

Al-Kindī's "First Philosophy" and Cognate Texts:

Translation and Commentary

Abstract

This work consists of a critical translation from the Arabic of "(On) First Philosophy" *في الفلسفة الأولى*, the major philosophical text of Ya'qūb ibn Ishāq al-Kindī (d. ca. 870 A.D.); and a detailed study of this text in relation to cognate treatises of al-Kindī's, and to works of classical and late Greek philosophy. Al-Kindī's ideas are also compared with those of his contemporaries among the theologians and philosophers of the 9th and 10th centuries.

The translation is formally patterned upon the Arabic edition of "First Philosophy" by Muḥammad Abū Rīdah (Cairo, 1950). A critical apparatus accompanying the translation notes differences in my reading of the manuscript from that of Abū Rīdah, and also refers, wherever helpful, to the readings of another (less careful) Arabic edition, that done by Aḥmad al-Ahwānī (Cairo, 1948). The introduction to the translation consists of four chapters: 1) a resumé of what is currently known of al-Kindī's life and times, and of the most important literature relating to al-Kindī philosophical studies; 2a) a description of the text and translation of "On First Philosophy" and a summary of its contents; 2b) a philosophical analysis of al-Kindī's views in

"First Philosophy" and cognate texts; 3) a reevaluation of al-Kindī's relation to the mu'tazila. The following is a brief summary of the major points of the commentary and introduction, which expand upon the remarks and allusions found in the translation.

Our growing awareness of the social and cultural forces at work in 9th century Baghdad helps us to locate al-Kindī, the "philosopher of the Arabs", in a complex environment of competing ethnic and religious groups; with none of whom, however, can we identify al-Kindī with any certainty. His main involvement appears to have been with the tradition of Greek philosophy and sciences newly acquired by the Moslems; to the elucidation and propagation of which tradition many of his writings are directed. "On First Philosophy" thus shares with many of his writings a disarming combination of elementary philosophical definitions and rather sophisticated arguments; the proofs of which, however, are usually given in a repetitious manner. Al-Kindī's favorite formulation of arguments -in which he uses a combination of logical and factual premises to reach a conclusion considered by him as "necessary"- is that identified with Stoic logic, viz., the hypothetical and disjunctive "syllogism".

In the repetitive and uneven style of his presentation, as well as in other ways, "First Philosophy" appears to have been presented originally in oral lecture form, probably at the court

of the caliph. A number of his remarks in this and other treatises tally with recently discovered sayings attributed to al-Kindī in the abridgement of Abū Sulayman al-Sijistānī's Siwān al-Ḥikmah, a source which also inclines one to revise in al-Kindī's favor the rather one-sided negative judgements of his personality known from antiquity. Al-Kindī emerges from this study as a subtle and relatively private man about whom the last word has yet to be written.

Much, however, of al-Kindī's theoretical philosophy can be gleaned from a study of "On First Philosophy". The treatise analyzes causation, perception, substance and the categories and predicables of existence; presents elementary principles of logic; and defines the concepts of eternity and of body, motion and time, all of which are deemed finite. Unity and multiplicity (i.e., plurality) are examined separately and shown to require each other in the existence of every object; which is then seen as possessing unity in a non-essential, accidental way. This leads to the assumption of an essential cause for all accidental unity, which essential unity must be totally unlike any other kind of unity imaginable; neither one by number, form (including neither intellect or soul), genus or even by analogy. This unique, True One, however, as responsible for the unity of all else, is considered the (ultimate) cause of the becoming of all substances and of the creation of the world from nothing; achieved

apparently by a process of emanation which is just barely mentioned.

This reference to emanation, and the emphasis upon the existence of an ultimate One above all of creation, indicates a strong Neo-Platonic influence in al-Kindī's thought, though he does not attempt to construct an ontological scheme of universal hypostases existing between the One and man. He is similarly vague, in "First Philosophy" and elsewhere, on the status of the individual intellect and its entire relation to a possibly universal agent intellect. Al-Kindī is using a composite source (or sources) in this area as well as in many others, making use of Alexander of Aphrodisias' division of the intellect, though not of his identification of the Agent Intellect with the Divine Mind. Al-Kindī distinguishes between the One and all else, including any universal intellect, probably going further in his transcendental view of the one than even his Plotinian source.

It is Aristotle's Metaphysics however, rather than Plotinus' Enneads, which serves as al-Kindī's main source in "First Philosophy", and he often follows the Arabic text of Aristotle's work quite closely, though never slavishly. He works with Aristotle's remarks on the general nature of all substance and being, supplementing the Metaphysics sources with material that ultimately goes back to the Categories, Posterior Analytics, Physics, and De Anima. He does not refer at all to Aristotle's

unmoved mover; rejecting, with the denial of potential infinity as a philosophically significant concept, the notion of an eternal universe and of an infinite extension of time and movement. His proofs for the finiteness of all body, and concomitants of body, follow arguments originally presented by John Philoponus, and which also appear in a number of al-Kindī's contemporaries (though he does not follow John Philoponus in other, related areas); while his arguments for the absurdity of predicating unity or plurality exclusively of anything are descended ultimately from Plato's Parmenides, though they probably reached al-Kindī through a paraphrase contained in some Middle or Neo-Platonic work, or a doxography of the sort he uses elsewhere.

A Hellenistic commentary to Porphyry's Isagoge serves as yet another major source for various parts of "First Philosophy", especially for a discussion of the predicables and the relation of unity and plurality to them. Al-Kindī probably referred to this same source for a critical discussion of number theory, with which he would also have been familiar from the Metaphysics and from Nichomachus of Gerasa's Introduction to Arithmetic, though significant metaphysical differences exist between Nichomachus and al-Kindī. The Ikhwān al-Ṣafā' of the following century were also highly familiar with Nichomachus' work, as well as with all of the same authorities used by al-Kindī in "First Philosophy" and elsewhere; and a brief comparison of their Rasā'il and

al-Kindī's writings indicates a common source for many of their views.

Al-Kindī had a number of disciples, notably Isaac Israeli and Ahmed b. al-Tayyib al-Sarakhsī. Both men, like al-Kindī, seem to have been a-political figures in their respective communities; and, again like him, al-Sarakhsī at least could not escape being drawn into the politics of his day; and apparently also being victimized by personal or politically motivated changes at court which masqueraded as pious anti-Mu'tazila action. From rather blunt remarks in the first chapter of "On First Philosophy", and from a close analysis of al-Kindī's views on physics and revelation there and elsewhere, it appears that al-Kindī is not to be as closely identified with the Mu'tazila as has hitherto been generally assumed. He is not, for example, to be seen as "the philosopher of the Mu'tazilite theology"; though by necessity and choice he shares with those rational theologians some common themes, exegetical techniques, sources and goals. His perspective, however, is totally different, his commitment to the rational process as defined by Aristotle shaping his formulation of religious belief. Though he speaks in "First Philosophy" of the accidental nature of all existence and the dependence of all being upon God the Creator, the "truly one" in relation to whom all else is only "metaphorically one", he also talks there and elsewhere of causality and of substance in a way that indicates


he believes in its practical, if not theoretical, autonomy. It is with Aristotelian notions of form and matter, potentiality (though with reservations) and actuality that al-Kindī works, establishing their limitations and dependency upon an external source, but accepting within these limitations the view of a physical universe which they present. In yet other treatises, al-Kindī appears even to accept Aristotle's view of eternal heavenly bodies which influence the earth; yet we must understand al-Kindī as meaning to say by this that the world is "eternal" as long as God, Who created it, wills it to endure.

It is with such paradoxical if not contradictory expressions that al-Kindī formulates his philosophy, which, despite its shortcomings, entitles him to be known as the first major philosopher in Islam; a man who, working with many diverse sources, attempted to establish a philosophy which he felt would be viable for Islamic society.

AL-KINDĪ'S "FIRST PHILOSOPHY" AND COGNATE TEXTS:
TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY

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Alfred Lyon Ivry

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Part I: Introduction

Chapter One
Al-Kindī and Kindī Studies
A Resumé

The name of Abū Yūsuf Ya‘qūb ibn Ishāq al-Kindī, "the philosopher of the Arabs", is well known to students of Islamic culture, and recent years have seen a number of studies devoted to him. We need not, therefore, rehearse in detail the facts of al-Kindī's life and accomplishments, presented originally by Ibn al-Nadīm and others.¹ Suffice it to say that al-Kindī was born probably in Kufah toward the end of the eighth Christian century or beginning of the ninth, during the tenure of his father, Ishāq ibn al-Sabbāh, as governor there. The family was used to holding important positions, tracing its lineage back to the kings of the South Arabian tribe of Kindah, and counting among its ancestors a Companion of the Prophet.

Al-Kindī began his education at either Kufah or Basrah, and completed it at Baghdad, the centers of culture of his day. He became well known in the ‘Abbāsīd capital as a scholar and physician, enjoyed the patronage of the caliphs al-Ma‘mūn and al-Mu‘taṣim, and was appointed tutor of the latter's son Aḥmad. In this favorable environment he pursued his many-faceted studies,² becoming a famous and even legendary figure. For some reason,

however (the sources are not completely satisfactory), al-Kindī fell from favor in the time of the caliph al-Mutawakkil, his large private library was confiscated and he was apparently beaten. Though the library was subsequently restored to him, al-Kindī never regained a position of official eminence, dying in Baghdad about 870 A.D.

Recent studies have served to fill out the social and cultural background of the times in which al-Kindī lived, allowing us to view him in proper perspective, and to appreciate the drama that is contained in even such a thumbnail sketch of his life as has just been given. Thus, from our knowledge of the transmission of philosophical studies from the world of late Greek thought to the major intellectual centers of the eighth and ninth centuries in Iraq (mostly through a Syriac Christian intermediary),³ we can place al-Kindī at or near the beginning of a philosophical current that remained vital in the Islamic world for some centuries thereafter.

Al-Kindī's "audience" would have been composed of members of the caliph's family and other aristocrats, fellow scholars, students and theologians of every persuasion. That many of these, particularly the Moslems, would have had trouble following him may be inferred externally from the fact that the Arabic texts upon which he bases his views were recent -in some cases very recent- translations;⁴ and internally, from the juxtaposition

throughout his writings of relatively sophisticated arguments with elementary definitions and discussions. Al-Kindī was not, of course, operating in a philosophical vacuum and Christian theologians in particular would have been familiar with many of his ideas.⁵ Yet it is clear, from the dedications to many of his treatises and from the introductory comments to such treatises as On First Philosophy and the paraphrase of Ptolemy's Almagest,⁶ that al-Kindī was addressing himself primarily to his fellow Moslems, for most of whom his teachings provided a philosophical initiation.

That these teachings were not necessarily well received may be deduced from the special pleading with which al-Kindī occasionally introduces his treatises (e.g., On First Philosophy); and we may be certain that he had to struggle against suspicious and hostile attitudes to philosophy, viewed as part of the new, secular and "foreign" culture that was anathema to more traditional circles.⁷ Among these may be counted not only extreme traditionalists such as Ahmed ibn Hanbel, but the more rationally oriented Mu'tazila as well. Al-Kindī's relationship to this latter group -which is examined in some detail in chapter three of the introduction below- is complicated by the politicization of faith and scholarship that followed the establishment of the Mihna in 218 A.H./833 A.D.⁸ Under the sanction of that institution, and in the name of rational faith, the Mu'tazila persecuted with varying

intensity, but at times great cruelty, both saintly jurists as well as simple soldiers.⁹

This inquisition, in turn, ought to be seen against a background of competing social and ethnic forces,¹⁰ among whom, however, it is difficult to locate al-Kindī. It would seem that, though an Arabian aristocrat, he is to be placed with the largely non-Arab forces that introduced secular studies into Islamic society; however, there is no conclusive evidence that he identified socially or politically with any particular group or religious sect. His misfortunes under al-Mutawakkil were apparently due more to personal intrigue or to a general change of intellectual orientation at court, than for a specifically held set of religious beliefs.

A similar ambiguity surrounds al-Kindī's personality. Often described as avaricious,¹¹ the newly-discovered material from al-Sijistānī's Ṣiwān al-Ḥikmah shows him to be virtuous as well as wise.¹² Clearly, the last word on al-Kindī the man has yet to be written, and he stands out as an interesting figure about whom we should wish to know more.

This wish has been partially granted, in the field of al-Kindī's philosophical pursuits, with the publication of an appreciable number of his treatises. To the collection of Latin translations of al-Kindī treatises edited by A. Nagy in the last century,¹³ R. Walzer has added two masterful textual analyses;¹⁴

and M. Abū Rīdah has published a two volume edition of twenty-five of al-Kindī's philosophical treatises, accompanied by a lengthy introductory general evaluation as well as individual introductions to each treatise.¹⁵ From these and other sources,¹⁶ a picture of al-Kindī the philosopher has emerged which balances somewhat the shallow, often negative judgement passed upon him by subsequent philosophers and bibliographers.¹⁷ True, his logic is not analytical and his philosophy not particularly consistent or faultless; yet there is no denying his erudition and industriousness, his attempt to comprehend and convey past philosophies as parts of an essentially unified tradition, and his desire to select from this tradition that which would make for a viable philosophy in an Islamic society.

This study of On First Philosophy and cognate texts is an attempt to further elucidate al-Kindī's methods and views, selecting for translation and close textual analysis what is probably his major philosophical treatise.

Notes to the Introduction

Chapter One

¹Cf. Ibn al-Nadīm, Kitāb al-Fihrist, ed. G. Flügel (Leipzig, 1871) I: 255 ff., II: 118 f.; Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, Kitāb Uyūn al-Anbā' fī Ṭabaqāt al-Aṭibbā', ed. A. Müller (Königsberg, 1884) I: 206 ff.; Ibn al-Qiftī, Tarikh al-Ḥukamā', ed. J. Lippert (Leipzig, 1903), pp. 35 ff., 366 ff. G. Flügel has repeated Ibn al-Nadīm's list of al-Kindī's written work, with comparative notes taken from al-Qiftī and Ibn Abī-Uṣaybi'a, summarizing the facts of al-Kindī's life as presented mostly by these sources; cf. Flügel's "Al-Kindī genannt 'der Philosoph der Araber'", Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes I: 2 (Leipzig, 1857), pp. 1-54. Among other bio-bibliographers who have written on al-Kindī we should mention Ibn Juljul al-Andalusī, Kitāb Ṭabaqāt al-Aṭibbā' wa l-Ḥukamā', ed. F. Sayyid (Cairo, 1955), p. 73; and Sa'id al-Andalusī, Kitāb Ṭabaqāt al-Umam, ed. L. Cheikho (Beyrouth, 1912), pp. 50 ff. (French translation by R. Blachere (Paris, 1935), pp. 104 ff.). H. Malter, availing himself of all these sources (as collected mainly by Flügel and Steinschneider), has reviewed both the facts of al-Kindī's life and the knowledge and opinions held of him by later writers; cf. Malter, "Al-Kindi: 'The Philosopher of the Arabs'", HUCA (1904), pp. 55-71.

A fair number of the treatises mentioned in the early sources have happily turned up in manuscript, particularly in the codex Aya Sofya 4832 discovered by H. Ritter; cf. Ritter and M. Plessner, "Schriften Ja'qūb Ibn Ishāq Al-Kindī In Stambuler Bibliotheken", Archiv Orientalni IV (1932), pp. 363-372. On the basis of this and other discoveries -and cf. particularly, in the field of science and philosophy, the manuscripts turned up and discussed by F. Rosenthal, "Al-Kindī and Ptolemy", Studi Orientalistici In Onore Di Giorgio Levi Della Vida (Rome, 1956), II: 436-456; "From Arabic Books and Manuscripts VI: Istanbul Materials for al-Kindī and as-Sarāḥsi", JAOS 76 (1956), pp. 27-31- there is now a sizable amount of primary and secondary source material on al-Kindī's life and work. Thus R. J. McCarthy has been able to publish a revised list of works attributed to al-Kindī, Al-Tasānif al-Mansūba ilā Faylasūf al-'Arab (Baghdad, 1962), pp. 1-122 (which unfortunately I have been unable to secure); and N. Rescher has published Al-Kindī: An Annotated Bibliography (Pittsburgh, 1964), pp. 13-55.

For recent general histories and evaluations of al-Kindī's life and writings, cf. W. M. Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology (Edinburgh, 1962), pp. 45-47; A. el-Ehwany (sic!), A History of Muslim Philosophy, ed. M. M. Sharif (Wiesbaden, 1963), I: 421-434; and H. Corbin, Histoire de la Philosophie Islamique (Editions Gallimard, 1964), pp. 217-221. Mention should be made also of G. N. Atiyeh's book, Al-Kindī: The Philosopher of the Arabs

(Rawalpindi, 1966), pp. 1-147, in which the author passes in review the details of al-Kindī's life and the various genres of his philosophical writings. Appendices to the book include an English translation of the Fihrist list of al-Kindī writings, with current information on the published state of various treatises (pp. 148-210); an English translation of al-Kindī's Treatise On the Intellect (pp. 211-215); and, most importantly, the abridged text and translation of Abu Sulayman al-Sijistānī's Siwān al-Hikmah, containing many additional sayings and remarks attributed to al-Kindī. (Cf. Atiyeh's edition of this material, pp. 216-238, translated into English by A. S. Bazmee Ansari, op. cit., pp. 239-257). See also note 14 below.

²To name just the major areas of his writings as given by the early bibliographers mentioned in the preceding note, al-Kindī published in the fields of arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy, pharmacology, meteorology, chemistry, medicine, astrology, divination, and polemics; as well as in most of the various divisions of philosophy, viz., logic, physics, (including "celestial" or "spherical" physics), metaphysics, psychology and ethics.

³Cf. the recent studies mentioned in note one above, and see particularly M. Meyerhof, "Von Alexandrien nach Bagdad", Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften;

phil.-hist. Klasse, xxxiii (1930), pp. 389-429, pp. 402-405 in particular for the cultural milieu of al-Kindī's Baghdad; and also F. E. Peters, Aristotle and the Arabs: The Aristotelian Tradition in Islam (New York-London, 1968), pp. 7-55.

⁴Cf., for studies summarizing our current knowledge of Arabic philosophical translations, and of the translators themselves, R. Walzer, "New Light on the Arabic Translations of Aristotle", Greek into Arabic (Oxford, 1962), pp. 65-70; F. Peters, Aristoteles Arabus (Leiden, 1968), pp. 1-75; ibid., Aristotle and the Arabs, pp. 57-67. Much of the philosophical and scientific information which reached al-Kindī did so not by way of direct translation of the original texts, but rather through translations and oral knowledge of such varied types of literature as paraphrases and commentaries, encyclopedias and doxographies (Cf. Peters, Aristotle and the Arabs, pp. 96-129). Al-Kindī's Treatise On the Soul Abridged from the Books of Aristotle and Plato edited by M. Abū Rīdah, Rasā'il al-Kindī al-Falsafiya (Cairo, 1950), pp. 272-280, is an example of a doxographical work, while On First Philosophy, for example, has much material best attributed to such secondary sources as commentaries and epitomes. The nature of such sources often makes it difficult to know whether al-Kindī is indeed the one responsible for a variation upon or disagreement with the ultimate original source.

⁵Cf. note 3 above, and see too L. Gardet and M. Anawati, Introduction a la Théologie Musulmane (Paris, 1948), pp. 192 ff.

⁶Cf. F. Rosenthal, "Al-Kindī and Ptolemy", op. cit., p. 444 f.

⁷An echo of the struggle al-Kindī waged, and which had to be waged in every generation of philosophers, is heard in a disputation reported by Yāqūt on the authority of Abū Hayyān al-Tawhīdī, and edited by D. S. Margoliouth, "Abū Bishr Mattā and Abū Sa'id al-Sīrafī on the Merits of Logic and Grammar", JRAS (1905), pp. 79-129. Al-Kindī is depicted as in attendance at the debate (though it was held in 320 A.H., i.e., at least two generations after his death), and al-Sīrafī mimics his style (rather well), considering him as pursuing absurd questions. Abū Bishr Mattā, for his part, defends logic, and thus the philosophical tradition built upon it, with arguments portraying its universal validity and utility. Besides indirectly testifying to one type of opposition al-Kindī encountered, this disputation indicates al-Kindī's stature in the century following his death, and his influence upon both critics and sympathizers alike.

⁸The man most responsible for the initiation of the Mihna, which lasted until 234 A.H./848 A.D., was the chief Qādī, Ahmad b. Abī Du'ād, a gifted as well as zealous Mu'tazilite spokesman. Al-Mu'tasim appears to have been a less eager proponent of the

Mu'tazilite creed than his predecessor al-Ma'mūn; and was persuaded for political reasons rather than religious ones to continue the persecution of Ibn Ḥanbal. Cf. W. Patton, Aḥmed ibn Ḥanbal and the Mihna (Leiden, 1897), pp. 52 ff., 101 ff., 120 ff.

⁹Cf. the preceding note and see too the sources gathered by I. Goldziher, Vorlesungen über den Islam (Heidelberg, 1925), pp. 96-116. The Mu'tazila, as Goldziher rightly says (p. 114), were rationalists but not liberals.

¹⁰Cf. H.A.R. Gibb, "The Social Significance of the Shu'ūbiya", Studia Orientalia J. Pederson Dicata (Copenhagen, 1953), pp. 105-114, reprinted in Gibb's Studies on the Civilization of Islam (Boston, 1962), pp. 62-73; and see also W. M. Watt, "Political Attitudes of the Mu'tazila", JRAS (1963), pp. 38-57.

¹¹Cf., for example, the influential opinion of Jāḥiẓ, Kitāb al-Bukhalā', publ. Dar Sader, Dar Beyrouth, (Beyrouth, 1963), pp. 116-132; trans. by C. Pellat, Le Livre Des Avarès (Paris, 1951), pp. 115-134. However, after depicting al-Kindī as a bad host and landlord, Jāḥiẓ presents al-Kindī's side of the argument, in which a credible rebuttal is made of these charges.

¹²Cf. the Muntakhab Ṣiwān al-Ḥikmah in Atiyeh, op. cit., particularly numbers 39, 42, 45, 46, 71-73 for remarks which indicate that

al-Kindī was (at least ostensibly) against avarice and similar mean practices. In his judicious description of al-Kindī's position and person, F. Rosenthal has cautioned against uncritical acceptance of the oral tradition regarding al-Kindī; cf. his "Al-Kindī als Literat", Orientalia N.S. 11 (1942), pp. 262-288, particularly pp. 268 f. As regards the Munthakhab Siwān al-Hikmah, it would appear on internal grounds that al-Kindī is indeed the author of the philosophical views attributed to him, and the gnomic utterances may well be also "his"; though both genres and their contents are clearly indebted to ultimately Greek sources. Attributing these moralistic remarks to al-Kindī, of course, does not necessarily mean that he practised what he preached, though there is no necessity to believe he did not, either.

¹³Cf. Nagy's "Die Philosophischen Abhandlungen der Ja'qūb ben Ishāq Al-Kindī", Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, II: 5 (Münster, 1897), pp. 1-64.

¹⁴Cf. his "Studi su al-Kindī I: Uno scritto introduttivo allo studio di Aristotele" (with M. Guidi), and "Studi su al-Kindī II: Uno scritto morale inedito di al-Kindī" (with H. Ritter), Memorie della Reale Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei (Classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filologiche) Serie VI, Vol. 6, (Rome, 1937-1940), pp. 375-419, and VI, 8 (Rome, 1938), pp. 5-63

respectively. Walzer has, in addition, written a number of general evaluations of al-Kindī's thought; cf. in particular "New Studies on Al-Kindī", Oriens X (1957), p. 203 ff., reprinted in his Greek into Arabic, (Oxford, 1962), pp. 175-205.

¹⁵Cf. Abū Rīdah, Rasā'il Al-Kindī Al-Falsafīya, I (Cairo, 1950), pp. 1-80 (25) introduction, 81-374; II (Cairo, 1953), pp. 5-133.

¹⁶Cf. particularly the observations on al-Kindī's philosophy which A. Altmann and S. M. Stern have made apropos of their study of another philosopher, one very influenced by al-Kindī. See their Isaac Israeli (Oxford, 1958), p. 220 (index); cf. too Stern's article, "Notes on Al-Kindī's Treatise On Definitions", JRAS (1959), pp. 32-43.

¹⁷Assembled by Malter, op. cit., pp. 66-67.

Chapter 2

On First Philosophy: Text and Translation

A Description

The Arabic text of On First Philosophy (to be abbreviated henceforth as FP) is found among the manuscripts of the codex Aya Sofya 4832 (no. 23, pp. 43a-53a).¹ H. Ritter has described the codex as being in a format of 22 x 12 cm., with dark brown paper of 32 lines to the page, the manuscripts being written in an angular, nearly entirely unpointed NesḲhī-Kufī hand of the 5th century A.H./12th century A.D.²

Since Ritter's discovery of this codex, two editions of the Arabic text of FP have appeared: a rather unreliable edition by A. al-Ahwānī, and a more careful, scholarly work by M. Abū Rīdah.³ No translation has hitherto appeared in any language, Western or Eastern, though a rough, preliminary edition and Italian translation was prepared by Michaelangelo Guidi and Richard Walzer over thirty years ago, which Walzer kindly allowed me to consult. The translation offered herein has benefited from all these earlier readings of the manuscript, as well as, and primarily, from an independent examination of it.⁴

Abū Rīdah's edition (to be designated "AR") has been used as the primary reference for the translation, with all manuscript

peculiarities which are not mentioned by Abū Rīdah, as well as all deviations from his reading of the manuscript, mentioned in the apparatus below the translation. Reference is also made there to al-Ahwānī's readings ("AH"), where they appear superior to AR or equally plausible.

My translation frequently differs with the determination of sentences and paragraphs established by AR, a difference which is left unremarked in the apparatus but which the reader familiar with Arabic will immediately notice. While attempting a faithful, literal translation wherever possible, I have had at times to restructure al-Kindī's long, involved sentences, so that the English reader will find them comprehensible. The notes in the commentary should, hopefully, clarify any remaining awkwardness in the translation. The commentary itself is rather detailed, for besides elucidating al-Kindī's presentation of the argument in FP, it compares his remarks there with those he makes in other treatises, and relates his work wherever possible to the Greek sources (to be mentioned in the following chapter) which he helped introduce into Islamic thought.

While references to many of al-Kindī's other treatises abound in the commentary, detailed textual comparisons are made with such cognate texts as his treatises "On the Unity of God and the Finiteness of the Body of the World" (abbreviated as UG); "An Explanation of the Finiteness of the Body of the World" (EF);

and "On the Essence of that which cannot be Infinite and that of which Infinity can be Predicated ("OE")".⁵ In addition, the treatise "On the Definitions and Descriptions of Things" (AR I: 165-180), offers many an important comparison with FP. Among the Greek works used by al-Kindī in Arabic translation, that done of the Metaphysics by al-Kindī's contemporary Aṣṭāṭ provides particularly intriguing textual comparisons.⁶

A brief summary of the contents of FP is as follows: Chapter 1 (AR 97-105):

Al-Kindī begins the treatise by expressing homage to the caliph to whom the book is dedicated, al-Mu'taṣim Billah. He then immediately introduces his subject by extolling philosophy as the greatest and most noble human art, since it seeks to know the true nature of things. Knowledge of things is considered dependent upon knowledge of their causes, the ultimate cause of all being the "True One", knowledge of whom is "First Philosophy".

The four (Aristotelian) causes are described and related to four types of inquiry and to substance. The difficulty of obtaining all the truth evokes recognition of the joint effort required in philosophy, and gratitude for the efforts of all previous philosophers, the use of whose work al-Kindī fully (though in general terms) acknowledges. He is opposed, however, to those who do not appreciate the philosophical tradition, and who subscribe to other standards and methods of truth; maligning

their motivations, he calls for their ouster from positions of religious leadership within the community. The true message of faith is compatible with philosophy, he contends, claiming that one must know philosophy if only to be able to refute the necessity of knowing it. The chapter concludes with an invocation of Divine assistance in the task of establishing proof of the Divinity (i.e., existence) and unity of God.

Chapter 2 (AR 106-122):

Al-Kindī begins the chapter with a comparison of sensory and intellectual perceptions, the latter of which is deemed superior. A spatial example is chosen to illustrate the nature of a necessary intellectual perception; leading al-Kindī to assert belief in the finiteness of the universe, on the principle of the impossibility of something being infinite in actuality.

Returning to different kinds of perception, al-Kindī emphasizes the need to use the appropriate method in investigating a particular subject, not, e.g., confusing probable with demonstrative arguments in mathematics.

This leads al-Kindī to assert the principles with which he works in FP: they refer firstly to the concept of an eternal being, clarifying the meaning of the term logically and relating it to an unique being; and secondly, to basic ideas of corporeal equality and inequality, founded on the laws of identity, contradiction, and the excluded middle. Working with these latter

principles, al-Kindī offers a number of arguments to prove that a body, and its properties of time and motion, cannot be infinite in actuality. While establishing the necessity for a finite universe, he also shows that it could not, in ordinary physical terms, have either come from nothing or have been in a state of rest before motion.

Chapter 3 (AR 123-143):

The chapter opens with an examination and rejection of the concepts of auto-causation, and of an essence as separate from the substance of which it is the essence. These latter terms are related to one or another of the predicables, which are defined. These predicables -the genus, species, individual (!), specific difference, property and common accident- then serve as the subjects for a detailed discussion of the ways in which "one" is predicated, al-Kindī showing that in each case the predicable is not "essentially" one.⁷ The accidental unity in everything is taken as indicative of the existence of an external agent which imposes unity from without upon the predicable and related quantities, the agent possessing unity essentially.

The nature of everything in our experience is shown to require elements of both unity and multiplicity (i.e., plurality), the assumption of either existing alone in something leading to absurd conclusions, which al-Kindī works out in detail for both. The necessary association in everything of unity and multiplicity

is seen as requiring a cause which cannot be similar to it in any way and must be an absolute unity.

Chapter 4 (AR 143-162):

Absolute unity is shown as not found in anything possessing quantity, size being relative. Nothing is absolutely large or small, not even the number 2. The possibility of 1 being a number is examined and ultimately rejected, it being viewed as the element of number, multiple in its relation to numbers. Relative sizes are applicable only to other members of the same genus, diverse examples being given.

The True One, it is reiterated, has no genus and cannot be compared with anything. It is eternal and absolutely one, and al-Kindī describes it in terms of what it is not. It is not comparable to any of the predicables and does not possess any physical properties whatsoever. The True One is likewise neither soul nor intellect, both of which are considered multiple and not essentially one. Comparison with other things is further excluded by the insistence that the True One is neither synonymous nor homonymous with anything, and its unity is one neither through number, form, genus, or analogy.

The True One is, therefore, a unique being, absolutely and essentially one, responsible through an emanative power for the unity which exists in other things accidentally, but which unity is not part of the being of the True One. The True One thus

causes everything to come to be, the ultimate cause of the unity of all being; and also causes the creation of the world from nothing, being uniquely capable of initiating movement. Without unity objects would perish, the True One thus responsible also for the continuing existence of the world.

Al-Kindī concludes the treatise (or, strictly speaking, the first part of it, which is the only part extant) with mention of the True One's creative, emanative and powerful nature, having shown that the unity (and thus the existence) of all else is "metaphorical".

Chapter 2a

Notes

¹Cf. H. Ritter and M. Plessner, op. cit., p. 368.

²Ibid., p. 363.

³Cf. Kitāb al-Kindī fī al-falsafah al-ūlā, edited Aḥmad Fuʿad al-Ahwānī (Cairo, 1948), pp. 77-143, Abū Rīdah, op. cit., I: 97-162.

⁴The manuscript was studied through photographs loaned by Dr. Walzer, for whose assistance and encouragement in the work I am deeply grateful. I should also like to acknowledge the assistance of Professor S. Pines in questions relating to the translation of chapters 3 and 4 of the text. Responsibility for the translation, as well as entire study, is, of course, mine alone.

⁵Cf. FP 114.12 ff., and see the note to 114.11.

⁶Aṣṭāt's translation is preserved in Averroes' Grand Commentary of the Metaphysics, Tafsīr Mā Ba'd At-Ṭabī'at, ed. M. Bouyges, Notice and 3 volumes, Beyrouth, 1942, 1948, 1952.

⁷This and the following chapter are summarized in greater detail by M. Marmura and J. Rist, "Al-Kindī's Discussion of Divine Existence and Oneness", Mediaeval Studies 25 (1963), pp. 339-346.

2b: "On First Philosophy"

An Analysis

Any attempt to make philosophical sense of an al-Kindī treatise is often complicated by an abbreviated style, in which the premises of arguments may be missing,¹ important terms may be used without being defined,² and whole "treatises" can consist of a few pages.³ This shortcoming is "balanced", as it were, by redundant passages and treatises,⁴ and by repetitive arguments which seek to establish a universal proposition by offering the same proof in formulaic type statements for each member of a class; i.e., through a preference for inductive rather than deductive methods of reasoning.⁵

These stylistic characteristics indicate that al-Kindī's philosophical works ought to be read not as self-contained pieces, but in conjunction with one another. We ought perhaps to view each kitāb and risāla of his as part of a continuing lecture series addressed to a small and select audience, for whose philosophical inexperience or skepticism he made allowance, no doubt, by providing a full oral explanation of the reasoning behind otherwise perplexing arguments; as well as by referring to his other written works.⁶ It is this hypothesis of a semi-private and semi-oral tradition which may best account for the unsatisfactory state of al-Kindī's written corpus, much of which

was probably not only published and titled after its author's death,⁷ but also collected and given its "definitive" shape then.

If one can claim a certain philosophical credibility for those Kindian treatises which are in their present form essentially fragmentary, certainly the same can be said for al-Kindī's major philosophical treatise, fī al-Falsafa al-Ūlā, a work which exhibits the awareness and concerns of a committed philosopher, as well as the tensions and inevitable compromises forced upon a philosophy which must accommodate itself to faith. The treatise opens with a celebration and explanation of the philosophical pursuit, which I have translated as follows:⁸

AR 97.8 "Indeed, the human art which is highest in degree and most noble in rank is the art of philosophy, the definition of which is knowledge of the true nature of things, insofar as is possible for men. The aim of the philosopher is, as regards his knowledge,
 10 /to obtain the truth, and as regards his action, to act truthfully; not that the activity is endless, for we abstain and the activity ceases, once we have reached the truth. We don't find the truth we are seeking without finding a cause; the cause of the existence and continuance of everything is The True One, in that each thing which has being has truth. The True One exists
 p.98 necessarily, and therefore beings exist. /The most noble philosophy and highest in rank is the First Philosophy, i.e.,

knowledge of the First Truth Who is the cause of all truth."

This passage makes it clear that the theoretical aim of the philosopher is to "obtain the truth", which is ultimately "the First Truth Who is the cause of all truth". Such a remark causes one to think in philosophical terms of the Neoplatonic emphasis upon a single source of all being;⁹ and looking to a Neoplatonic model, certain obscurities in this and subsequent passages of FP become clear. Thus, the relation between being and truth, inadequately stated above, may be understood to assume that the reader -or auditor- understands (or was independently informed) that all beings owe their existence to the necessary existence of the True One;¹⁰ the combination and ultimate identity of being and truth in His nature being responsible for their particular occurrences and correlations in this world.

It is significant, however, that al-Kindī does not detail this causal relationship, and that he does not develop the notion of the identity of truth and being. For the Neoplatonic doctrine of emanation posits an unbroken chain of being,¹¹ while its epistemology leads to a mystic unity with the One;¹² doctrines which al-Kindi eschews.¹³ Indeed, the qualifications and physical limitations put upon the philosophical endeavor already in this opening paragraph seem designed to proclaim al-Kindī's awareness of the limitations -as well as possibilities- of philosophy.

It is, again, the Neoplatonic background which makes sense of al-Kindī's use of "cause" in the above quotation, since he follows this passage with another which stresses that there are just four causes, the well known Aristotelian "material", "formal", "efficient" and "final" causes;¹⁴ and al-Kindī states clearly that every cause must be one or the other of these. This, however, apparently means every cause except for the "first cause" which contains all the others and is pre-eminent in everything.¹⁵

Granting this, however, one must also admit that al-Kindī proceeds to ignore this sense of cause for most of the treatise, and that he remains instead within the Aristotelian framework of causality and physical entities. Within this framework he attempts to prove that a) nothing is essentially one, and therefore b) God is essentially one. Again one sees the ambivalent usage of terminology, al-Kindī alluding to Neoplatonic doctrine but not really justifying it or working with it.¹⁶

This employment of a term in a unique, absolute sense is particularly noticeable with "the One," since al-Kindī finds against the existence of an absolute one just prior to his adoption of such a concept in relation to God.¹⁷ Ordinarily, al-Kindī feels, there is no quantity or number that is so large that it cannot in theory be larger, nor so small that it cannot be smaller. Al-Kindī does at first make a mathematical exception

to this rule, claiming that the number "two" is the lowest numerical limit, on the grounds that the term "one" is a unit of quantity and does not possess quantity itself, which "numbers" must.¹⁸ Two is, at the same time, admitted to be double the one, and therefore not absolutely small. In admitting this, however, "one" is brought into a quantifiable relationship, and its exclusion from number seems ultimately arbitrary and semantic. Al-Kindī would appear to be acknowledging this later in the treatise,¹⁹ when he says that the numerically one is, through its position as the measure of all things, also multiple.

Al-Kindī was probably attracted to the idea of a non-numerical "one" in part because of the similarity of this concept with that of the "True One": separate from number, "one" is yet the base of all numbers; not a quantity, it is not not a quantity. It is the device whereby enumeration, quantification, in short, knowledge of this world becomes possible. So too with the First Cause, the "True One": while viewed as the source and guarantor of all being and becoming, it is explicitly divorced from them; while certainly not unrelated to the world, neither is the "True One" related in any demonstrable sense. Nothing is to be predicated of the "True One" whatsoever, not even, as we have seen, numerical oneness. It is at most a homonym, though al-Kindī does not admit even this much.²⁰

Yet, despite its philosophical ambiguity, al-Kindī refers

-albeit seldom- to the "True One", as he does to "The First" and "The Eternal" (which is said to have "being" and to be "self-subsistent").²¹ His use of these terms is certainly not careless nor could he be using them merely as homonyms. The thrust of his entire conceptual system depends upon the positing of an essentially unified, independent source of all reality; even as his logic undermines credibility in such an entity as rationally defensible.²²

Thus al-Kindī establishes at one point in FP that the motion of the universe could neither have begun from nothing -since, assuming the impossibility of creatio ex nihilo, an external prior body would have to be posited as the source of motion, and this would lead to an inadmissible infinite regression- nor could the motion have begun from a prior state of rest, since there would be no reason for a change to motion.²³ This indicates that al-Kindī was certain that there is no strictly philosophical solution, at least not along Aristotelian lines, to the problem of the origin of motion and consequently that of matter.

It is the equivocal use of terms that enables al-Kindī to resolve physical problems with non-physical concepts; which, however, he couches in physical terminology. Yet however few the epithets used to describe God in physical relation with the world, they are too many in terms of al-Kindī's own argument. The via negativa can lead only to a Deus Negativus or Absconditus;

a Creator -the one non-philosophical term al-Kindī uses- about whom, however, we know nothing.²⁴

This problem is sensed by al-Kindī, though he was certainly not aware how ultimately self-defeating his negative approach is. It is the emanationist structure -barely mentioned in this treatise- which is intended, as we have seen, to bridge this cognitive and ontological gap. It is therefore surprising to find that al-Kindī borrows so little explicit doctrine from the major work of Neoplatonism, Plotinus' Enneads; the paraphrase of which he is credited with having "corrected" -aslahahu- for al-Mu'tasim Billah.²⁵

Indeed, after some initial resemblance between the two works,²⁶ textual parallels with the Theology suggest themselves only towards the end of FP, when background knowledge of the former work can clarify al-Kindī's position.

Thus his description of the relation of the "True One" to "caused" or "accidental" unity, i.e., the relation of God to the world, revolves around the words "unity", "being", and "emanation", wahda, huwiya, and fayḍ. It is, al-Kindī contends, by some (unexplored) emanative process that qualifiedly "unified" things "come to be" from the absolutely unified Being.²⁷

Now the Theology of Aristotle is primarily a detailed examination of this very structure of emanation, describing the various universal hypostases of intellect, soul and nature, and

analyzing their relation to each other and to the One. The fact that al-Kindī virtually ignores this world of intelligible entities probably reflects his unresolved relationship to the Neoplatonic metaphysic. He is, however, congenial to the idea of emanation if not to the details, and receptive to the terminological shell of Neoplatonism, while altering its inner meaning. Thus he apparently treats the process of "coming to be" (as distinct from the act of the Divine agent) as equivalent to physical generation, since he views practically all "being" as multiple, hence divisible, and perishable. However, in the equivalent Theology passage, which treats of the relation between "the first cause and the things which originate from it", huwīya is considered as the first emanation which "gushes forth" -inbajasa- from The One; and from it the universal intellect and subsequent entities are formed.²⁸ In other words, huwīya is treated in the Theology as a creative principle emanating from the One, though the One is, as such, above it. Al-Kindī, I suggest, may well be reacting against this idea, even as he uses the terms, claiming that the True One's Unity is His Being, which Being is never in any way shared by the rest of creation, though it owes its being, somehow, to the Being of the One.

Thus al-Kindī's use of the Theology and -possibly- related writings is very circumspect; apparently he rejects Neoplatonic ontology but is drawn to its view of the transcendent One Who is,

nevertheless, the Creator.²⁹

We ought, therefore, to locate al-Kindī's philosophy within a more narrowly Aristotelian framework, particularly as it is clear that he is modeling his "First Philosophy" to a large extent after parts of the Metaphysics. Indeed, al-Kindī's opening remarks read like a paraphrase of certain chapters in Alpha Elatton. We know, moreover, that al-Kindi was keenly interested in the Metaphysics, and that a certain Astāt (or Eustāt) translated it for him.³⁰ Moreover, al-Kindī openly states his admiration for Aristotle, and the Stagirite clearly is a primary moral as well as intellectual influence upon him.³¹ Nevertheless, certain extra, even anti-Aristotelian conclusions are meant to be drawn from the "First Philosophy", though al-Kindī does not spell them out in great detail here.

There is an indication of this ambivalent attitude to Aristotelian teachings already in the opening remarks of "First Philosophy", even, one may say, in the very choice of such a title. For al-Kindī prefers, in "First Philosophy" as in his other writings, to discuss that aspect of Metaphysics which Aristotle called σοφία, viz., the general principles of all being, τὸ ὅν ᾗ ὅν.³² He thereby in effect repudiates the existence of separate and unmovable substances, i.e., the area of "Theology" as defined and developed by Aristotle in the Metaphysics also.³³ Thus, though he calls his treatise al-falsafa

al-ūlā, using Aristotle's third designation of Metaphysics, al-Kindī treats "First Philosophy", unlike Aristotle, as *σοφία* removed from *Θεολογική*.³⁴ This is apparent in spite of the above quoted remarks regarding "First Philosophy" as "Knowledge of the First Truth Who is the cause of all truth"; and other introductory comments in the same vein, such as his statement that, "Knowledge of the first cause has truthfully been called "First Philosophy", since all the rest of philosophy is contained in its knowledge. It is, therefore, the first in nobility, the first in genus, the first in rank with respect to that the knowledge of which is most certain; and the first in time, since it is the cause of time."³⁵

By hailing knowledge of the "First Truth" and the "First Cause" as "First Philosophy", al-Kindī, it could be thought, is within the Aristotelian *Θεολογική* tradition, even if the formulation has a Neoplatonic ring. Yet these statements are not followed up by any examination of the "first cause" or "first truth" per se whatsoever, or by an analysis of any separate and unmovable substance; instead we are given a work devoted to general principles of causation and "truth", i.e., being.

Al-Kindī may thus be telling us that all we can know about the First Truth, i.e., God, is that our knowledge of all else is not applicable to Him; or, more positively put, He is what the world is not. Of course the possibility exists that al-Kindī

discussed "First Philosophy" as Θεολογική in the lost second part of the book;³⁶ yet the absence in his other writings of a philosophical analysis of this topic along either Aristotelian or Neoplatonic lines, makes this unlikely. Most probably al-Kindī felt that his arguments concerning the finite and contingent nature of the universe forced one to certain conclusions about the existence and nature of the Creator; and that this indirect approach was the only method philosophically feasible for a "First Philosophy".

Philosophical "feasibility" or validity is indeed a primary criterion for al-Kindī, and Aristotelian texts and commentaries provide the authority for the instruction in methodology, definition of terms, and logical rules which we find in "First Philosophy". Al-Kindī in fact accepts most of Aristotle's arguments for a contingent universe as found in the Metaphysics (and Physics), viz., that form and matter actuality and potentiality, are primarily attributes of a substance;³⁷ that time and movement also exist only in relation to substance, as functions of a body;³⁸ and that, while a causal sequence must be invoked to explain physical relations, an infinite causal regression is both logically and physically impossible.³⁹

Aristotle exempts time and motion from this last generalization, as he considers them, by the definition of their natures, to be eternal; entailing, thereby, the positing of an eternal

body which, while spatially finite, is eternally in motion. This in turn allows Aristotle to posit the existence of an eternal first cause, the unmoved mover.⁴⁰ Al-Kindī, however, rejects this basic exception of the nature of time and motion.⁴¹ He rather views them, like everything else, as possessing infinity in potentiality in the sense, apparently, of a fanciful, hypothetical possibility only; and he emphasizes that in actuality nothing is and nothing could be infinite. Everything is subject, al-Kindī argues, to quantification and hence limitation. Far from dragging body with them into eternity, time and motion are always confined by an actual body to finite, measurable dimensions. In effect one cannot speak of time, motion or body in isolation from each other, al-Kindī insists, in actuality they are mutually dependent concepts which refer to finite corporeal and therefore perishable being.

Al-Kindī proceeds to belabor this doctrine of "conceptual reciprocity" in chapters 3 and 4 of "First Philosophy", partly using a method and discussing a problem along lines enunciated by Plato in his Parmenides, and which may have reached al-Kindī from some Neoplatonic or possibly Middle Platonic source, as some scholars have suggested.⁴² Thus we find al-Kindī arguing for the necessary existence of unity and plurality in all things and in all concepts. Nothing is itself by itself, i.e., essentially one, and the world is characterized by an apparently

accidental combination, in themselves and together, of subjects and predicates.

Now in arguing against Aristotle's idea of an eternal world, al-Kindī offers an actual finite world which requires a first, non-finite cause; one, however, which he is unable to present within the confines of Aristotelian philosophy, since he rejects Aristotle's move in the direction of separate, unmovable forms which yet serve as the cause of eternal motion. In his discussion of the one and the many, al-Kindī again disproves the possibility of separate and independent, hence eternal existents, insofar as we can understand the meaning of all these terms in our physical world. Yet the very "accidental" existence of substances indicated to al-Kindī the legitimate affirmation of a prior "essential" existent, i.e., a being which is completely "one"; even though the nature of such an existent is beyond the competence of philosophical discourse. Hence al-Kindī's argument concludes with a metaphorical use of descriptive terms, borrowing, at least partially, from the Neoplatonic vision of the One, which, while the source for all becoming, is beyond Aristotelian distinctions and analysis. Al-Kindī, however, is not willing -or able- to detail the relation of this One to the world; it is enough, he feels, to have "proved" that the world needed the Creator Who is the True One.⁴³

Al-Kindī's Aristotelianism, then, like his Neo-Platonism, is tempered with other intellectual currents, some of which are discussed in Chapter 3 of the introduction below. The most significant of his deviations from Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition are his rejection of an eternal universe, achieved in part by a highly qualified attitude to the concept of potentiality;⁴⁴ and, relatedly, his assertion of what amounts to a fifth kind of causality, that worked by God and most evident in the act of creation from nothing.⁴⁵ This in turn leads to regarding all other causes and actions, and the unity of all substances, as "metaphorical", a perspective on this world which, if not representative of al-Kindī's total view, is yet foreign to Aristotelian thought.

It is the Neo-Platonic tradition in philosophy, as well as the Christian and Islamic theological perspectives, which here make their contribution to al-Kindī's thought. Other influences are at work as well, those inspired by Hellenistic philosophical commentaries and late Greek mathematical works. Indeed, in discussing the one and the many and in defining number in First Philosophy, al-Kindī blends dialectical philosophy and mathematics, an approach that is not uncommon for the Neo-Platonic tradition.⁴⁶ His specific treatment of number, moreover,⁴⁷ shows him as familiar with arithmetical theory, and raises the possibility of his having used an arithmetical source here; which possibility is rendered

more plausible by our knowledge of his other work.⁴⁸ Moreover, his pupil, Abū Sulaymān Rabi' ibn Yahyā, wrote a paraphrase to Nichomachus of Gerasa's Introduction to Arithmetic,⁴⁹ in which he often acknowledges his teacher's views.

Nevertheless, a comparison of our text and Nichomachus' yields little by way of specific comparisons. Even the particularly arithmetical passages of FP seem to be derived from secondary sources, probably from some such discussion as is found in the introduction to the Isagoge commentaries, a source al-Kindī uses elsewhere in this work.⁵⁰ Certain remarks, however, concerning both books would seem to be in order, for al-Kindī may be reacting to Nichomachus' text indirectly; and, as we shall see, may be following some outline of the work which is later reflected in the Rasā'il Ikhwān al-Ṣafā'.

While al-Kindī would have been in sympathy generally with Nichomachus' description of philosophy as concerned with the knowledge of eternal beings,⁵¹ he would not have agreed with Nichomachus' positing of the elements of number, the monad and dyad, as such beings, or with his equally Neo-Pythagorean assumption of the existence of universal, eternal numerical patterns by which the world is ordered.⁵² It is only with Nichomachus' identification of the monad and dyad with the same and the other, the one and the many, viewing number as equivalent to form,⁵³ that al-Kindī would have been more sympathetic (though he would

not have granted an independent existence to such principles); for al-Kindī too proclaims the necessity of positing both unity and multiplicity, the one and the many together in all things, and, like Nichomachus, he considers the one as more basic than the many.⁵⁴

However, as Nichomachus himself points out, the concept of the same and the other, the divisible and indivisible, are pre-Socratic and are found in Plato,⁵⁵ so that al-Kindī's familiarity with these themes cannot be traced specifically to Nichomachus' Introduction. Moreover, the emphasis upon the one as the original element and cause of all is, as we have seen, a tenet of Neo-Platonism.

There is, nevertheless, an additional point that is worth mentioning in considering the possible relation between Nichomachus and al-Kindī. In his Theologumena Arithmeticae, Nichomachus explicitly compares the monad to God; as He is seminally in all things, so the monad is in all numerical forms (i.e., in all things).⁵⁶ Now, while al-Kindī's views on the relation of the numerical one to number may evoke in the reader an analogy with God's relation to the world,⁵⁷ al-Kindī is quite emphatic in denying any real comparison between the two, his True One being considered as completely unique and having nothing in common with the rest of creation. In making this very point, however, and in being concerned with the entire question of the nature of

number, al-Kindī may be reflecting an awareness of Nichomachus' position, and a reaction to it.

It is interesting to note that the encyclopedia composed by the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā' roughly 100 years after al-Kindī's death, compares the Creator's relation to all beings to that of the number one's relation to other numbers;⁵⁸ and that in general the first chapter of the work, "On Numbers", is frequently indebted to Nichomachus' Introduction to Arithmetic.⁵⁹ The authors of the Rasā'il state explicitly, however, that numbers do not have an independent existence, indeed that complete knowledge of their various subdivisions leads to the realization that all are accidents whose being and existence is to be located only in the soul. Thus one is led, in the pursuit of knowledge, from number to the soul.⁶⁰

Al-Kindī, of course, has a similar view as that of the Ikhwān regarding the accidental nature of numbers; and, more than they profess, of the accidental nature of soul too.⁶¹ It may not be merely coincidental that he proceeds, shortly after a discussion of the numerical one, to a discussion of the soul, soon continuing from there to the highest subject of all theoretical science, the nature of God. In so doing, he may well be following a method prescribed by a source common to the Ikhwān and himself,⁶² which source had possibly already incorporated some of the basic views as well as arithmetical propositions of Nichomachus.

Chapter 2b:

Notes

¹Cf., e.g., the FP extract quoted below and ensuing discussion.

²As al-Kindī's use of anniya (ibid., and see the discussion of this at FP 97.13 below, and see note there); or of infinity (FP, p. 109), of which the assertion is made -but not explained there- that it cannot be in actuality; and of a number of logical terms (FP, p. 132).

³Cf., e.g., his article on "The True, First, Complete Agent and the Deficient Agent which is (Spoken of) Metaphorically", Abū Rīdā I: 182-184; or his abridged "Treatise On the Soul", I: 281-282. Short treatises of this sort, mostly "epistles" (rasā'il), are apparently a stylistic innovation of al-Kindī's, as the author of the Muntakhab Siwān al-Hikmah claims (cf. Atiyeh, op. cit., p. 217, and see Dunlop, op. cit., pp. 88, 89).

⁴Thus, e.g., creatio ex nihilo and the finiteness of the world are similarly treated, in addition to FP, pp. 114-122, in three other treatises (Abū Rīdā I: 186-192, 194-198, 201-207), as well as elsewhere.

⁵Cf. FP, p. 114, where al-Kindī lists as a "true first premiss" that the finite cannot be infinite; which categorical proposition

is then followed by repeated individual "confirmations", based on circular reasoning. Cf. too FP, pp. 127 ff., for separate though essentially similar "proofs" of the composition of predicables by a combination of (accidental) unity and multiplicity; and the examination of these latter terms in various relationships, pp. 152 ff.; though the definition of unity at p. 132 and multiplicity at p. 134 should have precluded such extensive illustration. This confusion of methods may be at least partially due to al-Kindī's fondness for the conditional type of argument, the disjunctive syllogism with its appeal to fact and simplification of alternatives (cf. H. Joseph, An Introduction to Logic, (Oxford, 1961), pp. 335 ff.; and see W. and M. Kneale's remarks (The Development of Logic, Oxford, 1964, pp. 158 ff.) on the use of the conditional statement made by the Stoics, who are probably al-Kindī's ultimate source in this area.). Al-Kindī apparently feels obliged to present many such individual "proofs", in order to proceed (illegitimately) to a kind of universal statement.

⁶Cf. the cross-references in al-Kindī's writings, assembled by F. Rosenthal, "Al-Kindī and Ptolemy", Studi Orientalistici in Onore di Giorgio Levi Della Vida (Rome, 1956) II: 440-443.

⁷Following Rosenthal's suggestion, ibid.

⁸Cf. FP 97.8-98.2 below, and notes there.

⁹Cf. the second note to FP 97.13 in the commentary below. The Plotinian corpus in Arabic, (the prevalence of which in Islam has been studied by P. Kraus, "Plotin Chez Les Arabes", Bulletin de l'Institut d'Egypte (Cairo, 1940-41) XXIII, pp. 266-279), has been assembled in English translation by G. Lewis in Vol. II of Plotini Opera, ed. P. Henry and H. R. Schwyzer, Paris-Bruxelles, 1959. Much of this material is now found in A. Badawī's Arabic edition, Plotinus apud Arabes, Cairo 1955. Badawī has also edited much of the Arabic Proclus extant (cf. his Neoplatonici Apud Arabes, Cairo 1955), including the Arabic paraphrase (formerly edited by Bardenhewer) of that classic of Neoplatonism, The Elements of Theology. While the Latin version of this paraphrase, the Liber de Causis, made a great impact upon the Scholastic West (cf. E. R. Dodds, Proclus: The Elements of Theology, Oxford 1963, p. xxvii), the Arabic version K. al-idāh fi al-Khayr al-mahd was barely read in the Moslem world (cf. now Peters, op. cit., p. 57), even though it was attributed to Aristotle. While this work was probably translated well after al-Kindī's death, some, at least, of the Elements of Theology itself was translated, by Abū Uthmān al-Dimashqī (fl. ca. A.D. 914), only a generation or so after al-Kindī (cf. the fragment of propositions 15-17 Dodds published by A. Badawī, Aristū 'inda al-ʿArab (Cairo, 1947), pp. 291-292, and discussed by both B. Lewin Orientalia Suecana IV (1955) pp. 101-108, and S. Pines,

Oriens VIII (1955) pp. 195-203); so that the work, in some form or another, was probably circulating in his time, and al-Kindī may well have had indirect knowledge of its contents from his Greek-reading informants.

Moreover, a much earlier adaptation of the Elements, the sixth century Mystical Theology of "Dionysius, the Areopagite" had already spread Proclus' conception of a transcendent, unknowable and indescribable God throughout Christianity (cf. the English translation of this work by A. B. Sharpe, in his Mysticism: Its True Nature and Value, (London, 1910), pp. 207-229); and in the person and writings of a John of Damascus (died c. 750) the Moslem intellectual world would have become acquainted with an essentially Proclean formulation of these ideas.

One may thus assume some familiarity with Proclus' ideas on al-Kindī's part, though he might not, in some cases, have known Proclus to be their author. While he would not have agreed with Proclus' notions of the eternity of the world and its dialectically designed, hierarchically related substances of Being, Intelligence, Life and Soul, not to mention Proclus' henads, al-Kindī would have been responsive to Proclus' views on the "Pure True One", Who is above all epithets and yet the "cause" and "creator" of all (cf., e.g., Badawī, K. al-Khayr al-mahd, op. cit., pp. 7, 12, 22 and elsewhere). As it is unlikely, however, that al-Kindī read any Proclus himself, while he was directly familiar with

Plotinian-based material, the following notes will draw comparisons only between the Arabic Plotinus and al-Kindī.

¹⁰Cf. the preceding note's reference to FP 97.13; and see further, e.g., op. cit., pp. 207 Lewis ("Theology")/ 51 Badawī; 291 Lewis (ibid.)/ 134 Badawī (cf. Enn. V 2. 1, 1); 353 f. Lewis ("Epistola De Scientia Divina")/ 181 f. Badawī (cf. Enn. V 5. 9, 33 ff.); 474 Lewis ("Dicta Sapientis Graeci" I)/ 186 Badawī (cf. Enn. VI 9. 6, 7).

¹¹Besides the references in the preceding note, cf. further op. cit., pp. 263 Lewis ("Theology")/ 108 Badawī, and 487 Lewis (ibid.)/ 6 Badawī.

¹²Cf. ibid., 375 Lewis/ 56 Badawī (Enn. V 8. 1, 1), 403 Lewis/ 116 Badawī; expressed in a more qualified way as a unification with the intelligible world of eternal substances (which is derived from and "reverts" in its own way to the One), in, e.g., pp. 225 Lewis/ 22 Badawī (Enn. IV 8. 1, 1), 251 Lewis/ 91 Badawī (Enn. IV 8. 8, 22).

¹³Al-Kindī does assume (cf. his treatise "On the Quantity of the Books of Aristotle", Abū Rīdā I: 372, edited earlier, with an Italian translation, by Guidi and Walzer, op. cit., pp. 395, 409) that the prophetic soul undergoes "purification" and "illumination" by God, the prophet receiving "inspiration" from Him; terms which

have been seen as deriving ultimately from Proclus' "upward way" towards unity with the One (cf. Altmann and Stern, op. cit., p. 185 f., and see Walzer, New Studies on Al-Kindī, op. cit., pp. 178 ff.). "Inspiration" (ilhān), however, is not, as Altmann mentions, ordinarily used for "union" (ittiḥād); and there is no reason to assume al-Kindī is so alluding, both from the context of the passage and because nowhere in his writings does he even discuss this favorite mystic topic. What is said of the prophet, here and elsewhere (cf. particularly FP, p. 104) does not impel us to conclude that the content of prophetic knowledge is different in kind from that of the philosopher; but only that it differs in degree, style, and method of acquisition. Indeed, it would seem that the explanation of Koranic material which follows in the "Quantity" treatise assumes that the "mystery" of Koranic truth is explicable; and the explanation is invariably framed, despite rhetorical statements to the contrary, along philosophical lines. The prophet should be regarded as a master philosopher, thanks to Divine assistance; but he does not therefore become one with God.

¹⁴Cf. FP below, p. 101.3, and see note there.

¹⁵Cf. this "first cause" sense of cause in the Theology, pp. 205 f. Lewis/ 50 f. Badawī; 231 Lewis/ 26 Badawī; 263 Lewis/ 108 Badawī.

¹⁶The Neoplatonic doctrine is advanced in the Theology, e.g., pp. 271 f. Lewis/ 112 Badawī (Enn. V 1. 5, 3 ff.); 291 f. Lewis/ 134 f. Badawī (Enn. V 2. 1, 1 ff.); and in the "Dicta Sapientis Graeci I, 474-476 Lewis/ 186-189 Badawī. As contrasted with these places, al-Kindī does not follow his logical argument for the existence of an essential unity (i.e., God) with any scheme which would show how this one relates to the world. Cf. FP 132, and see below, p. 35.

¹⁷Cf. FP, pp. 140-143.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 151; this whole discussion being in FP pp. 143 ff. Cf. Plotinus' discussion of number, Theology pp. 271 Lewis/ 113 Badawī (Enn. V 1. 5, 6), and "Epistola De Scientia Divina" pp. 345 Lewis/ 180 Badawī (Enn. V 5. 4, 12); and see Aristotle's Met. XIV 1. 1087b 33 ff. This Aristotelian doctrine (which may be of Pythagorean origin; cf. T. Heath, A History of Greek Mathematics (Oxford, 1921) I: 69) of the one as not itself a number because a measure is not the things measured, appears in Nichomachus of Gerasa's Introductionis Arithmeticae, ed. R. Hoche (Leipzig, 1866), ii 6.3, 7.3; translated by M. L. D'Ooge, (New York, 1926), pp. 237 and 239). Al-Kindī was familiar with this latter work, and its influence may be appearing here as well as in other writings; see further below, p. 37.

¹⁹Cf. FP p. 158.

²⁰Ibid., p. 155 f.

²¹Ibid., pp. 113 and 162.

²²I.e., nothing exists in reality of which essential unity can be predicated. The "essentially one" is a logical construct (and therefore, in al-Kindī's eyes, a necessary existant) derived from the existence of the accidentally one; but any attempt to comprehend this concept is precluded by al-Kindī's own demonstration of the actual philosophical meaninglessness of such a concept.

²³Ibid., p. 118.

²⁴Cf. the Theology, pp. 291 Lewis/ 134 Badawī (Enn. V 2. 1, 1); "Epistola De Scientia Divina" 321 f. Lewis/ 174 f. Badawī (Enn. V 3. 12, 43); "Dicta Sapientis Graeci" II 281 Lewis/ 185 Badawī; "Dicta" IX 481 Lewis/ 196 Badawī (Enn. VI 7. 32, 6). As the above places indicate, Plotinus moves very easily from negative to positive assertions regarding the nature and actions of the One; even if such positive statements are not meant, ostensibly, to be taken literally. Al-Kindī, however, makes very few such positive assertions, and those only of a general sort. He seems to wish to remain within that sphere of philosophy which "is concerned only with that of which inquiry can be made ... universal delimited things the true nature of which knowledge can comprehend

perfectly" (FP pp. 124, 125).

²⁵Cf. Theology, pp. 486 Lewis/ 3 Badawi. Al-Kindī's role as a reviser-stylist of this and another translation is mentioned by Ibn al-Nadīm in his K. al-Fihrist (ed. Flügel, pp. 252 and 268). That al-Kindī was not himself a translator, though he received such a reputation, has been recently shown by M. Moosa, "Al-Kindī's Role in the Transmission of Greek Knowledge to the Arabs", Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society, XV: 1 (1967), pp. 3-14.

²⁶Compare FP 97.13, 101.3 below. This resemblance is probably due to a common Aristotelian source (Met. alpha ellaton) in the introduction of both works. They both commence by distinguishing between the theoretical pursuit of truth and truthful action; and proceed to an enumeration of the four Aristotelian causes (presented mostly as substantives and not adjectives): "matter" is given as al-hayūlā (Theology) and ʿunsur (FP), "form as al-sūra, "active (efficient) cause" as (al-ʿila) al-fāʿila, and "perfection" (or "completion", i.e., final cause) as tamām (Theology), mutammima (FP). Other identical terminology appears in, e.g., the use of al-ḥaqq, ʿamal, fiʿl and sarmad.

²⁷Cf. FP p. 161 f.

²⁸Cf. Theology, p. 291 Lewis/ 134 Badawī (Enn. V 2. 1, 5). Lewis

translates huwīya (to on) as "identity" rather than "being", probably reflecting the Latin ipseity (used as such by Stern, op. cit., p. 19), which in this context appears misleading.

²⁹Al-Kindī may have been helped to this emphasis upon the One, sacrificing the creative roles of the other universal substances, by the Arabic Plotinus corpus, in which such a tendency -reflecting a Christian source- has been discerned (cf. Kraus, op. cit., pp. 292, 293.).

³⁰Cf. the Fihrist, ed. Flügel, p. 251, and see Bouyges' bio-bibliographical discussion of this translator and his relation to al-Kindī (op. cit., p. CXVIII f.). As Bouyges remarks, little is known of Astāt (or Astāth) whose name in the sources - استات - could as well be pronounced Eustāt/Eustāth; and is therefore found, e.g., in Peters, loc. cit., as Eustathius.

³¹Cf., e.g., FP p. 103.

³²Cf. Met. I 2. 982a 4 ff., 982b 9; and see Met. IV 1. 1003a 21 f.

³³Particularly in Met. XII 7. 1072a 19-1073b 3; but defined in Met. VI 1. 1026a 10-19 (and cf. Ross' notes there) and XI 1064a 33-b 3.

³⁴Cf. Met. VI 1. 1026a 29-32: "if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will

belong to this to consider being qua being -both what it is and the attributes which belong to it qua being" (in Ross' translation). At Met. XI 4. 1061b 19 (and see 26), "first philosophy" is used solely in the sense of being qua being, which is closer to al-Kindī's actual usage, though not to his stated intention.

³⁵Cf. FP p. 101.15.

³⁶If indeed there was a second part; cf. F. Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 437, concerning a similar "incomplete" Kindian treatise.

³⁷And not substances themselves; i.e., understanding substance as a sensible individual thing (cf. Met. VII, VIII and IX), and not as the unchanging substances of Met. XII 6.-10.

³⁸I.e., a magnitude; cf., for example, Physics IV 11., 14, VI 1.-4; ignoring, however, Aristotle's conclusions (Physics VIII) regarding an eternal first mover and motion.

³⁹Cf., e.g., Met. II 2. 994a 1 ff., XII 8. 1074a 29.

⁴⁰Cf. Physics III 7. 207b 23; VI 2. 232a 23 ff.; and Physics VIII in particular. See too Met. XII 6. 1071b 3 ff.

⁴¹Cf. FP p. 116.5 ff.

⁴²Cf. M. Marmura and J. Rist, op. cit., p. 347; and see Walzer, "New Studies on Al-Kindī", op. cit., pp. 201, 202. The difference between al-Kindī's treatment of the relation between the one and the many and that of his predecessors, from Plato to Proclus, is, generally speaking, that the latter argue from a necessary co-dependancy of the one and the many to a one which is inside the scheme and yet transcendent; while al-Kindī reasons to a One who is completely outside the scheme and yet somehow immanent.

⁴³The ontological gap in al-Kindī's universe is also evident in his discussion of intellection and the intellect, in which the implications of the relationship between an individual intellect and the universal intellect are not explored. Cf. FP 155.1 ff., and see particularly the note to 155.9.

⁴⁴Cf. FP 116.13 ff. and notes there.

⁴⁵Cf. FP 162.7 and note there.

⁴⁶Cf. S. Breton, Philosophie et Mathématique chez Proclus (Paris, 1969), p. 13.

⁴⁷Cf. FP 146.15-151.5.

⁴⁸That al-Kindī wrote many treatises on mathematics is known from the bibliographers; cf., e.g., Ibn al-Nadīm, op. cit., pp. 256, 257; in Flügel's extract, op. cit., pp. 22-23, 25-27 German,

38-39, 41-43 Arabic; translated into English by Atiyeh, op. cit., pp. 165-166, 175-179. Included among these we find an "Introduction to Arithmetic", "An Explanation of the Numbers which Plato Mentions in his Book the Republic" (السياسة), and "An Epistle on Unity by way of Number"; from any of which (unfortunately lost) treatises al-Kindī may be borrowing in our work. F. Rosenthal, "Al-Kindī and Ptolemy", op. cit., pp. 440, 441, has established possible cross-references to some of these treatises by al-Kindī in his Almagest paraphrase.

⁴⁹Nichomachus' work was translated into Arabic by Thābit ibn Qurra (d. 901 A.D.), and has been edited by W. Kutsch, Tabit b. Qurra's Arabische Übersetzung der Ἀριθμητικὴ εἰσαγωγή des Nikomachos von Gerasa, Beyrouth, 1959. Rabī' ibn Yahyā's paraphrase is preserved in manuscript (cf. M. Steinschneider's Die Hebraische Übersetzungen des Mittelalters (Berlin, 1893), pp. 517-519), and Steinschneider has edited extracts of Kalonymos b. Kalonymos' Hebrew translation in "Miscellena 26", MGWJ (1893), pp. 68-77. Stern mentions Rabī' ibn Yahyā's paraphrase, and contends that al-Kindī was "intimately acquainted" with Nichomachus' work (cf. Isaac Israeli, pp. 28, n. 1 and 35).

⁵⁰Cf. FP, the note to 146.15, and see too FP 124.17 ff. as well as 101.5 ff. and 105.2 ff.

- ⁵¹Cf. Nichomachus' work, edited by R. Hoche, Introductionis Arithmeticae Libri II (Leipzig, 1866) I: i, 2; English translation by M. L. D'Ooge, Nichomachus of Gerasa: Introduction to Arithmetic (New York, 1926), p. 181; quoted in Rabi' ibn Yahyā's paraphrase as well (cf. Steinschneider, "Miscellena 26", op. cit., p. 70, translated by Stern, op. cit., p. 35).
- ⁵²Ibid., ed. Hoche, I: iv, 2; I: vi, 1-4; D'Ooge translation, pp. 187, 189, 190.
- ⁵³Ibid., ed. Hoche, II: xviii, 1, 4; D'Ooge translation, pp. 257-259, and see F. Robbins' remarks in Part I of the English edition, pp. 97-100 and 118. This view is expressed also in Nichomachus' Theologumena Arithmeticae, ed. F. Ast (Leipzig, 1817), pp. 3-12, 58 (and cf., for Nichomachus' authorship of this work, Robbins' study, op. cit., Part I, pp. 82-87).
- ⁵⁴Regarding Nichomachus' paradoxical position, in which both the one and the many are considered necessary principles of all existence and yet the one is often regarded as more fundamental, cf. Robbins, op. cit., p. 115.
- ⁵⁵Cf. Nichomachus' Introduction, ed. Hoche II: xviii, 1, 4; pp. 257-259 in the English translation of D'Ooge, and see, for example, Timaeus 35a.

⁵⁶Cf. Ast, op. cit., pp. 4, 5, and see Robbins' remarks in Part I of the Introduction, op. cit., pp. 95, 96.

⁵⁷Cf. above, p. 27.

⁵⁸Cf. Rasā'il Ikhwān al-Safā' (Beirut, 1957), I: 53. 2 is then compared to the Intellect, 3 to the Soul, and 4 to Matter.

⁵⁹Nichomachus is singled out with Pythagoras by the Ikhwān as sources for the knowledge of arithmetic (ibid., p. 49), even as Euclid is regarded as the source for geometry and Ptolemy for astronomy. Cf. B. Goldstein's translation of this entire first chapter of the Rasā'il (op. cit., pp. 48-77) in his article, "A Treatise On Number Theory from a Tenth Century Arabic Source", Centaurus 10 (1964), pp. 135-160; and see his comparison of the Ikhwān's views with those of Nichomachus, ibid., pp. 129-131.

⁶⁰The nature of the soul being regarded as the first of the "metaphysical sciences" (العلوم الإلهية), which lead to knowledge of God. Cf. Rasā'il, op. cit., pp. 75, 76; in Goldstein's translation, op. cit., pp. 157, 158.

⁶¹Cf. FP, 155.15.

⁶²This notion of a common source, rather than of an influence exerted by al-Kindī upon the Ikhwān (which Stern considers and rejects, "Notes on Al-Kindī's Treatise on Definitions", op. cit.,

p. 37), may also explain the appearance of a number of eschatologically-oriented definitions in the British Museum manuscript of On Definitions which do not appear in the manuscript used by Abū Rīdah but which do recur in the Rasā'il Ikhwān al-Safā' (cf. Stern, ibid., pp. 34-37). As Stern remarks, the evidence that these definitions belong to al-Kindī's text is rather slight, as they reoccur nowhere else in his writings, and, one may add, express the concept of one universal soul, concerning which al-Kindī is nowhere else so explicit. Yet there is nothing at all in al-Kindī's other extant writings on the soul which preclude his having believed in a universal soul from which and to which particular souls come and go (cf. FP note 155.9 below); and he could as well have included among his definitions, particularly on religiously sensitive matters, views which he copied from his source but which he did not necessarily subscribe to fully without qualification.

3) Al-Kindī and the Mu'tazila:

A Reevaluation

It has been often asserted that al-Kindī had an affinity for certain viewpoints of the Mu'tazila, and that he gave a philosophical formulation to some of their basic tenets.¹ Support for this assertion has been collected mostly by Walzer and Abū Rīdah. The former, in his article "New Studies on Al-Kindī",² presents both "external" and "internal" evidence to buttress the claim, made in an earlier study,³ that al-Kindī is "the philosopher of the Mu'tazilite theology". The external evidence relies upon the dedications of some of al-Kindī's treatises to the caliphs who supported the Mu'tazila, as well as a number of dedications to the caliph al-Mu'taṣim's son Aḥmad, al-Kindī's pupil.⁴

This type of evidence at most indicates, as Walzer himself declares, that "al-Kindī cannot be completely at variance with the official Mu'tazilite interpretation of Islam which was followed by the caliphs al-Ma'mūn and al-Mu'taṣim."⁵ It would indeed have ill become al-Kindī, living in the shadow of the court, to be "completely at variance" with the officially endorsed religious doctrine of the state. It would, moreover, have been gratuitously poor taste for al-Kindī not to dedicate at least some treatises to his patrons. That al-Kindī was not an opponent of the caliphs may indeed be deduced from these dedications and from all we know of al-Kindī's life; yet that he espoused Mu'tazila

doctrine in any significant way is an unwarranted inference from this particular source. Walzer does not, it should be mentioned, so infer, acknowledging that "it would be rash to build too much on information of this kind unless it is supported by internal evidence";⁶ and it is therefore to this kind of evidence that we must next turn.

The information here is more varied and impressive. Walzer quotes an intriguing passage from al-Kindi's treatise "On the Quantity of the Books of Aristotle" which mentions that the "Divine Science" (Walzer, "knowledge", العلم الدلہی), i.e., knowledge of theological matters, is acquired effortlessly, without preparation and instantly, being as such superior to "human sciences" (العلوم الانسانية), i.e., philosophy broadly conceived.⁷ The prophets (literally, the "apostles" الرسل) are viewed as the recipients of this unique knowledge, granted them by God's will, which distinguishes their nature from that of other men.

Al-Kindi follows these remarks with an assertion, referring to sura 36, verses 78-82, of the inimitable supremacy of the rhetorical argumentation of the Qur'an over any possible philosophical reasoning, the issues being such basic articles of faith as creation of the world from nothing and resurrection. Verse 82 reads, "His command, when He desires a thing, is to say to it 'Be' and it is"⁸ (انما أمره إذا أراد شيئاً أن يقول له كن فيكون).

Al-Kindī interprets the statement, that God utters the word "be", in a non-literal, metaphorical way, referring to the analogy of poetic metaphor as practised by pre-Islamic poets.⁹ Walzer then identifies these remarks of al-Kindī with views held by the Mu'tazila concerning the supremacy of revealed truth, and the inimitability of Sacred Scripture (إعجاز القرآن), beliefs the Mu'tazila often based on philological and rhetorical criteria; and specifically with the denial of creative speech attributed to Bishr ibn al-Mu'tamir (d. 825-6 A.D.) and his pupil, Abū Mūsā Isā b. Ṣabīḥ al-Murdār.¹⁰

The Mu'tazila, of course, were not at all unique among the believers in subscribing to the belief in i'jāz al-Qur'ān, or in the supremacy of revelation -God's word- to any other kind of knowledge;¹¹ though their approach, as characterized by the affirmation of a created Qur'ān and by their exegetical methods, was to qualify the dogmatic nature of religious beliefs by interpreting them in a more rational way.¹² Thus al-Kindī may indeed be identified with the Mu'tazila in his use of philological and poetic criteria to achieve a non-literal understanding of God's Word; though this approach is what one expects from a rationally (and not dogmatically) oriented person, one who considers himself to be a philosopher.

In fact, the arguments al-Kindī brings in defense of this Koranic passage, the truth of which he first affirms dogmatically,

are philosophically rooted. They rest on the principle of the generation of contraries from contraries, which general principle is then applied to the creation of being (أيس) from its contrary, non-being (ليس).¹³ It is this belief in creatio ex nihilo, held by al-Kindī only among Islamic philosophers, together with his use of rational principles introduced by philological and rhetorical methods of tafsīr in explanation of Islamic dogma which Walzer feels links al-Kindī quite securely to the Mu'tazila, and would indeed seem to indicate a strong affinity between them.

Abū Rīdah, for his part, writing on the relation between al-Kindī and the Mu'tazila in the introduction to his edition of al-Kindī's philosophical treatises,¹⁴ mentions the titles of some treatises ascribed to al-Kindī by the bibliographers, which treatises apparently dealt with such particularly Mu'tazilite themes as God's "unity" and "justice".¹⁵ Abū Rīdah then refers to titles of treatises ascribed to al-Kindī in the fields of polemics, prophecy and physics, subjects common to all the Mutakallimūn. Unfortunately, the only treatises which are brought in support of this "external" evidence are the "First Philosophy" and the above-discussed treatise "On the Quantity of the Books of Aristotle".

