# English Diplomatic Agents 1603-1688

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Short Abstract
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The general historiography of Stuart diplomacy has, by and large, argued that those who were tasked with carrying out foreign policy were ineffective, amateurish and, in some cases, incompetent. This harsh view is in need of reassessment in the light of a number of incidents, which suggest that much effective foreign policy and general diplomatic work was carried out by lower-ranking diplomats, who were titled agents. These agents have attracted little historical comment or study. This thesis sets out to redress this by considering the agents employed from 1603 to 1688, when the title disappeared due to rank inflation, duties transferred to consuls, and other factors.

The texts of the period on the perfect ambassador leave clear omissions in descriptions of diplomatic work, which therefore suggests a role for another type of diplomat, the agent.

The initial chapter looks at background and education and offers a portrait of an average agent as typically a well-educated member of the lower gentry. The terms under which agents served are compared with other professional groups of comparable social rank and those in other government positions. Agents' work in information gathering, including where and from what sources they obtained material and how it was transmitted, is investigated. The existence of an efficient international network is uncovered. Agents' role in negotiations, unconstrained by protocol, allowed them a greater degree of freedom than ambassadors. This and the element of deniability are key to understanding their importance to Stuart diplomacy. The task of protecting merchants' rights is demonstrated by a case study in France which shows all the usual stages involved in resolving a dispute. Involvement in buying naval supplies and cultural transfer are also discussed in chapters concerned with agents' practical activities. Finally, the careers pursued after their agencies are outlined, showing how some, such as Cottington, used their skills and knowledge to their advantage. Having demonstrated the differences amongst, and the utility of, agents it is possible to suggest that some of the criticism of Stuart diplomacy comes from a misunderstanding of the use of both agents and ambassadors, and how, when and why each could be employed for a specific task.

Long Abstract

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The general historiography of Stuart diplomatic history has by and large suggested that those who were entrusted with carrying out foreign policy were ineffective, amateurish and, in some cases, incompetent. The exception is William Temple, who is deemed the only great diplomat produced by England during the period. This harsh view is in need of reassessment in the light of a number of incidents, which suggest that much effective foreign policy and general diplomatic work was carried out by the lower-ranking diplomats, who were titled agents. This rank is one which has attracted little historical comment or study.

Before making a close study of the activities of diplomatic agents, the thesis attempts to locate them within a theoretical framework. This draws upon texts of the period on the perfect ambassador and it will be found that the gaps in the descriptions of diplomatic work suggest a role for a lesser type of diplomat. After the theoretical agent has been defined, it is possible to consider how far those employed as agents matched this in reality.

Chapter one will consider the background of the diplomatic agents, their education and social rank, along with their age at the start of their careers. The significance of the average age, closely mirroring ambassadors' average age, will be used as evidence that agents were a distinct form of diplomat and it was not merely a training post for future ambassadors. Religion and the effects of the Test Acts, when these came into force from the 1660s, will be considered, although it appears that few agents ever needed dispensation due to their being outside the Kingdom. Finally, the terms of service agents operated under will be considered and how these compared with those of their social rank in general and other government positions in particular. A portrait of a well-educated member of the lower gentry will be drawn as the average diplomatic agent.

Chapter two will deal with the important activity of information gathering. It considers the networks that agents used within the countries they were posted to, the range of people from whom they received information, and the type of information. The network used to transmit this information back to Whitehall will be considered in detail. This network was a large international network which, by sending dispatches to multiple individuals, ensured that information could always eventually reach London. This practical area of diplomacy has long been neglected by scholars. The use of ordinary and express messages and the difficulty in providing reliable information will be covered in two case studies.

Chapter three will address the significant aspect of an agent's work of protecting merchants in the nation to which they were accredited. This responsibility developed with the decline of monopoly trading companies. The ways in which agents were persuaded to accept cases will be considered, with the suggestion that merchants provided credit and information to agents in exchange. Some cases came via the direct instructions of the Privy Council. The actual work performed by agents will be

demonstrated through a case study about a long-running dispute in France, in which Sir Henry De Vic demonstrated the usual stages that an agent had to go through when dealing with a trade dispute of this kind. Agents were often far less successful than De Vic.

The type of negotiations agents undertook is a key to understanding their importance to Stuart diplomacy and is discussed in chapter four. What emerges is their importance in unofficial negotiation. The examples of Francis Cottington, in Spain, and John Taylor, in the Empire, show that agents could make propositions, in a way which an ambassador could not, which could then be set aside or repudiated without impacting on their masters. The issue of protocol in negotiations is also important and agents were allowed a greater degree of freedom, not just in their promises but also in their interactions with members of a foreign court. Owing to unresolved issues of protocol, Cardinal Richelieu did not receive a single ambassador; however, he did receive agents. In the Empire, John Taylor, even without proper credentials, was still able to gain access to those of the greatest importance.

Agents undertook additional tasks to their normal diplomatic work. Chapter five will look at these other tasks. A few agents bought naval and other military supplies. However, the activity of Francis Gordon, in providing arms to the Covenanter forces, is an interesting example of the breakdown of loyalty in the diplomatic corps. The transfer of culture is a noteworthy area and a task taken up by agents. They provided high art, manuscripts and printed books, and written reports on local court culture. The important activities of Balthazar Gerbier and the employment of Van Dyck will be considered, as well as the impact material culture and knowledge, and also taste, had on the careers of agents.

The careers of agents after their time as diplomats will be discussed. It will be shown how individuals, like Francis Cottington and Henry De Vic, used their time abroad to procure preferment at home. Cottington rose, due to his diplomatic knowledge and domestic skill, to the rank of Lord High Treasurer during the Civil War. The large number of former agents that clustered in the office of Clerks of the Council will be examined. Agents proved themselves capable of undertaking this role by their service abroad.

The thesis will conclude by considering the disappearance of the rank of agent after 1688. It will be suggested that rank inflation occurred and that this, and other factors, rather than a change in the structure of diplomacy, was the major cause of the disappearance of the title. It will be argued that there were many calls for young men to learn the trade in a lesser post abroad before becoming an ambassador and this was in fact the system which regularly operated, and was successful in producing capable diplomats, for much of the period. Having demonstrated the difference and possible usage of agents, it will be suggested that some of the criticism of Stuart diplomacy comes from a lack of understanding of the important roles which agents played in this diplomacy, and the use that the government made of them in attempting to extract the maximum concessions from foreign powers.

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# Contents

**List of Figures and Charts.** ..... **iii**

**Conventions and abbreviations** ..... **iv**

**Introduction** ..... **1**

**Chapter I Background of Diplomatic Agents** ..... **24**

**Chapter II Diplomatic Communication** ..... **59**

**Chapter III Defending the Rights of Subjects** ..... **104**

**Chapter IV Negotiating with Foreign States** ..... **133**

**Chapter V Tasked with Other Duties** ..... **168**

**Chapter VI After an Agency** ..... **203**

**Epilogue: The Decline of Diplomatic Agents** ..... **235**

**Appendix I University Education of Diplomatic Agents.** ..... **250**

**Appendix II Diplomatic Employment of Agents.** ..... **253**

**Bibliography** ..... **263**

# List of Figures and Charts.

Chart 1 Total Agents employed and total who attended university. ..... 36

Chart 2 Number of agents serving each year (1603-1688). ..... 236

Chart 3 Percentage of diplomats holding each diplomatic rank (1660-1688). ..... 237

Chart 4 Percentage of diplomats holding each diplomatic rank (1689-1715). ..... 239

Chart 5 Number of diplomats by rank (1689-1715). ..... 240

Figure 1 Known lines of correspondence by Sir William Curtius..... 81

Figure 2 Network if each diplomat to whom Sir William Curtius wrote followed his example ..... 82

Figure 3 Extract of a report from Henry De Vic using a substitution code..... 99

Figure 4 Extract from one of Balthazar Gerbier's letters using the more complex code..... 101

## Conventions and abbreviations

Quotations have been left with the original spelling except where failure to modernise them would lead to confusion.
The National Archives London has been omitted from each reference to the State Papers both foreign and domestic held there. Other series held by the National Archives London are identified for clarity.
The following abbreviations are used.

| | |
|---|---|
| ed. | editor |
| HMCD, ii | Edward K. Purnell & Allen B. Hinds (eds.), *Papers of William Trumbull the elder 1605-1610 (vol. ii of Report on the Manuscripts of the Marquess of Downshire preserved at Easthampstead Park Berks)* (London, 1936). |
| HMCD, iii | Allen B. Hinds (ed.*), Papers of William Trumbull the elder 1611-1612 (vol. iii of Report on the Manuscripts of the Marquess of Downshire preserved at Easthampstead Park Berks)* (London, 1938). |
| HMCD, iv | Allen B. Hinds (ed.), *Papers of William Trumbull the elder January 1613-August 1614 (vol. iv of Report on the Manuscripts of the Marquess of Downshire preserved at Easthampstead Park Berks)* (London, 1940). |
| HMCD, v | G. Dyfnallt Owen (ed.), *Papers of William Trumbull the elder September 1614-August 1616 (vol. v of Report on the Manuscripts of the Most Honourable the Marquess of Downshire formerly preserved at Easthampstead Park, Berkshire)* (London, 1988). |
| HMCD, vi | G. Dyfnallt Owen & Sonia P. Anderson (eds.), *Papers of William Trumbull the elder September 1616-December 1618 (vol. vi of Report on the Manuscripts of the Most Honourable the Marquess of Downshire formerly preserved at Easthampstead Park, Berkshire)* (London, 1995). |
| MS. | Manuscript |
| SPF | State Papers Foreign |
| SPFF | SPF, France, held in the National Archives. |
| trans. | translator |

# Introduction

Those men, who in the words of Sir Henry Wotton, were sent abroad to lie for their country have received relatively little historiographical attention as a group, especially those who occupied the lower diplomatic ranks.[1]

England, it has been suggested, did not manage to produce diplomats of the quality of Jean-Baptiste Colbert, marquis de Torcy in France or Diego Sarmiento de Acuña, 1st count of Gondomar in Spain. The exception during the period was said to be William Temple.[2] Henry Savile and Robert Southwell have also both been suggested as superior diplomats by later historians.[3] Percy Kirk's skill and achievements in Morocco are forgotten.[4] Sir George Downing is usually damned for his conduct at The Hague, although his time under Cromwell, as with all the Cromwellian ambassadors, receives far more praise.[5] Even Sir Richard Fanshawe, whose wife sang his praises, and was respected during the period, is characterised as having a lack of diplomatic sense.[6] It is claimed that there is no discernible diplomatic service before 1688.[7] The best that has been said of English diplomats is that without them, policy would be even more confused, and that they 'did not fare badly'.[8] They were,

[1] J. Black's *A System of Ambition?: British Foreign Policy 1660-1793* is thin on pre-1700 diplomats. See J. Black, *A System of Ambition?: British Foreign Policy 1660-1793* (London, 1991).
[2] Both A. Wicquefort and P. Ferdinand Galardi believed Temple was an excellent diplomat. See P. Lachs, *The Diplomatic Corps under Charles II & James II* (New Brunswick, 1965), p. 50; J. Jones, *Britain and Europe in the Seventeenth Century* (London, 1966), p. 5.
[3] K. Feiling, *British Foreign Policy, 1660-1672* (London, 1930), p. 21.
[4] A. J. Smithers, *The Tangier Campaign: The Birth of the British Army* (Stroud, 2003), p. 129.
[5] Feiling, *British Foreign Policy*, p. 113; T. Venning, *Cromwellian Foreign Policy* (London, 1995), p. 36. As do other diplomats. See G. Howat, *Stuart and Cromwellian Foreign Policy,* (London, 1974), p. 4.
[6] A. Fanshawe, *Memoirs of Lady Fanshawe, Written by Herself, Containing Extracts from the Correspondence of Sir Richard Fanshawe*, ed. B. Marshall (London, 1905), p. 23; Feiling, *British Foreign Policy*, p. 169.
[7] J. R. Jones, *Britain and Europe in the Seventeenth Century* (London, 1966), p. 4.
[8] Howat, *Stuart and Cromwellian Foreign Policy,* p. 9.

however, totally outmatched by the diplomats of Louis XIV.[9] Blame for these problems has more often been laid at the government's feet for the lack of resources allowed for diplomacy and also for organisational and policy failings.[10]

Study of England's diplomats has centred on individuals, usually those who held the rank of Ambassador or Ambassador Extraordinary, such as Sir Thomas Roe, Sir William Trumbull the younger, Sir Henry Wotton or Sir William Temple.[11] There has been one collective study of diplomats during the Stuart period and this only covered diplomats after the Restoration.[12]

Below the highest rank of Ambassador, there was a whole series of ranks that diplomats were accredited at and the lowest of these was the 'Agent'. It might be thought that, at this lowest level of accredited diplomacy, agents would play a marginal and unimportant role. However, evidence suggests otherwise. The agent Henry De Vic was recognised on the streets by Cardinal Richelieu, who led him away to his bedchamber to discuss an on-going diplomatic dispute. Such occurrences suggest that, despite their absence from series such as the *'Les papiers de Richelieu'* or the *'Lettres, instructions diplomatiques et papiers d'état du Cardinal de Richelieu'*, diplomatic agents were far from unimportant in the regular diplomacy of the English Crown.[13]

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[9] Jones, *Britain and Europe in the Seventeenth Century*, p. 71.

[10] C. Henneke, 'The Art of Diplomacy under the early Stuarts, 1603-1642' (Univ. of Virginia Ph.D. thesis, 1999), p. 310; Feiling, *British Foreign Policy*, p. 21; Jones, *Britain and Europe in the Seventeenth Century*, pp. 4-5.

[11] M. Strachan, *Sir Thomas Roe 1581-1644* (Salisbury, 1989); C. Mitchell, *Sir Thomas Roe and the Mughal Empire* (Karachi, 2000); R. Clark, *Sir William Trumbull in Paris, 1685-1686* (Cambridge, 1938); L. Smith, *The life and letters of Sir Henry Wotton* (Oxford, 1907); K. Haley, *An English diplomat in the Low Countries* (Oxford, 1986).

[12] Lachs, *The Diplomatic Corps.*

[13] P. Grillon, *Les papiers de Richelieu: section politique intérieure, correspondance et papiers d'Etat* (9 vols.; Paris, 1975-1997); D.L.M. Avenel, *Lettres, instructions diplomatiques et papiers d'état du Cardinal de Richelieu* (8 vols.; Paris, 1853-1877). It should be noted that the only English diplomat mentioned in these volumes of Richelieu's correspondence during the period is one reference to Sir Isaac Wake**,** the ambassador; Avenel, *Lettres, instructions diplomatiques,* VIII, 676.

This thesis will examine one class of diplomat, the diplomatic agent, from the accession of James I to the flight of James II. What role agents played in communicating news, defending the rights of the King's subjects overseas, and in negotiations, will be looked at in-depth. The origins of diplomatic agents will also be considered, as well as the means some of these men employed to build careers in government service after their agency.

While it is unlikely that the view of Stuart diplomacy will be dramatically altered by this thesis, it is hoped a more nuanced view of the diplomats employed by the English government can be formed. More importantly, light will be shed on a group of men who, on average, spent the longest serving abroad for the Stuart government.

## The Perfect Ambassador?

It is important to define Stuart diplomatic agents and the role they were expected to fulfil for the government. An obvious point of departure might be the texts available during the period on how to act as a diplomat. These texts tended to concentrate on the theoretical creation of the perfect ambassador.

This genre of books on the perfect ambassador had probably been established in the early 15th century by Bernard du Rosier in his *Ambaxiator Brevilogus* (c. 1436).[14] The genre then grew throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The texts did not, however, provide a detailed manual on how an ambassador should operate his embassy. Nor did they lay out procedures for the many common problems that he would have encountered. They are similar to books which provided instruction on the behaviour of the courtier. The ambassador was considered a multi-lingual

[14] *Ambaxiator Brevilogus* circulated in manuscript rather than in print and was not printed until 1905. J. Jusserand, *The school for ambassadors and other essays* (London, 1924), p. 12; B. de Rosergio, *Ambaxiator brevilogus* (Dorpat, 1905).

Renaissance courtier, albeit one with a number of specific tasks to perform. There was always a broad range of activities he had to undertake unguided by the texts and thus at his own discretion. An ambassador could, therefore, place his own stamp upon his embassy. The relationship and work done by any agent serving under him would be subject to this.

Despite the large number of agents sent out by the Stuart government, which was by no means alone in their use, a search yields no volume on how to act as the perfect diplomatic agent. While Balthazar Gerbier did leave suggestions for his replacement, in a memorandum, much of it was concerned with his belief that his post was being intercepted and read by the Taxis post office.[15]

This lack of literature presents a challenge to the study of the diplomatic agents of the Stuart government. One key to understanding and explaining the relationship between the agents, the central government in England, and the ambassadors they occasionally served with, would be to discover how that relationship was expected to work in theory. Following this, and using archival evidence, how it worked in practice can be assessed. However, apart from a few surviving instructions, there is no readily available source to state what would be theoretically expected of a Stuart agent.

With this in mind, this chapter will seek to ascertain as much as possible about the functions that an agent could be expected to perform, by viewing the literature on the perfect ambassador and extrapolating a role for a lower level of diplomat. A key reference point will be that an ambassador 'must be iealous of the degree and place which is due vnto his maister' and that he should do nothing to embarrass his master.[16] As an ambassador could not risk embarrassmentor damage to his sovereign's prestige, there were a number of practical problems in fulfilling his duties.

[15] SPF, Archives of British Legations, SP 105/13 no pagination 'Notes for a Resident at Bruxelles'.
[16] J. Hotman, *L'ambassadeur* (London, 1609), p. 50.

It is here that the role for a diplomatic agent begins to come into focus, as someone who could risk greater embarrassment without damaging the *gloire* of his master.

The Texts Available on Diplomacy.

Books on the subject of the perfect ambassador were an increasingly popular genre during the period. However, despite their European popularity, few were translated into English.

The literature on the 'Perfect ambassador' began with the works of Etienne Dolet's '*De officio legati'* and the German scholar Conradi Bruni's *'De legationibus libri quinque'*.[17] These were followed by the work of Ottaviano Maggi, who published '*De legato libri duo*'.[18] Despite the long-established Italian system of diplomacy, he was the first Italian to write on the subject. These works were followed by the French authors Pierre Ayrault's '*De origine et auctoritate rerum judicatarum'* and Felix de La Mothe Le Vayer's '*Legatus seu de legatione legatorumque privilegiis officio ac munere libellus'* and latterly the famed poet Torquato Tasso's *'Il Messagiero'* and Alberico Gentili *'De Legationibus Libri Tres'*.[19] Between 1589 and 1620 there were twenty new volumes produced. Mattingly has argued that, of those twenty, four should be considered important. These are the works of Don Juan Antonia De Vera, the French Huguenot Jean Hotman de Villers, the German scholar and jurist Herman Kirchner, and the Belgian Frederick van Marsellaer.[20]

[17] E. Dolet, *De officio legati… [etc]* (Lyon, 1541); C. Bruni, *De legationibus libri quinque* (Mainz, 1548).
[18] O. Maggi, *De legato libri duo*, (Venice, 1556).
[19] P. Ayrault, *De origine et auctoritate rerum judicatarum* (Paris, 1573). F. de La Mothe Le Vayer, L*egatus seu de legatione legatourmque privilegiis officio ac munere libellus* (Paris, 1579); Torquato Tasso, *Il Messagiero* (Venice, 1582); Alberico Gentili, *De Legationibus Libri Tres* (London, 1585).
[20] J. Hotman, *L'ambassadeur* (London, 1603), *De la charge et dignité de l'ambassadeur* (Paris, 1604), *The ambassador* (London 1603); H. Kirchneri, *Legatus* (Marburg, 1610). F. van Marsellaer, *Legatus libri duo* (Antwerp, 1618).

In the view of Mattingly, the most important of the works produced during the period was *'El Embajador'* written by Don Juan Antonia De Vera.[21] This work was later reproduced and translated into a number of languages, notably French.[22] Mattingly argues that the French edition of *'Le parfait ambassadeur'* became ubiquitous.[23] Mattingly believes that 'in one edition or another .... , it may have travelled in the saddlebags of more ambassadors than any other treaties of its kind'.[24] If this was the most widely circulated treatise on the subject, it would appear likely that a number of ambassadors in Stuart England would have acquired a copy while overseas, although an edition has never been published in English. The text was superseded around the end of the Stuart period by Abraham de Wicquefort's *The rights, privileges, and office of ambassadors and public ministers*, which received its first English edition in 1713.[25]

There were only two printed manuals in English for an aspiring ambassador at the beginning of the period.[26] The first to be published in English was *'Ambassadeur'*, which was a translation of the work of the French Huguenot Jean Hotman. While not an 'English' perspective on the functions and workings of an ambassador, it was the first text to appear in English on the subject. This was followed in 1651 by *'The Perfect Ambassadovr Treating Of The Antiquitie, Priveledges, And Behaviour Of Men Belonging To That Function'* written by Francis Thynne. Thynne was noted for his

[21] J. A. de Vera, *El Embajador* (Seville, 1620); G. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (London, 1955), p. 211.
[22] J. A. de Vera, *Le Parfait Ambassadeur* (Paris 1635); J. A. de Vera, *Le Parfait Ambassadeur* (Paris, 1642).
[23] Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 211.
[24] *Ibid.*
[25] A. Wicquefort, *The Rights, Privileges, and Office of Embassadors and Publick Ministers*, trans. J. Digby (London, 1713).
[26] V. E. Grabar, *De Legatis et Legationibus Tractatus Varii* (Dorpat, 1905).

interest in alchemy, antiquity and the study of heraldry and history.[27] His work was presented to William Brooke, Lord Cobham, and was dated 8 January 1579, although it appears not to have been printed and circulated until much later.[28] Thynne's work can be said to demonstrate the only particularly English view of diplomacy. However, Thynne's examples are almost entirely derived from antiquity, showing his lack of diplomatic experience compared with Hotman. Francis Bacon did publish, in his *The Essays or Counsels Civil and Moral*, a section on negotiating; however, from the context and the content of this work, this has been said to be on private business dealings rather than public diplomacy.[29]

There have been numerous suggestions that the language skills of English diplomats were very limited.[30] This would indicate that their ability to read foreign works on diplomacy would also be limited. Yet after considering the education possessed by a number of Stuart agents, this claim appears open to question. The evidence from the educational background of these diplomats suggests they would be acquainted with Latin, to varying degrees, and that a large number of agents employed by the crown would have had sufficient proficiency in foreign languages to access non-English texts. [31]

This introduction has by no means provided an exhaustive list of the texts produced during the period, and 48 texts have been noted by Russian scholar V. E. Grabar.[32] While there may well have been copies of various texts in Britain during the period

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[27] L. A. Knafla, 'Thynne, Francis (1545?–1608)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed 3 January 2010, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/27420.

[28] F. Thynne, *The perfect ambassadour treating of the antiquitie, priveledges, and behaviour of men belonging to that function* (London, 1652), p. 1.

[29] B. Vickers, *Francis Bacon* (Oxford, 1996), p. 771.

[30] Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 237.

[31] While all these men may not have been able to converse in Latin, the reading of a text in private would be a far more used skill, especially for the men who served as fellows of college and would have been expected to read in Latin.

[32] Grabar, *De Legatis*.

under consideration, possibly bought by an ambassador when abroad, this study will consider only those which are known to have been held in British libraries at the time. On compiling this list, special consideration will be given to those texts which are, either like Thynne, produced in English, or like Hotman, found in translation, and also those like Alberico Gentili's *De Legationibus Libri Tres*, which were reprinted in Britain.[33]

An Ambassador or a Renaissance Courtier abroad?

The personal characteristics required for an ambassador, by the literature of the period, included a plethora of capabilities. Not just intellectual and practical abilities were prescribed. Appearance, social rank and even material wealth were defined and discussed in detail by theorists. All of these requirements find almost direct parallels with the literature on the Renaissance courtier, which suggests that, rather than constructing a diplomat, the authors proposed to transpose a courtier to a foreign court. Yet even in these settings, it is possible to see the role that an agent might need to fulfil, to aid this paragon of ambassadorial qualities.

Hotman urges that those who select an ambassador for foreign service should ensure their candidate 'may be fitting to the place and prince'.[34] This is not for the obvious reason that there are 'diuersitet of Estate and negotiations' but that there are great 'diffrence of humours, conditions and religions of Princes' which it is important to match the prospective candidate against.[35] The skills possessed by such a man also had to be of the highest level as, according to De Vera, he 'goes alone ... to a foreign and distant country, to treat with the most skilful in the country, against whose ability

[33] A. Gentili, *De Legationibus Libri Tres* (London, 1585).
[34] Hotman, *The ambassador,* p. 7.
[35] Hotman, *The ambassador,* p. 7-8.

he must at all hours measure his own'.[36] None of this is surprising, nor does it point to any necessary role for an agent, other than they also may be called upon to treat in the country they are sent to and that they should likewise be chosen to be fitting for the nation, and highly skilled politically.

There was a general view that it was best for an ambassador to be honest, indeed Thynne believes that it was not possible for someone to serve as an ambassador unless they were in 'good credit in respect of his honesty'.[37] Yet those, such as Hotman, who had actually served as ambassadors, recognised that there was not 'any publike charge wherein there is more lying and fometimes by the masters commandment and for the good of his servuice'.[38] The method of reconciling these problems, the need to sometimes deceive and lie, and the need to appear to be of good faith, was not always easy. De Vera posed the question of whether 'the ambassador should support the unjust passions of his master against the reasonableness of the other prince': in the circumstances a most surprising question, as it would naturally be assumed that the ambassador owed fidelity to his master.[39] However, De Vera believed that honesty was more important as 'the ambassador a good man as we suppose he is must not deviate from the path of justice for the sake of anyone'.[40] One of the more interesting suggestions is to adopt the practice, which is said to be widespread, of using 'ambigious termes couched so artifcially that the subilest heads know not where to find an yea or a Nay'.[41]

As a general rule, however, the preference remains that, except when necessary for some reason of state, in his conduct abroad it is far better for the ambassador to be

[36] J. A. de Vera, *Le Parfait Ambassadeur* (Paris 1635), p. 21.
[37] Thynne, *The perfect ambassadour,* p. 13.
[38] Hotman, *The ambassador,* p. 33.
[39] Vera, *Le Parfait Ambassadeur*, p. 201.
[40] Vera, *Le Parfait Ambassadeur*, p. 198.
[41] Hotman, *The ambassador*, p. 33.

'true in his words' rather than dishonest.[42] It would follow that this would apply equally to the rank of agents.

The ability to keep faith was also of great importance, as any blemish on their ambassador's reputation for keeping faith would hinder them in performing their duties. One ancient maxim, repeated by later authors, is that an ambassador should remember to think 'an houre before you Speake and a day before you promise'.[43] However, even if the ambassador has the right to make a promise of his master to another, he must always remember that he ought to be careful before he 'oblige his Master : and although he haue ful authoritie to doe it neurerthelesse he shall doe well, if the seruice of his Maister permit it to give him aduice thereof before the conclusion and contract be passed'.[44] This rule is to prevent the ambassador needing to renege on a promise, as the 'will of princes are subiect to change' and reneging on promises would of bring an element of dishonour on both him and his master.[45]

Evidence in Chapter IV suggests that an agent's word was taken more lightly than that of an ambassador and they often went much further with promises than an ambassador would. Charles I allowed Francis Cottington to propose and prepare an alliance with the Spanish for a joint conquest of the United Netherlands and John Taylor to negotiate long and hard with the Emperor. Nothing ever came of these propositions, while John Harrison, negotiating with the rulers of New Salé, went so far as to sign a treaty, before returning it to London for agreement. The ability to make hasty proposals was one of the key benefits of utilising the diplomatic agent.

One of the few clear deviations from the books on the perfect courtier and the books on the perfect ambassador was the nationality of the ambassador. It was plainly stated

[42] Hotman, *The ambassador*, p. 34.
[43] Hotman, *The ambassador*, p. 32.
[44] Hotman, *The ambassador*, p. 33.
[45] *Ibid.*

that the ambassador sent by a sovereign could not be the subject of another monarch. Those selecting an ambassador must ensure that he is not a subject of the prince with which they are sent to treat with, as such an act is 'a thing odious and unsauory to send unto a neighbor Prince a subiect of his for Ambassador to whome he will ever do honor discontentedly'.[46] This prohibition was ignored regularly in practice when it came to selecting diplomatic agents. One of the longest serving Stuart/Protectorate diplomats was Réné Augier who was a French Huguenot.[47] This did not hinder him in serving first as agent and later, under the Protectorate, as ambassador in France.[48] However, at the level of the courtly ambassador, this prohibition seems to have been adhered to. Additional to ensuring that a Prince does not send a foreigner to serve as his ambassador, Thynne reminds the Prince that he should not send traitors to serve as ambassadors and we must assume that it was equally unwise to send traitors as agents![49]

An area where the authors of the period agree is that anyone who was selected to carry out the office and duties of an ambassador would need to be independently wealthy.

> 'So also I would have him rich, in goods of fortune, at least, in some indifferent sort … it is very hard for him to hold that dignity which he ought to represent; their Masters being not always very careful to make them due provision'.[50]

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[46] Hotman, *The ambassador*, p. 20.
[47] G. Bell, *A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives 1509-1688* (London, 1990), p. 109.
[48] Though the Venetian ambassador raised concerns that Augier was thought to be one of the Queen Mother's creatures and would not be an acceptable choice to Cardinal Richelieu, there appears to be no great disharmony presented in the correspondence. The action of the Commonwealth and the French reaction to the execution of Charles I seemed to have hindered him far more than his birth. A. Hinds (ed.), "Venice: March 1635, 1-15." *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, Vol. 23: 1632-1636 (1921), pp. 336-345, accessed 7 February 2011, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=89356. [British History Online].
[49] Thynne, *The perfect ambassadour,* p. 13.
[50] Hotman, *The ambassador*, p. 11.

This view was echoed by Gentili, who believed that it 'concerns the dignity of both sovereigns that ambassadors should come with all the pomp of a large retinue and elaborate equipments' and thus an ambassador must have the means to pay for this.[51] Independent wealth to support his establishment when overseas was essential. Payments in the early modern diplomatic services of all nations were sporadic and a large number of men died still awaiting sums owed for their services to their masters.[52] The court culture of majesty, and the need to highlight the prestige of one's sovereign by grand displays, only worsened the financial situation for the ambassador. Further to formal entries and displays of pomp, with a large train of liveried followers, was the requirement to provide dinners for important persons. Hotman states clearly that the principal councillors of a foreign monarch could be expected to be entertained 'with magnificence and affability' by an ambassador at his own cost.[53] This was again the idea of the perfect courtier and his wealth and spending habits transposed to the international stage, perhaps with even higher expectations of display and consumption, as the ambassadors' actions reflected directly on the monarch.

Agents sent out by the Stuart government would have no need for the great entries, or the entertainments required of an ambassador, and no great minister of state was likely to join them for dinner. Their salaries would have been no more promptly paid, which suggests that it would have been useful for an agent to have a source of private income.[54] However, their lesser costs would have been easier to bear, making it

[51] A. Gentili, *De Legationibus Libri Tres*, trans. G. J. Laing (New York 1924), p.139.
[52] Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy,* p. 231.
[53] Hotman, *The ambassador*, p. 44.
[54] Stuart agent Sir Henry De Vic regularly complained of the non-payment of his salary and the hindrance this was to him performing his duties, SPFF, SP 78/88 213, De Vic & Aguier to Dorchester, 13 March 1631. SPFF, SP 78/89 66, De Vic to Dorchester, 6 May 1631.

possible to find staffing for foreign postings, especially those which were not as glamorous or sought after as Paris, Brussels, The Hague and some Italian states.

While there is no debate about the level of wealth required by a diplomat, there is disagreement about whether he should be a great noble. Hotman believes that 'In some Esstates they consider much the qualitie of the Ambassador, and make the lesse account of him if he be not gentleman or nobilitie', but there are others who do not worry about this issue, including the Swiss.[55] Thynne believed it was important that an ambassador be 'well born, free, no bonds-man'.[56] Consequently, a large number of professions rule out serving as a diplomat, including 'Crafts-man, a Serving-man, a common Citizen, a mean Priest, an Advocate'.[57] As with the wealth requirements, using an agent provides a way of selecting a diplomat without the need to live up to the expectations of the perfect ambassador.

The physical appearance of the perfect ambassador is discussed by a large number of authors. Jean Hotman believed that 'if he be bleare-eyed, crookebackt, lame or otherwise mishaped, it is certaine that he will not be so acceptable'.[58] Other authors had even more exacting standards, for example Thynne requires that any ambassador sent out be 'comly of person, tall of stature'.[59] Gentilis agreed with Thynne that an ambassador should be a 'tall and distinguished figure' and that he should also be 'of comely appearance, especially one who goes on an embassy among barbarians'.[60] This again is more concerned with the perfect courtier than a diplomat, a person who is able to mingle with the great courtiers and not appear out of place in that world.

[55] Hotman, *The ambassador*, p. 8.
[56] Thynne, *The perfect ambassadour,* p. 143.
[57] Thynne, *The perfect ambassadour,* p. 191.
[58] Hotman, *The ambassador*, p. 73.
[59] Thynne, *The perfect ambassadour,* p. 14.
[60] Gentili, *De Legationibus Libri Tres*, p. 141.

While agents did attend court and mingle with the great in the land, their appearance seems unimportant to their less courtly and more functional role.

Chapter I will consider in detail the educational background of diplomatic agents. At this stage, it is useful to point out that the level of education of the agents selected by the Stuart government was far higher than might have been expected. This suggests formal education was an important requirement for those who became diplomatic agents. This contrasts with the knowledge and education needed for the perfect ambassador, which again mirrors far more closely that of the perfect courtier.

The first area of knowledge that was important for an ambassador is 'lawes, cuftoms & maners of his owne country, specially in things concerning the Estate, the rights, titles and pretences of his Masisters Crowne'.[61] This is emphasised in a number of texts, including Hotman. Yet ambassadors were not experts and could have very short commissions. It would of course be inappropriate to send an ambassador without such knowledge. Here a role for the agents and filling in the gaps in their knowledge can be seen. The account of the embassy of Sir John Chaworth, to the Spanish Netherlands, provides a clear example of where advice, about travel and the political situation, was provided by William Trumbull throughout the embassy, though much of the advice seems to have been ignored![62]

Knowledge of languages is a somewhat more complex area. Hotman's suggestion is that the ambassador should 'know the language of the Countrie where he is, it will be a great furtherance vnto him to the more perfect vnderftanding of the hiftories and affaires of that eftate'.[63] Gentili also believes that this is a requirement.[64] Thynne

[61] Hotman, *The ambassador,* p. 12.
[62] A. J. Kempe (ed.), *The Loseley Manuscripts. Manuscripts, and Other Rare Documents* (London, 1835), pp. 437-456.
[63] Hotman, *The ambassador,* p. 13.
[64] Gentili, *De Legationibus Libri Tres*, p. 150.

merely hopes that any ambassador would be 'furnished with divers Languages'.[65] Yet, as Thynne makes clear, 'many without this qualitie haue not failed to performe their charge well and worthily'.[66] Hotman and all his contemporaries agree that an ambassador should at 'least [have a knowledge of] Latine which is common vnto all'.[67] Maggi would have included as well Latin, Greek, Spanish, German, French and even Turkish.[68] Gentili was somewhat less demanding, believing that 'if the ambassador has learned the Latin language he has in my opinion taken a wise step' but, from that base, he should 'should learn some living languages, either the better known ones or those which by reason of international trade relations, opportunities occasioned by propinquity or some other cause may be useful'.[69] The ideal, in the view of Gentili, was that an 'ambassador ought to understand three languages ... and if he can one or two more'.[70] Thynne believed that, if there was no common language between the two parties negotiating, it would best for the party making a request 'to use their language, because the truth of the matter should better be understood thereby than otherwise'.[71] This method was also likely to avoid the possibility of ambiguities in translation. Hotman did have a suggestion for those ambassadors who were not greatly endowed with linguistic skill, that they 'should faine, not to understand it for so hath he the more aduantage to speake and negotiate in his owne language'.[72] Hotman hardly advances the most ethical position, or practical for Stuart diplomats, as no theorist requires English from even the most perfect ambassador. In contrast, and as will be seen throughout the study, agents had a high degree of language skills,

[65] Thynne, *The perfect ambassadour,* p. 13.
[66] Hotman, *The ambassador,* p. 13.
[67] *Ibid.*
[68] Maggi, *De legato libri duo*, p. 127.
[69] Gentili, *De Legationibus Libri Tres*, pp. 150-151.
[70] Gentili, *De Legationibus Libri Tres*, p. 152.
[71] Thynne, *The perfect ambassadour,* p. 42.
[72] Hotman, *The ambassador*, p. 13.

normally above that of the ambassador they served with. Here it seems that the agent filled the gap between the theoretical perfect ambassador and the reality. An ambassador could take time to compose his formal orations and deliver them in Latin, rather than the native language of the court. The agent had no such functions and was expected to hold more spontaneous discussions, without ceremony and long formal orations.

Apart from languages, authors agree there was a vast array of knowledge that would be useful for an ambassador. Sadly Thynne does not go into great detail, merely saying 'that he must be learned', in what areas, other than the examples of antiquity supplied by Thynne, is a matter of conjecture.[73] Hotman suggests 'he ought to haue knowledge of the Morall and Politike and if before he haue had any taste of the Roman Civill Laew, the same would giue him more insight and facilitie to the negotation of treatie and clearing many matters'.[74] Gentili believed the most important knowledge was of history, as 'he who has knowledge in history will know the past and have knowledge of the present'.[75] In the practical application of his duties 'one who has trained in history will be much more likely to become an excellent ambassador in a few hours than he would in many, many years if he were deprived of the assistance of that study'.[76] Other suggestions, offered by authors, include knowledge of mathematics, architecture, music, geometry and astronomy. Clearly this reflects the classic Renaissance courtly role, rather than a focus on the practical, sometimes more devious, sometimes more banal, process of information-gathering. Gentili would not have any man sent who had 'highly elaborate literary training', then

[73] Thynne, *The perfect ambassadour,* p. 13.
[74] Hotman, *The ambassador*, p. 12.
[75] Gentili, *De Legationibus Libri Tres*, p. 154.
[76] *Ibid.*

going further in ordering 'scholars to refrain from embassies'.[77] Hotman and others believed that, in certain circumstances, it is better to send a specialist with great knowledge if much of the business is to be about that issue, rather than a generalist, for example 'concerning warre, it is fitter to commit it to a Marshall of France, or some other Generall of the field and practized in points of armes.[78] All these areas of knowledge may have proved some use to an ambassador to perhaps engage in courtly discussion. The vast majority of such knowledge would appear to be of much less use to diplomatic agents, who would have fewer occasions to regale the *grands* with their knowledge of music or mathematics. However, knowledge of Roman Law could easily be an asset during negotiations.

Travel was also recommended as an important part of the education of a diplomat, to gain knowledge and experience of the court to which he would be sent. To this 'experience of foreign travel', Gentili believed that he must also be of mature years to have learned from the experience.[79] It was suggested, by a number of authors, that it would be wise for the ambassador to be sent on embassies in a minor role, to learn about the nation and how to conduct the business of diplomacy. Agents had often previously been abroad in a number of capacities, both diplomatic and private. Dudley Carleton began as Secretary to his uncle's Embassy before remaining as agent in the Low Countries.[80] Joseph Avery's connections with the Merchant Adventurers suggest that he would have travelled before he began his post as agent in Hamburg. Experience of travel, however, does not appear to have been essential for posts of agent rank. Anthony Ascham, for example, had served only as a Cambridge Fellow,

[77] Gentili, *De Legationibus Libri Tres*, p. 159.
[78] Hotman, *The ambassador*, p. 10.
[79] Gentili, *De Legationibus Libri Tres*, p. 170.
[80] Also called Dudley Carleton, later Viscount Dorchester.

pamphleteer in the cause of the Commonwealth, and tutor to the Duke of York before he became agent to Spain.[81]

Other areas of education, exhorted as necessary for an ambassador, are those which can be regarded as courtly skills and bearing. These skills, such as hunting and hawking, seem more questionable in their value and inclusion, deriving, as many of them do, from the traditional literature on how to be the perfect courtier. They appear to have been lifted almost directly from that text and placed within the international context. While accepting that these skills may have had some use in helping to form a personal relationship with a monarch, they are of less use for an ambassador, who would not expect as much private time with a monarch as a member of their own court. Hunting and hawking may have been useful in forming better relationships with other members of the court. These particular courtly skills would not be necessary for an agent, as it is doubtful any monarch, or even member of the court in the period, ever hunted or hawked with an English agent.

Some courtly skills would have been of use to both ambassador and agents. These are skills primarily dealing with preventing embarrassment to themselves and thus their master, such as moderation in personal vices, as an ambassador must 'moderate himselfe in his pleasures not only in respect of women but also of his mouth and for play'.[82] There was a huge array of ways to cause disgrace, to either yourself or your master, listed by theorists. While not as extreme as the lists from books of courtesy, there was still a wide range of behaviours to be avoided.[83] As the agent is never seen as a courtly figure, he has the option of engaging in behaviour that would be

[81] G. Baldwin, 'Ascham, Anthony (*bap.* 1614, *d.* 1650)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed 18 May 2011, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/731.
[82] Hotman, *The ambassador*, p. 26.
[83] B. Castiglione, *The Book of the Courtier*, trans. Sir T. Hoby (London, 1959), pp. 31, 37, 39, 41, 48; G. Della Casa, *Galateo of Manners and Behaviours*, trans. R. Preston, ed. L. Einstein (Boston, 1914), pp. 16-17, 19, 25.

unacceptable to his superior. Even simple things like waiting for an audience would be unacceptable to an ambassador, but was common for an agent, thus providing the agent with greater flexibility in his work.

The Darker side of the Ambassador's Duties

While it is unlikely that an ambassador would go about in public with women of questionable virtue, or that using the wrong napkin could cause the scandal that books on the ideal courtier suggest, there were duties which diplomats might undertake which could cause embarrassment to their master.[84]

Spying, as an activity for diplomats, was often considered a dark art and one that should be avoided. Hotman says that this should not be the primary purpose of an ambassador's mission, for that would bring dishonour on the individual. Care should therefore be taken when information gathering.

An ambassador 'ought not to spare two or three hundred crownes a yeere this way if require'.[85] This is a large sum for which there is no indication whether the diplomat could expect any reimbursement. It again reinforces the importance of wealth to the prospective ambassador. This expenditure is expected to be effective: the payment of bribes for information 'maketh the closest Cabinet of princes to flie open', at least according to the diplomatic theories presented at the time.[86] Here the role of the agent in such spending is not addressed, though conclusions can easily be reached. As agents tended to spend a longer time at their post than the ambassadors, they would possess better knowledge of those who could cause the 'Cabinet of princes to flie

[84] Hotman, *L'ambassadeur*, p. 36; G. Della Casa, *Galateo of Manners and Behaviours*, p. 24.
[85] Hotman, *L'ambassadeur,* p. 19.
[86] Hotman, *The ambassador,* p. 46.

open'.[87] Chapter II on agents' information networks demonstrates the numerous friends that agents relied on for their information, including functionaries in the princes' administration. It would not be appropriate for an ambassador to entertain such men. His agent would have far fewer problems in this respect.

Whereas spying is covered by a number of the texts, the other dark arts which a sovereign might ask of an ambassador are discussed only to discourage an ambassador from carrying them out. While arguing in the usual cause of affairs 'that it is not lawful for him to refuse his [the sovereign's] commandment' Hotman does make exceptions to this rule.[88] Under no circumstances should an ambassador 'deceive, betray, to attempt the life of a Soverign prince, to make his subiects to reuolt from him to weaken and trouble his Estate especially in time of peace and under colour of amitie & alliance'.[89] This is not just bad politics, it is 'directly against the Commandment of God against the lawes of nature and of nations'.[90]

The perfect ambassador should not be caught in this situation in the first place, as only those that 'dooth not give better counsell [to their master] which is bound to doe by the dutie of his charge' face the choice between their sovereign's command and the law of God.[91] De Vera acknowledges that a pince may wish an ambassador to continue with such action but that the perfect ambassador 'must bring the affair to a halt even though he recognises without doubt that he is risking his job' and possibly his head depending on the prince involved.[92] There are a number of examples of ambassadors being deeply involved in plots in the nation to which they were

[87] *Ibid.*
[88] Hotman, *The ambassador,* p. 59.
[89] *ibid.*
[90] *Ibid.*
[91] *Ibid.*
[92] Vera, *Le Parfait Ambassadeur*, p. 204.

assigned.[93] Yet with his exemplary character and the advice not to dishonour himself the possibility exists that the perfect ambassador would never carry out the darker commands of the government. A diplomatic agent could therefore fill this role and carry out the more dubious policies. There is no direct evidence of an ambassador refusing the darker duties of diplomacy. The career of agent Ignatius White suggests that agents were more than willing to bridge the gap between diplomat, spy and hired sword when needed. White spied in turn for the Prince of Condé and Secretary Thurloe.[94] He went on to capture the regicide Thomas Scott and deliver him to Sir Henry De Vic, between other activities.[95] It is clear there was very little that White, who was described as being 'dishonest, self-serving and untrustworthy' was unwilling to do for pay.[96] He was perhaps not the best diplomat to send to the United Provinces.[97] The courtly rank of ambassador offers no one with so few scruples. It is clear that any task, provided it was paid for, would have been performed by such agents.[98]

## Agent and Ambassador: two roles?

The literature of the period on ambassadors does not present a defined and specialised government functionary, tasked with negotiations and other specific foreign policy objectives. Rather, it presents a Renaissance courtly figure, a perfect courtier,

[93] An interesting English example comes from the plot by Sir Francis Bryan to assassinate Cardinal Pole during the reign of Henry VIII. For further details, see S. Brigden, '"The shadow that you know": Sir Thomas Wyatt and Sir Francis Bryan at Court and in embassy' *The Historical Journal* Vol. 39 (1996), pp. 1-31.
[94] E.S. de Beer, 'The Marquis of Albeville and His Brothers', *The English Historical Review* Vol. 45, No. 179 (1930), p. 398.
[95] de Beer, 'The Marquis of Albeville and His Brothers', p. 401.
[96] A. Marshall, *Intelligence and Espionage in the Reign of Charles II, 1660-1685* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 277.
[97] Marshall, *Intelligence and Espionage in the Reign of Charles II*, p. 278.
[98] Though it seems White was willing to accept titles in lieu of wages, and amassed a number of them; de Beer, 'The Marquis of Albeville and His Brothers', p. 401.

someone who could integrate and ingratiate themselves with the top ranks of the society they were attached to, and then conduct matters relating to foreign policy. Crucially, as they were to share the mould of perfect courtier, they would not embarrass their masters, either by their personal conduct or their political actions, while they were posted to a foreign court.

Was there a role left for a lower ranking diplomat, the agent, in this world? Through the evident gaps left in the role described for the perfect ambassador, one can be seen to emerge. A clear use of this lesser diplomatic rank was in supplementing the limited number of individuals who came close to approaching the description of the perfect ambassador. They formed a level of imperfect ambassadors. Further, they provided diplomats to places where high-ranking courtly individuals would not wish to travel for prolonged periods, such as Sweden or Poland. Due to their long experience in their posting, they appear to be the most readily available source of knowledge the ambassador needed about the nation to which he was attached. The most important gaps in the literature were the roles they could fulfil in diplomacy. Unlike the perfect ambassador, they could makes promises that they did not need, or even intend, to keep, as their government could repudiate these promises much more easily than those of a full ambassador. Finally, they could carry out duties which might cause embarrassment, or be offensive and insulting, to an ambassador. Unlike the perfect ambassador, there was not a requirement that they need 'be iealous of the degree and place which is due vnto his maister'.[99] This, as will be seen in later chapters, gave a greater degree of access and enabled them to sidestep any arguments about precedence and ceremony.

[99] Hotman, *The ambassador*, p. 50.

Within the complex work of diplomatic and personal ceremony of the seventeenth century, the agents had a role which enabled them to be representatives, while not fearing for their master's dignity in ceremonies, to aid the Renaissance courtier within the foreign court, but not to have to conform to the exaggerated rules and expectations of the perfect courtier. It is this role, as a cheaper and more flexible diplomat, which is the most important feature of the diplomatic agent. It is also this role which explains the government's regular use of such agents and how they went about conducting the government's foreign policy abroad.

# Chapter I Background of Diplomatic Agents

The literature of the period, as was seen in the Introduction, presents an ambassador as a courtly Renaissance figure; thus he should be well-born, learned in multiple disciplines, experienced in government and an adept courtier. When considering agents much can be discerned about their place in this world from their background, social standing and education. If the government saw an agent as a junior or trainee ambassador then, to a degree, the same qualities of the cultivated courtly figure should be discernible in both their background and education. However if, as proposed, agents occupied a different grade, and functioned somewhere between a courtly ambassador and an ad hoc spy, a different education and background may be expected of them.[1] The Earl of Clarendon, when describing career progression, wrote 'As for Example in Queen Elizabeth's days a gentleman would put his younger son to the university, then to the Inns of Courts, to have a smakering in the Lawe, afterward to wayte of an Embassador, afterwars, to bee his secretary, Then to bee lefte as Agente or resident'. How far was this pattern followed during the period or was this an idealised view of the Civil Service from England's 'Golden Age'?[2] The background and education of agents is the area that this chapter will address. Any previous experience and employment abroad that agents gained before taking up their posts will also be considered. Finally, the conditions they served under will be examined. A comparison with the income that certain other groups in society could expect to earn at the time will be indicative of agents' social standing.

## Social Origin of the Agent Corps

[1] Though that did not rule out employment as both at different times as the case of Ignatius White shows. See A. Marshall, *Intelligence and Espionage in the Reign of Charles II 1660-1685* (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 276-278.
[2] Clarendon MSS 109 f. 67, quoted in E. Turner, *The Privy Council of England in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 1603-1784* (2 vols. Baltimore, 1927-1928) ii, 445-446.

Previous attempts to look at groups of early modern diplomats have concentrated not on the lower ranking agents but on the courtly and more historically prominent ambassadors.[3] So far only one academic study of the origin and work of a diplomatic agent during the period has been made.[4] In order to produce a study of agents as a distinct group, it is necessary to create a generalised picture of the type of men employed by the government and their social origins. When attempting to unravel the backgrounds of the men who served the government as agents a number of problems are encountered. Out of the total number of 105 agent posts filled by the various governments of the period, there is a limited amount of biographical information available which relates to 67 of the post holders. Further to this, of those whose biographical information might be expected to be easily accessible, there is often scant information. Even works from the period such as David Lloyd's 1670 guide '*State Worthies. Or, The Statesmen and Favourites of England since the Reformation'* contains only five of the individuals who served as agents. One striking omission is Sir Henry De Vic, who has no reference in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography despite serving in France, Denmark, and Brussels and as a Clerk of the Privy Council in Extraordinary, later being made a Baronet and Chancellor of the Order of the Garter and secretary of the French Tongue.[5] If such an eminent man is excluded, it is not surprising that many agents, who went on to have far less distinguished careers, are also elusive. However, from the information that is available, a number of common themes appear to run through the corps of agents and can be analysed to establish a picture of the men the State sent out as representatives.

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[3] P. Lachs, *The Diplomatic Corps under Charles II & James II* (New Brunswick, 1965); J. D. Schneider, 'The English Diplomatic Corps, 1649-1660: A Comparison of the Diplomats of the Commonwealth and Protectorate and of Charles II' (Kansas State Univ. M.A. thesis, 1996); W. James, *The age of Louis XIV: the rise of modern diplomacy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1976); J. Black, *British diplomats and diplomacy 1688-1800* (Exeter, 2001).

[4] I. Uddin, 'William Trumbull: A Jacobean diplomat at the court of the Archdukes in Brussels,1605/9-1625' (Univ. of Leuven Ph.D. thesis, 2006).

[5] J.C. Sainty, 'Lists of appointments', *Office-Holders in Modern Britain: Volume 2: Officials of the Secretaries of State 1660-1782* (1973), pp. 22-58, accessed 20 September 2011. http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=16620. [British History Online].

Imran Uddin states that the diplomatic corps of the Stuarts was one where 'unlike most of their European counterparts most English residents came from undistinguished families'.[6] Maurice Lee contended that it was the 'landed families of no great importance' with a few 'official' families and merchants who made up the balance, who formed the backbone of the English diplomatic service.[7] Lachs further suggests that, in general, important peers were needed for ceremonial missions, but men of the second order of diplomats needed to be no more than knights.[8] Lachs' study, however, covers only Post-Restoration diplomacy, though examining the handlist of diplomats for the period there appears to be no overall change in the regular use of peers, knights and commoners.

Each of these authors was considering the social origins of the entirety of the diplomatic corps, including the much more exalted ranks of Ambassador and Envoy Extraordinary, and one would not expect to find members of the nobility acting in the socially inferior capacity of agent. It has further been proposed that, for the post of agent, it did not matter if one held a title or not.[9] There are, nevertheless, examples of agents who were from noble families. George Goring, later earl of Norwich, Ralph Montagu, later duke of Montagu and William Kerr, third earl of Lothian, all served in France.[10] All of these aristocrats, however, served for shorter periods than their colleagues. Goring served for only one month, Ralph Montagu and William Kerr both for only four months. This is a substantially shorter term than that of most of the agents under consideration, who served for prolonged periods, often many years. These aristocratic men's backgrounds and their experience of serving as agents were not normal. It

[6] Uddin, 'William Trumbull: A Jacobean Diplomat', p. 16.
[7] M. Lee, Jr. 'The Jacobean Diplomatic Service' *The American Historical Review* Vol. 72, No. 4 (Jul., 1967), p. 1264. Referring to men whom Lee characterised as 'virtually hereditary government servants'. See Lee, 'The Jacobean Diplomatic Service', pp. 1264-1265.
[8] Lachs, *The Diplomatic Corps*, p.54.
[9] *Ibid.*
[10] D. Lloyd, *Memoirs of Excellent Personages* (London, 1666), p. 560; L. Stone, *The Crisis of the Aristocracy 1558-1641* (Oxford, 1958), p. 22; E. Metzger, *Ralph First Duke of Montagu 1638-1707* (New York, 1987), p.5; D. Thomson, *A Virtuous & Noble Education* (Edinburgh, 1971), p. 8.

appears closer to the advice of those books on ambassadors that young noble men should accompany embassies to learn their craft.

Turning to the majority of the diplomatic corps, who did not hail from a noble background, what social origin did these men have? Unsurprisingly the agent was a member of the gentry, an imprecise term, perhaps best viewed as a rank which was attained when it was recognised by others who were already recognised as members of the gentry.[11] The matriculation records for Oxford and Cambridge for the 36 diplomatic agents who attended English universities can be considered here. It was common practice to matriculate at the highest rank that an individual could sustain.[12] Of those who would later serve as agents, only seven matriculated at the lower ranks and, of these, only three at the lowest.[13] Matriculation data, therefore, suggest that the majority of agents were recognised as, and also able to maintain, gentry status. A number came from merchant families and legal families (legal training was suggested for diplomats though this was normally Roman Civil Law) such as Richard Bulstrode, whose father Edward Bulstrode was a member of Inner Temple.[14] Only Sir Isaac Wake was descended from a member of the clergy, though one who had at one stage been removed from his living for puritan non-conformity.[15] Richard Fanshawe was a direct descendant of an important government servant, Sir Henry Fanshawe, who held a senior

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[11] An imprecise term. See R. Asch, *Nobilities in Transition 1550-1700 Courtiers and Rebels in Britain and Europe* (London, 2003), pp. 49-53; G. E. Mingay, *The Gentry: The Rise and Fall of a Ruling Class* (London, 1976), p. 1; P. Coss, *The Origins of the English Gentry* (Cambridge, 2003).

[12] S. Porter, 'University and Society', in N. Tyacke (ed.), *The History of the University of Oxford: Volume IV: Seventeenth-Century Oxford* (Oxford, 1997), pp. 51-54.

[13] Thomas Glover (plebeian), John Harrison (plebeian), Thomas Lorkin (sizar), John Pell (sizar), John Robinson (pauper), Ralph Winwood (plebeian) and Richard Bradshaw (plebeian).

[14] This was an acceptable type of employment for the gentry, as well as a way of becoming a member of the gentry. See Sir T. Smith, *De Republica Anglorum: A Discourse on the Commonwealth of England*, ed. L. Alston (Cambridge, 1906), pp. 39-40. Though at least one authority of the period believed that lawyers were ill suited to be ambassadors. See F. Thynne, *The perfect ambassadour treating of the antiquitie, priveledges, and behaviour of men belonging to that function* (London 1652), p. 191; *Le Neve's Pedigrees of the Kings Made by King Charles II., King James II., King William III. and Queen Mary, King William alone, and Queen Anne,* ed. G. W. Marshall (London, 1873), p. 373.

[15] V. Larminie, 'The Jacobean Diplomatic Fraternity and the Protestant Cause: Sir Isaac Wake and the View from Savoy' *English Historical Review* Vol. 121, No. 494 (2006), p. 1302; W. Wake, A *Brief Enquiry into the Antiquity, Honour and Estate of the Name and Family of Wake* (Warminster, 1833), p. 60.

exchequer post.[16] A number of agents have relatives (most commonly uncles) who held important posts and aided their appointment.[17] An example is the selection of Sir Albertus Morton, whose half-uncle was the renowned Stuart diplomat Sir Henry Wotton, who sponsored the education and early career of Morton.[18]

Does the generalisation of Uddin hold true, that these were men from 'undistinguished families', though nearly always gentry families? The immediate problem is how to define 'undistinguished'. It is, however, easier to offer a definition of a leading gentry family. Those in the first rank of the gentry would be those families elected to parliament, or who sought election in the contested boroughs.[19] Though there were only 35 contested boroughs in 1628.[20] Membership was open only to those who were clients of the very powerful and the Crown, or those who were respected in their community. In county politics, it was the highest prize available outside promotion to the nobility.[21] It should, therefore, follow that if there were large numbers of agents serving in parliament before they became servants of the Crown, then they were more likely to be in the first rank of the gentry.

Of those agents who served in Parliament, and few did so, even fewer did so before they had served the Crown abroad. George Goring's father served as MP for Lewes in 1592-3 and 1601.[22] Goring served himself in November 1621 as MP for Lewes in Sussex, before

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[16] A. Fanshawe, *Memoirs of lady Fanshawe, written by herself, containing extracts from the correspondence of sir Richard Fanshawe*, ed. B. Marshall (London, 1905), p. 2; S. M. Jack, 'Fanshawe, Sir Henry (1569–1616)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed 15 July 2011. http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/9148.

[17] Dudley Carleton was the nephew of Dudley Carleton (later Viscount Dorchester) and served his as secretary and agent in England. See R. Hill & R. Lockyer, 'Carleton and Buckingham: The Quest for Office Revisited', *History* Vol. 88, Issue 289 (January, 2003) p. 20. Thomas Wilson was said to be the nephew of Thomas Wilson Secretary of State for Elizabeth I though this is uncertain. See A. F. Pollard, 'Wilson, Sir Thomas (*d.* 1629)', rev. Sean Kelsey, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed 11 July 2011, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/29690.

[18] L. Smith, *The Life and Letters of Sir Henry Wotton* (2 vols.; Oxford 1907), i, p. 199.

[19] D. Brunton & D. Pennington, *Members of the Long Parliament* (London, 1954), p. 3.

[20] A. Thrush, *The House of Commons 1604-1629* (6 vols.; Cambridge, 2010), i, p. 73.

[21] Thrush, *The House of Commons*, i, p. 82.

[22] Memegalos, *George Goring*, p. 6.

beginning his missions to France.[23] Goring subsequently served Lewes in 1624, 1625, 1626 and 1628 without recommendation from the court.[24] Richard Fanshawe was not a Member of Parliament until after the Restoration when he was elected for Cambridge University without his knowledge.[25] However, both his father, Sir Thomas, and his brother, also called Sir Thomas, served multiple times in Parliament.[26] The Fanshawes have been described as hereditary civil servants.[27] Sir Thomas the younger was elected without recommendation.[28] The family was able to occupy a position at the forefront of the gentry without official backing from the Crown. William Boswell, while he had acted as secretary to a number of embassies, had not served independently as an agent, was elected to represent Boston in 1624 and 1625.[29] This was apparently not on his local standing, but the recommendation of Bishop Williams, whom he served as secretary.[30] Sir Isaac Wake was elected by Oxford University in 1624 after his agency.[31] Given his failure to obtain the Wardenship of Merton in 1622, despite official support, it seems his scholarly record and education were more important than recommendation in his election. John Trevor was a recruiter member (elections held by Parliament to fill vacant seats excluding known or suspected Royalists) of Parliament for Flintshire and served in the subsequent parliaments.[32] While he was elected, as his father had been, without a recommendation, the recruiter elections were not normal elections. Nor indeed were any of the subsequent returns until the Restoration, with large numbers of exclusions. Although it seems probable he was elected, as his father had been, on the family's local prominence, it is a less certain case.

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[23] Memegalos, *George Goring,* p. 12.
[24] Thrush, *The House of Commons*, iv, p. 436.
[25] G. Cockayne, *Complete Baronetage* (6 vols.; London, 1902), iii, p. 12.
[26] Thrush, *The House of Commons*, iv, pp. 231, 237.
[27] P. Davidson, 'Fanshawe, Sir Richard, first baronet (1608–1666)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed 19 March 2012, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/9149.
[28] Thrush, *The House of Commons*, iv, p. 237.
[29] Thrush, *The House of Commons*, iii, p. 258.
[30] Thrush, *The House of Commons*, iii, p. 259.
[31] Thrush, *The House of Commons*, iv, p. 642.
[32] B. Henning, *The House of Commons 1660-1690* (3 vols.; London, 1983), iii, p. 602.

