Working paper
Auctions vs. Negotiations.
- Abstract:
-
Which is the more profitable way to sell a company: a public auction or an optimally structured negotiation with a smaller number of bidders? We show that under standard assumptions the public auction is always preferable, even if it forfeits all the seller's negotiating power, including the ability to withdraw the object from sale, provided that it attracts at least one extra bidder. An immediate public auction also dominates negotiating while maintaining the right to hold an auction subsequ...
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Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Volume:
- 4608
- Series:
- NBER Working Papers
- Host title:
- NBER Working Papers
- Publication date:
- 1994-01-01
- Paper number:
- 4608
Item Description
- Language:
- English
- UUID:
-
uuid:a924ad0e-92f7-4590-8c0d-1fd01b3b39c0
- Local pid:
- oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:12005
- Deposit date:
- 2011-08-16
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- Copyright date:
- 1994
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