Thomas Buckingham

a critical edition with commentary

of the First Question

of the Questiones super Sententias

by

Arthur R. Lee

Oriel College

Being an abstract of a thesis presented in the

University of Oxford for the

Degree of Bachelor of Letters

in

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ERRATA

P. 17, n. 28, line 2: for "when" read "on 28 September in which year".

P. 36, lines 1-4: change to read:

> "John by divine compassion Bishop of Exeter, to beloved sons in Christ masters Thomas of Bokyngham, Chancellor, and Hugh of Setone, our Official Principal of our Exeter ⟨church⟩ , and Benedict of Pastone...salutations, grace, and blessing."[73]

P. 36, n. 73: change to read:

73. "Johannes miseracione divina Exoniensis Episcopus, dilectis in christo filiis magistris Thome de Bokyngham cancellario et Hugoni de Setone officiali nostro principali ⟨ecclesie*⟩ nostre Exoniensis, ac Benedicto de Pastone collegiate ⟨sic⟩ Sancti Probi in Cornubia ecclesiarum Canonicis, salutem graciam et benediccionem." (*suggested by the Revd. H. E. J Cowdrey) Ms. Reg. Grandisson; Vol. I; f. 147^{v}. Substantially printed in Hingeston-Randolph; op. cit.; Vol. II, p. 1023. Mentioned in Emden; Biographical Register... Oxford...; Vol. I, p. 298.

P. 114, n. 75; add:

> Ockham, in fact, denies that any choice can be totally free: "nullus actus sit totaliter in potestate nostra"; Quodlibeta, III; q. xvi; Strasburg; 1491; f. C.6^{vb}.

P. 132, above footnote 3, add footnote 2:

> 2. Buckingham; Questiones super Sententias; Q. I, C. I, ll. 124 ff.

P. 352, "Maritain, J."; add to line 2:

> This is incorporated in De Bergson à Thomas d'Aquin; New York; 1944; as Chapter VII: 'Saint Thomas d'Aquin et le problème du mal.'

I. A Thomas of Buckingham was an Oxford theologian of some importance who flourished in the second quarter of the Fourteenth Century. Born ca. 1304-5, he first appears in the records of Merton College in 1324. He probably incepted as a Master in the Arts faculty ca. 1325. He unsuccessfully attempted to gain preferment in 1331, and most likely entered the Theology faculty shortly thereafter, perhaps in 1332. It is probable that he read the Sentences in 1339-40. He became rector of Deene, Northamptonshire, in 1340 and was twice licensed to absent himself for a year's study: once in 1340 and again in 1342. It is probable that he became D. D. in 1344. In March, 1346, he became Chancellor of Exeter Cathedral. His chancellorship appears to have had a markedly academic flavour. He died in June (?), 1349, at about the time the Plague struck Exeter.

I. B Two works can be firmly assigned to Buckingham. The first is the fruit of his lectures on the Sentences, the Questiones super Sententias, which was published ca. 1344. This comprises some six topic questions on materials from the first two books of Lombard's Sentences, and includes the discussion of a large number of conclusions and dubia. The second work is the Questiones Theologice, which was published, possibly posthumously, some time after 1346. This has the same structure: a few topic questions and many conclusions. The materials treated are much the same as those in the earlier work. His

authorship of a tractatus de infinito has been advanced, but appears to be quite unlikely. He has also been credited with a commentary on Book I of the Sentences which is almost certainly not his. There also exist a question solved by means of Buckingham's conclusions and the record of a Parisian debate in which his arguments on free will were opposed to those of Thomas Bradwardine.

II. A Question I of Buckingham's Questiones super Sententias is: "Whether to delight in God is the highest reward of any blessed creature?" This is discussed under eight conclusions, the first two of which are treated here. These are that: 1) Only the privation of good is of itself evil; and 2) Every privation of something which ought to inhere is as evil as is good that which it, of itself and essentially, takes away, if it were good. The next five conclusions treat the nature of evil, and the last conclusion returns to the topic question. The first conclusion, a mediaeval commonplace derived from Augustine's polemic against Manichaeism, is argued largely from authority, although the arguments, objections, and responses are of some importance. The second conclusion builds on the authority of the first to establish a principle of moral parity, according to which a strict relation is asserted between good and evil. The primary objection to this, that God punishes various amounts of mortal sin with one penalty: the privation of the beatific

vision, is met with reasons taken principally from William of Auxerre.

II. B Buckingham draws on a wide range of sources in these two conclusions. Augustine is the most important authority in the first, since it was through his arguments against Manichaean dualism that the principle that "evil is only the privation of good" became established in Christian theology. William of Auxerre dominates the second, since he is the primary authority for the arguments in the solution, and since the basic objection is derived from his Summa. Other authorities include Anselm, Peter Lombard, St. Thomas, and Duns Scotus. The influence, on Buckingham, of Ockham, Robert Holkot (from whom he took some arguments), and Thomas Bradwardine is considered.

II. C Buckingham appears to be attempting to assert the existence of standards of moral value which are neither contingent upon the possible vagaries of God's free will (as in some of the modernist school), nor are subsumed under the 'moral imperative' of obedience to God's overwhelming grace (as in Bradwardine's determinism). He thus attempts to assert a natural standard of good and evil. The principle of moral parity is an aspect of this - quite as much as is the principle that evil is the privation of good - for it is through this that degrees of

worth may be established and - thus - that choices may be properly made. God's punishment of sin is taken as a test of the validity of this principle, for both original sin and the greatest mortal sin receive the same loss of the beatific vision, and thus apparently illustrate a lack of relationship between good and evil. Buckingham argues that there are two sorts of punishment: poena sensus and poena damni, the former of which is proportionate and so corresponds to 'justice', and the latter of which is absolute, but involves no actual affliction, being only the loss of a possible state. While the latter has no relation to justice, per se, the former sees the exercise of the necessary strict, privative relation of evil to good.

III. A The sources for the text of Buckingham's Questiones super Sententias are some twelve manuscripts and one printed edition (Paris; 1505). The sources all show a considerable degree of contamination. They do, however, divide into three tightly-knit primary groups which are amenable to analysis, so some rationalisation of variants is possible. It is quite clear that there are no strictly apographic relationships among the sources, although there is one instance where a manuscript may have been one of another's sources. Since the relations among the sources are highly contaminate, argument to the archetype must follow a number of flexible approaches.

III. B The text of Question I, Conclusions I and II, of Buckingham's Questiones super Sententias is preceeded by a table of symbols and followed by an index of Buckingham's sources.

IV The Appendices include a transcript of a Merton College 'scrutinium', edited texts of two short passages from other parts of the Questiones super Sententias, tables of manuscript agreements, and a survey of manuscript forms of the names of the exemplificative characters 'Socrates' and 'Plato'.

V Bibliography

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Preface

The Fourteenth Century is no longer terra incognita, but neither does it suffer from so much contemporary exploration as to make its study an impersonal matter of following well-blazed trails. Because of this, one's debt to those who have guided, led, and given encouragement along the way is both a constant source of gratitude and a very real pleasure to acknowledge.

Some debts have waited long for recognition: it is a pleasure to thank John Gardner for having initiated my interest in the middle ages; Dr. S. M. Garrett for having encouraged an interest in Church History; Dr. Massey H. Shepherd, Jr., for having demonstrated the possibilities of scholarship; and Sherman and Jean Johnson for having shown me the greatness of the fusion of love and learning.

Ripon Hall and its Principal, the Revd. A. O. Dyson, showed me great kindness and, in the initial stages, made this work possible. The Community at the Dominican Convent of Blackfriars, in Oxford, generously gave me study space at a time when it was needed.

Many particular courtesies and kindnesses have been received from archivists and librarians, notably from Mrs. A. M. Erskine, in Exeter; Mr. M. G. Dickinson, at the Devon Record Office; Judith A. Cripps, in Lincoln; Mr. J. Ghyssaert, in Bruges; Dr. Gerard

Achten, in Berlin; Dr. Eva Irblich, in Vienna, The consideration and patience shown me by the staff of the Bodleian Library has been exceeded only by that shown by Mr. J.B. Burgass and Dr. J.R.L. Highfield at Merton College.

To Dr. Lorenzo Minio-Paluello and to Dr. R.J.A.I. Catto, both of Oriel College, I owe thanks for their timely advice and guidance.

Dr. R.W. Hunt has been Virgil to my Dante in his supervision of my progress through the thesis: it is through his vigilance and patience that my foot has not slipped more often or more seriously. For this, and for his having helped me to see beyond the immediate complexities of the work, I offer grateful thanks.

My parents have given their interest and support; my wife has added to this a quite remarkable patience: their gifts - being gifts of love - are beyond measure: to them, my humblest thanks.

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I

Thomas of Buckingham

Life and Works

A.

Thomas of Buckingham

Rather more information is currently available about the life and works of Thomas of Buckingham than there was only a few decades ago, when L'Abbé A. de Poorter, describing a manuscript containing Buckingham's Questiones super Sententias, was limited to saying:

> "Bockingham is the author of the second piece: the questions reproduced in folios 45 to 79 belong to his Commentary on the Sentences of which there exists one specimen at Florence (Laurenz.) and another at Paris (Bibl. nat.). We owe this information to the kindness of R.P. Pelster, S.J., who promises us more ample information about Bockingham."[1]

That it is now possible to write a reasonably full biography - albeit one subject to certain limitations - is due to the considerable work of Michalski, Chenu, Emden, Pantin, Robson and Weisheipl, among others.[2] They have brought to light a body of materials for his life

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1. L'Abbé A. de Poorter; Un recueil peu connu de questions sur les Sentences; Revue Néoscolastique; Vol. XXXIII; 1931; pp. 487-8: "Bockingham est l'auteur du deuxième morceau: les questions reproduites aux folios 45 à 79 appartiennent à son Commentaire des Sentences dont il existe un exemplaire à Florence (Laurent.) et un autre à Paris (Bibl. nat.). Nous devons ce renseignement à l'obligeance du R.P. Pelster, S.J., qui nous promet de plus amples informations sur Bockingham."

2. The principal contributions include: Michalski, K.; Les courants philosophiques à Oxford et à Paris pendant le XIVe siècle, Bulletin international de l'académie polonaise des sciences et des lettres, classe hist. phil.; Cracow; 1922-4; pp. 59-88. Le Criticisme et le Scepticisme

(continued overleaf)

which may be regarded as exhaustive, at least insofar as all likely - and many unlikely - sources of information have been consulted. Some of these items have been published, but the majority are known only in brief references.

Since, in common with most of his mediaeval contemporaries, Thomas of Buckingham has left the modern biographer a fragmentary corpus of materials from which to reconstruct his life, it is the nature of the materials themselves which justifies further attempts at reconstruction. As Robson has said of the materials for the life of Wyclif:

> "...the certain and authoritative sources for these years are so few and so stark that they permit, and even encourage, an assessment de novo."[3]

What is true of Wyclif, who has not lacked biographers, is at least

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dans la Philosophie du XIV^e siècle; ibid.; 1927; pp. 41-122. Les Courants critiques et sceptiques dans la philosophie du XIV^e siècle; ibid.; 1927; pp. 192-244. Le Problème de la Volonté à Oxford et à Paris au XIV^e siècle; Studia Philosophica; Vol. II; Lemberg; 1936; pp. 233-365. Chenu, M.-D.; Les "Quaestiones" de Thomas de Buckingham; in "Studia medievalia...in honorem R.J. Martin"; Bruges; 1948; pp229-241. Emden, A.B.; A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500; 3 vols.; Oxford; 1957-9. Pantin, W.A.; The English Church in the Fourteenth Century; Cambridge; 1955. Robson, J.A.; Wyclif and the Oxford Schools; Cambridge University Press; 1966. Weisheipl, J.A.; Early Fourteenth-Century Physics and the Merton "School"; Ms. D. Phil.; Oxford; 1957. Repertorium Mertonense; Mediaeval Studies; Vol. XXXI; Toronto; 1969; pp. 174-224.

3. Robson, J.A.; op. cit.; p. 9.

equally true of Buckingham, for whose life the sources are even more limited and no less ambiguous, but who has received far less critical attention. But, if it is the fragmentary nature of the materials which prompts this enterprise, it follows that interpretation must be both careful and open; i.e. that a balanced assessment of the conclusions and inferences which may be drawn from the primary materials must be presented, with clear distinctions drawn between the information actually given and the conjectural links.

Nothing is known of Buckingham's origins, apart from the reasonable inference from his surname that he was born in, raised in, or came to Oxford from, the nearby town of Buckingham. Geographical surnames in the Middle Ages all but invariably followed either from nobility or from personal mobility, a mobility which was associated primarily with churchmen, academics, soldiers, and other professionals. Nobility is possible, in Buckingham's case, but there is no positive evidence and it is unnecessary: as a scholarly churchman, Buckingham naturally would have had a geographical surname.[4]

The earliest documentary reference to Thomas of Buckingham is contained in the Bursar's roll of Merton College for the first of the three Merton "quarters" of the year 1324: from the 31st of July

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4. In the list of fellows in Ms. Merton 1047 (ca. 1330-38), discussed below, pp. 23 - 24, and given in full in Appendix I, pp. 321-323, at least 41 of the 43 fellows have geographical surnames.

until the Friday after the 25th of November. In the main roll, compiled by William of Shelton, the Bursar for this first quarter, under the accounts of the weekly stewards, there is the entry:

> "Item Thomas of Buckingham steward in the week of St. Michael for commons and allowances with wine••xlix s. vj d.. by tally."[5]

College stewards were temporary officials appointed from among the fellows to pay the bills for the fellows' commons and the allowances of the poor scholars during the week in which they served, their expenses being reimbursed by the Bursar at the end of the week. It is clear from this entry in the Bursar's roll that Buckingham was a fellow of Merton College in 1324; from this, some approximate dates for his life and academic progress can be inferred, bearing in mind that they are necessarily termini ad quem.

The Merton statutes then operative (i.e. those of 1274) required all newly selected fellows to serve a probationary year prior to their admission to full fellowship.[6] Probationer fellows were admitted to positions of responsibility, however, so it is quite possible that this first quarter of the academic year 1324-5 marks Buckingham's admission to probationer status. In any case, it provides a terminus ad quem

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5. "Item Thome de Bukingham senescallus in septimana sancti mychalis pro communis et pitancia cum vino••xlix s. vj d.•per talliam." Merton College Ms. 3654. Mentioned in Emden; Biographical Register...Oxford...; Vol. I; p. 298.

6. Merton College Ms. 232, ll. 26-7. In Allen, P.S., and Garrod, H.W.; Merton Muniments; Oxford Historical Society; Clarendon Press; Oxford; 1928; p. 22.

for his admission to his fellowship.

As to the academic rank a scholar had to obtain as a precondition of admission to a Merton fellowship, the statutes are uninformative, but an entry in the Registrum Annalium Collegii Mertonensis in June, 1492, indicates later practice and may reflect earlier custom. Three elected candidates - described as baccallarii - had not yet determined; in consequence "...the Warden does not wish to admit them immediately to the probationary year"; accordingly, they were not admitted until they had determined.[7] From this, it seems clear that admission to the status of baccallarius was a necessary precondition of election to a Merton fellowship and that the successful completion of determination was a necessary precondition of actual admission to the probationary year of that fellowship. This lends support to Weisheipl's conclusion that a student "admitted to determine" by the four examining masters during the week preceeding Ash Wednesday became a bachelor as a

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7. "sed quoniam tres istorum nondum determinauerant, scilicet Flowr', Skarbryge & Tremayle, noluit eos custos immediate admittere ad annum probationis...." Salter, H. E.; Registrum Annalium Collegii Mertonensis 1483-1521; Oxford Historical Society; Clarendon Press; Oxford; 1923; pp. ix, 158-9, and 183. Interestingly, none of the bachelors elected to fellowship at that time was admitted to the list of fellows until two years later (in 1494) whereas a master elected the next day was admitted to the list after one year (in 1493), thus confirming the seriousness with which the distinction between probationer-fellows and full fellows was maintained.

result of their vote.[8] Further, it suggests that determination was a forty-day analogue to the two-year regency of a master and that - just as a master had to earn his title by lecturing as a master for two years - so a baccallarius had to earn his title by determining for forty days. Otherwise, like a defaulting master, he would forfeit his title and status.[9]

The latest date by which Buckingham could have been admitted to bachelor status would have been during the week preceeding Ash Wednesday, 1324, in which case he would have conducted his determinations through the subsequent Lent. He then would have been elected to his Merton fellowship shortly after Lent and would have been admitted to his probationary year sometime near the 31st of July, the beginning of the Merton "year". Among his duties may be counted this weekly stewardship, which he served in the week of the feast of St. Michael, from the 25th of September through Sunday, the 1st of October.[10] He

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8. Weisheipl, J.A.; Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century; Mediaeval Studies; Vol. 26; 1964; pp. 156-7 and note 45. See also Rashdall, Hastings; The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages; edd. Powicke, F.M., and Emden, A.B.; Oxford University Press; 1936; Vol. III; p. 143.

9. Weisheipl; ibid.; p. 165, where this general principle with regard to masters is well stated. See also Rashdall; ibid.; p. 141. Note that Salter; op. cit.; p. ix, refers to determination as conferring bachelorhood.

10. For lack of definite information, either for these years or for the Fourteenth Century in general, the times of year given for Buckingham's election to his Merton fellowship, admission to his probationary year, and admission to full fellowship are conjectures based upon the normal

(continued overleaf)

would have become a full fellow near the end of July, 1325.

It must be emphasised that these dates are necessarily termini ad quem: it is possible that the events outlined above should be dated a year or more earlier. The chronology given, however, does seem most probable and does accord well with what else is known of Buckingham's life and career.

From these probable dates for his admission to bachelor status and to his Merton fellowship, the dates of certain other events in his life and academic career may be inferred. First, since admission to bachelor status normally took place during the fifth year from the beginning of undergraduate studies,[11] Buckingham probably entered upon university studies in the autumn of 1319. Similarly, since students normally began their university studies when they were about fourteen

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(continuation)

practice of the following century. See Salter; op. cit.; passim; for examples. It should be noted that departures from these norms occurred with some frequency, particularly in times of crisis. The date of the beginning of the Merton year varied from year to year: in 1324 it came on the 31st of July.

11. Weisheipl, J. A.; Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts...; pp. 146, n. 7, and 156. Rashdall, H.; op. cit.; Vol. III; p. 153. The relevant statute can be found in Statuta Antiqua Universitatis Oxoniensis; ed. Gibson, S.; Oxford; 1931; p. 24, ll. 9-12: "ordinatum est quod nullus magistrorum quemquam ad lecturam alicuius libri facultatis arcium presentare presumat, nisi presentandus se artes ad minus per quadriennium audisse in scolis, ubi uiget eiusdem facultatis studium generale, proprio fermauerit iuramento:".

or fifteen years of age,[12] it follows that Buckingham probably was born ca. 1304-5. Unfortunately, failing records of his life prior to 1324, these rough estimates are probably the nearest we can approach accuracy.

Although it is a statement of the obvious, it must be emphasised that Buckingham's adult intellectual and social life centred on Oxford University and Merton College. Because the basic social bond was one of personal loyalty, men moved within spheres of patronage and obligation, or from sphere to sphere, and tended to maintain large patterns of relationship by repeating successful patterns of promotion. Thus, Richard de Bury "collected" Mertonians and Bishop Grandisson filled the chancellorship of Exeter Cathedral, when made vacant by Buckingham's death, by the promotion of another Mertonian. This ordering of society created close-knit circles of acquaintence whose members were bound by ties of common patronage, rather than by ties of shared ideas, and who thus knew each others' ideas well, yet felt little or no pressure to agree. Matters of theological doctrine were, perhaps, an exception, but orthodoxy was an obligation far above conformity to the views of any small circle. In consequence of this structuring of scholarly society, it is important to know the circles within which a scholar moved, not necessarily to know his sources of ideas, but in order to know the approaches which were common to the group,

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12. Weisheipl; ibid.; pp. 146-7. Rashdall; op. cit.; Vol. III, p. 196, n. 4. Salter; op. cit.; p. ix, n. 1.

the presuppositions which underlay styles and methods of argument, and in order to know the matters of general concern which became topics for discussion.

At the beginning of his academic career, as an undergraduate, Buckingham probably would have been resident in an academic hall and would have been enrolled under a master of arts in the university.[13] He has left two highly ambiguous references to men under whom he studied; the first, from the Questiones super Sententias, has been made more difficult by the omission of some material from the Paris edition of 1505 (omitted material underlined):

> "To the same. If in the aforesaid case the privation of grace would not then be a sin, now in fact and by the present dispensation there would not be sin in children, just as said my lord and master who began the next to the last section on original sin; and this was the opinion of the reverend doctor and, not long ago, chancellor."[14] (Q. VI, Art. III)

The second, from the Questiones Theologice, places Buckingham as

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13. Weisheipl; Curriculum...; pp. 145-7.

14. "Ad idem. Si in casu predicto privatio gratie non foret peccatum tunc, nunc de facto et lege currenti non esset peccatum parvulis, sicut dixit dominus meus et magister qui penultimo loco intravit de peccato originali; et fuit hec opinio reverendi doctoris et non diu est cancellarii." (Perez; f. m.ij^{rb}) Given with apparatus in Appendix II. It is unclear whether Buckingham is referring to one person or two. Further, the obvious interpretation of the omitted clause, that he "began the last section on original sin" does not appear to refer to Buckingham's text, which lacks obvious candidates. "Intravit" did have the technical sense of "entered upon a course of lectures in", but "who in the next to the last place entered upon a course of lectures on original sin" offers perhaps even less hope of a positive identification. For "intravit" see below, p. 29.

the student and disciple of a doctor against whom he argues that "no infinite is greater than another infinite of the same species...."[15]

Neither of these references appears to permit a positive identification. Using the Paris, 1505, edition, Michalski and, later, Robson have identified the "lord, master...doctor and chancellor" of the first passage with Richard FitzRalph, Chancellor of the University from May, 1332, through May, 1334. The identification is not unlikely, but - as Robson concedes - it is tenuous. Robson has identified the doctor of the second passage with Thomas Bradwardine, which is - again - not improbable, although perhaps a little startling in view of the later doctrinal conflicts between Buckingham and Bradwardine. It should be remembered, however, that Bradwardine became Chancellor of St. Paul's, London, in 1337: since the first reference is vague, either FitzRalph or Bradwardine could have been the subject of either passage.[16]

Quite independently of the normal pattern of arts lectures and exercises, Buckingham would have been exposed to a wide range of

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15. "Pro hiis et similibus argumentis doctori et domino reverendo, in scolis doctoris suus scolaris et discipulus, respondebam, et in legendo Sententias idem dixi, quod nullum infinitum est alio infinito eiusdem speciei maius..." Ms. New College 134, f. 364^{rb} and Ms. Merton College 143, f. 34^{rb}. Given in Robson; op. cit.; p. 45. The argument about infinites was a commonplace.

16. Michalski; Le Problème de la Volunté...; p. 250. Robson; op. cit.; pp. 41-2, for the first passage; ibid.; p. 45, for the second. For Bradwardine's Chancellorship, see Emden; Biographical Register...Oxford...; Vol. I, p. 245a.

topics and talents at open debates and disputations. Among the scholars he would have heard would surely have been William of Ockham. Indeed, since Ockham lectured on the Sentences ca. 1317-9, and continued to lecture and dispute until he was summoned to Avignon in 1324, Buckingham almost certainly was exposed to his views, both logical and theological, at first hand. This might well have made the venerable inceptor's summons to Avignon and subsequent difficulties an especially salutary lesson in the perils of imputed theological eccentricity to Buckingham, who is often alleged to have "tempered" his positions in the Questiones Theologice.

When Buckingham became a fellow of Merton College, he joined a community of scholars of great individual importance, now known collectively as the "Merton school", who must have influenced him profoundly. Dr. Weisheipl, in particular, has developed the study of these scholars as a group, especially in the arts faculty where their contributions to the development of logic and physics were particularly important.[17] They were also strong in theology, where Buckingham

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17. In addition to the works already cited, Weisheipl, J.A.; The Development of Physical Theory in the Middle Ages; Sheed and Ward; London; 1959; pp. 69-81, 87. Developments in the Arts Curriculum at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century; Mediaeval Studies; Vol. XXVIII; 1966; pp. 151-175 passim. Ockham and some Mertonians; Mediaeval Studies; Vol. XXX; 1968; pp. 163-213 passim. See also Maier, A.; Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert; Roma; 1949/66; pp. 3-4, 86-98. Crombie, A.C.; Medieval and Early Modern Science; 2nd. edn.; Oxford; 1959; Vol. II; pp. 89-90. et al.: a comprehensive bibliography would be prohibitively long.

was to make his own contribution: Richard of Campsale, John Maudith, Thomas Wilton and Thomas Bradwardine wrote theological works which have survived, while Walter Burley and several others may be presumed to have been active in theology and to have written lost works.[18] Common to the group was an interest in mathematics and the physical sciences, in logic and logical puzzles, and a tendency to apply geometric and mathematical methods (or such neo-mathematical ones as the "letter-calculus") to the solution of non-mathematical problems, all of which is found reflected in Buckingham's theological works.

A general confirmation of Buckingham's fellowship at Merton exists in the entry of his name in the Catalogus Vetus of Merton, a register compiled by one of the fellows, Thomas Robert, ca. 1395-1422. The entry merely records that Buckingham became a fellow temp. Edward II.[19]

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18. Weisheipl; Repertorium Mertonense; passim; Ockham and some Mertonians; passim. See also individual entries in Emden; Biographical Register...Oxford.... Among the artists should be noted also John Ashinden, Richard Billingham, Simon Bredon, William de Collingham, John Dumbleton, William de Estry, William Heytesbury, William Rede, Walter de Segrave, William de Sutton, Richard Swineshead and a certain Tewkesbury.

19. Thomas Robert; Catalogus Vetus; Merton College ms.; p. 4. For the Catalogus, see Allen and Garrod; op. cit.; p. 37. Robson; op. cit.; pp. 11-12. Emden; Biographical Register...Oxford...; Vol. I, pp. xiii and xxiv; Vol. III, p. 1579. Emden; ibid.; Vol. I, p. 298; has confused the entries of John and Thomas Buckingham in the Catalogus: Thomas is on p. 4, temp. Edward II; John is on p. 8, temp. Edward III.

The next reference to Buckingham occurs in the Bursar's roll for the third quarter of 1328, from the 25th March to the Sunday before the 25th July. This entry, also in the list of expenses of the weekly stewards, is:

> "Item allowance to Thomas of Bukingham • 7 • the week of the feast of the Ascension for commons of the fellows and allowances with wine. lxii. s. x. d. halfpenny. which pertains."[20]

Sometime in 1328 or later, Buckingham acquired an attractive copy of Peter Lombard's Book of Sentences. This volume, now Ms. Bodleian 335, was used as a caution for loans from the Vaughan chest in 1327 and 1328 by Robert and/or John Kynevelle (Kynebelle); at Buckingham's death it passed to Exeter Cathedral, which in 1602 presented it to the Bodleian Library.[21] The only indication of when Buckingham acquired the volume is the probability that it was before he began reading the Sentences, which narrows the limits to 1328-(1335-43), or more probably to 1328-1339.[22] Both John and Robert Kynevelle appear to

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20. "Item liberatum thome de bukingham • 7• septimana feste ascensionis pro communis sociorum et pitancia cum vino. lxii. s. x. d. obol. que pertinet." Merton College Ms. 3657. Mentioned in Emden; ibid.; Vol. I, p. 298.

21. The volume contains the notations "Liber magistri Thome de Buckyngham" and, f. 5^{v}, "Istum librum dedit (ecclesie Exoniensi Cathedrali, added) magister Thomas de Buckyngham quondam huius ecclesie Cancellarius." These and the cautions are given in Madan, F., and Craster, H. H. E.; A Summary Catalogue of Western Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library at Oxford...; Oxford; 1922; Vol. II; part I; p. 315. (S. C. number 2334.)

22. The dates for Buckingham's reading the Sentences are discussed below, pp. 22 - 23, & 29.

have been associated with Merton College, particularly Robert, whose career runs parallel to Buckingham's at many stages. He was perhaps three or four years Buckingham's senior, having become a fellow of Merton in 1321 (?); he was granted a living in the thirteenth (?) year of his fellowship and continued to study for several years - presumably living in town - although he appears not to have taken a higher degree. He escaped the Plague, and continued in his living until his death in 1361 (?). His fellowship at Merton would have overlapped Buckingham's by a period of 3-10 years, so they would have known each other and, incidentally, probably would have directly concluded the sale of this manuscript.[23]

In 1331, there is another reference to Buckingham in the Bursar's rolls. This records, in the roll of Adam of Tuysilton, Bursar for the first quarter (27 July - 19 October), under the heading "remunerationes sociorum":

"Item. bakigham. iiij s."[24]

While this merely confirms Buckingham's presence at Merton, another document from 26th September of the same year provides a great deal of useful information: this is a Papal reservation, made at

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23. For biographical notices of John and Robert Kynevelle (Kynebelle), see Emden; Biographical Register...Oxford...; Vol. II, p. 1070.

24. Merton College Ms. 3664. Mentioned in Emden; ibid.; Vol. I, p. 298.

the king's request, of a benefice in the gift of the abbot and convent of St. Alban's. The reservation refers to Buckingham as "master in arts", the earliest reference to his inception. The benefice to be given Buckingham is to be to the value of twenty marks with cure of souls or fifteen without. The bishops of Bath and Ardfert and Richard de Bury, canon of York, are sent a concurrent mandate, which effectively appoints them executores.[25]

This reservation is doubtless to be seen as one of those "exceptionally numerous" grants issued in the years shortly after 1327, perhaps especially in the few years after Edward III's accession in 1330, in an effort by king and pope to give each other support.[26] Since many of the grants at this time were made to the king's clerks,[27] it is not too surprising to find Richard de Bury named as one of the executores: although he is here referred to in his ecclesiastical

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25. The record of this reservation is found in Reg. Vat. 103, f. 366r. It is described in Bliss, W.H., and Johnson, C.; Calendar of Entries in the Papal Registers relating to Great Britain and Ireland: Papal Letters, 1198-1484; H.M.S.O.; London; 1895; Vol. II, 1305-1342; p. 365. Buckingham is saluted as "Dilecto filio Thome de Bokyngham clerico lincolniensi diocesi magistro in artibus..."; Reg. Vat. 103, f. 366r, l. 15.

26. Deeley, Ann; Papal Provision and Royal Rights of Patronage in the Early Fourteenth Century; The English Historical Review; Vol. LXIII, No. 172; 1928; p. 498.

27. Ibid.; p. 497. See also Highfield, J.R.L.; The Relations between the Church and the English Crown from the Death of Archbishop Stratford to the Opening of the Great Schism (1349-78); unpublished D. Phil. dissertation; Oxford; 1950; pp. 12 ff.

capacity, he was at the time keeper of the privy seal.[28] It seems probable that he acted on Buckingham's behalf, both in the initial petition to the Pope and in the processus which necessarily followed upon the issuance of the papal reservation.[29] There is no indication of any further relationship between Buckingham and any of the executores: Richard de Bury, Ralph of Shrewsbury (Bishop of Bath and Wells),[30] or either Nicholas or Alan o O-Ahern (Bishops of Ardfert, Ireland).[31] There is no evidence of either the course of the processus which followed upon the issuance of this reservation,[32] nor of the

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28. Richard de Bury was keeper of the privy seal from September, 1329, through February, 1334, when he became chancellor of England. Handbook of British Chronology; edd. Powicke, F.M., and Fryde, E.B.; R.H.S.; London; 2nd edn.; 1961; pp. 84 and 91.

29. There is no indication of any further dealings with the crown or with Richard de Bury.

30. Handbook of British Chronology; p. 206. Jones, B.; John Le Neve; Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae, 1300-1541; Vol. VIII, Bath and Wells; London; 1964; p. 1 (Ralph de Salopia).

31. Nicholas died ⊆. 1330; Alan was elected in 1331 but was not consecrated until 1336, when his claim was recognized. It is unclear whether the mandate is directed to Nicholas, in the unlikely event of his decease having not yet become known, or to Alan, who would not yet have been consecrated. Handbook of British Chronology; p. 323.

32. "A papal letter of grace providing to a benefice is not to be interpreted as a final administrative mandate ... but rather as a document initiating a processus which is to be carried to its legal termination by a group of executores, invariably the recipients of a mandate, concurrent with the provision, to inquire into the legal aspects of the grace and to discharge functions which are as much judicial as executive. In other words, the executors of a

(continued overleaf)

outcome of the deliberations of the executores,[33] but three factors point to a negative decision: first, there is no evidence of Buckingham's having held any benefice until some nine years later, when he became rector of Deene, in Northamptonshire;[34] second, there is an absence of any indication that Buckingham continued to have dealings with Richard de Bury, so it is most probable that this early attempt at patronage was unsuccessful;[35] and third, it seems unlikely that, having received a benefice of the value stipulated by the reservation, Buckingham would have been allowed to hold his Merton fellowship for the next nine years.[36] These considerations are not conclusive,

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(continuation)

> provision, even if it is their business to carry it to a conclusion, are inquisitors first and foremost." Jacob, E. F.; Petitions for Benefices from English Universities during the Great Schism; Transactions of the Royal Historical Society; Fourth Series; Vol. XXVII; 1945; p. 42.

33. "The papal rescript...normally imposed on the executor four duties: first he had to purify the grace, secondly to test the petitioner's habilitas, then to hear whatever exceptions might legitimately be propounded, and finally - provided the petitioner's claim had not been invalidated in the course of the preliminary proceedings - he might proceed to the conferment of a ius beneficiale." Barraclough, G.; The executors of Papal provisions in the Canonical theory of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries; Acta Congressus Iuridici Internationalis...; Vol. III; Roma; 1936; pp. 133-4.

34. See below, p. 29 ff.

35. De Bury's familia included many Mertonians. See Denholm-Young, N.; Richard de Bury; Transactions of the Royal Historical Society; Fourth Series; Vol. XX; London; 1937; pp. 160-1, 165.

36. The Merton statutes state that a socius shall be deprived of his fellowship if "beneficiumue uberius fuerit assecutus." Allen and Garrod; Merton Muniments; p. 22.

but they are strongly suggestive.

Since this reservation contains the earliest reference to Buckingham as "master", it provides a terminus ad quem for his inception. The limit thus placed, 1331, appears to be late: more probable dates for inception are 1324-26. The normal interval from bachelorhood to inception was three years, counting the year of determination as the first year, but two exceptions were regularly admitted: an interval of two years was permitted students who had determined for someone else (as well as for themselves), and an interval of four years was required of students who had not determined at all (presumably those for whom others had determined). Thus, the normal arts course was seven years, but it could be shortened to six or lengthened to eight.[37] Given 1323 as the latest probable date for Buckingham's admission to determine, it follows that he would have incepted in 1324-6, with 1325 the most likely date. It seems improbable, however, that he would have sought a benefice until he had completed his necessary two years of regency, teaching in the arts faculty, since failure to complete his regency would have caused him to forfeit his status as a master.[38] Thus, 1326-8 would probably have been the earliest period in which Buckingham might have realistically begun to approach possible patrons.

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37. Statuta Antiqua...; p. 34, ll. 20-27. Rashdall, H.; op. cit.; Vol. III; p. 154. Weisheipl, J. A.; Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts...; p. 163.

38. See above, p. 7 and note 9. Note also that Merton may have imposed an additional two years regency (four in all) on its members: Salter; op. cit.; pp. xxi-xxii.

Dating from the period of Buckingham's regency, (1324-6)-(1326-8), or from the period thereafter until his entry into the faculty of Theology, is a reference to Buckingham in the notes of one "J. T.(?)" presumably a bachelor of arts. After a list of requirements for inception in the faculty of Arts, there is the notation:

> "Memorandum that I had from Bokynham xii days in geometry and the total text of the second book of geometry and from Wescot ix days in geometry. Item from Bokynham the total text of the first book of arithmetic and xii days of arithmetic".[39]

It seems probable that Buckingham gave these lectures in Merton.

The next records of Buckingham's life are contained in two of the Bursar's rolls from the year 1334-5. The first, in the roll for the first 'quarter' of the academic year, when John of Villiers was Bursar, records Buckingham first in the stewards list:

> "Item. Bokyngham steward for the week of the nativity of Mary with allowances xxxvij s. iij d. halfpenny by inspection."

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39. These notes are found on the verso of the last folio of Merton Ms. 261. "Med quod habui a Bokynham xii d⟨ies⟩ in gemetria et totalem literam 2i libri geometrie et a Wescot ix dies in gemetriā.
Item a Bokynham literam totalem primi libri arsmetrice et xii dies arsmetrice." This has been printed in full by Powicke, F.M.; The Mediaeval Books of Merton College; Oxford; 1931; p. 34n; who dates it from the early fourteenth century.

For inception, the bachelor was required to have heard lectures on the Ars geometricae (Elementa), Books I-VI, of Euclid for five weeks, not including feast-days, and on the Arsmetrica (Arithmetica) of Boethius for three weeks, not including feast-days. Statuta Antiqua...; pp. 33-4. Rashdall, H.; op. cit.; Vol. III; p. 155. Weisheipl, J.A.; Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts...; pp. 170-1.

This item is followed by another entry under the heading "External payments":

> "Idem. against the payments of Thomas of Bokyngham for expenses"

This has been struck through. The following line records:

> "Idem. against the expenses of Thomas of Bokyngham for autumnal expenses at Gamelgey for two ways xl s."

The third reference to Buckingham from this quarter is in a small roll enclosed with the main roll, under the heading "Remunerations for the toil of the fellows:"

> "Idem ⟨altered to Item⟩ paid bokyngham. vi. s. viij. d."[40]

Only the second of these entries requires comment: Buckingham had apparently been sent to supervise the harvest at the College-owned manor at Gamelgey, or Gamlingay, in Cambridgeshire. As Bennett has remarked, in a slightly different context, "It is pleasing to think that such a subtle controversialist as Buckingham once checked college accounts or supervised harvests on the college fields...."[41]

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40. "Item. Bokyngham senescallus pro septimana nativitatis marie cum pitancia xxxvij s. iij d. obol q^{li} ⟨conspectu ?⟩." Under the heading "Liberationes forinsece": "Idem. contra liberats ⟨liberationes⟩ Thome de Bokyngham pro expensis" struck through. On the following line: "Idem. contra liberats ⟨liberationes⟩ Thome de Bokyngham pro expensis auctumpni apud Gamelgey per duas vias xl s." On the small roll, under "Remunerationes pro laboribus sociorum:" "Idem ⟨corrected to Item⟩ soluit bokyngham. vi. s. viij. d." These are contained in Merton Ms. 3669. Noted in Emden; Biographical Register...Oxford...; Vol. I; p. 298.

41. Bennett, J. A. W.; Chaucer at Oxford and at Cambridge; Clarendon Press; Oxford; 1974; p. 63. Bennett goes on to refer to the "college fields at Holywell or Grantchester."

The bursar's roll for the second quarter of the same year, 1334-5, when John of Fancley was Bursar, contains the entry:

> "Item to master thomas of bukingham going towards [ ]ingdon after epiphany xx d. halfpenny. evident through an indenture". [42]

It should here be noted that, after Buckingham had completed his two years of teaching as a regent master in arts (probably in 1326-8), he was then free to enter one of the higher faculties: Medicine, Canon Law, Civil Law, or Theology. This he did, proceeding to become Doctor of Divinity. According to the statutes, a master of arts would have been admitted to Opponency in his fifth year of study; then admitted "to lecture on the book of sentences" (i.e. made a bachelor of divinity) after two more years, i.e. after seven years in all; and finally made a Doctor of Divinity after one year of lecturing on the book of Sentences followed by two years of further study, i.e. after ten years in all. [43]

Since Buckingham might first have entered the faculty of Theology in 1326 and might have become Doctor of Divinity as late as 1346, it is possible that he took twenty years to complete a ten-

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42. "Item magistro thome de bukingham eunti versus [ ]ingdon post epiphaniam xx d. obol. patet per indenturam," Merton College Ms. 3668. Dr. J.R.L. Highfield, Fellow, Librarian and Archivist of Merton College, and Mr. J.B. Burgass, Assistant Librarian, kindly helped with the transcription. Mentioned in Emden; Biographical Register...Oxford...; loc. cit..

43. See Rashdall, H.; op. cit.; Vol. III; pp. 158-9; where the course is discussed in detail. See also Leff, G.; Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries; Wiley; New York; 1968; pp. 174-5. The primary sources are in the Statuta Antiqua...; pp. cix-cxiii and 48 seqq.

year course, or that it could have occupied any portion of that period. These limits are, of course, extreme: the period could have been as short as fourteen years (1328-42), leaving only four years unaccounted for; the most probable period appears to be 1327-43, a span of sixteen years. While the course could have occupied any portion of that period, it seems likely that Buckingham became a bachelor of divinity in 1339 and, if so, then it would follow that he entered the faculty of Theology in 1332, was admitted to Opponency in 1337, lectured on the Sentences in 1339-40, and became D. D. in 1343, taking a total of eleven years to complete the course. This outline receives some support from Buckingham's unsuccessful attempt to obtain a benefice in 1331, since his entering the faculty of Theology may then be seen as a response to the difficulties of gaining preferment; similarly, as will be seen, Buckingham was not styled D. D. until 1346: on balance, a long period as master of arts seems more likely than a very long, slow progress through the Theology course.

In 1338, one of the more curious of the Merton documents was written. This is a voting-list, dated 28th October, for the benefice of the Chapel of Kilworth Harcourt, in Leicestershire, of which Merton College held the advowson.[44] While the assessed value of the chapel was (in 1344) five marks, its true yearly value was said to have been

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44. The full text of this scrutinium is printed in Appendix I, pp. 321-323, below. See Highfield, J. R. L.; The Early Rolls of Merton College Oxford; Clarendon Press; Oxford; 1964; p. 46. Ms. Merton College 1047.

ten marks;[45] in consequence, it was enough of a prize to attract two Merton fellows, Walter Segrave and William Burgelon: the four close ballots recorded in this voting-list record their attempts, which apparently were self-defeating, since neither of them appears to have held it in the end.[46] Buckingham appears to have stood somewhat aloof, voting instead for John Villiers, who had been Bursar in 1334.[47]

The period 1338-9 is particularly rich in interesting Merton documents: from this period survive minutes of four College meetings held on 12th April, 20th July, and Christmas, 1338, and 28th March, 1339.[48] Since the primary topic of discussion was a particularly complex and many-sided feud in which Buckingham took little part, only a few salient points need be noted:

The meeting of April 12, 1338, is notable primarily for general complaints about the small number of fellows and bachelors and for the rather lurid complaints of Robert Finmere:

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45. Victoria County History; A History of the County of Leicester; Vol. V; London; 1964; p. 181. Calendar of ...Papal Letters; Vol. III; p. 98. Calendar of Entries in the Papal Registers relating to Great Britain and Ireland: Petitions to the Pope; ed. W. H. Bliss; Vol. I, A. D. 1342-1419; London; 1896; p. 51.

46. Segrave became Chancellor of Richard de Bury in 1340; Burgelon became rector of Wykeham, Hants., 1 April, 1341. See Emden; Biographical Register...Oxford; Vol. I, p. 308; and Vol. III, p. 1664.

47. See above, p. 20.

48. The text of these minutes has been printed in full by Allen and Garrod; Merton Muniments; pp. 33-35. The quotations which follow are from their text. Ms. Merton College 4249.

"that the bachelors...
they run about among whores...
he says that they carry away...
standing at the door...
after breakfast and supper with the fellows...
and Wyly that they have a benefice, and it is nothing..." [49]

Damage to the manuscript has made the sense a little difficult, but the tone is unmistakable. Perhaps in allusion to Finmere's remarks, Buckingham spoke

"of the discord to be ended between..." [50]

By the time of the next meeting, that of 20th July, the situation had developed to a higher pitch: Wescombe began the meeting by complaining of a lack of silence at table and then spoke

"of the discord between Wyly and Finmere" [51]

This was seconded by Humberston, but followed by an attack from Finmere on Wanting, Wyly, and Elyndon. As the discussion developed, it became apparent that the Warden, Robert of Tring, also had differences with Wanting, Wyly, and Elyndon, and that the fellows were

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49. Words between parentheses "()" are emendations by Allen and Garrod.
"quod bacul(arii)...
discurrunt per g(aneas et tabernas. Item)...
dicit quod asporta(nt inde vina bibuntque)...
stantes ad ostium (aule)...
post prandium et senam cum sociis, (Item quod delinquunt Elyndon)
et Wyly quod habent uberius, et nichil est..."
Allen and Garrod; op. cit.; p. 33.

50. "de discordia cedanda inter (Wyly and Finmere)..." Ibid.

51. "dicit de silentio non obseruato in mensa. Item de disc(ordia inter) Wyly and Fynmer." Ibid.

becoming divided into hostile camps. Buckingham, who was the penultimate speaker at this meeting, remarked:

> "that he would wish peace between Wyly and Fynemer, and begs that the discord between them will be given up. Item that Wyly and Wantyng, while they are assignees by custom in form and manner to auditing the accounts, do not come, nor do they have reasonable cause. Item that Wantyng did not minister in the feast of St. John at the table of the fellows on account of the dislike which he had against the Warden. Item that in handling community business Wantyng does not consult as he is bound, but always responds 'It pleases me just as it pleases others.'" [52]

While it is possible that Buckingham favoured Finmere, it is most apparent that he was displeased with Wyly and Wantyng. Hardele summarised the situation - which was beginning to foreshadow the complexities of Jacobean tragedy - in the closing speech of the meeting:

> "of remaking peace between Wyly and Fynemer, and between Elyndon and Fynemer, and between Wantyng and Wyliot, and between the Warden and Elyndon, Wantyng, andWyly." [53]

The situation had clearly not improved by the time of the next

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52. "quod vellet pacem inter Wyly et Fynemer, et petit quod cedetur discordia inter eos. Item quod Wyly et Wantyng', cum sint assignati in forma et modo vsitatis ad audienda ratiocinia, non veniunt, nec habent causam rationabilem. Item quod Wantyng' non ministrauit in festo sancti Iohannis in mensa sociorum propter odium quod habuit erga Custodem. Item in negociis communibus tractandis Wantyng' non consulit sicud tenetur, sed semper respondet 'Placet mihi sicud placet aliis'." The 'ministering' which is referred to is the work of the weekly stewards. Ibid.; p. 34.

53. "de pace reformanda inter Wyly et Fynemer, et inter Elyndon et Fynemer, et inter Wantyng' et Wyliot', et inter Custodem et Elyndon' Wantyng' et Wyly." Ibid.

meeting, at Christmas, 1338, but the subjects of complaint had changed to some extent. The Warden, Elyndon and Wantyng had made their peace, but the feud between Wyly and Finmere continued, and there were complaints about John the chaplain. Buckingham remarked:

> "that the fellows use stockings ‹which are› unseemly according to ancient custom which was wont to be observed. Westcombe, Bredon', W. the chaplain at fault."[54]

The fourth meeting, that of 28th March, 1339, saw matters of more importance discussed. The discord between Wyly and Finmere continued unabated, there was some talk of the mismanagement of funds and of the premature sale of books deposited as cautions for loans: it may be significant of the deterioration of relations that several of the fellows then present appear to have written their own accounts of the meeting, for there are complaints and defences of the number of "scriptores" attending. Buckingham's comments at this meeting are of increased relevance:

> "that Wantyng sold horses belonging to the House near Elham, and detains the money in his hands, nor does he make satisfaction, nor‹does› the bailiff. Item that when he was second bursar the cautions were in the hands of the fellows, and there was not a reckoning but he secretly sold the books. Item that there are not many writers in the meeting. Item that Elyndon provokes the fellows."[55]

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54. "quod socii vtuntur caligis inhonestis iuxta antiquam consuetudinem que solebat obseruari. Westcombe, Bredon', W. capellanus in culpa." Ibid.

55. "quod Wantyng' apud Elham vendidit equos Domus, et detinet pecunias in manibus suis, nec satisfecit, nec balliuus. Item quod quando fuit bursarius secundus cautiones fuerunt in manibus sociorum, et non fuit ratiocinium sed fur(tim

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It is possible that some reflection of these debates may be found in the selection of bursars for the following year. The accounts of money received in the record of John de Grundewelle, chaplain of the College, for building operations in 1339-40 contain the list:

> "from money received
> The same, receipt of lxxxij. s. received from master Robert Fynon bursar. And of xxi. s. vj. d. received from master William Humbston Bursar. And of xxxvj. s. iij. d. received from master Thomas Bukyngham bursarius. And of xxviij. s. of revenue from bokehalle. And of xxv^{iii}. s. of revenue of St. Stephan's hall."[56]

Buckingham, then, was the third bursar of Merton in 1339-40; that is, he was bursar from April through July. Unfortunately, the bursar's roll for this period has not survived. Since Buckingham and the other two bursars mentioned, Robert Fynon ⟨Finmere⟩ and William Humberston, had all argued for reforms and for financial responsibility in the prec_eding college meetings, it is tempting to see their appointments either as an attempt at reform or, more likely, as a classic

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libros) vendidit. Item quod non sint in scrutinio plures scriptores. Item quod Elyndon proucat socios." Ibid.; p. 35.

56. "receptis denariis.
Idem. receptis de lxxxij. s. receptis de magistro Roberto Fynon bursarius. Et de xxi. s. vj. d. receptis de magistro Willelmo Humbston Bursarius. Et de xxxvj. s. iij. d. receptis de magistro Thoma Bukyngham bursarius. Et de xxviij. s. de redditu de bokehalle. Et de xxv^{iij}. s. de redditu aule Sancti Stephani." Although dated in the Merton catalogue to 1338 (following the note "anno xii" on the outside of the roll), the text gives "anno xiii" of Edward's reign, so the date is actually 1339-40. Merton College Ms. 4087. Noted in Emden; Biographical Register... Oxford; Vol. I; p. 298.

example of the timeless pattern of handing unpleasant tasks along to the most troublesome critics of the last appointees.[57]

If, as has been suggested above, Buckingham "entered the Sentences",[58] i.e. became a bachelor of Divinity and began to lecture on Peter Lombard's Book of Sentences, in 1339, then the academic year 1339-40 was spent lecturing on the Sentences, and the summer of 1340 would have seen Buckingham past the most intensive part of his studies and in need of only two further years of study for the D.D..

With this in mind, it is not surprising that the next two references to Buckingham occur in the registers of the bishop of Lincoln: both record him as rector of the parish of Deene, Northamptonshire, and both are one-year licences to absent himself from his parish in order to continue his studies. Since the previous incumbent, Thomas de Holm, is known to have held the parish through the 1st June, 1340,[59] Buckingham was instituted between the end of the academic year and December of that year. The first licence occurs in the registers of Bishop Burghersh of Lincoln under the heading "licences to study":

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57. Another consequence of the disagreements preserved in these minutes appears to have been the migration of at least six Merton fellows to the newly-founded Queen's College in 1341: Colyngham, Dumbleton, Reynham, Hardley, Heghtelbury, and Wantyng. Magrath, J.R.; The Queen's College; Clarendon Press; Oxford; 1921; Vol. I; p. 87, n. 1, and p. 91.

58. "intravit Sententias"; for the use of this phrase, see Salter; Registrum Annalium...; p. xxvii.

59. Ms. Reg. Lincoln. V (Reg. Burghersh); f. 200^{v}.

"Deene Item. Ides of December the year of the Lord written above master Thomas of Buckingham, the Rector of Deene, was permitted by ⟨the Bishop of⟩ Lincoln that he might be able to study within the kingdom of England or without. for one year and to receive the fruits ⟨i.e. income⟩. Thus transcribed etc. in the whole form." [60]

The second licence was granted by the new Bishop of Lincoln, Thomas Bek, on the 21st October, 1342:

"Deene Item. xij kalends of November the year of the Lord abovementioned the same was permitted master Thomas of Buckingham rector of the church of Deene of this diocese. that he can study for one year and receive the fruits . Thus transcribed etc." [61]

If, as seems likely, Buckingham took the first of these leaves of absence in the academic year 1341-2 and the second in the academic year 1343-4, then he would have become D. D. in 1344. While this does leave a gap of two years between the probable end of his Oxford academic career and his appointment to the chancellorship of Exeter Cathedral in 1346, it is not unlikely that those two years were spent in residence at Deene. Certainly, there is no evidence for his

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60. "Dene Id. Decembris anno domini supradicto Lincolniense licitus fuit magister Thomas de Buckingham Rector de Dene quod posset studere infra regnum anglicanum vel extra. per unum annum et fructus percipere. Ita transcriptum et cetera in formam totam." Ibid.; f. 201^{v}.

61. "Dēn item. xij. kalendis Novembri anno domini supradicto ibidem. licitus fuit magister Thomas de Bokyngham rector ecclesie de dēn huius diocesis. quod posset studere per unum annum et fructus percipere. Ita transcriptum et cetera." Ms. Reg. Lincoln. VII (Reg. Bek); f. 124^{r}.
This license and the preceeding are noted in Emden; Biographical Register...Oxford...; Vol. I, p. 298.

presence anywhere else, and there is no episcopal record to suggest his absence.[62]

There is no indication of the authority under which these leaves of absence were granted, but it is probable that it was assumed to have been the bull Cum ex eo, although according to Fr. Boyle this was most frequently specified.[63] If it was, it should be noted that a recipient of leave to study was expected not only to provide a suitable substitute to run the parish in his absence, but also to proceed to the subdiaconate within a year of his institution, and to the priesthood within a year of the completion of his studies.[64] While there are no firm grounds for assuming that this bull was the authority used, it was the most appropriate legislation available;[65] if it were used, it would follow

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62. The frequently-raised possibility that Buckingham visited Paris during this period appears to be based solely on an account of a dispute in Paris in which his ideas were advanced; this is discussed below, pp. 63-66. The Hundred Years War was then in an active phase (Crecy: 1346) which, while it would not have inhibited travel, would have lent it an element of risk; but, see Coleman, J.; Jean de Ripa and the Oxford Calculators; Mediaeval Studies; Vol. XXXVII; 1975; p. 189 and passim for an interesting minimising assessment of the effects of the War on the passage of scholars and ideas.

63. Boyle, L.; A Study of the Works Attributed to William of Pagula; unpublished D. Phil. thesis; Oxford; 1956; pp. 103-4. And, The Constitution Cum ex eo of Boniface VIII. Education of Parochial Clergy; Mediaeval Studies; Vol. XXIV; 1962; p. 297.

64. Boyle; A Study of the Works...; pp. 98-9.

65. It should be noted, however, that Cum ex eo was intended as a basis for the provision of support to parochial clergy who wished to study at a university, so its use to finance the last years of a doctoral candidate's study would have

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that Buckingham became a subdeacon by December, 1341, and a priest by, perhaps, the summer of 1345.

If, as was suggested above, Buckingham lectured on the Sentences in the academic year 1339-40, it is probable that some of his time in Deene was spent rewriting those lectures into the Questiones super Sententias, which was probably published before 1344.[66]

The next record of Buckingham's life occurs in the registers of Bishop John Grandisson of Exeter for 1346 with the marginal reference "Collation of the Chancellorship of Exeter":

> "On the twenty-fifth day of the month of March at Chudleigh the lord ⟨i.e. the Bishop⟩ granted to master Thomas of Bokyngham, priest, professor of sacred theology, the Chancellorship in the cathedral church of Exeter then vacant and with regard to his collation by observing the full law. Who also, master Thomas, took upon himself an oath of obedience to the lord ⟨i.e. to the Bishop⟩. And he issued a mandate to the Dean of the church of Exeter to himself induct etc. With masters present: Benedict de Paston, David Alyam, William de la Heigh, John Scikke, and N. Aunger, notary public."[67]

(continuation)

been something of a perversion of the constitution's purpose, unless - of course - it was understood that the recipient would subsequently serve in the parochial ministry. This lends some incidental support to the likelihood that Buckingham stayed in Deene from 1344-6.

66. For the dating of the Questiones super Sententias, see below, pp. 44-47 .

67. In mg.: "Collatio cancellarie Exoniensis". In text: "Vicesimo quinto die mensis marcii apud Chuddelegh, dominus contulit magistro Thome de Bokyngham presbitero sacre theologie professori, Cancellariam in ecclesia Cathedrali Exoniensis vacante et ad collationem suam pleno iure spectantem. Qui quidem magister Thomas prestitit domino obediencie juramentum. Et emanavit mandatum Decano ecclesie Exoniensis ad ipsum inducendum et cetera.

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In 1346, then, Buckingham was both D. D. and priest, and had begun a Chancellorship which was to have a distinctly academic flavour.

A little over three months later, Buckingham served as a witness in proceedings concerning the priorship of the house of Austin Canons at Launceston, Cornwall. Buckingham appears to have been merely a casual, albeit legally necessary, witness to the final stage of a proceeding in which Bishop Grandisson had been engaged for some nine years: the reformation of a house whose canons were burdened with private establishments "with rooms, horses, dogs, boys, herb gardens and dovecotes."[68] In this, apparently final, stage of the proceeding, Adam Knolle, the Prior, who had earlier been replaced by a coadjutor but had subsequently rebelled and regained power, had been finally induced to resign altogether. It is a temptation to read into Buckingham's presence in the list of witnesses,

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Presentibus magistris Benedicto de Paston, David Alyam, Willelmo de la Heigh, Johanne Scikke, et N. Aunger notariis publicis." Ms. Reg. Grandisson, Vol. III; f. 56^{r}, ll. 39-44. Summarised in F. C. Hingeston-Randolph; The Register of John de Grandisson, Bishop of Exeter, 1327-1369, with some account of the Episcopate of James de Berkeley, 1327; 3 Vols.; London and Exeter; 1894-9; Vol. III, p. 1352. Noted in Emden; Biographical Register ...Oxford...; Vol. I, p. 298. Given in Horn, J. M.; John le Neve, Fasti Ecclesiae Anglicanae 1300-1541; Vol. IX: Exeter Diocese; London; 1964; p. 9.

68. Knowles, D.; The Religious Orders in England; Cambridge; 1948; Vol. I, p. 103, where the course of events is succinctly described.

> "With masters present: Thomas de Bukyngham, Benedict de Pastone;..."[69]

an attempt by Grandisson to introduce him to some of the administrative difficulties of the diocese, but it is more likely that he simply happened to be at hand.

In May of the following year, Buckingham was collated to a prebend in Exeter Cathedral by virtue of a papal faculty which permitted Bishop Grandisson to provide to five prebends in the Cathedral, waiving the papal right of provision.[70] Buckingham was first nominated by the Bishop on the 19th of May:

> "On the 19th day of the month of May, the lord (i.e. the Bishop) in his chambers at Clyst, by virtue and force of the abovementioned faculty chose and nominated master Thomas of Buckingham Chancellor in the church of Exeter and professor of the sacred page and wished him of the abovementioned number five to be the first,..."[71]

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69. "Presentibus magistris Thoma de Bukyngham, Benedicto de Pastone;..." Ms. Reg. Grandisson, Vol. I; f. 137r. Given in full in Hingeston-Randolph; op. cit.; Vol. II, p. 1005. Noted in Emden; Biographical Register...Oxford...; Vol. I; pp. 298-9.

70. Ms. Reg. Grandisson Vol. III; ff. 60v-61r (and, repeated, at f.67, ?). The faculty is printed in full in Hingeston-Randolph; op. cit.; Vol. III; pp. 1359-60. Curiously, it is dated a full three years before it was put to use: 6 July, 1344.

71. In mg.: "Nominacio magistri Thome de Bukingham". In text: "xixmo die mensis maii, dominus in camera sua de Clyst, virtute et vigore facultatis predicte elegit et nominavit magistrum Thomam de Bukyngham Cancellarium in ecclesia Exoniensis et sacre pagine professorem ac ipsum de numero quinario predicto voluit esse primum, et de canonicatu ipsius ecclesie Exoniensis cum plenitudine juris canonici eidem providitur auctoritate apostolica antedicta ac prebendam si que in dicta ecclesia vacavit vel cum vacaret quam per se vel procuracionem suum infra unius

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Then, the next day, he was collated to the prebend:

> "Item on the 20th day of May, the said master Thomas in the chambers of the lord ⟨i.e. of the Bishop⟩ at Chudleigh personally constituted accepted by virtue of the grace (?) and of the processes aforesaid the prebend which the lord John de Eysi was possessed in the church of Exeter and the lord bestowed that upon him and provided him with the same...." [72]

This second source of income doubtless saw Buckingham well provided for financially.

Less than a month later, in July, Buckingham was appointed to a commission of visitation for the Archdeaconry of Barnstaple:

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> mensis spacium postquam de ipsius vacacione constaret et duceret acceptandam reservavit conferendam sibi postquam ille vel suus procurator ad hoc constitutus eam infra dictum spacium acceptaret ac inhibuit decretum interposuit et censuras in rebelles fulminavit. presentibus magistris Nicholas Aunger de Ermyngtone et Johanne Scilke Publicis Auctoritate Apostolica notariis, Johanne Taillur, et Guidone Busse testibus, et cetera." Ms. Reg. Grandisson; Vol. III; f. 61r. Extracts printed in Hingeston-Randolph; op. cit.; Vol. III; p. 1360.

72. In mg.: "Collacio prebende facta dicto magistro Thome." In text: "Item xx die maii dictus magister Thomas in camera domini de Chuddelegh personaliter constitutus acceptavit virtute gratie ⟨gre - ?⟩ et processuum predictorum prebendam quam dominus Johannes de Eysi in ecclesia Exoniensi obtinuit et dominus eam sibi contulit et sibi providit de eadem presentibus magistris Benedict de Paston, Nicholas Aungar, R. de Todeworth et Johannes Scilke notariis publicis, Nicholas Kyrkam, Johanne Taillur, Guydone Busse testibus, et obtinuit litteras inductionis directas decano et thesaurario ecclesie Exoniensis." Ibid. Mentioned in Hingeston-Randolph; loc. cit.. Mentioned in Emden; Biographical Register...Oxford...; Vol. I; pp. 298-9. Mentioned in J. M. Horn; op. cit.; p. 31.

