The Chinese party-state's use of model worker narratives to legitimize reform and maintain order, 1977-1992

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Abstract

This dissertation investigates how and why the Chinese party-state used the figure of the "model worker" in the state-owned media in the period 1977-1992. Through close reading and digitally-aided analysis of articles published in the *People's Daily*, the dissertation demonstrates that model workers were employed to frame and discuss the most important political, economic, and social issues of the period.

Through analysis of newspaper articles, the dissertation shows that the party-state sought very determinedly to alter popular norms and expectations so as to fit with the evolving reform policies, and model workers appeared frequently in these efforts. Under Hua Guofeng, and later Deng Xiaoping, the party-state sought to create a national community based on narratives of common past suffering, joy over the PRC's athletic triumphs, and pride in the country's improving ability to produce consumer goods. What characterizes the roles assigned to model workers in the narratives of the *People's Daily* is that they invariably appear as moral paragons, particularly in their eagerness to suppress individual material desires so as to benefit the larger community. For this reason, model workers almost never appeared in stories about workers benefitting materially from the economic reforms, except when they could justify their newfound wealth through philanthropy.

The great number of articles devoted to influencing workers' norms and expectations indicate entrenched popular resistance to the economic reforms. The sustained efforts of the *People's Daily*, along with the many articles published in this period aiming to explain to local cadres how best to do "thought work" among the general population, also show how methodically the party-state leadership approached the task of changing popular norms and expectations.

Finally, the dissertation advances the claim that the concept of "porous personhood"—a concept borrowed from anthropology and further developed—presents a useful way of understanding why concerns about models and modelling have been so prevalent in the PRC. The dissertation demonstrates that porosity remains an important element of how personhood is made sense of in the contemporary period, and it is suggested that porous personhood may provide a useful lens through which to integrate cultural and psychological insights into the analyses of Chinese media policies and state-society relations.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACFTU: All-China Federation of Trade Unions
CCP (or CPC): China's Communist Party (alternatively: The Communist Party of China)
CCTV: China Central Television
CPD: China's Publicity Department (former translation: The Chinese Communist Party Central Propaganda Department)
DH: Digital humanities
DSI: Definition of self-interest
GMD (or KMT): Guomindang (The Nationalist Party of China)
MPS: Ministry of Public Security
NPC: National People's Congress
NPCSC: Standing Committee of the NPC
OTA: Orientation towards authority
PRC: People's Republic of China
PLA: People's Liberation Army
SARFT: China's State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television
SOE: State-Owned Enterprise
TVE: Township and village enterprises

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Charts

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zhurenweng zerengan), "worker master attitude" (主人翁态度: *zhurenweng taidu*), or "worker master spiritual civilization" (主人翁精神文明: *zhurenweng jingshen wenming*) in 1960-1991.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Opening

In the most emotionally-charged scene in the biopic *Guo Mingyi* (郭明义) (2011), a young girl suffering from late-stage leukemia directs her gaze to the movie's eponymous hero and says that she wishes to honor him for his many kind acts towards her. She does this by calling him "Father." Moments later she expires, having uttered no other words, not even to her biological father who stands by Guo Mingyi's side as they watch her pass away. As anyone who watched the film in China would have known, the real Guo Mingyi is no fictional movie hero; rather he is a worker at a well-known steel factory in Anshan, Liaoning Province, and his exploits have been publicized widely by China's national media in recent years. One instance of this publicity occurred in 2011 when a play based on Guo Mingyi's life began touring around China. According to the *People's Daily*,

> Many of the lines spoken in the play are taken directly from Guo Mingyi's own life. For example, in one scene Guo Mingyi says: 'I am just an ordinary Party member. When I see children who cannot afford to go to school, or when I see so many sick people in need of blood transfusions, I feel very anxious and find it hard to accept. I can't eat or sleep, I just want to do everything I can to help them. After I have helped them, I feel a great happiness in my heart! A great sense of joy!' Since the play *Guo Mingyi* began touring across the country last year, a tidal wave of good reviews has met this theatrical rendition of the exemplary deeds of the national model of morality, our epoch's inheritor of the Lei Feng spirit.[1]

Guo Mingyi was first brought to national attention in a front-page article in the *People's Daily* in September 2010 under the heading: "A model of morality for a new time—Guo Mingyi."[2] Placed prominently in the center and upper left of the first page, Guo Mingyi's visage was the

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[1] *People's Daily*, 2012.03.15, p.24, "塑造真实的郭明义." The *People's Daily* relies on the YYYY/MM/DD format, and I have chosen to retain this when I refer to *People's Daily* articles in the footnotes. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations in this dissertation are mine.
[2] *People's Daily*, 2010.09.19, p.1, "新时期的道德模范——郭明义."

only picture on that day's front page. Taking up more space than any of the other front-page articles and moreover continuing on page two, where it took up three quarters of that page, Guo Mingyi's story was clearly the main story of the day. Since that very prominent debut in the national limelight, Guo appeared in 240 articles in the *People's Daily* between September 2010 and 1 July, 2012. In April 2012, Guo Mingyi was among 200 "model workers" mobilized to set up microblog accounts on Sina Weibo, and as of July 2016, Guo had no less than 21,202,936 followers.[3] In my own interactions with young Chinese people, I have heard only praise for Guo Mingyi when I have brought up his name.

Before proceeding, a note on the term "model worker." Model workers are selected by cadres on the national level, on the provincial level, and at company and village level. Most of the model workers appearing in this dissertation have been selected at the national level, though some are "only" provincial or local selectees. In this dissertation I use the terms "model worker" and "labor model" interchangeably to refer to recipients of the titles *laodong mofan* (劳动模范: "work model"), *xianjin shengchanzhe* (先进生产者: "advanced producer"), *tujishou* (突击手: "shock worker"), and *sanbahongqishou* (三八红旗手: "March 8 red banner pacesetter"), the latter reserved for women.

In contrast to Guo, Lei Feng (雷锋)—the party-state's premier propaganda creation and official role model for more than fifty years—seems to hold much less popular appeal these days. Despite enormous media hype, the three feature films about his life which premiered in 2013 reportedly drew extremely limited audiences. Other model workers have come to be positively derided on the Chinese internet, such as Shen Jilan (申纪兰), three times national worker award recipient and the longest serving representative on the National People's Congress, who was widely derided by netizens in 2013 for proudly stating that she has never voted "No" to a proposed bill.[4] Among those who ridiculed Shen was the

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[3] Http://www.weibo.com/guomingyi?is_hot=1Sina. Accessed July 5, 2016.

[4] Http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/12time-legislator-who-never-voted-no/article4492039.ece. Accessed March 02, 2016.

well-known civil rights lawyer Pu Zhiqiang (浦志强) who is currently facing criminal charges for, among other things, his online criticism of Shen.[5]

In many ways, the appointment of model workers appears anachronistic. While model workers seem to fit well with a Maoist ethos of continuous class struggle in order to foster morally superior socialist individuals capable of overcoming just about any physical constraint through willpower and dedication to the common good, today's rotating billboards with Lei Feng offering morally uplifting advice as a backdrop to luxury malls being built by lowly-paid construction workers working with flimsy occupational safety protection seems incongruous. Nevertheless, China's party-state remains very much invested in producing, maintaining, safeguarding, and updating its army of model workers and other types of exemplary models deployed to disseminate messages to the public. This tradition of selecting model workers and publicizing their exploits in order to influence public knowledge, dispositions, and actions dates back to the 1940s and draws on even older Chinese traditions for social engineering and education through model emulation. In today's digital media landscape—a landscape China's party-state invests enormous resources in controlling and guiding—this strategy is frequently ridiculed by Western media and Chinese netizens alike. More than a decade ago, Qinghua sociology professor Sun Liping recommended retiring the model worker institution and compared it to old holiday stickers peeling off government office doors because no one could be bothered to take them down.[6] Yet, throughout the period of economic reform, model workers have continued to feature regularly on the front page of the *People's Daily*. This was what first piqued my curiosity and fueled my desire to understand more clearly what was at stake here.

What makes the study of model workers all the more interesting is the fact that the party-state unequivocally sought to create "new people" (新民: *xinmin*) for a "new China" (新

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[5] Http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/15/world/asia/pu-zhiqiang-china-trial-weibo-posts.html?_r=0. Accessed November 28, 2015.

[6] Sun Liping, "Laomo Pingxuan de Ganga [The Embarrassments of Selecting Model Workers]," *Zhongguo Gaige*, no. 6 (2005): 52–53.

中国: *xin Zhongguo*). This ambition was nourished by what Price has referred to as an "almost infinite belief" in man's ability to rise above his limitations.[7] This ambition was in no way invented by the CCP, but was in fact shared across the ideological spectrum in the early decades of twentieth century China, where anxiety over the future of the Chinese race condensed out of military defeats and social Darwinism.[8] One of the interesting aspects of this is how pivotal a role culture, and literature in particular, was assigned in the efforts to improve the Chinese nation and thereby secure its survival.[9] Another interesting aspect, and this one is the topic for the present dissertation, is the question of why the dissemination of model worker narratives have featured so prominently in the party-state's attempts to influence the social imaginary?[10] In my examination of the evolution of state-propagated model worker publicity in contemporary China, I take my inspiration from the historian Robert Darnton who suggested that, "When we cannot get a proverb, or a joke, or a ritual, or a poem, we know we are on to something. By picking at the document where it is most opaque, we may be able to unravel an alien system of meaning. The thread might even lead into a strange and wonderful world view."[11] This leads me on to the following research questions.

In this dissertation, I will investigate how narratives involving model workers were employed by the Chinese party-state's main publicity organ (the CPD)[12] in the early period of

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[7] R. F. Price, *Education in Communist China* (New York: Praeger, 1970), 197.
[8] Andrew F. Jones, *Developmental Fairy Tales Evolutionary Thinking and Modern Chinese Culture* (Cambridge (Mass.); London: Harvard University Press, 2011). China's political right wing also nourished ambitions of fundamentally transforming the Chinese population; see Maggie Clinton, *Revolutionary Nativism: Fascism and Culture in China, 1925-1937* (North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2017).
[9] Kirk A. Denton, "Introduction," in *Modern Chinese Literary Thought: Writings on Literature, 1893-1945*, ed. Kirk A. Denton (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1996), 1–61.
[10] I will shortly explain why I find Charles Taylor's concept of the "social imaginary" useful for my work.
[11] Robert Darnton, *The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History* (1984; repr., New York: Basic Books, 1999), 5.
[12] The full title of the publicity department is Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Xuanchuanbu, which has been variously translated as the "Chinese Communist Party Central Propaganda Department" or "Central Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China."

economic reform, i.e., 1977-1992. How did the CPD use the tradition for using models—and in particular labor models—in its attempt to shape the social imaginary in ways conducive to the reforms? More broadly, this investigation will illuminate how the nominally proletarian party-state legitimized the many policies and trends which hurt the economic interests—along with the public esteem as well as the self-esteem—of China's workers who had for so long been praised as new China's leading class. In addition to analyzing *how* the party-state made use of model workers to put the best possible spin on the evolving reforms, this dissertation will also attempt to answer *why* model workers—along with other types of models—featured so prominently in the *People's Daily* in this early period of reform. Answering this second question turned out to involve considerable cross-disciplinary investigation into psychology, anthropology, and cultural studies. The second chapter of this dissertation will lay the groundwork for understanding the concept of "porous personhood," which I posit as a useful means of understanding the pervasiveness and the longevity of relying on various types of models for popular education in China. This dissertation will combine qualitative and quantitative analysis of texts, and it attempts to explore how such an approach may be used to interrogate newspaper articles to shed light on how the CPD attempted—and continues to attempt—to shape the nation's social imaginary.

In order to lay the groundwork for the following chapters, this introduction will cover a number of issues: 1) It will begin with an analytical history of the model worker institution, seeking to place the introduction of the model worker institution in its historical context, as well as detailing some of the early challenges the Party faced in maintaining and improving the usefulness of the institution as a tool of propaganda. 2) Model workers are not only models, they are also workers, and workers were, at least symbolically, placed at the very pinnacle of the socialist state from the 1950s into the 1970s. In the period of economic reform, however, many workers, particularly in the industrial sector, have experienced lay-

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Colloquially it is often abbreviated Zhongxuanbu, "China's Publicity Department," (CPD).

offs, a deteriorating social safety net, and a rapid decline in status and relative income. To understand the evolution of the model worker institution since 1976 we need to pay attention to the momentous shifts in the material, political, and symbolic fortunes of the working class in PRC history. The party-state has, for various reasons, been forced to address these momentous shifts in its public narrative, and this makes an investigation of the model worker institution in the period of economic reform all the more interesting. In short, the remainder of this introduction will situate the analysis to come in its historical and social context. The next chapter will unpack the theoretical toolbox used in the subsequent analysis.

1.2 A brief analytical history of labor models in China

In 1942, the CCP initiated a campaign to increase production in the areas under its control, and as part of this campaign they selected their first model worker, Zhao Zhankui, who worked at an agricultural tool factory, and promoted his selfless and untiring dedication to his work as model qualities for others to emulate. In initiating the practice of publicly celebrating selected individuals for their hard work, the CCP leadership was drawing on long-established political-cultural precedents as well as on practice from the Soviet Union, where models such as Aleksei Stakhanov had been celebrated by the state as models of industriousness since 1935.[13]

We know from several pieces of his writing from 1942 that Mao was a warm supporter of the idea of selecting labor models. In his "Economic and Financial Problems," presented to the Senior Cadres Conference of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region in December 1942, Mao wrote at length to recommend the propagation of knowledge about those who had done best for themselves in the CCP-dominated areas, in order that others would emulate their achievements. This would, Mao explained, help the peasants get richer

[13] This paragraph relies primarily on Yu Miin-ling, "'Labor Is Glorious': Model Laborers in the PRC," in *China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949-Present*, ed. Thomas P. Bernstein and Li Hua-Yu (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2010), 231–58. As we will see, the introduction of the celebration of model workers fitted in extremely well with existing political-cultural dispositions in China and should thus not be thought of primarily as a foreign import.

and thus come to feel increasingly inseparable from the CCP, the army, and the government. In his report, Mao quoted and commented at length on the articles in the *Liberation Daily* praising the accomplishments of the former landless peasant Wu Manyou (吴满有), who had managed to acquire not only a piece of land so large that he needed to hire others to help him farm it, but also horses, cows, and 200 sheep.[14]

When the CCP held its first model worker conference in late 1943, Mao gave a speech in which he praised the Chinese labor models for being leaders of the people. At the conference, 185 model workers were awarded certificates of merit autographed by CCP leaders.[15] They also received material rewards, such as money, draught animals, and farm equipment.[16] After the conference, woodcut portraits of the 25 singled out as "special model workers" were prominently displayed on the front page of the *Liberation Daily*.[17] Singled out for special mention was the peasant labor hero Wu Manyou. The special attention paid to Wu Manyou and the generous distribution of material rewards show that the CCP leadership—most notably Mao as attested to by his writings about labor models in these years—had few qualms about relying on material incentives to spur production at this point in time. Some readers of the *Liberation Daily* did, however, take exception to appointing Wu Manyou on the ground that he extracted surplus value from the labor of others. Answering to this challenge, the *Liberation Daily* repeatedly explained that even if these practices shared a certain exploitative aspect with capitalism, they were certainly better than the previous system of feudal oppression.[18] In an internal publication, the editor confidently argued that the development of the economic aspects of capitalism among the peasantry was both "natural

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[14] Mao Zedong, *Mao's Road to Power: Revolutionary Writings*, ed. Stuart R. Schram, Timothy Cheek, and Nancy Jane Hodes, vol. 8 (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), 314ff.
[15] Yu Miin-ling, "'Labor Is Glorious': Model Laborers in the PRC," 235.
[16] Govind S. Kelkar, "The Role of Labour Heroes in the Yenan Period," *China Report* 13, no. 4 (January 7, 1977): 54f., https://doi.org/10.1177/000944557701300405.
[17] *Liberation Daily* , December 19, 1943, p.1.
[18] Su Shaozhi, "Geming Genjudi Xin Funong Wenti Yanjiu [A Study of the Problem of New Rich Peasants in Revolutionary Base Areas]," *Jindaishi Yanjiu 近代史研究*, no. 1 (2004): 141ff.

and desirable," resting his defense on Mao's essay "On New Democracy."[19]

The campaign to tout the achievements of Wu Manyou was launched by an editorial in the *Liberation Daily* on 11 January, 1943, urging everyone to emulate Wu's achievements. On 10 February, the *Liberation Daily* published a woodcut by the young and promising artist Gu Yuan (古元)—who would become one of the major propaganda artists of the age and eventually be appointed President of the Central Academy of Fine Arts in Beijing—with the words "Emulate Wu Manyou" [向吴满有看齐] immediately above Wu's likeness; a composition resembling traditional deity prints, according to James A. Flath.[20]



Illustration 1.1: Gu Yuan, "Emulate Wu Manyou." From the *Liberation Daily*, 10 February, 1943, p.4.

The well-known poet Ai Qing was requested to write—and duly contributed—a long poem celebrating the achievements of Wu, which was published in the *Liberation Daily* on 9 March,

[19] Tetsuya Kataoka, *Resistance and Revolution in China: The Communists and the Second United Front* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1974), 259.
[20] James A. Flath, *Cult of Happiness: Nianhua, Art and History in Rural North China.* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014), 139.

1943. In 1944, the "Emulate Wu Manyou campaign" was still in high gear. Harrison Forman, an American reporter, who visited Yan'an in 1944, noted the high esteem in which Wu and other labor heroes were held: "His [Wu Manyou's] portrait is hung prominently in the galleries, homes and public places alongside those of Mao Tse-tung [Mao Zedong], Chu Teh [Zhu De] and other high political and military figures—Labour Hero Wu Man-yu [Wu Manyou] and others like him are not only held in high esteem by the people but are invited to attend all public and state functions, at which they occupy seats of honor along with the highest government military officials.'"[21] In September 1946, filming began on the movie *A Border Region Labor Hero* (边区劳动英雄: *bianqu laodong yingxiong*), based on Wu Manyou's life, with former Shanghai actress Jiang Qing among its scriptwriters. The shooting of the film, which would have been the first feature film successfully produced under Yan'an Party patronage after 1942, was cancelled, however, after Wu was taken prisoner by the Nationalists and, presumably under severe pressure, publicly denounced the CCP. A telegram from the Northwest Party Bureau put an effective end to the film production by noting that "Wu Manyou has been taken prisoner. Appears to have lost all integrity (*bianxian* [presumably a typo for *biaoxian*; my insertion] *haowu qijie*). Do not recommence shooting on the film concerning him."[22]

Despite such setbacks, the CCP continued to expand its usage of models of many kinds to further industrial production and generally encourage proper behavior. In 1945, in a speech at a conference in honor of labor heroes in the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region, Mao spelled out three of the functions labor models were to fulfill:

> First, there is the role of the initiator. In other words, by your outstanding efforts and your numerous innovations, you have made your work a model for others, raising work standards and inspiring others to learn from you. You are the leaders in the production campaigns and in every sort of construction work. Second, there is the role of the

[21] Kelkar, "The Role of Labour Heroes in the Yenan Period," 60f.
[22] Matthew David Johnson, "International and Wartime Origins of the Propaganda State. The Motion Picture in China, 1897-1955" (PhD diss., University of California, San Diego, 2008), 234.

> backbone. Most of you are not yet cadres, but you have already become the backbone and the core of the masses. With you, it is easier to move our work forward. In the future, you may become cadres; at present, you are cadres in reserve. Third, there is the role of the bridge. You are the bridge between the leaders above and the broad masses below. Through you, the opinions of the masses are transmitted to the leadership; the opinions from above are transmitted below.[23]

What Mao's speech shows is that the Party expected model workers not only to serve as exemplars for others to emulate, the model workers were also to serve the important function of trustworthy local representatives to secure good relations between the Party and the local people. In this important role, model workers were, in the words of Gail Hershatter, "the linchpin of the Communist Party's mass line."[24] Mao also sounded a note of warning, however, reminding model workers that "you must always remember not to become conceited. [...] if you are not modest and cease to exert yourselves, and if you do not respect others, do not respect the cadres and the masses, then you will cease to be heroes and models. There have been such people in the past, and I hope you will not follow their example."[25] In other words, even labor models had to take care not to choose the wrong models.

In 1950, at the first of three national model worker conferences of the decade, 468 model workers were honored, roughly half were industrial workers while most of the remaining were agricultural laborers and soldiers. At the second conference, in 1956, the title conferred upon the chosen was not "model workers" (劳动模范: *laodong mofan*), but "advanced producer" (先进生产者: *xianjin shengchanzhe*). The reason seems to have been that "worker" appeared to exclude those who did not work in manufacturing, and Zhou Enlai had recently announced that a majority of the nation's intellectuals were now loyally serving socialism and thus deserved inclusion into the hallowed ranks of honorees. In 1959, after the

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[23] Mao Zedong, *Mao's Road to Power*, 8:683.
[24] Gail Hershatter, *The Gender of Memory. Rural Women and China's Collective Past* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 212.
[25] Mao Zedong, *Mao's Road to Power*, 8:683.

Anti-Rightist Campaign's attack on intellectuals, the third national conference was held, and those chosen were now again referred to as "model workers." Moreover, good class background had now become imperative for selection as model worker, something which had not been of decisive importance in previous years.[26]

It is very important to remember, of course, that labor models did not just emerge out of the blue: They had to be selected and educated by the state—or as administrative instructions from 1951 put it: labor models had to be "trained and discovered."[27] In concrete terms, this meant that cadres were dispatched to villages where they "identified potential leaders, cajoled them to take up leadership roles, trained them in the necessary skills, supported them if they met opposition, and recommended them for state recognition."[28] If the dispatched cadres failed to locate anyone with the requisite technical proficiency, they also had to teach the most promising candidates how to perform their work. For those groomed to serve as models beyond the local level, the cadres would also have to teach them how to speak with panache in front of a crowd.[29] Oftentimes, skilled technicians were behind the productive improvements which were then publicized as having been developed by a given labor model. In this way, labor models became "the medium for a technical message."[30] Relaying messages with the kind of precision required of a "medium" was not always easy, however, as revealed by a comment by senior CCP member Peng Zhen, who complained at a meeting that "The worst thing is that some model workers are really very good speakers, but when you ask them to read a script aloud they begin to stutter."[31]

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[26] Yu Miin-ling, "'Labor Is Glorious': Model Laborers in the PRC," 236f. In the period under investigation in this dissertation, the CCP has conferred both the titles of model workers (劳动模范: *laodong mofan*) and advanced producers (先进生产者: *xianjin shengchanzhe*) along with a few other categories shifting over time. In this dissertation, I use the translations model worker and labor model interchangeably to refer to all of these titles, as the different titles now connote merely a gradation of honor and material awards and no longer seem to convey political signals.
[27] Hershatter, *The Gender of Memory. Rural Women and China's Collective Past*, 213.
[28] Hershatter, 213.
[29] Hershatter, 214f.
[30] Hershatter, 218.
[31] Shoudu hongdaihui Zhongguo Renmin Daxue sanhong jiudeng bingtuan, "Deng Xiaoping

After 1959, it would be twenty years before China convened another national model workers' conference. During this period, the CCP dispensed with nominations and meetings and instead directly picked heroes to be held up for emulation on a nation-wide scale. Moreover, during this period the party-state moved towards much stricter control of the public personae of the model workers, taking care to publish simultaneously diaries, stories, songs, and films about the anointed heroes and promulgated these across the entire country.[32] It is also worth noting that the most heavily publicized heroes, such as Dong Cunrui (董存瑞, 1929-1948), Huang Jiguang (黄继光, 1930-1952), Lei Feng (雷锋, 1940-1962), Ouyang Hai (欧阳海, 1940-1963), Wang Jie (王杰, 1942-1965), Liu Yingjun (刘英俊, 1945-1966), Cai Yongxiang (蔡永祥, 1948-1966), and Li Wenzhong (李文忠, 1942-1967), were all soldiers.[33] According to Louie Kam, "they were portrayed like virtuous women of traditional China. That is, they were good-looking, extremely loyal [...] and most importantly they die young. In fact, they die with their virginity intact, ensuring that they are devoid of any pollution and not tainted by any capitalist ideas."[34]

The Cultural Revolution was a time of hardship for most model workers, and few exemplified this better than "iron man" Wang Jinxi (王进喜, 1923-1970), one of the pre-eminent model workers from the early 1960s. In 1960, the CCP—in the face of increasingly fractious relations with the Soviet Union who was China's main supplier of technical equipment and training of experts—moved to publicize the successful establishment of oil drilling at Daqing in Heilongjiang. Wang was reportedly the first worker to strike oil in the extreme Northern cold, and Wang further became famous for using his own body to mix cement when the cement mixer broke down, averting a catastrophic loss of oil. In addition to

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Fangemin Xiuzheng Zhuyi Yanlun Wenzhang Huibian (The Compilation of Deng Xiaoping's Counterrevolutionary Revisionist Speeches and Writings)," vol. 2 (Beijing, 1967).

[32] Mary Sheridan, "The Emulation of Heroes," *The China Quarterly* 33 (1968): 50f.

[33] Landsberger's collection provides a useful catalogue of these heroes. https://chineseposters.net/themes/models.php.

[34] Kam Louie, *Theorising Chinese Masculinity: Society and Gender in China* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 107.

highlighting the importance of self-reliance for China, Wang also served to remind everyone that braving extreme hardship and relocating to the thinly-populated but resource-rich peripheral regions was crucial for building socialism. Stressing this element of the story had become even more important because the recently-introduced *hukou*-system made relocation to the countryside much less attractive to the urban few, as any relocation under the new system threatened to become permanent. As someone with impeccable worker credentials, Wang was appointed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1968, but his perceived closeness to the economic line associated with Liu Shaoqi meant that he came to suffer violent persecution at the hands of Red Guards shortly thereafter, and he died in 1970.[35] The year after Wang's death, a memorial hall was nevertheless dedicated to his memory at Daqing. The gigantic fort-like exhibition hall, guarded by a hulking sculpture of Wang at work, is still open for visit.[36]





Illustrations 1.2 (left) and 1.3 (right). Left: Still from the movie about Wang Jinxi, *Iron Man* (铁人: *Tieren*) (2009). Right: Photo taken at the entrance to the Wang Jinxi memorial hall. Courtesy of https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Iron_Man_Wang_Jinxi.jpg.

[35] James Kynge, *China Shakes the World: A Titan's Rise and Troubled Future-- and the Challenge for America* (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2006), 128f. Also, Song Yuwu, *Biographical Dictionary of the People's Republic of China* (McFarland, 2013), 305f.
[36] Rachel Funari and Bernard Mees, "Socialist Emulation in China: Worker Heroes Yesterday and Today," *Labor History* 54, no. 3 (June 28, 2013): 240–55.

What did it mean for those involved to be selected model worker? Answering this question is, of course, extremely difficult, but Gail Hershatter has provided valuable clues in her oral history from Shaanxi Province. What surprises Hershatter the most in her interviews with the women who had served as labor models in the 1950s was how integral their identity as labor models was to their self-perception. Even though the state had through its agents, as we saw above, been crucially involved in selecting, grooming, publicizing, and rewarding labor models, this in no way diminished the completeness with which the women identified themselves as labor models. "Their memories [...] were neither in opposition to, nor even separated from, the project of state-building or the language of official history. Many of these women came to inhabit the position of labor model to such a degree that their subjectivity cannot be apprehended independent of it."[37] Instead, Hershatter emphasizes, we need to accept that the labor models were brought into being

> not by state fiat, but by the labor of cadres, the women themselves, their village communities, and regional or national reading and listening publics. These life stories direct our attention, not to hidden inner truths or the sort of life writing engaged in by contemporary biographers and historians, but to shared world-making projects. They suggest that the interior self is itself a historically situated and peculiar idea, and that our attachment to it as historians deserves a gaze as skeptical as any we turn on our source materials. Labor models do not necessarily tell us what we want to know, but perhaps they offer us lessons we need to hear.[38]

Over the longer term, the hardiest role model produced during the 1960s—and indeed in the history of the PRC—would turn out to be a scrawny young soldier by the name of Lei Feng. At first blush, Lei Feng seems an unlikely candidate to serve as a model of soldierly virtues. He had no feats of glory to his name when he was first presented nationally in a long article in 1961 in the *People's Daily*; though his steadfast dedication to fulfilling his mundane duties of cleaning and cooking had earned him a title of labor model. That such a do-gooder should become the focus of an enormous media campaign serves to remind us of how much

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[37] Hershatter, *The Gender of Memory. Rural Women and China's Collective Past*, 234.
[38] Hershatter, 235.

resentment the overweening behavior of soldiers and officers were causing across the country.[39] The CPD was grooming Lei Feng to serve in the role of national icon when he lost his life in a work-related accident in 1962; this, a least, seems to be the only way of accounting for the many high-quality photographs of him performing all sorts of tasks which came to light over subsequent decades.





Illustrations 1.4 (left) and 1.5 (right): Lei Feng riding across Tiananmen Square, and Lei Feng studying Mao Zedong's writings. Photos courtesy of http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/14/inside-china-lei-feng-and-chinas-zeitgeist. Accessed 2015.12.11.

His death, however, seems to have stimulated rather than deterred the CPD in their construction of Lei Feng's legacy, and in 1963, the year after his death, the campaign to "learn from Lei Feng" swung into high gear, not least with enormous attention being paid to publicizing his diary across the country.[40]

The evolving story of Lei Feng after his death is a fascinating one, but for the present purposes we must limit ourselves to asking: What are the primary characteristics of Lei Feng that have made him such a perpetual favorite of the CPD, and what does this teach us about

[39] In many places, PLA troops "were requisitioning land, living in a luxurious style, ignoring road safety in their army vehicles, and taking over private homes without permission," just to mention a few of their transgressions. Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (Norton, 1990), 562.

[40] The origins of this diary are still in doubt. It is not true, as has sometimes been claimed, that it was only discovered after Lei Feng's death, but it remains contested whether he wrote it all by himself or if other writers or editors were involved in its composition.

role models in China? The most obvious trait of Lei Feng is his very ordinariness, which puts his example within everyone's reach. Secondly, even if he performed no heroic feats, he did die on duty which allows him a certain sacrificial aura. In addition, in a society very much focused on family and kinship, Lei Feng stands out because he has no living relations. As a substitute, Lei Feng in his diary positions himself thus: "I am like a toddler, and the party is like my mother, who helps me, leads me, and teaches me to walk [...] My beloved party, my loving mother, I am always your loyal son."[41] That the CPD found this notion appealing can further be corroborated by noticing that none of the heroes in the "model operas" selected by the propaganda authorities during the Cultural Revolution are portrayed as having living biological relations or spouses. As Clark puts it, "Politics thus takes precedence over biology in molding a new, modern Chinese person."[42]

While these traits are important—ordinariness, self-sacrifice, and filial piety towards the party-state—they do not fully explain why Lei Feng has remained the most publicized everyman's-hero in the PRC. In trying to account for his perpetual appeal, Xiaofei Tian points out that even though Lei Feng was marketed as a new and unusually consummate specimen of the new, socialist individual, his continued attractiveness is best understood as arising out of what Tian, borrowing a term from Paul Cohen, calls "the tenacity of culture." While Lei Feng is overtly marketed as an immaculate socialist, there are other elements of the myth around him that embody much older traditions and cultural narratives. Tian argues persuasively that, in order to understand the perplexing durability of the myth of Lei Feng, we need to recognize that this myth "is not simply a product of communist party propaganda; rather, the story of Lei Feng represents some deep concerns of the culture. [...] the past persists in the present in permutations and transformations."[43] Most pertinent to our

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[41] Lei Feng, *Lei Feng ri ji [The diary of Lei Feng]* (Beijing: Jiefangjun wenyishe, 1965), 34.
[42] Paul Clark, "Model Theatrical Works and the Remodelling of the Cultural Revolution," in *Art in Turmoil: The Chinese Cultural Revolution, 1966-76*, ed. Richard King et al. (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 171f.
[43] Xiaofei Tian, "The Making of a Hero: Lei Feng and Some Issues of Historiography," in *The*

purposes here is noting how Lei Feng's penchant for recording his every good deed in extreme detail is very much akin to the ledger of merit associated with Buddhism and Daoism.

What this brief study of the myth of Lei Feng shows is that the party-state of the 1960s and 1970s offered a conception of the nation as a family, where the responsibility of the party-state to function as the mother of the people is represented as being sustained by the people's constant attentiveness to duty and self-surveillance in search of betterment, and even a willingness to die in the service of others. The story of Lei Feng also reminds us that much older stories and patterns of thought and language help to structure these narratives.[44] This last point can also be brought out by reflecting, once again, on the oral histories analyzed by Gail Hershatter, who arrives at a similar conclusion from a very different angle. Hershatter notes that the women selected as labor models in the 1950s recounted to her their labor model exploits in a language much more redolent of womanly virtue than of socialist service. In other words, the party-state's attempts to interpret what it meant to be a modern woman worthy of praise very much came to be inflected by older and local conceptions of virtuous womanhood.[45]

1.3 Chinese workers in a time of economic reform

Considering the crucial role Marx and Engels foresaw for the proletariat as an agent of historical progress, it is no wonder that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) placed great

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People's Republic of China at 60: An International Assessment, ed. William C. Kirby (New York, USA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011), 295.

[44] Charles Stafford has pointed out that the topic of children repaying their parents has in Chinese tradition—from the story of Yue Fei to the account of Chiang Kai-shek's life studied by school children on Taiwan—very often been rendered in terms similar to repaying one's nation. As Stafford notes, the words are closely related: 报答 (*baoda*) and 报国 (*baoguo*). In many of these legends, mothers urge their children to sacrifice themselves for the nation as a form of filial piety. Charles Stafford, *The Roads of Chinese Childhood: Learning and Identification in Angang* (1995; repr., Cambridge University Press, 2006), chap. 6.

[45] Hershatter, *The Gender of Memory. Rural Women and China's Collective Past*, 30.

emphasis on the role of China's workers.[46] According to Elizabeth Perry:

> China's establishment of a Communist regime in 1949 was accompanied by extravagant pro-labor rhetoric that promised a dramatically improved political status for the proletariat. Workers were heralded in official pronouncements as "masters of the country" (*guojia de zhuren*), the "leading class" (*lingdao jieji*) that should rightfully "take charge" (*dangjia zuozhu*). Looking back on this period more than a half century later, one may be inclined to disregard such declarations of proletarian hegemony as little more than empty verbiage manufactured by a cynical state. But there is evidence that at the time many workers, as well as many union cadres, took these pledges quite seriously.[47]

In the early years of the PRC—and, in fact, with only minor variations all the way up until 1979—the CCP's strategy for achieving modernization and security centered on extracting resources from the agricultural sector and investing them in heavy industry.[48] Throughout this period, the state particularly favored the steel industry along with other enterprises engaging in technologically sophisticated production on a large scale, much to the detriment of the considerable number of small-scale rural industrial enterprises established before 1949 that were virtually wiped out over the following decades.[49] As capital-intensive industry was considered by the CCP to be the gateway to the future, workers in China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were granted relatively high wages and a considerable level of

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[46] In the early decades of the PRC's history, physical labor in itself was often invested with a transformative potential. According to Wagner, "This faith in the magical powers of physical labor […] led to Chinese intellectuals' being sent for years and decades to factories, state farms or People's Communes, regardless of whether they were engineers, paleontologists, Marxologists, or teenagers with some school education. These measures were to 'help' them in overcoming a quite real traditional revulsion against physical labor and the noise and smells coming with it." Rudolf G. Wagner, "The Concept of Work/Labor/Arbeit in the Chinese World," *Manfred Bierwisch (Hg.), Die Rolle Der Arbeit in Verschiedenen Epochen Und Kulturen, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag*, 2003, 110.

[47] Elizabeth J. Perry, "Masters of the Country? Shanghai Workers in the Early People's Republic," in *Dilemmas of Victory*, ed. Jeremy Brown and Paul G. Pickowicz (2007; repr., Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), 59.

[48] For a brief account, see Barry Naughton, *The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007), chap. 3. For a more detailed exploration, see Carl Riskin, *China's Political Economy: The Quest for Development since 1949* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

[49] Jacob Eyferth, "De-Industrialization in the Chinese Countryside: Handicrafts and Development in Jiajiang (Sichuan), 1935 to 1978," *The China Quarterly*, no. 173 (2003): 53–73. See also Naughton, *The Chinese Economy*, chap. 2.

social benefits, despite the severe lack of resources characterizing the war-weary country.[50] According to Nara Dillon, the establishment of this "revolutionary welfare state" set China on a path of ever-widening disparity between rural and urban populations that continues to plague the country and the current leaders' attempts at extending welfare coverage.[51] The predetermined destiny of the Chinese working class also figured prominently in the party-state's justification for driving out of business all major private entrepreneurs in the first half of the 1950s. The realization of Communism, it was explained, relied more than anything on establishing exploitation-free labor relations, and this could only be done by making workers the masters of their enterprises.[52]

In real-life, of course, it remained a less-than-self-evident matter, for both Party bureaucrats and for workers, how Marx's visions of workers' control were to be realized. In some factories, workers interpreted the slogans of democratization and ownership-sharing in ways far exceeding what the CCP leadership was willing to countenance.[53] Consequently, the *Workers' Daily* found it necessary to publish a series of articles in 1950, in which it was made clear that workers were to work, rather than to concern themselves with issues of management. Union officials were especially berated for prioritizing democratization over production output: "The result is that they [union officials] intentionally or unintentionally 'mobilize the masses' and stir up opposition to and disputes with the administrative leadership; and they intentionally or unintentionally lead the masses in raising a lot of demands relating to purely economic interests which cannot all easily be resolved straight

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[50] Mark W. Frazier, *The Making of the Chinese Industrial Workplace State, Revolution, and Labor Management* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), chaps. 4–5.
[51] Nara Dillon, *Radical Inequalities: China's Revolutionary Welfare State in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2015).
[52] Perry, "Masters of the Country? Shanghai Workers in the Early People's Republic." See also, Elisabeth Köll, "A Fine Balance: Chinese Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurship in Historical Perspective," in *The People's Republic of China at 60: An International Assessment*, ed. William C. Kirby (Cambridge: Harvard University, East Asia Center, 2011), 195–211.
[53] Elizabeth J. Perry, *Patrolling the Revolution: Worker Militias, Citizenship, and the Modern Chinese State* (2006; repr., Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).

away."[54] These were, moreover, not simply the demands of a few pockets of isolated and overly enthusiastic workers; the CCP-led trade union (The All-China Federation of Trade Unions, ACFTU), under the seasoned Communist leader Li Lisan, was striking out to define a sphere of autonomy from Party control that some of the other CCP leaders, including Mao Zedong, came to find insupportable, and in December 1951, Li Lisan was relieved of his leadership for having failed to bring workers into line with Party discipline. Replacing Li Lisan, however, did not put pay to worker activism. Up through the 1950s, Chinese workers were extremely active: organizing strikes, sit-ins, and slow-downs, attacking capitalists, founding cooperatives, petitioning, and much else, all culminating in a massive strike wave in 1957. The party-state repeatedly had to compromise with, and sometimes even yield to, worker demand, such as when worker protests caused the party-state to abandon its attempts to centralize workplace authority, institute piece rates, and increase worker productivity through material incentives such as bonuses.[55]

In part to forestall such difficulties with wayward workers, the CCP instituted a regimen of stern control over all aspects of workers' lives. The labor market was replaced with an allocation system under which the state assumed responsibility for dispatching personnel to every major workplace across the country. Each of these workplaces (known as a 单位: *danwei*, a (work) unit) came to be charged with providing a womb-to-urn gamut of social reproduction services to its workforce: food, health care, schooling, pensions, cremation, ideological infotainment, and so forth.[56] Compared to peasants, the workers enjoyed very high living standards and prestige as the titular "masters" (主人翁: *zhurenweng*) of their firms and, through their representative as the CCP pronounced itself, of the very

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[54] Quoted in Jackie Sheehan, *Chinese Workers: A New History* (London: Routledge, 1998), 25.
[55] Frazier, *The Making of the Chinese Industrial Workplace State, Revolution, and Labor Management*, chaps. 4–5. Elizabeth J. Perry, "Shanghai's Strike Wave of 1957," *China Quarterly* 1994, no. 137 (n.d.): 1–27.
[56] The *danwei* has been analyzed in a number of works. Among the most valuable are David Bray, *Social Space and Governance in Urban China: The Danwei System from Origins to Reform* (Stanford University Press, 2005). Dillon, *Radical Inequalities*. Andrew G. Walder, *Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry* (University of California Press, 1986).

state.

During the 1960s and all the way through the Cultural Revolution, the income gap between workers and peasants continued to widen, despite Maoist rhetoric of favoring the peasantry.[57] Moreover, the Cultural Revolution also saw Maoists attempting to reignite revolutionary passions by, *inter alia*, rhetorical adulation of the working class. According to Perry and Li:

> The bizarre language of the Cultural Revolution bespoke the altered status of the Chinese intellectual under socialism—rewedded to the state apparatus, but now required to masquerade as part of the ordinary masses. [...] the vulgarity, violence, and vain construction of a phoney 'language of labor' represented the forced efforts of young students to present themselves as bona fide proletarians.[58]

In Shanghai, the upshot of the Cultural Revolution was that the working class increased their sense of political efficacy and developed "a newfound pride in their proletarian status as well as a powerful language of class with which to challenge unwelcome policies."[59]

Since the early 1970s China has gradually moved towards integration with the global capitalist system, though with extreme caution in the early years. In 1978, 99 percent of the Chinese workers were still employed in publicly owned undertakings, and this only changed slowly during the 1980s.[60] In 1986, contracts were introduced on the labor market with the "Regulations on Administration of Labor Contracts by State Enterprises." These regulations introduced what was referred to as a "double track system" under which new personnel could be engaged by use of temporary contracts, rather than by offering the kind of lifetime employment that permanent staff enjoyed.[61] Perhaps even more controversial at the time

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[57] For a contextual account see Maurice Meisner, *Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic*, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1999), chaps. 15–20.
[58] Elizabeth J. Perry and Hsün Li, "Revolutionary Rudeness: The Language of Red Guards and Rebel Workers in China's Cultural Revolution," in *Twentieth Century China: New Approaches*, ed. Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom (Routledge, 2003), 234.
[59] Elizabeth J. Perry and Xun Li, *Proletarian Power: Shanghai in the Cultural Revolution* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997), 193.
[60] Naughton, *The Chinese Economy*, 181.
[61] Jaeyoun Won, "Farewell to Socialist Labor in China," in *Laid-off Workers in a Workers' State:*

was the 1986 adoption of a law governing enterprise bankruptcy, which made it possible for major enterprises to go bankrupt; something that had not happened in China for almost forty years. Then, in the middle of the 1990s, the Chinese state began to divest itself of state owned enterprises (SOEs) through privatization and company closures: From the mid-1990s to 2004, the total number of industrial SOEs dropped from 120,000 to 31,750.[62] Consequently, more than 60 million workers lost their jobs in Chinese SOEs and in urban collective sector enterprises between 1993 and 2006, amounting to roughly 44 percent of the 1993 workforce.[63] With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the Chinese labor system was transformed in roughly 20 years: from a system where life-time employment and broad social benefits predominated to a system where short-term employment and very uneven benefits dominate across manufacturing, services, and construction.[64]

An important factor facilitating China's rapid industrialization has been the low level of employment regulation, which has served to attract foreign investment.[65] As was the case in Eastern Europe, the abandonment of comprehensive state socialism revealed the protection of workers' rights to have been entirely dependent upon the state's active commitment to the proletariat. When that commitment waned, the most beautiful constitutional guarantees could not save the working class from slipping into a situation of

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Unemployment with Chinese Characteristics, ed. Thomas B. Gold, William J. Hurst, and Jaeyoun Won (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 189.

[62] Naughton, *The Chinese Economy*, 313.

[63] William Hurst, *The Chinese Worker after Socialism* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1,16. Hurst also notes, however, that "the reporting of job losses is notoriously fraught with deception, corruption, and political interference." William Hurst, "Cases, Questions, and Comparison in Research on Contemporary Chinese Politics," in *Contemporary Chinese Politics: New Sources, Methods, and Field Strategies*, ed. Allen Carlson, Mary E. Gallagher, and Kenneth Lieberthal (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 175.

[64] Thomas B. Gold, William J. Hurst, and Jaeyoun Won, "Introduction," in *Laid-off Workers in a Workers' State: Unemployment with Chinese Characteristics*, ed. Thomas B. Gold, William J. Hurst, and Jaeyoun Won (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 1–14.

[65] The low level of intellectual property rights regulation may also have been crucial for China's success. See Ha-Joon Chang, *23 Things They Don't Tell You about Capitalism* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2011), chap. 7.

extreme job insecurity.[66] A low level of regulation has also characterized privatization:

> The absence of a formal process of ownership transfer has had certain consequences. It has encouraged the—often illegal—appropriation of economic resources by the ruling elite of the country, thanks to continued vagueness surrounding definitions of ownership. Since then China, which some had imagined to be on a disciplined march towards modernity, has appeared corrupt, inegalitarian and even mafia-like.[67]

These back-room dealings allowed senior managers to transfer company assets to newly-founded private companies while leaving all debt with the mother enterprise.[68] Dorothy Solinger summed up the situation for China's workers by millennium's end:

> [F]ormal Chinese workers, dignified and advantaged for decades, became idle or informal ones in the late 1990s. In the place of the miraculous world of the crowd of yore, we see instead a grim and lackluster one of the undistinguished masses, those let go by their firms. In the altered social status hierarchy in the making in Chinese cities, to be a laborer is lowly, not lordly, as it had been not so long ago. There is, too, quite a transformed tie between the state and its one-time working class, a bond lately characterized much more by mutual fear and shame than by the original socialists' shared and cooperative mission of constructing, with and through their honored crowd, a more fair and egalitarian China.[69]

Most of the new jobs created in the booming factory towns in the South were repetitive, extremely tiring, poorly-paid, and by many observers characterized as de-humanizing, even approaching a form of slavery.[70] Chan Kam Wing has noted that, "Even though the economy grew annually at double-digit annual rates over the past 30 years, the real wages of rural migrants [to the city, my insertion] remained basically little changed until recent years. This was all the more striking, considering the increases in labor productivity and living costs

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[66] A shift from proletariat to "precariat" which, as Bourdieu and many others have pointed out, has spanned the globe. Pierre Bourdieu, *Acts of Resistance: Against the Tyranny of the Market* (New York: New Press, 1998), 81ff.
[67] Antoine Kernen, "Shenyang, Privatisation in the Vanguard of Chinese Socialism," in *Privatising the State*, ed. Béatrice Hibou (C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 2004), 77.
[68] Kernen, 84.
[69] Dorothy J. Solinger, "The New Crowd of the Dispossessed: The Shift of the Urban Proletariat from Master to Mendicant," in *State and Society in 21st Century China: Crisis, Contention and Legitimation*, ed. Peter Hays Gries and Stanley Rosen (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 61f.
[70] Jack Linchuan Qiu, *Goodbye ISlave: A Manifesto for Digital Abolition* (University of Illinois Press, 2017).

over the same period."[71] Until the late 2000s, the Chinese labor market seemed to operate "almost in defiance of the rules of economics, enjoying stagnant wages […] and a seemingly endless supply of pliant labor."[72] Consequently, "[f]rom the beginning of the reforms until the end of the first decade of the 2000s, income inequality exploded in China."[73] In the past five years, a relative shortage of migrant workers has driven up wages, but a notable share of this newfound income has been whittled away by rapidly rising costs of food, schooling, housing, and medical insurance.

The many problems arriving in the wake of the reforms have unleashed a rapidly rising number of work-related protests. This prospect must seem all the more unnerving to China's political elite as there are millions of migrants in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and the other political and economic hubs. These migrants have their lives shaped by state-sponsored discrimination related to aspects as crucial to their lives as health care and the welfare and education of their children. Some companies have experienced violent protests with deadly outcome, while other workers have taken their own lives. On the Chinese internet, a new term, "hatred of the rich" (仇富: *choufu*), has gained widespread usage. The majority of worker protests aim at provoking intervention by the authorities. Indeed, the Chinese state has played a significant role in constructing a labor market that is skewed towards capital and has kept worker wages low.[74] And not only does the Chinese state severely discriminate against migrant workers, in the increasingly capitalist labor market

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[71] Kam Wing Chan, "A China Paradox: Migrant Labor Shortage amidst Rural Labor Supply Abundance," *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 51, no. 4 (2010): 516.
[72] Alexandra Harney, *The China Price: The True Cost of Chinese Competitive Advantage* (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), 273.
[73] Hansjörg Herr, "Perspectives on High Growth and Rising Inequality," in *China's Labor Question*, ed. Christoph Scherrer (München, Mering: Hampp, 2011), 16.
[74] C. Cindy Fan, *China on the Move: Migration, the State, and the Household* (London: Routledge, 2008), 5. Mary E. Gallagher, "China's Older Workers: Between Law and Policy, Between Laid-Off and Unemployed," in *Laid-off Workers in a Workers' State: Unemployment with Chinese Characteristics*, ed. Thomas B. Gold, William J. Hurst, and Jaeyoun Won (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 135–58.

women and the elderly also experience harsh discrimination.[75] Moreover, local state agents have been known to suppress any attempts at independent union organizing, while doing little to compel the government-led union, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), to represent the interests of workers effectively vis-à-vis their enterprises.[76]

The Chinese state has even managed to accumulate, rather than re-distribute, by far the largest stock of currency reserves in the world, among other things by keeping domestic interest rates so low that it amounts to a de facto tax on bank savings for those who lack other investment opportunities. While many millions of workers have been adversely affected by government policies, a large number of cadres have embezzled formidable sums from the SOE restructuring.[77] The fact that some political top leaders and their families have amassed vast fortunes while being in office has occasioned more bitter conflicts between the Chinese regime and the foreign press in recent years than has human rights or Tibet. While the articles published by Bloomberg and the New York Times devoted to the wealth of the political elite did not expose any illegal acts on the part of China's top politicians—and relied entirely on aggregating openly-available sources—the party-state leadership subjected itself to very negative international news coverage to let its displeasure be known. The fact that the disclosure of the private assets of China's top leadership has become such a hot button issue reflects that the increasing disparity is a sensitive issue.[78]

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[75] Qi Wang, Min Dongchao, and Bo Ærenlund Sørensen, eds., *Revisiting Gender Inequality: Perspectives from the People's Republic of China* (Basingstoke [England]; New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2016).

[76] Anita Chan, *China's Workers under Assault: The Exploitation of Labor in a Globalizing Economy* (New York, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2001). For more recent examples, see the reports by China Labour Bulletin, http://www.clb.org.hk/content/depth-research-reports-%E7%A0%94%E7%A9%B6%E6%8A%A5%E5%91%8A, and China Labor Watch, http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/reports.

[77] China Labour Bulletin, "No Way Out: Worker Activism in China's State-Owned Enterprise Reforms," 2008, 5, www.clb.org.hk/sites/default/files/archive/en/File/research_reports/no_way_out.pdf.

[78] Just how much domestic anger is generated by China's widening income and wealth gaps is a contested topic. Whyte argues that the widening income gap generates less anger than many commentators have assumed. Martin King Whyte, *Myth of the Social Volcano: Perceptions of Inequality and Distributive Injustice in Contemporary China* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University

In summary, as so much of China's capital construction and capital accumulation in the period of economic reform has rested upon a docile and low-paid labor force, it is not difficult to understand why the party-state has consistently treated labor protesters much more harshly than other protesters. Inducing docility is, of course, by no means only a matter of proffering properly instructive narratives to the populace—the production, solidity, and maintenance of webs of sanctions and rewards surrounding individuals as well as collectives are, of course, of the utmost importance. Nevertheless, in a state where the party-state continues to devote extensive resources to monitoring and manipulating public opinion—not infrequently to the severe detriment of its own public image both domestically and abroad—it is of great interest to see how the party-state has used the figure of the model worker as part of its strategy to mediate economic reform with social control.

1.4 Cultural aspects and the social imaginary

Paul A. Cohen has argued that cultural factors are much more important for political and historical developments than is generally assumed by many of the political scientists who study contemporary China. In doing so, Cohen poses an important challenge I wish to make my own:

> How do we assess the importance of cultural phenomena that, although clearly continuing to enjoy widespread influence in post-1949 China, are far less available to the senses and may or may not relate in significant ways to the more readily accessible changes, such as rapid economic growth and increased military strength, that have captured everyone's attention in China's recent history? Clearly, there is a strong historical bias in favor of the importance of economic wealth and military power, but in seeking to understand a society—what makes its inhabitants tick—it may be no less vital to probe its less visible, harder-to-get-at aspects. The shared stories I have focused on supply essential data about the interior of the Chinese world. They form an undercurrent of intellectual/psychic meaning that flows beneath the surface of conventionally recounted history. But Westerners certainly—and perhaps Chinese as well—if we are to

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Press, 2010). Andreas, however, provides a perceptive criticism of Whyte's claim that China has no smoldering social volcano. Joel Andreas, "Sino-Seismology," *New Left Review*, II, no. 76 (2012): 128–35.

> gain a deeper and fuller understanding of China, need to do a much better job of mapping these stories and illuminating how they fit into the larger picture of Chinese life.[79]

What Cohen points to is that culture cannot be separated from a country's economic and political processes. Culture is, however, as Raymond Williams noted, "one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language,"[80] so a clearer definition will be useful for this dissertation:

> Culture is defined as prevalent values, beliefs and norms, as well as orientations and underlying assumptions characterizing the majority of people in a society. This definition, which clearly has been borrowed from anthropology, shows that *culture is learned behavior*. [...] *values* are shared ideas about what is good, *beliefs* are shared ideas about what is true, and *norms* are shared expectations about how to behave based on the common values and beliefs. *Orientations* are more fluctuating, affected by the given information as well as by daily life experiences, and *underlying assumptions* belong, on the mental level, to the subconscious field and, on the behavioural level, to what is considered the natural and standard way of doing things.[81]

This definition of culture posits that the personal cannot be separated from the political. As Helgesen notes, "It is hard to envisage a person *not* tempered by culture, or a society *not* governed according to the values, beliefs, and norms embedded in a particular culture. Our basic point of departure is the centrality of culture in societal development, its particularity and dynamism, and not least its intertwinement with politics."[82]

The philosopher Charles Taylor has provided a useful study of the diachronic development of the relationship between the individual, society, and politics in a very broad sense. The keyword in Taylor's analysis is the term "social imaginary," which he defines as "the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how

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[79] Paul A. Cohen, "The Tenacity of Culture," in *The People's Republic of China at 60: An International Assessment*, ed. William C. Kirby (New York, USA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011), 397.
[80] Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (1976; repr., London, England: Oxford University Press, 1983), 87.
[81] Geir Helgesen, "Culture Matters," in *Politics, Culture and Self: East Asian and North European Attitudes*, ed. Geir Helgesen and Søren Risbjerg Thomsen (n.p.: NIAS Press, 2006), 18.
[82] Helgesen, 18.

things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations.[83]" Taylor uses the term to emphasize that in any society there is an intimate relationship between the political system and tradition, ethical expectations, images, stories, legends, and assumptions about the relationship between language and other aspects of reality, all drawing on and giving life to the social imaginary.

Taylor emphasizes that by the term "social imaginary" he is not simply referring to "social theory," and he offers three reasons for why the concept of the "social imaginary" is better suited for understanding how people make sense of their lives:

> I adopt the term imaginary (i) because my focus is on the way ordinary people 'imagine' their social surroundings, and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms, but is carried in images, stories, and legends. It is also the case that (ii) theory is often the possession of a small minority, whereas what is interesting in the social imaginary is that it is shared by large groups of people, if not the whole society. Which leads to a third difference: (iii) the social imaginary is that common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy.[84]

An important element of a society's social imaginary is how it conceives of social order and the proper relations between people. In his analysis of Western Europe and the US, Taylor notes how a "hierarchical distribution of functions" in society used to be a constitutive part of the normative order in these societies. Rather than assuming equality between people, the social world was constituted on the basis of "hierarchical complementarity," where everyone was obliged to fulfil her or his responsibilities. This notion of the socio-moral affected every type of social organization, powerfully shaping relations in the family, between educated elite and masses, between lord and peasants:

> It is crucial to this kind of ideal that the distribution of functions is itself a key part of the normative order. It is not just that each order ought to perform its characteristic function for the others, granted they have entered these relations of exchange, while we keep the

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[83] Charles Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries* (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 2007), 23.
[84] Taylor, 23.

> possibility open that things might be arranged rather differently [...] No, the hierarchical differentiation itself is seen as the proper order of things. It was part of the nature or form of society. In the Platonic and Neoplatonic traditions, this form was already at work in the world, and any attempt to deviate from it turned reality against itself. Society would be denatured in the attempt. Hence the tremendous power of the organic metaphor in these earlier theories. The organism seems the paradigm locus of forms at work, striving to heal its wounds and cure its maladies. At the same time, the arrangement of functions that it exhibits is not simply contingent; it is 'normal' and right. That the feet are below the head is how it should be.[85]

In contrast, what Taylor terms the "modern idealization of order" is predicated on notions of equality between individuals, which also means that any existing social order comes to be perceived as contingent. It is important to stress that what Taylor is delineating is a process, in the course of which the ramifications of the shift from hierarchical complementarity to a vision of general equality have only slowly manifested themselves over the centuries. In fact, "[w]e still have some lively sense of this disparity in the case of the family, because it is really only in our time that the older images of hierarchical complementarity between men and women are being comprehensively challenged."[86]

The social imaginary, however, is not simply a set of propositions about the world; rather, social practice is suffused with, and thus carries and reproduces, a given society's social imaginary. One consequence hereof is that any attempt to posit either ideas or materiel factors as the prime historical agent becomes non-sensical. "[I]t is not even clear," Taylor notes, "that we have a typology of such motivations (economic vs. political vs. ideal, etc.) that is valid throughout human history."[87]

Part of what I find so useful about Taylor's work for the investigation of model workers in China is his persuasive analysis of how legends, norms, traditions, rituals, religious beliefs and practices, pedagogical theory, political ideologies, even a culture's prevalent metaphors are all connected. In particular, I find useful his observation—and this

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[85] Taylor, 11f.
[86] Taylor, 16.
[87] Taylor, 33.

is a fundamental claim of this dissertation as well—that how a culture views "the self" is bound up with and has ramifications across politics, religion, art, education, and every other domain of society. In the second chapter of this dissertation, I will explicate why the Chinese social imaginary—and in particular the Chinese view of selfhood—has been so productive of exemplary models.

With inspiration, then, from Cohen, Hershatter, Helgesen, Taylor, and many others, this dissertation seeks to illuminate our understanding of the CPD and of the Chinese reform period by examining both the political-economic context and the harder-to-get-at aspects flowing within stories and modes of thought. While much attention has been paid to China's economic reforms after Mao's death, little in-depth work has been done to investigate how the party-state's ideological apparatus through its newspapers attempted to persuade the Chinese citizenry of the need for reform. It has often been assumed that the Chinese reformers under Deng Xiaoping began to make rational use of China's factor endowments and could thus let economic growth persuade the population that further reform and CCP leadership was in the common best interest.[88] The present dissertation challenges this view by showing that the party-state has paid enormous attention to actively persuading the population of the need for reform. This persuasion has only to a very limited extent been based on arguments relating to economic growth; instead, the CPD has worked determinedly to mold the values, beliefs, and expectations of the populace so as to make these conform to the party-state elite's economic, political, and social projects.

By analyzing how the CPD has represented issues relating to the reforms, the present dissertation demonstrates that moral and emotional narratives revolving around the working class have been at the center of the CPD's efforts to alter social norms and expectations to suit the exigencies of reform. As such, this dissertation provides a corrective to previous accounts of the reform process, which have tended to exaggerate the capacity of

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[88] Julian Gewirtz, *Unlikely Partners* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2017); Naughton, *The Chinese Economy*.

the party-state to implement reforms as the party-state elite saw fit. This dissertation challenges this view by demonstrating that the economic reform process has constantly been wedded to, and influenced by, the project of re-educating the Chinese population. As noted above, the dissemination of exemplary models has been a feature of the party-state's efforts to educate the public for decades, and by focusing on the CPD's use of the "model worker" this dissertation demonstrates that the CPD continued to make wide use of this practice in the early years of reform. In order to explain why this has been the case, this dissertation fuses insights from anthropology, psychology, and cultural studies to substantiate why a notion of "porous personhood" furthers our understanding of the prevalence of exemplary models in China past and present.

Finally, this dissertation offers an investigation of how quantitative analysis may be combined with qualitative analysis and sensitivity to social norms and cultural practices. It is shown that, at least in the case of a medium as closely controlled as the *People's Daily*, quantitative analysis provides a helpful way of assessing how public norms, emotions, and expectations impinge upon policy formulation, and how the Chinese party-state has had to wrestle with these in the course of the period of economic reform.

In the next chapter, I will attempt to explain *why* the injunction to imitate models—along with the related assumption that model imitation is a useful means of education—has featured centrally in both Chinese pedagogy and state-craft under the current party-state, and can indeed be traced back many centuries.

1.5 Guiding hearts and minds. Persuasion and propaganda in the PRC

From the early days of CCP rule, the media served as a central component in the party-state's attempts to remold the citizenry. In the words of David Shambaugh, the Chinese Communist propaganda system has been "a—if not the—key mechanism for Mao's and the Party's

subsequent efforts to transform Chinese society after 1949."[89] In the early decades of the PRC, all facets of newspaper production and distribution—and in some cases even their consumption through CCP-led reading classes—were handled in toto by the state apparatus.[90] While this is no longer the case, Nicolai Volland argues persuasively that the Chinese propaganda system has changed very little in the time of the PRC's existence and that the conception of the media in China is quite different from that found in the West.[91] According to Volland, the "propaganda *xitong*" (系统 roughly meaning "system") is an integral component of the state's governing apparatus. Under the term "propaganda *xitong*" Volland includes the media—the press, radio, TV, and publishing houses—but also literature, political theory, education of children as well as of adults, physical education, and hygiene. Uniting these elements is a larger socio-political project; in the words of Volland: "[I]t is the aim of the Party to form a socialist man who is free from pathologies of both physical and mental kind (both of which are caused by oppressive forces in the 'old' society), a man healthy both in his thinking and his body who participates in and is devoted entirely to the cause led by the Communist Party."[92] Volland notes that when the degree of ideological conformity across media in China during the Cultural Revolution remained surprisingly high, this was because the guiding ideology was so widely shared by media practitioners that severe institutional weakness at the heart of the propaganda apparatus did not unleash

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[89] David Shambaugh, "China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy," *The China Journal*, no. 57 (2007): 26. For accounts of how seriously the CCP approached the management of newspapers and propaganda in the decades straddling 1949, see Patricia Stranahan, *Molding the Medium: The Chinese Communist Party and the Liberation Daily* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1990). and Andrew J. Nathan, *Chinese Democracy* (New York: Knopf : Distributed by Random House, 1985).

[90] Daniela Stockmann, *Media Commercialization and Authoritarian Rule in China* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 61.

[91] Nicolai Volland, "The Control of the Media in the People's Republic of China" (PhD diss., Heidelberg University, 2003). Volland has later extended his analysis into the current millennium and argues that commercialization has also wrought very limited fundamental change. Nicolai Volland, "From Control to Management: The CCP's 'Reforms of the Cultural Structure,'" in *China's Thought Management*, ed. Anne-Marie Brady (Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2012), 107–21.

[92] Volland, "The Control of the Media in the People's Republic of China," 66.

widely divergent opinions or practices.[93]

A number of recent scholarly works have demonstrated that the party-state is still firmly dedicated to controlling public displays and discussions of history, morality, proper behavior, and social justice. A striking aspect of Chinese media policy is the very high number of detailed regulations. China's State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) has issued a large number of very specific rules over the years. SARFT has, *inter alia*, banned time travel in television programs (in 2011), issued guidelines for appropriate songs in talent shows (2007), and laid down which maladies cannot have purported cures advertised during mealtimes (2009).[94] SARFT takes the propagation of all kinds of public information—including cultural works—very seriously.

A further look into SARFT has been provided by Ruoyun Bai, who has composed a thorough account of how China's propaganda authorities have involved themselves with the framing of corruption in Chinese television dramas, laying bare astounding meticulousness. In early 2002, the crime drama *I'll Never Let You Off*, directed by the well-known director Lei Xianhe, passed the censors at the Radio, Film and Television Bureau of Jilin Province and a number of provincial channels began broadcasting in April of that year. In December, however, SARFT ordered the termination of broadcasting. Thereupon, officials from SARFT, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), and the Public Security Department of Jilin met to decide a course of action. Subsequently, director Lei Xianhe was instructed to make more than three hundred changes to the original series.[95] An excerpt from the criticism by the director of the censorship team is indicative of both how detailed the censorship can be and of what the censors find most crucial:

Wei Tao [the police officer protagonist] is too simple-minded and witless. As a public

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[93] Volland, 438.
[94] Rogier Creemers, "Evaluating Chinese Media Policy," in *Routledge Handbook of Chinese Media*, ed. Gary D. Rawnsley and Ming-Yeh T. Rawnsley (London ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), 48.
[95] Ruoyun Bai, *Staging Corruption: Chinese Television and Politics* (Vancouver, CA: UBC Press, 2014), 105.

> security officer, he does not have the basic capacity of fighting the evil ... How can a person who is not even able to protect his girlfriend be expected to protect people's interest as a policeman? ... An isolated case does not reflect the Chinese society under the rule of law, which must be grasped holistically ... The inept police seem at a loss facing the underworld (for example, after Yang Kun and Zhou Jianfei are murdered, the police must take immediate action ...). Zheng Zhong and Qiu Haiquan must not let Chen Yilong have his way. Zheng must be able to constrain Chen and must not let Chen so smoothly become a policeman and crime investigator (you should consider adding Zheng's interior monologue as voiceover and thus let the audience know that he has been using his wisdom and making efforts to combat the evil force rather than staying inactive).[96]

As can be seen, the censorship authorities are keen to shape the qualities and actions of these fictional characters in particular ways. The police officer should appear intelligent and capable, and his ability to protect his girlfriend is a basic prerequisite for his work as a police officer. Moreover, the criminal should not appear more resourceful than his law enforcement counterparts. From there, the propaganda authorities go on to delineate other inappropriate details related to the relationship between criminals and the political system in China. Bai summarizes these instructions in the following way:

> As for Chen [a criminal who takes employment as a police officer], he must not be shown in a police uniform when engaging in criminal activities, for that would create an impression that the people's police harm rather than protect society. It was inappropriate for him to address his right-hand man, Old Lu, as *shuji* [书记, my insertion]. Because *shuji* is a term used exclusively to refer to Party secretaries—that is, the heads of Party committees at all levels—it would certainly be an insult to Party leaders if a criminal addressed his aide as *shuji*. He was not supposed to say to Old Lu, 'With you in charge, I am at ease,' because this same statement was allegedly made by Mao Zedong on his deathbed and written down on a piece of paper for Vice Chairman and Premier Hua Guofeng, who then used the note to legitimize his accession to power immediately after Mao's death. How could a mafia leader mimic Mao Zedong?[97]

Bai's work illustrates that the Chinese publicity authorities take micro meddling with implicit and explicit messages in cultural products just as seriously as they do the information contained in news programs and text books. By studying the social imaginary

[96] Bai, 105. Omissions in Bai's original text.
[97] Bai, 105.

implicit in the work of the CPD—through sources such as those quarried by Ruoyun Bai—we might come to expand our understanding of state-society relations in China. Gauging the efficiency of the system is incredibly difficult, but it can hardly be disputed that the party-state takes the matter of shaping public norms, beliefs, and expectations—not least through creating appropriate role models and regulating language and historical memory—very seriously. And this, in itself, makes such studies interesting.

