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China-India Rivalry and the Border War of 1962:
PRC Perspectives on the Collapse of China-India Relations, 1958-62

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Abstract:

After Indian Independence in 1947 and the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, China and India began a period of friendship and cooperation, leading to the Bandung Conference in 1955 and the declaration of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in 1954. Just under a decade later, however, the two new nations were at war in the Himalayas. This thesis examines Chinese views of India as the relationship collapsed between 1958-62, culminating in the China-India Border War of 1962. While much of the current literature argues that the collapse of China-India relations was driven by a territorial dispute in the Himalayas, or by a conflict of interests over the Himalayan region, this thesis aims to widen our understanding of China's view of India during these years, demonstrating that CCP leaders and officials saw India as a comprehensive threat to the PRC, and that India loomed much larger in the early PRC worldview than is generally understood. After examining the periods between 1950-53 and 1954-57, during which the two new nations defined their policies towards one another and began their attempted friendship, this thesis will focus on three core arguments in order to shed light on the years of collapse. First, that the CCP saw India as a threat to the core values of the PRC and to the project of creating a 'New China'. Second, that the CCP saw India as a threat to its international agenda, particularly in Asia and Africa. Third, that the CCP saw India as actively working with both the United States and Soviet Union against the PRC, as the two superpowers competed for influence in India, heightening the threat that India posed. As such, this thesis will argue that CCP leaders and officials viewed India as a comprehensive threat overall, much beyond the border dispute. In doing so, this thesis aims to widen our understanding of China's view of India during these years in which relations rose and fell, and to help to explain India's importance to the early PRC.

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Chapter 1 – Introduction and Literature Review

1.1 The Purpose of this Thesis

The purpose of this thesis is to shed light on China's perspective on the collapse of relations with India in the 1950s and early 1960s that culminated in the China-India Border War of 1962. This thesis will challenge the prevailing arguments which ascribe the collapse of relations to a dispute over territory or over conflict of interest in Tibet, and argue instead that Chinese leaders and officials came to see India as both a threat to the security and founding principles of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and as a strategic rival on the world stage. The trajectory of China-India relations from professed friendship in the 1950s to war in the Himalayas in 1962 was closer in nature to the Sino-Soviet split than to a conflict over disputed territory. Moreover, the importance of the Republic of India in the eyes of the founders, strategy-makers, and foreign policy professionals of the People's Republic of China, both as friend and foe, is greater than we have previously understood.

This thesis will focus on the Chinese side of the conflict given the availability of new materials and the lack of attention to this perspective in scholarly work to date. This thesis fits within the literature on the history of the international relations of the People's Republic of China in the Maoist period.

In addition to being driven by the problems arising from a territorial dispute, the collapse in relations occurred because Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders and officials viewed the Indian leadership as 'heirs to the British Empire' and 'tools' of the United States engaged in a

broad ‘anti-China’ program that included subverting Chinese influence in Tibet, carrying out an American agenda around the globe, subverting Sino-Soviet relations, and undermining Chinese influence in Asia and Africa. In short, the CCP saw India as a major rival, one with a capacity to challenge Chinese influence and the CCP agenda not only in the Himalayas and in Asia, but also around the world.

Scholarship on the question of why China and India went from professed ‘brotherhood’ in the mid-1950s to war in 1962, all within the first two decades their respective founding as modern states, has generally focused on the territorial dispute. This disguises what in fact was a far more profound, comprehensive, and interesting collapse of relations.

This thesis will attempt to demonstrate the following points:

1. India’s place in the CCP worldview during the 1950s and early 1960s was significantly more important than is generally appreciated.

2. CCP leaders and officials came to regard India as a threat to the security of the PRC, a threat to the PRC’s position in Cold War international relations and to its influence abroad, and a threat to the mission to build a ‘New China’.

3. The period of friendship between China and India, while authentic in many ways, was based on misconceptions that each country had about the other’s interests and worldview, and thus offers insight into the eventual collapse of China-India relations.

4. The China-India Border War of 1962 was not simply the result of a territorial dispute, or even the result of a deeper conflict of interest over Tibet and the Himalayan region; it was the end result of a comprehensive collapse in relations closer in nature to the Sino-Soviet split than to a dispute over territory.

This thesis will not attempt to outline decision making processes and explain the decisions and choices behind the outbreak of war between China and India as reliable documents detailing the decision for war are not available. However, this thesis can substantially increase our

understanding of the Chinese perspective on the collapse of relations and view of India, making clear, for example, that CCP leaders and officials viewed the border dispute as a distraction, used by the Indian government to cause trouble with China, and part of a much wider range of disagreements and conflicts of interest with India.

1.2 General Introduction

After the founding of the PRC in 1949 and the achievement of Indian Independence in 1947, the two largest nations in Asia began a relationship that proceeded from professed friendship in the 1950s to war in the Himalayas in 1962. The reasons for which China-India relations rose and fell during this period remains an important and relatively understudied question in the history of modern China and India, and in the history of modern Asia.

The events of the rise and fall of China-India relations are well known. The friendship period was marked most importantly by the declaration of the 'Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence' or 'Panch Sheel', 'The Five Virtues', in 1954, and the meeting of China and India as leaders among Asian nations at the Bandung Conference of 1955. By 1958, both sides realized that they held deep disagreements over the demarcation of the China-India border, and that large tracts of Himalayan territory were in dispute, as each country claimed the same regions as their own. The following year, with the Tibetan Uprising of 1959, the flight of the Dalai Lama to India, and the first violent clashes between Chinese and Indian patrols in the Himalayas at Longju, tensions between the two countries deepened. After failed negotiations over the border in 1960 between Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indian government began what is known as the Forward Policy. The Forward Policy involved moving Indian troops into the disputed territories and to set up military outposts in response to

the presence of Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) infrastructure being built in the disputed territories as the Chinese consolidated their hold on Tibet.[1] This policy, described by both sides as a 'game of chess', continued until the outbreak of war.[2]

Skirmishes proliferated under the Forward Policy, and, on October 20th, 1962, the China-India Border War erupted. PLA troops swept through the disputed Western and Eastern sectors of the Himalayan border in an overwhelming military victory, before declaring a ceasefire on November 21st, and withdrawing to twenty kilometers from the 'line of actual control'.[3]

As this introductory chapter will make clear, our current understanding of the collapse of China-India relations is largely centered on the events of the disputed border as described above, concealing what was in fact a much more comprehensive, substantial, and interesting collapse in relations. Moreover, attention to the views of the Chinese side has been constrained both by a general approach to the conflict which assumes the border and, to a lesser extent, conflict of interests with India in Tibet to be the primary drivers of conflict and also by the lack, until now, of primary documents from the PRC. This thesis will attempt to substantially revise our understanding of the Chinese perspective on the collapse of China-India relations, and on the nature of the conflict with India from the Chinese point of view. In doing so, it will reveal that India's importance to the CCP in the 1950s and early 1960s has been seriously underestimated. A stronger understanding of the role of India in the CCP worldview, and the realization that India was in fact a country of major significance to the CCP, will further our understanding of

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[1] Garver, John W., 'China's Decision for War with India', in Alastair Johnson and Robert S. Ross, (eds.) *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy* (Stanford, 2006), 107-8.
[2] Ibid., 107 and D.K. Palit, *War in High Himalaya: The Indian Army in Crisis, 1962*, (London, 1991), 161.
[3] Neville Maxwell's *India's China War*, (London, 1970), 417.

China in this period, a time in which the CCP aimed to both advance the project of building the 'New China' and to navigate the superpower competition that dominated the era. Attention to India, and the problems and opportunities that it presented for the CCP adds another dimension to our understanding of the nature of the Chinese revolution and the nature of 'China's struggle with the modern world'.[4]

As this thesis will demonstrate, the CCP initially saw India as an essential partner in its attempt to build an international atmosphere congenial to the progress of the Chinese revolution and the construction of the 'New China'. Similar to the ways in which alliance with the Soviet Union allowed the CCP to harness the support of a fellow Communist nation as an ally in the Cold War, partnership with India allowed the CCP to make use of the other major phenomenon of the era: decolonization. As a fellow Asian nation which had experienced European imperialism, the two built a friendship that appealed to other decolonizing and recently independent nations across Asia and Africa, both offering leadership to emerging nations, and in the case of CCP strategic purposes, carrying out an agenda that was meant to counter American containment policy towards China in Asia. However, CCP expectations of India as a partner set the stage for a profound change in attitude towards India as differences between the two countries, some of which were evident before and during the friendship period, became more substantial in the late 1950s.

The CCP began to take a more aggressive line in its policies towards Asia, Africa, and the superpowers from 1958 onwards, promoting national liberation movements by means of violence, confronting both American 'imperialism' and Soviet 'revisionism', and beginning its

[4] Rana Mitter, *A Bitter Revolution: China's Struggle with the Modern World* (Oxford, 2004), introduces this phrase.

split with the USSR as well during the period of 1958-62. India, guided by a foreign policy of 'nonalignment' in the Cold War world, maintaining cordial relations with both superpowers, and, exerting its own unique influence in Asia, Africa, and the 'nonaligned' movement, was an independent actor with influence, interests, and objectives existing well outside of the strategic framework which the CCP sought to incorporate India into for the purposes of its revolutionary objectives in Asia and the wider world. The combination of territorial claims, Indian interests in the Himalayas, including in Tibet, India's independent influence in the decolonizing world and among the superpowers all became sources of consternation to the CCP, leading to a view of India as a major rival on the world stage and a threat to the PRC project of national resurrection, the latter of which took as a necessity the transformation of the international environment into an atmosphere favorable to Chinese revolutionary objectives, as scholars have demonstrated, and as will be reviewed in this chapter. In short, the CCP's inability to make India into a lasting partner in the restoration of Chinese power led to the view of India as a dangerous threat and rival which needed, as a senior Chinese leader eventually put it, to be taught a 'lesson'.[5] This 'lesson' took the form of the China-India Border War of 1962, which was the culmination of the collapse of China-India relations.

The collapse of relations with India is an instructive episode in China's encounters with other major powers. By the mid-1960s, China's relations with India, the USSR, and the United States were all openly hostile. China's relations with the superpowers have been explored in depth by scholars. The addition of India to the study of China's relations with major powers with

[5] 外交部开放档案馆，北京，中华人民共和国 105-01792-08 锡兰总理、印尼外长访华会谈情况 11.1.1963. Foreign Ministry Public Archive, Beijing, PRC (Hereafter, FMA), Discussions during the visit to China by Ceylonese Prime Minister and Indonesian Foreign Minister, 92. All translations from Chinese into English are by the author, unless otherwise noted.

whom China proved unable to coexist during the early Cold War will offer a helpful dimension in understanding the early PRC as India's Asian and anti-colonialist identity presented unique synergies with the CCP foreign policy agenda during partnership and also created unique challenges when the two became rivals. Moreover, while the superpowers dominated the international politics of the era and the foreign policy thinking of both India and China, as John Garver has pointed out,[6] India was arguably the only major *independent* power in the early Cold War era that was able to exert a large degree of influence in international politics and set, to an extent, an alternative agenda in world politics. The collapse of China's relationship with India, and the fact that the CCP came to see India as a major threat and rival, was perhaps the most significant encounter in China's international relations during the period other than that with the superpowers themselves. For this reason, China's relationship with India merits deeper investigation and attention in the study of the history of China's foreign relations in the Maoist period.

1.3 Notes on Sources

This study makes use of primary documents from China's Foreign Ministry Archives, including embassy cables from around the world, intelligence documents, in depth country-specific analyst reports, and memoranda of conversations between senior Chinese Communist Party leaders and diplomats and their counterparts in other countries. It also makes use of published collections from the People's Republic of China, including writings and diplomatic collections of senior CCP leaders Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, which contain memoranda of meetings and conversations on strategic and foreign policy issues between CCP leaders and other world

[6] John W. Garver, *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century,* (Seattle, 2001), 5.

leaders, internal directives, and speeches and minutes from CCP gatherings.[7] These collections have been the standard in the scholarly histories of the international relations of the PRC since they became available in the 1980s and 1990s, but they have not yet been used in an extensive study of China's relationship with the Republic of India in the 1950s and 1960s.[8]

The published collections referred to here in some cases, for example, memos of conversations, can be corroborated by matching archival sources. Drawing on such a reservoir of source material, this thesis will be able to present and organize, as other scholars do in examining their subjects, evidence of the thinking and strategic views of top PRC leadership, reporting from embassies and intelligence branches, published propaganda, and internal documents, in order to provide a comprehensive view of the subject at hand. However, a clear, event based decision making chain is not possible to deduce with absolute accuracy. The Chinese Communist Party Central Archives, where documentation of decision-making and internal conversations at the

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[7] These collections include 毛泽东年谱 1949−1976 (北京, 2013), *A Chronological Record of Mao Zedong 1949-1976*, (Beijing, 2013), 6 Vols., hereafter MZDNP, 周恩来年谱 1949-1976, (北京, 1997), *A Chronological Record of Zhou Enlai, 1949-1976*, (Beijing, 1997), 3 Vols., hereafter ZELNP, and 周恩来转, (北京, 2013), 4 Vols., *Biography of Zhou Enlai* (Beijing, 2013), among others.

[8] See for example Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill and London, 2001) and Simei Qing, *From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1945-1960* (London, 2007) and Lorenz Luthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World*, (Princeton, 2008) for book-length studies making extensive use of these collections, as well as shorter length work including by Niu Jun, '1962: The Eve of the Left Turn in China's Foreign Policy', *Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 48*, Shu Guang Zhang 'Constructing "Peaceful Coexistence": China's Diplomacy toward Geneva and Bandung Conferences, 1954-55', *Cold War History,* 7, No. 4, November 2007 and Michael Sheng, 'Mao and China's Relations with the Superpowers in the 1950s, *Modern China*, 34, No. 4, October 2008 and Michael Sheng, 'Mao's Role in the Korean Conflict: A Revision', *Twentieth Century China*, 39, No. 3, November 2014. See also Chen Jian's excellent 'Bibliographic Essay' in *Mao's China and the Cold War* for a summary of published documents available at his time of writing, most of which remain available or have been expanded upon. The most recent generation of scholars has also benefitted from the opening of Russian archives which are also referenced in Cold War histories involving the PRC.

highest levels of government may be available, are closed.[9] The PRC Foreign Ministry Archives, which were open until 2012, have closed now as well.[10] However, it is possible to provide a clear portrait of how and why China's view of India changed from one of a friend to a strategic rival, and even an enemy. It is a view that is very different from what the current literature, though sparse, tells us about the collapse of this relationship. Some scholars have probed and hinted at what the Chinese view of India may have been as relations proceeded from friendship to collapse. This thesis aims to provide substantial documentary evidence of the view of India inside the PRC leadership and diplomatic services, and thereby to fill in a major missing piece in our understanding of the collapse of China-India relations in the early Cold War.

This thesis will avoid the use of memoirs as much as possible as the author does not consider them to be fully reliable, and the abundance of primary archival and published material offers an opportunity to examine China's relationship with India without the need to rely heavily on memoirs. In the instances in which memoirs are used, they will be drawn from a collection which has been used as supporting evidence for historical work of the highest caliber.[11]

This thesis will also make use of published collections of memoranda and directives related to CCP political and military operations in Tibet when appropriate, and diplomatic notices and letters exchanged between China and India when useful,[12] though many of the latter have been

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[9] See Chen Jian, 'Bibliographic Essay' in *Mao's China*, 373-385, for a discussion of archives.
[10] Fortunately, the author was able to obtain a number of documents from the Foreign Ministry Archives in 2012-14.
[11] See, for example, Chen Jian *Mao's China* and Lorenz Luthi, *Sino-Soviet Split.*
[12] The Government of India published a collection of documents in English called *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed Between the Governments of India*

available for decades in English language and some have been used as evidence in prior studies of China-India relations and the Border War.[13]

Finally, this thesis will draw in small measure upon Indian sources when useful and appropriate in providing a larger context to PRC perspectives or broader events. This will include use of speeches and correspondences of senior leaders in the Government of India.

Primary documents from the PRC, both from archives and in published collections, must be used with care and scrutiny. Published documents collections from the PRC, while invaluable to scholars and researchers, are selected and issued in by the ruling Communist Party, which is concerned with its own legitimacy and also control of the historical narrative inside China.[14] As such, documents are released in a deeply politicized environment in which archivists are careful to attend to the Party's image.[15] This presents problems of bias, selective release of documents, and representation of events that a researcher must contend with. As historian James Belich explains, dealing with bias in sources involves the 'study of group ideology, of *mentalité*' in

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and China: White Paper (10 vols., New Delhi, 1959-63), hereafter *WP* which will be referred to as well in the course of this thesis.

[13] See especially Maxwell's *India's China War*, considered the authoritative study of the war since its publication in 1970. Maxwell uses diplomatic notices exchanged between China and India in the above mentioned collection, as well as Indian newspapers and speeches, and translations of Chinese language news media and commentary to anchor his study of the Border War.

[14] See Chen Jian, 'Not Yet a Revolution: Reviewing China's Cold War Documentation', Conference on the Power of Free Inquiry and Cold War International History (College Park, 1998), http://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/cold-war/conference/chen-jian.html

[15] Ibid.

order to effectively deconstruct biases and find truth in sources.[16] Because this thesis is concerned with the view and understanding of India inside the Chinese leadership and government, it is in a sense concerned with the very nature of this 'group ideology' at the heart of PRC views of the changing relationship with India. The problem becomes more to do with the question of the value of these sources in representing or revealing the authentic views of CCP leaders and officials, and less to do with working through their own prejudices in order to understand the situation more objectively.

With regard to published collections, as Chen Jian has stated, writing in the late 1990s after substantial collections were introduced, 'the policy of "opening up and reform" has made its mark' on the quality and value of the collections released in that period, especially to do with the speeches, memoranda and internal documents of Mao and Zhou.[17] Christian Ostermann, Director of the Cold War International History Project, writes of the opening of the Foreign Ministry Archives which began in 2004, that it 'likely stems from a complex set of motives' including that 'Beijing…is aware that a certain degree of archival transparency has become an international standard for any government intent on projecting the image of a modern world power'.[18] The publication of documents and opening of archives has produced a source base, which, though selective and incomplete, reveals a great deal about the foreign relations of Maoist China and has facilitated a substantial literature on the period as mentioned previously.

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[16] James Belich, 'The Victorian interpretation of racial conflict and the New Zealand wars: an approach to the problem of one-sided evidence', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 15:2, 2008, 144.
[17] Chen, 'Not Yet a Revolution'.
[18] Christian F. Ostermann, 'Director's Note: Archival Thaw in China', in *Inside China's Cold War*, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 16, Fall 2007 / Winter 2008.

In the case of the collapse of China-India relations and the China-India Border War, the CCP appears to be most concerned with portraying the conflict as a war of 'self-defense' and the collapse of relations with India as a the product of Indian 'expansionism' and illegitimate claims.[19] Use of this source base, however, both published collections and archival sources, reveals a far larger and more interesting context into which this collapse of relations with India fits, and provides material which can substantially revise our understanding of what the relationship with India, its collapse, and its culmination in war meant to the CCP. While the opening of Foreign Ministry Archives was a significant event among historians of the history of China's foreign relations, the fact that they have since been closed is perhaps testament to their value in contributing to new narratives and new understandings of China's foreign relations during the Maoist period.

1.4 Literature Review and Role of this Thesis within Current Literature

The literature relevant to this thesis falls into two main categories. The first is the literature on the history of the international relations of the People's Republic of China in the Maoist period. The second is literature on the collapse of China-India relations and the Border War itself. Despite a burgeoning new history of China's foreign relations in the Maoist period, which has led to thorough scholarly investigation of subjects including China's participation in the Korean War, China's role in the Vietnam wars, and the Sino-Soviet split, China's relationship with India has largely been left out of the literature on China's foreign relations, creating a substantial gap in what has otherwise become a comprehensive and vibrant field of study. While the collapse of

[19] See for example, the official PRC history of the war, produced by the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, 中印边境自卫反击作战史（北京, 1994）, *The History of the War of Self-Defense on the China-India Border* (Beijing, 1994).

China-India relations and the Border War are often referred to in studies of China's foreign policy in the period, they have not been investigated in depth, relying instead on a relatively sparse set of works that have done much to anchor our sense of the conflict as the result of a territorial dispute. As such, the full scope and meaning of the collapse of China-India relations, and of China's view of India has yet to be explored. While this thesis aims to contribute primarily to the literature on China's foreign relations during the Maoist period, this section will review both categories of literature, and also touch upon scholarly work produced in China and India, which are more numerous, but find fault with the opposite side, thus presenting distinct interpretations of the events and climate of the years of deterioration.[20]

1.4.1 China-India Relations and the Border War of 1962

The primary text on the China-India Border War remains Neville Maxwell's *India's China War*, published in 1970. This work does much to anchor our sense that the Border War was primarily about a territorial dispute. Maxwell provides a detailed history of the China-India border, starting from the period of British expansion into the Hindu Kush and Karakoram mountains in the 19th Century.[21] Using published collections of diplomatic correspondence, contemporary media, and,

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[20] Principal works on the Chinese side include 徐延, 中印边界之战历史真相 (香港, 1993). Xu Yan, True History of the China-India Border War (Hong Kong, 1993) and 师博 1962，中印大战纪实（北京，1993）Shi Bo (ed.), 1962, Record of the China-India War (Beijing, 1993). On the Indian side, for example, S.P. Varma., *Struggle for the Himalayas: A Study in Sino-Indian Relations*, (Jullundur, 1965) and Gautam Das, *China-Tibet-India: The 1962 War and the Strategic Military Future* (New Delhi, 2009) review the conflict from an opposite perspective. 尚劝余，尼赫鲁时代中国和印度的关系 (1947-1964), (北京, 2009) Shang Quanyu, China-India Relations in the Nehru Era (1947-1964), (Beijing, 2009) presents a helpful perspective, and former Head of Xinhua News Agency, Wu Lengxi, 吴冷西，十年论战 1956-1966 (北京, 1999) Wu Lengxi, Ten Years of Polemics 1956-1966 (Beijing, 1999), 2 vols., is helpful on the period generally.

[21] See Maxwell, 19-64.

in the Indian case, speeches and Parliamentary statements, Maxwell argues that it was Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's unwillingness to negotiate over the disputed border, along with his orders to move the Indian Army into the disputed area in what is known as the Forward Policy, that led to the outbreak of war with China over disputed territory. Though Maxwell does mention Chinese concerns over Tibet, especially with the town of Kalimpong which served as a base for Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist (GMD) covert contact with Tibetans, the heart of his argument is border-centric and does not take a wider view of the collapse of China-India relations. While the Forward Policy is likely to have caused the outbreak of violence, it is only an immediate cause, and does little to explain the arc of China-India relations from friendship to collapse. Neither does this account of events in the Himalayas explain the view of the Chinese government of India as relations rose and fell during the 1950s and early 1960s.

Maxwell offers a brief chapter on 'The View from Peking' which, quoting articles in the *People's Daily*, *Peking Review* and other mainland journals, hints at PRC suspicions about the situation that, as this study will show, prove to be very deep. Maxwell quotes a Shanghai journal in 1950, for example, claiming that 'It is on India that America has pinned her real hope'.[22] Senior PRC leaders and diplomats did in fact see India as acting in league with the United States in activities across the globe during the years before the Border War. However, publishing in 1970, and without the use of Chinese language sources, it would have been impossible to examine this view in depth even if that had been the intention of Maxwell's study.

[22] Maxwell, 259.

Other scholars and writers have done much to deepen and contextualize Maxwell's initial work. However, his remains the only full-length book on the collapse of China-India relations and the Border War written outside of China or India.[23]

At another end of the spectrum is John Garver's *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century*, which takes a broad view of Sino-Indian relations, and argues that rivalry was geopolitically inevitable, as the two countries shared spheres of influence in the Himalayas, Southeast Asia, and Indian Ocean.[24] Within this framework, Garver examines a number of issues, including conflicting interests in Tibet, the unresolved border, and competition for influence in the Himalayan states and other regions. However, Garver's work is historiographically rather than archivally based, and the arc of his project precludes close examination of the period of collapse in China-India relations. Garver notes a 'brief period of Sino-Indian friendship' but, as Sulmaan Khan points out, does not focus on it;[25] his analysis thus does not make use of signals within China-India cooperation to explain the collapse of relations, but rather assumes that the two nations were rivals from the start.

Other scholars have worked to build upon Maxwell's work on the Border War, and its border-centric view of China-India relations. Allen Whiting's *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence* argues that conflict was due to a larger set of difficulties confronting the PRC, though most of them had little to do with India. In Whiting's analysis, China-India conflict was the result of a

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[23] Newer books, for example, Bruce Riedel, *JFK's Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and Sino-Indian War*, (Washington D.C., 2015), focus on other aspects, such as US-India relations.
[24] See Garver, *Protracted,* 15, Map 1.1.
[25] Sulmaan Khan, 'Cold War co-operation: New Chinese evidence on Jawaharlal Nehru's 1954 visit to Beijing', *Cold War History,* 11, No. 2, May 2011, 218.

number of external and internal pressures on the CCP during the years 1961-62. As Whiting explains, this was a critical period in CCP insecurity: the combination of the Great Leap Forward, threats from the American-backed GMD in Taiwan, the Hong Kong exodus of May 1962, and unrest in Xinjiang 'potentially involving the USSR' brought pressure on the PRC in the same period that Nehru chose to militarize the border with his Forward Policy.[26] Whiting's analysis deepens the debate, and is, by its own account, a response to Neville Maxwell. However, the author focuses only on the period from November 1961 to November 1962, before devoting the rest of his text to comparisons of Chinese decision-making in Indochina, India, and Korea. It is not an examination of China-India relations, so much as a contextualization of the China-India Border War, and Nehru's Forward Policy, within the problems facing the CCP in that year, and previously unconnected to the Border War. Publishing in 1988, Whiting did not have access to Chinese archival material or to primary documents published in later decades.

In *Strong Borders, Secure Nation*, M. Taylor Fravel makes a similar argument and applies it to the whole range of China's territorial disputes in the 1960s and 1990s[27], arguing that internal pressures and regime insecurity, precipitated by the 1959 Tibetan uprising, caused China first to

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[26] Allen S. Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina,* (Ann Arbor, 1988), pp. 20-41.

[27] M. Taylor Fravel, *Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes* (Princeton and Oxford, 2008) is the most comprehensive book on PRC boundary disputes. For books on PRC border politics beyond India, see for example Richard Wich, *Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics: A Study of Political Change and Communication* (Cambridge, MA, 1980), Leo E. Rose, *Nepal: Strategy for Survival* (Berkeley, 1971), and Pao-min Chang, *The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute* (New York, 1986). Andrew Scobell, *China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March* (Cambridge and New York, 2003) is also helpful on the subject. For approaches to boundary disputes, negotiation, conflict, and resolution see Krista Eileen Wiegand, *Enduring Territorial Disputes: Strategies of Bargaining, Coercive Diplomacy, and Settlement* (Athens, GA, 2011) and Paul K. Huth and Todd L. Allee, *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge and New York, 2002), both of which use India and China as examples.

negotiate with India over the boundary in the 1960s—which they would not, he believes, have otherwise done—and then to use force to handle the territorial dispute when India attempted to shift the military balance in their favour.[28] Regime insecurity, he contends, however, was not enough to provoke the use of force in a territorial dispute; what was more important was Indian pressure on China's 'vulnerable frontier region', Tibet.[29]

It is worth pointing out that numerous scholars have included the Border War itself in their works as an important historical reference, but little has been done to investigate it as its own subject, nor to understand its deeper context in the collapse of China-India relations. The China-India Border War features as an important episode in the Sino-Soviet split,[30] as a reference in the international and diplomatic history of China and India in their first decades, and as part of the military, political, and diplomatic history of Asia.[31] Though it is frequently referred to, neither the event itself, nor its context are fully understood. However, in histories of modern China, the relationship with India, and the Border War itself, are barely mentioned, a testament to a lack of awareness of India's role in the CCP worldview, and also a stark contrast with the importance of relations with China in histories of modern India.[32]

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[28] Fravel, 173.
[29] Ibid., 182-3.
[30] See Luthi, *Sino-Soviet* and Sergey Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962-1967,* (Stanford, 2009).
[31] See for example Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution,* (Oxford, 1997) and Michael Burleigh, *Small Wars, Far Away Places: The Genesis of the Modern World, 1945-1965,* (London, 2013). In Indian history, it is noted as a humiliation—see Ramachandra Guha, *India After Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy,* (Basingstoke and Oxford, 2007)— responsible for the 'erosion' of Nehru's authority in India—see Judith Brown, *Nehru: A Political Life,* (New Haven and London, 2003).
[32] See for example Jonathan Fenby, *The Penguin History of Modern China: The Fall and Rise of a Great Power, 1850-2009*, (London, 2009) and Jonathan Spence*, The Search for Modern China*,

Works on the history of modern India give the Border War and the relationship with China a more central place, particularly as good relations with China was a cornerstone of Nehru's vision of Asia. As China confronted both superpowers in order to realize its nationalist vision, Nehru sought to build a pan-Asian sphere led by the two most populous nations on earth, misreading China as a country that could share India's vision of the world. The collapse of this relationship is not taken lightly. A chapter in M. J. Akbar's *Nehru: The Making of India*, is titled 'China: A Stab From in the Front', to use an example.[33] Seen variously as betrayal, open deceit, and even the ultimate cause of Nehru's death, the collapse of relations and war with China continues to define China-India relations today, generating great interest in Indian popular media and numerous publications throughout the decades since the war, including an outpouring of memoir writing by figures involved in the conflict.[34] However, the Chinese view of India at the time is rarely explored in depth, nor is it reconstructed from primary documents in the body of literature that has been produced in India.

John W. Garver provides an excellent literature review of Chinese accounts of the Border War in his essay 'China's Decision for War with India in 1962', helpfully explaining that 'published scholarship in China is still expected to explain and justify, not to criticize, the decisions of the

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(New York and London, 1991), the Border War is only briefly mentioned, as a major military victory.

[33] M.J. Akbar, *Nehru: The Making of Modern India*, (London, 1988).

[34] See for example Varma., *Struggle for the Himalayas*, Mohan Ram, *Politics of Sino-Indian Confrontation* (Delhi and Bombay, 1973) and Das, *China-Tibet-India*. The primary memoirs on the Border War period by Indian authors are Intelligence Bureau Chief, B.N. Mullik, *My Years with Nehru, 1948-1964*, (Bombay, 1972); Major General D.K. Palit, *War in the High Himalaya: The Indian Army in Crisis, 1962*, (London, 1991); Lt. General B.M. Kaul, *The Untold Story*, (New Delhi, 1967); and Brigadier J.P. Dalvi, *Himalayan Blunder: The curtain-raiser to the Sino-Indian War of 1962* (Bombay, 1969).

Chinese Communist Party, at least on such sensitive matters as war and peace'.[35] The role of scholarship in justifying CCP actions helps to explain why Chinese authors impute British imperial designs onto Nehru's India, arguing that India was 'meddling in Chinese affairs', having 'inherited British imperialist thinking' about the region,[36] and even intending to make Tibet a buffer zone between the two countries in India's pursuit of a maritime empire spanning the Indian and Pacific Oceans.[37] The view inside the CCP, for example, of the Indian government as 'heirs to the British Empire' will be explored in depth in this thesis. Garver writes of 'unanimous agreement among Chinese scholars that that the root cause of the 1962 was an Indian attempt to undermine Chinese rule and seize Tibet'.[38] The Border War history produced by the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences also asserts that Nehru planned to create a 'great Asian empire' at China's expense, with Tibet as a buffer zone.[39]

Chinese language work coming out of the PRC is in this sense consistent with aspects of PRC speech-making, propaganda, and diplomatic communications. Studies by Lu Zhaoyi and Wang Hongwei largely find fault in India's handling of the relationship.[40] Wang Hongwei's work does take a wider view of relations, looking beyond the border dispute, and including for example the role of superpower competition for influence in India. However, his work is firmly rooted in the CCP official worldview, attempting to represent the truth of the collapse of relations, rather than

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[35] Garver, 'Decision', 91.
[36] Bo Shi, 20-34.
[37] Xu Yan, 29-51.
[38] Garver, 'Decision', 89.
[39] *History of War of Self-Defense*, cited in Garver, *Protracted*, 59.
[40]吕昭义，中印边界问题，印吧领土纠纷研究 (北京, 2013) Lü Zhaoyi, Study of the China-India Border Question and India-Pakistan Territorial Conflict (Beijing, 2013), 王宏伟，当代中印关系述评 (北京, 2009) Wang Hongwei, Review of Contemporary China-India Relations (Beijing, 2009).

the view inside the CCP. At least two new works on China-India relations during the Cold War are underway in the PRC right now, both of which will use new archival information from around the world.[41]

1.4.2 Tibet as a Crucial Point of Conflict Between China and India

In Tibet, with the CIA active in the area, an international lobby raising the 'Tibetan question' at the United Nations, and serious unrest due to the 1959 uprising, geopolitical planning, international intrigue, and the China-India territorial dispute converged.[42]

John Garver's essay 'China's Decision for War with India in 1962' is the most attentive work on the subject since Maxwell. Garver deepens Maxwell's border-centric view by focusing on an Indian challenge to Tibet perceived by Chinese leadership. However, his essay is grounded in Chinese language secondary literature and memoirs, including substantial use, for example, of a banned-book that the author found in a street stall in Sichuan and a Chinese language author who Garver explains 'apparently had access to primary documents, although he does not reference those sources'.[43] The essay is not grounded in archival sources and should not prevent further investigation into the collapse of China-India relations. Nonetheless, Garver's work leads to interesting and important claims, including that CCP leadership believed that India sought to cleave Tibet from China. Garver demonstrates the merging of Indian border policy with deeper

[41] Forthcoming, Meng Qinglong and Dai Chaowu. Professor Meng will be focusing on international accounts of the Border War from non-Chinese archives, and Professor Dai's account, which he and the author have discussed in person, will differ greatly from this thesis. Disclosure: I have been invited to translate and write an introduction for Professor Dai's book.
[42] See Tsering Shakya, *The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947* (London, 1999) and S. Mahmud Ali, *Cold War in the High Himalayas: The USA, China and South Asia in the 1950s* (Oslo, 1999)
[43] Garver, 'Decision', 126.

Chinese suspicions about Indian 'expansionism' in Tibet, and asserts that the combination of the two led the PRC to war in 1962.[44] Garver's argument that Tibet was a critical factor is an important one, and this is clearly revealed in documents available today. Garver also provides an excellent literature review of Chinese language authors, most of whom also argue that Tibet was a driving factor in the war with India. While Tibet indeed plays a prominent role in the collapse of China-India relations, this thesis will argue that the collapse of China-India relations had even more comprehensive reasons, and that India featured as a significant actor and rival in China's foreign policy around Asia and around the world.

Chen Jian also examines the relationship between the Tibetan Uprising and the collapse of China-India relations in an essay 'The Tibetan Uprising of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union', arguing that the uprising marked a turning point in the previously friendly Sino-Indian relationship.[45] Chen highlights important tensions in the relationship, noting that Mao did not wish to isolate Nehru and 'push the Indian leader into the arms of the imperialists',[46] but also that Mao and Nehru had developed 'self-centred and superior perceptions of their own countries' great mission in the modern world.'[47] Beijing, by 1959 was caught between what was left of a desire to maintain relations with India and the fact that the two countries possessed very different visions of their own power in Asia and the world. Chen's assertion that 'in a few short months' in 1959 'the two hitherto friendly countries became bitter

[44] Ibid., 86-125.
[45] Chen Jian, 'The Tibetan Rebellion of 1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union', *Journal of Cold War Studies,* 8, No. 3, Summer 2006, 54.
[46] Ibid. 91.
[47] Ibid. 84.

adversaries'[48] does not appear to be correct when one is able to review both the friendship period and the period of collapse in depth—Chinese diplomatic documents speak against this and will be addressed in subsequent chapters. However, Chen reveals contradictions in the attempted friendship which deserve deeper investigation.

Finally, Sulmaan Khan's new work on the Tibetan borderlands offers cutting-edge familiarity with China-India conflict without focusing on China's relationship with India itself. Khan's subject, rather than the collapse of China-India relations, is the tenuous control that the CCP had over its Himalayan border regions. While this new work does not focus on the collapse of China-India relations or CCP views of India, it is based in new material from the foreign ministry archives, and China's relationship with India features prominently in its narrative of Chinese activities in the Himalayas.[49]

1.4.3 The History of China's International Relations in the Maoist Era

The scholarly literature on the history of the foreign relations of the People's Republic of China often centers on major events. Chen Jian's seminal work, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, uses for example, a series of events and episodes in order to analyze the foreign relations of the PRC, and the leadership of Mao Zedong. Each event that Chen examines, from the rise and fall of the Sino-Soviet alliance from 1949-63, the Korean War in 1950-53, China's involvement in the first Vietnam War in 1950-54, the Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1958, and others, has its own substantial literature surrounding it, written both before and after Chen's definitive work on the foreign

[48] Ibid. 80.
[49] Sulmaan Wasif Khan, *Muslim, Trader, Nomad, Spy: China's Cold War and the People of the Tibetan Borderlands*, (Chapel Hill, 2015).

relations of the PRC under Mao.[50] However, the rise and fall of China-India relations, from brotherhood to Border War, is absent, not only in Chen's work, but in the field at large.

The reason may be that our understanding of the China-India Border War has been circumscribed to the idea of a conflict over territory, rather than a dramatic fallout between two new nations. Even a transformational work like Odd Arne Westad's *Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, which does include the Bandung period of China-India friendship in its examination of the synergies between decolonization and the Cold War, does not explore the collapse of China-India relations.[51]

The Tibetan Uprising of 1959, which is also used to explain the collapse of China-India relations, has a comprehensive literature surrounding it, and new accounts continue to emerge.[52] However, our current understanding of the Border War and the collapse of China-India relations

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[50] See for example, Odd Arne Westad, ed., *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-63*, (Washington, 1998), Luthi, *Sino-Soviet*, and Radchenko, *Two Suns*, on the Sino-Soviet split. See Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War*, (New York, 1960), Chen Jian*, China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation*, (New York, 1994), Shen Zhihua, *Mao, Stalin and the Korean War: Trilateral Communist Relations*, (London, 2012), and John Lewis Gaddis, *We Know Now: Rethinking Cold War History*, (Oxford, 1997) on Korea. See Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975*, (Chapel Hill and London, 2000) on China's role in Vietnam, as well as Charles Kraus 'A border region "exuded with militant friendship": Provincial narratives of China's participation in the First Indochina War, 1949-1954', *Cold War History*, 12, No. 3, November 2011, and Shu Guang Zhang 'Constructing "Peaceful Coexistence": China's Diplomacy toward Geneva and Bandung Conferences, 1954-55', *Cold War History,* 7, No. 4, November 2007. See also Simei Qing's *From Allies to Enemies* for an account of the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958 to supplement Chen Jian's in *Mao's China*.

[51] Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War,* (Cambridge, 2007).

[52] See for example Melvin Goldstein, *A History of Modern Tibet*, 3 vols., (1997, Berkeley), Shakya, *Dragon in the Land of Snows*, John Kenneth Knaus, *Orphans of the Cold War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival*, (New York, 1999), Riedel, *Forgotten Crisis*, and Chen, Jian, 'Rebellion'.

remains rooted in Maxwell's 'border-centric' study in 1970, broadened slightly by the inclusion of Tibet and domestic pressures on the Chinese leadership, though we are still far from a comprehensive understanding of how China-India relations went from friendship to Border War in a short period after their founding as modern states.

It is time for a substantial investigation into the collapse of China-India relations in 1950s and 1960s. Scholars are paying more attention to the subject now, but a comprehensive study of the Chinese side remains to be done.[53]

This thesis aims to transform our understanding of this event and of the collapse of China-India relations by examining the Chinese perspective in depth. In order to do this, it must begin by examining the view of India from the PRC as the diplomatic, intellectual, and philosophical architecture was built around China-India friendship in the 1950s. The thesis will then examine the years of collapse in greater depth than has previously been attempted, using primary documents as evidence for the view of India within the Chinese leadership and foreign policy apparatuses as relations went from friendship to ruin. In doing this, we may see both how important India was to the PRC, and how worthwhile it will be to include this episode of friendship and collapse in our understanding of both modern China and modern Asia as a whole.

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[53] See for example Lorenz Luthi's twenty-five page essay, Lorenz Luthi, 'Sino-Indian Relations, 1954-62', in *Eurasia Border Review Special Issue on China's Post-Revolutionary Borders, 1940s-1960s*, (Hokkaido University, 2012), helpful on diplomatic meetings and border negotiations of 1960, but does not offer a transformative account of the relationship. Luthi also believes that the border clashes of 1959 were a 'war' and calls them this in *Sino-Soviet Split* as well, which is premature.

With regard to both ideology and the objectives of the CCP revolution, Chen Jian's *Mao's China and the Cold War* has done much to anchor the current literature, explaining the CCP revolution as a means to restoring Chinese power in the modern era:

> [I]deology's impact upon China's Cold War experience is reflected in Mao's 'continuous revolution' as his central theme in shaping Chinese foreign policy and security strategy. Mao's revolution never took as its ultimate goal the Communist seizure of power in China; rather, as the chairman repeatedly made clear, his revolution aimed at transforming China's state, population, and society, and simultaneously reasserting China's central position in the world.[54]

As this thesis will demonstrate, the CCP came to see India, perhaps more than any other world power other than the two superpowers themselves, as an impediment, perhaps not to every aspect of 'continuous revolution', but to the restoration of China's central position in the post-war world, and to the realization of the nationalist vision of the 'New China'.

Qiang Zhai's exploration of China's role in the Vietnam Wars makes the important link between this restoration of Chinese power, and China's support for both national liberation movements and socialist revolutions around the globe, demonstrating that the project of the 'New China' carried with it a global agenda:

> When he devoted his life to revolution, Mao aimed at transforming not only the old China but also the old world order…Just as the old international order had helped cause China's suffering and humiliation, so too would the creation of a new order contribute to the rebirth of a strong and prosperous China. Mao equated security and prosperity at home with the development of anti-imperialist insurgencies and socialist revolutions abroad.[55]

As the other rising power in Asia during the Cold War era, and, by wielding international influence through an ambitious international agenda centered on nonalignment, Nehru's India was a natural challenger to the CCP agenda of insurgencies and revolution. What is important, is

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[54] Chen, *Mao's China*, 7.
[55] Qiang, 4.

that the CCP's international agenda, as Qiang Zhai reveals, was part of the core project of China's national restoration and of Chinese national security. By offering a competing vision internationally, and by wielding influence as a prized partner of the superpowers, India presented a direct challenge to the CCP program, and the sum of India's challenge to the PRC cut to the heart of the CCP's project of national rejuvenation. As examination of the friendship period reveals, Chinese leaders attempted to coopt Nehru's India into their broader vision of revolution, opposition to the United States in Asia and around the world, and support of national liberation movements, and even believed that India would ultimately produce a government that was friendly to the Chinese agenda. The CCP was unwilling to accept India as an independent actor in Asia.

Qiang Zhai explains a historical factor in Chinese policy towards Vietnam which is also instructive in the case of India: 'Historically speaking, the Chinese held a Sino-centric view of the world, regarding other countries as inferior. Chinese emperors considered Vietnam as within the orbit of China's influence and kept that country within the tributary system…These historical parallels would be inescapable to Mao and his lieutenants, who took history seriously'.[56] In the Maoist period, 'Despite their professed effort to respect Vietnamese opinions…the Chinese leaders were disappointed and angry when their Vietnamese comrades deviated from the Chinese line'.[57]

In the case of India, CCP leaders exhibited a tendency to see Indian dissent from the CCP agenda as invalid, questioning the legitimacy of a range of Indian realities, from claims to territory, as

[56] Ibid., 24.
[57] Ibid., 25.

John Garver observes,[58] to Indian influence among Asian neighbors and India's policy of promoting nonalignment – as opposed to Maoist revolution – as a means of approaching decolonization struggles in Asia and Africa. What differentiates India from Vietnam of course, on this point, is that rather than looking to China for material and ideological support in the process of waging revolution as in the case of Vietnam, India had broad-based means of resistance to China, including the support and attention of both superpowers, an independent foreign policy agenda, and a vigorous nationalism that sought leadership and influence in its own right on the world stage. In short, there is no way that India would have submitted itself to a Chinese global agenda. Indian leaders resisted all manners of invitation for alliance with the United States and USSR in the 1950s and 1960s in order to maintain an independent path, and upheld the policy of nonalignment until signing the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in 1971.

India's independent path, and its status as a large nation, presented a kind of insurmountable challenge to the CCP, and an obstacle in its mission to restore China's 'central position in the world', both by transforming China and by transforming the world itself. The unique combination of claims to territory and influence in the Himalayas, which struck at the heart of core tenets of the 'New China' including 'sovereignty and territorial integrity', as well as an independent path coupled with a preponderance of influence in both Asia and Africa, the realm in which China sought to carry out the transformations that would complement its own restoration, made India a formidable challenger to the PRC, and an obstacle, in the minds of the CCP, to the project of Chinese restoration itself. The result is that the CCP view of India turned

[58] Garver, 'Decision', 113.

from one of a potential partner in carrying out the agenda of Chinese national restoration, to a view of India as a rival, bent on destroying Chinese influence around the world and collaborating with China's enemies, in addition to a clear and present danger posed to the CCP in the Himalayas.

Importantly, CCP leaders never quite lost faith in India as a potential partner, imagining even after the Border War, the resurrection of relations and possibility of revolution in India that would make the country more accepting of Chinese interests. It was the Indian government that was vilified and considered a menace and threat to China. Though contact with the Indian Communist Party (ICP) was limited, and the ICP's reputation among the Indian public was devastated by the Border War with Communist China, CCP leaders and officials spoke of the idea that eventually India would produce a government friendly to Chinese interests, and of the enduring and inevitable friendship between China and India. The CCP misunderstanding of India was driven in part by an inability to understand the country on its own terms rather than as it related to Chinese interests and a Marxist framework. Examination of China's relationship with this other significant power will help illuminate our understanding of the 'central position' that Mao's China sought in the world, an inherent objective of China's national restoration, as Chen Jian makes clear. Mao's China was an open challenger to the US and the USSR during the Cold War. With regard to India, when this partnership failed to advance Chinese interests – essentially because India would not conform to a CCP agenda – the result was a collapse in relations leading to the outbreak of war. What sort of position did China really seek in the opening decades of its 'national rejuvenation'? War with the United States and United Nations, the Sino-Soviet split, support for violent revolutions around the world, and also war with India, all help us to better

understand both the nature of the CCP program in the Maoist era, and the program of the 'New China'.

While much of the work on China's foreign relations in the Maoist period focuses on Cold War related conflict, there is less work exploring intersections between the Cold War and decolonization, arguably the two major phenomena of the 1950s and 1960s. Arne Westad's *Global Cold War* is the major work on the subject, essentially introducing these synergies to the study of Cold War history, and Jeremy Friedman's *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World*, advances our understanding of China's particular role in the developing world, and in national liberation movements, making it clear that China's foreign policy was not just Asia-centric, but had a global outlook since the 1950s.[59] While Friedman's work advances our understanding of Chinese foreign policy in this way, it is in relation to China's superpower rival, the USSR, rather than in relation to its Asian rival, India, the country which was instrumental in introducing the PRC to a wider audience of decolonizing nations, despite fears held by non-Communist Asian nations of Chinese aggression following the Korean War. Friedman makes an important point, which underscores the strategic independence that China sought within the Cold War world:

> The PRC, a non-white, non-European, primarily agrarian nation which had suffered tremendously from the depredations of imperialism, managed to rally others in its challenge to the Soviet agenda and revolutionary model…In part, the Chinese leadership felt compelled to mount this challenge in order to build its own global constituency to protect it from American aggression and Soviet betrayal.[60]

[59] Jeremy Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World*, (Chapel Hill, 2015).
[60] Friedman, 6.

As such, the PRC was using its influence in the Afro-Asian sphere, a political arena built by China and India together, as a strategic hedge against both superpowers. Moreover, the PRC had another, non-Communist identity that it shared, as this thesis touches upon, with India and other decolonizing nations. Following on Chen Jian's observation that the restoration of China's central position, rather than a purely Communist agenda, was the objective of the CCP revolution, it is important to recognize China's identity as Asian nation, an identity of importance to post-Qing leaders from Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, and also to Mao Zedong.[61] This identity was not exclusively shared between China and Asian nations undergoing decolonization. As Amy King points in her work on China-Japan relations in the Maoist period, Chinese leaders 'looked frequently to Japan for advice, technology, and goods because they saw Japan as more similar to China than many other states'.[62] As such, in a similar way to the ways in which scholarship has examined divergences between China and the USSR despite their shared Communist identity, it is important to recognize how Asianism both brought China and India together, but ultimately was not enough to prevent their relationship from breaking apart. As Westad observes on the Sino-Soviet split, and Friedman expands upon, 'there was never a *common* ideology' that was genuinely shared by China and the USSR.[63] Similarly with India, shared concepts of anti-colonialism, shared experience of colonialism, and concepts of the rise and resurrection of Asia as a whole, were enough to bring the two together in friendship and create a political bloc in the Afro-Asian sphere. However, these shared concepts were not enough

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[61] See for example, Sun Yat-sen, 'Pan-Asianism', 28.11.1924, kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/26325/...doc/.../1129_panasianism.pdf

[62] Amy King, *Imperialism, industrialisation and war: the role of ideas in China's Japan policy, 1949-1965*, Thesis (D.Phil.)-University of Oxford, 2013, 43.

[63] Westad, *Brothers in Arms*, cited in Friedman, 6.

to hold China and India together, and eventually became ideological weapons that the two countries used against each other as their relationship split apart.

By examining the formation and collapse of China's relationship with India, this thesis can also to shed light on another significant aspect of China's Cold War and Maoist revolutionary experience, which is how China split with its Asianist partner at the same time as its Communist benefactor, thus contributing to a fuller understanding of Chinese foreign policy during the period.

Finally, in order to be clear on the purpose and intentions of this project, this thesis will not investigate the interplay between domestic policy and foreign policy in Chinese policy towards India. While much good work has been done on the correlations between domestic and foreign policy in Maoist China, anchored especially by Chen Jian's work on Mao's 'continuous revolution', and supported by Qiang Zhai's similar observations in the study of China's involvement in the Vietnam Wars, the subject deserves its own investigation and is best left to another researcher, perhaps building upon the work that this thesis does to advance our understanding of PRC views of India.

1.5 Chinese Leadership, the Chinese Foreign Ministry, and Foreign Policy Making

The use of the term 'China' presents an interesting challenge as it is problematic to abstract the goals or views of an entire nation while discussing its international relations or bilateral relations with another state. The conventions of diplomatic notices during the period in question refer

often to 'our side', 'the Indian side', 'them', 'us', 'our country (我国)', 'India', 'American imperialism', or 'America' for example, while PRC Politburo members, ambassadors, embassy reporting, or intelligence documents discuss or interpret the intentions or policies of another state or country.[64] The conventions of current literature on China's foreign relations in the period 1949-65 also refers frequently to 'China' or 'the Chinese leadership' or 'Chinese leaders' while examining China's international or bilateral relations, in order to represent a substantial strategic view or interpretation of events on a governmental level.[65] Chen Jian refers repeatedly to 'Mao's China' when arguing about the foreign policy of the nation as a whole, for example, 'Mao's China was not an expansionist power,'[66] and Mao himself as an avatar for vast foreign policy changes, despite dissent within the Party, for example, 'Mao's wrecking of the Sino-Soviet relationship did not happen without challenge from other members of the CCP leadership'.[67]

This thesis will aim to take as nuanced a view as possible of the forces at play within PRC foreign policy during the period, while allowing, as scholars have demonstrated, for the fact that China's foreign policy remained under tight control by the Politburo and under the ultimate direction of Mao and, to a certain extent, his colleagues, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, and Chen Yi. As Chen Jian writes in *Mao's China and the Cold War*, 'Behind every crucial decision… Mao always was the central figure'.[68] Xiaohong Liu sheds further light on the interplay between the

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[64] See for example 中国和印度关于两国在中国西藏地方的关系问题中印边界问题和其他问题来往文件汇编 1950 年 8 月－1960 年 4 月，(中华人民共和国外交部); *Collection of documents on China and India's bilateral relations in China's Tibetan region, the China-India border question and other issues, August 1950 – April 1960*, (Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China). Hereafter *ZGHYD*.
[65] See for example Niu Jun, '1962'.
[66] Chen, *Mao's China*, 15.
[67] Ibid., 83.
[68] Ibid., 10.

Chinese leadership and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), noting that '[t]hroughout the Mao-Zhou period, the MFA was under the direct micromanagement of the Chinese supreme leaders'.[69] The MFA began as an organization drawn from CCP military leaders: 'Mao and Zhou formed a highly politicized, disciplined and military-like foreign service. Mao trusted representation of his regime abroad to none but his own peers, a group of tested political-military leaders who had excelled in the war years'.[70] Mao and Zhou explicitly intended for the MFA to operate as a civilian version of the People's Liberation Army.[71]

Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, 'political loyalty' was the most important feature of members of the Chinese foreign service, even as the leadership sought to develop professional skill sets of its diplomatic corps and broaden the MFA's recruitment base.[72] However, even as the group of diplomats diversified, it was characterized by 'limited access to the overall foreign policy-making process'.[73] Ambassadors in the early generations of the MFA were 'the political representatives of the CCP ideology and advocates of its domestic and foreign policies. They were bound to the regime through shared ideology, common experiences, and personal loyalty. In a sense, they represented their own political values and the system built on these values'.[74] Zhou himself, who was in charge of the MFA, was subordinate to Mao, including on matters of foreign affairs. Xiaohong Liu refers to him as a 'second-level decision maker' and Chen Jian

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[69] Xiaohong Liu, *Chinese Ambassadors: The Rise of Diplomatic Professionalism since 1949*, (Seattle and London, 2001), 15.
[70] Ibid., 15.
[71] Ibid., 204-5.
[72] Ibid., 20.
[73] Ibid., 202.
[74] Ibid., 206.

calls him 'Mao's chief lieutenant'.[75] Importantly, the MFA, like the rest of the country and the CCP, was subject to Mao's domestic campaigns and purges. In 1959, for example, the Anti-Right Opportunist Movement 'became a real purge of those whose loyalty to Mao had become questionable'.[76] In sum, while the CCP used a bureaucracy to manage its internal and external affairs, Mao dominated the political agenda: 'the making and implementation of policy decisions were tightly controlled and supervised by Mao; and the whole bureaucratic structure seemed overwhelmed by Mao's authority'.[77]

Despite the dominance of China's foreign policy making by of the Politburo generally and Mao specifically, PRC foreign policy was informed by a vast array of analyses, reporting, and opinion which will be demonstrated in the documents mentioned in this introductory section, much of which demonstrates a consistency in the CCP view of the world and of its external affairs, rather than complicating the picture or providing deeply dissenting viewpoints. The great exception in the case of China-India relations is Wang Jiaxiang's 'Three Reconciliations and One Reduction' which advocated a softer stance on the 'imperialists', 'revisionists' and 'internal reactionaries' and the reduction of assistance to national liberation movements.[78] Wang's proposals were not adopted. This episode will be addressed in brief in the thesis as a whole, and would make an interesting subject of its own for another researcher. Because the source material on decision making surrounding the rise and fall of China-India relations is incomplete, this thesis avoids

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[75] See Liu, 54 and Chen, *Mao's China*, 377. For the lives and political careers of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong see for example Suyin Han, *Eldest Son: Zhou Enlai and the Making of Modern China, 1898-1976*, (London, 1994), Wenqian Gao, *Zhou Enlai: The Last Perfect Revolutionary: A Biography* (New York, 2007), and Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine, *Mao: The Real Story*, (New York and London, 2012).
[76] Liu, 109.
[77] Chen Jian, 'Not Yet a Revolution'.
[78] Niu Jun, '1962', 34-40.

direct linkages between embassy reporting and other analyses whether by leadership or bureaucracy, and direct changes in policy. Instead, it aims to paint a picture of the dramatic change in China's view of India, much of which will help to explain the nature of the conflict and collapse in relations, based on a range of sources from within the Chinese leadership and government.

1.6 Thesis Structure

This thesis contains eight chapters including its introduction and conclusion. Two will focus on the formation of China's friendship with India, which took place in two distinct phases from 1950-57, and four chapters will analyze the period of collapse, from 1958-62. While the subject of the thesis is PRC perspectives on the collapse of relations with India, analysis of the friendship period reveals many of the core problems in China-India relations that would come to define the period of collapse which came soon afterwards, as well as the roots of CCP views of India as a rival and a threat. Moreover, because the rise and fall of the PRC's relationship with India occurred within a relatively short period, between 1950-62, taking place soon after the founding of the PRC and the achievement of Indian Independence, it is useful to view the period from start to finish in order to understand the nature of the collapse of relations and of China's changing view of India.

Chapter 1 provides the reader with a literature review and overview of thesis purpose, methods, sources, and objectives, as well as an introduction to the core themes in the literature of modern Chinese history and Cold War history that this thesis will explore.

Chapter 2 examines China-India relations between 1950-53, as China was simultaneously engaged in the Korean War and in a campaign to bring Tibet under the control of the CCP, both of which led to extensive interactions with the Republic of India. In this period, Chinese and Indian diplomats began negotiations over a treaty of friendship, and laid the foundations for a vision of Asia in which the two would cooperate as 'brothers of a thousand years'.

Chapter 3 examines the friendship period itself, from 1954-57, centering on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence which were announced in 1954, and the Bandung Conference in 1955. The Five Principles laid a foundation for relations as partners, and the Bandung Conference brought China and India together as leaders in a gathering of new nations as decolonization proceeded across Asia and Africa. Despite proclamations of friendship, however, clear divergences in each country's foreign policy agenda are visible, and China and India would soon split ideologically, using the Five Principles against each other to make identical claims on territory, while the decolonizing world became an arena of competition and rivalry.

Chapter 4 provides an overview of the Chinese perspective and the defining events during the years of collapse from 1958-62. During these years, the territorial dispute came to light, the Tibetan Uprising of 1959 added stress to bilateral relations, and Nehru's policy of moving troops into the disputed territory added to the militarization of the territorial dispute and eventually to the outbreak of war. However, as internal documents and views from CCP leadership make clear, the border dispute was a fraction of the CCP view of India's threat to the New China, as will be discussed in depth in this chapter.

Chapter 5 analyses CCP views of India as a threat to its security, interests and identity, not only in terms of India's challenges in the Himalayas, but also in terms of core tenets of the 'New China', including 'sovereignty and territorial integrity' which India had once been an essential partner in promoting. This chapter will explore the view held by CCP leaders and officials of the Indian government as 'heirs' to the British Empire, and also place the perceived Indian challenge within the context of the CCP's revolutionary objectives, revealing India as a significant challenger to China's revolutionary worldview, able to confront PRC objectives both geographically and ideologically, as well as challenging core tenets and objectives within the project of Chinese revival.

Chapter 6 will focus on CCP views of India as a challenger in Asia and Africa, examining how PRC officials both represented their conflict with India to other Afro-Asian nations and how they observed Indian influence within the Afro-Asian sphere as relations collapsed between 1958-62. This chapter will examine the unique challenge that India posed to the PRC as the only other significant rival for influence in Asia of this kind, and ways in which Afro-Asianism was important to Chinese leaders and to the project of the People's Republic of China, so much so that, while India was once an essential partner in building this sphere, China was willing to confront India ideologically within the Afro-Asian sphere as their relationship collapsed, leading to the destruction of the Bandung movement.

Chapter 7 will examine CCP views of India's relations with the United States and USSR. CCP leaders and officials came to view India's nonalignment policy as a falsehood, designed to gain influence with both superpowers, as India adroitly mobilized both superpowers against the PRC.

This chapter will review the CCP's view of India as an antagonist in the Sino-Soviet split, a phenomenon which occurred alongside the collapse of China-India relations, and also CCP views of India as a 'tool' of the United States, carrying out an American agenda worldwide, and playing a role within the US containment policy towards China. The combination of support by both superpowers for India, which CCP officials came to believe was happening, illustrates a final and substantial way in which Chinese leaders and officials believed that India was wielding its influence against the PRC.

Chapter 8 will recount the conclusions of this thesis, including that the CCP view of India was one of a comprehensive threat and challenger, that the Border War was the culmination of a deeper collapse of relations, and that India's importance to the CCP has been greatly underestimated.

Chapter 2

Two New Nations: China and India Navigate Korea and Tibet, 1950-53

'There was a dark side to China-India relations from the beginning.'[1]

Diplomatic Notice, Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of China to Indian Embassy in Beijing, May 11th, 1962

2.1 Chapter Purpose

This chapter will review China-India relations from 1950-53, soon after the founding of the PRC in 1949 and the achievement of Indian Independence in 1947. Interactions between China and India during this period laid the foundations for the friendship period from 1954-57 and also reveal difficulties that would later contribute to the collapse of relations that occurred between 1958-62. This chapter will identify causes of cooperation and also disagreement between China and India, as well as Chinese and Indian views of the opposite country, that will play a key role in the development of this thesis.

This chapter will review China's foreign policy during the period, especially insofar as it relates to the project of creating the 'New China' and to the role that India played in this project. It will review Indian foreign policy insofar as it relates to Indian interactions with China and the

[1]中华人民共和国对外关系文件集（1962）第九集，（世界知识出版社编辑，北京） Collected Documents on the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China, Collection No. 9, (World Knowledge Publishing House, Beijing) Hereafter, *ZDWGX 1962*, 11.5.1962*,* 42.

foundations that were laid for both cooperation and collapse between the two countries. It will focus on the two primary events related to China-India relations during the period of their origin, the Korean War of 1950-53 and the Tibetan Crisis of 1950-51.

The Korean War led to extensive China-India diplomatic interaction as the two new nations tested their guiding foreign policy principles on the world stage, of 'lean to one side' and 'nonalignment' respectively. The Korean War also led to the establishment of Cold War security architecture in Asia that would eventually set China and India against each other in the eyes of the PRC. The entry of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) into Tibet in 1950 marked the arrival of significant Chinese power in the Himalayas for the first time since the Qing dynasty, leading to changes in the Himalayan political and international order that would bring China and India into conflict and which sowed the seeds of distrust at the outset of their relationship as modern states.

The examination of these aspects of China's relationship with India will help illuminate India's unique role as a challenger to the PRC, and the importance of India in the early PRC worldview, both as a nation with which CCP leaders found that they must do business, and as a nation in whom they saw the potential for both significant support and danger.

2.2 Introduction

After coming to power at the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, the CCP engaged simultaneously in securing control over the remainder of the country and in carrying out

international diplomatic and military efforts to strengthen the strategic position of the newly founded PRC. In 1950, the CCP sent an army into Tibet to incorporate the Himalayan territory into the PRC and planned offensive operations on Taiwan as the final stage of the Chinese Civil War. In the same year, the CCP dispatched military advisors to Vietnam to assist the Communist Viet Minh against French forces, entered into full-scale war against American-led United Nations forces in the Korea peninsula, and signed a treaty with Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union, which CCP Chairman Mao Zedong told his Central Committee would be used 'as a big political asset to deal with imperialist countries in the world'.[2] As Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis notes, Mao was 'hypersensitive' to the prospect of invasion from the United States, telling the PRC State Council in June 1950 that he expected an American offensive directed from Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Southeast Asia.[3]

The activities of these early years did much to shape the strategic environment in Asia, leading for example to a tripling of the American defense budget, a deepened American commitment to the region, and also establishing Asia as a major theatre in the Cold War world.[4] Moreover, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and the Himalayas all became theatres of Cold War struggle, involving not only the PRC, but the superpowers themselves. This was the environment in which the CCP's struggle to build the 'New China' would unfold.

