Why Parades are Peaceful

A Study of Mobilisation, Segregation and Authority in Northern Ireland, 2006-2016

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Abstract

Across the world, from India to Israel, it is common for parades to trigger episodes of ethnic violence. In Northern Ireland, Catholics and Protestants have sometimes come to blows over parades, however the number of parades-related riots is small. This is puzzling, because between 2006-2016 over 30,000 parades associated with Northern Ireland's Protestant & Catholic populations took place. If parades are indeed a spur to ethnic enmity, we should expect Northern Ireland to experience far more violence than it does. This thesis seeks to explain why this is not the case.

First, I demonstrate that there is indeed a link between ethnic conflict and the desire to parade. I show that threats to the status of one's ethnic group correlate with increased participation in parades.

Second, I find that PUL parades that march in the vicinity of borders between majority-Catholic and majority-Protestant areas, are more likely to be protested. The fact that such borders are rare in Northern Ireland constitutes one explanation for the absence of parades-related violence.

Third, I assess the role played by local leaders in preventing violence. By examining Belfast's Crumlin Road parade dispute, I show that peace activists can prevent violence under certain conditions. These conditions prove to be far more common outside of Belfast. This offers another explanation for why parades-related violence is unexpectedly rare in Northern Ireland.

In making this argument I draw upon both quantitative and qualitative sources. My study of parade motivation and protests depends upon a previously-unused dataset obtained from the Parades Commission of Northern Ireland. My study of the Crumlin Road parades dispute uses a combination of interviews and analysis of newspapers and archival material. In summary, I use this evidence to argue that parades in Northern Ireland should trigger more ethnic violence, but the absence of hard borders and the presence of peace activists ensures they do not.

Acknowledgements

It is a bit basic for a student of British politics to sum up their work with a quote from Yes Minister. However, I cannot think of a better summation of my PhD experience than the following warning delivered by Sir Humphrey: "If you're going to do this damn silly thing, don't do it in this damn silly way."

That warning, I know now, would have been very useful for me back in 2015, the year I began my PhD at Oxford. Knowing what I was like at the time though, I would probably have ignored it.

PhDs are fundamentally silly things. Spending three to four years (or in my case, four and half years) writing a book that very few people will want to buy is not necessarily the best thing to do with one's limited lifespan. Equally, it does not seem particularly sensible to spend that amount of time in an apprenticeship for a trade that pays little, is increasingly insecure, and demands that you be constantly inventive, entrepreneurial, and empathic, possess a wide-ranging intellectual and technical skillset, and have the mental fortitude to deal with constant rejection.

And yet, despite all of this, the choice to spend four and a half years studying ambulating Protestants in Northern Ireland is absolutely the best decision I have ever made. The fact of the matter is that in producing my readerless book, and realising that I had neither the grit nor masochism to become a fully-fledged academic, I ended up, rather by accident, becoming a well-rounded human being. I learned to do complex things in three separate computer programs. I interviewed politicians and civil servants and kindly old men who used to be terrorists. I presented my research to senior academics on multiple occasions, and they often had very kind things to say about it. As a tutor, I figured out the traits of effective arguments, and I managed to show students how to incorporate those traits into their own writing. Doing all this showed me that the terror I often feel when faced with new challenges, is just my brain telling lies about the future. I know now where my limits actually lie, and how to safely extend them. This knowledge is priceless. I could not have obtained it without completing my PhD, and I could not have done that without the support of my friends and family. So, here and now, I would like to give them some overdue thanks.

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Chapter One: Introduction

1.1: Setting the Stage

Every week of every year in Northern Ireland, and all across the province, men, women and even children leave their homes, form into groups – some numbering no more than 10, some several-thousand strong – for the purpose of walking from one place to another place.

In doing so the marchers adopt a uniform appearance, marching in step, and often wearing uniforms. They will carry flags or banners bearing the insignia of their bands or organisation chapters, as well as the flags of their nations. They are accompanied by drummers, pipers and sometimes full brass bands, playing from a standardised set list of tunes associated with their groups. Crowds will watch and cheer the marchers on, and often join in singing the chorus of the songs. At the end of their march the people, and sometimes their audience, usually perform some sort of ceremony, such as laying a wreath, or listening to a speech or sermon. Once that is done, the event is over. The group may dissipate, or go on to dinner together, or head to the pub, but in general, they go back to the lives of individuals. For the last few hours though, they performed the existence of something larger – sometimes a class, sometimes a city, and sometimes a nation. In this thesis, I name these events 'parades'.

Most parades pass without incident. But, for a minority (0.6% of Catholic/Nationalist/Republican (CNR) parades and 1% of Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist (PUL) parades between 2006-2016) this is not the case.[1] When some groups march down certain streets, they will encounter an

[1] Figures obtained from the Parades Commission Dataset

audience of a very different character. These crowds do not clap or cheer. Indeed, they will watch the parades pass in stony silence, hurl insults, and even throw bottles and golf balls at the marchers. The risk of this violence escalating forces the state to intervene, so oftentimes the parade – if the state does not decide to forbid its passage – must walk behind protective walls of police officers. In the face of this audience, the parade is no longer exuberant. The music stops – usually again at the behest of the state – and the parade grimly passes by to the beat of a single time-keeping drumbeat. Such confrontations leave bitterness in their wake, and, sometimes, riots.

Here we see the two sides of parading in Northern Ireland. Parades are, the vast majority of the time, little more than days out, which are puzzling mostly for how popular they are. But they are also, and have been in the past, important triggers of ethnic conflict, especially between the Protestants and Catholics of Northern Ireland.

Both the popularity and the contentiousness of parades have snared the attention of many academics. Most of them have focused their studies on the Orange Order, it being the largest and most influential parading organisation in Northern Ireland. Multiple books and articles have analysed the history of the Orange Order, the changing demographics and politics of its membership, the symbols they employ, the intra-group political conflicts that play out within its parades, and the reasons why Protestants choose to participate in them.[2] Other aspects of Northern Ireland's parading traditions, such as the history and politics of Nationalist and Republican parades, have also received attention, though less in depth analysis, as have the parades-related protests.[3] Given the extent of the

[2] Bryan (2000), p.6-7; Kaufmann (2007), McAuley et al. (2009), p.1; Blake (2019), p.6
[3] Caldwell (2001), p.2-3; Jarman & Bryan (2000), p.95-96; Browne (2016), p.102-103

scrutiny brought to bear on the practice, it might reasonably be asked: why do we need another study of Northern Irish parades?

To answer this question, I must broaden our view. There is an increasing awareness that parades play important roles in the politics of multiple countries. It is in fact startling how common the practice of parading by subnational groups is. In explicitly global events, such as LGBT Pride, International Womens' Day and May Day, and in single-nation and sometimes single-city parades, such as those held by the Portuguese in Toronto, Sufis in New York and Filipinos in Italy, identity groups the world over are using parades to celebrate and define their communities. Viewed through a global lens, the parade calendar of Northern Ireland differs from that of other countries only in quantity, not kind. It is this fact that demands our interest. Even though we know that parading is a very common practice, we know comparatively little about it. In particular, which is startling in the light of the ubiquity of parading, we know very little about the relationship between ethnic parades and ethnic conflict.

In The Deadly Ethnic Riot (2002) Horowitz asserts that 'Processions, demonstrations and mass meetings precipitate violence in perhaps one-third to one-half of all ethnic riots'.[4] The list of examples he provides to back this up is extensive, and includes violence between Hindus and Muslims in India, Chinese and Malay in Malaysia and Kurds and Turkomen in Iraq. Returning focus to Northern Ireland, we can see that parades have also played a role in triggering ethnic riots in Northern Ireland from the 1830s to the 2010s.[5] Yet, even if a large number of ethnic riots are associated with parades, very few parades trigger riots. Taking Northern Ireland again as an example, between 2006 and

[4] Horowitz (2002), p.272
[5] Budge & O'Leary (1973), p.89; Bryan (2000), p.37-38; Blake (2019), p.48-49

2016 there were over 30,000 parades held by Protestant and Catholic organisations. Over the same period there were less than 10 parades-related riots. This discrepancy prompts the following two-part question:

(1a) Given the rarity of parades-related riots, is there actually a relationship between parades and ethnic conflict?
-and, if so-
(1b) Why is parades-related conflict so rare?

In this introductory chapter, I will lay out how I will answer this question. In the next section I will further define the global phenomenon of 'the parade' as a distinct type of event. Following that, I describe the case in more detail, by presenting a potted history of Northern Ireland's parading organisations. The final section 10avo then lay out the structure of the ensuing thesis, describing the chapters and the contributions they make.

1.2: What are Parades?

I define parades as 'proactive, identarian demonstrations'. Establishing this definition from the outset is vital because, as pointed out in the previous section, the puzzle of parading takes on new urgency once you can see how global the practice is. In this section, I justify that assertion. Here, I will define the features shared by events employed by a vast and heterogeneous array of identities. One cannot lightly say that the Easter Rising commemorations of various IRA factions, and the 12th July marches of the Orange Order are, at root, the same type of thing. This statement needs justifying, and this section does that work.

I will first break down what the two important, qualifying descriptors. First, 'proactive'. Tilly (1978) distinguishes between proactive and reactive collective actions, based on whether they assert new group claims, or, reassert established claims.[6] This distinction between proactive and reactive is the genesis of the distinction I adopt, but I choose to adjust it somewhat. I argue that what distinguishes a proactive parade from a reactive parade is not the relative newness of the claims they make, but rather lies in where the motive of the action comes from.

To clarify this distinction, I turn to Northern Ireland. A comparison of the 12th July Orange marches, and the Flag Protests which broke out in the winter of 2012-2013 show the difference. The inspiration for holding the 12th July parade is endogenous to the parade itself. 12th July parades are occur in order to commemorate the Battle of the Boyne, celebrating the United Kingdom and representing Ulster Protestantism. The purpose of the Flag Protests was, by comparison, exogenous to the demonstration. They occurred in response to a

[6] Tilly (1978), p.145-147

policy change – the decision by Belfast City Council to restrict flying the Union Jack flag on City Hall to 'designated days'.[7]

The significance of this difference in origin is indicated by Inclan & Almeida (2017). They found that prior political interest and experience was a more powerful motivator for participation in reactive protests, than for a set of (proactive) ritual demonstrations, whose participants tended to be more motivated by personal ties.[8] In distinguishing between proactive and reactive demonstrations then, I ask the question: "does attending the demonstration make sense if the participant does not have specific information about current events?" For the Flag Protests the answer is no: flag protesters had to know that Belfast City Council was taking down the flag, else, why would they be protesting? For the 12th July parade, the answer is yes: 12th July participants do not have to know about any current events to participate in the 12th celebrations. The parade occurs with or without them. The presence or absence of requisite and specific current-events knowledge is what distinguishes a reactive from a proactive protest.

The second descriptor needing definition is 'identarian'. Where the first descriptor distinguished proactive demonstrations by the origin of their inspiration – endogenous or exogenous – the second sets demonstrations apart by their purpose. To illustrate this difference, I compare the aforementioned 12th July march with the Rally for Life, an annual demonstration held in Belfast for the purpose of celebrating 'the pro-life message'.[9]

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[7] Nolan et al. (2014), p.34 & 42-43
[8] Inclan & Almeida (2017), p.67-68
[9] 'Get Involved' section of the Rally for Life website. Accessible here: https://rallyforlife.net/get-involved/. Accessed 20/09/2019.

These demonstrations are both proactive. Rally For Life, though it is an event organised by a movement oriented around opposing abortion, was not begun as a reaction to any specific pro-abortion legislation adopted in Ireland. Indeed, some of the Rally's messaging suggests that it was Ireland's distinctive lack of legalised abortion that led to the establishment of the Rally ('we felt it only right and proper, that as one of the few countries in the western world that protects human life from conception, that people [in Ireland] were also able to express their pro-life sentiments publicly').[10] The two demonstrations are however differentiated by their strategic intent.

The question that allows us to see the difference between Orange march and Rally for Life is: what would you have to remove from reality, to cause the demonstration to lose its raison d'etre? For the Rally for Life, the answer is 'legal abortion'. The core purposes of the Rally for Life are to raise awareness about the (purported) negative consequences of abortion, and bring together those who to seek to bring the practice to an end.[11] Thus the Rally for Life is policy-oriented. By contrast, the thing that would need to be removed from reality to make the 12th July pointless, is an identity group: Unionist Protestants. The identarian parade is thus defined as a proactive definition that exists for an identity group, rather than, in the case of the Rally for Life, a political cause. When we talk about a parade existing for an identity group though, the immediate follow-up question should be: what is the parade doing for the group?

There are a number of potential answers to this. At the most basic level, parades give people the opportunity to be openly themselves, through public

[10] Previous Rallies section of the Rally for Life website. Accessible here: https://rallyforlife.net/previous-rallies/ Accessed 20/09/2019.
[11] 'Get Involved' section of the Rally for Life website. Accessible here: https://rallyforlife.net/get-involved/. Accessed 20/09/2019.

display of their membership in a valued social group. Participants in LGBT Pride, May Day and Orange Order parades, when asked why they participate, describe how much they value and enjoy being public members of an identity group.[12]

Parades also have a communicative function, as described by Bernstein (1997) and McFarland Bruce (2016). They can both claim that an identity group belongs as part of a wider society, by demonstrating very visibly how present they are, and, challenge negative stereotypes about the group that society holds.[13] This goal of defining the group is shared by Irish, Sufi, Persian, Filipino and Portuguese parades in the USA, Canada, UK and Italy.[14]

Finally, parades may be a means, not just of defining the group, but of bringing the group into existence. I was unable to find direct measurement of parades having this effect. The closest any analyst has come is Zepeda-Millan & Wallace (2013), who that Latinos were more likely to answer 'yes' to the question 'Do you feel that Latinos make up a distinct racial group in America?' if asked during or after a wave of majority-Latino protests, than they were before the protests began.[15] Yet, three studies of the effect of participation in national ceremonies on strength of national identification found no relationship between participation and identification.[16]

The question of whether parades cause people to become attached to identity groups, or are simply expressions of pre-existing attachment, remains without firm answer. Nor has the ability of parades to change public perceptions been thoroughly tested. However, it is certainly the case that across multiple

[12] Peterson et al. (2018), p.199-200; Wahlstrom (2016), p.232-3; Blake (2019), p.89-97.
[13] Bernstein (1997), p.536-537; McFarland Bruce (2016), p.106-107
[14] Moss (1995), p.137-140; Abdullah (2009), p.219; Malek (2011), p.394-395; Saint-Blancat & Cancellieri (2014), p.655; Leal (2014), p.206-207
[15] Zepeda-Millan & Wallace (2013), p.514 & 521
[16] Ariely (2017), p.2605; Ariely (2019), p.1400; De Regt (2018), p.1720

different contexts organisers believe that parades can help those beyond the group see the group differently. Thus, regardless of actual empirical effect, parades are definable as acts undertaken for the purpose of making identities visible, and defining them.

In summary, in this section I have defined 'parade' as, 'a demonstration with endogenous origins, organised by members of a collective identity, that provides an outlet for celebratory desires, and potentially increases the visibility of the group and defines its public image'. This work has been done in order to show why it is worth producing another study of parades in Northern Ireland. This section shows that asking whether Northern Irish parades do actually have a relationship with ethnic conflict, and if so, why violence is so rarely triggered by them, the answers do not relate to Northern Ireland alone. With a study of Northern Irish parades, we shed light on the relationship between ethnic conflict, and a practice common across the world. However, to achieve this aim, we do need to focus in on our case. That will be the goal of the following section, in which, I will introduce and describe the parading groups of Northern Ireland.

Fig. 1.1) Percent of CNR Parades (2006-2016), by Organising Group.





Fig. 1.2) Percent of PUL Parades (2006-2016), by Organising Group.



1.3: Parading Groups: A History

In this section I will briefly describe the history of Northern Ireland's CNR and PUL parading groups, as well as their politics and the identities they represent. As can be seen from Fig. 1.1 and 1.2, there are several different parading groups within the broader PUL and CNR mega-identities.[17] PUL and CNR are commonly-used acronyms in Northern Irish scholarship, meaning Protestant-Unionist-Loyalist and Catholic-Nationalist-Republic respectively. I prefer to use these acronyms than the simpler 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' descriptors, on the basis that these terms foreground both, that these identities are political and national as well as religious, and, that they are at once separate units and internally divided. That latter point regarding internal diversity is particularly important to keep in mind, as the ensuing description of PUL and CNR parading groups shall demonstrate.

PUL: Loyal Orders and Others

The vast majority of PUL parades – 73% of them to be exact – that took place from 2006 to 2016 were organised by the three Loyal Orders – the Orange Order, the Royal Black Preceptory and the Apprentice Boys of Derry. This is not surprising. The Loyal Orders have been central to the everyday life and politics of Northern Ireland since the 19th century, with the Orange founded in 1795, the Black in 1797 and the Apprentice Boys in 1835.[18]

[17] The term 'mega-identity' is taken from Mason (2018), where it is used to refer to a grouping of multiple different social identities, under a single title.
[18] Jarman & Bryan (1996), p.7-9; Fraser (2000), p.175

The stated function of these groups was, and is, to commemorate key victories in the Glorious Revolution, a war between the Protestant (and future King) William of Orange and his Catholic predecessor James II, in particular the Battle of the Boyne and the Relief of the Siege of Derry.[19] At their time of founding, celebrations of Williamite victories were common in Ireland, but these tended to be highly-orchestrated ceremonies organised by the state for the purpose of celebrating religious liberty and parliamentary democracy.[20] The Loyal Orders by contrast owed their existence to popular enthusiasm for 'hard-won Protestant ascendancy', at a time of increasingly-violent Protestant-Catholic conflict.[21]

When Irish revolutionaries threatened British rule, such enthusiasm could be quite useful to the British State. Members of the Orange volunteered to fight for the British during the Rising of the United Irishmen (1798), and during the Troubles.[22] However, absent such existential threat, Order parades were less welcomed by British governments, due to the risk they posed to public order. The Loyal Orders therefore have a complex relationship with the British state, being at times its most loyal defenders, and at others, undermining the peace that state fought to build.

In some ways, the Loyal Orders have barely changed since the 19th Century. They still celebrate the same events, and the most important dates in the parading calendar – the 12th July Battle of the Boyne commemoration, the 12th August Relief of Derry march and Black Saturday (or Last Saturday, so-named for taking place on the last Saturday of August) – have remained the

[19] Jarman & Bryan (1996), p.10; Bryan (2000), p.33-34
[20] Bryan (2000), p.31
[21] Ibid, p.34-35
[22] Bryan (2000), p.35; Kaufmann (2007), p.75-76

same for 200 years.[23] However, there has been some change amidst this continuity.

The most notable shift has been in the Loyal Orders' political connections and allegiances. After the partition of Ireland in 1921, the new devolved government of Northern Ireland was controlled without interruption by the Ulster Unionist Party until 1972. The Orange Order had helped to found the UUP in 1905, and during this period of Unionist control, it enjoyed strong connections with the governing Party: '[a]ll Northern Ireland's Prime Ministers were Orangemen and only three members of the cabinet during that time were not in the Orange Order.[24]' Their power was made even more visible, by how the two solitary attempts to restrict Orange parades in the Stormont period resulted in 'senior politicians losing their jobs'.[25] The Orange experience has however changed markedly since 1973.

Orange membership has consistently fallen since the 1970s.[26] The Good Friday Agreement passed against the wishes of the majority of the Order's membership, and in the following years the Order was twice defeated in its attempts to parade against the wishes of the state: at Drumcree in 1998, and Springfield Road in 2005.[27] Finally, the split in Unionist politics between UUP and DUP led to the withdrawal of the Order from the UUP's governance structures: a firm acknowledgement of the end of the Order's formal political power.[28]

That said, the modern Order is hardly without influence. The Northern Ireland General Election Survey found in 2015 that 14% of a total 687 surveyed

[23] Jarman & Bryan (1996), p.14
[24] Bryan (2000), p.60
[25] Ibid, p.76
[26] Kaufmann (2007), p.277
[27] McAuley & Tonge (2007), p.41
[28] Hennessey et al. (2019), p.176-178

self-identified Unionists were members of the Orange Order, while in 2017 10% of the 456 Unionists surveyed were Orangemen. By way of comparison, 0.6% and 2% of Unionists were members of political parties in 2015 and 2017 respectively. Even more significantly, many Unionist politicians are still members of the Loyal Orders. During the 2011-2016 NI Assembly, 61.7% of DUP MLAs and 60% of its MPs, as well as 20% of UUP MLAs were members of the Orange Order.[29]

What's more, while the Orange Order is no longer able to play the role of the popular base for a Protestant hegemony, it has adapted well to post-GFA Northern Ireland. By depoliticising itself, and rebranding itself as a organisation for the promotion of 'Protestant culture', the Order has adapted to and benefited from the new multicultural politics of the 1990s and 2000s.[30] This 'culturisation' is, as Blake (2019) argues, a useful strategy, giving the Loyal Orders' leadership and members a rhetorical foundation with which to protect themselves against Republican opposition, as well as access to state funding.[31]

Over the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries then the Loyal Orders have shifted in character, from the grassroots opponents of Irish Nationalism and Republicanism, to the officially-sanctioned mass movement on which Protestant hegemony was built in Ulster, to a cultural-preservation pressure group in the modern, Northern Irish, multiculture. However, the Orders are not the sole PUL parading organisation in Northern Ireland.

More prolific than both the Apprentice Boys and the Royal Black Preceptory are the Unionist Bands. Between 2006-2016 bands organised 19% of PUL parades. During the 19th and early-20th centuries bands paraded as part of

[29] Hennessey et al. (2019), p.180
[30] Kaufmann (2007), p.300-305
[31] Blake (2019), p.128-129, 134-135 & 152; Kaufmann (2007), p.

the Loyal Orders. Since the 1970s however, they have become increasingly independent.[32] Many band parades have nothing to do with commemoration, being instead displays of musical prowess intended to raise funds to meet the costs of uniforms and instruments.[33] The independence of the bands is not just financial though – it is also cultural. Where the Loyal Orders' leadership tends to seek respectability, and is often (if not always) disapproving of members' antisocial behaviour, the bands have a reputation for enthusiastic confrontation with Catholics (though as Witherow (2016) makes clear, this is hardly true of all bands).[34]

Central to this reputation are the Blood and Thunder bands, which are both aurally ('the aim of many of these bands is to play as loudly as possible') and symbolically disruptive, thanks to their use of military and sometimes paramilitary insignia in their uniforms and banners.[35] The bands therefore present a different picture of the PUL identity bloc to the world, than that offered by the Loyal Orders: one more militant and confrontational than respectable. More entertaining than commemorative, and more combative than respectable, the emergence of the bands gave Northern Ireland's PUL an alternative face, happily worn by some within the mega-identity, and thoroughly rejected by others.

[32] Jarman (2000), p.165; Witherow (2016), p.388
[33] Witherow (2016), p.388-389
[34] Ibid, p.392-393
[35] Witherow (2016), p.390; Jarman (2000), p.166

CNR: Traditional Nationalists and Divided Republicans

There are far fewer CNR parades than PUL parades. Between 2006-2016, just 1937 CNR parades took place, compared with over 29,000 PUL parades. Though they march less often, the history of CNR parading is no less storied.

Jarman & Bryan (1998) argue the first parades to combine Catholicism with Irish Nationalism were the St. Patrick's Day parades organised by the Ribbonmen in the early 19th Century.[36] According to the definition established in the previous section, this activity may not even be rightly called 'parading', given how linked it was with the political campaign to establish Home Rule in Ireland.[37] It was not until the late 19th Century that true CNR parading organisations began to emerge, and many of the organisations currently operating in Northern Ireland were not founded until the 20th Century. This is the clearest difference between PUL and CNR parading. While the significant events of the PUL parading calendar have persisted without change since 1800, the current CNR parading calendar has had multiple dates added to it from the 19th Century onwards, in line with the changing shape of Irish Nationalism.

The first of the modern movements to emerge were the Ancient Order of Hibernians and the Irish Foresters. The AOH are an explicitly Irish Nationalist organisation, and had a relationship to the C19th Irish Parliamentary Party that resembled the Orange Order's link to the Ulster Unionist Party.[38] They also held an important social function in Ireland, 'operating the national insurance schemes that were introduced by [UK Prime Minister] Lloyd George.[39]'

[36] Jarman & Bryan (1998), p.9
[37] Ibid, p.20-21
[38] Ibid, p.22-23
[39] Ibid

The Foresters were not linked to any particular Party, but they held a similar social function, also being involved in the provision of social welfare and insurance schemes.[40] The primary days of celebration for these groups were St. Patrick's Day (17th March) and Our Lady's Day (15th August, also known as Assumption Day), and they continue to hold the bulk of their parades on these dates.[41] These parades combined the religious significance of the holiday, with explicit support for Irish Home Rule.[42]

As the 20th Century wore on, the AOH and the Forestors lost their pre-eminent position in CNR parading. Between 2006-2016 they were responsible for organising only 21% of CNR parades. Their decline in importance mirrors the decline in the popular energy that surrounded their more reformist and religious brand of Irish Nationalism. During the C20th that energy was redirected into the Republican movement, who between 2006-2016 were responsible for 37% of CNR parades, and whose activity I will now describe.