1.6 Chapter overview

Chapter 2 examines previous attempts to explain the prevalence of selecting models for imitation up through Chinese history, concluding that the existing understanding is not entirely satisfactory. In an attempt to enrich our understanding of why models have been—and continue to be—a solid pillar of Chinese statecraft and educational practice, insights from various other disciplines—in particular psychology and anthropology—are drawn upon to make the case that the notion of "porous personhood" can serve as a useful means for understanding how the Chinese model traditions is intimately related to Chinese ways of understanding the self and interpersonal influence. Chapter 3 presents the methods employed in this dissertation, explaining why the work of Quentin Skinner is suited for analysis of Chinese media products.

Chapter 4 is the first analytical chapter. This chapter focuses on how the CPD made use of narratives in the *People's Daily* about model workers to frame the burning political issues of the early years of reform. It shows how the party-state made use of stories about model worker suffering during the Cultural Revolution to fashion an emotional community united against the recently deposed "Gang of Four." These stories also served to increase the popular respect for model workers, allowing them to serve as spokespeople for various policy changes formulated by the Hua Guofeng leadership and then later by Deng and his supporters, who mobilized model workers initially to garner support among urban workers, and then later as spokespeople for outlawing strikes and doing away with the democratic

reforms.

Chapter 5 traces how economic issues were framed in the *People's Daily* in the early reform years as part of the party-state's attempt to weaken the widespread popular support for an egalitarian wage structure and to ready the population for privatizing the costs of social reproduction and ending the regime of life-time job security. While model workers were employed at certain stages in these attempts, it is demonstrated that the portrayal of them as immaculate incarnations of morality made them unsuited to appear in stories which could not easily be articulated in terms adhering to popular moral convictions.

Chapter 6 focuses on social issues and brings the analysis up to the late 1980s and into the early 1990s. The chapter argues that the decreasing attention paid to model workers in the latter half of the 1980s is related both to the greater confidence the party-state leadership felt vis-à-vis China's workers as well as to the bourgeoning of social problems in the 1980s. Through an investigation of how these social problems were defined and sought solved, it is shown that the party-state relied on a conception of interpersonal influence derived from the view of the self identified in Chapter 2.

In the Conclusion, I add up the insights from the analytical chapters and show how the CPD in its attempts to remodel the social imaginary in the 1980s came to draw upon a well-established cultural idiom—what we, with reference to Cohen, might refer to as "the tenacity of culture." The Conclusion also discusses how the findings in this dissertation ask us to reconsider a number of previous arguments about how the party-state sought to legitimize the reforms in their early phase. Finally, the concluding chapter shows that a conception of personhood as being marked by porosity is still an integral element of the Chinese social imaginary. This can, it will argued, be used to stimulate new thoughts about media control in China as well as about the debate over "authoritarian resilience."

Chapter 2: Porous personhood. Towards a wider understanding of role models in the Chinese social imaginary

2.1 Model workers in the scholarly literature

This chapter will begin by reviewing the existing scholarly literature dealing with the party-state's use of model workers for popular imitation. As will become clear, this literature provides many insights, but it does not satisfactorily explain why the party-state dedicated so much attention to disseminating model worker narratives in the early years of post-Mao reform. In an attempt to improve our understanding of this topic, this chapter will examine other more general aspects of the party-state's attempts to re-educate the population as a part of its efforts to move China towards communism. This examination is then brought into dialogue with recent research in psychology, anthropology, and cultural studies, in an attempt to show that a particular model of personhood underlies the Chinese party-state's social engineering efforts. Understanding this model of personhood, this dissertation will claim, enables us to better grasp why the party-state has expended so many resources on selecting, refining, and disseminating stories about model workers.

Very few academic works written in Chinese have concerned themselves with model workers. A sophisticated analysis is provided by Zhang Jing, who analyses media portrayals of model workers and interviews with model workers.[98] Zhang points out that there may be said to exist two kinds of model workers: the larger-than-life icons celebrated in national newspapers, films, and classrooms, and then the ordinary model workers who have to struggle with all the everyday issues facing everyone else. This bifurcation creates serious problems for model workers in their daily lives and it undermines their effectiveness as role models. Model workers selected by the party-state are placed on pedestals so high that even

[98] Zhang Jing, "Laodong Mofan: Zai Daode Yu Quanli Zhijian [Model Workers: Between Morality and Authority]," *Kaifang Shidai*, no. 2 (2007): 107–23.

though people may find their exploits impressive, they are generally not inspired to imitate them. In addition, the accounts of the formidable achievements of model workers carried in the press create very high expectations for moral behavior on the part of model workers in their local communities. In themselves, these expectations are impossible to fulfill, and moreover, local model workers are placed in a morally problematic situation, because their selection comes with material rewards, which make their colleagues wonder whether these model workers exert themselves for the good of the community, or merely in the hope of reaping material rewards. The model worker system, Zhang notes, has a tendency to produce nepotism and factions among people competing for the material rewards distributed to model workers. The upshot is that the colleagues of model workers often do not accept them as role models. According to Zhang, these deficiencies in the model worker system urgently need to be corrected, because a decline in popular morality is a serious threat to social order.

Wang Xiaohui has examined the self-perception of model workers through interviews and reaches conclusions broadly similar to those of Zhang Jing: While society expects model workers to epitomize selfless devotion to the common good, the pursuit of fame and fortune is what matters to most ordinary people.[99] This, Wang concludes, places model workers in a difficult position, leaving many of them without a feeling of purpose in their lives. Zhang Mingshi concludes that the widespread poverty characteristic of China in the period 1949-1979 brought people to work together for the benefit of the entire country.[100] Since then, however, increasing prosperity has caused people to strive ever more to enrich themselves and their families. For this reason, Zhang concludes, it is necessary to improve the model worker system to instill in people a greater inclination towards working, once again, for the common good.

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[99] Wang Xiaohui, "Maodun de Ziwo Rentong: Dangdai Guoyou Qiye Gongren Laodong Mofan de Xintai [Conflicting Self-Identity: The Mentality of Model Workers at State-Owned Enterprises in the Present Period]," *Beijing Keji Daxue Xuebao* 27, no. 2 (2011): 101–5.
[100] Zhang Mingshi, "1949-1978: Gongheguo Yingmo Renwu [1949-1978: Heroic Models in the Republic]" (PhD diss., Huazhong Shifan Daxue, 2012).

Yao Li distinguishes between two periods of selecting model workers, namely before and after 1989.[101] According to Yao Li, whereas the period from 1949 to 1989 was distinguished by unevenness in terms of titles awarded, the length of time between national ceremonies, and the criteria employed for selecting model workers; the period after 1989 saw a rapid regularization in all of these aspects. Yao also notes that exceeding one's work quota became a—if not *the*—most central factor for selecting labor models after the commencement of reform in 1977. This was, Yao avers, a sensible change because it served to mobilize and inspire people. Now, as attested to by Xi Jinping's coining of the term "the new normal," China has arrived at another crucial turning point and the dissemination of model worker consciousness is therefore once again of the essence, argues Yao.

Liu Hui and Kuang Ying note that there is a great difference between the work attitude of model workers and that of most other workers, and through interviews and published narratives they attempt to establish how model workers have arrived at a work ethic so superior to that of most other workers.[102] They arrive at the conclusion that whereas model workers in the period from the 1940s to the 1990s came to be such formidable workers because of the tough times they lived in, model workers in the most recent decades stand apart primarily on the basis of inner personal traits, most notably self-discipline and character. Fostering such mental dispositions, Liu and Kuang argue, is therefore increasingly important in the contemporary period. Xu Wei argues that the Chinese labor union and Chinese companies need to pay greater attention to fostering model workers, because the qualities embodied by model workers are vital for improving the social atmosphere in a time of increased competition.[103]

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[101] Yao Li, "1977-1979 Nian de Quanquo Laodong Mofan Biaozhang [Honoring National-Level Model Workers, 1977-1979]," *Dangdai Zhongguo Shiyanjiu* 22, no. 5 (2015): 39–47.
[102] Liu Hui and Kuang Ying, "Wo Guo Laodongmofan Zhiye Jingshen Xingcheng [Researching the Factors That Influence the Formation of the Vocational Spirit of China's Model Workers]," *Zhijiao Tongxun*, no. 19 (2017): 39–47.
[103] Xu Wei, "Xin Xingshixia Gonghui de Laodong Mofan Peiyang Gongzuo [The Labor Union's Training of Model Workers in the New Period]," *Mingri Fengshang*, no. 21 (2017): 287.

Apart from the works summarized above, most Chinese-language academic articles dealing with model workers rely not on empirical analysis, but consist either of assertions about the positive influence of model workers on society, or of calls to increase the dissemination of model worker narratives so as to improve popular morality, worker industriousness, and the social atmosphere. More than anything else, these articles attest to the fact that such claims—about the positive effects model workers have on society—can be made with little apparent need to provide supportive evidence that model workers, and the dissemination of narratives about them, do indeed produce such an effect.

That the party-state attributed importance to model workers is further underscored by the fact that the ACFTU published a journal titled *Contemporary Model Worker* (当代劳模: *dangdai laomo*) from 1984 to 2015. Unfortunately, the journal is not available in a digital format for the period I cover in this dissertation. Later issues of the journal are available online and they are dedicated primarily to portraits of successful model workers and stories about model worker celebrations across the country. According to the responses I received to an email to the Sinologist librarians mailing list, only the library at the University of Cambridge has a single issue of the journal dating from 1992. Unfortunately, I have not been able to go in person to study this issue, but the very existence and longevity of the journal testify to the fact that the party-state provided a great number of avenues along which the public might hear about China's model workers.

No article I have been able to find examines how the dissemination of model worker narratives in the media can be analyzed for clues about specific policy priorities of the party-state, nor do any of these articles attempt to analyze published model worker narratives in order to understand the political dynamics and controversies at the higher echelons of the party-state. I have also not been able to locate in the Chinese language research any articles examining the cultural, psychological, or political foundations for China's tradition of disseminating stories about model workers for popular consumption and imitation.

One reason why few Chinese academics have paid attention to model workers may be

a feeling that the selection of model workers and the dissemination of stories about them seem connected to a time when China was closely allied with the Soviet Union, and this relationship has not evoked great interest among Chinese scholars in recent decades. Another reason may be that the dissemination of model worker narratives have been a staple of the life-world for most Chinese researchers, and as such may seem too mundane to be worthy of much interest—just as it took European anthropologists many decades to develop any overt interest in their home countries. For some Chinese academics, the continued selection of model workers and their association with somewhat clumsy party-state propaganda may evoke a feeling that model workers are best swept under the rug, or at least peeled off the walls as suggested by Sun Liping.

The dissemination of model worker narratives in the PRC has not attracted great attention in the English-language literature either, but a few notable works stand out as providing key inspiration for the present dissertation. Of central inspiration has been the work of intellectual historian Donald Munro, who points out that the party-state's dissemination of model workers narratives draws on a long pedagogical tradition: "Much of the historical scholarship for which the Chinese are famous was concerned with unearthing models from the past for the education of the people."[104] Munro shows that the importance of establishing models for others to emulate has remained a frequent topic in Chinese thinking about education at least since Confucius, and that this also figures prominently in Mao's writings.[105]

This propensity for establishing models extended far beyond educational reform. In a study of how the city of Nantong was constructed and presented publicly in the Republican era, Qin Shao notes how

> 'model' became the hallmark for all that happened in Nantong. [...] Indeed, 'model' crept in everywhere. After the prefectural jail in the old downtown of the city underwent a

[104] Donald J. Munro, *The Concept of Man in Contemporary China* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977), 136.
[105] Munro, 139ff.

> reform to include workshops for criminals, it was renamed Model Jail. The main street of the new downtown was named Model Road (Mofan Lu). When, in 1915, Zhang Jian started to develop the traditional pilgrimage site of Langshan as part of a large plan to re-landscape Nantong, he sought to renovate the temples in a way that would make them a model for temples elsewhere.[106]

According to Lyle Davidson, imitation also appears to be valued higher as a means of advanced music instruction in China than it does in the US, where instruction at advanced levels pays much more attention to breaking down and discussing musical pieces in terms of formal structures and physical properties.[107] Interestingly, Davidson also found descriptive titles, metaphors, and stories to be the primary means of music instruction in China, with teachers encouraging their students to shape their emotional expression by having them think of "the quiet of the early morning," "a storm in the trees" or "echoes." These metaphors "provide an affective atmosphere which [...] [becomes] the vehicle for integrating the subskills of technique into a fluent and coherent musical expression."[108] It will become apparent in the course of this dissertation why these notions of atmospheric stimulus resonate so strongly with the notion of porous personhood.

As Jo Riley has observed, the imitation of models has also been a characteristic feature of actor training in China:

> There is no philosophical or aesthetic text on training for the Chinese theatre such as the *Natya Sastra* in India, or Zeami's writings in Japan. Rather the master incorporates the performance knowledge in his body. This is passed on to the student by the process of imitation. In training for actual role pieces (rather than learning the basic repertoire of movements, or training physical strength and flexibility) the master stands next to the student as model, giving the correct pattern of movements.[109]

The richest account of model thinking in Chinese history, culture, and politics remains the work of the sociologist Børge Bakken. Bakken notes that the state-sanctioned selection and

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[106] Qin Shao, *Culturing Modernity: The Nantong Model, 1890-1930* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004), 40f.
[107] Lyle Davidson, "Observing a Yang Ch'in Lesson: Learning by Modeling and Metaphor," *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 23, no. 1 (1989): 85–99, https://doi.org/10.2307/3332890.
[108] Davidson, 98.
[109] Jo Riley, *Chinese Theatre and the Actor in Performance* (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 23.

dissemination of stories about exemplary individuals who behave in ways those in power would like to see imitated by the populace at large has been a pervasive feature of Chinese society for many centuries. This state-orchestrated dissemination of models for emulation has, Bakken notes, been no less pervasive in the reform period. Bakken sees this as the party-state's attempt to inspire individual moral behavior as a means of neutralizing the centrifugal effects tearing at China's social fabric due to the progressive modernization and marketization of Chinese society.[110]

As such, the dissemination of models was the Confucian state's preferred alternative to control through brute force: "Confucian thought prefers social control through the presentation of virtuous models. By emulating them, people will develop a constant attitude towards the norms, thus ensuring proper conduct even in the absence of direct surveillance."[111] In this regard, Bakken sees continuity stretching back to pre-imperial times:

> The Chinese have a faith that positive models and good morality will naturally attract people. In early texts there is talk of a magnetic attraction towards people of virtue. For example, Confucius compares the ruler of exemplary virtue with the Pole star: 'He who exercises government by means of his virtue may be compared to the north polar star, which keeps its place and the stars turn towards it.' Mencius said: 'The people turn to a benevolent rule (*ren*) as water flows downward, and like wild beasts fly to the wilderness.' Beliefs seem to follow the very same pattern today.[112]

As to how these values have persisted over the centuries, Bakken posits that exemplarity has been passed down in Chinese "cultural memory"; by which he means "symbols, values, norms, practical strategies, thought patterns, 'ways of doing things', or 'traces' that have materialized in a culture and function as legitimizing factors for acting in society and organizing society."[113] According to Bakken, it remains the case that "[t]he Chinese process of socialization is still followed by massive doses of model learning, and people know their

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[110] Børge Bakken, *The Exemplary Society: Human Improvement, Social Control, and the Dangers of Modernity in China* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 177f.
[111] Bakken, 169.
[112] Bakken, 172.
[113] Bakken, 10.

models as an obvious part of their cultural knowledge and identity."[114] In particular, Bakken sees the notion of exemplarity as materializing in the educational system, in the disciplinary system, and in the bureaucratic system—and this is regardless of whether the culture is feudal, communist, or capitalist. What makes these pedagogical ideas all the more important is that Chinese views on education have consistently stressed that human beings are characterized by "unlimited malleability and educability."[115]

In short, Bakken offers a rich examination of modelling practices across time and social subject areas, and he ends up concluding that the contemporary Chinese emphasis on modelling draws on ancient ideas about statecraft, in which the utility of disseminating models for popular imitation has been brought to the fore in the reform period because it is a long-established means whereby Chinese rulers seek to establish order in times of turbulence.

While I find the connection Bakken draws between statecraft and education persuasive, Bakken fails to account for why modelling has remained so prevalent in Chinese society, despite enormous changes in the realms of religion, demography, technology, urbanization, medicine, interaction with the outside world, the influx and local adaptation of such ideas as the theory of evolution, communism, and nationalism, just to mention a few. Though Bakken prefaces his study by noting that "cultural memory" is where this pervasive mode of thinking survives, his focus is almost exclusively on (primarily) older philosophical texts and on the exigencies of the contemporary party-state. In other words, in accounting for the prevalence of exemplary models in modern China, Bakken focuses almost exclusively on why Chinese rulers have found the dissemination of narratives involving models so attractive, while he pays little attention to the question of whether there are social, cultural, or psychological aspects which might make modelling a more complex phenomenon than simply a means used by the ruling elite to secure hegemony in order to reduce its reliance on

[114] Bakken, 181.
[115] Bakken, 173.

brute force.

Next to Bakken, the intellectual historian Donald Munro has provided one of the most thorough and interesting examinations of the Chinese tradition of selecting exemplary models for imitation. In addition, his work resonates, as I will show, with recent research by a number of psychologists. One of Munro's central claims is that there is an intimate connection between long-standing Chinese views of how the human mind works and the Chinese tradition of modelling. Munro makes his argument by juxtaposing "liberal democratic individualism"—which considers a human being's most important traits to exist independently of the social context—with the Chinese notion of being human where much greater emphasis is placed on the role of society in shaping the individual.[116]

According to liberal democratic individualism, personality formation takes place in early childhood and is crucially limited by innate dispositions, whereas the Chinese conception sees much greater potential for humans to change throughout the entire lifespan. In addition, Chinese and American views of the relationship between thinking, feeling, and acting are dissimilar. In China a strong belief exists in the "clustering" of knowing, feeling, and promptings to act, while this is much less so in the American tradition.[117] What this means is that where the dominant American tradition perceives of feeling and acting as activities that in general are best kept apart, the Chinese view of human beings is founded on a much closer connection between the two. This being the case, the Chinese educational tradition has tended to concern itself much more with shaping what are deemed appropriate feelings and actions, rather than focusing more narrowly on imparting knowledge as in the liberal democratic educational tradition.

The Chinese belief in the fundamental malleability and perfectibility of human beings comes with a concomitant norm stipulating that it is the responsibility of those in authority

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[116] This and the following two paragraphs are based on Munro, *The Concept of Man in Contemporary China*.
[117] Munro, 26.

to educate those over whom they wield control; in Munro's terms, in China, "the most important function of government is fosterage."[118] Munro employs the term "fosterage" rather than "education" in order to stress that what is a stake is not solely, or even primarily, the communication of facts, but rather the development of moral character.[119]

While I find Munro's work valuable for its investigation of the psychological aspects of China's modelling tradition, there are still a number of issues which are not satisfactorily dealt with by either Munro or Bakken. One central issue is that while both authors note that the Chinese modelling tradition conceives of human beings as extremely malleable throughout the lifespan—neither Munro nor Bakken does much to explain *why* that should be the case; nor do they really explore what ramifications such an assumption might entail. Another central limitation in the work of Bakken and Munro is that they do not satisfactorily explain how the modelling tradition has been reproduced over the centuries. Bakken reduces modelling to little more than a tool of the ruling elite, which does little to explain why the elite have considered it so effective. Munro for his part predominantly relies on his reading of the philosophical-political canon, thereby eliding the connection between daily-life practices and the modelling tradition. In the following, I will argue that recent work in other disciplines can be employed to delineate a Chinese model of personhood on the basis of which the prominence of model imitation as a potent force of interpersonal influence can be placed in the larger social imaginary.

2.2 Social engineering in China. Creating "new people"

Before we delve into the specific technique of modelling, it is instructive to examine the more direct and forceful efforts to effect thought reform as these were employed in "re-education centers" in the 1950s. The fact that the party-state expended a great amount of resources on attempts to remold individuals in these centers, along with the fact that the party-state

[118] Munro, 105.
[119] Munro, 98ff.

recognized no external institutions as having the authority to intervene in the process, makes a study of the techniques employed in these centers pertinent for understanding how the party-state assumed that individuals could most effectively be reformed.

Just how serious the CCP was about improving China's populace is brought out in a study by Cheng Yinghong. Cheng notes that the revolutionary party-state's efforts to create "new people" after 1949 included

> a calculated and systematic cultivation of ideas and perceptions, consciousness and sub-consciousness, personal character, psychology, and even physical constitution. The new man was created not just to ensure that new ideas would replace old ones and that the party's tasks would be carried out [...] but also to stand up as an alternative human model that dwarfed all prior or contemporary types of human being.[120]

The techniques employed by the CCP to improve the Chinese populace found their most concentrated expression in the attempts to remold the various groups who were suspected of resenting the new powerholders after 1949, in particular the landed elite, the lumpen-proletariat, and anyone who might be suspected of nurturing loyalties to the Nationalist Party (the KMT) or to the Americans in the wake of the Korean War. The decision of twenty-three American POWs to remain in China after fighting against the Chinese in the Korean War gave rise to much speculation in the US about the ability of the Chinese to "brainwash" people. This event also provided the impetus for a thorough investigation of these efforts by the psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton. The study by Lifton remains one of the most thorough and enlightening examinations of how the early party-state approached the challenge of shaping China's "new people." On the basis of in-depth interviews with two dozen Chinese and Westerners who had undergone "thought reform" in the 1940s and 1950s, Lifton lays out in great detail the central elements of how thought reform was pursued in the re-education centers.

Lifton notes that the Chinese program of thought reform

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[120] Yinghong Cheng, *Creating the "New Man." From Enlightenment Ideals to Socialist Realities* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2009), 3.

> emerged as one of the most powerful efforts at human manipulation ever undertaken. To be sure, such a program is by no means completely new: imposed dogmas, inquisitions, and mass conversion movements have existed in every country and during every historical epoch. But the Chinese Communists have brought to theirs a more organized, comprehensive, and deliberate—a more *total*—character, as well as a unique blend of energetic and ingenious psychological techniques.[121]

Lifton explains that

> [w]hatever its setting, thought reform consists of two basic elements: *confession*, the exposure and renunciation of past and present 'evil'; and *re-education*, the remaking of a man in the Communist image. These elements are closely related and overlapping, since they both bring into play a series of pressures and appeals—intellectual, emotional, and physical—aimed at social control and individual change.[122]

Lifton describes the arduous regime of re-education as related to him by a Frenchman who had spent three years in a Chinese "re-education" camp on the charge of being an imperialist spy. The former prisoner, referred to as Dr. Vincent, explains how, upon first arriving in his cell which he shared with eight other inmates, the cell chief, the prisoner who was supposedly the most advanced in his thinking, "instructed him to sit in the center of the cell while the other prisoners formed a circle around him. Each in turn then shouted invectives at Vincent, denouncing him as an 'imperialist' and a 'spy,' demanding that he 'recognize' his 'crimes' and 'confess everything' to the 'government.'"[123] Then he was chained on hand and foot, leaving him no choice but to "eat as a dog does, with your mouth and teeth. You arrange the cup and bowl with your nose to try to absorb broth twice a day. If you have to make water they open your trousers and you make water in a little tin in the corner."[124] After this initial phase, the period of what was referred to as "re-education" began. Re-education primarily involved a study program,

> whose sessions took up almost the entire waking existence of the prisoners, ten to

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[121] Robert Jay Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of "Brainwashing" in China* (1961; repr., New York: Norton, 1989), 4f.
[122] Lifton, 5.
[123] Lifton, 20.
[124] Lifton, 22.

> sixteen hours a day. Led by the cell chief, its procedure was simple enough: one prisoner read material from a Communist newspaper, book, or pamphlet; and then each in turn was expected to express his own opinion and to criticize the views of others. Everyone was required to participate actively, and anyone who did not was severely criticized. Each had to learn to express himself from the 'correct' or 'people's standpoint' —applied not only to personal actions, but to political, social, and ethical issues.[125]

Lifton draws out three key elements of the applied confessionary method:

> The totalist confession [was] a means of maintaining a perpetual inner emptying or psychological purge of impurity [...] Second, it is an act of symbolic self-surrender, the expression of the merging of individual and environment. Third, it is a means of maintaining an ethos of total exposure—a policy of making public (or at least known to the Organization) everything possible about the life experiences, thoughts, and passions of each individual, and especially those elements which might be regarded as derogatory.[126]

This "cult of confession," as Lifton terms it, was such a pivotal element of the procedure that it came to matter little if the confessed crimes had only a tenuous relation to reality. What mattered was not so much the truth, but rather that individuals learned how to express past transgressions and became elevated to a new plane of consciousness by use of a very limited number of prescribed terms.[127] In short, reeducation consisted of intense group pressure for extended periods of time, focused on acquiring the prescribed language with which to analyze one's past failings and connect these to China's march from feudal oppression towards the bright horizons of communism.

In two recent studies revisiting these earlier attempts at thought reform, Kushner claims that the Chinese efforts at changing the ways of thought of Japanese soldiers indicted for war crimes could be surprisingly effective, while Smith finds that efforts at mending the minds of petty criminals and prostitutes were oftentimes less than successful.[128] What both

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[125] Lifton, 26.
[126] Lifton, 425f.
[127] Lifton, 425–30.
[128] Barak Kushner, *Men to Devils, Devils to Men: Japanese War Crimes and Chinese Justice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015). Aminda M. Smith, *Thought Reform and China's Dangerous Classes: Reeducation, Resistance, and the People* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield

studies emphasize, however, is that the Chinese authorities took the challenge of changing the thought of those under their charge extremely seriously.

While ordinary citizens were subjected to much less forceful means of re-molding, party-state publications frequently stressed that even in peacetime the "new people" ought to willingly lay down their lives to protect the state and collective property. This was brought home to the public through many stories in the press and in school textbooks, such as the one about Xiang Xiuli, a female model worker at a textile factory who sacrificed her life to save a machine during a fire.[129] In the new society, the party-state symbolically indicated time and again, individual lives were less important than the tools of production. Even Lei Feng described himself as but a screw in the national machinery. In order to instill such radical notions in the citizenry, filial piety was denounced as a feudal remnant, and youths who denounced family members who had acted in politically incorrect ways were hailed as having been spiritually reborn.[130] As the party-state increased its control over society up through the 1950s, morality and consciousness-raising became increasingly more prominent aspects of the curriculum.[131] While the screw-metaphor may to some convey dehumanization, it is important to remember that party cadres, at least in the early years, considered both the coercive and the hortatory endeavors to be "*a morally uplifting, harmonizing, and scientifically therapeutic experience.*"[132]

A number of key points emerge from the above: the CCP had great faith in the possibility of remolding the thoughts and habits of individuals through determined efforts; this entailed exposing the incorrect thoughts of the individual and enabling her or him to make sense of her or his life and situation in a vocabulary of devotion to the group, to the Party, and to the country. For the individual, this meant fostering both a willingness and an

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Publishers, 2013).
[129] Http://chineseposters.net/themes/xiangxiuli.php. Accessed June 30, 2016.
[130] Cheng, *Creating the "New Man." From Enlightenment Ideals to Socialist Realities*, 73.
[131] Cheng, 83f.
[132] Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of "Brainwashing" in China*, 15. Emphasis in original.

ability to verbally and publically construct a personal identity that was intimately related to the historical and teleological progress of China from a feudal to a communist country. The social environment created to effect re-education was in the form of group sessions lead by someone who was at once a member of the group but also singled out as possessing a higher consciousness than the other group members. The over-riding group activity was the reading and discussion of documents and past failings of the group members, aiming to connect written texts with personal experiences and ways of thought. Severe criticism was meted out by group members to anyone found unable or unwilling to explicate how her or his past actions constituted crimes against the interests of the masses as these were formulated in documents selected for joint study.

In the remainder of this chapter, I will examine in greater detail a number of insights from medicine, psychology, anthropology, and cultural studies in order to understand why modelling has been such a central preoccupation of statecraft and pedagogy in China.

2.3 Insights from anthropology: Influence in medicine and daily life

A key term advanced in this dissertation—that of "porous personhood"—is borrowed from anthropologist Mikkel Bunkenborg, who himself draws on previous work by, *inter alia*, Mueggler and Shapiro. In the following, I will sketch Bunkenborg's arguments, before I proceed to add a number of insights from various disciplines in order both to strengthen Bunkenborg's argument and to refine the concept of porous personhood. With inspiration from Charles Taylor, I will look to various cultural practices and influential ideas in an attempt to locate some of the sources of the self in the Chinese social imaginary.

Based on ethnographic fieldwork exploring health care practices in rural China, or more precisely Fanzhuang village in Southern Hebei Province, Bunkenborg describes how cultural and religious traditions, local institutions, state policies, along with medical discourse and technologies from outside the village all impact how the agents in his study approach the task of caring for their bodies. What I take from Bunkenborg's work is the

concept of "porous personhood," which he develops on the basis of how his respondents talk about and practice healthcare. Bunkenborg argues that his respondents treat and talk about their bodies through a vocabulary and a set of practices grounded in an understanding of being separated from the surroundings only by a thin, membrane-like film which allows for constant transaction with the environment. Attending to this transaction, then, becomes a central part of the pursuit of health.

In addition to his own observations, Bunkenborg grounds his arguments on various strands of scholarly literature; most pertinent to the topic of porosity are observations drawn from linguistics and religious studies. Here, Bunkenborg speculates that "[p]erhaps the liquidity of things has to do with the structure of the Chinese language where objects never present themselves as discrete, countable entities but always occur as mass nouns, as fluid substances without a finite form."[133] Drawing from studies of Chinese religion, Bunkenborg notes that Chinese religious thinking and practice conceives of the land of the living as being separated from the domain of the dead by a mere flimsy, permeable boundary.[134] Interestingly, in order for something to be allowed to pass from one dimension to the other, it has to be bereft of form—that is, it has to be dissolved in water or to be consumed by flames. Likewise, forces and demons may traverse the same boundary in ethereal form. In other words, only gaseous and liquid substances may pass the boundary, and such passage is almost always associated with danger.[135]

Where Bunkenborg focuses on the discourses and practices that help to shape how people in rural China discuss and seek health care, I will argue in the following that his concept of "porous personhood" can in fact be used to combine a host of insights from various disciplines to add to our understanding of the "intellectual/psychic meaning that

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[133] Mikkel Bunkenborg, "Porous Persons and Empty Disorders: Producing Healthy People in Rural North China" (PhD diss., University of Copenhagen, 2009), 12.
[134] Here Bunkenborg draws in particular on Erik Mueggler, *The Age of Wild Ghosts: Memory, Violence, and Place in Southwest China* (Univ of California Press, 2001).
[135] Bunkenborg, "Porous Persons and Empty Disorders," 12.

flows beneath the surface of conventionally recounted history."[136] Below, I will gather these insights in order to construct a model of "porous personhood" that I believe is able to better our understanding of why the emphasis on role models has been a mainstay of China's educational tradition.

2.4 Psychology and group formation

A number of scholars have emphasized how Chinese cultural norms valorize strong barriers between group-insiders and group-outsiders. In an early article on this topic, King and Bond noted that people from China in the 1970s and 1980s differed from contemporary Westerners in their intense loyalty towards group formation.[137] The authors quote Abbott's observation that "[h]eavy reliance on the family and primary group seems to make functioning in outside groups in Chinese society an uncomfortable process even for people with healthy ego-structure and who enjoy associating with others."[138] To facilitate in-group interactions, Chinese upbringing emphasizes restraint of individual emotional expression: "In child-rearing practices, a fundamental concern is to inhibit open emotional expression of hostility or aggression towards authority or even peers."[139]

For several years after the publication of King and Bond's article, few new studies concerned themselves with trying to compare Eastern and Western notions of the self; quite possibly in part a reflection of the increasing influence of Edward Said's book *Orientalism*, which was first published in 1978 and made any such conjectures seem suspect. In 1991, however, Markus and Kitayama published what would become a seminal article in which they claimed that notions of the self, as well of notions of the relationship between the self and others, varied much more between cultures than standard accounts within the discipline

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[136] Cohen, "The Tenacity of Culture," 397.
[137] Ambrose Y.C. King and Michael H. Bond, "The Confucian Paradigm of Man: A Sociological View," in *Chinese Culture and Mental Health*, ed. Wen-Shing Tseng and David Y. H. Wu (Elsevier, 1985), 29–45.
[138] King and Bond, 39.
[139] King and Bond, 34.

of psychology had recognized. In particular, they argued that "[m]any Asian cultures have distinct conceptions of individuality that insist on the fundamental relatedness of individuals to each other. The emphasis is on attending to others, fitting in, and harmonious interdependence with them."[140] This view of the self, which they term the "interdependent view of self," they contrast with an "independent view of self," which they posit as characteristic of individuals with an American cultural background.




Illustration 2.1: The "independent view of self" and the "interdependent view of self." Reproduced from Markus and Kitayama.[141]

Markus and Kitayama note that

[140] Hazel R. Markus and Shinobu Kitayama, "Culture and the Self: Implications for Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation," *Psychological Review* 98, no. 2 (1991): 224.
[141] Markus and Kitayama, 226.

> Despite the growing body of psychological and anthropological evidence that people hold divergent views about the self, most of what psychologists currently know about human nature is based on one particular view—the so-called Western view of the individual as an independent, self-contained, autonomous entity who (a) comprises a unique configuration of internal attributes (e.g., traits, abilities, motives, and values) and (b) behaves primarily as a consequence of these internal attributes.[142]

In what Markus and Kitayama refer to as the Western view of the individual, there is a "normative imperative [...] to become independent from others and to discover and express one's unique attributes."[143] This has important implications for individual self-construction: "Achieving the cultural goal of independence requires construing oneself as an individual whose behavior is organized and made meaningful primarily by reference to one's own internal repertoire of thoughts, feelings, and action, rather than by reference to the thoughts, feelings, and actions of others."[144]

In contrast, the Chinese view holds that "persons are only parts that when separated from the larger social whole cannot be fully understood. Such a holistic view is in opposition to the Cartesian, dualistic tradition that characterizes Western thinking and in which the self is separated from the object and from the natural world."[145] In short, Markus and Kitayama aver that normative pressures founded upon cultural expectations shape not only how individuals behave, but also impinge fundamentally on how individuals in both cultures construe their selves.

In recent decades, a number of psychologists have conducted experimental research confirming the claims formulated by King and Bond and later added to by Markus and Kitayama. The psychologist who has done the most to compare the importance of group formation in Asiatic versus Western cultures is Toshio Yamagishi, who has attempted to explain why a number of studies of experimental psychology seemed to show that Japanese and Chinese people were sometimes more cooperative, and sometimes less cooperative,

[142] Markus and Kitayama, 224.
[143] Markus and Kitayama, 226.
[144] Markus and Kitayama, 226.
[145] Markus and Kitayama, 227.

than Americans and Australians. Yamagishi solved this conundrum by noting that the seemingly irreconcilable experimental results can be explained by noting that the experiments differed with respect to the creation of group cohesion, and that the East Asian subjects proved quite cooperative when they were placed in situations where they had prior interactions with the other participants, or would expect future interactions with the other participants, but correspondingly uncooperative in settings where they had no such interactions or expectations.[146]

Yamagishi concludes that

> Given the survey results [...] that Japanese are less trustful of others than Americans, it is suggested that the Japanese have a stronger tendency to form commitment relations than Americans because they are less trustful of others in general. The overall picture emerging from this discussion is that the lack of general trust among Japanese people constitutes a piece in the cultural complex of collectivism. The core of the collectivist behavioral pattern is commitment formation that produces assurance for mutual cooperation and high cost of exit. Once this pattern emerges, trust is seen as confined within the closed circle of commitment relations, and development of general trust that extends beyond the closed circle is hampered. The resulting lack of general trust further motivates people to avoid interacting with 'outsiders' and thus to strengthen the existing commitment relations.[147]

In a later study, Chen and Li concluded that Yamagishi's observations could be extended from the Japanese to the Chinese context.[148] A point worthy of note is that while

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[146] Toshio Yamagishi, "Cross-Societal Experimentation on Trust: A Comparison of the United States and Japan," in *Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental Research*, ed. James Walker and Elinor Ostrom, 2003, 352–370. Other studies have come to similar conclusions. Doris and Plakias reports results from the administration of a famous thought experiment—known as "The magistrate and the mob"—presented as a survey to young Chinese and young Americans. The survey can be boiled down to asking the participants whether the police ought to prosecute and punish a single innocent scapegoat in order to prevent rioting that will bring about greater losses of life and property. As it turns out, the Chinese participants were more willing than their American counterparts to allow for the individual to be sacrificed for the sake of the collective. John M. Doris and Alexandra Plakias, "How to Argue about Disagreement: Evaluative Diversity and Moral Realism," in *Moral Psychology: The Cognitive Science of Morality: Intuition and Diversity*, ed. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2007), 322f.

[147] Yamagishi, "Cross-Societal Experimentation on Trust," 367.

[148] Xiao-Ping Chen and Shu Li, "Cross-National Differences in Cooperative Decision-Making in Mixed-Motive Business Contexts: The Mediating Effect of Vertical and Horizontal Individualism,"

acquiescence towards the collective is a highly-valued virtue in this scheme of behavior, there is also a quite robust norm that good deeds ought to be done anonymously, leading many Chinese children in contemporary society to deny ownership of good deeds they have in fact performed.[149] Similarly, Zhang Hui has argued that there exists in contemporary China a stronger notion—compared with contemporary Judeo-Christian cultures—that people who prosper economically are themselves responsible for not provoking envy in others.[150] It seems reasonable to interpret this norm as consequential upon the more fundamental norm of group-acquiescence, because anyone taking ownership of a good deed might be suspected of having acted out of a desire to stand apart from the group, rather than working for its benefit.

The proclivity for distinguishing sharply between group insiders and outsiders is also a clear feature of Chinese cultural products of the 20th century. Drawing on a rich analysis of a range of cultural products, including movies, literature, and museum displays, the literary analyst Haiyan Lee has argued that an anxiety over "stranger sociality" was a strong cultural current in China up through the 20th century. This anxiety has, Lee avers, remained a prominent cultural feature under the CCP, because the party-state—in its aspiration to inhibit the growth of an autonomous civil society—has refused to acknowledge forms of relationships modelled on anything but kinship. Lee furthermore argues that this anxiety over stranger sociality was embodied in the secluded nature of the Chinese socialist workunit compound (the *danwei*). In this way, Lee argues, the party-state has consigned every stranger to an identity of potentially hostile alien.[151]

In recent years, Louise Sundararajan has done more than anyone to integrate

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Journal of International Business Studies 36, no. 6 (2005): 622–636.

[149] Gao Minghui, "Lying about Good Deeds: Chinese Children's Ethical Discourse" (PhD diss., Harvard University, 2008).

[150] Zhang Hui, "The Ethics of Envy Avoidance in Contemporary China," in *Ordinary Ethics in China*, ed. Charles Stafford (London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 115–32.

[151] Haiyan Lee, *The Stranger and the Chinese Moral Imagination* (Stanford Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2014), 6ff.

contemporary scholarship in the domains of psychology, religious studies, Chinese literature, and linguistics. Based on a magisterial summation of experimental psychology in particular, Sundararajan posits that it is possible to delineate a Chinese model of the mind that is different from the Western model which is still taken as the unspoken and unexamined point of departure for most research in psychology and several other disciplines. Sundararajan starts by noting that there are basically two explanations for why people have developed big brains. "Conventional wisdom in psychology has it that our big brains are evolved to be smart—to learn, figure things out, and problem-solve."[152] In recent years, however, a new explanation has been gaining adherents, namely what is known as the "social brain hypothesis" according to which "individuals tap into the cultural store of knowledge simply by mimicking those around them [...] Thus, it is group-living that constitutes the niche for which our big brains are evolved."[153]

These two diverging views of the brain are related to two different types of rationality. Notes Sundararajan,

> Consistent with the two competing hypotheses about our big brains—cognitive versus social—is Bloom's (2009) claim that there are two independently evolved systems for reasoning about the world—one for the physical world and the other for the social world. While it is necessary to have both types of rationality, cultures differ in their emphasis on one or the other. The rationality of individualist cultures capitalizes on non-relational cognition, generally referred to as intelligence, whereas that of collectivist cultures, such as China, relational cognition.[154]

Where cognitive rationality primarily engages in detecting difference, social rationality primarily engages in detecting similarity. Cognitive rationality, the view of rationality dominant in the Western tradition, is founded on the assumption of a subject-object dichotomy. Social rationality, in contrast, posits no such *a priori* distinctions. On the basis of a rich discussion of Chinese literature and psychological studies, Sundararajan concludes

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[152] Louise Sundararajan, *Understanding Emotion in Chinese Culture: Thinking Through Psychology* (New York, N.Y.: Springer, 2015), 7.
[153] Sundararajan, 8.
[154] Sundararajan, 8.

that we may speak of a Chinese "hypertrophy of social cognition," visible for instance in the many stories about "finding a responsive heart in rocks and stones" in the Chinese literary canon.[155]

While Sundararajan concerns herself primarily with Chinese poetry, other scholars have pointed out that China's fictional tradition, compared to the European fictional tradition, also evinces a greater interest in social interactions and processes, and a lesser interest in the interior lives of its characters.[156] It is worth noting that where many of China's greatest writers in the first half of the 20th century were more concerned with using literature to improve China's population, those writers who exhibited the greatest interest in interior worlds—such as Ding Ling, Shi Zhecun, Zhang Ailing, and Qian Zhongshu—found it difficult, and for extended periods impossible, to have their works published in the PRC due to the political strictures placed upon literary expression in the early decades of the PRC.[157]

In order to grasp the implications of these cultural differences, Sundararajan stresses, we need to broaden the scope of psychological enquiry by supplementing the examination of explicit beliefs held by individuals with attention to their lived experiences and thereby come to understand their beliefs as "multifaceted and rich in meanings that are encoded and decoded experientially through affect."[158] Quoting Averill, Sundararajan claims that "[c]ultures are characterized [...] by the emotional lives of their members rather than by the intellectual content of their ideologies."[159]

This difference in cognitive style gives rise to different ways of relating to others. Where the modern Western privileging of difference tends to favor an emphasis on mind reading, the Chinese privileging of sameness motivates a tendency towards mimicry, with

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[155] Sundararajan, 9.
[156] Denton, "Introduction."
[157] Perry Link, *Evening Chats in Beijing: Probing China's Predicament* (New York, N.Y.: Norton, 1992); Perry Link, *The Uses of Literature: Life in the Socialist Chinese Literary System* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).
[158] Sundararajan, *Understanding Emotion in Chinese Culture*, 18.
[159] Sundararajan, 18.

less emphasis paid to what may be going on inside the mind of others and more emphasis on social bonding.[160] These differences are intimately related to how China and the West, respectively, sought to solve the problem of fostering habits conducive to living in large social groups: Where the Western approach emphasized that one or more Gods was watching, the Confucian response was an emphasis on strong social ties, which came to mean modelling society on the analogy of the family.[161]

In short, Sundararajan makes the claim that Chinese and Western cultures operate with two identifiably dissimilar conceptualizations of how the human mind works. Where the Western conception privileges the rational-evaluative component of learning and identity formation, the Chinese conception emphasizes that the human mind is much more open to outside influence, which means that people cannot avoid being profoundly influenced by their environment, and particularly by other people. It should be easy to see why such conceptions might entail a focus on imitation as a crucial mode of learning.

A number of conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion. First of all, in the Chinese conception the mind is conceived of as much more open to outside influence than is assumed in the Western, Cartesian model of the mind. Second, in the Chinese conception the individual mind is much less able to control when and how the environment will have an impact on the contents of the mind. Third, the notion that people are crucially influenced by their surroundings is a central reason why modelling is considered more efficacious, indeed inevitable, in the Chinese than in the Western tradition. Fourth, this gives rise to the somewhat more accentuated boundaries between group insiders and outsiders in Chinese society.

2.5 Wind and water in myth and medicine

The above examination suggests that the Chinese modelling tradition is grounded on a

[160] Sundararajan, 100.
[161] Sundararajan, 42f.

particular conception of the self. It was argued that the "interdependent" self, to some extent characteristic of people from a Chinese cultural background, was associated with both greater normative expectations for individual openness towards the surroundings as well as with a greater perceived need to distinguish group insiders from group outsiders. With inspiration from Charles Taylor, I now turn to examine how these conceptions of the self are interwoven with cultural beliefs and daily-life practices central to the Chinese social imaginary. As Taylor notes, "If the understanding makes the practice possible, it is also true that it is the practice that largely carries the understanding."[162] Relying primarily on recent work in anthropology and history, I will show how threats to bodily health and to the social order have very often been conceptualized in Chinese thought—and mediated in daily-life practice—as gaseous or liquid transgressions of boundaries. I will draw in particular on insights related to myth and medicine, because I think these are some of the most important domains for the interweaving of popular and political fears, beliefs, and aspirations.

Investigating how transactions across the porous boundaries separating people from their surroundings have been conceived of in Chinese tradition, the elements of wind and water stand out as particularly important, and I will focus on these in the following. The centrality of wind and water to Chinese folk beliefs is probably nowhere clearer than in the tradition of *fengshui* (which literally means "wind-water"). According to Ole Bruun, the geomantic practice of *fengshui* "explores possible correlations in the combined psycho-social-material world. It is highly activist in outlook and suggests remedies for all ills and imbalances."[163] *Fengshui* is, in other words, precisely founded upon and devoted to the interconnection between people and their surroundings through all kinds of interaction. Despite its name, however, *fengshui* is in no way limited to conceiving of influence in terms of wind and water: "While a small collection of rules applies to all situations, the feng shui

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[162] Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*, 25.
[163] Ole Bruun, *Fengshui in China: Geomantic Divination between State Orthodoxy and Popular Religion* (Singapore: University of Hawai'i Press, 2003), 257.

master may draw on the entire Chinese cosmology, on popular symbolism and on local lore in his interpretation of the specific situation."[164] This diversity and flexibility of the *fengshui* tradition makes it unreceptive to systematic examination, and I will therefore not pursue this tradition in the present analysis.

Turning to Chinese medicine, we find that wind has been central in etiology. The medical historian Shigehisa Kuriyama has noted that,

> There are few things in the world, the classics of Chinese medicine warn, more dangerous than wind. Winds cause chills and headaches, vomiting and cramps, dizziness and numbness, loss of speech. And that is just the beginning. 'Wounded by wind' (*shangfeng*), one patient burns with fever; 'struck by wind' (*zhongfeng*), another drops suddenly comatose. Winds cause madness. Winds kill. Although we today may not blame it for any illness, Chinese physicians saw wind's ravages in nearly all. 'The hundred diseases,' the *Huangdi neijing* declares, 'arise from wind.'[165]

This, Kuriyama notes, was based on

> a conception of the body in which winds streamed in and out of strategic orifices in the skin, just as winds streamed in and out of the hollows and caverns of the earth. And from this followed their pivotal importance for the body and its afflictions. [...] [The imagination of wind] bespoke an embodied apprehension of an ever shifting self in an ever changing universe. Personal breath could harmonize with cosmic breath, and habitually the two might be reasonably in phase. But the character of all winds, inner or outer, was that they always retained some chaotic contingency.[166]

This anxiety pertaining to wind's ability to penetrate bodily boundaries and thereby cause disease has stretched across a considerable span of time. Paul Unschuld has noted how wind was considered to be involved in demonic possession in pre-imperial China,[167] while

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[164] Ole Bruun, *An Introduction to Feng Shui* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 3.
[165] Shigehisa Kuriyama, "The Imagination of Winds and the Development of the Chinese Conception of the Body," in *Body, Subject, and Power in China*, ed. Angela Zito and Tani E. Barlow (University of Chicago Press, 1994), 23.
[166] Kuriyama, 37f. See also Hsu 2007. The centrality of breathing exercises in the Chinese tradition of health and self-improvement has been absolutely vital, as detailed at length in Nancy N. Chen, *Breathing Spaces: Qigong, Psychiatry, and Healing in China* (Columbia University Press, 2003).
[167] Paul U. Unschuld, "Der Wind Als Ursache Des Krankseins: Einige Gedanken Zu Yamada Keijis Analyse Der Shao-Shih Texte Des Huang-Ti Nei-Ching," *T'oung Pao* 68, no. 1/3 (1982): 91–131.

Elisabeth Hsu notes how "contemporary Chinese doctors speak of one [i.e., a close affinity] between wind and madness. The idiom 疯了 *fengle* 's/he has become windy' means in colloquial language 's/he is mad', and the term 疯病 *fengbing* 'wind-induced disorder' is synonymous with 'mental illness'."[168] The function of wind as a disease-inducing agent remains an active discussion among contemporary practitioners of traditional Chinese medicine.[169] A terrifying instance of the association of wind with danger is provided by Tan Hecheng's account of the killings in Dao County in 1967, an episode referred to by the local inhabitants as "the killing wind."[170]

Chinese literature also provides dramatic invocations of dangerous, boundary-crossing winds. One example is found in one of China's most beloved works of literature when the Patriarch warns Sun Wukong of the third and most fearsome danger Sun will face in his quest to attain enlightenment:

> Yet another five hundred years later, a wind will blow at you. It will not be the north, south, east or west wind, nor will it be a warm, fragrant wind from the northeast; nor will it be the kind of wind that blows among flowers, willows, pine, and bamboo. It will be what is called a 'monster wind'. It will blow through the crown of your head down into your six entrails. It will go through the Cinnabar Field below your navel and penetrate your nine orifices. Your flesh and your bones will be destroyed and your body will disintegrate.[171]

If wind has featured prominently in the Chinese social imaginary as a dangerous boundary-crossing substance, the element of water shows up with great frequency in meditations of danger to the social body. Historian David A. Pietz has noted that flood myths have continually been refashioned for political purposes from the time of the Warring States and

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[168] Elisabeth Hsu, "The Experience of Wind in Early and Medieval Chinese Medicine," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 13 (April 1, 2007): 122, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9655.2007.00400.x.

[169] For a lengthy discussion and guide to contemporary acupuncturists on the relationship between wind and disease, see http://www.itmonline.org/articles/feng/feng.htm.

[170] Tan Hecheng, *The Killing Wind: A Chinese County's Descent Into Madness During the Cultural Revolution* (Oxford University Press, 2016).

[171] Wu Cheng'en, *Journey to the West*, trans. W. J. F. Jenner (1952; repr., Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2003), 35.

into the PRC period: "The sanctioning power of myths, adapted and retold to legitimize political authority, was expressed in a host of water management projects throughout Chinese history. This ethos of 'directing the waters' penetrated all levels of society."[172] A rich genealogy of the importance water has played in Chinese history and thought has recently been provided by Philip Ball, who has charted how there evolved in the course of Chinese history "an intimate connection between hydraulic engineering, governance, moral rectitude, and metaphysical speculation."[173] An examination of how water has figured in the Chinese social imaginary is worthy of several dissertations in itself, so here I will merely draw out a few salient examples of the water-morality-politics relationship.

Some of China's most famed cultural heroes—such as Yu the Great and Qu Yuan, both frequently mentioned in contemporary state-media and school textbooks—are connected to water management, individual sacrifice, morality, and statecraft. This is, however, only the proverbial tip of the iceberg. Lewis has demonstrated how in ancient China flood myths provided the etiology for all the most important features of the ordered society. Of particular salience was how the flood myths provided

> a means of discussing social order and criminality. In these accounts, developed most elaborately in the *Mencius*, the flood served as the classic image for the collapse of all divisions and distinctions. In this context it was particularly identified with the disappearance of the fundamental distinction between men and beasts [...] accounts of taming the flood dealt largely with the expulsion of beasts and reimposition of order through executing archetypal criminals or exiling them to the edges of the earth.[174]

Many versions of these myths contained "the belief that a new regime had to expel the polluting traces of earlier rulers"[175]—claims which, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, were repeated almost verbatim over and over by the leaders who had deposed the Gang of Four

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[172] David Allen Pietz, *The Yellow River: The Problem of Water in Modern China* (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2015), 31.
[173] Philip Ball, *The Water Kingdom: A Secret History of China* (London, England: Penguin, 2017), 70.
[174] Mark Edward Lewis, *The Flood Myths of Early China* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2006), 148.
[175] Lewis, 148.

and depicted themselves as doing battle with the remaining poison (流毒: *liudu*) harming the social body. Nü Gua and Fu Xi, the mythic figures (along with their son, Yu the Great) most often charged with managing dangerous floods in Chinese mythology, were at times placed on doorways to tombs, "thereby establish[ing] the tomb as a distinct realm, and maintain[ing] that realm from the threatened incursions of the watery forces of pollution and chaos. It is furthermore notable that the Chinese underworld was imagined as a realm of water known as the 'Yellow Springs.'"[176] Another common Chinese legend has it that after death one meets up with a woman known as Meng Po (孟婆), an ancient goddess of wind, whose task it is to ensure that all souls drink of her "Tea of Forgetfulness" so that they may be reborn unburdened by memories of their past lives. Having sipped her tea, the soul, now cleansed of memories, is led by Meng Po to a bridge from where the soul dives into the streaming water below and thus returns to the land of the living.[177]

In more recent times, water and other forms of liquid have also frequently appeared in discussions related to physical danger and moral disintegration. In the Republican period, involuntary bodily secretions—associated with inferior morality and a loss of self-control, brought together under the term "spermatorrhea" (遗精: *yijing*)—was considered a serious malady both at the level of individual bodies and at the level of the body politic.[178] It is also worth noting that some of the most popular fiction in the late Qing revolves around issues of controlling dams, rivers, and tears.[179] Link notes that it was widely believed that Zhang

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[176] Lewis, 151.

[177] Oddly enough, neither Mark Lewis nor Philip Ball mention Meng Po, who is well-known in China and frequently figure in TV shows and comic books, but a useful introduction can be found at https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E5%AD%9F%E5%A9%86/172504?fr=aladdin.

[178] Hugh Shapiro, "The Puzzle of Spermatorrhea in Republican China," *Positions* 6, no. 3 (December 21, 1998): 551–95, https://doi.org/10.1215/10679847-6-3-551. According to popular belief at the time, the Guangxu Emperor had lost his life due to spermatorrhea brought on by licentiousness in his youth. A search for "spermatorrhea" on www.baidu.com reveals that a great number of herbs and pills are advertised as cures for spermatorrhea.

[179] A look at the most popular titles, such as *The Sea of Regret* (恨海: *Henhai*), *Stones in the sea* (禽海石: *Qinhai shi*), *Flowers in the sea of regret* (恨海花: *Henhai hua)*, and *Flower on a Sea of Evil* (孽海花: *Niehai hua*) indicates the metaphoric centrality of water in this time of imperial crisis. The

Henshui (张恨水) chose his pen name—which literally means "Hate Water Zhang"—because water was symbolic of the female gender.[180]

In its efforts to legitimate its harsh policies against landlords in the 1950s, the party-state also played on the association of water with danger. A good example of this is provided by the broad dissemination of knowledge about the "water dungeon" where the landlord Liu Wencai supposedly placed recalcitrant tenant farmers:

> Around 1951 she [tenant farmer Leng Yueying] began to tell a story about how, in 1943, she was taken to the Liu manor house with a blindfold and was imprisoned in a water dungeon for owing Liu Bohua five pecks of rent grain, merely three days after she had given birth. Dayi County officials soon seized upon the story and commissioned a minidiorama re-creation of the water dungeon accompanied by live narration in 1954 as part of a larger exhibition to contrast the Old and New Society and to celebrate rural collectivization. In 1958, the year the Landlord Museum was launched, planners filled the basement room adjacent to the prayer chamber with water, installed a replica cage, and simulated bloody smudges on the walls—all according to the diorama model [...] Leng Yueying soon became the most famous peasant woman in China—affectionately known as Mother Leng—and highly sought after in the *yikusitian* (remembering past bitterness and cherishing present sweetness) lecture circuit. According to Xiaoshu's estimate, in the space of two decades, she gave nearly a thousand lectures in front of a total audience a million strong.[181]

As it turned out, however, the water dungeon was pure fabrication, as the authorities admitted in the 1980s.[182]

The movie produced about Lei Feng's life (*Lei Feng*, 1965) is also rich in attention to liquid, such as when Lei Feng carries a peasant's child for miles through a heavy downpour, and when he refuses to buy himself lemonade in order to send his money to flood victims.

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dangers related to water also figure prominently in the best-selling 老残游记 (*Lao Can Youji*: *Travels of Lao Can*), where river management and flood victims are central to the plot, and the main character even dies from drowning at the end of chapter one, even though this turns out to be only a nightmare. For more on these works—though not on why water features so prominently, see Eugene Perry Link, *Mandarin Ducks and Butterflies: Popular Fiction in Early Twentieth-Century Chinese Cities* (Univ of California Press, 1981).

[180] Link 1981, 35.

[181] Lee, *The Stranger and the Chinese Moral Imagination*, 211.

[182] Lee, 201.

Later on in the movie, the other main character, Lei's friend Wang Dali, is called home to help in his waterlogged village, and while Wang arrives shamefaced because he has not sent anything to his mother for a long time, he is given a hero's greeting by his tearful mother, and soon Wang realizes that Lei has sent his mother gifts in Wang's name. This affects a radical change in Wang's character as demonstrated to the audience by his great effort to save parcels, children, and the elderly from the torrential downpour. As noted by K. S. Karol, who watched the movie in China when it was released, the movie's Lei Feng inspires those around him by exemplary deeds, not by debate: Lei Feng "helps the lazy by doing their work while they sleep, which, contrary to what one might believe, does not encourage their laziness. Lei Feng's gesture moves them, awakens their conscience, and does more than long discussions to make them better citizens and more collectivist in outlook."[183] In other words, Lei Feng's power is one of moral example.

Several other of the most highly publicized model workers selected in the PRC also forge interesting connections between liquids, danger, and morality. One of the most famed model workers of all times, Wang Jinxi (王进喜), rose to national prominence when a cement mixer broke down and he—according to countless media accounts—jumped into the liquid cement in order to use his own body to prevent the cement from hardening, *ipso facto* proving just as willing as Yu the Great and Qu Yuan before him to sacrifice his life for the good of the nation. Another famous model worker, Shi Chuanxiang (时传祥), worked as a night-soil collector, incarnating the need for clearing away potentially disease-inducing liquid filth from the city.

Some of China's most powerful leaders appear to have been much preoccupied with the powerful influence of liquids on bodily functions. According to his personal physician, Mao in his later life came to adhere to the Daoist notion that having coitus without

[183] K. S. Karol, *China: The Other Communism,* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1968), 247.

ejaculating was beneficial to improving bodily vigor.[184] Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the CCP from 1966-1971, is reported to have suffered from severe phobias about water, wind, and the cold.[185] The potency of water symbolism has also been reflected in a number of events and projects undertaken by the party-state leadership. These include the multiple swimming trips undertaken—and subsequently widely-publicized—by both Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping to show their vitality and political control. Other symbolic ventures include Deng's promise to lead China across the river by feeling for the stones, as well as the enormously ambitious Three Gorges Dam project, initiated despite strong criticism of the losses of culturally-significant landscapes, not to mention the potentially catastrophic consequences an earthquake in the region might unleash.

[184] Li Zhisui, *The Private Life of Chairman Mao: The Memoirs of Mao's Personal Physician* (New York: Random House, 1994), chap. 3.
[185] Jin Qiu, *The Culture of Power: The Lin Biao Incident in the Cultural Revolution* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999), 145.


人民日报

1966年7月25日

“我们敬爱的领袖毛主席这样健康，这是全中国人民的最大幸福！是全世界革命人民的最大幸福！”

毛主席畅游长江

毛主席在快艇甲板上检阅正在同江水搏斗的游泳大军。

毛主席乘风破浪畅游长江。（彩照）



Illustration 2.3: Deng Xiaoping swimming at Beidaihe in 1989. Photograph from the *People's Daily*, November 11, 1989, p.2. The caption reads: "August, 1989. 85-year old Comrade Deng Xiaoping enters the ocean every day during midsummer, regardless of wind or rain."

The popular writer Wang Meng lampooned the tendency for water regulation to be coupled with political power and morality. In his short story "A winter's topic," the forefathers of the main protagonist, Zhu Shendu, have for generations been embroiled in controversy over how often one should bathe; controversies that have cost the life and reputation of Shendu's grandfather. The family's reputation seems restored, however, when a commentary to the Confucian classic *The Great Learning* is found to suggest that bathing may promote "sincerity of thought, rectification of the mind, cultivation of the person, regulation of the family, good government of the state, and peace throughout the kingdom."[186] Shendu's father, however, provokes renewed disputes by building a bathhouse open to women, but Zhu Shendu manages to redeem his family name by writing a seven-volume opus titled *Introduction to Bathing*, which includes chapters on "'Bathing and Mental Hygiene,' 'Bathing and Puberty,'

[186] Wang Meng, *The Stubborn Porridge and Other Stories* (New York: George Braziller, 1994), 68. I have slightly amended the translation.

'Bathing and the Hygiene of Menopause,' 'Bathing and the Family,' 'Bathing and the Nation,' 'Bathing for Workers and Miners,' 'Bathing in Wartime,'" just to mention a few.[187] From there, however, Zhu becomes embroiled in an acrimonious debate over whether one should bathe in the morning or the evening; a debate that rages throughout the rest of story and for a while seems to be the undoing of the protagonist. As someone who had spent many years in a thought reform labor camp for his writings and would come to serve as China's Minister of Culture 1986-1989, Wang Meng must be considered a perceptive observer of the intermingling of political power with cultural symbolism in modern China.

Water imagery also figured prominently in the six-part documentary *River Elegy* (河殇: *Heshang*, 1988) produced by CCTV and broadcast twice in the summer and fall of 1988, unleashing enormous discussion due to its strong calls for deepening political and economic reform as well as for its severe criticism of traditional Chinese culture. As the voice-over puts it,

> The Yellow River has given all it could to our ancestors. It cannot give birth again to the civilization created by our ancestors. We must create a brand-new civilization, one which cannot flow from the Yellow River. The dregs of the old civilization, like the silt in the Yellow River, have built up in our nation's blood vessels. It needs a good scrubbing by a great flood! This flood has come. It is industrial civilization.[188]

The importance for health attributed to liquid regulation by the general public is also palpable in Chinese hospitals and dental clinics where intravenous infusions—often containing only salts and other minerals—are administered much more often than they are in Western clinics. In contemporary popular culture, one very often encounters claims about the determining effects of blood type on individual personality. A fuller account of the importance attributed to liquids would, of course, also examine the rich popular lore and religious traditions that have developed around tea drinking in China. In a fascinating recent account, James A. Benn claims that the psychoactive and physiological effects on the body

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[187] Wang Meng, 69.
[188] Su Xiaokang and Wang Luxiang, "River Elegy" (Beijing: Zhongyang dianshitai, 1988).

and mind of tea drinking were interpreted in religious as well as medical terms by poets and compilers of *materia medica*, providing yet another example of how the perceived influence of liquid upon the body has been so important to Chinese history.[189] Some of China's most beloved poetry, not least that of Li Bai who is commonly referred to as "The immortal of wine," also focuses much attention on the transformative effects of consuming powerful liquids.

Finally, it is worth noting that the element of water appears frequently as a constituent part, a so-called "radical" (氵), in Chinese written characters. According to Hodge and Louie, a cultural logic unites the many characters with the water radical, in effect establishing associations between licentiousness, vastness (often vastness to excess), purity, and the female gender. They further argue that it has been overlooked how "The laborious induction into the system of characters [...] inserts a dominant ideology, of both class and gender, into the very form of the language, which is then repeated endlessly in everything that is written or read."[190] The Chinese writing system is, they argue, an incredibly inefficient technology, but it serves to perpetuate a political and cultural conservatism, at least among the elite stratum of society, because "The process of learning Chinese characters is in part a process of committing to memory cultural values—about power relationships, categorisations and social norms."[191] While I do not believe that human sociality can ever be reduced to a causal relationship between a writing system on the one hand, and the complex and dynamic systems of politics and ideology on the other, I do believe that deeply-ingrained aspects of a language—such as the associations charted by Hodge and Louie—can be catalytic of certain dispositions through subliminal affective coloring.

Overall, the fact that Chinese notions of bodily health and social order vest so much

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[189] James A. Benn, *Tea in China: A Religious and Cultural History* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2016), 200.
[190] Bob Hodge and Kam Louie, *The Politics of Chinese Language and Culture the Art of Reading Dragons* (London: Routledge, 1998), 57f.
[191] Hodge and Louie, 62.

importance in controlling liquid and gaseous flows across boundaries is indicative, I believe, of the porous personhood model I have outlined.

2.6 Physical boundaries and their moral aspects

When group-dynamics, myths, and medicine all emphasize the importance of controlling the boundaries both between bodies and their surroundings, and between group-insiders and group-outsiders, it is not surprising to find the same needs expressed in China's architectural tradition. On the basis of his thorough investigation of China's architectural history, David Bray notes that from pre-imperial times and until the end of the Qing Dynasty, Chinese building practices along with architectural treatises have consistently placed great emphasis on demarcating inner from outer space; evidenced not least in the great emphasis on city-walls and courtyard houses. Bray traces this tradition to religious-political origins: "In reproducing the sacred order of the cosmos, the spatial forms of the traditional city and the traditional house imbue the everyday physical environment with religious and philosophical significance. [...] Spatial arrangements, then, provide a cosmological grid that underpins and orders the ritual practices of day-to-day social and religious interaction."[192] The remarkable uniformity and longevity of these building practices—and not least their emphasis on wall-building—Bray sees as expressive of the strong desire to order social space manifest in Confucian tradition.[193]

Bray notes striking similarities between the urban environment envisioned and constructed by the CCP and that of the millennia-long tradition, exemplified not least in the *danwei* and its often symmetrical, and always walled, design. In this, however, Bray sees only similarity, not cultural continuity. Instead, Bray claims that the choice of the walled compound as a dominant architectural form in the PRC arose out of the party-state's conscious attempt to foster what he refers to as "collective subjectivity." What Bray posits,

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[192] Bray, *Social Space and Governance in Urban China*, 21.
[193] Bray, 27f.

then, is that the surface-similarity of the building practices—i.e., the modern and the pre-modern proclivity towards creating enclosed space—should not blind us to the fact that there are two very distinct rationalities at play before and after 1949. According to Bray, where the early period was controlled by religious and Confucian norms, the recent period has been controlled by the ruling elite's conscious aim to produce collective subjectivity to fit the political ideology and, ultimately, make it possible to impose a governmental regime founded upon shaping the conduct of conduct.