It could, therefore, be said that diplomatic agents were often on the fringes of the society which furnished a large number of ambassadors, although they occasionally had relations amongst the hereditary government servants, and possible links with the lesser nobility. But these men were not at the forefront of their counties, nor did many ever attend parliament until after they had become servants of the Crown, with only one or two attending without interest and recommendation.[33]

There are some exceptions to these backgrounds. Some men began their lives at a far lower social level than the majority of the agents. John Robinson, who was the second son of a cooper, would go on to be agent in Sweden and also serve as Bishop of London. This was, however, an exceptional case.[34] Otherwise, from those who are known, Ralph Winwood appears to be at the next level in the social hierarchy from Robinson, as his family 'lived on the fringes of gentility', working land which was probably rented from an Oxford college.[35]

More typical of the type of diplomats employed by the government are men such as William Beecher and George Gage. William Beecher, who served twice in France and once in The German States, was the grandson of an Alderman of the City of London and his father and grandfather were both merchant tailors, placing them firmly in London's urban elite.[36] This was a position which was comparable with the gentry of the period.[37] Meanwhile, George Gage served twice in the Italian States in 1621 and 1622. Gage was the son of a gentleman of Firle, Sussex, and Margaret, daughter of Sir John Shelley of Michelgrove which, while

[33] For further discussion of Agents' parliamentary careers, see Chapter VII, After an Agency.
[34] 'The Robinson Family, of Middlesex, &c (Continued)', *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Jul., 1908), pp. 104-107; J. Granger, *A Biographical History of England* (4 vols.; London, 1779), ii, p. 79.
[35] M. Greengrass, 'Winwood, Sir Ralph (1562/3–1617)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed 15 July 2011, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/29783; C. McAllister, *'The Boisterous Secretaire': The Political Career of Sir Ralph Winwood 1563?-1616* (Univ. of Virginia Ph.D. thesis, 1983), p 1.
[36] A. Hughes Clarke (ed.), *The Register of St. Lawrence Jewry* (2 vols.; London, 1940), i, p. 70.
[37] P. Laslett, 'The Gentry of Kent in 1640', *Cambridge Historical Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1948), pp. 148-164.

clearly not at the forefront of their county, based on attendance in parliament, remains a solid gentry background. [38]

The 'English' diplomatic corps, as it is often described, was not an entirely English one; unsurprisingly there were a number of Scots, such as Patrick Gordon, who served in Poland, and Sir Robert Anstruther, who served in Denmark, or Irishmen, such as Ignatius White who served in Spain.[39] More surprising are the number of foreign nationals who served the English state in a diplomatic capacity. Réné Augier, a French Huguenot, and later his nephew, Réné Petit, both served in France.[40] Despite serving the English Crown, both remained French nationals throughout their service.[41] William Curtius, more properly Wilhelm Curtius, was another example of a foreign citizen serving the English government, as was Balthazar Gerbier, another Huguenot, though he was born in the Dutch Republic to émigré parents.[42] Gregorio Monti, who served in Venice, was a Venetian.[43] There are those who doubt his nationality as such, although this seems unlikely.[44] While the authors of the period considered it 'a thing odious and vnsauory to fend vnto a neighbor Prince a subiect of his for Ambassador', there seems to have been no issue in the mind of the government about sending foreign nationals home to act as agents, as Augier did in France. Gregorio Monti did

[38] J. Gage, *The History and Antiquities of Hengraue, in Suffolk* (London, 1822), p. 234; P. Revell and F. W. Steer, 'George Gage I and George Gage II', *Historical Research*, Vol. 31, Issue 84 (1958), p. 143.
[39] S. Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart, 1603-1660* (East Linton, 2000), p. 37; J.K. Fedorowicz, *England's Baltic Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century: A Study in Anglo-Polish Commercial Diplomacy* (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 150-151.
[40] L. Bienassis, 'The Diplomatic Career of René Augier', *Proceedings of the Huguenot Society of Great Britain and Ireland* Vol. 28, No. 2 (2004), pp. 199, 206. This would have been illegal in Venice. See D. Queller 'Early Venetian Legislation Concerning Foreign Ambassadors' *Studies in the Renaissance* Vol. 12, (1965), pp. 7-17.
[41] Though Réné Augier did receive letters of denization in November 1628. See W. Shaw (ed.) 'Letters of Denization and Acts of Naturalization in England and Ireland, 1603- 1700', *Huguenot Society Quarterly Series* Vol. 8 (1893), p. 43.
[42] H. Williamson, *Four Stuart Portraits* (London, 1949), p. 26.
[43] R. Brown (ed.), 'Accredited Diplomatic Agents in Venice', *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice,* Vol. 1: 1202-1509, accessed 15 July 2011, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=94083. [British History Online]
[44] R. Ayres suggest he may have been Christopher Marlowe, but this seems highly improbable; for this theory, see R. Ayres, 'Evidence that Marlowe was Gregorio**:** summary of the historical evidence that Marlowe lived after 1593, and wrote the plays wrongly attributed to William Shakespeare', *The Marlowe Society Research Journal* Vol. 7 (2010), pp. 1-15.

not even leave Venice before taking over the post as agent.[45] The different role proposed for agents, discussed in the Introduction, compared to that of ambassador, explains the willingness to hire foreign nationals as they would have both an excellent grasp of the local language and also knowledge of the working of the state to which they were accredited.[46] These attributes, coupled with a ready-made network of friends and acquaintances, discussed in Chapter II, from which they could gather news to transmit to their paymasters, would be viewed as valuable.

## Agents' University and Legal Education

While a university education would not have been a requirement for an ambassador, texts clearly state the need for learning.[47] Though this is not necessarily formal education.[48] Universities provided the urban educated elite, who, in turn, served most of the European nations as the officials and officers; one need only consider the importance of the *noblesse de robe* in France. Did diplomatic agents in general follow the path of the educated urban elite in obtaining university educations, or was an agency, as Martin Havran alleged, a service which 'required little formal education, especially at the lower levels', alternatively, did they hold to the older, less formal education of members of the aristocracy?[49]

Thirty nine agents, out of a total of 83, who served between 1603 and 1688, have confirmed, or can reasonably be assumed to have had, a university education. This does not include William Kerr, third earl of Lothian, who entered university but did not offer himself for a

[45] Hotman, *The ambassador* (London 1609), p. 20.
[46] Réné Augier began his employment for the English Ambassador as his French Secretary.
[47] Hotman *The ambassador*, p. 12; A. Gentili, *De Legationibus Libri Tres*, trans. G. Laing (New York, 1924), p. 150; F. Thynne, *The Perfect Ambassadour Treating of the Antiquitie, Priveledges, and Behaviour of Men Belonging to That Function* (London, 1652), p. 13.
[48] None of the texts identified and studied have referenced a need for university education or a specialised academy. Considering the reaction to the establishment of one in France a 'Seminary of Petticoat Politicians', *The Spectator* (1712), it is doubtful one could have been established. See Lachs, *The Diplomatic Corps*, p. 48.
[49] M. Havran, *Caroline courtier the life of Lord Cottington* (London, 1973), p. 4.

degree during his time there.[50] This was a common practice among the aristocracy, whereas those of lower social standing needed to offer themselves for examination.[51] It was, however, less prevalent in England than in most of Europe.[52] The probability of an individual agent having taken a degree was around 47%. This is not the entire picture, however, as during the period these individuals filled a total of 105 postings. Repeat missions or promotions to another embassy also need to be considered when calculating the likelihood of a university educated agent being sent on an individual mission. Once these factors have been taken into account, on 51 occasions a university educated diplomat was dispatched, giving a probability that an appointee had a university education of almost 49%.[53]

The vast majority of university educated diplomats were educated at either Oxford or Cambridge, with Oxford providing 19 and Cambridge providing 21 agents, and it would appear that the government exercised no preference as to where the agent was educated before his service.[54] While there is evidence for a fraternity of strongly Protestant diplomats nurtured at Oxford, these men clearly did not form a dominant component of the agents selected.[55] Oxford and Cambridge did not provide all the university educated agents: Sir Robert Anstruther was educated at the University of St Andrews and both Patrick and Francis Gordon attended Aberdeen University. Sir John Trevor provides the most exotic formal education of any of the agents, having attended university in Leiden.[56] Ralph Winwood spent time studying Canon Law at the university of Padua, though he had already obtained a

[50] Thomson, *Noble Education*, p. 8.
[51] Porter, 'University and Society', p. 27, 54, and M. Feingold, 'The Humanities', p.216, in N. Tyacke (ed.) *The History of the University of Oxford Volume IV Seventeenth-Century Oxford* (Oxford, 1997)
[52] Asch, *Nobilities in Transition 1550-1700,* p. 57.
[53] For a full list of Agents with university education and the post they held. See Appendix I of this thesis.
[54] The reason for this totalling more than the number of university-educated agents is due to a number who received a university education (or possibly received one) but determining which university they received it from is not possible. See Appendix I University Education for more detail.
[55] Larminie, 'The Jacobean Diplomatic Fraternity', p. 1311.
[56] A. Marshall, 'Trevor, Sir John (bap. 1624, d. 1672)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed 15 July 2011, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/27727.

fellowship by this time.[57] John Taylor was educated at The English College, St Omer for seven years.[58] Taylor is not included in the above figures as the English College did not award him a degree.

Bachelor degrees were not the limit of the education that the diplomatic agents received. Fifteen of the 39 agents who attended university also received a Master's Degree, suggesting that the level of education within the diplomatic corps was high compared with other posts in the government.[59] Their educational achievements are on a par with the members of the Long Parliament, though far fewer attended the Inns of Court.[60]

Often the agents' knowledge and learning was recognised further and, of those who were university graduates, nine men had been elected to fellowships at Colleges before taking up their appointments for the government. Sir Isaac Wake, for example, was chosen as Public Orator of the University of Oxford.[61] Wake was considered by his descendant Archbishop Wake as 'the Ornament of our Name, Our University and of our very Country its self' for his learning.[62] Sir Francis Nethersole served as Orator for the University of Cambridge, which helped his career by coming to the notice of Prince Henry.[63] John Pell, who served the Protectorate in Switzerland, was a widely respected mathematician.[64] Pell was invited to take up the post of professor of philosophy and mathematics at Breda when it was founded by the Prince of Orange.[65] Pell was encouraged to return to England to teach mathematics by the English government shortly before the first Anglo-Dutch War; he then went on to the post of

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[57] McAllister, *"The Boisterous Secretaire"*, p. 9.
[58] A. Kenny (ed.), *The responsa scholarum of the English College, Rome*, (2 vols.; London, 1962), ii, p. 327.
[59] For example 'key office holders' as defined by Aylmer had only a 27% chance of having attended university during the interregnum, though this was down from 40.2% in the period before the civil war. This is still below the level for agents. See G. Aylmer, *The State's Servants* (London 1973), p. 188.
[60] Brunton & Pennington, *Members of the Long Parliament*, p. 7.
[61] A. Wood, *Athenæ Oxonienses,* ed. Philip Bliss (8 vols.; London, 1820), vii, p. 539.
[62] Wake, A *Brief Enquiry*, p. 62.
[63] D. Lloyd, *State Worthies. Or, The Statesmen and Favourites of England since the Reformation* (London, 1670), p. 797.
[64] A. Wood, *Fasti* (2 vols.; London, 1721), i, p. 253.
[65] *Ibid.*

agent to the Swiss Cantons.[66] Arthur Hopton 'became the miracle of his age for learning' according to contemporaries.[67] Ralph Winwood had a respected career presiding over disputations and colloquia and delivering lectures at Oxford.[68] Many of the agents were highly educated and a foreign Prince had a nearly evens chance that the man before him had been to university, a 14% probability that he had received not just a Bachelors but also a Master's degree and finally a 9% probability that he had been elected to a College Fellowship.

The chart below shows the number of agents who attended university for any given year and the total number of agents serving in the same year. It shows that the likelihood of an agent having a university education varied over time and also was not uniform through the different governments and systems of government in England during the period. The extreme fluctuations, such as the change from 100% of agents having a university education in 1680 to only 50% in 1681, can be explained by the limited number of agents employed during those years. In 1680 the government employed only three agents in foreign service.[69] The next year the government employed only two. There was no sudden policy drive to change the level of education in the diplomatic corps.

[66] M. Green (ed.), 'Volume 25: November 1652.' *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Interregnum, 1651-2* (1877), pp. 463-516,.accessed 13 December 2011, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=54459. [British History Online]
[67] Wood, *Athenæ Oxonienses,* vii, p. 151.
[68] McAllister, 'The Boisterous Secretaire', p. 6.
[69] These were Sir Richard Bulstrode (Spanish Netherlands), John Robinson (Sweden) and Francis Parry (Portugal).





**Chart 1 Total Agents employed and total who attended university.**

One of the most interesting periods is immediately after the Restoration, which saw a dramatic decline in the number of agents who had been university educated. There was a change from 56% probability of agents being educated at a university (in any given year) under Charles I and 62% under the Protectorate, to several years where there were no agents who received a university education. This sudden change in the makeup of the diplomatic corps needs explanation. It is possible to suggest that there was a decision to alter the character of the diplomatic corps, however, by 1670 half the agents were again university educated. This indicates that the Restoration government was not trying to alter the path to an agency; indeed no document exists suggesting a reduction or increase in university educated diplomats. Other factors must have caused this shift.

Lachs argues that political sympathies and practical politics played a major role in deciding who the government should send overseas to serve as diplomats.[70] Immediately after the Restoration, loyalty became a deciding factor for many appointments and there is no reason

[70] Lachs, *The Diplomatic Corps*, p. 59.

to assume that this was not extended to diplomats.[71] If, at the Restoration, agents had continued to be appointed at the normal age for a first post, these men would have been born in the mid-1620s and hence entered university around the Civil War. For committed Royalists of this generation university education was not an option during the Civil War. Further to this, considering the social background of the agents, it is unlikely that the young men who would usually become agents would have followed the court into exile. The diplomatic agents appointed by the Court in exile were those who had experience before the Civil War, such as Sir Henry De Vic and Joseph Avery. It is not surprising then that these factors, of the Civil War hampering university education and that few of the men who came from an agents' background were able to follow the Stuarts into exile, combined to lead to a decrease in university education among the men who were selected to serve as agents immediately after the Restoration.

Universities were not the only source of education. Within England, specialised education was often provided by the Inns of Court, which trained lawyers in English common law. This system of education would probably have been less use to diplomats, as the English legal system was based on Common Law rather than Roman Civil law, Roman Civil Law being the type of law recommended to be studied by the writers of treaties on diplomacy.[72] Out of the 85 agents, nine can be shown to have attended one of the Inns of Court, such as Thomas Henshaw, who served in Denmark, and William Blathwayt, who served in the Low Countries, both of whom attended Middle Temple.[73] Sir Richard Bulstrode, who served in the Spanish Netherlands, and Sir Peter Wyche both attended Inner Temple. [74]

This is significantly below the number who had attended university; indeed all but three of those who were admitted to the Inns of Court had also attended a university, which in itself

[71] Lachs, *The Diplomatic Corps*, p. 63.
[72] Hotman, *L'ambassadeur,* p. 12.
[73] J. Hutchinson, *Catalogue of Notable Middle Templers with Brief Biographical Notices* (London, 1902), p. 118, 23.
[74] Anon. *Members Admitted to The Inner Temple 1547-1660* (London, 1877), pp. 276, 333.

was unusual. Given the low number of men who had attended the Inns of Courts who were accredited, it would appear that the government did not look specifically for lawyers to send on diplomatic missions.[75]

## The Age of Diplomatic Agents

It is not possible to identify the dates of birth of all of the agents in the sample and thus the age at which they held their posts during the period. Just under half (47 of 105) of missions were carried out by an agent with an identifiable date of birth, or baptism, and an average age at which those agents served can be calculated. There was not a uniform age for taking up an agency; the youngest agents found were William Blathwayt (Low Countries) and George Gage (Italian States), aged 21.[76] Walter Montagu (Savoy) was the next youngest, aged 23.[77] The oldest agents were Dr Thomas Henshaw (Denmark), aged 54, and Sir Richard Bulstrode (Spanish Netherlands), aged 57, at the time of their respective missions.[78] This is a large range, yet the youngest men would appear to be somewhat anomalous, the next youngest agent being Albertus Morton (Savoy) aged 28.[79] While at the other end of the scale, apart from Hugh Morrell (France), aged 50, who also appears anomalous, the next oldest agent was William Beecher (France) at 44.[80]

The average age of an agent when he began his first posting was 35, not an age which would correspond with the proposition that agents were young men sent to learn diplomacy before

[75] Though Lachs suggests that there were occasions when lawyers were deliberately chosen as diplomats there is no evidence for this occurring at the rank of agent. Lachs, *The Diplomatic Corps*, p. 53.
[76] Although no record for Blathwayt's birth and baptism has been found, his biographer has traced it to 1649. See G. Jacobsen, *William Blathwayt A Late Seventeenth Century English Administrator* (London, 1932), p. 34; Revell & Steer, 'George Gage I and George Gage II', p. 145.
[77] Wood, *Fasti*, ii, p. 162. Though Montagu had been abroad in service for Buckingham at the age of 21. See B. Falk, *The Ways of the Montagues* (London, 1947), p. 28.
[78] Wood, *Athenæ Oxonienses,* viiii, p. 444; Sir R. Bulstrode, *Original letters written to the Earl of Arlington by Sir Richard Bulstrode, envoy at the Court of Brussels from King Charles II, &c. containing the most remarkable transactions, both in court and camp, during his ministry* (London, 1712), p. 4.
[79] T. Harwood, *Alumni Etonenses* (London, 1779), p. 206.
[80] S. Cary, *Cray Memorials* (2 vols.; London 1874), ii, p. 264. The Beecher Memorial, All Saints Church, Renhold, Bedfordshire, accessed 12 March 2012, http://www.all-saints-church-renhold.org/history/bechermemorial.htm.

returning to more exalted positions. Once repeat missions are included, the average age for an agent at the beginning of his assignment was 37 years. There appears a trend for employing older agents from the Civil War onwards. In the reign of James I, the average age for an agent (including repeat postings) was 35 years and this rose slightly with Charles I to 36 years. Charles I re-employed a number of agents who had been employed by his father, which gives an obvious reason for an increase in the average age. Under the Republic and Protectorate, the age increased noticeably, with the average age reaching 40 years.[81] This is the same as the ambassadors sent out during the period.[82] After the Restoration, the average age of agents sent out continued to be 40 years. The maturity of the agents sent by the government adds further weight to the view that this was not an unimportant post, or one which could be occupied by members of the nobility in lieu of a grand tour. One doubts, for example, that any member of the nobility would wish to spend seven years in Spain, as Francis Cottington did, or 16 years in the Spanish Netherlands, as William Trumbull did. Combining their age, education and social background a practical role for experienced men emerges.

## Previous Service and Experience Abroad

Experience abroad was desirable to the courtly ambassador.[83] To an agent with a practical role, experience and knowledge of where he served would have provided an invaluable advantage in the work he had to perform.[84] How likely was it that those who the state sent abroad had experience in the countries they served in, and experience of diplomacy in some capacity, before they were required to deal with the entire range of diplomatic work? Given

[81] A. Wicquefort recommended that ambassadors should be between 40 and 60 years of age. See Lachs, *The Diplomatic Corps*, p. 50.
[82] Schneider, 'The English Diplomatic Corps, 1649-1660', p. 28.
[83] Hotman, *The ambassador,* p. 11.
[84] Of the 15 diplomats Lachs cites (after the Restoration) as drawing 'special notice for their language skills', seven had served as agents. See Lachs, *The Diplomatic Corps*, p. 55.

that agents were not young men fresh from university, or the Inns of Court, it would seem reasonable to expect that many of them had experience abroad in some capacity, even as travelling tutors.

There are a number of agents who, before becoming a diplomat in their own right, served as the secretary to another diplomatic mission before taking over that mission, or being offered a post at another court. These include a number of the most prolific agents, such as Sir Isaac Wake, who served as secretary for Sir Dudley Carleton (later Viscount Dorchester).[85] Réné Augier served as secretary to a number of embassies in France before being promoted to act as agent as did his close colleague Henry De Vic.[86] Ralph Winwood, after traveling to Italy and studying at the University of Padua, acted as secretary to Sir Henry Neville in France.[87] John Dickenson served as secretary at The Hague, before becoming agent there, and later had service in the German States.[88] Francis Cottington served in Madrid as secretary before becoming agent there twice.[89] Unlike Venice, where the secretary was an employee of the government and paid directly by it, the English diplomatic secretary was the employee of the ambassador or agent whom they served.[90] There was some movement to create professional secretaries after the Restoration.[91] John Brisbane, agent in North Africa and France, was one of these rare government-paid secretaries.[92] Diplomats of the period were cautioned that they 'ought to be most carefull' in selecting their secretaries.[93] Patronage played a clear part: for example William Blathwayt's uncle, Thomas Povery, manoeuvred to have Blathwayt

[85] V. Larminie, 'Wake, Sir Isaac (1580/81–1632)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed 13 July 2011, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/28407.
[86] Bienassis, 'The Diplomatic Career of Réné Augier', pp. 199, 301.
[87] McAllister, 'The Boisterous Secretaire', p. 9.
[88] W. Hendricks, 'John Dickenson: the man and his works' (Northwestern Univ. Ph.D. thesis. 1941)
[89] Havran, *The life of Lord Cottington*, p. 9.
[90] This was standard Venetian and indeed Italian practice; the secretary would also have received separate credentials. See Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance diplomacy* (London, 1955), pp. 207-8; Keith Hamilton & Richard Langhorne, *The practice of diplomacy: its evolution, theory and administration* (London, 1995), p. 30.
[91] Though only 14 were employed in such a way. See Lachs, *The Diplomatic Corps*, pp. 66-67.
[92] W. Shaw (ed.), 'Entry Book: July 1678, 11-20', *Calendar of Treasury Books*, Vol. 5: 1676-1679, accessed 13 July 2011, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=80677. [British History Online].
[93] Hotman, *The ambassador*, p. 46.

selected as secretary to Sir William Temple, while Walter Montagu's father was associated with Buckingham.[94]

The transition from secretary to agent could often be a somewhat haphazard one. Upon the departure of an accredited diplomat it was common for them to leave their secretary, who was expected to continue their responsibilities, writing to the departed diplomat rather than the Secretary of State, until such time as a replacement for their employer arrived. Sir Henry Wotton followed this course of action, leaving Gregorio Monti in Venice, and then informing Whitehall of his actions.[95] In William Trumbull's case there was a period of reporting before he was appointed as agent, which might easily be characterised as an assessment of his skills when working independently of his former master.[96] During these periods, the secretaries did not write to the Secretaries of State but rather to their still nominal superiors, who forwarded this information on. The secretary was the personal employee and servant of the diplomat, who paid his wages, rather than the State's servant, with the exception of the fourteen state paid secretaries after the Restoration. It would be only after this transfer, from the diplomat's to the government's payroll, that the newly accredited agent would begin to appear in the government rolls. After a time of reporting to Whitehall in this indirect manner, it was usual to receive permission to write to the Secretary of State, to receive the credentials of an agent and a warrant to the Exchequer for payment of a diet, or salary. Of the appointments made to the rank of agent during the period, it is possible to find biographical information for 67 of the 105 posts. The information is not always clear about the post the men held within the embassy; for instance William Blathwayt was clearly not the principal secretary at The Hague under Temple, whose embassy had multiple secretaries.[97] Should this be considered the equivalent of serving as a sole secretary to the ambassador? Therefore, a wider

[94] Jacobsen, *William Blathwayt*, pp. 66-70; Falk, *The Ways of the Montagues*, p. 22.
[95] W Shaw (ed.), 'Entry Book: July 1678, 11-20', *Calendar of Treasury Books*, Vol. 5: 1676-1679, accessed 13 July 2011, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=80677. [British History Online].
[96] Uddin, 'William Trumbull: A Jacobean Diplomat', pp. 26-30.
[97] Jacobsen, *William Blathwayt*, p. 68.

categorisation 'acting in an administrative capacity' will be considered. Using this somewhat wider categorisation, we find that, in the case of 41 of the 67 postings where information is available, the post went to someone with previous administrative experience in an embassy. This indicates that, overall, some 39% of agent's postings were filled by former secretaries or administrators. It is, however, likely that this is a low estimate, as detailed records of the secretaries employed by agents and ambassadors are limited and often vague in their description of individuals.[98] With the experience of being a secretary, in some cases for a number of years in one nation, such men can certainly be seen as qualified for the position of agent. They would still, with this limited experience of government and the ways of power, be considered as entirely unsuited for the rank of ambassador, according to the literature of the period, which had strict prescriptions on the need for experience of government. Further to this, they would lack the connections into the court patronage network for such important and high profile appointments. However, for a practical role with the agents' level of negotiations and work, it would seem the ideal apprenticeship.

Experience abroad was not just limited to serving as a secretary in an embassy. Sir Oliver Fleming served as a 'gentleman' to Sir Isaac Wake in Italy, before taking up diplomatic service in his own right.[99] William Beecher served as a messenger to the embassy in Paris.[100] Later, Beecher became a tutor to Lord Clifford, where he was 'often in the English embassy, but not of it' before becoming an agent.[101] Sir Ralph Winwood served as a soldier in the Dutch Republic before beginning his diplomatic employment in that state.[102] Walter

[98] For example, though Sir Isaac Wake's list of servants include 'Mr Browne' as a secretary, it is only through details held elsewhere we can confirm that this is Richard Browne, who later served as agent in France. SPFF, SP 78/111 61, Instructions for Ric. Browne, agent in France, 23 July 1641.

[99] A Hinds (ed.), 'Venice: June 1627, 2-15', C*alendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, Vol. 20: 1626-1628 (1914), pp. 237-255, accessed 13 July 2011, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=89122. [British History Online]

[100] C. Firth & S. C. Lomas, *Notes on the diplomatic relations of England and France 1603-1688* (London, 1906), p. 12.

[101] J. Stoye, *English Travellers Abroad 1604-1667* (London, 1989), p. 48.

[102] Lloyd, *State Worthies*, p. 826.

Montagu was sent abroad by his father to acquire better knowledge of French and Italian.[103] Thus, even if an agent did not have experience of working in an embassy for an ambassador, it was still possible that he had experience of visiting and travelling through foreign nations and, consequently, the experiences he would encounter as a diplomat would not be completely alien. Sir Robert Anstruther had perhaps the most interesting upbringing and previous experience of any of the agents. He was placed as a page at the Danish Court and was sent on a diplomatic mission from Christian IV to James I, with perhaps his biggest diplomatic coup being his work on the Treaty of Knäred.[104] All of this work was accomplished before he was sent back to Denmark as agent, an unsurprising selection considering his connections and experience. The experiences of Anstruther are, however, atypical of the general experience of the corps of agents who did not, in general, have such extensive experience of diplomacy before their employment. They nevertheless do show that someone with this great experience of diplomacy and foreign courts could and would be willing to serve at the rank of agent.

Surprisingly, given their mostly modest background, the men sent out to act as diplomatic agents were, as a group, likely to have been overseas and often served in embassies in the countries to which they were later accredited. Even men who had no experience of the workings of an embassy had travelled abroad for various reasons, mostly educational, and in some cases traded as merchants in those parts. Richard Bradshaw, a merchant of Chester, acted as agent to the Hanse Towns under the Protectorate and was Deputy of the Merchant Adventurers.[105] As he was required to be a Freeman of the Company to undertake such employment, it suggests he was involved in the trade there. Although he was not a popular

[103] Falk, *The Ways of the Montagues*, p. 28.
[104] S. Murdoch, 'Anstruther, Sir Robert (1578–1644/5?)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed 13 July 2011, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/63416.
[105] S. Barber, 'Bradshaw, Richard (bap. 1610, d. 1685)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed 13 October 2011, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/3203.

agent, as later attempts of the Adventurers to remove him from his post show.[106] A more certain case is of Hugh Morrell who had traded for a number of years at Rouen before being appointed by Parliament to settle trade disputes with the French.[107] The limited number of merchants appointed accounts for the size of this sample. These examples point to a group of men who had a common experience of travel and living outside of the kingdom and were used to interacting with foreigners on a daily basis. While not all may have been so fortunate as to be presented to the Doge, as Sir Albertus Morton was during his time in Venice, they had probably built up some knowledge of other cultures and laws.[108] Stoye argued that a 'reputation for knowledge and experience' overseas was a method by which those who had a university education and had spent time abroad could differentiate themselves from others seeking positions at court and preferment.[109] In this it is clear that those who went on to become diplomatic agents followed this path, and while patronage is harder to discern, it is possible to see much of their experience abroad.

## Confessional Identity

Identifying the religious persuasions of the men who made up the agent corps is a challenging task. As they were often men of little political importance, they were unlikely to be denounced in pamphlets as Catholics or crypto-Catholics, and this is before even attempting to consider the inner thoughts of men who conformed outwardly. A final problem is one of identification; George Gage has often been confused with a priest of the same name, making disentangling the religious sensibilities even more complex.[110] From what little evidence that

[106] M. Ashley, *Financial and Commercial Policy Under the Cromwellian Protectorate* (Oxford, 1972), p. 122.
[107] B. Morgan, 'Morrell, Hugh (fl. 1601–1660)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed 13 October 2011, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/19295.
[108] S. A. Baron, 'Morton, Sir Albertus (1584?–1625)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed 18 July 2011, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/19358.
[109] Stoye, *English Travellers Abroad*, p. 46.
[110] J. Gillow, *Biographical Dictionary of the English Catholics* (5 vols.; London 1885-1887), ii, p. 356; Revell & Steer, 'George Gage I and George Gage II', p. 141.

can be gathered, it is possible to show that there were agents who were Catholics at the time of their appointments, later converts after their employment, as well as men who were obviously and strongly Protestant. Finally, there are some whose religion was not mentioned and clearly must have conformed at least outwardly.

Those men who can be identified as Catholics comprise both those who converted, usually during a period abroad, which had caused much concern under Elizabeth, and those who had been brought up as Catholics.[111] John Taylor, who served several times as agent for the government, most notably to the Emperor and Imperial Diet during the Thirty Years War, was born to Catholic parents and was also educated a Catholic.[112] While Taylor served before the Restoration, there are examples of Catholics serving as diplomats after the Test Acts. This was despite the 1674 Act extending to any person who held

> 'any Office or Offices Civill or Military or shall receive any Pay; Salary, Fee or Wages by reason of any Patent or Grant from his Majestie or shall have Command or Place of Trust from, or under his Majestie or from any of his Majestyes Predecessors'.[113]

Clearly this would include all forms of diplomats, and those few diplomatic secretaries appointed by the government. Ignatius White, who served in Spain, would also appear to have been raised a Catholic.[114] Sir Richard Bulstrode was known to be a Catholic during his time as an agent. He was converted while imprisoned in Bruges.[115] Bulstrode would later serve as agent to the Spanish Netherlands. Despite the Test Act, on 29 August 1685, James II sent Bulstrode back to the Spanish Netherlands, this time as ambassador. On 9 November

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[111] Stoye, *English Travellers Abroad*, p. 8.
[112] T. L. Lindquist, 'Taylor , John (1597–1655)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed 9 Sept 2013 http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/27045.
[113] J. Raithby (ed.), 'Charles II, 1672: An Act for preventing Dangers which may happen from Popish Recusants', *Statutes of the Realm*, Vol. 5: 1628-80 (1819), pp. 782-785, accessed 11 October 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=47451. [British History Online]
[114] E. S. de Beer 'The Marquis of Albeville and His Brothers' *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 45, No. 179 (1930), pp. 397-408.
[115] J. D. Davies, 'Bulstrode, Sir Richard (1617–1711)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed 13 October 2011, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/3930.

1685, James II reminded Parliament of his right to dispense his trusty servants from the Test Act.[116] Those who were known to be practising Catholics at the time of their agency were very few in number and only ever served in Catholic countries. This suggests that the government did not wish to advertise English Catholics, especially converts, to Protestant Courts, however skilled they might be as diplomats.

The next category of men is those who converted, such as Walter Montagu, who after serving as agent to Savoy chose to convert to Catholicism.[117] There is a suggestion of encouragement from Henrietta Maria whom he would serve as almoner.[118] Francis Cottington is alleged to have converted, (as his older brother who became a Jesuit did), while ill returning from Spain.[119] Newsmongers in England took his conversion to be incontrovertibly true.[120] This was largely due to his attempts to reach a satisfactory compromise with the Spanish on points of confessional toleration during negotiations.[121] Cottington's conversion was only certain in 1652.[122] Also included in this category is John Berkley who, long after his agency to Sweden in 1637, was suspected of converting to Catholicism in 1652, while a member of the Duke of York's household.[123] A less certain case is that of William Beecher who was forced from office as Clerk of the Privy Council. This was, according to Aylmer, because of allegations that he was a Catholic. However, Baron asserts there is no evidence for these claims.[124] It is impossible to tell if these men were sympathetic to Catholicism before their conversion or indeed were crypto-Catholics; however, their number, as with the number of known practising Catholics, was very small.

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[116] W. Toone, *Chronological Historian* (2 vols.; London, 1826), i, p. 320.
[117] Wood, *Athenae Oxonienses* ,ii, p. 162.
[118] Falk, The Way of the Monatgues, pp. 22, 27.
[119] Havran, *The life of Lord Cottington*, p. 54.
[120] Havran, *The life of Lord Cottington*, p. 77.
[121] Lloyd, *State Worthies*, p. 908.
[122] Pogson, 'Cottington, Francis, first Baron Cottington (1579?–1652)'.
[123] D. W. Hayton, 'Berkeley, John, first Baron Berkeley of Stratton (bap. 1607, d. 1678)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed 13 October 2011, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/2217.
[124] Baron, 'Becher, Sir William (bap. 1580, d. 1651).

From the other side of the religious divide, there were those whose Protestantism was obvious throughout their career. Réné Petit and his uncle Réné Augier were Huguenots and remained so, which Petit clearly demonstrated by his desire to join the Huguenot emigration to the New World, after the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes.[125] Another obvious Protestant was the forceful Sir Francis Nethersole who bitterly complained that 'the papistes [...] laugh at the proclamation agaynst their priestes'.[126] He continued to push for strong measures against them during the last years of James I's reign, while also serving the Winter King and Queen.[127] George Gage, despite being often misidentified as a priest (there is no evidence of ordination), was a staunch Protestant writing against Rome following the negotiations he took part in there.[128] There were also men who would progress though the diplomatic and church hierarchy at the same time, such as John Robinson, who became Bishop of London, and John Pell who, after serving as agent to Switzerland, served as the vicar for Fobbing in Essex. Essex was a county noted for strong puritan sympathies. No one could doubt the religious persuasion of such men; however, these men were also in the minority. A strong demonstration of Protestantism could cause a diplomatic incident, as Sir Henry Wotton found when asked to present James I's religious writing to the Doge in Venice.[129]

The majority of agents left no trace of their religion. This indicates, at the very least, outward conformity with the Church of England during their time before and after their service abroad. A level of toleration of other faiths may have been necessary for many of the agents to function properly, for example William Trumbull is described as not being hostile to Catholicism, yet there is no suggestion that he was either a Catholic or a crypto-Catholic.[130] England sent only three known Catholics overseas to serve as agents (despite a Catholic

[125] A. H. Hirsch, *The Huguenots of colonial South Carolina* (Hamden, 1962), p. 12.
[126] State Papers Domestic, James I 14/164 142, Sir Francis Nethersole, London, 15 May 1624.
[127] Fuller, *Worthies of England*, vi, p. 510.
[128] Revell & Steer, 'George Gage I and George Gage II', pp. 143-145.
[129] Smith, *The Life and Letters of Sir Henry Wotton*, ii, p. 104.
[130] G. Albion, *Charles I and the Court of Rome A Study in 17th Century Diplomacy* (London, 1935), p. 136.

revival in England and an increase in converts) and only to Catholic nations.[131] This implies a representation of only 3.7% of the total agents employed, even when including those who later converted this only rises to 8.7%. This latter is not an insignificant figure, but their later conversion may have been due to the time in Catholic nations rather than to crypto-Catholicism before appointment. This is the suggested case with Cottington.[132] Indeed, there were as many known Huguenots as there were Catholics in the agent corps. Unlike Catholic agents, who were sent only to Catholic states, those who were most obvious in their Protestantism do not appear to have been restricted in their postings. The Huguenots Augier and Petit served in France and it would appear in this case that local knowledge trumped possible religious sensibilities, as well as any offence that might have been created by sending French subjects as diplomats. There was, however, a tendency to send those identified as strongly Protestant to Protestant states, hence John Robinson (future Bishop of London) is found serving in Sweden and Nethersole was sent to the Princes of the Protestant Union, while the Cromwellian John Pell served in the Swiss Cantons. While strong religious convictions do not appear to have been a requirement for service, affection for the Roman Church, even if it could be helpful while serving overseas, was not a quality that was looked for in agents. Although convincing arguments have been made that there was a strong group of Protestant diplomats during the reign of James I, this was clearly not the rule, and certainly not a strict rule for diplomatic agents.[133]

## Conditions of Service and Reasons for Serving

The conditions, under which agents agreed to serve, when compared with other state servants, can be a useful indicator of their social standing and their relative value to the government. If

[131] Albion, *Charles I and the Court of Rome*, p. 193.
[132] Havran, *The life of Lord Cottington*, p. 77.
[133] Larminie, 'The Jacobean Diplomatic Fraternity', p. 1310.

it is found that the pay an agent expected to receive was similar to the incomes expected by those with a comparable social background it is possible to categorise the job of an agent as a "gentry" role.[134]

Receiving their Pay

The traditional view of ambassadors' pay is that it was low, often late when paid and that there is only one example of a diplomat who made a profit from his service.[135] This image is challenged by Gary Bell, and although his focus is on the preceding Tudor period, there is some important overlap with the later period under consideration.[136] Bell argues that there was a far larger selection of rewards available to diplomats, apart from the expected diet (an allowance usually paid for each day of service) and extraordinaries (lump sum payments for irregular occurrences and purchases). In addition, they were given an expectation that they could call upon the royal bounty for the rest of their lives.[137] They might also expect the Crown's interference in legal proceedings on their behalf.[138] Or they could possibly expect speedy treatment in other matters, as William Trumbull benefitted from when he naturalised his sons, with the bill bypassing the committee stage and being carried to the Lords by Sir Edward Coke.[139] Finally, diplomatic service was, according to Bell, a 'sound avenue for further advancement'.[140] While this may have been true for the Elizabethan period, and some of the early years of the reign of James I, it appears not to have been the usual practice throughout the period. The contention that diplomats' complaints were more likely to be

[134] Certain occupations were routes to membership of the gentry if one was not already a member and considered respectable employment if one was. See Sir T. Smith, *De Republica Anglorum: Discourse on the Commonwealth of England*, ed. L. Alston (Cambridge, 1906), pp. 39-40.
[135] The Savoyard Eustache Chapuys is credited with managing this rare feat of profiting from his foreign service. See Mattingly, *Renaissance diplomacy*, pp. 235-6.
[136] G. Bell, 'Elizabethan Diplomatic Compensation: Its Nature and Variety', *Journal of British Studies* Vol. 20, No. 2 (1981), pp. 1-25.
[137] Bell, 'Elizabethan Diplomatic Compensation', p. 17.
[138] Bell, 'Elizabethan Diplomatic Compensation', p. 16.
[139] Thrush, *The House of Commons*, vi, p. 579.
[140] Bell, 'Elizabethan Diplomatic Compensation', p. 17.

preserved in the public records, and thus their lack of payment was no more common than other servants, may be true.[141] However, diplomats were cut off from other sources of revenue and reliant for credit on their own networks with merchants.[142] Based on the complaints raised, and the length many diplomats went to in order to receive their diet from the exchequer, it would seem that the diplomatic agent found the financial conditions of service hard to bear.[143]

Substantiating the claim of either traditional historiography, that diplomats were rarely paid on time and not rewarded adequately, or Bell's contention that they were, is problematic. The Exchequer fire of 1834 has left many of the financial records for the period nearly unusable, limiting the ability to prove the pay which diplomats received. For example, there is no record of the pay to Sir Henry De Vic for his time as agent in France, only payment of £120 for postage, though other evidence exists that De Vic did receive pay.[144] A letter written to the agents stationed in France states that their pay would be provided by the financer Philip Burlamachi, rather than through the treasury, making identification of payments to agents even more challenging.[145] However, the actions taken by the agents in France before they were informed of Burlamachi's visit, and that he would be bringing with him their pay, suggest that they had not been paid for an extended period. De Vic and Augier launched what might amount to a strike. Both men informed their masters that for want of money they could not follow the French King on his progress to the south of the kingdom and thus the

[141] Ibid

[142] There was no revenue that they could 'appropriate' for themselves or fees they could charge for their office, unlike Consuls who received a percentage of goods landed, though this does not rule out occasional gratuities from grateful merchants. See Chapter V, Protecting the Rights of Subjects, in this thesis.

[143] When serving in the Spanish Netherlands, William Trumbull sent his staff to the Exchequer repeatedly to try and induce payment, though he still regularly waited 15 months to be paid. See Uddin, 'William Trumbull: A Jacobean Diplomat', p. 47.

[144] J. Bruce (ed.), 'Charles I - volume 186: March 1-18, 1631', *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I, 1629-31* (1860), pp. 522-542, accessed 13 December 2011, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=52121. [British History Online]

[145] SPFF, SP 78/89 348, Wake to Dorchester, 18 July 1632.

intelligence that they would send back into England would suffer.[146] Furthermore, it would not be possible to have any meetings with officials from the French government, as those men all intended to follow the King on his southern progress. While the reply to this does not survive, there is a letter from the two agents a short while later thanking the Lord Treasurer for the payments made. Even this rather drastic threat, however, did not bring their pay up-to-date as they still remained several months in arrears, and neither does payment appear to have become any more regular following this action.[147] While complaints of a lack of pay are a regular feature of early-modern diplomatic life, actions such as De Vic and Augier's are not.

Broadly the experience of agent and ambassador were probably the same when it came to the Crown and the disbursement of money. After the death of Salisbury, both struggled to receive what they were owed or, at times, any money at all to pay their expenses.[148] Both types of men, therefore, had to resort to borrowing from merchants to support themselves during their time overseas. It is doubtful if any agent managed to complete their mission without borrowing from merchants. William Trumbull wrote to thank Secretary Winwood for paying over a sum of money which could be used to cover his debts to several merchants.[149] Sir Richard Bulstrode, while serving in the Spanish Netherlands, wrote of the hardship he was under, complaining of wanting a 'propoertion monthly as may supply my present occasions' and believed that if he did not receive such he would lose his credit.[150] Perhaps the most shocking borrowing for an agent was that of Francis Cottington, who was required to hazard his own credit to supply Lord Roos with funds during his time in Spain.[151] The similarities diverge, for while it was assumed that an ambassador could support himself with his own

[146] SPFF, SP 78/88 213, De Vic & Aguier to Dorchester, 13 March 1631.
[147] De Vic was to complain again of a lack of pay from the government. SPFF, SP 78/89 66, De Vic to Dorchester, 6 May 1631.
[148] Trumbull for one appears to have been paid regularly before this time. See Uddin, 'William Trumbull: A Jacobean Diplomat', p. 40.
[149] SPF, Flanders SP 77/12 330, Trumbull to Winwood, 25 May 1617.
[150] R. Bulstrode, *Original letters written to the Earl of Arlington by Sir Richard Bulstrode, envoy at the Court of Brussels from King Charles II* (London, 1712), p. 7.
[151] Stoye, *English Travellers Abroad*, p. 264.

wealth, and they were provided with silver plate from the jewel house, which could be used as a last resort, an agent was far more dependent on his salary than other diplomats, as can be seen from their frequent requests to receive their pay.

Given the strong possibility that there was a lack of anything resembling regular pay, Trumbull, for example, claimed to be owed £3,300 at the end of his agency, after the breakdown of regular pay under Salisbury, one must question why agents were willing to serve, in some cases multiple times and for a number of years.[152] No doubt the motivations which agents had for accepting their work were myriad, varied enormously from agent to agent, and cannot be discerned easily at this distance. However, some generalisation can be intimated.

The desire for a better post at home, and using diplomacy as a stepping stone, is a common assumption made about ambassadors for the English government during this period.[153] The same can be seen in the actions of a number of the agents who also served the English government, though, in at least one case, their ambitions are described as 'more modest'.[154] Nevertheless, they did on occasion reach great offices.[155] The nature of the diplomatic service under Robert Cecil is said to have been one where the route to advancement was through diligent work and taking the next post that they were offered, rather than through the patronage networks of the court, at least for diplomatic positions.[156]

The desire for other posts though was by no means limited to diplomatic or even government posts. Provost of Eton College was hotly contested by a number of diplomats, including Dudley Carleton, an ambassador.[157] It, however, had been promised to Sir William Beecher,

[152] Thrush, *The House of Commons*, vi, p. 579.
[153] Lachs, *The Diplomatic Corps*, p. 52.
[154] Used when comparing the ambitions of Dudley Carleton (Ambassador at The Hague) to those of William Trumbull (Agent in the Spanish Netherlands). See Hill & Lockyer 'Carleton and Buckingham: The Quest for Office', p. 20.
[155] See Chapter VI in this thesis.
[156] Lee, 'The Jacobean Diplomatic Service', p. 1281.
[157] Peck, *Court Patronage*, pp. 62–7.

who served as agent in France.[158] Eventually the post went to Sir Henry Wotton, another diplomat.[159]

The social prestige that would be enjoyed by an agent was probably high, despite Berridge's suggestion that 'agents were the lowest form of diplomatic life'.[160] Agents did, wherever they served, enjoy audiences with the most powerful men and women in the countries to which they were accredited. This was a great change from the position they would have found themselves in at home where, as members of the middle and lower gentry, their horizons may have been limited to lesser court posts and to their own county interests, rather than meetings and dealings with the *grands* in foreign courts. Further to this, they would often have been posted to areas considered the epicentre of European culture and been able to experience (to a limited degree) this court culture, which would have boosted their social standing when they returned home. It has often been suggested that this motivated men to serve as ambassadors, so it seems likely that such consideration would also have been in the mind of agents serving the government. While there are few records available, the marriages of the children of agents suggest that they were able to marry better, after serving abroad, than their parents had. For example, the marriage of William Lewis' daughter, Elizabeth, to Sir Francis Dayrell, or Philip Meadow's daughter Eliza's match to Sir Thomas Powis suggest a distinct element of upward mobility.[161] In contrast though, the marriage of William Beecher's daughter to Thomas Huxley does not appear as impressive, and appears to be one that could have occurred without any increase in social standing.[162] William Trumbull made it clear, in a letter sent to his son, about the rank in which he should matriculate at Oxford, a

[158] Hill & Lockyer, 'Carleton and Buckingham: The Quest for Office', p. 24.
[159] Smith, *Sir Henry Wotton*, i, pp. 201-202.
[160] G. R. Berridge, 'Notes On The Origins Of The Diplomatic Corps: Constantinople In The 1620s', *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy* No. 92 (2004), p. 5.
[161] *Le Neve's Pedigrees of the Knights*, ed. Marshal, pp. 275, 404.
[162] *Le Neve's Pedigrees of the Knights*, ed. Marshal, p. 166.

gentry rank.[163] At least this one former agent evidently believed that they had increased in status from their time and that this needed to be recognised formally, and it was important their children understood this.[164]

The salary to which an agent was entitled.

Unlike the army, where the pay rates were clearly set out in the Establishment, there was no defined pay scale for diplomats of the period, indeed diplomats complained that they were serving with the same rank at different posts but receiving different pay.[165] The government occasionally granted an increase in pay, but wished it to be clear that this was not a binding precedent for the future. However, there do appear to be two rates of pay which can be suggested as the usual rate for an agent. The first pay rate was one of 20 shillings a day, the second 40 shillings a day. When William Trumbull finally moved from an employee of the previous diplomat, Thomas Edmondes, to one of the State he received a warrant for 20 shillings a day or £365 a year.[166] This appears to have been the most typical standard rate, though a number of diplomats received less.[167] It was possible to progress to the higher rate of 40 shillings a day after a number of years of service, seven of the agents managed to double their diet by this method, although again there appears to have been no standard practice as to if, and when, such an increase should be provided to the diplomat.[168] This compares with the 'usual' salary of an ambassador, which was £4 per day.

[163] Berkshire Register Office, Trumbull Add MS 46, letters 24th August and 11 October 1622. See Porter, 'University and Society', p. 51.
[164] T. Phillipps, *The Four Visitations of Berkshire* (2 vols.; London, 1907), i, p. 296.
[165] Such as Francis Cotttington, who received more than William Trumbull. Trumbull wrote asking that his payment be equalised. See SPF, Flanders SP 77/10, 338, Trumbull to Rochester, 6 October 1613.
[166] HMCD, ii, 177, Edmondes to Trumbull, Blackfriars, 2 November 1609.
[167] Such as Gregorio Monti, who served in Venice from April 1619 to March 1621 and only received £90 per year. It would appear that some merchant consuls were able to earn more than some agents. See V. Barbour, 'Consular Service in the Reign of Charles II', *The American Historical Review* Vol. 33, No. 3 (1928), pp. 563-565.
[168] These were: William Perwich (France), May 1672-September 1677; Réné Augier (France), February 1629-July 1640; Roger Meridith (Low Countries), May 1678- October 1679; Dudley Carleton (Low Countries), December 1625 – November 1632; Francis Parry (Portugal), June 1669 – November 1680; Sir Isaac Wake

From the pay offered, it is apparent that the more important courtly ambassador ranked far above the diplomatic agents. This is hardly surprising, but how does an agent's salary compare to incomes enjoyed by other areas of society during the period? It has been asserted that the highest ranking members of the gentry could often enjoy an income of £1,000 or more a year.[169] This is considerably more than an agent could expect to be paid, but at the lower end gentry incomes could range from a mere £50 a year to £200 a year.[170] All agents were paid, in theory, more than the lowest of all 'gentry income' and most paid above the £200.

Having considered that the income of an agent (if paid) was usually higher than that of the lower gentry, it also useful to consider how this compares with other areas of government service. Was diplomacy better paid, for example, than service in the navy or in the army?

Taking first the navy, using the pay rates established after the Restoration and used during the Commonwealth, which has been described as 'relatively modest beside those of army officers', the diplomatic agents appear well paid.[171] Thirty six out of a total of 72, whose salaries are known, were paid above the Vice Admiral's rate of £547 per annum.[172] Moving from flag ranks to those of ship captains, a captain of a first rate ship could expect to be paid £273 per year, which was less than the standard salary of a diplomatic agent.[173] When looking at the army, it is immediately apparent that, if pay was used to determine social standing, that of a diplomatic agent is far higher than would have been expected. The standard diplomatic pay of 20 shillings a day is the same as was laid down in the

(Savoy), December 1614 – November 1626; and William Trumbull (Spanish Netherlands), August – 1609 – November 1625.

[169] Asch, *Nobilities in Transition*, p. 49.

[170] *ibid.*

[171] Aylmer, *The State's Servants,* p.110.

[172] *Ibid.*

[173] *Ibid.*

establishment for a colonel of foot.[174] A captain of foot was only entitled to a salary of 8s a day.[175] In the entire period only five of the diplomatic agents earned less. It could be argued that the army pay rates are lower than for diplomats because members of the military were expected to supplement their salaries with booty and the spoils of war, yet there was not always this opportunity and there would be extended periods where officers would be required to live on their salary, as diplomats were. Thus the government considered that agents were usually worth as much as the colonels of foot and more than the commanders of their ships.

It is worth considering what another government was willing to pay their diplomats of the equivalent rank. After the Restoration, the French government was willing to pay their agents in London between 500 *livres* and 1500 *livres* a month, depending on the social standing of the agent involved.[176] The exchange rate fluctuated greatly during the period, however, using an exchange rate of £1 = 12.5 *livres* this gives the French agent a diet of around £1 7s to £4 a day. Thus English agents abroad were paid at the similar rate to the lower level French agents, while the highest paid French agent commanded a salary closer to that of the average English ambassador.

The pay which an agent was entitled to receive was surprisingly high when compared to the salaries offered to their social superiors for military service. They regularly received salaries higher than their background would have entitled them to in England. However, it must be remembered that agents were expected to support any staff they had with their salary.[177] Yet when compared to French agents, where all but those at the lower end of the scale were paid

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[174] Due to the wage rates being laid down clearly in the Establishments, the rates paid to the New Model army will be used for ease of comparison. See 'House of Lords Journal Volume 10: 19 February 1648', *Journal of the House of Lords,* Vol. 10: 1648-1649 (1767-1830), pp. 64-71, accessed 22 November 2011, at http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=32756. [British History Online]

[175] *Ibid.*

[176] Bibliothèque National, Paris Collection des Mélanges de Colbert 323, ff.9$^{v}$-15$^{r}$. Quoted in R. Clayton, *Diplomats and Diplomacy in London 1667-1672* (Univ. of Oxford D.Phil. thesis, 1995), p. 154.

[177] Though it seems few entertained many staff.

more, the suggestion is, that in terms of international diplomacy, they may have been underpaid.

A Portrait of the Average Agent

For a good number of the agents sent out by the government, the description which Clarendon provided almost holds true. From the information above, it is possible to sketch a portrait of the average agent employed by the State. He was likely to be a man in middle to late thirties (only a few years younger than the ambassador he may have served) who had received a university education and likely held a Masters, as well as Bachelor's, degree.[178] This was a sign that they were of the educated gentry, who comprised most of those awarded a Master degree.[179] Before taking up a post as an agent, he served in some lesser capacity within another embassy, most likely as secretary to an ambassador. Determining language skills is more difficult. Agents who attended either the Inns of Court or the Universities may have taken lessons from the independent language teacher located near those institutions.[180] Others would seem to have developed the language skills they would require at their post while serving as a secretary, as Cottington did. However they came about their skills with foreign languages, it should be noted that, of the 15 diplomats Lachs cites as drawing 'special notice for their language skills', seven had served as agents and this study only covers diplomacy after the Restoration.[181] From before the Restoration, Wood suggests that Sir Isaac 'Wake had in his pen more Latin, English and French tongue, than any of his time in the university'.[182] Pell spoke Arabic, Italian, French Spanish, High Dutch (German) and Low Dutch (Dutch).[183] Thus, by the time an agent took up his post, he was a mature man, educated

[178] Schneider, 'The English Diplomatic Corps, 1649-1660', p. 28.
[179] Porter, 'University and Society', p. 94.
[180] Porter, 'University and Society', pp. 24-27.
[181] Lachs, *The Diplomatic Corps*, p.55.
[182] Wood, *Athenae Oxonienses*, vii, p. 541.
[183] Wood, *Fasti*, i, p. 251.

and with experience of serving and living abroad, often in the same nation to which he would be posted. Despite having spent much time abroad, often in Catholic states, he was probably still a Protestant and would remain so throughout this service. While professional training was unknown, it would not appear too outlandish to suggest that the agents had received a form of training not totally out of line with the requirements from the texts on how an ambassador should conduct himself and what experience he should have. The glaring exception is that the agent had not, in most cases, received the courtly education which would have made him the ideal courtier, which was the suggested major function of the ambassador. A less courtly and far more practical diplomatic role can be envisioned from the consideration of the background of the agents.

# Chapter II Diplomatic Communication

## English Diplomatic Information Gathering and Communication Networks.

The early modern world encompassed a variety of information networks, amongst them those of merchants, politicians and co-religionists. Often previous foreign travel had provided Englishmen with contacts in a number of these different networks. Diplomats were a part of these networks. They also formed their own distinct network, which exchanged information with fellow diplomats and also with members of the Court in London.

Information gathering was the main duty of diplomats during the period under consideration and still is to the present day.[1] How agents gathered this information, and in what way it was transmitted, can tell us much about their role within the government. Before addressing the theory and practice of gathering information, it is important to establish what sort of information the Court desired their agents to garner and what information the agents did indeed send back to their superiors. This chapter will then address the gathering of information by diplomats, with whom they communicated and when. How this information was sent, and the measures taken to ensure that it did indeed reach Whitehall, will be considered. It will be shown that the Stuart diplomats had a complex network of communication. This network attempted to avoid the problem of single points of failure in information transmission. It ensured that information, even from the farthest reaches of diplomatic postings, arrived in England. The practicality of the network will be discussed. The use of ordinary and express post will be considered by the use of two case studies

[1] K. Hamilton & R. Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and* Administration (London, 1995), pp. 8-9; G. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (London, 1955), p. 109 for early Italian diplomacy, p. 244 for seventeenth century diplomacy; D. Horn, *The British Diplomatic Service 1698*-1789 (Oxford, 1961), p. 182.

concerning the English agents in France, during the "Day of Dupes" crisis and the War of the Mantuan Succession.

What news was newsworthy?

There are various ways to determine what information was most desirable to the governments of the period; one could look at the instructions to diplomats and the writings of authors on the subject of diplomacy. Alternatively, a selection of writings by agents could be analysed to see what was dispatched. If an agent was not sent a reprimand it might be concluded that they were fulfilling their role adequately. However, this assumption, that not removing a diplomat confers government satisfaction with performance, could be challenged. It regularly took prolonged periods for diplomats to be replaced. This was often due to the unwillingness of men to take up such posts.[2] Even when the government was satisfied, there could still be talk of recall; for example William Trumbull's recall was discussed regularly in 1611. The government was satisfied with his performance and Cottington wrote to inform Trumbull that, after much speculation, he was unlikely to be replaced.[3]

An analysis of the huge number of dispatches, sent from a wide range of countries, over such a long period, although providing statistical information on what was reported, may not be useful. There was a tendency for diplomats of the period to write regularly, and extensively, even when little of obvious importance occurred. It would be challenging to isolate what the government wanted to know from what agents used as filler in their dispatches. Indeed the conclusion could be reached that the government was interested in eccentric gossip and

[2] P. Lachs, *The Diplomatic Corps under Charles II & James II* (New Brunswick, 1965), p. 59; H. Nicholson, *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method* (London, 1953), p. 59. Though the English did not go to the lengths that the Venetians did in 1185 criminalising the refusal to serve in the capacity of an ambassador and periodically reviewed and reinforced this legislation. For a full discussion of this, see D. Queller, *Early Venetian Legislation on Ambassadors* (Geneva, 1966), pp. 31-39.

[3] HMCD, iii, 204, Francis Cottington to William Trumbull 11 December 1611.

strange goings on, such as this report from William Perwich in May of 1669, from the French Court, about Mademoiselle de Montenner.[4]

> 'Shee was this week to take the air in her coach by the Bois de Boulogne where shee heard a dismall voice lamenting in pititfulle termes, & being come nearer shee saw a man on the ground with his hands & eyes surveying ye heavens. Shee asked him what discomposed him & took him into her coach, thinking to bring him into Paris, when hee told her many horrible things & predictions of troubles in this land, of y$^{e}$ death of great men, &c; & immediately vanish out of y$^{e}$ coach'.[5]

The importance of prophecy during the period cannot be discounted, especially in France, in the aftermath of the later Affair of the Poisons.[6] However, such information was not the most important part of diplomatic writing. This can be seen by considering some of the instructions issued and the texts of the period, looked at in the Introduction. This sort of diplomatic writing corresponds more closely to providing a personal news service for the home governments about a foreign court.

It might be thought that all the instructions issued to diplomats, before their departure, would shed a greater light on what was expected of them in their charge. These were, however, often vaguely drafted, to cover the multitude of occurrences which might need to be reported, such as

> 'More particularly you are to keep a watch full eye all their negotiations particular & correspondence with the French & chiefly what accommodation they that Make for sea, matters in kind, discourse & advertise wth take case there open are in underhand dealings wth the Spaine the Archdutches and have subjects or with another on there behalf either for peace or for truce for suspetions of armes or for traffique by commiunce or licence further you must require & certifie what relations & correspondence they hold (sic)'.[7]

or the instruction to William Curtius, sent into the Empire, that

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[4] Identity is uncertain; there is no Montenner listed in the *Dictionnaire de la Noblesse*. It is certainly not a corruption of Maintenon due to the date of the incident. See A. Desbois & F. Badier, *Dictionnaire de la Noblesse ... de France* 3rd edition (19 vols.; Paris 1863), xiii, p. 133.

[5] SPFF, SP 78/126 137, Perwich, Paris, 25 May 1669.

[6] F. Mossiker, *The Affair of the Poisons*, (London, 1975), p. 17; L. Mollenauer, *Strange revelations: magic, poison, and sacrilege in Louis XIV's France* (University Park, Pennsylvania, 2007), pp. 129-131.

[7] SPF, Holland SP 84/144 165, Instructions for Sir Wm. Boswell, with draft and abstract.

> 'During yo residing there you are to carry a vigilant eye upon the affaires in these parts, observing diligently the motions of them [the Elector]' and 'are to observe & discover this negotiations of the Agent of France' [8]

General catchall instructions were regularly issued by the government. However, there were also instances of very specific instructions being presented, such as those to the agents serving in France, between the times of Treaty of Susa to the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye. The signing of the Treaty of Susa (1629) brought about the end of the Anglo-French war (1627-1629). It left a number of issues unresolved, namely the restitution of Quebec, restitution of prizes of war and the final payment of Henrietta Maria's dowry.[9] The Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye (1632) sought to deal with these matters. By far the most complex issues during the negotiations were the points relating to ships and cargos seized during the conflict (discussed more fully in Chapter IV). In this context, in 1631, the Crown sent specific and detailed instructions of the information they required from their agents.

> '1 First to mark diligently which ships the king hath there their burthen names building what ordinances they have aboard what on shore their bore & how many of them they can carry whither they are rigd or not & how by whatperson & by how many they are guarded & lastly what number of men may be stoged in them for transportation
> 2 What magazines or storehouses there be & how they are furnished wth mass cables anchors pitch & the like sea provisions wherein the enquiry must not listed to what belongs to the king onely but what may be usually furnished thence of the ordinary provisions of the pleace of what nature & what quantiy the place of it selfe afforded
> 3 They you are to enquire what number of shipping belong to the pleace their burden where they use to traffique & wth what comodityes that stronge ships do trade there with what wares & what are their returnes their number the burden what tyme of the yeare they come thither & depart what mariners those of that place use in their voyages whither natives or strangers by wch it may be guessed what number every place doth yield'.[10]

This is a comprehensive and very precise list of information. At this time mutual restitution was being discussed. These are clear information demands from policy makers. They

[8] SPF, German States SP 81/48 143, Instructions for Sir Wm. Curtius.
[9] V. Tapié, *France in the Age of Louis XIII and Richelieu*, trans. & ed. D. McN. Lockie (London, 1974), p. 255.
[10] SPFF, SP 78/89 154, Wake to Dorchester, 30 May 1630.

wanted to know what preparations the French had undertaken for future maritime conflicts should a privateering conflict resume. While numerous ships' lists are provided throughout the State Papers France, and also of Holland, this was not a regular demand made to all agents based abroad. This request was a response to specific needs.

The texts of the period provide an equally long list of information that a diplomat would need to transmit to their superiors at home, in order to fulfil their duty. According to Hotman,

> 'hee shall do well to learne, what is the forme of gouernment of the Countrie, wherein hee is, the limites, greatnesse and largenesse thereof, the maners of the people the numbers of places of strength, hauen and vessels, the store-house of munition, the forces of warre for see and land G what may be drawne out of the Country without unfurnishing the frontiuer and places of importance, the entrance into the Countrie, the ordinarie and extraorinarie reuenuewe and Treasure and meane in ready mony, the alliance offensive and defensive with other Princes and Estates neare or far off the traffike and if it be a Prince to know the humour and the inclination of him'.[11]

This is not the limit of needs for Hotman, or other writers of the period, who would have their diplomats learn everything and 'Aboue all, let him always haue an eye abroad into the country, to discouer if there be any stiring against the seruive of his Master or against his confederates'.[12] The English writer, James Howell, simply states that he should 'report to him that sent him ... most diligently'.[13] This implies that everything which comes to his notice should be reported! Abraham de Wicquefort, writing near the end of the period under consideration, perhaps most succinctly summed up the prevailing view on what information was needed to be sent and how. 'The Embassador cannot be too reserv'd in writing of News either general or particular. He ought to be very punctual in sending that which comes to his knowledge'.[14] This appeared to be the general attitude taken by English agents abroad. They would report in detail, when requested to, about a certain matter, and would always report

[11] J. Hotman, *The ambassador* (London 1603), p. F7-G.
[12] *ibid.*
[13] J. Howell, *Proedria Vasilike a Discourse Concerning the Precedency of Kings* (London, 1688), p. 196.
[14] A. Wicquefort, *The Rights, Privileges, and Office of Embassadors and Publick Ministers to Which Is Added, a Discourse Concerning the Succession in the German Empire*, trans. J. Digby, 2nd edition (London, 1740), p. 361.

fully on any legal dispute they were engaged in. Outside these confines, they reported whatever news reached them, as quickly as possible, even if it appears to modern readers to be entirely frivolous.