The main events in the modern Republican parading calendar are 'the Easter Rising; Bloody Sunday (30 January 1972), marked by an annual parade in Derry; the Hunger Strikes, commemorated by parades in early May; and the anniversary of Internment, commemorated on the second Sunday of August.[43]' Northern Irish Republicans have paraded in commemoration of the Rising since the 1920s, while the three latter parades were commemorations of previous, reactive demonstrations against the relevant British policies.[44]

Many of these initial mobilisations and commemorations were organised by the various manifestations of Sinn Fein and the IRA, and the parties (or their

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[40] Ibid, p.23
[41] Ibid
[42] Ibid, p.30
[43] Ibid, p.55
[44] Ibid, p.34 & 55-57

proxies, eg. The Sinn Fein-dominated Belfast National Graves Association) remain the principal organisers.[45] Republican parties see such commemorative activity as vital, with Gerry Adams (President of Sinn Fein 1983-2018) describing it in the following terms:

'"Nations are built through sharing experiences, memories and a common history. That is why the British Government and others have frequently tried to destroy our history, our language, our memories—all the things that give us our unique identity as a people. But we will remain unbowed and unbroken. More than that we refuse to let our memories to be taken from us, to be reshaped or twisted. To be deemed illegitimate . . ."'[46]

Commemoration does not only offer opportunity for resistance though. Brown & Grant (2016) note that Sinn Fein use events commemorating the Troubles 'to deliver orations that feed into the Sinn Fein peace strategy narrative[47]' and Brown & Viggiani (2010) describe how at a Hunger Strike commemoration Adams employed the words of Bobby Sands 'to underline the need for [his group's] "strategic compromises"'.[48] Viggiani (2014) shows this working on a local scale, with the Clonard Martyrs Memorial Parade being used to maintain an explicitly PIRA Republican community in West Belfast.[49] Nor are the Provisionals the only Republican group to use these events in this manner.

[45] Browne (2016), p.110
[46] Gerry Adams, quoted in McDowell (2007), p.733-734
[47] Brown & Grant (2016), p.154
[48] Brown & Viggiani (2010), Kindle Location 4008.
[49] Viggiani (2014), p.106

Six Republican groups hold separate commemorations of the Easter Rising every year over Easter Sunday and Monday, and from some activists' perspectives this is entirely necessary.[50] As one put it:

'"This (segregated) approach to the commemorations is about giving us proper recognition after 36 years, we are a sovereign organisation, we are not nationalists, we have our own agenda! People say they are republicans, but they are nationalists and right wing nationalists at that . . . we will always march on Easter Sunday as a separate republican socialist movement, if not, then where would we join in and who with? The people we have split from, the constitutional nationalists?! (IRSP, interview date, 2 May 2011)[51]"'

Parties are not the only organisations present at Republican commemorations. Just as with PUL marches, CNR parades are often accompanied by bands.

According to Rollins (2018) most bands came into existence in the 1980s, with the goal of adding '"music and colour"' to the commemorations of Republican dead.[52] Much like PUL bands, CNR bands often maintain independence from the dominant organisations in their movement. Some bands align themselves with Sinn Fein but others do not, and, much like the Blood and Thunder bands, this difference is made concrete by the adoption of controversially militant imagery.[53] Unlike PUL bands though, CNR bands are few in number, and may in fact be a movement in decline. One bandsman, quoted in

[50] Browne (2016), p.109-110
[51] Browne (2016), p.112
[52] Rollins (2018), p.64
[53] Ibid, p.66

Rollins (2018), stated that between the 1990s and early 2000s the number of CNR bands in Belfast decreased from 20 to just two.[54] Yet, even if the organisations are declining in number, they retain high levels of activity, as shown by CNR bands accounting for 28% of CNR parades.

In Section 2 of this Chapter I defined the term 'parade'. In this Section 3, I described the groups in Northern Ireland that organise parades. These sections are intended to introduce the phenomenon and the case that are the subject of this thesis. They have shown that throughout the world, and throughout the history of Northern Ireland, various identity-groups have used parades to establish, maintain and define their identities, sometimes in a way that resists attempts to stereotype or even destroy them. Parades are clearly conceived by those organising them as a tool for both perpetuating and subverting existing ethnic hierarchies. Questions that are still to be resolved however include whether the mass motivation to parade is accentuated by factors associated with ethnic conflict, and if that is the case, why it is that parades trigger conflict so infrequently. In the following, and final, section of this Introduction, I explain how this thesis will go about answering those questions, by describing what it is that Chapters Two to Five hope to achieve, and how they intend to achieve it.

[54] Ibid, p.67

1.4: The Shape of the Thesis

In this Section, I describe the Chapters of my thesis. These descriptions introduce the tasks of each Chapter, and the means by which each Chapter pursues their task. I start at the top, with Chapter Two. This Chapter is a literature review, split into two halves to better deal with the two-part puzzle of the thesis. In the first half I review the literature on ethnic protest, to find a way to demonstrate that the group-status-based anxieties that fuel ethnic conflict are linked with parading. In the second, I use the literature on ethnic conflict to identify subnationally-variant factors that may explain why parades tend not to trigger violence.

In the ethnic conflict portion of Chapter Two, I seek information on anxieties by examining publications on ethnic/racial social movements in the United States. I chose this literature because, unlike the literature on civil wars or ethnic riots, it mostly examines nonviolent or small-scale violent forms of protest. This activity is more similar to parading – indeed, some of it may be parading – than wars or riots, but is still recognisably 'conflict', in the sense that these protests involve ethnic groups battling against laws or practices that they see as oppressive. This similarity between parades and protests means that the literature on the latter can indicate variables that measure or proxy the kind of beliefs or feelings about the world that are associated with ethnic conflict. I can then use these variables to demonstrate that parading is related to ethnic conflict.

In the second half of the literature review, I seek factors that can explain a surprising absence of conflict. I therefore review two literatures which try to explain fine-grained, subnational variation in the incidence of violence. The first

of these examines whether where different ethnic groups live is associated with higher degrees of conflict. The second looks at the effect of local leadership on the presence and absence of ethnic violence. These literatures offer a guide to understand why parades-related violence is so rare in Northern Ireland, by introducing the factors that might be preventing it.

The purpose of Chapter Three is to answer the question of whether there is a relationship between parading and factors associated with ethnic conflict. This answer is produced by studying the causes of parade participation, using a large panel dataset obtained from the Parades Commission, a public body in Northern Ireland tasked with monitoring parades. This Chapter is most interested in discovering whether parade participation correlates positively with the ethnic-conflict-motive variables identified by the literature review. The results will let us know whether we should indeed expect CNR and PUL parades in Northern Ireland to spark ethnic conflict.

Chapter Four shifts perspective from the existence of ethnic conflict, to examining reasons for its absence. The study examines the causes of CNR counter-protest against PUL parades, a major example of parades-related ethnic conflict. Of particular interest to this study are the ethnic residence patterns found in the vicinity of areas deemed by the Parades Commission as 'at-risk' of protest. The goal of this chapter is to ask whether places that protest are marked by different residence patterns, such as segregation. Through this examination I can answer the question of why parades do not often result in ethnic conflict, by showing what makes particularly contentious spaces distinctive, and therefore, uncommon.

Chapter Five shares Chapter Four's goal – explaining the absence of ethnic conflict. The means by which it pursues this goal however is very

different. In this Chapter I seek to discover why the area most associated with parades-related violence in Northern Ireland – the Crumlin Road flashpoint – experienced regular riots in 2004-2005 and 2009-2012, but not in 2006-2008, and, how it was that antagonism over the parade was resolved in 2016. Using a wide range of data sources, including interviews, newspapers and reports by civil society and government groups, I tell the story of why violence waxed and waned on the Crumlin Road, with particular focus on those trying to build peace. In doing so it reveals another reason why parades are so rarely associated with violence. Even when socio-economic conditions most incentivise ethnic conflict, human agency remains capable of preventing violence.

To conclude, in this Introduction, I have done three things. First, I outlined the puzzle that drives this thesis – the fact that parades, which are to all appearances acts of ethnic conflict, do not in the vast majority of cases end up provoking mass violence. Second, I sought to provide explainers both of what a parade is, and, of what the parading organisations of Northern Ireland are. Third, and finally, I have outlined the structure of the ensuing thesis, to show how this dissertation moves from justifying the claim that parades are related to ethnic conflict, to asking why they so rarely result in violence. These tasks now complete, I move on to my literature review, and the causes of ethnic protest.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

2.1: Ethnic Protest in the USA

I begin Chapter 2 with a review of the literature on ethnic protest in the United States. The purpose of this review is to establish a means by which we can prove that the desire to parade is connected with the underlying motives of ethnic conflict. To accomplish this end, I will review the literature on minority and majority-ethnic protest in the United States. This literature covers a wide variety of mobilisations, including reactive, proactive, law-oriented and identity-oriented demonstrations. Thus, the events under analysis here are not perfect matches for the ones I wish to study – namely, proactive identarian demonstrations alone – but they are the most similar available.

I chose to focus on protest in just the USA for two reasons. First, the USA was the only country I could find where protests by both ethnic majority and ethnic minority groups were studied both separately, and quantitatively. Other regions, for example South America, have seen studies conducted on specific ethnic groups, but these have focused almost entirely on ethnic minorities. Second, holding the country context constant helps ensure that when I compare findings regarding different movements of different ethnicities, I am at least holding background variables constant. In this review I also choose to focus on studies that employ quantitative methods. I do this because this review is intended to provide guidance for Chapter Three, which is also a quantitative study, and is therefore bound by restrictions in what correlations it can test for. Having now introduced this review, I will identify the causal factor the literature associates most with the motives of ethnic conflict: threat.

The social movements literature identifies four primary causes of protest mobilisation: grievances/strains, resources, political opportunities and threats.[55] Grievances and threats have not always been treated separately, with Snow et al. (2005) identifying both 'dire social conditions' and 'rapidly changing conditions and trends' as strains, while Almeida (2019) identifies them as threats.[56] Academics have however begun to distinguish between these phenomena.

Van Dyke (2013) illustrates this difference using Cunningham & Phillips' (2007) study of Ku Klux Klan mobilisation in North Carolina. This showed that, while the long-standing presence of an NAACP chapter was not associated with Klan presence, new NAACP chapters were.[57] To put this exemplary difference into theoretical terminology, long-standing and negatively-perceived social conditions are grievances, whereas threats are events which either serve to make society noticeably worse in the short term, or, throw how bad things already are into sharp relief. These threats come in a variety of different forms, which I will now delineate and discuss.

Almeida (2019) establishes four distinct types of threat.[58] **Economic threat** involves sudden declines in absolute economic wellbeing, such as mass increases in unemployment. **Public health and environmental threat** includes actions that destroy or disrupt local environments, and/or negatively impact peoples' health. **Erosion of rights** is a form of threat generated when governments, or other social actors, formally or implicitly abolish valued rights and/or privileges. Almeida (2019)'s principle example of this is election fraud,

[55] Tarrow (2011), p.22-23 & 160; Staggenborg (2012), p.14; McCarthy & Zald (1977), p.1220; Snow et al. (2005), p.1095; Edwards & McCarthy (2004), p.125-128
[56] Almeida (2019), p.44; Snow et al. (2005), p.1187
[57] Van Dyke (2013), p.2
[58] Almeida (2019), p.52

which implicitly abolishes the right to political representation. In my analysis here, I identify racial or ethnic discrimination as another form of rights erosion, given that discrimination constitutes an erosion of the right to equal treatment (or at least, treatment on the basis of merit). Finally, **government repression** 'occurs when states coerce, harass, and repress citizens under their jurisdiction.[59]'

Almeida's typology captures many dimensions of threat. However, it fails to incorporate into the discussion the extensive work on threat done by studies on white supremacy, which has resulted in the ethnic competition and power devaluation theories.[60] To incorporate these insights, I add a new form of threat to Almeida's typology. **Status threat** is generated when individuals believe a group they belong to is set to lose power and standing relative to other groups in society. Such beliefs can be triggered by economic and demographic shifts, and, are associated with increased antagonism towards the increasingly-powerful out-group. For example, a growing literature in social psychology has shown that Americans, upon learning that the USA is set to become a 'majority-minority' country, 'express greater preference for racial homophily in their social settings and interpersonal interactions, and have more negative evaluations of racial minority groups.[61]'

Given this association between status threat and ethnic antagonism, and the more direct relationship between discrimination and ethnic antagonism, the review below will focus on findings relating to these forms of threat. By showing that these threats have an impact on ethnic protest, and identifying the

[59] Ibid, p.51
[60] Boutcher et al. (2017), p.691-692
[61] Craig et al. (2018), p.206-207

variables used to proxy them, I will find a means to demonstrate that parading and ethnic conflict are linked.

I begin this analysis with minority protest. I here summarise the results of 15 articles on ethnic minority protest, of which, seven focus on Latinx, six on African Americans and one each on Arab Americans and immigrants in general. These articles employ a mix of survey and event analysis methodologies, which creates significant variation in what variables each study measures. Nevertheless, if the variables are grouped according to the broad social phenomena they are supposed to capture, three consistent, positive findings hove into view. We see that the presence of organisational support (captured by, for example, NAACP membership rates, a count of Latino civic organisations, and membership of a politically active church) for the most part increases the likelihood of protest.[62] Similarly, most of the studies show that education has a positive impact on protest participation.[63] The final variable/s of interest relate to threat.

The studies I examine here measure two main types of threat: the erosion of rights, measured via ethnic economic disparities and other forms of discrimination, and status threat, measured through counts of counter-movement mobilisation.[64] Regarding status threat, Ebert & Okamoto (2013) find that anti-immigrant events at t-1 had a strong, positive correlation with 'immigrant collective civic events' at t[65]. Maher et al. (2019) however found that

[62] Jenkins et al. (2003), p.291-292; Martinez (2008), p.198; Coddou (2016), p.140; Beyerlein et al. (2019), p.177 & 181. Maher et al. (2019), p.13, using an updated dataset on African American protest from that employed by Jenkins et al. (2003) qualifies their finding re: NAACP membership, in that it only has a significant, positive effect on protests that occurred in 1960-1968.
[63] Biggs (2006), p.328; Harris et al. (2006), p.36; Martinez (2008), p.198; Coddou (2016), p.140; Albarracin et al (2017), p.308; Williamson et al. (2018), p.407
[64] Jenkins et al. (2003), p.291-292; McCann (2016), p.183; Maher et al. (2019), p.12
[65] Ebert & Okamoto (2013), p.1284-1285

counter-movements were negatively associated with African American protest between 1960-1968, while Biggs (2006) found that if African American students believed more whites to be in favour of segregation, they were less likely to participate in protest.[66]

Experiencing discrimination has a more consistently positive effect on minority protest participation, though it does not affect all groups at all times.[67] McCann et al. (2016) found that discrimination motivated Latino protest in 2008 but there was no significant relationship in 2015.[68] Beyerlein et al. (2019) found that discrimination incentivised Latinx with US citizenship to protest, but had no effect on non-citizens.[69] This variation however is not surprising.

The citizen/noncitizen difference is explicable because the threat of discrimination is that it erodes rights, and non-citizens are less likely to perceive themselves as having much rights within the USA. Time difference requires a more qualitative understanding of the case to explain thoroughly than I possess, but, speaking generally, it also makes sense. As argued above, the distinction between threat and grievance is that the latter is experienced as continuity, the former as change. Even if, as McCann et al. (2016) find, actual levels of discrimination appear constant, the context of particular times may recast these experiences as either further proof of escalating disaster, or, just another manifestation of the grinding status quo.

I turn now from examining ethnic minority collective action, to collective action by white supremacist and nativist groups. Before I delve into the causes of this form of activism however, it should be noted that these movements are

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[66] Maher et al. (2019), p.12
[67] Jenkins et al. (2003), p.291-292; Coddou (2016), p.140; McCann et al. (2016), p.183; Azab & Santoro (2017), p.483; Williamson et al. (2018), p.407; Beyerlein et al. (2019), p.180-18
[68] McCann et al. (2016), p.183; Maher et al. (2019), p.13
[69] Beyerlein et al. (2019), p.176-183

very different from both the minority protest movements listed above, and from the PUL organisations I listed in Northern Ireland. As recounted by Blee (2017), the vast majority of white supremacist groups are 'highly disordered', lacking fixed memberships, formal hierarchies or coherent ideologies.[70] In this they differ markedly from the Loyal Orders.

I was also concerned that white supremacist and nativist groups more closely resemble terrorist organisations than the nonviolent social movements focused on by this thesis. This difference in movement type, could invalidate comparison. I considered focusing on conservative social movements such as the Tea Party, as an alternative comparison, but, while such groups resemble PUL organisations more in form, they lack the explicit concern for identity-group-status that is the signature feature of parading groups.[71] Luckily, from my reading it seems that many – indeed, potentially most – far right groups never participate in ideologically-motivated violence.[72] I therefore decided to persist in turning to studies of white supremacist and nativist groups for guidance, as they remain the best-studied type of ethnic majority protest.

I here summarise seven studies of white supremacist and nativist movements. All the quantitative studies I came across were conducted using event analysis, due to the typical reluctance of white supremacists to be studied.[73] Unlike studies of minority activism, which, according to the literature cited above, tend to be at least as interested in the effects of political

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[70] Blee (2017), p.4-5

[71] This is not to say ideas about the proper hierarchy of ethnic groups do not play a role in conservative movements. The distinction is that, while the far right sees shifts in the ethnic hierarchy as the precursor to white subordination, conservatives appear to take more issue with how they think the change in status was achieved. This latter position does not necessitate any attachment to and fear for one's own group, and in this, the Tea Party and the Orange Order are fundamentally different. Tope et al. (2015), p.324-325

[72] Chermak et al. (2013), p.203

[73] Blee (2017), p.3

opportunities and resources as they are in threat, threat is the primary interest of scholars working on majority-ethnic mobilisations. As such, most of their studies examine what threats exactly have the most impact on collective action.

Status threat, measured through the local size of ethnic minority groups, the increasing size of ethnic minorities, and increases in pro-minority mobilisation, tends to have a positive relationship with white collective action.[74] The studies also examined the impact of the economy, with the size of the local manufacturing industry being a common subject of study. Results were mixed, with some studies (such as McVeigh (2009)'s analysis of the 1920s KKK) revealing a positive correlation with a growing manufacturing industry, while others (such as Van Dyke & Soule (2002)'s study of mid-1990s militias) reveal a positive relationship with manufacturing decline.[75]

Beck (2000) and Cunningham & Phillips (2007) also examined the impact of comparative economic performance by group, though in different ways (C&P used a flat black/white manufacturing workers ratio, Beck used ethnic minority groups' share of aggregate household income), and with different results (positive for C&P, negative for Beck).[76] The relationship between white supremacist/nativist mobilisation and economic forms of strain and threat is therefore unclear. However, it is demonstrably the case that status threat increases the rate of ethnic majority protest.

The goal of this section was to establish a means by which we could prove the assumption that parading is associated with ethnic conflict. As shown by this

[74] Quadratic in the case of the population variables. Beck (2000), p.166; Van Dyke & Soule (2002), p.512; Cunningham & Phillips (2007), p.802-803; Durso & Jacobs (2013), p.2013; Boutcher et al. (2017), p.695; Ward (2017), p.472

[75] Van Dyke & Soule (2002), p.512; McVeigh (2009), p.176; Durso & Jacobs (2013), p.2013; Boutcher et al. (2017), p.695; Ward (2017), p.472

[76] Beck (2000), p.166; Cunningham & Phillips (2007), p.802-803

literature review, white collective action is increased in areas with large and/or growing minority populations, a demographic change that is seen by them to herald a coming shift in power. I will therefore use size of the opposing group, and the change in that size over recent years, as one means of measuring the association between parades and ethnic conflict.

Meanwhile, my review of studies of minority collective action suggests that minority protest often responds to the threat of rights erosion. However, it is harder to use these studies as a guide to what variables I ought to use to test for this effect. The data I use in Chapter Three is drawn, not from surveys, but from existing panel data. Therefore, I cannot adopt most the measures of discrimination used by survey studies of minority mobilisation. What's more, other measures of rights erosion – such as Williamson et al. (2018)'s measure of police-caused deaths – do not fit the Northern Irish context.

The one transferable measure is that used by Jenkins et al. (2003), that being the 'ratio of black to white median family income'.[77] They argue that if whites on average have higher incomes relative to blacks, African Americans will perceive that as proof of discrimination.[78] It seems reasonable to suggest that Northern Irish Catholics will share this perception, given the communal narrative of Catholic economic discrimination during Northern Ireland's Protestant hegemony. This is not quite the standardised measure I would have hoped to find – however, it is the best available option, and with it located, we have fulfilled the purpose of this section. We turn now to the second section of this literature review, and move on from unveiling causes of ethnic conflict, to discover what might explain episodes of ethnic peace.

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[77] Jenkins et al. (2003), p.289
[78] Ibid, p.283

2.2: Causes of Conflict, Causes of Peace

In the previous section, I established a means to prove the link between the desire for conflict, and the desire to parade. In doing so, I focused on status-based explanations for why the scale of ethnic mobilisation varies across people, areas and time. In this section, I shift from proving that parades ought to incite conflict, to introducing two reasons for why they do not.

One problem that bedevils scholars of ethnic peace is that ethnic inequality is often present over large areas, but actual conflict between ethnic groups is highly spatially concentrated. During the Troubles for example, violence mostly took place within the Belfast Urban Area, and even there it was 'a feature only of particular highly segregated and deprived inner-city areas, while neighbourhoods of similar socio-economic profile in the suburbs saw far fewer fatalities.[79]' To explain this more fine-grained variation, scholars have turned to many 39avourable39s, two of which I explore below: ethnic residence patterns, and, the influence of community leaders. Below, I review the literature's findings regarding the influence of these variables, and lay the groundwork for the empirical Chapters that will test their influence.

I begin by discussing the impact of residence patterns on conflict location. Following Weidmann (2009) I categorise this literature into investigations of two competing causal paths.[80] The first path prioritises motive – the desire by ethnic groups to engage in conflict. The second prioritises opportunity – circumstances, for example the enemy group being particularly weak in a certain area, which make violence more desirable. Most studies stress the importance of

[79] Cunningham & Gregory (2014), p.68
[80] Weidmann (2009), p.526-527

opportunity. Weidmann & Salehyan (2013) and Salvatore (2016) argue that civil war violence in Baghdad and Bosnia respectively was more common in areas where the enemy group had a relatively large presence, within an area otherwise dominated by the opponent group.[81] Dhattiwala (2016) also stresses the importance of power, pointing to how during ethnic riots in the Indian city of Gujarat, Hindus' sense of self-preservation held them back from attacking large or united Muslim communities, or those that could quickly seek reinforcements from majority-Muslim areas.[82]

Madueke (2018) and (2019) explains Christian-Muslim conflict in Jos using spatial vulnerability. He finds the spaces most likely to see violence are mixed-ethnicity neighbourhoods located between ethnically-homogenous neighbourhoods, because they are at once open to assault, and unable to resist it.[83] Legewie & Schaeffer (2016) similarly focus on 'fuzzy boundaries', arguing that the vulnerability of such spaces comes from their indeterminate ownership. As they neighbour majority-inhabited areas, but are mixed in population themselves, fuzzy boundaries are at once subject to claims of ownership and unowned, creating both a threat and a reward that incentivises confrontation.[84] However, ethnic confrontations are not purely the result of material advantage or consequence. Pre-existing antagonism also plays a role, and, as I will now show, segregated residence patterns play a significant role in generating that antagonism.

Since Allport (1954)'s seminal work, it has been argued that contact with members of an ethnic minority reduces prejudice towards them.[85] Numerous

[81] Weidmann & Salehyan (2013), p.60-61; Salvatore (2016), p.12
[82] Dhattiwala (2016), p.90
[83] Madueke (2018), p.466; Madueke (2019), p.15-16
[84] Legewie & Schaeffer (2016), p.131-132
[85] Sigelman & Welch (1993), p.781-783

studies, having observed this, have sought to demonstrate whether the opposite is true – that, in other words, segregation (usually residential) promotes ethnic antagonism. Evidence is building to support this claim.

In laboratory conditions Enos & Celaya (2018) find that randomly assigning identities to groups of people, then spatially segregating them within a room, was sufficient to increase levels of intergroup bias, relative to groups that were not separated.[86] Laurence et al. (2016) reveal that residential segregation, when combined with high ethnic minority populations, in English communities results in increased white negative attitudes towards ethnic minorities.[87] Biggs & Knauss (2012) meanwhile show, using the same measure, that the combination of segregation and high ethnic minority populations in Local Authorities increased the likelihood of local whites being members of the neo-fascist British National Party.[88]

Despite the strong rationale for segregation being related to conflict through negative attitudes though, actual studies examining the impact of segregation on conflict are rare. Klasnja & Novta (2016) contend that segregation interacts with polarisation (the comparative share of the population in each ethnic group, where 1 = 50/50 split), and that at higher levels of polarisation, segregation might help reduce conflict by arresting its spread across the country.[89] Corvalan & Vargas (2015) find a straightforward positive correlation between segregation and casualty rates due to conflict, though the size of the subnational units the study uses throws doubt on the accuracy of their segregation measurements.[90] Far more convincing is the work of Cook et

[86] Enos & Celaya (2018), p.32-35
[87] Laurence et al. (2019), p.1054-1055
[88] Biggs & Knauss (2012), p.637-639
[89] Klasnja & Novta (2016), p.944-946
[90] Corvalan & Vargas (2015), p.216

al. (2018), who exploit fine-grained historical data on USA black-white residence patterns, to show that segregation was positively correlated with lynching in the 1910s & 20s.[91] There is therefore evidence to show that residence patterns can engender both motive and opportunity for ethnic conflict. In Chapter Four, I assess which causal pathway best explains parades-related conflict in Northern Ireland, and how in turn this helps us understand why such confrontation is surprisingly rare.