In my opinion, Bray's eagerness to view CCP rule as exemplifying a Foucauldian logic causes him to exaggerate the ruptural character of the PRC's establishment. His own account of the centrality of walls and walled compounds in the built environment before and after 1949 indicates that the symmetrical, enclosed structure—courtyard house as well as *danwei*—satisfies certain cultural predispositions for close-knit communities. I do not dispute that the CCP sought to foster collective subjectivity, but I think that the strong impetus towards this goal—as well as the popular acceptance of this model of social organization implied by the degree of control this enabled the CCP to wield over urban China—show that CCP policies were in this regard to an important degree in accordance with a widely-shared cultural common sense. Indeed, I would argue that the willingness of a ruling elite to incorporate such cultural common sense into its policies is vital to making rule by other means than violence possible at all. Therefore, I argue that the focus on demarcating inner from outer space in China's architectural tradition derives to some extent from the envisioned porosity of personhood outlined above. To take a page from Clifford Geertz, one might say that in order for something to be a "model for" (in this case the built environment) it needs to some extent also to be a "model of" (in this case notions of bodily porosity).

Another interesting aspect of wall-building in China—one that resonates with the topic of porous personhood but is never explored by Bray—is the emotional investment in walls apparent in Chinese myth and cultural products, as described in great detail by Carlos

Rojas.[194] One of the best known myths relating to walls in China is that of Meng Jiang whose husband, Fan Liang, was conscripted by the Qin emperor to help erect the Great Wall. In the end, Fan Liang dies and Meng Jiang travels to the Great Wall where her wails bring down a section of the wall, exposing countless bones inside the wall, whereupon Meng Jiang uses her own blood to identify the bones of her husband so that he may receive a proper burial.[195] As is readily apparent, this myth invests great emotionality in the wall, and its multiple retellings over the centuries all rehearse elements of wall-building, suffering, sacrifice, and the power of liquids in the shape of tears and blood to tear down walls and establish kinship.

In short, I argue that the strong architectural proclivity towards establishing enclosed space so clearly demonstrated by Bray—including up through the 20th century and even the 21st century's proliferation of gated communities—is premised to some degree on the felt need for establishing boundaries to protect the porous self.

2.7 Norms related to hierarchy and modelling

Finally, what is perhaps most obvious is that modelling as a technique of popular education rests on a hierarchical view of social relationships. This is another area where the Chinese and the American social imaginaries tend to differ. By contrasting Chinese and American attitudes towards legitimate structures of authority, Munro notes that when many contemporary Americans react with intuitive aversion to the intimate link between the public and the private domains, which seems less abhorrent to most people brought up in the Chinese tradition, this is based on differing conceptions of human autonomy and legitimate authority. Consequently, where Americans generally assume that a private individual is always the best judge of his or her own best interest, the strong emphasis on education and morality in China, and not least the intimate link perceived to exist between

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[194] Carlos Rojas, *The Great Wall: A Cultural History* (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 2011).
[195] This myth exists in multiple versions. See Rojas, 81ff. for a discussion of these various versions.

the two, have meant that the Chinese state's attempts to regulate the behavior and norms of its citizens have been perceived as more legitimate than has been the case in American society.[196] Munro does not claim that these are never-changing essences of Chinese and American traditions, but rather that these theories and values continue to "lurk in the background" from where they continue to wield a certain influence across many areas of social life and governmental reasoning.[197]

The most extensive empirical investigation of the norms held by people with a Chinese cultural background has been conducted by Tianjian Shi.[198] Where Shi's methods and queries come from the social sciences—and in particular from quantitative survey analysis—he arrives at conclusions supporting the conjectures of Munro. As such, though they never quote each other's work, I argue that their conclusions illuminate each other. According to Shi, in order to understand the relationship between the Chinese state and China's citizens we must understand that Chinese popular political norms are different from the popular political norms prevailing in the US. Shi's analysis reveals that the political norms of Americans and Chinese differ primarily in two dimensions, with the Chinese having a more hierarchical orientation towards authority—what Shi terms a hierarchical OTA—and relying on a more collective definition of self-interest—what Shi terms a collective DSI. Where Shi's surveys were collected in the 1990s and 2000s, I will present evidence—primarily in Chapter 6—that a hierarchical OTA was conspicuous in the *People's Daily* in the early years of reform, which further indicates why the dissemination of model worker narratives may have been less grating on Chinese ears than Westerners oftentimes assume. This, as I will return to in the Conclusion, has implications for our understanding of Chinese media regulations.

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[196] Munro, *The Concept of Man in Contemporary China*, 178.
[197] Munro, 177f.
[198] Tianjian Shi, *The Cultural Logic of Politics in Mainland China and Taiwan* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

2.8 In summary

Based on the above examination of insights about modeling and personhood from psychology, anthropology, religion, architecture, and cultural studies, I have attempted to delineate the aspects of Chinese culture which I see as the primary ones for understanding why the selection and propagation of knowledge about models for popular imitation has been such a perspicuous and durable feature of Chinese state-craft and pedagogy. Where Bakken has documented the pervasive existence of exemplary models across time and space in China, Munro added the insight that this pervasiveness might be based to a significant extent on Chinese conceptions of how the mind works. Later scholars, primarily psychologists, have confirmed several of Munro's conjectures and have found through both observation and experiment that contemporary Chinese conceptions of personhood consider the mind to be more open towards the surrounding environment than is found in the dominant Western conceptions of the mind. This openness, in turn, drives a stronger inclination towards distinguishing between group insiders and outsiders in China compared to what is typical in Europe and the US.

It has also been demonstrated that important parts of Chinese culture and daily-life practices, not least in popular religious observance but also in practices relating to health and medicine, the physical body is conceived of as being engaged in constant and unavoidable transaction with the environment. Concrete practices as well as medical treatises focus on the potential danger associated with substances, such as wind and water, which are able to transverse boundaries, physical as well as cosmological. In other words, the claim is that role models are, in the Chinese social imaginary, able to influence those with whom they come into contact because it is assumed in the dominant Chinese conception of personhood that influence often takes place imperceptibly and irrespective of personal intent.

My central claim in this chapter, then, is that my mapping of particular facets of the Chinese conception of personhood provides a step forward in our attempts to understand

why Chinese philosophers, rulers, and others grappling with how interpersonal influence occurs have found models so compelling. As Markus and Kitayama noted, where the Western conception of the self creates normative pressures on the individual to locate inner justifications for her or his actions, the Chinese view of the self puts greater emphasis on exhibiting loyalty towards the group. In the Chinese context, therefore, models may be quite reasonably assumed to be more efficacious when it comes to influencing personal thought and conduct; indeed, normative pressures may even mean that models *are* more efficacious in such a context. Though I will have to leave this last conjecture as an interesting possibility and not something I will in any way attempt to substantiate.

Chapter 3: Methodology

In this chapter, I will first show how the work of Quentin Skinner provides a good way of understanding how the CPD has attempted to frame public debate so as to reconcile changing policies with ideological legacies and normative expectations. Then I will lay out the primary focus points of the CPD in order to sharpen the analysis. Third, I will account for my selection of empirical source material. And finally, based on the above, I will provide an account of my analytical approach and explain how close reading can be fruitfully combined with quantitative analysis of my sources.

3.1 Quentin Skinner and the political use of language

The major part of the historical and methodological scholarship of Quentin Skinner revolves around the question of how people frame their arguments so as to best convince other people. Or, put differently, how anyone wishing to have an effect upon public opinion—"ideological innovators," as Skinner dubs them—must necessarily situate their arguments in relation to norms, morality, ideology, the social environment, the political past, and the contemporary configuration of power relations. In constructing an understanding of how and why these factors must be included in any political and rhetorical analysis, Skinner takes his inspiration from Friedrich Nietzsche, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and John Searle, among others, who changed the study of language from examining *meaning* to examining *use*. Noting that any statement may be conceived as a kind of action, Skinner criticizes hardcore realists and Marxists for viewing political debate and public sentiment as trivial surface phenomena. Skinner instead insists that political debate and argumentation is not external to the political process: "[P]olitical thinking," Skinner notes, "is not an activity that stands apart from politics but is part of politics itself."[199] Skinner holds that historians as well as political

[199] "Interview with Professor Quentin Skinner," School of Advanced Study, University of London, 2008, http://www.history.ac.uk/makinghistory/resources/interviews/Skinner_Quentin.html.

scientists tend to overlook the fact that all agents, regardless of what spurs them on, are motivated to win support for their claims:

> [P]eople generally possess strong motives for seeking to legitimize any conduct liable to appear questionable. One implication is that they will generally find it necessary to claim that their actions were in fact motivated by some accepted principle. A further implication is that, even if they were not motivated by any such principle, they will find themselves committed to behaving in such a way that their actions *remain compatible* with the claim that their professed principles genuinely motivated them. To recognize these implications is to accept that the courses of action open to such agents will in part be determined by the range of existing principles they can hope to profess with some degree of plausibility.[200]

This shift of emphasis—from studying motives to studying concrete rhetorical intervention—is supremely useful for analyzing the products of the Chinese propaganda apparatus. While it can be difficult to gauge the exact intentions of the Chinese leadership when they set about trying to renegotiate the inheritance from Mao—such intentions were, moreover, neither uniform among the leadership nor were they immutable in the face of social events, political power shifts, and sensible arguments—what we are able to observe is what viewpoints were fielded in the public sphere, how, based on which arguments, and with what degree of tenacity.

As many have noted, modern Chinese political discourse is very much—perhaps even more so than political discourse in most other societies—shot through with suppositions relating to morality,[201] and attention to how those who wish to influence public discourse always face normative constraints are precisely at the heart of Skinner's work. In Skinner's words,

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Accessed March 3, 2016.

[200] Quentin Skinner, "Moral Principles and Social Change," in *Visions of Politics*, vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 155.

[201] Lucian W. Pye, "Communications and Chinese Political Culture," *Asian Survey* 18, no. 3 (1978): 221–46, https://doi.org/10.2307/2643217; Patricia M. Thornton, *Disciplining the State: Virtue, Violence, and State-Making in Modern China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007); Perry Link, *An Anatomy of Chinese Rhythm, Metaphor, Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013); Link, *Evening Chats in Beijing*.

> [T]he vocabulary in terms of which we can hope to legitimise what we are doing will always, and necessarily, be a socially established one. This being so, the capacity to get what we want while legitimising what we are doing will generally depend on our ability to bring what we are doing under some broadly accepted normative description. But this in turn means that we are constrained to tailor our projects in such a way as to fit prevailing moral vocabularies that can plausibly be invoked to describe them.[202]

Another reason why Skinner's work—focused on textual analysis as it is—can be so fruitfully applied to analyze the products of the Chinese propaganda apparatus is that texts and linguistic circumspection have been considered of vital importance by the CCP throughout its existence.[203] Skinner repeatedly underscores that the historian should not analyze texts to uncover their everlasting meaning, but should rather treat texts "as interventions, as contributions to some preexisting conversation or debate. [Therefore], the act of interpretation principally consists in trying to identify the nature of the intervention that some given text may be said to constitute."[204] In other words, a concrete newspaper article discussing the merits of, say, socialism may, at least for our present purposes, be more profitably analyzed as partaking in a contemporary debate about social justice and leadership legitimacy, rather than as a refinement of the meaning of that particular term in a global debate. The unwavering dedication of the Chinese propaganda apparatus to influence public discourse by patrolling the limits of permissible discourse is testimony to the fact that they share Skinner's view of texts as powerful weapons in debates that are very much of contemporary and local relevance.

3.2 Controlling language

The CCP's propaganda approach has been particularly focused on the jealous control of

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[202] Raia Prokhovnik, "An Interview with Quentin Skinner," *Contemporary Political Theory* 10, no. 2 (May 1, 2011): 276.
[203] Hans J. Van de Ven, "The Emergence of the Text-Centered Party," *New Perspectives in the Chinese Communist Revolution*, 1995, 5–32.
[204] Quentin Skinner and Christopher Ricks, "Up for Interpretation or What Is This Thing That Hearsay Is Not?," *Literary Imagination* 14, no. 2 (July 1, 2012): 125, https://doi.org/10.1093/litimag/ims039.

language use. Many scholars and commentators have over the years noticed that both the correct use of language as well as printed materials play a particularly prominent role in Chinese culture: From Derk Bodde, who suggested that China has a "cult of books," to Hans Van de Ven, who argued that the CCP is a text-centered party, to Perry Link, who claims that "[f]rom early times, Chinese culture has taken language, literature, history, morality, governance, and cosmology to be shades on a spectrum and not easily separable."[205] The choice of particular groups or individuals as models is, of course, very much a case of naming. As Anagnost notes:

> The power to name, in this instance, is the power to discriminate between those who fulfill the requirements of the model and those who do not; and it is a power that the party reserves for itself, as a 'universal' and 'transcendent' authority." [...] [This exercise of power] appears to be continuous with certain practices of the imperial state. Indeed, one is tempted to invoke the notion of the 'rectification of names' as something eternal to any construction of power that is quintessentially 'Chinese.'[206]

The manipulation of language was, as Ji Fengyuan has demonstrated, absolutely crucial to the CCP leadership's efforts to "carry the revolution into people's souls and bring about a genuine socialist transformation."[207] Ji notes that the instruments to radically alter the minds of the Chinese populace "included the conventional ones of social engineering, censorship, and propaganda. However, his [Mao's] most precise instrument of ideological transformation was a massive, prolonged, and intensive program of linguistic engineering—a program that required people to recite, day after day, formulae that encoded the sentiments of model

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[205] Derk Bodde, *China's First Unifier: A Study of the Ch'in Dynasty as Seen in the Life of Li Ssŭ (280?-208 B.C.)* (E. J. Brill, 1938), 164; Van de Ven, "The Emergence of the Text-Centered Party." Perry Link, review of *Chinese Reportage: The Aesthetics of Historical Experience*, by Charles A. Laughlin, *The China Quarterly*, no. 179 (2004): 845. For an account of the CCP's focus on controlling the use of terms in more recent years, see Maurizio Marinelli, "Disembodied Words: The Ritualistic Quality of Political Discourse in the Era of Jiang Zemin," in *Discourse, Politics and Media in Contemporary China*, ed. Qing Cao, Hailong Tian, and Paul Chilton (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2014), 25–42.

[206] Ann Anagnost, "The Politicized Body," in *Body, Subject, and Power in China*, ed. Angela Zito and Tani E. Barlow (University of Chicago Press, 1994), 135.

[207] Ji Fengyuan, "Language, State and Society in Post-Mao China: Continuity and Change," in *Legacies of Totalitarian Language in the Discourse Culture of the Post-Totalitarian Era: The Case of Eastern Europe, Russia, and China*, ed. Ernest Andrews (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2011), 183.

revolutionaries."[208] According to Ji, the CCP was able to powerfully influence most people's political attitudes and moral beliefs by inculcating orthodox linguistic habits through repeated study and criticism sessions.[209]

One of the scholars who have done the most to elucidate the CCP's strong focus on controlling language as a way of guiding thought is Michael Schoenhals. When it comes to controlling the language used in the media, Schoenhals points out, this is done by routinely issuing lists enumerating which terms, *tifa* (提法), can and cannot be used in the media in relations to particular topics. As one of his examples, Schoenhals notes that the CCP, on June 19, 1980, proscribed the term "capitalist roader"—which had been used with high frequency in 1976 to denigrate, *i.a.*, Deng Xiaoping—with the explanation that the term was "unscientific."[210] Using this term to refer to those who, like Deng Xiaoping, wished to import practices such as freely-floating prices to better allocate capital in order to improve productivity, thus became not only unjust, it became patently and objectively wrong. Since science had revealed that "capitalist roaders" did and could not exist, this very potent accusation was rendered nugatory, at least as far as public debate was concerned. Based on a great number of observations, Schoenhals claims that, while political ideology has played an important role in Chinese political culture after 1949, Party circulars have been even more important as shapers of political discourse.[211] As Kluver has pointed out, this officially decreed linguistic uniformity serves to hide personal political disagreements from public view: "It is difficult to be seen as somehow 'different' from other political figures when a common political language is used."[212] In terms of the current project, the technique of issuing *tifa* and thus homogenizing debate at the level of the terms employed in newspapers

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[208] Ji Fengyuan, 183.
[209] Ji Fengyuan, 184ff.
[210] Michael Schoenhals, *Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics: Five Studies* (Berkeley: Center for Chinese Studies, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1992), 40.
[211] Schoenhals, 51.
[212] Alan R. Kluver, *Legitimating the Chinese Economic Reforms: A Rhetoric of Myth and Orthodoxy* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), 129f.

makes quantitative analysis a particularly powerful tool. Due to the use of *tifa*, quantitative analysis also makes it easy to track when particular terms are proscribed and when they are strongly encouraged, and this may then be measured against the fates of other terms.

Perry Link, a prominent scholar of contemporary Chinese language and culture, also argues that linguistic engineering has remained a highly effective means of influencing the thoughts of most Chinese citizens:

> I was recently talking with a Chinese-language teacher whom I had not seen since 1989 in Beijing. Trying to recall our first meeting, she asked me, 'Was that before or after the *dongluan* [turmoil]?' Teasing her, I asked, 'What do you mean by *dongluan*? Student *dongluan* or government *dongluan*?' She replied reflexively: 'Student *dongluan*, of course.' Then she peered at me for a moment, realized what I had meant, and said: 'Oh, yes! Government *dongluan*. The massacre!' Then she went into a long apology to me: she herself had been a student protestor in 1989, had been in Tiananmen Square in the days before the massacre (but not during it); she was on the students' side; she agreed with me. And yet the phrase 'student turmoil' now rolled off her tongue as easily as 'Wednesday.'[213]

It is, of course, all but impossible to establish to what extent the party-state has been able to manipulate the thoughts and acts of the Chinese population through the manipulation of language—what we can say with certainty, however, is that the Chinese propaganda apparatus subscribes to a strong version of the claim that language powerfully affects what we can and do think. That this is so is in itself noteworthy and makes the study of this topic highly interesting.

3.3 Connecting personal experiences with political issues through tales of morality and emotion

A related means of attempting to guide thought has been the attempt by the Party to present people with highly-emotional prototypes for how to make sense of their own experiences.

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[213] Perry Link, "Politics and the Chinese Language," ChinaFile, December 24, 2012, http://www.chinafile.com/politics-and-chinese-language. Accessed August 18, 2016.

This has been a recurring feature of political campaign activity in the PRC.[214] One of the most successful of these campaigns—if measured by the number of people mobilized and the momentousness of the results—was land reform in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Several scholars have demonstrated how difficult it was for the Party to convince peasants to conceive of landlords as the fountainhead of their grievances.[215] The immediate solution was inculcation of class consciousness which peasants were taught to imbibe by participation in thoroughly stage-managed struggle sessions centered around peasants—preferably women as they were found to be better at expressing their emotions and had the greatest effects on the crowds—"speaking bitterness," i.e., recalling previous miseries and then, guided along by CCP cadres, attributing these miseries to exploitation by a local landlord. Guo Wu amply establishes that this and related techniques were absolutely crucial to engendering the kind of animosity needed to execute the landed elite *en masse*. That this was very much a calculated strategy on the part of the CCP is illustrated with remarkable clarity by a 1952 dictionary defining "speaking bitterness" (诉苦: *suku*) as "articulating one's history of being oppressed and exploited by class enemies and thus stimulating others' class hatred, and in the meantime consolidating one's own class standpoint."[216] In short, by proffering particular ways of connecting personal experiences with political issues through a moral idiom the party-state was able to create subject positions so attractive that a great number of individuals found appropriate the narrative and roles offered to them. Even if these subject

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[214] Liu Yu, "Maoist Discourse and the Mobilization of Emotions in Revolutionary China," *Modern China* 36, no. 3 (January 5, 2010): 329–62, https://doi.org/10.1177/0097700409360015.
[215] Guo Wu, "Speaking Bitterness: Political Education in Land Reform and Military Training under the CCP, 1947–1951," *The Chinese Historical Review* 21, no. 1 (2014): 3–23; Guo Wu, "The Social Construction and Deconstruction of Evil Landlords in Contemporary Chinese Fiction, Art, and Collective Memory," *Modern Chinese Literature and Culture* 25, no. 1 (2013): 131–64; Li Fangchun, "Making Revolution on the Mind: Fanxin and the Exercise of Thought-Power in the Land Reform Movement of Northern China (1946–48)," *Frontiers of Literary Studies in China* 6, no. 4 (2012): 598–620; Elizabeth J. Perry, "Moving the Masses: Emotion Work in the Chinese Revolution," *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 7, no. 2 (2002): 111–128.
[216] Guo Wu, "Speaking Bitterness," 3. Perry places the use of emotion to guide thought and behavior in a long-lived tradition in China for using theater as a means of educating the people. Perry, "Moving the Masses."

positions were never created *ex nihilo*, and were crucially inflected by local historical circumstances, by the personalities and relationships of the individuals involved, and by the internal dynamic of the process as it unfolded locally, it must be said that the party-state's efforts to mobilize through emotion and morality were remarkably successful in persuading individuals to partake in the land reform campaign which utterly transformed the Chinese countryside.

Michael Dutton has also noted that emotions have played a particular role in China's governance. According to Dutton, the party-state's aptitude for channeling popular indignation into mass-line organizations, which then function as integral parts of the security forces in times of mass campaigns, was absolutely crucial to—and a quite unusual aspect of—the functioning of the state during Mao's time at the helm.[217] The Chinese campaign strategy of governance recognized no need for technological or legal stability and instead relied upon mobilizing popular indignation around the friend/enemy distinction, rendering superfluous any distinction between state and civil society. According to Dutton, this form of politicization also played a central role in how the Chinese *danwei* came to structure urban life into delimited communities where political participation and production became intertwined with affective bonds. When this strategy of governance became so pervasive, Dutton points out, it was because the drawing of distinctions between "the enemy" and "us" was an exceptionally strong preoccupation of the CCP, which had, after all, come to power through a bloody civil war.[218] Dutton points out that policy formulation in the first several decades of the PRC's existence took shape under the shadow of the threat of a Cold War that was much warmer in that part of the world than it was in Europe or America, and that this constant threat gave rise to a distinct mentality of government, where the weak state

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[217] Michael Dutton, "Passionately Governmental. Maoism and the Structured Intensities of Revolutionary Governmentality," in *China's Governmentalities: Governing Change, Changing Government*, ed. Elaine Jeffreys (London, England: Routledge, 2009), 33f.

[218] As Dutton points out, "On the first line of the first page of the first volume of *The Selected Works of Mao Zedong* the following statement appears: 'Who are our enemies, who are our friends? That is the question germane to the revolution' (Mao Tse-tung 1975)." Dutton, 24.

apparatus was forced to integrate—and indeed had only survived on the basis of—popular participation. On this basis, the early 1950s were absolutely crucial for the formation of governance in China: "The campaign to suppress counter-revolutionaries signaled the beginnings of a new tactic of socialist governance as military style campaigning was mimicked and redeployed in the realm of politics. This style of campaigning would end up touching and profoundly altering virtually every facet of Chinese social life, producing a set of institutions and styles of work that would eventually come to be closely associated with Maoist politics."[219] Where Guo Wu presents an intriguing case of how the party-state attempted to use emotions and role models as a tool to carry out land reform, Dutton offers a reasonable explanation for why this form of governance—mass line mobilization through emotional appeals—remained a strong feature of governance in China at least until the end of the Cultural Revolution.

While the importance of emotions for political and social change has become increasingly clear over the past two decades, David Ost has pointed out that in political science emotions are still conceived of as something that is only of importance for those at the margins of society. Countering this implicit presupposition, Ost claims that emotions—and particularly anger—is a key emotion to master for a society's rulers, whose success hinges on their ability to persuade people to accept who their enemies are. "Anger, then, [...] is not something that only occasionally bursts onto the political scene, transforming agendas and shifting alliances in its wake. It is central to 'normal' politics as well."[220] "Far from choosing from a random potpourri of emotions, elite parties first of all need to organize anger."[221] Few eras have provided as rich object lessons of Ost's claim as the first three decades of PRC history. In this dissertation, I will examine how the party-state negotiated this tradition in relationships to the model worker and the popular legitimation of reform

[219] Dutton, 30.
[220] David Ost, "Politics as the Mobilization of Anger. Emotions in Movements and in Power," *European Journal of Social Theory* 7, no. 2 (2004): 230.
[221] Ost, 238.

policies.

In the study of media and public opinion, attention to emotion as a serious object of study is also relatively recent. Eugenia Lean argues convincingly that we need to downgrade the Habermasian notion of the public sphere as the playground for disembodied rationality and instead come to realize that we cannot disregard emotions if we truly wish to understand the dynamics of public debate. I agree with Lean who argues that Habermasian notions of a true public sphere as constituted by enlightened, rational individuals fighting for their economic interests and their political freedom against an authoritarian state remains strong among scholars studying the Chinese mediasphere.[222] Lean notes that the Nationalist government pardoned the unrepentant murderess Shi Jianqiao because there was a strong public sentiment that her actions had been in accordance with the precepts of filial piety. By doing so, the Nationalist government in effect claimed to serve a higher morality than that contained in the law books, and by pardoning Shi Jianqiao—and thus place emotion and norms above the statutes—the government was able to rally public support behind itself. As should be obvious from the description of land reform offered by Guo Wu above, the CCP also made use of the strategy of appealing to a higher morality and proclaiming itself to be the defender thereof—which was, of course, a most useful strategy for a revolutionary party who did not trust the established legal system. By connecting concepts related to morality and past suffering with the scientific-historical sureties of Marxism, the PRC party-state managed to create a template for political action so strong that it lasted for thirty years and, I will argue, continue to do so up until present time, though in much attenuated form.

3.4 Empirical analysis

3.4.1 Selecting a source

In seeking to analyze how the CCP has administered its legacy of using the figure of the

[222] Eugenia Lean, *Public Passions: The Trial of Shi Jianqiao and the Rise of Popular Sympathy in Republican China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 8.

model worker to publicly discuss some of the most pertinent issues of the day, this project relies on the *People's Daily* as its prime source material. Since its founding in 1946 and up until today, institutional "ownership" of the *People's Daily* has rested with the highest Party leadership, and ordinary Chinese and international scholars alike continue to consider the newspaper to be the mouthpiece (or the 喉舌: *houshe*, the "throat and tongue") of China's national leadership.[223] As one of its most famous journalists, Liu Binyan, once noted—after being dismissed from the paper and purged from the CCP—"People regard every article, every sentence in this paper as the voice of the Party. The position of a particular article on its pages, the kind of type used for its title, the order in which Party leaders are announced on its pages, and the number of times their names appear are all signals of the variable political climate."[224] In the history of the PRC, newspapers have provided the Chinese citizenry with clues about imminent political shifts, and this could be critical in a country where, as a popular saw had it, "You may not want to pay attention to politics, but politics will pay attention to you."[225] Such political shifts could, e.g., be indicated by the sudden emergence of inverted commas in the *People's Daily*, as in 1980 when changing political attitudes found material expression in a decree renaming the Cultural Revolution 'the Cultural Revolution.'[226]

3.4.2 Selecting a time period

As for time period, this project examines the period after the death of Mao in 1976 up until 1992. The starting date is chosen because the year 1976 was a truly earth-shattering one in Chinese history, and because, as is clear in hindsight, the leadership soon crystallizing

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[223] Daniela Stockmann, "Race to the Bottom: Media Marketization and Increasing Negativity toward the United States in China," *Political Communication* 28, no. 3 (2011): 273.
[224] Binyan Liu, *A Higher Kind of Loyalty: A Memoir by China's Foremost Journalist* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990), 155.
[225] Nathan, *Chinese Democracy*, 170.
[226] Link, *An Anatomy of Chinese Rhythm, Metaphor, Politics*, 269.

around Deng Xiaoping would shift China onto what was in many respects a new trajectory. As for the other bookend, 1992 has been selected as the historical endpoint for the analysis for a number of good reasons, as I will argue below.

The period 1977-1992 was in many respects tremendously challenging for the political leadership, who had to contend with widespread disaffection—in regards of policy as well as ideology—and with a populace torn by tensions that might easily flare up. The period was also a particularly interesting period because the disagreements in the party-state elite about the future of China were acute and unsettled. While the party-state leadership broadly agreed that reform was necessary, there was significant disagreement on what reform ought to entail. The democratic experiments around 1980 had many proponents in the party-state elite, while the planned economy had both strong proponents and detractors. These elite disagreements would—in a period of increasing media openness—come to be at least more visible than they had been in the past, with serious repercussions for state-society relations in the latter part of the decade.

For other reasons as well, these were years of unusual uncertainty. The demise in 1976 of not only Mao, but also of Zhou Enlai and Zhu De—followed in short succession by the arrest of the "Gang of Four"—utterly changed the political landscape. Who could possibly replace Mao at the helm of the nation? And where was China's place in the world? Would the new ally—that den of capitalism and imperialism which the US had been made out to be in domestic discourse—prove trustworthy, not to mention committed to standing by China if relations with the Soviet Union continued to deteriorate? Add to this the influx of foreign products, images, people, and ways of thought which gradually gathered pace from the late 1970s, and the sureties of the past seemed to provide only very weak guidance for the road ahead.

After this "long decade" of the 1980s, China was by 1992 in many ways set upon the trajectory which has brought it to today when Deng, on his so-called "Southern tour," managed to muster and unify strong support for his reformist agenda among the most

powerful provincial leaders.[227] Since then, China has at no point made major policy changes, economically or politically, which were not prepared by expert analysts, tested and evaluated at smaller scales, directed by professional administrators, and if not altered then at least framed or kept secret as recommended by opinion specialists. Not even the unprecedented numbers of layoffs of SOE workers between 1995 and 2003 came anywhere close to provoking protests on a scale sufficient to shake the resolve of the party-state leadership. In all, after 1992 China has not experienced the kind of tension, protest, non-regularized power transfer, and outright violence which shook the country repeatedly up through the 20th century. For these reasons I argue that the period 1977-1992 was a pivotal one in China's modern history, and it is therefore this period I will analyze.

3.4.3 Does it matter what the *People's Daily* writes?

Some may question whether it matters what is printed in the *People's Daily*. Is not the party-state so strong that it can dispense with public opinion all together? And why should the paper feel compelled to tackle anything of true importance? I argue, on the contrary, that it is still of great importance what is printed in the *People's Daily*. Even if many readers of the *People's Daily* may not believe that the paper furnishes the complete and unvarnished truth about all matters, the *People's Daily* nevertheless remains a crucial source for information about how the party-state wishes to influence public opinion and the social imaginary. Susan Shirk has noted that China's political elite, rather than feeling no need to consider public opinion, in fact fears public opinion far more than democratic leaders because "the price of political defeat to China's leaders could be crushing. Political defeat could cost them and

[227] Michel Oksenberg, "Deng Xiaoping's Nanxun in Perspective," in *The Nanxun Legacy and China's Development in the Post-Deng Era*, ed. John Wong and Yongnian Zheng (World Scientific, 2001), 19–31; Ezra F Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), chap. 23.

their families their livelihoods and even their lives."[228]

Based on a thorough analysis of Chinese newspapers, Jones-Rooy argues that the Chinese leadership, "contrary to common generalizations about them, do not simply censor unfavorable news and spread only information that flatters the regime. Instead, they carefully use their power over the flow of information in a manner that rationally balances a desire to boost regime legitimacy along with a realization that keeping the media credible is as important as the content itself."[229] As leaders the world over, the CCP Central Propaganda Department has in recent years had to accept that their decreased ability to control the circulation of information means that they have to focus on framing and damage control rather than crude censorship. Bearing further testimony to this claim, Daniela Stockmann has found that, in China, the newspapers under the strictest Party control mention sensitive issues more often than less-strictly politically-controlled papers.[230] This testifies to the fact that the CPD vests great importance in its ability to shape public understandings of what goes on in the world.

Furthermore, the composition of the *People's Daily*'s readership also makes us expect that the CPD takes very seriously what is printed in the *People's Daily*. It is commonly believed that cadres make up the majority of the paper's readers, and it is very important for the CCP to be able to present a sensible narrative to this audience, because they are the "foot soldiers" of the state who have to be able to carry out party directives with conviction and persuade the populace at large of the soundness of public policies and interventions. In addition, as Yuezhi Zhao notes, the potential impact of what is written in the *People's Daily* is multiplied because "[i]mportant editorials in *People's Daily* are frequently transmitted by *Xinhua News Agency*, summarized on the national radio and television broadcasts, and

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[228] Susan L. Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 6f.
[229] Andrea E. Jones-Rooy, "Communication and Commitment: The Strategic Use of the Media in China and Other Autocracies" (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2012), 176.
[230] Stockmann, *Media Commercialization and Authoritarian Rule in China*, 107.

sometimes reprinted by provincial Party organs."[231] The *People's Daily* is, moreover, often perused by foreign journalists, who love to point out falsities and glaring omissions found in the leading organ of the CCP, undoubtedly limiting the inventiveness as well as the sloppiness of *People's Daily* journalists and editors.

In short, the *People's Daily* is an excellent source when it comes to analyzing the CPD's deployment of the worker as a figure activated to discuss social issues. Obviously, the paper's close affiliation with the CPD means that we have to be wary of accepting its pronouncements at face value, but this only adds to its allure. And, last but not least, a good source is an accessible source, and every issue of the *People's Daily* is available in digitized and searchable format from 1946 up until the time of writing.

3.4.4 The relationship between the *People's Daily* and the CPD

The CCP propaganda apparatus employs several techniques to control the content of the *People's Daily*. First of all, all editorials in the *People's Daily* are very closely vetted, and sometimes even composed, by the CPD.[232] Secondly, the CPD issues detailed instructions to editors at the *People's Daily* on coverage of sensitive issues. Thirdly, journalists and editors are routinely required to undergo training in Marxism.[233] A fascinating glance into the practicalities of influence is offered by Schoenhals who provides a detailed account of how Hu Qiaomu, then vice-head of the CPD, conducted breakfast meetings with junior editors at the *People's Daily* in 1955. At these meetings—the transcripts of the meetings were published in book form in 1978, in other words, just at the beginning of the post-Mao period—Hu went into considerable detail regarding linguistic nuance in recently printed *People's Daily* articles. Schoenhals concludes that "The attention a senior politician like Hu

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[231] Zhao Yuezhi, *Media, Market, and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the Bottom Line* (University of Illinois Press, 1998), 18.
[232] Shambaugh, "China's Propaganda System," 53.
[233] Kingsley Edney, *The Globalization of Chinese Propaganda: International Power and Domestic Political Cohesion* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 54.

devoted to such minute issues of language is remarkable."[234] This devotion to controlling media products—and ultimately public opinion—through controlling language will be further discussed below.

It is, moreover, important to realize that the social norms guiding journalistic production differ between countries. Politics, historical contingency, moneyed interests, cultural traditions and norms, religion, and a host of other factors all influence the spheres of media. Media studies have for decades been dominated by Anglophone scholars and presses, and until recently news people working in other countries have, implicitly or explicitly, been conceived of in such studies as in dire need of catching up, rather than as working in a different environment with different norms and expectations. This whiggish approach to media studies has, however, been undermined in recent years by accounts of how the "objective" standards of news production in the US were formulated by the educated elite as an attempt to rein in the popular press which appealed to a mass market by muckraking exposés of what the elite would prefer to keep a lid on.[235] S. Elizabeth Bird and Robert W. Dardenne argue that what passes for objectivity among journalists seldom amounts to anything but a reproduction of cultural stereotypes maintaining social power differentials.[236] In addition, recent comparative studies have shown that journalistic norms vary considerably between countries, and the British-American fetish for objectivity and neutrality is not shared nearly as widely as was previously assumed. In Germany and France, e.g., journalists and publics expect subjective analysis and even partisanship on the part of journalists, where such practices are rejected as unprofessional in the US-UK. In Scandinavia,

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[234] Schoenhals, *Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics*, 226.
[235] Kevin G. Barnhurst and John Nerone, "Journalism History," in *The Handbook of Journalism Studies*, ed. Karin Wahl-Jorgensen and Thomas Hanitzsch (New York: Routledge, 2009), 17–28. A very similar process occurred in Britain, see James Curran and Jean Seaton, *Power without Responsibility: The Press, Broadcasting, and the Internet in Britain* (London: Routledge, 2009), chaps. 1–7.
[236] S. Elizabeth Bird and Robert W. Dardenne, "Rethinking News and Myth as Storytelling," in *The Handbook of Journalism Studies*, ed. Karin Wahl-Jorgensen and Thomas Hanitzsch (New York: Routledge, 2009), 205–17.

the public is much less suspicious of state-produced news programs than in the US.[237]

In regards of Chinese journalism, a number of scholars have noted that many Chinese journalists, as inheritors to a Confucian literati tradition, consider their prime responsibility to be serving the state, rather than serving as principled antagonists to wielders of power.[238] Helen Dunstan has noted that even some of the most polemical writings in contemporary China—including the journalism of Liu Binyan, and Chen Guidi and Wu Chuntao's exposé of rampant cadre corruption in *Will the Boat Sink the Water? The Life of China's Peasants* (2006)—very much partake of such a Confucian tradition.[239] Charles Laughlin claims that the Chinese tradition for reportage (报告文学: *baogao wenxue*) is precisely founded on the premise that journalism, in service of the higher cause of enlightening and arousing the reader via emotional appeals, is allowed to adopt a range of methods Western journalists would consider improper and unduly tendentious.[240] Writing decades earlier, A. S. Chen noted that the stories published about model individuals in China sometimes admit that they take liberties with the actual events so as to better convey the spirit or moral aspects of a story. This, Chen perceptively noted, should cause Western researchers to reflect critically on their "preoccupation with the distinction between truth and fiction."[241]

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[237] Thomas Hanitzsch, "Comparative Journalism Studies," in *The Handbook of Journalism Studies*, ed. Karin Wahl-Jorgensen and Thomas Hanitzsch (New York: Routledge, 2009), 413–27. Michael Schudson and Chris Anderson, "Objectivity, Professionalism, and Truth Seeking in Journalism," in *The Handbook of Journalism Studies*, ed. Karin Wahl-Jorgensen and Thomas Hanitzsch (New York: Routledge, 2009), 88–101.

[238] Bai Hongyi, "Between Advocacy and Objectivity: New Role Models among Investigative Journalists," in *Chinese Investigative Journalists' Dreams: Autonomy, Agency, and Voice*, ed. Marina Svensson, Elin Sæther, and Zhi'An Zhang (Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2014), 75–90. Also, Lin Fen J., "Organizational Construction or Individual's Deed? The Literati Tradition in the Journalistic Professionalization in China," *International Journal of Communication* 4 (February 2, 2010): 175–97.

[239] Helen Dunstan, "Inconvenient Confucianism and the Construction of Heroes in Recent Chinese Reportage: A Banned 'Investigation into China's Peasantry,'" *Modern Chinese Literature and Culture* 22, no. 1 (2010): 1–58.

[240] Charles A. Laughlin, *Chinese Reportage: The Aesthetics of Historical Experience* (Duke University Press, 2002).

[241] A.S. Chen, "The Ideal Local Party Secretary and the Model Man," *China Quarterly* 17 (1964): 231.

3.5 How to read the *People's Daily*?

Considering the organizational position of the *People's Daily*, particular care must be given to evaluating its contents. This does not, however, render the paper uninteresting; it merely means that we need to ask how the predictable biases of the *People's Daily* influence how we evaluate it as a source. Historians must, of course, always evaluate their sources, and in my analysis of material from the *People's Daily* I rely on this craft of historical source criticism. All sources, despite themselves, contain layers of unwitting evidence waiting to be exposed.[242]

3.5.1 Bias

The first thing to consider is that due to its place in the publicity apparatus, and to the dearth of independent news outlets in China, we need to be wary of accepting claims made in the *People's Daily* as accurate and complete representations of real-world events. A profitable approach is, rather, to read the paper "against the grain." What this means was put succinctly by Wu Zuxiang, Professor at Peking University, in a 1980 interview with Perry Link: "There is truth in Chinese newspapers, but you have to know how to find it. This often means reading upside down. If they say great strides have been made against corruption in Henan, you know that corruption is especially bad in Henan. If they say dozens of police were hurt in a clash with students, you know hundreds of students were injured if not killed."[243] This approach holds not only for trying to gain an impression of events which may have been reported in a misleading way, it also extends to evaluating social concerns and public discussions taking place in other venues: The *People's Daily* is motivated by its mission to influence public opinion to respond to such concerns and discussions, albeit it does so only obliquely when the issues are so sensitive as to preclude direct treatment.

It must be expected that the *People's Daily* has faced increased pressure to report

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[242] John Tosh, *The Pursuit of History: Aims, Methods, and New Directions in the Study of Modern History* (London: Longman/Pearson, 2010), 135f.
[243] Link, *An Anatomy of Chinese Rhythm, Metaphor, Politics*, 237.

facts more accurately in recent years due to the growth of social media and the increased penetration of information from abroad following from increased travel activity and the deeper penetration of the internet. This also means more pressure on the CPD to respond to hot-button issues arising beyond its control. Where industrial action could be completely disregarded by the paper in 1980 when information—and particularly information in the shape of images which are usually the most dangerous due to their ability to arouse strong sentiment—circulated slowly and sparingly outside of official channels, we would expect to see the *People's Daily* being forced to react to major instances of industrial unrest in the new millennium. In this way, the Chinese media landscape has certainly become more open, but this only makes it more interesting to see how the *People's Daily* tackles complex events. Certainly, for the period examined in this dissertation, the party-state still had quite a strong monopoly over the circulation of information, and therefore the new dynamics introduced by internet and communications technologies will not affect the biases and communicative strategies of the *People's Daily* in the present analysis.

3.5.2 Framing

One of the most important concepts in news research is that of framing:

> [A] frame can be defined as 'a central organizing idea or story line' (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p. 143) that 'shape[s] understanding and opinion concerning an issue by stressing specific elements or features of the broader controversy' (Nelson et al., 1997, p. 568) 'in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation' (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Thus, a frame 'generally implies a policy direction' (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p. 143), but importantly the frame provides more than a simple position or argument about an issue because the frame also 'spell[s] out the essence of the problem,' gives meaning to the issue, and suggests how the issue should be thought about and understood (Nelson & Kinder, 1996, p. 1057).[244]

Patterson notes that people forget almost everything they pick up from the news, but the

[244] Lene Aarøe, "Investigating Frame Strength: The Case of Episodic and Thematic Frames," *Political Communication* 28, no. 2 (April 28, 2011): 208f., https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2011.568041.

fundamental frames stays with them, as they are repeated across story after story.[245] George Lakoff has suggested that there may be a neurological basis for this. Lakoff has noted that American political debate can very often be understood as a clash between two metaphorical ways of conceiving of the nation as a family: either as a family with a strict father or a family with a nurturing parent, characteristic of present-day Republicans and Democrats, respectively. Lakoff claims that because these two frames structure so many issue areas, they give rise to neural circuits which are then strengthened by synaptic accretion whenever activated.[246]

Frames are often separated into two types: *Thematic* framing is abstract and impersonal, typically focusing on policies, statistics, and general trends, while *episodic* framing centers on particulars and individuals.[247] Patterson notes that the kind of framing chosen crucially affect how people think about the issues involved: "When exposed, for example, to an episodically framed story about an individual who is poor as a result of not having a job, people tend to attribute the problem to a personal failing, such as laziness. On the other hand, when the story is framed thematically, people also tend to take into account systemic factors, such as economic conditions."[248] Patterson further argues that an over-reliance on episodic framing will tend to cloud the ability of the public to understand the world, producing a *less* rather than a *more* informed citizenry.[249]

3.5.3 Actors

Another crucial element influencing the meaning of a news story is the inclusion and exclusion of actors. Theo van Leeuwen notes that actors can be included, backgrounded, or

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[245] Thomas E. Patterson, *Informing the News: The Need for Knowledge-Based Journalism* (New York, USA: Vintage Books, 2013), 91.
[246] George Lakoff, *The Political Mind: Why You Can't Understand 21st-Century Politics with an 18th-Century Brain* (New York, N.Y.: Viking, 2008), chaps. 2–3.
[247] Shanto Iyengar, "Framing Responsibility for Political Issues: The Case of Poverty," *Political Behavior* 12, no. 1 (1990): 22.
[248] Patterson, *Informing the News*, 92.
[249] Patterson, 92.

excluded. If actors are backgrounded, their actions are mentioned but the actors are never specified; if actors are excluded, actors as well as actions pertinent to the story are left out. Exclusion is especially "useful" in cases where reporters wish to avoid attention to exploitation, and this often "requires that the regimes and their agents be put constantly in the role of promoters of progress, law and order, concerned to eliminate social evil and conflict, but never responsible for it."[250] Exclusion can also signal elevation. Dominant groups, as Roland Barthes has noted, are frequently "exnominated," that is, they come to be the group about whom very little needs to be said.[251] Other important things to look for is whether actors are represented as individuals or as groups, and which verbs specific actors get to perform. In the European and American context, it is very often the case that emotions, as well as crude sensory experiences, are reserved for actors near the bottom of the social hierarchy.[252] I have not been able to find any scholarship examining whether the same holds true in the Chinese press.

3.5.4 Lexical choice

Another important factor in shaping the narrative tone of a news piece is the choice of particular terms to denote the actors. In an analysis of how *The Sun* referred to incidents of sexual violence against women, Kate Clark found that naming strategies—usually evoked in the headline—invariably signaled who, according to *The Sun*, was the victim and who was the perpetrator, and that the involved parties had to occupy one, and only one, of these antagonistic positions. If, e.g., the woman in the story was described as "a mother of three" she was, throughout the article's narrative, placed in the role of innocent victim; whereas if she was a "busty divorcee" she was placed in the role of inviting or provoking the man.[253] Of

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[250] Theo van Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice: New Tools for Critical Discourse Analysis* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 28.
[251] Robin Tolmach Lakoff, *The Language War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 53f.
[252] Leeuwen, *Discourse and Practice*, 35,56.
[253] Kate Clark, "The Linguistics of Blame: Representations of Women in The Sun's Reporting of Crimes of Sexual Violence'," *Language, Text and Context: Essays in Stylistics*, 1992, 208–24.

course, lexical choice also colors actions. When "the allies" chose to act against Iraq in 2003, some media portrayed them as "entering" Iraq, where others had them "invading."[254] Some words attain such cultural prominence that they become "God Terms," while others become "Devil Terms." Terms such as "freedom" and "al Qaeda" have the power to stir up such emotion that they "do our thinking for us."[255]

At other times, words left out can be of signal importance. As Michael Schoenhals noted, when Mao left out references to "class struggle" and the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in a 1957 speech, this was taken as permission by intellectuals to deepen their on-going criticism of the party.[256] The modern Chinese political system also shuns certain words in official proclamations; Liu Binyan has noted that revolution (*geming*), struggle (*douzheng*), class (*jieji*), and ideals (*lixiang*) are almost never used in official documents.[257] In the present period it is important to note, e.g., if workers are referred to by using the respectful term *gongren* (工人) or the term *nongmingong* (农民工) which emphasizes their rural origins, as *dagongde* (打工的), stressing the temporary nature of their current employment relationship, or as *dagongzai* (打工仔) or *dagongmei* (打工妹), which fixes the sex of the worker and emphasizes youth and inexperience.

3.5.5 Repetition

Messages also tend to seep in via repetition. Dixon Wecter contends that in "American journalism, [it] has often been sufficient to confer leadership on individuals or groups simply

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[254] For an example, see Allan's thought-provoking dissection of which words were used in the British press during the war against Iraq in 1991. Stuart Allan, "The Culture of Distance: Online Reporting of the Iraq War," in *Reporting War: Journalism in Wartime*, ed. Stuart Allan and Barbie Zelizer (London, UK: Routledge, 2004), 347–65.
[255] Roderick P. Hart et al., *Political Keywords: Using Language That Uses Us* (New York, USA: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1.
[256] Schoenhals, *Doing Things with Words in Chinese Politics*, 16.
[257] Liu Binyan, *Two Kinds of Truth: Stories and Reportage from China* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 21f.

by printing their names, day in and day out."[258] While repetition may seem a most dull propaganda tool, Michael Billig has argued persuasively that repetition and unspectacular uniformity is exactly what makes nationalism such a potent ideology in Western nations, because the messages of nationalism surrounding us are so bland and ubiquitous that they fly beneath our perceptual radar.[259] Repetitiveness and lexical uniformity is, of course, what characterized news reporting in the PRC until the middle of the 1980s and, albeit to a lesser degree, up until today.[260] Kahneman similarly notes that frequent exposure to messages can be more effective than many tend to believe: "A reliable way to make people believe in falsehoods is frequent repetition, because familiarity is not easily distinguished from truth. Authoritarian institutions and marketers have always known this fact." However, repetition may entail different things in different contexts. Yang Hengjun relates how when he came back to China after a long sojourn abroad with his son he settled into the habit of watching *CCTV*'s "Nightly News" every night. One day his son pointed to Hu Jintao on the screen and asked: "Is this person a bad guy?" The son made this assumption, his flabbergasted father realized, because he had become habituated to a news system where only criminals made the headlines every night.[261]

3.6 Quantitative analysis

In addition to focusing on the aspects related to close textual reading outlined above, I also make use of quantitative analysis made possible by the availability of the *People's Daily* in digitized format. Having almost instant access to all of the articles ever printed in the *People's Daily* offers new analytical possibilities. Based on their quantitative analysis of printed texts,

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[258] Quoted in Diana Kendall, *Framing Class: Media Representations of Wealth and Poverty in America.* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Incorporated, 2011), 23.
[259] Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London, England: Sage Publications Ltd, 1995).
[260] As Barbara Mittler has shown, cultural products produced during the Cultural Revolution were characterized by an enormous amount of repetition of a few key messages across time and media. Barbara Mittler, *A Continuous Revolution: Making Sense of Cultural Revolution Culture* (Harvard University Asia Center, 2012).
[261] Yang Hengjun, "胡爷爷是坏人吗？ [Is Grandpa Hu a Crook?]," Yanghengjun.com, 2007, http://www.yanghengjun.com/?action-viewnews-itemid-369. Accessed Oct. 2, 2014.

Hart et al. explains that

> The more a word is used, we have reasoned, the more it accelerates and hence the greater its mass; the greater its mass, we reason further, the more gravity it exerts on an audience. Like all metaphors, this is an imperfect one, but it does capture the importance of linguistic proportions and, hence, of the additive effects of language. Necessarily, counting things has distanced us from the texts being analyzed [...] but it lets us see patterns that would have been missed close up. Too, quantifying things lets us make direct comparisons between different moments in time and different spokespersons. Mostly, though, the value of our approach is that it ignores the vivid instance, the distinctive and hence unrepresentative text.[262]

The historian of literature Franco Moretti has developed the notion of digitally-aided "distant reading," which he offers as a corrective or supplement to "close reading." According to Moretti, close reading is so time-consuming that it renders us blind to the knowledge we might gain from the analysis of larger number of units that may appear unworthy of interest at first sight. According to Moretti, by utilizing digitally-aided research we may come closer to the stated goal of the historian March Bloch, who wrote about the ideal of "years of analysis for a day of synthesis."[263]

If we take seriously the proposition that repetition crucially affects how we think, then we need, as Hart et al. suggests, a quantitative approach as a corrective to our natural proclivity to focus upon the unusual man-bites-dog stories. This approach is especially useful for analyzing the *People's Daily*, because the Party puts so much emphasis on controlling the content of this paper—and not least on controlling the use of specific words and collocations. In the following, I will explicate how the crude technique of simply counting news articles in which particular words appear may be an illuminating technique and a valuable supplement to close reading.

Let us, for starters, investigate how, by simple digital magic, it suddenly becomes possible to gain an overview over how the party-state approached the practice of "speaking

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[262] Hart et al., *Political Keywords*, 249.
[263] Franco Moretti, "Conjectures on World Literature," *New Left Review*, II, no. 1 (2000): 56f.

bitterness" in the *People's Daily*. By a quick glance at Chart 3.1, we see that this practice was very much found on the pages of the paper in the years of land reform, and that it almost completely disappeared from the paper thereafter. This simple chart could serve as an entry point for a deeper investigation of the framing of land reform and the playing on emotions in Chinese state-led discourse. In this connection, one valuable line of inquiry would be why "speaking bitterness" was suddenly more on the mind of the *People's Daily* in 1988. Was an outpouring of bitterness noticeable in the *People's Daily* leading up to the crisis of 1989? If so, what was the context and the framing? Who were granted the right to speak?




Chart 3.1: Number of articles using the term 诉苦 (*suku*: speaking bitterness) in the *People's Daily* 1946-2011. The numbers can be found in the Appendix.

As a further example, digitally-aided research makes it much easier to follow—and represent graphically—the ups and downs of the party-state-sponsored adulation of the young soldier Lei Feng (1940-1962). See Chart 3.2. This simple graph enables us to make several observations. First of all, we notice that Lei Feng had been mentioned in the *People's Daily* prior to his death in 1962, in fact portrayed in considerable detail, as the digitally-aided

scholar can easily discover, in an article in 1961.[264] We also note a sharp drop in the references made to Lei Feng in 1967 and another drop in 1969; an observation we might use to further think about how the militarization of Chinese society during the Cultural Revolution, along with a radicalization of political objectives, may have rendered a do-gooder such as Lei Feng somewhat unattractive.

Unattractive, that is, until the tenth anniversary of Mao's appeal to "Learn from Lei Feng" in 1973. Was this occasioned, close reading combined with contextual analysis could reveal, primarily by a Chinese fondness for anniversaries, or was something else at stake in 1973? Four years later, in 1977, Lei Feng is once again dragged on to center stage and appears, on average, in almost every single edition of the paper that year. This in itself says something about how seriously the Hua Guofeng leadership took the promotion of emulable role models as a part of its legitimation strategy, and possibly also, and this could be further investigated combining a close reading of the articles in the *People's Daily* with other sources, in an attempt to instill in young soldiers and in the public alike how a "model soldier" ought to behave—something Hua Guofeng, short of military credentials of his own, might have had an interest in doing.

[264] It is incorrect when Xiaofei Tian claims that the first media exposure of Lei Feng took place in November 1961. Xiaofei Tian, "The Making of a Hero: Lei Feng and Some Issues of Historiography," 296.





Chart 3.2: Number of articles mentioning Lei Feng (雷锋) in the *People's Daily* 1960-1992. The numbers can be found in the Appendix.

Also worth noting is how Lei Feng almost disappears from the *People's Daily* in 1988 and then returns with a vengeance in 1990; the latter observation perhaps both less surprising and less interesting than the first—something we shall return to in due course. Overall, the graph tells us that Lei Feng and role modelling has not disappeared from the weaponry of the Chinese propaganda apparatus. In order to tease out more consequential conclusions about the propaganda career of Lei Feng we would, of course, need to engage in close reading of at least a number of these articles. Nonetheless, this simple graph helps us both to formulate questions and decide where to look for initial answers.

A deeper appreciation of what this approach may yield, and how it must be tempered, can be provided by examining how frequently Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi are mentioned in the pages of the *People's Daily* over a given period; here 1962-1980.




	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
MZ	642	985	1547	1844	4686	5166	5023	5409	4019	2668	1266	1048	1369	1263	2710	1896	1073	958	525
LS	261	705	565	636	366	1	801	3062	2147	1747	1541	1269	988	926	1588	541	219	4	269

Chart 3.3: Number of articles mentioning Mao Zedong (毛泽东) and Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇), respectively, in the People's Daily 1962-1980. The numbers can be found in the Appendix.

Several observations may be drawn from chart 3.3. First of all, it indicates that references to Mao begin to escalate in 1964 and that the highest number of articles making mention of Mao is printed in 1969, where roughly 15 articles every day mention Mao Zedong by name; in a paper of six pages. Secondly, we notice that Liu Shaoqi is only mentioned by name in one *People's Daily* article in 1967. The fact that Liu—from 1946 to 2015—has never been mentioned as frequently in the *People's Daily* as he did during the height of the campaign against him in 1969—also the year of his death—indicates how important his denigration seemed to those in charge of the propaganda apparatus at that time. The above graph is also a good illustration of how shifts in the Party's propaganda efforts are often punctuated by periods of silence. Here, the virtual absence of Liu from the pages of the paper in 1967 and 1979 both bespeak a re-evaluation of his person by the top leadership.

A further investigation of the fate of these two figures in the *People's Daily* must, however, also serve to remind the researcher that searching is not always as simple as it may seem.




	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
LS	261	705	565	636	366	1	801	3062	2147	1747	1541	1269	988	926	1588	541	219	4	269
CK	0	0	0	0	2	652	66	2	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0

Chart 3.4: Number of articles mentioning Liu Shaoqi and "China's Khrushchev" in the *People's Daily* 1962-1980. The numbers can be found in the Appendix.

Chart 3.4 shows that Liu Shaoqi did not exactly disappear from the pages of the *People's Daily* in 1967; rather, he was provided a different identity, namely as "China's Khrushchev" (中国的赫鲁晓夫: *Zhongguo de Heluxiaofu*). In the context of the times, this epithet serves to cast Liu as a traitor against the revolution, against the Chinese people, and against Mao Zedong. When he reemerges by name in 1968, Liu has now become "the renegade, traitor, and scab Liu Shaoqi" (叛徒、内奸、工贼刘少奇: *pantu, neijian, gongzei Liu Shaoqi*)—i.e., almost all references to his name now include this denigrating preface, as illustrated by Chart 3.5. The uniformity of these charges reveals how jealously the propaganda apparatus works to control naming. The chart also indicates just how much emphasis those in control of the *People's Daily* put on denigrating political opponents: in 1972 and 1973 there were even more articles vilifying Liu Shaoqi than there were praising Mao Zedong. This may remind us of Lucian Pye's observation that, compared to Western culture, the Chinese are usually more courteous face-to-face, while wielding their pens more aggressively.[265]

[265] Pye, "Communications and Chinese Political Culture," 225.



	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Series1	636	366	1	801	3062	2147	1747	1541	1269	988	926	1588	541	219	4	269
Series2	0	2	652	66	2	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
Series3	0	0	0	377	1488	1914	1257	169	23	88	18	37	10	1	0	1

Chart 3.5: Number of articles mentioning Liu Shaoqi (Series1), "China's Khrushchev" (Series2), and "the renegade, traitor, and scab Liu Shaoqi" (Series3) in the *People's Daily* 1965-1980. The numbers can be found in the Appendix.

3.6.1 Dealing with a fluctuating number of news articles

Another aspect to keep in mind is that the number of articles in the *People's Daily* changes over time. Chart 3.6 shows the number of articles published in the *People's Daily* every year from 1946 to 2011. For the present project it is especially important to note that the *People's Daily* published relatively few articles during the Cultural Revolution, but that the number of articles published grew rapidly in 1980 and then continued on a slightly erratic upward slope. This is obviously important if we wish to draw conclusions from year-on-year comparisons of the number of articles mentioning specific terms.




Chart 3.6: Total number of articles in a given year in the *People's Daily*, 1946-2011. The numbers can be found in the Appendix.



Chart 3.7: Number of articles mentioning workers (工人: *gongren*) in the *People's Daily* 1946-2011. The numbers can be found in the Appendix.

If we investigate the yearly number of articles making use of, e.g., the important word "worker" (工人: *gongren*), we might conclude, from a sheer frequency perspective, that the coverage in 1947 was not very different from the coverage in the 2000s. See Chart 3.7. While this would be correct from a numerical standpoint, the fact that one year's worth of the

People's Daily in the latter period contained 5-8 times as many articles as in the early period, throws the comparison into a very different light. In order to account for this, I provide normalized numbers in my discussions of the development of terms over time. I arrive at such normalized numbers by dividing the number of articles mentioning a specific term in a given year with the total number of articles published that year and then multiplying by the average number of articles in one year's batch of the *People's Daily*—that figure, the average number of articles published by the *People's Daily* in a year from 1946-2011, is 25,555. Once more taking "worker" as an example, Chart 3.8 shows the normalized figures. This revised chart tells a somewhat different story, indicating that workers were indeed much more present in newspaper articles in 1947 than in 2011, and it also shows that the apparent increase in attention to the *gongren* in 1980 disappears if we take into account that the paper increases its number of articles that year. The revised chart also shows that, in relative terms, workers were never mentioned as frequently in the *People's Daily* as they were in the years 1968-69, confirming Perry and Li's contention that claims to be speaking on behalf of the workers were absolutely central to the jockeying for political position in that period.[266]

Now, it is not as simple as saying that the one chart is better than the other regardless of the terms investigated. Knowing, e.g., that the terms "strike" (罢工: *bagong*) and "autonomous organization" (自治组织: *zizhizuzhi*) are only ever brought together in a positive fashion in two articles in the history of the *People's Daily*—namely in 1980—it does not matter all that much if this was a year with particularly many or particularly few articles. The same holds for stories related to the rehabilitation of previously condemned individuals or movements; in such cases, one or two articles may change the world for those involved and convey important political signals to the entire readership. In contrast, if we wish to evaluate the "tenor" of feeling in particular volumes of the *People's Daily*, it once again becomes very important to weigh the number of articles making use of certain emotives—if

[266] Perry and Li, "Revolutionary Rudeness: The Language of Red Guards and Rebel Workers in China's Cultural Revolution."

terms such as "hate" and "loathing" appear in a 1,000 articles in a particular year, we need to know if the total number of articles published that year was 10,000 or 100,000.




Chart 3.8: Number of articles mentioning workers (工人: *gongren*) in the *People's Daily* 1946-2011. The above chart relies on a normalized number of articles, because the average number of articles in the *People's Daily* increases significantly over time. The numbers can be found in the Appendix.

3.6.2 Selecting words for quantitative analysis

In order to select the most telling words for quantitative analysis, I have gone through a number of steps. I started by reading a large volume of *People's Daily* articles, around 100 articles, mentioning "model workers" (劳动模范: *laodongmofan* and, in its abbreviated form, 劳模: *laomo*). Whenever I came upon a word that seemed to be particularly important, I entered it into my spreadsheet as a candidate for further scrutiny. This included words and concepts that seemed to change their meaning over time (e.g., individualism, remuneration according to work), notions and people that were denounced for various reasons (e.g., Wei Jingsheng, democracy wall, Li Lisan), metaphors that somehow stuck out by being unusual (e.g., shock troops of the new long march), words mentioned with particular frequency (e.g., democracy, fairness), and words which I knew from the relevant literature and from common sense would be particularly sensitive (strike, workers' movement, bureaucratism). Based on my interest in changing notions of morality and emotion, and for how such

changing notions may be used to suggest behavioral change, I also looked for words belonging to these realms. Having assembled a list of 150 such terms, I then began to search for them methodically, with particular attention to how they appeared in connection with model workers. This then gave me a new corpus of articles, 296 in total, which I then read and coded, looking for interesting collocations, and narratives often repeated or subtly—and sometimes not so subtly—modified over time. From this round of reading I selected another 632 terms of potential interest to my project. I yet again searched through the database, this time looking for patterns in the material, such as when a particular term suddenly jumped or decreased significantly in usage. I also tugged at particular narratives to see how particular individuals, places, and historical events were imbued with meaning over time. This gave me approximately 700 additional articles to look at as well as a substantial body of quantitative data to analyze. The analysis is thus based on 782 keywords and around 1000 articles.

Many keywords will be discussed and analyzed in this dissertation. Nonetheless, the analysis on the following pages is to some extent based also on the many keywords *not* directly discussed on the coming pages. The entirety of the data—i.e., all of the selected 782 keywords along with frequency counts in the period 1946-2011—would require more than five hundred pages of print at even a very small font-size. I have therefore chosen to include in the Appendix only the data directly analyzed and discussed in the dissertation. I invite anyone interested to see the data in their entirely to contact me directly for a digital copy.

3.7 Overall

As will have become clear, the present dissertation draws methodological inspiration from the work of many scholars working in the disciplines of media studies, political science, history, psychology, and anthropology. Where the present dissertation makes a modest claim to methodological originality is in showing how a Skinnerian approach can fruitfully be pursued through a combination of quantitative and qualitative cross-fertilization to make

sense of how the party-state through its media outlets sought to alter the meaning of both specific keywords and public norms as a central part of its evolving pursuit of reform. While several scholars have dedicated energy towards analyzing the role of the model worker in official publications, this dissertation goes a step further by claiming that we are able to make better sense of the CPD's efforts in this period, as well as of the CPD's qualified success, by placing the model worker and related aspects of the Chinese role modelling tradition at the center of our attention.

Chapter 4: The model worker and political leadership (1977-1985)

4.1 Introduction

After Mao's death and the arrest of the Gang of Four, the party-state faced a number of political problems, particularly in the areas of social control and public confidence, and the CPD would play a central role in trying to rectify both. The Cultural Revolution with its public violence and drastic policy reversals had cost the party-state dearly in terms of popular loyalty. The early 1970s had seen not only the mysterious treachery of Lin Biao, but also the sudden rapprochement with both the US and a number of right-wing military dictatorships across the world;[267] in the countryside, former Red Guards were quickly losing their enthusiasm for the political powerholders who had sent them "up to the mountains and down to the countryside" in order to reinstate centralized political control.

The disaffection of the urban working class presented a particularly onerous problem as the proletariat was central to the regime's legitimating narrative, and industrial production was the area in greatest need of expansion and improvement if the party-state was to retain any pretensions of leading China towards a bright future. In 1976, strikes, factory slowdowns, and absenteeism caused industrial production to drop significantly, and at some factories workers armed themselves to resume fights from the bloody years of the Cultural Revolution.[268] In many places, unrest broke out during the winter of 1976–1977, and some estimate that hundreds and possibly thousands lost their lives in violent clashes.[269] In many provinces, the PLA had to be called in to protect trains against sabotage and local unrest, which nonetheless continued on a smaller scale into the summer of 1977.[270]

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[267] Meisner, *Mao's China and After*, 388.
[268] Meisner, 405.
[269] Jürgen Domes, *The Government and Politics of the PRC: A Time of Transition* (Boulder, Colorado, US: Westview Press, 1985), 141.
[270] Robert Weatherley, *Mao's Forgotten Successor: The Political Career of Hua Guofeng* (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 142f.

Mao's political legacy was also highly problematic to the new leadership; his kindling of public animosity towards the bureaucratic elite in the 1960s through an agenda of public mobilization had shaken the bureaucratic establishment to its core. In addition, "[t]he Cultural Revolution politically activated China's urban working class for the first time since the proletariat had been so brutally crushed by Chiang Kai-shek's armies in 1927,"[271] allowing China's working class to develop "a newfound pride in their proletarian status as well as a powerful language of class with which to challenge unwelcome policies."[272] While Mao had backed down from some of his most radically mobilizing rhetoric amidst the chaos of the early Cultural Revolution, it was upon his insistence that the "four great freedoms"—to "speak out freely, air views freely, hold public debates, and write big-character posters"—along with the right of workers to strike had been added to the Constitution in 1975.