The idea of restoring China's wealth and power and protecting the country from the predations of other nations was at the heart of the CCP's vision for the 'New China'. Mao himself acknowledged that he was continuing the work of earlier generations of Chinese leaders whose work was guided by a similar vision: 'For over a century our forefathers never stropped

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[2] See Kraus, 500, on Vietnam and Gaddis, 69, on the Sino-Soviet alliance.
[3] Gaddis, 78.
[4] See Gaddis, 84 and Chen, *Mao's China*, 2-3.

waging unyielding struggles against domestic and foreign oppressors, including the Revolution of 1911 led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, our great forerunner in the Chinese revolution. Our forefathers enjoined us to carry out their unfulfilled will. And we have acted accordingly'.[5] In his founding speech, declaring that 'the Chinese people have stood up', the CCP Chairman explained that China would no longer suffer nor tolerate humiliations at the hands of other nations, and that the CCP would lead China towards an advanced state of development:

> The era in which the Chinese people were regarded as uncivilized is now ended. We shall emerge in the world as a nation with an advanced culture. Our national defence will be consolidated and no imperialists will ever again be allowed to invade our land…Hail the founding of the People's Republic of China![6]

As Chen Jian argues, the objective of the Chinese leadership, in addition to socialist transformation of China, was 'reasserting China's central position in the world'.[7] As Qiang Zhai makes clear, Chinese foreign policy, and regional intervention, as much as domestic policy, was a result to Mao's 'vision of China's place in the world', which 'aimed at transforming not only the old China but also the old world order'.[8] This thesis will argue that China's encounter with India was among the most significant adventures on this path towards intended restoration and among the most significant obstacles to the restoration that Mao envisioned. CCP leaders came to see India as such, despite their attempts to incorporate newly independent India into their vision for Asia and the world, which nevertheless, failed quickly.

The government of the Republic of India, led by Jawaharlal Nehru, and practicing a policy of 'nonalignment' within the Cold War world, was among the first governments to

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[5] *Selected Works of Mao Tsetung*, Vol. 5, (Peking, 1977), 18.
[6] Ibid., 18.
[7] Chen, *Mao's China*, 7.
[8] Qiang, *China*, 4.

recognize the PRC.[9] The government of India made initial efforts to support and work with the new Chinese government, acting as a mediator between China and other powers during the Korean War, advocating for PRC membership at the newly formed United Nations, and abandoning rights in Tibet inherited from the British Raj, including a military garrison and trading station in Lhasa which became a consulate under a new agreement with China. In the years post-Independence, India was regarded as an 'imperialist' proxy by Joseph Stalin's Soviet Union, and condemned for 'nonalignment' by the Eisenhower administration in the United States, whose Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, saw Indian neutrality as a troublesome dereliction of moral duty in the emerging Cold War.[10]

The Indian government sought to provide its own form of leadership on the world stage, focusing on newly independent states and the newfound freedom of Asia as a whole in the era of decolonization. Through 'nonalignment', Nehru sought to secure peace in Asia and keep the emerging Cold War from taking root among developing nations, believing that this would arrest the independent path of new nations emerging from colonization.[11] Nehru believed that Communism in China would eventually give way to China's own civilizational identity, and as such, that Communism in China was not necessarily a threat to Asia, and that China itself could be incorporated into an Asianist framework.[12] Nehru regarded war between China and the United States as the biggest threat to Asian security and independence. His foreign policy in Asia, in this sense, was a bid to keep the Cold War out, and to forge an independent path, not only for India,

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[9] See Jayanta Kumar Ray, *India's Foreign Relations: 1947-2007,* (New Delhi and Oxon, 2009), on 'nonalignment'.
[10] Ibid., 536-7, and Harold A. Gould, *The South Asia Story: The First Sixty Years of U.S. Relations with India and Pakistan*, (New Delhi and London, 2010), 32-4.
[11] Garver, *Protracted,* 120-1. See also, Brown, 257-71, on 'nonalignment'.
[12] See for example, Nanda, B.R. (ed.), *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years* (Delhi, 1976), 16-7.

but for other nations including China, even as US-China warfare, along with Soviet-Chinese strategic coordination in the region, was transforming Asia into a primary Cold War theatre, and as Chinese leaders sought their own unique version of national resurrection.

The relationship between China and India was defined by two disparate visions of Asia, the world, and of each nation's role in the world, that emanated directly from each nation's own struggle: a peaceful independence struggle in the case of India, and violent revolution in the case of China. As each country's foreign policy evolved, they would attempt to influence the world, and especially the developing world, in the image of their own national foundings. In the years 1950-53, the two nations began to come together, believing that they had enough in common to forge a friendship in which the opposite nation could play an essential role in their respective visions. As Sulmaan Khan explains, 'the Cold War created the perception of common interests' between the two nations which he argues would otherwise have become rivals even more quickly.[13] However, it was not only the Cold War which led to a sense of common interests, driving both nations temporarily, as Khan points out, to cooperate in order to counteract US involvement in Asia. It was each country's national experience and principles of their founding, which defined their respective foreign policy visions, and for a brief time, created the perception of common interests. While this thesis will explore Chinese perspectives, it is important to identify these disparate visions, as it will become clear that these visions did not ultimately coexist, and that India's bid for leadership and influence in its own right, along with India's ability to carry out an independent program on the world stage, became anathema to the CCP's vision of the 'New China'.

[13] Khan, 'Evidence', 216.

In these first tumultuous years, India and China began their interactions as the states that exist today. The path towards proclaiming themselves 'brothers' was set as the two nations dealt with Tibet and Korea, but so were the roots of the Border War, which would come just a decade later.

Importantly, these early years were among the most violent in the Cold War era. The three-year war on the Korean peninsula put Communist forces into sustained combat against American-led United Nations troops, and in Vietnam, France was fighting for the remnants of its empire in Indochina, supported by the United States on one hand, against the Viet Minh, with backing from China and the Soviet Union on the other. In these three years, much of the Asian security architecture that we are familiar with today was formed.[14] The sustained American troop presence in South Korea, American political and military support for Taiwan – along with the prevention of an invasion from mainland China – and the US-Japan defense agreement all came to be during these years of violence in East Asia.[15] The Cold War between the United States and Soviet Union was marked initially by developments in Europe in the late 1940s, including the advent of Soviet-backed satellite states behind the 'Iron Curtain' of Eastern Europe, tensions over the division and occupation of Germany, and the life-saving flood of American economic aid to post-war Europe via the Marshall Plan.[16] However, violence erupted, not on the plains of Germany, as was often expected, but in Northeast Asia. It was in this fraught environment, one

[14] Bruce Cumings, *The Korean War: A History*, (New York, 2010), 243.
[15] See William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History*, (Princeton, 1995), 3-9, 24.
[16] See Gaddis 26-53 and Vladsislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev*, (Cambridge, 1996), on the early Cold War in Europe.

which even led Stalin's successors to pursue a milder line with the United States,[17] that China and India began their relationship as modern states.

2.3 China-India Relations in 1950-53

From the first years after the founding of the PRC, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai took an interest in building relations with India. In a July 1950 exchange with the Chinese Embassy in India, Zhou explained both the desire for good relations and also concerns over Tibet: 'Tibet is our territory. India has sent a representative to Lhasa on your own without the approval of our government. We cannot concede this, but we still should work to build good China-India relations', adding that 'We want to have mutual respect for the borders and territory of India, Bhutan, Nepal and others, and mutual non-encroachment. As long as India can respect these principles, establishing India-Tibetan trade can be considered'.[18]

The early stages of China-India relations presented problems and opportunities. Nehru was explicit in recognizing the challenges of a new Communist China to his north, and the problems that this presented for peace in Asia. However, he sought to deal with these challenges by bringing China into an Asian order based on peace and friendship between India and China. He also acknowledged the anti-imperialist basis of relations between new Asian nations, a theme that would become essential to China-India cooperation, but which would eventually lead to grave frustrations between China and India as CCP leaders saw India as insufficiently anti-imperialist, and ultimately as a nation which sought to counter this agenda in Asia. Nehru gave

[17] Stueck, 6.
[18] Telegraph to Chinese Embassy India, 27.7.1950, ZELNP 1, 59-60.

an overview of his objectives and understanding of the new PRC in a broadcast to the BBC in 1951, declaring that Indian history involved 'two thousand years of friendship with China':

> China has taken a new shape and a new form. But whether we like that shape and form or not, we have to recognize that a great nation has been reborn and is conscious of her new strength. China, in her new-found strength, has acted sometimes in a manner which I deeply regret. But we have to remember the background of China – as of other Asian countries, the long period of struggle and frustration, the insolent treatment that they received from imperialist powers and the latter's refusal to deal with them on terms of equality. It is neither right nor practical to ignore the feelings of hundreds of millions of people. It is no longer safe to do so. We, in India, have had two thousand years of friendship with China. We have differences of opinion and even small conflicts but when we hark back to that long past something of the wisdom of that past also helps us to understand each other. And so, we endeavour to maintain friendly relations with this great neighbour of ours, for the peace of Asia depends upon those relations.[19]

On one hand, India was eager to help the PRC enter into the international system. One the other, Indian leaders recognized the strategic challenges presented by the PRC. Chief of Indian intelligence, B.N. Mullik provides insight into Nehru's strategic thinking just after the founding of the Republic of India, as Nehru's thinking on nonalignment was germinating, and he contemplated the primary security threats to the new Republic of India.[20] Mullik recounts a speech to the Intelligence Bureau as follows, revealing a realpolitik dimension to Nehru's thinking on China-India relations:

> …India had a 2,000-mile frontier with China and had to take care of that. It was one thing to take care of a quiet frontier but quite another to defend a hostile frontier. If India had to do the latter, then all her resources would be spent in just defending it. Therefore, in India's national interest, a war must be avoided specially [sic] with the neighbouring countries like Russia and China.[21]

Indian diplomats were in frequent touch with the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) both on the subject of Tibet and during negotiations pertaining to the Korean War. Frequent contact

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[19] Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 2, (Delhi, 1954), 135-6.
[20] Mullik, owing to his memoirs, is cited as a counterweight to Nehru's idealism regarding the PRC. See Riedel, 25.
[21] Mullik, 75.

and discussion of Korea paved the way for a view of anti-imperialism to develop between the two countries which brought together Nehru's vision of an Asian renaissance and China's vision of countering the United States in Asia in order to preserve the security of the New China.[22] K.P.S. Menon, India's First Foreign Secretary, later wrote that the Korean War was an 'acid test' of Indian nonalignment.[23] The opportunity for Indian mediation between America and China gave India a valuable role in global politics, and Nehru believed that the PRC must be brought into the world order, both because it would be more dangerous as an outcast and because his vision of an Asia led by India and China required this.[24] However, the Chinese desire for cooperation and friendship with India was motivated less by a desire to share Asia with India, or to create a third way for new nations in the emerging Cold War, than by a desire to build a security perimeter of friendly states which would safeguard China's revolution, and to challenge US dominance in Asia, as will be discussed.[25]

In 1950, Zhou explained to the Chinese Embassy in India that the new Ambassador, Yuan Zhongxian would explain the following upon arrival: 'India recognizes Chinese sovereignty in Tibet, moreover they have expressed through their ambassador in Beijing that they have never had any territorial or political ambitions in Tibet. They have also said that other countries cannot interfere in Tibet'.[26] In September, Indian Ambassador to China, K. M. Panikkar, met with Zhou Enlai to discuss international affairs, including India's support for

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[22] See Stueck on China-India contacts during the Korean War and Sulmaan Khan, 'New Evidence', on 'anti-imperialist' discussions between China and India in 1954.
[23] K.P.S. Menon, 'India and the USSR', in B. R. Nanda (ed.), *Indian Foreign Policy: The Nehru Years*, (Honolulu, 1976), 138.
[24] Nanda, 16-7, and *Nehru's Speeches 2*, 133-6, 143-58, 232-3 on Nehru's early views of China.
[25] John W. Garver, *Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China,* (Upper Saddle River, NJ, 1993), pp. 43-50 and Zhang, 'Constructing "Peaceful Coexistence"', on strategic properties of China's 'peaceful coexistence' policy.
[26] Call, Chinese Embassy India, 19.8.1950, ZELNP 1, 65.

Chinese membership of the United Nations. Zhou's discourse with the Indian ambassador makes clear that conflict with the United States was at the heart of China's policy objectives in Asia, including with regard to Taiwan, as 'liberation' of the island remained a core Chinese objective:

> The People's Republic of China should join the United Nations, this is indisputable. The only reason that it cannot happen is American obstruction…As for the so-called 'attack' issue, it happens to be America that attacked China, so then China attacks America. Who is it that occupies Taiwan? It is the American seventh fleet and its air force. Of course the Chinese people and the Chinese government will all fight against this. If the Chinese people do not oppose America, then the American government should change its policy of invasion.[27]

India's leaders also had concerns about the US presence in Asia. However, despite the brief meeting of the minds between the two countries in opposition to the US presence in the region, as revealed by Sulmaan Khan, China's conflict with the United States was far more essential to the CCP worldview than Nehru's milder concerns over American bases and influence as Asia emerged from colonization, and the nature of the Chinese struggle against the United States was different from Nehru's Asianist objectives.

Panikkar and other Indian representatives met regularly with Zhou during these years, and as the Indian officials offered India's help in negotiating a ceasefire with the United States, the Chinese Premier shared important insights into China's foreign policy worldview. As ceasefire talks continued to fail in 1951, Zhou explained to the Indian embassy the CCP view of 'imperialism' in Asia and the role that China intended to play in the region:

> On any issues or even misunderstandings between China and any of our friendly Asian neighbors arise, we will take a tolerant attitude right away. However, on the other hand, if any country allows imperialist forces to invade, allows imperialism to make use of that country as a base that is unfriendly to China and from which to blockade China, or relies on imperialist forces to oppress their own people, we cannot take a tolerant attitude… We completely understand the difficulties that Asian countries are going through as they are

[27] Meeting, Panikkar, 9.9.1950, ZELNP 1, 78.

> seeking liberation and we are very sympathetic. These difficulties are precisely the result of the imperialist rule over the last one hundred years or the last few decades. Moreover imperialism wants to exploit these difficulties and expand their power within these countries. China also faces the same difficulties. In order to overcome these difficulties, we will rely on our own strength.[28]

The Chinese view of other Asian nations involved sympathy towards struggles against foreign encroachment and imperialism and it also contained a security dynamic that sought to break American involvement in Asia. As Zhou told Panikkar earlier in the year, 'the American invasion of Korea and simultaneous aggression against Taiwan has destroyed [the chance for] any peaceful resolution' to the Korean conflict.[29] The 'Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan', signed in September, 1951 would further aggravate the Chinese sense of embattlement in Asia and became a subject of China-India discussions that year. India also sympathized with national liberation movements and the struggle against empire in Asia. However, Indian overtures toward China were also designed to tame the Communist country by bringing it into the international system.[30] India's initial interest in mediating during the Korean War, as Indian diplomats explained to the PRC, was the prevention of what they feared could become a another world war.[31] Indian agreement with China over the security dynamics in the Taiwan straits, Korean peninsula, or with regard to the US-Japan security treaty, was arguably in service of the larger objective of a third way in the Cold War world and for the sake of an Asia unencumbered by the influence of superpower confrontation. However, China's confrontation with American 'imperialism', in Taiwan, in Korea, and in the region as a whole, came from a view of its own national restoration, which sought, as historians have demonstrated, to transform the region as well as China itself, in order to build a secure environment for the survival of the

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[28] Meeting, Indian Embassy China, 6.2.1951, ZELNP 1, 127.
[29] Meeting, Panikkar, 27.1.1950, ZELNP 1, 122.
[30] Nanda, 17.
[31] Report to Government Administration Council (政务院), 21.7.1950, ZELNP 1, 57.

Chinese revolution and the creation of the 'New China'.[32] Whether Indian leaders understood that China sought their support in order to restore Chinese power and to carry out regional policy for the sake of securing *Chinese objectives* rather than *Chinese and Indian objectives*, seems unlikely.

By 1951, the PLA had destroyed a small Tibetan army, occupied Lhasa, and Chinese leadership was negotiating the future of political relations with the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan leaders.[33] Meetings between Zhou and Indian diplomats reveal that the PRC kept India abreast of certain aspects of the events unfolding in the Himalayas north of India. Zhou was willing to present the Chinese entry into Tibet in the most palatable terms possible for India, making a series of claims that Indian authors reflecting on the period would later characterize as lies and betrayal by the PRC.[34]

In March 1951, Zhou and Panikkar discussed the Tibetan situation, with Zhou offering an agreeable and optimistic view of the situation. Zhou emphasized that the PRC hoped the Dalai Lama would not leave Tibet, adding that if the situation could be solved in accordance with the Central People's Government's methods, Tibet would continue to enjoy religious freedom and that the Dalai Lama could send representatives to negotiate with Beijing as Tibet's religious and political leader.[35] Moreover, according to the provisions of the 'Common Program', Tibet would definitely become a National Autonomous Region within China's borders. In order to eliminate imperialist influence and reactionary forces, and to secure China's frontiers, the PLA had to enter

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[32] See especially Chen Jian and Qiang Zhai.
[33] See Shakya, *Dragon in the Land of Snows* and Goldstein, *A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951*, for PLA entry into Tibet.
[34] See for example Varma, *Struggle for the Himalayas*.
[35] Meeting, Panikkar, 21.3.1950, ZELNP 1, 141.

Tibet. If the Dalai Lama would not leave, and issues could be peacefully resolved through negotiations, the PLA could peacefully enter Tibet, and the Dalai Lama could retain his position. Furthermore, if this could be achieved, China-India relations could also take a step forward, as Tibet should still need trade with India.[36]

The view inside the Chinese Foreign Ministry was more suspicious of Indian motives. Just months earlier, a 'Report on Negotiations regarding Tibet between China and India' stated that:

> The Chinese government has negotiated with the Indian government on the Tibet issue for three months. Generally, it discloses the Indian government's intention to interfere with our internal affairs, prevent our liberation of Tibet, and maintain Indian and capitalist privileges in Tibet.[37]

The Foreign Ministry broke their assessment of Indian attitudes into four stages:

> Stage 1: from 12 August to 21 August [1950], India pretended to have no ambition over Tibetan policies or territories but intended to maintain its privileges awarded by the covenant dated 1906. The Ministry [PRC] declares to them as follows: Tibet is an inalienable part of China and must be liberated, preferably in a peaceful manner.
>
> Stage 2: from 26 August to 31 August, India continued to emphasize India's interest in the Tibet issue, the border issue, and the Tibetan autonomy issue with an aim to prevent our liberation of Tibet under the disguise of the peaceful settlement of the Tibet issue.
>
> Stage 3: from 1 September to 20 October, the Chinese Embassy in India discussed with the Tibetan delegation in China about its visit to Beijing. We introduced our ethnic policies in our Common Program…and urged them to come to Beijing as soon as possible. However, the Tibetan delegation failed to come to Beijing before the deadline due to the abetments of India and Britain and instructions from Lhasa.
>
> Stage 4: from 21 October to 16 November, India publicly expressed its intention to interfere with our internal affairs with an aim to prevent our liberation of Tibet. It also intended to maintain its governmental delegation, commercial organs, post and telecommunications facilities, and troops stationed in Tibet.[38]

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[36] Ibid.
[37] 'Report on Negotiations regarding the Tibet issue between China and India', 24.12.1950, FMA 105-00011-02, 42-44, Cold War International History Project Digital Archive, hereafter CWIHPDA. All files from CWIHPDA are in English translation.
[38] Ibid.

The report is then consistent with what Zhou proposed to Panikkar in early 1951: 'The Ministry pointed out as follows: Tibet is an inalienable part of China and the People's Liberation Army must enter and liberate Tibet and safeguard the frontier of China. The Tibet issue is a domestic issue of China and no foreign interference is allowed. The diplomatic, commercial, and cultural relations between China and India in Tibet can be settled to mutual benefit through diplomatic approaches'. [39]

As China and India worked through the management of interests in Tibet and the Himalayas, the Korean War, the other primary arena for China-India interaction, continued to change the security dynamics of Asia. The United States and Japan signed the 'Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan' on September 8, 1951, leading to outrage from the PRC, and a series of discussions between Zhou Enlai and Ambassador Panikkar. After a banquet at the Indian embassy, Zhou explained the PRC vision for collective Asian resistance to American influence:

> [T]he American government's methods in the [treaty] and its methods in the Korean War are the same, which is to use frightening words to intimidate other countries into submission. If the people of Asia, representing half of the world's population, do not submit, and resiliently oppose America's aggressive expansion, then the American government will run into difficulties in implementing its policies, hesitate, and ultimately the American policy of aggression will fail. *This is the line that the Chinese government follows* [Emphasis added].[40]

[39] Ibid.
[40] Meeting, Panikkar, 2.8.1951, ZELNP 1, 166.

China's view of American activity in Korea, Taiwan, and Japan was part of a larger fear of American encirclement and intervention.[41] The US policy of 'containment' originated in the Truman administration as a counter to the expansion of Communism, and, as Lawrence Freedman explains, facets of containment, including the Marshall Plan for economic reconstruction of Europe, the Berlin airlift, the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and American will to fight in Korea were expressions of an American 'internationalist consensus founded on firm principles, generosity to allies, prudent applications of force, and avoidance of provocation'.[42] Mao, however, as Qiang Zhai points out, saw 'three fronts' which he 'perceived as vulnerable to an invasion by imperialist countries headed by the United States', in Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia.[43] Moreover, the Chairman 'viewed developments in Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam as interrelated'.[44] As such, Chinese security policy became a mixture of intervention (Vietnam and Korea), confrontation (Taiwan), suppression of unrest (Himalayas) and protection through alliance and partnership (USSR and India), both in order to combat the American containment policy, and to secure a congenial geopolitical space in which China's revolution could survive and flourish. This thesis will make clear that there was also a fourth front, in the Himalayas, which Mao and Zhou also saw as interrelated with the others, and in which the key to security and also the key to vulnerability was India, a matter which intensified CCP senses of vulnerability as the Chinese leadership came to believe that India had become a partner to the United States in the early 1960s, rather than an opponent as was initially desired and planned.

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[41] Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of Sino-American Confrontation*, New York, 1994), 120-1, Qing, 160 and Gaddis, 64-9.
[42] Lawrence Freedman, *Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam*, (New York and Oxford, 2000), 16-17.
[43] Qiang, 20.
[44] Ibid., 20.

The US presence in Asia and fear of 'imperialist' intervention in the Chinese revolution led Beijing to pursue its 'lean-to-one side' policy of alliance with the Soviet Union which began with the signing of the 'Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance' in February, 1950, just months after the founding of the PRC.[45] In order to secure this alliance with Stalin, Mao even conceded that the USSR could maintain 'privileges' in Northeast and Northwest China, keeping naval bases on the Chinese coast.[46] Following this agreement, Soviet economic and military aid flowed into the PRC, and Stalin made clear his expectation that the PRC would keep America occupied in Asia, as the Communist allies pursued Stalin's vision of a 'division of labor' in global Communist revolution with Chinese responsibility in Asia and a Soviet focus on Europe.[47] In January 1950, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson outlined an American defense perimeter in Asia, including Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, and the Philippines, but excluding the Korean peninsula.[48] The US Congress had just passed budget cuts, including cuts in defense spending and was planning for a withdrawal of troops from the Korean peninsula.[49] Stalin soon approved of Kim Il Sung's plan to invade South Korea, and expected Mao to provide military support, and if necessary, enter the war against the United States.[50] The PRC was thus embroiled in a mixture of its own security concerns in Asia, the unfinished business, as CCP leaders saw it, of Taiwan and the Chinese Civil War, and the imperatives of global Communism, including military expectations by Joseph Stalin.

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[45] Chen, *Mao's China*, 50-1. See also Westad, *Brothers in Arms*, on the Sino-Soviet alliance.
[46] Chen, *Mao's China*, 52-3.
[47] See Gaddis, 67, on Stalin's vision of Sino-Soviet cooperation.
[48] Acheson, 'Speech on the Far East', 12.1.1950. http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/44/1950-01-12.pdf.
[49] Stueck, 25.`
[50] Gaddis, 71-9.

The CCP strategic view of Asia that was evolving during this period drew upon all of these factors. Moreover, in addition to its alliance with the USSR, Chinese leaders developed a second large-scale security strategy, outside of the Communist bloc, which would be built upon a system based on friendly Asian states that were either opposed to the United States, or not involved in American treaties, thus solving Chinese security problems and also challenging the US position in Asia. At the heart of this second strategy was cooperation with India.

On September 8th, 1951, representatives of 48 countries signed the Treaty of San Francisco, a peace treaty with Japan following its defeat in the Second World War.[51] Indian delegates did not attend the conference, instead electing to sign their own peace treaty with Japan. Speaking with Panikkar on the US-Japan security treaty draft and the San Francisco peace treaty a month before it was to take place, Zhou explained his view:

> Prime Minister Nehru has said that without the participation of the People's Republic of China, the problems of the Far East cannot be resolved. America and Britain's objective with the Japan Peace Treaty is to split up Asia and threaten Asian peace. If everyone is able to work together to strenuously oppose the implementing of this American conspiracy, America's invasion of Asia cannot be realized.[52]

Privately, Zhou discussed Asia with other Chinese diplomats in September 1951, emphasizing that, 'Towards India, Nepal, and other countries, we always take a vigorous and proactive policy, in order to fight for friendship'.[53] India was a linchpin of the CCP strategy to counter US-influence in Asia. The Premier added that, 'In order to fight for Asian countries to oppose war, advocate peace, and thus attack the aggressive and warlike policies of America and its henchmen, it is possible to strenuously promote friendly relations between China and India, Burma,

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[51] See John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Aftermath of World War II*, (London, 2000), 552-3.
[52] Meeting, Panikkar, 15.8.1951, ZELNP 1, 171.
[53] Telephone call, Zhang Jingwu, 28.9.1951, ZELNP 1, 182.

Indonesia and other countries, and we should do this'.[54] The Premier also recognized the complexities of dealing with India and India's own security challenges, mentioning India's dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir, noting that 'we should pay attention to this and research it; at present it is not suitable to hastily take a position'.[55]

Meanwhile, China-India negotiations over Tibet continued. Zhou and Panikkar met in June 1952, and the Chinese Premier explained what seems to be the politest version of China's interpretation of Indian interests in Tibet, also bringing up themes related to the legacy of the British Empire. These themes would later come to define CCP views of India during the years of collapse. As Zhou explained to Panikkar, just two years before the friendship period:

> The existing situation of China-India relations in China's Tibetan region is a vestige left over from Britain's past invasion of China. Regarding this, the new Indian government bears no responsibility. The privileges which are based on unequal treaties signed between the British government and the Old China are now defunct. Therefore, this should be a principle that is clearly stated at the beginning, that relations between the Chinese and Indian governments in China's Tibetan region must be established through new negotiations.[56]

Zhou went on to suggest that the Indian mission in Lhasa remain and be converted to an Indian consulate, adding that 'That should resolve a concrete issue'.[57] In keeping with a 'principle of reciprocity', Zhou requested that China establish a consulate in Mumbai.[58] Nine days later, an Indian representative reported to Zhou that India agreed to the consulate proposal.

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[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Meeting, Panikkar, 14.6.1952, ZELNP 1, 242.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid.

In 1953, Chinese plans for Asian unity took much larger steps as Zhou and Nehru agreed that the two governments should meet in Beijing in December. At this winter meeting, the guidelines for the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence came to be, forming the basis for the declaration of China-India friendship in 1954. The Chinese vision of an Asian order, with diplomacy spearheaded by Zhou Enlai, gained concreteness and confidence during 1953. In a meeting with the Pakistani ambassador in August, 1953, Zhou gave the Chinese narrative of national 'humiliation' a wider application to all Asian nations, even invoking the famous language of Mao on 'standing up', and also casting China in the role of peacemaker in Asia, in this case offering advice on Kashmir:

> We Asian nations have always been bullied and humiliated by others. Now we are gradually standing up. We should have peaceful dealings between our neighboring countries. We do not want to see any dispute happening, especially disputes created by foreign interference, because we have already received enough of this bitterness ourselves. We do not want to see Pakistan and India meet on the battlefield.[59]

Zhou offered four items of advice to avert conflict, which, though not terribly concrete, presaged the more concrete ideas that would be laid out in Panch Sheel declaration with India the following year:

> First, everybody should strive towards peace. Second, consider the interests of the people. Third, as the ambassador has said, there must be a spirit of compromise with one another. Fourth, the issue must be solved yourselves, without foreign interference.[60]

Receiving the Indian Ambassador a week later, Zhou commented on a recently released joint public statement by India and Pakistan, expressing it in terms of a collective Asian strategy to counter the United States:

> This is the gospel of peace (和平的福音) It strikes a blow to America's attempts to interfere. As a neighbor, this is what China was hoping for. As long as we Asian

[59] Meeting, Pakistani Ambassador, 14.8.1953, ZELNP 1, 319-20.
[60] Ibid., 320.

> countries, neighboring countries, especially India and Pakistan, these kind of brother countries, can come together, and if there is a problem, have direct negotiations and resolve it peacefully, then attempts to interfere by foreign countries will surely fail.[61]

Just months later, at the end of December, Chinese and Indian diplomats met for intensive negotiations and began to discuss the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence:

1. Mutual Respect for Territorial Integrity
2. Mutual Non-aggression
3. Mutual Non-interference in Internal Affairs
4. Equality and Mutual Benefit, and
5. Peaceful Co-existence

Zhou added that: 'Between two great powers (大国), especially between two great powers like China and India that share a border, there will definitely be some problems. However, by following these principles, any mature, unsettled issues can be brought up and discussed'.[62] The Chinese strategy had many uses and India appeared to be on board. However, with regard to the confidence in these principles as a way to avoid trouble, Premier Zhou and other Chinese leaders could not have been more wrong.

2.4 A New Himalayan Order: The People's Liberation Army Enters Tibet

Tibet had been central to Chinese security strategy for centuries, beginning with a Yuan Dynasty invasion and achieving its most consistent form of political stability when the Qing Dynasty garrisoned the Himalayan plateau during the Kangxi and Qianlong emperors' attempts

[61] Meeting, Indian Ambassador Raghavan, 25.8.1953, ZELNP 1, 322.
[62] Meeting between Chinese and Indian delegations, 31.12.1953, ZELNP 1, 342.

to crush Mongol invaders coming from what is now China's northwest.[63] Following the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, Tibet had returned to de facto autonomy, something which the new leadership of the PRC intended to change as soon as possible.[64] Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek explained the strategic value of the Himalayas in a book published during the Chinese Civil War:

> There are no natural frontiers in the areas of the Yellow, Huai, Yangtze and Han rivers where a strong defense line can be prepared. Therefore Formosa, the Pescadores, the Four Northeastern Provinces [Manchuria], Inner and Outer Mongolia, [Xinjiang], and Tibet are each a fortress essential for the nation's defense and security. The separation of any one of these regions from the rest of the country means the disruption of our national defenses.[65]

For the CCP, it was no different. Chinese control of the Himalayan region, as Mao Zedong explained to his colleagues, would be essential.[66]

In November 1949, just after the founding of the PRC, Mao notified top leaders Peng Dehuai, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and Xi Zhongxun that 'solving the Tibetan question should be complete by Spring or Fall of next year', adding that 'solving the Tibetan question without sending troops will be impossible'.[67] In a letter to the Panchen Lama the same month, Mao wrote that 'the Tibetan people love the ancestral land and oppose foreign invasion; they are not satisfied with the policies of the reactionary Nationalist government. Moreover they desire to be

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[63] See Sam Van Schaik, *Tibet: A History*, (New Haven, 2011), for Tibet since the Yuan dynasty, and Peter Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia*, (Cambridge, 2005) on the Qing in Tibet.
[64] See Van Schaik, 180-206, and Melvyn C. Goldstein, *A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State*, (Berkeley, 1989), on this period.
[65] Chiang Kai-shek, *China's Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory*, (New York and London, 1947), 36.
[66]毛泽东西藏工作文选, (北京, 2008) Mao Zedong's Tibetan Work (Beijing, 2008), hereafter MXZGZ, 3, 6-7.
[67] Ibid., 3.

part of the united, prosperous, ethnically equal and cooperative family of the New China'.[68] Chinese communications with Tibetan leadership would continue in this vein as the PRC crushed a Tibetan defense force and proceeded to take control of the Himalayan plateau.

Early the next year, addressing top PRC leadership, Mao explained that 'Although the Tibetan population is not large, its international status is very important. We must occupy Tibet and create people's democracy in Tibet', issuing orders to 'gather the Tibetan people and train cadres', and noting that 'the Tibetans only have six thousand soldiers and they are scattered'.[69] From there, Chinese entry into Tibet proceeded with relative ease. In October, 1950, the People's Liberation Army entered Tibet with slogans such as 'Oppose American imperialism and those who plot invasion of Tibet', 'Liberate Tibet, and Consolidate National Defense' and 'The People's Liberation Army is entering Tibet in order to strengthen national defense and build the New China'.[70]

Crucially, Chinese control over Tibet in the 1950s meant redefining India's relationship with the region.[71]

A meeting between Indian Commissioner T.N. Kaul and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu in November 1951 illustrates the early stages of China-India relations and the challenges posed to stability between the two nations brought on by the situation in Tibet. As Kaul explained to Zhang:

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[68] Ibid., 5.
[69] Ibid., 7.
[70] Ibid., 12.
[71] Sulmaan Khan makes a similar point in *Borderlands.*

> President [sic] Nehru has also reiterated his wishes for peaceful coexistence between India and China. The Indian government feels happy about the peaceful liberation of Tibet and hopes that some cross-border issues between China and India can be settled through normal diplomatic approaches in a cordial matter. There are some rumors about the actions of the Chinese troops on the border between China and India and such actions may cause unnecessary disputes and therefore attention shall be given thereto.[72]

Zhang and Kaul discussed the issue of tension on the border here, years before it was to become a major issue in China-India relations. As Zhang explained to Kaul:

> We also have said it is necessary for China and India to coexist peacefully and cooperate cordially…Regarding the rumors and instigations, we believe some capitalist forces expect to undermine the friendly relationships between China and India…After the peaceful liberation of Tibet, our troops returned to Tibet just to…safeguard our frontier. However, the capitalist forces just fabricated rumors about conflict between the Chinese and…Indian troops. We do not need to bother such rumors so long as we maintain our cordial relations and coexist peacefully.[73]

Discussions between Chinese and Indian diplomats ranged over practical issues from the presence of Indian troops, postal and telegraph systems in Tibet, and trade and pilgrimage by Indian citizens in the Tibetan Himalayas.[74] By 1953, R.K. Nehru was lobbying China's ambassador to India in order to have an Indian garrison resupplied in Tibet, complaining that Indian troops could not exist in Tibet 'for long' without garrison relief.[75] An additional topic was the confiscation of guns and radios carried by India's commercial representative. The PRC's response, referencing 'unequal historic relationships', would become familiar over the years as tension over the Himalayas continued. Importantly, it is clear that the project of the 'New China' included the repudiation of the legacies of empire in China, as expressed below. As the decade

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[72] 'Meeting Minutes between Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu and Indian Commissioner T.N. Kaul', 27.11.1951, FMA 105-00082-03, 10-14, CWIHPDA.
[73] Ibid.
[74] 'Summary of Conversation between Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Indian Commissioner T.N. Kaul', 23.6.1952, FMA 105-00025-03, 28-32, CWIHPDA.
[75] 'Cable from Ambassador Yuan Zhongxin, 'Minutes of Meeting between R.K. Nehru and Ambassador Yuan', 6.9.1953, FMA 105-00032-03, 12-14, CWIHPDA.

wore on, the repudiation of imperial legacies became more difficult, expressed most clearly by conflict over the British-drawn 'McMahon Line' that the British Empire used as a border between China and India, and which served as the basis of the China-India territorial dispute. China's view of India as heir to these legacies became a defining feature of the Chinese view of India's threat to the 'New China'. The sources of this view and the conflict it would engender are visible in the early years of diplomatic contact:

> The Chinese government has reiterated its stance on the Tibet issue multiple times… Indian privileges in Tibet are based on the unequal relationships between Britain and the former Chinese government… All privileges established on unequal historic relationships shall no longer exist… Garrison relief: this is an issue relating to the sovereignty of China.[76]

The ambassador added a conciliatory note which nonetheless indicated a change in India's position in the Himalayas with the advent of PRC control of Tibet:

> We did not ask the Indian troops to withdraw from Tibet right away. However, our government never allows the relief of garrisons. Any Indian governmental officials that intend to enter China need to obtain our visa because this is an international practice.[77]

The fundamental division over Tibet is evident from the beginning of the fifties, and remained one of the unresolved questions in China-India conflict during the early Cold War. As R.K. Nehru pointed out to Ambassador Yuan during the meeting, 'India and Tibet were historically interdependent on each other'.[78] Such was the trouble that the Chinese government dealt with as it piece by piece stripped the Indians of their radios, guns, and 'privileges' in Tibet.

Mao's problems in Tibet continued during these early years as the PRC attempted to bring a Tibetan delegation to Beijing to negotiate over the terms of 'peaceful liberation'. The

[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid.

CCP was having trouble bringing the region to heel, and attempted to enlist Indian help in delivering the Tibetan delegation to Beijing. Mao's communications with the Dalai Lama exhorted him to see that 'The agreement on peaceful liberation of Tibet fulfills the interests of the Tibetan ethnicity and people and also of the ethnicities and peoples in the whole of China'.[79] He invoked imperialism as a source of solidarity, stating that:

> [T]he Tibetan regional government and people, which are part of the great ancestral country's family, and under the leadership of the Central People's Government, are able to cast off the chains of imperialism and oppression by foreign races forever, rise up, and work towards the great endeavors of the Tibetan people.[80]

Orders issued to the PLA, after the signing of an agreement with representatives from Lhasa, illustrates the sense of vulnerability that Mao had over the Himalayas, the crucial fourth region in CCP security which would later be troubled not only by India but by American covert operations. The Chairman invoked threats from 'imperialism' and the necessity of Tibetan occupation for the defense of the nation: '[I]mperialism will certainly try its many conspiratorial methods to prevent us from implementing our peaceful liberation of Tibet…we must strengthen the policy of military discipline in order to assure that the mission of liberation of Tibet and consolidation of national defense is fully realized'.[81]

The Himalayas were a strategic region whose vulnerability to international intrigue was clear to the CCP leadership. However, integrating the region into the PRC meant starting from scratch by way of Chinese influence in the region, and also meant imposing the will of the new Chinese state on a region whose political structures had been changing and unstable for centuries.

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[79] MXZGZ, 45.
[80] Ibid.
[81] MXZGZ, 48.

As Tsering Shakya points out, when the Republic of China was founded, Chinese authority in Tibet was 'virtually nonexistent'.[82] Since the 19th Century, Tibet had been a zone of very limited Chinese authority, with political relations dominated by the strategic competition between the British, Russian and the Qing Empires for influence and imperial security in Central Asia.[83] Prior to Indian independence, the British Empire sought to uphold a de facto buffer zone in Tibet, initially against Russian expansion in Central Asia and eventually against Chinese influence as well, for the sake of the security of the Indian subcontinent.[84] Britain had secured a set of 'privileges' in Tibet through the Simla Convention of 1914, which included trading rights, the right to garrison a limited amount of troops – similar to China's rights at the time to station a 300 person garrison, and the right to establish a British mission in Lhasa. Shakya maintains that, for the Tibetans, in a period of de facto sovereignty following the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911, the hosting of a British mission of a similar nature to the Chinese mission allowed the Tibetans to demonstrate their freedom to conduct international relations as they saw fit.[85]

Britain had acknowledged China's 'suzerainty' but not 'sovereignty' over Tibet.[86] The difference in these descriptions of Chinese influence, and the question of the nature of the Chinese presence in Tibet, whether it was 'sovereign' whether Tibet was 'autonomous', self-governing or otherwise, and what sort of military and political presence the PRC would establish there would all become tough problems between China and India in the years to come. During the years 1950-53, some of these problems appeared to be resolved, crucial disagreements were

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[82] Shakya, 2.
[83] See especially Alastair Lamb, *The China-India Border*, (Oxford, 1964).
[84] Goldstein, 822.
[85] Shakya, 7.
[86] Van Schaik, 195 and Shakya, 14.

apparent at the start, and would come back to cause deeper damage to China-India relations later on.

With the achievement of Indian independence and the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Himalayan political order went through large changes very quickly. The international relations of smaller Himalayan states had been subject to a system of treaties largely built upon the dominance of the British Raj in the Himalayan region. The region was a patchwork of smaller states and kingdoms, some of which, like Sikkim, Bhutan, and Nepal, retained their sovereignty as modern nation states, and others of which, like Jammu and Kashmir, had been incorporated as territories into larger states.[87] The fractiousness and complexity of the region, its politics, and its various sovereign kingdoms and treaty relationships, is hard to overstate. The nineteenth century order created by British and Russian competition was giving way to a new Himalayan order dominated by the two new Indian and Chinese states.

Both Nepal and India had their own treaty relationships with Tibet. Nepal's dated back to 1856.[88] Sikkim and Bhutan had just signed security treaties with India which handed over the control of their international relations to their southern neighbor. Jammu and Kashmir was the source of a dispute between India and Pakistan as the subcontinent split during the Great Partition in 1947-8, and violence claimed hundreds of thousands of Indian and Pakistani lives. Meanwhile, the PRC sought to sever any treaties or remaining official ties between Tibet and

[87] See Lamb, 27-57, on Himalayan treaties prior to Indian independence.
[88] Leo Rose, *Nepal: Strategy for Survival*, (Berkeley, 1971), 115-122.

other countries, integrate the region into the borders of the New China and take control of any external relations through Beijing, and build up military defenses in the Himalayas.[89]

In 1949, after the PRC declared its intention to 'liberate' Tibet, the Tibetan government set about in various attempts to secure its independence while a Chinese presence did not yet exist in the region. Tibetan representatives sought help from the new Indian government, which agreed to supply limited amounts of small arms and to train Tibetan troops.[90] In the background, the United States, Britain and India were engaged in a series of diplomatic interactions, attempting to figure out how to respond to China's intention to enter the Tibetan plateau. As Shakya and other historians point out, Tibet had long been considered an essential strategic region for the defense of the Indian subcontinent. However, with Indian independence, Britain effectively handed all decision making on this subject to the new Indian government.[91] As Tibetans sought ways to secure independence, approaching India, the United States and England, ultimately bringing their cause to the United Nations in 1950, each of these governments declined to support Tibetan independence initiatives. The Indian ambassador in Beijing encouraged his government in 1950 to 'wash her hands completely of Tibet', and the British government elected to support the Indian position on the issue, stating that 'India should do what they can…short of military assistance… recognizing Tibet's independence must be ruled out…Tibet is now primarily an Indian concern'.[92]

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[89] See Khan, *Borderlands*, on Beijing's challenges in bringing the Chinese state to the Himalayas.
[90] Shakya, 13 and Goldstein 634-7.
[91] Goldstein, 822-3.
[92] Shakya, 19 and 25.

Nonetheless, the three governments found themselves in a quandary when contemplating the imminent Chinese presence in the Himalayas. PLA troops entered the eastern region of Chamdo in October 1950, destroying a small Tibetan army, and then solicited a Tibetan delegation to Beijing in order to negotiate the next steps in 'peaceful liberation'. One year earlier, as Britain, America and India debated what to do, Indian Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs, Sir G.S. Bajpai, presented the following perspective to the British High Commissioner:

> The present Government of India were as anxious as any past Government of India to retain Tibet as a buffer between them and China and they certainly did not want to see any increase in Chinese and still less Chinese Communist influence there. On the other hand the present regime in Tibet was completely out of date and they did not feel that the Lamas could in the long run resist Chinese infiltration… Quite apart from whether it would be wise to attempt to bolster up the lama regime, the Government of India did not feel that they had the military resources effectively to defend Tibet against Chinese encroachment.[93]

India had elected to supply small arms and train Tibetan troops,[94] but to avoid the political question of dealing with the region's future, Nehru also chose to dissuade the United States from taking any further action in Tibet, lest it 'give credence' to Chinese allegations of 'imperialist' meddling, believing also that Indian support would result in the same accusations.[95] After the Chinese military entry in October 1950, Nehru did, however, request that the Tibetan negotiators sent to Beijing in April 1951 not accept Chinese demands to station troops in Tibet as this would have consequences for India.[96] Historians have asserted that Nehru chose, at this juncture, to prioritize friendship with the PRC over any kind of commitment to Tibet.[97] Moreover, the Indian Prime Minister believed that, in Garver's words, that 'the best way to prevent China from

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[93] Ibid., 25. See also Goldstein, 634-7, 'Position of the New Indian Government'.
[94] Shakya, 13.
[95] Ibid., 54-5 and Goldstein 636, 662-71.
[96] Shakya, 64.
[97] Goldstein, 719-22, 823-4, and Garver, *Protracted*, 48-50.

establishing a large military presence in or direct political rule over Tibet was by convincing Beijing that there was no need for such measures'.[98] This would prove to be a fundamental misunderstanding of Beijing's intentions towards the region. Nonetheless, in discussions with Indian diplomats, for example, as in discussions with the Tibetans, the PRC continued to speak of Tibetan 'autonomy', religious freedom, and other points that seemed to soften the impact of the intended Chinese presence in the Tibetan plateau.[99] Once the Chinese military entered Tibet, however, the American view of the situation changed, adding another subtle but important factor in the impending collapse of China-India relations.

Nehru had asked the United States to refrain from any action on Tibet, believing that it would be unhelpful.[100] The US, however, moved from deference to India and the UK on the Tibetan issue, towards increased interest and commitment to the region, offering in 1951 to support '(1) Tibetan "self-determination", (2) the Dalai Lama as the head of an autonomous Tibet, and (3) the Dalai Lama's ultimate return to Tibet to head a non-Communist state'.[101] The US State Department even told their British counterparts that they would not 'appease India and were content to suffer a deterioration in relations' in order to pursue actions 'justified by the need to counter aggression'.[102] The Tibetan delegation to Beijing ultimately accepted CCP demands in full. Meanwhile, contact increased between Tibetans and American diplomats in Kalimpong, operating in India without Indian knowledge, in order to discuss American support for Tibet.[103]

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[98] Garver, *Protracted*, 49.
[99] See for example, Conversation, Panikkar, 21.3.1951, ZELNP 1, 141, see also Shakya, 56-8.
[100] Shakya, 54-5.
[101] Goldstein, 794.
[102] Shakya, 75.
[103] Ibid., 75. See also Knaus and Riedel on US-Tibetan covert operations. It would require archival declassifications to understand the Indian perspective more completely.

The stage had been set for clandestine contact between Americans and Tibetans in India, and eventual covert military action in the Tibetan plateau.

The details of Indian decision-making during the period are yet to be known in full. However, it is likely that Nehru was balancing the difficult strategic position of seeking a limited Chinese presence in the Himalayas to the north of India, as evidenced by the value he seems to have given Chinese assurances of Tibetan 'autonomy', with a sense of both the inevitability of Chinese power in the region and the desire to find security and prosperity through friendship with Beijing. The Chinese, on the other hand, appear not to have trusted India on the subject of Tibet, though the 1954 agreement on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, a subject of the next chapter, was meant to secure Indian recognition of Chinese legitimacy in Tibet, and thus to divert Indian interests from the region.[104] PRC accusations of foreign meddling in the region are borne out by the fact that the US, UK, and India were all conferring on the subject. However, the legitimacy of Chinese control and actions in Tibet was hotly debated by the world following PLA entry into the region.[105] The hands-off approach by India and Britain at this stage would likely have pleased China, had they understood it. The United States, however, was busy not simply with Tibet, but with a crisis on China's eastern flank. Almost concurrently with PLA entry to Tibet, Chinese forces crossed the Yalu river to engage American-led UN forces in Korea. As such, the American desire to take action in Tibet is linked to direct confrontation with the PRC as American policy was shifting from 'containment' of global Communism to a 'roll-back'

[104] Sulmaan Khan makes the excellent point that the Five Principles 'did not emerge in a vacuum; they were a direct outgrowth of acquiring Tibet'. Khan, *Borderlands,* 139.
[105] See Goldstein, 729-36, on the Tibet and the UN in 1950.

strategy during the Korean War.[106] China would continue to face its own problems in Tibet, dealing with a series of minor and eventually major outbreaks of violence. As events deteriorated in the Tibetan plateau during the 1950s, the Chinese view of India would darken and the severity of the conflicts of interests between the two countries would be revealed.

2.5 Korea: The 'Acid Test'

The span of events that this thesis will cover includes two of the most consequential crises since the Second World War. The Cuban Missile Crisis, occurring simultaneously with the Border War in 1962, is well-known for bringing the superpowers to the brink of nuclear war. The impact of the Korean War is perhaps less clearly appreciated.[107] US efforts to 'roll back' the Communist advance in the Korean peninsula, in one of the most violent episodes of the Cold War era, also meant a hardening of American policy towards the newly established PRC, which, as Qing Simei explains, had previously been driven by 'a combination of deterrence and inducement', and was the subject of much internal debate. [108] The war also led to the establishment of the US system of alliances in Asia that endures to this day.[109] The CCP directed the bulk of its foreign policy energy during the Maoist period towards confronting, countering, and undermining the American alliance system and American presence in Asia, and sought to use India as a partner in carrying out its policy towards the region, which was, to a large degree, a policy towards the United States.

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[106] See Riedel, *Forgotten Crisis,* 19-21 on Korea-Tibet connections from the American side. Goldstein, 773-813, for primary documents on US escalation of support for Tibet.
[107] See Cumings, on the 'forgotten' nature of this war and its importance.
[108] See Qing, 96-111 on US policy debates before the Korean War.
[109] See Ibid., 143-204 on changes in US policy towards China during and after Korea.

After dividing the Korean peninsula along the 38th parallel, the US government was making plans to withdraw troops from the peninsula in 1950 following Congressional budget cuts, with the expectation that United Nations forces would take up responsibility for security on the southern half of the peninsula.[110] However, Mao Zedong's first significant foreign policy act, an alliance with the Soviet Union, effectively recast the new Chinese state as a protector of Communism in Asia. As Chen Jian explains, Mao's China changed the Cold War world by shifting the primary strategic theatre from Europe into Asia.[111] While the Korean War may have been an 'acid test' of nonalignment, it was also the test of Mao's seriousness as a Communist leader on the world stage. Stalin, who had been coy about an alliance with the new Chinese state, arguably saw Korea as the chance for Mao to prove his worth as a partner.[112] Mao, in addition to consolidating his revolution around the 'War to Resist America and Aid Korea' as it is known in China, was able to fight the United States head on and preserve a Communist ally on the Korean peninsula.

Historians have pointed out that China emerged from the Korean War with a newfound confidence, having proven itself in the Communist world.[113] Moreover, the CCP proceeded to declare victory to the Chinese people in a war against the world's leading military power.[114] The Korean War set the battle lines of the Cold War world, and an Asian security structure that has lasted until the present day. American troops in Korea, the US-Japanese defense treaty, and American support for Taiwan all took shape during these years of war in northeast Asia. As such,

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[110] Stueck, 25.
[111] Chen, *Mao's China*, 2-3.
[112] See Chen, *China's Road*, 85-91 on Mao-Stalin discussions of Korea.
[113] Ibid., 220-3, Stueck, 6.
[114] The result is more accurately a return to the status quo ante, yet each side was able to declare victory in terms of their own military objectives and political interests.

India and China began their journey as modern states in an environment fraught with violence and geopolitical upheaval as the Cold War came to Asia and enduring architecture was built.

The diplomacy surrounding the outbreak of the Korean War and the ever-present push for a ceasefire by a number of world powers offered India and China a front for meaningful interaction and even cooperation even as events in Tibet brought about suspicion and difficulty. The Korean War brought the two new nations into the heart of world affairs, with China as a primary actor in the conflict and India making use of its neutral position to pursue a diplomatic solution through negotiations with the United States, China, the USSR, Britain and other powers. The United Nations became an important discussion space, and importantly, an 'Afro-Asian' group was emerging within the UN General Assembly, a precursor to the Afro-Asian movement which China and India would work to solidify at the Bandung Conference in 1955.[115] The Korean War produced several outcomes that were important to the trajectory of China-India relations. First, it allowed India to play a meaningful role on the world stage as an interlocutor between major powers, thus establishing India's neutral position in the Cold War world and giving credence to Nehru's policy of nonalignment. Second, it took US-China animosity to a higher level, shaping Chinese and American foreign policy in Asia essentially as strategies for mutual opposition, and thus setting up the antagonistic environment in which China-India relations had to find their course. Third, the Korean War contributed to the prominence of both India and China on the world stage, and perhaps most importantly, to views in both India and

[115] See 'Chinese Foreign Ministry Intelligence Department Report on the Asian-African Conference', 4.9.1954, FMA 207-00085-19, for PRC reference to this group at the UN.

China that peace in Asia and even a durable Asian order must be sought on their own terms and through their mutual cooperation.[116]

The Korean War illustrates both the influence and the limits of superpower strength in Asia, and as a consequence, reveals some of the space for political influence that India and China would have for themselves in their own continent and beyond. Despite American pressure, both India and Britain recognized the People's Republic soon after its founding. Moreover, India advocated both for recognition of the PRC in the United Nations and settlement of the Taiwan question as part of a ceasefire in Korea.[117] The limits of US influence in Asia were apparent in these early years of the Cold War, despite a series of American security gains as treaties were signed around the region. The US saw it as essential to enlist the support of Asian nations in the UN mission in Korea, lobbying for soldiers from the Philippines, Thailand, India and Pakistan in particular.[118] However, the UN Command was ultimately a largely non-Asian force. India did not send combat troops, electing to send a medical unit instead, and, in a signature gesture of neutrality, chaired the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.[119] Meanwhile, the Chinese launched a 'hate America campaign' in 1950, with Chairman Mao declaring to the Politburo the need to send Chinese troops, remarking that 'If the U.S. imperialists won the war, they would become more

[116] See for example, Khan 'New Evidence', 207-11.
[117] Stueck, 81. The 'liberation' of Taiwan had been postponed by the outbreak of the Korean War, and then thwarted by the presence of the US Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits.
[118] Stueck, 58.
[119] Sheila Miyoshi Jager, *Brothers at War: The Unending Conflict in* Korea, (London, 2013), 112.

arrogant and would threaten us.'[120] Mao was also 'cultivating' the Indian ambassador to Beijing, and playing on Indian fears of a wider war in Asia.[121]

Perhaps the most complicated problem for the United States, and the most interesting one for China and India, was the question of the position of decolonizing states, and the tide of new nations coming into existence as the European colonial powers rolled back their empires across the globe. The international nature of the Korean War contributed to the formation of an Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations General Assembly, one which the United States had a difficult time influencing and which drew concerns from Washington as the USSR attempted to win favor with this group.[122] The United States was caught between its European allies, who were embroiled in their own colonial travails from the French in Indochina to the Dutch in Indonesia, and the rise of new nations, some of which even appealed to American values as they set their course as new nations. As historians have pointed out, the United States was conflicted between support for its European allies in the aftermath of the Second World War, choosing in some cases to support its allies rather than the nationalist movements which opposed the waning colonial powers.[123]

The political space opened by decolonization is one of the most essential pieces of the story of China and India as new nations and modern states. Nehru had been vexed in his dealings with the United States, wary of American policy in Asia, and of US support for the French in Indochina

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[120] Chen, *China's Road,* 143 and Stueck, 65.
[121] Stueck, 52.
[122] Ibid., 291. See also 'Chinese Foreign Ministry Intelligence Department', 4.9.1954, FMA 207-00085-19, CWIHPDA.
[123] George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776*, (Oxford, 2008), 634-5.

and the Dutch in Indonesia.[124] India nonetheless worked extensively with the British and other Commonwealth countries during the Korean War negotiations, leading to tensions with the United States over ceasefire proposals that even led Acheson to declare in a meeting with British officials that 'there would be no NATO, no Anglo-American friendship' if they were to proceed in their support of an Indian armistice proposal towards the end of the war.[125] American concerns about a string of Communist victories in Asia had begun, expressed for example by Lt. General O. P. Weyland, commander of the US air forces in Asia: 'Siam, Malaya, Hong Kong, Burma, India, Pakistan, Iran and the Middle East will come successfully under Communist expansion', the general surmised, if the French were to exit Indochina.[126] As such, new nations and new nationalisms emerging across the globe were caught between their own nationalist aspirations and the imperatives of the American confrontation with global Communism.

The PRC, aided at this stage by the Soviet Union, was openly confronting the United States and its allies on the battlefield, creating a steady stream of propaganda against the American presence in Asia, and even carrying out its own diplomatic outreach, with the Asia and Pacific Rim Peace Conference, attended by delegates from dozens of countries, in Beijing in 1952.[127] However, the American presence in Asia was well established by the end of the Korean War, with defense treaties signed not only with Japan, Korea and the Philippines, but with the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty soon to come in Taiwan in 1954 and the formation of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization also on its way in 1954. For the remainder of the period until the Border War, the Chinese view was shaped by the American presence in Asia. Indeed outreach

[124] Stueck, 81.
[125] Ibid., 299.
[126] Ibid., 211.
[127] Ibid., 291.

and ‘cultivation’ of India were a part of Chinese strategy to counteract the American presence in Asia, though the Indian element to this strategy would ultimately break apart as relations with India foundered upon troubles unique to that relationship.

The historic friendship period between China and India had its roots in these violent years, in the sustained diplomatic contact between the two nations that Korea brought about, in the worldviews engendered both by their own unique nationalist foundings, and in reaction to the Cold War world, both for the security imperatives that it created for the PRC and for the moral position that India saw that it could take in relation to the superpowers. The creation of this friendship, its subsequent destruction, will be addressed in the following chapters.

Chapter 3 – Building the Bandung World: Friendship and Cooperation, 1954-57

3.1 Chapter Purpose

This chapter will review one of the most famous periods in the history of modern China-India relations. It will critically examine the Bandung period and the Afro-Asia movement, from the perspective of Chinese and Indian objectives and roles in what was meant to be a flourishing relationship, but turned out to be a rivalry, within the newly-designated Afro-Asian sphere. To a certain extent, the Bandung period was a way out of China's earlier hardline policies and changed the image of the PRC – something that would not have been possible without Indian support. On the other hand, Mao's China and Nehru's India each sought a leadership role in both Asia and the world. The Afro-Asian movement was meant to facilitate this role, yet the two powers neither found enduring common ground nor an agreement on how to share power in Asia. Just as Mao's China would not play junior partner to the USSR, neither could the PRC fit into Nehru's vision of Asia.

3.2 Introduction

Following the Korean War, the People's Republic of China began a diplomatic charm offensive designed to reduce tensions in Asia and buy time with which to implement domestic economic reforms at home with the launch of the first Five Year Plan.[1] As Qiang Zhai explains, Mao was 'eager to reduce tensions in Asia' and '[t]he urgent domestic agenda and the realization of the

[1] Zhang, 509-528. See also Ronald C. Keith, *The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai*, (New York: 1989), 59-87.

power of the United States combined to force Mao to settle for a peaceful international environment'.[2] However, Beijing's strategy continued to have an underlying purpose of countering the United States, through the construction of a bloc of newly independent nations that could be mobilized, through India's help, to resist American influence in Asia. The strategy, in which Beijing sought to reinvent its image in Asia, presenting a 'benevolent' and 'conciliatory' version of the New China, was known as the 'united front' or 'peaceful coexistence'.[3]

The new diplomatic efforts had three main foundations, occurring in 1954 and 1955.[4] First, Chinese diplomats, led by Zhou Enlai, participated in the Geneva Conference in 1954, which was meant to deal with both the aftermath of the Korean War and the armed conflict between Ho Chi Minh's Viet Minh and the remnants of the French Empire in Vietnam. Participation in the Geneva Conference allowed the CCP to advance Chinese interests on their periphery in Southeast Asia through a combination of military and diplomatic means, as well as facilitating a reinvention of China as a diplomatic power, willing to negotiate and do diplomatic business with other nations after a violent debut on the world stage through the Korean War. Second, Chinese participation in the Asian and African Conference at Bandung Conference, facilitated by India in 1955, allowed the PRC to expand its influence in Asia and build a direct diplomatic counterpoint to American influence in the region. Third, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, also created in partnership with India, gave a conceptual framework with which China could advance

[2] Qiang, 50.
[3] Zhang, 510-3, 518.
[4] See also Ibid., 513, on China's new diplomacy, though not directly in the context of China-India relations. Zhang emphasizes other aspects as well, including the use of ancient Chinese philosophy.

its diplomatic relations and explain its intentions towards other nations, further paving the way for influence through diplomatic, rather than military means. In short, the years 1954-57, were the beginning of the PRC as a diplomatic power, and this beginning was brought about through essential cooperation with India.

As Shu Guang Zhang explains, 1954's Geneva Conference was the first participation in an international conference for the PRC,[5] during which Zhou was instrumental in securing a ceasefire agreement between France and the Viet Minh following France's defeat at Dien Bien Phu.[6] The Communist victory at Dien Bien Phu itself was the result of direct Chinese involvement, including military advisors and the supply of anti-aircraft guns to break French air superiority.[7] Chinese advisers were selected from units that had fought in Korea, illustrating the fluidity of Chinese operations in managing the Chinese strategic periphery from Korea to Southeast Asia by military means.[8] Mao insisted upon victory at Dien Bien Phu, explaining that the 'fortress should be conquered resolutely' in order to strengthen the Communist hand at Geneva, pave the way for a peace settlement which would allow China to focus on economics while the Viet Minh could prepare for military victory in the South through insurgency at a later juncture.[9] The careful application of military and diplomatic work in managing 'imperialism' on the periphery of the 'New China' through Dien Bien Phu and Geneva in the case of Vietnam is a useful precursor for understanding CCP handling of the territorial conflict with India which culminated in the Border War in 1962, as will be explained in later chapters.

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[5] Ibid., 514.
[6] Ibid., 514-6. See also Qiang, 43-67.
[7] Qiang, 46-48.
[8] Ibid., 47.
[9] Ibid., 47-50.

The mid-1950s marked a new period in Chinese diplomacy, as the PRC attempted to 'portray a benevolent image', and felt the need to win international sympathy and support.[10] Behind this, however, was a policy directed against the alliances forged by the United States both in Asia and also in Europe. Mao and Zhou had identified 'contradictions' and 'weaknesses' in America's relationships around the world, and sought to build an advantage through 'peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition', emphasizing also the use of economics.[11] Peaceful coexistence was a global policy, through which Chinese leaders sought to engage Asia, Africa, and the West, making clear that the leadership of the 'New China' saw the Chinese revolution as an example with international applications from the beginning, and that the exertion of strategic influence by the 'New China' would involve a combination of military, diplomatic, and economic means.[12] As Xiaohong Liu explains of the new Chinese foreign policy, 'Beijing targeted the "nationalist" countries in Asia, Africa, and South America and the Western European countries as potential allies in its efforts to prolong world peace and to stabilize and reduce tensions at China's borders'.[13] With regard to America's alliances in Europe, undergoing economic reconstruction following the Second World War, Zhou believed that:

> [Western Europe] has to look for a way out by finding a vast [foreign] market in its efforts to restore its economy, and the East–West trade certainly provides that outlet…given its 600 million population, China has always been a very large market and thus to trade with China has enormous potential.[14]

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[10] Zhang, 510-2.
[11] Ibid., 511-12. See also Garver, *Foreign Relations*, 136-8 on this strategy's evolution.
[12] Friedman's *Shadow Cold War*, also makes the point that CCP diplomacy had a global view.
[13] Liu, 54.
[14] Zhang, 512.

With regard to Asia, Zhou assessed that America's allies, including South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and in Indochina were 'unreliable' and that Asian nations 'have merely waved and shouted battle cries for America' while not actually following US policy.[15] The new 'peaceful coexistence' policy would allow China to gain time and become 'as strong as walls of bronze', while preventing a United States attack.[16]

Geneva brought PRC diplomacy to the international arena essentially for the first time. Moreover, success at Geneva, as Zhang explains, contributed to the CCP decision to attend the Asian and African Conference at Bandung the following year,[17] soon after announcing, with India, the 'Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence', which would underpin Chinese foreign policy rhetoric during these years, and which continue to be used as guiding principles in Chinese foreign policy to this day. Bandung was arguably a more complex event than Geneva, and it was a forum which put greater importance on the presence of China.

Between the 1850s and 1920, as Westad explains, colonialism reached over 450 million people in Africa and Asia.[18] In the aftermath of the Second World War, a period of decolonization began, freeing colonized nations from European Empire all across Africa and Asia. The Asian and African Conference of 1955, organized by India, Burma, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Ceylon, would bring together 29 nations from Africa and Asia, drawing the attention of the world to the Bandung, Indonesia, where it was held in April 1955. The superpowers viewed the conference

[15] Ibid., 511, 512.
[16] Ibid., 511.
[17] Ibid., 518.
[18] Westad, *Global*, 73.

with concern, wondering how it might affect their international strategies.[19] The United States, having witnessed the skill of Zhou Enlai at Geneva, was concerned that the Chinese Communists could introduce a forum in Asia that excluded the United States and could even produce an anti-American bloc in the United Nations led by China and India.[20] The USSR was concerned that too much political independence among 'Third World' leaders could make it hard for the Soviet Union and local Communist parties to gain influence.[21] As scholarship reveals, China and India did in fact conceive of their relationship in part as resistance to the United States in Asia,[22] and by the early 1960s, China would openly compete for influence in the developing world against the USSR.[23] Perhaps most importantly, the Bandung showcased combined Indian and Chinese leadership to Asian and Africa nations.