> "John by divine compassion Bishop of Exeter, to beloved sons in Christ, Masters Thomas of Bokyngham, Chancellor, and Hugh of Setone, our principal official, of ours 'Exeter', and Benedict of Pastone... salutations, grace, and blessing". [73]

Unfortunately, the records of this visitation do not appear to have survived; it would have been interesting to have seen how Buckingham's concerns were manifested in the practical matters of reform at the parochial level.

The atmosphere in which theological debate was conducted appears to have changed markedly in the years 1346-7 with the condemnation in Paris of a number of propositions held by Nicholas of Ultracourt and John of Mirecourt. [74] This assertion of ecclesiastical authority in matters of doctrine was not unheralded - 1340 had seen the Papal citation of several Parisian scholars for errors concerning the faith and the condemnation by the University of Paris of several errors of William of Ockham [75] - but it does appear to have taken scholars by surprise and to have given them a strong feeling that it

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73. "Johannes miseracione divina Exoniensis Episcopus, dilectis in Christo filiis, Magistris Thome de Bokyngham, Cancellario, et Hugoni de Setone, Officiali nostro Principali, nostre Exoniensis, et Benedicto de Pastone, Collegiate <sic> Sancti Probi, in Cornubia, Ecclesiarum Canonicis, salutem, graciam, et benediccionem." Ms. Reg. Grandisson; Vol. I; f. 147^{v}. Substantially printed in Hingeston-Randolph; op. cit.; Vol. II, p. 1023. Mentioned in Emden; Biographical Register...Oxford...; Vol. I; p. 298.

74. Denifle, H.; Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis; Paris; 1891; Vol. II; pp. 576-90, 610-614.

75. Ibid.; pp. 505-7.

was not wise to appear to be other than strictly orthodox.[76] Regardless of questions of whether the condemnations were of the same sort and so should be grouped together, or of whether they were properly made, they both asserted the authority of the church in matters of faith and so exercised a cumulative effect.[77] Since several of the propositions condemned in John of Mirecourt can be found in Buckingham's Questiones super Sententias,[78] and since Mirecourt recently has been shown to have used that work as a source - indeed, sometimes to have "slavishly copied"[79] - it is probable that Buckingham was concerned after the condemnations to defend himself against any possible charges of unorthodoxy or error.

It is presumably this consideration which underlies Buckingham's report of a dispute which he held in Exeter with an otherwise unidentified doctor, who may have been resident at Exeter, but who was more likely a visitor whose stay provided the occasion for the debate. Robson has treated this debate as a vivid illustration of the turning of a chastened Buckingham from "his youthful flights"[80]; but it appears to

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76. See, for example, Courtenay, W.J.; John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini on Whether God Can Undo the Past; part 2; Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale; Vol. 40; 1973; p. 164.

77. Ibid.; 172-4 and passim.

78. Michalski; Le Problème de la Volonté...; pp. 352-3. In addition to propositions 1-3, whose dependence he notes, propositions 10-12, 14, and 17 appear to be from Q. VI, Art. VI, of the Questiones super Sententias.

79. Courtenay; op. cit.; pp. 151-2.

80. Robson; op. cit.; p. 252 and 247-252.

be not unlikely that that is precisely the impression which Buckingham wished to convey. It is certain that Buckingham found himself in the - perhaps rather strange - position of arguing against an opponent of quite "Pelagian" tendencies, since he would not have distorted a matter which was so clearly public knowledge, and it is equally certain that he took an obvious delight in parading his own orthodoxy, both at the time and later in his report of the debate in the Questiones Theologice,[81] but it does not follow that there were any fundamental changes in his positions. As Jacob has remarked, Buckingham's language "has its shades and its reservations":[82] it would not be surprising were his Questiones super Sententias to prove to be more moderate than is generally thought, and his Questiones Theologice to be more extreme. In this instance, Buckingham appears to have been taking advantage of a fortunate situation to provide himself with protective colouring.

Pantin has discussed this debate as a significant instance of the decentralisation of learning,[83] an aspect which seems to be reflected in the style adopted by the principals: while the topics and the debate

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81. Contained in Ms. New College 134; ff. 395^{va}-409^{va}; beginning at question 67 in that manuscript. For the Questiones Theologice, see below, pp. 53 - 59 .

82. Jacob, E. F.; review of Gordon Leff's Bradwardine and the Pelagians; The Journal of Ecclesiastical History; London; Vol. IX; 1958; pp. 94-6.

83. Pantin, W. A.; The English Church in the Fourteenth Century; Cambridge; 1955; pp. 113-5, 263-6.

itself were serious, the process had the air of being a demonstration of scholastic method for the benefit of those who had not attended University: like a demonstration match in any sport, in this the moves were real, but exaggerated and - perhaps - simplified. When Buckingham reports in the Questiones Theologice that

> "By this response the doctor is offended and says that for all the world he would not have imputed so much blasphemy to me. But whether this response is a blasphemy or truth, who understands may judge."[84]

it appears that both Buckingham and his opponent were playing to the gallery, although they were both also arguing seriously.

Unfortunately, this dispute appears to be undatable, except within the broad limits of Buckingham's Chancellorship. Pantin has suggested tentatively that the anonymous doctor might have been Richard FitzRalph, who wintered in Exeter in 1347-8,[85] but Robson's rejection of this appears to be well based.[86]

Buckingham appears to have died in 1349 at about the time of the arrival of the first attack of bubonic plague in Exeter. Sometime shortly after the 19th June, 1349, Bishop Grandisson wrote, in a reply to a request from Edward III for a prebend for one of his clerks,

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84. "De hac responsione offensus est doctor et dicit quod pro toto mundo tantam blasphemiam non inposuisset mihi. Sed numquid hec responsio sit blasphemia vel realis qui intelligit iudicet." Ms. New College 134, f. 405va. Thus given in Robson; op. cit.; p. 248.

85. Pantin ; op. cit.; p. 114.

86. Robson; op. cit.; p. 248.

> "...and now, dearest Lord, with your leave, as God wills that I live and am able to advance those to whom I have been for a long time past bound and obliged, and also Masters of Divinity, who can preach and lecture, to the honour of God, in the church of Exeter, of whom there is now great lack, for there is no one residing here;..."[87]

This would seem to argue either that Buckingham no longer was alive or that he was no longer attached to Exeter Cathedral.

That it argues Buckingham's death is shown by a papal confirmation of Henry of Pyke in the prebend held by Buckingham, dated the 4th October, 1349:

> "Item in the same way acceptable etc. made by apostolic authority for Henry of Pickochio master in arts and bachelor in both laws and canon of the church of Exeter of the prebend of the selfsame church vacant through the death of Thomas of Bakingham".[88]

Thus, although the first firm date by which Buckingham must have

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87. "...et ore, trescher Seignur, ove vostre conge, tant come Dieu vorra qe jeo vive et peusse avauncer ceaux a queux jeo su long temps passe tenuz et obligez, et auxi Mestres en Devinite qi peussont prescher et lire, al honur de Dieu, en leglise Dexcestre, des queux il y ad ore tresgrant defaute, qar nul ny est demoraund, ..." Ms. Reg. Grandisson; Vol. I; f. 88^{v}. Given in full by Hingeston-Randolph; op. cit.; Vol. I; pp. 307-8. The translation is Pantin's; op. cit.; p. 115. Mentioned in Robson; op. cit.; p. 46.

88. "Item simili modo acceptus et cetera auctoritate apostolica facta pro henricum de pickochio magistrum in artibus in utroque Iure bacallarium canonicum ecclesie Exoniensis de prebenda ipsius ecclesie vacante per obitum thome de bakingham." Reg. Suppl. 21; f. 26^{v}. Recorded in Calendar of...Petitions to the Pope; Vol. I; p. 177. Noted in Horn; op. cit.; pp. 9 and 31. Noted in Emden's annotations to his Biographical Register...Oxford...; Vol. I; pp. 298-9; deposited in the Bodleian Library.

died is the 4th October, it seems safe to assume that Grandisson's letter provides a true terminus ad quem and that he had died sometime shortly before it was written (a few days after the 19th of June).[89]

Buckingham's Questiones Theologice has already been mentioned briefly, since it contains his account of the Exeter dispute. This substantial collection of questions can be dated to the period 1344-1349, with the proviso that it was probably written during most of that period, in short sections which Buckingham intended to order later into a unified whole. The lower date is that of the publication of Thomas Brawardine's De Causa Dei, since the Questiones Theologice is clearly in part a refutation of that work, and of Book III in particular. The terminal date must be that of Buckingham's death, for the preface and

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89. It should be noted that, on the 12th July, 1353, Henry de Pyk received a ratification from the king of his title in the "prebend which master Thomas of Bukyngham once held in the same <church> ...". ("...in prebenda quam magister Thomas de Bukyngham nuper optinuit in eadem...") Patent Roll of the year XXVII Edward III, second Part; 12th July at Westminster. Given in Calender of Patent Rolls; Edward III, Vol. IX; 1350-1354; H.M.S.O.; 1907; p. 484. Noted in Emden; Biographical Register... Oxford...; Vol. I, p. 299. Buckingham was succeeded in the Chancellorship by John Wylyot, a fellow Mertonian (see above, p. 26, and Appendix I, p. 323).
See, for example, Hingeston-Randolph; op. cit.; Vol. II, p. 1188. Mentioned in Emden; ibid.; Vol. I, p. 298.
It should also be noted that Robson, lacking knowledge of the papal confirmation noted above, has speculated on the possibility of Buckingham's having returned to Merton College from Exeter. Robson; op. cit.; p. 46. The Buckingham he records from the 1350's is John Buckingham, not the Bishop of Lincoln. See Emden; ibid.; p. 298.

the somewhat unordered state of the work suggest that it was put into circulation by someone other than Buckingham, and that after his death. It seems probable that Buckingham began work on the Questiones Theologice while still at Deene, and then continued work on it as best he could while Chancellor: the phrase "... here ⟨I will take the trouble⟩ to insert a question..."[90] which is used to introduce the Exeter dispute, strongly suggests that his account was inserted into a previously written section, while his calling attention to the circumstance of the dispute's having been held in Exeter might be taken to suggest that the main body of material was written elsewhere, e.g. at Deene.[91]

Of Buckingham's will, all that is known is what may be inferred from the disposition of four of his books. Three books in Merton College library had belonged to him:

1) Augustine; The City of God; T 166; Powicke 184.

2) Augustine; Confessions and other works; T 197; Powicke 185; Coxe 1.

3) R. Cestrensis; Chronica; T 14; Powicke 186.[92]

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90. "...hic inserere questionem... ⟨curavi or curabo⟩ ..." Ms. New College 134, f. 395va. The missing main verb is supplied by Pantin; op. cit.; p. 264; to fill a physical gap in the manuscript. The same gap occurs in Ms. Merton 143.

91. The Questiones Theologice is discussed below on pp. 53 - 59.

92. Powicke; Mediaeval Books of Merton College; p. 113. Mentioned in Emden; Biographical Register... Oxford...; Vol. I; p. 299.

The other volume is the copy of Peter Lombard's Book of Sentences mentioned above. It had been given to the Exeter Cathedral library and contains the notation:

> "Master Thomas of Buckyngham, once Chancellor of this church, gave this book (to Exeter Cathedral church added)."

The dean and chapter of Exeter presented this volume to the Bodleian Library in 1602.[93]

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93. Discussed above pp. 14-15. Noted in N.R. Ker; Mediaeval Libraries of Great Britain; second edn.; R.H.S.; London; 1964; p. 262.

B

The Works of Thomas of Buckingham

The indubitably authentic works of Thomas of Buckingham are two: the Questiones super Sententias and the Questiones Theologice. In addition, a Tractatus de Infinito and, in Ms. Vat. lat. 1089, a Commentary on the Sentences have been placed to his credit, but these attributions are highly dubious. Finally, two questions in which his views are advanced have been attributed to him directly: in the first, his authorship has been suggested; in the second, he has been thought to have have engaged personally in a disputatio in aula held in Paris, in which his views were contrasted with those of Thomas Bradwardine on the question of the freedom of the created will.

1. The Questiones super Sententias[1]

The Questiones super Sententias is the earlier of the two authentic works of Buckingham. Unfortunately, the evidence for its date is both circumstantial and vague. The outline of Buckingham's

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1. Stegmüller, F.; Repertorium commentariorum in sententias Petri Lombardi; Wurzburg; 1947; Vol. I; p. 415; #899. Weisheipl, J.A.; Repertorium Mertonense; Mediaeval Studies; Toronto; Vol. XXXI; 1969; pp. 184-5; #3).

academic career given above suggests that he had "entered the Sentences"[2] (i.e. had attained the degree of B.D. and had begun to give a course of lectures on Peter Lombard's Book of Sentences) in the period 1335-1343.(most probably in 1339-40).[3] Since the Questiones super Sententias is presumably the rewritten fruit of this required course of lectures, its publication can be placed in the years 1336-1344 (most probably in the years 1340-44). Some slight confirmation of this may be found in the probability that its publication preceded that of Thomas Bradwardine's De Causa Dei, which was completed in 1344.[4]

Internal evidence does not appear to provide much further assistance. References to Thomas Aquinas as "saint", rather than as "brother", for example, only place the writing at some time after Aquinas's canonization in 1323.[5]

Dating the work after the Chancellorship of Richard FitzRalph on the basis of the intriguing passage in Question VI which Michalski

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2. "intrauit Sentencias" For the use of this expression, see Salter, H.E.; Registrum Annalium Collegii Mertonensis 1483-1521; O.H.S.; Oxford; 1923; pp. xxvi-xxvii and, e.g., 169. See also above, p. 29.

3. The tentative nature of these dates must be stressed: while 1335-1343 is most probable, he could have begun these lectures as early as the 1320's or as late as 1343. This stage of Buckingham's academic career is discussed above, pp. 22, 23 and 29.

4. See, inter alia, Emden, A.B..; Biographical Register; Vol. I; p. 246a.

5. See below, Questiones super Sententias, Q.I, C.I, l. 171, and C.II, l. 108 and 612.

and, later, Robson understood as meaning that Buckingham had studied under FitzRalph "who not long ago was chancellor"[6] cannot be accepted since - as we have seen - the passage is too ambiguous to support this identification, which is not improbable, but only unproven.[7]

In considering the date of the Questiones super Sententias, it should be noted, finally, that Maier's identification of the "doctor noster" in Question I, C. VI, as Thomas Brawardine creates certain chronological difficulties.[8] The earliest known date by which Brawardine had attained the degree of D.D. is November, 1348.[9] It is possible that the Questiones super Sententias was published at this late a date, or that it was brought up to date by the later inclusion of this reference,

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6. FitzRalph's chancellorship ran from May, 1332, to May, 1334. See Emden; Biographical Register; Vol. II; p. 693a.

7. This passage is discussed fully on pp. 10-11 above. Michalski has also used the reference "Secundum Bokkyg super sacram scripturam..." in William of Ockham's Compendium Errorum Johannis XXII (London; 1495; f. aa-2^r, col. I), which he dates from 1335-8, to provide a terminal date of 1338 for the composition. (Michalski; Le Problème de la Volonté...; p. 250n.). This reference is surely to Thomas Docking, the Thirteenth Century Franciscan biblical scholar. See A.G. Little; The Grey Friars in Oxford; O.H.S.; Oxford; 1892; p. 151, n.7.

8. Buckingham; Questiones super Sententias; Q. I, C. VI. "Ad idem arguo et facio formam quam fecit doctor noster anno proximo ad istam eandem conclusionem. Ratio sua fuit talis". For apparatus, see Appendix II. (Perez; f. c.ij^{ra-va}) Maier, Anneliese; Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert; Roma; 1966; p. 96, n. 27.

9. Emden; Biographical Register; Vol. I, p. 245a. Note that this is "by Nov. 1348" (italics supplied): since he was B. Theol. by 1333, he may have attained the D.D. much earlier.

but it seems most likely that the reference to "doctor noster" does not refer to Bradwardine.[10]

The Questiones super Sententias comprises six questions based loosely on Peter Lombard's Book of Sentences. In common with many commentaries of the period, the Questions are mostly long and discursive, often covering a surprising range of materials under a single heading. The principal questions are:

Q. I: Whether to delight in God is the highest reward of any blessed creature? (Primarily a discussion of the nature of evil and of the measurement of degrees of good and evil)[11]

Q. II: Whether the divine nature begets or is begotten?[12]

Q. III: Whether God is omnipctent? (Of a projected eight, two articles only treating A) Whether God can will the world never to have been?[13] and B) Whether every future

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10. Maier, loc. cit., noted that only one ms. consulted (Vat. lat. 4353) carried the annotation "Bradwardine"; in fact, there are two such, but the other (Madrid; B.N., ms. 133) is very closely related to Vat. lat. 4353.

11. Utrum Deo frui sit summa merces cuiuslibet creature beate. Buckingham; Questiones super Sententias; Q. I; C. I, ll. 3-4. (Perez; ff. a.ij^{ra}-e.ij^{va})

12. Utrum essentia divina generet vel generetur. (Perez; ff. e.ij^{ra}-e.vi^{rb})

13. This article is discussed by W. J. Courtney; John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini on Whether God Can Undo the Past;part two; Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale; Vol. 40; 1973; pp. 150 sqq.

Q. III (continued)
event is by necessity about to be? ((i.e. Whether every future event is inevitable?)) A discussion of the freedom of the will and of future contingents.) [14]

Q. IV: Whether to concede a first instant of merit or demerit? (Discussions of time and of causality). [15]

Q. V: Whether God is omnipotent? (The nature of omnipresence: infinity and the properties of infinite bodies). [16]

Q. VI: Whether eternal punishment is owed for each and every mortal sin? (A long series of questions concerned with the justice of eternal punishment citra condignum, with whether exterior acts aggravate sin, and with the nature of sin, including God's role in willing its existence). [17]

The ordering of these Questiones is superficially and approximately based on the arrangement of materials in Peter Lombard's Book of Sentences. Thus,

Question I	corresponds	to	Book I, d. 1
Question II	"	"	Book I, dd. 4-13
Question III	"	"	Book I, dd. 35 & 43-44
Question IV	"	"	Book I, dd. 14-18 & 38-41
Question V	"	"	Book I, d. 37
Question VI	"	"	Book II, dd. 34-44.

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14. Utrum Deus sit omnipotens. Art. I: Utrum Deus potest velle mundum nunquam fuisse. Art. II: Utrum omne futurum sit necessario futurum. (Perez; ff. e.vi^{va}-g.vi^{va})

15. Utrum sic dare primum instans meriti vel demeriti. (Perez; ff. g.vi^{va} - h. vii^{rb})

16. Utrum Deus sit omnipotens. (Perez; ff. h. vii^{va} - k.i^{rb}). The second half of this question appears to correspond to one of the projected articles of Q. III, a possibility reinforced by the common title of Questions III and V.

17. Utrum pro omni et solo peccato mortali pena eterna debeatur. (Perez; ff. k.i^{va} - p.viii^{vb}).

It is clear that Buckingham did envisage the Questiones super Sententias as a commentary on the Sentences, but it is less clear what form he originally intended it to take. Despite the apparent awkwardness of the sandwiching of Question IV between two Questions overtly concerned with God's omnipotence, the order of the Questions is probably as clear, and as close to Lombard's order, as is possible in the case of such wide-ranging questions. However, references in Question I to material in Question VI as being "in secundo libro"[18] and to the second book as "quando tractabo de peccato"[19] strongly suggest that Buckingham had originally intended Question VI to be part of the second book of a four-book commentary on the whole of Lombard's Sentences. The truncated form of Question III reinforces this view, suggesting that for some reason Buckingham abruptly ceased work on the commentary and placed it in circulation.[20] It is significant in this connection that his second, later work, the Questiones Theologice, while treating some new topics, generally continues and amplifies arguments presented earlier in the Questiones super Sententias.

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18. Buckingham; Questiones super Sententias; Q. I, C. I, ll. 320-1 and I. 327.

19. Ibid.; Q. I; C. I, l. 321.

20. It is tempting to see Buckingham's hastily putting aside the Commentary as occasioned by his becoming Chancellor of Exeter Cathedral, but this view is merely speculative and - perhaps - counter to Pantin's interpretation of his chancellorship as notably academic. (Pantin; The English Church in the Fourteenth Century; pp. 113-16). Alternatively, of course, publication may have been advanced to help secure the Chancellorship.

The title of the work and the manuscripts which contain the Questiones super Sententias are discussed in Chapter III below.

a. Variant Forms

Three abridgements of very different character exist of the Questiones super Sententias.

The first, a long straightforward abridgement of even texture, is contained in Palat. lat. ms. 329, a quarto volume of 249 paper leaves comprising at least three distinct works.[21] The second of these, ff. 94^{r}-140^{r},[22] is the Questiones super Sententias.[23] The text is contained in five gatherings numbered 8-12 (6, 6, 5, 6, 6,) with catchwords at ff. 112^{v}, 122^{v}, and 134^{v}.[24] This manuscript is unique in dividing Question V into two parts, the second of which is placed after Question VI. At f. 140^{v} there are various notations including, at the foot of the page, an "Explicit lectura buckinkam"; this is followed, ff. 141^{r}-147^{r}(?), by an alphabetical index and a table of questions. The text is written in single columns in a Fifteenth Century cursive bookhand.

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21. Noted in Stegmüller, F.; Repertorium...; Vol. I, p. 415. Stevenson, S.; Codices Palatini Latini Bibliothecae Vaticanae; Rome; 1886; p. 89.

22. Incorrectly given as ff. 75^{v} - in Codices Palatini Latini Bibliothecae Vaticanae, loc. cit.

23. The manuscript also contains: Herman Hetzstede: questions on the Sentences; ff. 1-94^{r}; and two sets of anonymous questions on the third book of Sentences; ff. 147^{r}-159 and 159-249 (?).

24. No catchword at f. 100^{v}.

The abridgement was made intelligently, the editor having managed to retain the sense and flavour of the original despite drastic cuts in length. Brief samplings suggest a familial affinity with Bibl. Antoniana, ms. 238 (= A, below). [25]

The second abridgement is a collection of several Articles - mostly shortened - from the questions which make up the Questiones super Sententias. It is found in Bibl. Amploniana ms. 4^{o} 110, a large quarto volume of 77 parchment leaves, in ff. 20^{rb}-30^{va}. [26]

It contains: [27]

ff. 20^{rb}-23^{va}: Question III; Art. I&II; essentially complete, lacks introductory material.

ff. 23^{va}-24^{va}: Question IV; shortened by at least half: opening omitted, but some material apparently re-introduced; probably complex.

ff. 24^{va}-25^{va}: Question VI; Art. II (Utrum actus...); first 2/3 omitted.

ff. 25^{va-b}-26^{va}: Question VI; Art. III (Utrum si Deus...); shortened by about half.

ff. 26^{va}-27^{rb}: Question VI; Art. IV (Utrum pura omissio...); about 1/3 omitted.

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25. Ms. 238 of the Biblioteca Antoniana, Padua, is described on pp. 156-7.

26. See Stegmüller, F.; Repertorium....; loc. cit., where it is numbered as a separate work (#900). Described in Schum, W.; Beschreibendes Verzeichniss der Amplonianischen Handschriften-Sammlung zu Erfurt; Berlin; 1887; p. 369. The manuscript also contains: Thomas de Ringstead; lectura; Inc. "Utrum ordo bonitatis naturalis in creaturis.", ff. 1-20; and Robert Holcot; Questiones philosophicae;(unique ?) in ff. 31-77.

27. The incipit (f. 20^{rb}) "⟨A⟩rticulos questionum Bockincam transformando in Tytulos" is a little misleading: the Articles stand on their own, but their titular questions are unchanged.

(continued)
ff. 27^{rb}-28^{vb}: Question VI; Art. V (Utrum voluntas possit...); essentially complete.
ff. 28^{vb}-29^{rb}: Q. VI; Art. VI (Utrum deus voluntate ...); first 2/5 only, shortened by 2/3.
ff. 29^{rb-va}-30^{rb}: Q. VI; Art. I; pars I (Utrum pro omni ...); reduced by 1/4.
ff. 30^{rb}-30^{va}: Q. VI; Art. I; pars II (Utrum de facto ...); apparently complete.

It is clear from even this outline that the quality and importance of these selections varies enormously: the texts of Question III, Articles I and II; Question VI, Articles V and I, appear to be complete and sound enough for their inclusion among the manuscript sources for an edition to be warranted. The manuscript is written in double columns in an English cursive bookhand and dates from shortly after the middle of the Fourteenth Century. The manuscript was doubtless one of those collected by Amplonius Ratinck in the late Fourteenth Century.[28]

The shortest of the abridgements is contained in Paris, Bibl. Nat. fonds latin ms. 14576, a folio volume of 269 parchment leaves.[29] In ff. 262^{ra}-264^{ra} there is a brief outline summary of the principal topics and arguments of the Questiones super Sententias, together with a brief, 24 item alphabetical list of words and concepts with references to the Questions and Conclusions. This short outline carries interjected comments on the dangerous nature of some of

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28. See the description of Amploniana ms. 2^{o} 369 (= E) on pp. 152-3 below.

29. See Stegmüller, F.; Repertorium...; loc. cit.

Buckingham's ideas.[30] The text is written in double columns in a Fourteenth Century university bookhand. The brevity of the text would seem to preclude any easy tracing of manuscript affinities. The volume came into the possession of the library of the monastery of St. Victor in Paris between 1420 (at latest) and May, 1458 (perhaps 1448), while the bibliophile John Lamasse was Prior.[31]

2. The Questiones Theologice[32]

The Questiones Theologice, the later of the two authentic works of Thomas of Buckingham, admits of a much firmer dating than the Questiones super Sententias. Although portions of it may have been written before he became Chancellor of Exeter Cathedral, some passages are explicitly based on a dispute held in Exeter and

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30. Noted in Michalski, K.; Le Probleme de la Volonté...; p. 251, with extracts in Appendix 4, pp. 247-8. De Wulf, M.; Histoire de la Philosophie Médiévale; 6e edn.; Louvain; 1947; Vol. III, p. 172.

31. At the foot of f. 269v, there is the notation: "Hunc librum adquisiuit monasterio sancti victorie prope parisius frater johannes lamasse dum esset prior eiusdem ecclesie". See Fourier-Bonnard; Histoire de l'abbaye royale et de l'ordre des chanoines réguliers de Saint-Victor de Paris; Paris; 1904; Vol. I; pp. 402, 404-5, 420, and 430-1. He comments that "il serait facile de retrouver encore ce que nous appellerons le fonds Lamasse"; ibid.; p. 420.

32. Stegmuller, F.; Repertorium...; pp. 415-6; #901. Weisheipl, J.A.; Repertorium Mertonense; p. 184; #2). See above pp. 37-42.

must have been written during his Chancellorship.[33] Thus the widest possible range of dates within which Buckingham could have completed the work lies between his collation as Chancellor in March, 1346, and his death, shortly before October, 1349. It seems highly probable that publication was towards the end of this period; indeed, judging by the preface contained in the two manuscripts of the Questiones Theologice, there is a considerable likelihood that it was published posthumously.[34] Should this have been the case, it seems probable that someone other than Buckingham assembled the work in its present form and that the form is not necessarily one which Buckingham had intended.[35]

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33. Ms. New College 134, f. 395^{v}: "... hic inserere questionem que Exonie inter quosdam doctores diucius vertebatur [spat. vac.], et fuit questio sub hac forma:..." Pantin; op. cit.; p. 264, n. 3; supplies curavi or curabo for the empty space in the line.

34. "<Q>uestiones tractate per thomam de Bukyngham nuper ecclesie exoniensis Cancellarium. ostendentes inter errores pelagii Cicheronis et scoti catholicum medium invenire". New College ms. 134, f. 324ra. The phrase "nuper... Cancellarium", and possibly the rest of the preface, was probably written by someone other than Buckingham, since it is likely that he died in office.

35. The ordering is obvious in the case of the first three sections, since Buckingham has placed explicit references in the text; the fourth is internally headed but not ordered; the fifth is both headed (in one ms.) and ordered (explicitly inserted by Buckingham into the fourth); the sixth is internally headed but not ordered; the seventh is neither headed nor ordered.

The work, which comprises perhaps 85 or 88 questions, is divided into five to seven sections:[36]

De contingentia futurorum[37]
De causalitate divina
De argumento gracie et de merito creature
De originale peccato
De limbo ante adventum Christi
De circumstantiis meriti et demeriti
De peccato et de pena peccati.[38]

The Questiones Theologice, is contained in two English manuscripts: the Fourteenth Century New College ms. 134, ff. 324^{ra}- 441^{v}, and the Fifteenth Century Merton College ms. 143, ff. 1-83.[39] Although it

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36. The table of questions in New College ms. 134, ff. 440^{r}-441^{v}, contains 85 questions, corrected to 88 in the margin by another hand. Merton College ms. 143 appears to have a quite different numbering system. See Chenu; Les Quaestiones"...; p. 231: "... et s'en remettre au futur editeur...pour denombrer efficacement." Robson; op. cit.; p. 48; alone divided the work into five sections, subsuming the fifth under the fourth and combining the sixth and seventh.

37. This section is now being edited (under the direction of the Revd. J. A. Weisheipl, O.P., of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto) by the Revd. Bartholomew de la Torre, O.P.., as a Doctoral dissertation entitled "Thomas Buckingham's Questiones Theologicae 1 to 15: 'De contingentia futurorum': An Edition and Study".

38. Chenu; loc. cit; suggests this title: the section is untitled in the manuscripts (New College ms. 134, f. 425^{va}, and Merton College ms. 143, f. 75^{ra}).

39. New College ms. 134 is described in Coxe, H.O.; Catalogus Codicum MSS. qui in Collegiis Aulisque Oxoniensibus hodie asservantur; Oxford; 1852; Vol. I; Collegii Novi p. 49. In Chenu; op. cit.; pp. 230 seqq. (includes transcriptions of some long passages and the openings of most of the questions). In Pantin; op. cit.; pp. 113-5, 263-6 (long extracts with corrections of Chenu's transcription). In Oberman; Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine...; pp.190-4.
(continued)

has been suggested recently that the Merton manuscript is an apograph of the New College manuscript, a cursory examination of the two texts suggests that - while the New College manuscript is probably the better text - their relationship is rather more complex.[40]

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39. (continuation)
In Robson; op. cit.; pp. 48-69 and 247-52 (a great number of selections extensively discussed). The manuscript also contains, ff. 3-322^{r}, Thomas Bradwardine, De Causa Dei. The manuscript was commissioned by William Rede (who probably knew both Buckingham and Bradwardine) and was given by him to New College. See Emden; Biographical Register...; Vol. III; pp. 1556-60. See also Powicke, F.M.; Mediaeval Books of Merton College; Oxford; 1931; p. 91. Robson; op. cit.; p. 47; has suggested that only the De Causa Dei was commissioned by Rede and that the two works were bound together by Merton College after Rede's death in 1385. While the reasons he advances are unconvincing, it is clear that the two works are quite separate (being, inter alia, of slightly different sizes), but this does not necessarily argue against their having been both commissioned by Rede or against his having had them bound together.

Merton College ms. 143 is described in Coxe; op. cit.; Vol. I; Collegii Mertonensis pp. 61-2. In Chenu; op. cit.; p. 231. In Powicke; op. cit.; pp. 243-4. In Robson; op. cit.; pp. 46-64, and 247-8. Robson has corrected a major misconception (ibid.; p. 47, n. 3) by showing that the Merton text is complete and not limited to the first three sections, as Chenu had thought (c.f. Chenu; op. cit.; p. 231). The codex also contains, ff. 84-144, Godfrey of Fontaines; Questiones Quodlibetales.

40. Robson; op. cit.; pp. 47-8. The problem, of course, lies in the virtually axiomatic difficulty of determining the relationship of two manuscripts when they are the only survivors of a tradition. Robson's argument, based on identical displacements of materials in the two mss., which in one case allows space at the point of displacement for the insertion of the material and in the other case does not, is in itself a reversible relation: it suggests that one manuscript is dependent on the other, without specifying which has priority. Given a tradition consisting only of the two manuscripts, his argument,that because the New College ms. is older and better the Merton ms. is

(continued)

The title of the work has been variously given, usually according to the number of questions it has been thought to contain, e.g. "Quaestiones Theologicas octoginta",[41] "Quaestiones (88) (tractatae,"[42] "Quaestiones theologicae q. 1-85,"[43] and "Questiones theologice (QQ. 88)."[44] Until such time as the number of questions has been determined by an editor of the whole work, it seems wisest to follow the example of Fr. de la Torre and to refer to it by the general title of Questiones Theologice, with no reference to the number of questions involved.[45]

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40. (continuation)
dependent, would be valid. But, we know that the materials contained in the Questiones Theologice were known in Paris, which strongly suggests that there once existed at least one other copy of the work, and a cursory comparison of the two texts reveals a fairly large number of instances in which the Merton manuscript not only omits material from the New College text, but also includes material not found in the other. These factors strongly suggest that there have been other manuscripts of the Questiones Theologice and that the route from the New College text to the Merton text has suffered contamination: certainly, they argue against an apographic relationship. In this connection, it will be most interesting to learn the results of Fr. de la. Torre's work on the text of the first group of questions. (See above, p. 55, n. 37).

41. Pitseus, Iohannis; Relationum Historicarum de Rebus Anglicis; Paris; 1619; p. 913. (Mentions the New College ms.).

42. Tanner, Thomas; Bibliotheca Britannico-Hibernica; London; 1748; p. 137.

43. Stegmüller, F.; Repertorium...; Vol. I, p. 416

44. Weisheipl, J.A.; Repertorium Mertonense; p. 184

45. Above, p.55, n. 37

Oberman has conclusively shown that Conclusions 13 and 15 of the Questiones Theologice are explicit refutations of sections on future contingents in Book III of Bradwardine's De Causa Dei.[46]

3. The Tractatus de Infinito[47]

A tractatus which begins, "Whether anything is actually infinite", is contained in ff. 48^r-59^r of Bibl. Amploniana ms. 2^o 135. The tractate, which bears no title, is recorded in Schum's catalogue as possibly having been written by Buckingham.[48] The entry reads:

> "Tractatus de infinito Backingham*) tam loyce quam philosophie naturali utilis. *) Guilelmi Collingham nach Bl.-Ueberschr.
> Anf: Utrum aliquid sit actualiter infinitum.
> Ende: pars esset divisa a toto".[49]

It seems most likely that this altered entry to which Schum refers is on one of the fly-leaves of the manuscript; certainly, there is no evidence of it in the tractate itself, i.e. ff. 48^r-59^r, which has been consulted in microfilm. Rather, the tractate gives evidence only of Collingham's authorship and that in a flamboyant manner, each opening being inscribed "Guillelmus" at the top of the left-hand sheet and

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46. Oberman; Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine...; pp. 192-4. See below, p. 65, and n. 69.

47. Stegmüller, F.; op. cit.; p. 415; in #900 mss.. Weisheipl, J.A.; loc. cit.; #1).

48. "Utrum aliquid sit actualiter infinitum". Schum, W.; Beschreibendes verzeichniss der Amplonianishchen Handschriften-Sammlung zu Erfurt; Berlin; 1887; pp. 88-9.

49. Ibidem.

"Collingham" at the top of the right-hand sheet.

Since the manuscript appears to be unique, there is little hope of further evidence for the authorship of this apparently minor work coming to light. [50] Buckingham's claim rests entirely on Schum's entry. Enquiries have been made of the Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek in Erfurt to clarify the sources of his entry, but - since that entry can be based on no more than a fly-leaf table of contents - it is unlikely that any clarification will alter substantially the present balance of evidence. From this, it appears that William Collingham is by far the more likely author.

4. Questiones in lib. I Sententiarum in Vat. lat. 1089. [51]

The Fifteenth Century codex Vat. lat. 1089 contains ff. 1^{ra} - 107^{va}, an anonymous collection of questions on Book I of Peter

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50. There is no indication of any further copies, or of any firmer attribution, in: Hauréau, B.; Initia Operum Scriptorum Latinorum Medii Potissimum Aevi ex Codicibus Manuscriptis et Libris Impressis Alphabetice Digessit; Brepols; 8 vols.; Turnhout; 1974. Little, A. G.; Initia Operum Latinorum quae saeculis xiii. xiv. xv attribuuntur; Manchester; 1904. Thorndike, L., and Kibre, P.; A Catalogue of Incipits of Mediaeval Scientific Writings in Latin; Mediaeval Academy of America; 1963. Mohan, G. E., O. F. M.; Incipits of Philosophical Writings in Latin of the XIIIth - XVth centuries; n.d. (c. 1973); microfilm copy print in the Bodleian Library of the unpublished original at St. Bonaventure University, New York. (f. 840 notes this ms. of de infinito, giving Schum's attributions).

51. Noted in Stegmüller; op. cit.; p. 415, in #899, mss. Weisheipl, J. A., op. cit.; p. 185, in #3) mss.

Lombard's Book of Sentences.[52] The Vatican inventories of books ascribe this work to "Io. Bocchincana," identified by Pelzer with Thomas of Buckingham.[53] However, examination of the work suggests that these ascriptions are untimely: while the first two-thirds of the commentary are as yet unidentified, the last third, ff. 76^{ra}-107^{va}, is a portion of Thomas of Strassburg's commentary on Book I of the Sentences.[54] The commentary is peculiar, then, in the scribe's having switched from one commentary to another (perhaps unwittingly, thinking he was changing from one exemplar to another) in the middle of the work. The smoothness of the transition is notable: the first

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52. Described in Pelzer, A.: Codices Vaticani Latini..., t. II, I, Codices 679-1134; Citta del Vaticano; 1931; pp. 686-7 Inc. "Queramus istam questionem. primo. utrum uidelicet ex hoc quod scientia preexigit in scito necessario imperfectionem. impediat de deo esse scientiam proprie dictam. Et uidetur quod sic". The manuscript also contains, ff. 108^{r}-133^{r}, Hervaei Natalis; Tractatus de unitate formarum; (ed. Venetiis 1513; ff. 71^{r}-87^{va}, l. 26.); incomplete.

53. Pelzer; ibidem; gives these references: "in Inventario Bibliothecae Palatinae Sixti IV cod. Vat. lat. 3947, f. 35^{v} inscribitur Questiones primi sententiarum Bocchincane: et Tractatus de formis; in Inventario librorum lat. mss. Bibliothecae Vaticanae, t. 2, p. 287 Io. Bochincanae Questiones super primo sententiarum. Item de formalitatibus Anon".

54. From lib. I, d. xxiiij (Utrum in divinis sit verus numerus?) through the first half of d. xlvii & xlviii (Expl.: tunc sufficit non tristari. Ad argumentum principale dicendi quod in deo esset realis mutatio quia sibi aduenire noua uolitio ut probaui superius. Et in hoc terminatur lectura primi sententiarum). Thomas of Strassburg; Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum; Venetiis; 2 vols.; 1564; Vol. I, ff. 82^{vb}-121^{vb}, l. 37.

commentary ends at about the point in the Sentences where the second, fragmentary, commentary begins; thus, there is no indication of discontinuity.

Although no easy explanation of the ascription of authorship to "Io. Bocchincana" presents itself, it seems unlikely that either John Buckingham[55] or Thomas of Buckingham is to be regarded as author of this commentary. The former studied Canon Law rather than Theology; the latter might have written two commentaries on Book I of Lombard's Sentences, but the improbability of this is reinforced by apparent differences in the styles of the two commentaries. It seems possible that the author will prove to have been, like the two other authors represented in this manuscript, a Parisian religious of the first half of the Fourteenth Century.

5. The Question in B.N. fonds latin 16708.[56]

A question entitled "de voluntate" occurs in Paris Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 16708, ff. 264^{r}-265^{r}. This question has been ascribed to Buckingham on the grounds that it is thrice annotated in the margin

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55. Not John Buckingham, Bishop of Lincoln. See Emden; Biographical Register...; Vol. I, p. 298.

56. This question is noted in Baudry, L.; Remarques sur trois Manuscrits Occamistes; Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge; Vol. X (1946); Paris; pp. 169-174. See also Chenu; op. cit.; p. 231.

"Bokinkam"; or, rather, "bokinkam", "opinio bokinkam", and "bokinkam responsio".[57]

The question is not Buckingham's however, but rather is solved by means of his conclusions. Thus, once the question has been stated, the author writes: "For the solution of the question, conclusions will be considered which bokinkam the englishman asserts, as will be clear".[58] Two conclusions are then advanced: these are the first two conclusions of the first section of the Questiones Theologice.[59] In the discussion which follows, two otherwise unascribed arguments are annotated in the margin as "opinio bokinkam" and "bokinkam responsio".[60] While this question is clearly not by Buckingham, it is

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57. The question, "Utrum voluntas nostra producit actus suos necesitate antecedente que est divina voluntas", is thus annotated at ff. 264, 264^{v}, and 265, respectively. Baudry; loc. cit.; comments: "Des notes marginales font probablement connaître l'auteur du fragment: Bokinkam, opinio Bokinkam, Bokinkam responsio" Chenu; loc. cit., n. 1; is more definite: "On trouvera ailleurs à l'état isolé, telle ou telle question de Buckingham; ainsi dans Paris Nat. lat. 16708, fol. 264-265, la question Utrum voluntas nostra producit actus suos necessitate antecedente que est divina voluntas, annotée trois fois en marge Bokinkam".

58. "Pro solutione questionis ponentur conclusiones quas ponit bokinkam anglicus ut patebit ---", in f. 264^{r}, ll. 43-4

59. The conclusions are, as given in this question: "Nulla res secundum suam essentiam nisi deo ipsam per se et proprie faciente eternaliter prevolente". and "Non omnis <o> causa qua posita cum omnibus suis dispositionibus previis quibus ipsam causat suum causatum necessario et ineuitabiliter sequitur illud est necessitas antecedens", f. 264^{v}, ll. 1-5.

60. As noted in n. 57 above, these are at ff. 264^{v} and 265^{r} respectively.

of importance both as an indication that his ideas were considered noteworthy and for its evidence that the Questiones Theologice - or at least, some of its conclusions - received circulation outside England.[61]

6. B.N. fonds latin 16409.[62]

This manuscript contains the comment on f. 23^{v}, in the course of recording a questio disputata in aula propria, that "Buckingham asserts the following conclusion against the author <of> De Causa Dei;" i.e. against Thomas Bradwardine.[63] The conclusion which follows is the ninth conclusion of the first part of the Questiones Theologice.[64] This citation has achieved an unwarranted significance by means of a process of increasingly vigorous affirmation: the original "Buckingham asserts" of the manuscript has developed into, most recently;

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61. The Questiones Theologice is known only in two manuscripts located in England. It may be noted that paradoxically the Questiones super Sententias is known only in manuscripts located on the Continent.

62. Described in Hauréau, B.; 'Notice sur le numéro 16409 des manuscrits latins de la bibliothèque nationale', Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale, XXXIV, pt. ii; Paris; 1895; pp. 319-62.

63. "Ponit bokinkam talem conclusionem contra auctorem de causa dei:"; f. 23^{v}, l. 15.

64. "voluntas creata potest libere libertate contradictionis producere actum suum"; f. 23^{v}, following immediately " dei" in n. 63 above. Identified by Robson; Wyclif and the Oxford Schools; p. 43, n. 1

"Shortly after 1340, Buckingham seems to have gone to Paris where he may have held a chair of theology until 1346 and where he engaged in a publicized debate in aula attacking the position of Bradwardine".[65]

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65. Courtenay, W. J.; op. cit.; p. 150. The progress towards this interpretation has been gradual: Michalski, K.; Les courants philosophiques à Paris et à Oxford pendant le XIV^e siècle; Bulletin international de l'academie polonaise des sciences et des lettres, classe hist. phil.; Cracow; 1922-4, p. 69, (Présenté 19 Janv., 1920): "Et pourtant Buckhingham <sic> fut connu à Paris par son opposition au déterminisme théologique, ainsi qu'en témoigne une 'disputatio in aula' ténue à Paris dont il est fait mention dans le manuscrit de Thomas de Pologne (Fonds latin 16409) et où les opinions de Buckingham sont opposés aux idées de Bradwardine". and Le problème de la volunté à Oxford et à Paris au XIV^e siècle; Studia Philosophica, Vol. II; Leopoli (Lemberg); 1937; p. 250 (18): "A Paris on considérait Thomas de Buckingham comme l'adversiare de Thomas de Bradwardin ainsi qu'il résulte d'une dispute in aula, conservée dans le manuscrit parisien de Thomas de Cracovie". Oberman, H. A.; Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine...; p. 189; (1957): "It is not impossible that Buckingham was 'Magister Regens' in Paris for some time, where, according to Thomas of Cracow (c. 1345), he made a name for himself as a critic of Bradwardine". Emden, A. B.; A Biographical Register...; Vol. I, p. 298: "Possibly studied theology at Paris c. 1343; reported by mag. Th. of Cracow as having engaged there in a disputatio in aula with mag. Th. Bradwardine (q.v.)". "but; op. cit.; Vol. III, pp. xv-xvi (1959); under Bradwardine: "delete para. 3, as it has been pointed out to me by fr. B. J. Fleming, S.J., that M. B. Hauréau in his 'Notice...' <my contraction> dates this MS. c. 1360 and notes that the disputant, probably Étienne de Chaumont, is weighing views that had been expressed by Buckingham and Bradwardine respectively and comes down on the side of Buckingham, but does not intend the inference that either Buckingham or Bradwardine was present". Robson; op. cit.; pp. 42-3 (1966): "It is also possible that he visited Paris (where two copies of his Sentences survive). A collection of Parisian incepting exercises, belonging to Thomas of Cracow, who was a

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However, it is clear from the context that the disputant is quoting Buckingham against Bradwardine's views, and that Buckingham himself is not taking part in the dispute.[66]

The significance of this question lies not in its supposed evidence for Buckingham's life, but in its evidence that the controversy between Buckingham and Bradwardine on the question of free will was current matter for debate in the schools of Paris twenty-five years after their deaths,[67] in its evidence that the Questiones Theologice was known in Paris,[68] and in the apparent understanding that Buckingham is attempting to refute in the Questiones Theologice Bradwardine's attack on free will in the De Causa Dei.[69]

(continuation)
student at the university about 1350, cites him as an opponent of Bradwardine on the question of created will. Buckingham incorporated this proposition into his Questiones.〈!〉 His visit, if it did occur, is likely to have taken place between 1344 and 1346, when he became Chancellor of Exeter. But Thomas of Cracow may simply have been recording an Oxford〈!〉 dispute; the reference does not in itself imply Buckingham's presence at Paris". See also above pp. 30-1, n. 62.

66. Haurćau; op. cit.; suggests that the disputant was Étienne de Chaumont.

67. Haurćau; op. cit.; dates the disputatio ca. 1373. Buckingham had died by Nov. 1349; see above, p. 39 ff. Bradwardine died 26th August, 1349: (Emden; Biographical Register...; Vol. I, p. 245).

68. See above, p. 63, n. 61.

69. Oberman; Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine...; p. 192: "Owing to the note made by Thomas of Cracow it has been thought, ever since the days of the Collectio Judiciorum by du Plessis d'Argentré[1]), that the man whom Buckingham is attacking

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in his Questiones ⟨Theologice⟩ must have been Thomas Bradwardine. 1) Recorded there for the first time, op. cit. (Paris, 1728), I, p. 325 ⟨actually at I. p. 328⟩."

II

The Doctrinal Content

of Question I, Conclusions I and II,

of the Questiones super Sententias

of Thomas of Buckingham

A. Topics

Discussion of the first Question of the Questiones super Sententias of Thomas of Buckingham comprises a series of eight Conclusions:

> Question I: Whether to delight in God is the highest reward of any blessed creature?[1]
>
> Conclusion I: Only the privation of good is of itself evil.[2]
>
> Conclusion II: Every privation of something which ought to inhere is as evil as is good that which it, of itself and essentially, takes away, if it were good.[3]

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1. "Utrum Deo frui sit summa merces cuiuslibet creature beate." See below, p. 196 ff. "Deo frui" is to be understood as the beatific act: see Baudry, L; Lexique Philosophique de Guillaume d'Ockham; Paris; 1958; pp. 97-8.

2. "Sola privatio boni est per se malum." See below, pp. 198-235.

3. "Omnis privatio rei debite inesse est tantum malum quantum est bonum quod ipsa per se et essentialiter privat si esset bonum." See below, pp. 236-313. "Rei" is used in such a wide variety of meanings in the discussion - from specific sense-objects to universal forms - that it is here translated by the least specific of words. "debite inesse": "owed to inhere", generally translated as 'which ought to inhere', is used both loosely in the sense of "which belongs to n." and in the strict sense of "without which n. ceases to be n." which is used of formal principles (it is rarely clear whether this is used only of substance, or whether it applies to certain sorts of accidents as well). It may be understood best, perhaps, in the sense of necessary predication; see William of Ockham; Summa Logicae; ed. Boehner, P. et al.; St. Bonaventure, N.Y.; 1974; p. 653: "Notandum est hic quod per 'inesse' intelligitur 'praedicari'." et seq.

Conclusion III: No privation is of itself and essentially to someone greater evil than the good of which it is the privation, if it were good.[4]

Conclusion IV: Every sensible punishment is more to be shunned than any punishment of damnation, so far as it is punishment.[5]

Conclusion V: The privation of every good is not evil.[6]

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4. "Nulla privatio est per se et essentialiter alicui magis mala quam bonum cuius est privatio si esset bonum." (Perez; ff. b.iij^{va}-b.v^{rb})

5. "Omnis pena sensus est magis fugibilis quam aliqua pena dampni quoad esse pene." (Perez; ff. b.v^{rb}-c.i^{vb}) Buckingham regularly uses "eligibilis" and "fugibilis" in opposition to denote desirability and its contrary without expressing that opposition by means of a simple negation - e.g. optabilis/inoptabilis -which would beg the question of the nature of their opposition. Unfortunately, English does not posess a simple adjective with quite the same meaning as "fugibilis" (most convey some reason for undesirability) and compound adjectives of negation must be ruled out since, as in Latin, they would beg the question: the consequence is the translation of "fugibilis" by the inelegent phrase "to be shunned" and the consequent occasional translation of "eligibilis" by "to be desired", in the interests of symmetry, rather than "desirable".

"Pena sensus" and "pena dampni" are to be understood in slightly different ways: "pena dampni" is the punishment of simple damnation which, in the beginning of the Question, Buckingham virtually defines as privation of the beatific vision; as such, it is not punishment in the sense of inflicted pain, but rather in the sense of eternal exclusion from the bliss of heaven. "Pena sensus", on the other hand, is punishment which is felt by the senses - i.e. pain - and is used indifferently of earthly and infernal punishments: perhaps best translated by the compound "sense-punishment", it is here translated by the less awkward "sensible punishment" ("sensual punishment", which might seem preferable, has less desirable connotations).

6. "Non cuiuslibet boni privatio est mala." (Perez; ff. c.i^{vb}-c.ij^{ra}).

Conclusion VI: As much as some thing is to be desired, by so much is its perfect privation to be shunned, and the contrary.[7]

Conclusion VII: No misery, being misery that is not a fault, is as much to be shunned as not to be is to be shunned.[8]

Conclusion VIII: To delight in God is the greatest possible good of a rational creature.[9]

As this list of Conclusions suggests, discussion of the topic question of Question I is preceeded by an investigation of the nature of evil per se and - in consequence - of the nature of good per se. As will be discussed below,[10] it seems most likely that this roundabout approach was taken in order to find a means of removing the concepts "good" and "evil" from the limbo of contingency upon God's will, however bound it might be as potentia ordinata, into which they had been plunged by contemporary debate, and thus to establish standards of natural good and evil which might then be applied to the moral

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7. "Quantum eligenda est aliqua res, tantum fugibilis est eius perfecta privatio, et econtra." (Perez; ff. c.ii^{ra}-c.iiij^{vb}.)

8. "Nullum miserum esse miseria que non est culpa est tam fugiendum quam fugiendum est non esse." (Perez; ff. c.iiij^{vb}-d.v^{vb}.) "Non esse" is to be taken as meaning "to be annihilated": to cease to exist in any form, death being regarded - in this context - as a mere change of form.

9. "Deo frui est creature rationali maximum bonum possibile." (Perez; ff. d.v^{va}-e.ii^{va}.)

10. See below, pp. 130-135.

realm.

The topic question of Question I (Whether to delight in God is the highest reward of any blessed creature?) is introduced by a brief transitional argument which prepares the way for the first conclusion. Briefly to paraphrase this argument: To the extent that it (to delight in God) is "good" to some rational creature, to the same extent would its loss be "evil" to him: but if it is the highest reward, then its loss would be the greatest punishment of the damned. But its loss is the punishment of children (unbaptised infants) who are excused all punishment: thus it must be false that it is the highest reward. But authority (Peter Lombard and Augustine) says that it is the highest reward. The solution of this question will be approached through the preliminary discussion of several conclusions.[11]

This preliminary argument serves as a useful introduction to the Question as a whole. In particular, it illustrates the style and

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11. "Et arguo quod non, quia tunc tam bona est creature rationali fruitio divina tam mala sit ei carentia fruitionis divine. Et tunc carentia fruitionis divine foret maxima pena dampnatorum. Consequens est falsum, quia illa est pena parvulorum, que est omnium penarum mitissima, ut patet Enchiridion, c. 103.

Ad oppositum, arguo per Magistrum Primo Sententiarum, d. 1, c. 2, ubi loquitur magister de fruitione divina et dicit: 'Haec merces summa est, ut ipso Deo perfruamur.' Et per Augustinum, Primo De Trinitate, c. 37, ubi dicit, 'Visio Dei facie ad faciem est summum premium quod promittitur iustis.' In primis pro solutionem istius questionis ponatur quasdam conclusiones quas primo tractabo de inde redibo ad questionem principalem." Questiones super Sententias; Q. I; C. I; ll. 4-16.

method which Buckingham generally employs. This tight, logical reasoning, in which concepts are manipulated in an almost mathematical manner, finds expression in Buckingham's typically Mertonian use of the "...'letter-calculus', the use of letters of the alphabet to represent ideas, which facilitated academic disputations, but which was detested by humanists and almost unintelligible to later readers."[12] There can be no doubt that this style of itself makes a theological work difficult reading. While it is clear that Richard de Bury was referring to works of logic when he remarked in the Philobiblon that the unproductive scholars of Paris "are losing all propriety of logic, except that our English subtleties, which they denounce in public, are the subject of their furtive vigils", his remark could be applied to Buckingham's work as well, both because it is a clear extension of the "English subtleties" in logic into Theology and because it is, unfortunately, quite tortuous enough at times to warrant vigils.[13]

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12. Weisheipl; The Development of Physical Theory...; p. 78. Revealingly, one such argument prompted a reader to comment in a marginal note, "compute ..." ("computa..." Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, Ms. 133, f. 5^{r}. See below, pp. 155-6).

13. "et omnis logicae proprietate privantur; nisi quod Anglicanas subtilitates, quibus palam detrahunt, vigiliis furtivis addiscunt." Richard de Bury; Philobiblon; Blackwell; Oxford; 1960; Chapter IX; p. 107. While there is no evidence that de Bury knew Buckingham personally, he certainly knew of him, both through the Mertonians in his household and through the papal mandate cited above, p. 15 ff.

While the "mathematical" aspect of the work does give rise to a difficult - even tortuous - style, it has the compensatory advantage of introducing a greater precision into the formulation and solution of theological problems than is to be found in more discoursive approaches; or, rather, of giving the appearance of an increase in precision, since the steps in the chains of logical reasoning are more open to analysis and the meanings of terms are more firmly fixed. In practice, the advantages seem to be balanced by difficulties in the initial stages of formulation and there are ambiguities in language and thought which survive the more rigorous style. Further, it seems likely that this method shapes not merely the style of the argument but the actual content as well, limiting the argument to materials which can be treated by simple and complex syllogisms.

If the introductory argument given above is treated in this manner, some of these aspects will become apparent. Let (to delight in God)=A; the loss of (to delight in God)= -A; the greatest reward=B; the greatest punishment =-B; and the punishment of children =C. Then, to the question "Does A=B ?", Buckingham argues that if A=X (some quantity of good), then -A=-X (the same quantity of evil); by analogy, it follows that, if A=B, then -A=-B. But, since -A=C and C<-B, it follows that -A<-B. Since the premises (A=B and -A=C)are given by authority, but lead to incompatible consequences (-A=-B and -A<-B) an apparently insoluble problem has been posed.

Since this "mathematical" treatment is not actually Buckingham's, rather than discuss it in detail it will be sufficient to use it to illustrate some general features of the method. First, it requires that the problems submitted to it be undistorted by the process of formulation. For example, it is in this case crucial both that A and -A be seen as having equivalent relations to external standards of good (X) and evil (-X), and that there be a cosmic standard of moral parity such that the greatest punishment be the negation of the greatest reward (that it=-B). Given this, then A=B and -A=-B, resulting in the problem of -A=C<-B, but -A=-B. The Conclusions I-VII of this first question are directed precisely to proving, and to exploring the limits of, this principle of moral parity.

But, there is the underlying question of whether quantitative methods can be applied with any real accuracy to qualitative problems and, beyond this, whether these methods - whatever their accuracy - may not grossly misrepresent the nature of the relationship of man to God by making it appear to be other than personal and subjective. This question will be examined later, particularly in connection with Thomas Bradwardine.[14]

It is also clear that the questions asked must be ones which are amenable to analysis by means of the chosen method. It may be argued that this was a chronic problem of the scholastic method: i.e. that argument by disputation (assuming a two-valued logic according

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14. See below, pp. 129 and 135-138.

to which, given that statements must be either true or false, disproof of the objections to a statement is proof of the validity of that statement) does not necessarily lead to a proof of more than the logical consistency of the position asserted. Compensation for this narrowness was normally provided by means of fairly general interspersed discussions; in Buckingham's case, these seem to be minimal, although sufficient for the advancement of his arguments.

To turn from these general comments on Buckingham's method, based on the introductory argument of Question I, let us examine the first of his Conclusions: "Only the privation of good is of itself evil."[15] This is one of the most banal of Mediaeval commonplaces, a statement so unexceptionable that its presence - when presented as a Conclusion requiring an extended defence - actually seems to require an explanation. In this case, as we have just seen, the argument which introduced Question I assumed this understanding of the nature of evil, so there is some justification for this Conclusion as the defence of a fundamental assumption; more to the point, however, it is a vital precondition for the second Conclusion (Every privation of something which ought to inhere is as evil as is good that which it, of itself and essentially, takes away, if it were good.) which is specifically essential to the solution of the initial problem. In short, Conclusion I is a necessary step in the chain of conclusions by which the initial question is resolved: unexceptionable

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15. See above, p. 68; and below, pp. 198 ff.

in itself, it prepares the way for the critical computation of relative good and evil on which the resolution is based.

Buckingham's first arguments in favour of the conclusion are from authority: he cites nine works of St. Augustine, two Pseudo-Augustinian works,[16] three works of St. Anselm, and once each St. John Damascene, Boethius, the Glossa Ordinaria, Peter Lombard's Book of Sentences, and Hugh of St. Victor. He then advances seven arguments in favour of the Conclusion: 1) that sin must have some reality and that, failing a formal negative essence, it would have to have a positive essence; that this is false since God, who is the author of all existents, would then be the author of sin; thus, sin must have only a formal negative essence;[17] 2) that if sin were positive evil, God would be able to conserve directly the good which it would otherwise remove, in which case sin would not be of itself

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16. The De Fide ad Petrum of Fulgentius Ruspensis and the Hypomnesticon of Prosper Aquitanus. (Q. I; C. I; ll. 36-44 and 63-5.)

17. (Q. I; C. I; ll. 96-104.) "Sin" is here, and elsewhere, understood to be "malum culpe." Compare this assumption that God is not the author of sin with Question VI, Art. VI, pars II: "Sed magis credo quod loquendo de voluntate beneplaciti et approbationis deus non vult peccatum nec vult peccatum esse, sed loquendo de volitione que est simplex velle siue beneplacito. Et ad probationem probabile est quod deus vult hominem peccare et peccatum esse, illud velle simpliciter sine beneplacito et ab approbatione vocatur a doctoribus permissio et aliquando operatio: quia nunquam permittit aliquid fieri nisi velle beneplaciti et approbationis vel simplici velle voluerit illud fieri inesse. (Perez; ff. o.ij^{vb}-o.iij^{ra})

and formally evil, but only insofar as it effectively removes good;[18] 3) if sin were something positive, then it could be created directly by God; but, made by God, it would not be sin;[19] 4) if evil were positive, then - against authority - there must be a greatest evil (just as there is a greatest good: God);[20] 5) if evil were positive, then there would always be some portion of evil not actually engaged in privation, which is against authority;[21] 6) Augustine argues that evil is not eternal, since it is the privation of good and good is temporal; thus, if evil were positive, it would also be eternal;[22] 7) if evil is positive, then, since the creation is good, evil must be a good which is evil because it somehow upsets the natural order; but in that case it is only accidentally, rather than of itself and essentially, evil.[23]

Buckingham then advances ten objections to the Conclusion:

1) that Anselm, in De Casu Dyaboli, refers to evil which is positive.[24]

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18. Q. I; C. I; ll. 105-119.

19. Ibid.; ll. 120-3.

20. Ibid.; ll. 124-139.

21. Ibid.; ll. 140-50.

22. Ibid.; ll. 151-6; a number of propositions concerning the eternity of the world, of species, and of matter were included in the Paris condemnations of 1277. Thus, by authority, good cannot be eternal; similarly, evil cannot be eternal. Denifle, H.; Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis; Vol. I; Paris; 1889; pp. 543-555.