The first studies of the impact of leaders – in this instance, politicians – on ethnic conflict tended to show that they exacerbate conflict. Wilkinson (2004)'s seminal book demonstrated the incidence of Hindu-Muslim riots in towns in Uttar Pradesh was positively correlated with competitive elections, a relationship he explained as the outcome of intentionally provocative processions organised by Hindu Nationalist politicians.[92] His findings, already based on the work of multiple historians, have since been supported by Dhattiwala & Biggs (2012), who also showed that ethnic murders during the 2002 Gujarat riots were more common in areas where the BJP faced electoral competition.[93] Iyer & Shrivastava (2018) have also confirmed the rationality of Hindu Nationalist provocation, by demonstrating that such communal riots boosted BJP vote share by around 5%.[94] Politicians have been similarly implicated in fomenting ethnic violence in studies of Russia and Indonesia.[95]

While some leaders create conflict, others have been shown to be instrumental in stopping it. Again, studies of India have paved the way in demonstrating this. Studies of Gujarat (2002) and Varanasi (2006) show that,

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[91] Cook et al. (2018), p.659
[92] Wilkinson (2004), p.43, 45 & 47-49
[93] Dhattiwala & Biggs (2012), p.502
[94] Iyer & Shrivastava (2018), p.111
[95] Barron (2014), p.127-129; Beissinger (2002), p.303

even in the face of extreme provocations, various forms of persuasion employed by leaders intent on keeping the peace – ranging from speeches to patronage to corporal punishment – can counter the work of elite provocateurs and dissuade non-elites from violence.[96] Multiple other studies, of Myanmar, Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria, Indonesia, France and, of course, Northern Ireland, have revealed similar factors at play.[97] Much as residence patterns appear to concentrate violence in particular areas of a city, the presence of strong, peace-oriented leadership can prevent violence in even the most vulnerable neighbourhoods. In Chapter Five I investigate whether this dynamic can explain why parades-related conflict is so rare in Northern Ireland, by examining the ability of community leaders to restrain violence in Northern Ireland's most contentious post-1998 parade dispute.

To conclude, the purpose of this Section of my literature review has been to establish how we might explain the puzzling absence of parades-related conflict in Northern Ireland. Together with the previous section's summary of existing work on ethnic mobilisation, I have shown how this thesis uses existing literature as a guide for how this puzzle might be resolved. In the following three Chapters, the example of the literature will be put into practice. I begin with Chapter Three, wherein I show that participation in parades, just as with protests with more explicit ethnic claims, is motivated by anxiety about the status of one's group.

[96] Williams (2007), p.157; Berenschot (2011), p.226-227

[97] Walton et al. (2017), p.17; Kutmanaliev (2015), p. 470-471; Khamidov et al. (2018), p.1126-1129; Krause (2018), p.148-150, 231-232; Garrett (2013), p.225-226; Clubb (2014), p.850-851

Chapter Three: The Motives behind Parade Participation

3.1: Introduction

As laid out in the Introduction and the Literature Review, the primary purpose of this Chapter is to find out if there is, in fact, a relationship between parade participation and ethnic conflict. To restate the puzzle, it is apparent that while parades are often associated with ethnic conflict, they don't incite actual confrontations very often. One answer for why this might be, is that the kinds of fears or hatreds that drive ethnic conflict do not motivate people to parade. As paraders do not desire conflict, or parade in order to pursue conflict, conflict for the most part does not occur. It is the primary goal of this Chapter to test this interpretation. Drawing on the work done in Chapter Two, this results in the following question: does ethnic threat increase parade participation?

This Chapter begins with a description of my dependent variables – participation in PUL and CNR parades – and the dataset I used to create this variable: the Parades Commission Dataset (PCD). I follow this up by laying further groundwork for the regression, by explaining my choice of unit of analysis, independent variables and methodology. The results of the regressions will then be presented and summarised. Finally, I will discuss these results, interpreting their meaning in light of other knowledge gleaned from survey data, and conclude by describing the potential consequences of what has been uncovered. In this manner, I will discover whether we should indeed expect parades to trigger ethnic conflict.

3.2: The Parades Commission Dataset

The data for this study was obtained from the Parades Commission of Northern Ireland. The Commission is a non-departmental public body established in 1998 with the threefold purpose of (1) educating people about parades, (2) promoting mediation as a solution to disputes over the right to parade, and (3) 'to keep itself generally informed as to the conduct of public processions and protest meetings'.[98] It is by fulfilling this latter purpose that the Parades Commission came to create the dataset I rely on here.

Since the 1980s, those wishing to organise 'public processions' in the United Kingdom have had to notify the police about their intention well in advance of holding the parade.[99] They must also provide other information about the parade, including its route and the date on which it takes place. In Northern Ireland, parade organisers should also provide 'the number of persons likely to take part in [the parade]'.[100] The other important difference in Northern Ireland is that the police, once they have the notification, must immediately pass that information on to the Parades Commission.

The Parades Commission takes these individual notifications, and collates the information they contain into a single dataset. It also categorises the parades, grouping them by organisation and political affiliation, and assesses whether or not they are likely to disrupt public order. If such a risk is present the Commission will then enter into dialogue with the parade organisers and those opposing the parade, with the goal of resolving tensions. If no such resolution is possible, the Commission will then take steps to minimise the capacity of the

[98] Public Processions (NI) Act 1998, s 2(1)
[99] Public Order Act 1986, s 11(3)
[100] Public Processions (NI) Act 1998, s 6(4)

parade, and anyone protesting the parade, to offend. This involves preventing paraders from playing certain songs, displaying certain images or, in the last resort, preventing parades from marching certain routes. Such decisions are also recorded in their database. Though data collection has been done since the Commission's founding, digital data storage only began in 2006. The upshot of all this is that the Commission has produced a massive, publicly-accessible database that contains information on the majority of, if not every single, legal parade that has taken place in Northern Ireland since 2006.

Catalogues of collective action events are nothing new in social science. Charles Tilly first deployed them in the 1960s, and since then they have been used to analyse a wide variety of movements across several countries.[101] The longevity of their use however has not insulated the tool from criticism. The principle issue is the source material used in constructing the catalogues. Almost all event catalogues draw information from newspapers, because they tend to be the most accessible, selective, informative and accurate sources available continuously over the period of interest.[102] Newspaper coverage however is known to be subject to selection bias.

McCarthy et al. (1996), Oliver & Myers (1999) and Ortiz et al. (2005) demonstrate that newspapers are far more likely to record the occurrence of collective action if said action is large, contentious, attended by prominent people, takes place in an easily-accessible area (such as major cities) and occurs during a slow news cycle.[103] Then there is the additional problem articulated by Davenport (2009) that newspapers are not neutral transmitters of information. Instead, newspapers are institutions telling stories about the world, and the

[101] Davenport (2009), p.5
[102] Hutter (2014), p.349.
[103] McCarthy et al. (1996), p.491; Oliver & Myers (1999), p.70-71; Ortiz et al. (2005), p.398-401

stories they wish to tell shape their selection and presentation of events.[104] None of these weaknesses invalidate newspaper catalogues as tools for the study of protests. However, for reasons I will now detail, they do make newspapers bad sources of data on parades.

Nationalist and Unionist parades in Northern Ireland are often not very big, take place in settlements of all sizes and are rarely contentious enough to be newsworthy (see Fig.3.1-3.3). This means many parades are unlikely to be covered by newspapers. What's more, Northern Irish newspaper coverage is particularly distorted by influenced by their Nationalist/Unionist ideologies.

When reporting on the 12th July in 2011, *The Belfast News Letter*, a Unionist paper, repeatedly stressed how large the parades were. They did this in part, because as a Unionist mouthpiece their interest was to cast the parading tradition as being increasingly popular, not just with Northern Irish Protestants, but also with revenue-generating tourists.[105] The Nationalist *Irish News* meanwhile sought to tell a story of the 12th as disruptive and costly, in line with classic Irish Nationalist hostility to a holiday seen as a celebration of Catholic oppression. As such it ignored the peaceful parades detailed by the *News Letter* and restricted coverage to the few parades which were associated with rioting.[106]

Such coverage, which alternately make parades look bigger than they might be in reality, or more violent than they might be, make the Northern Irish newspapers a poor source of data for a comprehensive study of parade participation. The Parades Commission Dataset however has no such deficiencies. The Commission does not collect data with the purpose of telling a story, nor does it have to pick and choose which parades to cover. Its purpose is

[104] Davenport (2009), p.27 & 39
[105] Ferman (2013), p.62 & 66
[106] Ibid, p.63 & 65

to keep itself 'generally informed' about all Northern Irish parades, and it takes in, rather than seeks out, data. The PCD therefore lacks the biases of newspapers. This is not to say that the PCD is perfect. Data supplied by members of the public has its own problems. However, as I will now detail, those flaws are largely correctable and do not cancel out the superior capacity of the PCD to represent reality.

One problem with relying on members of the public to supply your information is the resulting absence of consistent style. This results in issues like; the same organisation being referred to by several slightly different names; the use of local names for route start and end points that are not used by official maps, and rampant misspelling. There is also no consistency in deciding whether to treat an outward and return parade, put on by the same organisation, as one or two parades. The Commission's categorisation of the data is also flawed. I encountered several examples during my analysis of the PCD of parades being mistakenly labelled as either not Unionist/Nationalist when they clearly were, or, as being labelled as one when they were in fact the other. I had to correct these flaws in the dataset by means of manually checking the data, and either editing values, or not including or deleting parades (the rules I followed to do this are outlined in Appendix A). This was a lengthy process, but, in the end it produced a stylistically consistent database.

The other potential issue with the PCD relates to participant data. This has two problems. First, some parade organisers provide no participant data at all. Second, all participant data is guesswork on the part of organisers, an assumed figure rather than an observed one. The absence is a problem, but as it only affected 1,537 parades out of the over 31,000 identified, its impact on results should be minimal. As for the latter issue, one problem that might result from

participant size being organiser guesswork is an inflation of participation count, resulting either from organisers' enthusiastic belief in the appeal of their event, or, by their cynical desire to represent their movement as being popular. However, the nature of the data would not appear to bear such concerns out. Organisers seem to be willing to state low participant numbers for their parades, and the numbers of participants claimed often scale alongside, for example, the broad social significance of the event commemorated. On this basis it looks as though the numbers of participants supplied by organisers are informed and realistic guesses. This should not surprise us either. There is little benefit to making one's parade look larger on a rarely-read government form. As such, I am comfortable employing this information as the basis for my dependent variables: participation in CNR and PUL parades.

Fig. 3.1) PUL Parade Participation – Descriptive Statistics

Variable	*Obs*	*Mean*	*Min*	*Max*
PUL Participants	1390	3299.679	0	82991
PUL Troubles Deaths (sqrt)	1390	1.243	0	14.036
CNR Participants (Lag)	1390	6.679	0	168.048
CNR Population (%)	1390	44.638	2.555	98.026
Population Change (%)	1390	.177	-3.761	2.818
PUL Working Class (%)	1390	27.339	8.051	40.957
Unemployment Ratio	1390	1.39	1	1.7
Housing Benefit Claimants (%)	1390	21.421	0	55.227
PUL Degree Holders (%)	1390	17.994	3.846	42.203
PUL Participants (Lag)	1390	40.698	0	288.082
Assembly Election Year	1390	.3	0	1

Fig. 3.2) CNR Parade Participation – Descriptive Statistics

Variable	*Obs*	*Mean*	*Min*	*Max*
CNR Participants	1390	360.721	0	42495
CNR Troubles Deaths (sqrt)	1390	.951	0	15.716
PUL Participants (Lag)	1390	40.698	0	288.082
PUL Population (%)	1390	49.643	1.394	93.107
Population Change (%)	1390	.177	-3.761	2.818
Unemployment Ratio	1390	1.39	1	1.7
CNR Working Class (%)	1390	26.335	9.353	44.118
Housing Benefit Claimants (%)	1390	21.421	0	55.227
CNR Degree (%)	1390	19.545	8.774	43.655
CNR Participants (Lag)	1390	6.679	0	168.048
Assembly Election Year	1390	.3	0	1

3.3: Dependent Variable & Unit of Analysis

The Dependent Variable

My dependent variables are intended to measure participation in Nationalist and Unionist parades. I therefore whittled the PCD down to parades associated with either the PUL or CNR identity blocs. In practice, this meant identifying the broad purpose of every PUL and CNR parade in my dataset. This process is also categorised in Appendix A.

I counted as 'parades' those Nationalist and Unionist public processions that were held for the purpose of commemorating important ethno-nationalist events, or simply for the purpose of display. This involved, for example, excluding PUL and CNR parades held for the purpose of protesting policy, such as the 2012-13 Flag Protests or the 2013-2016 Twaddell Civil Rights Marches. It also meant excluding parades held by churches, as those celebrated a more religious identity, and parades purely associated with recreation or festivity.

As mentioned above I also removed all parades for which there was no data on participants. The final step left was to prepare each variable for ecological analysis. This required removing those parades that do not take place in a Settlement, and summing the participant-counts of the CNR and PUL parades which took place within my units of analysis, into a single count. In the regressions I used the exposure command to effectively treat this participant count variable as a participation rate of Catholics or Protestants in this type of parade, in my units of analysis. This then was the process for constructing my dependent variable. I will now go over the process by which I selected my unit of analysis.

Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis employed in this study is the Settlement-Year. This unit was selected as a compromise choice between features of the dataset, the demands of ecological analysis, and the difficulty of subjecting parades to such analysis.

As previously stated, two of the PCD's chief flaws were the frequent use of local, rather than official, terms for locations, and the lack of consistent terminology and accurate spelling. These issues meant that my geocoding software (opencagegeo) was only able to automatically locate 18,226 out of the full dataset of 47,350 parades to postcode-level or below. Manually checking and inputting coordinates for the remaining 29,000 parades would have taken far more time than I had available. However, most of the remaining parades could be located to villages, towns or cities (hereby referred to as 'Settlements'), and this, as outlined below, became the best available choice of geographic unit.

Ecological analyses are bedevilled by the inference problem. The problem is that correlations found in geographically-aggregated data do not necessarily reflect trends in individual-level behaviour within those units.[107] The principle response to this problem – which, though not a solution, can help to allay concerns – is to use the smallest geographic units possible, thereby making the aggregate as reflective of individual-level variation as possible.[108] However, in an ecological analysis of parades, this solution cannot be employed. Even if I had sufficient data to locate every parade to a street or building, it would be unlikely that all participants in that parade would live in its start-point's immediate vicinity. The unit I must choose is therefore one small enough to not over-

[107] King (1997), p.14-15; Kalyvas (2006), p.50 & 247
[108] Costalli & Ruggeri (2015), p.44; Kalyvas (2008), p.404

aggregate the data, and large enough to likely contain the parade participants. Conveniently, the Settlement is a fair compromise between these two goals.

The Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency has identified the existence of 136 Settlements in Northern Ireland, with the minimum population size for Settlement status being 1,000 residents.[109] 72% of Northern Ireland's population lives within the boundaries of a Settlement. On this basis, I assume that the majority of the participants in parades that take place in Settlements will either live in those Settlements, or, live close enough to be influenced by the Settlement's peculiar economic and social characteristics.

These Settlements vary significantly in size, with the largest, Belfast, having a population of 280,211 – almost three times the size of the next largest Settlement, Derry (83,125), while the smallest, Dromara, only has a population of 1,006. To account for this, I made two major adjustments. First, instead of using the formal Settlement boundaries, I used the Small Area approximation of those boundaries.[110] This allowed me to disaggregate my census data within Settlements by those identified as being either Protestant or Catholic, or brought up in the religion. Using Small Areas also allowed me to split Belfast into four Settlements, using the internal-to-Belfast Constituency boundaries of North, South, East and West Belfast to divide the city. This brought my total number of Settlements up to 139. In order for me to test the impacts of time-variant variables, I created 10 Settlement-Year units per Settlement (ranging from 2007 to 2016). I therefore possess a total of 1390 units of analysis, for which I constructed counts of parade participants.

[109] NISRA (2015), p.4-5
[110] NISRA (2016), p.3-4

3.3: Independent Variables & Methods

As set out in the literature review, the variables of most interest to this study measure the threat posed by the ethnic other, specifically, status threat and the erosion of rights, as these indicate the existence of conflict. In this section, I describe the independent variables used in this thesis, and the data that was used to make them. First, I discuss the variables used to measure impact of threat and/or discrimination, which were introduced in the literature review. Second, I look at measurements of economic insecurity, which can be used to assess the impact of access to resources, and/or economic threat. Third, I examine several miscellaneous controls which may have an impact on the scale of nationalist sentiment. Following this, I move on to briefly discuss my methodology, before finally presenting the results of my regression.

Threat

My first threat variable measures status threat, using the measurements of demographic size and change favoured by the literature on ethnic majority protest. Following Ward (2017), I use two distinct variables: one measuring population size, the other measuring population change over time.[111] The former uses the Catholic and Protestant population of the Settlement (expressed as a percentage), using the census' 'brought up Catholic/Protestant' variable to ensure I capture the 'ethnic' rather than 'religious' dimension of the identity. The latter takes the percent-change in the Catholic population of a Settlement

[111] Ward (2017), p.468

between the 2001 and 2011 censuses, and subtracts the percent-change of the Protestant population of that Settlement that occurred over the same time. The resulting variable is at its highest when the Catholic population is increasing and the Protestant population falling, and at its lowest when the Protestant population increasing and the Catholic population falling. Also, because the literature on ethnic white and far right mobilisation in the United States suggests that the relationship between ethnic other population size and mobilisation is unlikely to be linear, I include a quadratic term (the proportion of the Catholic/Protestant population, squared) in order to test for a potential n-shape relationship.

I also measure status threat through a measure of the size of the ethnic other's marches, in line with the literature discussed in Chapter Two. To measure this I turn my dependent, parade-participants variable into a t-1 lagged variable. This means, for example, that I test the impact of total participation in CNR parades in a Settlement in 2006, on participation in Protestant parades in a Settlement in 2007. As with deaths, the participation variable is right-skewed, and so I transformed it via a square root.

My second measure of threat captures the erosion of rights through a measure of economic inequality. As shown in the literature review, discrimination is a strong motivator for ethnic minority protest. I cannot assess whether my paraders have direct experience of discrimination, but, following Jenkins (2003) I include a ratio of Catholic to Protestant unemployment rates as a proxy, on the basis that difference in this measure can capture in aggregate various forms of personal and structural discrimination. This is an annual measure produced by The Executive Office, in their Labour Force Survey Religion Report. The higher this measure, the higher the Catholic unemployment rate is

relative to the Protestant unemployment rate. Unfortunately the data in this report is not consistently available at a geographically disaggregated level for my time period. Still, it is reasonable to suggest that a sense of how one's ethnic group is faring nationally would influence one's propensity to mobilise.

My third and final measure of threat is two variables peculiar to the Northern Irish context: a count of PUL deaths at the hands of CNR groups, and a count of CNR deaths at the hands of PUL groups, during the Troubles. I use this variable to proxy the potential impact of past violence on present-day peoples' sense that the other ethnic group poses a threat to them. There is a budding literature that has shown that peoples' attachment to their partisan or ethnic identities is strengthened following historical victimisation, and that this increased attachment can be inherited from victimised family members.[112] It seems reasonable to assume that the Troubles would leave a similar legacy. This variable is not intended to measure the actual levels of violence that took place between 1969-1998. Instead it a measurement of the likelihood that the Protestant or Catholic inhabitants of a Settlement in 2007-2016 would perceive themselves as an historically victimised population. I therefore chose to measure these variables as counts rather than rates, in line with Tolnay et al. (1996).

These authors contend convincingly that when people remember non-quotidian violence (lynching in their article, but the logic applies just the same to deaths inflicted by terrorists and/or the military) they are more likely to remember the count of victims, rather than the general probability that people from their group would have been victimised.[113] Data for these variables was taken from the Sutton Index of Deaths, a list of deaths associated with the

[112] Balcells (2012), p.334-335; Linke & O'Laughlin (2015), p.117-118; Lupu & Peisakhin (2017), p.844
[113] Tolnay et al. (1996), p.800

Troubles that took place between 1969-2001.[114] Sutton's list is well-regarded in the literature, and is often used to measure the impact of Troubles-era violence.[115] Its usefulness is compounded by the fact that Sutton records the organisational affiliation of the victims and perpetrators of violence, as well as the religious affiliation of victims without organisational affiliation. This allows me to create two 'deaths' variables mentioned above, as it means both perpetrators and victims can be assigned to an ethnic category.

For purposes of this variable, all Northern Irish Catholics and members of armed Republic groups were coded as 'CNR' while all Northern Irish Protestants and members of the police and military were coded as 'PUL'. These deaths were then aggregated to Settlement level, and the count transformed via square-root to account for the data's rightward-skew. In conclusion then, taking all four measurements of threat together, I present the following four hypotheses:

H1: Participation will have a quadratic relationship (i.e. a positive relationship with the non-transformed variable, and a negative relationship with the squared variable) with both population size and population change.

H2: The higher the other's participation was at t-1, the higher participation will be at t.

H3: The higher the Cath-Prot unemployment ratio, the higher CNR participation will be, while the lower the variable, the higher PUL participation will be.

[114] I only used the deaths that took place between 1969 and 1998, the latter date marking the official end of the Troubles.
[115] Balcells et al. (2016), p.40; Deglow (2016), p.791

H4: The higher the deaths count in a Settlement, the higher participation will be.

Economic Insecurity

My measurement of economic insecurity takes into account both a permanent insecurity, measured through class, and also a more time-sensitive insecurity intended to represent the impact of the Great Recession, the worst impact of which fell right in the middle of my observed time period. To proxy the first, I used the 2011 census to measure the percentage of Catholics and Protestants in each Settlement employed in 'technical, semi-routine, and routine occupations'. Such people are likely to be low-paid and low-skilled, and therefore economically vulnerable.

To capture the more time-variant impact of the Recession, I measured the percent of households in a Settlement in receipt of housing benefit.[116] I chose this benefit, first, because as it is available to those in work it measures the presence of poverty in general, not just the poverty of the unemployed, and second, because the type of poverty it measures – the inability to afford shelter – is a particularly potent source of insecurity.

Economic insecurity could have two competing impacts. The resource mobilisation thesis would lead us to expect economic insecurity to suppress participation by reducing the amount of time, energy or funds people have to invest in collective action.[117] Threat theory by contrast would lead us to expect that a sudden decline in an individual's circumstances may lead to the sense that

[116] Households are used instead of a population measurement because in cases where two people share the same house, only one is allowed to claim the benefit. "Housing Benefit", *gov.uk*, accessed 16/06/2019, https://www.gov.uk/housing-benefit

[117] Cress & Snow (1996), p.1090

the security of their group is under threat, and inspire counter-mobilisation that might re-establish group dominance.[118] I believe that the minority population (CNRs) are more likely to respond in line with the resource mobilisation thesis, while the majority population (PULs) are more likely to behave according to the threat thesis. Therefore:

H5a: The higher the measures of economic insecurity, the lower the participation in CNR parades.

H5b: The higher the measures of economic insecurity, the higher the participation in PUL parades.

Other Controls

In addition to these variables, I include two other miscellaneous controls. Employing the census I measure the percentage of Catholics and Protestants in each Settlement educated to at least university level. Higher levels of education are positively associated with protest participation by African Americans and Hispanics (at least, US-born Hispanics).[119] However, I expect higher levels of education to negatively correlate with participation in the Northern Irish case, because Northern Irish parading is associated with competing nationalist sentiments absent from US minority mobilisation, and repeated studies have

[118] Biggs & Knauss (2012), p.634
[119] Williamson et al. (2018)

shown nationalist sentiment to have a negative relationship with educational attainment.[120]

I also include a t-1 lagged measure of participation. This is measured because many of the parades whose participants I measure recur on an annual basis. This control accounts for the habitual motive behind participation – the fact that people may parade simply because they have always paraded before.

Last but not least, I include a binary variable titled 'electionyear', labelled '1' on years when there was an election to the Northern Ireland Assembly, the devolved government of Northern Ireland.[121] Such elections are often characterised by intense sectarian competition, as the Unionist and Nationalist parties compete to be the largest force in the Assembly, and secure the First Minister position. I argue that in this atmosphere of intensified sectarian competition, peoples' ethnonational identities may become more salient. In such a context, higher participation in ethnonational parades is expected, as people who feel more attached to their nation may parade more.

[120] Hjerm (2001), p.50-55; Coenders & Scheepers (2003), p.330-333; Hjerm & Schnabel (2010), p.533

[121] There are four types of election that take place in Northern Ireland: Assembly elections to the devolved government, Westminster elections to the UK Parliament, local elections to councils and European elections to the EU Parliament. I tested both Assembly and Westminster elections, as members of these Parliaments have the greatest control over Northern Irish life at this time. Models were compared using AIC, which showed the Assembly election model to be the better fit.