In short, many problems faced the party-state leadership after Mao's death, and selecting the most effective remedies, let alone securing public embrace of these remedies, promised to be no easy matter. Would the party-state—whose top leadership was torn by personal and ideological rivalries—be able to regain the loyalty of the population? Would Hua Guofeng be able to consolidate his hold on power after arresting the "Gang of Four"? Would the radical egalitarianism, the breakdown of political institutions, and the distrust of "leaders in power taking the capitalist road" characteristic of Cultural Revolution rhetoric make it impossible for the leadership to achieve the level of social, political, and economic control over the working class that centralizing reforms would depend upon?

Beset by all these problems, how would the party-state go about motivating a largely disenchanted workforce to not only work harder, but also to forsake the radical egalitarianism touted by the state's ideological apparatus for over a decade and to abandon the political activism they had been encouraged to embrace during the same period? This chapter will show that a key reason why the party-state chose to invest itself in the

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[271] Meisner, *Mao's China and After*, 294.
[272] Perry and Li, *Proletarian Power*, 193.

reestablishment of the model worker institution after the arrest of the "Gang of Four" was that model workers provided an excellent opportunity to cast the Cultural Revolution as a morally corrupt project perpetrated by a few individuals upon the population at large and, conversely, an opportunity to cast the new leadership as a force for political as well as moral restoration. The chapter will also demonstrate how Deng chose to ride the wave of democratic sentiments in his fight for leadership of the party-state, before reversing course when he had secured his hold on power.

4.2 Surviving the Cultural Revolution: model workers and the CCP

A quantitative investigation of the coverage awarded to labor models in the period after Mao's death reveals that they came to be employed with great frequency by the *People's Daily* in the years immediately after the fall of the Gang of Four. See Chart 4.1. This great increase in attention is also attested to by Yao Li who refers to the period of 1977-79 as the "second high water mark" of attention paid to model workers, noting that no less than five national-level model worker meetings were conducted in this short period.[273]

[273] Yao Li, "1977-1979 Nian de Quanquo Laodong Mofan Biaozhang [Honoring National-Level Model Workers, 1977-1979]," 40.




Chart 4.1: Number of articles referring to "model workers" (劳动模范: *laodongmofan* or in the abbreviated form 劳模: *laomo*) in the *People's Daily* 1976-1984. The above chart relies on a normalized number of articles, because the average number of articles in the *People's Daily* changes significantly over this period. The numbers can be found in the Appendix.

The majority of the *People's Daily* articles featuring model workers in the period of greatest attention, 1977-79, deal with their undeserved suffering during the Cultural Revolution and their subsequent rehabilitation after the arrest of the Gang of Four.[274] One illustrative example is provided by an article featuring the once-famous labor model Wu Jichang (吴吉昌). A search for Wu in the *People's Daily*'s database reveals that Wu was selected labor model in 1961 and had been mentioned in *People's Daily* no less than 39 times in the years 1961-66. In the first half of the 1960s, including in a number of articles in 1966, Wu was lauded as an example of an ordinary farmer who had conducted successful scientific experiments with his own cotton farming, producing increased yields. After 1966, however, Wu disappears from the public limelight, and in the period 1967-1976, Wu is not mentioned even once in the *People's Daily*. After the arrest of the Gang of Four, Wu reappears, this time with a gruesome

[274] See, e.g., *People's Daily*, 1976.11.06, p.1, "英明的华主席是灾区人民贴心人——'四人帮'是不顾人民死活的害人虫"; 1976.11.07, p.4, "在华主席为首的党中央领导下胜利前进"; 1977.02.12, p.1, "走在时间前面的闯将"; 1977.06.22, p.1, "柳桂芝干一九八二年的活了"; 1977.12.19, p.2, "险恶的用心——卑劣的伎俩"; 1978.03.14, p.1, "为了周总理的嘱托"; 1978.06.03, p.1, "认真落实党的政策——坚决推倒'四人帮'的诬陷."

story to tell. In an article partly made up of direct quotes credited to Wu himself, the *People's Daily* relates how Wu was criticized during the Cultural Revolution for following the revisionist line of Liu Shaoqi by putting science above everything else, earning Wu the sobriquet "black model worker" (黑劳模). For this crime Wu was subjected to nearly 100 struggle sessions. Multiple times he was beaten with clubs and left unconscious, drenched in blood. He had been singed with pokers, and his arms had been twisted out of joint on so many occasions that he had been crippled.[275]

Wu's story is but one of many published in the *People's Daily* detailing the suffering endured by model workers who had been branded "counter-revolutionaries" and "capitalist-roaders" during the Cultural Revolution. While some suffered grievously under public struggle sessions, others had their homes ransacked and their most prized possessions—usually items such as photographs and small prizes related to their status as model workers—destroyed. Some model workers had their party membership revoked. In terms of assigning blame for the ill treatment suffered by model workers, the articles express neither doubt nor diversity of opinion: To blame was the Gang of Four.[276] This allocation of guilt for the ill fate suffered by model workers during the Cultural Revolution is made explicit in an article detailing the seventh meeting of the Eighth Executive Committee of the ACFTU in late April 1978:

> At this meeting, everyone denounced the 'Gang of Four' for their criminal acts of persecuting model workers and older workers. The 'Gang of Four' subjected model workers to unfounded criticism and stigmatized and smeared them with labels such as 'black labor model' and 'false labor model', and they conducted ruthless persecution, mercilessly attacking veteran workers and veteran model workers for being 'solely

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[275] *People's Daily* 1978.03.14, p.1. "为了周总理的嘱托."

[276] E.g., *People's Daily*, 1976.11.06, p.1, "英明的华主席是灾区人民贴心人 "四人帮"是不顾人民死活的害人虫——唐山人民坚决拥护华主席为首的党中央，愤怒声讨'四人帮'滔天罪行"; 1976.11.07, p.4, "在华主席为首的党中央领导下胜利前进"; 1977.02.12, p.1, "走在时间前面的闯将——顾凯"; 1977.06.22, p.1, "柳桂芝干一九八二年的活了"; 1977.12.19, p.2, "险恶的用心——卑劣的伎俩"; 1978.03.14, p.1, "为了周总理的嘱托", and 1978.06.03, p.1, "认真落实党的政策——坚决推倒"四人帮"的诬陷."

> concerned with profits' and for being 'old conservatives,' 'the foundation of society's capitalist-roaders,' to be disposed of the sooner the better.[277]

This report clearly fits into a tradition of holding public meetings to assign blame and mobilize public venom against paradigmatic perpetrators who had transgressed against public morality. There is no discussion, in this or any of the other articles, of how exactly the "Gang of Four" managed to exert their influence on a nation-wide scale, nor is any attention paid to elucidating which social frictions the Gang or their unmentioned henchmen could have played upon. The *People's Daily* devotes little attention to explaining what motives the Gang of Four might have possessed to subject so many model workers to such cruel treatment; it is simply stated over and over that the Gang of Four hated the proletariat and anyone building socialism and engaging in science. As for concrete accusations, the Gang of Four is noted as denouncing the profit-oriented motives of model workers. In the very few articles where model workers are described as being condemned by anyone to their face, they are criticized for working too hard. In one case, "Master-worker Liu" is criticized by a few unnamed people for being ludicrously preoccupied with production, when she ought instead to concern herself with the "line question."[278]

If the *People's Daily* remains virtually silent regarding the question of how it could happen that so many model workers suffered so horrendous ordeals during the Cultural Revolution—apart from attributing everything to the rampage of the Gang of Four—this may be unpacked if we reflect upon the role and status of the many model workers who had been appointed during the previous two decades. First of all, many model workers had been appointed by leaders—locally as well as nationally—who were now under attack for undermining the revolution and the leadership of Mao Zedong, and as such their fate became intertwined with that of the leaders who had selected them.[279] Moreover, a crucial aspect of

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[277] *People's Daily,* 1978.04.26, p.1, "全国总工会八届七次执委扩大会议决定——中国工会第九次代表大会十月召开."
[278] *People's Daily*, 1977.06.22, p.1, "柳桂芝干一九八二年的活了."
[279] Andrew G. Walder, "The Chinese Cultural Revolution in the Factories: Party-State Structures

how model workers were used locally consisted in urging others to work as hard as the model workers did—something which under the right circumstances undoubtedly won the model workers respect, but a respect that might turn to envy and irritation when they were used as yardsticks—often obviously embellished yardsticks—to coerce others to work much harder and longer than they would have preferred. Moreover, model workers had often been touted as experts, a status rendered uncomfortable by the persistent push of those in charge of the media during the Cultural Revolution to rate amateurish doggedness over professional proficiency.[280]

In many places, according to Gail Hershatter, model workers also came under criticism for spending too much time on political meetings, leaving others to pick up their share of the work.[281] As such, the fate of model workers during the Cultural Revolution is an interesting case of what may happen when state-directed adulation suddenly falters: bereft of the support of local cadres and suddenly without a narrative disseminated and underwritten by the state to legitimate their prominence and perks, model workers were left in precarious positions and often suffered dire consequences.

The fact that the *People's Daily* dedicated so many articles to describing the ill fate of model workers during the Cultural Revolution tells us several things. First of all, framing the brutalities as enacted by the Gang of Four provides a convenient way of explaining their recent incarceration. Irrespective of their ill treatment over the past decade, model workers presumably enjoyed a degree of respect among many, and therefore their ill treatment reflects especially gravely on the Gang. This is, of course, all the more so as the *People's Daily* chooses to characterize as extreme and unjust the treatment meted out to the unlucky and

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and Patterns of Conflict," in *Putting Class in Its Place: Worker Identities in East Asia*, ed. Elizabeth J. Perry (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1996), 172ff.

[280] This policy produced various conflicts, not least in the management of the arts. See Richard Curt. Kraus, *The Party and the Arty in China: The New Politics of Culture* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 160ff.

[281] Hershatter, *The Gender of Memory. Rural Women and China's Collective Past*, 230.

hapless model workers. In this way, the unhappy model workers come to serve as symbols for all of those who felt they had been wrongly victimized during the Cultural Revolution. That the persecuted model workers may be considered emblems of injustice is highlighted by the fact that the *People's Daily* provides virtually no personal information about them—save for select details of particularly gruesome treatment—thus serving to facilitate identification on the part of any reader who believed that she or he had also suffered injustice.

The many stories of past suffering and subsequent rehabilitation must also be understood as the Party's attempt to court the trust of model workers. This must have been important not just to reestablish loyalty from model workers, but also to reestablish respect for anyone owing their position to the party-state. It is also clear that a central aim of these articles is to foster reconciliation between model workers and their former tormentors, instead of publicizing tales of vengeance that might inspire emulation. This is the reason why it is never explained exactly *how* the Gang of Four was implicated in local struggle sessions against model workers all over the country, and one searches in vain in the *People's Daily* articles for wicked local cadres doing the dirty work of the Gang of Four. Instead, many articles emphasize that the long-tormented model workers have decided to let bygones be bygones and have, by "writing their hatred onto the bodies of the Gang of Four," been able to focus on the future and the realization of the Four Modernizations.[282] In this spirit, many rehabilitees have, avers the *People's Daily*, regained their "revolutionary spirit" (革命精神: *geming jingshen*) and have managed to increase production considerably by re-dedicating themselves to hard work and placing their trust in socialism.

In the few articles where the *People's Daily* depicts friction between model workers and their fellow workers, this is explained in terms of "egalitarianism" (平均主义:

[282] See for example, *People's Daily*, 1977.09.03, p.4, "'冤家'变成了战友"; 1978.05.17, p.2, "苏州市委领导干部亲自复查审干重大案件"; 1978.07.09, p.2, "落实政策必须旗帜鲜明措施有力"; 1979.03.19, p.1, "统战部召开统战系统干部大会宣布"; 1979.04.21, p.1, "做好思想工作"; and 1979.08.01, p.1, "共产党员只有团结同志的义务."

pingjunzhuyi) proffered by the Gang of Four and still surviving as "residual poison" (余毒: *yudu*) or "flowing poison" (流毒: *liudu*) in the minds of a few misguided workers. This, the *People's Daily* stresses, should be eradicated by persuasion and education (说服教育: *shuofujiaoyu*)—in other words, revenge or punishment is not called for. Metaphorically, what *is* called for is 肃清 (*suqing*): a term which can be translated as "cleaning up" or "eradicating" and is, in addition to being used about political cleaning-up, primarily used about removing weeds. In the two years 1977-1978, the *People's Daily* uses the term *suqing* in no less than 2512 articles, 2470 of which directly employ the term "Gang of Four." This juxtaposition of poison, eradication, weeds, and a "Gang of Four" was unequivocally established and maintained as the dominant way of talking about the relationship between the previous and the new leadership.

In short, as soon as Hua Guofeng's faction had toppled the Gang of Four, the *People's Daily* began to invest considerable column space in rehabilitating the public image of the model worker. This provided a convenient opportunity for the party-state to position itself as the moral defender of the working class in general, and of model workers in particular, in an attempt to restore the loyalty of workers and model workers to the party-state, who still ruled in the name of the proletariat and who desperately needed to reestablish order at workplaces across the country. What the *People's Daily* offers to achieve this end is a morality tale: Model workers did not suffer persecution due to local frictions over resource consumption, or jealousy, or status anxiety, or misunderstandings, or because those selected model workers suddenly no longer had the time to perform their workplace duties, or because unworthy individuals had been chosen model workers by their kin or factional allies. Instead, the *People's Daily* offers the normative explanation that torment was visited from on high by a number of morally corrupt political leaders upon powerless local cadres and hapless labor models. Now, at long last, the new leadership is proving its moral worth by publicizing and rectifying these many gory cases of mistreatment, or so the narrative goes.

In short, a thorough examination of how the *People's Daily* featured model workers in

the years immediately following the death of Mao Zedong shows that the crucial reason why model workers were resuscitated was that they provided a moral narrative in which the previous regime could be depicted as uniformly evil and violent, while the new leadership had proven their right to rule by vanquishing these evil-doers. This cast of characters was often accentuated—and naturalized—by use of metaphors referring to poison and gardening. What the Gang of Four seemed guilty of, as implied by the *People's Daily*'s frequent and derisive use of the term "egalitarianism," was that they had sought to diminish the superior worth of the model workers, whose objective—and, according to the *People's Daily*, undeserved—suffering endowed them with a higher morality. This the Gang of Four had brought about not by appealing to the interests of identifiable constituencies, but by injecting poison into the body politic. In the literal sense, a society cannot be afflicted by weeds, neither can it suffer the effects of poison. The metaphorical or cognitive grounding here obviously draws upon the imagery related to unwanted influence in the form of liquid and alien intrusions as developed in Chapter 2; something that will be further discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.

4.3 Ruling China: Model workers, factional disputes, and a new democratic China?

As the party-state struggled to regain popular support in 1977-1978, a contest over party-state leadership developed between Mao's anointed successor, Hua Guofeng, and Deng Xiaoping. This contest came to revolve around divergent notions of control and mobilization: Ought people to emulate the superior abilities of their superiors, or should they instead be allowed a political say through democratic representation?

As Hua Guofeng's sole claim to legitimate leadership rested on his connection with the departed Chairman Mao, he quite naturally chose to align himself closely with the memory of the Chairman. This strategy included building a mausoleum for Mao in the middle of Tiananmen Square—the most powerful political space in the country—in clear violation of

an understanding previously reached by the CCP leadership that no leader should have their remains preserved for public viewing after their death.[283] It also included inserting lines about Mao Zedong into the "March of the Volunteers" when this was restored as China's national anthem.[284] It included having the *People's Daily* publish on its front page a calligraphic injunction to "Learn from Lei Feng" on 5 March, 1977, on the exact date and spot where Mao's calligraphy had urged everyone to do the same fourteen years previously.[285] Hua also decided that he would edit the next volume (the fifth) of Mao's selected works.[286] Hua and those around him also commissioned scores, if not hundreds, of paintings, wall posters, and books emphasizing the close connection between Mao and Hua. In every classroom in China were hung identically-sized portraits of Mao and Hua.[287] Some even suggest that Hua tried to copy the pose and the hairstyle of Mao.[288]

Under Hua, however, emulation was not simply a way of establishing the closeness of Hua and Mao; it became the centerpiece of the CPD's vision for organizing industrial relations and stimulating the workforce. A noteworthy example occurred in May, 1977, when Hua personally presided over a "Learn from Daqing" conference in Beijing. See Illustration 4.1. Daqing refers to the Daqing oilfield, a symbol of the strength of ordinary worker willpower and egalitarian values frequently invoked by Mao's supporters since 1971. Just how much the injunction to learn from Daqing was emphasized in 1977 is revealed by Chart 4.2. And emulation was in no way limited to Daqing either: Throughout 1977, the *People's*

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[283] Rudolf G. Wagner, "Reading the Chairman Mao Memorial Hall in Peking: The Tribulations of the Implied Pilgrim," *Pilgrims and Sacred Sites in China*, 1992, 387.
[284] Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 92.
[285] Elaine Jeffreys and Su Xuezhong, "Governing through Lei Feng: A Mao-Era Role Model in Reform-Era China," in *New Mentalities of Government in China*, ed. David Bray and Elaine Jeffreys, vol. 50 (London, England: Routledge, 2016), 6.
[286] Roderick MacFarquhar, "The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 1969-82," in *The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng*, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 312.
[287] John Gittings, "Obituary: Hua Guofeng," *The Guardian*, August 20, 2008, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/aug/21/china. Accessed August 10, 2015.
[288] Weatherley, *Mao's Forgotten Successor*, 150.

Daily published an endless stream of articles devoted to encouraging emulation, not least on the part of the working class. Imitation, in other words, seemed to be a panacea prescribed by the Hua leadership as a means to achieve both political stability and economic progress. Chart 4.3 provides a sense of how pervasive references to emulative behavior became in the *People's Daily* in 1977. As the text accompanying the chart illustrates, the Chinese language is, in itself, unusually rich in terms relating to the emulation of conduct.




Illustration 4.1: Photograph printed in the People's Daily, May 10, 1977, p.4. The banner at the top reads "The entire country's industry learns from the Daqing conference." The paintings depict, on the left, Mao Zedong, and on the right, Hua Guofeng.




Chart 4.2: Number of articles mentioning the phrase "In industry, learn from Daqing" (工业学大庆: *Gongye xue Daqing*) in the *People's Daily* 1970-1984. The above chart relies on a normalized number of articles, because the average number of articles in the *People's Daily* changes significantly over this period. The numbers can be found in the Appendix.




Chart 4.3: This chart represents a summation of the number of articles in the *People's Daily* employing the most common terms relating to the emulation of behavior used in the Chinese language in the period 1975-1984. The included terms are 以身作则 (*yi shen zuo ze*), 作出了表率 (*zuochu le biaoshuai*), 英模 (*yingmo*), 标杆 (*biaogan*), 标兵 (*biaobing*), 榜样 (*bangyang*), 模范 (*mofan*), 看齐 (*kanqi*), 弄潮儿 (*nongchao'er*), 排头兵 (*paitoubing*), 带头示范 (*daitou shifan*), 人民的

楷模 (*renmin de kaimo*), 榜样教育 (*bangyang jiaoyu*), 率先垂范 (*shuaixian chuifan*), 典范 (*dianfan*), 学先进 (*xue xianjin*), 样板 (*yangban*), 领头羊作用 (*lingtouyang zuoyong*). The number of articles mentioning each term can be found in the Appendix. The above chart relies on a normalized number of articles, because the average number of articles in the *People's Daily* changes significantly over this period.

Coming up against the Hua faction, which was both too divided and too inexperienced, and perhaps without the intellectual savvy, to formulate forward-looking visions other than emulation of the past and top-down leadership, Deng perceived that he would gain a strong hand by allying himself with popular demands for increased political participation coming both from politically-mobilized workers as well as from many intellectuals thirsting for greater openness and academic freedom.

As Deng rallies his supporters in 1977-1978, he clearly attempts to offer a different vision for the governance of China, and not least of China's workplaces. In a talk at the ACFTU's ninth national congress in 1978, the first national ACFTU congress since 1958, Deng Xiaoping clearly allied himself with the move towards expanding workers' rights. In his talk, Deng noted that from this day on, on all enterprises across the country, workshop directors, workshop section chiefs, and workshop group leaders are to be elected democratically by the workers. In addition, all major decisions at the enterprises are to be presented and debated at workers' representatives' conferences. Moreover, leading cadres at enterprises will be obliged to listen to the opinions of the workers, to accept the workers' criticism and supervision, and, in cases of egregious leader misconduct, the workers' representative conferences will have the power to recommend that a particular leader is to be disciplined or fired.[289] Just a few months later, the *People's Daily* publishes an article titled "The words of workers carry a lot of weight!" in which Deng gives a speech at Taiyuan Iron & Steel Corporation after the company's workers have elected people to serve in the three managerial positions mentioned above.[290] In other articles as well, Deng unequivocally allies

[289] *People's Daily*, 1978.10.12, p.1, "在中国工会第九次全国代表大会上的致词."
[290] *People's Daily*, 1979.01.05, p.2, "工人说话顶用了!"

himself with the expansion of democracy in Chinese society.[291] Searching through the *People's Daily* it becomes clear that Deng appears particularly eager to associate himself with electoral democracy just before and after the third plenum of the 11th Central Committee, December 18-22, 1978—obviously in an attempt to secure support from forces favoring the greater democratization of Chinese society.

With Deng's ascent to power in late 1978, the *People's Daily* comes to publish a flurry of articles stressing the need for increased workplace democracy in 1979-80. 1980 was also the year with by far the most references to workers' representative congresses (职工代表大会: *zhigong daibiao dahui*) since 1957. Even the Yugoslavian model, lauded for worker ownership of the means of production, is described in positive terms.[292]

After the third plenum, writers, artists, and scholars were also granted considerably greater freedom than they had been for many years. In a speech before the Politburo in August, 1980, Deng devoted considerable time to calling for the "democratization of the life of society as a whole" as a means of vesting people with the power to genuinely supervise political power at every level of society.[293] That Deng's speech was not published until late 1983 reveals, as we shall see shortly, that democratic reform would soon run into considerable resistance.

Discussions over democratization quickly proved to be more than empty talk. In 1980, a slight but nevertheless meaningful liberalization of the election laws was passed, seeming to augur the possibility for the progressive democratization of the Chinese polity. A quantitative analysis of the language used in the *People's Daily* backs up this point: In the years 1979-1980 there were more references in the *People's Daily* to democratization (民主

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[291] *People's Daily*, 1979.01.01, p.1, "把主要精力集中到生产建设上来"; 1979.02.21, p.1, "认真做好发扬民主的引导工作."
[292] *People's Daily*, 1980.05.21, p.7, "南斯拉夫的社会主义自治."
[293] Deng Xiaoping, "Reforming Leadership System," *Peking Review* 26, no. 40 (October 3, 1983): 14–22.

化: *minzhuhua*) than there had been since 1950.[294] In an attempt to forestall problems with electorates who might elect the wrong candidates, the party-state attempted to educate election committees in how to steer voters towards the preferred candidates. If done correctly, the election manuals issued to the committees stated, the elections, although admittedly arduous to administer, would serve as helpful occasions for educating the public.[295]

The move towards allowing and formalizing greater worker input at their enterprises is accompanied by a move towards democratizing the selection of model workers. The first clear indication of this change in the *People's Daily* comes in an article from August, 1978, where it is pointed out that model workers should be "chosen through public appraisal" (评选: *pingxuan*).[296] The term *pingxuan*—here rendered as "choosing through public appraisal"—does not necessarily mean that model workers will be chosen by ballot voting, but it does signal a considerable degree of input from the grassroots in selecting model workers. That the phrase is sensitive can be seen from the fact that it had not been used in relation to selecting model workers by the *People's Daily* since 1957, and that it all but disappears after 1985. It is, however, used in this connection in *People's Daily* articles every year from 1978 to 1985. The height of enthusiasm over worker input in the selection of model workers occurs in March of 1980, when the *People's Daily* clearly spells out that model workers are to be selected democratically.[297]

Right from the beginning, however, increasing the popular input in the process of

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[294] The term "democracy" (民主: *minzhu*) was also used with unusual frequency in 1979-80, though it had been used somewhat more during the Cultural Revolution and much more during the 1950s. Due to the very wide range of meanings associated with the term "*minzhu*" in Chinese, it is not very useful to study it as an indicator of any move towards liberal, representative democracy. "Democratization," on the other hand, has been used more along those lines, particularly in the 1980s. This point can be substantiated by noting that the term "democratization" has never appeared as frequently in the *People's Daily* as it did in 1988, a year of singular media openness to the West, as we shall see later.

[295] Nathan, *Chinese Democracy*, 199ff.

[296] *People's Daily*, 1978.08.16, p.1, "在全国农田基本建设会议上的讲话."

[297] *People's Daily*, 1980.03.28, p.1, "发挥劳模的带头、骨干和桥梁作用."

selecting model workers unleashes worries that workers may select improper labor models. To counteract this possibility, the CPD undertakes a sustained campaign to explain the criteria upon which model workers should be elected: Model workers and advanced collective enterprises, the *People's Daily* explains,

> should possess a high degree of political consciousness. This kind of consciousness is not demonstrated by words, but is shown through concrete action. Most importantly, it consists in doing one's job well, which means having a high degree of vigor and surging enthusiasm. It means having a strong dedication to one's work [事业心: shiyexin; literally, an 'enterprise heart'] and a great sense of responsibility. It also means bowing one's head and working hard, diligently and conscientiously, having proficient mastery over advanced technology and work skills, and taking the lead in advancing production. Only this kind of model worker and advanced collective is worthy of being called a model for the broad masses of workers and all professions.[298]

In other words, "political consciousness" should remain a criterion for electing model workers, but the *People's Daily* attempts to redefine "political consciousness" by solely equating it with professional skills and untiring diligence.

Equally reflective of the Dengist faction's openness to experimenting with new modes of workplace authority are the discussions over industrial strikes which found their way into the *People's Daily* in this period. As is apparent from Chart 4.4, the *People's Daily* makes frequent mention of industrial action in the early years of the 1980s—a frequency that decreases gradually in the latter part of the decade, and then, after 1989, precipitously. In a country where all industry is owned by a party-state ruling in the name of the working class, industrial strikes are obviously problematic. As such, before 1979 the *People's Daily* had dealt with strikes (罢工: *bagong*) in a very predictable manner, describing strikes in capitalist countries as historically significant omens of the capitalist system's imminent collapse, while the discussion of strikes in China are limited to reminiscences of strikes taking place before 1949. This pattern is maintained in 1979-1980, although the *People's Daily* publishes a few articles about strikes taking place during the Cultural Revolution,

[298] *People's Daily*, 1979.09.14, p.1, "老劳模要做出新贡献 新劳模要迎头赶上."

serving to show that workers were antagonistic towards the Gang of Four.




Chart 4.4: Number of articles in the *People's Daily* using the term "strike" (罢工: *bagong*) in 1975-1985. The above chart relies on a normalized number of articles, because the average number of articles in the *People's Daily* changes significantly over this period. The numbers can be found in the Appendix.

In 1980, the *People's Daily* publishes a remarkable number of articles dealing with strikes. Many of these are devoted to strikes in China's past, particularly the February 7, 1923, strike by workers at the Beijing-Hankou Railway; the Hong Kong sailors' strike in 1925; and the Anyuan railway workers' and coal miners' strike in 1922. Only very rarely are other strikes brought up, and those that are brought up almost all date to the years 1922-1927, while the strike wave of 1957—or any other strike taking place between 1949 and 1965—are never mentioned.[299] Model workers appear frequently in these articles and in two different capacities: as participants in anniversary celebrations of historic strikes and/or as venerable,

[299] In stricter terms, these events are never mentioned as "strikes." It is a limit of this project that circumlocutions and other forms of indirect references may sometimes go unnoticed. This is, however, not a serious problem for the present investigation. It may be that there are references buried in the *People's Daily* to, e.g., "factory disturbances" in 1957 and that by disturbances the CPD is, among other things, hinting at the strikes of that period. However, in so far as the present project is about how to do things with—and to—words, the CPD would need to make some kind of explicit connection to the term "strike" in order to seriously engage in an attempt to influence the connotations, emanations, and reverberations surrounding that potent little word.

and now aging, participants in these strikes of yore. By forging the connection between present-day model workers and the much-celebrated strikes in the 1920s, the CPD suggests that those striking workers were also model workers, and that today's model workers are inheritors to that proud tradition upon which the CCP rests its legitimacy as the natural representative of the working class.

A particularly interesting debate concerning the rights and grievances of workers plays itself out in a long series of articles devoted to the eruption of Solidarity onto the Polish political landscape in 1980. The dissatisfaction of Polish workers is explained with reference to a wide range of factors, including poor macroeconomic policy, mounting foreign debt, corruption within the ruling Polish United Workers' Party, a lack of democracy, and bureaucratism. Such openness about the grievances of workers living under a Communist system—especially grievances which must have sounded familiar to many Chinese workers at the time—is very unusual in the *People's Daily* and once again shows that 1979-80 were unusual years in that the *People's Daily* posited, more or less directly, that independent worker organizing and industrial strikes could play a positive role in socialist society. The greater openness towards autonomous worker influence is also reflected in the rehabilitation of Li Lisan (李立三), the former leader of the ACFTU who fell afoul of the rest of the leadership in the early 1950s by advocating that the union should be allowed to act independently of the Party. Li is rehabilitated in March 1980 and receives positive recognition in several articles. In the fall of 1980, the *People's Daily*, in two separate articles, conjoins the terms "autonomous organization" (自治组织: *zizhizuzhi*) and "strike" (罢工: *bagong*) in a positive way.[300] The only other *People's Daily* article to ever bring these two concepts together (in the period 1946-2016) would appear in June, 1989, and this time specifically to denigrate the notion that autonomous organizations should ever involve

[300] *People's Daily*, 1980.10.11, p.6, "波兰领导人谈国内经济形势"; 1980.11.12, p.7, "引人注目的波兰局势."

themselves with strikes.[301]

4.4 Putting an end to workers' democratic participation and the right to strike

As remarkable as the party-state leadership's embrace of democratic reform had been in 1979-1980, as notable was the change in the winter of 1980-1981. A number of political and economic developments may be adduced to have contributed to this development. In urban areas, the promising economic growth rates of 1978-79 turned out to be unsustainable, and in 1980, a number of troubling effects began showing up in the Chinese economy. First of all, the national budget deficit was proving much more difficult to reign in than anticipated, not least because provincial and local governments found ways around the austerity measures announced by the central government. The 1980 figures for industrial production proved considerably weaker than the leadership had expected, with heavy industry growing by only 1.4 percent and energy output declining by 3 percent.[302] These problems were compounded by unemployment and inflation, both of which were becoming increasingly obvious as well as unsettling to city-dwellers who had experienced neither, at least not of this magnitude, for decades. Moreover, several cities experienced strike waves in 1980, quite probably triggered by inflation and the frequent appeals in the media to "smash the iron rice bowl" and do away with "eating of the big pot," which had become very frequent in 1979 and were obvious signals that job security was no longer to be taken for granted (a topic to be investigated in the next chapter).

In early 1980, with the purge of a number of key Hua supporters from the Central Committee, it became clear that Deng's faction had utterly vanquished the allies of Hua Guofeng, and Deng was thus in much less need of popular support. The attempts to use electoral democracy locally to increase order and eliminate unpopular hold-over officials

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[301] *People's Daily*, 1989.06.03, p.1, "北京市总工会发表声明——要求取缔'工人自治联合会'."
[302] Maurice Meisner, *The Deng Xiaoping Era: An Inquiry into the Fate of Chinese Socialism, 1978-1994* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996), 262f.

from the previous epoch had seen both local controversies and the election of candidates anathema to the party-state leadership. Ever anxious of popular resistance against the Party, and now without the need for popular support in his fight against Hua Guofeng, towards the end of 1980 Deng cast his lot with those who favored a curtailment of electoral democracy and of workers' rights.

Having propagated further democratization as an important policy goal in 1979-1980, from early 1981 the CPD had to legitimize a reversal of its previous position. What we see in the *People's Daily* is that the CPD does not wage an aggressive fight to delegitimize democracy as such—something which would have been quite unthinkable, and indeed unnecessary—because democracy had been a fundamental element of the party-state's self-description since the founding of the republic and had been kept afloat as a rather free signifier the entire period. The party-state does, however, send some very clear signals by holding trials against a number of electoral candidates, and some of their supporters, who had, claimed the party-state, breached the rules for orderly conduct and thus caused chaos. The *People's Daily* also describes in a number of articles that "bourgeois democracy" might be fine for the West, but it is not suitable for China. In short, the delegitimation of representative democracy was attempted by explaining that conceiving of democracy as primarily competitive elections merely served to sow social discord, and that anyone who saw in this a promising road for China was obviously in cahoots with enemies abroad.

When it came to workplace democracy, in 1981 the *People's Daily* increasingly stresses that engaging in production ought to take precedence over political issues.[303] At the best enterprises—such as the famed oil fields of Daqing where the celebrated model worker Wang Jinxi was once employed—the leadership, so claims the *People's Daily*, has almost completely done away with the exaggerated focus on political study sessions among work teams; a move which is referred to as "taking the proper medicine" (对症下药:

[303] *People's Daily*, 1981.09.07, p.3, "中共安徽省委和省政府要求各级党政机关 采取有力措施关心支持劳模."

duizhengxiayao)—once again metaphorically transforming unwanted workplace behavior to a form of poison or disease.[304] It is notable that Daqing is singled out as an example here, because it had been publicized as a Maoist symbol of successful industrial development where ordinary workers had overcome extremely unfavorable odds through single-minded perseverance sustained by exceptional revolutionary consciousness. This clearly sends the signal that even at the workunits most closely associated with direct worker influence and with the power of volition, production is now prioritized above political consciousness. By selecting Daqing as an example, the *People's Daily* also sends a signal that even though workplace democracy is being de-emphasized, and even though the socialist character of China is again being emphasized and pitted against feudal and capitalist practices, this does not mean that workers should once again embrace the political fervor and boisterous exuberance previously represented by Daqing.

In regards of the selection of model workers, from 1981 there is no more talk about grassroots participation. Instead, the *People's Daily* explains that the participation of the grassroots in selecting model workers have caused a number of unworthy workers to be awarded the model worker title, because the local leaders had not properly instructed the workers in the criteria upon which they ought to be selected.[305] In other words, democratic selection procedures must be suspended because local cadres are not up to the task of educating the populace in the proper exercise of their voting rights—sending the implied message that without proper instruction the populace tend to elect among themselves individuals not worthy for such an honor. With this, the *People's Daily* stops showing concern over grassroots participation in model worker selection, indicating that such a practice has come to a halt. Instead of being selected through public appraisal, model workers are now most often described as "gushing forth" (涌现出: *yongxianchu*). In other words, model

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[304] *People's Daily*, 1982.01.24, p.1, "这里的先进人物为什么香？——大庆党委做好劳模工作的调查."
[305] *People's Daily*, 1981.03.09, p.3, "评选"劳模"不要定名额."

workers are metaphorically transformed into a liquified force for good under the administration of the party-state.

The change of political atmosphere is also clear in the coverage of the development in Poland, where the *People's Daily* suddenly begins to talk much more positively about the Polish leadership and much more negatively about Solidarity.[306] The changed status of strikes is expressed even more clearly in the coverage of the most discussed industrial action case of the year, *viz.*, the large airport-controllers' strike in the US. The articles devoted to this conflict are very light on direct denunciations of the hard-bitten approach of the American government—marking a clear contrast with how the American government's treatment of its working class had been covered in the *People's Daily* during the previous two decades. The *People's Daily* even goes so far as to express sympathy for the problems of the American administration and explains that "If [Reagan] chooses to make a concession to the airport controllers' union, this will ignite a chain reaction and seriously affect his plans for an economic recovery."[307] In a marked contrast to how strikes in capitalist countries have previously been covered in the *People's Daily*, in 1981 it was suddenly stressed that these strikers might imperil national economic performance.

That the problem of industrial action continued to haunt the party-state was made clear in the new state constitution adopted in December 1982. In addition to removing the glowing references to the Cultural Revolution, which had featured in both the 1975 and the 1978 Constitutions, one of the most consequential revisions is the elimination of the right to strike,[308] sending a powerful signal that the working class should be productive, not obstreperous or political. The revocation of the right to strike was clearly a sensitive topic, and it is dealt with in very somber tones by the *People's Daily*. The first of only five articles to

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[306] For a comprehensive treatment of this changing press coverage in China, see Jeanne L. Wilson, "'The Polish Lesson': China and Poland 1980–1990," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 23, no. 3 (1991): 259–79, https://doi.org/10.1016/0039-3592(90)90011-A.
[307] *People's Daily*, 1981.08.06, p.6, "美国机场塔台指挥人员大罢工影响巨大."
[308] William C. Jones, "The Constitution of the People's Republic of China," *Washington University Law Quarterly* 63 (1985): 726f.

mention that the new Constitution will scrap the right to strike is printed in May 1982, and it consists of a very terse, and untitled, report informing readers that model worker representatives attending a national symposium for model workers have discussed the draft for the amended constitution and unanimously endorse abolishing the right to strike.[309] In the accompanying photograph, three model workers stoop over some very large pieces of paper, presumably the draft constitution. Of the two figures in the front, one is inspecting the documents, while another is writing something down, metonymically allowing model workers a hand in the drafting of the constitution. The third person, at the farthest remove from the camera, a way of framing the shot which places the huge documents in the center, looks into the camera with a stern gaze, signaling his unwavering support of the party-state's amended constitution. What this article does, then, is both to confirm that (model) workers have a right to be heard, as well as to establish that they harbor neither the wish nor—from this day forth—the right to actively seek other, independent ways of exercising that right.

In the second article mentioning the abolition of the right to strike—titled "All power belongs to the people," a somewhat crude attempt at framing the constitutional amendment as a victory for popular rule—members of the China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese (归国华侨联合会, Guiguo Huaqiao Lianhehui) discuss the constitutional draft.[310] In the words of the article, "These returned patriots, who have had their fill of loneliness abroad and have experienced extreme leftism [under the Cultural Revolution] which have filled their hearts with countless things to say, are today able to discuss the constitutional revisions in their capacity as masters of the country [*zhurenweng*]." Zhou Xiqing (周锡卿)—an associate professor and member of the China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese who had returned to China from abroad in 1938 and, it is emphasized, had seen much hardship—is quoted as applauding the decision to remove the constitutional right to strike. Zhou shores up his argument by asking rhetorically what good strikes would do for the

[309] *People's Daily*, 1982.05.03, p.4, "[No title]."
[310] *People's Daily*, 1982.05.14, p.3, "一切权力属于人民."

national economy, for the lives of the masses, and for peaceful cooperation? He adds that bureaucratic corruption of course needs to be fought, but he cannot approve of strikes as a means of doing this. Such corruption, the implied argument goes, is on the radar of the political leadership and is best fought by the party-state apparatus itself, not by over-animated workers.

By drawing a line from the violence of the civil war and the Cultural Revolution to the abolition of the right to strike, the *People's Daily* frames industrial strikes as a kind of violent chaos against which precautions need to be adopted by a party-state dedicated to maintaining order. The returned overseas Chinese make good spokespeople here, because they are known to have suffered during times of political upheaval and could with good reason be expected to favor a curtailment of any form of mass mobilization. In addition, this long-persecuted group is a better choice as spokespeople than journalists or politicians—who usually explicate political decisions in *People's Daily*—because they do not represent the political establishment. This choice of spokespeople must also be seen as a way of saying that returned overseas Chinese should be respected and their opinions taken into consideration. This makes sense in the context of the times, when more than 300.000 returned overseas Chinese had left since the exit restrictions had been eased in 1973, depriving the Chinese state of access to a substantial pool of resources, skills, and foreign connections.[311] As the Chinese state began to focus on developing international contacts it became very interested in both attracting more overseas Chinese and encouraging those who had already returned to stay.[312]

In the third article devoted to the topic, a member of the National People's Congress from Gansu Province explains that the new constitution thoroughly eliminates the

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311 Michael R. Godley, "The Sojourners: Returned Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China," *Pacific Affairs* 62, no. 3 (1989): 349, https://doi.org/10.2307/2760626.

312 Under reform and opening, both Chinese with relatives overseas and overseas returnees were entitled to special treatment, and the latter was also singled out in the 1982 Constitution. Mette Thunø, "Reaching out and Incorporating Chinese Overseas: The Trans-Territorial Scope of the PRC by the End of the 20th Century," *The China Quarterly* 168 (2001): 910–929.

"misguided leftist after-effects." As above, a connection is posited between extreme leftism and the right to strike.[313] In another article on the same day, an unnamed representative of the PLA states that the constitutional changes regarding government, strikes, and the continued revolution are all correct, and that their implementation need to be protected by the armed forces—sending a clear signal to anyone who might have thought the constitutional revision was a topic for discussion, rather than simply something to be aware of. In the last article on the topic, the *People's Daily* reports that the constitutional amendments have met with praise across the world and that even though the right to strike has been abolished, the political rights of the Chinese people have been considerably improved by this constitutional revision. Reading through the international newspaper coverage of the time, it is obvious that the *People's Daily* picks and chooses the quotes most to its liking, but it is nevertheless also true to say that contemporary newspaper commentary around the world *did* present the constitutional amendments as largely positive, not least because the glowing references to the Cultural Revolution had been removed—and as Kraus notes, it was probably widely assumed in the West that nothing associated with Mao could have positive implications for human rights.[314] The glowing words of foreign approval selected by the *People's Daily* stands in curious contrast to the remarkably few domestic politicians and opinion-makers who are associated with the new constitution in the *People's Daily*; probably an indication that the CPD finds it wise to draw attention away from the politicians responsible for the changes and instead focus on the supposed necessity of the constitutional revision and on relaying the positive reception the amendments have supposedly met with.

Finally, in a richly symbolic article, the *People's Daily* ties together industrial strikes and "bourgeois democracy" in order to delegitimize both. The article asks the reader to

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[313] *People's Daily*, 1982.11.30, p.2, "人大代表、甘肃省委第一书记冯纪新说——多种经济形式并存完全符合我国国情."

[314] Richard Curt Kraus, *The Cultural Revolution: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 107.

compare the two photographs shown here below: "Dear reader, when you look at the photograph of Parliament Road No. 26 from before liberation, that tightly shut iron gate, the large characters spelling 'strike,' the grim sentry, the shabby clothes, the idle expressions on the children's faces, all of this, does it not lead you to recollect the miserable times of old China?"[315] The article further explains that Parliament Road no longer exists as it was demolished in a round of urban renewal. The reason for the name of the street, the article explains, is that the Chinese parliament was once situated here—but this was "bourgeois democracy" it is explained, and those who summoned meetings here were the "Northern Warlord 'Presidents.'" At this spot is now found Xinhua (New China News Agency). What this article does very clearly is to consign to the past both strikes and the notion of "bourgeois democracy," which is further disparaged by being linked with warlords. In place of dilapidated buildings, closed gates, strikes, guards, and sluggish children, the new China is a broad thoroughfare with paved roads, street lighting, tall buildings and various motorized vehicles rushing head-on—as if progress itself had blown apart the gates and left industrial action and bourgeois democracy irrelevant at the wayside. In other words, in order that China may arrive at the future, the obstacles of sham democracy and strikes must be removed.





Illustration 4.2: Photographs accompanying *People's Daily*, 1982.07.11, p.5, "'国会街'今昔."

[315] *People's Daily*, 1982.07.11, p.5, "'国会街'今昔."

4.5 Abandon politics, embrace spectator sports and nationalism

With the end of the democratic experiment and the formal abolition of the right to strike, the party-state took another important step away from the popular participatory aspects of socialism as it had been conceived of under Mao. This marked the end of an era in terms of conceptions about mass input into political decision-making, and just how swift the ending had come may be appreciated by noticing how rapid the use of terms such as "the proletariat," "the exploiting class," "continue the revolution," and "politics in command" decreased after 1976—see Chart 4.5 for more examples or look to the Appendix for many more. By 1980, most such terms had decreased in usage by 80-90%, and most would continue on a slow but steady downward slope until 1989, when the events at Tiananmen caused a temporary resurrection for many of these terms, before their continued gradual weakening up to the present. While Deng's faction had for a while supported workers' aspirations for a certain political participation, the limited democratic experiments had, as noted above, constantly been accompanied by a perceived need, on the part of the party-state elite, to educate the masses in how to exercise their voting rights with decorum.



	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
马克思	4716	2388	1580	858	558	490	548	626	365	308	425	427	274
列宁	1418	822	552	351	280	188	195	171	124	114	128	135	131
共产主义	2573	1729	1180	748	465	481	899	720	385	466	355	286	183
社会主义	8690	7570	5799	4145	2348	2563	2887	2283	1952	1748	1848	2114	1598
革命	12060	9718	7011	3909	2243	2246	1996	1818	1704	1444	1357	1310	922
无产阶级	8640	4652	2630	1247	615	461	397	337	224	159	193	165	128
继续革命	2947	1387	520	23	6	15	16	11	18	10	2	2	4
剥削阶级	634	203	173	154	108	73	79	69	43	25	18	21	7
阶级斗争	6448	1908	877	414	171	94	116	93	73	59	72	54	58
政治挂帅	674	260	203	33	5	0	4	2	4	1	2	2	3

Chart 4.5: Number of articles using a number of terms related to socialism in China in the *People's Daily* 1976-1988. The terms are Marx (马克思: *Makesi*), Lenin (列宁: *Liening*), communism (共产主义: *gongchanzhuyi*), socialism (社会主义: *shehuizhuyi*), revolution (革命: *geming*), proletariat (无产阶级: *wuchanjieji*), continuous revolution (继续革命: *jixugeming*), exploiting class (剥削阶级: *boxuejieji*), class struggle (阶级斗争: *jiejidouzheng*), politics in command (政治挂帅: *zhengzhiguashuai*). The above chart relies on a normalized number of articles, because the average number of articles in the *People's Daily* changes significantly over this period. The numbers can be found in the Appendix. I have chosen to render the legend in Chinese characters for this chart, because the English translations would take up so much space that the numbers would become illegible.

The political demobilization of the population included drastically decreasing the time spent

on party-meetings in factories.[316] Model workers are intimately involved in this process through a long list of articles published in the late 1970s and early 1980s criticizing factories where model workers are, according to the *People's Daily*, constantly being dragged around to participate in time-consuming political meetings, limiting their otherwise fabulous capacity for great feats of production. The *People's Daily* severely criticizes this kind of "formalism" (形式主义: *xingshizhuyi*) along with the practice of using model workers as "window dressing" (装饰门面: *zhuangshi menmian*) for festive occasions.[317]

From around 1980, familial concerns begin to appear as a kind of prescribed anti-dote to politicized life, and with this emerges a gendered dimension to the reform efforts. Model workers had always, as Paul Clark has noted about the heroes of the "model operas" of the Cultural Revolution, been without biological relatives—Lei Feng, who often referred in his diary to the CCP as his mother, being a case in point. Clark points out that,

> In a culture that had privileged the family for two millennia, this new model person was a deliberate effort to repudiate the heroes of the 'feudal' past. The central heroes of the model operas and ballets have a substitute family in the form of their comrades-in-arms and a caring and supportive Communist Party. Politics thus takes precedence over biology in molding a new, modern Chinese person.[318]

This situation changes drastically in the early 1980s, when an engagement with politics suddenly comes to be portrayed as an obstacle to achieving a fulfilling family life. One example is provided by an article featuring a young woman who has been selected model worker four years in a row. One day she informs her boss that she would rather not be a model worker again, because all the potential spouses she is introduced to are so awestruck by her titles that they dare not converse with her about anything but politics.[319] The following year, it is reported that many workers in the service industry are getting on in years and "still have not solved their personal marriage problems." This, it is explained, is

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[316] Walder, *Communist Neo-Traditionalism*, chap. 7.
[317] *People's Daily*, 1980.10.14, p.2, "兼职多、会议多、社会活动多亟待解决."
[318] Clark, "Model Theatrical Works and the Remodelling of the Cultural Revolution," 171f.
[319] *People's Daily*, 1981.07.08, p.4, "从"一个青年劳模的苦恼"说开去."

because what people are looking for in a spouse is not a political activist but someone who can look after the home—presumably a woman.[320] A few years later, a female model worker is quoted as impressing upon her fellow women the importance of working diligently, but also to find time to "educate their children and encourage their husbands to sacrifice themselves for their enterprises."[321] As these examples indicate, participating in politics should not be at the expense of family life, and women in particular should not forget that their primary responsibilities are towards their home, and that they will only bring problems onto themselves if they are overly ambitious professionally or politically.

With the rapid divestment of Maoist socialism, the most remarkable ideological innovation from the CPD comes in the form of a turn toward patriotism and identifying with the nation. This manifests itself in many ways in the *People's Daily*, such as in the keen interest many model workers suddenly develop in national-level sports. One example of this occurs when model worker Sun Lianben (孙连本), upon learning that the Chinese female volleyball team has won the world championship, exclaims that "Chinas has won! This is a victory of our motherland, and an honor for the people." That same evening, the *People's Daily* reports, Sun decided to complete the equivalent of 1.000 hours of work in only 600 hours. Not long after, all of the workers at Sun's factory decides to study "the high patriotic consciousness of the female volleyball heroes."[322] Two days later, at the official reception for the returning volleyball heroes, a number of model workers state that they have been inspired by the revolutionary and patriotic consciousness of the volleyball players to work even harder for China's modernization.[323] Four days later, the volleyball team's coach gives a speech to an assembly of more than 100 model workers, describing the reorganization of the

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[320] *People's Daily*, 1982.08.16, p.3, "关心服务行业青年劳模的婚姻大事."
[321] *People's Daily*, 1986.03.07, p.1, "十九位女劳模向全国四千万女职工倡议——为实现'七五'计划建功立业."
[322] *People's Daily*, 1981.11.20, p.1, "以女排为榜样——为四化做贡献——中国女排的胜利鼓舞了广大群众的生产、学习热情."
[323] *People's Daily*, 1981.11.22, p.1, "倪志福在欢迎载誉归来的中国女排的茶话会上号召——学习女排精神——为四化立新功."

team in 1976, the preparations for the recent tournament, and the most important moments during the final match. Coach Yuan Weimin (袁伟民)—a man and many years later chosen to be President of the Beijing organizing committee for the 2008 summer Olympics—explains that when China was trailing the Peruvian team 14-15 in the final set of the match, the Chinese players showed that they took China's honor as the highest expression of patriotic consciousness and thereby managed to win the game.[324] In subsequent years—such as in 1983 when China won just about every medal at the table tennis world championship—labor models have always been seen in the *People's Daily* to rejoice in China's athletic triumphs, sending the message that labor models care greatly about enhancing China's international prestige through competition.

This political reimagining—replacing domestic class conflict with international competition—also had profound consequences for the representation of China's history. This surfaced perhaps most clearly in the newfound attention to the history and memorialization of the Nanjing Massacre (南京大屠杀: *Nanjing datusha*) by the *People's Daily* from 1982, where the *People's Daily* publishes no less than 42 articles mentioning the event—many of them detailing horrible atrocities perpetrated by Japanese soldiers against Chinese women and children—after not having employed the term "南京大屠杀" since 1960.[325] Takashi Yoshida has described how official PRC documents dealing with the Japanese invasion of China, and in particular with the invasion of Nanjing in 1937-1938, had for decades emphasized that those bearing the guilt were a limited number of Japanese militarists who also subjected their own population to horrendous suffering. This narrative, Yoshida notes, changes in 1982-1983, where American devils, Chinese collaborators, and evil

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[324] *People's Daily*, 1981.11.26, p.4, "教练袁伟民谈——女排冠军是怎样得来的."

[325] That the party-state is invested in determining exactly how this heinous event is represented is indicated by the fact that while the *People's Daily* has, in the period of 1946 to 2011, published 843 articles mentioning the term "the great Nanjing Massacre" (南京大屠杀: *Nanjing datusha*), the same paper has published only eighteen articles referring to the event as "the Nanjing Massacre" (南京屠杀: *Nanjing tusha*). Clearly, the CPD has established that there is only one correct way of referring to this event.

nationalists (KMT) are erased from the official narrative, which instead lays out the conflict as a simple dichotomy where one nation brutalizes another.[326] Another way of expressing this is that the CPD from around 1982 creates a world where national boundaries, rather than class antagonism, constitute the major fault lines, seeking to foster a uniform national identity on the basis of supposedly shared collective suffering.

Further indicative of the increased inclination to explain developments with reference to national interests is the surge of references to China's "national conditions" (国情: *guoqing*) in this period; a term which has continued to become used ever more frequently in the *People's Daily* up until the present. The increased focus on nationalism on the part of the party-state leadership is reflected in 1982 when socialism—previously conceived of very much as an international movement—is replaced by "socialism with Chinese characteristics" as the country's guiding ideology. This new term would come to be used with great frequency in the *People's Daily* in the following years, until it gradually waned from around 2003. This development was, as Hughes has noted, seized and supported by Deng Xiaoping who used it to forge a direct connection between national disintegration and resistance to the economic reforms, making it difficult to challenge the reform policies without appearing unpatriotic.[327] Also in 1982, Deng stopped including "communist thinking" as an element of "revolutionary spirit," which was instead cast as "ideals, morality, culture and discipline"[328]—leaving the party-state solidly in charge of flexibly determining what exactly "socialism with Chinese characteristics" would mean.

4.6 Conclusion

With the above analysis we are now able to make sense of how model workers were used in

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[326] Takashi Yoshida, *The Making of the "Rape of Nanking": History and Memory in Japan, China, and the United States: History and Memory in Japan, China, and the United States* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2006), chap. 8.
[327] Christopher R. Hughes, *Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era* (Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2006), 11ff.
[328] Hughes, 18.

the *People's Daily* to deal with the most burning political issues of the early reform period. In the years immediately after Mao's death and the arrest of the "Gang of Four," publicizing stories about the suffering of model workers gave the party-state an ideal opportunity for presenting the difference between the "Gang of Four" and the subsequent party-state leaders as one predicated primarily on the moral treatment of the country's supposedly leading class. By placing all blame for the suffering of model workers on the "Gang of Four," the party-state attempted to construct the nation as a homogenous emotional community without any of the volatile fractures from where violent conflict might re-emerge. This approach shares with the land reform movement of the early PRC an attention to publicly interpreting and channeling the emotions of a large collective into specific projects, but this time the animosity is to be directed against—or "written upon the bodies of," as one of the cautious and cultured metaphors in frequent use had it—the Gang of Four, rather than against any group still active in society.[329]

The articles about model worker suffering suggested that the difference between the Gang of Four and the new leadership hinged on hatred versus caring for China's working class. It should be noted that these articles all focus on individual stories of hardship, and as such they fall into the "episodic" class of issue framing in Iyengar's widely-used distinction between "thematic" and "episodic" issue framing. This is in no way coincidental: as Iyengar noted, and as many have found since, episodic framing tends to encourage emotional responses based on individual cases, whereas thematic coverage of an issue is more likely to cause readers to think of issues in structural, rather than emotional or moral terms.[330] As such, the individual stories of hardship experienced by model workers fit the requirements

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[329] Land redistribution and the new rural class structure of the 1940s and early 1950s were performed and morally legitimated through planned-in-advance struggle sessions hinging upon the correct understanding of who had suffered and for what reasons. Guo Wu, "Speaking Bitterness"; Li Fangchun, "Making Revolution on the Mind."

[330] See, e.g., Robert M. Entman, Jörg Matthes, and Lynn Pellicano, "Nature, Sources, and Effects of News Framing," in *The Handbook of Journalism Studies*, ed. Karin Wahl-Jorgensen and Thomas Hanitzsch (New York: Routledge, 2009), 175–90.

perfectly, as they were individuals who had been chosen for their excellence and whose suffering, related in gruesome detail, would make anyone sick to the stomach. Narratives emphasizing the suffering of model workers as a group, in contrast, might have provoked questions about the political structure, rather than just about certain political individuals within that structure—which probably explains why thematic framing is not employed in any of the articles detailing model worker suffering.

Under Hua Guofeng, who desperately attempted to model himself on the late Mao Zedong, the calls for emulative behavior reached a crescendo, revealing the poverty of the alternative political visions of participation, coordination, and control Hua's faction was able to formulate. Hua and his faction were clearly without the courage to court popular support through mobilization drives, as Mao had so expertly done. Where the *People's Daily* had virtually flowed over with calls to emulate Chairman Mao and to model personal behavior on his writings in 1966-1971, Hua now attempted to revive this popular adulation and turn it into a political vision where harmony, order, and prosperity would follow if merely everyone would model themselves on virtuous exemplars and proven practices.[331] As such, Hua's

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[331] At a cultural level, there is also a religious aspect to this. The severity of the charges directed against Mao in recent years for crimes against humanity should not blind us to the fact that Mao had by the time of his death achieved such a stature that he made it into the Chinese popular religious pantheon. Elizabeth Perry noted in a 2012 lecture that "Reverence for Mao extends well beyond state-sponsored initiatives. A survey of popular religious beliefs conducted recently in 40 major cities in China found that nearly 12% of urban residents report that they regularly worship images of Chairman Mao in their homes. About the same number who report that they venerate ancestor tablets and more than the ten percent who say that they pray to Buddhist images. [...] In the countryside the reverence for Mao is even more pronounced." Elizabeth J. Perry, *Anyuan: Mining China's Revolutionary Tradition* (Brown University, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p68OM0JjhrE. Perry also notes that it is not uncommon to place pictures of Mao side by side with Buddhist icons. One may also note that most statues of Mao built during the Cultural Revolution was 12.26 meters high, a number chosen as an acronym for Mao's birthday, revealing a mode of thought connected to geomantic correspondences between different ontological realms, which continue to play a role in traditional Chinese medicine and *fengshui*. See Daniel Leese, *Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in China's Cultural Revolution* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 156f. In regards of the late Chairman, Wagner has shown that Mao's mausoleum can fruitfully be interpreted as a structure partly political, partly religious. Wagner also notes that upon assuming power in 1949, the CCP had redefined China's "religious geography" and constructed numerous sacred places and

faction tried to offer an educative vision for how China could navigate the uncertain sea of the future without its helmsman by taking the past as a guide for what was to come, and Hua quite naturally surrounded himself with a considerable number of model workers to send political signals.

The second wave of narratives involving model workers was very different from the narratives dominating in 1977-78. Where the party-state leadership under Hua had attempted to present emulation as inherently virtuous, thereby positing attacks against emulable exemplars as particularly reprehensible, Deng and those around him found that the reinvented model worker tradition could be used for entirely different purposes. By allying himself with the widespread sentiment that workers ought to be involved with politics and factory decision-making, Deng managed to harness the norms and expectations of a working class who had been politically mobilized during the Cultural Revolution and who found little appeal in the Hua leadership's interminable praise for workplace emulation and labor competitions (more on labor competitions in the following chapter). This normative emphasis on modelling as a desirable mode of identity formation is intimately related to the notion of porous personhood.

In addition to presenting the election of model workers by their comrades as a symbol of the new workplace democracy, Deng also embraced a wider vision of grassroots democracy. Deng's motivation here was undoubtedly that many of his potential allies were intellectuals who saw in formalized democratic institutions and freedom of speech a safeguard against a repeat of the Cultural Revolution and a way to fashion out of China a modern nation-state. Obviously, electoral democracy was also attractive to Deng's faction because elections could be wielded against the upstart Hua and his faction who were neither very well-known nor very well-liked among China's population at large, and Deng hoped that

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memorials whose "purpose was furthermore to set up a model of rarefied behavior for the visitors that, if successfully imitated, would lead them to similar glory." Wagner, "Reading the Chairman Mao Memorial Hall in Peking," 383. At the popular level, Mao is still kept symbolically alive by impersonators, songs, paintings, buttons, and a long list of related paraphernalia.

popular elections would boot out of office (and thus save him the task) many locally unpopular officials, who had been appointed during the Cultural Revolution, a period now roundly condemned in the official press.

Having secured their hold on power, and facing a number of unexpected economic and social problems (more on these to come in Chapters 5 and 6), Deng's faction saw much less use for democracy as a means of securing popular support, and from early 1981 the party-state launched a sustained campaign to delegitimize both representative democracy and the workers' right to strike. This campaign involved calling upon several model workers to explain the necessity of the new policies. In the matter of just a few years, model workers were transformed from being piteous victims of terror who vowed to transform their animus into productive labor, to symbols of democratic development, and finally to staunch defenders of a party-state which sought to curb worker autonomy and experiments with democracy and legitimized this by connecting strikes and democracy with a supposedly violent and feudal past.

As it abandoned its short-lived attachment to the democratization of Chinese society, the party-state leadership, in the course of 1982, formulated a new understanding of the world where nations, rather than classes, were at the center. Model workers became involved in this project to serve as demonstrations of how model workers, who had previously been selected among the most politically active at a work place and therefore presumably had a particular political role and insight, were rejoicing that a political vision of the world impelled forward through class conflict was being replaced by a vision of a Chinese nation excelling in international spectator sports. The *People's Daily* has also sought to forge this connection between sports heroes and model workers in the decades since by staging recurrent meetings between various members of these two groups. The connection was made with particular clarity in 2009 when the strapping Olympic diver Tian Liang was cast

as Lei Feng in a TV series.[332] The frequency with which model workers have been summoned up to create emotion-based community is indicative of the centrality accorded to examplars for creating groups in a social imaginary where personhood is characterized by porosity, as outlined in Chapter 2.

Finally, the analysis shows that the political elite took the Chinese working class very seriously in the early years of the reform period: both Hua and Deng went to great lengths to present themselves as closely allied with China's workers. This reflects the fear of armed worker insurrection on the part of the political elite in the wake of the Cultural Revolution, and it also shows how the competing political elites were jostling for power by attempting to appear to be the closest friend of the working class. This latter point is brought home with particular clarity by noting how sternly the party-state began to agitate against worker influence and autonomy as soon as the battle for power between Hua and Deng had been settled. Having secured control over the central party-state institutions, Deng no longer needed workers to vote, he needed them to work, hard and obediently. Worker obedience, as the next chapter will show, became increasingly important up through the 1980s as the reforms continued to make inroads on what had for decades been China's social compact.

[332] Jeffreys and Su Xuezhong, "Governing through Lei Feng: A Mao-Era Role Model in Reform-Era China."

Chapter 5: Model workers and the workplace. Remuneration, motivation, and industrial relations (1977-1988)

5.1 Introduction

Economically, the period 1977-1984 was marked by both ups and downs and uneven development. Rural residents experienced rapid economic growth in the period 1978-1984 due to a combination of decollectivization, an increased availability of chemical fertilizer, and increased requisitioning prices, and by 1984 cloth rationing could be abolished and the persistent threat of food shortage suddenly seemed to be a thing of the past.[333] According to official figures, per capita rural incomes rose from 134 yuan in 1978 to 355 yuan in 1984.[334] In addition, rural industry, commonly referred to as township and village enterprises (TVEs), grew rapidly in the same period and proved hugely profitable.[335] There had, in fact, been considerable rural industrialization before 1949—of a small-scale and often household-based kind—but the KMT as well the CCP—both desiring large-scale, technologically advanced industry—had smothered this kind of industrialization which they considered an obstacle on the path to the kind of modernization they envisioned for China.[336] In addition, Maoist policies of local grain self-sufficiency had further forced ruralites to abandon rural industry in favor of foodstuff production, even in areas where the environment did not favor

[333] Naughton, *The Chinese Economy*, 89f.
[334] Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China*, 464.
[335] Naughton provides a detailed description of the factors underpinning the strong growth of TVEs after 1978. Naughton, *The Chinese Economy*, 175ff.
[336] Eyferth, "De-Industrialization in the Chinese Countryside"; Henrietta Harrison, "Village Industries and the Making of Rural-Urban Difference in Early Twentieth-Century Shanxi," in *How China Works: Perspectives on the Twentieth-Century Industrial Workplace*, ed. Jacob Eyferth (London: Routledge, 2006), 25–40. The Chinese case is an interesting example of how convictions of what industrialization is supposed to look like, may dampen a more organic and potentially quite robust industrial structure. See David Edgerton for an interesting and amusing account of how a tendency to overestimate the value and usefulness of new technologies and underestimate the continued importance of older technologies have become widespread in the post-World War II atmosphere of infatuation with science. David Edgerton, *The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History since 1900* (Profile Books, 2008).

such efforts.[337]

In urban areas, the promising economic growth rates of 1978-79 turned out to be unsustainable, and in 1980, a number of troubling effects began showing up in the Chinese economy. First of all, the national budget deficit was proving much more difficult to reign in than anticipated, not least because provincial and local governments found ways around the austerity measures announced by the central government. The 1980 figures for industrial production proved considerably weaker than the leadership had expected, with heavy industry growing by only 1.4 percent and energy output declining by 3 percent.[338] These problems were compounded by unemployment and inflation, both of which were becoming increasingly obvious as well as unsettling to city-dwellers who had experienced neither, at least not of this magnitude, for decades. Moreover, several cities experienced strike waves in 1980, quite probably triggered by inflation and the frequent appeals in the media to "smash the iron rice bowl" and do away with "eating of the big pot," which had become very frequent in 1979 and were obvious signals that job security was no longer to be taken for granted. For a Party still very much staking its legitimacy on providing urbanites both full employment

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[337] Just how rigidly these policies had been enforced may be appreciated by Zhao Ziyang's account of the sense of revelation he experienced when he visited Western Europe for the first time. "I arrived first in southern France on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea, a region world-renowned for economic development. The climate there was very dry and no rain falls in the summer. Under such conditions, according to our past way of thinking, in order to plant crops we would 'change the conditions defined by heaven and earth' by creating huge irrigation projects. They did no such thing, but instead planted grapes and other crops that were suited to the dry climate. The result was the natural formation of the French wine industry. The farmers there are very wealthy. [...] On my way back through Greece, comrades in the embassy accompanied me for a tour of the hilly regions where the weather was dry and there was no rainfall in the summer. According to our approach, the conditions would have been considered very tough for agriculture. We would have replicated the Dazhai model, using terraced fields and irrigation projects. But they did not do that. The hills were covered with olive trees and the olive oil industry flourished. The farmers' living standards were high. Why were they able to do this? Because they were not living in an autarky, but instead relied on trade with the outside world and utilized their strengths to export their goods in exchange for what they needed." Zhao Ziyang, *Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang* (New York, N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 2009), 134f. That the leader of the world's most populous country was so surprised by the profits to be reaped by pursuing comparative advantage says a lot about how powerful notions of self-sufficiency and development through volition had been for the party-state.

