Struggling to Belong

Nativism, Identities, and Urban Social Relations in Kano and Amsterdam

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

David Ehrhardt
Abstract

Struggling to Belong
Nativism, Identities, and Urban Social Relations in Kano and Amsterdam

David Ehrhardt, St Antony’s College
D.Phil in Development Studies
Trinity Term 2011

The research problem of this thesis is to explore the effects of top-down, bureaucratic definitions of belonging and social identity on urban social relations. More specifically, the thesis analyses the ways in which the nativist categorisations of indigeneity in Kano and autochtonie in Amsterdam can help to understand the tensions between ethnic groups in these two cities. Methodologically, the study is designed as a least-similar, comparative exploration and uses mixed qualitative and quantitative methods in its case studies of Kano and Amsterdam. Theoretically, this study uses identity cleavages and identification as the mediators between policy categories and social relations. It combines social-psychological, historical, and institutional theories to link bureaucratic nativism to ethnic identities and, finally, to conflictual (or ‘destructive’) interethnic relations. The resulting theoretical argument of the thesis is that nativist policy categorisations are likely conducive to antagonism, avoidance, and conflict between groups defined as ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’.

The central finding of the thesis is that both in Kano and in Amsterdam, indigeneity and autochtonie have entrenched a primordial and competitive (or ‘exclusionary’) notion of ethnic identities and have thus been conducive to interethnic antagonism, avoidance, and conflict. Introduced at a time of rapid immigration, social change, and persistent horizontal inequalities, the two top-down policy categories came to redefine urban belonging in Kano and Amsterdam. As a result, previously apolitical ethnic boundaries between ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’ became politicised, connected to exclusionary definitions of religion and class, and ranked on the basis of their claim to a primordial ‘native’ status - that is, their status as historical ‘first-comers’ in their place of residence. The categorisation and group positioning effects of nativism have, therefore, intensified the urban struggle to belong in Kano and Amsterdam. At the same time, however, the thesis underlines that ethnic conflict in Kano and Amsterdam is limited, partly because nativist forms of belonging are continuously challenged by, for example, inclusive multiculturalism in Kano and urban citizenship in Amsterdam.
Acknowledgements

This research would not have been possible if not for the endless patience, support, and constructive criticism of my supervisors, Raufu Mustapha and Cathie Lloyd, and of the participants and research assistants in Nigeria and the Netherlands. They have helped me through this project, trying to make me understand some of the complexities of identity, ‘integration’, and social conflict. I am thankful for their efforts; any mistakes in this work are mine.

In Nigeria, I specifically would like to thank the staff and affiliates of the Development Research and Project Centre (dRPC), Yahaya Hashim, Judith Walker, Haruna Wakili, Alhaji Inusa, Shehu Mustapha Chaji, Christopher, Gadaffi, Malama Ladi, Haytham, Kanmi Kings, Abdullahi Sule, Yahaya, Idriss, Amina, and Grace, whose hospitality and invaluable support have made my fieldwork perhaps the most rewarding aspect of this D.Phil project – both personally and intellectually.

In the Netherlands, Johanneke, (all) my parents, and friends have been a constant source of warmth, enthusiasm, patience, and indispensable practical support. There is no way I could, or would, have done it without them. I am also indebted to the staff at Amsterdam's O+S, especially Willem Bosveld, who have been kind enough to include my questions in their survey questionnaire, and of course to the many participants in the research.

Over the years in Oxford, I have bothered many of my friends with ‘thesis issues’ - most especially Tom, Farid, and Rachael. I cannot thank them enough for their help. Finally, I would like to acknowledge those in the Loft and in CRISE who have helped me with invaluable contacts, constructive criticism, and a much-needed sense of perspective.

Financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), CRISE, the Prins Bernhard Cultuurfonds, the Dr Hendrik Muller Vaderlandsch Fonds, the St Antony’s Carr/Stahl travel funds, the DPIR Pavry and Winchester fund, the African Studies Kirk-Green Travel fund, and the QEH travel and ODS doctoral funds, is gratefully acknowledged.
# Table of Contents

Abstract iii
Acknowledgement iv
Table of Contents v
List of Tables ix
List of Figures x
Glossary xi

1. Introduction 1

PART I: Kano
2. From Caliphate to Post-Colonial Democracy 48
3. Indigenes, ‘Natives’, and ‘Settlers’ 78
4. Managing Diversity in an Islamic State 109
5. Ethnic Hatred and Religious Radicalism? 143

PART II: Amsterdam
6. Capital of an Emerging Ethnic Nation 178
7. *Allochtonen, Autochtonen, and Amsterdammers* 220
8. The City, Nativism, and Citizenship 251
9. Failing Integration and Multicultural Disaster? 282

10. Conclusion: Struggling to Belong 317

Annex A: Maps of Kano and Amsterdam 350
Annex B: Fagge Local Government Indigene Certificate 352
Annex C: Calculating Probabilities 353
Sources Used 355
Table of Contents (detailed)

Abstract iii
Acknowledgement iv
Table of Contents v
List of Tables ix
List of Figures x
Glossary xi

1. Introduction 1
   1.1 Research Problem: Nativism and Urban Social Relations 2
   1.2 Struggling to Belong: Theorising Social Relations 7
      1.2.1 Urban Belonging and Nativism 8
      1.2.2 Social Relations: Interactions and Perceptions 14
      1.2.3 Struggling to Belong: Nativist Categorisation and Social Relations 17
         1.2.3.1 Discourse as a Tool: Locating Boundaries, Positioning Groups, and Framing Interactions 19
         1.2.3.2 Intersectionality and Identity Choice 23
         1.2.3.3 Indigeneity, Autochthony, and the Origins of Nativism 30
      1.2.4 Research Questions 32
   1.3 Research Methodology 34
      1.3.1 Research Design and Case Selection 34
      1.3.2 Data Collection 37
      1.3.3 Data Analysis 41
      1.3.4 Ethical Reflexivity 45
   1.4 Structure of the Thesis 45

PART I: Kano 48
2. From Caliphate to Post-Colonial Democracy 48
   2.1 Introduction 48
   2.2 Frontier of Dar al-Islam: Belonging in 19th Century Kano 49
   2.3 Kano under Colonial Rule and the First Republic, 1900 - 1967 54
   2.4 Identities and Belonging in Post-Biafra Kano, 1970-2009 62
      2.4.1 Political Reform, Oil, and Structural Adjustment 63
      2.4.2 Nigeria’s Federal Character: Safeguarding the Nation, Reproducing the ‘Settler’ 66
      2.4.3 Economic and Religious Competition 71
   2.5 Conclusion 75

3. Indigenes, ‘Natives’, and ‘Settlers’ 78
   3.1 Introduction 78
   3.2 Diversity, Identity, and Inequality in Kano 79
   3.3 Definitions of Belonging 89
      3.3.1 Indigeneity 90
      3.3.2 Traditional belonging 94
      3.3.3 Civic-communal and Civic-territorial Belonging 99
      3.3.4 Subjective Belonging 101
   3.4 Kano’s Identity Repertoire 104
   3.5 Conclusion 107

4. Managing Diversity in an Islamic State 109
   4.1 Introduction 109
   4.2 Political Organisations 109
      4.2.1 The Nigerian State 110
      4.2.2 Traditional Rulers 113
      4.2.3 Religious Leaders 115
      4.2.4 Ethnic and Community Leaders 118
   4.3 Authority 121
   4.4 Institutions and Political Participation 127
   4.5 Policies and Belonging: Social Provision and A Daidaita Sahu 134
10. Conclusion: Struggling to Belong 317
10.1 Nativism, Identities, and Social Relations in Kano and Amsterdam 317
10.1.1 Theory: Nativism and Social Relations 318
10.1.2 The Origins of Nativism: Bureaucratic Classifications and Ethnic Identities 321
10.1.3 The Impact of Nativism: Ethnic Identities and Interethnic Relations 327
10.1.4 Bureaucratic Nativism and Interethnic Relations: Struggling to Belong? 332
10.2 The Complexity of ‘We’: Diversity, Belonging, and Social Relations 336
10.3 Social Change, Horizontal Inequality, and Politics 341
10.4 Limits and Further Research 346
Annex A: Maps of Kano and Amsterdam 350
Annex B: Fagge Local Government Indigene Certificate 352
Annex C: Calculating Probabilities 353
Sources Used 355
List of Interview Respondents 355
Bibliography 359
List of Tables

**Introduction**
Table 1.1: Ideal–typical social interaction
Table 1.2: Ideal types of inclusionary and exclusionary identity cleavages

**Part I**
Table 2.1: Population of Sabon Gari, 1921–1967
Table 3.1: Ethnic communities in Kano
Table 3.2: Religions in Kano
Table 3.3: Religion by ethnic category
Table 3.4: Highest level of formal education achieved by ethnic category
Table 3.5: Employment in Kano by ethnicity and gender
Table 3.6: Occupation of the formally employed by ethnic category
Table 3.7: Number of items in household by ethnic category
Table 3.8: Ethnic groups by neighbourhood
Table 3.9: Four definitions of urban belonging in Kano
Table 3.10: Feeling at home and being considered a ‘native’ by ethnic category
Table 4.1: Proportions of respondents with at least some trust in political authorities
Table 5.1: Proportions of ethnic communities who think negatively about other groups
Table 5.2: Proportions of ethnic communities evaluating other communities as ‘lazy’
Table 5.3: Proportions of ethnic communities evaluating other communities as ‘violent’
Table 5.4: Proportions of ethnic communities evaluating other communities as ‘dishonest’
Table 5.5: Proportions respondents who never work/meet with other ethnic/religious groups
Table 5.6: Linguae francae spoken at home
Table 5.7: Proportion respondents with most/only friends from own ethnic/religious group
Table 5.8: “Would you object to your daughter marrying outside your ethnicity/religion?”
Table 5.9: Probabilities and avoidance ratios for only/mostly intra-ethnic friends, by ethnicity
Table 5.10: Correlations of incidence of different interactions

**Part II**
Table 6.1: Schematic of development of Dutch post-war diversity policy
Table 7.1: Ethnic self-identification and official ethnicity in Amsterdam in 2008
Table 7.2: Religion and ethnicity
Table 7.3: Occupation by ethnic category
Table 7.4: Monthly net income of household by ethnic category
Table 7.5: Highest level of completed education by ethnic category
Table 7.6: Definitions of belonging in Amsterdam
Table 7.7: Different measures of belonging by ethnic group
Table 7.8: Salient identities by ethnic category
Table 8.1: Proportions of respondents who have “at least some” trust in political institutions
Table 9.1: Respondents with negative views of other ethnic groups by ethnicity
Table 9.2: Proportions “Do you think people in general have negative views of ethnic groups?”
Table 9.3: Respondents who never interact with other ethnic groups, by ethnicity
Table 9.4: Social situations where respondent meets other ethnic groups, by ethnicity
Table 9.5: Proportions of respondents with most/only friends from own group, by ethnicity
Table 9.6: Friendship connections of respondents with interethnic friends, by ethnicity
Table 9.7: Probabilities and avoidance ratios for only/mostly intra-ethnic friends, by ethnicity
Table 9.8: Correlations of different types of interactions
Table 9.9: “Would you permit your daughter to marry outside your ethnicity/religion?”
Table 9.10: Non-single respondents with a partner from their own ethnic group
Table 9.11: Probabilities and avoidance ratios for intra-ethnic marriages, by ethnicity

**Conclusion**
Table 10.1: Different forms of nativism
## List of Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure/Map/Annex</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3.1</td>
<td>Salient identities in Kano</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.1</td>
<td>Indices of inequality in Amsterdam, 1950-2000</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6.2</td>
<td>Religious affiliation in Amsterdam, 1849-2000</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map 1</td>
<td>Nigeria and Kano</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map 2</td>
<td>The Netherlands and Amsterdam</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map 3</td>
<td>Kano Metropolis</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map 4</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annex B</td>
<td>Fagge Local Government Indigene Authentication Declaration</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition/Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Daidaita Sahu</td>
<td>Policy programme aimed at ‘societal reorientation’ in Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Algemeen Beschaafl Nederlands – Standard Dutch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Action Congress (political party, Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>achaba</td>
<td>Motorbike taxi (Nigeria) (also okada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOM</td>
<td>Adviescommissie Onderzoek Minderheden – Advisory Committee Research Majors (The Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIVD</td>
<td>Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst – Dutch intelligence and security services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>allochthon</td>
<td>‘allochthon’ (The Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>almajirai</td>
<td>Quranic students in northern Nigeria (also gardawa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANPP</td>
<td>All Nigeria Peoples Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>Abandoned Property Commission (Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>asali</td>
<td>‘ancestral home’ (Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ase</td>
<td>Spiritual grace or charisma in Nigerian Pentecostal churches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>autochthon</td>
<td>‘autochthon’ (The Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>autochtonic</td>
<td>‘autochthonic’ (The Netherlands), a nativist discourse of belonging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayagi</td>
<td>Ward in Kano’s Old City inhabited by people with Yoruba ancestry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>baraka</td>
<td>Spiritual grace or charisma in Sufism (Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bevolkingsregister</td>
<td>‘population register’ (The Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>birni</td>
<td>Kano’s walled Old City (Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bijzonder onderwijs</td>
<td>‘neighbourhood policeman’ (The Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>Christian Association of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAO</td>
<td>Collective wage agreement (The Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek – Central Bureau for Statistics (The Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Christen-Democratisch Appèl (political party in the Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHRI</td>
<td>Centre for Human Rights in Islam (Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COT</td>
<td>Crisis Onderzoek Team – Crisis Research Team (The Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRISE</td>
<td>Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security, and Ethnicity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CU</td>
<td>Christen Unie (political party in The Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagatai</td>
<td>Village heads (traditional title in Kano Emirate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dar al-Harb</td>
<td>‘the world of unbelief’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dar al-Islam</td>
<td>‘the world of Islam’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dhimmi</td>
<td>Non-Muslim ‘people of the book’: Jews and Christians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D66</td>
<td>Democraten ’66 (political party in The Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dRPC</td>
<td>Development Research and Project Centre (Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMO</td>
<td>Dienst Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling – Department for Societal Development (The Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCN</td>
<td>Evangelical Church of Christ in Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eze Igbo</td>
<td>Traditional leader among the Igbo ethnic community (Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCC</td>
<td>Federal Character Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORUM</td>
<td>Instituut voor Multiculturele Vraagstukken – Institute for Multicultural Issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulbe</td>
<td>Language of the Fulani ethnic group (Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBA</td>
<td>Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie – Municipal Population Register (The Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gereformeerde Kerk</td>
<td>Reformed Church in the Netherlands (orthodox Calvinist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gemeente</td>
<td>‘municipality’ (The Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gida</td>
<td>‘house’ (Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRA</td>
<td>Government Reserve Area (Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grachtengordel</td>
<td>‘canal belt’: central canal area in Amsterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakimi</td>
<td>District head (traditional title in Kano Emirate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerf</td>
<td>(Dutch) Reformed Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Horizontal inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hisbah</td>
<td>Islamic police (Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch (Organisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICA</td>
<td>Igbo Community Association (Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group (Organisation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHH</td>
<td>Informatiehuishouding – Information hub (The Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMN</td>
<td>Islamic Movement of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inburgering</td>
<td>Citizenship tests (The Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izala</td>
<td>Society for the Removal of Innovation and the Reinstatement of Tradition (Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNI</td>
<td>Jama’atu Nasril Islamiyya – Society for the Victory of Islam (Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordaanoproer</td>
<td>Riot in the Jordaan neighbourhood in Amsterdam in July 1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordanees/Jorda</td>
<td>Residents from the Jordaan neighbourhood in Amsterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAPEDI</td>
<td>Kano Peace and Development Initiative (Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanawa</td>
<td>‘Kano people’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katsinawa</td>
<td>‘Katsina people’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMAN</td>
<td>Komitee Marokkaanse Arbeiders in Nederland – Committee Moroccan Workers in the Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNIL</td>
<td>Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger – Royal Dutch Indies Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kurmi</td>
<td>Market in Kano’s Old City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kwari</td>
<td>Market in Kano metropolis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>levendeslied</td>
<td>melodramatic ‘song of life’ (The Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGA</td>
<td>Local Government Area (Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mallam (pl. mallamai)</td>
<td>Person schooled in Quranic knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maguzawa</td>
<td>Non-Muslim Hausa in Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masu unguwa</td>
<td>Ward head (traditional title in Kano Emirate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Native Authority (Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nativism</td>
<td>A discourse about belonging defined by three propositions: (i) that belonging depends on identification with certain communal identities; (ii) that such identification depends on ‘primordial’ conditions; and (iii) that belonging is a necessary condition for full access to particular social, political, or economic rights or benefits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCNC</td>
<td>National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEPU</td>
<td>Northern Elements Progressive Union (Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLA</td>
<td>Non-indigene Leadership Association (Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>Northern Peoples Congress (Nigeria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NVIVO</td>
<td>Qualitative data analysis computer software</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
volkstelling: ‘census’ (The Netherlands)

VVD: Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (conservative-liberal political party in The Netherlands)

waje: Parts of Kano Metropolis outside Kano’s Old City (birni)


WWI/WWII: World War One/World War Two

‘yan daudu: ‘feminine men’ (Kano)

Zakat: One of the five pillars of Islam: giving alms.

zikir: Sufi prayer ritual
1 Introduction
1.1 Research Problem: Nativism and Urban Social Relations

Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. We have failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We have even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values (Cameron 2011).

Multiculturalism is under fire. Understood as a state policy supporting the development and emancipation of minorities within their ethnic and religious communities, multiculturalism was the diversity model of choice in ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ societies alike. In an era of rapidly increasing mobility, both in geographic and socio-economic terms, multiculturalism was thought to contain a promise of maintaining social cohesion through flourishing cultural difference. In recent years, however, politicians and pundits of all ideological hues have lined up to question the legitimacy and efficacy of this approach. Multiculturalism, they argue, encourages segregation and weakens the shared sense of national community. Instead, these critics call for a ‘return’ to the arcadian values and customs of the mainstream, ‘native’ culture and for a strengthening of the ‘shared’, the ‘mainstream’, and the ‘normal’. In David Cameron’s (2011) words: “A genuinely liberal country believes in certain values and actively promotes them; [i]t says to its citizens, this is what defines us as a society: to belong here is to believe in these things”.

Both multiculturalism and Cameron’s return to the ‘native’ represent attempts to reorganise diverse contemporary societies from the top down. In essence, they constitute categorisations, used to make complex social reality manageable and, more importantly, suitable for policy interventions. Looking down from the level of the state, political authorities use such categorisations to orient their agency – and while the ‘Western’ focus of these multiculturalism debates perhaps suggests otherwise, this political behaviour reverberates widely beyond the political hubs of Washington, London, and Berlin. This
thesis explores the effects of these top-down categorisations. It does so by examining the impact of one set of categories - defined by their adherence to the premises of ‘nativism’\(^1\) - on social relations in two widely divergent social contexts: the cities of Kano (Nigeria) and Amsterdam (the Netherlands).

In many ways, Kano and Amsterdam are as different as cities\(^2\) can be. Their geographical location, their economic development, the design and efficacy of their institutions, and their national and regional contexts all differ substantially. Their historical development and formative experiences have differed, as have the relative economic positions of migrants and their host communities: where non-Dutch ethnic groups in Amsterdam have dominated the lower rungs of the class ladder, non-‘native’ ethnic groups in Kano have made use of their educational advantage and are relatively well-off compared to most ‘natives’. Moreover, the specific ethnic categorisations of people in these cities differ, just as the relative proportions between religious communities: in Kano, Muslims are the ‘native’ majority, while in Amsterdam they constitute the ‘settler’ minority.

And yet, despite their numerous differences, Kano and Amsterdam also share a few key features. For one, they are both trading hubs with cosmopolitan aspirations and long histories of effective incorporation of migrants and their families. Both, however, are currently struggling with their diversity, due to the tension between the cities’ ‘native’ ethnic communities and their more recently migrated ‘settler’ minorities. Finally, both cities operate in a national context where political actors have actively attempted to re-define belonging

\(^1\) The term nativism has been borrowed from Higham’s (1958, 1963) work on 19\(^{th}\) century anti-immigrant ideologies in the United States (see also Friedman 1967). Subsequent studies have used it in similar ways to analyse anti-immigrant sentiment in the US (Perea 1997; Sanchez 1997), but also to study political constructs of the ‘native’ in Africa (Mamdani 2001; Mbembe 2001). This thesis uses the term to denote a specific discourse about belonging that centres on three propositions: (i) that belonging depends on identification with certain communal identities; (ii) that such identification depends on ‘primordial’ conditions; and (iii) that belonging is a necessary condition for full access to particular social, political, or economic rights or benefits. In subsequent chapters, it is argued that these propositions together constitute the core of notions of \textit{autochtonie} in the Netherlands and indigeneity in Nigeria.

\(^2\) This thesis uses Fischer’s (1976: 7) simple definition of the city, based on demography: a place of residence is more or less like a city depending on its population size.
along nativist lines - through the classifications of indigeneity\(^3\) (Nigeria) and bureaucratic autochthony\(^4\) (the Netherlands). Indigeneity is a policy categorisation used by the Nigerian state in order to manage the risks of Nigeria’s social diversity by ensuring equal political participation across ethnic groups. Bureaucratic autochthony performs a similar function in the Netherlands, where it was introduced into the political system in order to allow for the emancipation of allochthonous (i.e. non-‘native’) communities.

Regardless of the progressive and emancipatory aims of the two classifications, commentators in Nigeria have observed the negative ‘boomerang’ effects of the introduction of indigeneity (e.g. Bach 1989); in similar vein, Dutch researchers have highlighted the negative connotations and exclusionary logic behind autochthony (e.g. Schinkel 2007). The research question of this thesis is therefore to explore this connection, both theoretically and empirically: to what extent can the introduction of bureaucratic nativist categorisations (indigeneity and autochthony) help explain tensions and conflicts between the cities’ ethnic communities?

The central argument of the thesis will be that indigeneity and autochthony in Kano and Amsterdam, introduced in the context of rapid social change and persistent horizontal (intergroup) inequalities (Stewart 2001, 2008a, 2008b), strengthened definitions of ‘belonging’ along the lines of exclusionary identifications of ethnicity and religion. Previously apolitical ethnic boundaries became politicised, connected to exclusionary definitions of religion and class, and ranked on the basis of their claim to a primordial ‘native’ status - that is, their status as ‘first-comers’ in their place of residence. By reinforcing this hierarchical and exclusionary notion of ethnic identities, indigeneity and autochthony are then argued to have

\(^3\) The term ‘indigeneity’ (or ‘indigeneship’) is used in this thesis to denote the bureaucratic distinction between ‘indigenes’ and ‘non-indigenes’ made by the Nigerian state. See chapter 3 for more details.

\(^4\) The term ‘bureaucratic autochthony’ (or simply ‘autochthony’) is used in this thesis to describe the bureaucratic distinction made by Dutch policy researchers and policy makers, defined strictly by the place of birth of a person or his or her parents. ‘Autochtonie’, by contrast, is the more colloquial discourse defining the ‘native’ Dutch. Autochtonie and bureaucratic autochthony are closely connected examples of Dutch nativist discourse, but should be treated as analytically distinct. See chapter 7 for more details.
contributed to the antagonism, avoidance, and conflict between the two cities’ ‘native’ and ‘settler’ ethnic communities. The thesis thus shows that indigeneity and autochthony have fed into what Fearon and Laitin (2000: 848) have called “everyday primordialism”. However, the thesis also highlights that primordialism and ethnic tensions are only one dimension of ethnic relations in cosmopolitan cities such as Kano and Amsterdam – underlining the multiplicity of available social identifications and the creative agency involved in social relations.

In making these arguments, the thesis aims to contribute to the scholarly literature on diversity, belonging, and social conflict in the following ways. In substantive terms, there are two main objectives to the research. First and foremost, the study aims to provide two empirical case studies of the social struggles around ‘belonging’ that characterise contemporary metropolitan cities. Second, in addition, it aims to explore the hypothesis that nativist policy language, used by the state and other political authorities in their attempt to make society ‘manageable’, can impact negatively on the everyday reality of social relations. Due to its exploratory nature, the emphasis of the study will be on the social processes through which nativism becomes incorporated in the social structures that guide social perceptions and interactions. Thus, the study will not simply ‘measure’ the extent to which social relations in Kano and Amsterdam are influenced by nativism, but focus on tracing the processes that have created this connection.

These objectives are not only interesting in empirical terms, but they may also aid the development of theory. Specifically, the study aims to contribute to theory in three connected ways. First, it provides a theoretical alternative to, on the one hand, the ‘conflict approach’ that dominates analyses of Nigerian social relations and, on the other, the ‘integration approach’ hegemonic in the Netherlands. Thus, the thesis aims to explore one way of bridging the gap between the quantitative, political-sociological analyses of ‘Western’ societies and the anthropological and ‘conflict studies’ analyses dominant in Africa. Second,
in formulating this alternative, the research connects theories from the micro level of social-
psychology to the macro level of structuralist and historical approaches. It thus makes a
modest attempt at connecting the historical processes of identity formation to those of
everyday identity choice and social interaction. Third, following Huddy (2001), the thesis
focuses on the role of political actors in these dynamics, exploring their capacity to influence
social relations by introducing, re-creating, or promoting certain discourses and social
identities.

In methodological terms, then, the main contribution of the thesis lies in its unorthodox
comparison of cities across the ‘border’ between developed and developing societies. Through
this complex, least-similar comparison, the research aims to test the precarious
methodological balance between within-case specificity and across-case comparability. At the
same time, the study aims to problematise the, often implicit, boundary constructed between
analyses of ‘Western’ societies and those of Africa, South-Asia, or other ‘developing’ regions.
If successful in this sense, one possible outcome in societal terms could be to make the two
case studies ‘speak to each other’; using experiences from one case to outline alternative ways
of dealing with diversity and belonging in the other. With these research objectives in mind,
the remainder of this introduction presents the theoretical framework of this research (section
1.2), followed by a brief discussion of methodological considerations (1.3). Section 1.4 will
outline the structure of the thesis.

---

5 ‘Discourse’ is defined here “as shared systems of thoughts composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of action,
beliefs, and practices that people use to systematically construct the objects and worlds of which they
speak” and in which they act (Foucault 1982; Lessa 2006: 285). For discourse to be shared, it has to be
communicated; discourses therefore exist (or ‘are embodied’) in ‘communicable’ forms, i.e. language or art.

6 Defined by Tajfel (1982: 4) as the part of one’s complete self-image that is “derived from knowledge about
social group membership and the value and meanings attached to that membership”.

---

6
1.2 Struggling to Belong: Theorising Social Relations

This section discusses the theoretical underpinnings of this thesis, focusing on impact of bureaucratic, nativist categorisations on the everyday relations between urban ethnic communities. The central argument is that these categorisations, by introducing nativist notions of urban belonging based on ethnicity, religion and class, reinforce exclusionary versions of these identities. Nativism thus enters society through bureaucratic policy language and attaches itself to notions of belonging and identity; these identities, in turn, become the basis for antagonism, avoidance, and conflict between the ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities.

This theoretical section starts by defining the concepts of urban belonging and nativism (section 1.2.1) and social relations (1.2.2). Section 1.2.1 highlights how urban belonging, conceived of as identification with a particular place, may be defined territorially or communally; nativism represents an exclusionary form of communal urban belonging. Section 1.2.2 then defines social relations as a combination of perceptions and social interactions, which may be characterised by antagonism, avoidance, and conflict (‘destructive relations’) or by positive perceptions and co-operative interactions (‘constructive relations’).

Building on these definitions, section 1.2.3 then argues, first, that exclusionary identities are likely to induce destructive social relations and, second, that nativist bureaucratic categorisations may help to construct or reinforce such exclusionary identities. This argument starts in section 1.2.3.1 from the micro-sociological premise that social identities, and identification, are used strategically to frame intergroup perceptions and interactions. Through two mutually reinforcing mechanisms (the ‘categorisation’ and ‘group positioning’ effects), the characteristics of identity cleavages may help to determine the extent to which social relations are destructive or constructive. Nativist identities – characterised by hard boundaries, hierarchy, and competition – are hypothesised to be conducive to destructive social relations.
Section 1.2.3.2 and 1.2.3.3 then complicate this basic argument, by acknowledging, first, the multiplicity of identities and, second, the historical context of identification and identity formation. Together, these two sections outline the ways in which bureaucratic categorisations can affect social identities. Section 1.2.3.2 describes how, first, multiple identities can intersect and change each other; and second, how the multiplicity of identifications necessitates a form of identity choice (Posner 2005: 2-4). Bureaucratic categorisations may affect intersectionality and identity choice if they are translated into politics – specifically into institutions, political practices, and public discourses. Section 1.2.3.3 then adds the dimension of time by locating social relations in the historical process through which identities are formed and reproduced. Through this analytical lens, identities, social perceptions, and interactions converge with shifting material and demographic relations and elite-level politics, which, together, give meaning to social identities.

1.2.1 Urban Belonging and Nativism

Ideas about ‘belonging’ and ‘social relations’ have long histories as analytical as well as colloquial concepts, which complicate their use in structured sociological analysis. Belonging is defined as the subjective sense of affiliation and identification with a social environment or group. On this basis, urban belonging can be conceptualised as identification with a community of people who are considered legitimate residents of a city. As such, urban belonging is inherently territorial, bounded by the borders of the city. It is also inherently hierarchical, by including those who meet the criteria for identification at the expense of those who do not, and is generally a matter of degree: while the residents of a city’s core neighbourhoods may be able to claim a stronger or deeper connection to ‘their’ city than residents of newly built suburbs, the latter may also have some sense of belonging in the city. The nature of this hierarchy depends on the identification conditions and the boundary of the identity cleavage that is used to construct it.
There are two ideal-typical ways of defining belonging. First, the most straightforward forms of urban belonging are those where the criteria for identification with a city community are either protracted residence or birth in the city – referred to here as territorial urban belonging. In Weber’s (1978: 43-4) classical definition of open and closed social relationships, communities bounded by the condition of residence are relatively open with regards to individuals interested in claiming to belong in the city – they only need to move into the city to make a successful claim. The criterion of birth within a city renders the urban community substantially more closed. Furthermore, territorial urban belonging may also be defined at geographical levels below or above the city level, such as neighbourhoods on the one hand and provinces, regions, or countries on the other.

Purely territorial identification criteria, however, are rare. Second, therefore, urban belonging is often conditional not only on residence or birth within the city, but also on various communal criteria⁷. Much has been written on the different criteria for such communal urban belonging, from the early sociological works of Wirth (1938) and Simmel (1950 to the contemporary analyses of urban marginality by Wacquant (2008) and ‘global cities’ by Sassen (2001). Although these analyses focus on divergent aspects of social life in the city, virtually all agree that the urban environment produces diversity and difference rather than uniformity and homogeneity. Fischer (1975, 1995), building on the insights of Wirth (1938) and Gans (1968), argues that this is due to the diverse origins of city dwellers, the structural differentiation that comes with large populations, and the presence of a ‘critical mass’ needed for the growth of sub-cultures. Faced with such social diversity, it would seem likely that the residents of most cities would define belonging territorially or along a highly inclusionary identity cleavage.

However, as the two case studies below will show, there are also cities in which belonging, at least partially, is defined along strict communal lines. One communal definition of

⁷ There is some analogy between the territorial–communal notions of belonging and the ius soli–ius sanguinis interpretations of citizenship. For more details on the latter distinction, see e.g. Entzinger (2000: 101)
belonging, as illustrated by the logic of indigeneity and bureaucratic autochthony, is referred to here as ‘nativism’. This term describes a set of three discursive propositions about belonging, claiming that:

a) belonging is dependent on identification with particular social identities;

b) these identities are defined along ‘primordial’ boundaries; and

c) belonging is a necessary condition for full access to particular social, political, or economic rights or benefits.

First, according to a), nativist definitions of belonging are communal, in the sense that they require a particular social identification. In principle, nativism may be ‘connected’ to any social identity, based on ethnicity, religion, or political ideology. If the nativist notion of belonging is salient or even hegemonic in a society, it renders its connected identity nativist (as in ‘nativist ethnicity’). Second, premise b) requires a nativist identification to be defined in primordial terms - that is, as an alleged historically ascribed quality, rather than a voluntary affiliation. This primordiality renders nativist identities particularly hard-bounded, because people cannot change qualities that are considered historically ‘given’. Finally, premise c) makes certain rights and benefits conditional upon identification as a ‘native’ or a ‘settler’, thus reinforcing the boundary and hierarchy between ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities.

Nativism is a discourse that conceives of belonging as conditional upon primordial identification and considers certain rights and benefits to be conditional upon one’s status as a ‘native’ or ‘settler’. Although it is difficult to pin down the place where a discourse exists, it is important to note that nativism may exist in slightly different shapes in different spheres of society. The two main examples of nativism discussed in this thesis are the Nigerian concept of indigeneity and the Dutch discourse around autochthony. Both these discourses are policy-oriented bureaucratic discourses, but they also have colloquial equivalents. Although
all these discourses are based on the principle of nativism, they are separated analytically in order to trace how official and colloquial forms of nativism interact and reinforce each other.

Others have analysed the general aspects of indigeneity and autochthony in some detail\(^8\) so it may suffice to note three of their most important features. Firstly, both notions are closely connected to Stolcke's (1995) “cultural fundamentalism” and, although with a little more distance, to new forms of ‘racism without race’ (Miles 1993; Rex 1973; Wieviorka 1993). They are also, secondly, related to the conceptual framework behind the ‘indigenous peoples’ movement (Tsing 2007; UNPFII 2008). In his trenchant critique of “the return of the native”, Kuper (2003) highlights this relation as part of a global return to essentialism in political discourses about culture and diversity. While others, such as Barnard (2006), argue for the usefulness of the term in the specific political context of the ‘indigenous peoples’ struggle, most agree on the similarity of the underlying structures of the ‘indigenous peoples’ discourse and those of Dutch autochthony or Nigerian indigeneity. Kuper’s critical notes will therefore resonate with much of the analysis that follows below.

The third important aspect of nativist discourses such as autochthony is emphasised by Geschiere (2009) and Geschiere and Nyamnjoh (2000)\(^9\): the contradiction between the natural, self-evident appeal of nativist notions of belonging and the emptiness and ambiguity of the identities they produce. “Despite its heavy appeal to the soil, autochthony turns out to be quite an empty notion in practice” (Geschiere 2009: 28), an “emptier form of ethnicity” (ibid.: 230). Although the ‘emptiness’ of nativism is less surprising if it is defined as a set of propositions to define belonging rather than an identity cleavage in itself, the tension between its self-evident, ‘son-of-the-soil’ appeal and the deep ambiguity in defining precisely who qualifies as a ‘son-of-the-soil’ are crucial aspects of the struggles produced by nativist

---

\(^8\) For analyses of *autochtone* in the Netherlands, see Geschiere (2009), Ceuppens and Geschiere (2005), and Geschiere and Nyamnjoh (2000); of autochthony in other contexts, see Ceuppens (2006), Marshall-Fratani (2006), Pelican (2009) and also Geschiere (2009); and for analyses of indigeneity in Nigeria, see e.g. Bach (1989; 1997), Adesoji and Alao (2009), Human Rights Watch (2006), and Kirk-Greene (1983).

\(^9\) See also Comaroff and Comaroff (2001) for an earlier discussion of the rise of autochthony discourses as a result of the reconfiguration of the post-colonial state.
belonging. In the cases of Kano and Amsterdam, the identity cleavages most closely intertwined with nativist belonging are ethnicity, religion, and class; three different discursive models to represent and simplify the social world, as a collection of ethnic communities, religious groups, or classes. We will briefly discuss these identities.

Ethnicity is defined here as an identity cleavage based on a shared language, cultural customs, or often an (implicit) myth of a common history. Often, ethnicity is constructed as an historical (or even primordial) social relationship, binding those whose familial histories have long been intertwined – or even perceived to originate from the same ‘blood’.

Furthermore, perceptions of physical appearance may be interpreted to create distinctions between groups. Although these historical or phenotypical criteria are difficult, if not impossible, to prove empirically, they are nonetheless important aspects of the imagination of many ethnic communities. Moreover, they render ethnicity a particularly exclusive (or closed) identity cleavage, since for ‘outsiders’ to become part of an ethnic group would either require turning back time or a long period (often stretching over generations) of ethnic assimilation. In the most primordial of definitions, it is conceptually impossible to join an ethnic community different from one’s own.

Ethnicity may exist in various forms, defining communities on many different (nested) societal levels. It is also, like all social identities, socially constructed and may be used instrumentally, by elites and non-elites alike. Moreover, contemporary ethnicity is essentially modern, deeply affected by processes of state formation, urbanisation, and (de)industrialisation (Cohen 1969; Gans 1962; Melson and Wolpe 1970; Thomas and Znaniecki 1918). Although this definition of ethnicity overlaps with religion in many ways, this thesis will, in contrast to Horowitz (2000), regard religion separately. Ethnicity and religion can both be bases for the formation of affective communities or interest groups, as
well as sources of shared values and norms\textsuperscript{10}; and, as subsequent chapters will show, they often do so in complex interaction with each other.

But while ethnicity comprises claims about historical roots and common descent, people use their religious identity to express their connection to a ‘sacred’, supernatural reality. Ethnicity is therefore easily connected to land and territorial boundaries, while religious boundaries may allow the formation of religious communities regardless of the geographical origins of the community members; as, for example, in the pan-Islamic community of the \textit{Ummah}. A second difference between ethnic and religious identities, although it should not be overstated, may be that the minimal identification criteria for a religious identity are solely dependent on affiliation, while those of ethnic categories require some form of actual assimilation. In practice, however, religious boundaries often also feature substantial obstacles to conversion.

Ethnic and religious identity cleavages may appear as ranked or unranked social categorisations; no ranking is inherent in either of their conceptual definitions. The cleavages of status and class, however, provide examples of identities that are inherently ranked: their various identity categories are by definition organised hierarchically rather than horizontally. A person’s status relates to the prestige attached to his or her position in society and may be achieved (e.g. through occupational status) or ascribed (e.g. through inheritance). Class is often used virtually synonymously with status, but is a more specific historical construct, dependent on the division of wealth and power in the capitalist economy (Marx edited by McLellan 2000, 2008; Thompson 1980). Class identities should be analysed as distinct from class positions\textsuperscript{11}; although class identities are to a large extent dependent on class positions, the translation of a position into an identity requires an act of social construction, in which material circumstances are translated into class-consciousness (Thompson 1980: 9).

\textsuperscript{10} Cf. Lonsdale’s (1994) concepts of ‘moral ethnicity’ and ‘political tribalism’ to denote these two possible social functions of ethnicity and religion.

\textsuperscript{11} I.e. the objective material position of an individual in the capitalist economy, for example in terms of education, income, occupation, or wealth.
1.2.2 Social Relations: Interactions and Perceptions

Having defined the central concepts of belonging and nativism, social relations are defined as the ways in which individuals or groups interact with and perceive each other. The definition consists of two key elements: first, the contingent episodes of social interaction displayed by the relating actors; and second, the more structural social relationship in which these actors partake over time. Our analysis of social interactions starts from Weber’s (1978: 4) classical concept of social action, which “is social insofar as its subjective meaning takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in the course”\(^\text{12}\). But where Weber’s social action may involve only a single individual who takes into account his past experiences or future expectations of the behaviour of others, our focus is on situations in which a plurality of actors display social action toward each other; in other words, on situations of social interaction (Becker et al. 1990; Blumer 1969; Plummer 1991; Reynolds and Herman-Kinney 2003).

In principle, interactions are conceptualised to occur between individuals. Because, however strongly they may be influenced by external factors, ultimately individuals have to decide (how) to act in a given situation. Interactions may, however, be more or less institutionalised\(^\text{13}\). Moreover, actors do not engage in interactions only as individuals; they may also do so collectively or as representatives of a group or organisation (Blumer 1969: 6). Collective and representative action does not shift agency away from the decisions of the individual, but rather denotes different fields in which individual agency may be formulated. Thus, actors involved in collective action have to interact, simultaneously, with actors within

\(^{12}\) As Weber (1978: 22) points out, social action need not be active; rather, it may include an purposeful failure to act or passive acquiescence. It may also be directed at past or expected future behaviour by others.

\(^{13}\) Institutionalisation is defined as the extent to which procedures of interaction, role expectations, and mutual evaluations have become subject to rules and regulations, either informally established (i.e. as rituals, traditions, or customary practices) or formally codified. It is thus a measure of the institutional constraints on individual or collective agency in social relations, much in same the way North (1990: 3; 1991) defines institutions: “the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”.
and outside of their own group; actors interacting as representatives need to balance their individual preferences and decisions with those of the actors they represent, while also adapting to the behaviour of their interlocutors. The first aspect of social relations thus consists of concrete episodes of social interaction.

In addition, however, we need to consider the more long-term or structural relationships in which different actors may feel to be engaged. Referring again back to Weber (1978: 26), we may use his concept of a social relationship that denotes the “behaviour of a plurality of actors insofar as [...] the action of each takes account of that of the others and is oriented in these terms”. Seemingly similar to our definition of social interactions above, Weber’s social relationship in fact “consists entirely and exclusively in the existence of a probability that there will be a meaningful social action” (ibid.: 27). It is thus a structural definition, based on temporarily fixed perceptions and expectations of reciprocal behaviour. Such role expectations may be based on affection, such as friendship or love, but also on past experiences, or on material relations, such as those between the employer and the employed. The expectations, in turn, may induce specific forms of evaluations and attitudes between the interacting parties, such as trust and friendship, or prejudice and stigma. Such evaluations may be unilateral, as, for example, unrequited love or the racial prejudice of white supremacists, but are more often reciprocated in some way.

Evaluations between individuals or groups need not match or mirror each other; in effect, actors involved in a social relationship may define and understand their mutual relationship in very different terms. Such divergent understandings may be due to miscommunication or misinterpretations, but also to differences in the world views of the involved actors. Moreover, while shared understandings and definitions may improve the efficacy and efficiency of interactions, divergent definitions of a relationship may function in much the

14 Due to the complexity of these types of interactions, Simmel (1950) argues that collective behaviour is usually negative, since it is by definition easier to induce collective agreement around a negative proposition than around a positive one.
same way - provided the desired trajectory of the relationship is similar for all those involved, regardless of their understanding of the situation. The second aspect of social relations is thus constituted by the role expectations, perceptions, and evaluations that exist between relating actors. Although most types of social relations have both episodic interactive and structural perceptual aspects, some relations only exist for the duration of one social interaction (e.g. a market exchange between a tourist and a local salesman). Others, on the other hand, may exist only as perceptions - for example the ethnic prejudice of those who have never actually interacted with people from a different ethnic community.

In the subsequent section, we will focus on the ways in which social relations are constructed and produced, emphasising the role of discursive identity cleavages in these processes. Before doing so, however, it is useful briefly to outline the difference between constructive and destructive social relations. In terms of social perceptions, destructive relations are characterised by negative evaluations, or ‘antagonism’, while constructive ones are defined by positive evaluations and co-operative attitudes. These general categories also help to classify social interactions, although these also differ along the dimension of their goal-orientation: are the goals of the interacting parties competitive (i.e. a zero-sum game) or compatible? The two dimensions of evaluations and goal-orientation result in a matrix of four ideal-typical social interactions (see table 1.1): co-operation, competition, avoidance, and conflict. It should be noted that real interactions may contain aspects of different ideal-types. Friends may co-operate in one context, but be forced to compete the next day; similarly, competition between actors who dislike each other may involve aspects of conflict.

Table 1.1: Ideal types of social interactions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goal Orientation</th>
<th>Intercommunal evaluations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compatible</td>
<td>Co-operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitive</td>
<td>Competition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Co-operation is defined as the social relations in which actors have goals that are compatible and evaluate each other positively; competition exists when the actors are generally positively disposed towards each other, but their goals are competitive. They will therefore have to compete - that is, negotiate and measure their strengths against each other in order to formulate a compromise or, if necessary, acquire exclusive access to particular opportunities - but will accept the outcome of the competition. Co-operation and competition thus coincide with positive intercommunal perceptions and constitute constructive social relations.

Conflict, on the other hand, is distinguished by the negative evaluations and competitive goals of the interacting parties and strategies that involve diminishing, negating, or even destroying actors involved in the social relations. Violence, especially in its collective forms (Spencer 2004; Tilly 2003), is therefore interpreted as an indicator of conflict in social relations. Avoidance, as the final category, exists if actors have compatible goals, but are also negatively disposed towards each other. In some ways, avoidance cannot be considered a social interaction, but rather its negation - there are, however, situations in which actors actively avoid each other, regardless of the potential constructive effects of engagement. Such active avoidance is therefore, along with conflict, considered as destructive social relations.

The subsequent section will explore one way in which to explain the constructive or destructive nature of social relations, using the notions of nativism, bureaucratic classifications, and social identities as central explanatory concepts.

1.2.3 Struggling to Belong: Nativist Categorisation and Social Relations

This section will address the central theoretical puzzle of this thesis: how can bureaucratic categorisations help to explain urban social relations? There is a vast and diverse literature offering explanations of social relations, ranging from Kakar’s (1996) psychoanalytical approach, via the social psychological fields of, for example, Simpson and Yinger (1953), Allport (1954), Sherif and Sherif (1969), and Tajfel and Turner (1979), all the way to
probabilistic ‘root cause’ theories of collective violence and civil war (Collier 2004; Huntington 2002; Stewart 2008a). However, as Huddy (2001) highlights, there remains remarkably little interaction between these various levels of analysis, thus curtailing the opportunities for fruitful interaction and cross-fertilisation. This thesis makes a moderate attempt at connecting and integrating a few of the strands of this social relations literature, using the concepts of social identities and identification as its focal point.

In recent decades, social identity has been a popular, yet increasingly criticised concept in the study of social relations (e.g. Brubaker 2004: 28–53). It has been used in primordial explanations, in which identities reflect natural groups with immutable cultural content that determines the behaviour of the group members, including their relations with other groups (Huntington 2002). Constructivist analysts have rightly attacked this premise, but as Fearon and Laitin (2000) and Brubaker (2004) argue, for example, they have been divided on the precise implications of the constructivist premise. In an overview of some influential constructivist analyses, Fearon and Laitin observe a tension between approaches that emphasise the structural processes behind identity construction; those that identify an independent, causal role for discourse; and those that focus on strategic and rational agency by individuals.

On the basis of their overview of the empirical literature, they argue for the strength of explanations focusing in strategic and rational choice, at the expense of an independent role of discourse and the underlying structural factors. It is argued here, however, that the three approaches are not mutually exclusive, but should be used as different layers in analysing identities and social relations. Briefly, such a multi-layered analysis dissects the main research question into three sub-problems. First, it starts at the level of perceptions and interactions, describing how people may use social identities to structure these two aspects of social relations (section 1.2.3.1). Second, the analysis allows for the multiplicity of salient identity cleavages and focuses on the effects of intersectionality and the role of bureaucratic
categorisations in the process of identity choice (section 1.2.3.2). Finally, section 1.2.3.3 considers the ways in which bureaucratic categorisations may affect patterns of identification over time and thus alter the historical process of identity formation.

1.2.3.1 Discourse as a Tool: Locating Boundaries, Positioning Groups, Framing Interactions

We will now examine the different levels of this analysis in more detail. Central to all levels is a broadly instrumental interpretation of identity cleavages and of discourse more generally: much like language or other types of social tools, identity cleavages are an instrument that individuals and social groups use to interpret their environment and give it meaning. People live in the ‘raw’ reality, but in order to act meaningfully they must selectively reconstruct this reality into a simplified – and therefore understandable – social world (Allan 2005: 4). The ‘objective’ features of reality are therefore not sufficient to motivate or determine social action by themselves; at a minimum, some features need to be selected and translated into meaningful perceptions and understandings, through a process that can be referred to as “interpretative meaning construction” (Kane 1997: 251). This is a discursive process that occurs both in the minds of individual actors and in their interactions with other actors (Blumer 1969). Together, these different forms of creative agency mediate the individual experiences of the actors, their individual and shared memories, and the relevant discourses at their disposal.

With the exception of purely reactive, ‘instinctive’ forms of behaviour, all human perceptions and forms of action depend on this process of meaning construction, including social relations. Different types of discourses guide different types of perceptions and actions; it is argued here that social perceptions and interactions are structured by the discourses of

---

15 Referred to by Blumer (1969) as the internal interaction between the actor and the ‘self’.
16 Cf. the concept of ‘cultural models’ used by D’Andrade and Strauss (1992) and Shore (1996).
identity cleavages. Identities are thus tools in a broadly instrumentalist sense: rather than mere instruments in the hands of economically rational individuals, they are used constructively - and continuously, by everyone - to reduce the complexity of reality in the ‘raw’, allowing people to imagine society as a collection of communities instead of a huge collection of infinitely diverse individuals.

An identity cleavage may fulfil these social functions in various ways. First, it can serve as a tool for self-identification and the identification of others, and to draw the relevant social boundaries between and around all those involved. The features that people use to characterise themselves and others in terms of these categories are the boundary conditions. Phenotypical differences, for example, may be used symbolically to represent identity boundaries based on ‘racial’ or ethnic identity discourses. A cleavage is thus used for identification by connecting it to certain symbolic features or ‘gestures’ of individuals or groups, whose symbolic meaning is derived from the identity discourse in question (Blumer 1969, 1980; Mead and Morris 1934).

Second, an identity cleavage can provide guidance on mutual perceptions and the expected rules and role behaviour of different parties involved in the interaction (Onuf 1989). As Blumer (1958) and Bobo (1999) show, for example, the sense of hierarchy and competition inherent in the ‘race’ cleavage provides clear, ideal-typical evaluations and behavioural expectations between the various ‘racial’ communities. Third, a cleavage can help to frame and contextualise an interaction into a longer trend of past, present, and expected future interactions. A market interaction between members of different ethnic groups may, if so interpreted, be seen as part of the larger field of ethnic relations in that society. As such,

---

17 Posner (2005: 15-7) distinguishes between ‘identity categories’ or identities and the category sets (referred to here as ‘identity cleavages’) that specific combinations of identities constitute. For example, the individual labels of Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo are identities; together, however, they constitute the identity cleavage of the wazobia notion of Nigerian ethnicity. Identity cleavages thus comprise identity categories and the cleavage boundaries that separate the categories. Cleavage boundaries are defined, following Barth (1998), as (i) criteria for identification with one of the identity categories (also referred to as the boundary conditions) and (ii) the social rules and regulations for interactions between people of from different communities.
fourth, an identity discourse may also contain information about the nature of the interaction and its objectives – take for example Appadurai’s (2006: 51) notion of ‘predatory identities’, “whose social construction and mobilisation require the extinction of other, proximate social categories”. Finally, identity cleavages provide tools through which groups and representatives of groups can co-ordinate their ‘joint action’ through framing and identity-based mobilisation (Cohen 1969: 201-11; Posner 2005).

Building on this broadly instrumentalist interpretation of identification, it is likely that identity cleavages are to some extent “quasi-autonomous social forces” (Bobo 1999: 450) that can affect the nature of social relations. As such, identity cleavages can be argued to affect social relations through two, mutually reinforcing, mechanisms. The simplest one is described by Tajfel and Turner’s (1978; 1979; 1982) social identity theory: any collection of people tends, once given different identity categories, to display positive in-group evaluations and social action (‘ethnocentrism’) and negative out-group perceptions and discriminatory behaviour. According to this minimal group paradigm (Tajfel 1970), the mere fact that an identity boundary is salient is a cause for positive in-group and negative out-group perceptions, affect, and discriminatory behaviour (Brewer 1996: 292). Moreover, Huddy (2001: 14) suggests that the more hard-bounded (or less permeable) an identity cleavage is, the more likely it is to inspire in-group identification and out-group bias and prejudice. Hartstone and Augoustinos (1995: 179) suggest that these effects are particularly strong in dichotomous classifications, because they “prime a competitive orientation”. Over the past decades, dozens of largely experimental studies have confirmed and corroborated Tajfel and Turner’s minimal group findings (Brown 2008; Dovidio et al. 2007); on that basis, it serves as one of the core premises of this conceptual framework.

There is, however, some contention about whether simple categorisation actually spurs negative out-group bias, or that this out-group bias results only from a more positive evaluation of the in-group. Also, it has been suggested that social identity theory is only
concerned with the boundaries of identity cleavages, neglecting the potential role of the content, or meaning, of identity categories (Huddy 2001). In addition, therefore, we take Blumer’s (1958) notion of “group position” into account. Blumer (1958: 3) argues that racial prejudice is based on a sense of racial group position or, in other words, “a scheme for racial identification”. Prejudiced interracial perceptions are thus the result of the ways in which people construct themselves and others in terms of the hierarchical and competitive identity cleavage of ‘race’. ‘Race’ is hierarchical due to the sense of superiority on the part of the dominant group members; it is competitive because of the “sense of proprietary claim over certain rights, statuses, and resources” on the part of the dominant group (Bobo 1999: 449).

An identity cleavage such as ‘race’ can thus impact on social relations, not only because it categorises individuals into communities (the categorisation effect), but also because of the way in which it positions communities towards each other; that is, because of its meaning and content (the group positioning effect)\(^1\). If both the categorisation and group positioning effects are present, the latter may reinforce some forms of antagonism and conflict, but attenuate others. For example, in strongly racist societies, the racist discourse may enhance all negative perceptions focused on the ‘black’ community, including negative self-perceptions of members of this community, while the same time reducing negative perceptions of the ‘white’ community.

On this basis, it is possible to formulate ideal types of cleavages and outline their impact on social relations. It may be expected that the following factors are conducive to antagonism, avoidance, and conflict between communities: dichotomous cleavages; hard identity boundaries; and hierarchical and competitive group positioning. Identity cleavages with these characteristics are therefore referred to as exclusionary – see table 1.2. In contrast, multiple or

\(^{1}\)Identity cleavages may vary along four dimensions. First, the number of identity categories they comprise may differ; second, they may differ in their salience in society or group at any point in time. Third, cleavages may differ in the content that defines their categories, their boundary criteria, and, in consequence, the hardness of their identity boundaries: the conditions for interactions across identity boundaries. Finally, cleavages may differ in their representations of ideal-typical relations between their identity communities, ranging from equal and co-operative to hierarchical and competitive – cf. Horowitz’ (2000: 22) concept of ‘ranking’.
nested identity categories, porous identity boundaries, and co-operative and interdependent\textsuperscript{19} group positioning are the main factors that reduce positive in-group bias and the tension between communities. Identities with these features will be referred to as inclusionary.

Table 1.2: Ideal types of inclusionary and exclusionary identity cleavages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Inclusionary</th>
<th>Exclusionary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cleavage structure</td>
<td>Multiple/nested</td>
<td>Dichotomous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardness boundaries</td>
<td>Porous</td>
<td>Hard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group positioning</td>
<td>Interdependent</td>
<td>Ranked</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are many empirical examples of both types of identities, as well as ones that combine different aspects. One type, however, is particularly relevant to this thesis: identities shaped along the premises of nativism. As defined above, nativist identities fall squarely within the exclusionary type. First, they categorise communities along the dichotomous ‘native’-‘settler’ boundary. Second, these boundaries are hard due to their primordial conditions for identification and its inherent aspect of ‘native’-‘settler’ competition. Third, nativist identities are exclusionary because they are hierarchical, ranking the ‘native’ communities above those considered ‘settlers’. On this basis, it may be expected that nativist identities are conducive to destructive social relations.

1.2.3.2 Intersectionality and Identity Choice

We have thus seen how identities may impact on social relations: inclusionary identities are conducive to constructive perceptions and interactions, while exclusionary identities increase the likelihood of antagonism, avoidance, and conflict. In order to apply this theory to the real world, however, we must take into account that several, potentially competing, identity

\textsuperscript{19} Hewstone and Brown (1986) argue for a mutual intergroup differentiation model, in which groups do not have to have equal status to achieve intergroup co-operation, but differentiated – yet interdependent – areas of expertise.
cleavages are salient at any point in time. This multiplicity of identity cleavages has relevance both for social perceptions and social interactions, although in different ways. Multiple identity cleavages complicate perceptions and role expectations between members of different communities if they overlap and intersect (Bulmer and Solomos 2009; Davis 2008; Hancock 2007; McCall 2005; Phoenix and Pattynama 2006; Prins 2006).

In essence, the intersectionality approach resembles the classical notion of cross-cutting and overlapping cleavages (e.g. Bentley 1908): while cross-cutting cleavages reduce potential for tension and conflict across cleavage boundaries, overlapping cleavages are considered to reinforce each other. The more recent feminist contribution to this line of argument, however, has been to show the intricacies of how different cleavages may interact to reinforce the exclusion of particular subordinated groups, such as black women in America. The intersection of cleavages not only reinforces their exclusive effect, but also relocates the main boundaries and changes the ways in which exclusion functions (Crenshaw 1989).

The intersection of cleavages may thus impact on the patterns of perceptions between the communities that are defined by the cleavages, as well as relocate the salient boundaries between them. The multiplicity of identifications per se, however, has little impact on social perceptions, because perceptions concern entire categories of people rather than specific individuals. This is not the case, however, in situations that require social action, such as social interactions. To deal with the complicating consequences of multiple identity cleavages in such situations, Posner (2005: 4-7) introduces the concept of identity choice, which assumes that individuals ‘choose’ their most appropriate identities strategically from their identity repertoire. But while Posner assumes a choice to be economically rational20, this thesis assumes a level of constrained strategic choice of the individual actors involved in

---

20 Such an assumption may be justified in his analysis, as it focuses on highly institutionalised and competitive elections. Others, however, have emphasised the importance of for example emotional considerations in the process of identity choice and identification in other contexts - such as intensely violent interactions (Horowitz 2002: 545-60; Petersen 2002). In these specific historical situations, certain identity boundaries have become burdened with grievances and expectations of violent social action. This renders them highly salient, potentially to the exclusion of any other identity cleavage - hence the emotional identification – as well as catalysts for further violent behaviour.
interactions. This more lenient assumption allows for the multiplicity of cleavages and strategic agency, while also taking into account the relational and situational constraints on identification and the fact that the objectives of interactions may go beyond those dictated by economic rationality.

An aspect of identity choice that receives little attention in Posner’s treatment of the subject is the idea that every instance of identity choice involves not only the blind and unthinking application of the identity’s pre-existing meanings, but also their creative reconstruction (Blumer 1969; Charon 2007; Goffman 1969). A striking example of this creativity may be found in some uses of the word ‘nigger’, which, in certain contexts, was reconstructed from an exclusively derogatory term into a racialised ‘badge of honour’. Such creativity is driven by agency, but constrained and made possible by contextual and situational factors. We will consider these factors in turn, starting with contextual ones: the composition of the identity repertoire; the demographic and material relations in a society; and the institutions, practices, and discourses of politics.

First, the importance of the composition of the identity repertoire is simple to intuit: if an identity has no prior salience or social meaning it cannot be used effectively to frame social interactions. This thesis thus takes ‘identity salience’ to denote whether or not an identity is part of a person’s identity repertoire, rather than the extent of the salience of a particular identity to the person. Although some argue that the depth of the attachment of an individual person to a particular identity affects the strength of the in-group and out-group biases, the empirical evidence for this hypothesis is mixed (Brown 2008: 504). This thesis therefore defines salience at the collective level, arguing that the likelihood of the categorisation and group positioning effects of an identity cleavage depend on the proportion of a population that feels the identity is salient to them.

the connection between the identity a person chooses and the payoff she receives lies in nothing more than the size of the group that the identity defines. […] Ethnicity is an admission card for membership to a coalition of a particular size and a source of information about the political coalitions to which others belong.

In similar vein, Dovidio et al. (2009: 7-8) argue that members of majority communities are motivated to maintain their dominance and, therefore, are likely to “endorse a one-group representation and re-categorisation as a single group because they see the qualities of the superordinate group as representing and promoting their group’s dominant values and characteristics”. Minority group members, in contrast, likely prefer an identity that highlights their minority status and thus may help to mobilise for their group’s emancipation (ibid.: 9). Although the latter approach is arguably needlessly mechanistic, it may be clear that the relative demographic sizes of identity communities play an important role in the process of identity choice and re-construction.

Proponents of realistic conflict theory have long made the same argument for material relations, based on the proposition that competing material interests are a significant cause for conflict (Austin and Worchel 1979; Coenders 2001; LeVine and Campbell 1971; Sherif and Sherif 1969). Competing interests may not only increase the likelihood of particular identities to be selected, but also affect their meanings through notions of grievance, threat, or discrimination. Any account of identity construction should therefore take into account the role of changing material relations, for example through the concept of horizontal inequalities (Stewart 2001, 2008a). These inequalities may be political or economic, but also cultural (Langer and Brown 2008): in the eyes of some of Kano’s Christians, for example, the strong
Islamic identification of the Kano State Government can be construed as a horizontal inequality of cultural status. Persistent horizontal inequalities between members of different identity groups are argued to increase the likelihood of the selection of those identities and infuse them with meanings of grievance, threat, and conflict.

The demographic and material context of interactions thus impacts on the process of identity choice and reproduction; a similar argument can be made for their political context. This thesis considers politics to be constituted by the processes through which different actors, ranging from political elites to local-level neighbourhood community groups, interact in their pursuit of power and effective governance. Both objectives, power and governance, require political authorities to re-construct the social world into useful and meaningful categories: on the one hand, this helps to identify their supporting constituencies while, on the other, it allows them to identify segments of the population to be targeted by policy interventions. These categories may differentiate citizens from illegal immigrants, liberals from socialists, the unemployed from the formally employed, or ‘indigenous’ citizens from ‘non-indigenes’. The significant point to underline is that if these categories overlap with social identities, they may increase the salience of these identities and thus the likelihood of their selection in situations of social interaction.

To understand this process, the analysis uses Posner’s (2005) insightful account of institutions and identities in Zambia. Institutions have been defined above as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. There is a difference, however, between social institutions (based, for example, on customary practices, cultural traditions, or religious values) and political institutions, which rely on legal codification for their legitimacy. With regard to political institutions, Posner (2005: 5-6) argues that they affect identity choice because they structure incentives and provide opportunities for the co-ordination of joint action or collective interactions.
In electoral politics, for example, political institutions determine the requirements for access to the political arena and may thus reward the selection of certain identification over others. The boundaries of electoral units and the conditions for election are particularly important in this regard. Moreover, political institutions may provide for preferential treatment of certain identity communities in a more direct way, for example by restricting access to welfare institutions or education to their members (ibid.: 5). Examples of such policies may include the formal discrimination of South African apartheid, but also the emancipatory policies of multiculturalism. Because as Ireland (2000: 270) writes, “even compensatory policies that aim at reducing social inequalities can magnify the expression of cultural differences”.

This argument may be extended to social institutions, such as those derived from religious beliefs, cultural traditions, or local customs. However, there is a level of functional differentiation between political and social institutions: social institutions often relate to situations and issues beyond the reach of codified political rules and regulations. This may pertain to courtship or marriage rituals, but also to the institutions that define charisma\(^\text{21}\) and grant other forms of informal authority. However, the lack of codification of social institutions and their limited demographic reach (e.g. only within one particular ethnic or religious community) may render them more likely to be subject to ambiguity and contestation than political rules and regulations. Moreover, analysing both political and social institutions requires not only an examination of their written or spoken forms, but also of the ways in which they are implemented in practice.

Institutions, depending on their implementation, may thus be used to reinforce and re-construct certain social identifications; they are an indirect tool of identity formation in the

\(^{21}\) Charisma is understood here in Weber’s (1978: 241) sense: “a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he [or she] is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities”. As Weber also notes, these qualities are often not considered as acquired skills, but as gifts - either of divine or magical origins, or of an extraordinary personality. In the context of Nigeria, examples of charisma exist in Pentecostal churches (through the concept of ‘grace’) and in Sufi islam (as in its notion of ‘baraka’).
hands of political authorities and a simultaneous constraint on the actions of future leaders. However, authoritative actors may also affect identity choice more directly, namely by convincing individuals or groups to make particular choices. This thesis argues that such influence is only possible if the leaders have a form of authority that is based on their connection and embeddedness within their community. This type of authority is defined as informal authority, as opposed to a sense of formal authority that is derived from constitutional codification. While formal authority is generally required to change political institutions, informal authority may be used to influence the ways in which people think and act more directly, especially through public discourses. In this sense, informal authority is particularly important in situations of collective interaction, when leaders with informal authority are able, through discursive framing, to influence public interpretations of triggers, justifications, mobilisation, and opportunities for collective action.

The main contextual factors used to explain identity choices are thus the identity repertoire, the demographic and material relations prevalent in a society, and its institutions, political practices, and public discourses. In addition to these contextual factors, identity choice is also constrained by the features of specific situations. In this regard, identity choice is firstly constrained by the objectives of the interaction. Affective interactions, aimed at the development of more or less intimate relationships, may lead people to select different identifications than casual meetings in the workplace. Secondly, the meaningful features - or available symbols - that characterise the situation are likely to affect identity choice. These may be features or gestures of the interacting parties, including their dress, skin colour, or language, but may also be aspects of the direct environment of the interaction such as its timing or location.

---

22 Thus, formal authority is closely related to Weber’s concept of legal authority; informal authority comprises his traditional and charismatic authority (Weber 1978: 212-54). For more details see Ehrhardt (2007).

23 Theories of collective action used in this thesis are discussed in Brass (1997, 2003), Schock (2005), Tilly (2003), McAdam (1982) and McAdam and Tarrow (2000)
1.2.3.3 Indigeneity, Autochthony, and the Origins of Nativism

So far, this introduction has argued that nativist identities may impact negatively on social perceptions and interactions if they are part of a population’s identity repertoire and if they are selected in situations of social interaction. Moreover, it showed that the outcome of identity choices are dependent on the composition of the repertoire at the time of the interaction, as well as on its demographic, material, and political context and several situational factors. Relating this argument back to the initial research question, this theoretical framework has outlined one role of the bureaucratic, nativist categorisations of legal indigeneity and bureaucratic autochthony on social relations in the two cities. Such categorisations may impact on social relations if they become part of the institutions, practices, and discourses that shape politics; in this manner, they may increase the likelihood of their nativist identities to be chosen in situations of interaction.

The full impact of this process becomes clear if we acknowledge that these instances of identity selection are not isolated, timeless incidents. Rather, interethnic perceptions and social interactions should be analysed in their historical context and in relation to other social processes occurring simultaneously. Through this analytical lens, social relations become part of the larger historical process of identity formation, in which an individual’s perceptions and interactions converge with elite interests, public discourses, demographic and institutional developments, and an infinite number of other forms of agency and social interaction. To analyse this complex process, we turn to the historical analysis of identity construction as exemplified by Anderson (2006), Vail (1989), Hobsbawm (1992), Ranger (1994), Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983), Cohen (1969) and Shah (2002).

Inspired by these analyses, historical identity construction can be considered as a public, discursive process on which politicians, interest groups, and other ‘visible’ actors have
significant influence but which is also fed ‘from below’ and is dependent on its structural context. This is aptly summarised by Blumer (1958: 3-6):

Leaders, prestige bearers, officials, group agents, dominant individuals, and ordinary laymen present to one another characterisations of the [other] group and express their feelings and ideas on the relations. Through talk, tales, stories, gossip, anecdotes, messages, pronouncements, news accounts, orations, preachments, sermons and the like definitions are presented and feelings are expressed. In this usually vast and complex interaction separate views run against one another, influence one another, modify each other, incite one another, and fuse together in new forms. […] If the interaction becomes circular and reinforcing, devoid of serious inner opposition, such currents grow, fuse, and become strengthened.

Bureaucratic categories, such as those of indigeneity and autochthony, are one example of the “characterisations” in Blumer’s “vast and complex interaction”. If they become part of the talk, tales, stories, and other prevalent discursive formations in a society, they can become transformed or incorporated into salient notions of identity and identification. Political organisations and elites are central to this process, because they have the authority, influence, and visibility to introduce a set of categories and disseminate it in the wider society. They may do this through speeches and other public discourses, but also by embodying the categories into political and social institutions.

In addition to these public discourses and institutions, however, there is a range of other factors that explain historical processes of identity formation – including demographic developments, structural economic shifts, and critical ‘turning point’ historical events. Due to the contingent and unique nature of historical trajectories, however, the analysis of these factors will be heuristic, aimed at building up context-sensitive explanatory narratives within the two cases. Therefore, the two case studies below, tracing the trajectory of nativism from its bureaucratic birth to its role in everyday social relations, will commence with an historical
account of the development of social identities and notions of belonging. These narratives will then provide the backdrop for an analysis of contemporary society, which focuses on the main factors that help to explain nativist identity choice: the composition of the cities’ identity repertoire; their demographic and material relations; and the institutions, practices, and public discourses that dominate their politics.

1.2.4 Research Questions

The theory presented in the preceding sections of this introduction can be used to dissect the central research question into sub-questions. In this regard, it may be helpful to restate the central research question: to what extent can the introduction and proliferation of bureaucratic, nativist categories (i.e. indigeneity and autochthony) help explain tensions between ethnic communities in Kano and Amsterdam? Section 1.2.3 has disaggregated this central question into essentially three sub-problems, focusing on (i) the origins of nativism and the impact of nativist bureaucratic categories on the historical process of identity formation (section 1.2.3.3); (ii) the impact of nativist categories on intersectionality and identity selection (section 1.2.3.2); and (iii) the hypothesised negative impact of nativist identities on social relations (section 1.2.3.1).

The first set of sub-questions guiding the empirical analysis will therefore focus on the historical origins and impact of the nativist discourse. More specifically, it will analyse, heuristically, the historical origins of nativism as an ideological discourse, with special emphasis on the specific influence of indigeneity and bureaucratic autochthony on the processes of identity construction. The second set of questions, in turn, will then ‘freeze time’ and focus on the contemporary factors that increase, or indeed diminish, the likelihood that nativist identities are selected by individuals and groups in everyday social situations. In other words, this second set of research questions will focus on the extent to which contemporary social and political structures reproduce, or deconstruct, nativist social identities in Kano and
Amsterdam. Using the theory in section 1.2.3.2 as a guide, these questions will look specifically for the influence of, on the one hand, public discourses of belonging, horizontal inequalities, and identity repertoires and, on the other, political institutions, authorities, and public policies. Finally, the third set of research questions will assess the extent to which the hypothesised negative impact of nativist identities matches the reality of everyday social relations in Kano and Amsterdam.

On this basis, the sub-questions that will be used to address the central question of this thesis will be the following:

1a. What are the historical origins of the nativist discourses in Kano and Amsterdam?
1b. To what extent did the top-down nativist categorisations in Kano and Amsterdam impact on the historical development of identities in the two cities?
2a. To what extent do contemporary social structures, i.e. the salient discourses of belonging, horizontal inequalities, and patterns of self-identification, help to reproduce nativist identities?
2b. To what extent do contemporary institutions, political authorities, and public policies reproduce nativist identities of belonging?
3. To what extent are social relations between ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities characterised by antagonism, avoidance, and conflict?

In the empirical analysis below, questions 1a and 1b will be discussed in the historical chapters 2 and 6. Question 2a will be addressed in chapters 3 and 7, followed by an analysis of question 2b in chapters 4 and 8. Finally, question 3 will guide the analysis of chapters 5 and 9. Before engaging with the empirical core of the thesis, however, the subsequent section will discuss some of the more important methodological challenges and choices upon which the empirical analyses are built.
1.3 Research Methodology

This section will briefly introduce the research design, data collection methods, and analytical procedures behind this study.

1.3.1 Research Design and Case Selection

This DPhil project, building on the author’s MPhil thesis (Ehrhardt 2007), began with the puzzling observation that Kano and Amsterdam, although widely apart in most aspects of their everyday existence, shared two characteristic features: on the one hand, a significant sense of tension between their ‘native’ and ‘settler’ ethnic communities and on the other, a salient state-endorsed discourse categorising the city population into ethnic ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’. This observation raises the question of whether state attempts to re-categorise the city population along ‘native’-‘settler’ lines could have contributed to the tension between ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities. On this basis, the objective of the DPhil study has been to develop a theoretical approach to this question. As such, this thesis comprises two least-similar, partly heuristic case studies of comparable cosmopolitan cities, which are loosely held together by their shared research questions, a common conceptual framework, comparable empirical data, and of course the presence of the two objects of the study: nativist categorisations and ethnic tensions.

As discussed in, for example, George and Bennett (2005), case studies are particularly suited to the purpose of theory development. Case studies allow for in-depth and nuanced analysis and provide opportunities for combining disciplinary approaches as well as different types of data. Case studies also allow for “process tracing”, an analytical technique that “converts a historical narrative into an analytical causal explanation couched in explicit theoretical forms” (George and Bennett 2005: 211). Process tracing creates multiple points of observation within a single case study, which are causally connected by the central analytic
narrative. Case studies can therefore help to build or refine theories, specifying complex and interactive causal patterns that are context-sensitive and open to the possibility of “equifinality” (George and Bennett 2005: 215).

On this basis, this research has been structured around two in-depth case studies, which focus on the causal mechanisms linking nativist categorisations to ethnic relations within Kano and Amsterdam. These two case studies are the core of this research; the primary methodological challenge, therefore, has been to produce valid and reliable accounts of the social processes within these two cities. Like any other research technique, however, case studies also have weaknesses. Although process tracing is designed to minimise risks of alternative explanations and endogeneity effects within the case studies, it remains an empirical challenge to collect the required data. Theory-building case studies often require a wealth of empirical data that precludes the incorporation of a large number of cases into the analysis, while at the same time pushing the theoretical framework of the analysis into the realm of idiosyncrasy. As a result, generalising from the conclusions of case study research is often problematic.

This research has attempted to address some of these challenges by loosely following Mill’s (1843) method of agreement, or the ‘least-similar’ comparative framework. This means that while the two cases differ in most significant aspects, they also overlap in two significant ways. First, Kano and Amsterdam are comparable social units, in the sense that they are both open and cosmopolitan cities24 with long histories of managing the struggles resulting from a heterogeneous population. Moreover, the diversity of both cities is multidimensional, including ethnic, religious, class, and other nested or intersecting identity boundaries. Due to this historical experience, both cities have their own ‘traditional’ and idiosyncratic ways of

---

24 Although different in absolute size, Kano and Amsterdam are both historical commercial centres and large cities within their respective countries (Kano: 2.8-5 million, second only to Lagos; Amsterdam: 756,347, the largest city in the country). Moreover, the relative sizes of the different identity communities within the cities are comparable, with roughly 60% ‘natives’ and 40% ‘settlers’. Many of these ‘settlers’ have not migrated themselves, but were born as (grand)children of those who migrated into the cities.
defining and dealing with social diversity, which interact (and sometimes compete) with the relatively recent notions of indigeneity and autochthony. Both cities are also characterised, however, by clear ‘native’ majorities – a final factor that renders the two cities useful units of comparison.

The second set of shared features of Kano and Amsterdam concerns the conceptual objects of this study: the remarkable overlap between their nativist categorisations (indigeneity and autochthony) and the somewhat elusive, but nonetheless very real, sense of interethnic tension between ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’ that exists in the two cities. The two ways in which Kano and Amsterdam overlap are thus, irrespective of the many differences between them, methodological arguments for their comparability in a least-similar framework. An additional requirement for this comparative design, however, is that the two case studies use a shared set of research questions and analytical concepts, which have been detailed above, as well as comparable sources of data. These data sources will be discussed in section 1.3.2.

The methodological arguments for selecting Kano and Amsterdam were therefore, first, that the two cities are comparable units; second, that they both feature the central explanatory concept, bureaucratic nativism, but are different in many other ways; and third, that the same research methods were used in the analysis of the two cities. A final reason for the unusual choice of cases, however, was ethical rather than methodological in nature. It relates to the imperative for researchers in ‘development’ to continuously test and challenge the assumptions prevalent in ‘developmental’ thinking. One of the most effective ways of designing such a challenge, this thesis argues, is simply to test one of the core tenets of ‘development’: the existence of a meaningful boundary between the ‘developed’ and the ‘developing’ world. By selecting Kano and Amsterdam, which many would classify as opposite sides of the ‘development’ boundary, this research aims to test the usefulness of this boundary and, if possible, suggest other ways of describing their differences that are more analytically precise and productive.
With its unusual comparison, this research constitutes somewhat of a methodological experiment, connecting least-similar heuristic case studies in a loosely comparative framework. Note, however, that the comparative ambitions of the study are modest, relating solely to the level of analytic explanation. At this theoretical level, the comparison constitutes a “tough test” (George and Bennett 2005: 76) for the theoretical framework described above, while at the same time allowing both cases to contribute their own contextual factors to the framework. It thus simultaneously tests the usefulness of the common conceptual approach and contrasts the explanatory factors and conditions arising from the heuristic historical and sociological analyses. If the framework proves useful in these two highly divergent cases, it may have value in other contexts as well. It may, however, prove to be useful only up to a point, after which it has to be adjusted to fit the particulars of individual cases.

1.3.2 Data Collection

The data used in these analyses was collected through five months of field work in Kano between 2006 and 2008 and six months of active data collection in the Netherlands in 2008. In Kano, I was affiliated to a local development NGO, the Development Research and Project Centre (dRPC), which provided office space and an invaluable wealth of contacts. In Amsterdam, I became acquainted with the municipal research department (O+S), which provided indispensable access to their survey results. The primary data used in this thesis is the result of mixed research methods, including qualitative interviews, personal observations25, and quantitative perceptions surveys. Two concerns guided the process of data collection: the quality and representativeness of the data within each case; and the comparability of the types and sources of data across cases. This section will discuss the most

---

25 Although ethnographic participant observation was beyond the scope of this DPhil research, the fieldwork has allowed the researcher ample opportunity to witness everyday social life in the cities, as well as several ceremonies and events. Extensive fieldwork notes have recorded my observations and have subsequently been used in the empirical analysis.
important strategies used to address these concerns in the collection of qualitative and quantitative data.

First, the qualitative data used for this thesis consists of unstructured and semi-structured interviews and group discussions; newspaper articles\(^{26}\); archival materials from the Kano State colonial archives and the data from historical Dutch censuses available online\(^{27}\); and ethnographic mappings of certain violent ‘hotspots’ in Kano\(^{28}\). The main sources of qualitative data are the interviews and group discussions. In total, the fieldwork resulted in 59 formal and recorded\(^{29}\) interviews in Kano and 45 in Amsterdam. On the basis of the exploratory research problem, the selection strategy for these interviews developed over time. In both cities, the first batch of interviews comprised largely unstructured conversations with experts and stakeholders in the field of urban ethnic relations. This category comprised NGO professionals, academics, and civil servants; their interviews mainly focused on defining the “cultural domains” (Bernard 2006: 299-317) of ethnic relations, indigeneity, autochthony, belonging, and integration and collecting their tentative ideas of the interrelations between these concepts.

As the research progressed, more emphasis was put on capturing the opinions and experiences of various political authorities, including civil servants and politicians, traditional and ethnic authorities, religious leaders, and trade union representatives. Building on the tentative results from the key informant interviews, conversations with these political authorities became increasingly structured, focusing on questions of elite ethnic definition,

\(^{26}\) In Kano, hard copies of newspaper articles were collected from the periods from May–July 2004 and February and March 2006; for both Kano and Amsterdam, digital articles were collected through the Lexis Nexis UK website at www.lexisnexis.com/uk/nexis, last accessed 19 February 2011. Although Nigeria has a wide range of daily newspapers and the most productive press community in the African continent (Olutokun 2001), the quality and objectivity of much of its reporting is dubitable. To address this problem, where possible I have used newspapers from different parts of the country reporting on the same event.