Gathering Information in Foreign Nations

The approaches that an agent used to gather information varied, both with the individual and the posting. There was no prescribed set of procedures laid down by the government for the nation to which he was accredited. They can, however, be broken down into a number of methods; attending Court, interacting with fellow diplomats and merchants (this method is described in detailed instructions from Whitehall). Consuls and personal contacts were used, to a greater or lesser extent, in different nations. Each of these different sources will be examined in turn.

Attending the court provided much of the information which was later reported back to the home government by the agents. This was the primary method for gaining information advised by the texts of the period.[15] While the agents would not have been invited to the more intimate gatherings, or on the royal hunt (a time when much information might be acquired according to Hotman), information could still be had by mere attendance.[16] Information was traded during the period, in what Ramond has called, the 'common currency of social exchange' and that 'to be esteemed as a source of or conduit for news conferred a measure of status and position'.[17] In such a market place, the English agents would have been well placed to trade information with those at court. News dissemination was also considered

[15] J. Hotman, *L'ambassadeur* (London, 1609), p. 44.
[16] *Ibid.* When there were multiple diplomatic agents in France the usual procedure appeared to be that one would remain in Paris and the other would follow the King if he moved away from the capital.
[17] J. Raymond, *The Invention of the Newspaper: English Newsbooks 1641-1649* (Oxford, 1996), p.1; N. Greenspan, 'News, Intelligence and Espionage at the Exiled Court at Cologne: the Case of Henry Manning', in J. Raymond (ed.), *News Networks in Seventeenth-Century Britain and Europe* (Oxford, 2006), p. 105.

'a direct route to social contact'.[18] Even the nobility at court could inquire about news from their social inferiors, as Charles de L'Aubespine, marquis de Châteauneuf did with Henry De Vic, without being seen to impugn their status.[19] Thus discussions at court, where agents were regular attendees, provided information useful for the government. Announcements were often made at Court, such as which noble was to have command of the army.[20] These were public proclamations, but still news which needed to be reported to the government. Less official news was also reported. The correspondence of agents is littered with references to which person made which claim at Court, such as Charles de Saint-Maure's claim that the Abbess of Fontevraud only received preferment because of her relationship with Madame de Montespan.[21] Assessments were also given of why such a claim was made and if it was likely to be true or not.

Coupled with transacting news at the Court with members of the government, was trading of news with other foreign diplomats, also attached to the court. This was a similar process of gaining social currency and had the additional benefit of allowing agents to tap into information networks of foreign powers. Many discussions were had between English and other diplomats, notably the Venetians and others from the Italian States, over news they received and the news which was put out by the government to which they were accredited.[22] These contacts, with ambassadors of other nations, could come under the category of public announcements, such as the Spanish Resident informing the diplomatic corps that he 'had a letter from Madrid of the 28th past (two days since the late courier brought the ill news of the

[18] B. Dooley & S. Baron (eds.), *The Politics of Information in Early Modern Europe* (London, 2001), p. 17.
[19] SPFF, SP 78/88 249, Augier and De Vic to Dorchester - 3 letters, 20/30 March 1631.
[20] Perwich regularly reported on this. For example, see; SPFF, SP 78/133, Perwich, 19 March 1672.
[21] SPFF, SP 78/131 27, Perwich, 4 February 1671.
[22] Such as the Ambassador Girmolamo Soranzo's opinion that a 'seasonable peace should not be lost for the convenience for the Pole', and that the treaty with the Ottoman Empire would go ahead regardless of the Polish King's delays. See HMCD, ii, 79, Robert Sutton to William Trumbull. The Ambassador from Savoy 'was pleased to send' to William Perwich the letter he received from Madrid when both of them were in Paris. SPF, France SP 78/127 Perwich, 27 July 1669.

King's being in danger) which sayd hee was recovered & very well againe'.[23] Or they could be more subtle, when sounding out intentions, such as when one agent was told 'by the Dutch minister [Pieter de Groot, son of the jurist Hugo Grotius] here that Holland takes it soe ill that y$^{e}$ French make such a vast imposition upon all their comodities that they will bee forced to break off all commerce with France'.[24]

Questions can rightly be raised about the accuracy of the information provided by fellow diplomats. Misinformation was ever a possibility, as Henry Wotton's famous description of an ambassador makes clear.[25] Agents did report when they felt that the information was of questionable value. However, the majority of the time they did not report that they felt the information they passed on to other diplomats was false. They had, therefore, sufficient belief in the truthfulness of that information at the time to pass it on, without a disclaimer, and that they felt their source was acting in good faith.

Whitehall obviously believed that merchants could be important sources of information for its diplomatic agents. This is clearly illustrated in a long letter sent to the embassy in France which, after detailing what information the government expected to be collected on their behalf, went on to discuss methods that should be employed. This letter of instruction was sent on 28 May 1631; some time after a permanent English diplomatic presence was re-established, after the Anglo-French War of 1627. However, secret agents had gone to France during the war, including one of the newly appointed agents, Henry De Vic.[26] The agents, when travelling in the places where they 'finde the most part of their sea preparations', were to 'take notice of the cheefe marchants in the Towne as well natiues as stranger especially

[23] SPFF, SP 78/129 145, Perwich, 14 June 1670.
[24] M. Park, *The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century The Gold Age*, trans. Diane Webb (Cambridge, 2005), p. 56; SPFF, SP 78/127, Perwich, 5 October 1669.
[25] I. Walton, *The Lives of Dr. John Donne, Sir Henry Wotton, Mr. Richard Hooker, Mr. George Herbert* (London, 1898), p. 155.
[26] R. Lockyer, *Buckingham, the life and political career of George Villiers, first Duke of Buckingham, 1592-1628* (London, 1981), p. 347.

English of whose names you are to take a list'.[27] While this may at first seem to be a mere platitude that would be provided with every set of instructions, these directions are not a regular feature of Stuart or Interregnum diplomatic instruction. These English merchants are expected, by Whitehall, to provide the backbone of the information network that the agents would use. The agents are then directed that 'among those English marchants wth either by address or chance You shall meete wth all you shall make choice of one who for his ablites & affection to his Ma service you shall judge most fit to give mee advertism'.[28] Interestingly, there is no direction of what, if anything, the agents had to offer the merchants in exchange for the work, which the government was about to ask them to undertake. It would seem that Whitehall believed that natural affection for his majesty would provide a number of willing servants to the cause. Following this plan, set out by Whitehall, and with these new merchants-come-informants recruited, the agents are finally directed 'wth him you shall leave a cipher to be used by him in his letter both for his now safety & the security of the service'.[29] Thus, having only recently met their new informants, the agents were ordered to leave their cipher with them so they could receive correspondence in secret from them.

What resulted from this attempt in France to recruit a large number of merchants to provide information for the government? The results were obviously not what Whitehall had desired. It did not take long before the agents at the embassy reported that they were preparing a new cipher to use, because the one previously employed was no longer secure.[30] No list of recruited merchants was sent back to Whitehall. This is to be expected. The risk of interception of this information was very high and it is rare to have written records of informants from the period.[31] There is clear evidence that the ports were visited, as De Vic

[27] SPFF, SP 78/89 154-155, Wake to Dorchester, 30 May 1631.
[28] *Ibid.*
[29] *Ibid.*
[30] SPFF, SP 78/89 366, Wake to Dorchester, and duplicate, 22 July/1 August 1631.
[31] Roosen, *The Age of Louis XIV: the Rise of Modern Diplomacy*, p. 153.

was shipwrecked when travelling back from one of the trips to the French ports.[32] These instructions described are the only time that specific instructions on how to gather information are provided by Whitehall to the diplomats in France.

This example does not mean that the merchants Whitehall expected to be recruited did not provide a good source of information on many other occasions. Of particular note are the monopoly trading companies. They often had a role in selecting the agents or ambassador who would serve in their region of trade. These selections frequently came with elaborate contractual agreements, with the government and the ambassador, about sharing the costs of the embassy.[33] They also, and most importantly, provided a readymade information network, that of the company to the diplomat.[34] The extensiveness of such networks varied between the trading companies and the areas in which they operated. The Levant Company maintained three consuls of its own, at Constantinople, Aleppo and Smyrna.[35] This certainly appears to have been an effective system and information from there was passed to English diplomats in the Italian States, as will be seen later. There was no such widespread provision by the Muscovy Company or the Merchant Adventurers. However, even these companies would have had access to useful information. While these men served the Company and not the Crown directly, some of them, such as Paul Rycaut in the Levant, believed that they were also there to serve the Crown.[36] There were times, however, when this ready-made system of information gathering was not accessible to the agents stationed in those areas. Richard Bradshaw, when serving in Hamburg, filled many letters with his complaints against the

[32] SPFF, SP 78/89 390, De Vic to Dorchester, 29 July/8 August 1631.
[33] To follow the course of negotiations through changed in unsigned agreements. See SPF, Russia SP 91/3. For discussion of Henry Finch third earl of Winchilsea negotiations, see S. Anderson, *An English Consul in Turkey: Paul Rycaut at Smyrna 1667-1678* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 39-48.
[34] Though the diplomat was also required to write and inform the Company of occurrences. See Anderson, *English Consul*, p. 25.
[35] *Ibid.*
[36] Anderson, *English Consul*, p. 26.

Merchant Adventurers, including them not keeping him fully informed.[37] Bradshaw, however, was a Commonwealth appointment and was deeply unpopular with the Company. Added to this, the recently deposed Crown appointee, Joseph Avery, remained in Hamburg as well. This accounts for the lack of help which Bradshaw received from the Merchant Adventurers and should be viewed as a deviation, rather than the norm. While these sources of information were important in the Ottoman Empire, Russia and the Hanse Towns, in providing the diplomat with a network of people to assist with information gathering, such sources were not available for the majority of the English diplomatic agents posted elsewhere.

Unlike merchants, the consuls employed by the government were expected, and explicitly required, to provide information to the ambassador or agent, the diplomat standing at the centre of the government's information network in a foreign nation. Consuls were a relatively new development in England, with the word only entering the English language in 1599.[38] The idea of political consuls was an even later development, as the resistance to Francis Cottington's appointment in Spain shows.[39] As consuls were invariably located at the main ports of a nation, the work of monitoring naval preparation by a potential adversary could be greatly eased by their diligent work; the records, however, do not reflect this in practice. In France, William Perwich complained that 'M$^{r}$ Codgill at Marseilles never gives us any advice of occurrences there some very considerable happening weekly worth our information'.[40] Perwich went on to complain that 'Wee never had but one letter from him & that was 5 months since'.[41] The service the embassy received from their consuls was evidently not good.

[37] Richard Bradshaw served as the agent for the Commonwealth & Protectorate in the Hanse Towns from 30 January 1650 to 15 August 1658. For more details of his long running dispute, see G. E. Aylmer, *The State's Servants* (London, 1973), p. 127; and SPF, Hamburg and Hanse Towns SP 82/7-9.
[38] D. Fox, *Manchester Consuls* (Lancaster, 2007), p. 6.
[39] C. Carter, 'Anglo-Spanish relations and the development of modern diplomacy: Persistent sources of friction affecting the peacetime routine, 1604-1625' (Tulane Univ. Ph.D. thesis, 1989), pp. 129-149.
[40] SPFF, SP 78/127, Perwich, 21 September 1669.
[41] *Ibid.*

A further indication of this is where Perwich attributes information from Marseilles the next year 'I received from ye Dutch consul at Marseilles'.[42] The working arrangement had clearly not improved if he was forced to rely on the Dutch. Thus a source of information, which would be expected to provide regular and detailed reports to the diplomats, often failed to provide any information at all. The power of the state to compel them to perform their duties was extremely limited, as they held their posts by patent. This situation often left agents to find for themselves the information required by London.

The number of consuls had increased throughout the period. By 1679 there were around 34 consuls, though there had been fierce resistance to this growth by merchants and also the local town authorities where they were based.[43] This resistance was due to either the charges that were levied on the merchants to pay for them, for example in the case of Bordeaux where both the merchants and the *Cour des aides* at Bordeaux were unhappy at this imposition, or because the merchants believed that those appointed were less than competent to fulfil their duties.[44] More consuls, however, should imply more men sending more information but agents' complaints about consuls increased after the Civil War.

It may be this was caused by the Restoration and the previous, more diligent, incumbents being replaced with 'deserving Royalists' and consulships being used as rewards.[45] If, however, the consuls appointed by James I and Charles I were no more diligent than those appointed by Charles II, the question becomes why were diplomats far more concerned with Consuls writing to them after the Restoration than before?

What can be suggested is that before the Restoration, as shown in the previous chapter, there had been an oft-travelled pathway to becoming an agent, from beginning as a secretary in an embassy, often for a number of years, and then promotion to agent and then, in a number of

[42] SPFF, SP 78/129 8, Perwich, 18 January 1670.
[43] V. Barbour, 'Consular Service in the Reign of Charles II', *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (April, 1928), pp. 578, 558.
[44] *Ibid.* Fox, *Manchester Consuls*, p. 6.
[45] Barbour, 'Consular Service', p. 556.

cases, promotion to a higher diplomatic rank, all frequently in the same country as they had started as a secretary. In this time they would build up a network of friends, contacts and associates and thus there was less need for them to rely on officials, such as government consuls. This pathway was disrupted by the Interregnum. After the Restoration, the desire for demonstrated loyalty was paramount; therefore the majority of agents employed by the Protectorate were excluded, with the exception of Joseph Kent who remained in the Italian States.[46] The agents dispatched by Charles II were less likely to have served as secretaries before their appointment than those under Charles I; for example Ralph Montagu, John Trevor, Ignatius White and Meredith Rogers had not served in a subordinate capacity abroad, before being appointed to act as a diplomat. Some men had lived in the countries they had been appointed to, such as Sir Richard Bulstrode. However, Bulstrode was resident in the Spanish Netherlands for two years in prison! Bulstrode was later appointed auditor of a Scottish regiment in the Spanish Netherlands. The only post-Restoration agents to have long experience in the country to which they were appointed were Francis Parry (Portugal), John Robinson (Sweden) and William Perwich (France). Without time to build a network of contacts in the nation, as for example Trumbull did in the Spanish Netherlands by aiding merchants in court cases, agents would be forced to be far more reliant on the Consul as the official source of news.[47] There is a notable decrease in references to information provided by friends and acquaintances in the early parts of the post-Restoration missions. There would have been an expectation of information from the Consuls, which wasn't forthcoming, and hence the increase in complaints.

Inevitably, outside the network of accredited consuls, there are a number of problems when identifying the sources of some of the information which the English agents would later pass

[46] Lachs, *The Diplomatic Corps*, p. 59.
[47] I. Uddin, 'William Trumbull: A Jacobean Diplomat at the Court of the Archdukes in Brussels, 1605/9-1625' (Univ. of Leuven Ph.D. thesis, 2006), pp. 84-95.

on to their masters in Whitehall. There are numerous occasions when the source that has passed them information of importance is only recorded as 'a gentleman of quality', or 'a good hand' or, more rarely, 'a friend of mine'. The most regularly used of these terms is 'a gentleman of quality' which tells us little.[48] However, from the information we are provided, by men of quality, it seems most likely that these men were of similar standing and status as the agents, i.e. government officials who were not members of the great nobility, but most likely functionaries with whom agents socialised.[49]

A 'friend of mine' is a term less used, although it still peppers the correspondence of agents throughout the period. From the background of a number of agents, it is not surprising that they had friends in the countries to which they were sent to serve. Réné Augier was associated with the household of Queen Henrietta Maria, being considered by the Venetians as 'a particular servant of the queen'.[50] Henry De Vic, alongside whom Augier was serving, had acted as an envoy to Huguenot leaders during the Anglo-French war. Evidently this must has eased Augier's access at court. Later, while still in France, Augier also had regular access to Anne of Austria, and was the intermediary in passing her correspondence with the Spanish Netherlands and the Marquis de Mirabel, the former Spanish Ambassador.[51] This was a position of enormous trust. This may also explain why Cardinal Richelieu was far more likely to meet with Henry De Vic, than with Augier, when both agents were serving together.

While copious professional correspondence for diplomatic agents survives, when attempting to reconstruct their network of personal interaction difficulties are encountered. For example, the letter books of Balthazar Gerbier clearly cannot contain copies of all his correspondence.

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[48] Though it is interesting to note that the Earl of Shaftsbury wrote *'Letter from a Person of Quality'*. See M. Knights, 'John Starkey and Ideological Networks in Late Seventeenth-Century England' in Raymond (ed.), *News Networks*, p. 135.

[49] Most often technical details of army movements, court cases and governmental changes.

[50] A. B. Hinds (ed.), 'Venice: March 1635, 1-15', *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, Vol. 23: 1632-1636 (1921), pp. 336-345, accessed 7 Feb. 2011, at http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=89356. [British History Online] The name is misspelled as Ogier in the source text.

[51] M. G. Brenna, *The Sidneys of Penshurst and the monarchy, 1500-1700* (Aldershot, 2006), p. 142.

In the State Papers, there are letters, which he sent to Viscount Scudamore while ambassador in France, which are omitted from his letter books. Gerbier clearly recorded what he considered his most important letters in the letter books, along with his dispatches, and only occasionally recorded others.[52] One of the few complete collections, which contains both the letters the agent received and sent, personally and professionally, is that of William Trumbull, from his service in the Spanish Netherlands. This correspondence gives us an idea of who Trumbull was and the type of correspondence carried out by an English diplomatic agent. Trumbull corresponded widely with men such as Wolfrad von Plessen, who served as ambassador to the United Provinces for the Elector Palatine in 1615, as well as the French diplomat, and later theorist, Jean Hotman, and the Dutch agent in Cologne, Henry Bilderbeck.[53] In the Spanish Netherlands, the men Trumbull corresponded with have been described as having 'few high profile figures' within the administration, apart from the Advocate of the Council of Brabant, Jean Thymon.[54]

Trumbull's network of correspondence was not merely limited to government functionaries and other diplomats. It included all who could potentially provide information for him in different parts of the Spanish Netherlands. At Antwerp, the English merchants who were trading in the Spanish Netherlands, such as Lionel Wake, wrote to Trumbull, as well as providing books and other luxuries, as did the English merchant John Chandler.[55] Trumbull

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[52] For example, Gerbier's letter book contained in SPF, Archives of British Legations, SP 105/14, Letter books of Sir Balthazar Gerbier [d'Ouvilly], minister at Brussels contains letters to the Duke of Lenox, Earl of Northumberland, Earl of Holland, Secretary of State Sir John Coke, Secretary of State Sir Francis Windebank, Lord Aston, Ambassador to Spain, and William Boswell, agent in the Low Countries.

[53] HMCD, iii, 5, M. De Plessen, 16 January 1611; Allen Hinds (ed.), 'Venice: April 1615, 1-15', *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, Vol. 13: 1613-1615 (1907), pp. 397-414, accessed 6 February 2011, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=95900. [British History Online]. HMCD, ii, 375, Jean Hotman to William Trumbull, 18 October 1609; HMCD, ii, 213, Henry Bilderbeck to William Trumbull, 14 January 1610.

[54] Uddin, 'William Trumbull: A Jacobean Diplomat', p. 19; HMCD, ii, 19, William Trumbull to ___, 18 January 1607.

[55] Lionel Wake was not a relation of the contemporary diplomat Sir Isaac Wake. See W. Wake, A *Brief Enquiry into the Antiquity, Honour and Estate of the Name and Family of Wake* (Warminster, 1833), pp. 60-67; and HMCD, ii, 2, Lionel Wake to William Trumbull, 7 December 1605. HMCD, ii, 183, Jean Beaulieu to William Trumbull, 12 November 1609; HMCD, ii, 4, Samuel Calvert to William Trumbull, 23 February 1608.

also benefitted from correspondence with English refugees, such as Sir Thomas Leedes, and members of the Irish Regiment in Spanish service. Trumbull, therefore, had a wide network, both within the Spanish Netherlands and outside of it, to provide information to him, with a number of well-placed diplomats, merchants at major trading centres and government officials, to supplement the information he received at official interviews and through memoranda.

To what extent is Trumbull, with his wide ranging correspondence, indicative of the rest of the diplomatic agents? Could it be that Trumbull was atypical in writing so widely? Considering that there is evidence for regular entertainment together between diplomatic agents, it seems logical to conclude that there would be a similar tendency to correspond and that all diplomats would have done so.[56] It cannot be proved beyond all doubt that Trumbull's behaviour was not an anomaly; however, Edmondes (the previous holder of Trumbull's post) implies that he should correspond with those that he had previously.[57] Further to this, Thomas Floyd, as servant of Edmondes, wrote to Trumbull to ask him to help his friend and kinsman, Humphrey Lloyde, with the promise that for such help and correspondence Lloyde would repay Trumbull in kind.[58] This suggests there were a number of people who believed it was to their benefit to begin corresponding and providing information to diplomats, in the hope of some advantage from the information they received in return. This is an example of the wider information economy of the seventeenth century. While professional news writers developed in Venice and Rome, who commercialised news though the *reportisti* and *menanti* which later spread across Europe, there were other forms of 'selling' news, not for immediate monetary gain but for social gain.[59] Filippo de Vivo describes the complex forms of information exchange in Venice, from the streets and the Rialto where even foreign

[56] R. Clayton, *Diplomats and Diplomacy in London 1667-1672* (Univ. of Oxford D.Phil. thesis, 1995), p. 150.
[57] HMCD, ii, 177, Sir Thomas Edmondes to William Trumbull, 2 November 1609.
[58] HMCD, ii, 162, Thomas Floyd to William Trumbull, 19 October 1609.
[59] F. de Vivo, *Information and Communication in Venice, Rethinking Early Modern Politics* (Oxford, 2007), p. 81.

ambassadors and nobles went for news, to the use shopkeepers made of news to attract the wealthy and others into their premises.[60] Those who could provide news were highly respected and sought after.[61] It is in that context that the information gathering and exchange conducted by diplomats must be seen.

There was always open to any diplomat the opportunity to pay for the information which he required. However, there is no evidence that this was usual practice employed by the English agents. The pay of such agents was often in arrears, and rarely settled until years after they had completed their service to the Crown. Isaac Wake's widow was still petitioning after his death for expenses he incurred while serving as an agent, and he had been promoted to Ambassador to France after this![62] Such strained financial situations suggest that an agent would have precious little gold to make the cabinet of princes fly open. Added to the problems of being able to buy information with these limited resources is the questionable value of such purchased information. The case of the Spanish ambassador, Bernardino Mendoza, suggests that it was possible to spend a great deal of money on secret service agents and get very little in return.[63]

The news and intelligence, which Whitehall required an agent to report, was not of a kind which required a great and complex information gathering network. This was the public news, which the government was happy and even desired to be reported widely, even for no other reason than to stop reports to foreign government of 'false rumors which are ordinarily spread by the enimies of an Estate' as Hotman stated.[64] Such information would be readily available to agents, despite their inferior status compared with ambassadors, and would be provided in a variety of forms. These could range from audiences with members of the government, or other important figures, such as Joseph Avery's interview with the Chancellor

[60] Vivo, *Information and Communication in Venice*, pp. 91, 95, 96.
[61] *Ibid.*
[62] British Library, Egerton MS 2597, fol. 112.
[63] Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 246.
[64] Hotman, *L'ambassadeur*, p. 19.

of Saxony, where he was told the position of the government in detail.[65] Information also came in the form of official proclamations, which were freely sold in Paris to anyone and were eagerly purchased by the diplomatic corps in the city, as well as printed speeches of nobles and leaders in the government; these naturally varied, depending on the constitutional arrangement of the nation involved, but there is evidence of speeches made by the Prince of Condé, to the Estates of Brittany in August 1630, being high on the list of items to obtain by English diplomats in France.[66] Official ceremonies and events were widely reported by diplomats of the period and, while there was a need for interpretation of some of these events, such as the French royal ballets, they also provided public news which was reported back to Whitehall by the English diplomats.[67]

## Communication between Diplomats

### The Structure of England's Transnational Diplomatic Information Network

The methods by which information was transmitted between diplomats, serving in often far off outposts, and the government they served, is rarely if ever considered in terms of day-to-day practicalities in diplomatic history. When they are considered, the central theme is the hazards of the journey and the threat of interception.[68] When the organisational and administrative issues surrounding foreign diplomacy are considered, problems such as the disorder of the record office and Richelieu's need to ask for copies of the instructions from his diplomats in 1616, are normally the areas highlighted.[69] Alternatively, single occurrences of the poor handling of communication are used to berate statesmen for their policy and

[65] SPF, German States, SP 81/43 198, Avery to Coke, 24 August 1636.
[66] SPFF, SP 78/87 137, De Vic, 25 August 1630.
[67] See M. Christout & F. Bassan, 'Ballet: Incarnation of Allegory' *Dance Chronicle* Vol. 18, No. 3 (1995), pp. 427-435.
[68] Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, pp. 247-252.
[69] Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 231; Tapié, *France in the Age of Louis XIII and Richelieu*, p. 103.

actions, such as the Anglo-Danish and Anglo-Swedish abortive treaties, which were supposedly 'hampered by carelessness on the part of Clarendon', when two conflicting treaties were drawn up by the English diplomats.[70] Neither of the diplomats involved had any understanding of what the other had offered and they had therefore drawn up treaties which were mutually exclusive.

In so far as it is considered, the network that diplomats used to transmit information is assumed to be one in which information is passed, from the areas where diplomats of all ranks worked, back along the major postal routes, to arrive in the central government at Whitehall. From there pertinent information would be collected, interpreted and distributed back to the agents at other postings, while instructions relating to the information would be returned to the sender of the information. This framework envisages a central controlling mind, located around the King (or Protector or Council of State), which received the information and then formulated policy for each diplomat to act upon. Unless it was important, and related to their agency, each diplomat would not know what was occurring with each of his fellows in other parts of Europe, unless the Secretaries of State had decided that this information was of significance and had sent them summaries, or copies of the dispatch.

This view is challenged by evidence from agents and ambassadors at the time. The view of a central information controller in Whitehall does not reflect the reality of the network used by English diplomats for transmitting information. The network and system which emerges from consideration of diplomats' instructions, correspondence and accounts, suggests a much more open network where all information was fully shared. The sharing of apparently irrelevant information should not count against the efficiency of such a network.

[70] R. Hutton, *Charles the Second: King of England, Scotland and Ireland* (Oxford, 1989), p. 221.

Viewing the correspondence of English diplomats, it is readily apparent that they did not merely report what was occurring in the locality to which they were accredited. This can easily be demonstrated by examples from a number of different missions, at different points in the period. Henry De Vic and Réné Augier, during their French agency, passed on information from a number of different locations**:** from Monferrato, about the continuance of the siege there and that 'the retrenchment of y Spaniards att the farther ende of y Bridge' had not occurred as the French had told them it would**;** from Germany were received reports of the state of the forces of the Catholic League's army and the Emperor after the successes of Gustav Adolphus.[71] Joseph Avery, in his mission in Germany, sent back news from the United Provinces.[72] Meanwhile William Perwich, in France, continued to provide information from outside his immediate area of residence, including news from even as far afield as Poland, concerning the movements of the forces in the Polish-Ottoman War and the on-going siege of Lvov, which would eventually fail.[73] The vast majority of these reports are not attributed to any source. Those that are include De Vic's report from Spain that the treasure fleet had arrived, and Perwich's report on politics in Poland.[74] The sources for these reports were listed as 'the ordinary' from Madrid and the courier respectively.

It is clear from these few examples (of many instances) that news could be provided by agents from across Europe. How was this information obtained from outside the state to which they were attached? One possibility could be that this information came from other diplomats also attached to the same court. Yet the regularity of information suggests that,

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[71] Sir Henry De Vic served in France among other postings from 2 January 1630 to 21 October 1636. See G. Bell, *A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives 1509-1688* (London, 1990), p. 110. Réné Augier served initially as English agent in France from 23 February 1629 to 25 July 1640. Bell, *A Handlist*, p. 109. SPFF, SP 78/87/132, De Vic to Dorchester, 13 August 1630. SPFF, SP 78/87/125, De Vic to Dorchester, 12 August 1630; and SPFF, SP 78/89/15 Sir Isaac Wake to [Viscount Dorchester] and duplicate, 3 May 1631.

[72] SPF, German States SP 81/30/170, Mem. of Mansfelt to Lords of the Council for arms.

[73] William Perwich served as agent in France from 1 May 1672 to 29 September 1677. See Bell, *A Handlist*, p. 120; and SPFF, SP 78/134 244, Perwich, undated.

[74] SPFF, SP 78/87/563, Augier and De Vic to Dorchester, 25 December 1630; SPFF, SP 78/134 183, Perwich, 18 August 1672.

either the English diplomats were highly skilled at getting information from their colleagues, or that large amounts of news was regularly distributed amongst all diplomats. The idea that news was used as a social currency of exchange challenges this latter idea. An alternative suggestion is that diplomats subscribed to newsletters and they were simply passing on what is related there. While there is no doubt that agents and the Secretaries of State subscribed to newsletters, such printed or manuscript materials were enclosed, rather than copied out, when sent to Whitehall.[75]

If both of these methods of information gathering seem unlikely then a third method might be proposed. Each diplomat employed by the State not only reported to Whitehall what had transpired in his area of responsibility but also reported the same information to his colleagues at other postings.

The most explicit evidence for this is an account by the English Ambassador to the German States, based in Frankfurt, Sir William Curtius, who at the end of this tenure, wrote a memorial detailing the duties he had undertaken and the manner in which he carried them out.[76] This memorial was considerably less common outside of Venice, where the writing of *relazione* was a requirement.[77] Personal audiences with the King, the Secretary of State or a special committee of the Privy Council, to provide an oral account were far more common in England, where formal written reports were more often used to justify conduct when needed.[78] Ordinarily such a document would be of little interest to this study as it does not exclusively deal with the work of an agent.[79] Further to this, Sir William did not have an

[75] P. Fraser, *The Intelligence of the Secretaries of State & Their Monopoly of Licensed News 1660-1688*, (Cambridge, 1956), p. 64.
[76] SPF, German States SP 81/56 Mem. Of William Curtius .William Curtius served as agent in German from 17 September 1639 – 1658; Bell, *A Handlist*, p. 145.
[77] Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 113.
[78] Lachs, *The Diplomatic Corps*, p. 43.
[79] Though Sir William Curtius did serve as an agent from 17 September 1639- 1658, the documents seem to relate mostly to his later time as an Ambassador. There is some confusion as a number of these individuals named did not serve during the time he acted as an ambassador.

agent working with him at the time of his embassy, however, at the end of his memorandum he lists

> 'he kept correspondency according to the first instructions with Sr Richard Browne at Paris Sr H de Vic at Brusselles Sr Williaam Boswel at the Haghe Mr Avery at Hambourg Mons Taylor at Vienna Sr Gilbert Talbot at Venice Sr Oliver Fleeming in Switzerland'.[80]

All of the above diplomats are agents, thus they, and their stations, are included in the news information network and would receive copies of information which Sir William Curtius was able to glean in Frankfurt. While 'keeping correspondency' does not imply a strict weekly ordinary dispatch, as writing to Whitehall entailed, there is clear evidence that regular correspondence did occur between diplomats, and even evidence for a weekly correspondence.

It is possible to represent on a map the routes which Sir William Curtius used to send his information from his posting to the rest of Europe. This is shown in Figure 1.[81]

[80] SPF, German States SP 81/56 Mem. Of William Curtius.

[81] While it is not explicitly stated it has been assumed that Sir William Curtius also corresponded with the Court.





**Figure 1 Known lines of correspondence by Sir William Curtius**

With each diplomatic agent, ambassador and envoy likewise ordered to send copies of the information they received at their posts to the others employed elsewhere, this would have created a complex network of news interchange. Expanding upon the map in Figure 1, if all the posts mentioned by Sir William Curtius were involved, the network would look like Figure 2.





**Figure 2 Network if each diplomat to whom Sir William Curtius wrote followed his example**

What is visible from this extrapolation is a complex web, where information from one part of the network could pass to any other, through a variety of different routes. For instance, if the route for information from Venice via France was blocked for some reason (be it conflict or adverse weather over the Alps) it could have passed alternatively via Germany and then through to the United Provinces and Harwich and then back to London.[82]

Was this network, described by Sir William Curtius, the standard operating system used by the English government during the period? Or was it an aberration caused by the individuals involved, or circumstance, rather than a conscious policy? No other agent, or ambassador, provides such a comprehensive list of those with whom they corresponded during the period of their work. As has been discussed, oral reports were far more common in England.

[82] Dutch mail passed through Harwich every Tuesday and Thursday and then onto London. See J. Hemmeon, *The History of the Post Office* (London, 1912), p. 114.

However, other evidence, from the instructions the government issued to its diplomats, can be found to support the assertion that this was the standard way the government expected the system to operate.

Evidence, from the limited number of instructions from the period which have survived, gives clear direction on what was expected, by the central government in Whitehall, of each of the agents employed by them. In terms of communication these instructions can be divided into two sub sets. The first type is for short missions. These instructions were given to an agent whom it was intended would travel to a nation for a short period and carry out a set mission before returning.[83] In these instructions, little reference is found about keeping in contact with home, or with other agents, and this is hardly surprising. Considering the short length of some missions, it is clear that a letter would not have time to travel, for example, from London to Amsterdam.[84] The second set is instructions to agents who were sent to reside in a specific area for a prolonged period. In these instructions it is possible to find clear commands to keep in contact with other diplomats and agents, for example the instructions given to William Boswell.[85] Boswell was sent as agent to the States General, and his instructions include the clear directive that he:

> 'Shall hold correspondence with al our ambassadors and agents in other countries who shall have like direction to keepe intelligence wth you'.[86]

Richard Brown, who was sent to reside at the French Court, also received such instructions from the government in Whitehall.[87] The government commanded him that for:

> 'Your better light and information herein you are to bey of intalligont wth our ambassador and agents with outher princes and state to whome wee will grant ordor to correspond wth you'.[88]

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[83] Such missions as John Belasyse's mission to compliment Louis XIV at Dunkirk. See Bell, *A Handlist,* p. 119.
[84] H. Joyce, *The History of the Post Office from Its Establishment Down to 1836* (London, 1893), p. 27.
[85] Sir William Boswell agent and later ambassador to the Low Countries from 31 January 1631 to June 1649. See Bell, A *Handlist*, p. 199.
[86] SPF, Holland SP 84/144 168, Instructions for Sir Wm. Boswell, with draft and abstract.
[87] Richard Brown agent to France from 20 July 1641 to December 1650. See Bell, *A Handlist,* p. 112.
[88] SPFF, SP 78/111.

John Berkley, who served in Sweden as agent (though his instructions also order him to pass via Danzig), was instructed that he should:

> 'You shall write on all occasion and us often as you can to give us knowledge of you proceedings and of the state of affaires and occurrences'.[89]

This was followed by orders to correspond with other diplomats, though unusually and far more specifically than normal, that Berkley especially:

> 'shall hold correspondence both with M Auvery and also wth Sr William Boswell'.[90]

Did such a system operate in practice or were these just rhetorical flourishes in instructions? A document called 'Occurrences till ye 12th of July 1665' provides a detailed listing of occurrences in the Ottoman Court and the trading centre at Aleppo to the knowledge of the English diplomats stationed there. This document is specifically addressed to 'For Sr John Finh his Maties Resident wth ye Gran Duke'.[91] The suggestion that agents were obligated to pass on a précis of information, which they received from other postings, is also supported by a document of the same time, where Sir John Finch wrote to Whitehall and, apart from the usual information from his posting, also included information which Finch had received from the Ottoman Empire. This was not all however, despite its position, or perhaps because of it, Finch also had information to relay from the English garrison at Tangiers to the English court.[92] Further evidence of this practice comes from a series of letters written to Viscount Scudamore, while he was serving as ambassador in France, from the resident agent in the Spanish Netherlands, Balthazar Gerbier. While these do not appear to be the complete collection of letters sent, they provide evidence that Gerbier regularly wrote to Scudamore

[89] SPF, Sweden SP 95/4 162, Instructions for John Berkley for Sweden, with draft.
[90] *Ibid.* Only a limited number of instructions for agents have survived but these contain references to corresponding with other ambassadors and agents in order to be informed more generally of the political news on the continent.
[91] SPF, Tuscany SP 98/6, Occurrences till ye 12th of July 1665.
[92] Sadly the originals of the letters from Tangiers have not survived with that of the Ottoman Empire.

about occurrences in the Spanish Netherlands and that Scudamore preserved many of these letters and forwarded the information.[93] Gerbier's letter books provide a selection of those letters he wrote during his time in the Spanish Netherlands, for example in May 1637 he wrote to the agent William Boswell on the first, the fifth and the twelfth, while July saw letters on the seventh, the twenty-first and the twenty-seventh.[94] While this is not a constant weekly correspondence, it is only one less letter a month than Gerbier wrote to the Secretaries of State. Gerbier was keeping Boswell nearly as well informed as Whitehall.

Conclusive proof of the correspondence between agents is unlikely to be available, as the personal papers of agents were rarely, if ever, preserved and the individual packets sent to them from other agents are now lost. Yet the evidence, provided by their dispatches to Whitehall, does show that information from other diplomatic posts was sent to them, and from there was forwarded to Whitehall, even if it did not directly affect their actions, thus creating a backup system for the transmission of news back to England.

## Reasons for the Use of this Structure

Little evidence exists to explain why the diplomats should use the network of communication which has been described above, bar vague references to the good of the king's service from being better informed.[95] However, by contrasting what could be achieved by the diffused network of information sharing that existed with a network centred on Whitehall, reasons may be identified.

There are a number of explanations why this network structure might be adopted. Firstly, and probably the most important, would be duplication of information to prevent a single point of failure. If each of the agents, in each of the areas, was sharing the information they obtained

[93] NA, Chancery: Master Harvey's Exhibits: Duchess of Norfolk's Deeds C 115/105, News letters from Balthazar Gerbier in Brussels to Viscount Scudamore.
[94] SPF, Archives of British Legations, SP 105/14, Letter books of Sir Balthazar Gerbier [d'Ouvilly], minister at Brussels.
[95] SPF, Holland SP 84/144 168, Instructions for Sir Wm. Boswell, with draft and abstract.

with their colleagues, it is far more likely that this information would be received in Whitehall eventually than if it was only sent from where it had originated. The example of the Ottoman Empire is a case in point.[96] Throughout the period, there was never any guarantee that ships departing from Constantinople would reach England, not just for the usual reasons of the hazards of the sea, but also due to the activity of the Barbary Corsairs.[97] The Corsairs made regular descents upon unguarded ships in the English-occupied port of Tangiers.[98] War could also cause a major disruption to the diplomatic postal network, especially with foraging armies operating along communications lines. Yet even during a war, it is possible that the English diplomats would be able to receive information via neutral states, from both sides of the battle lines.[99] The problem of transmitting letters was clear and one which was understood and considered. By the end of the period, Abraham de Wicquefort points out, in his treatise on diplomacy, that 'there are a thousand Accidents which may make his Letter miscarry, or cause them to be intercepted'.[100] From this fear of interception of mere accident delaying the transmission of information back to their government, Wicquefort suggests that 'When he writes about Affairs of Importance and the Ways are not very safe, it is proper to send duplicates'.[101] Thus manuals of the period advocate at least some backup plans in the information network used by diplomats. From there it is not a great leap to consider that the English government believed its agents sharing information with one another provided a greater probability of that information's arrival than simply sending an additional copy via another route, for example sending messages by both Rouen and Calais in France. There are numerous duplicates in the State Papers of dispatches from English

[96] SPF, Tuscany, SP 98/6, Occurrences till ye 12th of July 1665.
[97] Anderson, *English Consul*, pp. 191-193.
[98] J. Childs, *The Army of Charles II* (London, 1976), p. 131.
[99] While there are no orders for this secondary sharing of information from one posting to another it seems highly unlikely that useful information arriving in France from the Empire would not have made its way to diplomats in Sweden, to give but one example.
[100] Wicquefort, *The Rights, Privileges, and Office of Embassadors*, p. 363.
[101] Wicquefort, *The Rights, Privileges, and Office of Embassadors*, p. 375.

embassies. It seems improbable, for example, that in France, Augier and De Vic felt the need to send three copies of a dispatch to London as they did on the 25th February 1636.[102] By duplicating information and sending it to others, they created a network, which not only allowed them a great deal of confidence that their reports would eventually reach their destination, but allowed them to gather information from both sides of warring nations.

Apart from duplication of dispatches, this network would potentially provide every agent in the network with information from every other posting. This allowed each of the English diplomats abroad a rather impressive view of the totality of events from across the entire continent. Indeed, as has been shown, there is evidence of dispatches from outside Europe reaching the network from the Levant and also Tangiers. The question is why an English diplomat would need to have such good grounding in events from around the continent, which might not directly affect his mission or posting?

One credible theory for the access which this network would allow English diplomats is, as previously mentioned, that news was a kind of currency used at court and traded for other information.[103] As discussed earlier, news could break through social boundaries and provided a route to being esteemed among members of the Court. Such a network would allow agents, and ambassadors, a plentiful supply of currency, in order to 'purchase' the information which was required for them to carry out their instructions. In his treatise on how to act as an ambassador at a foreign court, Hotman told those who wished to perform their duties well that 'it is a shame to an Ambassadour that stranger should know the newes of his countrie before him' and that if they received their news from others at their posting they would be esteemed by their hosts little, while those who always had up-to-date news would be esteemed greatly, especially if it was from a third county.[104] Hotman suggested that every

[102] SPFF, SP 78/88, De Vic and Augier to [Dorchester].
[103] Raymond, *The Invention of the* Newspaper, p. 1.
[104] Hotman, *L'ambassadeur*, p. 19.

diplomat should 'haue some friends in court which many aduertize him often of that which is done'.[105] The network of communications, envisaged by instructions, did not meet the needs of providing news from their home country. That was the responsibility of Whitehall, and specifically the Secretaries of State. This complex network would have provided a much wider selection of information, and links to Hotman's idea of a friend providing news from home, but covering everywhere where diplomats were posted.

Objections could be raised to this system of information exchange that it would, by giving the diplomats information before the court received it, create a more decentralised foreign policy with agents acting on information as they received it, and unduly diluting the control of the King. As was shown in many of the debates of the period, the monarchy, and later the Protector and Council, were keen to keep foreign policy their prerogative. They were greatly resistant to any attempt by Parliament to dilute their control over this area of policy and often provided restrictive orders to their diplomats.

Every diplomat, however, still received his instructions from the Secretary of State. While there was latitude within them, the diplomats knew they must ultimately justify their conduct. Also an agent, who acted in a way the government did not wish to be bound by, could be disavowed for exceeding his instructions, leaving in the hand of central government the final veto over any actions performed on their behalf in negotiations.[106] In the example of the English agents, and later Ambassador, negotiating mutual restitutions with the French in the 1630s, those present in Paris negotiated the treaty but it could not be ratified by them. It was subject to review and eventual ratification by Philip Burlamachi, who was sent from England with plenipotentiary powers for that purpose.[107]

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[105] *Ibid.*

[106] A regular ploy when a ruler did not wish to be bound by a treaty their diplomats had negotiated. Richelieu employed this tactic when he heard reports that the Comte de Bautru had made a compromising treaty. See D. P. O'Connell, *Richelieu* (Letchworth, 1968), p. 193; Tapié, *France in the Age of Louis XIII and Richelieu*, pp. 224-226.

[107] See Chapter V of this thesis on negotiations for more details.

The transport networks available at the time also present a strong argument for a decentralised system of correspondence and foreign policy. While impressive speeds could be achieved by the postal system, and by agents and their servants during the period, with turnaround of important messages being as quick as four days from Paris, this was the exception rather than the rule. Further to this, speeds had not greatly increased since the time of Charles V, of 100km per day.[108] England's island nature meant that, if the winds in the Channel were contrary, it was possible for dispatches to end up backlogged at one of the Channel ports and, although dispatched in various weeks, they would arrive at Whitehall on the same day.[109] Even where travel was overland, there were still frequent delays and agents were not slow to complain about them. Perwich was clearly plagued in France by inattentive correspondents - 'wee can yet get noe letter from Holland. It is 2 months since we had any thence' - as were other diplomats.[110] While a cause was usual identifiable for delays, such as the weather, it was not always so easy to allocate blame: 'what troubles us y$^{e}$ more is y$^{t}$ we cannot divine, what ye reason of it should be y$^{e}$ weather having been very good'.[111] However, if we view a lack of complaints, and evidence of news from outside the nation that they were accredited to, as signifying that they were receiving the information they needed, then the system appears to have operated well. Considering the distance and time that was involved, if all information had to flow to London and first be digested and analysed, and then sent out to the agents in the field, it is obvious that for far flung postings it would have taken an inordinate length of time for them to learn of developments from Whitehall. As many of the dispatches to London were likely to travel through other postings, it makes sense that copies of news could easily be deposited en route rather than waiting for Whitehall.

[108] M. Hollingsworth, *The Cardinal's Hat* (London, 2005), p. 69.
[109] Pencil marks on the reverse of the letter would appear to indicate the arrival date.
[110] SPFF, SP 78/127 86, Perwich, 31 August 1669.
[111] SPFF, SP 78/139 156, Perwich to Secretary Williamson, 12 December 1674.

## The Practicalities of Posting Diplomatic Information

The methods used to gather information have been discussed and the interlocking network of information exchange, in which agents engaged, has also been outlined. It is now necessary to examine the practicalities and problems associated with sending the information onwards, to other agents, and also homewards, to Whitehall and the government situated there. The use of the postal service and couriers will be considered, as well as the security precautions taken by agents, to ensure that their correspondence arrived at its destination without being tampered with.

### Ordinary & Express

News in the period generally followed the rhythm of the postal network in the Empire, operated by the Taxis family, with one or two ordinary posts a week, depending on the importance of the destination and the demand associated with it. All those who produced texts, on diplomacy and diplomats, stressed that a diplomat 'ought also to write on all occasions'.[112] In France there were two ordinary posts, which English ambassadors and agents wrote their dispatches for. One went to Rouen and one went via Calais. These then linked into the English postal distribution out of the Kingdom, which sent post into France via either of these two ports.[113] We can assume that once the post arrived in port it was in the hands of the English postal service for the remainder of its voyage, as it was the English postal service that operated the boat across the channel from these two ports.

How diplomatic dispatches arrived at these destinations is less sure. It was always possible for diplomats to use the host nation's postal network as a courtesy; however, this had obvious drawbacks in terms of vulnerability to interception and being read by the host nation. Another option would be a member of the embassy staff. In France, it might have been possible for

[112] Wicquefort, *The Rights, Privileges, and Office of Embassadors*, p. 375.
[113] Joyce, *The History of the Post Office*, p. 47.

one of the servants to travel back and forth weekly, between Rouen and Paris.[114] In other embassies, which were farther from the official English postal system, or English shipping, such practices would not have been very efficient, or practical. During his mission in Germany, the only other person who is referred to by Joseph Avery, who might be available to send messages, is his trumpeter. By contrast with the ordinary post, an express seems mostly to have been carried by a servant of a member of the embassy, returning in haste to London, and rarely to have been entrusted to the national post system of the host country. Although staffeto post (a non-stop post service with much reduced travel times) operated from Calais to England after 1633, and the possibility of tampering would have been lower, as any delay would have been far more noticeable.[115] Still it would appear that the most important messages were always accompanied by someone trustworthy from the embassy staff, riding post all the way to London.

Even after the safety of the post departing their embassy had been assured, by whatever means the ambassador felt to be necessary, there was still no guarantee it would safely reach London, even had it arrived at the channel untouched by foreign hands. Once loaded onto the English postal services boat, which was armed with six guns, the boat could still easily be overcome by pirates who infested the Channel. So bad did this in fact become that in 1636 the postmaster of Dover was robbed five times within seven weeks, four of those by the French and once by a Flushinger'.[116] Not to be outdone by the French, during the Interregnum, Royalists Privateers also preyed on the packet boat.[117] During these attacks, the King's or Lord Protector's mail was no safer than any other item aboard. When pirates attacked the postal service it was usual to strip passengers 'of all their money, apparel and

[114] The distance being only 77 miles.
[115] H. Robinson, *The British Post Office: A History* (Princeton, 1948), p. 29.
[116] Robinson, *The British Post Office,* p. 160.
[117] P. Arblaster, 'Posts, Newsletters Newspapers: England in a European system of communications', in Raymond (ed.), *News Networks*, p. 28.

goods, and took from the post all his bundles of letters among which was a packet from the King'.[118]

Despite the difficulties which faced diplomats in sending their packets to London, in the form of spies and pirates, the speed of express post could be impressive. Richard Browne was able to send his servant with express information to Whitehall and received a reply within four days. This was a very impressive speed from Paris to London, across the channel and back, including the time spent in London awaiting a reply from the government. It was faster than the estimated usual speed of diplomatic information, of 60 miles in 24 hours (this was for land based travel).[119] Travel involve corssing the Channel could take longer, for example news of the Royalist defeat at Worcester took nine days to reach St Germain, a distance of 437 miles including the Channel crossing.[120] Both of these were much slower than the intended rate of the English postal service, which was planned to cover 120 miles every 24 hours, though it appears not to have reached that heady rate.[121] It is harder, however, to calculate the speed that regular post would have travelled at. The public post service, it was alleged, usually required eight and sometimes fourteen days from London to Antwerp under the administration of De Quester.[122] This was later improved, under the tenure of Thomas Witherings, Postmaster of Foreign Mail, to three days from London to Antwerp.[123] After 1653 and the passage of the Post Office Act, English diplomats could look forward to the government operating a twice weekly mail boat to Paris, the Hague, Brussels, Cologne, Hamburg and Leghorn, increasing the chances of a diplomat being near a port from which

[118] J. Hyde, *The early history of the post in grant and farm* (London, 1894), pp. 31-32.
[119] D. Woolf, 'News and the pamphlet culture of mid-seventeenth-century England', in B. Dooley & S. Baron (eds.), *The Politics of Information in Early Modern Europe* (London, 2001), p. 85.
[120] Woolf, 'News and the pamphlet culture', p.85.
[121] Robinson, *The British Post Office,* p. 16.
[122] Robinson, *The British Post Office*, p. 27.
[123] *Ibid.*

English Post Office vessels would collect the mail. This act was re-enacted almost verbatim by the Convention parliament of 1660.[124]

The use of the ordinary and express posts, and the question of which was appropriate, and for what sort of information, appears not to have been fully defined by the central government. Nowhere in the surviving instructions are there references to the sort of information which should be sent back post haste and that which could be dealt with by the ordinary post. Even the texts of the period are unwilling to provide information on this point. 'It is his business again to judge what he ought to write in Cypher, and when the Importance of an affair is such as to deserve an Express. There is no Rule to be given on all these Heads'.[125] After the period under consideration, in 1697, the issue was addressed directly by Rousseau de Chamoy, a minor diplomat who had served Louis XIV in Stockholm and represented him at the Imperial Diet.[126] Rousseau de Chamoy dictated the express should be reserved for finished treaties, "extremely urgent affairs", if the ordinary post was entirely broken, or if there was no other way of getting a letter through.[127] Before this limited advice, agents and other diplomats were clearly expected to know what information required an express and what could wait for the ordinary. Sir Isaac Wake, while ambassador to France, wrote to the Secretaries of State at Whitehall asking for direction on the issue of when an express should be used and what news could wait for an ordinary.[128] The answer which is preserved is not greatly illuminating and does support the idea that experience in foreign affairs should teach when an express was

[124] J. Raithby (ed.), 'Charles II, 1660: An Act for Erecting and Establishing a Post Office', *Statutes of the Realm*: Vol. 5: 1628-80 (1819), pp. 297-301, accessed 31 October 2011, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=47283. [British History Online]

[125] Wicquefort, *The Rights, Privileges, and Office of Embassadors*, p. 359.

[126] F. Callieres, *The Art of Diplomacy,* trans. & eds. H.M.A Keens-Soper & Karl W. Schweizer (London, 1983), p. 38.

[127] L. Rousseau Chamoy, *L'Idée du parfait ambassadeur,* ed. L. Delavaud (Paris, 1912), p. 40.

[128] A man long experienced in diplomatic work having served as agent in Italy and ambassador in Venice and Savoy before being sent as Ambassador to Louis XIII.

needed. They replied that 'one so long in his Ma service should not need direction'.[129] As seen in Chapter I, many of the agents had served as secretaries to embassies for a number of years before they were accredited to a court independently. In such time they would, therefore, have learned from experience what information was sent by express in an embassy and what information was sent by ordinary.

This lack of any standard regulation, or even rule of thumb, which new staff could be advised of, must have resulted in a large amount of variation in the information, in different courts, which was considered worthy of express and even variations within postings, depending on who was serving at any given time.

An interesting case study for the use of the post comes from a comparison of the attitude taken by English diplomats in France to two events, usually thought to have been complex and confused at the time; the War of the Mantuan Succession (1628-31) and the Day of the Dupes (1630).

In the case of the War of the Mantuan Succession, it seems that expresses were sent regularly, in addition to the ordinary diplomatic packet, when it was thought that a major change in the situation on the ground in Italy had occurred. These messages were often contradictory. De Vic reported peace in his dispatch of the 12 September 1630.[130] The treaty of Regensburg was not signed until the 13 October.[131] However, in an express just two days later, he reported that 'Wee holde here all traties of peace to bee absltly broken in Italy'.[132] De Vic would later report peace again after the terms of Regensburg reached Paris, prompted by the reaction of Claude Bouthillier, Secretary of State, who organised a widespread proclamation

[129] This begs the question of why Wake requested direction; one could suggest that his lack of familiarity with France having only served in Italy may have contributed to his request. Or the possibility that, as Louis XIII's sister was Charles I's wife, he wished to know if domestic news should be treated as more important than it would in the Italian courts. Sadly Wake's original request does not survive.
[130] SPFF, SP 78/87 198, De Vic to Dorchester, 2 September 1630.
[131] Tapié, *France in the Age of Louis XIII and Richelieu*, p. 226.
[132] SPFF, SP 78/87 216, De Vic to Dorchester, 4 September 1630.

and celebration of the peace.[133] Despite being an intimate of Cardinal Richelieu, Bouthillier believed that the terms of the peace were acceptable to him and France; it was not until the 1 November that the English agents were confident that Bouthillier was certainly mistaken about the peace of Regensburg.

Given the remoteness of the English agents from events, it is hardly surprising that solid news was hard to come by.[134] De Vic lamented the poor quality of the information he was passing on, but excused himself that

> 'If they that are att the Springe have no clearer waters it is no greate wonder I those that come to us att so greate a distance bee troubled howsoever wee can discerne in them a confused image of the war or of a disuantagious Peace for this kingdome'.[135]

However, the large number of short letters detailing news which had just arrived suggests that, during an uncertain time, a large amount of money could be spent very quickly on postal charges in an attempt to keep Whitehall informed of developments. Often contradictory news reached Paris on the same day.[136] A variety of happenings made a clear understanding of the events even more complicated, such as news of the September truce, the death of Ambrogio Spinola on the 23 September and Mazarin's continued peace efforts in Italy after the peace of Regensburg. Finally, the illness of Louis XIII threatened the reversal of the entire French policy. Indeed, no one appears to have expected the resolution, with Mazarin riding before the French army proclaiming peace, before it had occurred. These events were reported with astonishment.[137] The treaty of Cherasco, the terms of which Mazarin had presented before Casale, was not finally signed until June 1631. Once news of Mazarin's ride before the armies deployed at Casale arrived, the follow of further news decreased dramatically. The

[133] SPFF, SP 78/87 372, De Vic to Dorchester, 1 November 1630; Tapié, *France in the Age of Louis XIII and Richelieu*, p. 226.
[134] Even modern historians state the situation was confusing. See L. Moote, *Louis XIII The Just* (London, 1989), p. 212.
[135] SPFF, SP 78/87 153, De Vic to Dorchester, 21 August 1630.
[136] SPFF, SP 78/87 1-153.
[137] SPFF, SP 78/88 94, Augier and De Vic to Dorchester, 1 February 1631.

fact that two treaties had been concluded in separate locations, with one then repudiated, made matters more complicated for all involved.[138] Indeed, news of the general peace was proclaimed as a fact far outside France after the Treaty of Regensburg.[139] It is hardly surprising that, in such a complex situation, the news from the French court was less than ideal and required a large number of expresses to be sent.

It is impossible to discover the cost of each individual express. The standard rate for a letter from England to Paris was charged at 9d per sheet for the ordinary service, with express being charged at many times more.[140] As 9d was already near the daily pay for a labourer, or private in the Tangiers garrison, the costs incurred in postage must have been very high during uncertain times like the Mantuan Succession crisis.[141] De Vic and Augier were in fact to receive a special payment of £120 to defray the costs from the Mantuan War of Succession 'due for port and postage of letters'.[142] This differed from the French service where, if the government was not entirely satisfied with the reasons for sending an express, the individual would be expected to defray the cost themselves.[143]

From England, under postmaster De Quester, there were a number of standard charges for expresses, paid on departure and not on receipt. Whether these prices prevailed for the entire period is uncertain. All of these were packets to be carried by special messenger costing, to The Hague £7, to Brussels or Paris £10, and finally to Vienna £60![144] These are truly staggering sums of money, with a single express to Vienna costing almost two months wages for a diplomatic agent. Even the cheaper cost of sending an express to Paris would become financially onerous if the situation was uncertain and fast changing. The consequence of

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[138] O'Connell, *Richelieu*, p. 217.
[139] O'Connell, *Richelieu*, p. 219.
[140] Joyce, *The History of the Post Office*, p. 49.
[141] Childs, *The Army of Charles II*, p. 126.
[142] J. Bruce (ed.), 'Charles I - volume 186: March 1-18, 1631', *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I, 1629-31* (1860), pp. 522-542, accessed 13 December 2011, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=52121. [British History Online]
[143] Roosen, *The Age of Louis XIV: the Rise of Modern Diplomacy*, p.130.
[144] Hemmeon, *The History of the Post Office*, p. 135.

hiring a courier to carry a private express could be a great burden on a diplomat's personal finances and credit.

The issue of when diplomats needed to pay for postage is not necessarily clear, though a number of assertions can be made. The English Post Office demanded payment for the carriage of letters once they had entered the kingdom if they had come from Europe.[145] In general, only by prior agreement and treaty, were letters carried into England and then bills sent to the English Postmaster-General.[146] It was not until 1698 that an effective postal treaty was enacted between England and France, ensuring that, after pay on departure, a letter would travel further in France than Paris. This cost the English government £3,500 annually.[147] Sir Richard Bulstrode, who served in the Spanish Netherlands, while writing the usual complaints about his unpaid salary, lamented that even had it been paid it would not have been sufficient because of the cost of 'postage of Letters, not only from England but from other Places where I have a constant Correspondence, costs me much besides'.[148] Even if there were agreements whereby postal charges were only levied on delivery, England was always in a disadvantageous negotiating position when attempting such agreements, due to the need to use either the French or Taxis network to pass letters further.[149] English diplomats would still face high postal charges from just the correspondence which was incoming to their embassy, even if the higher cost of sending letters into England was met at Whitehall. It is obvious, from the case of Bulstrode, and the additional payments for postage to De Vic and Augier, that the cost of sending on information was a concern to some agents. This would be especially true for those who were posted to areas which more often required expresses sent, than the quieter courts.

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[145] Hemmeon, *The History of the Post Office*, p. 30.
[146] Hemmeon, *The History of the Post Office*, p. 111.
[147] Robinson, *The British Post Office*, p. 161.
[148] Sir R. Bulstrode, *Original Letters Written to the Earl of Arlington by Sir Richard Bulstrode, Envoy at the Court of Brussels from King Charles II, &c. Containing the Most Remarkable Transactions, Both in Court and Camp, During His Ministry* (London, 1712), p. 7.
[149] Fraser, *The Intelligence of the Secretaries of State,* p. 63.

The Day of the Dupes, where one would have expected a great number of dispatches, as the situation changed and many rumours filled the courts and spread over Paris, received far less notice in general, and certainly less expresses.[150] There is a reference to the disgrace of Cardinal Richelieu.[151] This message is short and was sent on the 11 November. The information was provided to De Vic by 'a very good hand' in note form. This was duly reported to London, though in doubtful tones. A second message, sent on 12 November, in the ordinary packet, stated that the Cardinal had not fallen and that the information previously dispatched was incorrect. Indeed, in light of new information received, De Vic boldly declared that 'But it is out of question that the Cardinal will fall' the only 'ende this business will take is as yet uncertaine' was the fate of the Queen Mother and her suite who plotted against the Cardinal.[152] This echoed the Venetian ambassador's assessment that both Gaston and the Queen Mother were dangerous, he 'did not know if the Cardinal will succeed' in defeating them. Despite the Comte de Serrant labelling it, 'the day of the dupes', it does not seem that the English diplomats were long duped, if they ever were.[153]

## Keeping Dispatches Secret

When considering the security of information sent back to England, there appears to have been limited use of ciphers and rarely is the entire document encoded.[154] This ran counter to the usual advice of the texts of the period, which all stressed the importance of cipher, with de Wicquefort even going as far as to declare that 'One may say that a Cypher ... is a kind of

[150] Moote, *Louis XIII The Just*, p. 217. It was after all in the words of Moote, 'a fundamental turning point in Louis XIII's reign and in French and European History'. See Moote, *Louis XIII The Just,* p. 199; O'Connell, *Richelieu*, p. 232.

[151] This may be more concerned with the offices he held from the Queen Mother as it states he was entirely in disgrace with her. See SPF, France SP 78/88 374 Mr Brown's Report from Sir Isaac Wake, 19 April 1631. SPFF, SP 78/88 374, De Vic to Dorchester, Paris, 11 November 1630.

[152] SPFF, SP 78/88 378, De Vic to Dorchester, Paris, 12 November 1630.

[153] H. Griffet, *Histoire du regne de Louis XIII* (3 vols.; Paris, 1758), ii, p. 74.

[154] Few whole documents appear in cipher and while occasional passages are rendered in cipher this too is a rare occurrence, for the most part the diplomats wrote in plain text.