Abū Rīdah turns next to expressions and themes common to al-Kindī and all the Kalām writers of his day and later,

particularly concerning the necessary finiteness of all things and their createdness. As Abū Rīdah mentions, however, the theologians were not unanimous in their views concerning the ultimate termination of the world, and despite his general claims, no counterpart is located among them for al-Kindī's views on this subject. There is, however, no denying that the point of Abū Rīdah's remarks is well taken, and that indeed al-Kindī shared common concerns with the Mu'tazila, as with all the Mutakallimun, and this is often expressed in a similar vocabulary and form of expression.¹⁶

Additional parallels between al-Kindī and the Mu'tazila writings emerge from H. Davidson's recent study of medieval arguments for creation.¹⁷ Davidson has shown that both al-Kindī and the Mu'tazila, as well as many other writers, used similar and often the same arguments, mostly derived from John Philoponus, to establish the doctrine of creation of the universe.¹⁸

Thus, in an adaptation of one of Philoponus' proofs of the generation of the universe based on the impossibility of eternal motion, al-Kindī as well as Iskāfī (d. 854 A.D.) and Naẓẓām (d. 845 A.D.) are shown to have argued that the present moment could never have been reached if it were preceded by infinite time, on the principle that an infinite time (or series of events) cannot be traversed;¹⁹ while al-Kindī, Abū al-Hudhayl (d. ca. 841 A.D.) and Naẓẓām have variations, in temporal and

spatial terms, of an offshoot of Philoponus' contention of the impossibility of infinity, contending that what is finite in one direction must be finite in the other (or others) as well.²⁰ Still other Philoponus-based arguments which al-Kindī uses appear in the later mutakkalimun, and may well have been used in al-Kindī's time as well. Thus al-Kindī's argument against infinity which shows the absurd conclusions reached in adding to and subtracting from an infinite magnitude is used, in a slightly different way, already by Nazzām;²¹ while al-Kindī's statement that body, being necessarily associated with certain "concomitants", i.e., accidents (particularly, for al-Kindī, motion and time), does not precede them and is therefore as finite as they are, is apparently an early formulation of an argument, reportedly used by Abū al-Hudhayl as well, which became, in Davidson's words, "the standard Kalam proof for creation".²²

It ought to be borne in mind that these similarities of al-Kindī's with the views of John Philoponus do not obviate the important differences which exist in the philosophies of the two men. True, both men insist upon the finitude of time and motion, the corporeality and hence perishable nature of all body, and creation from nothing by the will of God.²³ Yet though al-Kindī argues, in the "First Philosophy" and elsewhere, for the finitude and hence corruptibility of all body,²⁴ in

still other treatises, some subsequent to the "First Philosophy", he apparently accepts the Aristotelian description of the fifth element as a simple, ceaselessly moving substance; and agrees with Aristotle's description of the supra-lunar spheres as not having generation and corruption, being perfectly circular and concentric.²⁵ This means, apparently, that al-Kindī accepts in principle John Philoponus' contention that celestial and terrestrial phenomena have identical natures, and proves to his own satisfaction, and following Philoponus both directly and indirectly, that all the universe is subject to the same laws of finite time and space; but that he rejects much of the Alexandrian's specific arguments, as well as his astronomical and empirical refutations of Aristotle.²⁶ The world, al-Kindī seems to be saying, is in effect as Aristotle said it was, except it need not be so and would not be so, were it not for God's will.²⁷ Put another way, it appears that al-Kindī is satisfied that he can prove theoretically that the world is ultimately finite; and, this being understood, he feels that Aristotelian physics, including celestial physics, can explain the phenomena of daily existence.²⁸

This example of al-Kindī's complicated relation to John Philoponus may help us understand his equally qualified position vis-à-vis the Mu'tazila. He has, as they do, the notion of the finiteness of the world and its dependence on a Creator who brings

it into being from nothing, proving this by similar arguments which emphasize the accidental nature of all existence and, as most of the Mu'tazila, the impossibility of any sort of infinity. In addition, both al-Kindī and the mu'tazila are concerned with the Unique Oneness of God, and try to limit the extent to which attributes may be predicated of Him.²⁹

None of this, however, is particularly unique to the Mu'tazila, since in the intellectual climate of ninth and tenth century Baghdad these themes and arguments were apparently the common stock of most rationally inclined people. Thus, for example, we find the Christian encyclopaedist Job of Edessa (born ca. 760 A.D.) referring, before al-Kindī, to a number of philosophical points and arguments which also occur in al-Kindī; while the Jewish philosopher Saadia Gaon (882-942) shortly after al-Kindī, has many of the very same arguments which are found in First Philosophy and other al-Kindī treatises. While Davidson has shown in detail the striking similarities between al-Kindī and Saadia,³⁰ it is worth noting the parallels with Job's few but important philosophical remarks. Thus Job contrasts the "true unity" of God, due to His unique infinite nature, which admits of no increase or decrease, with the "relative unity" of everything else, which is finite. This finiteness is proven by the combination of elements -which combination circumscribes their external dimensions- in forming a body, the argument being

explicitly that whatever has an end (or limit in one direction) has also a beginning (i.e., a limit in the other (or other) direction(s).) This beginning, moreover, is depicted as a creation from nothing by the will of God, with Job quite insistent that there is no physical relation between God and His creation, and thus no emanative process of being.³¹ It is God also who is seen as the one agent capable of combining contrary elements which by themselves are mutually antagonistic, an argument al-Kindī doesn't use but which is found among Christian, Jewish and Islamic theologians alike, and can be traced to John of Damascus and the fourth century Athanasius.³² Job also has the distinction between essence and accident which is crucial to al-Kindī in chapter three of First Philosophy, though unlike al-Kindī he distinguishes between elements which may be viewed as essences when considered by themselves, and as accidents when considered in relation to other elements, forming bodies by their relationship.³³

On the one hand, then, similarities with al-Kindī's thought are not limited to the Mu'tazila; while on the other, his differences with the Mu'tazila, philosophical and otherwise, are real and significant. Thus, referring only to the theologians already mentioned, Iskāfī follows his assertion of a necessary beginning of the world with a statement, quite foreign to al-Kindī, that the world, having come into being from an unchanging source,

may be kept in existence eternally, and that this notion of an infinity a parte post (لا إلى آخر) does not contradict the notion of an "agent" preceding its "activity" (الفاعل , الفعل) as does the view of an infinity a parte ante (لا إلى أول).³⁴ Nazzām, on the other hand, follows his proofs of finiteness with the apparently contradictory assertion that all bodies, and the space which they traverse, are infinitely divisible.³⁵ This latter notion is of course related to Nazzām's well known denial of the existence of atoms,³⁶ which existence Abū al-Hudhayl, for example, is known to have affirmed.³⁷ Abū al-Hudhayl and Nazzām, moreover, are both shown to be engaged in typical Mu'tazila disputations on the question of the survival of the blessed and damned in the next world.³⁸

Now al-Kindī has no sympathy with an atomistic physics, and apparently no taste for rationalizing theological dogma beyond the most basic beliefs, the ones most amenable to philosophical inquiry.³⁹ Where he does touch on a typical theological issue, such as the subject of Divine attributes, he does so in the most general of terms, avoiding the Kalām-type discussion of the corporeal attributes found in the Qur'ān. It would seem that al-Kindī's point of reference, his total perspective, is essentially different from that of the Mu'tazila. While they take their point of departure from the Qur'ān and tradition and use whatever philosophical tools they feel are appropriate to explain and

support their faith,⁴⁰ al-Kindī, it appears, begins from a philosophical body of literature and tradition, accomodating it to religious doctrine wherever he can and asserting religious dogma wherever he must, but essentially aiming for a coherent, philosophical affirmation of the truth.

It is worth reexamining, in this perspective, the passage from al-Kindī's treatise On the Quantity of the Books of Aristotle described above.⁴¹ We note firstly that the entire passage stands in strong contrast to the rest of the treatise, which is a description of the sciences knowledge of which man -i.e., normal man- must have for attaining the truth; and of the Aristotelian corpus of writings. As though interrupting himself, al-Kindī assures his reader that this entire scientific tradition cannot compare with sacred Scripture, the philosopher cannot equal the prophet. Having said this, and given a few examples in support of the claim, al-Kindī then resumes introducing his reader (or listener) to the scientific tradition, the acquisition of which he himself has mastered and which he clearly values most highly for all but the messengers of God.

The impression thus received is that al-Kindī believes that for the likes of himself, i.e., under normal circumstances for all men, philosophy is the only approach to the truth and the philosopher the actual ideal figure.

This impression is strengthened by careful scrutiny of

al-Kindī's assertion, in this passage, of prophetic superiority and Koranic truth; for this assertion is made from within a philosophical perspective and applying philosophical criteria. Firstly, prophetic knowledge is portrayed as superior to the philosophical only in degree, not in kind, the prophet becoming thereby a sort of extraordinarily gifted philosopher. Then, the revelation granted him is reformulated along philosophical lines (and cf. below, FP 104.10 and note there), which reformulation is then accepted as "proof" of the Koranic truth.

The reformulation of the Koranic assertion of the creation of the world is particularly interesting. Creation is viewed, as has been mentioned, as an instance of the general principle of the generation of contraries from contraries: as fire is from non-fire, warmth from non-warmth, so in general that which is (هو) comes from that which is not (لا هو), bodies from non-bodies and existence (أيس) from non-existence (ليس).⁴² Now, inasmuch as God is viewed as responsible for the unique, a-temporal act of creation of matter from nothing, so one could think He is also responsible, in al-Kindī's estimation, for the creation of each and every contrary which also comes to be, in one sense at least, from its state of non-being. This would bring al-Kindī close to the Mu'tazila and general Kalām view of continuous Divine creation from nothing, and Walzer rightly notes the absence of any allusion to potentiality which would ruin this association.⁴³

However, that this is not al-Kindī's full view may be inferred from a comparison of this passage with a remark in the First Philosophy to the effect that it is only the form (literally "predicate", **الحوّل**) of a thing which changes and not its primary substratum, which is called "existence" (**الأيّس**) and which is said to be eternal.⁴⁴ As we must understand this use of "eternal" (**الأزلي**) for the primary substratum, i.e., first matter, there in the sense of enduring only so long as God wills, so we should understand the contraries here as contraries of a common substratum. God is responsible ultimately, al-Kindī would say, for the creation of the entire world, including the creation of contrary states of being for every thing; but He is not really involved in the generation and destruction of each thing at every moment. True, al-Kindī does not wish to expand upon potential existence, with which concept he is generally not happy;⁴⁵ but he would not wish the reader for whom the treatise is intended to assume continuous Divine intervention in physics either, particularly since this would go against the basic physical world view of Aristotle with which al-Kindī is eager to acquaint him.⁴⁶

We may assume that al-Kindī's approach in the (as yet) lost "Treatise on Unity by Exegesis" (literally "commentaries", **رسالة التوحيد بتفسيرات**) took a similar approach to that which we find in this passage and in another treatise of

al-Kindī's, "An Explanation of the Uttermost Body and its Obedience to God."⁴⁷ There as here religious statements are put into a non-literal, philosophical framework, in keeping with a physics that establishes God as the ultimate source of all being and yet allows His creation an independent daily functioning. This acceptance of a quasi-independent physical universe, as far as its day to day activity goes, moves al-Kindī generally to the left of a Mu'tazila tradition which sees God as continuously involved with the world and intimately responsible for the physical survival of each of its parts; in Aristotelian terms, the efficient as well as final cause of the universe.

That al-Kindī distinguishes between these two roles is evident, further, from his treatise On the True First Perfect Agent and the Deficient Agent which is (an agent) Metaphorically.⁴⁸ However much he wishes to qualify the nature of agents other than God, al-Kindī clearly ascribes to created beings the immediate responsibility for acting upon other beings, God being the remote (i.e., final) cause of all but the first created being. In his treatise On the Explanation of the Active Proximate Cause of Generation and Corruption,⁴⁹ al-Kindī singles out the sun and moon as the immediate proximate causes of generation and corruption in the sub-lunar world, their creation, in turn, being due to God, the remote (final) cause of all being.

Al-Kindī's attitude to the physical world view of the

Mu'tazila may be further inferred from an important passage in First Philosophy, in which he establishes that everything one can think of in the world is only accidentally and not essentially one, and that its unity, i.e., its identity and being, comes from an outside agent. As everything is equally seen as "accidental", al-Kindī is led, on the principle that an essential existent is a prerequisite for the existence of an accidental one of the same genus (and assuming the impossibility of an infinite regress of accidental existents), to the assertion of an essential One (i.e., God), the external agent of all being.⁵⁰

In making this statement, al-Kindī could not have been unaware of the similarity of his remarks to those of the Mu'tazila, who also claimed no essential existence to anything, and considered all as created from an external agent, viz., God.⁵¹ Most of the Mu'tazila, however, divided all being into atoms and accidents, and though both were considered as created, the atoms were understood to be indivisible. Al-Kindī would appear, therefore, to be rejecting this view, insisting that nothing can be thought of as one or indivisible, that the very concept is absurd.⁵² All, then, would be accidental in al-Kindī's thought, it appears, and as such completely without set characteristics.

It is clear, however, that al-Kindī did not conceive of "accidents" in this way, viewing them rather as permanent categories of real existence. "Accidental" is for him significant

as opposed to "essential" only as regards the question of "unity", al-Kindī accepting all the individual beings which comprise the Aristotelian world as units of substance, if only "accidental" units. Moreover, having made his point regarding essential unity, al-Kindī proceeds in FP to show that unity, together with multiplicity, is an essential ingredient in the composition of all being. It is form and matter which al-Kindī accepts, with the proviso that they, together with everything else, are not independent existents. Having said this, he is content to allow them to function as if they were independent.

Thus al-Kindī is both refuting the Mu'tazila doctrine of the division of the world into atoms and accidents, and, while affirming the contingent, accidental nature of all being, which would return him to the Mu'tazila camp, clearly works with creation as though it were independent. The accidental theory of being is for him a theoretical truth that is significant for the ultimate question of creation and God's existence; for knowledge of the world as it is "otherwise", it is irrelevant.

That al-Kindī's concern is with the world as it is, in all its variety, and with man's various scientific accomplishments, is clear from the long list of his highly diversified writings.⁵³ He has, judging from this source, apparently little inclination for insisting upon the particulars of religious or political creeds. The one extant record of his style when engaged in a

religious polemic, his refutation of the Christian concept of the Trinity, shows him as taking the high road of philosophical disputation.⁵⁴ Apparently he is not interested either in the advancement of particularist, ethnic claims, which we can also infer from the fact that though of pure aristocratic Arabian stock, he is dedicated to a field of learning identified with foreign ideas and pursued mostly by non-Arab mawālī.⁵⁵

It would, therefore, be a reasonable assumption to see al-Kindī largely as his own man, a person of considerable learning, with a dispassionate concern for the truth within limits acceptable to the society at large and, no doubt, to his own religious beliefs; with which, however, he felt scientific knowledge was compatible. The real al-Kindī may well have been like the sage historical figure about whom stories were told and in whose name proverbs were recounted.⁵⁶ Such a figure would probably not have been happy with the Mu'tazila supported mihna initiated by al-Ma'mūn and followed by a number of his successors, which furthered the polarization of society and intimidation of intellectual inquiry.⁵⁷ One could imagine al-Kindī using his position at court to express his resentment of Mu'tazilite practices, both theoretical and political; and, indeed, we find him speaking out in the introductory chapter of First Philosophy in such a way that, in the context of his remarks and in the terminology which he chooses, the passage is best understood as a thinly veiled indictment of the Mu'tazila.

The passage follows a paraphrase of part of chapter one of Metaphysics alpha ellaton, in which al-Kindī praises Aristotle by name and seconds his remarks concerning gratitude to all who have preceded in the search for truth.⁵⁸ Al-Kindī then proceeds to attack those who are not in the philosophical tradition yet who are "in our day acclaimed for speculation".

"If they are crowned undeservedly with the miters of truth, it is due to their narrow understanding of the methods of truth and their scant knowledge of what Majesty requires as regards opinion and judgement in those common universal usages which prevail among them; as well as to the dirty envy which is a capability of their animal souls, obscuring their thought's perception from the light of truth by darkening its veils; and (to) their placing those with humanly virtues -in attainment of which they are deficient, being on its remote fringes- in the position of habitual, cheating opponents; thereby defending their spurious thrones which they erected undeservedly. (Their stature, however, is) really due to their leadership and traffic in religion, though they are devoid of religion; for one who trades in something buys it, and one buys that which he does not have. Thus one who trades in religion does not have religion, and it is necessary that one who resists the acquisition of

knowledge of the real nature of things and calls it
unbelief be divested of (the offices of) religion."⁵⁹

In referring contemptuously to the "usages" (الأنفاع) of
"speculation" (نظر), "opinion" (رأى) and "judgement"
(اجتهاد), al-Kindi is specifying methods of reasoning with
which the Mu'tazila were identified, and which to al-Kindi cannot
compare with the "methods of truth" (أساليب الحق), i.e.,
syllogistic proofs. That it is the Mu'tazila particularly whom
al-Kindi is attacking may be deduced further from the fact that,
at the time of the composition of this treatise, they alone
enjoyed positions of authority and official sanction, using
their political office to impose their religious beliefs by
threats and accusations of unbelief, to all of which the passage
alludes.

Thus, as a man who is prepared to call for the ouster of
the Mu'tazila from political office and official favor, al-Kindi
should not be overly identified with them. On the other hand,
one should not take this passage as the last word on al-Kindi's
relationship with the Mu'tazila either, since he does have, as
we have seen, many points of contact with them; and he avoided,
as far as we know, real political activity of any sort. This
relatively neutral stance did not help him with al-Mutawakkil,
though from the fact that his library was eventually restored,
we may gather that he was not considered a real political or

religious threat.⁶⁰ Al-Kindi's life, as much as we are able to reconstruct it, thus exemplifies the personal difficulties and conflicting forces with which Muslim philosophers had to cope.

Notes:

3) Al-Kindī and the Muʿtazila:

A Reevaluation

¹Cf. L. Gardet, "Le Problème de la 'Philosophie Musulmane'", Mélanges offerts à Étienne Gilson (Toronto-Paris, 1959), p. 269; H. Laoust, Les Schismes Dans l'Islam (Paris, 1965), p. 106; and see W. M. Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology (Edinburgh, 1962), pp. 45-47.

²Oriens 10 (1957), p. 203 ff., reprinted in Greek into Arabic, (from which future citations will be drawn) pp. 175-205.

³"The Rise of Islamic Philosophy", Oriens 3 (1950), p. 9.

⁴Cf. "New Studies", op. cit., pp. 176, 177 and see the notes to FP 97.3 and 97.5 below.

⁵Cf. "New Studies", op. cit., p. 176.

⁶Ibid., p. 177.

⁷Cf. the edition of this treatise prepared by Walzer and M. Guidi, "Studi su al-Kindī I", op. cit., pp. 395, 396 of the Arabic text, 409, 410 of the Italian translation; and see too Abū Rīdah's Rasā'il, I: 372, 373. Al-Kindī employs the term

العلم الالهي in FP to denote metaphysics, considered as

within the philosophical syllabus and as such, it may be inferred, a "human science" (see below, 112.15 and n. 112.15¹). We may therefore assume that it is not **العلم الالهي** as such which is superior to **العلوم الانسانية**, but only that **العلم الالهي** which is received through revelation, in which case it is not metaphysics as commonly understood but a supposedly unique kind of knowledge. However, as we shall see, al-Kindī proceeds to convert this "divine knowledge" into what we commonly recognize as metaphysics.

⁸Following A. J. Arberry, The Koran Interpreted (New York, 1955), p. 149.

⁹A method employed by al-Kindī elsewhere as well. Cf. Walzer, "New Studies", op. cit., pp. 183, 198. Walzer's analysis (ibid., pp. 196-199) of al-Kindī's interpretation of sura 55 verse 5 in this treatise, "An Explanation of the Worship of the Uttermost Body and its Obediance to God" (**الابانة عن سجود الجرم**) , AR I: 244-247) provides further proof of al-Kindī's use of philological criteria to further philosophical understanding of the Qur'ān.

¹⁰Cf. "New Studies", op. cit., p. 183 and see al-Ash'arī's Maqālāt al-Islāmiyīn, ed. H. Ritter, Die Dogmatischen Lehren Der Anhänger Des Islam (Wiesbaden, 1963), p. 510. Al-Ash'arī also presents

the argument against this view which denied the literal meaning of this passage. Cf. his Kitab al-Luma', ed. R. McCarthy, The Theology of al-Ash'ari, (Beirut, 1952), pp. 15 ff. Arabic, 21 ff. English.

¹¹Cf. Walzer's parallels from late Greek and Christian thought, from Philo on, for this latter belief, in "New Studies", op. cit., pp. 179, 180.

¹²Cf. I. Goldziher, Die Richtungen der Islamischen Koranauslegung (Leiden, 1920), pp. 130 ff., and see Walzer, ibid., pp. 197, 198.

¹³Cf. Walzer, ibid., pp. 184-187.

¹⁴Cf. AR I: 28-31. At p. 31 mention is made of the Qur'ān exegesis discussed above.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 28, and see Ibn al-Nadīm's Fihrist, op. cit., p. 259; Flügel's Al-Kindī, op. cit., pp. 46 Arabic, 30 German translation; Atiyeh, op. cit., pp. 191-193; and Walzer, "New Studies", op. cit., p. 183.

¹⁶While Aristotelian syllogisms and systematic, rigorous definitions were not adopted until the eleventh century at the earliest, the Mu'tazila of the preceding centuries used a kind of dialectic in which analogies are drawn upon the basis of either externally obvious similarities and differences, or relationships suggested

by the Qur'ān; and they employed (unexamined) concepts of necessity, possibility and impossibility of a sort which we find spelled out by al-Kindī. All this without his sense of a causal relationship between events, or of independent natural or logical "laws"; the absence of which, however, only enhances the impression of a finite universe with clearly delimited possibilities, knowledge of which may be considered certain because revealed by God. Cf., for remarks concerning this earliest period of Kalam logic, J. Van Ess, Die Erkenntnislehre des 'Adudaddīn Al-Īcī (Wiesbaden, 1966), pp. 17 ff., 114, 358 ff., 373, 385 ff.; S. Pines, Beiträge zur Islamischen Atomenlehre (Berlin, 1936), pp. 26 ff.; L. Gardet and M. M. Anawati, Introduction a la Théologie Musulmane (Paris, 1948), pp. 357 ff. See too al-Baghdadī's eleventh century summation of this logic, in the first chapter of his K. Uṣūl al-Dīn, translated by W. M. Watt, "The Logical Basis of Early Kalam", The Islamic Quarterly VI, VII (1962, 1963), pp. 3-10, 31-39 respectively.

¹⁷Cf. Davidson's article, "John Philoponus as a Source of Medieval Islamic and Jewish Proofs of Creation", JAOS 89 (1969), pp. 357-391.

¹⁸See also, regarding Philoponus' influence, H. Wolfson, "The Kalām Arguments for Creation in Saadia, Averroes, Maimonides and St. Thomas", Saadia Anniversary Volume (New York, 1943), pp. 201-203;

and Walzer, "New Studies", op. cit., pp. 190-196. For later, critical reaction to Philoponus, see M. Mahdi's "Alfarabi Against Philoponus", Near Eastern Studies 26 (1967), pp. 233-260.

¹⁹Cf. Davidson, op. cit., pp. 371-373, 375, and see FP below, 121.5 ff. and the note to 121.15-122.1.

²⁰Cf. Davidson, op. cit., pp. 378, 379. He does not mention the occurrence of this argument in al-Kindī; see, however, FP below, 122.13-15 and note there.

²¹Cf. Davidson, op. cit., pp. 376, 379 and 390, and see FP below, 115.1-116.4, and the note to 114.18.

²²Discussed also by the mutakallimun usually in terms of accidents and body, not atoms. Cf. Davidson, op. cit., pp. 382-388, and see FP below, pp. 117-120. Al-Kindī has two arguments for the inter-dependence of body and the accidents of time and motion, the second of which (p. 120), discussing the composition of body, is clearly traceable to a similar proof of the generation of the universe from the finiteness of the power contained within it used by Philoponus; the latter's argument running, that what is composite is not self-sufficient, and what is not self-sufficient does not have infinite power (cf. Davidson, ibid., pp. 362-363, 371-372).

- ²³John Philoponus' ideas have been summarized by S. Sambursky, The Physical World of Late Antiquity, (New York, 1962), pp. 157 ff.
- ²⁴Cf. the fourth through sixth treatises in Abu Rida, op. cit., I: 186-207. B. Lewin, referring to one of these treatises in his article, "La notion de muḥdat dans le Kalām et dans la philosophie", Orientalia Suecana III, fasc. 2/4 (1954), p. 86, also traces the theme of the finitude of all body to Philoponus.
- ²⁵Cf. AR I: 219, 220, 246; II: 10, 12 (Abū Rīda's Arabic translation of the Latin Liber de quinque essentiis, ed. Nagy, op. cit., pp. 29, 30); 44 ff. (the treatise being titled "An Explanation That the Nature of the Heavenly Spheres Differs from the Nature of the Four Elements"); 48 ff. (treatise translated by H. Khatchadourian and N. Rescher, "That the Elements and the Outermost Body Are Spherical in Form", Isis 56 (1965) pp. 190-195, reprinted in the latter's Studies in Arabic Philosophy, Pittsburgh 1967, pp. 9-14).
- ²⁶For which cf. Sambursky, loc. cit.; many of John Philoponus' technical arguments, as well as fundamental positions, find no echo in al-Kindī, e.g., Philoponus' concept of time, privation, and denial of the existences of the aether, of perfect circular motion, and unchanging uniform celestial phenomena.
- ²⁷Cf., e.g., al-Kindī's statement in "On ... the Cause of Generation

and Corruption" (Abū Rīda I: 220), that the heavens and the four elements undergo neither generation nor corruption, remaining for as long as God has appointed them to be.

²⁸In this perspective, the fact that John Philoponus also apparently acknowledges God's will as a possible factor in deferring the otherwise necessary destruction of the heavens (Cf. Simplicius' commentary to Aristotle's Physics, CAG X (Berlin, 1895), p. 1331, lines 23-25, and see Davidson, op. cit., p. 362, n. 46), does not affect the quite basic difference between his unified, universal physics and the more complicated, dual physics of al-Kindī.

²⁹Cf., for the early Kalām views of God's unity and His attributes of will, action, creation (both original and continuous creation, of the world and of each of its atoms) and infinity, al-Ash'arī's Maqālāt, op. cit., pp. 136 f., 163 ff., 177, 232, 312, 377, 393, 407, 418, 480, 484, 551; and see too al-Khayyat's Kitāb al-Intiṣār, edited and translated into French by A. Nader (Beyrouth, 1957), pp. 80 ff.; and for the various "accidents" of initiation (ibtidā') and duration of being, its motion and cessation or extinction (fanā'), cf. Maqālāt, pp. 137, 319 ff., 355 ff., 363, 570, and K. al-Intiṣār, pp. 52 ff.

³⁰Op. cit., pp. 362-373.

³¹Cf. Job's Book of Treasures, ed. A. Mingana (Cambridge, 1935), pp. 16 f. English translation, 305 f. Syriac text, and see too Mingana's introduction, pp. xxvii-xxix. While Job was acquainted with Mu'tazilite ideas and had met some of their early leading figures (cf. S. Pines, "Études sur Awḥad al-Zaman Abu'l Barakât al-Baghdâdî", REJ n.s. iii (1938), p. 45, n. 168), he clearly did not receive all his philosophical knowledge from their circles, differing with them on many issues. Cf. the Book of Treasures, pp. 153, 154 English, 388, 389 Syriac.

³²Cf. Davidson, op. cit., pp. 373-375, and see the Book of Treasures, pp. 15 English, 304 Syriac. This argument occurs as well in the Christian polemical work The Book of the Demonstration by the tenth century Eutychius of Alexandria, who also briefly mentions the argument for the impossibility of an infinite regression and the doctrine of negative attributes. Cf. P. Cachia's edition of the Arabic text and W. M. Watt's separate English translation (both published in Louvain, 1960, 61), pp. 3, 4, 16, 17 Arabic, 2, 3, 13, 14 English.

³³Cf. the Book of Treasures, pp. 11 English, 302 Syriac.

³⁴Cf. al-Khayyat, op. cit., pp. 19 Arabic, 12 French (which, however, mistranslates the latter argument). Cf. too, for the lack of a distinction in infinity, FP below, n. 113.5.

³⁵Cf. al-Khayyat, op. cit., pp. 33 Arabic, 32 French.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 32 Arabic, 30 French. Nazzām says, in terminology like that of al-Kindī, that all parts of bodies can be divided into two by the wahm; however, unlike al-Kindī, Nazzām feels this is sufficient reason to discredit the actual existence of atoms, i.e., he accepts the actual significance of potential existence.

³⁷Cf. al-Ash'arī, op. cit., pp. 302, 307, 311, 314, 315, 319.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 358, 359, and see al-Khayyat, op. cit., pp. 16-18, 21-22 Arabic, 9-11, 15-16 French.

³⁹While for their part, the Mu'tazila rejected not only the notions of causality and of substance as composed of "form" and "matter", but the notions of universal being and essence as well, the terms for which concepts are missing entirely from the vocabulary of Abū al-Hudhayl, for example. Other terms, such as those for generation and corruption, are used differently than when employed by the philosophers. Cf. R. Frank, The Metaphysics of Created Being According to Abū l-Hudhayl al-'Allāf (Istanbul, 1966), pp. 8, 16.

⁴⁰Cf. Frank, ibid., pp. 5-7, for a recent evaluation of the priority of faith to reason as valued in the Kalām. See too

H. Nyberg's characterization of the Mu'tazila as heavily oriented towards apologetics and polemics, as well as Koranic inspired speculation (EI¹ III: 790).

⁴¹See p. 57 above, and note 7 there.

⁴²Cf. AR I: 375, and see Walzer, "New Studies", op. cit., p. 186.

Al-Kindī does not distinguish between "existence" and "being" in the sense of essence. Cf. FP below, n. 113.11².

⁴³Cf. "New Studies", op. cit., p. 185.

⁴⁴Cf. below, FP 113.11, and see note there.

⁴⁵See above, pp. 34, 36 and note 44 there.

⁴⁶Al-Kindī elsewhere clearly accepts the Aristotelian notion of the existence of matter as well as form. At FP 111.1,2 matter is said to be a "substratum for affection" (موضوعة للإنفعال , similarly defined in On Definitions, AR I: 166), and "nature" is viewed as "the primary (sic!) cause of everything which moves and rests." (and see below, notes to 111.1,2). Cf. also al-Kindī's description of matter in relation to substance, genus and form, in the Liber de quinque essentiis, ed. Nagy, op. cit., pp. 30-33, AR II: 12-18.

⁴⁷Cf. above in this chapter, note 9.

48 رسالة الكندي في الفاعل الحق الأول التام والفاعل
الناقص الذي هو بالمجاز ; cf. AR I: 182-184.

49 كتاب الكندي في الابانة عن العلة الفاعلة
القريبة للكون والفساد , AR I: 219, 226-237.

50 Cf. FP below, 132.3 ff., and see note to 132.8 there.

51 Cf. Davidson, op. cit., pp. 370, 385; and see also his article,
"Arguments from the Concept of Particularization in Arabic
Philosophy", Philosophy East and West XVII (1968), pp. 300-302.

52 Al-Kindī we know wrote a specific refutation of the atomistic
view (cf. Fihrist, ed. Flügel, p. 259, and see Pines, op. cit.,
p. 94, and Walzer, op. cit., p. 184). Not all the Mu'tazila, of
course, held to an atomistic physics, though alternative views
were similarly based on a discrete structure of being. Cf.
al-Ash'arī's Maqālāt, op. cit., pp. 281, 303 ff., 321, 395.
While al-Kindī's minimization of the significance of potential
existence leads him to an attitude towards actual beings which
similarly emphasises their ultimately discrete, and not contin-
uous, nature, there is nothing in al-Kindī even remotely
resembling the Mu'tazila denial of causality and substitution of
"habitual" occurrences with their "entailment" (tawallud) of
action and thought. Cf. ibid., pp. 408, and al-Khayyat, op. cit.,
p. 122; and see, for a discussion of the various Mu'tazila

formulations of physical and quasi-physical principles, M. Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism, (London, 1958), pp. 26 ff.; Pines, op. cit., pp. 3 ff., 27 ff.; Van Ess, op. cit., pp. 211 ff., 289 ff.; Frank, op. cit., pp. 13 ff., 39 ff. and H. Wolfson, "Mu'ammār's Theory of Ma'na", Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of H.A.R. Gibb (Leiden, 1965), pp. 682-683.

⁵³Cf. above, chapter one of the introduction, note 2. It is worth noting that most of al-Kindī's "polemical" writings are separated by the bibliographers from his other, more strictly scientific and philosophical treatises (cf. the Fihrist, op. cit., I: 259; Flügel, Al-Kindī, pp. 30 German, 46, 47 Arabic; Atiyeh, op. cit., pp. 191-193), probably following in this al-Kindī's own distinction. The term translated "polemical", jadali, has also been called "dialectical", and it is a term with which the Kalām type of reasoning has been identified; cf. Gardet and Anawati, op. cit., p. 358. Judging by the titles of the treatises listed as **كتبه الجلالية**, al-Kindi did indeed discuss under this heading both Mu'tazila-type religious and physical themes; except that in the latter category he clearly attacks notions held by many of the Mu'tazila concerning the discontinuous motion of bodies and the existence of atoms.

⁵⁴Cf. Yahyā ben 'Adī's excerpts from al-Kindī's "Refutation of the Christians" (**مقالة في الرد على النصارى**), in Yahyā's

rebuttal, edited and translated into French by A. Périer as "Un Traité de Yahyâ Ben 'Adî: Défense du Dogme de la Trinité Contre les Objections d'Al-Kindî", Revue de L'Orient Chretien 3^e serie II (1920), 3-21 (French translation reprinted in Perier's Petits Traités Apologétiques de Yahyâ ben 'Adî (Paris, 1920), pp. 118-128). It appears that in his treatise, al-Kindî argued, in a manner similar to his technique in chapter three of FP, that the concept of an eternal Trinity of one substance, though of three persons, is incompatible with each of the predicables outlined in the Isagoge. Instead, however, of drawing the conclusion that the Trinity, like the True One of FP, is a unique kind of unity, al-Kindî believes the argument shows the logical meaninglessness of the concept. He buttresses the argument, moreover, with an inquiry into the mathematical as well as logical senses of the term "one" (for which compare chapter 4 of FP), from which he deduces that the Trinity fits no acknowledged sense of the term. These contentions, however fallacious Yahyâ may find them, have the merit of addressing the issue philosophically. Compare this, for example, with Jahîz's low, slanderous attack on Christians and Christianity in his contemporary polemic, الرد على النصارى, edited by J. Finkel, Three Essays of Abū Othmān 'Amr Ibn Bahr al-Jahîz (Cairo, 1926) pp. 10-38; discussed by Finkel and partially translated into English as "A Risāla of al-Jahîz", JAOS 47 (1927), pp. 311-334.

⁵⁵Cf. above, p. 5, n. 10. Al-Kindī's leading followers, al-Sarakhsī and Isaac Israeli, are also highly versatile learned types who cannot be identified readily, through their own writings at least, with any particular sectarian interest in their communities (cf. F. Rosenthal, Aḥmad B. Aṭ-Ṭayyib As-Sarakhsī (New Haven, 1943), p. 35; Altmann and Stern, Isaac Israeli, pp. xi-xxiii).

⁵⁶Cf. above, p. 5, and see note 12 there.

⁵⁷Cf. above, p. 4 f., and note 9 there.

⁵⁸Cf. below, FP 103.1 ff., and see notes there.

⁵⁹Cf. below, FP 103.13-104.7 and see, for what follows, the notes there.

⁶⁰Al-Kindī's punishment in the time of al-Mutawakkil, as that of the eminent Christian translator Hunain ibn Ishāq (for whom cf. M. Meyerhof, "New Light on Hunain ibn Ishāq and His Period", Isis VIII (1926), p. 689), is apparently due more to personal court intrigue and a general animus to philosophical and scientific inquiry, than to any particular identification with the Mu'tazila. Al-Kindī's disciple al-Sarakhsī was even more the victim of internecine factionalism in Abbāsid society: falling out of favor with the caliph al-Mu'tadid, al-Sarakhsī was removed from his high position at court, imprisoned and beaten, succumbing

apparently to this treatment, in 899 A.D. While opinions differ, al-Sarakhsi was ostensibly persecuted by the anti-Mu'tazilite regime for his unorthodox opinions; though he receives no sympathy either from Ibn al-Munajjim, an allegedly Mu'tazilite poet (cf. Rosenthal, op. cit., pp. 25 ff., and see p. 37, n. 117.).

Part II

Text and Commentary

p.97 In the Name of Allah the Merciful the Compassionate

There is no success without Allah

Al-Kindī's Book, for al-Mu'taṣim Billāh

On First Philosophy

5 /May Allah grant you long life, O son of the children of
princes and of the company of men of good fortune whom He
rendered happy in the worldly and eternal domains because of
their adhering¹ to their true religion; and may He adorn you
with all the accoutrements of virtue and purify you from all
types of vice.

Indeed, the human art which is highest in degree and most
noble in rank is the art of philosophy, the definition of which
is knowledge of the true nature of things, insofar as is possible
for man. The aim of the philosopher is, as regards his knowledge,
10 /to obtain the truth, and as regards his action, to act truth-
fully; not that the activity is endless, for we abstain and the
activity ceases, once we have reached the truth.

We don't find the truth we are seeking without finding a
cause; the cause of the existence and continuance of everything
is The True One, in that each thing which has being has truth.
The True One exists necessarily, and therefore beings exist.

¹ من استسأل, emending the ms.

من استسأل .

p.98 /The most noble philosophy and the highest in rank is the
 First Philosophy, i.e., knowledge of the First Truth Who is the
 cause of all truth. Therefore it is necessary that the perfect
 and most noble philosopher will be the man who fully understands
 p.101 /this most noble knowledge; for the knowledge of the cause is
 more noble than knowledge of the effect, since we have complete
 knowledge of every object of knowledge only when we have obtained
 full knowledge of its cause.

Every cause will either be material, formal, efficient, i.e.,
 that from which movement begins; or final, i.e., that for the
 5 sake of which there is an object. /Scientific inquiries are four,
 as we have determined elsewhere in our philosophical treatises;
 either "whether", "what", "which", or "why". "Whether" is an
 investigation only of the existence (of something); "what"
 investigates the genus of every existent which has a genus;
 10 "which" investigates its specific difference; /"what" and "which"
 together investigate its species; and "why" its final cause,
 since it is an investigation of the absolute cause. It is
 evident that when we obtain full knowledge of its matter we
 thereby obtain full knowledge of its genus; and when we obtain
 full knowledge of its form we thereby obtain full knowledge
 of its species, knowledge of the specific difference being
 subsumed within knowledge of the species. When, therefore,
 we obtain full knowledge of its matter, form and final cause, we
 thereby obtain full knowledge of its definition, and the real

nature of every defined object is in its definition.

15 /Knowledge of the first cause has truthfully been called "First Philosophy", since all the rest of philosophy is contained in its knowledge. It is, therefore,¹ the first in nobility, the first in genus, the first in rank with respect to that the knowledge of which is most certain;² and the first in time, since it is the cause of time.

p.102 /The truth requires that we don't reproach whomever is even one of the causes of even small and meagre benefits to us; how then shall we treat those who are (responsible for) many causes,³ of large, real and serious benefits to us? Though deficient in some of the truth, they have been our kindred and associates in that they benefited us by the fruits of their thought, which have become our approaches and instruments; leading to much knowledge the real nature of which they failed to acquire. (We
5 should be grateful) /particularly since it has been clear to us and to the distinguished philosophers before us who are not our co-linguists, that no man by the power of his own pursuits can attain the truth, i.e., that which the truth deserves, nor will the (philosophers as a) whole comprehend it. Rather, each of

¹Reading **ولذا هي** with the ms. AR **ولذا هي**.

²Reading **الشيء الأيقن علميه**, AR **علمية**. Cross in ms. above word suggests dissatisfaction with it.

³Reading **أكبر**, AR **أكثر أسباب**.

them either will not attain any truth or will attain something small in relation to what the truth deserves. When, though, the little each of those acquiring truth has achieved is collected from them, something of great worth is assembled from this.

- 10 /It is proper that our gratitude be great to those who have contributed even a little of the truth, let alone to those who have contributed much truth, since they have shared with us the fruits of their thought and facilitated for us the real, hidden inquiries, in that they benefited us by those premises which facilitated our approaches to the truth. If they had not lived, these hidden principles¹ with which we have been educated towards the hidden conclusions of our inquiries would not have been assembled for us, even with intense research throughout our time.
- 15 But indeed this has been assembled only in preceding past /ages, age after age, until this time, accompanied by intensive research, necessary perseverance and love of its toil. This cannot be assembled in the time of one man; even if his life-span were extended, his research intensive, his insight subtle and he were fond of perseverance, he would not have assembled, even in many multiples of this time, such strong research, elegant insight and fondness for perseverance.

p.103 /Aristotle, the most distinguished of the Greeks in philosophy,

¹Reading *الأوائل الخفية* . AR *لحقية*.

said: "It is proper for us to thank the fathers of those who have contributed any truth, since they were the cause of their sons' existence; let alone their being a cause for their sons' and our attaining the truth." How beautiful is that which he said in this matter! We ought not to be ashamed of appreciating the truth and
 5 of acquiring it from wherever it comes, /even if it comes from peoples distant from us and nations different from us. For the seeker of truth nothing is more primary than the truth; there is no minimizing of truth, nor belittling its spokesmen or proponents. (The status of) no one is diminished by the truth; rather does the truth ennoble all.

It is well for us--being zealous for the perfection of our species, since the truth is to be found in this--to adhere in this book of ours to our practice in all our compositions of pre-
 10 senting the ancients' /complete statement on this subject by the most direct and facile means, entering thereby upon an understanding of this approach; and completing, following the custom of the language and contemporary usage, and insofar as is possible for us, that which they did not state completely; (presenting the above) with that cause which has hindered us in (understanding) this, it(s absence) being a restriction on the sufficiency of the statement, solving the difficulty and confusion of problems; while being wary of the bad interpretation of many strangers to the truth who are in our day acclaimed for speculation. If they

are crowned undeservedly with the miters of truth, it is due to
 15 their narrow understanding of /the methods of truth and their
 scant knowledge of what Majesty requires¹ as regards opinion and
 p.104 judgement in those /common universal usages which prevail among
 them; as well as to the dirty envy which is a capability of their
 animal souls, obscuring their thought's perception from the light
 of truth by darkening its veils; and (to) their placing those
 with humanly virtues--in attainment of which they are deficient,
 being on its remote fringes--in the position of habitual, cheating
 opponents; thereby defending their spurious thrones which they
 5 erected /undeservedly. (Their stature, however, is) really due
 to their leadership and traffic in religion, though they are
 devoid of religion; for one who trades in something buys it, and
 one buys that which he does not have. Thus one who trades in
 religion does not have religion, and it is necessary that one who
 resists the acquisition of knowledge of the real nature of things
 and calls it unbelief be divested of (the offices of) religion.

In the knowledge of the true nature of things there is
 knowledge of Divinity, unity and virtue, and a complete knowledge
 of everything useful, with approaches to it; while there is a
 distance from anything harmful, with precautions against it. It
 10 is the acquisition of /all this which the true messengers brought

¹Reading ذوالجلالة بما يستحق ذوالجلالة. with the ms. AR ذوالجلالة.

from Allah, great be His praise. For the true messengers, may Allah's blessings be upon them, brought but an affirmation of the Divinity of Allah alone, and an adherence to virtues, which are pleasing to Him; while relinquishing vices, which are contrary to virtues both in themselves and in their effects.¹

p.105 /Devotion to this precious possession is, therefore, required for truthful people, and we must exert ourselves to the utmost in its pursuit, in view of that which we have said previously and that which we shall say now; namely, acquisition of this can be required necessarily through (positing) two contrary locutions; for they must say that acquisition of this is either necessary or
5 not necessary. /If they say that it is necessary, then its pursuit is necessary for them. If, on the other hand, they say that it is not necessary, it is necessary for them to bring a cause of this, and to give a demonstration of this; and the presentation of cause and demonstration are part of the possession of knowledge of the real nature of things. Pursuit of this possession is, therefore, required by means of (contrary) locutions, and devotion to it is necessary for them.

10 /We shall petition our mental studies and judgmental cognition in establishing the proof of His Divinity and the explanation of His unity, defending against His opponents who disbelieve in Him,

¹ وايثارها Ms. as AR, واثارها.

by proofs which subdue their disbelief and rip the veils¹ of
 their shameful known actions off the deficiencies of their
 rebellious creeds; that He may encompass us, and whomever follows
 our approach, within the enclosure of His might,² (more than)
 which could not be desired; and clothe us with the garments of
 His protective armour and bestow upon us the assistance of the
 15 penetrating edge of His sword and the support of the /conquering
 might of His strength. (All this) so that He bring us to our
 ultimate purpose of assisting the truth and supporting veracity;
 and so that he bring us to a level of consent with His purpose
 and acceptance of His action. For to Him is granted success and
 victory over His opponents who deny His grace and who deviate³
 from the truthful approach which is pleasing to Him.

Let us now complete this section, imploring the support of
 the patron of virtues and recipient of good works.

¹Reading **لَسْبُوفٍ** with the ms. AR **وَالْمَاتَكَةُ بِسُجُوفٍ**.

²Reading **بِحَصْنٍ** with the ms. AR **مَحْصَرُهُ**.

³Reading **وَالْحَاثِدِينَ** with the ms. AR **وَالْعَانِدِينَ**.

p.106

Chapter Two of the First Part of

The First Philosophy

Inasmuch as that which ought to precede has been given priority in the beginning of this book, let us follow this with
 5 what follows naturally, and say: /there are two kinds of human perceptions, one of which is nearer to us and further from nature. This is the perception of the senses which belongs to us from the beginning of our development, and belongs to the genus common to us and to many others, by which I mean the sensation¹ common to all animals. Our perceiving with the senses, through the contact of the sense with its sensible object, is timeless and without duration. Sensory perception is unstable, due to the motion and fluctuation of that which makes contact,² its change
 10 in every case being through one of the kinds of /motion.³ Its quantity is differentiated⁴ by "more" or "less", "equal" and "unequal", while its quality is contrasted by "similar" and "dissimilar", "stronger" and "weaker"; and it always occurs in continuous motion and indivisible change.

¹Reading الحسن, against the ms. and AR الحسّ.

²Reading مباشر. AR مباشر.

³الحركات, literally, "movements".

⁴Reading وتفاضل. AR وتفاضل.

It (sc. sensory perception) is that which establishes¹ its forms in the imagination,² and it (sc. the imagination) conveys them³ to the memory; and it (sc. the sensible object) is represented and portrayed⁴ in the soul of (all) living beings. Though it has no stability in nature, being far from nature and therefore hidden, it is very near to the perceiver, in that his perception is due
 15 to the sense, with the /contact of the sense with it (sc. the
 p.107 sensible). /All sensibles, moreover, are always material, and the sensible is always body and in a body.

The other (perception) is nearer to nature and further from us, being the perception of the intellect. It is true that there are two kinds of perception, sensory perception and intellectual perception, since things are universal and particular. I mean by
 5 "universal" the genera of species and the species /of individuals; while I mean by "particular" the individuals of species. Particular, material individuals fall under the (perception of the) senses, whereas genera and species do not fall under the senses nor are they perceptible by sensory perception; they are, rather, under one of the faculties of the perfect, i.e., human, soul,

¹Reading تَثَبَّتْ. AR يُثَبَّتْ.

²Ms. المصوّر. AR المصورة.

³Reading فتؤديها. AR فيؤديها.

⁴Reading ممتثل ومتصوّر. AR فهو ممتثل ومتصوّر.

that which is termed the human intellect.

As the senses perceive the individual objects, every sensible
 10 object represented in the soul /belongs to the faculty which
 employs the senses. Every specific concept and that which is
 above the species, however, is not represented by the soul, for
 all representation is sensible. Rather are the concepts verified
 in the soul, validated and rendered certain through the veracity
 of the intellectual principles which are known necessarily, as
 that "it is" and "it is not" cannot both be true of the same
 p.108 thing without /another (factor) present. Thus this perception
 of the soul is not sensory, is necessary, (and) does not require
 an intermediary; and an image will not be represented for it in
 the soul, since it has no image, having neither color, sound,
 taste, odor or something palpable; it is rather, an unpictorial
 apprehension.

Everything which is material is pictorial, (and) the common
 5 sense will represent it in the soul, /while everything which is
 immaterial may be perceived with the material, as shape which is
 perceived through color; since it is the limit of the color, it
 happens that the shape is perceived by the visual sense, as it
 is the limit of that which is perceived by the visual sense.

It is sometimes believed that it (sc. shape) is represented
 in the soul through the common sense's acquiring of it, and that
 its representation in the human soul is an attachment which

attaches to the colored image, as the attachment which attaches
 10 to color is the limit of that which is colored. (However) /In
 the perception¹ of the limit, which is the shape, an intellectual
 perception, which is not really sensible, occurs to the sense.
 Therefore everything which has no matter and is perceived with
 matter is sometimes believed to be a representation in the soul,
 though it is only thought of, not represented, with the sensible;²
 whereas whatever has no matter and is not joined to matter is not
 represented in the soul at all, and we do not think that it is a
 p.109 representation. We acknowledge it only because /it is a necessity
 to affirm it, as when we say that outside the body of the universe
 there is neither void nor fullness, i.e., neither emptiness nor
 body. This statement is not represented in the soul, for "neither
 void nor fullness" is something which the sense has not apprehended,
 and (it) is not attached to a sense so that it could have an image
 in the soul, or be believed to have an image. It is something
 which only the intellect necessarily perceives, in accordance with
 5 the premises /which have been stated previously.

Therefore we say, in the investigation of this, that the
 meaning of "void" is a place without any spatial object in it.
 Now "place" and "a spatial object" are in that type of relation

¹Reading فوجود AR ؟ فإنَّ بوجودِ with the ms.; originally

²Reading تُعَقَّلُ من . تُعَقَّلُ مع الحسوس لا تتمثل . AR
 الحسوس لا يتمثل .

where one does not precede the other, so that if there is place there is, necessarily, a spatial object, and if there is a spatial object there is, necessarily, place. It is therefore not possible for place to exist without a spatial object; whereas by "void" a
 10 place without a spatial object is meant. /It is not possible, therefore, for an absolute void to exist.

We then say: fullness, if it exists, is body, and the body of the universe is either quantitatively infinite or quantitatively finite. It is impossible that there is a thing which is infinite
 15 in actuality, as we shall explain shortly, /and thus it is impossible for the body of the universe to be quantitatively infinite, and therefore there is no fullness after the body of the universe. For if there were fullness after it, this fullness
 p.110 would be a body; and if, after this fullness, /there would be a fullness, and after every fullness a fullness, there would be an infinite fullness, and this would necessitate (the existence of) a quantitatively infinite body, and would necessitate (the existence of) an actual infinity, whereas it is impossible for there to be an actual infinity.

Therefore¹ there is no fullness after the body of the universe, in that there is neither a body nor a void after it,
 5 as we have explained. /This (statement) is absolutely necessary,

¹Ms. فإذن. AR فإذن.

and it has no form in the soul, it being solely a necessary intellectual perception. Whoever examines things which are beyond nature, i.e., those which have no matter and are not joined to matter, will not perceive them representatively in the soul, but will perceive them by means of intellectual inquiries.

Remember--may God protect you (with) all virtues and defend
 10 you from all vices--this /preface, let it be your guide, directing (you) to the path of truth, and a star, removing the darkness of ignorance and cloudiness of perplexity from the eye of your intellect.

By these two ways is the truth on the one hand easy and on the other hand difficult:¹ for one who seeks a representation of the intelligible shall find it by this (way), in spite of its clarity in the intellect, to be as dimly visible² to him as is the dim vision of the eye of the bat in the rays of the sun in acquiring (perception of) the individual objects which are distinct and clear to us.

15 For this reason many of the inquirers into things which are beyond nature have been confused, since they, like youth, have used in the investigation of them their representation in the soul, corresponding to their practices for the sense. Instruction

¹Ms. عسیرا. AR عسیرا.

²Reading عشی, as AH. AR عشی.

is easy only in customary things, the proof of this being the speed of those educated by sermons and messages, or by poetry or stories, whatever is a ḥadīth, due to their practice as regards ḥadīth and legends from the beginning of their development.

(Many of the inquirers have been confused) also in physical p.111 things, whenever¹ they have used /mathematical investigation, for this is suitable only in what has no matter; for matter is a substratum for affection, and it moves, and nature is the primary cause of everything which moves and rests. Therefore every physical thing is material and hence it is not possible for mathematical investigation to be used in the perception of physical things, since it (sc. mathematics) is a certain particular thing 5 which has no matter. Since, then, mathematics is such that /its investigation² concerns the nonphysical, whoever uses it in the investigation of physical objects has left³ and is devoid of the truth.

Therefore it is incumbent upon everyone inquiring into any science to inquire firstly what cause falls under that science. If we inquire what is the cause of the natural dispositions, that which is the cause of physical things, we find, as we have said

¹Reading إذا with the ms., against AR's emendation to إذ.

²Ms. في الفحص به. AR فالفحص به.

³Reading حار with the ms., rejecting AR's emendation to حار. AR footnotes numbers 2, 3, 4, and 5 of p. 111 correspond, in the footnote section, to numbers 3, 4, 5 and 2.

in "The Principles of Physics", that it is the cause of all motion.

10 Therefore the physical is everything which moves, /and hence the science of physical objects is the science of everything which moves. Thus that which is beyond the physical objects is not moving. For it is not possible that something should be the cause of its own generation, as we shall explain shortly. Thus¹ the cause of motion is not motion nor the cause of that which moves something moving, and therefore what is beyond physical objects is not one of the moving objects; hence it has been explained that the knowledge of what is beyond physical objects is knowledge of what does not move.

We ought not to seek² for a demonstrative finding in the
15 apprehension of every pursuit. For not every /intellectual pursuit is found through demonstration, since not everything has
p.112 a demonstration. As demonstration /is of some things (besides itself), a demonstration has no demonstration for this would be without end. If there would be a demonstration for every demonstration, then there would never be perception of anything; for that which does not result in knowledge of its principles is not knowable; and then there would be no knowledge at all. Thus, if we desired to know what is man, he being that which is living, speaking and mortal, and we hadn't known what is "living", "speaking"

¹Ms. فاذا. AR فاذن.

²Reading يطلب, as AH. AR يطلب.

5 and "mortal", then we would not have /known what is man.

Similarly, we should not¹ pursue probable arguments in mathematical sciences, but rather demonstrative; for should we use probability in the science of mathematics, our comprehension of it would be conjectural and not scientific. Similarly, every distinctive inquiry has a particular perception different from the perception of another. Therefore many of those inquiring
10 into distinctive things err²--some proceeding /in accord with a pursuit of probability, some proceeding in accord with parables, some proceeding in accord with historical witness, some proceeding in accord with sensation, and some proceeding in accord with demonstration--when they are unable to distinguish between the pursuits.

There are some, moreover, who want the use of (all of) this in finding their pursuit, either due to failing to know the methods of the pursuits or due to a passion for increasing the methods of truth. We ought, however, to aim at what is required
15 for each pursuit, and not pursue /probability in the science of mathematics, nor sensation or exemplification in the science of the metaphysical; nor conceptual generalizations in the principles of the science of the physical; nor demonstration in rhetoric, nor demonstration in the principles of demonstration. Surely if

¹ لا ينبغي أن لا, following AR in emending the ms. to include لا.

²Reading ضل. AR ضل.

we observe these conditions, the pursuits which are intended will become easy for us; but if we disobey this, we will miss the objectives of our pursuits, and the perception of our intended objects will become difficult.

Inasmuch as these admonitions have now preceded, we ought to set forth beforehand the canons¹ the employment of which we
20 require /in this craft, and we accordingly say:

p.113 /The eternal is that which must never have been a non-existent being. The eternal (is such that) coming to be is not prior to its being; the eternal's subsistence is not due to another; the eternal has no cause; the eternal has neither subject nor predicate, nor agent nor reason, i.e., that for the sake of which it is--for there are no causes other than the ones which
5 have been previously stated. /The eternal has no genus, for if it has a genus, then it is species, a species being composed of its genus, which is common to it and to others, and of a specific difference which does not exist in others. It (sc. species) moreover, has a subject, viz., the genus which receives its form and the form of others; and a predicate, viz., the form particular to it and not to others. It (sc. the eternal) therefore has a subject and predicate. It has, however, already been explained that the eternal has neither subject nor predicate, and this

¹Reading القوانين , as AH. AR الفوائد (for الفوائد?).

(contradiction) is an impossible absurdity; the eternal, then,
10 /has no genus.

The eternal does not perish, perishing being but the changing
of the predicate, not of the primary substratum; as for the
primary substratum, which is existence, it does not change, for
the perishing of a perishable object does not involve the existence of
its existence. Now every change is into its nearest contrary
only, i.e., that which is with it in one genus, as heat which
changes with cold--for we don't consider opposition like that of
15 heat with aridity, or with /sweetness or with length, or anything
p.114 like that--and related contraries comprise one genus. /A perish-
able object therefore has a genus, and if the eternal is corruptible,
it has a genus. However, it has no genus, this is an impossible
contradiction, and therefore it is impossible for the eternal to
perish.

Motion is change, and the eternal does not move, for it
neither changes nor removes from deficiency to perfection.
Locomotion is a kind of motion, and the eternal does not remove¹
5 to perfection, since it does not move. /Now the perfect object
is that which has² a fixed state, whereby it excels; while the
deficient object is that which has no fixed state, whereby it

¹ ينتقل , following AR in emending the ms.: لا ينتقل .
The error may have occurred by a scribal omission, as

² لا ينتقل من النقائص .
ليست , following AR in striking الذي له .

may excel. The eternal cannot be deficient, for it cannot remove to a state whereby it may excel, since it cannot ever move, neither¹ to (a state) more excellent nor to (a state) more deficient than it; the eternal is, therefore, of necessity perfect.

Now, inasmuch as a body has genus and species, while the
10 eternal has no genus, a body is not² eternal; /and let us now say that it is not possible, either for an eternal body or for other objects which have quantity or quality, to be infinite in actuality, infinity being only in potentiality.

I say, moreover, that the true first premises which are thought with no mediation are: all bodies of which one is not greater than the other are equal; the distances between the limits of equal bodies are equal in actuality and potentiality; that
15 which is finite is not infinite; /when a body is added to one of equal bodies it becomes greater than the others, and greater than what it had been before that body was added to it; whenever two bodies of finite magnitude are joined, the body which comes to be from both of them is of finite magnitude, this being necessary in (the case of) every magnitude as well as in (the case of) every object which possesses magnitude; the smaller of

¹ لیست . لیست الی . AR omits

² لیس or لیس هو , as AR, in lacuna of ms.

every two generically related things comes after the larger, or after a portion of it.

p.115 /Now, if a body has infinity, then whenever a body of finite magnitude is separated from it, that which remains of it will either be a finite magnitude or an infinite magnitude.

If that which remains of it is a finite magnitude, then whenever that finite magnitude which is separated from it is added to it, the body which comes to be from them both together is a finite magnitude; though that which comes to be from them
5 both is /that which was infinite before something was separated from it. It is thus finite and infinite, and this is an impossible contradiction.

If the remainder is an infinite magnitude, then whenever that which was taken from it is added to it, it will either be greater than or equal to what it was before the addition.

If it is greater than what it was, then that which has
10 infinity will be greater than that which has infinity,¹ /the smaller of two things coming after the greater, or after a portion of it, and therefore the smaller of two bodies which have infinity coming after the greater of them or after a portion of it -if the smaller body comes after the greater, then it most certainly comes after a portion of it- and thus the smaller of the two is equal

¹ **مما لا ينشأ له**, following AR in adding **له**, on the basis of its repeated usage (cf. this same sentence and 115.1 above); compare also UG, 202.22.

to a portion of the greater. Now two equal things are those whose similarity is that the distances between their limits are
 15 the same, and therefore the two things /possess limits -for "equal" bodies which are not similar are those (in) which one part¹ is numbered the same, though (as a whole) they differ in abundance or quality or both, they (too) being finite- and thus the smaller infinite object is finite, and this is an impossible contradiction, and one of them is not greater than the other.

p.116 /If it is not greater than what it was² before it was added to -a body having been added to a body and not having increased anything- and the whole of this is equal to it alone -it alone being a part of it- and to its (own) part, which two (parts) join, then the part is like the all, (and) this is an impossible contradiction.

5 /It has now been explained that it is impossible for a body to have infinity, and in this manner it may be explained that any quantitative thing cannot have infinity in actuality. Now time is quantitative, and it is impossible that time have infinity in actuality, time having a finite beginning.

Things predicated of a finite object are also, of necessity,
 10 finite. /Every predicate of a body, whether quantity, place, movement or time -that which is segmented through movement- and the sum of everything which is predicated of a body in actuality,

¹ جزء, as at AR I: 203.3. Ms. as AR جرم.

² ما كان, following AR in adding كان. Cf. above, 115.9, and compare UG 203.6.

is also finite, since the body is finite. Now, the body of the universe is finite, and also, therefore, is everything predicated of it afterwards.

As it is possible through the imagination for something to be continually added to the body of the universe, if we imagine something greater than it, then continually something greater
 15 than that--there being no limit to addition as a /possibility-- the body of the universe is potentially infinite, since potentiality is nothing other than the possibility that the thing said to be in potentiality will occur. Everything, moreover, within that which has infinity in potentiality also potentially has infinity, including movement and time. That which has¹ infinity exists only in potentiality, whereas in actuality it is impossible for something to have infinity, for (reasons) which we have given
 p.117 previously, /and this is necessary.²

It has thus been shown that it is impossible for time in actuality to have infinity. Time is the time, i.e., extension, of the body of the universe. If time is finite, then the being³ of (this) body is finite, since time is not an (independent)
 5 existent. /Nor is there any body without time, as time is but

¹Reading **فإنّ الذي** as UG 203.19, instead of the ms. **فإذ الذي**.

²Reading **وإنّ ذلك** as UG 204.1, and as there concluding the paragraph. AR begins the next paragraph (118.1) with these words, reading with the ms. **وإذ ذلك**.

³**إنّيّة** AR **أنّيّة**.

the number of movement, i.e., it is an extension counted by movement. If there is movement, there is time; and if there were not movement, there would not be time.

Movement is the movement of a body only:

If there is a body, there is movement, and otherwise there would not be movement. Movement is a kind of change; the change only of place, (either) of the part of a body and its center, or of all the parts of the body, is spatial movement; the change of
10 place which is brought about by the /limits of the body, either in nearness to or farness from its center, is increase and decrease; the change only of its predicate qualities is alteration; and the change of its substance is generation and corruption. Every change is a counting of the number of the extension of the body, all change belonging to that which is temporal.

If, therefore, there is movement, there is of necessity a body, while if there is a body, then there must of necessity either be movement or not be movement.

15 /If there is a body and there was no movement, then either there would be no movement at all, or it would not be, though it would be possible for it to be. If there were no movement at all, then movement would not be an existent. However, since body exists, movement is an existent,¹ and this is an impossible

إذ الجرم. ms. emending the ms. وإذ الجرم موجود هي موجودة¹
موجودة وهي موجودة.

p.118 contradiction /and it is not possible for there to be no movement at all, if a body exists. Therefore, if there is (a body), then whenever there is an existing body,¹ there is the possibility that there will be² existing movement.

Now movement necessarily exists in some bodies, for that which is possible is that which exists in some possessors of its substance; as the (art of) writing which may be affirmed³ as a possibility for Muhammad, though it is not /in him in actuality, since it does exist in some human substance, i.e., in another man. Movement, therefore, necessarily exists in some bodies, and exists in the simple body, existing, moreover, necessarily in the simple body; accordingly body exists and movement exists.

Now it has been said that there may not be movement when a body exists. Accordingly, /there will be movement when body exists, and there will not be movement when body⁴ exists, and this is an absurdity and impossible contradiction, and it is not possible for there to be body and not movement; thus, when there is a body there is movement necessarily.

It is sometimes assumed that it is possible for the body of

¹Reading جرم موجودا with the ms. AR جرم موجودا.

²Reading يكون (حركة). AR تكون (حركة).

³Reading موجبة, as the ms., rejecting AR's emendation of موجودة.

⁴الجرم الجرم. Printer's error in AR, الجرم.

the universe to have been at rest originally, having the possibility /to move, and then to have moved. This opinion, however, is false of necessity: for if the body of the universe was at rest originally and then moved, then (either) the body of the universe would have to be a generation from nothing or eternal.

If it was a generation from nothing, the coming to be of being from nothing being generation, then its becoming is movement, in accordance with our previous classification¹ of movement, p.119 (viz.) that generation is one of the species of movement. /If, then, body is not prior (to movement, movement) is (of) its essence;² and therefore the generation of a body can never precede movement. It was said, however, to have been (at rest) originally,³ without movement: Thus it is, when there is no movement, and it is not, when there is no movement, and this is an impossible contradiction and it is impossible, if a body is a generation 5 from nothing, /for it to be prior to movement.

If, on the other hand, the body (of the universe) is eternal, having rested and then moved, it having had the possibility to move, then the body of the universe, which is eternal, will have

¹Reading وصفنا with the ms., rejecting AR's emendation of وصفنا.

²Emending the ms. to read **وإذا لم يسبق الجرم الحركة** **كان الحركة من ذاته** AR's emendation
فإذا لم يسبق الجرم الكون كان الكون ذاته
 In its corrupt state the ms. has **فإذا لم يسبق الجرم كان ذاته**.

³Reading **فقد قيل إنه كان ساكنا أولا**, on the model of 118.14 above.

moved from actual rest to actual movement, whereas that which is eternal does not move, as we have explained previously. The body of the universe is then moving and not moving, and this is an impossible contradiction and it is not possible for the /body of the universe to be eternal, resting in actuality, and then to have moved into movement in actuality.

Movement, therefore, exists in the body of the universe, which, accordingly, is never prior to movement. Thus if there is movement there is, necessarily, a body, while if there is a body there is, necessarily, movement.

It has been explained previously that time is not prior to movement; nor, of necessity, is time prior to body, /since there is no time other than through movement, and since there is no body unless there is movement and no movement unless there is body. Nor does body exist without extension, since extension is that in which its being is, i.e., that in which there is that which it is; and there is no extension of body unless there is movement, since body always occurs with movement, as has been explained. The extension of the body, which is always a concomitant of the body, is counted by the movement of the body, which is (also) always a concomitant of the body. Body, therefore, is never prior to time; /and thus body, movement and time are never prior to one another.

p.120 It has, in accordance with this,¹ already been explained
 that it is impossible for time to have infinity, since it is
 impossible for quantity or something which has quantity to have²
 infinity in actuality. All time is therefore finite in actuality,
 and since body is not prior to time, it is not possible for the
 body of the universe, due to its being, to have infinity. The
 being of the body of the universe is thus necessarily finite,
 5 and it is impossible for the body of the universe /to be eternal.

We shall, moreover, show this by means of another account--
 inasmuch as that which we have said (here) has been explained--
 which shall add to the skill of the investigators of this approach
 in their penetration (of it). We therefore say:

Composition and combination are part of change, for it is a
 joining and organizing of things. A body is a long, wide, deep
 substance, i.e., it possesses three dimensions. It is composed
 of the substance which is its genus, and of the long, wide and
 deep which is its specific difference; and it is that which is
 10 composed of /matter and form. Composition is the change of a
 state which itself is not a composition; composition is movement,
 and if there was no movement, there would not be composition.
 Body is, therefore, composite, and if there was not movement,

¹Reading فاذا, as the ms. (for فاذا ان AR فاذا ن .

²Reading يكون كمية . AR يكون كمية .

there would not be body, and body and movement thus are not prior to one another.

15 /Through movement there is time, since movement is change; change is the number of the extension of that which changes, and movement is a counting of the extension of that which changes. Time is an extension counted by movement, and every body has extension, as we said previously, viz., that in which there is being, i.e., that in which there is that which it is. Body is not prior to movement, as we have explained. Nor is body prior
20 to extension, which is counted by movement. /Body, movement and time are therefore not prior to one another in being, and they occur simultaneously in being. Thus if time is finite in actuality, then, necessarily, the being of a body is finite in
p.121 actuality, if /composition and harmonious arrangement are a kind of change, though if composition and harmonious arrangement were not a kind of change,¹ this conclusion would not be necessary.

Let us now explain in another way that it is not possible for time to have infinity in actuality, neither in the past nor future. We say:

5 /Before every temporal segment there is (another) segment, until we reach a temporal segment before which there is no segment, i.e., a segmentary interval before which there is no segmentary

¹Reading **تبدلا** with the ms. AR omits **ل**.

interval. It cannot be otherwise--if it were possible, and after every segment of time there was a segment, infinitely, then we would never reach a given time--for the interval from past infinity
 10 /to this given time would be equal to the interval from this given time regressing in times to infinity; and if (the interval) from infinity to a definite time would be known, then (the interval) from this known time to temporal infinity would be known, and then the infinite is finite, and this is an impossible contradiction.

15 /Furthermore, if it is so that a definite time cannot be reached until a time before it is reached, nor that before it until a time before it is reached, and so to infinity; and (if it is that) the interval can neither be traversed nor brought to an end; then the temporally infinite can never be traversed so as to
 p.122 /reach a definite time. However, termination at a definite time exists, and time is not an infinite segment, but rather is finite necessarily, and therefore the extension of body is not infinite, and it is not possible for body to be without extension. Thus the being of a body does not have infinity; the being of a body is, rather, finite, and it is impossible for body to be eternal.

5 /It is (also) not possible for future time to have infinity in actuality: for if it is impossible for (the interval from) past time to a definite time to have infinity, as we have said previously; and times are consecutive, one time after another

time, then whenever a time is added to a finite, definite time, the sum of the definite time and its addition is definite. If, however, the sum was not definite, then something quantitatively definite would have been added to something (else) quantitatively definite with something which is quantitatively infinite having been brought together by them both.

10 /Time is a continuous quantity, i.e., it has a division common to its past and future. Its common division is the present, which is the last limit of past time and the first limit of future time. Every definite time has two limits: a first limit and last limit. If two definite times are continuous through one limit common to them both, then the remaining limit
15 of each one of them is definite and /knowable. It has, however, been said that the sum of the two times will be indefinite;¹ it will then be both indefinitely limited and definitely limited, and this is an impossible contradiction. It is thus impossible, if a definite time is added to a definite time, for the sum to be indefinite; and whenever² a definite time is added to a definite time, all of it is definitely limited ultimately. It is, therefore,
20 impossible for future time to have /infinity in actuality, and let us now complete this second section.

¹ المحدودة, emending the ms. لاحدودة, which AR alters to محدودة.

² Reading the ms. فكلما. AR وكلما.

p.123

The Third Chapter of the First Part

An investigation whether it is or is not possible for a thing to be the cause of the generation of its essence, shall now follow the previous (discussion). We say that it is not possible for a thing to be the cause of the generation of its
 5 essence. /I mean by "the generation of its essence" its becoming a being, either from something or from nothing —generation usually being predicated, in other places, of that which comes to be particularly from something— for it is necessary that (a thing) will be either an existent and its essence non-existent; or it will be a non-existent and its essence existent; or it will be a non-existent and its essence non-existent; or it will be an existent and its essence existent.

If (a thing) were a non-existent, and its essence were non-existent, then it would be nothing, and its essence would be
 10 nothing; and nothing is neither a cause /nor an effect, for both cause and effect are predicated only of something which has existence of some sort. Therefore¹ it is not the cause of the generation of its essence, since it is no cause whatsoever. However, it has been said that (a thing) is the cause of the generation of its essence, and this is an impossible contradiction.

¹Ms. إِذْن. AR إِذْن.

Thus¹ it is not possible for a thing to be the cause of the generation of its essence, if it is a non-existent and its essence is non-existent.

A similar thing would occur if a thing were a non-existent and its essence were existent. For, again, if it were a non-existent, it would be nothing, /and nothing is neither cause nor effect, as we stated previously. Therefore it would not be the cause of the generation of its essence. As, however, it has been said previously that a thing is the cause of the generation of its essence, this is an impossible contradiction, and it is not possible for a thing to be the cause of the generation of its essence if it is a non-existent and its essence is existent.

It would appear from this discussion also that the essence of a thing is different from the thing; the differences being p.124 that which make it possible /for something to occur to one and not to the other. If, therefore, it would occur that a thing were a non-existent, its essence would be an existent; its essence then would not be it, though the essence of every thing is that thing. Thus a thing would not be itself and it would be itself, and this is also an impossible contradiction.

A similar thing would occur if a thing were an existent and its essence were non-existent; I mean that its essence would be different from it, since that /which occurs to a thing would be

¹Reading فليس with AR. Ms. is illegible for first letter.

different from that which occurs to its essence. It follows necessarily from this, as we stated previously, that a thing would be itself, and it would not be itself, this also being an impossible contradiction. It is not therefore possible for a thing to be an existent and its essence not existent.

A similar thing would occur if a thing were an existent and its essence were an existent, and it were the cause of the generation of its essence. For if it were the cause of an essence which it generates, then its essence would be its effect, and
 10 the cause is different from the effect. It therefore would/ occur that a thing would be the cause of its essence, while its essence would be its effect. Its essence would then not be it, though the essence of every thing is that thing. Thus it follows necessarily from this kind (of argument) that a thing would not be itself, and that it would be itself, and this is an impossible contradiction; and it is not possible, assuming a thing were the cause of the generation of its essence, for it to be an existent and its essence an existent.

Similarly, if it were a non-existent and its essence were
 15 non-existent, and it were the cause of its essence, /and its essence were also the effect; it would occur that a thing would be itself and it would not be itself. It is not, therefore, possible for a thing to be the cause of the generation of its essence, and this is what we wanted to clarify.

Inasmuch as this has been explained, we now say that every utterance must be either meaningful or not meaningful. That which has no meaning has nothing of which inquiry can be made; philosophy is concerned only with that of which inquiry can be made, and it is not in the nature of philosophy to employ that of which no inquiry can be made.

20 /That which has meaning must be either a universal or particular thing. Philosophy does not inquire into particular things, for particular things are not limited, and that which p.125 cannot be limited, knowledge cannot comprehend. /Philosophy is knowing the true nature of things. It therefore inquires only into universal, delimited things the true natures of which knowledge can comprehend perfectly.

Universal general things must be either essential or non-essential. I mean by "essential" that which establishes the essence of a thing, namely, that by the existence of which the
5 being of a thing is sustained /and maintained, and by the absence of which the destruction and corruption of a thing occurs: as "life",¹ by which the sustenance and maintenance of a living being occurs, and by the absence of which the corruption and destruction of a living being occurs. Life is essential in a living being, and the essential is that which is called substantial, for the substance of a thing is sustained by it.

¹Reading كالحياة with AR. Ms. كالحياة.

The substantial must be either a collective or separate thing. The collective refers to many things, each one receiving
 10 its definition and name from it, and it /thereby combines them. That which refers to many things, in that each one receives its name and definition from it, can refer either to individuals—as "man", which refers to each one of the units of man, i.e., every human individual, and this is what is called "species", since it is one species referring to every one of these indi-
 15 viduals— /or it can refer to many species, as "animal", which refers to every species of animal, such as man and horse; and this is called "genus", since with one genus it refers to every one of these species.

As for the substantially separate entity, it is that which distinguishes between the definitions of things; as the "rational", which differentiates some living beings from others. This is called a "specific difference", due to its differentiating some things from others.

20 /As for that which is not essential, it is contrary to the p.126 foregoing description, and it is that the sustaining /and maintaining of which is due to something which is its substrate; while its absence is due to the absence of that thing which is its substrate. Therefore that which is non-essential is in a substance which is its substrate and is not substantial. On the contrary, it accompanies the substance and is therefore called accidens.

That which is in a substance must be either in one thing alone, by which that thing and none other has a specific property, as laughter in /man and the braying in a donkey, this being
 5 called a property, as it characterizes one thing; or it will be in many things, common to them all, as the whiteness in paper and cotton. This is called a common accident, due to its condition, in that it happens to many things.

Thus, every utterance has a meaning which will be either a genus, species, individual, specific difference, property or
 10 /common accident. Together these comprise two things, substance and accidens. The genus, species, individual and specific difference are substantial; while the property and common accident belong to accidens; and every utterance will be either universal or particular, and either collective or separate.

Let us now, since the foregoing has been discussed, speak of the number of ways "one" is predicated. We say that "one" is
 15 predicated of /every continuum, and also of that which doesn't receive multiplicity. It is thus predicated of (many) kinds of things, including the genus, species, individual, specific difference, property, common accident and all that has preceded.

The individual will be either natural, as an animal or plant, p.127 and what is similar to them; /or an artifact, as a house and what is similar to it. A house is continuous by nature, though its composition is continuous by accident, viz., through the (builder's)

technique. It is one by nature and its composition one by technique in that the composition can become one only through an accidental unity, while the house itself is one through a natural unity.

"One" is predicated also of "all" and "part", "whole" and
 5 /"some". It has sometimes been thought that there is no difference between "all" and "whole", in that "all" is predicated of things having both similar and dissimilar parts: as in our remark, "all the water", water being one of the things having similar parts; and "all the body", body being composed of bone, flesh and such, having different parts; and "all the people",
 10 /these being different individuals. However (there is a difference between "all" and "whole"): "Whole" is not predicated of things having similar parts —one does not say, "the whole water"— for "whole" is predicated of an aggregate both heterogeneous by accident and¹ in some sense unified, though each diverse element is sustained by its own nature without the other, the name "totality" referring to it.

"All", however, is predicated of every unified thing in whatever way the unity comes about. Therefore one does not say
 15 "the whole water", since water is not made of /heterogeneous things each of which is sustained by its own nature. One says, rather, "all the water", since it is a unified thing.

¹ وَأَنَّ. Ms. as AR, وَأَنَّ¹.

In a similar way there is a distinction between "part" and
 p.128 "some". /"Part" is predicated of that which enumerates and divides
 the "all" into equal amounts; while "some" is predicated of that
 which does not enumerate the all (uniformly) but divides and
 apportions it into unequal amounts; it does not establish equality
 among the "somes" which comprise the all, for then it would be
 "part" of the all.

"One" is, then, predicated of each one of the predicables,
 5 and that which derives from the predicables, whether /genus,
 species, individual, specific difference, property, common
 accident, all or part, whole or some. As for the genus, it is
 in each one of its species, since it is predicated of each one
 of its species univocally, while the species is in each one of
 10 its individuals, since it is predicated of each one of /its
 individuals univocally. The individual is one only by position,
 in that every individual is divisible and therefore not one by
 essence. The individual unity is separable from individuals,
 and is not essentially one; the unity which is in it, through
 its position, is not in it essentially. It therefore does not
 15 have true unity. /That which, in something, is not in its true
 nature¹ essential, is in it in an accidental manner, and that
 which occurs accidentally to a thing does so in virtue of something

¹ حقيقته. Ms. apparently as AR, حقيقة.

other than itself. That which occurs accidentally is an effect in that in which the accident occurs. An effect is a relative term, the effect coming from an agent. Thus unity in the individual is, necessarily, an effect of an agent.

The species is predicated of a multiplicity of individually different things. Multiple, inasmuch as it has many individuals; and also as a composite of things, inasmuch as it is composed of p.129 genus and specific difference; /as the human species, which is composed of living, reasoning and mortal (elements). That which is a species through its essence is multiple, by way of its individuals and its being composite. The unity it has is by position only, in a non-essential sense, and therefore its unity is not true unity. Unity is thus in the species in an accidental manner, and that which occurs accidentally to a thing does so in virtue of something other than itself. The accident is an effect 5 in that in which the accident occurs. An effect is /a relative term, the effect coming from an agent, and unity in the species is also, necessarily, an effect coming from an agent.