\(^{27}\) http://www.volkstellingen.nl/, accessed 5 December 2010; censuses cover the period from 1830-1971.

\(^{28}\) Specifically, Sharada, Ja’en and Dorayi; the borders of Sabon Gari; and Dakata, Ranguza, and other parts of Brigade.

\(^{29}\) Where possible, interviews were recorded using a digital voice recorder and transcribed in full after the interview.
the roles of authoritative actors in the processes of ethnic relations and ‘integration’, and the sources of legitimacy and authority of these actors. Although the specific content of the interviews in Kano and Amsterdam differed, this approach to the selection of respondents and the structure of interviews was followed in both cities in order to improve the comparability of the data. An additional respondent selection criterion was to ensure a balance in terms of the ethnic, religious, and gender divisions in the two cities.

Second, the quantitative data used in this thesis has been collected through a perceptions survey, which focused on three main themes: people’s self-identifications; their relation to other communities and the state; and the horizontal inequalities between people of different communities. In Kano, over the two periods of data collection in 2006 and 2008, 420 questionnaires were administered by teams of local research assistants. In Amsterdam, the perceptions survey overlapped to a great extent with the Amsterdam Burgermonitor (ABM) government survey performed every year, to which the Dutch researchers kindly added the questions from my survey that were not included in theirs. This resulted in a large sample size (N=2,854), covering all major neighbourhoods and identity communities in Amsterdam. Because the ABM procedures have been relatively well-documented elsewhere, this section focuses on the survey administration in Kano.

Specifically, this section focuses on the issues of sampling, data quality, and working with research assistants. On the issue of sampling, the research used multi-stage sampling, meaning that a certain number of Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) were selected with a

---

30 The perceptions survey is adapted from the one used by the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security, and Ethnicity (CRIS) at the Department for International Development (Oxford). The CRIS survey was administered in various other places in Nigeria (e.g. Maiduguri, Kaduna, and Lagos), as well as in Ghana, Peru, Indonesia, and Malaysia. For more details on CRIS and the survey results, see Stewart (2008a) and the discussion papers at www.cris.ox.ac.uk.

31 Amsterdam Burgermonitor (ABM) is conducted by the municipal Research and Statistics Services (O+S).

32 The ABM survey was administered by telephone, in face-to-face interviews, and by mail, depending on the accessibility of the particular category of respondents. It is designed to include equal numbers of respondents from all stadsdelen (boroughs) and represent the city population in terms of ethnicity, gender, age, and socio-economic characteristics. For more details on the methods of ABM data collection, see www.os.amsterdam.nl (last accessed 19 February 2011).
probability proportional to size (PPS), from which a fixed number of households was chosen randomly to participate in the survey. The research population was the population of Kano. To ensure sufficient sample sizes of both ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’, the sampling frame was stratified for these “analytical domains” (Grosh 1996: 58–9). Four neighbourhoods in Kano were selected to represent the variability on the ‘native’-’settler’ scale: Kano’s Old City, homogeneous indigenous; Sabon Gari, homogenous non-indigenous; and Naibawa and Badawa with a heterogeneous population. Within this stratified sampling frame, the following conditions were set for the composition of the sample: (i) a 50/50 gender balance in each PSU; (ii) 10 randomly selected households in each PSU; and (iii) an equal number of randomly selected PSUs in each stratum. The total sample size was set on 420 households, as a compromise between financial and time constraints and a maximum precision.

Having set these conditions, the division of neighbourhoods into PSUs required some improvisation. Historically, Kano is divided into wards, but while a list of such wards existed for the Old City, neither Sabon Gari nor Badawa nor Naibawa had sufficiently small or clearly bounded wards to be used as PSUs. Instead, therefore, satellite maps from Google Earth were used to demarcate areas that functioned as PSUs. A second problem arose from the random selection of PSUs, because PPS selection requires accurate population statistics for each PSU (Grosh 1996: 216). These were hard to find. Only the Old City had a village listing from 1994, with population statistics for its wards (Department of Planning 1994). PSUs in Kano’s Old City were therefore selected with PPS; PSUs in the other two strata were selected at random. Within the PSUs, households were selected through a random walking pattern. From each household, a male or female interviewee was randomly selected; there were stringent rules for household substitution.

33 See Annex A for the location of these neighbourhoods in Kano.
34 Using the formula to calculate statistical precision specified by Woodruff (2002), the precision of this data set is just under 5% - in terms of analysis, this means that only intergroup differences larger than 5% are likely to be meaningful; anything below 5% can be caused by the sampling error.
The specific sampling procedures, derived from earlier CRISE PS exercises, were explained to the research assistants in a training session, which also gave them the opportunity to standardise their translations of the English questionnaire into Nigerian languages and practise. This training session was therefore the first mechanism through which to ensure the reliability of the survey administration by the research assistants. Remuneration was made conditional on following the procedures specified in the training. However, the problem at this stage was that I could neither work with them nor watch them while they were working, in order to ensure my safety and the willingness of respondents to co-operate. To ensure reliability of the data, I therefore used four additional mechanisms:

- selecting administrators (17 in total) with roots in the neighbourhoods where they administered the survey and who were proficient in the relevant Nigerian languages;
- collecting the administered questionnaires every day, checking their coding and overall quality and providing feedback by mobile phone the next morning;
- collecting sketches of the walking patterns of the administrators;
- ensuring that the principal research assistants, who were seniors to the administrators, checked with all teams regularly and participated in at least two interviews per administrator.

1.3.3 Data Analysis

Having grappled with the methodological challenges of field work in Kano and Amsterdam, the next step in the research process was the exploratory, mixed-methods analysis required to connect the empirical data to the research question. This section will discuss the analytical techniques used in the case studies below, as well as some of the issues of interpreting the research results. To begin with the analytical techniques, different approaches were necessary to address different dimensions of the research problem. These mixed methods not only
ensured analytical and data triangulation within each case, and thus a stronger base upon which to build the within-case conclusions, but also a level of comparability across cases (e.g. Bryman 1992: 131-4).

If we then zoom in on the analyses contained in the different chapters, the historical analysis of identity construction in chapters 2 and 6 uses largely secondary historical sources that have been re-interpreted through the lens of the above theoretical framework. Where necessary and feasible, original data has been used in addition to these secondary sources – most prominently from the last 16 Dutch volkstellingen (censuses), from the Kano State colonial archives, and from government policy documents (especially in the case of Amsterdam). These analyses have long time horizons - looking back to pre-colonial times in Kano (18th-19th century) and the ‘Second Golden Age’ in Amsterdam (19th century). Such longue durée analyses necessarily focus on grand trends at the expense of historical detail; this is possible and meaningful, however, thanks to the extensive existing historical scholarship on which this thesis can build.

The analyses of social structures (chapters 3 and 7) and the politics of belonging (chapters 4 and 8) ‘freeze’ time and zoom in on the contemporary era, with the purpose of analysing the present repertoires of identities that define belonging in Kano and Amsterdam. A substantial part of these analyses relies on the data from the perceptions surveys, specifically the findings on urban diversity, horizontal inequalities, self-identification, and political authority. For this data, chi-square tests were used to test for independence between ethnic identity and the relevant categorical variables, while the t-test was used to test for differences the cities’ ethnic groups along continuous variables (Agresti and Finlay 1997: 184, 254-6). Both analyses also relied on the range of semi-structured interviews and secondary sources, in order, for

---

35 As the majority of interviews were transcribed in full, most of the important interviews were coded and analysed through the NVIVO computer programme. The analysis started by ‘in vivo’ coding of the interviews and the construction of sensitising concepts on the basis of these codes (Ritchie and Lewis 2003: 203). However, in formal terms there was not sufficiently ‘thick’ data for a full grounded theory analysis. Therefore, as the analysis progressed I increasingly compared and contrasted these codes and sensitising...
example, to describe bureaucratic procedures and contextualise the quantitative data on identification and belonging.

The final sub-question, discussed in chapters 5 and 9, focuses on social relations in Kano and Amsterdam. To measure perceptions, the case studies use data from the perceptions surveys; interviews and other qualitative data is used, where relevant, to elucidate and contextualise the quantitative findings. To analyse social interactions, furthermore, cases of individual and collective interactions were selected (workplace meetings, friendships, and marriages as cases of individual interactions; and riots and peaceful protests as cases of collective interactions). The data used to analyse interactions are both quantitative and qualitative. Individual interactions are measured through the survey data, but their explanations are based largely on qualitative evidence and secondary sources. Finally, the riots, collective interactions and peaceful protests are analysed through interviews, newspaper articles, and other qualitative sources, applying the principles of ‘process-tracing’ in order to find evidence of sequential events that help to explain identity choice and the nature of the resulting interaction (George and Bennett 2005).

So far, this discussion has focused on the more technical aspects of data collection and analysis, ignoring the position of the researcher in these processes. This personal position, however, has crucially shaped both the qualitative data collection and the interpretation of the empirical data. One aspect in particular has been important in this regard: the discrepancy between the ‘outsider’ status of the researcher in Kano and the ‘insider’ position as an autochtone Dutch person in Amsterdam. The problematic outsider position of the (lone) fieldworker has been discussed by anthropologists at least since the work of Malinowski

It may be argued that survey evidence of individual interactions is problematic, because it measures what people say about their interactions rather than what they do in them. There are indeed great advantages to the qualitative, in-depth study of interpersonal interactions, as e.g. Goffman (1969) has shown; however, in the context of this thesis, a trade-off was necessary between the internal validity of the research methods and the comparability of the data. The present analysis represents a compromise, using a quantitative (and hence comparable) measure of individual interactions within a contextual, qualitative explanatory framework.
(1922, 1926). In Kano, my status as outsider in religious, ‘racial’, linguistic, educational, and socio-economic terms affected access to respondents and the relations with them. It provided a remarkable level of ‘autonomy’, in the sense that few social mores and codes were deemed to apply to me. I was not expected to wear formal northern Nigerian dress, even to the most formal meetings; and when interviewing Islamic and traditional leaders, these authorities readily shook my hand – even if I tried to behave ‘the Nigerian way’.

More importantly, my outsider status in Kano allowed me to speak to people who would otherwise have been out of my reach; it also allowed me to ask questions that Nigerians would not be able to ask. In contrast, my position in Amsterdam was quite the opposite of an ‘outsider’. For although I had not lived in Amsterdam before the research, I am clearly within the category of autochtone Dutch. As an ‘insider’ in the majority ethnic community, my position in Amsterdam was more constrained than it was in Kano, for example when it came to questioning colloquial concepts of ethnicity, ‘integration’, and autochtonie. Where the Kano interviews had thus mostly been conducted in the languages of ‘ethnic conflict’ and ‘intercommunal relations’, those in Amsterdam referred to ‘integration problems’, ‘ethnic tension’, and ‘youth delinquency’. This discrepancy complicated the comparative analysis of the two cities; however, using the analytical language of nativism has allowed me to use comparable theoretical concepts in conjunction with case-specific concepts, such as indigeneity or autochtonie.

My status as an outsider in Kano and an autochtone in Amsterdam thus both enhanced and constrained this research. Their combination, however, resolved some of the constraints that arose within the two cases. For example, my knowledge of the Dutch context, its language, and some of its everyday social processes helped me to see subtleties in social relations that would, to an outsider, likely have remained hidden. The comparative dimension of the research then forced me to look for such subtlety in the Kano analysis, thus helping me to identify dynamics that I would otherwise have failed to see. Conversely, some of the findings
in Kano challenged my assumed understandings of the Netherlands, thus helping me to analyse the Amsterdam case more critically. In sum, therefore, although my social position impacted on the processes of fieldwork and analysis, the insider-outsider interaction helped me to identify crucial analogies – for example between indigeneity and autochthony – as well as ‘hidden’ differences, such as the meaning of ethnicity in the two cases.

1.3.4 Ethical Reflexivity

Reflexivity with regard to the researcher’s social position thus sheds light on certain methodological aspects of the research process. However, it is also a crucial tool with which to address some of the ethical challenges of academic research. In this light, researchers need to be critical of their own frames of reference not only in order to pinpoint potential analytical biases, but also to assess their impact on their research environment. Such a principle of ethical reflexivity requires continuous introspection and openness, on the part of the researcher, to feedback from the research participants and the wider environment (Ritchie and Lewis 2003: 14; Scheper-Hughes 1995: 426). In practical terms, reflexivity also involves acquiring informed consent of the research participants, providing them with the option of full anonymity, and compensating respondents and research assistants where appropriate and feasible. Moreover, it requires researchers to take their ‘objects’ of study seriously and to provide them, if they so wish, with the results of the study. These principles have, therefore, guided this thesis research from the case selection to the write-up.

1.4 Structure of the Thesis

The argument of this thesis is presented in two case studies of Kano and Amsterdam, each comprising four chapters (see schema). For Kano, chapter 2 will analyse the impact of indigeneity on the process of identity formation, after which chapter 3 will analyse the
identity repertoire and definitions of belonging in contemporary Kano. Chapter 4 will then examine the ways in which indigeneity and nativist ethnicity have become embodied in the city’s political institutions, organisations, and elites. Together, chapters 2, 3, and 4 thus provide the historical, discursive, and political context of Kano’s interethnic relations; chapter 5 then zooms in on these relations to assess to what extent they reflect the nativism inherent in the indigeneity discourse.

The chapters on Amsterdam are organised along the same lines, with chapter 6 providing a historical analysis of identities and notions of belonging, chapter 7 an assessment of contemporary identities and notions of urban belonging, and chapter 8 a discussion of the political dimensions of *autochtonie* and its bureaucratic counterpart autochthony. Chapter 9 then assesses the extent to which social relations in Amsterdam mirror the exclusion and competition inherent in the nativist *autochtonie* discourse. The final chapters of each case study (chapters 5 and 9) can thus be interpreted as an initial test of the argument that the discourses of indigeneity and autochthony have induced antagonism, avoidance, and conflict between the ‘native’ and ‘settler’ ethnic communities in Kano and Amsterdam. The final chapter 10 will summarise the earlier chapters, tease out the relevant contrasts and similarities between the cases, and discuss some of the problems and wider implications of the research.
Part I: Kano
2.1 Introduction

Metropolitan Kano is the major urban centre in the Sudanic region of West Africa and the commercial and industrial heart of northern Nigeria. Based on the most recent, deeply contested, Nigerian census, Kano is the second largest city in Nigeria, with close to three million people. It is built around the Old City (birni), the walled part of metropolis that is home to the Emir’s palace, the central mosque, and the famous kurmi market. The Old City is inhabited almost exclusively by ‘native’ Hausa-Fulani Muslims; Kano as a whole is therefore often regarded as a Muslim city. However, neighbourhoods outside the walls (waje) also host economic migrant communities with divergent ethnic and religious affiliations. One neighbourhood - Sabon Gari, to the north east of birni - has since colonial times been considered the ‘strangers quarters’, the place where ‘non-natives’ reside. As we will see below, however, Sabon Gari is no longer the only neighbourhood inhabited by non-Hausa or non-Muslim residents; many other areas in waje are also ethnically and religiously mixed.

37 Metropolitan Kano (or in short: Kano) is defined here as the eight Local Government Areas at the heart of Kano State, which are dominated by the urban sprawl around the walled Old City of Kano. These LGAs are: Kano Municipal (population 2006 census: 365,525), Dala (418,777), Nasarawa (596,669), Fagge (198,828), Gwale (362,059), Tarauni (221,367), Ungogo (369,657) and Kumbotso (295,979). The total population of Kano based on the 2006 census (Federal Government of Nigeria 2007: B188) is thus 2,828,861; however, while in Kano in 2006 and 2008, I met many residents who had not been counted in the census – giving credence to the widely held opinion that the census drastically underestimated Kano’s true population.

38 See Map 3 in Annex A.
Although hit heavily by Nigeria’s protracted economic crisis, Kano has retained some of its commercial stature through several vast, labyrinthine, and highly atmospheric markets\(^{39}\). As a city with a long-standing reputation as a hub in the trans-Saharan and Sahelian trading routes (Mustapha 2003), Kano has an extensive record of immigration and diversity, bringing together people from across the African continent and beyond. This chapter analyses the development of identities of belonging in the city, focusing specifically on the origins of nativism and the role of bureaucratic indigeneity in the processes of identity formation. Examining the period from the pre-colonial Caliphate until the present day, the chapter will show how rapid social change and increasing diversity, persistent horizontal inequalities, and colonial and post-colonial politics converged to construct a nativist form of urban belonging defined by ethnicity and religion. To this end, section 2.2 will sketch the main tenets of belonging in the Sokoto Caliphate of the 19th century. Section 2.3 will focus on the impact of colonial rule on identities in the city, while section 2.4 will trace their development in the post-Biafran era.

### 2.2 Frontier of *Dar al-Islam*: Belonging in 19th Century Kano

Kano’s history is said to have begun long before the Fulani Jihad with the foundation of the city by the blacksmith Bagauda (850 AD). According to Paden (1970: 251), however, it was only during the Maguzawa period (1000-1500) of non-Muslim Hausa rule that Kano became a ‘plural’ society through migration of Fulani and other northern ethnic groups into the Old City. With the spread of Islam from the late 15th century, trade routes were opened on a north-south and east-west axis, Islam became the official religion, a differentiation occurred between rural farmers and urban traders, and Kano became the major trade centre in the western Sudan (Paden 1970: 252-53). Increasing contact led not only to trade but also to war, 

\(^{39}\) Most notably *kurmi* (in the Old City), Sabon Gari (on the border of Fagge LGA), *kwari* (textile market), *singer* (wholesale), and *dawanau* (grains).
both of which necessitated the establishment of inter-ethnic relationships and integration (Paden 1970: 252). To acquire an understanding of the historical basis of Kano’s identities of belonging, this section will commence its analysis at the beginning of the 19th century, when large parts of northern Nigeria had just become united under the banner of the Fulani Jihad.

The Fulani Jihad of 1804–1808, led by Uthman dan Fodio, was a reaction to the despotism of the Hausa Emirs, their syncretism in religious affairs, and the related ‘un-Islamic’ practices of slavery (Lovejoy 2005). Although ultimately the Fulani leaders were unable to implement all of their theocratic ideals on account of the political and economic realities of Hausaland (Loimeier 1997: 12), they nevertheless reinforced the links between the Emirates and Islam and revitalised consciousness of the Muslim community in northern Nigeria. As a result, political power became centralised in the Sultan of the Sokoto Caliphate, a governance system that comprised the individual Emirates and was built on the principles of Islam (Dudley 1968: 11; Paden 1973: 214). The Jihad reinforced the dominant position of Islam in northern Nigerian society and thus emphasised the social boundary between dar al-Islam (the world of Islam, of which the Caliphate was part) and dar al-Harb (the world of unbelief) (Lovejoy 2004: 3).

This principal religious cleavage, however, was complicated by the intersecting classifications of social status and, to a lesser extent, pre-colonial ethnicity. Status was characterised by two main divisions: first, between the stratum of aristocratic rulers (the largely Fulani sarauta) and the (mostly Habe)40 commoners (talakawa), and second, between free citizens and slaves. The sarauta/talakawa status distinction has roots in the 15th-century teachings of Muhammad al-Maghili and the governance traditions of the Borno empire. Although it is imprecise to speak of an aristocracy in all parts of the Sokoto Caliphate, Kano’s size allowed for a critical mass of new elite Fulani that approximates most closely this notion (Burnham and Last 1994: 306). Following Lubeck (1986: 17), the sarauta/talakawa

---

40 Non-Fulani inhabitants of the pre-colonial Hausa-speaking states (Feinstein 1987: 25).
distinction should be interpreted as a ‘class-like, status-honour system’, in which powerful patron-client relations and intersecting cleavages of slavery, religion, and ethnicity constructed an “arabesque system of status relations” rather than the horizontal formation of distinct conflicting classes or ethnic groups.

Northern Nigeria, part of Sudanic West Africa, has long been a frontier province of dar al-Islam (Lovejoy 2004: 16), and as such a prime region for slave raiding. Therefore, as Lovejoy (2005: 13) argues, the region’s economy was for a long time strongly dependent on slavery. Most of these slaves occupied non-elite positions as labourers, domestic servants, or concubines, but a small minority of them obtained positions of power and privilege as royal title-holders (Stilwell 2004). It is difficult to overstate the importance of slavery in pre-colonial Kano society. Slave raiding was not only a profitable business, but also a means of enforcing conversion from paganism to Islam (Perham 1937: 133) and of maintaining and reinforcing the legitimacy of the theocracy of the Caliphate itself (Lovejoy 2005: 25). This is not to say that Muslims, especially those living on the borders of the Caliphate, did not fall prey to slave raiding. The social cleavage between the world of Islam and the world of unbelievers in pre-colonial Kano was crucial, nonetheless, in distinguishing the Caliphate’s free citizens from those who could, in theory, legitimately be enslaved.

Although the Jihad was not justified in ethnic terms, Burnham and Last (1994: 326) note that about 80% of the participants were from Fulbe-speaking families and clans and that its Muslim opponents did view it partly in ethnic terms. Moreover, the ruling classes in Kano also identified themselves as Fulani – even though in cultural and linguistic terms, these urban Fulani had become considerably Hausanised41. These ethnic labels therefore also had some meaning in pre-colonial Kano. However, many of the Fulani office-holders were assimilated Habe who had been recruited into the group; the boundary between the Fulani

---

41 Paden (1973: 248, 354-60), however, shows how by 1960 it was possible to identify separate quarters of Kano’s birni inhabited by the Hausa and the Fulani; it was therefore not until the early post-colonial era that the inclusive urban Hausa-Fulani identity developed fully.
and the Habe was therefore neither very strictly defined nor ethnic in a contemporary sense, but flexible and status-based, linguistic and, as the urban Fulani increasingly adopted the Hausa language, religious (Burnham and Last 1994). Moreover, King (2001: 356; 2003) argues that in pre-colonial Hausaland identities related to specific territories trumped those of ethnic affiliations; in important social or political matters, people identified themselves as *Katsinawa* (equivalent of *Kanawa*) rather than Hausa or Fulani.

In his analysis of pre-Jihad Rogo, a small town in the south-west of Kano state, Mustapha (1990) shows that identities of ethnicity, linguistic background (Hausa), and territorial loyalty (*Kanawa*) could interact and create an inclusive society for most northern Muslim ethnic groups except the nomadic Fulani (Mustapha 1998: 30-1). Similarly, Olaniyi (2004) describes the historical commercial links between Yorubaland and Kano, which have existed since the 15th century. As a result of these connections, Yoruba traders began to settle in Kano as an anchor community. The Yoruba Muslim identity, their economic importance to Kano’s mercantile economy as traders of kola nuts and livestock, and their effective assimilation into Hausa culture and society ensured their acceptance into the community of Kano’s Old City. The efficacy of their integration is indicated by the facts that the Yoruba were granted their own ward within the Old City (*Ayagi*) and established a separate section within the central *kurmi* market (*iso atare*) (Olaniyi 2004: 86-93). Bako (1990: 71) argues that in pre-colonial Kano, “all categories of immigrants were allowed to reside in the Old City as long as they agreed to submit themselves without question to the rules and regulations governing the city”. He gives examples of ‘ethnic’ wards beside the Yoruba *Ayagi*: *Tudun Nufawa* (established by Nupe scholars), *Zangon Bare-Bari* (Kanuri), *Dandalin Turawa* (Arabs), and *Agadasawa* (people from Agadez).

Mustapha (1998) suggests three factors that stimulated the integrative process of migrants into Kano society. First, immigrants played a vital economic role in the development of the Emirate and later Caliphate, which was appreciated by the host community. To facilitate
these market forces, “immigrants were accorded the exalted status of being the guests of Sarkin Kano. Furthermore, new arrivals were given accommodation, food, land, seed, and other sundry assistance until they could fend for themselves” (Mustapha 1998: 33-34).

Second, both in Kano as a Hausa State and in Kano under the Sokoto Caliphate, Islam was pan-ethnic and provided an integrative force even between Muslims and dhimmi42. The ‘established’ Islamic denomination in the Sokoto Caliphate was the (traditional) Qadiriyya brotherhood (tariqa) (Loimeier 1997: 19-20) and the diversity of branches within this tariqa allowed for the theological flexibility needed in order to preserve the unity of a theocracy of such enormous proportions (Paden 1973: 148). These tendencies were, third, reinforced by the cultural similarities between the immigrants and the ‘native’ Hausa communities (Mustapha 1998: 35-36). Olaniyi (2004: 92) emphasises, in addition, the importance of cultural and linguistic assimilation of Yoruba that made them virtually indistinguishable from other Kano Hausa communities43.

In sum, the foundations of contemporary identities of belonging in Kano can be located in the pre-colonial Caliphate era. The base layer of belonging under Caliphate rule was one’s affiliation to Islam. Although there was substantial contestation over the features of a true Muslim, religion made for a relatively open identity boundary that could be crossed through conversion to Islam. Although Kano was a constituent part of the wider Caliphate, there was also a sense of territorial identity that connected Kanawa to their city of residence. However, these Islamic and urban identities were cross-cut by hard distinctions of socio-economic status between the aristocratic sarauta, the talakawa commoners, and the stratum of slaves. Moreover, as the role of Kano as a trade hub expanded, the city was also increasingly faced with differences between various ethnic groups. However, it seems that these ethnic boundaries were primarily linguistic and therefore neither politically salient nor impregnable,

42 Dhimmi denotes non-Muslim ‘People of the Book’: Jews and Christians

43 It should be noted, however, as Mustapha (1998) and Osaghae (1994) do, that even in pre-colonial Kano some groups (and especially non-Muslim ones) faced more obstacles to their integration and acceptance than others.
especially for those of the Muslim faith and the higher echelons of society. They were welcomed into the city and allowed to assimilate effectively into fully accepted Kanawa.

2.3 Kano under Colonial Rule and the First Republic, 1900 - 1967

Throughout most of the 19th century, the Sokoto empire had been a tributary, centralised polity (Last 1967). As King (2001: 350) highlights, however, it was also characterised by enormous heterogeneity and political struggles within its own borders. This became apparent in the periods of protracted civil war over succession, but especially towards the end of the 19th century when the central authority in Sokoto increasingly came to depend on the other Emirates, most notably Kano. This dependency caused the connections between Kano and Sokoto in the second half of the century to fluctuate and, ultimately, break down after the British conquest of the Caliphate in 1902-3 (Paden 1973: 252). Kano’s civil war (1893-5) turned out to be a prelude to this break, as it had been caused by a conflict between the Kano and Sokoto aristocracies over the line of succession of the Kano Emir. Kano’s ruling families were victorious, but the war had left its scars among the city’s talakawa and thus prepared the way for the British invasion less than a decade later (Paden 1973: 264; Wakili 1997: 34-5).

British colonial rule formed a pivotal stage in the development of social identities in Kano. Where 19th-century Kano had been the economic centre of the Sokoto Islamic theocracy, it now became the core of Nigeria’s northern region. The reorientation of Kano’s economy towards the South and towards Britain, its increasing urbanisation, and the rise of local Kano politics emphasised its growing status as a modern metropolis. Britain’s central concern was “the regularisation of the system of tax collection and the sharing of the tax between the central government and the local government unit.” (Fika 1978: 106). Social peace and stability were considered the key to ensure the maximisation of economic profit; as a consequence, the British used existing channels of Emirate political authority (the Native
Authority) to govern Kano’s Old City (*birni*) and strengthened them with their military and administrative support. As Mamdani (1996) has pointed out for Africa in general, these practices of indirect rule increased the centralised power of the office of the Native Authority. This was partly due to the rationalisation and bureaucratisation of the Emirate administrative structure (Mustapha 1990); moreover, the British now supported the Native Authority with their military power.

This ensured accountability from the Emir upwards, to the Colonial Government, but decreased the necessity for popular accountability. Although rulers under the Sokoto Caliphate had no institutional mechanisms ensuring accountability, there had been certain avenues through which non-ruling *sarauta* and wealthy *talakawa* could gain access to the political process, such as through the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya brotherhoods. British support for ‘their’ indirect rulers, however, all but closed these avenues for downward accountability and made the local customary governments more authoritarian, or “decentralised despotist” (Mamdani 1996: 53–65). Smith (1951, 1964), during his field work in 1949–50, observed numerous cases of exploitative conduct of Native Authority officials, which he attributes to the increasingly centralised nature of the northern Nigerian governance at the time. This increasing despotism led to a crisis of legitimacy of Emir Sanusi in the 1950s (Paden 1973: 270–71) and hardened the contradictions between the *sarauta* and *talakawa* status groups.

From 1950, these status identities became translated into politics through two political parties: the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), representing the *talakawa* and the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), supported by the *sarauta* and the Muslim merchants (Lubeck 1986: 39; Yahaya 1980: 30).

Cross-cutting these divisive developments in terms of class and politics, however, there were also significant integrative trends in the formation of ‘native’ colonial identities in Kano, most notably those of Islam, the North, and Kanawa. As for the integrative influence of Islam, the British pledge not to interfere with Islamic affairs was clearly seen as a victory for...
Islam and consequently led to a 50% increase in the number of Muslims and in the salience of religious identities between 1900 and 1951 (Kane 2003: 34-5). And although there was considerable competition between the different schools of Islam, Lubeck (1986: 303) argues that the salience of Islam served to cross-cut and merge northern Muslim ethnic groups and de-emphasise their differences. This was especially true for the late colonial and early post-colonial period, when Islam came to be seen largely through the prism of regional competition between the Islamic North and the Christian South of Nigeria.

Regardless of the religious competition between them, the Sufi Brotherhoods also provided a trans-ethnic integrative identity for (northern) Muslims in Kano. As Paden (1970: 266-8; 1973: 94-104, 152-9) describes in some detail, the popularised ‘Reformed’ Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya brotherhoods brought together Hausa and Fulani mallam classes and were thus crucial in the development of the inclusive urban Hausa-Fulani identity. Because of the importance of the Hausa language as the symbol of this identity, the new Hausa-Fulani category has increasingly allowed Muslim northerners from other ethnic groups than the Hausa or Fulani to assimilate (Mustapha 1998: 40; Paden 1973: 355).

At the regional level, this integrative trend was also compounded by the development of Northern nationalism: “one north, one people, under one God” (Mustapha 1998: 40). Promoted by the Northern Premier, Sardauna Ahmadu Bello, the ideology focused the diffuse northern apprehension of the Nigerian south and constructed a community through religious uniformity and ethnic integration. In its early years in the 1950s, ‘Northernisation’ promoted a territorial form of political identification, inclusive of all those who could claim Northern roots and, to some extent, regardless of religious affiliation. In the 1960s, however, with the campaign for the Islamisation of the North, the ‘Northern’ identity became increasingly connected to Islamic identification.

44 Although, as Perham (1937: 132) argues, “these figures can only be approximate […], since the religion of the Prophet is a variable quantity between the degree represented by, say, the revered Alkali of Bauchi and the pagan headman, who, having donned a gown for the visit of the census scribe, claims that religion as his own”.

56
Partly as a reaction to the success of Bello’s Northern nationalism (Coleman 1958; Kwanashie 2002) and the removal of Kano Emir Sanusi by the Sardauna of Sokoto, the late 1960s also witnessed the emergence of a sense of political community around the idea of a Kano State. This emergent ideology became institutionalised in the Kano State Movement in 1965, by which time the call for a Kano State had wide currency. The main arguments behind it were based on the unique commercial and cosmopolitan nature of Kano, its historical autonomy in the face of domination, and the lack of returns on their taxes paid to the regional government (Paden 1973: 329). The result of their efforts is likely to have been an increase in the salience of the urban identity of Kanawa, which fitted within the wider rise of the Northern identity and interacted positively with the merger of the (urban) Hausa and Fulani in the city.

At the same time, however, southern communities in the immigrant neighbourhood (Sabon Gari) began to grow significantly. Until 1945, the majority of the neighbourhood was Yoruba, many of whom came to Kano either as independent traders or as workers on the railway, which was finished in 1912 (Bako 1990: 104-5). In these first decades of colonial rule, most ethnic communities had their own ethnic or traditional leaders and many of them also set up their own religious institutions. Most significantly, however, ethnic communities founded socio-cultural unions to represent their welfare interests in the neighbourhood. The Igbo State Union, founded in 1938, was the most powerful of these ethnic unions and, for example, set up and maintained primary and secondary schools for its members (Bako 1990: 302). Some of the individual community leaders commanded respect across communities and thus formed the basis for the institutional integration of the neighbourhood (Bako 1990; King 2003). After the Second World War, the Igbo community overtook the Yoruba in size and has remained the largest southern ethnic minority in Kano Sabon Gari since, except during and immediately after the Biafran war.
Table 2.1: Population of Sabon Gari, 1921–1967

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>3579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>5250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>7237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>7619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>8000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>20454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>21628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>22334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>30000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>40000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>2129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1 shows the growth of Sabon Gari in the years of leading up to the Biafran war in 1967. The neighbourhood’s population increased dramatically throughout the entire period before 1966. This influx of mostly Christians would have been a challenge to the pre-colonial system of social assimilation and integration in itself, but the problem was compounded by the British policies of indirect rule and its strict segregation of Kano ‘natives’ and ‘non-natives’. While the Hausa and Fulani, amongst themselves, had multiple and layered understandings of ethnicity and belonging, colonial segregation simplified and combined these distinctions in the dichotomous ‘northern natives’ and ‘southern immigrants’. Because of the British aim of maintaining the social and political status-quo, which they interpreted as defined by Islam and Fulani Emirate rule, they feared southern immigrants would increase tensions in Kano society. Moreover, they feared that the nationalist ideals from southern, Western educated migrants would to spread to the northern communities.

For these reasons, the British expanded Kano and constructed Sabon Gari, which was to be inhabited by “non-natives and such natives of Kano as might cause trouble if they would live in the Old City” (Osaghae 1994: 32). They also constructed Tudun Wada, for non-native northern immigrants (Fourchard 2009: 202), and the Government Reserve Area (GRA), the seat of the colonial government. This residential segregation was enforced by the political system: until 1940 Sabon Gari was to come under direct rule of the colonial government, while the Old City was governed by the Emirate (Albert 1999: 279). It was also enforced by law, which prevented natives from living in Sabon Gari and non-Muslim men from marrying...
Muslim women (Paden 1970: 264). It forced southern immigrants to bring wives from their ‘home’ region and reinforced ethnic and religious divisions on the basis of ‘native-ness’.

The consequences of the segregation policy were, first, that it removed the need for hospitality, adaptation, and integration that had characterised pre-colonial Kano Emirate; second, that there were no integrated decision-making institutions or mechanisms for conflict resolution within the Kano urban area (Paden 1973: 334); and third, that it formulated the boundaries between ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’ in primordial ethnic and religious terms. In the early post-colonial period, moreover, the effects of segregation were reinforced by the new dynamics of national politics, where the northern, eastern, and western politicians competed to define the political and economic terms of an independent Nigeria. On a local level, these tensions erupted in the 1966 riots against the Sabon Gari Igbos, whilst on the national level they resulted in the Biafran civil war.

Rising diversity, strict British-enforced ethnic and religious segregation, and regionalist national politics can thus help to explain the rising salience of overlapping nativist ethnic and Christian-Muslim boundaries. Class differentials did not relieve the tensions across these boundaries, but rather exacerbated them as horizontal inequalities. According to Paden (1973: 317-22) there were three main ways in which economic competition affected ‘native’ - ‘settler’ relations. Firstly, many inhabitants of Sabon Gari were employed in the Sabon Gari market. Although the Old City kurmi market had been the core of Kano’s pre-colonial economy, by 1965 Sabon Gari market has surpassed kurmi market in number of traders, value of turnover, and in the average profit per trader (Paden 1973: 317). This caused resentment among the ‘native’ Kano traders, especially among those who had not been able to begin competing on the wholesale markets.

A second pattern of economic competition was emerged in the growing modern sector of white-collar and semi-skilled employment. By the end of the WWII, Kano had acquired the largest modern sector in northern Nigeria, but because of the low levels of literacy among
northerners, the manpower for this sector was mainly drawn from southern immigrants. Although urbanised Northerners took back some of the semi-skilled labour in the 1950s, clerk jobs remained dominated by Igbo employees. Especially during and after Kano’s economy retreated in the mid-1960s, this led to resentment among the ‘native’ population. For not only was the remuneration in the modern sector considerable, but the clerks also represented the visible face of both the new industries and the colonial state.

A third object of economic competition between the ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’ in colonial Kano was the issue of land. Under indirect rule, all Kano land was owned by the Emirate. Except in Sabon Gari, however, usufruct of the land could not be granted to persons not originally resident in northern Nigeria, limiting a rapidly growing community to a relatively small plot of land. Paden observed, during his field work, that Sabon Gari had an average number 7 residents per room, against an average of 1.9 in the Old City (Paden 1973: 321). Together, these three forms of economic competition constituted the main areas of interaction between Kano’s ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities. For all other aspects of life, the ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities in Kano looked within themselves. Christian communities formed a myriad of different churches in Sabon Gari. Ethnic communities each set up their own cultural associations, which looked after the welfare of their members. Igbo town unions, for example, were based on a town or village in Igboland and were thus part of three networks: one that connected them to the Igbo home town, one that connected them to the other Kano Igbo, and one that connected them to the national Igbo State Union (Anthony 2002: 39).

First, as a connection to the home town, the town unions provided emergency assistance to their members and functioned as a source of social control: enforcing standards of public

---

46 Northern indirect rule explicitly prevented missionaries from entering the Old City of Kano and therefore restricted the Western education of Kano ‘natives’. In Sabon Gari, in contrast, the maintenance of a high standard of Western education became a matter of community pride. The result of the educational difference was that in 1952 only 23,000 of the 3.4 million northerners was literate, half of whom were originally from the south. Similarly, by 1965 the proportion of ‘natives’ in Kano’s Old City with a Western education was 5%, against a staggering 98% in Sabon Gari (Paden 1973: 321), a pattern that still exists today.
conduct and deporting members who had been convicted of crimes. Second, the Igbo Union united the 100 or so individual town unions into a single Igbo voice for local Igbo interests. As such, the Union engaged in political activities (both within Kano and in other parts of the country, representing the Igbo population of Kano or even the entire North) as well as in cultural projects, local capital development, and even education through the Igbo Union Grammar School. Third, the national Igbo State Union was the furthest removed from Kano Igbo’s daily lives, representing the entirety of the Nigerian Igbo population in Lagos. Although its influence over Igbos was limited, it had a strong political function partly through its ties to the political party National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) (Anthony 2002: 42). The town and ethnic unions of Igbo migrants in the north were a major factor in the “sub-group amalgamation” of the Igbo population into the mould provided by the colonial definition of Igbo ethnicity (Anthony 2002: 17; van den Bersselaar 1998). They thus fed into the process of the hardening of ethnic and religious boundaries initiated under colonial rule.

Combining all the different strands of identity formation in Kano under colonial rule and in the First Republic, this section has attempted to sketch the development of ‘belonging’ as Kano became increasingly integrated into the Nigerian nation. The resulting image is a complex one, consisting of integrative tendencies among the ‘native’ Muslim population and of divisive trends in the relations between the ‘native’ northerners and the southern ‘settlers’. The integrative trends comprised the strengthening ideas of the North and the Kanawa identity, but also the slow amalgamation of the urban Hausa-Fulani and the increasing elite collaboration between the British colonial officers and the Fulani sarauta Emirate rulers. As Kano integrated into the colonial economy, class relations also changed significantly, creating new lines of (intergenerational) conflict within Kano’s Muslim community.

47 Already in the 1950s, Igbos in Kano were considered citizens of the Eastern Region and as such ineligible for waivers of school fees paid by the Northern regional government. Igbo parents therefore had to send their children either to schools in the East or to relatively expensive church schools in Kano, until the Igbo Union set up its own grammar school (Anthony 2002: 41).
The most significant divisive trend, however, was the construction of the primordial ethnic, religious, and regional distinctions between Kano ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’. As Paden (1973: 335) argues, “the emergence of ‘northerner’ and ‘southerner’ as ethnic identities was, in both cases, an amalgamation of other types of ethnicity”. These new distinctions were partly the result of ‘native’ homogenisation, new immigration patterns, Kano’s integration into the Nigerian nation, and the consistent horizontal inequalities between ‘native’ and ‘settler’ ethnic groups. But they were also in large part due to the segregationist policies and institutions of the British. Social change, immigration, and horizontal inequalities were thus forged into the nativist mould of British indirect rule. An indication of the intensity of these new ethnic divisions is given by the Hausa-Igbo riots 1953 and 1966 (Northern Regional Government 1953; Paden 1971) and, at the national level, the civil war in Biafra.

2.4 Identities and Belonging in Post-Biafra Kano, 1970-2009

In many ways, the Biafran war (1967-1970) was the explosive consequence of the unstable, regionalised national polity crafted in the colonial and early post-colonial years. The political dominance of Ahmadu Bello’s Northern region in terms of territory, population, and parliamentary representation (Bach 1989), along with the relative weakness of the federal government vis-à-vis the regional governments turned out to be fatal flaws in the design and dynamics of Nigeria’s First Republic (1963-1966). This section will outline how urban belonging in Kano developed in the aftermath of the civil war. It will show how political transformation, oil politics, and structural adjustment converged with local ethnic politics, the Federal Character, and Christian-Muslim conflict to reinforce the nativist ethnic identities that were formed under colonial rule. To this end, section 2.4.1 will focus on the shifting political-economic context in the period. Section 2.4.2 will discuss the interaction between local and national factors in the reproduction of nativist ethnic identities, with special emphasis on the introduction of the Federal Character programme and the
categorisation of indigeneity. Finally, section 2.4.3 will focus on the development of religious contestation in the period, highlighting the shift from intra-Islamic struggles to Christian-Muslim conflict.

### 2.4.1 Political Reform, Oil, and Structural Adjustment

In the decades following the Biafran War, four changes to Kano’s political context stand out as significant factors in the process of identity formation: the creation of Kano State, the transformation of Emirate authority, the rise of oil politics, and structural adjustment. The creation of Kano State, implemented actually two months prior to the start of the war, provided a boost to the salience of the Kanawa identity, even though in content this identity remained closely tied to notions of the Muslim, Hausa-Fulani northerners (Paden 1970). At the same time, however, the Gowon regime (1967-1975) began the political reforms that would, with the Local Government Reform of 1976, transport full executive power from Kano’s Emirate rulers to popularly elected representatives (Yahaya 1980: 203). In the political context of Kano, these reforms offered a partial solution to the historical status tension between the sarauta and talakawa strata by demoting the sarauta rulers to a symbolic rather than executive political position and opening the political arena to talakawa politicians.

However, as Yahaya (1980) and Yusuf warn, this development should not be seen as a rejection of traditional structures of authority, but rather as a change from executive to symbolic functions. The transformation increased the importance of community links for the traditional authorities both to perform their symbolic functions and to retain their legitimacy. The Kano traditional authorities have therefore been careful to represent both the territorial community of Kano and, since the historical link between Islam and the Emirate governance structure still exists today, the religious community of Kano Muslims. Due in no small

---

48 Dr Salahudeen Yusuf, Islamic scholar, 10 September 2006 in Kano
measure to the personal qualities of the current Emir Ado Bayero, who has been the traditional ruler of Kano since 1963, the Emirate has been able to maintain this precarious balance, gaining respect both among the ‘native’ residents of Kano and the city’s many resident ‘settlers’. As such, Kano’s traditional rulers have come to represent a notion of urban belonging that has roots in the pre-colonial traditions of assimilation and incorporation, because it is sufficiently ambiguous to allow for the inclusion of ‘natives’ as well as ‘settlers’.

The decades following the Biafran War thus witnessed a blurring of the old *talakawa/sarauta* distinction and the development of an inclusive, territorial notion of *Kanawa* fostered by the traditional rulers. At the same time, however, the extension of party politics coincided with the 1970s oil boom. This convergence also had far-reaching consequences for class relations in Kano, most importantly because it changed the main income of the Nigerian state from the productive agricultural, industrial and manufacturing sectors to the rents derived from petroleum sales. Although the impact of this shift has been complex in a way that is far beyond the reach of this chapter, one important effect was that it made Nigeria’s political class virtually autonomous from their constituencies. Politicians needed neither their constituents’ labour, nor their taxes. In Kano, therefore, the oil boom thus reinforced colonial patterns of commoner exploitation, with the significant difference that some of the old *talakawa* were now part of the new exploitative political elite.

Dividing the spoils of political or economic influence became the elite’s primary objective and the ever increasing oil rents ensured that Nigeria’s public sector in the 1970s and early 1980s was awash with money. This not only resulted in the large-scale development of construction and infrastructure projects, but also in increasing returns to public employment and corruption in the public sector. Public employment therefore ballooned in the 1970s (Bach 1989: 243) not least because of the proliferation of regional governments through the formation of States and Local Government Areas (LGAs). But while the central state in the First Republic had been largely subject to the interests of the Regions, the decreasing size of
the multiplying State units and the central inflow of petro-dollars reversed this relationship in favour of the Federal centre. Increasingly, as a result, the state began to intervene in almost every aspect of Nigerians’ lives, through over 800 parastatals (in 1983), a wide range of public companies, and large investments in education, infrastructure, and defence (Watts 1984: 412).

The oil boom had changed the incentive structure within which political actors operated and had inserted the Nigerian state into its economy. These developments entrenched, as Ekeh (1989: 36) argues, the conservative trend in Nigerian politics of preserving the tendency of politicians to share the fruits of politics with ‘their people’ - a term increasingly defined in terms of a narrow familial, ethnic, and/or religious loyalty. These trends were yet further reinforced through the Nigerian Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and the protracted economic crisis. The negative effect of structural adjustment on Nigeria’s economy in the 1980s and 1990s has been well described and requires no further elaboration here (Jega 2000b; Mustapha 1992; Olukoshi 1991). Structural adjustment worsened the effects of the economic crisis, both by increasing poverty and reinforcing existing patterns of horizontal inequality. This latter aspect is of particular importance to this analysis, because it highlights that the SAPs worsened rather than attenuated the historically divisive effect of horizontal inequalities between Kano’s ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities.

Arguably the most damaging aspect of the SAPs, however, was their effect on the structure of Nigeria’s political economy. Where the First Republic and early post-war regimes had attempted to build a state that was capable of social service provision, the neo-liberal policies of structural adjustment negated this development. They allowed the state to focus on “satisfying the conditionalities imposed by the IMF, the World Bank and Euro-American interests and reaching a better understanding with the Nigerian capitalist class and its international patrons” rather than on building legitimacy among the Nigerian population at large (Osaghae 1995: 61). Moreover, this development took place under successive military regimes that centralised political power and used the state’s resources selectively, favouring
the military, the ruling classes, and the clients and allies of these dominant classes (Jega 2000a: 34).

During years of the oil boom and subsequent structural adjustment, local and national politics thus became a zero-sum game of redistributing oil wealth among the ruling elite and preventing the domination of one (ethnic, religious, or regional) group over the others. The dual purpose of this new political game was to extract maximum revenue without endangering the fundamental structure of the system, necessitating simultaneous elite cooperation and societal segmentation. These developments were thus part of a long historical trend of distancing the Nigerian elite from its wider population, but since this gap no longer simply equated the old northern talakawa/sarauta distinction, it remained relatively un-politicised in Kano. Instead, the main identity cleavages of the 1970s and 1980s in Kano were those between different strands of Islam, while societal struggles since the late 1980s have been dominated by the cleavage between Kano’s ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’. We will now look at the construction of this latter cleavage, analysing separately the rise of its ethnic and religious component parts.

2.4.2 Nigeria’s Federal Character: Safeguarding the Nation, Reproducing the ‘Settler’

This section dwells on the rising local salience of ethnicity throughout the post-Biafra era, outlining how the local Kano dynamics converged with those unfolding at the Federal level. In terms of the local dynamics, the Biafran War had pushed the vast majority of Sabon Gari Kano’s southerners to embark on a massive exodus. Especially the Igbo had fled Kano, as well as other northern cities, in fear of reprisals for the rising conflict. It is therefore perhaps surprising that most of Kano’s Igbo population began to return as soon as the war was over. Already in January 1971 large numbers of Igbo had taken advantage of the renovated railroad and returned to reclaim their property; two years later, Sabon Gari had swelled to 22,314 inhabitants (Bako 1990: 315). This number would only increase, the most recent estimation
standing at roughly 60,000. Although the politics and economics of reclaiming abandoned property was complicated and left many returnees empty-handed, about two-thirds of the properties under supervision of the Abandoned Property Commission (APC) was returned to their owners (Anthony 2002: 147-69; Bako 1990: 316-21). Moreover, the booming 1970s economy allowed even the ‘dislocated’ returnees, as well as newcomers, to find employment easily, first and foremost in the rapidly recovering Sabon Gari market.

It seems that the national government’s rhetoric of ‘No victor, no vanquished’ and its emphasis on the brotherhood of all Nigerians aided the speedy re-integration of Igbo into the rest of the country. Re-integration of Nigeria’s Igbo population was widely recognised as the only way to maintain the country’s unity and as Paden (1973: 357) highlights, Hausa-Fulani post-war attitudes towards the Igbo were largely positive. This was partly due to the national trauma of Biafra, but also to the fact that the pre-war patterns of ethnic competition had been broken - to the benefit of the Hausa-Fulani. Many Igbo had lost property and wealth during the war, while the flat-rate currency exchange and the Indigenization Decree (1972) put the Igbo increasingly on the back foot (Anthony 2002: 182-3) in economic terms. Moreover, Hausa-Fulani had been able to acquire significant segments of the Sabon Gari market, which they, at least to some extent, retained after the war. In Kano’s public sector, the change was even more significant as the Kano State Government was increasingly able to fill public sector positions with Western educated Kano ‘natives’ (Anthony 2002: 189-90). The Igbo were therefore forced to adapt and find new, and sometimes surprising, niches in the economy.50

50 Sabon Gari is assumed to constitute about one third of Fagge LGA, which the 2006 census estimated at 198,828 inhabitants.

50 According to Anthony (2002: 201-6), for example, “the precipitous rise in sex work among Igbo women is one of the most striking changes in social relations between Igbo and non-Igbo in post-war Kano. The selling of sexual services by Igbo women is something that many Igbo and non-Igbo men remember as a distinctly post-war phenomenon, that expanded during the early years of the 1970s”.

67
In pre-war Kano, the Igbo town unions had been the “cornerstone of Igbo community life (Anthony 2002: 219). With their prohibition at the start of the civil war\textsuperscript{51}, the Igbo in Kano therefore lost their primary mode of organisation. Although the initial returnees organised around churches, neighbours, and their employment, these social networks lacked the unions’ capacity for community development and political representation. From the early 1970s, therefore, Igbo town unions came to be resurrected as ‘community associations’, many of which were united in the Igbo Community Association (ICA) upon its inception in 1983 (Anthony 2002: 225). Moreover, the ICA facilitated the creation of the \textit{Eze} cabinet of Kano Igbo, a body of around 100 prominent ‘chiefs’ who then selected the \textit{Eze} as the ‘traditional ruler’ of the Kano Igbo\textsuperscript{52}. This \textit{Eze} was turbaned by the Emir of Kano in 1986, as the \textit{Sarkin Yorubahwa} (or \textit{Oba Yoruba}) had been in 1974 (Bako 1990: 327–8).

This step, although largely symbolic due to the lack of executive powers of the Emirate, was a significant development in the post-war integration process of southern minorities in Kano. Firstly, it demonstrated that the Igbos, Yorubas, and other minorities were now accepted as a permanent feature of Kano society, worthy of traditional representation recognised and endorsed by the Kano traditional rulers. Although these ethnic traditional leaders were distinctly modern constructions, their incorporation into the Emirate structure also reflected pre-colonial practices of ethnic assimilation. Secondly, however, it solidified the salience of their ethnic background as the basis on which they should be represented, as Kano Igbo or Kano Yoruba, within both the Emirate and the State Government. Thirdly, therefore, it reduced the need for other channels of political representation (especially political parties) to allow access to members of communities with ethnic/traditional

\textsuperscript{51} The Igbo State Union was prohibited in 1966 on account of its close links to the NCNC (Bako 1990: 321)

\textsuperscript{52} This was done partly in response to the Governor Abubakar Rimi’s annexation of the Igbo Grammar School, which he did without paying the Igbo community any compensation since there was no traditional ruler he could pay (Anthony 2002: 227). Under PRP rule in the Second Republic, therefore, the political authorities seem to have given the Igbo a clear incentive to organise themselves along ethnic lines. As chapter 4 will show, in the contemporary democratic dispensation Governor Shekarau has created a similar incentive structure by incorporating representatives of the ethnic associations as ‘special advisors’ to the State Government.
organisations that represented their interests. Since other southern ethnic communities \(^{53}\) united in similar ways it can be argued that the importance of ethnic representation for ‘settler’ communities served to reinforce their ‘settler’ status.

Local dynamics thus fed into a rising salience of ethnic identities in Kano and their importance for definitions of belonging, with a particular emphasis on the boundary between the Hausa-Fulani (and other northern Islamic groups) and the southerners living in Sabon Gari\(^{54}\). This pattern was also reinforced and given extra layers of meaning by some of the national political reforms introduced in the wake of the Biafran civil war, which can be summarised as Nigeria’s ‘Federal Character’ principle. This term was first used by Murtala Muhammed in a 1975 speech, which held that the composition of the Cabinet should “be such as would reflect the Federal character of the Country” (Muhammed 1975 in Ekeh 1989: 30). It was subsequently taken up by the Constitution Drafting Committee, which then expanded it to be the guiding principle in all facets of government\(^ {55}\).

The purpose of this expansion was to maintain the stability of a Federal, democratic Nigeria by acknowledging its diversity, accommodating it in all matters pertaining to the state, and thus preventing the domination of one group over the others. Its introduction into the 1979 constitution marked the formal start of the implementation of the Federal Character. The policy’s watchdog, the Federal Character Commission (FCC), was established by Decree No. 34 of 1996 and “invested with enormous powers, including the powers to prosecute heads of ministries and parastatals [and even] to address inequalities in the social services and infrastructural development, along with inequalities in the private sector” (Mustapha 2007: 10).

\(^{53}\) E.g. the Edo community in Sabon Gari Kano (Bako 1990; Du-Sai 1986; Olaniyi 2002)

\(^{54}\) Ethnic differences remained, of course, within the ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities - not least due to divergent religious affiliations, e.g. between the predominantly Protestant and Aladura Yoruba and the mostly Roman Catholic Igbo (Paden 1971: 121).

\(^{55}\) Note, however, that Gowon in 1966 already applied an ethnic quota principle to the division of ministerial government posts.
Although the purpose of the Federal Character principle was thus to accommodate difference through affirmative action, Kirk-Greene (1983) discusses some of the initial complications of its implementation. This theme is further developed by Bach (1989; 1997), Osaghae (1988), Ekeh and Osaghae (1989), Suberu (2001) and Mustapha (2007), who highlight many problematic intended and unintended consequences of the principle and, more specifically, the introduction of indigeneity as a meaningful political category. The main problem identified was that, while indigeneity and the Federal Character ensured a level of egalitarian inclusion at the level of the federal state, at the local level it mapped perfectly onto colonial ethnic boundaries between ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities. Moreover, the ambiguous and primordial definition of an indigene enshrined in the constitution reinforced the primordialism already inherent in colonial ethnic identities. The introduction of indigeneity as a condition for political office thus turned nativist ethnicity into a legitimate principle structuring Nigeria’s post-Biafran political sphere.

But as Bach (1997) already noted in 1997 and Human Rights Watch (2006) confirmed almost a decade later, indigeneity has also become important in spheres beyond the directly political. Nigerians now often require an indigene certificate to secure employment in the (semi)public and sometimes even private sector, to gain access to state services, and to become involved in local politics. This is not only the case at the national level, but also increasingly at the State and Local Government levels – where, after all, indigeneity is defined. The Nigerian political elite, on the other hand, needs indigeneity in order to legitimise its political strategies of maximising its share of the oil revenues (Bach 1997). This multiplication of spheres in which indigeneity has become important, combined with the increasing penetration of the political into the economic sphere, fostered the salience of nativist ethnicity from the late 1970s.

56 For an in-depth exploration of indigeneity in Kano, see chapter 3.
2.4.3 Economic and Religious Competition

The ethnic boundary between ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities thus rose in salience in post-Biafra Kano. In terms of overt conflict, however, post-Biafra Kano long remained dominated by the struggles between its Islamic groups. This was due to the fact that 1970s saw the dominance of the turuq in Kano (as well as the unity of Islam propagated by the JNI) challenged by a younger, Western educated generation of radical Muslims. These reformists were often critical of the fragmentation of the Muslim Ummah through competition between the turuq, objected to their mystical zikir rituals, and strove for a revitalisation (tajdid) of Islam and its return to the literal message of the Qur’an and the Hadith. Faced with this collective reformist challenge, the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya were drawn together and relations between them became increasingly co-operative.

The most violent expression of the new Islamic “fragmentation of sacred authority” (Kane 2003: 67-103) in Kano was the millenarian Maitatsine movement in 1980, which led to a violent confrontation with the Kano State governor, Abubakar Rimi, and the killing of at least 4177 people (Christelow 1985; Hickey 1984; Hiskett 1987; Isichei 1987; Kastfelt 1989; Lubeck 1985). The strongest reformist organisation, however, was the Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition, or Izala. Formed in 1978 and inspired by “one of the most charismatic anti-Sufi reformists in twentieth-century West-Africa” (Kane 2003: 82), Sheikh Abubakar Gumi, Izala became the most vocal opponent of the traditional brotherhoods in Kano. Education, including the education of women, was a central element of Izala’s socio-religious platform and according to Kane (2003: 140), the

---

57 Those were the official statistics; unofficial sources estimate casualties at double this figure (Kane 2003: 98)

58 The integration of Izala into Kano society, however, was initially deeply resisted by Kanawa in the Old City, who remained loyal to the Sufi brotherhoods. Especially in the wake of Maitatsine, Kane (2003: 88-9) describes how local traditional rulers took violent action against Izala supporters aiming to set up their mosque in birnin Kano. In the face of Izala persistence, however, the Emir eventually allowed its supporters their mosques in the Fagge area just outside the Old City; consequently, Izala then continued to attract most of its Kano support in the waje neighbourhoods of Fagge and Brigade.
movement claimed to have established 2843 schools throughout Nigeria with no less than 1.6 million housewives enrolled. Izala thus propagated a rationalisation and intellectualisation of Islam as well as the rejection of the existing religious structures, a message that attracted the young educated elite (Larkin and Meyer 2006: 298-305).

Besides critique on the allegedly ‘syncretic’ practices of the dominant Sufis – thus laying a rather direct claim on the 19th century Jihad, which had been based on similar theological reformism – the radical Muslims of the 1970s and 1980s also were a product of the rapid development of Nigeria’s oil-based “fast capitalism” (Watts 1996: 267). Although the reform movements framed their resistance mostly in theological terms, it seems that it was also in part a reaction against this rapid rise of petroleum capitalism in their society. In the case of Maitatsine, it was clear that a substantial segment of his support was among the unemployed gardawa or almajirai (Quranic students) and the yan ci rani (seasonal workers), many of whom had lost their rural employment in the declining agricultural economy (Hiskett 1987; Lubeck 1985). Under the leadership of Maitatsine, they explicitly turned against the conspicuous consumption of those who profited from the oil economy – to the extent that they considered going “to sleep with more than one naira was to exhibit a lack of trust in Allah” (Watts 1996: 261). Izala and the other reform movements were less based on the support of the urban poor, but equally resisted the corruption (both financial and spiritual) of the oil-boom era.

In contemporary Kano, however, these fissures within the Islamic community have softened to the extent that today a Yoruba Muslim in Kano can argue that “Kano Muslims are one”59 although Islamic groups are obviously still divided over theological and other issues60. This was partly due to factors internal to the Muslim community: as Kane (2003: 204-6) argues, the increased “regulation of the spiritual economy” in Kano, through an agreement between Sufi leaders and Sheikh Gumi that all imams in Kano should be

---

59 Dr Salahudeen Yusuf, op. cit.

60 Not least of which is ethnicity; e.g. the division between those communities who have been traditionally Muslim (Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba) and those who have more recently begun to convert (most notably the Igbo) (Anthony 2000).
sanctioned by the Emir, led to an initial intensification of the tensions with Maitatsine, but after 1980 increased the construction of integrative Muslim identities. Moreover, the deliberate state policy of supporting certain factions within radical movements like Izala, led to internal power struggles that took the wind out of the external struggles (Kane 2003: 226).

At the same time, however, the tensions between Muslims and Christians increased, as marked by the Muslim-Christian disturbances of 1982 in Kano (Kane 2003: 189; Kukah 1993: 158–60) and, on a much grander scale, the spell of violence that began in Kafanchan in March 1987 (Falola 1998: 179–84; Ibrahim 1989; Kane 2003: 190–95; Kukah 1993: 184–206). Other riots followed61 but most analysts agree on the significance of the 1987 Kafanchan violence in marking the increasing Muslim-Christian tension in Nigeria. This cleavage was by no means new, as Islam and Christianity had already developed an institutional presence at the national level during the First Republic. Moreover, after the end of the Biafran war Kano’s religious composition diversified drastically, due to the return of southern refugees and increasing numbers of new Christian immigrants. However, as Kane (2003: 178–207) details, it was not until the late 1970s that this confrontation began to develop in full.

To explain the timing of the Christian-Muslim tensions, Kane (2003: 204) argues that in the 1970s the younger, Western educated Christian elites acquired a strong political awareness and were increasingly determined to break what they considered the political hegemony of Nigerian Muslims. In Kano, this is clearly exemplified by the militant evangelical character of many Sabon Gari churches, such as the ‘Aggressive Evangelical Church – Gospel Warriors’, and the language of ‘crusades’ that is used in their advertisements62. At the national level, competition between Islam and Christianity had been institutionalised for several years by the 1970s through the creation of Jama’at Nasr al-Islam


62 Dr Salahudeen Yusuf, op. cit.; Sheikh Qariballah, leader Qadiryya, 9 September 2006 in Kano.
(JNI) and the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) in the 1960s. But in the 1970s, the highly politicised leadership of Archbishop Okogie (CAN) and Sheikh Gumi (JNI) increased the political conflict between the two religions (Kane 2003: 205).

The central issue between Muslims and Christians is thus the question of dominance; a question of great relevance in a context of an almost equal split between the two religions in terms of followers at the national level. This struggle against domination can be illustrated by the conflict over the educational system under General Gowon, which led to the founding of CAN in order to organise the Christian protest (Kane 2003: 181). Other examples could include the confrontation over Nigeria’s accession to the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1986 and the position of sharia in the Nigerian legal system (Kane 2003: 183-8; Kukah 1993: 115-36). While both issues were resolved politically, they became the focal point and catalyst for Christian-Muslim contestation and institutionalisation.

This institutionalisation was also reinforced by the repressive nature of Nigerian military rule after the Second Republic. Political dissent was repressed, often violently, and popular opposition was banned. The only civil society organisations at the national level that were condoned, and even supported, by the state were religious institutions (especially CAN and the JNI); at the local level these were supplemented by (‘settler’) ethnic associations. These religious and ethnic organisations became practically the only alternative institutional spheres outside the state in which Nigerians could organise and themselves and formulate their values, norms and ideals. Moreover, in light of the state’s increasing abnegation of its social responsibilities, these institutions also became primary providers of essential social services, from education to health care and banking services (Osaghae 1995).

The reintroduction of democracy in 1999 did not diminish the influence of ethnicity and religion in Kano politics and its wider society; if anything, as both Falola (2004: 149) and Mustapha (2004: 257) show, it increased these tensions by allowing for more open political competition. For example, the resolution of the sharia debate of the 1970s and 1980s included
a compromise that allowed individual States to have sharia courts of first instance and appeal courts, even though a Federal appeal court would not be established. In effect, this shifted the locus of the sharia debate from Federal politics to the level of the individual States. The reintroduction of the more controversial aspects of the sharia penal code in Kano in 2000 should be interpreted as a consequence of this locational shift. But while this extension could claim significant public support among the dominant Muslim residents of the northern States, including Kano, it simultaneously marginalised their Christian populations. Moreover, it has reaffirmed the legitimacy of the presence of two separate legal systems, which since colonial rule have reinforced ‘settler’ perceptions of being guests, or lesser citizens, in Kano. As such, it could be argued that the current resolution of the sharia debate has increased the tension between Christian and Muslim populations at the level of Kano State.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to show how Kano’s main identities of belonging - religion, ethnicity, and status or class - have developed and transformed over time. Specifically, it has focused on the origins of nativism and the impact of indigeneity on the city’s identities of belonging. In pre-colonial Kano, belonging was primarily defined in terms of status and religion. Ethnic and linguistic identities existed, but were more flexible and less politicised than their current incarnations. Patterns of inclusion and exclusion therefore occurred along the lines of status and religion, targeting, for example, non-Muslims as legitimate objects of enslavement. Pre-colonial politics was largely controlled by the aristocratic rulers (sarauta) but, while they have been labelled as ‘Fulani’, their rule was not organised along these ethnic

63 In fact, Christians can choose on a case-by-case basis which legal system they prefer; interestingly, many of them choose sharia because of its efficient and fair courts (Dr Mustapha Ismail, director CHRI, 17 August 2006 in Kano).
Throughout most of this period Kano was a prosperous and diverse city, characterised by the effective incorporation and assimilation of many of its migrants – with the significant exception of those who came into the city as slaves.

These patterns changed with the arrival of the British: not only did their amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates construct the contemporary geographical unit of Nigeria, but it also integrated Kano into the colonial economy. As such, the city prospered economically, attracting unprecedented numbers of semi-skilled or highly skilled workers from Nigeria’s south. These southerners were not only different in ethnic, linguistic, and cultural terms, but also predominantly Christian and could therefore not assimilate in the pre-colonial tradition. Moreover, the boundaries between ‘northerners’ and ‘southerners’ were reinforced by horizontal inequalities and the resulting economic competition between them. Finally, in political terms, colonial rule forcibly increased the social distance between the Kano’s ‘native’ Muslim population and the new ‘settler’ Christians residing in Sabon Gari, the strangers’ quarters.

Independence broke the control of the British over Nigerian society, but did not attenuate the ethnic and religious contradictions brought about by colonial rule, the Biafran war being arguably the strongest indication. And while the Biafran experience encouraged political reform to ensure the stability of the federal state, some of these reforms backfired at the level of local identities. The case in point here is the bureaucratic categorisation of indigeneity that was used to organise Nigeria’s Federal Character principle. Although intended as a means to ensure equal political participation between ethnic communities at the national level, at the local level in Kano indigeneity reinforced the colonial divisions of ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities. Moreover, this cleavage was reproduced through persisting horizontal inequalities between ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities, as well as by the rising competition along the Nigerian Christian–Muslim divide. In post-Biafra Kano, therefore, indigeneity,
horizontal inequality, and religious competition all compounded the colonial boundary between the city’s ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities.

These categorisations originated under colonial rule with the definition of the ‘native’, but were reproduced and refined as ‘indigeneity’ under the Federal Character programme. So while this programme in itself constituted a constructive effort to stabilise the Nigerian federation through power-sharing and affirmative action, its use of indigeneity instead of more territorial definitions of belonging and identity entrenched the exclusionary tendencies of the colonial administration. Alternative notions of belonging continue to exist, such as the inclusive Kanawa identity propagated by Kano’s Emirate rulers, but the convergence of nativist categorisations with conducive historical circumstances prioritised nativist ethnicity at the expense of these alternatives. The subsequent chapter will focus on the everyday meanings and relative importance of the different notions of belonging in contemporary Kano and highlight their connection to the dynamics of diversity, inequality, and identification in the city.
3.1 Introduction

For a long time, Kano was the only State that would accommodate strangers. Everybody came from every part of the country, any part of the world, [and] he could come to Kano. We, the people of Kano, have a tradition to receive him and settle him as his home. This [has] made Kano a big city

Ever since its integration into the trade routes across the Sahara and the Sahel, Kano has been characterised by continuous immigration and social diversity. However, opinions diverge as to the ways in which the city has dealt with this diversity, and especially the extent to which non-Hausa and non-Muslim people can claim to belong in the city. On the one hand, as evidenced in the above quotation, many residents portray their city proudly as a cosmopolitan “Centre of Commerce”\(^65\), which welcomes and incorporates strangers for their economic contribution to its prosperity. On the other hand, however, Kano is also often viewed as an exclusive place, deeply Islamic and dominated by the northern Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups, and even as a “theatre of violence and intolerance” (Ojo 2006). As the preceding historical chapter has shown, both representations of Kano reverberate with particular aspects of Kano’s history. But more importantly, both images have retained some form of influence in contemporary Kano, especially as part of the salient discourses on belonging in the city.

Building on the historical insights of the preceding chapter, therefore, this chapter will focus on the contemporary expressions and meanings of ‘belonging’ in Kano and relate them

---

\(^{64}\) Tafidan Kura, district head of Kura, 15/9/2006.

\(^{65}\) Kano State’s official slogan, which figures prominently on numbers plate of every car that is registered in the State.
to the social structures of demography, identity, and inequality. Its main objective will be to point out how the many overlapping definitions of belonging, identities, and inequality reinforce the ethnic boundary that is at the heart of nativist belonging in Kano. At the same time, however, the chapter will also show that competing and cross-cutting discourses and identities continue to exist, even if they have been temporarily subordinated by the salience of nativism. To make these arguments, section 3.2 will describe Kano in terms of its ethnic, religious, and class identities, with special focus on their intersections and overlap with horizontal inequalities. Section 3.3 will then examine the main definitions of urban belonging in Kano, after which section 3.4 will connect these findings to the identity repertoires of Kano residents.

3.2 Diversity, Identity, and Inequality in Kano

Due to the historical prominence of Islam in Kano, the city is often considered as essentially Islamic - with the notable exception of Sabon Gari, considered by many Kano Muslims as the ‘Christian’ or ‘godless’ neighbourhood. Building on this stereotyped perception, Kano is considered as a predominantly Muslim and Hausa-Fulani city. While these stereotypes hold true for the Old City, data from the perceptions survey indicate that there is little basis for their application to waje neighbourhoods. If we consider the ethnic composition of Kano first, table 3.1 presents the ethnic self-identification of respondents who took part in the perceptions surveys. It shows how the majority of the sample belongs to the (‘native’) Hausa-Fulani ethnic category. This majority, however, is less overwhelming than many Kano ‘natives’ believe; only within the Old City does this ethnic community command a numerical

---

66 The term Hausa-Fulani is used here to denote the large ethnic-linguistic category that exists in contrast to the Igbo, the Yoruba, and the minority ethnic groups. Although it is difficult to draw the precise boundary between this concept and the independent communities of the Hausa and Fulani, the hyphenated notion is useful as it denotes more precisely the compound character of the contemporary understanding of the urban Hausa ethnic category. As a label, it applies to all those urban Hausa, Fulani, and closely related communities who speak Hausa and identify themselves as such. Its application is more objectionable in rural Kano, where there remains a clearer division between the rural Hausa and rural Fulani.
majority of over 91%, with Naibawa, Badawa, and Sabon Gari following at 82%, 64%, and 9%, respectively.

Table 3.1: Ethnic communities in Kano (N=413)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Ethnic label</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hausa</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>Hausa-Fulani</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulani</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igbo</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>Igbo</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanuri</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edo</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nupe</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Kaduna</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efik/Ibibio</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plateau</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calabar</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian/Boso</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These numbers alone, however, indicate little more than that Kano is an ethnically diverse society. Interpreting the relative sizes and relationships between the ethnic categories in table 3.1 therefore requires some elaboration on the meanings of ethnicity in the local Kano context. As detailed in chapter 2, ethnic identities have a long and dynamic history, in which they have moved from fluid pre-colonial territorial distinctions to the nativist categories of the contemporary era. This historical development has resulted in nested sets of ethnic cleavages, ranging from the large regional wazobia cleavage (distinguishing the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo, and minorities) to the intricate and minute distinctions between Hausa families from different birni wards. Because of this nested nature, the meaning of ethnicity changes depending on the social context in which it is used. Despite this multiplicity, however, it is possible to sketch some basic contours of Kano’s ethnic distinctions, especially in contrast to those outlined by Paden (1973: 37–8) 40 years ago.

67 Wazobia is the combination of the Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa words for ‘come’ (Mustapha 2006: 1; Osa 1986: 39)
In his seminal study of Kano in the 1960s, Paden highlights eight community cleavages that structured the city’s patterns of identification and group formation. Three of those are related to what has been defined above as ethnicity: place of birth (garin haihuwa), ancestral home (asali), and ‘tribe’ (kabila). In the 1960s, Paden (1973: 37) argues that place of birth was an “extremely important” source of legal and political identification in Hausaland. The customary Hausa term denoting one’s status in this regard, ‘Yan kasa (“sons of the land”), referred both to people born in a place and “the original people of a locality” (ibid.). The closely related notion of asali gained importance as migration increased in scope and size and was particularly important to those individuals who had migrated into Kano (ibid.). Kabila in Paden’s time referred only to an apolitical linguistic category, such as the Yoruba, the Arabs, and the Hausa (ibid.: 38).

In contemporary Kano, these ethnic identifications have shifted and transformed to retain their relevance in a changing social and political context. One of the most important shifts is that local ethnic distinctions have to a large extent become subsumed under a national ethnic classification that resembles the division of European ethnic nations. Its boundary usually differentiates between the four main wazobia categories, although it may also refer to other ethnic labels (e.g. Kanuri, Edo, or Berom)\(^{68}\). However, in its ideal-typical form the defining feature of this ethnic cleavage is that it conceives of Nigeria as divided into a distinct number of historical and therefore immutable ethnic categories, which are all inextricably connected to a particular geographic area. Ethnic identity in this sense is therefore primordial and connected to belonging in one particular place; it will therefore be referred to as nativist ethnicity.

---

\(^{68}\) Within these ethnic categories, more localised ethnic boundaries remain that have retained the fluidity and nested character of pre-colonial kabila and asali. On the whole, however, these local understandings of ethnicity reinforce rather than cross-cut the nativist ethnic cleavage - e.g. the divisions between Kano Hausa communities from different birni wards, or the various Igbo communities with origins in different South Eastern Nigerian States.
Table 3.2: Religions in Kano (N=418)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>% of Kano population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Islam (No brotherhood)</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam - Qadiriyya</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam - Tijanniyya</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam - Other Brotherhood (incl. izala)</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian - Catholic</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian - Protestant</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian - Pentecostal</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian - African Independent Church</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The importance of this notion of ethnicity, as chapter 2 has highlighted, is partly explained by its overlap with other identities and boundaries - most notably those of religion and class. In religious terms, the ratio of Muslims to Christians in the four survey neighbourhoods is about 2 to 1, with 65% of the sample identifying as Muslims, 32% as Christians, and 2% as ‘other’. Table 3.2 shows the various affiliations within the Christian and Muslim faiths, indicating how the majority of Muslims is no longer affiliated to a brotherhood (or tarīqa).

Among Christians, the majority identifies as Catholic, with the minority affiliated to the various African, European, and American Protestant churches. In theory, religious affiliation is more flexible and dependent on choice than ethnicity, which is generally considered to be determined by blood and birth. However, due to the deep significance of religion in Kano and its overlap with ethnic and regional divisions, conversion is rare and frowned upon among most ethnic groups.

Table 3.3: Religion by ethnic category*** (N=412)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Islam</th>
<th>Christianity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hausa-Fulani</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igbo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For a discussion on the birth-choice continuum, see Horowitz (2000: 55-6).
Religious beliefs and practices differ substantially across ethnic communities. Table 3.3 shows how ethnicity relates to the Christian-Muslim cleavage. It shows that almost all Hausa-Fulani are Muslim, whilst all Igbo people are Christian; the Yoruba and minority groups are in majority Christian with sizeable Muslim minorities. If we dissect the minority category into specific ethnic groups, a pattern emerges where northern ethnic groups (e.g. Kanuri) are in majority Muslim, and those from the Nigerian south (e.g. Edo) primarily Christian. But while Islam is thus an important feature of the Hausa-Fulani community, and Christianity of the Igbo, this does not preclude the existence of non-Muslim Hausa-Fulani or Muslim Igbo. The Yoruba and many minority communities are even more diverse in religious terms, with the religious tolerance of the Yoruba as the stereotypical example (Laitin 1986; Peel 2000). Finally, there are also differences between ethnic communities within the major denominations of Christianity and Islam, for example distinguishing the Catholic Igbo from the Yoruba aladura churches.

But while the interaction between religion and ethnicity is thus more nuanced than a simple dichotomy suggest, table 3.3 does show that the Christian/Muslim divide strongly overlaps with the wazobia notion of ethnicity. Moreover, this overlap is compounded by regional distinctions between northern and southern Nigeria. Stereotypically, the north is considered predominantly Muslim and the south Christian. Of course, in practice this link is mediated by the multi-religious character of the Yoruba community and the Middle Belt region, and by the increasing religious mixing due to migration. For example, although there is a sense in which Kano’s Igbo Christians remain considered southerners in the eyes of many Kano people, they are also northern in the eyes of the rest of the country, a fact they

---

70 In all tables and figures presenting survey data in this thesis, triple stars (*** ) denote a significant intergroup difference for the starred variables (using a chi-squared or ANOVA test, depending on the variables) at the < 0.01 level; double stars (**) denote a significant difference (or dependence) at < 0.05 level; a single star (*) denotes significance at the < 0.1 level.

71 Such as the Maguzawa, or non-Muslim Hausa residents of Kano (Barkow 1973; Last 1993). In Sabon Gari, there are also several churches that cater for a Hausa-speaking, northern community and whose services are held in Hausa. This has led to an interesting tension between the Islamic connotations inherent in the Hausa language and their use in Christian rituals – e.g. the use of the word ‘Allah’ for the Christian ‘God’.
themselves use strategically in the national political game (e.g. Shiklam 2010). However, these nuances do not negate the overlap of nativist ethnicity, Christian/Muslim, and regional divisions.

On top of these intersections, tables 3.4 to 3.7 show that these boundaries are also fortified by horizontal inequalities in terms of education, employment, and income. Table 3.4 depicts the highest level of education attained by each respondent. It shows a general pattern of Igbo, Yoruba, and minority ethnic groups who are more highly educated than the Hausa Fulani. Between the three ‘settler’ groups, however, there is also an educational hierarchy: the Igbo are the best educated, followed at some distance by the Yoruba and minority groups. Moreover, while the relatively high level of tertiary education among the Igbo and Yoruba is mostly among the women of these communities, the opposite is true for the minorities: their women are less likely to be educated at the tertiary level than the men, as is the case among the Hausa-Fulani. The historical pattern of better educated southern Christians has thus been reproduced until the present day, as southern ‘settlers’ in Kano are still significantly higher educated than the more ‘native’ northerners.

*Table 3.4: Highest level of formal education achieved by ethnic category*** (N=411)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Islamic</th>
<th>None or primary</th>
<th>Some or full secondary</th>
<th>Some or full tertiary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hausa-Fulani</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igbo</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.5: Employment in Kano by ethnicity and gender (N=402)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Employed</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
<th>Working in the home</th>
<th>Student</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hausa-Fulani</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igbo</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Female</strong>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hausa-Fulani</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igbo</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All</strong>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hausa-Fulani</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igbo</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.5 displays the forms of employment in which the four main ethnic categories in the Kano perceptions survey are involved. While the bottom five rows contain the data for the entire research sample, the data have also been split by gender to highlight certain significant differences between male and female patterns of employment. The table contains three patterns that are of particular interest to this chapter. First, it shows evidence for a horizontal inequality between the ‘native’ Hausa-Fulani and the ‘settler’ groups: for both men and women, ‘natives’ are significantly less often gainfully employed than any of the other three groups. Second, however, this has not led to more Hausa-Fulani men considering themselves to be unemployed. Instead, significantly more Hausa-Fulani men consider themselves students than the other three groups.

