Journal article
Prior-free multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders
- Abstract:
-
Prior-free auctions are robust auctions that assume no distribution over bidders’ valuations and provide worst-case (input-by-input) approximation guarantees. In contrast to previous work on this topic, we pursue good prior-free auctions with non-identical bidders.
Prior-free auctions can approximate meaningful benchmarks for non-identical bidders only when sufficient qualitative information about the bidder asymmetry is publicly known. We consider digital goods auctions where ther...
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- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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Authors
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Elsevier Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Theoretical Computer Science Journal website
- Volume:
- 846
- Pages:
- 160-171
- Publication date:
- 2020-09-24
- Acceptance date:
- 2020-09-13
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1879-2294
- ISSN:
-
0304-3975
Item Description
- Language:
- English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
1137837
- Local pid:
- pubs:1137837
- Deposit date:
- 2021-04-19
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Elsevier B.V.
- Copyright date:
- 2020
- Rights statement:
- © 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
- Notes:
- This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Elsevier at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2020.09.030
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