Methods

My dependent variables – 'cnrparticipants' and 'pulparticipants' – are both overdispersed count variables. As such, I analyse them using negative binomial regression, standard poisson regressions being inappropriate for such data.[122] In line with other studies that employ pooled time-series data (for example, Durso & Jacobs (2013)) I use a population-averaged form of negative binomial regression, in order to account for the likelihood that observations within my spatial unit (Settlements) are correlated.[123] I also extend this assumption to the reported standard errors by using robust standard errors (in xtgee, robust standard errors are effectively clustered).

Population-averaged models employ generalised estimating equations, which in turn require the user to set a working covariance structure. Following Cui (2007), I use the QIC measure to select the most appropriate correlation structure, which turns out to be "independent" (observations over time are independent).[124] The results of this analysis are presented below in two forms. Regression tables (Fig. 3.4 & 3.5) will be used to show the precise relationships between my independent and dependent variables. And with that, we reach the end of the sections describing the process of study-construction. Now I present my results.

[122] Cunningham & Phillips (2007), p.793; Dhattiwala & Biggs (2012), p.493-494
[123] Durso & Jacobs (2013), p.134-135
[124] Cui (2007), p.211

Fig. 3.3) Correlates of PUL Parade Participation

	Model (1) (PUL)	Model (2) (PUL)	Model (3) (PUL)
sqrt_puldeaths	0.897**	0.884**	0.785***
	(-2.14)	(-2.35)	(-5.20)
cnrparticipants_lagged	1.011**	1.006	1.002
	(2.24)	(1.28)	(0.46)
cnrpop_pcent	1.080***	1.062***	1.051***
	(5.53)	(5.15)	(4.83)
cnrpop_pcent_sq	0.999***	0.999***	1.000***
	(-4.58)	(-4.31)	(-2.58)
popchange	1.805***	1.968***	2.491***
	(2.68)	(2.61)	(3.95)
popchange_squared	0.851***	0.855**	0.802***
	(-2.94)	(-1.99)	(-3.29)
unemployment_ratio	0.733**	0.842	0.808
	(-2.47)	(-1.07)	(-1.36)
pulworker		1.105***	1.015
		(5.74)	(0.59)
hbclaimants		1.033**	1.001
		(2.56)	(0.11)
puldegree			0.925***
			(-3.42)
pulparticipants_lagged			1.023***
			(9.27)
electionyear_a			0.817***
			(-3.33)
_cons	0.367**	0.0122***	0.345
	(-2.45)	(-10.07)	(-0.96)
N	1390	1390	1390

Exponentiated coefficients; *z* statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Fig. 3.4) Correlates of CNR Parade Participation

	Model (1) (CNR)	Model (2) (CNR)	Model (3) (CNR)
sqrt_cnrdeaths	0.900	1.011	0.860**
	(-1.63)	(0.20)	(-2.04)
pulparticipants_lagged	1.025***	1.017***	1.013***
	(6.15)	(4.93)	(3.51)
pulpop_pcent	0.841***	0.877***	0.926*
	(-3.15)	(-3.19)	(-1.95)
pulpop_pcent_sq	1.001**	1.001*	1.000
	(2.12)	(1.92)	(0.98)
popchange	1.096	0.806	0.819
	(0.26)	(-0.62)	(-0.45)
popchange_squared	0.920	0.901	0.934
	(-0.72)	(-0.93)	(-0.54)
unemployment_ratio	6.253***	4.133***	4.713***
	(3.43)	(3.29)	(3.20)
cnrworker		1.154***	1.093**
		(2.72)	(2.53)
hbclaimants		0.953**	0.957*
		(-2.02)	(-1.93)
cnrdegree			0.978
			(-0.53)
cnrparticipants_lagged			1.055***
			(4.63)
electionyear_a			0.826
			(-0.82)
_cons	0.0480***	0.00379***	0.00485***
	(-3.09)	(-3.81)	(-3.50)
N	1390	1390	1390

Exponentiated coefficients; *z* statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

3.4: Results

I begin my description of the regression results with the impacts of status threat. Starting with the demographic variables, in line with H1, PUL participation shows a quadratic relationship with both the size of the Catholic population in 2011, and the relative increase of the Catholic population between 2011 and 2001. Indeed, the latter variable has the largest single impact on the dependent variable. CNR participation however bucks this trend.

In the final model, CNR participation has a slight negative relationship with PUL population size, and this does not appear to be quadratic. However this effect is also barely significant, being at the 0.1 level. The association meanwhile between CNR population and demographic change over time is completely insignificant. It appears that minority populations, against expectations, are neither threatened by the demographic strength of the majority, nor enthused by their own burgeoning populations. This is an important contrast between minority and majority ethnic group behaviour, which will be explored further in the discussion.

The other measure of status threat – the size of the opposing ethnicity's mobilisations – had a slightly more consistent impact. Past CNR parade participation on PUL participation was positive, but not significant. PUL parade participation did however have a significant positive relationship to the incidence of CNR parade participation. Expectations regarding the impact of rights erosion were thoroughly met in the case of CNR participation, but PUL participation was unrelated to the ratio of Catholic-to-Protestant unemployment. Finally, both parade-types were associated with a significant negative correlation between historic victimisation and modern-day parades participation. This was not the

expected direction of the correlation, and the reasons why this might be the case will be covered in the discussion.

Turning to the economic variables, the expectations encapsulated in H5a and H5b were both refuted, with the results regarding CNR participation in particular being the reverse of expectations. CNR participation is higher in Settlements where the Catholic population is working class, not lower, and there is also a slight positive relationship between participation and housing insecurity (though this is only significant at the 90% level). PUL participation on the other hand is apparently unrelated to the proportion of Protestants in a Settlement that are working class, or to the extent to which households in a Settlement require housing benefit.

Finally, we have the miscellaneous controls. As expected, the size of the degree-holding population was negatively-associated with participation in CNR and PUL parades, though only the relationship with PUL participation is significant. Parade participation at t-1 is also consistently, positively-related to parade participation at t, though, given how ritualistic parades are, the size of the effect is not quite as large as one might expect. More interesting though is the impact of the electionyear variable. Contrary to expectations, election years are associated with a decline in parade participation for both CNR and PUL parades, though only the relationship with PUL parading is significant.

As outlined, the primary purpose of this Chapter is to discern if there is a relationship between parade participation and ethnic conflict. These results suggest that there is, in that status threat and the erosion of rights are both positively associated with participation in parades. However, what is also clear from this preliminary survey of the results, is that there are clear differences in what effects CNR and PUL mobilisation. I therefore structure the following results

discussion to make productive use of this difference, and compare and contrast the results of the two mobilisations. I start by discussing the results that have the same impact on CNR and PUL participation, and then move on to those which had opposite reactions. With this structure, I not only tie participation to threat, but also, will be able to isolate what ecological factors spark mobilisation amongst ethnic groups regardless of their power, and which factors must interact with a group's social status to bring people out onto the streets.

3.5: Discussion

Before we embark on discussing the findings described above, we must acknowledge their limitations. These results were generated via an ecological analysis, using units of analysis with populations ('cnrpop' and 'pulpop') that ranged in size from 35 and 12, to 65,011 and 45,665 respectively. There is therefore every chance, especially in the larger Settlements, that this analysis of the aggregate population does not capture the characteristics of the individuals actually going on parade. Reliance on this method is somewhat justified by the lack of viable alternative data to conduct a similar comparison.

There is very little survey data examining participation in ethnonational parades, or indeed, any collective action events in Northern Ireland. There are exceptions. For example, the Northern Ireland General Election Survey asks its respondents whether they are members of the Orange Order. However, such data sheds light on only a comparatively thin slice of parade participation. My Parades Commission Database therefore remains the most comprehensive source of data available on parade participation, and aggregate analysis the best option available. What's more, as will be seen over the course of this discussion, the results presented here are often in line with established conclusions drawn by the wider literature. In the interests of mollifying concerns then, let us proceed to discussing those factors with a consistent impact across all parade-types: education, past parading (same type) and past victimisation.

CNR-PUL Similarities

The results regarding educational attainment and repeat parading were as anticipated. Scholars have been using the ISSP to demonstrate the negative relationship between nationalist sentiment and educational attainment since the early 2000s.[125] Given that the identities expressed by PUL and CNR parades are 'national', it makes sense that a more educated population would be less likely to parade. It is interesting that the negative relationship is only significant for Protestants. The reasons for this are unclear, but, may be associated with the more 'leftist' character of Irish nationalism (in the context of Northern Ireland) as opposed to the more right-wing associations of PUL Britishness.

In regard to repeat parading, Blake (2019) has already identified unionist parades as rituals, in that they are '"symbolic 69avourabl that is socially standardised and repetitive"', and nationalist parades share many of the same traits.[126] Many of the parades in the PCD commemorate historical events, and it only makes sense that their participants would turn out year on year to mark these dates of national significance. The negative impact of past victimisation though makes for a more complex puzzle.

I expected that historic victimisation would result in deeper attachment to one's national identity. Those with stronger attachments to their national identities should in turn be more likely to participate in parades. These expectations were buttressed by findings that suggest that those with greater exposure to civil war violence are more likely to vote for ethnic or nationalist parties, and attend protests.[127] The results though show a negative relationship

[125] Hjerm (2001), p.50-55; Coenders & Scheepers (2003), p.330-333; Hjerm & Schnabel (2010), p.533
[126] Blake (2019), p.7
[127] Hadzic et al. (2017), p.17; Freitag et al. (2017), p.7-8

between participation and victimisation. I have two explanations for this. First, the work of Hadzic et al. (2017) and Costalli & Ruggeri (2018) suggests that, in some contexts at least, the direct impact of civil war on political behaviour fades over time.[128] Given that the most serious violence of the Troubles took place in the late 1960s-early 1970s, over 30 years before many of the parades in my dataset took place, it may be that the mobilising effect of violence has waned.

However, in such a case, the expected result would be non-significance, not a significant and negative relationship. A more appropriate explanation is extractable from the work of Lesschaeve (2019). Unlike the other studies mentioned, Lesschaeve (2019) explicitly measures two separate kinds of ethnic war experience: that of being a fighter in the war, and that of having PTSD or other war-related trauma.[129] He found that the former experience was related to increased voting for nationalist parties, while the latter diminished the likelihood of doing so.[130] As a further test of these possibilities, I have decided to employ a second analysis, using survey data gathered in the 2005 edition of the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey.

The NILT is an annual survey designed 'to monitor the attitudes and behaviour of people in Northern Ireland annually to provide a time-series and a public record of how [their] attitudes and behaviour develop on a wide range of social policy issues.[131]' In 2005, a randomly-selected sample of 1200 people were asked a series of questions relating to their political behaviour and their conflict victimisation (this is the only year both sets of questions were asked). To test the validity of my existing results regarding the impact of conflict experience

[128] Hadzic et al. (2017), p.8; Costalli & Ruggeri (2018), p.949-950
[129] Lesschaeve (2019), p.2-3
[130] Ibid, p.12
[131] ARK (2006), 'Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, 2005' [computer file], *ARK*, www.ark.ac.uk/nilt [distributor], June 2006.

on parades participation, I conducted two sets of logistic regressions on Catholic (n=357) and Protestant (n=592) respondents to the survey.

My dependent variable measured whether the respondent had 'taken part in a demonstration, picket or march', which, while not a perfect equivalent of my CNR and PUL participation variable (which focuses on a specific kind of parade, not all mobilisations), is the best available. My key variables of interest stated whether the respondent considered themselves to be a 'victim of the Troubles' or whether they had been 'a victim of any conflict-related violent incidents'. I also included a number of controls, including income decline, class and education level, similar to those included in the ecological regression.

The results of this analysis are more in line with what we would expect from the literature. Victimisation of both kinds was associated with higher levels of Catholic collective action, while the latter variant (direct experience of conflict violence) was positively correlated with Protestant collective action (being a self-identified Troubles victim was not significantly correlated with participation). To explain this, I could follow Lesschaeve (2019), and argue that my ecological analysis measures the effect of the trauma of war, while the survey analysis captures fighting experience, but, given that the survey measures ask respondents whether or not they are 'victims' of violence, not whether they fought, this does not seem a particularly defensible interpretation.

What is more likely is either (i) that the survey variable's non-specificity when defining collective action obscures a difference in participation-motivations for parades and protests, or, (ii) that a count of Troubles-era murders captures a different trait of the ecological environment from the one I intended to measure. I do not have the data to confirm or dismiss either of these possibilities, and therefore, am left with an unexplained difference. Additional work will be

required to solve the problem of what exactly the relationship is between collective action and historic violence in Northern Ireland, but at least now we have a better grasp on the problems we must solve.

CNR-PUL Differences

As shown in the literature review, it is common practice for scholars to test the effects of demographic change on majority-group mobilisation, but not for minority-group mobilisation. The results of my study show why, but also raise an important question. PUL parade participation follows the same trend as white and nativist protest in the USA, by having a positive, quadratic relationship with the 'ethnic other's' population size, and with demographic shifts that increase the relative size of the Catholic population. Meanwhile, CNR participation has mostly no relation to the size of the local Protestant population, nor to any Protestant-favouring shift in the local Catholic population. This discrepancy confirms the approach of the literature, but, it also suggests an interesting characteristic of minority ethnic mobilisation.

The theoretical justification for why majority-ethnic mobilisation should emerge in reaction to local demographic change, is that a rising minority population is interpreted by majority groups as a threatening increase in minority political or economic power.[132] Social psychology has supported this argument, by showing that supplying whites in the USA and Canada with information that their group will in future no longer be a majority in their city, state or country, causes stronger fear and dislike of other ethnic groups, and

[132] Boutcher et al. (2017), p.691-692

increased sympathy with their own group.[133] The process however does not happen in reverse. Not only is there no comparable CNR mobilisation in contexts where the Protestant population is high or rising, but there is also no CNR mobilisation when the Catholic population is rising.

It is understandable that minorities would not react against demographic proof that the ethnic majority remains the majority, or even that locally their population is increasing – that is not a jarring departure from the norm. It is less expected that there is no relationship between the mobilisation of minorities, and their own rising demographic power. It would be ridiculous to suggest that whites alone view population size as a measure of power, and regardless, there is evidence to the contrary: the same studies that show whites' sensitivity to rising ethnic minority populations also reveal a similar threat-response amongst African Americans to information about rising Latinx populations.[134] The lack of reverse causation is important, because there is significant disagreement in the social movement literature as to whether it is strength or weakness that motivates people to join collective action events. The results of the above regression would seem to suggest that it is perceived weakness, not perceived strength, that causes mobilisation. This conclusion is reinforced by the results relating to economic discrimination.

This time the measure of discrimination has its large, positive effect on CNR mobilisation, and no effect on PUL mobilisation, despite being, at its highest level, a measure of comparative Catholic weakness and Protestant strength. This shows a similarity between minority and majority activism. Despite the difference in their collective power, both minorities and majorities are apparently

[133] Outten et al. (2012), p.19-20; Craig et al. (2018), p.206-207
[134] Craig & Richeson (2018), p.389-390

most mobilised by threats to their position, rather than by their access to resources.

These are not the only differences in how the two groups mobilise, though the other differences are not quite so stark. Participation in PUL parades is unrelated to participation in CNR parades in the previous year, while there is a positive correlation between increased participation in CNR parades, and higher PUL participation the year before. As one parader put it, the message often is: '"Listen, we're here, we're not going to threaten you, but we're here, we exist."'[135] I explain this difference through reference to research by the NILT.

The 2015 edition of the NILT showed that Catholics are more likely to be 'annoyed' by Loyalist parades (27%), than Protestants are by Republican parades (20%).[136] Catholics are also more likely than Protestants to state that parades should only be able to march through areas with the consent of local residents.[137] This evidence suggests Catholics are more prone to be see PUL parades (particularly those which seek enter Catholic areas without permission) as a symbolic threat, than Protestants are by CNR parades. Taken together with the findings regarding the impact of demographic change, we find here further evidence that while status threat does impact mobilisation, ethnic groups differ in what they perceive as threatening to the status of their group.

The relationship of participation to the resource mobilisation variables is interesting. It is particularly surprising that higher proportions of Protestants that are working class in a Settlement has no impact on participation, especially

[135] Blake (2019), p.113
[136] ARK (2016)
[137] In the 2014 NILT, 73% of Catholics agreed that 'Parades should only be allowed if the organisers and local residents agree to the arrangements'. Only 57% of Protestants agreed. In the 2015 NILT, in response to the same question, 82% of Catholics agreed as opposed to 63% of Protestants. ARK (2015); ARK (2016).

given that the Orange Order has a mostly working-class membership.[138] It may be though that expanding the study of PUL participation beyond the Order has incorporated parading groups with a more middle or upper-class membership, thereby eliminating the association.

The positive relationship between participation and the proportion of working class Catholics could be attributed to two factors. First, Republican groups have traditionally been strongest in working class Catholic areas, and therefore, people living in majority-working class Catholic communities are more likely to participate in Republican parades. Second, working class Catholics are most likely of all Catholics to be impacted by unequal levels of unemployment, and so are most likely to be mobilised by a sense of discrimination. Unfortunately, we have no data to test either of these pathways, so more work is needed to properly investigate the link between class and national mobilisation in Northern Ireland.

Finally, we have the unexpected result of the 'electionyear' variable. Assembly elections often involve Unionist politicians calling for Protestant unity in the face of the threat of a Sinn Fein electoral majority.[139] Despite this however, PUL parade participation is negatively related to the timing of Assembly elections, whereas CNR mobilisation appears unaffected by the political context. The question is, why would one community be more responsive than the other? One potential explanation for this difference is offered by the NILT's examination of political trust. Between 2007 and 2014, when asked "How much has the N Ireland Assembly achieved?" and "are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way Northern Ireland MLAs are doing their job?", the

[138] McAuley, James et al. (2008), p.5
[139] Tonge et al. (2014), p.170; DeYoung (2018), p.133

responses of Catholics were consistently more positive than those of Protestants.[140] This greater Protestant pessimism offers the following reading of 'electionyear': Protestants, being more pessimistic about the worth of politics, are unlikely to respond to the electoral context with any great enthusiasm. Therefore, the differential impact of electoral proximity is, I argue, due to different levels of trust in the messenger.

In conclusion, the differences between what mobilises CNR and PUL paraders both confirms our previous expectations regarding the impact of ethnic threat on parade participation, and, advances our understanding of how ethnic minorities and majorities react to their ecological environments. There is a tendency in the scholarship on social movements to associate higher levels of minority-ethnic activism with communal resources and political opportunities, and majority-ethnic activism with threats.[141] My literature review suggested otherwise, showing that threat was equally important for both minorities and majorities, with the real difference lying in the form of threat thought to have the most impact. The findings here reflect that broader conclusion.

What this study has shown is that members of ethnic groups mobilise to celebrate the group more, when they think it is under threat. The primary difference between ethnic majority and minority mobilisation lies in what group members perceive as most threatening. The consequences of this observation for the social movements literature will be covered in the following, and final, section of this chapter.

[140] See the 2008 through to 2015 NILT surveys.
[141] Azab & Santoro (2017), p.476-477; Owens et al. (2019), p.556

3.6: Conclusion

The purpose of this Chapter was to find out if there is, in fact, a relationship between parade participation and ethnic conflict. The puzzle at the heart of this thesis – the fact that Northern Ireland has so many parades and so little parades-related ethnic conflict – is only a puzzle so long as we expect parades to be driven by similar motives to that which lie behind ethnic conflict. This Chapter has shown that that is the case. Threats to the status of one's ethnic group, and the erosion of the rights possessed by the group, indicated by the greater strength of an ethnic other, are each positively related to participation in parades. However, this is not the only work this Chapter does. I believe this study to be the first to compare and contrast the correlates of mobilisation by minority and majority ethnic groups. Given this novelty, I will take this section to articulate the broader consequences of that comparison for the literature, before describing where this dissertation intends to go next.

As summarised by Owens et al. (2019), minority ethnic mobilisation is usually 'predicted to emerge when new resources or organizational structures become available or when the political context becomes more 77avourable to activism', while mobilisations by the ethnic majority are 'more likely to be prompted by perceived threats to pre-existing privileges.'[142] My review of the literature on ethnic minority protest in the US already challenged that assumption, finding the threat of discrimination to regularly increase the likelihood of members of minority ethnic groups participating in protest. This Chapter further confirms that minority group mobilisation is more likely under conditions of threat. More than that though, this study actively compared the

[142] Owens et al. (2019), p.556

kinds of threat that motivates minorities and majorities to action, testing to see whether demographic shifts and economic discrimination impacted minority and majority mobilisation respectively. By showing that they do not, I articulate a finding that has been assumed, but not tested, by the literature: that the status of one's group alters one's perception of what is threatening. However, the comparison undertaken here is only partial. There are many gaps for future comparisons to fill.

One clear weakness of this study is my inability to assess the impact of changing political opportunities. Due to a combination of Settlement boundaries not matching up with constituency boundaries, and the fact that the Nationalist-Unionist proportions of the Assembly barely shift in size over the period I study, I was not able to measure factors relating to political context. Given the importance of political opportunity theory in understanding why protests peak at particular times, comparing how ethnic groups of differing status respond to such opportunities would be a vital addition to further work.

Second, further studies should seek to examine if the scale of the power imbalance offers different findings. Catholics are a very numerically large minority (45% of Northern Ireland's population in 2011), with the Protestant population being only slightly larger (48%). It may well be that in contexts where the minority population is far smaller, the comparative importance of resources, organisations and political context rises, while that of threat falls. Additional studies should therefore seek to compare majority and minority mobilisation amongst larger majorities/smaller minorities, as well as conduct broader cross-national analyses of differences between majority/minority mobilisation. These however are tasks for other studies.

This thesis will now move away from a discussion of the causes of ethnic mobilisation, to discuss the causes of ethnic conflict. Having shown that we should indeed expect parades to incite more conflict than they do, we now seek to discover why parades-related conflict is so rare. We do this first, by examining the impact of demographic residence patterns on parades-related protest.

Chapter Four: Segregation or Contestability? The Correlates of Parades-Related Protest

4.1: Introduction

In the previous chapter, I established that participation in both PUL and CNR parades is motivated by anxiety about the status of one's ethnic group. This reveals the link between parading, which is not on the surface an explicitly confrontational activity, and ethnic conflict. Having shown that there is a link between the motives of parading, and the motives for ethnic conflict, we turn to the question of why it is that parades, on average, do not tend to trigger such conflict. In this Chapter I assess the impact of demographic geography.

As identified in Ch.2, a burgeoning literature has identified the borders between ethnic areas as the primary site of ethnic violence. However, the chapter also identified a debate as to what kind of border is most conducive to conflict. Madueke (2018 & 2019) and Legewie & Schaeffer (2016) argue 'fuzzy boundaries', areas of relatively mixed populations lying in between areas dominated by particular ethnic groups, are most conducive to conflict because they are vulnerable and therefore 'up for grabs'.[143] Other studies however, most notably Cook et al. (2018), argue that the key factor incentivising conflict is the social distance that exists between ethnic groups, a distance that is empirically captured by residential segregation.[144] In this Chapter I pit these competing

[143] Legewie & Schaeffer (2016), p.131-132
[144] Cook et al. (2018), p.642

theories against each other, with my results suggesting that it is indeed social distance, not contestability, that is more related to ethnic conflict.

As stated above, I intend to use Chapter Four to investigate the impact of residence patterns on conflict. My study differs from those surveyed in literature review along two key dimensions. First, I do not proxy 'ethnic conflict' with violence, but rather with protests, wherein one ethnic group (Catholics) challenge the claims to spatial ownership made by another ethnic group (Protestants). Participation in protests carries fewer consequences than participation in violence, and this may make protests more common in riskier conditions than violence is (i.e. in settings where the ethnic other is more numerous).

Second, my study differs in that I focus on comparing officially-designated 'contested spaces'. Therefore, instead of testing theories about what makes one space vulnerable to violence, and another not, I am able to test hypotheses about what makes one space, already known to be vulnerable, more conflict-prone than another. As Krause (2018) has shown, just because a space is vulnerable to conflict, that vulnerability does not determine conflict.[145] Since vulnerability has already been quite comprehensively theorised, scholarship must move on to determining what catalyses that vulnerability, and turns it into conflict. In Chapter 4 I attempt to discern what residence patterns act as those catalysts.

The structure of the Chapter is as follows. Following this Introduction, in my next section I will introduce and describe the event with which I measure conflict: the parades-related protest. This will involve a quick history of the CNR parades-related protest movement, and a description of where I got the data on

[145] Krause (2018), p.52-56

these protests from. After that I will move to describing the key geographic unit, the flashpoint, both how I constructed them and how I categorised them. After this I present my hypotheses, the independent variables that test them, the method of quantitative analysis, and the results. Finally, I conclude the Chapter by discussing the consequences of the results, both in terms of how they reflect on past findings, and, by reflecting on how this study could inform future research.

4.2: CNR Counter-Protest

The form of ethnic conflict studied in this chapter is the Nationalist counter-protest. In this section, I describe what counter-protests look like, and the loose movement they were a part of. I then describe the data used to identify them, though, this will not take long given that I already introduced the Parades Commission Dataset in the previous chapter.