This difference is not due to an age bias, as there are no significant differences between the age structures of the ethnic groups in the sample\(^{22}\). Moreover, it poses an analytical problem, since table 3.4 showed that on the whole Hausa-Fulani have had less formal education than

\(^{22}\) The average age of men in the sample is 30 for Hausa-Fulani, 29 for Igbo, 31 for Yoruba, and 32 for the ‘others’ (sig. of 0.917 in ANOVA); the average age of women is 32 for Hausa-Fulani, 29 for Igbo, 32 for Yoruba, and 30 for the ‘others’ (sig. of 0.532 in ANOVA).
any of the other groups. The discrepancy is therefore also unlikely to be explained by any bias in the formal educational system in favour of indigenes (most of whom are Hausa-Fulani). Instead, I would suggest an explanation that focuses on the involvement of young male unemployed Muslims in Islamic education. The term ‘Islamic education’ is somewhat ambiguous, allowing for a wide interpretation and hence for easy identification with it. Islamic education is thus argued to hide some of the unemployment of Hausa-Fulani men in the perceptions survey sample.

The third trend of importance in table 3.5 is the relatively low level of employment of the women in the sample and the high percentages of women in working in the home. Especially among the Hausa-Fulani, this points to strong gender roles in which the man is expected to work and the woman takes care of the home. The differences between the ethnic communities, however, also suggest strong ethnic differences in these gender roles; Igbo women, for example, although also less often employed than their male counterparts, classify themselves much more often as either unemployed or student. I would argue that most women who classified as unemployed could also have labelled themselves as working in the home and that, therefore, this labelling tells us something about the expected societal role of women in the different ethnic groups in Kano as well as their actual occupation. Women who label themselves as unemployed rather than working in the home express the expectation that they could (or even should) have been employed outside the home. It could therefore be argued that Igbo and minority women more often see themselves as potential employees and that the gender roles in these ethnic categories are therefore different than those among the Hausa-Fulani and the Yoruba.
Table 3.6: Occupation of the formally employed by ethnic category*** (N=195)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public employed</th>
<th>Private employed</th>
<th>Self-employed &lt;10 employees</th>
<th>Self-employed &gt;10 employees</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hausa-Fulani</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igbo</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although there are other interesting trends displayed in table 3.5, the three discussed above suggest horizontal inequalities of (un)employment patterns and gender-specific expectations for employment between the ethnic groups. Table 3.6 shows a similar dynamic in the types of employment in which the different ethnic communities are involved. The general pattern is that Igbo and Yoruba dominate the private sector (especially the higher income segment), whilst public employment is almost exclusively in hands of the ‘native’ Hausa-Fulani and the minority ethnic communities, many of whom are also northern Muslims. This is particularly striking as the educational difference points in the opposite direction, which would lead one to expect a higher proportion of southern Igbo and Yoruba in public employment. The data thus points towards two grievances: on the one hand, ‘natives’ feel that ‘settlers’ are taking ‘their’ money through successful entrepreneurship and higher levels employment, whilst on the other, ‘settlers’ feel discriminated because public employment (and hence political influence) is in the hands of the ‘natives’.

Table 3.7: Number of items in household by ethnic category*** (N=401)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0-2 items</th>
<th>3-5 items</th>
<th>6-7 items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hausa-Fulani</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igbo</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to, and partly as a result of, inequalities in education and occupation, there are also inequalities between Kano’s ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’ in terms of wealth and income. Table
3.7 presents a more or less objective indicator of wealth, that is the number of certain types of commodities in the household\textsuperscript{73}. The pattern depicted here mirrors the patterns described above in that the ‘settler’ ethnic groups, and most especially the Igbo, are significantly better off than the ‘native’ Hausa-Fulani. These patterns correlate significantly with the different groups’ perceptions of their wealth relative to the rest of Kano’s population\textsuperscript{74}.

\textit{Table 3.8: Ethnic groups by neighbourhood*** (N=411)}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Old City</th>
<th>Sabon Gari</th>
<th>Naibawa</th>
<th>Badawa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hausa-Fulani</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igbo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kano’s nativist ethnic cleavage thus overlaps with the Christian/Muslim boundary and regional divisions, and is compounded by economic horizontal inequalities – mostly at the expense of the ‘native’ Muslims (cf. Stewart 2008b). Table 3.8 shows that there is also a measure of residential segregation to this cleavage, as Kano’s Old City is dominated by ‘natives’ while Sabon Gari is largely inhabited by ‘settlers’. Although largely abandoned by the Igbo during the Biafran War, contemporary Sabon Gari is still primarily the home of Igbo, Yoruba, Edo, and other ‘settlers’. The demographic opposite of Sabon Gari remains the Old City (\textit{birni}), where Hausa-Fulani Muslims have practically retained a residential ethnic monopoly. Together, Sabon Gari and \textit{birni} represent what most Nigerians consider to be Kano metropolis: a predominantly Hausa-Fulani, Muslim city with a relatively small neighbourhood of Christian southerners.

However, this dichotomous representation of Kano excludes the considerable number of ‘new’ neighbourhoods that have sprung up in the last three decades as a result of continuous

\textsuperscript{73} The following commodities were included: radio, TV, refrigerator, motorbike, flush toilet, car, and video.

\textsuperscript{74} Correlation of 0.35 at significance level of 0.000.
and rapid urbanisation coupled with relatively high birth rates. Some of these
neighbourhoods, such as Challawa, Jaen, and Sharada, are industrial development areas,
while others (e.g. Badawa - see table 3.8) are former villages that have gradually become
incorporated into the metropolitan area. Yet others are residential neighbourhoods (e.g.
Naibawa and Brigade) for northern migrants, southern ‘settlers’ who prefer to live outside
Sabon Gari, or ‘natives’ whose lifestyle is out of sync with the more ‘traditional’ Hausa
culture and identity of the Old City. These ‘new’ neighbourhoods do not feature in common
representations of Kano metropolis, but have come to drastically change its composition and
nature, if only because they are generally less segregated than the Old City and Sabon Gari.

In sum, this statistical evidence underlines the diversity of Kano society in ethnic,
religious, and class terms and the overlap of these identities and inequality. We will now
consider the challenge such diversity poses to the coherence and connectedness of an urban
society: in light of such divergent ethnic and religious affiliations and horizontal inequalities,
who can claim to belong in Kano?

3.3 Definitions of Belonging

There is no single, uniformly hegemonic set of conditions that define belonging in Kano.
Different individuals, communities, and neighbourhoods may define differently the
requirements for being accepted as part of the city community. Based on fieldwork
observation and qualitative interviews with a wide range of key respondents, table 3.9
presents four such discourses salient in contemporary Kano society: indigeneity,
‘traditional’ belonging, civic-communal belonging, and civic-territorial belonging. The
section outlines the definitions of these forms of belonging and highlight how ethnicity, in its
nativist interpretation, is central to three of the four.

75 To improve the legibility of this section, subsequent usage of the phrase ‘traditional’ belonging will not employ quotation marks; the contested character of the notion of the ‘traditional’ will therefore be left implicit, but no less intended.
Table 3.9: Four definitions of urban belonging in Kano

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition of belonging</th>
<th>Indigeneity</th>
<th>Traditional</th>
<th>Civic-communal</th>
<th>Civic-territorial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indigenes and non-indigenes defined by familial ethnic origins</td>
<td>‘Native’ Kano people and ‘settlers’, defined by ethnicity, religion and class</td>
<td>‘Native’ Kano Hausa-Fulani; Kano Igbo, Kano Yoruba, etc.; and ‘settlers’</td>
<td>Kano residents; and outsiders.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3.1 Indigeneity

Indigeneity is a national policy categorisation that is nonetheless defined at the local level in Kano and distinguishes between the city’s indigenes and non-indigenes. It was implemented as part of Nigeria’s Federal Character project, which was designed to ensure equal representation of Nigeria’s diverse communities at the central executive government and, increasingly, its civil service. This was enshrined in the 1979 constitution and has been reproduced in its most recent incarnation (Federal Government of Nigeria 1999: Art. 14 (3)): the composition of the Government of the Federation should ensure “that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few States or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that Government or in any of its agencies” (Federal Government of Nigeria 1999). More specifically, “the President shall appoint at least one Minister from each State, who shall be an indigene of such State” and the members of governing bodies of political parties should “reflect that their members should belong to different States” (Federal Government of Nigeria 1999: Art. 135 (3) and 203 (2)).

The constitution thus creates an explicit connection between indigeneity and political representation and suggests that indigeneity is defined by primordial communal origins76. What defines a “community indigenous to that State”, however, was left ambiguous, which devolved de facto the responsibility of defining indigeneity to the lower levels of the state.

Human Rights Watch (2006) highlights the problematic consequences of this ambiguity and

76 The latter definition is further explicated in the definitional section 318 (1): “‘belong to’ or its grammatical expression when used with reference to a person in a State refers to a person either of whose parents or any of whose grandparents was a member of a community indigenous to that State” (Federal Government of Nigeria 1999).
describes how, in response, the issue of certificates of indigeneity has become common
practice throughout Nigeria. Annex B shows such a certificate from the Fagge local
government in Kano, called ‘indigene authentication declaration’, which may be considered
representative for the certificates issued by other local governments in the city. It contains
two formal criteria for being recognised as a Kano indigene: first, a person has to be born and
a resident in a ward of the local government; and second, he or she has to be acknowledged as
such by the local ward head, the village head, the district head, and the local government
chairman.

Practically, therefore, these four authorities only have to certify a person’s place of birth
and residence in order to be able to award indigeneship. However, both from the Human
Rights Watch (2006: 20–4) report and discussions with the village and district heads of Fagge
local government, it transpired that the process is not quite so straightforward. First, people
often reside somewhere other than where they were born. This is particularly true in Sabon
Gari, which is commonly seen as a place of continuous in- and out-migration\textsuperscript{77}. As such, in
addition to birth and residence in the local government, authorities in Fagge may also
recognise people as indigenes on the basis of their protracted residence in the area. However,
it is unclear how many years of residence makes one an indigene: even the Sabon Gari village
head and the secretary to the district head of Fagge disagreed on this when they were asked
for a specific duration. The village head specified 40 years, while the secretary argued that
five were enough. Or, at least, five years used to be enough, as the latter quickly qualified his
statement: “before, when you had stayed five years, you could get indigene papers. But over
time, there have been people who have abused it […] and the authorities came to realise that
these people took over the chances of the indigenes of Kano. So now they have stopped giving
out indigene papers, only resident ones”\textsuperscript{78}.

\textsuperscript{77} Prince Mahmud Ado Bayero, district head of Fagge, November 2008 in Kano.

\textsuperscript{78} Resident papers are identified by Human Rights Watch as “generally useless except as a form of
identification” (2006: 21) and even potential tools of exclusion. In Kano, the status of these ‘resident papers’
Becoming an indigene only on the basis of protracted residence is thus, at least in Fagge local government, difficult. It is likely, however, that this difficulty is not limited to Fagge alone; the second complication in the process of determining whether or not someone can become an indigene, is that this process often depends on the ethnic, cultural, and religious background of the applicant. Although the precise interaction between ethnicity and indigeneity requires more systematic, and preferably national, documentation, the general pattern was aptly summarised by one State official: “If you go to Enugu, indigene means: Igbo people, because it is an Igbo majority country. If you go to Lagos, indigene means Yoruba. If you go to Kano, indigene means Hausa. It is difficult for others to be indigenes”. Moreover, he said, “it helps if you are a Muslim”.

In Kano, indigeneity is thus defined not only on the basis of residence, which is not a constitutional requirement, but also on the basis of ethnic and religious identification. Moreover, this ethnic membership is an ascribed, ancestral identity. Indigeneity, similar to the Dutch notion of bureaucratic autochthony, is immutable, as one cannot change one’s ancestral origins, whether through migration, through protracted residence, or through marriage. Every ethnic community is deemed to have its ‘native’ territory where its members are rightful legal indigenes; those with an ethnic background that is inassimilable to the dominant local group have much more difficulty acquiring indigene rights. This is also confirmed by the 1989 guidelines of the National Electoral Commission, which refer to Local Government Areas as “culturally or ethnically homogeneous” (Federal Electoral Commission is unclear, but from the anecdotal evidence collected it indeed appears that they do not have the same value as the indigene certificate, because they do not confer any legal rights onto the owner.

Dr Bala Muhammad, DG A Daidaita Sahu, 22 October 2008.

80 Religious and other forms of diversity are mentioned in a different context within the constitution but they are not explicitly related to indigeneity. Article 15 of the 1999 constitution, for example, stipulates that “national integration shall be actively encouraged, whilst discrimination on the grounds of place of origin, sex, religion, status, ethnic or linguistic association or ties shall be prohibited” (2) and that “it shall be the duty of the State to encourage inter-marriage among persons from different places of origin, or of different religious, ethnic, or linguistic association or ties (3c) and promote or encourage the formation of associations that cut across ethnic, linguistic, religious and or other sectional barriers (3d)” (Federal Government of Nigeria 1999).
in Bach 1989: 223). Although empirically untenable, it is precisely this primordial ‘Blut und Boden’ understanding of ethnic belonging that is at the heart of contemporary definitions of indigeneity.

And herein lies the rub. For while at the national level of the state, the Federal Character principle organised political competition as a game between equals (i.e. indigenes of different States), article 14 (4) expands this pattern to State and Local Governments with a radically different result:

The composition of the Government of a State, a local government council, or any of the agencies of such Government or council, and the conduct of the affairs of the Government or council or such agencies shall be carried out in such manner as to recognise the diversity of the people within its area of authority and the need to promote a sense of belonging and loyalty among all the people of the Federation (Federal Government of Nigeria 1999)

This clause extended the reach of the political use of indigeneity as the formal definition of ethnicity from Abuja to the States and Local Government Areas. The result has been that indigenes at the national level are equal in their claim to a political power, but that, at the State and LGA level, there is an inherent inequality between indigenes and non-indigenes: the former belong to the State of their residence, while the latter belong elsewhere. Replicating the logic of the national Federal Character locally therefore leads to the exclusion of those who are non-indigenes in their place of residence; they have their indigenous political rights, after all, in ‘their own’ places of origin and cannot assimilate due to the primordialism inherent in the concept of indigeneity. This exclusion is particularly pernicious for women who marry outside the State where they can claim indigeneity: they are often considered non-indigenes both by their original home State and the State of origin of their husband.
3.3.2 Traditional belonging

According to the discourse of traditional belonging, the territory of the ‘natives’\(^{81}\) in urban Kano is discursively bounded by the birni city walls. The waje areas, although accepted and lauded for their economic importance, are not seen to reflect the true, historical nature of Kano as a northern, Muslim, and predominantly Hausa-Fulani city. Being a ‘native’ in Kano is defined at the level of the compound or local neighbourhood, in which residents know each other personally and can trace everyone to a particular house or family. As a consequence, compounds and small localities (up to the level of a ward) are the first territorial unit of identification within Kano, in which belonging is largely defined on the basis of historical personal or familial ties. To belong, one has to be known in the community, not only as an individual but preferably also as part of a household, family, or other social institution that can denote trustworthiness. Hausa, Fulani or other ethnic groups from outside the Old City are therefore considered as relative ‘strangers’ in the city, unless they can be identified through family or other personal ties. Even individuals without prior relations in the city would, upon arrival as a migrant, be expected to become attached to a household or family and thus identify themselves in the eyes of the rest of the locality’s community. Marriage is of course a common way to acquire such relations, but single men can also attach themselves to families independently. This applies to rural Hausa or Fulani, but also other ethnic communities that are culturally (and especially religiously) similar to the Kano Hausa-Fulani.

Traditional authorities play an important role in defining and maintaining the ties required for this kind of belonging, as they were historically responsible for administering residents, getting to know them and their position in the local social networks, and dividing land rights between individuals of the various communities. Rapid urbanisation, especially in conjunction with Nigeria’s political reforms, has diminished the reach and influence of the

---

\(^{81}\) In Hausa the term ‘native’ resembles the concept of Bakano (plural: Kanawa), but this term is ambiguous due to its other possible interpretations (e.g. denoting a resident of Kano Emirate, or only an urban resident of metropolitan Kano).

94
Emirate in Kano, but its role has remained important in the ‘native’ communities of the Old City. An indication of the strength of the traditional definition of belonging employed here is the regularity with which people, regardless of the true population statistics - which, in any case, are unavailable - refer to Kano as inhabited over 95% by Muslim Hausa. The city’s core community, in this view, is therefore seen to comprise ‘native’ Kanawa in a narrow sense: Hausa-Fulani Muslims from the north, and especially those whose ancestral origins (asali) can be traced back to Kano itself. If one can claim all three characteristics of being a Kano-born, Hausa or Fulani Muslim, one can easily affiliate oneself to a patron and, after protracted residence, claim status as a Bakano; the more one deviates from this pattern, the harder it becomes. It is therefore possible to identify certain gradations of belonging.

As a rough indication of type and relative importance, the following can be considered as a ranking of the main conditions for traditional belonging in Kano:

1. Local, personal connections in a community, through one’s extended family, clan, ethnic community, or occupation; in other words, being known and recognised as part of the community’s social networks. Length of residence is an important part of this, as it shows commitment to the neighbourhood and city. It may also, however, require productive participation in the economy and socio-political life of the community, at the local neighbourhood, city, or State level.

2. Affiliation with Islam, especially those forms of Islam with historical roots in Kano such as the Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya Sufi turuq, but also more recent reformist movements such as Izala.

3. Speaking Hausa and respecting, if not observing, the cultural values, norms, and rituals of Kano’s Hausa and Fulani communities.
In many ways, traditional belonging in Kano thus requires a person to have a position in the local social, economic, and political networks and to be assimilated in terms of religion, language, and/or other expressions of the Kano Hausa culture. The relative priority of the three conditions is difficult to establish, but perhaps most clearly phrased as follows. It is virtually impossible to become accepted as a Bakano in the traditional sense without personal connections in a local social network, as part of a family, recognised ethnic or religious group, or the local economy. Traders, for example, may become accepted as a ‘native’ due to their economic importance even though they are culturally and religiously distinct and have few social connections outside their professional sphere. Conversely, however, many young male achaba drivers, although culturally similar to the Kano ‘native’, are often considered ‘problematic’ and have few social connections; they therefore continue to be considered ‘immigrants’. In similar vein, it is difficult to be accepted as a ‘native’ without Islamic affiliations, with the exception of the Maguzawa residents of Kano, or without a working knowledge of Hausa and of the local cultural norms – i.e. without some level of assimilation to the stereotypical ‘native’ Hausa-Fulani Muslim category. Immigrants who are Muslim, speak Hausa, and can position themselves in Kano’s social networks are therefore much more easily assimilated and accepted as ‘natives’ than those who are not.

With these conditions in mind, there seems to be a qualitative difference between the category of ‘natives’ whose status as such is uncontested on account of their familial, ethnic, and religious backgrounds and the category of people who have a more ambiguous status. For those in the latter category, social class, understood as the customs and identifications derived from a person’s socio-economic status in the capitalist economy, can play an important role in catalysing (or hindering) one’s acceptance as a ‘native’. First, as it is important to be seen to contribute economically to Kano society, having a respectable and productive occupation

82 One of the ways to establish such a local Kano network is recognition by or co-optation into the structures of the traditional Emirate authorities, for example as a local elder, recognised head of the family, or (non-territorial) title holder.

83 Non-Muslim Hausa who can trace their asali to Kano.
helps ‘settlers’ to be accepted into local Kano networks and, as such, to close the gap in belonging between themselves and the ‘natives’. This dynamic is particularly strong for those at the top of the class pyramid, who are easily accepted regardless of their ethnic or religious background. Second, certain occupations have historically been associated with Kano’s Old City, including blacksmiths (makeran baki), tailors of traditional northern garments (madunka), and leather workers (dukawa) (Dan-Asabe 1996: 140, 144, 156). For assimilated ‘settlers’, such occupations may increase their sense of traditional belonging in the ‘native’ Kano community.

Such ethnic specialisation, however, is not limited only to the Kano ‘natives’; there are also certain trades which, even if they are recognised as beneficial to Kano society, reinforce a person’s ‘settler’ status. An obvious example of such ‘settler’ occupations is managing a beer parlour or hotel outside the Old City; other examples can be found in Sabon Gari market, such as the Igbo motor parts salesmen (Nwaugo 1999) or the Yoruba women grinding and selling peppers and tomatoes. In similar vein, there is also a sense in which Kano residents whose ‘native’ status is ambiguous and who are considered to live a ‘Western’ middle-class lifestyle – which may be indicated by symbols such as Western dress (e.g. business suits rather than northern clothing) – are less likely to be accepted as ‘natives’ than those who dress ‘like a northerner’. Social class may thus support Kano ‘settler’ residents in their pursuit to belong as a ‘native’, but it may also reinforce their position as strangers.

In the absence of strong personal connections, ethnicity, complicated by aspects of religion and social class, is thus the primary boundary condition of traditional belonging in Kano. Displaying affiliation with the ‘native’ Hausa-Fulani community through language, dress, and observance of religious and cultural norms is crucial in the process of being accepted as a ‘native’. Social class further complicates the many gradations of belonging made on the basis

---

84 A Chinese businessman “Mr Li” helps to underline this point, as he is widely recognised as a ‘Kano man’ due to his extensive economic investment in the city even though he has not assimilated to the ethnic and religious stereotype of the ‘native’.
of ethnicity and religion; but except in the small top echelon of society, it cannot trump
ethnic assimilation as a condition for belonging as a ‘native’. Such assimilation, however, need
not be very extensive: many northern Nigerian migrants argue that “if you are a Muslim and
speak Hausa, you are assumed to belong here”\textsuperscript{85}. The inclusive Northern identity from the
1950s and 1960s still reverberates; and ethnic boundaries only become ‘thicker’ and less
pregnable when they coalesce with religious, regional, or class ones.

Two Igbo men in Kano can illustrate how overlapping regional boundaries can thicken
and harden ethnic boundaries and thus obstruct belonging in the traditional sense. Garba
Nwachukwu\textsuperscript{86} was born and raised in Kano, but has his origins in Nigeria’s south - in Owerri,
Imo State. He is a Muslim and considers himself an indigene in Kano on the basis of his birth
and extensive social and political network in the city. But at the same time, Nwachukwu
cannot describe himself as a Hausa man: depending on the situation, he is either an Igbo or
the interesting hybrid ‘Igbo Hausa’. Similarly, an anonymous interviewee\textsuperscript{87} is a Muslim Igbo
with over 30 years of residence in Kano behind him. Moreover, he has strong connections to
the Kano Emirate, as the secretary to one of the traditional rulers in the Emir’s Council. He
was born in Jos, but also has origins in Imo State. As a consequence, he considers himself
both an indigene and a non-indigene. For although he argues that the notion of indigeneity
based on ancestry is erroneous, his ethnic origins do not allow his full assimilation into the
traditional Kano ‘native’.

Both men meet all criteria for traditional belonging in Kano: they have lived in Kano for
decades, they are Muslims, speak Hausa, behave according to local tradition, have made
recognised economic contributions to Kano, and they have strong local connections (even
within politics and the Emirate institutions). Only their ethnic origins, which are southern,
stand in the way of full ‘native’ Kano status and as a consequence they remain, even if to a

\textsuperscript{85}Dr Bala Muhammad, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{86}Alh. Garba Nwachukwu, business man, 1 December 2008 in Kano.
\textsuperscript{87}Anonymous (x), business man, 2 December 2008 in Kano.
small extent, ambiguous strangers. The status of these assimilated strangers, however, differs qualitatively from many Kano residents outside the walls of the Old City, especially those living in Sabon Gari. Some of these waje residents do not consider themselves to belong in Kano, but rather as temporary migrants focused on fulfilling a particular economic function. Such residents are usually migrants who retain strong familial and cultural ties with their localities of origin and display little identification with or affection for Kano. Regardless of whether they are successful or not, their stay in Kano often pivots around capital accumulation, after which they envision a return to their ancestral homes in prosperity.

But the many waje neighbourhoods are also home to people who do affiliate themselves with Kano but are unwilling or unable to assimilate to the ‘native’ stereotype. This may be due to their Christian beliefs, their attachment to the culture of their non-Hausa asali, their lack of economic prospects or connections to any ‘native’ social networks, or other factors that structurally set them apart as ‘settlers’. Nonetheless, they may feel they belong in Kano. Many ‘settler’ families can trace their origins in Kano back several generations. Especially those who were born and grew up in the city often have strong attachments to it, if only because they do not belong anywhere else. As Nwachukwu phrased it: “My character, my everything is from here. […] When I went back [to eastern Nigeria] I couldn’t cope with the conditions - I look like a stranger there”88.

3.3.3 Civic-communal and Civic-territorial Belonging

‘Settlers’ who identify with Kano are in a different position to those who assimilate into a ‘native’, because they attempt to unite their own cultural and religious background with a sense of a Kano identity. As such, their notion of belonging in Kano is distinct from the traditional one in the Old City: it is based on residence and equal citizenship rather than

---

88 Alh. Garba Nwachukwu, op. cit.
social connections and assimilation. This form of belonging is classified here as a ‘civic’ interpretation of urban belonging. Its claim to belonging in Kano is made on the basis that all Nigerians have equal citizenship rights throughout the national territory and can therefore belong anywhere they reside. The only condition is a sense of attachment to the place of residence, which is most easily indicated by the length of stay, occupation, and familial or other social links.

The precise boundaries here are often subject to individual interpretation: there may be Yoruba in Sabon Gari who were born in Kano but feel more at home in Ibadan, just as there may be those who migrated from Ibadan to Kano in their youth and feel they can lay claim to being a ‘Kano man’. The important aspect to note is not so much the precise location of these boundaries, but the fact that they remain well outside the traditional definition of the ‘native’. Civic notions of urban belonging therefore portray a more inclusive vision of Kano, as a city that is metaphorically bounded by the outer limits of the metropolis rather than the Old City walls. Metropolitan Kano, in the civic notion of belonging, thus encompasses a population that is diverse in ethnic and religious terms but united by a shared sense of territorial and residential identity.

Within civic notions of belonging, however, a distinction can be made between belonging as a community and belonging as an individual. The latter, referred to here as ‘civic-territorial’ belonging, represents arguably the most extreme form of civic belonging, as it holds that every individual Nigerian should be able to identify with Kano (and be accepted as such) on the basis of his or her individual residence in the city. Those who hold this view emphasise the rights of individual Nigerian citizens to belong and be accepted in any part of their country regardless of their religious, ethnic, or other affiliations. The community of Kano imagined in terms of individual-civic belonging is thus based on common residence and placed firmly within the boundaries of the Nigerian nation.
However, many ‘settlers’ who feel they belong in Kano express and utilise their rights as ‘Kano people’ not as individuals but through membership of ethnic and religious groups and organisations. Although the main functions of these organisations are related to their specific religious, cultural, or economic objectives, they also function as representative bodies for ‘settlers’ in Kano. The individual members of these organisations are therefore formally part of the Kano community through their ethnic or religious organisations, rather than as individuals or through the ‘native’ social networks, Emirate institutions, or political parties. Rather than Kano ‘natives’, in other words, they are Kano-Igbo, Kano-Kanuri, or Kano-Yoruba, a collection of intermediate categories that emphasises the multiple places in which these ‘settlers’ may belong.

In a way, this civic-communal definition of belonging reflects pre-colonial forms of the incorporation of ‘strangers’ as distinct, yet tolerated communities. As such, it represents a compromise between the nativism of indigeneity and the more exclusive forms of traditional belonging, allowing for the incorporation of ‘strangers’ without challenging the Islamic character of Kano and its ‘native’ population. Therefore, as chapter 4 will show, authorities both within the State government and the traditional authorities appear to favour this combination of traditional and civic-communal belonging, as indicated by the incorporation of traditional ‘settler’ leaders into the Emirate structure and ethnic representatives into the State government. However, these “hyphenated” identity categories (Caglar 1997) also underline the ambiguity of their positions relative to those of the ‘natives’ and reproduce the nativist boundary between them.

3.3.4 Subjective Belonging

Having outlined the four main definitions of belonging in contemporary urban Kano, it may be apparent that there is both tension and considerable similarity between them. One similarity stands out in the context of this thesis: the importance of nativist ethnicity in
defining indigeneity, traditional, and civic-communal belonging. In all three discourses, membership of an ethnic community that is considered part of the urban Kano community is a necessary condition of belonging. Furthermore, the particular ethnic cleavage at play here bears close resemblance to ‘national’ ethnicity as it was defined above, including its overlap with boundaries of indigeneity, religion, and region. Traditional belonging only fully includes ‘native’ Muslim Hausa-Fulani, or those with strong personal connections in this community; additionally, civic-communal belonging only incorporates ‘settlers’ as part of their tolerated ‘settler’ ethnic community. Civic-territorial belonging is exceptional in this respect, because it is not conditional on any form of ethnic or religious identification. However, as the remainder of this case study will show, this discourse has limited relevance in everyday Kano society.

This summary can help to outline a tentative hierarchy of belonging in Kano, which ranks various communities on the basis of their claim to belonging in the dominant discourses of indigeneity, traditional belonging, and civic-communal belonging. This hierarchy is primarily ethnic, although other cleavages sub-divide the ethnic categories. In ethnic terms, the Hausa-Fulani are the most ‘native’, followed by other northern ethnic communities such as the Kanuri, Nupe, or rural Fulani. Southern ethnic communities, such as the Igbo or Edo, are furthest removed from the ‘native’ ideal type, not only because of the overlap of ethnic and regional cleavages, but also due to the influence of religious affiliation and their relatively strong class position. Religion complicates the ethnic stratification: identification as a Muslim brings a person closer to the ‘native’ stereotype in Kano, regardless of ethnic or regional identification. If we use the wazobia classification of ethnicity as the basis of our hierarchy, the Hausa-Fulani are the stereotypical ‘natives’ while the Igbo are most clearly ‘settlers’; the minorities and Yoruba fit into intermediate categories, because their ethnic categories are cross-cut by regional and religious divides.
Table 3.10: Feeling at home and being considered a ‘native’ by ethnic category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Category</th>
<th>Feeling at home in Kano (N=271)***</th>
<th>Considered ‘indigene’ in Kano (N=413)***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hausa-Fulani</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igbo</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This ethnic hierarchy of belonging is confirmed by table 3.10, which displays the percentages of respondents per ethnic community who feel at home in Kano and those who are considered ‘natives’ in Kano. Both variables show a general trend where Hausa-Fulani are the most ‘native’ and the Igbo the least; the minorities and Yoruba fall somewhere in between the two. Within these intermediate categories, moreover, there is a significant effect of religious affiliation on belonging: in both communities, Muslims feel more at home and are more likely to be considered ‘natives’ than Christians. Social class, however, was not found to have a significant relationship with either form of belonging as measured in table 3.10. Class can be a catalyst of ‘native’ and ‘settler’ identification, but has no unidirectional causal effect on belonging. Moreover, the potential causal effect of class on identification in ethnic and religious terms is complicated by the historical patterns of horizontal inequality between different ethnic and religious groups in Kano.

In addition to the relationship between ethnicity, religion, and belonging, table 3.10 also shows that there remains a discrepancy between feeling at home in Kano and being considered a ‘native’. While the two forms of identification are equal within the ‘native’ Hausa-Fulani community, the gap between them increases as we move towards the more ‘settler’ communities. This pattern illustrates that the tension between feeling accepted as ‘natives’ and identifying oneself as at home in the city is greater for the less ‘native’ ethnic communities. Although Kano residents from ‘settler’ ethnic communities may therefore feel at home in Kano, they are at the same time also more likely to perceive their ‘native’ status as ambiguous or contested than those who belong to the ‘native’ Hausa-Fulani community.
3.4 Kano’s Identity Repertoire

We have thus described four ways in which urban belonging in Kano is defined and identified nativist ethnicity – in overlap with religion, region, indigeneity, and social class – as the primary identity cleavage in three of these definitions. This section will examine Kano’s repertoire of salient social identities in order to assess the extent to which the identities that define belonging are meaningful in the city’s everyday social life. Using data collected through the perceptions survey, figure 3.1 presents the salience of different social identities to individual respondents. It depicts, for every identity, the percentage of people who have selected the identity as one of the three “most important to the way in which they think about themselves”.

Figure 3.1: Salient identities in Kano (N=413)

Overall, figure 3.1 shows that religion, ethnicity, occupation, gender, neighbourhood, and at some distance nationality are the most salient identity discourses in metropolitan Kano, with emphasis on the overwhelming majority of respondents who identify with their religion (94%). Together, these six identities therefore constitute the city’s identity repertoire. This means that Kano residents, from their entire range of potential identifications, are most likely to identify themselves in terms of these six cleavages and use them to frame their social

---

89 Respondents thus had the option of selecting up to three identities, which 93% of the respondents did (2% noted 2 and 5% only 1).

90 Because of the close relationship between ethnic groups and their language in the context of Nigeria, ethnicity and language have for this analysis been merged into a single communal identity.
behaviour. Their relative salience suggests that religion and ethnicity are used by most Kano residents to identify themselves, while nationality is only meaningful to just under a quarter of the city population. At the bottom end of the spectrum, identifications with one’s State of origin or political ideology are meaningful only to 7% and 2% of the population, respectively. Regardless of the importance such distinctions may have in political or economic reality, the data presented here suggests that they have little relevance in terms of subjective identification.

Ethnicity and religion are both uniformly salient across ethnic groups; the same is true, though at lower percentages, for nationality, State of origin, and political ideology. For occupation, gender, and neighbourhood, however, there are statistically significant differences in the percentages of identification between the four main ethnic categories studied in this thesis: the Hausa-Fulani, minorities, Yoruba, and Igbo. As for occupation, its importance is much greater for the three ‘settler’ \(^91\) communities than for the ‘native’ Hausa-Fulani. This might be explained by the fact that most of the migration into Kano has been economically motivated; it stands to reason that people who themselves, or whose families, migrated into Kano expecting a higher income and better occupation would attach more value to these aspects of their lives than the city’s other residents.

The reverse is true for identifications with neighbourhood, with which the Hausa-Fulani are most likely to identify (35%), followed by the minorities (33%), Yoruba (24%), and Igbo (19%). Although there appears to be an ethnic dimension to this variation, it is more easily explained by considering the neighbourhoods where the different ethnic groups reside. Controlling for neighbourhood in this way shows a pattern where, regardless of ethnic affiliation, the neighbourhoods of the Old City and Badawa are relatively important to their residents. The two neighbourhoods probably have different reasons for their popularity: the Old City, as was highlighted above, is the imagined core of Kano Emirate and its

\(^91\) The percentages for identification with occupation were: Hausa-Fulani (29%), minorities (49%), Yoruba (59%) and Igbo (56%). On the basis of a \(\chi^2\) test, the difference is significant at the 0.01 level.
metropolitan centre, and is therefore likely to speak to the imagination of its residents.

Badawa, on the other hand, derives its corporate identity from being a village within the wider city of Kano, with its densely populated streets incorporated by Kano’s urban sprawl but distinctly cut off from the central city by the wealthy Nassarawa GRA.

Gender, finally, shows a particularly striking ethnic dimension, as the Igbo community has the largest proportion of identifications (47%), compared to between 31% and 33% for the other three groups. This peak in salience is particularly puzzling because it exists solely within the female half of the Igbo: while over 63% of the Igbo women in Kano identify with their gender, all other ethnic groups show roughly equal lower levels of gender identification (between 29% and 36%) - both between ethnic communities and between men and women. One explanation could be the high level of organisation of Igbo women in Kano, as documented by Anthony (2002: 221-4). He describes how Igbo women in Kano are active in the Igbo Community Association (ICA), either as unmarried general members or married members of the Women’s Wing. Moreover, Anthony (ibid.) highlights that many of the pre-Biafra restrictions on women have been lifted and women are therefore actively and openly engaged in income-generating activity, though separated from the Igbo men. These observations, of the institutionalisation of women into the ICA and their active, though gender-specific, economic involvement, could perhaps form the basis for explaining the salience of gender among Igbo women in Kano.

In sum, it is clear that the two identities that constitute the core of indigeneity, traditional, and civic-communal belonging (ethnicity and religion) are salient in Kano’s repertoire. However, while ethnicity is the primary identifier of belonging as a ‘native’, its salience is second to that of religion. To some extent, this difference is irrelevant due to the tight intertwining of ethnicity and religion in Kano; for while the Kano ‘native’ may conceptually be bounded by an ethnic division, most ‘natives’ in Kano may well understand ‘native’ in religious terms. The high salience of religion, however, also emphasises that these
identifications are by no means only meaningful in relation to urban belonging. Most ‘natives’ probably identify with Islam because of the importance they attach to the religious injunctions and articles of faith, rather than to set themselves apart from ‘settlers’. However, these motivations are unlikely to alter the exclusionary effect of strong Islamic identification in ‘native’/‘settler’ relations. Figure 3.1 therefore suggests the high salience of all forms of belonging that rely on ethnic and religious identification, irrespective of the individual motivations for identification. The relatively low salience of national identity, in contrast, suggests the comparatively small role of civic-territorial belonging in Kano social life.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has described Kano’s social diversity, definitions of belonging, and salient identity repertoires. In terms of diversity, a two-thirds majority of the city is Muslim and Hausa-Fulani, while the Igbo and Yoruba are the largest minority ethnic groups. Although ethnicity and religious affiliation are complex and nested identifications, there is a strong overlap between the two as nativist ethnic and Christian/Muslim cleavages. Moreover, this boundary is compounded by regional divisions and by economic horizontal inequalities. Finally, ethnic and religious communities are not distributed equally across the city’s many neighbourhoods: while the central Old City is almost exclusively Hausa-Fulani and Muslim, Sabon Gari houses a variety of (predominantly southern) ethnic communities. Other neighbourhoods outside the city walls are host to a mix of the majority and minority communities.

In this diverse society, there is considerable debate around the question what it means to belong. Section 3.3 has identified four different ways in which belonging is commonly conceptualised in Kano: indigeneity, traditional belonging, civic-communal belonging, and civic-territorial belonging. Indigeneity, traditional belonging, and civic-communal belonging
differentiate between ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities on the basis of their ethnic and religious identification and the strength of their local social networks. Civic-territorial, and to some extent civic-communal, belonging builds on the equal rights to belonging derived from Nigerian citizenship. In addition, however, civic-communal belonging requires some form of ethnic identification. Nativist ethnicity, in conjunction with religious, regional, and class identities, thus plays a role in defining both traditional and civic-communal forms of belonging. Its inherent ethnic hierarchy, ranging from the ‘native’ Hausa-Fulani to the ‘settler’ Igbo, was shown to be reflected in the patterns of subjective belonging as captured by the perceptions survey.

Moreover, the relative salience of ethnic and religious identities, and, by extension, the nativist definitions of belonging, was supported by the patterns of self-identification of Kano residents. Religion and ethnicity were by far the most important identities in Kano’s repertoire, followed by occupation, gender, neighbourhood, and nationality. These findings therefore suggest that notions of indigeneity, traditional belonging, and civic-communal belonging are more common and salient than civic-territorial belonging. Nativism is thus an important aspect of Kano’s repertoire of identities and discourses. It is challenged only by the weak notion of civic-territorial belonging; civic-communal belonging represents a compromise, promising to unite the historical, ‘native’ representation of Kano with the equal claim to belonging in Kano shared by all Nigerian communities. The subsequent chapter will analyse the extent to which these notions of belonging, and the social identities connected to them, are reproduced through Kano’s political system.
4 Managing Diversity in an Islamic State
Politics and Belonging in Kano

4.1 Introduction

The historical development of ethnic identities in Kano has suggested the deep connections between politics, belonging, and identification. This chapter ‘freezes’ the progress of time and anatomises these connections in the contemporary city, assessing to what extent institutions, political authorities, and public policies reproduce nativist forms of belonging and identity. To this end, section 4.2 will present the four main types of political authorities in contemporary Kano: the state, traditional, religious, and community leaders. Subsequently, sections 4.3 and 4.4 will then analyse the institutions of authority and political participation. Section 4.5 will examine some of the policies that relate directly to issues of belonging and identity and assess the way they relate to nativism.

4.2 Political Organisations

This section will introduce the four main political authorities involved in the governance of metropolitan Kano: the Nigerian state, the traditional Emirate rulers, the religious leaders, and the city’s ethnic and community leaders. By way of definition, political authorities or leaders comprise all individuals who are structurally involved in the governance of metropolitan Kano and who have a measure of authority within Kano society. This may include influential public intellectuals with advisory positions, as well as a wide range of individuals within different social, religious, political, or economic organisations. This chapter has selected those authorities that combine considerable legitimacy and authority
with a set of governance roles that are connected both to ethnicity and to interethnic relations.

4.2.1 The Nigerian State

The federal state of Nigeria is organised into three tiers of government: the federal government (FG) in Abuja, 36 State governments (SG) organised into 6 unofficial geopolitical zones, and 774 local governments (LG) that are constituted by several wards. Kano State is part of the North West geopolitical zone and has 44 local governments, 8 of which constitute the larger Kano metropolis (Basta Fleiner et al. 1999; Suberu 2001; 2009a, 2009b). Each level of the state has executive, judiciary, and legislative branches. Popularly elected positions exist within the legislative and the executive branches, while other positions are generally appointed. All three state levels have a civil service divided into thematic ministries or departments, led by political appointees. The division of labour between the state levels is roughly based on the principle of subsidiarity: each level takes on those responsibilities that it can meet most efficiently.

Formally, the SG and LG are responsible for such things as primary education, basic health care, local infrastructure, and agricultural development. Only the SG and FG are involved in the organisation of secondary and tertiary education, while the matters pertaining to foreign policy, defence, security and policing, petroleum, allocation of revenues, banking, public borrowing are exclusively within the domain of the FG (Suberu 2009a: 74). On the

---

92 The resulting selection excludes several important societal actors and organisations, not least of which are the organisations structured around material interests or class. One reason for this exclusion is the complexity of the connection between class, indigeneity and ethnicity. More importantly, however, class-based organisations in Kano have less societal influence than state, traditional, religious, or community organisations. One indication of this relatively small influence was given in section 3.4, by the low percentage of people who identify with their occupation than with their religion or ethnic community. Moreover, several studies have highlighted the difficult position of trade unions in Kano society, both historically and in the more contemporary period (Andræ et al. 1998; Lubeck 1975, 1986). Another indication is that, in the Kano perceptions survey data, only 15% of the respondents are a member of a trade union or a professional organisation. In contrast, 25% are members of religious or community-based organisations and virtually all Kano residents regularly go to religious prayers or services.
whole “little room is left to the exclusive discretion of the States [which] are so enmeshed in corruption and mismanagement that they have largely ignored their responsibility under Nigeria’s federal arrangement” (Suberu 2009a: 74-5). In terms of income, all government levels depend for more than 80% of their budgets on centrally-divided oil revenues. This has not only lead to the so-called ‘cake-sharing syndrome’, but also to the political instrumentalisation of ethnic and religious difference and a lack of downward accountability among the political class (Mustapha 2002: 168–9; Suberu 2009a).

Although the central government is thus fiscally and constitutionally hegemonic, there is a considerable field of contention between the different state levels on issues such as control over the security services, the formulae for revenue allocation, and the creation of new States and local governments. In the case of Kano State, arguably the most contentious question has been that of the implementation of sharia. The controversial re-introduction of the Islamic penal code in Kano and other northern States in 2000 led commentators to express worries over the “ticking time bomb” that now lay under Nigeria (Herbst 2005; Human Rights Watch 2004). The reality of sharia implementation, however, is more complicated than this image suggests. To be sure, there is a contradiction between the principle of a religiously neutral state and the introduction of a religious legal system. This has been a cause for concern not only for non-Muslims, but also for Muslims unwilling to submit to sharia law (Ludwig 2008).

At the same time, however, by implementing sharia at the State rather than federal level, some of the problems resulting from this contradiction never materialised (Suberu 2009b: 547). For one, the sharia legal codes have been designed to fit within the confines of Nigeria’s constitution and federal framework and have put the sharia courts, in the ultimate instance, under the jurisdiction of the secular federal courts (ibid:552–4). As such, the sharia States have to remain within the constitutional boundaries that prohibit State religions and religious political parties, and guarantee certain basic human rights. Moreover, sharia legal codes only
apply to consenting Muslims and non-Muslims. In addition, the *Sharia* Court of Appeal has
been a moderating influence, overturning most of the controversial and violent sentences on
procedural grounds (ibid.: 556). For these reasons, Suberu (2009b) interprets the
introduction of *sharia* as a sign of the strength and stability of Nigeria's federalism, rather
than a ticking bomb. The *sharia* compromise highlights both the primacy of the federal
government and the space for manoeuvre granted to the State government, and thus
emphasises the complexity and fluidity of the division of labour between the different levels
of government.

Since 1999, access to the state is dependent on first-past-the-post elections, although some
positions, such as special advisors, commissioners, and ministers, are still given by
appointment. However, the EU Election Observation Mission (2007: 1) described the 2007
elections as “[falling] far short of basic international and regional standards for democratic
elections. They were marred by poor organisation, widespread procedural irregularities,
substantial evidence of fraud, widespread voter disenfranchisement and numerous incidents
of violence”. This was all the more disappointing, they continued, since the “Nigerian people
showed remarkable commitment to democracy, eagerly engaging in the electoral process”.
The People’s Democratic Party (PDP) won the presidency and the majority of other elections
in 2007, but in Kano State the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) retained the governorship
as well as the majority in the State House of Assembly. Regardless of the flawed electoral
process, the ANPP victory was generally acknowledged to represent the actual votes in Kano.
So, much like the role of the Action Congress (AC) in Lagos, the strong position of the
ANPP in Kano can be interpreted as an expression of the autonomy of Kano politics in
relation to the dominant PDP at the federal level.

It is important to note that, although ethnicity and religion come into politics, the political
process is not in any simple way determined by ethnic or religious affiliation. If only because
all major parties are national, none of them can afford to ally itself with any one group to the
exclusion of all others. So while the ANPP is generally considered a northern Nigerian and predominantly Muslim party because of its position in Kano politics, its current national chairman hails from Ebonyi State in the south. In Kano, however, it can be argued that the ANPP identified itself with the Islamic agenda for *sharia* - this provided both a strong basis for rallying popular support among Kano’s Muslim majority and a clear break with the reluctant stance of the former PDP governor, Kwankwaso, towards the *sharia* issue. Although the structure of Nigerian politics is thus formally unconnected to ethnicity or religion, the State and local governments in Kano are deeply intertwined with Islam.

### 4.2.2 Traditional Rulers

The Kano Emirate is the traditional structure of government in Kano state. Its organisational structure is hierarchical, with the Emir at the apex of the power structure, supported by the Emir’s Council that consists of local business men, the four kingmakers who are appointed by the Emir, district heads, and influential Islamic scholars (*mallama*). Additionally, the Emir chairs the Emirate Council, an advisory council to the government that largely consists of all Local Government chairmen. The Emirate Council was instituted after the creation of the Local Government structure to allow the Emirate an institutional entry to the state. Within the Emirate, there are different levels of government. The Emir of Kano has 44 district heads (*Hakimai*), most of whom are responsible for specific territories that often overlap with Kano’s Local Government Areas (LGAs). Some district heads, however, have been given an honorary title and accompany the Emir in his Councils without having territorial responsibility. Each district head, especially in the rural districts, has several village heads (*Dagatai*) who report to him. Finally, each village consists of multiple wards, which are under authority of the ward head (*Masu ungwu*).

The Emirate has functions both in religious affairs and governance. In religious terms all imams in Kano need official recognition by the Emir to perform either daily or *Juma’at*...
prayers. Similarly, the Emir leads festivals such as the Kano Durbar and calls the sighting of the moon at the start of the fasting\(^93\). In governance terms, traditional rulers use their community links to mediate disputes within their communities and between their community and the state. Although the executive responsibility for maintaining social stability lies with formal authorities, it is culturally and politically preferred that disputes and other social disturbances be resolved informally, without resorting to the formal channels of law enforcement and adjudication (Paden 2005: 92; Wilson-Fall 2000: 49-50). Before the governance reforms that culminated in 1976, the Emirate rulers were responsible for administering justice through formal channels, while informal dispute settlement was the job of community elders (Paden 2005: 92-93). In the current democratic dispensation, the Emirate has not replaced but rather subsumed the roles of these elders, striving to become the institutional umbrella for informal dispute settlement processes\(^94\).

To do this, the traditional authorities use their position between the Kano communities and the government. On the one hand, the organisational structure of the Emirate enables ward heads, district heads, and even the Emir to retain a close connection to their people. The ward and village heads are part of the community they supervise and usually live in a central part of the area. They stay informed about the welfare and the problems of the people in their community and report all disturbances and problems to their superiors in the Emirate whenever they occur\(^95\). Although the connection between the traditional rulers and the wider Kano community has suffered from the tremendous increase in the city’s population, the role of the traditional ruler has been retained, especially in Kano’s Old City\(^96\). Policies and laws proposed by the government are reviewed by the Emirate Council to make sure “they will not

\(^93\) Dr Salahudeen Yusuf, op. cit.

\(^94\) Tafidan Kura, op. cit.

\(^95\) Abdullahi Sule, president YEDA, 15/8/2006 in Kano

\(^96\) Tafidan Kura, op. cit.
cause conflict […] and will be helpful for the people, useful to the community.” 97 Although no formal power is attached to their advice, the governor listens to the Emirate Council because of its broad base of popular support. Similarly, if state actors such as the police misbehave or hurt their communities, the Emir or the district head will file a complaint and defend the interests of the people against the police.

On the other hand, however, the Emir also has close links to the Kano state government. In addition to informal dispute settlement within their communities, one of the institutional linkages between the Emirate and the government is the so-called security committees that exist on the state and local government levels. At the state level, the security committee:

- involves the executive governor, the commandant of the military, the police commissioner, the Emir, the director of the state security services (the state intelligence) and other key people within the state. The same structure trickles down to the local government and if you come down to the wards it is more or less similar: the councillor of the ward is considered to be the chief security, the village head is there to assist him, the Divisional Police Officer is there. 98

These committees thus provide a forum in which traditional authorities, the state government, and the federal security services can exchange information about the security situation in Kano. If deemed necessary, the Emir or his district heads can also contact the governor or the police directly and advise them on particular problems in or between communities.

4.2.3 Religious Leaders

Although Islam is the ‘native’ religion in Kano, there are substantial Christian communities among the ‘settlers’ as well as small ones within the ‘native’ population. Islamic authorities in

97 Tafidan Kura, op. cit.
98 Abdullahi Sule, op. cit.
Kano can be divided into the Sufi Brotherhoods (*tariqa*, pl.: *turuq*), radical reformist movements, and the Jama'at Nasr al-Islam (JNI), the umbrella organisation for Islam in Nigeria. Historically, Islam in Kano has been represented by the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya *turuq*. Sufism, or Islamic mysticism, rests on the core belief that Muslims should foster their personal relationship with God. The Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya *turuq* are structured around the authority of a single leader (*sheikh*)⁹⁹. For example, the Qadiriyya *tariqa* is led by Sheikh Qaribullah, son of the late Sheikh Nasiru Kabara¹⁰⁰, who leads Kano members in prayer and *zikir*, the ritual remembrance of Allah (Kabara 2004: 66–80). In places outside of Kano, Sheikh Qaribullah can sanction representatives (*muqadam*) to represent him. In contrast, radical movements like Izala have a more formal organisational structure, with a president (*amir*), secretary, treasurer, and modern accountancy practices¹⁰¹. Similarly, the JNI is organised formally, with a chairman (the Sultan of Sokoto), supreme patron, secretary general, and a number of committees and state chapters (Loimeier 1997: 141).

The role of these religious authorities comprises both internal and external functions: on the one hand strengthening the faith, providing social services, managing marital and social tensions, and promoting the spiritual welfare among their followers; and on the other, representing the interests of their followers in society. Individual *turuq* and radical associations usually focus more on internal responsibilities, while the JNI emphasises its role in uniting Islam and proselytising. It is characteristic of radical associations in Kano to attempt a wide provision of social services, such as hospitals, education, and crisis relief, whereas *turuq* rely more on government provision (Gwarzo 2003: 302–8; Larkin and Meyer 2006: 306–8)¹⁰².

---

⁹⁹ Sheikh Qariballah, leader of African Qadiriyya, 9/9/2006 in Kano
¹⁰⁰ Ibid.
¹⁰¹ Dr Tahir Gwarzo, director Kano State Polytechnic, 10/8/2006 in Kano
¹⁰² Reverend Jebis, reverend ECCN and member of CAN, 14/9/2006 in Kano
Christianity was introduced in northern Nigeria through migration of southern Christians and the missionary activities of both Western and African missionaries. It is organised in churches that differ in doctrine, rituals, social position, and membership. Although the exact number is unknown, a brief survey of the Sabon Gari area showed that almost every street has at least 3 churches of various denominations; Egbe road, in 2006 the westernmost street of Sabon Gari, was home to no less than 25. In Christian churches, a distinction can be made between ‘orthodox’ and Pentecostal churches: the former have formal organisational structures and are led by an executive council on the basis of a church constitution, while the latter are structured around the charismatic authority of prophets (Marshall 1995: 244). Individual churches of both types are linked to Christian movements and organisations in Nigeria and abroad, through missions, sponsorship, and the education of their leaders.

Churches in Kano are also represented in the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), which represents the interests of Nigerian Christians in the political sphere and mirrors the Islamic claim for a universal *Ummah*. The roles of Christian authorities are similar to those of the Islamic ones, combining both internal and external responsibilities. Individual churches focus more on their internal responsibilities, which include providing a wide range of social services such as hospitals, education, and crisis relief. The external, evangelical functions of Christian leaders are sensitive in Muslim-dominated Kano, but while many ‘orthodox’ churches refrain from open competition, Pentecostal churches and the CAN are strongly evangelical (Marshall 1993: 233–6).

If we consider the institutional links of Christian and Islamic organisations, the first aspect of note is that there is no institutionalised forum facilitating the interaction between them.

---

103 ‘Orthodox’, here, denotes denominational churches, e.g. Protestant or Catholic, as opposed to, for example, Evangelical churches.

104 Reverend Jebis, op. cit.

105 Ibid.

106 Ibid.

107 Ibid.
Secondly, the relationship between these religious organisations and the state vary from denomination to denomination. Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya turuq have close connections to the State government. They legitimise government policies, while profiting from this relationship through government subsidies and political influence (Gwarzo 2003: 301). More radical Islamic groups have a more complex relationship to the state. With the extension of sharia in 2000, some of the radical Islamic scholars and authorities have been incorporated into the State’s sharia bodies and institutions. In contrast, the radical movements that were not incorporated generally question the legitimacy of the multi-religious federal state (Gwarzo 2003: 301) as well as of the Kano State government, although some do accept government assistance. Christian churches also have an ambiguous relationship with the Kano State government, but for different reasons: they oppose the State because of its Islamic character, but at the same time accept and depend on it in terms of law enforcement and protection 108.

4.2.4 Ethnic and Community Leaders

Ethnic leaders and community elders perform informal leadership functions at the neighbourhood level. There are significant differences, however, between their structure among ‘settlers’ and among ‘natives’. In ‘settler’ Sabon Gari, there are three types of community authorities: traditional leaders, ethnic associations, and the non-indigene leadership association (NLA), which comprises leaders from all individual ethnic associations. The traditional rulers of ‘settler’ ethnic groups, such as the Eze Igbo and the Oba Yoruba, wield positions that have been created, or ‘invented’, specifically in the context of Kano’s Emirate structure (Osaghae 1994: 59-60). They are “in charge of everything pertaining to

108 Ibid.
tradition and culture"\textsuperscript{109}, while the administrative and limited executive authority in the communities is wielded by the ethnic associations. Traditional rulers and ethnic associations of the 'settler' communities both promote development, security, and access to education, politics, and economic resources for their community (or the entire non-indigene community, through the NLA) in interactions with the state and the traditional authorities. Every ethnic group in Sabon Gari has its own traditional rulers and ethnic association, but the Igbo and the Yoruba associations are the most influential due to the size of their communities.

The internal functions of non-indigenous traditional leaders resemble those of the Emirate, in leading rituals and ceremonies, managing tensions and informally settling disputes (Osaghae 1994: 62-63). Intra-ethnic disputes are also often settled by the corresponding ethnic association, while interethnic conflicts are addressed through either the NLA alone (if all parties are non-indigenes) or in co-operation with the district head of Fagge (if one of the parties is an indigene), the local government that comprises Sabon Gari. Ethnic associations are also explicitly political in their outlook. They educate their members to be politically active and sometimes offer advice on whom to vote for\textsuperscript{110}. The recent appointment of an Igbo as advisor to Governor Shekarau was celebrated as progress for the Igbo community, and, by extension, a victory for the Igbo Association\textsuperscript{111}. Similar positions have been given to one representative from the Yoruba Association and one from the other minority ethnic groups.

Ethnic associations developed in the 1940s, uniting the existing State and town unions (Olaniyi 2002: 21–24). But where the unions had focused on maintaining nation-wide links within ethnic groups, ethnic associations and the newly traditional rulers integrated into the institutional framework of the Kano Emirate (Olaniyi 2002: 25). They function within the

\textsuperscript{109} Chief Boniface Ibikwe, president-general Igbo Association Kano, 16/9/2006 in Kano; and Chief Olayiwole Adeaga, vice-president Yoruba community Kano, 6/9/2006 in Kano

\textsuperscript{110} Chief Boniface Ibikwe, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.; Chief Olayiwole Adeaga, op. cit.
boundaries of the State and the Emirate, while challenging them for the emancipation of their community.\textsuperscript{112} Ethnic associations are usually formally organised, with a constitution and an elected executive council. They also have several functional committees, such as the peace committee that deals with crises within the Igbo community.\textsuperscript{113} Every ethnic association is divided into State or hometown chapters, which compete for recognition in committees and functions of authority. Together, the executive councils of the ethnic associations formed the NLA, whose main role is to mediate between members of different ethnic groups and represent the entire non-indigenous community in interactions with the state. Individually, most of these ethnic associations are part of larger regional or national ethnic associations.\textsuperscript{114}

‘Native’ neighbourhoods in Kano have elders, who command respect and authority because of their age and life experience. Older men in northern Nigerian society, especially those with distinguished careers or extensive religious knowledge, may occupy such positions of informal authority (Paden 2005: 93). Their houses are social hubs for prayer and community discussions, and people come to them with problems. In the case of Hotoro, a neighbourhood in eastern Kano metropolis where a community elder was interviewed, all elders meet regularly (about once a month) in order to discuss the developments in their communities.\textsuperscript{115} Like the traditional rulers, elders represent territorially delineated communities. Like ethnic leaders, however, they represent their people in case of external problems and manage tensions and problems within their community. External representation can either go through the ward head or the local government channels, depending on the nature of the issue. Internal dispute resolution takes place through informal

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{113} Chief Boniface Ibikwe, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.; Chief Olayiwole Adeaga, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{115} Interview with an anonymous (vi) community elder, 30/8/2006 in Kano
hearings and discussions and can lead to arbitration or a mediated settlement. If this proves unsuccessful, the dispute is referred to the ward head\textsuperscript{116}.

4.3 Authority

\textit{Table 4.1: Proportions of respondents with at least some trust in political authorities\textsuperscript{117}}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political leaders (N=375)</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police*** (N=394)</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hisbah*** (N=367)</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders (N=398)</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community leaders** (N=381)</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional rulers*** (N=380)</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We have thus introduced the four main authoritative organisations involved in the governance of metropolitan Kano, which differ in their organisational structure, popular base of support, and their roles in society. This section will analyse the authority of these political organisations, starting from table 4.1. This table depicts the perceived honesty of the authorities discussed above. The most important trend in the table is that Kano residents are considerably more likely to trust their religious, traditional, or community leaders than the authorities who are connected directly to the state – the police, \textit{Hisbah} (Islamic police), and political leaders. And while there are differences in absolute levels political trust between ethnic groups\textsuperscript{118}, this pattern is the same for all of them. This section will explain this division

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{117} This table presents the results of the question: “On a scale from 1 (high trust) to 7 (no trust), how would you rate [authority]?” The percentages represent the proportions of respondents whose answers are in the range 1–4.
\item \textsuperscript{118} For the police, \textit{Hisbah}, community leaders, and traditional rulers, trust is significantly lower among the Igbo and the Yoruba than among the minorities and ‘native’ Hausa-Fulani. While this general pattern indicates a sense of political exclusion among the southern ‘settlers’, the differences for the police, community leaders, and traditional rulers are relatively small: not more than 40% of any community trusts the police, while not less than 60% trusts community or traditional leaders. The difference is more substantial, however, in the case of the \textit{Hisbah} (ranging between 26% and 87%), which will therefore be discussed separately.
\end{itemize}
of authority with reference to the sources of legitimacy available to the various leaders and the avenues through which they can use this legitimacy as effective authority.

To understand, first, the deep distrust of politicians and the federal police, we need to look more closely at the nature of the contemporary Nigerian state. As Mustapha (2002: 152) argues, three elements help to give a clearer understanding of the nature of the Nigerian state: the country’s deep ethno-regional divisions, the militarism and authoritarianism of the period 1966 to 1999, and the primacy of the rentier state. While the contemporary federal structure has managed to dilute the national dynamics of ethnic domination as they existed in the First Republic (Suberu 2009a), it could be argued that this has not resolved ethnic competition but rather relocated it from the national to the local levels of the state. This relocation, with the Federal Character principle at its core, has reduced the salience of ethnic and religious identifications in political competition at the national level. To be elected as the Nigerian president, for example, a candidate must not only have the overall majority of the votes but also 25% in at least two-thirds of the States. This electoral rule provides a disincentive for political parties to field deeply ethnicised candidates, whose popularity would be low in States dominated by other ethnic groups than his own.

At the State and LG levels, however, ethnic and religious affiliations remain powerful instruments for the political class; the case in point being the ANPP’s identification with sharia and Islam. The effects of this instrumentalisation of ethnicity and religion at the State and LG levels is complex: on the one hand, it provides the successful politicians with a (temporary) measure of legitimacy and public goodwill; on the other, it requires these same politicians to set policy targets that are practically impossible to reach. Shekarau’s ANPP government was first elected because it campaigned explicitly on a religious platform: not only did the ANPP support sharia, but it also argued for a revival of Islamic values in Kano
After almost two terms in government, however, it is widely acknowledged that the Shekarau government’s Islamic revival has been predominantly cosmetic. This indicates the risks of using religious discourses even in local politics: not only does it harden boundaries between the Christian and Muslim segments of the population as was highlighted before, but it also sets a government up to fail. The authoritarianism of the Nigerian state and its focus on the distribution of oil revenues simply do not allow it to implement effectively a programme (whether inspired by religion or otherwise) of moral reorientation.

The core reason for the state’s unpopularity is thus the fact that its authority is based on a combination of coercion (by the military and the police) and dividing the spoils of government, i.e. the oil revenues, through extensive corruption. The state does not legitimise itself by being democratically elected, or representing the people’s interests, or providing public services effectively. Therefore, although granted formal authority through the constitution and other legal provisions, the Kano State and local governments have little informal authority and legitimacy in the communities they govern. They can use their formal powers to influence policy, access the government revenues, and exercise coercion, but they have little discursive power to influence the ways in which individuals think and act. The only mechanism through which the state can do this is the state-owned media, specifically the Triumph newspapers, Radio Kano, and the CTV television station. It is argued here, however, that these discursive functions are performed more effectively by traditional, community, and especially religious authorities, due to their legitimacy and embeddedness within their respective communities.

In this regard, the difference in trust displayed towards the *Hisbah* indicates that this organisation merges some of the unpopularity of political actors with some of the high regard for religious leaders. The *Hisbah* began as a religious voluntary organisation in Kano’s Old

---

119 Another important factor was the decreasing popularity of the PDP governor, Kwankwaso, and his enforced candidacy for a second term as governor (Tahir Gwarzo, Director Kano State Polytechnic, 20/10/2008 in Kano; Ahmad Isyaku Salisu, PDP politician, 21/11/2008 in Kano).

120 Dr Tahir Gwarzo 2008, op. cit.; Ahmad Salisu, op. cit.
City before it was incorporated into the State structure during the first term of Shekarau’s government (2003-2007). Among the local Muslim population, its functions were considered generally beneficial, especially in conjunction with the reintroduction of sharia criminal law and the refusal of the federal police to enforce it. This is reflected in the extremely high proportion of trust in the Hisbah among the ‘natives’: 87% and second only to religious leaders. Conversely, the exclusively Islamic orientation of the Hisbah explains why its ratings among the Igbo, Yoruba, and (predominantly Christian) minorities are close to the ratings of politicians and the police: 25%, 26%, and 40%, respectively.

The non-Muslim ‘settlers’ thus regard the ‘Islamic police’ with an equal measure of distrust as they view the state authorities, while the Muslim ‘natives’ consider them to be religious authorities. Because, while most Muslims in contemporary Kano go to mosque without an affiliation to a specific association\(^{121}\), table 4.1 shows that religious leaders are trusted by the vast majority of both Muslims and Christians. This high level of legitimacy is of course connected to the high salience of religion in the context of Kano. In this deeply religious context, religious authority is generally based on religious knowledge or a sense of ‘closeness to God’ (or in Sufi terminology, baraka). This term denotes spiritual grace, but has also come to imply political and economic power (e.g. Cruise O’Brien 1975: 10); its equivalent in Pentecostal churches is Ase (Marshall 1993: 226). Using these sources of authority, religious organisations promote a ‘religious’ representation of the social world. Often, in the context of Nigeria, this religious representation posits the Islam-Christian boundary as the primary social cleavage, especially through the heavily politicised JNI and CAN. Although this cleavage may be presented as a line of religious conflict or brotherhood (e.g. Channer 2006), its reinforcement, by definition, also feeds back into the nativist ethnic cleavage.

Religious leaders thus contribute to the reproduction of nativist ethnicity. However, it should be noted that while religious authority in Kano is considerable, its influence remains

\(^{121}\) Based on the survey results from Kano in 2008, only 16% of Muslims were member of a religious association; among Christians this percentage was about twice as high: 32%.
limited to issues that are accepted as being religious. Imams, priests, and pastors alike depend on the number of faithful attending their prayers and services. In addition, religious organisations control the important institutions of qur'anic or biblical education and advise people on personal and societal matters pertaining to Islam. Religious meetings and education thus provide religious leaders with platforms through which they can use their authority; but they also constrain the range of topics and issues that may be discussed. Theological debates, religious practices, family matters, and individual morality are all subjects well within this range. Issues of a more political nature, however, can only be discussed if they are framed in religious terms. Therefore, many preachers will advise their followers on issues of marriage, household finances, sexuality, and forms of religious worship, but usually refrain from giving electoral advice or commenting on political developments.

A similar balance is maintained by the traditional Emirate authorities, which table 4.1 shows to hold the trust of more than three quarters of the Kano residents. Their legitimacy and authority is built upon the factors that maintain their position in between the political class and Kano’s other residents. In this regard, their symbolic function and message of unity and peaceful integration grant traditional rulers legitimacy, especially in a context where politics is perceived as ‘a dirty game’. Thus, it is the very distance of traditional rulers from formal power and politics that explains their legitimacy. In recent years, links between the State government and the traditional authorities, which hit their low point during the Second Republic (Ibrahim 2001), have become warmer. In general, however, the Emirate rulers purposefully try to maintain their distance from politics, so as not to associate themselves with the negative reputation of Nigeria’s political class.

---

122 Dr Tahir Gwarzo 2006, op. cit.
123 Dr Salahudeen Yusuf 2006, op. cit.
125 Prince Ado Bayero, op. cit.
At the same time, traditional authority is based on the close link between the rulers and the community of the territory. Traditional rulers are said to be an integral part of their community and are therefore accepted as legitimate authorities. They have also shown a long-term commitment to their constituency, as opposed to the short-term positions held by elected politicians\textsuperscript{126}. The Emirate symbolically represents the unity of Kano and a long tradition of both African and Islamic state building. Much like Western European royal families, history and tradition give meaning and a measure of legitimacy to the Emirate institutions. Finally, people’s perceptions of the personal qualities of traditional rulers, generally positive with regard to the current Emir, Ado Bayero, play an important role in determining their legitimacy.

In one way, therefore, traditional authorities have become the symbols of Kano and promote the cultural model of an inclusive, Kanawa identity for both ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’. But their position is not uncontested. As representatives of the ‘traditional’ aristocratic sarauta class in Kano, their very existence propagates a contested class-based social distinction. Moreover, maintaining their distance from formal politics is often difficult, for example because the current governing party (ANPP) is seeking a legitimating alliance, as indicated by the conferment of a new ‘traditional’ title Sardaunan Kano on Governor Shekarau in January 2010. Furthermore, the Islamic orientation of the Emirate ensures that its rulers remain, at least to some extent, associated with ‘native’ Hausa Muslim dimension of Kano. Lastly, in a city that has witnessed a veritable explosion in terms of demography and diversity, traditional rulers are struggling to maintain the level of local control and support that has proven essential to their legitimacy\textsuperscript{127}.

With regard to the final category of authorities, community leaders, table 4.1 indicates that they are regarded in a similar way to the traditional leaders, even if their selection procedures and sources of authority are different. Traditional leaders of ‘settler’ communities, such as

\textsuperscript{126} Tafidan Kura, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
*Eze* Igbo, are selected on the basis of age, income, respectability, knowledge of traditions, and personal authority (Osaghae 1994: 61). Similarly, elders are wise, often elderly, men whom people respect and listen to and who, among the ‘native’ community, are considered as informal extensions of the Emirate structures because of their social skills and personal qualities\(^{128}\). In contrast, however, leaders of ethnic associations are elected. Their legitimacy depends on ‘modern’ values such as free and fair elections, transparent government, honesty, management skills, and progress of the community\(^{129}\). Moreover, in the contemporary political framework, these associations derive some of their authority from their incorporation into the State government.

While their sources of authority thus diverge, community leaders, elders, and ethnic associations all have considerable influence on social life at the local level. This contrasts sharply with the lack of legitimacy of the organisations of the state and suggests a ‘division of labour’ in the exercise of political authority in Kano. The state, on the one hand, has formal authority over the division of (oil) revenues, political participation, and formal policy, but has little informal authority over the discursive world views held by the Kano people. This type of authority is largely in the hands of traditional religious, and community leaders, who therefore have a considerable level of discursive power in Kano society (see also Ehrhardt 2007). This means that, in addition to the State’s explicitly Islamic orientation, informal authority in Kano is also divided along the lines of nativist ethnicity.

### 4.4 Institutions and Political Participation

With this overview of the complex political landscape of Kano in mind, this section will look in more detail at the ways in which Kano residents can access and participate in the city’s politics. It will show that while indigeneity and ethnicity rarely explicitly shape political

\(^{128}\) Anonymous (vi), op. cit.

\(^{129}\) Chief Boniface Ibikwe, op. cit.
discourses, the Islamic character of Kano State and the practices of Kano’s political parties effectively exclude ‘settlers’ from participating, except through their ethnic associations. The focus of this section will be on access to and involvement in political organisations that allow for formal membership and participation in their leadership, without reference to aristocracy - as in the case of the Emirate - or to religious authority. Thus, the section will mainly outline political participation through political parties and ethnic associations.

In Kano’s political party system, there are several ways in which non-‘native’ Kano residents are excluded from Kano politics. First, contestants for political office require indigeneship certificates in order to stand for election in Kano State or any of its LGAs. This practice is often legitimated with reference to the Federal Character principle, but it is not, as such, enshrined in the constitution. In the words of one respondent, “in politics, people’s ethnic background and historical origins matter, because candidates need to be acceptable to their people”\(^{130}\). Although the details of this process require further research, it appears that political parties police this practice both by selectively granting party memberships and demanding indigeneity from their candidates fielded for electoral contests.

However, I would argue that formal indigeneship certificates are only part of the restrictions on political access of ‘settler’ communities in Kano. This is due to the procedure of granting indigeneship certificates, which, as discussed above, depends at least partly on the extent of ethnic and religious assimilation of the resident. It is also, however, due to the fact that “being acceptable to their people” depends on a wider range of factors than legal indigeneship. Even if southern or non-Muslim ‘settlers’ acquire indigeneship certificates, therefore, they are unlikely to be able to stand for election outside the boundaries of the two wards in Sabon Gari (East and West). Within these wards, Igbo, Yoruba, and other ‘settler’ communities may legitimately accept one of their own as councillors to represent them in the L.G; in any of the other Kano wards or LGs, however, this would be virtually impossible.

\(^{130}\) Anonymous (x), op. cit.
Neither the party officials nor the majority of the voters would allow it; which explains the absence of southern and non-Muslim ‘settlers’ in Kano politics, save for the non-indigenous Special Advisors.

The party officials are important in this regard because of the hierarchical structure of Kano’s political parties. As one young politician explained, parties are organised into ‘houses’ (gida in Hausa, also referred to as factions): informal hierarchies of support around a single senior ‘big man’ politician, who gathers lucrative and influential political appointments both for himself and his supporters\(^\text{131}\). As one of the interviewees described it:

> These houses are not families, they are followers of political mentors, more or less like a school of thought, but not really because there is no written-down philosophy. However, the trend of their political behaviours and beliefs tend to be like a school of thought. […] They go all the way from the state level down to the grass roots. And each house is struggling for either the party or the executive control of the state. Even within the political parties therefore, there are conflicts between the houses. And even within these political houses, there are killings. Sometimes there are killings or injuries…\(^\text{132}\)

Although these ‘houses’ in the past were ideologically distinct along the progressive/conservative axis, they have in recent years become centred on the individual political leaders. Thus, the PDP in Kano (in late 2008) had four main houses, built around Rabiu Kwankwaso, Abubakar Rimi\(^\text{133}\), Dauda Dangalan, and Aminu Wali. Together with the lower-level party officials, these party leaders appear to have extensive leverage over the direction of the party and the allocation of various appointments. “You cannot be in the PDP without identifying yourself with a house. […] It’s how you defend the leader of the house, that identifies you as a member of the house”, says a young PDP politician\(^\text{134}\). He continues,
“there is a phenomenon that has come into Nigerian politics: instead of the democratic principle, it is becoming the norm that people sit down and nominate positions”. Party officials and ‘house’ leaders use their influence over these appointments to retain a level of control over the party, the political arena, and the revenue coming in from the state - a practice that often precludes critics or ‘settlers’ from acquiring such appointments.

Even if political parties were to field ‘settler’ contestants for any position above the Sabon Gari ward level, however, the electoral system in conjunction with voter preferences would render their election virtually impossible. Due to the salience of nativist ethnicity, the majority of Kano residents outside Sabon Gari will only vote for candidates who can be considered as ‘native’ Kanawa: in other words, people who are Muslim and sufficiently assimilated to Kano Hausa-Fulani culture and tradition. Add to this the location of the political boundaries of the ‘settler’ neighbourhood Sabon Gari and the full extent of the barriers to ‘settler’ involvement in politics becomes clear. While Igbo, Yoruba, Edo, or other ‘settler’ candidates have been elected as councillors for the wards Sabon Gari East and West, the number of votes in these wards has been dwarfed consistently by the votes of the other eight wards in Fagge LGA when it comes to local or State government elections. In short, “the Sabon Gari [‘settler’] communities can be king makers, but never the king”135.

However, it is important to be subtle and careful in the use of ‘settler’ in this respect. Most of my interviewees indicate that indigeneity per se has less importance in Kano than in the rest of Nigeria, bar Lagos. Kano is, after all, a longstanding cosmopolitan trading hub. The most often cited example of this disregard for indigeneity is that the current governor, Ibrahim Shekarau, is reputed to have non-indigenous origins. Several respondents independently mentioned that although he was born in Kano’s Old City, Shekarau’s parents hail from Biu in Borno State.

135 Dr Tahir Gwarzo 2008, op. cit.
In a similar vein, most interviewees mention the three non-indigenous Special Advisors (SA) to the Governor - Chris Azuka, Mika’il Adebayo, and Adams Salahudeen - as examples of the integration of ‘settlers’ in Kano politics. Their position was instituted, in the words of Mika’il Adebayo, “to be an intermediary between their community and the host [Hausa-Fulani] community [and] to stem the tide of crisis in Kano. Because Kano’s name has become synonymous with crisis […] we work together with our leaders, our community leaders, and the community leaders of other tribes”136. Adebayo sees his job as follows: liaising with and connecting the plethora of community leaders in Kano; preaching peace; “making sure that the benefits the host community is enjoying, my community enjoys too”; and briefing the State government on developments in Kano’s Yoruba community137.

In the interviews I conducted, these examples of politicians with non-indigenous origins were used to illustrate that indigeneity is of little importance in Kano politics. This, as Adebayo also argued, reflects the official State government stance on the issue: “Indigeneship is supposed to be a thing of the past. […] Once you live in this town, you are an indigene. […] Because the only person who can claim the ownership of the land is Adam, created by God; all others came later”138. However, based on the above discussion of indigeneity and ethnicity in politics I would suggest a slightly different reading. Although the examples indeed show that being a legal non-indigene does not preclude one’s involvement in politics as such, they also highlight some of the conditions under which this involvement is possible. Ibrahim Shekarau is only acceptable as a governor because he himself was born in Kano birni, strongly and explicitly identifies with his Kano heritage, and meets the conditions of traditional belonging. He can therefore be considered a ‘native’, even if his familial roots are

136 Mika’il Adebayo Adeniyi, Special Advisor to KSG, 22/10/2008 in Kano
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
rumoured to lie outside Kano State\textsuperscript{139}. In practice, Shekarau is therefore neither a non-
indigene nor a ‘settler’. The three Special Advisors are ‘settlers’ based on their ethnic groups,
however, and were selected on that basis as representatives of the non-indigenes in Kano –
even though they all have a long history of residence and activity in Kano and are likely to
have indigeneship certificates\textsuperscript{140}.

The fact that they were appointed on the basis of their ethnicity, rather than their
indigeneity, indicates that the latter is often actually understood in the language of the
former: irrespective of their status as indigenes, these Special Advisors were selected on the
basis of their status as ethnic ‘settlers’ with the specific task to represent ‘their’ ethnic
communities in the government of their ‘hosts’. Azuka represents Kano’s Igbo community,
Adebayo the Yoruba, and Salahudeen the other northern minorities. Together, they are
meant to represent all those Kano residents who have not been assimilated into the ‘native’
Hausa-Fulani community. The examples of Shekarau and his three Special Advisors
therefore illustrate the importance of ethnic boundaries in Kano politics: involvement as a
Kano resident requires recognition as a Kano ‘native’, while ‘settlers’ can only be involved as
representatives of their ‘settler’ ethnic community (or of the non-Muslim, non-Hausa
population more in general). In the long run, these practices are likely to reinforce the ethnic
dimension of Kano politics rather than reduce it, especially if Kano’s ethnic diversity
continues to increase.