[338] Meisner, *The Deng Xiaoping Era*, 262f.

and daily-lives sheltered from the economic boom-and-busts found under capitalism, these were troubling signs. Accordingly, when the Party leaders met in December 1980 and again in the spring of 1981, the conservatives, who were critical of the wide-ranging economic reforms being implemented, found themselves in a position of increased leverage, and the leadership decided to suspend further marketization of urban industry and recentralize economic decision-making.[339]

One of the most pressing issues for the new leadership after Mao's death was how to improve both the quantity and quality of industrial production, problems which hinged not least on how to control and motivate the workforce. Mao, and those who claimed to follow his command, had launched the Cultural Revolution in an attempt to wage permanent revolution in order, in Meisner's words, "to spiritually revitalize and politically activate the people," who—and this was a crucial point—had to liberate themselves and not have anyone act on their behalf.[340] The goals of those most bent on waging Cultural Revolution had been various, but the furtherance of industrial productivity and factory floor discipline had not been primary among them. What had been considered important was doing away with distinctions between workers and managers and heightening the consciousness of workers and cadres alike through job rotation aiming to eliminate the distinction between mental and manual labor.[341]

In order to formulate the new policies, Deng had, since 1980, repeatedly invited the World Bank to send delegations to China to help draw up plans for reforming the economy. The reports subsequently submitted by the World Bank—in addition to meetings with János Kornai who had attracted world-wide attention with his contention that "soft budget

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[339] Meisner, 268.
[340] Meisner, 48f.
[341] According to Schoenhals, Mao's "insistence upon mediating all economic activities through political movements was so total, his wife was able to claim she 'never heard the Chairman mention pushing the national economy forward." Michael Schoenhals, "Political Movements, Change and Stability: The Chinese Communist Party in Power," *The China Quarterly* 159, no. 1 (1999): 597.

constraints" created perverse incentive structures which made it practically impossible to increase productivity in the state-owned sector—helped the reformist faction convince the conservative members of the party-state leadership that market mechanisms were what China needed. This effectively meant that where the initial stages of economic reform had been inspired by policies being enacted in Communist countries in Eastern Europe, the next stage of reform in China would be made up of practices imported from the US and Western Europe.[342]

Central to the World Bank's recommendations for reforming China's SOEs was the re-introduction of material incentives, the abolishment of life-time employment, and increasing the power and responsibility of factory management. These were, however, daunting challenges. As Frazier has pointed out, the party-state's attempts to tie individual remuneration closely to work performance had largely become undone with the decentralization of industrial managerial control in the late 1950s. Locally, workers and their immediate leaders had been largely successful in their attempts to peg wages to non-skill criteria such as tenure, previous job experience, number of dependents, and political attitude.[343] This development took place because social norms relating to fair compensation in the workplace did not tally with the national industrial policies introduced up through the 1950s—leading to, among other things, the strike wave of 1957. As individual salaries were determined at plenary sessions in the factories, social norms came to override policies promulgated by the central authorities.[344] In 1966-1967, activist workers in many factories managed to abolish pay differentials all together and to extend permanent positions to those originally hired as temporary workers.[345] Summing up the period from the 1950s to the beginning of the reform period, Frazier argues that "Chinese workers consistently resisted

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[342] Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China*, 459ff. Gewirtz, *Unlikely Partners*.
[343] Frazier, *The Making of the Chinese Industrial Workplace State, Revolution, and Labor Management*, 154ff.
[344] Frazier, 180ff.
[345] Frazier, 230ff.

efforts to depersonalize the employment relationship with a rule-bound labor regime of personnel administrators."[346]

If worker sentiments generally favored a relatively equal wage structure, the expectations for life-long employment were even stronger:

> The state decided your job, and a job was for life. This complete absence of labor markets was an extraordinary feature of the Chinese command economy. In the Soviet Union, workers were rarely fired but they were free to quit. In fact, in 1978, in the Russian Republic, 16% of all industrial manual workers quit their jobs during the year [...] Voluntary job turnover was hundreds of times more common in the Soviet Union than in China. [...] When the process of market transition began, after 1978, urban labor market rigidity was a severe handicap that slowed progress in the gradualist transition and hampered the efforts of reformers to introduce market forces.[347]

In short, increasing the pay differential and relying increasingly on material incentives, in addition to abolishing the life-long employment relationship promised to be huge challenges. Furthermore, workers who had during the Cultural Revolution developed "a newfound pride in their proletarian status as well as a powerful language of class with which to challenge unwelcome policies,"[348] might be expected to react extremely negatively to efforts to increase the power of factory managers at their expense. In my analysis of how the ideological innovators at the *People's Daily* constructed their narratives in relations to these topics, I focus in particular on how stories about model workers were used to frame these most burning human resource management issues in the period from 1977 up until 1989.

5.2 How to increase worker motivation?

The question of how to motivate the workforce was a crucial issue in the years following the Cultural Revolution. The party-state leadership attempted three different strategies: labor competitions, emulation of model workers, and the increase of material incentives. By analyzing how the changing party-state leadership conceived of the proper and possible

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[346] Frazier, 241.
[347] Naughton, *The Chinese Economy*, 181ff.
[348] Perry and Li, *Proletarian Power*, 193.

ways of increasing worker motivation, we are able to see how and why the changing party-state leadership sought to involve model workers in its endeavors, and we are also able to draw more general lessons about how the party-state sought to use its wide control over the media to influence popular perceptions of reform.

5.2.1 Competition

One method attempted with enormous insistence from early 1977 was to arrange local "labor competitions" (劳动竞赛: *laodongjingsai*). Such competitions, it was stressed, should be undertaken as a means to encourage everyone to adopt the attitudes and practices of the best workers. These best workers were, not surprising, often model workers, and model workers also appear in many of the articles as originators of the competitions, presumably because this made the competitions seem more popular and less top-down impositions. The fact that such competitions were not simply occasions for workers to showcase their best practices and learn from each other—as the *People's Daily* describes them—but could also be used to increase work quotas makes it easy to understand why such competitions were widely unpopular, as is clear from the persistent insistence by the *People's Daily* that everyone embraced the competitions wholeheartedly. That workplace competition was at this point in time by no means accepted internationally as an intrinsically socialist method of inspiring workers is made clear by the criticism leveled against such competitions by Western Marxists, such as Bettelheim who mentions them in his 1978 letter as a key reason for his loss of faith in the new regime;[349] that the CPD also perceived an urgent need to reconcile these competitions with socialism is revealed by the fact that they are almost consistently referred to as "socialist labor competitions" (社会主义劳动竞赛: *shehuizhuyi laodongjingsai*). Such competitions were held across the country in 1977, only to almost disappear over the following two years. See Chart 5.1. In the political context of the times, it

[349] Neil G. Burton and Charles Bettelheim, *China Since Mao* (New York, N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1978), 46f.

is clear that the Hua faction supported labor competitions, and it is also clear that Deng—who courted the support of the working class—perceived their lack of popularity and swiftly dismissed this approach.




Chart 5.1: Number of articles referring to "labor competition" (劳动竞赛: *laodongjingsai*) in the *People's Daily* 1976-1984. The above chart relies on a normalized number of articles, because the average number of articles in the *People's Daily* changes significantly over this period. The numbers can be found in the Appendix.

5.2.2 Model workers propelling China into the future

The second motivational method pursued by the Hua faction was to call on workers to perform another "great leap" (大跃进: *dayuejin*), employing the same term Mao had used two decades earlier, along with the related notion of "going all out and fast" (大干快上: *dagankuaishang*).[350] See Chart 5.2. This great leap could be made, the *People's Daily* explained, if all workers would emulate those model workers who, by dedicating their minds solely to production, had fulfilled their tasks long ahead of time and were thus already

[350] That the term "great leap forward" could be used as something to aspire to, reveals just how strong the party-state's control over information and framing had been up until this time. It confirms Crane's claim that the party-state was able, by a mixture of censorship, remedial policies, scapegoating, and the deft manipulation of language, to largely contain the damage done to its authority by the catastrophic failure of the Great Leap Forward. George T. Crane, "'Special Things in Special Ways': National Economic Identity and China's Special Economic Zones," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 32 (1994): 75f., https://doi.org/10.2307/2949828.

performing their work for 1982, or even longer into the future. Anyone merely fulfilling their quota risked being consigned to the past.[351] The emulation of the miraculous feats of labor performed by these model workers thus came to represent the possibility for propelling China away from the present and into the future.

It may seem baffling that emulation was granted this semi-mystical power to increase industrial productivity. Munro offers a possible explanation by noting that the CCP elite from the 1950s to the late 1970s shared the idea that unity of purpose and indefatigable willpower, acquired by the population via their emulation of extraordinary individuals, would enable the masses to overcome any obstacle.[352] According to Munro, this idea rested on a combination of neo-Confucianism with wartime experience. Misra offers a slightly different interpretation by arguing that the Maoist propensity for exaggerating the ability of the proletariat—when armed with correct class consciousness—to overcome any obstacle was intimately connected to the CCP's claim to have overcome China's industrial backwardness and leapt straight to socialism by stimulating and relying on the advanced thinking of the proletariat. For this reason, mind-over-matter voluntarism was intrinsic to the legitimacy of the Maoist as well as the early post-Maoist leadership.[353] It is difficult to evaluate the purchase of these theories, but it is certainly clear that the Hua leadership saw in this a strategy to motivate the workforce.

What would also become clear is that the Dengist faction chose to actively counter such claims, as shown most clearly in the many stories in the *People's Daily* in 1979-1981 roundly lambasting cadres and managers for having fueled a "wind of exaggeration" (浮夸风:

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
[351] E.g., *People's Daily*, 1977.02.12, p.1, "走在时间前面的闯将"; 1977.06.22, p.1, "柳桂芝干一九八二年的活了"; 1977.11.26, p.3, "刘风云四年干了八年的活"; 1978.05.25, p.3, "跟青年人谈谈心里话"; 1978.06.14, p.3, "袁兰娣优质高产二十六年"; 1978.08.24, p.2, "反林彪、'四人帮'的英雄集体——马恒昌小组事迹侧记."

[352] Donald J. Munro, *The Imperial Style of Inquiry in Twentieth-Century China: The Emergence of New Approaches* (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1996), 8f.

[353] Kalpana Misra, "Rethinking Marxism in Post-Mao China: The Erosion of Official Ideology, 1978-1984" (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 1992), chap. 4.

fukuafeng) by exaggerating the windfalls in their districts. The Bohai oil platform catastrophe in November, 1979, further provided the Dengist leadership with an opportunity to criticize the mind-over-matter voluntarism espoused by the Hua leadership, and they did so through a "well-orchestrated media exposure"[354] in the summer and fall of 1980.[355] As part of the media campaign, a number of very high ranking officials were forced to make public self-criticisms. Munro notes that "In his self-criticism, the dismissed minister [Petroleum Minister Song Zhenming; my insertion] stated that the cause of the tragedy was 'being prejudiced in favor of the subjective, and exaggerating subjective initiative' (*kuada zhuguan nengdongxing*). He said that 'subjective will replaced objective reality' (*zhuguan yizhi daiti keguan shiji*) and that administrators had made plans that ran counter to objective possibilities."[356] Deng may have courted the working class—as we saw in the previous chapter—but he would attempt to create a diligent and obedient workforce, not a workforce who could rest its claims to prestige and influence on sudden frenzy and larger-than-life achievements.

[354] Misra, 115.
[355] That this was indeed well-orchestrated, rather than simply part of the news flow, can be backed up by searching through the digitized archives of the *People's Daily* and noting that the oil spill was not mentioned in the paper until late July, 1980, a full seven months after the event.
[356] Munro, *The Imperial Style of Inquiry in Twentieth-Century China*, 69.



	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Great leap forward	115	266	327	235	27	42	43	32	24	27
Go all out and go fast	136	51	606	528	65	6	11	1	1	1

Chart 5.2. Number of *People's Daily* articles mentioning "Great leap forward" (大跃进: *dayuejin*) and "Go all out and go fast" (大干快上: *dagankuaishang*) 1975-1984. The above chart relies on a normalized number of articles, because the average number of articles in the *People's Daily* changes significantly over this period. The numbers can be found in the Appendix.

5.2.3 Material incentives

The third method of increasing motivation, also adopted by the party-state in early 1977, was to argue that remuneration should be tied strictly to work performed, rather than to properties such as seniority or number of dependents.[357] This was, for reasons to be discussed in the Conclusion, a topic where the CPD initially chose *not* to make much use of model workers. What the CPD needed to do was difficult for two reasons: First of all, Mao had determined in 1974 that China was still far from true socialism because the country still

[357] It is untrue as some have argued, i.a., Ding, that Hua was strongly opposed to relying on material incentives to motivate workers. This is clearly demonstrated by the strong advocacy for such a policy undertaken by the *People's Daily* from the early months of 1977, when Hua's ally Wang Dongxing had a strong grasp on the editorial line taken by that newspaper. Ding X. L., *The Decline of Communism in China: Legitimacy Crisis, 1977-1989*, Revised ed. edition (1994; repr., Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 87f. Teiwes and Sun have argued that the lingering idea that a difference of opinion existed between Hua and Deng in the realm of economic policy-making is wrong and have only been formulated and kept alive because the subsequent political leadership needed to blacken Hua's reputation, partly because the Chinese political imagination can accept only one leader. Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun, "China's New Economic Policy under Hua Guofeng: Party Consensus and Party Myths," *The China Journal*, no. 66 (2011): 1–23.

had an unequal wage system and practiced "distribution according to labor" (按劳分配: *anlaofenpei*) as well as exchange by means of money; which further meant that China stood in an imminent danger of capitalist restoration.[358] Proceeding from this premise, Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao, who had risen to prominence as members of the Cultural Revolution Group formed in 1966 at the behest of Mao Zedong and were arrested in October, 1976, charged with counter-revolutionary crimes as members of the "Gang of Four," had penned a number of articles for the *People's Daily* in 1975 and 1976, where they decried the practice of distributing wages according to labor instead of distributing them according to need.[359] Second, as mentioned above, the advocacy for tying remuneration more closely to performed labor offended reigning sensibilities in many SOEs, and the CPD would therefore have to modify these norms in order to gain acceptance for the re-introduction of material incentives at the workplace.

The CPD's attempt to increase public acceptance of tying remuneration strictly to labor and of allowing a greater wage gap came to revolve around two issues: a reworking of the term "distribution according to labor," and an effort to make performance-based bonuses publicly acceptably. The term "distribution according to labor" does not appear in the *People's Daily* in the remaining months of 1976 after Mao's death. Starting in January, 1977, however, the first droplets of what would develop into a minor torrent of articles devoted to the topic appear. See Chart 5.3. Many of these articles are of considerable length and they largely rehearse the same two arguments: First, Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao had tried to slander the principle of "distribution according to labor"; second, "distribution according to labor" is a socialist principle, not a capitalist one. The sheer number of articles devoted to the topic, as well as the repetitiveness and intensity of the rhetoric, shows that a significant segment of the population found it unappealing to tie remuneration strictly to performed

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[358] Teiwes and Sun, "China's New Economic Policy under Hua Guofeng," 17f.
[359] E.g., *People's Daily*, 1975.03.08, p.2, "把理论搞清把批判搞深——学习无产阶级专政理论的一点体会"; 1975.04.12, p.1, "发扬理论联系实际的革命学风,"; 1975.05.10, p.2, "生产关系中的一个重要问题."

labor. In order to understand why the CPD found the expression "anlaofenpei" so useful—and devoted no less than four major conferences to exploring the meaning of the term between April, 1977 and October, 1978[360]—it is necessary to trace the history of the concept, which further provides a very interesting study of how Chinese ideological innovators work their craft, and for how contexts and layers of meaning accrete and dissolve over time.




Chart 5.3: Number of articles mentioning the term "distribution according to work" (按劳分配: *anlaofenpei*) *People's Daily* 1975-1988. The above chart relies on a normalized number of articles, because the average number of articles in the *People's Daily* changes significantly over this period. The numbers can be found in the Appendix.

The *People's Daily* attributes the concept of "distribution according to labor" to Marx's "Critique of the Gotha Programme" and further notes that Lenin later adopted the term. What Marx had in fact noted in his "Critique of the Gotha Programme" was that in what he termed "the first phase of communist society," "the individual producer receives back from society—after the deductions have been made [for maintenance of machines, insurance against accidents and related expenditures]—exactly what he gives to it." Only later, Marx notes, "in a higher phase of communist society," would it be possible to realize production

[360] Luigi Tomba, *Paradoxes of Labour Reform: Chinese Labour Theory and Practice from Socialism to the Market* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 25.

and remuneration on the principle "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."[361]

Lenin now uses this distinction between what Marx refers to as "the first phase" and "a higher phase" of communism to introduce a distinction between socialism and communism, something which is not found in the writings of Marx, who changes between these terms in the course of his writings. Under socialism, Lenin writes, "The socialist principle, 'He who does not work shall not eat', is *already* realized; the other socialist principle, 'An equal amount of products for an equal amount of labor', is also *already* realized."[362] It is, incidentally, interesting to note Lenin's contribution to ideological innovation here: The first of Lenin's "two socialist principles" originates in Paul's "Second Epistle to the Thessalonians" in the New Testament, implicitly conferring Christian sanction upon the socialist project.

The commission charged with drawing up the Soviet Union's 1936 constitution took this passage from Lenin as the basis for its Article 12: "In the U.S.S.R. work is a duty and a matter of honor for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the principle: 'He who does not work, neither shall he eat.' The principle applied in the U.S.S.R. is that of socialism: 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his work.'"

This rewriting of Lenin's statement is obviously cast in the same shape as Marx's vision for "a higher phase of communism," but of course the implications are very different. By its shape, the sentence alludes to the Marxian vision for "a higher phase" of communism—"from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs"—but by having been reworked, the sentence no longer, as Marx intended it, states that the worker should receive

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[361] Karl Marx, *Selected Writings* (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing, 1994), 320. It is worth remembering that Marx' conception was in fact revolutionary in its context, because what he was stressing by calling for "distribution according to labor" was that the owners of capital should not receive rent merely from having the good fortune of being rich already. In the Chinese context of state-ownership, this principle seems hardly socialist at all; which is, of course, what made it attractive to many in the party-state leadership after Mao's death.

[362] V. I. Lenin and Todd Chretien, *State and Revolution* (Haymarket Books, 2015), 132. Emphasis in original.

all of the proceeds from his work, save for necessary deductions related to his safety and the maintenance of his equipment; instead, the sentence now merely states that workers should be paid according to their effort—a principle that would offend few capitalists, and indeed sounds more Taylorist than socialist. This probably explains why Lenin, as well as the Soviet constitutional framers, felt a need to accentuate that this was, indeed, "a socialist principle."

This article from the Soviet 1936 constitution provides the basis for Article 9 in the Chinese constitution of 1975, which states that "[Our] country practices the socialist principles of 'those who do not work shall not eat,' and 'from each according to his ability, to each according to his work.'"[363] It is curious that the framers of the Chinese constitution would, at a time when "Soviet revisionism" was condemned on a daily basis in official media, translate a clause directly from the Soviet constitution. That the Chinese framers did this anyway must be considered testimony to the rhetorical and ideological usefulness of the formulation. What spoke to the benefit of this clause was, first, that it could be traced back to both Marx and Lenin, and, second, that it managed to sound socialist but did not provide very specific instructions on how wages were to be distributed. As such, the sentence was acceptable to both the radicals in Shanghai and the more industrial-oriented leaders in Beijing.[364]

For all the attractiveness of the "distribution according to labor" formula, however, it suffered from the problem that it seemed to gainsay the move towards pegging salaries to skill-level and position at the workplace, and for this reason the party-state increasingly focused its framing of material incentives on performance-based bonuses as a more flexible and less potentially troublesome instrument. Initially, though, the leadership was wary of introducing bonuses to encourage workplace productivity. In the early months of 1977, such

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[363] "第九条：国家实行'不劳动者不得食'、'各尽所能、按劳分配'的社会主义原则." The 1975 Constitution is available through http://www.hrichina.org/en/1975-constitution-peoples-republic-china. Accessed July 14, 2015.


[364] According to Cohen, the constitution was formulated out of conflict and negotiation primarily between these two groups. Jerome Alan Cohen, "China's Changing Constitution," *The China Quarterly*, no. 76 (1978): 804.

bonuses were consistently referred to as "material incentives" (物质刺激: *wuzhiciji*), a distinctly negative term in Chinese, and as "bonuses in command" (奖金挂帅: *jiangjinguashuai*), playing on the late Chairman's injunction to let "politics [be] in command" (政治挂帅: *zhengzhiguashuai*), implying that bonuses were a perverse distortion of socialism that Mao would never have condoned.[365] From April, 1977, however, the *People's Daily* stops referring to bonuses as "material incentives."

Then, in February 1978, an article suddenly and unequivocally states that referring to bonuses and performance-based wages as material incentives is a way of thinking characteristic of the Gang of Four and must be eradicated.[366] That this *volte face* had the highest political backing would be made clear later that month when Hua Guofeng presented his government work report at the Fifth National People's Congress which contained clear support for tying remuneration to productivity and to distributing performance-based bonuses.[367] The about-face signaled that the party-state leadership found it increasingly necessary to change the norm against the concept of material incentives, and in the latter half of 1978, the *People's Daily* begins to publish articles asking whether material incentives are really that bad, and whether it makes any sense to distinguish between "material incentives" and "material encouragement" (物质鼓励: *wuzhiguli*).[368] This very direct phrasing is quickly abandoned, however, and in the course of 1979 the term "material incentives" is replaced in the *People's Daily* with the less direct, and thus less offensive term "material reward" (物质奖励: *wuzhijiangli*). Interestingly, only a year later the term "material incentives"—along with its cousins "material encouragement" and "material reward"—just about disappear from the *People's Daily*, and they have seldom been used by

[365] *People's Daily*, 1977.02.11, p.2, "关心群众生活的优良传统不容践踏"; 1977.04.25, p.1, "高举毛主席的伟大旗帜走我国自己工业发展的道路——大庆油田党委书记、革委会主任宋振明在全国工业学大庆会议上的发言."
[366] *People's Daily*, 1978.02.14, p.2, "切实整顿企业——实现增产增收."
[367] Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: People's Republic of China (Washington, D.C.) March 16, 1978, supplement, p.3-39.
[368] *People's Daily*, 1978.12.02, p.3, "物质鼓励和物质刺激能划清界限吗？"

the paper since. In short, the *People's Daily*'s attempt to soften the norm against the term "material incentives" in 1978-1979 was abandoned in the face of the strong norm, and even less direct terms were tested and discarded before the CPD decided to employ less contentious terms, primarily the more anodyne term "bonus," in its attempt to rework public norms in a more innocuous manner.




	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984
Bonus	196	142	20	199	432	398	473	324	393	515
Material incentives	404	479	98	111	26	2	3	0	2	2
Material reward	8	4	4	71	109	32	25	12	16	17
Material encouragement	15	4	6	68	36	11	14	5	10	9

Chart 5.4: Number of articles mentioning the terms "bonus" (奖金: *jiangjin*), "material incentives" (物质刺激: *wuzhiciji*), "material reward" (物质奖励: *wuzhijiangli*), and "material encouragement" (物质鼓励: *wuzhiguli*) in the *People's Daily* 1975-1984. The above chart relies on a normalized number of articles, because the average number of articles in the *People's Daily* changes significantly over this period. The numbers can be found in the Appendix.

As the ideological innovators at the *People's Daily* ratchets up their campaign in favor of bonuses in the course of 1978, they have to contend with the fact that bonuses, in accordance with norms favoring equal pay, are in many places distributed equally to all workers. The headline of an article in November succinctly conveys the party-state's unhappiness with this development: "Distributing bonuses equally to everyone is unreasonable."[369] Over the following years, the *People's Daily* repeatedly makes the point that bonuses should be issued to those who work hard, rather than simply divided among all

[369] *People's Daily*, 1978.11.04, p.2, "平均分配奖金不合理."

the workers at a particular factory or in a particular workshop;[370] a practice often criticized as "egalitarianism" (平均主义: *pingjunzhuyi*), and described as one of the poisonous aftereffects of the Cultural Revolution. See Chart 5.5. Throughout 1978 and 1979, the party-state also issues circular letters emphasizing that bonuses are to be paid to industrious individuals rather than being divvied up and issued across the board, and in a further move to ensure that bonuses in fact come to stimulate productivity, new rules are issued to tie the size of bonuses to the profit made by the individual enterprise.[371]



	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Egalitarianism	6	8	24	118	251	118	139	72	96	157	53	80	78	74

Chart 5.5: Number of articles referring to "egalitarianism" (平均主义: *pingjunzhuyi*) in the *People's Daily* 1975-1988. The above chart relies on a normalized number of articles, because the average number of articles in the *People's Daily* changes significantly over this period. The numbers can be found in the Appendix.

By increasing the wage gap and distributing bonuses the party-state creates other phenomena provoking normative intervention. One such problem is that people receiving sudden windfalls may spend such earnings on items or activities offending the ascetic norms propounded by the party-state for decades. One article from March, 1979, states that "Some

[370] *People's Daily*, 1979.08.08, p.1, "就奖金问题展开一场辩论分清了是非"; 1981.03.21, p.1, "奖金和生产责任制挂钩效果好."
[371] Tomba, *Paradoxes of Labour Reform*, 66ff.

people have erroneous ways of thought, and they lavish away their bonus money on eating and drinking,"[372] and all the way up through the 1980s, the CPD continues to underscore that people should not spend their money on trivialities such as banquets and binges (大吃大喝: *dachidahe*). Another issue tackled by the *People's Daily* is unease about the growing wealth gap. In an article from March, 1983, the *People's Daily* recounts how a prosperous peasant has been selected labor model but refuses to attend official labor model meetings because he is afraid that people around him—who are constantly stealing from him and imploring him to lend them money—will become even more jealous.[373] This topic is repeated many times in 1983-1984, usually described as people with "red-eye disease" (红眼病: *hongyanbing*) treating labor models and the "slightly well-off" (冒尖户: *maojianhu*) unfairly.

In its attempts to delineate the proper ways of spending money and to alter public norms to fit with the reform agenda in ways both conducive to social stability and the emerging pattern of economic growth, the *People's Daily* begins to increase its focus on another practice intimately connecting money and morality, *viz*., philanthropy. One of the first of these stories appear in 1982, where a worker who the previous year had alerted the *People's Daily* that the liquor distillery where he worked was constantly being visited by people from work units in the vicinity who commandeered liquor from the distillery, causing the distillery to lose 20.000 bottles of alcohol each year. Having come to the attention of central authorities, the *People's Daily* reports, the problem at the distillery has been resolved, and the worker who exposed the matter has been made a model for others to emulate. As a reward, the worker has been awarded opportunities to pursue studies outside the factory (perhaps indicating that his efforts found less approval locally), in addition to a 100 yuan prize, which he has donated in full to the distillery's nursery.[374]

In another account involving philanthropy, a man who has contracted a company and

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[372] *People's Daily*, 1979.03.09, p.1, "要把心思放在增产节约运动上."
[373] *People's Daily*, 1984.03.08, p.7, "晏东升为何不愿当劳模?"
[374] *People's Daily*, 1982.05.28, p.2, "可喜的变化."

done well economically has been selected model worker and awarded 1.000 yuan.[375] This is an enormous bonus compared to anything mentioned in the *People's Daily* previously, which has usually been sums of a few dozen yuan. If the reader of this article may at first blush have been surprised by this, the story goes on to explain that the model worker has donated the entire sum to his company's nursery. If we examine who are the recipients of donated awards and donated bonus payments, we find that these are nurseries, elementary schools, China Children and Teenagers' Fund, and a government-run educational amusement park known as the Children's Palace.[376] In other words, bonus payments and the practice of contracting companies are presented as morally legitimized through philanthropy with distinct fatherly overtones; a storyline which would become more prevalent in subsequent decades. The story also reflects positively on the party-state for its ability to construct an environment where such things are possible, as well as for upholding such praiseworthy individuals as role models for others.

There is also a gender-aspect to the topic of material incentives, such as in a *People's Daily* article bemoaning the death of model worker Wang Jiancai: "[He] made great achievements at work and changed often from post to post, and yet his family knew nothing of this. For a long time, his wife and children did not, and could not, understand him. He was under the dual pressure of heavy work and complaints from his family."[377] Other articles fault wives of model workers for being so materialist that they fail to appreciate the selfless dedication of their husbands, such as in one story where a wife blames her model cadre husband for spending the family's money on benefitting the local community.[378]

By 1985, it seems that the norm against unequal wages has weakened, judged by the less frequent and less strident attention to the topic in the *People's Daily*. There is no way of

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[375] *People's Daily*, 1984.03.06, p.2, "承包兑现厂长受奖."
[376] *People's Daily*, 1982.01.24, p.3, "大学新风——发生在江汉石油学院的事情"; 1983.09.22, p.5, "种瓜人的追求——记湖南省劳动模范、高级农艺师陈为霖"; 1984.10.18, p.2, "西安市长张铁民把奖金捐献给少年宫."
[377] *People's Daily,* 1985.07.19, p.1, "魂系大西北——记优秀共产党员、水利工程师翁建才."
[378] *People's Daily*, 1989.12.15, p.5, "服务是根本——访黄冈县陈策楼村党支书、全国劳模陈焱清."

telling to what degree media coverage has been an agent of this change, or if we are rather dealing with the effects of social modernization, such as the increased availability of desirable products and services, inter-generational conflicts, the decreasing tendency for generations of families to live under the same roof, the increased importance and visibility of technical proficiency, the rapid expansion of education generating a pool of youngsters with expectations of higher earnings based on years of forgoing any earnings, and the weakening of social ties among workers no longer organized to the same degree into morally meaningful activities by their *danwei*.

Norms relating to remuneration were, however, not the only norms in need of an update if the party-state was to be successful in its bid to reform the Chinese economy; workers would also have to be brought to accept that life-long tenure needed to be abolished.

5.3 The arduous battle to end life-long employment

During the Cultural Revolution, the relative strength of SOE workers vis-à-vis the state had even allowed the informal practice of *dingti* (顶替)—making worker and cadre jobs inheritable within families—to evolve in many factories. Further testifying to the relatively weak position of the party-state *vis-à-vis* SOE workers in the early years of the reform period, this practice had been allowed to linger on despite the reformers' ambitions of reforming the system so that hiring would be done on the basis of individual skills above everything else. While the practice of *dingti* was formally terminated in 1983,[379] it continued to be practiced in many enterprises, as is clear from the continued denunciations of the practice in the *People's Daily.*[380] No comparable system ever evolved in the Soviet Union[381], indicating that the norm had strong popular roots domestically.[382]

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[379] Martin King Whyte, "The Changing Role of Workers," in *The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms*, ed. Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 185f.
[380] *People's Daily*, 1984.02.06, p.4, "贵州省采取有力措施 坚决纠正干部突击退休让子女顶替歪风."
[381] Whyte, "The Changing Role of Workers," 177.
[382] Part of the reason why the party-state allowed *dingti* to persist into the early 1980s was also

From 1979, the party-state invests considerable efforts in denigrating the notion of life-long tenure by a barrage of references to smashing the "iron rice bowl" (铁饭碗: *tiefanwan*) and to altering the mindset of those who liked "food from the big pot" (大锅饭: *daguofan*). In one article, the *People's Daily* claims that many readers have written letters to the newspaper, demanding the abolition of the iron rice bowl, because this kind of employment surety makes people lazy and passive.[383] An article later in the year quotes a model worker who has rejected a promotion, even though the offered position would provide him an iron rice bowl. There is, however, the model worker explains, so much remaining for him to do in his current position that even an iron rice bowl cannot make him accept the promotion.[384] Model workers, in other words, know their place and care little for job security. In 1981-82, the suspension of urban economic reform is mirrored in less severe attacks on oversized pans and ferrous rice bowls, but the laziness supposedly induced by eating from the big pot comes to be more frequently connected with lower SOE earnings and, thus, national economic problems—during the same years, as we saw in the previous chapter, when political issues were also being reframed in national terms.[385] In 1983, the *People's Daily* once more ratchets up the campaign to abandon the iron rice bowl. One article quotes a representative at the Shanghai People's Congress, who explains that "cherishing" (爱护: *aihu*) model workers has by many local cadres been misinterpreted to be solely a matter of dispensing diplomas and seats on local committees, which means that the important task of raising the cultural and scientific level of the model workers has been neglected. Another representative explains that security is not always a good thing:

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the fact that *dingti* served to encourage parents to take early retirement and thereby reduced the unemployment problem.

[383] *People's Daily*, 1979.01.11, p.2, "《浙江日报》开展'铁饭碗'问题的讨论，在社会上引起很大反响."

[384] *People's Daily*, 1979.06.26, p.1, "政府工作报告——一九七九年六月十八日在第五届全国人民代表大会第二次会议上."


[385] *People's Daily*, 1983.04.22, p.5, "评'大锅饭'."

> At some factories where they have introduced the responsibility system and broken the iron rice bowl, some people have developed a 'feeling of crisis' [...] A 'feeling of crisis' is not a bad thing. If a 'feeling of urgency' can develop out of such a 'feeling of crisis,' then all the better. An 'iron rice bowl' is very secure, but it brings along with it indolence, exasperating sluggishness, lethargy, and perfunctoriness. If this persists, how can our country's backward situation ever be changed? Facing such prospects with equanimity—that is the real danger![386]

Later in the same article, the journalist quotes a story from Shanghai's *Wenhuibao* about a 94-year old teacher who is also on the standing committee of the Shanghai People's Congress. Despite her advanced age, the *People's Daily* explains, she is still very active in her work, which among other things consists in visiting the disabled. "Compared with this old woman, do those comrades who are turning rusty not feel ashamed?" asks the *People's Daily*. Later in the year, Premier Zhao Ziyang stressed in his government work report to the NPC that "We must gradually reform the labor personnel system, so that people who are employed can be dismissed, promoted, or demoted."[387] Also in 1983, the *People's Daily* takes to employing rhymes to hammer in the message that "'the big pan' suckles the lazy Han" ("'大锅饭'养懒汉"); a rhyme used in nine articles in 1983-1984 and on special occasions up until the present.[388] Chart 5.6 shows just how rapid the attention to life-time employment and equal salaries mounted in the *People's Daily* during this period; indeed, the 1980s would prove to be the decade where these terms have received by far the most attention in the history of the PRC.

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[386] *People's Daily*, 1983.02.19, p.1, "今日谈."
[387] *People's Daily*, 1983.09.07, p.5, "论劳动合同制."
[388] *People's Daily*, 1983.01.27, p.1, "'大锅饭'养懒汉——四论不能再吃'大锅饭'."



	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Food from the big pot	2	14	38	207	178	223	173	321	224	209	212	215	81
Iron rice bowl	2	2	4	53	59	51	44	72	91	41	66	62	107

Chart 5.6: Number of articles referring to "food from the big pot" (大锅饭: *daguofan*) and to the "iron rice bowl" (铁饭碗: *tiefanwan*) in the *People's Daily* 1976-1988. The above chart relies on a normalized number of articles, because the average number of articles in the *People's Daily* changes significantly over this period. The numbers can be found in the Appendix.

Working towards readying the population for the abolishment of security of employment, 1978-1979 also marks the beginning of a great increase in stories in the *People's Daily* relating to entrepreneurs (企业家: *qiyejia*), self-employed (个体户: *getihu*), and individuals setting up their own businesses (创业者: *chuangyezhe*), all prospering in no time, according to the *People's Daily*. In 1984, the *People's Daily* also begins to publish stories about model workers who voluntarily abandon their "iron rice bowls" and start successful businesses on their own.[389]

In 1986, the *People's Daily* begins to talk about lay-offs in more direct terms. In one case, the head of an electrical machinery factory has been removed from his town's list of model worker nominees and subjected to severe criticism because he has made redundant a number of mid-level managers. The *People's Daily* makes clear that the criticized leader has acted appropriately, and when the paper picks up the case a month later, the leader has

[389] *People's Daily*, 1984.11.01, p.3, "今日首都和各省市区报纸要目."

indeed been cleared of all criticism and even awarded a model worker prize.[390]

In 1986, a small but consequential step was taken towards reforming the labor system with the introduction of five-year contracts for new employees, and during that summer opinion surveys revealed waning support for the economic reforms, particularly among young urban residents who would be the most adversely affected by the new reforms. The same period also saw increasing numbers of labor unrest episodes, including strikes and occasionally even riots.[391] In an attempt to strengthen their position by making allies out of the protesters, the conservatives on the Standing Committee of the NPC (the NPCSC) repeatedly remanded drafts of the labor and bankruptcy laws. While the bankruptcy law was ultimately passed in December 1986, the NPCSC managed to delay implementation of the law until late 1988.[392]

What makes the assault on life-time employment even more remarkable is that the party-state did not begin to lay off workers from the SOEs at this point, and would in fact not do so in any noteworthy degree before the middle of the 1990s. When the party-state took no significant concrete steps in this direction—at least not before the adoption of the Contract Law in 1986 and that did not affect workers in an existing employment relationship—this was due to the fact that the implicit social contract was very much focused on providing job security. This is well-illustrated by how the state handled the rapidly growing number of urban unemployed in 1978-1979. The party-state had for two to three decades largely avoided open unemployment by overstaffing and by sending urban residents to the countryside, but with millions of rusticatees returning to the cities in 1978-1979, adding to the already rapidly growing labor force, there was a brief period of significant and

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[390] *People's Daily*, 1986.06.10, p.2, "被抹掉的劳模——记开封电机厂厂长郑志勇"; 1986.07.15, p.2, "开封市委支持郑志勇搞改革'被抹掉的劳模'重新当选."

[391] Richard Baum, "The Road to Tiananmen: Chinese Politics in the 1980s," in *The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng*, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 385f.

[392] Kevin J. O'Brien, *Reform without Liberalization: China's National People's Congress and the Politics of Institutional Change* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 133f.

visible unemployment in China's cities.[393] At the behest of parents as well as the party-state, however, urban work units quickly created jobs to absorb the majority of the unemployed, and up until the middle of the 1990s, the party-state maintained very cautious labor policies in order to keep urban unemployment low.[394] In actual fact, this meant that overstaffing at China's SOEs continued to grow until the early 1990s. The research revealing this phenomenon surprised many economists, who had previously assumed that the notable overstaffing at China's SOEs in the 1990s was a legacy dating to the Cultural Revolution, rather than something that had expanded considerably in the period of economic reform.[395]

5.4 Managers in charge or workers in charge?

Another central element of the reforms was the attempt to increase the authority of the factory managers. This entailed delegating authority from the central level as well as minimizing the involvement—and as part of this the expectation of involvement—in management of the ordinary workforce. As early as 1978, in its efforts to delegitimize the Hua faction's calls for campaign-style production drives, the *People's Daily* began to field stories specifically aiming to encourage and legitimize the adoption of new management practices, such as "management by quota" (定额管理: *ding'e guanli*). In one article, the *People's Daily* recounts how a model worker has suggested that this form of management be introduced at his production brigade. Under this system, six parameters are singled out for regulation: machines, tasks, time spent on tasks, personnel, resource consumption, and rewards and punishment. The local cadres believe that due to their particularly long history of undertaking collective work, they have arrived at such a high level of ideological

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[393] Riskin, *China's Political Economy*, 265f.
[394] Naughton, *The Chinese Economy*, 183ff.
[395] Dong Xiao-yuan and Louis Putterman, "On the Emergence of Labour Redundancy in China's State Industry: Findings from a 1980-1994 Data Panel," 2001, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1671781; Dong Xiao-Yuan and Louis Putterman, "Soft Budget Constraints, Social Burdens, and Labor Redundancy in China's State Industry," *Journal of Comparative Economics* 31, no. 1 (March 2003): 110–33, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0147-5967(02)00012-4.

awareness that these crude managerial measures could not possibly increase productivity. Nonetheless, owing to the prestige of the model worker, his suggestion is implemented on a test basis with a few work teams, generating a productivity increase that amazes everyone, so avers the *People's Daily*.[396] In this narrative, as in many of the stories about labor competitions, model workers are called upon to act in the role of managers.

That model workers are able to replace managers in these stories is predicated upon their high moral standards, as an article from 1982 demonstrates. In this article, a *People's Daily* journalist has traveled to a mine to find out why a local model worker is criticized so severely by his co-workers. The model worker, the journalist discovers, has exposed a number of individuals working in the mine—especially emphasized is a security official—for truancy and sleeping on the job. When the local Party branch learned of the reason underlying the disagreements, they convened a meeting where they called on all workers to respect the model worker for his moral rectitude in speaking up, and this, the *People's Daily* explains, cleared the atmosphere and made everyone respect the model worker. By this framing—pitting the moral model worker against security officials sleeping on the job in what is notoriously China's most dangerous line of work—the newspaper emphasizes that model workers do not place unreasonable demands upon others; rather, they protect their co-workers by their praiseworthy commitment to expose those who endanger others through laziness and dereliction of duty.[397]

Where the unpleasant duties of managers are often described as being performed by model workers in the early years of reform, managers and the new group of successful entrepreneurs come to feature much more from the middle of the 1980s. One such article focuses on how the businesswoman Li Guilian has achieved her formidable success.[398] The article explains that "Li Guilian has a very simple and unadorned philosophy: People want to

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[396] *People's Daily*, 1978.11.03, p.1, "著名劳模耿长锁引导干部从办社实践中总结经验教训."
[397] *People's Daily*, 1982.06.30, p.2, "各级党组织敢于支持劳模善于做群众思想工作 晋华宫矿出现学先进新风气."
[398] *People's Daily*, 1987.09.06, p.2, "成功之道——部分优秀农民企业家访问记（下）."

live. Company directors should do everything they can to put their employees' emotions at ease." Putting the emotions of employees at ease does not, the article explains, entail having workers eat from the big pot, nor does it entail providing them an icon-rice bowl, but Li's workers are provided pensions and nurseries for their offspring. Since no medical scheme is mentioned in the article, it must be assumed that the workers are without medical insurance. Every single employee does, however, receive a cake on their birthday. A boss, cannot, though, Li emphasizes, limit herself to being a "loving mother;" a boss must also be a "strict father," and therefore she has established twenty-three unbendable rules, which are known to all her employees. Overall, though, she considers rewards a superior method to punishment, so, the *People's Daily* adds, she is primarily a loving mother.

The only thing we learn about the workers at Li's factory is contained in a small anecdote. At her factory, Li has established very strict quality standards, and every piece of clothes produced must meet these exacting standards. The products produced by her workers are consistently appraised by the authorities to reach a quality score of 98 or above—an extremely high score, the article explains. Once, however, one of her workers produced an item of clothing earning a score of only 96, causing the worker to break down in tears for "having lost the face to see anyone." Clearly, while managers are portrayed as parents, the workers are cast in the role of children anxious to please their parents.

Supplementing the familial framing of workplace relations, the *People's Daily* begins to publish many articles describing the sagacious decisions of wise SOE managers. One such article deals with the gigantic Angang Steel Company, which has incurred significant losses over the previous years. Now, the *People's Daily* explains, the reforms and the possibilities for contracting out have turned around this very serious situation at Angang and "put golden wings on the soaring company."[399] The reason why the formerly so successful Angang company struggled economically for a while, the article explains, was that there was too little

[399] *People's Daily*, 1987.10.14, p.1, "'钢铁巨人'葆青春——鞍钢坚持改革加速改造纪实."

investment in technology in previous years, leaving the company's aging equipment longing for a technological upgrade, "just like a great drought longs for clouds and a rainbow." Fortunately, the new manager has pursued technological upgrade, and the company is once again thriving.

About the workers at Angang, we learn that they "as inheritors to Meng Tai's spirit of 'loving the company as one's family, and loving the furnace as one's life' cannot but look towards the future with burning enthusiasm."[400] According to the article, model worker Meng met with Mao Zedong on no less than eight occasions. A present-day model worker, Zhao Chengshun (赵成顺), has recently managed to save the company a great sum of money by repairing a broken-down piece of machinery much faster than anyone had thought possible. Zhao performed this deed by inviting the "'Great King' of metalloid cutting, Li Benmao, and the 'Divine Doctor' of electrical machinery along with other elite craftsmen, and together they conquered every problem one by one with their high-quality work."

As a consequence of the reforms, the previously dispirited employees have realized that when "the country increases its income, the company prospers, and the employees receive higher rewards. These three things are closely linked." To express their happiness, the workers "loudly shout the slogan 'when the company does well, I prosper, when the company does poorly, I become impoverished." There is an almost fairy-tale like nature to articles such as this one with its golden wings, longed-for rainbows, the links to Chairman Mao who had met with Meng on eight occasions (eight being a propitious number in China), and the 'Great King' and the 'Divine Doctor.' This feeling is emphasized by the claim that the workers are so thrilled with the results of the reforms that they spontaneously erupt into four-character cheers. The journalist never provides names of the workers, describe when they did their shouting, for how long, or why they settled on this particular refrain. It is, therefore, hard to resist the interpretation that this spontaneous shouting of slogans is too

[400] Meng Tai (孟泰) had been a much-celebrated national model worker award recipient in the 1950s and 1960s.

much like a myth—or maybe a film—to be accepted as a real event.

Overall, in the latter half of the 1980s, the *People's Daily* publishes a great number of stories praising managers for their acumen and their superior moral worth. Workers, conversely, are portrayed as grateful for the enlightened leadership of their superiors, never in possession of competing ideas for how the workplace should be organized, and largely passive. Model workers for their part excel through allegiance and brawn rather than ambition and brainpower. Taking these notions to an extreme is the example of Qi Lili (齐莉莉), a model worker praised as a "living account book" (活帐本: *huo zhangben*), who is able to recall from memory everything that is on stock in the warehouses at the Daqing oilfield. Where Wang Jinxi, who had mixed cement with his own body to aid China's industrialization, was a symbol of Daqing in the 1960s, the promotion of Qi Lili as the quintessential Daqing labor model of the 1980s, suggests that China's reform era workers should be diligent rather than daring.[401]

While providing appropriate role models was central to the party-state's efforts to alter the expectations for participation in management by the industrial workforce, the ideological innovators also had to contend with the fact that workers had available to them a number of terms which had been used for decades to describe the crucial role of workers in the running of enterprises. One of the most troublesome of these terms was *zhurenweng* (主人翁, variously translated as "worker master", "worker as master", or "master of the country"). The term *zhurenweng* had been used frequently in the early years of the PRC to describe workers as the collective owners of their enterprise, something which had been considered a hallmark of socialism in China. This was a useful term in the early and middle years of the 1950s when the party-state sought to legitimize its policies aiming to squeeze out of business private entrepreneurs in order to increase state-control over manufacture

[401] For instance, *People's Daily*, 1982.01.24, p.1, "这里的先进人物为什么香？——大庆党委做好劳模工作的调查."

and commerce.[402] As the state would not allow workers *real* ownership over factories, the workers instead became nominal masters—the "worker master."

A most interesting change takes place in 1981—starting in April to be exact—when the term "worker master" suddenly appears much more frequently than previously in collocations such as "worker master feeling of responsibility" (主人翁责任感, *zhurenweng zerengan*), "worker master consciousness" (主人翁精神, *zhurenweng jingshen*), and "worker master attitude" (主人翁态度, *zhurenweng taidu*). While these terms had occurred in tandem with "worker masters" before, there is at this point in time nonetheless a considerable shift towards focusing on the duties and proper behavior incumbent upon this figure. In previous decades, these collocations had appeared in between one-third and one-seventeenth of the *People's Daily* articles mentioning "worker masters"; from 1981 to 1991 they appear in close to one half of the articles mentioning the "worker master"—with the noteworthy exception of 1988, a year with, as we shall see again later, uncharacteristically little high-level management of China's media. See Chart 5.7.

[402] As Zhang notes, "The promise of this discourse [that of the *zhurenweng*] inspired people throughout the Maoist era and helped propel popular participation in that period's mass political campaigns." Zhang Jishun, "Creating 'Masters of the Country' in Shanghai and Beijing: Discourse and the 1953–54 Local People's Congress Elections," *The China Quarterly* 220 (December 2014): 1089, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741014001118.




Chart 5.7: Number of *People's Daily* articles, 1960-1991, mentioning the term "worker master" (主人翁: *zhurenweng*) on its own (the blue columns), and (the red columns) the number of articles mentioning the term in the conjunctions "worker master thought" (主人翁思想: *zhurenweng sixiang*), "worker master consciousness" (主人翁精神: *zhurenweng jingshen*), "worker master sense of responsibility" (主人翁责任感: *zhurenweng zerengan*), "worker master attitude" (主人翁态度: *zhurenweng taidu*), or "worker master spiritual civilization" (主人翁精神文明: *zhurenweng jingshen wenming*). The above chart relies on a normalized number of articles, because the average number of articles in the *People's Daily* changes significantly over this period. The numbers can be found in the Appendix.

In an article from early 1986—titled "A Talk on the question of forming the idea of worker masters"—the *People's Daily* makes it clear that updating the perception of the *zhurenweng* to suit the period of reform is of the utmost importance:

> [In the early years of the PRC] The overwhelming majority of workers and staff members came from the old society; even if they had had no personal experience of oppression or exploitation, they had at least witnessed or heard about the suffering of the working people. The working class now became the leading class in the new society and was being respected. Its living standard was improved and secured. With all these important changes, class education in the form of drawing comparisons between the new and the old society and recalling one's suffering in the old society and contrasting that with the happiness in the new could easily stimulate the sense of responsibility of being worker masters among the workers and peasants.
>
> Now things are different. [...] With opening up to the outside world, what the workers have seen and heard about conditions in capitalist societies is different from what it was in China's old society. Under such historical conditions, class education in the

> form of recalling one's suffering in the old society and contrasting it with the happiness in the new is not enough to encourage the idea of being worker masters among the workers and staff members. Nonetheless, establishing the idea of worker masters remains the key task of ideological and political work, even if it is necessary to infuse new contents into the concept in the new historical stage.[403]

Workers, the article continues, need to be taught to "[l]ink the individual with the collective by starting with caring for a small collective and progressing to caring for the whole enterprise, the whole society, and the country. This is a natural process in the formation of collectivism and the notion of worker masters." If this is indeed "a natural process in the process of collectivism," it is also reminiscent of one of the basic tenets of *The Great Learning* (大学: *Daxue*), a text traditionally attributed to Confucius, according to which "The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the world, first ordered well their own States. Wishing to order well their States, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts."[404]

This comes increasingly to the fore as the relationship between workers and the party-state turns still sourer in 1986-89.[405] In an article from March, 1989, the *People's Daily*


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[403] *People's Daily*, 1986.02.28, p.5, "谈谈树立职工的主人翁思想的问题."

[404] Confucius and Mencius, *The Four Books: Confucian Analects, The Great Learning, The Doctrine of the Mean, and The Works of Mencius*, trans. James Legge (China: The Chinese Book Co., 1930), 310ff. Xi Jinping also seems to pay oblique homage to this famous passage in his much-publicized book, as the following extract from the final essay of the work seems to indicate: "Xi's mother Qi Xin, nearly 90 years of age, is also a veteran revolutionary and Party member. A dutiful son, Xi often strolls and chats with his mother, holding her by the hand, and regularly makes time to dine with her. The Xi family has a tradition of being strict with children and living a simple life. Xi Zhongxun believed that if a senior Party official wanted to discipline others, he should begin first with himself and his family. [...] Xi Jinping has carried on his family's tradition and has been strict with his own family." Xi Jinping, *The Governance of China* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2014), 494.

[405] Walder provides a thorough account of the ways in which workers' lives became more difficult in the period 1986-1989. Andrew G. Walder, "Workers, Managers and the State: The Reform Era and the Political Crisis of 1989," *The China Quarterly* 127 (1991): 467–492.

finally states flatly that workers are not to concern themselves with factory management.[406] The article recounts that recently many workers have become angry because they are not allowed a say in management, but that is because they confuse the term *zhurenweng* with the term *zhuren* (主人: master or owner). While the proletariat is indeed the leading class of the country, locally some cadres have failed to explain that even though managers and workers have the same "position" (地位: *diwei*) at their enterprise, their responsibilities are different. This cadre negligence has caused 79 cases of strikes, go-slows, and collective petitioning in Shenyang in recent months.[407] In other words, the fault is—as so often in the narrative of the party-state—located with local officials, and therefore the grievances nourished by the workers are unrelated to state policies undermining the job security and workplace influence of workers. As is apparent from Chart 5.8, with the decreasing bargaining power of the working class, the *People's Daily* increasingly stresses that the worker masters enjoy a special position—and apparently little else.



	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Master worker position	2	0	1	5	8	13	5	15	9	15	17	25	29	32	29

Chart 5.8: Number of articles referring to "worker master position" (主人翁地位: *zhurenweng diwei*)

[406] *People's Daily*, 1989.03.14, p.5, "我们还是主人吗?"
[407] This is the first article since 1979 where the term "strike" (罢工: *bagong*) is used to refer to an event taking place in China after 1949.

in the *People's Daily* 1977-1991. The above chart relies on a normalized number of articles, because the average number of articles in the *People's Daily* changes significantly over this period. The numbers can be found in the Appendix.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has examined industrial relations in China in the period after the Cultural Revolution with a particular emphasis on three aspects: how the party-state sought to motivate workers, how the party-state framed the need to abolish the system of life-long employment, and how the party-state envisioned relationships of authority at the workplace. Model workers came to play central roles in the attempts by the party-state's ideological innovators to refurbish industrial workplaces in the social imaginary, though they turn out to be much less suited for some purposes than for others.

Under Hua Guofeng, the party-state organized a large number of labor competitions across the country in an attempt to use these to motivate the workforce. Model workers appeared in many of these competitions as a means of allowing the regime to signal that formidable productivity was a crucial part of being a model worker. In addition, model workers could be used as supposed initiators of the competitions, at once eliding the party-state's role as the true sponsor of the competitions and sending the message that arranging such competitions was typical of advanced personalities.

A second approach employed to increase worker motivation under Hua consisted in calling on everyone to emulate the superior workstyles and mentalities of model workers as a means to dramatically increase production and enable China to once again leap into the future. In method as well rhetoric, Hua was clearly drawing on Maoist precedents, particularly in ascribing transformative power to the wholehearted efforts of China's workers. However, coming on the heels of the Cultural Revolution, which had kindled the expectations for workers to participate in politics and in the running of enterprises, the adoption of this approach was a tactical mistake because the development policies favored by the Hua regime relied on a depoliticization of the workforce, while Maoist rhetoric and

practice had often served the opposite purpose. That this was indeed a mistake is indicated by the fact that the more savvy Deng Xiaoping chose the opposite strategy of attempting to regularize work routines, downplaying the importance of the individual worker and her or his political consciousness, and promising to increase worker influence through elections and institutions, as we saw in the previous chapter.

Another attempt to motivate the workforce came in the form of relying increasingly on material incentives. This endeavor clashed with popular norms in favor of a narrow wage gap as well as in favor of basing wage differences on seniority and number of dependents; just how strong these norms were can be gauged through the intensity of the *People's Daily*'s attempts to alter these norms and practices. In this pursuit, the *People's Daily* relied primarily on two devices. The first of these was the formulation "distribution according to labor," a slogan chosen because it can be traced back to both Lenin and Marx; but where Marx and Lenin lived under circumstances where this slogan was politically progressive, the party-state adopted the slogan in 1977 precisely because it could be used to *increase* the wage gap, rather than diminishing it as had been Marx's intention. Model workers hardly ever appear in the articles championing distribution according to labor, for reasons to be discussed shortly.

In regards of the second device adopted to increase the popular acceptance of material incentives—namely the introduction of performance-based bonuses—the Hua leadership found it difficult to find its footing, causing the *People's Daily* to take the somewhat inconsistent position in 1977 of strongly supporting the notion of tying remuneration to effort while, at the same time, ferociously attacking the distribution of performance-based bonuses. By February, 1978, however, the *People's Daily* reversed itself and declared that performance-based bonuses were a hallmark of socialism and as such appropriate for China. The very large number of articles making the case that wages should be tied to effort and that bonuses should be awarded for outstanding production results demonstrates the intransigence of popular norms regarding wage differentials.

One of the most interesting tactics adopted in the *People's Daily* in order to increase the popular acceptance of bonuses begins to take shape in 1982 where stories describing how individuals—mostly model workers—who receive very large bonuses freely donate these to charitable causes, primarily to institutions taking care of and educating children. In this way, popular norms are sought reworked through the conduit of philanthropy by reminding the audience that while bonuses seemingly accrue to the individual, they do, in fact, benefit society as a whole. This creates a small narrative where the party-state bestows upon unusually hard-working individuals a monetary reward which is, in turn, passed on to institutions in charge of nurturing and educating society's young ones, thereby conferring moral sanction on monetary reward and singling out particularly productive individuals as being also unusually righteous. Hard work and selflessness earn the model workers the right to serve as honorary parents of China's children, creating an association between professional diligence and the socio-political hierarchy, intimating that the party-state's leaders have also earned their place through hard work and that the party-state's monetary distributions are also founded on emotional bonds.[408]

A similar kind of hierarchy is established through narratives about relations of authority at the workplace in the 1980s. As the CPD clearly attempts to reduce the workforce's expectations of participation in the management of enterprises, the wisdom and foresight of factory managers are emphasized again and again, while workers come to be measured against numerical scales based upon the quality of the products they produce. The workers who fail to live up to the expectations built into the scoring system—not unlike a school examination system—are not described as expressing anger towards the strict quality

[408] This emotional framing of state-assistance to those in need remains notable, not least around China's most important holidays. This is demonstrated, e.g., through the ACFTU's annual "sending warmth project" (送温暖工程: *song wennuan gongcheng*), where cadres visit working families and help them solve various difficulties, typically through granting small sums of money around Chinese New Year. Mingwei Liu, Chunyun Li, and Sunghoon Kim, "Chinese Trade Unions in Transition: A Three-Level Analysis," in *China's Changing Workplace Dynamism, Diversity and Disparity*, ed. Peter Sheldon et al. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011), 286.

assessment measures or towards the exacting time norms, but instead they fault their own inadequacies and react with tears and expressions of shame. In this way, the employment relationship is envisioned as a parent-child relationship, even to the point of having the employers sweeten the birthdays of employees with birthday cakes.

The modification of the employment relationship also came to include the reworking of various key concepts related to the CCP's notion of socialism. An interesting example of this is the term *zhurenweng* which had been used by the CCP in the 1950s to make the claim that the Party ruled on behalf of the working class. By the 1980s, this term had become a political liability, but instead of discarding the concept the CPD attempted to vest it with new meaning. As the CCP of the 1980s had little desire to see workers claim any kind of role in the management of factories, let alone protest against any of the new policies which formally established workers as the subordinate party in the employer-employee relationship, the term "worker master" was changed so that it no longer meant sharing in the collective ownership of the means of production, but rather meant having a particular mindset associated with orderly conduct and to enjoy a prestigious, albeit purely symbolic, position at the workplace.

An even more troublesome issue for the party-state was the issue of life-long employment, which had been a hallmark of Chinese socialism for decades. Dismantling life-long employment was clearly high on the agenda of the party-state from 1979, but social norms against this policy change were so robust that the party-state leadership, even backed by a forceful media campaign, did not feel secure enough to begin dismantling lifelong employment at this point. In fact, labor redundancy in Chinese SOEs only shot up during the 1980s and into the early 1990s,[409] even though a bloated workforce and escalating pension payments were making it increasingly difficult for SOEs to compete with TVEs, let alone with foreign-invested companies or on overseas markets. This is a good illustration of how

[409] Dong Xiao-yuan and Putterman, "On the Emergence of Labour Redundancy in China's State Industry."

popular norms have at certain points constrained the opportunities available to the reformers, just as it illustrates how the CPD attempted to use media campaigns to prepare the populace for the reforms in the melting pot.

In evaluating how model workers figured in the endeavors of the party-state analyzed above, it is noteworthy that they were less involved in the reworking of the economic compartment of the social imaginary than they were in the reworking of the political compartment. Model workers hardly ever appear in stories about pegging salaries to effort, nor do they appear much in the many articles discussing performance-based bonuses. While this surprised me at first—after all, who would make better candidates for receiving performance-based bonuses?—it is understandable in the light of the previous chapter. In Chapter 4, it was illustrated how model workers very often appeared in stories were they could be used to create out of the Chinese nation a homogenous emotional and moral community, and as the implications of pegging salaries to effort were normatively problematic—and as the policy would lead to diligent model workers receiving considerably higher salaries than their co-workers, fueling resentment against the model workers and thus minimizing their efficacy as spokespeople in other regards—model workers seldom appear in articles championing distribution according to labor. Only when the party-state began to make the connection between bonuses and philanthropy did the model worker come to play a significant role in these narratives. In other words, the model workers were only useful to the CPD to the extent that they could be construed as moral exemplars, such as in the role of philanthropist.

An interesting illustration of the *People's Daily*'s emphasis on the morality of model workers appears in an article dealing with a contemporary play about a model worker.[410] In the play, a model worker has made a mistake at her loom, and when her supervisor decides to protect her public appearance by shifting the blame onto someone else, she does nothing

[410] *People's Daily*, 1984.07.30, p.7, "《戏剧报》和《文艺报》开展——话剧《街上流行红裙子》的讨论."

to reveal the deception and thus someone else is made to suffer for her mistake. Subsequently, the model worker undergoes terrible pangs of conscience and she finds herself unable to endure the company of her fellow workers before she ultimately confesses to them and achieves reintegration into the group. The *People's Daily* subjects the play to thorough analysis and takes it to task for its allegedly sloppy logic and its lack of attention to realism: a model worker would, the *People's Daily* emphasizes, never have gotten herself into such a predicament in the first place. Betraying a fellow worker and being dishonest to one's peers is, the *People's Daily* avers, exactly the type of immoral behavior a model worker would never engage in. The *People's Daily*'s insistence that model workers by their very nature are incapable of immoral behavior—and in particular of immoral behavior towards their peers—follows from the porous personhood model as described in Chapter 2.

What we see in the economic domain is that as the intended economic reforms were very difficult to legitimize in moral terms, the CPD instead chose to focus a great deal of its attention on demonstrating the historical legitimacy of its economic policies by emphasizing an apparent historical continuity. If it was hard to legitimize the reforms in moral terms, the party-state would instead labor to prove that the reforms constituted a move towards a more perfect realization of socialism as conceived by Marx and Lenin. This particularly revolved around imbuing old concepts with new meaning in order to make them useful for the policy changes, or at least to defuse them so that troublesome workers would find them less potent weapons against the reforms.[411] China was still socialist, so the narrative went, and the workers were still the masters of the country, owing not least to the sacrifices and exemplary morality of the model workers. It seems that for everything to change—to reverse

[411] Many scholars have noted that present-day Chinese workers still often couch their protests in terms related to Maoist socialism as propagated by the party-state during the first three decades of the PRC; though these scholars disagree whether the rhetorical and symbolic choices of protesting workers are merely strategic or if they really express truly felt attachments to the social compact of that epoch. See, e.g., Ching Kwan Lee, *Against the Law: Labor Protests in China's Rustbelt and Sunbelt* (University of California Press, 2007); Mun Young Cho, *The Specter of "the People": Urban Poverty in Northeast China* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2013).

an oft-quoted line from Lampedusa's *The Leopard*—everything would have to remain the same.[412]

Finally, this chapter speaks to the scholarly dispute over whether Deng's faction nourished economic visions different from Hua's faction.[413] As Teiwes and Sun have argued, even though a significant part of the reform program later to be associated with Deng was in fact launched when Hua Guofeng was still the predominant leader of the Party, the initiation of the reforms is still very often dated to the third plenum in December, 1978, and the difference of the economic visions of Hua and Deng is routinely emphasized. The above examination has found further support for the claim of Teiwes and Sun by demonstrating that the *People's Daily* began its determined propagandizing for opening up the wage gap and tying wages more closely to effort at a time when Hua was still the dominant leader. According to Teiwes and Sun, the disregard for Hua's economic vision has been predicated on an inclination in China's political culture to accord guilt and praise in a black-and-white fashion. Based on the current and the previous chapter, however, a more interesting explanation emerges: While Hua and Deng saw almost eye-to-eye on the issue of economic reform, Deng managed to garner public support by allying himself with the various forces—not least workers and intellectuals—who wanted a larger influence over politics and the running of factories. After the Dengist faction had come to power, however, they completely reversed course and threw their full weight behind curtailing those moves towards democracy they themselves had initiated. For this reason, it seems plausible to argue that the Dengist faction found it expedient to vilify Hua's economic policies in order to exaggerate the domestic threats to the economic reform program as well as to paper over the fact that the ascent of the Dengist faction had come about through old boys' networks and by promises of democratic reform, both of which threatened to throw an unfavorable light on the Dengists after their policy-reversals in early 1981, and would thus need to go down the memory hole.

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[412] Giuseppe Tomasi Di Lampedusa, *The Leopard* (Vintage, 2007), 19.
[413] Teiwes and Sun, "China's New Economic Policy under Hua Guofeng."

In other words, the differences between the economic policies of the Hua and Deng factions had to be exaggerated in order that Deng's unfaithfulness to his democratic promises might be forgotten.

Chapter 6: Model workers, social issues, and interpersonal influence (1977-1992)

6.1 Introduction

The previous two chapters have examined how model workers were employed by the *People's Daily* in the party-state's endeavors to alter the social imaginary so as to make it fit the political and economic reforms. In the course of the 1980s, however, the attention paid to model workers by the *People's Daily* gradually decreased—for reasons to be explained shortly—while other types of models came to take up more space on the pages of the *People's Daily*. In order to further understand how and *why* the party-state deployed exemplary models for popular imitation in the period under investigation, this chapter will broaden the investigation to include other types of models than labor models. In order to more deeply understand the model of personhood underlying the frequent invocations for imitation, this chapter will also examine how the party-state depicts interpersonal influence more broadly. This will include the kinds of negative influence in the 1980s that led to the proliferation of what the party-state leadership saw as unwanted social phenomena, and it will include also the means endorsed by the party-state for improving individuals and thereby society.

As the 1980s progressed, the party-state leadership became particularly preoccupied with three social problems: the behavior of the younger generation, the apparent escalation of crime, and cadre corruption. The party-state invested great resources in trying to both understand and combat these social problems, and the discussions related to these topics came to be some of the period's most sustained debates about how interpersonal influence occurs, and how it may have to be averted, shaped, or embraced. This chapter will therefore draw on the *People's Daily* to investigate how the party-state depicted a number of unwanted social behaviors—and the possible solutions to correct these behaviors—in order to better

understand the model of personhood implied by these descriptions and solutions. Why, according to the party-state, did so many people seem to behave in problematic ways, and by what techniques might they be compelled to act in more socially productive ways? As will be shown, both the anxieties of the leadership and the techniques called upon to dispel these anxieties are explicable in terms deriving from the porous personhood model.

There were several reasons why model workers came to feature less often in the *People's Daily* as the 1980s progressed. One reason why model workers featured so prominently in the *People's Daily* in the early years of reform was that the party-state needed to ameliorate the animosity against model workers which had in some places manifested itself in extremely cruel treatment during the Cultural Revolution. Second, as the case against the Gang of Four—which officially ended in 1981—gradually receded into the past, there was less need to justify the case against them by focusing on the suffering of model workers during the Cultural Revolution. Third, the topics treated in the previous two chapters—i.e., politics, wages, and relations of authority at the workplace—dominated the attention of the early reform leaders, and workers were inevitably central to these topics. Fourth, a range of new social problems began to emerge in the course of the 1980s—such as youth unemployment, crime, and corruption; while model workers appeared in a number of stories devoted to these topics, they were not prime actors in these dramas. Fifth, as the economic reforms entailed giving higher wages and more social recognition to managers and professionals, these occupational categories came to feature more prominently in the *People's Daily*, to some extent edging out stories about model workers. Sixth, as the wage and prestige of manual workers deteriorated relative to the wage and prestige of managers and professionals, the party-state presumably found it less attractive to focus popular attention on the lives and opinions of China's working class.