23. Q. I; C. I; ll. 157-77.

24. Ibid.; ll. 179-86.

2) that, if anguish is evil because it removes some good, but God can effect directly the same privation, then it is not the anguish which is evil, but the privation.[25]

3) that, according to this, positive actions such as wounding or whipping are not evil.[26]

4) that, since there exists good which is not the privation of evil, there must exist evil which is not the privation of good.[27]

5) that hunger, sadness, fear, etc. are not merely privations of good.[28]

6) that since pleasure is of itself good, sadness must be of itself evil (and thus be positive evil).[29]

7) that according to this all punishment would be privative (of damnation) and none would be positive (sensible); but this is against authority.[30]

8) that, since changed circumstances can cause a formerly harmless privation to become evil, privation is not of itself

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25. Ibid.; ll. 187-95.

26. Ibid.; ll. 196-8.

27. Ibid.; ll. 199-202.

28. Ibid.; ll. 203-8.

29. Ibid.; ll. 209-13.

30. Ibid.; ll. 214-17; the implication is that this applies to the punishments of the damned primarily.

evil.[31]

9) that, if only the privation of good is of itself evil, then any privation will be of itself evil; but, since a rational creature can lose some justice without sin, no privation of justice is of itself sin.[32]

10) that, if there were some rational creature with a single indivisible form with nothing superadded and which was capable of sin, if that creature were evil it would be by reason of the privation of some good which formerly inhered; but such a good would have to be superadded to its present state, which is impossible since - by definition - the creature has a single indivisible form with nothing superadded.[33]

Without a general discussion, Buckingham replies to these objections:

to 1) by citing Augustine in opposition and by giving examples of privative evil.[34]

to 2) by objecting that in man there is a good which is the contrary of sadness and that, even if God could remove that good directly, it is not in his nature to do so.[35]

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31. Ibid.; ll. 218-32

32. Ibid.; ll. 233-45

33. Ibid.; ll. 246-60

34. Ibid.; ll. 263-78

35. Ibid.; ll. 279-87

to 3) by arguing that they are evil, not in themselves, but because they result in a privation of health.[36]

to 4) by denying the consequence: good is positive, so must evil be.[37]

to 5) by asserting that hunger, etc., are not of themselves evil, but only if they take away good.[38]

to 6) by asserting that sadness is not of itself evil, but only as it takes away good.[39]

to 7) by agreeing that all punishment is privative (of damnation) since sensible punishment is a privation of the quiet of the senses.[40]

to 8) by objecting that, if the changed circumstances make the privation evil, it is still the privation which is evil, because it is now a privation of good which ought to inhere.[41]

to 9) by asserting that such a privation can be and not be evil; therefore, it is not of itself evil; to be treated later.[42]

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36. Ibid.; ll. 288-90.

37. Ibid.; ll. 291-2.

38. Ibid.; ll. 293-5.

39. Ibid.; ll. 296-8.

40. Ibid.; ll. 299-307.

41. Ibid.; ll. 308-313.

42. Ibid.; ll. 314-21; deferred to "secundo libro": i.e. Q. VI; Art. IV.

> to 10) by asserting that, were such a creature to exist, sin would be in it a privation of justice; were the creature then to sin, the sin would be a privation of some good which it had from God, for the sin would not be the privation of some positive good which it previously had.[43]

Having thus answered the objections to Conclusion I (Only the privation of good is of itself evil), Buckingham now turns to Conclusion II (Every privation of something which ought to inhere is as evil as is good that which it, of itself and essentially, takes away, if it were good). This second conclusion is crucial to the development of Buckingham's argument, since it provides the basis of his method of calculating relative good and evil.

Without initially claiming support from authority, he proceeds directly to advance seven arguments in support of the Conclusion: 1) that if the privation of something is not as evil as the thing which was lost was good, then there must be some intermediate value between the two such that, if the thing is lost and the intermediate value acquired, more good is received than evil, but this is absurd;[44] 2) that in giving satisfaction for a privation, the amount is equivalent to the quantity of good taken; thus, the amount of evil is equal to the amount of good taken away;[45] 3) rewards or payment are always of

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43. Ibid.; ll. 322-331

44. Q. I; C. II; ll. 4-38.

45. Ibid.; ll. 39-45.

good received; thus, evil is in proportion to the good removed;[46] 4) that, since the only privation which is evil is privation of good which ought to inhere, it follows that to the extent that something is good and useful to someone its privation will be evil to him;[47] 5) that evil is the corruption of good, so the degree of corruption is the measure of evil;[48] 6) that to a rational creature the loss of the divine vision is as evil as the vision would be good (proof as in "1)");[49] 7) that, since the punishments of hell and of sin are privative rather than sensible, the degrees of punishment must accord with the degrees of privation.[50]

Against Conclusion II, Buckingham raises twenty-four objections:

1) that God then punishes for the least mortal sin as much as he rewards for any good merit, since however much someone may merit blessedness he will merit the loss of all of it for the least mortal sin.

2) that God then punishes evil more than he rewards good merit, for the loss of beatitude is as much evil as blessedness is good, but the least mortal sin merits the loss of all the good of blessedness.[52]

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46. Ibid.; ll. 46-50.

47. Ibid.; ll. 51-58.

48. Ibid.; ll. 59-64.

49. Ibid.; ll. 65-96.

50. Ibid.; ll. 97-111.

51. Ibid.; ll. 114-123.

52. Ibid.; ll. 124-132.

3) that it follows that someone in hell is punished as much as he would have been rewarded had he not sinned but stood firm and been saved.[53]

4) that it follows that someone who lives well all his life and in the end dies with a modicum of mortal sin is more heavily punished in hell than another who has always lived badly.[54]

5) that it follows that it promotes damnation more to abstain from good than to do good in which one does not continue.[55]

6) that, if the loss of the divine vision is as evil as the vision is good, it follows that any damned creature would do better not to be than to be.[56]

7) that the punishment of the damned (loss of the divine vision) would be greater evil than any sin is evil.[57]

8) that it follows that a soul in purgatory would be punished as much as it would later be rewarded in heaven.[58]

9) that, if someone can merit de condigno the loss of beatitude through sin, then he can also merit de condigno beatitude by an act.[59]

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53. Ibid.; ll. 133-140.

54. Ibid.; ll. 141-160.

55. Ibid.; ll. 161-167.

56. Ibid.; ll. 168-175.

57. Ibid.; ll. 176-185.

58. Ibid.; ll. 186-193.

59. Ibid.; ll. 194-200.

10) that, if the loss of the divine vision is as evil as the vision is good, then a man would do better to choose to be an ass or a rock than to live eternally with the loss of the vision.[60]

11) that, since God can cause the loss of beatitude to be not evil, the loss of the divine vision is not as evil as beatitude is good.[61]

12) that, since circumstances can affect the degree to which a privation is evil, not every privation of being which ought to inhere is as evil as that being would have been good.[62]

13) that, if the privation of A is less evil than the privation of B, then A is a greater good than B.[63]

14) that it follows that every mortal sin is more evil than any grace is good.[64]

15) that, if A is some good less than B, then the loss of A is as evil as A was good, and the omission of A will be as much a sin as A, less than B, was good; but this cannot be, since there would then be an infinite series of sins of omission.[65]

16) that, since circumstances can affect the extent to which a good

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60. Ibid.; ll. 201-226.

61. Ibid.; ll. 227-242.

62. Ibid.; ll. 243-257.

63. Ibid.; ll. 258-263.

64. Ibid.; ll. 264-270.

65. Ibid.; ll. 271-285.

is good to someone, the same good can have different values simultaneously, and its privation different degrees of evil.[66]

17) that, if two privations are equal except insofar as one good is more needed than the other, the privations are unequally evil.[67]

18) that, to the extent that something is evil its privation is good, and so a creature must contain good equal to its capacity for evil.[68]

19) that positive evil is no more evil than its opposite good is good; but it is more evil than pure privation, since it includes it.[69]

20) that, since the rational soul is better than the animal soul, but the loss of the animal soul is worse than the loss of the rational soul since its loss implies the loss of the rational soul as well, it does not follow that the privation of something is only as evil as the thing itself is good.[70]

21) that, if some good is good only because it removes a particular evil, then that good is as good as the evil is evil; but that good also conveys good to the extent that its privation is evil, so the good is more good than its privation is evil.[71]

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66. Ibid.; ll. 286-295.

67. Ibid.; ll. 296-303.

68. Ibid.; ll. 304-312.

69. Ibid.; ll. 313-321.

70. Ibid.; ll. 322-326.

71. Ibid.; ll. 327-335.

22) that, since God cannot cause a good act to be de congruo or de condigno more meritorious than the least mortal sin or a strong venial sin is demeritorious, it follows that the least mortal sin merits more evil than any possible good is good.[72]

23) that, because circumstances can influence the degree to which a privation is evil, no privation of a thing is evil.[73]

24) that, were the privation of good as evil as the good was good, then the privation of evil would be as good as the privation is evil, but this cannot be true.[74]

Buckingham begins his general discussion towards the solution of the objections by asserting that - following Augustine, William of Auxerre, and St. Anselm - there are diverse sorts of punishments: e. g. the punishment of the damned and sensible punishment, punishments which God merely permits and punishments which he ordains to punish sin. Since the punishment of damnation is a permitted privation, it follows that the punishment of damnation is a much smaller punishment than any sensible punishment: so much smaller, in fact, that no amount of punishment of damnation is sufficient punishment for any actual mortal sin. Thus, all original sin is less sinful than any actual mortal sin. Further, the punishment of damnation is not reckoned according to the amount of sin, but according to the amount of good which ought to inhere. To the objection,

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72. Ibid.; ll. 336-351.

73. Ibid.; ll. 352-384.

74. Ibid.; ll. 385-392.

supported by a number of references to the Bible, Anselm, Lombard, and Gregory the Great, that all sensible punishment and the punishment of damnation is reckoned according to the measure and quantity of sin, Buckingham responds that this is true only of the punishments inflicted by God for sin, not of merely permitted, privative punishments.[75]

To the objections to this second Conclusion, Buckingham responds:

to 1) by asserting that God both rewards the blessed ultra condignum and punishes the damned citra condignum; i.e. rewards the blessed more than they absolutely deserve and punishes the damned less than they absolutely merit.[76]

to 2) by conceding the argument, but noting that it applies only to the punishment of damnation and not to sensible punishment.[77]

to 3) by asserting that someone in hell is punished as much as he had merited reward to the time of his damnation, not as much as he might have merited reward had he stood firm and been saved.[78]

to 4) by asserting that the actual punishments of hell are in proportion to the amount and type of sin.[79]

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75. Ibid.; ll. 394-505.

76. Ibid.; ll. 507-536.

77. Ibid.; ll. 537-541.

78. Ibid.; ll. 542-549.

79. Ibid.; ll. 550-561.

to 5) by conceding the conclusion, but adding that a little temporal good is more to be chosen than some eternal privative evil is to be shunned.[80]

to 6) by asserting that it is not worse to be and not have the divine vision than it is not to be.[81]

to 7) by affirming that, while the punishment of damnation is more evil than any sin is evil, it is infinitely worse to be in culpable sin, for which the punishment is still greater evil.[82]

to 8) by denying the conclusion and affirming that the punishments of a soul in purgatory are infinitely less than its rewards afterwards in heaven.[83]

to 9) by denying absolutely that beatitude can be merited de condigno, admitting only that insofar as sin merits punishment it would have merited reward: not as much as the evil merit deserves evil, but that is an accidental difference.[84]

to 10) by denying the objection and affirming that, although the argument is very strong, no privative evil is more to be shunned than the privation of an equal good.[85]

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80. Ibid.; ll. 562-569.

81. Ibid.; ll. 570-580.

82. Ibid.; ll. 581-588.

83. Ibid.; ll. 589-607.

84. Ibid.; ll. 608-627.

85. Ibid.; ll. 628-647.

to 11) by replying that, if God makes the privation of the divine vision to be not evil, He confers a good equal to the vision.[86]

to 12) by asserting that, in the examples given, there was a variation in the degree to which the thing removed ought to inhere and, thus, the argument is false.[87]

to 13) by asserting that, in the example given, the A is less good than B, and so its privation is less evil.[88]

to 14) by replying that, although in this case a modicum of mortal sin is more evil than the greatest grace would be good, it does not follow that one would be simply more or less good than the other.[89]

to 15) by replying that, since there is no indication of whether A ought to inhere, there is no indication of whether its privation would be evil or a sin.[90]

to 16) by asserting that, in the example given, the degree of good does not actually change.[91]

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86. Ibid.; ll. 648-667.

87. Ibid.; ll. 668-677.

88. Ibid.; ll. 678-683.

89. Ibid.; ll. 684-691.

90. Ibid.; ll. 692-701.

91. Ibid.; ll. 702-707.

to 17) by asserting that since the privations are not initially equal, one being more necessary than the other, they are not equal in their degrees of evil caused.[92]

to 18) by arguing that it does not follow that a creature contains good equal to its capacity for evil, just as it is not true that the privation of a good of which a creature is capable is evil, for the good may be quite unnecessary.[93]

to 19) by asserting that the positive evil cited (sadness) is precisely as evil as the pleasure opposite it is good; but adding that circumstances can cause that privation accidentally to take away other goods as well.[94]

to 20) by conceding that the rational soul is better than the animal soul, and that the loss of both the animal and rational souls is worse than the loss of the rational soul alone, but arguing that the loss of the rational soul is worse than the loss of the animal soul if they are considered separately.[95]

to 21) by arguing that, if some good is good only because it removes some evil, its good will be less than the evil is evil, since it is not a positive good.[96]

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92. Ibid.; ll. 708-713.

93. Ibid.; ll. 714-722.

94. Ibid.; ll. 723-734.

95. Ibid.; ll. 735-747.

96. Ibid.; ll. 748-754.

to 22) by conceding the argument (with the implication that it does not really attack the Conclusion.)[97]

to 23) by asserting that the fluctuations in the degrees of evil caused by privation were accidental and not essential.[98]

to 24) by asserting that the "privation of evil" is something positive whose privation is evil: the one is as good as the other is evil.[99]

Having outlined the topics and arguments in the first two conclusions of Question I of the Questiones super Sententias, let us turn to examine Buckingham's sources and contemporary influences.

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97. Ibid.; ll. 755-757.

98. Ibid.; ll. 758-761.

99. Ibid.; ll. 762-765.

B. Sources and Influences

Since the purpose of this chapter is the elucidation of the content of Conclusions I and II of Question I of Thomas of Buckingham's Questiones super Sententias, the discussions which follow are not intended to be exhaustive analyses of the development of doctrines, nor of the place of those doctrines in the thought of the scholars considered, but rather they are intended to show the role which these scholars and their works played in the formation of Buckingham's thought and in the creation of the context of that thought.

St. Augustine:

It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of Augustine's influence on Buckingham, yet that influence is subject to great qualifications. Of the seventy references to other authors in the text under consideration, twenty-nine - over 40% - are to St. Augustine or to pseudo-Augustinian authors. Further, Buckingham's ownership of the magnificent codex of Augustine's works now in the Merton College Library (Ms. Coxe, I)[1] suggests a concern for an accurate text, which is supported by the fidelity which his references show to Augustine.[2]

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1. See p. 42 above.

2. In practice, Buckingham's quoted texts from Augustine often are taken from Peter Lombard's Book of Sentences. (e.g. Conclusion I, line 64 and note.)

While this indicates an affinity between Buckingham and what Damas us Trapp has called the "historico-critical attitude of the 14th- century Augustinian school,"[3] Buckingham is not normally regarded as a member of the Augustinian camp.

In the light of Trapp's reclassification of Gregory of Rimini,[4] it is possible that Buckingham's position should be reconsidered. Certainly, Oberman's description of Gregory as "a Nominalist in his philosophy as well as in his theology, and at the same time, in both an Augustinian,"[5] might apply as well to Buckingham's thought as it appears in the text under consideration. It seems likely that its application to the whole of Buckingham's thought would be misleading, however, unless the terms were stretched beyond all recognition. While Buckingham is concerned tc take full and accurate account of Augustine, he is primarily occupied with the creation of contemporary solutions to contemporary problems; thus, he would probably have seen an overtly Augustinian approach as inappropriate, especially in view of the much more apparent Augustinianism of his frequent opponent Thomas Bradwardine.

Buckingham appears to use Augustine much as he uses the Bible,

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3. Trapp, P. Damas us; Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century; Augustiniana; Vol. VI; 1956; p. 152 and passim.

4. Ibid.; pp. 188 ff.

5. Oberman, Heiko A.; Fourteenth Century Thought: A Premature Profile; unpublished paper read at the Fiftieth Anniversary Meeting of the Mediaeval Academy of America on 18 April, 1975; p. 16 of typescript.

as a source of appropriate proof-texts for his positions, rather than as an author whose works deserve more extended interpretation. This sort of attitude is notoriously difficult to gauge, however, so it is best recorded merely as an impression. Buckingham clearly in no sense rejects Augustine, but - while he is concerned to present him accurately - he primarily uses Augustine as an authority, rather than as a source of inspiration. A more discriminating view of Buckingham's references shows this plainly: in the first Conclusion, which is the defense of a commonplace derived from Augustine, Augustine is cited as an authority in no less than 27 (i.e. 60%) of the 45 references to other authors; but, in the second Conclusion, which turns that commonplace to very Fourteenth Century ends, he is cited in only 2 (i.e. 8.3%) of the 24 references to other authors. In short, Buckingham is not so much restating Augustine in Fourteenth Century terms as he is using him, when appropriate, as an authority for his own positions.

Conclusion I, "Only the privation of good is of itself evil", is basic to Augustine's thought, having been developed from neo-Platonism and expounded in response to the dualism of the Manichaean heresy.[6] In the succinct words of the Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church:

> "...in his attack on it ⟨Manichaeism⟩, Augustine laid the basis of the metaphysic which moulded the thought of the Schoolmen. He defended, against the Manichaean attempt to solve the problem of evil by positing the existence of an evil agency eternally opposed to the good God, the essential goodness of all creation.

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6. Copleston, F.; A History of Philosophy; Vol. 2, Part I; Image Books; New York; 1962; pp. 99-100. Leff, G.; Medieval Thought; Chicago; 1959; p. 44.

> He maintained that God was the sole creator of all things and alone sustained them in being, and that evil is, properly speaking, the privation of some good which ought to be had. In the case of physical evil this results from the imperfect character of creatures; in the case of moral evil it springs from free will." (Italics supplied)[7]

Buckingham's extensive use of Augustine in this Conclusion is not merely appropriate, but essential.

His use of Augustine in Conclusion II is less necessary, since Conclusion I has provided much of the needed authority, and less appropriate, since the tendency of the argument is unAugustinian. Thus, the first citation is merely to the effect that punishment is of diverse sorts (i.e. of the senses and of damnation),[8] and the second, significantly, is to the effect that God rewards the blessed more, and punishes the damned less, than they strictly deserve.[9]

St. Anselm:

St. Anselm, "for whom the Moderns and the Modernists have so much affection,"[10] figures strongly in the two Conclusions, although far less prominently than Augustine. In the first Conclusion, six of the forty-five references to other authors (i.e. 13.3%) are to Anselm; in the second, four of the twenty-four (i.e. 16.6%).

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7. Cross, F. L.; The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church; London; 1963; p. 107a.

8. Questiones super Sententias; Q. I, C. II, ll. 394-6.

9. Ibid.; C. II, ll. 522-25.

10. Trapp; op. cit.; p. 149.

Of the six references to St. Anselm in Conclusion I, five are grouped together to support the Anselmian contention that original sin is the loss of the original inclination in man to justice for its own sake.[11] The sixth is to an interesting comment in De Casu Dyaboli which Buckingham understands as implying the existence of positive evil, a point which he refutes by means of Augustine.[12]

In Conclusion II, the references to Anselm are grouped into two pairs: the first pair supports the diversity of sins and the justice of an extreme penalty (annihilation) for the least mortal sin;[13] the second pair is included among a number of proof-texts adduced to the objection that punishment should be in proportion to the amount of sin.[14]

Perhaps the most significant references are those to Anselm's understanding of original sin as the privation of the original inclination to justice for its own sake, since this is one of Anselm's most distinctive contributions to Christian doctrine, but even these are treated only as instances of the general principle that evil is the privation of some good, in this case original justice.

It seems clear that, while Buckingham's references to Anselm are germane to his arguments, they are references of convenience,

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11. Questiones super Sententias; Q. I, C. I, ll. 90-5.

12. Ibid.; C. I, ll. 181 ff. and 263 ff.

13. Ibid.; C. II, ll. 402 ff. and 415 ff.

14. Ibid.; C. II, ll. 496-9.

rather than of necessity. As such, they demonstrate Buckingham's familiarity with Anselm's works and ideas, but they do not here indicate any intellectual dependence.

Peter Lombard:

As we have noted above, Lombard frequently served as a mediator of Augustine to Buckingham.[15] In addition to the case already cited, three of the eight direct references to Lombard in Conclusions I and II are, in fact, references to quotations from Augustine in the Book of Sentences, one of which is acknowledged as such.[16] While this is not surprising, given Lombard's extensive use of Augustine[17] and the difficulty of separating quotations from the main body of manuscript text - even in a volume as orderly as Buckingham's own copy of the Sentences[18] - it does bear strongly on any assessment of Lombard's place in Buckingham's thought.

Conclusion I contains five of the eight direct references to Lombard. The first, which is directed to the principal question, affirms that the greatest possible reward is the vision of God.[19] The next

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15. Above, p. 92.

16. Questiones super Sententias; Q. I, C. I, ll. 9-10; C. I, l. 22 (acknowledged); and C. II, ll. 499-500.

17. Forest, A.; De Jean Scot Érigène au Siècle des Universités; in Histoire de l'Église; Vol. 13; Paris; 1956; p. 172.

18. Above, pp. 14-15 and 43.

19. Questiones super Sententias; C. I, ll. 9-10. The passage is in a quotation of Lombard's from Augustine's De Doctrina Christiana.

three, all from Book II, Distinction XXXIV, of the Sentences, are to the effect that all evil is the corruption of good. The first merely cites one of Lombard's quotations of Augustine; the other two are included in groups of proof-texts.[20] The final reference to Lombard in Conclusion I is to the effect that hunger is a punishment, not just a lack of necessary good; this is used as the basis of an objection and is subsequently proven false by the argument that hunger is not per se evil, but rather causatively and effectively, since it causes the privation of natural good which ought to inhere.[21]

Conclusion II contains three of the eight direct references to Lombard. The first, which is paired with a reference to Gratian's Decretum, argues that it is worse to abstain from doing good than it is to do a good and not to continue in it.[22] The second, which asserts the necessity of the assent of the will in an act for it to be sinful, is used to counter an argument that the punishment of damnation is worse than punishment of the senses.[23] The third, which is from one of Lombard's quotations from Augustine's Enchiridion, is one of a number of proof-texts on the proportionality of punishment (or damnation) to the degree of sin.[24]

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20. Ibid.; C. I, l. 22; C. I, 111-12; C. I, l. 137.

21. Ibid.; C. I, l. 205. "Fames"; "appetitus" is, to Lombard, good.

22. Ibid.; C. II, ll. 165-6.

23. Ibid.; C. II, ll. 449-50.

24. Ibid.; C. II, ll. 499-500. (Augustine not acknowledged.)

It does not appear that Lombard, despite the frequency with which he is cited, exercised a strong influence on Buckingham's thought. Often a mediator of Augustine to Buckingham, he served primarily as as source of proof-texts for conventional ideas. The exceptions to this - the reference to hunger, the argument that it is worse to abstain from doing good than it is to do a good and not to continue in it, and the assertion of the necessity of the assent of the will for an act to be sinful - are not areas in which Lombard was an innovator, but rather areas where he was close to his sources and where he was probably seen as being close to them by Buckingham.

William of Auxerre:

Despite the small number of references to William of Auxerre in the text under consideration, it is clear that he exerted a deep influence on the directions taken by Buckingham's thought. There are only three explicit references to William in the text, all in Conclusion II: one of them is indefinite, and the other two are grouped together. While these references are important - the two grouped ones provide the pivot for Buckingham's solution to the Conclusion - William's influence is seen in more diffuse ways as well.

William's treatment of the problem of evil was innovative.[25] The researches of Carmelo Ottaviano have given the shape of that ap-

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25. Van Steenberghen, F.; Le XIII^{e} siècle; in Histoire de l'Église; Vol. 13; Paris; 1956; p. 216.

proach, which in many ways influenced later work on the problem of evil.[26] William's point of departure was necessarily the Augustinian dictum that all evil is nothing (i.e. non-being or the privation of good). The only positive nature which William concedes to evil lies in the statement "Malum sit per eius ordinationem."[27] This again derives from Augustine: in the course of an argument for the positive nature of evil, William quotes from the De Ordine: "...quod bona et mala in ordine sunt. Sed quicquid habet ordinem est‹,› igitur malum est."[28] To the problem of whether something non-existent can be ordained, William replies in his solution that "silentium est bene ordinatum inter acutum et grave: igitur silentium est."[29] His most telling argument is also his most characteristic: "dico quod ‹malum› ordinatum est, sed non ex natura tantum, neque ex natura actionis sive subiecti tantum: sed ex natura mixti. Malum enim quoddam mixtum est ex ente et non ente...."[30]

Passing over William's arguments for the utility of evil in the divine economy, it should be noted that he believed that - in a strict sense - it was fallacious to think of good and evil as opposites, except

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26. Ottaviano, C.; Guglielmo d'Auxerre...; Rome; 1930; pp. 107-116 and passim.

27. Guillermus Altissiodorensis; Summa Aurea in quattuor libros sententiarum; ed. Philippe Pigouchet; Nicolaus Vaultier and Durandus Gerlier; Paris; 1500; Lib. II, tract. XIII, c. 1.

28. Ibid.; obj. 1. Noted in Ottaviano; op. cit.; p. 107.

29. Ibid.; Solutio.

30. Ibid.; responsio 2.

in the case of grace and sin: "sed bonum gratie habet contrarium. quoniam virtus et vicium sunt contraria."[31]

William argues that, in Ottaviano's words, "l'intensità del male denota la sua realtà."[32] Variations in degrees of evil may come about in four ways, according to William: "Primo propter privationem maioris boni....Secundo modo...propter privationem melioris boni.... Tertio modo...propter privationem plurium bonorum.... Quarto modo propter privationem boni magis debiti."[33] Although Buckingham does not appear to use this four-fold classification directly, he does make extensive use of these types, or bases, of variation in his arguments.

In his consideration of whether evil is privation or consists in privation, William lists a number of instances of evil which are not apparently instances of privation; e.g. Adam's eating the apple. His solution is characteristic: having listed three sorts of enjoyment - gratuita, libidinosa, and nimia - he then uses the defects of the latter two sorts (i.e. privatio modi, speciei, et ordinis and privatio debiti finis) to show that all the instances mentioned are, in fact, instances of some sort of privation; e.g. Adam's eating the apple was libidinous

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31. "Bonum per essentiam non habet contrarium. quantum nichil est summe malum.... Similiter bonum nature non habet contrarium. quantum malum culpe non potest esse nisi in bono et cum bono nature. Similiter bonum in genere non habet contrarium... sed bonum gratie habet contrarium. quoniam virtus et vicium sunt contraria." Ibid.; Lib. III, tract. II, c. 1, q. 13.

32. Ottaviano; op. cit.; p. 108.

33. Guillermus Altissiodorensis; Summa Aurea...; Lib. II, tract. XIII, c. 3, solutio. Noted in Ottaviano; op. cit.; p. 108.

(the privation involved was the loss of obedience).[34] Although these types of enjoyment with their respective privations appear to have not enjoyed a great currency, the attempt to interpret privation in a very wide sense did find favour. (The types of privation - privatio speciei, modi, et ordinis naturalis - are taken, of course, from Augustine.)

To the question of what it is that makes an action evil, William asserts that it is not merely that the action is contrary to the laws of God: sins are prohibited because they are evil, not conversely.[35]

To the question of whether evil acts are a deo operante vel cooperante, William declares that "actio mala in quantum actio: bona est et a deo. Quid concedemus dicentes quod deus est causa efficiens formalis et finalis male actionis: sed non materialis."[36]

Buckingham's citations of William of Auxerre show both familiarity with his work and Buckingham's penchant for accurate quotation.[37]

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34. Guillermus Altissiodorensis; Summa Aurea...; Lib. II, tract. XIV, q. 1.

35. To the objection that some sins are sins only because they are prohibited (anger in a dog or luxuria in a pig not being evil), William replies that anger in a dog is necessary because he is a custodian for his master, and that luxuria is an essential part of a pig's nature, but that human sin is neither useful nor necessary. Ibid.; Lib. II, tract. XV, q. 3.

36. Ibid.; q. 4.

37. Buckingham is not, here, guilty of the sin of quoting out of context or - more properly - of quoting a discussed opinion as though it were the author's considered conclusion with which Courtenay taxes him in another context: "The extent of his zeal to bury his opponent under the weight of patristic and scholastic opinion is reflected in his use of only part of William of Auxerre's discussion, namely William's second response to the quotation from Jerome, not mentioning that William eventually rejected

(continued overleaf)

In the Solution of Conclusion II, Buckingham cites two passages from the Summa Aurea to the effect that there are two sorts of punishment:[38] poena contracta, which God merely permits, and poena inflicta, which is effectively from God for the punishment and ordering of sin.[39] It is on this distinction that Buckingham bases the different manners in which he treats poena sensus and poena damni; indeed, this provides the central theme of much of Question I. Buckingham's next reference to William is merely to provide a proof-text for the proposition that venial sin is punished in hell more than is original sin.[40]

Buckingham's last reference to William in these Conclusions is a vague citation of him in support of the proposition that, when speaking

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(continuation)

> that position in favor of Gilbert's solution. ... Because of the precision with which Buckingham reproduced his authorities, especially someone as old and as comparatively rare as William of Auxerre, one suspects a first-hand knowledge of these sources which, when it misrepresented an authority - as it did in the case of William - did so by intention. That such is the case is revealed through a contemporary ⟨Gregory of Rimini⟩ who shared that same love for exact quotations from past authority and caught Buckingham at his own game." Courtenay; John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini on Whether God Can Undo the Past; part 2; pp. 151-2.

38. Questiones super Sententias; Q. I, C. II, ll. 397 ff.

39. Guillermus Altissiodorensis; Summa Aurea...; Lib. II, tract. XXVII, c. 1: to an argument that original sin comes from God, William replies that the corruption which is original sin is poena contracta and "Soluimus ergo ad primum obiectum per interemptionem huius: omnis pena est a deo; quia pena contracta non est a deo, sed inflicta." Printed in Lottin, D. O.; Psychologie et Morale aux XII^e et XIII^e Siècles; Vol. IV; Problèmes de Morale; Troisième Partie; I; Louvain; 1954; p. 110.
    The second reference is to Lib. II, tract. XXIX, c. 6.

40. Questiones super Sententias; Q. I, C. II, l. 430.

of punishment as being in proportion to sin, it must be understood that this applies only to poena inflicta a deo and not to permitted punishment.[41]

In addition to these direct references and to William's effect on both the general state of the question and Buckingham's particular understanding, we should also note two arguments which Buckingham appears to have taken from him,[42] The initial argument of Question I is the first of these: Buckingham's reasoning that the loss of the divine vision is as evil as the vision is good, but that the loss of the vision is the punishment for original sin and, thus, is the least of punishments, occurs in one of William's discussions of original sin.[43] William's solution was wholeheartedly adopted by Buckingham, who uses it as the basis for the underlying argument of the Question.[44]

The second argument is of a different sort, and it must be emphasised that here it is the type of argument which Buckingham appears to have borrowed from William, rather than the specific application. In

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41. Ibid.; C. II, l. 505.

42. Noting that Buckingham may have taken either or both of them, in fact, from other theologians who had them - in turn - from William; i.e. they may have become part of a standard, received approach to these questions.

43. "Item dicit Augustinus quod carentia visionis dei maxima pena est: et peccatum originale minimum est: ergo peccatum minimum punitur maxima pena: ergo maior condigna est." Summa Aurea; Lib. I; tract. XV, q. 2.

44. "Ad secundo obiectum dicimus quod carentia visionis dei maxima pena est quantum ad damnum: sed minima quantum ad sensum." Ibid.

his discussion De Malo in genere, William raises the possibility that - because of differing degrees of consent of the will - it is possible for one act (he uses fornication as an example) to contain an infinite range of degrees of evil; or, more precisely, that one can merit an infinite series of lesser degrees of punishment for the same outward act.[45] (This turning of the will is the result of grace and so is not available to pagans.[46]) The principle is restated later, with the interesting qualification that the will's consent is an attendant "circumstance of the sin".[47] The solution of William's argument is an assertion of the positive direction of the intension, and of the negative direction of the remission, of forms.[48] This type of argument is twice used by Buckingham in his objections to the principle of parity embodied in Conclu-

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45. "Quid probatur. quantum cum fornicari in genere sit aliquantum malum meritorium est aliquante pene eterne. Sit quod tante. Sed aliquis qui fornicatur meretur aliquantam penam. et potest mereri minorem et iterum minorem. quantum potest peccare minus et minus quantum non potest aliquantum peccare: quin minus." Ibid.; Lib. III, tract. II, c. 1, q. 17.

46. Ibid.

47. "...constat quod ipse potest minus velle fornicari et iterum minus et sic in infinitum et constat quod intentio voluntas est circumstantia peccati ergo fornicari secundum quod est malum in genere non se habet in aliqua proportione ad fornicari cum aliqua circumstantia." Ibid.

48. "Solutio. regula est quod intensio proprietatis vel naturalis vel gratuite non attenditur secundum recessum ab infinito gradu. sed secundum accessum ad supremum gradu... remissio autem attenditur secundum recessum a summo non secundum accessum ad infinitum." Ibid.

sion II: in the Fifteenth Reason against, he posits that the omission of a good act is as evil as the act would have been good, but that this cannot be, since one can then sin by omitting less and less in an infinite progression.[49] Further, in the Twenty-second Reason against, he uses an infinite series of decreasingly serious sins - each of which merits the loss of the same good (which is more good than any of the sins is evil: although it is unstated, Buckingham presumably has in mind the vision of God) - to create a situation in which each lesser sin takes away more good in proportion to its own degree of evil than the sin before it.[50]

St. Thomas Aquinas:

St. Thomas is quoted three times by Buckingham in the course of the two Conclusions. Two of these references are trivial, although they do give useful support to Buckingham's arguments; the third is rather more important.

The first of Buckingham's references to St. Thomas is to the Quaestiones Disputatae: De Malo; this is merely a proof-text to the effect that evil is the privation of good.[51] Perhaps the most interesting feature of the reference is its being grouped with a reference to Duns Scotus to the same effect, suggesting that Buckingham associated (or

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49. Questiones super Sententias; Q. I, C. II, ll. 271-9.

50. Ibid.; ll. 336-351.

51. Ibid.; C. I, ll. 171-4.

perhaps contrasted) the two theologians.

The second of the references, also to the Quaestiones Disputatae: De Malo, occurs in Conclusion II.[52] This cites St. Thomas to the effect that the loss of the divine vision is the greatest punishment, adding that "it would not be unless because it is as much harm as beatitude is good."[53] This oversimplifies Thomas's position, since - while Thomas does say "the loss of the divine vision...is the most grave of punishments" - he also goes on to say that the loss of the vision is minor compared to the punishments of the damned who are punished for actual sin.[54]

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52. Ibid.; C. II, ll. 108-111.

53. Ibid.: "Similiter, Sanctus Thomas, questio De Malo, q. 41, dicit quod carentia visionis divine est maximum dampnum, quod non esset nisi quia tantum dampnum est quantum beatitudo est bona; igitur, et cetera."

54. The statement is the response to the objection: "3. Praeterea, August. dicit in Enchir. (cap. XCIII), quod mitissima est poena eorum qui pro solo peccato originali puniuntur. Sed Chrysostomus dicit super Matthaeum (homilia XLVII ad popul. Antioch.), quod carentia divinae visionis est maxima poenarum, et intolerabilior quam gehenna. Ergo carentia visionis divinae non est conveniens poena originalis peccati."

The response: "Ad tertium dicendum, quod gravitas alicuius poenae potest attendi dupliciter. Uno modo ex parte ipsius boni quod privatur per malum poenae; et sic carentia visionis divinae et fruitionis Dei, est gravissima poenarum. Alio modo per comparationem ad eum qui punitur; et sic tanto est gravior poena, quanto id quod subtrahitur est magis proprium et connaturale ei cui subtrahitur; sicut magis diceremus puniri hominem si auferretur ei patrimonium suum, quam si impediretur ne perveniret ad regnum quod ei non debetur. Et per hunc modum dicitur esse mitissima omnium poenarum sola carentia visionis divinae, in quantum visio divinae essentiae est quoddam bonum omnino supernaturale." St. Thomas Aquinas; Quaestiones Disputatae; vol. II; De Malo; Marietti; Roma; 1953; pp. 544a&b and 546a&b. See Maritain, J; Saint Thomas and the Problem of Evil; Milwaukee; 1942.

The third of Buckingham's references to St. Thomas is in the response to the Ninth Reason against Conclusion II. The objection was that, just as someone can merit the loss of beatitude de condigno,[55] so according to the Conclusion he can also merit beatitude de condigno.[56] After a brief restatement of the objection in his response, Buckingham asserts that the conclusion does not follow. He then states, "Yet in what way is someone able to merit eternal life de condigno, says Saint Thomas, Prima Secunde, q. 114, art. 3. And in what way 'not' says the Gloss to Romans 8 on that: 'Non sunt condigne passiones, et cetera.'"[57] In a strict sense, Buckingham's statement is perfectly correct: q. 114, article 3, of the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologicae is indeed given to the question, "Utrum homo in gratia constitutus possit mereri vitam aeternam ex condigno." Indeed, within that Article, Romans 8(:18) - not the Gloss[58] - is used as a principal argument against the proposition that beatitude can be merited de condigno. But, Buckingham does not say that Thomas in fact decides the

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55. Buckingham here defines mereri de condigno as "mereri scilicet quantitatem actus." This is highly eccentric, being much more appropriate to mereri de congruo.

56. Questiones super Sententias; Q. I, C. II, ll. 194-200.

57. "Quomodo tamen aliquis de condigno potest mereri vitam eternam, dicit Sanctus Thomas, Prima Secunde, q. 114, art. 3. Et quomodo 'non' dicit Glosa ad Romanos 8 super illo: Non sunt condigne passiones, et cetera." Ibid.; C. II, ll. 611-614.

58. The Glosses, both Ordinary and Interlinear, are not relevant; Buckingham may have had in mind the Expositio of Nicholas de Lyra, which does treat this passage in terms of merit de condigno. Ibid.; C. II, l. 613n.

question on the other side, arguing cogently that - while eternal life, of course, cannot be merited de congruo because of the disparity between human works and the divine standards of excellence[59] - it is both possible and, in a sense, normal for men to merit eternal life de condigno, since it is only by God's grace that acts can be considered sufficiently meritorious; in other words, Thomas argues that man can merit eternal life only de condigno.[60] Although Buckingham only asserts that Thomas discusses the question, he comes quite close to misrepresenting him by implying that he agrees with both the Gloss on Romans and with Buckingham's own position. Buckingham's own position, however, if it is what it appears to be,[61] i.e. a rejection of the possibility that one can in any sense, including by means of God's grace, merit eternal life, is wholly alien to Thomas's under-

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59. "Respondeo dicendum, quod opus meritorium hominis dupliciter considerari potest: uno modo, secundum quod procedit ex libero arbitrio: alio modo, secundum quod procedit ex gratia Spiritus Sancti: si consideretur secundum substantiam operis, et secundum quod procedit ex libero arbitrio, sic non potest ibi esse condignitas propter maximum inaequalitatem, sed est ibi congruitas propter quamdam aequalitatem proportionis. Videtur enim congruum, ut homini operanti secundum suam virtutem Deus recompenset secundum excellentiam suae virtutis:" St. Thomas; Summa Theologicae; Prima Secundae; q. 114, art. 3. Ed. Leon.; vol. VII, p. 347.

60. "si autem loquamur de opere meritorio, secundum quod procedit ex gratia Spiritus Sancti, sic est meritorium vitae aeternae ex condigno: sic enim valor meriti attenditur secundum virtutem Spiritus Sancti moventis nos in vitam aeternam...." Ibid.

61. Buckingham's initial definition of merit de condigno (above, p. 108, n. 55) is almost so odd as to suggest that he had confused merit de condigno with merit de congruo.

standing of salvation.[62]

These three references by Buckingham to St. Thomas are of quite different qualities and characters. While they all evince a clear first-hand knowledge by Buckingham of Thomas, the last two show a tendency to 'bend' materials in order to bring Thomas more closely into line with Buckingham's thought. The former of these two seems to be a legitimate simplification, but the latter case is border-line: Buckingham slants the presentation of Thomas slightly to imply a negative attitude where there is a positive and does not give Thomas's actual opinion, yet Buckingham does not actually present false information. The case is not unlike that mentioned by Courtenay, although it is less extreme.[63] Certainly, it brings to mind Copleston's comment that:

> "The Dominican Robert Holcot even tried to show that some of his clearly Ockhamist tenets were really not alien to the mind of St. Thomas Aquinas."[64]

In this case, Buckingham appears to be trying to enlist Thomas's support for a cause entirely alien to him.

Duns Scotus:

Buckingham refers twice to Scotus, in both cases to the same

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62. Buckingham's understanding of grace and merit is further discussed below, pp. 141 f.

63. See above, pp. 102-3, n. 37.

64. Copleston; A History of Philosophy; Vol. 3, part I, p. 137. However, see below, p. 121.

passage (but to different items in that passage), and in neither case to material of great import. The first of the references is a proof-text to the proposition that evil is the loss of good which ought to inhere, joined to a similar proof-text from Aquinas's De Malo.[65]

The second reference is also something of a proof-text of a commonplace, but its presence is interesting since it appears at first glance rather to undermine Buckingham's main argument. Scotus is quoted by Buckingham as saying that the proposition is not true: "that that which takes away the greater good or more of good is the greater evil."[66] While this appears to contradict directly the argument of Conclusion II that "Every privation of something which ought to inhere is as evil as is good that which it, of itself and essentially, takes away, if it were good," the former proposition is vague and does admit of telling exceptions: thus, it must be taken as logically false although it is partially true.[67] (Buckingham's ConclusionV, "The privation of every good is not evil", is apposite; his arguments point to precisely the exceptions which render the proposition false.) Thus,

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65. "Similiter, Doctor Subtilis, Quarto Sententiarum, d. 50, q. 1, dicit quod formaliter malicia est carentia boni debiti, et intelligit indifferenter de malo culpe et pene." Questiones super Sententias; Q. I, C. I, ll. 174-177. For Aquinas, see above, pp. 106-7.

66. "Doctor Subtilis, Quarto Sententiarum, d. 5 ⟨0⟩, q. 1, dicit quod hec propositio non est vera, quod illud quod adimit maius bonum vel plus de bono sit maius malum." Ibid.; C. II, ll. 349-351.

67. E.g. by not specifying that the good is a good which "ought to inhere", it admits such un-necessary goods as vision in a stone or hearing in a tree.

Buckingham's agreement with Scotus on the falsehood of the proposition is well based.[68]

It should be noted that Scotus is credited often with having initiated the change of perspective in morality which removed the bases of "goodness" and "evil-ness" from the realm of natural law and transferred them to a direct dependence upon God's will. Certainly, there appears to have been no significant break in doctrinal continuity between William of Auxerre[69] and, say, Aquinas on this matter, and there were - of course - a great number of later theologians, probably a majority, who retained the more traditional concept. Scotus's role does appear to have been to widen the area of morality in which God's will was determinative, but without introducing uncertainty as to the nature of the actions willed or of the value of a necessarily contingent morality.[70]

William of Ockham:

Buckingham does not refer directly to Ockham in these Conclusions from the Questiones super Sententias, but the impact of Ockham's

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68. In his reply to the objection which contains this proposition, Buckingham says, "concedo totam conclusionem ad intellectum ad quem summittitur in ista materia," meaning, of course, to Scotus and this proposition. Ibid.; C. II, 11. 755-757.

69. See above, p. 102.

70. See, for example, Gilson, E.; History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages; London; 1955; p. 461. De Gandillac, M.; Le XIVe Siècle; in Histoire de l'Église; Vol. 13; Paris; 1956; pp. 365-384 passim. Copleston; A History of Philosophy; Vol. 2, part II, pp. 268-274, gives an account which emphasises the traditional elements in Scotus's approach.

theology on the development of Fourteenth Century thought is such as to necessitate some mention here. It has been said that "Ockham has no ethical 'system'...⟨his⟩ understanding of morality has no formal or systematic unity."[71] The point is highly debatable, but there is no question that the lack of a systematic exposition by Ockham has led to a wide range of differing interpretations of his position.[72] Indeed, a reading of his works suggests that he deliberately avoided questions of good and evil, and of morality, as much as possible, preferring to discuss the epistemological preconditions of such questions.

Some aspects are reasonably clear, however. Ockham did essentially regard "good" and "evil" as relations, rather than as properties inherent in acts as acts. Thus, one act can be simultaneously just and unjust, when seen from different points of view, and similarly it can be simultaneously good and evil.[73] If an act admits of different

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71. Clark, D.W.; William of Ockham on Right Reason; Speculum; Vol. XLVIII, No. 1; 1973; p. 35.

72. The literature generated by the Venerable Inceptor's occasional comments on ethics is quite extensive; indeed, extensive enough to make the inclusion of even a moderately full bibliography quite prohibitive. Clark's article (above, n. 71) provides a good discussion of the literature. Interestingly, Clark; p. 14, n. 4; divides the literature according to whether Ockham's morality is seen as depending on reason, God's will, or authority: this diversity should be cautionary.

73. "Et sicut idem totaliter potest fieri ab uno iuste et ab alio iniuste. ita idem actus totaliter sit ab homine male et a deo bene et iuste. et ideo idem actus illo modo quo actus est bonus vel malus erit tam bonus quam malus. quia actum esse malum non est aliud quam fieri ab aliquo male. et actum esse bonum non est aliud quam fieri ab aliquo bene. et cum idem actus fiat ab homine male et a deo bene. idem actus erit bonus et malus.

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interpretations of such magnitude, it follows that morality must lie elsewhere than in outward acts.[74] Ockham appears to place it in the concurrence of two factors: the free performance of an act by the will of a rational creature, and God's ordinance, or voluntary suspension of His ordinance, to the ultimate effect that the act performed is determined to be morally good or bad by God. Knowledge of the Divine will is, then, necessary if one is to know that one is acting morally: Ockham appears to find that knowledge both in Authority and in Right Reason, which together provide the link between creature and creator.

The creature's act must be voluntary; i.e. it must be an act of the will acting freely (the role of habit is acknowledged, and its limiting effect on free will is seen as critical[75]). In particular, the interior act of the will in choosing a course of action is given an effective primacy over the exterior act of performance: thus, an act which is performed against the will's volition is not seen as determined by the outward act

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nec videtur homo plus inconveniens quam dicere quod idem homo est pater et filius. similis et dissimilis respectu diversorum." William of Ockham; Ordinatio; I; d. XVII.

74. Expounded at some length with examples in Quodlibeta III, q. 13. Ed. Paris; 1487.

75. "The distinctive feature of Ockham's theory of free will is the consistent effort to show that volitive self-determination is threatened finally by the history of one's free choices. Initially a tabula rasa, the adult will must struggle against the facilitating and residual effect of prior volitions to recapture its primitive indifference and moral agency. Only contingent and self-determined actions enter the realm of morals." Clark; op. cit.; pp. 21-22.

(Ockham gives the example of someone who throws himself from a precipice voluntarily and then repents while still falling: although he no longer wills the fall, it is not in his power not to fall.)[76] On the other hand, acts which lie within the agent's powers and realm of effective freedom are judged by both interior and exterior criteria; because truly free, these acts are fully capable of being meritorious or demeritorious.[77]

Merit and demerit are, however, again terms descriptive of relationship: God's will, like man's, is free (as potentia absoluta), so God is not bound to regard any human act as good or evil; rather, the

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76. William of Ockham; Quodlibeta, III, q. 13. Ed. Paris; 1487.

77. "Hoc etiam ratione probatur: Nam qui potest mereri et demereri, potest facere aliquid, quod non facit; nam si non posset aliter facere, non esset in potestate eius aliter facere; sed per illud, quod non est in potestate alicuius, ipse non meretur nec demeretur. Sed homo potest mereri et demereri; ergo potest aliter facere et aliud quam facit. Haec ratio confirmatur: Quia omne meritum est laudabile et omne demeritum est vituperabile. Sed illud, quod non est in nostra potestate, ut possimus illud facere et non facere, non est laudabile neque vituperabile; ergo omne meritum et demeritum est in nostra potestate, ut possimus illud facere et non facere. ...illud, quod non est in potestate nostra, et tamen facimus, non est laudabile nec vituperabile." William of Ockham; Opus Nonaginta Dierum; c. 95; ed. H.S. Offler; Manchester; 1963; p. 723. "On the one hand, God was free to reward as he willed; on the other, only a voluntary act...is meritorious or demeritorious and so alone worthy of remuneration." ; "...for any acts which are in the will's power, and hence those which are purely natural, are more deserving of God's love and acceptance than habits, which are not in its power."; and "Where Duns therefore locates moral worth or its absence in the relation between an act and its circumstances, Ockham identifies it with a right or wrong act of will." Leff, G.; William of Ockham; Manchester; 1975; pp. 470, 473, and 479. See also de Gandillac; op. cit.; pp. 468-9; and Copleston; A History of Philosophy; Vol. 3; part I; p. 113 ff. (References to the Ordinatio and Reportatio are to the Paris, 1495, edition.)

relationship is established and completed when God accepts the act as meritorious or demeritorious.[78] Since God's will is free, He is not bound by any habit of acceptance, so that He can choose to change His criteria or even to act arbitrarily.[79] That God can so act by virtue of the potentia absoluta does not, however, mean that He will so act; the assertion of freedom is not the expectation of caprice.[80]

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78. "Merit is thereby reduced to God's free acceptance of an act by a rational creature freely performed. In Ockham's words, 'An act is called meritorious because it is accepted by God,' (Note: "Quia ideo dicitur actus meritorious quia acceptatur a deo". Reportatio, III, q. 5, 1.) and it is demeritorious because God rejects it." Leff; William of Ockham; p. 476. It does appear that acts of "natural" virtue may not be accepted as meritorious. Reportatio; III, q. 12. On the element of causality involved, see Courtenay, W. J.; Covenant and Causality in Pierre D'Ailly; Speculum; Vol. XLVI, No. 1; 1971; pp. 94ff.

79. "It is otherwise by God's absolute power: not only can he...remit sin, both original and actual, without created grace, or give a sinner a vision of his essence at the same instant in which he gives him grace or accept him naturally for eternal life; he can also reduce him without grace to Adam's primal state of innocence." Leff; William of Ockham; pp. 513-4.

80. "Quarto declarant quomodo debet intelligi distinctio theologorum dicentium in Deo esse duplicem potentiam, scilicet absolutam et ordinatam; et quomodo Deus potest aliqua facere de potentia absoluta, quae non potest de potentia ordinata: dicentes quod non est intelligenda dicta distinctio, sicut quidam ignari putant, quasi realiter in Deo sit duplex potentia, quarum una sit absoluta et alia ordinata; quia unica potentia est in Deo, immo ipsa unica potentia est unica essentia. ... Et ita dicere quod Deus potest aliqua de potentia absoluta, quae non potest de potentia ordinata, non est aliud, secundum intellectum recte intelligentium, quam dicere quod Deus aliqua potest, quae tamen minime ordinavit se facturam; quae tamen si faceret, de potentia ordinata faceret ipsa; quia si faceret ea, ordinaret se facturam ipsa." William of Ockham; Opus Nonaginta Dierum; c. 95; pp. 725-6. De Wulf's interpretation is extreme: "La morale est basée sur le volontarisme divin. Il n'y a ni bien ni mal en soi, la différence entre

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Authority and Recta Ratio are the links of knowledge by which the creature reasonably may expect to know what the creator has ordained he must do in order to be saved. Authority appears to be understood in a normal sense, as comprising the revelation of God in Sacred Scripture, mediated in understanding by the teaching of the Church. Recta Ratio, which is used in a manner not unlike that of "synderesis",[81] is regarded by Ockham as an infallible guide to right action in cases where Authority gives no precept and in those cases - presumably hypothetical - in which God overrules the present dispensation by an act of will.[82] In connection with recta ratio, it should be noted that

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> l'un et l'autre reposant sur un décret de Dieu qui eût pu renverser l'ordre existant. Dieu est un autocrate qui pourrait, sans tenir compte de ce qu'il y a de rationnel ou non dans ses volontés, provoquer chez l'homme des actes d'amour aussi bien que des actes de haine (II Sent., q. 19). S'il en est ainsi, l'inspection de notre nature ne peut rien apprendre sur la moralité, et l'intelligence devient impuissante à renseigner sur les prescriptions de la loi divine. Puisque les valeurs morales ne sont pas des absolus, elles varient suivant le point de vue subjectif de qui les considère et les juge. On voit apparaître la distinction entre la potentia ordinata et la potentia absoluta de Dieu, mais l'accent est mis sur cette dernière." De Wulf, M.; Histoire de la Philosophie Medievale; Vol. III, p. 42.

81. For "synderesis" see Lottin, D.O.; Psychologie et Morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles; t. II; Louvain; 1948; pp. 103-349; and Études de Morale Histoire et Doctrine; Gembloux; 1961; pp. 233-4.

82. Ockham states, in Reportatio III, d. 13, that right reason cannot sin, for it will necessarily always choose virtue. Further, "hoc solum voco realiter et apparenter bonum vel malum, quid judicatur ab intellectu bonum vel malum." Ibid. But authority must inform the intellect for the process of recta ratio to happen. "Right reason indicates, not normative statements, but the psychological process which gives language the force of moral obligation." Clark; op. cit.; p. 36.

Ockham does posit one act which reason dictates cannot be otherwise than good: the act of loving God.[83]

Ockham's nominalism,[84] and his resultant transference of morality from universals to relationships between individuals, from acts in themselves to a combination of intention and acceptance, was probably not seen by Ockham himself as in any way undermining the bases of traditional morality; most likely, he saw his method as merely providing a means of clarifying and simplifying issues by clearing away unnecessary concepts.

Robert Holkot:

Robert Holkot, Buckingham's Dominican contemporary (resident at Oxford Convent c. 1326-c. 1334; died c. 1349) is commonly re-

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83. Quodlibeta; III, q. 13. Ockham does give definitions of evil, but they are all statements of relationship (Reportatio; III, q. 13). "Sed istum dubium bene precederet si malum esset res factibilis: quid falsum est: quia malum nihil aliud est quam facere aliquid ad cuius oppositum faciendum aliquis obligatur. que obligatio non cadit in deum: quia ille ad nihil faciendum obligatur." Reportatio; II, d. III & IV. See Baudry, L.; Lexique Philosophique de Guillaume d'Ockham; Paris; 1958; "malum" and "bonum".

84. Ockham's nominalism is much debated, but Maurer's affirmation seems sensible: "For myself, I see no compelling reason to give up his traditional title. In the middle ages a nominalist was one who taught that universals ... exist only in the mind. In other words, they are nothing but names (nomina). This is what Ockham taught, and he did so in as thorough-going a manner as possible." Maurer, A.; The Nature of the Philosophical Enterprise in the Fourteenth Century; unpublished paper read at the meeting of the Mediaeval Academy of America, April, 1975; p. 12 of typescript.

puted to have been one of Ockham's most extreme English followers. Since he is a contemporary, Buckingham does not refer to him directly, but it is most likely that he knew his ideas: Holkot's lectures on the Sentences were given in Oxford shortly before 1332, at about the time when Buckingham was entering the faculty of Theology.[85]

Rather than attempt to relate the positions of Holkot and Buckingham on the nature of evil, merit, and grace in any detail, we shall here merely indicate some of the most obvious features of Holkot's position.[86]

Like Ockham, Holkot argues that "good" and "evil" are not qualities inherent in acts, but rather that they are terms which describe relations.[87] The understanding of morality which he derives from this is very close to Ockham's, as we have just presented it.

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85. Smalley, B.; Robert Holcot O.P.; Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum; Vol. XXVI; Roma; 1956; pp. 7-8. Emden ; Biographical Register...Oxford...; Vol. II; p. 946.

86. It must be noted, however, that the relationship between the two theologians is apparently extremely close, despite evident doctrinal differences, and that a careful study of their dependencies (mostly, I fear, of Buckingham on Holcot) would be well worth the time invested.
Holkot's position is examined in Molteni, P.; Roberto Holcot o.p. Dottrina della grazia e della giustificazione; Ed. Alzani; 1967.

87. "Ad primum istorum dicitur quod actum esse malum est ipsum male fieri: et eodem modo actum esse iustum est actum iuste fieri: actum esse iniustum est actum iniuste fieri. quia igitur idem actus sit iuste a deo et ab homine iniuste: quia contra preceptum: ideo idem actus posset vere dici bonus et malus: iustus et iniustus. unde bonum et malum iustum et iniustum et huiusmodi non sunt termini absoluti: sed respectivi:" Robert Holkot; Super Sententias; London; Iohannes Clein; 1518; rp. Minerva; Frankfurt; 1967; Lib. II, q. I, art. 3; FF-GG. "solus ille est malus qui male facit: et ille bonus qui bene facit." Ibid.; GG-HH.

Thus, with Holkot as with Ockham, morality appears to consist in the free performance of an act by a rational creature and the subsequent free acceptance of that act by God as good or evil.[88] Similarly, the necessity of the creature's act being an exercise of free will is stressed,[89] as is the total freedom of God, via the potentia absoluta, to accept or not accept, as He wills.[90]

The difference between Holkot and Ockham appears to be primarily centred on the effect of the application of the potentia absoluta: in Ockham's case, it asserts the freedom of a still knowable, and thus still lovable and loving, God; in Holkot's case, by dissolving any ties of causality in the moral sphere, the assertion of God's freedom leads

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88. "omnis actus voluntatis create ideo est meritorius si est meritorius: quia deus illum acceptat." Ibid.; Lib. I, q. I, art. 2, D.

89. "Tertio patet hoc idem de meritorio: quia nullus actus est meritorius vite eterne nisi sit actus liberi arbitrii." Ibid. As in so many cases, Holkot then proceeds to qualify his argument, in this instance with a 'Bradwardinian' twist: "et quod sit in gratia: sed non est in potestate liberi arbitrii quod sit in gratia absolute loquendo." Ibid.

90. One of the more extreme examples is: "omne meritum vel demeritum est ex hoc quod actus creature est conformis vel difformis legi divine: ideo enim homo meretur: quia facit sicut deus vult eum facere... sed non est in potestate voluntatis create quod sibi aliqua lex a deo ponatur. posset enim deus permittere hominem sine lege sibi data et sine preceptis vel consiliis: sicut permittit bestias: si voluntati sue placeret..." Ibid. On the other hand, "Dico tunc istam conclusionem: quod deus potest acceptare ad vitam eternam omnes actus naturales alicuius hominis: et facere omnes actus liberos atque indifferentes aut non meritorios... ergo non est contradictio: dicendo quod actus naturalis sit meritorius si deo placet: et hoc quia eque libere posset illum acceptare ad vitam eternam." Ibid.; art. 4, D. Given also in Leff; Bradwardine and the Pelagians; p. 217.

to a thoroughgoing, albeit informed, indeterminacy. Thus, while Holkot asserts what appears to be a rather conventional understanding of morality,[91] expressed through Ockham's method, he so consistently undermines his own arguments - usually by positing the exceptions which might be caused by the unlimited application of God's potentia absoluta - that the possibility of there being any firm relationship between acts and acceptance is extremely uncertain.[92]

Holkot appears to have found a modus vivendi in the occasional application of three principles: the first is that natural logic is not necessarily applicable to matters of faith;[93] the second, that authority is a probable guide;[94] and the third, that - in Miss Smalley's

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91. This - in part - may explain Holkot's frequent citation of St. Thomas as an authority.

92. "si decedat damnabitur, nam non includit contradictionem quod deus hominem sine charitate beatificet..." Robert Holkot; Super Sententias; Lib. I, q. IIII, art. 3, F-K. Given also in Leff; Bradwardine and the Pelagians; p. 217.

93. "Similiter non est inconveniens quod logica naturalis deficiat in iis que fidei sunt. Et ideo sicut fides est supra physicam naturalem: ponens res produci per creationem: ad quam philosophia naturalis non attingit. ita moralis doctrina fidei ponit quedam principia: que scientia moralis non concedit. Eodem modo rationalis logica fidei alia debet esse a logica naturali. Dicit enim commentator. ii. Metaphysice commentum .xv. ...." Robert Holkot; Super Sententias; Lib. I, q. V, J. This is very close to being an assertion of the 'double truth' of Averroism; c.f de Gandillac; op. cit.; p. 487.