Therefore, although ethnicity is not an explicit issue in political discourse in Kano, it plays
a significant role in determining who can be involved in politics and on what basis. The
importance of \textit{sharia} in the political discourse, the use of indigeneship forms as a condition
for political office, the ethnic preferences of voters, and the location of Kano’s political

\textsuperscript{139} In this regard it is significant that some respondents did not want to be quoted in reference to the
governor’s alleged non-indigenous origins; apparently, they considered it as a negative statement and
therefore potentially detrimental to their careers.

\textsuperscript{140} Adebayo suggested he did have these papers, because he was now stranger in his own State and everyone
in Fagge L.G gets the certificate, even though my own research indicated this certainly is not the case.
boundaries all hinder the involvement of ‘settlers’ in Kano politics. The perceptions survey indicated that Kano’s residents recognise this ‘native’ domination in their political arena: close to two-thirds of the respondents, irrespective of their ethnicity, felt that their local government and Kano State were dominated by Hausa-Fulani. These perceptions are matched by reality, as the three SAs discussed above are the only non-‘native’ people in Shekarau’s cabinet (out of 57) and, to the best of my knowledge, in the Kano State House of Assembly. The Igbo Special Advisor is the only Christian.

In a way, Kano’s political arena thus operates a multicultural system: ‘natives’ can be involved through the political parties and elections, while ‘settlers’ are incorporated through their ethnic representatives. Although in 2008 the practice was still relatively new and its long-term effects therefore require more research, it appears that the political representation of ethnic representatives has increased the importance of ethnic community associations.

Although the three Special Advisors were not selected from these community associations per se, their political position has *de facto* ensured them a leadership position within their ethnic community and its association. Mika’il Adebayo attests to this for the Yoruba community and Chris Azuka’s prominence in the Igbo Community Association was clearly visible during the ICA’s election ceremonies in Sabon Gari in 2008. Moreover, Azuka has played a role of significance in the ICA leadership crisis, supporting the faction competing against the camp of the former ICA president, Chief Boniface Ibikwe.

Through these connections with the Special Advisors, Kano’s ethnic community associations have become an alternative channel for political representation for Kano’s Igbo, Yoruba, Edo, and other ‘settlers’ – even if their formal purpose is merely to maintain the cultural aspects of these communities. The State Government is thus increasingly mirroring the Emirate’s approach of incorporating the representatives of ethnic communities into the

---

141 Chris Azuka, the first SA on intercommunal relations, was instated in August 2006.
142 Other effects include the support of the ICA and Yoruba Association for Shekarau’s bid for the presidency.
political sphere. This practice not only contributed to social peace in pre-colonial Kano, but continues to grant the Emirate a considerable measure of trust and legitimacy in the eyes of Kano’s ‘settlers’\textsuperscript{143}. Although still a relatively recent development, the pragmatic multiculturalism displayed by the State government has become a prominent example in political rhetoric about Kano’s cosmopolitan tolerance, widely cited by Kano politicians and pro-government newspapers (e.g. Sa’idu 2008).

4.5 Policies and Belonging: Social Provision and \textit{A Daidaita Sahu}

This section examines the ways in which policy design and implementation construct notions of belonging and identity in Kano. To this end, this section will briefly sketch two fields of policy – the provision of health and education – that could impact on notions of identity, but fail to do so due to their limited reach (section 4.5.1). It will then look at a State attempt at community building (\textit{A Daidaita Sahu}) that is likely to have reinforced nativist notions of belonging in Kano (section 4.5.2).

4.5.1 Health and Education

While the provision of social services such as education, health care, and social security is widely considered as one of the central tasks of the contemporary state, many states struggle to deliver such services. Nigeria is no exception to this pattern, as its public health and education sectors have been in decline ever since the oil bust in the 1980s (Alubo 2001, 2002)\textsuperscript{144}. In terms of education, the 1970s witnessed ambitious policy programmes such as the Universal Primary Education programme (1975) of General Gowon (Bray 1981). Although initial results were promising, the economic crisis destroyed the financial foundation of these

\textsuperscript{143} Prince Ado Bayero, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{144} Dr Tahir Gwarzo 2008, op. cit.
programmes. As a result, the quality of public schools has declined dramatically: “It’s not like in France where public schools have a high standard and private schools a low one; here, it’s the other way around”\textsuperscript{145}. This observation is also corroborated by recent research for the Education Sector Support Programme in Nigeria (Bawa 2009; Boulton et al. 2009: 1; Williams 2009), which concludes that “there is a significant shortfall in both the quality and quantity of public education [in Kano State]” (Boulton et. al. 2009: 1).

The consequence of this shortfall is that, in the words of Gwarzo, “anybody who can afford it would not send their child to state schools”\textsuperscript{146}, parents prefer private schools, which exist at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels and continue to increase in number. Ethnicity or indigeneity are of little importance in acquiring access to the private institutions, although some may be religiously exclusive (e.g. those organised by churches or particular Muslim denominations). Due to the shortage of educational facilities, however, there remains a level of competition for access to public education, and it is here that indigeneity plays a role. These trends have been documented elsewhere (e.g. Adesoji and Alao 2009; Bach 1997; Human Rights Watch 2006; Osaghae 1988, 1996), so it is sufficient to recount them briefly. On the basis of the Federal Character principle, access to federal education (secondary schools, polytechnics, or universities) is dependent on entry examinations and state quotas based on indigeneity. Education organised by the State and local governments (ranging from primary schools to universities), however, may discriminate between indigenes and non-indigenes - as indicated by indigeneship certificates - by restricting access for non-indigenes or increasing their school fees. Finally, employment in the public education sector is often restricted for non-indigenes, for example by giving them fixed-term contracts rather than permanent positions\textsuperscript{147}.

\textsuperscript{145} Alh. Ibrahim Ado Kurawa, DG KS Research and Documentation, 16/10/2008 in Kano.
\textsuperscript{146} Dr Tahir Gwarzo 2008, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{147} Kanmi Kings, lecturer polytechnic, 2008 in Kano.
Indigeneity thus plays a role in the division of public educational opportunities; the actual impact of these discriminatory practices, however, is reduced by the poor availability and standards of public education. One indication of this lack of impact lies in the educational inequalities as discussed in chapter 3: they remain strongly in favour of the ‘settler’ groups in Sabon Gari. A similar argument can be made for the provision of health care, for which several studies have shown the prevalence of private forms of health care provision outside the scope of what the state provides (Alubo 2001, 2002; Brieger 2002). Public health care, like education, is lacking in both quality and quantity, regardless of the relative abundance of public funding (Galadanci et al. 2007; Yahya 2007). Many people, therefore, rely on various forms of private care, most prominent of which are the ill-educated, but relatively cheap patent medicine vendors. If public health care was more effectively organised, it would perhaps become subject to restrictions based on indigeneity; the status quo in 2008, however, was that the general public hospital was open to everyone, while the federal teaching hospital as well as other commercialised hospitals did not discriminate against anyone, except those without the money to pay for their services.\(^{148}\)

### 4.5.2 Community Building: A Daidaita Sahu

Indigeneity thus impacts on the provision of social services by Kano’s political institutions through restricted access for non-indigenes, but this impact is attenuated by the poor availability and quality of the provided social services and the resulting prevalence of commercial alternatives. The second mechanism to be discussed is the redefinition of Kano as a Muslim State. The main tool with which the two consecutive Shekarau governments have concretised this redefinition has been *sharia*, through the re-implementation of the *sharia* penal code and the creation of several institutions to promote other aspects of the *sharia* legal system. These institutions include the Kano State *sharia* court of appeal, its *sharia*

\(^{148}\) Dr Tahir Gwarzo 2008, op. cit.
commission, the *Zakat* commission, the *Hisbah* board, the censorship board under the Ministry of Information, Sports, and Culture, and the Directorate for Societal Re-orientation (*A Daidaita Sahu*)\(^{149}\).

Although all these institutions, and the high-status position and visibility of their leaders, contribute to the official endorsement of Kano as Muslim society, the Directorate *A Daidaita Sahu* will be used here to represent the way in which the *sharia* efforts impact on public discourse. There are two reasons for this selection. First, the societal re-orientation programme has been one of the priorities of the Shekarau administration\(^{150}\) and is therefore organised and funded relatively effectively. Second, the programme represents the most direct attempt by Kano’s political institutions to change Kano’s public morality and therefore provides the best illustration of the mechanisms behind such an attempt. As a brief sketch, the *A Daidaita Sahu* programme is implemented by the Directorate of Societal Re-orientation, an executive branch of the Kano State government. It is led by Bala Muhammad, a young director-general with roots in journalism and communication and previous working experience as a communications consultant at the World Bank. The purpose of the programme is to “tell people to do things right: avoid corruption, […] respect law and order, be punctual, work hard, respect the rights of others, plan and think through whatever you want to do”\(^{151}\).

The Directorate thus aims at attitudinal change: “Japan is advanced because of the attitude of the people! Nigeria is a country where the people are advanced but the country is behind. […] So we are telling Nigerians: we can be great, but it is our attitude [that holds us back].”\(^{152}\) To this end, it has an annual budget of roughly half a million pounds, 50 (paid and

---

\(^{149}\) For details on *sharia* implementation in Nigeria, see Last (2002), Human Rights Watch (2004), Ostien (2007), and Suberu (2009b).

\(^{150}\) Dr Tahir Gwarzo 2008, op. cit.

\(^{151}\) Dr. Bala Muhammad, op. cit.

\(^{152}\) Ibid.
unpaid) staff in the secretariat, seven State stakeholder committees\textsuperscript{153}, and 44 LG branches\textsuperscript{154}. According to Bala Muhammad, the Directorate has a wide range of policy measures at its disposal, for example: weekly items in the State-owned media, the tricycle taxi programme for women, educational programmes for schools, empowerment programmes for young unemployed men, and monthly public discussion forums\textsuperscript{155}. The extent to which these measures have been implemented and the programme has achieved any of its aims remains difficult to measure and contested; I visited the secretariat and witnessed that it was relatively well-equipped and maintained compared to the Ministries of Education and of Commerce: it boasted permanent electricity, internet connections, a recording studio, and a library.

This relative wealth of the Directorate headquarters indicates the priority it received from the State government, as did its physical proximity to the seat of the SG - just across the road from Government House. Similarly, the phrase \textit{A Daidaita Sahu} was often mentioned in public statements by politicians and articles in the state-owned media - not least in the recurring reports of the SG confiscating alcohol. I therefore argue that \textit{A Daidaita Sahu} represents the attitude of the SG towards public morality and, by extension, also towards the way in which different communities in Kano should relate to each other. On this topic, Bala Muhammad stated that,

\begin{quote}
Every time we had violence in Kano, we understood that it was the youth who were used. Jobless male youths. So we directly addressed them, through the empowerment programme. Also, we tell the Sabon Gari community [of ‘settlers’] that Islam is a religion that is very sensitive to attacks. Muslims in all countries do not take it lightly if you attack their religion. So we tell the non-indigenous community: please respect our religion. If you are in a community - as they say,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{153} Public servants; educational institutions; business community; women affairs; youths; urban communities; rural communities.

\textsuperscript{154} Dr. Bala Muhammad, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.
if you are in Rome, do as the Romans do - respect the community. So we can at least understand each other.\textsuperscript{136}

The quotation is informative in three respects. First, it highlights that the State government frames community relations in terms of the violence Kano experienced previously. Both the youth empowerment programme and the communication with Sabon Gari communities are aimed at preventing new incidences of such violence. Second, Bala Muhammad emphasises Islam as the defining feature of the Kano community. Third, the quote also highlights that within this frame of Kano as an Islamic place, the position of the Sabon Gari community is one of guests in the house of the Kano ‘natives’. Bala Muhammad thus preaches mutual respect, but also retains the notion that in essence being indigenous in Kano entails being a Muslim. Moreover, he juxtaposes Muslims with the Sabon Gari and ‘settler’ communities, thus confirming the complicated overlap between religious and ethnic identity boundaries. The public morality promoted through the \textit{A Daidaita Sahu} programme is therefore consistent with the patterns of political representation promoted by the SG through the non-indigene Special Advisors: it conceives of Kano as a Muslim place, where ‘native’ belonging is conditional upon religious and, by extension, ethnic affiliation. ‘Settlers’ are welcomed and incorporated as guest communities as long as they respect Islam and “do as the Romans do”.

\subsection*{4.6 Conclusion}

This chapter has analysed the connections between Kano politics, belonging, and social identification. To this end, it has examined the role of ethnicity, religion, and indigeneity in three different dimensions of Kano politics: the structure and authority of the city’s political authorities; the processes of political representation and participation; and some of the relevant state policies related to social provision and community building. In terms of Kano’s

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid.
political structures, there are four main types of organisations: the state, traditional rulers, religious leaders, and ethnic or community leaders. Section 4.3 showed how the state authorities have little legitimacy and informal authority in any of Kano’s ethnic communities. Instead, Kano residents consider their religious leaders to be most trustworthy, followed by the ethnic and traditional leaders. All four authorities in Kano thus have a considerable level of authority and influence; the nature of this influence, however, differs between the formal power of the state and the informal authority of the religious, traditional, and community leaders.

Of these authorities, both the religious and ethnic leaders represent clear ethnic and religious groups, while the connection between ethnicity and the state and traditional rulers is more ambiguous. Religious and ethnic leaders therefore have a clear incentive to reproduce the exclusionary identities connected to nativism, using religion and ethnicity and tools to mobilise their constituencies, represent their followers’ interests, and ensure that they retain their authority. For the state and Emirate leaders, their interests in promoting the exclusionary logic of ethnicity and religion compete with the strong incentives for preventing interethnic violence. So although the Kano State government and the Emirate both explicitly define themselves in Islamic terms, these institutions also allow for the inclusion of ‘settler’ - and even Christian - communities. These findings suggest the simultaneous political presence of, on the one hand, the fully exclusionary logic of indigeneity and ‘traditional’ belonging and, on the other, the less exclusive nativism of civic-communal belonging and the multicultural approach.

Regardless of the rhetorical prominence of Kano State’s inclusion of ‘settlers’ in government, section 4.4 showed how participation in the state is dependent on one’s status as an indigene of Kano. Not only is indigeneity a condition for political office at Nigeria’s federal level, but it is also a requirement for acceptance as an eligible candidate at the level of Kano State’s political parties. Being able to claim a ‘native’ status in Kano is therefore
virtually a necessary condition for political participation in the state. Political opportunities for ‘settlers’, unable to stand for office in Kano’s elections, are largely restricted to the ethnic community organisations, who have access to the State government through the ‘settler’ Special Advisors.

Ethnicity, religion, and indigeneity are thus an important part of Kano politics, both by defining the major political authorities in the city and by structuring the dynamics of political participation. Finally, section 4.5 showed the role of these identities in state policies of education, health care, and community building (A Daidaita Sahu). Although indigeneity was argued to influence the provision of education and health care, the inefficacy of these policies and their implementation negates the impact of this influence on the wider Kano society. In contrast, the programme of A Daidaita Sahu was implemented more effectively. It carried the same message of nativist belonging, however, defining Kano as an essentially Islamic, ‘native’ community with small pockets of ‘settlers’ residing in the city as guests. In sum, therefore, there are several ways in which Kano politics reproduces the divisions of nativist belonging and ethnicity: through the structures of political authority, the restrictions on full political participation, and the State’s policies of community building.

The analysis of these political structures and processes, however, again underlined the strong, but complicated links between nativism and religious divisions, specifically the Christian–Muslim boundary. The ideal-typical ‘native’ in Kano is both Hausa–Fulani and Muslim, virtually in equal measure; a Christian, by extension, is therefore considered at least as ‘non-indigenous’ as a someone who is not a Hausa–Fulani. Nativist belonging in Kano may thus be defined in ethnic and religious terms; this thesis has argued, however, that the ethnic identity cleavage more accurately captures the nativist hierarchy, because it captures Kano’s ethnic and religious variation (see chapter 3). At the same time, the strong connections between nativism and the Christian–Muslim divide have allowed us to interpret, for example, the implementation of sharia and A Daidaita Sahu as a factor that reinforces both the
Christian-Muslim and the nativist divisions: in Kano, excluding non-Muslims is virtually the same as excluding ‘settlers’. The subsequent chapter will now analyse the extent to which these nativist divisions have resulted in interethnic tensions, as defined by antagonism, avoidance, and conflict.
5 Ethnic Hatred and Religious Radicalism?
Social Relations in Kano

5.1 Introduction

This chapter studies the social relations between ethnic communities in Kano, within the historical, discursive, material, and political context drawn out in the preceding chapters. The central question regards the extent to which these interethnic relations reflect the impact of nativist definitions of belonging and the corresponding exclusionary identities. Do interethnic relations in Kano bear the imprint of the nativist ethnicity that dominates belonging in the city? On the basis of the introductory chapter, such an imprint would be characterised by antagonism and prejudice in the perceptions between Kano’s ethnic groups and avoidance and conflict in their interactions. The three core sections of this chapter will therefore each tackle one of these aspects. First, section 5.2 analyses antagonism and prejudice in interethnic perceptions, after which section 5.3 focuses on different types of individual interactions to assess the extent and nature of interethnic avoidance. Finally, section 5.4 will examine different cases of collective interethnic interactions, in order to tease out the dynamics of violent and non-violent encounters and the role of nativist discourses in them.

5.2 Antagonism and Prejudice: Interethnic Perceptions

This section will focus on the way in which different ethnic groups perceive each other, measuring the extent of antagonism between them. Two questions are central to the analysis: first, what is the absolute extent of interethnic antagonism, and second, how do communities rank each other relatively? These questions are relevant for all perceptions and interactions analysed in this chapter, since they reflect the two causal paths through which nativist
identities were argued to affect social relations: the ‘categorisation’ and ‘group positioning’
effects.\textsuperscript{157}

\textit{Table 5.1: Proportions of ethnic communities who think negatively about other groups}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Negative views of Hausa*** (N=257)</th>
<th>Negative views of Yoruba*** (N=238)</th>
<th>Negative views of Igbo*** (N=242)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hausa-Fulani</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igbo</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1 presents the proportions of the four ethnic communities in Kano who have negative
views of the city’s three main ethnic groups: the Hausa-Fulani, the Igbo, and the Yoruba\textsuperscript{158}.

In this survey question, respondents were asked to translate their perceptions of different
ethnic communities into a mark ranging from 1 (highly positive) to 5 (highly negative);
ratings 4 and 5 were counted to denote ‘negative’ perceptions and hence measure a ‘blanket’
form of antagonism. In this table, the first aspects to note are (i) that there is substantial
antagonism (or out-group bias) between some of the ethnic groups; (ii) that the levels of
antagonism differ significantly between ethnic groups; and (iii) that the Hausa-Fulani and
Igbo display a considerable positive in-group bias. As such, table 5.1 provides evidence for
the effect of categorisation; the simple fact of being categorised into different (nativist) ethnic
groups appears to lead to some level of intergroup antagonism. This categorisation effect is,
of course, reinforced by the various factors that have been identified in previous chapters as
causes of the salience of ethnicity in the first place: overlapping ethnic and religious
boundaries, horizontal inequalities, cultural and religious differences between Kano’s various

\textsuperscript{157} See chapter 1.

\textsuperscript{158} The category of ‘minorities’ was constructed during data analysis and was therefore not as such included in the survey questions.
ethnic communities, and the complex connections between ethnicity, religion, and politics in the city.

Moreover, however, the significant interethnic differences also suggest the influence of group positioning. In terms of ranking and hierarchy, there are two interacting dynamics at work in table 5.1. First, the table highlights that the more ‘native’ communities (i.e. Hausa-Fulani and minorities) display more antagonism towards other communities than the southern ‘settler’ Yoruba and Igbo. The antagonism that exists between ‘native’ and ‘settler’ ethnic communities in Kano is thus mostly driven by the ‘native’ communities. This may be an indication of the strength of their grievances and sense of threat felt towards the ‘settlers’. However, why would the ‘settlers’ not feel aggrieved by their political exclusion, as described in chapter 4 above? This lack of ‘reciprocity’ of antagonism from the side of the ‘settlers’ points, it is argued here, to the fact that Kano’s ‘settler’ communities have by and large internalised the central premise of Kano’s nativism: that they are, in essence, guests in Kano and can therefore not lay claim to the same rights as the ‘natives’. Note that this pattern is not unique to Kano, but can also be identified in the case of Amsterdam in chapter 9.

As a second trend related to ranking, the table shows that antagonism towards the ‘native’ Hausa is relatively low, while, at the other extreme, the Yoruba are consistently subject to the most negative evaluations. These findings hint at an important trend. In Kano’s nativist discourse of belonging, the Hausa-Fulani ‘natives’ and the Igbo ‘settlers’ are generally considered furthest apart from each other, in terms of their ethnicity, religion, and the extent of their belonging in Kano. The Yoruba, in this hierarchical scheme, are more heterogeneous in religious terms and therefore considered to take up an intermediate position: some Yoruba Muslims have assimilated and become accepted as full ‘natives’ of Kano, while others reside in Sabon Gari and emphasise their ethnic (and often religious) ‘settler’ status.

Although this diversity is present in all ethnic communities, it is particularly strong among the Yoruba - not least because of their long historical presence in Kano and the religious
heterogeneity of the Yoruba community throughout Nigeria. It seems, however, that this intermediate status in ‘native’/‘settler’ terms is not rewarded by positive ethnic evaluations from other communities (or indeed themselves) in contemporary Kano. Ambiguity in terms of the ‘native’/‘settler’ cleavage therefore seems to be punished with antagonistic rather than co-operative attitudes from other, perhaps more clearly defined, ethnic communities. In sum, therefore, table 5.1 suggests that the nativist hierarchy in Kano has been translated into interethnic antagonism by (i) hardening the antagonism of the ‘natives’ toward ‘settler’ communities; (ii) restraining the negative views held by the ‘settlers’; and (iii) stigmatising the intermediate, or ambiguous, Yoruba.

Table 5.2: Proportions of ethnic communities evaluating other communities as ‘lazy’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Negative views of Hausa*** (N=410)</th>
<th>Negative views of Yoruba*** (N=393)</th>
<th>Negative views of Igbo*** (N=387)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hausa-Fulani</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igbo</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3: Proportions of ethnic communities evaluating other communities as ‘violent’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Negative views of Hausa*** (N=400)</th>
<th>Negative views of Yoruba*** (N=396)</th>
<th>Negative views of Igbo*** (N=387)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hausa-Fulani</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igbo</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.4: Proportions of ethnic communities evaluating other communities as ‘dishonest’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Negative views of Hausa*** (N=399)</th>
<th>Negative views of Yoruba*** (N=378)</th>
<th>Negative views of Igbo*** (N=370)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hausa-Fulani</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igbo</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Tables 5.2 to 5.4 can help to both elucidate and further complicate this picture. They present the proportions of Kano’s ethnic communities who hold negative stereotypes of other groups, specifically concerning their ‘laziness’, ‘violent nature’ and ‘dishonesty’. Clearly, these percentages are substantially higher than the overall negative evaluations in table 5.1: it seems easier for people to comment negatively on a single aspect of an ethnic community than on the community as a whole. Three trends presented in tables 5.2 to 5.4 are of importance to this thesis. First, they show that ethnic stereotypes exist, that they differ between groups, and that most groups display positive in-group biases, thus providing further evidence for the categorisation effect on interethnic perceptions in Kano.

Second, however, the three tables also complicate the notion of the Yoruba as a stigmatised community, because the Yoruba are only rated most negatively in three instances: as most violent by the Hausa-Fulani and as most dishonest by the Hausa-Fulani and the Igbo. The negative stereotypes of Yoruba held by the Hausa-Fulani may result from the difference between Yoruba Islamic practices and those of the Hausa-Fulani; as a result, Kano Muslims may sometimes be uncertain as to whether or not the Yoruba are ‘good’ Muslims. The distrust between the Igbo and the Yoruba, expressed as mutually-held dishonest stereotypes, is likely to result from their economic competition in Kano’s markets. The group with the most negative stereotypes in these three tables, however, is Hausa-Fulani: they are seen as most lazy and violent by all three ‘settler’ communities. While the general ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ evaluations thus produced antagonism towards the Yoruba, specific ethnic stereotypes – especially related to laziness and violence – are more often directed against the ‘native’ Hausa-Fulani.

159 The relatively high proportions of stereotypes about violence are striking, perhaps especially in the group’s stereotypes of themselves; while in many societies the label ‘violent’ would be considered more negative than ‘lazy’ or ‘dishonest’, tables 5.1 - 5.3 suggest that the label ‘violent’ is more common than the other two in the context of Kano.
On this basis, therefore, it is too simple to argue that all ethnic antagonism and stereotyping in Kano is dependent on the nativist ethnic hierarchy. Ethnic identities in Nigeria have considerable histories and meanings beyond the discourse of nativist belonging in Kano. As a result, interethnic antagonism and ethnic stereotypes are not only informed by the local Kano struggles around belonging, but also by other discourses and experiences about ethnicity. Some of these other discourses and experiences may be related to nativism and struggles around belonging, such as the deeply held notion among Kano’s Igbo that the Hausa-Fulani are violent. It would be difficult to understand this stereotype outside the context of recurrent anti-Igbo violence in Kano’s recent history. Other stereotypes, however, may be altogether unrelated to nativist belonging, such as the stereotype of Hausa-Fulani as lazy.

In sum, the four tables provide evidence for the existence of interethnic stereotypes, positive in-group identifications, and out-group antagonism. They also provide some evidence for the ‘group positioning’ effect of nativist ethnicity, even if this is evidently complicated and intersected by other discourses concerning ethnic stereotypes. The tables also show, however, that, with the exception of ‘settler’ stereotypes of the Hausa-Fulani as violent, all antagonistic and stereotypical perceptions are held only by the minority of Kano’s ethnic communities. While still considerable, interethnic antagonism thus exists alongside positive interethnic perceptions. With these findings on antagonism in mind, the next section will assess to what extent individual interethnic interactions in Kano are characterised by avoidance rather than (positive) engagement.

5.3 Avoidance in Individual Interethnic Interactions

This section uses the perceptions survey data to assess the level of avoidance in interethnic interactions. It will outline the frequency of different forms of interactions in the city: casual
interactions in the workplace or neighbourhood, friendships, and marriages. In order to explain these patterns, the section will refer to factors that bias intergroup preferences, as were discussed in the antagonism section above, as well as those that limit the opportunities for constructive intergroup interactions.

Table 5.5: Proportions respondents who never work/meet with other ethnic/religious groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No interaction at work (N=271)***</th>
<th>None in neighbourhood (N=382)***</th>
<th>Neither at work nor in neighbourhood (N=251)***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hausa-Fulani</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igbo</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In everyday social life, Kano witnesses many lively, and generally cordial, interactions between members of its various communities. Although there is a level of ethnic specialisation and residential segregation as demonstrated in earlier chapters, relatively few people can live their lives without ever coming into contact with people from outside their religious and ethnic communities. This is the general picture emerging from table 5.5, which displays the proportions of each ethnic community that have no interethnic or interreligious interaction at work and those that never meet any other communities in their neighbourhood.

For the Igbo, Yoruba, and minority communities, the workplace regularly brings an overwhelming majority into contact with other communities. The proportion of Hausa-Fulani working together with other communities, however, is substantially lower; this can be seen as an indication of a higher level of work specialisation along ethnic lines of the ‘natives’ compared to the ‘settler’ communities.

For all communities, people are more likely to meet other groups in the neighbourhood than at work, reducing the proportion of ‘settlers’ who never meet other ethnic or religious groups to less than 5%. Among the ‘native’ Hausa-Fulani, however, just under one third

---

This pattern is confirmed by the perceptions of the respondents themselves, as 36% of them report to meet other groups in the street or neighbourhood against 22% in the market, 13% at home, 10% with friends, 8% at weddings and funerals, and only 5% at work or in school (N=294).
reports never to meet any other groups in the neighbourhood (second column of table 5.5); combining the two measures, just under 23% of the Hausa-Fulani profess never to meet any other groups, either at work or in the neighbourhood (as opposed to 2% of the Igbo and the minorities). Although casual interactions between ethnic groups are thus common in Kano, especially for ‘settlers’, there are also people who never interact with anyone outside their ethnic or religious group.

The relatively high proportion of ‘natives’ without any interethnic or religious interactions compared to the ‘settlers’ could be explained in reference to their majority status: members of the majority group are simply less likely to meet other groups than members of minority communities. In this line of argument, the relative sizes of majority and minority communities can help to interpret and explain patterns of in-group bias and avoidance. Now, although this argument is valid in principle and will be referred to in discussions of interethnic friendships and marriages, it has little significance in explaining the pattern in table 5.5. For if we assume that, on average, residents of Kano have interact casually with 50 other people, the likelihood of any member of the Hausa-Fulani having no interethnic contacts is 0.58^50 – a figure that is significantly lower than the 23% in table 5.5^{161}.

Aside from demography, the three most important factors in explaining why some members of ethnic groups in Kano have no interethnic contacts are: (i) the antagonism and prejudice reported in section 5.2; (ii) the relatively high levels of residential segregation, and (iii) the multitude of languages spoken in the city. First, the interethnic antagonism and the negative interethnic stereotypes discussed section 5.2 are likely to reduce people’s willingness to engage in interethnic interactions, even if these are restricted to casual meetings.

Moreover, specific stereotypes may impede particular interactions; for example, perceptions of dishonesty may reduce people’s willingness to engage in market interactions.

^{161} This calculation assumes that the real proportion of Hausa-Fulani in Kano is 58% as measured by the perceptions survey. However, even if we assume that the Hausa-Fulani command a majority of 95% (as many Kano residents believe) the likelihood of a Hausa-Fulani having no friends from other groups would still be less than 8%, indicating that other factors than demography have a role in structuring casual interactions in Kano.
Second, residential segregation has been discussed in chapter 3 and can also be expected to impede interethnic interactions, especially in the most segregated and ‘native’-dominated neighbourhood, the Old City. Third, and similar to the effects of residential segregation, it is also likely that the sheer diversity of language spoken in Kano is an impediment to effective interethnic communication. Nigerian languages are one of the main defining aspects of ethnicity and although English is officially the lingua franca in Nigeria, its association with the colonial regime, the lack of universal basic education (UBE), and the poor quality of some of the education that is provided, have limited its efficacy in this respect.

Within the context of Kano and the Nigerian north more in general, Hausa is more widely spoken than any other language, but its connection to the Hausa-Fulani ‘native’ identity still prevents other ethnic groups from completely adopting it. Table 5.6 gives an indication of this dilemma, as it shows the percentages of the various groups who speak either English, Hausa, or both linguae francae at home. It shows that while all Hausa-Fulani speak Hausa, only a small minority also speaks English in the home; among the other communities, however, only a minority speaks Hausa along with English in the home, while the majority, at best, speaks English plus their own ethnic language. Although not speaking a language at home does not imply a complete lack of knowledge of the language, it does provide an indication of the fluency of the speakers and hence of the language obstacles that exist between Kano’s ethnic communities.

Table 5.6: Lingua francae spoken at home*** (N=413)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Hausa and English</th>
<th>Hausa</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Neither</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hausa-Fulani</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igbo</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While certain people, such as the traders in Sabon Gari market (Ogunnika 1994), have developed their own distinct ‘dialects’ or other ways around the language barrier, Kano’s diverse language spectrum reduces the opportunities for casual interethnic interaction. It may also, moreover, hinder more intimate and intensive types of interethnic interaction, such as friendships or marriages. Table 5.7 displays the proportions of respondents whose friends are only or mostly from the same ethnic or religious group as their own. Two trends are of importance to this chapter. First, the table shows how only a minority of Kano’s ethnic communities have friends exclusively from their own ethnic and religious communities. However, among the Hausa-Fulani and the Igbo these minorities are considerable, especially if they are seen in conjunction with those who mostly have friendship from within their community. This presents a shift away from the open and interactive relationships in the workplace and in the neighbourhood: it appears that friendships in Kano are considerably more ethnically and religiously exclusive than casual work and neighbourhood meetings.

Table 5.7: Respondents with most/only friends from own ethnic/religious group*** (N=384)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Only own groups</th>
<th>Most own groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hausa-Fulani</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igbo</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a second pattern, both for neighbourhood interactions and friendships, respondents were consistently more likely to interact with other ethnic groups than with other religious ones. This pattern underlines the relative salience of religious identities in Kano, as well as the hardness of Christian-Muslim boundaries. But perhaps most importantly, it emphasises the mutually reinforcing effect of intersecting (or overlapping) ethnic and religious boundaries in Kano. Finally, table 5.7 shows a clear difference between the ‘native’ Hausa-Fulani and the other communities: ‘natives’ appear to have more exclusive circles of friends than the various
‘settler’ communities. Among the ‘settlers’, moreover, the Igbo are most exclusive in their choice of friends – suggesting that in terms of friendship, the groups at either extreme end of the nativist ethnic hierarchy are more exclusive than the intermediate communities.

Most of the patterns in table 5.7 are also found in table 5.8, which displays the proportions of the four ethnic categories that indicate they “would object to their daughter marrying someone from a different ethnic or religious group”. The respondent was then asked to specify the group(s) they object to, which have been categorised as ethnic or religious. The table shows that Hausa-Fulani have the strongest preference for marriage within their ethnic and religious groups, followed by the Igbo, the minorities, and finally the Yoruba. The table also shows that the communities have different priorities: while Hausa-Fulani object most often to a different religion, Kano’s Igbo population resists marrying outside their ethnic group more than outside their religion; the other two communities fall in between these two extremes. In reference to marriage preferences, Igbo thus appear to police their ethnic boundaries somewhat more arduously than their religious ones – a distinct exception compared to the other communities’ marriage preferences and the other interaction patterns.

Table 5.8: “Would you object to your daughter marrying outside ethnicity/religion?”*** (N=403)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Object to other ethnicity and religion</th>
<th>Object to other ethnicity</th>
<th>Object to other religion</th>
<th>No objection or uncertain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hausa-Fulani</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igbo</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the Hausa-Fulani thus confirm the presence of a hard - mostly religious - boundary in terms of marriage preferences of parents towards their children, and although the overall resistance against interethnic marriages are stronger than those against e.g. interethnic workplace relations, the other three categories also display considerable openness towards them. Almost half of the Igbo and more than half of the Yoruba and minority communities
appear, in principle, to have few problems with a partner of a different ethnic or religious background. Although it remains to be seen to what extent this affects actual patterns of interethnic marriage\textsuperscript{162}, table 5.8 does suggest that ‘settler’ communities in Kano are in fact much more open to the idea of interethnic and inter-religious marriage than the existing literature suggests and also more open to the idea than Kano’s ‘native’ population. Especially the Yoruba, stereotypically known for their open attitude towards religious difference, confirm this representation of themselves by displaying few objections to interethnic unions.

However, if we compare the proportions of people who object to intermarriages to those with friends exclusively from their own ethnic and religious groups, or with the dynamics of casual interactions, table 5.8 does suggest that marriage objections are at least as prevalent as ethnically exclusive friendships. The remainder of this section will look at different explanations of the ethnic preferences in intimate relations such as friendship and marriage. It will focus on demographic explanations, the connections between different types of interactions, and on the factors that engender in-group bias and hinder the opportunities for interethnic interactions: interethnic antagonism, demographic and linguistic segregation, cultural differences, and the communal importance of marriages in Nigeria.

In measuring and analysing interethnic avoidance, or in-group biases, the first potential explanatory factor that should be taken into account is demography. To what extent can the patterns in tables 5.7 and 5.8 to be explained by the different group sizes? Using the figures presented in table 5.9 (see Annex C for details), it is possible to address this question for the data on interethnic friendships in table 5.7. The first column of table 5.9 presents the theoretical probability that someone from one of Kano’s ethnic communities only has co-ethnics as friends, assuming that his or her choice of friends was completely at random within Kano. The second column, similarly, presents the probability that most, but not all, of the friends of this person are from his or her own ethnic group. As such, these first columns

\textsuperscript{162} Unfortunately, data on actual interethnic marriages were not collected in the perceptions survey, nor were they available elsewhere.
present the theoretical equivalents of the data presented in table 5.7 – building on the assumption of a completely random selection of friends. The third and fourth column, in turn, present the ‘avoidance ratio’: a measure to assess the relative order of magnitude of the interethnic avoidance at work in table 5.7. It is calculated by dividing the ‘real’ proportions in table 5.7 by their theoretical equivalents in table 5.9.

Table 5.9: Probabilities and avoidance ratios for only/mostly intra-ethnic friends, by ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Only own groups - probability</th>
<th>Most own groups - probability</th>
<th>Only own groups – avoidance ratio</th>
<th>Most own groups – avoidance ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hausa-Fulani</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igbo</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2915</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Now, there are three potential patterns to look out for in table 5.9. First, if the difference between the real, reported proportions of interethnic friendships in table 5.7 and their theoretical probabilities in 5.9 is minimal, the avoidance ratio is close to 1, indicating a minimal level of active avoidance or bias. Second, if the real proportion is higher than its theoretical probability, the avoidance ratio is smaller than 1 and indicates an out-group bias. Finally, however, if the real proportions of interethnic friendships are substantially lower than the theoretical probability and the avoidance ratio is much larger than 1, this indicates the presence of active interethnic avoidance and in-group biases.

With this in mind, there are two points of note in table 5.9. First, the table shows that the avoidance ratios of three groups are substantially higher than 1: the Igbo, Yoruba, and minorities. Second, the figures for the majority Hausa-Fulani are clearly lower than those for the minority groups. Their avoidance ratio of 3 shows that, if friendships were random, three times fewer Hausa-Fulani would only have Hausa-Fulani friends than was reported; the avoidance ratio of 0.7 even indicates that about 1.4 times more Hausa-Fulani would have
mostly Hausa-Fulani friends. Table 5.9 therefore suggests that the incidence of interethnic friendships among the Hausa-Fulani is roughly proportional to their group size. However, the high avoidance ratios of the ‘settlers’ suggest that, while the Hausa-Fulani have more in-group friends because they are in the majority, the ‘settler’ in-group bias requires additional explanations.

Table 5.9: Correlations of incidence of different interactions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work together?</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interethnic neighbourhood interaction?</td>
<td>.407***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interethnic friendship?</td>
<td>.259***</td>
<td>.445***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objection to marriage</td>
<td>-.233***</td>
<td>-.160***</td>
<td>-.166***</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional explanations are also necessary to explain the parental preferences of all Kano’s ethnic groups against interethnic marriages, reported in table 5.8. One way of finding such additional explanations may be found in table 5.10, which suggests how the various types of interactions may be related to each other. It presents the correlations between the variables displayed in the tables above and shows a very simple pattern, in which all interethnic interactions are significantly correlated to each other. Thus, while interethnic interactions at work, in the neighbourhood, and in friendships are mutually reinforcing, they are also negative correlated to objections against interethnic marriages. In short, therefore, those who have one type of interethnic interaction are likely also to have other forms of constructive interethnic interactions and the factors that explain one type of interaction can therefore also help to explain the others. However, this finding fails to explain the fact that people across all

---

163 Please note that the probabilities for the Hausa-Fulani are based upon the demographic data presented in table 3.1. As noted above, these are likely to understate the actual majority the Hausa-Fulani command in Kano, which implies that the avoidance ratios for the Hausa-Fulani are most likely somewhat overstated.

164 To construct the variables used to calculate these correlations, the original variables of tables 5.5, 5.7 and 5.8 have been reconstructed into dummy variables, indicating no interaction (0) and interaction (1) (or no objections (0) and objections (1), for the marriage variable).
groups are much less likely to have intimate relationships (i.e. friendships and marriages) with people from other ethnic or religious groups than casual work or neighbourhood meetings.

Three sets of factors can help to explain why intimate relationships are subject to stronger in-group preferences, especially for Kano’s ‘settler’ minorities. First, the obstacles to casual interethnic interactions may be expected to have the same impact on intimate relations. In fact, it could be argued that interethnic antagonism, fed at least partly by the discourses of nativist belonging and the factors that reinforce these discourses, has a greater impact on intimate relationships than on casual ones. After all, it seems intuitive that negative perceptions and stereotypes of an ethnic or religious group weigh more heavily on the decision to become friends or, most especially, to marry someone than on the decision to buy something from a person in the market. The same can be argued for linguistic differences, as the more intimate interactions often profit from mutual understanding.

Second, cultural practices and traditions may, if they overlap with ethnic and religious boundaries, hinder intimate social relationships across these boundaries. Since it is beyond the reach of this thesis to attempt a description and full comparison of cultures across ethnic and religious groups in Kano, suffice to say that the city is host to a wide range of cultural expressions, some of which are connected to a specific ethnicity, others to a religion, and yet others to social classifications such as gender, youth, class, and lifestyle. Cultural expressions related to ethnicity can be language, dress, structures of informal authority, celebration of cultural festivals and holidays, social rituals such as the Igbo burials or Hausa weddings, or different forms of art. Similarly, and partly overlapping, religious cultural expressions can be seen in forms of dress, social or religious rituals, belief in particular values and norms, the practice of religion through various forms of prayer and other rituals, or the structure of religious informal authority.

---

165 A good example of ethnic and religious differences in art preferences is given by Nigerian films: while ‘Nollywood’ films are popular across ethnic groups from all over the country, the main wazobia groups also have their own brand of ‘ethnic’ films, which are distinct in terms of the language spoken, their story lines, thematic focus, and the origins of the actors involved.
Sharing such forms of culture can be conducive to the development of friendship and marriages, while having substantially different cultural traditions may cause a ‘clash’ and thus hinder these relationships. This may be because these differences cause negative stereotypes and antagonistic attitudes, which can reinforce existing cultural difference: they may emphasise or even exaggerate those aspects that are deemed culturally ‘incompatible’ (e.g. the ‘laziness’ of the Hausa). Cultural (or religious) differences may also cause avoidance in intimate social interactions, however, simply because they produce uncertainty: the simple fact that one is more familiar with one’s own customs and traditions than with those of other groups is likely to bias one’s choice of friend or marriage partner in favour of one’s own group.

Finally, a third obstacle to interethnic friendships and especially marriages lies in the institutional and communal importance of intimate interactions in Nigeria. Such relationships are not merely confirmations of affective bonds, but are also shaped by economic and political incentives of the marriage partners, their parents, imams, or ethnic community representatives. As such, they are subject to considerable social control, which often restricts the opportunities for interactions across identity boundaries. Historically, marriage in Nigeria has been an institution of great social importance, not only as a sacred bond between the individuals involved, but also - and perhaps more importantly - as a means of making alliances between different family groups or clans (Yusuf 1975). As Solivetti (1994: 258) shows for rural Hausa in the early 1990s, “marriage is a public matter, not something personal; [it] is a manifestation of the families’ will, not of the will of the couple getting married”.

Smith (2004a; 2005) argues the same for Igbo communities in southern Nigeria, who used to marry mostly within their social class and with “[fellow Igbo] from among close-by neighbouring communities with whom they had longstanding ties. Such alliances helped maintain peace […] and facilitated trade networks” (Smith 2001: 135). Because of their
importance in political and economic terms, marriage was widely considered an obligation and the choice of partners was usually decided by family elders. Among the more ‘traditional’ Hausa, there has historically been no space for women to be of childbearing age and unmarried (Callaway 1984; Larkin 1997; Solivetti 1994); in similar vein unmarried men, regardless of their biological age, are considered ‘young boys’ rather than full adults.

Traditionally, Nigerian marriages have thus been viewed as functional, arranged institutions in which individual affection is of secondary importance to the interests of the family and the ethnic or religious community. The specific interests at play differ from one family, or ethnicity, to another: the exchange of dowries or bride wealth, the alliance between families or villages, or the maintenance and expansion of the ethnic or religious community.

However, all traditional forms of marriage seem to have been characterised by their functionalism, their public and arranged character, and the youthfulness of the girls involved (Feyisetan and Pebley 1989: 343-4).

Needless to say, perhaps, in recent decades the forces of Western education, urbanisation, and the modernist religious beliefs of Islamism and Evangelical Christianity have fostered significant changes in these ‘traditional’ patterns (Callaway 1984; Larkin 1997; Smith 2001). Although too complex to be captured in a single sentence, these changes can broadly be summarised as a shift from purely functional notions of marriage to more affective ones, in which love and individual choice contest the monopoly of collective political and economic motivations. Indications for this greater freedom of the individuals to be involved in their

---

166 ‘The word ‘traditional’ is used because Nigerians themselves use it to differentiate between the ‘old’ practices of marriage and the ‘modern’ ones (cf. Smith 2001: 138).

167 Solivetti (1994) goes even further by arguing that rural Hausa actively avoid (public) expressions of intimacy between husband and wife in order to prevent affections from overpowering family and community interests in the marriage. He interprets the early marriage of girls in similar terms, as an attempt by the family ‘elders’ to pre-empt any “personal, unconventional, or hasty choices” on the part of the girl - in other words, as a solution to potential conflict between fathers and daughters over the selection of a husband (Solivetti 1994: 258). In his interpretation, the strongly enforced Hausa norms against pre- or extra-marital (sexual) relations is a similar attempt to protect the interests behind marriage, as is the institution of polygamy.

168 Referred to by Smith (2004b; 2005) as ‘having people’ among the Igbo.
partner selection can be found in the slowly rising age of first marriages\textsuperscript{169}, the rising 
importance of non-traditional marriage rituals (Smith 2001: 138–9), and the increasing 
acceptance and incidence of pre-marital sexual relations (Federal Ministry of Health 

However, the rising status of affection and individual choice in marriages is only partial 
and, more importantly, does not necessarily lead to more marriages across ethnic or religious 
boundaries. As Smith (2005) shows for the post-Biafra Igbo in Kano, the drive to retain 
connections with the region of ethnic origins - and the connected idea of ‘having people’ - has 
remained an important factor in Igbo choices of marriage partners, including among the 
members themselves. Similarly, among Kano’s Hausa, marriage is still considered a 
social obligation: so much so, that even ‘\textit{yan daudu}\textsuperscript{170}’ often marry and have biological children 
(Gaudio 2009: 10). At the same time, the rising salience of (reformist) religious identities 
among Muslims and Christians has perhaps changed existing marriage patterns, but not 
increased the likelihood of inter-religious marriages; if anything, it has in fact reduced it, 
because both religions have a clear interest in maintaining their mutual boundary. This 
interest is partly religious\textsuperscript{171}, but in the highly politicised religious context of Nigeria, 
marrying outside the group has also become a ‘political’ statement of ‘betraying’ one’s 
religion.

Finally, it is true that the gradual increase in female education has created a new stratum 
of women who remain unmarried into their twenties. However, the extent to which they will 
be able to marry successfully remains to be seen, given the dominant male preferences for

\textsuperscript{169} Both among men and women, but especially among the more highly educated urban Nigerians, and more 
so among the southern, Christian ethnic groups than the northern Muslim Hausa (Federal Ministry of 
Health (Nigeria) 2003).

\textsuperscript{170} ‘Feminine men’ who are often, but not always and not exclusively, homosexual and behave in 
stereotypically feminine ways (Gaudio 2009: 9–10).

\textsuperscript{171} Following Islamic injunctions, a Muslim man may marry a non-Muslim woman on the (implied) 
condition of her conversion to Islam; clearly, especially in the highly politicised religious context of Nigeria, 
this is unacceptable to most Nigerian Christians, who have their own religious prohibitions concerning the 
marrriage of a ‘good’ Christian with affiliates of other religions.
youthful brides. Moreover, there is no indication that these women are much more likely to choose partners across ethnic or religious boundaries. Intimate social relations, such as friendships but especially marriage, are thus subject to a complex set of forces that more often than not throw up obstacles for the establishment of such relations across ethnic and religious boundaries. The effects of these obstacles on patterns of interethnic avoidance have been analysed above; in terms of marriage, moreover, they are confirmed by Smith (2001: 149), who maintains that “while interethnic marriages are certainly more common than a generation or two ago, it was my observation that they are still exceedingly rare”. Having thus discussed patterns of antagonism, prejudice, and avoidance in Kano’s interethnic relations, the remainder of this chapter will focus on interethnic conflict, specifically in collective interactions.

5.4 Collective Interactions: Conflict, Violence, and Peaceful Protest

Kano has a long history of violent riots, which can be traced back at least to the dynastic crisis of the Emirate in 1893. As Wakili (1997: 235; 2005: 45) shows, Kano experienced eleven large-scale riots between the crises of the Hausa-Igbo riots in 1953 and the Plateau riot of 2004; eight occurred in the second half of this period. There are many views on the causes of these riots, ranging from those who regard them as hijackings of Kano by ‘foreign’ hooligans, through those who point to the socio-economic crisis and the resulting poverty among male youth, to those who blame them on Al-Qaeda (Pham 2007; Schwartz 2005). This section will argue, however, that they should be interpreted as part of the local tensions between Kano’s ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities, infused with the often destructive tendencies within Nigerian politics. Riots, as well as non-violent protests or public boycott movement, are interpreted here as cases of collective interactions, which can be explained in reference to theories of collective action. Discourses of ethnicity, religion, or legal indigeneity are often
used to frame and organise such collective interactions and the features of the selected discourses impact on the outcome of the interaction.

This section will outline two cases of collective interactions in Kano, the Plateau riot of May 2004 and the peaceful cartoon protests of February 2006, and explain the variance in the level of violence between them. The central argument will be that while the Plateau riots were framed and organised using the exclusionary and competitive discourses of nativist ethnicity, the cartoon riots were framed as a struggle between the religious city of Kano and the anti-religious West. Nativist ethnicity is thus not only salient in certain situations of collective action in Kano, but also a potential factor in the production of violence. In the course of this analysis, subsequent sections will also illustrate the complicated and overlapping roles of Kano’s various political authorities in organising collective action.

5.4.1 “Revenge for Yelwa and Shendam”: Riots in May 2004

The peaceful demonstration and subsequent riots of May 11 2004 in Kano were initiated as a reaction to intergroup violence in Plateau state earlier that month. As Human Rights Watch (2005: 1) documented, “on May 2 and 3, large numbers of well-armed Christians surrounded the town of Yelwa [in Plateau state] and killed around seven hundred Muslims”. These killings, compounded by the absence of state security forces, sparked an angry reaction in Kano that resulted in a violent riot on May 11. It therefore seems that this violence was triggered by external factors; however, the mechanisms through which this occurred betray the importance of discourses of local grievances, between Muslim ‘natives’ and Christian ‘settlers’. The Plateau crisis triggered violence because it was translated into the local opposition between ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’. This interpretation framed mobilisation and justifications for protest as part of the struggle between ‘native’ Muslims and ‘settler’ Christians, activated religious identity boundaries, and triggered the local, deeply felt grievances between the two communities.
The patterns of network-based mobilisation indicate the ‘local’ interpretation of the Plateau crisis. At the lowest level of aggregation, mobilisation and justification occurred around individual mosques, where local imams preached against the injustices of Yelwa. In an interview with HRW (2005: 58), Governor Shekarau estimated that 90% of the sermons during the escalation process were on the topic of the Plateau crisis. Networks of Islamic religious ritual thus became vehicles of mass mobilisation and justification; Islamic leaders initiated and fostered the religious discourse through angry sermons (Human Rights Watch 2005: 59) and simply because they responded, rather than anyone else. As a young fuel hawker, who wanted to partake in the fighting but was kept at home by his family, explains the justification of his friends and his imam: “if a person kills three people, he who kills that person has avenged those three. In Islam, […] this is good.”

Reactions of local and national media, which often uncritically framed the Plateau crisis in religious terms, also contributed to a ‘Muslims-versus-Christians’ discourse in Kano.

Through the brokerage of the Ulama, a group of Kano’s most respected and influential Islamic scholars, these local mobilisations were connected and integrated into a larger movement. The success of the Ulama in this process was dependent on its organisational flexibility and moral authority in the eyes of Kano Muslims. The Ulama are respected solely because of the knowledge of its members. Their appeal for protest can therefore broker links between Muslims of all denominations. This mobilisation within the ‘native’ Muslim community activated the identity boundaries between Muslim ‘natives’ and Christian ‘settlers’. The victims of Yelwa came to be seen as fellow-Muslims, rather than for example fellow-Nigerians or people from a different state, and their suffering was blamed on the Christians. The intensity of this reaction was exacerbated because at least 500 refugees from Plateau state were housed in Sharada and Ja’en quarters, where many ‘native’ inhabitants have historical ethnic origins in Plateau state (Human Rights Watch 2005: 57-58). Through

---

172 Anonymous (iv), fuel hawker, 15/8/2006 in Kano
the stories of these refugees, inhabitants of Sharada and Ja’en therefore felt personally connected to their suffering.

Mobilisation, however, did not occur exclusively in Islamic networks. Both the government (Kazaure 2004: 2) and some of the interviewees have argued that in preparation for the demonstration on May 11, politicians mobilised their young supporters and paid them to destabilise the situation. Two structural opportunities can explain the incentive for such political action: first, the political consequences for the incumbent governor if the peaceful demonstration would escalate into violence; and second, the well-known tensions between governor Shekarau (ANPP) and president Obasanjo (PDP). The competition between these two levels of the state, based on competing claims for jurisdiction and inter-party tensions, was expressed in the governor’s refusal to heed the advice of the president and the police against the demonstration. In their public correspondence after the riots, the governor and the president underlined their differences in a mutual attempt to shift the blame onto each other (Obasanjo 2004; Shekarau 2004).

The next stage of escalation began with the start of the demonstration from the Aliyu Ibn Talib mosque on Zaria Road and ended two days later after the heavy-handed intervention of federal security forces. The demonstration was organised by the Ulama, who had officially requested permission from the governor. It started with a prayer session at the Zaria Road mosque, after which several thousand people were led to the Government House with a letter to the governor outlining an ultimatum to the president: if the situation in Plateau was not resolved in seven days, the consequences would be his (Human Rights Watch 2005: 58–59). Violence began towards the end of the demonstration, around noon, most notably in Sharada, Panshekara, Dorayi, Ja’en and other areas south of BUK Road. The extent to which this violence was planned or spontaneous is a difficult, but important question. The role of political opponents of the incumbent governor has already been discussed, but the role and responsibility of the Islamic leaders in the violence is a more complex issue. On the one hand,
it is argued that the violence would not have occurred if the Islamic leaders had not mobilised the people and strengthened their justification: “If the leaders are not behind them, I think those under them will not have the boldness of doing that.”173 Most sources, however, vehemently oppose this claim and argue that if anything, it was an honest miscalculation on the part of the Ulama.

The evidence does not support either of these extreme claims. Firstly, it is important to acknowledge differences between Islamic leaders: although all Islamic leaders answered to the call for protest, some may have incited anger through ‘fiery preaching’, while others emphasised the importance of prayer and support for the survivors rather than retaliation. Secondly, the fact that the violence began in a different part of the city from where the demonstration was held indicates that there may not have been a direct link between the two events. However, it is also true that Islamic leaders denounced the killings in Yelwa because Muslims were killed and therefore presented the issue as part of the continuing struggle between Muslims and Christians. As Gwarzo argued,

…it is a revenge thing, it is a reaction. And if the reaction was not meant to be violent, they would not have called [the demonstration]. There are other ways in which you can take it calmly, and appease them. Why now call for a demonstration? Why now call for a prayer? […] They knew they could not control it, nobody could174.

Muslims and their leaders were angry because they felt ‘their brothers’ had been hurt. A collective prayer session, in which tens of thousands of Muslims ritually reaffirm their collective religious identity is a powerful ‘bonding’ event even without a justification for collective anger; if this ritual is dedicated to and especially called in response to the suffering of fellow Muslims, it has a huge mobilising and escalatory potential. The tone of the

174 Dr Gwarzo 2006, op. cit.
ultimatum to the president supports this view, because its implicit threat is that of violence in Kano. I would argue that violence, although perhaps not planned by Islamic leaders, was constructed as a legitimate option in the repertoire of reactions against the injustices of the Plateau crisis.

Both the morning prayer and the demonstration to the Government House are examples of setting-based mobilisation, mobilising formerly unconnected people. Such events, as Gwarzo said, are difficult to control, because they provide a diverse range of temporary opportunities to different actors. Apart from opposition politicians and religious leaders, a mass demonstration that is feared to become violent provides an opportunity to loot for the many unemployed youths and *almajirai*\(^\text{175}\). This mechanism is due to a temporary opportunity for so-called ‘specialists in violence’: unemployed angry youth and criminals (Tilly 2003: 15–19). But where many attach the prime responsibility for the violence to these hooligans, I follow Wakili in arguing that they are peripheral to the larger process of conflict escalation (Wakili 1997: 233), because the demography and nature of the violence of the 2004 riot, although reaffirming the multiplicity of actors and incentives, indicates the centrality of the existing social conflict.

The demography of the violence on May 11 and 12 is telling, because it shows the links between existing causes of social conflict and the dynamics of escalation. In previous riots, much of the violence was concentrated on the streets around Sabon Gari and its market. ‘Native’ youths no longer enter Sabon Gari since the Igbo have taken to arming themselves in anticipation of riots since the 1980s, so the violence is confined to the borders between the conflicting communities. Other hotspots are usually areas where ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities interact. Before the 2004 riot, the neighbourhoods around BUK Road had never been plagued by riot violence. Sharada, Ja’en, Dorayi and the others are mostly industrial

\(^{175}\) *Almajirai* are often young, male Quranic school students who, outside of class hours, have to secure their livelihoods through begging, working as household helps, or taking menial jobs. In cities such as Kano, groups of young almajirai roaming the streets in search of food or money are ubiquitous.
areas, with residential parts that are predominantly inhabited by immigrants who work in the factories. During the riot looting occurred, but eyewitnesses held that this was incidental to the killing (Human Rights Watch 2005: 60). This dominance of killing is difficult to explain using the ‘vagabonds thesis’, even though these neighbourhoods have many unemployed youths. The grievances created by the economic horizontal inequalities between the Hausa Muslims and the southern immigrants in the area provide a better explanation. Although the former group forms the majority both in the city and the neighbourhood, most of the employment in the factories is taken up by southern ‘settlers’, because of their higher education. It is this grievance that caused many of the unemployed young men of Sharada and surrounding neighbourhoods to take the opportunity for revenge against their ‘settler’ neighbours.

Although the economic grievance was particularly strong in the areas around Sharada, violence in other neighbourhoods shows remarkable similarities. It occurred mainly in areas with a heterogeneous population or on the borders between homogeneous communities. The majority of culprits belonged to the category of young men, aged generally between 15 and 30, and many of them were unemployed. Weapons used included machetes, smaller knives, an occasional home-made gun, and fuel (Human Rights Watch 2005: 60). Both killing and looting occurred, supporting the view of multiple actors and motives, but the way in which victims were selected betrays the impact of the ‘native’-‘settler’ conflict on the violence. Victims were chosen on the basis of their clothing, language or accent, or were asked to recite phrases from the Quran to prove they were Muslim (Human Rights Watch 2005: 62-73). Based on these patterns, it is feasible to argue that although looting and ‘opportunistic violence’ has been a motivation for some of the violent youth, the demography, nature of the violence, and victim selection methods point towards a trend of ‘coordinated destruction’ of ‘settlers’ and their property.
Because part of the problem in Yelwa had been the absence of security forces, the government reacted forcefully to the crisis in Kano by means of a ‘shoot-on-sight’ order to the police (Civil Society 2004: 4). Although many local newspapers credited the government for this “swift and decisive” action, HRW criticised the “brutal response of the police and the army” and its unprovoked, extrajudicial killings (Human Rights Watch 2005: 73–79). Other actions taken to control the violence included the Emir and governor appealing to their people on the radio for calm. By May 14, the violence had effectively ended and by May 20 the city-wide curfew was lifted. In total, HRW (2005: 62–63) estimates that at least 250 people were killed and many more wounded and displaced.

5.4.2 Peaceful Protest, Boycotts, and Prayer: February 2006

Although riotous violence had been a characteristic of Kano society throughout the 20th century, the 2004 crisis seems to have made a significant impact on public awareness of the risks of these violent outbreaks. Three possible reasons for this impact were the widespread media attention for the crisis, not only within Nigeria but also in other parts of the world; the strong negative effect on the Kano economy, as investors withdrew their capital from Kano industry in fear of further destruction; and the reaction of the federal government, which not only denounced the violence but decreed that new eruptions of violence would be addressed with the state of emergency. The Kano Peace and Development Initiative (KAPEDI) Peace Forum held in September 2004 was one of the most rigorous and widely attended of a wide array of peace meetings and conferences that followed the Plateau crisis and will therefore be considered as representative. The KAPEDI analyses that produced the most practical recommendations were those pertaining to the economic and educational problems propelling youths into violence and the ethnic and religious tensions that were perceived to lie at the heart of the conflict (KAPEDI 2006: 70–76).
Three main strategies were applied to resolve these problems: the creation of early-warning mechanisms, conflict resolution NGOs, and peace committees; capacity building and employment generation schemes for youths; and increased co-operation between non-indigenous ethnic leaders, traditional rulers, and the state government. The impact of the early-warning mechanisms and peace committees is difficult to assess, but it is likely that they have contributed to an awareness of the risks of violence. Capacity building and employment generation for youths, both through NGOs like Youth and Environmental Development Association (YEDA) and Gidauniyar Alheri and through government schemes, have only been partially successful. The schemes seem to have an effect, but the number of youths involved is small compared to the size of the problem. Economic crisis, the cause of unemployment and poverty, can only be tackled through state and national economic reform that, among others, addresses the problem of corruption.

Increased co-operation between the state government, traditional authorities, and the Sabon Gari ethnic associations, certainly enhanced communications between ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities in Kano. Partly because of his compassionate reaction to and (financial) support for the suffering of non-indigenes during the 2004 riot, the Emir has become widely respected both in the Old City and Sabon Gari, whilst the recent appointment of an Igbo man as Special Advisor to Governor Shekarau has also improved intergroup perceptions and co-operation. Structural co-operation between Christian and Muslim leaders, however, has hardly increased after the 2004 riots. Explaining this trend would require further research, but two contributing factors have been the strength of intra-religious, vertical institutional linkages and the politicised nature of religious authorities at the national and state levels.

After the 2004 riots and prior to the second case of collective interaction in February 2006, several institutional responses to the risk of conflict and violence had thus developed, except between Muslim and Christian leaders. There is little indication, however, that the social structures of identification and group formation had changed considerably in the period.
between 2004 and 2006. Like the riots in 2004, the escalation process in February 2006 was triggered by external events: the reprints of the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammed in January 2006 in European newspapers. Published in September 2005 in Denmark, it was only after the reprints in other European countries that popular protest erupted in Pakistan, Syria, and other ‘Muslim’ countries (BBC 2006). In Nigeria, 15 people were killed and churches burnt in Maiduguri, the capital of north-eastern Borno state, but Kano, despite public and political fears, remained peaceful (Musa 2006). In Kano, both CAN and Islamic authorities of all denominations denounced the Danish cartoons as an insult by the secular Danish state, rather than interpreting it as an inter-religious matter (BBC 2006; Musa 2006). Following this interpretation, Kano members of parliament collectively burnt Danish and Norwegian flags in a protest against what they perceived as the transgressions of these countries (BBC 2006).

On the basis of this interpretation, Islamic leaders and the state government promoted a response that was targeted at the Danish economy, rather than at local Christians. Through sermons, radio appearances on Freedom Radio, newspaper articles, text messages and emails, Islamic and traditional leaders and organisations rallied Kano residents to boycott Danish products (Kazaure 2006). The Kano state government, as well as some private enterprises, cancelled contracts with their Danish partners and banned the sale of Danish dairy products (Gwantu 2006). Unlike in 2004, existing grievances and tensions resulting from the social conflict between ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’ were therefore not invoked as justifications for violent action, nor were the ‘native’-‘settler’ identity boundaries activated; if anything, Muslims and Christians jointly protested against this insult of religion as a whole.

Because the cartoons were not interpreted in terms of the ‘native’ and ‘settler’ identities, the people of Kano were jointly mobilised against Denmark through formal and informal networks. Because the insult had been directed at Islam, it is true that Islamic networks mobilised their members most strongly. But because ‘settler’ authorities like CAN also
denounced the cartoons, this mobilisation was inclusive of Christians and ‘settlers’ at large. Brokerage therefore occurred across the ‘native’-‘settler’ divide rather than within both categories, de-emphasising intergroup difference. Partly because of this, the demonstration that was organised against the insulting cartoons failed to create an opportunity for violence.

A second reason for this lack of opportunity is the fact that the demonstration was organised by the IMN, a ‘Shia’ group in Sunni-dominated Kano. The IMN is more strictly organised than other Islamic organisations and therefore not open to ‘hijacking’: “they put on their black dress, particularly the women put on their hijab. The men have a way of showing their different identity, so if you are not a member you don’t join the group. So nobody can hijack the demonstration.”\textsuperscript{176}

The third, and perhaps more crucial, factor that explains this lack of opportunity for violence was the preventive action taken by the federal security forces. Apart from public appeals promoting the boycott and denouncing violence, the police and army were mobilised in advance of the demonstration in order to prevent violent ‘hijacking’ to occur. This proactive approach could be taken because the competition between Governor Shekarau and President Obasanjo, which had prompted the governor to allow the 2004 demonstration without adequate police or army control, had been ended in the threat of the president to declare the state of emergency, and thus effectively end the rule of the incumbent governor, in any state where renewed violence would erupt.

5.4.3 Nativist Ethnicity, Framing, and Violence

A comparison of the two case studies presented above allows us to formulate several conclusions about the use of nativist ethnicity as discursive frame in Kano’s collective interactions. The 2004 riots in response to the violence in Plateau State showed that nativist forms of ethnicity can be used discursively to frame and organise episodes of collective

\textsuperscript{176} Dr Yusuf 2006, op. cit.
interactions. The violence between Plateau Christians and Muslims was brought into Kano and translated into the local opposition between Muslim ‘natives’ and Christian ‘settlers’. This thesis argues that this was partly as a consequence of this framing that Kano’s Christians became legitimised as targets for violent reprisals. Although the causality is difficult to establish in these matters, the comparison between 2004 and 2006 provides evidence to support it.

The 2004 riots and the 2006 protests and boycott were both escalatory reactions to external shocks that triggered resistance and protests along religious lines. The main difference between them, therefore, was not in the nature of the shock but its interpretation in the public arena. In 2004, the killings in Yelwa were translated into the local opposition between ‘native’ Muslims and ‘settler’ Christians, while the 2006 cartoons were framed in terms of Kano’s Muslims against an ‘ungodly’ Denmark. In 2004, the discourse of ‘Christians-versus-Muslims’ led to antagonistic patterns of justification and mobilisation between ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’, a process that allowed related grievances (such as the horizontal inequalities in Panshekara) to be triggered and to escalate into violence. In 2006, however, the identification of Denmark (or even the West) as a common enemy allowed for justifications and mobilisation across ethnic and religious boundaries. This thesis therefore argues that the selection of the nativist discursive frame for collective interactions had a substantial impact on the nature of the interaction, increasing the likelihood of conflict and violence.

This argument raises the question, however, of how to explain the selection of a particular frame and its success in terms of capturing the collective imagination. As for the success of a discursive frame, the above case studies suggest several contributing factors. First, both the Christian-Muslim and the Islam-‘ungodly’ West frameworks were salient in the identity repertoires of Kano residents. Second, they were selected and promoted by leaders with considerable informal authority (i.e. religious leaders, traditional rulers, and, using religious
language, Governor Shekarau), who could give the frame legitimacy and quickly get the message across to a large audience. The third and final contributing factor for successful framing was the connection between the trigger for collective action and the discourse used to frame it. Although there is room for manoeuvre in discursive interpretation, authorities should be able to explain the connection between the trigger and frame they propose.

These three factors - being part of the discursive repertoire, being supported by actors with informal authority, and having some connection to the trigger of the interaction - can help to explain the success of certain discursive frames at the expense of others. However, they do not explain why such divergent discourses were used to frame the riots of 2004 and the protests of 2006. From the discussion of the two cases above, several factors can be outlined in response to this problem. First, it is crucial to highlight the initial way in which the Plateau violence was physically brought into Kano: by the decision of Governor Shekarau to offer shelter to at least 500 Muslim victims of the violence. This decision can best be interpreted in the wider political context of the Shekarau government, which had only taken up office in the year preceding the riots. Their election campaign had been built on support for sharia and for Islam; the decision to shelter fellow-Muslims from a different part of Nigeria can thus be interpreted as an attempt by Shekarau to establish his national reputation as a truly Islamic political leader.

Shekarau’s political calculations can thus help to explain why the Plateau violence was brought to Kano and why it was initially interpreted in religious terms: the victims were, after all, brought to Kano only on the basis of their religious affiliation. They were Muslims and therefore Kano needed to help them. This religious interpretation was supported by initial reactions by CAN and Islamic leaders in Kano, who immediately interpreted the Plateau violence in terms of Nigeria’s Christian/Muslim competition. Islamic leaders in Kano are therefore likely to have felt compelled to interpret the Plateau violence in these same conflictual terms: they could hardly seem less concerned with the welfare of fellow Muslims.
than the new State governor. The resulting fiery preaching that was described above, in combination with the organisation of the protest march, allowed ample justification and opportunity for violence to erupt.

The contrasting selection of the ‘Islam-versus-the West’ discourse in 2006 should equally be interpreted in its wider political context. The negative political and economic fallout of the 2004 riots had been considerable, leading to capital flight and a warning reprimand by President Obasanjo: if this were to happen again, he would declare the state of emergency - and thus effectively remove Shekarau from office. The increase in numbers of conflict resolution NGOs, the inclusion of the three non-indigenous Special Advisors in the cabinet, and the more informal efforts at peace building by the Emirate authorities can therefore all be understood as a reaction to this negative fallout. In a similar vein, it seems plausible that the explicitly inclusive religious frame of the cartoon protests and boycotts and the more effective preventive intervention of the security forces can be interpreted as an attempt by both the State government and other political authorities to prevent new incidences of violence.

In sum, the above case studies have shed light on the causes and effects of the selection of the nativist ethnic cleavage in situations of collective interactions in Kano. More specifically, the section has shown that identity selection, or discursive framing, depends on the political context in which authoritative actors function; moreover, it has highlighted several factors that contribute to the success of top-down framing efforts. In terms of consequences, it has suggested that the selection of nativist ethnic cleavages to frame interactions increases the likelihood of conflict, potentially to the point of legitimising intercommunal violence.

5.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter has addressed the question to what extent interethnic relations in Kano reflect the antagonism, avoidance, and conflict that may be expected on the basis of the salience of the nativist notion of ethnic identities. In terms of antagonism, section 5.2 has
demonstrated that considerable minorities of Kano’s ethnic groups hold negative evaluations of other groups. Several trends indicated the impact of nativism on these perceptions: ‘natives’ were more negative about ‘settlers’ than vice versa; and the ‘ambiguous’ Yoruba were consistently ranked most negatively. These patterns became more complex in the analysis of negative ethnic stereotypes around laziness, violent nature, and dishonesty. In this regard, the Yoruba were only viewed most negatively by the ‘native’ Hausa-Fulani, while the ‘natives’ themselves were also on the receiving end of some of the negative prejudice. The discrepancies between the findings indicate the difference between ‘blanket’ negative views and ethnic stereotypes and the richness of Nigerian ethnic stereotypes without direct connections to Kano’s nativist ethnic hierarchy.

In terms of individual interactions, section 5.3 has demonstrated that there is a significant level of interethnic avoidance in Kano. Moreover, it showed that this avoidance (or positive in-group bias) increases with the intimacy of interactions and that, if we control for the relative sizes of the different ethnic groups, it is more common among the ‘settler’ communities than among the majority Hausa-Fulani. These trends were explained in reference to residential and social segregation, negative intergroup perceptions, language differences, cultural differences, and the restrictive social pressures of the ethnic and religious community. The strong overlap of ethnic and religious boundaries was also deemed of significance in this regard: both in the antagonistic perceptions and biased interactions, Kano’s respondents were consistently more negatively disposed towards contact with other religious groups than with other ethnic ones. Together, sections 5.2 and 5.3 thus provide evidence for the presence of some level of interethnic antagonism and avoidance, which appears to be shaped by the nativist ethnic hierarchy both through categorisation and group positioning. To some extent, therefore, this chapter has supported hypothesised negative impact of nativism on interethnic relations, an impact that is reinforced by and possibly even dependent on horizontal inequalities, politics, and wider social discourse. At the same time,
however, they also highlight that this impact is far from ubiquitous and that, therefore, there are other factors shaping interethnic perceptions and interactions.

Finally, section 5.4 analysed two cases of collective interactions: the riots following the Yelwa violence in 2004 and the non-violent protests and boycotts that resulted from the publication of the cartoons of the prophet Muhammad in 2006. This analysis highlighted several aspects of the role of nativist ethnicity in collective interactions, specifically relating to the causes and consequences of its selection as a discursive frame for collective encounters. It showed that the main differences between the processes that led to violence in 2004 and those that led to peaceful protests in 2006 were related to (i) the framing of the collective encounter and (ii) the way in which political authorities and police forces networked in anticipation of the encounter. In terms of framing, it was found that selecting exclusionary identities to frame collective interactions increases the risk of conflict between the interacting parties, due to the related local grievances and experiences that may be triggered in the process.

The final section 5.4 described the process through which this occurs in some detail, focusing on the mechanisms through which authoritative actors may successfully select and propagate particular identity discourses. It was argued that both in 2004 and 2006 there was an important interaction between the state authorities - led by Governor Shekarau - and the city’s religious and traditional authorities. In brief, while the state authorities determined the political context within which the informal leaders operated, the actual dissemination of the discursive frames was largely in the hands of Kano’s religious leaders. Their embeddedness in their religious community, and the salience of religion in Kano to start with, allowed them a measure of legitimacy and influence on the moral and discursive frameworks of their followers, obviously with widely divergent results in the two cases.
Part II: Amsterdam
6.1 Introduction

Amsterdam has a long history of commercial cosmopolitanism, going back at least to the 17th-century Golden Age. Following the Republic’s bloody separation from the Spanish, this was a time of economic prosperity, political stability, and growth: from 1580 to 1680, Amsterdam grew from 30,000 to 200,000 inhabitants (van den Berg et al. 1998; Israel 1998). By the end of the 17th century, Amsterdam had become the third largest city in Europe; moreover, most of its inhabitants had their roots outside the city and often outside Holland (Kuijpers and Prak 2004: 192). Surprisingly, however, historians have been unable to find evidence for instances of conflict or riots between ‘native’ Amsterdammers and ‘settlers’ in this period (Dekker 1982; Lucassen and Penninx 1994-12). Moreover, there is a strong indication that most immigrants - and especially their descendants - were quickly and effectively accepted into Amsterdam society: most of the immigrants who married after they had arrived in Amsterdam did so with women from Amsterdam (Kuijpers and Prak 2004).

This exceptional social peace can be explained in reference to two factors: the political practices of toleration and the territorial definition of belonging based on poorterschap.177 (urban citizenship). On the one hand, toleration was a pragmatic political compromise

---

177 Poorterschap was transferred over generations, granting citizenship to those who were born to parents who were citizens, but could also be acquired either by paying the required admission fee or marrying a poorter’s daughter or widow. In some cities, poorters were required to be registered members of the Dutch Reformed Church, but in Amsterdam even Catholics and Jews could join the citizen ranks - with the proviso that Jews were never allowed to become members of one of the guilds. For more details on the nature of Amsterdam’s poorterschap, see e.g. Lucassen and Penninx (1994), Prak (1997b, 1997a), Hsia and Van Nierop (2002) and Kuijpers and Prak (2004).
between the city regents, the dominant Reformed Church, and the subordinate Catholic and Jewish minorities. This compromise made public expressions of faith the prerogative of the Calvinists, while also allowing Jews - and even Catholics - to practise their faiths privately. The “miracle of the Dutch Republic” that allowed for the emergence of this compromise, as Mout (1997: 46) argues, was both the lack of a fixed and detailed religious settlement and the limited power of the state church to impose its will over the interests of the governing and merchant classes. Its result was social peace between the religious communities. On the other hand, Amsterdam’s open, territorial notion of citizenship offered almost all immigrants an opportunity to acquire citizenship rights - including the rights to own property in the city, to become a guild member, and to take up public office (Prak 1989).

The end of the Dutch Republic marked the end of Amsterdam’s uncontested dominance in the Netherlands and Europe, but not the end of the practices of toleration and urban citizenship. This chapter will show how, over the past 150 years of Amsterdam’s history, these two concepts have interacted with new historical circumstances and other identity discourses to form the city’s salient notions of belonging. Section 6.1 will discuss Amsterdam’s “second Golden Age” (Bakker 2000) in the period from the 1870 leading up to the Second World War (WWII); section 6.2 will focus on the post-war period from 1945 until the contemporary era. Within these periods, the chapter will outline the development of the four main identities connected to belonging - religion, status and class, ethnicity, and urban citizenship - and show how this resulted in the contemporary salience of a nativist form of ethnicity (autochtonie) and the territorial identity of Amsterdammers.

On the emergence of toleration, see e.g. Elias (1903), Berkvens, Israel et al. (1997), and Israel (1998). On its intellectual roots, see Israel (1997).
In the 17th century, Amsterdam’s dominance over the rest of the Republic was beyond doubt. The national unification of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, however, subjected Amsterdam to national institutions that were seated in The Hague. Even though the city government remained in the hands of the old regent families, they had now lost their political autonomy and ancient regent privileges to the national government in The Hague. At the same time, the Patriot Revolution and Batavian Republic had resulted in a tremendous decrease of the city’s sea trade and therefore depressed its economy (Aerts 2006b: 304–6; Knotter 1991: 237). Most historians therefore label the first half of the 19th century as one of (relative) decline and stagnation for Amsterdam (Brugmans and Brugmans 1972; van Tijn 1965).

By the end of the 19th century, however, this trend had been all but reversed and the city had reinvented itself both as an economic hub and as the capital of the Netherlands. In fact, the restoration of Amsterdam was so striking that it has prompted the use of the label “second Golden Age” for the period around the turn of the century (Bakker 2000). This section will outline how the city’s social identities and notions of belonging developed in this context of political, cultural, and economic reconstruction. Section 6.1.1 will focus on the convergence of political and economic reconstruction and ideological pillarisation (verzuiling), while section 6.1.2 will outline the ways in which identifications around ethnic and urban belonging developed in this period.

6.2.1 Reconstruction and Ideological Segmentation

One of the results of Amsterdam’s economic and political recovery in the late 19th century was the gradual increase of city’s population; slowly at first, but more rapidly from the 1870s (Aerts 2006a: 242). Part of this increase was accounted for by the improvement of public health, increases in life expectancy, and the reduction of the city’s mortality rate (Aerts 2006a:
243). A second source of population growth between 1870 and 1900 was immigration. As Suurenbroek (2001) argues, this immigration was largely domestic: North and South Hollanders, Frisians, Brabanders, Utrechters and other Dutch people migrating to the new capital in search of employment. Domestic immigration accounted for 90% of the 650,000 people who migrated into the city from 1870-1900 (Suurenbroek and Schrover 2005: 998)\textsuperscript{179} and many of these migrants were young and single, looking for employment in the rapidly expanding construction sector in Amsterdam or simply fleeing the continuous agrarian crisis of the neighbouring rural areas (Wagenaar 1990: 120).

In this context of development and social change, significant transformations occurred in the city’s identities of religion and political ideology. Amsterdam’s religious fabric was altered by the increasing emancipation of the city’s Catholic population, as well as by Kuyper’s schismatic doeleantie movement that divided the Dutch Protestant community into the orthodox Gereformeerde Church and the more moderate Dutch Reformed Church. With the expansion of the state and the rise of modern politics, moreover, both denominations became increasingly politicised, resulting in the creation of the Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP, Gereformeerdd) in 1879 and the Roman Catholic State Party (RKSP) in 1926. At the same time, the industrialisation of market relations and the subsequent transformation of the standen (status) society into a class society resulted in a rising class awareness and, consequently, in the steady rise of socialist ideology (Regt 1986). Together, these emancipatory movements marked the beginning of the Dutch era of pillarisation.