Magick'.[155] Yet even with his enthusiasm for the use of ciphers, he informs readers that 'It is no hard matter to invent a million of new ciphers, but it is almost impossible to find out any that cannot be unravel'd by those who have a little genius that way and a great deal of use',[156] thus demonstrating the drawback of the substitution codes used during the period. This said though, some of Charles I's encoded dispatches were not decoded for 200 years.[157] There appear to have been two standard practices used by English agents. The first was to substitute names, though these could easily be guessed at by the context, or the encoding of sensitive paragraphs. Below is an example of the use of a substitution code by Henry De Vic, English agent in France.




**Figure 3 Extract of a report from Henry De Vic using a substitution code, the meaning was later written onto the document.[158]**

Both of these practices were designed only to prevent the speedy copying of a dispatch, rather than being proof against breaking after falling into the hand of expert cryptographers.[159] Such codes were not used until late in the period, according to cryptographer John Wallis.[160] From this it would seem that the agents believed the precautions they took when delivering the

[155] Wicquefort, *The Rights, Privileges, and Office of Embassadors*, p. 359.
[156] *ibid.*
[157] J. W. Thompson & S. K. Padover, *Secret Diplomacy A Record of Espionage and Double-dealing: 1500-1815* (London, 1937), p. 261.
[158] SPFF, SP 78/101 8, H. De Vic to Secretary of State, 3/13 May 1636.
[159] Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, pp. 248-50.
[160] C. Scriba, 'The Autobiography of John Wallis, F.R.S.', *Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Jun., 1970), p. 38.

most important letters (often those sent most quickly) would prove sufficient to prevent them falling into unwanted hands.

It is worth noting that even Joseph Avery, when travelling through Germany during the Thirty Years war, did not encode his letters. As these dealt with his conversations with a number of rulers and high government officials, this is most surprising.[161] At no point does Avery account for this himself and, while there are no letters from Whitehall covering the issue, the fact that later letters are not encoded supports the notion that encoding was not desired or requested. It is possible to offer two suggestions why this is the case; one being that, as one early modern ambassador expected, there being 'nothing of offence in plain writing, I opened it [his packet] in the king's presence' meaning that nothing that could not be shown was transmitted openly.[162] The second suggestion is that the limited knowledge of English, 'where they did not expect foreigner to speak English in England or understand it abroad' provided an additional protection to the English diplomat who almost always wrote his dispatches in English.[163]

Further credence is lent to this argument by two pieces of evidence. Firstly, when the English agent William Trumbull was corresponding with Tobias Mierbeech, a magistrate of Antwerp, fears were raised that their letters were being intercepted and read by others.[164] As a result of these fears, Mierbeech provided Trumbull with a cipher to use in future correspondence that he claimed was 'so easily [used] that it can be read without confusion, surpassing any cipher ever invented'.[165] It is important to note that this correspondence was carried out in French rather than English, the language of Trumbull's regular diplomatic dispatches. Despite being

[161] Such as the Elector of Saxony. See SPF, German States SP 80/84 188.
[162] Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 250.
[163] Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 237. The only occasions of an English diplomat writing home not in English appear to be some letters by foreign nationals employed by the English government such as Réné Augier, who wrote in French, and Gregorio Monti who wrote in Italian.
[164] K. Zedler (ed.), *Die Matrikel der Hohen Schule und des Paedagogiums zu Herborn, herausg. von G. Zedler und H. Sommer* (Wiesbaden, 1908), p. 37.
[165] HMCD, iii, 375, T. Mierbeeck to William Trumbull, 5 October 1612.

told that the mail was likely to be intercepted, there is no increase in the use of cipher in Trumbull's diplomatic dispatches to London. This shows that the precautions he was taking with regard to these were considered adequate for their protection. The second piece of evidence, that English was a safe language in which to correspond, comes from the letter books of Balthazar Gerbier who, when corresponding with Réné Augier, wrote in French rather than English.[166] Here, rather than the rare use of encryption, it is resorted to regularly, and not only a substitution code as shown above, but rather more complex codes as shown below.



**Figure 4 – Extract from one of Balthazar Gerbier's letters using the more complex code.[167] Unlike most examples of substitution codes a translation has not been added to the letter.**

This provides evidence that, when writing in the more widely known French language, English diplomatic agents took greater precautions. The case of Réné Petit indicates the dangers which were faced by English agents when their letters were intercepted. It was for supposed libels against the King of France, contained in his diplomatic dispatches, that Petit was imprisoned in the fortress of Pignerol, usually reserved for political prisoners of

[166] This is unsurprising as both were Huguenots, though Gerbier's family were émigrés.
[167] SPF, Archives of British Legations SP 105/14; Letter books of Sir Balthazar Gerbier [d'Ouvilly], minister at Brussels.

importance. Louis XIV did eventually release Petit, though Petit was forced to remove himself from Paris as a condition of his freedom.

The Meaning and Consequences of the English Communication Network

From the instructions, memoirs and dispatches of diplomatic agents of the period, there emerges evidence of a complex interdependent network which relayed diplomatic information and news from all points of Europe back to Whitehall. Due to the multiple deliveries of the same information, and the forwarding of this information to London, diplomats could feel confident their news would eventually reach its destination. Such a network suggests that the Stuart diplomatic service was more advanced in terms of its organisation and structure than is usually pictured. It demonstrates that thought had been given to the problems it was likely to encounter. While this is significantly more impressive than is often envisaged, a system could not be designed that would mitigate England's island position and the dangers of shipwrecks or of privateers seizing communications, as the fate of the Postmaster of Dover amply demonstrates.[168] However, the use of multiple dispatches from different points did increase the chance of the news reaching London.

The system provided English diplomats with news from the entire continent, and from even further afield, at a time when information was treated like a currency and 'to be esteemed as a source of or conduit for news conferred a measure of status and position'.[169] When a key part of the mission of the diplomat was to maintain and improve the reputation of their master, the ability to be first with the news was important.

The network was not so advanced as to be able to untangle the complexities of major conflicts which were distant to the diplomats, as seen with the Mantua Succession crisis. However, it is doubtful that any of the competing diplomatic services in the period were any

[168] Robinson, *The British Post Office,* p. 160.
[169] Greenspan, 'News, Intelligence and Espionage', p. 105.

better placed to understand large-scale complex conflicts which were occurring on the periphery of their diplomatic area of operations. Indeed, even members of the French and Imperial governments were struggling with the complexities of negotiations in both Regensburg and in Italy, during a brief suspense of arms. Richelieu was unaware of all the clauses in the treaty, signed by François Leclerc du Tremblay and Nicolas Brûlart de Sillery, until it reached him, where he was enraged by them.[170] Conversely, when closer to events, English diplomats were able to find accurate news swiftly, as in the case of the Day of the Dupes, before all the French court were aware of the full implications, and could inform their masters what had happened and make correct predictions of future events.

Considering the limitations, imposed by both technology and the financial resources allocated to diplomacy, the Stuart diplomatic corps must be judged to have produced an impressive system, which reduced single points of failure to a minimum and could ensure that information always flowed back to London, even if it did so in a roundabout way rather than directly.

[170] Tapié, *France in the Age of Louis XIII and Richelieu*, p. 226.

# Chapter III Defending the Rights of Subjects

## Diplomatic Agents and Trade Disputes.

A survey of the books relating to diplomacy and the duties of diplomats, like the one conducted in the Introduction, yields few mentions of merchants other than their unsuitability to be entrusted with the important rank and post of ambassador.[1] Yet even a brief study of the State Papers of the period would yield a plethora of information about merchants and in particular the work which diplomats undertook on their behalf. Aiding merchants was not one of the key duties of a diplomat according to authors of the period, nor has it been greatly considered by historians since, with one going as far as to call this work a 'petty task'.[2] There were even those who disagreed with diplomats acting to help merchants. In Spain, the Duke of Infantado suggested to the English Agent, Francis Cottington, that he should not concern himself with the affairs of merchants. Cottington vehemently disagreed with this suggestion.[3] Cottington's view was taken from Salisbury, who was firm in the belief that it was part of a diplomat's duties to aid the King's subjects abroad.[4] Salisbury reminded William Trumbull that he was 'emplloyed there for the dispatch of such affaires as concernes his matie, or his subiects'.[5] From the letters and reports, it was clear that all agents agreed with Cottington and that it was one of the most regularly undertaken, frustrating and time consuming duties of diplomats and especially diplomatic agents.

This chapter will consider the work undertaken by diplomatic agents in relation to merchants and their disputes. Firstly, how the expectations of government help in private business

[1] J. Hotman, *L'ambassadeur* (London, 1609), p. 8.
[2] I. Uddin, 'William Trumbull: A Jacobean Diplomat at the Court of the Archdukes in Brussels, 1605/9-1625' (Univ. of Leuven Ph.D. thesis, 2006), p. 84. G. Jacobsen, *William Blathwayt: A Late Seventeenth Century English Administrator* (London, 1932), p. 66.
[3] SPF, Spain, 84/17 207-22, Cottington to Salisbury, 14 October 1610.
[4] Especially his relatives, who were in need of money. See Chapter II of this thesis.
[5] HMCD, iii, 80, Salisbury to Trumbull, Whitehall, 11 July 1611.

disputes developed will be briefly addressed. The type of cases and in what ways they came to be taken on by diplomats will be considered. The two usual routes merchants took to gain access to the aid of diplomats, by personal appeal to the individual and via the King or Privy Council, will be examined. Whether the route chosen led to a noticeable difference in the outcome for an appeal will also be considered. The work of agents trying to resolve a trade dispute will be examined through a case study. This single dispute went through a series of typical stages before being resolved diplomatically. This type of resolution, however, was in fact an unusual occurrence. Other agents, acting similarly at other times, and in other States, enjoyed less success. Finally, the results of these various interventions will be considered, seeing the usual lack of impressive resolution, and what the process and outcomes tell us about the diplomats and the utility of this work.

## Responsibility for Defending a Subject's Rights

Before looking closely at how diplomats involved themselves in merchants' disputes, it is important to gain some understanding of why they did so, and how this involvement had developed over time. This relates to a complex series of interconnected developments which may have begun in the late middle ages.[6] It, of course, has no mono-causal explanation. A number of factors can be seen to have caused so much of diplomats' time being devoted to dealing with mercantile disputes.

As with much of the early development of diplomacy and commerce, the Italian States had begun to develop a rudimentary system for resolving disputes long before the rest of Europe.[7] Merchants of one nation, trading in a port, elected their own Consuls to resolve disputes between them, but also to make representation on their behalf to the government which ruled

[6] N. S. B. Gras, 'Economic Rationalism in the Late Middle Ages', *Speculum*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (July, 1933), p. 307.
[7] G. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (London, 1955), p. 32; M. E. Mallett, 'The Sea Consuls of Florence in the Fifteenth Century', *Papers of the British School at Rome*, Vol. 27 (1959), pp. 157-160.

there. Like the Italian diplomatic method, this system then spread to other nations, eventually becoming the norm.

One key factor which created such a large workload for the Stuart agents was the decline or abolition of merchant monopoly trading companies, such as the Andalusia Company. These companies, when geographically focused in specific ports, employed consuls of their own to defend the rights of company members. Paul Rycaut, in Smyrna, for example, demonstrated the effectiveness of a merchant consul. Rycaut was able to persuade the local governor to prevent the use of debased foreign currency in the region and disassociate the English Levant Company from the use of debased money.[8]

As these organisations declined, there was no longer necessarily a company consul. However, the trading merchants still required some form of official representation to the prevailing powers. This responsibility was transferred to the Crown. English merchants also called upon diplomats to resolve disputes between themselves.[9] Agents William Trumbull and Richard Bradshaw were asked to perform this function.[10] Agents were thus called upon to fulfil another of the old functions of a merchant company consul.[11]

The need for representation of the merchants in disputes continued and the diplomatic agents filled the gap. One of the clearest examples of this is in Spain. Before the Anglo-Spanish War (1585–1604), the vast majority of the trade in Iberia, carried out by English merchants, was through the Spanish Company, incorporated in 1573.[12] This had originally been incorporated

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[8] S. Anderson, *An English Consul in Turkey: Paul Rycaut at Smyrna, 1667-1678* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 178-185.

[9] C. Henneke, 'The Art of Diplomacy under the early Stuarts, 1603-1642' (Univ. of Virginia Ph.D. thesis, 1999), p. 292.

[10] It was usual for the agent in Hamburg to be a deputy of the Merchant Adventurers and thus was expected to help resolve disputes within the company. However Richard Bradshaw did not hold this position throughout his time as agent but was still called upon to resolve disputes. See T. Birch (ed.), 'State Papers, 1657: April (4 of 7)'; *A collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe*, Vol. 6: January 1657 - March 1658 (1742), pp. 198-208, accessed 23 April 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=55590. [British History Online]; T. Birch (ed.), 'State Papers, 1655: July (1 of 6)', *A collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe*, Vol. 3: December 1654 - August 1655 (1742), pp. 599-613, accessed 23 April 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=55394. [British History Online]

[11] Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p. 67.

[12] P. Croft, *The Spanish Company* (Chatham, 1973), p. xiii.

under Henry VIII as the Andalusia Company.[13] The company provided consuls, stationed in Seville and Lisbon, to help its members. When trade resumed in 1604, after the Treaty of London, attempts were made to reintroduce the Spanish Company.[14] However, this failed following the Commons debates on free trade. The result of the introduction of free trade with Spain was that disputes became the responsibility of the English diplomats there, in the absence of a company member to act on the merchants' behalf. Similar situations can be seen in France, the Spanish Netherlands and the Dutch Republic.[15] In each of these states, trade was not organised through a monopoly company, although the Merchant Adventurers had a large share of the trade in the last two. When disputes needed recognised representation, only the English diplomats stationed there were available for this role. Sir Isaac Wake, ambassador in France, suggested the formation of a Royal company as a remedy for the amount of time spent on trade disputes by the English diplomats in France.[16] It was not until after the Restoration that the network of government consuls expanded rapidly to fill the void left by company Consuls.[17] By comparison, in the Hanse Towns, Russia and the Ottoman Empire**,** where the trade was controlled respectively by the Merchant Adventurers, the Russia Company and the Levant Company, the companies employed their own Consuls, who were also usually accredited English diplomats, to resolve mercantile disputes. Further to this, the merchants involved were experienced in dealing with the markets that they traded in. The Levant Company was described as respectable and well organised.[18] One of the claimed aims

[13] Croft, *The Spanish Company*, p. viii.
[14] V. Kerth, 'Anglo-Spanish relations and the development of modern diplomacy' (Tulane Univ. Ph.D. thesis, 1989), p. 24; Croft, *The Spanish Company*, p. xxxi.
[15] Though again attempts were made to form a company. See HMCD iv, 305, Anthony Wither to William Trumbull, 17 February 1614.
[16] Wake seemed ignorant of the fact that an attempt had been made and a company formed. However an exemption later granted to the West County ports defeated the monopoly of the company. See F. H. Durham, 'The Relations of the Crown to Trade under James I', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* (New Series) Vol. 13 (1899), pp. 199-247; HMCD, iv, 388, -- to Sir John Throckmorton, 23 April 1614. SPFF, SP 78/91 108, Wake to Coke, 9 April 1632.
[17] V. Barbour, 'Consular Service in the Reign of Charles II', *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (April, 1928), p. 555.
[18] Ramsay, *English Overseas Trade*, p. 41.

of reintroducing the Spanish company was to help inexperienced merchants not to fall foul of local trading rules.[19]

Coupled with the decline of consuls outlined above was the growth of England's trade. New markets were opened outside England's traditional sphere of the Channel, North Sea and the Baltic, for example, the development of trade with the American colonies, with Russia and the Levant.[20] This growth in new trade would grow to the extent of being termed a "commercial revolution" by historians of the post-1660 period.[21] At the beginning of the seventeenth century, there was also a Europe-wide increase in trade as peace came and embargos were slowly lifted.[22] English merchants returned to Spain, and the King of Spain's other domains, from where they had been excluded since 1585.[23] With an increase in trade came a greater possibility of disputes, as mercantile policies and the desire for free trade came into conflict more often and more readily. It must be noted, however, that even where the volumes of trade fell, as in the Spanish Netherlands where volume was down by half**,** there still remained a significant number of disputes.[24]

There were a number of developments which made this period one of rapid change in commerce and the organisation of commerce; after a long absence, English merchants re-entered Spain and the King of Spain's other domains. The coming of peace caused a general increase in trade and the likelihood of more disputes as a result.[25] Subsequently, there were the upheavals of the 1620s and a number of short wars, compared with Elizabeth I's long war

[19] Kerth, 'Anglo-Spanish relations and the development of modern diplomacy', p. 43.
[20] C. Cunningham, 'Anglo-French trade, war and diplomacy in the early Stuart Age' (Univ. of Virginia Ph.D. thesis, 1998), p. 19. Ramsay, *English Overseas Trade*, p. 27; T. S. Willian, *The Early History of the Russia Company 1553-1603* (Manchester, 1956), pp. 1-18.
[21] R. David, *English Overseas Trade 1500-1700* (London, 1973), p. 32.
[22] R. H. Tawney, *Business and Politics under James I* (Cambridge, 1958), p. 14.
[23] Ramsay, *English Overseas Trade*, p. 43.
[24] A. Friis, *Alderman Cockayne's Project and the Cloth Trade: The Commercial Policy of England in Its Main Aspects, 1603-1625*, trans. A. Fausbøll, (London, 1927), p. 406.
[25] Tawney, *Business and Politics*, p. 14.

with Spain, which provided a huge number of commercial disputes and seizures to be dealt with at the end of each conflict.[26]

It is clear, therefore, that there was a growing demand on the time of diplomats, in the early part of the seventeenth century, to intercede in merchants' disputes and to bring them to a satisfactory resolution.

Types of Cases and Diplomats' decisions to offer aid.

One thing becomes quickly apparent when looking at the types of cases diplomats concerned themselves with. They almost always involved trading rights or money owed by the foreign government to English subjects. One example is the drapery seized in Rouen by the Courts, who claimed it was contraband, or defective.[27] It was far less common for an English diplomat to intervene in cases of individuals who fell foul of the law, though they did intervene with the Inquisition in Spain. There are numerous cases in Spain and the Italian States concerning the seizure of goods and ships that could serve as case studies. When the case involved the Spanish territories in Italy, the case could be tried in Spain, as in the famous case of the *Vineyard*, an English merchant ship captured and used by the Viceroy of Sicily, Lorenzo Suárez de Figueroa y Córdoba, duke of Feria.[28] With Feria's death, the attempt to gain restitution for the owners moved to Spain, where the case was eventually tried.

The second, and less common type of dispute, was where an English subject had contracted to provide a service or loan to a foreign government and had not been paid for it. Such is the case of Colonel David Boyd, a mercenary who led twelve companies of foot for the Duke of

[26] For example: The Anglo-Spanish Wars 1625–1630 & 1654–1660, The Anglo-French Wars 1627-1629 & 1666–1667 and the Anglo-Dutch Wars 1652–54, 1665–67 & 1672–74.
[27] Cunningham, 'Anglo-French trade, war and diplomacy in the early Stuart Age', p. 48.
[28] J. Howell, *Epistolæ Ho-Elianæ: Familiar Letters Domestick and Foreign* 10th edition (London, 1737), p. 124.

Parma.[29] Boyd was owed £5,400 for services rendered. Another case is that of Thomas Albery, an English merchant, who had bought debts owed by several towns and an annuity, all of which remained unpaid. There was also a debt owed by towns in Flanders, to the Queen of England and a group of English merchants, valued at 100,000l.[30] Both of the above mentioned cases originated in the Spanish Netherlands.[31]

How did these disputes come to the attention of the agents accredited to that state? How and why did diplomats become charged with concluding some form of resolution? It is immediately obvious that agents did not take up every dispute which occurred in their territory. Time alone would be the biggest constraint. How did they decide which cases should be represented to Kings, Councils and Regents and which should to left to the individuals to deal with as best they could?

In a number of cases the agents were simply given no choice but to aid the individual. They were instructed to do so by the Privy Council or King. In the example of Thomas Albery, his case was commended to William Trumbull a number of times by the Privy Council.[32] The case of Colonel Boyd, received the personal recommendation of James I.[33] Interventions such as these were either because the King or Council had looked upon the merchants favourably when they had made an appeal, or because the merchants had the support of those at Court, who could push their case forward. This, however, did not preclude the individual taking the second and more common route, to diplomatic help.

This second route open to merchants, rather than appealing to the crown or government, was to appeal directly to the diplomats for help with their case. Here it was entirely up to the discretion of the individual diplomat if they wished to take on the case or not. In these

[29] D. Worthington, *Scots in Habsburg Service* (Leiden, 2004), p. 27.
[30] HMDC, v, 450.
[31] Uddin, 'William Trumbull: A Jacobean Diplomat', p. 88.
[32] HMCD, ii, 321, Privy Council to Trumbull, Whitehall, 10 July 1610; HMCD, iv, 183, Privy Council to Trumbull, Whitehall, 19 August 1613.
[33] HMCD, iv, 408, Sir Ralph Winwood to William Trumbull, 22 May 1614.

instances, when they did take on the case, they would report that they had done so to Whitehall and provide some reasoning for acting. It may be that they had to justify how they spent their time. Letters recording that they had decided against acting in a merchant's dispute are very few in number, in either the State Papers or the collections of agents' correspondence which survived. Agents, it seems, either felt there was no need to inform the government when they had refused help, or it was very rare for them to do so. Without a greater survival of personal correspondence it is impossible to be sure which the case is.

Agents who served with a resident ambassador often had cases assigned to them by the ambassador. Even men acting as secretaries might be called upon to help in this work. Many of the secretaries, who later became agents, undertook such work before taking on their new positions. In the situations where an ambassador assigned the case to a subordinate, it had still become the ambassador's responsibility in one of the ways outlined above.

Agents who were not only agents of the Crown but also representatives of the monopoly companies, such as the Russia Company or the Levant Company, took some form of action with every merchant case which came to them, provided the individual was not an interloper.[34] These actions appear similar to those of diplomatic agents elsewhere. However, in general they sought political intervention at a far earlier stage than their counterparts in Europe.

## Case Study: The English Merchants at Rouen.

Having seen how a merchant's dispute might become one of the responsibilities of a diplomatic agent, the process they went through to attempt to find a resolution needs to be outlined. In order to illustrate this process a single case study will be used. The steps the individuals took in this case were the typical ones taken on by a diplomat in a dispute.

[34] Where it was more likely they would complain about them rather than aid them. See Anderson, *An English consul*, p. 74

Background: Rouen and English Drapery

The events took place in France during 1630-31, after the signing of the Treaty of Susa but before the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye.[35] During the Anglo-French war, a large quantity of cloth had been seized in Rouen.[36] Drapery was still the main and most valuable commodity sold by English merchants in France and indeed the largest of the Kingdom's exports.[37] Rouen was an important trading centre for English merchants from the South-West and was noted for its diverse manufactured goods.[38] There was, however, growing hostility in Rouen to English merchants and in 1598 the *bailli* of Rouen had seized all the English cloth claiming it to be defective.[39] These escalating disputes have been labelled as 'endemic strife in the merchant community'.[40] It was the actions of the *bailli* of Rouen which would start the dispute with the English merchants in the 1630s. With the coming of peace, the merchants, who had their goods seized by the French, sought restitution. They wanted help from English diplomats to accomplish this.

While the final ending of the dispute was not usual, in that all individual claims resulting from the war would be considered by commissioners, and then made a part of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, all steps taken before this were entirely regular ones. Firstly, the ambassador, Sir Isaac Wake, tasked agents Henry De Vic and Réné Augier with finding a resolution to the dispute. The dispute had reached Wake's attention through direct appeal

[35] Discussed in Chapter IV of this thesis.

[36] Valued at £20,000 by the English Merchants. See SPFF, SP 78/90 538, Petition of Toby Goodridge and others trading at Rouen concerning cloth, 1631. This later sold for 300,000 francs according to the Venetian ambassador. See A. Hinds (ed.), 'Venice: September 1631', *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, Vol. 22, 1629-1632 (1919), pp. 539-54, accessed 24 March 2009, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=89287. [British History Online]

[37] Cunningham, 'Anglo-French trade, war and diplomacy in the early Stuart Age', p. 19; F. J. Fisher, 'London's Export Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century', *The Economic History Review*, New Series, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1950), p. 154.

[38] G. Brunelle, *The New World Merchants of Rouen, 1559-1630* (Kirksville, MO, 1991), p. 11.

[39] Cunningham, 'Anglo-French trade, war and diplomacy in the early Stuart Age', p. 48.

[40] Cunningham, 'Anglo-French trade, war and diplomacy in the early Stuart Age', p. 55.

from the merchants.[41] However, this did not stop them also petitioning Charles I, which they would do again later in the dispute.[42] The original decision of the agents was that the dispute should follow through the normal legal channel for a case of this type. It is not clear if this was because they believed they would win the case or because they doubted that the Royal Government would intervene until they had exhausted the usual legal avenues. In this particular case, as the drapery had been seized by the *bailli* of Rouen, an appeal against the sentence would need to be made to the *Parlement* of Rouen. Only after the judgment was delivered by the *Parlement* did the English agents intervene diplomatically. Up to this point they had simply assisted the merchants with putting a case before the *Parlement*. De Vic and Augier met with the merchants' lawyers shortly before the hearing.[43]

The *Parlement* of Rouen: a *Parlement* with little conformity

The case had first been heard by the *bailli* of Rouen and at this time there was little mention of the case in the letters of the English agents. Once the case was appealed to the *Parlement* of Rouen, it became a more regular fixture in the reports sent back to London. This was common; there were often long periods without any news of a case while awaiting hearings.[44] The *Parlement* of Rouen had a turbulent relationship with Royal government, as did the city as a whole. Rouen was said by Catherine de Medici to have 'the most difficult inhabitants of the Kingdom'.[45] Although this was said in 1565, sixty seven years later Rouen would remain as troublesome.[46] While the revolt of the *Nu-pieds* was still some seven years away, Rouen was not bent to the wishes of the central government. The Court of *Aides*, which was part of

[41] SPFF, SP 78/90 53, English merchants at Rouen to Wake, 25 August / 4 September 1631.
[42] SPFF, SP 78/89 246, Petition of English merchants, June 1631; SPFF, SP 78/90 83, Merchants' information on proceedings at Rouen, on seizing cloth, 27 August / 6 September 1631.
[43] SPFF, SP 78/89 169, De Vic to [Dorchester], 2 / 12 June 1631.
[44] William Trumbull reported that despite two years and three judgments in his favour, Colonel Boyd still had no justice. See SPF, Flanders, SP 77/10 175, Trumbull to Salisbury, Brussels, 19 March 1612.
[45] P. Benedict, *Rouen During the Wars of Religion* (Cambridge, 1981), p. 112.
[46] For more detail on the troublesome nature of Rouen during the War of Religion and the city's attitude to royal authority, see Benedict, *Rouen During the Wars of Religion*.

the *Parlement* of Rouen, would be repeatedly suspended by the King for its acts of disobedience relating to tax assessments.[47] The relationship between the *Parlement* and the central government was not one of obedience to the King's wishes. Jonathan Dewald suggests that this was a process related to the Wars of Religion in France, whereby the *Parlement* had been transformed from 'a docile, if occasionally corrupt instrument of royal policy' to something quite different: an assembly which believed its role was 'representing the province to the crown'.[48] Under these circumstances, the Crown had far less control over the *Parlement* which, after the Wars of Religion, resisted the Edict of Nantes for a decade. It is also worth noting that the *Parlement* had refused to register a trade treaty with England under Henri IV.[49] The situation had not improved by the reign of Louis XIII. The reign saw a close alliance between the *Parlement* of Rouen and of that of Paris in order to resist a number of royal policies.[50] Finally, by 1637, the *Parlement* of Rouen was bold enough to refuse to register decrees from the King, and only relented when Louis XIII threatened to go in person to force the *Parlement* to submit.[51]

The *Parlement* was, therefore, an independent body that would act as it saw fit, rather than in the way the central government might wish. While it has been suggested that this was particularly French, the same situation was encountered by diplomatic agents all over Europe, from Francis Cottington in Spain, William Trumbull in Brussels, Joseph Avery and later Richard Bradshaw in Hamburg.[52] When dealing with mercantile disputes, all agents had to

[47] The *Cour des aides* in Rouen had its jurisdiction suspended during the reallocation of the *taille* during 1623-4. See R. Bonney, *Political Change in France under Richelieu and Mazarin 1624-1661* (Oxford, 1978), pp. 252-253.

[48] J. Dewald, 'Magistracy and Political Opposition at Rouen: A Social Context' *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (October, 1974), p. 67.

[49] H. Nicolle, 'Anglo-French Trade 1540-1640' (LSE Ph.D. thesis, 1976), p. 182.

[50] A. L. Moote, *The Revolt of the Judges: The Parlement of Paris and the Fronde, 1643-52* (Princeton, 1971), pp. 56-59.

[51] M. Foisil, *La révolte des nu-pieds et les révoltes normandes de 1639* (Paris, 1970).

[52] Cunningham, 'Anglo-French trade, war and diplomacy in the early Stuart Age', p. 56.

deal with the courts trying the case, rather than central government, who often had little control over their judges in the provinces.

When the *Parlement* finally delivered a judgment on the case of the English merchants, De Vic wrote home complaining that what happened in Rouen had 'little conformity with the good language … in this court'.[53] This shows that he had been led to believe, from his position in Paris, that the *Parlement* would look favourably on the English merchants in this case. While there is no mention of the specific promises made to De Vic, or other English diplomats resident in Paris, there is certainly a sense of surprise in the letters at the outcome. De Vic's letter just a few days before the judgment is more concerned with who played cards with whom at the French court, and what this may have hinted at.[54] De Vic was not the only agent to receive such assurances, about the outcome of cases before a nation's courts, only to have his expectations confounded. This was also the experience of Cottington in Spain.[55]

While it was almost routine for judgments to go against the interests of English merchants in overseas cases, and almost notoriously so in Spain, what happened next was very different from the usual judicial decisions.[56] An English merchant present related to De Vic what happened. When the *Parlement* assembled in the evening to consider the judgment in the case 'a great number [of the people of Rouen] assembled together, threatened to pillage, both us [the English merchants present] and the Judges'.[57] The English merchants present clearly felt that their lives were under threat. Although based only on the English account, these actions were more serious than the usual insults and rock throwing which occurred frequently.[58] The

[53] SPFF, SP 78/90 79, Wake to Do, 27 August 6 September 1631.
[54] SPFF, SP 78/89 171, De Vic to ?, 13 June 1631.
[55] Kerth, 'Anglo-Spanish relations and the development of modern diplomacy', p. 113.
[56] Kerth, 'Anglo-Spanish relations and the development of modern diplomacy', pp. 78-9.
[57] SPFF, SP 78/90 83, Merchants' information on proceedings at Rouen, on seizing cloth, 27 August / 6 September 1631.
[58] Beik discusses the idea of everyday resistance, beginning with 'personal indignation' (pp. 28-40) where limited violence and cutting insult were used on a personal level, which was near normality for the period. Higher up the escalatory chain were 'broader movements', leading to attacks on those seen as imposing hardship and acting against the community, though Beik points out that in general the town authorities were

English merchant who brought this news to the embassy believed the population 'did soe terrifie, the Court that last night, they gave an arrest confirming the sentence of the Bailife' ordering the sale of the English cloth.[59] Nevertheless, it seems that even this did not calm the feelings in Rouen and the city gates were ordered to be closed and the militia mustered to attempt to contain the disturbances.[60] This did not, however, prevent one English merchant from having to 'forsake my lodging, to hide myselfe, to avoyd the furye of the people'.[61] The merchant escaped the city after leaving by his lodging's window. News of these happenings was brought in after five o'clock the next evening to the English embassy.[62]

The goods of the English merchants in Rouen would now be sold and the proceeds dispersed. The usual judicial processes had been carried out with the English merchants receiving no redress. The English diplomats, prompted by the verdict and the incidents surrounding it, decided to take diplomatic action. While it was technically possible for the English merchants to appeal the sentence of the *Parlement*, this would be to the *Parlement* of Paris. There is no reference showing that this action was taken. This is unusual, as appeals to higher courts were made regularly by agents stationed elsewhere, such as in Spain.[63] In the case of France, however, unlike most of the other states where agents were accredited, the royal government had no more control over this further court of appeal than it did over the court which had just passed sentence. Indeed, the royal government had even less hope of receiving the right judgment from the *Parlement* of Paris, which regularly supported regional *Parlement* against

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safe to move around the city and 'almost always came through the crisis without personal injury' (p. 93). That the members of the *Parlement* were threatened with death indicates the seriousness of the crowd's actions and intentions, which appear to go past merely punishing the English merchants. Later in the same merchant report, it states that the city militia had been called out and shut the gates. Beik points out that the city militia was often unwilling to respond to violence, thus the appearance of these companies indicates that the prospective violence was of a level which compelled the authorities to ensure that action was taken. See W. Beik, *The Culture of Retribution. Urban Protest in Seventeenth-century France* (Cambridge, 1997)

[59] SPFF, SP 78/90 83, Merchants' information on proceedings at Rouen, on seizing cloth, 27 August / 6 September 1631.

[60] P. A. Floquet, *Histoire du parlement de Normandie* (9 vols.; Rouen, 1841), IV, 543-549.

[61] SPFF, SP 78/90 83, Merchants' information on proceedings at Rouen, on seizing cloth, 27 August 6 September 1631.

[62] SPFF, SP 78/90 77 De Vic to Dorchester, 27 August 6 September 1631.

[63] Havran, *The Life of Lord Cottington*, p. 308.

the government.[64] This suggests why the English agents in France did not launch an appeal to the *Parlement* of Paris but rather sought a diplomatic solution to the dispute through Royal intervention in the case.

Despite the late hour at which news of the judgment and disturbances arrived in Paris, the agents took immediate action. Agents did not always act so swiftly in getting the intervention of the crown. In the case of Thomas Albery, Trumbull, after receiving instructions from the Privy Council, took over six months to extract a reply and had not even seen the Archduke! When rebuked, he excused himself that the Archduke was away from Brussels.[65] De Vic, however, went immediately to attempt to gain an audience with Cardinal Richelieu. De Vic clearly believed that the Cardinal would be able to issue orders to prevent the imminent disposal of the goods. Despite Wake, the English ambassador, being present, it was his agent who sought out the Cardinal. This was due to a longstanding dispute between Richelieu and Wake regarding ceremony.[66] Upon arriving at the Cardinal's residence, De Vic was refused admittance as the Cardinal had just returned and was 'weary of his voyage … had retired himself already for the night'.[67] This could be seen as a convenient excuse. If news of the events in Rouen had reached the English the news of disturbance of Rouen would certainly have also reached Richelieu. However, De Vic leaves no hint that he believed the Cardinal was trying to avoid seeing him, unlike many other disputes where the English agents leave no doubt in the reader's mind that they believed they were being fobbed off by their hosts, who had no interest in dealing with the dispute at hand. [68]

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[64] J. Kitchens, 'The *Parlement* of Paris during the Ministry of Cardinal Richelieu, 1624-1642' (Louisiana State Univ. Ph.D. thesis, 1974), pp. 178-181.

[65] HMCD, iv, 323, draft, Trumbull to the Privy Council, Brussels, 1 March 1614.

[66] For a fuller discussion of the point of representing the dignity of the monarchy, see Chapter IV of this thesis.

[67] SPFF, SP 78/90 77 De Vic to Dorchester, 27 August 6 September 1631.

[68] At other points in his correspondence with Whitehall, De Vic was always forthcoming if he believed that officials were attempting to cause undue problems for them. This suggests that he would be equally ready to discuss the Cardinal in similar terms if he had such a belief.For example, De Vic complained 'how contrary the Garde des Sceaux was'. See SPFF, SP 78/90 321 Do. To Weston, 13/ 23 October 1631.

De Vic, having been thwarted in his attempt to see the First Minister of France, then 'wente to the Garde des Sceaux' attempting to gain an audience with the *Garde des Sceaux* Charles de l'Aubespine.[69] Why did De Vic choose to go to Charles de l'Aubespine after failing to meet Richelieu? The Keeper of the Seals was a senior figure in the French government. Charles de l'Aubespine was not one of the close associates of Cardinal Richelieu, in whom De Vic placed more hope for an intervention on behalf of the English merchants.[70] However, any order issued to the *Parlement* from the Royal Government, which had the force of law and therefore could not be disregarded, would need to be issued under the Great Seal of France. Thus this would require the cooperation of the *Garde des Sceaux.* There appeared to be little trouble in procuring the audience and De Vic was soon in discussion with him. Charles de l'Aubespine refused to act until such time as De Vic gave 'him a coppy of the saide Arrest' of the *parlement*.[71] With the swift action that De Vic had taken as soon as word had been brought from Rouen, there had not been time for any documentation to be acquired; no less, it might be suspected that the authorities in Rouen were more concerned with the disturbances than issuing copies of the arrest. De Vic 'tolde him it was not yet come' but the *Garde des Sceaux* refused to act without a copy of the document.[72] De Vic left with a promise of action when the document arrived, although the precise nature of the action was left vague and presumably would depend on the form and wording of the arrest of the *Parlement*. De Vic returned to the embassy, where orders were given that a copy of the document should be

[69] SPFF, SP 78/90 77, De Vic to Dorchester, 27 August 6 September 1631. Charles de l'Aubespine, marquis de Châteauneuf – served as a French diplomat, and between 1630-3 as *Garde des Sceaux*, or Keeper of the Seals. See V. Tapié, *France in the Age of Louis XIII and Richelieu*, trans. & ed. D. McN. Lockie (London, 1974), pp. 236, 309, 328.

[70] Indeed, de l'Aubespine was removed for conspiring with Mme de Chevreuse and the Princess of Lorrain against the Cardinal in 1633. See Tapié, *France in the Age of Louis XIII and Richelieu*, p. 328.

[71] SPFF, SP 78/90 77, De Vic to Dorchester, 27 August /6 September 1631. The belief that Charles de l'Aubespine was being less than helpful with the English diplomats did not remain confined to the English embassy in France. Giovanni Soranzo the Venetian Ambassador in England reported to the Doge that 'all [The English Ambassador, Philip Burlamachi and at court] agree in laying the blame for it upon the Garde des Sceaux'. See A. Hinds (ed.), 'Venice: October 1631', C*alendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, Vol. 22, 1629-1632 (1919), pp. 547-559, accessed 13 March 2009, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=89288. [British History Online]

[72] SPFF, SP 78/90 77, De Vic to Dorchester, 27 August/6 September 1631.

retrieved by a courier using post horses. This retrieving of documents and paying for them was one of the services most regularly provided by diplomats to merchants and was still being carried out by agents such as Blathwayt after the Restoration.[73]

A copy of the arrest was procured by the English agents, for which they had to offer £100, a staggering sum, but despite this little more was accomplished.[74] While the dispute so far had involved moments outside the normal run of events for such disputes, violence in Rouen and late night meetings with ministers, it began now to settle into the usual pattern. A number of meetings were held, in this case with de l'Aubespine, where much was said and very little done to improve the situation. This frustrating process of meetings, where results seemed possible, drafting memorials but very little action, was a common theme in the majority of disputes.[75] This can also be seen with William Trumbull who, having been promised a reply in a week, was forced to wait months for one.[76]

## De Vic meets privately with Cardinal Richelieu

De Vic and Augier were joined by Philip Burlamachi, who was one of the main financiers of the Stuart government. Burlamachi had been sent with powers to restore Quebec, as well as to negotiate the payment of the remainder of the Queen's dowry.[77] The dispute in Rouen was slowly being submerged into other Anglo-French disputes in which it was just one small part. After another conference with de l'Aubespine about the actions of the authorities in Rouen, the English agent met with Richelieu. According to De Vic, they 'mett very opportunely as

[73] Jacobsen, *William Blathwayt*, p. 78.
[74] SPFF, SP 78/90 142, De Vic to [Dorchester], 8 / 18 September 1631.
[75] HMCD ii, 19, William Trumbull to ____, 18 January 1607.
[76] Uddin, 'William Trumbull: A Jacobean Diplomat', p. 67.
[77] A.V. Judges, 'Philip Burlamachi. A Financier of the Thirty Years' War', *Economica* Vol. 6 (1926), p. 297. What would now be considered part of modern Canada, the fort of Quebec had been seized from the French during the Anglo-French war in 1629 by David Kirke and was therefore a major part of the restitution, which would need to be made before normal diplomatic activity resumed. R. Ashton, 'Burlamachi, Philip (*d.* 1644)', rev. *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed 6 May 2012, at http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/37246.

hee came out of his coach'.[78] That De Vic describes it as opportunely suggests that there was a high degree of luck in coming across the minister so shortly after seeing de l'Aubespine and with him being equally willing to see them. Other agents' experience suggests that lucky and chance encounters were rare when trying to resolve disputes.[79]

Upon exiting his coach, Richelieu recognised De Vic from a distance and 'hee came to mee and saide I was the man hee did looke for'.[80] After not only recognising De Vic and stating that he desired to speak with him, the Cardinal went further and 'takinge mee by the hande carried mee into his bed chamber'.[81] This proves to be perhaps the most curious of the incidents which occurs during the dispute. It is also perhaps the hardest to corroborate with any independent source.[82] Nevertheless, the first section where the Cardinal recognised De Vic and leads him away was witnessed by both Augier and Burlamachi. Considering the evidence of a very serious deterioration in the relationship between Burlamachi and De Vic, it seems likely that had this not happened as described, letters informing officials at Whitehall of this would have been written shortly afterward.[83] Further, it would not have benefited De

[78] SPFF, SP 78/90 143, De Vic to Dorchester, 8 / 18 September 1631.
[79] For example Trumbull in the Spanish Netherlands recounts no such helpful chance encounters; HMCD ii-iv.
[80] SPFF, SP 78/90 143, De Vic to Dorchester, 8 / 18 September 1631.
[81] The Cardinal at this point was not resident in the Palais-Cardinal and there are problems pinpointing where the cardinal was staying. De Vic provides no exact date for this, though from De Vic's letter it is likely that this happened between the 27 August / 6 September 1631 and 8 / 18 September 1631. However, Wake wrote on 28 August / 7 September 1631 to Dorchester and made no mention of De Vic's visit to the Cardinal, suggesting it occurred after this. As the English embassy was at the time operating in Paris, it is safe to assume that any meeting with the Cardinal occurred in the city. This is further supported by De Vic's statement that he met the Cardinal after a meeting with the Garde des Sceaux. If the court were away from Paris the officials would be far more dispersed. During the building of the *Palais-Cardinal*, Richelieu was lodged at the Petit Luxembourg in Paris, as he had been for a number of years. See Anonymous, *The History of Paris, from the Earliest Period to the Present Day* (Paris, 1825), p. 45. While the Petit Luxembourg was not as big as the later *Palais-Cardinal* it still offered a large number of rooms. There would have been a choice for the Cardinal of which room to receive De Vic into, and therefore De Vic was granted a great honour to be allowed into the Cardinal's private chamber. See SPFF, SP 78/90 143, De Vic to [Dorchester], 8 / 18 September 1631.
[82] None of the other English officials wrote of this meeting to Whitehall. However, this should not cast greater doubt on this than on any other meeting or encounter, as it does not appear to have been the habit of the diplomats at the English embassy to overlap their dispatches and provide corroboration for one another's actions.
[83] On 17 / 27 June 1632 after the death of the Resident, Wake, De Vic wrote to Whitehall to ask that letters which he had written there concerning the conduct of Burlamachi would not be disclosed to Burlamachi and informing them that he, De Vic, had sealed the ambassador's papers so they would not be opened before their return to London. See SPFF, SP 78/91 261, De Vic to [Coke] – 2 letters, 17 / 27 June 1632.

Vic to greatly exaggerate the Cardinal's affection toward him, as this would lead the Court in Whitehall to expect far more of De Vic than he would have been able to deliver.

Having taken De Vic inside, the Cardinal embraced him and led him to his bedroom and there De Vic recited again the complaint of the English merchants in Rouen. He also outlined several other complaints against the actions of de l'Aubespine, who De Vic believed was being less than helpful to the English merchants. This was a common theme of English agents, believing or being told that various officials were to blame for lack of action. Trumbull, for example, was told the absence of Treasurer-General Balthazar de Robiano was the only reason for continued delay in the Spanish Netherlands.[84]

De Vic wrote that after this the Cardinal 'professed unto mee with much earnestness to have a particular affection to his Majesties service which as longe as it did not cross that of the Kings his Maister (which he hoped never to see) he wolde prefer before any other and this hee repeated twice or thrice over' Finally, the Cardinal promised De Vic that he would act to help remedy the situation.[85]

This is another unusual event in the dispute. It was not a normal occurrence for a first minister to take an agent away into his private chambers to discuss a dispute after meeting him on the street. Certainly Cottington in Spain never had a similar experience with Olivares, nor did Trumbull in the Spanish Netherlands.

This incident, apart from its importance in the context of the trade dispute, highlights a number of significant points about diplomatic agents. Despite his lowly status as a mere agent, De Vic was recognised on sight by Cardinal Richelieu. Considering the number of agents of all nations in France, and the number of other officials to whom Richelieu would have been introduced, it is interesting that De Vic was so memorable to the Cardinal. However, this should not be viewed as unique. It appears that every agent who was regularly

[84] Uddin, 'William Trumbull: A Jacobean Diplomat', p. 67.
[85] SPFF, SP 78/90 144, De Vic to [Dorchester], 8 / 18 September 1631.

attached to a court and engaged in similar disputes was well-known to the minister and ministry, as Cottington in Spain, Trumbull in the Spanish Netherlands and Réné Petitt, who served later in France, undoubtedly were.[86] It is further noteworthy that the Cardinal should be seeking, so he said, to speak with De Vic and not the English ambassador, Sir Isaac Wake, though this may be related to Wake's punctiliousness in regard to protocol, discussed in Chapter IV.

Secondly, after recognising De Vic, Richelieu took him not merely into a private room but 'into his bed chamber'.[87] This shows a high degree of both familiarity and honorable treatment accorded to De Vic. Rather than ignore the agent or have him removed from the premises, Richelieu was clearly pleased to find him and was happy to begin discussing the issues which De Vic had come to raise with him. Considering the increasingly elaborate security arrangements which the Cardinal adopted over the years, it is also interesting to note that Richelieu allowed De Vic into his most private rooms without a second thought, suggesting that the Cardinal was not concerned for his safety or felt his dignity was under any threat.[88] This suggests that De Vic was in a somewhat rare position in having the First Minister, in the nation to which he was attached, want to cooperate with him (or at least appear to) rather, than as is regularly suggested by other agents, their mercantile disputes being seen as a distraction to diplomacy or the normal running of government.

## A *Lettre de cachet?*

The focus of the dispute moved on to attempts to prevent the sale of the goods by the *bailli* of Rouen. After a number of meetings, and much negotiation, the remedy offered to the English

[86] SPF, Spain SP 94/19 24, Digby to [Salisbury], 2 February 1611; T. Birch (ed.), 'State Papers, 1654: July (3 of 7)', *A collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe*, Vol. 2: 1654 (1742), pp. 439-450, accessed 27 April 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=55331. [British History Online]

[87] *Ibid.*

[88] J. H. Elliott notes that Richelieu was vigorous in insisting on the proper marks of respect being paid. See, J. H. Elliott, *Richelieu and Olivares* (Cambridge, 1984), p. 47.

and De Vic by the *Garde des Sceaux* was a *lettre de cachet.*[89] De Vic had already written to Whitehall to protest about this, complaining that a previous attempt to use such a remedy had failed and that the 'letter of Cachet [for the dispute in Rouen was to] bee written in the ordinary stile I know it by my owne experience, to be but an amusement, which they commonly use to those that are unacquanted with their formes of proceedinge'.[90] De Vic displayed here one of the main advantages of the assistance that long serving agents could offer in merchants' disputes. He had an understanding of not just the technical legal system but more importantly also what was likely to happen politically. He believed that the *Parlement* of Rouen would disregard a *lettre de cachet* without any fear of reprisal from the royal government for having done so. In a later letter, De Vic further elaborates this point that 'they [letter de cachet] doe ordinarily proceede in lesser Courtes then a parlement (especially that of Rouen which is the stoutest & most privileged of all others in this kingdome)' showing a knowledge of the recent activities in France and the recent disobedience of the *Parlement* of Rouen.[91]

Soon after this letter was written, it is shown that De Vic's predictions of the effects of the *lettre de cachet* which had been sent had indeed come true. Although even De Vic did not expect that it would have the effect it did, which was 'to embolden their parties to proceede more eagerly to the sale of our Merchands goods'.[92] Throughout this process of negotiating for, and ultimately being granted, a *lettre de cachet*, De Vic had desired another legal

[89] *Lettre de cachet* - sealed order from the King of France to an individual or group. They were made under the great seal of France and, while generally remembered for their use for extrajudicial imprisonment they had far wider usage. See R. Mousnier, *The Institution of France under the Absolute Monarchy 1598-1789 Society and the State*, trans. B. Pearce (London, 1979), pp. 756-757.

[90] SPFF, SP 78 89/169, De Vic to [Dorchester], 2 / 12 June 1631.

[91] SPFF, SP 78/89 169, De Vic to [Dorchester], 2 / 12 June 1631.

[92] SPFF, SP 78/90 143, De Vic to [Dorchester], 8 / 18 September 1631. That the sale of goods occurred is confirmed by the Italian Alvise Contarini, Venetian Ambassador in France, who wrote to the Dodge and Senate 'the parliament of Rouen has had the goods taken in reprisals from the English sold for 300,000 francs'. Furthermore, all of Wake's anger was directed against the *Garde des Sceaux*, whom Wake believe was culpable for these actions. See A. Hinds (ed.), 'Venice: September 1631', *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, Vol. 22, 1629-1632 (1919), pp. 539-547, accessed 24 March 2009, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=89287. [British History Online]

instrument be granted to the merchants, an *évocation*.[93] The reasons for this strategy are obvious. It might at first be thought that an *évocation* would only move the case to the *Parlement* of Paris and thus bring the dispute again before a possibly unfriendly court. However, the French king granted an *évocation* directly to the King's Council, over which he had direct control. This was indeed a regularly used procedure and one of the favours the king could grant. It was not considered a controversial act until over a century later.[94] The *évocation* would allow the French government to merge a political and a judicial resolution to the dispute into one neat solution. The French government were unwilling to grant an *évocation*, unless the English government were prepared to make similar concessions, hearing cases involving French merchants at a higher court than the Admiralty.[95] Sir Isaac Wake later provided a different explanation for this unwillingness to grant an *évocation*, that it would have greatly offended the 'mutinous' inhabitants of Rouen.[96]

Louis XIII's Commission

Due to the circumstances which had been left by the Anglo-French war, the claim of the merchants at Rouen was not the only mercantile dispute to be placed in the hands of the diplomatic agents at this time. There were a number of other disputes which had similar origins. Most prominent were those of the merchants who had been trading at La Rochelle and the ships *Benediction* and the *James* located in Normandy.[97] The case of the *Benediction* proceeded much like that at Rouen, though De Vic was able to obtain a personal letter from

[93] An *évocation* nullified the decision of a lower court and transferred the case to a court with higher judicial authority.
[94] D. Bell, 'Safeguarding the Rights of the Accused', in D. Van Kley (ed.), *The French Idea of Freedom* (Stanford, 1994), p. 246.
[95] SPFF, SP 78/88 300, De Vic to Dorchester, 3 / 13 April 1631.
[96] SPFF, SP 78/90 473, Wake to Dorchester, 1 / 11 December 1631.
[97] SPFF, SP 78/89 169, De Vic to [Dorchester], 2 / 12 June 1631; SPFF, SP 78/89 210, Wake to Dorchester - 2 letters, 15 / 25 June 1631.

Richelieu to the Admiralty to prevent the sale of the ship.[98] Wake suggested that the attempts to sell English goods, and especially the *Benediction*, were part of French domestic court manoeuvring to undermine several officials in the eyes of the English.[99]

With such a large number of different disputes needing resolution, and a number of questionable (from the English diplomats' point of view) decisions and actions by French authorities, it was important to find a speedy resolution to all the disputes. As the Anglo-French conflict had not been completely resolved, there was, unusually, a possibility that all of these merchant disputes could be resolved, along with the territorial disputes in New France. This was not a regular situation for agents dealing with merchants' disputes; usually each claim had to be fought on its individual merits.

Louis XIII appointed commissioners to deal with the dispute at Rouen and others, which resulted in demands for restitution from English merchants. The commission would also present the case of French merchants who had demands upon the English Admiralty Courts. These commissioners would be 'the Gardes de Sceaux, Mr de Schonberg, the Marll d'Effinte, Mr de Bouthel, Mr de Bullion'.[100] Two others had yet to be named by Louis XIII. D'Effiat and Bullion were added as d'Effiat had 'been in England did understand that businesse'.[101]

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[98] *Ibid.*

[99] SPFF, SP 78/90 128, Wake to [Dorchester], 8 / 18 September 1631.

[100] Henri de Schomberg was a warrior-nobleman who returned to the King's council in 1624 where Moote describes him as acting as minister without portfolio. Richelieu had urged that he be returned to his old post of superintendent of finance, however, he lacked the skill for this post and Louis XIII preferred to keep him for his advice only. See A. L. Moote, *Louis XIII, the Just* (London, 1991) p. 167.

-Marshal Antoine Coiffier-Ruzé, marquis d'Effiat, served as superintendent of finance and is described in Tapié, *France in the Age of Louis XIII and Richelieu*, p. 159.

-Claude Bouthillier served as a clerk to Cardinal Richelieu's grandfather, François de La Porte, who recommended Bouthillier to his grandchildren. Bouthillier served as a councillor in 1613 in the *Parlement* of Paris and under Richelieu's ministry rose to be co-*Superintendant des Finances* with Bullion: see O. Ranum, *Richelieu and the Councillors of Louis XIII* (Oxford, 1963), pp. 32-35.

-Claude de Bullion began his career in the *Parlement* of Paris, later he would serve Henry IV as master of royal requests. Later he would serve the regency government as superintendent of Navarre (1612) and as the queen mother's chancellor (1615). In 1632 he became co- *Superintendant des Finances*. Since 1628 he was firmly in the Cardinal's confidence, though more willing to speak his mind than other créatures. See Ranum, *Richelieu and the Councillors*, pp.32-35; SPFF, SP 78/90 218, Wake to Dorchester and extract, 30 September / 10 October 1631.

[101] *Ibid.*

All of these officials, apart from the *Garde des Sceaux*, were close associates of the Cardinal. This suggests that at this stage Richelieu desired a swift end, but more importantly one over which he had a degree of control.

While up until this point the dispute had largely been in the hands of De Vic and his colleague Augier (Augier spent more time dealing with the other disputes, rather than the one in Rouen), the English Ambassador, Wake, now took centre stage. Wake went in person to these meetings and presided over them on behalf of the English. These were the most formal meetings about restitutions to have occurred in the dispute. Originally the negotiations had often required quick action on the English part, such as attempting to secure an *évocation*, or at the least an *arrêt* of the council, but now the negotiations had become much slower and far more formalised than the previous discussions.

Through the slow process of negotiations the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye was formed and finally the merchant disputes received a resolution. This was obviously not the usual state of affairs, as it was rare for the English to be negotiating a treaty at the same time as dealing with a large number of merchant claims. While disputes, such as the Amboyna massacre and the island of *Porto Bello,* did feature in treaties, this was due to their *cause célèbre* status rather than their political importance. However, in all other aspects, the English agents, in first waiting for the judgment of the court and then seeking political intervention, acted in a way which was entirely typical of all other agents of the period. It was only unusual in that they were so successful in gaining a resolution for the vast majority of claims.

## English Agents and Merchants' Disputes

This single case study has provided a glimpse into the type of work conducted thousands of times throughout the period by English diplomatic agents in numerous disputes. Despite the texts of the period offering scant advice for the would-be diplomat, and devoting little if any

space to methods of helping merchants, it is likely that this was the second most time consuming activity which agents carried out, after finding and reporting news.[102] It also appears that the work was generally conducted around a broadly established pattern, going through each phase of the dispute in turn. It is very rare to find precise instructions from either the Secretaries or the Privy Council on how to handle a dispute; most were broad and general, suggesting that representations be made again to the government for a just resolution.[103]

In the first phase, an injustice was committed by a court or other authority to a merchant, and the merchant would demand restitution from them. At this stage they might appeal to the diplomats directly, or through friends via the Privy Council in London, to secure the help of diplomats. There was clearly, from the diplomats and the government, an expectation that the merchants would demonstrate commitment to their case by initiating legal proceedings. The help that would be provided by the diplomats at this stage would have been of a rather limited nature. It was highly unusual initially to make a political appeal to the government for intervention, as this was generally rebuffed, with the diplomats being told that justice needed to take its natural course. As a result, the help that was received was similar to that which De Vic and Augier originally provided in this case study, attendance at meetings with the lawyers who had been engaged by the English merchants at Rouen to present their case before the *Parlement*.[104] On occasions, however, it seems agents found the lawyers for the merchants, as William Trumbull did.[105] The other help which was usually offered at this stage was in the form of acquiring documents, either from courts (which De Vic did after the judgment in Rouen) or in acquiring copies of treaties which might be of help in putting the case before the court. Trumbull and William Blathwayt both asked friends to search out

[102] Based on the quantity of writing from the State Papers.
[103] HMCD, vi, 434 (letter 939), Instructions to William Trumbull, Whitehall, 16 June 1618.
[104] SPFF, SP 78/89 169, De Vic to [Dorchester], 2 / 12 June 1631.
[105] HMCD, iii, 360-361, draft, Trumbull to James VI/I, Brussels, 3 September 1612.

copies in London for them to give to merchants.[106] The merchant Lyonell Wake asked Trumbull for copies of treaties to help him before seeking political help.[107] This could be an expensive form of help and often, when looking for copies of treaties, relied on the goodwill of friends in London. It appears that diplomats regularly (as De Vic did) hoped to gain a satisfactory outcome from the local courts (albeit that some courts, such as the Spanish, had a particularly poor reputation)**,** and not to have to use political capital at the Court to intervene in disputes such as these.[108] It was only when the merchants had failed to receive justice, or the case was forced on the diplomat by Council instructions, that the dispute became a diplomatic issue with the central government.

The attitude which the English diplomats had towards those that they negotiated with varied considerably. De Vic suggests that Richelieu was favourable to the English and the *Garde des Sceaux* contrary, while it is clear in Spain that Cottington had come to loath those he had to deal with.[109] Trumbull's attitude varied, though his regular lawyer Jean Thymon complains; 'Justice is portrayed as being blindfolded so that she may not see anything. But to me she is invisible because she is not to be seen at all'.[110] Meanwhile, Blathwayt was greatly unimpressed by court procedures in the United Provinces, though this may have been more to do with the rebuff to his youthful self-confidence from his failure; he was after all the second youngest agent.[111]

It has been suggested that delay was a tactic used by those involved ultimately to win the case.[112] Such a view, however, ignores the length of time cases took in English domestic

[106] HMCD, iv, 409, More to Trumbull, Whitehall, 24 May 1614.
[107] HMDC, ii, Wake to Trumbull, 3 March 1609-10.
[108] Henneke, 'The Art of Diplomacy under the early Stuarts', p. 287.
[109] SPFF, SP 78/90 147, De Vic and Augier to [Dorchester], with account for several voyages, and another copy, 8 / 18 September 1631.
[110] HMCD, v, 349 (letter 702), Thymon to Trumbull, 8 October 1615.
[111] Jacobsen, *William Blathwayt*, pp. 72-3.
[112] Uddin, 'William Trumbull: A Jacobean Diplomat', p. 88.

courts, such as the wait in the Court of Chancery.[113] In the end, it must always be remembered that those whom the agents engaged, to try to gain redress for for merchants, were regularly busy in much more important matters. Their time was limited and when the dispute moved towards an important matter of state, such as when letters of reprisal might be issued, then resolutions could be more quickly forthcoming.

The question of why so much of an agent's time was tied up in dealing with commercial disputes must be answered. There was clearly some benefit to the agents in taking on a merchant's case in terms of gifts and thanks. Considering the pay, or lack thereof, outlined in Chapter II, gifts from merchants, or even credit, would be useful resources to a diplomat. Moreover, had the case been recommended by King or Privy Council it was obvious that there would be benefit to the agent on producing a successful outcome.

The most obvious answer for why such a large amount of time was spent on merchant disputes is the limited development in the official government consul network for much of the period. It was not until the Restoration that there was a great increase in the number of consuls.[114] Though, in France the English Crown only had three such men in 1669, at Bordeaux, Marseilles and Bayonne.[115] These men were tasked specifically with dealing with minor trade disputes, as had the consuls of the trading companies in an earlier age. While this did not remove totally the need for diplomats and their secretaries to act in such disputes, and such appointments were unpopular with merchants, it does appear to have decreased the number of times that the agents were called upon to act in this way.[116]

For most of the period, and even during the expansion of the consul network under Charles II, attempting to find resolution to mercantile disputes was a key and important part of the work

[113] H. Horwitz & P. Polden, 'Continuity or Change in the Court of Chancery in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries?', *Journal of British Studies* , Vol. 35, No. 1 (January, 1996), p. 56.
[114] H. Koenigsberger, 'English Merchants in Naples and Sicily in the Seventeenth Century', *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 62, No. 244 (July, 1947), p. 307.
[115] P. Fraser, *The Intelligence of the Secretaries of State* (Cambridge, 1956), p. 68.
[116] Fraser, *The Intelligence of the Secretaries of State*, p. 70.

of agents and diplomats. Yet the repeated suggestions, such as Wake's for the formation of Royal Companies with their own consuls, hint at the widespread annoyance this work created amongst diplomats.[117]

This aspect of diplomats' work is overlooked by writers on the period's diplomats, and yet it was perhaps their second most important task after informing the government of the news. The sums of money involved in these cases were often large and could be staggeringly so. The drapery in Rouen was valued at £20,000 and a number of other cases, such as that of the ship *Vineyard*, were valued at £30,000.[118] Even smaller claims were still for a large amount such as that of Colonel David Boyd for £5,400.[119] It is easy to see why merchants felt they had the right to call upon the government for help when tonnage and poundage was levied on them.