94. "Ad secundum inconveniens quid infertur in eodem argumento: quod deus posset fallere et decipere, dico quod non habendo respectum ad auctoritatem: sed respiciendo ad virtutem voluntatis: concedo quod deus potest fallere et decipere. id est voluntarie causare errorem in mente hominis: et facere eum credere aliter quam res se habet."Robert Holkot; Super Sententias; Lib. I, q. I, art. 6, R. Given also in Leff; Bradwardine and the Pelagians; p. 221, n. 2; and in Meissner, A.; Gotteserkenntnis und Gotteslehre; Nach dem Englischen Dominikanertheologen Robert Holkot; Limburg-Lahn; 1953; p. 84, n. 59.

phrase - it is "better to 'play safe'" and believe accepted doctrine than not.[95] This latter principle has two aspects: the first is the case illustrated by the tale Holkot tells approvingly of the conversion of a heretic by a Dominican lay brother's advice that the heretic would lose nothing if he believed and the belief were unfounded, but that he would gain everything should it prove to be true.[96] The second aspect lies in Holkot's conclusion that "man is able to merit through false faith", which suggests that - while the love of God impels the viator to ever more accurate knowledge of Him - God's mercy is such that He will not penalise man for inaccurate belief.[97]

Although he has been frequently taxed with Pelagianism,[98] it is doubtful whether Holkot can be said to assert a sufficiently strong causality to substantiate this. He does occasionally argue that God can

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95. Smalley; op. cit.; p. 85.

96. Ibid.

97. "Ad quintum principale quando infertur pro inconvenienti quod homo possit mereri per fidem falsam: consequens est contra Anselmum. ij. cur deus homo c.xvi. Dico quod illud verbum allegatum est argumentum discipuli: et non determinatio magistri. unde non habendo respectum ad auctoritatem: sed ponderando propositionem que infertur pro inconvenienti: videlicet quod homo posset mereri per fidem falsam: concedo eam. homo enim volando credere certam propositionem que precipitur esse credenda: et est falsa: potest mereri: nec pertinet ad meritum fidei utrum sit vera an falsa: sed hoc per se pertinet ad rationem meriti fidei quod voluntarie credatur sicut deus vult credi. Posse autem deum precipere aliquid falsum credi non est dubium. (followed by examples)." Robert Holkot; Super Sententias; Lib. I, q. 1, art. 6, R. Given in part by Leff; Bradwardine and the Pelagians; p. 221, n. 3.

98. See, inter alia; Leff, Bradwardine and the Pelagians; p. 219 and passim; Oberman; Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine...; pp. 43-6 and passim: this interpretation is partly due to the tendency to view Holkot through Bradwardine's eyes.

become man's debtor,[99] but he qualifies this by stating that - as regards the potentia absoluta - God cannot be man's debtor unless He so wills.[100] Further, Holkot argues at some length that it is not in man's power that his acts be meritorious or demeritorious, and this without equivocation.[101]

Finally, it should be noted that three of Holkot's arguments from his Questiones super Sententias (referred to here as Super Sententias to reduce confusion), BookII, question I, article 1, have been used by Buckingham in his Questiones super Sententias. The passage from Holkot discusses the justice of God's governance of humanity in terms of the justice with which God rewards and punishes men after death: since some of his arguments are from the general stock of scholastic arguments on the subject, direct dependence is - of course - merely probable. The 'borrowings' are:

Lib. II, q. I, art. 1, A,	arg. 4	is found in	Q. I, C. II, ll. 462-490.
	arg. 5	" " "	Q. VI, Art. III, expanded
	arg. 7	" " "	Q. I, C. II, ll. 412 ff.

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99. "non sit inconveniens isto modo loqui de deo: dicendo deum debitorem creature:" Robert Holkot; Super Sententias; Lib. II, q. 1, D.

100. "Ad tertium quando arguitur quod similiter homo posset mereri tempore. Dico quod aliquem esse debitorem est dupliciter.... Dico quod de potentia dei absoluta potest non reddere isti: quia non est debitor hominis nisi quia vult esse debitor."Robert Holkot; Determinatio (printed with Super Sententias); Q. II; Y. Given in Leff; Bradwardine and the Pelagians; p. 222, n.3.

101. "De secundo articulo: videlicet utrum sit in potestate hominis quod actus suus sit meritorius vel demeritorius. Dico isto conclusionem: quod non est in potestate voluntatis create quod actus suus sit meritorius alicuius boni vel demeritorius ut ei correspondeat aliqua pena. Hec conclusio sic apparet:" followed by three brief supportive arguments. Robert Holkot; Super Sententias; Lib. I, q. I, D, article 2.

Thomas Bradwardine:

Although Bradwardine's principal theological work, the De Causa Dei, was not published until after Buckingham's Questiones super Sententias,[102] some mention should be made of him here. It seems most likely that the linking of their names in the minds of their contemporaries as opponents on the question of the extent of free will was based on more than the evident opposition of their writings.[103] Bradwardine and Buckingham were both fellows of Merton College during the period 1324-1335, and undoubtedly during that eleven-year period came to know each other's views very closely. Bradwardine left Merton in 1335, but continued to study in the faculty of Theology: his presence is recorded in 1336 and he is known to have become Doctor of Theology by November, 1348.[104] While Bradwardine's curriculum vitae is here somewhat uncertain, it seems highly unlikely that he remained in Oxford beyond the summer of 1337; even so, this would have allowed some five years of association in the Faculty. It is even possible that Bradwardine was Buckingham's master in his theological studies, in which case their differences would have been extensively explored.[105] In any case, the two men must have written

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102. Questiones super Sententias: 1340-44; De Causa Dei: 1344. For the former, see above, pp. 44-47; for the latter, Emden; Biographical Register...Oxford...; Vol. I, p. 246a.

103. See above, p. 63 ff.

104. Emden; Biographical Register...Oxford...; loc. cit.

105. The evidence is tenuous, Robson; op. cit.; p. 45.

their works with each other in mind, although their targets are obviously much broader and they never descend to personal attack.[106]

Bradwardine's position in Fourteenth Century thought is peculiar, for he stands apart from his contemporaries in order to offer a fundamental criticism of their approach, yet the ground on which he stands is highly unstable; so unstable, in fact, that he appears to have had no real followers.[107] Because he does stand apart from his fellows, yet criticises them carefully, he has been used as a means of illuminating the period.[108] The problems connected with this use of Bradwardine are many, however, and not easily soluble. "Pelagianism", one suspects, is not so much an appropriate term for the position of Bradwardine's opponents as it is a way of defining the position furthest from Bradwardine's own; i.e. if Pelagianism be defined as "the theological system which ⟨holds⟩ that a man took the initial and fundamental steps towards salvation by his own efforts apart from the assistance of Divine Grace,"[109] or if semi-Pelagianism - to take a modern term -

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106. Bradwardine's "Pelagiani pestiferi" is a generic term of abuse; Buckingham's attack on the De Causa Dei in his Questiones Theologice mentions neither the work nor its author, so far as I can determine.

107. With the possible exception of Wyclif, but this appears to be more a convenient coincidence for Wyclif than a real dependence. See Robson; op. cit.;p. 39; Leff; Bradwardine and the Pelagians; pp. 261-2; and Oberman; Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine...; 198 ff. and passim.

108. Notably by Leff and Oberman. Leff's position, at least as regards Ockham, has recently changed,however. See Leff; William of Ockham; Manchester; 1975.

109. Cross; Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church; p. 1040.

be defined as the doctrine that "the first steps towards the Christian life were ordinarily taken by the human will and that Grace supervened only later,"[110] then Bradwardine's own position is decidedly anti-Pelagian, since it asserts the utter impossibility of any human volition towards good, salvation, or God, without the prior action of God's grace. The radical determinism which results from this has been characterised as Augustinian,[111] perhaps in part because of Bradwardine's frequent references to Augustine for authority, yet - in Copleston's words - "it is difficult to say how far he was influenced by Augustine's writings taken by themselves and how far he was influenced in his interpretation of Augustine by the Ockhamist emphasis on the divine omnipotence and the divine will."[112]

Bradwardine's understanding of the nature of evil is, however, traditionally Augustinian: since the creation is good and contains nothing evil, evil can be only the privation of good.[113] Thus, in the case of human acts, the acts themselves must be always good as acts, although they can be put to purposes which take away good.[114] It is

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110. Ibid.; p. 1239.

111. Oberman; Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine...; passim. But see Leff; Bradwardine and the Pelagians; pp. 116-7.

112. Copleston; A History of Philosophy; Vol. 3, part I, p. 137.

113. Thomas Bradwardine; De Causa Dei; ed. Savile; London; 1618; pp. 251-5 seqq.

114. Some of his examples are extreme: the execution of an innocent man is meritorious if done through ignorance. Ibid.; p. 256.

significant that Bradwardine applies this to interior acts as well as to exterior ones. As has been indicated by both Oberman and Leff, the central weakness in Bradwardine's position is the difficulty of reconciling the positive nature of the creation, which results from the goodness of God, with the reality of sin and evil, since Bradwardine has posited that all acts of the human will are, as acts, subsumed under the divine will as expressed through grace, and are thus acts willed by God.[115] Bradwardine is thus forced to assert that "Vult ergo Deus hanc esse verum, Peccatum est;"[116] in order to maintain the primacy of God's will, and then to justify evil and sin in the divine economy. In this connection, in one of his few references to the potentia absoluta, Bradwardine himself asserts that "many Saints are often deceived through sophistic arguments";[117] and that, by permitting their deception, God wills sin and evil.

Relative degrees of good and evil are touched upon, but only insofar as they pertain to the correct choice to be made between evils: here, Bradwardine follows conventional teaching and says merely that the lesser evil is to be chosen.[118] It is here, however, that he does

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115. Oberman; Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine...; pp. 123ff. Leff; Bradwardine and the Pelagians; p. 57 ff.

116. Bradwardine; op. cit.; p. 294.

117. "Videmus enim, quod multi Sancti per argumenta sophistica decipiuntur frequenter. Et saltem hoc est possibile de divina potentia absoluta." Ibid.; p. 257.

118. "de duobus malis, minus malum est eligendum, cuius causa est, quia in bonis est e contrario, scilicet quod maius est magis eligendum." Ibid.; p. 256.

allow some scope to natural law.[119]

Bradwardine's total rejection of merit de congruo follows from his insistance on the element of divine participation in all acts of the human will, since merit de congruo - in his view - implies the possibility that man might initiate the gift of God's grace by in some way making God man's debtor. Thus, the only merit is merit de condigno, which is God's own free gift.[120]

It is surprising perhaps to find Buckingham and Bradwardine in agreement at any point: their unanimity on the subject of the nature of evil is startling, if only because it would seem to be a subject close to the centre of their differences. In Bradwardine's case, it is not out of place for him to treat evil as a lack of good which ought to inhere, since it is a traditional, Augustinian view, but it is perhaps odd in Buckingham's case, insofar as he is regarded as a "modernus". The answer to this seems to lie in the use they make of it, for Bradwardine appears to find it an awkward, but necessary, way of asserting God's goodness and omnipotence, whereas Buckingham finds in it a

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119. "Auctoritates vero dicentes quod talis debet eligere minus peccatum, intelligunt, quod debet eligere illud, quod videtur sibi minus peccatum, et quod in omni alio casu esset peccatum: Tantum enim in hoc casu licet homini eligere et facere, quod credit esse peccatum, et cum hoc sit ius naturale, ut omnis homo fugiat, et non eligat sibi malum, contra istud ius naturale dispensatio admittitur tantummodo, in hoc casu, sicut superius recitatur." Ibid.; p. 258.

120. This rejection of merit de congruo is discussed at length in the literature, where it is rightly regarded as central; see Oberman; Archbishop Thomas Bradwardine...; p. 145 ff. and Leff; Bradwardine and the Pelagians; p. 57 ff.

starting-point for the discussion of degrees of good and evil in constructing an economy of moral value.

This difference can be seen clearly in the material of Buckingham's second Conclusion, for - apart from his acceptance of the fact that one act may be more evil than another - Bradwardine shows no interest in defining relative degrees of good and evil. Even in discussing the infusion of grace, he appears to think in terms of the grace filling a privation totally, rather than partially or by degrees.[121] As we suggested earlier,[122] it may be that Bradwardine regarded the attempt to quantify spiritual qualities - such as grace - as a perversion of method, since the essential relation is personal and subjective, rather than abstract or objective. If this were so, then any attempt to calculate good or evil, or the degree of merit occasioned by an act, might well have struck him as being implicitly Pelagian.

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121. Bradwardine; De Causa Dei; p. 397.

122. Above, p. 74.

C. Buckingham's Doctrinal Synthesis

While Buckingham touches on a number of issues in these first two Conclusions of Question I of the Questiones super Sententias, he treats only three of them at sufficient length to warrant their extended discussion. After an examination of the nature and purpose of these three - the nature of evil, the principle of moral parity, and the case of poena - brief mention will be made of Buckingham's treatment of merit de condigno and de congruo, malum culpae and malum poenae, and God's potentia absoluta,

It should be stressed that these discussions treat only the first two Conclusions of Question I: while occasional reference is made to other parts of the Questiones super Sententias and to the later Questiones Theologice, treatment of their doctrinal content lies beyond our present purpose.

The Nature of Evil:

As we have seen, Duns Scotus and William of Ockham are to be credited with an important reinterpretation of the nature of morality: by shifting the basis of moral value from natural law to the immediate will of God, they opened the way for a radical, although possibly remote, indeterminacy, such as we have seen in the works of Robert

Holkot. One reaction to this has been seen in the case of Thomas Bradwardine: by stressing the radical contingency of all being, and so all natural goodness, upon God's will, and by stressing the radical contingency of all moral goodness upon the prior infusion of God's grace, Bradwardine essentially accepted the modernist basis of morality in the will of God, but removed all possibility of indeterminacy by subsuming all other possible bases - conscience (synderesis), recta ratio, natural law - under God's will as expressed, when appropriate, through His grace.

Buckingham's response is markedly different. The apparent intention of the Question is to establish some sort of workable concept of good and evil which - falling within the realm of natural law - will permit moral certainty within the potentia ordinata and moral probability within even the potentia absoluta. To do this, Buckingham treats good and evil as omnibus terms, covering expressions of every possible sort of worth. Thus, the conclusion Sola privatio boni est per se malum is purposefully vague, although its continuation et intelligo universaliter tam de malo culpe quam de malo pene does indicate that he is primarily interested in morality, rather than in the value of 'things' in themselves.[1] Since evil is defined as the privation of good, it would

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1. Buckingham; Questiones super Sententias; Q. I, C. I, ll. 18-20. C.f.: Herveus Natalis; Questio de Peccato Originali; ed. R. M. Martin in La Controverse sur le Péché Originel au Début du XIV^e Siècle; Louvain; 1930, pp. 102-3: "...racio mali generaliter dicti in hoc consistit, quod sit carencia alicuius debiti inesse. Ultra autem hoc, malum culpe addit quod sit in potestate illius, qui tale malum perpetrat, ipsum perpetrare vel non perpetrare, sive quod malum sit voluntarium et subiectum libero arbitrio.

(continued overleaf)

be of interest were Buckingham to define "good", but he confines himself to the discussion of particular "goods".

The first Conclusion is concerned primarily to prove that there cannot be positive evil. In addition to the basic doctrinal reasons against positive evil - dualism, etc. - there is the more immediately apposite reason that a positive evil would necessarily be subject to increase and decrease quite independently of any increase or decrease in the quantity of good, thus destroying any necessary relation between good and evil. Thus, although Buckingham argues that there cannot be positive evil because, for example, there would then be some "greatest evil" in opposition to the "greatest good: God",[2] his purpose appears to be the defense of the principle of moral parity.

Buckingham shows a particular concern for cases in which things or actions which are in themselves good have accidentally evil effects and, thus, appear to act as positive evil; his examples are not notable for their originality, but they are less extreme than some others in the tradition,[3] and do provide an effective means of closing off a catagory of apparent exceptions to the definition of evil as privation of good.[4]

(continuation)

> Ex hoc ergo quod peccatum originale est quoddam malum, oportet quod sit formaliter loquendo defectus alicuius disposicionis bone debite inesse in ordine ad finem hominis in quantum est homo; alioquin non esset malum hominis in quantum est homo."

3. E.g. Bradwardine's example: above, p. 126, n. 114.

4. Buckingham; Questiones super Sententias; Q. I; C. I, ll. 163-166; 187-195; 196-198; 203-208.

In treating evil as the privation of good in all cases, Buckingham does appear to neglect a current of thought, exemplified by William of Auxerre,[5] which argues that good and evil are properly opposites in the moral sphere, since virtue and vice may be seen to be contraries. Even with William's qualification that vice is the contrary of virtue, not because it is evil in itself, but because it is a perversion of positive good, this seems to mark an important separation. For Buckingham, it is important that good and evil not be opposites - for that would imply some sort of positive character in evil which, as we saw above, would destroy any necessary relation between the two - but rather that the presence of evil be only the absence of good (and not the contrary).

Buckingham makes much of distinctions among various sorts of privations, possibly on the basis of William of Auxerre's classification: of greater good, of the better good, of more goods, of good which owes ‹ought to inhere› more.[6] The latter distinction is particularly important.[7] Buckingham frequently refers to privations of good which are not evil because they are privations of good which does not need to inhere,[8] (Conclusion V of Question I asserts that not every

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5. Above, pp. 100-101.

6. Above, p. 101.

7. The meaning of "debite inesse" is discussed above, p. 68, n. 3.

8. E.g. Buckingham; Questiones super Sententias; Q. I; C. I, ll. 221-224; 311-313. C. II, ll. 51 ff.; 252 ff.; 668 ff.; 698-9.

privation of good is evil, in part along these lines.) This catagory of privation, incidentally, in conjunction with the potentia absoluta, provides the basis for some interesting arguments that, were God so to change a creature that a good which was once debite inesse were no longer necessary, then the privation of that good would be no longer evil, were the good to be taken away.[9]

Buckingham's treatment of the nature of evil is not notably innovative. Its most distinctive feature is its conservatism, which shows no outward awareness of the fundamental questioning of the bases of morality initiated by Scotus and Ockham. This appearance is deceptive, however, for Buckingham seems to be creating the foundation for a natural moral law which will have meaning beyond the possible fluctuations of God's will. This has particular meaning in the context of his assertion in Question VI that there is a middle state between grace and sin, in which it is possible through natural justice to come to eternal life.[10] Thus, he appears to be laying the

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9. Ibid.; Q. I, C. II, Decima ratio, ll. 201-226, and Responsio ad decimam, ll. 628-647.

10. Ibid.; Q. VI, Art. III: "Ad tercium argumentum dico quod posito quod adam in statu innocentie fuisset sine gratia gratum faciente ut videtur esse communis opinio doctorum〈:〉 nescio tamen an i〈s〉ta fuit vel non. sed scio quod est possibile quod sic fuit: et possibile quod non et in utroque statu potuit mori et eternaliter vivere et nego ista〈m〉 consequentiam〈:〉 ergo fuit in gratia gratum faciente quia fuit dignus regno ut supra dixi quia per iusticiam originalem potuit fuisse principaliter iustus et similiter nego hanc consequentiam fuit dignus ex illo non habere regnum celorum igitur est in peccato mortali. quia licet sit vera de lege

(continued overleaf)

foundations for an approach which seeks to eliminate both the indeterminacy of modernism and the radical contingency on grace of Bradwardine's approach.

The Principle of Moral Parity:

This is stated as Conclusion II: "Every privation of something which ought to inhere is as evil as is good that which it, of itself and essentially, takes away, if it were good." The wording of the conclusion is necessarily awkward, but the principle is itself exceedingly simple. If - on some scale of moral value - something is good to the value "a" and its value is reduced to value "b", the resultant evil - the distance of the reduction from "a" to "b" - is precisely equal to the amount of good from "b" to "a" which has been lost. It is, in short, a statement of identity which is very nearly a tautology: the distance from "a" to "b" equals the distance from "b" to "a".

This concept exemplifies some of the difficulties involved in what Edith Sylla has termed the "quantification of qualities." [11] We

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(continuation)
communi non tamen est simpliciter necessaria... videtur michi mirabile quod deus non potest de potentia sua absoluta facere creaturam rationalem nisi sit digna clara dei visione vel sit in peccato mortali." Perez; f. m.iij[rb]. Given in part in Leff; Bradwardine and the Pelagians; p. 230, n. 1.

11. Sylla, E.; Medieval Quantifications of Qualities: The "Merton School"; Archive for History of Exact Science; Vol. 8; 1971; passim.

have noted earlier this general sort of difficulty, in relation to Buckingham's tendency to use the "letter-calculus".[12] Here, the primary difficulty lies in relating the relationship between a particular good and a particular evil to any outside standard of reference. Any third value tends, unless the argument is very carefully stated, to distort things hopelessly. In particular, it must always be remembered that, on the sort of moral scale we have posited, the total privation of anything, be it rationality, the divine vision, or "a", is not a proportionally large negation, but simple negation = 0. Thus, if there exist two goods, "a" = 8 points on the scale and "b" = 10 points on the scale, the perfect privation of each of them is "0", not "-8" or "-10". This becomes more complex when Buckingham compares "goods" with "evils", particularly when the argument takes the form "if A is more evil than B is good, the aggregate AB is more to be shunned than chosen",[13] since - unless one is willing to accept the positive evil which he seems to posit - there appears to be no possible point of reference. Indeed, in this sort of question, one tends to be more faithful to Buckingham's premises than Buckingham himself was, for the arguments are often of the form "if A is -10 and B is 8, their aggregate will be negative", which treats evil as a "positive" negation, rather than as simple privation = 0. Buckingham's non-fidelity to his premises is more apparent

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12. See above, pp. 73-5.

13. See, for example, the first opening arguments of Conclusion II, ll. 4 ff.

than real, however, for "evil" in this sort of case may be taken as a measure of the reduction of some positive good, which measure may then be compared with the actual value of some positive good.

The method bears more than a little resemblance to the variety of methods devised for the analysis of the change of qualities through the "intension and remission of forms", when it is applied to cases involving aggregates of good and evil. In these instances, Buckingham proceeds as though he were applying the admixture theory, combined perhaps with Burley's concept of "succession".[14] The application of the former may have been suggested by William of Auxerre's reference to sin and evil as being real because they are a mixture of being and non-being,[15] but the concept was doubtless in common use: the 1330's, in fact, saw considerable debate in Oxford on the question of the nature of intension and remission.[16]

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14. In other cases, Buckingham clearly rejects the admixture theory for, as we saw above (p. 132), positive evil - which can be mixed with good - has no necessary relation to good.

    Burley's theory of succession may be stated as: "in every movement with regard to form the whole preceeding form, from which the per se motion (like intensification) occurs, is destroyed and a totally new form is acquired of which nothing preexisted." From the Tractatus Secundus. Given in Coleman; op. cit.; p. 144.

15. Above, p. 100.

16. Coleman; op. cit.; p. 132. Maier, A.; Zwei Grundprobleme der scholastischen Naturphilosophie: das Problem der Intensiven Grösse, die Impetustheorie; 3rd ed.; Rome; 1968; passim. Weisheipl; Early Fourteenth-Century Physics...; passim. Combes, A.; L'Intensité des formes d'après Jean de Ripa; Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age; vol. XXXVII; Paris; 1971; pp. 17-147, passim.

The principle of moral parity does give rise to a series of very nice paradoxes when applied to beatitude and damnation, however, for - as we saw earlier - damnation appears to be multi-valued.[17] The initial argument of Question I is a paradigm of the type, especially in the form given by William of Auxerre: "the loss of the vision of God is the greatest punishment and original sin the least ⟨of sins⟩; therefore the least sin is punished by the greatest punishment."[18] This paradox is treated in a number of places in Conclusion II, and - indeed - the solutio is given over entirely to what may be termed:

The Case of Poena:

Damnation does represent a special case of privation, for there are two distinct sorts of punishment involved. Confusion of the two has been constant in the course of doctrinal development, not least because the early sources confuse the two. The first, poena damni,[19] is entirely the punishment of privation of the divine vision (it is, for example, the state of virtuous pagans and - more relevantly - of unbaptised children in the First Circle of the Inferno in Dante's Commedia). It involves no actual punishment whatsoever, apart from deprivation of blessedness. The second, poena sensus, is punishment meted out for actual sin: it involves - as the name indicates - punishment felt by

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17. Discussed, for example, in the outline of William of Auxerre's thought above, pp. 99-106.

18. Above, p. 104, n. 43.

19. "Poena sensus" and "poena damni" are also discussed above, p. 69, n. 5.

the senses and is in proportion to the amount and type of sin committed. Poena sensus is applied as a generic term to all sorts of sensible punishments, however, both earthly and infernal, as well as to the penances of Purgatory.

Poena damni is the punishment merited for original sin; poena sensus, the punishment for actual sin.

Because entirely different criteria apply to the distribution of these two sorts of punishment, it is possible to see a lack of justice in God's ordination of rewards. Indeed, Holkot's discussion of these poenae came under a question concerning the justice of God's governance of humanity.[20]

Buckingham closely follows William of Auxerre's distinction between two ways in which God can be said to "inflict" these punishments. The first way is through permission - through refraining from action - and it is in this sense that God causes poena damni (poena contracta, in William's terminology[21]). The second way is through direct ordinance - through the imposition of actual sensible punishment - and in that way God is the cause of poena sensus (poena inflicta, in William[22]).

Poena damni is an absolute: one either is blessed or damned, either has the vision of God or does not have it. There is no middle

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20. See above, p. 123.

21. See above, pp. 103-4.

22. Ibid.

ground: those in Purgatory will have the vision; those in limbo will not. It is misleading to speak - as Buckingham does - of "quantities" of poena damni: the least amount is no less than an infinitely great amount. On the other hand, because there is no proportionality in the distribution of poena damni, it does appear to violate the principle of moral parity: the greatest possible amount of mortal sin merits exactly the same punishment as the very least mortal sin. Buckingham reconciles this with justice by arguing that "pena dampni is a lesser punishment than any pena sensus, nor can any pena dampni be sufficient punishment for any actual mortal sin; indeed, infinite pena dampni is merited for all actual mortal sin."[23] Similarly, Buckingham argues conventionally that original sin is less a sin than any actual venial or mortal sin.[24] His most effective argument, however, is simply that poena damni is reckoned according to the good which ought to inhere (the vision of God), rather than according to the amount of sin.[25] Thus, since all damnation involves poena damni, and since it is not actual punishment - but rather the privation of a possibility - its unproportionality is not unjust.

Poena sensus is the domain of'justice'and of the principle of proportional retribution for actual sin. Buckingham's only descriptive reference to infernal punishments occurs in his response to the Seventh

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23. Buckingham; Questiones super Sententias; Q. I, C. II, ll. 410-413.

24. Ibid.; ll. 427-429.

25. Ibid.; ll. 462-463.

objection to Conclusion I. He uses the example of fire burning the body of someone undergoing sensible punishment, adding that if he did not feel the burning his punishment would be merely poena damni.[26]

Buckingham's treatment of these two types of punishment derives in large part from William of Auxerre's response that "the loss of the vision of God is the greatest punishment with respect to damnation; but the least with respect to the senses."[27]

Merit De Condigno and De Congruo:

Buckingham's references to merit occasionally specify that it is to be understood as any merit, de condigno or de congruo.

Merit de condigno does receive some further amplification in the course of Buckingham's arguments. In the response to the First objection to Conclusion II, he follows authority in arguing that God - being merciful - punishes sin less than it absolutely deserves (citra condignum) and - being generous - rewards good merit more than it absolutely deserves (ultra condignum).[28]

The other reference to merit de condigno occurs in the Ninth objection to Conclusion II and its response; this has been discussed in the context of St. Thomas's influence.[29] This reference is peculiar

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26. Ibid.; C. I, ll. 300-307.

27. See above, p. 104, n. 44.

28. Buckingham; Questiones super Sententias; Q. I, C. II, ll. 515-536.

29. See above, pp. 108-9.

for two reasons: first, it defines merit de condigno as to merit "the quantity of the act." This definition is far more appropriate to merit de congruo, although it would apply were the prior gift of God's grace to be understood. Second, it states that eternal life cannot be merited de condigno, but it was the normal understanding that eternal life could be merited only de condigno, since merit de congruo without the additional support of grace is grossly unequal to the amount of merit required.

It seems likely that Buckingham has either made a gross error and confused merit de condigno with merit de congruo or, more probably, that he used condignus in the loose sense of "very worthily" or "absolutely" and means - as the argument suggests - that although someone can merit "absolutely" the evil of loss through sin, yet he cannot "absolutely" merit eternal life by his own action. This assumes, perhaps improbably, that Buckingham understands de condigno here not to include the prior gift of grace.

Malum Culpae and Malum Poenae:

These two sorts of evil, corresponding - in a sense - to poena sensus and poena damni, are used by Buckingham in a conventional manner. Malum is ambiguous, meaning either "evil" or "sin".

Malum poenae, evil "of punishment", corresponds to original sin, for which there is punishment (poena damni), but no burden of

blame.[30] It is also used, in a similar sense, of punishments in Purgatory.[31]

Malum culpae, evil "of blame", corresponds to culpable sin, which is punished in proportion to the amount and type of sin (poena sensus).

God's Potentia Absoluta:

Buckingham includes in his arguments examples in which God's potentia absoluta is invoked to create a hypothetical situation in order to test a proposition. Among these may be counted the simultaneous placing of a good and its privation in someone[32] and the deprivation of good without any concomitant suffering.[33] The examples are not extreme, nor are they used in a sensational manner.

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30. C.f. Peter of Palud; In Sententias; Lib. II, 30, 2: "Sed carencia originalis iusticie non fuit in Adam culpa, sed pena; quia nullus peccat nisi agendo quod non debet, vel prout non debet, vel omittendo quod agere debet. Si enim homo facit factum propter quod perdit hereditatem, perdicio hereditatis non est ei culpa, sed pena. Ergo nec est culpa in posteris." Ed. Martin, R.M.; La Controverse sur le Péché Originel au Début du XIV^{e} Siècle; Louvain; 1930; pp. 246-7.

31. Buckingham; Questiones super Sententias; Q. I, C. II, ll. 599 seqq.

32. Ibid.; C. I, ll. 112-119.

33. Ibid.; C. I, ll. 285-7.

III

The Text of

Question I, Conclusions I and II, of the

Questiones super Sententias

of Thomas of Buckingham

A

Sources and Conventions

A

The Sources for the Text[1]

The unabridged text of the Questiones super Sententias is known to have survived in twelve manuscripts. In addition, the sole printed edition merits inclusion as a substantive source, and there is a record of one manuscript which is now lost.

1. Extant Manuscripts

T Berlin, Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, früher Preussische Staatsbibliothek, Ms. Theol. Fol. 197[2]

Parchment and paper, a composite volume comprising two distinct manuscripts. The first of these, a fragment consisting of eight parchment leaves numbered 1-8, contains only the greater por-

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1. In the interest of brevity, the descriptions of these sources have been limited to information which may have a bearing on the establishment of the text; in particular, no descriptions have been given of manuscripts of other texts bound together with manuscripts of the Questiones super Sententias unless they have a direct bearing on the establishment of the text.

2. See Stegmüller, F; Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi; Herbipoli (Würzburg); 1947; Vol. I; p.415; and Rose, Valentin; Die Handschriften-Verzeichnisse der Koniglichen Bibliothek zu Berlin; Verzeichniss der Lateinischen Handschriften; Berlin; A. Asher & Co.; 1901; Vol. II; p.335; Item 480. Dr. Gerhard Achten, of the Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, has kindly supplemented Rose's description and supplied further information on the history of the manuscript.

tion of Question I of the Questiones super Sententias, from Conclusion 1 through the bulk of Conclusion VII (through d.iii^{va}, line 30, in the Paris edition).[3] The pages are 32.5 x 22.5 cm. with a writing-area 15.5 - 16 x 22 cm., in two columns of sixty lines.

This fragment is a single gathering of four, with a catchword at the foot of 8^{v}. The fore-edge and head are badly water-stained, especially in the first two leaves.

The text is written in a single university bookhand, with rubrication, from the middle of the Fourteenth Century. It is probably of Northern French or English provenance.

The binding, in Fifteenth Century calf, carries marks which indicate that the manuscript was part of the old Augustinian library at Lippstadt, Westfalen, West Germany. After 1524, the Augustinians were expelled and, in the Seventeenth Century, the Jesuits took over their library. After the suppression of the Jesuits in 1773, this was one of many manuscripts of the old Augustinian collection which passed to the Kurfürstliche Bibliothek in Berlin.

B Bruges, Stedelijke Openbare Bibliotheek. Ms. 192.[5]

Parchment, a composite volume comprising four distinct manuscripts in three different hands (plus fragments of a fifth

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3. The manuscript also contains Ludolf of Saxony, Glosa super psalmos, in ff. 9^{r}-294^{v}.

4. Rose, Valentin; loc. cit.

5. See Stegmüller, F; loc. cit.; Xiberta, B.M.; De scriptoribus scholasticiis saec. xiv ex ordine Carm.; Louvain; 1931; p. 246;

(continued overleaf)

manuscript used as guard-sheets). The first of these, ff. 1^{ra}-44^{va}, the Lectura magistri Rosete (Roger Roseth, O.F.M.), is copied by the same scribe as the second, ff. 45^{ra}-79^{vb}, which contains the Questiones super Sententias.[6] The pages are 30 x 22.5 cm., with a writing-area 21-21.5 x 15-15.5 cm., with two columns of 60-64 lines per page.

The text is contained in three gatherings of six (ff. 45-56, 57-68, and 69-80), ending at 79^{ra}. A Tabula huius operis extends from 79^{ra}-79^{vb}; f.80 is blank.

The text omits a substantial portion of Q. VI (from l.iiii^{ra},

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(continuation 5.)
de Poorter, L'Abbé A.; Un receuil peu connu de questions sur les Sentences; Le manuscrit 192 de la bibliothèque de Bruges; Revue Néoscolastique; Vol. 33, 1931; pp. 487-491; and Catalogue général des manuscrits des Bibliothèques de Belgique; Vol. II; Catalogue des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Publique de la Ville de Bruges par L'Abbé A. de Poorter; Gembloux, Belg., and Paris; 1934; pp. 240-242; and Weisheipl, J.A.; Repertorium Mertonense;p. 185.

6. The Lectura magistri Rosete is cited in Michalski, Konstanty; Le Criticisme et le Scepticisme dans la Philosophie du XIV^{e} siècle; Bulletin international de l'academie polonaise des sciences et des lettres, classe hist. phil.; Cracow; 1927; pp. 47-8; where it is erroneously ascribed to Richard de Swyneshed. It is similarly misascribed in the works of L'Abbé A. de Poorter cited in note 5. See Doucet, V; Le Studium franciscain de Norwich en 1337; Arch. Franc. Hist.; vol. xlvi; 1953; pp. 89-93; and Emden; Biographical Register ... Oxford ...; Vol. III; p. 1836, "Swyneshed".
The manuscript also contains the Lectura O. Pickenham (Osbertus Anglicus), ff. 81-146. See Xiberta, B.M.; loc. cit.; and Emden; Biographical Register ... Oxford ...; Vol. III; p. 1481, "Pickingham".
The manuscript also contains a collection of theological questions, ff. 147-166, Inc. "Circa tertium librum sententiarum queritur utrum aliqua pura creatura..." erroneously identified by L'Abbé A. de Poorter in the Catalogue des manuscrits...; loc. cit., as the Questiones in III Sent. of Robert Cowton, from a short incipit in Little, A.G.; Initia Operum Latinorum quae saeculis xiii. xiv. xv.attribuuntur; Manchester; 1904; p. 40: "Circa tertium librum".

line 6, through m.iiii^{vb}, line 35, in the Paris edition). There is a unique illustrative diagram at f. 63^{vb}, near the end of Q. IV.

The text is written in a very small Fourteenth Century university bookhand and is rubricated throughout. According to the colophons of the first (ff. 1-44) and second (ff. 45-79) manuscripts, the text of the Questiones super Sententias was copied by Nicholas de Ranc, of the diocese of Reims, a Parisian, in the quarters of John Thomas of Dunes, who had commissioned the work, during the month from the 28th July to the 1st September, 1374.[7] John Thomas of Dunes taught at St. Bernard's, the Cistercian house in Paris, and became the twenty-second Abbot of that Order's monastery at Dunes.[8] From him, the manuscript presumably passed to the monastery, and so eventually to the public library in Bruges.

The manuscript appears to have passed through several stages of binding: in the first, guard-sheet ii.

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7. The colophon of the first ms. (ff. 1-44) reads "Explicit lectura magistri Rosete, scripta anno Domini 1374°, 28 die mensis Julii, per manus Nicolai de Ranc, Remensis diocesis. Deo gratias, Librum istum fecit scribi dominus Johannes de Dunis in Flandria". The colophon of the second ms. (ff. 45-79), the Questiones super Sententias, reads: "Explicit hoc opus, scriptum pro domino Johanne Thome de Dunis, per manus Nicolai de Ranc, Remensis diocesis, Parisius, in camera dicti domini Johannis, anno Domini 1374, prima die Septembris. Deo gratias". Both colophons are reported in the works of L'Abbé A. de Poorter cited in note 5 above; "dominus" is omitted in the report of the first colophon in the Catalogue des manuscrits...., p. 241.

8. For Abbot John Thomas of Dunes see de Poorter, L'Abbé A.; Catalogue des manuscrits...; loc. cit.; and But, frater Adrian; Cronica Abbatum Monasterii de Dunis; Bruges; 1839; pp. 18-19 and 78-84; and Cronica <of A. But> et cartularium de Dunis; ed. F. Van de Putte; Bruges; 1864; pp. 65-70. It is possible that one "Nicholaus Rync", who is listed on pp. 84 and 70 of the respective

(continuation overleaf)

was reversed recto-verso, and guard-sheet i was not bound in; in the second, probably before 1450, after extensive worming and some damp, sheet ii was reversed and the first title added;[9] in the third, guard-sheet i was bound in (and the second, Seventeenth Century, title was added ?)[10]; and in the fourth, the present binding was completed.

C Bernkastel-Kues, St. Nikolaus-Hospital. Ms. 90.[11]

Paper, a composite volume of 86 leaves comprising four distinct manuscripts. The fourth of these, ff. 29-86 contains the Questiones super Sententias.[12] The pages are 33.4 x 22.4 cm., with a writing-area 25.5 x 16-16.5 cm., in two columns of 41-54 lines per page.

(continuation 8)
editions of the Cronica as having become a monk at Dunes during the rule of Abbot John Thomas, is the same as the "Nicholaus de Ranc" who copied this manuscript.

9. In a late Fourteenth Century (?) hand: "Questiones diversorum doctorum super sententias"; f. ii^{r}.

10. In a Seventeenth Century (?) hand: "quaestiones Magistri Rosetae et quorumdam aliorum Super Sententias"; f. ii^{r}.

11. See Stegmüller; loc. cit.; and Marx, J; Verzeichnis der Handschrifter-Sammlung der Hospitals zu Cues; Trier; 1905; p. 91.

12. The manuscript also contains Rosetus super sententias abbreviatus (Roger Roseth, O. F. M.), ff. 1-23. The incipit of this work is the same as that of the Lectura magistri Rosete in B above ("Utrum aliquis in casu possit ex precepto obligari...") The explicit is: "Expeditur iste articulus. Finis roseti abbreviati Deo gratias". See note 6 above. The manuscript also contains, ff. 23^{v}-24^{v}, a theological question, Inc.: "Utrum ante verum complexum theologicum...", Expl. : "Et hoc de toto isto articulo secundo prologi". and, ff. 25-28, an unfinished theological question, Inc.: "Utrum omnis credens (qui) non secundum ecclesiam credit erret in credendo necessario ad salutem".

The text is contained in five gatherings (6, 6, 6, 6, 5) without catchwords. In addition to the numbering of the leaves in relation to the whole volume, ff. 29-86, the leaves are also numbered 1-58 in a Fifteenth Century hand. Some signatures are detached; the fore-edge is worn, but only seriously in fol. 86, where it cuts into the writing.

The manuscript omits a substantial portion of Q. VI (from l.iiii^{ra}, line 6, through m.iiii^{vb}, line 35, in the Paris edition). Colophon and a brief index to the Questiones super Sententias at f. 86^{rb}; at f. 86^{v} there are various notations including a brief list of books.

The text is written in Fifteenth Century continental cursive bookhand. The scribe, Petrus de Gauraco, a Carmelite friar, notes in the colophon that his copy is "good and correct so far as I have been able, in which there are some unwritten spaces, distributed where good sense could not be spoken or drawn from the exemplar."[13]

Nothing further is known of the early history of this manuscript. The two manuscripts which comprise this volume were probably bound together in the Sixteenth Century.

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13. The colophon, at f. 86^{rb}, reads: "hoc opus breve sed comptum et utile boquinquam proprio vocatum est nomine quod ego frater petrus de gauraco ordinis beate marie de monte carmeli propria manu scripsi bonum et correctum quantum potui, in quo aliqua spatia non scripta, dispensi (divisi ?) ubi bona sententia non poterat ex exemplari orari seu trahi". Marx, J.; loc. cit.; gives: "Hoc opus breve et comptum et utile bokynquam (?) proprio vocatum est nomine quod ego frater petrus de gauraco ordinis beate marie de monte carmelo propria manu scripsi bonum et correctum quam potui...."

E Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Allgemeinbibliothek (Bibl. Amploniana). Ms. CA. 2° 369.[14]

Parchment, a composite volume of 200 leaves comprising five distinct manuscripts. The fourth of these, ff. 93-146, contains the Questiones super Sententias.[15] The pages are of folio size, with two columns of 55-57 lines per page.[16]

The text is contained in five gatherings (6, 6, 6, 6, 3), with catchwords at ff. 104^{v}, 116^{v}, 128^{v}, and 140^{v}; the gatherings are numbered "• IX•" through "• XIII•" respectively, at the foot of the

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14. See Stegmuller; loc. cit.; and Schum, Wilhelm; Beschreibendes verzeichniss der Amplonianischen Handschriften-Sammlung zu Erfurt; Berlin; 1887; p. 257.

15. The manuscript also contains, ff. 1-69 (ff. 68^{rb}-69^{vb}, blank), Thomas Sutton; Questiones Ordinarie; (Stegmüller; op. cit.; Vol. I; pp. 421-2; #915).
In ff. 70^{ra}-71^{vb}, there is a question of Thomas Anglicus (Thomas Wilton ?) against Durand of St. Pourcain, Inc.: "Quod in intellectum possint esse plures." (See Koch, Joseph; Durandus de S. Porciano, O. P., Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn d. 14 Jahrhunderts. I. Teil; Munster; 1927; pp. 153-159.)
In ff. 71^{vb}-75^{ra}, a disputation between John Duns Scotus and the Dominican Guilelmus Petri de Godino, Inc. "Utrum materia sit principia individuationis." (See Pelster, R. P; Handschriftliches zu Skotus mit neuen Angaben uber sein Leben; Franziskanische Studien; vol. 10; 1923; pp. 15-16.)
In ff. 75^{rb}-75^{vb} there is a theological question, Inc.: "Utrum agens instrumentale possit attingere essentia principia agentio."
In ff. 76-92, a collection of theological questions.
In ff. 147-200, John of Ripa, Determinationes, Inc. "Quoniam elucidatio sapiencie fructus est conservatus."
See also Pelzer, Auguste; Études d'histoire litteraire sur la scolastique médiévale; eds. Pattin, A., and Van de Vyver, E.; Louvain and Paris; 1964; pp. 419 and 498.

16. Schum; loc. cit.; does not specify the page size, nor has either the microfilm or the library provided any firm indication.

first and last pages of each gathering.

Question V is omitted.

The manuscript is English, written in a university book-hand of the late Fourteenth Century, rubricated throughout, and extensively corrected in a second, cursive hand. It was doubtless one of the many manuscripts of Fourteenth Century English theologians in the manuscript collection of Amplonius Ratinck, rector of the University of Erfurt in the late Fourteenth and early Fifteenth Centuries.

L Florence, Bibl. Med. Laurenz. Conv. Soppr. 129.[17]

Parchment, a composite volume of ii, 87, ii leaves comprising two distinct manuscripts. The first of these, ff. 1-47, contains the Questiones super Sententias.[18] The pages are 27.7x 18.8 cm., with a writing-area 20.5 - 21 x 14.5 cm., in two columns of 57 lines per page.

The text is contained in four gatherings (i plus 6, 6, 6, 6,) with catchwords at ff. 11^{v}, 23^{v}, and 35^{v}. The text ends at 47^{va}; 47^{vb} is blank. The second guard-sheet, ii, which is the first leaf of the first gathering, is discoloured and worn, suggesting that the first guard-sheet, i, was added some time after the manuscript was writ-

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17. See Stegmüller; loc. cit.; Del Furia, Francisco; Catalogo dei manuscritti dei Conventi Soppressi; manuscript ca. 1846; Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Florence; p. 488^{r}; and Weisheipl, J. A.; loc. cit..

18. The manuscript also contains, ff. 48-87, the Responsiones of Peter the Minorite.

ten. The edges of the manuscript have been heavily trimmed, often damaging marginal notations, but leaving the text per se intact.

Question V is omitted.

The text is written in a Fourteenth Century university book-hand, rubricated throughout.

Nothing is known of the early history of the manuscript; it was transferred to the Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana from S. Maria del Carmine in 1808-9, when the regular orders were suppressed.[19]

K Klosterneuburg, Stiftsbibliothek. Ms. CCL 307.[20]

Parchment, a composite volume of 249 leaves comprising seven distinct manuscripts. The second of these, ff. 18-50, contains the Questiones super Sententias.[21] The pages are 28 x 21.5 cm.,

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19. Del Furia, Francisco; loc. cit.; and ex inform. Dott. Berta Maracchi Biagiarelli, Director of the Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana.

20. See Stegmüller; loc. cit.; and Pfeiffer, Hermann, and Černik, Bertholdo; Catalogus Codicum Manu Scriptorum qui in Bibliotheca Canonicorum Regularium S. Augustini Claustroneoburgi Asservantur; Klosterneuburg, Austria; 1931; Vol. II; pp. 66-7.

21. The manuscript also contains, ff. 1-18, Questiones sex dogmaticae-morales, Inc. "Utrum aliquis necessario vel voluntarie possit offendere Christum." Expl. "Licet alia velit voluntate."
In ff. 51-96, John Duns Scotus, Questiones Quodlibetales.
In ff. 97-105, sixteen questions, Inc. "Secuntur due questiones de Deo in comparacione ad extra et erat prima questio illa: Utrum perfectiones creaturam virtualiter contente in essentia divina."
In ff. 105-120, Jacob of Asculo, Questiones Quodlibetales.

(continued overleaf)

with a writing-area 23 - 23.5 x 16 - 16.5 cm., in two columns of 61 lines per page.

The text is contained in three gatherings (, 8,) with catchwords at ff. 24^{vb} and 40^{vb}. The text begins at f. 18, near the middle of the first gathering, and ends at f. 50^{rb}, near the middle of the third. There is some damp-staining in the lower outside corner.

The manuscript omits a substantial portion of Question VI (from l.iiii^{ra}, line 6, through m.iiii^{vb}, line 35, in the Paris edition).

The text is written in Fourteenth Century university book-hand, with rubrication throughout.

The manuscript has been in Klosterneuburg since the Fifteenth Century; on the 10th June, 1656, it became part of the library of the Augustinian Canons Regular in Klosterneuburg.[22]

M Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional. Ms. 133.[23]

Parchment, a volume of iv, 92, xiv leaves containing

(continued)
In ff. 105-126, Libellus theorematum magistri Iohannis Scoti (Pseudo-).
In ff. 127-247, Gregory of Rimini, lectura primi sententiarum, with index and list of questions.

22. Pfeiffer and Černik; loc. cit., cite the following notations in the manuscript: "f. 1: "Can. reg. Claustroneoburgensi bibliothecae insertus 10 Iunis 1656". f. 83 et 247: "Liber sancte Marie in Newnburga Claustrali", s. XV."

23. See Doucet, P. V.; Commentaires sur les sentences, supplément au répertoire de M. Frédéric Stegmueller; extractum ex Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, XLVII, 1954; Florence; 1954; p. 85; and Remolar, R. P. and De Toro, J. L.; Inventario General de Manuscritos de la Biblioteca Nacional; Madrid; 1953; Vol. I; p. 115.

(ff. 1-92) the Questiones super Sententias. The pages are 24.6 x 17.5 cm., with a writing-area 18 - 18.5 x 11 - 11.5 cm., in a single column of 35-38 lines per page.

The text is contained in twelve gatherings (iv plus 4, 4, 4, 4,4,4,4,5, 4,4,4,2) with catchwords at ff. 8^{v}, 16^{v}, 24^{v}, 32^{v}, 40^{v}, 48^{v}, 56^{v}, 66^{v}, 74^{v}, 82^{v}, and 90^{v} respectively. The text ends at f. 92^{r}.

The manuscript omits a substantial portion of Question VI (from l.iii^{vb}, line 44, through m.iii^{vb}, line 23, in the Paris edition).

The text is written in university bookhand, with rubrication, and dates from the Fourteenth Century; it has been extensively corrected in a second, unembellished cursive hand.

The only indication of the history of the manuscript before it came into the possession of the Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, is an undated ex libris of one Petrus Raynarius.[24]

A Padua, Biblioteca Antoniana. Ms. 238.[25]

Parchment, a composite volume of 106 leaves comprising two distinct manuscripts. The second of these, ff. 37-106, in pages of two columns of 45-48 lines, contains the Questiones super Sententias.[26]

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24. Remolar and De Toro, loc. cit., give: "En el folio 92^{v}: Ex libris de Petro Raynario obligavit et promisit facere instrumento statim cum abierit domino pro...hospitator in hospicia."

25. See Doucet, P. V.; op. cit.; pp. 85 and 100; and Le Studium ciscain de Norwich en 1337; Archivum Franciscanum Historicum; Vol. XLVI; 1953; p. 90, n. 6.

26. The manuscript also contains, ff. 1-36, a portion of the Commentary on the Sentences of Roger Roseth.

The text is contained in seven gatherings (6, 6, 6, 4, 6, 5, 2) with catchwords at ff. 48^{v}, 60^{v}, 69^{v}(!), 72^{v}, 80^{v}, 92^{v} and 102^{v}. In addition to the folio numbering of the volume, the text is also numbered ff. 1-70 in the same hand as the marginal conclusion-numbers, which are most likely the work of the scribe who copied the text. The text ends at f. 106^{v}.

The manuscript is Fifteenth Century, written in a cursive continental bookhand. Nothing is known of its early history.

P Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris. Ms. Latin 15,888.[27]

Paper, strengthened by parchment strips inside the signatures, a composite volume of 264 leaves comprising several distinct manuscripts. The second of these, ff. 6-64, contains the Quaestiones super Sententias.[28] The pages are 29.5 x 24 - 24.5 cm., with a writing-area 21 x 15 cm., in two columns of 47-48 lines per page.

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27. See Weishepl, J.A..; loc. cit.; Chenu, M.-D.; Les "Quaestiones" de Thomas de Buckingham; Studia medievalia ... in honorem R. J. Martin; Bruges; 1948; p. 231; and Leff, Gordon; Bradwardine and the Pelagians; Cambridge University Press; 1957; p. 269.

28. The manuscript also contains, ff. 1-5, Gregory of Rimini, the end of the Lectura Primam Sententiarum.
...
In ff. 174^{v}-180, William of Ockham, De Sacramento Altaris. See Baudry, L; Sur trois manuscrits Occamistes; Archives d'histoire doct. et litt. du moyen âge; vol. X; 1936; pp. 130-140.

The text is contained in four gatherings (11-1, 10-1, 6, 7-3) with catchwords at ff. 23^{v}, 42^{v}, and 54^{v}. The text ends at f. 64^{rb}; f. 65 is blank and lacks its lower half. Some signatures have become detached; the fore-edge is worn, but not so deeply as to affect the text.

There is a brief list of topics treated in the Questiones super Sententias at f. 2^{r} and a table of the questions treated at f. 64^{v}.

The manuscript is late Fourteenth or early Fifteenth Century, written in a cursive bookhand with marginal embellishments and occasional sketches (generally heads and crown-shapes).

Nothing is known of this manuscript prior to its acquisition by the Sorbonne.[29]

S Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, Ms. Latin 16,400.[30]

Parchment, a volume of 110 leaves containing, ff. 2-109, the Questiones super Sententias. The pages are 22-22.5 x 15.5-16 cm., with a writing-area 17 x 13 cm., in two columns of 35-39 lines per page.

The text is contained in fourteen gatherings (4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 2 +i) with catchwords at ff. 9^{v}, 17^{v}, 25^{v}, 33^{v},

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29. The manuscript carries the number Sorbonne 793.

30. See Stegmüller; loc. cit.; Chenu; loc. cit.; Leff; loc. cit.; Oberman, H. A.; Archbishop Thomas Brawardine; A Fourteenth Century Augustinian; Utrecht; 1957; p. 189.; and Weisheipl; loc. cit.

41^{v}, 49^{v}, 57^{v}, 65^{v}, 73^{v}, 81^{v}, 89^{v}, 97^{v} and 105^{v}. The text ends at f. 109ra; f. 109^{rb} is blank.

The manuscript omits a substantial portion of Question VI (from l.iii^{vb}, line 44, through m.iii^{vb}, line 23, in the Paris edition). At f. 109^{v} there are various notations.

The manuscript dates from the late Fourteenth or early Fifteenth Century and is written in a cursive bookhand. Nothing is known of the manuscript prior to its acquisition by the Sorbonne.[31]

U Statniknihovna, Prague. Ms. XIII • F • 19.[32]

Paper, reinforced with parchment strips, a composite volume of 234 leaves comprising several distinct manuscripts. The fifth of these, ff. 129-174, contains the Questiones super Sententias.[33]

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31. The manuscript carries the number Sorbonne 806.

32. See Stegmüller; loc. cit.; Weisheipl; loc. cit.; and Truhlar, J.; Catalogus Codicum Manu Scriptorum Latinorum qui in C.R. Bibliotheca Publica atque Universitatis Pragensis Asservantur; Pars Posterior; Prague; 1906; pp. 251-2.

33. The manuscript also contains, ff. 1-97^{r}, Robert Holcot, Questiones super Sententias, and ff. 97^{v}-103^{r}, an alphabetical index.
In ff. 103^{r-v}, various notes on theology and canon law.
In ff. 104^{r}-108^{r}, Robert Holcot, Sex Articuli sive Conferentie.
In ff. 108^{r}-123^{r}, theological questions, Inc."Utrum angeli confirmato conveniat."
In ff. 123^{r}-126^{v}, Robert Holcot, Tabula super lecturam sententiarum.
In ff. 127^{r}-128^{v}, a theological question, Inc. "Utrum intellectus viatoris possit habere...." followed, f. 128^{v}, by a short list of questions in the Questiones super Lib. I Sententiarum, Questio I, of Robert Holcot.

(continued)

The pages are 21 x 15 cm., with a writing-area 17.5 x 12 - 12.5 cm., in one column of 58-62 lines per page.

The text is contained in four gatherings (6, 6, 6.6) with catchwords, and the signature-numbers "xii", "xiii" and "xiiii" at ff. 140^{v}, 152^{v} and 164^{v}, respectively. The text ends at f. 172^{r}, which also carries a list of the questions in the text; ff. 172^{r}-173^{v} contains an alphabetical index of topics keyed to a system of pagination in which each opening is numbered in the upper left corner of the left-hand page, and the left and right pages of the opening are given the letters "a" and "b" respectively. There is a colophon at f. 174^{r}.

The manuscript is written in a continental cursive bookhand; from the colophons, the manuscript was written in 1393-4 by Sigismund Theychinger, of a monastery in Cologne, when he was a student at Magdeburg.[34] Nothing further is known of the early history of this manuscript.

(33. continued)
Between ff. 128 and 129, there is a blank leaf numbered "1".
In ff. 174^{r}-176^{r}, a work Inc. "Isti sunt articuli, in quibus s. Thomas ⟨Aquinas⟩ ...videtur aliter dicere in scripto et summa et in aliis dictis."
In ff. 176^{r}-176^{v}, philosophical notes, Expl. "Explicit hoc totum, libenter biberem bonum potum."
In ff. 177^{r}-219^{v}, Questions on the Sentences, Inc. "Utrum verbum incarnatum"; Expl. "sicut deus est bonus".
In ff. 220^{r}-234^{r}, Legal (?) questions, Inc. "Cum omne appetitum movere debens".

34. Other colophons by the same scribe give the date 1393-4, e.g. f. 126^{v}, 1394. The colophon at f. 174^{r} reads "Explicit bochynkam super sententias qui est satis famosus inter doctores modernos de anglia/ per manus fratris Sigismundi theychingeri de conventu coloniensi provincie bohemie protunc studentis / mag⟨d⟩eburgensis. Benedictus...".

V Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana. Ms. Vat. lat. 4353.[35]

Parchment, a volume comprising a miscellany of four groups containing twelve works. The third of these groups, ff. 73-88, is Question I only of the Questiones super Sententias.[36] The pages are 24.7 x 21.5 cm., with the text in a single column of 47-48 lines per page.

The text is contained in two gatherings (5, 5) with a catch-word at f. 82^{v}; the text ends at f. 88^{v}.

The manuscript, which dates from the Fifteenth Century, is written in a cursive bookhand with spaces left for initials.

Nothing is known of the early history of this manuscript.

2. Lost Manuscripts

Dominikanerkloster, Vienna. Ms. I 45.[37]

A catalogue of the library of the Dominican convent in

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35. See Stegmüller; loc. cit., the Vatican manuscript inventory Sala Cons. Mss. 305; pp. 217-8; and ex inform. Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana.

36. The manuscript also contains, ff. 1-49, Robert Halifax, Questiones Quodlibetales.
In ff. 50-57, Robert Halifax, the third article of a question: "Utrum existens in gratia possit esse perplexus inter duo peccata".
In ff. 61-72, Robert Holcot, Questions in Book IV of the Sentences.
In ff. 89-123, Robert Halifax, Commentary on Book I of the Sentences.
In f. 124, a question, "Utrum in omni generium tria principia acquirantur."
In ff. 125-end, Questions and exposition on Book I of Aristotle's Physics.

37. See Stegmüller; loc. cit.; and Gottlieb, Theodor; Mittelalterliche Bibliothekskataloge Österreichs. 1. Bd. Niederösterreich; Vienna; 1915; p. 356.

Vienna written in 1513 lists in Codex I 45:

> Thomas Bokenkam super sentencias incipit: Utrum deo frui sit summa merces.[38]

This manuscript has since disappeared.[39] It is clearly not one of the manuscripts listed above, unless it had been disbound after 1513 and subsequently rebound, in most cases with other companion manuscripts. The only extant manuscripts which might meet these conditions are T, C, L, M, and S, of which the last two seem the least likely.

3. Printed Edition

X Paris, 1505.[40] Editor: Augustinus Perez de Olivano

An octavo volume of 122 leaves, consisting of fifteen gatherings of four(signatures "a" through "p") plus one gathering

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38. The volume is recorded as having also contained, "Summa omnium librorum sentenciarum in generali, incipit: Cupientes" and, "De futuribus contingentibus tractatus, incipit: Utrum deus possit revelare creature racionali", and, "Proposicionem famosarum intellectus, incipit: Inter agens infinitum."

39. Ex inform. Dr. Eva Irblich, p.p. Dr. Otto Mazal, Director of the Manuscript Collection, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek; Vienna.

40. Adams, H.M.; Catalogue of Books Printed on the Continent of Europe 1501-1600 in Cambridge Libraries; Cambridge; 1967; Vol. I; B 234g. Moreau, Brigitte; Inventaire Chronologique des Editions Parisiennes du XVI^{e} siecle; Imprimerie Municipale; Paris; 1972; p. 148: 1505, #40. Eight copies known. See also Stegmüller, loc. cit.; Leff, loc. cit.; Oberman op. cit., pp. 188 and 235; Weisheipl, loc. cit.

of one (signature "q"). The pages are 18.2 x 13.3 cm., giving an approximate size for the unfolded signature sheets of 36.4 x 53.2 cm. Similarly, the blocks of print measure 14.5 - 15.5 x 9.5 cm., giving an approximate size of 33.5 x 48.3 cm. (plus space for furniture and quoins) for the chase of the printing press. The text is set in type slightly larger than 9 point, with initial lines in 14 point, in two columns of 32-48 lines per page, with an eight-point lead between columns, with the exception of pp. $1^{r\&v}$, which are in single columns.[41] There is a six line title and the publisher's block at p.1^{r},[42] and an introduction, which includes a short "carmen liricum" in praise of Buckingham, at p.1^{v}.[43]

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41. For notices of the decorative initials "C" and "V" at ff. a.i^{v}, a.ii^{ra}, e.ii^{va}, e.vi^{va}, g.vi^{va}, h.vii^{va}, and k.i^{va}, see Larsen, Sofus; To danske Palaeotyper trykte i Paris; in Collijn, Isak; Bok-och Biblioteks Historika Studier Tillägnade; Uppsala; 1925; pp. 186-8 and fig. 2 a, b, c.

42. The full title given is: "Questiones solertissimi viri totiusque sacre quondam pagine professoris vernatissimi necnon torrentis liquidos inter riuulos affatim manantis Iohannis bokinkam genere anglici. in quattuor libros sententiarum." Whether or not this title began the erroneous ascription of the work to John Buckingham, Bishop of Lincoln, it has certainly helped to perpetuate the error. See Robson, J.A.; Wyclif and the Oxford Schools; Cambridge University Press; 1966; p. 41, n.5.
The publisher's block here employed by Denis Roce is Davies #135. See Davies, H.W.; Devices of the Early Printers; Grafton & Co.; London;1935; pp. 460-1.

43. Following an interesting list of notable English intellectuals ("venerabilis" Bede; "venerabilis nominalium institutor" Ockham; "argutissimus" Holkot; and "doctissimus hentisber" <Heytesbury> "subtilissimus calculator") the introduction declares: "sed bokinkam nostrum non inferiorem". Somewhat surprising is the application to Buckingham's style of "liquidus" and its derivatives: while the final effect may be that clarity of proof which results from sound, logical argument, the course of Buckingham's actual arguments is anything but limpid, flowing, or evident.