In their public pronouncements of what ailed Chinese society in the 1980s and into the 1990s, spokespeople for the party-state, including the *People's Daily*, stressed again and again that the fundamental problem in Chinese society was the poor "social atmosphere" (社

会风气: *shehui fengqi*). As this chapter will show, the "social atmosphere" came to be used as a catch-all phrase for anything deemed unsavory by the party-state leadership, including laziness, poor hygiene, disrespect for book learning, changing sexual mores, the spread of pornography, rising crime rates, and failures of personal morality. One of the major topics of this chapter will therefore be to answer the question of why the party-state found attractive this conceptualization of the major social ills of the period.

6.2 The three spheres particularly affected by the bad social atmosphere

6.2.1 Youth and the social atmosphere

A significant source of leadership worry and popular dissatisfaction was the rapid increase in urban youth unemployment, which had roots which were partly demographic, partly a result of sent-down youths returning to the cities, and partly a consequence of the economic imbalances of the early 1980s. Moreover, as the political and economic objectives of the reforms partly consisted in depoliticizing the workforce and limiting political meetings outside of workhours, even those youngsters who did have jobs were left with at least some free time on their hands.

What further created a fraught relationship between the young and the party-state leadership was the vast dissimilarity of their formative experiences.[414] The generation that demonstrated its clout after the death of Mao by sweeping aside the many younger newcomers at the political table of power and arrogating for themselves the positions of authority in the party-state was a generation battle-hardened in the 1930s and 1940s, who had won enormous prestige by bringing an end to war and national fragmentation. Their experiences had seasoned them in frugality, and their ability to overcome physical adversity and persist under harsh living conditions had been crucial for their ultimate victory. For this generation, resistance towards city-life and its supposed corrosive influence on morality, not

[414] See Ruth Cherrington, *Deng's Generation: Young Intellectuals in 1980s China* (Basingstoke [England]; New York: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997), chap. 1.

least sexual and family morality, had been at the center of their moral universe. The party-state had subsequently sought to promulgate this ascetic sensibility because it fitted perfectly with a development strategy aiming to accelerate industrial and military development by deferring the dispensation of creature comforts. This moral vision found expression in multiple cultural products, such as in a play celebrating the so-called "Exemplary Eighth Company on Nanjing Road," where a married platoon leader almost succumbs to the allure of a female spy and the luxury of Shanghai's most bustling thoroughfare, only to be saved by an alert political officer and thought reform.[415]

Where the PRC leadership had been unusual, even among socialist states, for its hostility towards commercials since the middle of the 1950s,[416] and where the PRC had been praised internationally in the 1970s as a place where women were not made into sexual objects,[417] norms and practices relating to sexuality and commercials changed rapidly up through the 1980s,[418] and increasing real wages and an expanding market in consumer goods gave the young the opportunity to splurge—however modestly by today's standards—on items their elders found superfluous and often even morally detestable. All of this rapidly transformed the atmosphere of Chinese city-life:

> [A] foreign visitor accustomed to Mao's China walking through Chinese cities in the early 1980s had to process a dizzying array of new phenomena: individual merchants setting up private street stalls almost everywhere; women starting to get their hair done and to use lipstick and makeup; clothing that reflected ever greater fashion-consciousness; the reappearance of private cars; recrudescence of nightclubs, discos, and even prostitution;

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[415] Cheng, *Creating the "New Man." From Enlightenment Ideals to Socialist Realities*, 107f. For more on the celebration of the PLA's eighth company, see Gucheng Li, *A Glossary of Political Terms of the People's Republic of China* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1995), 285f.
[416] Karl Gerth, "Compromising with Consumerism in Socialist China: Transnational Flows and Internal Tensions in 'Socialist Advertising,'" *Past & Present* 218, no. suppl 8 (January 1, 2013): 229f., https://doi.org/10.1093/pastj/gts041.
[417] Beverley Hooper, "Women, Consumerism and the State in Post–Mao China," *Asian Studies Review* 17, no. 3 (1994): 78.
[418] Beverley Hooper, "From Mao to Madonna: Sources on Contemporary Chinese Culture," *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science* 22 (1994): 161–169; Hooper, "Women, Consumerism and the State in Post–Mao China"; Beverley Hooper, *Youth in China* (Ringwood, Victoria, Australia; New York, NY, USA: Penguin Books, 1985).

> newspapers that featured bold new pieces of 'investigative literature' (*baogao wenxue*); colorful ads beginning to clutter the pages of new, glossy magazines; black-market money changers; and the reappearance of long-banned private pedicab drivers, who had been considered irredeemably 'feudal' just a few years before.[419]

In the face of these remarkable changes, the party-state came to take a keen interest in the views of the young in the 1980s, as testified to by the large number of surveys undertaken to chart the values of the young which official organs began to conduct with increasing frequency from the late 1970s.[420] These surveys and the reports based upon them clearly revealed that what most concerned the party-state in relation to the young in the 1980s were selfishness and a lack of discipline. Bakken summarizes the findings from a number of research reports, and their conclusions provide a good summary of what the *People's Daily* reported as the most troubling characteristics of the young, namely that they were "'selfish, individualist, hyper-critical, self-centered, and dependent'; that they 'lacked cooperative character'; and that they evinced 'laziness, willfulness and carelessness.' They were deemed to be 'without scruples' (*wusuo guji*), suffered from 'insatiable desires,' and were 'unsociable and eccentric.'"[421]

That the young felt strongly ambivalent about the ideals of selflessness and personal sacrifice represented by the many models held up as exemplars by the educational system was revealed by a debate which was kicked off by a letter published in May, 1980, in the China Youth League's magazine *China Youth* (*Zhongguo qingnian*). The letter was published under the name of Pan Xiao, supposedly a young female reader, though it was in fact the joint product of two people, at least one of whom was employed at *China Youth*.[422] The letter

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[419] Orville Schell and John Delury, *Wealth and Power: China's Long March to the Twenty-First Century* (New York, USA: Random House, 2013), 291.
[420] Xu Luo, *Searching for Life's Meaning: Changes and Tensions in the Worldviews of Chinese Youth in the 1980s* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002). For discussions of such surveys, see pages 69, 97, 157f.
[421] Børge Bakken, "The 'Bad' and the 'Sick': Medicalizing Deviance in China," in *Disease and Crime: A History of Social Pathologies and the New Politics of Health*, ed. Robert Peckham (New York: Routledge, 2013), 99.
[422] Catherine H. Keyser, *Professionalizing Research in Post-Mao China: The System Reform Institute*

details the painful maturation of a young woman who starts out as a devout follower of Lei Feng whose heroic acts "excited me so much that I could not sleep for days." The letter describes how:

> I began to develop my first and most beautiful views about life: One lives to make the lives of others more beautiful; one lives and so should have high ideals; when the Party and the people are in need, without hesitating, one should give one's all. I lost myself completely in a kind of ecstasy of self-sacrifice. In my diary, I wrote paragraphs and paragraphs of bright and shining words, and in my every speech and action I imitated the model of heroes.[423]

However, the letter details that following quickly upon this heady phase came a series of disappointments with the Youth League, with friendship, and with romantic love, causing the fictional letter-writer to search high and low for the meaning of life, but finding no answers from the young or the old, nor from farmers or master workers. Instead she turned to literature and philosophy, but there as well she searched for answers in vain until,

> Gradually, I became calm, cool. Social Darwinism gave me a deep revelation: man is human after all! No one can escape life's underlying laws. In crucial moments, everyone chooses based on his original nature. No one can religiously follow the high morals and convictions he preaches. Man is selfish; there is no such thing as a selfless, noble person. All that past propaganda was exaggeration or fiction. Ask the great saints, the distinguished scholars, the noble teachers, the well-respected propagandists. If they dare confront themselves, how many of them can say they have escaped the underlying law of struggles to achieve personal desires? In the past, I believed fanatically that 'man lives to make the lives of others more beautiful,' and 'don't hesitate to sacrifice your life for the people.' Recalling this, how ridiculous it seems now![424]

The publication of the letter in May, 1980, generated a heated, nation-wide discussion, with many thousands of readers sending letters to *China Youth* and to *China Youth Daily* to voice their opinions, and the wide interest caused several magazines and newspapers to conduct similar discussions of the same themes. In June, Hu Qiaomu signaled his—and thereby the

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and Policy Making (M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 122f.
[423] Quoted in Xu Luo, *Searching for Life's Meaning*, 53.
[424] Quoted in Xu Luo, 55.

party-state leadership's—approval of the on-going discussion, and in July the *People's Daily* published an article titled "The discussion on the meaning of life deserves attention," encouraging cadres and youth alike to participate in the debate.[425] The debate came to an official close in March, 1981, when editorials summarizing the debate were published in *China Youth* and in *China Youth Daily* pointing out that investigations of the meaning of life always accompanied world-historic changes such as the Renaissance, China's May Fourth, and the Russian Revolution.[426]

The Pan Xiao debate showed a number of things. First of all, it revealed that many young felt a deep ambivalence towards the ideals of selflessness and personal sacrifice. The debate also showed how the CPD has at times allowed quite a wide a range of views to be voiced on sensitive topics in a controlled setting, whereby the CPD can at once gather and attempt to shape public views. As a form of media control, this is very different from pure censorship, as will be discussed in this dissertation's Conclusion. It should be remembered, nonetheless, that the Pan Xiao debate took place in a period of unusual press freedom, and with the clampdown of the "spiritual pollution" campaign in 1983, the journalists in charge were severely criticized and some were forced to leave the magazine.[427]

When it came to improving the outlook of the young, the *People's Daily* noted that there were basically three possible solutions: imitation of models, education, and high culture. Fortunately, "Young people are inclined to emulate heroic deeds and draw inspiration from advanced and model people on various fronts. We should therefore arrange meetings between the young and celebrated scientists, writers, musicians, actors and actresses, combat heroes and model workers."[428] As what we may refer to as the "youth problem" only seemed to escalate after 1979, Party elder Song Renqiong is quoted in the *People's Daily* in 1981 as impressing upon a gathering of labor models in Beijing that they

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[425] Xu Luo, 57f.
[426] Xu Luo, 58.
[427] Xu Luo, 66.
[428] *People's Daily*, 1979.06.08, p.1, "改造社会风气是全党的任务."

must place their personal conduct *above* their production results, because that is the only way for them to remain role models for the masses and thereby educate the young and "braid all workers into one rope."[429] As is generally the case, however, it remains unexplained *how* these model workers are to influence the students and ordinary workers with whom they come into contact. It seems to be assumed—and never questioned—that simply staging meetings with model workers is enough for a beneficial transmission effect to occur.

In addition to relying on visits by model workers, the party-state focuses on culture as a means of improving the social atmosphere. One such attempt is the establishment of local "culture centers" (文化中心: *wenhua zhongxin*). In an article from 1980, the *People's Daily* describes how participating in events at a newly-built culture center has thoroughly reformed a young man who used to be lazy and quarrelsome. Having attended movies and plays at the center—referred to by the *People's Daily* as constituting "edifying education" (熏陶教育: *xuntao jiaoyu*)—the young man was inspired to participate in dirty, arduous undertakings, ultimately earning him selection as a labor model. The metaphoric term "*xuntao jiaoyu*" is in itself interesting, as the first character in the expression, *i.e.,* 熏 (*xun*), usually refers to the smell of flowers or to the process of curing foodstuff through smoking. In other words, the edifying effects of association with high culture are metaphorically represented as a gaseous substance entering and permanently affecting the person. Obviously this resonates with the notion of porous personhood developed above. In addition, this young man is, the *People's Daily* explains, just one example of how the staging of vivid and morally-edifying plays and movies continue to improve the local population and has drastically reduced bad habits such as gambling, theft, brawls, etc.[430]

The strengthened emphasis on book-based education was, in fact, evident already

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[429] *People's Daily*, 1981.04.30, p.1, "宋任穷同志在首都劳模座谈会上讲话 希望劳模带动广大职工一道前进."
[430] *People's Daily*, 1980.07.02, p.1, "转变社会风气—促进安定团结."

under Hua Guofeng. This is nicely illustrated by the posters produced to commemorate Mao's supposed anointing of Hua Guofeng as his successor, which show the two old men, seemingly communicating through their eyes, flanked on all sides by great piles of books.[431] See Illustration 6.1. Stories about model workers also increasingly come to involve book learning, such as when a cadre stresses that gold-tipped fountain pens and notebooks serve as excellent awards for labor models,[432] while a batch of model workers visiting Beijing spend all of their free time studying and even have a teacher lecturing to them while they take supper.[433] Here, one may also think of the model worker Qi Lili, discussed in Chapter 5, whose formidable memory earned her the sobriquet "living account book."

[431] As Landsberger has noted, all the way up through the 1990s references to books and schooling became ever more pervasive in the posters produced by the party-state. Http://chineseposters.net/toomanybooks/29.php. Accessed October 10, 2016.
[432] *People's Daily*, 1978.10.08, p.6, "沾边就算."
[433] *People's Daily*, 1983.10.22, p.4, "上海五位青年劳模在工会十大提出—劳动模范要争当读书模范."



Illustration 6.1: On the left, Hua Guofeng, and, on the right, Mao Zedong. Courtesy of http://chineseposters.net/posters/e15-121.php. Accessed 2016.11.23.

Furthermore, books were not simply described as something from which students may acquire useful knowledge; sometimes having one's deeds entered into a book can also be a life-changing experience. This notion finds expression in an article where a journalist reports on a recent visit to a mine in a small village. At this mine, the journalist explains, they have since 1978 maintained the habit of entering outstanding labor performances into a ledger.[434] While some workers had initially considered this procedure pointless, it turned out to have remarkable effects as a means of motivating those with tendencies to slack off, and over the years the records of outstanding achievements had come to fill four weighty tomes. One example of the beneficial effects of this is provided by the young worker Liu Baoying who

[434] As Tian Xiaofei posited for Lei Feng's diary, it seems reasonable to detect in this practice an echo from Buddhist ledgers of merit. See Xiaofei Tian, "The Making of a Hero: Lei Feng and Some Issues of Historiography."

used to be a gambler and an idler.[435] One day, however, Liu worked so hard that his name was entered into the ledger and from that day on he worked assiduously and no longer quarreled with his family, ultimately earning him recognition as a labor model. If there is anything left of the Chinese "cult of books" mentioned by Derk Bodde and described in Chapter 3, it may be glimpsed in the many ways in which books feature in *People's Daily* articles in the 1980s.

Finally, the party-state emphasized that schooling was an effective means of teaching the young not to put individual interests above those of society:

> We must be good at educating them [i.e., the young] and, through concrete examples, point out to them what is true, pleasing and beautiful and what is false, ugly and evil. [...] With this understanding, they [the young] will gradually establish a new common practice in which they love the country and the collective, relish to study and work, conscientiously observe law and discipline and uphold the social norms.[436]

To the young who do not abide by the laws, the *People's Daily* sends harsher messages, such as in one article praising Master Fu Tun—a character from the ancient chronicle *The Spring and Autumn Annals*—who chose to have his son executed for murder in order to see law upheld, even though his sovereign urged Fu Tun towards leniency towards his only son. This is the kind of strictness, the *People's Daily* explains by referring to the hard-nosed classical injunction to "uphold righteousness (by) eradicating relatives" (大义灭亲: *dayimieqin*), that created a positive social atmosphere in the 1950s and now needs to be revived.[437]

Education was also posited as the remedy for another shortcoming of the young which was threatening the social atmosphere—namely their lack of pride in China's achievements. The attempts to cure this infirmity found a curricular expression when many schools changed their "political education" classes (政治教育: *zhengzhi jiaoyu*) to "patriotic education" classes (爱国主义教育: *aiguozhuyi jiaoyu*), while references to "socialist

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[435] *People's Daily*, 1989.12.17, p.5, "唐家庄煤矿的'功劳簿'."
[436] *People's Daily*, 1979.06.08, p.1, "改造社会风气是全党的任务."
[437] *People's Daily*, 1980.06.25, p.3, "送子伏法."

education" (社会主义教育: *shehuizhuyi jiaoyu*) decreased rapidly in the *People's Daily* in the same period. Article after article describe how kids in schools and kindergartens have their political thinking heightened by participating in flag-raising ceremonies, by singing the national anthem, and by studying China's national emblem. In some articles, model workers are invited to address school audiences as part of patriotic education.[438]

Some of the articles dedicated to "political education" forge telling connections between national pride, China's vast territory, and a new commercial culture. In one article, the *People's Daily* reports from an elementary school in Fujian Province where the students had in recent years become unable to control themselves when faced with the influx of imported products, causing them to "imitate the rotten thinking of the bourgeoisie." In order to counteract this trend, the school had introduced patriotic education, and this had proved a huge success. On the day when the journalist attended patriotic education at the school, the students had been asked to bring along with them any trademarks they possessed from products produced in mainland China, in Hong Kong, and on Macau. One student explains,

> This is the trademark of a Xinjiang company producing woolen sweaters and milk powder. This is the trademark from a Shanghai company producing T-shirts and nylon socks. This trademark comes from "Phoenix Bicycles" in Shanghai, this is from a Shanghai "Butterfly" sewing machine, this is from "Swan" underclothes, and this is a "Peace" shirt, both from Shanghai. This is from seedless raisins grown in Xinjiang, this is "Narcissus" lychees from Xiamen, and this trademark is from a can of longan, also from Xiamen.[439]

By studying these trademarks, the students, according to the *People's Daily*, learn that a multitude of products are produced in China, and by comparing them to trademarks from things brought home from abroad by visiting relatives, the students are able to see that things produced in China are just as good as foreign products. This exercise "creates a sense of ethnic pride in the young minds of the students." It is worth noting that the students—and through them the readers of the *People's Daily*—are never exhorted to curb their desire for

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[438] *People's Daily*, 1982.05.27, p.3, "这样的思想教育我们欢迎."
[439] *People's Daily*, 1981.12.08, p.3, "侨乡小学—红花满园—晋江石狮中心小学开展生动活泼的爱国主义教育."

these material goods; instead, this desire is indulged, and even stimulated, as a means of arousing patriotic sentiment. The students are not, in other words, encouraged to reflect critically on their desire to imitate the affluent life-style from abroad; rather, they are taught to imitate those who appreciate the quality of domestically-produced goods. Where material desires are typically presented as a vice in the *People's Daily*, it is represented as unproblematic when it is used to stimulate patriotism.

What we see in articles such as this is a topographical reimagining of the PRC's territory based upon trademarks and high-quality products. In this way, China is portrayed as being able to hold its head high in the world of nations to the degree that its domestic products can compete with those produced abroad. As we saw in Chapter 4, the early 1980s was a key turning point when the *People's Daily* offered a momentous reconceptualization of the world by replacing class struggle with nationalist loyalties. One facet of this turn towards nationalism was furnished by school lessons such as the one analyzed above, where pupils—and *People's Daily* readers—were offered a world consisting of places represented by consumer products. Where the Chinese nation had previously been constituted by the alliance of workers and peasants, we now have a Chinese nation produced through its production of consumer goods.

In short, when it came to improving the contribution of the young to the social atmosphere, the party-state promoted a moral vision emphasizing the importance of book learning, cultured personal behavior, national pride, and submission to larger collectives, in particular the party-state.[440] As tools for achieving this, the party-state stressed the importance of role-modelling, contact with high culture, and education.

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[440] This pedagogic emphasis of the party-state is exactly the same as that identified by Hess in her analysis of the pedagogic vision of the Mass Education Movement in the 1920s and 1930s. Kate Merkel-Hess, *The Rural Modern: Reconstructing the Self and State in Republican China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 39.

6.2.2 Crime and the social atmosphere

The early years of the reform period brought rising crime rates, leading the political leadership to organize repeated campaigns of "striking hard" (严打: *yanda*) against crime. As the crime rates continued to climb up through the 1980s, the party-state continued to declare new rounds of "striking hard," every round punctuated by declarations of great success; every success seemingly forgotten when troubling new statistics caused new rounds of *yanda*.[441] As part of this strategy of harsh policing and punishment, one million new employees were recruited into the security forces, heavy sentences were meted out,[442] and the annual number of executions in China tripled from 1978 to 1986.[443] As we will see below, the party-state's understanding of crime—and of the potential remedies against crime—both exhibit clear signs of being grounded on the model of porous personhood.

If we look first of all to how the *People's Daily* described the apparent wave of crime in the 1980s, we notice that the most frequent metaphor was that of the "social atmosphere." The poor social atmosphere was described by the *People's Daily* as manifesting itself in, *inter alia*, gambling, prostitution, robberies, corruption, nepotism, spitting in the streets, jumping ahead in queues, and the sale of fake cigarettes, fake alcohol, and fake medicine.[444] One article notes that the Huizhou city government in Guangdong, in an attempt to purify (净化: *jinghua*) the social atmosphere, has closed down hundreds of street stalls which were breeding grounds for prostitution, blackmail and other acts poisoning (毒化: *duhua*) the

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[441] Susan Trevaskes, "Severe and Swift Justice in China," *The British Journal of Criminology* 47, no. 1 (2007): 23–41.

[442] Even a distant relative of Li Xiannian was executed for criminal activities; something which almost never happened to those with such high connections. Baum, "The Road to Tiananmen: Chinese Politics in the 1980s," 386.

[443] Børge Bakken, "Moral Panics, Crime Rates and Harsh Punishment in China," *Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology (Australian Academic Press)* 37 (August 16, 2004): 79.

[444] *People's Daily*, 1989.01.20, p.4, "甘肃一些职工认为治理社会环境的良策之一是——重提'我为人人，人人为我'"; 1989.03.01, p.6, "从'压岁钱'说到风气"; 1989.03.24, p.5, "大学生毕业不包分配引出的社会现象——父母为子女走后门明显增多"; 1989.04.16, p.1, "公安部和全国妇联座谈会强调."

social atmosphere.[445]

In addition to talking about crime as poisoning the social atmosphere, the *People's Daily* also frequently describes various socially disruptive acts as "bacteria" (毒菌: *dujun*), which may harm the social atmosphere and lead to crime.[446] Likening criminality to bacteria metaphorically implies that criminality is infectious, spreading from person to person irrespective of intention. The social atmosphere is further imbued with life by being metaphorically described as "healthy" or "unhealthy." The perceptions of criminality as akin to poison and criminal behavior as resembling the spread of bacteria both resonate with the concept of porous personhood. Moreover, thinking of unwanted behavior as bacteria is also a way of positing an analogy between the bodies of individual human beings and the corporate social body, illustrative of correlative thinking as mentioned in Chapter 2.

As is also apparent from the above quote and many similar ones, the *People's Daily* frequently asserts that minor moral infractions, which are not in themselves illegal, must be taken seriously because such infractions often prove to be the first step towards actual criminal behavior. In one case, the *People's Daily* notes that "A single ant hole may cause the collapse of a thousand-li dyke. It is starting from wrong acts such as harming others to benefit oneself that lead some people into gradually engaging in corruption, larceny, speculation and profiteering."[447] Tanner, based on a thorough investigation of the discourse surrounding crime in China of the 1980s, notes that

> From the Central Committee of the Communist Party's characterization of hooligans as 'dregs of society' to a high-ranking procuratorial official's description of thieves as lazy, undisciplined persons whose personal hygiene leaves much to be desired to the remarks of criminologists that women engaged in prostitution because they lacked a sense of shame, had an unrestrained appetite for luxury, and were unable to control their sexual desires, one observes throughout the Chinese literature on crime a strong sense of moral

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[445] *People's Daily*, 1989.10.2, p.8, "惠州治理路边店."
[446] *People's Daily*, 1982.11.15, p.3, "搞好社会治安是实现社会风气根本好转的重要条件."
[447] *People's Daily*, 1982.03.05, p.2, "讲求商业道德 建设市场文明."

outrage.[448]

In short, the slippery slope seems so slippery that people who commit minor moral infractions will almost inevitably end up as habitual law-breakers. Individuals, in other words, are depicted as having a poor capacity to control their own behavior in the face of outside temptation. This is, once again, one of the characteristics of the porous personhood model developed in Chapter 2.

Singled out as the immoral act that most often leads to crime is that of looking at pornography. In an article titled "27 out of 28," the *People's Daily* explains that a recent investigation has found that out of 28 hardened criminals variously convicted for acts including robbery and rape, 27 of them had looked at pornography prior to committing their crimes. The *People's Daily* makes clear that "This kind of spiritual opium [精神鸦片: *jingshen yapian*] corrupts morality, pollutes the social atmosphere, poisons the young, and causes great damage. For this kind of crime the perpetrators must be punished severely in order to appease public indignation."[449] The article goes on to call pornography a foreign threat, and further casting the party-state in the role of heroic defender of the nation's morality and autonomy by drawing an explicit parallel to Lin Zexu's destruction of opium confiscated from the imperialist powers which, the article enjoins, should serve as a model for the present.[450]

A striking example of how the *People's Daily* turned the supposed threat of pornography into an instrument of harsh policing rolled off the presses in the early hours of June 4th, 1989, just when the tanks were rolling towards Tiananmen Square. Under the title "A glance at 'sweeping away pornography' in the US," the article opens by recounting how Ted Bundy, before his electrocution in January of 1989, had professed that he had been set

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[448] Harold Tanner, *Strike Hard! Anti-Crime Campaigns and Chinese Criminal Justice, 1979-1985* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University East Asia Program, 1999), 131f.
[449] *People's Daily*, 1983.11.22, p.1, "28 与 27."
[450] Lin Zexu was an Imperial Commissioner under the Qing, famous for having orchestrated the confiscation and destruction of large quantities of opium from British traders in 1939. These actions that were taken as *casus belli* by the British and led to the First Opium War (1839-1942).

on his murderous path by looking at pornography.[451] The article goes on to explain that while some people doubt that pornography is a direct cause of violence, other people and organizations—among these spokespeople for the feminist movement in the US—claim that pornography clearly *does* lead to violence, and swayed by this latter standpoint the US has, the *People's Daily* avers, for the past two years been embroiled in a large-scale sweep-away-pornography campaign (扫黄运动: *saohuang yundong*). This article was the first one of 1989 to make mention of the term "sweeping away pornography," but in the remainder of the year the *People's Daily* would publish no less than 78 articles mentioning the establishment of China's own anti-pornography campaign, and no less than 102 articles in 1990—by far the most attention anti-pornography has ever received in the *People's Daily*. For comparison, only 22 *People's Daily* articles had used the term "sweeping away pornography" over the previous 43 years.

The timing of the Bundy piece, along with the large increase in the number of articles devoted to anti-pornography after June 4th, indicates that the party-state was purposefully planning to frame its actions against the Tiananmen protesters in terms of a crackdown on pornography. Dangers such as those posed by the likes of Ted Bundy must have been intended as legitimation for state-perpetrated violence against its own citizens. Where anti-models were generally represented by the *People's Daily* in a generic fashion, the particular gruesomeness of Ted Bundy's actions may explain why he is described in greater detail than most anti-models. In addition, had Ted Bundy been Chinese, in-depth descriptions of his actions might have caused readers to fault the inadequacy of China's criminal and educational systems, or his story might have invited national soul-searching. Such interpretations were unlikely to be made by readers of the *People's Daily* on the basis of Ted Bundy's story. In short, the party-state attempted to mobilize the popular moral indignation over changing sexual norms and practices as a justification for its decision to break up the

[451] *People's Daily*, 1989.06.04, p.7, "美国"扫黄"一瞥."

protests—providing an excellent illustration of how the ideological innovators of the party-state at times attempted to alter public norms, while they at other times attempted to derive support by playing upon popular norms.

Another great danger singled out in many *People's Daily* articles is that posed by gangs, especially juvenile gangs and their leaders. The *People's Daily* notes that

> Article 23 of the criminal code stipulates that instigators of a joint offense should be severely punished. [...] Instigators are people who hide in the background and provoke others to commit crimes. They take advantage of the vulnerability of young people, their naivety, their mental immaturity and lack of social experience and their inability to distinguish between right and wrong, to provoke them to commit crimes.[452]

As the crime rates continued to rise, so did the party-state's focus on breaking up youth gangs and severely punishing their leaders. Bakken notes, "The 'anti-crime campaigns' (*yanda*) against alleged juvenile gangs in 1984 were probably among the biggest moral panics about youth experienced anywhere during the last century."[453] As we would expect from the porous personhood model, the unsupervised influence of bad examples in small-group settings is thought of as being particularly ominous.

Gang leaders, however, were not the only ones who might wield a pernicious influence.

> Criminals were considered to be dangerous, not only for the acts which they might perpetrate on others, but also because their presence in society was said to pollute the social atmosphere and to lead others into lives of moral dissolution and crime. [...] [W]omen, and particularly women sex offenders, were seen by some criminologists as exercising an especially strong corrupting influence on others. In the words of one criminologist who wrote on women hooligans: 'the main danger of their crimes was a spiritual danger, that is, they polluted the [social; word added by Tanner] atmosphere, disseminated poisonous germs, corrupted others, and adversely affected social stability.' Promiscuous women were regarded as encouraging law-breaking by men who sought their favor and as having 'a stronger power to affect others and greater powers of

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[452] *People's Daily*, 1980.01.07, p.5, "什么是量刑中的从重处罚."
[453] Bakken, "The 'Bad' and the 'Sick': Medicalizing Deviance in China," 107.

enticement than males.'[454]

In other words, even though the statistics showed that far fewer women than men were convicted for criminal behavior, women might nevertheless harm society and perhaps unwittingly incite criminal behavior by men; implicitly declaring that female sexuality was something everyone had to be wary of.

If we turn to investigate how the party-state sought to battle the apparent crime wave, a couple of techniques show up time and again. One of these techniques was to increase control over the populace; something that must have seemed to be slipping through the fingers of the leadership with the advance of reform. One concerned scholar made the suggestion that work units should

> Carry out a thorough and painstaking investigation of the personality, interests, hobbies, ideals, goals, work performance, family situation, previous crimes and misdemeanors, social contacts, romantic relationships, activities outside the factory, living habits, economic situation, political inclination, direction of development of behavior and so on, put them together to form a picture of the work unit as a whole, establish card files on young workers and keep constant track of the situation. These cards should be different from the staff and worker files; they are a reflection of a changing situation, and should be updated regularly, with the goal of predicting crime.[455]

When it came to reeducating those who had committed crimes, a number of techniques are stressed. One common description is provided in the following excerpt: "While dealing with juvenile delinquents who accept reform, just like parents treating their children who suffer from an infectious disease, doctors curing patients and teachers teaching their students, we should conduct patient and painstaking educational and reform work so as to rescue them."[456] In some cases it has reportedly been enough to put on educative plays for brawls

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[454] Tanner, *Strike Hard!*, 129f.
[455] Gu Yingchun, *Qingshaonian fanzui zonghe zhili gailun*, p.120; Quoted in Tanner, 72.
[456] *People's Daily*, 1981.09.10, p.1, "争取社会治安根本好转的一项重要工作." Dikötter has noted that a perceived connection between education, discipline, and morality was also characteristic of criminological thinking in Republican China: "Education, in short, was intrinsically linked to discipline. The prison was part of an educative mission that placed faith in the malleability of human beings while it was also a disciplinary project aimed at instilling respect of social norms.

and thefts to decrease.[457] In other cases, it is necessary to increase public awareness of morality so as to make wrongdoers feel shame and be pushed to engage in introspection.[458] In other words, the party-state portrays itself as patiently attempting to reeducate criminals, or as a doctor curing criminals of their disease.[459]

Reeducating criminals could also take the form of presenting them with worthy models for imitation. Tanner quotes from a textbook on labor reform law which explained that a labor reform cadre

> [S]hould arrive at a good combination of education that appeals to the reason with that which appeals to the emotions, using concrete facts to educate prisoners. For instance, organize the prisoners to tour factories and villages, so that they may see with their own eyes the great accomplishments of socialist construction and the huge changes taking place in the motherland; arrange for former prisoners who have gone on to make outstanding contributions to the building of the four modernizations to come to the labor reform unit to discuss their experience and to stand as examples before the prisoners; do a good job of running the prisoners' cafeteria, conscientiously heal them when they fall ill, and so on.[460]

As noted above, however, harsh policing and sentencing were perhaps the most characteristic features of crime fighting in the 1980s. Trevaskes notes, "Since 1983, there has

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Modernizing elites in republican China viewed the reformation of criminals as a constitutive part of a project of national regeneration in which social cohesion, economic development and state power could only be obtained by molding obedient subjects. This educative mission, for instance, extended to a panoply of charitable institutions of confinement such as orphanages, poorhouses, workhouses, houses for the elderly, reformation centers for women and mental asylums, all of which emphasized the need to transform vulnerable categories of people into productive citizens who could contribute to the moral community thanks to the tools of education." Frank Dikötter, "The Promise of Repentance: Prison Reform in Modern China," *The British Journal of Criminology* 42, no. 2 (2002): 247.

[457] *People's Daily*, 1980.07.02, p.1, "转变社会风气—促进安定团结."

[458] *People's Daily*, 1982.03.05, p.2, "讲求商业道德 建设市场文明."

[459] This is very similar to Smith's elucidation of how the party-state legitimated itself in the 1950s as the agent bringing to see the light those lumpenproletarians who failed to understand the new order. In this way, the party-state's painstaking attempts to reform petty criminals was a crucial justification for the party-state, and the resistance to reform displayed by a certain number of lumpenproletarians only served to emphasize the importance of the party-state's reform efforts. Aminda M. Smith, "Thought Reform and the Unreformable: Reeducation Centers and the Rhetoric of Opposition in the Early People's Republic of China," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 72, no. 4 (2013): 937–958.

[460] Tanner, *Strike Hard!*, 146f.

not been one year in which China has not experienced either a Yanda campaign or a specialized offensive against one type of crime or another."[461] According to Party document 31 of 1983,

> Without going through this great struggle [of striking hard; Tanner], we will be unable to improve public security, a fundamental improvement in the social atmosphere will not be possible, and socialist construction also will not be able to progress smoothly. At the same time, it is only in this way that as we open to the outside world and revitalize the domestic economy and step by step promote economic prosperity, we may avoid the incurable disease of rampant crime, social unrest and moral degeneracy that afflicts the capitalist countries.[462]

Harsh punishment was due in particular to those who failed to reform. As the *People's Daily* states in one article, "We should resolutely deal heavy blows to those elements who carry out sabotage in prisons and refuse to reform."[463] In other words, those who failed to develop morality and self-discipline, despite the best efforts of the party-state, in effect placed themselves so far from the human community that they could be—and perhaps even had to be—executed.[464]

An interesting aspect of the "strike hard" campaigns is how central to these was the re-adoption and refinement of the public sentencing rallies which had been so common during the 1950s. This publicizing of negative exemplars is a modelling tool used far back in Chinese history, manifesting the belief "that parading evil for all to see will lead to a decrease in crime."[465] At these rallies, which were variously organized at sports stadiums, at high schools, or at actual crime scenes depending on the intended audience, and which at times drew more than 100.000 spectators, a number of defendants were produced on stage—

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[461] Trevaskes, "Severe and Swift Justice in China," 23f.
[462] Party document 31, 1983; quoted in Tanner, *Strike Hard!*, 89.
[463] *People's Daily*, 1981.09.10, p.1, "争取社会治安根本好转的一项重要工作."
[464] Tanner, *Strike Hard!*, 131f. Aminda M. Smith has made a somewhat similar point by remarking that reformability almost came to be what marked a person as belonging to the category "the people." Smith in interview with Carla Nappi. http://newbooksnetwork.com/aminda-m-smith-thought-reform-and-chinas-dangerous-classes-reeducation-resistance-and-the-people-rowman-littlefield-2013/. Accessed May 6, 2015.
[465] Bakken, "Moral Panics, Crime Rates and Harsh Punishment in China," 68.

usually wearing distinctly colored clothes and with placards around their necks detailing their names and offenses.[466] Typically, the convicts chosen for these spectacles were convicted for very harsh crimes and they would be paraded around for a time before being led to a nearby execution ground.[467] Trevaskes notes that such rallies were excellent opportunities for the party-state to at once play on and carefully configure popular emotions: "[The rallies] should be envisaged as consciously planned mechanisms through which social values and emotions are structured and routinized into rituals depicting popular sentiment. In this way, judicial declarations can 'set the tone for the public's response at the very moment that they claim to express it.' (Garland, 1990: p. 58)."[468]

All in all, the depiction of crime in the *People's Daily* in the 1980s fit very well with the porous personhood model outlined in Chapter 2. Crime is depicted as spreading from individual to individual, sometimes analogized with disease or bacteria, more often with an ominous all-enveloping social atmosphere through which every immoral and criminal act may influence others to act in socially detrimental ways. Quite clear is also the fact that the party-state sought to fight crime by focusing much of its attention on improving morality and even every-day conduct such as spitting, because—as the *People's Daily* holds in what I think is a telling expression mentioned above—"A single ant hole may cause the collapse of a thousand-*li* dyke." These metaphoric renderings of interpersonal influence along with the focus on immorality—particularly that produced by irresistible sexual attraction—fit very well with the porous personhood model. In addition, two of the prime features of the *yanda*

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[466] The practices of placing signs on the chest of the convicted listing what they have been convicted of, along with the parading through cities of criminals as they are transported to be executed—even though this practice is now illegal—continues to be practiced, as frequently attested in the popular weekly TV program "Interviews before execution," which was broadcast on Henan Legal Channel from 2006 to 2012.

[467] For descriptions and discussions, see Susan Trevaskes, "Propaganda Work in Chinese Courts," *Punishment and Society* 6, no. 1 (2004): 5–22; Trevaskes, "Severe and Swift Justice in China"; Susan Trevaskes, "Public Sentencing Rallies in China: The Symbolizing of Punishment and Justice in a Socialist State," *Crime, Law and Social Change* 39, no. 4 (2003): 359–82, https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024085231324.

[468] Trevaskes, "Public Sentencing Rallies in China," 366.

campaigns—namely, their production of exemplary anti-models as well as the routine practice of making the bodies of the convicts legible as criminals through signs, clothing, and required postures—can plausibly be understood as attempts to showcase undesirable behavior while making the ostracized status of these individuals as clear as possible so as to caution the onlooker.

6.2.3 Corruption and the social atmosphere

Lastly, the party-state wrestled with cadre discipline as the economic reforms created new possibilities for corruption. The many stories about such abuse of office fielded by the new leadership, partly in order to justify the purge of Party members who had joined the Party during the Cultural Revolution, did little to secure public loyalty to the party-state as a whole, and the stories put a great deal of pressure on the new leadership to demonstrate their ability to wipe out these much-publicized evils. In addition, the increasingly conspicuous wealth of officials made a mockery of the Party's long-standing claim that cadres were servants of the people, rather than of their own wallets. One article explained:

> Whether the mores of our socialist society are good or bad is determined to a great extent by the Party's work style. Once the Party's work style is rectified, it will greatly affect the entire social atmosphere and the style of the young people. Why were we able to rapidly get rid of the dregs leftover from the old society in the early years after the founding of the nation and foster a brand new social atmosphere? One important reason is that the party had a fine work style.[469]

One of the most publicized corruption cases was that of Wang Shouxin, who as party secretary had been implicated in massive corruption at a state-run coal enterprise. The case was brought to national attention by the wide publication of the famous journalist Liu Binyan's exposé "Between people and monsters" (人妖之间: *Ren yao zhijian*), which was initially published in *People's Literature* (人民文学: *Renmin wenxue*) in September, 1979, and

[469] *People's Daily*, 1979.06.08, p.1, "改造社会风气是全党的任务."

subsequently widely discussed and republished.[470] Liu's article is mentioned in no less than 13 articles in the *People's Daily* in the years 1979-1981; every time extolled as an important and admirable piece of writing.[471] In this article, Liu presents a Manichaean storyline where the forces of good ultimately vanquish the evil forces of corruption. Wang Shouxin, the main culprit, is explicitly likened to a demon, and the portrayal of her is in many ways reminiscent of traditional Chinese writings about evil empresses with their extraordinary sexual appetites and predispositions for inhuman savagery.[472] As Liu asks rhetorically soon after having introduced Wang into his narrative, "Who knows what sexual passions the waves of the 'Cultural Revolution' awakened in Wang Shouxin's heart?"[473] A few lines further on, Liu notes that Wang was rumored to be virtually illiterate.

But what were ordinary individuals to do about cadre corruption? The *People's Daily* fielded a number of stories throwing light upon this issue. In one such story, a model worker cook is lauded for his efforts. Outraged that a certain official had repeatedly demanded splendid meals as symbolic payment at the place where he worked, the cook complained at various local departments who, though sympathetic, were unable to take action against the powerful official. Finally, the cook sent a letter detailing the matter to the central authorities in Beijing, who brought the arrogant official to justice.[474] Interestingly, the cook's missive is likened to a rock thrown into the ocean, "creating thousands of waves," as if what the cook sets in motion is a force of nature which responds powerfully through the element of water.

The actions of this labor model cook is mentioned several times by the *People's Daily* and explicitly contrasted with a story which had taken place a few months earlier, where a

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[470] Liu's article was reprinted in at least seven different regional newspapers, broadcast on radio, and posted in work units and markets across the country. Cook estimates that the article could easily have reached an audience of one hundred million. Alexander C. Cook, *The Cultural Revolution on Trial: Justice in the Post-Mao Transition* (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 80.
[471] This verdict would change completely in January, 1987, after which the article came to be cited by the *People's Daily* as one of the unreasonable attacks on the Party committed by Liu, which now forced the Party to revoke his membership.
[472] A point also made by Cook, *The Cultural Revolution on Trial*, 96.
[473] *Renmin wenxue*, "*Ren yao zhijian* [Between Human and Monster]," 1979, no. 9, 86.
[474] *People's Daily*, 1980.10.17, p.4, "青年厨师陈爱武敢于向特权挑战."

young, low-ranking cadre had drowned herself as a means of protesting against the corruption of her Party branch secretary, which she had been unable to expose by any other means. While the *People's Daily* states that her suicide was excessive, the newspaper on the whole celebrates her courage: "Her method of struggle was incorrect and reflects her immaturity. However, for someone who has only been a Party member for three years, a girl of only 24 years of age, to throw her heart entirely into the affairs of the Party, and even sacrifice her precious youth in fighting against the harmful atmosphere, how incredibly laudable!"[475] In another article published on the same day, the *People's Daily* noted that the deceased had written in her diary that she did not treasure her life as much as she treasured the Party. Moreover, the paper explains, she had "perceptively realized that the healthy body of the Party had suffered many ordeals through the past fifty years, and that the virus which had infected the Party was no mere moldy spot, but rather something which needed to be cured immediately to prevent its rapid spread."[476]

Finally, it is worth noting that in the two narratives analyzed above, the youth of the two heroes is stressed at the exact moment where they perform their laudable deeds: In the first story, the cook is referred to twice as "Little Chen," in both cases in sentences which connect him to the central Party leadership. In the second narrative, the cadre who drowns herself is referred to twice as a "girl" (姑娘: *guniang*), and in both instances this occurs when her suicide is mentioned.[477] In other words, when the heroes attempt to establish connection with the central Party leadership—via letter or suicide—their youthfulness is foregrounded, emphasizing that the young hero is not one who takes action, but rather one who persists despite physical danger to bring truth to her or his elder superiors, who will then solve the problem. Where the Pan Xiao letter had expressed grave doubts about the value of self-sacrifice to a larger cause, the *People's Daily*, through heroic portraits such as these—

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[475] *People's Daily*, 1980.07.05, p.3, "这样好的党支部委员为什么跳海? "
[476] *People's Daily*, 1980.07.05, p.3, "学习范熊熊的斗争精神."
[477] *People's Daily*, 1980.07.05, p.3, "这样好的党支部委员为什么跳海?"

published when the Pan Xiao debate was at its apex—offers a competing world-view where the selfless courage of young Party members and model workers is held up as that which will expunge corruption. It should furthermore be noted that these exemplary acts consisted in alerting highly-placed leaders to local malfeasance—rather than by mobilizing peers or by acting as individual vigilantes—implicitly asserting that high officials neglect to stamp out corruption solely because their subordinates fail to inform them of local wrong-doing.

As the economic reforms continued to increase the overall income gap as well as the opportunities for cadre profiteering, the need to combat corruption to save the social atmosphere remained a preoccupation of the *People's Daily* up through the 1980s. An article from 1986 neatly summarized why cadre conduct had to be improved:

> Beijing is always an example followed by the whole nation, so it is in improving Party conduct. [...] Now, the Party Central Committee has once more charged the central Party, government, military, and mass organizations with the task of setting an example to all Party members and comrades. This is timely and necessary. A host of dragons needs a leader, just as sheep need their shepherd. We must grasp the key link of our work as if leading an ox by the nose. [...] The general mood of our country is determined by our Party conduct, our Party conduct is determined by the atmosphere of the leading organs, and the atmosphere of the leading organs is determined by the practice of the central Party, government, and military organs. A good atmosphere at the central Party, government, and military organs will affect and carry along the entire Party and nation. This is a proven way of profoundly improving general social conduct.[478]

This one paragraph contains most of the elements favored by the CPD in the 1980s to improve—and reason about—public conduct: There is the notion that proper conduct radiates out from the center via the process of imitation; the notion that good behavior on the part of those in positions of power will improve the "social atmosphere," causing everyone in society to behave better; and the idea that the realm of nature—and particularly notions of animal shepherdry—provides apposite images for reasoning about political leadership. The connection between the Party and a particular "atmosphere" is forged

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[478] *People's Daily*, 1986.01.15, p.1, "全国看北京."


through the wide usage of the term "Party atmosphere" (党风: *dangfeng*; lit. "party wind"), almost invariably employed in these years as something in need of betterment. It is no coincidence that the derogatory term "bureaucratism" (官僚主义: *guanliaozhuyi*) was used more often in the *People's Daily* in the 1980s than it had been since the 1950s and indeed much more often than it has been used in the decades since. What finally served to block the steady stream of criticism of the bureaucracy were the protests of 1989; where after the *People's Daily* for obvious reasons reduced its criticism of official functionaries.

These brief reflections illustrate the development of the topic in this period. While corruption was an effective accusation in the wake of the Cultural Revolution—useful for targeting economic criminals as well as political opponents, and at times useful for eliding the difference between these two—the latter half of the 1980s illustrates how the party-state targeted corruption as a particularly worrisome phenomenon because positions of authority were supposedly vested with moral exemplarity. In short, charges of corruption served a number of functions for the party-state: they highlighted the need for continued vigilance and forcefulness by the central leadership; they hovered as a sword of Damocles above the heads of local cadres; they explained why the reforms did not in practice benefit all members of society; and they posited the existence of a common cause—not least a common cause for anger—uniting the central party-state leadership with ordinary citizens. An essential element of this framing—and in particular of the notion that a positive social atmosphere can radiate outward from the central leadership—is that positions of authority come with responsibilities for proper, moral behavior. This imbrication of morality and politics was also noted in the way model workers appeared in the narratives related to remuneration in Chapter 5, and we will revisit the topic in the Conclusion.

6.3 Model workers and the crisis of 1989

By 1988 model workers appeared in less than a third of the number of articles compared to just six years prior, while Lei Feng's ghost appeared to be granted leave of this world at long

last. See Chart 6.1. In the first three months of 1989 this downward trend continued. Then, with the increasing unrest in April, the *People's Daily* increases its attention to model workers—publishing 22 articles making mention of model workers in April, as compared to 10, 9, and 11 in the first three months of the year. In these articles, the model workers are marshalled to ameliorate public dissatisfaction with corruption, public spending, and nepotism. This was attempted in articles stressing that when model workers sometimes received cash prizes this was only because model workers were so few and far between;[479] besides, most of those honored as model workers were peasants and workers—quite a departure from the previous five years it was emphasized—and most of these honorees received the honor for the first time.[480] That these were the key topics is not surprising, as we know from many sources that these were some of the problems that displeased the population the most in this period.



	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
MW	156	307	321	356	263	222	324	290	204	201	178	138	103	199	296	207	148
LF	158	629	276	135	113	275	196	146	61	30	32	55	16	95	453	262	120

Chart 6.1: Number of articles referring to "model workers" (劳动模范: *laodong mofan* and the abbreviation 劳模: *laomo*) and Lei Feng (雷锋) in the *People's Daily* 1976-1992. The above chart relies on a normalized number of articles, because the average number of articles in the *People's Daily* changes significantly over this period. The numbers can be found in the Appendix.

[479] *People's Daily*, 1989.03.14, p.2, "无锡市提高劳模待遇."
[480] *People's Daily*, 1989.04.25, p.2, "辽宁选劳模——一线新人多."

In early May, the *People's Daily* reports that a batch of model workers have visited Tiananmen Square in celebration of May 1st, where "The Great Hall of the People is open as always, and visitors are queuing like a long snake."[481] Apart from this article—which must be read as an attempt to dispel rumors about events in Beijing by the awkward emphasis that everything is as always—the *People's Daily* only publishes an additional seven articles mentioning model workers in May. This limited coverage probably reflects the fact that workers did not play a central role in the May demonstrations, and also that by this point the *People's Daily* came to operate more or less independently of the CPD.[482] From what we know, the journalists and editors at the *People's Daily* were generally sympathetic to the protest movement and they obviously did not consider model workers of great importance for what was going on.

Towards the end of May, however, the central authorities reasserted control over the *People's Daily* and with the escalation of conflict, the *People's Daily* publishes an interesting article on May 26th, stating that the Ministry of Water Resources has honored a number of model workers, but cancelled the planned award ceremony in order to reduce expenses.[483] Never previously—nor any time later—has the Ministry of Water Resources been mentioned in the *People's Daily* as involved with selecting model workers, so considering this dissertation's emphasis on the relationship between water and state-power it is interesting to note that such a connection was drawn precisely at this very tense moment. The article furthermore reports that the model workers were elected through the means of "bottom-up democratic selection through public appraisal" (自下而上民主评选: *zixia'ershang minzhu pingxuan*), a term strongly emphasizing the democratic manner of selection. That the CPD wanted to make this point in the clearest terms possible is revealed by the fact that this cluster of terms—自下而上民主评选—has only ever appeared in the *People's Daily* in this

[481] *People's Daily*, 1989.05.02, p.1, "首都群众和劳模欢度'五一'."
[482] Zhao Dingxin, *The Power of Tiananmen: State-Society Relations and the 1989 Beijing Student Movement* (University of Chicago Press, 2004), 302ff.
[483] *People's Daily*, 1989.05.26, p.2, "水利部表彰先进."

one article in all the years of the *People's Daily* from 1946 up until the summer of 2018.

In June and July, the *People's Daily* pays almost no attention to model workers, but from August, 1989, and for about 12 months model workers come to feature much more often: where only 60 articles mention model workers in the period from January 1st to June 4th, the *People's Daily* publishes 184 such articles in the remainder of the year. These articles hardly ever touch upon issues related to the political and economic reforms, but invariably place model workers alongside political leaders, containing statements from model workers that they stand united in their support of the party-state leadership.

In short, the attention to Lei Feng and model workers increased considerably after the June suppression. In 1990, the attention awarded to model workers and to Lei Feng, as compared to 1988, increased by factors of roughly 3 and 28, respectively. That attention to Lei Feng in particular increased so prodigiously reveals that the CPD considered his unassuming manners and complete devotion to the Party to be just the panacea China's youth stood in need of.[484] Though many in number, neither model workers nor Lei Feng devotees do much in these articles; mostly they are simply there to bear witness to whatever new success agents of the party-state have accomplished. The same goes for the *zhurenweng* discussed in Chapter 5. Of the 114 articles mentioning the *zhurenweng* in June to December, 1989, 110 of them directly connect the term *zhurenweng* with a form of consciousness, responsibility, bearing, or position. The specific collocations used to talk about the *zhurenweng* in this period are even more devoid of action than had been the case in previous years, and we might say that in the latter half of 1989 the *zhurenweng* is reduced almost completely to a state of mind.[485]

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[484] That the Chinese authorities considered the events of June, 1989, to be attributable to poor discipline among the young was demonstrated in the fall of 1989 when most universities around the country began the practice of packing first-year students off on military training courses in order to inculcate in them a sense of discipline. Anne-Marie Brady, *Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People's Republic* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 216f.

[485] The following string of collocations was used to query the *People's Daily* database to examine this point: "主人翁精神+主人翁觉悟+主人翁地位+主人翁身份+主人翁积极性+主人翁的创造精

One final observation related to how the party-state sought to overcome the crisis of 1989 through the *People's Daily* is made possible through quantitative investigation that reveals how the party-state attempted to brighten the public mood by improving the weather. This becomes apparent by noticing how, in 1990, the terms "a bright sky after the storm" (雨后天晴: *yuhoutianqing*), "warm and sunny weather" (风和日丽: *fengherili*), and "clear and crisp autumn weather" (秋高气爽: *qiugaoqishuang*) all appear with unusual frequency. If we add up the normalized number of references to these three terms, 1998 was the only year in the period 1946-2011 where the sum total use of these terms was higher than it was in 1990; 1998 was also the warmest year in China's meteorological history, as well as the year with the largest recorded jump in average temperature compared to the previous year.[486] In the context of the present dissertation it is particularly noteworthy that *qingtian* (青天) has the dual meaning of "beautiful weather" and "upright official." In regards of the present dissertation it is also worth noting that people with an Asian cultural background are more inclined to discuss their moods by use of weather metaphors than people with an American cultural background who rely to a larger degree on metaphors describing interior bodily states.[487] This fits well with the claims advanced in Chapter 2 about the prevalence of porous personhood in Chinese culture. It should be noted, in all fairness, that the upturn of "excellent weather" reports in 1990 was only modest. It would be another two decades before the party-state gained the self-confidence and the technological wherewithal to seriously seek to put a shine in the public eye by clearing the sky.

神+主人翁作用+主人翁责任感+主人翁意识+主人翁的地位+主人翁的态度+主人翁思想+主人翁的精神+主人翁姿态+主人翁的责任感+主人翁劳动态度+主人翁的姿态+主人翁感+主人翁的责任感+主人翁态度+主人翁的思想+主人翁的意识+主人翁的自觉性+主人翁的豪迈姿态+主人翁的亢奋的参与意识+主人翁失落感+主人翁的责任心+主人翁的自豪感+主人翁情深似海".

[486] Wang Shaowu and Gong Daoyi, "Enhancement of the Warming Trend in China," *Geophysical Research Letters* 27, no. 16 (2000): 2581–2584.

[487] Junko Tanaka-Matsumi and Anthony J. Marsella, "Cross-Cultural Variations in the Phenomenological Experience of Depression: I. Word Association Studies," *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 7, no. 4 (December 1, 1976): 379–96.


6.4 Thought work

Before proceeding to the conclusion of this chapter, and thereupon to the conclusion of the entire dissertation, it is necessary to investigate one final question arising out of the analytical chapters. It has been amply demonstrated by this dissertation that the *People's Daily* up through the first fifteen years of reform eagerly sought to mold the popular social imaginary. The *People's Daily* sought to do this through repetition, through emotion, by evoking past humiliations and future glories, it did so by cautioning against conspicuous consumption and jealousy, by emphasizing the importance of moral circumspection, through fielding models of many kinds for popular imitation, by trying to redefine proper loyalties and identities, it did so through threats and promises. If these articles represent more, and sometimes less, indirect attempts at shaping the social imaginary, how did the party-state reflect through the *People's Daily* on its self-appointed mission in this regard? Did the *People's Daily* evince a great perceived need to justify its pervasive attempts to shape the beliefs, habits, actions, and expectations of the population?

The first thing to note is that the *People's Daily* relies on many terms to describe the endeavors of the party-state to influence the thoughts of the population. The most frequent of these terms are "thought work" (思想工作: *sixiang gongzuo*), "political thought work" (思想政治工作: *sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo*), "dissemination work" (宣传工作: *xuanchuan gongzuo*), "thought education" (思想教育: *sixiang jiaoyu*), "political awareness" (思想觉悟: *sixiang juewu*), "political education" (政治教育: *zhengzhi jiaoyu*), "effecting change through persuasion or example" (感化: *ganhua*), and "rectifying incorrect work-styles" (整风: *zhengfeng*). In the following, I will use the term "thought work" as shorthand for all of these to a great extent overlapping terms.

If we investigate the frequency with which the *People's Daily* discussed the topic of thought work, it immediately becomes noticeable that the topic popped up frequently—on average once or twice in every issue of the paper—and also that the attention to thought

work gradually decreased up through the period under investigation. See Chart 6.2. As we might expect, the periods typically associated with political relaxation, i.e. 1980, 1984, 1988, and 1992 are also the years where the use of the term declines the most in a year-on-year comparison.



	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
TW	1204	1593	1535	1391	695	1161	1129	997	648	799	747	753	546	1100	959	901	527

Chart 6.2: Number of articles in the *People's Daily*, 1976-1992, mentioning terms relating to "thought work." The numbers consist of a summation of articles mentioning the terms "thought work" (思想工作: *sixiang gongzuo*), "political thought work" (思想政治工作: *sixiang zhengzhi gongzuo*), "dissemination work" (宣传工作: *xuanchuan gongzuo*), "thought education" (思想教育: *sixiang jiaoyu*), "political awareness" (思想觉悟: *sixiang juewu*), "political education" (政治教育: *zhengzhi jiaoyu*), "effecting change through persuasion or example" (感化: *ganhua*), and "rectifying incorrect work-styles" (整风: *zhengfeng*). The numbers are normalized because the annual number of articles in the *People's Daily* changes considerably over this period. The numbers can be found in the Appendix.

Articles related to thought work are usually presented either as descriptions of the successful efforts of raising popular thinking and morality in a particular location, or as advice dispensed by the *People's Daily* to a local official who has written to ask the paper about the best means for doing thought work.[488] The detailed advice thus provided to the

[488] In a few articles the *People's Daily* explains how film and plays are excellent resources for influencing popular thought, because these media allow direct access to the emotions of the audience. For a particularly elaborate example, see *People's Daily,* 1984.10.08, p.7, "更好地发挥电

official "engineers of souls" (灵魂的工程师: *linghun de gongchengshi*)—a term not infrequently employed by the *People's Daily* itself—offer valuable glimpses into the CPD's approach to this topic.

A long article published in 1980—a year typically associated with political relaxation—can serve to represent how the *People's Daily* generally discussed the topic and necessity of doing thought work. Under the title "Ideological and political work is a science," the article makes it evident just how methodically the *People's Daily* approached the issue of thought work and how thoroughly it explained what it considered to be particularly efficacious methods.

First, the article establishes that people's thoughts and ideas are amenable to calculated manipulation:

> Proletarian ideological and political work is the scientific study of people's ideological and political conditions and the laws governing the formation and changes of such conditions, and it probes into ways of applying these laws in social practice, rousing people's enthusiasm to the greatest possible extent, coordinating interpersonal relations, developing people's abilities and training a new generation.[489]

The circumspect endeavors of cadres are crucial for influencing the thoughts of individuals. "We must also imbue the people with correct ideas, inspire and guide them, and be patient with them. The concrete expressions of these methods are study and visits, heart-to-heart talks and discussions, criticism and commendation, dissemination work and persuasion, inspection and assessment, and comparison and analysis."[490] In addition to direct efforts by cadres, the inspiration models may provide is also crucial:

> An important method of doing ideological and political work is to teach by personal example as well as verbal instruction. [...] Models can give inexhaustible power because with these models, people can concretely and vividly realize that the goals advocated by the educators are realistic, credible and beneficial. [...] This shows that the exemplary role

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影在培养新人中的作用."

[489] *People's Daily*, 1980.08.14, p.5, "思想政治工作是一门科学."

[490] *People's Daily*, 1980.08.14, p.5, "思想政治工作是一门科学."

> played by educators, including the party's leading cadres at all levels and cadres doing ideological and political work, is very important.[491]

In order to achieve the greatest effect, the article explains, ideological work needs to be preemptive and suited to the individual:

> We must predict people's motives and guide their behavior so that we can be more far-sighted and active in carrying out ideological and political work. [...] Because different people reach different levels in their social, economic and political activities, and because they have different family and economic backgrounds, different social experiences and different cultural levels, their individual characters and interests, the contents and peculiarities of their ideological awareness are intricate and differ from person to person.[492]

In addition, thought work needs to be pervasive: "Ideological and political work should permeate all processes from beginning to end. [...] [It] should run through people's activities, including productive labor, scientific research, business management, social work, cultural and artistic activities and even family and personal life, only thus can we make full use of ideological and political work."[493] Finally, thought work should tap into the energies of everyone: "We should emphasize self-education, make people influence each other and carry out ideological and political work on the broadest mass basis."[494]

It is noteworthy that the article discussed above—and indeed the numerous other articles devoted to the topic of thought work—are entirely unapologetic about the idea that it is the responsibility of those in power to improve the thoughts of the general population. While the articles target a number of problems—most often moral problems, crime, or corruption—there is little sense in the articles that the *People's Daily* is arguing against a perception among its readers that the attempts to consciously influence the thoughts of the population might be conceived of as illegitimate and in need of justification. Or, to put it differently, it seems that the existence of social problems is enough, at least in the eyes of the

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[491] *People's Daily*, 1980.08.14, p.5, "思想政治工作是一门科学."
[492] *People's Daily*, 1980.08.14, p.5, "思想政治工作是一门科学."
[493] *People's Daily*, 1980.08.14, p.5, "思想政治工作是一门科学."
[494] *People's Daily*, 1980.08.14, p.5, "思想政治工作是一门科学."

People's Daily, to warrant scrupulous attention to how the thinking of the population might be improved.

In the course of the 1980s, however, the *People's Daily*'s explicit attention to thought work slowly waned. In the decades since, this waning trend has continued—albeit only slowly, and on a few occasions interrupted by domestic crises—and the injunctions to improve thought work have become more guarded and less detailed. This decrease in direct references to thought work probably indicates the erosion of a norm allowing the party-state such a strong hand over public opinion formation.

As discussed in Chapter 2, Tianjian Shi has posited that people with a Chinese cultural background tend to have a more hierarchical orientation towards authority and to rely on a more collective definition of self-interest. The way in which the *People's Daily* discusses the topic of thought work offers a measure of confirmation of Shi's claim that certain aspects of Chinese culture foster norms that vest people in authority with greater legitimate scope for attempting to control the thoughts and actions of their political subjects and subordinates than does a Western cultural background. This, as I will return to in the Conclusion, has implications for how we understand both Chinese media management in broad terms and for how we understand the dissemination of model worker narratives. It should also be clear that the importance attributed to controlling various flows, and the assumption that people tend to be greatly influenced by their surroundings—both of which are central elements of the porous personhood model—are consonant with a comparatively hierarchical orientation towards authority.

6.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have sought to approach the question of *why* the party-state relied on the dissemination of stories involving various types of models as a part of its attempt to alter the public social imaginary in ways amenable to the on-going reform efforts. In order to outline more clearly the model of personhood on which modelling as an educative technique is

based, I have examined how the party-state sought to ensure that interpersonal influence would be advantageous for, rather than detrimental to, building the kind of orderly society desired by the political elite. In order to do this I have analyzed the three social issues which the party-state identified as particularly problematic up through the 1980s: the unruly behavior of the young, the apparent escalation of crime, and the spread of cadre corruption. As it was shown, while model workers for various reasons gradually came to assume less importance in the *People's Daily* as the 1980s progressed, the properties identified as characteristic of the porous personhood model remained conspicuous both in the party-state's definitions of social problems and in its suggested remedies thereof.

The chapter opened with an examination of the party-state's concern over youth behavior, where it was shown that the central issue feeding most of the other concerns was that of selfishness versus submission to various forms of collective authority. In its attempts to deal with this problem, the party-state promoted a moral vision emphasizing the importance of book learning, contact with high culture, the positive effect of role models, national pride based on the twin desires for material goods and national progress, and ultimately submission to larger collectives, in particular the party-state. These are all explicable in terms of porous personhood. First of all, the problem of selfishness is one of the fundamental challenges to a culture with a strong disposition towards collective identity formation as entailed by the porous personhood model. Secondly, the solutions posited by the party-state depend upon the openness of individuals towards outside influence from models and cultural products as well as upon openness towards defining personal identity in terms of participating in strengthening the nation. While the great reverence towards books may not emerge as directly out of the porous personhood model, there does exist a certain connection, as books—at least in an environment with centralized control over the publication of books—will often contain characters whose emotions and actions are deemed suitable for imitation.

With regard to the issues of criminality and cadre corruption, the party-state

frequently relied on metaphors such as disease, bacteria, or a nebulous social atmosphere that depicted crime and corruption as spreading infectiously from the body—or one might say from the porous personhood—of one individual to the next. For both crime and corruption it emerged that the best way of handling these threats was to improve the morality of leaders and then let this improved morality spread osmosis-like among the rest of the population. For those judged irredeemable criminals, the party-state made sure to mark off their bodies with clear signs through rituals bearing a resemblance to exorcism of the alien other, which may be considered an attempt to preclude the spread of undesirable influence.

Finally, this chapter examined the ways in which the *People's Daily* discussed the topic of ways to alter the thoughts of the population. As it turned out, the *People's Daily* recommended a wide range of thought work techniques, stressing that local cadres had an enormous responsibility for guiding the thoughts of those around them through discussion, criticism, and encouragement as well as through their own exemplary conduct. It was also found that the discussions of thought work in the *People's Daily* exhibited very little apparent need to justify this practice; indicating that the exhortations to perform thought work did not transgress public norms for the correct relationship between leaders and led.

In short, this chapter's investigation of how modelling and other forms of interpersonal influence were depicted in the *People's Daily* has confirmed that the model of porous personhood offers a useful ways of understanding how the party-state leadership sought to mould the social imaginary in ways amenable to legitimizing the reforms and its own leadership role. The leadership disseminated so many narratives focused on the imitation of various types of models because the efficacy of models as a means of influencing individual conduct is an inherent aspect of the concept of porous personhood.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

In this dissertation, I have combined close reading and quantitative analysis of the Chinese language *People's Daily* to examine how the CPD used models—and in particular labor models—in its attempts to shape the social imaginary in ways conducive to the reforms in the period 1977-1992. My research was motivated by a desire to understand how the party-state had sought to explain its changing policies that were in many ways detrimental to the status and interests of workers while retaining its claim to be ruling in the name of the proletariat. In particular, my research has been fueled by curiosity provoked by the continued selection and praise of model workers by the party-state in an era where its capacity for media control has become increasingly sophisticated.

In an often-quoted book, the media scholar Neil Postman argued that there are two ways of managing the media and through them society: Either in Orwellian fashion—through censorship and mass mobilization based on fear-inducing lies and rituals—or in Huxleyan fashion—by appealing to the basest human sentiments through lurid spectacles and narcotics.[495] Postman argued that Western society was generally moving down the Huxleyan path, but reform-era China, a country strongly dedicated to media control, does not seem to have chosen either course. While it is not difficult to identify Orwellian elements of China's media management, and even as Huxleyan soft-porn gratification is to some extent also working its way into many Chinese TV-shows, the wide dissemination of model worker narratives seemed to me to be an antiquated anomaly.