The majority of diplomats were frustrated, spending years attempting to resolve disputes which dragged on, through the lengthy court process and then appeal, with little hope of resolution.[120] A number of individuals died before their cases were resolved.[121] Likewise, the Court officials where they were posted were equally frustrated and annoyed by their regular appeals, Matthew Prior presenting nine in one week![122] More than just William Blathwayt received a rebuff at what they believed was a chance to make their name through resolving a

[117] SPFF, SP 78/91 108, Wake to Coke 9 April 1632.
[118] SPFF SP 78/90 538, Petition of Toby Goodridge and others trading at Rouen concerning cloth 1631. Later sold for 300,000 francs. See Allen Hinds (ed.), 'Venice: September 1631', *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, Vol. 22, 1629-1632 (1919), pp. 539-547, accessed 24 March 2009, at http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=89287. [British History Online]; HMCD, v, 106, John More to William Trumbull, London, 11 July 1611; Howell, *Epistolæ Ho-Elianæ*, p. 124; Havran, *The Life of Lord Cottington*, p. 30.
[119] Uddin, 'William Trumbull: A Jacobean Diplomat', p. 86.
[120] Trumbull for instance had one dispute that was already three years old and had been taken up by his predecessor. See HMCD, iv, p. 323, 'draft, Trumbull to the Privy Council, Brussels', 1 March 1614.
[121] Uddin, 'William Trumbull: A Jacobean Diplomat', p. 89.
[122] Havran, *The Life of Lord Cottington*, p. 30; William Roosen, *The Age of Louis XIV: The Rise of Modern Diplomacy* (Cambridge, MA, 1976), p. 172.

dispute.[123] Even cases that became a *cause célèbre*, such as the *Vineyard*, could take years before a favourable judgment was received, and then the process of enforcing the judgment was only just about to begin.[124] When the merchants had been awarded compensation, and could look forward to justice, problems began again almost immediately. The need to enforce the judgment against those who had committed the wrongdoing against the merchants and to extract the compensation almost reset the legal dispute to the first stage again, with a flurry of fresh court cases. In nearly every case, the goods and ships had long ago been sold, or if the goods and ships had not been sold they had rotted into disrepair. The only exception to this were cases of those claiming money from a government for services which they had provided and not been paid for. They might now expect payment from the treasury, though with about the same level of success as all those who sought to be paid by an early modern treasury.

Despite the frustration this work produced, the English diplomats had developed a standard method for dealing with disputes. Following this method did provide success at times, though it would be impossible to judge an overall success rate.[125] Sometimes moreover individuals abandoned their cases as hopeless, or died, despite all the work an agent had done. One thing is clear, however, that the interest of the King or the Privy Council did not appear to have increased the chance of success, or the speed, of the case in any meaningful way and should therefore be seen as only a method for ensuring that the agent would take up the case.[126]

The successes of even the most dedicated and hardworking diplomats were rare.[127] While we can look at diplomats, such as the ones in this case study, as having successfully resolved a

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[123] Jacobsen, *William Blathwayt*, pp. 72-5. Réné Petit fared no better. See T. Birch (ed.), 'State Papers, 1654: May (1 of 6)', *A collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe*, Vol. 2: 1654 (1742), pp. 259-272, accessed 23 April 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=55317. [British History Online]

[124] One only need look at the case of Colonel Boyd. See SPF, Flanders, SP 77/10 175, Trumbull to Salisbury, Brussels, 19 March 1612.

[125] Henneke, 'The Art of Diplomacy under the early Stuarts', p. 302.

[126] Uddin, 'William Trumbull: A Jacobean Diplomat', p. 94.

[127] Uddin, 'William Trumbull: A Jacobean Diplomat', p. 278.

large number of disputes, this in no way can tell us that De Vic, Augier and Wake could have resolved similar disputes elsewhere and under different circumstances, or indeed if these would have been resolved at all if they had not been incorporated into the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye. An indication of the value placed on diplomatic help, by those who received it, can be seen in that throughout the period there was always a steady stream of merchants both large and small, appealing for aid in their disputes. If there was no hope of the agents' intervention then one would have expected merchants to stop seeking their assistance. That they continued suggests they believed that agents did some good in trying to help them receive justice.

## Chapter IV Negotiating with Foreign States

This chapter will examine the role that agents played in negotiations, when they were employed and how. It will consider what types of negotiations agents undertook and also why, how and when an ambassador, rather than an agent, was used during a series of negotiations.

The first section will outline what type of negotiations it was usual for agents to conduct. It will assess if they were used to conduct wide ranging, continuous negotiations. The *Testament politique* of Cardinal Richelieu declared that 'States receive so much benefit from uninterrupted foreign negotiations, if they are conducted with prudence, that it is unbelievable unless it is known from experience'.[1] Richelieu's suggestion was for times of war, but did the Stuarts, with their generally more pacific policies, also adopt a similar attitude to the benefits of continuous negotiations?

The principle of resident diplomats conducting continuous negotiations with states, to make later negotiations easier and more profitable, has been widely commented on by diplomatic historians.[2] Diplomatic agents, with their long term postings and years of experience in foreign states, would appear to be the ideal group of men to conduct continuous negotiations. If agents worked in the manner similar to the ideas of Richelieu's *Testament politique*, how regularly did these conclude with a treaty or other diplomatic benefits?

The next section will look at the interplay between ambassadors and agents during negotiations. The trade dispute which is considered in Chapter III will be used as one example of how and when the most high profile parts of the negotiations were taken over by

[1] A. J. du Plessis, *The Political Testament of Cardinal Richelieu*, trans. H. Hill (London, 1961), p. 94.

[2] M. S. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450-1919* (London, 1993), pp. 64-65; K. Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, *The Practice of Diplomacy* (London, 1995), pp. 72-74; G. R. Berridge (ed.), *Diplomatic Classics: Selected Texts from Commynes to Vattel (*London, 2004), pp. 116-120; H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (London, 1994), pp. 80-81; G. R. Berridge, M. Keens-Soper and T. G. Otte, *Diplomatic Theory from Machiavelli to Kissinger* (London, 2001), pp. 77-80.

ambassadors. Further examples will be used to discuss the use of special ambassadors to ratify agreements that were largely reached by diplomatic agents. The circumstances when the other side of the negotiations would request a more important and higher ranking diplomat will also be examined.

The third section will examine the deniability of agents' negotiations. One of the important themes of this thesis is that diplomatic agents possessed a dual character, being a public minister but able to sidestep protocol when needed. This will be discussed at greater length in the fourth section of this chapter. This attribute, of being recognised but outside some of the formal protocol, extended to their negotiations with foreign states, where they were able to go further in making offers to foreign powers than an ambassador might have been. The negotiations of Sir Francis Cottington, Sir Arthur Hopton and John Taylor, with the Spanish and Imperial governments, will be used to illustrate the offers agents were able to make, which would later be denied by the government. Agents were not, however, just deniable but also more expendable and able to be sent into places where their life might have been threatened. The greater danger that agents could face will be examined by looking at the agencies of John Harrison, in Morocco, and Joseph Avery, as he crossed the war-torn Empire. These men faced greater dangers, with far more limited resources, than an ambassador would have done.

The final section will consider how and when diplomatic agents represented the dignity of the Crown. The importance of precedence and ceremony cannot be overstated; war was even threatened over such points of protocol.[3] The defence of a monarch's honour was one of the most important functions of ambassadors, even when conducting negotiations.[4] Therefore, how and when such a representative character was applied to diplomatic agents will be

[3] H. R. I. Kugeler, '"Le Parfait Ambassadeur": The Theory and Practice of Diplomacy in the Century following the Peace of Westphalia' (Univ. of Oxford D.Phil. thesis, 2006), pp. 98-100.
[4] J. Hotman, *The ambassador* (London, 1603), p. 11.

important when comparing their role to that of an ambassador. Did a more representative character, theorised earlier, aid them in their negotiations?

Diplomatic agents and continuous negotiations

Diplomatic agents often spent years residing at the courts to which they were accredited. They knew all the key members of the government and, as was seen in Chapter II, were able to tell who was rising and falling within that government. If ever there was a group of diplomats who it would be expected would have carried out continuous negotiations then it would be the diplomatic agents. How far did they engage in any form of continuous diplomacy during the period, or was the idea of continuous negotiations never one which featured in the work of the diplomatic agent?

Much of the negotiations which agents undertook were of the most mundane kind. They were usually related to commercial policies. This was, however, the sort of negotiation which allowed standard operating practices to develop, and tended to reduce friction between both parties as they resolved differences.[5]

These trade negotiations consisted of a number of different types of negotiations, depending on the state the agents were attached to. They may have been general negotiations for the reduction of tariffs and the general improvement of trade. Thus we find Michael Branthwaite, in Venice, conducting negotiations about the rates of tariffs charged upon goods imported by English merchants to that state.[6] These negotiations, while clearly important to the English merchants there, are not to be found in histories of trade in the Mediterranean or histories of

[5] V. Kerth, 'Anglo-Spanish Relations and the Development of Modern Diplomacy: Persistent Sources of Friction Affecting Peacetime Routine 1604-1625" (Tulane Univ. Ph.D. thesis, 1989).
[6] SPF, Venice, SP 99/25 254, Branthwaite to Conway, 26 November / 6 December 1624.

English merchants.[7] These were the types of negotiations undertaken often but with few demonstrable outcomes.

Other negotiations involving commerce could be far more specific, either about a certain trade, or even individual merchants. In the Spanish Netherlands, William Trumbull negotiated over the cloth trade. With somewhere between 6.4 and 7.2 per cent of English export going to the Spanish Netherlands this was important work.[8] Trumbull heard rumours of a ban on the importation of English cloth to the Spanish Netherlands but first dismissed this as 'the discreeter sorte of people holding those propositions for impossibilityes'.[9] This was especially as a passport for the import of cloth had been issued in 1610 to Nicolas van Merstraten and was expected to last for some time.[10] Trumbull was, however, mistaken and was forced to report the outline of a proclamation restricting the cloth trade in the Spanish Netherlands, though as of yet, he did not have a copy of the proclamation.[11] Trumbull suspected all this was part of a wider scheme, to move the Merchant Adventurers staple back to Antwerp and to have James I pressure the Dutch to reopen free navigation to Antwerp.[12] Trumbull then began a long round of negotiations with the Archduke in an attempt to return to the previous trading arrangement. During these negotiations, a number of interim passports for importation of cloth were issued, although at a much higher price than usual.[13] As the dispute continued, something approaching continuous negotiations was the outcome, as neither side could provide a resolution that would satisfy the other. This was particularly the

[7] J. Corbett, *England in the Mediterranean* (2 vols. London, 1904); G. P. De Divitiis, *English Merchants in Seventeeth-Century Italy*, trans. S. Parkins (Cambridge, 1997).
[8] I. Uddin, 'William Trumbull: A Jacobean Diplomat at the Court of the Archdukes in Brussels, 1605/9-1625' (Univ. of Leuven Ph.D. thesis, 2006), p. 62.
[9] HMCD, iii, 62-63, draft of Trumbull to [Salisbury], Brussels, 24 April 1611.
[10] Uddin, 'William Trumbull: A Jacobean diplomat', p. 65.
[11] HMCD, iii, 273, draft, Trumbull to Salisbury, Brussels, 9 April 1612.
[12] HMCD, iii, 279-281, draft, Trumbull to [Salisbury?], Brussels, 22 April 1612.
[13] Uddin, 'William Trumbull: A Jacobean diplomat', p. 77.

case as James I and the Council saw this as a matter of his honour as well as trade.[14] As the English cloth trade went through a number of changes with the scheme of William Cokayne, this added to the confusion faced by Trumbull.[15] No clear conclusions or treaty were reached during Trumbull's time in the Spanish Netherlands. However, trade continued, after a fashion, with a number of interim agreements and passports issued.[16]

A more enduring example of such negotiations were those carried out by Francis Gordon, in defence of the trading privileges of the Eastland Company. The dispute began with the Swedish seizure of Elbing and the forced loan which the Swedes then levied upon the town, including the English merchants then trading there.[17] In retaliation for the payment of the forced loan, seen as aiding the enemy, the Polish authorities began seizures of English merchants' goods. This left Gordon with a number of problems**:** the first being to seek restitution for those merchants; the second being the re-estabilising of trade with Poland and the need for a new principal port. Gordon's instructions highlighted the importance of trade in his mission.[18] The Polish authorities had also intended to impose a poll tax on all subjects of Charles I resident in Poland, though Gordon was able to persuade them to rescind this.[19]

Gordon's task to re-establish general trade would not have been an easy one in the best of circumstances; he needed to find a new home for the Eastland Company and negotiate favourable terms for their settlement. The actions of the government in London further hindered his task. When Charles I declared war on Spain, seizures began on ships trading

[14] J. Benson, *Changes and Expansion in the English Cloth Trade in the Seventeenth Century* (New York, 2002), p. 28.
[15] A. Friis, *Alderman Cockayne's Project and the Cloth Trade the Commercial Policy of England in Its Main Aspects 1603-1625*, trans. A. Fausbøll (London, 1927), pp. 305-382; Benson, *Changes and Expansion in the English Cloth Trade*, pp. 45-79.
[16] Benson, *Changes and Expansion in the English Cloth Trade*, p. 29.
[17] J. K. Fedorowicz, *England's Baltic Trade in the early seventeenth century* (Cambridge, 1980), p. 176.
[18] SPF, Poland and Saxony, SP 88/4 122-5, Instructions to Francis Gordon, 2 September / 1 October.
[19] SPF, Poland and Saxony, SP 88/4 151, Gordon to Conway, 16 / 26 June 1627.

with Spain, this included ships from Danzig, which was the principal candidate for the Eastland Company's new residence.[20]

While Gordon attempted to negotiate new trading terms, he recommended that the Admiralty Courts look more favourable on the Danziger cases.[21] The courts, however, did not moderate their course.[22] The greatest blow to Gordon's attempts to establish favourable terms for trading came not from the Poles, or the actions of the Admiralty Courts, but from the Swedes. Between 1626 and 1629, Danzig was besieged by the Swedish army, but its successful resistance strengthened the Polish defence against the Swedes and ensured that Danzig was able to extract a number of concessions from the Polish Sejm.[23] This included the stipulation that all cloth from England should be stamped in the city and only imported through Danzig.[24] This Danzig seal monopoly would consume much of Gordon's time and prevent him extracting any concessions for the English merchants. Gordon appealed to the Polish Sejm to repeal the monopoly.[25] For this to happen required unanimity which, after a fractious session, was not forthcoming and the monopoly remained in force.[26]

Gordon was ultimately unsuccessful in having the Danzig monopoly revoked, but he did initiate a strategy of attempting to play off the Prussian towns against Danzig, and there appeared even a possibility of trade though Elbing being restored.[27] However, before this could come to fruition, it was revealed that the Polish King, Władysław IV, intended to marry the Emperor's daughter.[28] There had been on-going negotiations to marry Władysław's sister to the Elector Charles Louis of the Palatinate. This revelation brought Anglo-Polish

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[20] Fedorowicz, *England's Baltic Trade*, p. 177.
[21] J. Bruce (ed.), 'Charles I - volume 98: March 22-31, 1628', *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I, 1628-29* (1859), pp. 31-53, accessed 13 October 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=52010. [British History Online]
[22] Fedorowicz, *England's Baltic Trade*, p. 180.
[23] Fedorowicz, *England's Baltic Trade*, p. 176.
[24] SPF, Poland and Saxony, SP 88/4 160 Gordon to Conway, 3 / 13 September 1627.
[25] SPF, Poland and Saxony, SP 88/10 1, Gordon to Coke, 20 January 1637.
[26] SPF, Poland and Saxony, SP 88/10 10, Gordon to Coke, 4 / 14 March 1637.
[27] Fedorowicz, *England's Baltic Trade*, pp. 242-254.
[28] SPF, Poland and Saxony, SP 88/10 10, Gordon to Coke, 4 / 14 March 1637.

negotiations to a low point and Charles I ordered Gordon to take his leave of the Court and return to England.[29] Gordon returned to Danzig and was still mentioned as 'Agent in Poland' in a memorial of 1640.[30] His letters from Danzig no longer contain references to meetings with the Polish Court, or attendance at the Sejm, hampering his ability to negotiate trading privileges.[31] Gordon's negotiations had ultimately failed due to circumstances outside his control; he had, however, prevented a poll tax and received a private promise from Władysław to seek the removal of the monopoly at the next meeting of the Sejm.[32]

Other agents negotiated and attempted to gain additional privileges for English merchants while defending those already won. Such negotiations tended to be focused in those locations which were diplomatically not of greatest importance to England: Russia; The Ottoman Empire (though there was usually an ambassador as well here); and the Hanse Towns. It is in the latter that Richard Bradshaw could be found negotiating about the continuing privileges of the Merchant Adventurers in Hamburg. Bradshaw not only covered Hamburg but also went on a mission to the Tsar (1657), whom he described as the Great Duke.[33] There, Bradshaw, as all English diplomats sent to Russia did, was required to defend the privileges so far won and attempt to gain greater freedom to trade.[34] Joseph Avery, while agent at Hamburg (1631-1649), engaged in the same task as Bradshaw, diplomacy with the Hanse Towns to keep trade flowing and tariffs as low as possible.

This general resolving of disputes about trade merges with the work agents undertook defending the rights of the King's subjects. Chapter III discussed the role that diplomatic

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[29] State Papers Domestic, Charles I, SP 16/ 378 55, Petition of the Eastland Company, 12 January 1638.
[30] SPF, Poland and Saxony, SP 88/10 191, Mem. on Gordon's Negotiations, 1640.
[31] SPF, Poland and Saxony, SP 88/10 10, Gordon to Coke, 4 / 14 March 1637.
[32] SPF, Poland and Saxony, SP 88/10 2, Gordon to Coke, 27 January / 6 February 1637.
[33] T. Birch (ed.), 'State Papers, 1657: July (3 of 6)', *A collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe*, Vol. 6: January 1657 - March 1658 (1742), pp. 402-409, accessed 9 July 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=55606. [British History Online]
[34] T. Birch (ed.), 'State Papers, 1657: May (3 of 6).' *A collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe*, Vol. 6: January 1657 - March 1658 (1742), pp. 273-286, accessed 9 July 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=55596. [British History Online]

agents had in ensuring that the rights of the King's subjects abroad were respected, and that they found justice in local courts. It was in relation to this work that we find the closest approximation to regular and continuous negotiations undertaken by diplomatic agents.

Outlined in Chapter III was the usual route which agents took in dealing with mercantile disputes. Only several steps along that path would they usually resort to political intervention and only at that stage was there any attempt to negotiate with the state to which they were accredited. These negotiations related to mercantile disputes did not normally result in a treaty. They tended to focus on attempting to persuade the government to intervene in an individual case. Only when the two governments were negotiating a treaty at the same time was it likely that such a mercantile dispute might be rolled into that treaty, as in Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye 1632, or in the Treaty of London 1604. Although in these cases it was only when there were a large number of disputes, or cause célèbre, that needed to be resolved, that the inclusion occurred. Agents, however, conducted a great many more negotiations than the number of signed treaties suggest, as in the area of commerce, few of the proposals were in the end ratified by both sides.

## Agents, Ambassadors and Ambassador Extraordinary and their place in negotiations

There were many times when the only diplomat available to the English government in a capital was a diplomatic agent. Any negotiations required in that specific country will have been handled by the diplomat in situ, and it was rare to send someone out specifically to handle a particular issue. However, there were also a number of times when there was an overlap between a diplomatic agent and an ambassador. This was the regular state of affairs in France under Charles I, when there was both an ambassador and an agent.[35] This also

[35] Agents: George Goring (1624), Thomas Lorkin (1625), William Lewis (1626), John Hawkins (1626 – 7), Réné Augier (1629 – 40), Henry De Vic (1630 – 6) and Richard Brown (1641 – 50). Ambassadors: Edward Newburgh

happened in Poland when Francis Gordon was joined by temporary Ambassadors Extraordinary, Sir Thomas Roe and Sir George Douglas.[36] In these circumstances how were negotiations handled, and what was the division of responsibility between the two diplomatic staff? There were times, on the other hand, when the state negotiating with the English diplomats demanded to negotiate with someone more prestigious and who wielded a higher rank. These circumstances will also be examined.

How did an agent interact when there was also an ambassador present? Was this a matter of personality or was there a usual form which was observed in these circumstances? For answers to these questions the best country to consider is France, where it was far more regular to have an overlap of agent and ambassador than at any other court.

Chapter III examined a dispute in France between the English merchants trading at Rouen and the government of that city. The dispute had moved from a legal one in Rouen, to a political and diplomatic one after the actions of the *Parlement* of Rouen. The eventual solution to that dispute was to roll it into the finalisation of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, along with a number of other commercial disputes which were on-going at the same time.

The Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye was a much wider ranging treaty than a simple commercial one. It dealt with mutual restitution of prizes between both nations and how this should be accomplished, the restitution of New France, and Henrietta-Maria's unpaid dowry. Louis XIII appointed a commission consisting of the 'Garde des *Sceaux* [Charles de l'Aubespine], Mr de Schomberg, the Marll d'Effiat, Mr de Bouthillier, Mr de Bullion.[37] D'Effiat and Bullion were added as d'Effiat had 'been in England did understand that

(1625 – 7), Isaac Wake (1631 – 2), John Scudamore (1635 – 9), Robert Sidney (1636 – 41). See Bell, *A Handlist*, pp. 107-112.

[36] Bell, *A Handlist*, pp. 215-216.

[37] SPFF, SP 78/90 218, Wake to Dorchester and extract, 30 September / 10 October 1631.

businesse' to conduct the negotiations for the treaty with the English.[38] While the English ambassador, Sir Isaac Wake, had previously remained in the background, he now came to centre stage for the negotiations with the commission. This pushed into secondary positions the diplomatic agents, Sir Henry De Vic and Réné Augier, who had previously appeared to conduct the largest share of diplomacy related to the commercial disputes. Both De Vic and Augier still participated in these negotiations but their role became a subordinate one, of assisting Wake and appearing with him at the formal negotiations.[39] It was clear that at this juncture it was only acceptable for the full ambassador to carry out the formal negotiations with a commission composed of so many eminent Frenchmen. Despite the previous negotiations and meetings that De Vic and Augier had conducted, meeting with the *Garde des Sceaux*, and Cardinal Richelieu, their roles were now reduced to a surprisingly low level. In December 1631, Augier was reduced to enquiring, on behalf of Wake, when a meeting of the commission would be held next.[40]

An interesting feature of these negotiations is that the financier Philip Burlamachi was also sent to France to aid in the negotiations, although he was not accredited to a diplomatic rank.[41] Burlamachi was to lead the negotiations which touched on the unpaid portions of the Queen's dowry.[42] This was one of the few examples of an expert being placed in a delegation which included agents. It was usual for agents to seek the thoughts of merchants during mercantile disputes, as Trumbull did for example.[43] However, they were clearly not a part of the diplomatic delegation. The enlarged delegation would eventually conclude a treaty which

[38] *Ibid.*
[39] *Ibid.*
[40] For the meeting with the *Garde de Sceaux*, see SPFF, SP 78/90 77, De Vic to Dorchester, 27 August 6 September 1631; SPFF, SP 78/90 142, De Vic to [Dorchester], 8 / 18 September 1631. For the meeting with Richelieu, see SPFF, SP 78/90 144, De Vic to [Dorchester], 8 / 18 September 1631. Augier sent to enquire the date of the next meeting. See SPFF, SP 78/90/499 Wake to Dorchester 3 letter with 2 duplicates and 3 extracts 22 December 1631 / 10 January 1632.
[41] G. Bell, *A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives 1509-1688* (London, 1990), pp. 109-110.
[42] A. V. Judges, 'Philip Burlamachi: A Financier of the Thirty Years' War', *Economica* No. 6 (1926), p. 297.
[43] HMCD, iv, 5-6, Kendrick to Trumbull, London, 4 January 1613; SPF, Spanish Netherlands SP 77/12 205, Trumbull to Winwood, Brussels, 7/17 November 1616.

provided for mutual restitution and the payment of the remainder of the Queen's dowry. The combination, of the requirement to have the highest ranking diplomat meet with the high ranking officials from the French court and Burlamachi's specialised knowledge, marginalised the agents in the formal negotiations, though they remained important outside the formal meetings.

This situation continued throughout this period in France. When important formal negotiations were undertaken, they were undertaken by the ambassador, Scudamore, or ambassador extraordinary, Robert Sidney, earl of Leicester. However, meetings between Richelieu and the ambassadors did not occur. For example, from January to April 1641, despite having two full audiences with Louis XIII, Leicester did not meet once with the Cardinal.[44] This might perhaps have been explained by a lack of business to be transacted; however, this was clearly not the case. Leicester was negotiating for the return of an English ship, which had been taken as a prize by a Spanish man of war, who in turn with their prize was taken by a French ship.[45] As a case relating to both the navy and commerce, it was clearly a matter for Cardinal Richelieu in his role as *Grand-maître de la navigation*.[46] Leicester, however, without an agent with him at this time, was reduced to negotiating by note and the use of Claude de Chauvigny de Blot as an intermediary.[47] Nevertheless, Leicester was able to come to a partial settlement that the merchants were willing to accept.[48] Richard Browne had been absent from the French Court while these negotiations by paper were carried out. Browne returned with fresh instructions.[49] Leicester then took Browne with

[44] SPFF, SP 78/111 17, Earl of Leicester to Secretary of State, 12 / 22 February 164; SPFF SP 78/111 34, Earl of Leicester to Secretary of State, 12 / 22 March 1641.
[45] SPFF, SP 78/111 10-12, Earl of Leicester to Secretary of State, 22 January / 1 February 1641.
[46] J. Bergin, *Cardinal Richelieu: Power and the Pursuit of Wealth* (New Haven and London, 1985), pp. 94-95.
[47] SPFF, SP 78/111 1-2, Earl of Leicester to Secretary of State, 1 / 11 January 1641; SPFF, SP 78/111 13, Earl of Leicester to Secretary of State, 29 January / 8 February 1641; SPFF, SP 78/111 19, Earl of Leicester to Secretary of State, 19 February / 1 March 1641.
[48] SFPFF, SP 78/11 26, Leicester – power to Ric. Harper to receive the ships at Toulon, and his receipt, 27 February 1641.
[49] SPFF, SP 78/111 61, Instructions for Ric. Browne, agent in France, 23 July 1641.

him to his next audience with the French King.[50] After this audience, in his first dispatch home, Browne relates an immediate meeting with Cardinal Richelieu.[51] The pressure of the French participation in the Thirty Years War seems to have kept audiences with the Cardinal to a minimum and it was not until November that Browne met with the Cardinal again, after the Cardinal had returned to Paris to visit the arsenal.[52] This situation does not vary between Wake, Scudamore or Robert Sidney, earl of Leicester, which strongly suggests that the use of agents for prompt work, while the ambassador was required to appear and take the lead in conferences, was not a function of personality but a standard practice.

The examples provided in France, appear to have been standard in theory, though practice could diverge when the need arose elsewhere. In Poland, Sir George Douglas, as Ambassador Extraordinary, was provided with detailed instructions by the Crown for the forthcoming negotiations with the Polish King, Władysław, while Francis Gordon, as agent, was provided with much more general instructions.[53] This indicates that the government did not expect their agent to undertake the largest share, or the most important parts, of the negotiations.[54] Douglas, however, proved himself to be deeply unpopular with the Polish King and Court and was practically in disgrace.[55] Douglas, therefore, remained in Danzig and much of the work of diplomacy and negotiation was transferred to Gordon, including meeting with Władysław IV and appearing before the Polish Sejm.[56] Gordon's work is similar to that of De Vic in France, when due to Wake's inflexibility over matters of precedence, the ambassador could not meet with Cardinal Richelieu. In both cases, agents were forced to step forward and fill the gap when their diplomatic superiors encountered problems.

[50] SPFF, SP 78/111 69, Leicester to Secretary of State, 27 August 1641.
[51] SPFF, SP 78/111 71, Ric. Browne to Do., 27 August 1641.
[52] SPFF, SP 78/111 101, Browne to Vane, 29 October / 8 November 1641.
[53] SPF, Poland and Saxony, SP 88/9 184, Instructions for Francis Gordon, September 1635.
[54] Fedorowicz, *England's Baltic Trade*, p. 233.
[55] SPF, Poland and Saxony, SP 88/9 114, Douglas to Coke, 9 / 19 November 1635.
[56] SPF, Poland and Saxony, SP 88/9 125, Gordon to Douglas, 20 / 30 November 1635.

Thus far we have considered an ambassador also present in the same capital as a diplomatic agent. We have seen at what stage and for what part of the negotiations the ambassador would take over and supersede the agent and when they would leave such negotiations in the hands of the agent alone. There was, however, another type of intervention by ambassadors over the heads of agents. Unlike the first, where it was always evident that the ambassador would take centre stage in the negotiations, in these cases it was much less clear. This was when the government decided that negotiations were sufficiently advanced and important to send an ambassador extraordinary, to either conclude the negotiation or to sign the treaty which the agent had worked to produce thus far. This is different from the case of Francis Gordon, where the negotiations undertaken by Roe and Douglas were far more wide ranging than those on which Gordon had initially been working.[57]

This handing over of sufficiently advanced negotiations to someone of higher rank was one the government's intentions in the case of the discussions held by John Taylor with the Emperor Ferdinand II. Taylor's agency to the Emperor will be discussed in more detail under the deniability of agents' work below; however, those aspects relating to the use of an ambassador extraordinary are relevant here.

The government believed, from Taylor's reports, that the Emperor was willing to sign a treaty, which would allow for the restitution of the Palatinate to Charles Louis. As a result of this understanding, in 1636, Thomas Howard, 2nd earl of Arundel and Surrey, was dispatched to the Emperor to conclude negotiations and sign the treaty. The use of Arundel had a number of different purposes. The first was that there were suspicions about Taylor's motives and abilities as a diplomat.[58] The second was that the Emperor should not be allowed to delay negotiations by claiming that the person sent to negotiate lacked sufficient status, as

[57] SPF, Poland and Saxony, SP 88/5 42, Instructions for Sir Thos. Roe - for Poland, 20 June 1629; SPF, Poland and Saxony, SP 88/9 3, Supplemental instructions for Sir Geo. Douglas, 24 January 1635.

[58] SPF, Holy Roman Empire SP 80/11 101, Sir Thomas Roe 'Considerations on hope given by Taylor on restoration of Palatinate', 20 March 1635.

Arundel was a preeminent peer of the realm.[59] Thirdly, such a far-reaching treaty, as it was expected to be, could not be signed by someone as unimportant as a diplomatic agent. As a result Arundel arrived in the Empire to finalise the negotiations and hopefully apply his signature to the treaty documents. Had the negotiations proceeded as intended, Arundel would have arrived, put the finishing touches to the arrangements set in place by Taylor, and then signed the treaty.[60] Even after Arundel's departure and when negotiations continued with Taylor, the Emperor requested that another ambassador extraordinary be sent to Vienna to finish negotiations and sign a fresh treaty.[61]

It is also possible that foreign ambassadors treating with an agent could request someone of higher rank to conclude the negotiations or indeed complete them. This happened to Joseph Avery and Sir Henry De Vic. Despite both being experienced agents of long standing, whom Charles I sent to the conference at Hamburg in 1638 with full powers, the French ambassador requested 'a person of greater quality' to represent England, rather than De Vic and Avery.[62] The reasoning of the French ambassador was likely two-fold. He did not believe that Avery and De Vic had the powers to commit England to war with Spain and the Empire and that Charles would repudiate any agreement they made, if it was to his advantage to do so. As the conference involved multiple different negotiations, the French ambassador may have believed it was more appropriate to send an ambassador extraordinary, and one who was well known, to such an important event. De Vic was annoyed by the actions of the French.[63] However, it was presumably anticipated that, had a general league been concluded, an Ambassador Extraordinary would have been dispatched to sign it, suggesting his annoyance was more with the timing of the intervention rather than the principle of it. De Vic had been

[59] D. Howarth, *Lord Arundel and his Circle* (London, 1985), p. 5.
[60] Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I*, p. 97.
[61] E. A. Beller, 'The Diplomatic Relations Between England and Germany During the Thirty Years' War' (Univ. of Oxford D.Phil. thesis 1924), p. 406.
[62] SPF, Denmark, SP 75/12 168 Henry De Vic to Secretary of State, 3 / 13 May 1638. SPF, Denmark, SP 75/15 109, De Vic to Windebank, 21 / 31 May 1683.
[63] Beller, 'The Diplomatic Relations Between England and Germany', p. 389.

sent from Denmark, where he was accredited, to Hamburg to join Avery and aid in the negotiations.[64] It was suggested that Sir Robert Anstruther might be sent to bolster the mission, however, Anstruther declined to undertake the assignment.[65] Considering his previous experience, of not being informed of the Spanish Treaty of 1631 while accredited to the Empire, his reluctance is unsurprising.[66] Charles I dispatched Sir Thomas Roe, an experienced diplomat, though he had not seen service for eight years.[67] Roe felt himself 'like Drake's ship, good for nothing but to be pointed at' yet he was more acceptable than De Vic or Avery.[68] Roe had lamented of Avery ever concluding a treaty.[69] Roe was also identified with those who supported an anti-Hapsburg policy and was known to be a leading member of Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia's adherents.[70] Thus Roe's appearance and high profile character would lend far more weight to the negotiations at Hamburg. Roe did, however, write in his 'A Discourse Concerning the Allies of England' arguing against a French alliance, as England would not be able to command concession at any peace as she did not have an army.[71] Nothing came from Roe's negotiations and it is not possible to tell if the substitution from agent to an ambassador extraordinary had any effect on the proceedings at that conference.

The cases mentioned are not the only occurrences of this phenomenon; they are simply used to illustrate the general pattern of diplomacy which occurred. Whenever negotiations were

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[64] Beller, 'The Diplomatic Relations Between England and Germany', p. 397.
[65] S. Murdoch, 'Scottish Ambassadors and British Diplomacy 1618-1635', in S. Murdoch (ed.), *Scotland and the Thirty Years War 1618-1648* (London, 2001), p. 45.
[66] D. de Quiroga & L. J. Reeve, 'Quiroga's Paper of 1631: A Missing Link in Anglo-Spanish Diplomacy During the Thirty Years War', *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 101, No. 401 (October, 1986), pp. 913-914.
[67] Sir Thomas Roe had previously been Special Ambassador to the Mughal Emperor, the Governor of Seurat and the Persian Court (1615 – 9), Resident Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire (1621 – 9), Ambassador Extraordinary to Denmark, The Hanse Towns, Poland and Sweden (1629 – 30). See Bell, *A Handlist*, pp. 212, 285, 34, 156, 215, 272; E. A. Beller, 'The Mission of Sir Thomas Roe to the Conference at Hamburg, 1638-40', *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 41, No. 161 (January, 1926), p. 70.
[68] SPF, Germany States SP 81/38 141, Roe to Elizabeth, April 8 / 18 1636.
[69] J. Bruce (ed.), 'Charles I - volume 369: October 1-18, 1637', *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I, 1637* (1868), pp. 458-481, accessed 9 July 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=52752. [British History Online]
[70] Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I*, p. 175.
[71] State Papers Domestic, Charles I SP 16/218 29, 'A Discourse Concerning the Allies of England'.

close to reaching a conclusion, and those negotiations were sufficiently important, it was at this point that diplomatic agents were regularly side-lined and replaced by diplomats of higher ranks. This could be a result of the continuation of the old idea of special embassies to conclude treaties even if they had not negotiated those treaties.[72]

## Agents of Deniability

This section will deal with the use of agents' deniability and their expendability. It will first look at the government's use of agents to make secret treaties and push negotiations further than would be acceptable, both to some members of the government and also to influential sections of those outside. Secondly, agents' expendability will be discussed and the more dangerous missions which agents undertook for the government will be examined.

The foreign policy of Charles I has been described as duplicitous.[73] Charles conducted negotiations with different parties at the same time in an attempt to complete his goal of the restoration of the Palatinate. Parts of these negotiations were not even known to both the Secretaries of State.[74] For such duplicity to work, Charles I needed diplomatic actors who could be easily disavowed both to the other crowned heads of Europe, but also to the body politic if needed. This would be on a standard pretext that the agent had greatly exceeded their instructions from the King and agreed to articles he did not authorise. It would be far harder for Charles I to disavow those he sent as Ambassadors Extraordinary, such as Thomas Howard, 2nd earl of Arundel and Surrey, or Robert Sidney, earl of Leicester. These individuals were high-ranking members of the court and disavowing them would lead to their

[72] G. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (London, 1955), p. 35.
[73] Reeve, *Charles I and the Road to Personal Rule*, p. 227; D. A. Bigby, *Anglo-French Relations 1641 to 1649* (London, 1933), p. 17.
[74] Sir John Coke was excluded from what is described as the 'triumvir' of Portland, Cottington and Windebank by Charles I; See M. V. C. Alexander, *Charles I's Lord Treasurer* (London, 1975), p. 214.

domestic disgrace and political ramifications for Charles at home. Agents, on the other hand, could command little political support.

For some tasks, diplomatic agents proved the perfect actors. Charles pursued negotiations variously with the Swedish, Danish, Dutch, and French as well as with the Empire and the Spanish. The negotiations which are most important in demonstrating this deniability of agents are the negotiations that took place in Madrid and Vienna. These were conducted variously by Francis Cottington, Sir Arthur Hopton and John Taylor. Cottington would end his career in government as Lord Treasurer. Taylor would end his career in the Tower. Both of these were largely a result of the negotiations they carried out at the behest of Charles I.[75] It seems likely that both of them exceeded their instructions from the King, although it is possible Cottington kept more closely to his.[76] However, the outcome of their negotiations and the King's acceptance of the outcomes accounted for the difference in their fates.

If it is accepted that the main goal of the foreign policy of Charles I was the restoration of the Palatinate then it follows that there were two routes which Charles could take to achieve this goal.[77] One lay in war with Spain and the Empire and the other in negotiations with them. Charles I flirted with both options at various times.

A closer alliance with Spain was a long term policy goal of James I. At the time of the 1604 Treaty of London, a marriage treaty was first suggested between the Crowns of England and Spain.[78] Until the beginning of the Thirty Years War, all English diplomats sent to Spain went there with these goals in mind.[79] With the Defenestration of Prague and its aftermath, a closer accommodation with Spain held out the possibility for the restoration of the Palatinate,

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[75] Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I*, pp. 509-536.

[76] Though it has been suggested Charles was manoeuvred into the Spanish Treaty of 1631 by Weston, Cottington and Rubens. See, Quiroga & Reeve, 'Quiroga's Paper of 1631: A Missing Link in Anglo-Spanish Diplomacy', p. 917.

[77] Gardiner, *History of England*, vii, p. 169; R. Cust, *Charles I: A Political Life* (Harlow, 2005), pp. 125-7; D. Mathew, *The Age of Charles I* (London, 1951), p. 54; Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I*, p. 69.

[78] G. Howat, *Stuart and Cromwellian Foreign Policy* (London, 1974), p. 22.

[79] M. Havran, *Caroline Courtier: The Life of Lord Cottington* (London: 1973), p. 51.

though public sentiment, while favouring the cause of Frederick, did not favour a Spanish alliance.[80] Such schemes had been mooted during the failed negotiations for the Spanish match; however, even after Charles I's marriage, Spain appeared to remain a viable route to restoration.[81] It has been suggested that for English diplomats in Spain success depended on achieving one outcome in the Empire, despite the difficulties of doing so. They also ignored the interests of the Duke, now Elector of Bavaria, who wished to retain his Electoral dignity and enlarged holdings. The duke was also in a far more important position in French and Imperial diplomacy than English diplomatic manoeuvres allowed for.[82]

While Cottington had negotiated with Spain as an agent, he had only carried on the prevailing policy of attempting to form a closer alliance with Spain.[83] This was mostly through dealing with causes of friction, such as the large number of trade disputes.[84] Cottington had not been entrusted with any attempt to form a long term alliance, other than with continuing the marriage negotiation while he was agent from 1616-22, before the voyage of Charles I to Madrid. After this time, Cottington did not serve as an agent again. Cottington was sent back to negotiate a peace settlement with Spain after the Anglo-Spanish War of 1625–30. It was during these negotiations that the diplomatic policy of Charles I, involving the Empire and Spain, began with a treaty, which Cottington signed after renegotiating the treaty in just five weeks at the King's command.[85] This speed was due to Cottington's long familiarity with Spain and the Spanish Court.[86]

On 2 January 1631, Sir Francis Cottington signed a secret treaty with the Spanish Government.[87] This provided for war against the Dutch, and the eventual division of the

[80] Havran, *Lord Cottington*, p. 61.
[81] Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I*, p. 72.
[82] Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I*, p. 97.
[83] Havran, *Lord Cottington*, p. 51.
[84] Kerth, 'Anglo-Spanish relations and the development of modern diplomacy', pp. 76-115.
[85] SPF Spain, SP 94/34 251-257, Dorchester to Cottington, 9 July 1630.
[86] Havran, *Lord Cottington*, p. 93.
[87] Bodleian Library, Clarendon MS, 5, 38-44, Secret Treaty.

United Provinces between England and Spain.[88] Had this design been widely known, it undoubtedly would have caused a sensation. This strategy was, however, not Cottington's but the King's.[89] Cottington was at the time serving in the capacity of Ambassador Extraordinary, rather than agent. However, the various steps which had been required, before the conclusion of such a wide ranging treaty, had been long in coming and had begun during Cottington's agency.

After the signing of the partition treaty, Cottington departed, recommending as his replacement Sir Arthur Hopton.[90] Hopton had previously served as secretary to Cottington in the Madrid embassy.[91] Sir Arthur Hopton was left to complete the strategy that Cottington had pursued at the behest of Charles I. Shockingly, Hopton was not informed about the exact details of the treaty which Cottington had signed![92] It has been suggested that the negotiations with Spain were doomed to fail before they had even begun.[93] Hopton had to content himself with hints from Olivares about English intervention. He continued to negotiate, not fully aware of previous promises made in secret, lamenting that he could not 'commend a friendship wherein we may lose much and gain little' with Spain.[94] Hopton was next informed that Cottington and Windebank and Portland had been conducting negotiations with Abbé Scaglia along the lines of Cottington's treaty, which he was now finally apprised of.[95] These negotiations, it was intended, were to form a maritime treaty for an English fleet to be put out with Spanish money. Hopton accepted these negotiations and continued them as requested. He did, however, raise causes for concern. Firstly, that it would be obvious that the fleet was intended to be used against the Dutch, and secondly that the Spanish would, having

[88] Havran, *Lord Cottington*, p. 102.
[89] Alexander, *Charles I's Lord Treasurer*, p. 214.
[90] Havran, *Lord Cottington*, p. 100.
[91] Bell, *A Handlist*, p. 260.
[92] British Library, Egerton Manuscripts, 1820, 68, 313.
[93] Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I*, p. 75.
[94] British Library, Egerton Manuscripts, 1820, 254, 12 April 1633.
[95] Alexander, *Charles I's Lord Treasurer*, p. 215.

funded the fleet, 'presume on the partnership' and not be obliged to England.[96] Hopton argued for the King to put out his own fleet with his own money, in effect the first ship money fleet. Multiple delays led to the abandoning of the maritime treaty, and the scheme against the Dutch was laid aside 'for a fit consideration after'.[97] At this time, thoughts returned to a French alliance and war against Spain and the Empire. The failure of the maritime treaty brought to an end the principal Caroline strategy of negotiation with Spain for the restoration of the Palatinate.[98] However, even before the end of negotiations with Spain, the axis of diplomacy for the restoration of the Palatinate by negotiations turned towards Vienna rather than Madrid.

Perhaps the most important case of a diplomatic agent being used for high level and prolonged negotiations is the case of John Taylor in his negotiations with the Emperor, from 1635 to 1639. Taylor was half Spanish by birth, and a Catholic.[99] Therefore, he was suspect to a large section of militant Protestant opinion. Sir Thomas Roe described Taylor as 'Catholic and so their cause affected, his education was in Spain by the Jesuits, and his whole dependence on that Crown, being brother to Taylor the Flanders agent, and nephew to old Taylor the nephew of Gondomar'.[100] Taylor was selected by Charles I to be sent to the Emperor on a specific and limited mission, as can be seen by the instructions given to him. Taylor was to ask for the investiture of Charles Louis as Elector Palatinate and also to proffer the hand of English friendship should he be fully restored.[101]

How far Charles expected this mission to proceed is unknown. There are two possibilities. One is that the King believed that something positive could come from negotiations directly

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[96] *State Papers Collected by Edward, Earl of Clarendon,* R. Scrope & T. Monkhouse (eds.), (3 vols. Oxford, 1767-86), i, pp. 83-4.
[97] Howat, *Stuart and Cromwellian Foreign Policy*, p. 44.
[98] Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I*, p. 75.
[99] Gardiner, *History of England*, viii, p. 83.
[100] SPF, Holy Roman Empire SP 80/11 101, Sir Thomas Roe 'Considerations on hope given by Taylor on restoration of Palatinate', 20 March 1635.
[101] Clarendon State Papers, i, p. 310, Instructions to Taylor.

with the Emperor and that a resolution in Vienna was possible. Such a view is supported by the fact that only the Emperor had the power to grant restoration and remove the imperial ban on Charles Louis. The alternative is that Charles used this mission as a bargaining chip with Cardinal Richelieu in the hope of unmasking his intentions. Richelieu had offered an alliance and not to make peace without restitution of the Palatinate.[102] As Taylor departed, Charles desired Richelieu to go further and suggested that Lorraine be restored to the Duke of Lorraine by the French, so that then the Palatinate could be restored by the Emperor.[103]

Once Taylor had arrived in Vienna, he began negotiations with the Emperor's representatives. Taylor's reports back to England have been dismissed as wildly optimistic.[104] Taylor himself has been accused of having a 'tendency to believe all that might tend to success which reduced his value as a diplomat'.[105] The Spanish agent in London, Juan de Necolalde, had a poor opinion of Taylor's skills, 'he is not a man of capacity or good desire'.[106] The view of Taylor's over optimism comes from his report that the Emperor would yield the Lower Palatinate, allow restoration and remove the Imperial Ban pronounced upon the Elector Palatine and his family. Under the plan the Upper Palatinate, occupied by the Duke of Bavaria, would be restored after the Duke's death, which fortunately for all concerned would be next year, at least according to an astrologer Taylor had consulted.[107] How far Taylor went in forming new agreements with the Emperor is uncertain. However, it appears clear that he exceeded his instructions and offered an offensive and defensive league to the Emperor. This only became clear at the time of Thomas Howard, earl of Arundel's mission to the Emperor.

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[102] Howat, *Stuart and Cromwellian Foreign Policy*, pp. 46-47.
[103] Gardiner, viii, pp. 97-98.
[104] British Library, Egerton Manuscripts, 1820, 581, Hopton to Windebank, 3 February 1636.
[105] Beller, 'The diplomatic relations between England and Germany', p. 349.
[106] F. Higham, *The Principal Secretary of State* (Manchester, 1923), pp. 93-94; SPF, Holy Roman Empire SP 80/9 51, Juan Necolalde, Spanish agent in London, to Count of Oñate, 10 August 1635.
[107] Clarendon State Papers, i, 451, Taylor to Windebank.

The optimistic reports which had come from Vienna had persuaded Charles I to send a higher level mission there. There were a number of reasons to supplement Taylor in Vienna. As with other agents conducting negotiations, it is clear that the final stages and ratification would need a full ambassador extraordinary, rather than the humble agent. Moreover, there was clear concern about Taylor as a diplomat, especially emanating from the Winter Queen, Elizabeth.[108] Elizabeth was much relieved after having seen Arundel's commission and spoken to him.[109] Finally, Arundel's mission added pressure to the simultaneous negotiations that Charles was conducting with the French, through Leicester in Paris. Charles at this stage was still making, and receiving, diplomatic offers.

Arundel's mission gave some cause to hope as he travelled to meet the Emperor. He met the King of Hungary, the Emperor's brother, and held discussions with him which seemed positive.[110] This, however, proved to be illusory, as with much of this diplomacy. When Arundel arrived, he was shocked to learn, from the Emperor's negotiator, Johannes Walderode, secretary of the Imperial Chancellery, that Taylor had proposed an offensive and defensive league between England and the Empire.[111] Sir Thomas Roe had warned against the danger of any leagues on the continent as bringing great danger 'unless you have equal force of the same nature' which England would never have.[112] This was but the first of many surprises for Arundel, who learned that the Emperor only intended to offer partial restitution, an offer already refused.[113] Arundel put greater pressure on the Imperial negotiations, but in the end, believing he was unlikely to receive satisfaction, requested his recall.[114] Once he had

[108] Beller, 'The diplomatic relations between England and Germany', p. 356.
[109] J. Bruce (ed.), 'Charles I - volume 318: April 1-18, 1636', *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I, 1635-6* (1866), pp. 348-372, accessed 10 June 2011, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=52660. [British History Online]
[110] Clarendon State Papers, i, p. 385, Windebank, 1 / 11 November.
[111] SPF, Holy Roman Empire, SP 80/10 55, Summary of Arundel's negotiations, with Ferdinand II's answer to Taylor of 24 Feb. Folio no. 55.
[112] Bodleian Library, Clarendon MS, 12, 952, Taylor to Windebank, 26 July 1636.
[113] Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I*, p. 521.
[114] Gardiner, *History of England*, viii, p. 160.

made this known, new proposals were made but these proved equally unsatisfactory. Through all these woes, Taylor still believed that there was hope in the negotiations and issued encouraging pronouncements.[115] Arundel again requested his recall in September and departed, ending the negotiations involving an ambassador extraordinary.[116]

Although the failure of Arundel's mission to the Emperor and his return greatly strengthened the desire for a French alliance, Taylor pushed for negotiations to be resumed with the Emperor as the only route to restoration.[117] Taylor remained in Vienna and, having not been recalled by Charles I, continued to negotiate with the Emperor.[118] Even in the face of obvious failure, Charles I kept his options open by leaving the possibility of further negotiations, though Taylor, always available.

Throughout this thesis we have only considered those men who were accredited as diplomats by the government, and then only those who were accredited at the rank of agent. However, Taylor would now continue to negotiate, and be recognised as able to negotiate by the Emperor, despite no longer having accreditation. Diplomats were the personal representatives of the monarch to another monarch. When either of these principals died, diplomats required new credentials naming their new principal, even if they remained in the same station. If titles were changed, as when Cromwell became Lord Protector, new credentials were also required. With the death of Ferdinand II and the coronation of Ferdinand III in 1637, Taylor's credentials expired.[119] Taylor never received credentials which satisfied Ferdinand III, as Charles I refused to refer to his Imperial dignity.[120] Taylor requested new credentials a

[115] Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I*, pp. 521-2.
[116] SPF, Holy Roman Empire, SP 80/10 55 Arundel to Coke, 25 October 1636.
[117] Bodleian Library, Clarendon MS, 13, 963, 19 Aug 1636.
[118] Beller, 'The diplomatic relations between England and Germany', pp. 373-378
[119] All diplomatic credentials expired when either the head of state died, or if their title changed. For a change of title, the case of Cromwell being named Lord Protector is an obvious example. See S. Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate 1649-1660* (London, 2000), p. 369.
[120] Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I*, pp. 532.

number of times but a suitable form of words could not be found.[121] The solution which Taylor used, or at least later claimed when the question of the Imperial dignity was raised, was that Taylor used the title of Emperor as a private person as he did not have the standing of a public minister.[122] Taylor also assured Ferdinand III that he had the power of a public minister; jurists of the period would certainly have disagreed with this assessment.[123] Thus he attempted to side step the issue and please all sides. While it has been suggested in this thesis that one advantage of making use of agents was that they could ignore the stricter areas of protocol, it was totally out of the ordinary for an agent to operate without credentials. Richard Bradshaw, for example, worried that there was 'necessitie of addinge the word legatus to that of oratour' for if that was not done he would 'appeare under doubtfull character' to the Tsar.[124] Another example which highlights Taylor's anomalous actions and disregard for the usual course of diplomacy is Francis Gordon, whose appearances at the Sejm have already been discussed. Gordon received orders to depart from the Polish Court and deliver his revocation to Władysław IV.[125] After he had delivered his revocation to the Polish King, Gordon did not appear again at the Polish Court or at the Sejm. However, he did remain in Danzig awaiting further instructions from England.[126] The behaviour of Gordon and Bradshaw was far more usual for an agent than Taylor's.

Despite this lack of authorised credentials, and therefore powers, the Imperial Government continued to negotiate with Taylor as if he was a fully accredited diplomatic agent. Taylor officially had no instructions for the negotiations which he now proceeded with.[127] When

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[121] Bodleian Library, Clarendon MS, 14, 61, Taylor to Windebank, 2 / 12 May 1638.
[122] Bodleian Library, Clarendon MS, 14, 61, Taylor to Windebank, 2 / 12 May 1638.
[123] Bodleian Library, Clarendon MS, 13, 148, Taylor to Ferdinand III, 1 / 11 March.
[124] T. Birch (ed.), 'State Papers, 1657: July (3 of 5)', *A collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe*, Vol. 6: January 1657 - March 1658 (1742), pp. 402-409, accessed 9 July 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=55606. [British History Online]
[125] SPF, Poland and Saxony, SP 88/10 17, Gordon to Coke, 14/24 May 1637.
[126] Fedorowicz, *England's Baltic Trade*, p. 249.
[127] E. A. Beller, 'The Mission of Sir Thomas Roe to the Conference at Hamburg, 1638-40', *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 41, No. 161 (January, 1926), p. 70.

Windebank rebuked him for his unauthorised negotiations with the Hapsburgs, he informed Taylor that Charles I 'did not dislike it' but 'the manner he could not avow'.[128] Taylor made a number of promises to Ferdinand III, including that all his letters would be answered and a new minister sent. If Ferdinand III offered satisfaction to Charles I over the Palatinate, Charles would aid in the defence of Flanders.[129] Taylor, it seems, knew about the previous promises of aid for the Spanish against the Dutch. Suggestions were also made by Taylor that the Elector should marry the daughter of the Emperor as part of the settlement of differences.[130]

John Taylor was recalled at his own request. No blame was attached to his activities by the King or the Secretaries of State at the time of his recall.[131] However, this changed when Taylor returned to England in 1639. First Taylor was confronted by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Privy Council, not all of whom had been aware of all his dealings with Spain or the Emperor.[132]

According to Secretary Coke, who had not been aware of the totality of Charles I's foreign policy machinations, 'He [Taylor] made no other defence but that he did it out of his own head, out of a good intention to discover the impostures of the Spaniards, who he said had never used any sincerity in their treaties with us.' Taylor defended his use of the Imperial dignity and other charges against him. [133] However, in letter to Roe, it was reported 'Sunday last, Mr Taylor, having been called before the Junta, was at last committed and sent to the Tower'.[134] His committal to the Tower was unsurprisingly the end of Taylor's diplomatic career.

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[128] Bodleian Library, Clarendon MS, 14, 20, Windbank to Taylor, 20 / 30 March 1368.
[129] Bodleian Library, Clarendon MS, 13, 148, Taylor to Ferdinand III, 1 / 11 March 1637.
[130] Clarendon State Papers, i, p. 394, Taylor to Windebank, 23 December.
[131] Beller, 'The diplomatic relations between England and Germany', p. 376.
[132] C. Carlton, *Charles I: The personal monarch* (London, 1983), p. 160.
[133] SPF, German States, SP 81/17 43, Coke to Roe, 15 September 1639.
[134] SPF, German States, SP 81/17 27, Weckerlin to Roe, 12 / 22 September 1639.

Charles I used duplicity throughout his diplomatic activities, hoping to gain the best possible bargain for the smallest level of commitment. As such, he regularly needed to switch tack and sound out others in how far they were willing to commit and how much they were willing to offer to him. For this work diplomatic agents were regularly employed. The results of this policy, however, were not impressive and did not lead to the accomplishment of Charles I's goal, the restoration of the Palatinate.

Deniability, Incognito and Danger: Harrison in Morocco and Avery in the Empire

So far the agents considered are those who, while their mission might have been disavowed, had the King not been pleased with the results, were still able to travel openly and safely through the territory in which they were appointed to reside. John Harrison, however, was not able to do this. He was forced to travel in secret for fear of being enslaved.[135] After the first treaty had been signed, on subsequent missions, Harrison was able to be travel openly in one of the King's ships.[136] Not only did he face this original risk but his mission was unpopular and divided opinion at home, among those who had been consulted on it. Thomas Roe and Kenelm Digby opposed ransoming captives and advocated capturing corsairs to exchange for English sailors.[137]

The Barbary Corsairs were an increasing menace to English shipping in the seventeenth century. It is estimated that they had captured 12,000 British subjects between 1600 and 1640.[138] A number of proposals were devised to deal with this, including the proposed joint Anglo-Spanish anti-piracy fleet.[139] However, these proposals would do little for those who had already been captured and enslaved by the corsairs. The only remedy which was

[135] G. Milton, *White Gold* (London, 2004), p. 17.
[136] SPF, Barbary States, SP 71/12 112, Order for taking Harrison to Barbary, 21 October 1626.
[137] C. M. Styer, 'Barbary Pirates, British Slaves and the Early Modern Atlantic World, 1570-1800' (Univ. of Pennsylvania Ph.D. thesis, 2011), pp. 98-99.
[138] L. Colley, *Captives: Britain Empire and the World 1600-1850* (London, 2002), p. 44.
[139] V. Kerth, 'Anglo-Spanish Relations and the Development of Modern Diplomacy' (Tulane Univ. Ph.D. thesis 1989), pp. 301-337.

available for them was either through the government attacking the locations where they were held captive, as Captain Rainborow did in 1637, or through negotiations which would lead to the freeing of the slaves. Petitions regularly arrived before the Privy Council for the relief of those seamen who had been taken.[140] In 1625, Charles I decided to send a diplomatic agent to negotiate a truce and the release of Englishmen held captive by the Sultan Moulay Zidan, who might also provide assistance against Spain.[141] The man selected for this post was John Harrison, who had previously undertaken missions there on behalf of James I.[142] There were other powers in the region besides the Sultan. With multiple towns in rebellion at various times, Harrison was also ordered to negotiate with the ruler of New Salé, Sidi Mohammed el Ayyachi, who served as the spiritual leader for the pirate republic operating from New Salé. Harrison could not travel publicly to New Salé as there was a high risk that he himself might be captured and then enslaved. This risk was one good reason why a full ambassador was not sent to Morocco. Indeed a full ambassador was rarely sent there without an English fleet.[143] Once Harrison had been delivered by ship to the Sultan, he then made his way overland 'in a disguised Moorish habit for the country being so dangerous'.[144]

It was only when he arrived at New Salé that Harrison revealed himself as an agent of King Charles and removed his pilgrim's garb. There was still a chance that he might have ended his mission in the dungeon or sold to the highest bidder. However, he was treated graciously and with courtesy by Sidi Mohammed el Ayyachi.[145]

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[140] P. G. Rogers, *A History of Anglo-Moroccan Relations to 1900* (London, 1977), p. 23

[141] Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, p. 25; SP 71/12 125, Harrison account of last two employments to Barbary, September 1627.

[142] Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, p. 23. Though this is disputed and not mentioned in F. B. Harrison, 'Some XVII Century Virginians: Commentaries upon the Ancestry of Benjamin Harrison. II. Captain John Harrison, Governor of Bermuda in 1623', *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, Vol. 53, No. 1 (January, 1945), pp. 21-36.

[143] Only one special ambassador, Edward Spragge, Algeria, (1671 – 2), and three ambassadors extraordinary: Henry Howard, Morocco (1669 – 1670), John Middleton (though he was serving as governor of Tangiers at the time) (1672) and James Leslie, Fez, (1680 – 2). See Bell, *A Handlist*, pp. 209-210.

[144] SPF, Barbary States, SP 71/12 125, Harrison account of last two employments to Barbary, September 1627.

[145] *Ibid.*

After long negotiations, Harrison was able to secure the release of 190 captives (rather than the 2,000 he had expected) and to sign a treaty with Mohammed el Ayyachi.[146] This treaty needed to be ratified in London.[147] It required that the English government provide the local ruler with 14 cannon and a large quantity of shot and powder for his use. This may have been to 'purchase' the captives or as a gift, however, the effect was the same. Paying with equipment rather than coin became the standard method of ransoming captives.[148]

When Harrison returned to London, he was greeted with long discussions about the treaty he had signed.[149] The treaty was intentionally misinterpreted by the government, who chose to read it as requiring four cannons rather than 14. The government sent in total four brass and two iron cannons mounted on carriages, with associated powder and shot and 150 pikes.[150] Initially, there seemed little ill effect from this deliberate mistake. A further treaty was signed giving freedom of trade to the English, as well as the release of captives and safety for English vessels from attack.[151] The death of Moukay Zidan necessitated a return of Harrison to Morocco. He was also instructed to renew negotiations with those at New Salé in 1627. There was clear evidence that the treaty that had been signed was not working. Large numbers of captives had again been taken.[152] Harrison was unable to release the large number of fresh captives at New Salé. He did, however, draw up a draft treaty with the new Sultan Moulay al Walid.[153] This treaty confirmed traditional privileges and would have freed captives, although also forbid English merchants from trading with rebellious subjects of the

[146] SPF, Barbary States, SP 78/12 119, Capitulations at Salee [sic] by J. Harrison, 31 March 1627.
[147] SPF, Barbary States, SP 71/12 126, Harrison account of last two employments to Barbary, September 1627.
[148] Colley, *Captives*, pp. 67-68.
[149] Milton, *White Gold*, p. 19; SP 71/12 126-7 Harrison's account of last two employments to Barbary, September 1627.
[150] Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, p. 26.
[151] SPF, Treaty Papers, SP 103/1 373-5.
[152] Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, p. 27.
[153] Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, p. 28; SP 71/12 182, Harrison - account of last employment in Barbary, 30 September 1637.

Sultan.[154] Charles I chose not to ratify this new agreement, though Harrison remained intermittently in Barbary.[155]

The continued depredations of New Salé required a response. Harrison had suggested a number of military expeditions, both against the Corsairs and also against Spain, with a view to providing English shipping with a safe harbour, though none of these were acted upon.[156] In 1637, Charles I sent out Captain William Rainborow, with a small fleet of warships, to use more forceful persuasion.[157] It should be noted that Rainborow's fleet of six vessels was smaller than that suggested by Harrison of 20 vessels.[158] Rainborow was able, by a combination of playing off factions and military action, to secure the release of 302 captives including 11 women.[159] Despite the risk which Harrison ran in traveling through Morocco, use of military force was eventually the option employed. This mix of diplomacy and force became the standard method for dealing with the Barbary Corsairs.[160]

Diplomatic agents were often expected to undertake missions that were dangerous. Joseph Avery, while agent for the Hanse Towns, was sent on a circuit mission to visit a number of the German Electors and other important rulers. An agent assigned to a court could have a fairly good expectation of where they would find those that they needed to speak with. Court progresses were advertised in advance and plans could be laid accordingly. During the Thirty Years War, Avery had no such knowledge and thus had to travel with only limited information of the whereabouts of those he had to see. As a result, he was often forced to change his plans and movements to avoid danger when the present information proved

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[154] SPF, Treaty Papers, SP 103/1 179-91.
[155] Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, p. 29.
[156] SPF, Barbary States, SP 71/12 140, Jn. Harrison – second proposal for exploit on Barbary and duplicate, 16 December 1627; 147 Jn. Harrison to Charles I for exploit against Barbary, 1627, 163 Mem. of John Harrison for exploit against Barbary, 1628.
[157] C. M. Styer, 'Barbay Pirates, British Slaves and the Early Modern Atlantic World', p. 104.
[158] Milton, *White Gold*, p. 21. SPF, Barbary States, SP 71/12 140, Jn. Harrison – second proposal for exploit on Barbary and duplicate, 16 December 1627.
[159] Rogers, *Anglo-Moroccan Relations*, p. 31.
[160] R. Perkins & K. J. Douglas-Morris, *Gunfire in Barbary: Admiral Lord Exmouth's battle with the Corsairs of Algiers in 1816* (Havant, Hampshire, 1982).

incorrect.[161] This was inconvenient. The war-ravaged territory though which he travelled also held numerous dangers, including 'the danger of the straggling cossackes' and other marauding troops.[162] These problems Avery complains of as 'dangeras for feare of murther, plague et other in convenuences'.[163] Imminent danger was not unknown to agents and Avery reports that he was forced to hide in a ditch to prevent being attacked.[164] While an ambassador might have possessed a large train, Avery mentions only a trumpeter who appears to act as some form of herald or symbol of his diplomatic status, although this did not seem to impress, or give reason to pause, many of those that they encountered, including the straggling 'Cossacks'.[165]

## Representing the dignity of the Monarchy

As was noted in the Introduction, one of the key duties of an ambassador in the period was to represent the dignity of his monarch in a foreign court.[166] It was suggested then that the role of representing the dignity of the monarch was not one which an agent was regularly called on to fulfil.