The genus which indicates the essence of the thing is predicated of many things different in species. The genus is multiple, inasmuch as it has many species, each one of its species being both an independent substance and many individuals; and each one of its individuals being also an independent substance. The genus is multiple in this way, and its unity is

10 also not true unity. Unity is therefore in it in an /accidental manner, and that which occurs accidentally to a thing does so in virtue of something other than itself. The accident is an effect in that in which the accident occurs. An effect is a relative term, an effect coming from an agent, and unity in the genus also is, necessarily, an effect coming from an agent.

The specific difference which indicates the quality of a thing is predicated of a multiplicity of things different in species. It is predicated of each one of the individuals of those species of which a specific difference, which indicates a quality, is predicated. It is multiple by way of the species
 15 and the individuals of which the /species are predicated. Its unity is also not true unity, and it is therefore in it in an
 p.130 accidental manner, and that which occurs accidentally /to a thing does so in virtue of something other than itself. The accident is an effect in that in which the accident occurs. An effect is a relative term, an effect coming from an agent, and unity in the specific difference is also an effect coming from an agent.

The property, which indicates the existence of a thing, is predicated of one species and of each one of its individuals. It is not a part (of the thing), since it is indicative of its
 5 existence. It is multiple, because it exists /in many individuals and because it has movement and movement is divisible. Its unity is also not true unity, and it exists therefore in an accidental

manner, and that which occurs accidentally to a thing does so in virtue of something other than itself. The accident is an effect in that in which the accident occurs. An effect is a relative term, an effect coming from an agent, and unity in the property is also an effect coming from an agent.

The common accident is also predicated of many individuals.

- 10 It is multiple since it exists in /many individuals. It will be either a quantity, receiving augmentation and diminution, it being divisible; or a quality, receiving the similar and dissimilar, the stronger and weaker, and receiving divergent (qualities). It is multiple, and its unity is also not true unity. It is therefore in it in an accidental manner, and that which occurs accidentally, as we stated previously, is an effect coming from an agent. Thus the unity in a common accident is also an effect coming from an agent.

- 15 The all which is predicated of the predicables has portions, in that every one of the predicables is /a portion of it. The all which is predicated of one predicable also has portions, in that every predicable is a genus, and every genus has many species, and every species has individuals. The all is thus multiple, in that it has many divisions. Its unity is also not true unity. It is therefore in it in an accidental manner, and it therefore comes from an agent, as we said previously, concerning that which occurs in an accidental manner.

Similarly, the whole is also multiple, in that it is predicted of a multiplicity of combined things. /Its unity also is not true unity, and it is in it in an accidental manner. It is therefore in it as an effect coming from an agent, as we said previously.

A part will be either substantial or accidental, and a substantial part will have either similar or dissimilar parts. /That which has similar parts is like water,¹ the part of which is completely water. All water receives division into parts, and a part of water, if it is completely water, is multiple. That which does not have similar parts, i.e., that which has different parts, is like the living body which is (made) of flesh, skin, nerve, arteries, veins, ligaments, peritoneum, diaphragms, bone, brain, blood, bile, phlegm, and everything from which the living body, which² does not have similar (parts), is composed. /Furthermore, every one (of the parts) of the living body we have mentioned receives division into parts and is also multiple.

The accidental part inheres within the substantial part; as, for example, the length, breadth and depth in the flesh, bone and other parts of a living body; and the color, taste and other accidents which are distributed in the distribution of the

¹Ms. **كالماء**. AR **كالماء**.

²Ms. **والتي**. AR **التي**.

substantial (parts). The accidental part has, therefore,¹ parts, and is also multiple, and the unity in the part is also not true unity.

- 15 /Both natural and accidental continuity have parts: as a house, whose natural continuity is its shape, having sides; and whose accidental continuity, i.e., the technical, is achieved through combination of its component parts, like stone, mortar² and (other) parts of its structure. It is also multiple, and its unity is not true unity.

The one has also been predicated in relation to other things, among some of the things which we have previously mentioned:

- 20 /as the mile, for one says, "one mile", since it is all of (many) stadia and part of a parasang, and in that it is continuous and combined, as stadia are continuous and combined, and it is the p.132 whole of its stadia; and in that it is separate from /other miles, i.e., those whose totality is a parasang. The unity in this is also not true unity, but rather it is an accident.

The unity in everything which we have defined is not true unity. Rather it is in each one of them in that each one is not divisible with respect to its (actual) existence. The unity in them is in an accidental manner, and that which occurs

¹Ms. إذا. AR إذن.

²وملاطه, as AH. AR ملاطه.

5 accidentally to something /is not part of its essence. That which occurs accidentally to a thing comes from something else, and therefore an accident in something which receives an accident is an acquisition from something else, and is an acquisition from a donating agent. It is an effect in that which receives the accident. An effect comes from an agent, in that the effect and the agent are in a relation where one does not precede the other.

Furthermore, everything which is an accident in one thing is essential in another thing, in that everything which exists
10 in one thing by accident is in another thing by essence. /Since we have explained that the unity in all these things is by accident, no part (of the unity in the things discussed) by
-2-
essence but rather by accident, the unity which occurs in a thing by accident is acquired from that in which it occurs by essence.

Thus here is a one, true, necessary, uncaused unity, and this is evident¹ from most of the things which have been discussed previously. We say:

15 /The natures of every predicate, in that which takes a predicate, i.e., everything which the sense perceives and the essence of which the intellect comprehends, must² be either one

¹Reading فليبين. AR فليبين.

²مخلو. AR مخلو, لا تخلو (طباع).

or multiple, or one and multiple together, or some of these
 p.133 things one and not multiple at all, /while others¹ are multiple
 and not one at all.

If the natures of every predicate were multiplicity only,
 then participation in one state or one concept would not occur.
 This occurrence exists, however, i.e., the participation in one
 5 state or one concept, /and therefore unity exists with multi-
 plicity. We had, however, supposed that unity is not an existent;
 (therefore) unity is an existent non-existent, and this is an
 impossible contradiction.

If, furthermore, every predicate were multiplicity only,
 then there would be nothing contrary to multiplicity, in that
 the contrary of multiplicity is unity, and there would be no
 contrary. If there were no contrary to predicates, they would
 10 both /occur and not occur, in that participation in one state
 or one concept does occur. This however, is an impossible
 contradiction, and it is not possible unless there is unity.

If, furthermore, there were multiplicity only without unity,
 then it would be dissimilar, in that similarity has one thing
 which is common to all its members, with which they are similar
 to one another, and there is no "one" with multiplicity, as we
 have supposed. Thus there would be no one thing common to all

¹Reading *وبعضها* with the ms., rejecting AR's emendation of
أو بعضها.

its members, and it would be both dissimilar and similar, through the absence of unity. It would thus be a similar dissimilarity
 15 /together, and this is an impossible contradiction, and it is not possible for there to be multiplicity unless there is unity.

If, also, there were multiplicity only without unity, it would be moving, in that if there were no unity, there would not be a state which remains one, and if there were not a state which remains one, there would be no resting, as repose is that which occurs in a state which remains one, unchanging and non-transferable. If there were no resting, there would be no repose; and if there were no repose, there would be movement.

20 /If there were multiplicity only, it would also be non-moving, in that movement is alteration, either in place, quantity, quality or substance. Every alteration is to something else,
 p.134 /and that which is other than multiplicity is unity. If there were no unity, there would be no alteration to multiplicity. We had supposed that unity does not exist, and thus an alteration to multiplicity would not exist, and movement would not exist. Thus, if there were multiplicity only without unity, it would be without both movement and rest, as we stated previously. This is an impossible contradiction, and it is not possible (for there to be multiplicity) unless there is unity.

5 /If, also, there were multiplicity only, then it would have to be (composed) either of individual members or not of

individual members at all. If it were (composed) of individual members, then either the individual multiplicities would be units or would not be units. If they were not units, and the multiplicity were not reduced to units at all, then the multiplicity would be infinite.

10 /If a section were separated from the infinite, everything of that which is divisible being greater than that section which is separated from it, then the separate part would be either finite in multiplicity or infinite in multiplicity. If the section were finite in multiplicity, an infinity of multiplicity already having been supposed, then it would be both finite in multiplicity and infinite in multiplicity, and this is an impossible contradiction.

15 /If the section were infinite in multiplicity, it being smaller than that which is divisible, then infinity¹ would be greater than infinity, and this is an impossible contradiction, as we stated previously.

There would thus be individual multiplicities, being necessary units, and unity would exist, in that every individual is one; and then there would be multiplicity only and non-multiplicity
20 /only, in that unity would exist with it, and this is an impossible contradiction.

¹Ms. *فلا متناه*. AR *فلا متناه*, which ms. ought to be.

If, furthermore, multiplicity were not (composed) of individual members, there would be no multiplicity at all, in that the concept of multiplicity is a combination of individuals. It would then be non-multiple and multiple together, and this is an impossible contradiction, and it is not possible (for there to be multiplicity) unless there is¹ unity.

p.135 /If, also, there were multiplicity only without unity, then all the individual multiplicities would be non-definite, in that the terminus of one is dependent upon the concept of one, and if there were no one in multiplicity, there would be nothing definite. If there were nothing definite, then there would be no terminus. However, the individual multiplicities are definite, and they would thus be definite and non-definite, and this is an impossible
5 contradiction, and it is not possible for unity not to /occur.

If, also, there were multiplicity only without unity, then multiplicity would not receive number, in that the principles of number are units, as number is a multiplicity composed of units, and the distinction of one multiplicity from another is by units. If there were no units there would be no number, and
10 if there were multiplicity without units, it would not be /numbered. Now multiplicity is numbered, and units occur with multiplicity. However, we had supposed that units do not occur with it, and

¹Reading يكون (وحدة). AR, as AH, يكون.

this is an impossible contradiction, and it is not possible for units not to occur.

If, also, there were multiplicity only without "one", there
 15 would be no knowledge, in that knowledge impresses /the description¹ of that which is known into the soul of the knower as one state, for if it were not impressed as one state in which the soul of the knower and the description of that which is known are united, there would be no knowledge. Knowledge does exist, however, and the one state does exist, and unity exists. We had, however, supposed that unity does not exist; this is therefore an impossible contradiction, and it is not possible for unity not to occur.

If, also, there were multiplicity only without "one", as
 20 every² predicate either will be a thing /or will not be a thing, and if it were a thing it would be one, and unity would exist with multiplicity; since we had supposed that it is multiplicity only, it would then be multiplicity only without unity and multiplicity and unity, and this is an impossible contradiction.

p.136 /If the predicate were not a thing, then multiplicity would not be compiled from it, nor, moreover, would it be multiplicity. It had, however, been supposed that it is multiplicity, and it would then be multiplicity non-multiplicity; this is an impossible

¹Reading (المعرفة) ترسم رسم الحروف AR. برسم، رسم.

²Ms. فكل. AR. وكل.

contradiction, and it is not possible for unity not to occur.

It shall now be clear that it is not possible for some things
 5 to be multiplicity only, in that it is /not possible for any
 thing to be multiplicity only, since it will either be a thing
 or it will not be a thing, and if it were a thing it would be
 one, and if it were not a thing, it would not be multiplicity.
 It is, however, multiplicity, and this is an impossible contradic-
 tion, and it is not possible for some things to be multiplicity
 only without unity.

10 /It is, moreover, clear from all these investigations that
 it is not possible for things to be multiplicity without unity,
 in that it is impossible for (even) some things to be multiplicity
 without unity.

Similarly, it is clear that it is not possible for unity to
 occur¹ without multiplicity, nor (may even) some things have unity
 without multiplicity.

We say: if there were unity only without multiplicity
 15 contrariety would not exist, for that which is /other than a
 contrary is (another) contrary, and otherness occurs in at least
 two things. Two things are multiple, and if there were no
 multiplicity there would be no contrariety, and if there is
 contrariety, there is multiplicity. Now contrariety exists,

¹Reading يكون (وحدة) تكون. AR يكون.

and therefore multiplicity exists; we had, however, supposed that multiplicity is not an existent. It would thus be an existent non-existent, and this is an impossible contradiction, and it is not possible for multiplicity not to occur.

If, furthermore, there were unity only without multiplicity, then there would be no exception, in that exception only occurs either to one or to more than one thing, among things which are p.137 not excepted. /Thus, if there were exception, then multiplicity would exist. Now the exception and that which is excepted do exist, and multiplicity thus exists. We had, however, supposed that multiplicity does not exist. It would thus be an existent non-existent, and this is an impossible contradiction and it is not possible for multiplicity not to exist.

5 /If, also, there were unity only without multiplicity, then there would be no differentiation, in that two things are the least in which there is differentiation, and two and more things are a multiplicity. If there were no multiplicity, there would be no differentiation, and if there were differentiation, then multiplicity would exist. Now differentiation exists, and therefore multiplicity exists. We had, however,¹ supposed that multiplicity is not an existent.² It would thus be an existent

¹ وأيضاً قد. AR. Ms. originally as AR, but line through أيضاً.

² Ms. ليست موجودة. AR. ليست بموجودة.

10 non-existent, this¹ is an impossible contradiction, /and it is
not possible for multiplicity not to exist.

If, furthermore, there were unity only without multiplicity,
there would be neither agreement nor disagreement, conjunction
nor separation. For two things are the least in which agreement,
separation, disagreement and conjunction will occur, and two
things are multiple. If there were no multiplicity there would
15 be neither agreement nor disagreement. /Now agreement and dis-
agreement exist, and therefore multiplicity exists. We had,
however, supposed that it did not exist. It would thus be an
existent non-existent, and this is an impossible contradiction,
that there may not be multiplicity.

If, furthermore, there were unity only without multiplicity,
then it would have neither beginning, middle nor end; for this
p.138 will not occur except in something which has parts, /and the one
has neither beginning, middle nor end. However, the beginning,
middle and end exist, and thus an object which has parts exists.
Every object which has parts is more² than one, and multiplicity
exists in it. We had, however, supposed that multiplicity does
not exist, and this is an impossible contradiction, and it is
5 not possible for /multiplicity not to occur.

If, furthermore, there were unity only without multiplicity,

¹Ms. وهذا. AR هذا.

²Ms. أكثر. AR كثر.

then there would be no figure, for figures are made either from arcs or chords, or from that which is composed of arcs and chords, either from arced or chorded surfaces or from that which is composed of them both.

The circle and sphere have a center and circumference, and
 10 that which is composed of arcs or arced (surfaces), or /(of) a line or linear (surfaces), or of arcs or an arced (surface together), or of a chord and chorded (surface) together, has angles and sides, and has multiplicity. If figures exist, then multiplicity exists. We had, however, supposed that multiplicity does not exist. Multiplicity is thus an existent non-existent,
 15 and this is an impossible contradiction, /and it is not possible for there not to be multiplicity.

If, furthermore, there were unity only without multiplicity, then it would neither move nor rest; for that which moves moves by transference, either to another place, quantity, quality or substance; and this is multiplicity.

That which rests rests in a place. Moreover, some of its
 20 parts are within others. Place and parts /are each multiple, for parts are more numerous than a part, and a place has a high and low, front and rear, right and left.

Place by nature necessitates the existence of multiplicity, in that place is other than that which occupies a place; and place (necessitates the existence of) that which occupies a

p.139 place, /(as) increase necessitates the existence of that which increases, decrease necessitates the existence of that which decreases, alteration necessitates the existence of that which is altered, generation necessitates the existence of that which comes to be, and corruption necessitates the existence of that which perishes. The negation as well of all these necessitates the existence of multiplicity. For (the terms) "not generating", "not perishing", "not increasing", "not dwindling" and "not altering", are subject and predicates: a subject of which negation is predicated for delimited things.

5 /If there is rest there is multiplicity, and if there were not¹ multiplicity there would be neither rest nor motion. Now rest and motion exist. Therefore multiplicity exists. We had, however, supposed that multiplicity does not exist. It would therefore be an existent non-existent. This is an impossible contradiction, and it is not possible for there not to be multiplicity.

10 It shall now² be clear that it is not possible for even one thing not to have multiplicity in it; /for if multiplicity were not in it, it would be neither moving nor at rest, and nothing sensible or attached to the sensible can avoid the species of movement and rest. It is thus not possible for there to be

¹Reading يكن. فإن لم تكن كثرة. AR

²Ms. وهنال. AR وهنال.

one thing without multiplicity in it.

If, furthermore, there were unity only without multiplicity, there would be neither part nor all, for the all is an association of parts, and two is the least of that which may be associated, and two things are a multiplicity. If there were no /multiplicity there would be no all, and if there were no all, there would be no part, for the all and the part are related things in which each side is rendered necessary through the necessity of the other; or, either of them¹ being invalid, its invalidity renders the other invalid. There would, then, be neither all nor part to things; however things are all and part. All and part would then each be an existent non-existent, and this is an impossible contradiction.

p.140 /Furthermore, the part is one, so that if there is a part, there is unity; if, also, there is a part, there is an all, and if there were no part, there would be no all. If there were neither part nor all, there would not be anything. If there were nothing, then there would be no sensible or intelligible object at all, nor any sensible or intelligible unity at all.

5 /If, moreover, there were no part, there would be no² unity; and, (as) when there is no part there is no all, there would then be no unity either. We had, however, supposed that there

¹Reading **وأيتها**, as the ms., rejecting AR's emendation to **وأيتها**.

²Apparently ms. as AR, **ولا (وحدة)**, though **فلا** would be more suitable.

is unity. Unity would thus be an existent non-existent, and this is also an impossible contradiction, and it is not possible for there not to be multiplicity.

It has now been clarified that it is not possible for any of the things which we have mentioned to have unity without multiplicity, for it would be neither part nor all, as we have
10 stated previously. /Thus it is clear, from all these investigations, that it is not possible for there to be multiplicity without unity in any of the things which we have mentioned; while it is clear from some of these investigations that it is definitely not possible for there to be anything having unity without multiplicity in it.

It is thus evident that it is not possible for there to be unity only without multiplicity, nor multiplicity only without unity, and nothing which we have mentioned can be free either
15 from multiplicity or from unity.¹ /It is necessary, therefore, that the things which we have mentioned be multiple and one.

As, moreover, it is now clear that the natures of things have unity and multiplicity, the unity must be either separate from the multiplicity or associated with it. If the unity were separate from the multiplicity, it would be necessary that there attend unity only, that contradiction which attends the unity which we have mentioned previously; and (there would attend)

¹Ms. ولاوحدة . ولا من وحدة.

20 that which is multiplicity only, /that (contradiction) which attends the multiplicity which we have mentioned previously.

p.141 /It remains, therefore, that unity is associated with multiplicity, i.e., associated with it in all of the sensible objects and whatever is attached to the sensible objects, in that whatever contains multiplicity contains unity, and whatever contains unity, contains multiplicity.

As it has now been explained that the association of multiplicity and unity is in every sensible object and that
 5 which is attached to /the sensible object, this association has to come about either through chance, i.e., coincidence, without a cause; or through a cause. If the association were through chance, then there would be a separation (between multiplicity and unity) which would be attended by the same absurdity which attended our investigations¹ concerning the existence of multiplicity without unity. How, furthermore, would it be possible for multiplicity and unity, being separate, to be together?
 10 Multiplicity is but the/multiplicity of units, i.e., a collection of single entities, and unity necessarily occurs with multiplicity and it cannot be possible otherwise.

Moreover, assuming unity and multiplicity were separate things,² how would it be possible for there to be unity only,

¹Reading الاتحاد إذ بحثنا . الأبحاث إذ بحثنا . AR

²Ms. إذ هما متباينان . AR

since they are two things, and two things are a multiplicity.

It is thus not possible that these two things be like this (separate). We can, then, attribute that which is "caused" by chance as being due to separation; this is two (things),¹ /and it is also attended by that contradiction which we mentioned previously. It is, therefore, not possible for there to be (things) which are separate which then come together by chance, i.e., without a cause.

It therefore remains that their association² is caused, from the beginning³ of the object's coming to be.

As it has now been explained that the association is caused, the cause must be either from itself, or the association will have⁴ another cause other than itself, outside of and separate from it. /If the cause of its association were from itself, then it would be part of it, and that part would be prior to the rest. As by itself the cause precedes the effect, as we have explained in our writing concerning the separation (between cause and effect), that (cause) which is one of the sensibles or p.142 is attached to the sensibles, i.e., to all things, /would be either unity only, multiplicity only, or an association of multiplicity with unity. Now there would be attached to unity only

¹Reading إثبات. AR إنبات.

²Ms. اشتراعيها. AR اشتراعيها.

³Ms. بدو. AR بدء.

⁴Reading يكون (لاشتراعيهاعلة). AR يكون.

(and to multiplicity only) that which is attached to the multi-
 5 plicity and unity which we have previously studied. /The unity
 and multiplicity (of the cause) ought, then, to be associated,
 and their association may be either by chance or through a cause,
 either of their own or from something else.

There would be attached to an association by chance that
 contradiction which we have previously mentioned; while in an
 association caused by themselves, the association would be a
 cause (caused) by itself, this going on indefinitely, and there
 would be a cause of a cause and a cause of a cause until infinity.
 It has, however, been explained that it is impossible for there
 to be an actual infinite thing, and it is thus not possible that
 10 /the association of unity and multiplicity is caused by themselves.

Nothing remains, therefore, other than that their association
 have¹ another cause, other than themselves, more illustrious,
 noble and prior to them, since in essence the cause precedes the
 effect, as we have mentioned previously in the writings in which
 we have spoken of them separately. This cause is not associated
 with them, for, as we stated previously, being associated would
 require, in the associated things, a cause which emerges from
 the associated thing; and if this were the case, causes
 15 could emerge indefinitely, and an infinity /of causes

¹Reading يكون (لاشتراعها على) تكون. AR يكون.

is precluded, as we stated previously, since it is not possible for there to be an actual thing having infinity.

Furthermore, (the cause of the association of multiplicity and unity) is not in that which is generic to them, for things which are in one genus are not prior to one another in essence; as, for example, the human and equine (species) in the genus of living being, neither one preceding the other in essence. The cause, however, does precede the effect in essence, and therefore the cause of the association of multiplicity and unity with multiple-single things is not in the genus.

20 /As it is not with them in genus, it is not with them in having one likeness: for that which is alike occurs in one genus and in one species, as a red (with) another red object, and a figure and another figure, and similar things. Thus the cause of the association of multiplicity and unity with multiple-single things is neither in genus, nor likeness nor resemblance, but rather it is the cause of the association's generation and consolidation, more elevated, noble and prior to it.

p.143 /It has thus been explained that all things have a first cause, which does not have their genus, and has no resemblance nor likeness, nor association with them. It is, rather, superior,¹ more noble and prior to them, being the cause of their generation and consolidation.

¹Ms. اعلى. AR اعلى.

This cause must be either single or multiple: if it were multiple, then it would contain unity, since multiplicity is
 5 but a collection of units, and it would /then be multiplicity and unity together. The cause of multiplicity and unity would therefore be unity and multiplicity, and a thing would then¹ be the cause of itself. The cause, however, is other than the effect, and consequently a thing would be other than its essence. This is therefore an impossible contradiction, and the first cause is neither multiple nor multiple and single. Nothing remains, therefore, other than that the cause be single only, in no way accompanied by multiplicity.

It has, then, been shown that the first cause is one, and
 10 that the one exists in caused things. /We have, furthermore, previously discussed the number of ways one is predicated of sensible things and of things attached to sensible objects. Therefore we ought now to conclude this part and to explain, in that which follows this part, in which way one exists in caused things, what is true unity and what is unity metaphorically and not truly; and let us now conclude this part.

¹Ms. إِنْ. AR إِنْ.

143.13

The Fourth Chapter of the First Part

Let us now speak of the way in which unity exists in the
 15 categories, of that which is /truly one, and of that which is
 one metaphorically and not truly; and let us accordingly discuss
 first that which has to take precedence. We say:

The large and small, long and short, much and little are
 never predicated absolutely of anything, but, rather, relatively;
 for the "large" is predicated only in relation to something
 which is smaller than it, and the "small" in relation to something
 p.144 which is larger than it. Consequently¹ /largeness is predicated
 of trivial things when they are compared to trivialities smaller
 -2-
 than them, while smallness is predicated of a mountain when it
 is compared to another mountain larger than it.

If the large -as, similarly, the small- were predicated
 absolutely of those things of which the large is predicated,
 the infinite would have no existence whatsoever, neither in
 actuality nor in potentiality, since it would not be possible
 5 for /another thing to be larger than that of which largeness
 had been predicated absolutely. The absolutely large will then
 not have infinity either in actuality or in potentiality, for
 if another object were larger than it in actuality or in

¹Ms. وكذلك. AR وكذلك.

potentiality, it would not be the absolutely large object, since it would have become small. This cannot be, the larger object
 10 being the smaller or the equal of another, and this is /an impossible contradiction, and thus nothing may be larger than the absolutely large object either in actuality or in potentiality.

There would then exist a large (object) of which nothing is double, neither¹ in actuality nor in potentiality. Now doubling something is multiplying its quantity by two, and
 p.145 multiplying a quantity by two exists, in actuality or /in potentiality. Thus multiplying the absolute large by two exists, in actuality or in potentiality, and therefore the absolute large has a double. The double is all of that which has the double, while that which has the double is half of the double. Half is part of the all, and that which is doubled is part of the double.

Thus the absolute large would be both all and part. Further-
 5 more, if /double the absolute large were not larger than the absolute large, it would be equal or smaller than it. If it were equal to it, an ugly absurdity would occur, viz., the all would be equal to the part; and this is an impossible contradiction. Similarly, if double the absolute large were smaller than the absolute large, the all would be smaller than the part, and this is most absurd and ugly.

¹Ms. لا ضعف له بالفعل. AR لا ضعف له لا بالفعل.

As the all is larger than the part, double the large which
 10 was considered as absolute /would be larger than the large which
 is considered as the absolute large. However the absolute large
 was intended to be that of which nothing is larger, and therefore
 the absolute large would not be the absolute large. Either, then,
 there will be no (absolute) large whatsoever, or there will be
 a relatively large, since the large is not predicated other than
 absolutely or relatively.

p.146 /If the absolute large were not large (absolutely), it
 would be an existent non-existent, and this is an impossible
 contradiction; while if the absolute large were the relatively
 large, absolute and relative would be synonymous terms for the
 same thing, viz., that another thing is smaller than it; since
 it has been explained that there can never be a thing which does
 not have something larger than it, either in potentiality or in
 actuality.

5 /In this manner it may be explained that there cannot be
 an absolute small, and that the small also occurs only relatively.

While the large and small are predicated of all quantitative
 things, the long and short are predicated of all quantitative
 things which are continuous, and they are specific to the con-
 10 tinuous and not to other kinds of quantity. /They also are
 predicated relatively only, and not as an absolute predicate,
 and the explanation of this resembles that which we explained

previously regarding the large and the small.

As for the little and the much, they are the property of discrete quantity. That which occurs to the large and small, long and short will occur to the much, in that it will not be predicated absolutely, but relatively, and the explanation of this lies in that which we have explained previously, the method being the same.

15 /It has been supposed, however, that the little may be predicated absolutely, it having been supposed so because if the first number is two, and every number other than two is greater than two, two is then the least of the numbers, and two is then the absolute little, since it is not "much" whatsoever, as no number is less than it.

20 If one were a number, nothing would be less than one, and one would be the absolute little. /This supposition, however, is not true, for if we were to say that one is a number we would be supposing something ugly and most shameful which would attach¹ to us due to this. For if one were a number, then it would be a certain quantity, and if one were a quantity, then the property of quantity would be attached to it and attend it, i.e., it would be equal and non-equal.

p.147 /Moreover, if the one were to have units, some having

¹Reading (شناعة)... تلحقنا. AR يلحقنا.

equality and some not having equality, then the one would be divisible, for the smaller one would be after the larger one or after part of it, and the larger one would therefore be a part and the one would be divisible. Now the one is not divisible, and its division would then be an existent non-existent, and
 5 this is an impossible contradiction. /The one is therefore not a number.

Do not, incidentally, infer from our remarks concerning "one" that the hyle of the one, i.e., the matter which exists with the (numeral) one, is one. This existent is not one, and the things which are composed in this way are numbered and are not number. As in our saying "five horses", the horses are numbered by five, a number having no matter, the matter being only in the horses. Do not, therefore, take our remarks
 10 concerning "one" to refer to /that which is unified by "one", but rather to unity itself, and unity is never divisible.

Now if "one" were a number and not quantitative, while the remaining numbers -i.e., two and more- were quantities, then "one" would not be subsumed in quantity, but would be subsumed in another category; and "one" and the remaining numbers would then be said to be numbers homonymously only and not naturally. "One", then, would not be a number naturally, but homonymously,
 15 since numbers are not /predicated other than in relation to "one" thing, as medicines to medicine and cures to a cure.

How, however, could it be possible for this supposition to be true, i.e., that if "one" were a number, then the property of quantity, which entails being equal and non-equal, would have to attend it, so that the one would have units, some equal and others larger or smaller than it? For if this were to attend p.148 the one, then it would also /attend every number, i.e., that it would have a namesake equal to it, a namesake smaller than it, and a namesake larger than it, and the three would (each) have three, some equal to each, and others smaller or larger than each; and this would be necessary in every number. Now, if this is not necessary in (all) numbers, of which there is no doubt, then it is not necessary in oneness.

5 /Furthermore, if the meaning of our remark, "the property of number and all quantity entails being equal and non-equal", were that every number has a number like it and a number not like it, viz., larger or smaller than it, then "two" would not be a number, since no number is smaller than it, but only larger. If, however, it were necessary that two be a number, since it has an equal, viz., another two; and a non-equal, viz., more than two; then it would be necessary for "one" to be a number, since it has an
10 equal, viz., another one; and a non-equal, viz., more¹ than /it, i.e., two and more. "One" would then be a quantity, and "one" and the rest of the numbers would be subsumed in quantity; and

¹Reading the ms. **أكثر**, paralleling the previous line. AR there **أعبر**, here **أكثر**.

since "one" would not be a number homonymously¹ it would be (one) naturally.

"One", in addition, cannot avoid being either a number or not a number, and, if a number, then either even or odd; if even, then it would be divisible into two parts of like onenesses, and "one" is indivisible. It would then be indivisible and divisible, 15 this being an /impossible contradiction. Moreover, if it had units in it, it would be composed of units; and it is (also) composed of itself, so that it would be one and units. "One", however, is one only, and not units, and it would thus (both) be units and not units, and this is also an impossible contradiction.

If the one cannot be even, then it is odd. The odd is that of which each of the two sections into which it is divided is not of like onenesses. "One" would then be (both) divisible 20 (and) non-divisible, and units (and) non-units, and /this is an impossible contradiction, /and one, therefore, would not be a number.

However, this definition whereby the odd number has been defined may be considered as not logically necessary except after it is clarified that "one" is not a number. For otherwise, what prevents one who says "one is a number", from defining the

¹ (باشتباه) الاسم. AR الأيسس, note 5 suggests possibility of الاسم. Ms. "الامر", apparently corrupt.

odd number as the number both parts of which, if divided into two parts, would not be of like onenesses? "One" would then belong to the odd number, since the odd number does not have to be divided necessarily.

Since it does not appear as a necessary consequence of this investigation that "one" is not a number, we then say:

The element of something from which the thing is constructed, i.e., from which the thing is composed, is not the thing (itself), as the phonetic particles from which speech is composed are not themselves speech, since speech is a composed sound, an object
 10 indicating something temporal, while a particle is a /natural sound and not composed. Now number is acknowledged by all to be composed from units, "one" being the element of number and therefore not a number. Consequently one does not have an element from which it is composed, which would also be the element for that which is composed from the one. The one would then be number, its element being the element of everything acknowledged to be numbers, and it would then be possible for "one" to be a number.

It might, accordingly, be considered that one is the element
 15 of two, and two the element of three, since /two exists in three. Therefore it might be considered that since two, which is a number, is the element of three, therefore one, being the element of two, could be a number. This supposition, however, is not

true, since two, though considered as an element of three, has an element, which is one; while one, though the element of two, has no element (itself). One is not composite, and is thus distinguishable from two in being simple; while two is a composite composed of the simple one. It is not, of course, possible for p.150 /some numbers to be simple, viz., the element, meaning by simple not composed of anything; and some composed of this simple (element).

It may, however, be thought that this sort of thing is possible with the substance of a composed thing, i.e., (with) the body which is composed of two simple substances, viz., matter and form; in that it has been said that /substance is three-fold, 5 the two simple substances which are the matter and the form, (and) that which is composed from them, viz., the formed matter, i.e., body; and it may be thought that it is also possible for number to have on the one hand something simple, viz., the one from which the acknowledged number is composed; and, on the other hand, the acknowledged number which is composed from the simple one.

This supposition is not, however, true, in that the comparison is the reverse (of that which it has been represented as 10 being): for the /first simple substances from which a body is composed are matter and form; and the body, being composed of the substances of matter and form, happens to be a substance,

since it is (composed of) substances only; it is, nevertheless, a body in its own nature, i.e., composed of matter and dimensions which are its form; and it will not occur either to matter alone, or to a dimension which is the form alone, to be a body, since that which is composed of them both is a body only.

15 /Similarly it does not follow that one, since it is the element of an acknowledged number, should be a number. It is, rather, because number is composed of units that it is a unit; as body, being composed of substances, is a substance. Moreover, as regards things from which (other) things are composed, these elements being parts of that which is composed from them, nothing precludes our giving the composite entities the names and definitions of the elements, i.e., their substantial and not accidental names, as "alive" in "alive things" and "substance" in "substances".

20 /One, therefore, is an element of number and not at all number.

Since, therefore, it is clear that one is not a number, the p.151 definition said of number shall then encompass /number fully, viz., that it is a magnitude (composed of) onenesses, a totality of onenesses, and a collection of onenesses. Two is, then, the first number, and two is therefore the smallest¹ (number) in its nature; and anything else should not be considered, for it will

¹ الأقل. AR أفرد. AH أفرد. The ms., as AR explains, n.2, apparently has أفرد with above the ق (? الأول), the ل, however, being crossed out.

not be (as) small in its nature. Hence smallness is attached to two only when it is related to that which is more than it, and therefore¹ it is small only because all numbers are more than it.

5 Consequently /it is small only when related to number, but when its nature is considered, it is (seen to be) double the one, the sum of two ones, and composed of two ones. Now that which is composite has parts, and is the whole of its parts, the whole being greater than the part; consequently two is not (absolutely) small in its nature.

Now, neither big nor little, long nor short, many nor few are predicated absolutely, (but rather) relatively; and each one
10 of a pair is related /to the other only in the same genus, and not in another genus. For example, magnitude, if it is (predicated) of body, can be related only to (magnitude of) another body, and not to (that of an) area, line, place, time, number, or (any other) predicate. For one does not say that a body is greater or less than an area, line, place, time, number or (any other)
15 predicate, but rather than (another) body; /and similarly for any other magnitude, its being said to be greater or less than something not in its genus would not be a true statement.

An area, likewise, is not said to be greater or less than a line, place, time, number or (other) predicate, but rather

¹Ms. فاذا. AR فاذن.

than (another) area. Nor is a line greater or less than a place,
time, number or (other) predicate, but rather than (another)
line; nor is place greater or less than time, number, or (other)
20 predicate, but rather than (another) /place; nor is time greater
or less than number or (another) predicate, but rather than
(another) time; nor is number greater or less than (another)
predicate, but rather than (another) number; nor is a predicate
greater or less than (any) one of the rest of the magnitudes,
but rather than (another) predicate (of its kind).

p.152 /Similarly, that a body is longer or shorter than an area,
line, place, time, number or (any other) predicate would not be
said to be a true statement, and if it were supposed that a body
is longer or shorter than an area, line or place, it would be a
false supposition; since, if it is supposed that the length of
5 a body is longer or shorter than the length of an area, /line
or place, then it is the length of each one which, of the dimen-
sions related to it, is a single dimension, and the single
dimension is line. Accordingly, we believe that a body, area,
line or place is longer or shorter (than the others) only if
the line of one is longer than the line of the other, all these
belonging to continuous quantity.

Time too belongs to continuous quantity, though it is
10 completely apparent that time has no line, /for one does not
say, "a body is longer or shorter than time". It is evident

that length and shortness are not predicated, in those things¹
 of which length and shortness are predicated, other than for
 that which is in a single genus, i.e., in body only, or area
 only, or place only, or time only; and, regarding number and
 predicate, length and shortness do not occur to them essentially,
 but are predicated of them by virtue of the time in which they
 occur. Thus, one says "a long number", i.e., (one which occurs)
 in a long time; and similarly, one says "a long predicate", i.e.,
 15 (one which occurs) /in a long time, and neither predicate nor
 number bears the names "long" and "short" in its essence.

"Many" and "few" are likewise not predicated, in that of
 which they are predicated, viz., in that of which number and
 predicate are predicated, other than in a single genus; for "a
 predicate is more or less than a number" would not be said to
 be a true statement, nor would "a number is more or less than a
 predicate"; but rather, "a number is more or less than (another)
 20 number," /and "a predicate is more or less than (another)
 predicate."

p.153 /The foregoing having been clarified, the True One, then,
 cannot be related to that which is of a similar genus to it.
 If it were to have a genus, it would have been related to that
 which is of a similar genus to it. Consequently, the True One

¹ل. Ms. apparently as AR ل, but see his note 5.

has no genus whatsoever. We have already stated that what has a genus is not eternal, and that the eternal has no genus.

Consequently the True One is eternal, and in no way whatsoever ever becomes multiple; and the (True) One should not be spoken
 5 of /in relation to something other than itself. It therefore is that which has no matter through which it is divisible, nor form composed of genus and species, that which is so, being multiple through that of which it is composed; neither is it ever a quantity nor has it quantity, that which is so, being also divisible, since every quantity or quantitative thing receives addition and subtraction, and that which receives subtraction is divisible, the divisible being multiple in a certain way. Multiplicity has been said to be in every one of the predicables
 10 and in that which is attached to them, /as regards the genus, species, individual, (specific) difference, property, common accident, all, part and whole; and similarly "one" is predicated of every one of these;¹ consequently the True One is not "one" of these.

Since motion in that which belongs to this -viz., the body, which is formed matter- is but a transfer from place to place,
 15 as either an increase, decrease, generation, corruption /or alteration, it is multiple. For place is a quantity and is

¹ هذه (من), as paralleled in the following line. Ms. (unpointed) as AR, من بعد (scribal error of بعد for هذه?).

divisible; and that which exists in parts is divisible through spatial divisions. It is therefore multiple, and therefore spatial motion is multiple.

Increase and decrease are likewise multiple; the motion of the termini of that which increases (and) decreases being divisible, since they exist in spatial divisions between that which was the terminus of the body before the increase and that which is the terminus of the /body in the increased terminus; and similarly between that which was the terminus of the body before the decrease and that which is the terminus of the decreased terminus.

p.154 /Similarly, as regards generation and corruption, (the period) from the beginning of generation and corruption to the end of generation and corruption is divisible into a temporal division in which generation and corruption occur. The motion of all increase and decrease, generation and corruption, is divisible; and likewise an alteration /to the contrary¹ and an alteration towards completion are divisible in the altering divisions of time.

All motions are then divisible, and are also unified, in that the wholeness of every motion is one, since unity is predicated of the whole in a general sense; while the part is (also) one, since "one" is predicated of the part in a general

¹ للضل, following AR's emendation. AH شدير, closer to "سود" of ms., but out of context.

sense. Since consequently multiplicity exists in motion, the True One is not motion.

10 /As every thing perceived through the sense or intellect either exists, in itself or in our thought, as a natural existent; or, in our speaking or writing, as an accidental existent, so motion exists in the soul; i.e., the thought passes from certain forms of things to others and among various dispositions and passions which attend the soul, such as anger,¹ cowardice, rejoicing, sadness and similar things. Thought is, therefore, multiple and (also) unified, since every multiplicity has a
15 whole and a part, in that it is numbered. /These accidents of the soul, then, are both multiple and unified in this manner, and the True One is not soul.

The end result of thought, whenever it proceeds along correct paths, is toward the intellect. Intellect is the species of things, since the species is intelligible, as well as that which is above them. Individual things, on the other hand, are sensible, meaning by "individual", particular things which do not give the
p.155 things their names nor their definitions. /When, however, they are united with the soul they are intelligible. Through the union of species with it the soul is an intelligence in actuality, whereas before their union with it the soul was an intelligence

¹ كالفضب. AR كالفضب.

in potentiality. Everything which is potentially something can be brought to actuality only by something else. That which brings something from potentiality to actuality is itself in actuality, and that which brings the soul, which is an intelligence in potentiality, to be an intelligence in actuality, i.e.,
 5 with which the species /and genera, the universals of things, are united, is the universals themselves. It is through their union with the soul that the soul intelligizes, i.e., that it has a particular intellect which brings universal things to the soul.¹ As universal things emerge from potentiality to actuality in the soul, they are the acquired intellect of the soul which the soul had in potentiality; and they are the intellect in actuality which has brought the soul from potentiality to actuality. The universals are therefore multiple, as we have stated previously, and consequently the intellect is multiple.
 10 /It has been thought that the intellect is the beginning of that which is multiple, being united in a way, since it is a whole, as we stated previously, and unity is predicated of the whole. However, the true unity is not intellect.

Since in our speech there are synonymous names, as shafra (a large knife) and madya (a butcher's knife), which are synonyms because of the slaughtering iron (common to them), "one" is predicated of the synonymous, and madya and shafra are said to

¹أوبرها AR. AH. , أتى لها (كليات الأشياء)

be one. This one is also multiple, in that its matter and that which is predicated of its matter is multiple; for the slaughtering iron which is the /matter of the synonymous, viz., the madya, shafra, and sikkin, is divisible into parts, and is multiple, and the names predicated of the slaughtering iron are also multiple. The True One is, therefore, not (identifiable by) synonymous names.

Moreover, since in our speech there are homonymous names, as the animal who is called "dog" and the star which is called "dog", they are both, therefore, said to be one in name, viz., "dog". The matter of this dog, however, is multiple, viz., the animal and the star. No member of this homonym is a cause of the other, in that the /star is not a cause of the animal nor the animal a cause of the star. A homonym is occasionally found in which some members are a cause of others, as that which is written, pronounced and thought of, and the actual quiddity; for the writing, which is a substance, is indicative of the pronounced term, which is (also) a substance; and the pronounced term, which is a substance, is indicative of that which is thought, which is (also) a substance; and that which is thought, p.156 which is a substance, is indicative of the quiddity, /which is a substance.

"One" is predicated of all of these, i.e., of the quiddity in its essence, and in thought, speech and writing. The quiddity

in its essence is a cause of the quiddity in the thought, the quiddity in the thought a cause of the quiddity in the speech, and quiddity in the speech a cause of the quiddity in the writing.

This kind of one is also multiple, since it is predicated of
 5 many (things), /and the True One is not of a homonymous kind.

Since "one" would be predicated of things whose matter is one, but for their differing¹ in a certain way, either being active, passive, related (to something else), or having other kinds of differences; as the door and the bed whose matter is one, viz., wood or any matter from which things of different shapes are made; so it may be said that the door and the bed are one through (their) matter. They are also multiple by virtue
 10 of their matter, since their matter is /multiple and divisible into parts; and by virtue of their shape. Those things, likewise, which are one through (their) first matter, i.e., through possibility, are multiple by virtue of (their) matter, since it exists for many shapes.

Things predicated of something to which something else is necessarily attached are also said to be one through (their) matter: corruption, for example, which is predicated of that which undergoes corruption, has generation attached to it, since corruption of that which undergoes corruption is generation for another (substance). Thus it may be said that that which undergoes

¹Ms., as AH, تغاير. AR تنغاير.

generation is that which undergoes corruption through (their)
 15 matter, this being in actuality. /This too is multiple, however,
 since the matter belongs to a number of shapes.

This kind of one, viz., one through their matter, is also
 spoken of in potentiality for those things predicated of some-
 thing to which something else is attached; swelling, for example,
 which is predicated of that which is swelling, has contraction
 attached to it, for that which has swelling has contraction in
 potentiality. The swelling, contracting thing is said to be
 one, i.e., that which swells is that which contracts. This is
 20 also multiple by virtue of the matter, since the matter, /as
 regards the shapes, viz., the swelling and contracting, belongs
 to several (things). The True One, however, is never spoken of
 in a material way, and is not predicated as one¹ by the kinds of
 one which are in matter.

p.157 /One, as has been stated previously, is predicated of that
 which is indivisible. The indivisible is indivisible either in
 actuality or in potentiality: the indivisible in actuality is
 either like that which is indivisible because of its hardness,
 as a diamond, i.e., it is divisible with difficulty -this having
 parts necessarily, since it is a body, and it is multiple-; or
 like that which is very small, (too small to be divided by) a

¹Ms., as AH, بواحد. AR واحد, and see his n.6.

dividing instrument. Such a thing is said to be indivisible,
 5 /since there is no instrument which can divide it. It has,
 however, parts, for it is a certain magnitude, since smallness
 is attached to it, and it is therefore multiple.

That is also said to be indivisible in actuality which,
 even if continually divided, would not leave its nature for
 another; rather, each of its divisions would bear its definition
 and its name. Take, for example, all the continuous magnitudes,
 i.e., body, area, line, place and time: a division of body is
 10 body, /a division of area is area, a division of line is line,
 a division of place is place and a division of time is time.
 All of these are not divisible in actuality nor in potentiality
 to another species, and each one of them continually undergoes
 division and multiplication in its own species.

Body is also multiple through its three dimensions and six
 limits, area through its two dimensions and four limits, and
 15 line through its (single) dimension and two limits. /Similarly
 place is multiple according to the dimensions of that which
 occupies the place and its limits; and likewise time is multiple
 through its limits, which are two instants of time which define
 its limits, similar to the definitions of points for the limits
 of the line. Likewise everything which has similar parts is said
 to be one, in that it is indivisible, i.e., each of its sections
 bears its definition and its name. It is also multiple in that

20 it is indivisible, i.e., each (section) /may continually be divided.

A thing is also said to be indivisible, in actuality and in potentiality, when, if divided, its essence is nullified. As, for example, the single man such as Muḥammad and Saʿīd, and the single horse such as the scout and the one with a tether, p.158 /and whatever is like this as regards every natural individual provided with a shape, or accidental individual of this sort, or species, genus, specific difference, property or common accident; if divided it is not itself. This thing is, however, multiple through that of which it is composed, and through its continual separability also. All of these, in addition, are said to be one because of their continuity also.

5 /That which is indivisible, in that it is not divisible into another species since it is not continuous, is also said to be one. A thing of this sort is said (to be one) in two ways: one is because it is not continuous and has neither a position nor a common (factor), as the numerically one. It is not a continuous thing, i.e., such that it would have dimensions and limits, being thereby continuous; it, rather, is not divisible and not separable. This is also multiple by virtue of its subjects which we enumerate, for it is the numerically one which is the
10 measure of all /things. The other (way in which this non-continuous category is said to be one can be seen from the example of)

phonetic particles: they are not continuous and (have) no position, for the reasons whereby the numerically one is indivisible; but the phonetic particle is the measure of words only.

That which is of this sort (i.e., indivisible) in that it is not divisible into another species, since it has no part like it nor any likeness other than itself, is (also) said to be one, and it is also (possessed of a) common (factor). That which is like this is said (to be one) in two ways: one is that it has
 15 /positions; as, for example, the point of a line, which is its limit, has no part, in that it is the limit of one dimension, and the limit of a dimension is not a dimension. It is multiple, however, in its subjects, i.e., past and future times to both of which it is common.

That which is indivisible by virtue of its whole is (also) said to be one. A ratl, for example, is said to be one since if something were separated from the whole of the ratl it would be
 20 negated, and "one" would not at all occur to the ratl. /For this reason it is said that the circular line is more deserving of the (predicate) "one" than are other lines, since it is all of the definition, having neither deficiency nor excess but
 p.159 rather a perfect whole. That which is like this /is also multiple, through its separability. Lastly, (it is such that) for all of which one is predicated, the indivisible is more deserving of unity than are all the other kinds of one, and its unification is more intense.

It has thus been explained from what we have said that the one is predicated either through the essence or through the accident: as for the accident, it is like the kind (of one) which is predicated (either) by homonym, or by synonyms or (by)
 5 including many accidents together; /as our saying, "the writer and the orator are one", when they are predicated of one "male", or of one "man"; or, "the man and the writer are one", and whatever is like this.

As for (that which is one through the) essence, it is the remainder of that which is said to be one of those things for which we mentioned one is predicated, in all that whose substance is one. Its first division may occur either through continuity, which is in the domain of matter, or through form, which is in the domain of species, or through the name, which is in the
 10 domain of both together, or through the genus, which is in /the domain of the first.

The one through continuity is that which is one through its matter or through its ties. It is that which is said to be one by number or by figure. The one through form is that whose predicate is one. That through the name, i.e., that which is in it so through analogy, is one, the one through analogy being that being whose relations are the same, as medical things
 15 /all of which relate to medicine.

Of all kinds (of one) which we have mentioned, i.e., the

one through number, then the one through form, then the one through genus and then the one through analogy, the latter follow the former and the former do not follow the latter. I mean by this that what is one through number is one through form, and what is one through form is one through genus, and what is one through genus is one through relation; and /what is one through relation is not one through genus, and what is one through genus is not one through form, and what is one through form is not one through number.

p.160 /It is therefore¹ clear that the opposite of unity is multiplicity, and multiplicity is predicated of every one of these kinds: multiplicity is thus predicated of something either because it is not continuous, being discrete, (or) because its matter is divisible into forms, or its forms into a genus, or (its genus) into that which is related to it. It is, moreover, clear that being is predicated of everything whose cause is one, and that being is predicated for that /which the types of the one enumerate.

It has thus been explained that the True One is not one of the intelligible things, and is neither matter, genus, species, individual, specific difference, property, common accident, movement, soul, intellect, whole, part, all or some. It is also

¹Ms. إذا. AR إذن.

not one in connection with anything else, but is an absolute
 10 one, neither augmentable, /composed (nor) multiple. Nor is it
 one of the sort which we mentioned in which kinds (of one) exist,
 (of) all the kinds of one which we mentioned, and that which is
 attached to their names is not attached to it. Since the things
 which we have mentioned are more simple and yet¹ do not belong
 to it, i.e., are not predicated of it, (things which are) more
 multiple are not predicated of it either.

The True One, therefore, has neither matter, form, quantity,
 quality nor relation, is not described by any of the remaining
 15 categories, and has neither a genus, /specific difference,
 individual, property, common accident nor movement; and it is
 not described by any of the things which are denied to be one
 in truth. It is, accordingly, one only, pure, i.e., (having)
 nothing other than unity, while every other one is multiple.

p.161 Unity, therefore, when an /accident in all things, is not
 the True One, as we stated previously: the True One being one
 through the essence which is never multiple in any way, nor
 divisible in any kind (of divisibility), neither by way of essence
 nor by another way, neither time, place, subject, attribute, all
 5 or part, and neither into substance nor into accident, nor /ever
 by any kind of divisibility or multiplicity.

¹ فا. AR لا. Ms. apparently as AH, لا.

As for all the kinds of one other than the True One, when they occur in whatever they are, it is by accident. That which enables the accident to occur, in everything which is in something by accident, is other than the accident; whatever this thing is, it is in it either through accident or essence, and it is impossible for things to be infinite in actuality. Consequently the first cause of unity in unified things is the True One which does not acquire unity from another, as it is impossible for acquired things to be reciprocal without an initial limit.

10 /The cause of unity in unified things is accordingly the True One, the First, and everything which receives unity is caused, every one other than the One in truth being one metaphorically and not in truth. Every caused unity passes from its unity (that of the True One) but to that which is other than its being, i.e., the True One is not multiple with respect to its existence. The caused unity is a multiple and not an absolute one, meaning by "absolute one" that which is not multiple at all and the unity of which is nothing other than its being.

15 /Inasmuch as unity and multiplicity together are in every sensible object and that which is attached to it, and the unity in it is entirely an effect from an agent which occurs accidentally in it and not through (its) nature, and multiplicity is, necessarily, a group of single units; then it is necessary that there would never be multiplicity if there were not unity. Accordingly

every multiplicity comes to be through unity, and if there were
 p.162 no /unity the multiple would never have being. Hence¹ every
 thing which comes to be is but an affection in which that which
 had not existed comes into being. Consequently² the emanation
 of unity from the True One, the First, is the coming to be of
 every sensible object and what is attached to the sensible object;
 and (the True One) causes every one of them to exist when it
 causes them to be³ through its being. Therefore⁴ the cause of
 coming to be is due to the True One, which does not acquire
 5 unity from a donor but is rather one /through its essence.
 Moreover, that which is made to be is not perpetual, and that
 which is not perpetual is created, i.e., it comes to be from a
 cause; consequently that which is made to be is created.

As the cause of coming to be is the True One, the First, so
 the cause of creation is the True One, the First; and it is the
 cause from which there is a beginning of movement, i.e., that
 which sets in motion the beginning of movement; meaning that
 "that which sets in motion" is the agent. As the True One, the
 First, is the cause of the beginning of the motion of that which

¹Ms. فاذا. AR فاذن.

²Ms. فاذا. AR فاذن.

³Reading تهوي. AR تهوي.

⁴Ms. فاذا. AR فاذن.

comes to be, i.e., that which is affected, it is the creator of
 10 all that comes to be; and as there is no being /except through
 the unity in things, their unification being their coming to be,
 the mainstay of everything is due to its unity. If the unity
 departed (from a thing), it would revert and perish, together
 with the departure (of the unity), in no time. The True One is
 therefore the First, the Creator who holds everything He has
 created, and nothing is free from His hold and power unless it
 reverts and perishes.

Inasmuch as that which we wanted to clarify concerning the
 distinction of ones has been explained, -to show that the True
 One is the donor, the Creator, the mighty, the holder (of all
 together); and what the ones by metaphor are, i.e., through
 15 the bestowing of the True One, /Who is greater and more exalted
 than the attributions of the heretics- let us now complete this
 section and follow it with its natural sequel, with the assistance
 of Him who possesses complete power, perfect potency, and an
 emanating generosity.

The first part of the book of Ya'qūb ibn Ishāq al-Kindī is
 completed. Praised be God the Master of the worlds, and blessings
 upon both Muḥammad the prophet and all his people.

Commentary

97.3 "al-Mu'taṣim Billāh": The son of Hārūn al-Rashīd and the slave Mārīda, al-Mu'taṣim succeeded his brother al-Ma'mūn as the eighth 'Abbāsid caliph, reigning from 218/823-227/842 (cf. the succinct summary of his life given by K. V. Zettersteen, EI¹ iii: 784, and see the list of primary historical sources given there). Al-Kindī dedicated treatises to both caliphs, as well, particularly, to al-Mu'taṣim's son Aḥmad, his pupil (cf. Walzer's enumeration of these treatises, "New Studies on al-Kindī," Greek into Arabic, p. 176 f.).

97.5 "May Allah grant you long life..." This opening phrase in particular (literally, "May Allah prolong your duration"), and the entire passage to line 7, "...and purify you from all types of vice", is the type of invocation al-Kindī uses when addressing the caliph or his son; compare AR I:244, II:48 (and I:214, which, from its many literal and stylistic parallels with the above, must also have been intended for a member of the royal household). When addressing friends or colleagues, al-Kindī's invocation is usually brief and to the point. Cf. AR I: 186, 194, 201, 265, 353, 363; II: 40, 64 and passim (cf. further other sources, assembled by Walzer, Studi su al-Kindī II, op. cit., p. 47, n.2).

97.8 "Indeed, the human art which is highest in degree and most

noble in rank is the art of philosophy." إن أعلَى الصناعات
الإنسانية منزلة وأشرفها مرتبة صناعة الفلسفة

This sentence is similar in structure and wording to that below at 98.1, and like it is ultimately inspired by Met. VI 1. 1026a 21-22 (though possibly also reflecting the influence of Met. I 2. 982b 3f.). As in the Met. VI passage, al-Kindī proceeds to esteem philosophy above all other pursuits, and "First Philosophy" above all other kinds of philosophy. Between the opening and closing sentences of this passage, however, he follows another Metaphysics source, and this beginning sentence itself indicates additional sources upon which he drew.

In his treatise "On the Definition and Description of Things" (Abū Rīda I: 173), al-Kindī presents a description of this sort as one of the "ancients" (qudamā') definitions of philosophy:

وحدّوها أيضا من جهة العلة فقالوا : صناعة
الصناعات وحكمة الحكم Together with al-Kindī's

five other definitions of philosophy (ibid., pp. 172, 173), this has been translated by S. M. Stern: "They also defined it from its pre-eminence, saying: Art of arts and science of sciences." (cf. Isaac Israeli, op. cit., p. 28). As Stern remarks there, this "On Definitions" passage "derives mostly from the Alexandrian commentators of Aristotle, among whom it became a convention to include in the introduction to their commentaries on the Isagoge an enumeration of the various definitions of philosophy." Thus

this definition is found in Ammonius as *Τέχνη τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστημῶν* (cf. his "In Porphyrii Isagogen", CAG iv/3, p. 6; and cf. as well the "Prolegomena" of Elias, CAG xviii/1, p. 8, and David, CAG xviii/2, p. 20. While this definition, attributed to Aristotle, is said to be derived from the "pre-eminence" of philosophy (*ὑπεροχή*); cf. Ammonius p. 2, Elias and David, loc. cit.), al-Kindī says that it is due to its *علّة*. However we choose to translate this -and while Stern renders it without comment as "pre-eminence", perhaps "the reason" (for its pre-eminence) would be better- it appears that al-Kindī is alluding with this word to his Alexandrian source's discussion of this definition; for Ammonius (pp. 7f.) Elias (pp. 20f.) and David (pp. 39f.) explain, within their discussion of this definition, the meaning of various terms and subjects, reasoning that philosophy is the most comprehensive of all, the "mother of sciences").

The above FP description of philosophy is, then, a paraphrase of the Alexandrian definition at one or two removes; which definition itself relies upon Aristotelian passages such as those quoted above (Compare, further, the eleventh century Arabic commentary on the Isagoge, modeled along similar Alexandrian lines, referred to by Stern, op. cit., p. 14, n.1). Al-Kindī here, moreover, qualifies the philosophical art as "human", though the immediately following definition carries a similar qualification

(see below). This emphasis upon philosophy as a "human" endeavor serves to distinguish it from the "Divine science", **العلم** **الالهى**, i.e., prophecy; a distinction al-Kindī makes explicit, e.g., in his treatise "On the Quantity of Aristotle's Books ...". (Abū Rīda I: 372, and cf. R. Walzer, Una Scritto Introduttivo allo Studio di Aristotle, op. cit. p. 395. It is philosophy as a science which -without supernatural intervention or theological assumptions- slowly yields knowledge to the person intensely trained and persistent, with which al-Kindī is here concerned (cf. FP 102.15). Though he is far from denying the validity of prophetic knowledge (cf. Walzer, "New Studies on al-Kindī", Greek into Arabic, pp. 177 ff.), al-Kindī attempts in this treatise, as in most of his philosophical writings, to prove his case without resort to extra-philosophical means.

97.9¹ "The definition of which is knowledge of the true nature of things, insofar as is possible for man";

التي حدوها علم
الأشياء بحقائقها بقدر طاقة الإنسان .

cf. Aristotle's description of philosophy in Met. II 1. 993b 20

as a "knowledge of the truth", **ἐπιστήμη τῆς ἀληθείας**, translated by Astāt (Bouyges, I: 11) as **علم الحق**.

That Aristotle here understands "the truth", **ἡ ἀλήθεια**, as equivalent to the ultimate nature of things, the first principles of being, is clear from the sequel to this passage as well as

from his use of the term in the same way elsewhere. Cf., e.g.

Met. I 3. 983b 2 (when it is used synonymously with τῶν ὄντων), 7. 988a 20 (when it occurs with τῶν ἀρχῶν), and elsewhere (see Ross, Met. I 3. 983b 2n.)

Such an ontologically oriented definition is also found in the Alexandrian commentaries to the Isagoge mentioned above, and al-Kindī is reading Aristotle here through their eyes; consulting, in the process, his adaptation of an Alexandrian source in "On Definitions" (Abu Rida I: 173). Thus the two definitions of philosophy said by the commentators to be taken from "its subject",

"the knowledge of beings qua beings" (or "the real nature of beings"), γνῶσις τῶν ὄντων ἢ ὅντα ἐστὶ; and "the knowledge of divine (i.e., eternal) and human affairs", γνῶσις θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων πραγμάτων

(cf. Ammonius op. cit., pp. 2, 3; Elias, op. cit., p. 8, David op. cit., p. 20), are apparently conflated by al-Kindī in "On Definitions" (ibid.) into one definition (the mortal aspect of the second definition apparently being viewed sub species aeternitatis): "Philosophy is the knowledge of the eternal,

universal things, of their existence, essence and causes, insofar as is possible for man",

إن الفلسفة علم
الأشياء الابدية الكلية، أنتشر ما يثبته وعلما،
بقدر طاقة الإنسان (and cf. Stern, op. cit., p. 29).

This definition now appears in abridged form in FP as above, with the "true nature of things" representing all the adjectives used in the longer definition, and the tag "insofar as is possible for man" retained.

Throughout FP, al-Kindī is actually following the first of the above Alexandrian definitions, as his formulation of the definition here indicates; though he is doubtless convinced that from the study of beings per se there emerges whatever knowledge we may have of the Divine and of "eternal" things.

97.9²

بقدر طاقة الانسان: "insofar as is possible for man".

As noted above, the reason for al-Kindī's use of this term here is probably because of its occurrence in the equivalent "On Definitions" definition of philosophy. The reason for its appearance there, furthermore, may be traced with some certainty, and bears upon al-Kindī's further composition of this FP passage.

The phrase in question is actually used by al-Kindī in "On Definitions" in another definition of philosophy as well, that which al-Kindī says is taken from its "activity" (فعل).

"Philosophy is resemblance to the actions of God, may He be exalted, insofar as is possible for man." (إن)

الفلسفة التشبه بأفعال الله تعالى بقدر طاقة

الانسان, AR I: 172). This is a translation of

one of the Alexandrian definitions (said to be taken from the

"aim", **τέλος**, of philosophy), incorporating as well part of their explanation of the definition. The definition itself, going back to Plato's Theatetus 176 B, is simply of philosophy as "becoming like God insofar as is possible for man", **ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ἀνθρώπῳ** ; which resemblance (Stern, op. cit., p. 29, "assimilation") is then qualified as being not to God directly but to His actions (Stern, ibid. p. 30, "works") or faculties, **ἐνέργεια** and **δυνάμεις**. (It is apparently this explanation of the definition, emphasizing God's actions **ἐνέργεια** / **افعال** which accounts for al-Kindī's description of this definition as being from its "activity", **فعل**). These actions are viewed, broadly, as His knowledge and benevolent action, **πρόνοια**, which man is to imitate. Yet neither man's knowledge nor his deeds can be the same as God's, since the substance (**οὐσία**) and perfection (**τελειότης**) of the two beings differ. God, e.g., knows all simultaneously and eternally, man does not. (cf. Ammonius, op. cit., pp. 3, 4; Elias, op. cit., pp. 8, 16f.; David, op. cit., pp. 2, 34f. See too Stern, op. cit., pp. 29, 30 and Altmann, ibid., pp. 197 ff., for the widespread use of this definition among Hellenistic and Islamic, as well as Jewish, authors).

It appears, therefore, that as the resemblance to God is understood by al-Kindī's source to be achieved in part through knowledge, which knowledge is considered as limited by man's

very nature, al-Kindī gives the definition of philosophy which involves knowledge, in both "On Definitions" and here, that qualification which he also appends, following his source, to the definition of philosophy involving resemblance. Moreover, al-Kindī reads the next line of the Metaphysics with this resemblance-definition in mind (see the following note), and it is this qualifying phrase which serves to bridge the two definitions for him.

97.9³ . "The aim of the philosopher is, as regards his knowledge, to obtain the truth, and as regards his action, to act truthfully."
 غرض الفيلسوف في علمه إصابة الحق وفي عمله العمل بالحق.

Cf. Met. II 1. 993b 20, "the end of theoretical knowledge is truth, while that of practical knowledge is action", θεωρητικῆς μὲν γὰρ τέλος ἀληθεία, πρακτικῆς δ' ἔργον.

This is translated misleadingly by Aṣṭāt (Bouyges, p. 11), "the end of knowledge is to obtain the truth, and the end of virtue (sic, probably a scribal error for "action", الفعل, as Bouyges suggests n.2) is to act truthfully," غاية العلم إصابة الحق

و غاية الفضل "العمل بالحق". Al-Kindī is apparently following

Aṣṭāt's text, explicitly considering both knowledge and practice of the truth as the "aim" of philosophy. In this he (and possibly Aṣṭāt) is influenced by the two-fold division of philosophy into θεωρητικὸν καὶ πρακτικόν common in the Alexandrian

prolegomena (cf. Ammonius, op. cit., p. 11, Elias, op. cit., p. 26, David, op. cit., p. 55); which division constitutes the two ways man is thought to resemble God. (Cf. F. Rosenthal, "From Arabic Books and Manuscripts VI: Istanbul Materials for al-Kindī and as-Sarāḥsī," JAOS 76.1 (1956), p. 27 f., for the further subdivision of these pursuits common in late antiquity, which subdivision al-Kindī is reported elsewhere to have made.) As mentioned in the preceding note, the resemblance-definition is said by the Alexandrians to be from the "aim" of philosophy, and al-Kindī's sentence here emphasises this term, giving the essential part of the explanation of this definition without explicitly referring to it. It appears likely, therefore, that al-Kindī is incorporating yet another "definition" of philosophy into this paragraph, managing to utilize three of the four Alexandrian kinds of definitions, those from the "pre-eminence," "subject" and "aim" of philosophy, omitting only that definition taken from its etymology (cf. Stern, op. cit., p. 29),

97.10 "not that the activity is endless, for we abstain and the activity ceases, once we have reached the truth"

لا الفعل سرمدًا،
لأن نسلع ويتسرم الفعل إذا انتهينا إلى الحق

This sentence, and particularly its first part, probably originates in Aṣṭāt's translation of Met. II 1. 993b 22; "practical

men study not the eternal but what is relative and in the present,

οὐ τὸ αἰδεόν ἀλλ' ὁ πρὸς τὰ καὶ νῦν θεωροῦσιν οἱ

πρακτικοί. Astāt, following a reading preserved by Alexander of

Aphrodisias, renders this rather heavily: "their aim (sc. that

of practical men, though Astāt's reference to them is awkward)

is not (to study) activity per se, nor is (their) continued

(concern) with activity related to endless (i.e., eternal

principles); rather, their aim is to study action (literally,

"to act") for another reason, relative and timely;

لم يكن غرضهم
لنفس الفعل ولا المداومة على الفعل سرمدياً، بل غرضهم أن يفعلوا
(Bouyges, p. 11). لعل أخرى مضافة زمانية

Al-Kindī's sentence, unlike Astāt's, may well refer to theory (ilm) as well as practice (amal), viewing the activity (fi'l) of philosophy in all its aspects as of limited duration. This would reflect the Alexandrian comparison (in their explanations of the resemblance-definition) of the "actions" of man with those of God, in which man's knowledge (and certainly his acts) is deemed non-eternal (cf. the two preceding notes). Al-Kindī has been alluding to the explanation of this resemblance-definition just before, and it is likely that he is still under its influence; moreover, his use of fi'l here may not be simply borrowed from Astāt's text, since it is this term which he says characterizes the resemblance-definition of philosophy. Al-Kindī may, therefore, be emphasizing in this manner the absence of any permanent

conjunction or union with God through the philosophical endeavor. He does not, we know, assert such a relationship elsewhere, but his contemporary coreligionists would have been reassured to hear that he did not envision any such religious or mystical role for philosophy.

As for the terminology of the latter part of this sentence, cf. al-Kindī's explanation of the metaphoric sense of fi'l in his treatise "On the True, First, Perfect Agent ..." (AR I: 184): "(Activity is) that the effect of which ceases with the cessation of the agent's affection (infi'āl fā'ilihī, which stands for "the agent's action", viewing each created action as essentially an affection, with The Creator the only real agent capable of action; cf. ibid., p. 183, and see AR note, 184 n.1 and above, p. 68 ff.); as walking vis-à-vis the walker: when he abstains from walking, the walking ceases with the cessation of the walker's affection."

(الفعل) ... ما كان يتصّرم الأثر فيه مع تصّرم إقّعال فاعله، كالمشي
للماشي، فإنه إذا أمسل عن المشي تصّرم المشي بتصّرم إقّعال

(الماشي). While this sentence is apparently the source for (or shares a common source with) the key wording of the FP remark above, the distinction drawn between fi'l and 'amal in the short treatise is foreign to our longer work. This is, then, in miniature, another example of al-Kindī's borrowing of phrases from one context and inserting them into another.

97.12¹ "we don't find the truth we are seeking without finding a cause":

ولسنا نجد مطلوباتنا من الحق من غير علة. This sentence closely follows Met. II 1. 993b 23, "now we do not know a truth without its cause", οὐκ ἴσμεν δὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀνευ τῆς αἰτίας, faithfully translated by Astāt (Bouyges, p. 12) as (ولسنا نعرف الحق من غير علة).

97.12² "the cause of the existence and continuance of everything is the True One", وعلة وجود كل شيء وثباته الحق. Cf. Met. II 1. 993b

27-30, "that is most true which causes subsequent truths to be true. Hence the principles of eternal things must be always most true....nor is there any cause of their being, but they are the cause of the being of other things" (ἀληθέστατον το τοῖς ὑστέροις αἰτίον τοῦ ἀληθέσιν εἶναι. δεῖ τὰς τῶν αἰετῶν ὄντων ἀρχὰς ἀναγκάσιον αἰετῶν εἶναι ἀληθεστάτας... οὐδὲ ἐκείναις αἰτίον τί ἐστὶ τοῦ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖναι τοῖς ἄλλοις).

The shift in subject number and thus in concept from Aristotle's first principles to al-Kindī's Principle, from truths to The True One (or Truth), may be accounted for in part by Astāt's translation of the above Met. passage, line 27 (Bouyges, p. 13):

فمعلوم أن الحق الأول علة لحقيقة الأشياء الأخيرة

This would ordinarily have been read, "it is known that the first truth is the cause for the truth of subsequent things",

a reading that would have been reinforced by Aṣṭāt's translation of the following line (28) of the Metaphysics: وباضطرار

. أن تكون أول علة الأكوان واجبة حقا أبدا

This would probably have been understood to mean that "the principles (أول) of the cause of beings must necessarily be true and eternal", again conveying to the reader the notion of basically one cause of beings. (Compare with this Ishāq

ibn Hunain's more accurate translation of the Greek text

فيجب من ذلك أن يكون أولى : (Bouyges, loc. cit.):
 الأشياء بالحق الشيء الذي هو علة حقيقة
 الأشياء التي بعده ولذلك قد يجب ضرورة أن تكون
 مبادئ الأشياء الموجودة دائما هي دائما في الغاية
 من الحق .

Al-Kindī, of course, needed little prompting for his view of creation as dependent ultimately on one source, which is the major theme of the treatise, though it was convenient for him to "find" the doctrine in his Aristotelian model. Similarly, al-Kindī was quite familiar with the term al-ḥaqq, the "True One"/"The Truth", used as an epithet for and description of God in the

Koran (cf., e.g., Suras xx: 114 and xviii: 44) and in philosophical sources (cf. the second note below). He himself uses the term in this context a number of times throughout his writings (cf. AR I: 160-162, 182-183, 215, 373).

97.13¹ "in that each thing which has being has truth", **لأن كل ما له أُنْيَّة له**
حقيقة cf. Met. II 1. 993b 30, of which al-Kindī's passage could well be a literal translation; "so that as each thing is in respect of being, so it is in respect of truth" (**ὥσθ' ἕκαστον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας**). Astāt's translation of this passage (Bouyges, ibid.) is not actually as precise as al-Kindī's: "the truth of everything must necessarily be like its being", **فواجب أن حقيقة كل واحد من الأشياء مثل أيسينته**, though in light of al-Kindī's sentence this partly illegible last word could well have been originally (pace Bouyges, n.5) **أُنْيَّة**.

Al-Kindī's use of anniya for being here is thus in all probability taken from Astāt's translation of **εἶναι**; a translation which Astāt uses elsewhere in the Metaphysics as well (cf. Met. 1041a 15; 1042b 28; 1043a 1 and 1047a 20). Al-Kindī uses the term here as a synonym for the previous sentence's "existence", **وجود**; which duplication may be accounted for by the fact that in the next sentence al-Kindī needs both terms to express his idea.

13² "The True One exists necessarily, and therefore beings exist", **فالحق اضطرارا موجود إذن لأُنْيَّات موجودة** Al-Kindī is led to this

conclusion by the foregoing paraphrase of the Metaphysics (particularly ll. 28-30), having substituted, following Astāt's lead, the "True One" for the first "principles" of things. As worded, however, this sentence and the entire paragraph has a decidedly Neoplatonic coloration, the existence of beings seen as deriving from the (necessary) existence of the True One. In asserting the priority of the True One to being, al-Kindī clarifies the previously expressed relation between being and truth, modifying thereby his Aristotelian source and foreshadowing his treatise's conclusion (cf. FP pp. 161, 162).

Al-Kindi would have found support for an interpretation of the Metaphysics in these terms in the Theology of Aristotle, where, e.g., the statement is found that the Creator is "the first being, the true one" (الأئبة الأولى الحق), the cause of all other beings, both immaterial and material (cf. A. Badawī's edition of the Theology in his Plotinus Apud Arabes, p. 26; translated by G. Lewis in Plotini Opera, ed. P. Henry and H. R. Schwyzer, II: 231. See also Badawī, p. 112 (Lewis, p. 271), equivalent to Enn. V l. 5, 4). In his treatise "On Explaining the Active, Proximate Cause of Generation and Corruption" (AR I: 215), al-Kindī actually describes God as "the true Being", الأئبة الحق (literally, "The Being, the True One"), referring to our treatise for elaboration.

The various meanings of anniya (and not inniya, as AR prefers; cf. FP 97, n.2) and its possible derivations have received much

attention; cf., e.g., the studies of M. Y. D'Alverny ("Anniyya - Anitas", in Melanges offerts à Étienne Gilson, Toronto, 1959, pp. 59-91), R. Frank ("The Origin of the Arabic Philosophical Term أنية", Cahiers de Byrsa, 1956, pp. 181-201), and S. Van den Bergh (El², I: 513). These and other scholars have shown that the term was used in both a narrow and broad sense. The narrow sense was first discussed by S. Munk (in his French edition of Maimonides' Guide for the Perplexed, Paris 1860 I: 241). He suggested that "quoddity" be used to express anniya when it denoted the existence of a particular thing, an x that is (used in Mlle. D'Alverny's words, "avec un sens d'affirmation existentielle", op. cit., p. 73); without regard to determining what the x is, its definition (i.e., anniya as opposed to māhiya, the Scholastic existentia and essentia). Al-Kindī uses both these terms in "On Definitions" (AR I: 173), reflecting- via the Alexandrian commentators- the distinction Aristotle makes in Anal. Post. II l. 89b 24 between τὸ ὅτι and τὸ τί ἔστιν, translated by Abu Bishr Matta as أنه يوجد and ماهو (Mantiq Aristū, ed. A. Badawī, Cairo, 1949, II: 407).

The broad sense of anniya, however, denotes not only being in general, the equivalent of huwiya and wujūd; but also, at times, "essence" (which latter translation Lewis chooses for the Theology passage quoted above; and cf. further, A. M. Goichon, Lexique de la Langue Philosophique D'Ibn Sīnā, Paris, 1938,

pp. 9 ff., and S. M. Afnan, "Philosophical Terminology in Arabic and Persian", Leiden, 1964, pp. 94 ff.).

It does not appear that al-Kindī is using anniya in its narrow sense here, nor again at p. 120, though he may be so using it (though not necessarily in the strictest sense of "quoddity") at pp. 101 and 130. He seems rather to be saying that beings owe their nature (viz., existence) to God, the source of being.

- 98.1 "The most noble philosophy and highest in rank is the FP, i.e., knowledge of the First Truth who is the cause of all truth" وأشرف الفلسفة وأعلىها مرتبة الفلسفة الأولى، أعني علم الحق (الاول الذي هو علة كل حق). While Met. II l. 994a 1 ff. speaks of the need for a first cause, and 993b 27 asserts that "that which causes derivative truths to be true is most true" (Ross), it appears that al-Kindī is digressing briefly from his Alpha elatton source here, returning to it at p. 102 with a paraphrase of the earlier section of II l. 993a 31-b19.

The short section which this sentence introduces is a fitting conclusion and sequel to that which precedes it, and like it is also composed of an adaptation of the Metaphysics in a Neoplatonic direction, and the incorporation (at p. 101) of remarks from the Alexandrian Isagoge commentaries (for which cf. Stern, op. cit., pp. 13 ff). The actual sections of the Metaphysics which al-Kindī

may be paraphrasing in the above sentence--as at 97.8 above-- could be Met. I 2 982a-b 10 or (and?), more probably, Met VI 1 1026a 18-31. While the former passage is not extant in any of the medieval Arabic translations, the contents of the latter passage and Astāt's translation contains some of the very terms al-Kindī uses, or their equivalents.

Thus 1026a 21: "and the most noble science (or philosophy, sc. Theology) must deal with the most noble genus" (καὶ τὴν τιμωτάτην δεῖ περὶ τὸ τιμωτάτον γένος εἶναι) which Astāt renders (Bouyges, op. cit., II: 707) وينبغي أن يكون العلم الشريف للجنس الشريف which at lines 29f. "first philosophy" (πρώτη φιλοσοφία, الفلسفة الأولى Bouyges, p. 713) is related to an "immovable (and separately existing) substance" (τις οὐσία ἀκίνητος, جوهر ماغير متحرك). Though Aristotle is referring to substance in a generic sense (cf. there above, 11. 16 ff.), it is easy for al-Kindī, having read the Theology, to regard Aristotle's "divine" substances (τὰ θεῖα / الأشياء) as a singular and unique entity, the "First Truth", prior and thus, to al-Kindī, the cause of all subsequent truth.

This relating of priority to causality could have followed from familiarity with the quest for the causes of being with which Met. VI 1. is concerned; as well, perhaps, from the somewhat ambiguous remark in line 30 that the science of the immovable substance will be "universal in this way, because it is first",

καὶ καθόλου οὕτως ὅτι πρώτη. This is translated quite ambiguously by Astāt, p. 713 Bouyges, as الكلية أيضاً فهو أول بهذا النوع. While fa-huwa awwal (for which there are variant readings of wa-huwa...) may be understood as a circumstantial clause, and thus faithful to the Greek, Averroes for one understood the sentence to read فهو أول بهذا النوع, "and it is first in this way" (ibid., p. 714). Al-Kindī may well have so read, seeing the "way" in which theology is first as causal.