Lijphart’s (1975) pillarised society (1917 - 1964) is best described as a vertically segmented society along cross-cutting religious and ideological lines, in which politics is conducted as an elite game of intergroup negotiation and accommodation. Generally, the four pillars are

\textsuperscript{179} As for the international segment of Amsterdam’s immigrants, Lucassen and Penninx (1994: 34, 56) specify those who came into the Netherlands in the first three decades of the 20th century: Jewish refugees from Belgium in the First World War, maidservants from Germany, mineworkers from Italy and Portugal, ice cream vendors from Italy, and Chinese seamen. Of these groups, only the Jews (most of whom returned to Belgium after the war), the maidservants and the Chinese were significantly represented in Amsterdam.
identified as Protestant, Catholic, socialist, and liberal or ‘neutral’; the last, however, was more like a residual category than an actively maintained social unit.\(^{180}\) In many ways, the system of pillarisation built on the religious toleration of the Dutch Republic - in the sense that it was premised on the maintenance of strict group boundaries and mutual toleration, rather than assimilation. At the national level, however, it now operated under the ‘roof’ of the Dutch nation-state, and as such opened up new political spaces for participation of religious and ideological minorities, specifically the Catholics, Calvinists, and socialists. Due to the lack of a majority group and the minorities’ cross-cutting alignment on the salient policy issues of the day (notably the *schoolstrijd*\(^ {181}\), extension of suffrage, and the rising class dialectic) Dutch politics became a game of elite negotiation and consensus - a political culture that was firmly established with the Pacification in 1917\(^ {182}\).

While the pillarised Netherlands were, at the national level, dominated by confessional political parties, early 20\(^{th}\) century Amsterdam has been characterised as a ‘Red experiment’: an era dominated by progressive, social-democratic politics (de Liagre Böhl 2000). The ‘Red’ policy measures, however, did not benefit the entire workers’ population, which had become increasingly stratified within itself. Most poignantly, a category of uneducated, often unemployed, poor had emerged at the bottom of the class pyramid. These urban poor were increasingly problematised both by the middle classes and the upwardly mobile, educated working class. Due to the housing sanitation policies, many of those on the bottom rung became more visible to the private building corporations, the municipality, and other elites involved in the policy implementation. Their often squalid living conditions disgusted both

---

180 In fact, Daalder (1966) only recognises three pillars: Calvinists, Catholics, and Socialists/Liberals.

181 The *schoolstrijd* was a struggle around the institution of public education. In the increasingly modernising Netherlands, all parties agreed on the importance of education for the development of the country - they disagreed, however, on the content of the educational programmes. Liberals were convinced of the need for the state to fund religiously neutral public education (*openbaar onderwijs*). Confessional groups, however, feared the secularising effects of such neutral education and therefore demanded the right to organise education based on their convictions, with funding equal to that of the neutral *openbare* schools.

182 This year marks the simultaneous resolution of the suffrage question and the *schoolstrijd* and is as such widely regarded as the starting point of the Dutch *verzuiling*. 
the educated working classes and the higher rungs of society, inspiring them to devise ways in which to “stimulate them towards a higher living standard” (Regt 1986: 204).

In response to these problems, the municipality categorised the various workers’ classes and identified those who required ‘civilising’. This categorisation included a class of “unacceptable families” who were deemed unfit for independent habitation on the basis of “unacceptable living behaviour” (Regt 1986: 205). To educate these families into acceptable, civilised habitation, the Amsterdam government – with support from all political parties except the communists – built Asterdorp in 1928, a tightly controlled, walled neighbourhood on the north side of the IJ River. Until 1941\(^1\), ‘unacceptable’ families were housed here, under tight supervision from middle- and upper-class opzichteressen (female overseers) who trained them in household skills and helped them resolve marital and financial difficulties and other family problems (Regt 1986: 185). Those families who learned how to behave acceptably were given the opportunity to move into normal public housing, the main ‘carrot’ wielded by the opzichteressen to achieve their civilising objective.

In sum, therefore, Amsterdam’s political and economic recovery of the late 19\(^{th}\) century was joined by, and indeed partly dependent on, the development of the social movements, ideologies, and institutions of Dutch pillarisation. This development entailed not only the segmentation of faiths and social classes, but also of new patterns of inclusion and exclusion: allowing for the emancipation of Calvinists, Catholics, and working class socialists while excluding the ‘unsocietal’ urban poor. In the short run, therefore, pillarisation meant that by the late 1930s, Amsterdam had not only become the proud capital of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, but also subject to the deep ideological and religious divisions that characterised Dutch society at that time. The subsequent section considers the ways in which these converging developments impacted on identities of ethnic and urban belonging in Amsterdam.

\(^1\) In 1941–43, Asterdorp was used to house Amsterdam Jews who were to be deported to Germany.
6.2.2 The New Ethnic Nation and its Capital

Although the unification of the Netherlands as a state was first codified under French rule in 1795, it was only in the last third of the 19th century that this unity became reflected in the country’s wider societal structures. According to Knippenberg and de Pater (1990) Dutch societal integration should be analysed in four dimensions: infrastructure, economics, politics and governance, and culture. Infrastructural integration - in terms of communication and transport networks - can be seen as the material condition for integration in the other dimensions (ibid.: 13). National economic integration in the 19th century bore a close resemblance to contemporary patterns of globalisation, in the sense that both comprise the expansion of markets and rising economies of scale (ibid.). A good example of this trend is the Dutch beer brewing industry, which consisted of over 500 individual breweries and was well represented in Amsterdam throughout the 19th century. From the last decades of the century, however, these small breweries had been eclipsed by larger, industrial producers, reducing the overall number of brewers to 20 (ibid.: 13-4).

Political integration occurred through the nationalisation of politics, the growth of the financial capacity of the state, and the introduction of obligatory primary education, military conscription, and national taxation (ibid.:14). As a result, Dutch inhabitants were increasingly bound to the national state. These structural developments were accompanied by the rise of national symbolism – the royal family of Orange, the Dutch flag, and the national anthem – and increasingly egalitarian notions of citizenship (ibid.). Closely related to these forms of political integration, cultural unification occurred through the increasing prominence of ‘standard Dutch’ over local dialects and languages (ibid.). This homogenisation of culture was strongly biased towards the cultural patterns of urban Holland, upon whose dialect *Algemeen Beschaafd Nederlands* (standard Dutch, ABN) was based (ibid.: 172). Local languages such as Frisian, Limburgs, and Zeeuws were thus marginalised and, at best, demoted to minority
status. Similarly, local rural cultures and traditions were subsumed under the larger Dutch nation and thus lost much of their former prominence (ibid.: 180).

These multiple and interactive trends towards the national integration of the Netherlands changed the ways in which residents of Amsterdam constructed their social world and their place within it. Although little work has been done on the historical development of the subjective dimension of identification and behaviour (de Haan 2002: 231), there is enough material to trace out the main two threads of this narrative. First, the nationalisation of politics and citizenship occurred at the expense of local, urban notions of belonging that had dominated in the Republic. Ideas of Amsterdam therefore became less formally defined and as a consequence more fluid and socially determined. Suurenbroek (2005: 1000), for example, shows how Frisians in Amsterdam “had mixed feelings about where they belonged”, as they felt distinct but were not recognisable as such except by their accents and therefore, importantly, they were not discriminated against (ibid.: 999). Some Frisians identified completely, and were completely accepted, as Amsterdammers, while others saw themselves rather as Frisian residents of Amsterdam. De Rooy (2006) highlights yet a different use of Amsterdammer, when he describes young city boys making fun of boys from rural areas just outside the city as boeren (farmers): in their world view, there was a strict social boundary between themselves as urban Amsterdammers and the boeren from outside.

Second, however, the egalitarian principles of the 1848 constitution and the subsequent broadening of conceptions of citizenship developed in tandem with increasingly ethnic definitions of the Dutch nation. This modern form of ethnicity emphasised the unity of traditions within Dutch national borders; this inclusion, however, necessarily came at expense of those deemed to have a different nationality. It received legal formality in the 1892 law on Dutch citizenship, which abandoned the previous territorial definition of nationality (ius soli) for one solely based on descent (ius sanguinis). The government’s reasoning was telling: “[T]he principle of descent was based on a ‘natural’ system of nationalities. National
affiliation was seen as the equivalent of the affiliation between family members, transferred from parents to their children. Strangers, who would not have learned this affiliation from their parents, could only acquire it after three generations” (de Haan 2002: 254).

To understand the impact of these shifts in definitions of citizenship on identities and notions of belonging in Amsterdam, it is useful to analyse the position and development of three communities that were ‘distinguishable’ from the born-and-bred Amsterdammer population in different ways: the Frisians, the Chinese, and the Jews. The Frisians were part of the large domestic wave of immigration into Amsterdam in the late 19th century. According to Suurenbroek and Schrover (2005: 998) they were the third largest group of migrants, with a size of between 20,000 and 40,000 people. The Frisian community was by no means entirely part of the working class; however, on average it seems likely that the Frisians had a lower income and class status than the ‘native’ Amsterdammers. Moreover, Frisians saw themselves as clearly ‘different’ from the Hollanders in Amsterdam, due to the significance of the Frisian language (Suurenbroek and Schrover 2005).

However, there is no evidence of tensions between the Frisian and other communities in Amsterdam. As an explanation, I would also suggest that although language differentiated Frisians from other Dutch communities, this did not render them a ‘nation’ in the 19th century sense. And while language was an obvious source of difference between people, it had little salience in a social and political sense in late 19th century Amsterdam because it bore no relation to political rights and patterns of exclusion. Being Frisian was compatible with full recognition as a Dutch citizen; similarly, being Frisian did not exclude identification as an Amsterdammer; inequalities therefore did not become interpreted as unjust horizontal inequalities. If we take the Frisians to represent other Dutch migrants in Amsterdam at the time, it is suggested here that the particular arrangement of ethnicity, citizenship, and urban belonging at the end of the 19th century allowed Dutch immigrants, regardless of their cultural or other differences, to belong both as citizens and Amsterdammers.
The fate of the Chinese community in Amsterdam before WWII stands in stark contrast to the Frisians. From 1918 to 1922, the revitalised trade with Asia generated small communities of about 1200 Chinese seamen in both Rotterdam and Amsterdam (Zeven 1987: 40-42). Their reception, however, was hostile: both the local Amsterdam seafarers union and the municipality resisted their settlement actively (ibid.). This was partly due to anti-Chinese sentiments built up in Dutch Indonesia, where Chinese traders were seen as the Shylocks of the East and the *gele gevaar* (“yellow threat”), and partly to the tangible effects of the Chinese competition to employment opportunities of Dutch sailors. But it was also part of a wider development of modern nationalism in the Netherlands, which made the 1920s feel like a “net that is tightened around non-European immigrants” (ibid.: 43). This tightening was clearly demonstrated by the raid on the Amsterdam Chinese neighbourhood in response to a fight within the Chinese community in the summer of 1922: the local police force did not stop at arresting 20 Chinese in relation to the incident, but also took it as an opportunity to organise the deportation of over 600 Chinese who had not been involved in the incident at all - about half of the entire Amsterdam Chinese community at the time (ibid.: 44-5).

Moreover, from 1935 onwards all Chinese residents of the Netherlands were registered by the national Dutch bureaucracy, which from 1936 until 1949 used this registration as a basis for forced repatriations. The government’s attitude can therefore not be understood simply as a protective measure against Chinese economic competition, as this had all but disappeared during the economic crisis of the 1930s. Rather, the government’s behaviour towards the Chinese - as well as public acceptance and even support for it - should be understood more in ideological terms: the Chinese were simply not seen as legitimate immigrants, because they were non-European and were deemed to have a detrimental effect on society (e.g. through espionage, opium smuggling, and “racial mixing”) (ibid.: 60).

As a final example, let us briefly look at the Jewish community in Amsterdam, which took up an intermediate position between the accepted Frisians and the excluded Chinese. The
Jewish experiences in this period are complex and, ultimately, tragic. Ever since the tolerance towards Jews in Republican Amsterdam, this city had been the focal point of the Dutch Jewish community; by the end of the 19th century, over 55% of all Dutch Jews resided in Amsterdam, where they constituted between 10% and 12% of the overall Amsterdam population (Aerts 2006a: 284). The vast majority of this Jewish population lived in the eastern part of the central city, around the synagogue they had erected in 1631. Because of the size of the community in Amsterdam, it was also one of the Jewish communities with a significant proletariat. On the other side of the class scale, there was also a small but influential Jewish elite in the city. On the whole however, it seems likely that on average, Jews were both poorer and more politically excluded than the rest of the population, regardless of the Dutch government efforts to improve the societal position of Jews and the economic boom in the 1870s resulting from South African diamond mining.

The position of Jews in the salient framework of ethnicity and citizenship was a complicated one. During the Republic, Jews had been uniquely positioned as the ‘minority nation’ within the city of Amsterdam. The new constitution of the 19th-century Netherlands, however, redefined their status: they were now a religious minority, like the Catholics and the sectarian Protestants. As such, they were deemed to be ‘ethnically’ Dutch and, since freedom of religion had been formally implemented, their Jewish identity was no longer deemed a socially or politically relevant factor (Blom and Cahen 1995: 278). This new equal status, however, was by no means immediately accepted in Amsterdam’s society; nor, it should be added, did all Jews agree to this radical redefinition of their identity. For while the Jewish religion was now accepted as equal to all other Dutch, they were expected to assimilate to ‘mainstream’ Dutch culture and traditions in all other aspects of life (ibid.: 248). Although in large part successful, this assimilation did entail the loss of Jewish traditions and knowledge and led to severe divisions within the Jewish community between modernists and
conservatives, between Zionists and Dutch nationalists, and between socialists and orthodox-religious Jews (Fuks–Mansfeld 1995).

Taken together, the Jewish, Frisian, and Chinese histories in the late 19th and early 20th centuries thus form a narrative of the rise of an increasingly nativist form of ethnicity, based on the principles of an exclusionary ethnic nationalism. Besides the Chinese, however, this ethnic definition had little impact on identities and belonging, due to the lack of foreign immigration. But it does highlight that the decades from 1851 to 1940 were characterised by a converging national unification, ideological segmentation, and the exclusion of those considered ‘unsocietal’. Although seemingly paradoxical, these trends should be understood in interaction. They have, in fact, reinforced each other: national unity was both a product of and a pre-condition for the stability of the Dutch pillarised society (van Sas 2004). We will now focus on the ways in which these trends developed after the most critical event in 20th-century Dutch history: the Second World War (WWII).

6.3 Diversity after the Holocaust: Amsterdam 1945 - 2009

It is difficult to assess the entirety of the impact of WWII on Amsterdam’s notions of identity and belonging. On the one hand, the German occupation was the major turning point in the country’s 20th-century history. It provoked resistance and a rallying effect around the Dutch nation and its royal family, the House of Orange; it traumatised the Dutch through the deportation of Jewish and other Dutch citizens to the German work and concentration camps; it broke Dutch control over its Indonesian colonies; and it impoverished the Dutch

---

184 During WWII, around 75% of all Jewish residents of Amsterdam were deported to Nazi concentration camps and murdered (Tammes 2009: 62). Confronted with this relatively high proportion of deported Jews from the Netherlands compared to other West European countries, a common explanation is found in the extensive and efficient registration of Jews that the Netherlands - and especially Amsterdam - maintained (Tammes 2009) and in the establishment of the collaborative Jewish Council (Romijn 1995: 348-9). Although most people accepted and complied with these measures of ethnic registration, some resisted it - with the burning of the Amsterdam office of the bevolkingsregister in 1943 as the most striking example of this resistance (Meershoek 2007: 294-6)
to the point of famine in the winter of 1944/45. On the other hand, however, there were also
many continuities between the periods before, during, and after the war. The social divisions
of pillarisation remained salient, social life for a large part continued as it had before the
occupation, public and political resolve to retain the Dutch colonies had, at least temporarily,
hardened during the occupation, and the Dutch wartime government even made some
progress in the development of the institutions of its welfare state.

WWII further strengthened the Dutch nation and solidified the role of the central state in
both its political and economic arenas. The German occupation and its persecution
stimulated a resistance movement that cut across all salient religious and political boundaries;
similarly, Queen Wilhelmina, exiled in Britain for most of the war, became a symbolic
rallying point for the post-war imagined community of the Netherlands (Lagrou 2000). The
economic destruction wreaked by the German occupation, especially after the Netherlands
became an important theatre of the war in 1944, became a crucial motivation for the post-war
Dutch governments to intervene in the economy, a lesson that had also been brought home
by the protracted crisis of the 1930s. The post-war Dutch governments, initially led by the
social-democrat Willem Drees (prime minister 1948–58), therefore introduced
industrialisation policies, centralised controls on prices (e.g. of foodstuffs and rents) and on
the labour market, and doubled government spending relative to the pre-war levels.

It is in this context that we should analyse the shifting notions of identity and belonging in
post-war Amsterdam. Overall, this section will show that while the ethnic Dutch slowly
‘homogenised’ (section 6.3.1), post-war immigration pushed the overlapping cleavages of
ethnicity and religion to the fore (6.3.2). As these cleavages coincided with class differences
and patterns of inequality (6.3.3), they became subject to state policy (6.3.4), which mostly
served to reinforce the salience of these cleavages and infuse them with strongly nativist
connotations. At the same time, however, an alternative discourse of belonging developed at
the municipal level in Amsterdam: the territorial notion of *Amsterdamer* belonging (6.3.5).
6.3.1 Autochtonen: Reconstruction, Struggle, and Homogenisation

During the post-war reconstruction of the economy, Amsterdam was a hardworking, clean, and safe city (Bosscher 2007c: 337-8). There was a general consensus around the importance of economic reconstruction, shared among all classes and social groups. Economic reconstruction focused on the city’s sea port and Schiphol airport, while building and renovation took place in practically every neighbourhood. Amsterdam politics became even more outspokenly progressive than before the war with the rise of the Communist Party (CPN), the continuing prominence of the social-democratic Labour Party (PvdA), and a Labour mayor (D’Ailly, 1946-57). Amsterdam’s economy continued to grow and this was reflected in the city’s peaceable social life. Illustrative is the nation-wide popularity of local singers like Johnny Jordaan, whose songs represented the 1950s as a period in which people were ‘poor but happy’ (Jordaan and Wierenga 1972).

The post-war economic Golden Years initiated a rapid increase in the country’s wealth while at the same time the extensive instruments of the welfare state ensured its relatively even spread (van Zanden 1998). This transformed the Netherlands from latecomer to trend-setter in terms of its social security; moreover, due to the rapid growth of its economy and the discovery of natural gas reserves (1959), the Dutch were able to offer a relatively high level of income security (van der Veen 1999: 67). However, this security did require a significant increase in Dutch government spending, up to a level of over 40% of the net domestic product in the late 1970s (van Zanden 1998: 63). During the crisis of the 1980s, this level of expenditure became untenable and necessitated substantial cutbacks by the Christian-Democrat led coalition.
By then, however, social security had already impacted on Dutch patterns of income inequality. As demonstrated in figure 6.1 both the Theil- and Gini-coefficients show a decline in the levels of income inequality in Amsterdam from the mid-1960s, with the late 1970s and early 1980s as a low point. This pattern of gradually increasing equality was also supported by certain social policies, especially in the field of education, and by the selective out-migration of people with a lower socio-economic status. As Dronkers and Ultee (1995a: 316) show, by 1995 “the freedom of receiving equal education regardless of one's socio-economic origins or gender has generally been realised”, at least among the ethnic Dutch. This development contributed significantly to the increasing inter-generational social mobility and the reduction in class distinctions among the Dutch (Dronkers and Ultee 1995a: 317). On the whole, therefore, the first post-war decades saw Amsterdam become both wealthier and more equal: in a sense, the middle classes subsumed large swaths of the strata below and above them and the ‘unsocietal’ underclass of the 1920s and 1930s essentially disappeared\(^{185}\).

But that is not to say that this had transpired without social struggles. As de Rooy (2007b) argues, from the 1960s to the 1980s Amsterdam lost its peaceable consensus around the

\(^{185}\) This was not only due to post-war growth and the Dutch welfare state; the pre-war ‘problem’ of vagrants (who had made up a significant segment of those classified as ‘unsocietal’) had been ‘resolved’ by the Germans, who simply arrested and deported many of them (Jansen 2008: 220-1).
importance of reconstruction and was increasingly characterised by a “city war [...] between past and present, young and old, alternative and conventional, authoritarian and anarchist” (ibid.:15). The late 1940s and early 1950s witnessed an emigration surplus to towns and villages just outside Amsterdam and to new locations abroad. International emigration was stimulated by the national government in the early post-war years and most of the emigrants from Amsterdam left for Australia and New-Zealand, which both had a shortage of (urban) labour (Wintershoven and Kolfschooten 2000: 78). At the same time, however, an influx of young people began, not least of which were the increasing numbers of university students (Bosscher 2007d: 399). These young Dutch men and women brought new hopes and ideals into the city, which often clashed with the prevailing wisdom of those residents who had survived the war and were focused on the reconstruction effort.

Especially significant in this regard were the movements of theatrical urban anarchism of Provo and the kabouters (lit.: leprechauns), and the more aggressive urban squatters (Moerings 1983: 102-6), all of which were emblematic of the struggle of the young post-war generation against the pillarised establishment. From the mid-1980s, however, most of those belonging to this ‘baby-boom protest generation’ became incorporated into mainstream society, leaving a remaining radical minority to lose its legitimacy and slowly become marginalised (Bosscher 2007b: 483-91). The tumultuous process of depillarisation was thus nearing its completion.

In one sense, depillarisation and the related trend of secularisation describe the loss of elite control over their constituencies and the blurring of the salient identity boundaries between the Protestants, Catholics, socialists, and liberals. Following this interpretation, there has developed an ever expanding literature on the nature of post-pillarisation cleavages. However, if we understand pillarisation as a stage in the process of minority emancipation rather than an instrument of elite control, an alternative view presents itself: namely one that

---

186 In total about 20,000 people from 1947-1958 (Wintershoven and Kolfschooten 2000: 77).
regards depillarisation as a significant step in the formation of the post-war Dutch nation. Groot (2000: 199–200) argues this point in his chapter on the development of the Dutch nation during *verzuiling*, explaining how the idea of a Dutch nation was extended gradually from its exclusively liberal 19th-century beginnings to include first the orthodox Protestants, then the Catholics, and finally the socialists.

In combination with the experiences of WWII, the increasing intervening powers of the Dutch state, the growth of the Dutch middle classes, and the resulting attenuation of class struggle, depillarisation can thus be understood as a phase in the homogenisation and consolidation of the contemporary Dutch nation. Depillarisation transformed those who had belonged to strictly bounded segments within Dutch society into unambiguously accepted members of the community of the Netherlands. Lijphart’s (1975: 86–99) national Dutch roof had thus merged the pillars on which it rested into a single national column, even though elites kept actively trying to divide them into manageable constituencies (van Mierlo 1986).

### 6.3.2 Immigration: New Forms of Ethnic and Religious Diversity

As depillarisation’s struggles were gradually being resolved, however, a new social issue began to feature in societal and political discourses: post-war immigration. While the Dutch in Amsterdam broke down the walls of pillarisation and class that had divided them, unprecedented waves of immigrants challenged the new consensual and ‘Nationalist’ framework of identification and belonging in the city. The first significant post-war immigrants were the 200,000–300,000 Indonesian ‘repatriates’ (of whom about 13,000 were Moluccan ex-KNIL, or Royal Dutch East Indies Army, soldiers and their families) who ‘returned’ to the Netherlands around the time of Indonesian independence (1949) (Rath 1991: 147). Their influence on Amsterdam was only indirect, however, as most of them came to live in The Hague and in rural areas. The 1960s then witnessed the first guest worker
migrants, initially from southern Europe (Spain, Italy, Portugal, former Yugoslavia) and later also from Turkey and Morocco. As guest worker immigration began to pick up in the early 1970s, a third current began to take significant proportions: the (post-)colonial migrants from Surinam and the Dutch Antilles. This current peaked in 1974 and 1979, the years before Surinamese independence (1975) and before the end of the open-border policy towards Surinamese immigrants (1980). The 1990s then witnessed a rapid increase in the number of asylum seekers and refugees (mostly from Iran, Somalia, Iran, Ghana, and Afghanistan), the fourth category of post-war immigrants.

Together, the immigration of Surinamese, Antilleans, guest workers, asylum seekers and refugees transformed the face of Amsterdam. While the Dutch capital had 9,400 foreign residents in the early 1960s, this number had increased to around 100,000 people belonging to ‘ethnic minorities’ by 1985 and to 374,399 allochtonen by 2009, amounting to 50% of its population. These ‘new Amsterdammers’ were divided along boundaries of language, nationality, ethnicity, religion, and class. In the eyes of many ‘old’ Amsterdammers, however, these internal divisions mattered less than the fact that these new arrivals were visibly of non-Dutch origin and displayed behaviour that was unknown and sometimes considered ‘unsocietal’. As such, they all represented a new form of social difference that hitherto had been of little import in the Dutch context: ethnicity. The simple fact of rapid post-war immigration of people who were recognisably non-Dutch was thus an important factor in pushing the cleavage of ethnicity to the fore.

This increasing salience of ethnicity was compounded by its overlap with religious identities, most notably in the case of Islam. Although the Dutch capital could boast a long history, 

188 The Dutch government signed agreements for recruiting guest labour from Turkey in 1964 and from Morocco in 1969. After the economic crisis of the early 1970s, a recruitment stop was introduced in 1974.

189 As definitions of foreigners, ethnic minorities, and allochtonen changed several times over this period, these figures are not perfectly comparable; however, they do give a reliable impression of the rapid growth of diversity of the Amsterdam population.

history of interaction with Islam through its Indonesian colonies, the knowledge and experience amassed in this period, for example by the Islam scholar Snouck Hurgronje (Benda 1958; Hurgronje et al. 1957) had little impact on Dutch society. In practice, Islam only arrived in earnest in Amsterdam with the arrival of the Islamic Turkish and Moroccan immigrants\footnote{Some of the Surinamese and Moluccan post-war immigrants were Muslims, but their numbers and societal impact were marginal (Rath 2001: 28)} from the late 1960s. It went through three distinct phases of development in Amsterdam: first, a period of hidden growth (1965-80); second, a decade of growing institutionalisation (1980-1991); and third, a period of increasing visibility and growing anti-Islamic critique (1991 to the present). The timing is significant here, for it not only coincides with the homogenisation of the Dutch in class and cultural terms as discussed above, but also with the first period in Dutch history in which the majority of the Amsterdam population considered itself non-religious. This is illustrated by figure 6.2, which shows the remarkably decreasing share of the population affiliated to a religion.

\textit{Figure 6.2: Religious affiliation in Amsterdam, 1849-2000}

The figure outlines the drastic secularisation of Amsterdam society throughout the 20th century; but it also shows that this secularisation came mostly at the expense of the Dutch Reformed church. For while the support for this church declined from 50% in 1850 to just over 10% in 1971, the proportions of the Catholics and Gereformeerden remained remarkably constant. At the same time, the chart also shows that Islam had little presence in Amsterdam until the 1970s. This was partly due to the specific demographics of the guest worker immigrants: they were almost exclusively young men who often considered themselves the progressive vanguard and pioneers of their families (Cottaar et al. 2009). Religion was largely an individual affair, especially since few guest workers had families to care for or children to raise – generally a significant factor stimulating the revival of the religious piety of immigrant men. Moreover, due to the labour requirements of being guest workers, Moroccan and Turkish migrants had little time to formally organise and institutionalise their religion. Taken together, this meant that expressions of Islam in the 1960s and 1970s were largely confined to prayer-sessions in the workplace or local churches.

Amsterdam Muslims only began to organise themselves in the late 1970s, starting with the Turkish mosque in the Nieuwezijds chapel, the Moroccan prayer-hall in the Van Ostadestraat, and the Surinamese Taibah mosque in South-East Amsterdam in 1985. In 1988 the number of mosques in Amsterdam had risen to 28, while by 2002 the city hosted no less than 44 (Maussen 2006: 80-1); their numbers thus rose in tandem with the population of Muslims in the city, which by 2008 had increased to almost 100,000. By this time, however, Islamic organisations no longer only functioned as institutions of religious worship, but branched out into providing education (e.g. Quranic education, computer skills training, or lessons in Arabic) and societal representation (Maussen 2006: 91).

Education became especially significant as, from the middle of the 1980s, Turkish and Moroccan guest workers began to form families and raise children in Amsterdam, accepted as their new place of residence. Arabic and Quranic education in the mosque became an
important way of reproducing Islam among the new generation; moreover, towards the end of
the 1980s Amsterdam’s Muslims also began to explore opportunities for setting up schools
based on Islamic principles. Schools based on religious or ideological convictions had been
sponsored by the Dutch government since the Pacification of 1917, but until the 1980s no
Islamic group had ever made use of these provisions. In 1989, however, the first Islamic
primary schools were set up and by 2002 Amsterdam had 8 Islamic primary schools and one
secondary school, which together provided education to 10% of Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-
Moroccan children in the city (Inspectie van het Onderwijs 2002; Maussen 2006: 246; Shadid
and Koningsveld 1992). This growth of Islamic institutions can be interpreted as an
indication of the increasing societal visibility of the Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccan
communities - a factor that will reappear in our discussion of the recent rise of the ‘new
realist’ discourse.

In sum, in the decades following World War II Amsterdam thus experienced an
unprecedented influx of migrants – most significantly the post-colonial migrants from
Indonesia, the guest workers from Morocco and Turkey, the post-colonial migrants from
Surinam and the Antilles, and the asylum seekers and refugees from countries such as Iran,
Afghanistan, Somalia, and Ghana. Not only did these migrants bring divisions of nationality,
language, and ethnicity to the fore, but also differences of a religious nature. Especially the
influx of considerable numbers of Muslims was significant in this regard, not least as the
majority of the autochtone Dutch had shed their religious identities for the first time in
history. Ethnic and religious differences thus overlapped for some of the new migrant groups,
especially for those with Islamic affiliations. We will now consider how these boundaries
interacted with class and horizontal inequality.
6.3.3 *Horizontal Inequality and ‘Unsocietal’ Youths*

The class positions of Mediterranean and postcolonial ethnic groups have been closely related to their patterns of immigration into the Netherlands. Both the Turkish and Moroccans were selected - first by companies and later by the Dutch government - on the basis of their suitability for the available labour in the Netherlands. As such, the large majority of them was young (average age at immigration was around 30), male, unmarried, and had little formal education (WRR 1979: 110). As a result, these migrants almost exclusively occupied positions in the lowest ranks of the class stratification; in 1975 only 4% were employed in some form of management position and most of these as foremen to small groups of their compatriots. In similar fashion, from the moment of their immigration guest workers were over-represented in the lower strata of the income pyramid (WRR 1979: 132). Most of them did not speak Dutch, nor were they challenged or motivated to learn the language (WRR 1979: 113-4). Their employers were responsible for their housing, which often resulted in overcrowded hostels or even bunk beds within the confines of the factory (Rath 1991).

The postcolonial migrants from Surinam and the Antilles showed a rather different immigration trajectory, which Van Amersfoort (1982: 143-4) summarises into four phases: (i) the elite migration up to 1950; (ii) expansion between 1950-65; (iii) mass migration 1965-74; and (iv) “the great stream” in 1974-5, which would be repeated in 1979-80. Over the course of these 30 years, postcolonial immigration changed in two significant ways. First, it increased in volume and second, its composition changed from well-educated elites to middle classes, low skilled labourers and the unemployed. Postcolonial immigrants were thus more diverse in socio-economic terms than the guest workers, although the last “great streams” showed considerable similarities. But perhaps more importantly, most of the postcolonial immigrants

---

192 Although the first groups of guest workers were from Italy and Spain, most of them migrated back to their countries of origin when the economy began to decline in the 1970s. Those who remained were predominantly Turkish and Moroccan and while the Dutch government ended guest worker recruitment in 1974, their numbers continued to grow through immigration on the basis of family reunification (and, from the 1980s, family formation).
had considerable knowledge of the Dutch language and were generally considered as part and parcel of Dutch society – until 1975 they had, after all, been part of the Dutch kingdom. Regardless of these advantages, however, the timing of the “great streams” could hardly have been worse, beginning precisely in the same year (1974) that the labour market (for the first time since 1958) became saturated and unemployment began to rise.

Kloosterman (1994) describes how the two decades after 1975 featured a worsening of the class position of guest workers and postcolonial migrants in Amsterdam due to a rapid rise and ‘ethnicisation’ of unemployment. He shows that while throughout the 1970s unemployment in Amsterdam was on par with that of the Netherlands as a whole (rising from a mere 2% in 1971 to 9% in 1981), the 1980s witnessed a considerable divergence: from 1983 onwards unemployment in the Netherlands began to decline, while it continued to rise in Amsterdam. This rise came mostly at the expense of the postcolonial and guest worker communities: the Surinamese experienced twice the unemployment rate of the ethnic Dutch, while the Turks had three times more unemployed (Kloosterman 1994: 1325-7). To explain this divergence Kloosterman uses the notion of a structural mismatch between labour demand and supply in the city. He argues that during the 1970s and 1980s, in conjunction with increasing low skilled postcolonial and Mediterranean immigration, de-industrialisation caused an upskilling of the employment structure of Amsterdam. Although the immediate effect of this upskilling was delayed by the suburbanisation of large parts of the ethnic Dutch middle and lower classes\footnote{Mainly towards the ‘new’ cities of Almere, Lelystad, and Purmerend.}, it kicked in with full force in the early 1980s. A growing local labour force\footnote{Due to the increasing labour participation of women and the entry of the cohort of post-war baby-boomers.} combined with an increasing inflow of suburban commuters (who were on average better skilled than local labour, especially the migrants) to result in unemployment rates of over 40% among minorities at the end of the decade (WRR 1989)\footnote{Among immigrant youths, unemployment rates in the second half of the 1980s were even close to 60% (Sansone 1992: 23).}.

\footnote{Mainly towards the ‘new’ cities of Almere, Lelystad, and Purmerend.}
\footnote{Due to the increasing labour participation of women and the entry of the cohort of post-war baby-boomers.}
\footnote{Among immigrant youths, unemployment rates in the second half of the 1980s were even close to 60% (Sansone 1992: 23).}
This convergence of high levels of low skilled immigration, the suburbanisation of the 
etnic Dutch middle class, oil crises and economic decline, and structural labour market 
changes thus helps us to understand the deepening of class differences between the 
postcolonial, Mediterranean, and ethnic Dutch populations of Amsterdam in the 1980s196. 
These differences have persisted until the contemporary period and have therefore been a 
cause for grievances and resentment among all three communities and an important factor in 
the hardening of identity boundaries between them. For the Dutch, the low socio-economic 
position and ‘unsocietal’ behaviour of Mediterranean and postcolonial communities changed 
from a source for societal concern in the multicultural years to a perceived threat in the 
contemporary era.

The minorities at the receiving end of this class spectrum, however, often interpret their 
societal disadvantage as a horizontal inequality: they feel they are excluded and marginalised 
on the basis of their ascribed non-Dutch status. Within the confines of this thesis, there is no 
need to argue the ‘truth’ of one of these interpretations over the other. Instead, the argument 
made here is two-fold. First, it purports that the patterns of horizontal inequality between the 
Dutch, the Dutch-Turks and Dutch-Moroccans, the Surinamese, and the Antilleans hardens 
ethnic boundaries between these groups because they foster perceptions of grievance and 
threat. Second, it suggests that the relative differences between the class positions of the non- 
Dutch communities have helped to construct a sense of ethnic hierarchy in Amsterdam’s 
ethnic cleavage; a hierarchy that puts the ethnic Dutch in a superior position to the post- 
colonial communities, who are in turn considered closer to the Dutch than Dutch-Moroccans 
and Dutch-Turks.

196 Asylum seekers and refugees have not been included in this analysis of inequality because their numbers 
are small, they arrived later (from the 1990s), and their class position is too diverse, ranging for example 
from Iranian professors to illiterate Somalian farmers (Dourleijn and Dagevos 2011). This diverse class 
composition has prevented the development of consistent horizontal inequalities; class relations therefore 
cross-cut and attenuate the ethnic boundaries around these communities.
Another dimension of class difference that has contributed to this ethnic hierarchy, however, is the extent to which communities - and especially their young, male members - have been considered ‘problematic’ and ‘deviant’. Since the fading of the movements of the Provos, kabouter (‘leprechauns’), and squatters, Amsterdam has mainly known two significant categories of ‘problematic’ youths: the Surinamese- and Antillean-Dutch in the 1980s and early 1990s, and the Dutch-Moroccans since the late 1990s. This sequence closely matches the socio-economic development of the two communities. Although the postcolonial community is on average still in a subordinate class position to the ethnic Dutch, this inequality was considerably more pronounced in the 1980s and early ‘90s. Partly due to extensive national media attention, the ‘deviant’ and sometimes criminal lifestyles of some of these unemployed young Surinamese became symbolic for the ‘unsocietal’ status of the entire postcolonial community, associating it discursively with a culture of drugs and violence (van San 1998; Sansone 1992; Vermeulen 2005: 146).

This changed in early 1990s, however, when Dutch-Moroccan ‘second generation’ young men, who lived predominantly in Amsterdam-West, began to attract media attention as ‘deviant’ and out-of-control youths. The increasing, and increasingly perceived, Dutch-Moroccan youth ‘deviance’ should be understood in the context of the simultaneous gezinshereniging197 and growth of the ‘second generation’ within Dutch-Moroccan communities. The Amsterdam riots of 1998, discussed in some detail in chapter 9, became the trigger for the discourse of Dutch-Moroccan ‘deviance’ to flourish. The central tenet of the discourse is that ‘Moroccan’ young men are distinctly over-represented in crime statistics and that this underlines the ‘deviant’ status of the Dutch-Moroccan community. A similar argument is made for the Antilleans in Amsterdam, although the Dutch-Moroccans have eclipsed them in terms of the sheer volume of media and political attention. This is partly

197 The reuniting of guest workers with their families by bringing wives and children to live in the Netherlands.
attributable to the dominance of anti-Islamic discourses, which connect alleged Dutch-Moroccan deviance to their ‘pre-modern’ attachment to Islam.

Young Dutch-Moroccan men have thus undeniably become a highly salient political issue. While, for some, however, these boys have become the symbol of the ‘unsocietal’ nature of Dutch-Moroccan communities, the connection between ethnicity and criminality remains deeply contested. Although it would lead us too far from the issues at hand to discuss this contestation in detail, it is useful to sketch in broad strokes the key issues that are debated. First, there remain substantial problems with the measurement of both ethnicity and youth criminality, which combine in the measurement of ethnic criminality. So while there are numerous studies that posit the over-representation of Dutch-Moroccans and Antilleans in crime statistics, their results are often patchy, local, and based on a definition of ethnicity that takes a person’s country of birth – or that of one of his parents, if this parent is born outside the Netherlands – as the defining characteristic. It may therefore be argued that, regardless of the high volume of research on the topic, the quality of the evidence does not warrant the vehemence with which the claims of ‘Moroccan’ criminality are presented.

However, if we accept the general results of most of the evidence, these indicate that there are differences between ethnic communities in the proportions of youths who are involved in criminal activity (Driessen et al. 2002). Moreover, the evidence also suggests that Dutch-Moroccans, Surinamese, and Antillean youths are more likely to be criminally engaged than Dutch-Turks, the ethnic Dutch, and other ethnic communities. There is a deep-seated and at times vitriolic debate about the causes of this pattern. The main dividing line is often thought to lie between the culturalist explanations of ‘deviance’ (Jurgens 2007; van Gemert 1998) and the analyses that focus on social and class-related causes, such as the development of specific ‘street cultures’ around groups of Dutch-Moroccan youths (de Jong 2007). Upon careful reading of the analyses, however, few studies are in fact as culturalist or as Marxist as their conclusions would lead one to believe. Most analysts consider combinations of factors to
explain criminality, including class position, cultural dissonance of the children of immigrants, relative deprivation, and (the lack of) social control within the family and wider social environment (Driessen et al. 2002: 130-9; Werdmölder 2005). There are also, however, scholars who emphasise the interactive effects between youth delinquency and public ethnic stigmatisation (Bovenkerk 2003).

In sum, this section has outlined the historical material basis of identity formation in post-war Amsterdam, with special emphasis on the horizontal inequalities between ethnic communities and the impact of (perceived) ethnic youth delinquency. As the discussion of Dutch-Moroccan delinquency highlighted, however, these material factors only impact on salient notions of identities if they are interpreted as such – that is, if they are given meaning in relation to these identities. This process, as outlined in the introduction to this thesis, has to be social and public in order for a particular identity or meaning to become publically shared. In line with this argument, the subsequent section will show how the Dutch national policies of diversity throughout the post-war period have compounded and reinforced certain exclusionary ethnic boundaries and hierarchies at the expense of others. In contrast, local policies in Amsterdam have attempted to cross-cut these exclusionary ethnic divisions with an inclusive notion of Amsterdammer urban citizenship.

6.3.4 Diversity as a Problem: the Construction of Allochtonen

Table 6.1 summarises the main changes in national Dutch diversity policies after WWII, highlighting their goals, the practical means to achieve them, and the definitions underlying them. It shows how the two periods of multiculturalism, which were focused on the maintenance of the ethnic distinctiveness of minorities, are caught between two periods of policies towards assimilation. There is thus an element of cyclicality to these policy shifts in

198 Local politics in Amsterdam followed these shifts to some extent, but have always maintained a considerable level of autonomy in their diversity policy, for example through *Wij Amsterdammers*. For more details, see section 6.3.5.
terms of their goals and policy means; their categorical definitions, however, show a different pattern. Here we see a clear shift from the notion of migrants as citizens to their description as ethnic minorities and finally as *allochtonen*: a continuous increase of the categorical exclusion of ethnic ‘strangers’. This section will focus on this pattern of increasing exclusion, arguing that it is inherent to the Dutch state definition of ethnic difference as the extent to which a community is considered ‘problematic’.

Table 6.1: Schematic of development of national Dutch post-war diversity policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Guided assimilation ('40s-'50s)</th>
<th>Ad-hoc multiculturalism (1960-'79)</th>
<th>Emancipatory multiculturalism (1979-'94)</th>
<th>Assimilationist integration (since 1994)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goals</strong></td>
<td>Quick incorporation of 'repatriates' as assimilated citizens</td>
<td>Emancipation of <em>rijksgenoten</em> and return migration of guest workers</td>
<td>Emancipation of ethnic minorities</td>
<td>Participation and (increasingly) assimilation of <em>allochtonen</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Means</strong></td>
<td>Enforced re-socialisation through social work</td>
<td>Maintenance of identity; emancipation of postcolonial migrants</td>
<td>Emancipation within own community; migration restrictions</td>
<td>Equal opportunities, <em>inburgering</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Definitions</strong></td>
<td>‘Repatriates’ as Dutch citizens</td>
<td>Guest workers, <em>rijksgenoten</em>, and other group-specific terms</td>
<td>Ethnic minorities and, from 1989, <em>allochtonen</em></td>
<td>Western and non-Western <em>allochtonen</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this regard, it is important to flag the marked differences between the policy response to the ‘repatriate’ immigration in the 1940s and 1950s and the diversity policies towards other postcolonial and guest worker migrants. Dutch policies towards Indonesian ‘repatriates’ (dubbed ‘guided assimilation’ in table 6.1) were aimed at their quick assimilation through enforced socialisation with Dutch everyday norms. These policies therefore showed a remarkable continuity with the pre-war policies towards those considered ‘unsocietal’ (Rath 1991: 147–52). This was possible because ‘repatriates’ were considered as essentially Dutch – they merely needed socialisation into the prevailing values and behavioural norms of their home society.\(^\text{199}\) However, this assimilation did not include all aspects of the ‘repatriate’

\(^{199}\) See also Van Amersfoort (1982: 91).
culture - Indonesian food, music, literature, and other cultural expressions have generally been considered as part of the Dutch colonial heritage and as such valued positively.

On the whole, these assimilationist policies, spurred by the economic recovery at the time, helped post-war ‘repatriates’ to adjust to their new place of residence without becoming a segregated minority (Oostindie 2010; Rath 1991: 151). The Moluccans were the main exception to this rule but, as Van Amersfoort (1982: 102-9) argues, this was due to their being caught in between government promises for repatriation (i.e. to the independent Moluccan Republic) and the reality of their social marginalisation and forcible relocation into Dutch *woonoorden* (residential camps).

Aside from the Moluccans, however, the general attitude of the Dutch state towards ‘repatriates’ had less in common with its ethnic minorities policies than with the pre-war approaches towards the ‘unsocietal’. In the immediate aftermath of the war, the Netherlands considered itself a country of emigration, in which the ‘return’ of the ‘repatriates’ was a temporary exception. This self-image of the Netherlands as unable to cope with structural immigration would continue to characterise Dutch diversity policy until the development of ‘emancipatory’ multiculturalism (see table 6.1) in the 1980s. But while ‘repatriates’ had been considered part of the Dutch nation, guest workers had no historical connection to the Netherlands.

Born out of a pragmatic wish not to impede guest worker return, this notion of ‘maintaining one’s identity’ became the leading principle of incipient Dutch multiculturalism in the 1970s. It was implemented through education in immigrant languages and the institutionalisation of immigrants into subsidised ‘ethnic’ organisations (Rath 1991: 163-4). It requires little analytical effort to recognise the traditions of the *verzuiling* in these patterns. The Dutch state provided immigrants with clear incentives to identify and organise on the basis of their ethnic/national origins, as the *Gereformeerden*, Catholics, and socialists had done a century earlier. Moreover, it provided the new immigrant elites with incentives to play the
ethnic card in their pursuit of status and influence (Rath 1991: 171-2). For the Surinamese in Amsterdam, whose population had already risen drastically in the early 1970s, this opportunity structure reached its zenith between 1974 and 1986, when millions of municipal guilders were spent on subsidising minority organisations (Vermeulen 2005: 149). In the 1980s their funding was reduced to the level of support for other minority organisations, most notably the Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccan (Vermeulen 2002).

The main bases on which these organisations were founded were national/ethnic origins, cultural heritage, political ideologies, and religious affiliations. All received state financial support, including incipient Islamic institutions, both at the national and local levels (Waardenburg 1988). After 1983 structural support to religious institutions became contested, but the Amsterdam municipality continued to help Muslim groups to find appropriate accommodation and to renovate their buildings where necessary (Maussen 2006; Rath 2001: 35). Government minority policies thus enhanced the relevance of ethnic identities in the social lives of immigrants and their families. But they also shaped the ways in which the ethnic Dutch regarded the immigrant communities. Minority institutions did not only function within their own communities and within the state, but also represented their members on broader societal issues. Through regular statements in newspapers, on the radio, and increasingly on television, minority organisations became the public ‘face’ of their communities. In this regard, it is important to highlight how the state defined the ethnic communities; or, more specifically, how it came to limit their definition of ethnic minorities to Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese, and Antillean segments of the population. Effectively, this definition came to dominate Dutch notions of ethnicity and, from the 1990s, the cleavage between autochtonen and allochtonen.

In his detailed description of the process of ethnic definition within the national Dutch state and policy apparatus, Rath (1991, 1992) shows how this selection of ethnic minorities was largely due to the pragmatic policy orientation of the limited group of social scientists and
bureaucrats in charge of the definition process. Scholten (2010: 2) refers to this as the “technocratic and depoliticised mode of policy-making […] with a strong research-policy nexus” of which the Advisory Committee on Research pertaining to Minorities (ACOM) was the beating heart (Penninx 2005). The notion of ‘ethnic minorities’ as the ACOM conceptualised it originates from the dissertation of Van Amersfoort (1982: 78), who selected the Indonesian Dutch, the Moluccans, the Surinamese, and the guest workers as case studies. His selection criteria were that all these groups have come to the Netherlands (i) in large numbers and (ii) with clear political or economic reasons. These two factors, Van Amersfoort (ibid.) argues, turned these migrants into collectivities for Dutch society and as such relevant groups for his study.

In most influential policy documents that followed, Van Amersfoort’s definition has been adopted as the basis for minority policies, with the significant omission of the Indonesian Dutch and the Chinese. The significance of these omissions is two-fold. On the one hand, the Indonesian Dutch are not considered because their guided assimilation had prevented them from becoming ‘problematic’ and had hence prevented them from being relevant to government policy. On the other, the Chinese community was “not subject to government policy” and therefore omitted (WRR 1979: 163). Policy concerns with ‘problematic minorities’ thus trumped the development of a coherent and comprehensive conceptual categorisation of ethnicity in the Netherlands. In 1979, this emphasis on the ‘problematic’ was formalised as the ACOM defined ethnic minorities as those groups whose culture has foreign origins and who objectively occupy a low socio-economic position. These minorities became the object of analysis, affirmative action, and other social policies; other ‘non-problematic’ communities, in contrast, did not.

---

200 Van Amersfoort was also a member of ACOM; please note that the 1982 book is the English translation of his 1974 dissertation.

201 Specifically ACOM (1979), WRR (1979), and Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken (1981, 1983).
In the era of ‘ad-hoc’ and ‘emancipatory’ multiculturalism, the objective of minority policy was socio-economic emancipation, though not at the expense of immigrant cultural identities. On the contrary, once the Netherlands redefined itself as a country of immigration at the start of the 1980s and thus accepted that most migrants would stay in the country, cultural identities were believed to both be a policy goal in itself and a positive factor in community emancipation (Rijkschroef et al. 2003: 36). For example, education in immigrant languages, a cornerstone of the policy of maintaining immigrant cultures, was propagated as a means to improve immigrant knowledge of the Dutch language, learning in one’s mother tongue as a way to enhance the emancipation process (Fermin 1997: 184). This positive correlation between cultural and socio-economic processes formed the core of the ‘emancipatory’ multicultural ideology of the 1980s and early 1990s.

Already in 1989, however, the WRR\(^{202}\) (1989: 23-4) expressed concern with this multicultural approach: categorical support for ethnic minorities was deemed to solidify ethnic boundaries, discriminate against those *allochtonen* who did not belong to one of the major minorities, and put too much emphasis on the maintenance of culture at the expense of fostering emancipation. The common alternatives to the term ethnic minorities (‘immigrants’ or ‘foreigners’) were considered too restricted, as “children of immigrants […] and those who have acquired the Dutch nationality often show shortages [of integration into Dutch society] that are related to their immigrant status” (WRR 1989: 61). The Council therefore chose the term ‘*allochtonen*’\(^{203}\) as the “broadest denotation of the category of residents of the Netherlands who are of non-Dutch origins” (ibid.), while at the same time introducing the term ‘integration’ for the collection of socio-economic indicators of the ‘problematic-ness’ of ethnic minorities: “equivalent participation in the most important societal sectors and institutions” (ibid.: 63).

\(^{202}\) *Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid* – Scientific Council for Government Policy

\(^{203}\) The term had been used by Verwey-Jonker (1971) almost two decades earlier, but had until then never caught on.
The WRR recommendations, however, would not catch on in the national diversity policy until after the Contourennota memorandum (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1994), and even then only in an adjusted form. For example, the WRR had intended the term *allochtoon* to denote a broad and self-identified category of ‘non-Dutch’ residents of the Netherlands (WRR 1989: 25). In adopting the term for general bureaucratic use, however, the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) decided to define the term *allochtoon* using available data from the *Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie* (GBA, Municipal Population Register). Although the post-war Netherlands had never registered ethnicity, it had always kept a written population register, which, in 1994, was restructured and automated.

While this opened up vast new statistical possibilities, however, it retained the existing shortcomings in terms of data on ethnic origins – namely, that it could only be defined on the basis of the places of birth of a person and his/her parents, which were registered in the GBA. With the WRR definition of *allochtoon* in hand, the CBS defined *allochtonen* as those Dutch residents with at least one parent born outside the Netherlands. But in order to remain ‘policy-relevant’ the CBS went one step further, by differentiating between *allochtonen* on the basis of their similarity to the *autochtone* Dutch (Keij 2000). Showing remarkable historical continuity, the outcome was a differentiation between unproblematic Western *allochtonen* and policy-relevant non-Western *allochtonen*.

The *allochtoon/autochttoon* language codified Dutch ethnicity as a primordial identity, based solely on one’s familial national origins rather than self-identification. Moreover, it did so selectively, for only those groups classified as recent immigrants could be *allochtoon* – excluding, for example, Roma, Sinti, Jews, or other potential candidates for a non-Dutch ethnic label. The notion of non-Western *allochtonen* further narrowed down ethnicity to those considered most different (culturally or socio-economically) from the ethnic Dutch – i.e. those residents of the Netherlands with at least one parent from Morocco, Turkey, Surinam, or the Antilles. Finally, the *allochtoon/autochttoon* cleavage positioned these ‘ethnic’ categories
in a hierarchical relationship, based on the extent to which the groups were deemed to resemble the ‘native’ Dutch.

The policy language of bureaucratic autochthony, building on the process of ‘minorisation’ (Rath 1991) in the multicultural era, thus promoted a notion of ethnicity that was primordial, limited to the most ‘problematic’ communities, and inherently hierarchical. This ethnic definition has come to dominate most quantitative statistical research on diversity in the Netherlands and has been reinforced and disseminated through the wealth of social research based on these categories; through the subsidies for ethnic minority organisations; through the multicultural policies aimed at conserving immigrant identities; and through the integration policies aimed at stimulating the participation of non-Western allochtonen. Perhaps most importantly, however, the language and logic of autochthony has spread into the public imagination through its ubiquitous presence in the public debate on diversity and the negative attention given to ‘problematic’ allochtonen.

While the language of allochtonen and autochtonen became more prevalent, its meaning also quickly transformed from the narrow definition based on place of birth (‘bureaucratic autochthony’) to a wider classification of ‘problematic’ minorities with non-Dutch ethnic backgrounds (‘autochtonie’). In this regard, we have already considered perceptions and discourses about allochtone youth deviance and their impact on Amsterdam’s ethnic boundaries. In recent years, moreover, these narratives have merged with anti-Islamic and anti-establishment ideas in the ‘new realist’ discourse (Prins 2004). Arguably the first proponent of this discourse was a leading conservative-liberal politician, Frits Bolkestein. In a 1991 speech, Bolkestein claimed that there was a fundamental tension between Islamic principles and the Western values of liberalism. In the two decades following Bolkestein’s speech, his anti-multicultural and anti-Islamic stance was taken up and further developed by influential politicians and commentators such as Paul Scheffer, Pim Fortuyn, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and Geert Wilders. Many argue, therefore, that these political actors were the driving
force behind what is considered as a sudden ‘turn-around’ of the Dutch diversity approach from multiculturalism to assimilation and exclusion.\textsuperscript{204}

However, this chapter has shown that most of the roots of the nativist discourse of ‘new realism’ and cultural assimilation go back considerably further than 1991. Ideas about ‘civilising’ and isolating ‘unsocietal’ and ‘problematic’ members of society hark back at least to the social-democratic policies of the 1920s. Notions of nativist ethnic/national boundaries were formed even earlier, in the process of Dutch state formation and national unification. These principles of ethnic nationalism were hardened in WWII and subsequently applied to domestic ‘ethnic diversity’ through the various post-war state approaches to immigration, moving from guided assimilation to multiculturalism and, finally, integration and assimilation. The resulting ethnic hierarchy of \textit{autochtonie} was reinforced by the patterns of horizontal inequality and the connotations of youth ‘deviance’ connected to some of the \textit{allochtone} communities. Religious tension, finally, had characterised Dutch society at least since the 17\textsuperscript{th} century. Until the mid-20\textsuperscript{th} century, these tensions had mainly existed between different denominations, but with the process of secularisation a new religious cleavage developed: the struggle between those with and those without religious affiliations.

Proponents of ‘new realism’ built on all these discourses and identities, merging nativist ethnicity and criticism of Islam with notions of the ‘unsocietal’, ‘backward’ and ‘problematic’. Thus, they helped to reproduce the hierarchy inherent in the notion of \textit{autochtonie}, especially with regard to the alleged ‘backward’ and ‘unsocietal’ character of the Dutch–Turks and Dutch–Moroccans. They did so in a particular historical context, however, in which the increasing visibility of Muslims in the Netherlands converged with a period of progressive liberal government that actively disregarded ethnic or religious considerations (the Dutch ‘purple cabinets’, 1994–2002). This convergence provided space for the development of anti-establishment and anti-\textit{allochtonen} populism on the conservative ‘right’ of the Dutch political

It has been the contribution of the ‘new realist’ political actors to seize this opportunity – not least through Geert Wilders’ political party, the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV, Party for Freedom), which has been successful at the national level but not in Amsterdam.

6.3.5 Diversity as a Strength: the Construction of Amsterdammers

The consecutive policy approaches of the Dutch state towards immigration and diversity thus contributed to the formation of a nativist form of ethnicity and belonging in the Netherlands. However, although fed by structural developments at the local level of Amsterdam, the resulting autochtonie cleavage and the ‘new realist’ discourse were defined and controlled on the national Dutch stage through policies devised by the national government, social research performed by national research councils, and public debates held and communicated through the national media. At the lower levels of society, in contrast, this discourse is often problematised and contested, not just by individuals in the course of their everyday lives, in which social reality does not easily conform to the crisp representation of autochtonie, but also by informal authorities and organisations and by the more local layers of the state. These actors often represent and foster radically different notions of belonging, based on gender, family, education, lifestyle, and many other sources of identity.

Within the context of Amsterdam, this section will explore the post-WWII development of one of the strongest of these alternative discourses of belonging: that of Amsterdammer urban citizenship. Starting from its roots in 17th century notions of city-based citizenship, earlier sections have traced the development of this territorial identity until the German occupation of 1940–45. In the post-war decades, the notion of Amsterdammer went through a period of considerable change and rejuvenation, in which three partially overlapping discursive layers have been of particular importance. First, the Jordaan culture of the city’s urban poor in the 1950s and 1960s; second, the urban anarchism and liberalism of
Amsterdam’s protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s; and finally, the unwavering urban multiculturalism and territorial inclusivity propagated by the city’s mayors Ed van Thijn (1983–1994), Schelto Patijn (1994–2001), and Job Cohen (2001–2010).

In the early 1950s, Amsterdam was poor and focused almost exclusively on post-war reconstruction. This environment stimulated the development of a distinct working class culture among some of Amsterdam’s residents, especially those in the Jordaan neighbourhood on the western edge of the grachtengordel (central canal district). The Jordaan had long been a predominantly working class neighbourhood, especially in the small streets and alleys just off small canals, and was the scene of the Jordaanoproer (Jordaan riot) of 1934 (de Rooy 2007a: 216-7). In the years of reconstruction, the Jordaan was impoverished, with small working-class housing, lacking social provision, blunt and often violent social and family relations, and a social life taking place largely in the streets and local bars. Uniquely, however, the Jordaan figured prominently in a few popular drama performances and, most importantly, it had cherished a culture of singing the levenslied (literally the “song of life”), a rather melodramatic version of the French chanson and the German Schlager. The “typically Amsterdamse” culture of the Jordaan, embodied in its music, gave the term Amsterdammer its most specific connotation: that of the white, working class survivors of the 1950s Jordaan. This working class neighbourhood identity became a source of pride among the Jordanezen that was most eloquently expressed through the neighbourhood’s most famous singers: Johnny Jordaan, Aunt Leen, Willy Alberti, and, slightly later, André Hazes (Bosscher 2007a: 525).

All four had worked in cafes and bars from a young age and had used their singing as a way to entertain the customers, but in 1955 Johnny Jordaan won a local singing competition that would expose the rest of the Netherlands - and even Flanders - to his ‘typically Amsterdam’ music. His first record, a humorous eulogy of the city entitled Geef mij maar Amsterdam (Just give me Amsterdam), became an instant success with as many as 360,000 sales in the first year alone (ibid.). The practised culture of the Jordaan neighbourhood would
be short-lived as the class status of its inhabitants rose and they emigrated in search of better living conditions in Amsterdam’s ‘garden cities’ and, somewhat later, in towns around the capital. Its music, however, has acquired an enduring cult-status in the Netherlands as a symbol for its capital city, indicated by the nation-wide attention for André Hazes’ 2004 funeral and the continuing popularity of his recordings.

The demographic and cultural changes in the Jordaan were indicative of wider shifts in the character of the city in the 1960s to the 1980s. As discussed above, during these years Amsterdam was dominated by the urban protest movements of the Provo’s, kabouter, and the squatters, who laid the foundations for the city’s liberal reputation in terms of drug use, homosexuality, and other forms of often controversial behaviour. They indicated an increasing rejuvenation of the city, not least because of the increasing numbers of students flocking into the University of Amsterdam (UvA) and the Free University of Amsterdam (VU) (Wintershoven and Kolfschooten 2000). This young protest generation gave Amsterdam a rebellious and progressive reputation that continued until well into the 1990s, but experienced its violent peak in the riotous years between 1979 and 1982.

The most violent of these riots, on the day of Queen Beatrix’s installation in April 1980, were not merely a protest against the local housing situation in Amsterdam, but also a protest against the established structures of authority. The government in The Hague, through the Minister of the Interior Hans Wiegel, expressed its dissatisfaction with the violence displayed in the riots and the alleged lenience with which the Amsterdam municipality had dealt with the rioters – which in turn met with disapproval among Amsterdammers, who, though often themselves critical of their mayor Polak, closed their ranks against the criticism from The Hague (Bosscher 2007b: 482-3).

The 1960s to the 1980s thus saw Amsterdam gain a distinctly anarchic-liberal reputation and restate its autonomous politics and identity from The Hague and wider Dutch society. After the difficult years directly preceding the war, Amsterdam was now recovering the
position of strength it had occupied in the Netherlands around the turn of the 19th century – a trend that was formally confirmed by the constitutional codification of its status as capital of the Netherlands in 1983\textsuperscript{205}. The third aspect of the Amsterdammer identity developed roughly from that same year, as the new mayor Ed van Thijn began formulating a position with regard to Amsterdam’s increasing allochtonous population. His stance towards immigrants and diversity can be characterised as a combination of a territorial identity (based on residence in Amsterdam) and a positive evaluation of the city’s increasingly multicultural character. Van Thijn thus “attempted to incorporate ‘new’ Amsterdammers in the city’s community” (Bosscher 2007b: 485), a mission that was continued, reinforced, and extended by his successors – although each had their own emphases. Patijn became known for defending the rights of the sans-papiers in his city and received extensive national attention for his vocal support for the illegal Turkish family Gümüs during the lawsuit that led to their expulsion in 1997 (Bosscher 2007b: 492-3). Job Cohen, in turn, supported the expulsion of the Gümüs family, but emphasised the importance of “keeping the city together” (“de boel bij elkaar houden”) as the core of his attitude to diversity (Cohen 2002).

In sum, post-war Amsterdam added three distinct discursive layers to its city identity: that of the urban working class in the 1950s Jordaan, the progressive anarchism of the 1960s and ‘70s protest generations, and the inclusive urban multiculturalism of mayors Van Thijn, Patijn, and Cohen. The city thus recreated its 1920s image as the leftist progressive vanguard of the Netherlands and, increasingly around the turn of the century, as a multicultural bastion against the new realist onslaught from The Hague. Summarised by the city council as including “all those who reject violence and accept the basic societal rules”, the identity of Amsterdammer has thus become increasingly inclusive, capable of representing the autochtone

\textsuperscript{205} See article 32 of the Dutch constitution: “Nadat de Koning de uitoefening van het koninklijk gezag heeft aangevangen, wordt hij zodra mogelijk beëdigd en ingehuldigd in de hoofdstad Amsterdam in een openbare verenigde vergadering van de Staten-Generaal.”
Dutch working class as well as Dutch-Moroccan youths in Amsterdam-West. It has, in short, redefined ethnic diversity as a strength rather than a problem.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has looked at the origins of nativism in Amsterdam and the impact of the bureaucratic categories of autochthony on processes of identity formation. Drawing the many complex trends together, the chapter has suggested that, historically, discourses about belonging in Amsterdam have revolved around religion, status and class, ethnicity, and urban citizenship. Identities of religion, status, and urban citizenship have roots in the 17th-century Dutch Republic, which maintained peaceful social relations through its practices of religious toleration and inclusive poorterschap. With the end of the Republic, however, came decades of economic and political decline for Amsterdam, which were only to be reversed towards the end of the 19th century. By then, the unification of the Netherlands had diminished the formal status of urban identification, replacing it with an ethnic notion of national citizenship. At the same time, the Dutch acceptance of religious pluralism and the modernisation of its economy had created societal oppositions in terms of religion and class. Resolving these contradictions required the adaptation of pragmatic toleration and its reinvention in the shape of pillarisation.

On the eve of the Second World War, therefore, urban belonging in Amsterdam was defined in the fluid terms of Amsterdammer identities, the rigid and increasingly nativist notion of ethnic citizenship, and the religious and class identities of pillarisation. The war altered some of these patterns, not least because of its devastating effects on the city’s considerable Jewish population, but left others intact. Amsterdam in the late 1940s and early 1950s remained divided along the lines of pillarisation, while at the same time witnessing the strengthening of the Amsterdammer identity of specific parts of the city’s working class. The
economic recovery of the 1950s, however, marked considerable shifts in Amsterdam’s Dutch population: overall increases in wealth and class equality were followed by a wave of educated youths attacking the structures and elites of the pillarised era.

At the same time, the city also experienced an unprecedented inflow of foreign immigrants, most notably from Indonesia, Surinam, the Antilles, Turkey, and Morocco. Most of these immigrants entered the Netherlands as low-skilled workers and took a position at the bottom of the class pyramid, and because many of them were expected to return after the end of their employment, little effort was made in pursuit of their emancipation. Immigration thus coincided with depillarisation among the Dutch residents of the city, while the rapidly increasing wealth of the Dutch only served to enhance the horizontal inequalities between them and the immigrant communities. These were further deepened in the 1980s, as the depillarisation struggles subsided and economic restructuring reduced the demand for low-skilled labour.

The 1980s witnessed the dawning realisation that immigration, and the resulting ethnic and religious diversity, was to become a permanent rather than temporary feature of Dutch society. The first reflex was to foster the development and emancipation of these immigrants within their own ‘ethnic’ communities. In principle, these communities were defined along the lines of national origins. However, because of the state’s preoccupation with those minorities that were deemed ‘problematic’, ethnic labels were selectively applied to the communities of Surinamese, Antillean, Turkish, and Moroccan migrants. Dutch multiculturalism thus connected ethnicity with the notion of the ‘unsocietal’ classes, which had been subject to the civilisation offensive of the 1920s and ‘30s. As such, multiculturalism not only impeded a nuanced understanding of ethnic difference, but also reinforced the sense of hierarchy between the ‘native’ Dutch and the ethnic minorities. The introduction of the autochthony discourse continued this trend, explicating the ‘native’ status of the Dutch and the connection between the ‘problematic’ minorities and their ‘settler’ status.
The policies of multiculturalism and bureaucratic autochthony thus defined ‘ethnic minorities’ and *allochtonen* selectively, on the basis of their primordial ethnic origins, Islamic affiliations, and ‘problematic’ status. Moreover, these policies reserved full belonging in the Netherlands, and by extension in Amsterdam, exclusively for members of the *autochtone* Dutch community. Ever since the time of their first arrival, therefore, the Dutch state has consistently categorised the Moroccans, Turkish, Surinamese, and Antilleans in Amsterdam as *allochtone* communities. Due to the historical context of post-war social change and persistent horizontal inequalities, these categorisations not only became the mainstream language in policy circles, but also affected the ways in which individuals and groups identified themselves and other in everyday life. In light of this continuous trend towards exclusionary ethnic boundaries, it is all the more remarkable that the local political authorities in Amsterdam have managed to retain some of the inclusivity of the Republican *poorterschap* in contemporary notions of the *Amsterdamer*. 
7.1 Introduction

Our Western culture is superior to Islamic culture. [...] We will have to stop mass immigration from Muslim countries and promote voluntary repatriation [...] If you [as a Muslim] subscribe to our laws, values and constitution you are very welcome to stay and we will even help you to assimilate. But if you cross the red line and commit crimes, start thinking and acting like jihad or sharia we will expell you the same out of our countries (Wilders 2009).

Who is an Amsterdammer? Someone who is born in Amsterdam. [...] You have to know what the harbour smelled like, playing there as a little boy.206.

The issues of diversity, integration, and Islam have arguably been the most salient political issues of the early 21st century in the Netherlands. The two quotes illustrate the range of opinions on the issue, capturing both the anti-Islamic nativism propagated by Geert Wilders and other proponents of ‘new realism’ and the inclusive urban citizenship fostered by Amsterdam’s local political class (Prins 2004; Wilders 2006). Although opinions and discourses around diversity are thus plentiful and divergent, chapter 6 has already suggested that all these discourses rely in essence on two main notions of belonging: autochtonie and urban citizenship. The discourse of autochtonie is expressed as a bureaucratic as well as colloquial categorisation (which are referred to as bureaucratic autochthony and autochtonie, respectively). In contrast, Linthorst’s notion of an Amsterdammer is based on purely territorial and subjective conditions: birth or protracted residence in the city and a sense of attachment

to it. This territorial definition of *Amsterdamer* urban citizenship constitutes the most salient competitor of the *autochtonie* discourse.

This chapter will analyse the resulting three classifications of belonging in Amsterdam and discuss their salience in contemporary repertoires of social identities in the city. Moreover, it will assess to what extent horizontal inequalities overlap with the cleavages of ethnicity and of urban citizenship. To this end, section 7.2 will introduce the city of Amsterdam in the first decade of the 21st century, describing its social diversity and patterns of horizontal inequalities. Section 7.3 will then focus on the three classifications that define belonging in the Dutch capital. Section 7.4 will continue to examine the extent to which these identities of belonging are salient in the contemporary identity repertoires of Amsterdam's urbanites, highlighting which definitions of belonging are relevant for understanding the city’s social relations. The concluding section 7.5 will recap the main findings of the chapter and draw out its implications for the remainder of the thesis.

### 7.2 Diversity, Identity, and Inequality in Amsterdam

With its 177 nationalities (DPG 2009; Trouw 2007) and famed liberalism in matters of sex, drugs, and other forms of controversial behaviour, Amsterdam has long had international recognition as one of the world’s most diverse and cosmopolitan cities. The sheer extent of the city’s diversity increases in light of the city’s relatively modest population size – 756,347 inhabitants in January 2009 (O+S 2009b). Many of the 177 nationalities, however, are only represented by a few individuals; the most common foreign nationalities are Moroccan (16,975), Turkish (10,128), and British (6,592) followed by the US, Ghana, and a range of European countries (O+S 2009c).

Before discussing further the city’s demographics as presented in tables 7.1 to 7.6, however, it is useful to provide some details on the nature and meanings of these identities in the Dutch context - especially given the comparison with Nigeria. Chapter 6 showed how
ethnicity has a relatively short history in the Netherlands, beginning with the 19th-century formation of the Dutch nation and rising to prominence only after the Second World War. Moreover, ethnicity developed in response to the arrival of immigrants with foreign nationalities, rather than the migration of different linguistic or cultural communities within the Netherlands. As such, the primary ethnic boundaries are located between the Dutch and communities with origins outside the Dutch national borders. Due to the influence of *autochtonie* on ethnic definitions these ‘origins’ have become quite independent of people’s nationality or self-identification: the non-Dutch national origins of one’s parents or grandparents have become a sufficient condition for classification into a non-Dutch ethnic community.

Among the ethnic Dutch, however, ethnicity has remained of little social consequence and highly ambiguously defined - see for example the deeply contentious, yet largely inconclusive, public debate on the defining features of the Dutch nation (Grever 2007; Sleegers 2007; van Meeteren 2005; Wieringa and Boomgaard 1981; WRR 2007). For the ethnic Dutch (or *autochtonen*), ethnicity has largely remained a feature attached to ethnic ‘Others’, while they prefer to identify themselves in terms of nationality, religion, ideology, or other social identifications. As a concept, ethnicity in the Netherlands is therefore rather shallowly understood, especially as it is defined by the dominant Dutch with an emphasis on the classification of ‘Others’ rather than constructing a meaningful representation of themselves (Blokland-Potters and Mitzman 2003: 167). However, especially in ethnically diverse environments such as Amsterdam, cultural or ethnic differences have become increasingly salient in people’s everyday lives, as indicated, for example, by the rise of a range of ethnic stereotypes\(^{207}\). Ethnicity is therefore currently in a state of flux, as outdated primordial definitions clash with the lived experiences of those residing in Amsterdam.

\(^{207}\) See e.g. Vuijsje (2009) for a fictional, yet highly informative, exposition of such stereotypes in contemporary Amsterdam.
Table 7.1 presents the ethnic self-identifications of respondents in the Amsterdam Burgermonitor 2008, as well as the official ethnic break-down of the city as measured through the GBA and the bureaucratic definition of autochthony. It shows that the majority of the people in the sample classify themselves as Dutch, followed by Dutch-Surinamese, Dutch-Antillean, Dutch-Moroccan, and Dutch-Turkish. The ‘other’ category comprises a wide range of nationalities and ethnic identities, including Indonesians, Hindoestanen, Ghanaians, Chinese, and even Amsterdammers; the majority of the ‘others’, however, originates from West-European countries (so-called ‘Western allochtonen’). Because many of the categories are relatively small, it is useful to cluster these different ethnic labels into meaningful ethnic categories. It is argued here that the most salient ethnic boundaries in Amsterdam are those between the ethnic Dutch, the Indische and Moluccan Dutch with origins in Indonesia, the Antillean and Surinamese postcolonial communities, and the descendants of the Turkish and Moroccan guest workers.

---

208 This final column presents the official municipal statistics on the relative size of Amsterdam’s ethnic groups, measured through the GBA rather than the Amsterdam Burgermonitor. Source: [http://www.os.amsterdam.nl/tabel/8781/](http://www.os.amsterdam.nl/tabel/8781/).

209 Since the question on ethnic self-identification was an open question and allowed for multiple answers, the most common combinations have also been presented. Only those categories (or combinations) with more than .5% of the sample were included, with exception of the Hindoestaanse category. These respondents were included because they are Surinamese Hindus and as such part of the clustered ‘postcolonial’ ethnic group.
As table 7.1 shows, these communities also constitute the major ethnic communities in Amsterdam, with the exception of those with Indonesian origins because of their relatively small representation in the city (see also O+S 2009c). Therefore, the ethnic classification used in this thesis comprises the ethnic Dutch, the postcolonial Caribbean communities\textsuperscript{210}, the Dutch-Turks, the Dutch-Moroccans, and the ‘others’. The ‘others’, as depicted in the table, comprise a wide variety of identifications, including post-colonial Moluccans, European \textit{allochtonen}, those who consider \textit{Amsterdamer} their ethnic affiliation, and even cosmopolitan sceptics of ‘ethnicity’. Together with those respondents who do not know their ethnic affiliation, this latter category indicates the proportion of Amsterdam’s population that actively contests the salience of ethnic identities. It shows that while nativist ethnicity may be a salient cleavage in Amsterdam as a whole, it does not have the same meaning for every individual resident of the city.

In this regard it is also relevant to note that about 8\% of the respondents reported two ethnic identities; moreover, about 4\% of the respondents mentioned 3 or more such affiliations. In most cases, these multiple identifications combine an \textit{allochtone} ethnic identity with that of the Dutch. Perhaps due to their colonial heritage, this combination is most likely to occur among post-colonial Caribbeans - 48\% of this community identifies as Dutch as well as Surinamese and/or Antillean. Although less common among the ‘others’, the Dutch-Moroccans, and the Dutch-Turks, about 20-25\% of members of these communities also identify themselves as Dutch. These multiple identifications highlight two intriguing aspects of Dutch ethnicity: first, they underline the dual meanings of the ‘Dutch’ label, as a nationality and an ethnic label; and more importantly, second, they challenge the exclusionary

\textsuperscript{210} There are two reasons why the Dutch-Surinamese and Dutch-Antillean identities are clustered into a single category, although there are substantial differences between these communities that would warrant their separate treatment. First, the size of the Dutch-Antillean population among the survey respondents is statistically too small. Second, there were over three times more people who identify as both Surinamese and Antillean than people who view themselves as only Antillean. What explains these double identifications is unclear; it may be due to Surinamese immigration into the Dutch Antilles, but also to the negative stereotype attached to the ‘Antillean’ ethnic group. In any event, in the context of Amsterdam the double identifications are an indication of the merger of these two ethnic categories into a post-colonial Caribbean community.
model of nativist ethnicity used in this thesis. Although it is beyond the data collected for this thesis to discuss the ‘multiple identification’ aspect of Dutch ethnicity in more depth, it is certainly a subject that warrants further empirical research.

The final point of note in table 7.1 is the discrepancy between the ABM measure of ethnic self-identification and the official measure of bureaucratic autochthony. The final column of the table shows the percentages of different ethnic groups as reported by the municipal government, on the basis of the place of birth, either of the individuals themselves or their parents. The table shows that, in official statistics, there are fewer Dutch and Dutch-Turkish people in Amsterdam than would self-identify as such, but more Dutch-Surinamese, Dutch-Antilleans, Dutch-Moroccans, and other communities. A small part of these differences may be attributed to a measurement error on the part of the ABM survey. For the most part, however, the table simply shows that self-identification and the official statistics measure different things: for example, the survey data show that 60% of Amsterdam’s residents identify themselves with the Netherlands, the official statistics show that 51% of the population, and their parents were born in the Netherlands. Although both measures can be used as indicators of ethnic identity, it is argued here that self-identification is a far more accurate measure of one’s ethnic identity than (parental) place of birth.

Table 7.2: Religion and ethnicity (N=2582)***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese-Antillean</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Moroccan</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Turkish</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The percentages for the minority groups in the official statistics are more difficult to interpret, because of the possibility of that either the individual or parents were born in different places outside the Netherlands. The official definition of bureaucratic autochthony (see 7.3.1) is silent on this issue, which means that it is unclear how such cases are dealt with statistically.
For the purposes of this thesis, therefore, the five-way ethnic categorisation based on self-identification most effectively captures Amsterdam’s ethnic diversity. Moreover, it also allows us to capture some of Amsterdam’s religious diversity, as shown in table 7.2. Only a minority of the Dutch and ‘other’ ethnic groups are affiliated to a religion, whilst the reverse is true for both the predominantly Muslim Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccans and the religiously mixed Surinamese-Antilleans. The table thus illustrates the two main religious cleavages in the Netherlands: first, between those who are affiliated to a religion and those who are not, and second, between affiliates of the different faiths. Religious debates therefore not only relate to the relative merits of different faiths, but also to the position of religion in society per se.