François de Callières hints that the diplomatic agent was not considered a courtly figure capable of representing the dignity of his sovereign abroad.[167] De Callières draws a

[161] SPF, German States, SP 81/43 182, Avery to Coke.
[162] SPF, German States, SP 81/43 198 Avery to Coke, 24 August 1636. There are numerous descriptions of similar events during the period. See G. Mortimer, *Eyewitness Accounts of the Thirty Years War 1618-48* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 52-55. Roving bands of Croat cavalry were reported by Arundel during his return, though he did not encounter them as Avery did. See Beller, 'The diplomatic relations between England and Germany', p. 372.
[163] *Ibid.*
[164] *Ibid.*
[165] *Ibid.* The most likely use of the trumpeter would be as a form of identification while Avery was travelling in the changing environment of the Empire. Though it is unlikely that a cavalry patrol which was encountered would be able to read the credentials which Avery possessed, they may have been more likely to understand the possession of a trumpeter. Though the cavalry later described as Cossacks seem to have been less than impressed.
[166] J. Hotman, *L'Ambassadeur* (London, 1609), p. 50.
[167] French diplomat born May 14, 1645, Torigni-sur-Vire, France, died March 5, 1717, Paris, and was well known for his famous treatise *The Art of Diplomacy*. See F. Callières, *The Art of Diplomacy*, trans. and eds. H.M.A. Keens-Soper & K. W. Schweizer (New York, 1983).

comparison between ambassadors and agents and the privileges which they would enjoy in the French court. Here ambassadors were granted a number of privileges, including being 'covered in the King's presence when they have their public audiences' as well as a stool for their wives.[168] By contrast 'they [agents] are not admitted to an audience of the King. They have audience only of the secretary of state or the minister who is in charge of foreign affairs'.[169] This points, not to a role of representing the dignity of the monarch, but to one devoid of ceremony, a role limited to the negotiations with the minister.

This may at first seem restrictive. After all, De Callières clearly states that an agent would not have been entitled to meet with the King of France. Little business, however, was ever transacted at the public audiences that ambassadors had, usually these were where pre-written orations were given in Latin.[170] Further, by not representing the dignity of the monarch, agents were freed from a number of the complex and restrictive practices surrounding etiquette that caused constant friction in early modern diplomacy.

The advantages of this position were clearly seen in the case of John Taylor, where he was able to render the imperial dignity desired by Ferdinand III but claim that he did this not as a representative of the dignity of Charles I but in his capacity as a private person.[171] A private person, nevertheless, who still possessed the powers of a public minister, though only in the eyes of Taylor and those he was negotiating with.[172] Such duality and convenient etiquette inspired fictions which allowed both sides to be relatively satisfied and were one of the major benefits that diplomatic agents had over ambassadors.

In essence no one was scandalised if an agent rendered greater honours than usual or, it seems, rendered honours at all, as there is no mention of any negative reaction. Yet in France, on the orders of Charles I, no English ambassador would render Richelieu the honours which

[168] Callières, *The Art of Diplomacy*, p. 102.
[169] Callières, *The Art of Diplomacy*, p. 103.
[170] W. Roosen, *The Age of Louis XIV: The Rise of Modern Diplomacy* (Cambridge, Mas. 1976), pp. 180-182.
[171] Bodleian Library, Clarendon MS, 14, 61, Taylor to Windbank, 2 / 12 May 1638.
[172] *Ibid.*

were due to a Prince of the Church.[173] Instead, they offered only those which would be due to a first-minister. The Venetians commented on Wake that he 'persisted in the idea that an ambassador ought in no wise to yield to the rank of cardinal'.[174] The Venetian ambassador, when this instruction first became known, predicted that there would be interminable wrangling and problems as a result, as indeed there were. Richelieu refused to grant a private audience to any of the English ambassadors who served in France. This restriction, however, was neatly sidestepped by the use of diplomatic agents. These men could come and go freely around Richelieu without great ceremony. As a result, direct English negotiations continued through these ministers of the second rank with the first minister of France. It is interesting to note that the commission named by Louis XIII to negotiate the treaty of St Germain-en-Laye did not include the Cardinal. As the English delegation was heading by the ambassador, Wake, this would have returned the issue of protocol to centre stage. Both sides could, therefore, continue their negotiations without ever having to resolve the issues of protocol which had caused the breakdown in communication in the first place. Nonetheless, there remained a bare minimum of dignity which an agent expected. When they were treated with less dignity than they considered themselves entitled they would complain of it. Beecher, agent in Paris in 1618, experienced just this. The French, in retaliation for the perceived poor treatment of their agent in London, disregarded usual protocol in their dealing with Beecher. Beecher in turn refused to meet with the French Council.[175] James I was eventually forced to replace Beecher with a full ambassador to end the impasse.[176] This, however, was so unusual as to cause much comment.

[173] C. Henneke, 'The Art of Diplomacy under the Early Stuarts, 1603-42' (Univ. of Virginia Ph.D. thesis, 1999), pp. 238-9.
[174] A. Hinds (ed.), 'Venice: August 1631', *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, Vol. 22, 1629-1632 (1919), pp. 529-539, accessed 8 May 2009, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=89286. [British History Online]
[175] SPFF, SP 78/68 84-5, Becher to James I, 16 July 1616; 90-2 Becher to Secretary of State, 2 August 1618.
[176] SPFF, SP 78/68 137-40, Becher to Secretary of State, 16 October 1618.

Agents appear to have encountered no problems when they wished to talk with either ministers of the court or with other members of the great nobility where they were stationed. As Chapter III detailed, De Vic was led away by Richelieu for private discussions when he met the Cardinal. This was not limited to diplomacy though as he was also able to enquire about news from the Prince of Condé. Despite the importance of status and showing due respect, and the dangers of displays of much deference or insufficient deference, agents appear to have been able to move freely through court society without the associated costs which a full ambassador faced, both financial and in terms of restrictions due to the need to render only appropriate honours. While agents did not represent the dignity of their sovereign, they were clearly not viewed as inconsequential and their words would be listened to even by great nobles. This is another strange duality about the status of agents at a foreign court who, it must be remembered, did not come from the first rank of English society.

Not only were agents less restricted in their movements around the court, where they were not hampered by protocol, but they were also able to move with greater physical speed. While there are examples of ambassadors moving with great haste, such as William Temple during the negotiations for the Triple Alliance, in general they moved far more slowly.[177] One key reason for this is the large amount of baggage and the size of the household, which they needed to take with them to represent their status at a foreign court. An agent was unencumbered with these. Thus Avery was able to make much better time as he travelled through Saxony and more widely across war-ravaged Germany than the Earl of Arundel managed.[178] When he was ordered immediately to visit Denmark he accomplished this with a minimum of trouble.[179]

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[177] Howat, *Stuart and Cromwellian Foreign Policy*, p. 119.
[178] SPF, German States SP 81/43 182, Avery to Coke.
[179] A. Hinds (ed.), 'Venice: June 1636', *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, Vol. 24: 1636-1639 (1923), pp. 1-14, accessed 9 July 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=89401. [British History Online]

There were occasions when agents did act as representatives of the dignity of their master. These, however, were hardly ever at courts of the first ranks and only in those of secondary importance. While we have seen Avery moving from place to place and hiding, with little dignity, when he reached the court where he was expected to treat, he did desire to be treated with appropriate dignity as representing Charles I, when, for example, he was negotiating with the Saxon Chancellor.[180] In Hamburg, Richard Bradshaw, the agent for the Commonwealth, sought to ensure that he was treated with the dignity due to the representative of such a power. Bradshaw even refused certain tasks when he felt that his public dignity prohibited him from carrying them out.[181]

## Agents as Negotiators

Agents carried out regular negotiations relating to trade and commerce. They were required continuously to defend the privileges of English merchants in foreign states. Agents provided some things more important in the complex world of early modern diplomacy; access without issues and protocol, and easy repudiations.

That an agent was generally not seen as the personification of the monarchy they represented was one of their most useful assets when it came to negotiations. While they may not have been entitled to an audience with the King upon arrival, they could meet with ministers, often more easily than an ambassador.[182] The French case of English ambassadors and Cardinal Richelieu is the most obvious example and provides an explanation why, throughout

[180] SPF, German States, SP 81/43 198, Avery to Coke, 24 August 1636.

[181] T. Birch (ed.), 'State Papers, 1656: September (6 of 7)', *A collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe*, Vol. 5: May 1656 - January 1657 (1742), pp. 437-446, accessed 8 June 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=55550. [British History Online]

[182] D. J. Hill, *A History of Diplomacy in the International Development of Europe* (New York, 1925), p. 26; W. Roosen, 'Early Modern Diplomatic Ceremonial: A Systems Approach' *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (September, 1980), p. 452.

Richelieu's ministry, England maintained not just an ambassador at the French court but also an agent as well.[183]

The odd mix that agents had, of being deniable but recognisable, and of being important enough to negotiate with but so unimportant that not all protocol applied to them, were the agents' greatest assets in the task of negotiations. This odd mix, however, meant that it was rare for an agent to sign a treaty with a foreign power even if they had carried out the negotiations. While this did occasionally occur, it was usually at courts of the second rank, such as Harrison's treaties in Barbary, and never at the most important courts in Europe.[184] When an important agreement was nearing the end stages, it was the usual practice to send out a great ambassador extraordinary to finalise the negotiations and ratify the agreement, as Roe was sent to Hamburg at the behest of the French and Arundel was sent to Vienna, though both of these proved unsuccessful despite sending an ambassador extraordinary.

[183] Agents were: George Goring (1624), Thomas Lorkin (1625), William Lewis (1626 – 7), John Hawkins (1626 – 7), Réné Augier (1629 – 40), Henry De Vic (1630 – 6), Richard Brown (1641 – 50). Ambassadors were: Edward Newburgh (1625 – 7), Isaac Wake (1631 – 2), John Scudamore (1635 – 9), Robert Sidney (1636 – 41). See Bell, *A Handlist*, pp. 107-112.

[184] SPF, Barbary States, SP 71/12 126, Harrison account of last two employments to Barbary, September 1627.

# Chapter V Tasked with Other Duties

This chapter will investigate the other activities and duties which agents undertook while they were abroad. These activities were not directly related to their function as diplomats. They can be divided into two categories, both of which often involved the purchase of goods. The first activity was the purchase of naval supplies, or other warlike equipment, by diplomatic agents. This function was a limited one and performed by relatively few diplomatic agents. However, that they were able to supply these goods, on a large enough scale for the navy's needs, demonstrates their local knowledge and how integrated they were in the societies where they were posted. The second activity relates to cultural transmission. When and how agents transferred knowledge about, and artefacts from, the culture they lived in, back to England, will be considered. Special reference will be made to the activities of Balthazar Gerbier and his use as an artistic agent, which went much further than the normal activities of diplomatic agents.

## Naval and Warlike Supplies

Given the well-studied history of contractors and their supplies to the navy and land forces, it is surprising to find that diplomatic agents were also used to procure supplies.[1] However, there are a number of examples of this during the period. In view of the nature of the supplies which the navy needed to import, these duties were clustered in only a few regions. Only those agents attached to the Baltic ever engaged in these activities and it was only certain agents amongst these.

[1] J. D. Davies, *'A lover of the sea and skillful [sic] in shipping': King Charles II and his navy* (Huntingdon, 1992); A. Tedder, *The Navy of the Restoration* (London, 1970) ; J. D. Davies, *Gentlemen and Tarpaulins: The Officers and Men of the Restoration Navy* (Oxford, 1991); L. A. Wilcox, *Mr. Pepys' Navy* (London, 1966); J. D. Davies, *Pepys's Navy: Ships, Men & Warfare, 1649-1689* (Barnsley, 2008); A. T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1805* (London, 1980).

The first diplomatic agent for which there is evidence of this type of work is Francis Gordon, who served as agent to Poland from 1626 to 1641.[2] This, however, was not a regular part of Gordon's work and appears to have been performed in an ad hoc fashion. For example, Gordon was tasked in 1629 with purchasing powder for the King's ships.[3] Gordon would also, in 1632, be required to buy masts for the navy.[4] The purchases which Gordon was called on to make were irregular, though increasing in bulk and value, as Charles I sought to increase the size of the fleet.[5]

The system of using the diplomatic agent regularly to purchase naval supplies appears to have begun with the Commonwealth; supplies were not sought from Poland but from Hamburg. Richard Bradshaw was appointed agent there in 1650.[6] His appointment broke the convention that the post was usually given to an appointee of the Merchant Adventurers, with government consent. This radical development of the purchasing of naval stores being put into the hands of a state employee, and then making him responsible for shipping it back to England, was not a sudden development. It was a solution to problems, which had arisen over decades, of trying to procure masts and powder.

It is clear that initially Bradshaw was instructed to find a merchant to handle the transactions in Hamburg, for the Naval Commissioners in England, rather than to purchase these goods himself. Bradshaw points out in a letter of the 23 September 1656 'my publick character not permittinge me to act the businesse myself' showing that at this time he felt the purchase of goods for the navy was incompatible with diplomatic duties and possibly demeaning for a diplomat of the Commonwealth.[7]

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[2] G. Bell, *A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives 1509-1688* (London, 1990), p. 215.
[3] SPF, Poland and Saxony, SP 88/5 32, Gordon to Dorchester, 15 / 25 May 1629.
[4] SPF, Poland and Saxony, SP 88/8 124, Instructions for Francis Gordon, 1632.
[5] K. Andrews, *Ships, Money and Politics* (Cambridge, 1991), p. 187.
[6] Bell, *A Handlist*, 156
[7] T. Birch (ed.), 'State Papers, 1656: September (6 of 7)', *A collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe*, Vol. 5: May 1656 - January 1657 (1742), pp. 437-446, accessed 8 June 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=55550. [British History Online]

This situation, however, clearly changed by 1658, when Bradshaw reported that it was tedious work sourcing the powder and masts for further deliveries.[8] At this point, he mentions no intermediaries; he was clearly buying the items direct and shipping to the Naval Commissioners. What reasons had there been for the move away from employing a contractor to using an accredited diplomat, especially one who considered it not fitting with his public duties?

The quality of the goods received was a clear problem in the view of the Naval Commissioners. Both the masts and powder that were provided by Bradshaw's merchants were found wanting. Bradshaw was forced to apologise for the 'bad provinge of the masts and powder sent'.[9] Bradshaw explained that the merchant he had bought the supplies from 'hath the repute here of as honest and as able a man for businesses, as any of the nation in this place'.[10] Despite this assurance, evidently the goods had not proved satisfactory by the time they reached the navy in London. Added to the unsatisfactory nature of the goods was the question of cost. The Naval Commissioners went so far as to suspect that they were being defrauded by the merchant who had been selected by Bradshaw.[11]

Bradshaw was thus forced to take over directly the sourcing of masts and powder for the navy. Once he had done so, there were no further complaints about unacceptable consignments. Despite this apparent improvement in the quality of the supplies, however, the

[8] T. Birch (ed.), 'State Papers, 1658: November (1 of 5)', *A collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe*, Vol. 7: March 1658 - May 1660 (1742), pp. 488-500, accessed 8 June 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=55685. [British History Online]

[9] T. Birch (ed.), 'State Papers, 1656: September (6 of 7)', *A collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe*, Vol. 5: May 1656 - January 1657 (1742), pp. 437-446, accessed 8 June 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=55550. [British History Online]

[10] T. Birch (ed.), 'State Papers, 1656: September (6 of 7)', *A collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe*, Vol. 5: May 1656 - January 1657 (1742), pp. 437-446, accessed 8 June 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=55550. [British History Online]

[11] M. Green (ed.), 'Volume 184: December 1658, 21-31', *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Interregnum, 1658-9* (1885), pp. 223-238, accessed 8 June 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=104036. [British History Online]

problem of fraud remained. By the end of his agency, the Admiralty believed that Bradshaw had profited by £2,188, on the supplies which he had purchased and then transported.[12]

Why was this system not more widely adopted by the government, which needed to source various supplies, especially naval supplies, which originated only in the Baltic or increasingly in the North American Colonies?[13]

It seems likely that this method of purchasing goods for the State was used due to the special circumstances of Bradshaw. As a merchant before his appointment as diplomat, and as someome who was later appointed to the Merchant Adventurers, Bradshaw had access to commercial networks that other members of the diplomatic corps would not have. Other agents, while they knew and dealt with merchants, were not usually members of their community. Bradshaw was also able to use his contacts and mercantile network to finance the buying of naval supplies. The large sums involved were beyond the reach of many diplomatic agents, who were not speedily reimbursed, nor would be paid in advance.[14] Bradshaw, however, was able to bear these costs, either personally, or through borrowing from his network of associates. Indeed, Bradshaw was even able to pay for the victualing of the navy's ship, *Foresight*, when her captain ran short of funds.[15] Bradshaw was, in effect, in this case speculating in purchasing goods, as he was in less urgent need of being repaid, and was able to make a profit from this. This is similar behaviour to a number of agents who, as we will see, purchased art and other goods for resale or as gifts in England, to advance their careers. The ordering of supplies for naval yards, however, was not optional as the victualing was.

The Naval Commissioners appear to have taken note of the benefits of someone negotiating at source for the supplies, which were needed by the fleet, and Sir William Warren was

[12] Admiralty Out-Letters, ADM 2/1, 145, Admiralty to Treasury Commissioners 1st May 1658 acknowledge their letter of the 16th.
[13] B. Capp, *Cromwell's Navy* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 9-11.
[14] A. Tedder, *The Navy of the Restoration* (London, 1970), pp. 1-6.
[15] M. Green (ed.), 'Volume 182: September 1658, 16-30', *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Interregnum, 1658-9* (1885), pp. 139-150, accessed 8 June 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=104029. [British History Online]

appointed agent, or factor, for buying supplies.[16] Warren bought far larger quantities of supplies than Bradshaw, receiving in 1665, £10,000 for the supply of a total of 855 masts.[17] It seems likely that the navy decided they wanted to have direct supervision over the purchaser of their goods, rather than have the work carried out by diplomatic agents, especially after the suspicions of Bradshaw's profiteering.[18] Although, Sir William Warren still had to be called to have his accounts examined.[19]

Bradshaw's ability to supply the navy's needs further demonstrates that the long service diplomatic agent was able to build up a web of contacts, not just to facilitate diplomacy but also to facilitate other transactions for the government and for others that they supported. This chapter will now turn to the more practised actions of trading in material culture and art.

## Cultural Transmission and Diplomatic Agents

In recent years the role that ambassadors took in facilitating the transfer of ideas and material culture has been re-examined, and this neglected area in early modern diplomacy given greater emphasis.[20] Art and culture were important parts of the role of a diplomat; this was even acknowledged by writers of the period. In the realm of cultural transfer, as with much of the agent based diplomacy described in this thesis, it reached its high watermark under the reign of Charles I. While there were a number of areas and ways in which agents could be involved in cultural transfer under Charles I, the most important was perhaps painting. This

[16] W. Shaw (ed.), 'Minute Book: February 1674-5', *Calendar of Treasury Books*, Vol. 4: 1672-1675 (1909), pp. 284-290, accessed 8 June 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=80495. [British History Online]

[17] W. Shaw (ed.), 'Entry Book: March 1679, 21-31', *Calendar of Treasury Books*, Vol. 5: 1676-1679 (1911), pp. 1296-1312, accessed 8 June 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=80695. [British History Online]

[18] Tedder, *The Navy of the Restoration*, pp. 52-5.

[19] W. Shaw (ed.), 'Entry Book: March 1679, 21-31', *Calendar of Treasury Books*, Vol. 5: 1676-1679 (1911), pp. 1296-1312, accessed 8 June 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=80695. [British History Online]

[20] H. Jacobsen, *Luxury and Power: The Material World of the Stuart Diplomat, 1660-1714* (Oxford, 2012).

was despite the prohibition of importing art.[21] Other areas of culture, such as reporting on the latest fashions and trends, and the provision of books and printed materials, must not be overlooked however.

Art was imported into the realm on an unprecedented scale under Charles I. He has been described as 'the finest art collector ever to sit on the English throne – or for that matter, possibly on the throne of any other western kingdom'.[22] There were problems, in the early Stuart period, for those who wished to purchase the finest art and cultural artefacts that could be acquired both from Europe and further afield. One major issue was that, until the establishment of an art auction in London after the Restoration, there was no easy means by which continental art could be brought to England to be sold.[23] With a lack of a home market to supply their need, the only way for the nobility, and even royalty, to acquire art and other cultural items was through agents located where these items were produced and available for sale.[24] Once this is recognised, it is easy to see why English diplomats acted as purchasers of art and other goods for patrons in England. There were often semi-permanent residents in the great art markets of Europe. What role was there, for diplomatic agents in particular, in facilitating the transfer of culture and goods, from where they were stationed, to England?

The background of diplomatic agents would appear to have played a large part in determining the role which they played in exchanging culture and items. Agents were not those of the highest social standing (see Chapter I) who could afford the most costly items. Nor would they be expected to have a great knowledge of art. This was especially true in the earlier part of the period when England had been virtually cut off from continental art for a prolonged

[21] D. Ormrod, 'The Origins of the London Art Market, 1660-1730', in M. North & D. Ormrod (eds.), *Art Markets in Europe, 1400 – 1800* (Aldershot, 1998), p. 167.
[22] C. Carlton, *Charles I: The Personal Monarch* 2nd edition (London, 1995), p. 141.
[23] J. Brotton, *The Sale of the Late King's Goods Charles I & His Art Collection* (London, 2006), p. 12.
[24] Italian art could be purchased from existing collections in a number of nations, including Spain and the Low Countries. See Brotton, *The Sale of the Late King's Goods*, p. 87; J. Brown, *Kings & Connoisseurs Collecting Art in Seventeenth-Century Europe* (New Haven and London, 1995), p. 17.

period.[25] Added to this national isolation from European artistic tastes, agents often had a scholarly background, which writers and theorists suggested could lead to pedantry.[26] Thus, in the majority of cases, we find agents not dealing in high art, but the main focus of their cultural activities was on items like books and scientific instruments, which they possessed relevant knowledge about. This does not mean that they did not act as intermediaries for their superiors in the purchase of art. However, they tended to act on direct instructions, providing lists of what was available and then awaiting instructions to attempt purchases. There were, however, some diplomatic agents who did not fit this general pattern. These were men who promoted their artistic credentials to patrons and, as a result, were allowed a much greater flexibility. The principal agent of this type was Balthazar Gerbier, who had previously been an artist and had even introduced artistic techniques into England.[27] Gerbier was allowed a free choice in paintings when he was asked to procure some. He was also entrusted with perhaps the most important artistic mission of the period, the contracting of Peter Paul Rubens to serve as royal painter to Charles I.

Culture was not only imported by diplomats on behalf of their superiors, it was also exported to the rest of the continent. This culture included works such as the books which James I sent to other nations, including his theological deliberations, whether or not they wanted to receive them.[28] As well as much less royal works, those of English scholars were exchanged by diplomats in Europe.

The cultural transfer and exchange undertaken by agents will be analysed in a number of separate categories. Although it is important to remember that all of these activities were occurring simultaneously, it is easier to categorise them by the type of goods procured and

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[25] J. Stoye, *English Travellers Abroad 1604-1667* (London, 1989), pp. 2-13; Brown, *Kings & Connoisseurs*, p. 17.
[26] B. Castiglione, *The book of the courtier*, trans. Sir Thomas Hoby (London, 1900), p. 34.
[27] J. Wood, 'Gerbier, Sir Balthazar (1592–1663/1667)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed 12 June 2011, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/10562. H. Williamson, Four Stuart Portraits (London, 1949), pp. 27-28.
[28] D. Fischlin & M. Fortier (eds.), *Royal Subjects* (Detroit, 2002), p. 381.

compared over time. First to be considered will be painting and other high art, followed by the written word, in the form of both manuscripts and printed volumes. Finally, cultural information which was passed on by agents, from their experiences of living in and viewing the courts, to which they were attached, will be considered. In this case, while there is much evidence for information coming from the continent into England, there is much more limited information for English cultural practices passing in the opposite direction.

## Paintings and other high art

Paintings and other similar works of art were not the usual acquisitions for diplomatic agents. This is for a number of simple reasons. The cost of the most desirable paintings was high compared to an agent's salary, for example six Tintorettos, five Veronese, two Bassano's and one Schiavone and Titian cost over £300, while Van Dyck's Rinaldo and Armida cost £72.[29] With such high prices, it is hardly surprising that agents, notionally paid £365 a year, were not often engaged in the buying and selling of paintings. Added to the price, however, was the lesson of Dudley Carleton's (later Viscount Dorchester) experiences trying to act as an art broker while serving as ambassador in Venice.[30] Carleton was able to purchase a number of paintings intended for Robert Carr, 1st earl of Somerset, as well as statues, and ship them back to England. This he did with borrowed money. In an attempt to sell them, he gifted a number of pieces to members of the nobility but found no ready buyer after the disgrace of Somerset.[31] Carleton was forced to dispose of the paintings at a loss of £100.[32] Such a loss was around a third of an agent's annual salary, though *only* a twelfth of Carleton's higher

[29] Brotton, *The Sale of the Late King's Goods*, pp. 61-62; R. Blake, *Anthony Van Dyck: A Life 1599-1641* (London, 1999), p. 246.
[30] R. Hill, 'The Ambassador as Art Agent: Sir Dudley Carleton and Jacobean Collecting', in E. Chaney (ed.), *The Evolution of English Collecting: Reception of Italian Art in the Tudor and Stuart Periods* (London, 2003), pp. 241-255.
[31] Hill, 'The Ambassador as Art Agent: Sir Dudley Carleton and Jacobean Collecting', p. 246.
[32] Brotton, *The Sale of the Late King's Goods*, p. 64.

ambassadorial salary.[33] Carleton retained the majority of the statue collection he had bought and, when he was sent to the Spanish Netherlands, took them with him. There Carleton exchanged the statues, in a complicated deal, with Peter Paul Rubens, involving some cash and some payment in kind with Rubens offering his own work in exchange.[34] At the end of this long series of transactions, Carleton still remained out of pocket from his original purchase and had seen a number of items lost, stolen or damaged along the way.[35] Carleton had also engaged in a protracted dispute with Rubens over the pictures he had provided, and he had gained no new patronage at Court as a result of these activities. Carleton's experience alone would surely have been enough to dissuade many potential art buyers that it was very risky to attempt to buy and sell in European art markets. This is especially if they were not considered a connoisseur, or acting for a patron. In such a case, they would be speculating on the possibility of a high return, either financially, or in kind, from a newfound patron.

However, some diplomatic agents, though few in number, did buy and sell high value works of art. These agents tended to be concentrated in either Italy or the Spanish Netherlands and United Provinces, as these were the premier storehouses and studio locations of internationally respected art. French art, unlike much of French culture after 1660, was not yet as highly thought of as traditional Italian art, or the Baroque art which flowed from Flanders.[36] Areas on the periphery of the diplomatic worlds were not areas where great works of art could be had, but they were places where curios could be found and there was some trade in collecting them. Describing all agents who acquired works of art, or objects of artistic value, would be too great an undertaking for this thesis. A select few have been chosen to illustrate the topic at the various levels of activity.

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[33] Bell, *A Handlist*, p. 290.
[34] Brotton, *The Sale of the Late King's Goods*, pp. 61-70.
[35] *Ibid.*
[36] H. Jacobsen, 'Cultural politics and luxury consumption: the world of the Stuart diplomat 1660-1714' (University of Oxford D.Phil. thesis, 2007), p. 113.

The most important diplomatic agent to be involved in the world of fine art was Balthazar Gerbier. Before becoming a diplomat, Gerbier had been a painter. While his artistic merit is recorded as being one of little note, he did introduce the table-book leaf to the English art world.[37] Gerbier was also closely acquainted with Peter Paul Rubens. Rubens, while staying in London, lodged with Gerbier when combining diplomacy with his artistic work.[38] It was the Duke of Buckingham who first utilised the artistic talents of Gerbier. Buckingham appointed him to serve as the keeper of his pictures and it was in this capacity that he spent time, in the 1620s, travelling Europe to purchase a collection which reflected Buckingham's desire to possess the most appreciated art.[39] During this time, Gerbier acquired Rubens' collection of art for Buckingham (apart from several marbles which Rubens retained) including nineteen Titians, seventeen Tintorettos, several Veronese and Raphael paintings and 13 of Rubens' own canvasses.[40] He joined the Prince of Wales and the Duke of Buckingham during the Spanish Match as artistic reinforcement.[41] Through this, Gerbier had established his credentials as one of the most well versed men in artistic taste in the kingdom.[42] With Buckingham's death, it seemed that the fortunes of Gerbier would fade, however, Charles I selected this artist and connoisseur to serve as his diplomatic agent in Brussels.[43] Gerbier would be expected to employ there his artistic connoisseurship and skill for the King. This he did, buying the King a number of pictures, many of which he selected personally, or advised the King to pursue the purchase of.[44]

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[37] J. Wood, 'Gerbier, Sir Balthazar (1592–1663/1667)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed 4 January 2012, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/10562.
[38] L. J. Reeve, *Charles I and the Road to Personal Rule* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 242.
[39] Blake, *Anthony Van Dyck: A Life 1599-1641*, p. 248; E. Chaney, 'The Italianate Evolution of English Collecting', in Chaney (ed.), *The Evolution of English Collecting*, p. 51.
[40] H. R. Williamson, *Four Stuart Portraits* (London, 1949), p. 31.
[41] J. Brown & J. H. Elliott, *The Sale of the Century: Artistic Relations Between Spain and Great Britain, 1604-1655* (London, 2002), p. 44.
[42] P. McEvansoneya 'Italian Paintings in the Buckingham Collection', in Chaney (ed.), *The Evolution of English* Collecting, p. 320.
[43] Bell, *A Handlist*, p. 268.
[44] D. Turner, *Catalogue of the Works of Art in the Possession of Sir Peter Paul Rubens* (London, 1832), p. 2.

This description suggests that Gerbier was dispatched to the Spanish Netherlands as an art agent and should perhaps be viewed differently from other diplomatic agents. Gerbier, however, did carry out diplomatic functions which are regularly associated with other diplomatic agents of the time. He was not purely an artistic agent. Gerbier's letter books contain the usual diplomatic reporting on news which was known and occurring in the Spanish Netherlands at the time of his posting.[45] Gerbier also carried out the usual diplomatic functions such as meeting with the Cardinal Infante, and discussing the prospects for the English embassy to the Emperor.[46] That said, Gerbier's record of defending the rights of the King's subjects was less than impressive, and he was called before the House of Lords to account for it upon his return.[47] But, as was seen in the previous chapter, there were numerous problems and frustrations involved in attempting to gain restitution for the King's subjects abroad, so these criticisms do not necessarily diminish the diplomatic role Gerbier played. One case, Gerbier was forwarded by the Secretary Coke, was that of Captain Thomas Newman, whose ship, the *Providence*, was seized by the Dunkirk privateers in 1636. Coke described this as an 'extravagant wrong'.[48] Gerbier proceeded though the usual phases outlined in Chapter III, to attempt to gain restitution, but rapidly decided to petition the Cardinal Infante for restitution.[49] Captain Newman was, however, an interloper (an illicit trader in the Spanish New World) whom the Spanish considered to be 'the greatest pirate this day on the seas' for his activities beyond the line.[50] It was not surprising that, in these circumstances, little redress would be offered to Gerbier for Newman. Gerbier was left

[45] SPF, Archives of British Legations, Letter books of Sir Balthasar Gerbier [d'Ouvilly], minister at Brussels, SP 105/14.
[46] SPF, Archives of British Legations, SP 105/13 no pagination, Gerbier to Secretary Coke, 9 May 1636.
[47] 'House of Lords Journal Volume 4: 28 June 1641', *Journal of the House of Lords*, Vol. 4: 1629-42 (1767-1830), pp. 291-292, accessed 22 September 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=35634. [British History Online]
[48] SPF, Flanders, SP 77/29 19, Sir John Coke to Gerbier, 9 January 1639.
[49] SPF, Flanders, SP 77/29 46, Gerbier - remonstrance to Cardinal Infant about Capt. Thos. Newman, 25 January / 5 February 1639.
[50] SPF, Flanders, SP 77/29 21, Gerbier to Coke, 12 / 22 January 1639.

lamenting that the case would 'prove very intricate'.[51] These brief examples show that Gerbier undertook a full range of diplomatic activities which agents usually carried out, and can be thus considered a fully active diplomatic agent, as well as an artistic agent.

Gerbier not only acquired art for the King, and other patrons, but was charged with a far more complex and delicate task. He was tasked with persuading Anthony Van Dyck to come to London and take up the post as the royal portrait painter. While the agent William Trumbull had been directed to make the first approach to Rubens, with regard to the ceiling of the Banqueting House, Trumbull's was an altogether easier mission. The agent simply had to offer Rubens the commission and persuade Rubens to visit London before returning home to work on the piece.[52] Gerbier, by contrast, had to persuade a highly respected painter to move to a country considered an artistic backwater.

Authorities disagree over whether the plan to hire Van Dyck was that of Gerbier's independently or one ordered by Charles.[53] That a number of authors are willing to attribute one of the most artistically important achievements of the period by the English Court to Gerbier's own initiative demonstrates the level of artistic knowledge that Gerbier is believed to have had. However the plan originated, Gerbier's attempts to acquire the services of Ruben's most talented pupil did not begin well. Gerbier negotiated the release of Van Dyck from his contract to the Archduchess Isabella, without the complete involvement of Van Dyck, who clearly had a personal dislike for Gerbier.[54] Gerbier had recently purchased the Madonna and St. Catherine by Van Dyck and had sent it to the Lord Treasurer, Weston, as a New Year's gift. Van Dyck then repudiated the work claiming that, rather than an original by

[51] SPF, Flanders, SP 77/29 51, Gerbier to Coke, 31 January / 10 February 1639.
[52] D. Howarth, 'The Arrival of Van Dyck in England', *The Burlington Magazine*, Vol. 132, No. 1051 (Oct., 1990), p. 709.
[53] Blake believes it was a plan by Gerbier to increase his prestige while Brotton states that it was at the direction of Charles I. See Blake, *Anthony Van Dyck: a Life 1599-1641* p. 249; Brotton, *The Sale of the Late King's Goods*, p. 61.
[54] Blake, *Anthony Van Dyck: A Life 1599-1641*, p. 248.

him, it was a studio copy.[55] There has been some suggestion that Van Dyck wished to discredit Gerbier in the eyes of those who valued his connoisseurship.[56] These actions led to Gerbier sending a sworn affidavit to London as to the provenance of the work.[57] Van Dyck wrote to Gerbier protesting his action and then proceeded to disappear without a trace.[58] Gerbier wrote home that 'Since Van Dyck wrote me this letter he had not suffered himself to be seen'.[59] Despite this acrimonious dispute, which even at one stage involved Rubens, Gerbier was eventually able to retain the service of Van Dyck for Charles I.[60] When, in March 1632, Van Dyck arrived in London with his considerable train of baggage, Gerbier could have been well satisfied in completing one of the most important artistic missions given to any diplomatic agent during the period. Only the acquisition of the Gonzaga collection of art can be seen as artistic diplomacy of a similar significance. Gerbier is also credited with attracting other artists to London, such as Gerrit van Honthorst and Orazio Gentileschi.[61]

The work of Gerbier is exceptional among diplomatic agents throughout the period; no other agent was allowed such a level of freedom in the choice of art they were to purchase when they were charged with acquiring it for their patrons. However, this is easily explained by Gerbier's background as an artist. He was respected and expected to be able to discern the quality of fine works of art that were offered for sale. Other agents, as will be seen, were far more restricted when it came to their forays into the world of art. Gerbier depended on his reputation as a connoisseur, and it was this that helped him to his employment as a diplomatic

[55] G. de Montebello, 'Van Dyck, Painter of the Counter Reformation', *The Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin*, New Series, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Dec., 1963), p. 142.
[56] *Ibid.*
[57] Montebello, 'Van Dyck, Painter of the Counter Reformation', p. 142.
[58] Blake, *Anthony Van Dyck: A Life 1599-1641*, p. 250.
[59] SPF, Flanders, SP 77/21 6, Gerbier to Dorchester, 4 / 14 February 1632.
[60] SPF, Flanders, SP 77/21 136, Rubens to Gerbier, and translation 2 / 12 April 1632.
[61] L. Whitaker & M. Clayton, *The Art of Italy in the Royal Collection: Renaissance & Baroque* (London, 2007), p. 17.

agent. The Civil War, however, ended his career as a diplomat for Charles I and brought his fortunes to a low ebb.[62]

We have seen in Gerbier a man who might easily have been described as a connoisseur of art. Such men were happy to make their own choices for their patrons and allowed to spend money on what they thought was best. The connoisseur agents were not the only agents to purchase art. Art was also purchased by agents whom it appears had little appetite for connoisseurship and knew their limitations in the new world of art. This art was purchased to order, rather than speculatively, as Carleton did. An example of this lower end in the art world was Trumbull.

Trumbull does not appear to be well rated by his patrons and superiors when it came to his knowledge of the arts.[63] Nor did he try and distinguish himself as a connoisseur. Trumbull's own small picture collection is described as conventional, made up of portraits of important persons and people he had dealings with.[64] However, by the time Trumbull had assembled this collection collecting had moved away from the Tudor gallery of important persons.[65]

Trumbull, however, seems to have understood his limits and, unlike Carleton, did not make attempts to purchase works of art to give or sell to others for political advantage. He presented Sir Ralph Winwood '3 pictures … of the Emperor, the King of Spaine and the Archduke Maximillian during his time in Brussels.[66] However, he lamented that 'I feare they are not so well donne as were requisite for your Honors contenetment. If you are not satisfied with them I will provyde yow as many more to be made by the best Painters of these parts,

[62] See chapter VI
[63] D. Howarth, *Lord Arundel and his Circle* (London, 1985), p. 33.
[64] Howarth 'William Trumbull and art collecting in Jacobean England', *British Library Journal*, Vol. 20 No. 2 (1994), p. 143.
[65] L. L. Peck, *Consuming Splendour* (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 162-164.
[66] HMCD IV, 268, Trumbull to Winwood, 27 August 1617.

and withdrawe the others for myne owne use'.[67] It is impossible to think of Gerbier writing a similar message.

Trumbull acted on instructions when asked to purchase art by others. He requested descriptions and sent inventories for those in England to choose from. Trumbull even worked to secure works by this method for Carleton. One example of Trumbull's method of working within the art world came with the death of the Duke of Aerschot, who died without issue and whose collection would be sold. Trumbull wrote to a number of individuals to inform them of the death and the upcoming sale. Trumbull was then asked by Rochester to provide a list of the jewels and plate.[68] Trumbull duly complied and sent information back to England for Rochester's perusal.[69] Rochester was not the only nobleman interested in the Duke's estate and Trumbull received requests for inventories from Viscount Lisle and Lord Darcy.[70] Little came of sending these inventories as, like Rochester, they saw little they wanted.[71] This was the usual character of Trumbull's involvement. He would inform those who wished to purchase what was available without offering advice. Indeed George Gage, a former agent and respected connoisseur, was called in to assess some of the paintings by Rubens which Trumbull reported were for sale.[72]

Perhaps the largest area where Trumbull had an affect artistically is in the world of tapestries. It has been suggested that he was instrumental in setting up the tapestry works of Mortlake.[73] While there is evidence that he did tempt workers to immigrate to London, there is less evidence for his work in the area of design, other than acquiring cartoons.[74] These, as with

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[67] HMCD IV, 268, Trumbull to Winwood, 10 September 1617.
[68] HMCD, iv, 233, John Packer to Trumbull, Royston, 23 October 1613.
[69] SPF, Spanish Netherlands, SP 77/10 366-367, Inventory of the Duke of Aarschot's jewel and plate.
[70] HMCD, iv, 154, Robert, Viscount Lisle to Trumbull 25 June 1613; 169 Robert, Viscount Lisle to Trumbull 22 July 1613; HMCD, iv, 160, Lord Darcy to Trumbull, 4 July 1613; 164, Lord Darcy to Trumbull 13 July 1613.
[71] HMCD iv, 25, Packer to Trumbull, Royston 18 November 1613.
[72] Howarth 'William Trumbull and art collecting in Jacobean England', p. 146.
[73] Howarth 'William Trumbull and art collecting in Jacobean England', p. 159.
[74] Howarth 'William Trumbull and art collecting in Jacobean England', p. 149; John Eustace Anderson, *A Short Account of the Tapestry Works Mortlake* (London, 1894), p. 6.

paintings, were from requests sent to him rather than his own choice. His involvement was on a wholly different scale to Gerbier's negotiations with Van Dyck to enter royal service, and there is no trace of any renowned tapestry workers moving to London after his intervention. Trumbull did, nevertheless, secure the services of "Benedetto the gardener" for the Arundels in 1618-9.[75]

Trumbull was solicited to acquire a number of tapestries from local craftsmen in the Spanish Netherlands, despite the growth of Mortlake. The royal favourite, Somerset, was one of those who contacted him. Here Trumbull's actions on receiving this request closely mirror his actions when faced with requests for paintings, and indicate that he was not confident that he had the requisite expertise. Rather than order what he believed were the most appropriate hangings, he wrote instead to Somerset asking for further directions. Trumbull recommended that, rather than commissioning original tapestries, Somerset should instead buy off the peg from designs he had already seen and liked. Trumbull carried out similar commissions, one with a set of bronzes for the Earl of Arundel.[76] Arundel would later send very detailed instructions for the purchase of a painting owned by the Taxis family.[77] Another commission was a painting by Frans Snyder for the Duke of Buckingham.[78] Trumbull eventually arranged the delivery of trees to the Arundels using the same method of detailed requests before acting.[79]

Trumbull did acquire other items and send them back to patrons in England, notably books. Trumbull clearly believed that he lacked the knowledge to purchase the goods desired without further information from those who wanted them. It has been suggested that rebuffs

[75] Peck, *Consuming Splendour*, p. 225.
[76] Hill, 'Ambassadors and art collecting in early Stuart Britain', p. 218.
[77] Howarth, *Lord Arundel*, p. 67.
[78] Peck, *Consuming Splendour*, p. 175.
[79] HMCD iii, 394, German Marsham to Mr and Mrs Trumbull, London, 5 November 1612; HMCD iv, 119, Earl of Arundel to Trumbull, Gaustien, 31 May 1613.

from Rochester dented his confidence to try and use art for his own advancement.[80] This suggests that Trumbull did not, during his agency, see gaining knowledge of fine art to be valuable, or something which he could use to further his career at a later point.

Nevertheless, a large amount of art and some craftsmen entered England through his actions, making an important contribution to the growing art collection established by the King and other nobles in England. Trumbull shows that, even when an agent did not demonstrate artistic knowledge, he could still be called upon to provide art to high-ranking purchasers.

Trumbull was not alone in carrying out this type of commission, another example of a diplomat who did not consider himself a connoisseur is Sir Isaac Wake. Wake did not enjoy art or having to deal with the King's artistic agents.[81] Sir Isaac Wake began his association with the world of art with Sir Dudley Carleton in Venice. Wake was called upon to help in the negotiations between Lord Roos and Tintoretto for several pictures. This was a not a role which required artistic knowledge.[82] It was at this time that Wake came to know Daniel Nys, the art merchant, who was intimately involved in Charles I's greatest acquisitions.

This association with Nys would prove to be of use to Wake, when he returned as ambassador to Venice, he was asked, by Viscount Dorchester, to procure quality Italian art. Wake, however, lamented to Dorchester that he 'knew nothing in that way'.[83] Wake once again relied upon Nys for the choice of the pieces and their transportation back to England. In terms of his own buying for use as gifts, unlike his former master Carleton who bought and gave lavishly, intending to sell or present as gifts without a clear intended recipient for each piece, Wake was more selective, for example in sending glasses to the Duchess of Buckingham.[84] Wake, like Trumbull, did not market himself as someone knowledgeable in

[80] Hill, 'Ambassadors and art collecting in early Stuart Britain', p. 215.
[81] S. Backen & R. Hill, 'Sir Isaac Wake, Venice and art collecting in early Stuart England' *Journal of the History of Collections* (2011), p. 9.
[82] Backen & Hill, 'Sir Isaac Wake, Venice and art collecting in early Stuart England', p. 2.
[83] Backen & Hill, 'Sir Isaac Wake, Venice and art collecting in early Stuart England', p. 3.
[84] Backen & Hill, 'Sir Isaac Wake, Venice and art collecting in early Stuart England', p. 5.

art, and indeed expressed frustration in dealing with artists. However, with the help of Nys, he was still able to fulfil requests, showing that agents, even without artistic knowledge or an inclination to acquire it, could still facilitate cultural interchange. Though, unlike Gerbier, collecting was not a major activity Wake indulged in while overseas.

Arthur Hopton, agent in Spain, had a similar experience to that of William Trumbull in the Spanish Netherlands. Glendinning has described Hopton as one of the group of diplomats who 'merely brought back portraits of themselves from Spain'.[85] It appears though that he made a greater artistic impact than Trumbull, even though it would be wrong to view Hopton as a skilled connoisseur. One incident clearly demonstrates Hopton's limited artistic knowledge. He was requested to acquire three moulds of the marble busts of Hannibal, Marcellus and Caesar. Hopton, as Trumbull would, acknowledged this request and set about acquiring the items and ensuring their delivery to London. When the works reached London, however, Hopton was rebuked. The wrong heads had been used to make the moulds. Francis I was in the place of Hannibal, Caracalla instead of Marcellus, and that of Caesar while actually a bust of Caesar was the wrong bust of Caesar![86] All that Hopton could do was lament that 'The heades I sent by His Majesties order were certifyed to bee the right by Diego Velázquez the king's painter a man of great iudgemen'.[87]

Hopton did undertake more successful artistic projects and purchases for those in London. He supported the artist Michael Cross, who was sent to copy a large number of works in the Spanish collection. Not one of the copied works by Cross survives, or indeed any of Cross' work.[88] Inevitably the amount of money which Cross was given was insufficient to live on in

[85] N. Glendinning, 'Nineteenth-Century British Envoys in Spain and the Taste for Spanish Art in England', *The Burlington Magazine*, Vol. 131, No. 1031 (February, 1989), p. 117.
[86] Bodleian Library, Clarendon MS., 18, fol. 213, Secretary Windebank to Sir A. Hopton.
[87] Bodleian Library, Clarendon MS., 18, fol. 232, Sir Arthur Hopton to Secretary Windebank.
[88] D. Howarth, *The Invention of Spain: Cultural Relations Between Britain and Spain 1770-1870* (Manchester, 2007), p. 1567.

Spain despite Cross' moderation.[89] Hopton was forced to fill the gap with £55.[90] This ensured the delivery to Charles I of copies of a large number of pictures which would never have been sold to him.[91]

One of the most interesting relationships that Hopton had was with the artist Juan Fernández, known as El Labrador. Fernández was a painter of still-life whose work Francis Cottington, while serving as agent in Spain, had come to appreciate. Fernández has been disparaged by art historians and Cottington's collecting of him labelled a distraction from being what might have been the opportunity to encounter better artists.[92] However, Fernández was one of the few Spanish still-life painters to receive international recognition.[93] Fernández had previously specialised in pictures of grapes and fruits. It was, however, at Hopton's urging that he expanded his repertoire and began to paint still lives featuring flower designs.[94] One of the few instances of an agent influencing an artist's style, these modified works were highly successful.[95] Hopton also sent unsolicited landscapes to Cottington, which Cottington was greatly pleased by. However, before Hopton could develop this relationship further the landscape artist, who remains nameless in Hopton's correspondence, died.[96]

Hopton also presented works of art, sent by Charles I, to the Spanish government. Unfortunately, as with the busts, this did not go to plan. Hopton was sent studio copies of works by Van Dyck, rather than originals, and the connoisseurs of the Spanish court were quickly able to discern this.[97]

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[89] British Library, Egerton MS., no. 1820, f. 241.
[90] *Ibid.*
[91] Brown & Elliott, *The Sale of the Century*, p. 55.
[92] Brown & Elliott, *The Sale of the Century*, p. 53.
[93] W. B. Jordan & P. Cherry, *Spanish Still Life from Velázquez to Goya* (London, 1995), p. 70.
[94] Brown & Elliott, *The Sale of the Century*, p. 63, Enriqueta Harris 'Las flores de El Labrador Juan Fernández' *Archivo Español de Arte*, 47 (1974).
[95] Jordan & Cherry, *Spanish Still Life*, pp. 76-77.
[96] British Library, Egerton MS., no. 1820, f. 269; Brown & Elliott, *The Sale of the Century*, p. 63.
[97] British Library, Egerton MS., no. 1820, f. 289.

Hopton marks a middle point in the agent's experience of the artistic world, between that of Gerbier and that of Trumbull. While Hopton tended to operate on instructions and attempt to fulfil the requests of his superiors in London, he also made some of his own choices. It was rare for someone of an agent's background or status to request alterations to the work of an artist. Although George Gage suggested changes to Rubens, this was after the end of his period as a diplomat when he had a reputation as a connoisseur.[98] That Hopton's suggestions were successful is remarkable. With larger and more costly acquisitions, Hopton still relied on instruction, unsurprisingly after the marbles debacle. Occasionally, he relied upon the advice of men in the Spanish court, whom he trusted to be able to select the appropriate purchases. These were men, such as the Marquess de la Torre, who already had a personal relationship with English courtiers and were trusted by them.[99]

The Civil War brought great changes to the art market in England. After the Civil War, it would no longer be usual to find diplomatic agents purchasing art, for either the Royal Collection or for patrons, on a large and lavish scale. The diplomats of the Protectorate did not engage in art purchasing while abroad. From the Restoration, the artistic role of agents moved totally into the private sphere, mostly as occasional personal gifts, but never again as part of a broader political and artistic strategy devised by the King.

After the Civil War, the Commonwealth moved to dispose of the goods which had previously comprised the Royal Collection. This included those artworks acquired, through great expense and effort, by diplomats under Charles I. With the prevailing view of art, which was often equated with Popery and idolatry, it is unsurprising that the Protectorate did not dispatch agents to buy works of Italian masters for the government, as had been done during the reign of Charles I.[100] This area of cultural transmission and work for diplomats ceased

[98] Howarth, *Lord Arundel*, p. 156.
[99] Brown & Elliott, *The Sale of the Century*, p. 55.
[100] Ormrod, 'The Origins of the London Art Market', p. 167.

almost entirely throughout the Interregnum; indeed, the English government was far more concerned with selling the works of art which it already possessed as a source of revenue, rather than acquiring more costly art.[101] The long parliament even rejected Gerbier's proposition for two grand portraits of them.[102] This should not be taken to mean that there was now no interest in art or connoisseurship, as some have assumed. Large amounts of the Royal collection were either reserved for the State's use (over £10,000 worth) or became part of the private collections of Parliamentary supporters.[103]

At the Restoration, there was a distinct change in the art activities of diplomatic agents. All English diplomats acquiring works of art for the monarch and their patrons acted on a distinctly smaller scale. Gifts and purchases of art became 'unofficial and motivated by the individuals rather than a coherent art acquisition programme established by the King as a collector'.[104] This was a dramatic change from the days of Balthazar Gerbier and the other agents, who procured art and even painters on a grand scale for the King's collection and their own patrons. Unlike Gerbier's well documented attempts to lure Van Dyke to England, it has been asserted that Gennari was attracted to England through English diplomats, but there is no evidence presented to support this.[105]

There was a marked change between the time of Charles I and the Restoration in the way in which art was bought and sold. Public art auctions had come to England originally to dispose of Charles I's goods. They continued after the Restoration and, between 1669 and 1692, around 35,000 oil paintings were sold on the London market.[106] No longer was there a need for diplomats to traverse Italy and the Low Countries in search of great works of art and acquire them in complex financial transactions. Art could be bought, with pre-established

[101] Brotton, *The Sale of the Late King's Goods*, pp. 210-212; Brown, *Kings & Connoisseurs*, p. 66.
[102] Peck, *Consuming Splendour*, p. 261.
[103] Brotton, *The Sale of the Late King's Goods*, pp. 259-262; Brown, *Kings & Connoisseurs*, p. 66.
[104] Jacobsen, 'Cultural politics and luxury consumption', p. 91.
[105] Jacobsen, 'Cultural politics and luxury consumption', p. 98.
[106] Brotton, *The Sale of the Late King's Goods*, p. 355.

internationally recognised prices, from Covent Garden or the City of London. This was far more convenient for the new connoisseur than attempting to find someone they could trust to buy art for them, or awaiting descriptions from abroad before acting.

Where previously there had been a prolonged period in which agents had been stationed in key artistic areas of Europe this, along with the entire use of agents, declined after the Restoration. Venice did not receive an agent after 1644, Sir Gilbert Talbot being the last to serve there.[107] In the United Provinces, only three agents served after the Restoration, each for only about a year.[108] This was where the centre of the artistic market in Europe had shifted, away from Italy.[109] One would have expected a much greater degree of activity if agents were still expected to procure art. Yet the agents hardly had time to develop good contacts and connections in the art world that would be needed for such a task. It is asserted that William Blathwayt began his collecting of Dutch paintings during this period.[110] However, this collecting was personal, rather than purchasing for gifts or for the Royal Collection.

Where, if not to their agent diplomats, did the wealthy turn to purchase their continental art after the Restoration? Some of those who now acquired foreign art did so themselves rather than buying through diplomatic agents. As Chapter VI discusses, there was an increase in the use of Extraordinary diplomats during the period. This gave the nobility a greater chance of being able to serve abroad and purchase art directly.[111] If members of the nobility desired works of art, and were not able to procure themselves an easy diplomatic post, they still turned to diplomats, but no longer to ambassadors or agents. John Doddington, in Venice, provided regular reports on fashionable artists and works of art and other cultural

[107] Bell, *A Handlist*, p. 292.
[108] These were William Blathwayt (June 1674 – January 1675), Roger Meredith (May 1678 – October 1679), Thomas Plott (February 1681 – February 1682). See Bell, *A Handlist*, pp. 203, 205-6.
[109] Jacobsen, 'Cultural politics and luxury consumption', p. 106.
[110] Jacobsen, 'Cultural politics and luxury consumption', p. 113.
[111] Jacobsen, 'Cultural politics and luxury consumption', p. 100.

developments, including updates on auction catalogues.[112] Italian art also entered the English market through the activities of the Consuls at Florence and Livorno, though this was also carried out by merchants at Genoa and Livorno.[113] While agents had acquired art for patrons and the King, they had never been dealers, with the possible exception of Gerbier, as these new men were.

Finally, there was a change in the nature of Royal art collecting. It has been described as an obsession for Charles I, as well as part of the structure which supported his ideas of kingship.[114] Charles' hiring of Van Dyck was possibly an attempt to emulate the relationship of Charles V and Titian.[115] While Charles II enjoyed art, it was not central to his ideas of kingship, as it had been to his father.[116] Nor was he an obsessive collector and connoisseur, which reduced the need for diplomats to find artistic masterpieces to satisfy the Royal collection. The efforts of the Commission for restoring the Late King's Goods were impressive and a large proportion of the Royal Collection was restored to the newly crowned King.[117] This greatly reduced the need for Charles II to invest in a large and extravagant art collection, as he had inherited one of Europe's finest from his late father. Charles II refrained from purchasing art with the limited financial resources of his government[118]. Unlike Charles I who had purchased the Gonzaga art collection for £17,500.[119] Although he did purchase £2,086 worth of pictures from the Low Countries before the Restoration, he waited some time to actually pay for these works of art and have them delivered to England.[120]

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[112] Jacobsen, 'Cultural politics and luxury consumption', p. 103.
[113] Jacobsen, 'Cultural politics and luxury consumption', p. 116.
[114] Brotton, *The Sale of the Late King's Goods*, p. 355; Blake, *Anthony Van Dyck: A Life 1599-1641*, p. 242.
[115] C. M. S. Johns, 'Politics, Nationalism and Friendship in Van Dyck's "Le Roi à la Ciasse"' *Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte*, 51. Bd., H. 2 (1988), p. 224.
[116] Johns, 'Politics, Nationalism and Friendship in Van Dyck's "Le Roi à la Ciasse"', p. 249.
[117] Brotton, *The Sale of the Late King's Goods*, p. 348.
[118] Jacobsen, 'Cultural politics and luxury consumption', p. 104.
[119] L. Cust, 'Notes on Pictures in the Royal Collections-XXVII: The Mantua Collection and Charles I', *The Burlington Magazine for Connoisseurs*, Vol. 24, No. 131 (February, 1914), p. 257; Turner, *Catalogue of the works of art*, p. 1.
[120] Brotton, *The Sale of the Late King's Goods*, p. 325.

Printed Work and Manuscripts

Printed works inhabited a different sphere from that of fine art. Unlike paintings, collecting and distributing printed books and manuscripts was a much more regular activity for diplomatic agents. This was indeed an activity that agents may have already undertaken before gaining their post; it was common for English travellers in Europe to buy books and similar items as souvenirs.[121] Here agents acted far more freely in choosing what to purchase and send back to England. While they would occasionally solicit what their superiors and patrons wanted, agents far more regularly made their own choices about what was of interest. This is probably due to two factors. Firstly, as a large number of agents were highly educated, they felt they could suggest works to help build a library. Indeed, some felt confident enough to offer criticism of the books available. Secondly, books were far less expensive than fine works of art, a complete set of Philippe de Mornay's writing cost only £6.[122] Therefore a misstep in the purchase of a book would be far less financially devastating than buying a great work of art.

There was clearly a demand from individuals in England for foreign books and manuscripts during the period and a distinguished library was expected to contain a large number of foreign texts.[123] While books were imported from Europe and sold in England, agents had access to a much wider range of material than was reprinted or imported into England. It was the high demand that agents were helping to fulfil, not just for the Court and patrons, but also for friends and family members.

Before considering the type of books and manuscripts that diplomatic agents acquired for others, it is important to look at where they acquired these artefacts. The usual source of

[121] Thomas Wentworth for example bought 62 when in France. See Stoye, *English Travellers Abroad*, p. 42.
[122] Stoye, *English Travellers Abroad*, p. 42.
[123] Peck, *Consuming Splendour* (Cambridge, 2005), p. 126.

printed material, which agents sent back to England, was from the ordinary booksellers who lived and worked near where agents were posted. By far the largest portion of the printed material sent by agents was obtained this way. Conveniently for the diplomatic agent, book sellers were regarded as an important place where news might be exchanged.[124] As was seen in Chapter II, gathering news was perhaps the agent's most important duty. Thus they would likely have been regular visitors to booksellers for their value in providing information, as well as for the books themselves.[125]

The local bookseller was not, however, the only provider of books to the diplomatic agents. Due to their status as public ministers, repositories of books and manuscripts not normally open to the public were available to them. They were able to gain access to the royal libraries and archives where they were stationed, and thus access to very rare manuscripts. William Perwich, shortly after having arrived in France, reported that he was 'perusing all the catalogues of manuscripts formerly y$^{e}$ Card$^{ll}$ Mazarine's & now in the King's Library'.[126] Considering the size of Mazarin's library, some 40,000 volumes, this was an impressive resource that Perwich was able to have volumes copied from.[127]

Further to the access that Perwich was granted to the Royal Library, he demonstrated that he felt he could decide what items would be worth copying. Perwich wrote 'what things are curious I marke downe & shall send them to you, for y$^{r}$ approbation'.[128] After this, Perwich also stated that once he was made aware of which documents were in Louis XIV's library that his masters were interested in, Perwich could 'have them copyed' and sent to his superiors.[129] Perwich also noted that Williamson's directions on previously sent catalogues of

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[124] F. de Vivo, *Information and Communication In Venice, Rethinking Early Modern Politics* (Oxford, 2007), p. 94; Peck, *Consuming Splendour*, p. 124.
[125] As the Spanish ambassador was regularly reported to be doing. *Ibid.*
[126] M. B. Curran, *The despatches of William Perwich* (London, 1903), p. 28.
[127] La bibliothèque personnelle du cardinal Mazarin, accessed 11 May 2012, http://www.bibliotheque-mazarine.fr/mazhisto.htm.
[128] Curran, *The Despatches of William Perwich*, p. 28.
[129] *Ibid.*

books 'would be punctually observed'.[130] Following the death of the Duke of Aerschot, William Trumbull undertook similar actions in the Spanish Netherlands. Trumbull provided a list of the books for sale, noting those of particular interest. In Trumbull's case, Secretary Lake expressed interest in the Duke's library, though did not make a purchase.[131] Meanwhile Archbishop Abbott, after receiving the list provided by Trumbull, only wanted four of the volumes.[132]

Apart from royal and noble libraries and the public booksellers, there were more sources for books from either important members of the court to which diplomats were attached, or ministers from other powers present there. There appears to have been a lively trade in books between diplomats and there are regular references to their exchange. Even books which were not available for public sale, or had been prohibited, might be acquired through a discerning member of the court, or via another diplomat.

It was the regular practice of agents to send home printed reports of events. This extended to books which had a diplomatic and political value. Thus in April 1656 from Hamburg Richard Bradshaw reported of a 'booke lately brought heither from Cullen [Cologne], makeinge his highnes Antichrist. If you have not seene it formerly, it's said to be the frutes of Charles Steward's idle houres, with the Jesuites pates to helpe him'.[133] Bradshaw enclosed a copy of the book with his report to Secretary Thurloe.

