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Limitations of deterministic auction design for correlated bidders

Abstract:

The seminal work of Myerson (Mathematics of OR ’81) characterizes incentive-compatible single-item auctions among bidders with independent valuations. In this setting, relatively simple deterministic auction mechanisms achieve revenue optimality. When bidders have correlated valuations, designing the revenue-optimal deterministic auction is a computationally demanding problem; indeed, Papadimitriou and Pierrakos (STOC ’11) proved that it is APX-hard, obtaining an explicit inapproximability fa...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Accepted manuscript

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Publisher copy:
10.1145/2934309

Authors


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Institution:
University of Oxford
Department:
Oxford, MPLS, Computer Science
Caragiannis, I More by this author
Kaklamanis, C More by this author
European Social Fund More from this funder
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Grant:
Thales on “Algorithmic Game Theory”
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Grant:
Advanced Grant 321171 (ALGAME)
Publisher:
Association for Computing Machinery Publisher's website
Journal:
ACM Transactions on Computation Theory Journal website
Publication date:
2016-06-29
DOI:
EISSN:
1942-3462
ISSN:
1942-3454
URN:
uuid:abc35962-faf2-4545-af52-cefe3a82d404
Source identifiers:
610915
Local pid:
pubs:610915

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