Nationalist counter-protests usually involve groups of people, ranging in size from 10 to 100, standing by the side of a road to communicate their displeasure (usually via handheld signs) at the passage of a Unionist parade past or through a majority Catholic area. This opposition is not simply based on Catholic antipathy to Unionist parades.[146] Catholics have long-disliked or feared Unionist parades, both for the Protestant triumphalism they are seen to embody, and the disruption brought by blocked roads and loud noises. For most of the C20th however, the most common reaction to them was avoidance, either by staying at home with the blinds drawn, or going on holiday (something which is particularly common during the Twelfth of July celebrations).[147]

Catholic quiescence came to an end in the 1990s. Then, self-styled 'residents groups' across Northern Ireland began organised protest campaigns against Unionist parades.[148] Their campaigns, which sought to prevent Loyal Order marches from moving through majority-Catholic areas, proved successful, with protests convincing the Parades Commission to restrict the routes of multiple parades.[149] There is no work that identifies a cause for this general shift

[146] Jarman & Bryan (1996), https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/csc/reports/parade11.htm#why
[147] Caldwell (2001), p.110-111, 188, 224, 263; Interview, Sean O'Baoill, 25th July 2017.
[148] Jarman & Bryan (1996), https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/csc/reports/parade.htm#dispute
[149] Parades Commission (2000), p.31-44

from avoidance to resistance. However, one important change was the development of an argument that Unionist parades should only be able to parade past Catholic areas with the consent of the residents of those areas.

This framing, reorienting the issue to one of consent and equal rights, found massive support amongst Catholics. A 1999 survey found that 89% of Catholics agreed that parades should only take place with residents' consent, and over a decade later 73% (2014) and 82% (2015) of Catholics continued to express this opinion.[150] On occasion, this resistance led to outright conflict, with the most famous example being the Drumcree Conflict in Portadown, where for four years in a row, the passage or non-passage of an Orange parade along the majority-Catholic and protested Garvaghy Road led to extensive riots.[151] However, violence is a rare even in relation to protested parades. Most protests are as peaceful as they are claimed to be. It should also be restated, as was I addressed in the Introduction, that it is rare for parades to be protested: only 0.1% of PUL parades in my 2006-2016 dataset were protested.

Nationalist counter-protests are organised rather than spontaneous. This is by design. Protest organisers I spoke to often stated that the formal protest groups and times were developed in order to lower the risk of conflict posed by pre-existing, more-spontaneous mobilisations.[152] Since 1998 the protests' premeditated quality has been legally enforced, as those intending to protest parades are required by the Public Processions (NI) Act 1998 to submit advance notification of this intent, just the same as those organising parades.[153] I

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[150] Smithey (2002), p.170; ARK, *Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, 2014* [computer file], ARK www.ark.ac.uk/nilt [distributor], June 2015; ARK, *Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, 2015* [computer file], ARK www.ark.ac.uk/nilt [distributor], June 2016

[151] McKenna, Fionnuala & Martin Melaugh, 'Developments at Drumcree, 1995-2000', *Conflict Archive on the Internet*, https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/issues/parade/develop.htm#9, accessed 14/01/2019

[152] Interview, Joe Marley, 13th July 2017

[153] Public Processions (NI) Act 1998, s 7(1) & 7(2)

therefore use the Parades Commission Database to identify which parades are protested.

By comparing information on the date, time and location of protests, with the date, time and route of parades, I have been able to link all notified protests to the parades they opposed. This allowed me to produce a binary variable named 'protest', that captures whether or not a particular parade was protested. The question however, is what population of parades do I compare my protested parades with? It would not make sense to compare protested parades to the whole dataset, as there are many parades in that dataset that, by not passing near Catholic areas, are unlikely to be protested. However, there is a subset of parades – named 'contentious' or 'sensitive' parades – which have been explicitly identified by the Parades Commission as passing near or through Catholic communities liable to protest. As all parades that are protested are also contentious/sensitive, those contentious/sensitive, but unprotested, parades make for an appropriate control group.

In this section I have introduced the CNR parades-related protest and described both my dependent variable and the data source I constructed it from. In the next, I move on to discuss how I identified whether these parades took place in a context of social distance, or contestable space. This involved, as I will describe, the construction of a new geographic unit: the flashpoint.

4.3: Flashpoints

'Flashpoints' are areas of Northern Ireland – usually sections of roads – identified by the Parade Commission. They are set apart because the Commission believes that if PUL parades were to walk through these spaces, it would anger nearby Catholics. In this study I group my parades into 38 flashpoints. In this section I describe how I constructed those flashpoints using QGIS, and how I categorised them, to investigate the influence of ethnic residence patterns on the incidence of protests. I conclude by stating the hypotheses relating to those categorisations, which this study will test.

One of the chief powers of the Parades Commission, given to it by the Public Processions (NI) Act 1998, is the ability to impose restrictions on where parades can march. This power is exercised when the Commission believes a parade might potentially incite public disorder and/or property damage, or otherwise disrupt 'the life of the community' or 'relationships within the community'.[154]

The presence of such risks is usually brought to the notice of the Parades Commission by its own employees (the Authorised Officers) as well as by politicians and the police.[155] If the Commission judges that the parades does post a risk to public order or community relations, it can place restrictions on the behaviour of the parade as it marches through a particular area, or ban the parade from marching in that area. These restrictions are publicised via an official form known as a determination. Breaching these restrictions carries the penalties of a fine and jail time, and given their legal status, the Commission is

[154] Public Processions (NI) Act 1998, s 8(6)
[155] Parades Commission (1999), p.22-24; Email response to Freedom of Information request, received 28th October 2016.

usually very exact about the roads and streets on which its restrictions apply.[156] I used their descriptions to create my flashpoints.

The Parades Commission Dataset identifies those parades that have had conditions imposed on them. After cutting the dataset down to only PUL parades with conditions, I downloaded the determinations associated with each parade. I then matched each parade to a particular stretch of street or road where either (i) its behaviour was restricted or (ii) it was forbidden from going. Using QGIS, an open-source geographic information system (GIS) program, I marked restricted spaces on a map of Northern Ireland (generated using openstreetmap).

As part of this process I found that some of the restricted spaces, though not identical, were so close to each other that I felt they should be treated as the same flashpoint. This process of identification and grouping resulted in a list of 38 distinct flashpoints.[157] These flashpoints are present across Northern Ireland. They are mostly located in large urban areas, with 30% of them in Belfast, and another 20% in settlements with a population of above 18,000, but they are not exclusively an urban phenomenon. 25% of flashpoints are to be found in villages with a population of under 2,500.

Once I identified the flashpoints, I then set about categorising them. The categories were created in order to test whether it is vulnerable space or social distance that most incentivises ethnic conflict. My goal was to assess whether or not a flashpoint lay in the vicinity of a 'fuzzy boundary' between areas mostly inhabited by different groups, or, a hard, segregated one. I accomplished this

[156] Public Processions (NI) Act 1998, s 8(9)

[157] It was initially 39. However, the extra flashpoint was Belfast city centre, an uninhabited area likely marked as 'contentious' due to the parade's ability to disrupt economic activity. Given my interest is in a parade's ability to incur Catholic reaction, I took the approach that this contentious space was not like the others and dropped it and the associated parades from the dataset.

through further use of QGIS. I overlaid the map of Northern Ireland with Small Area and 'gridsquare' polygons. The former are the smallest enumeration area used in the 2011 census, while the second consists of 1km by 1km (or, in more densely populated areas 100m by 100m) squares, arranged in a grid laid over the island of Ireland.[158] Using data from the 2011 census I constructed two ratios, one which provided a measure of how many Catholics lived in an area for every 1 Protestant (Protestant:Catholic), and other which measured how many Protestants lived in an area for every 1 Catholic (Catholic:Protestant), for both geographical units. I used both units because gridsquares offer more finegrained picture of population dispersal than the census districts, but, census data is only available for gridsquares which overlay space with at least 30 inhabitants in 10 households.[159] Combining the two offers the clearest picture of settlement patterns available.

My principle interest is in borders: areas where there is a noticeable transition between spaces mostly inhabited by Protestants, and those mostly inhabited by Catholics. I define 'mostly inhabited' as a ration of 1:3 and higher. I separate borders into two types. 'Hard borders' exist where the transition is between areas where Catholics and Protestants live in large-to-absolute majorities (defined as units where the respective ratios are above 1:3). The example of this, presented below in Fig. 4.1, is the Crumlin Road, where the majority-Catholic neighbourhoods of Mountainview and the Ardoyne border the majority-Protestant Shankill.

'Soft borders', meanwhile, exist where the transition is either between areas where Catholics and Protestants reside in moderate majorities (where the


[158] For images, see https://www.nisra.gov.uk/support/geography/grid-square-products
[159] NISRA (2015), p.1

respective ratios are between 1:1.5 and 1:3), or between areas where one group lives in a large-to-absolute majority, and the other lives in a moderate-to-small majority. The chosen example of a soft border is Castlederg, pictured below in Fig. 4.2. Of the 38 flashpoints, 50% are in the vicinity of borders. Of these 19, ten are hard borders, nine soft borders. In the following study, I assume that hard borders imply a degree of social separation, while soft borders imply the presence of contestable territory. This results in the following hypotheses:


H1: Ethnic conflict is more likely when communities are polarised and socially distant from one another. Therefore, hard borders should be positively associated with frequency of parade-related protests.

H2: Ethnic conflict is more likely in spaces where boundaries between the communities are 'fuzzy', and therefore space is contestable. Therefore, soft borders should be positively associated with the frequency of protests.

4.1) Map of Hard Border (Crumlin Road)



4.2) Map of Soft Border (Castlederg)



4.4: Controls & Method

The variables of interest in this study are measured at the level of the flashpoint. However, there are other factors beyond patterns of demographic residence that are likely to influence the occurrence of protest, and many of these are measurable at the level of the parade itself. In this Section, I will first describe these control variables. Then I will briefly describe the method used to analyse my data, before moving on to describe the results.

My first control tests the possibility that protests are as ritualistic as the parades they cover, by using a binary variable that accounts for whether the same parade was protested the year before. In their work on counter-mobilisation in the USA, Reynolds-Stenson & Earl (2019) found that larger parades were more likely to face counter-protests.[160] I test their assumption here by taking the sum total of participants in parades that pass a particular flashpoint on a particular day. I use the sum total as sometimes multiple PUL organisations parade the same flashpoint on the same day, but I assume that if numbers do antagonise Catholic residents, they are unlikely to distinguish between the size of separate lodge parades.

It is possible that determinations may reduce parades' antagonistic qualities. In particular, determinations that totally prevent parades from marching through flashpoint areas are likely to remove the need to protest. Parades-related protests aim to contest the implicit claim parades make to ownership of space. Route bans in effect are indications that the state both supports and enforces the protesters' side in the debate over spatial ownership.

[160] Reynolds-Stenson & Earl (2019), p.274

As such, I argue that the higher the proportion of parades p/flashpoint-month that have route bans, the lower the likelihood of protests.

I contend that parades with greater symbolic significance for the PUL community are more likely to be protested, as opposition to them is likelier to send a stronger message about Catholic grievance. I account for this using a binary variable named "twelfth", which marks whether or not a parade took place on the Twelfth of July, the most important PUL holiday.

I also include a variable measuring the proportion of votes that were cast for Sinn Fein in the constituency within which each flashpoint is based, as a proxy for Sinn Fein support in the flashpoint area. This measure takes into account the often central role played by Sinn Fein activists and politicians in organising and representing the protests, including Joe Marley in North Belfast, Daithi McKay in Rasharkin and Thomas O'Reilly in Newtownbutler.[161] I chose to use the vote share won in Westminster elections rather than for the devolved Northern Ireland Assembly for two reasons. First, there were three separate Westminster Parliaments in existence between 2006 and 2016, and only 2 full-term Assemblies, so using the Westminster vote provides more variation in vote share. Second, Sinn Fein's abstentionism means they cannot change policy at Westminster, so a vote for a Sinn Fein MP is more purely a sign of partisan or identarian support than a vote for a Sinn Fein MLA.

Finally, in line with the findings of Chapter 3 regarding the association of Catholic-Protestant employment disparities with increased parade participation, I

[161] Interview, Local Scholar, 15th July 2018; 'Rasharkin residents could take legal action over parade', *Belfast Telegraph*, 23rd August 2010, https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/rasharkin-residents-could-take-legal-action-over-parade-28554361.html, accessed 02/12/2019; '20 years on: Still no middle ground on Newtownbutler', *Fermanagh Herald*, 2nd July 2015, https://fermanaghherald.com/2015/07/20-years-on-still-no-middle-ground-on-newtown/, accessed 02/12/2019

test to see if Catholic protest is also rendered more likely in years with higher relative Catholic unemployment.

With the control variables established, all that remains to be done is establish the method. As my dependent variable is expressed as binary variable, while my independent variables of interest are grouped at a higher geographical level, a multilevel logistic model was deemed to be the most appropriate. I fit the model using the equation below, where a random intercept is added at the flashpoint level. With the variables and the model now described, I move now to present and discuss the results of my analysis.

Fig. 4.3) Protest – Descriptive Statistics

Variable	*Obs*	*Mean*	*Min*	*Max*
Protest	1134	.26	0	1
Protest (lag)	816	.305	0	1
Soft Border	1134	.358	0	1
Hard Border	1134	.366	0	1
Participants	1134	642.723	1	20000
Route Ban	1134	.612	0	1
Twelfth	1134	.24	0	1
Sinn Vote (%)	1134	27.899	0	71.1
Unemployment Ratio	1134	1.405	1	1.7

Fig. 4.4) Correlates of CNR Protest

	Model (1)	Model (2)	Model (3)	Model (4)	Model (5)	Model (6)
protest_lag	1.345***	1.348***	1.351***	1.338***	1.336***	1.517***
	(3.72)	(3.70)	(3.58)	(3.54)	(3.42)	(3.39)
softborder	-1.964	-1.961	-1.930	-1.899	-1.517	-1.313
	(-1.40)	(-1.40)	(-1.36)	(-1.36)	(-1.17)	(-1.02)
hardborder	2.320**	2.334**	2.048+	2.022+	2.127**	2.306**
	(2.20)	(2.23)	(1.83)	(1.88)	(2.16)	(2.40)
participants_day		-0.089	-0.093	-0.271	-0.275	-0.249
		(-0.27)	(-0.29)	(-0.80)	(-0.82)	(-0.84)
routeban			-0.545	-0.582	-0.580	-0.510
			(-0.82)	(-0.93)	(-0.93)	(-0.90)
twelfth				0.521**	0.521**	0.535**
				(2.13)	(2.09)	(2.20)
sfvote					1.294+	1.662+
					(1.71)	(1.94)
unemployment_ratio						1.019**
						(2.11)
_cons	***	***	***	***	***	***
	(-3.92)	(-3.89)	(-3.33)	(-3.46)	(-3.69)	(-3.71)
/var(_cons[flashpointid])	**	+	+	+	+	+
	(1.96)	(1.92)	(1.94)	(1.91)	(1.68)	(1.72)
AIC	554.4	556.2	556.6	555.2	555.5	543.9
N	816	816	816	816	816	816

Exponentiated coefficients; Standardized beta coefficients; *z* statistics in parentheses
+ $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

4.5: Findings & Their Implications

Results

I begin this section by describing the results of my regression, before moving on to discuss the implications. I start by discussing the results relating to the control variables.

Protests do prove to be somewhat ritualistic, with a parade being protested one year increasing the likelihood of it being protested the next year. A higher vote share for Sinn Fein is also associated with higher odds of a parade in that constituency being protested, but, the relationship is only significant at the 0.1 level. Against expectations, 12th July parades are less likely to be protested than others, which suggests that protesters are less interested in sending a message than they are tackling actually-problematic parades. Years where more Catholics were unemployed relative to Protestants also increase the odds of protests, which implies the sensible conclusion that a broader sense of being discriminated against increases Catholics' sensitivity to PUL 'triumphalism'.

My results regarding the impact of route bans and number of participants were statistically insignificant, which is surprising. These results may not be conclusive however. As regards route bans, one issue with my methodology is that while my data gathering method captures parades that attempt to parade a contentious route, I do not capture parades that have decided to amend their routes on the basis of a route ban, and are therefore no longer contentious. As such, the data here may not be sufficient to thoroughly test the effect of parade restrictions in ending ethnic conflicts. As regards participants, the difference between the results I find and those found by Reynolds-Stenson & Earl (2019) is

the overall size. Their study finds an effect only for protests exceeding 10,000 participants in size.[162] By contrast, the mean size of my participants variable is 642. It may be that very large mobilisations do see more counter-demonstrations, but, given the small size of most parades, this study cannot confirm or deny that hypothesis.

What this study can do however is add to our understanding of what demographic residence patterns are most associated with conflict. The results show that CNR counter-protest is far more common in proximity to highly-segregated areas than in areas where the boundary between groups is fuzzier. Being in the proximity of a hard border doubles the odds of a parade being protested, while proximity to a soft border does not have a significantly significant relationship to parades being protested. H1 is proven, while H2 is disproven, meaning that this study corroborates the argument that higher degrees of segregation are more associated with ethnic conflict that the vulnerability of space to ethnic contestation.

Discussion

In discussing the key findings of this study, the differences between the work done here and that mentioned in the literature review should be acknowledged. My measurement of conflict – counter-protests – is a very different phenomenon to the violence or deaths that are usually used to quantify conflict. This difference may limit the relevance this study has to the literature. Those seeking violence are likely to be more careful in selecting their targets than protesters

[162] Reynolds-Stenson & Earl (2019), p.274

are to select which parades to target. The former choice carries more risk of injury (or death) than the latter, and this in turn makes 'opportunity' more important to perpetrators' choice of where to enact ethnic violence.

That said, opportunity is not solely about risk. It is also about reward, and parades disputes, though they do not offer much in the way of material reward, offer symbolic goods. It is reasonable to assume that protests regarding parades might have more efficacy in less segregated conditions, as, with less social distance between Protestants and Catholics, it may be that PUL parading groups are more willing to listen and react constructively to protester grievances. However, that is not the pattern we observe here. Protest is far more common in areas where ethnic divisions are entrenched. Even though the risks of protesting are nowhere near equivalent to the risks of violence, there is still reason to suggest that this study demonstrates that it is motive, more than opportunity, that best explains ethnic protest.

Demonstrating that segregated spaces are more likely to produce ethnic conflict is however only the first step in this study. The puzzle I am here to solve is why parades-related ethnic conflict is so rare. Breaking down the numbers of this study offers an answer to that question. First, as mentioned above, only nine out of 38, less than a quarter of the flashpoints are in the vicinity of a hard border. What's more, these flashpoints are also geographically concentrated. All but one is located in Belfast, and five of the nine are located in North Belfast.

The fact of their location is not surprising. Deaths during the Troubles were similarly concentrated in North Belfast, and this violence intensified segregation.[163] Beyond Belfast however, such hard borders are very rare. What's

[163] Doherty & Poole (1997), p.532-534; Cunningham & Gregory (2013), p.68-69

more, maps suggest that these borders are not simply rare for flashpoints, but appear to be rare in general.

In the next page I present four maps. The first, Fig. 4.5 is of Northern Ireland as a whole, and shows the Catholic:Protestant and Protestant:Catholic population ratios at Small Area level. This map reveals 22 areas where Small Areas with high Catholic:Protestant and Protestant:Catholic ratios directly border each other. I investigated these further using gridsquares. As mentioned above, one feature of gridsquares is that, if they contain fewer than 30 inhabitants in 10 households, census data is not provided for them. While this does hamper my ability to see precise boundaries using gridsquares, it does allow me to see whether the boundaries of Small Areas are heavily populated. What's more, gridsquares covering uninhabited areas are excluded from the map. Taken together, I use gridsquares to see if the larger Small Areas are at their edges more equivalent in population than they appear, or if at their boundaries, Small Areas prove sparsely populated. If these features are indeed present, that would reduce the intensity of the border.

I find that nine of the 22 identified borders are, on closer inspection, nothing of the sort. Examples of sparsely-populated and soft borders are provided in Fig. 4.6 and 4.7 respectively. Of this remaining 14, over two-thirds (eight in total) are in Belfast (see Fig. 4.8). This is not a thorough survey of borders in Northern Ireland, and it might still be that both Small Areas and gridsquares are too large to see the borders that actually do exist, but are not captured by those who draw the grids and districts. However, the most high resolution picture we can offers an answer for why parades in Northern Ireland are so rarely associated with ethnic conflict. In this Chapter we demonstrated that PUL parades most often trigger Catholic counter-protest when in the vicinity

of hard borders. Such hard borders appear to be quite rare in Northern Ireland as a whole, which means parades in Northern Ireland as a whole, are less likely to trigger ethnic conflict.

Fig. 4.5) Catholic/Protestant Residence Patterns (NI)







Fig. 4.6) Catholic/Protestant Residence Patterns (Sparsely-Inhabited Area)



4.7) Catholic/Protestant Residence Patterns (Soft Border)



4.8) Catholic/Protestant Residence Patterns (Hard Borders in Belfast)



4.6: Conclusion

The goal of this Chapter was to explain the rarity of parades-related ethnic conflict. I accomplished this by demonstrating that, first, parades-related protests are more common on hard borders, and second, there are not many hard borders in Northern Ireland. This finding regarding hard borders challenges some other findings within the literature, most especially those by Madueke (2018) & (2019), and Legewie & Schaeffer (2016), who argue that soft borders are more likely to be sites of ethnic conflict.[164] The relevance of this finding for the literature is twofold.

First, my work here helps to confirm the importance of studying the impact of segregation on conflict. As stated in Chapter Two, studies investigating the relationship between segregation and ethnic violence are surprisingly sparse. Opportunity rather than motive has been the geographical cause most have turned to in order to explain why conflict takes place in some areas and not others. This Chapter makes the case for redirecting the spotlight back to motive.

Second, this study offers an alternative to the standard measurements of segregation. Most studies measure segregation using nested census output units to produce statistics, such as the classic index of dissimilarity. My method by contrast was to combine different types of census output area, to determine visually where borders lie. This method was designed to suit the needs of this study, and exploited a specific feature of the case: the availability of the Combined Grid Square Product. Grid squares offer both more consistent and fine-grained geographies in comparison with census outputs, and what's more, leave uninhabited or extremely low-population areas uncovered. They are

[164] Legewie & Schaeffer (2016), p.131-132; Madueke (2018), p.466; Madueke (2019), p.15-16

therefore better able to reveal borders, and, unlike output areas are less prone to misrepresent where community borders actually are.[165] Census data releases using this form of geography are unfortunately rare. However, in contexts where they are available, or can be produced using existing census data, they offer a means of seeing borders more studies ought to exploit.

This Chapter has shown how ethnic confrontation is geographically concentrated in the vicinity of hard borders. However, even in the most divided areas, parades-related ethnic conflict is not inevitable. Human beings may be influenced by our environments, but our actions are not dictated by space. Human influence also plays a large role in our decision-making. I take this into account in the following Chapter. There I tell the story of the Crumlin Road parades dispute, the source for the bulk of Northern Ireland's parades-related violence. By holding the spatial context constant, and comparing years with riots, to those without, I show how it was that North Belfast peace activists were able, despite heavy constraints, to produce peace not once, but twice, in this most conflict-ridden area.

[165] Lloyd et al. (2017), p.2

Chapter Five: Peace is Possible

5.1: Introduction

'After many years of disputes around the Crumlin/Ardoyne/Twaddell area, an agreement was signed that allowed the Twaddell camp to be dismantled and a moratorium to be put in, and for the Orange Order to complete its return parade from 2013. The agreement was long sought after. The issues surrounding the disputes affected not only everybody in the area but community relations. The big story is the fact that there was agreement, even though people had thought that this was an intractable problem, and there could be no agreement. The agreement also allows a conversation to expand beyond the issue of parades, which had entered into every conversation, whether on regeneration, housing or bringing tourists or jobs into the area. Parades came into the middle of every conversation. Now, with where we are, we have a great platform for moving forward.[166]'

- Gerry Kelly, Sinn Fein MLA for North Belfast

The purpose of this final empirical Chapter is to propose that one of the reasons parades in Northern Ireland provoke so little ethnic conflict, is because often local leadership is able to prevent any such conflict from taking place. I do this through a study of the Crumlin Road parades dispute. This was a conflict, over a decade in length, in which the CNR population of North Belfast sought to prevent the Loyal Orders from marching past "their" neighbourhoods. In this one dispute parades proved to be every bit the trigger of violence we might expect them to

[166] Hansard (2016), p.1

be. In 2004-2005, 2009-2013 and 2015, both the passage of parades up the Crumlin Road, and then the blocking of their passage, resulted in violence. Yet, even here, violence was not inevitable.


Between 2006-2008 and in 2016, the 12th July parade incurred no more violence than any of the other thousand PUL parades that take place every year. This Chapter asks how these periods of peace came about, and also how they broke down. The assumption that connects that question to the puzzle of this thesis, is that the Crumlin Road is exemplary. I argue that Northern Ireland sees less parades-related conflict than we might expect, because peace activists are willing and able to prevent it. As the ensuing Chapter will show, those who seek conflict must work hard to overcome their influence.

The Chapter lays this argument out in the following manner. I start by introducing the geography and the important actors of North Belfast, because without a primer on proper nouns, the story of the Road would be too often interrupted. Then I embark on a cross-time comparison of the contexts in which riots did and did not occur. This analysis is split into three periods.

The first, covering 2004-2008, describes how the first major riots on the Road came about, and how further conflict was prevented between 2006 and 2008. The second, covering 2009-2015, shows why that first period of peace ended in 2009, and how violence and division was purposefully maintained by spoilers over the next six years. I also show how, despite the spoilers' success in producing violence, they were unable to translate that street-level influence to a seat in negotiations. The third section, focusing in on the events of 2016, explains how the peace was reconstructed, and the spoilers outmaneuvered. The final section concludes by redrawing the link between this case and the broader puzzle.