The second largest category of books could be headed as curios or simple items of interest. These books did not have specific political or news-based reasons for being sent, but were used as a form of gift and also to demonstrate the knowledge and scholarship of the individual sending the book. This category is of course very broad; however, a broad

[130] Curran, *The Despatches of William Perwich*, p. 2.
[131] SPF, Flanders SP 77/11 121, Trumbull to Secretary Lake, 3 August 1614.
[132] HMCD, iv, 514, George Abbot, Archbishop of Canterbury, Lambeth to Trumbull, 31 August 1614.
[133] T. Birch (ed.), 'State Papers, 1656: April (1 of 7)', *A collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe*, Vol. 4: Sept 1655 - May 1656 (1742), pp. 664-674, accessed 11 June 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=55452. [British History Online]

selection of books was to be expected in a well-developed library of the period. Travel books and books about foreign localities were particularly popular. This may have included the works of diplomats like John Robinson with his "*An account of Sueden*" or Paul Rycaut's "*The Present State of the Ottoman Empire*". This was again fuelled by demand from individuals at home, reflecting the consensus that no well-stocked library should be without books about the exotic and far away.[134]

While agents were, in some cases, clearly helping to build the libraries of great men by providing important foreign works to which they had access, there were other individuals that they sent books to. While abroad, Dudley Carleton regularly sent books back to the tutors of the young Prince Charles.[135] Carleton's motive in sending these books to Charles was clearly to appear interesting and memorable to the young Prince. The selection of books sent was intended to demonstrate that Carleton was scholarly and knowledgeable, as well as showing his skill in selecting books that would be appropriate to the education of the young Prince.[136]

Perhaps deserving a category of their own are books that were banned, or otherwise restricted in circulation. These books were often sought after by diplomatic agents for recipients in England**,** either as evidence of what government was trying to suppress, or potentially to pass on gossip and rumour that was circulating. Unsurprisingly, it also appears that banned works were often sought after for the fact that they were banned. William Perwich reports that 'a book called 'Le Tiberie François' … is much concerned & consequently the importation of them hither strickly prohibited', Perwich had already been sent a copy by a bookseller who promised to buy the remaing stock for him should he want them.[137] Even though this is banned, he believes he could acquire a copy and intended to send it back to his superiors in

[134] Peck, *Consuming Splendour*, p. 125.
[135] Carlton, *Charles I*, p. 16.
[136] Carleton used a similar strategy with the Duke of Buckingham, though he utilised art rather than the printed word. See R. Hill & R. Lockyer, 'Carleton and Buckingham: The Quest for Office Revisited', *History*, Vol. 88, No. 289 (Jan, 2003) p. 20.
[137] Curran, *The Despatches of William Perwich*, p. 25.

England for their pleasure, though he suggested also sending to Sir William Temple whom he believed could get a copy. At no point does Perwich suggest that this book might have any political significance other than to see what had been banned by the government.

There was a reciprocal part to this procurement of printed works; it was not only the import from the Continent to England of printed works and copies of manuscripts. There were books written by English authors, and manuscripts in English libraries, that found their way to the hands of those on the continent through the auspices of English agents. In the early part of the period, there was also a unique form of transfer in the form of the books written by James I, which he had ambassadors and other diplomats present to foreign sovereigns. But no other English government distributed work abroad in the way that James had done through his diplomats. After this, the transfer of documents only took the form of providing books and manuscripts to interested parties in foreign governments and also the provision of books to the networks of men, whom the agents knew and received books from in return.

James I believed that his theological works should be read by many, both at home and abroad, even if those receiving them were less sure of the matter.[138] As a result, there are a number of instances recorded where diplomats were expected to present the works of James I to the rulers in the nation to which they were accredited. One famous example will serve to illustrate these activities. In 1609, James I sent a copy of the *Premonition to all most Mighty Monarchs, Kings, Free Princes, and States of Christendom* to be presented to the Venetian Senate. They were less than pleased to be placed in the position of either receiving a book by a Protestant King on theology or offending James I.[139] In the end the Doge accepted the book and then, without looking at it, placed it in the secret Chancellery unopened, where it has

[138] M. Wakely and G. Rees 'Folios Fit for a King: James I, John Bill, and the King's Printers, 1616–1620' *Huntington Library Quarterly*, Vol. 68, No. 3 (September 2005), p. 470; F. A. Yates, Paolo Sarpi's 'History of the Council of Trent', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, Vol. 7, (1944), p. 134.

[139] L. P. Smith, *The Life and Letters of Sir Henry Wotton* (2 vols.; Oxford, 1907), i, p. 103.

remained.[140] Despite the presentation of a book being of little strategic importance, it started a diplomatic incident between James I and Venice, after James's ambassador, Sir Henry Wotton, resigned without consulting James, feeling that James had been insulted by the book not being opened and read.[141] The Venetian Senate were forced to send a special ambassador to James in an attempt to resolve the row that developed after Wotton's regignation.[142] As it happened, fortunately for the corps of resident agents, they were rarely called upon to deliver James I's gifts as the sovereign preferred to have these delivered by special ambassador to underline the importance of the works.

Trumbull did not only send books into England, he was also in regular receipt of books from England, creating a cross-Channel literary exchange. In November 1609, Jean Beaulieu, a Dutch merchant in England, wrote to Trumbull to inform him that he had acquired and sent the following books to him; Lives of the Emperors, Sallust in English, The Relation of Boterus and The Relation of Tortura Torti.[143] It is doubtful if these books were intended to be circulated by Trumbull to others, especially as these and other books were printed in English.[144] This should not discount the probability that he exchanged them with his English speaking acquaintances, who also sent him books which he sent on into England. There are, however, many other references to books sent to diplomatic agents which were not printed in English. They were consequently much more likely to circulate in the nation to which they were attached depending on the type of book and its importance and message.

The cultural activities of agents, in relation to books and manuscripts, are similar to those which were carried out by students travelling abroad with their tutors. Here, as well local manuscripts, prints and books were regularly purchased for the return to England.[145] The

[140] Smith, *The Life and Letters of Sir Henry Wotton*, i, p. 104.
[141] *Ibid.*
[142] Smith, *The Life and Letters of Sir Henry* Wotton, i, p. 105.
[143] HMCD ii, 182, J Beaulieu to William Trumbull, London, 12 November 1609.
[144] *Ibid.*
[145] Stoye, *English Travellers Abroad*, p. 142.

difference is the regularity with which agents carried out these tasks and also that they could draw on a far larger number of acquaintances and friends to buy books, which were even banned in the locations they were in, or not on sale to the general public. Perwich, in France, for example, was 'endeavouring the getting y$^{e}$ 'modell of the Louvre' for you [Secretary of State Joseph Williamson], it being worth y$^{e}$ curiosity. There are some printed but not sold publiquely, & I suppose in the hands only of some Minister of State'.[146] While less noted than the work of those agents who procured art, far more books came into Britain via diplomats than works of art. While it has been argued that the proportion of English-made books increased in libraries during the period there was still a high demand for diplomatic agents to procure books.[147] William Blathwayt, while serving in the United Provinces, was continuously pestered by his uncle and John Avery to find the latest volumes and ship them, showing that this aspect of an agent's life continued, despite changes in preference and fashion at home.

## Reporting on Culture

The cultural exchange, which was carried out by diplomatic agents, was not just limited to the buying of works of art or other items, or the copying of manuscripts and shipping of books, or even persuading artists to move and work in England, rather than their native or adoptive home. Perhaps the largest area of their work in the cultural field, and the hardest to assess in its impact, is reporting on culture.

Reporting on their experience of the culture and society that they were living in was another important part of the role of any diplomat, and indeed the most consistent cultural activity. This reporting ranged from the clothes worn, to the ceremonies and balls attended, to the

[146] Curran, *The Despatches of William Perwich, English agent in Paris*, p. 11.
[147] Peck, *Consuming Splendour*, p. 125.

latest interior decoration.[148] This was an acknowledged part of the work of a diplomat; it was even included on the literature on the perfect ambassador. As Hotman states, an ambassador must 'bee dayly attendant at the Court' and 'take heed of rather that which is done, then to that which is spoken'.[149] Even for the normal traveller, visiting the Court was an important part of learning. Benevento Italiano states in his work written in dialogue that: 'I would we might there rather to see new fashions than hear news'.[150] As a result there are numerous reports on entrances, pageants and court ceremonies which formed an important component of court life, found in the archives. Agents were also prepared to point visiting nobles in the right direction. William Trumbull promised the Earl of Arundel that he would 'not want for sight of any curiosity' during his visit to the Spanish Netherlands. [151]

Reporting on clothing and fashion formed part of the cultural exchange. National styles and appearances were well defined at the time.[152] Any changes, however, were worthy of note and also if the style was considered worthy of imitation. William Perwich reported that he 'was at St Germains, where I saw a number of rich coats & garments' before providing a detailed description of each of those that he had seen.[153] The growing importance of French fashion in England and at the English Court after the Restoration made such information valuable and sought after.

Missteps in the world of fashion could be deeply embarrassing. The ridicule that Charles II was subjected to by Louis XIV for his 'English dress', noted by Pepys in his diary on 22

[148] Jacobsen, 'Cultural politics and luxury consumption', p. 123.
[149] Hotman, *The ambassador*, pp. 44-47.
[150] B. Italiano, *The Passenger: Pf Beneuento Italian, Professour of his Natiue tongue, for These Nine Yeeres in London* (London, 1612).
[151] Berkshire Record Office, T.A.C., col 2 item 111.
[152] For example images of national dress were included as border decoration in Willem Janszoon Blaeu's maps. While in Spain Arthur Hopton was painted in sombre Spanish dress. See E. Du Gué Tapier, 'Sir Arthur Hopton and the interchange of paintings between Spain and England in the seventeenth century: Part 1', *The Connoisseur*, Vol. 164 (January, 1967), p. 239.
[153] Curran, *The Despatches of William Perwich*, p. 92.

November 1666, made it all the more important for him to have up-to-date information about these changes in style.[154]

Royal pageants, balls and festivities also provided a ready source of activities for agents to describe.[155] As with other areas of cultural reporting, there was the possibility for discerning politically important messages from these events. Any change in the order of precedence of ambassadors at such an event would be the subject for major comment, as would any favour shown out of the ordinary. It is unsurprising that, after so many years observing foreign ceremonies and pageants, that Balthazar Gerbier should be appointed Master of Ceremonies by Charles I.[156]

An excellent example of the type of cultural events that the agents would wish to report upon were the regular ballets staged at the French court. While this was important from an artistic standpoint, and the costume and set design was regularly reported in detail, the Royal Ballet also often included allegorical meanings and distinct political messages. Here the link, between the material culture which agents reported on and politics, becomes most obvious, for example "The Deliverance of Renuard" staged by Louis XIII and his favourite Charles d'Albert, duke of Luynes in 1617 represented Louis XIII freeing himself from Concini and purging France of his influence.[157]

All court ballets were eagerly reported by English diplomats stationed in Paris, who considered not just the political message but also the technical achievements of the productions and the costume designs. If copies of the Gazette (the French Crown's

[154] S. Pepys, *The diary of Samuel Pepys : a new and complete transcription* R. Latham, W. Matthews & W. Armstrong (eds.) (XI vols., London, 1995), vii, 378.
[155] Curran, *The Despatches of William Perwich*, p. 18.
[156] Williamson, *Four Stuart Portraits*, p. 27.
[157] S. Kettering, *Power and Reputation at the Court of Louis XIII* (Manchester, 2008), p. 42.

newsletter) which contained such important information did not arrive it was quickly noted.[158]

Reporting on the general culture that they lived in is far harder to assess for impact than the other areas of cultural exchange so far considered. It is possible, though challenging, to trace books from agents to inventories of libraries where they were gifted. The impact of a report on the French ballet or other court ceremonial is, however, far harder to assess. Indeed, it is often hard to tell if this transfer of knowledge about court practices had any effect at all. As a desire for French fashion knowledge increased, agents in France attempted to fill the void.

## Agents as agents of Cultural Exchange

The cultural world of diplomats, and the function they fulfilled in transmitting knowledge about fashion style and taste, is not one which is usually considered in diplomatic history. While it has been pointed out that their work was not confined to the political, there is still a limited understanding of when and how this work was carried out.[159] As the thesis concentrates on all the activities of just one type of diplomat, the agent, only a very limited picture of their activities in this area can emerge. Nevertheless, examining the records of diplomatic agents suggests that it was considered a regular part of their responsibility, to pass comment and information on the latest developments in areas of culture and fashion and scholarly knowledge. Where possible, they also often provided examples of those developments, especially of scholarly knowledge through printed books.

The transfer of cultural artefacts carried out by diplomatic agents was at an altogether lower level that that carried out by ambassadors, especially the great nobles who acted as Ambassadors Extraordinary. These individuals could buy for themselves great works of art

[158] W. D. Christie, *Letters Addressed from London to Sir Joseph Williamson* (2 vols. London, 1874), ii, 5. Henry Ball to Joseph Williamson, 1 September 1673.
[159] Jacobsen, 'Cultural politics and luxury consumption', p. 151.

during their tours of duty and considered it one of the perks of their posting, as the Earl of Arundel's embassy to the Emperor clearly illustrates.[160] This does not mean, however, that the work of diplomatic agents did not have a lasting impact. A great many texts crossed from the continent to England by way of diplomats, as well as copies of historic manuscripts from Royal libraries. The purchase of great works of art, however, was limited to a much smaller group of agents and usually to those who were recognised as having specialised skills in the area of modern connoisseurship, the most notable being Balthazar Gerbier. This type of cultural transfer had its high point under the personal rule of Charles I, when Charles was willing to spend truly unprecedented sums for the art collection of Mantua, as well as directing his diplomats to court the services of some of the leading artists in Europe and finally succeeding in attracting Van Dyke to act as Court Painter.

## Agents as Intermediaries

There were a wide variety of duties which diplomats undertook which were not strictly speaking diplomatic ones. These were both reporting on the culture which they found themselves surrounded by as well as purchasing goods, both cultural goods and naval supplies.

As was seen when considering negotiations with a foreign state, the status of an agent was ambiguous. This allowed the agent a greater freedom of movement, to come and go as he wished and to be seen with anyone, making negotiations for goods easier. This was without the risks that many ambassadors had of damaging the honour and prestige of their master.

Despite this, Richard Bradshaw still, at least initially, raised concerns about the compatibility of buying naval supplies with his position as the representative of the Commonwealth. His

[160] F. C. Springell, *Connoisseur & Diplomat: The Earl of Arundel's Embassy to Germany in 1636 as Recounted in William Crowne's diary, the Earl's Letters and Others Made on the Journey by Wenceslaus Holler* (London 1969).

concerns, however, were eventually brushed aside when faced with the problems of sourcing naval supplies. It would almost certainly have caused a scandal for an ambassador to be seen searching out the best price for hemp, tar and mizzens. That the duty of buying naval supplies did not survive past his agency is hardly surprising, as it appears that the duties were taken on instead by men especially chosen by the Naval Commissioners and having no diplomatic capacity, thus ensuring that there was no risk of embarrassment of a public minister carrying out such work.

Cultural work decreased as the period went on, with even private commissions decreasing. It seems obvious that this was linked to the reduced number of agents overseas and also the reduction in the length of time that agents spent abroad. They no longer spent sufficient time to know the local craftsmen who could produce the desired goods. Consuls now, on average, spent longer in a foreign posting than an agent, averaging almost 10 years compared to an agent's two and a half.[161] There were also far more of them. Just in Italy there were Consuls in Villafranca, Turin, Genoa, Pisa, Leghorn, Naples, Trapani, Messina, and Venice, providing a far greater coverage than an individual agent for The Italian States could hope to.[162] The increase in travel by the nobility, as well as an increase in specialised art dealers, resulted in a decreased need for agents to act as intermediaries.

[161] P. Fraser, *The Intelligence of the Secretaries of State & Their Monopoly of Licensed News, 1660-1688* (Cambridge, 1956), pp. 166-7.
[162] Ibid

# Chapter VI After an Agency

This chapter will consider the careers that were pursued by those who served as diplomatic agents and what this can tell us about those men. Bell suggested that 'men agreed to serve only to put the government under a moral obligation to find some acceptable post for them at home on their return'.[1] Does this assertion hold true for diplomatic agents? These were after all the men who served for long periods overseas. Did the government feel a general sense of obligation to those who had served as agent, or did it depend on the individual?

Initially, two collective headings will be used to examine agents. The first is continued diplomatic work, where it seems likely that an agent's skills would be redeployed. The second cohort is Clerks of the Privy Council, where former agents provided a surprisingly large number of incumbents.

The final part of this chapter will focus on individual agents through case studies, showing how certain individuals were able to rise higher by using the skill, knowledge and connections they had made during their service abroad. Some who failed to thrive will also be considered, along with the political situations and negotiations they were involved in.

## Continued Diplomatic Work

The most obvious further employment for someone who had served abroad, as an agent of the government, was to remain in the State's service and undertake further diplomatic work. Of the 82 agents identified in this study, 58 served again in a diplomatic capacity, either in the form of further missions as an agent, or in one of the variety of other diplomatic ranks. Evidence of agents who were repeatedly used for diplomatic missions is a clear indication of an emerging corps of diplomats to whom the government regularly entrusted their diplomatic

[1] M. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy* (London, 1993), p. 82.

work. This of course stands at odds with the frequently asserted suggestion that diplomats were selected ad hoc, with little reference to diplomatic abilities and knowledge.[2]

Out of the 82 agents, 19 of them would serve again at least once as an agent.[3] However, only seven would serve as agent in a nation other than their first posting.[4] It is clear from this that after serving for a number of years as an agent, it would seem possible to return to the same post, or indeed to serve in another country. It is, however, important to note that while there are numerous petitions for an alternative posting, there is not one request by an agent asking to be returned to his original agency. While John Harrison did propose his return to Barbary, this was part of a larger proposed plan involving military action as well as diplomacy.[5] The lack of petitions for a return to their original position contributes evidence that it was not hard to secure further work as an agent. Nearly a quarter of agents chose to return to foreign work at the same rank, which demonstrates that they believed it was either a worthwhile career move, or they were forced by necessity. The prospect of their pay being in arrears during their service argues against it being a necessity. Further to this, Cottington and other agents took breaks between diplomatic employments and so it seems unlikely that they were forced to return by necessity, other than at the King's request.[6]

What chance did agents have of progressing up the diplomatic ranks to become an Ambassador, or even an Ambassador Extraordinary? The possibility of being tasked with another diplomatic mission at another rank was in fact higher than repeating a mission as an agent.[7] Of the 82 agents, 30 of them (36%) were later sent abroad in the capacity of

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[2] As was considered in the Introduction to this thesis.

[3] See Appendix II of this thesis.

[4] These were: Beecher served in France and the German States; Curtius in Sweden and Germany; De Vic in France, Denmark and the Spanish Netherlands; Dickenson in the Low Countries and Germany; Morton in Savoy and Germany; Taylor to the Emperor and Diet and Spain; Brisbane to France and North Africa.

[5] SPF, Barbary States, SP 71/12 140, Jn. Harrison – second proposal for exploit on Barbary and duplicate, 16 December 1627.

[6] M. Havran, *Caroline Courtier: The Life of Lord Cottington* (London, 1973), p. 37.

[7] It is assumed that agent was the lowest diplomatic rank and all other ranks should be considered a promotion to higher status. Only government appointed secretaries would have ranked lower, and they were

Ambassador Extraordinary, Special Ambassador, Envoy Extraordinary, Resident Ambassador, or Ambassador in Ordinary.[8] Also included in this tally is one case of a Plenipotentiary to a Conference and another of Commissioner.[9] Ralph Winwood served as Commissioner in the Low Countries from 17 June 1607 until 25 June 1609. Commissioner was a rank which was abandoned shortly thereafter and this rank only appears in relation to diplomacy with the United Provinces.[10] All of these titles were considered to be more prestigious ranks than that of agent.[11]

These 30 diplomats, serving abroad at ranks higher than agent, completed a total of 56 missions. This appears to be an average of around two missions per agent at a higher rank. The statistic certainly suggests some progression in terms of rank, as well as there being a core group of diplomats that the State could call upon to carry out diplomatic duties. This, however, does not represent the true picture**.** The majority of these missions were undertaken by a small select group of diplomats. Sir Robert Anstruther stands out as the foremost agent to be regularly dispatched overseas. He accounts for ten of the 56 missions performed by former agents. Anstruther would serve twice as a Special Ambassador, five times as an Ambassador Extraordinary and thrice as an Ambassador Ordinary or Resident Ambassador. He served in four different areas, Denmark (four times) to the Emperor & the Diet (four times) to the Hanseatic Towns (once) and to the Low Countries (once).[12] Despite having the largest number of missions and serving in the greatest number of nations, after acting as an agent, Anstruther appears to have worked regularly in two broad areas, Denmark and

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few in number. See A. Wicquefort, *The Rights, Privileges, and Office of Embassadors and Publick Ministers*, trans. J. Digby, 2nd edition (London, 1740), pp. 36-38.

[8] These final two ranks though both used would appear in all cases to be the same rank and function, though titles varied throughout the period under consideration.

[9] John Berkely served as a Plenipotentiary to the conference of Nimwegen, from the 7 October 1676 until 16 June 1677 after which time he returned to England. Berkely had been serving as Resident Ambassador in France before being dispatched to Nimwegen.

[10] G. Bell, A *Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives 1509-1688* (London, 1990), pp. 170-207.

[11] Wicquefort, *The Rights, Privileges, and Office of Embassadors,* pp. 36-38.

[12] W. Wood, *The East Neuk of Fife: Its History and Antiquities Geology, Botany and Natural History in General* (Edinburgh, 1862), p. 44.

Germany.[13] Service in Denmark is easily explained by his service in the Danish court as a youth.[14] Of the other agents, only two who served multiple missions served successively in areas which were not geographically linked. The first is Sir Gilbert Talbot, who was sent as Resident Ambassador to Venice and also as an Envoy Extraordinary to Denmark.[15] The second is Sir Isaac Wake who, after having served as an agent in Italy, served as Resident Ambassador in Savoy and Ambassador Ordinary in Venice, before serving as Resident Ambassador in France.[16] One agent sent to a different court from where they first learnt diplomacy as an agent was Walter Montagu, who was sent six times to serve as Special Ambassador to the French court, although his previous agency had been in the Duchy of Savoy-Piedmont rather than France. After the Civil War, Montagu would secure employment in France. Indeed, Montagu's final diplomatic work was not for the English government but in providing Louis XIV with translations of English drafts of the Secret Treaty of Dover.[17] His cousin Ralph Montagu, then serving in France as Ambassador Ordinary, was entirely ignorant of Walter Montagu's involvement.[18] These exceptions aside, in fact the majority of the agents, who undertook multiple missions, performed them within the same state.

The most desirable posts for the early-modern diplomat were short postings as Ambassadors Extraordinary. The holder would be allowed all the rights and prestige of an ambassador.[19] Indeed, they even outranked them, should one be present.[20] An Ambassador Extraordinary, unlike a resident ambassador, would not be away from the English court for a prolonged period. Thus they could more easily maintain their influence and seek out further lucrative

[13] Anstruther had twice served as agent in Denmark, though had never served in Germany as an agent.
[14] Wood, *The East Neuk of Fife*, p. 39.
[15] Talbot had served twice as agent in Venice, which raises questions as to why he was chosen for duties in Denmark.
[16] This is perhaps explained by the general belief that Wake would soon be made Secretary of State. However, Wake was passed over, and had yet to hold one of the most prestigious embassies. He then revived his posting to France. See T. Fuller, *The Worthies of England,* (3 vols.; London, 1811), ii, p. 166.
[17] B. Falk, *The Ways of the Montagues* (London, 1947), p. 24.
[18] Falk, *The Ways of the Montagues*, p. 57.
[19] A. Wicquefort*, The Rights, Privileges, and Office of Embassadors and Publick Ministers* (London, 1755), p. 36.
[20] Wicquefort*, The Rights, Privileges, and Office of Embassadors*, p. 39.

postings. Of the 82 agents, eight would attain this most attractive rank. They were Sir George Goring (France), John Berkeley (France), Sir Ralph Montagu (France), Sir Albert Morton (Low Countries), Sir Robert Anstruther (Low Countries, Emperor & Diet), Sir Richard Fanshawe (Portugal), Sir Francis Cottington (Spain) and Sir Philip Meadow (Sweden & Denmark). While not suggesting that becoming an Ambassador Extraordinary was a typical experience for a diplomatic agent, there was clearly a possibility of progression to the highest diplomatic rank for some. It might be argued that, by adopting the French custom of designating all ambassadors as Ambassador Extraordinary, the use of "extraordinary" had been debased and that this is therefore a meaningless distinction. However, the majority of these men served early in the period when this was not the case and "extraordinary" was used for extraordinary events rather than as a diplomatic flourish.[21]

Agents who served the government and completed their missions could, if they so desired, continue their service abroad.[22] There was a fair probability that they would progress over time to higher diplomatic ranks and even to the most sought after positions. That a small group of individual agents carried out such a large number of diplomatic missions suggests that there was a nascent diplomatic corps being developed. The lack of movement between countries suggests that the government believed individuals built up experience and knowledge of dealing with specific courts and therefore should remain in those posts, rather than being moved. As will be seen from the individual case studies, this suggestion is strongly supported by the career of Francis Cottington, who was considered by the government as an expert on Spanish matters and served in Spain four times.

Why did some agents receive promotion to higher diplomatic ranks while others did not? Agents regularly sought preferment to posts of a higher status than the ones they were

[21] Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy,* p. 83.

[22] Competition for the best embassies was high, as exemplified by Carleton's quest to be moved from Venice to the Hague. See, R. Lockyer & R. Hill, '"Carleton and Buckingham: The Quest for Office", Revisited', *History*, Vol. 88, Issue 289, (January 2003), pp. 17–31.

currently in. Agents also often suggested that they would be willing to serve in certain posts.[23] Promotion to a higher rank, however, was dependent on the twin pillars of reputation and patronage. An agent was regularly able to secure his progression from secretary to agent with only the patronage of the previous ambassador, whose decision was usually accepted by the Secretary of State, as was seen in the case of William Trumbull, Francis Cottington and many others. Progression to the rank of ambassador required more highly placed patrons. Sir Robert Anstruther, who rose from agent to an Ambassador Extraordinary, was already known to James I, who had placed him as a page in the Danish Court as a young man.[24] Anstruther clearly enjoyed the King's patronage, but he also demonstrated diplomatic skill when he mediated the peace agreement at Knäred.[25] With his connections between Denmark and the King, Anstruther was an ideal candidate for diplomacy, with tasks such as renegotiating a loan which James I had borrowed from the Danish Crown.[26] With success in diplomacy, Anstruther was promoted and sent further afield, including to the Diet at Regensburg and the Emperor.[27] Along with Sir Thomas Roe, Anstruther was the Crown's first choice for diplomatic missions, though in 1638 he refused to go to the Hamburg conference, effectively ending his career in English service.[28]

Anstruther, however, did not end his career in diplomacy, as he returned to Denmark and was sent as the Danish envoy to Charles I in 1641. The connections he had made in Denmark during his life provided employment opportunities outside England.[29]

Francis Cottington was able to find support from a number of patrons, initially the Earl of Somerset, then the Duke of Buckingham and finally Richard Weston.[30] All of these men also

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[23] J. Howell, *Epistolæ Ho-Elianæ: Familiar Letters Domestick and Foreign* 10th edition (London, 1737), p. 192.
[24] W. Wood, *The East Neuk of Fife Its History and Antiquities Geology, Botany and Natural History in General* (Edinburgh, 1862), pp. 104-105.
[25] S. Murdoch, *Fighting for Identity: Scottish Military Experience c. 1550-1900* (Leiden, 2002), p. 18.
[26] SPF, Denmark, SP 75/5 235-7, Sir Robert Anstruther to Sir George Calvert, 10 / 20 March 1621.
[27] Bell, A *Handlist*, p. 61.
[28] E. A. Beller, 'The Mission of Sir Thomas Roe to the Conference at Hamburg, 1638-40' *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 41, No. 161 (January, 1926), p. 70.
[29] T. Riis, *Should auld acquaintance be forgot … Scottish–Danish relations, c.1450–1707*, Vol. 2 (1988), p. 53.

valued Cottington's expertise on Spanish relations, which was the major reason that he was brought within their orbit. It was through their intersession that he was able to rise at home and abroad, eventually to become Ambassador Extraordinary to Spain in 1630.

Clerks of the Privy Council

During the Stuart period, only 29 men would be appointed to the position of Clerk of the Privy Council in Ordinary. Of these, nine of them would be former diplomatic agents. Agents, therefore, provided around a third of the men who held these positions. However, during the period before the Civil War, the proportion of agents who held the position of Clerk of the Pricy Council in Ordinary rises even higher with eight of the 17 Clerkships being held by former agents.

The number of Clerks of the Privy Council at any one time was limited to only four, with individuals often holding office for a prolonged period. Former agents were disproportionately selected for office compared to men from other previous employments.[31] The Clerkship of the Privy Council was the government office most regularly bestowed on those who held, or were holding, diplomatic appointments. There were two distinct offices during the period, the Clerkship in Extraordinary and in Ordinary. Contrary to the practice of diplomatic titles, being an Extraordinary Clerk to the Privy Council was the lesser of the two posts. Out of 82 agents during the period under consideration, nine held Clerkships in Ordinary.[32] A further four held Clerkships in Extraordinary. The Clerkship was primarily an

[30] Havran, *The Life of Lord Cottington*, pp. 42-3, 60-1, 84-5.

[31] This was exceeded during the time of Sir Ralph Winwood when there were six Clerks for a brief period (later reduced to four). See J. C. Sainty 'Clerks of the Privy Council 1540-1644', *Clerks of the Privy Council*, accessed 8 March 2012, http://www.history.ac.uk/resources/office/privycounc. [Institute of Historical Research]

[32] Though nearly every one of them had previously held a Clerkship in Extraordinary, it did not become standard practice for the senior Clerk in Extraordinary to fill the first vacant Clerkship in Ordinary until the Restoration. See D. M Gardener, 'The work of the English Privy Council, 1660-1679, with respect to domestic affairs' (Univ. of Oxford D.Phil. thesis, 1992), p. 245.

administrative post.[33] It was one which required a high level of trust in the appointee, who would be present during the deliberation of the Privy Council, then recorded the outcome of the Council's deliberation in one of the registers. Thus they were required to swear to 'keepe secret all matters committed and revealed unto you, or that shall be treated of secretly in council'.[34] The Clerks could also swear in members of the Privy Council in the absence of the King. Each Clerk was entrusted with a seal of the Privy Council that they retained in their possession during their tenure.[35] Despite attempts to change their tenure to "during the king's pleasure", it remained for life throughout the period.[36] The Clerks would also be expected to deal with the correspondence from the Council, such as the orders in Councils and the letters to the officials. As with many other offices, they worked in monthly rotation, although the outgoing and incoming Clerks were expected to attend for one week either side to provide continuity.[37] Many of the Clerks still served in diplomatic positions while holding office and so were not available to carry out their duties, which therefore fell to their deputies (Clerks in Extraordinary) or the other Clerks in Ordinary. One Clerk, who was not an agent, Sir Robert Southwell, complained that he 'never wrought less than ten hours a day' while attending upon the Council and that the workload was increased by absenteeism.[38]

Those who held the post in ordinary were entitled to a regular government salary of £50 per year, which was later raised to £250 a year in 1664.[39] They also received various fees and gratuities for the work associated with preparing and submitting petitions to the Council, as

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[33] '[T]he clerks were administrators first and politicians second', J. J. Carter, 'The Administrative Work of the English Privy Council 1679-1714' (Univ. of London Ph.D. thesis, 1954), p. 574.

[34] E. Turner, *The Privy Council of England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 1603-1784* (2 vols.; London 1928), ii, p. 54; Turner, *The Privy Council of England*, ii, p. vii.

[35] J. Vernon, 'The Staff of the Jacobean Privy Council', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (November, 1976), p. 22.

[36] Gardener, 'The work of the English Privy Council', p. 245.

[37] G. Aylmer, *The King's servants the civil service of Charles I* (London, 1961), pp. 149-158.

[38] F. E. Ball, *Calendar of the manuscripts of the Marquess of Ormonde, K.P., preserved at Kilkenny castle* (New series 8 vols.; London, 1902-1920) iv, p. 497.

[39] M. Green (ed.), 'Charles II - volume 109: Undated 1664', *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles II, 1664-5* (1863), pp. 137-158, accessed 8 March 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=54778. [British History Online]

well as issuing orders in council for which the standard fee was £2 10s.[40] These rewards were less than the salaries that agents were paid on paper, though as Clerks of the Council they were far more likely to receive them.[41] During their time of service, as when they were an agent, the Clerks were technically on call twenty-four-hours a day.[42] However, unlike acting as an agent, the rotation allowed them far more time off. An astonishing privilege of the Clerks of the Privy Council was that bonds paid over to the Council were collected and held by the Clerks personally, rather than being deposited with the Council. One individual, hoping to reclaim a bond for £1,000, was informed that it could not be repaid immediately to him as it was in the possession of Francis Cottington, who was at that moment in Spain on his majestys service![43] Considering the financial difficulties which Cottington encountered in Spain, an extra £1,000 would have at the very least improved his credit worthiness among the merchants there. Unlike excessive fees, retaining of bonds while on foreign services was not a practice which appears to have caused a great number of complaints, perhaps suggesting that it was unusual for a Clerk to take bonds overseas with them. [44]

Serving as a Clerk of the Council was therefore an attractive post from the workload involved and the amount of money which could be generated, both through the salary and the fees associated with the position. There would also have been opportunities for recognition and advancement, due to being in regular contact with the King and his leading ministers as they attended meetings of the Privy Council.

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[40] M. Green (ed.), 'Charles II: August 1668', *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles II, 1667-8* (1893), pp. 516-565, accessed 8 March 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=54972. [British History Online]

[41] While fees would have been relatively easy to collect there were still problems with the collection of salaries. In January 1666 the former agent Sir Richard Browne still had not been paid since the Restoration. See W. Shaw, *Calendar of Treasury Books* (32 vols.; London, 1904-1956), i, p. 713. As a former diplomat he was probably used to his salary being in arrears.

[42] Aylmer, *The King's Servants*, p. 153.

[43] *Acts of the Privy Council of England,* ed. E. G. Atkinson (46 vols.; London, 1890-1964 ), xxxiv, p. 592.

[44] Charging excessive fees was, however, noted. See Vernon, 'The Staff of the Jacobean Privy Council', p. 16.

Agents to hold the office of Clerk of the Privy Council were Sir Ralph Winwood (Low Countries), Sir William Trumbull (The Spanish Netherlands), Sir William Beecher (The German States), Sir Albertus Morton (The German States), Sir Francis Cottington (Spain), William Blathwayt (Low Countries), John Dickinson (Low Countries), Richard Browne (France) and Sir Dudley Carleton (Low Countries). While their service as secretaries to embassies, and later as diplomats in their own right, recommended them to posts that were administrative, such as the Clerkship, it is interesting to note that these men were often still sent on further diplomatic assignments, such as Cottington's return to Spain. Indeed, Sir William Trumbull never acted as a Clerk during his tenure of the office, remaining on diplomatic service in Brussels!

In addition to those who held the office in ordinary, were those who held the Clerkship in Extraordinary. They were not paid a salary and were not required to attend in the monthly rotation, unless they had made arrangements with one of the Clerks in Ordinary to deputise for them, in which case they were to receive a payment. The majority of those who became Clerks in Ordinary also served for a time as Clerks in Extraordinary before being promoted. However, those who remained Clerks in Extraordinary were William Boswell (Low Countries), Henry De Vic (France), Simon Digby (Russia), and John Hawkins (France).

Both types of Clerkship were offices that were bought and sold, as with other offices of State, and this would render meaningless any idea of them as being used as a type of reward for diplomatic agents. It must not be overlooked, however, that ultimately the King had the right to refuse or grant the new patent for a Clerk of the Council and therefore could pick from the applicants available. There is no record of a diplomatic agent being refused the revision of a Clerkship, or a vacant Clerkship, other than when it had already been promised to another. William Trumbull found this when seeking a Clerkship as he moved too slowly and the office

had already been promised to another candidate a Mr Leech the earl of Pembroke's secretary, who did not in the end receive the post.[45]

Former agents provided nearly half of the Clerks before the Civil War; this is the only common thread linking these individuals who did not have a common educational background, or even standard of education. This argues very strongly that agents were allowed to receive revisions (meaning they would be next in line to receive the office when the holder died or wished to sell) as a reward from the government for their services abroad. This further allowed the government to keep individuals, who had served long periods abroad, close to the council, where they could be consulted or dispatched for further missions.

After the Restoration, there was a clear decline in the number of diplomats being appointed to the post of Clerk in Ordinary and Clerk in Extraordinary of the Privy Council. Only two former agents were appointed to this office from 1660 onwards. The first was Sir Richard Browne, who was re-sworn into the Clerkship, which he had held before the outbreak of the Civil War, becoming senior Clerk.[46] The second was William Blathwayt, who was sworn in as a Clerk in Extraordinary in 1678.[47] Thus only one agent, who served as a diplomat for Charles II or James II, received a Clerkship, compared to twelve from the reigns of James I and Charles I. What reasons are there for this sudden change? The growing use of revisions, which became standard practice after the Restoration, would seem a major cause of this shift, with numerous revisions being held on the limited number of posts available.[48] Further to this, the cost had increased markedly. William Trumbull paid £350 for his Clerkship in

[45] I. Uddin, 'William Trumbull: A Jacobean Diplomat at the Court of the Archdukes in Brussels, 1605/9-1625' (Univ. of Leuven Ph.D. thesis, 2006), pp. 41-2.
[46] A. Wood, *Fasti* (2 vols.; London, 1721), i, p. 212.
[47] B. C. Murison, 'Blathwayt, William (bap. 1650, d. 1717)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed 11 September 2010, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/2626.
[48] Gardener, 'The work of the English Privy Council', p. 242.

1614.[49] The average cost of the Clerkships had increased massively by the Restoration, with costs of between £1,600 and £2,500.[50] At the same time Secretaryship of State cost £6,000.[51] These increases pushed both of these offices out of the reach of those who had recently returned from, or were still serving abroad, even had the King still been willing to grant them the office.

A number of agents, who would serve as Clerks of the Council, went further in their careers and secured one of the Secretaryships, however, again this was before the Restoration. The Clerkship appears to be the only government post which was held by a large enough number of agents to seem to be a form of career path, even though this did not occur throughout the entire period.

Having considered agents collectively, both in further diplomatic employment and in the clerkship of the Privy Council, the remainder of this chapter will focus on the careers of individual agents. Through these short case studies, it is hoped to show how some individuals were able to use the skills and knowledge they gained as agents to advance their careers, while others were unable to do so.

Of all the agents of the period, none rose as high as Francis Cottington. He began his career as an agent in Spain and rose to become Chancellor of the Exchequer and finally, during the Civil War, Lord High Treasurer. Cottington's career is exceptional among former agents, which poses two questions. Did his work as an agent help him in his career and why did he rise so exceptionally high compared with his colleagues?

Cottington began his career, as many agents did, by service as an embassy secretary, in his case to Sir Charles Cornwallis, the English ambassador in Spain.[52] He became well acquainted with the language and the practices of the Spanish court at a time when Spain was

[49] Uddin, 'William Trumbull: A Jacobean Diplomat', p. 60.
[50] Gardener, 'The work of the English Privy Council', p. 243; Turner, *The Privy Council of England*, i, p. 91.
[51] Turner, *The Privy Council of England*, i, p. 90.
[52] Bell, *A Handlist*, p. 257. Havran, *The Life of Lord Cottington*, p. 24.

alien to most Englishmen.[53] When recalled, Sir Charles Cornwallis lobbied for Cottington's appointment as agent in his absence.[54] This was almost the standard practice and occurred in the case of William Trumbull and many others.[55] When a new ambassador, Sir John Digby, was appointed Cottington was recalled to London and spent two years without government employment.[56]

However, Cottington's knowledge of Spain suggested him for further employment abroad and he was dispatched back to Spain to serve as Consul in Seville. This was part of a government attempt to turn the consulship into a political office that also aided the merchant community, rather than a purely commercial one.[57] Cottington's credentials were refused by the Spanish.[58] Upon his return to England, Cottington developed close links with the King and Privy Council due to the arrival of the new Spanish Ambassador, Count Gondomar. Cottington took on an advisory function, being one of the few men familiar with Spain and Spanish politics.[59] Aylmer suggested that, from 1623 until around 1632, the central executive was 'overstaffed with foreign experts'.[60] Yet despite this overstaffing (with foreign policy experts), there was such a limited knowledge of Spain that Cottington would repeatedly be called upon to provide advice to the Privy Council and the King.

With the regular consultation about Spain came his appointment as a Clerk of the Privy Council, first in Extraordinary and shortly after in Ordinary, before returning to Madrid.[61] During his continuing service in Madrid, he was deeply involved in the negotiations for the

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[53] J. Stoye, *English Travellers Abroad 1604-1667* (London, 1989), pp. 2-13.
[54] SPF, Spain, SP 94/15 13, Cornwallis to Lords of the Council, 30 September 1608.
[55] Uddin, 'William Trumbull: A Jacobean Diplomat', p. 22.
[56] Havran, *The Life of Lord Cottington*, p. 37.
[57] V. Kerth, 'Anglo-Spanish Relations and the Development of Modern Diplomacy: Persistent Sources of Friction Affecting Peacetime Routine 1604-1625' (Tulane Univ. Ph.D. thesis, 1989), pp. 129-150.
[58] SPF, Spain, SP 94/19 75, Digby to [Salisbury?], Madrid, 15 May 1612.
[59] Havran, *The Life of Lord Cottington*, p. 41.
[60] Aylmer, *The King's Servants*, p. 92.
[61] M. Green (ed.), 'James 1 - volume 74: September 1613', *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: James I, 1611-18* (1858), pp. 198-201, accessed 8 April 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=51478. [British History Online]

restoration of the Palatinate.[62] Not even all the Privy Council were aware of the details of this policy.[63] It is a measure of the confidence Charles I had in Cottington that he was entrusted with these secret negotiations**,** and by 1628 he was a Privy Councillor. Further diplomatic missions to Spain followed, the full scope of which was withheld from other government ministers. He then returned to further preferment, being appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer.[64] There was talk of him succeeding Lord Treasurer, Weston, because he was best acquainted with government matters and the business of the post.[65]

Cottington's early career was not all that different from many of the other agents. His rise was based partly on his reputation as a diplomat with skill, but more on his knowledge of Spain. Had he served as agent in France, a country that far more Councillors and senior members had knowledge and experience of, it is doubtful that he would have been called upon so often for advice by members of the government.

It is clear that the secret diplomatic plans that Charles I allowed him to negotiate, such as the scheme for war against the Dutch, demonstrated a high level of trust from the King.[66] This was a vital tool in securing promotion, as Charles I had no dominant favourite controlling the patronage system by this stage of his reign. During the Civil War, Cottington's career reached its highest point when, on 3 October 1643, he was appointed Lord High Treasurer.[67] The disrupted state of the country may have helped Cottington's final promotion. Laud was imprisoned and Wentworth had been executed and Charles had far fewer men to choose from. That said, as there had been talk of Cottington succeeding Weston at an earlier point,

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[62] His mission was aborted when there was no chance of success. See K. Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I* (London, 1992), p. 68.

[63] This treaty bound England to aid Spain in the partition of the Netherland if they could not be brought to peace. See Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I*, p. 70. For the exclusion of anti-Spanish ministers see D. de Quiroga, & L. J. Reeve, 'Quiroga's Paper of 1631: A Missing Link in Anglo-Spanish Diplomacy during the Thirty Years War', *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 101, No. 401 (October, 1986), p. 981.

[64] J. C. Sainty, *Office Holders of the Exchequer* (London, 1983), p. 39.

[65] Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I*, p. 152.

[66] Reeve suggests that it was Cottington, Weston and Rubens that brought peace with England and Spain. Quiroga & Reeve,'Quiroga's Paper of 1631', p. 917.

[67] W. Back, *Docquets of Letters Patent Signed at Oxford* (London, 1837), p. 80.

this appointment might still have been possible without the disruption of the Civil War. Cottington would sign the surrender of Oxford and, being refused indemnity by Parliament, was forced to retire abroad.[68] Charles II dispatched him on a mission to secure help from Spain.[69] Even at this stage of his life he was still clearly considered to be the court's expert on Spanish politics and Spain, though the exiled court had a far more limited choice of ministers. Cottington failed to secure help from Spain, finding the court had turned against him in his absence, but remained in exile in Spain until his death in 1652.

It is evident that it was a combination of three factors which helped Cottington to rise so far, his skill at the work he was assigned, his expertise in dealing with Spain at a time when Charles I needed such expertise and finally that he was trustworthy when carrying out these tasks. While other diplomats may have been skilled and trustworthy, few were brought in as an advisor so early in their career as Cottington was. This was Cottington's key advantage, which he derived from his agency in Spain, and he was able to advance his career from this point.

Ralph Winwood

Sir Ralph Winwood has been described as an example of a 'self-made man'.[70] Many of the agents came from equally modest backgrounds, though few rose as far. Winwood did so because of a mixture of skill as a diplomat, purchase and patronage. It was the way he combined these which led to the Secretaryship.

Winwood began his career in diplomacy under Elizabeth I in 1598, as a secretary to Sir Henry Neville, who was then sent as ambassador to France. Both men secured their

[68] Bodleian Library, Clarendon MS. 30, 42, Hyde to Cottington, Jersey, 29 August 1647.
[69] Havran, T*he Life of Lord Cottington*, pp. 167-171, Clarendon State Papers, II, 481, Cottington's Instructions.
[70] M. Davis, *James I* (London: 1967), p. 209.

appointments thanks to the influence of the Earl of Essex.[71] Following common practice, when Neville returned to England he left behind Winwood, who then served as agent in France.[72] The fall of Essex presented a problem to Winwood, losing his original patron and hope of promotion. He was, however, able to successfully transfer himself to the patronage of Robert Cecil.[73] Before the death of Elizabeth, Winwood was chosen (after a number of others refused the post) to go to The Hague as agent.[74]

With a change of dynasty little changed for Winwood. James I did not revoke Winwood's commission and he departed for The Hague. At this time he was also able to purchase a Clerkship of the Privy Council in Extraordinary.[75] Winwood's early years at The Hague were spent with the usual run of diplomatic work. In 1608, talks began which would eventually lead to the Twelve Year Truce. Winwood distinguished himself in these peace negotiations and received a knighthood. However, he was disappointed that preferment at home did not come with his diplomatic triumph abroad, though he was able to secure a post as Master of Requests though Cecil's intervention.[76] Cecil's death removed a major block to Winwood's further promotion, sending the court patronage networks into flux and allowing for greater advancement.[77]

It was then that Winwood began to seek the now vacant post of Secretary of State. It has been suggested that Winwood's appointment as Secretary was likely a 'concession to the popular party' and fulfilled James' need to have a secretary in Parliament.[78] However, the appointment was the result of a combination of the support of Archbishop Abott and the

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[71] C. McAllister 'The Boisterous Secretaire': The Political Career of Sir Ralph Winwood (1563?-1617) (Univ. of Virginia Ph.D. thesis, 1983), p. 13.
[72] McAllister, 'The Boisterous Secretaire', p. 17.
[73] McAllister, 'The Boisterous Secretaire', p. 22.
[74] SPFF, SP/78/48 31, Cecil to Winwood, 24 January 1603.
[75] M. Green (ed.), 'James I: Volume 32: April-May, 1608', *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: James I, 1603-1610* (1857), pp. 420-436, accessed 8 May 2011, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=15017. [British History Online]
[76] Cecil Papers, 127/131 Salisbury to Winwood, 14 August 1609.
[77] McAllister, 'The Boisterous Secretaire', p. 118.
[78] D. H Willson, *King James VI and I* (London, 1956), p. 345.

patronage of Robert Carr, to whom Winwood had sought to attach himself.[79] If any further proof is needed of the final point, the Patent from the Signet Office states the Secretaryship was 'procured by the Earle of Somerset'.[80] Winwood had demonstrated skill as a diplomat during his time in France and the United Provinces. His skills there, however, were insufficient to gain the advancement he sought**,** and ultimately only the patronage of powerful courtiers was able to bring him advancement. The King had the final decision on Winwood's eventual advancement, and could have refused the promotion had he wished, but Winwood had managed to emerge as an acceptable candidate to all sides. Winwood died in 1617, but had he lived Gardiner and others suggest that, as the prime government supporter and promoter of Raleigh's expedition, he would have followed Raleigh to the block to appease Spain.[81]

Agents rarely made it into such positions of power as the Secretaryship, and then only after long experience in matters of government and further diplomatic missions at the higher rank of ambassador. Even men with experience in other government posts and with time spent as ambassadors were unlikely to make it to the top. Patronage was the eventual decider at the highest level. Cottington was able to be noticed and acquire patronage largely though his knowledge, which was a commodity others desired. Meanwhile, Winwood was able to attach himself to favourites and yet not make any sufficiently powerful enemies to prevent his advancement.

<u>William Blathwayt</u>

William Blathwayt is now best remembered as an administrator rather than a diplomat. However, Blathwayt began his career as secretary to the famed diplomat, Sir William

[79] McAllister, 'The Boisterous Secretaire', pp. 130, 132.
[80] Signet Office, SO 2/6, April 1614.
[81] C. Hill, *Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution* (Oxford, 1965), p. 154. R. Lacey, *Sir Walter Raleigh* (London, 1973), p. 360. S. Gardiner, *Prince Chalres and the Spanish Marriage* (2 vols.; London, 1869), i, p. 105.

Temple, serving in the Low Countries. Blathwayt, as secretary, also accompanied the Duke of Richmond's embassy to Denmark and John Werden's embassy to Sweden. During Temple's absence from The Hague, Blathwayt was appointed to act as agent. He had apparently been the only member of the embassy staff to speak Dutch.

It was Blathwayt's uncle, John Povery, who secured him his first position of secretary to William Temple, through Joseph Williamson, 'one of the most desirable appointments to be had especially for a young dilettante'.[82] It was through his uncle and his correspondence he became aquatinted with Secretary of State, Joseph Williamson, and later John Trevor, who would help Blathwayt to advance his career. When left as agent in Holland, Blathwayt received word that 'the next post will bring a letter from his Majesty to the States General to be delivered by your hands: which is a favour Mr Secretary Trevor hath done you'.[83] This was a clear mark of the Secretary's favour, which his uncle helped to procure. Despite this favour from Trevor, Blathwayt continued to correspond with Williamson.[84] Blathwayt was allowed to join Charles Stuart, 3rd duke of Richmond's party on an embassy to Denmark after the arrival of Sir George Downing at The Hague.

On his return to England, Blathwayt chose not to continue diplomacy and petitioned for the office of Secretary of Jamaica, but was unsuccessful.[85] It was with the help of Joseph Williamson that Blathwayt entered the Plantation Office. Of the two Secretaries of State, Joseph Williamson had the greatest connection with the newly established office.[86] From the Plantation office Blathwayt continued his rise, becoming a clerk of the Privy Council. He then held the posts of Surveyor and Auditor-General of his Majesty's Revenues in America.[87]

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[82] SPF, Holland, SP/84/184, 254 Temple to Williamson, The Hague, 9 April 1669.
[83] Gloucestershire Archives, Porlock MSS, 15 August 1671.
[84] G. Jacobsen, *William Blathwayt: A late Seventeenth Century English Administrator* (London 1932), p. 70.
[85] W. N. Sainsbury (ed.), 'America and West Indies: June 1673', *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, America and West Indies*, Vol. 7: 1669-1674 (1889), pp. 499-504, accessed 13 October 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=70237. [British History Online]
[86] F. Higham, *The Principal Secretary of State: A Survey of the Office* (Manchester, 1923), pp. 317-320.
[87] Jacobsen, *William Blathwayt*, p. 150.

With the King's permission, Blathwayt was able to purchase the office of Secretary-at-War, although this was a more administrative than political post and was, before Blathwayt, held by a 'nonentity'.[88] The diplomatic role which Blathwayt played does not seem to have helped him greatly in his subsequent career. However, it did bring Blathwayt to the attention of Sir Joseph Williamson, who was in effect Blathwayt's patron in his further advance through government office.

John Brisbane

The career of John Brisbane cautions us against attempting to develop too strong a sense of any 'standard' career path for an agent and shows how eclectic the lives of diplomats could be. John Brisbane was appointed Judge Advocate of the Fleet and served in that post from 30 September 1672 until 20 July 1680.[89] He was paid £182 10s a year.[90] Despite this post, he was able to serve as a diplomatic agent for the first time with Admiral Sir John Narborough in North Africa, from 19 October 1674 until February 1675.[91] From there Brisbane went to serve as secretary to an embassy in France, although unusually he was one of the few secretaries to be paid by the government, rather than the ambassador he served.[92] He would return to France with £500 for his equipage[93] serving there as diplomatic agent from 19 September 1676 until 15 July 1678.[94] All this diplomatic work he undertook while still holding the post of Judge Advocate of the Fleet. Brisbane was then appointed Secretary to the

[88] G. Aylmer, *The Crown's Servants Government and Civil Service Under Charles II* (Oxford, 2002), p. 45.
[89] J. C. Sainty, *Office-Holders in Modern Britain: Volume IV Admiralty Officials 166nh0-1870* (London: 1975), p. 80.
[90] National Archive, Auditors of the Imprest and Commissioners of Audit Declared Accounts, AO 1/1711/106.
[91] Bell, A *Handlist*, p. 210.
[92] W. Shaw (ed.), 'Entry Book: July 1678, 21-31', *Calendar of Treasury Books*, Vol. 5: 1676-1679 (1911), pp. 1062-1074, accessed 11 October 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=80678. [British History Online]
[93] W. Shaw (ed.), 'Entry Book: September 1676', *Calendar of Treasury Books*, Vol. 5: 1676-1679 (1911), pp. 320-336, accessed 11 October 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=80602. [British History Online]
[94] Bell, A *Handlist*, p. 123.

Admiralty.[95] Brisbane would later be attacked by Pepys for his mismanagement of affairs.[96] At the same time, Brisbane would also serve as Undersecretary of State under Williamson, though this was only for a short period.[97] Despite this career, Brisbane is little mentioned by historians. His career does not follow that most commonly associated with agents, from secretary to an embassy, then as agent and possibly ambassador. He is highlighted here to demonstrate that there was diversity of appointment and post-agent career.

Secretaries of the Tongue: De Vic and Fanshawe

The Secretaries of the Tongue were positions in which the holder was expected to produce the government's official correspondence in foreign languages.[98] It is surprising that only two agents served in these positions, as it is clear that most of them possessed the requisite language skills to serve in such posts. One reason for this is the long service that was the norm in these posts, which greatly limited the opportunity to serve, whatever qualifications could be offered by other candidates. The last Secretary of the French Tongue, Henshaw, not a former diplomat, served for 38 years until his death in 1700.[99]

Sir Richard Fanshawe served as Secretary for the Latin Tongue.[100] This post had been reduced in importance during the Protectorate and contemporaries had raised questions as to

[95] National Archive, Admiralty: Out-Letters, Adm. 2/1753 1754.
[96] S. Hornstein, *The Restoration Navy and English Foreign Trade 1674-1688* (Aldershot, 1991), p. 11.
[97] F. H. B. Daniell (ed.), 'Charles II: April 1675', *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles II, 1675-6* (1907), pp. 48-93, accessed 30 January 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=57271. [British History Online]
[98] One questions how much work was expected of the Secretary of the French tongue given that French documents were regularly sent back without translation by agents and ambassadors. French was still widely spoken in the English court. It is hard to discern whether the Secretaryship was virtually a sinecure or whether he was overwhelmed with vast amounts of work. Feiling states that Clarendon, Morrice Clifford and Bridgeman could not comprehend spoken French. See Feiling *British Foreign Policy 1660-1672* (London, 1930), p. 19. However if their task were limited only to producing official documents for the government in question then their workload would have been much lighter.
[99] J.C. Sainty, 'Lists of appointments', *Office-Holders in Modern Britain*: Vol. 2: Officials of the Secretaries of State 1660-1782 (1973), pp. 22-58, accessed 20 September 2011, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=16620. [British History Online]
[100] 12 Jan 1661- 16 June 1666. See J.C. Sainty, O*ffice-Holders in Modern Britain Officials of the Secretaries of State 1660-1782* (London, 1973), p.47.

the ability of the Protectorate to find a subtle candidate with the requisite fluency in Latin. The post was retained after the Restoration. Fanshawe demonstrated his skill in Latin by his academic work and translations, rather than by its regular use during diplomacy.[101] The use of Latin was increasingly rare, other than to provide pre-rehearsed orations.[102]

The salary for the Secretary for the Latin Tongue was just £80 4s 7d per year, though this was more than the Secretary for the French Tongue. However, like his fellow Secretary of the Tongue, Fanshawe was able to secure other posts, including the Exchequer post, of the King's Remembrancer.[103] This brought with it not only a set salary of £55 13s 4d but also fees of varying amounts.[104] Added to this were dining rights the Secretary for the Tongue enjoyed, or they could compound for Board Wages.

The other former agent to serve as a Secretary of the Tongue was Sir Henry De Vic, who was appointed as Secretary for the French Tongue, both before and after the Civil War.[105] Sir Henry De Vic was one of the longest serving diplomatic agents for Charles I, serving in France from 1630 to 1636.[106] De Vic would also serve Charles I from 1637 to 1368 in Denmark and, in 1639, De Vic was appointed Clerk in Extraordinary to the Privy Council.[107] A regular occurrence for a diplomatic agent, this was combined with his appointment as Secretary for the French Tongue.[108] De Vic's background, born on the island of Guernsey, as

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[101] A. Fanshawe, *Memoirs of Lady Fanshawe, Written by Herself, Containing Extracts from the Correspondence of Sir Richard Fanshawe*, ed. B. Marshall (London, 1905), p. 58.
[102] G. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (London, 1955), p. 217.
[103] J. C. Sainty, *Office Holders of the Exchequer* (London, 1983), p. 47.
[104] Sainty, *Office Holders of the Exchequer*, p. 40.
[105] J. C. Sainty, 'Alphabetical lists of officials: A-J', *Office-Holders in Modern Britain,* Vol. 2: Officials of the Secretaries of State 1660-1782 (1973), pp. 63-85, accessed 3 October 2011, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=16622. [British History Online]
[106] Bell, *A Handlist*, p. 110.
[107] Bell, *A Handlist*, p. 35; William Douglas Hamilton & Sophia Crawford Lomas (eds.), 'Charles I - volume 538: December 1639', *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles I, 1625-49: Addenda* (1897), pp. 611-615, accessed 3 October 2011, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=54233. [British History Online]
[108] J. C. Sainty, 'Alphabetical lists of officials: A-J', *Office-Holders in Modern Britain,* Vol. 2: Officials of the Secretaries of State 1660-1782 (1973), pp. 63-85, accessed 3 October 2011, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=16622. [British History Online]

well as his work, clearly provided evidence of fluency in French.[109] As Secretary for the French Tongue, De Vic received just £66 13s 4d; however, added to this he was entitled to dine at the Secretary of State's table and also, from 1636, had the pay of a Clerk in Extraordinary to the Privy Council.[110]

During the Civil War, De Vic remained loyal to the King and served him as agent in Brussels, from 1641 to 1661.[111] It has been alleged that a major threat to De Vic's career came from his association with Lucy Walter, Charles II's mistress, whom he sought to marry.[112] The letters of Elizabeth of the Palatinate, which comment on De Vic, show her concern for him. There was, however, no marriage.[113] De Vic remained in his post until the Restoration. After the Restoration, De Vic returned to his previous post as Secretary for the French Tongue. He was also appointed to a far more prestigious office as Chancellor of the Order of the Garter.[114] This was a position usually held by a high ranking prelate and, as a position entirely in the King's gift, a clear sign of reward and favour to De Vic, after his long years of diligent service. As Chancellor of the Order of the Garter, De Vic was to receive £1,200 a year added to his other diets and wages.[115]

De Vic's career began on the normal trajectory for agents, with repeated service abroad and a Clerkship in Extraordinary, before the more unusual employment as Secretary for the French Tongue. The Civil War, and the loyalty which De Vic showed throughout, clearly helped his

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[109] See Chapter IV of this thesis.
[110] PC 2/46, p. 452; F. Higham, *The Principal Secretary of State, a Survey of the Office from 1558 to 1680* (Manchester, 1924), pp. 211-221.
[111] Bell, *A Handlist* , p. 268.
[112] D. Wilson, *All the King's Women* (London, 2003), p. 109.
[113] J. Evelyn, *Memoirs, Illustrative of the Life and Writings*, ed. William Bray (2 vols.; London, 1819), ii, p. 152.
[114] M. Green (ed.), 'Charles II - volume 10: August 1-20, 1660', *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles II, 1660-1* (1860), pp. 174-19, .accessed 12 June 2011, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=54630. [British History Online]
[115] M. Green (ed.), 'Charles II - volume 83: November 1-16, 1663', *Calendar of State Papers Domestic: Charles II, 1663-4* (1862), pp. 324-342, accessed 10 September 2011, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=54735. [British History Online]. It is unclear, however, whether this was for expenses of the Order of the Garter or as a salary. If it was a salary it was a very generous one indeed, and as it was drawn directly from the Customs Farmers it seems far more likely to be paid.

post-Restoration career, where he was returned to one of his offices and gained a far more important, though non-political, position.

## Outside Government

Not every individual who served as an agent would wish to continue in diplomatic, or even government, service. However, would their time as a diplomatic agent help them to establish careers outside government, possibly with patronage and connections built up during their service, or would they begin their second careers regardless of their previous employment? The first two individuals to be examined sought ecclesiastical careers, which in the Anglican Church could possibly be considered a type of government service. Then three other individuals will be considered, Balthazar Gerbier, William Perwich and Réné Petit, who all sought a further employment outside government service.

## John Robinson and John Pell

The most striking success in the Church of a former agent was that of John Robinson, who would become bishop of London. Robinson served as agent to Sweden, from 1679 to 1680 and again from 1683-87.[116] Upon his return, Robinson was directed to write a report on the state of Sweden, which was unusual in English service. Although no record of it has been preserved with the State papers, it would later be published.[117]

After the Revolution of 1688, Robinson was retained as a diplomat and was returned to Sweden.[118] William III chose to have Robinson focus on his diplomatic career rather than the ecclesiastical. Robinson would undertake numerous missions to Sweden and acted as the

[116] W. Shaw (ed.), 'Entry Book: December 1679, 22-31', *Calendar of Treasury Books*, Vol. 6: 1679-1680 (1913), pp. 317-323, accessed 4 October 2011, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=83514. [British History Online]; W. Shaw (ed.), 'Entry Book: June 1683', *Calendar of Treasury Books*, Vol. 7: 1681-1685 (1916), pp. 1527-1528, accessed 4 October 2011, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=83947. [British History Online]

[117] J. Robinson, *An Account of Sueden* (London, 1694).

[118] A. Wood, *The Life and times of Anthony Wood* (5 vols.; London, 1891-1900), ii, p. 421.

main advisor during the Duke of Marlborough's mission to King Charles XII. It was not until in 1709, when he returned to England, the English monarch, now Queen Anne, consented to make him a Bishop as a reward for his services.

Robinson initially refused a Bishopric, arguing he had been absent too long to immediately undertake such duties. A year later, however, he was consecrated as Bishop of Bristol.[119] This would be followed by Dean of the Chapel Royal.[120] Robinson's experience as a diplomat was widely recognised and regarded. Before beginning his final overseas appointment, Robinson was appointed Lord Privy Seal and a Privy Councillor. Robinson then departed as one of England's first plenipotentiaries to arrive at Utrecht.[121]

Upon his return from Utrecht, it was with the help of Robert Harley's patronage that Robinson reached his highest position as Bishop of London. Having voted with the Whigs at the Hanoverian succession, Robinson continued in his offices under George I. Robinson, like Cottington, had a high degree of knowledge about a single state which was important to English diplomacy. As a result, he was brought in as an expert advisor to four monarchs and was able to use this and his skill in dealing with Swedish matters, to first attain higher diplomatic rank and later to progress in an ecclesiastical career.