As noted above, the establishment of the PRC had come with "extravagant pro-labor rhetoric" stressing that workers would from now on be the leading class.[496] While these promises were never truly realized, the political establishment did have to make several

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[495] Neil Postman, *Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business* (New York: Viking, 1985).
[496] Perry 2007, 57.

concessions to worker activists up through the 1950s,[497] and with the Cultural Revolution many workers developed "a newfound pride in their proletarian status as well as a powerful language of class with which to challenge unwelcome policies."[498] By 1989, however, few workers enjoyed the collective confidence and the social status to participate in the demonstrations, even if the on-going reforms, which were already hurting their status and threatening their livelihood, must have inclined many of them to do so. This poses a number of questions: How had the party-state used model workers in its attempts to justify increasing the wage gap and diluting the employment relationship? How had the party-state managed to defuse the political engagement of the population after decades of recurrent mobilization? And why had the CPD found it expedient to enlist the figure of the model worker in these efforts?

In order to answer these questions, I proposed in Chapter 2—with particular inspiration from Charles Taylor and Donald Munro—that we might gain insight into China's media management strategies by adumbrating the model of personhood prevalent in the Chinese social imaginary. With inspiration from psychology, anthropology, and cultural studies, I borrowed Mikkel Bunkenborg's notion of "porous personhood" and attempted to show that this model of personhood can be developed in ways that grant it better cross-disciplinary support as well as greater explanatory power than Bunkenborg develops in his own research.

I organized the analysis around three topics: political issues, economic issues, and social issues. In this concluding chapter, I first revisit the principal findings from the three analytical chapters, before proceeding to show how these findings contribute to our wider understanding of the early period of reform. Next, I bring the investigation up to the present in order to see how the topics of modelling and porous personhood may contribute to our

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[497] Frazier, *The Making of the Chinese Industrial Workplace State, Revolution, and Labor Management*.
[498] Perry and Li 1997, 193.

understanding of present-day China. I do this in two ways: by examining the recent publicity surrounding Lei Feng and the contemporary model worker Guo Mingyi, and, secondly, by showing that porous personhood remains an active part of the social imaginary, as revealed not least through recent movies and novels. Finally, I will lay out the implications of this dissertation for our understanding of China's contemporary media policies as well as for state-society relations.

7.1 Summary of empirical findings

7.1.1 Model workers and the party-state's political challenges

In the late 1970s Hua Guofeng and those around him attempted to overcome the many challenges facing them by forging a moral and emotional community where the new leadership was righting all the wrongs supposedly inflicted by the Gang of Four. Model workers were useful in these efforts as they were widely known to have suffered terrible persecution during the Cultural Revolution. By re-emphasizing the importance of model workers, the Hua leadership could frame itself as returning the state to the supposedly golden epoch of the 1950s, where model workers had also featured prominently as the then newly-ascendant CCP framed its policies as necessary to alleviate past suffering. This framing allowed the leadership to focus its media attention on individual cases—rather than asking more uncomfortable questions about complicity and the political system—which served to turn political disagreements into a morality play whereby past suffering was adduced as evidence of present righteousness.

The model workers were also a natural choice as spokespeople for the Hua leadership because Hua consciously sought to stress the value of imitating past precedent. In fact, Hua's time at the helm was remarkable for its profuse use of language related to emulation. Where Mao's thoughts on political authority had always contained competing elements of authoritarianism and grass-roots mobilization, Hua sought to emphasize the aspect of Mao's thought that advocated the emulation of virtuous behavior—an aspect with

deep roots in Chinese tradition—in order to minimize expectations of popular political participation.

Model workers were also important as publicity figures in the early period after Mao's death because many workers were disillusioned with the political system and dissatisfied with the meager gains in living conditions they had seen during the previous two decades. Deng Xiaoping clearly perceived that he could mobilize a constituency among workers—as well as among intellectuals—and at public ceremonies held in honor of model workers, Deng frequently stated that workers ought to have a greater say over their factories. As soon as he attained political preeminence, however, Deng seemed to lose his enthusiasm for popular political participation, and model workers came to be used to convey messages about the need to abolish the right to strike.

Another noteworthy development is how the party-state altered its visions of community through the dissemination of emotional narratives. Where the party-state had for decades used emotional appeals to mobilize the population to combat traitors and hidden enemies—often inciting and legitimating physical violence—the early reform period sees a remarkable decline in denunciations of domestic enemies, accompanied by the mobilization of other kinds of emotion to foster loyalty towards the family and the nation. Since the early PRC, published narratives had employed kinship terms to describe the relationship between model workers and the party-state, but from the early period of reform, stories about model workers gradually came to include more and more references to their partners and children. These narratives of emotion-based caring within families must be seen in relation to the attempts to both decrease grassroots political engagement and to the party-state's plans to privatize social reproduction costs. Model workers were also frequently depicted as elated onlookers to China's sports triumphs, enacting the national community on the basis of joy and pride.[499] According to the *People's Daily*, model workers often vowed to imitate the

[499] Model workers often take part in the celebrations of China's international sports triumphs, a tendency which is intensified up through the 1990s, where model workers also come to be

successful athletes; an association that must have attracted the CPD by suggesting that the fortunes of workers also depended upon the combination of ability with exertion, wielded according to impartial and everlasting rules in a fiercely competitive environment.

That the party-state uses model workers to propagate such divergent messages within such a short timespan shows that the media-mediated model worker is fully constructed by the party-state. As such, model workers are an inexpensive means of disseminating messages to the public, and while they are cast as representatives of the working class, model workers have neither independent existence nor any capacity for autonomous mobilization, which is undoubtedly one of the important reasons why the party-state has found them so appealing. Whether model workers are effective as party-state spokespeople is an entirely different matter—and beyond the purview of this dissertation—but the fact that the party-state leadership chose to relay so many messages through model workers shows that the leadership at least perceived them to be effective.

Overall, model workers were mobilized quite frequently in the period to frame political issues, and they could be used to disseminate divergent messages within a very short span of time. It seems that the most important limitation on how model workers could be used was that they had to had to appear morally spotless. The insistence of the *People's Daily*'s that model workers by their very nature are incapable of immoral behavior shows how the party-state considers immaculate morality a prime prerequisite for its political spokespeople. On the basis of this supposed moral purity, the experiences of model workers serve as emotion-based invitations to the reader to identify with certain communities—primarily the family and the nation—and to accept certain expectations and adopt suitable forms of behavior.

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showcased as meeting with astronauts and movie stars in what must be considered a way of sprinkling star dust from the emerging sphere of popular idol worship onto the mundane lives of model workers. On Lei Feng and celebrity culture in China, see Jeffreys and Su Xuezhong, "Governing through Lei Feng: A Mao-Era Role Model in Reform-Era China." Also, Elaine M. Jeffreys, "Modern China's Idols: Heroes, Role Models, Stars and Celebrities," *PORTAL Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies* 9, no. 1 (June 5, 2012).

7.1.2 Model workers and economic issues

In the economic sphere, the party-state sought to achieve a number of different objectives in the early period after Mao's death, and model workers featured in these to varying degrees. First of all, the party-state sought to motivate China's workers through workplace competitions, with model workers serving as the apparent initiators of these competitions; something that must be considered an attempt to make these competitions seem less of an imposition from above. Secondly, in order to motivate the workforce to work harder, the *People's Daily* frequently held up model workers as examples of people who were performing "great leaps" (大跃进: *dayuejin*) and fulfilling their future quotas long ahead of time. Within just a few years after Mao's death however, workplace competitions were replaced with material incentives as the preferred means of motivating workers, and with Hua's dethroning, workplace competitions and stories featuring model workers accomplishing herculean tasks vanished from the *People's Daily*.

The move towards increasingly relying on material incentives as motivation of the workforce was, nonetheless, implemented with great caution. In the late 1970s, it was justified through the phrase "distribution according to work" (按劳分派: *anlaofenpei*). The wholesomeness of this principle was justified by noting that it had been at once detested by the Gang of Four and championed by Marx and Lenin. The fact that the *People's Daily* devoted hundreds of articles to justifying this principle shows that the party-state leadership felt a great need to legitimize this aspect of the reforms. In the early 1980s, however, as the party-state leadership moved towards rewarding education and managerial rank—rather than simply rewarding hard work—the emphasis on distribution according to work was quickly replaced with an emphasis on bonuses. It is worth noting that the *People's Daily* rarely emphasized that anyone should be motivated to work harder in order to enjoy the newly-emerging possibilities for consumption; instead, a number of *People's Daily* articles emphasized that bonuses should *not* be an occasion for indiscriminate spending.

Model workers do not play a major role in the articles devoted to justifying the

expanding wage gap—a notable testimony to the moral unease apparently associated with personal wealth—but they do feature in two types of stories illustrating what roles model workers could play. In the first type of narrative, model workers receive bonuses only to become the object of envy—literally "red-eye disease" (红眼病: *hongyanbing*)—in what must be considered an attempt to teach readers that bonuses are well-deserved and should not be a reason for disliking model workers or anyone else reaping the deserved fruits of their individual labor. In the other type of narrative, model workers donate their bonuses to needy children, representing a way of humanizing capitalism by constructing narratives where the party-state is united with model workers through paternalist philanthropic assistance to the young and vulnerable. In other words, model workers are generally not portrayed as becoming rich through their hard work, because this would transgress against the ascetic ethics to which the party-state still attached itself; when model workers *do* appear in stories related to bonuses and material incentives, they do so in an attempt to derive power from emotional narratives to help refashion popular norms.

The analysis of the *People's Daily*'s also revealed that the party-state—and in particular those who wielded the strongest control over the CPD—was intent on ending the life-long employment system from very early on in the reforms. From as early as the late 1970s, the *People's Daily* began to hammer home the message that the "iron-rice bowl" needed to be shattered and that there would be no more eating out of the big communal pot—purposefully colloquial ways of framing the intended abolishment of life-long employment along with the relatively undifferentiated wage structure. As was the case with "distribution according to work" analyzed above, the great attention devoted by the *People's Daily* to ending life-long employment indicates that many in the working class were opposed to this development.

On the topic of relations of authority at the workplace, the *People's Daily* conceived of worker-manager relations in child-parent terms, advising managers to cultivate motherly affection and fatherly firmness—a message which also served to reimagine proper gendered

behavior. Workers for their part were portrayed as childlike in their eagerness to please their substitute parents and properly shameful when they failed to do so. A related development was the transformation of the term *zhurenweng*, which had been used frequently in the 1950s to refer to the workers as the energetic and enlightened masters of the new state—and thereby to legitimize the nationalization of industry and commerce in the name of the proletariat. In the 1980s, the CPD increasingly reinterpreted this term—an example of the kind of creative rhetorical "move" Skinner refers to as a "paradiastole"[500]—to refer to the ostensibly honorable "position" (地位: *diwei*) of the working class; an honorable position resting on responsible behavior, but conferring none of the influence the term had previously entailed. What both issues show is that the CPD in this period attempted to foster an increased respect for established roles and hierarchical positions.

7.1.3 Model workers, social issues, and interpersonal influence

Chapter 6 sought to bring into sharper relief *why* calls for imitating exemplary models was so central to the party-state's attempts to control Chinese society in the first fifteen years of reform. To answer this question, the chapter focused on how the party-state defined and attempted to solve issues it saw as particularly problematic in this period: willful youth behavior, rising crime rates, and the spread of cadre corruption. While model workers did on occasion appear as tools for educating the young and criminals in their social responsibilities, model workers did not play a central role in the *People's Daily*'s prescriptions for tackling these problems. Instead, as the 1980s progressed, the morality requisite to function as a model for popular imitation was increasingly associated with people possessing book learning and with self-sacrificing cadres.

Of particular relevance for this dissertation is that both the social problem definitions as well as their suggested solutions—as they are expressed in the columns of the *People's*

[500] Quentin Skinner, "Retrospect : Studying Rhetoric and Conceptual Change," in *Visions of Politics*, vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 183f.

Daily—are all explicable in the terms of porous personhood. First of all, the major problems identified are private-regarding behavior and a lack of personal impulse-control in the face of temptation. These are, as described in Chapter 2, the major challenges to a society where identity-formation is believed to occur primarily through small-group-interaction and where people are assumed to be easily influenced by outside stimuli. The conceptualization of how unwanted social phenomena occur was also demonstrated to be readily compatible with the features of porous personhood, notably in the emphasis on how social problems propagate themselves from person to person, either through interpersonal influence metaphorically depicted as disease, poison, or germs, or at the macro-level through the "social atmosphere."

The solutions proffered are the imitation of exemplary models, book learning, contact with high culture, monitoring and control of group activities, and pride over being a part of the Chinese nation. In other words, the suggested remedies have little to do with political reform or with altering incentive structures, but focus rather on how group-loyalty and individual morality—as embodied in cultural products or through personal example—serve as important ways of shaping personal convictions and conducts. Finally, the chapter examined how the *People's Daily* discussed and legitimized its expressed ambitions to influence the thoughts and actions of the population, and it was found that the newspaper was entirely unapologetic about the very detailed and direct guidance it offered to officials on how to influence the thinking of others. This suggests that the conscious and hierarchical ordering of society may grate less on Chinese public sensibilities than it would on most people raised in a Western cultural setting, as previously suggested by Tianjian Shi. It seems reasonable to see such dispositions as related to a model of personhood that exhibits unease over unregulated stimulus and response; in other words, something that is also explicable in the terms of porous personhood.

7.2 Implications for our understanding of the early reform period

The findings outlined above have a number of implications for our understanding of how the

party-state attempted to manage the reform process through the CPD. First of all, we see that the CPD took the opinions and feelings of the population so seriously that they sought very determinedly to change them. The intensity of the media bombardment aiming to end the system of life-long employment—something which would surely anger many urbanites whose political loyalties were already worn thin—shows how much priority the party-state leadership—who otherwise sought not to antagonize the disgruntled workers—put on this measure, as well as on convincing the population of the need for it.

The fact that the party-state hardly dared to dilute existing employment relationships—despite the intense media bombardment aimed at changing popular sensibilities so as to realize this aim—shows that the party-state leadership felt compelled to decrease the speed of reform in the face of popular opposition. On the few occasions where the party-state tried to move decisively—such as with the rapidly aborted decision to abolish the dual-track price system in 1988—the consequences were dire setbacks for the leadership.[501] It seems, therefore, that the Chinese reformers were at once lucky that the Chinese working class was so ill-disposed towards the intended reforms, and wise in taking these ill feelings into account, because this caused the party-state leadership to slow the reforms to a more propitious trot than many among them would have preferred; a preference clearly signaled through the *People's Daily* from as early as 1978 and all the way up through the 1980s.

This also has implications for how we understand the repeated campaigns to improve public morality that the party-state leadership rolled out in the 1980s. It has sometimes been argued that these campaigns were attempts to derail the economic reforms undertaken by the conservatives in the party-state leadership who used them as a covert means of thwarting the economic reforms.[502] This dissertation shows that such a view is untenable for

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[501] Richard Baum, *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping* (Princeton University Press, 1996), 234.
[502] Thomas B. Gold, "'Just in Time!': China Battles Spiritual Pollution on the Eve of 1984," *Asian*

several reasons: The worry over declining morality was shared by many outside the conservative clique on the Politburo; these worries came to impact policies and campaigns across a broad range of policy areas; and the seismic social changes of the period were exactly of the type we would expect to be read as moral failings by the aging leadership whose formative experiences had been so different from those of the generation coming of age in the 1980s.[503] Moreover, if these campaigns were indications that anti-reformist sentiments had gained the upper hand at the Politburo, we would expect the *People's Daily*'s coverage to have de-emphasized the need for economic reforms in the periods where moral campaigns were being waged, but even though such a change *can* be detected in the *People's Daily*, it is very slight. Faced with the major social changes of the 1980s, the party-state leadership came to interpret many social ills as being based on deteriorating public morals, not least because abiding by one's social role and status was in itself considered a crucial aspect of individual moral behavior. This is consonant with Tianjian Shi's observation that rapidly changing social norms tend to occasion a "cultural backlash," where those in power try to solve social problems by restoring traditional culture and morality.[504]

The above analysis thus throws new light on how the reformist party-state attempted to justify its economic policies in the 1980s. It is frequently claimed that the CCP under Deng managed to shift its primary source of legitimacy from ideology to economic performance. While I think there is an obvious element of truth to this claim, it is interesting to note that the *People's Daily*—at least in the period of 1977-1992—only to a very limited degree used

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Survey 24, no. 9 (1984): 951, https://doi.org/10.2307/2644078. Barry Naughton, "The 1989 Watershed in China: How the Dynamics of Economic Transition Changed," in *Socialism Vanquished, Socialism Challenged: Eastern Europe and China, 1989–2009*, ed. Nina Bandelj and Dorothy J. Solinger (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), 128.

[503] As Elias has argued, when threatened by processes of social modernization, elites commonly attempt to maintain social order by improving popular conduct and morality. While in no way peculiar to China, the present dissertation has identified a number of factors which explain why it took on a particular urgency in China in the 1980s. Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations* (1939; repr., Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 2000).

[504] Tianjian Shi, *The Cultural Logic of Politics in Mainland China and Taiwan*, 97f.

arguments related to either national or individual incomes as rationales for the reforms. Articles dealing with the most consequential and controversial aspects of the economic reforms—such as privatization of SOEs, large-scale lay-offs, increasing the wage differential, and increasing the power of managers vis-à-vis workers—focused on convincing the population that the reforms accorded with the moral aspects of the social imaginary. While the *People's Daily* did on occasion showcase the material fruits of economic reform, it invested much more effort in the attempt to increase acceptance of the reforms by altering the norms and expectations of the population, while constantly probing and taking into consideration evolving popular sentiments. Another way of putting this is that among even the most dedicated economic liberalists in the party-state leadership there were quite strong attachments to what can be described as politically illiberal notions of social engineering.

Finally, I contend that the findings presented in this dissertation should caution us against focusing too narrowly on the economic aspects of reform if we want to understand the trajectory of China in the 1980s, and indeed in the decades since. I think there is a tendency in some of the recent scholarly literature about the reform period to neglect the social and even the political aspects and ramifications of reform. One example of this is provided by Arthur Kroeber who writes that

> Deng [Xiaoping, my insertion] was as committed as anyone to the preservation of the party's monopoly on power. But he gambled that the best way to preserve that monopoly was to run a dynamic economy that boosted living standards at home and raised China's international prestige and leverage. He reasoned that a better-fed population, proud to live in a China that was once again 'standing tall' in the world, would in the long run be more supportive of Communist Party rule than people living in a stagnant economic backwater.[505] (7f.)

While a strong case can be made—though particularly in hindsight—that the economic policies pursued under Mao were ill-suited to generate domestic economic development, the fundamental problem was reliance on the assumptions summarized by James C. Scott as

[505] Arthur R. Kroeber, *China's Economy: What Everyone Needs to Know* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 7f.

"high modernism,"[506] rather than a conscious decision to turn China into a "stagnant economic backwater." The extravagant devotion of resources to heavy industry, the attempts to eliminate the distinctions between workers, managers, and technicians, and the recurring mobilization drives to involve the masses in projects designated by the party-state—in other words, some of the key characteristics of the Maoist economic model—were attempts to fuel economic growth, not to slow it down.

Another example of what I consider a misrepresentation of Chinese economic policies is found in Julian Gewirtz's recent book in which he makes the case that inspiration from Western economists was absolutely crucial for the success of China's economic reforms. While fascinating and enlightening, I think Gewirtz's book unduly discounts how wary the reformers in fact were of the popular reactions to specific reform measures. This can be seen, e.g., in Gewirtz's account of the early experiments with letting enterprises retain a part of their profits in 1979. According to Gewirtz, this reform

> had little effect. Chinese economists soon discovered that the low marginal retention rate built into the equation used to calculate profit retention meant that the system created extremely weak incentives for enterprises. More ambitious reforms were necessary to create stronger incentives. These fumbling early attempts at enterprise reform demonstrated that Chinese officials were indeed moving toward combining plan and market, but they still had only a rudimentary understanding of how to deploy market mechanisms most effectively.[507]

It seems to me slightly dismissive to view these very cautious reforms as exemplifying an incomplete understanding of economic incentives. On the contrary, I think the early years of the PRC demonstrate that the party-state leadership was very aware of the power of economic incentives and consciously attempted to foster in the population a strong work ethic based on communal-mindedness, rather than on personal material interests. In the same way, I think the post-Mao political leadership was not as oblivious to the potential

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[506] James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (Yale University Press, 1998).
[507] Gewirtz, *Unlikely Partners*, 52.

effects of economic liberalization as Gewirtz seems to imply, but rather that they were fearful of the potential social, political, and moral ramifications of marketization. In my opinion, Kroeber and Gewirtz represent a tendency in some of the scholarly literature to focus so narrowly on economic policies that it is not taken into account that China's policy-makers had very broad goals.

7.3 Implications for our understanding of present-day China

In this last section of the dissertation, I will bring the debate up to the present period, both to investigate whether there are signs that the concept of porous personhood still appears to be alive in contemporary Chinese life, and in order to discuss a few areas where I think the dispositions arising out of porous personhood have an impact on Chinese state-society relations.

7.3.1 Media representations of model workers in the contemporary period

First of all, it is worth noting that model workers have continued to appear in Chinese media up until the present, although at a gradually diminishing frequency, as can be seen from Chart 7.1.




Chart 7.1: Number of articles referring to "model workers" (劳动模范: laodongmofan or in the abbreviated form 劳模: laomo) in the People's Daily 1976-2016. The above chart relies on a

normalized number of articles, because the average number of articles in the People's Daily changes significantly over this period. The numbers can be found in the Appendix.

Lei Feng has also remained a favorite character of the party-state for use to educate the young. In 2013, when no less than three new party-state-produced feature films about Lei Feng hit the cinemas, the authorities issued detailed instructions for how lower levels of the propaganda system were to assist in the distribution, marketing, dubbing into minority languages, and a range of other facets related to the dissemination of the three movies. A translation of the first paragraph of the instructions provides a flavor:

> 1. Doing the distribution and screening work of the films "The Young Lei Feng", "Lei Feng in 1959" and "Lei Feng's Smile" well, is a concrete practice to carry out and implement the spirit of the 18th Party Congress, all radio, film and television bureaus and relevant film work units must fully understand its importance, firmly keep their responsibility in mind, strengthen leadership, plan matters meticulously, fully give rein to the function of films to bring teaching into entertainment, and create a good cultural environment and atmosphere for the entire society to surge towards a new high wave of learning from Comrade Lei Feng. We must, through film screening, organization bookings, rural mobile screening and many other matters, screen the films for the broad masses, vigorously broaden the social influence of the films, give rein to the educational, guiding and encouraging functions of films.[508]

Pertaining more directly to workers' issues, it is clear that specific events are kept out of the *People's Daily* and of the press in general. The considerably increasing number of domestic strikes remained outside of the pages of the *People's Daily* all the way up to the middle of the 2000s, where a few selected cases—all involving large foreign employers, most notably Honda and Wal-Mart—were discussed in the *People's Daily*. In this period, the attention to strikes abroad and in China's past also decreased significantly, revealing that workers' strikes were employed much less as a means of shoring up the legitimacy of the party-state

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[508] Https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2013/03/04/notice-concerning-earnestly-doing-the-distribution-and-screening-work-of-the-films-the-young-lei-feng-lei-feng-in-1959-and-lei-fengs-smile-well/#more-2509. Accessed January 24, 2017. The website—maintained by the scholar Rogier Creemers—carries both the original Chinese text as well as the translation presented above.

than it had been previously, coinciding with the Party's shift towards recruiting fewer workers and more young professionals and entrepreneurs into the Party.[509] The term customarily used for talking about industrial action, i.e. 罢工 (*bagong*), did not entirely disappear from the columns of the *People's Daily* in the 1990s and 2000s, but it has come to be used primarily to refer to animals or tools which—due either to stubbornness or low quality—refuse to perform as their owners had expected. As with the term *zhurenweng* then, the concept of *bagong* continues to be used but it is vested with a new meaning.

A measure of the continuity in how the party-state attempts to disseminate model worker narratives can be found by returning to the movie rendition of the life of the contemporary model worker Guo Mingyi that opened this dissertation. On the basis of this dissertation, we are now able to see just how much this movie draws on the elements analyzed above. First of all, the importance of fatherhood is clearly foregrounded in the emotional climax of the movie where the young woman suffering from leukemia honors Guo Mingyi by calling him "Father." She does this because Mingyi has helped her realize her life-long dream of serving as a stewardess on an airplane, where she is shown servicing the well-dressed passengers and providing them safety instructions. In other words, the dream of this beautiful young woman is to serve in uniform and care for the wealthy elite bound for China's sub-tropical paradise of Hainan. The importance of fatherhood is further emphasized by Mingyi's close relationship with his own father, also a model worker in his time and recognized as such by Zhou Enlai, while Mingyi's mother is never mentioned. The mother of the young leukemia patient is also absent in the movie, having left her family when her daughter was only a child.

The movie further constructs national space through Mingyi's good intentions, which see him travel far and wide in search of stem cells and blood donors. National space is also a topic in the scene where Mingyi—much to the frustration of his wife and daughter who crave

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[509] Bruce J. Dickson, *The Dictator's Dilemma: The Chinese Communist Party's Strategy for Survival* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), chap. 5.

entertainment—donates the family's television to a village school, thus allowing the poor students to watch hurdler Liu Xiang win international glory for China. It is worth noting that this donation is done anonymously, which connects Guo Mingyi to Lei Feng who supposedly performed most of his good deeds in secret, and the anonymity also allows Mingyi to emulate his father who earlier on in the movie slipped into the Guo family's apartment to bring the family foodstuffs bought at the market, only to slip out again without being noticed by either Mingyi or any of the dinner guests.[510]

Moreover, the movie about Guo Mingyi deals very much with his mastery of liquids. Mingyi's father only appears in a couple of scenes in the movie, but in the charged scene immediately prior to his death, the old man suddenly sits up in his hospital bed and relates to Mingyi how he has just dreamt of an event long ago, when, at a ceremony honoring labor models in Beijing, Zhou Enlai had toasted him three times with white spirit; thus establishing that Zhou Enlai's affection for the model workers was also transmitted through the consumption of powerful liquid. Later, in a dramatic scene taking place during a torrential downpour, Mingyo almost seems to do singlehanded battle with the elements as he heroically directs the drivers of enormous earthmovers to secure a road against a mud slide threatening the lives of many miners. In a later scene, Mingyi comes close to a physical collapse when a rain storm drains the last of his strength, causing him to fall into a deep sleep as he mumbles into his phone that all he wishes for is that his wife would prepare a hot water bottle for him and some hot noodle soup. In other words, he has fought water for so long that he now needs his wife to help him transform water into a source of warmth and sustenance. At another level, Mingyi is closely associated with the mastery of liquids and the creation of the Chinese nation in the most intimate way possible in that his fame rests on his own frequent donations of blood and his encouragement of others to imitate him. The inclination to connect Guo Mingyi with control over water may also have determined his

[510] This tallies, of course, with Gao's finding that there is a strong norm in Chinese society that good deeds ought to be done anonymously. See Chapter 2.

Weibo profile picture, where he hovers above a calm body of water; an iconographic connection that seems entirely unrelated to his job or to his charity work. See illustration 7.1.



Illustration 7.1: Guo Mingyi's Weibo profile picture. Courtesy of https://www.weibo.com/guomingyi. Accessed 17 May, 2018.

In Guo Mingyi's own family, his wife is repeatedly depicted as frustrated by Mingyi's decision to put the desires of their family, particularly their desire for more living space, behind those of others—just as Yu the Great neglected his wife and children in many accounts of his myth[511]—though she ultimately comes to accept Mingyi's ascetic generosity as well as his decision to turn down an American company who offers to septuple his salary. In this way as well then, at least until the reconciliation of husband and wife towards the end of the movie, Mingyi's consistent choice to suppress his own needs in favor of the needs of others goes unrecognized by those closest to him—just as we saw was the case in several narratives about unselfish male model workers published by the *People's Daily* in the 1980s, which also explicitly censured wives for materialist yearnings. In short, Guo Mingyi is used to emphasize many of the same ideas that were crucial in the party-state's deployment of model worker narratives in the 1980s, and aspects of the porous personhood model feature prominently

511 Lewis, *The Flood Myths of Early China*, 148.

therein.

In short, the CPD remains committed to controlling public narratives related to workers' issues. As part of its efforts to shape popular norms, beliefs, and expectations, the CPD still invests considerable resources in disseminating stories about models such as Lei Feng and Guo Mingyi. The messages imparted through such stories are in many ways similar to those issued in the early reform period, and the messages are still shaped by ideas of porous personhood; notable, particularly, in the emphasis on morality, self-sacrifice, and control over liquids as prerequisites for functioning as an exemplary model.

7.3.2 Porous personhood in contemporary culture and practice

This dissertation has claimed that porous personhood was an important, culturally-grounded perception of what it meant to be a human being in the Chinese social imaginary of the 1980s. In the decades since, China has become integrated in the global flows of ideas, people, and objects to an extent heretofore unimaginable, and multiple "fevers" (热: *re*) for importing various aspects of foreign culture have swept through the PRC. Before considering in what ways the conception of porous personhood may inspire our understanding of contemporary China, we first need to ask, therefore, if this assemblage of ideas and practices remains important in the present. As I will show below, it is indeed possible to see vivid indications that personhood is widely conceived of in terms of porosity across a range of contemporary cultural expressions and social practices in China, as also suggested by the analysis of the *Guo Mingyi* movie above.

While this dissertation has focused on newspapers, popular fictional literature is another valuable object of inquiry if one wants to know more about culturally-predominant conceptions of personhood. For fictional literature to achieve popularity it needs to enact a society's dilemmas, anxieties, and hopes in a form that allows readers vicarious experiences suffused with emotional resonance. For this reason, popular fictional literature presents historians with some of our best sources for understanding the most pressing emotional

issues of a given period.[512] If we look at contemporary Chinese literature, the indications of porous personhood are surprisingly pervasive—at least their pervasiveness surprised me—and below I present a few examples.

Let us start by looking at Nobel Prize-winner Mo Yan's short story "Shifu, You'll Do Anything for a Laugh," which details how a laid-off model worker named Ding Shikou outfits an abandoned bus "with everything couples might need for their trysts, as well as beer, soft drinks, and snacks of dried fish slices and preserved plums," which he then rents out to romantically-engaged couples searching for a few hours of privacy.[513] This ploy turns out to be hugely successful, and Shikou makes a fortune, until one couple rents the bus, lock themselves inside, and fails to respond when Shikou bangs on the door, imploring them to exit. Gripped by fear that the couple have killed themselves by ingesting sleeping pills, Shikou goes through great trouble to have the bus door opened, only to find that no one is inside. Concluding that the young lovers must have been ghosts, Shikou is relieved and terrified in equal measure, and thus ends the story.[514]

Mo Yan conjures up this story's *frisson* by having a model worker, someone who is supposed to incarnate and impart morality, take it upon himself to create a closed space where liquids may circulate for nothing but private pleasure at the cost of ready cash. In plain terms, the story plays with the possibility that in a marketized economy, money makes it possible to establish private spaces for immoral acts. The speculation that ghosts may be attracted to such a confined space devoted to bodily pleasure and unregulated liquid transference, exposes the anxiety provoked by such a space. Mo Yan's popularity as an

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[512] Among the books which have made this argument most eloquently and pursued the analysis to the most interesting results are Lynn Avery Hunt, *Inventing Human Rights: A History* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008); Franco Moretti, *The Bourgeois: Between History and Literature* (London: Verso, 2013).

[513] Mo Yan, *Shifu, You'll Do Anything for a Laugh: A Novel* (Skyhorse Publishing, Inc., 2012), 40.

[514] This is no attempt at an exhaustive literary analysis, but if one were to examine in greater depth how porous personhood appears in literary products, key elements would be objects such as fish and preserved fruits, exactly the objects placed inside the bus, because these are also objects that have transgressed existential boundaries: the fish by being a water creature out of its element, and the preserved plums by having their existence artificially extended.

author resides precisely in his ability to give playful shape to these kinds of cultural concerns.

Yu Hua is another author whose entire *oeuvre* abounds with scenes and metaphors resonant with the model of porous personhood, most centrally through the repeated association of wind and water with bodily danger and sexuality, most often immoral sexuality. This happens in *To Live* where the main character states that visiting a prostitute is "like drinking lots of water and needing to relieve oneself."[515] Shortly thereafter, he remarks to his pregnant wife that "As soon as the wind blows, your stomach doubles in size."[516] When his ill father later collapses, wind is also suggested as the cause. The connection between water, filth, and illicit sexuality is also established to humorous effect by Yu Hua on the very first page in his novel *Brothers*.[517] In what will provide the impetus for the entire novel, the main character, Baldy Li, aged fourteen, falls into the public latrine because he leans down too far as he sneaks a peek under the partition to see the bottoms of the women squatting in the adjacent room. As the novel soon explains, the exact same thing happened to Baldy Li's father fourteen years previous, only he ended up drowning in the latrine. This is just one of many scenes in the novel where liquids and illicit sexuality are brought together.

Liquid nourishment, tears and blood are also crucial elements in a later key scene in *Brothers* where Baldy Li manages to transport his ailing mother, carrying a glucose drip Baldy has pinched at the hospital, to sweep the grave of her beloved second husband. These efforts finally earn Baldy Li his mother's tearful forgiveness. In Yu Hua's novel *The Seventh Day*, which details what the narrator Yang Fei goes through on the first seven days after his death in an interstitial limbo between life and the realms beyond, the entire story takes place in surroundings which are constantly described as foggy and drenched.[518] Many dozen examples could be provided from Yu Hua's writings which provide a treasure trove of dangerous winds and immoral liquids.

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[515] Yu Hua, *To Live* (New York, USA: Anchor Books, 2003), 11.
[516] Yu Hua, 12.
[517] Yu Hua, *Brothers* (London: Pan Macmillan, 2009).
[518] Yu Hua, *The Seventh Day* (New York: Random House USA Inc, 2015).

Another interesting example of how porous personhood plays a role in contemporary fiction is provided by Liu Cixin's hugely popular science fiction trilogy *Remembrance of Earth's Past* (in popular parlance known as *The Three Body Problem* which is the title of the first novel in the series). This work constantly revolves around the topics of trust and betrayal among group-insiders at every level of society, from the setting of the laboratory, to the military, to the level of the entire planet. The central conflict in the trilogy is that between the inhabitants of Earth and the Trisolarians, the latter of whom are unable to conceal their thoughts from each other because whatever goes through their minds is plainly visible for everyone to read; this changes, however, when the Trisolarians, after prolonged contact with Earth, finally come to understand the concept of keeping one's thoughts hidden.

Due to the advanced technology of the Trisolarians, which enables them to intercept all communication on Earth, the successor to the UN decides to establish the "Wallfacer Project" as a desperate measure of defense against the bellicose Trisolarians. As wallfacers are selected four individuals who are provided enormous resources to construct defense plans against the Trisolarians. Free to pursue whatever defensive projects they see fit, the key challenge facing the wallfacers is that, on the one hand, they have to think up a defensive strategy that will outwit the technologically-superior Trisolarians while, on the other hand, the wallfacers cannot explain their strategy to anyone else, as this would enable the Trisolarians to intercept their communications and take preventive measures against the defensive strategy. As such, the novels are in a sense an extended meditation on what happens when closed-off societies encounter each other. If, as postulated in Chapter 2, a willingness to divulge one's inner thoughts to the group is a prime personal quality arising out of the porous personhood model, then these are exactly the inclinations the wallfacers have to disregard.

Control over water is also a central element in the plot. The Trisolarians live in a solar system with three suns, making for seasons shifting unpredictably from extreme cold to scorching heat; hence the title of the "three body problem." With irregular intervals, the

Trisolarians have to dehydrate and be put into storage. "During a Chaotic Era, the entire country is dehydrated. But King Zhou remains awake, a companion to the lifeless land. In order to survive during a Chaotic Era, one must live in thick-walled buildings like this one, as though one were living underground. It's the only way to avoid the extreme heat and cold."[519] When the climate once again turns hospitable, King Zhou gives the order to rehydrate his shrivelled subjects, initiating another precarious cycle of life and death based on the availability of water. This precarious existence is the reason why the Trisolarians decide to conquer Earth, making the control over water of pivotal importance.

Interestingly, the very first—and imminently deadly—moment of physical contact between the Earthlings and the Trisolarians comes in the form of a water drop. For centuries, the inhabitants of Earth rest their defensive hopes against the alien invaders on the construction of an enormous fleet of battle-ready starships. As the fleet is expanded, the shared feeling of security on Earth grows. Next, a "water droplet" (a 水滴: *shuidi* in the Chinese)—a shiny metal object resembling a drop of water—appears near Earth's fleet. At first, this seemingly insignificant object is at once fascinating and mysteriously beautiful, but it soon turns out to be lethal as it, cannon-ball-like, smashes through the hulls of the starships, annihilating almost the entire fleet in a matter of minutes. In other words, the fortified steel bodies of the ships are defenseless against the onslaught of this single droplet, which exposes the insides of the starships to the emptiness of the universe, killing all life on board. Obviously, the trilogy cannot be boiled down to a few paragraphs, but the importance of group insiders versus group outsiders, and the danger associated with liquids are noteworthy.

A great many other contemporary Chinese works of popular literature present hopes and anxieties suffused with images and concerns related to a porous personhood model; here I will single out just a few. In the popular novelist Zhou Haohui's *Valley of Terror*, a small

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[519] Liu Cixin, *The Three-Body Problem* (New York, N.Y.: Tom Doherty Associates, 2014), 102.

band of travelers are put through a multitude of ordeals, where water, blood, and treachery are significant elements in the plot's many deaths and fatal attractions.[520] One could also mention *The Fat Years*, where the world-dominance achieved by China is explicitly exemplified by the purchase of Starbucks—the world's leading purveyor of potable liquids—and where the Chinese government's addition of MDMA to the drinking water is a central element in the plot.[521] Other works worth mentioning because of the prominent roles played by water, blood, and the betrayal of group-insiders are Yan Lianke's *Dream of Ding Village*,[522] Yu Hua's *Chronicle of a Blood Merchant*,[523] and Ma Jian's *Dark Road*.[524]

A final example may be provided by another very popular contemporary author by the name of Hao Jingfang. In her short story "Invisible planets," one finds the following description of the alien race of Jinjialinians, who seem to be the living embodiments of porous personhood:

> The people of Jinjialin possess bodies unlike the bodies of the people of any other planet. They are like soft balloons, or maybe like jellyfish floating through the air, transparent and loose. The surface of the Jinjialinians is membranous, like a cell's outermost layer. When two membranes touch, they can merge into one.
>
> When two Jinjialinians encounter each other, parts of their bodies briefly merge and mix the materials inside. When they separate, the materials are redistributed. Thus, the people do not care much about their physical bodies. Even they cannot tell how much of their current bodies comes from strangers they met along the road. They believe that they are still themselves, and it's no big deal to exchange some materials.
>
> But they don't realize that this sense of 'self' is an illusion. At the moment when two of them merge, the two original selves cease to exist. They become a combined person, and when separated, two new persons. The new persons do not know all that transpired before their encounter and each believes that the self is the self, never having changed at all.[525]

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[520] Zhou Haohui, *Valley of Terror* (Seattle: AmazonCrossing, 2017).
[521] Chan Koonchung, *The Fat Years* (London: Random House, 2011).
[522] Yan Lianke, *Dream of Ding Village* (New York, N.Y.: Text Publishing Company, 2011).
[523] Yu Hua, *Chronicle of a Blood Merchant* (New York, N.Y.: Pantheon Books, 2003).
[524] Ma Jian, *The Dark Road: A Novel*, trans. Flora Drew (New York: Penguin Press, 2013).
[525] Hao Jingfang, "Invisible Planets," in *Invisible Planets: Contemporary Chinese Science Fiction in Translation*, ed. Ken Liu (New York, N.Y.: Macmillan, 2016), 217f.

In addition to popular literature, many other examples can be adduced to substantiate the claim that porous personhood remains of importance for how selfhood and bodily integrity is conceived of in mainland China. One element of the porous personhood model as laid out in Chapter 2 is its assumption that individuals have a very limited capacity for resisting the allures provided by their surroundings. One instantiation of this belief may be seen in the heated social debate up through the 2000s on the topic of "flash weddings" (闪婚: *shanhun*) and, more recently, "flash divorces" (闪离婚: *shanlihun*). In recent years, the danger of "internet addiction" has also been much debated in Chinese society, likening the individual's unsupervised pursuit of personal interests and gratifications to a disease.

In regards to workers and collective subjectivity in the present period, it is interesting to note the resilience, and in some places even the resurgence, of the *danwei* workplace formation, with its gated compounds, complex structures of dependence, and wide-ranging benefits and services available to permanent employees.[526] Indeed, the growth of gated and to a certain extent self-administrating communities seems to be predicated both on popular demand and on the party-state's desire for legibility and control.[527] This disposition towards forming small communities—and the concomitant anxiety over stranger sociality—also shows up in the contemporary period in attitudes towards electronic surveillance. Recent surveys show that while Chinese respondents are unusually accepting of surveillance in public space, Chinese respondents were the most critical of all the nationalities included in the surveys when it came to accepting surveillance inside the workplace:

> Chinese citizens seem to make a clear distinction between private and work-place space where the so-called 'we-group' resides, and public spaces where the 'others' reside.

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[526] Tom Cliff, "Post-Socialist Aspirations in a Neo-*Danwei*," *China Journal*, no. 73 (2015): 132–157. Chan and Unger also note how danwei-like structures exhibit considerable longevity. Anita Chan and Jonathan Unger, "A Chinese State Enterprise under the Reforms: What Model of Capitalism?," *The China Journal*, 2009, 1–26.

[527] Luigi Tomba, *The Government next Door: Neighborhood Politics in Urban China* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2014).

> When asked about surveillance cameras in the street, the answers concentrate on thieves and robbers, the dangerous Other. However, when we talk of work-spaces and e-mails, the tone is very different. So much for the 'collectivist culture' of China, instead we see a popular outward-directed fear of the 'dangerous classes'.[528]

In other words, anxiety over stranger sociality, as described in Chapter 2, seems quite strong. An interesting aspect of this—which correlates well with this dissertation's claim that morality is considered an important attribute for leadership in China's close-knit communities—is provided by Luigi Tomba who finds that morality and self-discipline are considered very important by many inhabitants in neighborhood organizations for their construction of social hierarchy and their participation in neighborhood governance.[529] Interestingly, Tomba also notes how the assumed reproduction of exemplary behavior is a part of the rationale: "In this process, the middle class serves an exemplary purpose. In the new social hierarchy, not only education and wealth but also virtuous conduct and spiritual civilization have come to be associated with this group."[530] In official discourse, it is presented "as if the presence of groups of high-*suzhi* people would be enough to spread the virus of quality [...]."[531]

The cultural anxiety pertaining to the unregulated movement of outsiders found expression in the 1990s and the 2000s in the frequent characterization of rural migrants, including in the *People's Daily*, as *mangliu* (盲流 is often translated as "vagrants," but a more literal translation would be "blind flow"), *nongmin chao* (农民潮: "tide of peasant workers"), and *liudong renkou* (流动人口: "floating population"). Such expressions are not innocently descriptive but serve to cast ruralites as dangerous others lacking in self-control, while also making clear the need for a higher power to stem these dangerous flows. In recent years, the party-state has also launched campaigns against foreign spies and instigators—such as the

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[528] Børge Bakken, "Keep Smiling! – You're Being Watched | The China Story," 2012, https://www.thechinastory.org/2012/12/keep-smiling-you-are-being-watched/. Accessed 23 July, 2017.
[529] Tomba, *The Government next Door*, 3ff.
[530] Tomba, 164.
[531] Tomba, 156.

one depicted on Illustration 7.2 launched on the first annual National Security Education Day in 2016, warning Chinese women not to be duped into divulging state secrets by foreign men promising romance; a campaign aiming, presumably, to both derive legitimacy from, and add to, a certain distrust of foreigners. These campaigns involve school education, posters, animated videos, and websites where citizens may report foreign spies.[532] Another noteworthy aspect of political communication in contemporary China is the recent dissemination of animated cartoons and movie clips featuring children produced to explain China's Belt and Road Initiative,[533] a comparison of how the top political leaders are selected in China and in the US,[534] and an animation accompanied by rap music extolling the successes of the recent anti-corruption campaign.[535] This style of political communication seems to indicate that the party-state communicators are inclined to think of their job as that of educating children.



Illustration 7.2. Wall poster warning against foreign spies. From Beijing 2016.
Courtesy of https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/04/20/asia-pacific/offbeat-asia-pacific/comic-style-poster-warns-chinese-foreign-spies-love-agendas/#.W1NAccIyWCg.

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[532] Https://supchina.com/2018/04/18/national-security-education-day-in-china-puts-emphasis-on-foreign-infiltration.
[533] Https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tLBoom8M8Vw; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uKhYFFLBaeQ; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6KFBHBMatXk.
[534] Https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zd3l6d2m2eA.
[535] Https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xhU8C5RCbBs.

The anxiety over stranger sociality is also, I believe, noticeable in contemporary fears about the behavior of ruralites in Chinese cities. Over the past decade, the Chinese media have publicized a number of stories where a person—most often someone from the countryside—have purposefully stepped in front of a moving car—usually driven by an urbanite—in order to extort damages from the driver. Insurance companies have even begun to offer insurance against such malicious acts. Where Yan Yunxiang argues that this exemplifies the moral corruption characteristic of contemporary Chinese society,[536] I argue instead that the extensive media attention given to a very limited number of such cases reveals that stranger sociality remains a fraught issue in today's China. When these cases have captured the public imagination to such a degree, it is partly, I think, because they involve issues of wealth and modernity, and the potential conflicts these may bring about.

On the whole, there is a lively debate in both Chinese media and in the scholarly literature over the topic of moral degeneration in contemporary China.[537] While some scholars argue that modern China is marked by moral decay,[538] I am inclined to agree with the scholars who point out that the very active debate over morality in contemporary China bears testimony to the fact that Chinese society is engaged in discussions over what it means to act morally, which should primarily be understood as testimony to the importance people attribute to morality.[539] This is further reflected in the sharp top-level denunciations of the reports produced by Bloomberg and the New York Times about the wealth of China's political elite. While the articles exposed no criminal wrongdoing, the party-state leadership

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[536] Yan Yunxiang, "The Good Samaritan's New Trouble: A Study of the Changing Moral Landscape in Contemporary China," *Social Anthropology* 17, no. 1 (February 18, 2009): 9–24, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8676.2008.00055.x.
[537] Arthur Kleinman et al., eds., *Deep China: The Moral Life of the Person* (Univ of California Press, 2011).
[538] Jiwei Ci, *Moral China in the Age of Reform* (Cambridge University Press, 2014); Yan Yunxiang, "The Changing Moral Landscape," in *Deep China: The Moral Life of the Person*, ed. Arthur Kleinman et al. (Berkeley, Calif.: Univ of California Press, 2011), 36–77.
[539] Ellen Oxfeld, *Drink Water, but Remember the Source: Moral Discourse in a Chinese Village* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 226.

reacted with unusual harshness, subjecting itself to strong international condemnation, because the reports suggested that the top leaders put their own material interests above those of the community.

The party-state's framing of political disagreement in contemporary Xinjiang is in many ways similar to the discussion of anti-social elements in the 1980s and back to the 1950s. An excerpt from a recording produced by the CCP in Uyghur to educate Uyghur speakers about the supposed anti-terror policies provides a flavor:

> Although a certain number of people who have been indoctrinated with extremist ideology have not committed any crimes, they are already infected by the disease. There is always a risk that the illness will manifest itself at any moment, which would cause serious harm to the public. That is why they must be admitted to a re-education hospital in time to treat and cleanse the virus from their brain and restore their normal mind. We must be clear that going into a re-education hospital for treatment is not a way of forcibly arresting people and locking them up for punishment, it is an act that is part of a comprehensive rescue mission to save them.[540]

Many everyday practices also revolve around producing and maintaining the integrity of social as well as of physical bodies. As such, it remains the case that the creation of private spaces for dining seems more common in Chinese restaurants and karaoke bars than in most other countries. Also worth noting is that the use of intravenous treatment is still unusually common in China, while tea drinking, acupuncture, and moxibustion—all to some extent focused on regulating what enters and exits the body—are widely practised elements of bodily care.

In short, I think it is fair to say that there are many indications that porous personhood is an active part of the Chinese social imaginary. The emphasis on morality as a prerequisite for functioning as a model, the assumption that people have a very limited capacity to form independent choices in the face of temptation, the emphasis on maintaining the integrity of social and physical bodies, the anxiety towards strangers and in-group traitors, the metaphorized references to liquids and gaseous substances as dangerous due to

[540] Https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/infected-08082018173807.html.

their ability to transgress boundaries—in other words, all of the central aspects of the porous personhood model are noticeable across a wide range of practices and cultural products.

7.4 Contributions to the study of China's media

Having established that porosity is an important part of what constitutes the common understanding of personhood in contemporary China, I will end this dissertation by examining debates in two areas where I think the present dissertation and the concept of porous personhood may inspire new thoughts and investigations. The first area is media policies, the second is state-society relations.

China's evolving media landscape has been subject to a great amount of scholarship and debate over the past three decades. It was, for many years, a prevalent assumption that new and less easily controlled media technologies along with the influx of private investments into China's media enterprises would impose greater popular accountability upon the party-state and ultimately move China towards democratization. From the late 1990s and all the way up through the 2000s, the rapid adoption of ICTs in the PRC fueled wide-spread optimism that the Chinese party-state was being forced to adopt international standards in its relationship with an ever-stronger civil society. A number of cases seemed to confirm these predictions—most notably were the cases where popular opposition swayed the authorities to relocate polluting industries to be moved elsewhere, and the formal abolishment of the custody and repatriation system following the public uproar over Sun Zhigang's death in police custody in 2003.[541]

Overall, however, the effects of private investment and social media have not eroded popular trust in the CCP to anywhere near the degree that many had predicted, and studies show that—contrary to what is found in most countries—leaders in high administrative

[541] The most influential cases are discussed from various angles in Susan L. Shirk, ed., *Changing Media, Changing China* (Oxford University Press, 2010).

positions enjoy considerably greater trust than leaders in lower positions.[542] A great number of studies have attempted to explain why the combined effects of privatization and increased social media use have not created a strong public sphere able to force the party-state to move in the direction of greater transparency, the institutionalization of popular political participation, and from a conception of rule *by* law towards rule *of* law.

Attempting to explain how the party-state has thwarted the expected effects of media privatization and digitization, some have emphasized the party-state's control over the careers of most media professionals through the nomenclature system,[543] while others stress that the delegation of censorship functions to online platform providers serves as an effective brake on public debate.[544] Some argue that the harsh and unpredictable punishments meted out to a few dissidents are enough to induce wide-spread self-censorship.[545] Others argue that the conglomeration of the media landscape has made control much easier and more effective.[546] Some claim that the population has been deceived into thinking that Chinese news media are effectively monitoring the political elite by the introduction of investigative news programs,[547] and by the apparent independence of commercialized media.[548] Some have claimed that the party-state employs a huge army of netizens—the so-called "50 Cent party"—that buries negative online publicity under heaps

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[542] Tao Ran et al., "How Does Political Trust Affect Social Trust? An Analysis of Survey Data from Rural China Using an Instrumental Variables Approach," *International Political Science Review* 35, no. 2 (March 1, 2014): 237–53, https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512113492599.
[543] Anne-Marie Brady, "Conclusion: The Velvet Fist in the Velvet Glove," in *China's Thought Management*, ed. Anne-Marie Brady (Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2012), 197.
[544] Juha A. Vuori, "How to Do Security with Words: A Grammar of Securitisation in the People's Republic of China" (PhD diss., University of Turku, 2011), 244.
[545] Edney, *The Globalization of Chinese Propaganda*, 50ff.
[546] Zhao Yuezhi, "Watchdogs on Party Leashes? Contexts and Implications of Investigative Journalism in Post-Deng China," *Journalism Studies* 1, no. 4 (January 2000): 577–97, https://doi.org/10.1080/146167000441312.
[547] Zhang Xiaoling, *The Transformation of Political Communication in China - from Propaganda to Hegemony* (Singapore; Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, 2011), 175ff.
[548] Daniela Stockmann and Mary E. Gallagher, "Remote Control: How the Media Sustain Authoritarian Rule in China," *Comparative Political Studies* 44, no. 4 (January 4, 2011): 436–67, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414010394773.

of praise for the party-state.[549] Some argue that the party-state's attempt to control language use is a powerful means of controlling thought.[550] Others have focused on the party-state's ability to unite the population through the staging of events such as the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics and the 2010 Shanghai World Expo.[551]

While the conclusions of this dissertation do not challenge the perceptive insights summarized above, the underlying assumption—that we need to identify what it is that the Chinese state does to inhibit the formation of a public sphere—does invite critical examination. Munro argued several decades ago—in an article that has been largely overlooked—that a part of the impulse for controlling the availability of information in China was based on the Chinese view that individuals were considered highly likely to act based on whatever information they had available to them.[552] Where Munro based his claim on a reading of Chinese works related to state-craft and philosophy, I believe that the present dissertation has shown that taking insights about modeling and personhood from anthropology and cultural studies into account makes Munro's original claim much stronger. I argue that we need to appreciate this cultural assumption if we are to understand both why information control in the broadest sense has remained such a strong preoccupation of the party-state, and why obvious state-led social engineering meets less popular resistance in China than in the US.

This, in turn, helps us understand why the many predictions that the combined force of modernity and modern technology would soon oust the CCP turned out to be wrong. The fact that the *People's Daily* prints a great number of articles dedicated to explaining in what ways the thinking of the population can most efficiently be altered—without exhibiting the

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[549] Gary D. Rawnsley, "'Thought-Work' and Propaganda," in *The Oxford Handbook of Propaganda Studies*, ed. Jonathan Auerbach and Russ Castronovo (Oxford University Press, 2013), 147–61.
[550] See Chapter 3.
[551] Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation*.
[552] Donald J. Munro, "Belief Control: The Psychological and Ethical Foundations," in *Deviance and Social Control in Chinese Society. New York: Praeger*, ed. Amy Auerbacher Wilson, Sidney L. Greenblatt, and Richard W. Wilson, 1977, 14–36.

need to justify this form of top-down manipulation to its readers—indicates the existence of a sanctioning norm. This chimes with Shi's basic contention that there exists among ordinary Chinese, as compared to among their European and North American contemporaries, a stronger cultural norm of hierarchical orientations towards authority as well as a stronger cultural norm of collective definitions of self-interest.[553] Where Shi primarily attributes the salience of these norms to the dominance of Confucian culture, I attempt to expand upon his work by locating these norms in religious practices, myths, understandings of the body, and in the built landscape; all of which to some extent concretize and serve to reproduce these norms.

This should also remind us that Anglo-American conceptions of media freedom are neither natural nor uncontestable; indeed a number of recent works have noted that these conceptions are in themselves ideological and in some ways limit rather than enhance the ability of the press to catalyze broad popular debate and increase socio-political awareness.[554] While the assumption that privately-owned media corporations will naturally and effectively function as principled antagonists to state power and thus enforce popular accountability upon political rulers has long been debunked in scholarly investigations of the American media landscape, this assumption remains much more robust in much of the scholarship investigating Chinese media.

Another way in which this dissertation speaks to current media research is by questioning the somewhat one-sided emphasis on censorship. Dozens of studies could be cited to illustrate how the scholarly literature focused on China's news media have emphasized the topic of censorship and control over media practitioners—indeed, most of

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553 Tianjian Shi, *The Cultural Logic of Politics in Mainland China and Taiwan*.
554 W. Lance Bennett, *News: The Politics of Illusion* (Boston: Longman, 2012); Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini, "Western Media Systems in Comparative Perspective," in *Media and Society*, ed. James Curran (Bloomsbury Academic, 2010), 103–21; Michael Schudson, "Four Approaches to the Sociology of News Revisited," in *Media and Society*, ed. James Curran (Bloomsbury Academic, 2010), 164–85; Robert E. Gutsche, *Media Control: News as an Institution of Power and Social Control*, 2015; Curran and Seaton, *Power without Responsibility*.

the ones cited on the previous couple of pages do exactly that. Some of the most sophisticated treatments of media management in China have—I will claim—emphasized censorship as an element of media management to such an extent that it has been detrimental to the conclusions drawn in these studies.

One example of how a strong emphasis on censorship may lead to the neglect of important issues is to be found in the work of Daniela Stockmann.[555] A fundamental part of Stockmann's analysis is based on her claim that Chinese media professionals operate in an environment where some topics are open, while others are closed. Stockmann categorizes a number of topics as either open or closed by asking Chinese journalists to assign each topic to either category. On this basis, Stockmann finds that the topic of the labor law is open in China, which enables her to say that the public has little interest in this topic—because otherwise the journalists would produce many more stories about labor. I consider such an approach problematic. I see no reason to doubt that investigate reports exposing the rampant violations of workers' rights—many of them involving bribery, deception, violence, including sexual violence—would not garner millions of readers in China. If Chinese journalists genuinely perceive such topics to be open—and if China's market conditions compel newspapers to produce stories that would sell newspapers, as assumed by Stockmann—then the inattention of Chinese journalists to stories about the legal rights of workers says much about the effective socialization of Chinese journalists, something Stockmann elides.

Herman and Chomsky noted long ago that while American journalists felt free to report on American military interventions in Indochina, the powerful socialization of journalists and a common understanding of the American role in the world were enough to produce in the American mainstream media an entirely one-sided representation of the Vietnam War.[556] Recent investigations of American mainstream media produce results that

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[555] Stockmann, *Media Commercialization and Authoritarian Rule in China*.
[556] Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the*

are scarcely more sanguine.[557] In other words, factors such as elite consensus, stereotypes, popular myths, and other aspects of a given society's social imaginary—not to mention advertising pressures, the ability of the press to generate rather than simply respond to demand, and other aspects not seriously considered by Stockmann—need to be taken into account; otherwise, a focus on censorship may provide only a very partial account of how and why stories in the media are produced.

Another example of how a strong focus on censorship may cause a certain blindness to other important aspects is provided by a recent article by Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, whose incisive work on the Chinese party-state's management of the internet is in many ways the most sophisticated and inventive ever produced on this topic. In their most recent article, the three authors show that the much-discussed "50 Cent party" (abbreviated below to 50c party)—previously considered by most to be an enormous number of private citizens being paid very small amounts to make postings online in favor of party-state policies and leaders—are in fact made up by government employees.[558] As their primary finding, the authors emphasize that the 50c party members do not engage in argumentative praise or criticism of party-state policies or leaders. Instead, the authors claim, the 50c army floods online space with irrelevant posts on sensitive dates, such as days of historical significance and times of important CCP meetings, in an attempt to distract the public.

While I find the work of the three authors insightful, I think their research can be challenged and enriched in important ways. Most fundamentally, I do not think that "distraction" is the best way of understanding what the party-state aims to do. If we look at the analysis performed by the three authors, they have classified a total of 35,100 posts into

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Mass Media (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988).

[557] Bennett, *News*.

[558] Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, "How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument," *The American Political Science Review; Washington* 111, no. 3 (August 2017): 484–501.

various categories, "a process we found easy and unambiguous."[559] They note, for instance, that following immediately upon the clashes in Shanshan in Xinjiang in 2013, the 50c party made 1,100 postings about the China Dream and local economic development. Another example was 18,000 postings made on Tomb Sweeping Day—that has often been a day of popular protest in China—celebrating the glorious deeds of China's martyrs.

While the authors deem these postings to be distractions, it is interesting to note that if one tallies up all the postings categorized, it turns out that a little more than 61 per cent of the postings are about the exploits of Chinese martyrs. I think that this must make us question whether these postings are best considered to be aimed at distraction. That such a large share of the 50c posts deals with martyrs shows, I think, that the party-state is attempting to foster—and derive support from—a norm that stresses the importance of individual sacrifice to the collective. This argument is supported by remembering that the party-state has, for many decades, attempted to rework popular norms, beliefs, and expectations through a panoply of songs, dances, museum exhibits, model operas, movies, discussion groups, posters, public rallies, etc. These activities could also be described as distractions—perpetuated by the elite so that China's downtrodden would not realize that a new class was becoming more equal than everyone else—but that would obviously be a hugely reductive way of understanding PRC history.

Furthermore, the authors quote leaked directives from a local propaganda department admonishing 50c party members to "promote unity and stability through positive publicity" and to "actively guide public opinion during emergency events."[560] This, the authors claim, is consistent with their interpretation that distraction is the main aim of China's propaganda authorities. I would argue, though, that these specific instructions point to much more agency on the part of the 50c party, and to a vision where the authorities take it upon themselves to conjure into being a harmonious society by influencing what people

[559] King, Pan, and Roberts, 488.
[560] King, Pan, and Roberts, 489.

think, more so than it is an attempt to keep people from thinking about more important issues. If distraction were indeed the primary goal, it seems that stories about sex, violence, movie stars, narcotics, lottery billionaires, or gruesome disease—what drives most online traffic in the world—would be much better choices. In short, I think the work of King, Pan, and Roberts exemplifies how an emphasis on censorship may come at the cost of inattention to the importance of social norms and cultural repertoires. In part, I think this emphasis on censorship derives from a conception of human beings as atomistic, rational, self-regarding information processing units; a view identified and criticized by Sundararajan among many others as noted in Chapter 2.

As important as censorship is for understanding media management in contemporary China, I would argue that this dissertation has demonstrated the value of taking a culturally and historically contextualized approach to the study of Chinese media. While, as briefly outlined above, the analysis of China's media landscape has been undertaken through a variety of lenses, a considerable amount of the scholarly literature has focused upon the ability of the party-state to censor information, either directly or through delegating censorship responsibilities to editors, bulletin board managers, and a whole host of news and electronic platform providers. No one would deny that censorship is an important aspect of the Chinese party-state's attempt to influence the thoughts and actions of the Chinese citizenry. I would argue, however, that a strong faith in the ability and proclivity of the private press to enforce accountability upon the government—a faith arising out of the American historical experience and embodied in the legendary status accorded the Watergate exposé—has meant that other aspects of the Chinese party-state's attempts to influence the population through the media are ripe for much more investigation.

My aim here is not so much to criticize studies such as those by King et al., but rather to point out that there is much room for interesting investigations of how the CPD attempts to shape popular norms, beliefs, and expectations through many other means than censorship. An interesting example of how this can be done has been provided by Ruoyun

Bai, as discussed in the Introduction. By studying the social imaginary implicit in the work of the CPD, we see just how seriously the CPD approaches the challenge of shaping public norms, beliefs, and expectations through the creation of role models and the regulation of language and historical memory. And this, in itself, makes such studies interesting.

7.5 Porous personhood and state-society relations

This dissertation also speaks, albeit more obliquely, to the debate within political science on how the Chinese party-state has managed to survive the economic, ideological, and social changes emerging out of China's reforms and the country's consequent integration into the world economy with all of its flows of people, goods, images, and ideas.

In a recent literature review, Vivienne Shue and Patricia Thornton point out that it has been widely assumed among political scientists studying China that "'authoritarian resilience' must somehow be supplanted by genuinely liberal, more democratic, political institutions to avert the potential future crisis of state collapse."[561] According to Shue and Thornton, the "transition paradigm" has outlived its usefulness but, nevertheless, its assumptions continue to shape most of the research exploring state-society relations in China. They further claim that the neoinstitutionalist approach to studying authoritarian regimes is often misleading because the common assumptions about what an institution is—namely, a representative equilibria between competing social forces that continually reproduce the institutions by working through them—do not apply in authoritarian regimes where institutions commonly exist at the behest of the elite and can easily be retrofitted or dismantled.

Shue and Thornton conclude that "researchers in our China studies subfield must confront the fact that more critical imagination is urgently called for if we are to move beyond 'authoritarian resilience' and what remain its rather artificially narrowed conceptual

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[561] Vivienne Shue and Patricia M. Thornton, "Introduction: Beyond Implicit Political Dichotomies and Linear Models of Change in China," in *To Govern China: Evolving Practices of Power*, ed. Vivienne Shue and Patricia M. Thornton (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 22.

frames."[562] They call for "mov[ing] away from the dreary dichotomy of liberalism and authoritarianism to offer different vantage points on the problems of governing and being governed in China."[563] I hope that the present dissertation may offer one such vantage point, however modest. Admittedly, this vantage point is not altogether new; it is more of an attempt to re-open a dialogue between various disciplines that have engaged with ideas about modeling and personhood—not least media studies, anthropology, cultural sociology, and psychology—that seems to have faded with the progression towards academic specialization of recent decades.

As Shue and Thornton point out, the ability of the Chinese party-state to survive in a period where so many other nominally socialist states have disappeared has been one of the major conundrums among the political scientists who have studied the CCP. On the basis of this dissertation, I suggest that a part of the answer to this conundrum may reside in the conceptions I have brought together under the notion of porous personhood. As has been shown, narratives produced by the party-state are shot through with images, metaphors, and assumptions redolent with notions inherent to porous personhood, and the same images, metaphors, and assumptions are also easily identifiable in cultural products and practices not directly produced by the party-state. Therefore, I suggest that this model of personhood gives the Chinese party-state a reservoir of legitimacy that only becomes visible to scholars if we integrate insights from anthropology, cultural studies, and psychology.

If we accept that porous personhood is a culturally-grounded element of the Chinese conception of what it means to be human, then we gain a new way of thinking about the continuity of Chinese culture. Some of the most respected sinologists have grappled with the question of how certain aspects of Chinese culture and modes of social organization seem relatively immutable over the centuries. These scholars—and here just a few will be mentioned—explain this continuity by referring to a number of causes, including the

[562] Shue and Thornton, 28.
[563] Shue and Thornton, 30.

importance of local religion,[564] the dialectical tension between Daoism and Confucianism,[565] the strong focus on child socialization for the reproduction of norms,[566] the structure and historically-embedded associations of the Chinese language,[567] and a persistent Chinese conception of how the mind works.[568] Without disputing any of the work of the scholars mentioned here, I will add that certain dispositions may be passed down, and thus exert a force for continuity, through ideas, practices, and edifices related to the care for porous personhood.