Examination of the Crumlin Road dispute reveals the power of peace activists to arrest and prevent street-level confrontations from becoming violent. It also shows that overcoming these restraints requires a sincere effort on the part of spoilers. It is the presence of activists, and the absence of these spoilers elsewhere in Northern Ireland, that best explains why parades in Northern Ireland so rarely result in ethnic conflict.

Fig. 5.1) Map of the Crumlin Road Wards with Troubles Deaths



5.2: North Belfast

Locations & History

As previously stated, the purpose of this section is to provide essential background knowledge, required to understand the Crumlin Road parades dispute. This section will be structured as follows: first I will describe the location, then briefly summarise the area's history, and finally introduce the modern-day peace activists and spoilers who are the main players in the ensuing drama. Through this description, I reveal the environmental and historical factors that facilitate conflict in North Belfast, while also stressing that violence is not an unthinking response to history, but the result of understandable decisions made amidst chaos.

North Belfast is thick with neighbourhoods, but, for simplicity's sake, when referring to the areas of interest around the Crumlin Road, I will mostly use the place-names appended to the local electoral wards. These correspond roughly, if not exactly, with the neighbourhoods people believe they live in. There are three major neighbourhoods whose names are useful to know, which can be seen in Fig. 5.1. One is the majority-Catholic Ardoyne, positioned north of the Crumlin Road. The other are the majority-Protestant wards located to the south of the Road: Woodvale (also referred to as Twaddell, due to the nearby Twaddell Avenue) and Shankill.

Beyond these wards, there are two smaller neighbourhoods, distinctive because they are Catholic/Protestant enclaves on the 'wrong side' of the Road. The small splash of Catholic green in the mass of red on the southern side of the Crumlin Road is the neighbourhood of Mountainview. The peninsula of Protestant

red that butts up against the Ardoyne north of the Road is called Glenbryn (and sometimes Upper Ardoyne). The residents of these neighbourhoods have a long history of Catholic-Protestant conflict, in particular, the Shankill and the Ardoyne.

The residents of the Shankill have fought their Catholic neighbours since the topic of the dispute was Irish Home Rule.[167] Ardoyne meanwhile was created through ethnic conflict: it first became majority-Catholic thanks to an influx of Catholic refugees from elsewhere in Belfast displaced by riots.[168] As is clear from Fig. 5.1, during the Troubles, death clustered around the Crumlin Road. 99 residents of Ardoyne were killed over the course of the civil war.[169] Violence even persisted after Good Friday, most notably during the Holy Cross dispute.

The Holy Cross dispute saw the people of Glenbryn, in response to what they perceived as a series of acts of Catholic sectarianism, attempted to block Ardoyne residents' access to the local Catholic primary school: Holy Cross.[170] The ensuing campaign of protest was truly ugly, with Protestant crowds shouting at, spitting on, and throwing stones, bottles and, at one point, balloons filled with urine, at parents and children.[171] Throughout 2001 this violence often led to riots, which got so bad that by 2003, the wall between Glenbryn and Ardoyne was enlarged and strengthened in order to improve security.[172] Since then, the five wards have featured high levels of sectarian crime. Between 2005-2018, the

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[167] Budge & O'Leary (1973), p.89
[168] Hepburn (1990), p.86-87
[169] Ardoyne Commemoration Project (2002), p.5-6. Not included in this figure were people killed within the boundaries of the Ardoyne, but who were not residents.
[170] Ardoyne Commemoration Project (2002), p.507; Troy (2005), p.28; 'Police keep factions apart', *BBC News*, 20th June 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/1399081.stm, accessed 15/01/18
[171] Troy (2005), p.46-47, 83 & 115; Foy, Marie & Kathryn Torney, 'Urine-filled balloons thrown at protest', *Belfast Telegraph*, 2nd October 2001
[172] Troy (2005), p.175-183; Belfast Interface Project (2017), p.53

mean number of sectarian crimes committed p/ward across the whole of Northern Ireland, was 2. In Ardoyne, it was 10, in Shankill, 9, and in Woodvale, 12.

As this history suggests, the area around the Crumlin Road is particularly prone to ethnic violence. CNR and PUL residents alike have long lists of atrocities the other side has perpetrated against their side, fuelling their anger and stoking their fear. However, though history has great influence over people, it does not follow that past violence demands future violence. This becomes most clear, when we look at North Belfast's peace activists.

Peace Activists & Spoilers

In the following analysis, I will most often talk about the work of both peace and spoiler activist groups, such as the North & West Belfast Parades and Cultural Forum or the Greater Ardoyne Residents Collective. However, it is important to note that the groups were not institutions, in a sense that the collective possessed any authority. Rather they are collections of important and influential personalities. Indeed, within the neighbourhoods of North Belfast the groups were better known by the name of their most important activist - the Crumlin Ardoyne Residents' Association (2009-2016), for example, was most often referred to in the Ardoyne as 'Joe Marley's Group'.[173] Here then I introduce the groups that will feature throughout the oncoming narrative, and summarise their character through their chief activists.

[173] Interview, Local Scholar, 15th July 2018.

The chief peace activist groups in the Catholic neighbourhoods were the Ardoyne Parades Dialogue Group (APDG), in existence between 2004 and 2009, and the Crumlin Ardoyne Residents Association (CARA), which operated between 2009 and 2016. As already mentioned, their key figure was Joe Marley. Marley is a Sinn Fein activist with impeccable Republican credentials, his father being Larry Marley, a Provisional IRA member and mastermind of the 1983 H-Block breakout. Marley is a well-known community worker, with a presence in many Ardoyne-based volunteer organisations such as the Ardoyne Youth Enterprise and the Ardoyne, Bone and Ligoniel Heritage Association. His personal connections with Sinn Fein, in addition to the close sponsorship of his group practiced by local MLA Gerry Kelly (an ex-IRA member, and a major ally of Gerry Adams dating back to the Peace Process), have led peace activism in the neighbourhood to be seen as the work of the Republican Party.

This is not quite accurate. CNR opinion of all shades is represented in Ardoyne, and peace also had the backing of more moderate Nationalists and the Catholic Church.[174] For better and for worse however, the peace activists of Ardoyne were seen to be most closely aligned to Sinn Fein and the Provisional Republican movement.

Protestant peace activists were never so closely linked to a single faction. The most important voice in negotiation was of course the Orange Order, given that it was the Order's 12th July parade that the residents of the Catholic neighbourhoods most objected to. However, non-Orange voices were arguably more prominent and public, both in the media and on the streets. The main organisation representing the interests of the PUL community between 2004 and 2013 was the North & West Belfast Parades and Cultural Forum.

[174] 'Ardoyne parade deal: Plea for Garc to halt protest', *BBC News*, 30th September 2016

This group brought together UUP, DUP and PUP politicians, representatives of various paramilitary groups, local community activists and spokesmen for the Loyal Orders, to provide the fullest possible representation of PUL opinion.[175] The most prominent of these figures, who would remain heavily involved in peace work beyond the shuttering of the Forum in 2013, were Winston Irvine of the Progressive Unionist Party and Tommy Cheevers of the Apprentice Boys.[176] Their very different affiliations shows the main difference between PUL and CNR peace acitvists. Where the CNR peace activists were most associated with the Provisional Republicans, PUL peace activists had no such dominant association. They were far more a coalition of the internal factions of the PUL mega-identity.

Where the peace activist groups were associated with multiple, major factions within their respective mega-identities, the spoilers were generally associated with only small or marginal factions. The CNR spoiler organisation, the Greater Ardoyne Residents Collective (GARC), formed in 2009, was most closely associated with first Martin Og Meehan and then Dee Fennell. Both men were/are activists in Dissident Republican micro-parties, and GARC's protests were attended by activists from many Dissident groups.[177] GARC was very public in its difference and distinction from the Sinn Fein peace activists, because its

[175] O'Neill, Sharon, 'Sinn Fein cautious of parades talks pledge', *Irish News*, 17th July 2004

[176] Interview, Tommy Cheevers, 22nd March 2018; McAleese, Deborah, 'Warring sides in secret talks aimed at resolving Ardoyne parade dispute', *Belfast Telegraph*, 4th March 2016.

[177] 'Latest News from G.A.R.C.', *greaterardoyneresidentscollective.blogspot.co.uk*, 15th May 2010, accessed 19/10/2017, http://greaterardoyneresidentscollective.blogspot.co.uk/2010/05/latest-news-from-garc.html; McCaffrey, Barry, 'Marchers urged to talk with residents', *Irish News*, 10th August 2009; Meehan, Martin Og, 'The Twelfth of July - Aggressive attitude of PSNI triggered violent reac-tion', *Irish News*, 19th August 2009; Morris, Alison, 'Police search at dissident's home', *Irish News*, 19th August 2009; 'Baton rounds fired as police push march past Ardoyne protest', *Irish News*, 13th July 2010; Morris, Allison, 'Eirigi candidate in court over sit-down protest', *Irish News*, 2nd February 2011

intent was to use the parade dispute to try to challenge Sinn Fein's dominance in Ardoyne.[178] This however was not the case with the PUL spoilers.

There is no formal group associated with the PUL spoilers, who emerged during the Orange Order's protest campaign between 2013-2016. The PUL spoilers were not interested in supplanting a hegemonic power in their community, largely because, as discussed, there is no hegemonic PUL faction in North Belfast. They wanted to avoid the resolution of the dispute because they saw resolution as defeat. The PUL spoilers therefore, rather than being competitors for power, were in fact a hardline faction within one of the North Belfast Orange Order lodges: LOL No 1891 Ballysillan. Their most public figure was Gerald Solinas, who had a certain amount of authority thanks to his position within West Belfast Ulster Defence Association. As will be discussed, there was no formal articulation of difference or split by the PUL spoilers. Theirs was a struggle within the movement, rather than against the movement.

To conclude, the Catholics and Protestants of North Belfast have a long history of conflict, and so the fact that this area would once again fall into conflict in the 2000s has an air of inevitability to it. A survey of the organisations present in North Belfast however suggests otherwise. The social standing and number of the groups arranged in support of peace were so much greater than that of the groups who would prefer conflict, that it is surprising conflict ever broke out. As we will see in the following sections however, though the power imbalance is striking on paper, in the moment, in the wake of a parade and amidst the growing fury of the crowd, that power may no longer be real. As mentioned in the previous section, the solution this Chapter offers to the puzzle of why parades might not regularly face violence, is that peace activists are able

[178] Hoey (2018), p.66 & 72

to prevent said violence from taking place. However, other factors impede their ability to do so. This is particularly noticeable in 2004 and 2005, when a lack of communication and coordination between peace activists and the police gave space for riots to break out.

5.3: From Riots to Peaceful Protest (2004 – 2008)

In this section, I will explain why riots occurred on the Crumlin Road in 2004 and 2005, and the strategies by which peace was obtained and sustained from 2006 to 2008. To summarise the findings, peace in this period was obtained through an alliance between activists and the state. This alliance manifested in the police allowing activists to take the lead in restraining potentially-violent crowds. This required a level of trust and coordination that was far from guaranteed. Indeed, as we will see from 2004 and 2005, there was little cooperation between peace activists and the police. It was only once that was established, that both sides could obtain their goal of peace.

We start by explaining why the riots of 2004 and 2005 happened. The immediate assumption might be that people in the Catholic wards rioted, because they felt threatened by their Protestant neighbours, and angered by Protestant provocations during the march. This is a reasonable interpretation.

According to observers, the night before the parade gunfire could be heard coming from Glenbryn, and other surrounding Protestant areas.[179] On both the morning and evening marches, these same observers recorded that people within and accompanying the parades carried banners and emblems associated with paramilitary groups (2004), and engaged in provocative behaviour (both years).[180] The problem with this thesis however, is that these factors were also present before and during the 2002 and 2003 12th July parades, neither of which resulted in lengthy periods of post-parade rioting.[181] Indeed, the 2005 12th July parade may well have been less provocative than those that took place

[179] Bukantz et al. (2005), p.27; Cahill et al. (2006), p.43
[180] Bukantz et al. (2005), p.34-35; Cahill et al. (2006), p.51; Starmer & Gordon (2004), p.81
[181] Bukantz et al (2002), p.26-28; Bukantz & Cahill (2003), p.65-67;

in 2002-2003, with IPEC observers noting how, for the first time, no-one in the return parade was holding or drinking alcohol.[182] In looking for causes of rioting then, we must turn to other circumstances, beyond the conduct of 11th Night revellers and the paraders.

To find these circumstances, I compare detailed reports from observers in 2002 and 2004/05. All episodes of violence identified here involved a Catholic crowd surging forward to attack either an opposing Protestant crowd, or the police and army.[183] The reports show that peace activists were able to prevent violence by interposing themselves between the crowd and their targets, both in 2002 and in one instance in 2004.[184] Yet, CNR peace activists were unable to hold their crowd back again in 2004, or at all in 2005. Starmer & Gordon (2005) state that the police gave community activists two opportunities to get the crowd under control, and were apparently told that doing so was impossible.[185]

Comparison between these successes and failures reveals one key difference. In the success cases, the peace activists were able to intervene before the crowd and their targets came to blows. In the failure cases, the activists were having to intervene after the crowd and the police had already traded missiles.

The difficulty of public order policing is that the purpose of it - preventing crowds from harming other people, the police themselves and/or private property - oftentimes conflicts with the methods of persuasive de-escalation. There is little better indication of this than the public order policing operations that took place in 2004 and 2005. According to senior police officers I

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[182] Cahill et al (2006), p.49-50
[183] Starmer & Gordon (2004), p.93; Starmer & Gordon (2005), p.18; Bukantz et al. (2005), p.33-34; Cahill et al. (2006), p.51-52
[184] Bailie, Tony, 'Riot 'trap' fails to spring', *Irish News*, 13th July 2002; Bukantz et al. (2005), p.33
[185] Starmer & Gordon (2005), p.18

interviewed, de-escalation functions best when it can be focused on the violent people within the crowd, rather than on the crowd as a whole.[186] However, harm prevention, particularly in 2004 and 2005, often requires indiscriminate tools, in particular, water cannon. In 2005 for example when the police used water cannons, they not only drenched the violent elements of the crowd, but also soaked the community peace activists (among them two priests and Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams) who had been trying to stop the rioting.[187] Starmer & Gordon and the peace activists noted that the police had used the water cannon as soon as the crowd began throwing missiles.[188] The activists argued this meant they had been given no opportunity to mediate, and that once the water cannon was used, the activists could no longer restrain the crowd.[189]

On the basis of this comparison I argue that riots took place in 2004 and 2005 because when the police responded to crowd attacks with attacks of their own, it created a tit-for-tat cycle of escalation. In 2004, it was only when the police stopped responding to crowd attacks, instead simply weathering them, that the crowd lost interest and voluntarily dispersed.[190]

The notable contrast between 2004-05 and 2006-08 was the reduced role of police. Unlike in 2004-05 it was peace activists, and not the police, that reacted to the limited episodes of missile-throwing. The police also proactively reduced their presence on the Road, removing the security screens and the armoured landrovers that had been previously deployed as a wall between

[186] Interview, Gary White, 24th July 2017; Interview, Police Officer, 20th December 2017
[187] 'Dissident republicans blamed for orchestrating serious rioting - Sinn Fein's script goes awry as rioting flares', *Irish News*, 14th July 2005
[188] Starmer & Gordon (2005), p.17
[189] O'Neill, Sharon, 'Anger and Recriminations - Police 'moved too soon'', *Irish News*, 14th July 2005; 'Communities reflect - Water cannon put end to mediation', *Irish News*, 14th July 2005
[190] Starmer & Gordon (2004), p.97

Catholic crowd and the Protestant parade.[191] The peace activists meanwhile appear to have formalised their peacekeeping role. In 2007 the Ardoyne Parades Dialogue Group stated that its 100-strong protest would be accompanied by 'nine formally trained marshals', while in 2008, an agreement between the Forum and the APDG minimised the police's presence and led to the APDG taking full responsibility for policing.[192]

The potential for riot did not vanish in these years. As mentioned, crowds still threw missiles, and during a parade in June, Protestant and Catholic crowds nearly came to blows. However, the new trust afforded to peace activists paid off, and they were able to prevent this initial violence from escalating into riot.[193]

2006-08 reveal a police force willing to trust that peace activists could maintain public order. That trust however took time to build, and was not present in 2004-05. The biggest problem was that there was no coordination between Sinn Fein and the police. At the time, Sinn Fein did not recognise the PSNI's legitimacy. They therefore refused any formal contact with the police, and as such there was no possibility for planned peacekeeper coordination.[194] Relations however improved drastically in the months following the 2005 riot.

First, the PSNI's enforcement of the Parade Commission ban on the 2005 Whiterock parade deeply impressed Sinn Fein. The sight of police preventing crowds of angry Loyalists from entering the majority-Catholic Springfield Road, and withstanding live gunfire and 'hundreds' of blast bombs in doing so,

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[191] Northern Ireland Policing Board (2006), p.69; Henry, Lesley-Anne, 'Ardoyne keeps lid on violence', *Belfast Telegraph*, 13th July 2006

[192] McCaffrey, Barry, 'Relief as Twelfth passes off without major disturbances', *Irish News*, 14th July 2008; 'PUP's Winston Irvine and Residents' spokesman Joe Marley discuss the latest developments on the parades issue', *audioboom.com*, 22nd July 2013, https://audioboom.com/posts/1513319-pup-s-winston-irvine-and-residents-spokesman-joe-marley-discuss-the-latest-developments-on-the-parades-issue, accessed 23/01/2018; McCaffrey, Barry, 'Attacks put agreement on parades in jeopardy', Irish News, 16th July 2008

[193] Northern Ireland Policing Board (2006), p.65-66

[194] Interview, Gary White, 24th July 2017

demonstrated to Catholics that they could trust the police to protect their interests.[195] At the same time, Sinn Fein was itself increasingly interested in establishing formal relationships with police. The Party's strategy of taking the 'struggle' for a United Ireland inside of Northern Ireland's political structures, rather than challenging them from without, demanded that they enter the Policing Board (the PSNI's political oversight structure), and end the SF-PSNI silence.[196] The police's actions in Whiterock legitimised Sinn Fein's ambitions, and in 2006 Sinn Fein engaged with pre-emptive planning of the 12th July policing operation for the first time.[197] These new relations would be cemented when in January 2007, when the party officially accepted the legitimacy of the PSNI. This then explains why the peace activists of the Catholic wards were able take over the job of policing from the police in 2006-08. It was only by then that the two sides were able to coordinate.

The willingness of police to let peace activists perform the focused crowd-control they could not did make the difference between the riots of 2004 and 2005. However, it must be said that in 2005 there was another factor preventing peace. During the riots that year, the police came under attack from a Republican terror group called Continuity IRA who threw multiple blast bombs, contributing to over 100 injuries.[198] Because the peace activists on the ground were unable to restrain the crowd regardless, it is difficult to identify the separate impact of the CIRA. However, given that CIRA split from Sinn Fein to oppose its peace strategy, it seems unlikely that they would have been persuaded to step down by Sinn Fein-aligned activists. Given the missteps of the

[195] Starmer & Gordon (2005), p.2; Interview, Sean Murray, 13th July 2017
[196] Bean (2007), p.191-194; Hearty (2018), p.33-34
[197] Interview, Gary White, 24th July 2017; Graham, William, 'Sinn Fein's Kelly met police ahead of Ardoyne parade', *Irish News*, 14th July 2006
[198] Thornton, Chris, 'CIRA fired blast bombs, says 'spokesman'', *Belfast Telegraph*

police, the ability of peace activists to combat spoilers did not have to be tested that year. But in 2009 spoilers once again put peace activists to the test. The result would not only collapse the peace that had been established between 2006-2008, but would also lead to the alienation of North Belfast's Protestants, and one of the lengthiest protest campaigns in the history of the United Kingdom.

5.4: Peace Activists Lose Control (2009 – 2016)

In this section, we establish why both CNR and PUL peace activists were unable to prevent the escalation of conflict on the Crumlin Road. First we show why it was that CNR peace activists proved powerless to stop violence in 2009-12, when they had been so successful in 2006-08. Second, we show why PUL peace activists were drawn into supporting a lengthy protest campaign, that did nothing but increase ethnic tensions on the Crumlin Road. Through these two stories, why, despite the presence of peace activists, violence on the Crumlin Road remained possible.

From 2009-12 riots repeatedly broke out in reaction to the passage of the 12th July parade up the Crumlin Road. This was not due to a fresh breakdown in police-Sinn Fein communication. Instead, the cause lay in the emergence of CNR spoiler activists. As will be seen, the ability of peace activists to restrain crowds relied on them persuading their fellow CNR residents not to get involved in conflict. If those in the crowds were not willing to listen to persuasion however, there was little the activists could do. As stated, the authority of the activists derived from their standing within Sinn Fein and the IRA. Those mobilised by the Dissidents however had little respect for Sinn Fein, and so the peace activists were unable to restrain their behaviour.

The first public indication that Sinn Fein's peace activists were losing influence in Ardoyne came in April 2009. That month, according to *The Guardian*, senior figures in the Provisional IRA warned the Irish government that they '"would no longer be able to police their side of the line in Ardoyne this year."'[199] Subsequent events confirmed this warning. On the evening of the 13th

[199] McDonald, Henry, 'We've lost control of Ardoyne, IRA warns', *The Guardian*, 5th April 2009.

July 2009, a CNR crowd mobilised by Republic Network for Unity activist Martin Og Meehan attacked the parade.[200] Whether or not the rioting was planned from the start, which Sinn Fein claimed and the various dissident groups disputed, events demonstrated that, first, a group of activists separate from the established APDG was now capable of mobilising crowds on the Crumlin Road, and second, the APDG could not control this crowd.[201] Indeed, during the riot the CNR peace activists had to be protected by the PSNI.[202]

This story repeated itself in 2010.[203] Not even Bobby Storey, an IRA man known as 'The Enforcer' for his ability to compel loyalty to Gerry Adams within the H-Block prison, could dissuade people from rioting.[204] Bereft of peace activist support, the police had little choice but to resort to the indiscriminate and violent methods of crowd restraint that had escalated tensions in 2004-05: water cannon and plastic bullets. This happened again in 2011 and 2012.[205] In all four years, Dissident Republicans proved able to mobilise their own crowds to protest against the 12th July parade. They also sought to escalate the conflict in other ways.

One long-term concern of peace activists were so-called 'riot tourists' - people who would travel to the Ardoyne on the 12th with the purpose of rioting. As such, they often made public appeals for Catholics living outside North Belfast

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[200] Simpson, Claire, ''Dissidents' blamed for Ardoyne parade rioting', *Irish News*, 14th July 2009; Meehan, Martin Og, 'The Twelfth of July - Aggressive attitude of PSNI triggered violent reaction', *Irish News*, 15th July 2009

[201] McCaffrey, Barry, 'The Twelfth of July - Dissident outsiders 'bussed into Ardoyne' for violence', *Irish News*, 15th July 2009

[202] Archer, Bimpe, 'The Twelfth of July - Dissidents "started riot to attack police"', *Irish News*, 15th July 2009

[203] 'Police justified in using 120 AEPs during three nights of rioting in north Belfast', *policeombudsman.org*, accessed 07/02/18, https://policeombudsman.org/Investigation-Reports/Police-justified-in-using-120-AEPs-during-three-ni

[204] Craig, Olga, ''Sinn Fein are yesterday's men'', *Telegraph*, 18th Juluy 2010; 'Dissidents confronted', *Irish News*, 16th July 2010; Moloney (2007), Loc 10975

[205] Mulgrew, John, 'Peaceful day of parades ends in night of violence', *Belfast Telegraph*, 13th July 2011; 'The Twelfth - Tensions give way to rioting after parades', *Irish News*, 13th July 2011; Morris, Allison, 'The Twelfth - Police officers injured in Ardoyne violence', *Irish News*, 13th July 2012

not to come to the Ardoyne.[206] GARC by contrast issued calls for Catholics across Northern Ireland to come and 'stand shoulder to shoulder with the beleaguered Ardoyne community for the Twelfth of July parade'.[207]

In addition to this aggravation, in 2011 and 2012 GARC transitioned from protesting, to holding its own competing parade at the same time as the Orange Order held theirs'.[208] The 2012 episode particularly infuriated PUL opinion, as a series of decisions by the Parades Commission that year meant that GARC ended up marching at the time usually reserved for the Orange Order. This was interpreted by PUL activists as the Parades Commission discriminating against their parade to facilitate a march by a 'violent republican faction', and was described by Winston Irvine as the work of '"fools or knaves."'[209] GARC's ability to mobilise Dissident crowds therefore not only hamstrung CNR peace activists. It also deepened PUL-CNR antagonism, which was particularly problematic for the PUL peace activists.

We now move to explain how it was that PUL peace activists went from offering serious concessions in negotiations over the parade dispute, to protesting for the shuttering of the Parades Commission. Unlike with the CNR, the PUL peace activists did not face an external faction able to disrupt their control. Rather, their problem was that, as representatives of the PUL community, they were representing people who, between 2009 and 2012, were becoming more and more infuriated with the Parades Commission. Where the

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[206] Morris, Allison, 'The Twelfth - Taxi drivers urged not to take protesters to parade', Irish News, 10th July 2010

[207] 'Greater Ardoyne Residents Collective (GARC) Appeal For Solidarity', *greaterardoyneresidentscollective.blogspot.co.uk*, 8th June 2010, accessed 06/02/18, http://greaterardoyneresidentscollective.blogspot.co.uk/2010/06/greater-ardoyne-residents-collective.html; 'Parade protest call 'totally irresponsible'', *Belfast News Letter*, 1st July 2010;

[208] Simpson, Claire, '"Dismay" at city parade decison', *Irish News*, 9th July 2011; Simpson, Claire, 'Parade move criticised', *Irish News*, 9th July 2012.