Many of the critics of the multicultural society centre their argument on the alleged incompatibility of certain forms of religious belief – most notably Islam – with modern Dutch society, especially those in the ‘new realist’ camp (Prins 2004). It may be argued that this anti-Islamic discourse has only served to strengthen Islamic identities\footnote{For evidence for the positive effect of the Dutch Islam-debate on Islamic self-identification and religiosity of Muslims in the Netherlands, see e.g. Phalet, van Lotringen et. al. (2000), Phalet and Haker (2004: 33), Buitelaar (2006), Dagevos, Schellingerhout et. al. (2007: 180-6), Entzinger and Dourleijn (2008: 38-47), Ketner (2008, 2009), Jaspers, Van Londen et al. (2009) and Ersanili (2009: 52).}. The strong ascription, labelling, and stereotyping of Muslims by non-Muslim Dutch – skirting the boundaries of stigmatisation – seems to have strengthened Muslims’ self-identification in terms of their religion (and to a lesser extent their ethnic group), at the expense of their Dutch, Amsterdamer, or other social identities. As De Koning (2009: 63) argues: “[Muslim youths] express the differences between them and the autochtone Dutch in religious terms, […] because they increasingly feel categorised as Muslims”\footnote{Note, however, that increasing religious identification has not necessarily led to increased piety (Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008: 38-47; Phalet and Haker 2004: 34-5).}

This increasing religious identification, however, has been a complex process, as exemplified in De Koning (2008, 2009) and Ketner (2008, 2009). They describe how increasing religious identification among Dutch-Moroccan youths has simultaneously been (i)
a strategy to transcend the ethnic cleavage between ‘allochtoon Moroccan’ and ‘autochtoon Dutch’ and the stigma attached to being ‘Moroccan’; (ii) an expression of conformity towards the traditions of their parents; and (iii) a way of expressing their individuality. Islam offers young Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish an opportunity to identify themselves positively with both a strong moral discourse and a global sense of community – the *Ummah*. As their ethnic affiliations, especially of those born in the Netherlands, have become complex and divided, Islam has offered an attractive alternative that combines individual choice and resistance, conformity to family tradition, and recognition within Dutch society.

So far, tables 7.1 and 7.2 have shown that while Amsterdam is highly diverse in ethnic and religious terms, the majority of the city is ethnically Dutch and non-religious. The Caribbean, Dutch-Moroccan, and Dutch-Turkish communities are the main ethnic minorities, compounded by a collection of small minorities in the ‘other’ category. Moreover, there is a significant overlap between ethnic and religious divisions. In the remainder of this section, we will assess the extent to which these ethnic and religious boundaries overlap with inequalities. Tables 7.3 to 7.6 illustrate these inequalities, presenting data collected through the ABM 2008 perceptions survey. The general pattern shown in these tables is that of a hierarchy of inequalities, in which the ethnic Dutch take the top position, followed by the ‘others’, the postcolonial Surinamese-Antilleans, and, finally, the Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks.

*Table 7.3: Occupation by ethnic category (N=2569)***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Category</th>
<th>Publicly employed</th>
<th>Privately employed</th>
<th>Self employed</th>
<th>Pension</th>
<th>State support</th>
<th>Other (incl. no income)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese-Antillean</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Moroccan</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Turkish</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7.3 displays this hierarchy with a focus on the employment patterns of different ethnic communities in Amsterdam. It presents the main source of employment in the households of the survey respondents. The table shows three aspects of importance to the class relations of these communities. First, it highlights the inequality in terms of unemployment and reliance on state support: while only 5% of the ethnic Dutch households are reliant on unemployment or disability benefits for their main income, this is true for 13% of the Surinamese, 17% of the Dutch-Turks, and 21% of the Dutch-Moroccans. It might be argued that this difference is compensated by the communities’ reliance on (state) pensions, as the ethnic Dutch are three times more likely to depend on their pensions than the ‘others’ and the Caribbeans, over five times more than the Dutch-Moroccans, and six times more than the Dutch-Turks. However, I would consider (state) pensions as collective savings, to which pensioners have contributed their fair share, while state support is society’s mechanism for assisting those who are temporarily, and for reasons beyond their control, unemployed. The differences in reliance on pensions therefore indicate that the Dutch are, on average, older than most of the other communities; the differential reliance on state support, however, indicates a horizontal inequality in terms of unemployment.

Second, table 7.3 also shows an inequality in the level of public employment, where the Dutch (15%), Surinamese (14%), and ‘other’ (11%) communities are significantly better represented than the Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks (6%). Third, this pattern is inverted for private sector employment, the main source of income for all non-Dutch communities. Perhaps surprisingly, however, the more allochtone minorities are underrepresented in terms of self-employment, as this appears a segment where the ‘other’ and Dutch communities dominate. It is worth noting here that among the Mediterranean communities, there is a significant difference between the level of entrepreneurship of Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish residents of Amsterdam: while only 3% of the Dutch-Moroccans are self-employed, only 1.5% of the Dutch-Turks are so.
Moroccans rely on their own business for their main income, this is true for over 8% of the Dutch-Turks.

Table 7.4: Monthly net income of household by ethnic category (N=2638)***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Category</th>
<th>&lt; €1350</th>
<th>€1351 - €3200</th>
<th>&gt; €3200</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese-Antillean</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Moroccan</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Turkish</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are thus significant inequalities between the ethnic communities of Amsterdam in their patterns of employment. These are compounded by inequalities in income: table 7.4 displays the total net monthly income per household for each of the ethnic communities. The upper boundary of the lowest category (€1350) roughly corresponds to the minimum income level on basic social security; the middle category contains the Dutch ‘middle incomes’, between the 2008 net modal income and the ‘double modal’ income (€1600-€3200); the upper category then constitutes the Dutch high income category. As the chart shows, almost a quarter of the Dutch are in the high income category, while this is true for only 19% of the ‘others’, around 10% of the Surinamese and Dutch-Turks, and a mere 4% of the Dutch-Moroccans. The size of the middle incomes is relatively similar, although within this category the Dutch have higher average incomes than the other categories. Finally, a quarter of the Dutch-Moroccans and over one third of the Dutch-Turks live on or below the minimum social security level, as opposed to 29% of the Surinamese, 18% the ‘others’ and one sixth of the Dutch. Altogether, therefore, table 7.4 shows that there are clear horizontal inequalities in terms of income.
Table 7.5: Highest level of completed education\textsuperscript{214} by ethnic category (N=2535)***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No education</th>
<th>Lower</th>
<th>Intermediate</th>
<th>Higher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese-Antillean</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Moroccan</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Turkish</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These inequalities are partly the result of discrimination (Andriessen 2007; Andriessen and Ross 2010), but also of differential levels of education. As specified above, a relatively large proportion of the post-colonial and guest worker migrants had little education. Although recent generations of ethnic non-Dutch have made remarkable advances in this regard, these inequalities have to some extent been reproduced until the present day, as indicated by table 7.5. This table shows the percentages of group members along with the highest level of education they have achieved; overall, the Dutch and ‘other’ communities are clearly the most educated, followed by the postcolonial ones and, with some distance, by the Dutch-Turks and Dutch-Moroccans. Among both the Dutch and the ‘other’ communities, over half the population has had some form of tertiary education, as opposed to 37%, 19%, and 14% among Surinamese, Dutch-Moroccan, and Dutch-Turkish communities, respectively. Conversely, around one third of the Mediterranean communities have no formal schooling, as opposed to 6% or less among all other groups. Around 90% of the Dutch-Turks and Dutch-Moroccans with no schooling beyond the primary level, however, are part of the ‘first generation’ of guest workers; the other three educational levels include equal numbers of ‘first-generation’ migrants and their children.

Combined, tables 7.3–7.5 show consistent inequalities between the five main ethnic communities in Amsterdam. First, the ethnic Dutch (and ‘others’) are consistently at the top

\textsuperscript{214} No education: primary school or no schooling; low education: lower secondary education (VSO, VBO, LBO, MAVO, MULO, or VMBO); intermediate: lower tertiary or higher secondary education (MBO, BBL, BOL 3-4, HAVO, VWO, HBS, or MMS); and higher education: polytechnic or university (HBO or WO).
of the class pyramid; second, the postcolonials are consistently positioned between them and the Mediterranean communities; and third, the Dutch-Turks and Dutch-Moroccans are consistently at the bottom of the ranking (cf. Stewart 2008b: 7-9). It is argued here that these inequalities hardened ethnic identity boundaries in the city by feeding grievances on both sides. On the one hand, these inequalities have fuelled a sense of socio-economic exclusion among the postcolonials and among the Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks. Among the ethnic Dutch, on the other hand, they have fostered the notion that the other communities – and especially the Dutch-Moroccans – are ‘problematic’ burdens to the welfare state.

Building on these findings, the subsequent section will discuss the extent to which ethnic and religious identities have become part of the city’s salient discourses of belonging: it will, in other words, assess the degree to which these identities are used to define belonging on the basis of nativism. Before we turn to this topic, however, let us briefly consider the extent to which patterns of residence in Amsterdam follow ethnic or religious lines. Deurloo and Musterd (1998; 2002) and Musterd and De Vos (2007) have analysed the relationship between ethnicity and residential patterns at the micro-level in Amsterdam. In the period between 1994 and 2004, their findings showed that there was no evidence for “a process of of ghettoisation”, but that “concentration areas” or “clusters of immigrants” were more appropriate analytical terms to describe the Amsterdam situation (Deurloo and Musterd 1998: 395-6). In 1999, “only one-third of the Moroccans and Turks live[d] in the clusters identified […]. Moreover only 29% of the population in the Moroccan clusters was Moroccan; in the Turkish clusters less than 21% of the residents were of Turkish origin” (Musterd and Deurloo 2002: 501).

Although these analyses disregard the dominance of the ethnic Dutch in many areas of the city, they underline the fact that Amsterdam has no areas that are exclusively, or even in majority, inhabited by single non-Dutch ethnic groups. There are, however, areas of the city where certain non-Dutch ethnic groups are overrepresented. As Musterd and Deurloo (2002:
argue, the Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks are most distinctly overrepresented in
the western parts of Amsterdam outside the A10 ring road. The Surinamese, meanwhile, are
most concentrated in parts of the south-east of Amsterdam outside the A10, in the Bijlmer
neighbourhood (ibid.). The ring road is thus a boundary that separates an increasingly Dutch
and ‘other’ central area of Amsterdam from its increasingly Caribbean, Dutch-Turkish, and
Dutch-Moroccan suburbs. Corroborating the work of Musterd, Deurloo, and De Vos et al.
(2008: 60–2) also show that the proportions of ‘non-Western’ allochtonen within the ring road
have remained stable since 1992, while they have increased about 50% in the suburban
boroughs.

There is thus an ethnic dimension to patterns of residence in Amsterdam, although it is
complicated and considerably less hard-bounded than the ethnic and religious segregation in
Kano. Chapter 6 has suggested that Amsterdam’s ethnic segregation was partly due to
horizontal inequalities: like the poor Dutch Amsterdammers from the Jordaan before them,
ethnic minorities moved from their small and increasingly expensive housing in central
Amsterdam to the larger and relatively cheaper ‘garden city’ suburbs (Dagevos 2009; Scheffer
2006). Other explanations, however, may include ‘white flight’, the strong preference of some
non-Dutch communities to live close to their family, friends, and ethnic community members
(Dagevos 2009; Kullberg et al. 2009), and the subtle differences in general residential
preferences between Dutch and non-Dutch ethnic groups215.

7.3 Belonging in Amsterdam: Autochtonie and Amsterdammers

Within this diverse and unequal Amsterdam society, people use various diverging, and often
competing, discourses to define what it means to belong in their city. The three most salient
discourses of belonging in the city, as presented in table 7.6, will be discussed here:

(2009), Bos et al. (2005), and Lindner (2002).
bureaucratic autochthony, *autochtonie*, and urban citizenship. Building on the analysis of their historical trajectory in chapter 6, we will briefly outline each of these three discourses and finish the section by assessing their impact on Amsterdam’s residents’ subjective sense of belonging in the city.

**Table 7.6: Definitions of belonging in Amsterdam**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition of belonging</th>
<th>Bureaucratic autochthony</th>
<th><em>Autochtonie</em></th>
<th>Urban citizenship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bureaucratic autochthons, Western allochthons, non-Western allochthons; defined by country of birth (of parents)</td>
<td><em>Autochtoenen</em> and <em>allochtoenen</em>, defined by ethnicity, religion, and status/class</td>
<td><em>Amsterdammers</em>, other residents, and visitors; defined by duration residence and attachment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.3.1 *Bureaucratic autochthony*

Derived from the geological notion of allochthonous, an adjective “denoting sediment or rock that originated at a distance from its present” (McKean 2005), the term *allochtoon* denotes someone with at least one parent who was born outside the Netherlands (thus including the so-called first and second generations of migrants) (Keij 2000). This form of autochthony will be referred to as ‘bureaucratic autochthony’. In effect, it thus takes one variable to represent one's ethnic origins, which, in turn, single-handedly defines one’s status of belonging as a bureaucratic allochthon or autochthon. Moreover, in order to separate those allochthons with similar socio-economic and cultural backgrounds to the autochthons from the potentially more ‘problematic’ ones, the CBS introduced a distinction between Western and non-Western allochthons.

There is an aspect of self-evident and crisp neutrality to bureaucratic autochthony, partly based on the scientific, technocratic connotations of its terminology: like allochthonous rocks,

---

216 ‘Western’: all countries in Europe (except Turkey), North America, Oceania, Japan, Indonesia (Keij 2000). Here, the CBS explicitly collapses socio-economic features of societies with their alleged cultural background - the latter of which is captured in the Western/non-Western distinction. It presents the distinction as a necessary statistical trick, that needs to accommodate the social ‘fact’ of essential and categorical difference between those migrants who can easily integrate and those whose class status and cultural background prevents them from effective integration.
allochthons were now categorised along an objective characteristic (historical or familial origins) rather than complex social variables. Far from neutral, however, the policy distinction uses a primordial notion of ethnic identity - as determined by one's family’s place of birth - that is virtually impossible to change\textsuperscript{217}. Allochthons defined in the bureaucratic sense, especially those classified as non-Western, have virtually no avenues for assimilation into autochthons, except through two generations of marriages with autochthonous Dutch partners. Bureaucratic autochthony is therefore a form of nativism based on a reductive and primordial notion of ethnicity.

7.3.2 *Autochtonie*

In everyday Amsterdam society, however, the narrowly defined notion of bureaucratic autochthony has remained policy-speak, mostly used in texts pertaining to policy and those that explicitly use social statistical data on diversity and integration. The terminology of *autochtoon* and *allochtoon*, at the same time, has become translated into a colloquial discourse of *autochtonie*. In this usage, the word *allochtoon* has come to denote those individuals in Amsterdam who may formally have the rights of citizenship, but whose status as ‘fully belonging’ members of society is questioned on the basis of their ethnic and religious characteristics. The term *allochtoon* may thus be used generally, denoting anyone who does not look or speak like an *autochtone* Dutch person or whose name ‘looks foreign’. Due to the salience of Islam and the ‘deviance’ of Dutch-Moroccan youths in public discourses on diversity, however, the Islamic *allochtone* communities remain squarely at the bottom of the ethnic hierarchy.

In contrast, the binary opposite of *allochtoon*, *autochtoon*, has become both an opaque and a contested term. On the one hand, it came into existence as the necessary residual category of

\textsuperscript{217} Cf. Schinkel’s (2008: 39) “deindividualised individualisation”.

234
allochtoon, denoting what Schinkel (2008) refers to as the dispensation of ethnicity for autochtonen. On the other, however, autochtoon has also increasingly become used as a synonym for white and Dutch, denoting those residents who can trace their historical and family roots in the Netherlands and have certain ‘quintessentially Dutch’ characteristics. In everyday life, the boundaries between autochtoon and allochtoon allow for a large ‘grey’ intermediate area, largely signified through visible markers of difference. For example, certain features of Islam are highly visible and therefore mark the allochtone status of individuals (e.g. the headscarf or the djellaba dress). Language may have a similar function, as may certain phenotypical aspects: ‘Moroccan’ or ‘Turkish’ features, dark skin and hair, and other physical characteristics. ‘Race’ has thus become one of most important the symbolic markers of autochtone, allowing people of European origins, for example, to be identified as autochtonen – provided they have lived in the Netherlands for a long time and speak Dutch fluently.

It is a widely held idea that social class has lost most of its importance in the context of the Netherlands (e.g. Dronkers and Ultee 1995b; Tolsma et al. 2007). Cultural difference, language deficiencies, and other such variables related to migration and diversity are used instead, a trend that fits with the ‘new realist’ discourse on diversity, but that also obscures the connections between structural (horizontal) inequality and diversity. It denies any connection between the definition of allochtoon and its class position, a claim that is untenable because the categories of allochtoon and autochtoon are inherently hierarchical and linked to forms of political and economic exclusion. Allochtonen are seen as ‘problematic’ because of their culture and their lack of participation and have thus become the new ‘underclass’ (Scheffer 2000), bounded by its primordial ethnic origins. Class is thus by definition part of the autochtone discourse, even if this discourse may be used to obscure the dynamics of class and inequality that operate between Amsterdam’s ethnic groups.
A final aspect of the *autochtonie* discourse is its relation to gender. Although neither *allochtoon* nor *autochtoon* has any explicit gender connotations, gender does play a role in defining the most problematic segments of the *allochtone* category: namely, young Mediterranean, Muslim men. They are widely viewed as violent, insolent, abusive, and disrespectful; the young women, on the other hand, are considered to be inhibited in their much more successful ‘integration’ and development by their male family members. In similar vein, gender also figures rather prominently in the new realist discourse as a reason to denote Islam as a “backward culture” (Hirsi Ali 2002, 2006, 2007). The assumed lack of gender equality in Islamic cultures is one of the prominent arguments in the new realist plea for socio-cultural assimilation and the necessity for a dominant Dutch *Leitkultur*. Ayaan Hirsi Ali and her supporters were most vocal in their expression of this argument, although her position as defender of Muslim women’s rights was disputed because of her rhetorical style.

In sum, *autochtonie* is an ethnic hierarchy of belonging, primarily based on ethnic origins but with strong connotations of religion, race, class, and gender. It is a colloquial discourse, existing alongside the policy-oriented language of bureaucratic autochthony. Although this thesis attempts to separate the two notions analytically, there is considerable overlap in the ways in which these words are used in Dutch everyday language. However, in general, the categories of both bureaucratic and colloquial *autochtonie* are used to classify others rather than to identify oneself. Identifying oneself as either *allochtoon* or *autochtoon* is more likely to occur through ethnic or religious identification. Thus, Dutch-Moroccan young men who wish to emphasise their distance from Dutch society may emphasise their Muslim or Moroccan identity. In a similar vein, a Dutch commentator who wishes to highlight his or her *autochtone* identity may emphasise his or her Dutch Christian affiliations; alternatively, this pundit may reiterate his or her commitment to the ‘*autochtone* values’ of gender equality and free speech. In effect, therefore, everyday forms of *autochtonie* may be defined differently by different people and communities, depending on the situation and the symbols at hand.
7.3.3 Urban citizenship: Amsterdammers

Due to the virtually inextricable connection between ethnicity, Islam, and *autochtonie*, it has become difficult to talk about diversity and identity in the Netherlands without implicitly referring to and thus reinforcing *autochtonie*. Amsterdam’s discourse of urban citizenship forms an exception to this rule. The concept of *Amsterdammers* has a long history, but where the 16\(^{th}\)- and 17\(^{th}\)-century conception of urban citizen had formal legal, political, and economic dimensions, the current concept of *Amsterdammer* is a flexible social term that allows for multiple and layered understandings (Müller 2008). In addition to residence within the city, many people in Amsterdam would argue that a condition for membership of the community of *Amsterdammers* is to have been born in Amsterdam. But perhaps most importantly of all, an *Amsterdammer* should self-identify with his or her city and feel attached to it. Having lived in the city, having grown up in its streets, knowing its history and the informal norms, and feeling a sense of belonging in the city are thus the main characteristics that define *Amsterdammers* and distinguish them from other residents.

The physical reality of Amsterdam is important to the ways in which the city is imagined; many of its buildings, streets, canals, and markets have become symbolic landmarks in the mental city map *Amsterdammers* have of their place of residence. Water is the prime factor in this symbolic representation, in the shape of the Amsterdam’s canals, the Amstel and IJ rivers, the North Sea channel, and the city’s sea port. Although surpassed in economic significance by Rotterdam, the sea port is still a great source of employment and income, with a transhipment of 95 million tons and a direct and indirect added value of €5.6 billion in 2008 (Port of Amsterdam 2009). Like Schiphol airport, the sea port brought prosperity, growth, and diversity, as well as the mercantile aspect characteristic of so many other port cities. It has also fostered the development of Amsterdam’s many street markets, most important of which are those on the Albert Cuypstraat, the Dapperstraat, and the Waterlooplein. The most significant canals (the *Herengracht*, *Keizersgracht*, and *Prinsengracht*) were constructed during
the city’s Golden Age in the early 17th century and still express that era’s particular ideas about splendour and riches (Schama 1988).

In addition to a merchant city and the nation’s capital, Amsterdammers also view their city with a sense of “capital arrogance”218. Amsterdam is seen as fashionable, international, and progressive and thus on a par with other major international cities and miles ahead of any other place within the confines of the Netherlands. Being an Amsterdamer therefore indicates, especially for students and young professionals, belonging to ‘the place to be’. The international or diverse aspect of the city plays an important role in this imagination, for Amsterdammers do not praise their city just for its diversity in ethnic or religious terms, but also in terms of lifestyles, sexuality, and the arts. A recent survey by the municipal Research and Statistics Service (O+S) underscores Amsterdam’s popular characteristics219: its diversity, freedom, and multiculturalism (mentioned by 29% of respondents); the physical beauty of its city centre, particularly the Palace on the Dam and the canals (23%); its liveliness and gezelligheid (conviviality) (8%); and the (high) culture of its museums and theatres (6%) (O+S 2009a). Interestingly, Amsterdam’s football club Ajax only received 3 votes (1%), fewer than the Mayor Job Cohen (2%). This is perhaps indicative of the declining support for the club within the city of Amsterdam, a trend that extends not only to football but to many other professional sports as well (Randewijk 2003).

The boundary between Amsterdammers and outsiders is fuzzy, because it is marked by protracted residence and attachment to the city, both of which are difficult to observe in daily interactions. The only directly observable symbol of Amsterdammers would be their Amsterdam Dutch accent; but as this is relatively easy to acquire, it indicates the speaker’s eagerness to be recognised as an Amsterdamer rather than his or her actual connections to the city. Thus defined, the Amsterdamer cleavage is highly inclusionary and has few links

218 Jan Rath, professor of sociology, 17/1/2008 in Amsterdam.
219 Data based on a telephone and internet survey among 440 Amsterdam residents administered in 2009, which contained the following question: “Can you summarise (in one word) what aspect of Amsterdam makes you proud?”
with other communal cleavages of ethnicity, religion, or *autochtonie*. In fact, in the municipality-sanctioned definition of “We *Amsterdammers*”, the *Amsterdamer* community is simply made up by people who reside in the city, reject violence, and relate to the city constructively (Gemeente Amsterdam 2005c).

There is, however, one additional aspect to the *Amsterdamer* identity: its connection to the Jordaan neighbourhood in the 1950s (de Rooy and Los 2008). The power of this connection, and of public attachment to it, can be illustrated by the funeral of one of the most recent singers from the Jordaan (André Hazes), whose funeral service was held in the Ajax stadium to an audience of over 50,000 mourners. Moreover, the tradition of singing the *levenslied* is now taken up even by non-Dutch *Amsterdammers*, who use this form of musical expression to emphasise their status as *Amsterdammer*\(^{229}\). Over the past two decades, however, these connections between *Amsterdammers* and the residents of the Jordaan have weakened considerably, kept alive mostly by the annual end-of-summer Jordaan festival.

In terms of music, however, it could be argued that rap and hip-hop have taken over some of the significance of the classic *Amsterdammer levenslied*. Although these musical types are appropriated from African-American pop culture, in “karaoke Americanism” (Kooijman 2008: 93-4), they are at the same time authentic cultural expressions, popular among *allochtone* as well as *autochtone* youths in Amsterdam. One of the early examples of this *Nederhop* was the Osdorp Posse, a rapper group from one of Amsterdam’s suburbs set up in the 1980s. Especially the song *Origineel Amsterdams* (Originally Amsterdams) underlines the group’s connection to the city (as do their strong Amsterdam accents), as it is essentially a vocabulary of *Amsterdammer*-Dutch words.

As the genre developed, it became increasingly popular among ethnic minority youths, resident in Amsterdam, which meant that the language and issues within the *autochtonie* discourse mixed with those from the *Amsterdammer* one. Lyrics are particularly informative  

\(^{229}\) E.g. Rachid Aazouzi at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RtpZIVGtBuA&feature=related; last accessed 31-3-2011.
here. On the one hand, many of the songs revolve around classic hip-hop themes such as sex, money, and life ‘on the streets’ of Amsterdam. On the other hand, however, some young *allochtone Amsterdammers* use their songs to express criticism of Dutch society, its perceived structural discrimination and xenophobic political climate. Raymzter’s “*Kutmarokkanen??!*” ( Fucking Moroccans??!) is one of those politically engaged songs, which heckles the pejorative term that entered the public debate by Amsterdam Alderman Oudkerk’s slip of the tongue in front of a television camera, but seems to capture a widely held negative stereotype about young Dutch-Moroccan men in the Netherlands. In a similar vein, rapper Appa’s “*Schuif aan de kant*” (Move over) states: “I rise up for my people and enter the battle / A proud Moroccan is what I remain / So it will be mayhem if you stare at me”. Stigmatisation of young Dutch-Moroccans is also a prominent theme for rapper Salah Edin, whose picture on the cover of his polemical album “*Nederlands grootste nachtmerrie*” (“The Netherlands’ worst nightmare”) explicitly mimics the famous mug shot of Mohammed Bouyeri, Theo van Gogh’s murderer (Kooijman 2008: 130).

From this album, the song “*Het land van…*” (The land of…) shows one extreme take on the *autochtonie* discourse. It is a reaction to an earlier song with the same title, performed by the Dutch rapper duo Lange Frans and Baas B. But where this duo highlights the strength of their identification with the Netherlands, complicated and ambiguous as it may be, Salah Edin rejects the Netherlands as a materialist and racist country where “they reject you because of your name”, “they force you to cause problems”, and where “I was born, but where am I from / the country that labels me a *kutmarokkaan*”. The music video of the song reinforces this message, as it displays Salah Edin (2007) in the living room of a rather sad and fearful *autochtone* Dutch family, while he transforms from an angry ‘Moroccan’ youth into an orange-clad Muslim terrorist destined for Guantanamo Bay. This is a stark contrast to the video of Lange Frans and Baas B (2007), which is taken from a live recording and aims to
provoke empathy through sentimental shots of captivated and tearful members of the audience.

But although Amsterdam’s rappers utilise the language and themes from the *autochtonie* cleavage, this does not mean that notions of urban citizenship and *autochtonie* interact. In fact, I would argue that neither the categories nor the boundaries of urban citizenship are dependent on ethnicity, religion, or bureaucratic autochthony. Being an *Amsterdamer* inherently means being open to diversity, while *Amsterdamer* status is primarily determined by protracted residence and a ‘heart for the city’, and secondarily by an *Amsterdams* accent and the class connotations of the old Jordaan and, more recently, neighbourhoods like Floradorp and Betondorp. The language of *Amsterdammers* is thus individualist and multicultural, but has influence only within the boundaries of the city.

### 7.3.4 Subjective Belonging in Amsterdam

This discussion of the three main notions on belonging in Amsterdam allows us to construct an ideal–typical hierarchy of belonging between ethnic communities, based on the discourses of bureaucratic autochthony and *autochtonie*\(^{221}\). Bureaucratic autochthony ranks autochthons as the category with the strongest claim to belonging, followed by Western allochthons and, finally, non-Western allochthons. In the colloquial discourse of *autochtonie*, this hierarchy is elaborated along ethnic lines: *autochtone* ethnic Dutch are followed by Western ‘other’ communities, the non-Western postcolonial Caribbean groups, and finally the Islamic Dutch-Turks and Dutch-Moroccans. Table 7.7 examines the extent to which this discursive hierarchy is reflected in the subjective sense of belonging of Amsterdam’s ethnic communities.

\(^{221}\) Belonging as an *Amsterdamer* is not conditional on ethnic, religious, or other forms of communal identification; it is therefore expected that there is no difference between ethnic communities in their sense of belonging as *Amsterdammers*. 
Table 7.7: Different measures of belonging by ethnic group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Feeling more Dutch than non-Dutch*** (N=841)</th>
<th>Feeling at home in Amsterdam*** (N=2638)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese-Antillean</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Moroccan</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Turkish</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It depicts two measures of belonging in Amsterdam: first, the proportion of respondents who feel more Dutch than non-Dutch (taken as an indication that they feel *autochtoon*) and, second, the proportions of respondents who feel they are *Amsterdammers*. The table illustrates some important trends linking ethnicity and belonging. First, it reflects the ideal-typical ethnic hierarchy of belonging contained in the *autochtonie* discourse. In terms of feeling Dutch, ethnic communities follow the ranking of *autochtonie* from ethnic Dutch, to ‘others’, to Surinamese-Antillean, to Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks. Second, however, the table also provides evidence for the claim that the *autochtonie* and *Amsterdammer* cleavages are unrelated to each other. Although there is a statistically significant difference between the ethnic communities in the extent to which they feel accepted as an *Amsterdammer* and feel at home in Amsterdam, the differences are small, dwarfed by the fact that for all communities – a large majority feels accepted as *Amsterdammers*. This illustrates the inclusivity of the *Amsterdammer* category and the fact that it is virtually unrelated to ethnic identification.

7.4 Amsterdam’s Identity Repertoire

With these analytical distinctions in mind, let us now examine to what extent the identities connected to *autochtonie* and urban citizenship discourses have become salient in ways people

---

Note 222: Note that the 84% of Dutch who feel *autochtoon* is most likely an underestimated percentage, since this particular question (‘do you feel more like you belong in the Netherlands or in your parents’ home country?’) was only intended to be answered by those people with at least one parent who was not born in the Netherlands (hence the relatively small N). The other percentages for this question are likely to be accurate.
identify themselves. Table 7.8 shows the identities people of different ethnic categories chose as “the most important in the way they think about themselves (with a maximum of three)”. The identity categories are arranged in descending order for the Dutch segment of the population. Before analysing every category in detail, one feature of the table is striking at first sight: the high salience of Amsterdam as a social identity, regardless of the ethnic group in question. This is yet more evidence for the strength and openness of the *Amsterdamer* identity and its salience across the entire city population.

*Table 7.8: Salient identities by ethnic category (N=2638)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dutch</th>
<th>Surinamese-Antillean</th>
<th>Dutch-Moroccan</th>
<th>Dutch-Turkish</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands***</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood***</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation***</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe***</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender**</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion***</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity***</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autochtonie***</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To find out to what extent *autochtonie* identities are salient for people in Amsterdam, we have to zoom in on the individual identity categories, most specifically on those of the Netherlands, religion, and ethnicity. These identities are defined by the *autochtonie* hierarchy: identification with any of these categories therefore signifies the salience of the framework of *autochtonie*. In terms of identification with the Dutch nation or state, table 7.8 shows that the more *autochtone* communities show a stronger identification with the Netherlands. The ethnic Dutch identify more strongly with the Netherlands than the Surinamese-Antilleans and the ‘others’, who in turn identify more strongly with the Netherlands than the Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccans. It should however be noted that of the most *allochtone* ethnic communities, the Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccans,
there is still a substantial minority that does identify with the Netherlands (21% and 18% respectively). While the more *autochtone* groups identify with the Netherlands both as an ethnic identity and nationality, the more *allochtone* groups are more likely to identify with the Netherlands as their country of residence or nationality. This complex pattern underlines the dual (and consequently ambiguous) meanings of the ‘Dutch’ identity: it can be interpreted both as an ethnic category and formal nationality.

Moreover, if we look at the other two territorial identities in the chart two related patterns present themselves. First, there is a clear relationship between *autochtonie* status and identification with one’s neighbourhood: the more *allochtone* an ethnic community is, the more its members identify with their neighbourhood. While only one quarter of the Dutch identify strongly with their neighbourhood of residence, this percentage is 46% for the Dutch-Moroccans and over half of the Dutch-Turks. Second, however, a converse relationship appears in patterns of identification with Europe: the more *allochtone* the status of an ethnic community is, the less its members identify with Europe. In this case the ‘other’ ethnic communities are exceptional, displaying a connection with Europe that is only marginally smaller than that with the Netherlands. A simple explanation for this exception is that many of those within the ‘other’ category are non-Dutch Europeans - as opposed to the large majority of the other non-Dutch communities, whose ethnic origins lie outside of the European region. Intra-European migration thus appears to strengthen European identification, whilst being part of the Mediterranean community reduces European identification most markedly.

With regard to the other two identities (ethnicity and religion) that constitute *autochtonie*, a rather different picture emerges. On the whole, it seems that a more *allochtone* status corresponds to stronger identifications in both ethnic and religious terms. Only 8% of the ethnic Dutch identify with their religion, while barely 4% identify as an ethnic community. The ‘other’ ethnic communities are rather similar in this regard, perhaps illustrating a
common West-European lack of identification with categories of ethnicity and religion. But the salience of ethnicity and religion is markedly higher among the Caribbeans, Dutch-Turks, and Dutch-Moroccans. Religion is particularly important to the Muslim residents of Amsterdam, which is reflected most clearly in the 31% among the Dutch-Turkish and 45% among the Dutch-Moroccans – categories with the highest proportion of Muslims. The pattern of religious identification thus largely follows the pattern of religious behaviour as indicated by regular visits to church or mosque. On this latter indicator, Muslims come out on top (78%), followed by the Christians (68%), other religions (55%), and those without a particular religion (4%).

Drawing the different patterns in table 7.8 together, it seems that the Amsterdammer cleavage is salient throughout the entire city population, with over half the population selecting it as one of their 3 most important identities. As such, its salience is higher than that of the autochtonie cleavage. The final row of table 7.8 shows the combined proportions of each group that have selected one or more of the autochtonie identities (i.e. the Netherlands, ethnicity, or religion). It shows that the combined identities that define autochtonie are most important to the Dutch-Moroccans (at 57%) and least important to the ‘others’ (22%). On average, the autochtonie identities are salient among 41% of the overall city population.

It is important to note that the autochtonie and Amsterdammer identifications are not positively correlated to each other. In fact, while there is no correlation between the two types of identification among the Dutch, Dutch-Moroccans, and ‘others’, there is a negative correlation between identification with Amsterdammers and with autochtonie among Surinamese-Antilleans and the Dutch-Turkish. This indicates that those who identify along autochtonie lines are not more likely to identify as Amsterdammer and vice versa; among

---

223 Only the ethnic Dutch who identify with the Netherlands have been included in this measure; for if a member from an allochtonie ethnic community identifies with the Netherlands, it would denote rather the lack of salience of the autochtonie cleavage.

224 The significant correlations between identification with the Amsterdammer and autochtonie cleavages are as follows: -0.179*** among the Surinamese-Antilleans and -0.255*** for the Turkish.
the Caribbeans and Dutch-Turkish, moreover, identification with one of the two cleavages makes identification with the other one less likely.

Table 7.8 also shows that the ethnic communities differ greatly in the extent to which they identify with the three categories of the Netherlands, religion, and ethnicity. The general pattern is that the more autochtone communities identify more strongly with the Netherlands, while those that are more allochtoon lean towards the categories of religion and ethnicity. It is therefore likely that autochtone is defined differently for different communities: allochtenen view themselves and their social position more in religious and ethnic terms, while autochtenen relate to themselves as members of the Netherlands. In the next chapter we will explore whether this pattern holds true in interethnic interactions, but for now it suffices to emphasise that this divergence constitutes an embodiment of Schinkel’s (2008) dispensation of ethnicity in the self-images of Amsterdam’s population. Ethnicity is deemed to only apply to those people who cannot claim an autochtone status on the basis of their Dutch identity.

Another discrepancy between ethnic communities that is worth noting, but has no connection to the autochtone cleavage, is the one between the religious identification of Dutch-Moroccans and of Dutch-Turks. Although they are both predominantly Muslim and have a strongly allochtone status in the Netherlands, Dutch-Moroccans identify far more often with their religion than Dutch-Turks. This pattern corroborates findings from other studies in the Netherlands, such as Entzinger and Dourleijn’s (2008: 38–47) research in Rotterdam, where Dutch-Moroccans are more strongly attached to their religion and more conformist in the ways they practice it.

Phalet and Haker (2004: 7–8) find a similar difference between Dutch-Turks and Dutch-Moroccans, although the significance of this difference becomes negligible when they control for other background variables. However, they explain the differing religiosity in reference to divergent religious socialisation in Turkey and Morocco: while, in Morocco, the king is both the highest worldly and religious authority in the country, Turkey has known a long historical
process of secularisation. The extent to which this is still relevant for generations of ethnic Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccans born in the Netherlands, however, is questionable. Other explanations might therefore lie in the stronger external religious ascription of Dutch-Moroccans - i.e. the stronger process of discursive ‘Othering’ of Dutch-Moroccans in religious and ethnic terms - and the lower degree of social organisation within the Dutch-Moroccan community (de Koning 2008-88; Phalet and Haker 2004: 8)

The final identity categories in table 7.8, occupation and gender, show surprisingly low levels of salience. It is difficult to find an explanation for the lack of gender identification, especially since gender is such a salient feature of the new realist criticisms of Islam; it seems most likely that the wording of the question was - for want of an appropriate Dutch equivalent of gender - awkward and failed to refer to people’s lived experience. In terms of class, the trend seems to be that the more *autochtoon* a community is, the more its people identify in class terms. This result is particularly puzzling because of the horizontal inequalities between *autochtone* and *allochtone* communities. However, it may well be that the pattern of identification observed here indicates a shift in the meanings and workings of class. Rather than a class-conscious working class that organises its interests vis-à-vis the political and economic elite and therefore strongly identifies with their occupation, it seems more plausible that those Amsterdam residents who identify with occupation are (upper) middle class professionals, whose daily life and sense of self pivots around their career and occupation.

---

225 Occupation is used here as an indicator for class - the more salient one’s occupation, the more class-conscious the person would be.
7.5 Conclusion

This chapter has focused on the way in which social diversity, horizontal inequalities, and salient discourses of belonging in Amsterdam overlap to reinforce a nativist notion of ethnic identities. To this end, section 7.2 has sketched the demographic composition of the city. It has highlighted that, in terms of ethnic self-identification, the ethnic Dutch constitute a 60% majority of the city, while the remaining 40% is divided among a wide range of ethnic groups. The most important of these non-Dutch communities are the Dutch-Moroccan (7%), Dutch-Turkish (6%) and postcolonial Surinamese-Antilleans (8%); the remaining categories were clustered into a residual ‘other’ category (11%). In religious terms, Amsterdam is dominated by people without a religious affiliation (61%), with Christians (16%) and Muslims (15%) as the major religious minorities. There is a significant, though complex, overlap between ethnic and religious affiliations; non-Dutch communities are more likely to be religious, with the Dutch-Turks and Dutch-Moroccans as almost exclusively Islamic communities. These boundaries were shown to coincide with horizontal inequalities in terms of employment, income, and education.

Section 7.3 then discussed how bureaucratic autochthony, autochttonic, and urban Amsterdamer citizenship are the most important definitions of belonging in the city. Bureaucratic autochthony is a policy discourse employed almost exclusively in policy document and official statistics. Autochttonic, in turn, is the colloquial derivative of bureaucratic autochthony and widely used in Dutch society. Essentially, this colloquial form of autochttonic constitutes a ranking of Amsterdam’s ethnic communities, in which some ethnic communities have a stronger claim to belonging than others. Within Amsterdam, the most allochtone groups are the Islamic Dutch-Turks and Dutch-Moroccans, who are different from the autochtone Dutch in ethnic, religious, and class terms. Intermediate positions are occupied by the post-colonial Dutch-Surinamese and Dutch-Antillean communities, who can
claim a certain Dutch heritage but who are visibly (i.e. ‘racially’) and culturally different and are often ‘problematic’ in class terms. European and other ‘Western’ *allochtonen* are closer to the *autochtone* position and could assimilate into the *autochtone* Dutch community.

While bureaucratic autochthony and *autochtonie* thus define belonging along the lines of a nativist ethnic hierarchy, the notion of *Amsterdammer* allows for people to belong in Amsterdam on the basis of residence and self-identification. The discussion in section 7.4 showed that both the *Amsterdammer* and *autochtonie* identities are salient, although the latter is interpreted differently within different communities: while the *autochtone* Dutch identify with the Dutch nation rather than with themselves as an ethnic group, the more *allochtone* ethnic communities define themselves more often in ethnic and religious terms. At most, however, about 50% of the Amsterdam population identifies with Amsterdam, while 41% identify with categories that are defined by *autochtonie*. The fact that there is no positive correlation between the two types of identification indicates that Amsterdam’s ethnic communities are divided within themselves, with substantial proportions identifying exclusively on the basis of either the *Amsterdammer* or *autochtonie* identities.

That said, this chapter has demonstrated that a nativist form of ethnicity is a salient part of Amsterdam’s contemporary discourses of urban belonging. This ethnic cleavage, which primarily distinguishes the *autochtone* Dutch from the *allochtone* Caribbeans, Dutch-Turks, and Dutch-Moroccans, intersects with religious divisions and horizontal inequalities and is the prime defining factor of *autochtonie* and bureaucratic autochthony. The chapter has demonstrated the salience of ethnic and religious identities as well as the extent to which people in Amsterdam have internalised the ethnic hierarchy of *autochtonie*. At the same time, however, the chapter has also substantiated the salience of the inclusive *Amsterdammer* discourse of urban citizenship, which has no connection to ethnicity or *autochtonie*. This territorial definition of urban belonging was shown to be more relevant to social identification and diversity than nativist ethnicity. Subsequent chapters will explore the extent to which
this tension - between nativist and territorial notions of belonging, or between *autochtonie* and *Amsterdammers* - is reproduced in Amsterdam’s politics and its social relations.
8.1 Introduction

This chapter will zoom in on the role of ethnicity and autochtonie in the governance of Amsterdam, examining the ways in which institutions, political authorities, and public policies reproduce, or diminish, the salience of nativism. As Andeweg and Irwin (2009: 169-91) argue, governance in the Netherlands includes a wide range of actors and organisations. Due to the long history of corporatism\textsuperscript{226} in the Netherlands, intertwined with the legacies of pillarisation, organised interests have become integrated into the decision-making process of Dutch politics alongside the organisations of the Dutch state. Traditionally, these corporatist tendencies are strongest in the field of socio-economic policy, where interests are well-organised into unions that have become accepted as permanent negotiation partners in the formulation of policy and collective wage agreements (CAOs). Even though union membership has decreased over the past decades, the unions have retained their institutionalised influence to the extent that over 80\% of employees in the Netherlands are bound by their collective agreements (ibid.: 170).

Socio-economic policy, however, is not the only field in which corporatism is visible, the most relevant example in the context of this thesis being the incorporation and subsidisation of ethnic and religious organisations as representatives of ethnic minority interests. Moreover, it may be argued that while socio-economic organisations are powerful in the overall governance process in the Netherlands, they have little influence over the aspects of

\textsuperscript{226} This thesis takes Andeweg and Irwin’s (2009: 169) definition as its guide: “corporatism [is] an empirical relationship between interest groups and the government that is based on exchange (influence for support) and on co-operation rather than competition”
interest to this thesis: diversity policies, definitions of belonging, and community building\textsuperscript{227}. Therefore, in discussing political authorities in Amsterdam, section 8.2 will focus on the state and on ethnic and religious organisations. This will be followed by discussions of the relative authority of these political actors (section 8.3) and of the opportunities for political participation available to residents of Amsterdam (section 8.4). Section 8.5 will then consider some of the social policies through which the Dutch state attempts directly to affect notions of belonging, identification, and community in Amsterdam.

8.2 Political Organisations

This section describes the organisational structure and societal roles of the main types of political organisations discussed in this chapter: the state, ethnic, and religious organisations.

8.2.1 The State

The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy, in which the core of the state consists of an executive, legislature, and judiciary that are replicated on different levels. At the national level, the legislature is constituted by the Staten-Generaal ("States-General") in The Hague, that is the First and Second Chambers composed of elected representatives of political parties. The executive is constituted by the Dutch cabinet that consists of thematic ministers, secretaries of state (staatssecretarissen, i.e. junior ministers), and the royal head of state. Although the Netherlands is formally a monarchy, the political role of the King or Queen is strictly curtailed to a few specific functions and any political involvement of the royal family is carefully kept away from the public eye. The cabinet is politically responsible for all public actions of members of the royal family, who therefore have to ensure that they appear in

\textsuperscript{227} The increasing ethnic and religious diversity of Dutch society has, in fact, proven a challenge and source of ambivalence for many socio-economic interest groups, as indicated in the case of unions by Roosblad (2002).
public to be completely politically neutral. This neutrality applies to ideology, but equally to
religion and ethnicity: the royal head of state does not only symbolically represent the
\textit{autochtone} Dutch, but all those who can claim Dutch citizenship. As such, the Queen
represents the Netherlands not defined along ethnic lines, but by residence and formal
citizenship.

In addition to the royal family and the cabinet, the state of the Netherlands comprises
national, provincial, and local or municipal governments. Amsterdam even has a fourth level
of government, constituted by the seven city boroughs (\textit{stadsdelen}), each of which comprises a
civil service, a small elected council, and an executive branch\textsuperscript{228}. Based on the local
government sources of income, which in majority originate from the national government,
Andeweg and Irwin (2009: 199) maintain that the Netherlands is “a highly centralised
country”. At the same time, however, there is considerable overlap between responsibilities
on all levels in various policy areas, especially in education, social welfare, diversity and
integration, taxation, health care, economic affairs, security, justice, housing, infrastructure,
and the environment. These overlaps leave only a few policy fields exclusively to one of the
state levels, leaving fields such as foreign affairs, defence, and immigration to the national
state and local issues such as urban planning and the management of the city’s red light
district to Amsterdam’s municipality.

The Dutch electoral system is based on proportional representation, in which parties only
require the number of votes that is equivalent to one seat in parliament (or the local council)
in order to win the seat. The “extreme proportionality” (Andeweg and Irwin 2009: 97) that
results from this low electoral threshold allows for the political representation of highly
specific interests and ideologies through viable political parties, a prime example being the
Party for the Animals, which currently has 2 seats in the national parliament. The multi-party
system was crucial in maintaining the stability of the consociational system that characterised

\textsuperscript{228} Gerben Menke, policy advisor, 18/4/2008 in Amsterdam.
pillarised politics, as it allowed all pillars to be represented independently and on an equal footing. In the same way, it offers an opportunity for political mobilisation and organisation around the cleavages of ethnicity, *autochtonie*, or religion, an opportunity that has to some extent been utilised, at least within the camp of the ethnic Dutch. The spectrum of political parties both at the national and local Amsterdam level helps to underline this point.

In the national elections of 2010, 17 parties participated of which 10 actually obtained seats in parliament; similarly, 9 out of 19 participating parties acquired seats in the Amsterdam council. Most of the parties in the national parliament are replicated in the Amsterdam council, if only in different proportions.\(^{229}\) 3 are represented in The Hague but not in Amsterdam\(^{230}\), while 2 parties\(^ {231}\) are exclusive to Amsterdam. Out of all these political parties, five are in some way defined in relation to the cleavages of *autochtonie* or ethnicity: Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV), Verdonk’s Proud of the Netherlands (TON), and the three main Christian parties. However, while religion is one of the dimensions along which *autochtonie* is defined, the three Christian parties differ substantially in their stance towards non-Dutch ethnic groups and Muslims. On the one hand, the Christian-Democratic CDA has been a strong defender of the religious freedom of Muslims and their rights to set up schools and other faith-based institutions, even to the extent that a substantial number of CDA members, several local CDA politicians, and one CDA member of parliament, are Muslims.

On the other hand, however, the orthodox *Staatkundig Gereformeerd Partij* (SGP) takes a more confrontational stance towards Muslims and Islam in the Netherlands (Segers 2009). The SGP defines the Netherlands as a Christian country and emphasises the unique position of Christianity as one of the moral foundations of the Dutch nation. In consequence, the

\(^{229}\) I.e. the social-democratic *Partij van de Arbeid* (PvdA), the conservative-liberal *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie* (VVD), the Christian-Democratic *Appèl* (CDA), the progressive-liberal *Democraten 66* (D66), progressive-socialist GroenLinks, the socialist party (SP), and the Party for the Animals (PvdD).

\(^{230}\) I.e. Wilders’ PVV and the two conservative-Christian parties (CU and SGP).

\(^{231}\) I.e. the populist party Proud of the Netherlands (TON) and Save Amsterdam (RA). In the councils of the individual stadsdelen several other small local parties are represented, such as *Tulpen voor Amsterdam* (“Tulips for Amsterdam”) in New-West, *Leefbaar Noord* (“Liveable North”) in North, and *Zuid-en Pijpbelangen* (“South and Pijp Interests”) in South.
party argues for restraining public expressions of “cultures and religions that do not fit in Dutch society” (SGP 2010: 29). Moreover, they “reject the equal treatment of religions in the Netherlands [because] it is a government responsibility to support the Gospel and fight idolatry” (Brouwer 2005: 26-7). Balancing between the religious exclusivity of the SGP and the inclusion of the CDA, the Christian Union (CU) acknowledges both how “multicultural churches have brought the Christian faith and social cohesion back into their neighbourhoods” (CU 2010: 17) and how these “newcomers” have brought change, tensions, and uncertainty (ibid.). Like the CDA, however, the CU emphasises the unconditional freedom of religious expression of Muslims and Christians alike.

The SGP is therefore the only Christian party that is structurally opposed to the presence of the Muslims in the Netherlands, due to their belief in the connection between the Dutch nation and the Christian faith, or the ‘Judeo-Christian’ origins of Dutch society. Although even more strongly opposed to Muslim allochtonen in the Netherlands, ‘new realist’ parties such as the PVV and TON use slightly different arguments. To take Wilders’ PVV as the representative case of this political discourse, its 2010 election manifesto, under the heading of “Voting for the eradication of Islam and against the mass immigration”, argues that Islam is a totalitarian ideology (PVV 2010: 13). The importance of this ‘analytical’ claim in the Dutch context is that as an ideology, Islam can be excluded from the Dutch pillarised politics of providing state finance for religious schools and from the principle religious freedom. The claim thus allows the PVV to propose anti-Islamic policies, such as taxing the Islamic veil and prohibiting the quran, burqa, and the building of mosques (PVV 2010: 15), without contradicting the Dutch constitution.

Although many commentators emphasise the Dutch shift from multiculturalism to the assimilation policies exemplified by the PVV, assimilation still faces competition. As a sketch, it is possible to outline four distinct ideological positions to diversity that remain salient in Dutch politics: ‘old’ multiculturalism, ‘new realism’, socio-economic participation, and urban
citizenship. Multiculturalism in the Netherlands is defined by the top-down support for the emancipation of *allochtonen* as ethnic communities and is promoted, at the national political level, by a discourse coalition of ethnic and religious associations and left-wing progressives. In more abstract terms, it reflects aspects of Scholten’s (2011: 39–40) ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘differentialism’. Dutch political parties no longer, however, support this diversity approach, because they all have adopted aspects of its ‘new realist’ critique. New realists, though arguably even less coherent than multiculturalists, generally emphasise the incompatibility of *allochtonen* and the Dutch nation and blame the individual *allochtonen* for their ‘backwardness’ in socio-economic as well as religious and cultural terms. As such, it reverberates with Scholten’s (2011: 38) ‘assimilationism’. The PVV and SGP arguably represent the extreme cases of this discourse, but other political parties and authorities have adopted their arguments in the language of ‘integration’.

Third, socio-economic emancipation and participation was the dominant language during the ‘purple’ years between 1994 and 2002. Its proponents reject the responsibility of the state in matters of culture, ethnicity, and religion, and therefore focus on *allochtonen* as a socio-economic ‘problem’. In principle, emphasising the socio-economic dimension can reflect ‘universalist’ aspirations (Scholten 2011: 40–1) and challenge the nativism meanings of ‘integration’; however, in the run-up to the 2010 elections, only the progressive-liberal D66 propagated such universalism, stating that “*autochtoon* or *allochtoon* is of no importance [to integration]” (D66 2010: 19). Other political parties include socio-economic aspects in their notion of ‘integration’, but without challenging the nativist assumptions inherent in *autochtonie*. This stands in contrast to the discourse of urban citizenship, as discussed above, since it defines belonging in Amsterdam solely on residence within the city and is actively

---

232 The language of ‘integration’ has become virtually hegemonic among those who propagate multicultural, new realist, or even socio-economic approaches to diversity. As with many hegemonic concepts, however, its meaning has become all but vacuous, denoting virtually anything between socio-economic emancipation and enforced cultural assimilation. Perhaps its only defining characteristic is its reliance on the language of *autochtonie*, drawing a boundary between those who are liable to ‘integrate’ (*allochtonen*) and the *autochtonen* who, at most, have to make room for the *allochtonen* to fit in.
promoted by political parties in Amsterdam and by the city’s social-democratic council and government.

8.2.2 Ethnic and Religious Organisations

Although the Dutch state, therefore, is not organised along the lines of ethnicity, religion, or *autochtonic*, these identity cleavages are at the heart of some political parties. These parties were shown to represent the exclusionary *autochtone* part of the Dutch ethnic hierarchy; non-Dutch ethnic or religious political parties are conspicuous only in their absence. In contrast, however, Amsterdam hosts a wide range of organisations structured around ethnic and religious groups, which operate just outside the direct reach of the state. Penninx and Schrover (2001) and Van Heelsum (2004a, 2004b) argue that the institutional role of these organisations originates in the period of simultaneous depillarisation, rapid immigration, and the rise of the welfare state of the 1970s and 1980s. After a decade of multicultural critique, the first years of the 21st century witnessed a gradual change in the state’s attitude towards these ethnic organisations: rather than catering only for ‘their own’ ethnic constituents, these organisations, many of which were still dependent on government funding, now were to become catalysts for the ‘integration’ of their communities (Scholten and Holzhacker 2009).

In a set of studies performed around the year 2000, Van Heelsum (2001a, 2001b, 2004a, 2004b), Van Heelsum and Voorthuysen (2002), and Berger et al. (1998) mapped out the existing ethnic organisations among the four main Amsterdam communities. At the time, they found a total of 684 organisations: 217 Surinamese, 43 Antillean, 189 Turkish, 173 Moroccan, and 62 Ghanaian.233 Changes in the subsidy regulations are likely to have reduced

---

233 For the Netherlands as a whole, Van Heelsum (2004) also describes organisations of Moluccans, Chinese, and a wide range of communities of refugees, fled from wars in Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, Vietnam, and others. These organisations are smaller in number, however, and focussed specifically on the refugee status of their constituents. Therefore, we will base our analysis on the organisations of the main ethnic communities in Amsterdam: the Surinamese-Antilleans, the Moroccans, and the Turkish. Note how ‘Western’ allochtone communities are not represented as ethnic groups - rather, they find representation
these numbers, but perhaps not radically: as Vermeulen (2005) has shown for the Surinamese and Dutch-Turkish community organisations in Amsterdam, the significant reductions in state subsidies in the 1990s had little effect on the survival of these organisations. They did, however, affect their character and it is therefore to be expected that the contemporary policy priority of ‘integration’ has trickled down into the missions and targets of ethnic organisations in Amsterdam. One example of this shift is the association Assadaaka, which has transformed in recent years from a Moroccan community association into an “international multicultural organisation” aiming to enhance emancipation, participation, and social cohesion234 (van Hees 2010: 13).

It is therefore reasonable to assume that the overall total of organisations has remained relatively stable, even if their functions may have shifted over the past decade. This means that Amsterdam has a dense network of organisations: between 3 to 7 ethnic organisations per 1000 people in all the major non-Dutch ethnic communities (van Heelsum 2001a: 5). Many of these organisations, however, may be considered ‘dormant’, i.e. without any significant activity beyond the appointment of board members. The functions of the active organisations are mainly centred on religion, community welfare, language and culture, sports, internet, women’s issues, politics235, and education (Driessen and van der Werf 2004; van der Sar et al. 2009).

The emphasis within this range of issues depends on the ethnic community in question, as well as on the political opportunity structure. Surinamese, Turkish, and Moroccan organisations are often set up around a religious purpose, due to the fact that the majority of these communities adheres to religions that had no institutional representation in the

---

234 Ahmed el Mesri, director Assadaaka, 13/4/2008 in Amsterdam.

235 Political organisations along ethnic lines are usually unrelated to Dutch political parties, but are connected to politics in the country of origin of ethnic communities. These organisations, such as the Moroccan left-wing KMAN and the conservative Amicales, have lost a substantial amount of their participants and social relevance among the children of the ‘first-generation’ migrants.
Netherlands prior to their arrival. Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccan Muslims have thus established mosques and Islamic associations, Creole Surinamese evangelical churches and *winti* associations, and *Hindoestaanse* Surinamese both Hindu temples and Surinamese mosques. In the early years of their residence, in the 1970s and 1980s, these religious organisations were often supported by local churches (whether in terms of financial support or by offering the organisations the use of church-owned buildings and other resources\(^{236}\)).

Due to linguistic, theological, and cultural differences, most non-Christian religious organisations were established by ethnic constituencies; the Surinamese evangelical churches, as an exception, are increasingly co-operating with similar organisations of other ethnic backgrounds, such as those of Nigerians and Ghanaians. Due to secularisation among the ethnic Dutch population, many Christian organisations are eager to include members of non-Dutch ethnic communities; if only because they represent the only growing Christian constituency in the Netherlands. This is true for the Protestant Church of the Netherlands (PKN), the largest Protestant church in the Netherlands representing the previously independent Dutch Reformed, *Gereformeerde*, and Lutheran churches, as well as for the Roman Catholic church\(^{237}\). Among Muslims, however, such institutional co-operation has been problematic and rare, with the notable, but short-lived (2008-2010) example of the inter-ethnic *Poldermoskee*.

### 8.3 Authority

With this overview of the state, ethnic, and religious actors in Amsterdam in mind, this section will analyse the relative legitimacy and authority of these actors. Political authority in the Netherlands has undergone rapid and drastic changes over the past 50 years. In 1956, Van

---

\(^{236}\) Berry van Oers, staff Roman-Catholic church, 16/6/2008 in Utrecht.

\(^{237}\) Ds Bas Plaisier, scriba PKN, 14/5/2008 in Utrecht; Prof. Eduard Kimman, SG Dutch Bishops Conference, 8/5/2008 in Amsterdam
Doorn (2009: 121-2) argued that pillarisation in the Netherlands had merged previously unconnected forms of organisational and ideological social control. For “[within the pillars] we find a tightly knit organisation, control over the means of mass communication, ideological and faith-based educational institutions, and clearly defined planning on the one hand; and a well-defined and bonding ideology that directs behaviour on the other” (ibid.).

This argument formed the backbone of the depillarisation movement of the 1960s and 1970s. The young, and increasingly educated, post-war generation rebelled against their parents and the restrictions the pillarised institutions imposed on them; as such, they rebelled against the authority these institutions commanded. Their protests were a marker of individualisation; affiliations with religion and ideology became centred on the individual experience rather than the community. These trends are apparent in the continuous decline in participation in religious and ideological organisations; except for recreational organisations, membership numbers have dwindled across the board (Bernts et al. 2007; de Hart 2005; Dekker et al. 1997).

Some might interpret these transformations as the decline of political authority and social control per se. In contrast, however, this section suggests that a considerable part has survived, most prominently in the political legitimacy of the Dutch state. Table 8.1 provides an indication of the proportions of Amsterdam’s residents who have at least some level of trust in different political authorities. The first aspect of note in the table is that, while there are considerable differences, all leaders can boast to be trusted by at least half the population. Compared to the Nigerian case, Dutch people are thus considerably more trusting towards their political leaders, especially those that are part of the state. However, the table also shows that there is a clear ranking, moving down from the security services, to the Amsterdam municipal government, the judiciary, the national political institutions, and, finally, religious leaders.
Table 8.1: Proportions of respondents who have “at least some” trust in political institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ABM 2008 data</th>
<th>CV 2006 data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam government</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV 2006 data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autochtoon</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western allochtoon</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-western allochtoon</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National government</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the CV 2006 data, between 52% and 86% of the Dutch population and its ethnic groups trust the various institutions of the state; meanwhile, the ABM 2008 shows that eight out of ten Amsterdam resident trust their municipality. These high percentages suggest a high level of political legitimacy and, consequently, informal authority among Amsterdam’s state actors. As such, they provide a stark contrast to the low trust in political leaders in Kano. These figures also suggest, however, that although national political leaders can count on the trust of the majority of the Dutch population, it rally considerably less support than the leaders involved in Amsterdam’s municipal goverment. These results corroborate the findings of Van der Welle and Mamadouh (2008: 89, 101-2), whose survey of young residents of Amsterdam from various ethnic backgrounds showed remarkably high levels of trust in both the city council and the mayor, especially compared to their low trust in the national government and the parliament.

At the same time, however, Van der Welle and Mamadouh (2008) also show that Amsterdam youths with non-Dutch ethnic backgrounds are more likely to trust religious leaders, but less likely to trust national political institutions than Dutch youths; this

238 The data on trust in the Amsterdam municipality was collected through the ABM 2008 perceptions survey. The data on the other authorities, however, was collected in a different survey: *Culturele Veranderingen* (CV, “Cultural Changes”) in 2006, available at https://easy.dans.knaw.nl/. The survey was designed to represent the entire population of the Netherlands, rather than only the residents of Amsterdam. Moreover, there is a slight difference in the phrasing of the survey questions: while the ABM only offered two degrees of trust (‘very much’ and ‘considerably’), the CV survey offered three (‘unconditional’, ‘very much’, and ‘some’). As both questions only had 2 options for ‘little’ and ‘no’ trust, this is likely to have rendered the ABM trust percentages somewhat lower than the CV2006 ones.
difference hardly existed for the youths’ views of the Amsterdam authorities. The data in table 8.1 suggest the same patterns; however, it should be noted that the bureaucratic autochthony measure was used here for lack of a better indicator of ethnicity in the CV data. If we accept this data weakness, however, table 8.1 does suggest two conclusions about the authority of the state in Amsterdam. Firstly, the ABM data in table 8.1 shows that there is no significant difference between ethnic groups in Amsterdam in terms of their trust in the municipal government: it is uniformly high at 80%. Secondly, the CV data illustrates that bureaucratic autochthons are more likely to trust national political leaders and the police; even among the non-Westen allochthons, however, trust in political institutions never drops below 50%.

What can help explain this relatively high legitimacy of state actors in Amsterdam? And how should we interpret the gap between trust in national and municipal state institutions? Analysing the main sources of legitimacy and authority of Dutch political actors may help to answer these questions. First, political actors within the Dutch state have formal authority in the sense that their position and influence is codified in Dutch law. Moreover, with one exception – the Amsterdam mayor – all political actors are democratically elected and can therefore be expected to hold a measure of democratic legitimacy. Thirdly, national and local Amsterdam politicians alike are highly visible and actively engaged in the public debates on diversity as well as the processes of policy- and decision-making in this area. Although visibility is not considered as a sufficient source of political legitimacy and authority, in the current media-driven political climate it may certainly be a powerful catalyst.

Together, these factors may explain why at least two thirds of the Dutch population trusts both the national and Amsterdam political elites. To explain the relative legitimacy of the Amsterdam municipal government, however, I follow the analysis of Van der Welle and Mamadouh (2008: 89) in arguing for the importance of the attitude and charisma of Mayor Cohen and his message of urban inclusivity. According to them, “youths feel that the mayor
is visible when he should be; when something happens, the mayor is there to deal with it. […] His message of ‘keeping things together’ appeals to youths in Amsterdam especially at times when they feel groups are increasingly standing opposed to each other” (van der Welle and Mamadouh 2008: 89-90). I argue that the open and inclusive stance of Mayor Cohen grants him legitimacy not only in the eyes of Amsterdam’s youths, but also in those of the wider population. In addition to this factor, the relative proximity of the municipal government to Amsterdam’s residents may also contribute to its legitimacy, especially in comparison to more ‘distant’ politicians in The Hague.

In contrast to Amsterdam’s state actors, table 8.1 also suggests that religious institutions are least trusted by Amsterdam’s population. It should be noted, however, that there is a significant difference between the Dutch and non-Dutch ethnic communities\(^{239}\): in the CV 2006 data, religious leaders can boast very high levels of trust among Dutch-Turkish, Dutch-Moroccan, and Dutch-Surinamese communities. These figures are corroborated by Van der Welle and Mamadouh (2008: 102) who show similarly high levels of trust in religious authorities among Amsterdam’s Dutch-Turkish, Dutch-Moroccan, and Dutch-Surinamese youths. Because of the overlap of religious and ethnic organisations in Amsterdam, these figures also imply a significant amount of trust in those ethnic leaders who are also religiously active. Their position, according to an elderly Dutch-Moroccan leader of the Netherlands mosque association UMMON, is based on respect: “we leave people to make their own decisions, but are ready to help them with suggestions and experience. That is all”\(^{240}\).

While religious authorities can count on little trust among the secular majority of Amsterdam residents, there are thus forms of ethnic leadership, often with religious connotations, that grant certain individuals considerable respect and informal authority within their community – in whatever way that community is defined. Such informal

\(^{239}\) These figures are not included in the table because they were calculated on the basis of a notion of ethnicity defined along the lines of bureaucratic autochthony, rather than the self-identified ethnic identity in this thesis.

\(^{240}\) Ahmed Driss el Boujoufi, chairman UMMON, 23/4/2008 in Utrecht.
authority can depend on ‘traditional’ authoritative qualities such as age, religious knowledge, and experience. But it may also rely on appealing leadership, professional success, and ‘television charisma’ - in effect, the traits of a successful contemporary politician. Two examples of such ‘political’ ethnic leaders may be the director of the Dutch Institute for Multiculturalism (FORUM), Sadiq Harchaoui, and the director of the Samenwerkingsverband Marokkaanse Nederlanders (SMN, “Co-operation of Dutch-Moroccans”), Farid Azarkan. Both men are relatively young and successful Dutch-Moroccan professionals. They are charismatic, speak well on television, and thus represent an image that young Dutch-Moroccan people can identify with positively.

8.4 Institutions and Political Participation

These two examples of Harchaoui and Azarkan suggest that ethnic or religious organisations in the Netherlands provide ethnic minorities with access to political legitimacy and authority, even if this is limited to ‘their’ ethnic or religious constituencies. At the same time, however, the preceding sections also highlighted that nativism plays a role in ‘new realist’ and certain Christian political parties, while non-Dutch ethnic or religious political parties are conspicuously absent, regardless of the ‘extreme proportionality’ of the Dutch electoral institutions. This suggests a dominance of the ethnic Dutch in politics, particularly at the expense of Muslim minorities. This section will assess the extent of this political horizontal inequality, by examining the ways in which different ethnic communities in Amsterdam are represented, and may participate, in politics.

In national Dutch politics, about 11% of the members of parliament are affiliated to minority ethnic communities, most of them in ‘leftist’ or ‘progressive’ parties (FORUM 2010: 1). The fourth Balkenende Cabinet (2007–2010) also had two ‘non-Western’

---

241 I.e. PvdA, SP, D66, and Groenlinks.
*allochtone* junior ministers, the Dutch-Turkish Albayrak and Dutch-Moroccan Aboutaleb. As such, ethnic minority representation in the Dutch parliament is roughly proportional to the demographic proportions of the country. This is not true for the Amsterdam city council, where in 2010 roughly 13% was of *allochtone* origins, while this was the case for over 40% of the city population. In the boroughs, however, proportions of ethnic minorities in the legislative councils range from 3% in Amsterdam South to 60% in South East and are roughly proportional to the group sizes.

The representation of ethnic minorities through existing political parties is part of a longer trend that began in 1985, with the extension of the right to vote in local elections to all permanent residents (Berger et al. 2000; Fennema et al. 2000; van Heelsum and Tillie 2006). There are various explanations for this pattern of political participation. A first factor lies in the many ethnic, ideological, and religious divisions between the various *allochtone* ethnic minorities, and their resulting difficulties in joint political mobilisation (e.g. Cadat and Fennema 1996). Second, as Pennings (1987) and Cadat and Fennema (1996) have noted, the political opportunity structure of Dutch politics has pushed *allochtone* ethnic communities to participate through existing parties rather than particularist ethnic or religious parties. From the late 1980s, various political parties - most specifically the PvdA, CDA, and GroenLinks - were actively recruiting members from minority communities. This was pursued through recruitment drives and by establishing intercultural networks within parties, such as the Intercultural Consultation in the CDA and the Commission Ethnic Groups in the PvdA (Ensel 2003).

Irrespective of the Dutch pillarised history and its extreme proportionality in politics, the political opportunity structure in the Netherlands, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, thus allowed for the incorporation of members of *allochtone* ethnic communities into existing political parties. However, these individuals were not necessarily accepted as representatives of their ethnic communities (neither by their political colleagues, nor by the communities
themselves). Instead, they were caught in an intermediary position, in between the expectations of ethnically-Dutch politicians and of ‘their own’ ethnic and religious communities. As Cadat and Fennema (1996) showed, this has been a problematic aspect of allochton political participation for decades. Junior Minister Ahmed Aboutaleb, in a discussion about his critical attitude towards Dutch-Moroccan youths delinquency in Amsterdam, gave the following explanation:

> It has to do with group pressure, it has to do with ethnic solidarity. ‘Whatever those boys do, we know they’re in the wrong, but you can’t say this’ - because then you betray them. [...] That is called betrayal [...] and if you do this the group pushes you away. [...] This price [of being cast out] is high and there are no guarantees that the majority society tells you: welcome, there is plenty of space with us.\(^{242}\)

Ahmed Baadoud, the Dutch-Moroccan chairman of stadsdeel New West, addressed the issue of his ethnic solidarity by leaving the portfolio of ‘integration’ policies for an ethnic Dutch colleague. In this way, he could be a role model for young Dutch-Moroccans with political ambitions, without staking his political career on his ethnic background\(^{243}\). The former Dutch-Moroccan chairman of one of the constituent parts of New West Ahmed Marcouch, however, chose the opposite strategy. Marcouch presented himself as a devout Muslim and a Dutch-Moroccan politician, but also as a crime fighter, especially where it concerned ‘problematic’ Dutch-Moroccan youths. Moreover, he emphasised his identity of a ‘moderate Muslim’: devout, but emphatically in accordance with the liberal laws and values of Dutch society. He thus became a controversial and contradictory politician, at once clamouring for a tough approach to Dutch-Moroccan youths, for the development of New West as an Islamic


\(^{243}\) Ahmed Baadoud, alderman Osdorp, 8/4/2008 in Amsterdam.
neighbourhood, for the importance of teaching Islamic knowledge in schools within the reach of the state, and for the need for recognition of gay rights.

Individual members of *allochton* ethnic communities can thus access political office through the political party structure. But this does not mean that *allochton* ethnic communities as such are represented politically, because of the difficult and ambiguous position of many *allochton* politicians. Building on the remnants of pillarisation, however, the multicultural era had created a second path into politics, through ethnic or religious organisations. As suggested by the successes of, for example, Harchaoui, Azarkan, Aboutaleb\(^{244}\), and Marcouch\(^{245}\), ethnic, religious, and multicultural organisations can provide pathways to informal social, if not formal political, legitimacy and authority. There are two main ways in which these non-state organisations can accomplish this task.

First, ethnic, religious, and multicultural organisations can constitute training and recruitment grounds for existing political parties. They train a cadre of political leaders and managers among minority groups, who are more likely to enter successfully into politics because of their organisational experience. As shown in a considerable academic literature on the relationship between ethnic organisation and political participation, higher levels of organisation among minority ethnic groups lead to higher political participation (Berger et al. 2000; Fennema and Tillie 1999; Fennema et al. 2000; Jacobs and Tillie 2004; Tillie 2004; van Heelsum and Tillie 2006).

Second, ethnic or religious organisations have also provided political access in a more direct way: through Amsterdam’s ethnic advisory councils of the 1980s and 1990s that were consulted (and subsidised) directly by the municipal government. In the post-2004 reorganisation of its diversity policies, however, the Amsterdam municipality abolished the ethnic advisory councils and replaced them with a single advisory council on diversity.

\(^{244}\) Ahmed Aboutaleb was director of FORUM (1998-2002), the multicultural institute of the Netherlands, prior to his involvement in the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA).

\(^{245}\) Ahmed Marcouch was spokesperson for UMMON, prior to his involvement in the PvdA.
(Adviesraad voor Diversiteit). Rather than on the basis of ethnicity, this council was composed on the basis of professional expertise in specific fields related to diversity policy, such as education, employment, entrepreneurship, and criminality.

At the national level, however, the ‘multicultural’ structure of ethnic advisory councils was maintained through the Landelijk Overleg Minderheden (LOM, “National Consultation Minorities”) that was set up in 2002. The LOM consists of seven ‘umbrella’ organisations, aiming to represent the Chinese, Turkish, Southern European, Caribbean, Surinamese, Moroccan, and refugee communities in the Netherlands by uniting the plethora of ethnic organisations as described above. They are legally obliged to meet at least three times a year, although in practice this happens more frequently, with the purpose of informing the Dutch cabinet about ethnic minorities, advising it on diversity policy, and allowing the cabinet to engage in dialogue with ethnic minorities (Butter 2006). The strength of the connection between the LOM organisations and ‘their’ ethnic constituencies, however, is questionable; for example, because many of the member organisations themselves have a fluid, and often patchily registered, membership and are therefore not representative of ‘their’ communities – a problem that has been highlighted at least since the 1980s (e.g. Entzinger 1987: 10).

Irrespective of these critical notes, this section has highlighted two pathways for political representation of members of non-Dutch ethnic communities: first, through conventional political parties and second, through ethnic and religious organisations. It may be argued that, together and in interaction, these two types of political access ensure the effective representation of allochtone communities, mostly within existing political parties; this could help to explain the absence of non-Dutch ethnic or religious parties. However, one objection against this argument is the fact that politicians with non-Dutch ethnic affiliations are most successful in left-leaning and progressive political parties. This suggests that the more conservative members of ethnic and religious minorities are less effectively represented.

---

246 Ankie Verlaan, director Adviesraad, 15/4/2008 in Amsterdam.
Moreover, successful non-Dutch politicians rarely, if ever, represent ‘their’ ethnic or religious community. These objections suggest that regardless of the successful political participation of members of ethnic and religious minorities, there is still a sense in which these minorities, as collectivities, remain underrepresented in Dutch and Amsterdam politics.

8.5 Policies and Belonging

So far, this chapter has highlighted ways in which nativist ethnicity and *autochtonie* are reproduced in the structure of political organisations in Amsterdam and the Netherlands and the pathways to political representation. In both dimensions, the chapter has underlined that nativism competes with different approaches to belonging, such as urban citizenship, and ‘de-ethnicised’ socio-economic emancipation. This section outlines the ways in which the various approaches have affected social policy. We will briefly look at the role of bureaucratic autochthony in state-led knowledge production and social provision, after which we will concentrate in more detail on the national and local policies towards community building. The section will thus illustrate the tensions within the national state, between national and local authorities, and between rhetorical ambitions and the practical tools used to achieve these ambitions. In this last respect, this section highlights, first, the limited instruments with which the national state attempts to enforce ‘integration’ and, second, the resulting inflation of rather practical policy interventions, such as language courses, with connotations of nativist community building far beyond their immediate effects.

8.5.1 Knowledge Production, Social Provisioning, and Youth Delinquency

Considering the unwavering salience of diversity issues in the Dutch public debate, it is no surprise that the language of *autochtonie* and ‘integration’ continues to be used in government policy discourses. This concerns education, health care, criminality and security,
employment, societal discrimination, and labour and is particularly prominent in national-level institutions. The language of bureaucratic autochthony is primarily used by the national, and to a lesser extent, local governments to measure and monitor the progress, or ‘integration’, of the various *allochtone* communities in these fields. It is important to note that, as before, *allochttoon* is generally used in combination with its ‘non-Western’ adjective: reports on ‘integration’ rarely discuss communities that are not within the ‘non-Western’ category. Most attention is given to Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks, followed by the Dutch-Surinamese and Dutch-Antilleans. These monitoring reports usually centre on the ‘problematic’ nature of ‘non-Western’ *allochtone* communities: their low levels of education, high rates of youth delinquency, high levels of unemployment, or their discrimination in the job market. Generally intended to monitor minority emancipation, these measurements thus also contribute to the ‘problematic’ stigma of the monitored communities and reproduce the nativist notion of ethnicity.

Reflecting the competing visions of the relationship between ethnicity, religion and the state, there are also competing views about the best way to translate the monitoring findings into policy. Recurring proposals for ethnic registration, for example, have never passed parliament, for reasons of non-discrimination. This principle is codified in the first article of the Dutch constitution, which holds that “all who find themselves in the Netherlands, are treated equally in equal situations. Discrimination on the basis of religion, convictions, political ideology, race, gender, or whichever other grounds, is not allowed”. In practice, the various branches of the state therefore argue that ethnicity and religion can only legitimately shape policies and social provision in situations where they are proven to be beneficial to the communities in question.

Examples of such ethnically-oriented policies can be found for example in the areas of youth delinquency, health care, and education, some of which have been discussed earlier. All of these policies are designed at the national level, ‘in The Hague’. The most recent national
policies towards the ‘Moroccan drama’ (Jurgens 2007) is the Aanpak Marokkaans-Nederlandse probleemjongeren (Policy towards Dutch-Moroccan problem youths) (van der Laan et al. 2009b). Under this policy, the Dutch government has subsidised the 22 municipalities with the highest proportions of problematic Dutch-Moroccan youths (so-called Marokkanengemeentes), including Amsterdam, to develop ways to approach these youths. Although the efficacy of these varied local policies is questionable (de Boom et al. 2010), the specifically ethnic nature of the subsidies – and of the corresponding political debates – have certainly reaffirmed the stigmatised position of Dutch-Moroccans as ‘deviant’.247

In terms of health care policy, the debate generally centres on the legitimacy of providing different forms of health care to different ethnic communities. There is some evidence that ethnic communities in the Netherlands differ in their demands from Dutch health care institutions and in their preferred procedures for receiving care (Uiters 2007). Building on this premise, there have been attempts to set up health care consultants (zorgconsulenten) and clinics specifically catering for allochtone patients. Some hospitals, similarly, organise separate facilities and procedures for patients from allochtone communities. In the context of national politics, however, this ‘ethnicisation’ of health care remains controversial and relatively rare.

Finally, autochthony, ethnicity, and religion are intricately interwoven in education policies. This is, firstly, due to the consociational system of funding bijzonder onderwijs (‘particular’ education)248. In 2009, the CBS estimated that around 72% of Dutch children were enrolled in bijzondere schools, as against 28% in public schools. Only about 4% of the children in Amsterdam go to schools based on Islamic principles (ten Broeke e.a. 2004), but the ethnic homogeneity of these schools has put them squarely in the debate on educational

---

247 A similar argument can be made for the recent “Analysis Moroccan perpetrator populations of municipalities in the Netherlands” (van Tilburg 2009), which was designed to serve as a basis for the division of ‘liveability subsidies’ – highlighting the extent to which the Dutch policy discourse considers neighbourhood ‘liveability’ and Dutch-Moroccan residents as antithetical.