Nehru saw the inclusion of China as crucial to Bandung's success.[24] While other Asian leaders were hesitant to invite China, Nehru's interest in Bandung itself had much to do with the opportunity to invite the PRC.[25] As Itty Abraham explains, the Indian Prime Minister believed that 'Chinese communism was a nationalist movement first and a communist movement second'.[26] Moreover, as Ang Cheng Guan points out, Nehru later concluded that Bandung 'had given the Chinese a more realistic view of their international environment and the smaller states

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[19] Ibid., 103.
[20] Ang Cheng Guan, 'The Bandung Conference and the Cold War International History of Southeast Asia, in Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, *Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order*, (Singapore, 2008), p. 29.
[21] Westad, *Global*, 103.
[22] Khan, 'New Evidence'.
[23] See Friedman on Sino-Soviet competition.
[24] Itty Abraham, 'Bandung and State Formation in Post-colonial Asia', in Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, *Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order*, (Singapore, 2008), 59.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid., 60. See also Bo Shi, *1962*, 46 on this point.

of Asia less fear of Chinese expansionism'.[27] Nehru was essentially making an effort to 'socialize' his neighbor to the north, and to engineer a new Asia that included a peaceful PRC. Among Nehru's purposes for playing a central role in the conference – it was expected that he would dominate the conference, but this honor turned out to go to Zhou Enlai – the Indian Prime Minister wished to 'show the Europeans and Americans that Asia worked to different rules than did the West [sic]', and that national identities were more important in Asia than Cold War ideas of alignment – in order to achieve this, the inclusion of China was essential.[28] Indian policy-makers also worried that the United States might use nuclear weapons in Asia, with US-China conflict as the most likely cause of such an outcome;[29] the desire to avert US-China conflict by bringing China into the Asian community was shared by other Asian leaders including Indonesia's Sukarno.[30] As such, Nehru was making a gamble, based on his impressions of the People's Republic, the Chinese revolution, and the prospect of these phenomena fitting into the Asian order that he imagined. His dealings with China since 1950 must have encouraged this view. As Nehru explained to Burma's U Nu following his 1954 visit to China, 'I could not help feeling during my visit to China, even more than I have done before, how completely irrelevant was the idea that this great nation could be ignored or bypassed'.[31] The Indian Prime Minister sought to lead an international effort to bring the New China into the community of nations.

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[27] Guan, 36.
[28] Abraham, 59.
[29] Ibid., 59-60 and Helen E.S. Nesadurai, 'Bandung and the Political Economy of North-South Relations', in Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya (eds.), *Bandung Revisited*, 71. See also Garver, *Protracted*, 118-9 on Indian desires to use Bandung to moderate PRC actions.
[30] James R. Rush, 'Sukarno: Anticipating an Asian Century' in Ramachandra Guha (ed.), *Makers of Modern Asia*, (Cambridge and London, 2014), 189.
[31] Jawaharlal Nehru, 'Note on Visit to China and Indo-China', 14.11.1954, CWIHPDA, National Archives Department of Myanmar.

Indeed, China was embarking on its own peace offensive, but as shown above, it was for very different reasons.

The Chinese delegation arrived at Bandung facing on one hand great anticipation of and interest in Chinese participation, and on the other suspicion and fear of China by other Asian nations. In a private dinner with Thailand's Prince Wan, facilitated by Nehru, Zhou 'expressed surprise at the intensity of anti-Chinese feelings among many of the Asian countries' at Bandung, and worked in particular to establish stronger relations with Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia and Laos.[32] Ultimately, Zhou's visit, like his performance at Geneva, was an outstanding success, and is considered among the highlights of the Bandung Conference.[33] While Zhou's diplomacy led to a temporary reinvention of China's image in Asia, internal reporting also makes clear the extent to which the PRC saw Bandung as a strategic opportunity, particularly in relation to the struggle against the United States. The MFA reported for example, just weeks ahead of the conference, that 'The Five Principles declared by China and India have won support from many Asian-African countries of the world, demonstrating that the possibility of expanding the Asian-African peace region is increasing…', adding that 'Many countries don't want to follow USA [sic] and more and more countries oppose the military alliances formed by USA'.[34]

The MFA categorized China's relations with attending countries as ' "Peace and neutral" countries' including India, Burma and Indonesia, 'Close to "peace and neutral" countries',

[32] Guan, 32-3.
[33] Chen Jian, 'Zhou Enlai and China's "Prolonged Rise"' in Ramachandra Guha (ed.), *Makers of Modern Asia*, (London, 2014), 147-8, and Guan, 31-2.
[34] Report from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'The Asian-African Conference', 1.4.1955, FMA 207-00086-03, 14-19, CWIHPDA.

'Close to "anti-peace and neutral" countries, and "Anti-peace and anti-neutral" countries, recommending that 'we should select some key countries from each category' and 'solve some specific issues'.[35] Zhou was able to sign a treaty with Indonesia that ended the Chinese policy of dual-citizenship, a policy that troubled Southeast Asian nations with significant overseas Chinese populations; the Chinese Premier was also able to establish significant personal relationships with other Asian leaders.[36] China's relations with Indonesia flourished until the coup a decade later, and meetings with the Thai prince, a US ally, even led to a 'top-secret' mission to Beijing where Mao encouraged the Thai delegation to choose neutrality over alliance with the United States.[37] Zhou's success is underscored by the fact that the Chinese MFA considered Thailand to be in the lowest category of participating nations: "anti-peace and anti-neutral".[38]

Zhou succeeded in presenting a peaceful image of China and in navigating the many ideological visions represented in Bandung, something which was aided by Nehru's caution and leadership in creating as inclusive a forum as possible. Nehru, however, also sought not to confront even the colonial powers, warning, for example, against 'agitational language' on the French presence in North Africa.[39] Nehru's attitude towards the French position in Africa is evidence of his milder approach to national liberation movements, a difference with the CCP leaders that would become a serious bone of contention during the years of collapse as Chinese support for violent national liberation movements set them at odds with both India and the USSR in the developing world.[40]

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[35] Report by the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'Some Existing Issues in and Suggestions for the Asia-Africa Conference', 1955, FMA 207-00004-06, 59-62, CWIHPDA.
[36] Guan, 34-5.
[37] Ibid.
[38] FMA 207-00004-06, 59-62, CWIHPDA.
[39] Nesadurai, 76.
[40] See Friedman on Sino-Soviet rivalry.

Importantly, the US-led Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) had just been formed in February 1955, and member states were concerned about the advancement of Communist values at Bandung by the PRC.[41] The PRC in turn expressed concern about 'American and British Sabotage Activities' towards Bandung, such as American intensification 'of its activities to draw India over to its side' ahead of the conference; this included a proposal 'to help India to realize its industrialization through Japan'.[42] However, Zhou's delegation was able to shore up diplomatic support at Bandung, less in the name of Communism than for the purpose of building the buffer-zone of neutrality that Mao and Zhou sought after the Korean War.

In short, the PRC was making progress in chipping away at the US containment policy in Asia, by reaching out to Asian nations as a fellow Asian, rather than Communist, nation. China's Asianist identity, which drew upon narratives of shared humiliations at the hands of foreign empires, was essential in moving away from a security strategy based purely on support from the Communist bloc. Moreover, through the help of India, which effectively arranged China's introduction as an Asian rather than Communist power, Chinese foreign and security policy was now drawing on not one but two of the great historical phenomena of the time. The PRC began its journey as a modern state as a military combatant from the Communist bloc, in the first major conflict of the Cold War era. Now, with the help of India, the tide of decolonization became the second major historical trend which CCP leaders could draw upon to build up influence and power. Thus, by the mid-1950s, CCP leaders were using both Communism and decolonization to

[41] Guan, 31.
[42] Report from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'Compilation of the Excerpts of the Telegrams Concerning the Asian-African Conference', 27.3.1955, CWIHPDA, FMA 207-00004-07, 63-68.

facilitate the building of the ‘New China’ and the building of influence that they sought in the world. The use of each historical trend relied upon cooperation with a major partner, the first was the USSR and the second was India.

In sum, India played a crucial role in giving China the forum and introductions with which to pursue China’s diplomatic reinvention and its underlying security strategy. Moreover, the brief period of friendship, cooperation, and even ‘brotherhood’ between China and India during these years, resting most importantly on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the ‘Bandung Spirit’, presented leadership to Asia and the wider ‘Third World’ that had not been seen before, but which would soon turn to rivalry and confrontation.

3.3 The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

In June 1954 Zhou Enlai stepped off the plane in New Delhi to cheers of ‘Hindi Chini bhai bhai’, meaning ‘India and China are brothers’.

It was Zhou’s first visit to India. Just two months earlier, the two nations had signed the ‘Agreement (with exchange of notes) on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India’, which contained the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, also known as Panch

Sheel, or Five Principles in Sanskrit.[43] These five principles were meant to be the cornerstone of a new kind of international relations which China and India would advance before the world:

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty
2. Mutual non-aggression
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs
4. Equality and mutual benefit, and
5. Peaceful co-existence

At the New Delhi airport, Zhou spoke of Chinese support for the new friendship with India, and alluded to his vision of a 'zone of peace' that would bind all Asian nations together:

> We hope that China-India friendship will develop day by day. We desire that the unity of the people of each Asian country will become closer and tighter day by day. We desire that world peace will consolidate day by day.[44]

Zhou's conversations with Nehru dug more deeply into his strategic vision for Asia, the zone of peace and the role of China-India leadership and friendship in promoting this vision:

> China's policy towards Southeast Asia [sic] is peaceful coexistence. This is our policy towards India, Indonesia, Burma, Pakistan, Ceylon, Laos and Cambodia. We want to carry this policy out thoroughly. In order to build a zone of peace in Asia, the Chinese government wants to see the principles defined in China and India's Agreement on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India applied by every country in Asia. That would be very favorable. Asian nations should be at peace with one another, and trust each other.[45]

The Five Principles were two things at once. They were part of a strategy to establish a perimeter of neutral or otherwise non-threatening nations around the PRC and they were also, in the case of India, an effort to receive Indian acquiescence in the key Himalayan issues that troubled China-India relations earlier in the decade with the Chinese presence in Tibet. By winning Indian

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[43] See *United Nations Treaty Series*, Volume 299, 70-81, https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20299/v299.pdf
[44] Airport speech, Delhi, 25.6.1954, ZELNP 1, 390.
[45] Meeting, Nehru, 25.6.1954, ZELNP 1, 391.

acquiescence not only to the Chinese presence in Tibet but to the principles of 'non-interference in each other's internal affairs' and respect for 'territorial integrity and sovereignty', the PRC aimed both to end Indian ambivalence about Tibet, and to lay foundations upon which the Chinese presence in the region could not be challenged.[46]

By the end of the decade, however, the Five Principles would be used by each China and India to justify unilateral claims against the other as the border dispute emerged as a major issue, and as CCP control of Tibet, tenuous from the start, unraveled at a rapid pace, regained only through brutal suppression operations. The internationalization of the 'Tibetan question' became a de facto issue as the US and GMD exploited Chinese vulnerability in the region later in the decade, and as Nehru, in disappointment over CCP actions in Tibet in 1959, publicly asserted that India did in fact have 'cultural' interests in the region.

The principles of 'non-interference' and 'territorial integrity and sovereignty' were crucial to the New China. These were principles that were meant to prevent any recurrence of the 'national humiliation' which China had suffered at the hands of both European and Asian Empires. The very project of the New China was captured in this desire to replace 'humiliation' with national strength, and these principles were to be the diplomatic and conceptual foundation on which this project would be based. It is likely, through the experience of Indian ambivalence to China's presence in Tibet in the early 1950s, that the PRC understood that India was very capable of

[46] It is unclear whether CCP leaders were aware of Indian, British and American discussions pertaining to the future of Tibet in the early 1950s. However, it is clear that the CCP sought to terminate Indian 'interference' in the region. See also Khan, *Borderlands.*

challenging this foundation and that this was an issue which 'brotherhood' was meant to address. The worst of their Himalayan troubles was just under a decade away.

Zhou and Nehru's New Delhi talks continued in an expansive review of the purposes of China-India relations and the future of Asia, with the Chinese Premier outlining both the practical value of the 'peaceful coexistence' policy and also the vision of durable China-India friendship:

> With regard to China-India relations, I completely agree with what Prime Minister Nehru has said, which is that we should build mutual trust. China and India's political systems are not exactly the same. However, we have both liberated ourselves from imperialist oppression, and our Eastern cultures have common features. Because of the historical background of our two countries, and our cultural similarities, we should easily understand each other.[47]

Zhou pointed out that China and India could work together to show leadership to Asia based on the new example of China-India relations:

> [O]n the basis of the five principles of mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, mutual non-aggression, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence, China and India can not only build trust of ourselves, but can build mutual trust. This would have a very large impact on each country in Asia, enabling them to believe that peaceful coexistence is possible, and that it can gradually be realized. We should work hard to eliminate any ungrounded fears from Asia.[48]

Nehru, for his part, responded enthusiastically. Speaking of the Five Principles, the Indian Prime Minister characteristically remarked that 'If these principles can be recognized in a much wider sphere in Asia, then the risk of war could be reduced, and the possibility of cooperation could be enlarged among Asian countries'.[49]

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[47] Meeting, Nehru, 26.6.1954, ZELNP 1, 391.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Ibid., 392.

Later in the year, in October, 1954, Nehru met with Chairman Mao Zedong in Beijing,[50] who affirmed the spirit of friendship with him and the desire for goodwill from India:

> I remember telling Prime Minister Nehru at a dinner party about our feelings toward India, saying that China and India do not need to be on alert against each other. We have no apprehension that India will harm us…Every piece of good news from India makes us happy. When India gets better, the world benefits.[51]

Mao also alluded to the practical nature of 'peaceful coexistence':

> Between friends there are sometimes differences and sometimes quarrels…This kind of quarrel, however, is different in nature from our quarrel with John Foster Dulles. With this visit, Prime Minister Nehru must be aware that China is truly in need of friends. Ours is a new China, still weak, though called a big country. We are faced with a strong opponent, the United States, which is bent on fixing us [sic] whenever it has an opportunity. Therefore, we need friends, and Prime Minister Nehru must have felt this already. I think India is also in need of friends; this can be seen from the talks we have just had, from our cooperation over the last years…[52]

India and China were signing up to a vision of cooperation and even 'brotherhood', which had different meanings from the start. Nehru's vision of 'anti-imperialism' for the purpose of Asian unity and independence from the Cold War world was a very different idea from Mao's 'anti-imperialism' and desire for Asian unity for its use in confrontation with the United States and in building Chinese power. Nonetheless, the partnership steamed ahead in grand terms. As Zhou Enlai said in a broadcast to the Indian people before his departure from New Delhi in June, 1954:

> Since ancient times, there has been a profound friendship between the Chinese and Indian people…We have both built our own new nations. The traditional friendship between the Chinese and Indian people has had new developments…Our shared hope is that we may build each of our own great ancestral lands in a peaceful environment. This shared hope

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[50] See also Sulmaan Khan 'New Evidence' for comparative discussion of Nehru's visit to Beijing and discussions with Mao.
[51] 'Minutes of Chairman Mao Zedong's Third Meeting With Nehru', 26.10.1954, FMA 204-00007-17, 135-142, CWIHPDA.
[52] Ibid.

> will be the basis for the further development of the friendship of the Chinese and Indian people…We value friendship. Because friendship creates power.[53]

3.4 India's Vision: Jawaharlal Nehru Goes to Bandung

In the years leading up to the Asia and Africa conference in Bandung in 1955, Jawaharlal Nehru articulated a vision of an Asian renaissance in which India and China would both play a central role. The Bandung Conference was, in a sense, the culmination of this vision, one which would soon crumble as China-India relations began their rapid collapse in 1958-62, culminating in the Border War of 1962 and the destruction of the Bandung world. It was a movement which served both Indian and Chinese purposes, as the two came together in the aftermath of Korea, drawing upon shared desires to create peace in Asia and focus on economic development, before each country's relations with the developing world would take a different turn as the PRC focused on violent revolution throughout Africa and Asia, and India found other partners in its pursuit of neutrality and nonalignment. In order to understand the meaning of this friendship period between China and India, in both the pragmatism and the ideals that it entailed, a look into the statements and beliefs of the first Indian Prime Minister is essential.

Nehru's nonalignment policy was rooted in a deeper 'Asianism'. The Indian Prime Minister sought to build up Asian independence from the Cold War which was emerging just as India achieved independence. As he said in a speech titled 'India's Emergence in World Affairs' in 1947:

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[53] Broadcast to the Indian people, 27.6.1954, ZELNP 1, 392.

> [T]he main subject in foreign policy today is vaguely talked of in terms of 'Do you belong to this group or that group?'…We have proclaimed during the past year that we will not attach ourselves to any particular group… There is some meaning when we say that we stand for the freedom of Asian countries and for the elimination of imperialistic control over them…. We have sought to avoid foreign entanglements by not joining one bloc or the other.[54]

Nehru's vision of foreign affairs involved a comparison of India and China, an estimation of the weight that India and China both brought to Asian affairs, and the importance of bringing China into the Asian fold, rather than allowing Chinese isolation, insofar as India and other Asian nations could prevent this.[55] Nehru believed that the isolation of China would lead to great danger not only for the emerging Asianism which he sought to nurture, but also to the peace of the region and the world at large. Turning to the subject of Indian diaspora around the region in the same 1947 speech, Nehru shared a view of the weight and presence of China and India in the region:

> India is a country which in spite of everything has abounding vitality and spreads abroad. It rather frightens our neighbour countries, just as China which is also a country with abounding vitality and an abounding population [sic]. We spread. We tend to overwhelm others both by virtue of our numbers, and sometimes by virtue of the economic position we might develop there.[56]

In Nehru's speeches, Indian nationalism and the rebirth of Asia were essential to one another. He saw the rise of the region as a fundamental shift in world history, one in which India would play a central role:

> India now, in this last year or more, emerges again into the main trend of human affairs. Now that is something of great historical significance. I could have said that Asia emerges in this main trend of history. Asia, in the long millennia of her history, has

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[54] *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches*, Vol. 1, (Delhi, 1949), 202-4.
[55] See, for example, *Nehru's Speeches,* Vol. 2, (Delhi, 1954), 34, 136, 149, 159-61.
[56] *Nehru's Speeches*, Vol. 1, 209-10.

> played a very important part… When we talk of Asia, remember that India, not because of any ambition of hers, but because of the force of circumstances, because of geography, because of history and because of so many other things, inevitably has to play a very important part in Asia. And not only that; India becomes a kind of meeting ground for various trends and forces and a meeting ground between what might roughly be called the East and the West.[57]

Nehru's vision of Asia, of course, was different from that of the PRC. For Nehru, a rise of Asia could lead to a conciliatory relationship between, as he phrased it, 'East and West'.[58] The People's Republic of China was a revolutionary power, which, in the words of Chen Jian, was committed to the overturning of the old world order in a different way: 'Mao and his comrades made it clear that one of the primary missions of the "new China" was to destroy the "old" world in which China had been a humiliated member during modern times. The Chinese communist revolution…would serve as a model of other "oppressed" nations and would play a central role in creating a "new" world'.[59]

As Chinese leaders spoke chiefly of the new Chinese nation and the spread of Communist revolution in the early years after the founding of the PRC, Nehru spoke of the rise of Asia as a whole and the commitment of Asia as a force for peace in what he saw as the impending danger of a new world war. There are similarities, however, in the significance of each the Chinese and the Indian 'revolutions' – Mao himself described both foundings as 'revolutions' in his meetings with Nehru during these years, asking Nehru, 'In India, do you call it revolution?' Nehru replied

[57] Ibid., 235-6.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Chen Jian, 'China and the Bandung Conference: Changing Perceptions and Representations', in *Bandung Revisited*, 133.

in the affirmative.[60] The idea of the revitalization of Asia was with Nehru from the beginning. Mao declared that 'the Chinese people have stood up' in a way that made clear that the CCP project was the revitalization of China, while Nehru attached the freedom of India to the freedom of Asia as a whole. The vision and reality of a free and prosperous Asia, in Nehru's eyes, however, would require the participation of the new PRC.[61] Moreover, Nehru saw China as the country which had the most in common with India with regard to the challenges faced as new nations:

> [T]he problems they face in China are far more similar to our problems than the problems of Europe or America. There are in China and India huge agricultural communities with vast populations, industrially and technologically backward, wanting to advance in welfare, wanting to have higher standards of life, wanting to industrialize, wanting to deal with land problems and all that. The nature of problems is similar between India and China. They are not so similar between India and Russia.[62]

However, speaking on the Five Principles agreement in 1954, Nehru had to fend off criticism in Parliament, explaining the agreement as a victory for peace and an acknowledgement of the necessity of dealing with China, even when their northern neighbor took actions disagreeable to India:

> By this agreement, we ensure peace to a very large extent in a certain area of Asia. I would earnestly wish that this area of peace could be spread over the rest of Asia and indeed over the rest of the world…Several Hon. Members have referred to 'the melancholy chapter of Tibet'. I really do not understand… Many things happen in the world which we do not like and which we would wish were rather different but we do not go like Don Quixote with lance in hand against everything that we dislike; we put up with these things because we would be, without making any difference, merely getting into trouble. Big changes have taken place in the world since the last War. Among them has been the rise of a united China.[63]

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[60] 'Minutes of Chairman Mao Zedong's Second Meeting with Nehru', 23.10.1954, FMA 204-00007-15, 113-129, CWIHPDA.
[61] See, for example, *Nehru's Speeches*, Vol. 2, 135-6.
[62] *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches*, Vol. 3, (Delhi, 1958), 277.
[63] Ibid., 262-3.

Dealing with China was both a challenge and an integral piece of Nehru's vision for Asia. Moreover, his view of Asia was the view of a new era, in which India would play a central role: 'Asia, in the long millennia of her history, has played a very important part. So has India, of course, but during the last two hundred years or so certain, developments of science and technology in Europe, and in America a little later, led to the domination of Asia by Europe and to a restriction of her activities in the world at large…Now, that period and epoch has ended, and India now comes, I think, into the forefront of world affairs.'[64] This view of Asia as having played a central role until the interruption by the dominance of European empires, was shared by prior Chinese revolutionary leaders and thinkers including Sun Yat-sen.[65] Nehru's 'Asianism', thus, had its counterparties in China, and for the Indian leader, the role of China in this new era was essential.

Finally, Nehru's vision of Asia was challenged perhaps most interestingly, by the US-led military pacts that were coming into being in the early Cold War in Asia. His criticism of the SEATO included criticism of NATO as he believed that the extension of security commitments into Asia, including the notion that NATO covered overseas colonies held by European powers, was anathema to his vision of a peaceful and independent Asia.[66]

Nehru sought to build peaceful relations between India and the West, and indeed between Asia and the West, as the Bandung Conference would emphasize. However, he saw the extension of the Cold War and its system of alliances into the Asia that he sought to build as a dangerous

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[64] *Nehru's Speeches*, Vol. 1, (Delhi, 1949), 235-6.
[65] See for example, Sun Yat-sen, 'Pan-Asianism', 28.11.1924, kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/26325/...doc/.../1129_panasianism.pdf
[66] *Nehru's Speeches*, Vol. 3, 267.

encroachment and reversal of the gains of Indian and Asian independence. Nehru sought to bridge gaps with the West while nonetheless championing the cause of freedom amongst the colonized nations. As such, the Cold War, and decolonization ran afoul of each other in Nehru's eyes:

> [O]bserve how this NATO developed. In the first place it developed geographically. Supposed to be the North Atlantic community, it spread to the Mediterranean, to the coasts of Africa, to Eastern Africa and to distant countries which had nothing to do with the Atlantic community…This House will remember that recently a reference has been made by the Portuguese authorities to the North Atlantic Treaty covering Goa too in its wide scope…If the North Atlantic Treaty has managed to extend its scope to Goa, I wonder whether the South-East Asia Treaty too will extend likewise. It starts at our door-step; where might it go?[67]

As Sulmaan Khan reveals, Nehru's vision extended into realpolitik diplomatic dealings with Zhou and Mao.[68] The Indian Prime Minister sought to protect his vision of a free and independent Asia and to preserve it from the encroachments of the Cold War world by working with China.

When Nehru arrived in Bandung in April 1955, he was drawing on years of thought and vision. Bandung was the culmination, perhaps, of his Asian vision and the introduction of a China that spoke of peace was perhaps the masterstroke in the world he wished to lead. He arrived onto the stage before the leaders of Africa and Asia, stating that '[T]here is yet another spirit in Asia today. Asia is no longer passive; it has been passive enough in the past. It is no longer a submissive Asia; it has tolerated submissiveness too long. Asia might make mistakes, but they do not matter so long as she is alive'.[69] It was perhaps the high watermark of Nehru's vision of an

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[67] Ibid., 268.
[68] See Khan, 'New Evidence'.
[69] *Nehru's Speeches*, Vol. 2, 289.

Asian order, while the spirit of cooperation with China was alive and well and the future of Asia was theirs to build. However, as the evolution of China-India relations will reveal, this new order was neither so strong nor so durable as Nehru wished for it to be.

3.5 China's Vision: Zhou Enlai Goes to Bandung

The Chinese peace offensive, as explained, was part of a deeper CCP concern about the US presence in Asia. In a September 1954 cable to Molotov and Malenkov, Mao explained his view of American activity in the region as follows: 'The American invasion clique…is energetically resurrecting Japanese militarism, plotting and organizing a West Pacific and Asian war clique, intensifying its incitement and help for Chiang Kai-shek's treasonous clique group to sow discord along the mainland coast and islands, in order to expand its threat of war in the Far East and in the world'.[70] Earlier that year, reviewing Zhou Enlai's report from Geneva, Mao explained that 'At Geneva, we grabbed the slogan of peace, which is that we want peace. America did not grasp this; they want to attack; they are unreasonable…Now the overall international trend is that the Americans are fairly isolated…'[71]

PRC interactions with India, whether represented by Indian diplomats or by Nehru, spoke on one hand to Nehru's own vision of a united Asia, but also included overt discussion of PRC security strategy in Asia. During Nehru's visit to the PRC in October 1954, Mao expressed the following

[70] Cable, Molotov and Malenkov, 2.9.1954, MZDNP 2, 274.
[71] Politburo expanded meeting, 7.7.1954, MZDNP 2, 256.

vision to the Indian Prime Minister, with obvious intersections with Nehru's own views of the region's past and present:

> We Eastern peoples, all of us, have suffered the bullying and humiliation of Western imperialism in our history. China suffered the bullying and humiliation of Western imperialism for over one hundred years. The period in which your country suffered from bullying and humiliation was even longer, over three hundred years. We Eastern people have the feeling that we should come together and protect ourselves. Even though our thinking and social systems have differences, we have a very large thing in common, which is that we all have to deal with imperialism.[72]

Mao continued, discussing the challenges that US activity presented for China, and expressing them in terms of national independence themes that characterized the Bandung movement: 'Prime Minister Nehru should not think that China is already completely independent…We still have a very large problem, Taiwan is still in the hands of America and Chiang Kai-Shek'.[73] Mao made clear in conversation that he saw India as a vehicle, if not an ally, in the promotion of his strategy for building a defensive peace perimeter in Asia. Nehru stated that the Five Principles could be put into practice, they could remove the fear of China in all Asian countries, and Mao replied that 'The Five Principles should be propagated to every country'.[74]

Mao's discussion of the American presence in Asia, implied that it both threatened China directly and disregarded India and China as having any voice in the politics of Asia: '[America] put a defense perimeter around South Korea, Taiwan, and Indochina; these places are far from America, but very close to us. It makes it very difficult for us to sleep peacefully'; 'When America does something, it is regardless of whether or not others can accept it. For example, creating SEATO, they did not ask China and India. Asia has many countries, but [America] only

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[72] Meeting, Nehru, 19.10.1954, MZDNP 2, 302; See also FMA 204-00007-17, CWIHPDA.
[73] Ibid. See also FMA 204-00007-17, CWIHPDA.
[74] Ibid., 303. See also FMA 204-00007-17, CWIHPDA.

asked three: Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines'.[75] As such, the Chairman's appeal to India was very much in terms of the Asian vision that Nehru himself believed in, and a significant departure from the themes of international Communism that characterized the Korean War.

The second meeting with Nehru included Mao's increasingly typical discourse of nuclear war. In 1957 the Chairman would stun a Soviet audience into silence with a similar vision while on a visit to Moscow, contributing to the withdrawal of Soviet advisors in 1960 and the end of Soviet assistance to China's nuclear program.[76] Nehru's reaction to this line of thinking may not yet be available, but, given hostile CCP reactions to India's promotion of Gandhian nonviolence in Afro-Asia later in the decade, it is likely that Mao's vision of liberation through nuclear war is unlikely to be what Nehru had in mind in his support of anti-imperialism.[77] The section deserves to be cited in full given the contrast that it draws between Mao and Nehru's views of the world, and the hint that it gives towards the radicalism that would characterize China's foreign policy when Mao decided to end 'peaceful coexistence' at the end of the decade:

> The independence of our two countries is the result of the Second World War. Without the Second World War, it would have been very hard for us to achieve our independence. Some other countries were weakened by the war, for example Germany, Italy, and Japan. England and France, although they were victorious nations, were also weakened. In China, owing to the weakening of Japan and Chiang Kai-shek, we rose up. Because England was weakened, India, Burma and Egypt rose up…If we do battle again, I do not know how the American military clique will think. Their past experience is that they received great benefits and development from the past two world wars, and now they hope for another war in order to receive even bigger benefits and development…On the other hand, after the past two world wars, countries led by Communist parties and by nationalist parties were established. If we have another major war, I think America would not necessarily benefit, but rather may have problems. If we have another major war,

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[75] Ibid.
[76] Pantsov and Levine, 444-5.
[77] Pantsov and Levine argue that this kind of statement was intended to shock Mao's interlocutors. Chen Jian indicates that Mao may have believed the words he spoke, *Mao's China*, 189-90.

> large parts or the whole of West Asia and Africa, and the whole of Latin America may all break away from imperialism. With respect to weapons, America believes that with its atom bomb and artillery, naval and air strength, it can rely on these things. I think that although weapons have changed, other than being able to kill greater numbers of people, there is no fundamental difference. If we have a third world war, then the number of casualties will, I fear, not be in the tens of millions, but in the hundreds of millions (亿万).[78]

Mao went on to explain that if there were to be war, all of China's plans would be thrown into chaos, that cultural and economic plans would stop and that industrialization would be postponed. He added that, 'But it is difficult to destroy the whole of China, blow it up and slide it to the bottom of the sea; the Chinese people will exist forever. India is also like this'.[79] The desire to prosper through surviving a nuclear war was likely not what Nehru had in mind for his country. During the Korean War, Zhou and Mao played with the Indian fear of war when consulting with Indian diplomats.[80] It is possible that such a discourse as the one above was meant to have a similar effect, galvanizing Nehru now in his mission to spread the word of peace among the nations of Asia and Africa, and thus acting as an agent in the CCP's strategy to build security and influence. Mao added to the Indian Prime Minister, in front of Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Ambassador Yuan, and other top Party leadership, 'In sum, we must work together to prevent war, and struggle for enduring peace'.[81] In the final meeting with Nehru, three days later, Mao added an ominous note on China-India relations, reviewing India's acceptance of the peaceful coexistence strategy and hinting at a break up in relations should cooperation fail: 'Prime Minster Nehru advocates for building and expanding a zone of peace… We have

[78] Meeting, Nehru, 23.10.1954, MZDNP 2, 306-7.
[79] Ibid., 307.
[80] Stueck, 52.
[81] MZDNP 2, 307.

announced the Five Principles together. This is also very good…Cooperation must not harm any party, otherwise it cannot last long and it will break apart for certain'.[82]

With the Five Principles signed and declared to the world and Nehru and Zhou preparing for Bandung the following spring, China-India friendship was well underway. Mao's comments to the Politburo in the days ahead of Bandung makes the Chinese mission at the conference explicit:

> Our overall policy at the Asia and Africa Conference is to struggle to expand the world peace united front, to encourage national independence movements, and to establish and strengthen both our general affairs with a number of Asian and African nations and the conditions for our external relations.[83]

In other words, Bandung would lay the foundations for Chinese diplomacy in Asia, Africa and in the world at large. India's centrality in this is undeniable. China's view of its importance is clear.

Mao's interactions with other Asian nations are also useful in explaining the CCP view of their position in Asia, both in terms of larger Chinese strategic goals vis-à-vis America and in terms of the wider diplomacy involved in China-India led Afro-Asianism. Meeting with a Japanese delegation in Zhongnanhai later in the year, Mao presented a view similar to the one he shared with Nehru a year before:

> China is not yet completely independent; our situations are the same. You are also not yet completely independent, that is a common point. Our Taiwan has not yet been liberated. America's reach is very long. They have seized our Taiwan. They have also seized Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea. They want to grab all such large places in Asia. This is something that, in the end, cannot endure.[84]

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[82] Meeting, Nehru, 26.10.1954, MZDNP 2, 309. See also FMA 204-00007-17 CWIHPDA.
[83] Politburo Meeting, 5.4.1955, MZDNP 2, 363.
[84] Meeting, Japanese delegation, 15.10.1955, MZDNP 2, 452.

He espoused a similar message of solidarity, noting that 'Although our social systems are not identical, these inconsistencies will not impair our mutual respect and friendship'.[85]

With Indonesian Prime Minister Sastroamidjojo, Mao expressed a narrative of Western domination necessitating Asian solidarity:

> For a few hundred years, owing as a result of carrying out a long period of invasion, Western countries developed a certain kind of psychology towards Asia and Africa. They look down on backward countries. In front of Western countries, our problem is uniting and defending ourselves instead of targeting each other and causing damage.[86]

China's interactions with India during the friendship years were both strategic and founded on a mutual desire for a united Asia, albeit for different underlying reasons. Chinese engagement with India was part of a wider diplomacy in Asia that would prove temporary, but which, as Xiaohong Liu explains, marked a 'shift of priorities from war preparations to economic construction', such that 'the primary goal of PRC foreign policy was to create a peaceful and stable environment for China to pursue its domestic aspirations'.[87] India played an essential role in achieving this, and in doing so, proved to be a desirable strategic partner to the project of the 'New China', which had transitioned from a phase of military activity, marked by Tibet and Korea, and entered into a phase which prioritized economic construction. The larger strategic backdrop had to do with the United States, which, like the Soviet Union, dominated Chinese foreign policy thinking.[88] However, India became, in this period, essential to CCP strategy overall. China's economic goals vis-à-vis America further illustrate the ultimate objectives of the 'New China'. As Mao explained

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[85] Ibid.
[86] Meeting, Sastroamidjojo, 26.5.1955, MZDNP 2, 381.
[87] Liu, 54.
[88] Garver, *Protracted*, 5.

in a meeting on industry and commerce with Zhou, Deng Xiaoping and other top Party leaders some months after Bandung:

> Our objective is to catch up with America and then to surpass America. America only has one hundred million people or more; our population is over six hundred million. We should catch up with America. On the day that we catch up with America and overtake America, then we can let out a breath of air. Now, we are not there and must take the bullying.[89]

Zhou's diplomacy at Bandung was, in a sense, the convergence of his work at Geneva and in Asia in the year leading up to the Asian-African Conference. Reporting to the Politburo on his diplomacy at Geneva, he had explained his work to 'gather international forces together, isolate the United States, and stop America's plan to expand global hegemony'[90]. Zhou had also advanced this strategy in his diplomacy around Asia, under the 'peaceful coexistence' mantra, explaining to Burma's Prime minister, for example, the need to prevent neighbors from 'allowing foreign meddlers to set up military bases' and the need for 'the countries on our periphery to prosper'.[91] At Bandung, Zhou spoke of a new Asia and a shared modern history of colonial oppression, much in the same way that Nehru did. However, Zhou presented a version that contained the presence of a clear and present danger to all Asian and African nations, the 'new colonialists', by which he meant the United States:

> The peoples of Asia and Africa have already created glorious and splendid ancient cultures, making an immense contribution to humanity. In modern times, the majority of countries in Asian and Africa suffered from the plunder and oppression of colonialism to differing degrees, consistently forced into a stagnant state of poverty and backwardness...Today, the appearance of the Afro-Asian sphere has already undergone an enormous change. More and more Afro-Asian countries have thrown off or are now in the process of casting off the fetters of colonialism…Nonetheless, the rule of colonialism

[89] Meeting, Federation of Industry and Commerce, 29.10.1955, MZDNP 2, 460.
[90] Politburo Expanded Meeting, 7.7.1954, ZELNP 1, 395.
[91] Meeting, U Nu, 29.6.1954, ZELNP 1, 393.

> in this sphere has not yet ended. Moreover, new colonialists are plotting to take the old colonialists' place instead.[92]

Zhou went on at Bandung, as he had with Indian diplomats, to discuss the 'violation of China's sovereignty and territorial integrity' by the United States in Taiwan. As the two Asian leaders presented their vision of a united Asia to the gathered leaders of the Afro-Asian world, it is likely that the Indian delegation did not anticipate that in just a few years' time, the same accusations would be used against India, both before the Afro-Asian forum, and before the world.

3.6 Brothers of Two Thousand Years

The China-India friendship period served both countries needs for a short period. Importantly, it was a way for each new nation to navigate the difficulties of a confrontational and violent new world order after the Second World War. China sought respite from a period of simultaneously going to war with the United States in Korea, deploying advisers to Vietnam, and troops to Tibet, concluding that the most favorable path forward would be a foreign policy of 'peaceful coexistence'.[93] Indian diplomatic introductions proved to be essential to this strategy, but the Chinese initiative was not to last. While China-India friendship flourished on the surface from 1954-7, the subsequent years, 1958-62 would begin a deterioration of relations culminating in the Border War of 1962.

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[92] Speech at Asian-African Conference, 19.4.1955, ZELNP 1, 465-6.
[93] See for example, Qiang, 53, quoting Zhou, 'We are in no condition to get involved in another war at this time'.

As this chapter has explained, there was an underlying pragmatism to China-India friendship as the two countries sought to build diplomatic and political architecture of their own as each one pursued their own interests and development as new nations in the shadow of the early Cold War. As Ramachandra Guha explains, the Asian country which Nehru found most interesting was China, owing to 'shared civilizational ties, their shared history of resistance to European colonialism, and their similar economics problems'.[94] Both countries sought to focus on economic development during this period. China pursued this, as Mao suggested, in order to build national strength and overcome the history of 'bullying' by foreign powers.[95] While both countries discussed the need for a peaceful environment in which to build their national economies, both in private conversations between heads of state and also in speeches at Bandung, India perhaps sought a more permanent and long term vision of a peaceful Asian order. The PRC would soon reverse its attitude altogether. Mao considered Zhou to be 'too conciliatory' during the Bandung period,[96] causing him to resign as Foreign Minister, as the PRC prepared for internal and external upheaval during Great Leap Forward and Second Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958.

The Five Principles and the Bandung Conference were the hallmarks of China-Indian friendship. Zhou concluded his mission at Bandung declaring before all delegates a vision of a unified Asia and Africa, proclaiming that 'we peoples of the Asian and African countries share the same fate and the same desires' and that China would support 'the just struggle waged by all the peoples of Asia and Africa to shake off colonial oppression and win national independence

[94] Ramachandra Guha, 'Jawaharlal Nehru: A Romantic in Politics', in Ramachandra Guha (ed.), *Makers of Modern Asia*, (London, 2014), 135.
[95] MZDNP 2, 584, 683 and MDZNP 3, 159, on 'bullying' and industrialization.
[96] Chen, 'Zhou Enlai', 147-8.

and the people's freedom'.[97] The rhetoric of anti-imperialism and shared struggle against colonialism was present not only in China and India's discourse with each other, but also the world which they sought to organize and lead. Indonesia's Sukarno spoke of 'liberation from bonds of fear, bonds of human degradation', turning also to the theme of brotherhood in the decolonizing world: 'And let us remember, Sisters and Brothers, that for the sake of all that, we Asians and Africans must be united'.[98] General Carlos Romulo of the Philippines wrote, a year after the conference, for example, of 'a new spiritual unity in Africa and Asia'.[99] However, for China and India, the 'Bandung spirit', as it came to be known, would become a diplomatic weapon that each nation would use against the other.

In a letter from Nehru to Congress Party leaders after Zhou's visit to India in 1954, the Indian Prime Minister, presumably addressing skepticism towards friendship and cooperation with China, asserted that the PRC had to be given the chance to prove whether or not it would honor its pledge to the Five Principles.[100] Moreover, China's willingness to do so, Nehru believed, would be increased if 'an environment' could be produced which would make it difficult or otherwise uncomfortable for China to go against these principles.[101] As Kahin explains, Nehru believed that 'Asian public opinion' would enforce China's adherence to the Five Principles, and that 'the wider the audience, the more substantial would be the environment

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[97] 'Speech by Premier Zhou Enlai at the Closing Session of the Asian-African Conference', 24.4.1955, CWIHPDA.
[98] 'Speech by President Soekarno at the Opening of the Asian-African Conference, April 18, 1955,' in George McTurnan Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955*, (Ithaca, 1956), 51.
[99] Carlos P. Romulo, *The Meaning of Bandung: Asian-African Conference, 1899-1985*, (Chapel Hill, 1956), 54.
[100] Kahin, 7.
[101] Ibid.

and clearer the moral interdiction'.[102] Thus, India sought to build a moral realm and an Asian court of opinion with which to contain potential Chinese hostility or aggression. Just as China sought to 'consolidate their tendency of neutrality' with regard to India building a moat of neutralism as widely as possibly around its borders to counter 'encirclement' by the 'imperialists', India sought to balance potential threats to China through the advancement of an Asianism built on declarations and practice of 'peaceful coexistence'.[103]

The difference, perhaps, is that Nehru seemed to believe that the order he sought to build must include China, 'whether you like it or not' as he expressed it, and that China's revolution would ultimately take a milder course if brought into contact with the rest of the world, in this case the Asian and African sphere that he was building through energetic diplomacy, personal eminence and the implicit recognition by other countries of India as a leader in the decolonizing world. The five countries which organized the Bandung conference all sought to build peaceful relations with the PRC and believed that the stability of Asia depended on this.[104] China's view of India, however, was equally pragmatic, but more volatile and less accepting of an outcome in which the two would be peers. India under Nehru envisioned an Asia shared with China. China under Mao and Zhou envisioned national resurrection, vied continuously against the American strategic position in Asia, and would soon contest Soviet leadership of the Communist world as well. The court of 'Asian public opinion' that Nehru sought to build would become an arena in which the two countries would do battle.

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[102] Ibid.
[103] Li Qianyu, China Foreign Affairs University, uses this phrase on neutrality, in an unpublished article on the strategic purposes of 'peaceful coexistence'. Conversations with Dr. Li were influential in the author's understanding of this period.
[104] Kahin, 4-8.

Perhaps as important as the diplomacy of 'peaceful coexistence' was that the Five Principles were meant to settle the question of Indian claims to rights and interests in Tibet. As Chinese diplomatic documents reveal, the PRC later believed that India was 'violating' not only its 'territorial sovereignty and integrity' in the Himalayas, but also that: 'It is very clear that the Indian Government has not at all resigned itself to China's exercise of sovereignty in Tibet'.[105] The collapse of China-India relations was arguably made worse by the Five Principles, given that they were meant to codify a mutual understanding of the terms on which the two countries would interact, and yet, when a serious dispute did arise just several years later, each side used the Five Principles to advance unilateral claims, and assert that the opposite side had breached an agreement that was meant to settle any differences.[106] With regard to Tibet, the region was too volatile and PRC control over its politics and events was too tenuous, for a diplomatic agreement between China and India to hold down the fractious Himalayas. [107] The Tibetan Uprising of 1959 would give the lie to PRC control of the region. The Five Principles assumed that the fate of the Himalayas was already decided. However, neither the China-India border, nor the future of the Tibetan people were settled questions. In reality, Chinese control over Tibet was tenuous, and the fate of this region and its people, as the Dalai Lama's flight to India in 1959 reveals, involved both countries.[108] The failure by both parties to see Tibet as anything other than a settled question during the friendship years would suddenly put what China saw as its vital interests at

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[105] *ZDWGX 1962*, 11.5.1962*,* 42.
[106] See also Khan, Borderlands, 26-30, on the Principles in China-India relations.
[107] See Khan, *Borderlands*, for a comparative view.
[108] The Dalai Lama sought asylum in India twice, first in 1956 when Zhou brought him on his visit to New Delhi. The Dalai Lama 'escaped his Chinese minders and told Nehru of the troubles he and his people were facing'. Nehru dissuaded him from seeking asylum and said that he would ask the PRC to pursue more lenient policies. – Guha, 'Nehru', 135.

the mercy of the unpredictability of a transnational crisis just several years later, dragging India into a picture whose reality was more complex than this declaration of principles could account for. What is worse, the Panch Sheel agreement set into treaty that India agreed to support Chinese interests, even if these interests were subject to events both inevitable and unforeseen.

3.7 The East Wind Prevails Over the West Wind

The years 1954-57 led to a sense of confidence in the PRC which must be attributed in large part to the help of India. At the end of 1957, Mao declared in Moscow that 'the east wind is prevailing over the west wind', meaning that the 'forces of socialism are overwhelmingly superior to the forces of imperialism'.[109] The policy of 'peaceful coexistence' had become the hallmark of diplomatic exchanges with nations in Asia or Africa, whether neutral, Communist-leaning, or even allied with the United States.[110] Stalin's death in 1953, however, and his succession by Nikita Khrushchev, shook the Sino-Soviet relationship as Khrushchev denounced the policies of his predecessor in a speech in 1956. 'De-Stalinization' as it came to be known, marked the beginning of serious divergences in Sino-Soviet relations.[111] Mao sensed in Khrushchev a weaker statesman, eager to please and to seek out the attention of the PRC Chairman.[112] Soon Mao would bid against the Soviet Union for leadership within the Communist bloc in a radicalism that would course through Chinese diplomacy on all fronts, whether in the

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[109] Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, *Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership: A New History, 1945-1959*, (Lanham, 2015), 264.
[110] See CWIHPDA for discussions, for example, with US-allied Pakistan.
[111] Luthi, *Sino-Soviet*, 78.
[112] Levine and Pantsov, 425.

Afro-Asian world, towards the United States, or with its new Indian 'brother'. The Afro-Asian world, and Chinese support for national liberation movements, was one of the primary arenas for this new hard line, and the relationship with India would wither as the PRC objected not only to Indian missions under banner of the United Nations but also to what the Foreign Ministry saw as the promotion of a different set of liberation values and ideals.

The CCP was also motivated by a belief that the Socialist camp had seized a technological edge over the West with the Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite in 1957, and that they must therefore press ahead while they held the advantage in rocket technology and could not thus be 'blackmailed' by Western nuclear weapons.[113] Sino-Soviet tensions were exacerbated by Chinese attempts to urge the Communist world into a 'more activist international posture' and soon all Soviet advisors would be withdrawn.[114] Crucially, however, Mao saw India as a harbinger and an integral piece in the notion of 'East Wind' dominance in 1957. As such, the Chairman's vision of a tide of revolution that combined Chinese, Soviet, and Indian power in order to overwhelm the old world and usher in a new one is clear. He viewed India in contrast and in opposition to the West, and as a component piece in a broader assault against and opposition to the 'imperialist' world, drawing upon national revolutions in the decolonizing world. As the Chairman said in a visit to Moscow in November 1957:

> Who is stronger, the underdeveloped or advanced countries? Who is stronger, India or Britain, Indonesia or Holland, Algeria or France? To my mind all the imperialist

[113] Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation*, (London, 1970), 14.
[114] Ibid., 15.

> countries are in a position which is like the position of the sun at 6 P.M., but ours is like the position of the sun at 6 A.M. Thus the tide has turned…Undoubtedly, the Eastern wind prevails over the Western wind, for we are strong.[115]

However, this view would change during the years of collapse which soon followed, as the CCP came to view India as a saboteur rather than a partner in advancing the vision laid out above. Peaceful coexistence with India would became a casualty of an aggressive turn in Chinese foreign policy that stemmed partly from this new confidence and also from the combination of internal and external policies as Mao pursued his 'continuous revolution'.[116] The pragmatism of the years of peaceful coexistence soon gave way to, or perhaps laid the foundations for, an aggressive mixture of challenges to nations abroad and purges of dissent at home. Even Zhou Enlai, the architect of relations with India, was told by Mao, as he stepped down as Foreign Minister, that he was '50 meters away from becoming a rightist'.[117] Importantly, in these years, Nehru developed his interest in and relations with the USSR, with an exchange of visits with Nikita Khrushchev in 1955, and the commencement of Soviet technological support and advisory on industrial projects in India.[118]

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[115] Garver, *Foreign Relations*, 130.
[116] See Chen, *Mao's China*, 72.
[117] Chen, 'Zhou Enlai', 159.
[118] Ray, *India's Foreign Relations*, 556-7, and Robert C. Horn, *Soviet-Indian Relations: Issues and Influence*, (New York, 1982).

3.8 Conclusions

China's relations with India, despite soaring words of brotherhood, served clear pragmatic objectives for both parties. India saw the need to bring China into an Asian order, lest an alienated China be destructive to Asian peace. China saw that neutralism was a useful forum in which to advance strategic objectives, initially built around preventing further US penetration of Asia, a kind of reverse containment. Eventually, as PRC foreign policy shifted from promotion of 'peaceful coexistence' towards the promotion of violent national liberation movements in the Afro-Asian sphere, the Afro-Asian world became the place for an attempt at a kind of 'roll-back' of China's own, against the 'imperialist' world. India would be caught up in this on a number of fronts. Importantly, tensions in Southeast Asia were increasing, as America and China supported opposite sides in the conflict in Vietnam.[119] It is important to note that for all Zhou's talk of peace at Geneva in 1954, he vigorously worked with his Communist allies to seek strategic and political advantage in Southeast Asia. China was fighting the Cold War and promoting 'peaceful coexistence' simultaneously. India sought a third way through nonalignment. Ultimately the two visions would clash against each other and the partnership would crumble. Perhaps there should have been no surprise. As Mao said to Nehru in 1954, 'Cooperation has to be beneficial; otherwise, who will join in it?'[120]

Nonetheless, as a friend India loomed large in Chinese diplomacy and strategy. India was the facilitator of China's reinvention on the world stage during these years. As an opponent,

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[119] See Qiang, *Vietnam Wars*, and Priscilla Roberts (ed.), *Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the World Beyond Asia*, (Stanford, 2006).
[120] FMA 204-00007-17, CWIHPDA.

India would loom even larger. While the breakdown in China-India relations began subtly, but visibly, in 1958 and gathered momentum from 1959-62, the roots were visible in the friendship years, and even beforehand. In addition to the larger question of two disparate visions of two new nations with ambitious plans, the practicalities that would later lead to open rift were present already in 1956 and 1957. Chinese and Indian border patrols began to encounter each other in the Himalayas, though not yet to the point that the two governments acknowledged that there was a dispute, and the Chinese government began to worry about 'rebellion' taking place in Tibet. In a conversation with the Dalai Lama while visiting New Delhi on December 30, 1956 – the same trip in which the Dalai Lama would try for the first time to seek asylum in India – Zhou Enlai spoke of 'trouble-makers' in Tibet, seeking Tibetan independence and aiming to 'split Tibet from China', all while receiving help from the Indian territory of Kalimpong.[121] Zhou explained his view to the Dalai Lama in the following days:

> Right now in Lhasa there is a group of people that want to foment rebellion, and there are also these kinds of people in Kalimpong. The People's Liberation Army ultimately practices self-defense, but if they stir up rebellion, then the People's Liberation Army will definitely crush the rebellion for the sake of national defense and self-defense. More importantly, we cannot allow opposition to China. To foment rebellion and oppose the country is impermissible. If it is done in Tibet, we will manage it. If it is done in Kalimpong, India will stop it. There are people that want the Dalai Lama to stay in India and work for Tibetan independence. This is impossible. I urge the Dalai Lama to return as soon as possible and continue the work [of CCP mandated reform] in Tibet.[122]

The idea of coordinating a suppression of Tibetan 'rebellion' with India was wishful thinking as we will later see. The disputed Himalayan territories would become a focal point, though not the only focal point, in hostilities between China and India. China did attempt to negotiate a resolution to the border dispute, which would soon become the catalyst for a breakdown in

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[121] 周恩来军事活动记事（北京, 2000）Record of the Military Activities of Zhou Enlai, 2 Vols. (Beijing, 2000), Vol. 2, 410.
[122] Ibid., 411.

relations. The border acted as one catalyst in the breakdown of relations, but relations were built on problematic foundations and would ultimately give way to differing visions of the world and of the place that each China and India would occupy in the world. The friendship period thus appears closer to an attempt to bridge a deep divide and to reconcile differences by building diplomatic architecture according to which two powerful nations could coexist. Both saw this friendship and coexistence as in their interest. The ways that India could help China have been explored in this chapter. The ways that India could challenge China, and the gravity of this challenge, will be discussed in the subsequent chapters.

Chapter 4 – The China-India Split and the Road to War, 1958-62

4.1 Chapter Purpose

The China-India Border War of 1962 is generally understood as a violent episode in a boundary dispute between India and China. By examining perspectives from within the government of the People's Republic of China, using documents pertaining to the CCP leadership, military, and Foreign Ministry, this chapter will demonstrate that the collapse of China-India relations, occurring between 1958-62 and culminating in the Border War of 1962, had much more profound and diverse sources than the current literature suggests. Moreover, this chapter will demonstrate that India had a larger place in early PRC consciousness than has thus far been appreciated. In presenting an overview of essential events and attitudes arising during these years of collapse as a whole, this chapter will prepare the reader for deeper analysis in subsequent chapters.

This chapter will demonstrate that:

- CCP perceptions of a threat from India ran far deeper than the territorial dispute.
- CCP leaders and officials saw India as a significant international actor that threatened PRC objectives in Asia and Africa as well as playing a negative and even dangerous role in the PRC's struggle with the superpowers.
- The CCP saw Indian activity as a threat to the objectives and tenets of the 'New China', which included characterization of the Indian government as heirs to the British Empire.[1]

[1]See for example 周恩来外交文选 (北京, 1989) Selected diplomatic works of Zhou Enlai, (Beijing, 1989), 275, hereafter *ZELWJ*, for use of the term the 'New China'. This concept will be explored in depth in this thesis.

Between 1958 and 1962, Chinese leaders and diplomats came to view India as a comprehensive threat to the national security and foreign policy agendas of the PRC. In addition to perceived Indian interference in 'internal affairs' pertaining to Tibet, PRC analyses characterized India as a global competitor, attacking and undermining Chinese interests in the Afro-Asian sphere, which the two countries had essentially created together in the mid-1950s, supporting the United States, the PRC's primary enemy, in regions as diverse as Turkey, the Congo, Cuba, and Laos, as well as colluding with the United States in the Himalayas, and attempting to divide up China's relations with the USSR, which was aggressively courting influence in India, and until, the onset of the Sino-Soviet split, had been the external guarantor of the security of the Chinese Communist revolution.[2] As such, Chinese officials saw India as both an immediate threat to China's security and to the founding principles of the new People's Republic, and also as an opponent in what the PRC saw as an 'international struggle' against both American-led 'imperialism' and Soviet 'revisionism'.[3]

In *Mao's China and the Cold War*, Chen Jian writes of the Chinese Communist revolution's two 'fundamental missions' – in addition to creating a 'new Communist society' in China, CCP leaders would 'change China's status as a weak country and revive its central position on the world scene'.[4] As this chapter will demonstrate, CCP leaders and officials came to believe that the Republic of India threatened both the revival of China's national power and also its position in world affairs. India's own rise to prominence in international affairs during the 1950s and early 1960s, and its own strategic influence and interests in the Himalayas, which PRC leaders came to associate with the former British Empire, meant that the newly founded

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[2] See Gaddis, 54-84 on the Sino-Soviet alliance.
[3] See FMA 105-01519-01 驻印度使馆：1961 年印度对外关系概况 Embassy in India: Overview of India's foreign relations in 1961, 1.1.1962.
[4] Chen, *Mao's China*, 280.

Republic of India was, in the eyes of PRC leaders and officials, a threat to the 'fundamental mission', as Chen Jian characterizes it, of the 'New China' itself.[5] As such, both the depth of India's perceived challenge to the People's Republic and the importance of India in the early PRC worldview have not yet been grasped by the current literature.

In addition to reviewing essential events during the collapse of China-India relations from 1958-62 and attendant points of view from within the Chinese government, including the rise of the border dispute as a bilateral issue and the difficulties posed to both sides by the Tibetan uprising, this chapter will also provide context to PRC viewpoints by making use of the well-developed secondary literature on early Cold War history, in order to situate the thesis within the wider international context in which the collapse of China-India relations unfolded. This will include referring to assessments made by scholars about the nature of India's foreign relations and the events occurring within the global struggle between the United States and USSR which dominated international affairs during the period.

[5] NB: In his essay, 'China's Decision for War with India', Garver explains that Indian actions threatened the 'New China' and the idea that 'the Chinese people have stood up', however he uses this idea in part to explain the problem with the Indian leadership's idea that China would not retaliate, and China's determination to uphold its national sovereignty on the questions of Tibet and the border. He does not explore the idea in depth in his essay, or the ways in which India as a whole had come to be perceived as a comprehensive strategic threat to China. This thesis will devote an entire chapter to India's threat to the 'New China'.

4.2 Events Summary: The Collapse of China-India Relations 1958-62

The China-India relationship came apart during the years 1958-62. During these years, a series of events and clashes in the Himalayan border areas contributed substantially to the worsening of relations. In order to orient the reader, a brief summary is helpful upfront: in 1958, border tensions began in earnest as the two sides realized that they had disagreements over the boundary. 1959 saw the Tibetan Uprising, the flight of the Dalai Lama to India, and the first deadly clashes on the border, occurring in the Eastern Sector. In 1960 Zhou Enlai visited New Delhi in order to negotiate over the boundary, but the visit was not successful. In 1961, the Indian government began the Forward Policy, deploying troops and building military outposts in the disputed territories. 1962 saw an increase in violent clashes in the disputed territories, culminating in the outbreak of the Border War on October 20th, 1962. While these events are essential in understanding the collapse of relations and the culmination in violence, this chapter will explore the understanding of India held on the Chinese side, revealing that the view of India's challenge to the PRC was far more profound than disagreement over the disputed border and related events in the Himalayas.

4.3 Overview and Background to the Collapse of China-India Relations, 1958-62

By 1958, the high-tide of China-Indian friendship had peaked and the two nations began to face profound difficulties and disagreements. While the collapse of relations has important and observable roots before and during the years of China-India friendship which will be examined in other chapters, the years 1958-62 were the decisive period in which the two nations set upon the road to the Border War of 1962, an event which has marked relations ever since.

During these years, major changes unfolded within the Chinese foreign ministry, as Zhou Enlai, the architect of friendship with India was forced to carry out self-criticisms for his handling of Chinese foreign policy in 1958, before being replaced by Marshal Chen Yi as Minister of Foreign Affairs. [6] Mao sought to mobilize a military spirit within the country in conjunction with the Great Leap Forward, and the People's Republic went through a period of upheaval as Mao used overseas crises to galvanize the revolutionary spirit that he thought must underpin his radical domestic reforms.[7] The disputed China-India border came into focus almost simultaneously with the outbreak of armed rebellion against Communist Party rule in Tibet, leading Chinese leaders and analysts to believe that India harbored expansionist aims in the Himalayas.[8] Soon Chinese officials viewed India as an antagonist in the PRC's regional and international struggle. Chinese leaders and analysts saw India as a supporter of both the United States and USSR as enmity with America continued and as relations with the USSR began to fall apart, amplifying India's importance as an international actor and its perceived ability to undermine PRC objectives through superpower support, and as an antagonist in the Afro-Asian

[6] Chen, *Mao's China*, 173. Zhou retained his position as Premier of the PRC.
[7] Ibid., 174-5 and 202.
[8] Garver, 'Decision', 93-5.

sphere where the PRC sought influence beyond the reach of the superpowers. As Chinese assistance to Vietnam continued, and the standoff with the United States in Taiwan went into crisis in 1958, troubles in the Himalayas added another major theatre to China's regional issues. By 1960, the Chinese foreign ministry was reporting on India as though it was an enemy. India had become, in the estimates of the PRC, a third significant antagonist, alongside the two superpowers themselves.

Nehru's decision to move troops into disputed Himalayan territory occupied by China, Chinese perceptions of Indian claims on Tibet, and the dead-end nature of negotiations over the border all played important roles in the outbreak of the China-India Border War of 1962.[9] However, as this chapter will demonstrate, the PRC had a much wider conception of Indian rivalry and an Indian threat to China, and this threat fit within and built upon the embattled worldview of China's leadership as they struggled to carry their national revolution forward.

4.4 1958: The Beginning of a Split

By 1958, the Himalayan border between India and China was a place of repeated small-scale incidents. Indian and Chinese patrols met regularly in the mountains, threatening each other with small arms and claiming that the land they met each other on belonged to their own country.[10] Patrolling issues had started as early as 1954, when the Chinese Foreign Ministry wrote to the Indian Embassy in Beijing about Indian patrolling in the Western Sector of the border, which they claimed was 'not in keeping with China and India's principles of mutual non-

[9] See Garver, 'Decision' for perceptions of Indian activity in Tibet and Maxwell for a detailed account of the Forward Policy.
[10] See *ZGHYD*, 168-234, 291-292, 356-60, and 361-393 for diplomatic exchanges of this nature.

aggression and peaceful coexistence'.[11] By 1958, the border was a significant issue in China-India relations. A Chinese diplomatic notice regarding the arrest of an Indian patrol along the southwest Xinjiang border towards the end of the year illustrates the kind of complications that had been taking place in the Himalayas since the mid-1950s:

> These personnel clearly crossed into Chinese national territory, moreover they were carrying out illegal reconnaissance inside the Chinese border. Therefore the Chinese border defence force arrested them at once. The two groups of personnel included three active duty military officers, four soldiers and eight hired mercenaries. They were traveling with three submachine guns, rifles and handguns for each man, radios, surveying and photography equipment and horses.[12]

India replied with 'surprise and regret' – the patrol had been held for five weeks before they received any notice from China, yet the tone of friendship still remained: 'The Indian government had hoped that in view of the good and friendly relations between our two countries, our government would have been informed immediately…'[13] This was the first incident of an arrest on the Himalayan border. In 1956 a Chinese patrol threatened an Indian patrol with a hand grenade, but armed clashes on the border had not yet taken place.[14]

1958 brought the border into focus for the Indian leadership. A Chinese road had been discovered one year earlier that cut through the Western Sector, and the PRC published a map of China in a magazine that brought the disputed territories to the forefront of diplomatic correspondence between China and India. In August, 1958, after learning of the newly published map, the Indian Foreign Ministry made a statement to the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi stating that the following territories were listed as Chinese: 'four of five of our Northeast border regions,

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[11] Ibid., 366.
[12] Ibid., 295.
[13] Ibid., 296.
[14] Ibid., 362.

several places in the northern part of our northern province, a large portion of eastern Ladakh which constitutes part of Jammu and Kashmir'.[15] The statement noted that portions of Bhutan were also listed as Chinese territory – the status of the Himalayan kingdoms in between China and India would later become an issue as well. The map issue had come up in the past, as the Indian diplomatic notice pointed out, when Nehru had discussed a similar Chinese map with Zhou Enlai during their 1954 meeting in Beijing.[16] Zhou told Nehru in 1954, the Foreign Ministry recalled, that the map was based on an old map of China and the People's Republic had not yet corrected these maps. The Indian Foreign Ministry went on to recommend that the PRC 'make the necessary corrections to these maps without delay'.[17]

It was not to be so simple. The reply by the PRC three months later stated that indeed this map was based on a 'pre-Liberation map of China', as Zhou had pointed out in 1954.[18] However, the Chinese notice stated, the PRC continued to use this map as they still had not surveyed their borders, had not discussed borders with each relevant country, and could not simply change the map themselves.[19] The PRC would settle its borders with Burma and Nepal in 1960, but, as Zhou and Nehru began to discuss the border again in 1958, prompted by the new map and road, the China-India border question would grow larger, more intractable, and more complex with each new year before the war.