98.2 "Therefore it is necessary ... its cause." Compare here Met. I 1. 981b 27 ff.

101.2 "object of knowledge": al-ma' lūmāt. While this is the word which is found in the MS., and though it may be acceptable in itself and in the context, it rather seems to me that a scribal error may well have occurred, and that the original word was al-ma' lūlāt, "effects". This proposed emendation would continue the dichotomy of cause and effect, 'illa and ma' lūl, begun in the preceding line; and the translation would then be, "since we have complete knowledge of every effect only when we have obtained full knowledge of its cause."

101.3¹ "Every cause...object." Assuming al-Kindī is paraphrasing Met. I 2. in the preceding sentence, he could have been led by the opening of Met. I 3. (983 a 24-32) to this remark; which is,

however, common enough in Aristotle and subsequently. (Cf., e.g., Physics II 3. 194b 16 ff., Met. V 2. 1013a 24 ff., and see the following note.) Stern has, in fact, shown that a reference to the four causes is given in a Hellenistic interpretation to Posterior Analytics II 1. 89b 24 which links them with the four types of inquiry in a manner similar to that given below (cf. Isaac Israeli, p. 18). This interpretation (preserved by the late Greek commentator Eustratius, CAG, XXI/I. 9) was probably relocated fully in an introduction to philosophy of the sort which al-Kindī has been using in this section, though extant Greek texts speak only of the four types of inquiry (cf. the note to 101.5¹ below). Then again, al-Kindī could have learned of this relationship from a commentary on the Posterior Analytics, though we have no evidence of an Arabic translation of such a work, or of the Post. An. itself, in his time. Yet al-Kindī must have been familiar with the Aristotelian work, if not with commentaries upon it, even if only in a second-hand and incomplete way, for he is reported to have written one if not two commentaries of it. Cf. the Fihrist, pp. 249, 256, 257; Walzer, "New Light on the Arabic Translations of Aristotle", Greek into Arabic, p. 98; Peters, op. cit., pp. 17-20.) Whether or not al-Kindī is here showing a familiarity with a Post. An. commentary tradition, his use elsewhere of this Aristotelian work, to which he had no direct access, supports our conjecture that the preceding sentence may

well be a paraphrase of Met. I, knowledge of which he would also have acquired indirectly. Thus superficial familiarity with a text did not, it seems, deter al-Kindī from paraphrasing it or commenting upon it.

101.3² "material, formal, efficient...final": عنصر، صورة، فاعلة and تمتة, given actually as nouns and not adjectives.

Compare G. Lewis' translation of the similarly worded Theology of Aristotle, op. cit., II: 486: "the ... causes of the universe are four, namely Matter, (al-hayūlā) Form, the Active Cause and Perfection" (al-tamām; Arabic edition by A. Badawī, op. cit., p. 4).

101.3³ "that for the sake of which there is an object": ما من أجله كان الشيء, rendered as "at which a thing aims" by S. M. Stern in his translation of this and the following passage, to line 14, op. cit., p. 13.

101.5¹ "Scientific inquiries are four": والمطالب العلمية أربعة. Cf. Elias, op. cit., p. 3, David, op. cit., p. 1. Stern has analyzed this entire passage and traced its history from Aristotle, through the Alexandrian introductions, to the Isagoge, to Islamic and Jewish sources, op. cit., pp. 13-23.

101.5² "as we have determined elsewhere in our philosophical treatises": كما حددنا في غير موضع من أقاويلنا الفلسفية

Al-Kindī is possibly referring to his commentary (possibly commentaries) on the Prior Analytics, for which cf. above, note to 101.3; or (and?) to his treatises based upon the Isagoge.

He is reported to have written a number of such treatises, all unfortunately still lost, dealing explicitly or implicitly with the themes of the Isagoge and of its commentators; cf. Fihrist, I: 256, and cf. Flügel, Al-Kindī, pp. 36-38, nos. 7, 8, 25, 27, 32 (and see Baumstark, op. cit., p. 161, and Stern, op. cit., p. 31, n.1). The four epistemological categories are also referred to in al-Kindī's كتاب في الصناعة العظمى (cf. F. Rosenthal, "Al-Kindī and Ptolemy", op. cit., p. 441), a work with which FP has also other points in common (cf. below, notes to 102.15-19, 103.9).

- 101.7 "only of the existence (of something)": عن الأنية فقط
 which might be rendered as the "quoddity", whether there is an X.
 Cf. above, the note to 97.13². While his commentators treated of this question, as noted above, Porphyry himself incorporates only the "what" and "which" queries into his discussion of predicables, the "whether" (and "why") things exist being the sort of ontological question he deliberately excludes from consideration in the Isagoge (cf. A. Busse, Isagoge et in Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium, CAG IV/I, p. 1; missing in the MS. from which the Arabic translation of the Isagoge has been edited, but supplied

by Stern in his article, "Ibn al-Tayyib's Commentary on the Isagoge", BSOAS XIX.3, 1957, p. 424).

- 101.8-10 "what" investigates the genus..."which"...its specific difference ... "what" and "which" together...its species": **الما تبعت عن جنسها، وأى تبعت عن فصلها، وما رأى جميعا تبعتان عن نوعها**
 These correlations are found already in the Isagoge, Porphyry being followed in this by the commentators: for "genus", predicated of $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\epsilon\nu$ cf. Busse, op. cit., p. 2 (Arabic mā huwa in translation of Abū Uthman al-Dimashqī (d. ca. 900), edited by A. Badawī, Mantiq Aristū (Organon Aristotelis), Cairo, 1952, III: 1024; following Aristotle, Topics I 5. 102a 31 ff., rendered into Arabic by the same al-Dimashqī, ed. Badawī, op. cit., II: 476.); for the "specific difference", literally just difference, **Διαφορά / فصل**, predicated of $\pi\omicron\tau\epsilon\acute{\omicron}\nu\ \tau\acute{\epsilon}\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\epsilon\nu$ / **أى** **شيء هو**, cf. Busse, op. cit., p. 3 and 11; Badawī, op. cit., III: 1026, 1046. (Al-Dimashqī also translates the $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\epsilon\nu$ and $\pi\omicron\tau\epsilon\acute{\omicron}\nu\ \tau\acute{\epsilon}$ of 17.10 Busse as māhiya and kayfiya respectively, Badawī, p. 1058.) At 15.2 Busse (1054 Badawī), both types of the above sentences are mentioned together; while species is spoken of as a result of the determinations of genus and differentia at various places in the work (cf. Busse, 9.3, 13.23, 20.7, equivalent to Badawī 1038, 1052, 1064).

- 01.11 "its final cause": **عن علتها التامة**, a different though

obviously related nominal form to that given above at 101.3², and cf. note there.

101.12 "matter...genus;...form...species": **عنصر، جنس، صورة، نوع**.

Cf. the Isagoge, 11.15 Busse (1047 Badawī), where man's genus is said to be analogous to his matter (**مادة** /mādda), the specific difference to his form (**صورة** /sūra). (When this is repeated at 15.6 Busse (Badawī 1054), **صورة** is rendered as khilqa.) At 3.22 Busse (Badawī 1027), however, the species is said to be predicated of form; the interdependent nature of species and specific difference permitting both expressions, as al-Kindī proceeds immediately to explain.

101.13¹ "knowledge of the specific difference...species": **وفي علم**

النوع علم الفصل, literally, "knowledge of the specific difference being in the knowledge of the species". Cf. Isagoge, 10.1 ff. Busse, (1041 Badawī).

101.13² "When, therefore, we obtain full knowledge of its matter, form and final cause, we thereby obtain full knowledge of its definition":

فإذا أحطنا بعلم عنصرها وصورتها وعلتها التامة
فقل أحطنا بعلم حركتها That the

complete definition of a thing includes both its subject matter

(**υποκειμενον**, rendered here by al-Kindī in terms of matter and form) and aim (**τέλος**, equivalent to al-Kindī's final cause),

is asserted by Elias, op. cit., p. 5.19 ff., and David, op. cit., 17.31 ff. (and cf. Ammonius, op. cit., 1.18 ff.). Al-Kindī thus again refers, obliquely, to the two most important definitions of philosophy which the Alexandrians had discussed (cf. above, notes to 97.9), and again emphasizes the goal as well as the subject matter of philosophy. Though ordinarily--and in actual practice even for al-Kindī--the definition of a thing does not require more than knowledge of its genus and specific difference, the larger perspective within which al-Kindī views philosophy requires acknowledgement of a teleological force as part of the very definition of an object. Al-Kindī is thus led naturally to speak next of the first cause.

102.1-4 "The truth requires ... failed to acquire." Al-Kindī returns here to Met. II 1, from which he drew his remarks above at 97.8-14. As his previous statements were based upon the latter part of that chapter (993b 19-31), this passage as well as lines 10-12 below, are paraphrases of its middle section (993b 11-14, 16-19). At FP 102.5-9 al-Kindī borrows from the beginning of this chapter (993a 31-b 4), and then at 103.1-3 he returns again to its middle (993b 15-16). A chart of these comparable passages is as follows:

<u>FP</u>	<u>Met.</u> II 1.
97.8-14	993b 19-31
102.1-4, 10-12	993b 11-14, 16-19
102.5-9	993a 31-b 4
103.1-3	993b 15-16

Met. 993b 11-14 enjoins gratitude for those whose views we might share, as well as for those who have expressed more superficial (*ἐπιπολαλέτερον*) views. Implicit in this distinction is the assumption that one wants to share views worth sharing, viz., significant (non-superficial) ones. Astāt's translation (op. cit., pp. 8, 9), which al-Kindī follows, makes this explicit: "it is not right for us only to thank one who has uttered an important remark (*قولا جزلا*), of those with whose views we may be associated; rather is it also right for us to thank those who have uttered a small, insignificant remark (*قولا يسيرا نرا*)."

Aristotle stresses that one should be grateful even for superficial thinkers with whom one does not agree, since their views at least helped train the mind. To al-Kindī it is the major benefactors of the truth (as well as the minor) who have performed this service. This change of subject--accomplished in part by inverting the sentence order of his source--renders al-Kindī's text different from Aristotle's. The Stagirite appears to be saying that, while knowledge of the truth is a collective

effort, some views are philosophically valid and should be accepted, while others have a kind of historical validity only. Al-Kindī ignores this distinction, apparently believing that in general previous philosophy is true, though not complete. This total though qualified acceptance of past philosophy is of a piece with al-Kindī's non-historical approach in other treatises; an approach characterized by a broad, purportedly harmonizing compilation of views, rather than by a critical analysis of them (cf. his various definitions of philosophy I: 172 f., and of the soul, I: 272-282. See too Walzer, "New Studies on al-Kindī," Greek into Arabic, p. 201.)

102.1-2 "The truth requires that we don't reproach ... serious benefits to us" **ومن أوجب الحق ألا نذمّ منفعنا الجرّية**

This sentence paraphrases Astāt's translation quoted in the preceding note, reversing the style of its presentation.

102.3 "Kindred and associates": **أنساب وشركاء**. Cf. Astāt's use of **مشاركة** (for *κοινωνία* of 993b 12) in the phrase translated above, 102.1-4 note, "of those with whose views we may be associated".

102.3-4 "they benefited us ... approaches and instruments": **أفادونا**. This statement is an elaboration of 993b 14: **οὗτοι σπουδαίαν τε. τήνδε γὰρ εἰς προσηκόντων ἡμῶν συνέβλεποντο**

("these ... contributed something, by developing before us the powers of thought", i.e., following Ross, Met. I: 215, "they formed our εἵξεις by practice"). Aṣṭāt's translation (Bouyges, 9.2) is as follows: إنهم اعانونا بتقدمهم في الفحص قبلنا, "they have helped us by their prior progress in inquiry." Al-Kindī's explication of this passage indicates more than a slavish dependence upon Aṣṭāt's written work. Al-Kindī may also have consulted Aṣṭāt for explanations of difficult passages, having commissioned him to translate the Metaphysics. To the degree that our text amplifies Aṣṭāt's translation, it might be the "report" (Khabar) of the Metaphysics which al-Kindī is said to have written (cf. Fihrist, op. cit., p. 251). Cf. further below, 103.1-3.

Al-Kindī's usage of afādūnā, which he again employs in the related passage below at line 11 (and cf. note there), probably comes from Aṣṭāt's translation of παρελήφμεν there (line 18) as استفدنا (op. cit. line 4).

102.4 "the real nature of which they failed to acquire": ما قصرُوا
عن نيل حقيقته. This emphasizes the essential failure of prior philosophical attempts more than Aristotle does in the corresponding Metaphysics passage; and may also allude to al-Kindī's subject--al-haqq, the Real one--whose "real nature", ḥaqīqa, has not, in al-Kindī's estimation, been fully understood.

102.5¹ "to the distinguished philosophers before us": عند المبرزين

من المتفلسفين قبلنا, particularly Aristotle (and cf. below, 103.1), whose view in 993a 31-b 4 al-Kindī now in effect quotes (with modifications) to line 9, following Astāt's translation. As the ms. of this section of Astāt's work is in poor condition (op. cit., p. 3, lines 2 and 3), we may reconstruct it from al-Kindī's passage, and further verify the latter's use of Astāt by comparing al-Kindī with Ishāq b. Hunain's later translation. The one significant difference from the translation may be assumed to be al-Kindī's own contribution.

102.5² "our co-linguists": أهل لساننا, following the translation suggested by F. Rosenthal, ("Al-Kindī and Ptolemy", op. cit., II: 445.) As Rosenthal has pointed out (based upon remarks in the في الصناعة العظمى and our text), al-Kindī considers himself largely as an interpreter of Greek learning to the Arabic speaking (and reading) world.

102.6¹ "no man ... can attain the truth": لم ينل الحق..أحد من الناس. Astat (ibid.), لم يقدر واحد من الناس, with the rest mutilated. Cf. Ishāq's translation, Bouyges 3.7, لم يقدر أحد translating 993a 31, μεδένα δύνασθαι θεγεῖν αὐτῆς (τῆς ἀληθείας)

102.6² "by the power of his own pursuits": بجهد طلبه. This phrase is lacking in Aristotle, and may well represent for al-Kindī a

gesture towards religious tradition. The pious would have appreciated what could be taken as recognition by a philosopher that only with God's help can a man attain the truth, even as he is unable to do so unaided. Cf., for a similar expression, 97.9 above.

102.6³ "that which the truth deserves": **بما يستاهل الحق**, reflecting Aristotle's **δυνατόν** of 993a 31; given by Ishāq (Bouyges, 3, 7, 8) **بقدر ما يستحق**.

102.6⁴ "nor will the (philosophers as a) whole comprehend it": **ولا أحاط** **بجميعهم**. The translation of 993b 1, **μήτε πάντας ἀποτυχᾶν**, "nor do we collectively fail", is missing in the extant Astāt version. Ishāq renders it **ولا ذهب** **على الناس علم**, "nor (does the truth) depart from all men collectively". This negative phrase, containing both a negation and a negative-value verb, may have confused al-Kindī (and possibly Astāt), as it might have the anonymous author of the marginal notes to the extant ms. (Cf. Bouyges, Notice, op. cit., p. L, 2^o). This person wrote ambiguously--in what Bouyges calls "une traduction paraphrasée" **أيضا الحق على الناس جميعهم** (ibid., p. LVII). This could be translated either "moreover, the truth (is attained) collectively", which gives aīdan a converse meaning in the total context but which represents the original meaning of the Greek; or straight forwardly as "likewise the truth

(is not attained) collectively", which would be similar to al-Kindī. On this latter reading, however, there is ostensibly a glaring discrepancy between this statement of al-Kindī's and the following sentence but one, which affirms that man does, collectively, achieve considerable truth (line 9). This may be resolved by assuming that al-Kindī is distinguishing between collective knowledge which does not know all the truth (أحاط به in the sense of comprehensive truth), and collective knowledge which knows "something of great worth". Moreover, al-Kindī may be qualifying the philosophical endeavor by implying that in his opinion neither singly nor collectively can philosophers, "by the powers of their own pursuits" (cf. the second note to 102.6 above), attain the truth.

102.7-9 "Rather each of them ... worth is assembled from this". Having apparently digressed from his Aristotelian source to establish—or at least allude to—his fidelity to religious belief, al-Kindī now proceeds to follow his Metaphysics source quite closely. He employs nāla, "attain" here (as at lines 4 and 6 above) for Astāt's (and Ishāq's) adraka, the Greek ἐπεβάλλειν of 993b 2.

102.10 "It is proper that our gratitude be great": فينبغي أن يعظم شكرنا, using a nominal form of shkr, which root Astāt employs verbally in the sentence which serves as the base for this passage (cf. above, note to 102.1-4); al-Kindī paraphrasing both Astāt

and his own parallel sentence above, 102.1 f.

102.10 "even a little (of the truth) ... much (truth)": يسير الحق ...

Following but inverting the order of Astat's translation to Met. 993b 11-13 (Bouyges, pp. 8, 9): قولا

. جزلا ... قولا يسيرا نزا

.11-12 "since they have shared with us ... approaches to the truth".

This paraphrase of Met. 993b 14 corresponds to that given above at lines 3 and 4, though the terminology is mostly different.

Al-Kindī's اشركونا and سترلونا are equivalent to Astat's فحص ; the former's فكر and مطالب like the latter's أعانونا ; while بتقديمهم echoes المقدمات (and cf. the note to 102.3-4 above for أفارونا).

102.12 "If they had not lived": فإنهم ، لو لم يكونوا , following

Astat on Met. 993b 15 practically verbatim (op. cit., p. 9.2).

However, while Astat goes on to translate Aristotle faithfully, referring the subject to "Timā'ūs" (Timotheus), al-Kindī makes this a general remark concerning all those who have contributed to the truth; and then he paraphrases the Timotheus reference below, at 103.1 f.

13-14 "hidden principles ... hidden conclusions": الأوائل الخفية (and

not الأوائل الخفية ... as AR) as "principles" and

"conclusions" (literally, "firsts" and "lasts") are an obvious

match, so the adjective with each is likely here to be the same. Moreover, the principles, or premises, here require "intense research", which is so only if they are difficult to comprehend. Al-Kindī is thus speaking generally, expressing gratitude to all philosophers who have clarified the issues from beginning to end. (For awwal in a more specific, logical sense, cf. below, 114.12.) This passage may, in addition, be a faint echo of Met. 993b 18, 19, translated by Astāt (op. cit., p. 9.4) rather well. Whereas Aristotle is speaking of "some" philosophers to whom we are indebted, who in turn are yet indebted to "others" (آخرون in Astāt), al-Kindī speaks of "firsts" and "lasts" (أواخر). He thus converts Aristotle's reference to a chronological order of philosophers into a statement concerning the logical order of philosophical knowledge.

- .15-19 "intensive research, necessary perserverance and love of its toil ... elegant insight and fondness for perserverance": شدة البحث ولزوم الدأب وإيثار التعب... وإطاف النظر وإيثار الدأب
 Cf. the similar terminology al-Kindī employs, in his كتاب في الصناعة العظمى, to describe what is necessary for an understanding of astronomy (as quoted by F. Rosenthal, op. cit., II: 444). He also acknowledges there the successive labors and cumulative knowledge of prior scholars, an acknowledgement which Rosenthal calls "daring", for the challenge it represented to the

traditional view of knowledge as that received by inspiration. Rosenthal, however, finds that this view of al-Kindī's was current in his time and afterwards, among Muslim scientists (and philosophers); and traces it for al-Kindī to Theon of Alexandria's Commentary on the Almagest (ed. A. Rome, Studi e Testi 72 (Citta del Vaticano, 1936), p. 325; for which compare Ptolemy's Syntaxis Mathematica, ed. J. L. Heiberg, Opera (Leipzig, 1898) I: 1, 7.25 (English translation by R. C. Taliaferro in the series Great Books of the Western World (Chicago, 1938) XVI: p. 6. See too Rosenthal, op. cit., pp. 445-446). We thus have here an example of al-Kindī expanding upon an Aristotelian text with material borrowed from another Greek source. Cf. further below, 103.9 f.

- 103.1 "Aristotle, the most distinguished of the Greeks in philosophy, said": فأما أرسطوطاليس، مبرز اليونانيين في الفلسفة، فقال، using the same adjective as above, 102.5. While the passage there, particularly lines 7-9, is essentially an unattributed quotation from Aristotle's work (cf. note to 102.5), the following is actually a paraphrase (however different) of the Metaphysics, though claiming to be a quotation. Taking such liberties with sources is not unusual in medieval writers, and is, as we have already seen and will see, quite characteristic of al-Kindī's method.

- 3.1-3 "It is proper for us to thank the fathers ... attaining the truth".

This particular paraphrase of Met. I: 993b 15-16 uses a similar opening phrase as at 102.10 above, the source of which passage, at Met. 993b 11, precedes the Met. source of this sentence. In inserting remarks between these sentences, al-Kindī has lost the Metaphysics thread of continuity, so he begins, as it were, again.

Aristotle wrote, at lines 15 and 16, as follows: *εἰ μὲν γὰρ Τιμόθεος μὴ ἐγένετο, πολλὴν ἂν μελοποιίαν οὐκ εἶχομεν· εἰ δὲ μὴ Φρύνης, Τιμόθεος οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο*

("If there had been no Timotheus, we should not have much lyric poetry; and if there had been no Phrynis, there would have been no Timotheus"). Astāt translates this quite accurately, *فإنه لو لم يكن طيماوس لم يكن لنا معرفة بتأليف ... اللحن، ولو لم يكن أفرونيس لم يكن طيماوس*, understanding *μελοποιία* in the general sense of "musical composition", (*تأليف اللحن* ,

literally "composition of melodies"). Al-Kindī is in the dark (as was, no doubt, Astāt) concerning the identity of Phrynis and Timotheus, whom he apparently regards as father and son (they were not related, though both were fifth century Athenians associated with the development of the nome form of poetry; and cf. further, regarding them, the entries in Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encyclopadie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft, Zweite Reihe VI: 1331, no. 9 and XX: 1, p. 925). Al-Kindī's view of their relationship may well be based on his understanding of Astāt's use of kāna--for *γενεσθαι*--as connoting "to be born"; which

is a meaning of the Greek verb when predicated of persons. This again raises the possibility that al-Kindī consulted with Aṣṭāt to determine the possible meanings of difficult passages in the Greek (cf. above, 102.3-4 n.)

- 103.9 "our practice in all our compositions": **عادتنا في جميع موضوعاتنا**, as, e.g., in his treatise on the Almagest, in the introduction to which (fol. 56b) al-Kindī makes the same type of statement as that which follows (cf. Rosenthal, op. cit., p. 445). This method is one which Ptolemy says he practiced (cf. sources listed in note to 102.15-19 above), and while al-Kindī admits there that he is following Ptolemy's example, he omits this attribution here. It may well be that he assumes his auditors—and readers—are familiar with the Ptolemy work and/or method, having heard him lecture on it; and that mention of Ptolemy here is superfluous. Moreover, that this is (also) al-Kindī's method is indisputable, as evidenced from both these works and many others, in which predecessors' ideas are presented both with and without proper attribution.

- 103.11 "insofar as is possible for us": **بقدر طاقتنا** . Cf. 97.9 (and the second note there) above, and see too 102.6 above.

- 103.13 "acclaimed for speculation": **المتسمين بالنظر** . The fifth form of the verb well expresses al-Kindī's contempt for those

who consider themselves capable of reasoning properly. "Nazar" is used to express the dialectical process, "speculation" in the sense of general reasoning, the sense which is implied also in the terms ra'y and ijtihad below, line 15 (cf. EI¹, nazar, iii, 889). Though he does not mention by name the people against whom he is inveighing here, it is not difficult to deduce their identity, from this and the following lines. They must be the mu'tazila, sometimes called ahl al-nazar (cf. J. Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, Oxford, 1950, pp. 128, 258); men well known for their relatively extreme acceptance of the validity of reason in religious argument. As he does not go into detail, here or elsewhere, it is difficult to be certain what in particular al-Kindī objected to in the Kalām method (and cf. above, introduction pp. 72 ff., for further discussion). He is most certainly not criticising the use of reason, but rather what appears to him as its misuse.

103.14 "If they are crowned undeservedly with the miters of truth":

وإن تتوجوا بتيجان الحق من غير استحقاق . This

evoking of monarchic imagery is repeated in the following line and below at 104.4. Clearly, al-Kindī is referring to intellectuals who are in positions of authority (and cf. 104.5) and who enjoy royal approval, however unworthy of it they may be. The only theologians who were in this favored position at the time of

al-Kindi's composition of this treatise were the mu tazila (cf. above, introduction, p. 4). Therefore, barring the possibility that this is a later interpolation, the mu'tazila must be the objects of al-Kindi's indignation. This is, moreover, confirmed by internal evidence in the following lines.

4-104.1 "it is due to their narrow understanding of the methods of truth and their scant knowledge of what Majesty requires as regards opinion and judgement in those common universal usages which prevail among them":

لضيق فطنهم عن أساليب الحق
وقلة معرفتهم بما يستحق ذو الجدالة في الرأي
والاجتهاد في الأنفاع العامة الكل الشاملة لهم .

The "usages" which al-Kindi is deprecating are probably the arguments or locutions which preoccupy the mu'tazila, and which al-Kindi does not deign to call "proofs" or "definitions". His contention is that the mu'tazila have a narrow understanding of true methodology, and little knowledge of the dubious merits and serious limitations of "opinion" and "judgement", terms with which their method is associated.

Now while "opinion" (ra'y) and "judgement" (ijtihad) may be seen in the mu'tazila scheme as synonyms for individual reasoning in general (cf. Schacht, op. cit., pp. 98, 99), as used by al-Kindi, both should be contrasted with "knowledge" (ma'rifa), bearing in mind his definitions of ma'rifa and ra'y

elsewhere. In his treatise "On Definitions and Descriptions of Things", we read that "knowledge" (or "cognition", as Stern translates, Isaac Israeli, p. 54) is "an opinion which does not cease": **المعرفة رأى غير زائل** (AR I: 176); while

"opinion" is an "estimation which appears in word or writing. It is also said that it is a type of psychic belief, in one of two contradictory things, which can cease; and it is also said that it is estimation with the judgement established for the person judging, opinion thus being the resting of estimation":

الرأى هو الظنّ الظاهر في القول و الكتاب ، ويقال إنه اعتقاد النفس أحد شيئين متناقضين اعتقادا يمكن الزوال عنه ، ويقال إنه الظنّ مع ثبات القضية عند القاضي ، والرأى إذ ن سكون الظنّ . (AR I: 168, and compare Stern's translation, ibid.)

To these definitions should be added that of "estimation", said to be "a judgement of the apparent nature of a thing; not, it is said, of its true nature; and an explanation without proofs or demonstration, so that the person judging it may cease his judgement: **الظن هو القضاء على الشئ من الظاهر ،**

ويقال لا من الحقيقة ، والنبين من غير دلائل ولا برهان ، ممكن عند القاضي برها زوال قضيتة

(AR I: 171, and compare Stern's translation and comments, op. cit., pp. 63, 64.)

To al-Kindī, then, "opinion" is a kind of articulated

"estimation", an expressed view which may be strongly, but not necessarily correctly, held; and certainly not a view for which the holder has a logical demonstration. On the other hand, as "an opinion which does not cease", "knowledge" undoubtedly derives its permanence from conformity with the truth; a truth, it may be assumed, which can be rendered into "proofs or demonstration". In this connection it is worth noting that Isaac Israeli, who follows al-Kindī quite closely in these definitions, has one for "true knowledge" not found in the al-Kindī treatise extant, but which is certainly Kindian in derivation; "Definition of true knowledge: True cognition confirmed by syllogism and established by demonstration" (following Stern, *op. cit.*, p. 54). This is rendered in the original, as discovered by H. Hirschfeld, ("The Arabic Portion of the Cairo Genizah at Cambridge", *JQR* XV, 1903, p. 690) as: **חד אלעלם אלצאדק מערפֿה צאדקֿה** (י חקקֿה אלקיאס ויחבֿתֿה אלברוֿאן). Al-Kindī himself discusses "scientific syllogisms" **المقاييس العلمية**, elsewhere, describing the apodictic as those which are always true (**تجمع صرقاتظاهرا**) **ابدا وهذه هي البرهانية**, cf. "On the Quantity of the Books of Aristotle ...", *AR* I: 380, 381, also edited by M. Guidi and R. Walzer, *Studi su Al-Kindī* I, *op. cit.*, pp. 400, 401 Arabic, 415, 416 Italian; and translated into English by N. Rescher, "Al-Kindi's Sketch of Aristotle's Organon", *op. cit.*, pp. 54, 55). His criticism of the muṣtazila, therefore, is that they scant

demonstrative proofs and are not sufficiently aware of the logical inadequacy of their kind of reasoning, "general" in the sense of being non-apodictic.

103.15 "of what Majesty requires": **بما يستحق ذو الجلالة**, i.e., which methods merit being argued before the caliph or members of the royal family; al-Kindī implying that ra'y and ijtihad are not worthy of such an audience.

104.1 "as well as to the dirty envy which is a capability of their animal souls": **ولذات الحسد المتمكن من أنفسهم البرهمية**. Al-Kindī here begins to level a series of personal charges against his opponents, for which unfortunately we have little specific corroborating evidence. That the mu'tazila were generally intolerant and capable of cruel, inhuman acts has been mentioned in the introduction, as has the later indignity which al-Kindī suffered under al-Mutawakkil (see above, p. 4 f.). Clearly, the environment was such that suspicion and charges of deviationism, encouraged by personal slander, were rife. Al-Kindī attributes such behavior to a combination of jealousy, vested interests, and wrong ideas.

In referring to the "animal soul", al-Kindī is alluding to the tripartite Platonic division of the soul, which he discusses at greater length in his "Treatise on the Soul: A Summary of the Writing of Aristotle, Plato and Other Philosophers" (AR I: 273-280).

There the parts of the soul (called at p. 273 both "faculties" and "souls") are divided into the "rational", "spirited" and "appetitive", القوة العقلية ، الغضبية والسيروانية , the Platonic λογιστικόν, θυμοειδής and ἐπιθυμητικόν (cf. Republic IV: 439d 5 ff. and elsewhere). The "appetitive" faculty is then compared to a pig and the "spirited" to a dog, while the rational faculty is likened to an angel (AR I: 274, a passage which has also been retained among the sayings of al-Kindī collected by al-Sijistānī; cf. Atiyeh's edition of the Muntakhab Ṣiwān al-Hikmah, no. 5, pp. 218 Arabic, 240 English). Again, at the end of the treatise (p. 279), emotional indulgence is associated with animal behavior (طبع البرائم). Envy, one of such emotions, and as such a function of the "animal soul", is specifically referred to in al-Kindī's treatise On Definitions, where it is described as a consequence of an intemperate possessive desire (AR I: 178, 179, and cf. the Republic IX: 580d 10ff.; see too the second note below).

.04.2 "obscuring their thought's perception from the light of truth by darkening its veils" والحاجب بسدف سجوفه أبصار فكرهم

عن نور الحق . This sustains the literary metaphor and philosophical allusion of the preceding part of this sentence, and like it derives from either the "Treatise On the Soul" or a similar source. Throughout that treatise, and particularly in

AR I: 274-276, al-Kindī speaks of "the light of the Creator", نور البادى , from which the individual soul comes and to which it goes, when it separates itself from the body, i.e., from non-theoretical objects. The rational soul thus has as its natural object the radiant world of eternally true entities, and ultimately the Source of all truth.

- 104.3 "humanly virtues": الفضائل الإنسانية, by which al-Kindī would think of the four Platonic cardinal virtues (and probably subdivisions of them as well), which he gives as the meaning of this term in his treatise On Definitions and elsewhere; describing each with its excesses and deficiencies, and advocating for each observance of an Aristotelian mean, العدل (cf. AR I: 177-179, and al-Sijistānī, op. cit., nos. 104, 108, pp. 236, 238 Arabic, 256, 257 English). For Plato's σοφία, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη, al-Kindī has الحكمة, النجدة, العفة and العدل (and cf. R. Walzer, "Some Aspects of Miskawaih's Tahdhīb al-Akhlaq," Greek into Arabic, p. 224). These terms reappear in one saying attributed to al-Kindī (cf. al-Sijistānī, op. cit., no. 26, pp. 227, 228, English translation pp. 247, 248) which incorporates both his combined Aristotelian and Platonic moral philosophy and his Platonic trichotomy of the soul.

- 04.5 "due to their leadership and traffic in religion": للتروس والنجارة بالدين. As al-Kindī makes clear here and in the

following lines, his opponents are in power, and he boldly calls for their ouster, accusing them of corruption, hypocrisy, intolerance and opposition to the truth. The very boldness of this attack upon the mu'tazila, however brief and unsustained it may be, raises the possibility that this entire section may be a later insertion, written by al-Kindī after their fall from power and his fall from favor, in an attempt to ingratiate himself with the new religious officialdom. Against this view, however, it should be noted that there is no peculiarly Kalām position taken in these remarks, nothing said either for or against the eternity of the Qu'rān, Divine attributes, etc. Moreover, al-Kindī's criticisms are equally valid against the mu'tazila and their theological opponents, since they largely shared the same methods of reasoning and had common attitudes to a state religion and to dissent.

There is, therefore, no reason why al-Kindī should not have spoken so against the mu'tazila while they were in office, particularly since he too enjoyed at that time the protection of the caliph and would not have been suspected of actually plotting politically against the official religion. In addition, as an advocate of tolerance for diverse ideas, al-Kindī would have been incensed by the charges of heresy and unbelief, Kufr, which the mu'tazila threw at their opponents (cf. Goldziher, Vorlesungen, op. cit., pp. 114-116); and though the charge was officially

proffered only against those who did not accept the createdness of the Qu'rān and other theological dogmas, we may gather from al-Kindī's response that many mu'tazila had neither a kind word for philosophy proper nor for a particular philosopher.

- 4.5² "لأن من تجر بشيء: "for one who trades in something buys it", بأع, reflecting the material as well as social benefits normally enjoyed by those holding state-supported religious office. Al-Kindī apparently spurned such official perquisites, and was reportedly taken to task for not trying, among other places, to earn a living at court (cf. al-Sijistānī, op. cit., pp. 221 Arabic, 242 English).
- 4.8-9 "In the knowledge of the true nature of things with precautions against it." The benefits of true knowledge for both moral philosophy and metaphysics are also proclaimed in On the Soul (AR I: 275, echoed by al-Sijistānī, op. cit., pp. 218, 219 Arabic, 240 English), showing again the influence of that treatise on al-Kindī's thinking in this section.
- 4.10 "the true messengers": الرسيل الصادقة, viz., the prophets (and particularly, of course, Muḥammad), whose message which follows is simplified so as to be compatible with philosophy. In this accommodation al-Kindī is apparently prepared to minimize the particular dogmas and "principles of faith" which the

theologians and traditionalists emphasized. His very formulation of religious "essentials" shows a rational bias.

105.2 "and that which we shall say now": **ولما نحن قائلون الآن**

The following argument was attributed in antiquity to Aristotle's Protrepticus (cf. R. Walzer, Aristotelis Dialogorum Fragmenta, (Firenze, 1934), no. 2, pp. 22-24, English translation by Sir David Ross, The Works of Aristotle, Vol. XII, Select Fragments (Oxford, 1952), no. 2, pp. 27-29), and is found in a number of late Greek as well as Syriac writers (cf. Walzer, "Un Frammento Nuovo di Aristotele", Greek into Arabic, p. 45 n.5). Al-Kindī undoubtedly came across it in the same introduction to philosophy which has served him above, 97.8 ff. (cf. Elias, op. cit., p. 3. 17-23, David, op. cit., 9. 2-12); he thus returns at the end of this chapter to the source under whose influence he began it.

105.18 "imploring the support of the patron of virtues and recipient of good works": **بتأييد ولي الخيرات وقابل الحسنات**, viz., al-Mu'tasim Billāh.

Chapter II: Notes

106.1,2 Chapter Two of the First Part of "The First Philosophy":

الفن الثاني وهو الجزء الأول في الفلسفة الأولى

(literally "The Second Article, being the First Part in 'The First Philosophy'"), following the phrasing of chapter 3 below, p. 123. Fann, which I translate as "chapter" and, "literally", as "article" (for the more usual "kind" or "species"), is probably a translation of *τέχνη* ; it might be used to connote the introduction of another system or "art" of discussing the subject, a "treatise", though not a totally independent one, on the theme (cf. n. 106.3² below).

106.3¹ "that which ought to precede": ما يجب تقديمه, viz., an introduction which has contained a definition of philosophy and an enumeration of the various types of causes; as well as a general appreciation of previous philosophers and of philosophical endeavor.

106.3² "let us follow this with what follows naturally": فلنقل
ذلك بما يتلوه تلوا طبيعيا, viz., specific arguments
employing philosophical methods and definitions.

106.5,6 "there are two kinds of human perceptions; one of which is

الوجود للإنسان وجودان: "nearer to us and further from nature" Cf. Post. An. I

أحدهما أقرب منا و أبعد عند الطبيعة
2 72a 1-5, "I mean that objects nearer to sense (τὰ
أقرب إلى الحس; ἔγγυτερον τῆς αἰσθησεως;

in the translation of Abū Bishr Mattā, ed. A. Badawī, Mantiq
Aristū (Cairo 1949) III: 314) are prior and better known to us;

objects without qualification prior and better known are those
further (from sense, τὰ πορρώτερον, أكثر بعدا).

The greatest universals (τὰ καθόλου μάλιστα; الأمور
الكلية خاصة) are furthest from sense, while particulars

are nearest." Compare this with Physics I 1 184a 16, "the natural
way (of determining the principles of Physics) is to proceed from
the things which are more knowable and clearer to us, to those

which are clearer and more knowable by nature" (πέφυκε δὲ
ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῶν ἡ ὁδὸς καὶ σαφεστέρων
ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα; ومن

شأن الطريق أن يكون من الأمور التي هي أعرف وأبين
عندنا ، إلى الأمور التي هي أبين وأعرف عند
الطبيعة , in the translation of Ishāq ibn Hunain, ed.

A. Badawī (Cairo, 1964) I: 3).

Al-Kindī's statement is compounded terminologically of
elements of both these sources, even as his ensuing remarks draw
upon both books as well as portions of the De Anima and Metaphysics
(and see, in this particular connection, Met. I 2 982a 21). It

is likely that he was helped to this eclectic approach by some commentary to one or more of these books. We know that, except for the Metaphysics, these works were known in al-Kindī's time primarily through commentaries, often brief epitomes (see Peters, op. cit., pp. 17 ff, 31 ff. and 40 ff.).

106.7¹ "from the beginning of our development": منذ بدء نشوئنا.

Cf., e.g., Met. I 1 980a 28, "by nature animals are born with the faculty of sensation".

106.7² "the sensation common to all animals": الحس العام لجميع

الحيوان. Cf. De An. II 2 413b 2, "but it is sensation primarily which constitutes the animal", τὸ ἐκ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς

ἀλλοθιότητος πρώτης ; وأما الحيوان فإنه يقدم على غيره من الأحياء من أجل حسه

(in the translation ascribed to Ishāq ibn Hunain by A. Badawī, Aristotelis de Anima

(Cairo, 1954), p. 32; an attribution which is, however, suspect

(see R. Frank, "Some Fragments of Ishāq's Translation of the De

Anima", Cahiers de Byrsa, (1958-59), VIII, 231-234).). See too

De Gen. Anim. II 23 731b 4.

106.8¹ "contact": mubāshara, without the connotation of "direct

contact" or "touch", which would eliminate the significance of

the media through which all perceptions are transmitted (cf. De

An. II 7 418a 26 ff.; 419a 25.)

106.8² "blā zaman (perceiving is) timeless and without duration":
 ولا مؤونة These attributes of sense perception, as the predicates of "continuous motion" and "indivisible change" below in lines 11 and 12, appear to reflect certain remarks Aristotle makes in *De An.* III 6 and 7 (for the disjointed character of which chapters cf. D. Ross' edition, (Oxford, 1961) pp. 48, 49). While Aristotle's subject is ostensibly intellection, much of what he says is applicable to sensation as well, since he says that "sensation is like simple assertion or thought" (*De An.* III 7 431a 8). Now in 6 430b 29 Aristotle says that "the seeing of a proper object (of sight) is always true", while in 430a 26 he remarks that "the thinking of indivisible objects ($\tau\omega\nu \alpha\delta\iota\alpha\kappa\rho\acute{\epsilon}\tau\omega\nu$, or, as Ross suggests, *loc. cit.* and in his note to this passage, p. 299, "unitary objects") occurs among things concerning which there can be no falsehood." Thus simple perception **is** like basic, i.e., non-composite, intellection; and the indivisible time in which the mind, by an indivisible action, is said to think indivisible intelligibles (cf. 430b 6 and 14), may be equally said of sensation.

06.9¹ "due to the motion": li-ziwāl, in the sense here, and at line 11 below, of an evanescent, fleeting motion.

06.9² "its change in every case being through one of the kinds of motion":
 , وتبدله في كل حال بأحد أنواع الحركات:

viz., alteration. Al-Kindī uses "change" and "motion" here in a loose, synonymous sense, as below at 118.19 (and cf. n. 118.19¹). Aristotle says in De An. II 5 416b 33 that "sensation consists in being moved and acted upon ... for it is held to be some sort of alteration" (ἁλλοίωσις, إستحالة, (Badawī, op. cit., p. 41), for which term cf. n. 113.11¹ below).

106.10 "Its quantity is differentiated by "more" or "less", "equal"

and "unequal", while its quality is contrasted by "similar" and "dissimilar", "stronger" and "weaker": وتفاضل الكمية

فيه بالأكثر والأقل والتساوي، وتغاير الكيفية
فيه بالشبيه وغير الشبيه، والأشد والأضعف

i.e., one object of sensation as perceived is compared with

another by various criteria. "Equality" and "inequality", τὸ

ἴσον καὶ ἄνισον (مساوي وغير مساوي) in K.

Georr's edition of Ishāq ibn Hunain's translation, Les Categories

D'Aristote ... (Bejrouth, 1948), p. 332) are particularly

predicated of quantity by Aristotle in Cat. 6. 6a 27; while at 5b

14 "much" and "little", τὸ πολὺ and ὁ ὀλίγος (الكثير

والقليل, Georr, p. 330) are considered applicable as relative

predicates. At Cat. 8. 11a 15 Aristotle mentions the "similar"

and "dissimilar", ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια (الشبيه وغير

الشبيه, Georr, p. 344) as the distinctive predicates of quality;

while the predicates of "more" and "less", τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ

٢٢٥٧ (الأكثر والأقل, *ibid.*) are also used, in 10b 26 as general predicates of quality. Al-Kindī mentions "little" and "much" (القليل والكثير) among the predicates of quantity below at 146.12, while in "On Definitions" (AR I: 167) he defines quantity and quality by their distinctive above-mentioned Aristotelian predicates. Al-Kindī is reported to have written two works on the Categories (cf. Fihrist, p. 256, and see Peters, *op. cit.*, p. 11), and, in his brief description of its contents in On the Quantity of Aristotle's Books, he mentions similarity and dissimilarity as predicates of quality (cf. AR I: 365; ed. M. Guidi and R. Walzer, Studi I, pp. 391 Arabic, 405 Italian; N. Rescher's English translation, "Al-Kindī's Sketch of Aristotle's Organon," *op. cit.*, p. 51 (reading "shape" (shakl) for "shade").).

Thus, if al-Kindī did not find these various remarks already brought together in a commentary, it could have occurred to him naturally to elaborate on the nature of perception by using criteria taken from the Categories; even as his next association, dealing with the internal mechanics of sensation, could have come to him from a familiarity with the De Anima tradition.

106.12,13 "It (sc. sensory perception) is that which establishes its forms in the imagination and it (sc. the imagination) conveys them to the memory; and it (sc. the sensible object) is represented and portrayed in the soul of (all) living beings: وهو الذي تثبت صورته في المصور، فيؤديها إلى الحفظ، فهو

 , i.e., both men and animals perceive along similar lines, animals too having an imaginative faculty and related memory (cf. De An. III 10 433a 11, De Mem. I 450a 12-15; and see H. Wolfson's classification of the various terms used to describe the imagination and memory in their various aspects, in "The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophic Texts", Harvard Theological Review XXVIII (1935), pp. 130-133. In comparing the lists of Arabic terms with al-Kindī's usages here and elsewhere (see below), we may conclude that his classification is along broad, general lines, though he probably understood the functions of the various internal senses as multiple.). It is, in fact, the "sensational" aspect of imagination, *φαντασία αἰσθητική* , which animals share with men, to which al-Kindī is particularly referring in this sentence, ignoring its more "rational" or "deliberative" character, *φαντασία λογιστική* or *βουλευτική* (cf. De An. III 10 433b 29, 11 434a 5; though, as S. Van den Bergh points out, in Averroes' Tahāfut al-Tahāfut (London, 1954), II: 189, note to p. 334.6, Aristotle recognized that sensation is never completely without a rational element); and it is the latter function which in man prepares his perceptions for comprehension by the intellect. That al-Kindī was familiar with this rationalizing role of the imagination is evident from his definition of

tawahhum (ordinarily rendered as "estimation" but used by al-Kindī as the equivalent of "imagination" in the broad sense) in On Definitions (AR I: 167): "it is fantāsiyā, a psychic faculty which apprehends sensory forms in the absence of their matter.

It is also said that fantāsiyā, which is the imagination, is the presenting of the forms of sensible things in the absence of their matter".

التوهم هو المفنطاسيا ، قوة نفسانية .
ومدرسة للصورة الحسية مع غيبة طينتها ، ويقال
المفنطاسيا ، وهو التخيل ، وهو حضور صور الأشياء
المحسوسة مع غيبة طينتها . This point is repeated in
his treatise On the Essence of Sleep and Vision في ماهية

النوم والرؤيا (AR I: 295, Latin translation by Gerard of Cremona, Liber de somno et visione, ed. A. Nagy, Die Philosophischen Abhandlungen des Ya'qūb ben Ishāq al-Kindī (Münster, 1897), pp. 13, 14), where the imaginative faculty (القوة المصورة, virtus formativa) is differentiated from the senses by its role as an abstracting agent ("despoiler" in the terminology used by A. Altmann, who translates this passage in his and Stern's Isaac Israeli, p. 144; cf. the entire discussion of the history of this faculty there, and of al-Kindī's influence on others in dream theory, pp. 142-145.)

Thus it cannot be insignificant that al-Kindī here chooses to refer to a view of sense perception which ostensibly has nothing to do with the intellect; and that he mentions two of

the "internal senses" but omits the third and, for man, the most important, viz., the rational faculty, in which perceptions normally culminate. This glaring omission must be due to his desire to draw a sharp contrast between sensory and intellectual perceptions; and to construct a philosophy along lines that are "purely" logical and demonstrative.

107.2-4 "The other ... universal and particular". See above, 106.5,6, and the quotation from Post. An. I 2 72a 4 quoted in the note there. Cf. too De An. II 5 417b 22, "actual sensation apprehends individuals, while knowledge apprehends universals."

107.4 "things are universal and particular" **الأشياء كلية وجزئية**; i.e., the totality of things is composed of universal and particular objects; alternatively, and more probably, al-Kindī's intention is to say that objects are either universal or particular.

107.4,5 "I mean by "universal" the genera of species and the species of individuals; while I mean by "particular" the individuals of species" **أعني بالكلى الأجناس للأنواع ، والأنواع للأشخاص** species" **وأعني بالجزئية الأشخاص للأنواع**. Al-Kindī is interested in defining his terms with logical precision; and he refers naturally to the relationship between genus, species and the specific difference constitutive of the individual with which he

was familiar from his acquaintance with the Isagoge and/or a commentary to it (cf. above, pp. 97.8, 101.5).

107.6-8 "Particular, material individuals ... human intellect. Cf. below, p. 154.17: "(Intellect) is the species of things ... as well as that which is above them. Individual things, on the other hand, are sensible"; and see the commentary there.

107.11 "for all representation is sensible", لأن المثل علما حسوسة. This is a tautology, in al-Kindī's use of the term "representation". As remarked above in the note to 106.12,13, al-Kindī apparently deliberately avoids acknowledgement of the traditional role of sensory perception, or "representation", in intellection. It appears that there is for him no epistemic bridge from genuine sensory perception to intellectual cognition. A similar impression is received from his treatise On the Intellect (AR I: 354, edited as well by R. McCarthy in Islamic Studies (1964) iii, pp. 112 Arabic, 126 English); as Stern remarks in assessing al-Kindī's treatment of the process of intellection there (Isaac Israeli, p. 38): "Al-Kindī explains how the objects of intellection present in the 'intellect in actuality' are communicated to the 'intellect in potentiality', and does not deal at all with the process of apprehension passing through the senses."

107.12 "Rather are the concepts verified in the soul, validated and rendered certain through the veracity of the intellectual principles which are known necessarily": بل مصدق في النفس ، محقق متيقن بصدق الأوائل العقلية المعقولة اضطراباً ، which principles, have little or nothing to do with the above classification of individuals, genera and species, being valid at all levels. Al-Kindī is thinking of universal propositions and the principles by which they are verified. Basic to these are the primary logical axioms or so-called "laws of thought", analytical propositions the truth of which must be intuited. He confuses the issue by referring to individual noetic concepts, many of which are ideas derived by induction, generalizations based upon the particular perceptions of our senses. Aristotle discusses both topics separately (cf. Post. An. I, 2, 3, De An. III 3, 4, 7, 8), distinguishing in effect between the process of acquiring ideas, and that of validating statements about such ideas, in which latter process the "scientific knowledge" obtained is essentially independent of sense perception (cf. Post. An. I 31 87b 27, and see W. Hammond's discussion of the role of sensory perception and logical premises in Aristotle's view of intellection, Aristotle's Psychology, London, 1902, pp. LXXVIII - LXXXII). Al-Kindī apparently blurs this distinction, despite his remarks below at 111.14 ff.; and the impression is that he seems to be reading the De Anima with a Posterior Analytics bias.

107.13 "as that "it is" and "it is not" cannot both be true of the

same thing without another (factor) present": **كبرولا هو**

غير صارقين في شيء بعينه ليس بغيري. Cf. Met. IV 3

1005b 19, "(the firmest of all first principles is) that it is

impossible for the same thing to belong and not to belong to the

same thing at the same time and in the same respect": **τὸ γὰρ**

αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον

τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό (in Astāt's translation,

Bouyges I: 346, **لا يمكن أن يكون شيء واحد في شيئين**,

(معا بكل جهة)). Contradiction is, moreover, defined

in Post. An. I 2 72a 12 as "an opposition which of itself excludes

any intermediate": **ἀντίφασες δὲ ἀντίθεσες ἧς οὐκ**

ἔστι μεταξὺ καθ' αὐτήν, of which the last part

of al-Kindī's sentence above - **بعينه ليس بغيري** - could

well be an echo. Interestingly, the Arabic translation of Abū

Bishr Mattā is corrupt here (unless we have an editorial lapse),

reading **وأما المناقضة فهي انطتاسس، أعني التقابل**

الذي الأوسط له بذاته (ed. Badawī, Mantiq Aristū II: 314).

It may thus be that this passage was not clearly transmitted to

the Arabs; and al-Kindī, whose familiarity with the text was

derivative anyway, could have had this sentence transmitted with

particular imprecision.

108.1 "Thus this perception of the soul is not sensory, is necessary,

فإن هذا وجود (and) does not require an intermediary":
 للنفس لاحسي، اضطراري، لا يحتاج إلى متوسط . Cf. Post.

An. I 2 71b 20. At 72a 8 Aristotle explains that an "immediate" premiss, (غير ذات الوسط , $\mu\epsilon\sigma\sigma\omicron\varsigma$), Badawī, op. cit., p. 314) is one to which no other is prior.

108.4 "The common sense will represent it in the soul": يمثله الحس
الكلي في النفس . Al-Kindī refers here and at line 8

below to the "common sense", $\kappa\omicron\mu\mu\eta\ \alpha\lambda\gamma\sigma\theta\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$, and from such meagre sources it is difficult to be certain how he understood the faculty, or if he saw it at all as a separate faculty.

Apparently, he makes no claim for the common sense other than as a medium of perception in the soul. He refers only to its function in the perception of sensibles and the "common sensibles" (cf. the following note), ignoring its other functions (for which cf. D. Ross' introduction to the De Anima, pp. 33-36). As he has already acknowledged the role of the senses and of imagination in sense perception, it would seem that his common sense is either identical with one or the other, or, as its name implies, functions between them. It is this latter role which Isaac Israeli gives to common sense: "It is intermediate between the corporeal sense of sight and the imaginative faculty, which resides in the anterior ventricle of the brain and is called fantāsiya. It is for this reason that it is called 'common sense' (החוש המשותף),

sensus communis), for it receives from the corporeal sense, i.e., that of sight, the corporeal aspects of things and transmits them to the spiritual sense, i.e., the imaginative faculty" (המצייר, formatum, following Altmann's translation of Israeli's "Book on the Elements", pp. 53, 54, in Isaac Israeli, pp. 135, 136; Latin and Hebrew passages given by H. Wolfson, "Isaac Israeli on the Internal Senses", Jewish Studies in memory of George A. Kohut, ed. S. Baron and A. Marx (New York, 1935), p. 584, n. 9). As Israeli is often indebted to al-Kindī, the master's understanding of common sense might be reflected in the disciple's explanation, hitherto described as "unique" (cf. Wolfson, op. cit., p. 585, Altmann, op. cit., p. 141).

On the other hand, the Israeli passage quoted above has the common sense transmitting corporeal images to the imagination, which faculty is to further refine them into intelligibles. Al-Kindī, however, is opposed to any such view (cf. line 10 below). Thus, our knowledge of his understanding of the common sense remains at present incomplete; while his reticence freed Israeli to expound his own explanation, which he probably thought was at least in part in keeping with al-Kindī's opinion.

108.5 "while everything which is immaterial may be perceived with

the material, as shape which is perceived through color": **وعلى**
ما هو لا هيولانى وقد يوجد مع الهيولانى، كالمسكلى الموجود

باللون . For the common sense's perception of (composite) corporeal images, involving discrimination between the objects of diverse senses, cf. De An. III 2 426b 12 ff., De sensu 7 449a 3 ff.; while for its perception of the "common sensibles" of rest, motion, number, shape, magnitude and time -which al-Kindī is apparently referring to as "everything immaterial"- cf. De An. II 6 418a 17, III 1 425a 16, 3 428b 22 and De Mem. 1 450a 10.

108.8 "It is sometimes believed that it (sc. shape) is represented in the soul through the common sense's acquiring of it": **وقد يُظن أنه يتمثل في النفس باجتلاب الحس الكلى له** . This is the Aristotelian view (cf. the preceding note), that the common sensibles are perceived with and through the perceptions of particular sensibles. Though their being perceived is a function of the general perceptive faculty of the sense, and not, e.g., of sight qua sight (cf. Ross, op. cit., p. 33), the common sensibles are considered as perceived representationally.

108.10 "(However) in the perception of the limit, which is the shape, an intellectual perception, which is not really sensible, occurs to the sense": **(ف) بوجود النهاية التي هي الشكل ، وجود : إلى الحس** . **عقلي عرض بالحس لا محسوس بالحقيقة** .

This goes beyond Aristotle's position, as outlined in the preceding note, and effectively transforms the sense (when functioning as a common sense with common sensibles) into an

intelligent faculty. This is quite the opposite of Aristotle's teaching that the soul never thinks, at least at first, without an image (cf. De An. III 7 431a 16, 8 432a 3). From the beginning, al-Kindī appears to be saying, there are no images, i.e., representations, of ideas; rather, intellection is an act never intertwined with sensory perception. The lower faculties of the soul are, in this view, elevated to the status of intellect; or, put another way, the intellect is extended into the senses, and man does not require (or have) sensory experiences, for knowledge of objects.

109.1 "the body of the universe": جسم الكل. An alternative translation of this phrase could be "the all (-encompassing) heavenly body", i.e., the outermost sphere of the universe, in which the universe is contained. This reading would rely both on al-Kindī's identification of الجسم الأقصى with الجسم الكل in his work titled Explanation of the Worship of the Uttermost Body (الجسم الأقصى) and its Obedience to God (AR I: 244 ff., and cf. p. 252), and the same treatise's explanation that a sphere (falak) is a jirm (p. 247). Though this is counter to his own definition of jirm as "that which has three dimensions (On Definitions I: 165), and to his use of this term as "corporeal body" in distinction to jism, which is reserved for "heavenly body" (cf. On the Soul I: 281-2, and see S. M. Stern's English translation

in Isaac Israeli, p. 43), al-Kindī actually uses both terms in both senses, as Stern has remarked (ibid., p. 48); cf., e.g., the use of (corporeal) jism in definitions of soul and place (On Definitions AR I: 165, 167). Nevertheless, in our present context it may well be that by jism a heavenly body/sphere is intended, since it is the outer limit of the universe which is the operative factor in discussions of the finitude of the universe "as a whole".

As against this, however, we must weigh the usages of the synonym jirm al-kull in contexts which seem to indicate that by al-kull the universe is meant; and that the term has been so understood is also shown by the titles of those treatises in which الجرم الكلّ appears, where الجرم العالم, "the body of the world" ("Weltkörper" in Flügel, Al-Kindī, p. 21 no. 13), is used as a synonym. Compare, e.g., AR I: 186 and 192; I: 201 and 203 (equal to On First Philosophy, p. 116). Moreover, al-kull by itself is used by al-Kindī as "the All", the whole of creation, i.e., the universe (I: 247).

The difference between these two possibilities is probably more semantic than real, for even if it were more accurate to translate الجسم الكلّ, and for that matter also الجرم الكلّ, as, e.g., "the uttermost sphere", that body is in effect treated as tantamount to the universe, of which it is the perimeter; and therefore al-Kindī probably used the term in its wider sense. A

parallel and precedent for this can be found in Aristotle's discussion of the various senses of the term *οὐρανός* in *De Caelo* I 9 278b 10 ff., which passage in translation may have served as the (ultimate) source for much of the terminology here (cf. A. Badawī's edition, (Cairo, 1961), pp. 191-194). Ibn Sīnā, incidentally, mentions the two senses of *kull* in his *On Definitions*, p. 81 (and quoted by Goichon also in her *Lexique* p. 349).

109.4 "it is something which only the intellect necessarily perceives":

وإنما هو شيء يجده العقل اضطرارا, though not

immediately. In accordance with the premise of 107.12 above, al-Kindī now proceeds to demonstrate the validity of this statement, using common philosophical definitions and axioms. His choice of this example is interesting, since it assumes quite a familiarity with questions of physics and cosmology; nor are the reasons with which he verifies the statement as self-contained and obvious as he might have wished. His interest in the subject matter of the example undoubtedly led al-Kindī to get ahead of himself at this point. In another treatise, رسالة... أن العناصر والجسم الأقصى,

بحرية الشكل, "That the Elements and the Outermost Body (of the universe) are Spherical in Form", al-Kindī uses this statement as a premise with which to prove the sphericity of the universe (cf. AR II: 49 f. translated by H. Khatchadourian and N. Rescher *Isis* 56 (1965) pp. 190 f., reprinted in the latter's *Studies in*

Arabic Philosophy, p. 10).

109.6 "the meaning of "void" is a place without any spatial object in it": الخلاء مكان لا متمكن فيه. Al-Kindī has a word play not found in the original Greek definition (Physics IV 7 213b 31, τὸ κενὸν τόπος εἶναι ἐν τῷ μηδέν ἔστω, in Ishāq ibn Hunain's translation, ed. A. Badawī, (Cairo 1964) I: 347: الخلاء هو مكان ليس فيه شيء أصلاً). In the Physics passage cited, Aristotle proceeds to reject the existence of a void, showing that it is incompatible with the movements of bodies. In De Caelo I 9 279a 11 ff., he argues against the existence of a void outside the heaven -understanding void as the place of a potential body- on the grounds that the properties of a body (such as place, void and time) which cannot itself exist outside the heaven (as explained in De Caelo I 9 278b 21 ff.) cannot exist either. Al-Kindī ignores this distinction between potential and actual body, and the relative sense in which "void" is a meaningful term, though one which may be rejected on physical grounds. Instead, he treats the term in a purely logical, abstract manner, in keeping with his stated theory. He is admittedly thinking of the void in an absolute sense, in which there is no distinction between potentiality and actuality; and it is only in this sense, as related to a logically impossible "object-less" place beyond the universe, that his reasoning is valid.

109.7 "Now "place" and "a spatial object" are in that type of relation where one does not precede the other". Cf. Physics IV 4 210b 34 ff., and particularly 212a 20, in which place is defined as "the innermost motionless boundary of what contains", τὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος πέρασ ἀκίνητον πρῶτον.

109.11 "fullness, if it exists, is body". والملاء إذا كان هو جسم. Cf. De Caelo I 9 278b 21 ff.. Aristotle argues that "there neither is nor can there come into being any body outside the heaven", since the physical movements of all bodies, which are briefly mentioned, preclude such a possibility. In contrast, al-Kindi offers no physical argument in support of this statement, that there is no body outside the universe. He concentrates rather upon the logical entailments of "infinite body"; which is, for reasons he has yet to give (cf. below, 115.1 ff.), a self-contradictory term.

110.7 "beyond nature": فوق الطبيعة, i.e., metaphysical objects; compare al-Kindi's use of ما فوق الطبيعة in his Almagest paraphrase, as discussed by Rosenthal in "Al-Kindi and Ptolemy", op. cit., p. 440.

110.9 "Remember ... this preface": فاحفظ ... هذه المقدمة. This appeal does not conclude al-Kindi's general remarks, which continue until 112.19. He may have inserted this paragraph both for didactic and/or rhetorical, stylistic purposes, and to serve as

well as a transition to a theme which, while related to the foregoing, may well be taken from a different source.

110.12 "By these two ways is the truth on the one hand easy and on

the other hand difficult": **فإن برأتين السبيلين كان**
الحق من جربة سريلا ومن جربة عسرا Cf. Met.

II 1 993a 30, "the investigation of truth is in one way difficult,

in another easy", **ἡ περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας θεωρία τῇ**
μὲν χαλεπῇ τῇ δὲ ἥδύα (**ال... أن النظر في الحق**)

من جربة عسر ومن جربة سريلا in Astāt's trans-

lation, Bouyges I: 3). Aristotle, however, goes on to explain

that it is difficult to be precise about a particular part of the

truth which is being studied, though it is easy to say something

true in general. Al-Kindī, however, intends something else in

referring to "two ways" by which the truth is easy and difficult,

viz., the right way by which it is easy (use of the intellect),

and the wrong way, by which it is difficult (use of the senses).

110.13 "as is the dim vision of the eye of the bat in the rays of the

sun", **عشاء عين الوطواط ... في شعاع الشمس**, sun"

Cf. Met. II 1 993b 8, "for as the eyes of bats are to the blaze

of day", **ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ τῶν νυκτερίδων ὄμματα**

πρὸς τὸ φέγγος (apparently translated by Astat as **فكما**

حال عيون الوطواط عند ضوء النهار, Bouyges I: 4, while

Ishāq ibn Hunain translates **يشبه حال عيون الخفاش**

عند ضياء الشمس.) Al-Kindī, however, again modifies his source, since Aristotle's simile compares the bat's natural difficulty of seeing during the day with the intellect's natural difficulty of comprehending the causes and principles of all things; while for al-Kindī, the bat's daytime vision is to our vision as our sensory perception of intelligibles is to our intellection of them. Philosophy is not difficult, for al-Kindī, if properly pursued.

110.17 "Instruction is easy only in customary things": فإن التعليم
 إنما يكون سهلا في المعتادات. Cf. Met. II 3 994b 32,
 "the way we receive a lecture depends on our custom", δ' αὖ
 ἀκροάσεως κατὰ τὰ ἔθη συμβαίνουσιν والتعليم
 المسموع إنما يكون على ما اعتدنا, in Astāt's translation,
 Bouyges I: 42). Al-Kindī deviates from the following Aristotelian
 passage by mentioning only traditional Islamic forms of instruction,
 not, e.g., mathematics, which is introduced as a separate subject.
 From his prior emphasis upon the intellectual approach to truth,
 and the context of these remarks, it appears that al-Kindī is
 here being critical, however discreetly, of the element of universal
 scientific truth in the Hadīth literature, and by implication of
 the traditional learning based upon it.

110.19-111.1 "mathematical investigation ... is suitable only in what
 has no matter": الفحص التعليمي ينبغي أن يكون فيما لا

هـيولى له . Cf. Met. II 3 995a 15, the Arabic of which (Bouyges I: 49), though in a damaged state, is similar in its use of الفحص التعليمى.

111.1 الهوىلى موضوعة: "matter is a substratum for affection": للانفعال. This is similar to al-Kindī's definition of matter in his treatise On Definitions (AR I: 166): "matter": a faculty which is a substratum for the bearing of forms; an affection (الهوىلى - قوة موضوعة لحمل الصور، منفعة). Cf. Met. VIII 1 1042a 32.

111.2 "and nature is the primary cause of everything which moves and rests": والطبيعة علة أولية لكل متحرك ساكن. With this may be compared al-Kindī's definition of nature in On Definitions (p. 165): "nature is the principle of motion and of rest from motion. It is the first of the faculties of the soul" الطبيعة - ابتداء حركة وسكون عن حركة، وهو أول (قوى النفس). In his treatise An Explanation that the Nature of the Sphere is Different from the Natures of the Four Elements (AR II: 40, 41), terrestrial nature is defined in terms similar to those in our treatise. This definition of nature may be found in Aristotle's Physics II 1 192b 13.

111.4 الفحص الرياضى: "mathematical investigation", used as a synonym for الفحص التعليمى just above, indicating al-Kindī's

inconsistent usages.

111.8 "cause of the natural dispositions": **علة الطباع**, literally, "the cause of the natures".

111.9 "The Principles of Physics": **أوائل الطبيعة**, a missing work of al-Kindī's, possibly equivalent to his "Book on the Action and Affection of First Natures" **كتاب في الفاعلة والمنفوعة من** (الطبيعيات الأولى), or the "Book on the Principles of Sensible Things" (**كتاب في أوائل الأشياء المحسوسة**) mentioned in the Fihrist I: 256. The work is perhaps, at least in part, a summary of Physics III 1-3. Cf. 1 200b 12 ff.

111.11 "For it is not possible that something should be the cause of its own generation, as we shall explain shortly". **لأن ليس يمكن أن يكون الشيء علة حون ذاته غما سنبين بعد قليل**. Cf. below, 123.3 ff.

111.14 "We ought not to seek for a demonstrative finding in the apprehension of every pursuit": **وقد ينبغي أن لا نطلب في إدراك كل مطلوب الوجود البرهاني**. "Finding" is used in the sense of "apprehension" (cf. E. W. Lane's Arabic-English Lexicon (London, 1863-93), p. 2924, for "wujūd" as "finding by means of the intellect"). This intellectual apprehension is the sense of "perception" for wujūd in 106.5, 107.2, 112.2, etc. Cf., for the following lines in the text, Anal. Post. I 3 72b 18 f.

112.1,2 "If there would be a demonstration for every demonstration, then there would never be perception of anything": **إن كان لكل برهان برهان فلا يكون لشيء وجود البتة**, since one cannot traverse an infinite series (cf. Anal. Post. I 3 72b 10), and thus there never would be a premise (which is what is meant here by "demonstration") which could be known.

112.3 "Thus, if we desired to know what is man": **لأن إن رما علم ما الإنسان**. Al-Kindī here illustrates his argument for the impossibility of an infinite regress of premises, using the predicates of a definition as premises of a proposition. Now while the terms of a definition do have to be understood for the definition to be intelligible, they are not in themselves axioms of thought, the primary premises which are themselves indemonstrable. We may therefore assume that al-Kindī is thinking of the definition as a whole, in which the predicates, when taken together, are intuitively grasped as befitting the subject. It is the definition which is the primary premise of a syllogistic demonstration, and this particular definition which is one of the most commonly used in syllogisms. In viewing this definition, however, as an axiom of thought, al-Kindī would seem to be saying that not only can our reasoning about the activities of things be true, but our very grasp of the essential nature of things is also, and necessarily, true. This sense of conviction in the

veracity of his description of the nature of things permeates this work.

112.4 "he being that which is living, speaking and mortal": **الذى هو: الحى الناطق اليت**, the $\zeta\eta\omicron\nu\ \lambda\omicron\gamma\epsilon\kappa\omicron\nu\ \theta\nu\eta\tau\omicron\nu$ of Porphyry (cf. the Isagoge, ed. Busse, CAG IV/1 10.12, 11.16, pp. 1041, 1047 in Badawī's edition of Al-Dimashqī's translation, Mantiq Aristū III); which appears, naturally, among Porphyry's commentators (cf. Elias, op. cit., 4.17, 44.14; David, op. cit., 2.4, 11.22). Al-Kindi defines mankind, **الإنسانية**, in these same terms in On Definitions (AR I: 179). As is made clear there by definitions of the angelic and animal realms, mortality distinguishes man from the angels ("gods" in Porphyry, op. cit., 10.13, missing entirely from the Arabic translation, p. 1041).

112.6 "we should not pursue probable (literally "persuasive") arguments in mathematical sciences": **ينبغى أن [لا] نطلب** . **الدقائعات فى العلوم الرياضية**. This remark and the following two paragraphs have their origin in Met. II 3, to which other sources may have been added. Thus in Eth. Nich. I 3 1094b 25 Aristotle states that "it is equally foolish to accept probable reasoning ($\pi\epsilon\theta\alpha\nu\omicron\ \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\upsilon\nu\tau\omicron\varsigma$) from a mathematician, and to demand scientific proofs from a rhetorician" (and cf. the Theaetetus, 162e 7).

112.10 "some proceeding in accord with parables, some proceeding in

accord with historical witness": وبعضهم جرى على عادة . Cf. الأمثال ، وبعضهم جرى على عادة شهادات الأخبار

Met. II 3 995a 7, "(some people do not accept statements ...)

unless they are expressed by way of examples, while others demand

that a poet be quoted as a witness": οἱ δ' αὖ μὴ
 παραδειγματικῶς, οἱ δὲ μάρτυρα ἀξιοῦσιν
 ἐπάγεσθαι ποιητῶν (in Astāt's translation, Bouyges I:

ومنهم من لا يقنع إن لم يكن القول بأمثال ، 44, 45: (ومنهم من يريد أن يوتى بشهادة شاعر على ما قيل

Al-Kindī has here rendered Aristotle, with a minimum of modification, in cultural terms which would have been familiar to a Moslem audience. Thus, Aristotle's "examples" taken from everyday life (in which sense the paradeigma should be understood; cf. Ross' note to his edition of the Met. I: 220) is probably understood by al-Kindī as denoting "parables" or possibly "proverbs", genres of literature and instruction common in Islam. (Though amthāl can mean either "example" or "proverb" and "parable", and as such it is a fortuitous choice for translation of paradeigma, it would appear that the Arab reader, unfamiliar with the Platonic Dialogues or other examples of "paradigmatic discussion", would have understood the term in the latter sense. That this may have been the intention of Astāt is rendered possible by the second translation of this passage, that by the normally careful Ishāq ibn Hunain. He translates (Bouyges I: 44) the παραδειγματικῶς of the

above passage as *شهادة الجماعة* (shahāda al-jamā'a), "collective witness"; which could only have meant, to a Moslem, the *ijmā'* or "agreement" of the community of believers.)

This Islamicization of the text is more evident in al-Kindī's use of "historical witness", literally "witnesses of events" (or of the "stories" of these events), for Aristotle's "poetic witness". Al-Kindī's audience would have understood the phrase as alluding to reports of individual events, rendered as stories or anecdotes; and to the chain of transmitters which precedes the story and testifies to its accuracy. In this form, well delineated by al-Kindī's time, the *akhbar* genre of literature resembles that of the *ḥadīth*, and like it often dealt with stories of the Prophet or of battles fought (cf. F. Rosenthal, *A History of Muslim Historiography* (Leiden, 1952) pp. 10-11, 59-63). It was common too to include poetic insertions in the prose story, and this element, (in which the authority of the poet is in effect subordinated to that of other (prosaic but pious) witnesses) may have served al-Kindī as the bridge for his translation of a Greek cultural norm into an Islamic one.

112.15¹ "nor sensation or exemplification in the science of the metaphysical": *ولا في العلم إلا لى حسا ولا تمثيلا*, i.e., there should be no sensory representation of any kind, neither directly nor by way of metaphor or parable, in the pursuit

of metaphysics, **العلم الإلهي** ; literally "theology", used as a synonym of "metaphysics" (cf. Met. VI 1 1026a 19 (Bouyges, II: 707)).

112.15² "nor conceptual generalizations in the principles of the science of the physical": **ولا في أوائل العلم الطبيعي** , i.e., the principles of physics, the basic notions of form and matter, movement, the elements, etc., should be determined by empirical evidence, induction based upon sense data; and not by logical constructs and analytical propositions. While paying lip service to this idea, al-Kindī does not actually show, here or elsewhere, any particular interest in the experimental empirical approach to physical matters.

112.19 "we ought to set forth beforehand the canons the employment of which we require in this craft": **فينبغي أن نقدم القوانين** : **التي نحتاج إلى استعمالها في هذه الصناعة** . Al-Kindī now proceeds to give a number of attributes of the eternal, which he apparently considers to be a unique being. Understood as an allusion to the True One, i.e., God, these remarks anticipate in part the conclusions of this treatise, pp. 161 f. The remarks are presented here as logical statements, analytical propositions from which the subsequent discussion of things which are not eternal derives (and cf. the use of **قوانين العقل** in the Plotinian-based **رسالة في العلم الإلهي** , Epistola de

Scientia Divina, ed. Badawī, Plotinus apud Arabes p. 171; translated by Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 299: 4.16). The statements themselves spell out in somewhat redundant detail a number of mostly Aristotelian conclusions about the eternal, as well as a notion of the uniqueness of the eternal which may have come from Neoplatonic reflections upon the One or from John Philoponus' attitude to eternity. Declarations of the unique, uncaused, unchanging, self-sufficient One, or God, are of course scattered throughout the writings of the Church Fathers and mutakallimūn. It would seem, however, that al-Kindī is following a philosophical rather than theological formulation of the eternal, since his description lacks the more personal and volitional themes of the latter (cf., for example, al-Ash'arī's Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn, ed. H. Ritter, *op. cit.*, p. 177).

113.1-114.8 "the eternal is ... perfect". The information contained in these three paragraphs may be summarized as follows: the eternal has always existed and will always exist; it is independent of any cause; its being is simple and unique, changeless and perfect. With this description may be compared the definition of the eternal given in On Definitions (AR I: 169): "the eternal is that which has never been non-existent; it does not require another for its subsistence, and that which does not require another for its subsistence has no cause, while that which has

الأزلي - الذي لم يكن ليس ، "no cause endures forever":
 وليس يحتاج في قوامه إلى غيره ، والذي لا يحتاج
 في قوامه إلى غيره فلا علة له ، وما لا علة له
 فرائم أبدا . While there is overlapping of these concepts in

the sources, cf., for example, the view of the ungenerated and imperishable nature of the eternal in Physics IV 12 221b 2, De Caelo I 12 281b 25, Met. XII 7 1072a 21, Eth. Nich. VI 3 1139b 24; for the view of the eternal as self-sufficient and uncaused, Met. XII 7 1072b 28, XIV 4 1091b 18, Enneads V 4 1 (ed. Henry and Schwyzer II: 332, and cf. Lewis' translation there, p. 333, of the equivalent passage in the Arabic Plotinus corpus, ed. Badawī, op. cit., p. 179), al-Ash'arī's Maqālāt, p. 484, and al-Khayyat's K. al-Intisār, ed. A. Nader, op. cit., p. 80; for the view of the eternal as the one, unique, changeless, perfect being, cf. the last mentioned sources, as well as -in a tradition that may be traced to Parmenides' reflections upon the nature of being (preserved in Simplicius' commentary on the Physics CAG IX 145, 1 ff.; as quoted by Kirk and Raven, The PreSocratic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1966) p. 273)- the Arabic Plotinian passages in Badawī, pp. 112 and 186 (Lewis, pp. 271 and 474); and see too John of Damascus' De Fide Orthodoxa (ed. Migne, PG 94), I: 4, English translation by F. Chase Jr., Saint John of Damascus: Writings, The Fathers of the Church, Vol. 37 (New York, 1958), p. 170 f.

Now, Neoplatonic thought depicts the One as not the only eternal being, though its nature is beyond all comprehension and comparison, even with the other eternal hypostases; while kalām and Christian sources discuss the essence of God in relation to His attributes; and these are themes to which al-Kindī is not addressing himself. His depiction of the eternal as unique generically might, however, be an echo of John Philoponus' view of God as the only ungenerated being. We know that Philoponus attacked Aristotle on this point and rejected his doctrine of the eternity of the world (cf. Simplicius' commentary on the Physics, CAG X, 1141.11, 19 ff., 1144.24, "only the First is ungenerated and uncaused, μόνον τὸ πρῶτον ἀγενητόν ἐστι καὶ ἀναίτιον; and see Walzer, Greek into Arabic, p. 192). As we are approaching a section in which al-Kindī is clearly indebted to Philoponus, it is probable that these remarks already show his influence.

113.1 "which must never have been a non-existent being": الذى لم
يجب ليس هو مطلقا. Huwa, as huwiya, represents "being", as the fifth form tahawwaya of pp. 123 and 162 stands for "coming to be"; while laysa as "non-existent (being)", contrasted with aysa as "existent (being)" is used, e.g., in p. 123. Cf. below, note to 119.16.

113.3,4 "subject", "predicate", "agent", "reason": موضوع، محمول
فاعل، سبب: These four terms relate, as the allusion at

line 4 tells us, to the four types of causes mentioned above at 101.3, "material", "formal", "efficient", and "final". "Subject" and "predicate", while logical terms, entail substantive meanings: cf. the use of mawḍūʿ in 111.1 above, "matter is a mawḍūʿ (translated "substratum") for affection"; and see below, line 7, for mahmūl, "(the species) has a predicate (mahmūl), viz., the form". "Agent", fāʿil, is the word used in 101.3 and translated there as "efficient", while the definition of "reason", sabab, is the same given for the final cause, al-mutammina, there. Al-Kindī, if not simply presenting a partially different set of synonyms of causal terms, is here stating the physical correlates of causation; i.e., he is saying that the eternal is not caused since it has nothing with which causation is associated.

