G: fsQCA results

****
TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS
****

Model: INF = f(RED, EQU, SIZ, REP, ALL, LEF)
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

--- COMPLEX SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1
consistency cutoff: 0.714286
raw unique
(coverage, consistency)
---------- ---------- ----------
RED*EQU*~REP*LEF 0.594595 0.459459 1
~RED*~EQU*~SIZ*REP*ALL 0.459459 0.324324 0.85
solution coverage: 0.918919
solution consistency: 0.918919

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term RED*EQU*~REP*LEF: CSUTCB-2 (0.8,0.8), CSCIOB-2 (0.8,0.8), CSUTCB-3 (0.6,0.8), CSCIOB-3 (0.6,0.8),
Bartolina-2 (0.6,0.8), Bartolina-3 (0.6,0.6)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~RED*~EQU*~SIZ*REP*ALL: CIDOB-1 (0.6,0.6), CIDOB-2 (0.6,0.6), CONAMAQ-2 (0.6,0.6)

****
TRUTH TABLE ANALYSIS
****

Model: INF = f(RED, EQU, SIZ, REP, ALL, LEF)
Algorithm: Quine-McCluskey

--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1
consistency cutoff: 0.714286
raw unique
(coverage, consistency)
---------- ---------- ----------
ALL 0.72973 0.216216 0.771429
~REP*LEF 0.648649 0 0.96
RED*LEF 0.783784 0 0.90625
EQU*LEF 0.675676 0 0.925926
solution coverage: 1
solution consistency: 0.755102

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ALL: CIDOB-2 (1,0.6), CSUTCB-2 (0.6,0.8), CIDOB-1 (0.6,0.6), CONAMAQ-2 (0.6,0.6), Bartolina-2 (0.6,0.8)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term ~REP*LEF: CSUTCB-2 (0.8,0.8), CSCIOB-2 (0.8,0.8), CSUTCB-3 (0.6,0.8), CSCIOB-3 (0.6,0.8), Bartolina-2 (0.6,0.8), Bartolina-3 (0.6,0.6)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term RED*LEF: CSCIOB-2 (1,0.8), CSCIOB-3 (1,0.8), CSUTCB-2 (0.8,0.8), CSUTCB-3 (0.8,0.8), Bartolina-2 (0.8,0.8), Bartolina-3 (0.6,0.6)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term EQU*LEF: CSUTCB-2 (1,0.8), CSUTCB-3 (1,0.8), CSCIOB-2 (0.8,0.8), CSCIOB-3 (0.8,0.8), Bartolina-2 (0.8,0.8), Bartolina-3 (0.6,0.6)