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[15] Ibid., 291.
[16] Verma's account of the Border War uses these Zhou-Nehru meetings to suggest that China was in fact comfortable with the McMahon Line as a de facto border, and that later rejections of the McMahon Line by the PRC were disingenuous and ill-willed. See Verma, *Struggle for the Himalayas*. This thesis focuses on the comprehensive drivers of China-India collapse, rather than the debate over the border itself, which has been well-documented.
[17] *ZGHYD*, 291-2. See also Maxwell, 96 for reference to this map.
[18] *ZGHYD*, 292.
[19] Ibid.

In 1958, the PRC also brought up the question of US and GMD sponsored Tibetan activity in Kalimpong, a border town on Indian territory in between Bhutan and Nepal which had been a traditional gateway for crossings between India and Tibet. After the PLA entered Tibet in 1950, Tibetan refugees had fled for Kalimpong and indeed it served as a staging base for Khampas who were in contact with the CIA.[20] Though Nehru had called Kalimpong 'a nest of spies' in the Lok Sabha in 1953, the Indian Foreign Ministry denied any knowledge of CIA and GMD activities on their territory in their exchange with the PRC in 1958.[21] The PRC Foreign Ministry stated in a diplomatic notice in July that 'America and the Chiang Kai-shek clique are collaborating with reactionary elements that have fled from Tibet, and are using India's Kalimpong as a base', also mentioning that Zhou Enlai had brought the subject up with Nehru in 1956, and that Nehru had replied that if the Chinese government could provide proof, the Indian government would take action.[22] The 1958 notice went on to say that US and GMD secret agents were 'conspiring to add tension to China's Tibetan region' by 'actively stirring up and organizing small numbers of concealed reactionary elements inside Tibet' and 'conspiring to launch an armed rebellion in Tibet in order to meet the treasonous goal of splitting Tibet off of the People's Republic of China'.[23] The notice listed names of individual Tibetans, including some who had allegedly been in the United States, Tibetan organizations that were 'collecting intelligence and spreading propaganda into Tibet', and printing newspapers that were spreading 'vicious slander and rumors against the Chinese government, Chinese Communist Party, and People's Liberation Army' which would 'sow discord between the Chinese Han and Tibetan

[20] Shakya, 172-180.
[21] *ZGHYD*, 50-2. See Maxwell, 104 for Nehru's Kalimpong reference in the Lok Sabha.
[22] See *ZGHYD*, 47.
[23] Ibid., 47-9.

nationalities'.[24] The notice stated that Chiang Kai-shek had a special organization that was using Kalimpong as a stronghold to collect intelligence on Tibet, transport arms and ammunition to Tibet, dispatch spies, and provoke a Tibetan rebellion. This activity, Chinese MFA noted, constituted a direct threat to the PRC:

> The Chinese government believes that the above mentioned evil activities by reactionary elements and special agent elements are a direct threat to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and a sinister conspiracy by American imperialism to create tension in the Afro-Asian sphere. What cannot be overlooked is that special agents of America and the Chiang Kai-shek clique are using the territory of China's neighbor India to carrying out destructive activities against the PRC, including, moreover, the wicked goal of damaging China and India's good relations.[25]

The MFA went on to implore India to put a stop to these American and GMD activities, in the name of friendly relations between China and India and in the name of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. While the friendly tone remained – and both sides still seemed to have valued a cooperative relationship at this stage – China's concerns over the Himalayas were growing, as American covert activity, the vestiges of the Chinese Civil War, Tibetan unrest and Indian claims to territory coalesced.

In 1958, China's international position began to change dramatically. Though relations with India continued to take a moderate tone despite emerging issues, a period of upheaval in the PRC had begun, as tensions escalated with the United States and the Soviet Union, and domestic disaster befell the country in the form of the Great Leap Forward.

Khrushchev, who returned a Soviet naval port in Northeast China upon coming to power, advanced the idea of a joint submarine fleet in 1958, for Soviet-Chinese use. The episode

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[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid., 49.

enraged Mao who told his Soviet counterpart that 'The British, the Japanese, and many other foreigners stayed in our territories for a very long time, and we drove them out. Comrade Khrushchev, I will repeat one last time: we will never allow anyone to use our national land to achieve their own ends'.[26] With the launching of the Second Taiwan Straits Crisis just weeks after Khrushchev's visit, and without informing the Soviet Union of China's plans in the Straits despite nearly bringing war with the United States, the Sino-Soviet split had begun. Mao himself later called this year the beginning of the split: 'the overturning of [our relations with] the Soviet Union occurred in 1958; that was because they wanted to control China militarily'.[27]

Meanwhile, the PRC entered into a new period of revolutionary fervor with the launch of the Great Leap Forward. As the PRC prepared 'to surpass Britain [economically] in a period of even shorter than fifteen years', Zhou Enlai was forced into self-criticisms of both his opposition to a more assertive economic agenda in the mid-1950s and also of his foreign policy itself, particularly for being soft on 'imperialism' and for not engaging in 'necessary struggle' in the nationalist countries [presumably of Afro-Asia].[28] As Zhou turned over his post as Foreign Minister to Chen Yi, though retaining his position as Premier, the newly assigned military Marshal began a program of ideological cleansing in the Chinese MFA to deal with 'rightist tendency'.[29] China's ambassador to India, Pan Zili, however, remained in his post, where he had been appointed in 1956.[30]

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[26]毛泽东与外国首脑及记者会谈录, (北京, 2012) Record of Mao Zedong's conversations with foreign leaders and journalists (Beijing, 2012), 165. See also Qing, *Allies*, 265 and Luthi, *Sino-Soviet*, 93-4 for similar accounts. William Taubman, *Khrushchev: The Man and His Era*, (London, 2003), 391 uses this quote as well.
[27] Chen, *Mao's China,* 75.
[28] Ibid., 73 and 173.
[29] Ibid., 173.
[30] See Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark, *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1965*, (Cambridge, 1971), Vol. 2, 710-2, on Pan Zili, a military political officer, also

As Chen Jian writes of the combination of revolutionary fervor at home and abroad, 'When the Great Leap Forward was implemented, not surprisingly, Beijing's external policy became dramatically radicalized'.[31] Zhou himself seems to have embraced the new direction in foreign policy ultimately. Speaking to Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Beijing during the shelling of the offshore islands in the Taiwan Straits, the architect of friendship with India told the Soviet diplomat that the purpose of the Straits Crisis was 'to raise the combat spirit of our people and their readiness for war, to enhance their feeling of not being afraid of war and their hatred toward American imperialism and its aggressive, insolent foreign policy'.[32]

By the end of 1958, fissures in the Sino-Indian relationship were visible. Patrolling tensions in the Himalayas had increased and the border question had become a matter of serious discussion between the two countries, with each side using the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to justify identical claims to territory. Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, an issue which the Five Principles was meant to settle, had returned as a bilateral issue, which would become deeply inflamed in the following year with the Tibetan Uprising and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India. The status of neighboring Himalayan border countries had also been raised, as India had signed treaties with Sikkim and Bhutan in 1949 which secured Indian rights to manage the foreign affairs of these two sovereign countries – something which presented an

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Ambassador to North Korea and, after leaving India in 1962, Ambassador to the USSR. See Liu, *Ambassadors,* for an account of the formation and workings of the PRC diplomatic services during the Maoist period. Though the account is thorough, diplomatic work in India is referred to only briefly.

[31] Chen, *Mao's China*, 73.

[32] Ibid., 188.

additional arena of India-China competition alongside competition in Afro-Asia.[33] Finally, the belief that US and GMD covert operations were taking place out of Indian territory laid the foundation for a much wider concept of Indian cooperation with the United States, to the point that, in the years leading up to the war, PRC analysts believed that India had become a virtual American proxy state, despite the banner of nonalignment.

With the rapid onset of events in 1959, the stage had been set for an open rift between the two countries.

4.5 1959: Himalayan Events Add Tension and Trouble

In 1959, difficulties over the Himalayas came together all at once. A revolt had been spreading through Tibet since late 1957, which included guerrilla training and supply drops to a small number of Khampa rebels by the CIA.[34] By March 1959, the Khampas presented a serious problem to both the Chinese presence in Tibet and to the Tibetan government itself which was operating under the 17-Points Agreement signed in Beijing in 1951. As the revolt spread around the country, the Dalai Lama was preparing for his final exam in Buddhist studies, which would take place publicly in Lhasa during the festival of Monlam Chenmo, a time of celebration which had led to anti-Chinese activity in the past.[35] The Chinese authorities in Tibet had invited the Dalai Lama to view a Tibetan dance group which had recently returned to Lhasa after he finished

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[33] See Raj Kumar Jha, *The Himalayan Kingdoms in Indian Foreign Policy*, (Ranchi, 1986), and Andrew Duff, *Sikkim: Requiem for a Himalayan Kingdom*, (Edinburgh, 2015), for analysis of India and other Himalayan states.
[34] Shakya, 172-80. See also Knaus.
[35] Shakya, 182.

his exam. The dance would take place at the PLA headquarters in Lhasa.[36] As the date drew nearer, tensions spread in the city as members of the Dalai Lama's retinue secretly informed the public of the Dalai Lama's planned visit to the PLA military camp. Rumours began to spread among the people that he would be abducted to Beijing, perhaps not to return. Crowds of thousands formed outside the Dalai Lama's summer palace. Tibetan officials, representing the Kashag government which answered to China, were murdered in the streets, and the Tibetan population clashed with the PLA throughout Lhasa. On March 17th, PLA artillery shells landed near the summer palace and the Dalai Lama left with his retinue that evening in disguise, first for Khampa controlled territory near the Indian border, and then for India itself.[37]

1959 is often thought of as the turning point in China-India relations.[38] The Tibetan Uprising and flight of the Dalai Lama brought India and China into higher tensions than ever before. As the PLA pursued the Khampas south towards the Indian border, Himalayan spaces that had been porous enough to be held by rebel groups fell under Chinese Army control. The China-India border was militarizing and the PRC began to carry out a much harsher policy towards Tibet overall.[39] Indian and Chinese leaders had fundamentally different views of Tibet, which had long acted as a de facto buffer zone between the two countries.[40] The 1954 Panch

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[36] Ibid., 182.
[37] Ibid., 201-11.
[38] See, for example, Chen, 'Rebellion' and Luthi, 'Sino-Indian'.
[39] The 1959 response to the Tibetan Uprising is similar to the Qing dynasty response to Britain's Younghusband Expedition in 1904, when Francis Younghusband, led troops into Lhasa in search of a suspected Russian strategic presence in Tibet. Once the Qing realized that Tibet could be penetrated from India, they abandoned their relatively laissez-faire 'patron-priest' relationship with Lhasa, which they had established in imitation of the China-Tibetan relationship that began under the Buddhist Yuan dynasty. In its place, the Manchus marched into Lhasa, annihilating resistance in Eastern Tibet, destroying monasteries, and then garrisoning Lhasa. See Van Schaik.
[40] Chen Jian, 'Rebellion', 84.

Sheel Agreement settled the status of Tibet to India's satisfaction: while India gave up 'special interests' in the region, Nehru believed that geography would always prohibit a significant Chinese military presence in the region.[41] However, with the 1959 Tibetan uprising, the PLA became a force in the region, bringing it right to India's borders and giving the boundary issue new importance.[42] More frequent PLA patrolling in pursuit of rebels led to more frequent contact with Indian patrols, and culminated in the first fatalities on the border on August 25th 1959, at Longju in the Eastern Sector, when members of an Indian patrol were killed in a firefight with Chinese troops.

The view of India inside the Chinese government had begun to darken. However, it is clear from internal reporting that areas of the Chinese government and military did not believe that it was simply the border dispute that drove the collapse of China-India relations. A report from the Intelligence Department of the PLA General Staff Department comments on a wave of anti-China feeling that was sweeping through Indian media, statements, and public opinion as tensions escalated in the Himalayas:

> Following the rebellion in Tibet, India capitalized on the Sino-Indian border dispute and initiated the second anti-China wave in mid-August. With Nehru being the chief commander, this movement was on a rather high profile in the beginning, represented by more than ten distorted and instigating speeches within just one month. The rightists are even more arrogant in the fabrication of slander, so that even some intelligent people have become carried away in an unreasonable sense of nationalism…[43]

[41] Ibid., 82.
[42] Ibid and Fravel, 78-81.
[43] ''Report from the PLA General Staff Department, "Behind India's Second Anti-China Wave",' 29.10.1959, FMA 105-00944-07, CWIHPDA, 84-90.

The Intelligence Department saw the alleged anti-China fever in India as having several strategic objectives, the first of which was 'expansionism', in emulation of the British Empire, also stating that Indian ambitions in Tibet dated back to Independence:

> To force China to accept the 'McMahon Line'… Since independence, India has always intended to inherit imperialist Britain's expansionism and is very dissatisfied with our non-recognition and temporary maintenance of the status-quo. India used to trouble us during the printing of our maps. It felt even more alarmed when our armed forces reached the line because it was worried that we would cross the line to hunt down the rebels, as we do not recognize the line. It was even more worried about our recovery of the region to the south of this line after we consolidated our control over Tibet.[44]

Finally, the report mentioned also that India intended to 'flatter' the United States, from which India was receiving substantial amounts of economic aid,[45] and to create a Himalayan Union under Indian influence:

> [T]he Indian media and Parliament spread rumors about China's border conflicts with Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan and claim that China is encroaching upon small nations. [Nehru's] behaviors and declarations distinctively show India's intentions to turn Bhutan into a protected state like Sikkim and to strengthen control over Nepal, hence turning India, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim into a Himalayan Union.[46]

Even after fatal fire-fights with the Indian Army in Himalayas – explicable on one hand through the deepened PLA presence in Tibet – Chinese intelligence saw a wider program behind the confrontation with India, conflating Indian actions and domestic politics with a program to court the United States, itself active in the Himalayas, and assert Indian influence not only in Tibet, but over other Himalayan states as well. While the diplomatic tone between the two countries had been cordial through 1958, as this and other documents reveal, fears about India as

[44] Ibid.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.

a neighbor did not begin with troubles on the border in the late 1950s, rather dating to India's potential as a challenger '[s]ince independence'.[47]

As the Chinese view of India deteriorated inside the government, the Chinese leadership took to national media to criticize Indian policy in the Himalayas. In May, 1959, an article appeared in *The People's Daily* called 'The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru's Philosophy', attacking Nehru's response to the Tibetan Uprising, as he and many in the Indian government and public had shown sympathy for the Tibetans following the Uprising and its suppression in March 1959. The article, which Mao Zedong substantially edited himself, accuses Nehru and other Indian politicians of 'interference', 'applying…political pressure to [China's] internal affairs', following 'the tradition of the British government' on the status of Tibet, and aiming 'to prevent China from exercising full sovereignty over its own territory Tibet'.[48] It also outlined a kind of terms sheet for healthy China-India relations, praising India on the other hand for 'carrying out a foreign policy of friendship with China, with the Soviet Union and with other Socialist countries [and] of not joining in the military blocs of United States imperialism'[49] as well as issuing a stern warning that 'no interference by any foreign country or by the United Nations under whatever pretext or in whatever form will be tolerated'.[50]

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[47] Ibid.
[48] Garver, 'Decision', 94. See 'The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru's Philosophy', *People's Daily*, May 6th, 1959, in Harold C. Hinton (ed.), *The People's Republic of China 1949-1979: A Documentary Survey,* (Wilmington, 1980), Vol. 2, 821. See 吴冷西, 忆毛主席, (北京, 1995) Wu Lengxi, Remembering Chairman Mao, (Beijing, 1995), 115-131, for propaganda efforts and discussion of Nehru after the Uprising. See also Garver, 'Decision', 93.
[49] 'The Revolution in Tibet', 822.
[50] Ibid., 821.

Soon after the Tibetan Uprising, Zhou Enlai gave a speech on China-India relations to representatives of eleven Socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Mongolia, in which he laid out a much bleaker view of Indian activity, including allegations about GMD and US activity in Kalimpong and the Indian desire to create a 'buffer zone' in between China and India out of Tibet.[51] Perhaps most importantly, as Mao had done in his confrontation with Khrushchev over the proposed submarine fleet, Zhou's speech began to connect Indian actions to China's new nationalism and to the understanding of history that underpinned the 'New China':

> In the end of the 19th Century and the beginning of the 20th Century, imperialism carved out spheres of influence. Xinjiang was given to Russian imperialism and Tibet was given to British imperialism. But after the Russian revolution, Lenin nullified the unequal treaties. In India, however, a portion of the upper classes carries on with Britain's past policy, saying that Tibet is an 'independent country', saying that China only has 'suzerainty' or that Tibet is a 'protectorate'.[52]

The Chinese leadership and government had begun to identify Indian policy and strategy with the empires that predated on China in the past, caused havoc in the national psyche, and gave birth to a generation of Chinese leaders determined to rescue their country from further national humiliations.[53] However, by 1959, China's leaders saw vital challenges to this project emanating not only from the USSR and United States, but from India as well.

By 1959, India's threat to China was much larger than a territorial dispute.[54] India's capacity to challenge and provoke China in the Himalayas touched a nerve within the project of the 'New China' which was meant, in essence, to repudiate the humiliations of China's past.

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[51] ZELWJ, 268-76.
[52] Ibid., 269.
[53] See 'The Chinese People Have Stood Up!', 21.9.1949, in *Works of Mao*, Vol. 5, (Beijing, 1977), for concepts central to the founding of the PRC.
[54] NB: John Garver also uses the speech referenced above, and has an excellent literature review of Chinese language authors who largely argue that the Border War was a reaction to Nehru's desire to make Tibet into a buffer zone or to cleave the region off of China.

Chinese leadership now saw India as a threat to the core values of the People's Republic, in particular to respect for 'territorial sovereignty and integrity' and 'non-intervention in internal affairs', both of which were enshrined in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and which, in the 1950s, China intended to present before the world as a new model of international relations, with India's support.[55] Only the United States, the USSR, and India presented this kind of threat to the project of the PRC. From the GMD's 1949 flight to Taiwan onwards, the PRC saw United States support for the Taiwan-based Republic of China, and its political separation of Taiwan from the mainland, as breach of the sovereignty and integrity of China.[56] The Soviet Union also touched this nerve substantially as relations with China went into decline in the late 1950s, as the submarine fleet incident reveals. The plan which would include a radio station on the Chinese coast met with outrage from Mao Zedong as a violation of China's sovereignty, and is now considered a revealing episode in the Sino-Soviet split. The Soviet leader had unwittingly believed that this would be a welcome idea in their shared strategic struggle against the United States.[57]

As Zhou went on to say of the 1914 Simla Convention's McMahon Line in his speech to the Socialist nations, 'At that time, Yuan Shikai's government would not accept the Simla treaty. How can [India] imagine that the New China will accept it?'[58] In a similar vein, the public critique, 'Nehru's Philosophy' which appeared in the *People's Daily*, warned India and the wider world that '…interference by one country in the internal affairs of another may take diverse

[55] This theme is repeated in diplomatic notices, propaganda, and speeches throughout the period.
[56] See Chen, *Mao's China,* 187-9. See also Fravel, 227-266 on Taiwan and America in the early Cold War.
[57] See Luthi, *Sino-Soviet*, 92-5, and 250, as well as Radchenko, 12 and 81.
[58] *ZELWJ*, 275. Zhou distinguishes the 'New China' not only from the feudal past but implicitly from a government that followed the 1911 Revolution.

forms. To say that the Indian Government in the past and at present has not interfered in China's Tibet in any way does not sound convincing'.[59]

Nehru's India had thus entered into comparisons with both the most significant predators of the past, the British Empire and Czarist Russia, and also sat beside the new superpowers in its ability to alarm the PRC. In a spirit perhaps similar to PRC hostility towards the United States and the defiance that characterized the Chinese position in the Sino-Soviet split, Zhou's speech expressed not only the weight of India's challenge to China, but the PRC's determination to confront India over what it considered to be its internal affairs: 'Nehru understands that his actions cannot change our suppression of the Tibetan Uprising, that reform will definitely be carried out, and that the 'buffer zone' will vanish'.[60]

Mao Zedong expressed a similar determination to keep India out of Tibetan affairs during the same year in a meeting with Khrushchev who was advocating for peace between China and India: 'The Hindus acted in Tibet as if it belonged to them…We also support Nehru, but in the question of Tibet, we should crush him'.[61]

Interestingly, the PRC's concern over Indian encroachment was not limited to the Himalayas. On September 7th, 1959, just after the fatalities at Longju and in the midst of a diplomatic exchange over alleged Indian violations of Chinese airspace in the Himalayas, the PRC issued a warning to India over activities in the South China Sea as well. An Indian naval vessel approaching Hong Kong was said to have made 'an illegal intrusion into Chinese territorial waters' and was intercepted by the Chinese coast guard but then 'ignored the warnings

[59] 'The Revolution in Tibet', 820.
[60] *ZELWJ*, 275.
[61] 'Memorandum of Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Mao Zedong, Beijing, 2.10.1959, *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, No. 12/13, Fall/Winter 2001, 266.

and forced its way through'.[62] The Chinese notice explained that 'incidents of violation of the sovereignty of Chinese territorial waters [by India] happen on occasion', another instance of 'illegal intrusions into Chinese territorial waters' on a vessel's approach to Shanghai in 1958, and linking the two alleged incursions to Indian activity in the Himalayas:

> The Indian military has made ceaseless intrusions into China's Southeastern Tibet in recent months, and, moreover, has seized and occupied *tutamatun* and *shaze*, and has even made armed provocations towards the Chinese military in the *majidun* region…At the same time, Indian airplanes continue to invade Chinese airspace in this region. Thus, the Chinese government cannot but consider the intrusion of India's [*INS Magar*] landing ship into Chinese territorial waters to be part of India's plan to carry out military threats towards China by land, air and sea.[63]

India's protested that the vessel had not entered into Chinese waters; moreover, it was simply following a route in the South China Sea towards Hong Kong laid out in a manual on 'Navigation of the China Seas' published by the British Navy.[64] The Chinese response to this was outrage that India had not only 'not recognized the incident' but also 'cited the so-called 'Navigation of the China Seas' manual published by the British Navy before the Liberation of China'. The response went on: 'This kind of disregard for China's effort to cast off the chains of imperialism and become a fully independent and sovereign nation cannot but bring surprise and regret to the Chinese government'.[65] The notice then warned India to 'stop any naval vessels from violating China's sovereign territorial waters again'. As such, the British legacy in India was causing trouble not only in terms of the McMahon Line, but in terms of the waterways once used by the British Empire. As the Chinese view of India hardened in the years before the war, the government of India was often referred to as an heir to British imperialism, a force which had

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[62] *ZGHYD*, 415.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Ibid., 416-7.
[65] Ibid., 421.

marked the beginning of China's national humiliations.[66] Thus, as India was hardly a major naval power – though Nehru would deploy the Indian Navy against the Portuguese enclave in Goa in 1961 – the scope for India's challenge to the PRC went beyond the perceived challenge in the Himalayas and into a conceptual realm at the heart of China's revolution.

Other international factors continued to contribute to the deterioration of China-India relations, and domestic politics in China reached an important juncture as Mao purged Defense Minister Peng Dehuai while overriding dissenting views of the Great Leap Forward. Alarmed by Chinese statements on the use of nuclear weapons to win a victory for Communism and Chinese initiation of the Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1958, the USSR ended its agreement to assist China with nuclear technology in June 1959.[67] Chinese hostility to Khrushchev's new peaceful coexistence initiative with the United States, itself driven by the Soviet Premier's appreciation of the dangers of nuclear war, furthered the split on an ideological and strategic level. Meanwhile, Mao tied Peng's critique of the Great Leap Forward to troubles with the USSR, suggesting that perhaps Peng was working in secret with the Soviet Union.[68] The China-India border itself had become an issue in Sino-Soviet relations as Khrushchev tried to navigate the complexities of his foreign policy, which involved a thaw with the United States, friendship with India, and managing the troubled alliance with the PRC. Following the crises in the Himalayas in 1959, India became further entangled with China's superpower difficulties and thus with the CCP's view of a broader international struggle. Though the USSR showed support to the PRC during the Tibetan Uprising, when Chinese and Indian troops came into fatal clashes at Longju later in the year, the USSR

[66] See *Notes, Memoranda and Letters* for diplomatic notices and communications of this nature.
[67] Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution,* (Oxford, 1997), Vol. 2, 225.
[68] Ibid., 226-8.

adopted a position of 'neutrality', a move which rattled Sino-Soviet relations.[69] Naturally, the Soviet position was received with gladness in New Delhi. By now, China-India relations were in open disarray, and over the following years, the official view of India grew worse.

4.6 1960: Attempts to Reconcile; A Broader View of India

In 1960, the China-India relationship was marked by high-level global diplomacy with both the superpowers and in the Afro-Asia sphere. Eisenhower visited India at the end of 1959, and Khrushchev came to India just months afterwards. The Soviet Union withdrew its economic aid and advisors from China in 1960, as the Sino-Soviet split began to sink its teeth into the Communist world.[70] Notwithstanding, the USSR helped to facilitate a summit meeting between Nehru and Zhou in 1960, eager to resolve the disputed territories and seeking reconciliation between China and India for strategic purposes. The United States had intensified its courtship of India through economic aid, and PRC analyses closely followed the superpower competition for influence in India. China's relationship with the US was one of open hostility, and relations with the USSR were deteriorating. The situation on the China-India border remained tense with patrols continuing to meet in the Himalayas. China was gradually resolving other borders, however, signing an agreement with Nepal and a treaty with Burma in 1960, with the new China-Burmese border based closely on the McMahon Line. Meanwhile, the Indian government was

[69] Luthi, *Sino-Soviet*, 143-6, also Radchenko, 28.
[70] See MacFarquhar, *Origins,* 278-82, Allen S. Whiting, 'The Sino-Soviet Split' in John K. Fairbank and Roderick MacFarquhar (eds.) *The Cambridge History of China*, Vol. 14., 501-19, and Luthi, *Sino-Soviet*,174-180.

attempting to improve its relationship with Pakistan, and seeking help from both the United States and the USSR as it confronted the threat from China.[71]

The Chinese MFA paid close attention to Nikita Khrushchev's visit to India in February 1960,[72] watching the moves of their ally as the China-Soviet-India triangle became a complexity of its own. A transmission from the Chinese embassy in Moscow, led since 1955 by Ambassador Liu Xiao, noted ahead of Khrushchev's visit that the Soviet Union was taking 'large steps' diplomatically to 'expand Soviet influence' in Southeast Asia [sic], with a visit planned to Indonesia, having accepted invitations to visit India, Burma, and Afghanistan.[73] 'The focus of the visits,' the embassy reported, 'appears to be India. This is due to a very high estimate of India's influence in international affairs by the Soviet Union, as well as America's attempts to draw India over to their side and the current state of China-India relations'.[74]

The Chinese embassy in Moscow voiced some support for Soviet attempts to reach out to India – noting also that the emphasis on India was for the sake of current China-India relations, which the USSR wound up ineffectually trying to mediate. Some shared objectives were evident: 'In the midst of today's complex struggle between the East and West, especially ahead of the high level talks and arms reduction questions, the USSR wants to do the most they can to win the support of India and other Southeast Asian [sic] neutral countries'.[75] The report noted that the USSR may also be able to 'prevent new steps towards the militarization of Japan' and

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[71] Luthi, 'Sino-Indian', 110-111, for Indian outreach to Pakistan in October 1959 and Nehru-Eisenhower discussion on improving Indo-Pakistani ties.
[72] Ibid., 111-112.
[73] FMA 105-01001-02(1) 赫鲁晓夫访问印度: 对赫鲁晓夫东南亚之行的看法 14.1.1960 Khrushchev visits India: view of his visit to Southeast Asia, 5-7.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.

'counteract Eisenhower's influence in India and Southeast Asia'.[76] Moreover, the USSR could 'stabilize' the policy of neutrality and nonalignment in India and other nations.[77] The report also mentioned a 'reactionary anti-China and anti-Communist tide among the ruling classes and rightist elements of Southeast Asia, India and Indonesia' which might make use of Khrushchev's visit for 'bargaining' and attempts to force 'concessions' out of China, and that 'imperialism and reactionary elements will take the new opportunity to sow discord in Sino-Soviet relations'.[78]

A second report from the Chinese Embassy in Moscow that February analyzed the visit as it happened, emphasizing Indian attempts to leverage relations with the USSR in the conflict with China:

> [F]rom Soviet newspapers and openly published materials, it appears that Khrushchev's attitude towards China-India relations is still relatively cautious. Although India is trying to the utmost to exert influence on us through the Soviet Union…Khrushchev has still, to the greatest extent possible, avoided publicly or directly being dragged into it. He is still more or less on guard with Nehru…However, the Soviet Union still has not changed its position of neutrality and attempted mediation in China-India relations.[79]

The reports from the Moscow embassy demonstrate that the PRC saw the USSR, to an extent, as an ally in their concerns with India, and alluded to shared interests and objectives in the global struggle against the United States. However, as China's relations with India continued to deteriorate, the USSR's 'neutrality' and weapons shipments to India became a substantial irritant to the PRC to the point that Soviet support for India is considered to be an important episode in the Sino-Soviet split.[80]

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[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid.
[78] Ibid.
[79] FMA 105-01001-02(1) 赫鲁晓夫访问印度: 我使馆对赫老访印情况分析 18.2.1960 Khrushchev visits India: Our embassy's analysis of the situation of Khrushchev's visit to India, 8-9.
[80] See Luthi, *Sino-Soviet*, 224-8 and Radchenko, 29.

Reporting from the Chinese Embassy in India surrounding Khrushchev's visit emphasized economic aid to India, noting the 'development of a high tide in China-India relations' as Khrushchev stressed China-India 'brotherly friendship' in every speech, as well as speaking against capitalism and colonialism.[81] The embassy ascribed Khrushchev's purposes to a struggle with the United States for influence in India, which was indeed consistent with Soviet objectives for the visit, which included preventing India from allying with the United States after the 1959 Himalayan clashes.[82] Of Soviet efforts in India, the embassy noted that, 'This is directed against America's intensified bribery and pulling at India, and especially to negate Eisenhower's influence from his visit to India'.[83] However, the embassy reported a different agenda on the Indian side: India's 'attempt to develop Soviet-Indian relations has many aspects to it', including 'an attempt to take advantage of relations with the USSR to confuse the people and cover up their anti-China anti-Communist reactionary appearance'.[84]

The Chinese embassy reported on the influence of the USSR in India as stemming from the Indian people, rather than its government, ascribing Soviet influence to the 'Indian people's admiration of socialism'.[85] At this stage, there was an interesting expression of solidarity from the Chinese embassy with both the USSR and with Nehru as well – something that would dissipate as relations went deeper into collapse. However, in spite of optimistic tones in the embassy report on Khrushchev's visit, the embassy continued to see certain Soviet actions as fanning the fires of an 'anti-China' sentiment within India, as though Indian society was torn into

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[81] FMA 105-01001-02(1) 赫鲁晓夫访问印度: 对赫鲁晓夫访印的综合情况及看法 19.2.1960 Khrushchev visits India: a comprehensive view of the situation of Khrushchev's visit to India, 11-13.
[82] See Luthi, 'Sino-Indian', 111.
[83] FMA 105-01001-02(1), 11-13.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid.

segments of support and opposition to the People's Republic.[86] It is worth noting that the Marxist aspect to the Chinese revolution – Chen Jian emphasizes that the other main objective of the CCP's revolution was to build a Communist society – led PRC officials to see other countries in terms of class struggle as well, in this case voicing a kind of hope for PRC policy and interests through the 'Indian people' while frequently condemning India's government, democratic opposition, and national leaders.[87] Chinese ideological attacks against India throughout the period attempted to separate Nehru and his government from the people of India – a misunderstanding of the country's past and present as Nehru was largely seen as a founding hero in the fight for independence.[88]

The Chinese embassy in India watched the superpower struggle warily, noting especially the influence of economics. As the New Delhi embassy explained in reports on Soviet and American economic aid to India in 1960,[89]

> Since our Great Leap Forward, the struggle between China and India has deepened. At the same time, after the shocks of the capitalist economic crisis in 1958, world capitalism's contest over markets for goods and investment has intensified. In these circumstances, America has intensified its attempts to draw India over to its side for political gain, not to make [the government] fall from power but making it continue swinging to the right, expanding America's economic influence in India, and paving the way for the spread of American capital.[90]

The embassy reported on US agricultural, technological, and industrial economic aid and activity, stating that the US is 'making India economically reliant on America, in grain, foreign trade and

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[86] Ibid.
[87] See Chen, *Mao's China*, 280 for emphasis on the building of a Communist society.
[88] See Akbar and Brown for accounts of Nehru's role in Indian Independence.
[89] FMA 105-01001-04(1) 苏联和美国对印度的援助 13.2.1960 – 1.9.1960 Soviet and American aid to India.
[90] Ibid., 26.

other respects'.[91] However, the USSR was competing against 'imperialist monopolism' in mining equipment, the oil refining industry and 'mechanized state farms'; the Communist superpower was 'afraid that India would abandon its policy of nonalignment, so for the last two years it has given India a large increase in aid in order to stabilize India's neutrality, and in this respect struggle against America measure for measure'.[92] Soviet objectives included 'supporting India's nonalignment policy', 'smashing the capitalist monopoly of aid to India', and 'strengthening India's ability to bargain with the West'.[93]

PRC assessments of India and the superpowers appear at first glance to be a battleground in which the USSR is behaving like a trusted partner in the broader cause of Communism. However, these analyses did not regard India as a passive actor. Rather, the Indian government was interpreted as doing its part to manipulate both superpowers with China as the primary target. The Chinese embassy in Delhi viewed India neither as a partner nor a neutral nation that could be pushed either way in a Cold War struggle between communism and capitalism. The embassy instead reported back to Beijing observations that the Indian government was essentially hostile, exerting its own influence on the superpowers and leaning, if anything, towards the West.

In April, Zhou traveled to New Delhi after a series of disagreements with Nehru about where to hold talks. The visit was an attempt by Zhou to resolve the disputed border by trading the Eastern sector for the Western sector, and, as Lorenz Luthi writes, it was an attempt to 'display China's magnanimity toward the world' after the clashes of 1959.[94] The Indian leadership refused to accept Zhou's territorial swap, and the talks ended in failure, including a

[91] Ibid.
[92] Ibid.
[93] Ibid.
[94] Luthi, 'Sino-Indian', 112-3.

rejection by the Indian side of any reference to *Panch Sheel* (The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence) in the joint communiqué after the talks – the Indian side believed that such a reference would be inappropriate after recent events in the Himalayas.[95] The situation on the border was about to become even more dangerous as Nehru began his Forward Policy in 1961. However, the border, the Chinese side believed, could not explain the troubles with India. The Chinese MFA took a deeper view of the collapse of China-India relations, seeing it in the context of superpower relations and competition within the Afro-Asian sphere.

The Chinese Embassy in New Delhi issued a rich and comprehensive report on 'India's foreign relations in 1960', early the following year which was sent to Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and other CCP leaders, as well as to departments across the MFA including the department of Soviet and Eastern Departments, the Asian Departments Affairs, and the Afro-Asian Department. The report made clear that the embassy viewed India, by that point, as a hostile nation. The embassy articulated a comprehensive view of Indian policy, that involved not just claims on Chinese territory, but a strategy of leaning towards the West, attempting to disrupt Sino-Soviet relations, and undermining China's position in the Afro-Asian sphere:

> During this year [1960], the Indian governing group, owing to the fear of the Indian people's growing consciousness, fearing the success of Chinese socialism and the expansion of China's international influence, and under the energetic pulling and bribes of America, has taken a step to the right in its foreign policy, intensified its reactionary policies of resisting China, leaning towards America, and dividing up Sino-Soviet relations…[96]

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[95] Ibid., 115.

[96] FMA 105-01001-09(1) 1960 年印度对外关系中的几个问题 30.1.1961 Some questions surrounding India's foreign relations in 1960, 49.

The report claimed that India was 'taking advantage of the border question to keep up tension between the countries' and 'obstructing the friendly dealings between the two countries'.[97] Bilateral issues also abounded; the report noted a comprehensive crackdown on Chinese expatriates and activities within India. India had 'begun to fear and expel the backbone of patriotic overseas Chinese', 'expelled Xinhua journalists', and 'prohibited the import of Chinese publications'.[98] The reduction of trade with China in 1960 was described as 'more severe and thorough', and India was working to shore up relations with other countries, despite maintaining hostilities with China.[99] India had 'devoted efforts to easing and improving relations with Pakistan, trying in vain to resolve the question of enmity between the two sides'.[100] India-Soviet relations 'took a big step in development', and India now made a priority of 'sowing discord' in Sino-Soviet relations.[101] Indian objectives were summarized as 'isolating China, struggling for American aid, attacking the Indian Communist Party, and easing internal difficulties', though the embassy considered efforts to 'weaken' and 'isolate' China unsuccessful, stating that they only 'revealed India's own reactionary appearance' and resulted in an 'unprecedented low in international status and influence in the Afro-Asian region'.[102]

In reality, the United States was struggling to achieve the influence it wanted in India at the end of the Eisenhower administration. U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had labeled Indian nonalignment 'short-sighted' and 'immoral' earlier in the decade, during his pact-building efforts to contain global Communism, and the United States had incorporated Pakistan into its

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[97] Ibid.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid.
[100] Ibid., 53.
[101] Ibid., 57-59.
[102] Ibid., 50 and 61-2 on Afro-Asia.

alliance system, despite some misgivings by US officials including Dean Acheson and Omar Bradley, both of whom understood that military aid to Pakistan would result in troubled US-India relations.[103] Eisenhower was unwilling to give up the alliance with Pakistan however, and, with India facing a military build-up in Pakistan, the door was open for closer India-Soviet ties.[104] By 1960, the United States was in heated competition with the USSR for influence in India, and Nehru, backed by his openly anti-American Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, showed some sympathies towards the USSR, but relied on a stream of American economic and technological aid.[105]

In Afro-Asia, China-India relations were indeed in disarray. India, since Bandung, promoted nonalignment and the avoidance of war among the emerging nations of Afro-Asia. He believed that polarization along US-Soviet Cold War lines would lead to world war, and that the new nations emerging from decolonization must resist by choosing nonalignment.[106] Meanwhile, the PRC promoted 'wars of national liberation' within Afro-Asia and advocated 'drawing political class lines within the developing countries', while attempting to direct the Afro-Asian movement against the United States.[107] In contrast to both the Soviet Union's 'peaceful coexistence' initiative with America, and to Nehru's promotion of nonalignment, Mao stressed polarization of the Cold War world, espousing the advantages that nuclear war would bring to

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[103] Harold A. Gould, *The South Asia Story: The First Sixty Years of U.S. Relations with India and Pakistan*, (New Delhi and London, 2010), 32-4.
[104] Ibid., 38.
[105] See Ray, 579-602 on US-India relations and aid. See Jain*, India and the United States 1961-63*, (Delhi, 1987), 171-221 on US aid to India. See Jain and Jonathan Ward, 'Strategic Implications of the Sino-Indian Border War of 1962: Anglo-American Perspectives', M.St. in Global and Imperial History, University of Oxford, 2012 on US-Soviet rivalry vis-à-vis India.
[106] Garver, *Protracted*, 120-1.
[107] Ibid.

the Communist camp, and the importance of militarism within the Afro-Asian movement.[108] In May 1960, just months before the USSR announced the withdrawal of all of its advisors from China, Mao welcomed delegations from Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, stressing that 'US imperialism' was the common enemy and that it could only be defeated by 'unity and struggle'.[109]

In its report on India's foreign relations, the Chinese Embassy in India expressed a firm conviction that India was now on the American side 'in the international struggle'.[110] The embassy noted that Indian support for the United States was 'clearer than in any past year' including during incidents of US spy planes flying over the USSR, helping shore up support for the US in Turkey as the Turkish 'regime was about to collapse' and 'helping American imperialism strangle Congolese independence'.[111] However, India's 'lean towards America policy' (亲美政策) was also part of a plan to maneuver between the superpowers, according to the Embassy: 'Its objective is on one hand to deal with and draw the USSR towards its side, in order to continue to strike water left and right between the two camps, and on the other hand to avoid the naked appearance of leaning towards America'.[112] America for its part, was 'using aid and economics in a two sided conspiracy' to 'win over India' and 'especially to strengthen India's resistance to China'.[113]

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[108] Ibid. Garver refers to this period as 'post-1957'. See also Chen, *Mao's China*, 189-90 on statements regarding nuclear war.
[109] MacFarquhar, Vol. 2, 271-2.
[110] FMA 105-01001-09(1), 50.
[111] Ibid., 50-1.
[112] Ibid.
[113] Ibid.

The report argued that India was using its other relationships as well in order to maneuver against the PRC, noting a drop in anti-Pakistan rhetoric, as India turned its attention towards its 'anti-China cries', bound up in a larger policy of improving relations with Pakistan, resisting China and moving closer to the United States.[114] India was working to improve relations with Pakistan, and 'manufactured and maintained tension in China-India relations, inevitably wanting to find a mutual enemy'.[115] However, China's relations, the report asserted, with Burma, Nepal, Afghanistan, and Cambodia all improved that year, including the successful conclusion of a border treaty with Burma, all of which 'completely destroyed India's vain conspiracy to unite Southeast Asian countries in order to isolate China – rather it is India which has fallen deeper into isolation'.[116]

At the heart of it, India and Chinese international relations and priorities had come into an opposite alignment. Strategic assessments within the Chinese government referred to the border problem as something which allowed India to create tension with China – a desire which served other purposes, both internal and external. The question of whose 'side' India was on in the 'international struggle' seemed to be settled in Foreign Ministry analysis – however there is the question of what sort of international order China and India were striving to build. The PRC, by this stage, was beginning to have public differences with the USSR and Communist bloc, and India, whose neutrality had opened a leadership position in the years after decolonization, was losing ground as the Afro-Asian movement became an ideological battleground.[117] Chinese internal criticism accused India not only of countering Chinese influence in Afro-Asia and the

[114] Ibid., 54.
[115] Ibid.
[116] Ibid.
[117] Garver, *Protracted*, 120-2.

Himalayas, but of undermining Chinese objectives and challenging the Chinese worldview across the globe. The embassy report on India's foreign relations attacked India, for example, for supporting the US and United Nations in the Congo and behaving as a 'reactionary' in the 'anti-American struggle in Cuba' by selling sugar to America while America had begun its embargo of Cuban sugar and grain.[118] The Afro-Asia movement, which, after the Cuban revolution, included Latin America as well for the PRC, became, in the eyes of the PRC, a revolutionary solidarity front with little room for political independence. Such was the nature of China-India struggles. Perhaps there was little that the two countries genuinely agreed upon despite an attempt to lead Asia together. The period of brotherhood had been built on ideas of anti-imperialism which turned out to have little shared meaning; the Chinese attempt to gain Indian recognition of Tibet through the Five Principles had proved unsatisfactory; and Nehru's desire for an Asianism built on China-India friendship had foundered on divergent nationalisms and Maoist revolutionary upheaval.

The Afro-Asian sphere that India and China had built together – their most significant attempt at showing shared leadership to the world – had by now become an arena of rivalry and discord between the two nations. Each country's leadership aspired to a different kind of world ultimately, and sought influence through different principles. India could perhaps no more interest the CCP in peaceful nonalignment than the CCP could tempt Nehru and the Indian leadership to export violent Communist revolution. Moreover, Chinese officials saw destruction and ill-intent in India's promotion of the ideals that characterized its liberation from the British Empire. The Chinese embassy in Delhi complained of India's 'negative influence' on Africa through 'spreading theories of non-violence among countries struggling for independence' and

[118] FMA 105-01001-09(1), 59-60.

'resisting the idea of armed struggle'[119]. The embassy's conclusion was simple: 'India is extremely attentive and fearful of our political influence in Africa, which it is attempting to counteract and destroy'.[120]

In 1960, the Great Leap Forward ended, with fanfare and great achievements proclaimed by the Chinese leadership. The internal turmoil that had wracked the PRC decreased, and Mao Zedong took a momentary backseat in Chinese politics.[121] However, a thaw in the Cold War world was ending. After a U2 spy-plane was shot down over the USSR, the Soviets cancelled a superpower summit scheduled in Paris, a blow to Khrushchev's policy of 'peaceful coexistence', which occurred just as the People's Republic was attempting to challenge the Soviet Union on ideological grounds.[122] The PRC strategic view of India had grown more threatening and more comprehensive. For all the troubles of the period thus far, the next two years would be even more dangerous.

4.7 1961: Deepening Hostilities

By 1961, following the failure of the Zhou-Nehru meetings in 1960, tensions over the border were paramount, and at the end of the year Nehru made the decision to move troops into the disputed territories, a move known as the Forward Policy. Based on the logic that China had been building outposts – and infrastructure in the form of the Xinjiang–Tibetan highway – Nehru decided that India must act as well, rather than face de facto Chinese integration of the disputed

[119] FMA 105-01001-09(1), 60.
[120] Ibid.
[121] MacFarquhar, Vol. 2, 335-6.
[122] Ibid., 274-5.

territories. Nehru saw the posts as symbolic, an attempt to defend India's claim to the border, and he believed that China and India would not go to war.[123] By the end of 1961, fifty such outposts had been built in the Eastern and Western sectors. Nehru was invited to the United States at the end of the year by President John F. Kennedy who had just taken office, and the Indian government was busy debating weapons transfers from the United States to supply the border.[124]

The superpower competition over India intensified with each passing year and the Chinese embassies watched it closely, looking for driving factors and also for weaknesses in India's international relations. The Kennedy Administration took a more accepting view of Indian neutrality than the Eisenhower Administration; Kennedy was personally fascinated by both Indian democracy and the potential for an Indian counterweight to Chinese power in Asia.[125] Indian military activity had been all but eschewed since the founding of the Republic, with Indian leaders speaking initially of a policy of 'ahimsa', or nonviolence, in international affairs.[126] However, in the early 1960s, the first signs of Indian military force were at work. In 1960, Indian participation in the UN Congo mission began, initially with medical and technical personnel. The following year, Indian troops arrived, joining the UN military force in the Congo,[127] causing the Chinese Foreign Ministry's idea of US-India cooperation to deepen, and impacting China-India relations in the Afro-Asian sphere. In December 1961, India took the Portuguese colony in Goa, deploying the Indian army, navy, and air force. The move was

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[123] Kaul, 280-1.
[124] See Kaul, 320-1 for views on weapons imports within the Indian leadership. According to Lt. General Kaul, Menon believed that India should develop its domestic military industry rather than importing from abroad. Kaul argued in favor of importing American armaments, as the US was ready to help, telling Nehru that India was unprepared for conflict.
[125] Arthur M. Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House*, (Boston, 1965), 453-4.
[126] Chris Ogden, *Indian Foreign Policy: Ambition and Transition*, (Cambridge, 2014), 5-7.
[127] B. Chakravorty, *The Congo Operation: 1960-63*, (Delhi, 1976), 44.

censured by the United States – PRC analyses observed the discord that this brought to India's relations with the West – and the move was publicly praised by China as a stand against imperialism. Indian foreign policy operated without genuine American influence, despite PRC interpretations to the contrary, and the most pressing Indian concern remained the People's Republic of China.[128]

In 1961, the Cold War world was in crisis, as superpower struggle intensified across the globe. Crises were underway in the Congo, in Berlin, and in the Caribbean, with the failed Bay of Pigs operation in Cuba. A summit between Khrushchev and JFK in June went badly for the young American President: 'Before Vienna, and even more afterward, [Khrushchev] was convinced that Kennedy could be pushed around'.[129] Khrushchev's conclusions about Kennedy would soon lead to one of the most dangerous moments in the whole of the Cold War, the following year in Cuba.[130]

Reviewing India's foreign relations in 1961, the Chinese embassy in New Delhi asserted that 'India's ruling clique has increased its right-leaning, reactionary trend'.[131] By now, in MFA estimates, Indian-American relations were of paramount importance and danger: 'The Indian government is happy to be the tool of US imperialism'.[132] The report attributes this to an even more cooperative turn following Kennedy's rise to the US Presidency, to economic conditions,

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[128] See Jain, 9-11 on Indian resistance to US influence. See for example *Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations, Vol.1: Indian Parliament: Part II* (New Delhi, 1963), 50, for Nehru's commentary on 'Chinese aggression'.
[129] Taubman, 494-500.
[130] Taubman, 506. Also, David Reynold, *Summits: Six Meetings that Shaped the Twentieth Century*, (London, 2007), 200-6.
[131] FMA 105-01519-01 驻印度使馆：1961 年印度对外关系概况 1.1.1962
Embassy in India: Overview of India's foreign relations in 1961, 1.
[132] Ibid.

to 'the fear and hatred of the Indian Communist Party (this especially is China's influence) and the Afro-Asia national liberation movements by Indian monopoly capitalists', noting also that, the state of world affairs, in which there was 'increasingly profound pressure of the East Wind on the West Wind' had an influence as well.[133]

India's 'long-term' foreign policy, the Chinese embassy stated, was now guided by 'expansionism', 'anti-China anti-Communism', and 'dependence on America'[134]. India had become a source of deep trouble on the world stage, as the embassy reported, noting that Indian opposition to China had become 'more comprehensive, more profound, its methods more despicable and its attitude more crude'.[135] The embassy asserted that 'all important diplomatic activity now focuses on opposition to China' noting that,

> [India] attempts to use anti-China activity to thwart the influence of Communism and thus weaken the anti-imperialist anti-colonialist struggle, please America through opposition to China, and at the same time win favor with international revisionism; thus it has won all sorts of foreign assistance from different sides, and support for its expansionist ambitions'.[136]

By now, India was fully integrated into the PRC's broader view of international struggle, as one of the primary antagonists in a 'chorus of international opposition to China'.[137] In addition to its troubles with Soviet 'revisionism' and US 'imperialism', China was no longer being targeted simply as part of the Communist world, or as part of America's international struggle against the USSR. An 'anti-China' movement, the embassy apparently believed, had emerged in its own right, led by America and significantly enhanced by Indian involvement. India was able to confront China in ways that America never could; the combination of American power and

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[133] Ibid.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Ibid.
[136] Ibid.
[137] Ibid., 1-2.

Indian confrontation with China was an especially troublesome mixture. Though the PRC appears to have still felt confident about its position in Afro-Asia by the end of 1961, and indeed well into the time of the Border War, its external problems and troubled relationships, with India, the USSR, and the United States, were coalescing into a constant threat in MFA analysis. It is significant that India could come to embody, at this stage, the sum of all threats to China and to Chinese influence, forming a kind of hostile vanguard with superpower backing.

The Chinese embassy report focused especially on Indian cooperation with the United States, asserting that, 'In 1961, the scope of India's service to American imperialism has already expanded into a major problem' as Nehru 'energetically propagates Kennedy's New Direction policy in order to bully and baffle the people of the world, while at the same time acting as a tool for Kennedy's two-handed and new colonialist policy of "fake peace and prepare for war"'.[138] The report went on, 'India-American relations are closer every day, providing India with a series of new problems in its foreign relations', and labeling India 'the hired thug of America's new colonialism', due to its activities in the Congo.[139]

India was also allegedly trying to influence the USSR to 'split the socialist camp', 'a kind of tactic which fits the needs of international anti-Communism, and also isolates and strikes at China'.[140] In short, India was seen to be successfully using both superpowers against China. Moreover, the USSR, according to the embassy, now sought Indian support on a number of issues: for US-Soviet talks, arms reductions, and also to put 'pressure on China'.[141] The embassy now saw Khrushchev's neutrality in China-India troubles as active collusion with India, just as

[138] Ibid., 2.
[139] Ibid.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Ibid.

Sino-Soviet relations were undergoing tension over Khrushchev's attempted outreach to America. The view from the Chinese embassy in India was of an active enemy, effectively rearranging international relations in order to attack the PRC, and becoming closer to the superpowers as each year went by. Aside from being the 'hired thug of the United States', India-Soviet 'political and economic relations [had become] even closer'.[142]

The report noted, however, that the relationship with the United States had its costs to India's position elsewhere, especially in Afro-Asia, the Embassy believed:

> India uses shameless methods to damage the struggle against imperialism and colonialism. Moreover, its expansionist tendencies are developing anew, it is especially relying on America as a method to expand into Afro-Asia and enjoy the remains of the feast. All of this makes India all the more isolated in the Afro-Asian region, and earns it an infamous reputation.[143]

China, by contrast, as the embassy saw it, was able to exploit India's relationship with the United States in Afro-Asia:

> Our peaceful neighbor policy is having unceasing success in isolating and exposing Indian policy, and deepening India's plight of isolation.[144]

In reality, the new Kennedy Administration was making its own attempts to reach out to the decolonizing world, departing from Dullesian manichaeism, and 'by making national independence the crucial question, invited the neutrals to find a common interest with [America] in resisting communist expansion'.[145] JFK saw engagement with India as a crucial piece of his foreign policy, though appealing to India remained an elusive task.[146] Nehru continued to seek

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[142] Ibid., 1 and 4.
[143] Ibid., 2.
[144] Ibid.
[145] Schlesinger, 444.
[146] See Ward, 'Strategic Implications' and Jain, 84-148.

the assistance of both superpowers, and to uphold the policy of nonalignment, frustrating the United States with his warm relationship with the USSR.

To the Chinese embassy in Delhi, India's objectives were clear cut. By now, Indian 'fundamental policy' was referred to as 'resist-China, resist-Communism, rely on America, and expand outward'.[147] The reports on India in 1960 and 1961 express a mixture of contempt for India and a sense of confidence that China's position in Afro-Asia had improved at India's expense. It is possible that the gains that China saw in Afro-Asia outweighed their concerns over India's maneuvering with the superpowers. Indian relations with the United States were seen as a betrayal of the Afro-Asian movement, yet Chinese officials seemed content to attack India within the movement.

The embassy noted new developments in US-India relations, with 'America taking new steps in order to control India politically and economically' through 'huge' amounts of economic aid.[148] The report added that 'India and America maintain a close cooperation on international issues' – noting a visit to India by Dean Rusk, Chester Bowles and Averell Harriman to talk with Nehru after Kennedy assumed the presidency, and also noting a new development in US-India relations: military cooperation, including a communications satellite that would allow India to 'provide military intelligence to the United States' from a 'military surveillance stronghold'.[149] Additionally, 'rumor has it that India will buy new types of weapons from the United States, including air to air and surface to air missiles'.[150] The Soviet Union, at this stage, was also

[147] FMA 105-01519-01, 2.
[148] Ibid., 4-6.
[149] Ibid.
[150] Ibid., 6.

supplying weapons to India, including military aircraft which could be used in Himalayan operations.

With aircraft on the way from the USSR and 'rumors' of advanced weaponry purchases from the United States, China appeared to be in a difficult strategic position. Khrushchev had announced the withdrawal of all Soviet advisors in 1960, and the PRC seemed to be increasingly on its own in strategic affairs. However, the Chinese did see complexities in India's relationship with the United States, including tensions over arms transfers to Pakistan and increasing American attacks on pro-Soviet Defense Minister Krishna Menon. The 'rightists', were present as ever, trying to drive India closer to the United States.[151]

The embassy observed also that a military dimension to US-India relations would cause difficulty with Pakistan, and the US had 'publicly sided with' Portugal when India annexed Goa by military force in December 1961, noting that 'this had an effect on this year's highest tide of US-India relations'.[152] Both China and the Soviet Union supported the annexation of Goa, during an especially important episode in which Indian military action underscored India's independence in foreign affairs. Though the Chinese government publicly expressed support for India in the endeavor, the embassy in Delhi observed its drawbacks in relation to what it saw as India's position as a 'tool of new colonialism'.[153] The Goa annexation, the embassy observed, put India in a difficult position between pursuing its own interests and maintaining its relations, as they saw it, with the 'imperialist' West:

> In Goa the life or death struggle between new and old colonialism continues to intensify, as a sharp conflict emerges between the old colonialist, England, and India, the energetic

[151] Ibid.
[152] Ibid.
[153] Ibid., 2.

> tool of new colonialism…the contradictions between the two countries come to the surface day by day, and the depth of their fissures is as never before.[154]

Both Kennedy and Nehru took the disconnect over Goa almost personally. In a letter to the American President, Nehru inquired, 'Why is it that something that thrills our people should be condemned in the strongest language in the United States?'[155] And Kennedy told the Indian ambassador in Washington the following, '[Y]ou have done now what you should have done fourteen years ago. But you spent those fourteen years in preaching morality to us and telling us how wrong it is to use force in one's own interests'.[156] Despite a sense of great expectations on the American side, and a sense of desirable support on the Indian side, the US-India relationship still struggled to find its footing. Chinese analysis, however, saw India as leaning towards America and by now associated the country with a monolith of 'imperialism', old and new[157].

As the United States government struggled with the question of maintaining relations with both India and Pakistan, the Chinese embassy in New Delhi worried over what it saw as India's great value to the United States. Fears of a US-backed India had implications both for Himalayan security concerns and for a larger strategic struggle which included Afro-Asia: 'The value of India, a large country, hanging out its signboard of nonalignment, has value that already surpasses the military alliance with Pakistan'.[158] Both superpowers took an interest in China-India struggle in the Afro-Asian sphere, a place that neither could claim to influence in the ways

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[154] Ibid., 6-7.
[155] Schlesinger, 459.
[156] Ray, 594.
[157] FMA 105-01519-01.
[158] Ibid.

that China and India could.[159] As Kennedy made relations with the developing world a priority in his administration, his desire and enthusiasm for strategic engagement with India was central. Kennedy saw India and China engaged in a struggle 'for the economic and political leadership of the East, for the respect of all Asia', adding that 'We want India to win that race with China.'[160] While the Chinese embassy analyses may have interpreted US-India relations through their own particular frameworks, the US President's desire to engage was real.

As in prior years, the PRC kept a close eye on economic outreach by both the US and USSR in the subcontinent, which gave the appearance that India was proceeding from strength to strength vis-à-vis the superpowers. Each one was providing major assistance as India laid out its five year plans. By now in the dismal aftermath of the Great Leap Forward and cut off from Soviet aid, it is possible that China saw India as far better provided for in terms of helpful relationships overseas. By PRC assessments, India was now enjoying deep support from both the United States and the USSR, even as its own superpower relationship was collapsing: 'The Soviet Union is doing everything it can to support India from all sides' the embassy in Delhi noted in its report on India's Foreign Relations in 1961.[161] Moreover, in the view of the embassy in Delhi, India had taken a further step in its use of the superpowers against China, and was both profiting from and encouraging the Chinese rift with the USSR, 'using the Sino-Soviet split and China-India struggle as an excuse to attack both China and the Indian Communist left'.[162] Even worse, the embassy now saw the USSR as a full partner to India in China-India conflict:

> The Soviet Union is encouraging and cooperating with India's opposition to China. The helicopters and transport planes that the USSR is providing India are not just for military use on the China-India border, but they are also used as anti-China propaganda capital.

[159] See Westad, *Global Cold War,* for superpower interactions with the developing world.
[160] Schlesinger, 454.
[161] FMA 105-01519-01, 9.
[162] Ibid.

> On one hand, Nehru slanders China saying we are invading and expanding, and on the other hand, he praises the USSR for its opposition for war and desire for peace…[163]

China had been caught outside of a three-way courtship between India and the superpowers, which India, the embassy believed, was handling adroitly:

> India is, with exceptional energy, matchmaking between the USSR and United States, and influencing the USSR. The USSR also has a mind to use India to build a bridge towards America.[164]

The Cold War thaw, however, was ending. That year, the Berlin Wall went up in East Germany, cutting West Berlin off from the outside world, and the CIA's failed Bay of Pigs operation in Cuba added another crucial theatre to the dangers of the Cold War world. Finally, with Nehru's Forward Policy, the Himalayas too would become a scene of deeper military tension. As each side took to increased patrolling and buildup of forces in the region and its disputed borderlands, what remained between China and India was essentially a road to war.

4.8 1962: The War Arrives

Events on the border drove the final collapse of China-India relations. The first firefights began on May 5th, 1962 and Nehru's Forward Policy continued despite increasingly stern Chinese warnings. By the end of June, 1962, over 2,000 square kilometers of Chinese-claimed territory were now under Indian control.[165] The PRC strategic view of India had hardened during the preceding years, and as the Himalayan chess-match intensified, each side escalated their

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[163] Ibid.
[164] Ibid., 10.
[165] Garver, 'Decision', 109.

military tactics, with Indian soldiers receiving permission to fire on Chinese posts if threatened, and Chinese patrols receiving orders to surround any Indian posts that they encountered.[166] After an abortive attempt by Chen Yi to discuss de-escalation with Indian Defence Minister Krishna Menon while at the Geneva conference on Laos in July, the Chinese Central Military Commission drew up plans for a 'war of extermination', a crushing and decisive offensive, which would 'gnaw the flesh off the bones' of Indian forces.[167] On October 20th, following an Indian attempt to take Thagla ridge, the PLA swept through the Eastern and Western sectors, destroying the Indian outposts and then stopping, only once 'Chinese soldiers looked out from the Himalayan foothills to the broad valley of the Brahmaputra River'.[168]

The superpowers, by the time of the Border War, were distracted in their own perilous standoff with the Cuban Missile Crisis, and Khrushchev pledged support for China, only to reverse this position a week later, a move which was received with derision in Beijing.[169] By now the PRC saw the USSR as having betrayed their alliance over the issue of India. The United States made efforts to supply India with war material and offer strategic support; the Kennedy administration was eager to bring India into an alliance and even debated whether or not to put India under the American nuclear umbrella.[170] However, Indian leaders chose to hedge between the two superpowers, hanging on to what was left of nonalignment, and not wanting to drive China and the USSR together by moving too close to the United States, though Nehru did

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[166] Ibid., 109-110.
[167] Ibid., 114 and 119.
[168] Ibid., 123.
[169] Dong Wang, 'The Quarrelling Brothers: New Chinese Archives and a Reappraisal of the Sino-Soviet Split, 1959-1962', Cold War International History Project, Working Paper #49, 63-4.
[170] See Ward, 'Strategic Implications'

eventually accept small arms from the West.[171] The Cold War world was changing, with two pairs of rivals reaching denouements simultaneously. The superpower standoff ended peacefully, though on a razor's edge, and the path of China-India relations led to violence, ending a once promising relationship and destroying the Bandung world that China and India had tried to build together.[172]

PRC communications and public statements in the months ahead of the war touched on three major themes that defined the CCP view of the collapse of China-India relations. The first was the threat to the New China, the second was rivalry in the Afro-Asian sphere, and the third was India's relationship with the superpowers, especially the United States. Communications between the two countries had become less forgiving, with little mention of reconciliation, and China began to take a retroactive view of China-India relations, openly questioning the friendship period with India, noting for example, on the question of Tibet, that 'there has been a dark side to the China-India relationship from the beginning itself'.[173]

A review of Indian policy in the Himalayas by the Chinese MFA began with Indian diplomatic notices sent to the PRC following entry to Tibet in 1950, which, as the MFA explained it 'called China's exercise of sovereignty on its own territory, Tibet, an "invasion", that was "lamentable", and "without justification"'.[174] Moreover, the Indians had criticized Chinese conduct as a threat to the world at large, stating that 'China had "greatly added to trends of tension in the world and trends oriented towards a great war", "disturbing the friendly

[171] Ibid.
[172] See Luthi, 'Sino-Indian', 118.
[173] *ZDWGX 1962*, 42.
[174] Ibid.

relations of these countries (India and China) and also the interests of world peace.'"[175] India's interest in Tibetan affairs did not stop there, according to the Foreign Ministry: 'Afterwards, the Indian Government directly permitted a group of fugitive Tibetan elements in Indian Kalimpong and other areas to carry out activities that were damaging and subversive to China. This kind of activity is clearly interference in China's internal affairs.'[176]

With regard to the disputed border, the Bandung spirit became a diplomatic weapon, as each side accused the other of violating the Five Principles and undermining the Afro-Asian sphere. In sum, the PRC Foreign Ministry informed India unequivocally of the gravity of their threat to the new Chinese nation:

> Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese government has put special emphasis on friendship with India; moreover, it has tirelessly persevered in its efforts to safeguard and consolidate this kind of friendship. However, regardless of anything, *the liberated, new China cannot permit itself to be pushed back once again to the position of suffering that was the old China* [emphasis added].[177]

Afro-Asian rhetoric also intensified ahead of the outbreak of war. For example, as Chen Yi addressed a Nepali delegation on the anniversary of the signing of the China-Nepal border treaty in October 1962, speaking of Afro-Asian unity against Indian 'reactionaries', he invoked the 'imperialism' which the two countries had once opposed together, in order to tarnish China's Himalayan foe.[178] Moreover, the Foreign Minister linked alleged Indian transgressions to the core issues in Afro-Asian national liberation movements, invoking the legacy of British imperialism, both to explain the origins of the dispute, and more importantly, to tie 'Indian reactionaries' to this legacy, and its dangers for Asia:

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[175] Ibid.
[176] Ibid.
[177] Ibid., 44.
[178] Ibid., 95.