The text was edited by Augustinus Perez de Olivano, whose work is described as "Correxit propria numine stante manu"[44]. The phrase "cum sane laboribus" is also used of his work in editing,[45] as is the rather more colourful assertion that the Questiones "cum postrema lima, tum grandi sudore strictim castigata fuere."[46] Augustinus Perez de Olivano saw his own work, Argutissime totiusque posterioristice...., published by Jean Barbier in October of the following year.[47]

The edition of the Questiones super Sententias was printed by Jean Barbier for the publisher Denis (or Dionysius) Roce, who financed the printing. The work was finished on the 2nd August, 1505, in the first year of their fruitful collaboration.[48]

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44. The last line of the carmen liricum at f. a.i^{vb}.

45. In fol. p.viii^{vb}, line 47.

46. Ibid., lines 40-42.

47. Moreau, Brigitte; op. cit.; p. 209: 1506, #144. One copy known at the Universitätsbibliothek, Freiburg im Breisgau, W. Germany.

48. The colophon, at f. q.ii^{ra}, reads: "Impressum est hoc opus Parisii per Iohannem Barbier virum huius artis solertissimum: expensis venerabilis viri Dionisii Roce: moram trahentis in vico sancti Iacobi in intersignio divi Martini. Anno dominice incarnationis Millesimo quingentesimo-quinto quarto nonas mensis Augusti."
The extent of the collaboration between Barbier and Roce is evident from the following table which presents the numbers of volumes published or printed by each of them, jointly and seperately, in Paris in the years 1503-1510. Since the information summarised below has been

extracted from Moreau, Brigitte; op. cit.; passim: the table does not cover the period after the cut-off date of her book (1510).

	Barbier		Barbier & Roce	Roce	
1503	2	(2)	0	(10)	10
1504	3	(3)	0	(7)	7
1505	2	(13)	11	(22)	11
1506	7	(17)	10	(16)	6
1507	9	(24)	15	(25)	10
1508	17	(21)	4	(14)	10
1509	14	(15)	1	(11)	10
1510	9	(10)	1	(16)	15

Numbers in parentheses are the combined totals for each man in each year.

Jean Barbier had moved to Paris by 1502; previously, he had been in London in 1496, and in Westminster in 1498. (In 1497-8, he had joined with Julian Notary in printing a missal and a book of hours for Wynkyn de Worde: see Hind, A.M.; An Introduction to a History of Woodcut; London; 1935; reprinted by Dover Books; 1963; Vol. II; pp. 722 & 734.) In 1502-3, Barbier had been associated with Pierre Levet and François Foucher at Levet's address in St. Germain-des-Pres; it is possible that the beginning of his association with Denis Roce is linked to his new quarters in vico Sancti Iacobi. Through all of his working life, Roce traded in vico sancti Iacobi sub signo divi Martini: Barbier's address sub Ensis intersignio in the same street made them close neighbours. In 1508, Barbier began to print for François Reynault and, in 1508-9, for Durand Gerlier. These associations are doubtless related to the drop in work for Roce from those years. The continuing occasional collaboration between Barbier and Roce may have been a result of their proximity as neighbours: as Annie Parent notes (Les Métiers du Livre à Paris au XVI^{e} siècle (1535-1560); Librarie Droz; Genêve; 1974; p. 193.) a close community of members of the book trade had developed in

Paris in the 1500's, one clear faction of which was "des marchands libraires, dont la plupart sont jurés en l'Université...; ceux de la rue Saint Jacques, des familles solidement implantées depuis le debut du siècle..."
See Renouard, Philippe; Répertoire des Imprimeurs Parisiens....; Lettres Modernes; Paris; 1965; pp. 19-20 and 375.

The Relationships of the Sources

Perhaps the most obvious feature of the relationships among the sources for the text of the Questiones super Sententias is the degree of contamination which they show. While an uncontaminated tradition in such a late mediaeval latin text of wide circulation would be far more remarkable, it is unquestionable that contamination on this scale poses peculiar difficulties for the editor. As Griffith has remarked, rather colourfully:

> "In such cases the accepted doctrine about the method of sorting the MSS amounts to a counsel of despair: the thing cannot really be done: 'gegen die Kontamination ist noch kein Kraut gewachsen' said Maas (Textkritik^2, 1950 p. 31) and the effort to draw up a stemma or family-tree in these circumstances ends usually in an arabesque of dotted lines criss-crossing the unbroken lines of the putative family groups in a manner that may be decorative but often puzzles more than it illuminates."[1]

While more appropriate methods of analysing and describing the complex relationships of manuscripts in contaminated traditions now are being developed,[2] the stemma remains the standard and most widely understood device for the exposition of relationships among manuscripts and - if its use and interpretation be suitably qualified - need not be

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1. Griffith, J.G.; The Interrelations of some Primary MSS of the Gospels in the Light of Numerical Analysis; Studia Evangelica VI; Berlin; 1973; p. 221.

2. See below, pp. 185-186.

so inaccurate as to be positively misleading. Because, in constructing a stemma, meaning depends as much on the absence of lines as on their presence, error will be necessarily on the side of oversimplification, even in the most complex stemmata. Insofar as a stemma is a descriptive device, this is not entirely a disadvantage, for it may well be that any means of description must oversimplify in order to be intelligible; further, insofar as the stemma is a tool for the use of the editor in constructing his edition, it is a positive advantage, for it allows the selection of variants on some basis other than age, frequency, logical priority, "difficulty", better meaning, or style. These latter factors are important, but less important than evident stemmatic relationships.

If an over-cluttered stemma is to be avoided, however, it is even less desirable to create a stemma which actually misleads by either creating relationships where none really exist, through the drawing of unattested lines, or by presenting one of several equally probable relationships as the only true relationship, from the supposed necessity of having to posit some relationship.

Examination of the sources for the text of the Questiones super Sententias suggested that they consisted of three close-knit groups plus a number of dependent, highly contaminated, individuals. It further became clear that the relationships of the three basic groups were exceedingly complex: too complex, in fact, to form into a stemma of any validity. Following West's hopeful suggestion that,

> "If the relationship of the older manuscripts resists analysis, it may still be possible to identify sub-groups whose structure

can be stemmatized."[3]

the sub-groups proved, upon examination, to be reasonably amenable to analysis.

Primary factors in that analysis were four cases of major omissions of material from the text: the first is the intentional omission of all but Question I from V. The second is the complete omission of Question V from L and E. The third is the omission of Article III from Question VI in M and S; the fourth is a slightly different omission of the same material from B, K and C.

Secondary factors were the agreements among the sources in relatively small deviations from the lemma. Although these had been divided initially into two classes of greater and lesser importance, it soon became clear that there was no appreciable difference in the indications of affinity provided by the two groups, so they were eventually combined. One tool which was used in the analysis of this secondary material, and which provides the specific matter for the stemma presented below, was the application of the Standard Deviation from the Mean to the raw figures for the agreement in error of the various sources. Since the tradition is heavily contaminated at all stages, some means was needed of separating the smaller influences from the larger and simultaneously of indicating the approximate strength of the influence recorded. Application of the Standard Deviation indicated the range of deviation from the mathematical average of the agreement-

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3. West, M. L.; Textual Criticism and Editorial Technique; Stuttgart; 1973; p. 15.

scores which is "normal" for the group, taking into account both the range of scores and the distribution of scores within that range. If the levels of agreement which fall within this "normal" range are regarded as the products of contamination and disregarded, only those levels which are abnormally high or low remain for consideration. This reversal of the usual use of the Standard Deviation (i.e. the provision of a range which contains all significant scores) produces a separation which could have been effected in many cases by visual inspection, but which proved extremely useful in marginal cases. In the stemmatic diagram which follows, only those relationships which lie above the Standard Deviation are shown. Those absences of relationship signified by scores below the Standard Deviation are treated in the discussions of the groups and individual sources which follow, as are the less significant relationships. Two degrees of strong relationship have been distinguished: the first, indicated by an unbroken line, is between two manuscripts each of which is significant in the relationships of the other; the second, weaker relationship, indicated by a broken line, is between two manuscripts only one of which is significant in the relationships of the other.[4]

In considering this stemma, it must be borne in mind that the relationships shown disregard a great amount of contamination: influence is indicated, rather than direct transmission. In only one case (M-V) is there any likelihood of a direct relationship. Similarly, the absence of connecting lines between sources is not necessarily to be taken as

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4. The data for the relationship of manuscripts is in Appendix III below.

implying a lack of influence: in the most obvious example, the gap between the archetype and the three primary groups is caused by the complexity, not the absence, of relationships.

Further, this stemma does not necessarily apply to the Questiones super Sententias as a whole, but only to the portion of the text edited below (Question I, Conclusions I and II). The edited portion shows one major shift in a manuscript's exemplar (L_1 to L_2) and there is no reason to assume that later portions of the text will not show other, perhaps more significant, changes in the affiliations of the sources.

Finally, it should be noted that, in the actual editing of the text, it must be assumed that because of the degree of general contamination every source is at every stage a potential carrier of substantive variants and, in particular, that every source at every stage must be regarded as possibly being the one carrier of the true reading of the archetype. In practice, the reconstruction of stemmatic descent will frequently reduce the number of possibilities to a very small number indeed; but, as Maas notes, because of contamination

> "...their isolated readings, which would be worthless in ordinary circumstances...all become 'presumptive variants' for the reconstruction of a."[5]


It is perhaps especially when dealing with a contaminated tradition that the supplementary principles, "Manuscripts must be weighed, not counted",[6] and "Recentiores, non deteriores",[7] are to be remembered.

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5. Maas, P.; Textual Criticism; tr. B. Flower; Oxford; 1958; p. 8.

6. West; op. cit.; p. 49.

7. Pasquali, G.; Storia della Tradizione e Critica del Testo; 2ª ed.; Florence; 1971; pp. xvi and 43 ff.


(archetype)
α
1350
δ
η
B
(1374)
K
T
+ U
(1394)
L1
θ
ε
κ
L2
E
ζ
λ
M
P
S
1400
1450
C
A
V
1500
X (1505)

Primary group "δ":

Primary group δ consists of the manuscripts TBK, which form a tightly-knit central group; L_1, which is so close to TBK as to be all but a full member of the group; C, which is very close to BK, but whose affiliation occasionally wavers towards group ϵ; and U, which is clearly, although not strongly, related to TBK.

The manuscripts TBK are related not merely serially (i.e. TB, BK, TK) but simultaneously as well, so that the cluster TBK occurs some 627 times (151 times in isolation and 476 times in association with other manuscripts). In addition to distinguishing TBK, and thus δ, as the strongest cluster in the tradition, this frequency of deviation also identifies it as by far the most idiosyncratic: group ϵ, for example, shows 308 common errors, while group ζ shows only 85.

The sub-group BKC (i.e. η) must be posited, first, because all three of these manuscripts share the primary factor of the omission of Article III from Question VI; second, because the application of this division is substantiated by major agreements in error within the text under consideration;[8] and third, because the minor errors show a decidedly higher agreement between B and K than between either T and B or T and K, while C similarly shows a stronger agreement with B and K than it does with T. In K there is a relative lack of idiosyncracy (48 peculiar variants as against a mean number of 222.58 shared variants), whereas B shows a more idiosyncratic tendency (106 peculiar

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8. E.g. the transposition of ll. 378-384 of Conclusion II after l. 392 in BKC; as opposed to their omission in T and normality in U.

variants as against a mean number of 217.67 shared variants). The third member of this sub-group, C, is highly idiosyncratic, sharing with V and X the peculiarity of having a higher number of idiosyncratic variants (164) than its mean number of shared variants (141.25).[9] It should also be noted that C shows a marked lack of agreement with S, and that its level of agreement with other manuscripts in ζ is similarly low. Compared with other members of δ, however, its non-agreement is normal, so the non-agreement of C with S is apparently made remarkable primarily by the generally narrow range of scores in C.

Of the other manuscripts in the δ group, T is - as indicated - very closely related to η (B, K, C). It is as idiosyncratic as B, having 117 peculiar variants as against a mean number of 210.8 shared variants. Although T contains only Question I, slightly truncated, of the Questiones super Sententias (and thus does not contain Question VI, the presence or absence of Article III of which is a primary factor in the supposition of η) the failure of T to agree with η (B, K, C) at critical points in these Conclusions I and II of Question I - together with its relatively low agreement with B, K and, especially, C - seems sufficient evidence for its non-inclusion in η.

Almost evenly related to the three manuscripts which form the core-group (TBK) is U, which suggests that its exemplar may have

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9. The protestations of the scribe, Peter of Gauraco, that he left gaps wherever he could not make good sense of his exemplar (see above, p. 151), suggest that it was the exemplar which first contained the bulk of these idiosyncratic errors. Apart from, perhaps, exonerating this scribe from blame, however, it does not matter much whether they were introduced at C or at some point between C and η, since we must treat them as identical.

been an early manuscript in the development of the group. It is not, in itself, an idiosyncratic manuscript, showing only 78 peculiar variants against a mean number of 108.25 shared variants.

The final member of the group is L_1. As we have indicated, L changes its exemplar at Conclusion II, l. 66-75. The first exemplar came from this group: L_1 shows a very high, uniform level of agreement with TBK, such a high level in fact that it is only because of the change in exemplar that L_1 is not shown as related to δ by a solid line on the stemma. Significantly, L_1 is not closely related to either C or U. This, together with the uniformity of its relation to TBK, suggests that, like U, it derives from an early manuscript of the group. It is not a particularly idiosyncratic manuscript, showing 31 peculiar variants against a mean number of 82.67 variants. The relationships of L_2 (i.e. L after Conclusion II, ll. 66-75) will be considered under group ϵ.

In reconstructing δ in any given case, it is evident that the first step is the reconstruction of η. Here, agreements of B and K may be taken as proof; as also of T and B or of T and K, especially if supported by C (since it seems unlikely that B or K would have corrected their texts by reference to T). Agreement of η and T may be taken as indicative of δ, although this should be modified by consideration of U and L_1, especially if they agree in variation against ηT. This method of reconstruction places greater weight with T, B, and K, than with the other manuscripts in the group: C is, however, clearly derivative, and U and L_1, although probably taken from early manuscripts

in the development of the group, are probably to be considered as significant when they support TBK and as independently significant when they do not support it.

Primary group "ϵ":

Primary group ϵ comprises the manuscripts E, A, and L_2. The core grouping, EA, is attested by some 308 agreements in error, which marks it as both of middle intensity in agreement and as of a middle degree of idiosyncracy in variations. The affiliation of L_2 and, thence, of κ is definite, although weak.

Sub-group θ is necessitated by the primary factor of the omission of Question V from the work by both E and L_2. Sub-group κ is posited from the weak affinity of EA for L, combined with the relatively strong affinity of L_2 for both X and EA. The greater affinity of X for L than for E, and for E than for A, suggests that X derives from κ.

The manuscripts E and A are very close to each other in variant readings and are not particularly close to other manuscripts. Of the two, A is slightly the more idiosyncratic, with 53 peculiar variants against a mean number of 82.75 shared variants, whereas E shows 42 peculiar variants against a mean number of 77.17 shared variants. Significantly, they both singly and collectively show the greatest affinity for C, of other manuscripts, while X comes second and L a poor third.

The relation of L_2 to the group is quite weak. It is greater than L_2's relation to C, but both of these relations seem quite weak, perhaps because L_2 shows a markedly small amount of variation from

the lemma. It also shows only a small degree of idiosyncracy, having some 22 peculiar variants against a mean number of 40 shared variants.

In reconstructing ϵ, it may be assumed that agreement between E and A gives ϵ; when they disagree, L_2 provides a test of θ, and thus L_2A against E would suggest $\epsilon = L_2A$. Should L_2 agree with E, however, or with neither, there is no way of determining ϵ by stemmatic means. It may, of course, be possible to reason back to ϵ; similarly, should E or A agree with a strongly attested lemma, it is probable - though by no means certain - that ϵ agrees with the lemma.


Primary group "ζ":

Primary group ζ consists of manuscripts M, P, S and V. The core grouping MPS is attested by some 85 collective agreements in error, the smallest number of agreements of the three groups. It is both the least idiosyncratic and the weakest of the primary groupings. The relation of V to the core group is not above the level of general contamination, but it is quite closely related to M.

The sub-group λ derives from the omission of Article III from Question VI in both M and S. Unfortunately, V contains, by design, only Question I; it would be very interesting to know whether its exemplar included Article III. This sub-grouping is somewhat at variance with the indications of the minor variants, which show the bonds between P and S to be stronger than those between M and S, and those between M and P to be the weakest of the three, so that the most likely



stemma - purely along those lines - would be:



Unfortunately, there appears to be no way of reconciling these two indicators. It is possible that the higher agreement in error between P and S is a product of some accidental factor; it is certainly possible that P originally lacked Article III as well, and restored it by contamination from another exemplar: the editing of that portion of the text would reveal any close agreement with another group.

Both P and S are moderately idiosyncratic (35 peculiar variants against a mean of 75.25 shared variants in P; 39 peculiar against a mean of 74.25 shared in S) and both show no significant agreements apart from those with the core-group. In M, there is a slightly different pattern: the number of idiosyncratic errors is quite low (19 against a mean number of 72.58 shared variants) and, in addition to agreements with the core-group, there is quite a high level of agreement with V. Before considering V, however, it should be noted that M contains several contaminate annotations and corrections introduced into the margins and between the lines to "correct" M to the readings of some other exemplar. It is, in fact, a paradigm of the contaminator/corrector's method. Fortunately, the corrections of this other hand (it appears to be primarily one hand) are so numerous as to permit some analysis.[10] First, M^1 shows an extremely low

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10. The raw figures for this, as for all the manuscripts and the edition, will be found in Appendix III below.

agreement with P and, especially, with S: this is not surprising, since M^1 clearly intends to correct the deficiencies of ζ. On the other hand, M^1 shows a slightly high level of agreement with L and E, which seems to point to the exemplar's approximate area of origin. Interestingly, M^1 also shows quite a high level of agreement with X and a very high level of agreement with V.

It is this latter agreement, with V, which is the most interesting: of some 33 M^1 readings in the text under consideration, V agrees with M^1 against ζ in 29 cases (some 87.87%). This indication of affinity is strongly confirmed by V itself, which shows strong agreement only with M, while P and S are very much at the same general of agreement as the other manuscripts. In its readings, V is highly idiosyncratic, showing some 84 peculiar variants against a mean number of 67.42 shared variants. Because of its high level of agreement with both M and M^1, it seems probable that V used either M or a copy of M as one of its exemplars.

In reconstructing ζ, the first step is the reconstruction of λ, from agreements of M and S, although agreements of M and P or of P and S will give probable readings. Because of its apparent partial dependence on M, V does not figure in the reconstruction of λ, but does have value as a source of independent variants. Determination of ζ follows, agreement between P and λ giving probable readings. Since, however, λ is often determined by reference to P, the net effect of the process is often to make ζ dependent on the agreement of any two of the three manuscripts MPS; except that, when λ differs from P,

and M and S agree in the same variant, ζ either must be derived by reason or left indeterminate. In this way, slightly greater weight is given by this stemmatic arrangement to the more idiosyncratic PS than to the more stable M than would be given by the alternative stemma suggested above.

The sources for X:

The sources used by Augustinus Perez de Olivano when he edited the 1505, Paris, edition of the Questiones super Sententias remain quite obscure. It is evident that he did not use any of the extant manuscripts to the exclusion of all other sources.

The edition appears to be highly idiosyncratic, showing nearly as many peculiar variants (123) as agreements with its closest affiliate (L: 125) and far more than the mean number of 85.83 shared variants. The greatest affinity shown by X is for L, although the manuscripts T, C, E, and A follow closely behind. From this it appears that one major source of X was the group ε: the progression of relationships from L:125 to E:110 to A:104, together with the comparative insignificance of X in the relationships of E and A with other manuscripts, suggests that the ε-group exemplar came from some point κ in the tradition.

Application of the Standard Deviation places the relationship of X to T just below the level of significance; but - in combination with the relation of X to C, which is only a little less - it suggests a second direction in which a source of influence might profitably be


sought. Significantly, both M and S show a very low level of agreement with X, suggesting that the editor did not use a manuscript from that section of the tradition.[11]

Since X is clearly not derived directly from any of the extant manuscripts or groups, it has an independent value as a source of variants for the reconstruction of the archetype.

From the witnesses to the archetype:

The variations among the manuscripts of the Questiones super Sententias do not suggest that there was more than one primary version of the text or that a revision was ever circulated. There are occasional injections and omissions of material, but these are either short or idiosyncratic: there is nothing to suggest an extensive reworking of the text. Accordingly, it may be assumed safely that there was a single archetype, and that it admits of some possibility of reconstruction.

It must, however, also be admitted that the relationships of the primary groups to the archetype are so complex that no stemma would do them justice. Each of the primary groups agrees with each of the others against the third so firmly that none of them may be considered to be dependent. Thus, neither the manageable situation:




nor any of its analogues occurs. Because of this, the simplest recon-


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11. Leff, in Bradwardine and the Pelagians, p. 227, n. 4, refers to S and the printed edition (X) as being "very similar": since S is one of the least close manuscripts to X, this may be taken as an affirmation of the general quality of transmission.

structions would be on the order of:



or of



but it is highly doubtful whether either of these is accurate enough to be serviceable.

The situation facing the editor, then, is this: 1) because of general contamination, there is no manuscript which can be disregarded as a possible carrier of the archetypal reading: it is perfectly possible for all of the manuscripts, or for all but one of the manuscripts, to have false readings.[12] 2) it is possible to reconstruct, to some extent, the readings of three basic groups of manuscripts and so to combine readings: agreements in variation then may be disregarded in a number of cases; disagreements should not.

In attempting to reconstruct the archetype, once the number of variant carriers has been reduced as far as possible, the variants must be severally considered from the points of view of style, logical sequence, etc. in an attempt at least to place them in some order of probability, if not actually to select one as best. Here, a decision as to the cause of the variations often will prove to be conclusive, since it will give an evolutionary direction.

In the most troublesome cases, a simple weighing of units of agreement (normally, the primary groups, with single readings being used to modify the suggestions provided by the primary groups) can be

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12. See above, p. 171.

employed to establish probabilities, but not certainties.

Some examples will illustrate the methods more clearly:

1) C. I, l. 89: In the reference "Patet idem per Hugonem, De Sacramentis....", the manuscripts T, B, K and L_1 replace "De Sacramentis" with "de Sancto Victore". From the agreement of B and K, it follows that η carried the variant and, from the agreement of T and L_1 with η, it follows that δ carried it as well. The variant is thus reduced to one witness. Since the abbreviated forms "de sacȳat" and "de scoȳic" are not unlike, it seems likely that one was misread for the other. Further, it seems rather more probable that Buckingham would have given a short name and the title of the work, than that he would have given a long appellation and no title, although both are satisfactory. Given that the two forms appear to be derivable from each other by misreading and that one is more probable than the other, and given that the less probable reading is attested by only one (derived) witness, it follows that the probable reading of the archetype is "de sacramentis", the more probable, better attested form.

2) C. I, ll. 157-8: This presents a different sort of problem, the omission of the phrase "et istud argumentum tangit materiam que movet" by several sources: TBKLUX. While, as in the preceeding case, this can be resolved to a single witness (δ) plus X, whose closeness to the group is clear if not strong, the difficulty here lies in the inherent improbability of the phrase it-

self. It looks all too much like a marginal annotation which found its way into the main body of the textwhen it was transcribed. However, it is clear from the context that Buckingham felt the issue (that the creation is good) was both critical and fundamental - he says, two lines later, "et contrarium est erroneum et credo hereticum." - so the first statement may be taken as being less improbable than first appeared; indeed, its lack of improbability, together with the resolution of the witnesses which omit it to one (derived) plus one (X), lead to the conclusion that it was contained in the archetype.

3) C. II, l. 47: The word "invenirem" in the lemma is poorly attested, but the sources are extremely confused: "invenirem) BU; invenirem aliquid vel emerem, C; invenirem vel emerem, EA; inveniret, L; inveniretur, K; emerem, M; emerem aliquid, P; aliquod emerem, S; omne, V; inorme aliquid bonum vel enorme, X; om. T." The situation is amenable to some sorting, even of the less probable readings: η : inveniret(rem), hence δ : inveniret(rem); $C\varepsilon$:invenirem vel emerem; ζ: emerem (aliquid). V appears to be a misreading of emerem, and X seems to be a misreading of invenirem vel emerem. There appear to have been, then, three distinct readings: invenirem; invenirem vel emerem; and emerem. Invenirem vel emerem could well have been the creation of a scribe faced with both invenirem and emerem in his exemplars; but, equally, both invenirem and emerem could be attempts to simplify a text which seemed to

present an unnecessary choice. Similarly, there are no grounds for choosing between invenirem and emerem. To avoid the fate of Buridan's unfortunately apocryphal ass, an arbitrary choice must be made: grounds of style suggest invenirem, but -although this is used in the lemma - it has no greater authority than the other two possibilities.

4) C. II, ll. 449-450: The reference "Ad istud respondit Magister Secundo Sententiarum, d. 4⟨1⟩, c. 2" illustrates the possibility of only one manuscript in the tradition carrying the correct reading. In this case, all the sources except E give "d. 4"; E alone gives "d. 41". Examination of the passages referred to shows that d. 4 is irrelevant, while d. 41 fits the context perfectly; obviously, d. 41 is the intended reference. However, this situation is not unique; since there have been other instances of errors of omission in numbers at a very early stage in transmission, possibly by Buckingham himself in the process of composition, it seems more in keeping with the uncertainty of the source (E could have supplied the missing "1" from Lombard, rather than transmitted a unique reading) to indicate a question as to the origin of the omission by supplying angle brackets.

On Method:

As a footnote to this discussion, it should be noted that alternative approaches to the difficulties posed by the contamination of manu-

scripts are being developed and show signs of being able to give much more subtle and more accurate interpretations of the relations of sources. The use of spectrum-line analysis, while open to West's criticisms,[13] none the less represents a positive step towards devising a workable method.[14] The further application by Griffith of a three-dimensional display to the method appears to answer West's objections of ambiguity, leaving only the more basic objection that no mechanical method can do more than confirm what the mind has already seen. This point is conceded by Griffith, but with two important qualifications: the first is that a computer can handle large amounts of subtle data more objectively than can the human mind: i.e. it need not oversimplify at an early stage in order to handle the volume of information; and the second is that it provides a means of monitoring the changes in affiliation among the sources in a quite sensitive manner. Beyond this, Griffith's protestations that this direction of investigation "aims at nothing more than a reliable classification"[15] are to be taken at face value, but with an appreciation of the worth of that aim.

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13. West; op. cit.; pp. 46-7.

14. Griffith; op. cit.; passim, and A Taxonomic Study of the Manuscript Tradition of Juvenal; Museum Helveticum; Vol. 25; 1968; pp. 101-138.

15. Griffith, J.G.; A Three-Dimensional Model for Classifying Arrays of Manuscripts by Cluster-Analysis; unpublished paper given at the Seventh International Conference on Patristic Studies, Oxford, September, 1975; p. 4 of typescript.

Pecia:

It should be noted that none of the manuscripts of the Questiones super Sententias appears to carry pecia notations, nor do any of the extant university lists of tariffs for pecia include the Questiones super Sententias.[16]

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16. Destrez, J. A.; La "Pecia" dans les Manuscrits du Moyen Age; Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologique; vol. XIII; 1924; pp. 182-197; and La Pecia dans les mss. Universitaires; Paris; 1935.
Lists have been consulted in Statuti della Universita...; ed. Malagola; Bologna; 1888; and Statuti della Universita e studio Fiorentino; ed. Gherardi; Firenze; 1881.

Conventions

In the Text:

Diphthongs have not been expanded: e.g. pena, not poena.

Numbers: book numbers have been written out, but numbers of chapters and other sub-divisions are given as numerals; e.g. Secundo Sententiarum, d. 31, c. 1. There are exceptions; e.g. XXI De Civitate Dei, c. 2. Other numbers are written out or given as numerals as seems appropriate.

Expansion of abbreviations is not indicated; ambiguous abbreviations are indicated in the apparatus as necessary.

I and j, v and u, c and t, generally follow modern conventions.

Modern conventions of capitalisation are observed: the beginnings of sentences, proper names - including "God" and the names of exemplificative characters - and titles of works, as well as titles of persons (i.e. "Saint"), are all capitalised.

Modern conventions of punctuation are observed. The semicolon is used to sub-divide extended periods.

Mathematical letters, used in the "letter-calculus", are capitalised and not set off by raised points; i.e. the convention is "A et B" rather than ".a. et .b.", which is most often used in the manuscripts.

In cases where the sources all err in a citation, the error is given in the text, since it presumably belongs to the archetype, and the correction is given in the reference below. ∅ is always given as instans, etc.

Socrates and Plato:

The names of the exemplificative characters "Socrates" and "Plato" assumed a variety of forms at the hands of Mediaeval scribes. The transformation of Socrates to "Sor" or "Sortes", which dates from about the end of the Twelfth Century,[17] is embodied in all of our manuscripts and in the Paris edition of 1505. The form ".s." also occurs, although infrequently. Plato is frequently contracted in our manuscripts to either "Plo", with a sign of contraction, or to ".p.". The forms ".s." and ".p." normally are found opposed to the fuller forms, rather than to each other.

A sampling of the frequency of occurrence of the several forms in the sources has led to the adoption of the following forms for conventional use in the text:[18]

Nominative	Sor	Plato
Dative	Sorti	Platoni
Ablative	Sorte	Platone

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17. Latham, R. E.; Revised Medieval Latin Word-List; London; 1965; p. 443, col. 1, "Socrat/".

18. The choice of these forms is discussed in Appendix IV below.

Variants noted in the Apparatus:

Substantive variations in words.

Significant additions and omissions.

Changes in word order which affect meaning.

All variants of particularly difficult words.

Significant alterations and additions by persons other than the initial scribes.

Variants which suggest groupings of manuscripts, although they may be otherwise insignificant.

Variants not noted in the Apparatus:

Minor spelling differences and interchangeable letters: c and t, i and j, v and u.

Varieties of abbreviation.

Changes in word order which do not affect meaning.

Conventional symbols of abbreviation.

Capitalisation and punctuation, including paragraphing.

Variants which occur in only one manuscript are normally not noted, except:

when they are substantial additions or omissions of material, in which case they are included to indicate the impossibility of sole dependence of other extant sources on that source.

in the case of numerals, since these show a peculiar tendency to preserve good readings in few or single witnesses.

Variants which are attested in only one manuscript have been considered, of course, in the editing; here they are removed to reduce the bulk of material.

Sources:

The notes on Buckingham's citations follow conventional form, except that references to

Peter Lombard: are normally followed by the corresponding text as given in Buckingham's copy of the Book of Sentences (Ms. Bodl. 335), together with any relevant marginal notations and chapter numbers. Since this volume has passed through many Fourteenth Century hands, it is probably impossible to say which annotations are Buckingham's and which are not. The proportion of quoted passages which is annotated is so high, however, as to make it likely that most of the notations cited are his.[19]

St. Augustine: are normally followed by the corresponding text from the great collection of Augustinian works which Buckingham owned (Ms. Merton I), together with relevant marginal notations and chapter numbers. Since many Augustinian works are missing from the collection, notably De Civitate Dei, which Buckingham also owned[20] and from which he often

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19. The manuscript is discussed above, pp. 14-15 and 43.

20. Above, p. 42.

quotes, these references are occasional. Chapter numbers cited by Buckingham all but invariably coincide with those in the volume. References derived by Buckingham from Lombard include the appropriate passage from the Sentences (text noted above).[21]

The Title of the Work:

The title of the work is variously given as:

T	Incipit bock'yncam
B	(no title or ascription)
K	(no title or ascription)
C	Bokynquam super sententias 4 Jo(hannis ?) du(ns ?)
L	conclusiones bockinghem super sententias
E	questiones super sententias
A	Bokigam
M	boquinquam
P	bokinkam
S	bokinkam
U	bochynkam super sententias
V	bochigam
X	Questiones...iohannis bokinkam...in quattuor libros sententiarum....

Disregarding the ascriptions to Buckingham, the titles take the forms:

Questiones: EX	super sententias: LEU
Conclusiones: L	super sententias 4: C
	in quattuor libros sententiarum: X

From these, Questiones super Sententias has been chosen as the conventional form.

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21. The volume of Augustine is noted above, p. 42.

B

The Text

Conspectus Siglorum

Mss.:

T - Berlin, Staatsbibl. Preuss. Kulturbesitz; Theol. Fol. 197 (Rose 480); saec. XIV.

B - Brugge, Stedel. Openbare Bibl.; Ms. 192; a.d.1374.

C - Kues, St. Nikolaus-Hospital; Ms. 90; saec. XV.

E - Erfurt, Bibl. Amplon.; CA 2° 369; saec. XIV^{ex}.

L - Firenze, Bibl. Med. Laurenz.; Conv. Soppr. 129; saec. XIV.

K - Klosterneuburg, Stiftsbibl.; Ms. CCL 307; saec. XIV.

M - Madrid, Bibl. Nacional; Ms. 133; saec. XIV.

A - Padova, Bibl. Antoniana; Ms. 238; saec. XV.

P - Paris, Bibl. Nationale; Lat. 15,888; saec. XIV-XV.

S - Paris, Bibl. Nationale; Lat. 16,400; saec. XIV-XV.

U - Praha, Statniknihovna; Ms. XIII.F.19; a.d. 1393-4.

V - Vaticano (Citta del), Bibl. Apos. Vat.; Ms. Vat. lat. 4353; saec. XV.

Editio:

X - ed. Augustinus Perez de Olivano; impressum est per Iohannem Barbier, expensis Dionisii Roce; Paris; 1505.

Ordo Siglorum: TBK CL EA MPS UVX

In Textu:

<> ab editore ad commodum lectoris addita

[ ] e marginibus in textum introducta

In Apparatu Critico:

) verba textus delecti (lemma) a lectionibus variantibus distinguit

// variantes lectiones eiusdem lineae dividit

1, 2, 3 post sigla codicum, significat lectionem a prima(1), aut secunda (2), aut tertia (3) alia manu inductam

* post sigla codicum, significat lectionem ab ipsomet scriptore ad formam lemmatis correctam esse

- (lineola) sub signis * (*-) indicat correctionem in margine.

' sub signis * (*,) indicat correctionem supra lineam vel sub lineam

(-), (--) litteram vel litteras destructas et non restitutas designant

(_), (__ __) verbum vel verba destructa et non restituta designant

( ) includunt numeros linearum in quibus verba incipiant aut terminant

[ ] includunt lectiones variantes singulorum codicum intra longiorem lectionem pluribus codicibus communem

Sigla Librorum:

PL Patrologia Latina, ed. J.-P. Migne

AL Aristoteles Latinus

CCL Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina

CSEL Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum

QUESTIONES SUPER SENTENTIAS

⟨Quaestio Prima⟩

Utrum Deo frui sit summa merces cuiuslibet creature beate. Et arguo quod non, quia tunc tam bona est creature rationali fruitio divina tam mala sit ei carentia fruitionis divine. Et tunc carentia fruitionis divine foret maxima pena dampnatorum.

TBK CL EA MPS UVX

1. Questiones super Sententias) sic, E; questionis boquincham, M; Questiones...iohannis bokinkam...in quattuor libros sententiarum, X; conclusiones bockinghem super sententias, L; Incipit bock'yncam, T; bochynkam super sententias, U; Bokigam, A; bokinkam, PS; bochigam, V; Bokynquam super sententias 4 Jo(hannis ?) du(ns ?), C; sine titulo vel auctore, BK.

3. Utrum add. praem. Iuxta lectionis finem et libri principium, quero istam questionem, E; add. praem. Iuxta principium primi libri sententiarum, quero istam questionem, A. // Deo frui) frui Deo, MUV; probo Deo fruendum frui, P.

4. beate) beatorum, MV. // Et arguo) arguitur, K; Arguitur primo, X; om. TBLU. // tunc: cum add. EAMS.

5. fruitio) fruitionis, LU. // sit) est, TP; esset, CMUX. // fruitionis) visionis, BK.

6. Et tunc) ergo, MVX; consequens, U; om. APS. // fruitionis) visionis, BKLP. // dampnatorum) dampnationis, TPUX; dampnationis et, S; dampnatiorum (sic), M.

Consequens est falsum, quia illa est pena parvulorum, que est omnium penarum mitissima, ut patet Enchiridion, c. 103.

Ad oppositum, arguo per Magistrum primo Sententiarum, d. 1, c. 2, ubi loquitur magister de fruitione divina et dicit: "Haec merces summa est, ut ipso Deo perfruamur." Et per

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7. quia...(8) mitissima) ubi dicit Augustinus quod illa pena parvulorum est que omnium penarum mittissima est transp. post (8) c. 103, C.

8. penarum om. TP. // patet: per Augustinum add. B; per Augustinum 83 questiones et add. C. // 103) 104, S; 129, E; 149, LK; 143, B; 1(--), T; 14, C.

9. oppositum: questionis add. A; questionis istius add. E; questionis illius add. X. // arguo) arguitur, KU; om. CL. // per Magistrum) est magister, C.

10. c. 2) c. 10, BKEA; c. 37, L; om. TU. // magister om. TBKCLU; noster add. E(A?).// divina om. CEA. // dicit: sic add. TBKLU.

11. perfruamur) fruamur, TC. // Et) etiam, APSX.

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8. Augustinus; Enchiridion; c. XXIII (93). (CCL, XLVI, p. 99, ll. 133-5.) (In Ms. Merton I; f. 337^{vb}, ll. 45-48: In mg. linea undulata et "Ca. 103"; "Ca. 104" in textu. "Mittissima sane pena omnium erit eorum qui preter peccatum quod originale peccatum traxerunt nullum in super addiderunt tanto quisque tollerabiliorem habebit dampnacionem quanto inter minorem habebit iniquitatem"). Et Lombardus; Sententiae; lib. II, d. XXXIII, c. II. (Brady; t. I, pars II, p. 520).

9. Lombardus; Sententiae; lib. I, d. I, c. III. (Brady; t. I, pars II, p. 59, l. 14.) (Ms. Bodl. 335; f. 5^{vb}: lib. I, d. I, c. ll. Hae lineae uncinis in margine inclusae sunt. "Haec autem merces summa est ut ipso perfruamur. "In mg. "autem" corr. ad "omnia").

Augustinum, Primo De Trinitate, c. 37, ubi dicit, "Visio Dei facie ad faciem est summum premium quod promittitur iustis." In primis pro solutionem istius questionis ponatur quasdam conclusiones quas primo tractabo de inde redibo ad questionem principalem.

[Conclusio Prima]

Prima conclusio est quod Sola privatio boni est per se malum, et intelligo universaliter tam de malo culpe quam de malo

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12. Primo) quinto, V; doctrina, S; om. MX. // 37) 30, TK; 130 ("1" ras. ?), B; 30 corr. ad 13, U; 27, X. // ubi om. CEA. // dicit: quod add. TBKCL. // Dei) fidei, M; om. EA.

14. In primis om. TCX. // istius) huius, UV; om. T. // questionis) articulis, A; argumenta, E. // ponatur) pono, EA; om. TKL. // quasdam) quidam, E; aliquas, BCVX.

15. quas om. TBKL. // ad questionem principalem om. TB*.

17. [Conclusio Prima] TKCLAU; om. alii.

18. est quod om. MPSUVX.

19. et) quod, LX. // culpe...(20) pene) pene quam culpe, PX. // de malo^{2} om. CU.

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12. Augustinus; De Trinitate; lib. I; c. XIII (28). (CCL; t. L; p. 70; ll. 30-31.) (Ms. Merton I: f. 108va, ll. 54-56. In mg. "Ca. 13" et "Ca. XXXVII". "Et ipsa visio est facie ad faciem • que summum premium promittitur iustis:" In mg. "nota consimile c^{o} 22.")

20 pene. Istam conclusionem intendo persuadere primo per auctor-
itates. Primo per Augustinum, Enchiridion, c. 13, et ponitur
in Secundo Sententiarum, d. 34, ubi querit Augustinus, "Quid est

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20. intendo om. TBKLU. // persuadere) suadere, TKC; suadeo, BL; probatur, U. // primo om. TBKEU. // auctoriates: sanctorum add. TBKLX; et add. TU; secundo per rationes. primo per auctoritates sic add. C.

21. 13) 30, T.

22. in Secundo) Secundo, AMV; in Primo, P; a magistro, TBKL. // d. 34; secundi libri add. BK. // ubi om. EA.

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21. Augustinus; Enchiridion; III (II). (CCL, t. XLVI; pp. 53-54). (Ms. Merton I: f. 333ra, ll. 16-26. In mg. "Ca. 13"; In mg., supra has lineas, "istud habetur per hugonem de sacrementis 1 libro particulis 4, capitulo 5°6 & 13 & 22". Textus: "Quid autem aliud quod malum dicitur nisi privatio boni. Nam sicut corporibus animalium nichil est aliud morbis et vulneribus affici, quam sanitate privari, neque enim id agitur cum adhibetur curatio, ut mala que inerant id est morbi ac vulnera recedant...." Supra columnam: "hoc capitulo 13° videtur quod malum plus prodest in universo quam nocet. et post c' 106 et 107 et XI de c. dei et hoc dicitur 5°1° & c'XII in fine quod malum est unum in universitate bonum et ideo 2^{o} & vellit malum esse in magistro 1 s‹ententiarum› d. 46° c^{o} 5.")

22. Lombardus; Sententiae; lib. II; d. 34, c. 4. (Brady; t. I pars II; p. 526, ll. 29-30 et p. 527, ll. 1-6). (Ms. Bodl. 335, f. 155^{ra-b}. "Malum est corruptio vel privacio boni° [in mg. add. ubi autem bonum non est non potest esse corruptio vel privatio boni] peccatum igitur non potest esse° nisi in re bona° Sicut° enim (add. del. non)[in mg. nota alium est malum] morbi ac vulneribus corrumpuntur corpora que ut ait Augustinus in Enchiridion [in mg. capitulo 13]."

malum?" et respondet quod est privatio boni, et hoc ostendit tam de malo culpe quam de malo pene. Dicit quod morbi et vulnera sunt privationes eius boni quod dicitur sanitas et ita est de viciis animarum. Et postea dicit, "Quid est quod dicitur malum nisi privatio boni?", quasi diceret nichil. Similiter, Augustinus, Octavo super Genesi ad Litteram, c. 22, querit de malo quid sit. Et dicit quod "nulla natura est malum nisi amissio boni hoc nomen

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23. respondet) dicit, TBKU; om. L. // est om. TBCLV. // et hoc) quod, TBKL. // tam) quam, S; om. TB.

24. culpe quam de malo pene) culpe quam pene, C; pene de malo pene, E; pene, TBKL; et de malo pene add. A. // et) vel, LK.

25. eius) huius, TBKCLU. // dicitur) est, TBKL.

26. postea) post, EPU; propterea (?), T; prius, C. // dicit: Augustinus add. CEAX. // est om. AU. // quod om. PSX.

27. Similiter) idem, L; item, KC; idem add. praem. TB. // Augustinus om. TBKL.

28. Octavo...c. 22) genesi ad litteram, c. 8 et c. 22, TBKL. // c. 22) c. 20, C. // de malo quid sit) quid sit malum, V; quid est malum, C.

29. natura) creature, MPSVX; om. T. // nisi) sed, CAMV; om. BKU. // amissio boni) privatio boni, TPS; privatio boni exp. et corr. in mg. ad sed amissio boni, M; privatione, X.

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28. Augustinus; De Genesi ad Litteram; lib. VIII, c. XIV (31). (PL; t. XXXIV, col. 384.) (Ms. Merton I: f. 70ra, ll. 15-16. In mg. "Ca. 22". Textus: "neque enim ulla natura mali est• sed amissio boni hoc nomen accepit." In mg., sub his lineis, "nota quid est malum" et supra columnam "nota hoc quid est malum.")

accepit." Similiter, De Natura Boni, c. 4, dicit Augustinus, "Prius quam unde sit malum, querendum est quid sit malum." Et respondet, "quod nichil aliud est quam corruptio modi vel specei vel ordinis naturalis," et loquitur generaliter de omni malo tam culpe quam pene. Et c. 17, "Cuilibet creature non est malum nisi minui bono."

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30. c. 4) c. 10, A.

31. Prius...(32) quod) quod malum, C. // Prius...quid sit malum) Prius quam querendum est unde sit malum, quid sit malum, P; Prius quam querendum est unde sit malum, L; querendum est quam unde sit malum, TBK.

32. quod om. EA. // modi...(33) naturalis) boni, C. // vel om. TBKLU.

33. generaliter om. TCMV.

34. tam...(35) bono om. C. // culpe quam pene) pene quam culpe, EA. // creature) nature, EA.

35. nisi: corruptio boni et add. TBKLX. // minui) minimi, LP; minus, A.

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30. Augustinus; De Natura Boni; c. IV. (PL, t. XLII, col. 553.) (Ms. Merton I: f. 243ra, ll. 38-45. In mg. "Ca. 4". Textus: "Proinde cum queritur unde sit malum: prius querendum est quid sit malum • quod nichil aliud est quam corruptio vel modi vel speciei • vel ordinis naturalis." In mg. " nota malum est corruptio.")

34. Ibid.; c. XVII. (Ibid.; col. 556.) (Ms. Merton I: f. 243va, ll. 54-5. In mg. "Ca. xvij." Textus: "sed cuique nature non est malum nisi minui bono.")

Item, De Fide ad Petrum, c. 53, "Firmissime tene et nullatenus dubites quia omnis natura bona est. Sed quia in ea bonum et minui et augeri potest, in tantum malum dicitur, in quantum bonum eius minuitur. Malum enim nichil aliud est quam privatio boni." Et quod loquatur de malo culpe etiam pene, patet per illud quod sequitur, "Per se constat geminum esse creature rationalis malum, unum quo ipsa voluntarie deficit a summo bono,

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36. c. 53) c. 52, PS; c. 25, X; om. CE.

37. Sed om. BKL.

38. et[1] om. TBKLU. // et[2]) vel, TL; non, K; om. B. // dicitur) est, TBKL.

39. eius om. EA. // enim) in, TLE; om. M.

40. quod om. CL. // loquatur: tam add. TBKLX. // culpe: quam add. TBKLX. // etiam) et, CLE; et etiam, SU; et tam, MP; et de malo, A; conversi (?), K; om. TX.

41. Per se) der se, X; om. TBKCLEA.

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36. Ps. Augustinus (Fulgentius Ruspensis); De Fide ad Petrum; c. XXI (64). (PL; t. XL, col. 775. CCL; t. XCIa; p. 751.) (Ms. Merton I: ff. 259^{vb}, l. 71, - 260ra, l. 12. In mg. "Ca. liij". Textus: "Firmissime tene et nullatenus dubites...⟨quinque lineae⟩...quia omnis natura in natura est: bona est sed quia in ea bonum et augeri et minui potest in tantum mala dicitur in quantum bonum eius minuitur. malum enim nichil aliud est nisi privatio boni. unde constat geminum esse creature rationalis malum id est unum quo n̥ ⟨"n" del.⟩ voluntarie ipsa deficit a summo bono creature suo alterum quo invita punietur ignis eterni supplicio..." In mg. "nota omnis natura bona est.")

alterum quo invita punietur ignis eterni supplicio." Similiter, De Moribus Ecclesie Manichiorum, dicit Augustinus, "Queram quid sit malum?", et addit contra manicheos, "Respondebitis fortassis, corruptio." Et post, "Quis enim negaret et hoc: generale malum esse?" Et post, versus finem libri, dicit: "Malum est privatio, non res in qua est privatio." Similiter, Augustinus, Contra Epistolam Manicheorum quam vocant Fundamentum Fidei, versus finem tractatus, "Quid sit malum?" dicit, "Quis enim dubitet totum illud quod dicitur malum, nichil aliud esse quam

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43. supplicio) supplicationem, TBKLE.

44. Augustinus) sic, TBKL. // Queram...(47) dicit) generale, C. // Queram) querit, TM; quero, KEASX.

46. fortassis) fortasse, T; fortatis, E; forte, U; forsitam, X.

47. dicit) ait, TBKL; om. V.

48. Augustinus om. TBKL.

49. vocant) nominant, K; nominat, TL; nominavit, B.

50. dicit) ait, TBKL; sic add. U.

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44. Augustinus; De Moribus Manichaeorum; c. V (7). (PL; t. XXXII, col. 1347.)

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.; c.IX(14-18)Ibid.; coll.1351-3)

49. Augustinus; Contra Epistolam Manichaei Quam Vocant Fundamenti; c. XXXV (39). (PL; t. XLII; coll. 200-1. CSEL; t. XXV; pp. 193 sq.)

corruptionem? Possunt quidem aliis vocabulis alia atque alia mala nominari. Sed quod omnium rerum malum sit, in quibus animadverti potest aliquid mali, corruptio est." Et exemplificat: "Corruptio perite anime, imperitia vocatur; corruptio prudentis, imprudentia; corruptio iusticie, iniusticia; corruptio sanitatis, dolor et morbus; corruptio virium, lassitudo; corruptio quietis, labor; corruptio pulchritudinis, feditas; corruptio rectitudinis, pravitas," et sic de omnibus. Et post, "Videtur iam facile est nichil nocere corruptionem, nisi quod labefacit naturalem statum, et ideo eam non esse naturam, sed contra naturam." Et addit,

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52. corruptionem: et add. TKLX. // Possunt) ponunt, MPSUVX. // aliis om. S; atque aliis add. BK; et aliis add. CL; arguat augustinus add. T. // vocabulis: mala add. transp. ex l. 53, TBKL.

53. sit, in quibus om. EA.

55. perite) sapientes, U; in quid sapientes, TKL; in quis sapientia, B. // vocatur) est, MPSV.

56. corruptio sanitatis ...(58)labor om. A.

57. corruptio[1] om. TKCLU. // corruptio[2] om. BP.

58. corruptio pulchritudinis ...(59) pravitas om. C. // corruptio[2] om. PU.

59. et sic de omnibus om. TBKL. // omnibus) similibus, EA; consimilibus, SX; aliis, V; aliis similibus, C. // est) esse, BKL; om. TEAPX.

60. nocere) vocari, BX. // quod om. BK.

61. naturam[1] om. V; constat add. BK; assertit add. C.

"Quod si non invenitur in rebus malum nisi corruptio, et corruptio non sit natura; nulla utique natura malum." Similiter, Yponosticon, c. 66, "Malum natura non est, sed actus accidens ex defectu boni." Similiter, Augustinus, Contra Adversarium Legis et Prophetarum, libro primo, c. 3, dicit, "Malum contra naturam est, quia nature nocet: nec noceret nisi bonum adimeret."

62. malum om. PUX. // et corruptio om. CEA.

63. malum: est add. CA; esse add. E; vel mala add. BKL. // Similiter: idem add. TBKC; et add. L.

64. actus om. CL.

65. Similiter...(68) boni om. (hom.) C.

64. Ps. Augustinus (Prosper Aquitanus); Hypomnesticon; lib. IV; c. 1. (PL; t. XLV; col. 1629.) (Vide Chisholm, J. E.; The Pseudo-Augustinian Hypomnesticon against the Pelagians and Celestians; Fribourg; 1967; Vol. I; p. 129.) (Ms. Merton I: f. 330ra, ll. 19-20. In mg. "66^{m}". Textus: "Omne enim malum natura non est sed actus verissime accidens boni de⟨fectu⟩". Sed Ms. Bodl. 335; Lombardus; Sententiae; lib. II, d. 37, c. 1; ex libris Thomae de Buckingham; inquit: "Idem ✓ in quarta. Omne malum natura non est sed actus alicui ⟨'alicui' del.⟩ accidens ex defectu boni" et notatum est in mg. "✓ypon-osticon c. 66". Ex istis, videtur quod Buckingham textum protulit ex Sententiis Lombardi. Ex consilio J. E. Chisholm).

65-6. Augustinus; Contra Adversarium Legis et Prophetarum; lib. I, c. V (7). (PL; t. XLII; col. 607.) (Ms. Merton I: f. 343ra; ll. 62-5. Linea undulata in mg.. Textus: "Quod enim malum per vicium est profecto bonum est per naturam. Vicium quippe contra naturam est quod nature nocet. Nec noceret bonum eius minuereret (sic). Non est igitur malum nisi privatio boni...." In mg. "idem enchiridion c^{o}. 13": vide supra, ll. 25-7.)

Et concludit, "Non est ergo malum nisi privatio boni." Similiter, Augustinus, Questionibus LXXXIII, q. 6, in fine dicit, "Hoc non malum de specie privationis repertum est." Et idem, q. 21, ostendit quod omnium que sunt Deus est auctor, et mali non est. Et dicit mali auctor non est Deus: ab eo enim est esse et ideo ab eo non est non esse siue deficere quod est tendere ad non esse et malum, quia malum deficere est. Similiter, Boethius, De

68. ergo) igitur, BPU.

69. Augustinus om. PU. // Questionibus LXXXIII) Questionibus, MS; om. P; suis de malo add. BKLU. // q. 6) q. 3, T; q. ix, X. // in fine: questione totum add. EA. // dicit: de malo add. TX. // non) nomen, BKCLS.

70. q. 21) q. 12, MV; q. 22, CX.

71. non: est et dicit mali non add. S. // est^{2} om. LV; auctor add. BKEA; deus auctor add. C.

72. Et dicit) dicit, EP; Unde dicit, X; unde ait, TBKL. // Et... Deus) si, C.

73. ad non: est add. MS.

69. Augustinus; De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII; q. VI (De Malo). (PL; t. XL; col. 13.) (Ms. Merton I: f. 162va, ll. 33-34. In mg. "de malo". Textus: "...hoc nomen mali de specie privacionis repertum est. "In mg. notatum est "malum non est sed privatio").

70. Ibid.; q. XXI. (Ibid.; col. 16.) (Ms. Merton I: f. 163ra, ll. 24-34. In mg. "21" et "nota idem q. 3^{a}". Textus passim.)

74-5. Boethius; De Consolatione Philosophiae; lib. III; prosa 12; l. 29. (CCL; t. XCIV; p. 62, ll. 68-70.)

75 Consolatione Philosophie, libro 3, prosa 13, "Malum nichil est." Similiter, Augustinus, De Vera Religione, c. 20: "Quid est enim dolor qui dicitur corporis, nisi corruptio repentina salutis eius rei, quam male utendo anima corruptioni obnoxiauit? Et quid dolor qui dicitur animi, nisi carere immutabilibus rebus, quibus 80 fruebatur atque se posse frui sperabat? Et hoc est totum quod dicitur malum, id est peccatum et pena peccati."

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75. Philosophie om. TBKCAU. // libro 3) libro 2, EA. // prosa 13) prosa 17, B.

76. Similiter) Et, TBKL; item, C. // c. 20) c. 30, LPX; c. 2, MV; dicit add. EAX.

77. corporis) corruptionis, TM.

78. rei om. TU. // anima...(79)carere om. K. // corruptioni) corruptionibus, BC. // quid) quia dicitur, E; quis dicitur, KX; quis, P; om. TBLU.

79. carere) carentia, TBLU(V?). // immutabilibus) uitalibus, TBKLEX; in uit<alibus ?>, U.

81. id est) idest est, X; est, P; et, E; om. CA.

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76. Augustinus; De Vera Religione; c. XII (23). (CCL; t. XXXII; p. 202; ll. 10-15.) (Ms. Merton I: f. 270^{rb}, ll. 63-9. In mg. "Ca. XX^{m}". Textus: "quid enim est dolor qui i <'i' del.> dicitur corporis. nisi corruptio repentina salutis eius rei quam male utendo anima corruptionibus obnoxiavit ⟨sic⟩: quid autem dolor qui dicitur animi nisi carere mutabilibus rebus quibus fruebatur atque frui. se posse sperabatur. et hoc est totum quod dicitur malum: id <est>peccatum et pena peccati." In mg. linea undulata et "nota de malo pene et culpe.")

Item, Augustinus, De Civitate Dei, libro 11, c. 9, in fine dicit, "Mali enim natura nulla est, sed amissio boni." Et c. 22, "Cum omnino nulla natura sit malum nomen hoc non sit nisi
85 privationis boni." Similiter, in Glosa ad Hebreos, c. 5 et 6, "Malum non est substantia sed defectus quidam." Similiter, Damascenus, Quarto Sententiarum suarum, versus finem querit,

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82. Item...(85)boni om. BKL. // libro om. EA. // 11) (--), T; 2, CEV; om. A. // c. 9) c. 22, TCU; c. 4, V.

83. enim om. TCEAUV. // sed...(85)Similiter om. T. // Et... (85)boni om.(hom.) U. // Et...(89)boni om.(hom.), V.

84. Cum...(85)boni) dicit "omnis natura sit bonum, malum nichil nisi privatio est boni, C.

85. c. 5) c. 2, T. // et 6 om. BKCA; sic add. T.

86. malum) dicitur, TBKL. // quidam) quid(--), M, corr. ad quidorum ⟨quid4⟩, M^1; om. TBKL.

87. Damascenus: libro add. TBL; libri add. KU. // Quarto) spat. vac. T; om. LK. // suarum om. TPVX.

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82. Augustinus; De Civitate Dei; lib. XI; c. 9. (CCL; t. XLVIII; p. 330; ll. 70-71.)

83. Ibid.; lib. XI; c. 22. (Ibid.; p. 341; ll. 22-23.)

85. Glossa Ordinaria; ad Hebreos, 5:14. (Ven. 1485; vol. IV; f. 1297^{vb}: "... et malum nisi substantiam putare non possunt: cum sit potius ab immutabili substantia mutabilium substantiarum quidam defectus....")

87. Johannis Damasceni; De Fide Orthodoxa; c. 93, vel lib. IV, c.13. (Buytaert; pp. 355-6; ll. 26-30).

"Quid est malum?" et dicit quod, "Malum nichil aliud est quam privatio boni." Patet idem per Hugonem, De Sacramentis, libro 1, particula 7, c. 15. Similiter, Anselmus, De Casu Dyaboli, c. 9, dicit de primo angelo quod cum perdidit iusticiam originalem in qua factus est, "nichil pro ea inuenit nisi privationem eius que nullam habet essentiam quam iniusticiam nominamus." Et c. 16 et 20 ubique sunt auctoritates bundanter. Et De Conceptu Vir-

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88. quam) nisi, EAMPS.

89. privatio) corruptio, TBKL. //boni: et add. MPSU. // Patet idem) Similiter, TBKL; item hoc idem, C. // per) de, TKLX; om. B. // De Sacramentis) de Sancto Victore, TBKL. // libro 1) libro 2, MV.

90. c. 15) c. 52, V; c. 17, C; c. 3, KX. // Anselmus) Ans'helinus, X. // c. 9) c. 4, TBKLU.

92. pro ea) (___), T; propterea, BKU. // eius om. TBKLU.

93. Et...(95) c. 13. om. V. // Et) secundo, L; lib. 2, U; item, C.

94. et 20) et 210, B. // ubique om. TBKL. // bundanter) abundanter, TVX; habundanter, BK. // De Conceptu... (95) c. 13) de illa materia, TBK; de ista materia, L.

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89. Hugo de Sancto Victore; De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei; lib. I, pars VII, c. XV. (PL, t. CLXXVI, coll. 293-4.)

90. Anselmus; De Casu Diaboli; c. 9. (Schmitt; t. I, pp. 246-7.)

93. Ibid.; c. 16. (Ibid.; t. I, pp259-62.)

94. Ibid.; c. 20. (Ibid. ; t. I, pp. 264-6.)

94-5. Anselmus; De Conceptu Virginali et de Originali Peccato; c. 5. (Ibid.; t. II; pp. 146-7.)

ginali, c. 5, et De Concordia, c. 13.

[Prima ratio] Arguo ad idem per rationes. Primo de malo culpe quod sola privatio boni est per se et formaliter peccatum, arguo sic: quia si non sit aliquid per se et formaliter, peccatum erit aliquid positivum secundum illud quod est peccatum. Consequens falsum et impossibile quia omne quod est secundum quodcumque quod est, a Deo auctore est, et per consequens nichil tale est peccatum cum Deus non sit auctor peccati. Veritas premis-

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95. c. 5) c. primo, C.

96. [Prima ratio] TL; prima ratione, U; arguitur ad idem, prima ratione, E; prima, M; rationes ad idem, P; 17 ratio, C; om. alii. // Arguo om. V; de inde add. praem. TBKL; mo ‹modo vel inde ?› add. praem. C.

97. culpe: scilicet add. LK; quod scilicet add. B; et add. V. // boni om. TBKL.

98. arguo sic om. TBKLPUX. // quia om. EAPS. // non) peccatum, MPX; tunc add. CESUV; tunc peccatum add. T; omni add. A. // sit om. CV.

99. quod: aliud add. AV; etiam que add. E. // peccatum) positivum, KEAPX; positum, T. // peccatum...(101) quod est om. C.

100. falsum et om. BKLAV. // et impossibile om. TE. // quodcumque om. MP; illud add. EAMVX.

101. quod om. EAM. // tale) reale, U; om. TBKL.

102. cum...peccati om. C. // auctor: eius add. TBKL; eius scilicet add. U; mali si non add. V. // peccati om. TBKLP.

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95. Anselmus; De Concordia Praescientiae et Praedestinationis et Gratiae Dei cum Libero Arbitrio; lib. I, c. 7 (dub.: lib. III, c. 13). (Ibid.; t. II, pp. 257-60; dub., pp. 285-7.)

sarum et falsitas conclusionis patet locis superius allegatis et ubique quasi in scriptura.

105 [Secunda ratio] Ad idem. Si aliquod, secundum illud quod est, esset peccatum, sit A. Tunc arguo sic: A corrumpit et adminuit aliquid de bono quia alias non noceret nec foret malum, ut patet in locis superius allegatis. Et per Augustinus, 2 De

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103. patet) patent, TUX; in add. TBKLP.

104. in om. TBKL.