[209] Simpson, Claire, 'Parade move criticised', *Irish News*, 9th July 2012.

CNR peace activists failed because they no longer represented the people on the streets, the PUL peace activists failed because their community began to demand resistance rather than compromise.

Adversarial relationships between PUL activists and the Parades Commission are nothing new. In 2002, following the Commission's critiques of the alcohol-fuelled behaviour of parade supporters, the Orange Order accused the Commission of seeking to behave like 'religious police'.[210] However, evidence suggests that relationships between PUL activists and the Parades Commission between 2009 and 2012 were particularly strained. Tommy Cheevers described one meeting he held with the Commission where one activist and a Commissioner almost came to blows.[211]

The source of this antagonism seems to have been the Parades Commission repeatedly placing conditions on Orange parades without PUL approval. The aforementioned decision in 2012 to force the Orange Order parade to return early, interpreted as a facilitation of a GARC parade, was just one example of this. In 2010 and 2011 for example the Commission blocked the Tour of the North Orange Order parade from marching up the Crumlin Road. In reaction, the Forum cut off negotiations with CARA in 2010, and organised an actual protest in 2011.[212] They protested the Commission's decision in 2012 as well, both through the courts and again with a demonstration.[213] This opposition might appear odd, given that these restrictions had in fact been proposed by the

[210] Kaufmann (2007), p.294
[211] Interview, Tommy Cheevers, 22nd March 2018
[212] 'Calm urged at city parade', *Belfast News Letter*, 18th June 2010; Lynagh, Catherine, 'Loyalists protest over parade ruling', *Belfast Telegraph*, 17th June 2011
[213] McAdam, Noel, 'Forum rejects 'impossible' Ardoyne deadline and plans to bring its challenge to the High Court', *Belfast Telegraph*, 11th July 2012; Connolly, Maeve, 'The Twelfth - Group to challenge Ardoyne decision', *Irish News*, 11th July 2012; Morris, Allison, 'The Twelfth - Tension high as legal aid denied - Loyalist bid to overturn ruling fails', *Irish News*, 12th July 2012

PUL as potential concessions they could make.[214] The bigger problem though was not the actions themselves, but their symbolism.

PUL activists tend to display great sensitivity to public interpretation of their actions. Tommy Cheevers for example made a public apology in the Shankill Mirror (the local paper of Protestant North Belfast) after he told an anti-GARC protest he was leading to disperse, in the mistaken belief that the GARC parade had been called off.[215] The apology was necessary as he believed the mistake had 'damaged [his] integrity'.[216] That such a small action could be viewed by Cheevers as a mistake serious enough to damage the root of his authority is suggestive of the insecure position these community representatives occupied. They were not in control of PUL opinion, but representatives of it. The actions of the Parades Commission, by routinely imposing restrictions on the parade without PUL consent, was adding proof to a narrative of PUL victimhood. Their impositions thereby created anger that peace activists had to represent. This sense of PUL victimhood was, in the early 2010s, truly powerful, as the Flag Protests demonstrate.

In December 2012 the Flag Protests, a protest campaign triggered by Belfast City Council's decision to only fly the Union Jack on a limited set of days, rather than year-round. This campaign was truly huge: '[b]etween the first protest on 3 December 2012 and St Patrick's Day 2013 (17 March), the police recorded 2980 flag-related occurrences [PSNI-speak for protests][217]'. This campaign was fuelled by a sense of PUL victimhood, the loss of the flag being interpreted as yet another loss in a series of losses for PUL culture.[218] The

[214] Interview, Tommy Cheevers, 22nd March 2018; Interview, Peter Osborne, 14th July 2017
[215] Cheevers, Tommy, 'Letter of Apology', *Shankill MIrror,* August 2012.
[216] Ibid
[217] Jarman (2019), p.110
[218] Hearty (2015), p.160; Halliday & Ferguson (2015), p.8-9

decisions made by the Parades Commission between 2010 and 2012 touched a similar nerve. Reaction was however minor, because the restrictions themselves were more irritating than a truly significant loss. By contrast decision by the Parades Commission in 2013 to ban the Orange Order from parading up the Crumlin Road on the evening of the 12th was a clear loss for the community. All across Northern Ireland Protestants reacted with fury.

In the immediate aftermath of the Commission publicising their decision, a mass meeting, incorporating representatives from the Loyal Orders, PUL parties and paramilitary groups took place on the 10th July, to share impressions of how their communities were reacting to the decision, and devise a strategic response.[219] The dominant interpretation of what had happened was that Commission had caved in to the pressure of GARC's violence, and by banning the parade was '"rewarding intolerance."'[220] The strategy arrived at, and announced by the Order, was that the decision would be protested, with representatives stating that the goal was to provide a peaceful outlet for their anger.[221]

Unfortunately, this intention was not realised. When members and supporters of the protesting Orange lodges and PUL bands met the police lines enforcing the Commission's ban, a riot began 'within minutes'.[222] Similar riots would take place over the next four nights injuring 71 police officers.[223] The

[219] Kilpatrick, Chris, 'DUP sat alongside top paramilitaries at talks; Gathering held by Orangemen to discuss row', *Belfast Telegraph*, 12th July 2013
[220] Kilpatrick, Chris, 'Fury over ruling after tense day of deliberations', *Belfast Telegraph*, 10th July 2013; Morris, Allison, 'The Twelfth - Orangemen discuss "contingency plan"', *Irish News*, 11th July 2013.
[221] Kilpatrick, Chris 'Orangemen plan Ardoyne protest camp until march ban is lifted', *Belfast Telegraph*, 12th July 2013; Interview, Orangeman, 18th December 2017
[222] Kilpatrick, Chris, 'Hand-to-hand fighting on the edge of Ardoyne as PSNI and loyalists clash', *Belfast Telegraph*, 13th July 2013; Morris, Allison, 'The Twelfth - Violent clashes in north of city', *Irish News*, 13th July 2013
[223] Connolly, Maeve, 'Parade Violence - 71 officers hurt, 72 arrests and 51 plastic bullets fired but calm returning to streets', *Irish News*, 20th July 2013

scale of the disorder was such that 600 'mutual aid' officers had to brought in from the rest of the UK to support the PSNI.[224] The Orange Order, worried about the violence, tried to bring an end to the protests.[225] They comprehensively failed to do so.

Unofficial protests, spearheaded by the hardliners within LOL No. 1891 Ballysillan, continued, and a permanent protest occupation, the Twaddell Civil Rights Camp, was set up on the Ardoyne-Twaddell interface.[226] Under pressure to maintain opposition, the Order leadership appears to have capitulated to the demand of the hardliners. Protests against the Commission's decision would continue for the next three years. Though PUL peace activists might have wished for a strategy that would avoid increasing antagonism, they were unable to resist the popular pressure to oppose. A second attempt to change strategy in 2014 was also defeated.[227] The hardliners were giving the community what it wanted, and the peace activists had to follow in their wake. As Winston Irvine put it:

'"This is not a short-term approach, there is a 'stickability' that didn't previously exist. People want this issue resolved but are determined to have visible presence in the area until such times as it is."'[228]

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[224] Connolly, Maeve, 'Parade violence - Third tranche of British police arrive in city to tackle disorder', *Irish News*, 18th July 2013

[225] Kilpatrick, Chris, 'Order to call off protest as talks plot resolution path; Tactical changes to be unveiled in wake of violence', *Belfast Telegraph*, 29th July 2013

[226] Young, Connla, 'We'll eat Christmas dinner here if necessary - Loyalists vow to remain in 'civil rights camp' until Orangemen are allowed to pass nationalist district', *Irish News*, 13th September 2013; Morris, Allison, 'Illegal loyalist parade breaks through line of riot police', *Irish News*, 28th August 2013; Parades Commission (2013d), p.1

[227] Morris, Allison, 'The Twelfth - More details of graduated response released today', Irish News, 10th July 2014; Morris, Allison, 'Twaddell protest parades restarted - Demonstrations will be legal and lawful says spokesman', Irish News, 17th July 2014

[228] Morris, Allison, 'Illegal loyalist parade breaks through line of riot police', *Irish News*, 28th August 2013

This Chapter has posited that interventions by peace activists are able to prevent parades-related violence. This assertion however has to be justified, given the return of violence to the Crumlin Road between 2009-2016. Through this section I have demonstrated that, while peace activists can prevent violence, their ability to do so is not limitless. Persuading others not to engage in violence requires that one be a trusted authority. In CNR North Belfast, the Sinn Fein associated peace activists were not seen as trusted authorities by Dissident-mobilised crowds, and therefore they could no longer prevent riots. In PUL North Belfast, the entire notion of a peace-oriented strategy became invalidated by the community's perceived victimisation, and the peace activists had no choice but to sign up to a strategy of conflict and protest. Peace activists then are not all-powerful. However, as will be seen in the next section, even in the face of effective spoiling, peace activists were not bereft of power. When the opportunity to return to a strategy of peace presented itself, they proved very able to capitalise on it.

5.5: Exclusion, Coercion & Peace (2016)

In this final section, I explain how the CNR and PUL peace activists of the Crumlin Road regained control, and resolved the parade dispute. Given this Chapter's goal is to resolve the puzzle of peaceful parading, this singular achievement requires notice, as it not only demonstrates that peace activists can resolve parades-related conflicts, but also, they can do so in the face of sustained spoiler activity. The peace activists of North Belfast accomplished this feat by excluding spoilers from negotiations, ensuring that only they would have input into the shape of the dispute's final resolution. This meant that when popular opinion moved towards preferring peace to conflict, the activists were able to produce agreement between themselves. This agreement neutralised spoilers, both through its terms, and through assembling behind it a coalition of opinion that made the spoilers look weak and isolated. Bereft of support, the spoilers acknowledged defeat, and peace was finally brought to the Crumlin Road.

The exclusion of spoilers from influence over any peace deal was a result of coordination between CNR and PUL peace activists, and the Parades Commission. Though the Commission did hold talks with GARC in 2011, and PUL activists suggested doing so in 2014, these were only dalliances - CARA remained, in each faction's eyes, the chief representative of North Belfast Catholics.[229] Peace activists on both sides argued that any talks should only occur amongst themselves. What's more, according to Sean O'Baoill, who had

[229] Morris, Allison, 'Group fronted by dissidents meets Parades Commission', *Irish News*, 11th June 2011;'"Cynical attempt by the Orange to walk away from talks" - Joe Marley from residents' group CARA', *The Nolan Show*, 25th June 2014, accessed 14/03/2014, https://audioboom.com/posts/2280921-cynical-attempt-by-the-orange-to-walk-away-from-talks-joe-marley-from-residents-group-cara-bbcnolan; Interview, Peter Osborne, 14th July 2017; Interview, Tommy Cheevers, 22nd March 2018

long involvement in the dispute as a mediator, each side rejected compromises that they new would lead to the other side's activists losing authority.[230]

The strategy of excluding GARC was not just practiced by CARA, but also baked into the very design of the organisation. The old APDG had been designed to represent the entirety of the significant internal diversity of the CNR community, being 50-50 activists and residents, and including, in addition to its Sinn Fein/IRA core, several INLA/IRSP members.[231] CARA's membership by contrast was restricted to residents of specific streets: 'the Crumlin Road, Mountainview, and the Dales, which is about three streets further up the Crumlin Road, Ardoyne Road, which had always been impacted on, and Balholm Drive'.[232] The focus on these streets is interesting given that they exclude Estoril Park and Brompton Park, streets that are definitely in Ardoyne.[233] The fact that CARA still excluded these streets lends credence to the suggestion, made by one interviewee, that the choice was designed to remove more critical voices from the peace activist group.[234]

By 2016, the Orange Order had adopted a similarly exclusive approach. This is visible through contrast with its approach in 2014, where, amongst others, the PUL team featured Unionist politicians and Gerald Solinas.[235] These negotiations were in fact inclusive on both sides, with Sean O'Baoill stating that at one point there were over 30 people in the room.[236] In 2016 by contrast both

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[230] Interview, Sean O'Baoill, 25th July 2017
[231] Interview, Joe Marley, 13th July 2017
[232] Ibid
[233] 'Fr Gary Donegan confronted by angry Ardoyne protesters', *BBC News*, 3rd October 2016, accessed 05/02/2018, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-northern-ireland-37543648/fr-gary-donegan-confronted-by-angry-ardoyne-protesters
[234] Interview, Politician, 22nd December 2017
[235] Black, Rebecca, '"We shall not be moved until brethren get down that road"', *Belfast Telegraph*, 28th April 2014; Young, Connla, 'Residents to oppose north Belfast parade', *Irish News*, 28th May 2014; Interview, Orangeman, 18th December 2017
[236] Interview, Sean O'Baoill, 25th July 2017

Unionist politicians and Gerald Solinas were no longer in the room. PUL peace activists had become increasingly disenchanted with political involvement, with almost all of my interviewees suggesting that Unionist politicians tended to be more hindrance than help.[237] The other group notable in its exclusion was the West Belfast UPRG, which means Gerald Solinas was also not involved in negotiations.[238] Within both the PUL and CNR communities, peace activists had managed to exclude oppositional voices from their negotiations.

Of course, as we touched on in the prior section, the peace activists could not agree peace if the majority opinion in their communities still desired conflict. In 2016 however, an opportunity for rapprochement presented itself. On the 15th April 2016 Michael McGibbon, a 33 year old taxi driver and father of four, was shot several times in the leg in the Ardoyne.[239] He bled to death in the arms of his wife. Dissident Republicans were blamed for the attack. On the 19th April residents of the Ardoyne held a vigil for McGibbon, at which Joanne McGibbon (his widow) and local priest Father Gary Donegan openly criticised the murder as the work of Dissident Republicans.[240] Even worse for the spoilers, their lead figure Dee Fennell, was arrested in suspicion of being involved. Though he would be later released without charges, the association between GARC and the murder of an innocent man was deeply damaging.

What had even more impact than the damage to GARC's reputation however, was the decision of the North Belfast Orange lodges to suspend that night's protest out of respect for the family.[241] In response, Jim Roddy, a

[237] Interview, Orangeman, 18th December 2017; Interview, Tommy Cheevers, 22nd March 2018; Interview, Alfie McCrory, 22nd March 2018
[238] Young, Connla, 'Parade talks prompt discord among loyalists', *Irish News*, 27th June 2016
[239] Monaghan, John, 'Republican Fennell arrested in taxi driver murder inquiry', *Irish News*, 18th April 2016
[240] 'They will never beat us, widow of murdered cabbie Michael tells vigil', *Belfast Telegraph*, 20th April 2016
[241] Ibid.

prominent Derry businessman who had attended the funeral, phoned up a PUL contact to thank him. As he put it:

'So, after the vigil, I was driving back down home, and I rang someone who would've been very close to the protest. And I said "Listen, thank you very much, you have actually done something that's very, very important today. You've respected a man who'd been brutally murdered. You've also respected the community and you've respected the priest who was holding the vigil." And the answer back was "Look, it's alright, there's no issue. It was the right thing to do." And glibly I said, "Maybe we should talk some more, maybe there's a beginning of something." Then the conversation began to try and sort this seemingly intractable dispute out.

There were conversations happening with other people which I wasn't aware of because none of this was planned. But one of the people who conversations were happening with, was [The Reverend] Harold Good. And so, Harold and myself spoke, and we decided to speak to some of the people who were involved in the disputes, totally off the record, outside of the knowledge of anybody else, we didn't go to politicians, we didn't go to the police, we didn't go to anybody. We just spoke to people in the Orange, people who lived in the locality, and we said "Can we talk about this?" It really was a conversation like that. There was no considered strategy or plan.'[242]

Krause (2018) argues that the successful prevention of violence within a community depends on the members of said community choosing to value a geographic, suburb or city-based identity over their ethnic or sect identities: 'Community leaders rejected simplistic conflict narratives and onesided blame

[242] Interview, Jim Roddy, 28th July 2017

and supported proactive 'we-thinking' and alternative identities as 'people of Wayame' in Ambon and 'people of Dadin Kowa' in Jos, as opposed to 'Muslim' versus 'Christian' communities'.[243]

Such a communal identity could not be established on the Crumlin Road, because, as explored above, neighbourhood and sectarian identities overlapped significantly. Nevertheless, there was still potential for solidarity between neighbourhoods. As one of my respondents noted, the two communities have long suffered from troubles relating to drugs, alcohol and suicide, and they are both majority working class.[244] They also suffered thanks to the actions of paramilitaries. The recognition of this similarity by the Ligoniel lodges, and the respect they showed to fellow sufferers, did not break down the metaphorical (or literal) walls between the communities. However, it created a brief moment of mutual respect. Peace activists like Jim Roddy immediately saw that public opinion was now potentially in a space that could accept compromise and resolution and moved to capitalise on that.

Negotiations began in April 2016, and an initial deal was worked out in June. The Ballysillan and the UPRG however refused to sign up to it.[245] CARA decided that it could not sign on to an agreement only agreed to by 2 of the 3 lodges, and the deal was not ratified.[246] CNR peace activists however signalled that they remained open to further talks.[247] It was up to the Orange Order to face down their spoilers.

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[243] Krause (2018), p.72
[244] Interview, Alfie McCrory, 22nd March 2018
[245] Short, Evan, 'Historic Ardoyne parading deal collapses', *Belfast Media Group*, 28th June 2016; McAleese, Deborah, 'On the brink of collapse...proposed deal to end three-year Ardoyne parade dispute', *Belfast Telegraph*, 28th June 2016
[246] Interview, Joe Marley, 13th July 2017
[247] Morris, Allison, 'The Twelfth - Leading Orangeman urges troublemakers to stay away', *Irish News*, 12th July 2016

My interviewees were quite coy regarding the internal politicking that occurred in PUL North Belfast over the Summer of the 2016. Disagreement surfaced however on the 12th July. Journalists observed that the now-traditional protest on that date was not organised, as was usually the case, by all three North Belfast lodges. Instead, it was organised by the Ballysillan alone.[248] On the day observers also noted how small this parade was compared to usual, 'with fewer than 20 members of Ballysillan lodge, and a small number of supporters' arriving at the protest point, compared to the 'hundreds' normally mobilised. Solinas unsurprisingly was there, acting as the spokesman for Ballysillan.[249]

According the watching journalist the Ballysillan 'clearly expected the other lodges to join them and waited for an hour and a quarter for them to do so' before dispersing.[250] Though the Orange publicly stated that this had not been done to isolate and embarrass the hardliners in the Ballysillan, it is difficult to believe them. The Ballysillan hardliners had been the most prominent opponents to the deal, and they had been very publicly isolated. Peace activists added more pressure in late July when the Loyalist Communities Council, a group representing the leadership of various Loyalist paramilitary groups, including the UDA, announced their support for the Twaddell deal.[251] Though the internal conversations that achieved the peace activists' goal remain hidden, the public pressure appears to have worked. The Ballysillan lodge signed up to the deal in September and Gerald Solinas, along with 8 other lodge members,

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[248] Kearney, Vincent, 'Twelfth of July: Ballysillan members left 'isolated' at police barricade', *BBC News*, 13th July 2016, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-36785644, accessed 31/07/2019; McDonald, Henry, 'Maybe, just maybe, we are on the march to a more civilised future;
Time will tell, but this week's peaceful end to the Twelfth could mark a fresh start for parading', *Belfast Telegraph*, 15th July 2016

[249] Kearney, Vincent, 'Twelfth of July: Ballysillan members left 'isolated' at police barricade', *BBC News*, 13th July 2016, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-36785644, accessed 31/07/2019

[250] Ibid

[251] Kearney, Vincent, 'North Belfast: Disputed parades talks to resume', *BBC News*, 26th July 2016, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-36894993, accessed 31/07/2019

resigned from the Orange Order.[252] Demonstrably alone in their commitment to perpetual opposition, the PUL spoilers backed down.

CARA too made sure that internal opposition was neutered. In order to legitimise the deal, CARA held a public meeting in an Ardoyne community hall with the goal of obtaining the approval of the Ardoyne community.[253] According to members of GARC, and to an interviewee on the complete other end of the Catholic political spectrum; 'Sinn Fein flooded that place, and anybody that was trying to talk at it was shut down. They were trying to talk us down [unclear]…Every time Sinn Fein made a speech, they got a big clap. People from Ardoyne tried to talk, they tried to shoot them down.[254]'

Given Sinn Fein's previous exclusion strategy, this silencing seems entirely plausible. After all, as Dee Fennell argued, if you truly wanted to get the democratic approval of the whole Ardoyne ward (which in 2016 had an adult population of 4,000) you would not do it via a public meeting in a building with a capacity of around 100 people.[255] The public meeting was necessary to give CARA's deal a veneer of democratic legitimacy, but Sinn Fein made certain that the result of the meeting was guaranteed to be acceptance.

Further steps were taken to prevent GARC from spoiling the new peace. The symbolic 'return home' parade requested by the Orange lodges was organised for Saturday morning, an inhospitable time for which to organise a protest. In addition to this, a public letter, signed by a wide array of local

[252] Rainey, Mark, 'Ardoyne parade deal "within weeks"', *Belfast News Letter*, 22nd September 2016, https://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/ardoyne-parade-deal-within-weeks-1-7592668, accessed 31/07/2019
[253] Interview, Joe Marley, 13th July 2017
[254] Interview, Ardoyne Resident, 22nd July 2016; 'Fr Gary Donegan confronted by angry Ardoyne protesters', *BBC News*, 3rd October 2016, accessed 20/03/2018, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-northern-ireland-37543648/fr-gary-donegan-confronted-by-angry-ardoyne-protesters
[255] Breen, Suzanne, 'Republican group set to protest against agreed Orange parade', *Belfast Telegraph*, 28th September 2016

community groups, Nationalist politicians and Catholic religious leaders requested that GARC not protest the parade.[256] Happily for the peace activists GARC also supplied ammunition for its own defeat, when the group was filmed verbally assaulting Father Donegan during their protest.[257] Their actions were publicised, and extensively criticised.[258] This assassination/revelation of their character, combined with the agreement that the 12th July evening parade would be voluntarily suspended, appears to have been GARC's death knell. The group has not notified the Commission about any parade or protest, since November 2016.

To conclude, the problem peace activists from both the Protestant and Catholic communities of the Crumlin Road faced between 2009 and 2016, was a loss of control within their communities. Spoilers in the form of GARC and the Ballysillan/UPRG faction forced the Crumlin Road dispute to escalate via street-level protest. The peace activists could not prevent them from protesting. However, they could make sure that protesting was all they were able to do. By keeping spoilers out of negotiations, both the Protestant and Catholic peace activists were able to produce an agreement. With a resolution in sight, and public opinion at least tacitly accepting of it, spoilers found themselves isolated. Under extensive public and internal pressure to give in, and with the evening parade - the primary trigger for protest - suspended, spoilers were no longer

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[256] 'Twaddell protest: Parade resolution in full', *Belfast Telegraph*, 24th September 2016; Young, Connla, 'Protest passes off peacefully amid heavy police presence', *Irish News*, 1st October 2016; Young, David, 'Relief as protest over crunch Orange march passes off peacefully', *Belfast Telegraph*, 1st October 2016; 'Ardoyne parade deal: Plea for Garc to halt protest', *BBC News*, 30th September 2016

[257] 'Fr Gary Donegan confronted by angry Ardoyne protesters', *BBC News*, 3rd October 2016, accessed 20/03/2018, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-northern-ireland-37543648/fr-gary-donegan-confronted-by-angry-ardoyne-protesters

[258] 'Priest hailed after angry scenes at Orange Order parade', *Belfast News Letter*, 3rd October 2016, https://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/latest-news/priest-hailed-after-angry-scenes-at-orange-order-parade-1-7609832, accessed 01/08/2019; Hedges, John, 'Backlash against GARC protesters after venomous abuse of Holy Cross priest in Ardoyne', *anphoblacht*, 2nd October 2016, https://www.anphoblacht.com/contents/26407, accessed 01/08/2019

able to generate conflict. Peace activists therefore proved able to prevent parades-related violence, even in the face of spoilers.

5.6: Conclusion

This Chapter has sought to answer the puzzle of why parades-related conflict is so rare in Northern Ireland. To do this, I have used as my case study the area in which the most parades-related violence occurred, to see how even in this case there was less violence than we might expect. The answer is that violence was prevented by the actions of peace activists, who either directly persuaded people not to engage in violence, or, collaborated in removing the parts of a parade that proved most likely to trigger violence.

This case showed that the ability of peace activists to restrain violence is not limitless. Spoilers were able to exacerbate and escalate conflict between 2009 and 2016. But peace activists, by excluding spoilers from having any say over the shape of resolution, and through the weight of support they had from the broader society, proved able to (eventually) outflank spoilers and bring an end to the conflict despite their influence.