> The China-India border issue was originally created by British imperialism, using the Indian people's powerless situation and taking India as a base in order to invade China's Tibet and Xinjiang. Indian reactionaries are trying to forcefully use British imperialism's unrealized plan to occupy Chinese territory. Every country that takes Asian unity seriously must oppose what the Indian reactionaries are doing. This kind of method by the Indian reactionaries can only gain the cheers of imperialism.[179]

As military operations in the Himalayas came to an end, the PRC rhetoric bound together all the themes of China-India conflict, portraying the Indian government as a Trojan horse for US imperialism in Asia, and trying, as the PRC often sought to do, to separate the Indian government from the Indian people. Perhaps even India had become a target for China's 'wars of national liberation' in Asia and Africa.[180] In the words of Chen Yi in November, 1962:

> [W]hat is worth serious attention is that American imperialism is now sticking its hand in, trying to bind India up to its war chariot (战车), in order to take another step in controlling India, and realize its evil conspiracy of internecine Asian strife. Of course, the Indian people are against this; and the people of Asia are against this. Should the Indian government continue to walk according to this wish of American imperialism, this would be extremely dangerous.[181]

In a second speech at the Nepali Embassy in Beijing on November 26, 1962, Chen Yi also used the theme of an American role in the conflict, in Chinese security concerns, and in Asia as a whole, declaring that America was now 'trying to prolong and expand China-India conflict, in order to carry out its conspiracy of using Asians to beat Asians, and to pull India into America's new colonial abyss.'[182] Here he invoked the broader Asian identity of the Indian people, though by now all Chinese credibility in India was lost: 'We believe that the Indian

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[179] Ibid.
[180] See Garver, *Protracted*, 120-2 on Chinese support of national liberation movements. See also Van Ness.
[181] *ZDWGX 1962*, 176-7.
[182] Ibid., 164-5.

people and the Asian people will definitely be vigilant, and in no way allow this evil conspiracy by American imperialism to prevail.'[183]

Even in the final months of escalating tensions in the Himalayas, Nehru believed that war could not be possible between China and India.[184] Despite increasing Chinese warnings that India that it 'played with fire' and that the Chinese would react decisively, Nehru's Forward Policy continued, which was all the worse because his military staff warned him of Indian unpreparedness to fight and the need for adequate supplies of weapons, to be imported most likely from the West, an idea which Nehru resisted until war was finally upon him.[185] With the superpowers engaged in the Cuban Missile Crisis at precisely the same time as the Sino-Indian Border War, India was on its own, and, once the Indian government did accept small amounts of arms from the West, the policy of nonalignment was badly shaken.[186] The People's Republic of China won an overwhelming military victory in the Himalayas, before withdrawing from the disputed territories and ceasing operations. The fighting lasted just a month. However, along with the friendship period in the mid-1950s, the Border War remains the defining moment in the history of China-India relations in the modern era, leading to a sense of mistrust between the two countries that lasts until this day.

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[183] Ibid.
[184] Kaul, 365. See Maxwell 177-8 for Nehru on war during the Forward Policy period.
[185] See Garver, 'Decision', 113. See Kaul, 372-3 for debates on air support, and 328-340 on general unpreparedness.
[186] See Ward, 'Strategic Implications'.

4.9 Summary and Conclusions

As events in the Himalayas proceeded towards war, the PRC leaders and foreign policy professionals saw India, year by year, as a more comprehensive threat and competitor, not only in terms of territorial conflict – or even disagreements over Tibet and the Himalayas themselves – but as a rival on the world stage as a whole, buttressed by relationships in Afro-Asia and a unique ability to receive assistance and positive attention from both superpowers, even as China saw its own position with the superpowers deteriorating. The combination of multiple arenas of competition and hostility elevated India's importance in the eyes of the PRC and, by the time war broke out, it is clear that it was neither merely a territorial dispute, nor even a larger, continuous disagreement over Tibet that fully defined the view of India for Chinese diplomats and leaders.

Indian power and influence was uniquely dangerous both to the CCP's concept of security and to the position that CCP leaders intended to create for China in the world. The issues of disputed territory were linked to Tibet, itself a source of strategic vulnerability to China for as long as the Chinese Empire had claimed this region as its own, and given new weight in the modern era as PRC difficulties in Tibet attracted the interest of the United States, the GMD, and, through the United Nations at the time, the wider world as well. It was possible for PRC leaders to see India, falsely, as John Garver explains, as the primary actor in a plan to cleave this territory from the PRC.[187] However, the collapse of China-India relations runs deeper even than troubles over the Himalayas. India had become a competitor in nearly every area in which

[187] Garver, 'Decision', 96-7.

national strength was determined within the Cold War world, and within the strategic environments in which the PRC's nationalist revolution sought its survival.

As China and India simultaneously came into contact with the outside world after their decades long struggles for national sovereignty and self-determination – India's in the form of a decades long fight for freedom from the British Empire – and China's in the form of a continuous revolution beginning in 1911 and reaching a threshold of stability and control with the founding of the PRC in 1949 – each one sought to navigate the world and seek out their own advantage, finding their place and coexistence among other nations, both friendly and hostile, and also looking for advantages within the world system that they could build for themselves, the most important attempt being the creation of the Afro-Asian sphere. For a brief moment, leaders of the two nations believed, perhaps even at a deep level, that they shared priorities and that their two revolutions could co-exist, even prosper together. The two statesmen, Mao Zedong and Jawaharlal Nehru, were living out national foundings that brought power to Asia, even as they were uniquely nationalist and uniquely Indian and Chinese. The two men shared, for example, a sense of exuberance on learning in their youth of the 1905 victory of Japan over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, Nehru while in England and Mao while in Hunan, as it represented the victory of an Asian power over a European power for the first time in the modern era.[188]

However, the misunderstandings and false images of one another's countries were perhaps as significant a force in the collapse of China-India relations as the pressures of the global strategic environment in which their relations ultimately crumbled. In the idealism of the Bandung era, Nehru believed that Chinese Communism would eventually be absorbed by

[188] Akbar, 47 and Pantsov and Levine, 30.

'Chinese culture'.[189] However, China's vision of its role in the world was neither completely Communist nor completely Asianist as Nehru's was. Much in the same way that the Sino-Soviet relationship could not hold China indefinitely in the role of junior partner, and the split came when Chinese nationalism was tested repeatedly by the priorities held by the Soviet Union, neither was Nehru's vision of a world order something to which China could long adhere. The period of friendship quickly gave way to the pressures of bilateral transgressions, fundamental disagreements, and the matrix of strategic imperatives in which the Cold War world was lived. The collapse of China-India relations, like the Sino-Soviet split, was an instance of another country with whom China and the Chinese revolution could not share the world. With the Soviet Union, China could not keep a junior role. With India, China was unwilling to be an equal.

[189] 师博编, 1962 中印大战纪实（北京，1993）Shi Bo (ed)., 1962, The China-India War: Record of Events (Beijing, 1993).

Chapter Five – National Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity: India's Threat to 'The New China'

5.1 Chapter Purpose

This chapter will focus on CCP views of an Indian threat to central tenets of the 'New China'. In doing so, it will make clear that the CCP view of India as a challenger in the Himalayas had a much larger context than is generally appreciated. By challenging what they saw as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the new PRC, CCP leaders saw Indian claims and interests in the Himalayas as a threat to the restoration of Chinese power as envisioned by the project of the 'New China'. The founding of the PRC, despite its Marxist ideological framework, was deeply influenced by the 1911 Chinese Revolution and the May 4th movement, and the idea of the 'New China' enshrined in the PRC had its roots in this decades long struggle for the resurrection of Chinese dignity and restoration of Chinese power.

The CCP sought to establish its control over Tibet, end 'imperialist' interference in the region and, in doing so, contribute to the security and prosperity of the 'New China'. However, much in the same way that American power stood in the way of CCP objectives in Taiwan, Indian interests and claims became a challenge to the realization of CCP objectives in the Himalayas, a region, which, like Taiwan, CCP leaders saw as essential to the territorial integrity of the new PRC, and the control of which, the CCP saw as essential to the project of building the 'New China'. As CCP leaders and officials struggled with what they saw as Indian 'interference in internal affairs' and challenges to Chinese 'sovereignty and territorial integrity', they came to

regard the Indian leadership as 'heirs to the British Empire', carrying out an 'expansionist' policy in the Himalayas which had its origins in British imperial thinking during the period of British dominion over India.[1] As such, while the CCP worked to advance its revolution, which took as its purpose the restoration of China's wealth and power, CCP leaders came to characterize Indian leaders as an incarnation of the imperial force which had brought about China's 'unequal treaties' and national humiliations, and which had inducted the period of Chinese weakness which the CCP sought to end through the founding of the People's Republic of China.

Correspondence with India and comments by CCP leaders make reference to the differences between the 'New China' and China's condition before the founding of the PRC, sometimes referred to as the 'Old China'. Understanding the China-India territorial dispute and contest for Himalayan influence in this context, as CCP leaders did themselves, is essential to understanding the importance of the threat which India represented to the CCP. India's challenge to the CCP and its project of creating a 'New China' was not simply about territory, but rather about the core purposes of the 'New China', what it was meant to stand for and to stand against. India, like the United States and the USSR, was one of the few powers able to present this kind of challenge and touch this nerve within the nationalist project of the PRC during this period.

Understanding this context makes clear that India was a more significant actor in the CCP worldview than is generally understood. Moreover, the collapse of relations and outbreak of war, rather than a process driven simply by territory, had much to do with the founding principles of

[1] See also John W. Garver, 'China's Decision for War', which refers to these views among Chinese leaders, but makes only limited use of primary sources.

the PRC, itself a part of the longer path towards Chinese restoration which Mao himself believed began with the revolution of 1911. The meaning that the CCP gave to 'sovereignty and territorial integrity' meant that to touch this nerve, as India did, was to infringe on China's restoration.

5.2 Introduction – Characteristics of The New China and Their Relevance to Conflict with India

Mao Zedong's vision of a 'New China' drew upon what he believed was a deeper and ongoing Chinese revolution that would result in the restoration of Chinese wealth and strength, and as Chen Jian explains, 'the restoration of China's *central* position in the international community'.[2] He acknowledged the roots of his revolution in both the student protests of the May 4th movement,[3] and also in the Revolution of 1911.[4] In the 1930s, he explained a vision of ending colonialism in China and building up a new society, a process which he believed was already underway: 'The present stage of the Chinese revolution is a transitional stage between putting an end to the colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal society and establishing a socialist society'.[5] Mao explained in his writings, under the heading, 'We want to build up a New China', that the objective of the CCP was 'building up a new society and a new state for the Chinese nation' which meant that the CCP would 'change a politically oppressed and economically exploited China into a politically free and economically prosperous China'.[6] The Chairman later wrote that 'Two possible destinies await China, a bright destiny and a gloomy destiny…Either a

[2] Chen, *Mao's China*, 47.
[3] *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, (London, 1954), 4 Vols., Vol. 3, 97.
[4] Ibid., 110.
[5] Ibid., 97.
[6] Ibid., 107.

China independent, free, democratic, united and prosperous, i.e. a bright China, a new China with her people liberated, or a China semi-colonial, semi-feudal, divided, poor and weak, i.e. an old China. A new China or an old China: these two prospects lie before the Chinese people, the Chinese Communist Party and our Congress'.[7] As such, the difference between an old China and a New China, which would later appear in diplomatic documents with India, was a vision of these two divergent pathways, one of a return to the humiliations of the past, and the other to a bright new future. When the CCP announced the foundation of the PRC as discussed in Chapter Two, it was these objectives to which the new nation would be dedicated, and it was these objectives that would be tested in China's relations with other nations during the first decades of its founding. The conflict between Indian and Chinese objectives and activities in the Himalayas, especially as they pertained to core principles of the CCP revolution, contributed to a dramatic shift in CCP views of India, to the collapse of relations and a view of the Indian government as an enemy of the PRC.

Critical to the mission of the New China was the 'liberation' and incorporation of territories considered integral to the Chinese nation. As Mao explained in the 'Proclamation of the Chinese People's Liberation Army' in 1949, the objectives of the PLA would be to 'safeguard China's territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence, and bring about the genuine unification of the country'.[8] On a related note, Mao explained in his inaugural address in Tiananmen Square in 1949 that 'Ours will no longer be a nation subject to insult and

[7] Ibid., Vol. 4, 241.
[8] *Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung*, 5 Vols., (Peking, 1961), Vol. 4, 397.

humiliation'.[9] Among the principal missions following the founding of the PRC was PLA entry into Tibet in order to 'safeguard the national defenses of the great ancestral land'.[10]

Both the territorial claims that India held in the Himalayas, as well as the de facto influence that India exerted in Tibet due both to centuries of contact with Tibet and to the more recent legacies of British political influence, would come into conflict with the core beliefs that held together the CCP project of building a new Chinese nation. India's threat to China in the Himalayas was thus more than a conflict over territory – rather it was a challenge to the project of building a new Chinese nation and dispensing, as Chinese leaders saw it, with the humiliations and weaknesses of the past.

In a speech on the 'peaceful liberation of Tibet' in 1951, PLA general Zhu De explained that, 'Inside China's borders, the Tibetan ethnicity is one of the ethnicities that has a long history, and which has in the past carried out its glorious responsibility in the great cause of the creation and development of the ancestral land (祖国). However, in the last hundred years, imperialist forces have invaded China, and at the same time intruded into Tibet, sowing discord in many ways. At the same time, China's reactionary governments, from the Qing to the GMD have on the one hand surrendered to imperialist invasion forces, and on the other have carried out a policy of oppression and alienation towards the Tibetan ethnicity'.[11] Zhu De went on to explain that the CCP Central Committee would 'definitely assist the Tibetan people in wiping out imperialism's influence in Tibet and completing the integration of the People's Republic of

[9] Ibid., Vol. 5, 17.
[10]西藏工作文献选编（北京, 2005）Selected Documents from Tibetan Work, (Beijing, 2005), hereafter *XZGZ*, 47.
[11] Ibid., 46.

China's territory and sovereignty' as well as 'safeguarding the national defense of the great ancestral land'.[12] Later that year, Mao explained that 'advancing the military into Tibet and consolidating national defense is [our] great and glorious mission'.[13] Thus, China's struggle against imperialism, and its vision of the importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity were intimately linked both in the founding principles and the practical objectives of the CCP, especially in Tibet, which was, as M. Taylor Fravel explains, 'China's most vulnerable frontier region'.[14]

By 1959, with the Tibetan Uprising in full swing, the PLA carrying out suppression operations in the Himalayas, and the Dalai Lama's flight to India, as reviewed in Chapter Four, Chinese control over Tibet was undergoing serious difficulties. M. Taylor Fravel and Sulmaan Khan have both examined difficulties in CCP control over Tibet. Fravel characterizes the revolt in Tibet as 'the largest internal threat ever to the PRC's territorial integrity',[15] arguing that 'the revolt and internal vulnerability that it reflected' led to Chinese willingness to negotiate and make territorial concessions with neighbors in the southwest, Nepal, Burma, and India during negotiations over territory.[16] Khan explains in vivid detail the lack of control that the CCP had over the region as a whole, making the Himalayas a porous zone that facilitated non-state activity throughout the borderlands.[17] The combination of CCP vulnerability in the region, lack of control over its politics and events, and its legacy in the nationalist narrative of the New China which placed special importance on the predations of the British Empire through the 'unequal

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[12] Ibid., 47.
[13] Ibid., 52.
[14] Fravel, 182.
[15] Ibid., 7.
[16] Ibid., 71-2.
[17] Khan, *Borderlands*, 1-30.

treaties' and its various incursions into China and Tibet, gave the region a special importance to the CCP. Indian claims to territory, and Indian influence in Tibet, driven by India's own sense of national rights, claims, and principles, all of which were largely ignored or misunderstood by the CCP, lit the fuse on this mixture of CCP insecurity, resolve, and political and military determination.

The Tibetan crisis, for the CCP, was an unresolved issue on par with the 'liberation' of Taiwan. As Mao explained in May 1959, as the Tibetan Uprising was still in progress, 'We have two problems which have not been resolved, the Tibetan question and the Taiwan question. Now we are beginning to resolve the Tibetan question'.[18] He noted, moreover, the usefulness of what he saw as Nehru's involvement in the crisis, as it helped the CCP separate the 'exploiters' from the 'masses' in Tibet: 'This is thanks to Nehru and the Tibetan rebel elements. Their armed uprising has given us a reason to carry out reform in Tibet right now. The rebel elements took up arms to attack us, now we can clearly see who is on our side and who is making rebellion'.[19] The role of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in carrying out covert operations during the Tibetan Uprising is by now a well-known story.[20] However, the CCP belief in India's role in the Tibetan Uprising and also the importance which CCP leaders attached to the Himalayas, placing it on par with Taiwan, where US support for the GMD prevented CCP 'liberation' of the island, is less well known and forms an essential pillar in the CCP view of the Indian government as hostile to China. Essentially, the same importance that the CCP attached to US 'occupation' of Taiwan is visible in China's dealings with India in Tibet. The result is the view of two

[18] XZGZ, 228.
[19] Ibid.
[20] See especially Riedel, Knaus, and Shakya.

'imperialist' powers, each one impeding the progression of China towards its goals of national revival, the US as an 'imperialist' in Taiwan specifically and Asia and the world more broadly, and India in the Himalayas, as, in the minds of CCP leaders, India had taken up the thinking and policies of the former British Empire.

In November 1959, in a report delivered at the 'National Assembly of Heroes', Zhou explained his view that India did not want Tibet to become a 'socialist Tibet'; rather it, for India, it would be 'best that it become a buffer zone'.[21] By this time, the first violent clashes in the Himalayas had taken place, which China blamed on India, and which resulted in the death of members of an Indian patrol at Longju in September 1959. Zhou noted soon afterwards in a letter to Nehru that 'both China and India suffered long-term invasions by imperialism. This shared misfortune should naturally have given China and India the same views about the above mentioned historical background [the British Empire and the McMahon Line] and resulted in mutual sympathy, mutual understanding, and a fair and reasonable attitude in dealing with our bilateral border issues'.[22] However, India was 'exerting all manners of pressure on the Chinese government, even going so far as to use force to support its claim'.[23]

Rather than exhibiting 'mutual sympathy' and 'mutual understanding', which meant recognizing Chinese claims and interests in the Himalayas as the CCP desired for India to do, the Himalayan standoff worsened, and as this chapter will explain, Chinese leaders came to see the Indian leadership as heirs to their original imperial antagonist through events in the Himalayas,

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[21] 周恩来传, (北京, 2013), 4 Vols., Vol. 3, Biography of Zhou Enlai (Beijing, 2013), Vol. 3, 1356.
[22] Ibid., 1357.
[23] Ibid., 1358.

rather than as partners in their struggle against worldwide 'imperialism', as envisioned in the Bandung era.

The rhetoric of China's revival continued inside the Party and towards the outside world, as Chinese leaders sought to make clear to all that the Chinese people had indeed 'stood up' both in word and in deed. The origins of China's humiliations at the hands of imperialism were explicitly linked to Britain, even as the CCP began to see the incarnation of this original antagonist in their southern neighbor which proved unwilling to accede to Chinese demands in the Himalayas. Meeting with his former students from the Whampoa Military Academy in 1959, Zhou explained that 'From the Opium War to today, after nearly one hundred and twenty years of struggle, the Chinese people have turned over (翻了身), and achieved a great victory. This is a fact that even imperialism has recognized'.[24] As Chinese leaders would explain to India as conflict in the Himalayas worsened, the 'New China' would be unwilling to tolerate the degradations of its past. India thus would find itself in conflict not simply over land in the Himalayas, but rather with the full force and imperatives of the Chinese revolution.

5.3 'Heirs to the British Empire': India's First Core Threat to the New China

'The root of the conflict is that India wants to take up the mantle of British imperialism'.

– Zhou Enlai, October 20th, 1962[25]

[24] Ibid., 1361.
[25] Meeting, State Council, 20.10.1962, ZELNP 2, 504.

By 1958, tensions over the Himalayas had emerged with Chinese complaints to India over GMD and US collaboration with Tibetan rebels taking place in Kalimpong, and the discovery by both nations of the existence of a large-scale territorial dispute in the Himalayas.[26] When the Tibetan Uprising broke out in 1959, PRC leaders believed that India was directly involved, and acting, moreover, with the support of the United States and GMD, to carry out covert operations in the Himalayas.[27] The Tibetan Uprising presented a profound challenge, as Fravel explains, to the incorporation of territories considered integral to the new PRC.[28] Moreover, CCP leaders saw the uprising in terms of a resurrection of imperialist forces inside the New China. As Zhou explained during the Uprising, the CCP would have to 'expel the imperialist invasion of Tibet' as Tibetan rebels were attempting to 'split the ancestral land and resurrect the aggressive forces of imperialism'.[29] The silver lining which Mao saw in the Uprising has been noted above, as the Chairman saw it as a chance to separate those who supported the CCP from those who did not. Moreover, Mao saw it as an opportunity to contribute to the his program of building a new China through what Chen Jian defines as, 'continuous revolution'. In the words of the Chairman, 'this kind of war is helpful, it can mobilize the masses, it can train our cadres. We'd better do it often, fight for five, six, or seven years…'[30] Zhou expressed a similar sentiment in describing the 'Tibetan question' as 'the last intensive class struggle on the mainland'.[31] Mao also compared it to the Hungarian Uprising in 1956, which resulted in the Soviet suppression of this uprising within the Communist bloc,

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[26] See for comparison, Garver, 'Decision' which gives an account of tensions over Tibet chiefly using Chinese language historiography as a source base.
[27] Knaus explains that, 'Much to the Nationalist government's displeasure, the U.S. government never joined in any program with Taipei to support the Tibetan rebels', Knaus, 185.
[28] Fravel, 71-82.
[29] Report, Government Work, 18-28.4.1959, ZELNP 2, 218.
[30] Comments, telegraph from Tibetan Military Region, 22.1.1959, MZDNP 3, 574.
[31] Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (政协), 12.5.1959, ZELNP 2, 227.

stating that the uprisings were different, and reading into the Tibetan uprising one of the core anxieties of the CCP, the loss of what they saw as sovereign territory, to foreigners: 'The rebels say that Tibet wants independence, but so-called "independence" is giving Tibet to foreign countries'.[32]

The support of the Tibetan Uprising by the CIA and GMD – though limited and arguably having little effect – is known to historians and was in fact taking place. However, the CCP also believed that India was involved in the uprising and that Indian support for Tibetan rebels was of central importance, both inside Tibet and inside India. A directive from Deng Xiaoping in January 1959 described the 'rebellion of the Tibetan reactionary ruling class' as 'openly supported by Chiang and America, and covertly supported by India.'[33] The CCP leadership, moreover, believed that India's alleged involvement was the result of an Indian belief that Tibet was not a part of China, a belief which they supposed was the result of the influence of the British Empire. As Zhou Enlai stated in 1959, 'Tibet is part of China but our Indian friends have come to the opposite impression, this is because British imperialism carried out imperialist teachings for a long time, influencing some people in India'.[34] Zhou also blamed 'a section of the Indian upper classes' which were 'continuing British policy'.[35] Mao explained his view of India's role in the Uprising as follows, emphasizing a coordination of internal and external forces in breaking apart the integrity of the New China: '[Tibetan] rebels are coming to India, thinking India sympathizes with us [Tibetans], and might help us, also powerful America might help.

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[32] Meeting, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, delegation from Italian Communist Party, 19.4.1959, MZDNP 4, 23-4.
[33] Directive draft, 22.1.1959, MZDNP 3, 574-5.
[34] Meeting, Afghan Vice Prime Minister, 7.9.1959, ZELNP 2, 251.
[35] Meeting, Hong Kong journalist, 4.5.1959, ZELNP 2, 224.

Taiwanese President Chiang is already vigorously helping us'.[36] Moreover, the rebels were, as Mao wrote on a statement prepared by Wu Lengxi, a month later, 'all trained by Britain', adding that, 'Indian expansionist elements that have inherited the shameful legacy of Britain'.[37]

The belief that India was thus involved also introduced the violation of another core tenet of the CCP and the international relations of the New China, that of 'non-interference in internal affairs', a tenet which was enshrined in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence signed with India. The Five Principles had become an integral piece of the CCP's diplomacy, and ironically, CCP leaders had even advocated the use of the Five Principles within the Socialist bloc during the Hungarian Uprising.[38] Mao's corrections to a propaganda piece in 1959 explained that the use of 'imperialism', Chiang and 'foreign reactionary groups' inciting the Tibetan rebellion and 'interfering in China's internal affairs' was 'not suitable' and had to be updated: 'British imperialist elements and Indian expansionist elements are acting in collusion, openly interfering in our internal affairs'.[39]

The concept of splitting off what the CCP and earlier Chinese governments saw as an integral region of China was anathema to the Chinese revolution and to the core tenets of the People's Republic. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, declared jointly by Zhou and Nehru in 1954 was a kind of diplomatic codification of these core values of strength and sovereignty. However, the ideas of expressed in the treaty, particularly 'mutual respect for each

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[36] Conversation, Deng Xiaoping, Liu Shaoqi, reviewing Xinhua articles, 27.3.1959, MZDNP 3, 650.
[37] Edits, 'Evaluating the so-called Dalai Lama's Statement', 20.4.1959, MZDNP 4, 25.
[38] Keith, 97-8, and Chen, *Mao's China*, 154.
[39] Letter to Wu Lengxi, 25.4.1959, MZDNP 4, 28.

other's territorial integrity and sovereignty', 'mutual non-aggression', and 'mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs', proved to be less than useful in bilateral relations between China and India, as they were referenced more to justify unilateral claims and make accusations against one another, and failed to achieve progress in the resolution of the two nations' disputes.

The CCP sense of vulnerability in the Himalayas is evident in that leaders saw the Tibetan Uprising and the border dispute with India as linked phenomena. Zhou spoke of the Indian government 'using the Tibetan rebellion' and 'taking the opportunity to apply pressure to the Chinese government and forcing China to accept India's unilateral position on the border question'.[40] Zhou explained the importance of the Western sector: 'This area has been under Chinese administration for a long time, moreover, for China it has a very important meaning. This area links Xinjiang and a wide area of Western Tibet, as the life line of communication and transport'.[41] As each side sought to justify its own claims, the CCP's explanation of Indian views and behavior did not suppose any legitimacy to India's claims, as Garver points out, but rather explained Indian interests in the Himalayas, whether regarding Tibet broadly or the territorial dispute specifically, as the inheritance of the thinking of the British Empire.[42] Moreover, Chinese tensions with India extended outside of the disputed territories themselves and into the sovereign Himalayan kingdoms which punctuated the China-India border, and, which, like CCP involvement in Southeast Asia, represented another strategic region in which the CCP sought political influence for the sake of its perceived security interests. In the case of the Himalayas,

[40] Meeting, Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, 11.9.1959, ZELNP 2, 252.
[41] Letter to Nehru, 17.12.1959, ZELNP 2, 273.
[42] Garver, 'Decision', 113.

rather than the complex coordination of military, propaganda, and diplomatic operations demonstrated in the Geneva Conference of 1954 and Chinese involvement in the Vietnam Wars, China sought external influence chiefly through diplomacy, only using military force against the Tibetans themselves and later against India during the Border War of 1962.

The Himalayan order prior to the arrival of the PRC and Republic of India was in fact a patchwork of treaties and agreements between sovereign and semi-sovereign kingdoms, many of which had indeed been concluded by the British during their long rule over India, and which were the result of the significant political influence which the British wielded in the Himalayas. As described earlier, the arrival of China and India as two sovereign and independent nations with Himalayan territory meant rewriting the Himalayan political order. For India, this meant making use of many of the British legacies in the region, and for the PRC, this meant the rejection of British influence altogether. As such, the de facto legacy of the British Empire was indeed at the heart of the struggle in the Himalayas between the two new nations.

The two countries argued over Sikkim and Bhutan throughout the period, as India repeatedly requested the PRC to acknowledge India's right to administer the external relations of Sikkim and Bhutan, rights which were enshrined in the Indo-Sikkimese Treaty of 1950 which made the small kingdom an Indian protectorate and the Treaty of Friendship Between India and Bhutan, signed in 1949 which would allow India to 'guide' Bhutan's foreign relations.[43] CCP diplomats expressed discomfort with these treaties, explaining with regard to 'protectorates', that,

[43] See Jha, 99-103, 360-3.

'In Afro-Asia that is seldom seen'.[44] Moreover, CCP leaders viewed the Indian government not only as 'heirs' to British policy and thinking towards Tibet, but also as looking to expand their influence in other parts of the Himalayas as well. Mao noted for example that 'Nepal is not content with India's control, but regarding this, the Indian side has made some concessions, in order to pull Nepal to their side'.[45] As noted in Chapter Four, the Intelligence Department of the PLA General Staff reported with suspicion on Indian intentions in the Himalayas as well, noting in 1959 that '[Nehru's] behaviors and declarations distinctively show India's intentions to turn Bhutan into a protected state like Sikkim and to strengthen control over Nepal, hence turning India, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim into a Himalayan Union'.[46] Worse still were the problems of the British legacy on the Himalayan border between China and India. The PLA also reported its view that 'India has always intended to inherit imperialist Britain's expansionism', making clear that views espoused by Mao and Zhou spread well beyond the Politburo and into the CCP's diplomatic, military, and political branches.[47] Worse still were the problems of the British legacy on the Himalayan border between China and India.

As explained in earlier chapters, the border dispute itself was a dispute over the British-drawn McMahon Line, which was put in place during the Simla Convention of 1914. At this conference, British representatives, Tibetan representatives, and representatives from China negotiated over boundaries as three parties, as at this stage, following the Revolution of 1911, the

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[44] MFA 105-01056-03, 印度外交部秘书长拉-库-尼赫鲁访华（三）：章文晋司长同印度驻华大使帕蒂萨拉蒂三次谈话记录 17.7.1961. Secretary General of Indian Foreign Ministry R. K. Nehru's visit to China (three): record of three conversations between Bureau Chief Zhang Wenjin and Indian ambassador to China Parthasarathy, 48.
[45] Comments, India-Nepal joint statement, June, 1959, MZDNP 4, 82.
[46] FMA 105-00944-07, CWIHPDA.
[47] Ibid.

Chinese government exerted minimal influence in Tibet and the region existed in a de facto autonomous state until the CCP military entry in 1950.[48] In correspondences between the Republic of India and the PRC, the Indian government claimed that the McMahon line was the valid boundary between India and China while the CCP refused to acknowledge it. The Chinese MFA maintained for example, in 1960, that '[Firstly,] no Chinese government has ever recognized Britain's territorial claims on the Tibet and Sinkiang regions of China'[49], disputing the validity of the Simla Convention altogether as follows: 'Without the authorization and consent of the Chinese Central Government, the Tibet local authorities had no right to hold talks and conclude treaties with foreign countries'.[50] Moreover, the British legacy in the Himalayas was directly linked to China's sense of weakness and restoration, and its struggle with foreign imperialism. As the MFA maintained in 1959, 'It should not have been necessary to discuss the British policy of aggression and expansion in modern history…It is, however, surprising that the Indian Government should claim the boundary line which Britain unlawfully created through aggression against Tibet…If this assertion is maintained, the inevitable conclusion to be derived would be that the British colonialists were most fair-minded while oppressed China was full of undisguised ambitions…[and] that the powerful British imperialism was, for the past one hundred years and more, invariably upholding the traditional Sino-Indian boundary, while the weak China was ceaselessly encroaching upon British territory'.[51] Zhou wrote in his correspondences with Nehru that 'the Simla Conference was an important step taken by Britain in its design to detach Tibet from China' and referenced the McMahon Line as follows: 'This illegal line aroused the great indignation of the Chinese people…how could China agree to

[48] See Van Schaik, 180-218.
[49] WP Vol. 4, 10.
[50] WP Vol. 4, 14.
[51] WP Vol. 3, 70-71.

accept under coercion such an illegal line which would have it relinquish its rights and disgrace itself by selling out its territory?'[52] As such, the struggle in the Himalayas, and the dignity of 'the Chinese people' as Zhou expressed it, were intimately linked.

The CCP regarded the Simla Convention and its diplomatic products as part of the 'unequal treaties'.[53] The 'unequal treaties' were a series of treaties signed between China and foreign powers beginning with the Opium Wars against Britain, which, in the words of Dong Wang, 'occupied a central position in the Chinese collective memory of the nation's humiliating experience – known as *guochi* – in the one hundred years from 1842 to 1943'.[54] Repudiation of the 'unequal treaties' was a pillar in the Chinese struggle for national resurrection, even before the founding of the PRC.[55] Thus, in the CCP view, the Indian government was trespassing not only on sovereign territory and strategic interests in the Himalayas, but on the core mission of the Chinese revolution and restoration. As the MFA explained to India in 1959 on the subject of Simla,

> Many dirty unequal treaties signed by the past Chinese Governments under imperialist oppression have already been proclaimed null and void. The Chinese Government feels perplexed why the Government of India, which has likewise won independence from imperialist oppression, should insist that the Government of its friend China recognized an unequal treaty which the Chinese has not [sic] even signed.[56]

Privately, with nations friendly to China, Zhou expressed his belief that Nehru himself was conscious of these offenses to China and pursued them regardless. Speaking with Pakistan's

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[52] WP Vol. 2, 29-30.
[53] Wang Tieya, 'International Law in China: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives', in *Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law*, (London, 1991), 341.
[54] Dong Wang, *China's Unequal Treaties: Narrating National History*, (Oxford, 2005), 1.
[55] See Dong Wang, *Treaties*. See also Chiang Kai-shek, *China's Destiny*, (London, 1947).
[56] Quoted in Wang Tieya, 341.

ambassador in September 1962, a month ahead of the Border War, and after the Forward Policy had been in place for nearly a year, Zhou explained that 'India has already invaded China…At the time of Kuwait's independence, Menon said that all of Britain's territories belonged to India. Nehru's past writings have exposed this way of thinking. India sees China's Tibet, Xinjiang, and the Aksai Chin all as theirs. Nehru has always wanted to inherit the Great British Empire'.[57] In November 1962, Zhou wrote to Sukarno in Indonesia, explaining his official case for war against India in a detailed argument, including the following references to India and Britain, revealing both that the CCP saw the 1954 agreement as a repudiation of the British legacy, presenting India as heirs to Britain's 'imperial ambitions', and claiming that India intended to curtail Chinese influence in Tibet since, essentially, the founding of the New China; discussing the signing of the Five Principles in 1954, Zhou explained that: 'Our two countries were supposed to get rid of all of the imperialist inheritance entirely, and to establish and develop mutually friendly relations on a completely new basis'.[58] The Premier went on to state that, 'But the Indian government continued Britain's imperialist ambitions in Tibet. India has always regarded Tibet as its sphere of influence; at the least, it wants to make Tibet into a China-India buffer zone. Therefore, in 1950, India tried to stop China's peaceful liberation of Tibet'.[59]

The CCP official case for war against India, as represented to other countries, was broader than the border itself, and rested in part, upon India 'interference' in China's 'internal

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[57] FMA 105-01802-03 巴基斯坦驻华大使罗查拜会周恩来总理谈话纪要 5.9.1962. Minutes of conversation during official visit by Pakistani Ambassador to China Raza to Premier Zhou Enlai, 43.
[58] FMA 105-01786-02 周恩来总理就中印边界问题致函印度尼西亚总理苏加诺 15.11.1962. Premier Zhou Enlai's letter to Indonesian Prime Minister Sukarno regarding the China-India border question, 58.
[59] Ibid.

affairs' in Tibet. Zhou explained in his letter to Sukarno that 'The Indian government not only supported and encouraged this rebellion, but after this rebellion was suppressed, India received Tibetan remnants and connived in their anti-China political activities carried out in India. Not long after the Tibetan rebellion broke out, Prime Minister Nehru officially put forward to China demands for a large piece of territory'.[60] Zhou had shared a similar view to the Pakistani ambassador in September 1962, linking Nehru to 'the British Empire' as follows:

> [H]e definitely wants to interfere with China's internal affairs. He created the Tibetan problem. During my second visit to India, he received the Dalai Lama and clearly wants to make subversive moves. They sowed the seeds of the Tibetan uprising and 1959 was the result. This is how I see that Nehru's thoughts about inheriting the British Empire are very deep. A friend in government in a Southeast Asian country has told me that Nehru's thinking is British thinking. What he said is right.[61]

Importantly, in India's interactions with the CCP, legacies of the British Empire were not only hard to avoid but elements of Britain's imperial past in Asia were also invoked by the Indian government as reasons for various Indian actions in Asia. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) responded to an altercation over the South China Sea in 1959, referenced in Chapter Four, in which an Indian vessel entered what China called 'sovereign territorial waters', with a Indian statement that India had simply been using of British naval navigation manuals. This prompted the PRC to express incredulity for India's 'disregard for China's effort to cast off the chains of imperialism and become a fully independent and sovereign nation'.[62] It also led to accusations that it was 'part of India's plan to carry out military threats towards China by land, air and sea'.[63] Zhou's letter to Sukarno in November 1962 makes a similar statement about land and sea, emphasizing the extent of Britain's imperial activity, and also underscoring the CCP's

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[60] FMA 105-01786-02, 59.
[61] FMA 105-01802-03 5.9.62, 45.
[62] *ZGHYD*, 421.
[63] Ibid., 415.

anxieties about India: 'From the second half of 19th Century to the early 20th Century, British imperialism energetically carried out conspiratorial activities to invade China's Tibet and Xinjiang. It tried to open China's back door, coordinating at a distance with its invasion of China's coast and heartland'.[64]

With regard to the Himalayas, invocations of British-made treaties, as well as the accounts of British travelers in order to explain India's claims to the border areas did not help India's case with the PRC.[65] However, the Indian government saw itself as having shed Britain's legacy. Nehru's telling of *what India had given up* of the British inheritance in order to establish friendly relations with China reveals that the Indian leader saw himself as having made serious concessions to China already, that the Indian side did not accept China's view of existing treaties, whether British-made or not, and that the 'weakness' of prior Chinese governments was no excuse to re-negotiate. In a letter to Zhou in 1959, Nehru explains that,

> The Government of India voluntarily renounced all the extra-territorial rights enjoyed by Britain in Tibet and recognised by Treaty that Tibet is a region of China…you had told me that Tibet had been and was a part of China but that it was an autonomous region…All Chinese governments have respected the Indian border. The fact that previous Chinese governments were weak is no answer.[66]

In short, Indian acceptance of aspects of Himalayan inheritance clashed against China's desire to revise matters to suit their current needs, and these needs were directly related to China's intended resurrection. The desire to create a new boundary is explicit, as an 1958 diplomatic notice makes clear: 'a new way of drawing the boundary of China will be decided on in

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[64] FMA 105-01786-02 15.11.62, 56.
[65] See for example, WP Vol. 1, 26-7, 55-7; Vol. 6, 17-9; Vol. 7, 30.
[66] WP Vol. 2, 34-5.

accordance with the results of the consultations and the survey',[67] and the objective of repudiating the 'unequal treaties', one of which was the Simla legacy in the Himalayas has been explained above. Moreover, as diplomatic notices make clear, the CCP saw these issues as directly related to the project of the New China itself. To quote a diplomatic notice from March 1962:

> Even the then Government of old China clearly expressed its non-recognition of the so-called McMahon Line…Even the government of old China took such an attitude, how can one expect the government of new China to recognise this line as legal?[68]

Two months later, in May 1962, the MFA issued a stern warning, referenced in Chapter Four, in terms of the difference between the old and new China, explaining that it was an existential necessity that the New China not be returned to its past:

> [R]egardless of anything, the liberated, new China cannot permit itself to be pushed back once again to the position of suffering that was the old China.[69]

In June 1962, the MFA expressed itself in similar terms, explaining that it would not be pushed by India: 'How can one assume that the Chinese Government would accept such unilaterally-imposed submissive terms? Is China a defeated country?' adding that 'China will never submit before any threat of force'.[70] In July, the MFA wrote that 'The Indian side will make a fatal mistake if it should think that China is flabby and can be bullied'.[71] In August the Chinese Foreign Minister stated, according to India's MEA, that '"to wish that Chinese troops would

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[67] WP Vol. 1, 47.
[68] WP Vol. 6, 22.
[69] *ZDWGX 1962*, 44.
[70] WP Vol. 6, 57-58.
[71] WP Vol. 6, 91.

withdraw from their own territory is impossible. That would be against the will of 650 million Chinese. No force in the world could oblige us to do something of this kind"'.[72]

Mao Zedong, speaking on China's condition in 1958, stated that 'Politically we are a strong country, a powerful country. In military and economic affairs, we are still weak. For these reasons, there is a mission in front of us: we want to make a change, to go from weakness to strength'.[73] As has been explained, the core elements of the New China included the building up of China's military and economic power. In doing so, China would regain its central position in the world and achieve the purposes of the CCP revolution, the building of a New China. Building and defending the New China involved the repudiation of the 'unequal treaties' and thus of imperialism's *legacy* in China as much as the defense against a new 'imperialism' which, to the CCP, was represented by the United States, and which, in connection with India, will be reviewed in later chapters. Importantly, Chinese leaders believed that, in terms of military power, China was superior to India. As Liu Shaoqi explained in early 1963, after the end of the Border War, 'In a military contest, India is no good. Even with the help of America, it is no good'.[74] India's threat to China was therefore existential insofar as the CCP made clear that it could not tolerate Indian actions, seen as they were as threats to the project of the New China itself, but it was also manageable by military means, as is evident by the ultimate use of military force against India to defend, not simply territory, but China's resurrection.

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[72] WP Vol. 7, 36.
[73] Speech, Sixth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, MZDNP, 552-3.
[74] FMA 105-01792-08, 11.1.1963, 91.

Importantly, China saw India's challenge in the Himalayas as not only a replay of their prior troubles with British imperialism, but also as a 'demand' that was new, insofar as it exceeded the demands of the British themselves. As Zhou explained to Sukarno in his case for war, India wanted both to 'inherit British ambitions towards Tibet' and that the Indian leadership believed that 'the Chinese land which they had occupied was theirs and also that the Chinese land that they had not yet occupied was also theirs. This is a demand that not even the blustering British Empire dared to put towards the old, half-colonized China'.[75] For a new country that saw its core mission as national resurrection from prior humiliations, and which meant to change from its condition as the 'old, half-colonized China', India's 'demands' would have to be met with force. Mao's struggle against the USSR during the Sino-Soviet split is a useful comparison insofar as it shows that China would not be content in the Sino-Soviet relationship as a lesser power.[76] With regard to India, it is also clear that the CCP saw Indian claims in the Himalayas, as well as other factors, as an assertion of superiority over China which the CCP would not tolerate. As Liu Shaoqi explained with regard to India, '[T]hey always feel they are a head taller than us'.[77] Thus, India's dispute with China in the Himalayas was not simply about land, as Khrushchev had supposed when he proposed in 1959 that China give the land to India for the sake of a larger China-India-Soviet cooperation. [78] It was a challenge to the core purposes of the CCP revolution, which were to restore Chinese power in the world, through the founding of the New China.

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[75] FMA 105-01786-02 15.11.62, 55.
[76] See Luthi and Radchenko on the Sino-Soviet split.
[77] FMA 105-01792-08, 90.
[78] "Discussion between N. S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong," October 1959, CWIHPDA, Archive of the President of the Russian Federation.

5.4 'Interference in Internal Affairs': India's Second Core Threat to the New China

The concept of 'interference in internal affairs' is a second aspect of China-India conflict in the Himalayas that merits deeper examination on its own. As mentioned above, the CCP saw the Five Principles as an instrument by which China would dispose of 'British imperialist inheritance' and form a new relationship on terms which the New China could accept: 'Our two countries were supposed to get rid of all of the imperialist inheritance entirely, and to establish and develop mutually friendly relations on a completely new basis'.[79] However, as this section will reveal, China's concept of the Five Principles also involved demanding concessions from India, not only with regard to what China considered its own sovereign territory in the Himalayas, but also in terms of *Indian behavior and actions inside India's own borders.* These demands were justified by the CCP in terms of the concepts laid out in the Five Principles, particularly 'non-interference in internal affairs'. The result was a clash between the two nations not only over practical issues such as the territorial dispute, but in terms of the values held by each country, including freedom of speech expression and the right to protest, which derived from their respective national foundings. In Chinese statements to India over Indian civilian protests, for example, the CCP made clear that it saw Indian civil rights including '"freedom of speech" or any other "freedoms"' as no justification for what the CCP considered interference in 'China's internal affairs'.[80]

[79] FMA 105-01786-02, 15.11.62, 58.
[80] WP Vol. 1, 73.

'Interference in internal affairs', as this section will reveal, was anathema to the project of the New China. The CCP concept of Indian interference involved not only the Himalayas but also Taiwan and overseas Chinese, all of which, for the CCP, constituted its 'internal affairs'. Moreover, alleged Indian activities involving this interference took place, according to the CCP, both inside the borders of the PRC and *inside the borders of India*. To begin with, the question of 'interference' in the Himalayas, which, as the prior section demonstrated, was linked to CCP concepts of India as heirs to the British Empire, is the most obvious focal point in Chinese communications with India on this subject. In April 1959, for example, China's Vice Foreign Minister for Foreign Affairs told the Indian government the following about Tibet, soon after the outbreak of the Tibetan Uprising:

> The local government in Tibet…have torn up the agreement on the peaceful liberation of Tibet and begun armed revolt by attacking Government offices. [We will] never permit such high treason of the local Government of Tibet and we are certain to put down this revolt. This is entirely an internal affair of China and we shall never permit interference from outside. Tibet is an integral part of China's territory and any intrigue aimed at splitting Tibet away from China is doomed to total failure.[81]

In May 1962, the CCP went further in its communications with India, questioning the entire relationship with India and accusing India of interfering in Tibet from its own soil. The MFA stated that 'there has been a dark side to Sino-Indian relations since their very beginning', finding fault in Indian protests of China's use of force in Tibet in 1950 and accusing the Indian government of having 'all along allowed a batch of Tibetan fugitives to carry out disruptive and subversive activities against China's Tibet in Kalimpong and other places in India'.[82] The MFA added that 'All this clearly constitutes interference in China's internal affairs'.[83]

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[81] WP Vol. 1, 67.
[82] WP Vol. 6, 198.
[83] Ibid.

Importantly, the CCP linked both 'interference in internal affairs' and the Five Principles agreement of 1954 directly to the existence of the New China. A diplomatic notice referenced earlier in this thesis reveals this when quoted more extensively, explaining that it was perceived Indian threats to both territory *and* 'internal affairs' that challenged the existence of the New China. The document stated that '[The 1954 Agreement] did not settle all the questions existing between China and India, and did not even touch on the boundary question', adding that 'China is the wronged party both on the question of the implementation of the 1954 Agreement and on the question of the maintenance of the status quo of the boundary…', and, in a final paragraph explaining the paramount importance of the values of the New China:

> Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese Government has attached great importance to friendship with India and has made unremitting efforts to safeguard and consolidate this friendship. However, the liberated new China can in no circumstances allow itself to be plunged back to the position of the injured old China. China does not interfere in the internal affairs of any other country, nor will it allow any country to interfere in its internal affairs. China does not encroach on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of any other country, nor will it allow any country to encroach on its sovereignty and territorial integrity.[84]

With an examination of the accusations traded and justifications made by both sides using the Five Principles, the uselessness of these principles becomes clear. India's view of the situation is also worth quoting:

> It is obvious, in retrospect, that the Chinese government had from the beginning had no intention of abiding by the terms of the 1954 Agreement but had used the Agreement as a temporary expedient for tiding over the immediate problems facing them in Tibet. The Government of India, on the other hand, made important sacrifices and gave up considerable rights and interests which they had acquired in Tibet from the past in the hope that relations between China and India would thereafter be based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and develop in co-operation and harmony to the

[84] WP Vol. 6, 197-200.

> mutual benefit of both countries and strengthen peace and stability in this region of Asia. These hopes have foundered.[85]

By 1962, both sides were reinterpreting the history of their relationship, considering the opposite party to have betrayed them, and to have been acting in bad faith from the start. For China, this reinterpretation was linked to 'interference' emanating both inside and outside of India.

A further layer of complexity was added as the CCP viewed India as acting in collaboration with GMD covert activities inside Tibet. The First Asian Department of the MFA issued a comprehensive report in 1961 called 'India's Internal and External Direction' which maintained that India 'persists in long-term opposition to China, making China into the main enemy'; the report explained that, 'On the border Indian planes and personnel regularly cross the border to stir up trouble, conniving with Tibetan bandits to harass us', adding that Indian institutions and nationals in Tibet were 'carrying out subversive activities through covert operations'.[86] The CCP had asked for Indian cooperation against GMD covert activities in 1958, but the Indian government stated that it could not act until and unless the CCP could provide proof of these activities.[87] By the time the Tibetan Uprising had broken out, CCP leadership saw India as directly involved themselves.

CCP views of Indian tolerance of GMD activity and 'interference' in Tibet centered around the town of Kalimpong, where Tibetans gathered having fled CCP rule in the Tibetan plateau. The Chinese Embassy in Delhi complained to the Indian government in 1960 of an

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[85] WP Vol. 6, 216.
[86] MFA 105-01455-02 第一亚洲司：《印度目前的内外动向》27.4.1961. First Asian Department: "India's current internal and external trend", 1.
[87] *ZGHYD*, 47-9.

incident involving 'over 500 reactionary Tibetan nobles, Tibetan rebels and Khamba rebel bandits who have fled to India', who had met to 'observe the first anniversary of the rebellion in Tibet', carrying 'besides the Indian national flag, the so-called "Tibetan national flag"', and 'frantically shouted reactionary slogans such as "Ordure for the Hans" [sic], "Communists go back" and "Long live Indo-Tibetan cooperation"'. The Embassy complained that '[L]ocal authorities of India did not try to ban such anti-China activities, but the responsible persons of the police office attended the meeting themselves, and allowed the rebel bandits to continue their activities at the Kalimpong Town Hall…', adding that 'This is not in conformity with the Five Principles of peaceful co-existence [sic], and seriously damages the friendly relations between China and India'.[88]

Remarking on another incident later in 1960, the PRC accused India of attempting to 'shirk its responsibility',[89] and in March 1962 the PRC accused India of allowing Tibetans to operate as 'an exile government', also labeling this as 'interference in China's internal affairs':

> Apart from the boundary question…the Indian Government interfered in China's internal affairs by openly expressing its sympathy for the Tibetan rebels and conniving at their anti-Chinese political activities. Going back on its own pledge, the Indian Government even today allows the Tibetan rebels to operate in India in virtual capacity of an exile government.[90]

As such, for the CCP, the concept of 'internal affairs', applied not only to what took place in China, but to incidents taking place outside of China that the CCP considered a political provocation, including attitudes expressed by Indian officials, and the activities of refugees on foreign soil. As a further diplomatic notice on the subject expressed in April 1962, 'several

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[88] WP Vol. 4, 97.
[89] WP Vol. 4, 99.
[90] WP Vol. 6, 192.

hundred Tibetan rebel bandits in Kalimpong held a meeting at Tharpa Choling Monastery there to "observe" the third anniversary of the rebellion in Tibet, at which some Indians were present... Such activity is one of political nature, which constitutes an interference in China's internal affairs'.[91] From this, it is clear that friendship with the New China involved not only full acceptance of China's view of what constituted its 'sovereignty and territorial integrity', but also 'responsibilities' for how to behave and what to permit with regard to activities taking place outside of China.

The issue of 'responsibilities' and behavior went even deeper, into the fabric and core values of Indian society. Throughout the years of collapse, China took issue with Indian protests, *even calling domestic protests within India* 'interference in China's internal affairs'. In 1959, for example, the Chinese Embassy in India complained of Indian demonstrations in front of the Chinese consulate in Bombay, in which '[Protestors] branded China's putting down of the rebellion in her own territory, the Tibet Region, as imperialist action and made all sorts of slanders', and what was 'more serious', demonstrators put up a portrait of Mao Zedong and 'carried out wanton insult by throwing tomatoes and rotten eggs at it', as Indian police officers stood by.[92] The Chinese Embassy called this 'a huge insult to the head of state of the People's Republic of China and the respected and beloved leader of the Chinese people', adding with reference to the police officers, that 'It is evidently an act of connivance'.[93] The Embassy stated that, 'the masses of the six hundred and fifty million Chinese people absolutely cannot tolerate

[91] WP Vol. 6, 258.
[92] WP Vol. 1, 70.
[93] Ibid.

[this]', adding that 'In case the reply from the Indian Government is not satisfactory' the protests of the Chinese Embassy would 'never stop even for one hundred years'.[94]

India's reply explained that, under Indian law, 'processions cannot be banned so long as they are peaceful', adding that portraits of Gandhi and Nehru had been 'treated in an insulting manner' in the past and that 'Under the law and Constitution of India a great deal of latitude is allowed to the people so long as they do not indulge in actual violence'.[95] The PRC replied that 'These words and deeds were in the nature of serious interference in China's internal affairs…and cannot be altered by recourse to any pretext, whether "freedom of speech" or any other "freedoms"…'[96] The diplomatic notice also took issue with 'large quantities of words and deeds slandering China and interfering in China's internal affairs', considering statements made by Indian parliamentarians to be of this nature.[97] The PRC expressed approval, however, that Nehru called on newspapers to 'exercise restraint'.[98] Thus, the CCP concept of 'non-interference' or of a tolerable level of respect for China included the disbanding – as opposed to permission – of protests *inside India* and the 'exercise' of 'restraint' by India's own newspapers. By invoking the idea that '650 million Chinese people cannot tolerate' the above mentioned 'insult', the CCP was again invoking the language of the New China, its humiliations, and determination to assert itself as a risen nation, as the CCP did in the context of alleged Indian trespassings in the Himalayan territories.

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[94] Ibid.
[95] WP Vol. 1, 71-72.
[96] WP Vol. 1, 73.
[97] Ibid.
[98] WP Vol. 1, 75.

The fundamental clash of values here, resulted in India's need to express *its own sense of sovereignty and non-interference*. Two more incidents are worth citing. Also in 1959, the CCP protested over Indian 'slander' and burning of effigies, recounting the following incident to the Indian government:

> [H]ooligans…made speeches wantonly slandering the People's Republic of China they openly burnt on the spot two effigies of the Chinese People's leader Chairman Mao Tse-Tung and the head of the Chinese Government Premier, Chou En-lai…the Indian police present watched on with folded arms, without intervening at all…[We] cannot but deeply regret that, up till now, these provocations, instead of being stopped, have grown more and more rampant, culminating in the extremely grave incident of burning the effigies…The Indian Government cannot shirk its due responsibility for this incident. [99]

India responded again by explaining the nature of its own political system: 'demonstrations in the country are not infrequent even against the Ministers of Government and many of these are organised by political parties' adding that Nehru condemned 'the burning of effigies'.[100] Finally, in another incident of burning effigies of Mao and Zhou in Calcutta in 1961, the Chinese Embassy reported an 'anti-Chinese' protest: 'a serious provocation to China, for which the Government of China cannot but express indignation'.[101] India's response is worth quoting as it reveals the extent to which the Chinese condemnations were now infringing on *India's own sense of what it had won by its national founding:*

> There are certain facts of life in India which the Chinese Embassy might well begin to appreciate. The rights of freedom of speech and expression and of peaceful assembly without arms are guaranteed by the Indian Constitution to every Indian citizen. These rights are cherished as part of India's national heritage.[102]

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[99] WP Vol. 3, 106.
[100] WP Vol. 3, 107.
[101] WP Vol. 6, 146.
[102] WP Vol. 6, 155-156.

Additionally, rather than noting actions taken by the Indian leadership to mitigate these incidents, as prior notes had done, the MEA now took the side of the protesters directly. In a vein similar to China's invocation of 'the indignation of China' or the sentiments of '650 million Chinese people', the MEA now spoke on behalf of 'the public mind of India' and 'the Indian people' themselves:

> The fact of Chinese aggression on Indian territory forms the subject of protracted diplomatic exchanges and is not a matter of doubt in the public mind of India…The Indian people have reacted spontaneously and with dignity and restraint to Chinese incursions into Indian territory and the expressions of their just indignation against which the Embassy's note protests are as natural as they are sincere.[103]

China and India had come into a clash of national values, national foundings, and national wills. As the CCP sought to discredit, invalidate, and attack the actions, and by extension, the rights of Indians *in their own country*, and to explain their own protestations in terms of objections to 'slander' against China and 'interference in China's internal affairs', India chose, in its diplomacy, to take the side of its people. As such, the clash between China and India had become a visible clash of national wills. If the Chinese people had 'stood up', then so, of course, had India's.

CCP ideas of 'internal affairs' and concepts of Indian 'interference' extended beyond even the above mentioned views and incidents, and the visible clash between the two countries over a sense of rights permeated other incidents as well. The 1961 report from the MFA First Asian Department stated, for example, that India was engaged in 'Sinophobia' (排华), 'banishing and persecuting overseas Chinese personnel', 'striking at the patriotic power of our overseas Chinese (打击我华侨爱国力量), dividing our overseas Chinese position (分化我华侨

[103] WP Vol. 6, 156.

阵地)', as well as 'curbing our cultural propaganda', and 'using the United Nations to interfere in our internal affairs'.[104] Interference with overseas Chinese involved the arrest and deportation of various Chinese citizens living in India whom the Indian government chose to expel from the country, often across the Himalayan border.[105]

An incident worth examining is the denial of a visa for a Xinhua journalist whom the Indian government decided was engaging in hostile activity towards India. In response, the CCP claimed that ' "no one is any way entitled to interfere in the reports of the Hsin Hua [Xinhua] news agency" ' to which the Indian MEA responded that China 'has no right to question the wisdom or the propriety of the action which a sovereign government have taken against a foreigner who is in their view had [sic] been indulging in mischievous propaganda while resident in India'.[106] The CCP saw this incident as 'interference in the affairs' of its state propaganda agency, which the CCP believed had the *right* to operate in a foreign country as it choose. The Chinese MFA later called the Xinhua visa denial 'an interference in the affairs of the Chinese state News Agency' adding that ' "no one is in any way entitled to interfere in the reports of the Hsin Hua [Xinhua] news agency, using "interference in internal affairs" [of India] as a pretext'.[107] As such, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, in practice, involved 'responsibilities' by the Indian government to restrain its own citizens and newspapers while permitting Chinese state reporters to operate in India as they saw fit.

[104] MFA 105-01455-02 27.4.1961, 1-2.
[105] See WP Vol. 5, 114, 122, Vol. 6, 145, 152-3.
[106] WP Vol. 4, 46.
[107] WP Vol. 5, 151.

Finally, the CCP supposed that India was also interfering in their internal affairs with regard to Taiwan, both inside and outside of India. CCP suspicions over Indian support for GMD and American activity in Tibet have been discussed. However, two other incidents are worth mentioning. The first reveals that the CCP had been discontented with aspects of Nehru's behavior since Bandung itself. Speaking with the Pakistani Ambassador in September 1962, a month before the Border War, Zhou Enlai explained that at Bandung, 'We wanted to talk about Taiwan, but Nehru was opposed', adding that, 'liberating Taiwan is China's internal affair… Nehru wanted to monopolize and keep us from bringing it up'.[108]

The divergence between Indian and Chinese objectives within the Afro-Asian movement, and the CCP view of India as a rival on the world stage because of this, will be the subject of the next chapter. With regard to the current discussion, this recollection by Zhou highlights that the Chinese Premier saw India's use of the Bandung forum – which India essentially created by its insistence on the invitation of China – as counter to Chinese interests. Nehru's approach at Bandung had been inclusive and non-confrontational, as described, lobbying for example to moderate criticism of European countries which retained overseas colonies, and proclaiming that 'We want to be friends with the West and friends with the East and friends with everybody', perhaps in keeping with his original vision of a meeting of 'East and West'.[109] The CCP was in the midst of the First Taiwan Straits Crisis and had considered Bandung a forum, as Zhou reveals, for the advancement of its agenda regarding 'internal affairs'. As such, the CCP saw both Nehru's opposition to a Taiwan discussion at Bandung and also India's use of the UN with

[108] MFA 105-01802-03, 5.9.1962, 44.
[109] See Nesadurai, 76, also *Nehru's Speeches 3*, 289-91 and *Nehru's Speeches 1*, 233-50.

regard to the Himalayas, as referenced by the First Asian Department, as a problem. The former was obstruction of China's agenda on internal affairs and the latter was direct interference.

Mao, as quoted earlier in the chapter, described Tibet and Taiwan as the two remaining problems for the CCP in terms of its 'sovereignty and territorial integrity'. As the Tibetan Uprising crisis unfolded in 1959, the Chairman explained to Wang Jiaxiang and others that, 'As long as we solve the Tibet question, the only question that remains is Taiwan'.[110] The fact that the CCP perceived India as a troublemaker in not one but both of its core problems of 'sovereignty and territorial integrity', offers a taste of China's understanding of India as a much more significant rival geographically than has been previously been understood, something which will be the subject of the next two chapters. The GMD presence in Kalimpong also went beyond the problem of GMD activities in Tibet. Here the CCP criticized what it saw as Indian collusion with the GMD not only in Tibet, but also on the 'Taiwan question' and in the 'plot of creating two Chinas on Indian soil':

> Chiang Kai-shek clique elements and Tibetan rebels openly held a meeting in the vicinity of Kalimpong to celebrate the so-called "national day of the Republic of China"…they even hung the national flag of India side by side with the so-called national flag of the Chiang Kai-shek clique…Indian local authorities failed to forbid such activities, but a director of the C.I.D [Crime Investigation Department] of Kalimpong and a police officer attended the rally in person…local officials' connivance at such acts hostile to the People's Republic of China and detrimental to the Sino-Indian friendly relations…Chiang Kai-shek clique elements in Calcutta also obtained permission to hold celebrations for the so-called "National day of the Republic of China". The occurrence of such a series of incidents shows that the Indian local authorities concerned are deliberately conniving at the Chiang Kai-shek clique elements to be engaged in activities against the People's Republic of China and can carry out its plot of creating "two Chinas" on Indian soil.[111]

[110] Meeting, Wang Jiaxiang, et al., 10.11.1959, MZDNP 4, 236.
[111] WP Vol. 3, 109

It is worth mentioning that the CCP often saw activities perceived as hostile to China as acts of Indian government collusion, rather than as spontaneous activities. Again, this is an illustration of the CCP clash with India over what was permitted within a society. A helpful comparison is Nikita Khrushchev's exchange with the US Ambassador to the UN, during a visit to America in 1959. Their motorcade passed a protestor with a sign that read, 'Death to Khrushchev, The Butcher of Hungary'. The Soviet Premier asked why Eisenhower wanted to insult him, and, when told that this was not Eisenhower's doing, he stated, 'In the Soviet Union [the protestor] wouldn't be there unless I had given the order'.[112]

The question of interference in internal affairs was intimately linked to the question of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and all three were core tenets of the New China and the CCP revolution. India presented, in the eyes of the CCP, an extraordinary challenge to each of these tenets. Moreover, the clash over these issues, which could not be rectified by use of the Five Principles, brought forth a clash of foundational values between the two countries. China's negation, disregard, and disinterest in India's values and India's independent direction must be seen in the context of China's understanding of India itself, not just as a challenger, as has been reviewed in this chapter thus far, but as a country. For the CCP, India was very much an imagined nation.[113] The disinterest in understanding the country accurately or fully and the constraints of the CCP nationalist and Marxist views upon their understanding of this major nation led to conclusions that were both delusional in concept and violent in practice. This will be the subject of the final section of this chapter.