113.5 "a species being composed of its genus, which is common to it and to others, and of a specific difference which does not exist in others": والنوع مركب من جنسه العامي له ولغيره
ومن فصل ليس في غيره. At 107.4 f. above, al-Kindī has referred in passing to the relations between genus, species, and individuals, and here he elaborates somewhat on this theme, using material found ultimately in Porphyry and his commentators (cf. the Isagoge, CAG IV/1, 4.2, 13.23; in the Arabic edited by Badawī, op. cit., pp. 1027, 1052). Al-Kindī's view of the eternal as unique is, as has been mentioned in the note to 113.1-114.8, his

point of departure from Aristotle's world view and his point of affinity with that of John Philoponus. It is worth remembering here than al-Kindī does, however, agree with Aristotle elsewhere that the heavenly spheres as well as the basic elements of matter are "permanent", i.e., ungenerated and imperishable (cf. AR I: 220, 246; II: 45). Al-Kindī, however, does not consider them as eternal, but clearly states that they endure only for as long as God so wills. As, therefore, the world is ultimately not imperishable, one may assume that it is, in his view, originally created, though since -and now- "ungenerated".

This distinction is brought out in al-Kindī's terminology: Azliyy stands simply for the eternal, with no distinction between the eternal a parte ante and the eternal a parte post (cf. Van Den Bergh, Averroes' Tahafut al-Tahafut (London, 1954), II: 1); while the objects which endure like the eternal, are said to "remain" (باقية) for "a period of time", أيام مدة (cf. AR I: 220, II: 45). Thus it would appear that his unique eternal being is indeed God, and not any of the physical objects which might seem to qualify for the term.

113.11¹ "perishing being but the changing of the predicate": الفساد

إنما هو تبدل الأحوال. Though the argument at lines

13 f. below favor a reading of tabaddul as "alteration", it is translated as "change" since the argument here concerns the

physical components of substance, viz., form ("predicate"/mahmūl, for which cf. above, line 7) and (first) matter (cf. the following note), the coming into being and perishing of which are properly called "changes", μεταβολαί, while "alteration", ἁλλοίωσις, is the change of qualities within substance; cf. Physics V 1 225a 15, V 2 226a 26, and Met. XII 2 1069b 9 (in the latter text Aṣṭāt, al-Kindī's colleague, renders the ἁλλοίωσις of line 12 as al-taghyīr, as he did for the plural form in Met. V 21 1022b 19, Bouyges p. 641; while Abū Bishr Mattā translates it as al-istihāla, Bouyges, p. 1436 f.).

That tabaddul is used by al-Kindī as the generic equivalent of μεταβολή, much as taghayīr is found in Metaphysics (cf. Bouyges, III: Index 258), is further seen below at 114.3 and 117.8, at which latter citation we read at line 11, وتبدل جوهره هو, "and the change of ... substance is coming to be and perishing".

113.11² "the primary substratum": حامل . الحامل الأول is the subject as substratum, and as such cannot be the eternal, which has no subject and is not involved with forms in any way. The term is an apparently literal translation of τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον used as the definition of "matter" in Physics I 9 192a 31 (translated, however, by Ishāq ibn Hunain, ed. Badawī, op. cit., I: 75, as الوضع الأول); which chapter also establishes the permanence

of matter viewed as potentiality (line 27). This notion helped lead to the concept of an indeterminate "first matter" (for which cf. H. Wolfson, Crescas' Critique of Aristotle (Cambridge, Mass., 1929), pp. 581 ff.), which may be implied by الحامل الأول, said in the following line to be al-ays, i.e., existence (or being, i.e., existent being, al-Kindī does not distinguish between the two) pure and simple, unformed, therefore unactualized and theoretically purely potential. Al-Kindī, however, ignores -or rejects- this aspect of first matter, emphasizing merely the permanence of its existence.

113.11-13 "as for the primary substratum ... of its existence". This is essentially a parenthetical remark probably prompted by the distinction of the preceding sentence between al-mahmūl and al-hāmil. Al-Kindī's argument in this paragraph is that the eternal does not perish, since perishing is predicated of forms/predicates which are contraries of a common genus; hence perishable objects belong to a genus, while the eternal clearly does not. In saying that "the perishing of a perishable object does not involve the existence of its existence", الفساد ليس بتأيسر أيسرته, he means that it does not affect its ontological substratum, the first matter which to Aristotle is eternal and to al-Kindī ostensibly endures as long as God maintains His creation. I prefer "existence" for ta-yis rather than

"generation" (which is more appropriate in al-Kindī's treatise "On the True, First Complete Agent ..." 1:182, **تأسيس الأيسات**, "the generation of existence from non-existence"), since it expresses the sense of continuing existence which the present context seems to require.

113.13¹ **وكل متبدل فإنما تبدل بضده الأقرب** . By "Every change is into its nearest contrary":

"nearest contrary", al-Kindī may be thinking of the intermediate stages of the contraries, "into which that which changes must change first" (Met. X 7 1057a 21). Cf., moreover, the Cat. 5 4a 10 discussion of the effect of contrary qualities upon substance; and the linking of contrariety to the primary substratum of bodies in De Gen. et Corr. II 1 329a 24. See too Physics V 2 225b 10.

113.13² **الذى معه فى** "that which is found with it in one genus":

جنس واحد, which is said to occur with contraries and their intermediates in Met. X 7 1057a 20; and see too Met. X 4 1055a 4 for Aristotle's discussion of contrariety.

113.15 **الأضداد المتقاربة**, literally "related contraries":

"near" or "successive" contraries, by which al-Kindī is, again, probably alluding to the intermediates of contraries, which are themselves contraries.

114.3 **والاستحالة تبدل** . Cf. Physics V 1 "Motion is change":

225a 34, *πᾶσα κίνησις μεταβολή τις*. While istihāla is translated below at 117.11 as "alteration", I have translated it here as "motion", assuming an inconsistency of terminology on al-Kindī's part, and this I do for two reasons. Firstly, istihāla is qualified both in terms of tabaddul, of which it is a species; and of intiqāl, of which it is the genus. Intiqāl, like the more common nuqla, is probably a translation of *φορά*, and likewise probably denotes spatial motion, which will best explain lines 5 ff. below. (For *φορά* as spatial motion of "locomotion", cf., e.g., Physics V 2 226a 32. Abū Bishr Mattā translates Met. XII 1 1069b 12, *φορά δὲ ἢ κατὰ τόπον*, as *والنقلة في المكان*; and Met. XII 7 1072b 9, *φορά γὰρ ἡ πρώτη τῶν μεταβολῶν*, as *التغيرات* (!) *هي أول* though Astāt, it should be noted, renders these passages respectively as *والحركة في* and *فإن الحركة أولى التغيرات* and *المكان*; cf. Bouyges, III: 1437, 1608.) We thus have a descending order of tabaddul/change, istihāla/motion, and intiqāl/locomotion.

Secondly, al-Kindī has just discussed the impossibility of the eternal being perishable, which we saw relates to change of substance. Now he is about to make the point that the eternal is equally incapable of the remaining kinds of change, all of which entail motion, the primary kind of which is locomotion (cf. Physics VIII 7 260a 28 f.). In these two examples al-Kindī thus establishes that the eternal does not change in any sense of the word. While

this is true of Aristotle's unmoved mover, it is of course not true of the eternal circular movement of the spheres; movement which is perfection but nevertheless is motion (cf. Met. XII 6 1072a 21, De Caelo I 2, 3). Al-Kindī elsewhere accepts this unique, circular nature of celestial movement, which elevates the spheres out of the cycle of generation and corruption (cf. AR II: 44 f., 48 f.); but he does not therefore grant them the status of eternal being, reserved, as here, for that which does not move at all.

114.3² "neither changes nor removes": لا يتبدل ولا ينتقل ,
i.e., neither undergoes substantive nor spatial change. While losing the word play of the Arabic انتقال - ينتقل by translating the terms as "remove" and "locomotion", the English translation does justice, I feel, to the relationships of intiqāl and istiḥāla, "locomotion" and "motion"; and to yantaqilu and yastahilu, "remove" and "move". By these terms al-Kindī makes the point that no species of motion, and specifically locomotion, is possible for the eternal, since the idea of motion as such is unpredicable of the eternal.

114.8 "Now, inasmuch as a body": وإن الجرم . This sentence, whose beginning seems to follow the preceding remark, is entailed by it only generally and indirectly, belonging more naturally to the discussion above at 113.5-10. It therefore appears that

al-Kindī has digressed somewhat and is now getting back into his major theme, that of corporeal finitude and infinity.

114.10 "eternal body": **جسم أزلي**, an object whose existence, we had just learned, is theoretically impossible; therefore al-Kindī must be saying that not even an eternal body, if it could exist, could be infinite in actuality.

114.11 "I say, moreover ...": **فأقول**. The following section, from 114.12 to 117.12 appears again practically verbatim in al-Kindī's treatise, "On the Unity of God and the Finitude of the Body of the World", AR 1: 202.4-204.15 (to be referred to henceforth as UG), affording us a basis for verifying the text here. Moreover, essentially the same basic mathematical points involving equality, addition and subtraction, and their application to finite and infinite bodies, are made in al-Kindī's two other treatises on this theme; formulated in more abstract mathematical fashion in the risāla ... **في إيضاح تناهي جرم العالم** ("Epistle ... Explaining the Finitude of the Body of the World abbreviated as EF"), pp. 188 ff." and in a manner more like our treatise in the **رسالة في مائية ما لا يمكن أن يكن لا نهائية وما الذي يقال لا نهائية له** ("Epistle On the Essence of that which cannot be Infinite and that of which Infinity can be Predicated" to be abbreviated "OE"), pp. 194 ff. H. Davidson ("Creation", op. cit., p. 379), in noting

most of these parallel versions (omitting mention of the "Epistle ... Explaining the Finiteness of the Body of the World"), shows that the ensuing argument for the finiteness of all body (and thus for the "body" of the universe as well), which follows from these mathematical premises, FP 115.1-116.5, is an elaboration and slight modification of an argument by John Philoponus against eternal motion; viz., that an infinite cannot be increased, whereas in an eternal universe there would have to be just such an addition of movements. (cf. Simplicius' Commentary on the Physics, CAG X/ 1178.13, 14, 1179.12-14, and see Davidson, op. cit., p. 367).

114.12¹ "the true first premises": من المقدمات الأول
 المقدمات الأولى الواضحة، "the
 الحقيّة ; UG, 202:4, evident first premises".

114.12² "which are thought with no mediation": الحقولة بلا
 "without a mediator"),
 بغير متوسط ... (UG 202.4, توسط
 i.e., as intellectual intuitions, free of prior logical as well
 as physical mediation; the latter perhaps emphasized by al-Kindī's
 choice of ma'qūl, the action of 'aql, intellect. This same claim
 is not repeated in the other two treatises, and, indeed, OE
 follows its statements of premises with demonstrations which "prove"
 (in circular fashion) their truth.

114.12³ "all bodies, of which one is not greater than the other":

كل الأجرام التي ليس منها شيء أعظم من شيء
 literally, "all bodies of (i.e., in) which nothing is greater
 (in one) than anything (in another)", understanding the reciprocal
 relation of bodies "(in one)" and "(in another)" as implied by
minhā, "of which" (since otherwise equality could be seen as
 referring to each particular body only). Alternatively, and more
 simply, the Arabic text would translate "of which one is not
 greater than the other", if we would understand shay' in the
 sense of ba'd, "some", i.e., "one", as is actually given in the
 first premise of EF, 188.4.

114.13 "(distances) ... are equal": mutasāwiya; UG 202:6, wāhida,
 "the same", as also below, at 115.14.

114.14 "is not infinite": ليس لا نهاية; UG 202:7, لا
 ليس لا نهاية, "has no infinity".

114.15 "when a body is added ... and greater than what it had been
 before that body was added to it": This fourth premise is
 expressed in a slightly different fashion in the second premise
 of EF (188.11), viz., that if something is added to one of two
 equal magnitudes, then they are no longer equal; while the first
 premise of OE, 194.18, makes the same point in an obverse way,
 viz., that which remains after something has been subtracted from
 it, is less than it had been originally.

114.16¹ "before": qabla; UG 202:9, min qabli.

114.16² "whenever two bodies of finite magnitude are joined ...":

وكلّ جرمين متناهي العظم، إذا جُمعا....

This fifth premise resembles the fourth of EF 190.9, and the third premise of OE, 195.1; with the exception that the two latter treatises employ the plural number, while our treatise uses the dual.

114.17 "as well as in": أيضا... في UG 202.11, omitted.

114.18 "the smaller of every two ... things comes after the larger or

after a portion of it",... وإن الأصغر من كل شيئين

، بعد الأكبر منها أو بعد بعضها

and disparate sizes, even as equals, are finite. The Mu'tazilite Nazzām (d. 845) is reported to have made this same point, "that in which the little and the much (i.e., less and more) participate is finite" (فما دخلته القلة والكثرة أيضا متناه); after also having implied, regarding the movements of the stars, that the addition of different magnitudes results in a finite sum (cf. K. al-Intiṣār, op. cit., p. 33 f., French translation, p. 32, and see Davidson, op. cit., p. 376). This sixth premise here is like the last part of the third premise in EF 189.9, and the fourth premise of OE 195.2; except that for the above terms al-asgharu and al-akbaru the other two treatises employ the equivalent terms

al-aqallu and (as AR) al-aktharu, (closer to the terms used by Nazẓām).

114.19 "the larger": al-akbaru; UG 202:12, al-aẓamu, "the greater".

115.1 "Now, if a body has infinity ...": **فإن كان جرم**
لا نهاية له. Cf. the last paragraph to the note to 114.11,
 above, and see too the parallel versions of EF, 191.6 ff. and OE,
 195.4 ff. (besides the identical -minus scribal variants- version
 of UG 202.14 ff). Cf. Davidson, op. cit., p. 379, for authors
 after al-Kindī who employ this argument.

115.2,3 "that which remains of it": **الباقى منه**; UG 202.14 and
 16 omit minhu.

115.4 "the body which comes to be from them both together is a finite
 magnitude": **كان الجرم الكائن عنهما جميعا متناهى**
العظم, as the fifth premise above, 114.16, states; which
 premise is specifically referred to in the EF presentation of this
 argument, 191.10.

115.6 "It is thus finite and infinite, and this is an impossible
 contradiction": **فهو إذن متناه لا متناه**
وهذا خلف لا يمكن, as well as stated explicitly
 as al-Kindī's third premise above, 114.14.

115.7 "whenever that which was taken from it is added to it, it will

إِذَا زِيدَ عَلَيْهِ: "... either be greater than or equal to ..."
 مَا أَخْذَ مِنْهُ ، صَارَ أَكْثَمَ مَا كَانَ ... أَوْ مَسَاوِيَا

The FP version of this argument is the most fully presented of the three (cf. EF 191.13 ff.), OE 195.9 ff. approaching the argument from the perspective of the "lesser" and not the "greater" of the infinities (possibly in keeping with its own formulation of the premise at 194.18, which is equivalent to FP 114.15, and see note there).

115.9 "will be greater than that which has infinity": صَارَ أَكْثَمَ
 مَا لَا نِهَآيَةَ لَهُ . The impossibility of one infinite being less than another is given as (the first part of) the third premise of EF, 189.9, followed by reasoning similar to that in our treatise.

115.10 "the greater": a'zamihimā. "The larger", al-akbaru, as given above at 114.19 (al-Kindī's sixth premise, here repeated), would seem to be more appropriate, and this testifies to al-Kindī's indifferent use of terminology; for which cf. further the note to 114.18.

115.10 f. "a portion": ba'd, used here synonymously with juz', "part", which is used in the parallel passages of UG 202.23 f.; and as evidenced below in 116.3 f., where juz' takes over for ba'd. The distinctions between these two terms drawn in 128.1 f. are ignored here.

115.12 "-and if the smaller body comes after the greater then it most

certainly comes after a portion of it-": وإن كان بعده

فهو بعد بعضه لا محالة, literally, "and if it comes after

it..." This sentence is omitted in UG 203.1 except for la mahāla,

"most certainly", which there follows the preceding sentence.

The omission is perhaps best explained as a scribal error due to

the homoteleuton of بعد بعضه in lines 11 and 12. The part

after which the smaller body comes is of course that part of the

larger body in excess of the part which is equal to the smaller

body.

115.13 "a portion (of the greater)": ba'd; UG 203.1, li-jirm, "to

the body", which is probably a copyist's error for li-juz'.

115.16¹ "one part": جزء واحد, as at UG 203.3, assuming again,

though now in our text, that jirm (as AR) is a copyist's error

for juz'.

115.16² "is numbered the same": يعدّها ... عددا واحدا :

UG 203.3 missing.

115.16³ "abundance or quality": بالكثر أو الكيف ; UG 203.4,

بالكم والكيف "in quantity and quality", which is more

appropriate, though I translate literally to show al-Kindī's

imprecise usages.

116.3 "and to its (own) part, which two (parts) join," **ولجزئه**
الذين اجتمعا . UG 203.8 omits this phrase.

116.4 "the all": al-kull, i.e., "the whole", though, following the Arabic semantic distinction, the latter term is reserved for jami', as above in line 2. The two terms are not meant here as more than synonyms (as with juz' and ba'd, and cf. above, the note to 115.10), the distinction of 127.7 f. below being ignored, probably due to its irrelevance to this discussion. In terms of al-Kindi's above premises, that the part cannot be equal to the whole follows directly from the second, fourth and sixth statements above, p. 114 lines 13, 14 and 18; and indirectly from the first premise as well, 114.12. At this point, with the remark that the body of the universe and all bodies therein are consequently finite -equivalent to the statement below at 116.12- EF in effect draws to a close (192.3). OE continues to present al-Kindi's other arguments against actually infinite things, but in a different and more succinct order than in FP.

116.5-8 "and in this manner—a finite beginning": UG 203.9 omits this section, moving from finite body to things predicated of finite body, including time, but not singling it out.

116.5 "it is impossible for a body to have infinity, and in this manner ... any quantitative thing ...": **لا يمكن أن يكون**
جسم لا نهائية له. وبهذا التدبير تبين أنه لا

يمكن شئ) من الكميات . Besides possessing magnitude, body is defined elsewhere in this treatise in terms of a number of other quantifiable elements: cf. above, 114.8 (genus and species); below, 117.3 ff. (time and motion) and 120.7 ff. (substance and tri-dimensionality, matter and form).

116.7 "time is quantitative": والزمان كميّة , viz., as the number of motion, for which cf. below, 117.5; and see Aristotle, Physics IV 11. 219b 2 ff., and Met. V 13 1020a 29.

116.9 "Things predicated of a finite object are also, of necessity, finite": والأشياء أيضا المحمولة في المتناهي

متناهية اضطرارا Cf. Physics VIII 10 266a

24-66, concluding οὐδὲν ἄρα πεπερασμένον ἐνδέχεται

ἄπειρον δύναμιν ἔχειν , "nothing finite can have an

infinite power" (translated by Ishāq b. Hunain as فليس

يمكن إذن أن يكون متناهيا أصلا

له قوة غير متناهية , ed. A. Badawī, op. cit., II:

927). Both this Physics passage (and the ones before and after

it) and the preceding paragraphs in FP prove that an infinite

thing always performs actually in a finite way: Aristotle showing

here the (finite) effect of an infinite force on a finite body,

and al-Kindī -following John Philoponus- demonstrating the (equally

finite) effect of a finite magnitude on an infinite magnitude

(also discussed -in different though related terms- by Aristotle, op. cit., 266b 6 ff.). Philoponus' lengthy comments upon Physics 266a 24 (probably in his treatise "Showing that Every Body is Finite and has Finite Power"), as preserved by Simplicius (in Physicorum VIII 10, p. 1326.38 ff.) are not specifically reiterated in the above remark and ensuing paragraph (cf., however, ibid., 1327.17), though al-Kindī uses -albeit tersely- some of Philoponus' arguments from this section below at 120.7 ff. It is possible that al-Kindī's source here and in what immediately follows is Ibn Nā'imah's translation of the Physics; which translation, being done from John Philoponus' commentary (cf. Fihrist, p. 250, and see Peters, op. cit., p. 30 ff.) probably incorporated some of the Grammarian's views into the translation (which is probably the reason al-Nadīm disapproved of it, ibid.). It is more likely, however, that al-Kindī used a compilation of Philoponus' arguments for finiteness, which compilation would have been based on a number of the Alexandrian's works, including, and particularly, his commentary to the Physics.

116.10¹ "Every predicate": وكل فعل محمول ; UG 203.19, محمول.

116.10² "movement or time": حركة أو زمان (UG 203.11, ... al-zamān). Cf. Physics VIII 10 266a 12-24, concluding with the statement that it is impossible for the finite to cause movement

for an infinite time, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ πεπερασμένον
ἀπείρῳ κινεῖν χρόνον (Ishāq b. Hunain, *op. cit.*, p. 925,

لا يمكن أن تحرك المتناهي زمانا بلا نهاية .

116.10³ "segmented through movement": مفعول بالحركة, i.e.,
measurable into fusūl, divisions or segments of time (cf. below,
121.5, for faṣl in this sense, and compare line 6 there, مدة
مفعولة "segmented interval". UG 203.11 has فاصل الحركة,
"the segmenting agent (or divisor) of movement", instead of
مفعول بالحركة as in our text, and the two statements
appear at first to be opposed (cf. a similar paradoxical juxtaposition of statements in our text below at 117.5). The reciprocal relation of time and motion, in which each is the measure of the other (cf., e.g., Physics IV 12 220b 15), renders both our versions "correct". The point of our two versions here and of the text in 117.5 below is the same, viz., that time in this context is significant as related to movement and dependent upon it (rather than vice-versa), and, as movement is a predicate of body, so too is time.

116.11 "in actuality": بالفعل ; UG 203.12, missing.


116.12¹ "the body of the universe": جرم الكل . Cf. above, the
note to 109.1.

116.12² "afterwards": بعد , emended by AR to بعده ; UG 203.13
missing.

116.13-16 "As it is possible ... will occur": This statement (and compare the similar argument in OE 198.2 ff.) raises a number of problems which call in question al-Kindī's use of sources and his own consistency or lack thereof. Firstly, there is a confusion of the meanings of the terms "possible" and "potential", then of the type of potential infinity body and (the body of) the universe can have, and lastly of the significance of potential existence (and of the role of the imagination).

Aristotle had said in Met. IX 3 1047a 24 that "a thing is capable of doing something (i.e., it has a possible potency) if there will be nothing impossible in its having the actuality of that of which it is said to have the capacity," *ἔστι δὲ δυνατόν τοῦτο ὡς ἔάν ὑπάρξη ἡ ἐνέργεια οὗ λέγεται ἔχειν τὴν δύναμιν, οὐθὲν ἔσται ἀδύνατον.* Elsewhere Aristotle has argued that bodies, and the universe as a whole, cannot even theoretically be expanded to infinity without contradicting their very nature and definition (cf. Physics III 5 204b 5 ff., De Caelo I 3 270a 13, 5 271b 27ff., 9 278b 21 ff.). Thus in positing the possibility of an infinitely increasing universe, al-Kindī considers an impossible possibility as possible.

Now Aristotle does admit that a magnitude is potentially infinite, but by way of division; while it is number (and time) which are potentially infinite by way of addition (cf. Physics III 6 206a 16ff., 7 207b 2 ff.). If al-Kindī is not being careless

or ignorant of Aristotle's teachings, he apparently is indifferent to all these distinctions, and this despite the fact that he has himself shown above, following Aristotle, that there can be nothing outside the body of the universe (cf. 109.1 and note there). That this may well be indifference could be deduced from his use of the terms "possible through the imagination" , by which "imagination" he apparently means a fanciful possibility; something teasingly like a real possibility but basically just a creature of whimsy (and cf. the following note). This possibility is "just" imagination, as the idea of an infinite universe is "nothing other" than a possibility, i.e., not a real existant. Potentiality is "only" a possible existant, and to al-Kindī this kind of possible existence is not to be taken seriously (cf. al-Kindī's use of possibility as "necessity" below, 118.3). Therefore he need not be concerned with distinguishing between kinds of non-existents.

This deprecating of potential existence as related to infinite entities is fundamental to al-Kindī's position, and goes to the heart of his difference with Aristotle. For the Stagirite viewed time, motion and magnitude as infinite, each in its own way, but all potentially so, understanding their potentiality as a necessary and not merely possible type of existence, part of the process of becoming which characterises the eternally moving world (cf. Physics III 6 206a 18 ff., Met. IX 6 1048b 9 ff. and Ross' notes there,

II: 252). Indeed, this acceptance of the ontological legitimacy of potential existence enables Aristotle to consider the universe as eternal, though in actuality we perceive only finite time, moments and magnitudes. In treating potential existence as a mere fancy, therefore, al-Kindī rejects this view of the world, and is left with an actual finite world solely, which he apparently considers as dependent upon an external agent more than in the Aristotelian view.

116.13 "through the imagination": **بالوهم**, cf. the preceding note and see the use of wahm in comparable statements in Saadya Gaon's K. al-Amānāt wa-l-I'tiqādāt, ed. S. Landauer (Leiden, 1880) I: 1, p. 37, (maḥshabah in Hebrew, S. ha-Emunot we-ha-De'ot (Josefov, 1885), p. 60, "virtually" in the English translation of S. Rosenblatt, The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, (New Haven, 1948) p. 45, and as "a matter of imagination" by A. Altmann, The Book of Doctrines and Beliefs, (Oxford, 1946) p. 57); and in Maimonides' Dalālat al-Ḥa'irīn, ed. S. Munk (Jerusalem, 1929), I: 74, p. 155 (**אמור והמיה**, translated into Hebrew (S. Moreh Nebukhim (New York, 1946), p. 129r) as **עניני מחשביים**, and in the recent English translation of S. Pines, The Guide of the Perplexed (Chicago, 1963), p. 222) as "matters of fantasy").

Both these other authors consider the proofs of infinity -be they infinite divisibility or increase- which they reject as based on mere imaginary, not real, states of being. But where Saadya's

argument against what is recognizable as a Zenonian paradox accepts the Aristotelian idea of a potentially infinite divisibility, but, like al-Kindī, minimizes its significance, Maimonides' critique -attributed by him (loc. cit.) and by Averroes ("Epitome of the Metaphysics," Rasa il Ibn Rushd, Hyderabad 1947, pp. 128-29) to Alfarabi's "On Changeable Beings" (and cf. Davidson, op. cit., p. 380 f. for their as well as Avicenna's similar remarks)- is founded on an Aristotelian understanding of the nature of the infinite as a succession of things and moments; i.e., the members of such an infinity are seen to succeed each other (accidentally) but not to co-exist in actuality, and therefore are not numerable as a whole (cf. Physics III 6 206a 27; Simplicius' commentary on the Physics, p. 1179 ff.; Averroes' Tahāfut al-Tahāfut I: 18, 19, and Van Den Bergh's Tahāfut, II: 7, 8; and Wolfson, "Kalām Arguments for Creation", op. cit., p. 222 f.).

Maimonides and the other Aristotelians would therefore view al-Kindī's (and Saadya's) refutations of infinity -which Maimonides attributes to the mutakallimun-, positing as they do actual infinities, as spurious, their basic assumption concerning potential infinity being unnecessarily restrictive. Al-Kindī would thus be counted out by the Aristotelians on two counts: for dismissing the significance of potential existence as merely imaginative fancy; and for not realizing the extent of fanciful imagination, i.e., impossible assumptions- in his own refutations of infinity.

116.16 "said to be in potentiality": **المقول هو بالقوة** ; UG
203.17 huwa missing.

116.17 "is also": **فهو أيضا** , UG 203.17, **هو أيضا**.

116.18 "in actuality": **في الفعل** ; UG 204.1 **بالفعل**.

116.19 "for (reasons) which we have given previously": **لما قدمنا** .
Cf. above, 115.1-116.5.

117.3 "Time is the time, i.e., extension, of the body of the universe":
والزمان زمان جرم الكل , i.e., time
is a function of the (movement of the) universe, for which idea,
as well as for the concept of time as "extension", mudda, cf.
below, line 5.

117.4 "the being": anniya: "being" rather than "existence" (cf.
above, notes to 97.13), to emphasize, as al-Kindī may well intend,
that the very basic nature, the "quoddity", of body is finite.
Davidson has shown that part of al-Kindī's arguments for finiteness
from composition (cf. 120.7 ff. below) may be traced to John
Philoponus (cf. Simplicius' commentary on the Physics pp. 1329.20
and 1331.20, and see Davidson, "Creation" op. cit., pp. 363 and
371). The Alexandrian, however, asserts that the universe has
only finite "power" and is therefore generated, since infinite
power (**ἀπεροδύναμα**) cannot be present in a finite body

(cf. the note to 116.9 above); while al-Kindī argues for generation from the finite "being" ~~-anniya-~~ of the (body of the) universe. Davidson therefore believes that al-Kindi's "being" is equivalent, in its function within the structure of the argument, to Philoponus' "power". This equivalence is detected again at 120.4, where an ostensibly superfluous use of the finite-being (of the body of the universe) clause in an argument based on the co-existence of time, motion and the universe, is seen as evidence of a Philoponus influence (cf. Davidson, *ibid.*, p. 372). Thus Davidson would seem to assert that there exists a formal structural resemblance, in this section of "First Philosophy" at least and in passages such as the present one, between al-Kindī's "being" and Philoponus' "power".

While Davidson may well be right historically, two facts ought to be noted: al-Kindī explicitly defines "being" in this section (cf. below 120.17, and compare 119.16) in such a way that it ignores the notion of "power" (which notion is implicit above at 116.9); and the major thrust of the following chapters of this book, which these remarks may be seen as foreshadowing, is to assert the composite and hence dependent nature of every aspect of being, understood as here in terms of its basic nature or substance.

117.5 "(time is but) the number of movement, i.e., it is an extension

... عدد الحركة، أعني أنه مدة تقصّها: "counted by movement".

الحركة, literally, "... which movement counts".

The first definition above is Aristotelian, inadequately abbreviated (cf. Physics IV 11 219b 1, ἀρκθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, "for time is this, the number of motion according to prior and posterior"); the second, equally common to al-Kindī's contemporaries and neo-platonic predecessors, to whom mudda is διάστημα or διάστασις, and by whom the universe is regarded as the body whose motion is enumerated by time, considered as an extension or duration, was attributed by the latter to Plato and to the Stoics (cf., inter alia, Crescas, p. 638 ff., Israeli, p. 74 ff.). It is the second definition, somewhat amplified, which al-Kindī uses in his treatise On Definitions AR I: 167, and this seems to be the one which he favors, judging by its place in the structure of this sentence and above at 117.3 and 116.10 (and cf. as well OE 196.6); though it is clear that he considers both definitions as essentially the same (as evidenced further below at line 12 in the fusion of terms). As such, al-Kindī should be seen as subscribing to the (Aristotelian) view of the continuous nature of time, which view is emphasized further by his preference for the term "extension". Moreover, al-Kindī remarks specifically below, at 122.10, that time is continuous (cf. Categories VI 4b 22, Physics IV 11 219a 13 ff.). Cf., however, below, 121.5, and note there.

117.7¹ "Movement is ... of a body only": ... والحركة إنما . الجرم
 Cf. De Caelo I 9 279a 15, κίνησις δ' ἄνευ
 φυσικοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἔστιν , "without natural body
 there is no movement".

117.7² "and otherwise": , وإلا , UG 204.8, وإن لم يكن جرم ,
 "and if there were not body".

117.8¹ "Movement is a kind of change": والحركة هو تبدل ما ;
 UG 204.10 والحركة هي تبدل الأحوال , "movement is
 a change of states" (which description includes substantive change,
 following al-Kindī's discussion of 113.11). Cf., e.g., Physics
 V 1 225a 34, and, in general for what follows, Physics V 2 226a
 24 and Met. XII 2 1069b 9. Al-Kindī uses here the more suitable
ḥaraka for κίνησις , instead of the istihāla of 114.3, and cf.
 the note there.

117.8² "the change only of place": فتبدل مكان ... فقط ,
 following AR in emending the MS from q d (qad) b d l (not, as in
 AR note 4, q d t b d l).

117.8³ "... of the parts of a body and its center or ...": أجزاء
 الجرم ومركزه أو ; UG 204.10 missing (so AR, though in
 note 4 to our text UG is quoted, wrongly, as containing this clause).

117.9 "the change of place which is brought about by the limits of

the body": **وَتَبَدَّلَ الْمَكَانَ الَّذِي يَنْتَهِي إِلَيْهِ الْجَرَمُ**
, وَتَبَدَّلَ مَكَانَ نَهْرَايَا تَه ; UG 204.11, **بَنْرَايَا تَه**
 "the change of place of its limits".

117.10 "or farness": **أَوِ الْبَعْدِ** ; UG 204.11, **وَإِمَّا بِالْبَعْدِ**.

117.11 "alteration": al-istiḥāla. Cf. above, the first note to 113.11.

117.12¹ "counting of the number": **عَادَ عَدَدٌ** ; UG 204.14 omits adad.
 Cf. note to 117.5 above.

117.12² "of the body": al-jirm; UG 204.14 **الْمَتَبَدِّلِ أَيْ الْجَرَمِ** ,
 "of that which changes, i.e., body".

117.12³ "that which is temporal". There now follows in our text a section which is not found in UG, which (at 204.16) parallels our text again at 120.7.

The omitted material is mostly a deductive elaboration of the argument for the interdependence of (time) body and motion, outlined above at 117.3-7; an elaboration which is also missing, together with the argument from composition at 120.7 ff., from OE. This latter text (at 196.6 ff.) rather resembles FP 117.3-7 and its reiterations at 119.13-20 and 120.15-20, being limited to the argument for the interdependent finiteness of time, body and motion; which argument was probably the original one, based upon

the finiteness of magnitude. The relationship of body and motion, and the argument for composition as we have them in FP, and partially in UG, were apparently seen as variations upon this argument (and cf. below, note to 120.5 and 6).

117.16 "or it would not be": *وإما أن لا تكون*, i.e., in actuality, as al-Kindī makes immediately explicit and again below at 118.5; though he uses this formulation of non-actual movement in the sense of absolute non-movement in the contradiction he establishes below at 118.9.

117.17 "However, since body exists, movement is an existent":

وإذ الجسم موجود هي موجودة Movement is an existent since body is, on the assumption that we know, by our common sense perceptions, that there are bodies and that movement does occur; and it has just been asserted above that where there is movement, it is of a body.

118.2-7 "Now movement necessarily exists in some bodies ... in the simple body": This paragraph shows the influence of Aristotle's viewpoint on the priority of actuality to potentiality in species and substance, as expressed, e.g., in De Anima II 4 417a 22 ff. and Met. IX 8 1049b 18 ff. Al-Kindī, moreover, jumps without explanation to Aristotle's conclusion that the possible existence of all movement entails an ultimately necessary moving body, viz.,

the "first heaven" and, probably by implication, the universe as an entirety (cf. Met. XII, 6 and 7). Al-Kindī is unenlightening, however, as to the necessity of this "absolute body", and all "necessary" beings, since he denies the eternal nature of movement and body because of which Aristotle attributes priority to actual being (and see the following notes).

- 118.2 "Now movement necessarily exists in some bodies, for that which is possible is that which exists in some possessors of its substance": **فإن الحركة بالاضطرار موجودة في بعض الأجرام: لأن الممكن له الشيء هو الوجود ذلك الشيء في بعض ذوات جوهره**. At 116.13 above the possible was treated as an imaginative absurdity because the proposed infinite was "only" potentially possible; whereas, we may now deduce, the truly possible for al-Kindī is that which is realized in actuality by some member of its species (cf. the Aristotelian sources listed first in the preceding note). Moreover, this actualization is necessary for some members of the species, for whom therefore, there is no possibility that they may not be (and cf., for this dilemma, the second following note). This predication of necessary existence and movement in the species as a condition for their possibility is required for Aristotle, since he believes that otherwise the potential for eternally not being of a possible being, with the attendant destruction of the species, would, in infinite time,

have to be actualized (cf. Met. IX 4 1047b 3; 8 1050b 8; and De Caelo I 12 281a 28 ff.). Hence, eternal beings must be purely actual, without any potentiality or possibility. As such, they are necessary beings, a term which is convertible for Aristotle with eternal beings (cf., e.g., De Gen. et Corr. II 11 337b 35).

Al-Kindī, however, does not believe in the eternal nature of the universe, or the infinite nature of time and movement. Theoretically he should accept the idea that, in a temporally finite world, the actual existence of the possible members of a species is not dependent upon the necessary actual existence of any one member. There remains a necessity for an initial actuality in the species -accepting the priority of actuality to potentiality and the impossibility of an infinite regress- but no one member need necessarily, i.e., eternally, be actual; since the duration of the world could end before the theoretical possibility of the destruction of the species through loss of all actual members is reached.

118.4 "As the (art of) writing which may be affirmed as a possibility for Muhammad, though it is not in him in actuality, since it does exist in some human substance, i.e., in another man":

كالكتابة موجبة: **بالامكان لمحمد، وليس فيه بالفعل، إنه هو موجودة في بعض جوهر الانسان، أعني في آخر من الناس.** The transition

from prior by way of species to prior in substantiality, culminating

in the priority of eternal, necessary existents, is found most fully expressed in Met. IX 8 1049b 18 ff. The specific example of possibility in our text, however, reflects the discussion of De An. II 5 417a 21 ff., with the term kitāba a translation of grammatikós (though this cannot be verified directly in the extant Arabic manuscript of this translation (ed. A. Badawī, Aristūtālis fī al-Nafs (Cairo, 1954) p. 42), due to its corrupt or unsatisfactory nature here; cf., however, Ishāq's translation of this term in Cat. 11a 1 (ed. K. Georr, Les Catégories D'Aristote Dans Leurs Versions Syro-Arabes (Beyrouth, 1948) p. 344).). I have rendered kitāba as "(the art of) writing" in the sense of literacy, reflecting, as our context demands, more than is usually understood by the philosophically common literal translation of the Greek term as related to things "grammatical".

It is not, I believe, accidental that al-Kindī chooses this particular example of possible and actual being, using an illustration from a text that was probably not his primary one in this section; nor is it surprising that he employs Muḥammad in his example. It would, in fact, be natural for a pious Moslem to take the Prophet's life as a paradigm of universal truth. Moreover, in this instance the belief in Muḥammad's illiteracy (understood in Islamic tradition from passages in the Qur'ān such as VII 157, 158; and cf. EI, ummi, IV: 1016) -which it was considered necessary to assert as a support for the dogma of the inimitable, miraculously

revealed Qur'an (cf. W. Montgomery Watt, Muhammad At Mecca, (Oxford, 1960) p. 46)- would seem to receive al-Kindī's blessing. Thus he would appear to be asserting, even if only in passing, the compatibility of religious belief and philosophical truth.

It should be noted, however, that Muhammad's possible literacy is not, at least directly, due to God's Will, but rather due to the priority of actuality in the human species, to which the Prophet belongs. This actuality is, in addition, apparently conceived of as a necessary kind, part, in some sense, of a necessary universe. The religious dogma, in other words, is put into a philosophical perspective which is antithetical to conservative religious theology, that held, e.g., by the more anti-rational mutakallimun; though al-Kindī's view may have been more compatible with that held by the more rational mu'tazila. The more conservative theologians are understood to have felt on the one hand that all is possible for God, acting completely unilaterally; and, on the other, that nothing is innately possible for created things (i.e., everything else), all of whose states of being are dependent on God and as such may be considered as necessary. Members of the mu'tazila, however, were apparently prepared to allow for independently possible existents, among which God was in a sense obliged to act (cf. the elaboration of these two points of view in E. Fackenheim, "The Possibility of the Universe in Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina and Maimonides", PAAJR 16, 1946-47, p. 49 f.);

and for an expression of the orthodox kalām view (as represented by Maimonides and Averroes), cf. H. Wolfson, "The Kalām Arguments For Creation ...", op. cit., p. 234 f., and see particularly S. Van Den Bergh's Averroes' Tahafut Al-Tuhafut II: 37 ff.).

Thus to the mu'tazila Allah asserted Himself constantly but not, as it were, arbitrarily, upon the universe; while we may assume that to al-Kindī Divine action is apparently even more restricted, in the normal course of events, functioning mainly as the ultimate source and cause of the universe. Al-Kindī apparently views nature, in spite of its ultimate theoretical contingency, as functioning independently on a mundane level; which level, he seems interested to single out, includes that of the Prophet's life.

118.7 "(movement) existing, moreover, necessarily in the simple body":

موجودة اضطراراً في الجرم المطلق . The "simple body" is Aristotle's "first heaven", ἡ πρώτη οὐρανός, the outermost sphere of the universe, that in which the fixed stars reside (cf. Met. XII 7 1072a 23); probably so called because its movement is unceasingly "simple" (ἁπλοῦς), i.e., circular (cf. De Caelo II 6 288a 11-288b 1, and see the Arabic translation there, ed. A. Badawī, Aristūṭālis fī as-samā', (Cairo, 1961) pp. 248 ff.)

The use of al-jirm al-muṭlaq here is of course quite different

from the more widely used term al-jism al-muṭlaq, commonly translated as "absolute body", that which denotes the "second matter", i.e., the combination of "first matter" and "corporeal form" (for which cf. H. Wolfson, Crescas, pp. 578 ff., and see further for the Ikhwan al-Ṣafā', S. Nasr, An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, (Cambridge, 1964), p. 58 f.). Jirm has been noticed before as denoting, in such expressions as al-jirm al-aqsā, al-jirm al-kull and al-jirm al-‘ālam, a heavenly body or sphere, and the universe (cf. the note to 109.1 above). Al-jirm al-muṭlaq may be seen as a synonym of the former term, and probably as entailing the latter terms as well (cf. ibid).

There is no specific indication here that al-Kindī realizes all the consequences of positing a necessary sphere (or universe), viz., its independent, eternal nature; nor does he seem to appreciate the difficulty of interpreting possibility in terms of necessity (cf. Van den Bergh, op. cit., II: 36). Al-Kindī seems to assume a basic dichotomy between the possible beings of the sub-lunar world and the necessary beings (including the secondary substances of species and genera) of the supernal world .

One may assume that, unless he is unaware of the dilemma, al-Kindī's remarks in the following chapters on the non-essential nature of things and the essential nature of God alone, are an attempt to qualify the nature of this necessity.

118.9 "Now it has been said that there may not be movement when a body exists": وقد قيل أن الحركة لا تكون إذا كان الجرم موجودا. Cf. above 117.15, where al-Kindī posits the two possibilities of either there being no movement at all with body, or none but possible movement. The first alternative is then disposed of rather summarily, by being said to involve an obvious contradiction (of fact); and the second has just been shown as valid only if "possible" is understood to imply "necessary" existence, if only in the species. If merely possible, al-Kindī would consider that movement could not occur, and it must be this sense of non-movement, viz., movement as potentiality, that al-Kindī is considering in establishing this self-contradiction. In doing so, however, he has changed the very definition of possibility which he has just employed.

118.12 "and it is not possible for there to be body and not movement":

فليس يمكن أن يكون جرم ولا حركة. As a categorical remark this statement is misleading, for it ignores the actual states of rest and potential movements of sub-lunar objects, which al-Kindī refers to above, line 3. He apparently is thinking here of "body" as a member of a species, and even more probably of body in the sense of heavenly bodies, or of the universe as a whole, which he next considers.

118.14-17 "It is sometimes assumed ... a generation from nothing or

eternal": This is to be read, as Davidson suggests, ("Creation", op. cit., p. 371) "against the background" of Physics VIII 1.

There is, however, a basically different orientation to the two texts. Aristotle asks essentially whether the motion of a movable thing comes from nothing or is eternal (cf. 250b 11-15; 251a 9-17), and the answer is eternal; while al-Kindī more specifically inquires whether a universe which is assumed to have been at rest originally and then to have moved can be said to be generated from nothing or to be eternal -and the answer is neither.

118.14 "It is sometimes assumed that it is possible for the body of the universe to have been at rest originally ...": *قد يُظنّ (not) أنه يمكن أن يكون جرم الكلّ كان ساكناً أولاً* .

This is the view Aristotle attributes to Anaxagoras at Physic VIII 1 250b 24. Al-Kindī's use of it here is not directed against his contemporaries but rather against the very idea of divorcing body from movement. This particular formulation leads directly to the thesis that al-Kindī wishes to refute, viz., that the universe can be eternal. He has already established, and will argue again, that movement is finite (cf. above, 116.10 and see below, 119.14 ff. and 120.15 ff.); now he wishes to foreclose the possibility of another kind of infinity, viz., rest.

118.17 "a generation from nothing or eternal": *كونا عن ليس أولم يزل*, i.e., a being, as explained in the following line,

which is either generated from nothing or is eternal (literally, "unceasing").

118.19¹ "in accordance with our previous classifications": كما

قـمـناحيـث صـنـفـنا ; literally, "as we have said previously where we classified."

118.19² "that generation is one of the species of movement": أن

أحد أنواع الحركة هو الكون . At 117.11 above

generation and corruption are said to be species of change (tabaddul), not movement (haraka), which term is reserved at line 9 for locomotion; and indeed the whole classification is of kinds of "change", not "motion". It would thus seem that al-Kindī is using haraka here in a general sense, as equivalent to tabaddul though without really bearing the distinction between the two terms in mind (something like his reversion to istiḥāla in the general sense of motion below at 119.7, after having defined it in the more limited meaning of "alteration" in 117.11). He may well be thinking of the classification of 117.8, "movement is a kind of change", in the sense of the variant given in UG 204.10, "movement is a change of states", which would include as movements the substantive changes of generation and corruption as described above at 113.11. Yet that discussion posits changes of contraries within a genus, the very opposite of substantive change into (and out of) nothing. This latter type of change

(using even "change" equivocally) ought thus not to be called "generation", as al-Kindī has just blithely done, for in doing so he assumes what he ought to prove, *viz.*, that *ex nihilo* "movement" is not unique. This assumption is made out of a strong conviction that all really possible kinds of physical change are contained in the Aristotelian classification of the subject.

119.1 "body is not prior (to movement, movement) is (of) its essence":

لم يسبق الجرم (الحركة) كان (الحركة من) ذاته , following AR in emending this sentence, though

preferring al-ḥaraka to his al-kawn, and min dhātihi to his dhātahu, since movement, in al-Kindī's terms the genus of generation, could more properly be said to be essential to body.

119.7 "will have moved": فقد استحال , following the usage of istihāla in 114.3, and cf. the note there.

119.8 "as we have explained previously": كما قرمنا بيان ذلك Cf. 114.3 f.

Al-Kindī thus disposes of this possibility as well by showing it to be a self-contradiction. Aristotle's own argument here against eternal rest is again quite different from al-Kindī's. The Stagirite's objection is based on his view of rest as the "privation of movement", *στέρησις κινήσεως* (Physics VIII 1 251a 26), thus assuming prior movement and an actual cause

of the change. The eternally movable can't be originally at rest, Aristotle is implying, because "originally" there is movement, actual and eternal, of a body; the very antithesis of al-Kindī's position.

It appears inaccurate, therefore, for Davidson (Creation," op. cit., p. 371) to paraphrase this argument of al-Kindī's as follows: "If ... the universe is eternal, it must always have been in motion, for if it were ever completely at rest, it could never have begun moving." Al-Kindī feels the universe can easily be shown not to have been eternally at rest originally, given the definition of the eternal (and the fact of movement); but he does not want to infer that if the universe were eternal, it would have to be in constant movement. That couldn't happen, he has shown, due to the finiteness of movement. Al-Kindī is here eliminating the last possible chance for an eternal universe; while Aristotle is pointing the way to just such a conclusion.

119.14 "It has been explained previously": **وقد تقدم** . Cf.

117.5.

119.16 "since extension is that in which its being is, i.e., that in which there is that which it is": **إذ المدة هي ما هو** (following AR's **فيه هويّة ، أعني ما هو فيه هو ما هو** pointing and addition of a final huwa), by which al-Kindī is apparently saying that extension, or duration, (and thus time)

is essential to body, even as movement is so declared to be above, at 119.1; and cf. below, line 18.

Huwiya denotes the being of a thing, its being an entity, sometimes termed "ipseity". (cf. S. Afnan, Philosophical Terminology in Arabic and Persian, Leiden 1964, p. 120 ff.; and see A. M. Goichon, Lexique de la Langue Philosophique D'Ibn Sīnā, Paris 1938, p. 411 f.). It is used apparently as a synonym for anniya, as below, 120.17. Cf. also below, note to 113.1.

119.17 "as has been explained": كما قد اتضح. Cf. above, 117.14 ff.

119.18 "concomitant of the body": اللازمة للجسم, that which adheres necessarily to, is inherent in, the body; cf. above, lines 1 and 16. For extension as that which is counted by movement, cf. above, 117.5.

120.4 "due to its being": لأنّيته, i.e., due to its basic nature. Cf. the text and notes to 117.4 and 119.16 above, as well as 120.17 below. Al-Kindī has gone on for unnecessary length with this proof. The argument, beginning at 114.10, has long since established the impossibility of an infinite magnitude, from which the finiteness of all else follows (116.5 ff.). Despite the emphasis on the dependence of time and motion upon body, the argument essentially reflects one of John Philoponus' arguments

against the impossibility of eternal motion (cf. above, note to 114.11); and not his argument for the finite power of a finite body (as Davidson assumes, op. cit., p. 372).

120.5 "by means of another account": بقول آخر. This "other account" is taken ultimately from the set of John Philoponus' arguments for the finite power of a finite body. Such proofs were apparently contained originally in a separate treatise known to the Arabs and recorded separately by their bibliographers (cf. Davidson's summary of this treatise and sources, op. cit., pp. 358-365). Al-Kindī may well be aware of the peculiar nature of this argument, for it is missing entirely from OE, which, at pp. 196-197, paraphrases the previous and following proofs only. That it may well have been problematic for him may further be deduced from the fact, which Davidson has noted (ibid., p. 372), that al-Kindī transforms this proof into the same type of argument as the others.

120.6 "We therefore say": فنقول. Cf. again UG, AR I: 204.16-206.12, for comparison with our text from the following line to 122.4. UG continues in an apparently natural way from the equivalent of FP 117.12, progressing from a description of movement as a change of states (تبدل الأحوال) and an enumeration of the kinds of change, to an inclusion of composition and combination within movement. The impression is thus given in UG of only one proof.

120.7 "Composition and combination are part of change": **إن**
من التبدل التركيب والاشتلاف (UG 204.16,
ومن التبدل الاشتلاف والتركيب). Al-Kindī
 is using i'tilāf as a synonym for tarkīb, since he doesn't refer
 to i'tilāf again, and he does not seem to be distinguishing
 between, e.g., physical mixtures and chemical compounds (for which
 latter ikhtilāf or imtizāj would conceivably be better terms).
 Both tarkīb and i'tilāf, however, are already subsumed in the
 categories of change mentioned above (cf. the preceding note).
 Singling them out makes sense only if one wants to emphasize the
 finite nature of composite things for reasons not already given.
 Al-Kindī's reasoning, however, immediately becomes that which he
 has just used in the previous argument. Either his familiarity
 with the argument for finite power is hazy (as Davidson assumes,
op. cit., p. 372), or he prefers to repeat essentially the same
 argument with minor, though for him probably significant, varia-
 tions. It would not, it must be said, be out of character for
 al-Kindī if the latter were the case; this could, however, also
 imply that al-Kindī deliberately altered the nature of the
 argument.

Most of the proofs for creation from the finite power of the
 universe depend upon the composite nature of the heavens and of
 every substance, which, composed as they are of unstable combina-
 tions of matter and form, do not remain in any given form

permanently and are therefore not eternal as such; the power of such a contingent body is likewise, then, not self-sufficient or eternal (cf. Simplicius' commentary on the Physics, op. cit., pp. 1329-1331; and see Davidson's summary of Philoponus' proofs and illustrations of Saadya Gaon's use of them, op. cit., pp. 362-365). Now al-Kindī does not look upon the heavens as part of the sub-lunar world of generation and corruption; to him they are not composed of a form and matter which as a composite entity is therefore corruptible (cf. above, note to 113.5). Al-Kindī rather follows Aristotle in his description of the eternal nature of the heavens, and therefore it would be surprising to find him using John Philoponus' arguments for finite power which attack this view, were it not that he has qualified his identification with both Aristotle and Philoponus.

In addition, Kalām writers adopted the idea of composition as indicating contingency, and transformed the physical dichotomy of form and matter into accident and body, or atom (cf. Davidson, ibid., pp. 364, 365, 383-385). Al-Kindī, who again preferred Aristotle's scheme of things, in the sub-lunar sphere now, did not refrain from using an argument for creation the formulation of which could have identified him with the theologians, were it not for his explicit division of body into matter and form. His appreciation of the theoretical strength of this argument, moreover, is clear from his incorporation of it into the argument for the impossibility of an infinite magnitude above at 116.9; his partial use of it here; and his adaptation and extensive use of it in the following chapters.

120.8 "long, wide, deep substance, i.e., it possesses three dimensions":

جوهر طويل عريض عميق ، أو ذو أبعاد ثلاثة

UG 204.17 reverses these clauses (giving the adjectives as nouns,

طولا وعرضا وعمقا "length, width and depth"), while

the former clause is omitted from the definition of body in On

Definitions AR I: 165, which simply says that "body is that which

has three dimensions", الجرم ماله ثلاثة أبعاد

(cf. De Caelo I 1 268a 7 ff.; Met. V 6 1016b 28). This tridimen-

sionality is predicated of the heavens by Philoponus, op. cit.,

p. 1331.20 (and cf. Davidson, op. cit., p. 371).

120.9¹ "and of the long, wide and deep which is its specific difference":

UG 205.1, "and of the dimensions which are its specific differences",

changing the faṣluhu of FP to fuṣūluhu.

120.9² "and it is that which is composed of matter and form": وهو

المركب من هيولى وصورة . That the heavens are composed

of matter and form is stressed by John Philoponus, op. cit., p.

1329.20 ff. (and cf. Davidson, op. cit., p. 363). He argues from

this fact to their need of matter, hence their lack of self-

sufficiency and infinite power. Al-Kindī, on the other hand,

argues from the composition of body to its changeful nature; from

change to movement, and from movement to time.

120.11¹ "state": al-hāla (UG 205.3, al-aḥwāl, the masculine plural),

like hāl used in the general sense of "state" or "disposition" of an object viewed as a whole, while composition is seen as the process of achieving, through change, a given state.

120.11² "Composition ... and if": فإن ; UG 205.3, فالتركيب ... وإن, showing the often arbitrary nature of wa and fa.

120.13 "body is composite": UG 205.5 adds كما أوضحنا, "as we have explained".

120.14 "are not prior": lam yasbuq; UG 205.6, lā yasbuqu.

120.15¹ "movement is change": الحركة تبدل ; UG 205.7, الحركة تبدل ما, "movement is a kind of change".

120.15² "change is the number of the extension of that which changes, and movement is a counting of the extension of that which changes": والتبدل عدد مدة المتبدل ، فالحركة والتبدل UG 205.7 عادة مدة المتبدل , "change is a counting of the extension of that which changes", as at 204.14. Judging by the close relationship of movement and change just mentioned, the UG variant and the coalescence of both predicates ("number of ..." and "a counting of ...") with change in 117.12 above, al-Kindī is apparently saying essentially the same thing for change and movement.

120.17 "and every body has extension as we said previously, viz.,
 that in which there is being, i.e., that in which there is that
 which it is": **ولكلّ جرم مدّة، كما قدّمنا، أي ما هو
 فيه أنيّة، أعني ما هو فيه هو ما (هو)**
 (literally, "... i.e., that in which there is a certain that"),
 following AR's addition of a final huwa at 119.6 (though not,
 oddly, here), after which sentence ours is patterned and to which
 it refers. This parallelism highlights the synonymous usage as
 "being", in this context at least, of huwīyah and annīyah. UG
 205.9 has **ولكلّ جرم مدّة هي الحال هو فيه**
، أنيّة، أعني الحال التي هو فيه
 "and every body has extension which is a state in which there is being,
 by which I mean a state in which there is a that".

120.19¹ "nor is body": **والجرم لم** ; UG 205.10, **فالجرم لا**

120.19² "as we have explained": **كما أوضحنا** . Cf. above, 117.7.

120.20 "and they occur simultaneously in being": **فهو معا**
، فـ هي معا , literally, "and
 they occur together". UG 205.12, **في الأنيّة**
 The remainder of this discussion to 121.5
 is omitted from UG.

121.3 "in another way": **بنوع آخر** . The following proof, or
 rather proofs, of actual finiteness also belong to the genre of
 proofs for creation from the impossibility of an infinite magnitude

first established by John Philoponus. As presented by al-Kindī, they incorporate a number of these proofs, using arguments some of which have been encountered already, but substituting time for magnitude.

121.5 "temporal segment": فصل من الزمان . Cf. the note to 116.10 above, and see 121.15 below. UG 205.13 begins this section with a sentence not found in our text and which may be translated as follows: "Extension renders every change segmentable, and the segmentary interval is time" (فعل تَبَدَّل)
 تفاصل (بفواصل AR) مَدَّة ، والمَدَّة المفصولة
 هي الزمان ; preferring "interval" to "extension"
 for mudda, where the temporal unit functions as an absolute term; and likewise "segmentary" instead of "segmentable").

121.6 "it cannot be": lā-yumkin; UG 205.15, wa-lā yumkin.

121.8,9 "if it were possible ... we would never reach a given time":

فإن أمكن ذلك لا ننتهي إلى زمان
 (UG 205.17 partially corrupt, as AR notes there, n. 8),
 i.e., a distinct temporal period, viz., the present. I consider this sentence to be parenthetical. It is based upon the Aristotelian argument concerning the impossibility of traversing an infinite series (used by John Philoponus to prove the impossibility of an infinite number of actual transformations of things, ibid., p. 1178,

and cf. Davidson, op. cit., p. 365 f.). Al-Kindī reverts to this argument again at 121.15 f. below, and Davidson has apparently conflated the material in his translated excerpts, ibid., p. 371. The positive argument for the finite nature of time used here depends in fact upon the following sentence.

121.9 "for the interval from past infinity ... regressing in times to infinity": لأن من لا نهاية في القدمة ... مصاعداً في
 الأزمدة إلى ما لا نهاية له . As al-Kindī attempts to elaborate, and as he reiterates at OE 197.5 f., equal intervals are those which have the same finite limits; which is also the case with equal bodies, as discussed above, 114.13 and 115.14 (part of the argument against infinite magnitudes based upon the finite nature of equal or unequal bodies due to addition or subtraction). The term "infinity" in the expressions "past infinity" and "regressing ... to infinity" is apparently being used equivocally here, and the argument is probably adapted from a context in which both temporal directions are used to make the same point, viz., that an infinite series cannot be traversed. Cf. the more straightforward use of these terms in Saadya, k. al-Amanāt, p. 36, Hebrew translation, p. 59, English translation, p. 45 (Altmann, p. 56); and see Davidson, op. cit., p. 366, comparison with al-Kindī, p. 373. As for "regressing", I read muṣā'idan with the ms., which is probably a scribal error for

mutaṣā'idan, as given in the parallel passage of 197.8. UG 206.2 has mutaḍā'ifan, which preserves the sixth form but is otherwise corrupt. Davidson, ibid., translates this term as "ascending back", noting that Saadia employs the same root form (su'ūd).

121.15 "nor that before it until a time before it is reached";

UG 206.7 omitted.

121.15-122.1 "Furthermore ... a definite time." Time is here treated as a continuum capable by its nature of both infinite addition and division (cf. Physics IV 11 219a 13 ff.; 12 220a 31 ff.). The assumption again, here made explicit, is that it is impossible to traverse an infinite quantity (cf. above lines 8-9 and note there). This assumption is likewise operative in the teaching of two early contemporaries of al-Kindī, the Mu'tazilites Iskāfī (d. 854) and the already encountered Nazzām, (cf. above, note to 114.18, and see below, note to 122.13-15); cf. their somewhat similar formulations of this argument, as reported by al-Khayyat, k. al-Intiṣār, op. cit., pp. 19, 31 and 33, French translation, pp. 12, 30, 32. Davidson, moreover, feels that some of their arguments refer, contrary to their appearance, to temporal and not spatial infinity (op. cit., pp. 375 and 379). This emphasis upon the traversal of an infinite calls to mind the argument attributed to Zeno (in which case a further parallel exists (with qualifications, for which cf. above, 116.13) between Saadya's

and al-Kindī's presentation of the issue). It is therefore most interesting to note that al-Kindī does not even allude to Aristotle's solution of this dilemma, as given, e.g., in Physics VIII 8 263a 4 ff. Al-Kindī simply dismisses the theory, arguing that since there is a definite time (the present), all time must be finite. This is tantamount to a rejection of the validity of Aristotle's distinction between actual and potential time (cf. Physics VIII 8 263b 3 ff.). It may be that al-Kindī here dismisses this argument summarily because he had already, at 116.13 ff, rejected the notion of a valid potentiality for time, as well as for motion and magnitude.

122.1 "termination ... exists": **والانتهاء ... موجود به**

(UG 206.8, manjud), literally, "is found with it".

122.2 "segment": faṣl; UG 206.9, muttaṣal, "continuity".

122.5¹ "It is (also) not possible": Here the parallel with UG stops, the latter text going on at 207.1 to argue from the impossibility of an eternal body for the necessity of a created world, and thus for a Creator.

The following lines are a variation of the argument presented at 121.9 above; whereas there equal intervals are seen to entail finiteness, here the same is true for unequal intervals. Cf. further, the second note to 122.6 below.

122.5² "(the interval from) past time to a definite time to have infinity": **الزمان الماضي إلى زمن (!) محدود**, literally, "the time which passed to a definite time" ("definite" time probably in the sense of present time; as mafrūd, "given" time, above at 121.9).

122.6¹ "as we have said previously": **كما قدمنا**. Cf. above, 121.5 ff.

122.6² "and times are consecutive": **والأزمنة متتالية**
Cf. below, line 10. As the given or present time is finite, so each similar segment added to it is likewise finite, the concept of an infinite segment having been rejected. We have, therefore, the addition of two finite intervals, for which (formulated in terms of bodies) cf. above, 114.16 ff.

122.10 "Time is a continuous quantity": **والزمان من الكمية المتصلة**. Cf. Physics IV 11 220a 5 and VIII 1 251b 20. This statement clarifies al-Kindī's use of "consecutive" above, line 6, and his general treatment of time as if it is composed of a series of discrete segments (as Davidson so understands him, op. cit., p. 373). No more than Saadya (as Davidson has observed, ibid., pp. 366, 367) does al-Kindī distinguish between a series of segments and a continuous extension. While time is viewed as continuous in actuality, the impossibility of

infinite time for al-Kindī allows him to treat time as though it were discrete. In other words, where time alone is concerned, it is regarded as continuous; where the beginning and end of all time is in question, however, time is handled as a series of discrete parts.

122.11 "the present": al-ān, "the now".

122.13-15 "If two definite times are continuous through one limit

common to them both, then the remaining limit of each one of them is definite and knowable,"

فان اتصل زمانان محدودان
بنهاية واحدة مشتركة لهما، فإن نهاية كل واحد
منهما البقية محدودة معلومة

since an infinite series is impossible. Overlooking the circular reasoning employed here by the term "definite times", it is clear that al-Kindī arrives at his conclusion by treating time as "continuous" within circumscribed limits; for which static and paradoxical view cf. above, note to 122.10. The argument that whatever has an end must have had a beginning and vice-versa (which is a fair paraphrase of our sentence) is not an uncommon one among Islamic and Jewish theologians and philosophers (cf. Davidson, *ibid.*, p. 378, 379). It is mentioned first as being used (in a negative formulation) by Abū l-Hudhayl (d. 849) (cf. k. al-Intiṣār, p. 18, French translation, p. 11; a passage partially alluded to by al-Ash'arī, Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn, *op. cit.*, p. 358 f.). A variation of this

argument, viz., the contention that whatever is finite in one direction must be so in all directions, is, moreover, attributed to Naẓẓām (k. al-Intiṣār, p. 32, French translation, p. 31; and see Davidson, op. cit., p. 379).

122.15 "It has, however, been said": وقد كان قيل . Cf. above, 122.8, where the argument for an infinite sum is not really presented but only suggested, to be immediately refuted; our passage serving as further refutation.

122.19 "ultimately": min ākhirihī, literally, "at/from its end".

Chapter III: Notes

123.3 "An investigation whether it is or is not possible for a thing to be the cause of the generation of its essence, shall now follow the previous (discussion)": **وقد يتلو ما قدّمنا البحث عن الشيء، هل يمكن أن يكون علّة كون ذاته أم لا يمكن ذلك**. As the previous chapter has argued for the finiteness of body, time, and motion, al-Kindī now proceeds to reason that nothing of our acquaintance is fully self-sufficient or independent. Having denied the logical possibility of generation from nothing above, at 118.18 ff., al-Kindī now wishes to remove the possibility of something causing its own generation, i.e., being its own cause, or, as I have translated, being "the cause of the generation of its essence". While *dhāt* is used interchangeably by al-Kindī to denote "self" and "essence" (cf. below, 142.11 f.), it is the latter term which is clearly intended by our context, though the entire distinction between "a thing" and its "essence" is soon repudiated (124.3).

123.4 "We say that it is not possible for a thing to be the cause of the generation of its essence": **فنقول إنه ليس ممكناً أن يكون الشيء علّة كون ذاته**. Al-Kindī's position, though not his terminology, may be traced to Aristotle's discussion of substance and essence in *Met.* VII 3-6 (Aṣṭāt, for example, renders

Met. VII 6 1031a 15, "we should inquire whether each thing and its essence are the same or different ($\pi\acute{o}\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu\ \delta\grave{\epsilon}\ \tau\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\nu\ \epsilon\acute{\sigma}\tau\iota\nu\ \eta\ \epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu\ \tau\acute{o}\ \tau\acute{\epsilon}\ \eta\nu\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \epsilon\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\omicron\nu\ \sigma\kappa\epsilon\pi\tau\acute{\epsilon}\omicron\nu$), as $\text{ولكن فلنفحص ما هو بالذات والمفرد هو هو}$, (Bouyges, II: 821); and generally translates $\tau\acute{o}\ \tau\acute{\epsilon}\ \eta\nu\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ as ما هو بالذات , reserving ن ا ن for the pronoun of self, as at 1031b 5 and 13 (Bouyges, 822.15, 823.7, and see Afnan's list (op. cit., p. 101) of other places in Aristotle in which dhāt has this meaning). Avicenna, on the other hand, frequently uses dhāt in the sense of essence; cf. Goichon, op. cit., pp. 134, 135.). Significantly, al-Kindī does not at all consider using dhāt in a more Platonic way, as the transcendental form or idea of things; there is no association here with the Neoplatonic hierarchy of universal beings and God as the ultimate essence from which individual beings derive their identity (cf. the "Sayings of the Greek Sage" (Plotinus, as discovered by F. Rosenthal) in Badawī's edition of Plotinus Apud Arabes, p. 186 No. 6; translated by Lewis, op. cit., p. 474:24). Such a terminological association, which would make essence "the cause of the generation of a thing", is obviously foreign to al-Kindī's thought here, though his ultimate theory of being requires some such emanationist relation (cf. below, p. 161).

Al-Kindī's use of Aristotle here is, however, tempered structurally, though not conceptually, by the employment of a

type of formal reasoning which is associated with Stoic logic, viz., the conditional statement (cf. W. and M. Kneale, op. cit., pp. 98, 159 ff.). It is by the exercise of disjunctive and hypothetical propositions that al-Kindī formulates and "proves" his statement; assuming, by the law of the excluded middle upon which the Stoics placed great stress (ibid., p. 161), that the denial of one disjunct (e.g., that it is possible for a thing to be the cause of the generation of its essence) is equivalent to the affirmation of the other (that such is not possible).

123.5¹ "its becoming a being": **تَهْوِيَّة**, the verbal form of huwīya, being; the verbal form is apparently used uniquely by al-Kindī. Cf. Afnan, op. cit., p. 123.

123.5² "generation usually being predicated, in other places, of that which comes to be particularly from something." **فانه قد يقال كون، في مواضع اخر ، للكائن من شيء خاصة**. Cf. above, 113.11, which affirmed that an object does not perish completely; and 118.18 ff., which proved that the universe, and by implication any body, cannot (as we normally understand physical substance) be generated from nothing. As in the latter case, al-Kindī here entertains the possibility of generation from nothing only to show its logical impossibility, working within a strictly Aristotelian conceptual framework.

123.6,7 "existent ... non-existent": **أيس** and **ليس**. Cf. al-Kindi's use of **الأيس** in 113.12 above (and see note 113.11² there), as well as both terms together at 136.18, 137.3, 9, 16, etc., below. Elsewhere (AR I: 182) al-Kindi writes: **إن الفعل الحقى الأول**, translated by R. Walzer ("New Studies on Al-Kindi", Greek into Arabic, p. 187) as "True primary action is to produce real things from nothing" (and with which may be compared al-Kindi's definition of **ibdā'**, AR I: 165, **إظهار الشيء**, which Walzer renders (*ibid.*) as "**ibdā'** is to make a thing appear out of nothing"). As Walzer notes there, Astāt used **الأيس** to translate the **τὸ ἐξ ὕλης** of Met. VIII 2 1042b 25, Bouyges II: 1034.7, (as well as the **τὸ τῆς ἐξ ὕλης** of 3 1043b 25, Bouyges II: 1062.12). Astāt also uses the terms **انه ليس** and **ماليس هو** for the **τὸ μὴ εἶναι** and **τὸ μὴ ὄν** of Met. V 7 1017a 31 and VI 2 1026b 15 (Bouyges II: 555.10 and 716.1) respectively.

123.10 "for both cause and effect are predicated only of something which has existence of some sort": **لأن العلة والمحلول إنما** Cf. 101.3 **هما مقولان على شيء له وجود ما** and 12 above, in which al-Kindi describes the four Aristotelian causes and the substance with which each one is identified. In On Definitions (AR I: 169) he refers to the four causes as "the natural (or "physical") causes, **العلل الطبيعية** .

123.11 "However, it has been said that (a thing) is the cause of the generation of its essence": **وقد قيل إنه علة كون ذاته**.
 This explicit statement is missing in the ms., but, as it is the premise upon which the whole argument is constructed, it is possible that the original sentence read something like this (following the examples of pp. 124.8 and 124.14): "If a thing were non-existent and its essence were non-existent -and it were the cause of the generation of its essence- then ..." It is so typical of al-Kindī's method to posit that which he wishes to disprove, and then proceed to show the internal contradictions which ensue, that it may be possible that he assumed the reader would have assumed the initial premise of the argument after line 4 above.

123.16 "As, however, it has been said previously ...": **وقد تقدم**.
 See the preceding note.

124.1 "If, therefore, it would occur that a thing were a non-existent, its essence would be an existent": **فإذا عرض له أن يكون**.
ليسوا عرض لذاته أن يكون أيضا. Cf. Met. VII 6 1031a 31-b 10.

124.3 "Though the essence of every thing is that thing": **وكل**
شيء فذاته هي هو, literally "is it", is the thing
 itself, its being, and cf. Met. VII 6 1031b 12, 19. AR's
 punctuation and division of paragraphs is here rejected, and the

translation follows the parallel, and correctly punctuated, passage of 124.11.

124.17 "Inasmuch as this has been explained, we now say that every

utterance must either be meaningful or not meaningful": **ولمذا قد تبين ذلك فنقول ان كل لفظ فلا يخلو من أن يكون ذا معنى أو غير ذي معنى**. From here to 126.14, al-Kindī reverts to

the ultimately Alexandrian commentary to the Isagoge which he has utilized before (cf. above, 97.8 and 101.5 ff. and notes there). This passage bears particular resemblance to Elias'

Prolegomena, 35.18-36.30, beginning, as al-Kindī does, with the statement: **ἡ φωνὴ ἡ σηματικὴ ἐστὶν ἡ ἄσχημος.**

Cf. for Ammonius' commentary, op. cit., 58.19-63.5.

124.20¹ "That which has meaning must either be a universal or

particular thing": **وما كان له معنى لا يخلو من أن يكون كلياً أو جزئياً**. Cf. Elias, op. cit., 35.26: **τῶν δὲ σηματικῶν αἱ μὲν καθόλου, αἱ δὲ μερικαί.**

124.20² "Philosophy does not inquire into particular things, for

particular things are not limited, and that which cannot be limited, knowledge cannot comprehend": **والفلسفة لا تطلب الأشياء الجزئية، لأن الجزئيات ليست بمتناهية، ومالم يكن متناهياً لم يحيط به علم**. Cf. Ammonius, op. cit., 59.18-60.1, beginning **τὰ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἄπειρα καὶ ἀπερίληπτα**, and

ending ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ κατὰ μέρος πολλὰ ὄντα καὶ ἄπειρα ἐπιστήμην οὐ ποιοῦσιν. See too the more succinct variant given in the notes to 58.19, in which philosophers are said not to be concerned with individual substances, due to their unlimited number: αἱ μὲν καθ' ἑνὸς μόνου τῷ ἀριθμῷ λέγονται... οἱ φιλόσοφοι δὲ τὸ ἄπειρα εἶναι οὐ καταγίνονται.

125.1 "Philosophy is knowing the true natures of things":

والفلسفة عالة بالأشياء التي لها علمها
بحقائقها; literally, "philosophy is knowing things the knowledge of which is of their true/real natures". Cf. above, 98.8, al-Kindī here possibly amplifying modestly upon his source.

125.3 "Universal general things must either be essential or non-

essential": والأشياء الكلية العامة لا تخلو من أن تكون ذاتية أو غير ذاتية. Cf. Elias, *op. cit.*, 36.4, τῶν δὲ καθόλου αἱ μὲν οὐσιώδεις εἰσὶν, αἱ δὲ ἐπεισοδιώδεις.

Al-Kindī also offers immediately the same definition of the essential as follows in Elias, ἐκεῖνα δὲ λέγεται οὐσιώδη ὅσα καὶ παρόντα σώζουσι καὶ ἄπόντα φθείρουσι.

125.5 "as life": كالحياة. For this, as well as for the other

illustrations of the predicables which follow, cf. Porphyry as well as his commentators. See, for example, the *Isagoge*, *op. cit.*, 2.20, Arabic (edited by Badawi, *op. cit.*), p. 1025. Al-Kindī may well have interspersed his use of the one source with

the other. Elias, for example, uses "reason" as his example of an essential predicate (op. cit., 36.6).

125.7 "and the essential is that which is called substantial":

والذاتي هو المسمى جوهريا . Cf. Met. VII 6 1031a

18, "the essence is said to be the substance of each thing"

(καὶ τὸ τί ᾗν εἶναι λέγουται εἶναι ᾧ ἐκαστον οὐσία,

translated by Astāt (Bouyges II: 821.16, ويقال ما هو بالذنية أيضا,

). Al-Kindī here takes the opportunity to

clarify the nature of the "thing" with which essence is identified

above, at 124.3.

125.8 "The substantial must either be a collective or separate

thing": والجوهرى لا يخلو من أن يكون جامعا أو مفردا . Cf.

Elias, op. cit., 36.10: τὰ μὲν οὖν οὐσιώδη ᾗ ὑπαρξεν

δηλοῦσιν ᾗ τρόπον ὑπάρξεως, "the essential is indicative

either of a substance or of a mode of substance". Al-Kindī's

preceding identification of essence with substance, and his

phrasing of the subject of this sentence as "the substantial",

الجوهرى, may account for his complete divergence of terminology

here, though his examples follow those of Elias.

125.15 "animal": الحى, literally "living" or "living being", and

as such translated above, 112.4 and 125.5. As synonymous with

the latter, "animal" is the more conventional translation of the

term in this context, representing the Greek τὸ ὑπόκειν . Cf., for example, Ishāq ibn Hunain's translation of Cat. 5 2a 17, in Georr, op. cit., p. 322.

- 126.1 "Therefore that which is non-essential is in a substance which is its substrate and is not substantial": فهو إذن في الجوهر الموضوع له، وليس بجوهري . For the relation of property and accident to the substance in which they inhere, belonging to it but not an essential part of it, cf. Topics I 5 102a 18 and 102b 4, and Met. V 30 1025a 22. In Post. An. I 22 83b 19 Aristotle remarks that "(predicates which are not substantial) are all concomitants, some per se and others of a different type, but we say that all of them are predicated of some substratum, whereas a concomitant is not a substratum": συμβεβηκότα γάρ ἐστι πάντα, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτά, τὰ δὲ καθ' ἕτερον τρόπον. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινος κατηγορεῖσθαι φάμεν, τὸ δὲ συμβεβηκὸς οὐκ εἶναι ὑποκειμένον τι . This is translated by Abū Bishr Mattā ibn Yūnus (ed. Badawī, Mantiq Aristū II: 377) as اذ كانت باجمعا اعراضا لكن بعضها بذاتها وجميع هذه إنما نقول إنها محمولة على شيء موضوع، وإن العرض ليس هو شيئا موضوعا . This use of عرض for συμβεβηκός in the sense of the "concomitant" of a subject, or substratum, applied to both

properties and accidents (and cf. Ross, Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics (Oxford 1949) p. 582), is the way in which al-Kindī uses the term in the following sentence.

126.2 "On the contrary, it accompanies the substance and is therefore called accidens":

بل عارض الجوهر ، فسمي لذلك

عرضا . Cf. the preceding note. Accidens is chosen to

translate عرض here for its closer etymological relation to

"accident" as used below (lines 7, 10) in the term "common

accident", العرض العام (and see Goichen, op. cit., pp. 216 f.).

As al-Kindī derives the term here from the third form of the verb,

it is clear he is thinking of "accident" in the broad sense of a

concomitant or "coincident", a non-essential "attribute" (terms

by which συμβεβηκός has been translated) of a subject; the

ἐπεισοδιώδης or "adventitious" predicables of Elias (op.

cit., 36.8, 16).

126.3 "That which is in a substance must either be in one thing alone,

or it will be in many things": وهو الذي في الجوهر لا يخلو من

أن يكون في شئ منفردا... أو يكون في أشياء

كثيرة. Cf. Elias, op. cit., 36.16-18, τὰ δὲ ἐπεισοδιώδης

ἢ μιᾷ μόνῃ φύσει ὑπάρχουσι καὶ λέγονται

ἴδια... ἢ πολλὰς καὶ λέγονται συμβεβηκότες. The

"things" to which al-Kindī is referring are, as his examples

indicate, species; a property being uniquely related to one

species and therefore "convertible" (ἀντιστρέφει ,
 انعكس) with its substance (*ibid.*, 36.25, and see the
Isagoge, *op. cit.*, 12, 13, 21; Badawī, *op. cit.*, pp. 1049 f.;
 cf. too *Topics* I 5 102a 18). See further, below, 130.3 ff.

126.5 "... this being called a property, as it characterizes one
 thing": فيسمى لذلك خاصة ، لأنه يخص شيئا . واحد
 The Arabic emphasizes the nominal-verbal relation,
 خاصة - يخص , in a way the English cannot.