This then is how conflict was ended in North Belfast. However, this thesis is concerned with a puzzle that extends across Northern Ireland. It is reasonable therefore to ask: do the findings generated from a study of North Belfast apply across the province? I believe they do, for two reasons. First, peace activists are not limited to North Belfast. Jarman et al. (2009) in their study of 26 locations across Northern Ireland found multiple examples of PUL and CNR community representatives meeting to tackle parades disputes, with Derry and Newry hailed as particular examples of successful conflict deescalation.[259] Even in less public success stories, Jarman et al. (2009) report that representatives desired to

[259] Jarman et al. (2009), p.12 & 20-23

'avoid violence and public disorder'.[260] Though research on it is slim, what little there is suggests that peace activism is common across Northern Ireland. What is less common, is spoiler activity.

GARC's actions on the Crumlin Road came as part of a wave of Dissident Republican activism that included both nonviolent and violent actions. However, as examinations of violent Dissident actions suggests, this activity was short-lived, with a rise in activity in 2009-10 swiftly declining and petering out by 2015.[261]

As regards parades-related spoiling, in 2013 Dissidents in several CNR areas formed an umbrella group named 'Communities Against Sectarian Parading' to unite efforts in combating marches.[262] Of the other groups and locations mentioned in this communique however, only one other besides GARC - the Rasharkin Residents Collective - has ever organised protests. CASP itself was extremely short-lived, being shut down in 2015.[263] As we saw in North Belfast between 2009 and 2015, it was the mobilisation of sizeable protests by Dissidents, bringing people onto the street who had little respect for the authority of Sinn Fein, that overcame the ability of CNR peace activists to prevent violence. The fact that dissidents appear to have had little success mobilising opposition to parades beyond North Belfast, helps explain why there is so little parades-related violence in Northern Ireland. The reason why North Belfast was such an outlier in violence, was because it was the only place in

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[260] Ibid, p.48

[261] Horgan & Morrison (2011), p.646; Morrison & Horgan (2016), p.582

[262] Rasharkin Residents Collective, 'Communities Against Sectarian Parades – 21/6/13', *Rasharkin Residents Collective*, 1st July 2013, https://rasharkinrc.webs.com/apps/blog/show/29547086-communities-against-sectarian-parades-21-6-13, accessed 13/01/2020

[263] Young, Connla, 'No nationalist protest to be held at Rasharkin parade', *Irish News*, 16th August 2019, https://www.irishnews.com/news/northernirelandnews/2019/08/16/news/no-nationalist-protest-to-be-held-at-rasharkin-parade-1686869/, accessed 13/01/2020.

Northern Ireland where spoilers were truly able to disrupt peace activism. Elsewhere, those seeking to prevent violence were able to accomplish their goals unchallenged.

Chapter 6: Final Conclusion

The stated puzzle at the heart of this thesis is, given that episodes of ethnic violence in Northern Ireland (and indeed, across the world) so often begin with parades, why is it so rare for parades to end in violence? The puzzle deepens following the findings of Chapter Three, which demonstrate that in Northern Ireland participation in both PUL and CNR parades rises under conditions that pose a threat to these groups. Using the evidence at my disposal, I propose two reasons for why this might be the case.

In Chapter Four, I showed that protests directed against parades were far more common in the vicinity of sharp borders between segregated Catholic and Protestant-majority areas. I also showed that these areas were comparatively rare in number, with less than a quarter of areas where conflict was seen as a risk being located near such a border.

Then, in Chapter Five, I complemented this analysis of variation across space, with an analysis of variation across time in the most violent parades dispute in post-Good Friday Northern Ireland. This Chapter traces the emergence, loss and re-emergence of peaceful relations regarding parades on the Crumlin Road to the waxing and waning of the authority of local peace activists. I show that when the authority of peace activists is buttressed by cross-community cooperation and the restriction of conflict to controllable spaces, peace can be built in even the most conflict-prone areas.

These Chapters together propose an answer to the puzzle of why parades in Northern Ireland so rarely provoke violence. Not only are the conditions that promote conflict rare, but there are a sufficient number of powerful groups across the country interested in bringing violence to an end.

Yet, this thesis is not simply a story of how violence at parades is avoided. Each of my empirical Chapters has other stories to tell. In Chapter Three I demonstrate that participation in minority, as well as majority, ethnic parades is motivated by differing forms of threat: 'status threat' for the majority, 'rights erosion' for the minority. This Chapter is not only innovative in its comparison of majority and minority activism, but, it also justifies the disaggregated approach to 'threat' suggested by Almeida (2019) and refutes the narrative of Owens et al. (2019) that threat is a motivator purely for fearful majority groups.

Chapter Four meanwhile wades into the debate over whether motive or opportunity is the pathway by which geography incentivises ethnic conflict. At the finish it offers more proof for motive, by showing that CNR counter-protests against PUL parades are far more likely in the vicinity of sharp borders between segregated areas.

Finally, Chapter Five advances the literature on the power of activists to prevent ethnic conflict, by studying the ability of activists to do so across time. This complicated the image of authority as permanent constructed by cross-geography comparisons, by showing how the authority of the same set of activists waxed and waned depending on their ability to collaborate, and the spaces in which they attempted to exert it. In short, the empirical chapters not contribute answers to the core question of the thesis, but also offer new directions in which three distinct literatures could advance.

Beyond these innovations though, there is another way to build upon the findings of this study, and that is to take the analysis of parades and identity beyond Northern Ireland. Parades, as shown in the Introduction, are very common acts. They are the tools of a wide variety of identity groups. In the UK alone, women parade to 'Reclaim the Night', LGBT people parade for Pride, trade

unions parade on May Day, Sikhs parade in the Vaisakhi festival, Irish parade on St Patrick's Day, Scots in favour of independence parade "All Under One Banner" and English nationalists, like the EDL, parade on St George's Day. These events share a similar form, but that one form can be deployed in service of multiple goals.

These parades may state or celebrate a group's existence, commemorate an important event in a group's history, express the group's right to public space, or demand for society to change so that they might be included in it. Parades have been used to do this for well over a century. In particular, the traditions of British Protestant parading (through the Orange Order) and Irish Catholic parading (through the Ancient Order of Hibernians) have an extremely long history, that is not limited to Northern Ireland. O'Leary (2016)'s study of parades in C19th South Wales shows how both the Orange Order and Irish Catholics used parades as a means of laying claim to public space.[264] What has changed since this time however is the context.

The UK, and indeed much of the Western world, is experiencing a proliferation of identities vying for inclusion within the public sphere. The role parades play in these diversifying societies is being studied, with two major manuscripts comparing the form of and participation in May Day and Pride parades across Europe. However, this is but the tip of the iceberg. As the list above indicates, it is quite possible that one might never run out of parading groups to write about. There is then more work to do on the organisations behind and participants in various parades. However, if the focus moves beyond individual movements, there are two further questions that require solution.

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[264] O'Leary (2016), p.124-127 & 147-149

The first is the question of the consequences of parades, both for their participants and their audiences. It has long been argued that parades, much the same as other identity-celebrating rituals, are a means to create or strengthen peoples' attachment to social groups.[265] As stated in the Introduction, existing studies on participation in national ceremonies have thrown doubt on assumptions that such festivals inculcate stronger feelings of national belonging.[266] Instead, quantitative analysis suggests that attendance is an expression of pre-existing national attachment.[267]

The quantitative measurement of such feelings of attachment is rare. To date, surveys have only been deployed to study Israel and the Netherlands, and in each case, the measurement of participation in national rituals differs immensely. The Dutch studies explicitly measure participation in Dutch Liberation festivals, while the Israeli studies prefer a more general measure of 'exposure', that includes both participation in ceremonies and more passive activities such as watching Remembrance Day-related TV programmes.[268] The study of parades could advance this literature.

A focus on parades offers scope and comparability. As we have discussed, parades take place all over the world, and, tend to take similar forms regardless of the identities of participants or the country they are based in. As it is the form of the event that is supposed to inculcate identity attachment - in particular, a crowd's unity of action - this global consistency of form will allows us to see whether parades consistently fail to produce identity-attachment, or whether their ability to do so is contingent on context. Studies of parades also offer easy

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265 Durkheim (1922), p.429

266 Ariely (2017), p.2605; Ariely (2019), p.9; De Regt & Lippe (2017), p.290-291; De Regt (2018), p.1720

267 De Regt (2018), p.1720

268 Ariely (2017), p.2603-2604; Ariely (2019), p.8

categorisation of affected groups. With parades, unlike festivals or national days taken as a whole, there is a very clear demarcation between participant and audience. This separation will be useful to determine whether different degrees of engagement with the ritual or ceremony have differing impact, something which existing studies do not assess. We can also look within these groups, to, for example, look at the effects of parades on particular audiences. Given that many parades are held by minority groups seeking to incorporate themselves within society, examining their reception by elites and legislators offers an opportunity to see, not only their psychological impact, but also their potential for policy impact.

The second question parades can be used to solve relates to the function of parades. As said, parades claim public space as a means of celebration, self-definition and demand. However, not all groups choose to do this. For example, 1% of Northern Ireland's population (as of the 2011 census) had Polish nationality, yet between 2006 and 2016 there were no parades associated with the community.

One might explain this by stating that there are simply too few Poles. This analysis is however thrown into question by the presence of Pride Parades in both Belfast and Derry, when the province's Gay and Lesbian population hovers between 1-2% according to the ONS (2012-2017), and the occasional Chinese cultural parades in Belfast, when (as of the 2011 census) only 0.3% of Northern Ireland's population claimed Chinese ethnicity.

The question of "who parades?" has particular relevance, given the present ethnic/cultural diversification of Western countries, because people do not parade without purpose. The practice is often a defensive response, done to counteract negative social portrayals, and, as argued by Chapter Three, the

experience of discrimination can motivate members of minority ethnic groups to participate in parades. However, as already stated, Chapter Three as a sub-national study is limited in what it can test. A cross-national study though could answer some very interesting questions.

It may be that in other countries, different factors supersede threat in influencing peoples' behaviour. For example, if members of a group feel particularly under threat, or, believe that keeping their heads down is a better survival strategy than making a challenging claim on public space, then they may not parade. It may also be the case that parading is abnormal in particular countries, meaning that groups in those countries seeking social acceptance may prefer other strategies. Finally, it may well be that some people, though technically assigned to a national, gender or ethnic category, may not perceive themselves as part of a 'group', and as such, will feel no need to parade. By exploring these possibilities, the question of 'why do some categories of people parade, while others do not?' could offer valuable insights into the nature of Western diversity, allowing us to distinguish between 'categories' and 'groups', and discover why some contexts appear to facilitate public negotiations of difference, where others do not.

These then are the questions this thesis offers the opportunity to answer. However, this thesis not only offers further questions - it also offers a means to obtain the answers. All the work contained within this thesis would not have be possible without the data collection and monitoring work done by the Parades Commission of Northern Ireland. As described in Chapter Three, this government-collated data is far better suited to the study of parades than that obtained from newspapers. Newspapers tend cover events that are associated with politically contentious issues, are counter-demonstrated and/or disorderly,

and take place in major, easily-accessible locations.[269] The parades in my dataset by contrast are mostly small, non-contentious and take place in settlements all across the province. Without the Parades Commission, it is unlikely that any record of many of these parades would have been made.

Given the extreme usefulness of government-derived event catalogues, it is somewhat surprising, as Greenberg (2019) points out, that they have been so rarely used by scholars of social movements.[270] To an extent this is explicable by the absence of any broader knowledge about the availability of this data. The Parades Commission for example does not publicise the fact that they can download their data and provide it to users, and it was only through direct contact with the Commission that I learned this fact.

What's more, the availability of this data is often quite time-limited and organisation-specific. The Parades Commission's electronic records for example only go back to 2006. Exploration of data availability in Scotland meanwhile, where such data is collected by local government units, found great variation between localities, both in terms of how far back their electronic datasets stretch (ranging from 2007, to the current year only), and what data was collected (some localities only record name, date and location, whereas others include participant numbers). However, no data source is perfect, and the face that government-collected data typically covers far more events than the media, should inspire greater efforts to investigate how available such data is.[271] It is my hope that this study, by demonstrating what datasets built on government-collected data can do, can help inspire such investigations.

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269 McCarthy et al. (1996), p.491; Oliver & Myers (1999), p.70-71; Ortiz et al. (2005), p.398-401

270 Greenberg (2019), http://bit.ly/34yW6Uc

271 McCarthy et al. (1996), p.488; Wouters (2013), p.93

To conclude this conclusion, I began this thesis with a description of the parade. One of the enduringly fascinating characteristics of political behaviour is how events with such great social ramifications can be produced by individual actions that, when described, appear entirely banal. This however is the consequence of seeing only the action, and not the meaning it holds for participants.

One theme that appears in interviews with participants in parades, and the festivities surrounding them, is how little difference there is between the parade and the collective identity it promotes. Blake (2019) heard Orangeman after Orangeman state as much, and cites directly one's illustrative assertion that '"The parades *are* my culture"'.[272] However it is not just Orangemen that see no distinction between the parade and the nation. O'Donnell et al. (2016)'s analysis of interviews conducted during St Patrick's Day in both Belfast and Dublin cites similar opinions, with one participant, in reference to the carnival atmosphere of St Patrick's Day in Belfast, stating '"The atmosphere is portraying Ireland"'.[273]

I opened this thesis by depicting a parade as group of people, essentially, going for a bit of a walk, but this was an outsider's description. Seen through the eyes of the insider, this group of walkers becomes an act of communication - a description of a people, and a demand that the world make space for them. It has been my intent with this thesis to demonstrate that it is worth listening to what parades are saying, because through them we can see people with renewed clarity.

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[272] Blake (2019), p.89-94, emphasis added by the cited author.
[273] O'Donnell et al. (2016), p.69

Appendix A: The Parades Commission Dataset

A.1: The Original Dataset

I obtained the raw data used to produce the PCD through correspondence with the Parades Commission. They provided me with an Excel spreadsheet containing the following information on each public procession notified to the Parades Commission between 2006-2016:

- A unique Reference Number,
- The Date on which the procession took place,
- The number of Participants and Supporters listed as being part of/accompanying the procession,
- The Organisation that held the procession,
- The 'Location' of the procession (usually equivalent to the settlement or suburb the procession started in, or the name of the local area for more rural parades),
- The first stop on the procession's Outward Route (usually a street or building name),
- The Organisation Type, a categorisation system used by the Commission to group processions together that were organised by the same type of organisation (eg. Individual processions were identified as being organised by specific Orange Order lodges, but, all were grouped under the category of "Orange Order").

This dataset required significant work before it could be subjected to ecological analysis. Necessary additions were as follows. First, I needed to make it so the parades could be located to Settlements. Second, the dataset included a large number of events that were not parades, following the definition of 'proactive, identarian demonstrations'. These included a large number of reactive protests, but also, a number of events (including marathons, tractor runs, and long drives by car clubs) more properly identified as leisure or charitable activities. These would need to be set apart and distinguished from the commemorative and identity-promoting demonstrations.

Finally, there were a number of parades promoting non-CNR/PUL identities, for example, Pride Parades and May Day parades by unions, and civic parades carried out by various cities. These also needed to be identified and distinguished, in order that I might extract from this larger database, one that contained only proactive identarian demonstrations associated with the CNR and PUL identity-blocs. I describe the processes by which I located and defined the parades below.

A.2: Locating Parades

In order to locate parades to Settlements, I needed to assign coordinates to each parade. For this purpose I took the Outward Route and Location information, and analysed them using opencagegeo. Opencagegeo is a tool able to convert descriptions of where an event occurs into longitude-latitude coordinates. It sets itself apart from similar tools, in that, in addition to assigning coordinates, it also provides scores for how precise the coordinates supplied were. The most important of these scores was "g_value", which identifies the level of address that was identified via the information provided (from 'country level' to 'house number' level accuracy).

Using opencagegeo, I was able to assign coordinates to most of my parades with at least settlement level accuracy. However, the program was unable to handle all the entries in the dataset, due to the consequences of using organiser-submitted data. The problems encountered were multiple, including misspelt place names, the use of local nicknames rather than official designations for place names, and no a lack of standardisation in how the 'Outward Route' information was provided.

Due to the size of the dataset, the Commission only had sufficient computing power to provide me with the first line of information contained in the 'Outward Route' section. Sometimes this line would be a single street name, which opencagegeo could competently geolocate. Sometimes however that first line would be a whole phrase (for example, '(depart from West City Hall -')), which opencagegeo could not locate.

Finally, the software itself had certain limitations. Opencagegeo matches descriptions to coordinates using openstreetmap, an open-source map of the

world, generated like Wikipedia through user submissions. This did not create problems regarding accuracy, as I found openstreetmap to compare quite favourably with Google Maps in the accuracy of its location identifications. However, its coverage of place names was not quite as extensive as Google's, with smaller and more rural communities in Northern Ireland not being thoroughly mapped. Even some streets in Belfast were, I discovered, unidentified.

This, in conjunction with the software's inability to accurately locate all parades, meant that I had to manually locate a fair number of the parades myself, using openstreetmap, Google Maps and, for locations not listed in either of those maps, Facebook and geograph.ie, to look up locations and assign coordinates. For areas where the precise position was uncertain - for example, a particular street - I either selected the midpoint of that street or a junction of that street and the street the parade was travelling to next, according to which one I felt was more likely to be accurate. I labelled those parades located in this manner 'manual'.

A.3: Identifying Parades

As stated, in order to focus my study on 'proactive identarian demonstrations', I needed to distinguish commemorative events from those held for purposes of charity or entertainment. I therefore created the Event Type category. Processions were sorted into specific categories in the following manner.

First, the Organisation category was consulted, as certain Organisations, like the Orange Order, hold events for only one purpose (in their case, Commemoration and Display). Where the event type was not obvious from merely looking at the Organisation category, a Google search was conducted, looking for a description of the event itself, or, to see if the date on which the event took place had any commemorative significance. Information was drawn from social media (particularly Facebook), organisation websites and newspaper articles, links to which were in turn collected under two new columns: Organisation Information and Event Information.

Precise information about the purpose of each procession was not consistently available, and I was unable to categorise 7868 processions. However, of these unidentified processions, only 31 might have belonged in the PCD, so errors in categorisation are likely to have had limited impact. The Event Type categories are as follows:

1) Commemoration & Display. Defined as an event participated-in to explicitly make-visible a particular collective identity AND/OR commemorate a significant historical or otherwise-secular event.

2) Fundraising. Defined as a public procession held for the purpose of raising money for a particular cause. The fundraising category supersedes the recreation category, though in practice the two are very similar. All events held by charities and cause-based civil society groups, for example, MacMillan Cancer Support are considered to be 'Fundraising'.

3) Industrial. Defined as an event participated in for commercial or economic purposes, eg. as part of a job, or to sell/buy goods. The major definition employed here is the characterisation of military parades as 'industrial' given that they are participated in by soldiers as part of their job, rather than voluntarily.

4) Protest. Defined, in line with the Introduction, as a reactive demonstration.

5) Recreation. Defined as an event participated in purely for fun, and/or as part of a hobby. There will be many events in the PCD that people participate in for recreational reasons - for example, charity fun runs or the 'Mountnorris Presbyterian Church Vintage Rally' - that will not be labelled as 'Recreation'. This is because 'Recreation' is intended to capture events that have no consequence except individual enjoyment. Where participation is likely engaged in for multiple reasons, I choose to code EventType according to the more community-focused, rather than self-focused, reason, on the basis that there is a significant difference between the choice to run and raise money for others, and the choice to run just for oneself.

6) Religious. Defined as an event participated-in for purposes of celebrating one's religion. Includes all events hosted by Churches and other religious groups. Distinguished from 'Commemoration & Display' in order to avoid conflating ethnonational celebrations with religious events.

The Event Type category was but one of the additional categories required, in order to ensure that the PCD could be extracted from the mass of data obtained from the Parades Commission. The other I labelled Affiliation. This categorised parades according to the 'identity' of the people participating in them. I used a particularly broad conception of 'identity', which was, in effect, the answer to the question 'what do individuals in the procession have in common?'. This resulted in the following categories:

1) Civic. Label given to processions associated with a subnational, spatial entity, such as a city or county. This label is assigned mostly to the public processions held by charities which provide services to specific communities, such as the Randalstown Arches Association, or those held by local governments, such as district councils.

2) CNR. Label given to processions associated with the broad Catholic/Nationalist/Republican collective identity. This label is assigned to all public processions associated with this broad collective, from events held by Gaelic Athletics Associations and other Irish-aligned cultural and sporting organisations, to marches held to commemorate Republican martyrs.

3) Hobbyist. Label given to processions that occur for a purely recreational purpose, where there is no connection between participants but their love for the hobby, whether that's car enthusiasm or some form of sport.

4) Other Collective. Defined as an association with all non-PUL/CNR collective identities. These identities are grouped together due to the low number of processions celebrating them (598 out of 47,000). This label is assigned to public processions associated with the following commonalities - gender (ie. womens' marches), sexuality (LGBT Pride Parades), partisan (Left and Right, for example, processions held by unions, People Before Profit or anti-immigrant groups), masonic lodges and 'cross-community' marches (in particular the marches for communal peace held by members of different Churches every St. Patrick's Day).

5) Military. Label given to processions held by serving military units.

6) None. Defined as an absence of association. Attributed to Industrial events.

7) Prosocial. Label given to processions associated with charitable interests, that are not focused on particular group or area.

8) PUL. Label given to processions associated with the broad Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist collective identity. Most obviously, this includes processions carried out by Protestant churches, the Loyal Orders and the marches of socialist Loyalist parties like the PUP. It also includes the Royal

British Legion parades held on Remembrance Day to commemorate those who died in the First World War.

A.4: Data Cleaning

After locating and categorising all the processions in the original dataset, I subjected it to cleaning. While data entry by the Parades Commission was mostly done with high accuracy, two flaws in the dataset artificially inflated the number of processions. First, the dataset contained entries for processions which organisers had decided not to hold (these were often labelled 'withdrawn'). These entries were deleted from the dataset. Second, the dataset contained some duplicate entries, identified as two or more parades being held by the same organisation in the same place, on the same day. This resulted from two types of error.

Error one involved organisers submitting multiple notifications for the same procession, as information relating to that procession changed over time (for example, the route). This was resolved by retaining the duplicate entry with the highest Reference Number, as this would have been the latest notification, and deleting the others.

Error two involved organisers sometimes submitting separate notifications for different sections of the same procession (for example, treating the outward and return legs of the same procession as two separate processions). Where possible, I attempted to solve this problem by retaining the outward route procession, and deleting all other entries. The outward route was chosen, as I assume it more likely for parade participants to live closer to the start point of a procession than to its end point. This error was somewhat harder to resolve than the first, as it was not always clear which procession was the outward route. Mistakes made in the cleaning process however are unlikely to have led to

misallocating processions to settlements, given that it is very rare, and as such noticeable, for processions to start in one settlement, and finish in another.

In addition to removing duplicates, I also had to edit the participant numbers. Numbers of participants were recorded in the dataset in many different ways, including as 'lower than/higher than' a particular number, and as ranging between two different numbers. I used the following rules to generate whole participant numbers from these various forms of information:

1) Less than 'number'. SOLUTION: Use the midpoint number between minimum (0) and maximum, rounding down.

2) Range between 0 & 'number'. SOLUTION: Use the midpoint number between minimum (0) and maximum, rounding down.

3) An upper estimate. Often indicated by 'number max'. SOLUTION: Use the midpoint number between minimum (0) and maximum, rounding down.

4) Number of vehicles. SOLUTION: on the assumption that 1 vehicle requires at least 1 driver, I assume a 1:1 vehicle-to-human participant ratio.

5) A range. Indicated either by 'number - number' or 'number/number'. SOLUTION: use the midpoint number between the minimum and maximum, rounding down.

6) A lower estimate. Indicated by 'number+' or 'number plus'. SOLUTION: use this lowest estimate as the fixed number of participants.

7) A rough estimate, eg. ‘number approx.’. SOLUTION: use the number.

8) Two numbers - one for outward parade, one for return parade. SOLUTION: use the highest number.

After locating, categorising and cleaning the data, the PCD was ready to be extracted from the base dataset. I selected all processions held for purposes of ‘Commemoration & Display’, that were identified as PUL or CNR, that started inside the boundaries of a Settlement, and for which there was information on participant numbers. For both PUL and CNR I found the sum of participants in parades in each identity, in each Settlement-Year. I linked this data with data from the 2011 Census and the Sutton Index of Deaths, amongst others, to produce the final, analysed dataset.

Appendix B: List of Interviewees

Role	Name	Anonymous?
Journalist/Ex-PIRA	Danny Morrison	N
Academic	Dr Tim Mairs	N
Journalist	Henry McDonald	N
Residents' Spokesman	Joe Marley	N
Residents' Spokesman	Sean Murray	N
Mediator/NGO	Peter Osborne	N
Mediator	Fr. Gary Donegan	N
Parades Commission	Rev Brian Kennaway	N
Residents' Spokesman	Gerard Rice	N
Residents' Spokesman	Conor Keenan	N
Police Officer	Gary White	N
Parades Commissioner	N/A	Y
Mediator	Sean O'Baoill	N
Residents' Spokesman	Donncha McNiallais	N
Mediator	Jim Roddy	N
Orangeman	N/A	Y
Mediator	Reverend Harold Good	N
Police Officer	N/A	Y
Politician	N/A	Y
Civilian	N/A	Y
Parader	Tommy Cheevers	N
Residents' Spokesman	Alfie McCrory	N
Local Scholar	N/A	Y

A template consent form has been submitted as Additional Material.

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