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[112] Taubman, 431.
[113] Phrase adapted from Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism,* (London, 2006)

5.5 China's Delusion: 'Indian Expansionists' and 'The Numerous Indian People'

'Whether or not this lesson that we taught to Nehru was enough is still a question. Maybe there will need to be a second or a third lesson'. – Liu Shaoqi, January 1963[114]

This section will aim to explain key judgments made by the CCP on the nature of the Indian government's relationship with the Indian people, their belief that the Indian government was, essentially, illegitimate, and that the Chinese and Indian people were in fact meant to be brothers. The CCP case for war against India is presented as a 'war of self-defense'.[115] Supporting this claim was both a protracted diplomatic and propaganda campaign that presented India as the aggressor, and also an understanding of Indian intentions in the Himalayas that demonized the Indian government and believed, as this section will address, that the Indian government in its actions which represented the heritage of British imperialism, did not actually represent the 'will' of the Indian people themselves.

This chapter has illustrated the CCP's rejection and misunderstanding of Indian popular protest, whether in print or in demonstrations, as well as the CCP's rejection either that these incidents were expressions of popular Indian views of tensions in the Himalayas, or that they were enabled by freedoms held up by the Indian political system, which were as essential to India as the tenets of the New China were to China's own revolution. As such, at the heart of the conflict was a rejection of Indian legitimacy, not only with regard to territory, but, as this section

[114] FMA 105-01792-08, 11.1.1963, 92.
[115] See for example, Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, *The History of the War of Self-Defense*.

will explain, with regard to the Indian government's own representation of its people. This was largely because the idea that the Indian government could oppose Chinese interests was unacceptable, and thus must have been illegitimate, or as Garver explains 'evil'. John Garver expresses this disregard as follows, in his analysis of the CCP decision to go to war with India:

> Notably absent from this Chinese understanding of Nehru's motives [in the Himalayas] was the proposition that Nehru believed that through the Forward Policy, India was recovering legitimately Indian territory arbitrarily and illegally occupied by China during the 1950s. Again Chinese leaders simply failed to understand Nehru's motives, and attributed to him far-fetched motives deriving from his evil class nature.[116]

Diplomatic exchanges with India consistently blamed the Indian government or Indian troops for every instance of violence on the border. The CCP case to other nations blamed India, as Neville Maxwell does in *China's India War*, for the outbreak of violence claiming that China had tried to negotiate with India, but India refused to settle. The CCP did try to avert violence, electing instead for a policy of 'armed coexistence' in the Himalayas as Nehru moved his troops into the disputed territories.[117] India's own case for the Forward Policy was that, if China would continue to consolidate its hold on the disputed Western sector by building military and administrative infrastructure, then India must also move troops into the area, or risk the de facto loss of the territories that it claimed.[118]

As mentioned in Chapter Four, the CCP saw the border crisis itself as an instrument used by the Indian government to cause difficulties for China and to exert pressure on China in the service of a wider 'anti-China' agenda. Additionally, CCP reports and statements by CCP leaders portrayed India as militaristic and aiming to seize territory from China by use of violence. A

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[116] Garver, 'Decision', 113.
[117] Ibid., 108.
[118] Maxwell, 173-9.

1962 report from the MFA, titled 'The New Situation on the China-India Border' stated that, '[I]t looks as though after taking Goa, India wants to point the spear tip at China and Pakistan, and at the same time supporting subversive activity against Nepal'.[119] Referring to an annual meeting of the Congress Party, the report stated that, '…Menon threatened that India would use force in Kashmir. In his closing speech in the annual meeting, Nehru also emphasized that Kashmir was India's "autonomous province".[120]

The report continued in this vein, stating that 'Nehru is playing the trick of peaceful negotiation… on the anti-China issue (反华问题), the Nehru and Menon group have a mutual dilemma with the extreme right wing on one hand, but on the other they benefit from one another…Nehru promises to the right wing not only to "strengthen national defense" and "not surrender" but also "freedom of conduct" … It seems that India on the one hand does not want to talk, but on the other doesn't dare close the door on negotiations. In practice they will not give up the flag of peace, so that they can cover up their anti-China politics and military invasion'.[121] The section concluded that 'India will continue building military strength so that it can carry out military provocations and create tensions at the right times… they call this practice a "double policy" '.[122]

In 1960, Zhou claimed that Nehru was using the border as a means of meeting other objectives in both internal politics and external relations, as though the border tensions with

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[119] FMA 105-01638-01, 《新情况》有关中印边界问题的论文汇编 12.1.1962, 1. "New Situation", compilation of papers regarding the China-India border question, 1.
[120] Ibid., 1.
[121] FMA 105-01638-01, 28.8.1962, 14.
[122] Ibid.

China, were India's own means of waging Maoist 'continuous revolution': 'Nehru wants to use the border problem to attack progressive forces inside India and to control the Indian Congress and to get more aid from the US and from the USSR'.[123] In a meeting with the Polish Ambassador in 1960, Zhou claimed similarly that, 'India does not want to solve the border problem. Nehru wants to use the border to control the right wing in India and to attack the left wing'.[124] In correspondences and interactions with other countries, including in the case for war which Zhou made to Afro-Asian nations, Zhou combined alleged Indian manipulation of the border crisis, demonization of the Indian government, and alleged Indian coordination with 'the American supported Chiang Kai-shek clique' in Taiwan, in order to make the case that the CCP was fighting a 'self-defensive war' and that the Indian government was untrustworthy altogether, pursuing a course of 'military adventure'. Zhou's diplomatic narrative during the war included the following points:

> Indian military forces surpassed the illegal McMahon Line in the Eastern sector… In August 1959, during the course of the invasion and occupation of Longju, [they] stirred up the first bloody border clashes…These two border clashes [in August and October 1959] were an evil omen of the ways in which India sought to make the border situation worsen.[125]
>
> [T]he Indian government thought that the good faith towards a peaceful resolution expressed by the Chinese government in the bilateral ministerial talks was an expression of weakness and exploited China's unilateral cessation of border patrols as an opportunity. Therefore, after the bilateral meetings concluded, the Indian military crossed the line of control in the East and then in West and occupied more and more of China's territory. The military provocation was more and more grave… The Indian Army ceaselessly invaded the Chinese border, setting up military posts… [T]hey thought that this was a "unique victory, attained by the courageous, Napoleonic plans" of Defense Minister Menon… These increasingly provocative activities by the Indian side made the situation in the Western sector of the border rapidly more tense and serious.[126]

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[123] Meeting, Vietnamese delegation, 11.5.1960, ZELNP 2, 317.
[124] Meeting, Polish Ambassador, 5.6.1960, ZELNP 2, 325.
[125] FMA 105-01786-02, 28.11.1962, 61.
[126] Ibid., 65.

Zhou went on to explain that 'The Chinese side maintained colossal restraint and patience', [127] and continued his narrative of the road to war:

> India made a series of mistaken assessments about China, not only refusing China's peaceful suggestions, but deciding on the road towards military adventure. India thought that China's economic difficulties had reached an insurmountable stage, the American supported Chiang Kai-shek clique's attempts to intrude on the Southeast coast would pin down China's defensive power, China's Southwest region would be left exposed, and therefore [they] believed that this was a good opportunity to launch a large scale military attack on the China-India border.[128]

Zhou also referenced a special military group set up for China by the Indian military and Nehru's claim to have 'already given the order to "sweep out" the Chinese military from his so-called occupied region which was actually Chinese territory'.[129]

Above all, Zhou blamed India for the Border War, writing that 'this grave China-India border conflict has absolutely been the Indian government's long-term, premeditated creation',[130] that 'India made war plans against China as early as two years ago',[131] and that the Indian government was using the war, once it had broken out, and 'stirring up anti-China activity' in order to 'divert the attention of the people, add to the burdens of the people, and attack progressive forces within India, internally, and externally to receive more American aid'. [132]

The presentation of India in this light to third party countries reflected beliefs expressed by Chinese leaders and officials about Nehru and the Indian government themselves. Zhou's

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[127] Ibid.
[128] Ibid., 67.
[129] Ibid., 68.
[130] Ibid.
[131] Ibid.
[132] Ibid., 75.

personal contempt for Nehru will be shown in another section, and CCP leaders regularly referred to Nehru and others in the Indian government, as Garver points out, in terms of their 'class nature', thus giving the events and actions of India a Marxist framework and holding the Indian government in contempt. Mao referred, for example, to 'upper class reactionaries' when analyzing India, and a Zhou reference to Nehru as 'reactionary' in 1960, for example, ties the border crisis, 'Nehru's reactionary attitude' and the desire to *expose Nehru*, which will be referred to again in later chapters, all together as follows: 'India stirred up the quarrel over border problem. Even if we take a concessionary attitude toward Nehru, he will become more reactionary… So we criticize him and later seek unity. This will expose his mistaken and reactionary side so many people can see clearly'.[133]

Despite all of the views of India thus described, CCP leaders believed that China-India friendship could survive the Border War and that the 'Indian people' would support continued China-India friendship as they had been betrayed by their 'reactionary' government. CCP comments and statements are rife with reference to a division between the Indian government and the Indian people. In 1959 for example, Mao described the Indian government's 'reactionary policy' towards the Himalayas as follows: '[T]he reactionary groups are opposing China and the Indian people will rise up in opposition'.[134] Moreover, 'India stirred things up in Tibet and also with the border issue, and the result is that the Indian people are disadvantaged'.[135] Mao also noted the roots of China-India friendship, explaining that 'India recognized China early on and supported us at the UN. Our conflict with India is one finger out of ten. Nine fingers are

[133] Meeting, East German delegation, 18.1.1960, ZELNP 2, 279.
[134] Meeting, Afghan Vice Prime Minister, 8.9.1959, MZDNP 4, 175.
[135] Ibid., 176.

friendship'.[136] The following year, he offered a similar analysis, claiming that 'only five to ten percent' of the world was 'definitely anti-China', and that 'India's situation is the same; only a handful of people are truly anti-China',[137] adding also that 'each country's bad people and half-bad people who are anti-China, do not oppose [China] everyday…'[138]

This view was widespread in the CCP. In 1961, Chen Yi, then acting as Foreign Minster, offered a perspective that mirrored Nehru's own initial idea that China's cultural heritage would prove a more powerful identity than its Communist form, and that thus India could and should work to bring China into its vision of Asia. For Chen Yi, it was 'opposition factions' (反对派), rather than Communism, that was the blemish on an otherwise noble and important country: 'India is very good, it has many historical vestiges of culture and famous ancient sites. The people are very good, the intellectuals are very good; they are also building and the successes are many. But the government has many internal problems; the Congress Party has a fairly powerful opposition faction; the Congress Party right wing is actually a large opposition party'.[139] Chinese Ambassador Pan Zili, speaking with the 'China-India Friendship Group' in 1961, expressed a similar view of Indian politics, in a discussion on the decline of China-India relations, stating that, 'Nehru is the leader of the government and the Congress Party… [O]ne day he will die and after him there will be another… I think that the great people of India will find a way out'.[140] He went on to say that 'Zhou and Chen Yi have expressed that China and India have no fundamental

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[136] Ibid.
[137] Comments, 'On the Problem of Anti-China', 22.3.1960, MZDNP 4, 354.
[138] Ibid., 354-5.
[139] FMA 110-01968-05 陈毅副总理接见瑞典驻华大使布克谈话记录 11.2.1961. Record of conversation between Vice Premier Chen Yi and Swedish Ambassador Böök, 6.
[140] FMA 105-01060-02 驻印度大使潘自力同印中友协会长森德拉尔谈话记录, 26.9.1961. Record of conversation between China's ambassador to India Pan Zili and President Sunderlal of the China-India Friendship Association, 10.

conflict. The border issue is temporary'.[141] Zhou himself expressed his belief that the Chinese policy of 'armed coexistence' in the Himalayas was a form of *'unity with the numerous Indian people'* [emphasis added], '[T]he method of the Chinese government is armed coexistence and long-term struggle, both struggle and unity, both battle and negotiation. Unity is to unite with the numerous Indian people and express China's desire for friendship with India. This work will have a result. Our struggle is rational, beneficial, courteous, and will win by striking after the enemy has struck'.[142] In November 1962, with the Border War in progress, Zhou expressed the idea in a meeting with Chen Yi and an Indian embassy official that 'although the situation looks tense, we can look deeper and farther and see that China-India relations can come out with friendship. We should look beyond this. We are confident. We will not lose hope'.[143]

It was perhaps the most extraordinary misunderstanding to imagine that 'the numerous Indian people' would somehow benefit from or support the Chinese victory in the Border War itself, but such was the view inside the CCP which treated both Indian claims and Indian justifications as invalid and sought ultimately to teach India a 'lesson' as Liu Shaoqi explained when the Border War had finished. A diplomatic notice to Poland, the country chosen to represent Chinese interests in India in case of the severance of diplomatic ties by India, expresses the view of the Chinese government succinctly, explaining that the Indian government could not 'break the friendship of the Chinese and Indian people': 'In order to reach their anti-China objective, the Indian government unilaterally stirred up the China-India border conflict, recklessly using this conflict to dramatically worsen relations between China and

[141] FMA 105-01060-02 26.9.1961, 13.
[142] Speech, Plenary Meeting, 26.9.1962, ZELNP 2, 498.
[143] Meeting, Chen Yi and Indian Embassy official, 19.11.1962, ZELNP 2, 514.

India…However, China's government believes that the friendship existing between China and India for thousands of years definitely cannot be damaged by the Indian government. The suspension of China-India diplomatic relations can only be temporary'.[144]

Thus, the CCP viewed the Indian government both as 'heirs to the British Empire', making a vigorous and protracted threat to the existence of the New China, and also viewed 'the numerous Indian people' as the inevitable friend of China, with whom the CCP could cooperate in order to vanquish the 'reactionary' objectives of the Indian government. The thought that Nehru, or the Indian government, was in some way a legitimate representative of legitimate Indian interests or feelings does not seem to enter into CCP analysis. This is all the more astonishing as the CCP was engaged in regular debate with the Indian MEA over popular protests which the CCP denied as legitimate expressions of anything. The following exchange in 1962 reminds us of the CCP view of expressions by 'the Indian people' themselves, which the MFA claimed were merely the connivances of the Indian government:

> Indians shouted anti-Chinese slogans in front of the Embassy, insulting Premier Chou En-lai and the Chinese people…the Government of India has time and again connived with a few elements hostile to China…and, what is even more serious, in insulting a Chinese leader.[145]

The Indian government defended another 'anti-China' incident in which students sang the lyrics of a song criticizing Zhou Enlai as a popular expression which the government itself had come to empathize with, calling it: 'a spontaneous expression of the students' views on the existing state

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[144] FMA 105-01120-01 印度总理扬言要与我绝交、宣战 18.11.1962.
Indian Prime Minister threatens to end relations with us, declare war, 3.
[145] WP Vol. 6, 177.

of Sino-Indian relations, which the Government of India themselves have every reason to deplore'.[146]

For the CCP, apparently, there was no expression by either India's government or India's people which was legitimate, unless it supported 'friendship' with the 'New China', which meant, essentially, 'friendship' on China's terms. The ultimate outcome of behaving otherwise was the 'lesson' which the CCP decided to teach to India in 1962. The CCP not only imagined that the 'Indian people' were sympathetic to China, CCP leaders also pronounced that tensions between the 'Indian people' and the Indian government would move India's politics and international relations in a direction more favorable to China. Mao, for example, in 1959 while describing Nehru as a member of the 'centrist group in the bourgeoisie' explained that 'the whole situation in India, I think, is good. There are 400 million people and Nehru cannot help but respond to the will of 400 million people'.[147] Chen Yi took a step further in a conversation with Indonesia's Subandrio in 1963. The Chinese Foreign Minister explained that 'India's leading force has yet to take shape, and…India will ultimately be led by those who advocate anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism'.[148] In other words, India had yet to produce a government that would conform to China's own program, but top CCP leaders expressed their faith that it would.

Importantly, a dissenting view was presented by Wang Jiaxiang in 1962. Wang was the first CCP ambassador to the USSR, a member of the '28 Bolsheviks', Chinese students who had gone to Moscow in the 1920s and 1930s, a Long March veteran, and, during the period of

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[146] WP Vol. 6, 271.
[147] Meeting, Zhou and Chen Yi, 6.5.1959, MZDNP 4, 38.
[148] 'Minutes of Conversation between Chinese Vice Premier Chen Yi and Indonesian Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio,' 7.1.1963, CWIHPDA, FMA 105-01792-07, 85-87.

collapse in China-India relations, a member of the CCP Central Committee.[149] As Mao engaged in simultaneous confrontation with American 'imperialism', Soviet 'revisionism', Indian 'reactionaries' and the build up of support for 'national liberation' movements which will be addressed in the following chapter, Wang proposed a policy change in February 1962 which came to be known as the '*sanmian he yimian shao*' (三面和一面少), or the 'three kindnesses and one reduction'.[150] Wang proposed a gentler course with India, the United States, and the USSR, and reducing support of national liberation movements in Asia and Africa. He phrased his proposal in terms of China's own economic difficulties, the dangers of world war, and the benefits of peaceful coexistence.[151] However, Wang's proposals were attacked by Mao, Chen Yi, and other leaders in the CCP. Mao condemned them as 'revisionism', a move which Qiang Zhai explains 'revealed his limited tolerance for independent opinions'.[152] Chen Yi, as Niu Jun recounts, 'argued that it was inevitable to have struggles with the U.S., the Soviet Union, and India'.[153] The CCP pressed forward with 'armed coexistence' and the Border War followed soon afterwards.

For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to note that CCP leaders grouped India with the two superpowers themselves. As the thesis has touched upon, the type of challenge that India presented in the Himalayas and to core tenets of the New China is similar to the challenge that the CCP saw in America's involvement in Taiwan and in Khrushchev's submarine fleet proposal. The fact that the CCP saw India as a serious threat to their objectives in building the

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[149] See *Dictionary of Chinese Communism*, Vol. 2, 895-900.
[150] See Qiang, 114-117 and Niu Jun, 34-40.
[151] Qiang, 114.
[152] Ibid., 115.
[153] Niu Jun, 34.

New China has been demonstrated in this chapter. The fact that senior Chinese leaders saw India as a core challenger to China, grouping it alongside the United States and USSR themselves, both in terms of a policy proposal which could lessen China's burdens, and conversely as a country with whom China would have 'inevitable' struggles, adds to the clear evidence of India's importance to the newly formed PRC and in the CCP worldview. The CCP chose, of course, not to change directions with India, but rather to confront it militarily in 1962, as it had done with the US in Korea in 1950-53, and as it would with the USSR in the Amur River Valley in 1969. The confrontation with India, like China's confrontations with other major nations, was perhaps a test of China's new strength. As Mao expressed in 1960, 'We can withstand the ways of Khrushchev. We can withstand the anti-China wind blown by Nehru, America, and the United Kingdom…We are preparing to make our country powerful in stages.'[154]

The CCP view of India as a challenger and rival, however, was even larger than the problems described in the Himalayas. The CCP viewed India as a global rival, working to undermine Chinese influence around Asia and Africa, and opposing the CCP agenda of supporting 'national liberation movements' in Asia, Africa and Latin America, in addition to working with the superpowers themselves to attack China's position in the world. As such, India was a challenge, in the eyes of the CCP, not only to the core tenets of its founding as the New China, but to its interests and agenda on virtually every level of international politics. This will be the subject of the following chapters.

[154] Politburo expanded meeting, 17.1.1960, MZDNP 4, 310.

Chapter Six – The Bandung Spirit as a Diplomatic Weapon: China's Rivalry with India in Asia and Africa

6.1 Chapter Purpose

This chapter will examine China's rivalry with India in the Afro-Asian world during the years of collapse of China-India relations. The project of the New China, as scholars have explained, involved not only the transformation of China itself, but the transformation of the world around it in ways that the CCP believed would be friendly to its revolution and national goals. In the mid-1950s, as explored in Chapter Three, the CCP considered India to be friendly to these goals, and, with India's facilitation was able to build up the Afro-Asian forum, thus being able to make use of the phenomenon of decolonization, in addition to international Communism, as a realm in which the CCP could advance its power and support its revolution.

By 1958, the Bandung forum had undergone a dramatic shift from a forum for China-India cooperation into a realm of China-India competition and mutual attempts at delegitimisation before the Afro-Asian audience, using ideological attacks from both Cold War and decolonization discourse. Using reporting from Chinese diplomatic activities across the globe, including from the embassies in Indonesia, Burma, Pakistan, Nepal, and across the Afro-Asian sphere, this chapter will examine how PRC officials both represented their conflict with India to other Afro-Asian nations and how they observed Indian influence within the Afro-Asian sphere as relations collapsed between 1958-62. This chapter will also examine the CCP case for war

with India as it was made to Afro-Asian countries, as well as CCP attempts to hold the Afro-Asian sphere together despite the war with India, attempts which failed.

Finally, this chapter will also clarify ways in which Afro-Asianism was important to Chinese leaders and to the project of the PRC, so much so that while India was once an essential partner in building this sphere, China was willing to confront India ideologically within the Afro-Asian sphere as their relationship collapsed.

6.2 Introduction: Asia, Africa, and the New China's Global View, 1958-62

An examination of PRC policy and thinking on Asia and Africa reveals that the PRC had a global view of foreign affairs as early as the 1950s.[1] By 1958, the CCP had acquired international influence outside of the Communist bloc, something that was largely made possible with India's help. Within a few years of establishing this new influence in Asia and Africa at Bandung, the CCP came to see India as a major rival and obstacle to its international agenda, especially due to an understanding of India as a supporter and facilitator of the United States in these regions. The combination of a need to promote its own revolutionary ideals, challenge the United States in Asia, compete with both superpowers for global influence, especially in the developing world, and to discredit India among Asian and African nations as China-India relations suffered over tensions in the Himalayas, all led to CCP views of India as a major rival

[1] Friedman also emphasizes China's global view in *Shadow Cold War*.

and obstacle to a vital aspect of its foreign policy agenda: engagement and influence in the Afro-Asian sphere.

The CCP revolution, as scholars have demonstrated, was not only focused on China's own internal strength and territorial integrity. In order to build the New China, the CCP also had to transform the world around it. As Qiang Zhai explains, 'Just as the old international order had helped cause China's suffering and humiliation, so too would the creation of a new order contribute to the rebirth of a strong and prosperous China'.[2] In order to do this, China relied upon engagement with the Socialist bloc and USSR and also on the Afro-Asian sphere which was created through the assistance of India. China sought to achieve this, as Chen Jian summarizes, by using its own revolution as an example: 'Mao and his comrades were eager to reclaim China's central position in the world by promoting an Eastern, or even a global, revolution à la the Chinese Communist model'.[3] China's Afro-Asian policy was linked to Chinese confrontation of the United States both in Asia and, when possible, elsewhere around the globe. The Bandung movement itself, and Zhou's advocacy of 'peaceful coexistence', was meant, for the CCP, to act as a front against American 'imperialism', and as a way to combat US containment policy in Asia. As the decade wore on, anti-Americanism, and support for violent national liberation movements, became the defining features of the PRC's vision for Asia and Africa. As Jeremy Friedman notes in *Shadow Cold War*, 'China's concern was not with peace or international détente, despite its adherence to that agenda in public…Rather, China's priority was to unite as much of the world as possible in a broad, anti-imperialist coalition for the sake of confrontation

[2] Qiang, 4.
[3] Chen, 'Rebellion', 84.

with the West in general and the United States in particular'.[4] Moreover, this agenda set the CCP at odds with its primary patron, the USSR, both by way of a divergence over the Soviet agenda of 'peaceful coexistence' with the West, and also in terms of deeper CCP priorities as the CCP sought its own way in the world.[5]

The creation of the 'Afro-Asian' movement was one of the most important achievements of China-India cooperation in the 1950s. India's approach to the decolonizing world, however, was different. In contrast to Chinese emphasis on violent revolution along the Maoist model, a path that would set it at odds with the USSR as well in the developing world, Nehru's India pursued a policy of both anti-colonialism and the promotion of peace. As B.R. Nanda explains, 'With his passionate hatred of colonialism and war, it is not surprising that the two most important planks in Nehru's foreign policy, immediately after assuming office, should have been the liberation of countries under alien rule, and the promotion of peace among nations'.[6] This policy continued throughout the decade as India 'sought to foster a climate of international conciliation and co-operation'.[7] By the end of the 1950s, as the PRC attempted to set Afro-Asian countries on a 'more militant path', encouraging them to draw Marxist political 'class lines' within their societies, Nehruvian peaceful nonalignment and Maoist revolution diverged.[8] India 'became more emphatic in this period than ever in rejecting agitational approaches in international politics', and in contrast to CCP confrontation with both the US and USSR, Nehru, at 1961's Non-Aligned Conference in Belgrade, for example, 'discouraged invectives against the

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[4] Friedman, 39-40.
[5] See Friedman on Sino-Soviet rivalry in Afro-Asia.
[6] Nanda, 2.
[7] Deva Narayan Mallik, *The Development of Non-Alignment in India's Foreign Policy*, (Allahabad, 1967), 216.
[8] Garver, *Protracted*, 121-2.

colonial Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union'.[9] As mentioned earlier, the Indian Prime Minister had set out from the beginning to make India a 'meeting ground of East and West'.[10]

Increased CCP confidence in the late 1950s led to a harder line in China's international objectives, which meant confrontation with the USSR within the Socialist bloc as Mao 'accused the Kremlin of timidity in dealing with Western imperialism' and to 'efforts to rectify the international revolutionary movement by emphasizing the role of national liberation movements'.[11] As Peter Van Ness points out, 'The Bandung peaceful coexistence policy had failed to break the line of American military power and alliances in East Asia. In fact, there is evidence that the United States had begun to take the initiative by expanding its influence in Southeast Asia during these years, and that the Chinese were pressed to adopt new, more vigorous tactics to counter it'.[12] This meant that India, the erstwhile facilitator of Chinese engagement with the decolonizing world, would now become the CCP's rival in the Afro-Asian movement, as the CCP sought to take advantage of larger trends in global politics in order to spread the moorings of its own revolution: '[China] made a carefully conceived effort to create a new force in world politics to be comprised primarily of the colonial or newly independent countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America'.[13]

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[9] Mallik, 216, 221.
[10] See *Nehru's Speeches*, Vol. 1, 233-50.
[11] Qiang, 82.
[12] Van Ness, 14.
[13] Ibid., 15.

As explained earlier in this thesis, Chinese and Indian foreign policy objectives had inherent differences from the start. Each country pursued an ambitious agenda on the world stage, in keeping with the tenets of their own recent national foundings. However, India and China did not truly share a vision for the future of Asia, or the world beyond Asia. The concepts of the revitalization of Asia and the struggle against imperialism on behalf of the decolonizing world in Asia and Africa brought India and China together at Bandung in 1955. The introductions that India made for China contributed to a proliferation of Chinese embassies around Asia and Africa,[14] and to the beginning of Chinese international influence outside of the Communist bloc. As such, the CCP was able, through India's essential assistance, to make use of both the Socialist world, through its relationship with the USSR, and the decolonizing world, through its relationship with India, in order to support its own strategic objectives and the protection of its revolution. By end of the 1950s, and especially during the early 1960s, however, the CCP was challenging the USSR and India for leadership in each of these respective movements. Moreover, the Afro-Asian movement changed, for the CCP, from a realm of India-China cooperation and a counter-containment policy, to a vehicle of CCP independence on the world stage and a realm in which China could expand and support unique revolutionary objectives.

The tenets of the New China and also of the Bandung movement begin to fuse into a language of Chinese leadership within the developing world. The same devotion to economic development and industrialization which was meant to enable the New China to regain its place in the world, was meant also, in its Afro-Asian extension, to create new vitality in decolonizing

[14] See Liu, 58, 67, on the expansion of the PRC diplomatic corps from 1954-65.

nations which could be directed against the 'imperialist' United States and other Western countries. As Zhou Enlai stated in 1960 in a meeting with the United Arab Republic, Gamal Abdel Nasser's temporary unification of Syria and Egypt:

> We have suffered similarly from poverty and backwardness. This is what colonialism gave to us. In order to throw off colonialism, poverty and backwardness, we need to go through long-term peaceful construction; this is our common desire. If we want to realize this desire, we still need to gain our economic independence after gaining our political independence. This requires long-term struggle and Afro-Asian mutual support and sympathy. This is also the spirt of the Bandung meeting…[15]

The resurrection of the New China, itself defined by a program of revival in economic and eventually military power, was thus extended to the resurrection of other nations around the world.[16] If the objective of the New China was that China would become inviolate to outsiders, then this objective, in the CCP view, also extended to the whole of Asia as well. Mao's view of the US presence in Asia is made clear from the following edits to an article by Chen Yi in 1959. Chen Yi had written that 'Recently, in the Philippines which are tightly controlled by America, discontent with America's dictatorial interference is surging high', and the Chairman added the following:

> The Japanese people also oppose the US occupation policy. South Korea, South Vietnam, Thailand, Laos and all other countries that are controlled or threatened by America also harbor resentment towards America's imperialist policy. All of the people, in each West Pacific country, don't understand, why and with what reason the Americans from so far away come to the West Pacific countries, using their military, political, economic and cultural power, to control these countries? Actually it has no basis in reason. Therefore, one day, sooner or later, America will certainly let go of the West Pacific places and withdraw back home, just like it has had to let go of other regions in the world. If the Americans don't go themselves, there will be a day when the people of each country will unite and throw them out.[17]

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[15] Meeting, United Arab Republic, 27.1.1960, ZELNP 2, 284.
[16] See Qing Simei, 205-227, on the economic emphases of the New China.
[17] Comments, Chen Yi's article, 22.2.1959, MZDNP 3, 595.

The Afro-Asian world, which also included Latin America in the CCP view, thus became the CCP's chief forum for its vision of an Asia without the United States. As Mao stated before a meeting of delegates from Communist parties of Latin American countries in 1959: 'The United States is nominally not a colonial country, but in reality it is the biggest colonial country…to America, the Pacific doesn't belong those of us who live here, it belongs to America. Do you think that is just?'[18]

Moreover, the concepts of 'interference in internal affairs' and the legacies of the British Empire, core issues in both the New China and in the Chinese conflict with India, were also applied across the globe. Chinese leaders commented on American 'interference' in countries from the Philippines to Brazil,[19] finding that the legacies of the British Empire applied outside of China as well. As a Foreign Ministry report on Africa explained in 1959: '[Certain African figures (人士)] believe that all the conflict between China and India is because the Indian government attempted to carry out the invasion policy left over from the British Empire. They completely support China in opposing the British imperialist created McMahon line', adding that '[They] pointed out that on the black African continent [sic] now there exist many McMahon lines that must be wiped away in the future'.[20]

The Five Principles were also deployed around the globe in Chinese diplomacy, and eventually used by both China and India to discredit each other in the Afro-Asian sphere, as will be examined in this chapter.

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[18] Meeting, Communist parties of Latin American countries, 3.3.1959, MZDNP 3, 618.
[19] MZDNP 5, 68 and MZDNP 3, 595.
[20] Telegraph from Chinese Embassy, UAR, 30.9.1959, MZDNP 3, 187-8.

By the end of the 1950s, with China-India relations in confrontation in the Himalayas, the Afro-Asian sphere had become an ideological battleground, and the CCP began to view India as a rival rather than as a partner in the Afro-Asian sphere. Moreover, CCP officials viewed India as a saboteur to their objectives and influence in Asia and Africa. The scope of China's rivalry with and anxiety about the Indian government went beyond the Himalayas, and was in fact international, spanning several continents and built directly into China's 'struggle with the modern world'.[21] By addressing the collapse of China-India relations from this perspective, it is clear that India's importance to the PRC exceeded its capacity as a Himalayan antagonist – India was a challenger, as this chapter will demonstrate, to China's international agenda as a whole. The result, was that, much in the way that the CCP came to view India as the 'heirs to the British Empire' for resisting the CCP agenda in the Himalayas, the CCP came to see the Indian government as villains and rivals in their broader agenda for Asia and the world.

6.3 CCP Views of India in Asia and Africa: Where India Fit in China's Global View

The militant shift in the late 1950s and early 1960s is evident in Mao and Zhou's statements on the nature of the Afro-Asian movement and also in material and ideological support for national liberation movements across the Afro-Asian sphere, especially in Algeria and Vietnam.[22] Mao saw the unity of Asia and Africa as a united military front against

[21] See Mitter, *Bitter Revolution*, for an account of this struggle.
[22] See Qiang Zhai on Vietnam and Donovan C. Chau, *Exploiting Africa: The Influence of Maoist China in Algeria, Ghana, and Tanzania*, (Annapolis, 2014), on Algeria.

'imperialism', in a kind of fungible unity of purpose spanning Asia, Africa and Latin America; as he told the director of a Chilean newspaper in 1959, 'the Eastern people's primary mission is to fight imperialism and feudalism…We have been exploited by the West and become very poor. Here the East includes Asia, Africa, and Latin America'.[23] Speaking to delegations of African countries that year, he expressed that 'The struggle in your place is surging high; the African people are united in struggle; this is a great cause. The mission of the whole of Africa is to oppose imperialism, and those who follow imperialism…', adding that, 'the struggle of the whole of Africa is long-term'.[24] For the CCP, India's role within this kind of worldview was, in a sense, never meant to be on India's own terms. Moreover, the ability for Nehru's India to exist within and participate in the Maoist foreign policy worldview was further complicated by the CCP emphasis on violence and revolution. [25]

The global use of violence was a necessary and even desirable component for the leaders of the CCP. Moreover, struggle without compromise was central to the CCP's global vision of national liberation. Holding up the Chinese revolution as an example while commenting on the Congolese independence struggle in 1961, Zhou explained that there could be no compromise with 'imperialism', a sharp contrast to Nehru's more conciliatory approach towards Western nations: 'some [revolutionaries] compromise with imperialism…the result is that they all died at

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[23] Conversation, Chilean newspaper director and Wu Lengxi, 14.2.1959, MZDNP 3, 590.
[24] Meeting, delegation from African countries, 21.2.1959, MZDNP 3, 594.
[25] See Friedman 50, 56, and Garver 121-2 on PRC support for violence and militarism in Afro-Asia. See David E. Apter and Tony Saich (eds.), *Revolutionary Discourse in Mao's Republic*, (London, 1994), 128-9, and A. Doak Barnett, *China After Mao*, (Princeton, 1967), 35-68, for 'revolutionary violence' in the CCP's own revolution. By contrast, India's policy of 'non-alignment' is often considered to be related to India's 'long struggle for freedom' by peaceful means, see, for example, Hari Jaisingh, *India and the Non-Aligned World*, (New Delhi, 1983) and Mallik, *Non-Alignment*, or linked to Gandhian 'ahimsa' or non-violence, see Ogden, 6.

imperialism's hands'.[26] Commenting on the 'world situation' that year, Zhou explained that, 'limited war, namely local war, is inevitable'.[27] Mao's view on the whole of Afro-Asia as a military united front is the most explicit. Speaking to an Algerian delegation in 1958, he both outlined a connected vision of Asian and African struggle, and also drew contrasts with India's own independence movement:

> In the circumstances of anti-imperialism, we here count as one frontline, that is the Eastern frontline, on the West Pacific. You are the Western front line. You are in a period of difficulty… We have gone through many setbacks in the last 22 years; ultimately we won. India struggled against Britain for decades but won. Egypt has been independent for just a few years. Of course, their methods were different. Your struggle against the French now is a national liberation struggle, the time of the struggle may be long, hopefully yours won't take as long as ours. [28]

Mao emphasized the use of military struggle, 'against imperialism':

> …We should support you because you are struggling against imperialism. It is the same as our struggle. This is our international mission. Algeria's contribution to the whole world is very big – you can pin down 800,000 French troops…You will not lose. In five or ten years you will have victory.[29]

The idea of pinning down 800,000 French troops in Africa in 1958 as relevant to China's foreign policy is clearer when one takes into an account a similar statement to a Vietnamese delegation in 1962:

> …You are Southeast Asia's front line. We are paying close attention to your situation and to the situation in Laos. You have already grabbed one of America's fingers… If the [war in South Vietnam] goes on for five to ten more years and then the US will think it is not worth it…[30]

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[26] Meeting, Ghanaian President, 14.8.1961, ZELNP 2, 428.
[27] Meeting, 'democratic personages', 28.9.1961, ZELNP 2, 436.
[28] Meeting, delegation from Algerian interim government, 11.12.1958, MZDNP 3, 555.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Meeting, Vietnamese delegation, 5.10.1962, MZDNP 5, 163.

The CCP was attempting to lead a global diplomatic and military struggle against the United States and other Western countries. Material and financial support flowed into Algeria, facilitated by new Chinese embassies in Cairo and Morocco, and the CCP's involvement in Southeast Asia would last into the 1970s.[31] It was a transformation of the Afro-Asian sphere directly opposed to the values that India sought to promote.[32] In the meantime, Mao and Zhou hosted delegations from across the globe, emphasizing Afro-Asian and Latin American solidarity, anti-imperialism, and economic development.[33]

In 1958, India was still meant to be a partner in China's international strategic ambitions. India was the linchpin in Afro-Asia as a 'peace movement', and the peace movement was meant to offer an alternative to American-led defense pacts like SEATO and CENTO as new nations emerged. As Mao expressed when receiving the new Indian Ambassador Gopalaswami Parthasarathy:

> China and India have had a celebrated friendship since ancient times. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, jointly initiated by China and India, have already made a large impact on the world. Now, because of the colonialists' invasion of West Asia [presumably US-UK activity in the Levant] to the point of threatening world peace, I deeply believe that China and India must raise the Five Principles flag even higher, and must work hard in order to protect the peace of Asia and the world.[34]

The 'peaceful coexistence' movement had a genuine basis in China's desire to build itself – and other Afro-Asian nations – economically in order to build the strength of the nation and of Asia as a whole.[35] The strength of Asia had the larger purpose of resistance to, as Friedman puts it,

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[31] See Qiang on Vietnam and Chau on Algeria.
[32] See Mallik, 215-32, on nonalignment in these years.
[33] See MZDNP and ZELNP 1958-62 for numerous meetings of this kind.
[34] Meeting, Indian Ambassador Parthasarathy, 28.7.1958, MZDNP 3, 394.
[35] See Keith, 101, and Zhang on economic properties of 'peaceful coexistence'.

'the West in general and the United States in particular'.[36] India was meant to be a linchpin in this struggle, as explained in earlier chapters, and remained so even towards the end of the decade. Mao explained the entire strategy to Cambodian Prime Minister Norodom Sihanouk, drawing not only on the new themes of 'national liberation' but also on lessons from China's *own national history*. Mao was drawing upon China's own historical experience of humiliation, rather than on an ideological framework such as Communism, in order to offer leadership in Asia, and as such the humiliations of the old China became the lessons for an Asia renewed:

> We have a long term plan. Fundamentally, our plan is to build up economics, and plant the seeds for ten to fifteen years. There are lots of external problems. Taiwan and South Korea have US bases. Japan, Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand also have US bases. We hope that all Afro-Asian countries will build up their economies. We can all unite and say what we want to imperialism…
>
> Other countries like India, Burma, Indonesia, and Pakistan are all about the same, they have no industry. Independent countries can take steps forward, but joining military pacts divides us…
>
> In 1900, the Eight Nation Alliance beat their way into Beijing. The armies of the Eight Nation Alliance also included small countries, but they humiliated a big country. Japan was also a small country and it invaded us. This is because they were an industrialized country, and we were agricultural, and our government was corrupt.[37]

The mission that Beijing proposed to India's new Ambassador, to take up the 'Five Principles flag' was a mission to promote a peace movement around the world, in order to stem the flow of new nations into America's anti-Communist defense pacts, and to buy time for the development of industry and economics in China and other Afro-Asian nations. Thus, the building of the New China and the building up of Asia would follow virtually the same program.

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[36] Friedman, 86.
[37] Meeting, Cambodian delegation, 16.8.1958, MZDNP 3, 408.

Even as the Border Crisis unfolded, Zhou spoke to importance of China-India cooperation, emphasizing the Five Principles as an alternative to American influence in Asia. Speaking to a Burmese Prime Minister in 1960, Zhou explained that, 'Aside from Japan which is controlled by the US, all Asian countries want to intensify peaceful construction according to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. We want to see a strong Burma, a strong India, and other countries all strong'.[38]

However, the PRC vision of India was a vision of conformity to China's agenda. India was meant to adhere to China's vision both on bilateral issues, as explained in Chapter Five, and also internationally. Partnership meant adherence, and as CCP objectives in Asia and Africa took a radically different turn from Nehru's understanding of the Bandung world, CCP leaders and officials began to view India as a rival and a saboteur. Authors such as Garver have argued that India and China were destined to be rivals from the start, given overlapping geographical spheres of influence stretching from the Himalayas to the Indian Ocean.[39] Given that both countries sought international influence since their founding, it is not surprising that the relationship came apart as the CCP radicalism *that Nehru had bet against* emerged, and as the New China sought orthodoxy from the members of its international coalition.

[38] Meeting, Burmese Prime Minister, 18.4.1960, ZELNP 2, 306.
[39] Garver, *Protracted*, 15.

6.4 CCP Views of India in Asia and Africa: India Becomes a Rival

In 1958, as China's activities in Afro-Asia began to take a more radical turn, the CCP expected India to keep up with the Chinese international agenda, as evidenced from Mao and Zhou's conversations with India's new Ambassador that year. As explained in earlier chapters, China's use for the Bandung world was both for the extension of its own influence internationally and also, as Garver describes it, to use armed wars of national liberation as the 'cutting edge of the global anti-United States struggle'.[40] Citing Chalmers Johnson, Garver explains that 'At a minimum, [Mao] hoped to pressure the United States to cease supporting the [GMD], blocking China's entry into the United Nations, and economically isolating China. Maximally, if several foreign revolutions actually succeeded, China might emerge as the leader of a revitalized world revolutionary movement and the structure of U.S. power in Asia would either collapse or be rolled back'.[41]

The expectation that India would support the PRC on Taiwan was understandable, as India had consistently rejected what the CCP saw as a 'two-Chinas' policy throughout the 1950s. However, China and India's cooperation ended there. As Mao, Zhou and Chen Yi, now in the role of Foreign Minister following purges in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, worked to build what they saw as a global national liberation front that could work against 'imperialism', Indian cooperation fell by the wayside, leading to a shift in CCP views of their erstwhile partner and co-creator of the Afro-Asian sphere itself.

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[40] Garver, *Foreign Relations*, 138.
[41] Ibid., 137.

Chinese views of India in the Afro-Asian sphere were defined by several core beliefs by the early 1960s. First, that India was attempting to undermine Chinese influence in Afro-Asia, isolate China, and promote non-violence as a form of national struggle, in contrast to the PRC's support for the violent national liberation movements which Mao and his colleagues saw as essential to their success and influence. Second, that India was cooperating with America and other Western countries, acting essentially on the opposite side of what China's global policy was meant to accomplish, that is, the above mentioned counterpoint or even 'roll back' of U.S. influence. Finally, CCP leaders began to refer to Indian activity and attitudes as 'great power chauvinism', meddling in the 'internal affairs' of other countries, attempting to counter Chinese influence, and carrying out an American policy of 'using Asians to beat Asians', insofar as CCP leaders believed that the Himalayan border conflict was supported by the United States. India's negative influence in Asia and Africa, as the CCP saw it, was both related to the conflict in the Himalayas and a force of its own, a 'reactionary' foreign policy from a 'reactionary' group that governed India.

In his examination of Sino-Soviet rivalry in the developing world, Jeremy Friedman explains that Chinese suspicions of India began when Josip Broz Tito visited India in January 1959. The CCP was concerned that Tito aimed to bring India into a 'group of neutral countries', an interesting observation as it implies that the CCP saw India, in 1959, not as 'neutral' but rather on China's side in CCP global struggle; though India proved unwilling to host a nonaligned conference as Tito wanted, the Chinese MFA stated that 'Yugoslav revisionism still

has a rather large market in India'.[42] Chinese suspicions of India were not limited to interactions with Yugoslavia. Rather, Indian cooperation with the United Arab Republic, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, also vexed the CCP.[43] Moreover, China-India clashes in the Himalayas intensified CCP vexation with India as New Delhi sought condemnations of Chinese actions from members of the Afro-Asian sphere.[44] In the CCP view, an India-Egyptian axis had formed, which challenged their push towards national liberation movements with an agenda of neutrality and nonalignment.[45] As such, a struggle emerged for control of the direction of the Afro-Asian sphere. However, the CCP clearly believed that they could defeat the challenge presented by India.

CCP views of India and Egypt are instructive as this is one side to an ideological struggle that China and India engaged in. Importantly, Beijing appeared confident that, like the Indian challenge in the Himalayas, China could defeat an Indian challenge for leadership and control over the direction in the Afro-Asian sphere. Zhu Ziqi, a Chinese representative to the second Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization conference, held in 1960 in Guinea, one of a variety of conferences in which members of the Afro-Asian sphere vied for ideological influence, reported on Indian and Egyptian activities as follows:

> [O]ne can clearly see that after the failure of their [India and Egypt's] attempt to make neutrality the policy of the solidarity movement, they still conspire to boost the policy of so-called opposition to blocs and nonalignment, under the cover of anti-imperialism engage in antisocialism, as well as stealthily spreading the seeds of anti-Sinicism, in order to weaken and shift anti-imperialism, and they are rather preparing to completely lean towards imperialism, in Afro-Asia, especially in Africa, to create chaos and

[42] Friedman, 41.
[43] Ibid. Nehru also enjoyed a warm personal relationship with Nasser.
[44] Ibid., 42-3.
[45] Ibid., 44-5.

> confusion, in order to change the general character of the solidarity movement, replace it with reactionary content and have it led by the right-wing of the bourgeoisie.[46]

As such, Indian 'reactionaries' were a problem for the CCP not only in the Himalayas, but in the wider world which the CCP was trying to build and influence. As discussed, the New China required not only its 'sovereignty and territorial integrity', but also an international sphere of influence in which its interests could survive. India, like the United States and the USSR, was one of the primary obstacles to not only the internal, but to the external aspects of China's resurrection. The cover that India could obtain, in the CCP view, by advancing 'anti-Sinicism' inside the Afro-Asian movement, made it, as we will see, uniquely dangerous to the external aspects of the project of the New China, which depended, by this stage, not only on the Socialist bloc, but also on the decolonizing world.

With a global foreign policy characterized in large part by opposition to the United States, the CCP came to view India's non-conformity and non-acceptance of the CCP agenda as direct service to America, rather than as a path of India's own making. In much the same way that India's own sovereign choices in the Himalayas were viewed as the natural inheritance of the British Empire, the CCP began to define India's position in international affairs as assistance to the 'imperialist' menace which they sought to throw the weight of their revolution against.[47]

The CCP official view of India as a comprehensive threat was on one hand interlaced with the border dispute, but on the other, saw the Indian government as using the border to

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[46] Ibid., 45.
[47] CCP views of US-India relations will be examined in the final chapter; their appearance in Afro-Asian affairs will be addressed in this chapter.

pursue a wider, international agenda against the People's Republic of China, which largely played out in the Afro-Asian sphere. A report by the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi on 'India's Foreign Relations in 1960', referred to in Chapter Four, argues that 'India is using the border question to support tension between the two countries', and that India sought in 1960 to 'isolate our country'.[48] The report noted also that 'India has a negative influence on the Afro-Asian movement', and that 'India has not completely abandoned the anti-colonialist signboard, but it is very rarely anti-British and never anti-American'.[49] Expecting India to subscribe to the CCP's version of anti-Americanism misunderstood and disregarded India's own international agenda, and also set the stage for what the CCP ultimately saw as profound collusion with the West. To stray from the CCP's agenda was, in effect, to oppose it.

By 1961, in a report on R.K. Nehru's visit to Beijing, the Foreign Ministry reported that India's 'ruling clique' had taken up a 'resist China and move closer to America policy', adding that 'Currently India is unprecedentedly isolated and passive internationally, and losing prestige in Asia and Africa'.[50] By now the official view across MFA branches was that India and America were working *together* in Afro-Asia to subvert Chinese influence and undermine the CCP's agenda. A report from the Chinese Embassy in Beijing on India's foreign relations in 1961 noted that 'Indian monopoly capitalists fear and hate Communism (especially our country's influence) and Afro-Asian national liberation movements more and more, as the tendency of the

[48] FMA 105-01001-09 1960 年印度对外关系中的几个问题 30.1.1961. Several Questions on India's foreign relations in 1960, 50.
[49] Ibid., 60-1.
[50] FMA 105-01056-01 印度外交部秘书长拉-库-尼赫鲁访华（一）：访问目的和协商经过 7.7.1961. Secretary General of the Indian Foreign Ministry R. K. Nehru's visit to China (one): purpose of visit and course of discussion, 29.

East Wind to pressure the West Wind grows deeper…'[51], and accused Nehru of attempting to use an 'anti-China policy' to 'thwart Communist influence, weaken the anti-imperialist struggle, and support expansionist ambitions'.[52] The report added that 'India will take any possible approach to break the anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist struggle, moreover, its expansionist leanings have developed anew, especially as it adopts its method of relying on America and expanding into Afro-Asia'.[53]

In the view of the Chinese Embassy, Nehru's nonalignment was failing and he was attempting to push Afro-Asian countries in exactly the opposite direction that China wanted. With regard to the 1961 Nonaligned Conference in Belgrade, the Embassy reported that Nehru's attitude was initially 'indifferent', and that 'under America's influence' he engaged with Yugoslavia in a 'conspiracy to bring more Western-leaning countries' to the conference.[54] The Embassy saw India as 'intensifying its expansion into the Afro-Asian region', trying to gain advantage in Afro-Asia by sending 'technological personnel etc etc [sic] in order to complement American aid', adding that 'America expressed appreciation of the usefulness of its little partner India'.[55] The report also added that India was 'colluding with Japan to control the Asian economy'.[56] As such, India, in the Embassy's view, was now firmly on the opposite side of China's Asian and international objectives, working to undermine the reversal of the American presence in Asia that China was trying to achieve. Moreover, Indian influence carried special

[51] FMA 105-01519-01, 1.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid., 2.
[54] Ibid., 10.
[55] Ibid., 11-12.
[56] Ibid., 12.

weight because of nonalignment: 'Because India still has the nonaligned sign up, we cannot underestimate Nehru's deceptions'.[57]

The view inside the MFA of India as an American-backed opponent to China's expanding global diplomacy appears to be widespread by the early 1960s, going so far as to report on India as though it were an entirely hostile nation. A report on 'India's Internal and External Direction' from 1961 explained that, 'India opposes and isolates China, treating China as a major enemy'.[58] India was acting against China both in terms related to the Himalayas: 'Nehru is inciting trouble, saying that many Asian countries "censure" our "imperial ambitions". After the Burma border question was solved, India is sowing discord by saying that no country will believe that China wants peace… India is also sending rebels who are leaving from Nepal to India to the China-Nepali border, trying to stir something up…'[59] The MFA also situated India's activities within a broader international agenda, concluding that India was supporting American activity in Asia and Africa. The report refers to India as 'becoming imperialism's tool', in a litany of allegations, including Indian support for the Bay of Pigs, Laos, 'becoming America's tool on the Congo issue', 'defending American interference' in the Congo, not 'clearly condemning American imperialism in Cuba's struggle against America', and interfering with national liberation movements, for example by 'not helping Japan, South Korea and Turkey in their struggles against imperialism'.[60] Moreover, the Foreign Ministry took issue with Indian 'propagation of nonviolence and passive resistance (非暴力主义和消极抵抗)' in Africa, and

[57] Ibid., 14.
[58] FMA 105-01455-02, 27.4.1961, 1.
[59] Ibid., 3.
[60] Ibid., 4-6.

Nehru 'saying that the African people can through "passive resistance, overthrow colonialism without spilling a drop of blood" '.[61]

In the Foreign Ministry's view, India was working directly against the PRC, by turning the Afro-Asian movement against them, and inviting in the United States in a kind of Trojan Horse under the banner of nonalignment. India was 'resisting the Second Afro-Asian Conference',[62] 'publicly supporting American imperialism and the South Vietnamese Ngo Dinh Diem clique's destruction of the Geneva agreement', 'openly sending observers to join the March 1961 SEATO air and naval exercises', and 'using peaceful meetings and united organizations to oppose China', listing the 'Conference of the World Peace Committee' in Delhi as an example, as well as 'forcing the Indian Afro-Asian Unity Committee to pass…anti-China motions'.[63]

The CCP, moreover, realized that the United States understood India's importance in Asia and Africa, and viewed this with serious concern. As the MFA explained: 'America is energetically pulling at [India]. Kennedy said on February 19th, 1959 that "If we lose India, if Latin America leans to another side, if the Middle East is unconsciously pulled behind the Iron Curtain, then no matter how many missiles, no matter how many satellites and atomic aircraft and submarines, it will not be enough to save us"', adding that Kennedy said that "the Indian population is larger than Africa and Latin America combined"'.[64] This Foreign Ministry report added a quote from Kennedy that sums up the new American President's personal interest in

[61] Ibid., 7.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid., 7-8.
[64] Ibid., 19.

what he saw as the great Asian democracy: "In the last ten years, China has surpassed the Indian economy but the struggle is not over. India still has a huge potential for triumph. However, if the opportunity is squandered now, it will not return".[65]

Even as the view of India as a menace took shape within the Chinese MFA and CCP leadership, the CCP saw some potential for avenues of China-India agreement, though these appear to be more akin to the CCP strategy of exploiting 'imperialist and neo-colonialist countries with contradictions with U.S. imperialism', rather than a genuine chance for restoration of China-India friendship.[66] India's recapture of Goa from the Portuguese in 1961, an event which brought about considerable tension between India and the West, including the United States, led the CCP to surmise that reconciliation with India on foreign affairs after Goa could be possible. The Foreign Ministry explained to the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi that, 'We have always opposed imperialism and colonialism. Goa is part of India's territory, we support Indian action taken in Goa. Imperialism will not automatically give the land that it occupies. On this issue, it is very clear who is the friend and who is the enemy. As long as India opposes imperialism, we will certainly support it'.[67]

The Goa operation fit within the CCP view of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism by military force. As Ambassador Pan explained in 1961 on the subject of Goa, 'We have always supported and sympathized with all people and nations that are carrying out the anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism struggle… America is imperialist. We are completely different from

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[65] Ibid.
[66] See Garver *Foreign Relations*, 138, Figure 6.1 on 'contradictions'.
[67] FMA 105-01057-02, 印度收复果阿（二）：印人士要我表态支持 19.12.1961. India recaptures Goa (two): Indian figures want us to declare our supportive position, 25.

them… If we say support, we will support; our action is consistent with our word'.[68] Indian actions in Goa fit within the PRC's foreign policy of global military opposition to the West, from Algeria to Vietnam. However, the CCP view of India as 'America's little partner' working in the service of an 'anti-China movement' remained.[69]

Chinese perceptions of Indian 'interference' in the Himalayan countries are also worth pointing out in an Afro-Asian context. In its dealings with Himalayan countries, China's bilateral issues with India and CCP national liberation rhetoric combined. The CCP viewed the Himalayas simultaneously as a zone of strategic importance in its struggle for sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as seeing Himalayan nations as relevant to the wider project of the Afro-Asian sphere. As has been touched upon in Chapter Four, the CCP had grave suspicions about Indian activity regarding other Himalayan states. In 1959, the Foreign Ministry reported on India's relations with Sikkim and Bhutan, both of which had treaties with India that allowed India to handle the foreign relations of each Himalayan kingdom. The report noted that 'In recent years, India has been trying to increase its control over Bhutan [and] making Sikkim India's second protectorate', and that 'In August of this year, they stirred up another anti-China movement which included sowing discord in our bilateral relations with Bhutan and Sikkim, as well as trying to force us to recognize Sikkim and Bhutan as Indian protectorates'.[70] Ever concerned with the Indian press in the CCP's propaganda struggle against India, the Foreign Ministry reported on an Indian newspaper's 'slander' which stated that China 'wants to make Bhutan,

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[68] Ibid., 37.
[69] FMA 105-01519-01, 12.
[70] FMA 105-00944-03, 最近印度有关中印边界问题和锡金、不丹问题的一些提法，10.9.1959. Recent Indian formulations regarding China-India border question and Sikkim, Bhutan question, 68.

Sikkim, Ladakh, Tibet into a "united family"',[71] presumably to be directed against India. Moreover, the Indian 'reactionary publications' were 'clamoring that a huge Chinese army was gathering on the Bhutanese and Sikkimese borders; these countries face a grave threat from China' including possible 'invasion' of Bhutan.[72]

The issue of Himalayan kingdoms came up in China and India's bilateral meetings, for example, between the Indian Foreign Secretary and China's Vice Foreign Minister Geng Biao in 1961. The Indian Foreign Secretary pressed the point of whether or not China respected its treaties with Bhutan and Sikkim. Geng addressed the issue as follows: 'I don't understand why India wants to make Sikkim a protectorate. In Afro-Asia that is seldom seen',[73] adding that, 'Now the Indian side tends to put the China-India border issue aside and solely discuss Bhutan, Sikkim, and Pakistan issues; this is not for the sake of narrowing our disagreements, but to expand our disagreements'.[74] Later, Geng stated that 'We have no territorial ambitions towards our neighboring countries and we do not carry out subversive activities. The Indian side mentioned that China, in a meeting with Tibetan leaders, claimed Bhutan, Sikkim, and Ladakh as parts of China which need to be taken back. This is not worth a response… India is just relying on a Western news agency, it is not worth a serious response'.[75] The Indian Ambassador replied that this information had come from India's own intelligence sources.

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[71] Ibid., 68-69.
[72] Ibid.
[73] FMA 105-01056-03, 印度外交部秘书长拉-库-尼赫鲁访华（三）：章文晋司长同印度驻华大使帕蒂萨拉蒂三次谈话记录 17.7.1961. Secretary General of Indian Foreign Ministry R. K. Nehru's visit to China (three): record of three conversations between Bureau Chief Zhang Wenjin and Indian ambassador to China Parthasarathy, 48.
[74] Ibid., 48.
[75] Ibid., 54.

The MFA also reported on Indian activities regarding Nepal, a Bandung attendee in 1955, in addition to being sandwiched between India and China in the Himalayas. According to the MFA, Indian newspapers were 'sowing discord in China-Nepali relations' in 1960, 'slandering us as having "expansionist" attempts and threats towards Nepal, a Bandung attendee in 1955, and already occupying Nepali territory'.[76] The MFA later explained that 'It is reported that Nehru tried to to convince [Nepali Prime Minister] Koirala to accept "mutual defense" responsibilities', adding that 'Indian Foreign Ministry officials are especially bad (非常坏), they want to pull Nepal into the [border] conflict, drawing it near to India'.[77] As the two countries vied for influence in the Himalayas, the prerogatives of 'anti-imperialism' were generally within view. As Geng stated in his meeting with the Indian Foreign Secretary, referring to discussion of the Kashmir question: 'This can only please the imperialists elements who are trying to destroy the relations between China and its neighboring countries'.[78] India's position on the Himalayan Kingdoms would eventually help underpin Chinese views of India as a 'great power chauvinist' nation acting in collusion with the West. CCP use of Afro-Asianism in its propaganda to discredit India in the Himalayas will be addressed in the following section.

6.5 'Great Power Chauvinism' and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: Chinese Representations of India to Afro-Asian Nations

[76] FMA 105-01003-02(1), 尼泊尔－印度关系, 22.1.1960. Nepal-India Relations, 11.
[77] Ibid., 13.
[78] Ibid., 57

As the relationship with India turned from partnership to rivalry in the Afro-Asian sphere, CCP leaders and officials shared their views on India with countries around the Afro-Asian sphere, representing the South Asian democracy in terms anathema to the tenets of the Afro-Asian movement. CCP leaders and diplomats grouped India with the West, especially the United States and Britain, portrayed India as undermining the Afro-Asian cause, betraying the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and frequently invoked the idea of 'Great Power Chauvinism', a noteworthy concept both because it demonstrates the CCP's concept of India as a fellow great power and thus a rival to China, and also because it demonstrates the CCP perception of *India as a great power among other Asian and African nations*. By deploying these concepts, the CCP began to use the Bandung spirit and the Five Principles as diplomatic weapons against India in the Afro-Asian sphere. As such, the CCP presented India not only in contrast to the CCP's objectives of turning the Afro-Asian sphere into a space for national liberation movements, but also as a danger to the well-being and independence of Afro-Asian nations themselves.

The most interesting expressions of this propaganda technique by the CCP took place around the outbreak of the Border War itself. By 1962, with China-India conflict openly building, the Afro-Asian sphere had become a court of opinion which each country sought to mobilize against the other. CCP rhetoric at the time shows ways in which China sought not only to isolate India in the context of the border conflict, but to undermine India's position within the sphere of Afro-Asian nations that India had helped to mobilize, if not create.[79] Competition for

[79] Allen Whiting makes a similar point in *The Chinese Calculus*, and briefly mentions the Chen Yi speech in Nepal quoted below. However, as his book is concerned with November 1961 to November 1962, his purpose was to show how China attempted to isolate India in the context of

influence in Afro-Asia was open and clear at this point, but the Border War gave China the opportunity to attempt a kind of knock-out blow in the struggle.

As China-India tensions simmered in the late 1950s and early 1960s, China made full use of the moment to resolve other territorial disputes with its neighbours.[80] A China-Nepali boundary treaty was signed in 1961, strengthening China's relations with the Himalayan kingdom.[81] One year later, on October 10th, 1962, at the anniversary celebrations for the treaty's signing, Chen Yi gave a speech to the Nepali King and his delegation, in which important elements of China-India rivalry in Asia emerge.

Chen Yi's speech has two important dimensions. First, there is a regional dimension, in which he attempts to build up the idea of harmonious China-Nepali relations, founded on their peaceful border agreement, and in contrast to the trouble between China and India. Moreover, he presented the occasion as a Chinese-brokered step forward for Asian peace and solidarity:

> The China-Nepali border question is complicated one that is left over from history. A certain few people have tried to use border disputes to attain their own hidden aims. They once hoped and even asserted that China and Nepal were incapable of solving this issue. However, we have solved it… We have done a good deed not only for our two countries' people, and our ten thousand generations of posterity, but also for the advancement of the unity and cooperation of Asian countries, and the protection of peace in Asia and the world…[82]

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the Sino-Indian Border War; he does not view this in the context of a prolonged Sino-Indian struggle in Afro-Asia.

[80] Indian authors including Varma have asserted that China handled other border agreements in order to manipulate India; Fravel asserts that internal difficulties in China, including the Tibetan uprising of 1959, led to efforts to secure all of the country's southwestern boundaries, India included.

[81] Fravel, *Strong Borders,* 91-3.

[82] *ZDWGX 1962*, 94-6.

Chen Yi went on to invoke the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, by which the PRC still intended to conduct its relations with other countries, noting that India, not China, was the violator of this agreement.[83] After explaining that 'Indian reactionaries are trying to forcefully use British imperialism's unrealized plan to occupy Chinese territory', and that, 'Every country that takes Asian unity seriously must oppose what the Indian reactionaries are doing. This kind of method by the Indian reactionaries can only gain the cheers of imperialism'.[84] The Chinese Foreign Minister pledged Chinese defense and championship of national liberation movements, proceeding with the international context in which India had now been vilified, as well as championing the movement itself, claiming that all who oppose it cannot succeed:

> We have always upheld that whether countries are large or small, they should be equal without exception, and respect each other. China firmly opposes Great Power Chauvinism, and meddling in other countries internal affairs. Now we are in the 1960s; it is the era in which national and ethnic independence movements are vigorously developing. All big country chauvinism and meddling subverts these activities, violates the tide of the era, and is certain to fail.[85]

As such, CCP rhetoric set India not only against China and other countries, but against the tide of an entire era. Chen Yi's rhetoric sought to affirm China as a guarantor of the interests of Asian countries both in deed (the treaty with Nepal) and in spirit (dedication to the Five Principles, and to national liberation movements in Asia). Moreover, it sought to drive a wedge between India and the Asian solidarity movement which India helped to create, placing the Indian government, through their actions in the China-India border conflict, in the camp of the very imperialists whom Asian, and by extension, the global anti-imperialist movement, sought to resist. Whether or not this strategy of isolating India from its own global movement and pitting it against the

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[83] Ibid.
[84] Ibid. Also referenced in Chapter Four.
[85] Ibid. 96.

basic national interests of other Asian countries would succeed is a separate question. However, Chen Yi certainly succeeded in making wider rhetorical weaponry out of the China-India conflict, and using this diplomatic weaponry against India's interests and image in Asia.