126.7 "common accident": عرض عام , translating the τὰ
 συμβεβηκότα κοινῶς of *Isagoge* 2.19, 3.6, 18 (الراض)
 in Badawī, *op. cit.*, pp. 1025 ff.), and understanding
 the term in the sense of the "inseparable" accident (τὸ
 ἀχώριστον , غير المفارق) of *Isagoge* 12.25 (p. 1050 Badawī).
 Al-Kindī's distinction here between property and "common accident"
 is similar to the distinction between property and "inseparable
 accident" in *Isagoge* 22.5 (p. 1068 Badawī).

126.13 "and every utterance will either be universal or particular,
 and either collective or separate": (فكل ملفوظ) وإما كلاً وإما
 جزءاً , literally "either all or part, and
 either composite or separate". The slight variations upon the
 usages of 124.20 (كلياً أو جزئياً) and 125.8 (جامعاً أو مفزقاً)
 above do not require the introduction of new or modified concepts;

for it is clear that, like Elias (op. cit., 36.20 ff.), al-Kindī is summarizing, in this paragraph, his preceding remarks.

126.14¹ "Let us now ... speak of the number of ways "one" is predicated": فلنقل على كم نوع يقال الواحد. Cf. Met. V 6 1015b 16 ff. and X 1 1052a 15 ff., for the variety of meanings Aristotle declares the term "one" possesses. The Aristotelian material is here integrated into the Isagoge classification of predicables, with the addition of the "individual" as a predicable (meaningful philosophically, as in 125.13 above, only in relation to species). It would appear likely that al-Kindī, and not an earlier commentator, is the author of the following section, since the emphasis upon the accidental nature of the unity found in all things is central to his position, and quite foreign to the distinction between accidental and essential unity mentioned here in the Metaphysics, and followed by the commentators.

126.14² "We say that one is predicated of every continuum, and also of that which doesn't receive multiplicity": فنقول: إن الواحد: يقال على كل متصل، وعلى ما لم يقبل الكثرة أيضا, these being the categories of things Aristotle calls "essentially one". Cf. Met. V 6 1015b 36 ff.; X 1 1052a 34 - 1052b 1.

126.18-127.1 "The individual will be either natural, as an animal or plant, and what is similar to them; or an artifact, as a house

والشخص إما أن يكون: and what is similar to it":
 طبيعيا كالحيوان أو النبت وما أشبه ذلك وإما
 صناعيا كالبيت وما أشبه ذلك. Cf. Met. V 6 1016a 4
 for the juxtaposition of things continuous "by nature" and "by
 art", τὰ φύσει συνεχῆ, (τὰ) τέχνη ,
 rendered by Astāt as ما كانت متصلة بالطبيعة...متصلة بالصناعة
 (Bouyges, op. cit., II: 527). The equivalent examples
 of man, plant and house are used by Aristotle in the Met. VII 7
 1032a 12 ff. discussion of things which are generated, the former
 two "by nature" (line 18), the latter "by art" (line 32, and
 1032b 12). As this Met. 2 chapter follows Aristotle's inquiry
 into the relation of a thing and its essence, which al-Kindī
 followed in the beginning of this chapter (cf. above, 123.3 ff.,
 and see the note to 123.4), it appears that he was influenced by
 this chapter again in his choice of an illustration for the
 general remark of Met. 4. See further below, 127.1².

127.1¹ فإن البيت متصل بالطبع: "A house is continuous by nature".

Cf. Met. V 6 1015b 36 ff., in which one of the examples of things
 called one by continuity in virtue of its own nature is pieces
 of wood made one by glue; which al-Kindī apparently expands into
 a house (cf. preceding note). The notion of the continuous is
 defined by al-Kindī in On Definitions (AR I: 176) as "the uniting
 of the extremities" (الاتصال هو اتحاد النهايات), and cf.
Physics V 3 227a 10).

127.1² "though its composition is continuous by accident, viz.,
 through the (builder's) technique": وتركيبه متصل بعرض،
 أعني بالمهنة، i.e., the builder's "art". Cf. Asṭāt's
 translation of the τέχνη of Met. VII 7 1033a 12 and 28 as
 مهنة، which further attests to the probability of al-Kindī's
 use of the passage here. In Met. X 1 1052a 22 ff. Aristotle
 contrasts, among non-accidental unities, the form of a thing
 unified by glue with the form of a thing naturally one; the
 difference being that the latter has in itself the cause of its
 continuity. It is this distinction which is operative in al-
 Kindī's use of the term "accidental" in this and the following
 examples, going beyond Aristotle's preference for the naturally
 unified thing to establish causality (and particularly auto-
 causation) as the sole determinant of natural, non-accidental
 unity. In doing this, al-Kindī considers non-essential unity as
 equivalent to accidental unity, while to Aristotle both essential
 and non-essential unity are non-accidental, as long as they are
 in fact, and regardless of cause, unified.

127.7 "all is predicated of things having both similar and dissimilar
 parts": الكل يقال على المشتبه الأجزاء وعلى [الأشياء]:
 اللاتي ليست بمشتبهة الأجزاء Cf. al-Kindī's similar
 definition of "all" in On Definitions (AR I: 170): "(a substance)
 common to similar and dissimilar parts" (الكل مشترك لمشتبه)

(الأجزاء وغير المشبه الأجزاء). The particular illustrations al-Kindī chooses could have come to him from a number of sources. In Met. V 3 1014a 30 ff. water is given as an example of something the parts of which are of the same kind, and, though the context is different, the elementary parts of body are also used as an illustration. In the Rasā'il Ikhwān al-Safā' (Beirut, 1957) I: 430 we find the distinction between similar and dissimilar parts predicated of individual objects (الأشياء), with body given as one of the examples of the latter category. The entire section which contains this distinction has been preserved in Latin as a separate treatise and is attributed in the translated manuscripts to a certain "Mahometh discipulo Alquindi philosophi" (for whose possible identity cf. H. Farmer, "Who was the Author of the Liber Introductorius in Artem Logicae Demonstrationis", JRAS (1934), pp. 553-556); and Nagy has accordingly edited this material with the other al-Kindī Latin treatises (op. cit., pp. 41-64, and cf. pp. 42, 43 particularly for the above distinction).

According to the Arabic title of this risāla (في معنى أنولى طبقا لثانية), -the last of the first part of this encyclopedic work (which part is devoted to a syllabus which treats the subject matter of the Quadrivium plus geography, the Isagoge and Organon)- this section, purporting to discuss the Posterior Analytics, covers a wide variety of topics, including such issues

as the relationships of cause and effect; the world, fullness and the void; and eternity vs. creation, themes which occupy al-Kindī in FP and elsewhere. Al-Kindī is known to have commented on the Post. An. (cf. above, note 101.3¹), and his use of these particular illustrations could well be inserted here from some commentary to the Analytics used both by him and the Ikhwān al-Safā'. The attribution of the Latin version of this risāla to a disciple of al-Kindī, and thus indirectly to al-Kindī himself, may well, therefore, be closer to the truth than at first appears to be the case. Much of al-Kindī's writings, particularly his introductions to and surveys of Greek philosophy, mathematics and science, was probably well received by the Ikhwān, though as yet we cannot speak with any certainty of his influencing them.

127.11¹ "However ... 'whole' is not predicated of things having similar parts": فَمَا الْجَمِيعُ فَلَا يُقَالُ عَلَى الْمُشْتَبِهَةِ الْأَجْزَاءُ .
At Met. V 26 1024a 1 ff., Aristotle distinguishes between "total" and "whole" quantities, in the former of which the position of the parts is seen as not making a difference. Water is then given as one of the examples of a "total" quantity, for which properly speaking the phrase "the whole water" is deemed inappropriate. Al-Kindī is clearly following Aristotle here, understanding the position the parts of things have as due to their similarity or dissimilarity, and substituting this criterion for Aristotle's

"position" of the parts.

Al-Kindī, interestingly, reverses here Aṣṭāt's translation of the $\pi\alpha\nu$ and $\delta\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ of this Met. passage as جميع and كل respectively (cf. Bouyges, op. cit., II: 667); yet it may be (an earlier?) fidelity to Aṣṭāt's translation, and not a corrupt text, which has al-Kindī offer elsewhere a definition of جميع as "(a substance) particularly for similar parts", خاص للمشتبه الأجزاء (On Definitions, AR I: 170). While this is the opposite of his present use of جميع, it fits Aṣṭāt's use of it.

127.11² "for "whole" is predicated of an aggregate both heterogeneous by accident and in some sense unified; when each diverse element is sustained by its own nature without the other, the name

"totality" refers to it": لأن الجميع أيضا يقال على جمع مختلفات بعرض، وأن تكون موحدة بمعنى ما وكل واحد منها قائم بطباعه غير الآخر، فيقع عليها اسم المجموعة.

Al-Kindī is following and expanding upon Aṣṭāt's translation of Met. V 26 1024a 8, 9, accepting even Aṣṭāt's terminology, which he adjusts to fit his purposes. The Metaphysics passage reads

$\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha\ \delta\epsilon\ \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\tau\alpha\iota\ \epsilon\phi'\ \omicron\iota\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\ \pi\alpha\nu\ \omega\varsigma\ \epsilon\phi'\ \epsilon\nu\acute{\iota},\ \epsilon\pi\acute{\iota}\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\alpha\ \omega\varsigma\ \epsilon\pi\acute{\iota}\ \delta\epsilon\lambda\eta\gamma\eta\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\iota\varsigma\cdot\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\varsigma\ \omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma\ \delta\ \acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\theta\mu\acute{o}\varsigma,\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha\iota\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\alpha\iota\ \alpha\acute{\iota}\ \mu\omicron\nu\acute{\alpha}\delta\epsilon\varsigma$ ("To things, to which qua one the term 'total' is applied, the term 'all' is

applied when they are treated as separate; 'this total number', 'all these units'.", in W. D. Ross' translation); which Astāt renders (*ibid.*, ويقال جميع التي قول الجميع عليها كقول المجموع على الواحد منها، كما يقال في المنفصلة مجموع (!) هذا العدد وجميع (!) هذه الاتحاد

Al-Kindī is probably unaware that Aristotle's term for a quantity when its parts are taken together corresponds to his choice of *كل* and not *جميع*, and this inconsistency in his presentation of the subject is circumvented by a modification of the source and the omission of examples.

127.16 "In a similar way there is a distinction between "part" and "some": وكذلك بين الجزء والبعض فرق. The following distinction is partially alluded to by al-Kindī in On Definitions (*ibid.*): الجزء - لما فيه الكل، البعض - لما فيه الجميع, "part" is that which is related to (literally "in") the all, 'some' is that which is related to the whole"; omitting mention of "some" as also related to the all.

128.4 "predicables": المقولات, which is also the term usually translated as "categories". The context here, however, favors the use of "predicables" (cf. also Marmura and Rist, *op. cit.*, p. 339 note 5), even as that at 132.15 ff. below would seem to call for a translation of "predicate", referring to each member of every category of existence.

128.7 "As for the genus, it is in each one of its species": **ولأن الجنس هو في كل واحد من أنواعه**. The relations between the predicables which al-Kindī has occasion to mention in the following paragraphs derive from the Isagoge or (more probably) Isagoge commentary al-Kindī has used before. Cf., for example, the relations between genus and species in the Isagoge, ed. Busse (op. cit.), pp. 2.10 ff., 4.2 ff. (Badawī, op. cit., pp. 1024, 1027).

128.8 "univocally": **قولاً متواطئاً**, i.e., the genus is the same in both name and definition for each of its species. Cf., for the definition of "univocal" (rendered as $\sigma\upsilon\nu\omega\nu\upsilon\mu\omicron\varsigma$ in Greek, **المتواطئة** in the Arabic, ed. Georr, op. cit., pp. 319, 325) cf. Cat. I la 6, and see V 3a 33.

128.11 "The individual is one only by position": **والشخص إنما هو واحد من جرة الوضع**, i.e., the parts into which the individual object is divisible form a unity, but not by any inherent or essential cause. Al-Kindī here posits a standard by which the unity of all things in any way divisible is considered, a priori, as not necessary. He thereby invokes a standard of "true unity" and "essential being" foreign to the peripatetic tradition and closer to Platonic and Neoplatonic thought.

128.15 "That which, in something, is not in its true nature essential, is in it in an accidental manner, and that which occurs accidentally to a thing does so in virtue of something other than itself":
 ومالم يكن في الشيء لحقيقته ذاتيا ، فهو فيه
 بنوع عرضي ، والعارض للشيء من غيره ، والعارض
 أثر في المعروض فيه . Cf. Met. V 30 1025a 14-30, for
 this definition of "accidental", the sort which Aristotle says
 (line 33) can never be eternal. See too the distinction Aristotle
 draws between essential and accidental attributes in Post. An.
 I 4 73a 25 ff.

128.16 "An effect is a relative term, the effect coming from an agent":
 أثر and literally والأثر من المضاف ، والأثر من مؤثر
 مؤثر should be rendered as "impression" and "an impressing force"
 (and cf. Avicenna's use of the terms as outlined by Goichon, op.
cit., pp. 2, 3). As relative terms (من المضاف) , مؤثر and
 أثر correspond to the relationship of "the active to the
 passive" (τὸ ποιητικὸν πρὸς τὸ παθητικόν , الفاعل
 إلى المنفعل) mentioned by Aristotle among his definitions of
 relative things (πρός τε , المضاف . Cf. Met. V 15 1020b 26,
 30, translated by Astāt (Bouyges, op. cit.) at II: 608.) In his
 treatise On the True, First Perfect Agent ... (AR I: 183), al-
 Kindī also employs the terminology of مؤثر and أثر , as well
 as other nominal and verbal forms of the root. There, however,
 he gives as equivalents of these terms the more common فاعل

and **منفعل**, which may also be translated as the "agent" and "patient", or "affection", which latter term is equivalent in its usage to "effect". Viewed as either **المؤثر** or **الفعال**, God is there considered to be the only agent in the true, primary sense of the word, since he never is a recipient of action, always "influencing" (**مؤثر**) others, never "influenced" by others. As such he is also called there the "first (or rather, "primary") cause", **العلّة الأولى**, both directly and indirectly responsible for the effects of all other "agents" so called, which are "really" the effects or "affections" of His action (cf. above, note to 97.10 and see the introduction, p. 69 f.). Al-Kindi's choice here in FP of **مؤثر** and **أثر** instead of **فاعل** and **منفعل** or **علّة** and **معلول** may thus be explained in terms of the allusions to God's role in nature which the terms would be thought to convey; and to the intimation, by the use of terms not necessarily associated with matter, of a view of causality that is ultimately free of physical determination.

129.1 "That which is a species through its essence is multiple":

فالنوع بالذات كثير. This contradicts Aristotle's view of the species of things which have a common genus as being considered one; cf. Met. V 6 1016a 24, b 31. While Aristotle clearly views the species and genus as possessing unity, it is the kind of unity -indivisible in thought qua genus or species- which al-Kindi disqualifies as non-essential since it is composite in

fact. Thus al-Kindi limits the applicability of the term "one" severely. He may, however, have felt he was in agreement with Aristotle's view as expressed in Met. X 1 1052a 32, in which the indivisible in kind (i.e., formal unity, that of the species and genus) is considered as indivisible in intelligibility and in knowledge; and its cause is considered one in the primary sense
 (εἶδες δὲ τὸ τῷ γνωστῷ καὶ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ
 ἀδιδίκετον) ὥσθ' ἐν ᾧ εἶη πρῶτον τὸ ταῖς
 οὐσίαις αἵτιον τοῦ ἑνός, translated by Astāt

(Bouyges, op. cit., III: 1237 وأما الواحد بالصورة فالذى لا
 قسمة له بالمعرفة وبالفكرة فإذا الواحد الأول هو
 الذى هو للجواهر علة الواحد). As given by Astāt, al-Kindī
 could have thought Aristotle to mean that true formal unity should
 in no conceivable way be divisible.

129.6 "The genus which indicates the essence of the thing ...":

الجنس ... منبئ عن ماهية الشيء. Cf. above, 101.8 and
 see note 101.8-10.

129.7 "each one of its species being ... an independent substance":

وكل نوع من أنواعه فهو هو, understanding
 هو as the equivalent of هوية, "being" or "substance".

The repetition of هو, if not a scribal error, may be meant to
 emphasize the individual nature of each species.

129.12 "The specific difference which indicates the quality of a thing ...": **والفصل ... منبئ عن أئية الشيء**. Cf. above, 101.9 and see note 101.8-10.

130.3 "The property, which indicates the existence of a thing ...": **والخاصة ... منبئة عن أئية الشيء**. Cf. above 101.7 and note there. See also Topics I 5 102a 18: "A property is something which does not show the essence of a thing but belongs to it alone and is predicated convertibly of it", $\tau\acute{\omicron}\delta\iota\omicron\nu\ \delta'\epsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\nu\ \delta'\ \mu\eta\ \delta\eta\lambda\omicron\upsilon\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\omicron\ \tau\acute{\epsilon}\ \eta\nu\ \epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota\ ,\ \mu\acute{o}\nu\alpha\ \delta'\ \upsilon\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\epsilon\iota\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\epsilon\ \kappa\alpha\tau\eta\chi\omicron\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}\tau\alpha\iota\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \pi\rho\acute{\alpha}\gamma\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$; rendered by al-Dimashqī (ed. Badawī, Manṭiq Aristū, II: 475) as **والخاصة هي ما لم يدل على ماهية الشيء وكان موجودا للأمر موجود**. This translation of **موجود** for $\upsilon\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\epsilon\iota$, understood literally, could allow one to say "the property indicates the existence of a thing"; and an earlier translation, such as that reported to have been written by Abū Nūḥ (fl. ca. 800, and cf. Peters, Aristoteles Arabus, p. 21), could have even used the terminology adopted by al-Kindī.

(Incidentally, Abū Rīdah's notes 1 and 3 to this page concerning the manuscript pointing of what I render as anniyya are not confirmed by independent scrutiny of the ms., which is ambiguous in regard to this word).

130.4 "It is not a part (of the thing)": **وليس بجزء**, i.e., not

part of its essence, though it belongs to the thing, or "exists" along with it. Cf. preceding note.

130.14 "The all ... has portions": والكل ... ذو أبعاض. Ba'd has been translated as "some" above (cf. 127.5 ff.), in contrasting it with juz', "part"; proper English usage here, however, is more satisfied by "portions" than "somes".

130.16 "and every genus has many species": فكل جنس ذات صور. The ms. (followed by AR) actually reads فكل مقولة ذات صور, "and every predicable has many species". There appears, however, to be a descending order of genus, species and individuals intended in the sentence, and as emended the phrase is more meaningful than as given in the manuscript.

131.4 "a substantial part will have either similar or dissimilar parts": والبوصري إما مشتببه الأجزاء وإما لا مشتببه الأجزاء. Cf. above, 127.7 and note there. Al-Kindī expands here upon the examples of dissimilar parts of the body, probably from his own intimate acquaintance with the subject as a medical doctor. The Rasā'il Ikhwān al-Ṣafā' passage above mentioned (p. 431), however, also enumerates a number of the same parts.

131.7 "like the living body": فكبدن الحي, following the correction in the ms. above الحيوان (as AR); and in conformity with the parallel constructions of lines 9, 10 and 12 below.

131.15 "as a house": كالبيت. Cf. above, 127.1-3 and notes there.

131.17 "and (other) parts of its structure": وأجزاء جرمه ,
literally "parts of its body (or "mass")".

131.20¹ "as the mile": كالميل, another example of continuous things,
corresponding to Aristotle's example of a line; cf. Met. V 6
1016a 2, 1016b 26.

131.20² "it is all of (many) stadia and part of a parasang": إذ هو
كل للغلوات وجزء للفرسخ. The mile is considered
as equivalent to $7\frac{1}{2}$ stadia, and 3 miles constitute a parasang.
Cf. Rosenthal, "al-Kindī and Ptolemy", op. cit., pp. 450, 451
for other treatises in which al-Kindī refers to stadia and miles.

132.6¹ "and is an acquisition from a donating agent": فهو مستفال
من مفيد. These terms ordinarily belong to the terminology
of emanationism, and as such foreshadow the conclusion of the
treatise (cf. below, pp. 162.4, 13). As with مؤثر and أثر ,
al-Kindī again goes to a term not particularly associated with
physical causality to explain natural phenomena.

132.6² "An effect comes from an agent, in that the effect and the
agent are in a relation where one does not precede the other":
والأثر من مؤثر ، لأن الأثر والمؤثر من المضاف
الذى لا يسبق بعضه بعضا . Al-Kindī wishes to emphasize

that the effect cannot precede the agent, even as the accident is not prior to its cause. It is unlikely he would have wanted to claim as a universal truth that the agent also does not precede the effect, since this contradicts his views of creation from nothing and of the Creator as an agent exclusively. That he nevertheless utters this remark is probably due to the double standard of relationships which he holds, in which case this statement is meant as valid "only" for normal physical relations; and particularly viewing مؤثر and أثر here in the sense of correlatives in which, at least logically, one does not exist before the other (cf. Cat. 7 7b 15). Cf. further below, 141.22.

- 132.8 "Furthermore, everything which is an accident in one thing is essential in another thing" وأيضاً كل شيء حادث في شيء آخر: عرضاً، فهو في شيء آخر ذاتي. That which is an accident in a thing need not, by definition, have occurred to it. It thus was a potential existent, while, as an essential existent, it would occur necessarily to a thing. The argument here is thus a reformulation of the one from possibility and necessity found above at 118.2-7, and see the notes there. The existence of essential unity is necessary as a guarantor of accidental unity only on the assumption of an eternal universe in which all instances of accidental unity could conceivably not occur at a given time, and never, therefore, thereafter. In a

temporally finite world, accidental unity could conceivably exist and a time would never have to arrive when there would be no instances of such unity. Al-Kindī thus retains an argument for the existence of God based on a notion of eternity which he otherwise rejects.

The mutazila and mutakallimum in general also have as a major tenet the accidental nature of the composition of all substances (and see the introduction, p. 70 f.); they, however, did not adopt this particular argument, probably in the realization that the essentially one here belongs to the same genus as the accidentally one, and that this reasoning tends to make unity a "necessary" attribute of God. Among the philosophers, however, we find Avicenna, for example, using the same argument from accidental to essential existence in his proofs of the existence of various intellects; and as al-Kindī does, Avicenna also has recourse to a theory of emanation. (cf. M. Marmura, "Avicenna's Psychological Proof of Prophecy", JNES 22 (1963), pp. 52-56).

- 132.15 "The natures of every predicate ... must be either one or multiple, or one and multiple together, or some of these things one and not multiple at all, while others are multiple and not one at all": لا تخلو طباع كل مقول ... من أن يكون واحدا أو كثيرا، أو بعض هذه الأشياء واحدا لا كثيرا بته أو

بعضا كثيرا لا واحدا بته. Al-Kindī here resorts to the type of reasoning to which he is partial (cf. above 115.1, 123.6, and see the note to 123.4), combining a curious mixture of logical and factual arguments in disjunctive and hypothetical propositions of an exhaustive and repetitious sort. The arguments in the remainder of this chapter have been well outlined by Marmura and Rist, *op. cit.*, pp. 339-342, and they have supplied relevant Greek sources as well, pp. 347-348. Thus they point to the antinomies in Plato's Parmenides (noting differences as well as similarities) as a source for the argument which in the following posits the one and the many as mutually exclusive entities. One should not overlook, however, Aristotle's critique of this view, which sees the one and the many as absolute opposites, a critique which contains in brief the type of absurd conclusions al-Kindī enumerates at length (cf. Met. X 6 1056b 3 ff., and see Physics I 2 185b 5 ff.). We may, therefore, assume that in this section al-Kindī either drew upon some familiarity with the Parmenides which he possessed either "directly" or through excerpts in other Middle or Neoplatonic works; or/and that he used a (lost) commentary to the Metaphysics which in turn incorporated the Platonic material.

By "direct" familiarity with the Parmenides, I mean that al-Kindī might have had some paraphrase of the work, and not that he had access to a direct translation of it, the very

existence of which is questionable (The Fihrist, op. cit., I: 246, mentions the Parmenides together with Galen's epitome of it; and see Peters, Aristotle and the Arabs, pp. 168-170, and Walzer, "Aflaṭun", El² I: 234-236.).

133.2 "If the natures of every predicate were multiplicity only, then participation in one state or one concept would not occur":

فإن كان طباع كل مقول الكثرة فقط، فلا اتفاق
اشتراك في حال واحدة أو معنى واحد.

Some of the arguments for the existence of multiplicity (or "plurality") without unity are the opposites of those al-Kindī uses for positing the existence of unity without multiplicity. Many of the latter, in turn, are found in the Parmenides, references being given below in the latter set of examples. The argument here, for example, may be seen as the opposite of that below, 137.5, which states that if there were unity only, there would be no "differentiation"; i.e., "participation in one state or concept" would occur.

133.8 "in that the contrary of multiplicity is unity": لأن خلاف
الكثرة الوحدة. Compare 136.14 below for a similar, opposite type of statement.

133.12 "then it would be dissimilar": فهي لا متشابهة. Compare the opposite type of argument concerning the need for no "exceptions", i.e., complete similarity, if there is unity only; given

below at 136.19.

133.16 "it would be moving": **كانت متحركة**, and non-moving as well, as shown below, line 20. We have here the first real (pair of) antinomies of this series of arguments, since there results, from this premise of multiplicity without unity, the existence simultaneously of both motion and rest, and neither motion nor rest. Compare this with 138.16 below, in which al-Kindī argues that from unity alone there can be neither movement nor rest.

134.5 "individual members": **ذات أشخاص**. Compare the discussion of "parts" and "all" below at 139.13 f. In the ensuing argument here al-Kindī digresses to a brief discussion of the impossibility of an infinite quantity, applying a slight variation of the argument laid down in 115.1 ff. above (and see notes there), but discussing it from the viewpoint of the separated "section" of the infinite.

134.10 "that which is divisible": **مقسوم**, i.e., the "original" infinity from which the "section" has been separated.

135.2 "non-definite": **غير محدود**, i.e., non-limited. Compare 140.1 below, and see Marmura and Rist, *op. cit.*, p. 340, note 10.

135.6 "multiplicity would not receive number": **لم تقبل الكثرة** العدد. Al-Kindī develops the relation of number and the

one in chapter 4, 146.18 ff. below, from which chapter this and the following argument may be derived. Cf., however, Parmenides 144a 4 ff., which establishes that if the one is, number must also be, and if number, then multiplicity.

135.14 "Knowledge impresses the description of that which is known into the soul of the knower as one state": **المعرفة ترسم رسم** , i.e., in its universal, intelligible form. Cf. chapter 4 below, 155.1 and 5.

136.8 "It is, however, multiplicity": **وهو كثرة** , rejecting Abū Rīdah's suggested emendation, "it is however (not multiplicity and) multiplicity", **(فهو ليس كثرة) وهو كثرة**, as superfluous.

136.12 "Similarly, it is clear that it is not possible for unity to occur without multiplicity": **عزلا تبين أنه لا يمكن أن تكون وحدة بلا كثرة**. The following arguments, to 140.15, are elaborations and repetitions of the arguments found in the Parmenides, mostly at 137c - 139b. The difference between Plato's and al-Kindī's reasoning is that Plato constructs strictly logical antinomies, while al-Kindī's arguments have the appearance of antinomies, but are mostly straightforward and rather simply reasoned refutations of the initial premise of his syllogisms.

136.14 "contrariety would not exist": **لم تكن مضادة**. Cf. above,

133.8 ff., and see Parmenides 139b 4 ff. for a discussion of the relation of the "one" and the "other".

136.19 "then there would be no exception": فلا استثناء Cf. above, 133.12 and note there.

137.7 "then there would be no differentiation": لم يكن تباين . Cf. above, 133.2 and note there.

137.11 "neither agreement nor disagreement, conjunction nor separation":
فلا اتفاق ولا اختلاف ، ولا اتصال ولا افتراق .

These states may be subsumed under the preceding argument from "differentiation".

137.13 "neither agreement nor disagreement": لم يكن اتفاق ولا
اختلاف , literally, "neither agreement nor disagreement nor agreement" (ولا اتفاق), the last two words being obviously superfluous, as AR surmises in 137 n.5, though he includes them in the text. The original passage may well have been, as it should be, "neither agreement nor disagreement, and neither conjunction nor separation".

137.18 "neither beginning, middle nor end": فلا ابتداء ولا توسط . Cf. Parmenides 137d 4 f. ولا آخر

138.6 "then there would be no figure": فلا شكل . Ibid., 137d 8 ff., Plato's examples, however, being the round and the straight.

138.16 "neither move nor rest": لا متحركة ولا ساكنة. Cf.

above, 133.16 and note there, and see Parmenides 138b 7 ff.

139.3 "not dwindling": لا مضمحل, which for some reason al-Kindī prefers to "not decreasing", لا ناقص, which one would have expected from 139.1.

139.13 "there would be neither part nor all": لم يكن جزء ولا كل.

Cf. above, 134.5 ff., and see Parmenides 137c 5 ff. "Part" is here related to "all" in a general sense, broader than that given above, 128.1.

140.1 "Furthermore, the part is one": والجزء أيضا جزء واحد.

Cf. above, 135.2 ff.

140.10-12 "Thus it is clear from all these investigations ... while it is clear from some of these investigations ...": فقد تبين من جميع هذه الأبحاث ... ومن بعضا ... By contrasting جميع (in the general sense of "all"; literally "whole", following the remarks of 127.6 ff. above) with بعض vis-à-vis investigations of multiplicity and unity respectively, al-Kindī is declaring that he has not exhausted (or disproved) all the possibilities of predicating unity of things; the theme, in fact, of the following chapter.

140.16 "the natures of things have unity and multiplicity": طباع الأشياء وحدة وكثرة, literally, "are unity and multiplicity";

this being the abbreviated way al-Kindī regularly expresses himself in this section, but not intending thereby to imply that beings have no nature other than unity or multiplicity (which could be construed from the literal translation).

141.4 "is in every sensible object ...": **في كل محسوس**.

By emphasizing "sensible objects" and their concomitants as having been thoroughly discussed, al-Kindī is apparently showing awareness that he has not yet covered the multiplicity of such non-sensible abstractions as number and ideas (or the intellects), though he has shown their unity (cf. above, 135.6 ff.).

141.7 "If the association were through chance, then there would be a separation ...": **فإن كانت بالبحت فقد كانت متباينة**, or "would have been a separation", i.e., things associated by chance are essentially separate.

141.14 "being due to separation": **من التباين**, i.e., belonging to the category of separate objects.

141.22 "As by itself the cause precedes the effect, as we have explained in our writing concerning the separation (between cause and effect)": **ولأن العلة قبل المعلول بالذات**, Cf., among al-Kindī's other writings on causality (also referred to below, 142.12), AR: I: 183, 217 ff.; which treatises assume rather than state

this proposition directly. See too 101.1 above. Al-Kindī may here be basing himself on such Aristotelian passages as Cat. 12 14b 12 and Met. V 11 1019a 2.

142.9 "It has, however, been explained that it is impossible for there to be an actual infinite thing": **وقد تبين أنه لا يمكن أن يكون شيء بالفعل بلا نهاية**. Cf., regarding arguments for the impossibility of there being an infinite series of causes, given primarily in relation to temporal segments, 121.5 ff. above; and see notes "121.8,9" and "121.15-122.1" there. See too Met. II 2 994a 1 ff.

142.16 "Furthermore, (the cause of the association of multiplicity and unity) is not in that which is generic to them": **وأيضاً ليست بمجانسة لهما**. The examples of house, man (and dog) as belonging to a common genus and as such called "one", are given in Met. V 6 1016a 25 ff.; and al-Kindī has rejected this sense of unity above, 129.6. In now rejecting the possibility that the ultimate cause of multiplicity and unity can be a generically similar thing, he is in effect -and probably intentionally- rejecting Aristotle's first cause, the unmoved mover; which, for all its special characteristics, is understood within the conceptual, generic framework of substantial being (cf. Met. XII 7 1072a 21 ff.). Though not prior in time, this substance is first in actuality and causality of being.

142.20 "it is not with them in having one likeness": فليست معهما

في شبه واحد . As the preceding paragraph appears to be a discreet refutation of Aristotle's first principle of being, so this paragraph may well be directed against Plato's theory of ideal forms, in the likeness of which substances here are created; cf. Phaedo 100b-101c, Republic 596b, and Timaeus 30c-31b (Plato himself criticizing the notion of participation in the ideas, inherent in the concept of likeness, in Parmenides 132c-133a).

143.4 "if it were multiple, then it would contain unity": فإن كانت

كثيرة ففيرا الوحدة . Al-Kindī has just established that there can be no resemblance or likeness between the association of multiplicity and unity and its cause. Yet here he uses a concept of multiplicity that is the familiar one, associated with unity, and as such obviously inadequate. However, he next proceeds to assert that the only possible cause of this association is an unity, though he has rejected this concept of unity, as an existent separate from multiplicity, above, at 140.18. Obviously al-Kindī is thinking of unity in a unique sense, though he insists on arriving at the concept by using conventional terms; employing in the process, however, a double standard of logic which allows "unity" to be used in a way not allowed "multiplicity".

Chapter 4

Notes

143.14,15 "Let us now speak of the way in which unity exists in the categories, of that which is truly one, and of that which is one metaphorically and not truly": **فلنقل الآن بأي نوع توجد الوحدة في المقولات، وما الواحد بالحق، وما الواحد بالجازل بالحقيقة**. This introductory statement is identical with the closing remark of the previous chapter, the sort of repetition that a speaker would indulge in if an interval has passed between his lectures. Much in this last chapter repeats and is derived from that which has preceded, again conveying the impression that this material was originally presented as a lecture in which the speaker could permit himself this indulgence (and cf. p. 23 of the introduction).

Al-Kindī's distinction between the "true" and the "metaphorical" one is reminiscent of the same distinction as applied to the term "agent" in his treatise entitled "On the True, First Perfect Agent and the Deficient Agent which is (called agent) Metaphorically" (AR I: 182). As there, so here, his use of the term "metaphorical" is not meant to convey worthlessness, but only an inferior status. Of course, in the total context of the argument, it is the unity which is applied to the "True One" which is used metaphorically, since it is beyond our comprehension

of the term; except that for reasons of piety and fidelity to the Neoplatonic tradition, al-Kindī could not, and probably did not even conceive of so putting it.

- 143.17 "The large and small, long and short, much and little are never predicated absolutely of anything, but, rather, relatively":
 إن العظيم والصغير ، والطويل و القصير ، والكثير والقليل ، لا يقال شئ منرا على شئ قولاً مرسداً بل بالاضافة . Cf. Cat. 6 5b 14 ff., with the addition of a third pair of relatives, for which cf. below, 146.7. The use of the following relatives allows al-Kindī to introduce a mathematical discussion in which possible ways of finding the absolute, essential one in a quantity or number are eliminated.

- 143.19 "trivial things": الرهانة, the equivalent of Aristotle's "grain" in the similar examples of Cat. 6 5b 18 (κέγχρος in the Greek, rendered by Ishāq ibn Hunain (ed. Georr, op. cit., p. 330) as السمسمة).

- 144.3 "If the large -as, similarly, the small- were predicated absolutely ...": ولو كان يقال العظيم مرسداً (على ما absolutely ...). Al-Kindī diverges here from Aristotle's bare statement (ibid., line 20) that we simply can't use such terms as "small" and "large" in an absolute sense, to expand upon the themes which he has mentioned in the preceding chapters.

144.14 "and multiplying a quantity by two exists, in actuality or in potentiality ... and therefore the absolute large has a double":
 (وتضعيف الشيء تثنية كميته) وتثنية كميته موجودة
 Al- بالفعل أو بالقوة ... فإذا للعظيم المرسل ضعف
 Kindī here takes the potential doubling of an object as tantamount to its actual doubling, assuming that necessary correlation between the two which he has rejected above at 116.13-117.1, the last time he specifically dealt with this issue in terms of arithmetical relationships (and cf. the note to 116.13-16 above). The difference may be explained by the fact that in the earlier passage of this treatise potential existence is seen as a threat to the doctrine of a finite universe, and therefore its significance for actual existence is discounted; while here potential existence is enlisted, as an aid to actuality, in the doctrine of the relativity of all existents, and can therefore be accepted.

145.7 "Similarly ... the all would be smaller than the part, and this is most absurd and ugly":
 وكذلك يعرض ... أن يكون:
 الكل أصغر من الجزء، وهذا أشدّ إحالة وشناعة
 contradicting as it does one of the "first premises" al-Kindī has enumerated above, 114.18, and see note there.

146.8 "the long and short are predicated of all quantitative things which are continuous":
 الطويل والقصير فيقالان على كل
 كمية متصلة. With this remark and that concerning "the

little" and "the much" as predicates of discrete quantity (line 12 below), al-Kindī assigns quantitative properties to the two types of unity Aristotle mentions in Cat. 6 4b 20. Among the discrete quantities there mentioned (line 23) is number, concerning which al-Kindī next elaborates.

146.15 "if the first number is two ... two is then the least of the numbers": إن كان أول العدد اثنين ... فإن الاثنين أقل الأعداد. The following analysis essentially investigates the possibility of positing "one" as the basic number, the "absolute little", and the senses in which this is and is not deemed permissible. Notions of equality and inequality, odd and even as related to one are particularly examined, and similarities with the number two are brought out. Two is ultimately considered as the first, smallest number, though not an absolute unity. Many of the ideas al-Kindī mentions can be found separately in Aristotle, Plotinus, and Nichomachus of Gerasa, among others (see above, p. 36 of the introduction, and cf. also Marmura and Rist, op. cit., p. 349). The Hellenistic commentators on Aristotle and the Isagoge used Nichomachus' writings on arithmetic, as is evident, for example, from David's discussion of the subject in the introduction to philosophy which precedes his commentary to the Isagoge (ed. Busse, op. cit., pp. 49-52). David there acknowledges one to be the principle of number, a principle being different from that of which it is said to be the principle; one

is thus not number, which is further shown by its failure to pass tests of multiplication and addition (whereas al-Kindī applies tests of division). According to the standard by which the sum and product of adding and multiplying a thing by itself should yield different results, two is also considered not a regular number (and cf. Nichomachus' Introduction to Arithmetic, ed. D'Ooge, p. 117), though David argues the case back and forth in a manner similar to al-Kindī's deliberations with the one; finally accepting the number three as the first number in the fullest sense of the word.

We have seen al-Kindī previously make use of an Isagoge commentary, or some paraphrase of one (cf. above, 101.5 ff., 105.3 ff., and 124.17 ff.); and it is highly likely that such is again his immediate major source here, though he would have been familiar with the views of the other above-mentioned authors as well (and cf. the introduction, p. 37 above). Al-Kindī's Aristotelian bias emerges in that he doesn't follow the Neo-Pythagorean conclusions regarding the number three of a David, but chooses, with Aristotle (and cf. Heath, op. cit., I: 73), to regard the number two as prime, if in a qualified way.

146.21 "and if one were a quantity ... it would be equal and non-equal" **وإن كان الواحد كمية ... أنه مساو ولا مساو**: "equal", i.e., equality and inequality would be predicated of it, as of

all quantity; and cf. Cat. 6 6a 26 ff. Al-Kindī takes this statement at first to mean that the one itself would have to possess equal and unequal units, i.e., its equality and inequality would be within itself; and he thus speaks in 147.2 ff. below of the "smaller" and "larger" units of the one. At 147.16, however, he rejects this use of equality and inequality, and at 148.5 offers the proper application of these terms.

147.1 "Moreover, if the one were to have units": **فإن كان للواحد**
أوحاد, i.e., as a quantity, which need not be divisible into equal and unequal parts for this argument to be valid.

147.2 "for the smaller one would be after the larger one or after part of it": **لأن الواحد الأصغر بعد الواحد الأكبر أو**
بعد بعضه. This is one of the "true first premises" mentioned above, at 114.18.

147.14 "One, then, would not be a number naturally, but homonymously":
فإذا الواحد ليس بعدد بالطبع ، بل باشتباه الاسم.
The homonymous use of the term "one", while ostensibly rejected in all areas, is actually al-Kindī's solution when applied to God; though he insists that the unity of the One God is the primary reference of the term (cf. p. 35 f. of the introduction).

148.6 "two would not be a number, since no number is smaller than it, but only larger": **فلا ثنان ... لا عدد ، إذ ليس عدد أقل منه**.

Assuming one is not a number since no number is smaller than it, two is then similarly not a number, being deprived of one. Cf. the similar argument of David, op. cit., 50.12, 51.1; this line of reasoning being capable of infinite extension for all numbers (ibid., 52.14 ff.).

148.13 "then either even or odd": **فإما أن يكون زوجا وإما فردا**. This distinction of number goes back to the Pythagoreans, as Aristotle says in Met. I 5 986a 17 (and see Heath, op. cit., I: 70 f.).

149.5 "since the odd number does not have to be divided necessarily": **إذ ليس يوجب أنه منقسم اضطرارا**, i.e., the potential divisibility of one, with its logically impossible consequents, need never be actualized. Al-Kindī here again employs that un-Aristotelian view of potentiality which he has resorted to before; though elsewhere, and just recently, he has used the concept in its regular Aristotelian sense (cf. 144.14 above, and see note there).

149.7 "The element of something ... is not the thing (itself)": **إن ركن الشيء ... ليس هو الشيء**. The equivalent of the following passage may be found, in Aristotle for example, in Met. X 1 1052b 1 ff., and see too Met. XIV 1 1088a 6 (and cf. Heath, op. cit., I: 69).

149.8 "the phonetic particles": الحروف الصوتية, which could also be given as "the vocalized letters"; and cf. Met. X 1 1053a 13, "and in speech the letter" (is the starting point and measure), καὶ ἐν φωνῇ στοιχεῖον, rendered by Astāt (ed. Bouyges, op. cit., III: 1255) as وفي الصوت الحرف.

149.12 "The one would then be number": فيكون الواحد عددا, i.e., since it is not an element (to itself, being the element of numbers other than itself), one might be regarded as a number. This ignores the fact that the numerical one is initially understood in this paragraph only in relation to and distinct from numbers, of which it is the element; having no nature "by itself" which could be seen as a "number" in some absolute sense of the term. Al-Kindī does not even bother to refute this obvious bit of sophistry, which leads him, however, to formulate additional possibilities of considering one as number.

150.4 "it has been said that substance is three-fold": قد قيل إن الجوهر ثلاثة. Cf. De Anima II 1 412a 6 ff., 2 414a 14 ff.

150.10 "and the body ... happens to be a substance": ... فعرض للجسم أن يكون جواهر, literally, "substances", as again at line 17 below.

150.16 "It is, rather, because number is composed of units that it is a unit": بل لأن العدد مركب من آحاد، فهو آحاد,

i.e., that number is a unit, literally "units".

151.2 "and two is therefore the smallest (number) in its nature":

والاثنان إذا أقل بطباعه . Cf. Physics IV 12 220a 27.

151.9 "and each one of a pair is related to the other only in the

same genus": وإنما يضاف كل واحد منهما إلى آخر من

جنسه . This could be a variation and elaboration of Met. V

6 1016b 25 or/and X 1 1053a 24 ff.

152.9 "Time too belongs to continuous quantity": والزمان أيضا من

الكمية المتصلة . Cf. above, 122.10 and note there.

152.13 "Thus, one says "a long number", i.e., (one which occurs) in

a long time": فانه يقال عدد طويل - أى في زمان طويل .

Compare Cat. 6 5b 2.

153.1 "the True One": الواحد بالحقيقة (literally, "the one in truth"),

i.e., the absolute, unique one, a term used in contrast to the

"metaphorical one", الواحد بالجاز, (cf. above, 143.15), which we

now see includes all the predicables and properties of being, all

shown as containing multiplicity in one form or another, and thus

only relatively and accidentally one.

153.3 "We have already stated that what has a genus is not eternal,

and that the eternal has no genus": وقد قدمنا أن ماله جنس

. فليس بأزلي وأن الأزلي لا جنس له . Cf. 113.5 above,

and see too 143.1.

153.4 "and the (True) One should not be spoken of in relation to something other than itself": **ولا يقال واحد بالاضافة إلى غيره**. Al-Kindī here sounds the theme of the conclusion of this treatise, returning to it with greater emphasis below, 160.6 ff.

153.13-16 "motion ... is multiple": **والحركة... متكثرة**. Cf. above, 117.7 (and see note 117.8¹), of which passage this and the following two paragraphs constitute an expanded version.

154.7 "since unity is predicated of the whole in a general sense": **إذ الوحدة يقال على الكل المطلق**, literally "since unity is predicated of the 'general' whole", i.e., whole as an indeterminate, unconditioned concept. Cf. Goichon, *op. cit.*, p. 206 for this sense of **مطلق** (usually rendered as "absolute") as used by Avicenna.

154.10 "As every thing perceived through the sense or intellect either exists, in itself or in our thought, as a natural existent ...": **وإذ كل مدرك بالحس أو بالعقل إما أن يكون موجودا طبيعيا**, it being "natural" for sensations and ideas, wherever their primary base may be, to exist in the soul of man, a "rational animal"; whereas speech (i.e., a vocabulary) and writing, al-Kindī next implies, must be learned, and as such are "accidental". As between sensory and intellectual perceptions, the former has been described as "nearer" to man, the latter "nearer" to nature (cf. above, 106.5 ff.,

107.2 ff.); as such it is the sensible which exists "in our thought" as a natural existent, while it is the intelligible which exists "in itself" as a natural existent.

154.12 "various dispositions and passions which attend the soul":

أخلاق لازمة للنفس شتى وآلام. Al-Kindī makes a passing reference here to non-intellectual faculties of the soul, to which he has also referred above at 104.1, and see the note there. He is more interested here in discussing the nature of the rational faculty than of the soul per se, which is considered to be multiple because of the multiplicity of its sensations and emotions, (with which intelligible concepts are initially associated). The "thought" or fikr which is deemed multiple here is "imaginative thought", the product of the imaginative faculty and concomitant with sensory data and physical impressions (cf. above, 108. 8 ff., and compare the definition of fikr given by Isaac Israeli (op. cit., p. 55, rendered as "cogitation" by Stern there, who also mentions Wolfson's analyses of the various interpretations given this term by later Arabic philosophers).

154.16 "The end result of thought ... is toward the intellect":

نهایة الفكر ... إلى العقل, i.e., the formation of ideas proceeds from the (rational) imagination to the intellect. Cf. the preceding note and see too the text and note to 106.12,13. The following section, from 154.17-155.9, has received a "tentative"

translation from R. J. McCarthy in his article, "Al-Kindi's Treatise On the Intellect", op. cit., pp. 143-144.

154.17 "Intellect is the species of things as well as that which is above them": وهو أنواع الأشياء... وما فوقها. viz., the genus as well as the species. Cf. 107.4 ff. for this and the following sentence, and see too al-Kindī's On the Intellect (AR I: 354), in which immaterial form, which "falls under the intellect", is said to be نوعية الأشياء وما فوقها, "the specificality (after Stern, Isaac Israeli, pp. 37, 38; McCarthy, op. cit., p. 126, has "ind-ness") of things and that which is above it". The same treatise (AR, p. 356) refers to the "first intellect" (and not the "acquired intellect", as McCarthy (ibid.) and Abū Rīdah (note 4) assume) as "the specificality of things which are [or:is] always in actuality", نوعية الشيء التي هي، بالفعل أبدا (following Stern, op. cit., p. 37, and cf. Atiyeh's translation, op. cit., p. 213). The On Definitions manuscript preserved in the British Museum attributes the phrase "specificality of things" to the "universal intellect" (العقل الكلي), as quoted by Stern in "Notes on Al-Kindī's Treatise On Definitions", op. cit., p. 34, and in Isaac Israeli, p. 38), an entity apparently equal to the "first intellect" of On the Intellect. This British Museum definition also divides the "universal intellect" into "universal" and "particular" universal intellects, an oddity which Stern attempts to resolve ("Notes", loc. cit., note 1),

and which may also possibly be understood as referring to both the universal "first" or agent intellect, and to the particular "acquired" intellect, for which cf. below, 155.17 and note.

155.1 "فإذا اتحدت: "When, however, they are united with the soul"
 بالنفس, viz., as species, which McCarthy understands (op. cit., p. 143) as the subject of the sentence. Besides turning the preceding sentence into a digression, such a translation overlooks the fact that al-Kindī tends to speak (loosely) of the individual as an intelligible object. Cf. particularly 126.16 above (and see note 126.14¹ there), and the expressions "species of individuals" and "individuals of species" in 107.4 and 5, which indicate al-Kindī's awareness of an ontological relationship between the particular and the universal; even as his remarks in 108.5 ff. describe his particular view of the relation of a sensory to an intellectual perception. In his treatise On Sleep and Vision (AR I: 302), al-Kindī distinguishes between these perceptions in a manner similar to our present passage, concluding that "the genera, species and individuals comprise all the intelligibles" والأجناس والأنواع والأشخاص; retained partially in the Latin as et species quidem et individua sunt omnia nota (ed. Nagy, op. cit., p. 19, and see McCarthy's translation, op. cit., p. 146).

155.1,2 "intelligence in actuality ... intelligence in potentiality":

عاقلة بالفعل ... عاقلة بالقوة , rendered by McCarthy (*ibid.*, p. 143) as "intellect-ing in act" and "intellect-ing in potency". Al-Kindī here begins to refer briefly to his views on the nature of intellection and the intellect, which he mentions at greater length in his treatise On the Intellect (AR I: 353-358, edited and translated also by McCarthy, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-128, and translated too by Atiyeh, *op. cit.*, pp. 210-215. Atiyeh also summarizes (*ibid.*, pp. 113-122) the various interpretations which may be given al-Kindī's doctrine of the intellect, and Stern briefly describes it as well (Isaac Israeli, p. 38).

155.6,7 "universal things ... are the acquired intellect of the soul which the soul had in potentiality": فكلّيات الأشياء ... هي عقل
 النفس المستفاد الذي كان لهما بالقوة Cf. On the Intellect
 فرزه الصورة التي لا هيولى لهما ولا فنتاسيا (AR I: 356, "this form, then, which has neither matter nor phantasm, is the intellect acquired, for the soul, from the first intellect" (following McCarthy's translation, *op. cit.*, p. 126), the preceding sentence there stating that the intelligibles existed in potentiality in the soul before being in actuality.

155.8 "and then (sc., the universals) are the intellect in actuality which has brought the soul from potentiality to actuality":

فهو العقل الذي بالفعل الذي أخرج النفس من القوة

إلى الفعل. The "first intellect", which we saw defined in both On the Intellect and, (as "universal intellect"), On Definitions as the "specificity of things" (cf. the note to 154.16 above), is said in the former treatise (AR, 356.5) to be in actuality and مفيد, a source of emanation upon the soul, bringing about the acquired intellect, العقل المستفاد (and see the preceding note). This parallel thus suggests that the "intellect in actuality" of our text is this "first" or "universal" intellect, and that the acquired intellect is related to and in part identical with it. Al-Kindī thus posits here the existence of a (first, universal) intellect which is in actuality always, and, in man, an acquired intellect which passes from the state of a potential intellect to that of an actual intellect.

155.9 "and consequently the intellect is multiple": فالعقل متكثر, since it is composed of a multiplicity of universals and because the intellect, as has been stated, is neither simple nor ultimately one; though the various stages of man's intellect are related to each other and to the universal intellect.

In asserting the subdivision of the active and passive states of Aristotle's intellect (cf. De Anima III 5 430a 15 f.) into three (or four) intellects, al-Kindī is following some exposition of the writings of Alexander of Aphrodisias on the subject (cf., e.g., his De Anima, edited by I. Bruns, Alexander Aphrodisiensis Praeter Commentaria Scripta Minora, CAG Supplementum II. 1

(Berlin, 1887), pp. 84-86, and see O. Hamelin, La Théorie De L'Intellect D'Après Aristote Et Ses Commentateurs (Paris, 1953), pp. 31-37, for an analysis of Alexander's views). Yet in emphasizing the multiplicity of the intellect and in explicitly separating it from the ultimate First Principle, the Divine Intelligence, (viewed in terms of the True One), al-Kindī modifies the doctrine along Neo-Platonic lines (cf., e.g., Enn. V 3, 11 and 12, equivalent to that translated from the Epistola De Scientia Divina by Lewis in Henry-Schwyzzer, op. cit., II: 321; and cf. Marmura and Rist, op. cit., p. 351).

Incidentally, the division into four intellects mentioned in al-Kindī's On the Intellect, in which the actual intellect in man is divided into an acquired but relatively passive, latent state of actuality, and an active, "apparent" (ظاهر) state (cf. AR, pp. 353, 354 and 358; McCarthy, op. cit., numbers 2 and 10, pp. 122, 123 Arabic, 125-127 English, Stern, loc. cit.; and Atiyeh, op. cit., pp. 211, 214-215 and 121, n. 24), reflects an interpretation of Alexander's remarks on the intellect in man when viewed in habitu and in actu, as given in his De Anima (ibid.), and cf. too his Περὶ νοῦ, ed. Bruns, op. cit., pp. 106-113, the relations of which text to al-Kindī's having been discussed by E. Gilson, "Les Sources Gréco-Arabes De L'Augustinisme Avicennisant", Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age IV (1929), pp. 22-27; cf., however, F. Rahman's

qualification of some of Gilson's thesis, Prophecy in Islam (London, 1958), p. 22, n. 6, and see Atiyeh's summary of past scholarly viewpoints on this subject, op. cit., p. 121, n. 25).

Al-Kindī thus anticipates, in these all too brief remarks on the intellect, doctrines which later philosophers, notably al-Fārābī and Avicenna, were to develop (cf. Rahman, op. cit., pp. 11-29). Like them (and particularly like Avicenna; ibid, pp. 14, 15), al-Kindī views the intellect in man as acquired from a universal active intelligence (which, however, he does not -in contrast to his successors- relate to any scheme of emanated intelligences), partially uniting with it by thinking the universal ideas (cf. On the Intellect, AR pp. 356, 357; no. 8, 9 in McCarthy, pp. 123 Arabic, 127 English; Atiyeh, op. cit., pp. 213, 214). Man's intellect thus belongs essentially to a universal entity, though al-Kindī does not develop this view explicitly. The implications of this doctrine for the status of a personal soul and for personal immortality are left unresolved, which is in keeping with al-Kindī's other philosophical remarks concerning the soul, in such treatises as his On Grief (ed. Walzer and Ritter, Studi II, op. cit., no. 4, pp. 35 Arabic, 51 Italian); On the Soul (AR I: 274-276, and cf. above, note 104.2); and in his Abbreviated, Short Statement ... On the Soul (AR I: 281-2, translated by Stern, op. cit., p. 43).

- 155.12 "synonymous names": الأسماء المترادفة. Cf. Aristotle's discussion of homonyms and synonyms in Cat. 1 1 1a ff.
- 155.17 "and the star which is called dog": والكوكب المسمى كلبا , viz., the constellation Canis Major (or Canis Minor).
- 155.21 "the actual quiddity": العين القائمة , that which exists in actuality. العين can mean both substance and essence, as well as the thing itself. Cf. also below, 156.1, and elsewhere, AR I: 217.1.
- 156.13 "since corruption of that which undergoes corruption is generation from another (substance) إذ فساد الفاسد كون , Al-Kindī here speaks of natural change in a continuous and apparently autonomous way, applying a kind of conservation-of-matter principle which has no need, ostensibly, for an external Creator. In effect, however, he holds to both views, as we have seen.
- 157.12 "and each one of them continually undergoes division and multiplication in its own species": وكل واحد منها قابل , continually but not to infinity; cf. above, 116.5 ff. Al-Kindī again seems to forget himself in discussing the natural properties of things.
- 158.3 "separability": انفصال , used synonymously with تفصيل ,

"divisibility", as at line 8 below, and thus translated interchangeably, as in the preceding note.

158.7 "neither a position nor a common (factor)": **ولا وضع له ولا**
مشترك. Cf. Met. V 6 1016b 25.

158.9 "for it is the numerically one which is the measure of all things": **وهذا هو الواحد العدى مكيال كل [الأشياء]**,
i.e., as related to things, the numerically one, in spite of its differences from the things (as the measure is different from that which is measured), is considered multiple. Cf. above, 151.1 ff.

158.15 "the point": **العلامة**. Cf. Met. V 6 1016b 25.

158.16 "It is multiple, however, in its subjects": **وصى متكثرة**
بحاملاتها. Cf. above, 122.10 ff. The text has here jumped from discussing the point of a line to speaking of the instant of time, with which the point is compared above, 157.16. The probably identical sentence, "it is multiple, however, in its subjects", with which both arguments (regarding the point and the line) must have ended, probably led a copyist to skip a line or two in his transcription.

158.18 "That which is indivisible by virtue of its whole is (also) said to be one": **ويقال واحد أيضا الذى لا ينقسم من**
جزة الكلية. Cf. Met. X 1 1052a 22, the circle being given

as the primary kind of an extended whole in line 28 there.

158.19 "A ratl": A pound weight, or one of several variously defined measures. Cf. Lane, I: iii, 1102.

159.8 "Its first division may occur either through continuity ...

form ... name ... or ... genus": وينقسم قسمة أولى إما
 . Cf., for this بالاتصال ... بالصورة ... بالاسم ... وإما بالجنس
 and the following two paragraphs, Met. V 6 1016b 31 ff.

160.6 "the True One is not one of the intelligible things": الواحد
 الحق ليس هو شئ من المحقولات. The list of negations
 which follows places al-Kindī firmly in the tradition of those
 who describe God with negative attributes; a tradition which goes
 back to Albinus in the second century A.D. (cf. H. Wolfson,
 "Albinus and Plotinus on Divine Attributes", HTR 45 (1952), pp.
 115-130) and which is represented by Plotinus, Pseudo-Dionysius,
 John of Damascus and others before Islam (cf. Wolfson, "Philo-
 sophical Implications of the Problem of Divine Attributes in the
 Kalam", JAOS 79 (1959), p. 74, and see too Marmura and Rist, op.
cit., pp. 348, 349). This tradition was then taken up in various
 ways by the first generation of mutakallimun and their successors,
 in the 8th and 9th centuries (cf. Wolfson, Philosophical
Implications, pp. 74-78). Among the mu'tazila who give a negative
 interpretation of the predicates we find Nazzām and Abū al-Hudhayl,
 whom we have met before as writers who expressed arguments similar

to those used by al-Kindī (cf. p. 60 f. above). For all the similarity, however, al-Kindī's philosophical approach to this issue is different than that of his contemporaries, and he proceeds to allude to a relation of the One to the world via emanation, a view which the mu'tazila did not accept.

160.16 "pure": محض, the term describing The One found in the title of the Arabic paraphrase of Proclus' Elements of Theology; which work contains similar views to those expressed here by al-Kindī. Cf. chapter 2b note 9 of the introduction above, p. 42.

161.7 "and it is impossible for things to be infinite in actuality":
وليس يمكن أن تكون الأشياء بلا نهاية بالفعل. Cf.
above, 142.13 f.

161.11 "Every caused unity passes from its unity (that of the True One) but to that which is other than its being, i.e., the True One is not multiple with respect to its existence": فكل واحد من العلويات للوحدة إنما يذهب من وحدته إلى غيره، أعني أنه لا يتكرر من حيث يوجد.
Al-Kindī here draws a sharp distinction between the being and existence (which he does not differentiate anywhere in the text) of the One and that of other existents (a distinction which may be contrasted with the Plotinian passage mentioned in chapter 2b of the introduction above, p. 30), though immediately proceeding,

at 162.2, to build a bridge, however unstructured, between the One and the world.

162.2 "Consequently, the emanation of unity from the True One, the First, is the coming to be of every sensible object and what is attached to the sensible object; and (The True One) causes every one of them to exist when it causes them to be through its being":
 فاذا فيض الوحدة عن الواحد الحق الأول هو تروى
 كل محسوس وما يلحق المحسوس، فيوجد كل واحد منها
 إذا يروى بهويته، إياها. That unity which we saw as completely separate, in the preceding note, is now regarded as somehow endowing all creation with its being. Clearly al-Kindī has in mind some mediating hypostasis (or hypostases) which brings the diametrically opposed Creator and creation into this relationship, something in addition to the universal intellect which we have seen he acknowledges elsewhere (cf. the note to 154.17 above); but he nowhere states his views on this issue in detail.

162.7 "so the cause of creation is the True One, the First": فعلة
 الابداع هو الواحد الحق الأول. Creation, or rather "creation from nothing" (literally, "innovation"), is asserted elsewhere as the most characteristic and greatest of all of God's acts (cf. AR I: 183, and see the note to 123.6,7 above; cf. too Stern's translation of al-Kindī's treatise which discusses this issue, and his tracing of the concept of creation from nothing

to earlier and later Neoplatonic circles, in Isaac Israeli, pp. 68-74).

- 162.13 "Inasmuch as that which we wanted to clarify ...": **فإذ قد تبين ما أردنا إيضاحه ..** Much of this closing remark is found, with similar terminology and expressions, in al-Kindī's paraphrase of the Almagest (cf. Rosenthal, "Al-Kindī and Ptolemy", op. cit., p. 437); that work also promises to be continued, and Rosenthal entertains a small doubt if al-Kindī is doing more in saying so there than copying his source. It is, nevertheless, possible that On First Philosophy did have a second part, and we may look forward to the day when more of this or other treatises of al-Kindī's will come to light.

List of Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in this study.

- FP "First Philosophy"
- AR Abū Rīdah, ed. Rasā'il al-Kindī al-Falsafīya.
- UG Al-Kindī's treatise "On the Unity of God ...". AR I: 201-207.
- EF Al-Kindī's treatise "An Explanation of the Finiteness of the Body of the World", AR I: 186-192.
- OE Al-Kindī's treatise "On the Essence of That Which Cannot be Infinite ...". AR I: 194-198.
- CAG Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca.
- EI^{1,2} The Encyclopedia of Islam, first and second edition.

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وما توفيقى إلا بالله

كتاب الكندى إلى المعتصم بالله

فى الفلسفة الأولى

أطال الله بقاءك ! يا ابن ذُرَى السادات وعُرى السعادات ، الذين من
استمسك بهديهم سعد فى دار الدنيا ودار الأبد ؛ وزينتك بجميع ملابس الفضيلة ،
وطهرتك من جميع طبع^(١) الرذيلة !

إن أعلى الصناعات الإنسانية منزلةً وأشرفها مرتبةً صناعةُ الفلسفة ، التى
حدّتها علم الأشياء بحقائقها بقدر طاقة الإنسان ؛ لأن غرض الفيلسوف فى علمه
إصابة الحق وفى عمله العمل بالحق ، لا الفعل سرمداً ، لإنا نمسك ، ويتصرّم
الفعل ، إذا انتهينا إلى الحق .

ولسنا نجد مطلوباتنا من الحق من غير علة ؛ وعلة وجود كلّ شىء وثباته
الحق ، لأن كل ماله إنسيّة^(٢) له حقيقة ؛ فالحق اضطراراً موجود ، إذن ،
لإنيّات موجودة .

(١) هذه الكلمة غير منقوطة فى الأصل ، ومعناها بفتح الباء الدنس .

(٢) فى الأصل انية دون شكل ولا مد ولا تشديد ؛ وهذا اصطلاح فلسفى قديم ، يُعرف
مدلوله ، وإن كان ضبطه بالشكل وأصله غير معروفين على التحقيق ؛ فإذا تابعتنا النسخة المطبوعة
لكتاب التعريفات للجرجاني وجدنا الكلمة مضبوطة هكذا : آنية ؛ وهى تدل عند الجرجاني
على الوجود العيني ، يعنى المتحقق أمام الحس ، وذلك خصوصاً فى مقابلة الماهية ، أعنى ما يُعقل
من الشىء (راجع مادتي إنية وماهية فى التعريفات للجرجاني) .

أما أصل هذا الاصطلاح فهو غامض ، وإن كان بعض مؤلفي العرب مثل أبي البقاء فى كتابه
الكلبيات (ط . القاهرة ١٢٨١ هـ ص ٧٦) يقول إنه مشتق من إن التى تنفد فى اللغة العربية
التأكيّد وتقوية الوجود ؛ فالإنية ، إذن ، هى كون الشىء موجوداً وجوداً يستمد قوته من أنه
محسوس مشاهد . وربما بدا رأى أبي البقاء متكاملاً ؛ ولسنا نجد فى لسان العرب (مادة إن)

== ولم يكن العرب بحاجة إلى تعريب كلمة تعبر عن الوجود ، خصوصا وأنهم منذ العصر المبكر لعهدهم بالفلسفة قد استعملوا لفظ السكون في الدلالة على : (١) الوجود ، وعلى (٢) العالم في مجموعه ، وعلى (٣) وجود أو حدوث ما يوجد أو يحدث ، وعلى (٤) أحوال الموجود بالنسبة لذاته وللمكان ، وهذه الأحوال هي ماسمونه الأكوان الأربعة ، أعني الاجتماع والافتراق والحركة والسكون (راجع كتابنا عن إبراهيم الظلام ص ١٣٥ وما بعدها . ومادة كون عند الجرجاني في تعريفاته ، ومقال هورتن عن معنى السكون من حيث هو اصطلاح فلسفي في مجلة جماعة المستشرقين الألمان *M. Horten : Was bedeutet al-kaun als philosophischer Terminus ? Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlaendischen Gesellschaft, Bd. 65, 539—549*

والسكندي نفسه يستعمل لفظ السكون بمعنى الوجود أو الحدوث ، كما تدل على ذلك رسائله التي بين أيدينا ، خصوصا عناوين الرسائل التي تتناول مسائل طبيعية ، إذا صرفنا النظر عن استعماله لمعنى السكون في مواضع كثيرة جداً من رسائله .

وإذن فقد كان للعرب مندوحة عن تعريب المصدر اليوناني الدال على الوجود ، لأنه كان عندهم اللفظ العربي المقابل له والذي يسمح بصيغ مختلفة مثل : كون ، كونية ، كائنية ، لاسيما أن العرب كانوا حريصين على استعمال ألفاظ عربية ما أمكن . ويدل على ذلك الاصطلاحات التي يستعملها السكندى نفسه ، هذا إذا صرفنا النظر عن استعمالهم كلمات عربية صعبة في الدلالة على بعض الأسماء والاصطلاحات اليونانية، حتى قبل السكندى بكثير (راجع ما ذكره مثلاً كراوس في مقاله عن ابن المقفع في مجلة الدراسات الشرقية التي تصدر في روما ، مجلد ١٤ (١٩٣٣ — ١٩٣٤) ص ١ — ١٠ : فنجد كلمة οὐσία يقابلها كله : عين . (جوهر فيما بعد) ، وكلمة ὑποκαίμενον يقابلها كلمة متاع (موضوع فيما بعد) ، وكلمة ميتافيزيقي يقابلها : علم الغيب (علم ما بعد الطبيعة أو العلم الإلهي فيما بعد ، وهكذا) .

هذا إلى أنهم لم يعربوا الكلمات الدالة على المقولات وعلى كثير غيرها — مع شدة حاجتهم إلى التعريب — نظراً إلى وجود المقابلات العربية ؛ بل نجدهم يصوغون المصدر السماعي من اللفظ العربي ، فيقولون مثلاً : كمية ، كيفية ، مائية (ماهية) ، هوية ، بل هم استعملوا أفعالا من بعض الأسماء والضمائر مثل يتبعض (من بعض) ، ويتهوى (من هو) وأيسس الأيسات ، أى أوجد الموجودات (من الأيس ، راجع التعليق على هذه الكلمة في رسالة السكندى في التفاعل الحق ... الخ) .

وإذا كنا نلاحظ أن السكندى هنا يستعمل لفظ الإنية في الدلالة على ما يقابل الحقيقة فهو يستعمل الماهية في معنى حقيقة الشيء في مواضع أخرى من رسائله (تعريفه للفلسفة في رسالة حدود الأشياء ورسومها) .

أما ديور فهو ، تابعة لديتريسى ، يضبط الكلمة هكذا : أسيية ، ويقول إنه يمكن إيضاح هذه الصيغة إذا نحن مزجنا طريقة أفلاطون في التفكير وطريقة أرسطو في التمييز : هي تدل على الوجود عند أفلاطون (οὐσία, ὄν) ؛ لكن تسمية هذا الوجود هي بحسب طريقة أرسطو ، يعني —

وأشرف الفلسفة وأعلاها مرتبة الفلسفة الأولى ، أعنى علم الحق الأول الذى هو علة كل حق ؛ ولذلك يجب أن يكون الفيلسوف التام الأشرف هو المرء المحيط

== أنه بحسب رأى النحويين القدماء قد تكون فى كلمة إن هاء مضمرة ، وذلك فى مثل قول القرآن : « إن هذان لساحران » ، على تقدير : « إنه هذان لساحران » ، وذلك فى لغة بعض قبائل العرب . وقد يلاحظ إن الضمير ، اجتراء عن ذكر الشيء ، مثل قول ابن قيس الرقيات :

ويقلن : شيب قد علا ك ، وقد كبرت ، فقلت : إنه

أى : إنه قد كان . ويقر أبو عبيد هذا على أنه « اختصار من كلام العرب يكتب منه بالضمير ، لأنه قد علم معناه » . وإذن فقد يكون الجواب عن سؤال السائل : هل كذا موجود ؟ أن نقول باختصار : إنه ، أى إنه موجود ؛ فقد يجوز أنه قد صنع من هذه الكلمة المصدر السماعى أعنى الإنية .

على أن الدكتور عبد الرحمن بدوى يعتبر أن رأى أبى البقاء تخليط ، ويقول (كتاب الزمان الوجودى ص ٤ — ٥) إن من الظاهر أن الكلمة العربية — وهو يختار أن يقرأها آنية — « تعريب دقيق » لمصدر الكينونة اليونانى (εἶναι ، تنطق : أَيْسَنِ ، وتقابل to be الإنجليزية ، و être الفرنسية) ؛ ولكن الدكتور بدوى لم يبين لماذا اختير المصدر للتعريب ، مع أنه لا يبدو غالباً أن يكون صيغة لغوية محايدة ، وأنه ، حتى من حيث هو اصطلاح فلسفى فى الدلالة على الوجود ، غير مشهور ؛ ولا هو أبان كيفية التعريب ولا ذكر مراجع لذلك . ولا بد أن يتساءل الباحث لماذا يعرب المصدر الدال على الكينونة فى اليونانية ، وينسب إليه فى نفس الوقت على طريقة العرب ، من غير أن يكون تعريب المصدر أولاً أو تعريب كلمة أخرى تدل على الوجود خطوة أولى طبيعية . وأخيراً لماذا لم تعرب كلمات أخرى يونانية دالة على الوجود ؟ مثل : ὄν ، (تنطق : أُنْ ، ومعناها الوجود ، أو الموجود) ؛ ومثل ὡν (تنطق : أون ، ومعناها السكّان ، فهى اسم الفاعل من المصدر اليونانى) ؛ أو مثل οὐσία (تنطق : أوزيا = الماهية ، الجوهر ، الموجود) ، على اختلاف معانى هذه الكلمات عند مختلف الفلاسفة .

وإذا كان العرب قد صاغوا كلمة كوْن من كان ، أفلا يجوز أن المترجمين — إذا كان لابد من الرجوع إلى أصل أجنبى — قد أخذوا لفظ لانية من كلمة ἡν (تنطق : إين) اليونانية التى معناها فى اللغة اليونانية كان أو وُجد ؟ وقد يكون هذا هو الأشبه بالصواب والذى قد يبرر ضبط الكلمة العربية : لانية ، بكسر الهمزة .

وإذا كان قد يخيّل للانسان أن كلمة εἶναι اليونانية كان تعريبها من طريق أَيْسَنِية ، ثم قلبت الياء ألفاً وأدغمت فيما قبلها ، فصارت آنية ، فإن هذا كله أشبه بالتعسف والتكاف ، خصوصاً لأنه يؤدى إلى الالتباس بكلمة الآنية التى هى نسبة إلى الآن الزمنى . ولا بد على كل حال من الرجوع إلى اللغة السريانية التى كان المترجمون يترجمون عنها فى المآل ، لئلا نرى هل كان فى الاصطلاح الفلاسفى السريانى لفظ يقابل الإنية فى لغة العرب .

بهذا العلم الأشرف ، لأن علم العلة أشرف من علم^(١) المعلول ؛ لأننا إنما نعلم كل واحد من المعلومات علماً تاماً ، إذا نحن أحطنا بعلم علته .

لأن كل علة إما أن تكون عنصراً ؛ وإما صورة ؛ وإما فاعلة ، أعني ما منه مبدأ الحركة ؛ وإما مُتَمِّمَةٌ ، أعني ما من أجله كان الشيء .

والمطالب العلمية أربعة ، كما حددنا في غير موضع من أقاويلنا الفلسفية :

إما : « هل »^(٢) ؛ وإما : « ما » ؛ وإما : « أى » ؛ وإما : « لِمَ » .
فأما « هل » فإنها باحثة عن الإينية فقط .

فأما كل إينية لها جنس فإن الـ « ما » تبحث عن جنسها ؛

و « أى » تبحث عن فصلها ،

و « ما » و « أى » جميعاً تبحثان عن نوعها ،

و « لِمَ » عن علتها التمامية ، إذ هي باحثة عن العلة المطلقة .

وبيننا متى أحطنا بعلم عنصرها فقد أحطنا بعلم جنسها ؛ ومتى أحطنا بعلم صورتها فقد أحطنا بعلم نوعها ؛ وفي علم النوع علم الفصل ، فإذا أحطنا بعلم عنصرها وصورتها وعلتها التمامية فقد أحطنا بعلم حدها ، وكلُّ محدود فحقيقته في حده .

فبحق ما سمي علم العلة الأولى : « الفلسفة الأولى » ، إذ جميع باقي الفلسفة - منسوبة في علمها ، وإذ هي أول بالشرف ، وأول بالجنس ، وأول بالترتيب من جهة الشيء الأيقن علمية^(٣) ، وأول بالزمان ، إذ هي علة الزمان .

== أما عند بعض الصوفية فالإينية ترتبط بـ « أنا » ، وذلك فيما يتعلق بالذات الإلهية في مثل قوله تعالى : « إني أنا الله لا إله إلا أنا » ؛ وإذا كانت الهوية فيما يتعلق بالله تطلق على الذات المغيبة فإن الإينية تطلق على معقول العبد لها (أنظر كتاب الإنسان الكامل في معرفة الأواخر والأوائل لعبد الكريم الجيلاني ط . القاهرة ١٣١٦ ص ٥٩ — ٦٠) .

(١) في الأصل : علة ، وهو خطأ ظاهر .

(٢) يذكر الخوارزمي في مفاتيح العلوم في الفصل الأول الخاص بمواضع التكلمين ، فيما يتعلق بالموجود ، أنه هو الذي يصح أن يسأل عنه السائل : هل يُعَدُّم ؟ إلى أن يجاب عنه بلا ونعم ؛ وفيما يتعلق بالمعدوم ، أنه هو الذي يصح عنه سؤال السائل : هل يوجد ؟ وقد يكون في هذا ما يدل — دلالة ما — على قصد الكندي من ذكره مطلب « هل » بين المطالب العلمية ، وهو أنها تبحث عن إينية الشيء ، أعني هل هو موجود أو غير موجود . ويوجد مجال للنظر في العلاقة بين المطالب العلمية الأربعة وبين البحث في العال الأربعة .

(٣) عليها في الأصلي علامة — إشارة إلى تصحيح أو إلى قراءة أخرى لعلها : علماً .

== استعماله للفظ ὅτι (تنطق هو تي = أن ، بالعربية) ؛ أو هي تدل على الوجود في مقابل الماهية؛ ويقول دى بور إن هذا الاستعمال انتشر بين العرب من كتاب العلل (liber de causis) ، وهو مختارات من كتاب لبرقلس ، ولكنه نسب إلى أرسطو ، نشره Bardenhewer ، (١٨٨٢) ومن كتاب الربوبية المنسوب لأرسطو . وإذا كان دى بور يجد في كتاب الربوبية (ص ١٠٨ من النص العربي الذي نشره ديتريسي Fr. Dieterici) ذكر ستة أوائل (مبادئ للكون) هي : العقل والأنية والغيرية والهوية والحركة والسكون ، فهو يرى أن العقل أول مخلوق لله ؛ أما الخمسة الباقية فهي تقابل في رأيه المقولات الخمس الكبرى في محاوره السوفسطائي لأفلاطون ، أعني : ὅν, θάτερον, ταυτόν, κίνησις, στασις ؛ ويقول دى بور إنه في كتاب العلل (§ 1 — 14) يسمى الله العلة الأولى والأنية الحالصة المطلقة التي هي والوجود شيء واحد ، وعنه تصدر الأنية التي هي أقل كمالاً من العلة الأولى ، ثم يليها العقل وهكذا . لكن يوجد في كتاب العلل بعد ذلك (§ 22) أن العقل هو المخلوق الأول كما يوجد (§ 10) كلام عن الهوية دون تمييز واضح بينها وبين الأنية . وبعد أن يشير دى بور إلى أن الفارابي في كتاب الفصوص يستعمل الأنية مساوية للهوية يقول إن الأنية فيما يتعلق بالمخلوقات تدل على الوجود في مقابل الماهية . ويذكر أن الأشياء والدوات تسمى أنيات ، لأن لها وجوداً جزئياً (τὸ δε τι = الموجود الجزئي) بحسب مرتبتها في الوجود العقلي أو الجسماني . وإذا كانت الأنيات المعقولة باقية ثابتة فالأنيات الجسمية فانية (راجع مقالة دى بور عن الأنية في دائرة المعارف الإسلامية ، المجلد الملحق ص ٢٤) (مادة Anniya) .

أما الباحثة الفرنسية الآنسة جواشون فقد جمعت في قاموسها للاصطلاح الفلسفي عند ابن سينا (A. — M. Goichon : Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sina , ط . باريس ١٩٣٨ ص ٨ — ١١) مادة قيمة عن لفظ الإنية عند ابن سينا . وهي تتابع أبا البقاء ودى بور بعض الشيء بأن تشير إلى استعمال حرف التوكيد : « إن » في تأكيد وجود موضوع القضية وإلى أنه من هذه الكلمة المؤكدة التي لها معنى الكلمة اليونانية ὅτι (= أن ، بالعربية) أو معنى الـ ὅν (= الموجود) ، كما يقترح الأستاذ ماسينيون استناداً إلى قول مؤلف عربي ، استعمال كلمة إن بمعنى الموجود . وتستند الباحثة في رأيها هذا إلى نص في كتاب النجاة والشفاء لابن سينا وهو : « الصفة الأولى لواجب الوجود أنه إنٌ وموجود » . وهي تضبط الكلمة على هذا الوجه ، وإن كان هذا الضبط قد يحتاج إلى مزيد بيان . وهي تنقل عن ابن سينا نصاً آخر هو : « لاما هية لواجب الوجود غير أنه واجب ، وهذه هي الإنية » . ومهما كان ما يمكن أن يستنبط من هذين النصين مجلياً لاستعمال كلمة إنية عند الكندي الذي يقول في موضع من رسائله إن الله « هو الإنية الحق » (كتاب الكندي في الإبانة عن العلة الفاعلة القرية ... الخ) ، فإن الكلام عن أصل هذه الكلمة وعن اشتقاقها غير نهائي . وإذا كان الكندي هنا يستعمل لفظ الإنية في الدلالة على ما يقابل الحقيقة فهو يستعملها إلى جانب الماهية في مواضع أخرى من رسائله . وليراجع القارئ فهرس مصطلحات الكندي في آخر الكتاب فيما يتعلق بالإنية والماهية والهوية ... ١ .