105. [Secunda ratio] TKLU; 2, M; secundo ad idem, P; prima ⟨conclusio⟩ secundo, E; 18 ratio, C; om. alii.// Ad idem) Item, CV; secundo, T; secundo illud, A; arguo add. MX. // Si: est add. EAX. // aliquod: positivum add. CEAMVX. // secundum) solum, EA. // illud om. MS.

106. sit: illud add. EU. // arguo om. UV.

107. adminuit) minuit, CEAVX; diminuit, T; amictit, L. // quia om. TBKL.

108. in om. BKCLPX. // 2) 11, M; 21, A; 1, S; 5, U; 22, PX; om. B.

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103. locis superius allegatis : e.g. ll. 21-4, 26-7, 28-30, 30-5, 39-40, 68, 70-74, 75, 82-5, 85, 88-9 supra, inter alia.

104. ubique quasi in scriptura: e.g. Iohann. 3:19-21; ad Rom. I:28-31; ad Col. 1:21; ad Hebr. 3:12; Epist. Iohann. I, 5:18; et cetera.

108. in locis superius allegatis: vide 103 n. supra.

108-9. Augustinus; De Civitate Dei, Lib. II, c. 7, non pertinet; fuitne sibi in animo scribere lib. XI, c. 9? Vide l. 82 supra.

Civitate Dei, c. 7, et 12 De Civitate Dei, c. 2 et 3. Dicit quod
110 vicium non est malum nisi quia corrumpit nature bonum. Idem, Enchiridion, c. 4, et De Libero Arbitrio, libro 3, c. 21, et Secundo Sententiarum, d. 34. Ex istis arguo sic: A est unum positivum malum et privat bonum et posset Deus conservare in Sorte vel in alio, non obstante A malo, omnia que prius fuerunt

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109. c. 7...Dei, om. B//c. 7...et 3 om. KU.// c. 7) c. 2, T; c. 3, L; c. 17, V.// et 12...et 3 om. TCL. // De Civitate Dei) De Trinitate (?), EV; om. MPUX.// Dicit: Ubi add. praem. TBKCL.// quod om. BKCL.

110. Idem) item, CU; et, TBKL; in add. MP.

111. c. 4) c. 4 corr. ad c. 124, U; c. 9, V; c. 10, CMPSX.// libro 3 om. KC. // c. 21) c. 31, EAU; c. 13, TBKL; c. 17, C.// Secundo) primo, V; 20, MPS; libro add. T.

112. Sententiarum) De Civitate Dei, MS. // d. 34) d. 24, PS; d. 14, C; d. 28, M.// istis) isto, BKCL.

113. et[2]) ergo, BKLV; om. CMSU.// Deus om. LS.

114. vel in alio om. TBKL.

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109. Augustinus; De Civitate Dei; lib. XII, c. 3. (CCL; t. XLVIII; pp. 357-8; ll. 5-7 et passim.)

111. Augustinus; Enchiridion; c. IV. (CCL, t. XLVI, pp. 54-6). (Ms. Merton I: f. 332[va], ll. 36-53).

111. Augustinus; De Libero Arbitrio; lib. III; c. IX (26). (CCL; t. XXIX; pp. 290-1) (Ms. Merton I: f. 44[ra]; ll. 45-69. In mg. "Ca[m]21[m]" et "nota omne vicium nocet/nocet nec").

112. Lombardus; Sententiae; lib. II; d. 34. (Brady; t. I; pars II; pp. 525-9.) (Ms. Bodl. 335: f. 155[ra-b]. Vide supra, l. 22.)

in Sorte, quia omnia contraria potest Deus simul ponere in eodem. Tunc A non privaret nec minueret aliquid de bono; et per consequens A non noceret nec foret malum; et per consequens A non est per se malum formaliter sed tantum effective quia privat bonum.

[Tertia ratio] Arguo ad idem: si A sit aliquod positivum, posset Deus facere A per se sine omni voluntate creata concurrente, et si sic faceret A non foret peccatum. Ergo, A non est per se et formaliter peccatum, sed ratione alterius.

[Quarta ratio] Ad idem: secundum istam viam videlicet quod, si aliquod positivum secundum aliquod illud quod est posi-

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115. Sorte) eo, TBKL. // simul om. TBKMPS.

116. eodem: subjecto add. BKLU. // Tunc) et, S; autem add. V; in casu posito add. TBKLX. // A om. V; malum add. TBKLX.

118. formaliter om. CEASUV.

120. [Tertia ratio]) 3° ratio, TL: 3°, P; 3, MU; 20m, C; om. alii. // Arguo ad idem) 3 ad idem, arguo sic, TBKL; ad idem, EA; ad idem sic, U; item, CV.

121. per se om. TPV. // sine...concurrente) sine quocumque aliquo concurrente et sic sine voluntate creature, TBK. // omni om. MV.

122. si sic) tunc, BK. // faceret om. TBKL.

124. [Quarta ratio], TL; 4°, P; 4, M; 21m, C; om. alii. // Ad: arguo add. praem. KX. // secundum...(125) quod1 om. C.

125. si...(126) malum) si peccatum sit aliquod positivum secundum quod ipsum est malum, TBKL. // aliquod om. CPX. // illud om. PX. // positivum) peccatum, EAM; om. C; peccatum add. U.

tivum esset malum, rationes Augustini non valerent quibus ipse et alii nituntur probare quod nullum est summum malum. Arguit Augustinus contra Manicheum sic: si sit malum est privatio boni et non totius boni quia tunc non esset natura in qua esset illa
130 corruptio et privatio et, per consequens, illud malum est in re bona que ultra corrumpi et minui potest. Igitur, potest esse magis malum. Ergo, primum non fuit summum malum. Istud est argumentum Augustini, De Civitate Dei, libro 19, c. 13, et

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127. probare om. BKL. // nullum est) non sit dare, TBK; non est dare, L.

128. Augustinus om. TBKL. // si sit om. TBKL. // boni om. BK.

129. non esset: illa add. MV; in add. U.

130. est) esset, CMV.

131. Igitur, potest esse magis malum in mg. U. // Igitur...(132) summum) Igitur nullum est summum, TBKL.

132. magis) maius, CEAX; summum del. et corr. ad maius, P. // Ergo...summum malum om. CV.

133. libro 19, EAV; libro 4, TBKLU; libro 9, CPSX; libro 17, M. // c. 13) c. 30, KLU; c. 38, T; c. 130, B. // c. 13... (134) libro 12 om. CX.

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133. Augustinus; De Civitate Dei; lib. XIX; c. 13. (CCL; t. XLVIII; p. 679.)

134. Ibid.; lib. XII; cc. 6 & 7. (Ibid.; pp. 360-2.)

〈libro〉 12, c. 7, et in libro De Moribus Manicheorum quasi in principio, et in libro Contra Fundamentum Fidei. Similiter, per idem probat Augustinus, Enchiridion, c. 14, quod nullum malum est nisi in re bona, et ponatur Secundo Sententiarum, d. 34. Iste rationes non valent si aliquid esset malum et non solum secundum illud quod privativum est, sicut facile est videre.

[Quinta ratio] Ad idem arguitur sic, et arguitur indifferen-

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134. 12) 32, K; 31, B; om. TU; de add. E; dicitur add. A; De Civitate Dei add. PS; et add. B. // quasi om. EA.

135. Similiter...(137)d. 34. om. TBKL. // per om. MV.

137. ponatur) in, SX; om. CEA. // Secundo) Tertio, APX. // d. 34) d. 24, C. // Iste: Sed add. praem. TBKLU.

138. aliquid...(139)privativum est) et cetera, C. //solum om. MPSV.

139. videre: similiter aliquod malum quod est aliquod positivum et non tantum quia privat (---) ll. 141-2 add. praem. L.

140. [Quinta ratio] TKLU; 5, M; 22^{m}, C; om. alii. // idem: Similiter(^{174})...(^{177})pene add. A. // arguitur^{1}) arguo, BLEASX. // sic transp. post (141)pene, TBKL. // arguitur^{2} om. TBKLMUX.

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134. Augustinus; De Moribus Manichaeorum; c. II. (PL; t. XXXII; coll. 1345-6.)

135. Augustinus; Contra Epistulam Manichaei quam uocant "fundamenti"; c. XXXIII. (PL, t. XLII; coll. 198-9; CSEL; t. XXV; pp. 236-7)

136. Augustinus; Enchiridion; c. IV (cc. 12-14) (CCL; t. XLVI; pp. 54-56) (Ms. Merton I: f. 333^{ra}, ll. 27-49. In mg. "Ca^{m}. 14^{m}" et "nota gravum peccatum privat bono".)

137. Lombardus; Sententiae; lib. II, d. 34, c. 2. (Brady; t. I, pars II, pp. 525-6.) (Ms. Bodl. 335: f. 155^{rb}.)

ter de malo culpe et pene: sit A aliquod malum quod est malum positivum et non tantum quia privat bonum: tunc A privat et minuit bonum, sicut argumentum est per auctoritates, et A non solum est malum ratione illius privationis. Sit, ergo, gratia exempli, ratione B positivum. Tunc A habet maliciam AB cum A privatione; tunc possibile est quod ablata privatione et malicia quam A habet A privatione, maneat malicia quam A habet AB; et tunc est A malum culpe vel pene, et tamen nichil minuit vel privat bonum, quod est impossibile et contra auctoritates superius positas.

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141. malum quod est malum) malum quod est aliquod, BKL; malum, CX; om. TEA.

142. tunc A privat et minuit bonum) et minuit. Tunc A privat aliquid bonum, C; om. TBKL. // et minuit om. MPSUV.

143. et: tunc add. TBKL.

144. illius) alterius, TM*[1]S; alicuius, B.

145. ratione om. TCPSUX. // Tunc) et, TBKLU.

146. cum) et, TCLAV; om. B. // tunc...(147) A privatione om. (hom.) L.

147. malicia[1]...maneat om. (hom.) A. // A[3] om. TBKCL.

148. tunc om. TBKL. // est) erit, CEAX. // nichil) nec, EAMX; non, V.

149. vel) nec, EAX.

150. superius positas) prius positas, SVX; om. EA.

[Sexta ratio] Ad idem, Augustinus probat, 12 De Civitate Dei, c. 7, quod nullum malum fuit ab eterno, quia dicit ipse hoc foret in re bona in qua privaret bonum, et tunc illud bonum quod privat aliquando fuit; ergo non ab eterno fuit illud malum. Con-
155 stat quod hec ratio non concluderet nisi ponendo malum esse privationem boni in re bona.

[Septima ratio] Ad idem, et istud argumentum tangit materiam que movet, arguo sic: Omne quod est, secundum omne illud quod est, bonum est et a Deo est et non malum, et hoc satis

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151. [Sexta ratio] U; sexta ratione, TKL; 6, M; 6°, P; 23m, C; om. alii. // Ad idem: arguitur add. praem., TM; arguo add. praem. X. // 12) 22, TL; libro add. praem. TBKL.

152. Dei om. KCAMPSUVX. // 7) 17, BK; 12, P. // malum om. T*S.

153. privaret) privat, MPSV. // tunc om. TBKLU. // quod privat om. EA.

154. ergo...fuit om. (hom.) K. // Constat: autem add. TBL.

155. concluderet) concludet, (E?)PSV.

157. [Septima ratio] TKLU; 7, M; 24m, C; om. alii. // et istud... (158)que movet om. TBKLUX.

158. que) qua, AMV. // movet) manet, E; me add. C. // sic om. CUX. // omne2) esse, V; (-)e, S; om. TBKCL.

159. bonum est et a Deo est) a Deo est et bonum est, TBKLA. // non malum, et om. C (non ras.). // non...(161)aliquod om. K. // et hoc satis...(161)hereticum om. TBL.

151-2. Augustinus; De Civitate Dei; lib. XII, c. 6. (CCL; t. XLVIII, pp. 360-1.)

ubique patet in scriptura, et contrarium est erroneum et credo hereticum. Et si aliquod tale quod est sit malum, hoc est in comparatione ad aliud inquantum sibi nocet et non convenit cum illo, sed aufert bonum quod deberet ei inesse. Verbi gratia: Potare A venenum est Sorti malum, non quia venenum secundum se et illud quod est sit malum, quia alteri non foret malum, sed tantum illi cui non convenit est malum. Et consimiliter de omnibus aliis penalibus et per consequens nichil est malum nisi in comparatione ad aliud et hoc non est per se et formaliter sed per accidens. Privatio autem specie modi et ordinis est per se malum ratione cuius omne aliud per se malum est malum.

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160. ubique patet) patet ubique, MPSV. // in scriptura om. CEAX. // et credo hereticum om. C.

161. aliquod om. TBL. // quod: aliquod add. EAMV; alicui add. C. // sit) est, TBLPX; om. KCM.

162. cum illo om. EA.

163. bonum) ei, TBKL; om. MPSV. // ei) sibi, UV; illi, B; om. KLEA. // inesse: ut add. APU.

164. Potare) ponatur, TBKLEA; quia add. TK; quod add. BL. // venenum est...quia om. (hom.) P. // est) sit, TBKL. // secundum) sed, KM; per, EAU; oppositum, S; ex, X.

165. se et om. TBKL. // est: secundum se add. TBKL. // sit) est, CPSU; om. EA. // sed...(166)malum in mg. T.

166. illi del. M; ei, CEAV; ei add. MS.

169. Privatio...(170)est malum om. MPSV. // autem) Sed transp. praem. Privatio, EAUX.

170. per se om. CEAU.

Istam conclusionem tenet Sanctus Thomas in questionibus suis De Malo, q. 1, ubi dicit, "Quod malum, secundum quod ‹est› malum, non est aliquid in rebus, sed est alicuius boni particularis privatio, alicui particulari bono inherens." Similiter,
175 Doctor Subtilis, Quarto Sententiarum, d. 50, q. 1, dicit quod formaliter malicia est carentia boni debiti, et intelligit indifferenter de malo culpe et pene.

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171. in om. TBKLEA.

172. suis om. TBL. // ubi om. TBKL. // secundum quod est malum transp. post (173)rebus, V; om. TMPSUX.

173. alicuius) actus, TM; actus add. praem. X.

174. alicui) autem, KLP. // bono om. TBLPSU. // Similiter: hanc conclusionem tenet add. T; hanc opinionem tenet add. BKL.

175. Quarto: libro add. praem. MPUV. // Similiter...(177)pene transp. post (140)idem (q.v.), A. // d. 50) d. 9, TX; d. 40, L; d. 5, BK; d. 4, A.

176. formaliter) formalis, BL. // debiti: inesse add. UX.

177. malo om. CEA. // culpe et pene) pene et culpe, PX; pena et culpa, CEA; quod malum pene non sit solum privatio boni add. T.

171-2. Thomas de Aquino; Quaestiones Disputatae De Malo; q. 1; art. 1. (Marietti; vol. II, p. 447, col. 2.)

175. Duns Scotus; Quaestiones in Lib. IV Sententiarum (Opus Oxoniense); lib. IV; d. 50, q. 2. (Wadding; Vol. X; p. 629.)

[Contra Conclusionem Principalem]

[Prima ratio] Contra istam conclusionem objicitur multi-
pliciter et arguitur quod non solum privatio boni sit malum pene
per Anselmum, De Casu Dyaboli, c. 26, ubi ponit duplex malum:
culpe et pene. Et dicit quod illud "malum quod est iniusticia
semper nichil est. Malum vero quod est incommoditas aliquando
sine dubio est nichil, aliquando est aliquid ut tristicia dolor." Ex
isto videtur quod malum est aliquod positivum et non solum pri-
vatio boni.

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178. [Contra Conclusionem Principalem] MS; Contra conclusionem, BEAV; Contra conclusionem istam, U; Contra conclusionem ar⟨gumenta ?⟩, C; Argumenta ad oppositum, T; Object., P; Objectiones contra conclusionem, K.

179. [Prima ratio], TS; prima ratio contra hanc conclusionem, L. // istam) hanc, TBKL; om. E.

180. arguitur) arguo, C; probatur, T; primo probatur, BL; primo, U. // quod...pene) quod malum ‖ quod malum om. K‖ pene non sit solum privatio boni, (transp.), TBKLU. // non transp. post boni, EA.

181. c. 26) c. 36, C. // malum: scilicet add. TBKLX.

184. dubio: non add. TBKL. // aliquando est aliquid om. TBKLU*. // tristicia: et add. CEAP. // dolor om. TBKLU*. //Ex isto) Et isto modo, TBKL; Et add. praem. U.

185. et non solum privatio boni om. T.

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181. Anselmus; De Casu Dyaboli; c. 26. (Schmitt; vol. I; p. 274; ll. 8-10: "Malum quod est iniusticia semper nichil est; malum vero quod est incommoditas aliquando sine dubio est nichil, ut caecitas, aliquando est aliquid ut tristicia et dolor....")

[Secunda ratio] Ad idem arguitur sic: ponatur gratia exempli quod Sor patiatur A dolorem. Tunc A non est malum nisi ex hoc tantum quod privat bonum: sit B ista privatio. Sequitur quod tantum penale foret habere B privationem ceteris paribus sine A dolore sicut cum A dolore, quod non videtur verum. Et quod hoc sequitur patet, quia illud malum doloris non est nisi privatio alicuius boni; illud bonum posset Deus auferre ceteris paribus sine dolore; et tunc foret equalis privatio: igitur, secundum istam positionem, equale malum.

[Tertia ratio] Similiter, secundum istam positionem, non

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187. [Secunda ratio] TL; 2°, KESU; 2m, C; 2, MV; om. alii. // Ad...sic) item, C.

188. nisi ex...(189)sit B) nisi quia privat bonum et tamen ([tamen) tunc, TL] ex hoc tunc ([tunc) tamen, L; tantum, T] sit B, TBKL.

189. sit) sic, PSX.

190. quod om. TUX. // tantum) nullum, T; malum add. X. // B om. BKL.

191. sine) siue, codd.

192. hoc om. TBKLAU. // nisi om. TBKLEAU*.

193. boni: ergo add. EA; quia add. U; quia ([ex add. L] eo dato add. TBKCL.

195. positionem) responsionem, EA; responsionem vel rationem, C; est add. AUX; foret add. TBKL; et add. C.

196. [Tertia ratio]) 3°, U; 3m, C; 3, MSV; om. alii. // Tertia ratio transpositus est post quartam rationem in S; transp. post (201)bonum, P; in mg. M. // Similiter) item, CX. // secundum istam positionem) secundum hoc, C; ista, EA; ista add. X.

foret malum vulnerari percuti flagellari et consimilia positiva quod videtur inconveniens.

[Quarta ratio] Ad idem arguitur sic: aliquod est bonum quod non est privatio alicuius mali, ymo est per se et formaliter bonum. Ergo, eadem ratione, econtra: aliquod est per se et formaliter malum quod non est privatio boni.

[Quinta ratio] Ad idem. Fames est aliquod positivum, non solum privatio boni, quod patet quia fames est immoderatus appetitus edendi et fames est pena, ut patet Secundo Sententiarum,

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197. consimilia) similia, MV.

199. [Quarta ratio]) 4°, U; 4, CMV; tertia ratio, TKL; 3°, E; om. alii. // arguitur) arguo, AVX.

200. est[2] om. CEA.

201. bonum: igitur econtra et Similiter(196)...(198)inconveniens add. P. Vide supra l. 196n. // Ergo...(202)boni om. P. // econtra om. TBKLPX.

202. privatio: alicuius add. TBKL. // boni: Similiter(196)...(198) inconveniens add. S. Vide supra l. 196n.

203. [Quinta ratio]) 5, CMV; quarta ratio, T; 4, E; om. alii. // Ad idem: item, C; Arguo add. praem. EPX. // Ad idem ...(204)boni om. TBKLU. // Ad idem...(208)boni om. S. // Fames...(204)quia om. (hom.) M*[1].

205. edendi) comedendi, TMPSVX; boni add. BK. // Secundo) Quarto, PSX.

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205. Lombardus; Sententiae; lib. II, d. XX, c. 4. (Brady; t. I, pars II, p. 431, ll. 11-12.) (Ms. Bodl. 335, f. 125[vb]. Lib. II, d. 20, c. 7. Textus: "quod vere fames <est add. supral.> defectus et pena peccati. Est enim im-

d. 20, c. 7. Similiter, tristicia dolor timor et consimilia sunt per se pene et mala et tamen sunt positiva et non privationes boni.

[Sexta ratio] Ad idem: delectatio est per se bona, ergo
210 tristicia est per se mala. Antecedens patet per Philosophum, 10 Ethicorum, c. 11, et consequentia patet per Regulam Philosophi, libro Topicorum, si propositum de proposito et oppositum

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206. d. 20) 2 ij , PX; 2°, C; om. EA. // timor) meror, T; om. T. // consimilia) similia, TBCL.

207. non: tamen add. TKL; tantum add. B; solum add. EA; sola add. M.

208. boni om. TBKCL.

209. [Sexta ratio] T; 6, CMV; ratio 5ª, L; 5°, U; 5, E; 4ª ratio, K; om. alii. // Ad idem: Arguo add. praem. MX.

211. 10) 2, EA; 4°, C. // c. 11) ij, TEAUVX. // patet) tenet, BL. // Philosophi om. TBKCLU.

212. libro) secundo, V; om. CEA; primo add. praem. S. // oppositum de opposito) cetera, TBKLU.

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moderatus ꝯ appetitus edendi." In mg. prima manu: "ꝯ iste appetitus naturalis est et solum pena. appetitus autem positus in diffinitione gule prima distinctione sequenti c. x. ⟨i.e., d. XXI, c. x [[c. 5 in Brady]]⟩ uoluntas est inordinate(?)et ideo culpa." In mg. secunda manu: lineae et "nota" et "usque hoc totum in hugone sen. c. 23.")

210-11. Aristoteles; Ethica Nicomachea sive Liber Ethicorum; lib. X; c. 11. (Bekker; 1179a33-1180a14). (AL; t. XXVI, 1-3, fasc. 3; pp. 364-6).

211-12. Aristoteles; Topica; lib. III; c. 6. (Bekker; 119a36-b16) (AL; t. V, 1-3; p. 60).

de opposito.

[Septima ratio] Ad idem. Secundum istud videtur quod omnis pena foret pena dampni et nulla foret pena sensus, quod est contra omnes doctores, nam omnes doctores distinguunt penam in penam sensus et penam dampni.

[Octava ratio] Ad idem. Si sola privatio boni foret per se malum; tunc, si in aliquo esset malum in quo prius non fuit malum, in illo foret privatio alicuius boni que prius non fuit. Sed consequens falsum, ut probo sic: ponatur exempli gratia quod in Sor sit privatio alicuius boni, que privatio non sit mala. Hoc est

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214. [Septima ratio] T; 7, CMV; ratio 6ª, L; 6º, U; 6, E; 5ª ratio, K; om. alii. // Secundum istud videtur) sequitur, TBKL.

216. nam) quia, TBKCL; que, A. // omnes doctores^{2}) omnes, TBKLU; om. CA. // penam^{1} om. C. // penam^{2} om. BKL.

217. penam om. TBKLU.

218. [Octava ratio] T; 8, MV; 7º et 8º, U; 7ª ratio, L; 7, E; 6º, K; om. alii.

219. fuit) fuisset, TMPX.

220. illo) isto, BKL. // que prius non fuit om. TBKLU.

221. consequens: est add. BEAVX. // ut) quod, CMPSV; et, UX. //probo: igitur probabo add. TBL; igitur add. K; probatur add. V. // ponatur) sit, U; om. TBL.

222. sit^{1} om. MS. // mala: Sor add. TKCL; Sorti add. B. // Hoc) quod, TBKL.

possibile quia non cuiuslibet boni privatio est mala, sed tantum boni debiti inesse. Tunc pono quod Deus faciat illud bonum esse debitum inesse: hoc potest Deus facere sine positione alicuius boni quo facto. Arguo sic: Sit A illa privatio; A est malum, et ille Sor habet malum, et in eo est malum quod prius non fuit, et tamen in eo nulla est privatio que prius non fuit; et per consequens videtur quod non sola privatio est mala, quia ista privatio nunc est mala et prius non fuit mala; et hoc non est ratione alicuius privationis, quia privatio quelibet prius fuit quando non

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223. tantum om. A; est add. MV.

224. boni om. BKL. // pono) posito, KL. // esse om. TBKCLPVX

225. Deus om. TBL.

226. privatio: tunc add. BKLV; tunc arguitur sic add. T.

227. ille) illud, E; illa, K; illo, M; iste, A; ista, BV; in, L; inde, PS; om. X. // Sor) deo, S. // et in eo est malum om. M^{*1}PS. // malum om. TBKLU.

228. et tamen...non fuit om. (hom.) C. // eo) illo, MPSU. // fuit...(230) prius non om. (hom.) E. // fuit) erat, MSV; erit, P; om. L.

229. videtur) habetur, LU; om. BK. // quia...(230) mala[1] om. (hom.) $P^{*1}S^{*1}$. // quia...(230) mala[2] om. (hom.) M^{*1}.

230. nunc) non, TBKLU. // et prius...non est) per se ergo non sola privatio et cetera. Ergo hoc est, TBKLU.

231. alicuius...quando) alicuius boni positivum per se. Tunc non sit ratione alicuius privationis per se quia ista privatio [[privatio om. B]]prius in eo fuit et, TBKL. // quando non fuit om. AU.

fuit mala.

[Nona ratio] Ad idem. Si sola privatio boni foret per se malum, tunc aliqua privatio foret per se mala. Et arguitur quod non, quia cuiuslibet iusticie privatio potest esse in creature rationali et non esse peccatum; ergo, nullus iusticie privatio est per se peccatum. Antecedens patet: quia quacunque iusticie data illam potest Deus adnichilare sine aliquo merito vel demerito ipsius creature; quod probatur quia propter peccatum Deus potest

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232. mala: sequitur textus interpolatus: ergo est ratione alicuius boni [[boni om. M^1V]] positive per se [[per se om. CM^1VX]]; igitur [[et per consequens add. M^1V]] non sola privatio et cetera [[igitur...et cetera om. U]], add. $CEAM^1UVX$.

233. [Nona ratio] T; 9°, U; 9, CM; 8ª ratione, L; 7ª ratione, K; om. alii. // Ad idem) item, C; arguitur add. praem. T; arguitur sic add. praem. K; arguo sic add. (praem. L) BL; arguo add. praem. X. // Si...(234)malum om. V.

234. aliqua privatio foret) aliqua foret privatio que foret, TBKL. // foret) esset, CMPV; est, UX. // arguitur) arguo, A; probo, TBKLU.

235. esse in) inesse, UX. // creature) natura, MPSV.

237. peccatum) malum, MPS; tunc aliqua(234)...(237)peccatum add. repit. MS.

238. illam) eam, TBKL; nullum, S. // adnichilare: ergo add. BKL. // aliquo om. TBKLMUV. // merito vel om. TBKLU.

239. ipsius) illius, TBKLS; eius, M; om. CPV. // quod probatur quia propter peccatum om. TBKL.

illam adnichilare; ergo, sine demerito quia, licet homo peccet, non propter hoc est Deus maioris potentie adnichilandi gratiam quam foret si homo non peccaret. Similiter, minus est gratia inherens anime quam quantitas substantie quante et substantiam quantam potest Deus seperare a quantitate. Igitur, a multo fortiori potest Deus seperare gratiam ab ipsa voluntate.

[Decima ratio] Ad idem. Ponatur aliqua creatura rationalis puta forma sine omni superaddito substancie vel accidentis, ita quod sit una forma substantialis indivisibilis nullo modo composita, quo posito talis creatura potest peccare et esse mala.

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240. illam) aliquam, T; aliam, K; illud, CA; idem, M; gratiam, E; om. PS. // ergo: quod probatur quia non[non om. B] propter [hoc add. B]peccatum potest deus adnichilare illam add. (praem. B) TBL. // ergo...(241)adnichilandi om. M. // quia) et, TBKL. // homo) hoc, TL; om. K.

241. non: tunc add. TK; tamen add. B. // gratiam om. TBKL.

242. homo om. TBKLMSU. // non om. TK. // minus) minor, BC.

243. anime) ad animam, TBKCL. // substantie) ad substantiam, sed[sed om. C], TBKCL. // quante et substantiam om. TBKL.

244. a quantitate) a substantia// a multo...(245)voluntate) a fortiori gratiam ab ipsa voluntate potest seperare., X; gratiam ab anima, TBKL. // fortiori) forma, MP.

246. [Decima ratio]) 10°, UV; ratio 11, T; om. alii. // Ad idem) item, C; similiter, BKL.

247. puta om. TBKLE. // forma om. TBKL. // ita) puta, TBKL.

248. una) aliqua, TBKL; illa, V. // indivisibilis: que add. TBKLU.

Fiat tunc ita quo posito.

Arguo sic: Hec creatura est mala ista malicia et illud malum, quo hec creatura est mala secundum conclusionem propositam, est privatio alicuius boni debiti inesse. Ergo aliquod bonum debitum inesse deest huic creature et tamen prius habuit omne tale bonum; sequitur quod nunc privatur aliquo bono quod prius habuit. Consequens falsum, quia non habuit substantiam vel accidens nisi se tantum, quia si aliquid prius habuit quod nunc non habet illud fuisset superadditum naturalibus et tunc non fuisset una forma substantialis indivisibilis sine omni superaddito, quod est contra positionem.

[Solutio ad Argumenta]

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250. Fiat...posito) quo facto, TBL; om. K.

251. malicia) mala, TKLMX.

252. secundum) per, KSX.

254. et om. CEASU. // habuit) habuerit, BKV,

256. non habuit) nichil habuit, CEX; nec habuit, TA; om. B; nec add. C. // vel) nec, CAV; neque, TBKLX.

257. si aliquid...(258)habet om. TBKL. // habuit om. M*1SU*1.

259. substantialis) simplex, TBKL. // quod...(260)positionem om. TA.

260. positionem) positum, BK(C?)SUV; casum, X.

261. [Solutio ad Argumenta] L; Solutio, KU; Solutio argumentorum, V; Ad responsiones in oppositum, M; Responsio ad obj., P; ad oppositum, S; Responsio, C; om. alii.

Ad ista argumenta facta contra istam conclusionem respondeo.

[Ad primam] Ad primam: ad auctoritatem Anselmi dico quod sic intelligitur "malum culpe nichil est", nec causam efficientem habet sed solum deficientem, ut dicit Augustinus, 12 De Civitate Dei, c. 8. Nec ad hoc quod peccatum sit requiritur aliquod positivum quod ipsum efficiat. Sed sine aliquo positivo nocente potest esse et est peccatum per solam carentiam iusticie. Et eodem modo est de quibuscumque penis privativis, puta de cecitate et consimilibus. Quando homo est cecus, nichil est quod efficit vel corrumpit vel nocet nisi ipsa sola cecitas.

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262. ista om. TBKL. // istam om. TBKLSUX. // conclusionem om. PX; primam add. MPS.

263. [Ad primam] TBMU; om. alii.

264. intelligitur) intelligit, BKLUV. // nec) nichil, E; quia nullam, TBKLUX.

265. solum: causam add. EAX.

266. 12) 2, T; 21, KL; 11, B.

267. positivum) effectivum, TBKLX. // efficiat: vel positivum add. TBKLX. // sine om. CP*S.

268. nocente) non non existente, C; inesse, A; om. TBKL. // est) esse, PS; om. KM*1X.

269. est om. PV. // privativis om. M*1P*S.

270. et: huius add. PSUV; huius modi add. M.

271. est quod om. MV. // vel nocet om. BKL.

265-6. Augustinus; De Civitate Dei; lib. XII, c. 7. (CCL; t. XLVIII, p. 362, ll. 1-3.)

Sed aliud est malum pene ut est privatio quietis quod habet aliquam passionem contrariam quieti, que passio ipsam privationem efficit. Nec potest esse talis privatio nisi per positionem talis mali positivi contrarii et cessante tali passione mala effective sit quies in corpore et tollitur dolor, qui est privatio quietis naturalis. Et pro tanto dicunt auctoritates quod aliquod malum nichil est et aliquod est aliquid.

[Ad secundam] Ad secundam rationem ad idem, quando supponitur quod A sit dolor, B illud bonum quod privatur dolore: tunc secundum istam rationem ita malum esset habere privationem

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272. aliud) aliquod, MPV. // aliud est om. TBKLU. // ut) quod BKL. // quod) quia, TL; qua, C.

273. aliquam) aliam, PS. // quieti) nature, CEM[1]V; nec, A. // que passio ipsam privationem) quod naturam, E; quod ipsam, A.

275. mala) mali, TLEPU; male, C.

276. qui) que, EU.

277. auctoritates) auctores, CES (ambiguum verbum imminutum, KMV); doctores, X.

278. malum om. L; aliquid est et aliquod add. in mg. M[1]. // nichil et aliquid transpositi sunt, V. // et aliquod est aliquid) et aliquod, E; om. CMP[*]S. // aliquod: malum add. TX; nullum add. A.

279. [Ad secundam] TKCMSU; om. alii. // rationem) argumentum, T; om. BKCLU. // ad idem om. TBKCLVX.

280. dolor, B) dolor et B, X; dolor et B sit, TBKL; dolor B sit, U.

281. rationem) responsionem, P(S?); positionem, BK(U?)V; visionem, E; viam vel positionem, L. // ita) illa, TMV; om. X. // esset) posset, SX.

B sine A, sicut cum A. Respondeo quod privatio B non potest esse sine tali passione nocente; quia necessarium est in homine, si non sit passio doloris vel consimilis, esse bonum contrarium dolori et quiescere a talibus passionibus. Si objiciatur quod omne bonum potest Deus auferre sine passione alicuius mali vel nocentis positive, credo quod non salvendo rem in natura sua.

[Ad tertiam] Ad tertiam dico quod vulnerari percuti et cetera est malum causaliter, quia faciunt privari sanitatem. Sed non sunt mala per se sed ratione privationis boni consequentis.

[Ad quartam] Ad quartam rationem nego consequentiam: bonum est aliquid positivum; igitur, malum.

[Ad quintam] Ad quintam rationem, dico quod fames et

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282. sine) sit, AS^{*1}.

283. passione) privatione, V; pena, TBL.

284. esse) est, CEAMS.

285. et...passionibus om. C; et add. BLMSUV. // quiescere) quies, EMSUV. // Si: autem add. UX.

287. rem in natura sua in mg. U; rem naturam, TBKL.

288. [Ad tertiam] TCEMSU; om. alii. // tertiam: rationem add. CEAX. // vulnerari) flagellari, X; et add. CLMV. // et cetera) flagellari, EA; om. TCPX.

291. [Ad quartam] TCEMSU; om. alii. // rationem om. TBKLUV.

292. aliquid) aliquod, TBMPU; quid, CEAX. // igitur: et add. BKV. // malum: et cetera add. BPSU.

293. [Ad quintam] TCEMSU; om. alii. // rationem om. TBKLEUV.

consimilia non sunt per se mala sed effective tamen et causative eo quod privant bonum nature quod debet inesse.

[Ad sextam] Ad sextam rationem respondeo et dico quod loquitur de oppositis privativis; sicut verum est quod tristicia est mala, sed non per se sed causative eo quod privat bonum.

[Ad septimam] Ad septimam rationem, dico quod omnis pena est pena dampni. Certum est tunc quod aliqua pena sensus est et est quando bonum natura privatur per passionem sensibilem; sicut, verbi gratia, quando ignis agit in hominem, homo percipit calorem sibi disconvenientem et illam perceptionem naturaliter

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294. consimilia) similia, KCV; cetera similia, T.

295. debet) debitum, TMPUX; deberet, C.

296. [Ad sextam] TCEMSU; om. alii. // rationem respondeo et om. TBKCLUV. // et dico om. EAX.

297. sicut) similiter, CEASV. // verum) manifestum, TPX.

298. sed om. TBKL. // privat: nature add. TBKCLX.

299. [Ad septimam] TCEMSU; om. alii. // rationem om. TBKCLUV. // quod: non add. X.

300. pena[1] om. KL. // Certum om. VX. // tunc) tamen, BCLAUVX. // quod om. MSX. //sensus) sensibilis, TKL. // est om. MSX.

301. bonum) vere, X; om. TBKL. // nature) non, T; om. BC. // privatur: boni consequenti add. TBL; boni conventi add. K. // per: aliquam add. TBKL.

302. sicut om. TX. // hominem) hominibus, LU.

303. sibi) sue complexioni, TBKLX. // disconvenientem) indisconvenientem, EA. // naturaliter om. BKL.

sequitur dolor et tristicia, et dolor active est corruptio naturalis quietis vel alicuius consimilis boni. Si tamen ignis consumeret materiam et homo passionem non sentiret nec perciperet, tunc non esset dolor vel pena aliqua sensus, sed tantum pena dampni.

[Ad octavam] Ad octavam rationem, nego consequentiam. Ergo, si in aliquo esset malum in quo prius non fuit malum, in illo foret privatio alicuius bone que prius in eo non erat; quia, sicut argumentum probat, est possibile quod in eo sit privatio aliqua nunc mala que privatio prius fuit sed non fuit mala, sed nunc est mala quia privatio alicuius boni debiti inesse.

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304. sequitur) consequitur, C; om. TP. // active) anime, TAPSUX. // corruptio: anime add. APS; active add. UV.

305. boni om. TBKCL. // consumeret) conservaret, TKUX; totam add. TBKUVX; ipsam add. C.

306. materiam) naturam, CEAPS. // et homo) bonam, L; om. TBK; ipsam add. CEAPS. // non om. TKLU. // tunc) nec, TKL; vel, B.

307. aliqua om. EAV. // pena^{2} om. TBKL.

308. [Ad octavam] TCMSU; om. alii. // rationem om. TBKCLUV.

310. erat) erit, TS; fuit, CEAX.

311. eo) ea, TPSX; aliquo, EA.

312. privatio om. TBKCLPX. // sed nunc est mala om. T.

313. quia) et, AMPSUV. // debiti inesse) debiti in se, S; debiti se, M; om. EA.

[Ad nonam] Ad nonam rationem, nego consequentiam. Talis privatio potest esse et non esse mala; igitur non est per se mala quia non intelligo idem per se malum et per se et essentialiter malum: per se malum voco quando est malum et non ratione alicuius alterius sed secundum se tantum: homo est malus ratione malicie, sed malicia est per se mala. Numquid tamen cuiuslibet boni privatio potest esse et non esse peccatum, tractabo in secundo libro quando tractabo de peccato.

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314. [Ad nonam] TCMU; om. alii. // rationem om. TBKCLUV.

315. est om. AMS.

316. non om. EA. // intelligo) est, TBKCLX. // per se malum om. EA.

317. per se malum voco quando est malum) quando est malum, A; om. E. // voco: illud add. TEAUX.

318. alicuius om. CMV. // tantum) totum, EAU; ut add. TEAX.

319. mala om. EA. // Numquid) Quandoque, TKLU; Quandocumque, B; Utrum, CMV. // tamen cuiuslibet) autem aliqua, TBKCLU. // boni om. TBKCLPSU. // In mg.: Numquid autem cuiuslibet boni privatio, U^1.

320. peccatum) mala, T^1PX; credo quod non add. EAP^1X. // tractabo: sed illud add. praem. EA; istud add. praem. L; hoc add. praem. MX.

321. libro om. TBKCL. // tractabo) agetur, TBKCLU.

320-1. tractabo in secundo libro: Thomas de Buckingham; huius operis; Q. VI, A. IV (dubium): Inc. "Utrum si deus crearet creaturam rationalem cum privatione gratie...." (Perez; ff. l.iiij^{ra}-m.iii^{vb}.)

[Ad decimam] Ad decimam rationem dico quod, si esset possibile quod foret creatura rationalis in puris naturalibus habens omnia requisita, talis posset peccare et peccatum foret in ea privatio iusticie. Sed numquid iusticia foret ipsa natura sic se habens vel aliquod bonum positivum in eo sicut dicitur de virginitate postea apparebit in secundo libro. Si tunc talis creatura peccaret, foret in eo privatio alicuius boni absoluti vel respectivi eo quod alio modo se haberet hoc creatura ad Deum quam prius illud tamen peccatum non foret privatio alicuius boni positivi quod prius fuit.

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322. [Ad decimam] TCMU; om. alii. // rationem om. TBKCLUV.

323. foret in mg. M; erit, T; esset, BKL.

324. peccatum: illius add. TX.

325. numquid) numquam, KCLSU; tunc, B.

326. positivum) privationem, KCLEA; privativum, B.

327. postea om. EAUX. // secundo libro) quarto, TBKLU. // tunc) tamen, B; om. EA. // talis om. TBKLU.

328. peccaret: peccatum add. CEAM[1]UVX. // in eo) in ea, B; om. CEAX.

329. alio modo) aliquo, CU; aliter, X. // hoc om. TBKLX; modo add. P.

330. illud...(331)fuit om. X. // illud om. TL.

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327. postea apparebit in secundo libro: Thomas de Buckingham: huius operis; Q. VI, Art. VI. (Perez; f. o.viij[ra-b].)

Conclusio Secunda

Omnis privatio rei debite inesse est tantum malum quantum est bonum quod ipsa per se et essentialiter privat si esset bonum.

Istam conclusionem persuadeo sic: arguo in uno exemplo: si quis aufferret a me librum meum, tantum malum et dampnum faceret michi quantum liber meus esset michi bonus et utilis. Probo quia si non sit, tunc minus dampnum esset michi si perderet librum meum: tunc cum carentia libri sit michi dampnum et non tantum quantum liber esset michi bonus et utilis, sed liber esset michi multo magis bonum et utile quam carentia illius est

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1. Conclusio Secunda text. et mg. TBKCLEASUV; sit ista add. TBKL; quod add. CA.

3. est om. TBKLEX. // esset: et esset add. MPSV. // bonum^2 om. BKC.

4. sic om. TU. // arguo om. TBKLU.

6. michi^1 om. EAX.

7. Probo...(9) utilis om. U. // Probo) probacio, LK. // sit om. TBKL. // tunc) igitur, TKLUX; ergo, B. // esset michi) michi, S; et idem argumentum, EA; om. MPUX. // si perderet om. UX; quam michi esset utilis add. TBKCLUX.

8. tunc...(9) utilis om. (hom. <vide 1. 7n>) L.

9. et non tantum om. EA; dampnum add. CPSX. // sed liber) sed habere librum, TBKL.

10. michi^1 om. TKCEA. // multo) merito, TKMUX. // magis) maius, BKL. // illius) liber, TKLU; libri, B; nullius, A. // est: michi add. TBKCLUV.

dampnum, igitur aliquod minus bonum michi quam liber est bonus esset michi magis bonum et magis utile quam carentia libri est michi dampnum: sit A illud bonum.

Contra: tunc si aufferres librum meum et dares michi A bonum, plus faceres michi bonum quam dampnum vel quam malum, quod est notorie falsum, quia conferres minus et aufferres maius. Et consequentiam probo sic: iste nullum malum fecit michi nisi carentiam et privationem libri mei et facit michi A bonum, quod est maius bonum quam privatio et carentia libri est mala; igitur, et cetera.

Et consimili ratione, sequitur quod, si perderem 20 solidos et lucrarer 18, quod maius haberem lucrum quam dampnum, quia

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11. liber: iste add. MPSV. // est: michi add. TBKL.

12. bonum om. KMPUX. // magis^2 om. TBKLV. // carentia: illius add. UX. // est) esset, TBKL.

14. tunc om. TBKL. // aufferres: michi add. TBKCLU.

15. quam dampnum vel quam malum) quam inferres dampnum, TBKL.

16. conferres...maius) aufferres michi maius et dares minus, TBKL.

17. nullum om. EA.

19. est^1: michi add. TBKL. // privatio et om. TBKL. // libri: mei add. CPVX. // mala: michi add. TBKL. // igitur om. TX.

21. 20) 10, C.

22. 18) 9, C. // maius) magis, TCE; minus, S.

dampnum non est nisi carentia 20 solidorum quod non est tantum dampnum quantum 20 solidi sunt michi bonum, sed precise tantum vel minus quam 18 solidi sunt bonum. Igitur, habere 18 solidos est maius bonum et lucrum quam perdere 20 solidos est dampnum et malum. Consimiliter potest argui de omni alia privatione et bono sibi opposito.

Confirmatur ista ratio sic: si carentia et privatio libri foret minus malum quam A est bonum, tunc aggregatum ex A et carentia libri plus haberet de bono quam de malo et, per consequens, totum aggregatum foret bonum et eodem modo totum

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23. est[1] om. LE. //20) 30, E; 10, C. // quod) quae, BKLAU. // quod...(26)solidos[2] om. PS.

24. quantum) quam, TCEM; sicut, X. // 20) 28, K; 18, V; 9, C. // sunt...(25)bonum om. X. // sed...(25)bonum om. KC.

25. tantum) 18, EA. // 18[1]) 10, T; 20, L. // solidi om. TLU. // sunt: michi add. TBLV. // 18[2]) 10, T; 9, C; 20, X.

26. maius) magis, TCEMV. // et lucrum om. TBKL. // 20) 10, C. // solidos[2] om. TCV.

27. et malum om. TX. // Consimiliter) Et similiter, SX. // privatione...(28)sibi) re et [de add. B] eius, TBKL.

28. opposito) opposita, TBLP; mala et cetera, K.

29. Confirmatur...(30)bonum om. K. // foret) fuit, PS; michi add. TLV.

30. minus om. LV. // quam A est bonum) et cetera, BL; et carentia, T. // aggregatum...(32)totum[2] om. (hom.) VX. // A[2] om. AU. // et om. AS.

32. totum[1]...modo om. (hom.) KL.

aggregatum ex A et carentia libri foret eligibile quia plus haberet de bono quam de malo et, per consequens, data optione habere illud aggregatum vel non habere nec aliquid eius: recta ratione debet eligi et non fugi. Consequens falsum, quia fugiendo illud habebitur liber et eligendo illud totum habebitur A quod est minus bonum et cetera sunt paria; igitur, et cetera.

[Secunda ratio] Ad idem: si aufferes librum meum et deberes satisfacere michi pro dampno meo sublato numquam plene satisfaceres, quosque michi tantum bonum faceret quantum bonum fuit michi liber. Sed hoc non esset nisi quia faceret michi

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33. libri) boni, PS. // quia) et, EA.

35. nec aliquid eius) illud habere est, EA.

36. debet) deberet, BKLVX; om. EA. // eligi) eligendi, A; eligendum, E. // fugi) fugiendi, A; fugiendum, E. // Consequens: est add. CAVX.

37. habebitur[1])haberet, TL; haberetur, B; habere, KAU; haberem, MV. // liber) libri, TLE. // et...(39)Ad om. K. // illud om. TBL. // totum) tamen, EMV; tantum, PSU. // habebitur[2]) haberet, TLMV; haberetur, B; habere, U.

38. igitur om. TV. // et cetera[2] om. TVX.

39. [Secunda ratio] TM; 2°, K; 2, V; 3°, E; Item, U; om. alii.// aufferes) aufferas, TPX; aufferens, CEAMV; michi add. TBKL. // meum) michi, PS; om. BKCL.

40. deberes) deberet, CEAV. // michi om. TKCLEAX. // pro dampno meo) de, TBKL. // sublato) illato, CEAPX.

41. plene) michi, TP. // satisfaceres) satisfaceret, CEAMSV. // faceret) faceres, TBKLUX.

42. bonum...(44)quantum om. (hom.) B. // Sed...(43)bonus om. (hom. ?) EA. // quia: ipse add. CMPSV.

tantum bonum quantum liber fuit michi bonus, et per consequens quantum res ablata illi est bona tantum est carentia et privatio illius sibi mala.

[Tertia ratio] Ad idem: si reciperem propter meritum vel invenirem lucrum semper attenderem penes quantitatem boni recepti ceteris paribus. Igitur, eadem ratione, sic esset econtrario de dampno quod tantum est dampnum quantum bonum fuit res ablata.

[Quarta ratio] Ad idem arguitur sic: pura carentia rei secundum illud quod pura carentia est non est mala, sicut patet necessario per conclusionem quintam; nec ex hoc est privatio

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43. bonum) dampnum, TKCEAX.

44. carentia om. TBKCL.

46. [Tertia ratio] TM; 3°, K; 3, V; 4, E; Item, CU; om. alii. // propter) aliquod, TBKCL.

47. invenirem) invenirem aliquid vel emerem, C; invenirem vel emerem, EA; inveniret, L; inveniretur, K; emerem, M; emerem aliquid, P; aliquod emerem, S; omne, V; inorme aliquid bonum vel enorme, X; om. T.

48. sic om. TBKCL.

49. est) fuit, TBKL.

51. [Quarta ratio] TKM; 4, V; 5, E; Item, C; om. alii. // arguitur om. TBKCLUV. // sic om. TBKCLEU; si add. LEA.

52. carentia om. BKL. // sicut...(53)quintam om. X.

53. quintam) primam, V; istam, M; om. EA. // ex hoc om. TBKL.

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53. per conclusionem quintam: Thomas de Buckingham; huius operis; Q. I, C. V: "Non cuiuslibet boni privatio est mala." (Perez; f. c.i^{vb}.)

mala, quod sit carentia boni, sed ex hoc: quod est carentia boni debiti inesse. Igitur ex hoc: quod est magis vel minus boni debiti inesse; secundum illud precise est privatio magis vel minus mala; et per consequens quantum aliquid est alicui bonum et utile tantum eius privatio esset sibi mala.

[Quinta ratio] Ad idem: dampnum nichil aliud est quam diminutio boni et similiter malum est privatio et corruptio boni, ut patet per auctoritates superius allegatas ad conclusionem primam, et constat quod quantum est bonum corruptum et ablatum tantum est corruptio et diminutio boni: ergo, tantum dampnum et malum.

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54. mala: secundum add. BKL; sed add. T. // boni[1] om. TBKLU. // carentia[2]) privatio, CEA.

55. Igitur...(56)inesse om. (hom.) B. // Igitur...boni om. K. // magis) maius, CEAU.

56. magis) maius, EA.

58. esset) est, BKCL.

59. [Quinta ratio] TKM; 5, V; 6, E; Item, C; om. alii. // quam) nisi, TCEAPS.

60. et[1]...privatio om. T.

61. superius om. TBKL.

62. bonum: quod add. TL.

63. tantum[2]: est add. EAU. // et[2]) vel, TBLU.

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61. per auctoritates superius allegatas ad conclusionem primam: vide supra: Q. I, C. 1, ll. 21-95; 108-112; 133-7; 171-5; et 265-6.

65 [Sexta ratio] Ad idem: carentia visionis divine est creature rationali tam mala quam bona foret ei visio, ceteris paribus. Igitur, eadem ratione, sic esset in aliis privationibus. Antecedens arguitur quasi consimiliter sicut prius. Sit A visio divina, B sua carentia Sorti; tunc B est minus malum quam A est bonum. 70 Igitur, cum non indivisibiliter, aliquod bonum minus A Sorti esset magis bonum quam B malum. Hoc est falsum, sicut improbatum est per primam formam, quia sit illud C, tunc si ex aliqua causa perderem A et acquirem C simpliciter plus haberem lucrum quam dampnum, quia nullum dampnum haberem nisi 75 B, et lucrum et utile C quod est magis michi lucrum quam B

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65. [Sexta ratio] TM; 6, V; 7, E; Item, C; om. alii. // idem: si add. PS.

66. bona transp. post visio, T; om. KLX.

68. arguitur quasi consimiliter) arguitur, U; probatur, TBK; probatur consimiliter, X.

69. carentia: si add. EPSX. // Sorti om. TBKE.

70. non: est add. TS; sit add. BKC. // indivisibiliter) indivisibile, TBKC.

71. magis) maius, EAM[1]. // B: est add. BKUV. // Hoc: autem add. TBK. // sicut) ut, TBK. // improbatum) probatum, TBKEA.

73. acquirem) adquirem, MS.

74. nisi: privationem add. TBK.

75. et lucrum et utile C quod) et C lucrum est tam utile: igitur, TBKPSU. // michi om. TPV. // lucrum) bonum, CLEAX; bonum et add. praem. V.

dampnum, quid notum est esse falsum.

Similiter, si aliquis impediret me ab A et daret michi C, iste plus faceret michi malum quam bonum. Tunc B foret michi magis dampnum et malum quam C bonum et B nunc, si sit michi malum solum propter demeritum meum proprium, non est michi minus malum et dampnum quam tunc; igitur, et cetera.

Similiter, si B sit minus dampnum et malum quam C bonum, aggregatum ex BC esset michi bonum et utile. Consequens videtur falsum.

Similiter, tunc data michi optione habere illud aggregatum

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76. quid...falsum) quod est notorie falsum, TBK. // esse om. PS.

79. et malum om. TC. // C: est add. TBKMSU.

80. malum) pena, CLEAX. // meum om. LX.

81. minus) magis, TBK; maius, A. // tunc: foret add. PX.

82. sit: michi add. M^1V. // C: sit add. TBKA. // bonum: tunc add. BKEM^1U; igitur add. LV; ergo add. X.

83. aggregatum om. TK. // ex...(86)habere om. TEA. // ex... utile) recta ratione magis haberem eligere aggregatum quia si non que foret causa non carentia A quia illa carentia non foret michi tantum malum quantum illud videtur michi bonum, BK; vel non haberem recta ratione illud eligere si non que foret causa non carentia A quia illa carentia non foret tantum malum sicut illud foret michi bonum, U. Haec sunt ex ll. 86-9.

84. videtur) est, X; om. MPSV.

85. tunc om. BKCU. // michi om. BKCU.

vel non habere. Ego recta ratione haberem illud eligere, quia si non que foret causa non carentia A, quia illa carentia non foret tantum malum sicut illud C foret michi bonum.

Similiter, quicquid bonum in aliquo facit positivum, si pri-
90 vatio illius inesset, privatio illa omne bonum illud adimeret et privaret; et per consequens quantum prodesset alicui aliquod positivum tantum privatio illius sibi noceret et sic quantum positivum foret tale bonum tantum privatio eius erit mala. Et potest

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86. Ego) tunc, T; ergo, B; om. CEA. // haberem) habeo, BKX. // illud om. TBKA. // eligere: aggregatum add. BK; aggregatum si bonum, consequens videtur falsum. Similiter data optione habere illud aggregatum vel non habere. Ergo recta ratione habeo eligere, add. in mg. (repit. ll. 83-6), T.

87. A) illa, B; om. KC. // foret: michi add. TBKUV.

88. illud om. TEX. // C om. BKAPSU. // bonum: quam videtur ⟦ut nunc add. in mg., T¹⟧ illud aggregatum quia si non que foret causa ista carentia ⟦ quia illa carentia add. in mg., T¹⟧ non foret michi tantum malum quantum videtur foret illud michi bonum add. T.

89. aliquo) facto, PS. // facit om. TBKPS; aliud add. EA; aliquod add. CL.

90. privatio om. TK. // illa om. TKA. // illud om. TCSU. // adimeret) annichilaret, TBKSU.

91. alicui om. TX.

92. et: si add. CLEAX.

93. erit) foret, TBKU.

ista ratio confirmari per illud Philosophi, Primo Posteriorum:

Si habere pulmonem est causa respirationis, non habere pulmonem est causa non respirationis.

[Septima ratio] Ad idem: privatio rei debite inesse est malum et pena, quia aliter parvuli in inferno non punirentur nec peccatum esset pena. Sed tales privationes non sunt pena sensus sed dampni tantum. Aut igitur tunc attenditur in talibus privationibus malicia penes quantitatem boni privati, vel penes aliam causam. Si penes quantitatem boni privati, tunc quantum est bonum privatum alicui bonum tantum privatio eius erit sibi mala.

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94. Philosophi om. BK.

95. est...pulmonem om. (hom.) A. // pulmonem^2: non add. BU.

96. est) esset, LEA.

97. [Septima ratio] TM; 6^a, K; Item, E; Similia ratio, C; om. alii.

99. peccatum: per consequens add. PS.

100. tunc om. EA. // privationibus om. BK.

101. vel...(102) privati om. (hom.) U; vel...(102)causam om. E. // vel: etiam add. PV.

102. Si...(104)causam om. (hom.) S; Si...(103)mala om. (hom.) P. //penes quantitatem bonum privati) primo modo, TBK; primum, EX. // est) esset, TBKUX.

103. bonum^2 om. TBKC. // erit) foret, TBK; esset, AMX.

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94. Aristoteles; Analytica Posteriora; lib. I, c. 13. (Bekker; 78b13-31). (AL, t. IV, 1-4, p. 214.)

Si penes aliam causam attendatur malicia, tunc potest esse quod minus boni privatio michi sit magis mala, et tunc plus noceret ceteris paribus auferre a me rem michi minus bonam quam magis bonam, quod videtur mirabile.

Similiter, Sanctus Thomas, questio De Malo, q. 41, dicit quod carentia visionis divine est maximum dampnum, quod non esset nisi quia tantum dampnum est quantum beatitudo est bona; igitur, et cetera.

[Contra Conclusionem]

Contra istam conclusionem objicitur multipliciter.

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105. minus) minoris, BKLX; minorum, T. // plus: michi add. TBKU.

106. quam: auferre michi add. TK; auferre a me add. B; michi add. C.

108. questio[1]) questionibus, BK; suis add. TBKU. // q. 41) q. 14, C; q. 42, BKU; q. 24, TX.

109. divine om. BK. // non...(110)quantum om. E.

110. esset) foret, TBK. // est[1] om. LA.

112. [Contra Conclusionem] TBCEAV; Contra conclusionem secundam, LU; Contra istam conclusionem, K; Contra conclusionem arguitur, M; Con(---)/ Argu(----), S; om. PX.

113. istam) hanc, TBK; om. AU. // objicitur) arguitur, TK; arguo, B.

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108. Thomas de Aquino; Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo; q. V, art. 1, vel c. 41; obj. et resp. 3. (Marietti; vol. II, pp. 544 et 546.)

[Prima ratio] Primo sequitur quod tantum punit Deus pro minimo peccato mortali, quantum premiat pro aliquo bono merito. Probatur consequentia sic: si Sor existens in gratia meretur beatitudinem quantumcunque magnam de congruo vel de condigno, quocunque modico peccato mortali peccaret, Sor mereretur carentiam totius illius beatitudinis et gratie et omnium aliarum virtutum et, si Sor decederet in peccato mortali, Deus puniret Sortem tali carentia. Igitur, si talis carentia sit tam mala quam bona est beatitudo, tantum Sor meretur malum pene per minimum mortale quantum meretur premium per aliquod meritum possibile.

[Secunda ratio] Et eodem modo sequitur quos Deus plus punit malum quam premiat bonum meritum, ut ostenditur in

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114. [Prima ratio] TM; om. alii. // punit) punietur, EU; puniret, TBK.

116. existens om. TBKU.

119. carentiam) privationem, TBK. // illius) huius, U; om. TBKX. // omnium om. TBKU.

121. Sortem) eum, V; cum, U.

122. est: nunc add. MPSUV; tunc add. TBK. // tantum) tunc, TBKU; om. V. // meretur: tantum add. UV. // pene: tantum add. TBK. // minimum: peccatum add. LAV.

123. quantum) sicut, CLEAX. // meretur om. TBK. // premium) bonum, KU; om. TB.

124. [Secunda ratio]) 2°, CUV; 2ª, L; om. alii. // Et om. EA. // modo om. UX. // sequitur om. PS. *!!* Deus om. CLEA.

125. bonum om. KP. // meritum om. TBK.

exemplo de Sorte et Platone eque bonis: nunc salvetur unus et dampnetur alius pro minimo peccato mortali; tunc Sor dampnatus privatur toto premio quo premiatur Plato pro bono merito suo, que privatio est tam mala quam bonum est illud premium; et preter illam penam habet Sor aliam penam coniunctum. Igitur, simpliciter plus punitur Sor quam premiatur Plato, quod erat probandum.

[Tertia ratio] Item, sequitur quod quilibet in inferno tantum punitur quantum fuisset premiatus si non peccasset sed stetisset et fuisset salvatus. Quod hoc sequitur patet sic: Iudas nunc in inferno caret tota beatitudine quam habuisset si non peccasset sed decessisset cum omni merito suo quod habuit et quam bona

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126. eque bonis) qui eque boni sunt, TBK.

127. dampnetur: in processu add. TBK. // peccato om. VX.

128. priva tur) privabitur, TBK. // pro bono merito suo om. TBK. // merito) premio, PSU.

130. aliam penam: sibi add. TBKM[1]UX. // coniunctum: scilicet sensus add. PX.

131. simpliciter om. TBKP. // Sor om. MSV.

133. [Tertia ratio]) 3[a], L; 3[o], CUV; 2[a] ratio, M; 2[o], E; om. alii. // Item) Iterum, PX; sed tunc, E. // tantum... (134)peccaeest) caret(136)...peccasset, (hom.), S.

135. patet) probo, V; probatur, T. // sic...(136)inferno om. T. // nunc om. BK.

136. inferno: tota add. CEM. // caret) careret, LAUX; privatur, TBK. // non...(137)habuit) stetisset in apostolatu, TBK.

137. sed decessisset om. EA. // omni) bono, V; om. MPSU.

fuisset illa beatitudo tam mala est eiusdem beatitudinis carentia et tanta pena. Igitur, tantum malum pene habet nunc Iudas quantum habuisset premium in celo si fuisset salvatus.

[Quarta ratio] Similiter sequitur quod qui bene vixit et multum meritorie per totam vitam suam et in fine decedit cum modico peccato mortali gravius punietur in inferno quam alius qui semper male vixit et numquam bene. Probatur consequentia sic: Sor, qui merebatur per magnam partem vite sue et in fine decedit cum modico mortali, carebit beatitudine et gratia et aliis

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138. illa) illa sua, B; illi sua, K; sibi, T. // eiusdem) eius, CP; om. B. // beatitudinis) illi, BK; ei, T; om. C.