India was using this strategy as well, with the PRC duly combatting Indian rhetorical efforts. According to 'foreign reports', as a PRC diplomatic documents collection tells us, by October 1962, the Indian government had asked the Bhutanese king to let Indian troops pass through Bhutan, calling its defense efforts 'resisting-Communist China'.[86] In response, the MFA spokesman addressed the situation by offering the standard PRC line to other countries, that the military conflict on the China-India Border was 'completely the result of the Indian side's occupation of Chinese territory, refusal to peacefully negotiate, and launching of large-scale attacks on the Chinese Border Defense Forces'.[87] Moreover, while asserting that in its relations with Bhutan, China 'rigorously complies with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and strictly respects Bhutan's sovereignty and territorial integrity', the Chinese threat to Bhutan was recast as twisting the truth for Indian gain: 'To call the Chinese side's self-defensive actions a threat to China's neighbour and friend, Bhutan, is fabricated from head to tail (是彻头彻尾捏造)…Fabricating that China presents some sort of threat or ambition towards Bhutan can only expose the fabricators' ulterior motives and that is all'.[88]

As such, India and China were both battling in terms of the Five Principles, which represented terms of sovereignty as well as principles by which authority in the Afro-Asian

[86] Ibid., 107.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid.

solidarity movements could be asserted. Each country was attempting to show that the other was not a trustworthy neighbor or ally. The ideological dimensions of the Cold War which underpinned the Asian movements were brought into the rhetorical and diplomatic struggle, with China using the threat of imperialism when representing India's motives to Nepal, and India specifically referring to 'Communist China', when representing China to Bhutan and others.[89] In their attempts to present the other as a threat, each country made full use of the international symbolism available. In this way, the two countries sought to compete for influence in the 'Third World' and ultimately sought to use the Bandung Spirit and Afro-Asian movements against each other.

Chinese conversations about India were especially frank with Pakistan, Indonesia, and Cuba. The former two were founding members of the Bandung movement, and each sympathized with the PRC. The latter was China's chief contact in its attempts to spread influence in Latin America, and thus to transform the Afro-Asian sphere into a broader 'national liberation' front by making use of movements like the Cuban, Algerian, and Vietnamese revolutions.

Liu Shaoqi, Mao's chosen successor as State Chairman, told the Pakistan Ambassador in September 1962 that, 'In the past, we only felt imperialist countries, like the US and Britain, possessed great power chauvinism; now, we find that India too has great power chauvinism'.[90] Liu remarked on the principles that China had established following its treatment at the hands of foreign empires, noting that, 'Over 100 years ago, we suffered greatly from oppression and

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[89] See *ZDWGX 1962*.
[90] 'Record of Conversation following Pakistani Ambassador to the PRC Raza's Presentation of Credentials to Liu Shaoqi's', 01.9.1962, FMA 105-01801-02, 28-34, CWIHPDA.

bullying by great powers; so, after the revolution's victory, we reeducated our cadres and our people; we might not be bullied by great power chauvinism, but we absolutely will not commit errors of great power chauvinism ourselves'.[91] As such, in Liu's representation, India was a 'great power', possessed of the same qualities of Western 'imperialist' countries whom the Afro-Asian movement sought to resist, while China, by contrast, could be trusted because it had learned from the 'oppression and bullying' which Afro-Asian nations had all suffered from. India, moreover, according to CCP representatives in the meeting, practiced interference in the affairs of other countries, not only China but other Asian nations as well. According to Geng Biao who was present in the meeting: 'The Indian government has also said that from the west, where China, Afghanistan, and India meet together, to the east, where China, Burma and India border one another, all of this is the Sino-Indian border. According to this logic, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim all do not exist. This is typical great power chauvinism'.[92]

Liu and Geng found an appreciative audience in the Pakistani Ambassador, whose concept of Indian ambitions was even larger than those expressed by the two senior CCP officials. Ambassador Raza, for his part, noted that: 'I still remember, two years ago, [V. K. Krishna] Menon said, from Burma and Sikkim to the Persian Gulf region, along with regions in which Indian people have already settled, there will be a day when these will all again become the inseparable territory of India. According to this logic, Pakistan does not exist. India's chauvinism is undisguised'.[93] Liu concluded by illustrating a picture of a China that adhered to clear, predictable principles, that other nations could depend on, a theme that Zhou Enlai would

[91] FMA 105-01801-02 CWIHPDA.
[92] Ibid.
[93] Ibid.

also employ as the Border War broke out and he sought the support of other Afro-Asian leaders. In the words of Liu: 'India will, in the end, certainly fail. Executing this kind of policy, they will only end up isolating themselves. Our policy is to live on friendly terms with all countries; we insist on advocating that countries, regardless of whether they are big or small, strong or weak, should not interfere with each other's internal affairs or violate each other's laws, and should respect each other, ensure equality and mutual benefit, and peacefully coexist. Regardless of whether other big countries like it or not, we will adhere to these principles'.[94] As such, in the CCP representation China advocated principles of fairness towards smaller nations, while India, the other 'great power' in Asia, would be done in by its own imperial arrogance towards fellow Asian nations. India's 'great power' overreach, did not, however, end there in CCP representations.

The PRC representation to the Pakistani Ambassador of the breakdown of China-India relations is also revealing as it ties the problems of 'interference in internal affairs' with China to dangers towards other Asian nations. Behind the idea of 'great power chauvinism' lay Indian 'interference' in the Himalayas: 'I remember, when our army peacefully liberated Tibet in 1950, India sent us a diplomatic note saying China should not advance militarily into Tibet. We replied by explaining that liberating Tibet is China's own matter, and foreign countries have no right to interfere; after that, they did not speak again'.[95] Additionally, 'Afterward, it spoke of Sino-Indian friendship, and spoke this way for several years; we also did not get a sense of India's great power chauvinism…But in 1959, India stirred up armed rebellion at its border with China's Tibet. They regarded Tibet as part of India's sphere of influence, or even as Indian territory, and

[94] Ibid.
[95] Ibid.

instigated Tibetan rebellion. This is obviously something the Chinese people are unable to tolerate'.[96] With regard to China's own fair-mindedness, Liu included an anecdote about Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk in the conversation, who had allegedly told him that 'I feel you don't exhibit great power chauvinism, interacting with you is like being alongside a brother. You are very sincere and friendly. You speak honest words; when you agree you agree, and when you don't agree you don't. You treat people with equality'.[97] As such, the fairness of the PRC in Afro-Asia, versus India's 'great power chauvinism' was the message that Liu wished to convey.

Chinese leaders also attacked the idea of Indian neutrality. In a meeting with the Pakistani Ambassador in 1962, Zhou spoke of Indian deception on two levels, first that Nehru's neutrality was false, and also, in offering a review of China-India relations, that China had been deceived by India on Tibet: 'Nehru's claims of peaceful neutrality and peaceful coexistence are influential across the world, and also, at that time [several years ago] his plot concerning Tibet had not yet been revealed; thus there was no reason to oppose him. But we do not condone his lack of fair play'.[98] Moreover, Nehru 'just had to interfere in China's internal affairs and engineer the Tibet incident. During my second visit to India, he received the Dalai Lama, [so] it was absolutely clear that he wanted to get involved in subversive activities'.[99] Zhou went on to attack Nehru's nonalignment, stating that 'Nehru does not now say he is neutral, he says he is non-aligned, and he is cheating [people] out of [their] money everywhere', concluding that

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[96] Ibid.
[97] Ibid.
[98] 'Pakistani Ambassador Raza Pays Formal Visit to Chinese Premier Zhou', 05.9.1962, FMA 105-01802-03, 41-46, CWIHPDA.
[99] Ibid.

'There is, indeed, in Nehru's thinking, the ambition to inherit the great British Empire'.[100]

The attacks upon and derisive views of Indian neutrality appear to have been standard throughout the Foreign Ministry. In October 1962, just weeks before the Border War, the Chinese ambassador to Cuba, for example, noted that 'There are people that still say that India is neutral, but it is not neutral'.[101] Importantly, in these cases, China met with a willing audience. The Cuban representatives agreed, for example, that India was not neutral. China's ability to persuade nations around the Afro-Asian sphere would come into full view after the Border War broke out at last.

With the advent of the Border War in 1962, Chinese leaders emphasized core themes of 'great power chauvinism' and Indian efforts to undermine the Afro-Asian movement in their diplomacy surrounding the war. The Border War sent shock waves through the Afro-Asian world. For Asian leaders, part of the original purpose of the Bandung movement, had been to bring about prolonged peace and stability in the region, and the friction between the movement's two most powerful members was troubling. The Burmese Prime Minister wrote to Zhou Enlai in 1962, calling China and India, 'Asia's two foremost leaders' and stating that, 'I on my part would naturally wish to see this unhappy dispute between our two most friendly neighbours brought to a speedy end and towards achieving this end I shall spare no efforts...'[102] However,

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[100] Ibid.
[101] FMA 111-00361-03，申健大使与古巴统一革命组织领导委员会成员阿拉贡内斯谈话记录 12.10.1962. Record of conversation between Ambassador Shen Jian and Member of Governing Committee of the Cuban Integrated Revolutionary Organizations [Emilio] Aragonés, 3.
[102] FMA 105-01781-01, 缅甸驻华大使转来奈温致周总理电 29.10.1962. Telegram from Ne Win passed on to Premier Zhou by Burmese ambassador to China, 21.

the damage to the Bandung world would prove to be beyond repair. As Chinese diplomacy and military operations worked with expert coordination, China sought to deliver the full measure of its 'lesson' to India, to convince Afro-Asian leaders of the righteousness of the Chinese position in the conflict, and manage the opportunity that they believed the conflict presented to the United States to deepen its involvement with India, a concern shared by certain Afro-Asian nations that leaned closer to the Chinese side. The Border War opened up a rift within the Afro-Asian sphere, a movement which had entered into a kind of Cold War of its own, with some countries leaning towards India and others towards China, but ultimately, as China-India conflict broke the Bandung world apart, many different nations sought to heal these rifts and preserve what was left of the dream that began in 1955.

6.6 'Using Asians to Beat Asians': Chinese Representations of India and Afro-Asian Reactions

When the Border War commenced in October 1962, the CCP took the general line of Indian 'great power chauvinism' a step further, now invoking the idea of 'using Asians to beat Asians', a rhetorical line also employed during the Vietnam Wars and at the Geneva Conference in 1954 to refer to US support for the Diem regime in South Vietnam. As such, the CCP gave India an ultimate characterization as a vehicle of US 'imperialism' in Asia, a view facilitated in part by Indian requests for American weapons during the Border War. This presentation, as this section will make clear, was effective among some Afro-Asian leaders who opposed a US presence in Asia and feared US-India cooperation as, in their view, the Bandung movement was

indeed designed to keep non-Asian countries away from the region.

In a communication to 'All Foreign Ambassadors' on October 25th, five days into the Border War, the Chinese Foreign Ministry laid out the basic rationale for war that China's ambassadors would share with host governments around the world. Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu explained that 'The important thing is that India occupied China's land, China did not invade India's land. It must be made very clear, India is the invader and China is forced to act in self-defense…'[103] The CCP sought to blame India for the use of violence, going so far as to say that India had started the war themselves: 'India refused peaceful negotiations to resolve the China-India border issue and China always tried to resolve this peacefully. India invaded China's border, occupied China's land, and launched a large scale attack on China's border defense forces. China exercised maximum restraint, and was forced to counterattack'.[104] Such was the message that Chinese diplomats and leaders would convey to the world as Chinese diplomacy and Chinese diplomats, Mao and Zhou's 'soldiers in plain clothes', coordinated carefully with the use of military force in the Himalayas. Zhang emphasized alleged intrigues in the Himalayas on a deeper level as well: 'Nehru engineered the Tibetan Uprising and received the Dalai Lama a few days later. Also Indian figures voiced support and recognition for the Tibetan government in exile'.[105] However, the memoranda to the PRC ambassadors also noted themes that would trouble Chinese diplomacy and the Bandung world altogether: '[D]evelopment of the Border War situation is only good for imperialism and the Indian reactionary clique. All along they have

[103] FMA 109-03804-02, 关于苏联就中印边界问题和苏联卖飞机给印度问题给我的备忘录 25.10.1962. Concerning the diplomatic memorandum given to us by USSR on the China-India border question and question of Soviet sale of planes to India, 14.
[104] Ibid.
[105] Ibid., 14.

tried to crippled the China-India friendship'.[106] As such, the mission was to blame India for the war while preserving, if possible, the Bandung world. The CCP was using the idea of 'China-India friendship', which had once been the foundation of the Afro-Asian sphere, to isolate the Indian government.

As the war unfolded, Chinese diplomacy treated the Indian threat to China as a threat to the Afro-Asian movement itself, something which struck at the heart of the mission for a revitalized and liberated Asia, and instead brought 'imperialism' deeper into Asia and Africa, as India, they alleged, colluded with the United States and the West. In a dispatch from the Chinese Embassy in Burma in November 1962, Chinese diplomats explained to Beijing, for example, that, after winning a 'major victory' in the military struggle counterattacking the Indian reactionary clique' the PRC 'must catch Indian reactionaries in an even more awkward situation, bring chaos to American imperialism's plot to prolong and expand the China-India Border War, and foil the plot by international revisionism and Indian reactionaries to strike and isolate our country'.[107] The Chinese Embassy in Burma explained that, 'the overall situation is beneficial for us; moreover, it will expose Nehru's true nature, and he will fall into even deeper isolation'.[108] As such, the coordination of diplomacy and military action was meant to be a blow to Nehru and the Indian government themselves, not just in the Himalayas, but on the world stage.

In meetings with Indonesia, a friend to the CCP's program of national liberation movements, the CCP delivered a line about American interference, this time in the Border War

[106] Ibid., 13.
[107] FMA 105-01490-01, 告讨论我国声明情况 23.11.1962. Informing [on] the discussion of our country's statement, 16.
[108] Ibid., 17.

itself: 'India is making a war atmosphere, stirring up anti-China feeling, not only ignoring China's fair and logical suggestions but slandering China's positive efforts. Even though there is already a ceasefire on the border, the US is doing everything it can to get Nehru to continue to prepare for war, waiting for opportunities to restart the conflict, in order to realize their evil objective of "using Asians to beat Asians"'.[109] 'Using Asians to beat Asians' was the culmination of China's view of the Indian government as a 'tool of the United States', and the threat that this supposed partnership posed to their plans in Africa and Asia. The diplomatic attacks on India during and after the Border War played upon the idea of the spectre of imperialism that haunted the decolonization movement, and alleged that India was now working in the service of the imperialist force that the movement was trying to struggle against. The effect of this coordination of force and diplomacy had impressive effects around the Afro-Asian sphere.

In a conversation with Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio, in November, 1962 as the war was underway, Subandrio shared his view of the threat that the Border War presented to Asia and Africa through the opening that it gave to the West:

> The Indonesian government believes that the China-India border problem is historical legacy from the era of colonialism. The conflict caused by this issue only benefits colonialism and imperialism. It does not benefit Afro-Asian unity. Now Western imperialism is trying to expand the China-India border conflict. Twenty-four hours per day they are sending massive amounts of weapons to India. If the situation continues to develop in this way, the border conflict will no longer be solved by the people of India, but by those weapons. Western imperialism wants to turn India into their military base.[110]

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[109] FMA 106-01398-01 黄副部长与西哈努克谈话记录 30.11.1962. Record of conversation between Vice Minister Huang and Sihanouk, 58.
[110] FMA 105-01787-06 与苏班德里约谈中印边界问题 12.11.1962. Discussion of China-India border question with Subandrio, 75.

The United States and other Western countries had begun to send weapons to India as will be reviewed in a later chapter. The advent of Western support for India in the conflict, some Afro-Asian leaders believed, struck at the heart of Asia's bid for independence and revitalization on its own terms. Subandrio saw this as a blow to Indian nonalignment, creating a kind of chain reaction around other nations in Asia: 'Now not only has India taken a step back on nonalignment policy, but it is affecting Malaysia and the Philippines. Although this effect is very small now, for the whole of Afro-Asian unity this is not good'.[111]

China, however, was attacking nonalignment directly. A record of a meeting with Ceylon and Indonesia in January 1963 explains that, 'Our leaders exposed Indian big power chauvinism in this meeting', quoting Liu Shaoqi, who tied Indian policy to the United States: 'Nehru wants to use China's tense situation to get more American aid and possibly also for domestic purposes'; the report went on to explain that 'We have exposed the mask of Indian nonalignment'.[112] It appears that Chinese leaders believed that Indian nonalignment had been a deception for some time already. In the words of Liu, 'India got rid of nonalignment early on. But America and Britain tell India not to get rid of the nonalignment sign. That is American and British policy. Indian nonalignment is a formality and a signboard. India has already aligned with Britain and the United States'.[113] Zhou's own letter to Afro-Asian leaders as the war broke out claimed that, 'the Indian government threw off its outer clothing of nonalignment, publicly begging the Americans for military support, and currently receiving massive amounts of American arms. Large quantities of Indian soldiers and large quantities of US arms are being

[111] Ibid., 75.
[112] FMA 105-01792-08, 11.1.1963, 90-1.
[113] Ibid., 91.

shipped to the China-India border. Along the East and Western sectors of the border, Indian troops have not stopped attacking Chinese border guards. Indian newspapers ceaselessly proclaim that India will soon launch a massive counterattack.'[114]

The idea of Indian cooperation with America was a concern for others in the nonaligned movement, including Nasser's Egypt – though Chen Yi saw Nasser as 'biased' towards India.[115] As diplomats from the United Arab Republic (UAR) expressed to their Chinese counterparts in November in the midst of the Border War, 'According to our intelligence, the US and Britain are planning to act big on the border. The USA is trying to build a military base in India, and trying to change neutral India to Western India. This is not good for any country in Afro-Asia'.[116] The Arab diplomats continued, 'China is Asia's most powerful country, Asia's fate is decided by China. China must show restraint, concede a bit, and then we can stop US and British penetration and control of India'.[117] The Chinese party refused to accept responsibility, however, for either 'the fate of Asia' or US and British action in South Asia, claiming that : 'Asia's fate is decided by the Asian people. The Asian people and the people of the world oppose imperialism and want peace. If America builds a military base in India, this is the American imperialists' invaders nature. We must first blame the US, then we must blame the Indian government which permits it to build a base, but the blame does not fall on China's head'.[118] The Chinese diplomat added that, 'If the US and UK have plans to control [India], that has been there from early on' and that 'We

[114] FMA 105-01786-02, 15.11.1962, 74.
[115] FMA 105-01789-07, 陈毅副总理接见印尼驻华大使苏卡尼谈话记录, 17.11.1962. Record of conversation between Vice Premier Chen Yi and Indonesian Ambassador to China Sukarni, 55. Chen Yi comments on Nasser's 'biased' peace proposals during the Border War.
[116] FMA 107-00488-05 阿联国务秘书谈中印边界问题 8.11.1962. Discussion of China-India border question with Secretary of State of United Arab Republic, 16.
[117] Ibid.
[118] Ibid.

have always wanted a peaceful solution to the border dispute, but Nehru is wholeheartedly ready to implement the US policy of using Asians to beat Asians'.[119] CCP diplomacy thus brought together resolute blame on India for all aspects of the military conflict, accusations of Indian collusion with the West, insinuations that nonalignment was a deception, and finally, blame upon India for creating dangers to the Afro-Asian movement itself. Chinese views of US-India collusion were shared by some countries around the Afro-Asian sphere. In Iraq, for example, the Chinese embassy reported an Iraqi minister's view that, 'After the China-India border conflict, the hypocrisy of India's nonalignment has been completely exposed. For the last two years, India has prepared for war. It has refused to solve the border and focused on getting American aid.'[120] The Iraqi minister also mentioned that a fellow minister visiting India saw American planes flying over Indian air space, adding that, 'It looks like India has lost more sovereignty than a country in an alliance'.[121]

The MFA reported on Indian activity around the Afro-Asian sphere, noting for example in Indonesia that the Indian Ambassador was 'blaming the Chinese as invaders' and 'slandering our country for always taking Indian land through military actions'.[122] According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the Indian consulate in China was distributing materials published by Indian news agencies which claimed that China was, 'sowing discord in the relations between its neighbors and other Afro-Asian countries, blaming us for "creating crises" in Indonesia, "encouraging" overseas Chinese not to recognize Indonesian citizenship, "creating a military

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[119] Ibid.
[120] FMA 107-00509-03 现卡塞姆等对中印边界问题的看法, 31.12.1962. [Iraqi Prime Minister] Qasim and others' current view of the China-India border question, 1.
[121] Ibid.
[122] FMA 105-01787-06 印尼外长与李代办谈话内容，12.11.1962. Content of conversation between Indonesian Foreign Minister and chargé de affairs Li, 77.

uprising" in Malaysia and Burma, and "overthrowing" and "controlling" Indochina'. [123] Indian propaganda, the MFA reported, 'attacks our country as "expansionism", "neo-imperialism", while India "defends" peace, democracy and freedom in Asia and the world, and India is fighting a war "against invasion and expansion, for the sake of Asia and the world".[124] Moreover, India 'slanders Mao as a "dictator", distorts and curses our country's socialist system, saying that our politics is "not democratic", economy has "serious difficulties", and the people are "enslaved"'.[125] The MFA also mentioned a new book called 'China Betrays India' which claimed that '"China and India's traditional friendship was coarsely destroyed by the Chinese government's expansionist policy"', describing how India 'supported China in international affairs' and how the Chinese government 'betrayed this friendship'.[126] The MFA reported on the Indian use of the Five Principles as well, stating that India 'slanders our country's use of the Five Principles as a diplomatic measure of expedience, whereas India saw them as moral guidelines for international relations'.[127]

Chinese diplomatic efforts were successful to an extent in bringing certain Afro-Asian nations around to the Chinese view. However, as the Foreign Ministry collected reactions from around the Afro-Asian world, responses favorable to China's position were perhaps less prominent than the shared concern by Afro-Asian leaders that China and India resolve the dispute and stem the tide of wreckage that the movement had become. In Iraq, the embassy reported on the view from this country including that, '[T]he Indian ambassador wanted Iraq to

[123] FMA 105-01638-01, 29.12.1962, 21-22.
[124] Ibid., 22.
[125] Ibid., 22-3.
[126] Ibid., 21.
[127] Ibid., 21.

support India, but they gracefully refused…', adding that 'Iraq is neutral and doesn't support either side', 'the relationship between India and American imperialism is going too far. It is very dangerous'.[128] In Indonesia, Subandrio explained that 'China is not only Asia's biggest country but one of the world's most powerful countries… If it were true that China, as Indian news propaganda reports, gives the impression of an "expanding sphere of influence", not only India would feel insecure but Indonesia would feel insecure', adding that 'Indonesia hopes that the China-India border can be solved peacefully through negotiations'.[129] Zhou was busy writing to Afro-Asian leaders, telling the Burmese Prime Minister, for example, a founding member of the Bandung Conference, that his 'just attitude and noble efforts which are not only helpful in advancing peaceful reconciliation between China and India, but also contribute to consolidation of Afro-Asian nations' unity and the protection of peace in Asia', adding that 'US imperialism is fanning the anti-China flames in order to realize its conspiracy of using Asians to beat Asians' and that 'The Indian government is slandering China's initiatives'.[130] The Foreign Ministry reported from around the world, noting that the Japanese government had a 'neutral attitude' towards the border conflict, but that 'this neutrality' was because the 'Japanese people already clearly see that India's opposition to China is the work of American imperialist manipulation'.[131] Ho Chi Minh opined that 'Nehru is of the capitalist class, and is also himself an aristocrat. Before Indian independence, he was fairly progressive, but the present Nehru is no longer the same. However, among India's ruling circles, he can still be considered a leftist'.[132] In Cuba,

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[128] FMA 107-00509-03, 对中印问题的一些反映, 16.11.1962. Reflections on the China-India question, 5-6.
[129] FMA 105-01787-06, 12.11.1962, 75.
[130] FMA 105-01781-01, 29.10.1962, 65.
[131] FMA 105-01638-01, 22.12.1962, 45.
[132] "Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Vietnam, 'Chairman Ho Discusses the Following Two Situations,'" November 1962, FMA 106-00729-04, 19-20, CWIHPDA.

China's stalwart friend in 'national liberation' Latin America, the Chinese Ambassador explained that,

> Our general policy towards the Sino-Indian border problem is: our people's main enemy is US imperialism, rather than reactionary Indian nationalism. We advocate solving the Sino-Indian border problem by peaceful and friendly negotiations. But we both had the experience that when facing capitalists [we] should not always make concessions; sometimes necessary struggle should be conducted. We fought back…We wish that Asian-African friendly countries will exert influence and prompt [Jawaharlal] to go back to the negotiation table…The fact that imperialist countries and capitalist countries support Nehru does not surprise us…Nehru colluded closely with imperialism. How can he be described as a peace-loving person?'[133]

Despite the best efforts of CCP diplomacy to discredit India and yet maintain the Afro-Asian movement – a similar concept to the CCP view of crushing India's government while maintaining 'friendship' with the 'Indian people' – the Afro-Asian sphere would not hold. China's simultaneous push to set the movement on a militant path and also to attack and discredit its Asian rival meant that, the Afro-Asian sphere would soon be broken apart.

6.7 The Curtain Drops: The Border War and the End of the Bandung World

CCP diplomacy during and after the Border War was a combined attempt to keep Western countries out of the conflict and its aftermath and to deliver a kind of knock-out blow to the 'Indian reactionary clique'. Zhou's communications with Afro-Asian leaders stressed that the West must not be allowed to intervene and that the conflict must be resolved within the Afro-Asian sphere, by Afro-Asian countries. Essentially, the PRC characterized the Border War as an Afro-Asian problem. As Zhou wrote to Sukarno in November 1962, 'I know that Your

[133] Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Cuba, 'Memorandum of Conversation between Ambassador Shen and Foreign Minister Raúl', 30.11.1962, FMA 111-00361-04, 1-6, CWIHPDA.

Excellency is concerned, and that you are willing to facilitate the cessation of the China-India bilateral border conflict, and restart peaceful negotiations… [I]n view of the seriousness of the situation along the China-India border, and to prevent the conflict from widening further, the Chinese government already made the decision for a unilateral ceasefire and retreat along the whole of the China-India border…'[134] Predictably, the Chinese Premier faulted India and also warned of the dangers of US involvement, writing to Sukarno four days later that: 'The Indian government not only failed to respond positively, but slandered China's initiatives [regarding negotiations]. American imperialists are increasing their activities in India, trying to disrupt serious negotiations between China and India, in order to realize their conspiracy of getting Asians to beat Asians and destroying the Bandung Spirit'.[135] A group of Bandung nations, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Indonesia, Ghana, and the UAR, met in December, 1962 and offered a proposal for resolution of the conflict known as the 'Colombo Proposals'.[136]

By now, Nehru had openly turned towards the United States, UK, France and Canada for military aid. Kennedy had discussed plans with his cabinet about offering to place India under the US 'nuclear umbrella'.[137] The PRC was adamant about resisting Western influence in the conflict with India, and found support on this count from other Asian nations. As the First Asian Department in the Foreign Ministry reported in November 1962, quoting Indonesian Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio, 'The China-India border conflict must rely on Afro-Asian countries for resolution, and cannot depend on the Western imperialist countries. In Afro-Asian regions,

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[134] FMA 105-01786-02, 23.11.1962, 21.
[135] Ibid., 37.
[136] S.K. Bhutani, 'Sino-Indian War, 1962 and the Role of Great Powers', Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 6.4, 2012, 109-124.
[137] See Ward, 'Strategic Implications'. Riedel shows that Kennedy's cabinet considered using nuclear weapons against China if necessary to defend India in 1963. Riedel, 167-8.

imperialists are still conspiring to sow discord…'[138] Subandrio also told Chinese diplomats that, 'The Chinese government's unilateral ceasefire and retreat increased China's prestige in Afro-Asia; if the China-India border question can be resolved in the future, this will further increase China's prestige and status', adding that 'We want to preserve the Afro-Asian group…'[139]

While CCP diplomatic documents do not explicitly discuss the Border War as a way of subduing India within the Afro-Asian movement, the continual disregard for Indian legitimacy and Indian interests is evident in China's reduction of Indian actions, including the receipt of aid from the West, to a characterization of the Indian government as part of an American plot. In Zhou's letter to Sukarno, for example, in November, 1962, the Premier used the whole range of Bandung era discourse to discredit India, deflect blame from China, and emphasize that the resolution must happen within the Afro-Asian nations: 'Imperialism and colonialism are trying to use this kind of border problem to create conflict among our newly independent nations. We must recognize that solving this border issue is an Afro-Asian issue, not an issue between Afro-Asian countries and imperialist countries… Those border problems are left over from history, therefore the New China is not responsible, nor are other newly independent countries'.[140] In response to Indonesian suggestions of bringing other Afro-Asian countries into negotiations, the MFA instructed its diplomats to tell Sukarno that Yugoslavia must be left out, as it was 'not Afro-Asian and might cause problems for Afro-Asia'.[141] The reference to Yugoslavia reveals another PRC intention within the Afro-Asian sphere. Yugoslavia's leader, Josip Broz Tito, was,

[138] FMA 105-01786-01, 27.11.1962, 1.
[139] Ibid., 2.
[140] Ibid., 53.
[141] FMA 105-01786-02, 23.11.1962, 20.

like Nasser, a friend of Nehru's and staunch supporter of the nonaligned movement.[142] China was working to diminish the influence of the nonaligned movement, Nehru's diplomatic magnum opus, within the Afro-Asian sphere. As such, the Chinese bid to wrest control of the Afro-Asian movement from India is subtle but evident. Zhou sought influence instead from leaders sympathetic to China.

Writing to Sukarno, Zhou beseeched the Indonesian leader, '[W]e fervently hope that Your Excellency will use your distinguished influence to move India to take corresponding measures in order to bring about bilateral negotiations regarding the border problem. Your Excellency's efforts will be a tremendous contribution to the preservation of Afro-Asian solidarity and Asian peace'.[143] In his letter to Afro-Asian leaders, Zhou stated that Afro-Asian leaders had 'worked hard' to find a peaceful solution to the border problem, and summarized the views of other Afro-Asian leaders as follows, 'They almost all recognize: the enemy of we Afro-Asian nations is imperialism and colonialism. Our nations face an urgent mission to change our backward economies. China and India are both large Asian nations and must peacefully resolve the border problem. We must resurrect China-India friendship, strengthen Afro-Asian unity, and together confront our main enemies'.[144]

At the heart of China's diplomatic overtures to Asia and Africa was the discrediting of both Indian policies and territorial claims. In a similar fashion to the way in which the CCP sought an India that would conform to Chinese strategy and interests on bilateral issues, the CCP

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[142] See Natasa Miskovic, Harald Fischer-Tiné, Nada Boskovska, *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi – Bandung – Belgrade*, (London, 2014).
[143] FMA 105-01786-02, 27.11.1962, 37-8.
[144] FMA 105-01786-02, 15.11.1962, 75.

offering of 'resurrecting of China-India friendship' had little regard for India's own self-determination or Indian interests themselves. China, if anything sought a kind of friendly India, which it could use, like other Afro-Asian nations, as an instrument against its enemies. India's failure to become this instrument or to harmonize ultimately with Chinese strategy and interests, turned India itself into an adversary. The India that existed, the India of Gandhi and Nehru's making, was not the one that China sought, neither in terms of Himalayan conflict, nor in terms of its foreign policy and objectives among Afro-Asian nations. Chen Yi's assessment, mentioned in Chapter Four bears repeating, as following the Border War, the Chinese Foreign Minister explained the Chinese hope that India would ultimately fit the program of CCP strategic interests, which encompassed not only China's internal objectives but its external policies as well. As Chen explained, 'India's leading force has yet to take shape and that India will ultimately be led by those who advocate anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism'.[145] Zhou's own thoughts on Nehru himself, as expressed to Soviet Ambassador Chervonenko in 1961 are worth quoting in full, as they reveal a full spectrum view of the Indian Prime Minister, his alleged objectives, and the desire for an India that would work within China's program for the world:

> [We] also must pay attention to the India issue. The United States is currently brazenly making use of India [while] India just shamelessly supports the US position. Hasn't your *Literary Gazette* [sic] already criticized NEHRU? This man is crafty [and] I am quite familiar with him. We have known each other for seven years. He is a very dishonest person. He can shamelessly tell lies [even in] the face of the truth. [He never keeps his word.] That which was said last time is already forgotten this time. His entire being is a bourgeois Rightist and a typical reactionary. He is a completely untrustworthy person. He would kowtow to the imperialists while still being arrogant towards us. The imperialists' farts he would treat as [the sweet] smell [of incense]. In all ways he seeks any opportunity to oppose China and fight the Indian Communist Party. He is really hostile towards our country. The only reason we do not give up on the India issue is that we hope to gain support from its people and win the trust of the neutral members of the ruling

[145] "Minutes of Conversation between Chinese Vice Premier Chen Yi and Indonesian Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio," January 1963, FMA 105-01792-07, 85-87 CWIHPDA.

clique. The [primary] reason is not because of fighting for NEHRU.[146]

As the Border War unfolded, China was simultaneously trying to bring about a second Bandung Conference with the support of other Afro-Asian nations, especially Indonesia. In a conversation with the Indonesian Ambassador during the Border War, in response to the Indonesia Ambassador's observations that India was 'worried that China will use Bandung II to attack India', Chen Yi assured him that, 'It is not advantageous for us to use Bandung II to attack and isolate India. If India uses the conference to attack us, we will still insist on a peaceful solution to the bilateral border conflict through peaceful negotiations…if India doesn't mention the China-India border dispute, we will not bring it up either', adding that Bandung II could 'strengthen the spirit of Afro-Asia unity, which could facilitate a peaceful solution to the China-India border conflict'.[147] The Chinese Foreign Minister added that, 'Nasser's proposals are biased towards India, therefore Nehru says, see Nasser is supporting us,' and that 'Nasser is no good, but he we don't blame him. He doesn't understand the concrete situation'.[148]

Bandung II was not to be. India resisted efforts to bring about a second conference, and eventually scuttled the idea altogether in 1964 by insisting upon inviting the USSR, which, by now in the throes of the Sino-Soviet split, meant that China had to give up the conference.[149] The nonaligned movement soon diverged from the Afro-Asian world as Mao developed his 'intermediate zone' and the PRC supported armed national liberation movements around the

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[146] 'Transcript of the Meeting Between Premier Zhou Enlai and Soviet Ambassador Chervonenko', May 1961, FMA 109-03757-01, 1-5, CWIHPDA.
[147] FMA 105-01789-07, 陈毅副总理接见印尼驻华大使苏卡尼谈话记录, 17.11.1962. Record of conversation between Vice Premier Chen Yi and Indonesian Ambassador to China Sukarni, 54.
[148] Ibid., 55-6.
[149] Garver, *Protracted*, 125-8.

world with new vigor.[150] The Border War drove China and India apart for the remainder of the Cold War, and with their split, the Bandung dream was over.

As the Bandung movement mutated into an armed liberation front, the rift between China and India grew deeper and Chinese hostility towards the Indian government within the Bandung world was fixed by the time the Border War arrived. Reflecting on the conflict with India in January 1963, Zhou said that,

> In Afro-Asian independence struggles, on which issue has India stood on the front line? It didn't support Algerian independence struggle, didn't support the Suez incident, it did not even recognize the Yemen question; didn't support [Prime Minister] Phouma in Laos; they did not support Indonesia's struggle to recover West Irian; they did not support Brunei's independence struggle; on the contrary, India sent troops to the Congo, serving as America's tool to oppress the Congo.[151]

Viewing the nonaligned movement as divergent from China's aims, Zhou stated that, 'At the nonaligned meeting, [India] exposed itself even more. Now India is no longer the Afro-Asian peaceful neutrality alliance chief (盟主), no longer the boss and squad leader of Afro-Asia. This is India's own doing, not the doing of others'.[152] Two months later, in conversations with Pakistan, Chen Yi, Liu Shaoqi and Zhou discussed the Afro-Asian sphere, with Zhou noting that, 'Don't divide Afro-Asian countries into alignment or nonalignment. As long as we protect and struggle for national liberation movements, we can unite'.[153] As such, the CCP had decided that Indian nonalignment and peaceful methods were a threat to their own intentions for the Afro-Asian sphere. Perhaps the most telling statement of all came in 1964, well after the China-India

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[150] See Van Ness, 59-61.
[151] FMA 105-01792-08, 11.1.1963, 91.
[152] Ibid.
[153] FMA 105-01842-04, 1963 年以来刘少奇主席、周恩来总理、陈毅副总理有关巴基斯坦的谈话摘要 2.3.1963. Summary of Chairman Liu Shaoqi, Premier Zhou Enlai, and Vice Premier Chen Yi's conversations regarding Pakistan since 1963, 26.

split was a definite feature in the landscape of international politics. The Chinese ambassador to Ceylon offered a post-mortem of India's position in a letter to Zhou, eighteen months after the war:

> With respect to the Sino-Indian boundary issue, since China's victory in the military counterattack, and having taken a series of proactive political measures, the situation is very favorable to China. We have completely taken the political initiative. Militarily, India suffered a great defeat. The true face of Nehru – big power expansionism, hypocrisy, deception, a reactionary colluding and seeking refuge with the United States – has been exposed. Politically, he is now isolated and having a difficult time. [India wants to] collude with the United States and the Soviet Union… While it is too weak to fight and cannot carry out any big tricks, [India] will continue to make small disturbances. [154]

The ambassador added, 'I fully support the spirit of the Premier's instructions from this morning. We should continue to attack India in Asia and Africa'.[155]

The CCP saw India as a threat not only to the core tenets of the New China, but also to its global foreign policy, which India was uniquely able to challenge. As the fellow creator of the Afro-Asian sphere, the second 'great power' in Asia, and a country whose heritage of struggle against foreign colonialism made up the very ingredients of the identity of the Afro-Asian movement, India was uniquely able to challenge the CCP. Importantly, the CCP recognized that the military balance was always in their favor, and thus, India's challenge to the New China was something that the CCP could readily address through a combination of diplomacy and military force. However, India's relationships with the superpowers, themselves the military and diplomatic arbiters of the global order during the period, presented an additional challenge for CCP leaders, who came to view India as a challenger not only to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the

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[154] 'Cable from Xie Kexi, "Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike's Attitude toward the Sino-Indian Boundary Issue and Her Inclinations"', 20.7.1964, FMA 105-01894-03, 39-41, CWIHPDA.
[155] Ibid.

New China and to the New China's revolutionary foreign policy. The CCP viewed India as a power that was able to form relationships with *both* the United States and the USSR, thus transcending the conventions of the Cold War, and exerting pressure on China through the use of the two dominant powers of the era. This will be the subject of the final chapter.

Chapter Seven – Nehru the Imperialist: CCP Views of India's Relations with the United States and USSR

7.1 Chapter Purpose

This chapter will examine China-India relations in the context of the superpowers. The collapse of China-India relations was tied in large part to the strategic and international relations dynamics of Asia during the early Cold War. Chinese fears of 'encirclement' were amplified by the simultaneous occurrence of the Sino-Soviet split and US military build-up in East and Southeast Asia, particularly in Taiwan, Japan, and Vietnam. India's ability to work cordially with both the US and USSR brought forth a US-Soviet competition for influence of its own, which included US attempts to bring India into an alliance system for the sake of containment of China and international Communism. Chinese perceptions of India's friendly relations with both superpowers was a significant factor in the CCP view of India as a hostile nation, and to the perception that China could become surrounded by hostile powers, including the US, USSR, and a superpower-backed India.

Examination of CCP views of India and the superpowers reveals a third significant dimension to the collapse of China-India relations and to China's changing view of India during the period. In addition to perceived threats to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and to China's international agenda, India was able, in the eyes of the CCP, to marshal the support of both the United States and the USSR in order to put pressure on China, thus mounting a major challenge

to the goals of the CCP revolution and the restoration of Chinese power by making use of the two greatest powers of the era.

This chapter will begin with an examination of CCP views of Indian relations with the USSR, as the CCP came to view India as a major threat to relations with its superpower protector – a view which was true, as China's conflict with India has been shown by scholars to be a significant episode in the collapse of Sino-Soviet relations. It will then proceed to examination of CCP views of Indian relations with the United States, as this relationship has been referred to throughout this thesis both in a Himalayan and in an Afro-Asian context, and CCP views of India as a partner to China's arch-enemy, the United States, were prevalent throughout CCP analyses of the international situation at the time, of grave concern to the CCP, and left little room for a view of Nehru's India as China's own friend and partner.

7.2 Introduction: China and the Superpowers; India's Major Role

The world in which China and India existed during their first decades as modern states was defined by the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. A treaty ally of the USSR, China had already fought American forces in the Korean peninsula. The Sino-Soviet alliance, as John Lewis Gaddis explains, was 'a means of discouraging what Mao believed to be an immediately dangerous adversary by seeking the protection of another great power that might someday become a danger but was not now'.[1] The creation of the alliance involved concessions

[1] Gaddis, 69.

to Joseph Stalin, which would allow the USSR 'to expand its influence in China for the purpose of deterring the Americans', though, as Gaddis explains, 'This is not to suggest that [Mao] intended for China to become a Soviet satellite, or anything like that. Mao at no point was prepared to yield control of either his party or his country to anyone'.[2]

By the late 1950s, as the Sino-Soviet split began, China and the USSR were beginning to compete on geopolitical issues. China's struggle with India within the Afro-Asian sphere was accompanied by a budding competition with the USSR in Africa and Asia, as Mao's desire for independence from the USSR became more evident.[3] China's struggle against the United States also took on global proportions as the PRC supported 'national liberation movements' in Africa and Asia, and waged a propaganda war against 'imperialism' across Asia, Africa and Latin America. Importantly, both superpowers desired India as a partner. Recognizing that Nehru's India wielded international influence, particularly among decolonizing and newly formed nations, the US and USSR competed both to gain influence in India and to counteract the influence that the other superpower could gain if India were to move closer to their side in the Cold War world.[4] Casting himself as a vigorous proponent of peace, Nehru maintained his policy of nonalignment, attempting to offer a third way in the Cold War world, both because he believed it was beneficial to world peace, and in order to offer a refuge for new nations that could quickly be swallowed up by the US-Soviet global competition.

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[2] Ibid.
[3] See Friedman, *Shadow Cold War*.
[4] For analysis of India's relations with the United States and USSR, see Ward 'Strategic Implications', Guha, *India After Gandhi*, and Robert H. Donaldson, *Soviet Policy toward India: Ideology and Strategy* (Cambridge, MA 1974). See also J.A. Naik, *Soviet Policy Towards India: From Stalin to Brezhnev,* (Delhi and Bombay, 1970), and Schlesinger, *Thousand Days*.

As the United States built alliances around the Asia-Pacific, signing defense pacts with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand, moving troops into Vietnam, and organizing covert operations with Tibetans in the Himalayas, Chinese fears of 'encirclement' were significant. Viewed within the larger context of US-Soviet competition, American bases and alliances in Asia were part of a far broader program to counter both China and the USSR, as both superpowers made use of alliances throughout Eurasia, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific, as well as covert operations, economic aid, propaganda and limited warfare globally, in their competition against one another. Indian nonalignment presented a challenge for both superpowers as they sought influence, and as China-India relations deteriorated, superpower competition for Indian partnership played a crucial role in Chinese estimates of Indian power and influence. In the period of 1958-62, Chinese leaders and analysts came to see Indian nonalignment as a deception, which allowed India to manipulate and use both superpowers against China. Chinese policy towards the superpowers, designed after the founding of the People's Republic as a policy of 'lean to one side' through alliance with the USSR, employed the Soviet Union as a protector against the United States.[5] However, by the late 1950s, with the Sino-Soviet split underway, Chinese leaders and Foreign Ministry officials saw India playing a crucial role in destroying Chinese relations with the USSR and serving American interests in Asia and around the world.

In the eyes of the CCP, India was able to challenge *both* dimensions of the protective shield that Chinese foreign policy sought to build during the 1950s. The CCP had used both the Socialist bloc and the decolonizing world in order to facilitate the success of its revolution and

[5] See Gaddis, 54-84, Chen, *Mao's China*, 49-85, and Westad, *Brothers in Arms*.

the restoration of Chinese power, and by the late 1950s and early 1960s, it considered India a challenger to both of these aspects of CCP strategy. Moreover, the CCP believed that India was acting in collaboration with the United States, the nation which both aspects of CCP strategy were designed to resist. India's unique relationships with the superpowers, as an independent nation with global influence, even during the early Cold War, gave it a unique position from which to challenge the CCP, both in Asia and Africa, as has been demonstrated, and by reaping the goodwill of both arbiters of global power in the period, as each of these powers pursued its own struggle with the CCP. India's challenge to China, was thus not only to do with internal and international issues as this thesis has discussed thus far, but as a major actor and influencer, in the CCP view, as the CCP sought a resurrection of Chinese power that put it into conflict with the superpowers themselves.

India's third and final role for the purposes of this thesis, is as a great power rival to the PRC, working on the world stage and invested with the power and goodwill of the two states that dominated the era. Aside from the two superpowers themselves, India was perhaps the most significant world power for the People's Republic. While French and British influence was global throughout the era, each existed as part of the Western bloc, which, while the PRC continually spoke of 'exploiting the contradictions' within the West, was largely unified in its opposition to Communism during the 1950s and 1960s. France and Britain were neither major antagonists nor significant partners to China in their own right. Japan also operated within an American strategic framework, and while CCP propaganda sought contradictions between the Japanese people and 'American imperialism', and both CCP and Soviet leaders feared the

resurrection of Japan, Japan was not a genuinely independent actor in these decades.[6] For India, however, it was the very independence that India sought on the world stage that elevated Indian power and influence, and by extension, India's strategic threat to China as relations collapsed.

The CCP's program for relations with India was one in which India would share and conform to Chinese interests, accepting the PRC program in the Himalayas, and following the PRC line in Afro-Asia. However, the totality of the Cold War world and its superpower rivalry offered a third significant dimension to China-India rivalry, as it was in this Cold War world that Indian independence could attract assistance and power far beyond China's ability to direct events. While China may have been able to vanquish India militarily in the Himalayas, and while China may have been able to deal decisive blows to Indian influence in the Afro-Asian sphere, in both of these realms, the balance of power had largely to do with China and India themselves. In the Cold War world, the balance of power did not. India's ability to act as a rival to China, sought after by the two most powerful states of the era, for reasons entirely of their own, gave India a position well outside of China's ability to influence its southern neighbor or shape its neighbors agenda towards the ends that it desired. The Cold War was an overarching framework in which China-India relations existed, and much as China sought a shield for itself in aligning with one superpower against the other, India threatened to break this shield and to take China-India relations into a realm in which China had much less influence overall. This was a final, prominent threat to the People's Republic. Beyond India's territorial claims, and its influence in Asia and Africa, India's appeal as an alternative to China in Asia for the states that wielded more power than China did, caused the CCP significant alarm.

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[6] See Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, on Japan in the early Cold War.

7.3 Overview: Changing Relationships and the Strategic Balance, 1958-62

By the late 1950s, Chinese leaders were dealing with a simultaneous increase in American activity in Asia and a decrease in Soviet protection as the Sino-Soviet split was underway.[7] Mao saw the US military presence in Vietnam as the focal point of the US containment policy in China, and wondered how China would counteract this 'imminent national security threat' in Southeast Asia, should relations with the Soviet Union collapse.[8] Moreover, the US presence in Asia had solidified since the Korean War, leading to a sense of 'enciclement' for the CCP. As Mao explained to Khrushchev in 1958: 'NATO, the Manila Pact and the Baghdad Pact organizations, these three groupings encircle us. Undoubtedly the nature of these groups is aggressive',[9] referring also to what he called a 'wall' of US alliances in Asia: '[T]he East has a wall. It is not formally connected, but it is connected in reality. Chiang Kai-shek, [South Korean President] Syngman Rhee, and Japan are a Northeast Asia bloc'.[10]

The Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958 was a turning point in Eisenhower's view of the CCP, causing the American President to turn from an 'inducement' strategy, designed to separate China and the USSR, towards a 'punishment' strategy.[11] This crisis was a turning point in China's relations with the USSR as well. As Luthi explains, it was 'Mao's deliberate challenge

[7] See Qing, 269-70.
[8] Ibid., 269.
[9] Conversation, Khrushchev, 2.8.1958, MZDNP 3, 400.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Qing, 287.

to Khrushchev's strategy of peaceful coexistence'[12] as well as being 'both a challenge to the United States and the USSR'.[13] The CCP's policy shift towards support for national liberation movements was thus accompanied by open confrontation with both superpowers as Mao sought to challenge the USSR's rapprochement with the United States.[14] Confrontation with the superpowers, like other aspects of the New China, was part of Mao's quest to push China to the forefront of global politics. As Sergey Radchenko explains, 'China could not be an economic or military power, but it could be a revolutionary power, and so an equal of sorts to other great powers…Mao worked toward one goal alone: China's – and his own – power'.[15] Speaking to Alexei Kosygin in 1965, Mao made clear his confrontational view of US-Soviet domination of world politics:

> The US and the USSR are now deciding the world's destiny. Well, go ahead and decide. But within the next 10-15 years you will not be able to decide the world's destiny. It is in the hands of the nations of the world, and not in the hands of the imperialists, exploiters, or revisionists.[16]

The CCP restoration of Chinese power, which relied upon a transformation of the world around it as well as an internal transformation of China, thus put the PRC in conflict with the superpowers themselves. Lorenz Luthi notes that Mao was challenging the USSR for leadership of the Socialist camp as early as 1959, explaining that 'Mao concluded that the Sino-Soviet alliance had lost much of its usefulness to China's security and economic development. Given his dislike of the revisionist Khrushchev, the Chairman decided that China should sail an

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[12] Luthi, *Sino-Soviet*, 347.
[13] Ibid.,112.
[14] Ibid., 247.
[15] Radchenko, 69.
[16] Ibid., 146.

independent course, designed to displace the current Soviet leadership at the helm of the socialist camp, in international affairs'.[17]

By the time that Kennedy entered the White House in 1960, Sino-Soviet relations were under serious strain. The United States and Beijing opened up tentative talks in Warsaw between ambassadors, but they achieved little, as China had, in the words of Lawrence Freedman, 'declared itself an implacable foe of American imperialism and, increasingly, of just about everybody else. Any rapprochement would have had to be on Beijing's terms…'[18] As China pursued a war of ideology with the USSR, open confrontation with the United States, and increasingly, confrontation with India as relations collapsed, Beijing's confrontation with all three countries brought with it an increasingly precarious situation for the PRC. The CCP's original strategy of countering 'the Washington-Taipei alliance through the Beijing-Moscow alliance'[19] began to break down at the end of the 1950s, as China pursued open confrontation with all in its quest for national resurrection.

Conceivably, India could have become China's essential partner as the balance began to shift towards confrontation with both superpowers. Qing Simei, for example, argues that Mao and Zhou 'considered Nehru's India to be China's great friend and thought China must work hard to keep this friendship', emphasizing the friendly side of overtures towards India in correspondence, even after the Tibetan Uprising in 1959, with Mao adding the following passage to a Foreign Ministry communication to Nehru: 'India is China's great friend, it has been so in

[17] Luthi, *Sino-Soviet*, 116.
[18] Freedman, *Kennedy's Wars*, 251.
[19] Qing 140.

the past more than one thousand years, and it will continue to be so in the following one thousand and ten thousand years. This is our firm belief'.[20] However, it is clear from internal documents that China's view of India was far more complex: CCP leaders indeed wanted a certain version of India – an India that would abide by China's actions and China's agenda – rather than the India that existed in reality. In the case of the superpowers, rather than looking towards India as an essential bastion of friendship as China's struggle against the superpowers intensified, the CCP saw India as complicit, a facilitator, in the turning of the strategic balance against the PRC, and this became one more element in the CCP's bill of grievances against India.

The centerpiece of China's concern in Asia was the United States, and the presence of the US military in Asia. The CCP saw these bases, correctly, as directed not just against China but against the USSR. Moreover, the PRC came to view India itself as a prized piece in an 'encirclement' strategy that the US was trying to build in Asia. As Zhou explained to North Korea's Kim Il Sung in 1962:

> The United States' plan is to create a crescent shaped encirclement; from South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, South Vietnam, Malaya, Thailand, Pakistan, India, and then west to include Iran and Turkey, this would encircle Soviet Asia. The current American actions in South Korea, South Vietnam, and Taiwan, as well as the activities of the 7th Fleet, are inseparable elements from its plan.[21]

The CCP also believed that the United States could be countered in Asia, however, especially through the coordination of Asian nations. As Zhou explained to Kim:

> However, the United States also admits that its plans are incomplete, that there are some gaps, and its allies are not united…The most important experience is that the United States' weakness emerges when socialist countries and nationally independent countries

[20] Ibid., 275.
[21] "Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and the Delegation of the North Korean Supreme People's Assembly," June 1962, FMA 109-03158-01, CWIHPDA.

> join together in condemning American military provocations. If we become tough, then they become soft.[22]

Zhou concluded that 'The United States' condition in Asia is vulnerable', and that China would benefit from open confrontation with the American superpower.[23]

The USSR was also working to counteract the US and broader Western presence in Asia, coordinating with the PRC to supply and assist the Vietnamese Communists in Southeast Asia, for example, and also providing military support to Indonesia.[24] However, as with the increased American interest in India, especially after Kennedy assumed office, Khrushchev also saw India as a prized partner for the USSR. As Sino-Soviet coordination broke down, and Soviet courtship of India increased, the Soviet Union's overtures to India began to take a prominent position in the disagreements between China and the USSR. Nikita Khrushchev's ill-fated visit to Beijing in 1959, where the Soviet leader came on the back of a successful trip to Washington as US-Soviet relations seemed to be warming, brought disagreements over India into the open. The Soviet leader expressed consternation at Beijing's handling of the emerging border crisis with India, asking Mao, 'Do you really want us to approve of your conflict with India? It would be stupid on our part', and adding that 'We believe that the events in Tibet are the fault of the Communist Party of China, not Nehru's fault'.[25] Khrushchev also proposed solving the boundary crisis by giving India the land that it claimed, as this would lead to rapprochement between China and India and thus open the path for unity between China, India, and the USSR. The Soviet Premier

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[22] FMA 109-03158-01 CWIHPDA.
[23] FMA 109-03158-01 CWIHPDA.
[24] David Easter, 'Active Soviet military support for Indonesia during the 1962 West New Guinea crisis', in *Cold War History*, Vol. 15:2, 2015, 201-220.
[25] "Discussion between N. S. Khrushchev and Mao Zedong," October 1959, CWIHPDA, Archive of the President of the Russian Federation.

presented the issue as follows, 'We…do not understand in particular your conflict with India. We had a dispute with Persia on border issues for 150 years. 3-4 years ago we resolved this issue by transferring to Persia some part of our territory. I take Lenin's example, and he gave to Turkey Kars, Ardahan and Ararat'.[26] Khrushchev made his own mistakes in understanding Chinese views of sovereignty and territorial integrity, as revealed by the fallout from the submarine proposal in 1958. A request to put an airbase in Kunming for the support of Vietnam against the United States in the mid-1960s would also touch this nerve.[27] The Soviet handling of the first China-India border clashes in 1959 did not help Sino-Soviet relationship.

As the PRC struggled for what it saw as its sovereignty against both the United and India, Chinese leaders expected to have the support of the USSR. However, Mao's handling of the Taiwan Straits crisis in 1958, which created a crisis that led to American consideration of the use of nuclear weapons, tested Soviet patience and deepened their differences, particularly as it contributed to Khrushchev's belief that the Chinese Communists were irresponsible and could not be trusted with nuclear weapons.[28] The Sino-Soviet meeting in 1959 reveals the beginning of a serious foreign policy dispute between China and the USSR, as Khrushchev expressed his beliefs on the larger consequences of the China-India conflict brewing in the Himalayas. Politburo member Mikhail Suslov explained that, 'The imperialists would have been happy, had the relations between India and China been spoiled', with Khrushchev adding that 'Nehru may go over to the USA', and that 'we should support Nehru, to help him stay in power'.[29] While Mao agreed to these points, explaining that 'events in Tibet and the border conflict are temporary

[26] October 1959, CWIHPDA, APRA
[27] Luthi, *Sino-Soviet*, 320-321.
[28] Radchenko, 12-13. See Chen Jian, *Mao's China*, 162-204 on the Taiwan Straits Crisis.
[29] October 1959, CWIHPDA, APRA

developments', Khrushchev turned Soviet policy towards the support of India, declaring 'neutrality' in the border conflict, a position which undoubtedly had more to do with competition with the United States than with consideration for Chinese sentiments regarding sovereignty. Khrushchev was trying to prevent US-India rapprochement as Indian conflict intensified with China, opening a path for deeper American courtship of India. To the PRC, however, Soviet support for India was a betrayal of the Sino-Soviet alliance,[30] and by the time of the Border War, at which point the Sino-Soviet conflict was out in the open, CCP leaders believed that India and the Soviet Union were actually working together to isolate and damage China.

CCP views of Indian relations with the United States were even worse. As CCP views of Indian activity in the Afro-Asian sphere reveal, the CCP believed that Nehru was working directly with the United States to counter CCP influence around the world, and when the Border War finally erupted, the concept of an American plot of 'using Asians to beat Asians' became the centerpiece of Chinese diplomacy. However, CCP conceptions of US-India cooperation were broader even than their imagined implications for the Afro-Asian order that China sought to build. Imagined cooperation between the US and India was both a threat to the PRC in Asia, and also a threat to combine power against China that could leave the PRC completely surrounded by hostile nations, and US influence. As such, while it is not explicit that CCP leaders sought to punish Nehru for cooperation with the US by way of the Border War, Nehru's alleged cooperation with America was a factor in China's changing view of India, China's sense of India as a serious threat to the PRC, and also may have been a factor in China's decision to 'teach India a lesson' in its punitive Himalayan war.

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[30] See Radchenko, 27-9. See also FMA 105-01272-01, CWIHPDA, on CCP assessments of the USSR, issued after the Border War.

7.4 India and the USSR: CCP Views of Soviet and Indian Collaboration and Betrayal

In 1958, CCP leaders expressed confidence in relations with both India and the Soviet Union, even speaking of combined strategic efforts between China, India and the USSR. At the beginning of the year, Zhou presented a paper on 'the world situation' at the Fifth meeting of the First National People's Congress (NPC), explaining that there had been a 'new turning point in world affairs, which is that the east wind pressures the west wind. The Soviet Union will surpass the US in the next fifteen years in all major industrial capacities and China will surpass Britain in steel and other important industrial products'.[31] Zhou also received the Soviet Chargé de Affairs that month and told him that the CCP 'agreed to the Soviet suggestion of establishing a nuclear weapon free zone in Asia and recognized that this suggestion could combine with Indian Prime Minister Nehru's suggestion to expand the zone of peace in Asia', adding that, 'We will inform the Indian Chargé de Affairs in China, please report this to the CPSU and the Soviet Government'.[32] Zhou met with India's Chargé de Affairs the same day to discuss the 'zone of peace'.[33] Meeting with CCP leaders and ambassadors by the Zhongnanhai swimming pool that year, Mao explained that the 'United States is a paper tiger', and that 'non-Communist countries like India, Indonesia, Syria, and Egypt can also assert their independence from the US'.[34] In short, the CCP seemed confident that it had built a united front against American 'imperialism' which included both India and the Soviet Union.

[31] Fifth Meeting, First NPC, 10.2.1958, ZELNP 2, 124.
[32] Meeting, Soviet Chargé de Affairs, 1.2.1958, ZELNP 2, 124.
[33] Meeting, Indian Chargé de Affairs, 1.2.1958, ZELNP 2, 124.
[34] Conversation, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Chinese ambassadors, 16.6.1958, MZDNP 3, 370.

By 1959, the situation had become more difficult. Speaking with the Soviet Chargé de Affairs in October 1959, following the first clashes between Chinese and Indian troops in the Himalayas, Mao explained that 'on the border with India, Indian capitalists are taking the opportunity to make a lot of noise and to carry out their own aims'.[35] The two discussed national liberation movements and the resurrection of Japanese and German militarism, appearing to coordinate on international strategy. However, ruptures in the Sino-Soviet split had begun by 1959. Khrushchev's visit to Beijing descended into a shouting match between the Soviet Premier and members of the Chinese Politburo, during a conversation that included a substantial exchange of views on India. In December 1959, a draft of Mao's speech on the 'International Situation' made his frustration with the Soviet Union clear. Referencing the Tibetan Uprising and China-India border, Mao wrote that: 'At the October talks [with Khrushchev], [we] resisted the friends' fallacies', and that 'Also in 1959, since March, our friends have been organizing a big anti-Chinese chorus together with the imperialists and reactionary nationalists…'[36] Mao's draft went on to attack Khrushchev directly: 'Khrushchev and his group are very naïve. He does not understand Marxism-Leninism and is easily fooled by imperialism. He does not understand China, to an extreme extent. He doesn't research [China] and believes a whole bunch of incorrect information...He panics over China. The panic has reached its extreme. He has two main fears: imperialism and Chinese Communism'.[37] When Zhou and Chen Yi met with the Soviet Ambassador that month, Zhou expressed his belief that 'making concessions to Nehru without principle would only push him to the right', noting that, while the '[USSR and CCP] have different views on some issues and can argue and exchange opinions internally…we shouldn't

[35] Meeting, Soviet Chargé de Affairs, 14.10.1959, MZDNP 4, 213.
[36] 'Mao Zedong, Outline for a Speech on the International Situation', December, 1959, 599-603. CWIHPDA.
[37] Ibid.

make differences public'.[38]

PRC internal reporting in 1959 was more explicit. Noting in November that 'the Indian government and rightists are still against China' with regard to the border, the Chinese Embassy in Moscow reported that,

> [T]he Soviet Union still maintains a neutral stance towards the dispute…The Soviet media has not expressed any attitude toward our new proposal…the Soviet Union is still aggressively gaining the support of India. The leadership of the Soviet Union sang high praise of Nehru in the cable it sent in celebration of his birthday…It also attached great significance to Nehru's many talks on India maintaining the policy of nonalignment.[39]

The report noted that central newspapers 'published several articles…about India's love for peace and friendship between the Soviet Union and India', and that with regard to the border, 'We estimate that the Soviet Union will continue to maintain a neutral position regarding the Sino-Indian border disputes and its hopes that the border dispute can be settled through compromises from both the Chinese and the Indian sides'.[40] With regard to Soviet policy overall, the report explained that 'The Soviet Union's policy of one-sidedly emphasizing unity with India will stimulate the ambitions of Indian rightists and become an excuse to provoke tensions between China and the Soviet Union. It is going to generate a negative impact on the Sino-Indian relationship and Soviet-Indian relations'.[41]

In 1959, Chinese disagreements with India and with the USSR began to intertwine, leading eventually to a concept of India-Soviet collusion directed against the PRC. By the

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[38] Meeting, Soviet ambassador, 10.12.1959, ZELNP 2, 272.
[39] "Cable from the Chinese Embassy in the Soviet Union, 'The Soviet Union's Attitude towards the Sino-Indian Border Dispute'," November 1959, FMA 105-00946-04, 46-47 CWIHPDA.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.

following year, Mao spoke of simultaneous confrontation with India and both superpowers – standing against Khrushchev and also against an 'anti-China wind' coming from Nehru and America.[42] Khrushchev, in his memoirs expressed great consternation with Mao, and Mao blamed tensions with the USSR on Khrushchev's failure to 'understand China'.[43] In the eyes of the CCP, Nehru was no better, and it was the PRC that faced arrogance and rejection. As Liu Shaoqi explained in a meeting with Mao, Chen Yi and Zhou after the Border War

> We are not arrogant toward reasonable people, who treat us equally and discuss issues seriously with us, totally not arrogant. But towards the US, UK, and India, we must be a bit arrogant, because standing in front of us, they always feel they are a head taller than us. I say no, we are the same height, we listen to your opinions and you should listen to ours. Thus, they say we are arrogant... We cannot be a head shorter than them. We must be just as tall.[44]

China's quest to prove its equality among these powers would soon result in the destruction of its most important relationships and in the use of force against India. By the end of the Border War, China would be even further on the road towards isolation from the major powers of the world, and by 1965, CCP propaganda spoke openly of an 'Anti-China Holy Alliance' made up of the United States, the USSR, Japan, and India.[45]

The period of collapse in China-India relations also marked the beginning of CCP challenge to the USSR in Asia and Africa. As Jeremy Friedman points out, 'The PRC, a non-white, non-European, primarily agrarian nation which had suffered tremendously from the depredations of imperialism, managed to rally others in its challenge to the Soviet agenda and revolutionary model, and, for a while, it threatened Soviet influence in Asia, Africa, and to some

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[42] Politburo expanded meeting, 17.1.1960, MZDNP 4, 310.
[43] 'Mao, Outline for a Speech', CWIHPDA.
[44] FMA 105-01792-08, 11.1.1963, 90.
[45] Luthi, 336.

degree in Latin America as well'.[46] This challenge, in which as we have seen, the CCP vigorously confronted India for leadership in the Afro-Asian sphere, had much to do with China's relationship with the superpowers as well. As Friedman explains, 'In part, the Chinese leadership felt compelled to mount this challenge in order to build its own global constituency to protect it from American aggression and Soviet betrayal'.[47] While Friedman has explored Sino-Soviet competition in the developing world in depth, it is worth pointing out the tensions that China-India conflict was creating for the USSR in its own bid to gain influence in the Afro-Asian world at the expense of the United States. A Soviet statement from December 1959, explaining the Soviet position of neutrality in the China-India clashes that took place that year, explains Soviet disapproval of CCP conflict with India in terms of larger Soviet objectives in the developing world. The USSR apparently concluded that Chinese policy towards India was damaging to the Communist position in Afro-Asia overall, and playing into the hands of the United States: '[E]nemy propaganda did everything to exploit the Sino-Indian conflict for the purpose of disruption of the Soviet peace initiative, to lay blame for China's actions on the Soviet Union', adding that 'The Chinese comrades insist that they are guided by the considerations of self-defense and prestige of their country, that the truth and justice is on China's side'.[48] The Soviet report explained went on:

> What did aggravation of relations between China and India and other foreign policy gaffes of the Chinese comrades lead to? They led to a diminution of the international prestige of the PRC, to the weakening of her positions in Asia, to an increased tendency, in a number of countries of Asia, to ally oneself with Western powers, with the USA despite strong hatred among the peoples of Asian countries towards their perennial

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[46] Friedman, 5-6.
[47] Friedman, 6.
[48] "Draft Report, 'On the Trip of the Soviet Party-Governmental Delegation to the PRC,' by M. Suslov to CC CPSU Presidium for Presentation to a Forthcoming CC CPSU Plenum (excerpt)," December 1959, CWIHPDA.