فأما أرسطوطالس ، مُبرِّز اليونانيين في الفلسفة ، فقال : ينبغي لنا أن نشكر آباء الذين أتوا بشيء من الحق ، إذ كانوا سبب كونهم ، فضلا عنهم ، إذ هم سبب لهم ، وإذ هم سبب لنا إلى نيل الحق — فما أحسن ما قيل في ذلك !
وينبغي لنا أن لا نستحي من استحسان الحق واقتناء الحق من أين أتى ، وإن أتى من الأجناس القاصية عنا والأمم المبينة [لنا] ^(١) ، فانه لا شيء أولى بطالب الحق من الحق ، وليس [ينبغي] ^(٢) بحس الحق ، ولا تصغير بقائه ولا بالآتي به ؛ ولا أحد يحس بالحق ، بل كل يشرفه الحق .

فحسن بنا — إذ كنّا حراساً على تميم نوعنا ، إذ الحق في ذلك ^(٣) — أن نلزم في كتابنا هذا عاداتنا في جميع موضوعاتنا من إحضار ما قال القدماء في ذلك قولاً تاماً ، على أقصد سبله وأسهلها سلوكاً على أبناء هذه السبيل ، وتتميم ما لم يقولوا فيه قولاً تاماً ، على مجرى عادة اللسان وسنة الزمان ، وبقدر طاقتنا ، مع العلة المعارضة لنا في ذلك ، من الانحصار عن الاتساع في القول المحمل لعقد العويص الملتبسة ^(٤) ، توقياً سوء تأويل كثير من المتسمين بالنظر في دهرنا ، من أهل الغربة عن الحق ، وإن تتوجوا بقيجان الحق من غير استحقاق ، لضيق فطنهم عن أساليب الحق وقلة معرفتهم بما يستحق ذوو ^(٥) الجلالة في الرأي ، والاجتهاد ^(٦) في

(١) زدتها إكمالاً للتقابل في الكلام .

(٢) زدتها ، لأنني أشعر أن الكلام ناقص ، حتى في المواضع التالية مباشرة ؛ والكلام غير منقوط قطاً كاملاً ، فالقراءة اجتهادية .

(٣) يجوز أنه قد سقط كلام هنا ، أو أن هنا كلاماً وضع في غير موضعه مثل جملة : « إذ الحق في ذلك » ، إن لم تكن مجرد جملة اعتراضية ، كما هو جائز ، خصوصاً وأن قوله : أن نلزم ، يصلح جواباً لقوله : حسن . وإلا فيجوز أن يكون قد سقط كلام بعد قوله : فحسن بنا ، أو بعد كلمة : نوعنا . وإني إلى افتراض سقوط كلام أميل ؛ لأن بعض رسائل هذا المخطوط قد صحح بزيادات موضحة مكتملة في مواضع كثيرة ؛ أما في رسالة الفلسفة الأولى فلا نجد من ذلك إلا القليل جداً بالنسبة لطولها . ولا أريد أن أفرط في دلاء الفجوات ، ما دام المعنى الإجمالي واضحاً .

(٤) هكذا في الأصل ، ولم أغير شيئاً من النص ، لأنه مفهوم كما هو .

(٥) في الأصل : ذو ، وقد صححتها طبقاً لما يلي .

(٦) إني أميل إلى اعتبار هذه الكلمة معطوفة على كلمة لضيق ، على أن يكون ذلك إحساساً

لمساويء القوم .

ومن أوجب الحق ألا نذم من كان أحد أسباب منافعنا الصغار الهزلية ، فكيف بالذين هم أكبر^(١) أسباب منافعنا العظام الحقيقية الجدّية ؛ فإنهم ، وإن قصرنا عن بعض الحق ، فقد كانوا لنا أنساباً وشركاء فيما أفادونا من ثمار فكرهم التي صارت لنا سُبُلًا وآلات مؤدّية إلى علم كثير مما قصرنا عن^(٢) نيل حقيقته ، و[لا] سيما إذ هو بين عندنا وعند المبرّزين من المتفلسفين قبلنا من غير أهل لساننا أنه لم ينل الحق — بما يستأهل الحق — أحد من الناس بمجهود طلبه ، ولا أحاط [ب]له جميعهم ؛ بل كل واحد منهم ، إما لم ينل منه شيئاً ، وإما نال منه شيئاً يسيراً ، بالإضافة إلى ما يستأهل الحق . فإذا جُمع يسير ما نال كل واحد من النائلين الحق منهم ، اجتمع من ذلك شيء له قدرٌ جليل .

فينبغي أن نعظم شكرنا للآتين ييسر الحق ، فضلاً عن أتى^(٣) بكثير من الحق ، إذ أشركونا في ثمار فكرهم وسهّلوا لنا المطالب الحقيقية الخفية ، بما أفادونا من المقدمات المُسهّلة لنا سُبُل الحق ؛ فإنهم ، لو لم يكونوا ، لم يجتمع لنا ، مع شدة البحث في مُدَدِنَا كلها ، هذه الأوائل الحقيقية^(٤) التي بها تخرّجنا^(٥) إلى الأواخر من مطلوباتنا الخفية^(٦) ؛ فان ذلك إنما اجتمع في الأعصار السالفة المتقدمة عصرًا بعد عصر إلى زماننا هذا ، مع شدة البحث ولزوم الدأب وإثارة التعب في ذلك .

وغير ممكن أن يجتمع في زمن المرء الواحد ، وإن اتسعت مدّته ، واشتدّت بحثه ، ولطف نظره ، وآثر الدأب ، ما اجتمع بمثل ذلك^(٧) من شدة البحث وإطاف النظر وإثارة الدأب في أضعاف ذلك من الزمان الأضعاف الكثيرة .

(١) في الأصل غير منقوطة ، فحاش أن تكون أكبر أو أكثر .

(٢) في الأصل : من .

(٣) في الأصل : أنا .

(٤) غير منقوطة ، وقد قرأتها : الحقبة ؛ تمثيلاً مع الفكرة .

(٥) يمكن أن نضبطها : تخرّجنا ؛ أو تخرّجنا ؛ والمعنى مفهوم في الحالين .

(٦) على هذه الكلمة نقطة واحدة ، رجعت لي قراءتها : الحقبة ، وهو ما يلائم السياق أيضاً .

(٧) هكذا في الأصل بعد كلمة : اجتمع ، نجد كلمتين يمكن قراءتهما : بمثل ذلك ؛ وجائز أنهما كلمتان زائدتان ، ولا ضرورة لهما بالنسبة للمعنى ، على أي حال .

فواجبٌ إذنُ التمسكُ بهذه القنينة النفيسة عند ذوى الحق وأن نسعى
 فى طلبها بغاية جهدنا ، لما قدمنا ولما نحن قائلون الآن .
 وذلك أنه باضطرارٍ يجب على السنة المضادين لها اقتنائوها ^(١) ؛ وذلك أنهم
 لا يخلون من أن يقولوا إن اقتناءها ^(٢) يجب أو لا يجب .
 فإن قالوا إنه يجب وجب طلبها عليهم .
 وإن قالوا إنها لا تجب ^(٣) وجب عليهم أن يحضروا علة ذلك ، وأن يُعْطُوا
 على ذلك برهاناً .

وإعطاء العلة والبرهان من قُنْيَةِ علم الأشياء بمحققها .
 فواجبٌ إذنُ طلبُ هذه القُنْيَةِ بألسنتهم ، والتمسكُ بها اضطراراً ^(٤) عليهم .
 فنحن نسأل المطلعَ على سرائرنا ، والعالمَ اجتهداناً فى تثبيت الحجة على
 ربوبيته ، وإيضاح وحدانيته ، وذبُّ المعاندين له الكافرين به عن ذلك بالحجج
 القائمة لكفرهم والهاثكة لسجوف ^(٥) فضائهم ، المخبرة عن عورات نحلهم المزدية ،
 أن يحوطنا ومن سلك سبيلنا بحصنِ عزه الذى لا يُرام ، وأن يلبسنا سراويل
 جُفَّتْه الواقية ، ويهب لنا نصرة غروب ^(٦) أسلحته النافذة ، والتأييدَ بعزِّ قوته .
 الغالبة ، حتى يبلغنا بذلك نهاية نيتنا من نصرة الحق وتأيد الصدق ، ويبلغنا
 بذلك درجة من ارتضى نيتَه ، وقبل فعله ، ووهب له الفلج ^(٧) والظفر على
 أضدادِهِ الكافرين نِعْمَتَه والخاذلين ^(٨) عن سبيل الحق المرتضاة عنده .
 ولنكمل الآن هذا الفن بتأييد ولى الخيرات وقابل الحسنات .

(١) و (٢) فى الأصل : اقتناها .

(٣) هكذا فى الأصل ، ويحسن أن تكون العبارة : وإن قالوا إنه لا يجب ... الخ .

(٤) هكذا فى الأصل ، وهى فى هذه الحالة خبر لكلمة التمسك ، والجملة كلها عطف على
 الجملة المتقدمة عليها . على أنه قد يجوز أن أصل كلمة اضطرار هو : اضطراراً ؛ وإذن تكون
 حالا ، وتكون كلمة التمسك معطوفة على كلمة طلب .

(٥) يمكن أيضاً أن تقرأ فى الأصل : سجوف .

(٦) غرب السلاح حده .

(٧) هكذا فى الأصل ، والفلج ، بتحريك اللام ، وكذلك الفلاح أيضاً ، بمعنى الفوز .

(٨) فى الأصل : العابدين ، وهو تحريف فى الغالب .

الأنفاع^(١) العامة الكلّ الشاملة لهم ، ولدّرانة^(٢) الحسد المتمكن من أنفسهم
البهيمية والحاجب بسدّ^(٣) سجوفه أبصار فكرهم عن نور الحق ، ووضعهم
ذوى الفضائل الإنسانية التي قصروا عن نيلها ، وكانوا منها في الأطراف الشاسعة ،
بموضع الأعداء الجريّة الواترة^(٤) ، ذبّا عن كراسيهم المزوّرة التي نصبوها عن
غير استحقاق ، بل للترؤس^(٥) والتجارة بالدين ، وهم عدماء الدين ، لأن من تجرّ
بشيء باعه ومن باع شيئاً لم يكن له ، فمن تجرّ بالدين لم يكن له دين ، ويحقّ أن
يتعرّى^(٦) من الدين من عاند قنينة علم الأشياء بحقائقها ، وسماها كفراً .

لأن في علم الأشياء بحقائقها علم الربوبية ، وعلم الوجدانية ، وعلم الفضيلة
وجملة علم كل نافع والسبيل إليه ، والبعد عن كل ضار والاحتباس منه ؛ واقتناء
هذه جميعاً هو الذي أتت به الرسل الصادقة عن الله ، جل ثناؤه .

فإن الرسل الصادقة صلوات الله عليها إنما أتت بالإقرار بربوبية الله وحده ،
وبلزوم الفضائل المرتضاة عنده ، وترك الرذائل المضادة للفضائل في ذواتها ،
وإيثارها^(٧) .

(١) غير منقوطة ؛ وقد قرأتها اجتهداً ، على أن تكون جمع نفع ، ولعله يقصد أن القوم
يتهافون على المنافع العادية التي ليست شأن العلماء .

(٢) هكذا تبدو الكلمة ؛ وأميل إلى اعتبارها معطوفة على كذا : لضيق . وفي اللغة
درن الجلد والثوب يدرن درنا ، وأدرن أيضاً بمعنى اتسخ وتلطخ .

(٣) السدّ والسدفة بمعنى الظلمة .

(٤) هكذا في الأصل ، والمقصود : الجريئة المعتدية . والواتر هو الذي يصيب غيره
بظلم موجه . والأصل لا يهتم باظهار الهمزات

(٥) في الأصل : للتراس .

(٦) في الأصل : يتعرا .

(٧) غير منقوطة في الأصل ، وهي في رأي معطوفة على كلمة لزوم ، وقد يجوز أنها تحريف
لكلمة آتارها ، وفي هذه الحالة تكون معطوفة على ذواتها ، على معنى أن الرذائل مضادة
للفضائل في ذواتها وفي آتارها ونتائجها .

والمحسوس كله ذو هيولى أبدأً ، فالمحسوس أبدأً جرمٌ وبالجرم^(١) .
والآخر أقرب من الطبيعة^(٢) وأبعد عندنا ، وهو وجود العقل .
وبحق ما كان الوجود وجودين^(٣) : وجود حسي ووجود عقلي
إذ الأشياء كلية وجزئية ، أعني بالكلية الأجناس للأشياء ، والأشياء
للأشخاص ؛ وأعني بالجزئية الأشخاص للأشياء .
والأشخاص الجزئية الهيولانية واقعة تحت الحواس ؛ وأما الأجناس والأشياء
فغير واقعة تحت الحواس ولا موجودة وجوداً حسيّاً ، بل تحت قوة من قوى النفس
التامة ، أعني الإنسانية ، هي المسماة العقل الإنساني .
وإذ الحواس واحدة^(٤) الأشخاص ، فكلُّ متمثل في النفس من المحسوسات
فهو للقوة المستعملة الحواس .
فأما كل معنى نوعي وما فوق النوع فليس متمثلاً^(٥) للنفس ، لأن المثل^(٦)
كلها محسوسة ؛ بل [هو]^(٧) مصدق في النفس محقق متيقن بصدق^(٨) الأوائل
العقلية المعقولة اضطراراً ، كهو لا هو^(٩) غير صادقين في شيء بعينه ليس

- (١) هنا يباين قليل في الأصل .
(٢) المقصود من الطبيعة هنا والمقصود منها عند أول التقسيم هو حقائق الأشياء وماهياتها
المعقولة ، وهو ما يدل عليه الكلام بوجه عام .
(٣) في الأصل : وجودان .
(٤) يعني مدركة .
(٥) في الأصل : متمثل .
(٦) الكلمة عسيرة القراءة ، ويشبه أن تكون قد صححت هكذا ؛ فإن لم يكن هنا شيء
من التناقض ، فيجب أن نفهم المثل لا بالمعنى الخاص لهذه الكلمة كما نعرفه من مذهب أفلاطون ،
بل بمعنى ما يتمثل في النفس على الوجه المطلق ، وهي جمع مثال ؛ ولعله يقصد أن الأنواع وما فوقها
ليست مثلاً أو تمثلاً قائمة في الصورة ، بحيث تكون أشبه بالمحسوسة ، بل هي حقائق
وماهيات معقولة ، كالبديهيات العقلية ، ويدل على هذا كلامه بعد ذلك مباشرة .
(٧) زيادة للايضاح .
(٨) يقصد أن صدق الأوائل العقلية مصدق له ؛ وإلا فيمكن أن تكون الكلمة تحريفاً
عن : كصدق .
(٩) يقصد الحكيم على الشيء نفسه بأنه كذا ولا كذا في وقت واحد ؛ وهذا غير ممكن ،
وهو معلوم بالضرورة العقلية . والجملة مختصرة تفضيلها أن نقول : كالقول بأن الشيء كذا
وبأنه لا كذا في وقت واحد ، فهذا لا يصدقان معاً .

الفصل الثاني

وهو الجزء الأول في الفلسفة الأولى

بإذ قدمنا ما يجب تقديمه في صدر كتابنا هذا فلننتقل ذلك بما يتلوه تملؤاً طبيعياً ، فنقول :

إن الوجود الإنساني وجودان :

أحدهما أقرب منا وأبعد عند الطبيعة ، وهو وجود^(١) الحواس التي هي لنا ، منذ بدء نشوئنا ، وللجنس العام لنا ولكثير من غيرنا ، أعني الحي العام لجميع الحيوان ؛ فإن وجودنا^(٢) بالحواس ، عند مباشرة الحس محسوسه ، بلازمان^(٣) ولا مؤونة ؛ وهو غير ثابت لزوال ما نبأشر وسيلانه وتبدله في كل حال بأحد أنواع الحركات ، وتفاضل الكمية فيه بالأكثر والأقل والتساوي وغير التساوي ، وتغاير الكيفية فيه بالشبيه وغير الشبيه ، والأشد والأضعف ؛ فهو الدهر في زوال دائم ، وتبدل غير منفصل ؛ وهو الذي تثبت صورته في الصورة^(٤) ، فتؤديها إلى الحفظ ؛ فهو^(٥) متمثل ومتصور في نفس الحي ؛ فهو وإن كان لا ثبات له في الطبيعة ، فبعد عندها ، وخفي لذلك ، فهو قريب من الحاس جداً ، لوجدانه^(٦) بالحس مع مباشرة الحس إياه .

(١) يقصد في الواقع وجود الحواس لما تجده ، يعني ادراكها ما تدركه ؛ والوجود هنا وفي رسائل أخرى للسكندی (أنظر مثلاً رسالة في ماهية النوم والرؤيا) لا بمعنى الوجود المقابل للعدم ، بل بمعنى الوجدان والإدراك .

(٢) يمكن أن نزيد هنا كلمة : الأشياء ، لتوضيح المقصود .

(٣) بلازمان ، هذا هو خبر إن .

(٤) في الأصل : المصور ، وقد آثرت قراءتها : الصورة ، على سبيل التصحيح ، وقرأت ما بعدها : فتؤديها ، وإن كانت غير منقوطة أصلاً . والمصورة قوة نفسية يشكلم عنها السكندی في رسالة النوم والرؤيا .

(٥) يعود الضمير على ما تجده الحواس وما تبأشره .

(٦) أي لإدراكه أو كونه مدركاً .

يُوجِبُ ذلك اضطراباً ، كقولنا إن جسم الكل ليس خارجاً^(١) منه خلاً^(٢) ولا ملاء^(٣) . أعني لا فراغ ولا جسم ؛ وهذا القول لا يتمثل في النفس ، لأن «لا خلاً ولا ملاء» شيء لم يدركه الحس ، ولا لحق الحس ، فيكون له في النفس مثال^(٤) أو يُظَنُّ له مثال ؛ وإنما هو شيء يحده العقل اضطراباً بهذه المقدمات التي تقدم^(٥) .

وذلك أن نقول في البحث عن ذلك إن معنى الخلاء مكان لا متمم^(٦) . فيه ؛ والمكان المتمم من المضاف الذي لا يسبق بعضه بعضاً ؛ فإن كان مكان كان متمم اضطراباً ، وإن كان متمم كان مكان^(٧) اضطراباً - فليس إذن يمكن أن يكون مكان بلا متمم ؛ ويعني بخلاء مكان^(٨) بلا متمم ، فليس يمكن إذن أن يكون للخلاء المطلق وجود . ثم نقول : والملاء إذا كان هو جسماً^(٩) :

فإما أن يكون جسم الكل^(١٠) لانهائية له في الكمية وإما أن يكون متناهي الكمية .

وليس يمكن أن يكون شيء لانهائية له بالفعل ، كما سنبين بعد قليل . فليس يمكن أن يكون جسم الكل لانهائية له في الكمية - فليس بعد جسم الكل ملاء .

لأنه إن كان بعده ملاء ، كان ذلك الملاء جسماً ؛ فإن كان ذلك الملاء بعده

(١) في الأصل : خارج .

(٢) عبارة « لا خلاً ولا ملاء » يجب أن تفهم على أنها معبرة عن شيء واحد . أعني القول بلا خلاً ولا ملاء .

(٣) في الأصل : مثالا ، وهو خطأ من حيث المعنى واللغة معا .

(٤) غير منقوطة ولا مشكولة في الأصل

(٥) في الأصل : مكان .

(٦) في الأصل مكانا ؛ وهو جائز إذا قرأنا : نفي بدلا من نفي ، وهي غير منقوطة على كل حال .

(٧) في الأصل : جسم .

(٨) الكل هنا بمعنى الكون أو العالم في مجموعه ، وكذلك في مواضع كثيرة من رسائل الكندي .

بغيرى^(١) ؛ فإن هذا وجود^(٢) للنفس لاحسى ، اضطرارى^(٣) ، لا يحتاج إلى متوسط^(٤) ، وليس يتمثل لهذا مثال في النفس ؛ لأنه لا مثال [له] ، لأنه لا لون ولا صوت ولا طعم ولا رائحة ولا ملموس [له] ، بل [هو]^(٥) إدراك لامثالى . وكل ما كان هيولانياً^(٦) فإنه مثالى ، يمثله الحس الكلى في النفس ؛ وكل ما هو لا هيولانى ، وقد يوجد مع الهيولانى ، كالشكل الموجود باللون ، إذ هو نهاية اللون ، فيعرض بالحس البصرى أن يوجد الشكل ، إذ هو نهاية المدرك بالحس البصرى .

وقد يُظن أنه يتمثل في النفس باجتلاب الحس الكلى له ، وتمثله في نفس الإنسان لاحقة تلحق المثال اللونى ، كاللاحقة التى تلحق اللون أنه نهاية الملون ؛ فوجود النهاية التى هى الشكل ، وجود عقلى عرض بالحس لا محسوس بالحقيقة ؛ فلذلك كل اللاتى^(٧) لا هيولى لها وتوجد مع الهيولى قديماً يُظن أنها تمثل^(٨) في النفس ، وإنما تعقل من المحسوس لا يتمثل^(٩) ؛ فأما اللاتى لا هيولى لها ولا تقارن الهيولى ، فليس تمثل في النفس بته ، ولا نظن أنها تمثل ، وإنما نُقِرُّ بها^(١٠) لما

(١) غير منقوطة في الأصل ، وقوله : ليس بغيرى ، تأكيد لقوله : بعينه — يعنى بعينه ، غير مغاير لنفسه بوجه من الوجوه .

(٢) أى إدراك .

(٣) فى الأصل : اضطرارى ؛ وقد صححتها : اضطرارى ، تمثيلاً مع المعنى ؛ والمقصود أن البديهيات بالنسبة للنفس مدركة مباشرة . وإدراك النفس لها إدراك غير حسى ، وهو اضطرارى ، ولا يحتاج إلى مثال ... الخ . وربما كان يخطر على نظراً للنص أن أميل إلى قراءة : اضطرارى : اضطراراً ، أى لا يحتاج ... الخ ؛ والمعنى واحد على كل حال .

(٤) فى الأصل متوسط .

(٥) زيادات موضحة .

(٦) فى الأصل هيولانى .

(٧) فى الأصل الاتى .

(٨) هكذا فى الأصل ، لكن بدون نقط ؛ ويمكن ضبطها هى ونظيرتها التالية ، بالشكل على أكثر من وجه .

(٩) الباء والتاء غير منقوطين ، وأظن قراءتها هكذا صحيحة ، على معنى أنها تعقل دون أن يكون لها مثال حسى فى النفس .

(١٠) غير منقوطة ولا مشكولة .

التعليمي^(١) ، لأن ذلك إنما ينبغي أن يكون فيما لا هيولى له ، لأن الهيولى موضوعة للانفعال ، فهي متحركة ، والطبيعة علة أولية لكل متحرك ساكن^(٢) .

فإذن كل طبيعي فذو هيولى ؛ فإذا لم يمكن أن يستعمل في وجود الأشياء الطبيعية الفحص الرياضى ، إذ هو^(٣) خاصة ما لا هيولى له ، فإن ذلك في الفحص به أعلى ما ليس بطبيعي^(٤) ؛ فمن استعملها في البحث عن الطبيعيات حار^(٥) وعدم الحق .

فلذلك يجب على كل باحث علم من العلوم أن يبحث أولا ما علة الواقع تحت ذلك العلم ؛ فإننا إن بحثنا ما علة الطباع الذى هو علة الأشياء الطبيعية وجدناه كما قد قلنا في أوائل الطبيعة : هي علة كل حركة — إذن^(٦) فالطبيعي هو كل متحرك ؛ فإن علم الطبيعيات هو علم كل متحرك ، فإن ما فوق الطبيعيات هو لا متحرك ، لأنه ليس يمكن أن يكون الشيء علة كون ذاته ، كما سنبين بعد قليل ؛ فإن ليس علة الحركة حركة ولا علة المتحرك متحرك^(٧) — فإن ما فوق الطبيعيات ليس بمتحرك ؛ فإن قد وضح أن علم ما فوق الطبيعيات هو علم ما لا يتحرك .

وقد ينبغي أن لا يطلب في إدراك كل مطلوب الوجود البرهاني ؛ فانه ليس كل مطلوب عقلي موجوداً بالبرهان ، لأنه ليس لكل شيء برهان ، إذ البرهان

(١) يقصد الفحص الرياضى القائم على النظر الاستنباطى غالبا .

(٢) في الأصل حاد ، ولعلها تحريف .

(٣) راجع تعريف الكندي للطبيعة في رسالته في حدود الأشياء ورسومها .

(٤) في الأصل : هي ؛ وهو غير منسجم مع المعنى .

(٥) في الأصل : فإذا هي كذلك في الفحص بها على ما ليس بطبيعي ؛ وقد صححت العبارة تمثيا مع الفكرة ، لأنه يقول إن المنهج الرياضى لا يصلح في بحث الأشياء الطبيعية ، لأنها تلابس المادة ؛ فهو لا يصلح أيضا لدراسة ما بعد الطبيعة ، لأن ما بعد الطبيعة لا هيولى له . ويجب الاحتراز عند فهم هذه العبارة ؛ فالغالب أنه يقصد من قوله : فإن هو كذلك ، أن المنهج الرياضى يمكن أن يستعمل فيما بعد الطبيعة ، لأن المانع من استعماله في الطبيعة هو أنها تبحث فيما له هيولى ؛ فيجوز استعماله إذن فيما بعد الطبيعة .

(٦) في الأصل : إذا .

(٧) في الأصل : متحرك .

ملاء ، وبعد كل ملاء ملاء ، كان ملاء بلا نهاية ؛ فوجب حسم بلا نهاية في الكمية ، فوجب لانتهاء بالفعل ؛ ولا نهاية بالفعل ممتنع أن يكون .
فإذن جسم الكل لا ملاء بعده ، لأنه لا جسم بعده ، ولا خلاء بعده ، كما بينا

فهذا واجب اضطراراً ، وليست له صورة في النفس ؛ إنما هو وجود عقلي اضطرارى .

فمن بحث الأشياء التي فوق الطبيعة ، أغنى التي لا هيولى لها ولا تقارن الهيولى ، فلن يجد لها مثلاً^(١) في النفس ، بل يجدها بالأبحاث العقلية .

فاحفظ ، حفظ الله عليك جميع الفضائل ، وصانك عن جميع الرذائل ! هذه المقدمة لتكون لك دليلاً قاصداً سواء الحقائق ، وشهاباً حاسراً عن عين عقلك ظلم الجهل وكدر الخيرات

فإن بهاتين السبيلين^(٢) كان الحق من جهة سهلاً ومن جهة عسيراً ؛ لأن من طلب تمثيل المعقول ليجده بذلك ، مع وضوحه في العقل ، غمى عنه كعشاء عين الوطواط عن نيل الأشخاص البيئة الواضحة لنا في شعاع الشمس .

ولهذه العلة تحير كثير من الناظرين في الأشياء التي فوق الطبيعة ، إذ استعملوا في البحث عنها تمثيلها في النفس على قدر عاداتهم للحس ، مثل الضبي ؛ فإن التعليم إنما يكون سهلاً في المعتادات ؛ ومن الدليل على ذلك سرعة المتعلمين من الخطب والرسائل أو الشعر أو القصص ، أى ما كان حديثاً ، لعاداتهم للحديث والخرافات من بدء النشوء ؛ وفي الأشياء الطبيعية^(٣) ، إذ^(٤) استعملوا الفحص

(١) المثل بفتح الميم والهاء لعة في المثل بكسر الميم وسكون الراء .

(٢) هذه الكلمات غير منقوطة في الأصل

(٣) قوله : وفي الأشياء الطبيعية معطوف على قوله : في الأشياء التي فوق الطبيعة ، يعنى

أن التحير وقع في الميدانين بسبب خطأ المنهج .

(٤) في الأصل : إذا — وبمى خطأ ، وتصحيحها بحسب المعنى وقياساً على النص السابق

مباشرة .

إن الأزلى هو الذى لم يجب ليس هو مطلقاً^(١)؛ فالأزلى لا قبل كونيًا^(٢) لهويته؛ فالأزلى هو لا قوامه من غيره؛ فالأزلى لا علة له؛ فالأزلى لا موضوع له، ولا محمول، ولا فاعل، ولا سبب — أعنى ما من أجله كان — لأن العلل المقدّمة ليست غير هذه.

فالأزلى لا جنس له، لأنه إن كان له جنس^(٣) فهو نوع، والنوع مركب من جنسه العامي^(٤) له ولغيره ومن فصل ليس فى غيره؛ فله موضوع هو الجنس القابل لصورته وصورة غيره، ومحمول هو الصورة الخاصة له دون غيره؛ فله موضوع ومحمول.

وقد كان تبين أنه لا موضوع ولا محمول له، وهذا محال لا يمكن؛ فالأزلى لا جنس له.

فالأزلى لا يفسد، لأن الفساد إنما هو تبدّل المحمول لا الحامل الأول، فأما الحامل الأول الذى هو الأيس^(٥) فليس يتبدّل، لأن الفاسد ليس فسادُه بتأيس أيسيته^(٦)، وكلُّ مُتَبَدِّلٍ فإنما تبدّله بضدّه الأقرب — أعنى الذى معه فى جنس واحد، كالحرارة المتبدلة بالبرودة، لأننا لانعدّ من المقابلة كالحرارة باليبس^(٧) أو بالجلالة أو بالطول، أو ما كان كذلك، والأضداد المتقاربة هى جنس واحد.

(١) هكذا النص؛ وفى رسالة الكندى « فى حدود الأشياء ورسومها »، نجد يعرف الأزلى بأنه هو « الذى لم يكن ليس (= لم يكن معدوماً)، وليس يحتاج فى قوامه إلى غيره؛ والذى لا يحتاج فى قوامه إلى غيره فلا علة له، وما لاعلة له فدائم أبداً » ويجوز أن تكون كلمة يجب تحريفاً من النسخ عن: يجوز — يعنى أن الأزلى لا يجوز بوجه من الوجوه أن يكون كان معدوماً.

(٢) فى الأصل: كوني. ويجب لفويا أن تكون كما صححنا، ولا سيما أن المخطوط فى كثير من الأحيان لا يراعى النحو. والمعنى أن الأزلى ليس لذاته قبل وجودى، لأنه موجود أزلاً.

(٣) فى الأصل جنسا، وهو خطأ لغوى.

(٤) هكذا فى الأصل — وهو، كما يلى أحياناً، بمعنى العام. راجع ص ١٢٤، ١٢٦.

(٥) أى الوجود.

(٦) أى إيجاد وجوده — راجع فى كلمتي الأيس والتأيس التعليق على رسالة الكندى فى الفاعل الحق الأول التام والفاعل الناقص الذى هو بالحجاز.

(٧) يعنى: لانعد من التبدل الى الضد ما يكون مثل تبدل الحرارة ببوسة الخ.

[في] ^(١) بعض الأشياء ؛ وليس للبرهان برهان^٢ ، لأن هذا يكون بلا نهاية ، إن كان لكل برهان برهان^٣ — فلا يكون لشيء وجود البتة ، لأن ما لا ينتهي إلى علم أوائله فليس بمعلوم ، فلا يكون علماً ألبتة^٤ ، لأننا إن رُمنّا علم ما الإنسان ، الذي هو الحى الناطق الميت — ولم نعلم ما الحى وما الناطق ، وما الميت — لم^(٢) نعلم ما الإنسان إذن^(٣) .

وكذلك ينبغي أن [لا] نطلب الإقناعات في العلوم الرياضية ، بل البرهان ؛ فأما إن استعملنا الإقناع في العلم الرياضى كانت إحاطتنا به ظنية لاعلمية . وكذلك لكل نظر تمييزي^(٤) وجود خاص غير وجود الآخر ؛ ولذلك ضل^(٥) أيضاً كثير من الناظرين في الأشياء التمييزية ، لأن منهم من جرى على عادة طلب الإقناع وبعضهم جرى على عادة الأمثال ، وبعضهم جرى على عادة شهادات الأخبار ، وبعضهم جرى على عادة الحس ، وبعضهم جرى على عادة البرهان ، لما قصروا عن تمييز المطلوبات ، وبعضهم أراد استعمال ذلك في وجود^(٦) مطلوبه ، إما للتقصير عن علم أساليب المطلوبات ، وإما للعشق للتكثير من سبل الحق — فينبغي أن نقصد بكل مطلوب ما يجب ، ولا نطلب في العلم الرياضى إقناعاً ، ولا في العلم الإلهى حساً ولا تمثيلاً ، ولا في أوائل العلم الطبيعى الجوامع الفكرية^(٧) ، ولا في البلاغة برهاناً ، ولا في أوائل البرهان برهاناً — فإنا إن تحفظنا هذه الشرائط سهلت علينا المطالب المقصودة ، وإن خالفنا ذلك أخطأنا أغراضنا من مطالبنا ، وعسر علينا وجدان^(٨) مقصوداتنا .

فإذا تقدمت هذه الوصايا فينبغي أن تقدم الفوايد^(٩) التى نحتاج إلى استعمالها في هذه الصناعة ، فنقول :

(١) زيادة بتطلبها المعنى .

(٢) فى الأصل : فلم .

(٣) فى الأصل : إذا .

(٤) و (٥) قراءة اجتهدية .

(٦ ، ٨) يعنى البحث عن المطلوب والوصول إليه .

(٧) ربما يقصد الأقيسة وأنواع الاستدلال ، وهذا ما يمكن أن نفهمه من رسالته فى كمية كتب أرسطو

(٩) يشبه أن يكون فى هذه الكلمة تصحيح فى الأصل ، وقراءتها هكذا أقرب الوجوه .

فإن كان جرمٌ لا نهاية له ، فإنه ، إذا فصل منه جرمٌ متناهى العظم ، فإن الباقي منه : إما أن يكون متناهى العظم ، وإما لا متناهى العظم .

فإن كان الباقي منه متناهى العظم ، فإنه إذا زيد عليه المفصول منه المتناهى العظم ، كان الجرم الكائن عنهما جميعاً متناهى العظم ؛ والذي كان عنهما هو الذى كان — قبل أن يفصل منه شئ — لا متناهى العظم .

فهو إذن متناهٍ لا متناهٍ ، وهذا خلفٌ لا يمكن .

وإن كان الباقي لا متناهى العظم ، فإنه إذا زيد عليه ما أخذ منه ، صار أعظم مما كان قبل أن يزداد عليه أو مساوياً له .

فإن كان أعظم مما كان فقد صار ما لا نهاية له أعظم مما لا نهاية [له] ،

وأصغرُ الشئين بعد أعظمهما أو بعد بعضه ،

فأصغرُ الجرمين اللذين لا نهاية لهما بعد أعظمهما أو بعد بعضه ،

وإن كان بعده فهو بعد بعضه لا محالة ،

فأصغرهما مساوٍ بعض أعظمهما .

والمساويان هما اللذان متشابهاتهما^(١) أبعادٌ ما بين نهاياتهما واحدة ؛ فهما إذن ذوات نهايات — لأن الأجزاء المتساوية التى ليست متشابهة ، هى التى يعدّها جرمٌ واحد عدداً واحداً ، وتختلف نهاياتها بالكثرة أو الكيف أو معا ، فهما متناهيان^(٢) —

فالذى لا نهاية له الأصغر متناهٍ ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ،

فليس أحدهما أعظم من الآخر ؛

(١) فى الأصل هكذا ، وكذلك فى « رسالة فى وحدانية الله وتناهى جرم العالم » ونجد فى رسالة « فى مائة ما لا يمكن أن يكون لا نهاية له — الخ : « والأشياء المتشابهة هى التى أبعاد نهاياتها المتشابهة متساوية » — والمعنى بعد هذا مفهوم .

(٢) يعنى أن عدد أجزائها ، بحسب وحدة العدد ، واحد ، لكنها تختلف فيما عدا ذلك . والدليل على هذا الراى أن كلمة « جزء » تدكر بدلاً من كلمة « جرم » فى « رسالة فى وحدانية الله — الخ » . وفيما يلى (س ١٢٧) نجد الكندى يقول ان الجزء هو « ماعد الكل » ، فقسمه بأقدار متساوية .

فالفساد جنس ، فإن فسد الأزلى فله جنس ؛ وهو لا جنس له — هذا خلف لا يمكن ، فالأزلى لا يمكن أن يفسد .

والاستحالة^(١) تبدل ؛ فالأزلى لا يستحيل ، لأنه لا يتبدل ولا ينتقل من النقص إلى التمام ، فلا تتقال استحالة^(٢) ما ؛ فالأزلى لا ينتقل^(٣) إلى تمام ، لأنه لا يستحيل ؛ والتمام هو الذى له^(٤) حال^(٥) ثابتة ، يكون بها فاضلا ، والناقص هو الذى لا حال له ثابتة يكون بها فاضلا ؛ فالأزلى لا يمكن أن يكون ناقصا ، لأنه لا يمكن أن ينتقل إلى حال فيكون بها فاضلا — لأنه لا يمكن أن يستحيل إلى أفضل منه ولا إلى أنقص منه بقاء ، فالأزلى تام اضطراراً ؛ وإذا الجرم ذو جنس وأنواع — والأزلى لا جنس له — فالجرم [ليس هو^(٦)] الأزلى .

فلنقل الآن إنه لا يمكن أن يكون جرم^(٧) أزلى ولا غيره ، مما له كمية أو كيفية ، لا نهاية له بالفعل^(٨) ، وإن [ما] لا نهاية له إنما هو فى القوة ؛ فأقول^(٩) :

إن من المقدمات الأول الحقيقة المعقولة بلا توسط : (أ) أن كل الأجرام التى ليس منها شئ أعظم من شئ ، متساوية ؛ (ب) والمتساوية أبعاد ما بين نهاياتها متساوية بالفعل والقوة ؛ (ج) وذو النهاية ليس لا نهاية [له] ؛ (د) وكل الأجرام المتساوية إذا زيد على واحد منها جرم كان أعظمها ، وكان أعظم مما كان ، قبل أن يزداد عليه ذلك الجرم ؛ (هـ) وكل جرمين متناهيي العظم ، إذا جمعا ، كان الجرم الكائن عنهما متناهي العظم — وهذا واجب أيضا فى كل عظم وفى كل ذى عظم ؛ (و) وأن الأصغر من كل شيئين متجانسين بعد الأكبر منهما أو بعد بعضه .

(١) يعنى التغير .

(٢) فى الأصل : ينتقص ، وهو خطأ .

(٣) فى الأصل : ليست له ؛ وهو خطأ بلا شك ، لأنه لا يتفق مع المعنى .

(٤) بياض فى الأصل ، وقد زدتها اجتهداً .

(٥) جملة : « لانهاية له بالفعل » هى خبر يكون .

(٦) من هنا نجد المطابقة حريفة تقريبا مع رسالة السكندى فى وحدانية الله وتناهى

جرم العالم .

وإذ^(١) ذلك واجب ، فقد اتضح أنه لا يمكن أن يكون زمانٌ بالفعل
لا نهاية له ؛

والزمان زمان جرم الكل ، أعني مدته ؛ فإن كان الزمان متناهيًا فإن
إنية الجرم متناهية ، إذ الزمان ليس بموجود ؛

ولا جرم بلا زمان ، لأن الزمان إنما هو عدد الحركة ، أعني أنه مدة تعديها
الحركة ، فإن كانت حركة كان زمان^(٢) ، وإن لم تكن حركة لم يكن زمان^(٣) ؛
والحركة إنما هي حركة الجرم ، فإن كان جرم كانت حركة وإلا لم تكن
حركة ؛ والحركة هي تبدل ما ، فتبدل^(٤) مكان أجزاء الجرم ومركزه أو كل
أجزاء الجرم فقط ، هي الحركة المكانية ؛ وتبدل المكان الذي ينتهي إليه الجرم
بنهاياته ، إما بالقرب من مركزه وإما بالبعد منه ، هو الربو والاضمحلال ؛ وتبدل
كيفياته المحمولة فقط هو الاستحالة ؛ وتبدل جوهره هو الكون والفساد ؛

وكل تبدل فهو عادة عدد مدة الجرم ، فكل تبدل فهو لذي الزمان ؛ فإن
كانت حركة كان جرم اضطراراً ،

وإن كان جرم وجب أن تكون حركة اضطراراً ، أو لا تكون حركة ؛
فإن كان جرم [و]^(٥) لم تكن حركة ، فإما أن لا تكون حركة بية ، وإما
أن لا تكون ، ويمكن أن تكون ؛

فإن لم تكن بية ، فالحركة ليس بموجودة ، إذ الجرم موجود^(٦) ، وهي
موجودة^(٧) ، وهذا خلف لا يمكن ،

(١) في الرسالة الأخرى : وإن .

(٢) و (٣) في الأصل : زمانا ، وهو خطأ ، ويخالف طريقة تفكير الكندي في رسائل
أخرى له ، راجع « رسالته في وحدانية الله وتناهي جرم العالم » .

(٤) في الأصل قد تبدل ؛ وفي رسالة الوحدانية : والحركة هي تبدل الأحوال ، فتبدل
مكان كل أجزاء الجرم ومركزه أو كل أجزاء الجرم فقط هو الحركة المكانية . وقد صححت
طبقاً للرسالة الأخرى .

(٥) زيادة مقترحة .

(٦) في الأصل : موجودة ، وهو خطأ واضح .

(٧) لعله يقصد ما تقدم ، وهو أن الحركة ملازمة للجرم بوجه عام ، لأن الجرم في زمان حـ

وإن كان ليس بأعظم مما [كان ^(١)] قبل أن يُزاد عليه ، فقد زيد على جرمٍ جرمٌ ، فلم يُزد شيئاً ، وصار جميع ذلك مساوياً له وحده ، وهو وحده جزء له ولجزءه اللذين اجتماعاً ؛

فالجزء مثل الكل — هذا خلف لا يمكن ؛

فقد تبين أنه لا يمكن أن يكون جرم ^(٢) لا نهاية له . وبهذا التديير تبين أنه لا يمكن شيء ^(٣) من الكميات أن تكون لا نهاية لها بالفعل .

والزمان كمّية ، فليس يمكن أن يكون زمانٌ لا نهاية له بالفعل ؛ فالزمان ^(٤) ذو أول متناهٍ ؛

والأشياء أيضاً المحمولة في المتناهي متناهية اضطراراً ؛

فكل محمول في الجرم من كم أو مكان أو حركة أو زمان — الذي هو مفصول بالحركة — وجملة كل ما هو محمول في الجرم بالفعل ، فمتناهٍ أيضاً ، إذ الجرم متناهٍ . فجرم الكل متناهٍ . وكل محمول فيه بعده ^(٥) أيضاً .

وإذ جرم الكل ممكن أن يُزاد فيه بالوهم زيادة دائمة ، [ب] أ أن تتوهم أعظم منه ، ثم أعظم من ذلك دائماً — فإنه لا نهاية في التزايد من جهة الإمكان — فهو بالقوة بلا نهاية ، إذ القوة ليست شيئاً ^(٦) غير الإمكان ، [أعنى] أن يكون الشيء المقول هو بالقوة ؛

فكل ما في الذي لا نهاية له بالقوة هو أيضاً بالقوة لا نهاية له ؛ ومن ذلك الحركة والزمان . فإذا ^(٧) الذي لا نهاية له إنما هو في القوة — فأما بالفعل فليس يمكن أن يكون شيء لا نهاية له ، لما قدمنا —

(١) هذه الزيادة بحسب الرسالة الأخرى .

(٢) في الأصل : جرماً .

(٣) هكذا في الأصل ، ولكن بدون شكل — وهو صحيح منطقياً .

(٤) في الأصل : والزمان .

(٥) يعني أصغر منه ، وفي الأصل : بعد ؛ ويجوز أن تكون : يُعَمَد .

(٦) في الأصل : شيء .

(٧) في الرسالة الأخرى : فإن .

فإذا لم يسبق الجرم [الكون] كان [الكون] ذاته ، فإذن ^(١) لم يسبق كون الجرم الحركة بته ؛

وقد قيل إنه كان أولاً ولا حركة ؛ فهو ولا حركة ، ولم يكن ولا حركة ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ؛ فليس يمكن ، إن كان الجرم كوناً عن ليس ، أن يسبق الحركة ؛

فإن كان الجرم لم يزل ساكناً ، ثم تحرك لأنه كان ممكناً له أن يتحرك ، فقد استحال جرم الكل — الذى لم يزل — من السكون بالفعل إلى الحركة بالفعل ؛ والذى لم يزل لا يستحيل ، كما قدمنا بيان ذلك ؛

فهو إذن مستحيل لاستحيل ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، فليس يمكن أن يكون جرم الكل لم يزل ساكناً بالفعل ، ثم استحال متحركاً بالفعل . والحركة فيه موجودة ؛ فإذن لم يسبق الحركة بته .

فإذن ^(٢) إن كانت حركة كان جرم اضطراراً ، وإن كان جرم كانت حركة اضطراراً ؛

وقد تقدم أن الزمان لا يسبق الحركة ، فالزمان لا يسبق الجرم اضطراراً ، إذ لا زمان إلا بحركة ، وإذ لا جرم إلا وحركة ، ولا حركة إلا وجرم ، ولا جرم بلا ^(٣) مدة ، إذ المدة هي ما هو فيه هوياً ، أعنى ما هو فيه هو ما [هو] ^(٤) ؛ ولا مدة جرم إلا وحركة ، إذ الجرم مع حركة أبداً ، كما قد اتضح ؛ فمدة الجرم اللازمة للجرم أبداً تمدها حركة الجرم اللازمة للجرم أبداً ، فالجرم لا يسبق الزمان أبداً ؛

فالجرم والحركة والزمان لا يسبق بعضها بعضاً أبداً .

(١) فى الأصل : فإذا .

(٢) فى الأصل : فإذا .

(٣) فى الأصل : إلا بلا ، ولا شك أنه خطأ فى النسخ أو فى الكتابة ، لأنه لا يتفق مع المعنى .

(٤) زدتها للبيان ، وإن كان السكندى لا يهتم بهذه الزيادة ، كما نرى منه فيما بعد — راجع أول هذه الرسالة .

فليس يمكن أن يكون — إن كان جرمٌ موجوداً — لا حركة بقاء . وإن كان ، إذا كان جرمٌ موجوداً ، ممكننا أن يكون حركةٌ موجودة ، فإن الحركة بالاضطرار موجودة في بعض الأجرام ، لأن الممكن له الشيء هو الموجود ذلك الشيء في بعض ذوات جوهره ، كالكتابة موجودة^(١) بالإمكان لمحمد ، وليست فيه بالفعل ، إذ هي موجودة في بعض جوهر الإنسان ، أعني في آخر من الناس ؛ فالحركة باضطرار موجودة في بعض الأجرام ، فهي موجودة في الجرم المطلق ، فهي موجودة اضطراراً في الجرم المطلق ،

فإذن^(٢) الجرم موجود فالحركة موجودة .

وقد قيل أن الحركة لا تكون ، إذا كان الجرم موجوداً ؛ فهي إذن تكون ، إذا كان الجرم موجوداً ، لا تكون ، إذا كان الجرم موجوداً ؛ وهذا محال وخلف لا يمكن ؛

فليس يمكن أن يكون جرمٌ ولا حركة ؛

فإذن متى كان جرم كانت حركة اضطراراً .

وقد نظن أنه يمكن أن يكون جرم الكل كان ساكناً أولاً ، وكان ممكننا أن يتحرك ، ثم تحرك .

وهذا ظن كاذب اضطراراً ؛ لأن جرم الكل ، إن كان أولاً ساكناً ، ثم تحرك ، فلا يخلو من أن يكون جرم الكل كَوْنًا عن ليس^(٣) ، أو لم يزل^(٤) ؛ فإن كان كَوْنًا عن ليس ، فإن تهوَّيه أيسأعن^(٥) ليس فكون^(٦) ؛ فتهوَّيه حركة ، كما قدمنا ، حيث وصفنا^(٧) الحركة : أن أحد أنواع الحركة هو الكون ،

(١) في الأصل موجبة ، وقد صححتها تمشياً مع المعنى .

(٢) في الأصل : فإذا ، وهو جائز على كل حال .

(٣) يعني جرم العالم : أن يكون موجوداً عن عدم .

(٤) أو هو قديم .

(٥) يشتق الكندي من كلمة « هو » فعلا (يتهوى) يستعمله في معنى الوجود — راجع الفهرس الخاص بالمصطلحات .

(٦) هكذا في الأصل ويكون المعنى أوضح لو أسقطنا الفاء .

(٧) في الأصل صفنا ، وهي غير منقوطة ، ونظراً لأن الكندي قل أن يستعمل هذه الكلمة فلعلها محرفة عن : وصفنا .

كان التركيب والتأليف تبدلاً ما ؛ وإن لم يكن التركيب والتأليف تبدلاً ، فليست هذه النتيجة بواجبة .

ولنوضح الآن بنوع آخر أنه لا يمكن أن يكون زمان لا نهاية له بالفعل في ماضيه ولا آتيه ، فنقول :

إن قبل كل فصل من الزمان فصلاً إلى أن ننتهي إلى فصل من الزمان لا يكون فصل قبله ، أعني إلى مدة مفصولة ليست قبلها مدة مفصولة — لا يمكن غير ذلك ؛

فإن أمكن ذلك^(١) فإن خلف كل فصل من الزمان فصلاً^(٢) بلا نهاية ؛ فإذا لا ينتهي^(٣) إلى زمن مفروض ، أبداً ، لأن من لا نهاية في القدمة إلى هذا الزمن المفروض مساوي المدة للمدة التي من هذا الزمن المفروض فصاعداً^(٤) في الأزمنة إلى ما لا نهاية له ؛

وإن كان من لا نهاية إلى زمن محدود معلوم^(٥) ، فإن من ذلك الزمن المعلوم إلى ما لا نهاية له من الزمان معلوماً^(٦) ؛

فيكون إذن^(٧) لا متناه متناهيًا ، وهذا خلف لا يمكن . وأيضاً إن كان لا ينتهي إلى الزمان المحدود حتى ينتهي إلى زمن قبله ، ولا إلى الذي قبله حتى ينتهي إلى زمن قبله ، وكذلك بلا نهاية — وما لا نهاية له لا تقطع مسافته ، ولا يؤول على آخرها ، فإنه لا يقطع ما لا نهاية له من الزمان ، حتى

(١) هكذا في الأصل ، وأيضاً في رسالة وحدانية الله وتناهي جرم العالم ؛ فإن لم تكن كلمة « ذلك » ، « غير ذلك » فيجب أن تشير إلى الذي هو غير ذلك ، بحسب المعنى .

(٢) في الأصل : فصل ، كما في رسالة الوحدانية — والكلام كله غير مشكول . وقد صححتها ، لأن الأصل لا يعنى بالنحو . ويجوز أن نعتبر خلف فعلاً ، ويستقيم المعنى واللفظ أيضاً .

(٣) غير منقوطة في الأصل ، ويجوز أن تكون : تنتهي .

(٤) في الأصل : مصاعداً .

(٥) شكل اجتهادي ، يعنى : زمن معلوم .

(٦) في الأصل : معلوم .

(٧) في الأصل : إذا ؛ والكلمة التالية إما أن تكون اسماً لكان وإما أن تصحح : لا متناهيًا .

فإذن قد اتضح أنه لا يمكن أن يكون زمان لا نهاية له ، إذ لا يمكن أن يكون كمية أو ذو كمية لا نهاية له بالفعل ؛ فكل زمان فذو نهاية بالفعل .

والجزم لا يسبق الزمان ، فليس يمكن أن يكون جزم الكل لا نهاية له — لإنيته^(١) ؛ فإنيية جزم الكل متناهية اضطراراً ، فجزم الكل لا يمكن أن يكون لم يزل . ونبين ذلك بقول آخر ، بعد إذ اتضح بما قلنا ، يزيد الناظرين في هذه السبيل تمهراً بتولجها^(٢) ، فنقول :

إن من التبدل التركيب والائتلاف ، لأن ذلك جمع أشياء ونظمها . والجزم جوهر طويل عريض عميق ، أى ذو أبعاد ثلاثة ، فهو مركب من الجوهر الذى هو جنسه ومن الطويل العريض العميق الذى هو فصله ؛ وهو المركب من هيولى وصورة ؛

والتركيب تبدل الحالة التى هى لا تركيب ، والتركيب حركة ، فإن لم تكن الحركة لم يكن التركيب ؛

والجزم مركب ، فإن لم [يكن]^(٣) حركة لم يكن جزم^(٤) ؛

فالجزم والحركة لم يسبق بعضها بعضاً ؛

وبالحركة الزمان ، لأن الحركة تبدل ، والتبدل عدد مدة المتبدل ، فالحركة عادة مدة المتبدل ؛

والزمان مدة تعدها الحركة ؛ ولكل جزم مدة ، كما قدمنا ، أى ما هو فيه إنيية ، أعنى ما هو فيه هوما ؛

والجزم لا يسبق الحركة ، كما أوضحنا ، فالجزم لا يسبق مدة تعدها الحركة ، فالجزم والحركة والزمان لا يسبق بعضها بعضاً فى الإنيية ، فهى معاً فى الإنيية ؛ فإذا كان الزمان ذا نهاية بالفعل ، فإنيية الجزم ذات نهاية بالفعل اضطراراً ، إن

(١) هكذا فى الأصل .

(٢) كلمة لم أستطع قراءتها الا بعد العثور على استعمال الكندى لكلمة « التولج » فى رسالته فى دفع الأحران .

(٣) زدتها ، لإكمال المعنى .

(٤) فى الأصل : جزم ، وهو خطأ .

الفصل الثالث

من الجزء الأول

وقد يتلو ما قدّمنا ، البحثُ عن الشيء ، هل يمكن أن يكون علة كَوْن ذاته أم لا يمكن ذلك ؛ فنقول إنه ليس ممكناً^(١) أن يكون الشيءُ علة كَوْن ذاته ، أعني بكون^(٢) ذاته تهوُّيّه^(٣) من شيء أو لا من شيء — فإنه قد يقال : كَوْن ، في مواضع آخر ، للكائن من شيء خاصة — لأنه لا يخلو من أن يكون أيضاً وذاته ليس ، أو^(٤) يكون ليسا وذاته أيس ، أو يكون ليسا وذاته ليس أو يكون أيسا وذاته أيس ؛

فإن كان ليسا ، وذاته ليس ، فهو لا شيء وذاته لا شيء ؛ ولا شيء^(٥) لاعلة ولا معلول ؛ لأن العلة والمعلول إنما هما مقولان على شيء له وجود ما ؛ فهو إذن لاعلة كَوْن ذاته ، إذ ليس هو علة مطلقاً^(٦) ؛ وقد قيل إنه علة كَوْن ذاته — وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، فليس يمكن أن يكون علة كَوْن ذاته ، إن كان ليسا وذاته ليس .

وكذلك يعرض إن كان ليسا وذاته أيس ؛ لأنه أيضاً ، إذ هو ليس ، لا شيء ؛ ولا شيء لاعلة ولا معلول ، كما قدّمنا ؛ فهو لاعلة كَوْن ذاته ؛ وقد تقدم أنه علة كَوْن ذاته — وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، فليس يمكن أن يكون علة كَوْن ذاته ، إن كان ليسا وذاته أيس .

ويعرض من ذلك أيضاً أن يكون ذاته غيره ، لأن المتغيرات هي التي يمكن

(١) في الأصل : ممكن .

(٢) في الأصل غير منقوطة .

(٣) في الأصل مهبوبة — وهو غير مستقيم ، لأن التهوي ، عند الكندي ، هو صيرورة الشيء مهبوبة .

(٤) في الأصل : و .

(٥) معنى لا شيء هنا وقبل ذلك وبعده أنه معدوم .

(٦) في الأصل : مطلقة .

ينتهى إلى زمن محدود ، بته — والانهاء إلى زمن محدود موجود به ، فليس الزمان فصلا من لا نهاية ، بل من نهاية اضطراراً ؛ فليست مدة الجرم بلا نهاية .

وليس يمكن أن يكون جرمٌ بلا مدة ، فإنَّية الجرم ليست لانهاية لها ، فإنَّية الجرم متناهية ، فممتنع أن يكون جرمٌ لم يزل .

وليس يمكن أن يكون آتى الزمان لا نهاية له بالفعل ، لأنه إن كان الزمان للماضى إلى زمن محدود ممتنعاً أن يكون لا نهاية له ، كما قدمنا ، والأزمنة متتالية ، زمان بعد زمان — فإنه كلما زيد على الزمان المتناهى المحدود زمانٌ كانت جملة الزمان المحدود والمزيد عليه محدوداً — فإن لم تصر الجملة محدوده ، فقد زيد شيءٌ محدود الكمية على شيء محدود الكمية ، فاجتمع منهما شيء لا نهاية له فى الكمية ؛ والزمان من الكمية المتصلة ، أعنى أن له فصلا مشتركاً للماضى منه والآتى ؛ وفصله المشترك هو الآن الذى هو نهاية الزمان الماضى الأخيرة ونهاية الزمان الآتى الأولى ؛

ولكل زمان محدود نهايتان : نهاية أولى ونهاية آخرة^(١) ، فإن اتصل زمانان محدودان بنهاية واحدة مشتركة لهما ، فإن نهاية كل واحد منهما الباقية محدودة معلومة ؛ وقد كان قيل إنه تصير جملة الزمانين محدودة^(٢) فهى لا محدودة النهايات ؛ وهى محدودة النهايات ،

وهذا خلف لا يمكن ؛ فليس يمكن ، إن زيد^(٣) على الزمن المحدود زمانٌ محدود ، أن تكون الجملة لا محدودة ؛ فكلما^(٤) زيد على الزمن المحدود زمان محدود ، فكله محدود النهاية من آخره ؛ فليس يمكن أن يكون الزمان الآتى لا نهاية له بالفعل ؛

فلنكمل الآن هذا الفن الثانى .

(١) فى الأصل بلا شكل ولا تنقيط ، ويجوز أن تكون : أخيرة أو آخرة .

(٢) فى الأصل : المحدودة .

(٣) بعد هذه الكلمة فى الأصل : ما زيد ؛ وهى زائدة بلا شك .

(٤) فى الأصل : فكل ما .

والفلسفة عالمة بالأشياء التي لها علمها بحقائقها ؛ فهي إذن إنما تطلب الأشياء الكلية المتناهية ، المحيط بها العلم كمال^(١) . علم حقائقها ؛
والأشياء الكلية العامة^(٢) لا تخلو من أن تكون ذاتية أو غير ذاتية ؛
أعني بالذاتي ما هو مُقَدِّم ذات الشيء ، وهو الذي بوجوده قوام كون
الشيء وثباته وبعده انتقاض الشيء وفساده ، كالحياة التي بها قوام الحي وثباته ،
وبعدمها فساد الحي وانتقاضه ؛

فالحياة ذاتية في الحي ، والذاتي هو المسمى جوهرية ، لأن به قوام جوهر الشيء ؛
والجوهرى لا يخلو من أن يكون جامعا أو مفرقا ؛

أما الجامع فالواقع على أشياء كثيرة يعطى كل واحد منها حده واسمه ، فهو
يجمعها بذلك ؛

والواقع على أشياء كثيرة بأن يعطى كل واحد منها اسمه^(٣) وحده :
إما أن يقع على أشخاص كالإنسان الواقع على كل واحد من أوحاد الناس ،
أعني على كل شخص إنسانى ؛ وهذا هو المسمى صورة ، إذ هي صورة واحدة واقعة
على كل واحد من هذه الأشخاص ؛
وإما أن يقع على صور^(٤) كثيرة كالحي الواقع على كل صورة من صور
الحي ، كالإنسان والفرس ، وهذا هو المسمى جنسا ، إذ هو بجنس واحد^(٥) واقع
كل واحد من هذه الصور ..

وأما الجوهرى المفرق ، فهو الفارق بين حدود الأشياء ، كالناطق الفاصل
لبعض الحي من بعض ؛ وهذا هو المسمى فصلا ، لفصله بعض الأشياء من بعض .
وأما الذى ليس بذاتي فهو ضد هذا المتقدم وصفه ، وهو الذى قوامه بالشيء

(١) قراءة اجتهدية .

(٢) مكنا في الأصل .

(٣) غير واضحة تماما في الأصل .

(٤) في الأصل : صورة ؛ وهو خطأ في النسخ .

(٥) هكذا في الأصل ، ولعله يقصد : من جهة واحدة أو على نحو واحد .

أن يعرض لأحدها^(١) مالا يعرض للأخر ؛ فإذا عرض له أن يكون ليسا وعرض لذاته أن يكون أيسا ، فذاته هي لاهو ؛

وكل شيء فذاته هي هو ؛ فهو لاهو ، وهو هو ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن أيضا . وكذلك يعرض إن كان أيسا وذاته ليس ، أعنى أن تكون ذاته غيره ، إذ عَرَضَ له غيرُ ما عَرَضَ لذاته ؛ فيجب من ذلك ، كما قدمنا ، أن يكون هو هو ، وهو [لا] هو^(٢) ؛ هذا خلف لا يمكن أيضا ، فليس إذن يمكن أن يكون أيسا ، وذاته ليس .

وكذلك أيضا يعرض إن كان أيسا ، وذاته أيسس ، وكان علة كون ذاته ؛ لأنه إن كان علة ذاته المكوّنة لها ، فذاته معلولته ؛ والعلة غير المعلول ، فقد عرض له إذن أن يكون علة ذاته ، وعرض لذاته أن تكون معلولته ؛ فذاته هي لا هو ، وكل شيء فذاته هي هو ؛ فيجب إذن من هذا الفن أن يكون هو لا هو ، وهو هو — وهذا خلف لا يمكن ؛ فليس يمكن أن يكون أيسا ، وذاته أيسس ، وهو علة كون ذاته .

ومثل هذا أيضا يعرض ، إن كان ليسا ، وذاته ليس ، وهو علة ذاته ، وذاته معلولة أيضا : أن يكون هو هو ، وهو لا هو ؛ فليس يمكن إذن أن يكون شيء علة كون ذاته ، وذلك ما أردنا أن نوضح .

* * *

وإذ قد تبين ذلك فنقول إن كل لفظ فلا يخلو من أن يكون ذا معنى أو غير ذي معنى ؛ فما لا معنى له فلا مطلوب فيه ؛ والفلسفة إنما تعتمد ما كان فيه مطلوب — فليس من شأن الفلسفة استعمال مالا مطلوب فيه .

وما كان له معنى لا يخلو^(٣) من أن يكون كليّا أو جزئيا ؛ والفلسفة لا تطلب الأشياء الجزئية ، لأن الجزئيات ليست^(٤) بمتناهية ، ومالم يكن متناهيا لم يحيط به علم ؛

(١) في الأصل : لاحدها .

(٢) في الأصل : وهو هو ، وهذا لا يتفق مع المعنى .

(٣) في الأصل : يخلوا .

(٤) في الأصل : ليس .

وإما صناعيا كالييت وما أشبه ذلك ، فإن البيت متصل بالطبع ، وتركيبه متصل بعرض ، أعنى بالمهنة^(١) ؛ فهو واحد بالطبع ، وتركيبه واحد بالمهنة ؛ لأنه إنما صار واحداً بالاتحاد^(٢) العرضي ، فأما البيت عينه فبالاتحاد الطبيعي .
ويقال^(٣) أيضا على الكل ويقال على الجزء ، ويقال على الجميع ويقال على البعض ؛

وقد يظن أن الكل لا فصل بينه وبين الجميع^(٤) ،
لأن الكل يُقال على المشتبه^(٥) الأجزاء وعلى [الأشياء]^(٦) اللاتي ليست بمشتبهة الأجزاء ، كقولنا : كل الماء — والماء من المشتبهة الأجزاء — وكل البدن ، المركب من عظم ولحم ، وما لحق ذلك من المختلفة الأجزاء ، وكل الجليل ، وهي أشخاص مختلفة ؛

فأما الجميع فلا يُقال على المشتبهة الأجزاء ؛ فلا يقال : جميع الماء ؛ لأن الجميع أيضا يقال على جمع مختلفات بعرض ، أو أن تكون موحدة^(٧) بمعنى ما ، وكل واحد منها قائم بطباعه غير الآخر ، فيقع عليها اسم المجموعة ؛ فأما الكل فيقال على كل متحد بأي نوع كان الاتحاد ، فلذلك لا يقال : جميع الماء ، إذ ليس هو أشياء مختلفة قائم كل واحد بطباعه^(٨) ، بل يقال كل الماء ؛ إذ هو متحد .
وكذلك بين الجزء والبعض فرق^(٩) ؛

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- (١) هكذا في الأصل ، ولعله يقصد فعل الباني له .
(٢) هذه الكلمة والتي بعدها غير منقوطة ، ولكن اخترت قراءتها هكذا بحسب العبارات التالية .
(٣) الضمير يعود هنا على الواحد .
(٤) راجع تعريف الكل والجميع في رسالة في حدود الأشياء ورسومها ؛ وهو يطابق ما هنا ، في تعريف الكل .
(٥) هكذا في الأصل .
(٦) زيادة للايضاح .
(٧) هكذا في الأصل ، وقد يجوز أن تكون : موحدة ، وهذا يلتئم مع المعنى أيضا . من وجه .
(٨) في الأصل : قائم على كل واحد بطباعها ؛ وقد أصلحته طبقاً لما قبله بقليل .
(٩) راجع تعريف الجزء والبعض في رسالة في حدود الأشياء ورسومها .

الموضوع له ، وثباته به ، وعدمه بعدم الشيء الموضوع له ؛ فهو إذن في الجوهر الموضوع [له] ^(١) ، وليس بجوهري ، بل عارض ^(٢) الجوهر ، فسمى لذلك عرضا ؛ وهو الذي في الجوهر لا يخلو من :

أن يكون في شيء واحد منفرداً به خاصا له دون غيره ، كالضحك في الإنسان والنهيق في الحمار ، فيسمى لذلك خاصة ، لأنه يخص شيئا واحدا ؛ أو يكون في أشياء كثيرة يعمها كالبياض في الورق والقطن ، فسمى لذلك عرضا عاما على حاله ، لأنه يعرض ^(٣) لأشياء كثيرة .

فكل ملفوظ له معنى :

إما أن يكون جنسا وإما صورة وإما شخصا وإما فصلا وإما خاصة وإما عارضا عاما —

وهذه جميعا يجمعها شيئان : هما الجوهر والعرض — فالجنس والصورة والشخص والفصل جوهرية ؛ والخاصة والعرض العام عرضية . وإما كُلاً وإما جزءاً ، وإما مجتمعا وإما مفترقا .

وإذ قد تقدم ذلك فلنقل على كم نوع يُقال الواحد ؛ فنقول : إن الواحد يُقال على كل متصل ، وعلى ما لم يقبل الكثرة أيضا ؛ فهو يُقال إذن ^(٤) على أنواع شتى ، منها الجنس والصورة والشخص والفصل والخاصة والعرض العام ؛ وعلى جميع ما قد قدم .

والشخص إما أن يكون :

طبيعيا كالحيوان أو النبات ^(٥) وما أشبه ذلك ،

(١) زيادة بحسب النص المتقدم مباشرة .

(٢) غير مشكولة في الأصل ؛ فإذا لم تكن فعلا ، فلعله قد سقطت كلمة : في ، بعد كلمة عارض ، بحيث يكون النص : وليس بجوهري ، بل عارض [في] الجوهر ، فسمى لذلك عرضا ... الخ

(٣) في الأصل : لا يعرض ، وهو يخالف المعنى .

(٤) في الأصل : إذا .

(٥) غير منقوطة ، وقد اخترت قراءتها هكذا

كنوع الانسان الذى هو مركب من حى ومن ناطق ومن ميت؛ فالنوع بالذات كثير من جهة أشخاصه ومن جهة تركيبه ، والوحدة التى له إنما هى بالوضع من جهة لا ذاتية ؛ فليست الوحدة له إذن^(١) بحقيقة^(٢) ؛ فهى إذن فيه بنوع عرضى ، والعارض للشئ من غيره ، فالعرض أثر فى المعروض فيه ، والأثر من المضاف ، فالأثر من مؤثر ، فالوحدة فى النوع أثر من مؤثر اضطراراً ، أيضاً .

والجنس هو المقول على كثيرين مختلفين بالنوع المنبئ^(٣) عن مائية الشئ ؛ فهو كثير ، لأنه ذو أنواع كثيرة ؛ وكل نوع من أنواعه فهو « هو هو »^(٤) ، وكل نوع من أنواعه فهو أشخاص كثيرة ، وكل شخص من أشخاصه « فهو هو » أيضاً ، فهو كثير من هذه الجهة ؛ فالوحدة فيه أيضاً ليست بحقيقة ، فهى فيه إذن بنوع عرضى ، والعارض للشئ من غيره ، فالعرض أثر فى المعروض فيه ، والأثر من المضاف ، فالأثر من مؤثر ؛ فالوحدة فى الجنس أثر من مؤثر اضطراراً أيضاً .

والفصل هو المقول على كثير ، مختلفين بالنوع ، منبئ^(٥) عن أيّية^(٦) الشئ ؛ فهو مقول على كل واحد من أشخاص الأنواع التى يقال عليها الفصل ، منبئ^(٧) عن أيّيتها^(٧) ؛ فهو كثير من جهة الأنواع والأشخاص التى تقال عليها تلك الأنواع ، فالوحدة فيه أيضاً ليست بحقيقة ، فهى فيه إذن بنوع عرضى ؛ والعارض

(١) فى الأصل : إذا .

(٢) هكذا فى الأصل ، ويجوز أن تكون تحريفاً عن : بحقيقة .

(٣) فى الأصل ، منبئ ، وقد صححتها هكذا ، ويجوز أن يكون أصلها منبئاً (على أن تكون حالا) ، ولكنها لم يُراع فيها النحو ، كما هو فى كثير من المواضع .

(٤) هكذا فى الأصل ، ولعله يقصد : فهو « هو هو » ، أى فهو هوية ، يعنى شيئاً قائماً بذاته .

(٥) هكذا فى الأصل ، وهو جائز .

(٦) هكذا فى الأصل ، دون علامات التشديد ، فلهذا يقصد ، أى شئ هو ، تحت الجنس ، كما فى أول الرسالة حيث يقول المؤلف إن « أى » تبحث عن الفصل ، و « ما » عن الجنس بحيث تكون « أى » و « ما » مما ينبئ عن النوع . وقد كنت ميالاً إلى قراءة هذه الكلمة والكلمة الأخرى بعد قليل على أنها إنية ، ثم عدلت لما ذكرته .

(٧) ليس على هذه الكلمة إلا نقطتان فوق التاء ، وقد قرأتها هكذا (أنظر الهامش المتقدم ، ويجوز أيضاً أن تكون : إنيتها ، ولهذا وجه .

لأن الجزء يُقال على ما عُدَّ^(١) الكلّ ، فقسّمه بأقدارٍ متساوية ؛
 والبعض يُقال على ما لم يُعُدَّ الكلّ ، فقسّمه بأقدار ليست بمتساوية ؛
 فبعضه ، ولم يُساو بين أبعاضه — فيكون جزءاً له .
 فالواحد إذن^(٢) يُقال على كل واحد من المقولات والكائن من المقولات بأنه
 جنس ، وبأنه نوع ، وبأنه شخص ، وبأنه فصل ، وبأنه خاصة ، وبأنه عرض
 عام وبأنه كلٌّ وبأنه جزء ، وبأنه جميع ، وبأنه بعض .
 ولأن^(٣) الجنس هو في كل واحد من أنواعه ، إذ هو مقول على كل واحد
 من أنواعه قولاً متواطئاً ؛

والنوع هو في كل واحد من أشخاصه ، إذ هو مقول على كل واحد من
 أشخاصه قولاً متواطئاً ؛

والشخص إنما هو واحد من جهة الوضع^(٤) ، لأن كل شخص فنقسم ؛ فهو
 إذن [ليس واحداً]^(٥) بالذات ، فالوحدة الشخصية مفارقة للشخص ، فهو غير
 واحد الذات ، فالوحدة التي فيه — التي هي بالوضع — لا ذاتية فيه ، فليست
 إذن وحدة له بالحقيقة ،

وما لم يكن في الشيء لحقيقته^(٦) ذاتياً ، فهو فيه بنوع عرضي ؛ والعارض للشيء
 من غيره ؛ فالعارض أثر في المعروض فيه ، والأثر من المضاف ، والأثر من مؤثر ،
 فالوحدة في الشخص أثر من مؤثر اضطراراً .

والنوع هو المقول على كثير مختلفين بالأشخاص ؛ وهو كثير ، لأنه ذو
 أشخاص كثيرة ، ولأنه مركب من أشياء أيضاً ؛ لأنه مركب من جنس وفصل ،

(١) في الأصل : عدا .

(٢) في الأصل : إذا .

(٣) جواب لأن فيما بعد .

(٤) يعني بالوضع والتسمية لا بالطبع والحقيقة .

(٥) زدتها لأجل المعنى ، وإلا فربما كانت جملة : « فهو إذن بالذات » زائدة . ولا بد

من إصلاحها لأنها تنافي كل ما يلي .

(٦) يمكن أن تقرأ : بحقيقته . ويجوز أنها : بحقيقة ، وما بعدها بيان لها لغوياً ومنطقياً .

كثير، فالوحدة فيه أيضا ليست بحقيقية؛ فهي فيه بنوع عرضي؛ فهي إذن^(١) فيه أثر من مؤثر، كما قدمنا.

والجزء إما أن يكون جوهرياً، وإما عرضياً؛
والجوهري إما مشتبه الأجزاء وإما لا مشتبه الأجزاء؛
والمشتبه الأجزاء كالماء، الذي جزؤه ماء تكماله، وكل ماء فهو قابل للتجزئة،
فجزء الماء، إذ هو ماء بكماله، كثير؛

وأما لا مشتبه الأجزاء، أعني مختلف الأجزاء فكبدن الحيوان الذي هو
من لحم، وجلد، وعصب، وعروق، وأوردة، وربط^(٢) وشفاق^(٣)، وحجب
وعظم، ومخ، ودم، ومرة، وبلغم، وجميع ما ركب منه بدن الحي، والتي ليست
بمشتبهة؛ وكل واحد مما ذكرنا من بدن الحي فقابل للتجزئة، فهو كثير أيضا.

وأما الجزء العرضي فمحمول في الجزء الجوهري، أعني كالطول والعرض والعمق
في اللحم والعظم وغير ذلك من أجزاء البدن الحي، واللون والطعم وغير ذلك من
الأعراض، فهو منقسم بانقسام الجوهري؛ فهو إذن ذو أجزاء، فهو كثير أيضا،
فالوحدة في الجزء أيضا ليست بحقيقية.

والمتصل الطبيعي والمتصل العرضي كل واحد منهما ذو أجزاء — كالييت، فإن
اتصاله الطبيعي شكله، وهو ذو جهات؛ واتصاله العرضي — أعني الصناعي —
باجتماع ما ركب منه كحجارته وملاطه وأجزاء جرمه؛ فهو كثير أيضا، فالوحدة
فيه ليست بحقيقية.

وقد يقال الواحد أيضا بالإضافة إلى غيره ببعض هذه التي قدمنا ذكرها،
كالليل، فإنه يقال: ميل واحد، إذ هو كل للغلوات^(٤)، وجزء للفرسخ، ولأنه
متصل ومجتمع، لأن غلواته متصلة ومجموعة؛ فهو جميع لغلواته، ولأنه منفصل من

(١) في الأصل: إذا

(٢) جمع رباط، ويظهر أن المؤلف يقصد الأعصاب التي تربط أجزاء البدن

(٣) الشفاق هو الجلد الذي تحت الجلد، أو هو ما بين الجلد والصران.

(٤) جمع غلوة، وهي مقياس للمسافات، يختلف في تقديره.

للشيء من غيره ، فالعرض أثر في المعروض فيه ، والأثر من المضاف ، فالأثر من مؤثر ، ، فالوحدة في الفصل أثر من مؤثر أيضا .

والخاصة هي المقولة على نوع واحد وعلى كل واحد من أشخاصه ، منبثقة عن إنية^(١) الشيء ، وليس بجزء لما أنبأت^(٢) عن إنيته^(٣) ، فهي كثير لأنها موجودة في أشخاص كثيرة ، ولأنها حركة والحركة متجزئة ؛ فالوحدة أيضا فيها ليست بحقيقية ؛ فهي إذن^(٤) بنوع عرضي ؛ والعارض للشيء من غيره ، فالعرض أثر في المعروض فيه ، والأثر من المضاف ، فالأثر من مؤثر ، فالوحدة في الخاصة أثر من مؤثر أيضا ؛

والعرض العام أيضا مقول على أشخاص كثيرة ؛ فهو كثير ، لأنه موجود في أشخاص كثيرة ؛ وإما أن يكون كمية ، فيقبل الزيادة والنقص ، فهو متجزئ ؛ وإما أن يكون كيفية ، فيقبل الشبيه ولا شبيهه ، والأشد والأضعف ، فيقبل الاختلاف ؛ فهو كثير ، فالوحدة فيه أيضا ليست بحقيقية ؛ فهي إذن فيه بنوع عرضي ؛ والعارض ، كما قدمنا ، أثر من مؤثر ؛ فالوحدة في العرض العام أثر من مؤثر أيضا .

والكل المقبول على المقولات ذو أبعاد ، لأن كل واحد من المقولات بعض له ؛ والكل المقول على مقولة واحدة ذو أبعاد أيضا ، لأن كل مقولة جنس ؛ فكل مقولة ذات صور ، وكل صورة ذات أشخاص ، فالكل إذن كثير ، لأنه ذو أقسام كثيرة ؛ فالوحدة فيه أيضا ليست بحقيقية ،^(٥) فهي إذن فيه بنوع عرضي ؛ فهي إذن من مؤثر ، كما قدمنا ، فيما^(٦) كان بنوع عرضي .

وكذلك الجميع أيضا ، لأن الجميع يُقال على أشياء كثيرة مجتمعة ؛ فهو

(١) ، (٣) هاتان الكلمتان على الأولى نقطة النون وعلى الثانية قط النون والياء ، ولذلك تركتهما هكذا ، ولهما وجه من حيث المعنى ، وإن كان تفكير الكندي غير دقيق بحسب ما تقدم

(٢) في الأصل : أنبت .

(٤) في الأصل : اذا .

(٥) في الأصل : بحقيقة .

(٦) في الأصل : في ما

أو بعضها^(١) كثيراً لا واحداً بتّة .