248 As a result of the Pacificatie compromise of 1917, the Dutch state educational system differentiates between openbare (public) schools, which do not base their teaching on a particular ideology or religion and are run by the municipality, and bijzondere (‘particular’) schools, which are organised on the basis of a religious belief, didactic technique, or ideology. All are funded equally by the state.
segregation (Cohen and Broekhuizen 2010; Karsten et al. 2003). Secondly, the link between education policy and autochthony is also due to the importance given to education in the ‘integration’ process: higher levels of education are expected to lead to higher levels of social ‘integration’, both in cultural and socio-economic terms. To encourage this, schools with high proportions of ‘non-Western’ allochthonous students receive more state funding. This principle is not only outlined in policy but also codified in Dutch law249 (Inspectie van het Onderwijs 2006).

8.5.2 National ‘Integration’ Policies: The Neighbourhood Approach and Inburgering

Neither education nor health care are policy fields directly connected to ‘integration’ policies. Under the 2007-2010 Balkenende cabinet, specific national ‘integration’ policies comprised two sets of measures: a ‘neighbourhood approach’ and the inburgering (“citizen education”) (Ministerie van VROM 2009). The neighbourhood approach focuses on 40 preselected ‘problematic’ neighbourhoods throughout the Netherlands, five of which are found in Amsterdam250. Neither ethnicity nor bureaucratic autochthony were taken into account in the selection of these neighbourhoods, which was based exclusively on socio-economic indicators (education, income) and security251. ‘The neighbourhood approach does not, therefore, bear the imprint of ethnicity or autochthony; rather, it reverberates with the socio-economic ‘integration’ approach of the early 1990s.

In contrast, quite the opposite is true for the Dutch inburgering policies: while the actual policies are limited to a training course in the Dutch language and “Knowledge of Dutch Society” (KNS), they have become inflated with the full weight of the assimilationist notion

249 Article 8.3 of the Wet op het primair onderwijs, article 17 of the Wet op het voortgezet onderwijs, and article 11.3 of the Wet op de expertisecentra.

250 Bos en Lommer, de Baarsjes, New West, North, and South East.

251 Although it was recognised that the selected neighbourhoods housed substantially more ‘non-Western’ allochtonen (about 50%) than the national average (TK 2007).
of ‘integration’. Driouichi (2007) and Jacobs (2000) describe the origins of the inburgering policies in the early 1990s, when Van der Zwan and Entzinger (1994) argued for inburgering trajectories comprising language courses, social skills training, societal orientation, and preparation for employment in the Netherlands. In this vein, inburgering was institutionalised legally in the Newcomer Inburgering Act (WIN) of 1998. Its aim was emancipatory, to improve immigrants’ autonomy. As the public debate on diversity progressed and came to redefine ‘integration’ increasingly as cultural assimilation, the Dutch government began to envision inburgering as a tool to educate (or, more polemically, to discipline) immigrants and allochtonen into becoming good Dutch citizens (Driouichi 2007; Jacobs 2000).

As a consequence, the KNS aspect of the inburgering course was expanded with Dutch norms and values. Moreover, access to permanent residency or naturalisation became legally conditional on passing the inburgering examinations. Much has been written on the protracted implementation problems of the inburgering policies, as well as on their normatively problematic aspects (e.g. Besselink 2008): these problematic aspects include the deep-seated assumption that education breeds ‘integration’, the lack of concern for the affective or emotional aspects of ‘integration’, and the exclusionary side-effects of the mandatory inburgering examinations (Driouichi 2007; Jacobs 2000; Schinkel 2010; van Huis and de Regt 2005). What is often ignored, however, is that through the KNS emphasis on Dutch values (Bureau ICE 2006), inburgering has also become a tool to enforce the cultural assimilation of immigrants to a stereotype of the Dutch autochtone values.

In addition, a second way in which the inburgering policies are ethnicised is visible in the selection of immigrants who are required to take the inburgering courses and examinations in their country of origin. As discussed in Driouchi (2007: 83) and Wilkinson, Goedvolk et. al.

---


253 See e.g Gemeente Amsterdam (2005d, 2008a), Ministerie van VROM (2007), and Tazelaar (2010).
(2008), immigrants from ‘non-Western’ countries\textsuperscript{254} are required to take the preliminary inburgering examination before they are even allowed into the Netherlands, at an average cost of over €350. Prior to the implementation of the Inburgering abroad act, about 40\% of these immigrants were Turkish or Moroccan, but that percentage was drastically reduced after implementation (Wilkinson et al. 2008: 60)\textsuperscript{255}. The definition of those required to take the inburgering abroad tests therefore overlaps completely with the distinction between ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ allochtonen. On that basis, Human Rights Watch (2008) criticised the tests arguing that their selective implementation, as well as their prohibitive costs, amount to illegal discrimination on the basis of ethnicity.

In sum, therefore, unlike the neighbourhood policies, the Dutch inburgering bears substantial imprints of bureaucratic autochthony and ethnicity, regardless of the government’s insistence that “distinctions on the basis of ethnic origins are only made with the purpose of monitoring the relative deprivation of certain groups” (van der Laan et al. 2009a). On the one hand, the cultural and value-oriented aspects of the inburgering reinforce and impose a stereotypical image of the ethnic Dutch. On the other, the discriminatory selection of ‘non-Western’ bureaucratic allochtonen for the inburgering tests abroad reinforces their subordinate position in the Dutch ethnic hierarchy. In contrast, we will now show that local Amsterdam policies are aimed at fostering a territorial rather than nativist sense of belonging in the city.

\textsuperscript{254} I.e. those countries outside the EU/EER, the United States, New Zealand, Japan, Australia, Canada, and Switzerland.

\textsuperscript{255} Surinamese and other post-colonial immigrants are often exempted from inburgering abroad due to the fact that they have received primary education in the Dutch language in their countries of origin.
8.5.3 Fostering Urban Citizenship: Wij Amsterdammers

‘Integration’ policies in Amsterdam cover a wide array of policies regarding diversity, inburgering, radicalisation, terrorism, and urban citizenship. Contained in a veritable bibliotheca bureaucratic (Gemeente Amsterdam 2005g), the field of ‘integration’ policy has therefore been somewhat disjointed both horizontally and vertically. Horizontally, because it is conceived as ‘facet policy’ that needs to be implemented within the context of all other Amsterdam policies; and vertically, because there is a division of labour (as well as considerable overlap) between the central city government and the stadsdelen. Moreover, this complex set of ‘integration’ policies has changed over time, with the murder of Theo van Gogh in November 2004 as the most recent crucial turning point. Because of all these complexities, this section will only consider those ‘integration’ policies that have been developed and implemented throughout Amsterdam within the period 2005-2009. Thus, we will disregard stadsdeel-specific policies, as well as the recent developments after the March 2010 local elections. In effect, we will briefly outline the city’s general approach to diversity and inburgering and then focus more specifically on the action programme “Wij Amsterdammers”.

One year prior to Van Gogh’s murder, the Amsterdam city government detailed its take on ‘integration’ policies in the document Erbij horen en meedoen (“Belonging and participating”) (Gemeente Amsterdam 2005h). The document defined ‘integration’ as belonging and participating, with relevance for all Amsterdammers rather than only for allochtonen; inburgering, a national policy that is implemented largely at the local levels, was conceptualised as the ante-chamber of ‘integration’. In addition to educational and employment policies, ‘integration’ policies comprised the implementation of the inburgering.

---

Slootman and Tillie (2006: 26) define radicalisation as a “process of detachment from society, a process of delegitimisation. It is characterised by increasing distrust of the social and political system. People lose faith in government, retreat in their own group, and strive for through social change that is to be effectuated by non-democratic means”. Because this definition comes very close to denoting all deeply held idealism, this thesis includes the use of violence as a necessary condition for the presence of radicalisation.
the provision of subsidies for projects aimed stimulating ‘integration’ or participation[^257], and the city-wide promotion of diversity. Most of these policies were the responsibility of the diversity and integration unit of the civil service Department for Societal Development (DMO[^258]), whose main function has been to keep diversity on the public agenda. The organisation of the *inburgering* has been far more complicated and problematic, not least because of the partial privatisation of the process in 2007 (Gemeente Amsterdam 2005d, 2006b, 2008a; Kabalt 2009).

After the murder of Van Gogh, however, the city government felt additional efforts were necessary in order to address the “tensions in the city”[^259]. Building on commissioned research by Ervin Staub (2005, 2007), the city government defined these tensions on the basis of grievances among ‘white *autochtone Amsterdammers*’ and among religious minorities, especially Muslims (Gemeente Amsterdam 2004[^260]). To address these tensions, the policy programme “*Wij Amsterdammers*” was developed with three interlinked purposes: countering terrorism and radicalisation, preventing societal polarisation, and increasing social cohesion (Gemeente Amsterdam 2005c, 2006a[^261]). Platform Amsterdam United (PAS) was created as the co-ordinating team, but different branches of the programme fell under different branches of the city government[^262]. As a whole, the programme was intended to provide support to the existing efforts of the police and the national security service (AIVD) by focusing on the sociological processes preceding radicalisation, conflict, and violence. Different tactical approaches were taken within this overall strategy, however: on the one hand, long-term prevention of tensions by addressing social cohesion and polarisation; and on

[^257]: *Subsidieregeling Integratie en Participatie* (SIP)
[^258]: *Dienst Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling*
[^259]: Joris Rijbroek, policy advisor, 19/6/2008 in Amsterdam.
[^260]: Ibid.
[^261]: Ibid.
[^262]: Ibid.; Anonymous (xiv), policy advisor, 9/5/2008 in Amsterdam
the other, the short-term combating of radicalisation at a stage before the police would have to be involved. We will look at each of the two approaches in turn.

The ‘softer’, long-term approach of social cohesion and polarisation was part of the inclusive administrative approach of the city government under Mayor Cohen. The Wij Amsterdammers programme incorporated various policy initiatives. First, PAS created a network of key individuals and organisations from various ethnic, religious, ideological and other backgrounds that could enhance interaction between their various constituencies and respond in concert to external shocks to Amsterdam’s social stability (e.g. the Fitna film). Second, several projects were initiated to address public perceptions of diversity and the city’s various ethnic and religious groups. These projects partly focused on promoting and enhancing an inclusive urban Amsterdammer identity, partly on bringing different groups into contact with each other, and partly on “providing alternatives to the available points of view”; the latter, for example, involved actively displaying aspects of Islam that countered the image of political violence that had tainted it in the public perception after the murder of Van Gogh. Other initiatives within this cluster included a soap series on local television (AT5), the campaign “What do you do for your city?”, several dialogue and sports events, and the financial support of non-state initiatives with similar ends.

Finally, the programme also included measures to curtail discrimination of ethnic and religious minorities, but also discrimination of or violence against homosexuals. Cutting across these different types of ‘softer’ projects and policies, PAS also provided incidental project subsidies through its ‘good ideas desk’: a contact point where Amsterdam residents could report suggestions for projects aimed at reducing tensions and improving the ‘we-feeling’ of Amsterdammers. Taken together, the aim of the ‘softer’ policies under the Wij

---

263 Ibid.
264 Joris Rijbroek, op. cit.
265 Ibid.
266 Ibid.
Amsterdammers programme was thus discursive in nature, attempting to build an Amsterdammer identity and improve polarised or antagonistic perceptions between ethnic and religious communities. In contrast to the inburgering policies, the Wij Amsterdammer programme did not amount to citizenship training; rather, it was aimed at bridging the perceived boundaries between the various communities residing in Amsterdam. It is interesting to note that the logic behind the Amsterdammer identity was replicated at the local stadsdeel level: rather than speaking about different ethnic, religious, or other groups in Osdorp, alderman Ahmed Baadoud explained that “there is only one policy for all Osdorpers”.

In this sense, the data on identity salience presented above and corroborated by Van der Welle and Mamadouh (2008) shows that the desired outcome of the programme has to a large extent been reached. Residents of Amsterdam identify strongly and positively with their city, regardless of their ethnic or religious background. I would argue that this is at least partly due to the positive interaction between the Amsterdam city government and its inclusive approach to community building. In a political context of rising ‘new realism’, and thus a hardening discursive attitude towards allochtone communities and their assimilation, the inclusivity of the Amsterdam government provided an accessible and attractive alternative. The Wij Amsterdammers approach therefore cut two ways: it increased the legitimacy of the city government and provided Amsterdam residents with an alternative, inclusive mode of interaction as fellow Amsterdammers, rather than Moroccans, Hollanders, Muslims, or Antilleans.

However, there remains a level of antagonism between Amsterdam’s ethnic communities, including the risk of radicalisation and violence (Slootman and Tillie 2006). On this basis, the ‘harder’ end of the Wij Amsterdammer policies focused on interventions in the process of radicalisation. Balancing on the cusp of police and security services territory, this part of the approach thus...
Wij Amsterdammers programme established an information hub (Informatie Huishouding, IHH) regarding radicalisation; professional training on identifying and responding to radicalisation; and, in co-operation with social services, schools, and ethnic organisations, specific intervention projects in situations where radicalisation was reported. Although the city council supported these measures unanimously, co-operation between the IHH and other state institutions (notably the DMO and the police) has remained complicated269. Moreover, there has been considerable debate around the legitimacy of state intervention in (religious) radicalisation. The city government has since issued a statement arguing that, in specific circumstances of inequality, the state may take the role of “compensating neutrality” (Gemeente Amsterdam 2008b). However, this policy of ‘taking sides’ in the religious spectrum has remained controversial.

8.6 Conclusion

This chapter has looked at the role of ethnicity, bureaucratic autochthony, and autochtonie in Amsterdam’s politics, in an attempt to outline the ways in which these politics reproduce - or deconstruct - these nativist discourses. It has considered the city’s structure of political authority, its dynamics of political representation and participation, and some of the state policies aimed at community building. Political authority in the Netherlands, and Amsterdam in particular, transformed considerably with the deconstruction of its pillarised society. Section 8.2 has outlined the main political authorities at play in the city, as well as those national political actors with particular relevance for the Amsterdam context. It showed that while the state per se has no connections to the nativist boundaries of ethnicity and religion, certain political parties do have such connections. In particular, the orthodox Dutch Reformed parties and the anti-Islamic new realists are relevant in this regard. Ethnic

269 Anonymous (xiv), op. cit.
minorities, however, are not represented as such in political parties; rather, they are organised into ethnic and religious organisations.

Section 8.3 showed that while Amsterdam has a wide range of ethnic and religious organisations, these have a limited authority and influence in society, especially when compared to those in Kano. Only religious (and perhaps certain ethnic) leaders have considerable authority within their community, but it may be argued that this authority extends mostly to issues of faith and religiosity. In even starker contrast to the Kano case, political authorities within the state were shown to have legitimacy and authority in large majorities of all ethnic groups, especially the mayor and alderman in the Amsterdam municipality. It was argued that this high level of legitimacy of the state authorities depends on the legal codification of their position, their democratic legitimacy, and their high visibility through the news media. Specifically for Amsterdam, in addition, the popularity of the inclusive discourse of diversity and belonging was identified as the main cause for the authority granted to the municipality.

Section 8.4 then showed that while the Dutch electoral institutions provide opportunities for minority ethnic and religious political parties, such parties have developed neither at the national nor local level. Instead, members of ethnic minorities have two ways of accessing Amsterdam politics: first, through existing political parties, most notably those on the progressive end of the political spectrum; and second, through ‘corporatist’ ethnic or religious organisations. It should be noted, however, that those ethnic minority members who join political parties rarely do so as representatives of their ethnic or religious community. This role of ‘community representation’ is generally left to the ethnic and religious organisations, although the extent to which they effectively represent an ethnic or religious constituency may be questioned. Although individual members of ethnic minorities can thus participate in Dutch politics successfully, there is still a sense in which these communities, as collectivities, remain underrepresented.
This sense of political horizontal inequality is of course enhanced by the prominence of the ‘new realist’ discourses promoting ‘integration’ as cultural assimilation. As it stands, however, few of the ‘new realist’ anti-Islamic and anti-*allochtone* policies have been implemented. While bureaucratic autochthony is used extensively in the production of statistics and knowledge within the national state bureaucracy, and in the organisation of the inburgering (citizenship training), the diversity discourses of old multiculturalism and socio-economic emancipation also continue to inform national ‘integration’ and diversity policies. Moreover, at the local level in Amsterdam, the policy programme *Wij Amsterdammers* was designed in opposition to the nativist discourses of autochtonie and ‘new realism’. Rather than promoting the ‘integration’ of *allochtone* minorities into the majority society, the Amsterdam approach considers ethnic and religious diversity a defining aspect of the city’s identity.

Both the structure of Amsterdam politics and its social policies, therefore, display a tension between nativist notions of belonging – ethnicity and *autochtonie* – and territorial ones, most notably urban citizenship. This tension between inclusion and exclusion results not only from diverging ideological positions, but also from the complex interaction between the local and national levels of the Dutch state. Altogether, therefore, the chapter has shown, on the one hand, that contemporary politics in the Netherlands reproduces nativist identities of ethnicity, largely through the salience of autochthony in knowledge production and political rhetoric. On the other hand, however, it has also demonstrated that while nativism may be salient discursively in national politics, it remains far from hegemonic in Amsterdam, where it continues to compete with more inclusive notions of belonging. The subsequent chapter will show that this tension is also reflected in the social relations between the city’s various ethnic communities.
9 Failing Integration and Multicultural Disaster?
Social Relations in Amsterdam

9.1 Introduction

Amsterdam is generally a peaceful place. In global quality of life rankings performed by Mercer consulting firm, it ranks consistently as one of the 15 most attractive cities to live in (Mercer 2010). The city has come a long way since the depillarisation clashes of the 1960s and 1970s and now has an affluent and cosmopolitan reputation of a small city punching above its weight. In spite of the widely publicised murder of Theo van Gogh and the unrelenting political and media attention on allochtone criminality and violence, official statistics show a consistent decrease in the overall levels of criminality since the early 2000s. People of all ethnic, religious, or other backgrounds interact in markets, shopping areas, restaurants, night clubs, schools, and their places of work - and generally, these interactions are peaceful and cooperative.

But there is a flip side to the cosmopolitan and diverse character of Amsterdam. There are other representations in which the city is a space of intergroup contestation, where various ethnic and religious groups live in increasing segregation and in contempt of each other’s values and beliefs. Especially in the immediate aftermath of the Van Gogh murder, there was a distinct fear of the presumed ethnic conflict underlying the murder, due to the pressures of rapid immigration, demographic change, and value contestation. It was this sense of the city’s ‘conflict potential’ that motivated the city council to assess the city’s group relations in terms of ethnic conflict theory and design social policies on the basis of this assessment.

In the first three empirical chapters on Amsterdam, it has been argued that the introduction of bureaucratic autochthony prioritised and reinforced a nativist set of ethnic identities. These identities are ranked on the basis of their autochtonic status and intersect
with divisions of religion and social class. As was argued in the introduction to the thesis, nativist identities are likely to promote destructive social relations between the ‘nativist’ and ‘settler’ communities; this chapter, like chapter 5 for the case of Kano, will examine the extent to which interethnic relations in Amsterdam are characterised by antagonism, avoidance, and conflict. To this end, the chapter examines interethnic perceptions (section 9.2), as well as different types of individual (9.3) and collective interactions (9.4) between members of Amsterdam’s ethnic communities.

9.2 Ethnic Antagonism

This section will examine, through the results from the ABM 2008 perceptions survey, interviews, and secondary literature, the extent to which interethnic perceptions in Amsterdam are characterised by antagonism.

Table 9.1: Respondents with negative views of other ethnic groups, by ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Negative views of Dutch*** (N=2518)</th>
<th>Negative views of Dutch-Surinamese *** (N=2485)</th>
<th>Negative views of Dutch-Turkish *** (N=2508)</th>
<th>Negative views of Dutch-Antilleans *** (N=2380)</th>
<th>Negative views of Dutch-Moroccans*** (N=2508)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese-Antilleans</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Moroccan</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Turkish</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.1 displays the percentages of respondents in the survey who viewed ethnic groups ‘negatively’ or ‘very negatively’. Although attitudes such as these are flexible and may change over time, it is assumed that they are sufficiently stable to allow some inferences about the ways in which members of different ethnic groups regard each other. Overall, table 9.1 shows that only a minority of each group holds negative opinions of other groups (and often only
very small minorities at that). Especially the Dutch and Surinamese receive little negative attention, with the exception of the Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccan attitude towards the Surinamese (18% and 12% negative views respectively). Negative attitudes towards the Turkish are equally rare (7%-8%), with a maximum of 12% among the Surinamese and Antilleans. Except for this limited antagonism between the Dutch-Turkish and the Surinamese, attitudes between the Dutch, Caribbeans, and the Dutch-Turkish are therefore rather positive.

The great exceptions to this pattern, however, are the Dutch-Antilleans and particularly the Dutch-Moroccans. These two communities are consistently the two most negatively evaluated groups in Amsterdam - even amongst themselves. Table 9.1 thus highlights two lines of ethnic antagonism in Amsterdam society: first, the negative evaluations by all communities of the Dutch-Antilleans and Dutch-Moroccans; and second, the mutual antagonism between the Surinamese-Antilleans, the Dutch-Turkish, and the Dutch-Moroccans. Rather than uniform ethnic antagonism between all ethnic communities, it is therefore more appropriate to distinguish, at least analytically, between the sense of stigma attached to the Dutch-Antilleans and Dutch-Moroccans and the sense of mutual antagonism between the Dutch-Turkish, Dutch-Moroccans, and the Surinamese-Antilleans - the so-called ‘non-Western’ allochtonen.

Interethnic attitudes and prejudice (in Amsterdam and the Netherlands as a whole) have been studied and monitored extensively over the past decade, so it is useful to compare the above findings with the conclusions of some of this previous research. In its 2005 and 2007 Jaarrapporten Integratie (SCP/WODC/CBS 2005; Dagevos and Gijsberts 2007), annual reports that map the integration of ‘non-Western’ allochtonen in the Netherlands, the SCP uses a ‘thermometer’ measure through which to indicate the level of antagonism between

---

270 This number is not biased by the combination of both Surinamese and Antilleans (and the Surinamese-Antilleans) in this ethnic category, as from both the Surinamese and Antillean communities 21% hold negative views of the Antilleans. Only those with affiliations to both show a more positive attitude towards them.
different ethnic groups\textsuperscript{271} in the Netherlands (SCP/WODC/CBS 2005: 195; Dagevos and Gijsberts 2007: 292). The 2005 report uses a survey representative of the Dutch urban population, while the 2007 survey represents all Dutch people aged 15 and older. Both sets of results correspond closely to the pattern shown in table 9.1: Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Antilleans are disliked most by all groups but themselves; and all groups rate the Dutch (or \textit{autochtonen}) more highly than any other group.

Similar research among Dutch-Turkish, Dutch-Moroccan, and Dutch youths in Rotterdam in 1999 and 2006 (Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008; Phalet et al. 2000) also used the ‘thermometer’ measure to indicate interethnic antagonism. While these studies reported less interethnic antagonism than the other studies, they largely corroborate the pattern of negative perceptions of the Dutch-Moroccan ethnic community - with the proviso that these young \textit{Rotterdamers} all consistently rated their own group more positively than the others. The last study referred to here is by Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) and attempts to show, through sophisticated statistical analysis, that the multicultural policies of the Netherlands have caused a conflict of values between Dutch Muslims and non-Muslims. As part of their argument, they have measured negative stereotypes of \textit{autochtone} Dutch towards the Surinamese, Dutch-Turkish, and Dutch-Moroccans, as well as value evaluations between these Muslim and \textit{autochtone} communities (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007: 26, 49).

Although the value evaluations are difficult to interpret, the stereotype-measure shows that Dutch-Moroccans are overall perceived most negatively, followed by the Surinamese and then the Dutch-Turkish\textsuperscript{272}.

\textsuperscript{271} All the corroborating quantitative studies mentioned in this chapter use the CBS definition of ethnicity, i.e. a categorisation based on familial national origins, rather than the self-reported measure applied in this thesis. Although this hinders direct comparison between the results, the overlap between the two categorisations is enough to warrant cautious corroboration.

\textsuperscript{272} In interpreting these figures, however, it is important to note that the authors have not reported the \textit{autochtone} stereotypes of themselves. These were available in the original data, which showed, for example, that the Dutch viewed themselves far more often as selfish and complainers than any of the other groups.
There is therefore substantial corroborating evidence for the trends depicted in table 9.1: the ethnic stigma on Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Antilleans, the (limited) antagonism between non-Dutch ethnic groups, and the consistent positive evaluation of the Dutch. Together, these three patterns combine into what has been labelled as an ethnic hierarchy (Hagendoorn and Pepels 2003). From positive to negative, this evaluative hierarchy runs from the Dutch, through the Surinamese and Dutch-Turkish, to the Dutch-Antilleans and Dutch-Moroccans. Table 9.1 roughly follows this hierarchy, with the exception of the relatively negative views of the Dutch-Surinamese and Dutch-Antilleans among Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccans. But if we look at table 9.2, which shows the ways in which people “think that different groups are perceived generally”, the hierarchy becomes much more pronounced and consistent among all groups. Except for the Dutch-Moroccan view of Dutch-Turkish and Surinamese, all communities rank the different ethnic groups in exactly the same order. Moreover, the table also shows that people feel that society in general holds much more negative perceptions than they themselves do. All ethnic communities therefore seem to believe, rather strongly, that an ethnic hierarchy exists that overlaps to a large extent with the discursive hierarchy of belonging contained in the autochtonie discourse, even though their individual opinion may be more nuanced and deviate slightly from this perceived dominant pattern.
How should this ethnic hierarchy of antagonism be interpreted? In principle, the simple fact that there is some level of antagonism between different ethnic groups in Amsterdam is evidence in support of the categorisation effect, as outlined theoretically in chapter 1. As such, all the factors that reinforce these ethnic identities, as outlined in chapters 6, 7, and 8, also reinforce the antagonism between the ethnic groups. This includes the horizontal inequalities between the ethnic groups, the overlap of ethnic and religious identity boundaries, and the cultural differences between the groups. However, if we consider the role of cultural differences in causing the specific ranking displayed in tables 9.1 and 9.2, it is important to note that the variation between evaluations of Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccan Amsterdam residents suggests that any simple notion of value conflicts between Muslim and non-Muslim groups is an inadequate explanation (cf. Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). Equally, the variation between evaluations of Dutch-Surinamese and Dutch-Antilleans belies a blanket effect of the ‘postcolonial bonus’ – Dutch-Antilleans have an equal, if not greater, claim to this bonus than the Dutch-Surinamese, but are evaluated more negatively than the Dutch-Turkish and, in two cases, than the Dutch-Moroccans.

Instead of a simplistic reference to cultural difference, therefore, this thesis argues that the ranking displayed in tables 9.1 and 9.2 can be explained in reference to three additional factors. First, it appears that respondents distinguish between the ‘deviant’ Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Antillean minorities and the ‘normal’ Dutch-Surinamese and Dutch-Turkish ones. The two ethnic groups in the ‘deviant’ category are, as depicted in tables 9.1 and 9.2, consistently viewed more negatively than the others. Perceived ‘deviance’, spurred by extensive negative attention in the news media, can therefore, in conjunction with the discursive autochtonie hierarchy and the factors that reinforce it, help to explain the rankings.

273 See e.g. Van Uden and Groeneveld (2009) for an overview of the policy approaches to these two ‘problematic’ youth groups; Werdmölder (2005), Jurgens (2007), and De Jong (2007) for a discussion of the Moroccan youths in Amsterdam; and Van San (1998) for discussion of Antillean youth criminality. SCP/WODC/CBS (2005), Dagevos and Gijsberts (2007) and Gijsberts and Dagevos (2009) have sections describing the development of criminality among the main Dutch ethnic minorities.
in tables 9.1 and 9.2. Please note that this interaction of autochtonie and social deviance underlines the continuing connections between these discourses – a link that was also outlined in the historical chapter 6 above.

Second, this thesis argues that the consistent lack of negative views of the Dutch suggests that the large majority of Amsterdam’s residents, like those of Kano (as discussed in chapter 5), has internalised the ethnic hierarchy of autochtonie. As such, they accept autochtonie’s basic claim: that, in essence, the city belongs to the ‘natives’. In consequence, non-‘native’ minorities consider themselves, at least to some extent, as guests who reside in the city because of their positive choice, or those of their (grand)parents, to immigrate into the ‘native’ society. Accepting, if not liking, the ‘native’ hosts with whom you or your family have chosen to live can simply be considered a necessary consequence of this choice. The relative lack of negative perceptions of the Dutch, therefore, is evidence for the group positioning effects of the nativist hierarchy of autochtonie in Amsterdam.

Finally, the perceptions of Dutch-Turks and Dutch-Moroccans also indicate the effects of positive in-group identification, which they extend not only to themselves but also to each other. In other words, within the constraints of the effects of perceived ‘deviance’, Dutch-Moroccans rate themselves less negatively than the Dutch-Antilleans, and the Dutch-Turks less negatively than the Surinamese. The Dutch-Turks, on the other hand, rate the Dutch-Antilleans more negatively than the Dutch-Moroccans and the Surinamese more negatively than themselves. This suggests that in addition to the effects of ethnic categorisation and perceived ‘deviance’, there is also a measure of positive self-identification at work. For the Dutch and the Caribbeans, this relatively positive self-identification overlaps with the ranking of autochtonie. For the Dutch-Turks and Dutch-Moroccans, however, positive in-group evaluation cross-cuts and trumps the autochtonie hierarchy.
9.3 Avoidance: Casual Interactions, Friendship, and Marriage

We have thus seen that there is a distinct ethnic pattern of antagonism in the city, which shows overlap with the cleavage of *autochtonie* as discussed in previous chapters. Section 9.2 also showed, however, that this antagonism was only expressed by a minority of Amsterdam’s population. We will now look in some more detail at various types of individual interactions that take place between ethnic communities in the city, in order to assess the extent to which these are characterised by avoidance. Specifically, we will look at casual interactions, friendships, and interethnic marriages.

*Table 9.3: Respondents who never interact with other ethnic groups, by ethnicity (N=2604)***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese-Antilleans</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Moroccan</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Turkish</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.3 presents the proportions of respondents from each group who profess “never to work together or undertake any activities with other ethnic groups”. The table shows that one in seven Dutch people never interact with people from other ethnic groups, while this only applies to 8% to 10% of the minority communities. Of the minorities, the Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks seem most isolated within their own group, a finding that corresponds with earlier studies on social distance between ethnic groups (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2009: 229-30). On the whole, however, table 9.3 indicates that regardless of ethnic residential segregation, the vast majority of all groups have some form of interaction with other groups.

To get a clearer understanding of these casual interethnic interactions, it is useful to remember that, if we assume that casual meetings in Amsterdam are completely at random and people have causal meetings with at least 50 people, the likelihood that members of any of
the city’s ethnic groups never meet anyone from other groups is minute. Therefore, the percentages in table 9.3 can be interpreted as caused entirely other factors, such as the antagonism reported in section 9.2 and contextual factors such as residential segregation (cf. chapter 7) and linguistic barriers between the groups.

Table 9.4: Social situations where respondent meets other ethnic groups, by ethnicity (N=2278)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Situation</th>
<th>Dutch</th>
<th>Surinamese-Antillean</th>
<th>Dutch-Moroccan</th>
<th>Dutch-Turkish</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Amsterdam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Work***</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood***</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends***</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports***</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going out***</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School***</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family visits***</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mosque/church***</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To elucidate the patterns of casual interethnic interactions further, table 9.4 displays the proportions of Amsterdam’s ethnic categories who meet members of other ethnic groups in different social situations. Most (70%) of the respondents’ interactions appear to take place at work. This indicates, however, that about 30% of Amsterdam’s population only works together with members of their own groups. At the same time, table 9.4 also shows that there are several additional social situations in which Amsterdam residents meet people from other backgrounds, most importantly in the neighbourhood, among friends, at sports, while going out, in school, during family visits, and in church or at the mosque. In this regard, the table highlights that while interethic meetings at work are the most common type of meeting for almost all groups (except, by a small margin, for the Dutch-Turks), ethnic minorities are

274 More specifically, they would be: 0.650 for the Dutch; 0.0750 for the Dutch-Moroccans; 0.0850 for the Surinamese-Antilleans; 0.0650 for the Dutch-Turks; and 0.1150 for the ‘others’.
275 These linguistic barriers are limited, however, as may be indicated by the proportions of each group that speak the lingua franca, Dutch, at home: 99% for the Dutch, 95% for the Surinamese-Antilleans, 77% of the Dutch-Moroccans, 75% of the Dutch-Turks, and 89% of the others.
more likely than the Dutch to have interethnic contacts in other social situations – most strikingly their neighbourhood, schools, and church or mosque.

Table 9.5: Respondents with most/only friends from own group, by ethnicity (N=2543)***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Only own group</th>
<th>Most own group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese-Antilleans</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Moroccan</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Turkish</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having presented a basic overview of the types of casual interethnic interactions in which residents of Amsterdam engage, and having sketched the incidence of these interactions for the five ethnic groups, we will now turn to two more intimate forms of social contact: friendship and marriage. We have already seen that substantial minorities of all groups indicate that they meet other groups through contact with friends. However, we do not yet know how many people have interethnic friends or marriages; to this end, table 9.5 presents evidence on the incidence of interethnic friendship. Looking at table 9.5, two aspects stand out. First, in terms of their overall ranking order, the proportions of Amsterdam’s ethnic communities with only in-group friends are comparable to those without any out-group interaction in table 9.3. The Dutch have fewest friends in other ethnic groups, followed by the Dutch-Turks and Dutch-Moroccans, and the ‘others’ and the Surinamese-Antilleans.

Table 9.6: Friendship connections of respondents with interethnic friends, by ethnicity (N=1890)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Friends with Dutch***</th>
<th>Friends with Dutch-Surinamese***</th>
<th>Friends with Dutch-Moroccans***</th>
<th>Friends with Dutch-Turks***</th>
<th>Friends with Dutch-Antilleans***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese-Antilleans</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Moroccan</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Turkish</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Moreover, the second aspect of note in table 9.5 is that the proportions of respondents without any friends outside their own groups are larger than those without any casual interaction with other groups. These proportions increase even further if we add those respondents whose majority of friends are from their own ethnic group. The ranking, however, remains the same: over 80% of the Dutch state to have only or mostly Dutch friends, while over half of the Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccans profess to have friends mostly in their own ethnic groups; for the ‘others’ and the Surinamese-Antilleans, these proportions are 43% and 38%, respectively. Table 9.6 further clarifies these patterns of friendship, showing interethnic friendship connections as reported by the five ethnic categories. It shows that a solid majority of the non-Dutch ethnic groups are friends with Dutch people; however, only a minority of the Dutch population claims to be involved in these friendships. A second trend in this table is that proximity within the autochtonic ranking seems to induce interethnic friendships: between Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks, between Dutch and Dutch-Surinamese, and between Dutch-Surinamese and Dutch-Antilleans.

These findings integrate and corroborate results from previous studies. Using the same data set as Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007), Hagendoorn and Pepels (2003: 48) show how bureaucratic autochthons feel the greatest social distance from Dutch-Moroccan allochthons, followed by the Dutch-Turkish and finally the Surinamese. Gijsberts and Dagevos (2009: 229-33) depict how, between 1994 and 2006, Dutch-Turkish, Dutch-Moroccan, Dutch-Surinamese, and Dutch-Antillean bureaucratic allochthons consistently showed a strong preference for social interactions within their own groups; moreover, they provide evidence that this preference is strongest among the Dutch-Turkish and decreases in the above order, thus corroborating the Amsterdam data presented in this section. Finally, combining both autochthonous and allochthonous views on interethnic interactions, Entzinger and Dourleijn
(2008: 63-4) present a similar pattern in their 1999 and 2006 surveys among Rotterdam youths: in both years, autochthons and allochthons of Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish descent all predominantly have friends from their own ethnic communities and, again, these preferences are slightly stronger for the Dutch-Turkish than the Dutch-Moroccans.

To explain this ethnic structure of friendships, it is useful to look at three aspects of friendship as a social interaction: first, the relative group sizes of the different ethnic groups; second, the physical and social spaces in which friendships in Amsterdam are made and maintained; and third, some of the factors that engender or hinder interethnic understanding. To examine the potential impact of demographic proportions on the patterns of interethnic friendships, table 9.7 presents the theoretical probabilities of \textit{random} interethnic friendships and their corresponding avoidance ratios\textsuperscript{276}. The table shows that, due to the small group sizes of Amsterdam’s minorities, the avoidance ratios of the Dutch are much lower than those of the minorities. The Dutch thus report much less avoidance than the minorities if we control for group size, even though they have most intra-ethnic friendships in absolute terms.

\textit{Table 9.7: Probabilities and avoidance ratios for only/mostly intra-ethnic friends, by ethnicity}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Only own group - probability</th>
<th>Most own group - probability</th>
<th>Only own group – avoidance ratio</th>
<th>Most own group – avoidance ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese-Antilleans</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1465</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Moroccan</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7080</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Turkish</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>13117</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>956</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.7 thus indicates that while the majority position of the Dutch can largely explain their levels of intra-ethnic friendships, other explanations should be sought to explain the high levels of avoidance among the minorities. Especially the avoidance rates of the Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks are remarkably high in this regard. One of these explanations may lie in the available spaces that allow for intimate interethnic interactions. In this respect,\textsuperscript{276} Please see Annex C for details on the calculation of these figures.
Table 9.4 above already showed that most people meet other ethnic groups at work. However, as table 9.8 below shows, there is only a very weak correlation (0.037) between being friends with members from other ethnic groups and meeting them at work. It would therefore seem that although the workplace is an important source of interethnic contact, it does not usually produce interethnic friendships.

### Table 9.8: Correlations of different types of interactions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Interethnic work</th>
<th>Interethnic activities</th>
<th>Interethnic friends</th>
<th>Allow interethnic marriage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interethnic work</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interethnic activities</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interethnic friends</td>
<td>0.037*</td>
<td>0.209***</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allow interethnic marriage</td>
<td>0.050**</td>
<td>0.079***</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A second important space that allows for interethnic contact (cf. table 9.4) is the neighbourhood, or ‘the street’. In this regard, there is great variation between neighbourhoods: some have a thriving social life, with barbecues, playgrounds, and constructive social relations between the residents, while others approximate Wirth’s (1938) impersonal, anonymous, and transitory image of the city. Due to strong parental and neighbourhood social control, especially among the Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccan communities, however, interethnic friendships and romantic relationships mostly develop in ‘safe spaces’ outside the scope of the family and neighbourhood (Hooghiemstra 2003: 105, 110, 119). Prime among these are the educational institutions: the longer young people are enrolled in schools and universities, the more likely they are to engage in friendships across ethnic boundaries. This is partly due to the protracted contact between members of different

---

277 The same argument can be made for the relation between allowing interethnic marriages and the three other types of interactions: they all show low, and in one case insignificant, correlations. The only strong positive correlation is between interethnic friendships and interethnic activities, underlining that people with interethnic friendships are also more likely to undertake activities with members of other ethnic or religious groups, and vice versa.
groups in the shared setting of the school, but also to a greater similarity in world views fostered by the shared educational experience.

However, there are also factors that limit the ‘bridging’ effect of schools. First, there is considerable ethnic segregation in schools. As Karsten et al. (2003) show, about 50% of the 201 Amsterdam primary schools have a student population of at least 70% low income ethnic minorities and about half of those of more than 90%. In practice, they argue that this means that about 1 in 4 primary school students have no opportunities for interethnic contact. In secondary schools the pattern changes, due to the Dutch differentiation in the levels of education different school types provide, but the general pattern is that the lower the level of education provided, the higher the proportion of ‘non-Western’ allochtonen (Karsten et al. 2003: 9–10). Partly as a consequence, ethnic minorities have long been underrepresented in tertiary education; but the last decade has witnessed a marked improvement in their educational attainment (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2009: 133–4).

This increased educational participation is not, however, a guarantee for increased interethnic friendships. As Forbes (2004) argues, increased contact often leads to increasing ethnocentric attitudes among the members of interacting groups, especially if the context induces competition. In Amsterdam’s tertiary educational institutions, evidence for such increases could be found in the rising number and popularity of ethnically (or religiously) distinctive student associations (Hooghiemstra 2003: 112). Moreover, in about 10% of Amsterdam’s ethnically mixed primary and secondary schools, a local government study found interethnic relations to be antagonistic (Gemeente Amsterdam 2005a, 2005e). It also found that in the majority of mixed schools, social groups formed along ethnic lines both in and outside of school. Virtually all those who partook in the study by Karsten et al. (2003: 6) therefore considered the lack of interethnic contact as one of the main problems facing their schools regardless of its ethnic composition.
Other popular ‘safe spaces’ where young people can meet outside the view of their family and neighbourhood are sports clubs, cinemas, libraries, cafes, and night clubs. As table 9.4 showed, all these are spaces in which members of different groups interact and therefore likely to offer opportunities for friendship. In light of all these opportunities for interethnic contact, it seems that the consistently intra-ethnic nature of friendship in Amsterdam requires more than contextual explanations of social control or residential and educational segregation: that is, we should also consider people’s preferences for having friends within their own communities.

These preferences can be inspired by negative attitudes and prejudices towards members of other ethnic or religious groups, as discussed in section 9.2. Moreover, they may originate from shared practices and preferences within a specific ethnic community. Good examples of such ‘cultural’ similarities are a shared language, shared musical or other artistic preferences, or the collective sense of faith and community among Muslims. As Hooghiemstra (2003: 125) phrases it: “To Dutch friends, Turkish and Moroccan youths simply have to explain too many self-evident things about their lives”. More subtly, intra-ethnic similarity can also take the shape of shared values and norms, i.e. judgements and expectations about what constitutes morally acceptable and ‘good’ social behaviour. Shared values and norms can engender in-group identification and trust, while interethnic value differences can lead to out-group exclusion and stereotyping. Although many of the quantitative studies of values and ethnicity grossly simplify the subject, there is some evidence for value divergence between the ethnic Dutch and certain minorities.

In the case of friendships between young Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccans in Amsterdam, Hooghiemstra (2003: 125) argues that three of such perceived value

---

Note that ‘culture’ is understood here as the collection of locally shared practices, rituals, and preferences within a specific group of people – e.g. the Dutch-Moroccans of Amsterdam West or the Antillean young men of the Bijlmer.

For example Entzinger and Dourleijn (2008: 55-8) show that the views of Turkish and Moroccan youths in Rotterdam on family values and the issue of choice in romantic relationships differ significantly from those of the Dutch respondents.
discrepancies are crucial in promoting intra-ethnic intimate relations over interethnic ones (friendships or marriages): a sense of family ties and values, ideas about gender relations, and the importance of religion. In all three aspects, she has found that the Dutch–Turkish and Dutch–Moroccan youths feel they believe the opposite of most of the *autochtone* Dutch (and, though to a lesser extent, other ethnic groups). They feel the Dutch have little regard for their families, are too liberal when it comes to gender relations, and have different and often non-existent religious beliefs.

Whether or not these perceptions of value discrepancies reflect ‘real’ differences is theoretically irrelevant; the fact that Dutch–Turkish and Dutch–Moroccan youths believe them to be real constitutes a reason for them to prefer friendships, as well as marriages, within their communities. Such beliefs may stem from individual inferences about observed behaviour of other ethnic groups, such as dating behaviour among ethnic Dutch youths or their behaviour towards their parents. These observations, however, are often limited because of the lack of meaningful social relationship across ethnic boundaries. Moreover, behaviour is not necessarily a direct reflection of people’s values and beliefs. Perceptions about value differences are, therefore, also in large part based on stereotypes, derived from discourses shared within the family, group of friends, ethnic or religious community, or larger society. These interethnic stereotypes are often closely connected to the discourses of *autochtone*; for example, the notion of Dutch–Moroccan youth deviance and the alleged dominance of Muslim husbands over their wives are stereotyped representations of Amsterdam’s Muslim *allochtonen*, which many ethnic Dutch people interpret as indications of the ‘deviant’ and ‘backward’ values of Muslim ethnic communities (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007: 23–4).
Table 9.9: “Would you permit your daughter to marry outside ethnicity/religion?” (N=2638)***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Yes (%)</th>
<th>Depends on religion (%)</th>
<th>Depends on ethnicity (%)</th>
<th>Depends on other (%)</th>
<th>No (%)</th>
<th>Uncertain (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese-Antilleans</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Moroccan</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Turkish</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Shared in-group cultural practices, out-group antagonism, and perceived value discrepancies can thus help to explain why Amsterdam residents prefer friendships within their own ethnic community. Tables 9.9 and 9.10 show that these preferences become even more important in decisions about marriage. Table 9.9 presents the survey data on parental preferences for the marriage partner of their daughter, showing that there are substantial differences between ethnic groups in this regard. The Dutch are most likely to allow intergroup marriages, followed by the Surinamese-Antilleans, ‘others’, Dutch-Turks, and Dutch-Moroccans. Moreover, few respondents would categorically refuse to allow such marriages; such refusals are most likely among the Dutch-Turks (15%) and Dutch-Moroccans (20%)\(^{280}\).

Moreover, the table illustrates the reasons why parents would object. In this regard, two patterns are important. First, table 9.9 shows that religious difference is a much more likely cause for disallowing intergroup marriages than ethnic difference, especially for Dutch-Turks and Dutch-Moroccans. This pattern mirrors those found in Kano, where the religious boundaries between ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’ were shown to be considerably harder than the ethnic ones. Second, the table shows that for the Dutch, Caribbeans, and ‘others’, other considerations weigh more heavily than either religious or ethnic differences. The ‘other consideration’ that was most often mentioned was the bridegroom’s personality.

\(^{280}\) Note also the high percentages of Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccans who are uncertain - this could be due to actual uncertainty or reluctance to answer the question (and thus perhaps appear either too ethnocentric or too liberal); since older generations were more likely to report uncertainty than younger ones, it would seem that reluctance is the more likely explanation.
If we zoom in on the religious objections of the Dutch and the Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccans, furthermore, the survey data showed that while the Dutch mostly protest against potential fundamentalist forms of religion in a partner for their daughter, Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccans are more likely to object to a partner who is not a Muslim. This indicates that while the Dutch consider religion problematic if it is practised with a high level of intensity or orthodoxy, Dutch-Turks and Dutch-Moroccans hesitate to accept a religion that is categorically different from their own, let alone people with no religion at all.

Table 9.10: Non-single respondents with a partner from their own ethnic group (N=1662)***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner from own group</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese-Antilleans</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Moroccan</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Turkish</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparatively, table 9.9 thus showed that the Dutch are less likely to restrict their children in their choice of marriage partner than the other ethnic groups. Although these results are not presented here, the survey data also showed that all members of ethnic minorities who were born in the Netherlands (the so-called ‘second generation’) are significantly more likely to be lenient with their daughters than those born abroad. However, these numbers are all dwarfed by the percentages of people who actually have partners within their own group.

Table 9.10 gives an indication of this reluctance to engage in romantic relations outside one’s own group, presenting the proportions of the five communities who have a partner from their ethnic own group. It shows that while the Dutch are least likely to have parental restrictions on marriage, they are second only to the Dutch-Moroccans in their preference for in-group partners, followed closely by the Dutch-Turkish and, at some distance, by the Surinamese-Antilleans and the ‘others’.
These high proportions of in-group marriage of the Dutch, Dutch-Turkish, and Dutch-Moroccans match those reported in Hooghiemstra (2003: 26). Moreover, she estimates that, of the Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccans who marry inside their own groups, a substantial majority bring a partner from the ‘country of origin’ rather than choose one from their ethnic community in the Netherlands. ‘Other’ ethnic categories and the Surinamese-Antilleans are somewhat more likely to marry outside their groups, but even among them the number of actual intermarriages remains well below the proportion that would be allowed to do so according to table 9.9.

Table 9.11: Probabilities and avoidance ratios for intra-ethnic marriages, by ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Theoretical intra-ethnic marriage %</th>
<th>Avoidance ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese-Antilleans</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Moroccan</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch-Turkish</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moreover, table 9.11 shows that the proportions of in-group marriages are well above the theoretical probabilities of members of each group selecting a partner from their own group. Like table 5.9 and 9.7 showed for friendships, table 9.11 presents the probabilities of intra-group marriages if marriage selection was done completely at random. It shows that such random selection would lead 60% of the Dutch to marry a Dutch partner, while only 7% of the Dutch-Moroccans would marry another Dutch-Moroccan. As before, the ‘native’ Dutch avoidance ratio is closest to 1, indicating that their high rate of in-group marriages can largely be explained in reference to their majority status. Also as before, the relatively high avoidance rates of the ‘settler’ minorities require additional explanations – in this case, relating to contextual factors and individual preferences.
In addition to parental restrictions and demography, it is argued here that the relatively high levels of avoidance among minorities should be explained by the fact that the obstacles to interethnic friendships, as described above, inflate in the process of finding a marriage partner. This may partly be because the perceived value conflicts between ethnic communities relate directly to central issues of marriage (family, gender relations, love, and sexuality). Furthermore, the institution of marriage is by definition more of a family, or even community, affair than friendship, and therefore more likely to involve parents, family members, and religious leaders in the decision-making process. Their impact, by necessity, is likely to restrict interethnic relations rather than promote them. Moreover, the limited opportunities for meeting other people from other ethnic groups are gendered and therefore even more likely to prevent romantic relations between men and women across ethnic boundaries (Hooghiemstra 2003: 136; Korf et al. 2007: 65).

9.4 Collective Interactions: Ethnic Riots in Amsterdam?

The findings of sections 9.2 and 9.3 have been interpreted as a measure of interethnic antagonism and avoidance in Amsterdam. This section will focus on the third aspects of such relations, namely conflict in collective interethnic interactions. These may occur in various forms, but one prominent type of conflictual interethnic interaction is the ethnic riot: “an intense, sudden, though not necessarily wholly unplanned, lethal attack by civilian members of one ethnic group on civilian members of another ethnic group” (Horowitz 2002: 1). The Kano violence described in chapter 5 is an example of such a riot, but in Amsterdam there have been no instances of collective behaviour that qualify as an ethnic riot in Horowitz’ definition. Although there have been instances of more or less spontaneous collective violence with ethnic connotations, these were neither particularly lethal nor unambiguously targeted at civilian members of other ethnic communities. Section 9.4.1 analyses two of these instances.
of collective violence in order to explain them and assess the extent to which they can be considered cases of ‘ethnic’ conflict.

In addition, section 9.4.2 will look at two instances of non-violent collective interactions with an ethnic undertone and with the potential for violence. A comparison between these instances and the violent ones will help to highlight the causes for (non-)violence in Amsterdam. Before entering into this analysis, however, it is necessary to explain why certain discursively prominent forms of behaviour by members of different ethnic communities in Amsterdam are excluded from the definition of collective interethnic interactions of this thesis. This mainly concerns three types of behaviour: youth delinquency among certain *allochtone* ethnic communities, especially the Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Antilleans; cases of so-called ‘racist’ violence (van Donselaar and Rodrigues 2004b, 2004a, 2006, 2008; Witte 1995, 2010); and, finally, the murder of Theo van Gogh (Buruma 2006; Eyerman 2008; Vidino 2007).

All three of these forms of interaction have been interpreted and analysed as part of a wider conflict between Amsterdam’s ethnic communities. However, there are three reasons why these cases are not included in the analysis. First, it is a stretch to define any of these cases as ‘collective’ interactions. Youth criminality is often perpetrated by individuals or small gangs and, while some of their criminal behaviour may be directed at members of other ethnic groups, this may not be because of the ethnic boundary between them. Second, as a methodological argument, the three types of violence described above are not comparable to the cases of riots and protests analysed in Kano. As such, even if the cases were clearly collective and interethnic interactions, they are of little use in the comparative framework.

A third complication, which applies to both the unselected and selected cases of interactions, is the extent to which they are in essence interethnic. The Hofstad Group, which included Theo van Gogh’s murderer, was an ethnic mix, as are the youth gangs in for example Amsterdam West (Vidino 2007). In his ethnographic study of Dutch-Moroccan
youths in a ‘Moroccan’ neighbourhood in Slotervaart, De Jong (2007: 101) estimates that out of the 200 young men he met about 80% are of Moroccan descent. The remaining 20% is composed of Surinamese, Turkish, Chinese, and Dutch individuals. It is, however, likely that they too would be labelled as ‘Moroccans’ by an external observer. Rather than a purely ethnic label, this use of Marokkaan thus denotes an allochtoon who looks and behaves like the stereotypical ‘problematic’ Dutch-Moroccan young man. Collective behaviour by these youths, such as the case in 1998 described below, is therefore often classified as ethnic, ‘Moroccan’ behaviour, a classification that may reveal more about the labeller than the actors involved. The ethnic nature of an interaction is therefore seen as a matter of degree and assessed for all of the cases below.

9.4.1 Collective Violence

This section will look at two cases of collective interactions that could be, and have been, interpreted as interethnic encounters. The first one dates back to April 1998, when young men of allochtone ethnic origins protested in response to police actions against a young Dutch-Moroccan man earlier that day and occupied a roundabout on the border of the neighbourhood Overtoomse Veld in Amsterdam West. The second instance occurred in September 2006 in the Indische neighbourhood in Amsterdam East, when a crowd of young allochtone men wreaked havoc in reaction to the murder of a Dutch-Moroccan man earlier that evening. The details of both events have been amply described elsewhere (Adang et al. 2010; Crisis Onderzoek Team 1998; de Jong 2007: 65–7; Otten et al. 2001) and will therefore only be summarised here on the basis of those sources. The analysis will assess the alleged ethnic character of these interactions and highlight some of the mechanisms that caused them.

The Overtoomse Veld was a notorious neighbourhood in the late 1990s. It was an area with many Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turkish families that were characterised by a low
income, low education, unemployment, and youth criminality (De Jong 2007: 57-62). Due to the increasing incidence of theft and other minor crimes in the neighbourhood in 1997, the police, in consultation with the municipality, decided on a ‘no-nonsense’ policy towards the delinquent youths (Adang et al. 2010: 86). This policy focused on an estimated 50 predominantly Dutch-Moroccan young men, who ‘hung around’ in the local August Allebé square and were seen as the root of most disruptions (Crisis Onderzoek Team 1998: 37-8). In addition to the two neighbourhood policemen, surveillants were hired to patrol the streets; special instructions were given to pay attention to the Dutch-Moroccan youth. These youths, the surveillants were told, were the cause of the disturbances and their groupings in the street therefore had to be actively disbanded (ibid.).

The first months of 1998 were then characterised by increasing distrust and negative attitudes between the police and the neighbourhood youths, reinforced by several incidents. The police was unable to ‘get a grip’ on the street youths, while the youths felt slighted by the police, especially by the neighbourhood policeman (buurtregisseur) (Crisis Onderzoek Team 1998: 49-51). On the evening of 23 April, a fire in a playground rubbish bin provided a trigger for violence: the police, in pursuit of the culprit, demanded an explanation from a group of young men in the playground (Adang et al. 2010: 86). After a demonstrative denial and refusal to leave the area, the buurtregisseur decided to arrest a young Dutch-Moroccan man who went by the alias of ‘Pretty Boy’ (de Jong 2007: 66). His refusal to co-operate escalated into a violent arrest, witnessed by increasing numbers of bystanders and involving the father of the young man. The buurtregisseur called for police assistance. In the subsequent arrest, the young man was hurt, as was his father (De Jong 2007: 66), even though later enquiries did not report disproportional violence by the police. After the actual arrest had taken place, rumours spread fast throughout the neighbourhood and a group of allegedly Dutch-Moroccan young men occupied the roundabout.
In their actions to clear the roundabout and reclaim the public space, the Crisis Research Team (COT) (1998) argues that the police used proportional violence - which did not prevent the ‘rioters’ from getting hurt in the process. Media attention was extensive, and the behaviour of the youths was gravely condemned by the media pundits, the Amsterdam municipality, and the police. Many residents of the Overtoomse Veld neighbourhood, however, protested the behaviour of the police, framing it widely in terms of the neighbourhood’s and the Dutch-Moroccan population’s social marginalisation (De Jong 2007: 66). The COT therefore reports that interpretations of the events remain contested and, to some extent, inconclusive as to the causes and individual responsibilities of those involved (Crisis Onderzoek Team 1998).

As to the causes of this ‘riot’, it is clear that the triggering event was the rubbish bin fire, which came after a protracted period of worsening relations between the youths and the local police. In the context of the neighbourhood, with its relatively large population of young men lingering in the street, the ensuing violent struggle surrounding the arrest provided an opportunity for quick mobilisation. The policeman’s aggressive arrest, his call for backup, and the fighting of the Dutch-Moroccan youth rapidly increased the tension of the situation. Rumours then spread quickly, some doubtless exaggerated, through networks of friends and families, to the extent that the father of the arrested youth heard of the fight and left his house to enter into the struggle, as did other older residents. After the arrest had been conducted, the lack of contact and communication between the local authorities (including the police) and the resident community allowed rumours to grow and suspicion to remain unchallenged. The roundabout was then occupied by a group of local youths, who felt supported by the angry reactions of the older residents of the neighbourhood.

The lack of trust and communication between the police and the neighbourhood resident community is thus important in explaining the extent of the 1998 escalation process. This not only led policemen to react strongly to a relatively innocuous situation and thus create an
opportunity for violent escalation for the street youths, but also caused other local residents – such as the arrested young man’s father – to support the youths in their struggle against the police rather than restrain them. To some extent, this episode of escalation can be classified as interethnic, in the sense that the youths were predominantly Dutch-Moroccan and partly justified their behaviour in response to what they perceived as discriminatory ethnic targeting by the police. On the other hand, however, the ethnic Dutch in general were never the targets of the youth protest and violence, which was either aimed directly at the police or at the material environment. The incident is thus best characterised as an episode of escalation and violence between Dutch-Moroccan and other minority youths and the police, of which looting and some destruction were the side effects. Ethnicity played a role in the process, but perhaps a more limited one than the term ‘ethnic riot’ would suggest.

Such terminology would arguably be better suited for the second instance of collective violence, which occurred in 2006 in response to the murder of a Dutch-Moroccan man by a group of Dutch-Antillean men at a party in the Indische neighbourhood (Adang et al. 2010: 125-34). The neighbourhood policeman was present at the party and witnessed the stabbing, although from a distance. A group of about 70 young men formed to find the perpetrator, entering houses and destroying windows in the process (ibid.: 125). The police was able to stop them, but could not apprehend the perpetrator. The next evening, regardless of local government attempts to maintain the peace through a neighbourhood meeting, at which frustrations and rumours of police discrimination against Dutch-Moroccans were vented, a group of young allegedly Dutch-Moroccan men formed and destroyed the windows of a ‘Surinamese’ cafe (ibid.: 129). On the next day, Friday 22 September, the local imam helped to organise a prayer session at two neighbourhood mosques, followed by a prayer at the location where the crime took place. Another neighbourhood meeting followed, where local

---

281 Although every source describes these youths as Moroccan, not a single source provides any evidence of their Moroccan identity. The same applies to the riots of 2006.
government officials and the police attempted to explain the situation and preach for calm (ibid.: 130). The atmosphere was tense, but further violence did not ensue.

In the process of escalation in this particular case, several explanatory factors should be mentioned. First, the trigger of the violence was the stabbing of a Dutch-Moroccan man by Dutch-Antilleans. This triggered strong reactions, again not only from the local youths but also the wider population. As before, the police was seen as (purposefully) ineffective and rumours developed around alleged discrimination and neglect of the Dutch-Moroccans in the neighbourhood. Although the local authorities attempted to quell the rumours through neighbourhood meetings, distrust remained - and was fuelled by the media coverage. As Adang et al. (2010: 130-4) argue, the national media generally interpreted the disturbances as “race riots” between the Dutch-Moroccans and the Dutch-Surinamese or Dutch-Antilleans, exaggerating the numbers of rioters and the extent of the violence that was committed. These messages ran counter to what the municipality, including Mayor Cohen, and police officials attempted to communicate, thus complicating the picture and allowing for the rumours about a Moroccan-Surinamese confrontation to retain some of their power. However, Adang (2010: 133-4) also argues that the escalation was ultimate restricted and managed through the local networks of the police and the municipality.

The 2006 case shows more direct implications of an ethnic boundary between the Surinamese and Dutch-Moroccans, especially in the targeting of a Surinamese cafe by the rioting youths, who were most likely predominantly Dutch-Moroccan. These targets were perhaps all the more telling, as it emerged that the initial suspicion that the perpetrators of the stabbing were Dutch-Surinamese was false and that they turned out to be Dutch-Antillean. The cafe was, insofar as the available analyses show, unrelated to the perpetrator of the murder and thus only selected on an ethnic basis. At the same time, however, the justifications for the rioting of both the rioting youths and some of the neighbourhood residents were mostly centred on the triggering event: they wanted to find the perpetrator
and bring him to justice (ibid.: 129). In this narrative, the police were drawn in as the object of criticism of the *allochtone* youths. They, after all, had been unable (or unwilling, as some of the rumours claimed) to apprehend the perpetrator. As such, the riots were less an expression of ethnic conflict and more an angry response to the murder of the Dutch-Moroccan man.

The evening riots then provided an opportunity for street youths, like those in Amsterdam West, to join in for reasons described in De Jong (2007: 121, 144, 157) as both for entertainment and as a means to prove their worth in their gang community.

The ‘ethnic’ character of the 2006 disturbances remains contested to this day (Adang et al. 2010: 131–3). The national media and more conservative pundits emphasise the crucial role of ethnicity, while municipality and police officials, as well as local civic organisations, vehemently oppose the idea of conflicting ethnic groups in the neighbourhood. Here, it is argued that the disturbances became framed in ethnic terms, as the murder of a Dutch-Moroccan man by a group of Dutch-Surinamese. The ethnic dimension was then fuelled by perceptions of frustration at the inefficacy of the police, which was taken to symbolise the marginalisation of the Dutch-Moroccans by the state. This helps to explain the mobilisation of neighbourhood residents beyond the immediate angry young men and highlights the importance of ethnicity in mobilising for violence.

In addition, however, the role of the police should be considered: both in 1998 and 2006, they were the object of protest, and even violence, by the minority ethnic communities. As such, the local state was an active participant in the escalation processes of both cases, even if it attempted to position itself as a neutral conflict manager. We will now look at two cases in which the opposite patterns were visible: not only did substantial triggering events not lead to violence, but they did not trigger any substantial contestation between ethnic communities or between some communities and the local state.
To elucidate some of the ways in which social triggers can be managed without violent escalation, this section will look at the two most substantial social shocks that have occurred in Amsterdam over the past decade: the 2004 murder of Theo van Gogh and the 2008 film against Islam made by Geert Wilders. Both had a significant potential for violent escalation, but were managed peacefully with the help of two mechanisms: (i) the framing of the triggering event in terms that transcended local oppositions between ethnic communities or between ethnic groups and the local state; and (ii) the inclusion of community networks in the management process. We will look at the ways in which these two mechanisms have played out in both situations of external shocks; but as both shocks have been described elsewhere in some detail, our analysis will only summarise the main features necessary to illustrate the workings of the two mechanisms (Bosland 2010; de Bruijn 2010; Buruma 2006; Eyerman 2008; Kuitenbrouwer 2010).

The murder of Theo van Gogh took place in Amsterdam East on the second of November 2004. The murderer, Mohammed Bouyeri, was a Dutch citizen of Moroccan descent and a long-time resident of the city. Through an open letter to Ayaan Hirsi Ali, the co-producer of Van Gogh’s film ‘Submission’, which was left attached to a knife stabbed into the body of the deceased, Bouyeri emphasised the religious motives for his crime. Van Gogh had for some time been a critic of Islamic beliefs and practices - as well as many other aspects of contemporary society - and expressed his criticisms through provocative, and often obscene, columns and other writing. A prime example is his use of the term geitenneukers (“goat fuckers”) for Muslims, which can still be found on his website De gezonde roker (“The healthy smoker”)282. Together with Ayaan Hirsi Ali, who was also vocal critic of Islam, Van Gogh had made the film ‘Submission part I’ (van Gogh 2004), in which verses from the Quran were

projected on the veiled bodies of women who had suffered physical abuse. The production of ‘Submission part 1’ provided the triggering event for Van Gogh’s murder.

Only two years after the shooting of politician Pim Fortuyn, this violent act shocked the Netherlands perhaps even more intensely, not least because of the ethnic and religious background of the perpetrator. When Fortuyn was murdered, many public authorities expressed their relief that the murderer was *autochtoon*; with Mohammed Bouyeri’s act, many now feared societal repercussions in terms of increasing conflict and violence between the Dutch ethnic communities. Perhaps partly as a consequence of this fear, most political authorities, media, and other people active in the public debates denounced the killings and simultaneously rejected any form of collective responsibility for the crime among the Muslim or Dutch-Moroccan communities. In the national parliament, critical debates were held on the adequacy of the intelligence and procedures for information sharing between the various branches of the Dutch security services; the questions of guilt and responsibility for the crime, however, were left to the courtroom. As such, national politicians purposefully attempted to frame the murder as an act by an isolated individual, rather than the product of tensions between ethnic or religious communities.

In similar vein, local authorities in Amsterdam reacted to the shock of the murder by speaking out against the individual act, but not against the city’s communities of Muslims or Dutch-Moroccans. On the evening of the day of the murder a ‘noise wake’ was organised on the Dam square, at which the mayor, the national minister for integration, and many other officials expressed their shock in these terms. This discourse was repeated consistently in the many debates and discussions that were organised in the immediate aftermath of the murder, both by the municipality and by civic organisations, not least of which Amsterdam’s mosques. As Mayor Cohen phrased it:

> I can tell you what I will do and what I am doing. Yes, keeping things together. Everyone knows this. They can be cynical about it, but that does not bother me.
Keeping things together through hard interventions [against illegal transgressions], yes, but not only that. [It also involves] dialogue with the city. And yes, this dialogue also brings me to mosques. For what is the alternative, in a city with 120,000 Muslims? Excluding them? Pushing them further into that corner they already occupy? I refuse to. I am the mayor of all *Amsterdammers* (Cohen 2004).

As Cohen himself hinted, this attitude was controversial, as some felt it entailed a capitulation to the interests of Muslims at the expense of the *autochtone* Dutch. However, I would argue that the combination of the restraint and inclusion displayed by Cohen on the one hand and the more uncompromising attitude of his alderman of integration, Ahmed Aboutaleb, provided support for both groups of victims: the supporters of Van Gogh as well as the Dutch-Moroccan (and wider Islamic) community. The latter, a Dutch-Moroccan resident of Amsterdam himself, took a more confrontational stance towards ‘his own’ ethnic and religious community:

I am a proponent of a strong, diverse city. But a diverse city can only thrive on a set of shared core values. For people who do not share these core values, there is no place in this society. Freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and the principle of non-discrimination are the most important components of these values. Anyone who does not share them should draw his conclusions and leave (Aboutaleb 2004)

Moreover, he argued that “there is an extraordinarily heavy responsibility on the shoulders of the Dutch-Moroccan community, to produce an antidote[, a] vaccine against the poison that is intolerance” (ibid.). The speech, held only a day after the murder in a predominantly Dutch-Moroccan mosque, made many Dutch-Moroccans resentful towards the alderman, even to the extent of labelling him a traitor of his own people\(^283\). However, it is argued here

---

\(^283\) Ahmed Aboutaleb, op. cit.
that his confrontational stance allowed for the appeasement of those Amsterdam residents who felt resentful towards the city’s Dutch-Moroccan community, without blaming the community directly for the murder. Thus, Cohen and Aboutaleb, supported by the denouncement of the murder by ethnic and religious authorities and the restraint of national politicians, managed to shape the collective interpretation of the murder: rather than an expression of ethnic or religious tensions, it came to be seen as an individual crime with possible – yet preventable – repercussions for societal peace.

This active framing, I argue, helped to prevent retaliatory collective violence from occurring within the confines of Amsterdam. It mobilised Amsterdammers across ethnic and religious boundaries for protest and debate against violent expressions of intolerance, rallied their anger against those elements that were deemed to threaten the inclusive and open character of the city rather than against specific ethnic or religious communities; the many debates, demonstrations, and discussions provided opportunities to vent the shared public resentment against the incident. At the same time, however, the city government prepared itself for new cases of confrontation and violence: through the Draaiboek Vrede (“Scenarios for Peace”) (Gemeente Amsterdam 2005f), which had been developed in September 2001, all local police officers and borough government officials were instructed to report any cases of tensions within their locality directly to the administrative ‘Triangle’ constituted by the mayor, the chief of police, and the chief justice.

Inclusive framing, peaceful mobilisation across ethnic and religious boundaries, and effective information management were thus the main factors that helped to prevent collective violence from occurring as a response to the shock of Van Gogh’s murder. A similar argument can be made for the lack of violence in response to Geert Wilders’ (2008) film Fitna, which was published on the internet in March 2008. Due to Wilders’ virulent criticism of Islamic beliefs and practices, it was feared that the broadcast of this film would be a trigger

---

284 Violence did ensue in other parts of the country – see Van Donselaar and Rodrigues (2004b)
for collective violence, not least among Muslims in Amsterdam. In preparation, therefore, Mayor Cohen initiated the *Draaiboek Vrede* (Gemeente Amsterdam 2005f) several weeks prior to the broadcast of the film (Vugts 2008).

Local government officials contacted key persons within the Muslim communities, coordinating ways in which to mobilise them for a non-violent response (ibid.). In the wake of the Van Gogh murder, both the municipality and the Amsterdam police invested significantly in establishing contacts with the minority communities, for example through: Dutch-Moroccan, Dutch-Turkish, and Surinamese-Antillean networks within the police force (Politie Amsterdam-Amstelland n.d.; Adang et al. 2010: 109); institutionalised connections between the municipal officials, the police, and several civic organisations; and links with local ethnic and religious leaders. In addition, local police officers prepared scenarios for escalation, designating responsible officers in the case of escalation (Vugts 2008).

The results of these preparations were thus extensive contacts between state and civic organisations, with the shared purpose of preventing collective violence. These institutional efforts were compounded by the discursive frames used by national politicians, most of whom explicitly denounced Wilders’ film, or at least dissociated it from the principles and policies of the Dutch parliament and government. This discursive approach, consistently applied by Prime-Minister Balkenende, his government, and most parliamentarians, not only sought to prevent violence, but also to placate international actors. As a result, Wilders became seen as an isolated crusader against Islam rather than the representative of the Dutch government or the *autochtone* Dutch people. Allowing him to broadcast his film was necessary to uphold free speech; disagreeing with him, however, showed that the Dutch state and, arguably, the

---

286 Joris Rijbroek, op. cit.
287 E.g. the buurtvaders, or Dutch-Moroccan ‘neighbourhood fathers’ who were instated after the 1998 incident; or the Muslim youth organisation *Muslimjongeren* Amsterdam (Joris Rijbroek, op. cit.)
288 Joris Rijbroek, op. cit.
289 Ahmed Driss el Boujoufi, op. cit.; Bas Plaisier op. cit.
majority of the Dutch people disagreed with him on the content of the film. For imam Fawaz, an Islamic preacher in The Hague who had become notorious for his fiery verbal assaults on Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Theo van Gogh, this rejection of the film by the Dutch government was important in his decision to preach for peaceful protest: “The attitude of the Dutch government is very important. If the government rejects the film unambiguously […] we will keep calling for the whole Muslim community to remain calm. Otherwise, we will only serve to prove Wilders right” (van Gennip 2008).

The shock of the film Fitna (Wilders 2008) to relations between Islamic allochtone and autochtone communities in Amsterdam was thus managed through extensive networking between the municipality, police, and civic organisations; through active discursive framing, by all parties concerned, of the film as an individual act by Wilders rather than an expression of collective dislike; and through preparations for situations of (violent) escalation (Draaiboek Vrede). In the international context, a delegation of Islamic, Protestant, and Catholic leaders travelled to Egypt in order to illustrate the extent to which Dutch Muslims are free to practise their faith. As a result of these efforts, demonstrations against the film became an opportunity for the Islamic allochtonen in Amsterdam to express their rejection of Wilders while still embracing Dutch (and Amsterdammer) tolerance.

9.5 Conclusion

In sum, this chapter has discussed perceptions and interactions between ethnic communities in order to assess the extent to which they display antagonism, avoidance, and conflict. First, in terms of antagonism, the chapter has demonstrated that the patterns of negative perceptions (even stigma) towards various ethnic communities overlap with the ethnic hierarchy of autochtonie, although this hierarchy was complicated by the effects of perceived

290 Ahmed Driss el Boujoufi, op. cit.; Bas Plaisier op. cit.
group ‘deviance’ and positive in-group evaluations. The ranking of negative perceptions – ranging from the least negative perceptions of the Dutch to the most negative of the Dutch-Moroccans – was highly consistent across ethnic communities. This consistent overlap between *autochtonie* and antagonism is taken as an indication of the group positioning effect of *autochtonie* on interethnic perceptions: the more ‘problematic’ *allochtone* communities are perceived more negatively than the ‘normal’ *autochtone* Dutch.

Second, in terms of individual interactions, the chapter has shown the persistence of interethnic avoidance, from work interactions to friendships and marriages. In casual work interactions, the level of avoidance (or positive in-group bias) was lowest, and largely reflected the effects of segregated social lives as well as negative interethnic perceptions. In more intimate interactions, such as friendships and marriages, in-group preferences and interethnic avoidance increased markedly. Moreover, if we consider differences in interactive patterns by ethnic category and control for group size, the *allochtone* Dutch-Turkish and Dutch-Moroccans displayed a stronger preference for intra-group interactions than the more other categories. In addition to the inflated effects of segregation, cultural difference, and negative perceptions, these patterns of avoidance in more intimate interactions were explained in reference to the conservative social control over friendship or marriage decisions by family or community members.

Third, the chapter has analysed four cases of violent and non-violent collective interethnic interactions. Although the extent to which these interactions were in fact ‘ethnic’ remains contested, a comparison between these cases allows several tentative conclusions regarding the mechanisms behind collective interethnic interactions in Amsterdam. First, both cases of violence were triggered by ‘external’ shocks to the social system, and were characterised by quick mobilisation around youths from minority (allegedly mostly Dutch-Moroccan) ethnic communities. In contrast, in the cases of non-violent responses to similar shocks, police behaviour was carefully managed and ‘street youths’ were actively prevented from mobilising.
Second, in both cases of violence the police played an active role: in 1998, an aggressive police arrest triggered an angry reaction against the police by the local youths and wider neighbourhood, while in 2006 the police became the target of local youth who vented their anger at a recent murder. In contrast, in the cases of non-violent escalation, the role of the police was to liaise with the local state and civic organisations in preventing escalation rather than actively intervening.

Finally, the importance of active networking between the local state, police, and civic organisations, both in preparation for a shock and in its immediate aftermath, was also demonstrated in the process of framing the collective interaction. The episodes of collective violence were both framed in terms of local grievances - the marginalisation of the local allochton communities in 1998 and the perception that the police had been purposefully ineffective in 2006 - which allowed local mobilisation against an immediate target: the police and, in 2006, the Surinamese-Antillean community. The non-violent responses to the shocks of the Van Gogh murder and the Fitna film (Wilders 2008), however, were framed in more inclusive terms: the collective anger against politically/religiously inspired violence and the shared rejection of Wilders’ anti-Islamic rhetoric. In charting the formulation and dissemination of these discursive frames, the chapter has demonstrated the importance of the extensive networks between the city and stadsdeel governments, the police, and key civic organisations. It is suggested here that the success of the framing efforts of these networks depended in large part on the informal authority held by these municipality and civic leaders in their respective constituencies.
10 Conclusion: Struggling to Belong

10.1 Nativism and Social Relations in Kano and Amsterdam

Everywhere that [the city] made its appearance - in the Middle Ages, in Antiquity, in the Near and Far East - the city arose as a joint settlement by immigration from outside. [T]he city was able to maintain itself only through continuous new immigrants [and] has always contained elements from most varied social situations. […] City air makes man free (Weber 1960: 92, 94)

In his 1921 essay on the city, Weber was one of the first social theorists to highlight the deep connection between migration, social diversity, and the urban environment. As Borja et al. (1997: 89-90) phrase it: “our societies, in all latitudes, are and will be multicultural, and the cities are the places in which the greatest diversity is concentrated”. But while Weber was optimistic about the liberating mentality of the urbanites, the many cases of ‘contested cities’ (Mollenkopf 1983) have led other scholars to consider urban diversity a mixed blessing: an opportunity for creativity and innovation as well as xenophobia and conflict. This thesis has looked at two contested cities, Kano and Amsterdam, aiming to uncover some of the mechanisms that explain the tensions between their ‘native’ and ‘settler’ residents. It has argued for a historical and constructivist approach to this problem, focusing on the role of social identities in shaping social relations. Within this framework, the thesis has highlighted the importance of top-down and bureaucratic categorisations - indigeneity in Nigeria and autochthony in the Netherlands.

The central argument has been that the nativism inherent in these policy categories entered into the realm of social identification through notions of ethnicity and urban belonging. Introduced at a time of great social change and inequality, indigeneity and
bureaucratic autochthony reinforced nativism as a salient definition of belonging in the two cities. Although this was a process of converging structural change, bottom-up and top-down agency, the incorporation of indigeneity and bureaucratic autochthony into political institutions, practices, and public discourses was a necessary condition for its particular trajectory. The primordialism and competition inherent in the nativist categories came to redefine and reinforce exclusionary ethnic identifications. Indigeneity and autochthony thus helped to produce highly exclusionary and hierarchical ethnic identities, which increased the likelihood of antagonism, avoidance, and conflict between the ‘native’ and ‘settler’ ethnic communities. This concluding chapter will summarise the findings of the thesis and elaborate on their implications. It will also discuss some of the methodological and conceptual limits of the study and, on this basis, suggest avenues for further research.

10.1.1 Theory: Nativism and Social Relations

The research problem of this thesis has been to explore the extent to which the top-down introduction of nativist bureaucratic categorisations can help to explain interethnic tensions and conflicts. To this end, the introductory chapter sketched an approach to social relations centred on the notion of identification. Social relations are structured by identity cleavages, which allow individuals to re-construct their social world and orient themselves within it. On the basis of Tajfel and Turner’s (1979) social identity theory and Blumer’s (1958) group position paradigm, perceptions and social interactions are influenced by the boundaries and content of identity cleavages. More specifically, exclusionary identities are considered conducive to destructive social relations – constituted by antagonism, avoidance, and conflict – while inclusionary ones are expected to reinforce constructive perceptions and interactions. Nativist identities are defined as one type of exclusionary identities, leading to the expectation that if such identities are salient, perceptions between ‘native’ and ‘settler’ groups
are likely to be antagonistic and their interactions likely to be characterised by avoidance and conflict.

Building on this argument, the pertinent theoretical question is how to connect bureaucratic categories to identifications - in other words, how do nativist policy categories become translated into salient exclusionary identities? In this regard, two assumptions were made about the nature of identity construction and identification: first, that there are multiple salient identifications at any point in time; and second, that identities are a historical construction. First, the multiplicity of identities complicates the analysis of social perceptions because of intersections and interactive effects between identities. It complicates the analysis of social interactions because it provides people with different, and potentially competing, social representations. Following Posner (2005), therefore, the thesis has used a broadly instrumentalist notion of identification, arguing that people strategically choose identities, depending on their situation. Such strategic ‘choices’ are constrained by situational factors, including the social objectives of the interacting parties, the symbolic features and demographic context of the interaction. These choices are also, however, affected by the historical context in which they occur, including the composition of the identity repertoire and the field of politics and institutions in which the interaction takes place.