139. et tanta pena) econtraria, B; om. TK.

140. premium) bonum, TK; tunc, B. // in celo om. TBKMV.

141. [Quarta ratio]) 4°, CUV; Item, E; om. alii. // quod om. CEU; aliquis add. BK. // bene om. TBKP*SU. // et om. TBKU.

142. multum om. CVX.

143. peccato om. TBCX. // punietur) puniatur, KLEUX; puniretur, B. // alius) alicuius, UX.

144. male) maliciose, TBKU. // numquam) nullum, K; nichil, TB. // bene) boni egerit, TBK. // Probatur) Probo, TBKU.

145. sic: sit add. MPS.

146. modico om. TBKU; peccato add. CLEAV; peccato, tunc add. U. // aliis) quicumque, T; quilibetcumque, B; quocumque, K.

bonis que merebatur, que carentia est tam mala quam bona fuisset illa bona, sed Plato non punietur tantum. Probo, quia nec pena que est pura carentia boni nec pena positiva simul cum aliquali carentia, quia tunc talis pena sensus foret proportionabilis alicui parti beatitudinis essentialis, quia esset tam malum pene quam bonum esset certa pars beatitudinis, quod est falsum et

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147. que[1] om. TBKU. // que[2]) et talis, TBK. // carentia: carentia propositum add. K; praepositum add. B; p bonum add. T. // est: ei add. TB. // tam om. T*[1]M*[1]S.

148. illa bona) illi totum bonum suum, TBK. // bona om. PX.

149. pena[1]: dampni add. PX. // pena[2]: sensus scilicet add. praem. P; que est add. TBKU; sensus que est pena add. X.

150. tunc om. TBKLAUX. // foret) sortis non, BK.

151. essentialis...(165)non om. T et substituit textum ex Q. I, C. 7, huius operis (Perez; f. c. viij[va], ll. 15-34.): a.b. est precise tam fugibile mutari in hominem quam fugibile est .a. annichilare simpliciter. Istud patet ex argumentis superius factis, quia .b. in infinitum est magis bonum quam homo. Igitur, .a.b. mutari in hominem est plus fugibile quam .a. annichilare in hominem, et hominem totaliter annichilare est tam fugibile quam fugibile est .a. totaliter annichilare. Igitur .a.b. mutari in hominem est plus fugibile quam .a. totaliter annichilare, quid quid tam fugibile sit .a. mutari in hominem et hominem totaliter annichilare quam fugibile est .a. simpliciter annichilari. Patet quia simpliciter annichilari non est fugibilius .a. quam mutari in hominem nisi per tantum bonum quantum bonum est eligere homo et .a. mutari in hominem et hominem annichilari est tantum fugibile quantum fugibile est .a. mutari in hominem bonum. // essentialis: amisse add. VX. // malum) mala, MVX; bonum, BK. // pene om. BKU.

152. bonum) bona, MVX; malum, BK. // esset om. BS. // certa) una, BK. // et post om. BKU.

post improbabitur.

[Confirmatio rationis] Confirmatur hec ratio sic: Sor, si decederet cum omni merito suo et virtutibus quas habet, plus premiaretur in celo quam Plato puniretur in inferno et Sor, nunc peccans mortaliter, punietur carentia totius premii quod haberet in celo, que carentia est tam mala pena quam bonum foret premium sibi oppositum. Igitur, plus punietur Sor in inferno quam Plato, quia pena sua est magis mala quam pena Platonis.

[Quinta ratio] Item sequitur ut videtur quod magis expediret dampnatio abstinere se a bono quam facere bonum ad quod non

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153. improbabitur) improbatur, MSV; probabitur, EA; om. KU.

154. [Confirmatio rationis] C; Confirmatur Ratio, M; Confirmatio ad, S; Confirmatio, K; 4ª, L; om. alii.

155. decederet) decedat, BPX. // suo om. BK.

156. puniretur) punitur, CLMX; punierit, E; premiaretur, A.

157. peccans: peccato add. BKU. // mortaliter) mortale, KU; mortali, B; om. C; si moriatur add. X. // premii: in celo add. E; in inferno add. A. // quod) quam, EA.

158. est: tanta et add. BK. // foret) fuisset, BKU.

159. punietur) puniretur, CA; meretur, L. // in inferno om. BK.

160. est) esset, MV; erit, LEA.

161. [Quinta ratio]) 5ª, LUV; 5º ad idem, C; om. alii. // expediret) expedit, PS; deberet expedire, C.

162. dampnatio) dampnando, LAS; dampnatudo, EV. // se om. BK.

tenetur. Consequentia patet, quia faciendo bonum ad quod non tenetur per accidens tantum facit ad augmentum pene eterne et non ad bonum nisi tantum ad bonum temporale, ut patet Quarto Sententiarum, d. 15, et De Penetentia, d. 3, pluries. Igitur, et cetera.

[Sexta ratio] Ad idem, si carentia visionis divine esset tam mala quam bona est visio, videtur quod cuilibet creature dampnate melius foret non esse quam esse. Consequentia patet quia esse cum tali privatione mala plus habet de malo quam de bono, quia de malo tantum habet quantum visio esset bona et non tantum

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163. tenetur) teneretur, CEX. // faciendo) facere, BK. // bonum om. EA.

165. ad bonum^2) bonum, TBK; om. PX.

166. d. 15) d. iij, EU; d. 25, L; dist. secunda, X.

168. [Sexta ratio]) 6^a, LUV; 6^o, C; 3^a ratio, M; ratio secunda, T; om. alii.

169. cuilibet) cuiuslibet, TLMPSV.

170. foret) esset, TBK. // esse^2) foret, TBK.

171. mala om. TBKU.

172. non tantum habet transp. post (173)de bono, BCLEAX.

165-6. Lombardus; Sententiae; lib. IV, d. XV, passim. (Quaracchi; t. II; pp. 828-38.)

166. Gratianus; Decretum; Pars Secunda; Causa XXXIII; Quaestio III: Tractatus de Poenitentia; d. III; passim. (Friedberg; t. I, coll. 1211-1228.)

habet de bono. Igitur simpliciter totum aggregatum est magis malum quam bonum. Ymo videtur quod sit infinite peius sic esse quam non esse vel esse asinus.

[Septima ratio] Ad idem, secundum illud videtur sequi quod pena dampni foret magis mala quam aliqua culpa foret mala, quod est contra multos auctores et istud post tractabitur. Quod hoc sequitur probatur: beatitudo est magis bona quam aliqua iusticia vel aliquod meritum est bonum, cum sit finis et premium cuius-

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173. Igitur: et cetera add. TBKU. // simpliciter) similiter, E(?)SU; similiter videtur quod, TBK. // est) sit, TBK.

174. videtur om. TBK. // peius) magis malum, TBK.

175. vel: quam add. TCLEAX.

176. [Septima ratio]) 7ª, L; 7º, C; 7, UV; 5, E; 4ª ratio, M; ratio 3ª, T; om. alii. // secundum) ex, X; om. KMV. // illud) idem, CE; istud, L; isto, X; hoc, TBU; om. KMV. // videtur om. TB. // sequi) sequitur, TKV; om. EA.

177. foret) sit, TBK.

178. multos) multas, TKCL. // auctores) auctoritates, KCLE; doctores, P; sanctorum add. TBK. // post) postea, BKL; propterea, T.

179. probatur) patet, BK; patet quia, TU.

180. vel: quam add. MV. // finis om. TP.

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178. contra multos auctores: non apparet esse verum.

178. et istud post tractabitur: Thomas de Buckingham; huius operis; Q. I, C. VIII, obj. 3. (Perez; f. d.vi^{rb}, ll. 13-22.)

libet meriti boni et aliqua iusticia est tantum bonum quantum peccatum est malum. Igitur, beatitudo est magis bona quam aliquod peccatum est malum. Igitur et pena dampni, que est tam mala quam bona est beatitudo, est magis mala quam aliqua culpa est mala.

[Octava ratio] Ad idem, sequitur quod anime in purgatorio tantum puniuntur quantum post premiabuntur in celo. Quod hoc sequatur patet quia, si aliqua anima sit in purgatorio per unum diem, illo die pro peccato suo carebit beatitudine quam haberet si non fuisset peccatum suum, et illa carentia est tantum dampnum et malum sibi quantum bonum illud quo caret fuisset sibi. Igitur, tantum pro tunc punitus est quantum post premiabitur

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181. boni) bene, S; om. KP.

182. Igitur...(183)malum om. (hom.) MV.

183. peccatum) malum, PS.

184. bona...mala quam^2 om. (hom.) MV.

186. [Octava ratio]) 8^a, L; 8^o, C; 8, UV; 6, E; 5^a ratio, M; ratio 4^a, T; om. alii.

187. post) postea, L; om. TBKU. // hoc) illud, TK; idem, B.

189. pro om. CL.

190. fuisset) esset, TBK.

191. illud om. TCLEAX. // fuisset) foret, V; om. BK; vel foret add. LEAX.

192. sibi om. BK; bonum add. TCLEAX. // punitus) punita, TK; punitur, X.

pro equali tempore in celo.

[Nona ratio] Ad idem, videtur sequi quod aliquis posset mereri de condigno beatitudinem eternam et loquor de mereri de condigno: mereri scilicet quantitatem actus. Probatur sic: peccatum non est magis malum quam potest esse actus bonus et beatitudo non est magis bona quam carentia illius est mala. Igitur, si per peccatum potest aliquis mereri penam carentie beatitudinis de condigno, potest per actum mereri beatitudinem de condigno.

[Decima ratio] Ad idem, si carentia visionis divine foret tam mala quam bona est visio, sequitur quod quilibet homo

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193. in celo om. CLEA.

194. [Nona ratio]) 9ª, L; 9º, C; 9, UV; 7, E; 6ª ratio, M; ratio 5ª, T; 5º, K; om. alii.

195. loquor om. M*1S. // de mereri om. TBKU.

196. scilicet) secundum, BLEP. // Probatur: consequentia add. praem. TBK.

198. carentia...(199)penam om. (hom. ?) K. // illius) eius, TB; huius, U.

199. aliquis) quis, C; homo, TB. // penam om. TB. // carentie) carentiam, TK. // beatitudinis: eterne add. TK; eterni add. B.

200. condigno1: igitur et add. TB. // potest...condigno2 om. K. // per actum om. TB; bonum add. CUV; meritorium add. PX.

201. [Decima ratio]) 10ª, L; 10, CUV; 8, E; 7ª ratio, M; ratio 6ª, T; 6ª, K; om. alii. // Ad idem) Item, CU. // si... (202)visio om. TBK.

202. homo om. MUV.

haberet recta ratione eligere esse asinus vel lapis vel sic semper fuisse quam eternaliter vivere cum carentia visionis divine ut homines tunc vivunt. Probatur conclusio sic de Sorte: data optione Sorti eternaliter vivere ut vivit quantumcumque bene, dummodo carentia visionis divine sit ei pena et dampnum sicut nunc est in dampnatis, vel esse asinus vel lapis. Probo quod habet eligere esse asinus. Arguo sic: ita bonum esset Sorti esse certam creaturam perfectiorem Sorte ut esse angelus vel aliquod tale sicut Sorti esset malum esse asinus ceteris paribus, quod patet

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203. asinus) asinum, TBV. // vel lapis...(204)fuisse om. TBK. //semper om. EA.

204. divine) homine h exp. U; om. TLEAMX.

205. Probatur...(206)vivit om. A. // conclusio om. MPS.

206. Sorti) sibi, TBKE[1]; om. S*U. // eternaliter vivere om. TBK. // vivit) vivat, TBKC; om. U.

207. ei pena) sibi aliquod penam, TBK. // nunc om. TBKV. // in om. TBKU.

208. vel esse...(209)esse asinus om. TBK. // vel[2]: esse add. MPSV. // Probo) primo, EMX.

209. asinus: vel lapidem add. X; vel lapidis esse add. P. // Arguo) KMSUV; arguitur, CLEA; probo, P; probatur, X; tunc, TB; et add. praem. LU; Quod add. praem. X. // esse certam...(210)Sorte ut) recta ratione esse meliorem • et perfectiorem puta, TBK.

210. esse) esset, PV. // vel aliquod tale transp. post (211) asinus, TBK. // aliquod) aliud, CLEAUX.

quia quantum proportionaliter perfectionem adquireret Sor ex hoc quod mutaretur in speciem angeli tantum proportionaliter adquiret imperfectionem per mutationem in naturam asini, et sic ita malum esset Sorti esse asinus sicut esset sibi bonum esse angelus et melius esset Sorti eternaliter habere visionem Dei quam esse angelus et, per positum, quam bona est visio divine tam mala est eius carentia. Igitur, carentia visionis divine est Sorti magis malum quam esse asinus esset sibi malum. Igitur, data Sorti optione eternaliter esse asinus vel eternaliter habere illud malum

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212. quantum) quantumcumque, X; tantum, P. // proportionaliter ...(213)tantum om. (hom.) U. // proportionaliter) proportionis, LE; proportionabiliter, X. // adquireret) attingeret, TBK. // Sor om. UX.

213. speciem angeli) angelum, TBK. // adquiret) adquireret, CLMSU; consequenter, TK; consequenter add. B.

214. per mutationem) ex hoc quod mutaretur, TBV; quod mutaretur, K. // naturam asini) asinum, T; lapidem, BK.

215. esset Sorti...esse angelus) foret Sorti si esset asinus sicut foret sibi bonum si [si om. K] esset angelus, TBK.

217. divine) dei, TB.

218. divine) dei, BKCMVX.

219. esset sibi malum om. EA. // sibi om. LUX.

220. eternaliter om. TBK. // asinus: esset sibi malum. Igitur data sorti optione eternaliter esse asinum et eternaliter esse cum carentia visionis divine add. K; et eternaliter esse cum carentia visionis divine add. TB. // illud) talis, TBK.

carentie visionis divine, recta ratione deberet eligere esse asinus quam esse homo cum tanto malo privationis quantum habent omnes homines in hoc mundo viventes. Nec valet respondere, "Si esset asinus, haberet istam carentiam sicut nunc," quia licet asinus
225 haberet carentiam talem, illa carentia non est sibi mala, cum non sit natus habere illam visionem.

[Undecima ratio] Ad idem arguitur sic, quod carentia visionis divine non sit dampnato tantum mala quantum beatitudo sibi contraria foret bona. Pono gratia exempli quod Sor in eternum
230 carebit beatitudine, et probo quod carentia non sit sibi tantum

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221. divine om. TBK. // deberet) debet, P; debetur, EA; haberet, M.

222. homo) hominem, TBK; quod del. P; om. S. // tanto) talis, TBK; visionis add. T. // privationis...(223)viventes) carentia visionis divine qualem habent viatores communiter, TBK.

223. respondere: quod add. CLEAPX.

224. istam) illam, AP; illa, E; om. BMV. // sicut...(225) carentiam om. P. // asinus^{2}...(225) illa) carentia visionis cum illa, T; careret tali visione cum talis, K; careret tali visione tam est tali, B. // asinus^{2} om. M^{*1}S.

225. haberet) MSUV; habeat, CL; habet, EPX; om. alii. // sibi) ei, BK. // mala) pena, T; penosa, BK.

226. illam) talem, V; om. BK.

227. [Undecima ratio]) 1(-)^{a}, L; 11, CUV; 9, E; 8^{a} ratio, M; 7^{a}, T; 7, K; om. alii. // arguitur om. KU. // sic om. CX. // quod...(229)bona om. TBK.

230. carebit) careat, E; visione divina vel add. TBK. // sibi om. TBKPSU.

malum quantum beatitudo esset bona: quia si foret tunc, si Deus faceret quod illa privatio esset in Sorte et non esset sibi mala omnibus ceteris paribus, tantum bonum faceret Deus Sorti quantum ceteris paribus faceret si daret sibi beatitudinem. Probo conclusionem, quia per positum quam bona est beatitudo tam mala est carentia beatitudinis in Sorte et quam mala est tam bonum foret aufferre illud quoad esse mali. Igitur tam bonum foret aufferre illam privationem quoad esse mali sicut foret bonum dare Sorti beatitudinem, quod non videtur verum sed omnino impossibile.

Item, secundum illud videtur quod carentia visionis et cuius-

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231. quantum...bona) et cetera, V. // beatitudo) visio, TBK. // esset) est, TBK; et, U; sibi add. CA.

232. illa om. CPS. // privatio) carentia, TBK. // mala: scilicet add. EA.

233. omnibus om. EAPSVX. // bonum om. KE. // Deus...(234) faceret om. T. // quantum: bonum add. EX.

234. sibi) ei, TBK.

235. per positum) per totum, T; post omnia, L. // est) esset, CLEAPX.

236. est[1]) esset, CA. // est[2]: illa carentia add. K; sibi (-) privatio add. V.

237. foret[1])esset, KC; Sorti add. MV; illi add. C. // illud) illam, KCAMVX; privationem add. CMVX; bonum add. S. // Igitur...(238)mali om. TCM-[*1]SU. // foret: Sorti add. PVX.

238. sicut) quam, TU.

239. quod...(242)bonum om. T. // quod...impossibile om. U.

240. Item secundum) secundum, BKCL; per argumentum, EA. // visionis: divine add. BLUX.

libet alterius boni sit minus mala quam aliquod bonum positivum bonum.

[Duodecima ratio] Ad idem, probo quod non omnis privatio rei debite inesse est tantum malum quantum illa res, si esset, esset bona illi cui deberet inesse et arguo sic: non cuiuslibet boni privatio est mala, sicut patet per conclusionem meam; sit tunc A Sorti tale bonum, tunc A privatio non est mala Sorti et potest esse mala. Igitur, conditio vel circumstancia unde erit mala potest successive augeri et, per consequens, non subito erit tam mala quam bona est res cuius est privatio, sed per tempus erit

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241. positivum) positum, KCX; sit add. CMV.

242. bonum) ū, X; om. AU.

243. [Duodecima ratio]) 12ª, LS; 12º, C; 12, V; 10, E; 9ª ratio •a., M; 8ª, T; om. alii.

244. quantum...(245)inesse) et cetera, TBK. // esset om. EAM*1X.

246. sicut) ut, CLEAX. // meam om. TCU; quintam add. CLPSUX; quintam add. in mg. E1; quintam add. et del. M.

248. circumstancia: potest esse mala add. TX; potest esse malicia add. BK. // erit mala) esset mala CPU; si esset mala, X; om. TBK.

250. erit) est, EA; om. TBKU.

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246. conclusionem meam: Thomas de Buckingham; huius operis; Q. I, C. V: "Non cuiuslibet boni privatio est mala." (Perez; f. c.ivb.)

minus malum et tamen erit privatio rei debite inesse.

Similiter, potest esse quod sint due res eque bone Sorti et una magis debita inesse Sorti, tunc privationes illarum rerum erunt male Sorti et res ille opposite, si inessent Sorti, essent eque bone et tamen privationes ille non sunt eque male, quia una est rei magis debite inesse et cetera sunt paria; igitur, illa privatio est magis mala.

[Tertia decima ratio] Ad idem sic: sit A actus consilii; B, impletio precepti. Tunc pono quod Sor obmittat utrumque; tunc privatio A est minus malum quam privatio B; et tunc A est magis bonum quam B. Similiter, magis bonum est, ceteris

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251. minus malum) malum, SU; magnus, TBK.

252. potest esse) possibile est, TBK. // bone: simpliciter add. CAMV; et simpliciter add. LE; et arguo sic et eidem scilicet add. K; et eidem scilicet add. B; et eidem pena add. T; igitur add. S.

253. una: sit add. TBKU. // rerum) non, U; om. CEAM^{*1}PS.

255. tamen om. ES. // ille om. TPS. // sunt om. PS. // una om. M^{*1}S.

256. rei om. TBKU.

258. [Tertia decima ratio]) 13^{a}, LS; 13, UV; 14^{o}, C; 10^{a} ratio, M; 9^{a}, T; om. alii. // sic om. TBKC.

259. obmittat) emittat, LA.

260. et tunc...(261)B om. C$^{*1}_{1}$U.

261. magis^{2}) maius, LE. // ceteris paribus transp. post (262) proximum, MS; om. TBKM^{*1}U.

paribus, juvare extraneum quam proximum vel parentes et tamen non juvare parentes peius est quam non juvare extraneum.

[Quarta decima ratio] Ad idem, sequitur quod omne peccatum mortale est magis malum quam aliqua gratia est bona et, econtra, sequitur etiam quod omnis gratia est magis bona quam aliquod peccatum sit malum, quia omne peccatum mortale privat omnem gratiam quantumcumque magnam et, econtra, omnis gratia privat omne peccatum quantumcumque magnum et preter peccatum facit unum aliquod malum et gratia unum bonum ultra; igitur, et cetera.

[Quinta decima ratio] Ad idem, ponatur quod Sorti precip-

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262. proximum) juvare, TBK. // vel) seu, MPSU; om. TBK. // vel...(264)omne om. E*A.

263. extraneum: igitur add. EX.

264. [Quarta decima ratio]) 14a, LS; 14, UV; 12a ratio, M; 10a, T; 10, K; om. alii.

266. etiam om. TBEAU.

267. peccatum1: mortale add. TBK. // sit) est, EAX; om. CL.

268. et econtra...(269)magnum om. S.

269. peccatum1: mortale add. TBK. // et...(270)malum om. C. // preter) post, BKMP; tamen, U; hoc add. CLEAM1VX.

270. aliquod) aliud, LMP; anime, EA. // gratia: faciat add. TBKU. // unum2 om. CLAX; anime add. E1A; aliquod add. TCVX; aliud add. L. // ultra om. LVX. // igitur om. TKX.

271. [Quinta decima ratio]) 15a, L; 15, UV; 13a ratio, M; 11, E; om. alii. // Ad idem) Item, TC; om. BK; arguo sic add. L. // ponatur om. TC. // Sorti: Deus add. TBK.

iatur habere A actum bonum sub B gradu pro certa mensura; illo posito, pono quod pure obmittat. Tunc, illa pura obmissio est tam mala quam bonus esset actus A si esset, quia per con-
275 clusionem meam videtur quod tam mala est carentia actus boni sub B gradu quam bonus foret actus bonus sub B gradu, et tunc talis non posset obmittere A actum nisi tantum peccaret quantum A actus sub B gradu foret bonus. Consequens falsum, quia potest sic obmittendo minus peccare et minus et sic in infinitum.

280 Ad idem, arguitur sic: precipiatur Sorti pro aliquo instanti facere aliquod bonum non limitando in precepto gradum, et obmittat Sor. Videtur secundum istud quod illa privatio non sit mala

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272. habere) habeat, TBK. // A: unum add. BK. // pro om. TA.

273. illo) quo, BK; et, U. // pono om. TBKU. // quod) quia, C; om. TBK. // pure: tunc add. TBK. // obmittat) emictit, A; Sor preceptum add. TBK. // Tunc om. CEA.

275. quod om. LA. // carentia) privatio, TBK. // actus) alicuius, TU.

276. bonus foret) si illo, TBK. // B gradu^2) illo gradu, K; illo gradu esset, TB.

277. obmittere: habere add. CLEAM^{1}VX.

279. potest om. BK. // peccare) peccaret, BKV. // et sic om. TK.

280. arguitur om. TBKCAV. // sic om. TBKC. // Sorti: quod add. BK; quia add. T. // aliquo) •a•, TCAMSU; om. V. // instanti) instans, PS; om. TUV.

281. facere) faciat TK. // limitando) limitetur, BK. // in precepto...(282)mala om. TBK.

sub aliquo gradu, quia sub nullo gradu tenetur facere bonum, et per conclusionem propositam ut videtur quantitas malicie privationis debet attendi penes quantitatem boni privati.

[Sexta decima ratio] Ad idem, pono gratia exempli quod carentia libri mei foret michi malum et Sorti, cui liber meus foret ita bonus sicut michi, non sit malum. Sequitur secundum istam responsionem quod in duplo melius foret restitutio libri mei michi quam Sorti equalis datio libri, quod non videtur verum et hoc sequatur. Arguitur restitutio libri facit michi tantum bonum

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283. gradu^{2}) determinate, TBK.

284. conclusionem) consequens, TBKU; habetur add. TBK. // videtur om. TBKUV.

285. penes) scilicet, TK; secundum, B. // privati: igitur, et cetera add. CLMPSVX.

286. [Sexta decima ratio]) sine attestatione; 17^{a}, L; 17, V; 15^{a} ratio, M; 13, E; om. alii. // pono) ponatur, TBKU.

287. mei om. EA. // malum om. KA. // cui) qui, TBKUVX. // meus) meum, A; magnum, E; habet, TBKX.

288. bonus om. E*A; libri add. TBK. // non) nunc, TBKPSVX. // malum: carentia ipsius add. TBKX. // secundum) quod, TK; om. S.

289. istam om. BKS. // responsionem) positionem, TBKUV; conclusionem, C.

290. datio) restitutio, TB; retentio, KU. // libri om. BK. // quod...(292)boni om. E. // videtur) est, CLEAX; om. MSV.

291. Arguitur) arguo, TBKPV; probo, U; sic add. BCLEAX. // libri: mei add. EX.

sicut Sorti in consimili genere boni, et preter hoc tollit a me quoddam malum, yno tantum malum sicut facit bonum Sorti, et per consequens plus, ymo in duplo plus boni facit restitutio libri michi quam Sorti.

[Septima decima ratio] Ad idem, ponatur quod Sor et Plato habeant A B bona equalia et aufferantur illa ab ipsis; sint omnia paria preter hoc: quod Sor plus indigeat suo bono quam Plato suo. Arguo tunc sic: privationes A et B sunt equales et equaliter male et tantum male quantum A B sunt bona, et post carentiam

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292. consimili) tali, U; om. TBK.

293. quoddam) aliquod, TBKU. // ymo) quod est, TBPSU; et non, A; non, E; om. K. // facit) sint, TBU.

294. plus, ymo om. TBK. // libri: mei add. CLMPSUX.

295. michi om. LMPSX.

296. [Septima decima ratio]) 17, U; 18[a], L; 18, V; 12[a], T; om. alii.

297. A B) A, E; A et B, MP; A et B• B, C; om. AV. // bona om. P*S. // et om. TBK. // illa) hoc bona, TBK; et alia add. P; ablatis add. V. // ipsis) eis, TV; et eis add. C; et add. EL; si add. A. // sint omnia paria) et cetera omnia sint paria, TBK.

298. preter) post, LMPS; postea, V. // hoc) sit, LSV. // plus) magis, TBKVX; om. S; magis add. supral. P. // suo om. TBK; bono add. PS.

299. Arguo) arguitur, KAMV. // tunc om. KMSV. // A et B) A B, TLEAMX; om. BK. // equales et om. LEAX. // equaliter) essentialiter, A; om. C.

300. et tantum male) quia sunt tantum male, TBKU; om. EA. // A B) A et B, CP.

A boni erit Sorti magis malum quam nunc. Igitur, post privationem A boni erit Sorti magis malum quam A bonum, quod est falsum et contra conclusionem.

[Duodevicesima ratio] Ad idem: si omnis privatio rei debite inesse sit tam mala quam bona esset res cuius est privatio, sequitur eadem ratione quod quam mala est aliqua res tam bona est eius privatio, et tunc in quacumque creatura forent tot bona vel tantum bonum quot possent esse mala vel quantum posset esse malum. Consequentia patet, quia in quacumque creatura in qua non est malum est privatio cuiuscumque mali cuius ipsa creatura est capax, et quelibet talis privatio est tam bona quam mala foret res cuius est privatio; igitur, et cetera.

[Undevicesima ratio] Ad idem: malum positivum non est

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301. A om. TBKUX. // nunc: est bonus add. X; sit bonus add. K; est bonum add. T; bonum add. B. // privationem) restitutionem, TBKMUX.

302. malum) bonum, TBKEX; om. S. // quod) consequens, EX; quodam, A.

304. [Duodevicesima ratio]) 18, U; 19a, L; 19, V; 16a ratio, M; 14, K; 13a, T; om. alii. // idem: sic add. KA. // rei... (305)privatio) et cetera, V.

305. mala: illi cui est debita add. TBK. // res) illi, U; om. PS. // cuius est privatio) habitio, TBK.

308. quot) quantum, TEX; quanta, C; quod, KU.

309. Consequentia) quod, PS.

312. cuius: ipsa add. CLMUX; ipsam add. EA.

313. [Undevicesima ratio]) 19, U; 20a, L; 20, V; 17a ratio, M; 15, K; 14a, T; om. alii.

magis malum quam bonum positivum sibi contrarium est bonum. Puta tristicia non est magis mala quam delectatio contraria sibi est bona, et sic de similibus, et pura carentia est minus mala quam tale malum positivum est malum. Igitur, tale malum positivum est minus malum quam bonum positivum contrarium est bonum. Quod malum positivum sit magis malum quam sola privatio patet, quia includit illam privationem boni, et preter illam ponit aliquod malum positivum; igitur, et cetera.

[Vicesima ratio] Ad idem arguitur sic: melius est rationalitas quam animalitas; et tunc peius est privari animalitate quam rationalitate, quia ad privationem animalitatis sequitur privatio

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314. positivum sibi) illi, TBK.

315. contraria) opposita, TBK.

316. et sic de similibus om. TBK. // et^{2}) sed, EA. // minus) maius, BK.

317. malum^{1}) bonum, TBK; om. V. // malum^{2}) bonum, BK; om. TEA. // positivum^{2}) privativum, TBKP; del. et privativum add., C; scilicet etiam privativum add. V.

318. bonum om. BK. // positivum om. TBKV; illi add. TBK; sibi add. CV; eius add. U.

319. magis) maius, BK. // sola) pura, TBKP.

321. malum: aliquod add. CLAX; aliud add. E. // igitur om. TBK.

322. [Vicesima ratio]) 20, U; 21^{a}, L; 21, V; 18^{a} ratio, M; 16, K; 15^{a}, T; om. alii. // Ad idem arguitur sic om. CU. // arguitur) arguo, TBK; om. LVX. // melius) melior, TBLUX.

rationalitatis et non econtra, et per consequens non quam bona est res tam mala est eius privatio.

[Vicesima prima ratio] Ad idem sic: sit A aliquod malum, B aliquod bonum contrarium, si tunc A esset Sorti tantum malum quantum B esset bonum. Contra: si B nullum bonum faceret Sorti nisi quod privaret A malum, sicut A nullum est Sorti malum nisi ex hoc quod privat B bonum; tunc esset B ita bonum Sorti sicut A malum; et nunc de facto B bonum si inesset Sorti non solum privaret A malum sed preter hoc poneret tantum bonum in Sorte quantum B est bonum et A malum. Igitur,

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325. et per consequens om. BK. // quam) tam, EA.

327. [Vicesima prima ratio]) 21, U; 22ª, L; 22, V; 19ª ratio, M; 17, K; 16ª, T; om. alii. // sic om. CA. // malum: et add. MPX.

328. aliquod om. CLEA.// bonum: positivum add. LX; sibi add. BKCV. // tantum) tam, EAPS.

329. quantum) quam, PS; sicut, C. // Contra: et add. LE; quia add. TBKCUX.

330. faceret) foret, PSU; esset, TBK. // privaret: eum add. TBK; ipsam add. U. // A malum...(332) B bonum) hoc bono B, K. // A^2 om. TBX. // nullum) malum, EA; malum add. PSX.

331. tunc...(332) B bonum om. (hom.) TBU. // esset...(332) sicut om. X.

332. A: est add. PS. // nunc de facto B bonum om. X.

333. inesset) esset, BK. // sed) neque, TX; verum, BK; om. PS. // preter...(334)malum om. PS.// hoc) illud, CLEAM; illud add. U; quod sic privat [[privat) privaret, C]] malum add. CL.

334. Igitur...(335)malum om. (hom. ?) L.

simpliciter, B est Sorti magis bonum quam A malum.

[Vicesima secunda ratio] Ad idem arguitur, et sequitur quod per quodcumque modicum peccatum mortale posset creature plus mereri malum quam aliquod bonum possibile est bonum. Ymo sequitur quod Deus non potest facere quod actus bonus sit de condigno vel de congruo meritorius tanti boni quin minimum peccatum actuale mortale et forte veniale est demeritorium maioris mali. Quod probatur sic: si non, sit A aliquod tantum bonum quod tantum malum non possit mereri per B peccatum mortale. Contra: sit A creatura rationalis vel bonum creature rationalis, quia illud est summum bonum, tunc talis creatura

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335. A: est add. CPSX.

336. [Vicesima secunda ratio]) 22, U; 23^{a}, L; 23, V; 20^{a} ratio, M; 18, K; 17^{a}, T; om. alii. // arguitur, et) et, U; om. TBKC.

337. per om. MP^{*1}SV.

339. Deus om. PS. // bonus om. PS. // sit: bonus add. TBKUX.

340. quin) quem, M; quantum, U; quanti, T. // minimum) modicum, TBKU.

341. et) vel, TBKX.

342. Quod) ista, L; om. CEAVX.

343. quod tantum) quantum, MV.

344. Contra) econtra, T; consequens falsum, PS.

345. quia...bonum om. TBK.

posset peccare B peccato et minori peccato B et quantumcumque modicum peccaret mereretur carentiam A que foret tam malum quam bonum esset A et ad hoc posset mereri carentiam maioris boni et sic in infinitum. Doctor Subtilis, Quarto Sententiarum, d. 5, q. 1, dicit quod hec propositio non est vera, quod illud quod adimit maius bonum vel plus de bono sit maius malum.

[Vicesima tertia ratio] Item, quod non quam bona est res tam mala sit eius privatio, ymo quod nulla carentia rei sit mala.

Et suppono gratia exempli quod Sor habeat A et B bona; sint

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346. peccato[1]: mortale add. TBKAX. // minori om. CA. // quantumcumque) quantum, EA.

347. carentiam: maioris boni add. TBKU. // A...(348) carentiam om. (hom.) X.

348. esset) est, TB; foret, S; om. K. // A om. TEA.

350. d. 5) 5, EA.

351. illud quod om. TBK.// maius[1]) magis, TBK. // plus om. TBKU. // maius[2] in mg. M; magis, TBCAP; magis add. E.

352. [Vicesima tertia ratio]) sine attestatione; 24[a], L; 24, V; 21[a] ratio, M; 18[a], T; om. alii. // Item) ad idem, LX; arguo add. CEA; arguo sic add. X; arguitur sic add. L. // non quam) numquam, TK. // res: aliqua add. CLEAX.

353. rei) ei, PS; om. V.

349-50. Duns Scotus; Quaestiones in Lib. IV Sententiarum (Opus Oxoniense); lib. IV; d. 50, q. 2. "nec est etiam ista propositio vera, quod illud, quod adimit maius bonum, vel plus de bono, sit maius malum." (Wadding; Vol. X; p. 630.)

duo denarii vel aliqua bona quecumque; perdat Sor A et remaneat B. Sit Plato alius homo habens C bonum equale et consimile B, et sint omnia paria excepto quod Sor habuit A bonum et eius carentia est sibi mala, sive sit ex mutuo sive ex quacumque alia tam non curo, quo posito auferatur B a Sorte et C a Platone cum omnibus aliis paribus. Tunc arguo sic: si aliqua carentia esset mala, carentia A in Sorte foret mala, et carentia B, et Platoni carentia C. Probo quod non, quia secundum hoc sequitur quod perdere B foret Sorti peius quam Platoni perdere C. Probo quia ablatio B facit carentiam A magis malam quam fuit

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355. aliqua) alia, LA; alia add. PS. // bona om. KMV. // quecumque: sint add. T; sint quorum add. UX.

356. Plato: vel add. TBKC. // alius om. VX.

357. consimile om. TBKC. // et sint omnia paria) ceteris paribus, TBKCU. // omnia: mundi add. LEAS; cetera add. P. // quod Sor om. KC.

358. ex mutuo) ex merito, BKC; de merito, T. // sive[2]) vel, EA; sit add. P; ex alia add. S. // ex om. TLEAPSX.

359. alia) vel, T; om. LEAX. // tam om. LEAUX.

360. cum) semper, LEA; om. TX. // aliis) ceteris, TBKCU; om. S. // arguo) arguitur, KA.

361. esset) foret, TBKC. // foret) esset, LUVX. // et: etiam add. LEX. // carentia B om. PS.

362. Platoni) in Platone, TBKCPSU. // quia secundum hoc sequitur quod om. TBKC.

363. perdere[1]) perditio, TBKC. // peius) peior, TBKC. // perdere[2]) perditio, TBKC.

364. facit) sit, TPX; fuit, V.

manente B quia A si esset esset Sorti nunc magis bonum quam prius fuisset, quia Sor est magis indigens. Et tunc arguo ultra: aufferens B a Sorte, ex hoc solo quod aufferat B, facit Sorti tantum malum quantum facit Platoni aufferendo C et preter hoc facit quod carentia A est Sorti magis malum quam fuit ante, et auget maliciam A. Igitur, aufferens B a Sorte facit magis malum Sorti quam facit Platoni aufferendo C. Conclusio tamen videtur falsa, quia B non est magis bonum quam C nec Sor plus indiget et cetera sunt paria. Similiter, secundum hoc sequitur quod si quis teneretur michi in denario, cuius carentia esset michi

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365. A om. TBKCU. // esset[1]) inesset, TBKC; om. $M^{*1}PS$. // esset[2]) foret, TBKC. // nunc om. TBKC. // magis) maius, LEMVX.

366. arguo) arguitur, MV.

367. solo) solum, TBKCV. // aufferat) auffert, CLP; aufferatur, BK.

368. preter) propter, AP.

369. A) B, S; om. TX. // Sorti om. KCV. // ante om. X; igitur add. EA.

370. A) B, X; om. KC; carentie add. TBKCU; a sorte add. X. // magis) maius, BK.

371. facit om. TBKC. // aufferendo) aufferens, TKC; ab eo add. MPSUV. // C: et preter(368)...(369)malum add. del. V. // Conclusio tamen) quod, TBKC; quod tamen, U.

372. falsa) falsum, TBKCU. // magis) maius, BKMP.

373, secundum hoc) ex hoc, A; hic, X; om. TBKCP.

mala, si perderem denarium vel si quis aufferet a me denarium plus noceret michi quam si non teneretur michi aliquis ceteris paribus.

Ad idem, arguitur quod nulla carentia rei sit mala, quia si foret ponatur quod Sor habeat carentiam A rei que sit sibi mala. Tunc probo secundum hoc quod melius foret dare Sorti A quam alicui alteri, ceteris omnibus paribus, quia in Sorte faceret omne et equale bonum, sicut in aliquo alio et preter hoc aufferet unum malum quod non faceret in alio. Igitur, esset simpliciter melius Sorti quam alteri ceteris paribus.

[Vicesima quarta ratio] Ad idem, etiam probo quod privatio

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375. perderem) perdere, ESX; nisi add. KEX. // si^{2} om. TBKC. // a me) michi, TBKCV; eum add. TBKCU. // denarium om. TKCEU.

376. non) nullus, TBKC; om. X.// michi) nisi, T; om. MPSUV. // aliquis) aliis, P; quis, A; om. TBKCV.

378. Ll. 378...384 transpositi sunt post vicesimam quartam rationem (l. 392) in BKC et omissi sunt in T. // arguitur) arguo, BKCLSX. // quia si...(380)Tunc) et cetera, U.

381. omnibus om. MPSUX. // faceret) esset, MV; om. A. // omne om. MV; bonum add. X.

382. aliquo) quolibet, C; quodlibet, K.

383. malum om. KC.

384. paribus: aliunde add. BCLEAX.

385. [Vicesima quarto ratio]) 24, U; 26^{a}, L; 26, V; 23^{a} ratio, M; 19^{a}, T; om. alii. // etiam) et, V; om. TBKC. // probo ...(386)et cetera om. (hom. ?) T.

boni non sit tam mala et cetera, quia si foret eadem ratione privatio mali esset tam bona quam malum est illud privatum. Et arguitur quod non, et supponitur quod alicui habenti penam sensus A remittatur sibi tota illa pena, et sit B illa carentia. Tunc B
390 est Sorti tam bona quam mala fuit A. Igitur, Sor habet tantum bonum quantum prius habuit malum. Igitur, est ita bene quam prius fuit male, quod est notorie falsum.

[Solutio]

Pro solutione istorum argumentorum est advertendum quod

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386. boni om. KC. // eadem ratione) tunc, TBKC.

387. esset) foret, TBKC. // quam) tam, BS. // privatum) quod privat, TBKC.

388. quod^2: in die per diem add. A; inde perderem vel add. U; sorti vel add. E. // alicui) alteri, U; unde, T; sor, C; sorti, BK.

389. sibi om. KCEPVX.

390. quam...(391)bonum om. (hom.) T. // fuit: sibi add. BKC.

391. quantum) sicut, MV. // Igitur: Sor add. BKC.

392. fuit: sibi add. TBKCV.

393. [Solutio], L; solutiones, T; Solutio argumentorum, V; Solutio nota, U; notabile pro solutione, CE; notabile (?), A; Responsio, P; Responsio ad questionem et nota d- bonam de pena, M; N(?)(--)/ so(--)/(--), K; om. alii.

394. istorum om. BKC. // argumentorum om. TU.

multiplex est pena, ut dicit Augustinus, XXI De Civitate Dei, c. 2, ad propositum est pena dampni et pena sensus. Similiter, ut dicit dominus Altissiodorensis, Secundo Sententiarum, q. 64 et 117, est enim pena contracta et pena inflicta: prima non est a Deo nisi permissive, secunda est a Deo effective ad puniendum et ordinandum peccatum. Prime Deus non est auctor proprie, sed est secunde per se et proprie auctor, secundum modum loquendi

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395. XXI) 16, MV; 12, KCU. // 2) BKCX; 1, T; vi, E; 11, PSU; XII, A; 13, L; 41, MV.

396. ad propositum) quod, C; ad duplex, V; quod duplex, X; om. TBK. // est: scilicet add. KCVX. // ut dicit) ut, P; videtur, S; om. TBKC.

397. Altissiodorensis) Autissiodorensis, TLU. // q.) d., TKC; d (__) q., U. // 64) 54 corr. ad 64, M; 654, A; 24, BKC. // et om. BKC. // 117) 27, U; 57, E; 77, T; 71 (?), P; om. BKCX.

398. pena: secundum add. SX.

399. est om. EA. // et ordinandum peccatum del. et ordinatur ad peccatum add. in mg., M; et ordinandum ad peccatum, V; peccatum, B; peccatum pene, T; om. KC.

400. Prime) pene, KS; primo modo, EA. // proprie om. TC. // sed est om. TBKC.

401. secunde) secundo modo, EA. // per se om. TKCX. // et) aut est, TBK; est Deo, C. // secundum: propositum add. EA.

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395. Augustinus; De Civitate Dei; lib. XXI, cc. 2-3; passim. (CCL; t. XLVIII, pp. 759-61.)

397. Guilelmus Altissiodorensis; Summa Aurea; lib. II, tract. 27, c. 1. (Pigouchet; f. 87, col. 4)

397. Ibid.; lib. II, tract. 29, c. 6. (Ibid.; f. 100, col. 4)

Anselmus, De Casu Dyaboli, c. 1, dicit quod facere est duplex ut "facere aliquem esse nudum" dicitur illi qui spoliat et qui spoliantem non prohibit: primum facere est facere effective, secundum facere est facere privative. Et isto secundo modo est Deus auctor pene dampni, non primo modo, nec proprie dicitur quod Deus punit pena dampni sed pena sensus, quia ista proprie ordinatur, peccatum. Secundum ista potest esse duplex responsio utraque satis probabilis et licita. Prima est quam credo veram: quod pena dampni est minor pena quam aliqua pena sensus, nec

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402. c. 1: ubi add. BKCEA. // duplex) d^r ⟨dupliciter vel distinguitur⟩, EA; om. TBKC.

403. esse om. TKCU. // qui^2 om. TBKC.

404. primum...(405)privative om. T. // facere est facere) facere est, KCU; est facere, B.

405. facere^1 om. BKCU. // facere^2 om. C; effective add. AP. // privative) permissive, CX; sive permissive add. V.

406. non primo modo om. TBKC. // nec...(407) dampni om. T.

407. quia...(408)peccatum om. PS. // ista) secunda, TKC.

408. ordinatur) ordinat, EASU; privat, L; ad add. TKCV; aliquod add. B. // ista) hoc, TBKC.

409. quam: aliquo modo add. TBKC. // credo: esse add. TBKCU.

410. pena^2 om. UX.

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402. Anselmus; De Casu Dyaboli; c. 1. (Schmitt; vol. I, p. 234, ll. 10-11.)

aliqua pena dampni posset esse sufficiens pena pro aliquo peccato actuali mortali; ymo infinite pene dampni est meritorium omne peccatum mortale actuale; tamen quantumcumque fuerit perfecta creatura, pro minimo peccato mortali mereretur adnichilari,
415 secundum Anselmum, Secundo Cur Deus Homo, c. 16, et eodem modo credo de peccato veniali quod ostendo sic: postquam quis peccat venialiter et perdit aliquam iusticiam, puta A, posset Deus iuste numquam recreare A quia hoc quod facit est ex miseracordia sua et gratia, et si ita foret eternaliter maneret

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411. pena om. CLEAX.

412. mortali om. LEAMSV. // ymo...(413)actuale om. (hom.) T.

413. mortale om. M*PSU. // tamen om. TCMV.

414. pro) per, KC; om. LEAPSU. // minimo peccato mortali) peccato mortali, V; peccatum mortali, C; peccatum, TBK.

415. Secundo om. TCAU. // eodem modo) idem, TBKC.

416. credo om. MV. // ostendo) ostendi, LEASVX; ostenditur, MV; potest add. LEAX. // quis) aliquis, TV.

418. iuste om. TBKCU. // recreare) remittere, T; remittitur, U. //hoc om. TBKC. // est om. TBKCMX; ex mera liberalitate et add. X.

419. sua om. TBKCE; facit add. X. // gratia: facit add. TBKC.

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415. Anselmus; Cur Deus Homo; lib. II, c. 16. (Schmitt; vol. II, p. 117, ll. 7-11.)

peccatum et peccans eternaliter foret indignus vita eterna. Similiter, si Deus crearet hominem rectum dignum vita eterna vel aliquo premio et poneret in libera potestate sua servare ipsam vel non servare, si tunc ipsam perderet vel partem eius numquam eam recuperaret, tunc talis creatura quocumque peccato mereretur tantum dampnum quantum bonum debitum fuisset bonum, et peccatum nunc non est minus malum in se nec minus demeritorium; igitur, et cetera. Et eodem modo dicerem quod omne tale peccatum originale et consimile est minus peccatum quam aliquod

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420. vita eterna: et careret vita eterna [[eterna in mg., M^1]] add. LMPSVX.

421. Similiter...eterna in mg., M^1. // Similiter...crearet exp. K; om. T. // crearet: unum add. BCU. // hominem... eterna om. TK.

422. aliquo: alio add. EA. // poneret) ponare, KV. // libera potestate) libertate, TBKU; liberalitate, C.

424. eam) ipsam, CPV; om. TEAS. // quocumque peccato om. TBKC; praeveniendo add. EA.

425. $bonum^2$ om. TU.

426. nunc) sic, MPX; et, B; om. TKCL. // in se om. TBKC.

427. igitur om. EA. // dicerem: consimiliter add. TBKC. // omne tale om. TBKC.

428. originale om. E^*A. // et consimile) consimiliter, U; om. TBKC. // aliquod) quodcumque, BKU; quodlibet, T; quantumcumque, P; peccatum, C; peccatum add. EV; inferno magis add. A.

actuale mortale vel veniale. Istud tractabo postea. Et istud dicit
430 dominus Altissiodorensis, Secundo Sententiarum, q. 76, et dicit quod illis qui sunt in inferno magis nocet veniale quam originale.

Et si objiciatur contra istam rationem sic: pena dampni est magis mala quam certa pena sensus et non est malum nisi malum pene tantum; igitur, est magis mala pena et maior pena. Simil-
435 iter arguitur sic: pena dampni quantum est malum tantum est

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429. actuale: vel add. BK; quantumcumque add. C. // mortale om. TE. // vel) tam, E; om. BKCAM*,I. // veniale om. BKC; quantum mortale add. EA; vel mortale add. T. // Istud tractabo...(432)Et om. EA.

430. Altissiodorensis) Autissiodorensis, LU. // 76) 27, T. // et dicit om. BKC.

432. istam om. TBKCU. // rationem) responsiones, TK.

433. magis mala) tantum mala vel magis, TB; tantum malum vel magis, K; tam malum vel magis, C; tantum vel magis mala, X. // malum om. TBKC.

434. pene) pena, TKC. // tantum om. MV. // pena^{1} om. EUX. // maior) peior, TBKC.

435. arguitur) arguo, TB.

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429. Istud tractabo postea: Thomas de Buckingham; Questiones Theologice; Ms. New College 134; ff. 391^{rb}- 391va: "Hic posset questiuncula ista queri: Utrum peccatum originale sit minus peccatum quam aliquod peccatum mortale vel veniale". Vide M.-D. Chenu; Les'Quaestiones' de Thomas de Buckingham; Studia...in honorem R.J. Martin; Bruges; 1948; p. 238.

430. Guilelmus Altissiodorensis; Summa Aurea; lib. II, tract. 28, q. 4. "immo eis qui sunt in inferno magis nocet veniale quam originale". (Pigouchet; f. 91, col. 3, ll. 5-6.)

pena, quia non est malum nisi malum pene, et pena dampni est magis malum quam pena sensus; igitur, est maior pena.

Ad ista respondeo quod pena dampni est magis mala quam aliqua pena sensus et non est malum nisi pene; ergo, est maior pena quam aliqua pena sensus, non tamen est maior pena simpliciter. Et ultra ad argumenta nego consequentiam istam: pena dampni est magis mala quam pena sensus et non est malum nisi malum pene, igitur, est maior pena vel peior; sed sequitur quod est magis malum quam malum est pena. Similiter, nego quod pena dampni quantum est malum tantum est pena, tamen quantum

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436. malum[1]) dampnum, TBKCU. // et pena dampni...(437)sensus om. KC. // dampni om. BPS.

437. magis malum quam) maius malum dampnum quam sit, T; maius dampnum quam sit, B; maius malum vel dampnum quam, U.

438. respondeo: et dico add. EA. // magis mala) maius dampnum, TBKC; magis malum, V; maius malum, U.

439. et non...(442)pena sensus om. (hom.) EA. //et non...(440) pena sensus om. (hom.) PVX. // et non...ergo om. LM. // nisi: malum add. BKCU. // est[2]) et, LMS.

440. pena[1]: dampni add. LM; sensus dampni add. S.

442. quam: aliqua add. LX.

443. pena om. TBKAU. // peior: pena add. LX; pena negatur consequentiam add. EA. // quod) igitur, TK; om. C.

444. magis) maius, TBKCU. // quam) quod, LEAPSX. // malum[2] om. CAP. // Similiter...(445)pena[2] om. (hom.), U.

445. pena[2] om. S; est add. LMV. // quantum[2]) tantum, BKC,

malum tantum est pena dampni.

Sed forte ultra objicitur sic: pena dampni est magis mala quam pena sensus aut, igitur, magis mala pena aut magis mala non pena. Ad istud respondit Magister Secundo Sententiarum,
450 d. 4 ⟨1⟩, c. 2. Sed ad hoc objicitur sic: secundum dicta iam aliquod malum solum malum pene est magis malum quam ipsum est pena, sit illud malum A; et etiam aliquod malum est maior pena quam ipsum est malum, sit B; tunc B est tantum malum quantum est

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446. malum: est add. BKCEX. // tantum) quantum, BKC. // est om. LSUV.

447. Sed...(450)c. 2 om. (hom.) BKC. // sic...(450)sic om. (hom.) L.

448. magis[1] om. TU. // aut[2]) vel, EA; quam, T. // magis[2] om. TU.

449. istud) idem, EA; hoc, X. // respondit) respondeo per, TU; huic, S; vide, X; om. P. // Magister om. AV; respontionem add. X; respondit add. P; arguitur add. V. // Secundo) Primo, MSV; Primo libro, P.

450. d. 4 ⟨1⟩) d. 41, E; d. 4, omnes al. codd.. // ad hoc) ultra, AMX. // sic) si, EX; om. MPV. // iam om. TBKCX.

451. malum[1]: et add. EAPX. // solum om. EA. // pena) pene, TLEMSU.

452. maior) magis, TBKC.

453. sit: illud add. TBKCL. // B[2] om. LMPSUX. // est[2]) sit, TBKC; om. LMPSX.

449-50. Lombardus; Sententiae; lib. II, d. 41, c. 3. (Brady; t. I, pars II; pp. 564-5. Ms. Bodl. 335, f. 167.)

A. Contra arguo sic: A et B sunt equaliter mala similiter et B est maior pena, igitur est simpliciter peius; vel sic: A et B equaliter privant bonum quia aliter non forent equaliter mala et B est maior pena, igitur est magis malum. Ad ista respondeo quod non sequitur equale bonum privant et B est maior pena, igitur magis malum; vel potest dici quod repugnat quod A et B sint equaliter mala et B maior pena et tamen equale bonum privant; ymo, B minus bonum privat.

Ulterius etiam dico quod pena dampni non est secundum quantitatem culpe sed secundum quantitatem boni debiti, ut verbi gratia: ponatur quod Dives et Pauper equaliter offendant leges

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454. Contra) Tunc, TBKCU; om. X. // arguo) arguitur, EA. // similiter) simpliciter, LAV; om. TBKCU.

455. igitur...(457)pena om. (hom.) KU.

456. forent: equalia mala vel add. PS.

457. igitur: B add. TBKC. // est^2 om. VX. // magis) maius, TKU. // Ad ista...(459)malum om. (hom.) V. // ista) istam, EA; istud, LVX; hoc, TBKCU. // respondeo om. K; et dico add. MPS.

458. privant: A et B add. BKC.

459. igitur: est add. TBKCU. // magis) maius, TBKCLX. // potest) posset, MPS.

460. equaliter) equalia, PS. // B: est add. TBKCU; a add. X. // equale) equaliter, CV.

462. etiam om. BKCAMV.

463. culpe...quantitatem^2 om. (hom.) MV. // sed: solum add. LX.

sic quod omnia sua bona sint forefacta, nonne magis dampnum habet Dives quam Pauper? Et ratio est quia magis habuit. Sic in toto est in proposito: quanto quis magis habuit de thesauro celesti tanto dampnatus magis patietur dampnum et malum, sed pena inflicta correspondet culpe et est magis vel minus secundum quantitatem culpe. Et si objiciatur huic sic: posito quod Sor et Plato peccarent equaliter et sic quod Sor fuit multo melior. Tunc Sor punietur maiori pena dampni quam Plato et equaliter pena sensus; igitur simpliciter plus punietur Sor quam Plato. Ad istud concedo antecedens et nego consequentiam, et ratio est quia ut

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465. sua) eorum, TBKCP; om. U. // forefacta) ferefacta, KX. // nonne om. BCX. // magis) maius, LEPVX.

466. ratio) hoc, TBKCU. // magis) maius, CM; bonum add. KC. // in toto) in eo, P; in olo ⟨sic⟩, A; om. TBKCUX

467. quis) aliquis, T; om. EA. // magis) plus, TBKC; maius, A; maiorem, LX. // de thesauro) thesaurum, LEAX.

468. tanto: dependatus illo cum erit add. X. // magis) maius, TK; plus, B.

469. et om. TBKCU. // est) erit, LEAX. // magis) maius, EA; maior, TBC; multe, K. // vel minus) et minor, TBKC.

470. huic) hec, A; om. TBKCU. // sic) quod, TBKCU; om. P.

471. peccarent) peccent, BLAU. // sic quod om. TBKC.

472. et equaliter...(473)Plato om. (hom.) E. // equaliter) equali, TBK.

473. simpliciter) similiter, AMP. // plus) magis, T; magis multo, BKC.

dixi pena dampni est minor pena quam aliqua pena sensus et ideo aggregatum ex pena dampni et pena sensus non est maior pena quam ipsa sola pena sensus, sicut aggregatum ex linea et puncto non est maius quam ipsa sola linea vel aggregatum ex corpore et linea nisi sit secundum aliquid inproportionaliter maius. Si tamen aliquis voluerit dicere quod pena dampni quantum est malum tantum est pena simpliciter habet ipse concedere de pena sensus, sicut ego habeo concedere de pena dampni, quod ceteris paribus melior semper plus punietur et habet concedere conclusiones que adducte sunt in argumentis, quia non potest respondere quod si

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475. dampni: non add. BKC. // minor) maior, BKCU. // aliqua) ipsa sola, KCV. // et ideo...(477)sensus om. (hom.) A. // ideo aggregatum ex) ymo nec est maior pena, V.

476. non est maior pena om. V.

477. sicut: nec add. LEAMVX.

478. non om. EAMSV. // est om. A; secundum aliquid add. BKC. //ipsa sola) ipsa, V; om. TBKC. // vel) nec, A; et, TBKC; ipsum add. X.

479. nisi sit) non est, TBKC. // inproportionaliter) inproportione, TPU; inproportionatur, A; improportionale, M; improportionabile, S; improportionabiliter, X; proportionaliter, BKC.

480. aliquis) quis, TBKCU. // voluerit, voluit, KLAMSX.

481. simpliciter) similiter, BKMPU. // habet...(482) concedere de om. U. // habet) haberet, LMS. // sensus) simpliciter, LSUVX; similiter, M; om. P.

482. habeo concedere) concedo, LEAUX. // dampni: scilicet add. LEVX.

483. habet) haberet, TBKCU.

Sor sit multo melior quam Plato et peccarent equaliter quod Sor equaliter precise punietur sicut Plato per remissionem pene sensus, quia tunc in Sorte posset esse tanta pena dampni quod nulla omnino esset pena sensus. Et ad hoc sequitur necessario quod aliquis pro minori peccato gravius et magis punitur quam alius pro maiori.

Sed si objiciatur contra istam responsionem vel contra meam quod omnis pena sensus et dampni debet esse secundum mensuram et quantitatem culpe per auctoritates sanctorum: Deuteronomium, 25: Servabitur secundum mensuram delicti erit plagarum modus.

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485. quod Sor equaliter om. (hom.) U.

486. remissionem pene) remissiorem penam, LMPSVX.

488. omnino) omnis, TBCLA; om. X. // sensus: eidem add. KU; eiusdem add. TB.

489. et magis om. TBKCV.

491. Sed) et, LVX; om. EA. // si om. BKC. // vel contra meam) vel meam, TB; meam, V; om. KC.

492. et: pena add. KX. // mensuram et quantitatem) quantitatem et mensuram, TBKCU.

494. 25) 15, TKCSU; 5, B; om. X. // Servabitur om. TBKCPU. // delicti) peccati, LEAX. // erit) et, VX.

493-4. Deuteronomium; 25:2. "...pro mensura peccati erit et plagarum modus..."

495 Et Apocalypsis, 18: Quantum glorificavit se et in deliciis fuit tantum date illi tormentum et luctum. Et Anselmus, De Conceptu Virginali, c. 23: Nemo dubitat quod par pena non sequitur imparia peccata. Sed secundum mensuram peccati oportet esse satisfactionem: et Primo Cur Deus Homo, c. 26. Et Secundo Senten-

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495. 18) 16, U; 21, X. // glorificavit transp. post se, TBK. // et2) etiam, LX; om. TCP. // fuit om. TCLAPX.

496. date) dante, S; debet, T. // illi) ei, BKCV; et, T. // De Conceptu Virginali) spat. vac. T; de con, E; de concor, S; de casu dyaboli, X; monologion, U.

497. c. 23) c. 22, TA; c. 13, CMV; c. 12, BKU. // Nemo...(499) c. 26 om. T. // quod) quia, EMS.

498. Sed) et, EA. // oportet) debet, BKC.

499. Primo om. L; idem, A. // c. 26) c. 40, MV; c. 20, A; c. 16, BKCU. // Et om. APS.

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495. Apocalypsis; 18:7. "quantum glorificavit se et in deliciis fuit tantum date illi tormentum et luctum"

496-7. Anselmus; De Conceptu Virginali; c. 23. "Sed cum nemo dubitet quia par poena non sequatur imparia peccata..." (Schmitt; t. II, p. 165, ll. 28-9.)

499. Anselmus; Cur Deus Homo; lib. I, c. XX. "ut puto, quia secundum mensuram peccati oportet satisfactionem esse." (Schmitt; t. II, p. 86, ll. 19-20.)

499-500. Lombardus; Sententiae; lib. II, d. XXXIII, c. II, 4. (Ms. Bodl. 335: lib. II, d. XXXIII, c. 6. "Ostendit Augustinum...qui in eodem libro [ench⟨iridion⟩ c. 64 [[64 corr. ad 74]] in mg.] omnium mittissimam dicit esse poenam parvulorum...'...et in ceteris qui addiderunt, tanto quisque ibi tollerabiliorem habebit dampnacionem, quanto hic minorem habuit iniquitatem.'") (Brady; t. I, pars II, p. 520, et n. 1.) Vide supra, Q.I, C. I, ll. 7-8.

tiarum, d. 33, c. 6: In ceteris qui addiderunt tanto quisque tollerabiliorem habebit dampnationem, quanto hic minorem habuit iniquitatem. Et Nono Moralium quasi ubique. Pro ista parte sunt auctoritates innumerabiles, ad quas omnes respondeo quod debent intelligi de pena a Deo pro peccato inflicta et non de pena derelicta et ista est responsio domini Altissiodorensis.

Ad argumenta iam facta.

[Ad primum] Ad primum: cum arguitur quod tunc Deus

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500. d. 33) di. 3, X. // quisque: ibi add. LMPSV; igitur add. E.

501. tollerabiliorem) intollerabiliorem, AX. // dampnationem) penam, KC; om. TB. // quanto...(502)ubique om. X. // hic om. KCEA.