فإن كان طباعُ كل مقول الكثرة فقط ، فلا اتفاق اشتراكٍ في حال واحدةٍ
أو معنى واحد ؛

والاتفاق موجود ، أعني الاشتراك في حال واحدة أو معنى واحد ؛

فالوحدة موجودة مع الكثرة ؛

وقد فرضنا أن الوحدة ليست بموجودة ؛

فالوحدة أئس لئس ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن .

وأيضاً إن كان كلُّ مقول كثرَةً فقط ، فلا شيء يخالف الكثرة ، لأن
خلاف الكثرة الوحدة ؛ فلا خلاف ؛ فإن لم يكن خلافٌ في المقولات فهي
متَّفقة وهي لا متَّفقة ، لأن الاتفاق اشتراك في حال واحدة أو معنى واحد ؛ وهذا
خلف لا يمكن ، فليس يمكن إلا أن تكون الوحدة .

وأيضاً إن كانت كثرَةً فقط بلا وحدة ، فهي لا متشابهة ، لأن المتشابهة لها
شيء واحد يعمُّها ، تشابهٌ به ؛ ولا واحد مع الكثرة ، كما فرضنا ؛ فلا واحد
يعمُّها ، فهي لا متشابهة وهي متشابهة بعدَمها الوحدة ، فهي متشابهة لا متشابهة
معاً ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، فليس يمكن إلا أن تكون وحدة .

وأيضاً إن كانت كثرَةً فقط بلا وحدة ، كانت متحركة ؛ لأنه إن لم تكن
وحدة ، لم تكن حالٌ واحدة ؛ وإن لم تكن حالٌ واحدة ، لم يكن ساكن ؛
لأن الساكن ما كان بحال واحدة ، غير متغير ولا منتقل ؛ وإن لم يكن ساكن ،
لم يكن ساكن ؛ وإن لم يكن ساكن كان متحركاً^(٢) .

وإن كانت كثرَةً فقط ، كانت أيضاً غير متحركة ، لأن الحركة تبدُّلٌ :
إما بمكان ، وإما بكمٍّ ، وإما بكيفٍ ، وإما بجوهر ؛ وكل تبدُّلٍ فإلى غير ؛

(١) في الأصل : وبعضها

(٢) في الأصل : متحركاً

أميال آخر ، أعني اللاتي جميعها فرسخ ؛ فليست الوحدة في ذلك أيضا بحقيقة ، بل [هى] عرض .

فليست الوحدة في شيء مما حددنا بحقيقة ، بل إنما هى في كل واحد منها بأنها لا تنقسم من حيث وجدت ، فالوحدة فيها بنوع عرضي ، والعارض للشيء لا من ذاته ، فالعارض للشيء من غيره ، فالعارض إذن ^(١) في المعروض فيه مستفاد من غيره ، فهو مستفاد من مفيد ، فهو أثر في المعروض فيه ، والأثر من مؤثر ، لأن الأثر والمؤثر من المضاف الذي لا يسبق بعضه بعضا ؛

وأیضا كل شيء كان في شيء آخر عرضا ، فهو في شيء آخر ذاتي ؛ لأن كل شيء كان في شيء بعرض ، فهو في شيء آخر بالذات ؛

وإذ قد بينا أن الوحدة في هذه جميعا بعرض ^(٢) ، فهي لا جزء [لا] بالذات ، بل بعرض ^(٣) ؛ فالوحدة فيما هى فيه بعرض ^(٤) مستفادة الوحدة له مما هى فيه بالذات ؛

فإذن ^(٥) ها هنا واحد حق اضطراراً لا معلول الوحدة ؛ فلنبين ذلك بأكثر مما تقدم ، فنقول :

لا نخلو طباع كل بقول فيما عليه القول ، أعني كل ما أدركه الحس وأحاط بمائتته العقل من أن يكون :

واحداً أو كثيراً ،

أو واحداً وكثيراً معاً ،

أو بعض هذه الأشياء واحداً لا كثيراً ^(٦) بته ،

(١) في الأصل : اذا

(٢) و (٣) و (٤) الكلمة غير منقوطة ، ويمكن أن تقرأ على وجه آخر ، أعني على أن تكون فعلا ، والمعنى يستقيم بهذا أيضا ومعنى بعرض هو أن الوحدة ليست بالذات .

(٣) في الأصل : فهي لا جزء بالذات لا بعرض ؛ والمعنى غير مفهوم ، لذلك أصلحتها ، وأقصد من ذلك أن يكون المعنى المراد : فهي (يعني الأشياء) لا جزء (يعني واحدة) [لا] بذاتها بل بأمر آخر عرض لها ، هو فعل المؤثر ، وهذا يتفق مع الفكرة الأساسية لما تقدم .

(٥) في الأصل : ١٠

(٦) في الأصل : كثير

وأيضاً إن كانت كثرةً فقط بلا وحدة ؛ فإن كل شخص من أشخاص
الكثرة غير محدود ؛ لأن الحدث واحد يقع على معنى واحد ؛ فإن لم يكن في الكثرة
واحد فلا^(١) محدود ؛ وإذا لم يكن محدود فلا حد ؛ وأشخاص الكثرة محدودة ؛
فهى محدودة ، وهى لا محدودة ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، فليس يمكن أن لا تكون
وحدة .

وأيضاً إن كانت كثرةً فقط بلا وحدة ، لم تقبل الكثرة العدد ؛ لأن أوائل
العدد الآحاد ، لأن العدد كثرة مركبة من آحاد^(٢) ، وتفاضل بعض الكثرة
على بعض بآحاد ؛

فإن لم يكن آحاد لم يكن عدد ؛ وإن كانت كثرة بلا آحاد ، لم تكن
معدودة ؛

والكثرة معدودة ، فالآحاد مع الكثرة ؛
وقد كنا فرضنا أنه لا آحاد معها ؛ فهذا خلف لا يمكن ؛ فليس يمكن أن
لا تكون آحاداً^(٣) .

وأيضاً إن كانت كثرةً فقط بلا واحد لم تكن معرفة ؛ لأن المعرفة برسم ،
رسم^(٤) المعروف في نفس العارف بحال واحدة ، لأنها إن لم تكن بحال واحدة
تتحد بها نفس العارف ورسم المعروف ، فلا معرفة ؛ والمعرفة موجودة ، فالحال
الواحدة موجودة ، فالوحدة موجودة ؛ وقد كنا فرضنا أنها لا موجودة ؛ وهذا
خلف لا يمكن ، فليس يمكن لا تكون وحدة .

وأيضاً إن كانت كثرةً فقط بلا واحد ، فكل مقول إما أن يكون شيئاً ،
وإما أن لا يكون شيئاً ؛ فإن كان شيئاً ، فهو واحد ؛ فالوحدة موجودة مع
الكثرة ؛ وقد كنا فرضنا أنه كثرة فقط ، فهو كثرة فقط بلا وحدة ، وهو كثرة
ووحدة ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ؛

(١) في الأصل : ولا (٢) في الأصل ١١ حاد

(٣) مكنا في الأصل — ولهذا وجه . ولكن الأفضل أن نصححها آحاد .

(٤) الكلمتان غير منقوطين ، ويمكن القراءة على وجه آخر ، وقد يجوز أن تكون الكلمة
الأولى زائدة

وغير الكثرة فالوحدة ؛ فإن لم يكن وحدةً ، فلا تبدل للكثرة ؛ وقد فرضنا أن وحدةً ليس^(١) ، فتبدل كثرةً ليس^(٢) ، فحركةً ليس^(٣) ؛ فإن كانت كثرةً فقط بلا وحدة ، فليست بمتحركة أيضاً ولا ساكنة ، كما قد تقدم ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، فليس يمكن إلا أن تكون وحدةً .

وأيضاً إن كانت كثرةً فقط ، فلا يخلو من أن تكون ذات أشخاص ، أو لا ذات أشخاص بثةً ؛

فإن كانت ذات أشخاص ، فإما أن تكون أشخاص الكثرة إما آحاداً وإما أن لا تكون آحاداً ؛ فإن لم تكن آحاداً ، ولم تنتقص إلى آحادٍ بثةً ، فهي كثرة بلا نهاية ؛

وإذا فصل مما لا يتناهى قسمٌ ، وكل مقسوم أعظم مما يفصل منه ، فالفصول متناهى الكثرة أو لامتناهى الكثرة ؛

فإن كان متناهى الكثرة ، وقد كان فرض لامتناهى الكثرة ، فهو إذن متناهى الكثرة لامتناهى الكثرة ؛

وهذا خلف لا يمكن ؛

وإن كان لامتناهى الكثرة ، وهو أصغر من المقسوم ، فلا متناهٍ أعظم من لامتناهى ؛

وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، كما قدمنا ؛

فهى إذن^(٤) أشخاص الكثرة ، آحاد^(٥) اضطراراً ؛ فالوحدة موجودة إذن^(٦) ، لأن كل شخص واحد ، فهى إذن^(٧) كثرة فقط ، وهى لا كثرة فقط ، لأن الوحدة معها موجودة ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، فإن كانت ليست ذات أشخاص ولا كثرة بثةً ، لأن معنى الكثرة هى الأشخاص المجتمعة ، فهو لا كثرة وهو كثرة معاً ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، فليس يمكن إلا أن يكون وحدةً .

(١) و (٢) و (٣) ليس أى معدوم أو غير موجود

(٤) فى الأصل : اذا

(٥) فى الأصل آحادا

(٦) و (٧) فى الأصل اذا

فإن كان استثناءً فالكثرة موجودة ، والاستثناء والمستثنى موجودان ،
فالكثرة موجودة ؛

وقد فرضنا أنها ليس ، فهي ^(١) أيس ليس ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، فليس يمكن
أن لا تكون كثرة .

وأيضاً إن كانت وحدةً فقط بلا كثرة ، فلا تباين ؛ لأن أقل ما فيه التباين اثنان ؛
والاثنان وما فوقهما كثرة ؛

فإن لم تكن كثرةً ، لم يكن تباين ؛ وإن كان تباين ، فالكثرة موجودة ؛
والتباين موجود ، فالكثرة موجودة ^(٢) .

وأيضاً قد فرضنا أنها ليست موجودة ، فهي أيس ليس ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ،
فليس يمكن أن لا تكون كثرة .

وأيضاً إن كانت وحدةً فقط بلا كثرة فلا اتفاق ولا اختلاف ، ولا اتصال
ولا افتراق ؛ لأن أقل ما يكون الاتفاق والافتراق والاختلاف والاتصال ^(٣) ،
في اثنين . فالاثنان كثرة ، فإن لم تكن كثرة لم يكن اتفاق ^(٤) ولا اختلاف
ولا اتفاق ^(٥) ؛

والاتفاق والاختلاف موجودان .

فالكثرة موجودة ؛ وقد كنّا فرضنا أنها لا موجودة ، فهي أيس ليس ؛
وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، [فليس يمكن] ^(٦) أن لا تكون كثرة .

وأيضاً إن كانت وحدةً فقط بلا كثرة ، فلا ابتداء ولا توسط ^(٧) ولا آخر
له ، لأن ذلك لا يكون إلا في ذى أجزاء ^(٨) ؛

(١) في الأصل : وهي

(٢) هذه الكلمة في الأصل مكررة

(٣) في الأصل على هذا الترتيب ، ولم أعَيِّره

(٤) في الأصل : اتفاقا

(٥) كلمة : ولا اتفاق ، زائدة ، في الغالب

(٦) زيادة يتطلبها المعنى (٧) هكذا ، وهو مفهوم

(٨) في الأصل : احرا

وإن لم يكن شيئا فليس يأتلف منه كثرة ؛ ولا هو كثرة أيضا ؛ وقد فرض أنه كثرة ؛

فهو كثرة لا كثرة ؛ هذا خلف لا يمكن ، فليس يمكن أن لا يكون وحدة .
وهناك يتبين ^(١) أنه لا يمكن أن يكون بعض الأشياء كثرة فقط ؛ لأنه لا يمكن أن يكون شيء كثرة فقط ، لأنه إما أن يكون شيئا ، وإما أن لا يكون شيئا ؛
فإن كان شيئا فهو واحد ؛

وإن لم يكن شيئا ، فليس هو كثرة ؛
[فهو ليس كثرة] ^(٢) وهو كثرة ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، فليس يمكن أن يكون بعض الأشياء كثرة فقط بلا وحدة .

وقد تبين من جميع هذه الأبحاث أنه لا يمكن أن تكون الأشياء كثرة بلا وحدة ، لأنه لا يمكن أن يكون بعض الأشياء كثرة بلا وحدة ؛
وكذلك تبين أنه لا يمكن أن يكون وحدة بلا كثرة ، ولا بعض الأشياء وحدة بلا كثرة ؛

فنقول إنه إن كانت وحدة فقط بلا كثرة ، لم تكن مضادة ؛ لأن الضدَّ
غيره الضدُّ ؛ والغيرية أقل ما تقع في الاثنين ^(٣) . والاثنان كثرة ؛ فإن لم تكن
كثرة لم تكن مضادة ، وإن كانت مضادة كانت كثرة ؛

والمضادة موجودة ، فالكثرة موجودة ؛ وقد فرضنا أنها ليست بموجودة ،
فهى أينس لئس ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، فليس يمكن أن لا تكون كثرة .

وأیضا إن كانت وحدة فقط بلا كثرة ، فلا استثناء ؛ لأن الاستثناء إنما
يكون لواحد أو لأكثر من واحد دون أشياء غير المستثناة ^(٤) ؛

(١) في الأصل : تبين ،

(٢) بدالى أن هذه الزيادة ضرورية لسير الاستدلال ، وقوله : وإن لم يكن شيئا فليس بكثرة ، يشتمل على واحدة من النتيجةين لكونه ليس شيئا . وعلى كل حال فهذا الاصلاح احتجادهى .

(٣) يعنى أن الاثنين أقل ما لا بد منه للغيرية .

(٤) في الأصل : المستثناة

والربوبُ يوجب رايا ، والنقص يوجب ناقصا ، والاستحالة توجب مستحيلا ،
والكون يوجب كائنا ، والفساد يوجب فاسداً ؛
ونفى هذه جميعها يوجب كثرة ، لأن لا كائن لا فاسدٌ لا راب^(١) لا مضمحلٌ
لا مستحيلٌ ، موضوعٌ ومحمولٌ : موضوع محمول عليه النفي لأشياء محدودة^(٢) ؛
فإن كان السكون كانت كثرة ، فإن لم يكن كثرة لم يكن سكون ولا حركة ؛
والسكون والحركة موجودان ، فالكثرة موجودة ؛
وقد كنا فرضنا أنها لا موجودة ، فهي أينس كينس ؛ هذا خلف لا يمكن ،
فليس يمكن أن لا تكون كثرة .

وهناك يتبين^(٣) أنه لا يمكن أن يكون ولا واحد من الأشياء ليس فيه كثرة ؛
لأنه إن لم تكن فيه كثرة ، لم يكن متحركا ولا ساكنا ؛ وليس يخلو شيء من نوع
حركة وسكون من المحسوسة وما يلحق المحسوسة ، فليس يمكن أن يكون شيء
واحد لا كثرة فيه .

وأیضا إن كانت وحدة فقط بلا كثرة لم يكن جزء^(٤) ولا كل ؛ لأن
الكل جامع الأجزاء ، وأقل ما يكون المجتمع اثنان ، والاثنان كثرة ؛ فإن لم تكن
كثرة لم يكن كل ، وإن لم يكن كل لم يكن جزء ، لأن الكل والجزء من
المضاف الذي يجب كل واحد من طرفيه بوجوب الآخر وأيهما^(٥) بطل ، بطل
بيطلانه الآخر ؛

فلا كل ولا جزء إذن^(٦) للأشياء ؛ والأشياء كلٌ وجزءٌ ، فالكل والجزء
أينس كينس ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن .

(١) في الأصل : رابى (٢) هكذا النص

(٣) في الأصل : تبين

(٤) في الأصل : جزءا

(٥) في الأصل : أو أيهما ، ، وهو جائز

(٦) في الأصل : اذا

والواحد لا ابتداء ولا وسط ولا آخر له ؛
والابتداء والوسط والآخر موجود ، فذو الأجزاء موجود ، وكل ذى أجزاء
كثير من واحد ؛ فالكثرة موجودة فيه ؛
وقد كنا فرضنا أنها لا موجودة ، وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، فليس يمكن أن
لا تكون كثرة .

وأیضا إن كانت وحدة فقط بلا كثرة فلا^(١) شكل ، لأن الأشكال إما من
قسيّ وإما من أوتار ، وإما من مركبة من قسيّ وأوتار ، أو من سطوح قوسية
أو وترية ، أو مركبة منهما ؛
فالمستدير والكروي لهما مركز وإحاطة ؛ والمركب من قسيّ أو قوسية ، أو
خط أو خطية ، أو من قسيّ أو قوسى ، أو وتر أو وترى معا ، لها^(٢) زوايا وأطراف ،
ففيها كثرة ؛

فإن كانت الأشكال موجودة ، فالكثرة موجودة ؛ والشكل موجود ،
فالكثرة موجودة ؛
وقد كنا فرضنا أنها لا موجودة ، فالكثرة أيسر ليس ، وهذا خلف لا يمكن ،
فليس يمكن أن لا تكون كثرة .

وأیضا إن كانت وحدة فقط بلا كثرة ، فهي لا متحركة ولا ساكنة ، لأن
المتحرك يتحرك بانتقال إلى غير : إما مكان ، وإما كمّ ، وإما كيف ، وإما جوهر —
وهذه كثرة ؛

والساكن ساكن في مكان ، وأیضا بعض أجزائه في بعض ؛ والمكان والأجزاء
كل واحد منهما كثرة ، لأن الأجزاء أكثر من جزء ، والمكان علو وسفل
وأمام ووراء ويمين وشمال ؛

والمكان بطباعه يوجب كثرة ، لأن المكان غير المتمكن ، ومكان المتمكن
[يوجب متمكنا]^(٣) .

(١) في الأصل : ولا (٢) لعل الضمير يعود على جملة ما يسبقه

(٣) زدت ما بين القوسين ظنا أنه قد سقط من ناسخ الأصل ما يشبه ذلك .

فيبقى إذن^(١) أيضاً أن تكون الوحدة مشاركة للكثرة أى مشاركة لها
فى جميع المحسوسات وما يلحق المحسوسات ، أى أن ما فيه الكثرة منها ففيه
الوحدة ، وما فيه الوحدة ففيه الكثرة ؛

فاذاً قد تبين أن اشتراك الكثرة والوحدة فى كل محسوس وما يلحق
المحسوس ، فلا يخلو ذلك الاشتراك من أن يكون بالبخت ، أى الاتفاق ، بلا علة ،
أو بعلة ؛

فإن كان بالبخت فقد كانت متباينة ، فيلزمها المحالات التى لزمّت فى الاتحاد^(٢) ،
إذاً بحثنا عن وجود كثرة بلا وحدة ؛

وكيف يمكن أن تكون كثرة ووحدة معاً ، وهما متباينتان ؟ والكثرة إنما
هى كثرة الآحاد ، أى جماعة وحدانيات ؛

فمع الكثرة الوحدة اضطراراً ، لا يمكن غير ذلك . وكيف يمكن أن يكون —
إذاً هما متباينان — وحدة فقط ، وهما شيئان ، وشيئان كثرة ؟
فليس يمكن أن يكونا كذلك .

وقد يمكن أن نرجع^(٣) إلى ما كانت علته بالبخت من التباين ، وهى إننيات ؛
فيلزم فيها أيضاً ما قدّمنا من الخلف ؛

فليس يمكن أن تكون كانت متباينة ، ثم اتفقت بالبخت ، أعنى بغير علة ؛
فبقى إذن أن يكون اشتراكها بعلة منذ بدء كونها ؛

فاذاً قد تبين أن اشتراكها بعلة ، فلا تخلو العلة من أن تكون من ذاتها أو
يكون لاشتراكها علة أخرى من غير ذاتها ، خارجة بئنة عنها ؛

فإن كانت علة اشتراكها من ذاتها فهى بعضها ، فذلك البعض أقدم من
باقيةا ،

ولأن العلة قبل المعلول بالذات ، كما بينا فى كتابنا على المباشرة ؛ فيكون الشيء
الذى هو أحد المحسوسات أو ما يلحق المحسوسات ، أعنى جميع الأشياء :

(١) فى الأصل : إذا

(٢) هذه الكلمة عسيرة القراءة ، وقراءتى لها اجتهادية

(٣) نقطتها اجتهاداً وكذلك كلمة: علته ، ويمكن قراءة العبارة بعد نقطتها على نحو آخر .

والجزء أيضا جزء واحد ، فإن كان جزء^(١) كانت الوحدة ، وإن كان جزء^٢ كان كل^٣ ، فإن لم يكن جزء لم يكن كل^٤ ، وإن لم يكن جزء ولا كل^٥ فلا شيء ؛ وإن لم يكن شيء فلا محسوس ولا معقول بته ، ولا وحدة في محسوس ولا معقول بته ؛

فإن لم يكن جزء ولا وحدة ، فإذا^(٢) لا جزء ولا كل ، فلا وحدة ؛ وقد كنا فرضنا أن [ثم] ^(٣) وحدة ؛ فالوحدة أينس كئيس ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن أيضا ، فليس يمكن أن لا تكون كثرة .
وهناك يتبين^(٤) أنه لا يمكن أن يكون شيء من التي ذكرنا وحدة بلا كثرة ، لأنه لا يكون لا جزء ولا كل ، كما قدمنا ؛
فقد تبين من جميع هذه الأبحاث أنه لا يمكن أن تكون كثرة بلا وحدة في شيء مما ذكرنا ، ومن بعضها أنه لا يمكن أن يكون منها شيء وحدة بلا كثرة بته .

فقد اتضح أنه لا يمكن أن تكون وحدة فقط بلا كثرة ، ولا كثرة فقط بلا وحدة ، ولا يعزى شيء مما ذكرنا من كثرة ولا وحدة ؛
فواجب إذن^(٥) أن تكون الأشياء التي ذكرنا كثيرة وواحدة .
وأيضاً فإذا قد تبين أن طباع الأشياء وحدة وكثرة ، فلا تخلو الوحدة من أن تكون مباينة للكثرة أو مشاركة لها ؛
فإن كانت الوحدة مباينة للكثرة ، وجب أن يلزم ما كان وحدة فقط ما يلزم الوحدة التي قدمنا ذكرها من الخلف ، و [أن يلزم] ^(٦) ما كان كثرة فقط ما يلزم الكثرة التي قدمنا ذكرها ؛

(١) في الأصل : جزا

(٢) هكذا في الأصل ، ويجوز أن تكون : فاذن

(٣) زيادة للايضاح

(٤) في الأصل : تبين

(٥) في الأصل : اذا

(٦) زدتها للايضاح

فقد تبين أن للأشياء جميعاً علةً أولى ، غير مُجانسة ولا مشاكلة ولا مشابهة ولا مشاركة لها ، بل هي أعلى وأشرف وأقدم منها ، وهي سبب كونها وثباتها ؛ وهذه العلة لا تخلو^(١) من أن تكون واحدة أو كثيرة :
فإن كانت كثيرة ففيها الوحدة ؛ لأن الكثرة إنما هي جماعٌ أو حاد ، فهي إذن كثرةٌ ووحدةٌ معاً ؛ فتكون علةُ الكثرة والوحدة الوحدة والكثرة ؛
فالشئ^(٢) إذن علةٌ ذاته ؛ والعلة غير المعلول ، فالشئ غير ذاته ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، فليس العلة الأولى كثيرة ، ولا كثيرةٌ وواحدة ؛
فلم يبق إلا أن تكون العلة واحدةً فقط ، لا كثرةٌ معها بجهة من الجهات .
فإذن^(٣) اتضح أن العلة الأولى واحدة ، والواحد موجود في الأشياء المعلولة ؛
وقد قدمنا على كم نوع يقال الواحد في الأشياء المحسوسة وما يلحق المحسوسة ؛ فقد ينبغي أن نبين بأي نوع توجد الوحدة في المعلولات^(٤) ، وما الوحدة الحق وما الوحدة بالجاز لا بالحقيقة ، فيما يتلوه هذا الفن ؛ ولنكمل هذا الفن .

الفن الرابع

وهو الجزء الأول — فلنقل الآن بأي نوع توجد الوحدة في المقولات ؟ وما الواحد بالحق ، وما الواحد بالجاز لا بالحقيقة ؟
ولنقدم كذلك ما يجب تقديمه ، فنقول :
إن العظيم والصغير ، والطويل والقصير ، والكثير والقليل ، لا يقال شئ منها على شئ قولاً مرسلًا ، بل بالإضافة ؛ فإنه إنما يقال : عظيمٌ ، عندما هو أصغر منه ؛ و [يقال]^(٥) : صغيرٌ ، عندما هو أعظم منه ؛ وكذلك يقال للهنة^(٦) :

(١) في الأصل : تخلوا

(٢) في الأصل : والشئ

(٣) في الأصل : فإذا

(٤) هكذا في الأصل ، ويجوز أن تكون المقولات ، كما سيأتي بعد قليل

(٥) زدتها للإيضاح

(٦) الهنة الداهية أو الأمر العظيم ، جمعها هنوات . أما الهنات فهي خصال السوء ؛ والغالب

أنها جمع هنة

إما وحدة فقط ؛

وإما كثرة فقط ؛

وإما كثرة مع وحدة مشتركة .

ويلحق في وحدة فقط ما لحق في الكثرة والوحدة التي قدمنا البحث عنهما ؛
فينبغي أن تكون وحدة وكثرة مشتركة ، ويكون اشتراكهما بالبحث أو
بعلة منهما أو من غيرهما ؛ فيلحق في البحث ما قدمنا من الخلف ،
و [يلحق] ^(١) في اشتراكهما من ذاتهما أن يكون الاشتراك علة من الذات ،
ويخرج هذا بلا نهاية ، فتكون علة لعلة ، وعلة لعلة إلى ما لا نهاية ؛
وقد تبين أنه لا يمكن أن يكون شيء بالفعل بلا نهاية ؛ فليس يمكن أن
يكون اشتراك الوحدة والكثرة بعلة من ذاتهما ؛

فلم يبق إلا أن يكون لاشتراكهما علة أخرى غير ذاتهما ، أرفع وأشرف
منهما وأقدم ، إذ العلة قبل المعلول بالذات — كما قدمنا في المقالات التي قلنا فيها على
المباينة — وليست بمشاركة لهما ، لأن المشاركة تجب في المشتركات — كما قدمنا —
بعلة خارجة عن المشتركات ؛ فإن كانت كذلك خرجت العلل بلا نهاية ، ولا نهاية
في العلل ممتنع — كما قدمنا ، إذ ليس يمكن أن يكون شيء بالفعل لا نهاية له .

وأيضاً ليست بمجانسة لهما ، لأن اللواتي في جنس واحد ليس منها شيء أقدم
من شيء بالذات ، كالإنسانية والفرسية اللتين في جنس الحي ، اللتين ليست واحدة
منهما أقدم من الأخرى بالذات ؛ والعلة أقدم من المعلول بالذات ؛ فليس علة
اشتراك الكثرة والوحدة مع الأشياء الكثيرة الواحدة في جنس ؛

وإذ ليس هي معهما في جنس ، فليست معهما ^(٢) في شبه واحد ، لأن التشابهة
في جنس واحد وفي نوع واحد كالحمرة والحمرة والشكل والشكل وما كان كذلك ؛
فليست علة اشتراك الكثرة والوحدة ، مع الأشياء الكثيرة الواحدة ، في جنس ^(٣)
ولا شبه ، ولا مشاكلة ؛ بل هي علة كونها وثباتها ، أعلى وأشرف وأقدم منها .

(١) زدتها للايضاح (٢) في الأصل : معها

(٣) في جنس — خبر ليست .

بالقوة ؛ فإذا تذبذبة العظيم المرسل موجودة^(١) بالفعل أو بالقوة ؛ فإذا^(٢) للعظيم المرسل ضعف ، والضعف كل^٣ لذي الضعف ، وذو الضعف نصف^٤ للضعف ، والنصف جزء الكل ، فذو الضعف جزء الضعف ؛

فإذا^(٣) العظيم المرسل كل^٥ ، والعظيم المرسل جزء^٦ ، فإن لم يكن ضعف العظيم المرسل أعظم من العظيم المرسل فهو مثله أو أصغر منه ؛ فإن كان مثله عرض من ذلك محال شنيع ، وهو أن يكون الكل مثل الجزء ، وهذا خلف لا يمكن ؛ وكذلك يعرض ، إن كان أصغر منه ، أن يكون الكل أصغر من الجزء ، وهذا أشد إحالة وشناعة ؛

فإذا^(٤) الكل أعظم من الجزء ، فإن ضعف العظيم الذي ظن أنه مرسل أعظم من العظيم المظنون أنه العظيم المرسل ؛
والعظيم المرسل إنما يراد به ما لا شيء أعظم منه ؛
فإذا^(٥) العظيم المرسل لا عظيم^٦ مرسل ؛
فإما أن لا يكون عظيم بته ، وإما أن يكون عظيم^٧ بالإضافة ، إذ لا يقال عظيم إلا مرسل^(٧) أو بالإضافة^(٨) ؛

(١) في الأصل : موجود ، وهو جائز ، بمعنى شيء موجود
(٢) و (٣) في الأصل : فإذا وكذلك في أول السطر الأول
(٤) في الأصل فإذا ، واعتقد أن سير الاستدل يحتم إما أن تقرأ : فإذا ، وإما أن تصلح النص هكذا : فإذا [كان] ... الخ (٥) في الأصل : فإذا
(٦) هذه هي ، فيما يبدو لي ، النتيجة المتناقضة لما تقدم .

(٧) في الأصل : مرسل ، وهو خطأ نحوي
(٨) هذا الكلام من قوله : فإما ألا يكون عظيم بته ... إلى قوله بالإضافة ، في هذا الموضع ، كلام محير ؛ وذلك نظراً لاختلاف أساس التقسيم . وقد بدا لي أن اعتبر في قوله : « فإما أن لا يكون عظيم بته . . الخ » ، خطأً نحويًا صحته : فإما أن لا يكون عظيمًا بته ، وإما أن يكون عظيمًا بالإضافة — على أن يعود الكلام على العظيم المرسل ، وأن يكون حصراً للتقسيم بعد التآدي إلى النتيجة الفاسدة ، وهي أن العظيم المرسل ليس عظيمًا مرسلًا ، وذلك كله على أن يكون قوله : « إذ لا يقال عظيم إلا مرسلًا أو بالإضافة » تفریعاً عما قبله مباشرة بحسب التضمن الفكري ؛ والكلام بعد ذلك يعود إلى التقسيم الأول بفرعيه . ولكنني لم أصلح النص بحسب ما تصورته أنه خطأ عنه ، لأن الفكرة يمكن أن تسير سيراً طبعياً ، إذا اعتبرنا التقسيم الثاني جملة اعتراضية أو تفریعاً عما قبله ؛ ويجب على أن اعترف أن هذا الجزء ضعف ؛ فاعمل شيئاً سرفظ منه ،

عظيمة ، إذا أُضيفت إلى هناة أصغر منها ؛ ويقال للجبل : صغير ، إذا أُضيف إلى جبل آخر أعظم منه .

ولو كان يقال العظيم مرسلًا على ما يقال عليه العظيم ، وكذلك الصغير ، لم يكن لما لانتهاء له وجودٌ لا بالفعل ولا بالقوة بـتّة ؛ لأنه لم يكن يمكن أن يكون شيء آخر أعظم من المقول عليه : عظيمٌ ، قولًا مرسلًا ؛ فكان العظيمُ المرسل ليس لانتهاء له بالفعل ولا بالقوة ، لأنه إن كان شيء آخر أعظم منه بالفعل أو بالقوة فليس هو عظيمًا ^(١) مرسلًا ؛ لأنه قد عرض له أن يكون صغيراً ، إذ آخرُ أعظم منه .

فإن لم يكن كذلك فالذى هو أعظم منه أصغرُ منه أو مثله ، وهذا خلف لا يمكن .

فإذن ^(٢) ليس شيء يمكن أن يكون أعظم ^(٣) من العظيم المرسل ، لا بالفعل ولا بالقوة .

فإذن ^(٤) قد وُجد عظيم لا ضعف له بالفعل ولا بالقوة .
وتضعيف الشيء تثنويةٌ كميّةٌ ، وتثنويةٌ كميّةٌ موجودةٌ بالفعل أو

(١) في الأصل : عظيم

(٢) في الأصل : إذا

(٣) في الأصل : « فإذن ليس شيء يمكن أن يكون شيء آخر أعظم من العظيم المرسل بالفعل ولا بالقوة » ؛ وأغلب الظن أن يكون شيء قد سقط من النسخ أو يكون هنا تكرار ، وقد أصلحت النص . ويمكن إصلاحه على وجه آخر : فإذن ليس يمكن أن يكون شيء آخر أعظم من العظيم المرسل ... الخ ؛ والمعنى الذى يريد المؤلف من كلامه منذ أول هذا الفن الرابع واضح ، لولا طريقته فى البيان : هو يريد أن يقول إن العظيم والصغير ونحوهما إذا أطلقت على الأشياء لم يكن إطلاقها مرسلًا ، يعنى غير مقيد ، بل هو بالإضافة إلى شيء آخر ، وإلا لأدى إطلاقها بالمعنى المرسل إلى إنكار أن يكون هناك ، ولو فى الدهس ، شيء لانتهاء له هو أساس النسبة والإضافة بين الأشياء ، ثم يستنتج المؤلف النتائج الفاسدة التى تنشأ من القول بأن العظيم إذا أطلق على شيء كان ذلك إطلاقًا مرسلًا ومن القول بأنه يوجد ؛ بالقوة أو بالفعل ، شيء أعظم من العظيم المرسل ؛ وهـ يطبق استدلاله على غير العظيم والصغير من الألفاظ المائة (راجع المقدمة التحليلية لهذه الرسالة) (٤) فى الأصل : فإذا .

فإن كان للواحد واحد ، بعضها مساوية له ، وبعضها لاساوية له ، فالواحد منقسم ، لأن الواحد الأصغر بعد الواحد الأكبر أو بعد بعضه ؛ فالواحد الأكبر بعض ، فهو منقسم ؛

والواحد لا ينقسم ، فانقسامه أينس ليس : وهذا خلف لا يمكن ، فليس الواحد إذن ^(١) عدداً .

ولا تذهب من قولنا : واحد ، إلى هيولى الواحد ، أعنى العنصر الذى يوجد بالواحد ، فصار واحداً ؛ فإن ذلك موجود لا واحداً ، والمؤلف مع ذلك معدودات لا عدد ، كقولنا : خمسة أفراس ، فإن الأفراس معدودة بالخمسة التى هى عدد لا هيولى له ، وإنما الهيولى فى الأفراس ؛ فلا تذهب من قولنا : واحد ، إلى الموحد ^(٢) بالواحد ^(٣) ، بل إلى الوحدة عينها ، فالوحدة لا تنقسم بته ؛

فإن كان الواحد عدداً وليس بكمية ، وباقي الأعداد — أعنى الاثنين وما فوقه — كمية ، فإن الواحد ليس تحت الكمية ، فهو تحت مقولة أخرى ؛ فإذا ^(٤) الواحد وباقي الأعداد إنما يقال إنها أعداد باشتباه الاسم لا بالطبع ؛

فإذا ^(٥) الواحد ليس بعدد بالطبع ، بل باشتباه الاسم ؛ إذ ليس يقال الأعداد [إلا] ^(٦) بالإضافة إلى شئ واحد ، فالطبيات إلى الطب والمبررات إلى البرء ^(٧) ؛

ولكن كيف يمكن أن يكون هذا الظن صادقاً ، أعنى أن الواحد ، إن كان عدداً ، لزمته خاصة الكمية التى هى مساو ولا مساو ، فيكون للواحد آحاد ، بعضها مساو له ، وبعضها أكثر أو أقل ؛ لأنه إن كان هذا يلزم الواحد ، فهو أيضاً

(١) فى الاصل : إذا

(٢) فى الأصل بدون نقط

(٣) يسمح رسم الكلمة أيضاً بأن تقرأها : الواحد

(٤) ، (٥) فى الاصل : فإذا

(٥) فى الاصل : إذا

(٦) زيادة للإيضاح ، والمعنى مستقيم بدونها أيضاً .

(٧) فى الاصل : والمبررات إلى البرء

فإن كان العظيم المرسل لا عظيماً فهو لا هو ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ؛
وإن كان العظيم المرسل هو العظيم بالإضافة ، فالمرسل والإضافة اسمان مترادفان
لشيء واحد ، وهو ما كان شيء آخر أصغر منه ، إذ قد تبين أنه لا يكون شيء
لشيء أعظم منه لا بالقوة ولا بالفعل بته ؛
وبهذا التدبير^(١) يتبين أنه لا يكون صغير^(٢) مرسل ، وإنما يكون الصغير
بالإضافة أيضاً ؛

والعظيم والصغير يقالان على كل كمية ؛
فأما الطويل والقصير فيقالان على كل كمية متصلة ، خاصتان لها دون غيرها
من الكميات ؛
وإنما يقالان بالإضافة أيضاً ، لا قولاً مرسل ؛ وبيان ذلك بمثل ما قدمنا
في العظيم والصغير .

فأما القليل والكثير فإنهما خاصة للكمية المنفصلة ،
وقد يعرض للكثير ما يعرض للعظيم والصغير والطويل والقصير ، من أنه لا
يقال قولاً مرسل [بل]^(٣) بالإضافة ؛ وبيان ذلك بما قدمنا ، فإن التدبير واحد ؛
فأما القليل فقد يُظن أنه يُقال مرسل ؛ وذلك أنه يُظن أنه إن كان أول
العدد اثنين ، وكل عدد غير الاثنين أكبر من الاثنين ، فإن الاثنين أقل الأعداد ؛
فالاثنتان هو القليل المرسل ، إذ ليس هو كثير بته ، إذ لا عدد أقل منه ؛
وإن كان الواحد عدداً ، ولا شيء أقل من الواحد ، فالواحد هو الأقل
المرسل ؛

وهذا ظن ليس بصادق ، لأننا إن قلنا إن الواحد عددٌ نظن أنه يلحقنا من
ذلك شناعةٌ قبيحة جداً ؛ لأنه إن كان الواحد عدداً ، فهو كمية ما ؛ وإن كان
الواحد كمية ، فخاصة الكمية تلحقه وتلزمه ، أعني أنه مساوٍ ولا مساوٍ^(٤) ؛

(١) يعني على هذا النحو من الاستدلال

(٢) في الأصل : صغيراً ، وما بعدها حاله .

(٣) زدتها لضرورتها للمعنى .

(٤) في الأصل : مساوٍ ولا مساوٍ ، وهو خطأ نحوي .

فإذن^(١) ليس الواحد عدداً .

ولكن هذا الحد الذى حُدَّ به العدد الفرد يُظن أنه لا يجب إلا بعد أن يبين أن الواحد ليس بعدد ، وإلا فما يمنع من قال : إن الواحد عدد ، من أن يحدَّ العدد الفرد بأنه هو العدد الذى إن انقسم بقسمين فإن قسميه غير متماثلين الوحدانيات ؟ فيدخل فيه الواحد ، إذ ليس [ما]^(٢) يوجب أنه منقسم اضطراراً ؛ فإذا لم يظهر أنه واجب من هذا البحث أن الواحد ليس بعدد فنقول إذن^(٣) : إن ركن الشيء الذى يُبنى منه الشيء ، أعنى الذى ركب منه الشيء ، ليس هو الشيء — كالحروف الصوتية التى رُكب منها الكلام ، فإنها ليست هى الكلام ، لأن الكلام صوتٌ مؤلف موضوعٌ دالٌّ على شيء مع زمان ، والحرف صوت طباعى لا مؤلف — فإن كان العدد المقسَّرُ به^(٤) عند الكل مؤلفاً من آحاد ، فالواحد ركن العدد ؛ فليس بعدد ، وليس للواحد ركنٌ رُكب منه ، فيكون ركناً لما ركب من الواحد أيضاً ؛ فيكون الواحد عدداً ، ركنه ركن كل التى يُقَرَّرُ^(٥) بأنها أعداد ، فيمكن أن يكون الواحد عدداً .

وقد يُظن أن الواحد ركنُ الاثنين ، والاثنين^(٦) ركنُ الثلاثة ، إذ فى الثلاثة اثنان موجودان ؛ فيُظن لذلك — إذ كان الاثنان ، وهما عدد ، ركنَ الثلاثة — أن الواحد عددٌ ، وهو ركنُ الاثنين ؛ وهذا الظن غير صادق ، لأن الاثنين [مركَّب]^(٧) ؛ فإن ظنَّ أنه ركنُ الثلاثة^(٨) ، فله ركنٌ ، هو الواحد ؛ والواحد ، وإن كان ركنُ الاثنين ، فليس له ركنٌ ؛ فهو لا مركَّب ، فقد فارق الاثنين بأنه بسيط ؛ والاثنان مركَّب رُكب من الواحد البسيط ؛ فليس يمكن أن يكون

(١) فى الأصل : فإذا

(٢) زدتها للإيضاح

(٣) فى الأصل : فإذا

(٤) و (٥) غير مشكولتين فى الأصل

(٦) هكذا فى الأصل ، وهو معطوف على الواحد

(٧) زدتها ، لأنها سقطت من الأصل فيما أعتقد

(٨) فى الأصل : الثلاثة ، وكذلك ما قبلها .

يلزم كل عدد ، أعني أن يكون له سمي مساو^(١) له وسمي أقل منه وسمي أكثر منه ، فتكون للثلاثة ثلاث^(٢) ، بعضها مساو لها ، وبعضها أقل منها ، وبعضها أكثر منها ؛ وكذلك يجب في كل عدد ؛

فإن كان هذا لا يجب في الأعداد ، التي لا شك فيها ، فليس يجب في الوجدانية ؛ وإن كان معنى قولنا : إن خاصة العدد وجميع الكمية مساو ولا مساو ، أن لكل عدد عدداً مثله وعدداً لا مثله ، أي أكبر منه وأقل منه ، فالأثنان إذن^(٣) لا عدد ، إذ ليس عدده أقل منه ، وإنما له أكبر منه ؛ وإن كان يجب أن يكون الاثنان عدداً ، إذ له مساو ، هو اثنان آخران ، ولا مساو ، هو أكثر منه ، فإنه يجب أن يكون الواحد عدداً ، إذ له مساو ، وهو واحد آخر ، ولا مساو ، هو أكبر منه ، أعني اثنين وما فوق ذلك ؛ فإذا^(٤) الواحد كمية ، فالواحد وباقي الأعداد تحت الكمية ؛ فإذا ليس الواحد عدداً باشتباه الأيس^(٥) ، فإذا^(٦) هو بالطبع . وأيضاً لا يخلو الواحد من أن يكون عدداً أو لا عدداً^(٧) ؛ فإن كان عدداً ، فإما أن يكون زوجاً وإما فرداً ؛ فإن كان زوجاً ، فهو منقسم قسمين متماثلين^(٨) الواحدانيات ؛ والواحد لا ينقسم ، فهو لا ينقسم ، وهو منقسم ؛ هذا خلف لا يمكن . وأيضاً إن كانت فيه آحاد فهو مركب من آحاد ، فهو مركب من ذاته ، وهو واحد ، وهو آحاد ؛ والواحد واحد فقط لا آحاد ؛ فهو آحاد لا آحاد ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن أيضاً ؛

وإن لم يكن زوجاً فهو فرد ؛ والفرد هو الذي كل قسمين ينقسم إليهما غير متماثلين^(٩) الواحدانيات ؛ فالواحد إذن^(٩) هو منقسم لا منقسم ، وآحاد لا آحاد ؛ وهذا خلف لا يمكن ،

(١) في الأصل : مساويا

(٢) في الأصل : للثلاثة ثلاث

(٣) و (٤) في الأصل : إذا ، فإذا

(٥) هكذا في الأصل ، والاييس الوجود ولعلها بالاسم ، كما في العبارة المتقدمة :

(٦) في الأصل : فإذا (٧) في الأصل : لا عدد

(٨) في الأصل : مماثلين دون تقط . وقد صححتها بحسب مايلي .

(٩) في الأصل : فإذا

بالعدد، أعني أنه عظمُ الوجدانيات، وجميعُ الوجدانيات، وتأليفُ الوجدانيات .
فإذن^(١) الاثنان أول العدد ، والاثنان إذا قيل^(٢) بطباعه ، ولم يُتَوَهَّمْ
غيره لم يكن بطباعه قليلا ؛ فإذا^(٣) إنما تلحقه القلّةُ ، إذا أُضيف إلى ما هو
أكثر منه ؛ فإذا^(٤) إنما هو قليل ، إذ جميعُ الأعداد أكثر منه ؛ فإذا^(٥) إنما
هو قليل إذا أُضيف إلى الأعداد ، فأما إذا تَوَهَّمْ طَبَعُهُ فهو تضعيف الواحد ،
فهو جمع من واحدين ، فهو مركّب من واحدين ؛ والمركب ذو أجزاء ، فهو كلٌّ
لأجزائه ؛ والكل أكبر من الجزء ، فليس الاثنان قليلا بطباعه .

فإذا كان العظيم والصغير ، والطويل والقصير ، والكثير والقليل ، لا يقال
واحدٌ منهما مرسلا ، [بل]^(٥) بالإضافة ، وإنما يُضافُ كل واحد منهما إلى
آخر من جنسه ، لا من غير جنسه ؛ كالعِظَم ، فانه إن كان جسما فانه إنما يضاف
إلى جسم آخر ، لا إلى سطح ، ولا إلى خط ، ولا إلى مكان ، ولا إلى زمان ،
ولا إلى عدد ، ولا إلى قول ؛

فانه لا يقال : جسم أعظم أو أصغر من سطح أو خط أو مكان أو زمان أو
عدد أو قول ، بل من جسم ؛
فكذلك كل واحد من باقى الأعظام لا يُقال : أعظم ولا أصغر مما ليس
فى جنسه ، قولاً صادقاً ؛

ولا يقال : سطح أعظم أو أصغر من خط أو مكان أو زمان أو عدد أو قول ،
بل من سطح ؛ ولا خط أعظم أو أصغر من مكان ، أو زمان ، أو عدد ، أو قول
بل من خط ؛ ولا مكان أعظم أو أصغر من زمان ، أو عدد ، أو قول ، بل من
مكان ؛ ولا زمان أعظم أو أصغر من عدد أو قول ، بل من زمان ؛ ولا عدد
أعظم أو أصغر من قول ، بل من عدد ؛ ولا قول أعظم أو أصغر من واحد من
باقى الأعظام ، بل من قول .

(١) فى الأصل : فإذا

(٢) فى الأصل : إذا أقول ، وفوق الـ قو ، لام الف ، قد ضُرب عليها . ولعل

المقصود أنه إذا تصورناه بذاته : (٣) و (٤) فى الأصل : فإذا

(٥) زدتها لضرورتها للمعنى

العدد بعضه بسيط ، هو ركنه — أعني يبسيط لامركب من شيء — وبعضه مركب من ذلك البسيط .

ولكن قد يُظَنُّ أنه ممكن أن يكون كذلك بالجواهر المركب ، أعني الجسم الذى هو مركب من جوهرين بسيطين ، أعني العنصر والصورة ، لما ^(١) قد قيل إن الجواهر ثلاثة : بسيطان ، هما العنصر والصورة ، [و] ^(٢) مركب منهما ، هو العنصر المصور ، أعني الجسم ، فيُظَنُّ أنه يمكن أن يكون العدد أيضاً منه بسيط هو الواحد الذى ركب منه العدد المُقَرَّبُ بهِ ومنه العدد المُقَرَّبُ بهِ ، المركَّب من الواحد البسيط ؛

وهذا ظن غير صادق ، لأن التمثيل عكس [عكسى ؟] ، وذلك أن الجواهر الأولى البسيطة التى يركب الجسم منها هى العنصر والصورة ، فَعَرَضَ للجسم ، إذ هو مركب [من] ^(٣) جواهر ، العنصر والصورة ، أن يكون جواهر ، إذ هو جواهر فقط ؛ وهو بطباعه جسم ، أعني مركَّباً من عنصر وأبعاد ، التى هى صورته ؛ ولم يعرض للعنصر وحده ، وللبعد الذى هو صورة وحده ، أن يكون كل واحد منهما جسماً ، إذ كان المركب منهما جسماً .

وكذلك لا يجب أن يكون الواحد ، لأنه ركن العدد المُقَرَّبُ بهِ ، عدداً ؛ بل لأن العدد مركب من آحاد ، فهو آحاد ، كما أن الجسم ، إذ هو مركب من جواهر ، فهو جواهر ؛ وبحق أن الأشياء التى تتركب منها أشياء ، فتكون تلك الأركان أجزاء للمركبة منها ، لاشيء يمنع من أن نعطيها أساميها وحدودها ، كالخى فى الأحياء والجواهر فى الجواهر ، أعني أسماها الجوهرية لا العرضية ؛

فإذن الواحد ركن العدد ، لا عدد بته .

فإن قد تبين أن الواحد ليس بعدد فالحد المقول على العدد إذن ^(٤) هو محيط

(١) فى الاصل : كما ، بحسب طريقة الناسخ .

(٢) زدتها لضرورتها للسياق

(٣) زدتها لضرورتها ، وإن يمكن قراءة : مركب جواهر ، . الخ

(٤) فى الأصل : إذا .

فأذ قد تبين ما قدّمنا فليس إذن الواحدُ بالحقبة قابلاً للإضافة إلى مجانسه ،
 وإن كان له جنس قبل أن يضاف إلى مجانسه ، فأذن لا جنس للواحد الحق بته .
 وقد قدّمنا أن ماله جنس فليس بأزلى وأن الأزلى لا جنس له ، فأذن ^(١)
 الواحد الحق أزلى ^(٢) ؛ ولا يتكثّر بته بنوع من الأنواع أبداً ؛ ولا يقال :
 واحد ، بالإضافة إلى غيره ؛ فأذن ^(٣) هو الذي لا هيولى له ينقسم بها ، ولا صورة
 مؤتلفة من جنس وأنواع ؛ فان الذي هو كذلك يتكثّر بما ألف منه ؛ ولا هو
 كمية بته ، ولا له كمية ؛ لأن الذي هو كذلك أيضاً ينقسم ، لأن كل كمية أو
 ذى كمية يقبل الزيادة والنقص ، وما قبل النقص منقسم ، والمنقسم متكثّر
 بنوع ما ؛ وقد قيل إن الكثرة تكون في كل واحد من المقولات وفيما يلحقها
 من الجنس والنوع والشخص والفصل والخاصة والعرض العام والكل والجزء
 والجميع ؛ وكذلك الواحد يقال على كل واحد من بعده ^(٤) ؛ فأذن ^(٥) الواحد الحق
 ليس هو واحداً ^(٦) من هذه .

والحركة فيما هو من هذه ، أعنى الجسم الذي [هو] هيولى مصورة ، إذ
 الحركة إنما هي نقلة من مكان إلى مكان ، أو ربو أو نقص ، أو كون أو فساد ،
 أو استحالة ؛

والحركة متكثّرة ، لأن المكان كمية ، فهو منقسم ؛ فالموجود في أقسام
 منقسم بأقسام المكان ، فهو متكثّر ؛ فالحركة المكانية متكثّرة ؛
 وكذلك الربوئية والنقصية متكثّرة ، فإن حركة نهايات الراى الناقص
 منقسمة لوجودها في أقسام المكان الذى ما بين نهاية الجرم قبل الربو إلى نهاية
 الجرم فى نهاية الربو ؛ وكذلك ما بين نهاية الجرم قبل النقص إلى نهايته فى نهاية
 النقص ؛

(١) فى الأصل : فاذا (٢) يمكن قراءتها : أولى

(٣) فى الأصل : فاذا (٤) غير منقوطة فى الأصل

(٥) فى الأصل : فاذا

(٦) فى الأصل : واحد ؛ وهو غير صحيح .

وكذلك لا يقال قولاً صادقاً : جسمٌ أطول أو أقصر من سطح ، أو خط ، أو مكان ، أو زمان ، أو عدد ، أو قول ؛

وإن ظنَّ أن جرمًا أطول أو أقصر من سطح أو خط أو مكان فإنَّ ذلك ظنٌّ كاذب ؛ لأنه إن ظنَّ أن طول جرم أطول أو أقصر من طول سطح أو خط أو مكان ، فإن طول كل واحد منها هو بُعدٌ واحد من أبعاد ما نسبت إليه ، والبعد الواحد خط ؛ فاذن إنما نذهب من أن جرمًا أطول وأقصر ، أو سطحًا ^(١) أو خطًا أو مكانًا ^(٢) ، إلى أن خط ^(٣) هذا أطول من خط هذا ؛ فإنَّ هذه جماعات من الكمية المتصلة ؛

والزمان أيضا من الكمية المتصلة ، فلا أنه لا خط للزمان يظهر ظهوراً تاماً ، فانه ^(٤) لا يقال : جرم أطول وأقصر من زمان . فبيِّن أن لا يُقال الطول والقصر لما ^(٥) يقال له الطول والقصر إلا لما كان ^(٦) في جنس واحد ، أى في جرم فقط ، أو سطح فقط ، أو مكان فقط ، أو زمان فقط ؛ فأما عددٌ أو قول ، فلا يقع عليه طول ولا قصر بذاته ؛ بل يقال ذلك عليه من جهة الزمان الذى هو فيه ؛ فانه يقال : عددٌ طويل — أى في زمان طويل ؛ وكذلك يقال : قولٌ طويل — أى في زمان طويل ، لا ^(٧) أن القول والعدد يحتمل كل واحد منهما اسم الطول واسم القصر بذاته .

وكذلك الكثير والقليل لا يقالان فيما يقالان عليه إلا في جنس واحد ، أعنى فيما يقال عليه العدد والقول ، فانه لا يقال قولاً صادقاً : قولٌ أكثر أو أقل من عدد ، ولا عددٌ أكثر أو أقل من قول ، بل : عدد أكثر أو أقل من عدد ، وقولٌ أكثر أو أقل من قول .

(١) هذه الكلمة مكررة

(٢) فى الأصل : أو سطح أو خط أو مكان ؛ ولكن يجب تصحيحها ، لأنها فى أغلب الظن معطوفة على قوله : جرمًا

(٣) ربما يقصد من الخط البعد ، وكذلك فيما بل

(٤) فى الأصل : انه

(٥) يمكن بحسب رسم الكلمة أن تقرأ : بما (٦) فى الأصل : مكان

(٧) فى الأصل : الا

فإذا اتحدت بالنفس فهي معقولة ، والنفس عاقلة بالفعل عند اتحاد الأنواع بها ؛ وقبل اتحادها بها كانت عاقلة بالقوة ؛ وكل شيء هو شيء بالقوة وإنما يُخرج إلى الفعل شيء آخر ، هو ذلك المخرج من القوة إلى الفعل ، بالفعل ؛ والذي أخرج النفس التي هي عاقلة بالقوة إلى أن صارت عاقلة بالفعل ؛ أعني متحدة بها أنواع الأشياء وأجناسها ، أعني كليّاتها ، هي الكليّات أعيانها ؛ فإنها باتحادها بالنفس صارت النفس عاقلة ، أي لها عقل ما ، أي بها كليّات الأشياء ؛ فكليّات الأشياء ، إذ هي في النفس خارجة من القوة إلى الفعل ، هي عقل النفس المستفاد الذي كان لها بالقوة ، فهي العقل الذي بالفعل الذي أخرج النفس من القوة إلى الفعل ^(١) ؛ والكليّات متكررة ، كما قدمنا ، ، فالعقل متكرر ^(٢) .

وقد يُظن أنه أول متكرر ، وهو متوحد بنوع ما ، إذ هو كل كما قدمنا ، وأن الوحدة تقال على الكل ، والوحدة بحق لا عقل ؛

وإذ في ألفاظنا الأسماء المترادفة كالشفرة والمدينة المترادفة [على] حديدة الذبح ، فقد يقال : واحد ، المترادفة ، وإنه يقال المدينة والشفرة واحد ؛ وهذا الواحد متكرر أيضاً ، لأن عنصره وما يقال على عنصره متكرر ؛ فإن حديدة الذبح التي هي عنصر المترادفة ، التي هي المدينة والشفرة والسكين ، متجزئة متكررة ؛ وأيضا الأسماء المقولة عليها متكررة ؛ فالواحد الحق لا أسماء مترادفة .

وأيضاً إذ في ألفاظنا المشتبهة بالاسم ، كالبيع المسمى كلبا والكوكب المسمى كلبا ، فإنه يقال إنهما واحد بالاسم ، أي كلب ؛ وعنصر هذا الكلب متكرر ، أعني السبع والكوكب ؛ وهذه المشتبهة بالاسم ليس منها شيء علة لشيء ، لأن الكوكب ليس علة السبع ولا السبع علة الكوكب . وقد توجد متشابهة بالاسم بعضها علة لبعض كالخطوط ، والملفوظ ، والمفكر فيه ، والعين القائمة ؛ فإن الخط الذي هو جوهر منبج عن اللفظ الذي هو جوهر ، واللفظ الذي هو جوهر منبج عن العين عن المفكر فيه الذي هو جوهر ، والمفكر فيه الذي هو جوهر منبج عن العين

(١) إن كلام السكندى هنا عن العقل يتفق مع ما نجده في رسالته في العقل

(٢) لعل قوله : العقل متكرر ، يوضح تعريفه للعقل في رسالة الحدود .

وكذلك الكون والفساد ، فإن من بدؤوا^(١) الكون والفساد إلى نهاية الكون والفساد منقسما بقسم [لعلها : بأقسام ، كما يلي] الزمان الذي فيه الكون والفساد ؛

فحركة الربو والنقص والكون والفساد منقسمة جميعاً ، وكذلك الاستحالة للضد^(٢) والاستحالة إلى التمام منقسمة بأقسام زمان الاستحالة ؛ فجميع الحركات منقسمة وهي أيضاً متوحدة ، لأن كل حركة فكليةتها واحدة ، إذ الوحدة تُقال على الكل المطلق ، وجزؤها^(٣) واحد ، إذ الواحد يُقال على الجزء^(٤) المطلق ؛

فإذن^(٥) إذ الكثرة موجودة في الحركة ، فالواحد الحق لا حركة ؛ وإذ كل مدرك بالحس أو العقل إما أن يكون موجوداً في عينه أو في فكرنا وجوداً طبيعياً ، وإما في لفظنا أو خطوطنا وجوداً عرضياً ، فإن الحركة موجودة في النفس ، أعني أن الفكر ينتقل من بعض صور الأشياء إلى بعض ومن أخلاق لازمة للنفس شتى وآلام كالغضت والفرق والفرح والحزن وما كان كذلك ؛ فالفكر متكرر ومتوحدة ، إذ لكل كثرة كل جزء ، إذ هي معدودة ؛ وهذه أعراض النفس ، فهي متكررة أيضاً ومتوحدة بهذا النوع ، فالواحد الحق لا نفس . ولأن نهاية الفكر إذا سلكت على سبل مستقيمة إلى العقل ، وهو أنواع الأشياء — إذ النوع معقول — وما فوقها^(٦) ، والأشخاص محسوسة ، أعني بالأشخاص جزئيات^(٧) الأشياء التي لا تعطى الأشياء^(٨) أساميها ولا حدودها ،

(١) هكذا في الأصل ، وقد احتفظت بها ، لأنها غير خفية المعنى

(٢) في الأصل : سديد ، وهي غير ظاهرة المعنى في السياق

(٣) في الأصل : وحرها

(٤) في الأصل : الحر

(٥) في الأصل : فاذا

(٦) في الأصل : فوقه ، وقد آثرت هذا التصحيح ليكون الضمير راجعاً إلى أنواع ، ولأن

هذا ينطبق مع ما نجد في رسالة العقل للكندی

(٧) في الأصل جزويات

(٨) في الأصل : شيا

وقد يقال الواحد للذى^(١) لا ينقسم كما قدمنا ؛ والذى لا ينقسم إما لا ينقسم بالفعل ، وإما بالقوة ؛ أما الذى لا ينقسم بالفعل فكالذى لا ينقسم لصلابته كحجر الماس ، أعنى أنه غير الانقسام ؛ وهذا هو ذو أجزاء اضطراراً ، إذ هو جسم ، فهو متكثر ؛ أو كالذى يصغر جداً عن الآلة القاسمة ، فان ذلك يقال له : لا ينقسم ، إذ ليس [ثم] آلة تقسمه ، وهو ذو أجزاء ، لأنه عظيم ما ، إذ لحقه الصغر ، فهو متكثر ؛

ويقال لا ينقسم بالفعل أيضاً ، وإن فصل تفصيلاً دائماً لم يخرج عن طباعه إلى غيره ، بل كل مفصول منه يحتمل حدّه واسمه ، كجميع الأعظام المتصلة ؛ أعنى الجرم والسطح والخط والمكان والزمان ؛ فان مفصول الجرم جرم ، ومفصول السطح سطح ، ومفصول الخط خط ، ومفصول المكان مكان ، ومفصول الزمان زمان ؛ فهذه جميعاً لا تنقسم بالفعل ولا بالقوة إلى غير نوعها ، وكل واحد منها قابل للتفصيل والتكثير قبولاً دائماً إلى نوعه .

وأيضاً فان الجرم يتكثر بأبعاده الثلاثة ونهاياته الست ، والسطح ببعديه ونهاياته الأربع ، والخط ببعده ونهايتيه ، وكذلك المكان يتكثر بقدر أبعاد المتمكن ونهاياته .

وكذلك الزمان يتكثر بنهاياته التى هى آتات^(٢) الزمان الحادثة لنهاياته ، كحدّ العلامات لنهايات الخط .

كذلك كل مشتهى الأجزاء يقال له : واحد ، لأنه لا ينقسم ، أى كل مفصول منه محتمل حدّه^(٣) واسمه ؛ وهذا أيضاً يتكثر ، لأنه لا ينقسم ، أى كل قابل [للانقسام] قبولاً دائماً^(٤) .

ويقال أيضاً : لا ينقسم بالفعل ولا بالقوة ، الذى إن قسم بطلت ذاته ، كالإنسان الواحد ، كمحمد وسعيد وكالفرس الواحد ، كالراند وذى العقال ،

(١) فى الأصل للواحد الذى .

(٢) فى الأصل : الآتات ، وهو خطأ فى النسخ (٣) فى الأصل جدا

(٤) فى الأصل ، كل قابلاً قبولاً دائماً — وقد صحّحتم العبارة . ويجوز أيضاً أن يكون تصحيحها : أى كل ما كان قابلاً للقسمة . . . الخ

الذى هو جوهر ؛ وقد يقال لهذه جميعا : واحد^(١) — أعنى العين فى ذاتها ، وفى الفكرة^(٢) ، وفى اللفظ ، وفى الخط ؛ والعين فى ذاتها علة العين فى الفكر ، والعين فى الفكر علة العين فى اللفظ ، والعين فى اللفظ علة العين فى الخط ؛ وهذا النوع من الواحد متكرر أيضا ، إذ هو مقول على كثير ؛ فليس الواحد الحق واحداً^(٣) بنوع اشتباه الاسم .

وإذ قد يقال : واحد ، لتي عنصرها واحد ، إلا أنها تتغير بغيرية ما ، إما فعل أو انفعال ، أو إضافة ، أو غير ذلك من التغير ، كالباب والسريـر التي عنصرها واحد ، أعنى خشباً أو أى عنصر صنع منه أشياء مختلفة المثل^(٤) ، فإنه يقال : الباب والسريـر واحدٌ بالعنصر ، وهذه أيضا كثير من جهة عنصرها ، [إذ] أن عنصرها^(٥) متكرر ، متجزى ، ومن جهة مثلها ؛ وأيضا اللاتي هي واحدة بالعنصر الأول ، أعنى بالإمكان ، متكررة من جهة العنصر ، إذ هو موجود لمثل كثيرة ؛ وأيضا قد يقال : واحد بالعنصر ، الأشياء التي تُقال على شيء ، فيلحقها شيء آخر اضطراراً ، كالفساد المقول على الفاسد ، فإنه يلحقه الكون ، إذ فساد الفاسد يكون^(٦) لآخر ، فإنه يقال إن الكائن هو الفاسد بالعنصر ، وهذا بالفعل ؛ وقد يتكرر هذا أيضا إذ العنصر لعدة مثل ؛

وقد يقال هذا النوع من الواحد بالقوة ، أعنى الواحد بالعنصر ، الأشياء التي تقال على شيء ، فيلحقها شيء آخر ، كالرُبُوّ المقول على الرابي ، فإنه يلحقه الضمر ، فإن الذى له رُبُوّ له ضمـر بالقوة ، فيقال : واحد ، الرابي الضامر ، أى أن الرابي هو الضامر ؛ وهذا متكرر أيضاً من جهة العنصر ، إذ العنصر لعدة من جهة المثل ، أعنى الربو والضمر ؛ فالواحد الحق لا يقال بنوع العنصر بـتّة ، فليس يقال : واحد^(٦) ، من أنواع الواحد الذى بالعنصر ؛

(١) فى الأصل : واحد (٢) يعنى فى الفكر أو فى الذهن .

(٣) فى الأصل : واحد (٤) لعله يقصد مختلفة فى الصورة .

(٥) يظهر أن فى هذه العبارة التى صححتها بحسب إشارة فى هامش الأصل ، تكراراً ،

والمعنى ظاهر بعد الإضافة الإيضاحية التى يمكن الاستغناء عنها وتصحيح أن [إذ] إذ

(٦) فى الأصل يمكن أن تقرأ : بواحد

فهو متكرر بتفصيله أيضا ؛ وآخر^(١) بأن يكون الذى لا ينقسم أشدالتى يقال ::
واحد ، استحقاقا للوحدة من باقى أنواع الواحد وأشدّها توحّداً .

فقد تبين مما قلنا أن الواحد يقال إمّا بالذات ، وإما بالعرض ؛ أما بالعرض
فكنوع المقول بالاسم المشترك ، وإما بالأسماء المترادفة أو جامع أعراض كثيرة
كقولنا : الكاتب والخطيب واحد ، إذا كانا يُقالان على رجل واحد ، أو على
الإنسان ، أو : الإنسان والكاتب واحد ، وما كان كذلك ؛ وأمّا بالذات فبأى
ما يقال عليه الواحد مما ذكرنا أنه يقال : واحد ؛ وهى جميعاً ما جوهرها واحد ،
وينقسم قسمة أولى : إما بالاتصال ، وهو من حيز العنصر ؛ وإما بالصورة ، وهو
من حيز النوع ؛ وإما بالاسم ، وهو من حيزها جميعاً ؛ وإما بالجنس ، وهو من
حيز الأول ؛

فالواحد بالاتصال هو الواحد بالعنصر أو بالرباط ، وهو الذى يقال له :
واحد بالعدد ، أو بالشكل ؛ والواحد بالصورة هى^(٢) التى حدّثها واحد ؛ والواحد
بالجنس^(٣) هى التى حدّث مجموعها واحد ؛ والتى بالاسم ، أعنى بها ما هى بالمساواة ،
واحد ؛ والواحد بالمساواة هى التى نسبتها^(٤) واحد ، كالأشياء الطيبة المنسوبة
جميعاً إلى الطيب .

وجميع هذه الأنواع التى ذكرنا ، أعنى الواحد بالعدد ، ثم الواحد بالصورة ،
ثم الواحد بالجنس ، ثم الواحد بالمساواة ، يتبع أواخرها أوائلها ولا يتبع أوائلها
أواخرها ؛ أعنى أن ما كان واحداً بالعدد ، فهو واحد بالصورة ؛ وما كان واحداً
بالصورة فهو واحد بالجنس ، وما كان واحداً بالجنس فهو واحد بالنسبة ؛ وليس
ما كان واحداً بالنسبة فهو واحد بالجنس ، ولا ما كان واحداً بالجنس فهو واحد
بالصورة ، ولا ما كان واحداً بالصورة فهو واحد بالعدد .

(١) الكلمة غير منقوطة فى الأصل ، وليس على الألف شىء .

(٢) هكذا العبارة فى الأصل ؛ ولعله يقصد الأشياء التى حدّثها واحد

(٣) فى الأصل : بالجنس

(٤) الكلمة غير منقوطة فى الأصل

وما كان كذلك من كل شخص طبيعي ذى مثال أو عرضى كذلك أو نوع أو جنس أو فصل أو خاصة أو عرض عام ، فإنه إن قُسم لم يكن هو ما هو ؛ وهو متكرر بما ركب منه وبالتفصيل دائماً أيضاً ؛ وهذه جميعاً من المقول : واحد^(١) ، لاتصاله أيضاً ؛

ويقال : واحد ، لأنه لا ينقسم بنوع آخر ، ما كان لا ينقسم ، لأنه ليس متصلاً ؛ وما كان كذلك فإنه يقال على نوعين : أحدهما ، لأنه ليس بمتصل ، ولا وضع له ، ولا مشترك ، كالواحد العددي ، فإنه ليس شيئاً متصلاً^(٢) ، أعنى أن له أبعاداً ونهاياتٍ ، فهو شيء متصل ، بل هو لا ينقسم ولا منفصل ؛ وهذا متكرر أيضاً من جهة موضوعاته التى نعدّها^(٣) ؛ وهذا هو الواحد العددي مكيال كل [الأشياء] ؛ والآخر حروف الأصوات ، فإنها ليست بمتصلة ؛ ولا وضع للعلل التى بها الواحد العددي لا ينقسم ، وهو مكيال للألفاظ فقط ؛

ويقال : واحد ، لأنه لا ينقسم بنوع آخر ، وهو ما كان كذلك ، لأنه لأجزء له مثله ، ولا مثل غيره .

وأيضاً وهو مشترك ؛ وما كان كذلك فإنه يقال على نوعين : أحدهما له وضعٌ ، كعلامة الخط التى هى نهايته ؛ فإنه لأجزاء لها ، لأنها نهايةٌ بعد واحد ، ونهاية البعد لا بعد ؛ وهى متكررة بحاملاتها ، أعنى الزمان الماضى والزمان الآتى ، التى^(٤) هى مشتركة لها .

ويقال : واحد ، أيضاً الذى لا ينقسم من جهة الكليّة ، فإنه يقال : رطل واحد لأنه إن انفصل من كليّة الرطل شيءٌ بطل الرطل ، فلم يكُ كلاً لرطل واحد ؛ ولذلك ما يقال إن خط الدائرة أشد استحقاقاً للواحد من غيره من الخطوط ، إذ هو كل الحد ، لأنه لا نقص فيه ولا زيادة ؛ بل كلٌّ كاملٌ ؛ وما كان كذلك

(١) فى الأصل : واحد

(٢) فى الأصل : شيء متصل

(٣) الكلمة غير منقوطة فى الأصل

(٤) هكذا فى الأصل

عرض في جميع الأشياء ، فهي غير الواحد الحق ، كما قدمنا ؛ والواحد الحق هو الواحد بالذات الذي لا يتكثر بته بجهة من الجهات ، ولا ينقسم بنوع من الأنواع ، لا من جهة ذاته ، ولا من جهة غيره ، ولا [هو] زمان ، ولا مكان ، ولا حامل ، ولا محمول ، ولا كل ، ولا جزء ، ولا جوهر ولا عرض^(١) ، ولا [ينقسم]

بنوع من أنواع القسمة أو التكثير بته ؛ فأما الواحد بجميع الأنواع غيره ، فإذا كان فيما هو فيه بالعرض ، فكل ما كان في شيء بعرض فمعرضه فيه غيره ، إما ماذلك^(٢) الشيء فيه بعرض وإما بالذات ؛ وليس يمكن أن تكون الأشياء بلا نهاية بالفعل ؛ فأول علة للوحدة في الموحّدات هو الواحد الحق الذي لم يفد الوحدة من غيره ، لأنه لا يمكن أن تكون المفيدات بعضها لبعض بلا نهاية في البدو ؛ فعلة الوحدة في الموحّدات هو الواحد الحق الأول ، وكل قابل للوحدة فهو معلول ، فكل واحد غير الواحد بالحقيقة فهو الواحد بالمجاز لا بالحقيقة ، فكل واحد من المعلولات للوحدة إنما يذهب من وحدته إلى غير هويته ، أعني أنه لا يتكثر من حيث يوجد ، وهو كثير لا واحد مرسل ، أعني مرسلًا واحدًا^(٣) لا يتكثر بته وليس وحدته شيئًا غير هويته .

فإذا كان كل واحد من المحسوسات وما يلحق المحسوسات ، فيها الوحدة والكثرة معاً ، وكانت الوحدة فيها جميعاً أثراً من مؤثر ، عارضاً فيه ، لا بالطبع ، وكانت^(٤) الكثرة جماعة وحدانيات اضطراباً ، فباضطراب إن لم تكن وحدة لم تكن كثرة بته^(٥) ، فإذا تهوى^(٦) كل كثير هو بالوحدة ؛ فإن لم يكن

(١) في الأصل : ولا للجوهر ولا للعرض

(٢) هكذا في الأصل : والمعنى الإجمالي في كل هذا النص ظاهر ، على ما فيه من اضطراب . وقد زدت بعض الكلمات بين قوسين مضمعين رغبة في الإيضاح

(٣) في الأصل : مرسل واحد

(٤) في الأصل : ولا كانت — وليس لها وجه

(٥) في الأصل : فإذا .

(٦) هكذا رسم الكلمة في الأصل — وهي غير منقوطة ، وقد شككتها ونقصتها اجتهداً

فبين أن مقابل الوحدة الكثرة ؛ فالكثرة إذن تُقال بكل نوع من هذه ، فيقال : كثير^(١) ، إما لأنه لا متصل ، فهي منفصلة ، ولأن عنصرها ينقسم للصور ، أو صورها للجنس ، أو إلى ما ينسب إليه .
وبين أن الهوية تُقال على كل ما عداًه الواحد ؛ فالهوية تُقال لما تعدّه^(٢) أنواع الواحد .

فقد تبين أن الواحد الحق ليس هو شيء من المعقولات^(٣) ، ولا [هو] عنصر ، ولا جنس ، ولا نوع ، ولا شخص ، ولا فصل ، ولا خاصة ، ولا عرض عام ، ولا حركة ، ولا نفس ، ولا عقل ، ولا كل ، ولا جزء ، ولا جميع ، ولا بعض ، ولا واحد بالإضافة إلى غيره ، بل واحد مُرسل ، ولا يقبل التكثير ولا [هو] المركب ، [ولا] كثير^(٤) ، ولا واحد مما ذكرنا أنه موجود فيه أنواع جميع أنواع الواحد التي ذكرنا ، ولا يلحقه ما يلحق أساميتها^(٥) ؛ وإذ هذه التي ذكرنا أبسط ما هي له ، أعني ما تُقال عليه ، فما تُقال عليه أشد تكثيراً ، فالواحد الحق إذن^(٦) لا ذو هيولى ، ولا ذو صورة ، ولا ذو كمية ، ولا ذو كيفية ، ولا ذو إضافة ، ولا موصوف بشيء من باقى المعقولات^(٧) ، ولا ذو جنس ، ولا ذو فصل ، ولا ذو شخص ، ولا ذو خاصة ، ولا ذو عرض عام ، ولا متحرك ، ولا موصوف بشيء مما نعى أن يكون واحداً بالحققة ؛ فهو إذن وحدة فقط محض ، أعني لا شيء غير وحدة ؛ وكل واحد غيره فمتكثر ؛ فإذن^(٨) الوحدة ، إذ هي

(١) فى الأصل : كثيراً

(٢) الكلمة غير منقوطة فى الأصل

(٣) فى الأصل : المفعولات

(٤) إن عبارة : ولا المركب كثير ؛ غير ظاهرة المعنى ولا هى منسجمة مع الكلام ، فلعلها

بزائدة أو لعل النص ناقص

(٥) الكلمة غير واضحة فى الأصل

(٦) فى الأصل : إذا

(٧) فى الأصل : المفعولات

(٨) فى الأصل : فإذا

وحدة فلا^(١) هوية للكثير بَتَّةً ، فإذن كلُّ مُتَهَوٍّ^(٢) إنما هو انفعال يوجد ما لم يكن ، فإذن فيَضُّ الوحدة عن الواحد الحق الأول هو تَهَوٍّ كل محسوس وما يلحق المحسوس ، فيوجد كل واحد منها إذا تهوى بهويته إياها ؛ فإذن علة التهوى [هى] من الواحد الحق الذى لم يَفِدْ الوحدة من مُفيد ، بل هو بذاته واحد ؛ والذى يَهَوٍّ ليس هو لم يزل ، والذى هو ليس هو لم يزل مُبَدَّعٌ ، أى تهوية عن علة ، فالذى يَهَوٍّ مُبَدَّعٌ ؛ وإذا كانت علة التهوى الواحد الحق الأول ، فعلة الإبداع هو الواحد الحق الأول ، والعلة التى منها مبدأ الحركة ، أعنى المحرك مبدأ الحركة ، أعنى المحرك^(٣) ، هى الفاعل . فالواحد الحق الأول ، إذ هو علة مبدأ حركة التهوى — أى الانفعال — فهو المبدع لجميع المتهويات ؛ فإذا لاهوية إلا بما فيها من الوحدة ، وتوحدوها هو تهويها ، فبالوحدة قوام الكل ، لو فارقت الوحدة عادت ودثرت ، مع الفراق معاً ، بلا زمان ؛ فالواحد الحق إذن^(٤) هو الأول المبدع المُسَكِّ كل ما أبدع ، فلا يخلو شئ من إمساكه وقوته إلا عاد^(٥) ودثر . فإذ قد تبين ما أردنا إيضاحه من تمييز الواحدات ، ليظهر الواحد الحق المفيد المبدع ، القوى المُسَكِّ ، وما الواحدات بالمجاز ، أعنى بإفادة الواحد الحق ، جل وتعالى عن صفات الملحدّين ، فلنكمل هذا الفن ولنتلوه بما يتلو^(٦) ذلك تلواً طبيعياً ، بتأييد ذى القدرة التامة والقوة الكاملة والجود^(٧) الفائض .

تم الجزء الأول^(٨) من كتاب يعقوب بن إسحاق الكندى
والحمد لله رب العالمين وصلواته على محمد النبي وآله أجمعين .

(١) فى الأصل : ولا

(٢) فى الأصل : متهوى ، ويحسن أن تكون : تهوى

(٣) لعل فى هذا النص تكراراً

(٤) فى الأصل : إذا

(٥) هذه الكلمة غير منقوطة ، ودالها كالراء ، فهل يمكن قراءتها : غار ، هى والكلمة

الأخرى قبلها بقليل ، ولعل الصواب عدم .

(٦) فى الأصل : يتلوا

(٧) فى الأصل : الجواد

(٨) هنا ينتهى هذا الكتاب للكندى ، وليس له فى المخطوط الذى بين أيدينا البقية التى

يشير إليها المؤلف ؛ وهو يقول فى كتاب العلة القريبة إنه تناول موضوعها فى كتاب الفلسفة الأولى