The porous personhood model developed in this dissertation may also invite us to reflect on the relationship between China's economic growth in the reform period and the politics of place. Bryna Goodman has noted that, in both traditional China and in China of the 19th and 20th centuries, people were tied to their native place with economic, sentimental, and religious bonds so strong that migrants invariably considered their exodus to be temporary, even to such a degree that the children and grandchildren of migrants would be considered inheritors of the native place of their father or grandfather.[569] According to Tamara Jacka, in contemporary China "rootedness in a spatially bound community has been an important element in mainstream ideals of what constitutes a desirable, moral life [...] and the character *liu* [流: to flow; my insertion] has very powerful, negative connotations."[570]

That local rootedness has been a strong ingredient in individual and collective identity formation has, according to Elizabeth Perry who is one of the eminent experts on 20th century Chinese labor history, also had an important effect on Chinese labor politics,

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564 Barend J. ter Haar, "The Religious Core of Local Social Organization," *A Companion to Chinese History*, 2017, 304–314.
565 Lucian W. Pye, *The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Cultures* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan : Center for Chinese studies, 1988).
566 Pye; Tianjian Shi, *The Cultural Logic of Politics in Mainland China and Taiwan*.
567 Roger T. Ames, *Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary* (University of Hawai'i Press, 2011).
568 Munro, *The Concept of Man in Contemporary China*.
569 Bryna Goodman, *Native Place, City, and Nation: Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853–1937* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1995), 4f.
570 Tamara Jacka, *Rural Women in Urban China: Gender, Migration, and Social Change* (M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 43f.

with native-place identities and organizations oftentimes playing crucial roles in shaping the proclivities of China's workers.[571] These observations—taken together with the porous personhood model—invite us to ask to what degree the party-state's ability to establish and maintain the *hukou* system—a system that has served to perpetuate and deepen social, political, and economic inequalities—has been based on the ontological assumptions undergirding the social imaginary of porous personhood. The enforcement of the *hukou* system has been important for the ability of employers to pay low wages to migrant workers, because the system makes it very difficult for rural migrant workers to gain a foothold in urban society and thus build stronger social ties that might facilitate collective action. In addition, the regulations stipulating that migrant workers must file work-related complaints in their place of registered residence also tend to diffuse worker protests and thus strengthen the hand of corporations. In these ways, the *hukou* system—and porous personhood, to the extent that the importance attributed to belonging at one fixed place is based on porous personhood—seem to have fueled China's astounding economic growth by helping to shape a labor market seeming to operate "almost in defiance of the rules of economics, enjoying stagnant wages […] and a seemingly endless supply of pliant labor."[572]

7.6 Coda: Extended minds and theories of the self. The possibility for international cross-pollination

Finally, I would like to suggest that what makes this path of research even more interesting is the fact that recent developments in Western cognitive science and behavioral economics have seriously eroded the previous faith in individuals as autonomous, atomistic, and rational beings. Insights from a number of disciplines, and in particular that of behavioral economics, have challenged previously dominant models according to which people were

[571] Elizabeth J. Perry, *Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993), 29ff.
[572] Harney, *The China Price*, 273.

atomistic and rational resource maximizers.[573] Researchers within linguistics, psychology, philosophy, and neuro-science are producing a much more complicated account of how the human mind works. One of the more successful models is commonly referred to as the "extended mind" hypothesis. Pointing to this hypothesis, Sundararajan notes the remarkable similarity between recent developments within Western cognitive science and certain of the most long-lived aspects of the Chinese conceptions of the mind. In particular, she notes a number of philosophers making use of Heidegger's concept of "Stimmung" (which is usually translated as "mood" but could also be translated as "(emotional) atmosphere") whose work have much in common with long-standing Chinese folk theories of the mind.[574] According to Sundararajan,

> The Chinese folk theory of the mind finds an eloquent expression in one school of contemporary philosophy known as the extended mind hypothesis. The 'mind' according to conventional wisdom in the West is a private space for internal, mental processing that is privy only to introspection. By contrast, the extended mind hypothesis states that the mind is distributed in the world and outside the head.[575]

The claim that Western understandings of the human mind have been overly focused on the interior life of the individual, much to the neglect of attention to emotion and collective psychology among many other issues, has grown very strong over the past two decades. One of the most prolific representatives of this argument is Peter Sloterdijk, who argues that European culture has become blind to the central importance of emotional atmospheres and that we will need to invent a new vocabulary in order to make clear to ourselves that human beings are not autonomous and hermetic containers of emotions, but rather unavoidably and constantly partaking of and being influenced by the emotional moods we imbibe from our surroundings.[576]

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[573] See Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011). Also, Richard H. Thaler, *Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioural Economics* (Penguin UK, 2015).
[574] Sundararajan, *Understanding Emotion in Chinese Culture*, chap. 12.
[575] Sundararajan, 193.
[576] Peter Sloterdijk, *Sphären: Mikrosphärologie. 2, Globen* (Suhrkamp, 1999). A useful overview of

An interesting attempt to examine the relationship between language, thought, and culture has been made by Perry Link, who applies insights from cognitive linguistics—and particularly from the area of conceptual metaphors—to examine whether there are systematic differences between Chinese and English that may lead native speakers of the two languages to possess dissimilar worldviews.[577] Link concludes that in terms of metaphor the two languages are more similar than he had imagined; a finding that is consonant with the prevailing theory that conceptual metaphors develop through the physical interaction of people with each other and their environment. In his analysis, however, Link arrives at the interesting observation that there does exist a fundamental difference between Chinese and Indo-European languages, namely that the first tends to use verbs to express many things that the latter does through nouns. Link draws the conclusion that this aspect of the Chinese language makes its speakers less likely to conceive of the world in terms of dualisms—such as the body-mind distinction—but more likely to emphasize aspects of continuity and process. As Link recognizes, this supports the thoughts developed over many years by Roger Ames and David Hall.[578] Where Link, Ames, and Hall develop their insights primarily through the analysis of language and philosophy, I think that the concept of porous personhood offers one way of exploring how processual and correlative thinking are expressed in domains such as religion, medicine, and literature.

This dissertation took a suggestion from the historian Robert Darnton as a part of its inspiration: "When we cannot get a proverb, or a joke, or a ritual, or a poem, we know we are

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what we might term the "atmospheric field" is provided by Tonino Griffero, *Atmospheres: Aesthetics of Emotional Spaces* (2010; repr., Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2014). An investigation of how attention to mood and atmosphere can enrich our understanding of literary works can be found in Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, *Atmosphere, Mood, Stimmung: On a Hidden Potential of Literature* (Stanford University Press, 2012). Related propositions are to be found in recent works of cognitive science; see for instance Mark Rowlands, *The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2010).

[577] Link, *An Anatomy of Chinese Rhythm, Metaphor, Politics*, chap. 2.

[578] Ames, *Confucian Role Ethics*; David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, *Anticipating China: Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture* (Albany [N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1995).

on to something. By picking at the document where it is most opaque, we may be able to unravel an alien system of meaning. The thread might even lead into a strange and wonderful world view."[579] It has throughout been my ambition to examine what appeared to me the curious continuity of model worker publicity in modern-day China. Equally inspirational has been the suggestion of Paul A. Cohen that the scholarly community studying China has underestimated the importance of China's shared cultural narratives as a source that might be mined to add to our understanding of the "undercurrent of intellectual/psychic meaning that flows beneath the surface of conventionally recounted history" which is to a significant extent, Cohen adds, what makes individuals tick.[580]

Based on her interviews with aging model workers, Gail Hershatter reached conclusions that are in many ways resonant with the conclusions conveyed in this dissertation. Hershatter notes that while she started out in search of the true selves behind—or maybe even in opposition to—the state-building project, and with an assumption that an authentic self would emerge where inauthentic layers of the self were peeled away through intimate discussion and self-reflection, she ended up concluding that we need to accept that the labor models were brought into being

> not by state fiat, but by the labor of cadres, the women themselves, their village communities, and regional or national reading and listening publics. These life stories direct our attention, not to hidden inner truths or the sort of life writing engaged in by contemporary biographers and historians, but to shared world-making projects. They suggest that the interior self is itself a historically situated and peculiar idea, and that our attachment to it as historians deserves a gaze as skeptical as any we turn on our source materials. Labor models do not necessarily tell us what we want to know, but perhaps they offer us lessons we need to hear.[581]

In the PRC, the party-state has long attempted to make sure that everyone learns lessons from model workers, and maybe these attempts have surprising things to teach us all.

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[579] Darnton, *The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History*, 5.
[580] Cohen, "The Tenacity of Culture," 397.
[581] Hershatter, *The Gender of Memory. Rural Women and China's Collective Past*, 235.

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Appendix

	Chart 3.1		Chart 3.2		Chart 3.3			
	sùkǔ	sùkǔ (norm.ized (norm.))	léifēng	léifēng (norm.)	máozédōng	máozédōng (norm.)	liúshàoqí	liúshàoqí (norm.)
	诉苦		雷锋		毛泽东		刘少奇	
1946	227	974	0	0	83	356	14	60
1947	562	1333	0	0	86	204	10	24
1948	143	443	0	0	132	409	14	43
1949	106	142	0	0	1081	1452	147	197
1950	108	136	0	0	926	1166	222	280
1951	141	248	0	0	1031	1814	146	257
1952	47	90	0	0	972	1854	69	132
1953	39	78	0	0	776	1547	91	181
1954	13	24	0	0	687	1251	214	390
1955	13	21	0	0	664	1084	162	264
1956	23	25	0	0	789	841	360	384
1957	62	62	0	0	743	742	271	271
1958	27	24	0	0	912	822	225	203
1959	27	29	0	0	933	989	330	350
1960	18	19	0	0	1977	2112	505	539
1961	16	18	1	1	870	980	461	519
1962	16	23	0	0	642	917	261	373
1963	21	33	262	413	985	1553	705	1112
1964	27	40	263	392	1547	2308	565	843
1965	28	43	202	309	1844	2818	636	972
1966	20	41	301	614	4686	9551	366	746
1967	15	41	85	230	5166	13954	1	3
1968	15	41	70	191	5023	13708	801	2186
1969	9	22	24	59	5409	13366	3062	7566
1970	8	19	30	71	4019	9463	2147	5056
1971	5	11	23	50	2668	5808	1747	3803
1972	5	9	18	31	1266	2214	1541	2695
1973	4	7	145	247	1048	1782	1269	2158
1974	4	8	52	102	1369	2694	988	1945
1975	6	11	69	130	1263	2383	926	1747
1976	5	10	78	158	2710	5504	1588	3225
1977	17	33	320	629	1896	3730	541	1064
1978	9	17	147	276	1073	2016	219	411
1979	11	16	94	135	958	1376	4	6
1980	20	18	124	113	525	479	269	245
1981	9	8	314	275	744	651	132	116
1982	16	14	224	196	634	555	87	76
1983	11	9	184	146	696	554	95	76
1984	18	14	78	61	423	331	54	42
1985	18	13	42	30	346	251	72	52
1986	23	17	43	32	327	241	42	31
1987	27	20	72	55	406	308	47	36
1988	53	39	22	16	228	168	61	45
1989	22	18	116	95	524	428	91	74
1990	13	10	585	453	786	608	82	63
1991	15	11	358	262	902	659	93	68
1992	18	12	182	120	619	408	66	44
1993	16	11	288	194	805	542	73	49
1994	8	6	222	160	621	447	61	44
1995	13	8	175	113	588	379	48	31
1996	13	9	174	114	828	542	76	50
1997	14	10	175	123	924	648	56	39
1998	13	9	158	112	669	473	120	85
1999	18	12	104	72	731	507	55	38
2000	14	10	88	61	645	448	40	28
2001	15	10	98	67	924	628	46	31
2002	15	10	68	47	712	496	30	21
2003	20	11	192	108	750	422	32	18
2004	24	13	95	52	732	401	52	28
2005	17	11	85	54	635	402	62	39
2006	17	11	81	52	668	431	55	35
2007	20	14	66	45	386	264	64	44
2008	7	5	61	46	593	451	38	29
2009	21	15	85	62	683	500	56	41
2010	13	8	102	62	438	265	25	15
2011	31	21	135	93	826	566	65	45

	Chart 3.4				Chart 3.5	
	liúshàoqí	liúshàoqí (norm.)	zhōngguódehèlǔxiǎofu	zhōngguódehèlǔxiǎofu (norm.)	liúshàoqí	liúshàoqí (norm.)
	刘少奇		中国的赫鲁晓夫		刘少奇	
1946	14	60	0	0	14	60
1947	10	24	0	0	10	24
1948	14	43	0	0	14	43
1949	147	197	0	0	147	197
1950	222	280	0	0	222	280
1951	146	257	0	0	146	257
1952	69	132	0	0	69	132
1953	91	181	0	0	91	181
1954	214	390	0	0	214	390
1955	162	264	0	0	162	264
1956	360	384	0	0	360	384
1957	271	271	0	0	271	271
1958	225	203	0	0	225	203
1959	330	350	0	0	330	350
1960	505	539	0	0	505	539
1961	461	519	0	0	461	519
1962	261	373	0	0	261	373
1963	705	1112	0	0	705	1112
1964	565	843	0	0	565	843
1965	636	972	0	0	636	972
1966	366	746	2	4	366	746
1967	1	3	652	1761	1	3
1968	801	2186	66	180	801	2186
1969	3062	7566	2	5	3062	7566
1970	2147	5056	0	0	2147	5056
1971	1747	3803	1	2	1747	3803
1972	1541	2695	0	0	1541	2695
1973	1269	2158	1	2	1269	2158
1974	988	1945	0	0	988	1945
1975	926	1747	1	2	926	1747
1976	1588	3225	1	2	1588	3225
1977	541	1064	1	2	541	1064
1978	219	411	1	2	219	411
1979	4	6	1	1	4	6
1980	269	245	0	0	269	245
1981	132	116	1	1	132	116
1982	87	76	1	1	87	76
1983	95	76	0	0	95	76
1984	54	42	0	0	54	42
1985	72	52	0	0	72	52
1986	42	31	0	0	42	31
1987	47	36	0	0	47	36
1988	61	45	0	0	61	45
1989	91	74	0	0	91	74
1990	82	63	0	0	82	63
1991	93	68	0	0	93	68
1992	66	44	0	0	66	44
1993	73	49	0	0	73	49
1994	61	44	0	0	61	44
1995	48	31	0	0	48	31
1996	76	50	0	0	76	50
1997	56	39	0	0	56	39
1998	120	85	0	0	120	85
1999	55	38	0	0	55	38
2000	40	28	0	0	40	28
2001	46	31	0	0	46	31
2002	30	21	0	0	30	21
2003	32	18	0	0	32	18
2004	52	28	0	0	52	28
2005	62	39	0	0	62	39
2006	55	35	0	0	55	35
2007	64	44	0	0	64	44
2008	38	29	0	0	38	29
2009	56	41	0	0	56	41
2010	25	15	0	0	25	15
2011	65	45	0	0	65	45

	zhōngguódehèlǔxiǎofu	zhōngguódehèlǔxiǎofu (norm.)	pàntúnèijiāngōngzéiliúshàoqí	pàntúnèijiāngōngzéiliúshàoqí (norm.)
	中国的赫鲁晓夫		叛徒、内奸、工贼刘少奇	
1946	0	0	0	0
1947	0	0	0	0
1948	0	0	0	0
1949	0	0	0	0
1950	0	0	0	0
1951	0	0	0	0
1952	0	0	0	0
1953	0	0	0	0
1954	0	0	0	0
1955	0	0	0	0
1956	0	0	0	0
1957	0	0	0	0
1958	0	0	0	0
1959	0	0	0	0
1960	0	0	0	0
1961	0	0	0	0
1962	0	0	0	0
1963	0	0	0	0
1964	0	0	0	0
1965	0	0	0	0
1966	2	4	0	0
1967	652	1761	0	0
1968	66	180	377	1029
1969	2	5	1488	3677
1970	0	0	1914	4507
1971	1	2	1257	2736
1972	0	0	169	296
1973	1	2	23	39
1974	0	0	88	173
1975	1	2	18	34
1976	1	2	37	75
1977	1	2	10	20
1978	1	2	1	2
1979	1	1	0	0
1980	0	0	1	1
1981	1	1	0	0
1982	1	1	0	0
1983	0	0	0	0
1984	0	0	0	0
1985	0	0	0	0
1986	0	0	0	0
1987	0	0	0	0
1988	0	0	0	0
1989	0	0	0	0
1990	0	0	0	0
1991	0	0	0	0
1992	0	0	0	0
1993	0	0	0	0
1994	0	0	0	0
1995	0	0	0	0
1996	0	0	0	0
1997	0	0	0	0
1998	0	0	0	0
1999	0	0	0	0
2000	0	0	0	0
2001	0	0	0	0
2002	0	0	0	0
2003	0	0	0	0
2004	0	0	0	0
2005	0	0	0	0
2006	0	0	0	0
2007	0	0	0	0
2008	0	0	0	0
2009	0	0	0	0
2010	0	0	0	0
2011	0	0	0	0

	Chart 3.6	**Chart 3.7**		**Chart 3.8**	**Chart 4.1**
	Number of articles	gōngrén	gōngrén (norm.)	gōngrén (norm.)	láodòngmófàn+láomó
		工人		工人	劳动模范+劳模
1946	5957	625	2681	2681	11
1947	10773	964	2287	2287	37
1948	8247	1420	4400	4400	19
1949	19023	5210	6999	6999	112
1950	20296	5352	6739	6739	726
1951	14528	3984	7008	7008	941
1952	13397	3766	7184	7184	814
1953	12820	3613	7202	7202	580
1954	14035	3493	6360	6360	728
1955	15659	3177	5185	5185	437
1956	23982	4191	4466	4466	303
1957	25583	4398	4393	4393	311
1958	28350	5471	4932	4932	326
1959	24119	5727	6068	6068	296
1960	23924	6272	6700	6700	298
1961	22683	4490	5059	5059	180
1962	17887	2866	4095	4095	157
1963	16206	2327	3669	3669	226
1964	17128	2667	3979	3979	237
1965	16724	2485	3797	3797	148
1966	12538	2099	4278	4278	132
1967	9461	2192	5921	5921	54
1968	9364	3135	8556	8556	76
1969	10342	3650	9019	9019	27
1970	10853	2890	6805	6805	28
1971	11740	2326	5063	5063	29
1972	14611	2476	4331	4331	44
1973	15029	2366	4023	4023	131
1974	12984	2575	5068	5068	81
1975	13543	2429	4583	4583	88
1976	12583	2857	5802	5802	77
1977	12991	2214	4355	4355	156
1978	13603	1713	3218	3218	171
1979	17789	1786	2566	2566	248
1980	28027	2329	2124	2124	288
1981	29197	2307	2019	2019	254
1982	29185	2199	1926	1926	370
1983	32110	2082	1657	1657	364
1984	32684	1982	1550	1550	261
1985	35292	1947	1410	1410	277
1986	34666	1787	1317	1317	242
1987	33681	1695	1286	1286	182
1988	34639	1641	1211	1211	140
1989	31265	1636	1337	1337	244
1990	33027	1719	1330	1330	383
1991	34953	1352	988	988	283
1992	38766	1334	879	879	224
1993	37977	1047	705	705	214
1994	35515	1080	777	777	228
1995	39605	1231	794	794	366
1996	39072	1247	816	816	325
1997	36450	1140	799	799	323
1998	36164	1095	774	774	210
1999	36843	903	626	626	211
2000	36828	719	499	499	232
2001	37597	746	507	507	221
2002	36713	788	549	549	247
2003	45430	1058	595	595	206
2004	46700	1106	605	605	242
2005	40387	963	609	609	275
2006	39624	943	608	608	223
2007	37404	949	648	648	210
2008	33621	902	686	686	144
2009	34888	964	706	706	177
2010	42309	1084	655	655	188
2011	37286	1196	820	820	212

	láodòngmófàn+láomó (norm.)	**Chart 4.2** gōngyèxuédàqìng	gōngyèxuédàqìng (norm.)	**Chart 4.3** yǐshēnzuòzé	yǐshēnzuòzé (norm.)
		工业学大庆		以身作则	
1946	47	0	0	26	112
1947	88	0	0	83	197
1948	59	0	0	59	183
1949	150	0	0	85	114
1950	914	0	0	86	108
1951	1655	0	0	97	171
1952	1553	0	0	54	103
1953	1156	0	0	41	82
1954	1326	0	0	39	71
1955	713	0	0	44	72
1956	323	0	0	44	47
1957	311	0	0	81	81
1958	294	0	0	65	59
1959	314	0	0	71	75
1960	318	0	0	127	136
1961	203	0	0	82	92
1962	224	0	0	46	66
1963	356	0	0	95	150
1964	354	0	0	102	152
1965	226	0	0	60	92
1966	269	4	8	71	145
1967	146	3	8	34	92
1968	207	1	3	65	177
1969	67	7	17	149	368
1970	66	7	16	95	224
1971	63	196	427	54	118
1972	77	139	243	84	147
1973	223	114	194	94	160
1974	159	129	254	58	114
1975	166	230	434	104	196
1976	156	264	536	41	83
1977	307	909	1788	72	142
1978	321	209	393	93	175
1979	356	21	30	110	158
1980	263	3	3	152	139
1981	222	2	2	162	142
1982	324	1	1	149	130
1983	290	1	1	124	99
1984	204	0	0	66	52
1985	201	0	0	119	86
1986	178	0	0	115	85
1987	138	0	0	85	64
1988	103	0	0	87	64
1989	199	0	0	100	82
1990	296	3	2	113	87
1991	207	0	0	74	54
1992	148	0	0	70	46
1993	144	0	0	85	57
1994	164	0	0	79	57
1995	236	0	0	121	78
1996	213	3	2	125	82
1997	226	1	1	130	91
1998	148	0	0	92	65
1999	146	2	1	79	55
2000	161	0	0	105	73
2001	150	0	0	90	61
2002	172	0	0	65	45
2003	116	0	0	89	50
2004	132	0	0	76	42
2005	174	2	1	60	38
2006	144	1	1	77	50
2007	143	0	0	55	38
2008	109	0	0	57	43
2009	130	2	1	64	47
2010	114	2	1	83	50
2011	145	1	1	71	49

	zuòchūlebiǎos huài	zuòchūlebiǎos huài (norm.)	yīngmó	yīngmó (norm.)	biāogān	biāogān (norm.)	biāobīng	biāobīng (norm.)	bǎngyàng	bǎngyàng (norm.)
	作出了表率		英模		标杆		标兵		榜样	
1946	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	31	133
1947	0	0	30	71	0	0	0	0	50	119
1948	0	0	11	34	1	3	0	0	44	136
1949	0	0	13	17	1	1	1	1	228	306
1950	0	0	108	136	2	3	0	0	305	384
1951	0	0	6	11	0	0	0	0	277	487
1952	0	0	0	0	2	4	0	0	403	769
1953	0	0	1	2	2	4	0	0	464	925
1954	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	436	794
1955	0	0	0	0	4	7	0	0	364	594
1956	0	0	0	0	4	4	0	0	374	399
1957	0	0	3	3	3	3	0	0	411	411
1958	0	0	0	0	14	13	46	41	662	597
1959	0	0	0	0	9	10	438	464	567	601
1960	0	0	2	2	8	9	747	798	939	1003
1961	0	0	0	0	4	5	195	220	453	510
1962	0	0	1	1	3	4	40	57	392	560
1963	0	0	0	0	3	5	56	88	604	952
1964	0	0	0	0	7	10	172	257	741	1106
1965	1	2	10	15	3	5	113	173	650	993
1966	0	0	2	4	6	12	193	393	880	1794
1967	1	3	11	30	0	0	30	81	668	1804
1968	1	3	5	14	1	3	47	128	761	2077
1969	1	2	0	0	2	5	58	143	720	1779
1970	0	0	1	2	3	7	48	113	731	1721
1971	0	0	0	0	6	13	47	102	662	1441
1972	0	0	1	2	4	7	14	24	420	735
1973	0	0	0	0	5	9	39	66	465	791
1974	0	0	2	4	8	16	16	31	392	772
1975	0	0	0	0	6	11	27	51	537	1013
1976	0	0	1	2	5	10	30	61	470	955
1977	0	0	4	8	36	71	178	350	588	1157
1978	0	0	1	2	14	26	131	246	340	639
1979	3	4	29	42	11	16	99	142	310	445
1980	6	5	11	10	10	9	74	67	251	229
1981	2	2	19	17	2	2	96	84	301	263
1982	5	4	29	25	5	4	113	99	319	279
1983	2	2	11	9	2	2	85	68	287	228
1984	2	2	25	20	4	3	87	68	249	195
1985	10	7	84	61	3	2	91	66	230	167
1986	7	5	67	49	6	4	91	67	223	164
1987	3	2	83	63	2	2	65	49	170	129
1988	6	4	34	25	5	4	47	35	111	82
1989	4	3	45	37	4	3	53	43	176	144
1990	3	2	77	60	15	12	160	124	277	214
1991	4	3	42	31	17	12	160	117	251	184
1992	4	3	37	24	16	11	143	94	154	102
1993	4	3	33	22	18	12	160	108	178	120
1994	4	3	79	57	13	9	153	110	236	170
1995	5	3	82	53	16	10	162	105	297	192
1996	3	2	99	65	21	14	167	109	387	253
1997	5	4	115	81	18	13	181	127	337	236
1998	10	7	115	81	23	16	127	90	272	192
1999	2	1	79	55	16	11	138	96	225	156
2000	8	6	68	47	9	6	126	87	229	159
2001	4	3	48	33	16	11	94	64	226	154
2002	4	3	46	32	23	16	160	111	218	152
2003	8	5	83	47	32	18	148	83	305	172
2004	11	6	61	33	46	25	140	77	317	173
2005	11	7	45	28	42	27	95	60	366	232
2006	3	2	57	37	57	37	129	83	277	179
2007	11	8	69	47	74	51	109	74	292	200
2008	5	4	96	73	50	38	97	74	265	201
2009	2	1	87	64	102	75	116	85	314	230
2010	13	8	55	33	157	95	125	76	384	232
2011	6	4	82	56	162	111	161	110	378	259

	mófàn	mófàn (norm.)	kànqí	kànqí (norm.)	nòngcháo'ér	nòngcháo'ér (norm.)	páitóubīng	páitóubīng (norm.)	dàitóushìfàn
	模范		看齐		弄潮儿		排头兵		带头示范
1946	356	1527	16	69	0	0	0	0	0
1947	1170	2775	52	123	0	0	0	0	3
1948	412	1277	18	56	0	0	0	0	3
1949	931	1251	114	153	0	0	0	0	0
1950	1338	1685	108	136	0	0	0	0	9
1951	1011	1778	76	134	0	0	0	0	5
1952	1021	1948	57	109	0	0	0	0	9
1953	826	1647	35	70	0	0	0	0	8
1954	741	1349	29	53	0	0	0	0	5
1955	526	858	36	59	0	0	0	0	7
1956	369	393	82	87	0	0	0	0	1
1957	440	440	69	69	0	0	0	0	2
1958	614	553	119	107	0	0	0	0	3
1959	517	548	81	86	0	0	0	0	5
1960	560	598	89	95	0	0	0	0	4
1961	327	368	25	28	0	0	0	0	2
1962	258	369	13	19	2	3	0	0	1
1963	319	503	25	39	0	0	0	0	3
1964	353	527	49	73	5	7	0	0	2
1965	286	437	45	69	0	0	0	0	0
1966	304	620	25	51	0	0	1	2	1
1967	489	1321	9	24	0	0	0	0	0
1968	432	1179	11	30	0	0	0	0	0
1969	407	1006	5	12	0	0	0	0	0
1970	365	859	9	21	0	0	0	0	1
1971	268	583	6	13	0	0	1	2	0
1972	285	498	4	7	0	0	1	2	0
1973	344	585	7	12	2	3	1	2	0
1974	309	608	9	18	1	2	1	2	0
1975	407	768	8	15	0	0	1	2	0
1976	240	487	4	8	0	0	2	4	0
1977	406	799	26	51	0	0	33	65	0
1978	400	751	16	30	1	2	31	58	0
1979	448	644	15	22	2	3	17	24	0
1980	486	443	17	16	0	0	7	6	1
1981	537	470	12	11	3	3	6	5	1
1982	674	590	16	14	1	1	9	8	1
1983	527	419	16	13	2	2	12	10	2
1984	394	308	14	11	6	5	12	9	1
1985	585	424	18	13	10	7	7	5	2
1986	489	360	18	13	12	9	11	8	5
1987	470	357	15	11	12	9	10	8	1
1988	364	269	12	9	13	10	5	4	0
1989	421	344	17	14	10	8	10	8	3
1990	550	426	23	18	9	7	28	22	4
1991	694	507	12	9	1	1	27	20	2
1992	459	303	12	8	25	16	50	33	3
1993	451	303	24	16	23	15	41	28	4
1994	536	386	27	19	17	12	62	45	1
1995	560	361	26	17	13	8	71	46	6
1996	699	457	34	22	10	7	86	56	1
1997	646	453	38	27	10	7	93	65	3
1998	619	437	27	19	15	11	57	40	7
1999	410	284	32	22	11	8	52	36	1
2000	542	376	28	19	9	6	59	41	7
2001	529	360	32	22	12	8	53	36	4
2002	582	405	22	15	6	4	50	35	6
2003	690	388	46	26	12	7	61	34	4
2004	595	326	32	18	20	11	60	33	6
2005	756	478	36	23	10	6	58	37	8
2006	601	388	19	12	5	3	63	41	7
2007	599	409	24	16	5	3	48	33	7
2008	599	455	28	21	8	6	98	74	7
2009	692	507	34	25	10	7	101	74	6
2010	777	469	38	23	18	11	153	92	14
2011	834	572	41	28	11	8	138	95	8

	dàitóushìfàn (norm.)	rénmíndekǎimó	rénmíndekǎimó (norm.)	bǎngyàngjiàoyù	bǎngyàngjiàoyù (norm.)	shuàixiāncheuífàn	shuàixiāncheuífàn (norm.)	diǎnfàn	diǎnfàn (norm.)	xuéxiānjìn
		人民的楷模		榜样教育		率先垂范		典范		学先进
1946	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	17	0
1947	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	17	0
1948	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	9	0
1949	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	18	24	1
1950	11	1	1	0	0	0	0	40	50	0
1951	9	0	0	1	2	0	0	29	51	0
1952	17	1	2	0	0	0	0	46	88	0
1953	16	1	2	1	2	0	0	46	92	2
1954	9	0	0	1	2	0	0	39	71	1
1955	11	0	0	1	2	0	0	46	75	0
1956	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	48	51	1
1957	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	65	65	0
1958	3	0	0	1	1	0	0	69	62	185
1959	5	0	0	1	1	0	0	85	90	332
1960	4	0	0	1	1	0	0	134	143	175
1961	2	0	0	1	1	0	0	66	74	21
1962	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	44	63	10
1963	5	0	0	2	3	0	0	64	101	43
1964	3	0	0	2	3	0	0	37	55	124
1965	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	36	55	38
1966	2	0	0	1	2	0	0	107	218	21
1967	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	81	219	1
1968	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	52	142	11
1969	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	72	178	31
1970	2	0	0	2	5	0	0	49	115	48
1971	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	71	155	21
1972	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	25	44	22
1973	0	0	0	2	3	0	0	36	61	24
1974	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	38	75	11
1975	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	40	75	20
1976	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	107	217	4
1977	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	147	289	54
1978	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	92	173	36
1979	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	54	78	12
1980	1	0	0	2	2	1	1	47	43	20
1981	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	52	46	19
1982	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	49	43	75
1983	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	54	43	23
1984	1	0	0	0	0	2	2	90	70	10
1985	1	0	0	0	0	2	1	82	59	10
1986	4	0	0	0	0	3	2	73	54	10
1987	1	0	0	0	0	7	5	80	61	8
1988	0	1	1	1	1	12	9	52	38	2
1989	2	2	2	1	1	15	12	85	69	9
1990	3	2	2	3	2	43	33	108	84	20
1991	1	0	0	0	0	32	23	112	82	18
1992	2	0	0	0	0	23	15	88	58	13
1993	3	0	0	0	0	38	26	87	59	12
1994	1	0	0	0	0	57	41	124	89	16
1995	4	1	1	0	0	51	33	137	88	14
1996	1	0	0	0	0	66	43	165	108	34
1997	2	1	1	0	0	94	66	215	151	18
1998	5	0	0	0	0	79	56	160	113	18
1999	1	1	1	0	0	38	26	161	112	7
2000	5	6	4	0	0	47	33	161	112	8
2001	3	4	3	0	0	72	49	242	164	8
2002	4	0	0	0	0	66	46	173	120	8
2003	2	6	3	1	1	89	50	232	131	10
2004	3	1	1	3	2	58	32	241	132	4
2005	5	7	4	0	0	60	38	222	140	9
2006	5	0	0	1	1	65	42	273	176	8
2007	5	2	1	1	1	66	45	231	158	5
2008	5	0	0	0	0	71	54	192	146	7
2009	4	0	0	1	1	53	39	284	208	9
2010	8	1	1	1	1	79	48	358	216	39
2011	5	0	0	1	1	73	50	348	239	23

	xuéxiānjìn (norm.)	yàngbǎn	yàngbǎn (norm.)	língtóuyángzuòyòng	língtóuyángzuòyòng (norm.)	**Chart 4.4** bàgōng	bàgōng (norm.)	**Chart 4.5** mǎkèsī
		样板		领头羊作用		罢工		马克思
1946	0	1	4	0	0	161	691	5
1947	0	1	2	0	0	221	524	14
1948	0	0	0	0	0	333	1032	48
1949	1	8	11	0	0	437	587	374
1950	0	13	16	0	0	351	442	226
1951	0	5	9	0	0	243	427	491
1952	0	10	19	0	0	233	444	537
1953	4	14	28	0	0	183	365	547
1954	2	16	29	0	0	102	186	516
1955	0	10	16	0	0	129	211	605
1956	1	11	12	0	0	192	205	738
1957	0	8	8	0	0	263	263	1255
1958	167	30	27	0	0	247	223	1111
1959	352	42	45	0	0	375	397	1200
1960	187	97	104	0	0	516	551	1299
1961	24	25	28	0	0	315	355	849
1962	14	24	34	0	0	330	471	674
1963	68	30	47	0	0	196	309	1035
1964	185	161	240	0	0	158	236	999
1965	58	337	515	0	0	157	240	718
1966	43	232	473	0	0	115	234	1286
1967	3	97	262	0	0	222	600	1643
1968	30	100	273	0	0	371	1013	1055
1969	77	227	561	0	0	435	1075	1148
1970	113	115	271	0	0	273	643	859
1971	46	81	176	0	0	196	427	1152
1972	38	37	65	0	0	191	334	905
1973	41	39	66	0	0	154	262	998
1974	22	58	114	0	0	270	531	1554
1975	38	60	113	0	0	132	249	1799
1976	8	66	134	0	0	136	276	2322
1977	106	131	258	0	0	84	165	1214
1978	68	93	175	0	0	96	180	841
1979	17	44	63	0	0	121	174	597
1980	18	50	46	0	0	301	274	612
1981	17	29	25	0	0	261	228	560
1982	66	34	30	0	0	198	173	626
1983	18	26	21	0	0	157	125	787
1984	8	36	28	0	0	152	119	467
1985	7	38	28	0	0	133	96	426
1986	7	38	28	0	0	135	100	576
1987	6	29	22	0	0	143	109	563
1988	1	39	29	0	0	190	140	371
1989	7	38	31	0	0	177	145	581
1990	15	55	43	0	0	87	67	756
1991	13	55	40	0	0	68	50	874
1992	9	49	32	0	0	87	57	505
1993	8	46	31	0	0	84	57	386
1994	12	63	45	0	0	35	25	390
1995	9	73	47	0	0	69	45	411
1996	22	100	65	0	0	55	36	512
1997	13	127	89	0	0	49	34	726
1998	13	62	44	0	0	36	25	589
1999	5	73	51	0	0	35	24	650
2000	6	86	60	0	0	20	14	619
2001	5	53	36	0	0	31	21	986
2002	6	46	32	0	0	21	15	793
2003	6	77	43	2	1	51	29	808
2004	2	77	42	1	1	34	19	773
2005	6	67	42	0	0	65	41	682
2006	5	63	41	0	0	47	30	725
2007	3	71	49	0	0	31	21	803
2008	5	62	47	0	0	36	27	609
2009	7	65	48	0	0	45	33	751
2010	24	114	69	2	1	46	28	689
2011	16	95	65	3	2	76	52	934

	makèsi (norm.)	lièníng	lièníng (norm.)	gòngchǎnzhǔyì	gòngchǎnzhǔyì (norm.)	shèhuìzhǔyì	shèhuìzhǔyì (norm.)	gémìng	gémìng (norm.)	wúchǎnjiējí
		列宁		共产主义		社会主义		革命		无产阶级
1946	21	25	107	25	107	44	189	282	1210	9
1947	33	76	180	74	176	125	297	496	1177	47
1948	149	148	459	122	378	277	858	634	1965	118
1949	502	691	928	561	754	1432	1924	3221	4327	646
1950	285	742	934	644	811	1288	1622	2791	3514	315
1951	864	447	786	535	941	796	1400	2420	4257	294
1952	1024	570	1087	727	1387	1178	2247	1950	3720	314
1953	1090	780	1555	749	1493	1704	3397	1400	2791	257
1954	940	638	1162	643	1171	2988	5441	1448	2637	239
1955	987	528	862	585	955	3031	4947	1324	2161	201
1956	786	532	567	678	722	3936	4194	1677	1787	297
1957	1254	875	874	1245	1244	6632	6625	3163	3160	1089
1958	1001	608	548	2458	2216	6287	5667	4566	4116	831
1959	1271	699	741	2642	2799	5641	5977	4213	4464	748
1960	1388	642	686	2815	3007	5503	5878	5616	5999	1126
1961	957	528	595	1033	1164	2992	3371	2877	3241	600
1962	963	296	423	681	973	2378	3397	2496	3566	475
1963	1632	344	542	1090	1719	2804	4422	3074	4847	915
1964	1491	326	486	1088	1623	3424	5109	4527	6754	1130
1965	1097	202	309	858	1311	2894	4422	4909	7501	992
1966	2621	286	583	1107	2256	3219	6561	6072	12376	2949
1967	4438	610	1648	958	2588	2465	6658	6555	17706	4956
1968	2879	268	731	638	1741	2451	6689	6561	17906	4788
1969	2837	347	857	604	1493	2832	6998	7169	17715	4957
1970	2023	152	358	548	1290	3006	7078	6701	15779	3437
1971	2508	314	684	431	938	2743	5971	5880	12799	2608
1972	1583	215	376	320	560	2545	4451	5441	9517	1972
1973	1697	192	326	425	723	2874	4887	5260	8944	2289
1974	3059	347	683	312	614	3403	6698	5454	10735	3149
1975	3395	888	1676	885	1670	3748	7072	5678	10714	3691
1976	4716	698	1418	1267	2573	4279	8690	5938	12060	4254
1977	2388	418	822	879	1729	3848	7570	4940	9718	2365
1978	1580	294	552	628	1180	3087	5799	3732	7011	1400
1979	858	244	351	521	748	2885	4145	2721	3909	868
1980	558	307	280	510	465	2575	2348	2460	2243	675
1981	490	215	188	550	481	2928	2563	2566	2246	527
1982	548	223	195	1027	899	3297	2887	2279	1996	453
1983	626	215	171	905	720	2868	2283	2284	1818	424
1984	365	159	124	493	385	2496	1952	2179	1704	286
1985	308	158	114	643	466	2414	1748	1994	1444	220
1986	425	174	128	482	355	2507	1848	1841	1357	262
1987	427	178	135	377	286	2786	2114	1727	1310	218
1988	274	178	131	248	183	2166	1598	1250	922	174
1989	475	200	163	475	388	2622	2143	1701	1390	363
1990	585	231	179	580	449	2980	2306	1924	1489	446
1991	639	235	172	566	414	3452	2524	2055	1502	478
1992	333	106	70	253	167	2849	1878	1391	917	260
1993	260	73	49	198	133	3032	2040	1270	855	219
1994	281	67	48	193	139	3115	2241	1405	1011	178
1995	265	91	59	243	157	2992	1931	1633	1054	191
1996	335	85	56	325	213	3299	2158	1875	1226	231
1997	509	107	75	305	214	3643	2554	1973	1383	257
1998	416	92	65	222	157	2537	1793	1596	1128	264
1999	451	86	60	236	164	2680	1859	1486	1031	161
2000	430	83	58	245	170	2474	1717	1493	1036	182
2001	670	86	58	322	219	2865	1947	1959	1332	212
2002	552	46	32	182	127	2540	1768	1336	930	122
2003	455	61	34	200	113	2575	1448	1374	773	122
2004	423	71	39	141	77	2315	1267	1484	812	151
2005	432	59	37	268	170	2810	1778	1577	998	166
2006	468	58	37	205	132	4140	2670	1507	972	116
2007	549	51	35	152	104	3436	2348	1355	926	118
2008	463	46	35	130	99	2805	2132	1082	822	101
2009	550	70	51	216	158	2758	2020	1811	1327	149
2010	416	58	35	134	81	2565	1549	1544	933	82
2011	640	86	59	250	171	3044	2086	2336	1601	180

	wúchǎnjiējí (norm.)	jìxùgémìng	jìxùgémìng (norm.)	bōxuējiējí	bōxuējiējí (norm.)	jiējídòuzhēng	jiējídòuzhēng (norm.)	zhèngzhìguàshuài	zhèngzhìguàshuài (norm.)
		继续革命		剥削阶级		阶级斗争		政治挂帅	
1946	39	0	0	1	4	2	9	0	0
1947	111	0	0	7	17	8	19	0	0
1948	366	0	0	20	62	31	96	0	0
1949	868	3	4	89	120	161	216	0	0
1950	397	2	3	51	64	129	162	0	0
1951	517	2	4	64	113	130	229	0	0
1952	599	0	0	75	143	120	229	0	0
1953	512	0	0	50	100	83	165	0	0
1954	435	0	0	82	149	122	222	0	0
1955	328	0	0	91	149	272	444	0	0
1956	316	4	4	78	83	113	120	0	0
1957	1088	2	2	252	252	506	505	0	0
1958	749	2	2	207	187	264	238	459	414
1959	793	2	2	137	145	237	251	706	748
1960	1203	3	3	115	123	286	306	765	817
1961	676	2	2	72	81	146	164	86	97
1962	679	2	3	34	49	108	154	15	21
1963	1443	1	2	151	238	518	817	7	11
1964	1686	9	13	222	331	923	1377	76	113
1965	1516	5	8	129	197	721	1102	109	167
1966	6011	15	31	406	828	1502	3061	139	283
1967	13387	26	70	401	1083	1538	4154	119	321
1968	13067	173	472	591	1613	2519	6875	179	489
1969	12249	1193	2948	277	684	2306	5698	73	180
1970	8093	1189	2800	190	447	1752	4125	108	254
1971	5677	666	1450	109	237	1240	2699	135	294
1972	3449	348	609	116	203	904	1581	176	308
1973	3892	365	621	145	247	1118	1901	116	197
1974	6198	610	1201	573	1128	1989	3915	131	258
1975	6965	1204	2272	423	798	1637	3089	247	466
1976	8640	1451	2947	312	634	3175	6448	332	674
1977	4652	705	1387	103	203	970	1908	132	260
1978	2630	277	520	92	173	467	877	108	203
1979	1247	16	23	107	154	288	414	23	33
1980	615	7	6	118	108	187	171	6	5
1981	461	17	15	83	73	107	94	0	0
1982	397	18	16	90	79	133	116	4	4
1983	337	14	11	87	69	117	93	3	2
1984	224	23	18	55	43	94	73	5	4
1985	159	14	10	34	25	81	59	2	1
1986	193	3	2	25	18	98	72	3	2
1987	165	3	2	28	21	71	54	3	2
1988	128	5	4	9	7	79	58	4	3
1989	297	0	0	37	30	137	112	2	2
1990	345	1	1	54	42	86	67	1	1
1991	349	2	1	52	38	92	67	1	1
1992	171	5	3	13	9	50	33	1	1
1993	147	5	3	18	12	43	29	1	1
1994	128	2	1	13	9	35	25	1	1
1995	123	2	1	15	10	35	23	2	1
1996	151	6	4	24	16	39	26	1	1
1997	180	3	2	34	24	48	34	0	0
1998	187	11	8	14	10	70	49	4	3
1999	112	4	3	13	9	38	26	0	0
2000	126	0	0	16	11	29	20	1	1
2001	144	5	3	25	17	31	21	0	0
2002	85	2	1	15	10	14	10	1	1
2003	69	1	1	14	8	16	9	1	1
2004	83	1	1	18	10	36	20	0	0
2005	105	1	1	8	5	21	13	0	0
2006	75	4	3	3	2	18	12	0	0
2007	81	0	0	6	4	23	16	1	1
2008	77	1	1	4	3	31	24	2	2
2009	109	4	3	6	4	24	18	1	1
2010	50	0	0	7	4	23	14	0	0
2011	123	3	2	14	10	40	27	2	1

	Chart 5.1		**Chart 5.2**			
	láodòngjìngsài	láodòngjìngsài (norm.)	dàyuèjìn	dàyuèjìn (norm.)	dàgānkuàishǎng	dàgānkuàishǎng (norm.)
	劳动竞赛		大跃进		大干快上	
1946	1	4	0	0	0	0
1947	1	2	0	0	0	0
1948	15	46	0	0	0	0
1949	77	103	1	1	0	0
1950	62	78	1	1	0	0
1951	264	464	0	0	0	0
1952	147	280	2	4	0	0
1953	287	572	0	0	0	0
1954	429	781	1	2	0	0
1955	378	617	2	3	0	0
1956	235	250	0	0	0	0
1957	134	134	97	97	0	0
1958	104	94	4521	4075	0	0
1959	517	548	3985	4222	0	0
1960	403	430	2961	3163	0	0
1961	169	190	587	661	0	0
1962	110	157	246	351	0	0
1963	93	147	209	330	0	0
1964	39	58	129	192	0	0
1965	32	49	51	78	0	0
1966	18	37	231	471	0	0
1967	6	16	87	235	0	0
1968	17	46	89	243	0	0
1969	23	57	78	193	0	0
1970	26	61	100	235	0	0
1971	22	48	66	144	0	0
1972	55	96	45	79	0	0
1973	52	88	55	94	14	24
1974	41	81	103	203	47	93
1975	45	85	61	115	72	136
1976	38	77	131	266	25	51
1977	398	783	*166*	327	308	606
1978	153	287	125	235	281	528
1979	83	119	*19*	27	45	65
1980	27	25	46	42	7	6
1981	26	23	49	43	12	11
1982	37	32	36	32	1	1
1983	20	16	30	24	1	1
1984	12	9	35	27	1	1
1985	20	14	48	35	5	4
1986	26	19	43	32	0	0
1987	21	16	43	33	2	2
1988	15	11	45	33	4	3
1989	19	16	50	41	5	4
1990	33	26	37	29	12	9
1991	36	26	18	13	8	6
1992	34	22	29	19	6	4
1993	24	16	25	17	11	7
1994	23	17	14	10	3	2
1995	23	15	39	25	5	3
1996	25	16	21	14	8	5
1997	20	14	24	17	9	6
1998	15	11	45	32	8	6
1999	16	11	28	19	1	1
2000	20	14	28	19	5	3
2001	5	3	16	11	3	2
2002	15	10	10	7	2	1
2003	17	10	19	11	6	3
2004	16	9	17	9	12	7
2005	6	4	21	13	12	8
2006	17	11	25	16	8	5
2007	12	8	15	10	13	9
2008	9	7	16	12	8	6
2009	23	17	33	24	8	6
2010	32	19	29	18	11	7
2011	34	23	60	41	16	11

	Chart 5.3		**Chart 5.4**						
	ànláofēnpèi	ànláofēnpèi (norm.)	jiǎngjīn	jiǎngjīn (norm.)	wùzhìcìjī	wùzhìcìjī (norm.)	wùzhìjiǎnglì	wùzhìjiǎnglì (norm.)	wùzhìgǔlì
	按劳分配		奖金		物质刺激		物质奖励		物质鼓励
1946	1	4	33	142	0	0	4	17	0
1947	1	2	82	195	0	0	17	40	0
1948	3	9	60	186	0	0	4	12	0
1949	1	1	219	294	0	0	25	34	3
1950	2	3	319	402	1	1	49	62	1
1951	2	4	330	580	0	0	22	39	0
1952	4	8	330	629	0	0	8	15	0
1953	8	16	235	468	0	0	5	10	3
1954	13	24	203	370	2	4	22	40	6
1955	6	10	186	304	0	0	15	24	7
1956	10	11	206	220	1	1	54	58	19
1957	13	13	246	246	2	2	33	33	9
1958	25	23	124	112	8	7	18	16	5
1959	196	208	118	125	14	15	28	30	29
1960	89	95	59	63	14	15	24	26	22
1961	200	225	90	101	4	5	21	24	23
1962	60	86	43	61	2	3	5	7	9
1963	14	22	36	57	5	8	6	9	2
1964	37	55	42	63	7	10	5	7	7
1965	12	18	29	44	15	23	2	3	2
1966	11	22	52	106	61	124	3	6	1
1967	9	24	63	170	179	484	4	11	1
1968	8	22	116	317	388	1059	6	16	3
1969	1	2	57	141	287	709	0	0	0
1970	3	7	32	75	206	485	0	0	0
1971	25	54	12	26	103	224	0	0	0
1972	105	184	8	14	74	129	1	2	0
1973	43	73	13	22	15	26	1	2	0
1974	7	14	28	55	45	89	3	6	1
1975	144	272	104	196	214	404	4	8	8
1976	40	81	70	142	236	479	2	4	2
1977	66	130	10	20	50	98	2	4	3
1978	261	490	106	199	59	111	38	71	36
1979	337	484	301	432	18	26	76	109	25
1980	221	202	436	398	2	2	35	32	12
1981	185	162	540	473	3	3	28	25	16
1982	118	103	370	324	0	0	14	12	6
1983	119	95	494	393	2	2	20	16	12
1984	147	115	659	515	3	2	22	17	12
1985	97	70	823	596	4	3	20	14	12
1986	85	63	541	399	5	4	21	15	8
1987	100	76	501	380	6	5	19	14	14
1988	91	67	646	477	2	1	20	15	7
1989	53	43	474	387	7	6	16	13	6
1990	70	54	367	284	3	2	14	11	8
1991	99	72	365	267	4	3	6	4	2
1992	104	69	481	317	4	3	12	8	6
1993	72	48	424	285	1	1	7	5	2
1994	53	38	355	255	2	1	13	9	4
1995	39	25	394	254	2	1	21	14	1
1996	37	24	357	233	0	0	17	11	5
1997	66	46	273	191	2	1	5	4	1
1998	42	30	265	187	4	3	13	9	1
1999	45	31	241	167	2	1	10	7	2
2000	37	26	267	185	4	3	9	6	6
2001	41	28	231	157	2	1	13	9	2
2002	48	33	220	153	1	1	8	6	5
2003	62	35	258	145	0	0	20	11	0
2004	38	21	302	165	6	3	21	11	0
2005	32	20	226	143	3	2	20	13	1
2006	50	32	298	192	2	1	19	12	1
2007	39	27	228	156	3	2	14	10	1
2008	29	22	181	138	3	2	10	8	1
2009	24	18	207	152	0	0	9	7	0
2010	25	15	247	149	3	2	20	12	0
2011	41	28	251	172	2	1	18	12	

	Chart 5.5			Chart 5.6			
	wùzhìgǔlì (norm.)	píngjūnzhǔyì	píngjūnzhǔ yì (norm.)	dàguōfàn	dàguōfàn (norm.)	tiěfànwǎn	tiefànwan (norm.)
		平均主义		大锅饭		铁饭碗	
1946	0	4	17	0	0	0	0
1947	0	10	24	10	24	0	0
1948	0	75	232	1	3	0	0
1949	4	74	99	2	3	0	0
1950	1	58	73	17	21	1	1
1951	0	34	60	10	18	1	2
1952	0	27	52	18	34	0	0
1953	6	35	70	22	44	0	0
1954	11	28	51	6	11	0	0
1955	11	24	39	5	8	0	0
1956	20	53	56	3	3	1	1
1957	9	78	78	3	3	2	2
1958	5	21	19	12	11	9	8
1959	31	41	43	5	5	8	8
1960	24	5	5	2	2	9	10
1961	26	15	17	0	0	2	2
1962	13	8	11	0	0	1	1
1963	3	3	5	1	2	6	9
1964	10	11	16	1	1	3	4
1965	3	4	6	0	0	3	5
1966	2	8	16	1	2	5	10
1967	3	5	14	1	3	1	3
1968	8	4	11	1	3	6	16
1969	0	3	7	1	2	9	22
1970	0	3	7	6	14	9	21
1971	0	4	9	2	4	5	11
1972	0	52	91	3	5	3	5
1973	0	7	12	2	3	1	2
1974	2	3	6	0	0	2	4
1975	15	3	6	1	2	8	15
1976	4	4	8	1	2	1	2
1977	6	12	24	7	14	1	2
1978	68	63	118	20	38	2	4
1979	36	175	251	144	207	37	53
1980	11	129	118	195	178	65	59
1981	14	159	139	255	223	58	51
1982	5	82	72	198	173	50	44
1983	10	120	96	403	321	90	72
1984	9	201	157	286	224	117	91
1985	9	73	53	289	209	57	41
1986	6	108	80	287	212	89	66
1987	11	103	78	283	215	82	62
1988	5	100	74	110	81	145	107
1989	5	41	34	63	51	57	47
1990	6	35	27	129	100	22	17
1991	1	62	45	162	118	53	39
1992	4	52	34	111	73	117	77
1993	1	42	28	95	64	43	29
1994	3	38	27	73	53	36	26
1995	1	39	25	72	46	38	25
1996	3	34	22	89	58	30	20
1997	1	31	22	93	65	51	36
1998	1	24	17	45	32	67	47
1999	1	17	12	47	33	30	21
2000	4	23	16	43	30	24	17
2001	1	24	16	35	24	17	12
2002	3	24	17	37	26	15	10
2003	0	26	15	31	17	33	19
2004	0	18	10	28	15	25	14
2005	1	25	16	30	19	13	8
2006	1	22	14	24	15	13	8
2007	1	11	8	30	20	22	15
2008	1	15	11	30	23	28	21
2009	0	14	10	30	22	25	18
2010	0	27	16	50	30	37	22
2011	0	26	18	33	23	30	21

Chart 5.7

	zhǔrénwēng	zhǔrénwēng (norm.)	zhǔrénwēngsīxiǎng+zhǔrénwēngzérèngǎn+zhǔrénwēngtàidu+zhǔrénwēngwénmíng+zhǔrénwēngjīngshénwénmíng
	主人翁		主人翁思想+主人翁责任感+主人翁态度+主人翁文明+主人翁精神文明
1946	15	64	1
1947	34	81	10
1948	23	71	0
1949	259	348	21
1950	225	283	27
1951	203	357	27
1952	157	299	17
1953	131	261	24
1954	126	229	13
1955	81	132	13
1956	67	71	11
1957	159	159	39
1958	130	117	32
1959	127	135	26
1960	109	116	24
1961	79	89	18
1962	27	39	4
1963	55	87	11
1964	74	110	11
1965	71	108	20
1966	49	100	5
1967	69	186	2
1968	78	213	15
1969	28	69	6
1970	15	35	4
1971	16	35	3
1972	42	73	6
1973	60	102	14
1974	77	152	11
1975	139	262	31
1976	121	246	16
1977	62	122	12
1978	44	83	15
1979	70	101	7
1980	80	73	11
1981	222	194	75
1982	248	217	99
1983	176	140	62
1984	114	89	25
1985	118	85	32
1986	158	116	43
1987	116	88	35
1988	131	97	23
1989	165	135	43
1990	220	170	61
1991	198	145	59
1992	138	91	25
1993	80	54	23
1994	95	68	20
1995	104	67	17
1996	181	118	30
1997	131	92	22
1998	100	71	17
1999	99	69	15
2000	80	56	11
2001	78	53	11
2002	74	52	7
2003	67	38	10
2004	82	45	10
2005	61	39	10
2006	56	36	9
2007	56	38	6
2008	78	59	9
2009	98	72	6
2010	57	34	7
2011	74	51	6

	All the terms to the left (norm.)	**Chart 5.8** zhǔrénwēngdìwèi 主人翁地位	zhǔrénwēngdìwèi (norm.)	**Chart 6.1** láodòngmófàn+láomó 劳动模范+劳模	láodòngmófàn+láomó (norm.)
1946	4	0	0	11	47
1947	24	1	2	37	88
1948	0	2	6	19	59
1949	28	7	9	112	150
1950	35	6	8	726	914
1951	47	5	9	941	1655
1952	32	2	4	814	1553
1953	48	1	2	580	1156
1954	25	10	18	728	1326
1955	23	0	0	437	713
1956	13	0	0	303	323
1957	40	3	3	311	311
1958	29	1	1	326	294
1959	28	1	1	296	314
1960	27	0	0	298	318
1961	21	3	3	180	203
1962	6	0	0	157	224
1963	24	0	0	226	356
1964	21	0	0	237	354
1965	35	0	0	148	226
1966	12	1	2	132	269
1967	11	0	0	54	146
1968	46	0	0	76	207
1969	15	0	0	27	67
1970	9	0	0	28	66
1971	9	0	0	29	63
1972	12	0	0	44	77
1973	36	0	0	131	223
1974	30	0	0	81	159
1975	83	1	2	88	166
1976	73	26	53	77	156
1977	39	1	2	156	307
1978	36	0	0	171	321
1979	20	1	1	248	356
1980	16	5	5	288	263
1981	109	9	8	254	222
1982	120	15	13	370	324
1983	81	6	5	364	290
1984	38	19	15	261	204
1985	39	13	9	277	201
1986	50	21	15	242	178
1987	46	22	17	182	138
1988	24	34	25	140	103
1989	69	35	29	244	199
1990	76	41	32	383	296
1991	69	40	29	283	207
1992	34	39	26	224	148
1993	22	20	13	214	144
1994	27	20	14	228	164
1995	19	22	14	366	236
1996	39	35	23	325	213
1997	36	19	13	323	226
1998	25	18	13	210	148
1999	24	18	12	211	146
2000	15	14	10	232	161
2001	13	19	13	221	150
2002	10	21	15	247	172
2003	11	13	7	206	116
2004	16	12	7	242	132
2005	10	11	7	275	174
2006	10	6	4	223	144
2007	10	4	3	210	143
2008	17	8	6	144	109
2009	17	15	11	177	130
2010	11	5	3	188	114
2011	14	7	5	212	145

Chart 6.2

	léifēng	léifēng (norm.)	sīxiǎnggōngzuò	sīxiǎnggōngzuò (norm.)	sīxiǎngzhèngzhìgōngzuò	sīxiǎngzhèngzhìgōngzuò (norm.)	xuānchuángōngzuò
	雷锋		思想工作		思想政治工作		宣传工作
1946	0	0	1	4	0	0	10
1947	0	0	0	0	0	0	56
1948	0	0	6	19	1	3	44
1949	0	0	12	16	1	1	133
1950	0	0	16	20	0	0	326
1951	0	0	27	47	6	11	552
1952	0	0	56	107	6	11	213
1953	0	0	127	253	14	28	270
1954	0	0	123	224	12	22	170
1955	0	0	128	209	15	24	140
1956	0	0	158	168	6	6	127
1957	0	0	402	402	64	64	265
1958	0	0	445	401	37	33	160
1959	0	0	437	463	26	28	111
1960	0	0	508	543	38	41	78
1961	1	1	132	149	205	231	37
1962	0	0	64	91	63	90	23
1963	262	413	108	170	53	84	38
1964	263	392	313	467	255	380	44
1965	202	309	292	446	147	225	69
1966	301	614	313	638	82	167	79
1967	85	230	371	1002	85	230	57
1968	70	191	238	650	252	688	25
1969	24	59	424	1048	332	820	28
1970	30	71	255	600	128	301	32
1971	23	50	271	590	107	233	34
1972	18	31	169	296	155	271	23
1973	145	247	214	364	176	299	27
1974	52	102	261	514	91	179	19
1975	69	130	237	447	154	291	18
1976	78	158	144	292	74	150	30
1977	320	629	204	401	109	214	45
1978	147	276	229	430	123	231	39
1979	94	135	297	427	215	309	76
1980	124	113	230	210	138	126	83
1981	314	275	390	341	447	391	85
1982	224	196	337	295	278	243	97
1983	184	146	237	189	354	282	86
1984	78	61	211	165	239	187	64
1985	42	30	283	205	399	289	116
1986	43	32	210	155	397	293	80
1987	72	55	222	168	364	276	96
1988	22	16	196	145	283	209	76
1989	116	95	248	203	577	472	109
1990	585	453	226	175	499	386	98
1991	358	262	200	146	426	311	91
1992	182	120	126	83	264	174	83
1993	288	194	121	81	237	159	88
1994	222	160	192	138	187	135	104
1995	175	113	142	92	173	112	102
1996	174	114	147	96	258	169	101
1997	175	123	103	72	162	114	108
1998	158	112	141	100	147	104	87
1999	104	72	134	93	247	171	129
2000	88	61	270	187	893	620	110
2001	98	67	151	103	339	230	102
2002	68	47	118	82	251	175	89
2003	192	108	155	87	187	105	124
2004	95	52	125	68	185	101	96
2005	85	54	111	70	148	94	133
2006	81	52	104	67	120	77	119
2007	66	45	68	46	98	67	93
2008	61	46	108	82	96	73	99
2009	85	62	71	52	90	66	94
2010	102	62	99	60	98	59	135
2011	135	93	110	75	116	80	97

	xuānchuán gōngzuò (norm.)	sīxiǎngjiàoyù	sīxiǎngjiàoyù (norm.)	sīxiǎngjuéwù	sīxiǎngjuéwù (norm.)	zhèngzhìjiàoyù	zhèngzhìjiàoyù (norm.)	gǎnhuà	gǎnhuà (norm.)
		思想教育		思想觉悟		政治教育		感化	
1946	43	60	257	17	73	16	69	5	21
1947	133	149	353	43	102	27	64	9	21
1948	136	85	263	20	62	37	115	6	19
1949	179	190	255	29	39	163	219	13	17
1950	410	270	340	36	45	216	272	7	9
1951	971	433	762	74	130	250	440	13	23
1952	406	281	536	63	120	170	324	5	10
1953	538	357	712	82	163	185	369	3	6
1954	310	293	534	104	189	100	182	7	13
1955	228	326	532	91	149	72	118	5	8
1956	135	286	305	63	67	46	49	6	6
1957	265	840	839	165	165	164	164	9	9
1958	144	452	407	251	226	75	68	1	1
1959	118	538	570	289	306	84	89	7	7
1960	83	601	642	410	438	79	84	3	3
1961	42	357	402	147	166	138	155	6	7
1962	33	142	203	44	63	29	41	3	4
1963	60	174	274	79	125	36	57	8	13
1964	66	255	380	193	288	48	72	16	24
1965	105	174	266	159	243	46	70	9	14
1966	161	187	381	165	336	46	94	12	24
1967	154	174	470	72	194	24	65	7	19
1968	68	210	573	100	273	24	65	1	3
1969	69	321	793	210	519	39	96	11	27
1970	75	279	657	166	391	28	66	2	5
1971	74	493	1073	151	329	30	65	1	2
1972	40	212	371	134	234	49	86	2	3
1973	46	181	308	98	167	27	46	0	0
1974	37	107	211	78	154	27	53	9	18
1975	34	249	470	168	317	32	60	2	4
1976	61	101	205	83	169	20	41	1	2
1977	89	138	271	49	96	23	45	1	2
1978	73	132	248	43	81	59	111	3	6
1979	109	217	312	38	55	47	68	4	6
1980	76	176	160	52	47	49	45	9	8
1981	74	244	214	56	49	67	59	28	25
1982	85	399	349	107	94	62	54	21	18
1983	68	373	297	130	103	77	61	21	17
1984	50	197	154	64	50	44	34	14	11
1985	84	216	156	69	50	48	35	11	8
1986	59	205	151	53	39	72	53	14	10
1987	73	200	152	45	34	64	49	13	10
1988	56	107	79	20	15	46	34	6	4
1989	89	248	203	35	29	111	91	16	13
1990	76	258	200	45	35	94	73	19	15
1991	67	332	243	49	36	110	80	16	12
1992	55	231	152	25	16	44	29	7	5
1993	59	152	102	12	8	62	42	16	11
1994	75	158	114	14	10	37	27	12	9
1995	66	168	108	19	12	57	37	16	10
1996	66	181	118	37	24	90	59	38	25
1997	76	128	90	23	16	46	32	34	24
1998	61	101	71	24	17	41	29	21	15
1999	89	151	105	22	15	44	31	29	20
2000	76	258	179	36	25	146	101	41	28
2001	69	153	104	19	13	57	39	49	33
2002	62	116	81	15	10	52	36	28	19
2003	70	114	64	22	12	49	28	27	15
2004	53	126	69	23	13	116	63	38	21
2005	84	110	70	16	10	135	85	34	22
2006	77	91	59	18	12	103	66	37	24
2007	64	77	53	11	8	80	55	36	25
2008	75	71	54	18	14	62	47	20	15
2009	69	87	64	19	14	82	60	28	21
2010	82	85	51	19	11	89	54	32	19
2011	66	92	63	26	18	90	62	29	20

Chart 7.1

	zhěngfēng	zhěngfēng (norm.)	láodòngmófàn+láomó	láodòngmófàn+láomó (norm.)
	整风		劳动模范+劳模	
1946	8	34	11	47
1947	21	50	37	88
1948	13	40	19	59
1949	21	28	112	150
1950	427	538	726	914
1951	117	206	941	1655
1952	121	231	814	1553
1953	32	64	580	1156
1954	8	15	728	1326
1955	29	47	437	713
1956	42	45	303	323
1957	2216	2214	311	311
1958	1753	1580	326	294
1959	571	605	296	314
1960	253	270	298	318
1961	168	189	180	203
1962	28	40	157	224
1963	18	28	226	356
1964	30	45	237	354
1965	31	47	148	226
1966	123	251	132	269
1967	279	754	54	146
1968	109	297	76	207
1969	220	544	27	67
1970	143	337	28	66
1971	388	845	29	63
1972	520	910	44	77
1973	1653	2811	131	223
1974	659	1297	81	159
1975	284	536	88	166
1976	157	319	77	156
1977	250	492	156	307
1978	207	389	171	321
1979	91	131	248	356
1980	61	56	288	263
1981	54	47	254	222
1982	79	69	370	324
1983	94	75	364	290
1984	52	41	261	204
1985	27	20	277	201
1986	27	20	242	178
1987	29	22	182	138
1988	21	15	140	103
1989	32	26	244	199
1990	41	32	383	296
1991	47	34	283	207
1992	34	22	224	148
1993	31	21	214	144
1994	26	19	228	164
1995	28	18	366	236
1996	28	18	325	213
1997	38	27	323	226
1998	50	35	210	148
1999	128	89	211	146
2000	57	40	232	161
2001	45	31	221	150
2002	35	24	247	172
2003	21	12	206	116
2004	32	18	242	132
2005	35	22	275	174
2006	22	14	223	144
2007	31	21	210	143
2008	15	11	144	109
2009	27	20	177	130
2010	21	13	188	114
2011	38	26	212	145
			163	144
			131	87
			109	73
			179	123
			137	98