502. Nono) 4°, BKCU; cum, A.

504. intelligi...pena^2 om. K. // pena^1: et add. TBCSU. // pro peccato om. BC. // et om. TEASUV.

505. et ista...Altissiodorensis om. TBKC.

506. Ad argumenta text et mg., L; ad argumenta solutio add. in mg. U; responsio ad obiectiones add. in mg. K; contra conclusionem add. LUX.

507. [Ad primum] V; ad primum argumentum, T; primi, U; om. alii. // Ad primum om. KC; Respondeo add. praem. LEAX. // arguitur) dicitur, BKC; sic add. EA. // tunc om. TBKCP.

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502. Gregorius Magnus; Moralia in Job; lib. IX. (PL; t. LXXV; coll. 859-918.)

505. Guilelmus Altissiodorensis; Summa Aurea; lib. I, tract. 15, q. 2; et lib. IV, q. Utrum baptismus parvulorum auferat originale peccatum. (Pigouchet; f. 29, col. 3-f. 30, col. 1; f. 255, col. 1.)

tantum puniret pro minimo peccato mortali quantum premiaret pro aliquo bono merito; ad istud dico quod possibile est satis et foret in casu verum quod tantum punitur aliquis pro modico delicto quantum premiatur pro magno merito, loquendo de pena dampni sed non simpliciter de pena. Et si reducatur argumentum ultra tunc pronior foret Deus ad puniendum quam ad premiandum, dico quod non sequitur.

Et si ad hoc arguitur sic: actus bonus est tam bonus quam malum est peccatum mortale, et Deus plus punit in casu pro minimo peccato actuali mortali quam premiat pro bono merito;

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508. premiaret) premiat, K; premiabit, C; privaret, EUX; puniret, V.

509. aliquo) toto, TBKCP. // ad istud om. TBKCU. // possibile est) posito est possibile, BKC.

510. forte) foret, TU. // in casu om. EX. // aliquis) quis, TBKC. // modico) minimo, TBC. // delicto) debito, T; debitum, S; peccato, EA.

511. premiatur: quis add. TBPSU; aliquis add. M; alius add. V. // merito) debito, TU.

512. Et) sed, MV. // reducatur) deducatur, BK; dicatur, C; dicatur ducatur, T. // argumentum ultra om. TBKC.

513. tunc) quod, BKC; con⟨trari⟩o, T. // pronior) promptior, CVX; pro minimo, T; pro mortali, L. // quam ad premiandum) et cetera, TB.

515. ad hoc om. TBKCPU. // sic om. TBKCX.

516. et: tunc add. TBKCU. // in casu om. CX.

517. minimo) modico, EA. // peccato om. MPSVX. // actuali) ⟨a⟩equum, C; om. BK. // pro bono...(518)meritum om. E. // pro: aliquo add. LEAX.

igitur Deus non premiat bonum meritum ad condignum vel punit malum ultra condignum, quia si premiaret A bonum meritum ad condignum et puniret B peccatum mortale, quod est minus malum quam A est bonum citra condignum, plus premiaret A quam puniret B. Respondeo quod Deus omnem beatum pro omni bono merito suo in gloria premiat ultra condignum et omne peccatum mortale maximum actuale punit citra condignum, sicut patet per Augustinum, XXI De Civitate Dei, c. 25; et tamen in casu pena dampni pro peccato est magis malum et maior pena dampni quam

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518. vel punit...(520)condignum et om. (hom.) KL.

519. premiaret...(522)puniret B) premiaret A bonum meritum ad condignum et punifet B exp. E. // bonum om. MV. // meritum om. TBC.

520. et puniret...(521)condignum om. (hom.) V.

521. est) erat, T; sint, X; ad, A; om. LMPS. // citra om. TAX. // A^2 om. TBKCU.

522. puniret) premiaret, BMX. // B om. BKCU. // Respondeo) dico, U; et dico add. KC. // beatum) bonum, MSV. // bono om. EX.

523. in gloria om. KC. // et omne...(524)condignum om. (hom.) BKC.

525. c. 25) c. 15, T.

526. pro: minimo add. TBKC; a add. U. // peccato: uno add. BKC. // magis) maius, TPX. // dampni om. TBKCU.

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525. Augustinus; De Civitate Dei; lib. XXI, c. 25, passim. (CCL; t. XLVIII, pp. 794-6.)

est totum premium creatum bonum pro aliquo certo merito.

Et si ultra iterum arguatur: si pena debita pro peccato sit maior pena quam premium pro bono merito est bonum, cum premium sit magis bonum quam meritum et meritum tam bonum et in casu magis bonum quam demeritum malum; Deus puniret peccatum pena magis mala quam culpa foret mala, et per consequens puniret ultra condignum. Respondeo et dico quod Deus semper in inferno punit peccatum aliqua pena dampni que est magis mala quam peccatum est malum et tamen non sequitur quod puniat ultra condignum.

[Ad secundam] Et ad secundam formam respondeo eodem modo: concedo conclusionem, videlicet quod loquendo de pena

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527. est om. BKC. // bonum om. EA.

528. Et si) sicut, E; simpliciter, A.

529. cum premium sit) et in casu, TKC.

530. quam...(531)bonum om. (hom.) TKCX. // quam...bonum om. (hom.) B. // tam) magis, EAU.

531. et in...bonum om. (hom.) E. // Deus) igitur, TBKCU; tunc, PS.

532. foret) sit, TBKC.

533. Respondeo...(536)condignum om. TBKC.

537. [Ad secundam] TL; ad 2, V; ad secundam rationem, M; secundi, U; om. alii. // respondeo) respondere et add. praem. V; referendo, A; om. TBKCU.

538. modo: et add. LMUVX. // quod om. TA.

dampni in casu punitur peccatum pena que est magis malum quam bonum quo premiatur meritum bonum quantumcumque magnum sit bonum.

[Ad tertiam] Eodem modo ad tertiam formam videlicet quod quilibet in inferno tantum punitur pena dampni quantum ceteris paribus si decessisset sine peccato fuisset premiatus loquendo proprie de premio sic: quod si Sor sit perfectissimus hominum et peccet mortaliter et dampnetur, tantum dampnum habebit in inferno quantum habuisset premium pro merito suo priori, non dico quantum habuisset pro maiori merito quod potuit habuisse si stetisset sine peccato et ultra meruisset.

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539. in casu om. TBKC. // malum) mala, TBKC.

540. bonum[1]) premium, EA; culpa[[pena add. K]] sit mala et quam bonum, BKC. // quo om. KC. // bonum[2] om. TBKCX.

542. [Ad tertiam] TL; ad 3, V; ad 3 rationem, M; 3[i], U; om. alii. // modo: respondeo add. LAMSVX. // formam) argumentum, X; om. LEAP.

544. decessesset) decedisset, PS.

545. de premio om. MV. // Sor om. PS. // sit om. EA. // hominum) omnium, KC.

546. dampnum om. CAV.

547. inferno: de pena add. EA. // premium...(548)habuisse om. (hom.) T. // premium pro merito) meritum pro premio, MS; meritum propremio, U. // suo om. BKC.

548. dico: tantum add. LEAPX. // pro maiori...habuisse om. (hom.) BKCU.

[Ad quartum] Ad quartum argumentum nego consequentiam: videlicet quod in casu ille qui bene vixit per totam vitam suam et in fine decedit cum minimo peccato mortali magis punietur in inferno quam alius qui semper male vixit et numquam bene et hoc per equalem vitam, quia semper ille qui plus peccavit ceteris paribus gravius punietur, sed tamen potest esse quod ille qui minus peccavit puniatur pena que sit maius malum quam pena qua punitur. Magis peccans est tamen omnis pena sensus, maior pena quam pena aliqua dampni, sed non ex hoc magis malum. Ymo

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550. [Ad quartum] TL; ad 4, V; ad 4 rationem, M; 4^{i}, U; om. alii. // argumentum om. TBKCUV.

551. videlicet) scilicet, TV; dico add. PS; dico add. del. M.

552. peccato om. TBKV.

553. alius) ille, AV. // et numquam bene om. TBKC. // et hoc om. MP*SV.

554. quia om. EA. // semper om. KC. // ceteris paribus om. TBKC.

555. gravius) plus, BKCU; om. T. // punietur: pena que sit(556) ...(557)peccans add. X. // sed...(556)puniatur om. (hom.) T. // potest esse) probabile est, X. // quod) quo, EA.

556. minus) magis, A; mumquam, X. // maius) magis, MPSUV; minus, EA.

557. $pena^{2}$ om. TBKU; est add. CP.

558. aliqua om. TBKCA; alia add. LX. // sed om. KC. // non: est add. LEM^{1}; tamen add. KC.

aliquod magis malum, quod est solum malum pene, est minor pena quam aliud quod est minus malum et solum malum pene, quod patebit in conclusione quarta.

[Ad quintam] Ad quintam rationem concedo conclusionem: videlicet quod habendo respectum ad commodum vel incommodum proprium, id est ad dampnum vel ad lucrum, bene credo quod multis dampnatis magis expediret abstinere se a bono quam facere bonum, sed simpliciter magis expedit cuilibet facere bonum quam non facere, quia probabile est quod modicum bonum temporale sit

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559. est minor...(560)malum pene om. (hom.) E*A.

560. aliud) aliquod, PV.

561. quod) ut, U; om. TL; clarius add. TBKC. // patebit: plus add. MPSV; postea add. LEX; post add. A. // quarta om. L/

562. [Ad quintam] TL; ad 5, V; ad 5 rationem, M; 5^{i}, U; om. alii. // rationem) argumentum, X; om. TBKCUV; et add. EASX; etiam add. LMX.

563. videlicet) scilicet, V; om. PS.

564. id est) et, TBKCEU. // ad^{2}) aliquod, A; om. TBKCP.

565. dampnatis) dampnandis, L; damnandum, X; om. E.

566. $bonum^{2}$) bene, LEPSX.

567. quia) et, PS.

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561. patebit in conclusione quarta: Thomas de Buckingham; huius operis; Q. I, C. IV: "Omnis pena sensus est magis fugibilius quam aliqua pena dampni quoad esse pene." (Perez; ff. b.v^{rb}-c.i^{vb}.)

magis eligibile quam aliquod malum privationis eternum fugiendum et hoc quoad esse mali, ut plus patebit in conclusione quarta.

[Ad sextam] Ad sextam rationem nego consequentiam et conclusionem, quia illa est oppositum conclusionis mee. Simpliciter non esse non est bonum et tamen concedo quod tale esse plus habet de malo quam de bono, et tamen melius et eligibilius est illud aggregatum habere quam non habere. Nec sequitur: carentia visionis divine est magis mala quam totum esse Sortis est bonum, igitur esse cum carentia visionis est fugibilius et peius quam non

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568. eternum: est add. TBKCU.

569. et: ad add. M*PS. // plus) post, EAX; postea, L; om. TBKC; magis add. LEAV; satis add. X. // in om. TBKC. // quarta: sequentia add. TBKC.

570. [Ad sextam] T; ad 6, V; ad 6 rationem, M; 6^{i}, U; om. alii. // rationem) argumentum, X; om. TBKCLU. // et conclusionem om. TBKCU.

571. quia: cum add. BKC. // Simpliciter) similiter, EA; s^{r}, BKCLMSUV.

572. esse[1]: bonum add. BKCMU. // non[2] om. TX.

574. habere[2]...(576)quam non om. (hom.) TBKC. // sequitur: illa add. MV.

575. magis...(576)visionis est om. U.

576. visionis: divine add. MSV; dei add. P.

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569. plus patebit in conclusione quarta: Ibid.

esse simpliciter. Et ratio est quia non est ita fugibile et malum esse cum illa carentia sicut illa carentia est malum, sicut prius dictum est de pena; non ita male punitur, sicut peccatum est malum quod est malum pene, sed credo infinite minus male.

[Ad septimam] Ad septimam rationem: concedo quod pena dampni est magis mala peccanti, loquendo de malo ut commune est ad malum dampni et ad alia mala, quam aliqua culpa est mala et peccanti plus nocet: istud patet in conclusione. Est tamen peius in infinitum esse in malo culpe quam in malo pene dampni, loquendo de illa ut pena est et secundum esse pene et mali. Sed numquid peccare sit peius quam carentia visionis divine patebit

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577. simpliciter: habere add. K; habere. Nec sequitur(574)... (577)simpliciter‖575. visionis: divine add. B‖add. B. // et^{2}: ita add. PS.

580. quod est malum om. X. // credo om. M^{*1}PS; quod add. LM^{1}VX. // infinite) in infinitum, TLMPVX; infinitum, S. // male) malum, PSX; om. TBKC.

581. [Ad septimam] TL; ad 7, V; ad 7 rationem, M; 7^{1}, U; om. alii. // rationem) argumentum, X; om. TBKCU; ad idem add. LEAX. // concedo) dico, TBKCU; dico et add. praem. LX.

584. plus) magis, TBKC. // Est) et, BKCMX.

585. infinitum: est add. BKCX.

587. numquid) numquam, L; utrum, BKCU; utrumque, T. // peius) magis malum, TBC; maius malum, K. // divine: hoc add. TBK; habere add. C.

post in alia conclusione octava.

[Ad octavam] Ad octavam rationem ad idem, nego conclu-
590 sionem illam: quod anime in purgatorio tantum puniuntur quantum post premiabuntur. Ymo, ut credo infinite minus. Istud tamen potest esse: quod in purgatorio sustineant tantum dampnum et tantum malum quantum post in celo habebunt premium. Et si arguatur ultra: anime in purgatorio habent carentiam beatitudinis
595 sue future, que carentia est eis tantum dampnum et tantum malum quantum beatitudo est bona et premium; igitur, anime in purga-

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588. post) postea, LU; om. TBKC. // alia om. CLMUVX. // octava) 4^{a}, C; om. TBK.

589. [Ad octavam] TL; ad 8, V; ad 8 rationem, M; 8^{i}, U; om. alii. // rationem) argumentum, X; om. TBKCU. // ad idem om. TBKCU. // conclusionem) consequentiam, TBLP; consequentiam add. praem. et del. S.

590. illam) videlicet, TB; om. KCU; scilicet add. V; ·8· add. M.

591. post) postea, TBKCU; plus, A. // Ymo...Istud om. C. // ut om. TBKA. // credo: quasi add. LMV; quod add. A.

594. beatitudinis) fruitionis, TBKC.

595. future: glorie add. PS. // dampnum om. AV. // et tantum malum) malum, V; om. TBKU.

596. est) erit, C; om. LEA; eis add. TBKC. // bona et premium) bonum, BKC; om. T.

587-8. patebit post in conclusione octava: Thomas de Buckingham; huius operis; Q. I, C. VIII, obj. 3. "...tunc carentia beatitudinis esset creature magis mala quam peccatum est malum: ut patet per conclusionem meam secundam ..." (Perez; f. d.vi^{rb}, ll. 16-9.)

torio tantum puniuntur quantum post premiabuntur in celo. Nego istam consequentiam.

Et si arguatur ad hunc ultra sic: carentia beatitudinis est animabus in purgatorio tantum malum quantum beatitudo illa fuisset vel foret si esset bona et illa carentia est tantum malum pene et non culpe, ymo solum est malum pene, igitur est tantum pena quantum beatitudo est bona; respondeo quod talis carentia est tantum malum quantum malum est solum malum pene, non tamen sequitur quod tale malum sit tam magna pena quantum est magnum malum quod est solum malum pene. Est tamen tanta pena dampni, sed non tanta pena simpliciter, ut superius dictum est.

[Ad nonam] Ad nonam rationem ad idem: quando arguitur

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597. post) postea, LV; om. TBKC.

598. istam om. TBKCU.

599. ad hunc om. TBKCU. // animabus om. TBKC.

600. beatitudo) bonum, TBKC. // illa om. BKC. // vel foret om. TBKC.

601. bona) illa beatitudo, BKC; om. T. // et illa...(603)bona om. (hom.) M^{*1}PS. // et non cuple) non culpe, EAU; non pene, T; om. KC.

602. ymo...pene om. T.

603. est^{1} om. KCEAU.

606. tanta^{1}) solum, TBKCU. // dampni...(607)pena om. T.

608. [Ad nonam] TLE; ad 9, V; ad 9 rationem, M; 9^{i}, U; om. alii. // rationem) conclusionem, S; argumentum, X; om. CUV. // ad idem) dico, U; om. MPSV.

quod si carentia visionis esset tam mala quam bona esset visio,
610 igitur aliquis posset mereri de condigno beatitudinem eternam.
Dico quod hoc non sequitur. Quomodo tamen aliquis de condigno
potest mereri vitam eternam, dicit Sanctus Thomas, Prima
Secunde, q. 114, art. 3. Et quomodo 'non' dicit Glosa ad Romanos 8

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609. quod si...esset visio om. V.// visionis: divine add. TBKCL.
// mala: pena add. BKCU.

610. aliquis) aliud, TS.

611. Dico...(612) eternam om. (hom.) BKC. // hoc om. VX.

613. q.) art., LAMPSV.// 114) 134, BKCUX; 123, T; 54 text. et mg., E; 14, A.// art.) q., LAMPSV.// quomodo non dicit Glosa) similiter, X.// non: potest mereri de condigno, et cetera. dicit add. KC.

612-3 Thomas de Aquino; Summa Theologicae ; Prima Secundae Partis; q. 114; art. 3: "Utrum homo in gratia constitutus possit mereri vitam aeternam ex condigno". In obj. 1: "Videtur, quod homo in gratia constitutus non possit mereri vitam eternam ex condigno: dicit enim Apostolus ad Romanos 8: 'Non sunt condignae passiones hujus temporis...'." (Leon.; t. VII; p. 347.)

613. Glosa Interlinearis; ad Romanos 8:18. "hoc facit sperans quid merita non possunt." Et Nicolaus de Lyra; Postillae ⟨Expositio⟩; ad Romanos 8:18. "Passiones huius temporis. Sicendum ⟨Dicendum ?⟩ tamen quod passiones iste dupliciter possunt considerari. Uno modo ut acceptantur a libero arbitrio. et sic loquitur hic apostolus. alio modo prout sperans movens liberum arbitrium est huius acceptionis principium. et sic est ibi meritum de condigno. quia principium meriti est eiusdem dignitatis cum primo". (uterque: Ven. 1485; t. VI, p. 1202).

613-4 ad Romanos 8 super illo: Ad. Romanos 8:18 "existimo enim quod non sunt condignae passiones huius temporis ad futuram gloriam quae revelabitur in nobis".

super illo: Non sunt condigne passiones, et cetera. Et ad argumentum ultra, nego hanc consequentiam: peccatum non est magis malum quam bonum meritum est bonum, et beatitudo non est magis bona quam carentia beatitudinis est mala; igitur, si aliquis de condigno possit mereri per peccatum malum carentie, potest aliquis per bonum meritum mereri beatitudinem de condigno. Ymo concedo istud: quod plus potest malum meritum ad merendum malum quam bonum meritum ad merendum bonum et infinitum malum posset mereri de condigno cum peccato mortali peccatum mortale minus, ut patebit post. Tamen quantum penam meritur

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614. illo) verbo, KMV. // passiones: huius add. PUV. // et cetera) seculi ad futuram gloriam, V; om. CMPS.

615. magis) maius, BKCLEA.

616. meritum) meritorium, KC.

617. beatitudinis) visionis, T; visionis divine, BKC. // igitur) ergo, MVX; similiter, BKC.

618. de condigno om. TBKC. // carentie: visionis divine de condigno add. BKC; de condigno add. T; beatitudinis add. in mg. M^1P^1; beatitudinis add. LVX.

619. meritum om. TBKC.

620. istud om. TKCU.

621. bonum^2 om. PX. // et: in add. BKLMUV. // infinitum: plus add. TBKC.

622. cum peccato mortali) per, KC.

623. minus om. TBKCU. // ut om. M^*S. // post) postea, TBKC. // quantum) tantum, MP; tanta, S.

peccatum, tantum premium merebitur meritum, sed non tantum bonum quantum malum meritum meretur malum, et ratio est quia quanto magis bonum habet peccans tanto mereretur magis malum, et hoc est quasi per accidens.

[Ad decimam] Ad decimam, nego quod hoc sequatur: quod quilibet homo haberet recta ratione eligere esse asinus vel lapis vel sic semper fuisse quam eternaliter vivere cum dampnosa carentia visionis divine quantumcumque aliunde bene viveret quia, ut patebit post per conclusionem quartam, nullum tale malum privatum est in aliqua proportione magis fugibile quam foret

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624. merebitur) mereretur, TCEAM; bonum add. LMPSUVX.

625. et ratio...(626)malum om. (hom.) TU. // et ratio est om. BKC.

626. magis^2) maius, LX; plus, BKC.

627. est om. MV.

628. [Ad decimam] TLE; ad 10, KV; ad 10 rationem, M; 10^i, U; ad (-) rationem, S; om. alii. // decimam: rationem add. AMPS; argumentum add. X. // quod^2) quia, TE.

630. vel...quam) et cetera et sic, TBK; et cetera et cetera, C. // vivere) esse quam semper esse hominem, TB; esse quam semper hominem, KC. // dampnosa) tanta, TBK; om. C.

632. ut) sicut, CLEAX. // post...(633)proportione om. TU. // post om. BKC. // nullum om. EA.

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632. per conclusionem quartam: Thomas de Buckingham; huius operis; Q. I, C. IV. "Omnis pena sensus est magis fugibilis quam aliqua pena dampni quoad esse pene." (Perez; f. b.v^{rb}-c.i^{vb}.)

privatio equalis boni que privatio non esset mala.

Et ad argumentum ultra, admittatur quod ita bonum esset Sorti esse angelus, sicut esset sibi malum esse asinus. Et concedo etiam quod melius esset Sorti esse homo cum visione divina quam esse angelus sine visione divina, ceteris paribus. Et etiam concedo quod magis malum esset Sorti carentia visionis divine quam esset malum sibi esse asinus, et tamen nego consequentiam. Igitur, magis fugiendum esset Sorti carentia visionis divine et hoc quoad esse mali quam esse asinus. Bene tamen haberet Sor magis esse asinus vel species rationalis ita modicum perfectam, sicut est asinus cum visione divina, quam esse homo vel angelus carens visione divina. Istud argumentum staret in robore suo et

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634. esset, foret, TBKC.

635. ad: undecimum add. X. // ita bonum) melius, BKC.

636. esse[1]...(637)Sorti om. (hom.) TU. // sicut) quam, BKC.

637. etiam om. BKAV. // quod) quam, EMSVX.

638. visione divina om. CLEA. // ceteris...(639)divine om. (hom.) T. // etiam) tam, X; qui, K; om. A.

639. visionis divine) visione divina, BKU.

640. quam esset...(641)divine repit. S. // sibi) sorti, E; sor, C.

643. magis om. TBK; eligere add. TBKCUVX; eligere add. del. P. // vel species...(644)asinus om. (hom.) X. // vel: alterius add. KC.

644. angelus) asinus, PS.

645. carens) sine, TBKCV. // et) etiam, BKU; om. TCAPX.

si conclusio mea foret falsa, ut post patebit, ymo si esset possibile mallem esse asinus cum visione divine quam esse homo sine.

[Ad undecimam] Ad undecimam rationem, nego hanc consequentiam: carentia visionis divine est dampnato tam mala quam bona esset sibi divina visio; igitur, si Deus faceret quod illa privatio esset in Sorte et non esset sibi mala omnibus ceteris paribus, tantum bonum faceret Deus Sorti quantum faceret si daret sibi beatitudinem et visionem divinam quia, sicut patebit post, minus bonum et minus eligibile foret michi facere illam privationem esse et non esse malum quam auferre aliquam penam

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646. foret) esset, TBKA. // post) postea, TBKVX.

647. asinus: de facto add. TBK. // sine: ipsam add. L; eadem add. V; visione divina add. C; visione divina ceteris paribus add. X; vel carentia visione divina add. T; vel cum carentia add. B; vel carentia add. K; carentia add. U.

648. [Ad undecimam]) ad 11, T; ad 11 rationem, M; 11^{i}, U; ad 5^{m}, L; om. alii. // undecimam) decimam, X; quintam, L; om. T. // rationem) argumentum, TUX; om. C. // hanc) istam, TBK.

649. dampnato om. PS.

650. divina om. BK.

651. omnibus om. BKCPVX.

652. paribus: igitur add. TBK. // Sorti) sibi, P; in eum, T. // faceret om. TBK; et add. CEAS.

653. sibi) ei, MV; om. K. // beatitudinem et om. TBK.

654. minus[1]) cuius, EA. // bonum om. EAMV.

655. aliquam) aliam, SU; illam, TBK; om. C.

sensus, et tamen illa pena dampni est magis malum quam aliqua pena sensus; et ad argumentum ultra nego istud: quod quam malum est aliquid tam bonum est auferre illud quoad esse mali.

Sed objicitur contra sic: quam bonum est aliquid alicui tam
660 mala est eius carentia, sicut dicit hec conclusio mea; igitur, eadem ratione, quam malum est aliquid tam bonum est privatio que privat illud malum quoad esse mali. Ad istud respondeo quod quam malum est aliquid alicui tam bonum esset auferre illud malum et illam privationem boni que est sic mala, quia illud non
665 potest esse nisi per positionem boni privati; sed auferre illud malum privationis quoad esse mali sic: quod manebit privatio sed

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659. contra sic) sic, K; contra si, C; si, TB.

660. hec) ista, TK; illa, B; om. C. // mea om. TBKCU.

661. aliquid) aliqua res, TBK. // bonum est: eius carentia vel add. TBKU; eius add. CP; eius add. et del. V.

662. quoad...(664)malum om. (hom.) TBKEAU.

664. et) id est, CLMV. // mala: quam mala [[mala) bona, T]] est ista [[ista) illa, B]] privatio. Respondeo quod [[quod) quam malum est alicui aliquid, U]] tam bonum esset [[illi add. BK]] auferre illud malum et [[illam add. U]] privationem boni que est sic mala [[quam mala est ista privatio add. T; quam mala est illa privatio add. B; est ista privatio add. K]] add. TBKU. // illud: ablatio add. TBKLX.

665. esse) fieri, TBKX; om. AU. // privati) ablati, TCX. // illud: bonum est add. TX.

666. privationis om. TBKX. // mali) malum, EA. // sic) ita, TBK. // sed) licet, BK.

non erit mala, non est tam bonum quam malum est illa privatio.

[Ad duodecimum] Ad duodecimum argumentum, respondeo quod si in Sorte foret privatio A boni, que privatio non foret mala quia non rei debiti inesse, et inciperet illa privatio esse mala cum statim foret rei debite inesse, esset illa privatio tam mala quam bonum foret A, nec potest malicia talis augeri vel minui nisi ex quantitate boni privati. Et ad confirmationem illius: si essent due res eque bone Sorti et una magis debita inesse, privatio illius que foret magis debita inesse esset magis mala. Dico quod non forte, cum non possit esse magis debitum inesse nisi esset magis bonum.

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667. erit om. TBK. // illa om. TBK.

668. [Ad duodecimum] TLE; ad 12, V; ad 12 rationem •a•, M; 12i, U; om. alii. // argumentum) rationem, CLEA; om. TBKU. // respondeo) dico, TBKUV; om. L.

669. privatio^{2} om. TBK. // foret) esset, TBK.

670. mala: Sorti add. TBKU. // non: foret add. TBKU; esset add. V; est add. PX. // et om. TBKAU. // privatio...(671) illa om. (hom.) V. // esse) esset, KM.

671. statim om. PS. // foret) esset, TBKU; fieret, LA. // privatio: est add. EA.

674. inesse) quam alia, T; quam alia add. BK; tunc add. V.

675. inesse om. BKCMV. // esset) foret, TBKS.

676. quod: forte add. BK. // non forte, cum) non sequitur quia forte, TBK. // inesse om. BK.

677. esset) foret, V; sit, TBKU.

[Ad tertiam decimam] Ad tertiam decimam rationem, dico quod impletio precepti pro tempore pro quo est preceptum est magis bonum quam impletio consilii; et ratio est quia impletio precepti vitat tunc peccatum mortale; et omissio impletionis precepti esset magis mala quam consilii. Et eodem modo dico de subventione parentum et extraneorum.

[Ad quartam decimam] Ad quartam decimam rationem, quando arguitur quod sequitur quod omne peccatum mortale esset magis malum quam aliqua gratia bona et etiam, econtra, omnis gratia esset magis bona quam aliquod peccatum malum, dico quod neutrum sequitur. Sed bene fateor quod in casu modicum

---

678. [Ad tertiam decimam] TL; ad 13, SV; ad 13 rationem, M; 13^{i}, U; om. alii. // rationem) argumentum, X; om. TBKCMUV. // dico) respondeo, BK.

681. precepti: pro add. TBK. // vitat) privat, P; om. M*S.

682. eodem modo dico de) eodem est, T. // dico: quod est add. TBK.

683. extraneorum) ceterorum, TBK.

684. [Ad quartam decimam] TLS; ad 14, V; ad 14 rationem, M; 14^{i}, U; om. alii. // rationem) argumentum, X; om. TBKCEUV.

685. quod^{1} om. TBK. // peccatum om. EA. // esset) est, LUX; sit, TBK.

686. gratia: sit add. TBKC; est add. LX; esset add. V.

687. gratia: bona add. TBU. // quam aliquod peccatum malum) et cetera, V.

688. neutrum) non, TBK.

peccatum mortale est effective alicui magis malum quam maxima gratia fuit bona et utilis et aliquando econtra. Nec ex hoc sequitur quod unum sit minus vel maius bonum simpliciter alio.

[Ad quintam decimam] Ad quintam decimam rationem ad idem, dico quod non requiritur nec sequitur quod carentia A actus sub B gradu foret tam mala quam bonum foret A actus, nec requiritur quod carentia A actus sit mala. Constat quod talis carentia non est peccatum, sed forte volitio qua vult non habere A vel carentia obediencie vel aliquid consimile peccatum est. Nec dico quod A est bonum debitum inesse illo modo quo est ad propositum loqui de debito inesse. Et sicut multi dicunt

---

690. Nec: tamen add. TB; tunc add. K.

691. simpliciter alio) alio, TP; alio nec econtra loquendo de meliorem simpliciter, V; om. U.

692. [Ad quintam decimam]) ad 15, TLV; ad 15 rationem, M; 15i, U; om. alii. // rationem om. TBKPUVX. // ad idem om. TBKCUV.

693. quod[1] om. ES. // requiritur) sequitur, EA. // nec) quod, SU.

694. sub B...(695)actus om. (hom.) EA. // B om. TU. // foret) est, K; om. TB. // A om. TV. // actus: bonus add. TX.

695. requiritur) sequitur, TU. // sit...(696)carentia om. X. // mala: quia add. TBK. // quod) quia, EA.

696. vult) ultra, MV; requiruntur, T.

697. aliquid) aliquod, BMPV; aliquod tale, TU.

698. Nec) non, BK; ut, A. // est[2] om. P*iS

699. loqui) loquendo, TKEU.

stante precepto: non tenetur quis implere preceptum, sed tenetur non transgredi.

[Ad sextam decimam] Ad sextam decimam rationem, dico quod non obstante illo malo privationis in uno et non in alio, non magis utilis foret liber ille michi quam Sorti. Nec sequitur: omne bonum quod liber facit habere Sorti facit michi, et propter hoc tollit unum malum in me et non in Sorte, igitur plus bonum est michi quam Sorti.

[Ad septimam decimam] Ad septimam decimam rationem, dico quod, si Sor plus indigeat A quam Plato B, tunc privatio

---

700. preceptum om. EA.

702. [Ad sextam decimam]) ad 16, TLV; ad 16 rationem, M; 16^{i}, U; om. alii. // rationem) argumentum, X; om. TBKCUV. // dico om. EA.

703. non[1] om. EA.

704. Nec sequitur om. T. // sequitur om. EA.

705. habere) ille, BK; iste, T; om. PUX. // facit[2]: et add. TBKU.

706. unum) suum, PS; minimum, K; quantum, E; om. X. // in me) michi, TBK. // et non in Sorte om. C. // non in Sorte) Sorti, TBK; non Sorti, V. // igitur...(707)Sorti om. K. // plus) magis, PSX.

708. [Ad septimam decimam]) ad 17, TLV; ad 17 rationem, M; 16^{i} corr. ad 17^{i}, U; om. alii. // rationem) argumentum, X; om. TBKUV.

709. dico om. BK. // Sor: post add. EMP; post add. in mg. S. // B om. TBKMPU.

710 A erit sibi magis mala quam privatio B Platoni, et etiam A esset Sorti tunc magis bonum quam nunc est, numquam tamen esset privatio A magis malum Sorti quam A esset bonum, ceteris paribus.

[Ad duodevicesimam] Ad duodevicesimam rationem, dico
715 quod non sequitur quod in quacumque creatura essent tot bona vel tantum bonum quot possent esse mala vel quantum posset esse malum, nec est istud verum quod quelibet privatio mali est tantum bonum quantum illud malum si esset esset malum, sicut nec de bono est verum quod privatio cuiuscumque boni cuius quis est

---

710. erit) est, TBKU; esset, L. // etiam om. KE.

711. est om. C; B Platoni add. TBKCU.

712. A^2 om. BK.

713. paribus: et cetera add. T; et per hoc patet etiam ad 18 add. in text. et ad 18 add. in mg. V.

714. [Ad duodevicesimam] L; ad 18, TK; ad 18 rationem, M; 18^i, U; ad 19, V; om. alii. // duodevicesimam) decimum viii, X; 19, V. // rationem) argumentum, SX; om. TBKCUV.

715. $quod^2$) quia, PS. // essent) esset, AU. // vel tantum bonum transp. post (716)mala [(tantum) quantum, B], TBK.

716. quot) quod, CAU. // mala vel) mala, K; in eo Platoni, C; om. T. // $esse^2$ om. BC.

717. est istud verum) idem valet, X. // tantum) tam, EMPSUX.

718. bonum: vel tantum bonum add. MPSU. // $esset^2$ om. CEAUX. // $malum^2$ repit. E^*A.

719. boni om. EA. // cuius om. BK.

capax tantum est mala quantum illud bonum si esset esset bonum, quia multe sunt privationes boni que non sunt male, ut patet conclusione quinta.

[Ad undevicesimam] Ad undevicesimam rationem, concedo quod delectatio certa non est magis bona quam tristicia sibi contraria est mala; ymo aliqua tristicia est equaliter mala. Et dico quod privatio illius delectationis esset tam mala quam mala esset illa tristicia, nec illa tristicia que est passio contraria per se et formaliter privat illam delectationem nec includit privationem illius, sed posset Deus illam simul servare cum illa sicut

---

720. si esset transp. post bonum^2, TBK. // esset^2 om. LX.

721. patet) patebit, TCLMVX; in add. CX.

723. [Ad undevicesimam] L; ad 19, T; ad (--), K; ad 19 rationem, M; 19^i, U; ad 20, V; om. alii. // undevicesimam) decimum ix, X; 20, V. // rationem) argumentum, X; om. TBKCUV. // concedo) dico, CX.

724. certa om. MV.

725. contraria) opposita, TBKV. // est^1) esset, PX; sit, BK; om. T. // ymo...mala om. (hom.) V. // tristicia om. MPS; sibi add. TB; simpliciter add. K.

726. illius) alicuius, TBKU. // quam mala om. KA.

727. tristicia^2 om. BK. // passio: illius delectationis add. TBK.

729. illam om. CLAVX. // servare) conservare, CLEAX.

721-2. ut patet conclusione quinta: Thomas de Buckingham; huius operis; Q. I, C. V. "Non cuiuslibet boni privatio est mala." (Perez; f. c.i^{vb}.)

fecit in Christo. Et per predicta potest esse quod eadem tristicia sit in uno homine per accidens magis mala, in alio minus, ut puta: si Sor habeat delectationem, Plato nullum; equalis tristicia superveniens, peior foret Sorti quam Platoni, quia per accidens privaret delectationem et omne aliud consimiliter sicut in Platone.

[Ad vicesimam] Ad vicesimam rationem, concedo quod rationalitas melior est quam animalitas ut sic, quia forte in homine eadem sunt. Et dico quod peius est privari rationalitate quam animalitate. Et si arguatur quod ad privationem animalitatis sequitur privatio rationalitatis, verum est, et ideo privari

---

730. fecit) fuit, CLEAX.

731. magis mala) magis malum, V; maius malum, BKUV; et add. TBKCX. // ut) et, B; om. CV.

732. Plato: nunc add. BK; non add. TU.

733. peior) peius, PS; penalior, U; om. TBK. // foret: magis penaliter add. TBK.

734. delectationem: in Sorte quod non in Platone add. TBK; in Sorte add. V. // et: cum hoc add. BK; tantum hoc add. T.

735. [Ad vicesimam] L; ad 20, T; ad (--), K; ad 20 rationem, M; 20^{i}, U; ad 21, V; om. alii. // vicesimam) 21, V; om. K. // rationem) argumentum, LX; om. TBCUV; dico add. U; dico et add. PS.

736. rationalitas) rationabilitas, CLVX. // est om. EA. // quam om. TBK. // sic om. BK.

737. privari) privarem, CEA. // rationalitate) rationabilitate, VX; rationabilitatem, L; rationalitatis, EA.

738. quod om. TC.

739. rationalitatis) rationabilitatis, LVX.

utroque est peius quam privari sola rationalitate, et tamen privari animalitate circumscripta rationalitate minus malum est, ut verbi gratia: Si Deus primo in Sorte auferret rationalitatem servando animalitatem, deinde secundo auferret animalitatem, dico quod magis malum faceret Deus homini in primo actu quam in secundo. Et eodem modo dicerem quod, si Deus auferret a Petro visionem beatam et post mutaret eum in naturam asini, plus malum faceret Deus Petro in primo actu quam in secundo.

[Ad vicesimam primam] Ad vicesimam primam argumentum,

---

740. sola...privari om. (hom.) et et rationalitate add. in mg. S. // rationalitate) rationalitatis, A; rationabilitate, LVX; om. C.

741. rationalitate) rationalitatis, EA; rationabilitate, LX.

742. rationalitatem) rationabilitatem, LVX; rationalitatis, A.

743. animalitatem[1]) animalitate, TBKE. // deinde...animalitatem om. (hom.) EA.

744. dico quod magis malum) peius, TBK. // magis) peius, AUV. // faceret) foret, EA. // actu) casu, BKC.

745. dicerem) dico, TBK; dicere, X. // quod om. MPUX.

746. beatam) divinam, BK. // post) postea, TBKU.

747. Deus om. SV. // Petro om. LX. // actu) casu, BKC.

748. [Ad vicesimam primam] TL; ad 21 rationem, M; 21[i], U; ad 22, V; om. alii. // Haec responsio omissa est in PS et transposita est post vicesimam secundam responsionem in X. // vicesimam primam) 22, V; vicerimum <sic> tertium, X. // argumentum) rationem, A; om. TBKCUV.

respondeo et dico quod, si B bonum nullum aliud bonum faceret Sorti nisi hoc quod privaret A malum sive hoc, quod B aliquid poneret, minus foret bonum quam A malum, quia - si ita foret - B bonum nullum aliud bonum faceret nisi quod A non esset malum et hoc minus est bonum quam A est malum vel quam B nunc est bonum.

[Ad vicesimam secundam] Ad vicesimam secundam, concedo totam conclusionem ad intellectum ad quem summittitur in ista materia.

[Ad vicesimam tertiam] Ad vicesimam tertiam, respondeo

---

749. respondeo et om. TBKCUV.

750. hoc[1] om. BK. // privaret) privat, TKC.

752. bonum[2] om. TBKU. // nisi) A quantum, EA.

754. nunc) non, TBKCU.

755. [Ad vicesimam secundam] L; ad 22, T; ad 22 et 23 rationem, M; 22[i], U; om. alii. // vicesimam secundam) 21, PS; 23, V; argumentum add. PSX.

756. summittitur) vadit, TBK.

758. [Ad vicesimam tertiam] L; ad 23, T; 23, U; ad 2(-), K; ad 24 et 25, V; om. alii. // vicesimam tertiam) vicesimum quartum, X; 24, V; 22, P; argumentum add. X. // respondeo et om. TBKUV.

---

756. ad intellectum ad quem summittitur: J. Duns Scotus; vide vicesimam secundam rationem huius conclusionis, ll. 349-51 supra.

et concedo quod auferrens B a Sorte facit Sorti magis malum quam Platoni, sed hoc est per accidens. Et etiam consequenter concedo residua.

[Ad vicesimam quartam] Ad vicesimam quartam, dictum est prius quod privatio mali est positivum cuius privatio est mala. Nec ultra valet consequentia: hoc est tam bonum quam malum fuit aliud; igitur, tam bene est per illud sicut male est per aliud.

Ista omnia clara erunt per conclusionem quartam.

---

759. magis) maius, UV; om. S.

760. hoc om. TBKU. // est om. TBKPSU. // etiam om. CAV.

762. [Ad vicesimam quartam] L; ad 24, T; 24, U; ad (--), K; ad ultimum, V; om. alii. // vicesimam quartam) 23^{m}, P; vicesimum quintum, X; 26, V; 44, M.

764. ultra: hoc add. KVX. // fuit) facit, BKU; punit, S.

765. aliud[1]) illud, PS. // bene) bonum, TUX. // sicut) quam, TBKC. // est[2]) fuit, V; om. BLEASU.

766. omnia clara erunt) consequentia patebit, C. // erunt) sunt, TSU. // per conclusionem quartam om. X.

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Appendices

APPENDIX I

Merton Ms. 1047

This unique manuscript is discussed on pp. 23-4 above.

My thanks are due to Dr. J.R.L. Highfield, Fellow, Librarian, and Archivist of Merton College, and to Mr. J.B. Burgass, Assistant Librarian of Merton College, for their help with the transcription of a particularly difficult document.

This voting-list is written on one side of a parchment strip approximately 33 x 13 cm. It is inscribed on the verso "Scrut⟨inium⟩ pro capella de Kybb⟨eworth⟩," in a Fourteenth Century hand. The text on the recto reads:

1 "Scrutinium die apostolorum simonis et jude et iterum in
festo omnium sanctorum quo die
[ ]cep't dilacionem quia quidam soc[ ] nomina ⟨?⟩ erant
vocati nec presentes ut apparuit in
3 fine iterum in die animarum

		Lund	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave
5	*	Elindon	Burguynun[a]	Burg	Burg	Burg
		Segrave	Staunton		[ ]ant ⟨?⟩	Staunton
7		Vilers	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave
		Burguynum	Wyli	Wyli	Wyly	Wyli
9		Kary	Segrave		Segrave	
	*	Waneteng	Burg	Burg	Burg	Wyly

a. Afterwards abbreviated to "Burg".

11	* Wyli	Burg	Burg	Burg	Burg
	Staunton	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave
13	Boys [ ] dedit custos ad conferend			Burg	Burg
	Middelton	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave
15	Wakfeld	Segrave		Segrave	Segrave
	Bukingham	Johannem Vilers quod custos debet		Vilers	Vilers
17	* Hardele	Burg	Burg	Burg	Burg
	* Wexcomb	Burg	Burg	Burg	Burg
19	* Gillingham	Burg	Burg	Burg	Burg
	Humberston	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave
21	* Fynemer	Burg	Burg	Burg	Burg
	⟨name deleted⟩				
23	* Sutton	Burg	Burg	Burg	Burg
	Cleanger	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave
25	* Mideland	Burg	Burg	Burg	Burg
	Hotham	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave
27	He}terburi	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave
	* Burkote	Burg	Burg	Burg	Burg
29	* Lynham	Burg	Burg	Burg	Burg
	* Pecham	Burg	Burg	Burg	Burg
31	Birdon	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave
	* Wurting	Burg		Burg	Burg
33	[Seues ?]ham	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave
	Dumbelton	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave

35	* Sutton	Burg	Burg	Burg	Burg
	Luceby	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave
37	Eynhou	Burg	Burg	Burg	Burg
	Reynham	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave
39	Pecham	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave
	Wuliot	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave
41	Monynton	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave
	Body	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave	Segrave
43	* Heriard	Burg	Burg	Burg	Wyli
	* Custos[b]	Burg			Wyli
45	Wyk	Burg		Burg	Burg
	Gotham	Segrave		Segrave	Segrave
47	ista duo semel				
	Graspays			Segrave	Segrave

b. The Warden of Merton was Robert de Tring.

Note that asterisks are here used to represent dots found before the names of a number of the fellows on the list; the dots apparently were used to mark "safe" votes for William Burgelon. Capitalisation of names has been supplied.

The results of the ballots may be briefly summarised:

	1	2	3	4
Segrave	20	19 ?	19 ?	20
Burguynun	17 ?	16 ?	17	16
Staunton	1	-	- ?	1
Wyly	1	1	1	4
Vilers	1	1	1	1
	40 ?	37 ?	38 ?	42

Since the ballots were inconclusive, it appears that attempts to fill the benefice were temporarily suspended.

Appendix II

Reference has been made in the text to the following passages from the Questiones super Sententias which lie outside the limits of the edited text, i.e. outside Q. I, Conclusions I and II. For convenience, they are given here, using the same sigla as were used in the edited text, with certain noted exceptions.

A. From Q. I, C. VI. (Perez; f. c.ij^{rb-va}). Mss.: TBKCLEA-MPSUVX; plus ms. Palat. lat. 329 (abridgement of the Questiones super Sententias) = Y.

1 Ad idem arguo et facio formam quam fecit doctor noster
anno proximo ad istam eandem conclusionem. Ratio sua fuit
3 talis. Primo, posuit duas suppositiones. Prima, quod omne
compositum ex magis eligibili et minus fugibili alicui omnibus

---

1. idem) 3°, Y. // arguo) arguitur, X; sic add. TCLX. // facio formam) facio eandem formam, LX; faciam formam, MPSV; per formam, Y. // fecit) facit, LA. // noster ...(3)posuit) questionem et ponit, Y. // noster) m^{r} sic K; om. T; barduardi⟨nus⟩ add. in text. et barduardinus add. in mg., V; bradewardyne in mg. M.

2. anno proximo) anno isto, C; om. T. // istam om. T. // eandem) eadem, S; om. C.

3. posuit) supposuit, P. // Prima: est add. TCY. // quod om. PV. // omne) omni, U.

4. compositum) compositionem, M. // ex) est, S. // eligibili) eligibilis, MX; eligibile, S; om. TBKU. // fugibili) fugibilis, M; fugibile, S; eligibili, E; fugibile add. X; omni add. del. V. // alicui) alicuius, MSV.

5 ponderatis est magis eligibile sibi quam fugibile. Secunda,

omne illud est magis fugiendum alicui quam aliud unum ex

7 quo facto et non alio necessario provenit magis eligibile.

---

5. est: sibi add. TKU. //eligibile) eligibili, EA. // sibi om. EAY. // quam fugibile om. TEAU. // Secunda) secundam, EU; secundum, CA; est add. LY; est quod add. CA; quod add. E; suppositio add. X.

6. illud om. Y; quod add. MVY. // fugiendum) fugiendi, TKAU; faciendi, EM; faciendis, L. //alicui om. EAV. // quam aliud) aliud, LU; om. A. // unum...(7)eligibile) unum non provenit eligibile, nec magis eligibile, A. // unum om. X. // ex quo facto om. E.

7. et om. BKCU. // non alio) non ex alio, CMSVY; om. TBKU. // necessario om. TBK. // provenit magis eligibile) provenit eligibile vel magis eligibile, E; huius suppositione add. MS; huius suppositionis add. TBC; huius suppositione magne variatione add. U.

B. From Q. VI, Art. III. (Perez; f. m.ij^{rb}) Mss.: LEAPUX.

1 Ad idem. Si in casu predicto privatio gratie non foret pec-

catum tunc, nunc de facto et lege currenti non esset peccatum

---

1. in: gratia add. del. A. // gratie: et caritatis add. LEU.

2. tunc) cum, E; et add. X. // de: (__) et add. E. // currenti) currentis ubique sint et peccatum sequitur quod aliquod peccatum mortale esset mortale peccatum, eo quod esset sequela peccati mortali et aliter, L; currente ubicumque sint est peccatum est et, U; currentis ubique, E. // non om. E. // peccatum: in add. X.

3 parvulis, sicut dixit dominus meus et magister qui penultimo
loco intravit de peccato originali; et fuit hec opinio reverendi
5 doctoris et non diu est cancellarii.

---

3. parvulis om. LEU. // dominum: medius add. (del. ?) A. // qui) quod, L. // qui...(4)originali om. X.

4. loco om. LEU. // originali) mortali, LU.

5. non) nunc, U. // diu) diii, LU.

APPENDIX III

Raw data for the relation of manuscripts

The tables which follow contain the data used in calculating the approximate relationships of the manuscripts of the Questiones super Sententias. For each manuscript, identified by the letter used for it in the apparatus, there is given the number of times it agrees with each of the other manuscripts in error[1] (not distinguishing among error-groups of different sizes), the arithmetic mean, and the standard deviation from the mean, calculated according to the raw-score formula:

$$S = \sqrt{\frac{\sum x^2}{N}} \qquad \text{where} \qquad \sum x^2 = \frac{N \sum X^2 - (\sum X)^2}{N}$$

S = Standard deviation; N = the number of manuscripts; $\sum X^2$ = the sum of the squared numbers of errors; and $(\sum X)^2$ = the square of the sum of the numbers of errors. The figures given include some variants not recorded in the apparatus and exclude some others which are.

T: 117 peculiar variants

with B:	700	with M:	30
K:	682	P:	50
C:	266	S:	31
L:	263	U:	235
E:	48	V:	64
A:	52	X:	109

Mean number of variants: 210.8
Standard Deviation from mean: 231.34
Mean plus S.D.: 442.14 ; Mean less S.D.: -20.56

---

1. "Error" is used here and elsewhere for any deviation from the lemma.

B: 106 peculiar variants

with T:	700	with M:	22
K:	819	P:	33
C:	305	S:	25
L:	275	U:	229
E:	33	V:	59
A:	41	X:	71

Mean number of variants: 217.67.
Standard Deviation from mean: 262.49.
Mean plus S. D.: 480.16. Mean less S. D.: -44.82

K: 48 peculiar variants

with T:	682	with M:	28
B:	819	P:	31
C:	344	S:	23
L:	268	U:	234
E:	42	V:	69
A:	48	X:	83

Mean number of variants: 222.58
Standard Deviation from mean: 258.89.
Mean plus S. D.: 481.47. Mean less S. D.: -36.31.

C: 164 peculiar variants

with T:	266	with M:	40
B:	305	P:	41
K:	344	S:	29
L:	117	U:	130
E:	111	V:	87
A:	122	X:	103

Mean number of variants: 141.25.
Standard Deviation from mean: 101.16.
Mean plus S. D.: 242.41. Mean less S. D.: 40.09.

L_1: 31 peculiar variants

with T:	243	with M:	6
B:	256	P:	15
K:	254	S:	11
C:	58	U:	65
E:	16	V:	21
A:	16	X:	31

Mean number of variants: 82.67.
Standard Deviation from mean: 98.73.
Mean plus S.D.: 181.40. Mean less S.D.: -16.06.

L_2: 22 peculiar variants

with T:	20	with M:	29
B:	19	P:	16
K:	14	S:	24
C:	59	U:	27
E:	71	V:	29
A:	78	X:	94

Mean number of variants: 40.
Standard Deviation from mean: 26.52.
Mean plus S.D.: 66.52. Mean less S.D.: 13.48.

E: 42 peculiar variants

with T:	48	with M:	37
B:	33	P:	26
K:	42	S:	34
C:	111	U:	46
L:	87	V:	44
A:	308	X:	110

Mean number of variants: 77.17.
Standard Deviation from mean: 75.17.
Mean plus S.D.: 152.34. Mean less S.D.: 1.99.

A: 53 peculiar variants

with T:	52	with M:	41
B:	41	P:	37
K:	48	S:	40
C:	122	U:	53
L:	94	V:	53
E:	308	X:	104

Mean number of variants: 82.75.
Standard Deviation from mean: 73.14.
Mean plus S.D.: 155.89. Mean less S.D.: 9.61.

M: 19 peculiar variants

with T:	30	with A:	41
B:	22	P:	179
K:	28	S:	225
C:	40	U:	43
L:	35	V:	132
E:	37	X:	59

Mean number of variants: 72.58.
Standard deviation from mean: 64.71.
Mean plus S.D.: 137.29. Mean less S.D.: 7.87.

P: 35 peculiar variants

with T:	50	with A:	37
B:	33	M:	179
K:	31	S:	280
C:	41	U:	50
L:	31	V:	59
E:	26	X:	86

Mean number of variants: 75.25.
Standard Deviation from mean: 73.65.
Mean plus S.D.: 148.91. Mean less S.D.: 1.59.

S: 39 peculiar variants

with T:	31	with A:	40
B:	25	M:	225
K:	23	P:	280
C:	29	U:	60
L:	35	V:	64
E:	34	X:	45

Mean number of variants: 74.25.
Standard Deviation from mean: 81.41.
Mean plus S. D.: 155.66. Mean less S. D.: -7.16.

U: 78 peculiar variants

with T:	235	with A:	53
B:	229	M:	43
K:	234	P:	50
C:	130	S:	60
L:	92	V:	60
E:	46	X:	67

Mean number of variants: 108.25.
Standard Deviation from mean: 75.35.
Mean plus S. D.: 183.60. Mean less S. D.: 32.90.

V: 84 peculiar variants

with T:	64	with A:	53
B:	59	M:	132
K:	69	P:	59
C:	87	S:	64
L:	50	U:	60
E:	44	X:	68

Mean number of variants: 67.42.
Standard Deviation from mean: 22.05.
Mean plus S. D.: 89.47. Mean less S. D.: 45.37.

X: 123 peculiar variants

with T:	109	with A:	104
B:	71	M:	59
K:	83	P:	86
C:	103	S:	45
L:	125	U:	67
E:	110	V:	68

Mean number of variants: 85.83.
Standard Deviation from mean: 23.39.
Mean plus S.D.: 109.22. Mean less S.D.: 62.44.

M^1:

with T:	17	with A:	21
B:	17	P:	12
K:	17	S:	4
C:	21	U:	20
L:	24	V:	29
E:	25	X:	26

Mean number of variants: 19.42.
Standard Deviation from mean: 6.47.
Mean plus S.D.: 25.89. Mean less S.D.: 12.95.

From these tables, it will be observed that those manuscripts whose frequencies of agreement lie outside the bounds of the Standard Deviation are,

for T:	BK, very high agreement		
B:	TK " " "		
K:	TB " " "		
C:	TBK " " "	S, very low agreement	
L_1:	TBK " " "		
L_2:	EAX " " "		
E:	A " " "		
A:	E " " "		
M:	PS " " "		
P:	MS " " "		
S:	MP " " "		
U:	TBK " " "		
V:	M " " "	E, very low agreement	
X:	LE(T) " " "	MS, " " "	
M^1:	VX " " "	PS, " " "	

These manuscript relations and the deductions which may be drawn from them are discussed in the section on the relation of the manuscripts in the main text.

APPENDIX IV

Socrates and Plato

In order to determine which forms of these names for exemplificative characters should be adopted for conventional use in the text, an analysis was made of the exact forms these names took in the manuscripts and in the printed edition of 1505, in lines 470-760 of Conclusion II in the present edition.

To begin with Socrates, the nominative forms are as follows (note that "sor" with a sign of contraction and "sor" without a sign of contraction are recorded separately):

	sortes	sor(contr.)	sor	so	s
T[a]	-	1	7	-	-
B	-	-	9	-	-
K	1	1	7	-	-
C	-	-	9	-	-
L	1	5	3	-	-
E[b]	-	-	6	-	-
A	-	-	9	-	-
M	-	2	2	2	3
P	-	-	9	-	-
S	-	6	-	3	-
U[c]	-	-	8	-	-
V	-	-	9	-	-
X	9	-	-	-	-
	11	15	78	5	3

a. the ninth occurrence is "soe".
b. three occurrences omitted.
c. one occurrence omitted.

It is clear from this that the full form "socrates" is altogether absent in the manuscripts and that the form "sortes" is nearly as uncommon, being represented by only two occurrences in the

manuscripts, although it is the conventional form in the Paris edition of 1505. This general absence of the fuller forms, together with the occurrence of "sor" without a sign of contraction five times as often as "sor" with a sign of contraction, suggests that the scribes, and presumably Buckingham himself, while regarding both "sor" with a sign of contraction and "sor" without a sign of contraction as proper nominative singular forms, tended in practice to adopt the latter. To accord with their practice, the form "sor", or rather "Sor", will be adopted for conventional use in the text.

The dative and ablative cases are as follows:

Dative:

	sorti	sori	sor
T^{a}	-	9	-
B	13	-	1
K^{b}	7	6	-
C^{b}	1	-	12
L	14	-	-
E^{c}	8	4	1
A^{b}	-	12	1
M^{d}	1	11	-
P^{be}	12	-	-
S^{bf}	2	12	-
U^{b}	1	-	12
V	1	13	-
X	14	-	-
	74	67	27

a. five occurrences omitted.
b. one occurrence omitted.
c. one occurrence reads "so^{i}".
d. one occurrence reads "si"; another reads "scilicet".
e. one occurrence reads "sibi".
f. one occurrence is the repetition "sori sorti": both are recorded in the table.

Ablative:

	sorte	sore	sor	so
T[a]	-	5	-	-
B[a]	4	-	1	-
K	1	-	5	-
C[b]	-	1	4	-
L	5	-	1	-
E	3	-	3	-
A[c]	-	-	5	-
M	-	5	-	1
P	6	-	-	-
S	2	4	-	-
U	-	-	6	-
V[a]	-	4	1	-
X	6	-	-	-
	27	19	26	1

a. one occurrence in genitive: "sorti".
b. one occurrence omitted.
c. one occurrence reads: "ab homine".

While there is a definite tendency to add the letter of the ending to "sor", either above the line or with a sign of contraction, and thus treat it as the proper stem; and while there is an equally definite tendency to regard "sor" as indeclinable; the dominant tendency is to turn to "sorti" and "sorte" in the Dative and Ablative cases. This is confirmed by the presence of a sign of contraction with nearly all occurrences of "sor" plus the letter of the ending. "Sorti" and "Sorte", then, will be adopted for conventional use in the text.

Turning to Plato, the forms of the nominative are:

	plato	plo	p
T	-	6	1
B	7	-	-
K	-	7	-
C	-	2[a]	5
L	-	7	-
E[b]	-	2	1

a. one occurrence does not carry a sign of contraction.
b. four occurrences omitted.
c. one occurrence in ablative.

(table continued overleaf)

(table continued from preceeding page)

	plato	plo	p
A	-	7	-
M	-	6	1
P	-	3	4
S	-	7	-
U	-	1	6
V[c]	-	1	5
X	5	2	-
	12	51[a]	23

Although the full nominative form "plato" occurs with little more frequency than the full nominative form "sortes", there is a great difference in the frequency with which signs of contraction occur with the shorter forms "plo" and "sor"; "plo" with a sign of contraction occurs fifty times as often as "plo" without a sign of contraction, whereas "sor" without a sign of contraction occurs five times as often as "sor" with a sign of contraction. So, while "sor" was regarded as an acceptable alternative to "sortes", "plo" continued to be seen as an abbreviation for "plato". In consequence, "Plato" will be adopted for conventional use in the text.

The greater number of occurrences of "•p•" (23) than of "•s•" (3) is probably due to the precedence of "sortes" in the phrase "sor et plato"; thus, "sor et •p•" would have been more easily recognised and more 'natural' than "•s• et plato" or "•s• et •p•".

The dative and ablative forms for Plato show interesting differences from the corresponding forms for Sortes (it should be noted, however, that the samples for both of these cases are very small and that in consequence the results, particularly those for

the ablative, are suggestive, rather than indicative):

Dative:

	platoni	plōni	plōi	p	
T[a]	-	1	2	-	a. one occurrence of "pl'o".
B[b]	-	-	2	-	b. one occurrence of "platōi".
K	-	-	3	-	
C	-	-	3	-	
L	-	-	3	-	
E	-	-	3	-	
A	-	3	-	-	
M	-	-	3	-	
P	-	-	3	-	
S	-	3	-	-	
U	-	-	-	3	
V	-	-	3	-	
X	3	-	-	-	
	3	7	25	3	

Ablative:

	platone	plōne	plōe	
T	-	1	-	a. omitted.
B	1	-	-	
K	-	-	1	
C	-	-	1	
L	1	-	-	
E[a]	-	-	-	
A	-	1	-	
M	-	-	1	
P	-	-	1	
S	-	1	-	
U	-	-	1	
V	-	-	1	
X	1	-	-	
	3	3	6	

Unlike the corresponding forms for "Sortes", there is here no tendency to regard "plo" as indeclinable (apart from the one instance of the dative in T noted above); similarly, there is little tendency to use the full forms, although there is more of a ten-

dency to use them in the ablative, perhaps because of the relative infrequency with which that case occurs. There is a very strong preference for the addition of "i" and "e", rather than for "ni" and "ne", to the stem "plō"; but this is more likely to result from seeing the "n" of the ending as included in the omissions covered by "plō" than from any tendency to see "plo" as an acceptable stem form. For these reasons, the forms adopted for conventional use in the text will be "Platoni" and "Platone", although they rarely occur uncontracted in the manuscripts.

To summarise, the forms of Socrates and Plato adopted for conventional use in the text are:

Nominative:	Sor	Plato
Dative:	Sorti	Platoni
Ablative:	Sorte	Platone

V

Bibliography

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Note that the materials here given are only, with very few exceptions, items which have been cited in the footnotes or the text of this thesis. Thus, this bibliography is not intended to be comprehensive, either of materials actually consulted or of materials relating to the subject: either would have swollen it to unmanageable and unuseable proportions.

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