> enemies – the colonizers.[49]

The report concluded that, 'We are getting the impression that, while recognizing formally the principle of peaceful coexistence between the two global systems, the Chinese comrades tend to regard this principle just as a temporary tactical maneuver'.[50]

As such, the strategic moorings that once held the USSR and China in alliance were coming undone. The conflict between China and India, and what the Soviet Union saw as inept or incomprehensible handling of it by the CCP, was causing major difficulties as the USSR pursued its own strategy towards Asia and the CCP wrestled with both India and the USSR. As the USSR saw it, China was botching the Afro-Asian movement by going its own way against India. In contrast the USSR saw engagement with India as essential to its strategic goals:

> Nehru is highly influential in Asia. In addition to India's 400 hundred million people, many Asian countries wish to listen to Nehru…The East-West Summit Conference will be held soon. Winning Nehru's support for the Soviet Union will put the Soviet Union in a fairly advantageous position. Nehru can become an ally against Eisenhower, Nixon, Herter, and Rockefeller…the international balance of power will undergo major changes if international peace is maintained for the next five years.[51]

Frictions between China and India were indeed causing not only frustration for the USSR, but a change in the USSR's idea of China as a reliable strategic partner. The USSR saw great potential in a partnership with India, and also saw the urgency of not allowing India to move towards the United States, an outcome which the CCP was both accomplishing, and an idea that the CCP convinced itself had already taken place. While the Soviet Union's desire for a united front made

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[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.
[51] "Meeting Minutes between Zhang Weile and Soviet Deputy Director of the Far Eastern Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs R. Sh. Kudashev," February 1960, FMA 105-01001-03, CWIHPDA.

of themselves alongside India and China may have been neither possible nor realistic, China's worldview, and China's view of India, was increasingly becoming a preventative factor. As Soviet diplomacy lobbied for China and India to solve their border dispute peacefully, working to facilitate negotiations between Zhou and Nehru in 1960, the PRC increasingly saw India as using the advantage of Soviet interest in India as leverage against China. In a meeting in February 1960, two months ahead of the Zhou and Nehru talks in New Delhi, the Soviet Attaché in India explained to the Chinese Embassy that Khrushchev claimed ' "China and India are two brothers, and I believe the two of you have sufficient wisdom to handle it" '.[52] The Chinese Embassy cable explained that 'The general opinion at yesterday's press conference was that Nehru does intend to meet with Premier Zhou for talks, because as far as Nehru is concerned there is no other way out', adding that '[T]he Indian side has been deliberately building up an atmosphere and momentum [sic], attempting to shake off its passivity and isolation and, by doing so, pressure China into holding talks its way'.[53] Reporting from the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi claimed that India's 'ruling clique' was 'being actively pulled at and bought by American imperialists, with a foreign policy leaning towards the right, opposing China, leaning towards America, and splitting Sino-Soviet relations (分化中苏关系)'.[54] The report also noted that 'the USSR began selling oil to India this year, and helicopters'.[55]

The Chinese Embassy in Moscow showed a perceptive understanding of Soviet policy towards India, explaining that 'the Soviet Union has a very high estimation of India's

[52] "Cable from the Chinese Embassy in India, 'Soviet Attaché in India Tells Us that Nehru Initiated Discussion of Border Issues in Nehru-Khrushchev Talks'," February 1960, FMA 109-02087-02, CWIHPDA
[53] FMA 109-02087-02, CWIHPDA
[54] FMA 105-01001-09, 1.
[55] FMA 105-01001-09, 9.

international influence (国际影响)', that 'the Soviets are doing their utmost to gain support from India and other Southeast Asian neutral countries', in an effort both to 'offset Eisenhower's influence in India and Southeast Asia' and to 'solidify India and other countries' nonalignment, continuing to give favorable economic and technological support, so that they can continue to be neutral'.[56] The Embassy noted also that the 'Soviets' neutral, conciliatory position on China-India relations still has not changed', adding a day later that 'Khrushchev's visit right after Voriloshov's appears to be the high-tide of recent India-Soviet relations'.[57] Regarding Voroshilov's trip, a month before Khrushchev's, the Chinese MFA reported that 'India is using the visit to promote its position internationally and to put pressure on China. The Indian newspapers are trumpeting about Eisenhower, Voroshilov and Khrushchev's visits, actually placing India on the meeting agenda for leaders of great powers, a victory for Indian diplomacy', adding that 'Indian papers are distorting the content of [Voroshilov's] speech…that the USSR doesn't support China, sowing discord by saying that what China does to neutral Asian countries is bad for Soviet policy'.[58]

In contrast to its false notions of US-India collusion, the Chinese MFA was perceptive in assessing the realities of Sino-Soviet disagreements over India. For the superpowers, partnership with India had become a prize of its own. As the relationship between China and the USSR decayed, the CCP found itself caught between fresh Soviet interest in India and deepening Soviet frustration with the PRC, itself the product of Mao's challenge to the USSR for leadership and influence in the global revolutionary movement, which by the late 1950s and early 1960s

[56] FMA 105-01001-02, 5-6.
[57] Ibid., 8 and 11.
[58] Ibid., 3.

comprised not only socialism but the anti-imperialism movement which the CCP had forged out of the Afro-Asian movement created by India and China together.[59]

The Foreign Ministry, reporting from both India and the Soviet Union, not only saw India as a potent rival and challenger for the favors of its superpower protector, but also saw this challenge as a kind of zero sum game, in which India was using its influence to reduce China's position with the USSR. Another series of Foreign Ministry reports on Soviet interactions with Asia in 1960 described a blooming India-Soviet partnership, explaining that, 'there was an air force fighter escort for the Indian President in the USSR, which has never happened before in the past. It was a very grand reception', that '[T]he Soviets also sent people to India to compete with the British and Americans to sell helicopters to the Indian Air Force', and noting that the two countries had signed a joint oil exploration agreement.[60] The MFA explained that 'One reason that India pulls close to the USSR is to gain economic benefits; even though it primarily sells its people's interests and depends on America, it will not relax one bit from Soviet aid', adding that '[C]learly, India's intensified pulling at the USSR is closely connected to it's anti-China policy'.[61] The view from the Chinese Foreign Ministry was that a partnership was blooming at China's expense and that India was wielding this newfound influence with the Communist superpower in diplomatic combat against the PRC. As such, the perceived Indian threat to China was not only on its borders, to its identity as a newly risen country, and in the Afro-Asian sphere where China sought influence, but on an even larger scale on the world stage, in India's ability to deploy the power of the USSR against the PRC, not only through attacking China's most

[59] See Friedman, 25-100, for Sino-Soviet divergences in the developing world from 1956-63.
[60] FMA 109-02092-03, 96-7.
[61] Ibid., 98.

important alliance, but by having the capacity to turn this ally against China.

Sino-Soviet relations began to deteriorate in serious measure in 1960. As the USSR's 1959 'peaceful coexistence' policy towards the US had left Beijing isolated and with less of a voice in larger scale strategic politics, Khrushchev responded to Chinese criticisms by withdrawing all Soviet advisors from China, a move which Sergey Radchenko notes that Khrushchev 'would regret for years to come'.[62] However, it was not Khrushchev's intention to be left alone with India upon the deterioration of relations with Beijing. The Soviet leader tried in 1960 to effect reconciliation between the two Asian nations, and indicated to Chen Yi in 1961 that he wanted to improve relations with China.[63] There was incompetence on Khrushchev's part, as Radchenko notes, as the Soviet leader 'often acted like a bull in a china shop, only to bite his nails later'.[64] Moreover, Mao's personal acrimony towards Khrushchev played a substantial role in the split, as the Chinese leader saw Khrushchev as a weaker leader than himself, worked to free the PRC from the position of junior partner, and sought achieve an unlikely kind of parity with his superpower partner.[65]

Following the Border War itself, China-India fall-out continued to drive a wedge between China and the USSR. A Foreign Ministry report on 'The New Situation on the China-India Border' explained in a section on Soviet reactions to the Border War that, Khrushchev's neutral position 'is really to support India and oppose China', adding that, 'All kinds of Soviet airplanes

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[62] Radchenko, 14.
[63] See Luthi, 198.
[64] Radchenko, 14.
[65] See especially Luthi, *Sino-Soviet*, on Mao's relationship with Khrushchev. See Luthi and Radchenko on Mao's discontent as junior partner to the USSR.

and winter equipment are being delivered to the Indian front. Moreover, the Indian side has repeatedly asked for MiGs to be delivered on time'.[66] The report also noted that China's criticism of Khrushchev's 'adventurism and surrenderism' during the Cuban Missile Crisis led Khrushchev to 'openly attack China' and 'openly criticize our position on the China-India border question'.[67] Interestingly, the Foreign Ministry believed that the United States had come to approve of Soviet support for India. In the Foreign Ministry view, India had managed to bring both superpowers to its aid against China:

> [Kennedy] supports India taking Soviet aid because close "India-Soviet relations" leads to "tense Sino-Soviet relations": in the past, America was unhappy about India receiving Soviet MiGs, afraid that India would rely too much on the USSR. After the Sino-Soviet conflict intensified, the American government and media turned towards supporting India taking Soviet aid, even "minimal military use" MiGs are okay. Harriman publicly expressed doing this "not only benefits India, but also benefits our interests…if India and Moscow split, Moscow will lean towards Beijing again".[68]

In addition to the idea of American support for India, the MFA viewed India and the USSR as cooperating closely, stating that India was using Sino-Soviet differences, nonalignment and the Border War to its advantage in dealings with the USSR. The report stated that, 'Nehru's exploitation of Sino-Soviet divergence (中苏分歧) has become even more bold', explaining that 'Nehru is tightly seizing and holding Khrushchev and not letting go…doing the utmost to widen Sino-Soviet divergences, in order to isolate China, and uphold its goal of maintaining the cloak of Indian "nonalignment" and reaping economic benefits'.[69] Moreover, the MFA reported that the USSR was *using India against China,* for reasons of its own:

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[66] FMA 105-016380-01, 29.12.1962, 61.
[67] Ibid.
[68] FMA 105-016380-01, 29.12.1962, 62.
[69] Ibid.

> [S]oon after the USSR submitted to the USA and withdrew its missiles, Khrushchev's tone began to change; public opinion no longer mentioned the McMahon Line… [Khrushchev] took a step towards publicly attacking our country, on one hand instigating [Eastern Bloc countries]…openly taking India's side in the Supreme Soviet meeting (最高苏维埃会议), slandering us as responsible for the China-India border conflict, and on the other hand, intensifying activities to assist India…[70]

The FMA reported also that the USSR and India signed 'five or six' industrial agreements between November and December, including for oil extraction, shipping, and machinery.[71] The contrast to the USSR's withdrawal of aid and advisers from China, though not mentioned in the report, is notable.

When Zhang Hanfu met with the Soviet Ambassador on October 22, just after the start of the Border War, he presented the Chinese official line, stating that,

> What is important is that India has encroached upon Chinese territory and China has not encroached upon Indian territory…India is the aggressor and China has been forced to defend itself and defend its own territory…It was India that rejected peace talks to solve the Sino-Indian border issue, while China has consistently adhered to a peaceful solution to this issue'.[72]

The USSR voiced support for China's position with regard to border and the McMahon Line in a memo issued the next day: 'We fully support your desire to solve the border dispute with India through negotiations…We understand your position that the McMahon line is not an established boundary. It is a painful historical legacy…England drew and redrew the map of the area without

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[70] Ibid., 61.
[71] Ibid.
[72] "Memorandum of Conversation between Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu and Soviet Ambassador Stepan Chervonenko," October 1962, FMA 109-03804-02, CWIHPDA

considering the national interests of ethnic groups or historical and national characteristics'.[73] But the memo defended Soviet policy towards India, explaining that Soviet military aircraft to India 'will not affect the balance of power [because] these planes have no military significance'; the Soviet intention was to 'prevent India from becoming closer to the imperialist countries and, in particular, to prevent India's military clique from becoming closer to the militarists in the United States and other Western countries,' adding the 'hope' that the 'border dispute will be solved in a reasonable manner'. [74] Working with Indian memoirs, Lorenz Luthi explains that Khrushchev, in his meetings with India, may have voiced his support for India over the CCP on certain issues, for example rejecting CCP accusations of Indian 'expansionist ambitions' and 'Chinese claims of Indian attempts to turn Tibet into a buffer zone' in 1959, as Soviet aid to India continued on a substantial scale.[75] In his own memoirs, the Soviet leader claimed that Mao 'started the [border] war out of some sick fantasy' that he could 'dictate to the Soviet Union' what its foreign policy should be.[76] Beneath the surface of Sino-Soviet encounters, Soviet support of India was producing deep troubles for the relationship with China.

China's diplomacy around the Socialist world spoke to the conflict between the USSR and China over India. As China's Ambassador to Cuba explained just ahead of the Border War in 1962, 'The USSR is selling India war planes at a very low price. It is clear that this action doesn't fit international proletarianism'.[77] Following the war, Sino-Soviet exchanges became

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[73] "Soviet Reply to the Memorandum of Conversation between Premier Zhou Enlai and the Soviet Ambassador on the Sino-Indian Border Issue on 8 October 1962," October 1962, FMA 109-03804-02, CWIHPDA
[74] Ibid.
[75] Luthi, *Sino-Soviet*, 142-3.
[76] Luthi, 144.
[77] FMA 111-00361-03, 12.10.1962, 3.

even more heated. An encounter with a Soviet Chargé de Affaires at a Czech embassy event deserves to be laid out in full. The Soviet diplomat stated that '[T]he China-India Border War is bad for socialist countries, bad for peace-loving countries and bad for countries striving for independence. It only benefits imperialism', eliciting the following defense from the Chinese diplomat:

> We made many concessions, continually exercised patience, struggled for a peaceful solution, but India was still attacking us, so we could only be forced to fight back…Nehru was not carrying out a neutral policy, in the China-India border conflict, now many Afro-Asian countries, especially Asian countries all understand that the blame is with India, not us.[78]

The Chinese diplomat blamed the USSR for supporting India at the expense of China:

> …India took American imperialist weapons to attack Socialist China and you say India is a neutral, peaceful country, carrying India on a pedestal; this is clear support for India and opposition to us…You gave India weapons. India used the airplanes that you gave them, and trucks to transport troops to the front to attack us. The whole world knows this. We are very indignant about these things…[D]oing this gave India a great deal of support politically.[79]

Moreover, in the Chinese diplomat's view, the *USSR was to be blamed for India's policy towards China* with regard to the border: 'Nehru is stubborn. He doesn't want a peaceful solution. You are partially responsible'.[80] The Soviet diplomat defended the Soviet policy towards India, explaining Soviet MiG deliveries in terms of strategy towards the United States: '[I]f America wants to help India build a [warplane] factory, they can bring it all very quickly to India; don't tell me that letting America do this would benefit socialism'.[81] The response from the Chinese diplomat reveals the extent to which a CCP sense of cooperation between India and

[78] FMA 109-03804-04, 12.12.1962, 82-3.
[79] Ibid., 84.
[80] Ibid.
[81] Ibid.

the superpowers could play out in a live interaction: 'America does this because America is imperialist. You are Socialist! The question is not how many years [to build a factory], but that India feels that it not only has America's support but the support of the USSR'.[82] The final exchange includes an interjection from a Czech diplomat, as follows:

> China: It is not we who are disgraceful. Disgraceful is losing the class position, betraying proletarian internationalism, betraying Leninism. This is disgraceful to the party of Lenin!
>
> USSR: [C]omrade, please calm down…you must believe us, we would never betray proletarian internationalism and would never betray Leninism…
>
> Czech: [I]n the past you had a good assessment of the USSR. How can you equate the USSR with America now?[83]

Copies of this exchange were sent to Mao, Liu, Zhou and other members of the top leadership. It is not the first time that a member of China's insular and politically conformist Foreign Ministry became embroiled in an embarrassing spat. Chen Yi himself descended into a shouting match with Khrushchev in 1959, also in a conversation about India, prompting the Soviet Premier to utter his famous lines 'You should not spit from the height of your Marshal title. You do not have enough spit. We cannot be intimidated.'[84] And a Chinese Ambassador had to be pulled off the runway in Laos in 1962 where he was chasing down the Prime Minister in an effort to receive recognition for the PRC instead of the ROC.[85] The episode reveals the depth of CCP feelings of betrayal and isolation – brought on by the belief that India had both superpowers on its side – as well as the impact that India was having on China's most important relationship. While members of the CCP believed that India was exploiting its relations with the USSR

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[82] Ibid.
[83] FMA 109-03804-04, 12.12.1962, 85.
[84] October 1959, CWIHPDA, APRA.
[85] Liu, 92-3.

against China, the damage came as much from China's belief in this as from Indian and Soviet actions. Importantly, the episode also reveals the pervasiveness about views of India within the Foreign Ministry itself. While the reporting and cables from around the world speak to a shared view of India, it is clear that the view of India as a strategic danger to China was affecting diplomatic business itself, and that the Foreign Ministry, under tight control of the Central leadership, was a place in which these views proliferated, failed to remain internal, and found their way into China's foreign work and relationships. There was a cost to Mao's confrontation with all three countries. The result would be Chinese isolation from the USSR, US, and India for the remainder of the decade.

In reporting on the USSR position in early 1963, the Foreign Ministry's post-mortem on the conflict gave an analysis of the Soviet position on the China-India conflict from a 1959 starting-point, explaining that, 'The open differences between China and the Soviet Union over the Sino-Indian boundary question began with a statement released by TASS on 9 September 1959. Afterwards, both sides contacted with each other for more than thirty times on the border issue. When India launched a massive offensive against China in October 1962…Khrushchev again loosened his tongue at a session of the Supreme Soviet, openly attacking China'.[86] Referring, presumably, to the period between 1959 and the Border War, the Foreign Ministry explained that, 'The Soviet Union not only took an open stance politically, favoring India and inhibiting China, but also expanded its economic aid to India and sold aircraft and military equipment to India, giving direct encouragement and support to India's opposition to China'.[87]

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[86] "Report from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'The Soviet Union's Stance on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question and Soviet-Indian Relation'," April 1963, FMA 105-01272-01 CWIHPDA
[87] Ibid.

The Foreign Ministry added that,

> The main mistaken arguments of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) were as follows: The Nehru regime represented the national interests of India and persisted with nonalignment, while China changed its policy of "unity and struggle" towards India, pushing India towards the West; and the Sino-Indian border conflict was provoked by China and stemmed from China's "nationalism".
>
> Our side emphatically pointed out that the conflict had been deliberately provoked by India for the purposes of opposing China, attacking the Communist Party internally while striving for increased American aid externally, and countering the impact of the reforms in Tibet. In this serious international class struggle, CPSU outwardly adopted a neutral stance, but in reality sided with capitalist India and criticized socialist China, which was unprecedented.[88]

The report claimed that 'The Soviet Union's stance was not neutral at all; rather, it was engaged in intervention, supporting and encouraging India's opposition to China', declaring that the USSR was 'in a serious breach of the provisions of Article III of *The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance*', and adding that 'The CPSU and Soviet government supported and encouraged the Indian government's opposition to China on all three fronts – political, military and economic, giving aircraft and money to India to beat its brother China'.[89] As such, it was not only the perceived American policy of 'using Asians to beat Asians', but a perceived Soviet policy of using India to beat China that the PRC faced when dealing with the superpowers.

The collapse of Sino-Soviet relations had many factors, and importantly, the conflict with India was one of them.[90] The CCP believed that India was able to exploit its relations with the USSR in order to isolate China and receive Soviet support, and this perception itself contributed

[88] FMA 105-01272-01 CWIHPDA
[89] Ibid.
[90] See both Luthi and Radchenko on India's role in the Sino-Soviet split.

to tensions with the USSR, becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. China's fear of Indian influence over the superpower that, from the beginning of CCP strategy-making, was meant to protect China, was bad enough. A CCP belief in India's direct service of the United States was even worse in the Chinese official mind.

7.5 India and America: CCP Views of US-India Collaboration

During the collapse of China-India relations from 1958-62, CCP views of India took a dramatic turn from a view of India as an essential partner in keeping America out of Asia to a view of India as a 'tool' and 'little helper' of the United States, both in Asia and around the world. As described in earlier chapters, CCP strategy involved bringing India in as a partner in order to counter the American presence in Asia as the United States increased its strategic commitment to the region following the Korean War. The Chinese leadership was concerned about strategic encirclement, which helps to explain views of India. As described, soon after the founding of the PRC, the CCP was active in four key strategic regions in Asia: in 1950, the PLA entered Tibet in order to incorporate the Himalayan region into the PRC, sent military advisors to Vietnam, and entered into war with US-led United Nations troops in the Korean peninsula. While a planned invasion of Taiwan was postponed due to the outbreak of war with America, Taiwan remained an unresolved 'internal affair' for the CCP leadership, leading to two crises in the Taiwan Straits in the 1950s. As the PRC struggled for security in its immediate strategic region, Mao considered the USSR to be its primary guarantor of protection against possible American invasion.

CCP leaders and diplomats spoke openly with India about encirclement concerns and frankly explained the desire to maintain a friendship with India in order to allow China to concentrate on resisting the United States presence in Asia. This discourse with India persisted even as the border dispute came to light and tensions increased in the Himalayas. As Mao wrote in a draft message to the Indian Foreign Secretary in May 1959,

> India is China's good friend. For over a thousand years it has been this way…[T]he Chinese peoples' enemies are in the East; American imperialism in Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, has many military bases, all of which are pointed at China. China's major attention and direction of struggle is towards the East, on the West Pacific region, on an evil American imperialist invasion, but not on India, and not on Southeast Asia and South Asian Countries… Our main enemy is the United States. India did not join SEATO. India is not our enemy but our friend. China is not stupid like this – to make an enemy of America in the East and in the west to make an enemy of India.[91]

Zhou made similar points in 1959, speaking with the Ceylonese ambassador, explicitly mentioning the desire to keep a friendly southwest border: 'we want the Southwest borders to be friendly borders, not tense. This includes Afghanistan, Nepal, and Pakistan, not just India'. [92] Even as the CCP concluded that Indian leadership were 'heirs to the British Empire', they saw the inherent dangers in hostilities with India in terms of their larger struggle with the United States. As Mao stated in 1959, blaming 'reactionary groups' for Indian policy overall, 'Nehru's nonalignment policy is something that we welcome. The current policy [presumably towards Tibet and the border, or of 'lean toward America' as expressed in internal documents] does not benefit Nehru…Reactionary groups want to get close to America, want to join SEATO and want to surround us…So we really want to make peace with Mr. Nehru and solve the problem in a

[91] Draft letter to Indian Foreign Secretary, 14.5.1959, MZDNP 4, 49-50.
[92] Meeting, Ceylonese ambassador, 19.9.1959, ZELNP 2, 254.

friendly manner. We don't want India to fall into America's hands'.[93] As such, CCP efforts to negotiate with India over the border in 1960 were likely to be linked at least in part to the larger concern over India's possible relationship with the United States. Mao's 'welcome' of Indian nonalignment clearly fits the strategic picture of a desirably neutral India in the southwest as China concentrated its efforts on Taiwan, and towards the strategic regions in which it was already or had already engaged, that is Korea and Southeast Asia.

In 1961, during a meeting between Ambassador Partharathy and Zhang Wenji, the Chinese diplomat reiterated the position that the PRC did not want a hostile India on its Southwest, again linking this to the desire for peace: 'Ambassador Pan mentioned [that]…our enemies are in the east…India is a great nation with a long history; why would we want to offend India? No matter what, one can see that disharmony between the two countries has no advantages for either side. China has a saying: "when the snipe and the clam grapple, it is the fisherman who stands to profit." '[94] However, despite the outward soliciting for peace, no doubt a genuine desire in the context of strategic encirclement, the view of India inside the Chinese government had already darkened, not only with a view to Tibet and the Himalayas, but with a regard to the international encirclement that the PRC sought to intercede. Importantly, this involved not only perceived Indian support for China's main antagonist, the United States, but also the undermining of relations with China's main protector, the USSR, which was also arguably China's safest border when it came to the threat of encirclement. As a report from the First Asian Department explained just months before R.K. Nehru's visit: 'India maintains long-

[93] Meeting, Afghan Foreign Secretary, 8.9.1959, MZDNP 4, 175.
[94] "Memorandum of Conversation between Director Zhang Wenji and Indian Ambassador Parthasarathy (3)," July 1961, FMA 105-01056-03, CWIHPDA

term anti-China activities, making China its main enemy, sowing discord in Sino-Soviet relations, and advancing its support of US imperialism. It is filling its role as a tool of US imperialism'.[95]

Chen Yi explained the entire strategic view in terms of a larger possible war in 1960, this time bringing up the unity of the US, GMD, and Tibet in a discussion with Sardar Swaran Singh, a member of Nehru's cabinet. The American covert war in the Himalayas was already underway at this point, and CCP suspicions of Indian involvement are clear from other documents as has been explained. Despite these suspicions of Indian activity, CCP leaders used their own fears of encirclement in order to explain an honest desire for good relations with India:

> The Japan-U.S. Treaty is directed against us and the USA has built bases around us. We are alive to the fact that the U.S.A. may attack and take possession of cities like Canton, Shanghai, Peking, Tiensin etc. but we shall fight hard and ultimately defeat them… There are KMT troops in Northern Burma and American planes take over from that area [sic] and drop radio sets etc. to incite the rebel elements in Tibet and other areas. The United States and [Japanese PM] Kishi and Chiang are united together against us. We believe in having negotiations with U.S. [sic] for having peaceful relations but U.S. may suddenly attack us and we have to be prepared for this. It is clear to us that our most important enemey [sic] is the United States which may attack us at any time. In this situation it is most important for us to improve our relations with the South-East Asian nations [sic], e.g. Nepal, Burma, India, etc. It is most important for us to have most friendly relations with India.[96]

Here the former PLA commander turned Foreign Minister brought up Indian nonalignment explicitly in the context of the CCP's hypothetical war with the US and its allies in Asia:

> We do not want to offend India. Our relations with the United States and Japan in the east are tense. It would be stupid if we created a tense situation with India in the west also. The U.S.A. has its bases, atomic missiles and atomic weapons around us. Our dispute with India is very small. We know that India cannot occupy [illegible], Siking etc and that if we cross the Himalayas, the United States would attack us from the east and we cannot defend ourselves. We do not want to worsen the situation… It is not that we want

[95] FMA 105-01455-02, 27.4.1961, 1.
[96] "Notes on Conversation between Sardar Swaran Singh and Marshal Chen Yi," April 1960, CWIHPDA, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, P.N Haksar Papers

> India to fight along with us against the United States. The Indian policy of non-alignment is good for the world.[97]

Chen Yi went on to address the possibility of those in India that favored collaboration with the United States, explicitly calling for Indian friendship:

> Some people in India say that they should have understanding with the West. The policy of Prime Minister Nehru of non-alignment is correct. Your attitude towards China is very different from that of the United States and Japan. We are in a serious situation and need your friendship.[98]

The Indian cabinet minister, however, did not receive Chen Yi's message with complete sympathy. India's nonalignment policy, was not for the purpose of placating China:

> We do not boast about our friendship with you as it was in accordance with our overall policy of non-alignment and friendship with all. We have always adopted a correct attitude in our policy towards Formosa, Indo-China, Laos, Viet Nam [sic], SEATO, etc. The very idea that China may have any feeling of danger from India is irritating… India has been following a policy of non-alignment and friendship with all and even to imagine that we shall create an inconvenient situation for you in the west because of your difficulties in the east would be unjust. We had very close friendship with you and so felt shocked and the foundations of friendship were shaken because of recent incidents.[99]

As has been explained throughout this thesis, China had a kind of double view of India. On the one hand, CCP leaders desired partnership with India, both for the stability of the Himalayas, for cooperation in Asia and Africa, and, as revealed here, in order to prevent strategic encirclement, by keeping pressure off of China as it confronted the United States. However, just as Indian claims in the Himalayas were not the fruit, in the eyes of Indian leaders, of the British Empire, and India's objectives in the Afro-Asian sphere were not for the purposes of advancing China's bid for power on the world stage, neither was Indian nonalignment vis-à-vis the

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[97] Ibid.
[98] Ibid.
[99] Ibid.

superpowers for the purpose of helping China in its own strategic struggle. Predictably, CCP leaders came to view nonalignment itself as a farce, and came to believe that India was in fact working in the service of the United States. Following the Border War, the Chinese MFA reported, for example, in a document criticizing the USSR's policy towards India, that:

> In India's post-independence period, Nehru represented, to a certain degree, the interests of India's national bourgeoisie. In the ten years before independence, India became a polarized society; its economic dependence on the imperialists increased, and public resentment and revolts mounted. In such a situation, Nehru adopted, internally, the policy of attaching [sic] progressive forces and quelling people's movements, and externally, the policy of relying on the American imperialists. Long before the occurrence of the Sino-Indian border issue, the Nehru government had introduced a series of reactionary measures. Nehru's attack against China is the result of his increasingly reactionary domestic and foreign policies.[100]

The Foreign Ministry also concluded that, 'India's "nonalignment" has long been nonexistent. India is not going to discard the camouflage of nonalignment, a fact appreciated by the American imperialists. The evolution of Nehru's foreign policy is determined by its [sic] class interests rather than driven by his nonalignment policy'.[101]

Zhou himself explained in a meeting with the Prime Minister of Mongolia following the Border War that India was 'under the orders of the Americans' and that India had gradually abandoned its nonaligned policy in favor of cooperation with the United States: 'If India gives up Kashmir to Pakistan and tries to annex our Aksai district again, this will only be a proof that India is really working for and under the orders of the Americans'.[102] Zhou added that, 'India is diverging from its so called neutrality' and even cited a turn towards the United States as *a cause of the Border War itself:*

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[100] FMA 105-01272-01 CWIHPDA
[101] FMA 105-01272-01 CWIHPDA
[102] "Record of Conversation Between Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Mongolian Leader J. Zedenbal," December 1962, CWIHPDA, GDR Archives, Berlin

> The cause [of the Border War] is the aggressive policies of the ruling circles of the Indian government. The Nehru government is wavering and turning away from neutrality. India did indeed declare non-alignment to aggressive blocs, but became ever more dependent on American dollars. India received 640 million dollars from America for military purposes. Nehru's government is turning away from the policy of peace.[103]

Zhou elaborated, stating that Nehru himself was as 'pro-American' as the Finance Minister Morarji Desai: 'Nehru is however a representative of the Grossbourgeoisie [sic]. The reactionary tendency has the upper hand in the Nehru government's policies. We must lead a decisive struggle against him, we must unmask his treacherous machinations. In his pro-American policy, there is no difference between Nehru and Desai'.[104]

These views of Indian collaboration with the United States came after the Border War, and after India had openly turned towards the West for weapons during the conflict. However, other CCP leaders offered a retroactive view of Indian nonalignment as a deception, concealing pro-American leanings. Liu Shaoqi expressed his belief that India was a full ally of the West, even declaring the Border War a kind of victory in 'exposing' Indian nonalignment as a deception. Moreover, the senior CCP leader explained that India's departure from nonalignment went back a long way. Speaking in January 1963, Liu explained his view that:

> India got rid of nonalignment early on. But America and Britain tell India not to get rid of the nonalignment sign. That is American and British policy. Indian nonalignment is a formality and a signboard. India has already aligned with Britain and the United States. There are people who say we pushed India towards the West. In fact, we did not. They already leaned towards the West. America and Britain fully support India in fighting a long war against us. They continuously send weapons to India, wanting India to fight a long war. We hope it will not be this way, but we are not afraid.[105]

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[103] CWIHPDA, GDR Archives, Berlin
[104] Ibid.
[105] FMA 105-01792-08, 91.

Reporting from the USSR indicated that in earlier years, the Soviets shared Chinese views of Indian interference in Tibet and concern for the potential for US interference, especially with regard to Tibet. A report on the visit of a Soviet delegation to the PRC in December 1959 links the United States, the Himalayas and Indian reactionaries all together, explaining that '[T]his Spring, relations between the People's Republic of China and India have seriously deteriorated. This deterioration is linked to the counterrevolutionary rebellion in Tibet in March 1959. Reactionary circles of India to some extent were probably involved in this rebellion', noting also that 'The imperialist tactics aim at making the Tibetan issue a bone of contention first of all between China and India, to pit these two great Asian powers against each other, to aggravate the situation in South-East Asia [sic], to undermine the influence of the socialist camp, including China, in this region of the world…'[106] The report also explained that the US saw the value of Indian influence in Asia, as 'The American press openly admits that one word from India compromises the prestige of the PRC more than one thousand words spoken from the USA'[107] The report on this visit between the Communist allies does not, however, link Nehru himself to the 'reactionaries' as CCP leaders would later do. It instead explained Indian activities as the domain of 'rightists', 'linked to Anglo-American capital' who were trying to push Nehru aside; commenting on Nehru's support for PRC entry to the UN and recognition of Tibet as part of the PRC, the Soviet report explains that: 'Precisely these actions made the rightist bourgeois circles in India, who are linked to Anglo-American capital, to assail Nehru, blaming him for "indecisiveness" and "appeasement" with regard to [China]'.[108] The CCP's own associations of

[106] "Draft Report, 'On the Trip of the Soviet Party-Governmental Delegation to the PRC,' by M. Suslov to CC CPSU Presidium for Presentation to a Forthcoming CC CPSU Plenum (excerpt)," December 1959, CWIHPDA, TsKhSD, Moscow
[107] Ibid.
[108] Ibid.

India with the US and UK are plentiful. However, the process of linking Nehru himself to the reactionaries and other parties undesirable to the CCP took shape as China-India relations collapsed throughout the period before the war. India's potential, in the eyes of the CCP, for alliance with the West was existent already, and events not only in the Himalayas, but around the world, deepened this view for the Chinese leadership. A Foreign Ministry report in 1963, for example, explains that, 'Politically, Nehru has brazenly sided with the imperialists and colonialists, acting as the world's policeman in national liberation movements suppressed by the American imperialists (for example, in the Congo). This is a fact known all over the world…', adding that,

> Just as Yugoslavia is under the pretense of being a socialist country, playing the role that the Social Democratic Party cannot play, India, with its disguise of nonalignment and being a large country, is playing a role that cannot be played by smaller countries which have joined the military bloc or are nonaligned. In this regard, Kennedy is craftier than Dulles. He appreciates India's nonalignment in this way and would even allow Nehru to fawn upon the Soviet Union as long as he opposes China.[109]

Oddly, while many CCP reports struggled with the question of 'centrist' and 'rightist' groups within India, the 1959 report from the USSR explains Mao's view of relations with the West in a way that perhaps most clearly reveals CCP views and intentions towards India:

> According to com. Mao Zedong, they must unmask Nehru as a "double-dealer", "half a man, half a devil", 'half a gentleman, half a hooligan", and in doing this they allegedly "force" him to strengthen friendship with the PRC. A question, naturally, was raised how to live side by side with this "devil"? How to build relations with India? The Chinese comrades found a solution in forcing Nehru to repent and in pressuring him into cooperation with China. At the same time the Chinese said that they visualize the possibility of the downfall of the Nehru government and see no great trouble if a reactionary pro-Western government comes to power in India. In their opinion, this would only bring us closer to a revolution in India.[110]

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[109] FMA 105-01272-01 CWIHPDA

[110] "Draft Report, 'On the Trip of the Soviet Party-Governmental Delegation to the PRC,' by M. Suslov to CC CPSU Presidium for Presentation to a Forthcoming CC CPSU Plenum (excerpt)," December 1959, CWIHPDA

The idea that China could 'force' [Nehru] to 'strengthen friendship with China' is perhaps the heart of the CCP view of India. The CCP anxiety was that Nehru in fact took an interest in the West, the silver lining was that China could always hope for 'revolution in India'. In every facet of its dealings with India, China was attempting to force the country towards its own objectives.

In addition to concepts of Indian cooperation with the US and GMD in the Himalayas, CCP analyses contained a concept of US-India cooperation that extended to support for America's global Cold War program. While the CCP view of India as a threat to its relations with the USSR was troubling enough, the possibility of a combined India, US and GMD front against China was a concern as well. Indian press seized on the idea of a 'two-front war' on China from Taiwan and from the Himalayas, and according to Garver, confirmation from the United States that they were not planning an invasion from Taiwan in 1962, was a significant factor in the CCP's decision for war with India.[111] The PLA took the idea seriously, as is evidenced by a Central Military Commission (CMC) report on military preparations from August 1962:

> First, we must intensively carry out measures to prepare to break the US-Chiang army possible invasion on our southeast coast. In the midst of military preparations from late May to mid-June, troop morale was high, and each fighting force reached the place of being under orders and immediately dispatchable. The government organs worked closely together, with the people's full support. The masses are actively supporting the front and united against the enemy. Second, in the western part of the China-India border, we must struggle measure for measure against India's policy of nibbling land. Third we carried out summer 1962 conscription in advance.[112]

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[111] Garver, 'Decision', 110. See Whiting, 64-72, for CCP views and responses to possible US-backed GMD invasion in 1962, including troop deployments along the Taiwan Straits.
[112] CMC Report, 20.8.1962, MZDNP 5, 138.

Mao gave orders to 'Send [the report] to all comrades', adding that 'Our military, our people, our Party, our government are all very good. They are invincible. Who cannot see this essence is an opportunist'.[113]

Cooperation with the US extended into cooperation with America's anti-CCP front in Asia, which included Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek. In a report on overseas Chinese, Chiang and India, the Chinese Embassy in India explained that overseas Chinese in India were celebrating Chiang's re-election; Chinese diplomats cited a previous Indian diplomatic cable to 'the Indian side', which stated that India would "prevent any pro-GMD gatherings and demonstrations" and "not allow any activities that facilitate the growth ideas about "two Chinas", however, after being reminded of this, 'the Indian local authorities surprisingly expressed that it is hard to take any actions; they deliberately connived with the Bandit Chiang's damaging activities'.[114]

CCP fears of US-India-GMD collaboration are traceable at least to 1958, with the diplomatic notices sent to India about US-GMD covert activities taking place on Indian soil, directed against the CCP in Tibet.[115] While the CCP initially sought India's cooperation in defeating US covert work in Tibet, eventually, Chinese leaders were convinced that India was actively supporting the United States and that Nehru himself assisted the Tibetan Uprising in 1959. While the concept of the Indian leadership as 'heirs to the British Empire' was linked to a conception of India as a Western-oriented country, Chinese views of India-US cooperation went

[113] Ibid.
[114] FMA 118-00974-04, 11.6.1960, 4.
[115] See *ZGHYD*, 47.

well beyond the Himalayas. As discussed earlier, the CCP viewed India as a 'tool' of the United States and a kind of Trojan horse for the West in the Afro-Asian sphere, spreading American influence in Asia and Africa, and undermining the Chinese agenda of support for national liberation movements. Chinese leaders and officials had a sense of deep, multi-regional US-India cooperation, which threatened the PRC both on its own borders and as part of an encirclement scheme, and also threatened the influence that China was trying to build around the world. Moreover, in the balance of power that defined the Cold War world, Indian cooperation with both the US and USSR would leave China surrounded, and this was something that the CCP believed that both India and the United States desired. Importantly, as the war was approaching, China saw both superpowers actually working together to support India against China. As a report on the 'New Situation on the China-India Border' explains in 1962:

> US imperialism and revisionism have pressed certain influence on India regarding the question of negotiations. American Ambassador to India Galbraith publicly stated "complete sympathy" towards India on China-India border dispute. At a press conference on October 22nd, Kennedy said that India is an "extremely important country" and that "supporting" India is "in US interests".
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> …[Indian Defense Minister] Menon revealed that in addition to buying Soviet MiGs, they are negotiating the purchase of Soviet heavy transport planes helicopters. It seems that both imperialism and revisionism do not want to see China-India relations ease (缓和).[116]

After the war broke out, PRC analysis saw the spectre of UN involvement as well, which analysis believed was simply a front for India-Western cooperation: 'Imperialism, India, and some other middle countries are continually thinking about sticking their hands into the China-India border question through the United Nations' as well as 'Now that India has fallen into difficulty between peace and war, this kind of deliberation is meant to use the United Nations'

[116] FMA 105-01638-01, 28.8.1962, 13-14.

name to put pressure on us, help India get through the problem, and create an atmosphere for UN intervention'.[117] While UN involvement did not come to pass, it reminds us of the extent to which China remained on the outside of contemporary institutions, and the possibility that contemporary institutions could be deployed against China by India, which was a more accepted member of the international community of the period. Believing itself to be opposed by the United States, the USSR, and the US-backed United Nations, the Border War brought about a kind of de facto isolation for the PRC, despite CCP leaders' confidence about their standing in Asia and Africa.

As the Border War broke out, Zhou set about defending his thesis to Afro-Asian leaders that India had gone over to the United States. As he wrote in his letter to Sukarno and other Afro-Asian leaders: 'The Indian government threw off its outer clothing of nonalignment, publicly requesting military support from the US. Moreover, the US military right now is steadily giving material aid to India. Large quantities of Indian soldiers and large quantities of American arms are being shipped to the border. In the East and Western sectors, the Indian army ceaselessly attacks the Chinese border forces, and Indian newspapers continuously propagate that India is planning a huge counter attack'.[118] CCP leaders factored the United States into their assessment of Indian motives repeatedly. As Chen Yi said to the Indonesian Ambassador in November 1962, 'Nehru knows that his army cannot fight, but he still acts pretentious, attacking us, because he wants American aid'.[119]

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[117] Ibid., 16-17.
[118] FMA 105-01786-02, 15.11.1962, 74.
[119] FMA 105-01789-07, 53.

CCP analyses also saw the tensions between the superpowers and the tightrope that India had to walk in dealing with the conflicting interests of multiple nations, including in this case, Pakistan:

> India has enemies in many directions, facing the difficult situation of fighting on both the China-India and India-Pakistan fronts. Nehru himself said that…India has a front line with Pakistan and that if China and India go to war, Pakistan will be happy and India doesn't want this…Although India continues to get lots of aid from the US, on the question of buying Soviet airplanes, [India] gets direct US and UK interference. This openly interferes in the Nehru government's "independence and sovereignty".[120]

The MFA later offered a scathing view of US support for Indian nonalignment, explaining that Nehru's policy was useful to Kennedy *and to the USSR:*

> [Kennedy] supports India's clothing of "nonalignment": although America gives India certain military aid, American newspapers, in order to express the consideration of a long-term plan of military assistance to India, propagandized "US-India military alliance" relations, however Kennedy believes that "it is better for India to preserve nonalignment than [to enter] an alliance". Clearly, Kennedy thinks that as a tool to help America carry out its new colonialism, India continuing to keep its "nonalignment" will be more deceptive (欺骗性). From the perspective of containing the development of national liberation movements, "nonaligned India" is also more suitable to Khrushchev's distorted theory of "peaceful transition to socialism without bloodshed and revolution"'.[121]

CCP views of US-India collaboration were both a product of India's openness to the superpowers and also a product of a CCP worldview that was quick to see India, insofar as it challenged or remained independent of the CCP program, as a partner to China's main adversary. Ironically, while CCP views of USSR-India cooperation had an element of truth insofar as the USSR was pursuing influence in India – something which Soviet leaders believed to be of overall benefit to both China and the USSR – and thus Soviet ambivalence and pressure on China during its conflict with India became a genuine problem for the Communist allies – CCP

[120] FMA 105-01638-01, 11.
[121] Ibid., 62.

views of India and the United States were misguided. As explained in Chapter Four, India and the United States engaged in an ambivalent relationship.

Relations with India were complicated for the United States by the alliance with Pakistan which, on one hand was an acknowledged policy challenge for the US as policy makers also sought friendly relations with India, but which on the other hand delivered important strategic value in the US Cold War against China and the USSR, including basing U2 flights and covert operations out of Pakistani territory.[122] More importantly, relations were complicated by Nehru's commitment to nonalignment throughout the period. While the CCP came to see nonalignment as a deception, it was in fact a major obstacle to US policy towards India, resulting in the failure of America's own attempted entente with India during and after the Border War.[123] While John Foster Dulles had attacked Indian nonalignment as morally objectionable during the Eisenhower administration, both Eisenhower, and more deeply Kennedy had a personal interest in India and each President attempted to build close relations with India. Kennedy even hoped to bring the country into an alliance and viewed the Border War as a chance to do so. Nehru's desire for independence within the Cold War world, however, was genuine, and he resisted American attempts to deepen the relationship to this degree. The Border War brought about fears of invasion both in New Delhi and in Washington, and led to a temporary deepening of the US-India relationship as the United States and other Western countries supplied India with weapons and offered comprehensive assistance in the event of the war's expansion. However, the CCP was largely trapped within its own worldview, viewing India as a partner to the United States, rather than being in touch with the realities of the relationship.

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[122] Riedel, 33-40, on U2 flights from Pakistan.
[123] See Ward, 'Strategic Implications'.

7.6 Conclusions

As China sought space for its own revolution and projection of influence, China's attempt to remake the world around it was a challenge to the superpowers themselves. The original partnership with India and the creation of the Bandung world was a challenge of this kind in itself, as it created space for the CCP to compete with both the United States *and* the USSR in Asia and Africa as a unique wielder of influence among decolonizing states, and through the use of its own revolution as an example to other nations. China was thus challenging both the US and the USSR by the end of the 1950s as it offered its own vision of revolution and national values to new nations around the world. The CCP, which recognized India as the other 'great power' in Asia, though it believed India to be of inferior capability to China, saw that India had one further advantage beyond its influence in the Bandung world. India had attracted the interest and goodwill of both superpowers, as they competed for influence in South Asia, recognizing India's importance within the decolonizing world, a space to which their own Cold War had migrated, outside of the initial theatres in Europe and Asia. Thus, India was able, or so the CCP believed, to bring to bear the power and influence of the superpowers in order to apply pressure to the PRC and carry out what China saw as India's 'anti-China' program.

Insofar as the Chinese revolution was an attempt to 'restore China's central position in the world', as Chen Jian describes, it aimed to do this through both the restoration of China's internal strength and also by influencing, even transforming, the world around the PRC. The nature of this 'restoration' brought China into conflict with the US, the USSR, and India. Crucially, the CCP came to believe that *all three nations* were finding common ground by

working against China. Through examining India's role in the CCP worldview, this final piece is clear, that the CCP saw India as a major challenger that was able to bring the superpowers together against China. This is the final piece of India's challenge and significance to the CCP. India was, in the eyes of the CCP, a country that could challenge China internally, internationally, and also in terms of the checks on the CCP presented by far greater powers than either China or India themselves. As such, it is essential to view India as a major actor in the early CCP worldview, and to view China's conflict with India as something far more profound than either a dispute over territory or influence in the Himalayas.

Chapter 8 – Summary and Conclusions

This thesis has sought to shed light on China's perspective as relations with India collapsed between 1958-62. In doing so, it has aimed to widen our understanding of the CCP view of India as both a partner and as a rival, in the first two decades after the founding of the PRC and the achievement of Indian Independence, as China-India relations proceeded from proclamations of brotherhood to war in the Himalayas. Moreover, as current literature on the subject has generally focused on the border dispute itself, on perceived rivalry in Tibet, or has neglected the importance of India in the CCP's founding decades altogether, this thesis has attempted to show that India was a major actor in the early PRC worldview, and that the rise and fall of China-India relations in the early Cold War should be considered an important moment in the history of the PRC.

This thesis has focused on three core, interlocking arguments which, in aggregate, attempt to demonstrate both the importance of India to the CCP and also aim to enlarge our understanding of the nature of the collapse of relations, a phenomenon, given its comprehensive set of disagreements, which was closer in nature to the Sino-Soviet split than to a falling out over a territorial dispute or even a conflict of interests in the Himalayan region.

First, the CCP perceived India as a challenger not only to Himalayan territory considered important to its national security, but more importantly, CCP leaders viewed India's challenge in the Himalayas as a threat to the founding principles of the People's Republic of China, and the project of national resurrection which the Chinese revolution was meant to realize through the

building of a ‘New China’. As such, a territorial dispute and the related issues of ‘interference in internal affairs’ in Tibet became a clash of national wills as the Government of India came into confrontation with the principles, objectives, and insecurities that characterized the CCP’s national restoration. Friendship with India and the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence themselves were meant to neutralize Indian ‘interference’ and interests in Tibet. Through the forfeiture of ‘privileges’ in the region for the sake of friendship with the PRC, India initially met the expectations of the CCP. However, as the CCP lost control of Tibet in the 1950s, it came to view India, based in part on suspicions held since before the period of friendship began, as a primary actor in undermining CCP control of what it saw as a vital region. As tension mounted in the Himalayas, exacerbated by the territorial dispute, the CCP came to view India as ‘heirs to the British Empire’, determined to challenge the core tenets of the project of the ‘New China’, thus bringing the two nations into a confrontation with more profound dimensions than the territorial dispute itself.

Second, the CCP came to view India as a challenger and rival in the Afro-Asian sphere, an international political arena which the two nations built together during their friendship period, and which the two were uniquely qualified to lead. As historians have demonstrated, the CCP’s revolution and restoration extended well beyond its own borders as Chinese leaders believed that, in order to preserve their own revolution, they had to also transform the world around China. The CCP was militarily active outside inside and outside its intended borders immediately after its founding, sending troops to Tibet and Korea, preparing an invasion of Taiwan, and sending military advisors to Southeast Asia, some of whom were veterans of external military operations in Korea. Initially dependent on the USSR for protection, the CCP

worked through India in the mid-1950s in order to achieve a diplomatic reinvention which it used to promote 'peaceful coexistence' in Asia and Africa before attempting to set the Afro-Asian movement on a 'more militant path' later in the decade.[1]

With India's help, the CCP developed a global agenda of engagement with decolonizing nations, whom it sought to influence both by offering their own revolution as an example to other nations and also by offering material and ideological support to 'national liberation movements' around the world. However, by the end of the decade, Indian and Chinese agendas in the decolonizing world had separated, and the CCP came to view India as a saboteur, attempting to challenge and undermine its influence in Asia and Africa, and what was worse, working in the service of the United States, the superpower which China's Afro-Asian initiatives were designed to oppose. As such, India was not only a threat and challenger to the *internal* agenda that the CCP considered necessary to its revolution, but it was also a challenger to the *external* agenda which the CCP sought to build in order to safeguard its revolution and foster its influence around the world. Importantly, *both the CCP's internal and external agendas* required interactions with India, the first on negotiations over the Himalayas and the establishment of the Five Principles, and the second through Bandung which brought the Afro-Asian sphere into being.

Third, China came to view India as a dangerous wielder of influence vis-à-vis the two superpowers, whose own international agendas dominated the politics of the period. Both the United States and USSR competed for influence in India, the former as a means of countering China and the latter in order to counter the United States, doing so at the expense of its own

[1] Garver, *Protracted*, 121.

alliance with the PRC. The CCP considered US courtship of India as dangerous not only to its security but also to its international agenda, and it saw Soviet courtship of India as a betrayal of their alliance. Moreover, Soviet-India courtship contributed directly to the Sino-Soviet split. As a rival to the PRC, India was uniquely dangerous as it could wield influence both in Afro-Asia, where the PRC sought leadership, and vis-à-vis the superpowers, both of which could wield power over China. Like China itself, India was the other great independent actor in the Cold War world, neither a primary combatant in the superpower standoff, nor a full adherent to the superpower program. As the USSR and United States sought influence in India, it is no surprise that the CCP saw India as a threat of even greater proportions because of its attractiveness to the two nations of the period whose power was greater than either China or India themselves.

In aggregate, these three dimensions to the CCP view of India demonstrate that India was an important actor, able both to assist, and ultimately to challenge China internally, externally, and in terms of the Cold War itself, as the CCP sought to create the conditions for the fulfillment of the Chinese revolution and the restoration of China's 'central position in the world'.[2] As such, the China-India Border War of 1962, the culmination of these years of collapse, was arguably the sum of a multitude of factors, and not simply an act of punishment regarding disputed territories.

What has not been discussed at length in this thesis, and which deserves mention at this point, are the effects and consequences of the Border War on China-India relations. As has been mentioned, the interlocking collapse of China-India and Sino-Soviet relations in the 1960s left the PRC isolated vis-à-vis major powers, until its rapprochement with the United States in 1971,

[2] Chen, *Mao's China*, 7.

which would last for the duration of the Cold War. Relations with the USSR did not recover during the Cold War, though Russia and China have been able to build stronger relations since the collapse of the USSR. Perhaps most significantly of each of these relationships, relations between China and India *remain* tense and fraught with challenges even in the current day.[3] Of all of China's confrontations and broken relationships from the Cold War era and that followed the foundation of the PRC, the collapse of relations with India proves to be the most enduring. The reasons for this lie not just in the Border War itself, but in China's *understanding* of India and of India's role in Asia and the world as relations rose and fell following the founding of the PRC.

As this thesis has demonstrated, the Chinese view of India was based upon a view of China's own interests and values, and with this, contained a disregard for Indian interests, objectives, legitimacy, and the values of India's own national founding. As the collapse of relations culminated in war, China's leadership expressed their beliefs that relations would recover and even conform more closely to Chinese interests because of the Border War, as India would have learned a salutary 'lesson'. The Indian view was different.

As Nehru stated to the nation on October 22, 1962 as the Border War began:

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[3] See, for example, C. Raja Mohan, *Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific*, (New Delhi, 2013); John W. Garver, *Protracted Contest*, (Seattle, 2001); George J. Gilboy, *Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior: Growing Power and Alarm*, (New York, 2012); David M. Malone, C. Raja Mohan, Srinath Raghavan (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Indian Foreign Policy,* (Oxford, 2015); C. Raja Mohan, *Modi's World: Expanding India's Sphere of Influence*, (Noida, 2015); and Priya Chacko, *Indian Foreign Policy: The Politics of Postcolonial Identity from 1947 to 2004*, (London, 2012), among others, on China-India relations since the Border War.

> The time has, therefore, come for us to realise fully this menace that threatens the freedom of our people and the independence of our country. I say so even though I realise that no power can ultimately imperil the freedom we have won at so much sacrifice and cost to our people after long ages of foreign domination. But, to conserve that freedom and integrity of our territory we must gird up our loins and face this greatest menace that has come to us since we became independent.[4]

Like the PRC itself, India's national founding came at great cost and with great struggle, and the founding of the Republic of India brought with it definite principles and a strong national will. The China-India Border War, as Nehru stated in 1962, was 'a turning point in our history'.[5] India was not, as the PRC might have hoped, a nation that could be enticed through friendship, partnership, or ultimately through violence, to conform to Chinese objectives. Rather, the collapse of China-India relations and the culmination in war became a cornerstone in India's modern history, and arguably a turning point in the evolution of India's relationship to the modern world, as the nation has evolved through foreign policy visions from Gandhian *ahimsa*, to Nehruvian *nonalignment*, to a current day vision of military proficiency and strategic engagement both in India's immediate region and in other parts of the world.[6]

The Border War did, arguably, change, or at least deeply affect India, though not necessarily in the ways that CCP founders had hoped. As Nehru said to the nation upon the outbreak of war,

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[4] *Prime Minister on Chinese Aggression*, (New Delhi, 1963), 1.
[5] Ibid., 30. See also Guha, *India After Gandhi*, and Brown*, Nehru*, on the importance of the China-India Border War to modern India.
[6] See, for example, Harsh V. Pant, *The rise of the Indian Navy: internal vulnerabilities, external challenges,* (Farnham, 2012); James C. Holmes, Andrew C. Winner and Toshi Yoshihara, *Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-First Century*, (New York, 2009); Stephen Cohen, *The Indian Army: Its Contributions to the Development of a Nation,* (Delhi, 2001); Rajesh M. Basrur, *India's Military Modernization: Strategic Technologies and Weapons Systems*, (New Delhi, 2015); and Ashley Tellis, *India's Emerging Nuclear Posture*, (New Delhi, 2001), on Indian defense, doctrine, and modernization in the current day.

'We are men and women of peace in this country, conditioned to the ways of peace. We are unused to the necessities of war',[7] before explaining that,

> We must steel our wills and direct the nation's energy and resources to this one end…We must build up our military strength by all means at our disposal.[8]

The collapse of China-India relations and the mistrust that it brought between both parties is one of most enduring features in today's landscape of international relations. Another result of 1962 is a shift in Indian foreign policy which was, as B.R. Nanda explains, based on 'the promotion of peace among nations',[9] to a foreign policy that, like China itself, values the importance of military preparedness and strength. As today's PRC continues its journey as a modern state, in a new strategic environment which PRC founders, in the case of India, did much to shape, it is important to consider initial CCP views of India, and the effects of the collapse of China-India relations.

Chinese leaders believed that they could teach India a 'lesson' in 1962, and thought that India would likely conform to China's objectives in the long run, as Nehru and his government passed from the scene. The Border War achieved the opposite effect. The CCP created an enduring rival out of India, and, moreover, a rival that came to value the importance of military power, a turning point for a nation whose foreign policy was based upon the advocacy of peace. Far from making the world friendlier to China's resurrection, the Border War anchored a rivalry that has posed challenges to China's resurrection, to borrow a phrase, 'from the beginning itself'.

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[7] *Aggression*, 1.
[8] Ibid., 3.
[9] Nanda, 2.

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Appendix – Maps and Related Geography




India
International boundary
State or union territory boundary
National capital
State or union territory capital
Railroad
Road
0 100 200 300 Miles
0 100 200 300 Kilometers
U.S.S.R.
Yecheng (Kargilik)
Indian claim
Chinese line of control
Cease-fire line
Afghanistan
Feyzābad
Gilgit
Kābul
Peshāwar
Islāmābād
Leh
Srinagar
Jammu and Kashmir
Jammu
Himachal Pradesh
Gar
China
Qandahār
Fort Sandeman
Lahore
Amritsar
Pakistan
Chaman
Quetta
Sipiti
Chandigarh
Punjab
Haryana
New Delhi
Delhi
Sukkur
Rājasthān
Agra
Uttar Pradesh
Jaipur
Kānpur
Lucknow
Allāhābād
Benares
Patna
Nepal
Kathmandu
Sikkim
Gangtok
Bhutan
Thimphu
Lhasa
Arunachal Pradesh
Itanagar
Ledo
Assam
Dibrugarh
Dispur
Nāgaland
Shillong
Meghalaya
Kohima
Manipur
Bangladesh
Imphāl
Agartala
Aijal
Mizoram
Tripura
Dacca
Jessore
Karāchi
Kandla
Gāndhīnagar
Ahmadābād
Gujarāt
Baroda
Narmada
Bhopāl
Madhya Pradesh
Jabalpur
Bihār
Asansol
West Bengal
Jamshedpur
Calcutta
Burma
Mandalay
Verāval
Damān
Diu
Nāgpur
Raipur
Cuttack
Orissa
Bhubaneswar
Puri
Silvassa
Dādra and Nagar Haveli
Maharāshtra
Godāvari
Bombay
Poona
Hyderābād
Vishākhapatnam
Andhra Pradesh
Krishna
Pondicherry
Rangoon
Arabian Sea
Panaji
Mormugão
Goa
Karnataka
Guntakal
Bay of Bengal
Bangalore
Madras
Mangalore
Pondicherry
Cuddalore
Pondicherry
LACCADIVE ISLANDS (India)
Calicut
Kavaratti Island
Lakshadweep
Tamil Nādu
Madurai
Jaffna
Trincomalee
Trivandrum
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)
Laccadive Sea
Maldives
Colombo
ANDAMAN ISLANDS (India)
Port Blair
Andaman and Nicobar Islands
NICOBAR ISLANDS (India)
The states of Punjab and Haryana are administered from Chandīgarh. The Union Territory of Goa, Damān and Diu is administered from Panaji in Goa.
Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative
Base 504178 6-79

China-India Border




China-India Border: Western Sector
Xinjiang (Sinkiang)
Kangxiwar
Pulu
Dabongliutan
Karakoram Range
PAKISTAN
Karakoram Pass
Skārdu
Khapalu
Dansam
Karmango
Daulat Beg Oldi
no defined boundary
Saser Pass
Sasoma
Ladākh Range
Line of Control
Cease-Fire Line
Kargil
Drās
Mulbekh
Khalatse
Satti
Khardung La
Leh
Shyok
Tangtse
Ringdom Gompa
Pensi La
Great
Jammu and Kashmīr
Yurōd
Rong
Shila
Sani
Padam
Sangtha
Tantak
Kishtwār
Chār
Takh
Sach Khās
Chenāb
INDIA
Chamba
Rāvi
Tāndi
Rohtang Pass
Batal
Kibar
Pathānkot
Dharmsāla
Manāli
Himachal Pradesh
Bhawan
Jogindarnagar
Beās Dam
Dasūya
Beās
Mandi
Hoshiārpur
Jullundur
Nāngal
Bilāspur
Punjab
Govind Sāgar
Sutlej
Narkanda
Simla
Chinese line of control
Indian claim
Aksai Chin
Tianshuihai
Tielongtan
Sumdo
Aksayqin Hu
Kunlun
Gozha Co
Orba Co
Changmar
Kongka La
Tsolu
Nyingki
La-na-k'o Shan-k'ou
CHINA
Lumajangdong Co
Khurnak Fort
Pangong Tso
Banggong Co
Wūjiang
Ta-ya-erh
Chushul
Tindo
Spanggur
Spanggur Tso
Tsaka La
Rutog
Qing Zang Gaoyuan
(Plateau of Tibet)
Xizang (Tibet)
Kar Tso
Thangra
Indus
Tso Morari
Tashigang
Jaggang
Chūmar
Demchok
Qagcaka
Yanhu
Zhaxigang
Shiquanhe
Napo
Hapug
Dankhar Gōmpa
Kaurik
Jambu
Garxincun
Xangdoring
Shih-p'u-ch'i Shan-k'ou
Poo
Nuli
Gar Zangbo
Gangdise Shan Range
Sutlej
Chitkal
Toling
Pe-lin
Nelang
Moincēr
Bhaironghāti
Badarināth
Bara Hoti
Tsu-ssu
Barga
Mandi
Tapidunga
Mapam Yumco
La'nga Co
Joshimath
Kejiasumuna
Uttar Pradesh
Alaknandā
Srinagar
Kuthi
Garbyāng
Barang
Karnāli
Yāri
Rāpla
Askot
Chaur
Kali
NEPAL
Almora
Pithoragarh
Baitadi
Sukādhik
Rāmnagar
Kāthgodām
Surda
International boundary, in dispute
Chinese line of control/Indian claim
Disputed area
Other international boundary
Internal administrative boundary
Railroad
Road
Track or trail
Scale 1:4,000,000
0 50 100 Kilometers
0 50 100 Miles
Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.
800911 (A06000) 9-88

China-India Border: Eastern Sector