Few Churchmen served as diplomats during the period and Robinson is unique in holding high offices in the Church at the same time as serving in a diplomatic capacity. Another ecclesiastical career of a former agent is that William Lewis (France), who while not reaching the heights of Robinson held the Canonry at Winchester and the Mastership of the Hospital of St Cross.[122]

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[119] A. Boyer, *The History of Queen Anne* (London, 1735), p. 515.
[120] *Ibid.*
[121] W. Shaw (ed.), 'Warrant Book: December 1711, 1-10', *Calendar of Treasury Books*, Vol. 25: 1711 (1952), pp. 572-581, accessed 15 September 2012, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=85880. [British History Online]
[122] Wood, *Fasti*, i, p. 239.

John Pell's career after diplomacy was not as successful. He began as Professor of Mathematics at Amsterdam. He was employed by Oliver Cromwell, first as 'Professor of Mathematics' a most peculiar appointment, and one which appears to have included no teaching or attachment to a University. Pell was never elected a fellow or a scholar of Oxford or Cambridge![123] Later Pell was chosen to be the Protectorate's representative with the protestant Cantons of Switzerland. Pell completed one of the longer embassies, serving from 1653 to 1658.[124] Pell also had the largest allowance of any diplomatic agent. He was intended to receive £800 a year, although it is uncertain if he received his full pay.[125]

With the Restoration, Pell was ordained a deacon and then a priest, serving for Fobbing in Essex and later Laindon, living quietly as a country parson.[126] It is reported that he died in such poverty that he 'that he wanted necessaries, even Paper and Ink'.[127] Wood claimed this was due to Pell's lack of attention to worldly affairs and the tenants and residents 'cozen'd him of the profits of his parsonage'.[128]

## Deviser of preposterous schemes – Balthazar Gerbier

Sir Balthazar Gerbier had a colourful career compared with many of the agents employed by the government. He came to London with the ambassador for the States General and began producing miniature portraits in pen and ink.[129] Gerbier then become the factotum of the Duke of Buckingham, before serving as the keeper of his picture collection.[130] Gerbier

[123] Wood, *Fasti*, i, p. 462.
[124] Bell, *A Handlist*, p. 282.
[125] T. Birch (ed.), 'State Papers, 1657: November (1 of 5)', *A collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe*, Vol. 6: January 1657 - March 1658 (1742), pp. 585-600, accessed 3 October 2011, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=55621. [British History Online]
[126] J. Venn & J. A. Venn, *Alumni Cantabrigienses Part I (From the Earliest Times to 1751)* (4 vols.; Cambridge, 1924), iii, p. 337.
[127] Wood, *Fasti*, i, p. 253.
[128] Wood, *Fasti*, i, p. 462.
[129] H. Williamson, *Four Stuart Portraits* (London, 1949), p. 26.
[130] I. G Philip, 'Balthazar Gerbier and the Duke of Buckingham's Pictures' *The Burlington Magazine* Vol. 99, No. 650 (May, 1957), pp. 155-156.

continued his cultural activities, travelling to Italy and remodelling York House for the Duke of Buckingham. It was not until 1627 that he was involved with diplomacy, carrying letters for the Duke of Buckingham to France, and later that year at Delft, meeting with Rubens to discuss a secret Spanish treaty.[131] Despite these flirtations with diplomatic work, Gerbier returned to England, rebuilding Richard Weston earl of Portland's house, on the strength of his previous work for Buckingham. Gerbier was only made a diplomatic agent in 1631.[132] Upon his return, he was appointed Master of Ceremonies in charge of conducting foreign ambassadors in London.[133] During the Civil War, Gerbier fled England. The post of Master of Ceremonies for the parliamentary government was bestowed on Sir Oliver Fleming.[134] Fleming had served as agent at Zurich and would later translate for Cromwell.[135] With the usual routes of patronage and advancement closed, and despite Gerbier petitioning the House of Commons for redress and for employment, he had to look for alternative routes for future prosperity.

Gerbier returned to England in 1649 and dedicated himself to what has been described as 'devising preposterous schemes'.[136] These began with his founding of an academy for young men, modelled on the French academies of the period.[137] Here Gerbier sought to combine his knowledge of art and courtly practice. The academy lasted no more than a year, despite

[131] A. J. Loomie, 'Olivares, the English Catholics and the Peace of 1630', *Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Filologie en Geschiedenis* 47 (1969), p. 1155.
[132] Bell, *A Handlist*, p. 268.
[133] W. Black, *Docquets of Letters Patent passed under the Great Seal of Charles I 1642-6* (London, 1837), p. 403.
[134] 'House of Lords Journal Volume 6: 12 January 1644', *Journal of the House of Lords*, Vol. 6: 1643 (1767-1830), pp. 376-377, accessed 4 October 2011, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=37428. [British History Online]
[135] T. Venning, 'Fleming, Sir Oliver (d. 1661)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed 4 October 2011, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/66617.
[136] J. Wood, 'Gerbier, Sir Balthazar (1592–1663/1667)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed 11 September 2010, at http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/10562.
[137] P. Lee, 'Some English Academies: An Experiment in the Education of Renaissance Gentlemen' *History of Education Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Autumn, 1970), pp. 273-286.

Gerbier offering free public lectures.[138] With the failure of the academy, Gerbier sought new employment and was able to use his well-known artistic knowledge to be appointed one of the commissioners to sell King Charles I's art collection.[139] His suggestion of a series of group portraits of the House of Commons was rejected. Gerbier next proposed the founding of a national bank.[140] There was little interest in such a scheme. He then moved to The Hague and promoted gold exploration in Africa.[141] This project predictably failed.[142] The Restoration found Gerbier returning to architectural work, remodelling the house of the Earl of Craven and publishing treatises on architecture. His position of Master of Ceremonies was not restored and instead given to Sir Charles Cotteroll.[143] While comparisons to buildings in The Spanish Netherlands appear in his books on design and building, it does not appear his time as a diplomat was a critical advantage to his career as an architect.[144]

Gerbier's career before the Civil War does hint at the possibility that the reward for his services and his knowledge was the granting of the position as Master of Ceremonies. How far Gerbier's diplomatic knowledge aided him in acquiring this post is hard to say, though he combined a high degree of knowledge of art, design, and courtly etiquette with that of diplomatic practice, which was a rare combination.

Gerbier's time as an agent certainly does not appear to have helped his career outside royal service. He returned to his previous lifestyle of short term and varied private employment. Though his services as a diplomat certainly allowed him to meet, and interact with, a wide

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[138] Gerbier printed several of the lectures he delivered at the academy. See B. Gerbier, *The First Publique Lecture, Read at Sr. Balthazar Gerbier His Academy, Concerning Military Architecture, or Fortifications, to the Lovers of Virtue, Come Hither to That Purpose* (London, 1649); Williamson, *Four Stuart Portraits*, p. 52.
[139] J. Brotton, *The Sale of the Late King's Goods* (London, 2006), p. 243.
[140] Williamson, *Four Stuart Portraits*, p. 55; A. Andréadés, *History of the Bank of England, 1640-1903* (Abingdon, 1909), p. 27.
[141] Williamson, *Four Stuart Portraits*, p. 57.
[142] B. Gerbier, *A Sommery Description, Manifesting that Greater Profits are to Bee Done in the Hot than in the Told Parts off the Coast of America* (Rotterdam, 1660).
[143] M. Jenkinson, *Culture and Politics at the Court of Charles II, 1660-1685* (Woodbridge, 2010), p. 62.
[144] For the collected work of Gerbier on design and building, see T. Wilsford (ed.), *The Art of Building: A Brief Discourse, and, Counsel and Advise to All Builders, by Balthazar Gerbier* (Farnborough, 1969); H. J. Louw, 'Anglo-Netherlandish Architectural Interchange c. 1600-c. 1660', *Architectural History* Vol. 24 (1981), pp. 1-23.

range of individuals to whom he would later try to sell his various ideas and projects, his eclectic post-agency employment hints at what might have been a quite common occurrence, that of those agents who did not stay in government service trying a variety of different employments, not all of them successful.

Petit and Perwich.

While it is possible to trace Gerbier's employment and activities, from his time as an agent until his death, other agents are much harder to trace, leaving little evidence of their lives after they have left the State Papers. Two examples of this type of agent are Réné Petit and William Perwich, who were contemporaries serving in France.

Réné Petit, was a French Huguenot who served the various English governments. He began his service during the Civil War and would continue to carry out duties in France through the Commonwealth, Protectorate and Restoration. Petit was the nephew of Réné Augier, who had served Charles I in France. However, Augier had received little reward for his services and chose to side with Parliament during the Civil War. This brought neither Augier nor Petit any noticeable advancement.

Petit continued to serve in France, despite a growing rift with William Perwich, who was also agent there.[145] Petit was unpopular with the French court, who went so far as to imprison him in Pignerol.[146] This was for writing statements in his dispatches which were prejudicial to Louis XIV.[147] Petit was released from Pignerol, but no longer allowed near the court, which limited his utility as a diplomat to the English government. In the lead up to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, Petit petitioned Charles II to grant exile to 40 French Huguenot families

[145] Petit was accused by Perwich of trying to usurp his place or attempting to create a new post for himself and be paid from part of Perwich's salary through the offices of Louise de Kérouaille, duchess of Portsmouth. See SPFF, SP 78/139 145, William Perwich to Secretary Willamson, 8 November 1674.
[146] State Papers Domestic, Charles II SP 29/95 79, State Papers Domestic, Charles II SP 29/99 76.
[147] A. Marshall, *Intelligence and espionage in the reign of Charles II, 1660-1685* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 134.

and allow them to travel to Carolina.[148] Unlike his uncle, the Huguenot agent Réné Augier, Petit did at least receive some reward for his service, being granted by the King 4,000 acres in Carolina.[149] William Perwich alleged that Petit was a creature of Louise Renée de Penancoët de Kérouaille, duchess of Portsmouth, which is what may have helped Petit to secure the grant from the King.[150] Petit disappears from the English records after his time as agent, although it would seem that, after suffering imprisonment in France despite his diplomatic status, he joined the Huguenot refugees as his petition requested.[151]

While most agents left their diplomatic employment having served satisfactorily, there were other agents who did not, and as a consequence ceased to be employed by the government. One such person was the agent William Perwich. Perwich had served as agent in France during the same period as Réné Petit. While Petit was able to leave with a land grant, Perwich was not as fortunate. In 1677, Ralph Montagu, writing to Henry Bennet, earl of Arlington, asked whether Arlington was really concerned or interested in Perwich who 'can seldom stand for he is eternally drunk'.[152] Montagu clearly did not recommend Perwich for future employment despite several years of service. While Perwich had acquired books and performed a number of reporting services during his embassy this did not provide him with an alternative employment.

Perwich would try to perform one last government service, delivering a letter to Daniel Skinner, ordering him to return to Trinity College and return to them the manuscripts which he had taken. However, Perwich was unsuccessful, stating 'he intends notwithstanding the

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[148] W. Shaw (ed.), 'Entry Book: March 1679', *Calendar of Treasury Books*, Vol. 6: 1679-1680 (1913), pp. 3-11, accessed 3 October 2011, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=83488. [British History Online]

[149] A. Hirsch, *The Huguenots of Colonial South Carolina* (Hamden, 1962), p. 12.

[150] M. Curran, *The Despatches of William Perwich* (London, 1903), p. 295.

[151] W. Shaw (ed.), 'Entry Book: May 1680, 21-28', *Calendar of Treasury Books*, Vol. 6: 1679-1680 (1913), pp. 545-562, accessed 3 October 2011, http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=83539. [British History Online]

[152] R. E. G. Kirk. (ed.), *The Montagu-Arlington Letters (vol. i, Report on the manuscripts of the Duke of Buccleuch and Queensberry ... preserved at Montagu House, Whitehall.)* (London 1899), p. 523.

College summons to goe for Italy this summer'.[153] With Montagu against his further employment, and with no patron now that Arlington was no longer interested in him, Perwich left government employment.

Gerbier, Petit and Perwich show other possible courses of post agency employment. Diplomats, unless they had undertaken very long service or demonstrated expertise in a particular area that the King needed (such as Cottington with his knowledge of Spain), were forced to rely on the skills and knowledge that they had, and any connections they had made, and could not count upon government bounty.

## Death in Service

A number of diplomats died in service, or died during a subsequent diplomatic mission. In these cases it is unknown how high they might have risen, or how they would have utilised their experience and the contacts they had acquired. However, in some case there are hints of what might have been.

Sir Isaac Wake had commenced the usual trajectory of serving as secretary, in his case to Sir Dudley Carleton in Venice.[154] Then he was left as agent in Venice. With the help of Carleton, he was promoted to Resident Ambassador in Savoy and Ambassador Ordinary in Venice, before serving as Resident Ambassador in France.[155] While serving as ambassador to France, Wake died. He was, however, able to complete the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye before he died. It was generally and reliably believed that that he would have been made one of the Secretaries of State had he not died in France.[156] Wake, like others who were able to progress their careers, had the support of patrons in England, in his case James Hay, 1st earl of

[153] SPFF SP 78/142 15, William Perwich to William Bridgeman, Paris, 5 / 15 March 1677.
[154] Bell, *A Handlist,* p. 290.
[155] Bell, *A Handlist,* pp. 291, 110.
[156] This is perhaps explained by the general belief that Wake would soon be made Secretary of State. However, Wake was passed over and had yet to hold one of the most prestigious embassies. He then revived his posting to France. See T. Fuller, *The Worthies of England,* (3 vols.; London, 1811), ii, p. 166.

Carlisle, and Edward Conway, 1st viscount Conway, as well as successfully completed diplomatic assignments.[157]

While there are clues about how far Wake might have progressed, having already managed to become an ambassador, for other agents there are none. The Commonwealth's agent Anthony Ascham was murdered in 1650 by Royalists agents in Spain.[158] The career of Thomas Lorkin, agent in France, was short, serving from June 1625 to September 1625.[159] Lorkin was presumed drowned after several weeks of silence, and the new English ambassador, Henry Rich 1st earl of Holland, finding that he had departed Paris for London some time previously.[160]

Life after an agency

It is not surprising that, from such a large and diverse group of men as the diplomatic agents selected by the government during the period, no universal, or even general, career path emerges. There are, however, some important observations that can be made from considering the work that agents went on to do after they had served overseas.

A large number of agents were prepared to serve again as diplomats and the government was willing to re-employ them. There was a reasonable probability of promotion and returning to service as a diplomat at one of the higher ranks. While rising to the highest rank of Ambassador Extraordinary was rare, it was still possible. Those who served again were regularly posted to the same nation, or one with close connections, which suggests that the government believed they had acquired certain skills and knowledge related to those nations and wished to exploit these.

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[157] V. Larminie, 'The Jacobean Diplomatic Fraternity and the Protestant Cause: Sir Isaac Wake and the View from Savoy', *English Historical Review* Vol. 121, No. 494 (2006), p. 1326.
[158] J. Peacey, 'Order and Disorder In Europe: Parliamentary Agents and Royalist Thugs 1649–1650', *The Historical Journal* Vol. 40 (December 1997), pp. 967-978.
[159] Bell, *A Handlist*, p. 107.
[160] Stoye, *English Travellers Abroad*, p. 62.

The Clerkship of the Privy Council provided a great number of agents with work in England. Despite the main role of the Privy Council being domestic not foreign affairs, agents and former diplomats were able to regularly purchase these posts with Royal agreement. That a number of clerks were sent on further diplomatic missions suggests the government wished to use the skills and knowledge these men had, and may have been the reason so many were allowed to purchase the office. Surprisingly, agents never found immediate employment on the Boards of Trade, despite their experience of negotiating trade disputes.

The clearest way to high office for an agent was to utilise their agency to good effect when they returned to England and to promote themselves as having skills and expertise that the government wanted. Francis Cottington is the perfect example as he was able to transform himself into the government's expert on Spain. As a result, he had regular contact with high ranking councillors and the King. No other agents would find it possible to play the role that Cottington did. He was in a unique position with the limited knowledge of Spain in the Court and Council. Most agents looking to progress could look little further than the Clerkship of the Council. Other rewards were distributed; however, they were the exception rather than the rule.

## Epilogue: The Decline of Diplomatic Agents

Towards the end of this period, there was a marked decline in the use of diplomatic agents. From 1680 until 1688, France, which normally hosted an agent, and on occasion more than one, had no agents resident. The German States had an agent in only one state for one of those years. The Italian States and the United Provinces fared little better, receiving an agent in two of those years and finally Spain managed to have an agent serving for four of those eight years.[1] Compared to the heydays of agent diplomacy under Charles I, this was a significant reduction, both in the number of personnel employed to act for the state abroad, and also the number of states which received representatives of the government. Having seen the importance of agents to the conduct of Stuart foreign policy and diplomacy, the decline of the agent corps must be examined and explained. What replacements the state found for these men, if indeed they were replaced at all, should also be considered.

### The Decline in the Numbers of Agents.

The first question is how great was the decline in the number of agents stationed overseas by the government? The chart below illustrates the total number of agents serving for each year, from the accession of James I until the Revolution which deposed James II. While the graph appears erratic, broad trends can be seen.

[1] Dr. Johann Hogius, German States (1686); Sir Thomas Dereham, Italian States (1687 – 9); Sir John Litcott, Italian States (1687 – 8); Sir Thomas Plott, United Provinces (1682); Peter Levett, Spain (1682 – 5). See G. Bell, *A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives 1509-1688* (London, 1990), pp. 151, 169, 206, 264.





**Chart 2 Number of agents serving each year (1603-1688).**

The trend through the reigns of James I and Charles I shows an increase in the number of diplomatic agents employed, reaching highpoints in both 1632 and 1635, when a total of 15 agents were employed by the state. This is followed by a general decline in the number of agents. The years 1664, 1665 and 1667 saw the smallest number of agents, with only one agent accredited to any state.[2]

This was not just because of a general reduction in the number of diplomats brought about by financial concerns, especially after Charles II dissolved the Oxford Parliament in 1681. The percentage of agents within the diplomatic corps was also in terminal decline. The chart below illustrates the percentage of each of the diplomatic ranks, as a total of the whole diplomatic corps, for the years from the Restoration to the Revolution.

[2] Joseph Kent Italian States (1659 – 64); Thomas Warren, North Africa (1665 – 6); George Shuttleworth Sweden (1666 – 70). See Bell, *A Handlist*, pp. 166, 209, 277.





**Chart 3 Percentage of diplomats holding each diplomatic rank (1660-1688).**

From this chart a number of points are apparent. Firstly, there is a clear decrease in the percentage of diplomats accredited as agents. The high point was in 1660, where fully half the diplomats accredited were agents. There were none at all in 1687-8. Though the decline was not uniform, it is apparent that agents were now diplomatically less important than they had previously been to the government. Secondly, there is a trend of appointing diplomats to the rank of Envoy Extraordinary with ever-increasing frequency. There was only one in 1660, four in 1665, and then a rapid increase to a high point of 16 in 1672. There was a decline from this point. However, the rank continued to become increasingly prominent, so that in the final year examined, out of a total of nine diplomats serving overseas, fully six of them were accredited as Envoys Extraordinary. Thirdly, while outside the scope of the study, it is worth noting that there is also a fall in the number of Ambassadors Extraordinary being accredited. Previously these appointments were the most desirable. These short term missions brought

great social prestige, without the long term expense associated with being an Ambassador in Ordinary.

Was the decrease in the use of agents after the Restoration, during the rule of Charles II and James II, due to reasons other than a shift in the type of appointments? Was the general cost cutting the reason for so few agents to be dispatched? Agents were usually the cheapest form of diplomat available to the monarch, being paid around £365 a year, rather than £1,825 for an Envoy Extraordinary.[3] Cost cutting alone cannot explain the shift in the type of diplomat appointed.

If cost had been the motivating factor for reducing agents, then after the Revolution of 1688 a return to their use should be seen. There is, however, no evidence of such a change under William and Mary or Anne. The chart below represents the percentage of each type of accredited diplomat, in each of the years from 1689 through to 1714, covering the reigns of William and Mary and Anne.

[3] See Chapter I of this thesis for agent pay, envoy extraordinary pay comes from an average in Bell, *A Handlist.*





**Chart 4 Percentage of diplomats holding each diplomatic rank (1689-1715).**

The period illustrated above shows that there were only diplomatic agents accredited for five of the twenty-five years examined. These five years of service were accomplished by George Stepney (Emperor 1693), William Aglionby (Spain 1692), and John Robinson (Sweden 1694-6). Unlike the earlier agents who served for many years, all of these were comparatively short missions.[4] The longest, John Robinson's agency, was only two years duration. The rank which appears most common in this period is that of Envoy Extraordinary, which regularly makes up over half the diplomats who were accredited at any one time. Indeed, when combined with rank of Envoys Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, only in 1701 does the proportion of the diplomatic corps that they represent fall below 40 per cent. Envoy Extraordinary had become the dominant diplomatic rank issued. It had even replaced the title

[4] D. B. Horn, *British Diplomatic Representatives 1689*-1789 (London, 1932), pp. 28, 128, 139.

of Ambassador. The only men to receive this title were now those accredited to the Ottoman Court. Outside the *Sublime Porte* only William Harbord, accredited to the United Provinces in 1690, received the title of Ambassador.[5]

Could it be that the diplomatic corps was so small that a few appointments caused the percentage shown above to be so large? This was not the case. The chart below represents individual diplomats, by rank, each year that they were accredited. It shows a general trend of increasing the number of diplomats employed by the state through this period and that there were, in all but four of the years considered here, at least ten individuals with the rank of Envoy Extraordinary.





**Chart 5 Number of diplomats by rank (1689-1715).**

After the reign of William and Mary, only one other diplomat would be ranked as an agent in the 18th century, this was Henry Shirley who was accredited to Russia in 1767.[6] The period

[5] Horn, *British Diplomatic Representatives*, p. 155; S. Handley, 'Harbord, William (1635–1692)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, accessed 20 June 2012, at http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/12233.

where the diplomatic agent was an important individual and the peak of agent based diplomacy was, however, over long before Shirley's appointment.

Reasons for the Decline.

There is probably no single reason for the end of the regular employment of diplomatic agents. However, one factor which clearly contributed to it was the inflation of diplomatic ranks, as diplomats desired to receive ever more exalted titles. Another factor was the expansion of the consul network, which increasingly provided information and attempted to resolve mercantile disputes, as agents had done. There was an increase in the length of time that diplomats of other ranks were spending in foreign courts, reducing the need for a specific type of diplomat to maintain continuity between regular changes. Finally, there was a decline in the career path, which could be seen before the Civil War, by which agents seem to have gravitated towards secure advancement.

It has been argued throughout this thesis that one of the greatest advantages of the use of agents was that they had very limited status in terms of court protocol and hierarchy. This allowed them to avoid many of the associated disputes about etiquette and precedence, and therefore focus on their missions. However, there was a natural desire for the individual to wish to serve at the highest rank that he could possibly attain.[7] This had benefits both in terms of remuneration and in social prestige, which they received abroad and when they returned home to England. While the suggestion that agents were looked down on for much of the period has been refuted[8]. Cornelis van Bijnkershoek wrote that 'agents are as common to-day

[6] Horn, *British Diplomatic Representatives*, p. 117.
[7] J. Black, *A System of Ambition* (London, 1991), p. 59.
[8] Agents were the lowest form of early modern diplomatic life and really had no degree of 'representative character' at all'. See G. R. Berridge, 'Notes on the origins of the diplomatic corps: Constantinople in the 1620s', *Discussion Papers in Diplomacy*, No. 92 (May, 2004), p. 5.

as before, but in earlier times they were held in higher esteem than they are now'.[9] Clearly a shift had occurred and the rank was viewed as less attractive than it had been.

When the period after this thesis is also considered, there is evidence of the growing concern for rank and whether it would be esteemed appropriately at a foreign court.[10] Granting higher diplomatic ranks could also serve as a mark of the government's increased attention to a certain area, and in general more diplomats were placed at a higher diplomatic rank over time than were reduced.[11] At the beginning of the period, the addition of 'Extraordinary' to the title of a diplomat denoted not just that they were someone of great importance, but also that they were intended only to stay for a short period and carry out a set mission, such as the ratification of a treaty.[12] Even under Charles I, this time-limited character of the extraordinary appointments was not always adhered to. Robert Sidney, earl of Leicester, was sent as Ambassador Extraordinary to France, even though he was to remain there for five years, between 1636 and 1641.[13] However, Leicester was exceptional and was placed in France to displace an ambassador in ordinary, John Scudamore.[14] Leicester required a higher title so that he took diplomatic precedence over Scudamore. By the end of the period, the addition of Extraordinary was used far more regularly and indeed Ambassador Extraordinary was becoming almost the standard designation, as individuals sought to have as prestigious a title as possible for their embassies.

At the same time as the use of the title of agent was diminishing so too was that of Envoy. This was being replaced by the more impressive sounding Envoy Extraordinary. There appears to have been little change in the individuals who received the title, other than

[9] C. van Bijnkershoek, *De foro legatorum liber singularis: a monograph on the jurisdiction over ambassadors in both civil and criminal cases*, trans. G. J. Laing (Oxford, 1946), p. 64.
[10] J. Black, *British Diplomats and Diplomacy 1688-1800* (Exeter, 2001), p. 47.
[11] Black, *A System of Ambition*, p. 59; Black, *British Diplomats and Diplomacy*, p. 10.
[12] G. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (London, 1955), pp. 238-9.
[13] Bell, *A Handlist*, p. 111.
[14] K. Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I* (London, 1992), p. 611.

allowing them to move up in terms of precedence at the court to which they were accredited. As has been seen, this title would go on to become the dominant diplomatic title.

There is little clear evidence in the period for any need to inflate the ranks at which diplomats were dispatched. There is, however, evidence for this in the eighteenth century. Concern had been growing about the ranks used. It had long been acknowledged that an increase in the title of the minister to a state showed increased commitment and that value had been placed on that area by the home government. The reductions in the diplomats stationed there could be considered a snub by the host government. Concerns were growing also that certain ranks would not be sufficiently high to assure the diplomat full access to the court.[15] With envoy extraordinary increasingly becoming the most common rank, this problem was resolved.

Chapter II and Chapter III considered the two tasks which agents appear to have spent the greatest amount of their time and resources on, namely the gathering of information and attempting to resolve commercial disputes. So one credible reason for the decline in the number of diplomatic agents was that, as the number of consuls increased, they took over responsibility for these tasks, leaving the agent with a less clearly defined role and eventually they became no different from any other ambassador or other diplomat.

Perhaps the most important task that an agent regularly engaged in was the collection and transmission of news thought to be of value to government in Whitehall. At the beginning of the period under consideration, there were few options for the state to accomplish this vital role of intelligence gathering on the continent and further afield. The government could of course resort to paying spies and intelligencers to furnish them with the information they required.[16] However, there was no sound way to recruit such individuals abroad from London. This made it more practical to send overseas an individual already known to the government. Apart from this control, the news writer or intelligencer only had one role, to

[15] Black, *British Diplomats and Diplomacy*, p. 48.
[16] A. Marshall, *Intelligence and Espionage in the Reign of Charles II*, *1660-1685* (Cambridge, 1994), p. 185.

provide news; they did not attempt to take action as a result of that news. An agent can therefore be seen as a multifunctional individual and, in an age with limited financial resources, must have represented better value for money than employing large numbers of intelligencers.

As the period progressed, there were a number of changes at the lowest level of diplomatic activity, that of mercantile disputes. Merchants consuls, who had previously been used to settle disputes between merchants and help them abide by the restrictions embodied in the commence treaties, began to take on a more political and governmental character. They also became far more widespread than they were in 1605. The earliest example of this political and merchant consul can be seen in the attempt to appoint Cottington, a former agent, as a consul in Spain. This attempt did not succeed, and a hybrid of diplomat and merchant consul would not emerge until after the Restoration. This was also the period where information from, or complaints about the lack of such information from, consuls became a larger and regular feature of diplomatic dispatches.

The networks of consuls also underwent a huge growth as trade expanded and more consuls were settled abroad, the Secretary of State welcoming any chance to expand their network.[17] There were eight consuls in 1662, 19 in 1665, and finally by 1684 there were 38 consuls.[18] Many ports, where there had never been a consul presence before, now had one.[19] The consuls now wrote to the Ambassador Ordinary or Envoy Extraordinary and provided much of the mundane information that the diplomatic agents had previously produced.[20] Consuls also could be directed to write to the Secretary of State.[21] Included in the reports were the state of foreign navies, details of ships, tonnage and readiness, which previously agents had

[17] P. Fraser, *The Intelligence of the Secretaries of State & Their Monopoly of Licensed News, 1660-1688* (Cambridge, 1956), p. 70.
[18] Fraser, *The Intelligence of the Secretaries of State*, pp. 166-167.
[19] V. Barbour, 'Consular Service in the Reign of Charles II', *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (April, 1928), p. 578.
[20] See Chapter I of this thesis.
[21] Fraser, *The Intelligence of the Secretaries of State*, p. 68.

regularly provided.[22] Such a system decreased the need for the diplomatic agent as the government's long-term chief information-gatherer in a foreign nation. Coupled to this, unlike agents, who when they were paid were paid by the central government, consuls existed on the fees and poundage that they were entitled to charge merchants who arrived at their station.[23] This freed the government from the cost of supporting agents and thus saved the Crown money.

It was not just information gathering which shifted to consuls, so also, of course, did attempts to resolve disputes around trade. Whereas earlier in the period, a large proportion of every diplomatic agent's correspondence details the various court cases and the progress made, at the end of the period there was a marked decrease in this. Consuls were the obvious type of representative to resolve trading disputes and it had long been the role of merchant consuls for monopoly companies to do so.[24] With the decline of merchant companies, merchants turned to the King, who in turn created more consuls.[25] With an ever increasing number of consuls based in foreign ports, the need for agents to intervene in merchant disputes decreased rapidly.

Thus two of the most important functions that can be identified for diplomatic agents were taken over by other individuals. A further role which agents carried out was providing continuity at an embassy, often for ambassadors who would serve very short missions. At the height of agent-based diplomacy, agents served for a far greater period of time, averaging 4.5 years to an ambassador's three years, a Special Ambassador only averaged 265 days per mission. This, however, was changing. After the Restoration when the respective periods of service fell, to 2.5 years for an agent and six years for an ordinary ambassador. The increasingly common rank of Envoy Extraordinary averaged two years per posting. After

[22] Black, *British Diplomats and Diplomacy*, p. 140.
[23] Barbour, 'Consular Service in the Reign of Charles II', p. 557.
[24] G. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (London, 1955), p. 67.
[25] Barbour, 'Consular Service in the Reign of Charles II', p. 555.

1688, this trend continued and between 1688 and 1714 agents averaged 1.5 years in post (although there were only three agents serving), which compares favourably with 1.3 years for an Ambassador Extraordinary, 1.7 years for an Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. This length of service was far less than the 2.6 years for an Envoy Extraordinary, 3.8 years for a Resident and 4.7 years for an Ambassador. No longer did an agent provide the long service experience in an embassy, indeed many grades of diplomat were now spending longer than an agent at a foreign court, further reducing the reasons for appointing an agent. The only roles which remained for them were those which they shared with ambassadors, such as attending court and conducting negotiations. At this point, the need to support an agent and an ambassador, often at the same post, became unnecessary.[26]

A further cause of the reduction in agents was the effective disappearance of the career path for diplomatic agents, for which there was evidence before the Civil War. After serving several times, or for a number of years, it was often the case that diplomatic agents would be rewarded by being able to purchase, or being granted, one of the Clerkships, either in ordinary or extraordinary, of the Privy Council. Sir Ralph Winwood, Sir William Trumbull, Sir William Beecher, Sir Albertus Morton, Sir Francis Cottington, John Dickinson, Sir Richard Browne, William Boswell, Sir Henry De Vic, Simon Digby, and John Hawkins and Sir Dudley Carleton all followed this route serving first as a secretary to an embassy, then as an agent and then being appointed a Clerk of the Council.[27]

So common was this pattern that a majority of the Clerks by the Civil War had been diplomatic agents.[28] As the Secretaries of State had usually served as Clerks, this suggested a possible avenue of promotion, or at least offered hope for advancement. The clerkships also

[26] Though it was rare for both an agent and an ambassador to be appointed to the same court at the same time.

[27] See Chapter VI of this thesisfor a more detailed analysis.

[28] Only Sir Thomas Meautys, Sir Clement Edmondes, Sir Anthony Ashley, William Wade, Sir Thomas Smith, Sir Edward Nicholas and Sir Thomas Edmonds had not served as agents.

offered the possibility for moving into one of the other government posts which were available.

After the Restoration, this career pathway ended. Only two former agents were appointed Clerks of the Privy Council. Sir Richard Browne had served as a clerk before the Civil War and was reappointed as Senior Clerk and William Blathwayt was a Clerk in Extraordinary, though he served the Committee for the Plantations.[29] The reasons for the changes in appointment were many and complex and are discussed in the previous chapter. However, there was not as clear a link between serving abroad as diplomatic agent and reward with preferment at home as there had been. This would decrease the attractiveness of the position of agent and make recruitment harder, especially as Chapter I noted the level of education and skill that agents had was higher than has been presumed for the diplomatic corps of the period.

The theory of diplomacy regularly ran a long way behind the practice of diplomacy. The situation for the theory of immunities was, however, even more complex than the simple relationship outlined above. It was comparatively late that agents or ministers of the second order were recognised as having the same rights and privileges with regards to immunities as ambassadors did. However, it was noted by Cornelis van Bijnkershoek in *De foro legatorum liber singularis* that it is 'generally recognised that they [agents] were nothing more than private agents of princes'.[30] This suggests that a shift had occurred sometime previously and that agents were now viewed as the personal representatives of their sovereigns, rather than more general political operatives. If this was the general trend across Europe, for the title of agent to become associated with personal representative, it is understandable why their use declined in England as well, which followed continental diplomatic conventions.

[29] G. Jacobsen, *William Blathwayt: A Late Seventeenth Century English Administrator* (London 1932), p. 72.
[30] van Bijnkershoek, *De foro legatorum liber singularis*, p. 11.

By the time of James II's deposition, England's agent-based diplomacy was firmly at an end. It had taken until 29 March 1651 for the States General to pass a decree giving immunity to all who were 'ambassadors, resident envoys, agents or other minister of kings, princes, republic or others bearing the title of public minister' rather than just ambassadors.[31] The discussion was almost moot; there were then few agents who would need such protection.

As the 18th century began, there was an increasingly formalised and clear hierarchy in the titles to which diplomats were assigned. Running from Ambassador Extraordinary to Secretary, the title of agent did not feature in this hierarchy. Even this apparently established system is deceptive. The most frequently bestowed title by the reigns of William and Mary and Queen Anne, Envoy Extraordinary, covered a broad range of individuals, from William Paget or George Stepney, to the Earl of Cadogan.[32] In these later years, it was regarded as humiliating to be dubbed just 'ordinary' and all Ambassadors were accorded the title of extraordinary, even when that epithet had lost its meaning.[33]

The final diplomatic agent ever to be appointed was Robert Daniel, who served in Flanders.[34] After this there was a break of 26 years without the government appointing anyone to the rank of agent. While Daniel did serve for 23 years, a length of time which would be considered long even by the standards of agents, it is uncertain if he was ranked as an agent for all of this time, or as *chargé d'affaires.*[35] Daniel should be regarded as an anomaly rather than having any link with the previous policy of agent-based diplomacy, which he did not share continuity with.

The use of large numbers of diplomatic agents never fully recovered from the ruptures of the Civil War and Interregnum. While there were still some men accredited to the rank, as time went on it clearly became less and less important and useful in diplomatic exchanges. By

[31] van Bijnkershoek, *De foro legatorum liber singularis*, p. 66.
[32] Horn, *British Diplomatic Representatives*, pp. 28, 29, 161.
[33] H. Nicholson, *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method* (London, 1953), p. 59.
[34] Horn, *British Diplomatic Representatives*, p. 9.
[35] *Ibid.*

1686, the system of regular diplomatic agents effectively ended. This was the first time since 1586 that the English government did not have a single individual serving at the rank of agent overseas. Their work it seems was now done by the large and growing network of Royal consuls. With most duties taken away, the diplomatic agent was left with only negotiations as the key part of their role. This could be done by any diplomat and, as Chapter IV made clear, was almost always completed and signed by a more important minister than an agent. Any distinct role for an agent had thus disappeared.

## Appendix I University Education of Diplomatic Agents.

Anthony Ascham
King's College Cambridge, B.A. 1638, M.A. 1642, Fellow of King's College 1637-50.[1]

William Beecher
Likely to have been the William Beecher who matriculated at Peterhouse c. 1592.[2]

John Berkeley
Probably John Berkley of The Queen's College Oxford, B.A. 1625.[3]

William Boswell
Jesus College Cambridge, B.A. 1603-4, M.A. 1607, Fellow of Jesus College 1606-29. Incorporated into Oxford University 1608. Served as a Proctor at Oxford 1624-5.[4]

Richard Bradshaw
Trinity College Oxford, B.A. 1607, M.A. Balliol College Oxford 1610.[5]

Richard Browne
Christ Church Oxford B.A. 1623, Fellow of Merton College Oxford 1628, M.A. Merton College 1628.[6]

Richard Bulstrode
Pembroke College Cambridge, B.A. 1639-40.[7]

Dudley Carleton
King's College Cambridge, B.A. 1619-20, M.A. 1623, Fellow of King's College 1618-24.[8]

John Chapman
Could be John Chapman Trinity College Cambridge, B.A. 1609, M.A. 1613 or John Chapman Corpus Christi College Cambridge, B.A. 1614-15, M.A. 1619. The first is more likely, given the usual age at which agents took up their first posts.[9]

Thomas Dereham
St Alban Hall Oxford, B.A. 1681, M.A. 1685[10]

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[1] John Venn & J. A. Venn, *Alumni Catabridinese, From the Earliest Times to 1751* (4 vols.; Cambridge, 1922), i, p. 43.
[2] Venn & Venn, *Alumni Catabridinese*, i, 125.
[3] Joseph Foster, *Alumni Oronienses, The Members of the University of Oxford 1500-1713* (4 vols.; Oxford, 1891), i, p. 113.
[4] Venn & Venn, *Alumni Catabridinese*, i, p. 185; Foster, *Alumni Oronienses*, i, p. 153.
[5] Foster, *Alumni Oronienses*, i, p. 169.
[6] Foster, *Alumni Oronienses*, i, p. 196.
[7] Venn & Venn, *Alumni Catabridinese*, i, p. 253.
[8] Venn & Venn, *Alumni Catabridinese* i, p. 293.
[9] Venn & Venn, *Alumni Catabridinese*, i, p. 322.

Richard Fanshawe
Jesus College Cambridge, B.A. 1623.[11]

Thomas Glover
University College Oxford, B.A. 1600.[12]

George Goring
Sidney College Cambridge, B.A. 1600.[13]

John Harrison
Possibly B.A. Trinity College Cambridge 1607-8.[14] Also may have been B.A. The Queen's College Oxford B.A. 1603.[15]

Thomas Henshaw
The Queen's College Oxford B.A. 1657, M.A. 1661, incorporated Cambridge University 1664. Fellow of All Souls College Oxford 1662.[16]

Arthur Hopton
Lincoln College Oxford B.A. 1607.[17]

Thomas Lorkin
Emmanuel College Cambridge, B.A. 1600-1, M.A. 1604. Incorporated Oxford 1605[18]

Philip Meadow
Emmanuel College Cambridge, B.A. 1645-6, M.A. Queen's College Cambridge 1649, Fellow of Queens College Cambridge.[19]

Rogers Meredith
Trinity Hall Cambridge, B.A. 1658, M.A. 1662, Fellow 1662.[20]

Walter Montagu
Sidney Cambridge, B.A. 1623 (though this is uncertain) M.A. 1627.[21]

Albertus Morton
King's College Cambridge, B.A. 1606-7, B.A. 1610, Fellow 1605-18.[22]

Peter Morton
Christ's College Cambridge, B.A. 1622.[23]

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[10] Foster, *Alumni Oronienses*, i, p. 397.
[11] Venn & Venn, *Alumni Catabridinese*, ii, p. 120; A. Wood, *Fasti* (2 vols.; London, 1721), ii, 75.
[12] Foster, *Alumni Oronienses,* ii, p. 572.
[13] Venn & Venn, *Alumni Catabridinese*, ii, p. 241.
[14] Venn & Venn, *Alumni Catabridinese*, ii, p. 315.
[15] Foster, *Alumni Oronienses,* ii, p. 661.
[16] Foster, *Alumni Oronienses,* ii, p. 694; Venn & Venn, *Alumni Catabridinese*, i, p. 355.
[17] Foster, *Alumni Oronienses,* ii, p. 744.
[18] Venn & Venn, *Alumni Catabridinese*, iii, p. 106.
[19] Venn & Venn, *Alumni Catabridinese*, iii, p. 171.
[20] Venn & Venn, *Alumni Catabridinese*, iii, p. 176.
[21] Venn & Venn, *Alumni Catabridinese*, iii, p. 202.
[22] Venn & Venn, *Alumni Catabridinese*, iii, p. 217.

Francis Nethersole
Trinity Cambridge, B.A. 1606-7, M.A 1610, Fellow 1608, Public Orator 1611-9[24]

Francis Parry
Possibly Francis Parry Corpus Christi College B.A.1657, M.A. 1660.[25]

John Pell
Trinity Cambridge, B.A. 1629-30, M.A. 1630 (uncertain). Incorporated Oxford 1631, D.D. (Lambeth) 1663.[26]

John Robinson
Brasenose College Oxford B.A. 1673, Fellow of Oriel College Oxford 1675-86, M.A. 1683-4, D.D Lambeth 1696.[27]

Gilbert Talbot
Christ Church Oxford B.A. 1624, M.A. Lincoln College 1628, Fellow All Souls College 1629.[28]

John Taylor
Possibly John Taylor Magdalen Cambridge BA 1630 or of Peterhouse B.A 1625-6.[29]

William Trumbull
Magdalen College Oxford B.A. 1625, M.A. 1627.[30]

Isaac Wake
Christ Church Oxford B.A. 1597, Fellow of Merton College 1598, M.A. Merton College 1602-3, Public Orator 1604-1611.[31]

Thomas Wilson
St John's Cambridge, B.A 1583-4, M.A. Trinity Hall Cambridge 1587.[32]

Ralph Winwood
Magdalen College Oxford, B.A. 1582, Fellow 1582-1601, M.A. 1587, Proctor 1592[33]

Peter Wyche
Trinity Hall Cambridge, B.A. 1644-5, M.A. 1648, incorporated Oxford 1663.[34]

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[23] Venn & Venn, *Alumni Catabridinese*, iii, p. 218.
[24] Venn & Venn, *Alumni Catabridinese*, iii, p. 242.
[25] Foster, *Alumni Oronienses,* iii, p. 1120.
[26] Venn & Venn, *Alumni Catabridinese*, iii, p. 337; Foster, *Alumni Oronienses,* iii, p. 1139.
[27] Foster, *Alumni Oronienses,* iii, p. 1268.
[28] Foster, *Alumni Oronienses,* iv, p. 1453.
[29] Venn & Venn, *Alumni Catabridinese*, iv, p. 206.
[30] Foster, *Alumni Oronienses,* iv, p. 1514.
[31] Foster, *Alumni Oronienses,* iv, p. 1554; Venn & Venn, *Alumni Catabridinese*, ii, p 539.
[32] Venn & Venn, *Alumni Catabridinese*, iv, p. 432.
[33] Foster, *Alumni Oronienses,* iv, 1662; Fasti, i, p. 221.
[34] Venn & Venn, *Alumni Catabridinese*, iv, p. 481.

# Appendix II Diplomatic Employment of Agents.

Note: Diplomats often visited other Courts located near to the State in which they were acredited; these missions are not included in the appendix.

Robert Anstruther (Sir)
April 1611 – April 1613, Agent, Denmark
February 1615 - -May 1615, Special Ambassador, Denmark
March 1620 – September 1620, Ambassador, Denmark
January 1621 – July 1621, Agent, Denmark
December 1623 – April 1623, Resident Ambassador, Denmark
March 1625 – April 1635, Ambassador Ordinary, Denmark
March 1625 – April 1635, Ambassador Ordinary, The Hanse Towns
June 1630 – December 1630, Ambassador Extraordinary, Emperor and Imperial Diet
March 1631 – December 1632, Ambassador Extraordinary, Emperor and Imperial Diet
December 1632 – July 1633, Ambassador Extraordinary, Emperor and Imperial Diet
December 1632 – February 1633, Ambassador Extraordinary, Low Countries
December 1632 – February 1633, Ambassador Extraordinary, Low Countries
April 1634 – September 1634 Ambassador Extraordinary, Emperor and Imperial Diet

Anthony Ascham
January 1650 – May 1650, Agent, Spain.

Réné Augier
February 1629 – July 1640, Agent, France (Also served as Secretary to Ambassador Extraordinary Robert Sidney, 2nd earl of Leicester)
October 1644 – March 1651, Agent, France
December 1655 – May 1656, Agent, France
January 1656 – summer 1656, Agent, France

Joseph Avery
March 1625 – April 1635, Secretary to Sir Robert Anstruther, Denmark and The Hanse Towns
September 1631 – 1649, Agent, The Hanse Towns
August 1660 – 1663, Agent, The Hanse Towns

William Beecher
May 1605 – October 1609, Secretary to Sir George Carew**,** Resident Ambassador, France
October 1609 – May 1610, Agent, France
June 1614- November 1617, Secretary to John Merrick, Ambassador Extraordinary, Russia
October 1617 – Jan 1619, Agent, France
February 1622 – November 1622, Secretary to Arthur Chichester, Ambassador Extraordinary, German States
November 1624 – March 1625, Agent, German States

John Berkeley (1st Baron of Berkeley of Stratton)

January 1637 – July 1637, Agent, Sweden
October 1675 – October 1676, Ambassador Extraordinary, France
December 1675 – August 1678, Plenipotentiary, Congress of Nijmegen

William Blathwayt (Sir)
July 1668- October 1670, Secretary to William Temple, Ambassador Extraordinary, Low Countries
February 1670 – September 1672, Secretary to John Werden, Envoy Extraordinary, Sweden
June 1671 – January 1672, Agent, Low Countries
February 1672 – December 1672, Secretary to Charles Stuart, duke of Richmond Ambassador Extraordinary, Denmark

William Boswell (Sir)
February 1624 – June 1625, Secretary to James Hay, earl of Carlisle, Ambassador Extraordinary, France
January 1628 – January 1629, Secretary to James Hay, earl of Carlisle, Ambassador Extraordinary, France
January 1628 – January 1629, Secretary to James Hay, earl of Carlisle, Ambassador Extraordinary, Low Countries
January 1628 – January 1629, Secretary to James Hay, earl of Carlisle, Ambassador Extraordinary, Savoy
January 1628 – January 1629, Secretary to James Hay, earl of Carlisle, Ambassador Extraordinary, Switzerland
January 1628 – January 1629, Secretary to James Hay, earl of Carlisle, Ambassador Extraordinary, Venice
January 1631 – June 1641, Agent, Low Countries

Richard Bradshaw
January 1650 – August 1658, Agent, The Hanse Towns
November 1652 – February 1653, Agent, Denmark
April 1657 – Autumn 1657, Special Ambassador, Russia

Michael Branthwaite
June 1620 – December 1623, Secretary to Sir Henry Wotton, Resident Ambassador, Venice
September 1623 – April 1625, Agent Venice

John Brisbane
October 1674 – February 1675, Agent, North Africa (Algeria)
September 1676 – July 1678, Secretary to Ralph Montagu, Ambassador Extraordinary, France
September 1676 – July 1679, Agent, France

Richard Browne (Sir)
November 1624 – March 1631, Secretary to Sir Isaac Wake, Ambassador Ordinary, Venice
March 1631 – May 1632, Secretary to Sir Isaac Wake, Ambassador Ordinary, France
July 1641 – December 1650, Agent, France

William Bruce (Doctor)
April 1604 – March 1610, Agent, Poland

Richard Bulstrode (Sir)
July 1674 – June 1684, Agent, Spanish Netherlands
July 1684 – June 1689, Resident Ambassador, Spanish Netherlands

Dudley Carleton
December 1615 – December 1625, Secretary to Dudley Carleton, Viscount Dorchester, Resident Ambassador, Low Countries
December 1625 – November 1632, Agent, Low Countries
November 1626 – June 1628, Secretary to Dudley Carleton, Viscount Dorchester Resident Ambassador, Low Countries

John Chapman
September 1621 – February 1622, Agent, Turkey

Christopher Cocks
April 1623 – October 1624, Agent, Russia

Francis Cottington (Baron Cottington of Hanworth)
January 1605 – October 1609, Secretary to Charles Conrwallis, Resident Ambassador, Spain
October 1609 – August 1611, Agent, Spain
December 1615 – October 1622, Agent, Spain
July 1629 – March 1631, Ambassador Extraordinary, Spain

William Curtius (Sir, Bart)
May 1631 – November 1632, Secretary to Henry Vane, Ambassador Extraordinary, Sweden
October 1632 – December 1633, Agent, Sweden
September 1639-1658, Agent, German States
August 1664 – September 1677, Resident Ambassador, German States (Frankfurt)

Henry De Vic (Sir, Bart)
May 1629 – March 1630, Secretary to Thomas Edmondes, Ambassador Extraordinary, France
January 1630 – 21 October 1636, Agent, France
January 1637 – June 1638, Agent, Denmark
August 1641 – March 1661, Agent, Spanish Netherlands

Thomas Dereham (Sir)
November 1672 – September 1681, Secretary to John Finch, Resident Ambassador, Turkey
September 1681 – February 1685, Resident Envoy, Italian States
March 1687 – June 1689, Agent, Italian States

John Dickenson
June 1607 – June 1609, Secretary to Ralph Winwood and Richard Spencer, Commissioners, Low Countries

June 1609 – September 1609, Agent, Low Countries
June 1609 – November 1610, Secretary to Ralph Winwood, Resident Ambassador, Low Countries
November 1610 – January 1615, Agent, German States
July 1615 – January 1616, Special Ambassador, Poland

Simon Digby
October 1610 – July 1616, Secretary to John Digby, earl of Bristol, Resident Ambassador, Spain
May 1617 – May 1618, Secretary to John Digby, earl of Bristol, Ambassador Extraordinary, Spain
May 1621 – November 1621, Secretary to John Digby, earl of Bristol, Ambassador Extraordinary, Emperor & Imperial Diet
May 1621 – December 1622, Resident Ambassador, Emperor & Imperial Diet
February 1622 – April 1624. Secretary to John Digby, earl of Bristol, Ambassador Extraordinary, Spain
April 1635 – c. 1640, Agent, Russia

Isaak Ewers
September 1657 – March 1658, Secretary to Phillip Meadow, Ambassador Extraordinary, Denmark
March 1658 – 1659, Agent, Denmark

Richard Fanshawe (Sir, 1st Bart)
December 1634 – July 1638, Secretary to Walter Aston, Ambassador Ordinary, Spain
April 1638 – June 1638, Agent, Spain
December 1659 – June 1660, Secretary to George Digby, 2nd earl of Bristol, Special Ambassador, Spain
August 1661 – January 1662, Envoy Extraordinary, Portugal
February 1662 – September 1663, Ambassador Extraordinary, Portugal
December 1663 – June 1666, Resident Ambassador, Spain

George Fisher
May 1650 – September 1651, Agent, Spain

Oliver Fleming (Sir)
March 1629 – December 1641, Agent, Switzerland

George Gage
May 1621 – August 1622, Agent, Italian States
September 1622 – August 1623, Agent, Italian States
October 1622 – August 1623, Special Ambassador, Spain

Sir Balthazar Gerbier (Sir)
January 1631 – April 1641, Agent, Spanish Netherlands

Thomas Glover
November 1606 – January 1613, Agent, Turkey

Francis Gordon
July 1626 – December 1641, Agent, The Hanse Towns
July 1626 – December 1641, Agent, Poland
January 1627, Special Ambassador, Denmark

Patrick Gordon
May 1610 – December 1621, Agent, Poland

George Goring (Baron Goring, earl of Norwich)
September 1624 – October 1624, Agent, France
January 1625 – April 1625, Agent, France
August 1643 – November 1644, Ambassador Extraordinary, France

Anthony Hales
December 1614 – November 1624, Secretary to Isaac Wage, Agent, Savoy
November 1624 – March 1631, Secretary to Isaac Wake, Ambassador Ordinary, Venice
November 1624 – April 1635, Agent, Savoy
October 1628 – March 1631, Secretary to Isaac Wake, Resident Ambassador, Savoy

John Harrison
September 1625 – June 1626, Agent, North Africa (Barbary States)
September 1626 – September 1630, Agent, North Africa (Barbary States)

John Hawkins
December 1625 – April 1626, Secretary to Henry Rich, earl of Holland, and Dudley Carleton, Viscount Dorchester, Ambassadors Extraordinary, France
May 1626 – May 1627, Agent, France

Thomas Henshaw (Doctor)
February 1672 – December 1672, Secretary to Charles Stuart, duke of Richmond, Ambassador Extraordinary, Denmark
December 1672 – January 1673, Agent, Denmark

Johann Hogius (Doctor)
February 1686, Agent, German States (Cologne)

Arthur Hopton (Sir)
December 1630 – April 1636, Agent, Spain
March 1638 – December 1645, Ambassador Ordinary, Spain

Joseph Kent
January 1659 – March 1664, Agent, Italian States (Florence)

William Kerr (3rd earl of Lothian)
January 1642 – September 1643, Agent, France

Peter Levet
June 1679 – December 1682, Secretary to Henry Goodricke, Envoy Extraordinary, Spain

December 1682 – November 1685, Agent, Spain

William Lewis (Bart)
March 1626 – September 1626, Agent, France
December 1626 – March 1627, Agent, France

John Litcott (Sir)
January 1686 – August 1687, Secretary to Roger Palmer, earl of Castlemaine, Ambassador Extraordinary, Italian States
February 1687 – October 1688, Agent, Italian State

Thomas Lorkin
January 1624 – June 1625, Secretary to Henry Rich, earl of Holland, Ambassador Extraordinary, France
February 1624 – June 1625, Secretary to James Hay, earl of Carlisle, Ambassador Extraordinary, France
June 1625 – September 1625, Agent, France

Philip Meadow (Sir)
February 1656 – November 1656, Agent, Portugal
September 1657 – October 1659, Ambassador Extraordinary, Denmark
September 1657 – October 1659, Ambassador Extraordinary, Sweden

Rogers Meredith
May 1674 – May 1678, Secretary to William Temple, Ambassador Extraordinary, Low Countires
May 1678 – October 1679, Agent, Low Countries

Ralph Montagu (1st duke of Montagu)
October 1662 – February 1663, Agent, France
January 1669 – May 1672, Ambassador Extraordinary, France
September 1676 – July 1678, Ambassador Extraordinary, France

Walter Montagu
August 1626 – September 1626, Special Ambassador, France
March 1627 – April 1628, Agent, Savoy
March 1627 – April 1628, Special Ambassador, France
October 1628, Special Ambassador, France
June 1630 – July 1630, Special Ambassador, France
October 1630 – January 1631, Special Ambassador, France
March 1631 – April 1631, Special Ambassador, France

Gregorio Monti
April 1610 – November 1615, Secretary to Dudley Carleton, Viscount Dorchester, Resident Ambassador, Venice
October 1615 – August 1619, Secretary to Sir Henry Wooten, Ambassador Ordinary, Venice
April 1619 – March 1621, Agent, Venice

Hugh Morrell

April 1651, Agent, France

Albertus Morton (Sir)
December b 1603 – March 1611, Secretary to Sir Henry Wooton, Resident Ambassador, Venice
July 1613 – June 1615, Agent, Savoy
October 1617 – March 1621, Agent, German States (Princes of the Protestant Union)
May 1625 – August 1625, Ambassador Extraordinary, Low Countries

Peter Morton
February 1635 – January 1642, Agent, Savoy
February 1637 – January 1639, Secretary to Basil Fielding, Ambassador Extraordinary, Savoy

Francis Nethersole (Sir)
April 1619 – August 1619, Secretary to James Hay, earl of Carlisle, Ambassador Extraordinary, Emperor & Imperial Diet
September 1619 – June 1633, Agent, German States (Princes of the Protestant Union)

John Newman
1671 – August 1672, Secretary to Daniel Harvery, Resident Ambassador, Turkey
August 1671 – March 1674, Agent, Turkey

William Parkhurst
December b 1603 – March 1611, Secretary to Sir Henry Wotton, Resident Ambassador, Venice
June 1612 – January 1615, Agent, Savoy

Francis Parry
December 1665 – February 1668, Secretary to Francis Parry, Resident Ambassador, Portugal
November 1666 – February 1667, Secretary to Peter Wyche, Special Ambassador, Portugal
May 1668 – August 1669, Secretary to Robert Southwell, Ambassador Extraordinary, Portugal
June 1669 – November 1680, Agent (later Resident Ambassador), Portugal

John Pell
March 1654 – August 1658, Agent, Switzerland

William Perwich
January 1669 – May 1672, Secretary to Ralph Montagu, Ambassador Extraordinary, France
May 1672 – September 1677, Agent, France

Réné Petit
October 1644 – March 1651, Secretary to Réné Augier, Agent, France
March 1651 – January 1655, Agent, France
October 1662 – February 1663, Secretary to Ralph Montagu, Agent, France

July 1670 – September 1670, Secretary to George Villers, 2nd duke of Buckingham, Ambassador Extraordinary, France
May 1673 – May 1674, Secretary to Leoline Jenkins and Joseph Williamson, Plenipotentiaries, Congress of Cologne
December 1675 – January 1681, Secretary to Bevil Skelton, Envoy Extraordinary, Emperor and Diet

Thomas Plott
March 1678 – December 1678, Agent, Italian States (Florence)
February 1681 – February 1682, Agent, Low Countries

John Robinson (Doctor, Bishop of Bristol)
January 1678 – December 1679, Secretary to Edward Wood, Envoy Extraordinary, Sweden
August 1679 – September 1680, Agent, Sweden
June 1680 – March 1683, Secretary to Philip Warwick, Envoy Extraordinary, Sweden
February 1683 – October 1687, Agent, Sweden
July 1689 – September 1707, Sweden variously[35]
Agent, 1692 - 1696
Minister Resident, 1696 - 1702
Envoy Extraordinary, 1702 – 1709
January 1703 – September 1707, Envoy Extraordinary, Poland[36]

Thomas Rowlandson
December 1614 – November 1624, Secretary to Isaac Wake, Agent, Savoy
January 1628 – January 1629, Secretary to James Hay, earl of Carlisle, Ambassador Extraordinary, Low Countries
January 1628 – January 1629, Secretary to James Hay, earl of Carlisle, Ambassador Extraordinary, Savoy
January 1628 – January 1629, Secretary to James Hay, earl of Carlisle, Ambassador Extraordinary, Venice
January 1629 – March 1631, Secretary to Isaac Wake, Ambassador Ordinary, Venice
November 1629 – May 1636, Agent, Venice

George Shuttleworth
September 1666 – January 1669, Secretary to Thomas Thynne, Ambassador Extraordinary, Sweden
May 1666 – January 1670, Agent, Sweden

Fabian Smith
1626 – 1632, Agent, Russia

Richard Swift
April 1635 – c 1640, Agent, Russia

Gilbert Talbot (Sir)

[35] D. B. Horn, *British Diplomatic Representatives 1689 – 1789* (London, 1932), p. 139.
[36] Horn, *British Diplomatic Representatives* , p. 87.

September 1634 – May 1639, Secretary to Basil Fielding, Ambassador Extraordinary, Venice
February 1638 – January 1639, Agent, Venice
April 1639 – June 1644, Agent, Venice
January 1645 – June 1645, Resident Ambassador, Venice
July 1664 – April 1666, Envoy Extraordinary, Denmark

John Taylor
July 1634 – May 1635, Agent, Spain
August 1635 – May 1639, Agent, Emperor and Diet
January 1636 – December 1636, Secretary to Thomas Howard, 2nd earl of Arundel, Emperor and Diet

Peter Thelwall
1646 – 1651, Agent, Spanish Netherlands

John Trevor
February 1663 – April 1663, Agent, France
February 1668 – June 1688, Envoy Extraordinary, France

William Trumbull (Sir)
November 1604 – September 1609, Secretary to Thomas Edmondes, Resident Ambassador, Spanish Netherlands
August 1609 – November 1625, Agent (later Resident Ambassador), Spanish Netherlands

Charles Vane
January 1650 – July 1650, Agent, Portugal

Isaac Wake (Sir)
April 1610 – October 1615, Secretary to Dudley Carelton, Viscount Dorchester, Resident Ambassador, Venice
October 1614 – December 1614, Agent, Venice
October 1614 – October 1615, Secretary to Dudley Carelton, Viscount Dorchester, Resident Ambassador, Savoy
December 1614 – November 1624, Agent, Savoy
November 1624 – 1 March 1631, Agent, Venice
October 1628 – March 1631, Resident Ambassador, Savoy
March 1631 – May 1632, Ambassador Ordinary, France

Thomas Warren
July 1665 – June 1666, Agent, North Africa (Morocco)
June 1669 – October 1670, Secretary to Henry Howard, duke of Norfolk, North Africa (Morocco)

John Werden (1st Bart)
September 1657 – October 1659, Secretary to Phillip Meadow, Ambassador Extraordinary, Sweden
February 1666 – October 1668, Secretary to Edward Montagu, earl of Sandwich, Ambassador Extraordinary, France

July 1668 – June 16669, Agent, France
February 1670 – September 1672, Envoy Extraordinary, Sweden

Ignatius White
June 1677 – October 1677, Agent, Spain
November 1686 – February 1689, Envoy Extraordinary, Low Countries

John Wilkinson
November 1624 – March 1631, Secretary to Isaac Wake, Ambassador Ordinary, Venice
August 1625 – September 1626. Agent, Venice

Thomas Wilson
January 1605 – July 1605, Agent, Spain

Ralph Winwood
February 1599 – July 1601, Secretary to Henry Neville, Resident Ambassador, France
May 1600 – February 1603, Agent, France
April 1603 – June 1607, Agent, Low Countries
June 1607 – June 1609, Commissioner, Low Countries
June 1609 – September 1613, Resident Ambassador, Low Countries
June 1610 – November 1610, Special Ambassador, German States
March 1612 – May 1612, Special Ambassador, German States

Peter Wyche (Sir)
March 1625 – April 1626, Agent, Spain
March 1627 – September 1639, Resident Ambassador, Turkey

Thomas Wyche
January 1633 – December 1633, Agent, Russia
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