Second, the processes of identity choice and social relations cannot be adequately analysed in a historical vacuum, but should be considered as part of a longitudinal trajectory of identity formation. Building on the historicist tradition prevalent in the Africanist literature, this thesis has argued that a set of converging factors allowed bureaucratic categories to become translated into salient identities. Although the specific composition of this set was subject to heuristic historical analysis within the two case studies, three factors were suggested as a useful analytical starting point: rapid social change, the overlap of identities and persistent horizontal inequalities, and the institutionalisation and public propagation of bureaucratic categories.
Bureaucratic categories, introduced and propagated by political elites, may thus influence social identifications if they are translated into politics—that is, into political discourses, practices, and institutions. When nativist categories become politicised, there are three mechanisms through which they may reinforce exclusionary identifications: first, by inducing the selection of exclusionary identities; second, by gradually prioritising the exclusionary meanings of identities at the expense of their more fluid and inclusive understandings; and third, by producing or reinforcing political horizontal inequalities between the ‘native’ and ‘settler’ groups. These mechanisms depend partly on a conducive set of historical circumstances, but also allow for a considerable measure of influence on the part of political authorities. The theoretical framework of this thesis thus combines micro-sociological insights with the larger dynamics of political agency, institutions, and structural change.

The subsequent two sections will summarise the empirical findings of the thesis, focusing on the construction of nativist identities (10.1.2) and on the impact of these identities on social relations in Kano and Amsterdam (10.1.3). As such, section 10.1.2 will answer questions one and two, while section 10.1.3 will focus on the third:

1a. What are the historical origins of the nativist discourses in Kano and Amsterdam?

1b. To what extent did the top-down nativist categorisations in Kano and Amsterdam impact on the historical development of identities in the two cities?

2a. To what extent do contemporary social structures, i.e. the salient discourses of belonging, horizontal inequalities, and patterns of self-identification, help to reproduce nativist identities?

2b. To what extent do contemporary institutions, political authorities, and public policies reproduce nativist identities of belonging?

3. To what extent are social relations between ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities characterised by antagonism, avoidance, and conflict?
Finally, section 10.1.4 will combine the overall findings to address the central research question: to what extent and in what ways can the introduction of indigeneity and bureaucratic autochthony help to explain the destructive relations between ethnic communities in Kano and Amsterdam?

10.1.2 The Origins of Nativism: Bureaucratic Classifications and Ethnic Identities

The historical analyses of identity formation in Kano and Amsterdam (chapters 2 and 6) highlighted the uniqueness of the cities’ historical trajectories as well as the common thread between them. Some of the pertinent differences between the cities in this regard were found in their economic development, the context and duration of their foreign subordination, the extent and nature of their collective violence, and the diverging development of ethnic and religious identities. However, and perhaps more strikingly, the chapters showed that there is also a common thread in the two histories, connecting bureaucratic nativism, inequality, and social identification. In short, the thesis shows that in both Kano and Amsterdam, nativist policy categorisations were introduced at a time of rapid and unprecedented increases in ethnic diversity, overlapping ethnic and religious identities, and consistent horizontal inequalities between the ‘native’ majority and newcomer minorities. The convergence of these factors explains how policy categories helped to redefine the cities’ ethnic identities along the lines of nativism.

In both cities, ethnic and religious identities existed prior to the introduction of indigeneity and bureaucratic autochthony. However, rather than the hard-bounded and nativist notions dominant today, ethnicity was a nested, fluid, and more flexible representation of social reality. In Kano, ethnic identities date back to the pre-colonial era. However, at that time, ethnic identifications allowed for the effective assimilation of migrants into the majority community, partly due to the inclusive influence of Islam. In Amsterdam, belonging was historically defined by urban citizenship, religion, ideology, status, and
nationality. Beyond notions of urban citizenship and nationality, ethnic difference had little social significance. These patterns changed, however, at the juncture where immigration, inequality, and nativist categorisation converged.

In Kano, these changes commenced with the arrival of British colonial rule. The colonial amalgamation of Nigeria brought an unprecedented wave of southern Nigerian immigrants, but at the same time forcibly maintained and reinforced the boundaries between the southerners and the ‘native’ Kano Muslims. In the decades following independence, the categories of ‘indigene’ and ‘non-indigene’ formalised these colonial notions of ethnic ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’ – a distinction that was consistently reinforced by patterns of horizontal inequalities and economic and political competition. In Amsterdam, contemporary nativism has its roots in early 20th-century ethnic nationalism. The exclusionary logic of this nationalism, however, only became apparent after the Second World War. Following the post-war economic boom, there was a sustained period of rapid immigration of low-skilled guest workers and postcolonials, none of whom fitted into the existing social categories of identification and belonging. At this time of social uncertainty, top-down discourses of multiculturalism and bureaucratic autochthony came to determine the position of these immigrants in the terms of ethnic nationalism: they became ‘ethnic’ communities, rather than Dutch citizens.

Bureaucratic nativism in Kano and Amsterdam thus originated as a policy response to the collective uncertainty resulting from rapid immigration and other forms of structural social change. Political authorities felt the need to ‘step in’ to redefine belonging in an attempt to avoid the risks, or remedy the arising problems, inherent in their newly diverse and complex society. This was the case in early colonial Kano, where the British instituted the strict legal and physical boundaries between the ‘native’ Muslim Kanawa and the non-Muslim ‘settlers’ from southern Nigeria in order, at least partly, to prevent tensions between these newly cohabitating groups. Similarly, the notion of an ‘indigene’ was initially institutionalised as a
term of reference for affirmative action, or power-sharing, policies in Nigeria’s Federal Government after the devastation wreaked by the Biafran civil war. Finally, the notions of ‘ethnic minority’ and ‘allochthon’ were also first introduced in the Netherlands as ‘objective’ terms of reference for policies to support the emancipation of these minority groups. In this sense, indigeneity in Kano and autochthony in Amsterdam constitute earnest political attempts to develop objective policy languages with which to address the very real challenges of diversity and horizontal inequality.

At the same time, however, chapters 2 and 6 have also demonstrated that both instances of bureaucratic nativism connected to identity discourses with much deeper ideological roots and, in doing so, were only selectively reflective of the cities’ diversity. In Kano, indigeneity came to be superimposed on its colonial ethnic, religious, and regional divisions, entrenching the ethnic hierarchy ranging from the ‘native’ Muslim Hausa-Fulani to the ‘settler’ Christian southerners. In Amsterdam, similarly, bureaucratic autochthony connected with notions of ethnic nationalism, the ‘unsocietal’ classes, and criticism of Islam. In both cities, therefore, bureaucratic nativism reverberated with existing divisions and identities – a major factor in explaining the rapid and ‘successful’ translation of both nativist discourses into everyday language. But indigeneity and autochthony only reflected some of the ways in which Kano and Amsterdam had become diverse, prioritising ethnic and religious identities over other forms of social identification, such as ideology, class, or ‘race’. Moreover, the two categorisations entrenched exclusionary interpretations of these ethnic and religious identities at the expense of their more fluid and inclusive incarnations.

Historically, nativist categorisations in Kano and Amsterdam therefore catalysed the development of nativist and exclusionary ethnic and religious identities. It should be noted, however, that this development was also contingent on the flows of immigration, increasing cultural and religious diversity, and consistent horizontal inequalities that characterised the two cities. Together, these ‘material’ historical factors are a necessary part of the explanation
of contemporary identities and notions of belonging. In the context of these overarching structural factors, the role of bureaucratic nativism was limited to two things: to select and to reinforce. First, indigeneity and bureaucratic autochthony helped to select, from the wide range of new social divisions that characterised Kano and Amsterdam, one particular set of ethnic identities as the main marker of communal belonging by giving it political significance. Second, due to the deeply primordial definition of ethnicity they employed, indigeneity and autochthony reinforced the primordial and competitive aspects connected to ethnic identities in the two cities.

With this historical impact of bureaucratic nativism in mind, chapters 3, 4, 7 and 8 examined the extent to which nativism is reproduced in the contemporary era. Overall, these chapters showed a mixed picture. We will first consider the evidence on discursive and socio-economic factors presented in chapters 3 and 7. On the one hand, these two chapters clearly demonstrated how, in contemporary Kano and Amsterdam, ethnic boundaries continue to overlap with religious and other social identities. It may therefore be argued that these identity boundaries continue to reinforce the nativist ethnic cleavages in the two cities. More importantly, ethnic and religious identities continue to be salient, especially in Kano, and they are reinforced by horizontal inequalities - illustrating what Entzinger (1987: 6) referred to as the reinforcing relationship between ‘race’ and ‘class’. The two chapters also showed that nativism is deeply embedded in some of the salient discourses on belonging in the city – specifically in indigeneity, traditional belonging, and civic-communal belonging in Kano, and in *autochtonie* in Amsterdam.

On this basis, it may be argued that discursive and material structures of Kano and Amsterdam societies have remained unequivocally conducive to the salience of nativism. On the other hand, however, the two chapters also provided evidence that qualifies this conclusion. First, the two chapters showed that while nativism is part of some salient notions of belonging in the two cities, there are alternative discourses that contest the nativist
premises. In Kano, this contestation originates largely from the civic-territorial notion of belonging, while the discourse of urban citizenship competes with nativism in Amsterdam. Second, the two chapters show that the identities connected to nativism – ethnicity and religion – are not uniformly salient in the two cities, with the exception of religious identities in Kano. Especially in Amsterdam, ethnic and religious identities are only salient among less than half the population – about the same proportion that identifies strongly with their Amsterdammer urban citizenship.

Although chapters 3 and 7 thus provide substantial evidence that identity intersections, horizontal inequalities, discourses of belonging, and identity repertoires in Kano and Amsterdam reproduce nativist identities, they also highlight factors that limit this reproduction. A similar argument can be made for the political sphere in the two cities, based on chapters 4 and 8. Looking at the structure of political authority, the opportunities for political participation, and social policies, these chapters highlighted certain ways in which urban politics in Kano and Amsterdam continue to reproduce nativist identities. In Kano, it was argued that the strong Islamic orientation of the State government and the high levels of authority of traditional, religious, and ethnic leaders fostered the connection between nativist ethnicity and politics. Moreover, it was argued that indigeneity and ethnicity continue to have a significant role in shaping political participation and, to some extent, (public) employment. In Amsterdam, meanwhile, nativism and its ethnic identities continue to be reproduced through the political rhetoric against Islam, the ubiquitous use of the language of autochtone, the qualitative disparities between autochtone and allochtone political participation, and the culturalist connotations of ‘integration’ and inburgering policies.

To some extent, therefore, nativism continues to be reproduced by the discursive, material, and political contexts of contemporary Kano and Amsterdam. At the same time, however, chapters 4 and 8 outlined the limits of this argument, especially for the case of Amsterdam. For example, although the ethnic and religious connotations of politics and
policies in Kano are strong, their impact is limited by the inefficacy of the state in implementing its policies. Similarly, although the anti-Islamic and autochtonie discourses are strongly present in the national political arena in the Netherlands, their implementation into policies (aside from the inburgering policies) remains limited. Moreover, autochtonie and ‘new realism’ have largely remained confined to national Dutch politics; the municipality, in contrast, has long propagated the strongly inclusionary and territorial discourse of Amsterdammer urban belonging. Finally, although the more conservative allochtone groups have remained underrepresented in Dutch politics, ethnic minorities per se are represented in most of the national and local political parties.

In sum, therefore, chapters 3, 4, 7, and 8 have underlined that while some factors continue to reinforce nativist identities in Kano and Amsterdam, others limit or contest this reproduction. Nativism, as a discourse of belonging, is therefore neither hegemonic nor uncontested. Comparatively, moreover, it appears that the nativist tendencies in Kano politics are stronger than those in Amsterdam. For while Kano authorities are struggling to find new strategies of ‘settler’ inclusion, their proposed solutions continue to define ‘settlers’ as ‘ethnic groups’ rather than Kano citizens. In Amsterdam, in contrast, municipal state authorities actively contest nativist notions of belonging, by propagating the territorial alternative of Amsterdammer urban citizenship. This divergence highlights, perhaps, one of the significant differences between nativism in the two cities: while, in Kano, the notion of the ‘native’ is defined at the level of Kano State, or even the city, the notion of autochtoon in Amsterdam is defined at the level of the Dutch nation. It is likely that this discrepancy allows more room for the Amsterdam municipality to define belonging in contrast to the national nativist discourse.
10.1.3 The Impact of Nativism: Ethnic Identities and Interethnic Relations

Although the contemporary discursive, material, and political contexts of Kano and Amsterdam are thus to some extent conducive to the reproduction of nativist identities, this thesis has also highlighted factors that challenge this reproduction – especially in the case of Amsterdam. The resulting tension between exclusive and inclusive tendencies in the two cities was also tangible in the analyses of their interethnic relations. Chapters 5 and 9 have analysed the extent to which interethnic relations in Kano and Amsterdam are characterised by antagonism, avoidance, and conflict. Where possible, the analyses of perceptions and interactions have assessed the relative impact of the categorisation and group positioning effects, as discussed in chapter 1. In other words, these chapters have tested the theoretical argument that exclusionary notions of ethnicity, shaped by the introduction of bureaucratic nativism, have resulted in destructive interethnic relations in the two cities.

Overall, the resulting picture of interethnic relations in Kano and Amsterdam is a complex one. In terms of interethnic perceptions, at most one third of any ethnic group displayed outright antagonism towards other communities. As a first point of note, it should be underlined that these negative perceptions were only held by a minority of the overall urban populations. At the same time, however, this finding in itself provides evidence for the categorisation effect of nativism, and the resulting rising salience of ethnic identities, on negative out-group perceptions. Moreover, the relative evaluations (or ranking) of groups in the two cities provide evidence for a group positioning effect. In Kano, the Yoruba were consistently viewed most negatively, while in Amsterdam the Dutch-Moroccans bore the brunt of the city’s antagonism. While both these trends contain a sense of stigma, this was particularly strong in the case of Amsterdam, where the Dutch-Moroccans even evaluated themselves more negatively than they rated most other communities. In Kano, the Yoruba are considered ‘settlers’ while in Amsterdam the Dutch-Moroccans are quintessential
Their stigmatised position thus provides evidence for the impact of the nativist hierarchy on patterns of interethnic perceptions.

Neither of the two cities, however, showed much antagonism towards the ‘native’ populations, even among the most identifiably ‘settler’ or *allochtone* groups. Together with the negative evaluations of the more identifiably ‘settler’ communities, these findings on interethnic antagonism in Kano and Amsterdam indicate evidence for the group-positioning effect of nativist identities. The nativist connotations of ethnic identities have not increased the antagonism between all ethnic communities equally, but has focused the negative attention on ‘settler’ and *allochtone* communities - and especially those considered ‘deviant’ (Amsterdam’s Dutch-Moroccans) or morally ‘ambiguous’ (Kano’s Yoruba).

In terms of interethnic avoidance, the thesis has analysed casual meetings, friendships, and marriages and outlined three main findings. First, and for all three types of contact, within-group interactions were more common than interethnic ones. This consistent pattern provides evidence for interethnic avoidance and, by extension, for the categorisation effect of nativist ethnicity (and the horizontal inequalities, cultural differences, and other contextual factors that reinforce this cleavage) on ethnic relations. Chapters 5 and 9 also showed, however, that this avoidance (or in-group bias) was very limited for casual interethnic meetings. Large majorities of all ethnic communities in both cities interact with each other regularly at work, in the market, or in the neighbourhood, thus indicating the generally positive and tolerant atmosphere of the two cities. The minority proportions of the cities’ residents without casual interethnic contact were explained in reference to residential segregation, language differences, and negative interethnic perceptions.

Second, chapters 5 and 9 showed that interethnic avoidance is considerably more common in intimate interactions (friendship and marriage) than in casual interactions. This was explained in reference to the enhanced importance of negative perceptions, cultural differences, and other factors that explain antagonism and avoidance in casual interactions.
other words, this thesis argued that the categorisation and group positioning effects that cause interethnic antagonism and avoidance in casual meetings have a greater impact on intimate relations, such as friendships and marriage. This is partly due to the greater importance of such intimate relations to individuals, as well as the groups they belong to, and the resulting stronger in-group bias that structures such interactions. Moreover, specific contextual factors were outlined for the two cities that help to account for the limited opportunities for members of different ethnic groups to meet and establish meaningful intimate relations.

Third, in terms of ranking, interethnic friendships were shown to be rarest among the least ‘native’ communities: the Igbo in Kano and the Dutch-Moroccans in Amsterdam. The intermediate communities display a greater openness towards interethnic friendships, while the incidence of interethnic friendship among the majority communities was roughly proportional to their relative group size – even though this means that they have the lowest proportion of group members with friends from other ethnic groups. It seems, therefore, that in terms of friendships, the more ‘native’ communities are more open to interethnic friendships than the groups that are more identifiably ‘settlers’. This can be interpreted as evidence supporting a group positioning effect of the nativist ethnic cleavage on interethnic friendships.

The patterns observed for interethnic marriage preferences were more complex than those for friendships, partly due to the lack of data on actual interethnic marriages in Kano. In terms of parental restrictions on interethnic marriage, Kano’s most and least ‘native’ groups (that is the Hausa-Fulani and Igbo, respectively) were most likely to object to the marriage of their daughters across ethnic or religious boundaries. In Amsterdam, however, the allochtone Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turkish were most likely to object to interethnic marriages; the autochtone Dutch, in contrast, were least likely to do so. This pattern was confirmed by the actual rates of interethnic marriages, which showed that if we control for relative group
size, the *autochtone* Dutch were most likely to marry outside their groups, and the Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turkish were least likely to do so.

Within the limitations of the available data, it is difficult to decide on the correct interpretation of the intergroup differences in relation to interethnic friendships, marriages, and marriage restrictions. Perhaps the simplest interpretation is to consider the observed patterns as the product of two intersecting factors, in addition to those that shape interethnic antagonism and friendships: the group positioning effects of nativist ethnicity and the Islamic norms against Muslim women marrying outside their religion. Like in the case of interethnic friendships, the group positioning effects of nativist ethnicity on interethnic marriage can help to account for the relatively strong in-group bias of the ‘settler’ communities and the relatively open attitudes and behaviour of the *autochtone* Dutch. The restrictions against interethnic marriages reported by the Hausa-Fulani in Kano, however, can be explained in reference to Islamic norms against Muslim women marrying outside their religion – a factor that can also help explain the restrictions reported by the Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turkish.

The argument that Islamic injunctions on marriage can help explain the patterns of marriage restrictions and preferences reported in chapters 5 and 9 is supported by the relative salience and hardness of the religious identity boundary. Especially in Kano, the high salience of religion has already been noted. Moreover, in both cities, more people objected to their daughter marrying into a different religion than into a different ethnic group. Religious identities, therefore, may be argued to have harder and more salient identity boundaries than ethnic ones alone. In effect, however, in most situations both types of objections reinforce the same nativist identity boundaries, due to the high degree of overlap between the ethnic and religious cleavages. Thus, the findings presented in chapters 5 and 9 reaffirm the importance of overlapping identity cleavages, in this case ethnicity and religion, to explain the continuing impact of nativism on social relations in the two cities.
The importance of the overlap of religious and ethnic cleavages was also highlighted in the analysis of collective interactions. Chapters 5 and 9 focused on different instances of collective interethnic interactions that diverged in the extent to which they resulted in conflict and violence. The first concluding observation is that regardless of the salience of nativist ethnic and religious identities, they do not automatically lead to conflict and violence in all situations of interaction across ethnic and religious boundaries. Kano has witnessed gruesome violence between its ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities, while Amsterdam, on a smaller scale, has experienced violent encounters between allochtone youths and the police. Both cities, however, have also been witness to peaceful and co-operative interethnic protests. Therefore, this thesis has argued that the outcomes of interethnic collective interactions are subject to processes of discursive framing, co-ordination, and mobilisation. Moreover, it has shown that in both cities, these processes are highly dependent on the agency and informal authority of the cities’ political leaders, both within and outside the state.

All cases of collective interethnic interactions analysed in this thesis were characterised by external triggers, and all of these triggers could have been framed as a cause for violence. What differentiated the violent from the non-violent episodes, however, were active attempts by local state authorities, ethnic and religious leaders, and the security services to intervene in two ways. First, in the situations of non-violence, these actors networked and co-ordinated in order to control flows of information and deter violence, for example through the visible presence of the police. Second, however, the situations of non-violence were characterised by active discursive framing on the part of leaders with informal authority. Framing in terms of local exclusionary identities, such as those related to nativism, was argued to be more conducive to collective violence than framing that allowed for inclusive mobilisation. Thus, for example, the Christian and Islamic leaders in Kano played a crucial part in framing the Danish cartoons in terms of the locally inclusive discourse differentiating the ‘faithful
Nigerians’ from the ‘ungodly Danes’, just like political leaders in Amsterdam successfully constructed an inclusive discourse around the film Fitna (Wilders 2008).

10.1.4 Bureaucratic Nativism and Interethnic Relations: Struggling to Belong?

In sum, this thesis has presented evidence that supports the presence of destructive interethnic relations in the two cities – even though these destructive relations are far from ubiquitous and, in the case of collective encounters, differ qualitatively between the cities. The most significant differences in this regard were found in the presence of collective violence: while Kano has experienced repeated instances of collective violence between (‘native’ and ‘settler’) ethnic groups, Amsterdam’s experience with ‘ethnic’ violence is largely limited to small-scale confrontations between minority groups, or between them and the police. Drawing together the different findings and arguments summarised in the chapters above, to what extent and in what ways can the introduction of indigeneity and bureaucratic autochthony be said to explain these destructive relations between ethnic communities in Kano and Amsterdam?

Building on the findings in response to the research sub-questions presented in the preceding two sections, the answer to this central research question consists of three parts. The first part of the answer is historical, focusing on the process of ethnic identity formation and, more specifically, the impact of indigeneity and bureaucratic autochthony on this process. In this regard, the thesis has argued that the two forms of bureaucratic nativism were crucial factors in shaping the nativist ethnic identities in the two cities. In conjunction with other, converging historical factors, indigeneity and autochthony increased the political and societal relevance of particular ethnic labels at a time of considerable social uncertainty, thus reinforcing the salience of the corresponding ethnic identities. More importantly, however, these forms of bureaucratic nativism prioritised one particular (nativist) ethnic boundary,
which was hard-bounded, primordial, and inherently competitive, at the expense of the existing multiple and often fluid notions of ethnicity and belonging.

Secondly, with this historical argument in mind, this thesis has shown that ethnic identities, overlapping with religious ones, remain salient in contemporary Kano and Amsterdam. Moreover, the analysis has demonstrated that these ethnic identities remain tightly intertwined with nativist discourses of urban belonging both in Kano and Amsterdam. As a result, in both Kano and Amsterdam, it is difficult to think and talk about ethnicity without reference to its hierarchical aspect, which ranks different ethnic communities on the basis of their ‘native’ status. This salient form of ethnicity has been referred to, in both cities, as ‘nativist ethnicity’.

Finally, the analysis of interethnic relations has shown that in both cities there is antagonism, avoidance, and, sometimes, collective conflict between the groups that are defined by the nativist ethnic cleavages. This, in itself, was interpreted as evidence for the categorisation effect of nativist ethnicity and, indirectly, of bureaucratic nativism; moreover, some effects of nativist group positioning were observed in the patterns of interethnic antagonism and avoidance. Furthermore, in the collective interethnic interactions in Kano, it was argued that discursive framing in terms of the nativist ethnic (and religious) cleavage was conducive to the violence of 2004, while more inclusive framing prevented such violence in 2006. In Amsterdam, similarly, it was argued that the crafty inclusive framing of the murder of Theo van Gogh and the presentation of Wilders’ film Fitna contributed to the prevention of interethnic violence.

The core argument of the thesis is therefore: that nativist, bureaucratic classifications have historically contributed to the construction and salience of exclusionary ethnic identities, which, in turn, have proven to be conducive to interethnic antagonism and avoidance and, potentially, to interethnic conflict and violence. To complicate matters, however, the thesis has also analysed to what extent nativist ethnicity is reproduced in contemporary Kano and
Amsterdam. Here, the findings were more mixed and complex: while nativist ethnicity was salient and continued to overlap with religious boundaries and horizontal inequalities, it was also shown to be contested by strong alternative discourses, most notably that of Amsterdammer urban citizenship. Moreover, while indigeneity and bureaucratic autochthony continue to influence the structure of politics, its discourses, and policies, here too its position was far from hegemonic. Finally, comparatively, the contemporary forces propagating nativism may be considered as somewhat stronger in Kano than in Amsterdam.

So, in sum, this thesis has shown that indigeneity and autochthony can help to explain the ‘struggle to belong’ in Kano and Amsterdam through their historical and contemporary impact on the (re)production of nativist ethnic identities. At the same time, however, it has also underlined factors that limit this argument: the competing discourses and identities of belonging, the substantially different ‘outcomes’ in terms of the level of violent conflict in the two cities, and the significance of converging historical factors on ethnic identity formation (e.g. horizontal inequalities). Before contemplating some of the implications of these findings in the subsequent sections, it is useful to briefly consider the last of these limiting factors: the importance of bureaucratic nativism relative to the other factors that have reinforced exclusionary ethnic identities in Kano and Amsterdam.

The challenge is this: while the least-similar design eliminated many factors as potential alternative explanations for the salience of exclusionary (nativist) ethnicity in both cities, it did not prevent some analytically significant overlap beyond the bureaucratic nativist categorisations. Most important in this regard have been the relatively large and recent flow of immigrants, the overlap of ethnic and religious boundaries between the ‘native’ and ‘settler’ groups, and the consistent horizontal inequalities between them. So far, the argument of the thesis has been that the convergence of all these factors in both cases can help to explain the salience of nativist ethnicity and, in turn, its role in structuring ethnic relations. It may be argued, however, that the least-similar design of the study makes it impossible to
disaggregate these factors and analyse their relative significance. In theory, therefore, the role of bureaucratic nativism could be minimal compared to the impact of horizontal inequalities, cultural differences, or religious divisions.

In response to this challenge, however, three reasons can be advanced in support of a significant, though interdependent, role of bureaucratic nativism. First, the weaknesses of least-similar comparisons with regard to weighing alternative explanatory factors were addressed, within each of the two case studies, by applying the in-depth methods of process tracing. Even though this method is restricted to a single case, its focus on the sequence and processes that connect different phenomena allows it to make causal connections even within this single case. In this thesis, the historical analyses of nativism and identity formation have helped to outline the specific roles of bureaucratic nativism, alongside the horizontal inequality, cultural difference, and religious division, in selecting and reinforcing nativist ethnicity, as outlined in section 10.1.2.

A second argument for the relative significance of bureaucratic nativism in producing contemporary forms of ethnicity in Kano and Amsterdam may be found in the specific meanings of these ethnic identities. Particularly important in this respect are (i) the strong connections between nativist discourses of belonging and ethnic identities in both cities; (ii) the ubiquitous salience of the terms ‘indigene’ and *autochtoon* in colloquial language of the two cities; (iii) the sense in which ethnicity in Kano and Amsterdam is hierarchical, ranging from the ‘native’ to the ‘settler’ groups, which corresponds closely with the hierarchy inherent in bureaucratic nativism in the two cities; and (iv) the ‘ranking’ observed in the patterns of interethnic antagonism and avoidance, which indicates the significance of the nativist hierarchy in salient notions of ethnic identity in Kano and Amsterdam. Together, these four points illustrate the strong nativist meanings of ethnicity in the two cities, which could not be derived from horizontal inequality, religious division, or cultural differences alone.
Finally, it is worth remembering that while Kano and Amsterdam both have religious divisions, cultural differences, and overlapping horizontal inequalities, these are not the same in the two cities. Kano’s ‘native’ majority is Muslim and relatively poor, while its ‘settler’ minorities are Christian and relatively wealthy; in Amsterdam, in contrast, the autochtone majority is secular and wealthy while the allochtone minorities are Islamic (or, less stereotypically, Christian) and relatively poor. Both cities are thus host to overlapping religious, cultural, and class divisions that could produce intergroup hierarchy and tension; however, the fact that they produce similar hierarchies and tensions is difficult to explain without reference to a shared interpretive discourse. In these two cases, this shared discourse was nativism - which, for example, defines the ‘native’ group as the norm and allows it to interpret any horizontal inequality, regardless of its direction, as a grievance.

For these reasons, this thesis argues for the significance of the role of bureaucratic nativism in producing exclusionary ethnic identities and, subsequently, interethnic tensions in Kano and Amsterdam. This significant role does not come at the expense of the impact of horizontal inequalities and other contributing factors, but rather framed and connected these factors in such a way that they jointly propagated the nativist ethnic cleavage. Bureaucratic nativism, through its impact on ethnic identities, did therefore not create interethnic tensions and conflict, but rather reshaped and intensified them. With these conclusions in mind, the remainder of this chapter will discuss some of the implications of the findings and their limitations and suggest avenues for further research.

10.2 The Complexity of ‘We’: Nativism, Belonging and Social Relations

In their recent discussion of the potential positive effects of a common identity on intergroup relations, Dovidio et al. (2009) comment on the complications of defining commonality and a shared identity: or, in other words, the “complexity of ‘we’” (ibid.: 3). This complexity has
also been the subject of this thesis. For while it is intuitive to connect a shared identity to constructive intergroup relations, the case studies of Kano and Amsterdam have underlined the many factors that constrain the construction of shared identities. Approaching the subject through the notion of urban belonging, the thesis presented two ideal-typical ways of defining commonality: either through a shared sense of communal identity or through a shared place of residence. Nativism was defined as a particularly exclusive form of communal belonging, characterised by primordial notions of communal identity and inherent inequality and competition between the ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities.

Within the historical, discursive, and political contexts of Kano and Amsterdam, the thesis has identified examples of both communal and territorial notions of belonging. In Kano, the discourses of indigeneity and traditional belonging are defined largely along the premises of nativism, while the civic-territorial notion of belonging comes closest to the ideal-type of territorial belonging. In Amsterdam, bureaucratic and colloquial forms of autochtonie rest on the logic of nativism, while Amsterdammer urban citizenship closely approximates territorial belonging. Both case studies, however, have also analysed notions of belonging that are difficult to classify in the communal-territorial scheme. The notion of ‘multiculturalism’ is particularly significant in this regard, embodied in Kano’s civic-communal form of belonging and the Dutch notion of ‘old’ multiculturalism.

The difficulty of classifying multiculturalism on the communal-territorial axis is largely semantic. Some might classify the Amsterdam approach to urban citizenship as a case of multicultural policy, while others point towards the incorporation of ‘ethnic’ representatives in the Kano State government as a prime example of this principle. To avoid such definitional confusion, this thesis has viewed multiculturalism as a policy approach that stimulates ethnic or religious minorities to mobilise, organise, and emancipate along ethnic and religious lines, but that has no substantial impact on the social structure of the majority community. In this definition, Kano’s civic-communal belonging is multicultural, as is the
Dutch practice of subsidising and incorporating minority ethnic and religious organisations into the governance process.

In this sense, multiculturalism invokes a communal definition of belonging: people can claim to belong to the urban community only as part of their ethnic or religious group – either the ‘native’ majority or a ‘settler’ minority. As such, multiculturalism relies on the principles of nativism, differentiating between majority and minority communities on the basis of their ‘native’ status and assigning different political rights and benefits to ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities. Although it is thus in essence nativist, multiculturalism differs qualitatively from the discourses of indigeneity and autochtonie focused on in this thesis. The difference between them lies in the nature of the political rights that are attached to ‘native’ and ‘settler’ status. On the one hand, in multiculturalism, ‘settler’ communities are given rights and privileges unavailable to ‘natives’, in order to enhance their societal position. On the other, indigeneity and autochthony reverse this logic, by reserving certain rights and privileges exclusively for the ‘native’ majority.

Table 10.1: Different forms of nativism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minority rights</th>
<th>‘Native’ rights</th>
<th>‘Settler’ rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous peoples</td>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority rights</td>
<td>Indigeneity/autochthony</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Multiculturalism and indigeneity/autochthony are thus different forms of nativist belonging, differentiated by the recipient community of exclusive political rights: the ‘settler’ minorities and ‘native’ majority, respectively. This differentiation suggests the existence of two further forms of nativism (see table 10.1), providing exclusive rights to ‘native’ minorities and ‘settler’ majorities. The ‘indigenous peoples’ declaration (UNPFII 2008) could be considered an example of the third form, since it provides certain exclusive political rights to ‘native’
minority (or subordinated majority) communities. Nativist categories may thus be used to
design an inclusive political system, such as multiculturalism or indigenous peoples’ rights, or
an exclusive one, such the politics based on indigeneity or autochthony. The nativist
identities used to design these political systems, however, remain essentially exclusionary:
primordial, hard-bound, dichotomous, and inherently competitive.

Regardless of their emancipatory aims, multiculturalism and the politics of indigenous
peoples therefore promote exclusionary identifications. In Kano, this dynamic was
highlighted with regard to the corporatist politics of the Kano State government and the
Emirate with regard to the ‘settler’ ethnic representatives. Although less politically exclusive
than traditional belonging and indigeneity, all three definitions of belonging were shown to
rely on the same ethnic hierarchy. In Amsterdam, it was argued that the multicultural politics
of the 1980s, though intended to redress ethnic stratification (Entzinger 1987: 13), initially
constructed the nativist ethnic hierarchy that is the foundation of the contemporary ‘turn-
around’ towards assimilationist policies. Thus, the analysis in this thesis corroborates the
arguments made by Kuper (2003) and Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007), that introducing
the logic of the ‘native’ for emancipatory purposes also constructs the foundation for nativist
exclusion and, more to the point of this thesis, destructive ‘native’-‘settler’ relations.

If we accept the central argument of this thesis – that nativist categorisations are conducive
to destructive social relations – all four forms of nativism are liable to increase tensions
between ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities. This is not to imply that using nativist categories
in politics is necessarily a ‘wrong’ decision: such a normative judgement would depend on the
context of the decision and the availability of viable alternatives. One such alternative has
been suggested in this thesis in the shape of Amsterdam’s strong sense of urban identification
and citizenship. A second example is actually contained in the Federal Character principle at
Nigeria’s federal level; although its use of indigeneity has reinforced nativism at the local
level, its central principle of equalising political rights and privileges across all ethnic groups,
without any ‘native’ bias, presents a viable alternative to the logic of nativism. A third alternative is for political authorities to restrict their language to the discourses of formal citizenship (‘nationality’) and class, thus de-emphasising the political importance of ethnic and religious identities. Other alternatives may be constructed using the basic categories and connections outlined in this thesis: the distinction between communal and territorial belonging; the different forms of nativism; and the negative impact of nativist identities on social relations.

This thesis has thus illustrated the complexity of ‘we’ from several angles: from the historical-structural constraints on identity formation, through the various potential shapes of nativism, to the complex interaction between actors on different societal levels in their attempts to define belonging. All these factors complicate the definition and construction of a viable inclusive, common identity that may help to promote constructive social relations in contemporary urban society. At the same time, the thesis has also shown that nativist identities may coexist with, and be challenged and attenuated by, local and inclusionary forms of identification such as urban citizenship. As a result of these competing discourses, neither the interethnic relations in Kano nor those in Amsterdam can be characterised as solely – or perhaps even predominantly – destructive. Fostering multiple cross-cutting notions of belonging and social identification may thus also constitute a viable and effective alternative to the divisive hegemony of nativism. Such multiplicity may not only attenuate the impact of exclusionary identities, but also widen the space within which people can relate to each other as individuals, rather than solely as group members (Plotnicov 1967: 291).

10.3 Social Change, Horizontal Inequality, and Politics

Although the focus of this thesis has been on notions of belonging that induce avoidance and conflict, the analytical framework and findings can also be used to identify alternatives and
strategies to combat the potential negative effects of nativism. Within its exploration of
nativism and social relations, moreover, the thesis has suggested an analytical framework for
identity construction, pivoting on the interaction of social change, horizontal inequality, and
politics. In terms of social change, it was argued that rapid immigration, economic shifts, and
political transformations can deconstruct existing patterns of identification and belonging. As
such, these changes can create a sense of public uncertainty, which constitutes an opportunity
for political authorities to ‘step in’ and re-categorise social identities and notions of belonging.

Within the context of Kano and Amsterdam, the severe impact of immigration may be
surprising, given the long cosmopolitan and commercial histories of the two cities. However,
there are three reasons why the social changes in colonial Kano and post-war Amsterdam
were unprecedented. First, the waves of immigration of southern Nigerians into Kano and of
postcolonial and guest worker communities into Amsterdam were larger than any of the
previous immigrant groups that had migrated into the cities. Second, these immigrant
communities were exceptional because they differed from their host population not only in
ethnic or national terms, but also along the axes of religion and class status. Thirdly, these
overlapping boundaries were reinforced by the dissolution of some important social
differences within the ‘native’ populations. The fusion of the urban Hausa and Fulani and the
Northern and Kano State nationalism are illustrative of these processes in Kano, as are
depillarisation and the reduction of economic inequality in Amsterdam.

Social change and immigration thus opened an opportunity for the redefinition of identity
and belonging in Kano and Amsterdam. Moreover, a second recurring aspect of the
development of nativism in these two cities has been the consistent economic and political
inequalities between ‘native’ and ‘settler’ communities. So far, the analysis has primarily
highlighted these horizontal inequalities as factors conducive to the salience of nativist
identity boundaries, reinforcing the overlapping distinctions of ethnicity, religion, and region
and infusing them with connotations of grievance and competition. In this sense, horizontal
inequalities have come to be perceived as unjust disparities and identities of belonging have become tools for the articulation of these inequalities and for the mobilisation against them.

At the same time, however, the analysis has also suggested that the relationship between inequalities and identities is not necessarily one of identity reinforcement. This may be illustrated by two examples. First, while overlapping identity boundaries and inequalities may enhance the salience of these boundaries and provide a motivation for protest or resistance, identities that cross-cut or enclose horizontal inequalities, such as the Amsterdammer identity, may have the opposite effect of submerging and hiding existing interethnic inequalities.

There is therefore an inherent tension between efforts at inclusive re-categorisation and attempts to articulate and address horizontal inequality (Dovidio et al. 2009: 12). The analysis of urban politics of Kano and Amsterdam provides a second example, because it showed how institutions based on nativist categories created divergent forms of political participation for ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’. This suggests that identities can create as well as hide horizontal inequalities, especially in terms of political representation.

Identities of belonging, including nativist ones, may thus be vehicles for mobilisation against economic or political inequalities, but they may also hide or even (re)produce them. In consequence, the nature of the intersection of inequality and identity boundaries determines whose interests are served by the salience of particular identity boundaries. From the viewpoint of addressing inequalities, nativist identities in Kano aid the economically disadvantaged ‘natives’ to articulate their grievances towards the better-off ‘settlers’. For the Islamic allochtonen in Amsterdam, the Dutch nativist ethnic hierarchy may also help to articulate the inequalities between them and the autochtone Dutch; but at the same time, their subordinate and ‘problematic’ position in this hierarchy does not provide much of a basis for mobilisation to promote equality and inclusion.

Moreover, the two case studies have illustrated the difficulty of defining what it means to be ‘included’ or ‘treated equally’, especially in terms of political participation. In this respect,
chapters 4 and 8 suggested that there are two distinct ways in which members of ethnic minorities may be represented politically: on the basis of either their communal identity (‘symbolic representation’) or their substantive interests and values (‘substantive representation’). In ethnically homogeneous democracies, substantive representation is the norm: citizens vote for political leaders because they represent their interests or values. In multi-ethnic societies, however, ethnic or religious identities can become politicised into a basis for representation per se. In the best scenario, the two overlap; but in many cases there is a level of tension or mismatch between them.

For example, Kano’s Igbo and Yoruba Special Representatives were appointed to symbolically represent the entire Igbo and Yoruba communities, regardless of the huge diversity of substantive interests and values contained within these groups. Similarly, Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks in Amsterdam may be argued to be represented fairly if representation is purely symbolic: the proportions of Dutch-Moroccans and Dutch-Turks in parliament roughly match their relative group sizes. Chapter 8 showed, however, that ethnic minority politicians are predominantly progressive and as such have a hard time representing the conservative Islamic segment of the minority groups. It may be argued that this gap not only limits the substantive representation of minorities, but also dents the minority politicians’ capacity to represent their communities symbolically. Some of them are even seen as ‘traitors’ to ‘their’ people, who do therefore not feel represented by them.

Developing the optimal mix of symbolic and substantive representation in diverse and unequal societies is thus a complicated challenge. Irrespective of these complications, however, both case studies have shown the importance of politics in guiding the process of identity formation. In this regard, the analysis has borrowed liberally from Posner’s (2005) analysis of institutions and ethnicity. While Posner focused specifically on identity choices and political elections, however, this thesis has looked more broadly at identity formation and its impact on social relations. Moreover, in connecting politics to identities, this thesis has
explicitly considered institutions as a tool of politics and, more precisely, of political authorities. Alongside political discourses and political practices, institutions are created, sustained, and implemented by agents who have the authority to influence them. With these alterations in mind, however, both case studies have provided ample evidence to support Posner’s emphasis on the influence of institutions, as well as discourses and other political practices, on identity formation, identity choice, and social relations.

Political actors with the authority to use these political means are thus in a position of considerable discursive influence. In this regard, the case studies have suggested a ‘division of labour’ between political leaders with formal authority, based on law, and those with informal authority, which rests on their legitimacy in a particular community. While the two largely overlapped in the case of Amsterdam – especially for the city’s municipal government – Kano’s political landscape was more fragmented: informal authority was located in religious, traditional, and community leaders, while formal authority was centred on the state.

This divergence points to an important difference in the political opportunity structure for authorities to influence identity formation in the two cities. In Kano, while the state has the executive authority over laws, state revenues, and the implementation of policy, non-state leaders have a real sense of ‘discursive power’ over the ways in which their followers construct their social world. In Amsterdam, these executive and discursive powers are to a large extent united in the various bodies of the state, except among part of the Dutch-Turkish, Dutch-Moroccan, and perhaps some religious communities. These differences came to light in the analyses of collective interactions in the two cities. While, in Kano, religious and traditional leaders played a crucial role in the framing and mobilisation of both the riots and the peaceful protests, in Amsterdam these roles were largely fulfilled by the local and national state officials.

In sum, therefore, this research has outlined the prominent role of political authorities in guiding the process of identity formation. Depending on the precise nature of their authority,
political leaders may implement formal policies, guide the interpretation of economic or political inequalities, or directly influence the identity choices of their followers either in individual or collective interactions. Although these actors are constrained by their demographic, material, discursive, and political context, there is room for autonomous and creative agency. In utilising this room, however, political authorities too are faced with the complexity of ‘we’, because neither authority nor opportunity provides them with perfect information or flawless decision-making. In this thesis, the complications of top-down attempts to manage diversity and its consequences are amply illustrated by the effects of indigeneity and bureaucratic autochthony.

Both sets of categories originate as part of emancipatory policies and affirmative action: Nigerian indigeneity as a means to equalise political access at the federal level of the state and Dutch autochthony as a lens through which to identify and monitor the ethnic minorities that required state assistance. As such, both indigeneity and autochthony were instituted as part of a set of policies to address serious societal problems: the inherent instability of the Nigerian federation on the one hand, and the difficult socio-economic position of ethnic minorities in the Netherlands on the other. To some extent, the two notions have served their purpose. In Nigeria, the complex system of state quotas for federal political appointment may be credited as one of the reasons for the continuing integrity of the national state. Bureaucratic autochthony in the Netherlands, meanwhile, has certainly proved a fertile, if flawed, basis for data collection on the socio-economic position and cultural ‘integration’ of immigrants and their descendants.

This thesis, however, has shown that at the level of two cosmopolitan cities, both categorisations have also reinforced exclusionary ethnic identities and thus increased the likelihood of interethnic conflict. In Nigeria, addressing this unintended fallout of the use of indigeneity to organise the Federal Character project may only require a redefinition (and consistent implementation) of indigeneity based on a period of residence. Such a redefinition
would be possible without threatening to reduce the efficacy of the Federal Character power-sharing mechanisms. These affirmative action policies have thus far proven vital to the stability of the nation, but could be improved with a more territorial definition of its core category. And although it would not immediately deconstruct the nativist compound of ethnic, religious, and regional identities in Kano, this territorial redefinition of indigeneity would reduce the political salience of nativist ethnic identities and thus, in the long run, erase one cause of the sense of hierarchy inherent in Nigeria’s ethnic and religious cleavages.

Meanwhile, in the Netherlands, abandoning bureaucratic autochthony in favour of a notion of self-identified ethnicity would help to deconstruct the primordial and hierarchical boundaries that currently dominate ethnic identification. Moreover, due to the unbalanced and disputed character of ethnic categories in the Dutch context, and the practical difficulties of using self-identification for policy purposes, it may well be argued that the costs of using ethnic policy categories outweigh the benefits. Pan-ethnic, comprehensive social policies would therefore be preferable. In the short run, these redefinitions would not erase the existing interethnic antagonism and grievances between Amsterdam’s residents. This would require at least additional socio-economic policies, aimed to reduce the horizontal inequalities that characterise interethnic relations in the Netherlands. However, given the shallow and asymmetrical understanding of ethnicity currently prevalent in the Netherlands, an official re-definition of ethnic categories and rejection of ethnicity as policy-relevant may yet, in the longer run, have a real and constructive formative impact on the development of Dutch interethnic relations.

10.4 Limitations of the Thesis and Further Research

Based on the data and analysis presented in the thesis, it may thus be argued that indigeneity and bureaucratic autochthony have contributed to the tensions and conflicts between ethnic
groups in Kano and Amsterdam. There are, of course, strict limitations to the generality of this conclusion. In the first instance, the research was designed to produce valid results within the two cities. Therefore, the conclusions are valid only within the two case studies. In addition, however, the general research concepts and questions, along with the sources and format of the collected data, were designed to be comparable across the two cases. Therefore, the fact that the connection between nativist categories and destructive ethnic relations existed in both cities does suggest the wider applicability of this connection in other urban environments.

In this sense, it may be argued that the ‘methodological experiment’ of this loosely comparative study has been successful. Not only was it possible to study comparable social processes in cities as divergent as Kano and Amsterdam, but the comparison also brought to light similar causal connections. This suggests that the ‘development gap’ between the global South and the ‘developed’ North, although deep in some ways, does not preclude meaningful comparison between similar social units (cities) on either side. Of course, the two case studies also contained aspects that defied direct comparison, such as the meanings and applications of ethnic and religious identity, the levels and meanings of interethnic violence, and the societal roles of the state in relation to other political authorities. These differences underline the need for analytical specificity and nuance, as well as the utility of differentiating between the minutiae of within-case analysis and the comparison of between-case trends and causal links. In some cases, however, such as the divergent levels of violence in collective interactions, the differences between the two cities actually prevented a strong comparative analysis.

While the research design was thus successful in a general way, however, the case studies also highlighted the many gaps in the collected data and the analytical framework. Such gaps point towards weaknesses of the present research, but are at the same time an unavoidable aspect of selective analysis. Moreover, I have tried to note and justify some of the more important omissions in the introductory chapter and throughout the case studies. The
remainder of this section will discuss the most important gaps in this study as opportunities for further research.

In this light, the first avenue for further research suggested by this study is to test its central argument on other cities, or different social units, either through quantitative comparative work or through other disciplined configurative or theory testing case studies (George and Bennett 2005: 75). Such studies would be particularly worthwhile if they selected most-similar cases, because this would provide a different comparative test of causality and an opportunity to more effectively disaggregate the factors of horizontal inequality, religious divisions, cultural difference, and nativist categorisation. A second way forward would be to focus on different top-down classifications; testing, for example, whether territorial notions of urban citizenship are conducive to constructive interethnic relations.

Third, it would be useful to expand the empirical analysis in this thesis, either in Kano and Amsterdam or elsewhere, with more work on identity choice in various dimensions of social relations. This could include collecting ethnographic data on the everyday workings of indigeneity, *autochtonie*, ethnicity, and religion, but also further statistical analyses on the data presented in this thesis. Such analyses would be of great use in specifying the precise situational impact of nativism and its corresponding exclusionary identifications. Moreover, these studies could provide more insight into the workings of social institutions, such as the family and neighbourhood, in constructing and selecting social identities.

Fourth, further studies on the historical processes of identity formation could put more emphasis on the role of the market and the (in)formal economy in shaping identities and identity choices. Finally, further empirical as well as theoretical work could be done on the connections between identity, interpersonal perceptions, and social interactions. This thesis has suggested that while both perceptions and interactions are directly influenced by salient discourses of belonging and identity, there might also be an indirect effect of these discourses
on interactions through negative perceptions. In this study, however, these connections have only been suggested in a rudimentary way, thus paving the road for further enquiry.

In conclusion, then, this thesis may be considered as an exploratory study of the impact of top-down, bureaucratic classifications on identities and social relations. It has suggested that if such classifications are based on nativism and widely institutionalised at critical historical junctures of social change and inequality, they are likely to reinforce exclusionary identities and induce antagonism, avoidance, and conflict. At the same time, however, both Kano and Amsterdam were shown to harbour viable alternatives to the nativist discourse. This suggests that regardless of the prominence of nativist belonging, political authorities as well as other city residents have an opportunity to reconstruct and foster more inclusive notions of urban belonging. Perhaps the dissemination of these research results can contribute to the development of these alternatives at the expense of nativism.
Annex A: Maps

Map 1: Nigeria and Kano

Source for all maps: Google Maps (maps.google.com), accessed on 20/4/2011

Map 2: The Netherlands and Amsterdam
Map 3: Kano Metropolis

Map 4: Amsterdam
Annex B: Indigene Certificate

Fagge Local Government Indigene Authentication Declaration (as per October 2008)
Annex C: Calculating probabilities

This annex details the method used to calculate the probability of interethnic meetings, friendships, and marriages if we assume that such interactions happen randomly within the populations of Kano and Amsterdam. As discussed in chapters 5 and 9, these theoretical proportions were compared to the actual reported incidence of interethnic interactions, in order to aid the interpretation of the reported figures and to assess the impact of demography on interethnic avoidance. Of the different interethnic interactions discussed in chapters 5 and 9, marriage constitutes the simplest situation because it involves just two people who ‘select’ each other from the larger population of the city they live in. Note that, although many men in Kano have multiple wives, this is not relevant to this discussion because this thesis does not present actual figures of interethnic marriages in Kano. Therefore, the theoretical probability of interethnic marriage was only relevant to the case study of Amsterdam, where polygamy is illegal.

If we assume marriages to involve just two people, who have selected each other from the population of their city completely at random, their chances of selecting partners within or outside their own ethnic group are solely dependent on the relative size of their ethnic group. Thus, for example, the probability of a ‘native’ Dutch person choosing a ‘native’ Dutch marriage partner is equal to 0.6 or 60% (cf. table 7.1). As presented in table 9.10, the actual reported proportions of intra-ethnic marriages were divided by the probabilities of random in-group marriage in order to calculate the ‘avoidance ratio’: a measure of the relative order of magnitude of a group’s interethnic avoidance (or positive in-group bias). An avoidance ratio that is larger than 1 indicates interethnic avoidance, while a ratio that lies between 0 and 1 indicates a net group preference for out-group interactions. In the example of the ethnic Dutch, their avoidance ratio for interethnic marriage was equal to 0.96/0.6 = 1.6. Although this figure larger than 1, which indicates some level of interethnic avoidance, table 9.11 showed that it was very low compared to the other groups because of their smaller group size.
A similar method was used to calculate the probabilities of interethnic casual meetings and friendships. The complicating factor in these situations, however, is that people have multiple contacts and friends. This thesis has used the binomial distribution model to calculate the theoretical probability of these situations occurring in Kano and Amsterdam if meetings and friendships were selected at random. Then, the probability that a person, of a group with relative size $g$ (note that $g<1$), has $m$ intraethnic contacts out of a total number of $n$ contacts, is equal to:

$$p(m \text{ intraethnic contacts}) = g^m \times (1 - g)^{n-m} \times \frac{n!}{(n-m)!}$$

The first factor, $g$, is raised to the power $m$ to account for the probability of $m$ interactions within the same group. The second factor, $(1-g)$, is raised to the power of $n-m$ to account for the probability of $n-m$ friends from another ethnic group. Finally, the third factor counts all possible ways in which a person could have $m$ intraethnic and $n-m$ interethnic contacts.

As displayed in tables 5.5, 5.7, 9.3, 9.5, and 9.10, the survey questions differentiated between (i) people who ‘never have any interethnic [or: always intraethnic] meetings’; (ii) people with ‘only friends from their own group’; and (iii) people who have ‘mostly friends from their own group’. If we assume that the cities’ residents select their 50 casual meetings and 4 friends at random, the probabilities of these three situations can be calculated using the above binomial equation. In an ethnic group with relative group size $g$, these are the relevant probabilities:

$$p(\text{all intraethnic casual meetings}) = g^{50}$$
$$p(\text{all intraethnic friends}) = g^4$$
$$p(\text{most but not all intraethnic friends}) = g^3 \times (1 - g) \times 4$$

As for interethnic marriages in Amsterdam, these probabilities were used to calculate an ‘avoidance ratio’ for friendships by dividing the actual proportions of intra-ethnic friendships by the probability of the same situation occurring at random.
# Sources

## List of Interview Respondents

### Kano

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Mustapha Yahaya</td>
<td>Executive director Democratic Action Group (DAG)</td>
<td>01/08/2006</td>
<td>dRPC office</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous (i)</td>
<td>Chairman Conflict, Prevention and Reconciliation Committee (CPRC)</td>
<td>02/08/2006</td>
<td>Government House</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Haruna Wakili</td>
<td>Director Mambayya House</td>
<td>09/08/2006</td>
<td>Mambayya House</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Tahir Gwarzo</td>
<td>Director Kano State Polytechnic</td>
<td>10/08/2006</td>
<td>Kano State Polytechnic</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asma’u U. Yahaya</td>
<td>National secretary Muslim Sisters Organisation (MSO)</td>
<td>12/08/2006</td>
<td>Excel College</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Toba</td>
<td>Sabon Gari conflict expert</td>
<td>13/08/2006</td>
<td>Beer parlour in Sabon Gari</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdullahi Sule</td>
<td>President YEDA</td>
<td>15/08/2006</td>
<td>YEDA office</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous (ii)</td>
<td>Conflict resolution trainer</td>
<td>15/08/2006</td>
<td>YEDA office</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous (iii)</td>
<td>Motorcyclist</td>
<td>15/08/2006</td>
<td>YEDA office</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous (iv)</td>
<td>Fuel hawker</td>
<td>15/08/2006</td>
<td>YEDA office</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musa D. Abdullahi</td>
<td>Executive secretary Red Cross Kano</td>
<td>16/08/2006</td>
<td>Red Cross office</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Ajayi Memayetan</td>
<td>Journalist Civil Society and community leader</td>
<td>16/08/2006 and 5/12/2008</td>
<td>Civil Society office</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Mustapha Hussain Ismail</td>
<td>Director Centre for Human Rights in Islam (CHRI)</td>
<td>17/08/2006</td>
<td>BUK</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Femi Sodipo</td>
<td>Coordinator Peace Initiative Network (PIN)</td>
<td>18/08/2006</td>
<td>British Council</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Marie Pace</td>
<td>Peace and Development Advisor UNDP</td>
<td>22/08/2006</td>
<td>Hilton hotel</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Ochinya O. Ojiyi</td>
<td>Assistant director Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution</td>
<td>22/08/2006</td>
<td>IPCR office</td>
<td>Abuja</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asma’u Ahmed</td>
<td>Conflict resolution trainer</td>
<td>26/08/2006</td>
<td>Tourist Camp</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alh. Inusa Musa</td>
<td>Researcher dRPC</td>
<td>Multiple conversations: 2006 and 2008</td>
<td>dRPC office</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous (vi)</td>
<td>Community elder Hotoro</td>
<td>30/08/2006</td>
<td>27/28 Hotoro</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Olayiwole Ado Adeaga</td>
<td>Vice-president Yoruba and community Kano</td>
<td>06/09/2006</td>
<td>Miky-Joky Guest Inn</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdullahi Musa Hassan</td>
<td>Assistant Director Gidauniyan Alheri</td>
<td>07/09/2006</td>
<td>Gidauniyan Alheri Complex</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheikh Qaribullah</td>
<td>Leader Qadiriyya for southern Africa</td>
<td>09/09/2006</td>
<td>Qadiriyya House</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Salahudeen Yusuf</td>
<td>Professor Federal College of Education and imam in Sabon Gari mosque</td>
<td>10/09/2006 &amp; 13/12/2008</td>
<td>La Locanda</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Ibrahim Mauazzam</td>
<td>Director Centre for Research and Development (CRD)</td>
<td>13/09/2006</td>
<td>CRD office</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Title/Position</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reverend Jebis</td>
<td>Reverend Evangelical Church of Christ in Nigeria (ECCN) and CAN representative</td>
<td>14/09/2006</td>
<td>At his house in Sabon Gari, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tafidan Kura</td>
<td>President-General Igbo Association Kano</td>
<td>15/09/2006</td>
<td>At his house in Kura, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Boniface Ibikwe</td>
<td></td>
<td>16/09/2006</td>
<td>Igbo Association office, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group discussion of initial results (12 attended)</td>
<td></td>
<td>17/09/2006</td>
<td>dRPC office, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim Ado Kurawa</td>
<td>Director-General, Kano State Research and Documentation Directorate</td>
<td>16/10/2008</td>
<td>Government House, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mallam Aminu</td>
<td></td>
<td>17/10/2008</td>
<td>dRPC office, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Haruna Wakili</td>
<td>Director Mambayya House</td>
<td>20/10/2008</td>
<td>Mambayya House, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Tahir Gwarzo</td>
<td>Director Kano State Polytechnic</td>
<td>20/10/2008</td>
<td>Federal College of Education, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Yusuf Adamu</td>
<td>Professor Bayero University</td>
<td>21/10/2008</td>
<td>Bayero University, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bala Muhammad</td>
<td>Director-General <em>A Daidaite Sahu</em></td>
<td>22/10/2008</td>
<td>Office <em>A Daidaite Sahu</em>, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mika’il Adebuyo Adeniyi</td>
<td>Special Advisor to the Governor on Intercommunity Relations</td>
<td>22/10/2008</td>
<td>Spice Foods restaurant, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Mustapha Yahaya</td>
<td>Executive director Democratic Action Group (DAG)</td>
<td>23/10/2008</td>
<td>DAG office, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Gideon</td>
<td></td>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>conversations 2006 and 2008, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Pascal</td>
<td>Igbo chief and business man</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>conversations 2008, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanmi Kings</td>
<td>Lecturer Polytechnic and artist</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>conversations 2006 and 2008, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Mustapha Hussain Ismail</td>
<td>Director Centre for Human Rights in Islam (CHRI)</td>
<td>28/10/2008</td>
<td>CHRI Office, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florence Balewa</td>
<td>Director Fortress NGO</td>
<td>29/10/2008</td>
<td>Fortress Office, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous (vii)</td>
<td>Volunteer YEDA</td>
<td>31/10/2008</td>
<td>YEDA Office, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Haruna Salibi</td>
<td>Lecturer at Bayero University</td>
<td>03/11/2008</td>
<td>Mambayya House, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alh. Abubakar Rimi</td>
<td>PDP politician, former governor</td>
<td>13/11/2008</td>
<td>His house in GRA, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad Salisu Isyaku</td>
<td>PDP politician in Fagge</td>
<td>21/11/2008</td>
<td>His house in Kano, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mrs Fatima Ibrahim</td>
<td>Researcher at BUK</td>
<td>25/11/2008</td>
<td>BUK Old Site, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous (viii)</td>
<td></td>
<td>25/11/2008</td>
<td>DRPC office, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nura Hassan</td>
<td>Consultant at Census Office</td>
<td>25/11/2008</td>
<td>Woodhill Plaza, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Mahmud Ado Bayero</td>
<td>District head of Fagge</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>conversations 2008, LGA Fagge Office, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alh. Sani Umar</td>
<td>Village Head of Sabon Gari</td>
<td>26/11/2008</td>
<td>LGA Fagge Office, Kano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Function</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Place</td>
<td>City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alh. Garba Nwachukwu</td>
<td>Business man</td>
<td>1/12/2008</td>
<td>His shop in GRA</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatima Oyine Ibrahim</td>
<td>Academic</td>
<td>2/12/2008</td>
<td>BUK New Site</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous (x)</td>
<td>Business man</td>
<td>2/12/2008</td>
<td>His office on Bompai rd</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mallama Ladi</td>
<td>NGO director</td>
<td>4/12/2008</td>
<td>Her office</td>
<td>Kano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group discussion with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>survey administrators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(students)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Amsterdam**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kate Kirk</td>
<td>Academic researcher</td>
<td>15/1/2008</td>
<td>Cafe</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan Rath</td>
<td>Professor of sociology</td>
<td>17/1/2008</td>
<td>UvA</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous (x)</td>
<td>Civil servant integration (1990s)</td>
<td>22/1/2008</td>
<td>Cafe</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaco Dagevos</td>
<td>SCP researcher</td>
<td>24/1/2008</td>
<td>SCP office</td>
<td>The Hague</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rudolf Buurma</td>
<td>Director SALTO</td>
<td>24/1/2008</td>
<td>SALTO office</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han Entzinger</td>
<td>Professor of sociology</td>
<td>25/1/2008</td>
<td>EUR</td>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radj Ramcharan</td>
<td>Programme manager integration FORUM</td>
<td>25/1/2008</td>
<td>FORUM Office</td>
<td>Utrecht</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Mahdi</td>
<td>FORUM</td>
<td>11/3/2008</td>
<td>FORUM Office</td>
<td>Utrecht</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mourad Taimounti</td>
<td>Process manager SAOA</td>
<td>13/3/2008</td>
<td>Cafe</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous (xi)</td>
<td>Dutch–Moroccan businessman</td>
<td>19/3/2008</td>
<td>Cafe</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Aboutaleb</td>
<td>Minister for Social Affairs</td>
<td>20/3/2008</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>The Hague</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous (xii)</td>
<td>Policy advisor Slotervaart</td>
<td>28/3/2008</td>
<td>VU</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yusuf Altuntas</td>
<td>Director Milli Görus Nederland</td>
<td>3/4/2008</td>
<td>Milli Görus mosque</td>
<td>Soest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elmas Duduk</td>
<td>Policy advisor stadsdeel</td>
<td>7/4/2008</td>
<td>Stadsdeel office</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meindert Fenema</td>
<td>Professor of political science</td>
<td>7/4/2008</td>
<td>UvA</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan Willem Duyvendak</td>
<td>Professor of sociology</td>
<td>8/4/2008</td>
<td>UvA</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Baadoud</td>
<td>Alderman stadsdeel Osdorp</td>
<td>8/4/2008</td>
<td>Stadsdeel office</td>
<td>Osdorp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position/Role</td>
<td>Date(s)</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerben Menke</td>
<td>Policy advisor stadsdeel Osdorp</td>
<td>8/4/2008</td>
<td>Stadsdeel office Amsterdam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piet de Rooy</td>
<td>Professor of history</td>
<td>9/4/2008</td>
<td>UvA Amsterdam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farid Tabarki</td>
<td>Research and entrepreneur Cafe</td>
<td>9/4/2008</td>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veit Bader</td>
<td>Professor of sociology</td>
<td>11/4/2008</td>
<td>UvA Amsterdam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justus Uitermark</td>
<td>PhD student</td>
<td>11/4/2008</td>
<td>UvA Amsterdam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed el Mesri</td>
<td>Director Assadaaka</td>
<td>13/4/2008</td>
<td>Assadaaka Amsterdam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ankie Verlaan</td>
<td>Director Adviesraad Diversiteit</td>
<td>15/4/2008</td>
<td>Stadsdeel office Amsterdam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Tillie</td>
<td>Professor of political science</td>
<td>17/4/2008</td>
<td>UvA Amsterdam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eddy Linthorst</td>
<td>Alderman stadsdeel Oud-Zuid</td>
<td>18/4/2008</td>
<td>Stadsdeel office Oud-Zuid Amsterdam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed ben Hamida</td>
<td>Programme manager</td>
<td>22/4/2008</td>
<td>Taalwijzer Amsterdam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Driss El Boujouf</td>
<td>Chairman CMO</td>
<td>23/4/2008</td>
<td>His house Utrecht</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustapha Baba</td>
<td>Social entrepreneur</td>
<td>25/4/2008</td>
<td>Mexit office Amsterdam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rene Paas</td>
<td>Chairman CNV union</td>
<td>25/4/2008</td>
<td>Office Utrecht</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duco Adema</td>
<td>Chairman stadsdeel Zuideramstel</td>
<td>6/5/2008</td>
<td>Stadsdeel office Amsterdam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eduard Kimman</td>
<td>Secretary-general of Dutch Bishops conference</td>
<td>8/5/2008</td>
<td>VU Amsterdam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous (xiv)</td>
<td>Policy advisor on radicalisation</td>
<td>9/5/2008</td>
<td>Cafe Amsterdam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bas Plaisier</td>
<td>Scriba of the Protestant Church of the Netherlands (PKN)</td>
<td>14/5/2008</td>
<td>PKN office Utrecht</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeroen Dijssebloem</td>
<td>Member of parliament for social-democrats (PvdA)</td>
<td>4/6/2008</td>
<td>Parliament The Hague</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remco Cornelie</td>
<td>Manager Bureau Inburgering en Participatie SEZO</td>
<td>11/6/2008</td>
<td>Cafe Amsterdam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berry van Oers</td>
<td>Theological Staff Roman Catholic Church in NL</td>
<td>16/6/2008</td>
<td>Secretariaat Roman-Catholic church Utrecht</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joris Rijbroek</td>
<td>Policy advisor Platform Amsterdam Samen</td>
<td>19/6/2008</td>
<td>PAS office Amsterdam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous (xv)</td>
<td>Taalwijzer employee</td>
<td>24/6/2008</td>
<td>Taalwijzer Amsterdam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bas Plaisier</td>
<td>Scriba of the Protestant Church of the Netherlands (PKN)</td>
<td>14/5/2008</td>
<td>PKN office Utrecht</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous (xvi)</td>
<td>Policy advisor Slotervaart</td>
<td>11/9/2008</td>
<td>Stadsdeel office Amsterdam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous (xvii)</td>
<td>Academic researcher</td>
<td>15/9/2008</td>
<td>Cafe Amsterdam</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


Austin, William G. and Stephen Worchel (eds.) (1979), The social psychology of intergroup relations (Monterey: Brooks/Cole).


Barth, Fredrik (1998), *Ethnic groups and boundaries: the social organization of culture difference* (Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland).


--- (1980), 'Mead and Blumer: The convergent methodological perspectives of social behaviorism and


Bolt, G., R. van Kempen, and M. van Ham (2008), 'Minority ethnic groups in the Dutch housing market: Spatial segregation, relocation dynamics and housing policy', *Urban Studies*, 45 (7), 1359-84.


Channer, Alan (dir.), *The Imam and the Pastor* (FLT Films, 2006).


Civil Society (2004), 'Kano sees red', *Civil Society*, 26, 3.


--- (2004), 'Toespraak van burgemeester Job Cohen in de gemeenteraad van Amsterdam', (Amsterdam).


--- (1996), 'Kano labour and the urban poor, 1930-1990', PhD (Bayero University Kano).


de Boom, J., A. Weltevrede, P. van Vensveen, M. van San, and P. Hermus (2010), 'Marokkaanse Nederlanders 2010', (Rotterdam: Risbo), 86.


dei Liagre Böhl, Herman (2000), *De stad bestuurd*, in Bakker, Martha (ed.), *Amsterdam in de tweede Gouden Eeuw* (Bussum: THOTH, Genootschap Amstelodamum), 159-85.


de Rooy, Piet and Emma Los (eds.) (2008), *De canon van Amsterdam* (Amsterdam: Boom).


Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (1994), 'Village listing', (Kano: Kano State agricultural and rural development authority), 132.


Driessen, Danielle and Marieke van der Werf (2004), 'Laat het van twee kanten komen. Eindrapportage van een verkennin van de maatschappelijke rol van moskeeen in Amsterdam.', (Amsterdam: Nieuwe Maan en ICP Advies).


Ensel, Remco (2003), 'Multiculturalisme in de politieke partij. Migrantennetwerken in de politieke partij',


--- (2006), 'Changing the rules when the game is on; from multiculturalism to assimilation in the Netherlands', in Bodemann, Y. Michal and Gökçe Yurdakul (eds.), *Migration, citizenship, ethnos* (1st edn.; New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 121-44.


of ethnic and cultural conflict (Westport: Praeger), 69-88.


Foucault, Michel (1982), The archaeology of knowledge and the discourse on language (New York: Pantheon).


Gemeente Amsterdam (2001), 'De Amsterdamse Burgermonitor 2000: Verslag van de tweede peiling over democratie en participatie in Amsterdam', (Amsterdam: Bureau Informatiemanagement Amsterdam en Bestuurdienst Amsterdam/ Afdeling Communicatie), 63.


--- (2005a), 'Interculturele verhoudingen op Amsterdamse scholen voor voortgezet onderwijs en middelbaar beroepsonderwijs', (Amsterdam: Bestuursdienst), 12.


--- (2005d), 'Inburgeren in Amsterdam', (Amsterdam: Adviesraad Diversiteit en Integratie), 16.

--- (2005e), 'Verhouding tussen etnische groepen op Amsterdamse basisscholen: tussenstand', (Amsterdam: Bestuursdienst), 8.


--- (2005g), 'Integratie in Amsterdam. Herorientatie op de beleidsprocessen', (Amsterdam: Adviesraad Diversiteit en Integratie), 5.


--- (2008a), 'Uitvoering inburgering in Amsterdam: hoge ambities, lage opbrengsten.', (Amsterdam: Adviesraad Diversiteit en Integratie), 7.

--- (2008b), 'Notitie scheiding kerk en staat', (Amsterdam: College van B&W), 15.


Grever, Maria (2007), 'Nationale identiteit en meervoudig verleden', *Nationale identiteit en meervoudig verleden*.


Hancock, Ange-Marie (2007), 'Intersectionality as a normative and empirical paradigm', *Politics & Gender, 3* (2), 248-54.


Hewstone, Miles and Rupert Brown (1986), 'Contact is not enough: An intergroup perspective on the "contact hypothesis"', in Hewstone, Miles and Rupert Brown (eds.), *Contact and conflict in intergroup encounters* (Oxford; New York: Blackwell), 1-44.


Huddy, Leonie (2001), 'From social to political identity: A critical examination of social identity theory', *Political Psychology*, 22 (1), 127-56.


--- (2006), 'They do not own this place: government discrimination against "non-indigenes" in Nigeria', (18; New York: Human Rights Watch), 64.

--- (2008), 'The Netherlands: Discrimination in the name of integration. Migrants' rights under the Integration Abroad Act', (1; New York: Human Rights Watch), 44.


Inspectie van het Onderwijs (2002), 'Islamitische scholen en sociale cohesie', (Utrecht: Inspectie van het Onderwijs), 44.


Jordaan, Johnny and Hans Wierenga (1972), *Ze kunnen van me zeggen wat ze willen* (Bruna boeken; Utrecht: Bruna).

Kabalt, Joeri (2009), 'Samenwerken in een werkende markt?', MSc (University of Utrecht).

Kabara, Shaikh Qaribullahi Shaikh Nasir (2004), *A crystal clear mirror: on sufism* (Kano: Alkali Sharif Bala).


Ketner, Susan Liesbeth (2008), *Marokkaanse wortels, Nederlandse grondexploratie, bindingen en identiteitsstrategieÎn van jongeren van Marokkaanse afkomst*, PhD (Groningen: Rijksuniversiteit Groningen).

--- (2009), 'Ik denk niet in culturen... ik denk eigenlijk meer in mijn geloof', *Migrantenstudies*, 25 (1), 73-87.


--- (2003), 'From caliphate to protectorate: Ethnicity and the colonial Sabon Gari system in northern Nigeria', *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History*, 4 (2).


Kooijman, Jaap (2008), *Fabricating the absolute fake: America in contemporary pop culture* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press) 179.


Kuitenbrouwer, Jan (2010), *De woorden van Wilders & hoe ze werken* (Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij).

Kullberg, J. (2002), 'Consumer's responses to choice based letting mechanisms', *Housing Studies*, 17 (4), 549-79.


class formation and action (London: Longman), 139-60.


McAdam, Doug and Sidney Tarrow (2000), 'Nonviolence as contentious interaction', *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 33 (2), 149-54.


Mead, George Herbert and Charles W. Morris (1934), *Mind, self & society from the standpoint of a social behaviorist* (Chicago: The University of Chicago press).


Müller, Floris (2008), 'Wat doe jij voor de stad? De stad als basis voor een multiculturele gemeenschap', Migrantenstudies, 1 (40-53).

Musa, Njadvara (2006), 'Mobs burn Christian churches; at least 15 killed, dozens arrested', Associated Press, February 19.


North, Douglass Cecil (1990), Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press).
--- (1991), 'Institutions', The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5 (1), 97-


Oggunika, Olu (1994), Inter-ethnic tension management in Nigeria: an interpretative approach (Lagos: Muffets (Nig.) Ltd) 225.

Ojo, Ayodele (2006), 'Will Kano rise again?', Vanguard, 7 May.


Onuf, Nicholas Greenwood (1989), World of our making: rules and rule in social theory and international relations (Studies in international relations; Columbia: University of South Carolina Press) 341.

Oostindie, Gert (2010), Postkoloniaal Nederland: vijfentwintig jaar vergeten, herdenken, verdringen (Postkoloniale geschiedenis in Nederland; Amsterdam: Bakker).


--- (1973), Religion and political culture in Kano (Berkeley; London: University of California Press).


Penninx, Rinus and Marlou Schrover (2001), Bastion of bindmiddel? Organisaties van immigranten in historisch perspectief (Amsterdam: IMES).


Port of Amsterdam (2009), 'Factsheet economy', (Amsterdam).


--- (1997b), 'Burghers into citizens: Urban and national citizenship in the Netherlands during the revolutionary era (c. 1800)', Theory and Society, 26 (4), 403-20.


Randewijk, Marije (2003), 'Topsport aan Amsterdam niet besteed', Het Parool, 18 October.

Ranger, Terence (1994), 'The invention of tradition revisited', in Kaarsholm, Preben (ed.), Inventions and boundaries: historical and anthropological approaches to the study of ethnicity and nationalism
Rath, Jan (1991), Minorisering: de sociale constructie van 'etnische minderheden' (Amsterdam: Sua).
Reynolds, Larry T. and Nancy J. Herman-Kinney (2003), Handbook of symbolic interactionism (Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press).
Sa'idu, Isa (2008), 'Kano - City where everything turns into money', The Daily Trust, 1 November.
Schinkel, Willem (2007), Denken in een tijd van sociale hypochondrie, aanzet tot een theorie voorbij de maatschappij (Kampen: Klement).
--- (2008), De gedroomde samenleving (Kampen: Klement).
Schuch, Kurt (2005), Unarmed insurrections: people power movements in nondemocracies, ed. Klandermans, Bert (22; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).
Scholten, Peter (2010), 'Constructing Dutch immigrant policy: Research-policy relations and immigrant integration policy-making in the Netherlands', Political Studies Association Conference (Edinburgh).
Scholten, Peter (2011), Framing immigrant integration: Dutch research-policy dialogues in comparative perspective (IMISCOE Research; Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press).
Schwartz, Stephen (2005), 'Islamic extremism on the rise in Nigeria', Terrorism Monitor, 3 (20), 9-10.
Segers, Gert-Jan (2009), Voorwaarden voor vrede: de komst van de islam, de integratie van moslims en de
identiteit van Nederland (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn Motief).

SGP, Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (2010), 'Verkiezingsprogramma SGP: De daad bij het woord voegen'. <http://www.vsnu.nl/web/file?uuid=9cc42f2a-c608-4838-b88b-b1350b4f81f1&owner=acca8c78-c6a3-4d93-b723-89a0f02cc70c1>.


Smith, M.G. (1951), 'Social and economic change among selected native communities in northern Nigeria', (University of London).

--- (1964), 'Historical and cultural conditions of political corruption among the Hausa', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 6 (2), 165-94.


Staub, Ervin (2005), 'Understanding the roots and avenues to the prevention of violence and to developing positive relations between the local ethnic group and Muslim minorities in Amsterdam, in the Netherlands - and in the rest of Europe', (Amsterdam).

--- (2007), 'Preventing violence and terrorism and promoting positive relations between Dutch and Muslim


--- (2009a), 'Federalism in Africa: The Nigerian experience in comparative perspective', Ethnopolitics, 8 (1), 67-86.


--- (1978), Differentiation between social groups: studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations (London; New York: Published in cooperation with European Association of Experimental Social Psychology by Academic Press).

--- (1982), Social identity and intergroup relations (Cambridge; Paris: Cambridge University Press; Maison des sciences de l'homme).


Tammes, Peter (2009), 'Het belang van jodenregistratie voor de vernietiging van de joden tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog', Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis, 6 (2), 34-62.


Tilly, Charles (2003), The politics of collective violence (Cambridge studies in contentious politics; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).


Uiters, Ellen (2007), 'Primary health care use among ethnic minorities in the Netherlands', (Erasmus University).


van den Bersselaar, Dmitri (1998), 'In search of Igbo identity: Language, culture, and politics in Nigeria, 1900-1966', PhD (University of Leiden).


van der Welle, Inge and Virginie Mamadouh (2008), 'Links en labels: Identiteiten en identificatiestrategieen van Amsterdamse jongvolwassenen', (Amsterdam: AMIDSt).


--- (2008), 'Monitor racisme en extremism. Achtste rapportage', (8; Amsterdam: Anne Frank Stichting/Universiteit Leiden).


van Hees, Suzanne (2010), 'Pijlers voor bruggenbouwers – een update', (Amsterdam: ACB Kenniscentrum).


van Meeteren, Masja (2005), 'Discoursen van integratie', MA thesis (Erasmus University of Rotterdam).


van Tijn, Theo (1965), *Twintig jaren Amsterdam: de maatschappelijke ontwikkeling van de hoofdstad van de jaren ’50 der vorige eeuw tot 1876* (Publikaties van de Gemeentelijke Archiefdienst van Amsterdam; Amsterdam: Scheltema & Holkema).


Vasta, Ellie (2006), *From ethnic minorities to ethnic majority policy: changing identities and the shift to assimilationism in the Netherlands* (COMPAS working papers; Oxford: Centre on Migration, Policy & Society).


--- (2005), 'The immigrant organising process: The emergence and persistence of Turkish immigrant organisations in Amsterdam and Berlin and Surinamese organisations in Amsterdam, 1960–2000', PhD (University of Amsterdam).


Vugts, Paul (2008), 'Draaiboek Vrede volstond; dit was typisch zo'n moment om 'de boel bij elkaar te houden", *Het Parool*, sec. Binnenland p. 6.


Wagenaar, Michael (1990), 'Amsterdam 1876-1914: economisch herstel, ruimtelijke expansie en de veranderende ordening van het stedelijk grondgebruik', Thesis (doctoral) (Universiteit van Amsterdam).


--- (2007), Identificatie met Nederland (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press).


Yahya, M. (2007), 'Polio vaccines - "No thank you"! Barriers to polio eradication in northern Nigeria', African Affairs, 106 (423), 185-204.


Zeven, Bart (1987), 'Balancerend op de rand van Nederland: De Chinese minderheid in de jaren 1910-1940', in Benton, Gregor and Hans Vermeulen (eds.), De Chinezen (Muidenberg: D. Coutinho), 40-64.
This thesis is typeset in the Ehrhardt font