

Introductory Abstract

The primary source for the biography is Baader's correspondence, nearly all of which is contained in the fifteenth volume of his collected works or in the four volumes edited by E. Susini¹. This material is predominantly religious and philosophical rather than personal in content, a factor which influences our presentation in two main respects. Firstly, it becomes necessary to introduce what may seem an inordinate number of personalities in order both to describe Baader (as 'the sum of his relations'), and to set his works as well as his life within an historical context. Secondly, the character of the letters often requires that motive be sought, if at all, in Baader's philosophical religion, making this to some extent a life of his ideas. This need not be artificial or unbiographical, inasmuch as Baader's mystic Romanticism disdained the separation of philosophy and action, or religion and life. Whatever 'coherence' is discernible in Baader's life is provided by an incessant striving not only to propagate but in fact to institutionalize the principles of his mysticism. This attempted meeting of 'the ideal and the real', often in the form of religious and political polemics, appears as a major theme in each of the three main sections into which Baader's life is here divided: 1) the years 1765-1814, leading from his education and religious background to his professional life as a mining engineer and public theosopher; 2) 1815-1824, the era of the Holy Alliance and of Baader's major theocratic and ecumenical activities; and 3) 1825-1841, beginning with Baader's advocacy of Catholicism and ending with his renewed ecumenical designs.

1. Throughout this thesis, reference to volumes of Baader's collected works (I-XVI) is by upper case Roman numeral. Susini's first volume of letters (i) is richly annotated in a further two volumes (ii and iii), which contain additional letters, while his second volume of letters (iv) is unannotated; as indicated, reference to these volumes is by lower case Roman numeral. The authors' names serve as references for all other books, whose full titles are given only in the bibliography; where more than one book by a single author has been used, an abbreviated title will also be given in the reference.

The Second Part of this dissertation deals particularly with Baader's writings from 1786-1814, here called generally his Naturphilosophie. Our intent is to elicit the prime motive which they share with Baader's mature theosophy, and we state that to be an intuited unity of 'spirit' and 'nature'. These terms are Baader's own, and it is the definition of their relation -- tending to be also that of ideal and real, soul and body, mind and world, God and creation -- that the mystic makes his major task. The project appears first in his diaries, where in reaction to the mechanistic view of nature he extends the enthusiasm of the religion of feeling to include an intuitive appreciation of nature as the World-Soul. The Herderian analogical identification of the self as microcosm with the physical universe is Baader's initial method, which he gives a more detailed application in the thesis that discovers the World-Soul in the qualitative chemical heat-substance as a kind of Stoic 'technikon fire' (chap. 1). Departing not from the atomistic but from the 'dynamic' theory of matter for which Kant's metaphysics and theory of science had rather strangely prepared a way (chap. 2), Baader next produces an a priori refutation of natural necessity by proving for chemical and mechanical phenomena an underlying spontaneity and thereby an analogue of human freedom and life (chap. 3). In our fourth chapter, while taking note of Schelling's comparable effort to join 'religion and science' or the metaphysics of mind and of nature, we observe the mingling of Idealist terminology and mystic symbolism that marks the remainder of Baader's works, and we encounter as well the primary assumption of his doctrine of nature; for by his 'squared triangle' he has traced all natural organization and spontaneity to a source of life in the Divine. There follows a presentation of the doctrine of the organism wherein life stood as the realized unity of 'spirit' and 'nature' and as the paradigm for understanding the physical universe in all of its particulars and as a lawfully ordered whole. By way of a concept of organic teleology, Baader finds natural analogues


to human moral purposiveness, and a means of re-establishing a theosophical teaching that knows all of creation to take part in the mystic return to God. Throughout this fifth chapter, reference to his contemporaries is intended to suggest why Baader would consider Boehme's vitalist metaphysics relevant to common Romantic concerns. Ending our Second Part, we introduce Jacobi's objection that any self-consistent philosophy purporting to have knowledge of the Deity and a religious understanding of nature leads ineluctably to pantheism. To this statement of the case for a separation of Wissen und Glauben, Baader replies that the intellect must be engaged in devotion, that 'the self is the other' or religious man needs not merely the 'supernatural' God but needs to know the divine presence in nature, and finally that the reconciliation of 'spiritualism' and 'naturalism' that Jacobi's other-worldly mysticism deemed impossible had already been achieved by Boehme.

Because theosophy claims knowledge as well as faith, we begin our Third Part by reviewing the main arguments of Baader's mystic epistemology. While repeating without critical spirit the traditional ciphers for divine illumination, he calls upon preternatural experience in order to show that theosophy can fulfil even the rational criteria for 'knowledge'. The protean theme of ^a'reunion of religion and science' takes on other forms in Baader's desire to make belief philosophical through a speculative thinking that will take religious symbol and mystery as its given items of knowledge, and in his confrontation with the 'scientific' philosophy in which irreligiosity had assumed two different guises: the 'egocentric' Criticism that had declared the absolute independence of human thought, and the Hegelian system that would supersede religion and subsume it within its own categories. Baader's theosophy, his 'onto-theology' (chap. 2) joins 'spirit and nature', morality and natural knowledge, by discerning in the internal structure of the Deity a metaphysical law that defines both freedom and the general form of the panorganic universe. Expressed by the sym-

bol of a fire in which darkness is overcome by light, this 'dialectical' law by which Boehme is to have laid the foundation for a resolution of all metaphysics, functions identically to the doctrine of the organism as a mediation of opposites. It generates the speculative concept of the self-created Trinity (or rather the Quaternary), the analogous concept of the Deity as the ideal organism, and the crucial concept of Baader's Boehmian theosophy: that of the eternal nature or life. The symbolical archetype of life, this mediative term acts at once as the divine 'substance' or 'body' ensuring the absolute concrete reality of God, and as a center of qualities and forces providing the creative model and power. The creation of the world of particulars is then pictured as the extension and articulation of that ideal life by the process of God's self-alienation and His 'return' to Himself through reflection on His image incarnate in the organic form of the created individuals, and of the creation as a whole. After characterizing the theosophical manner of signifying the dynamic structure of that eternal nature in 'this' vitalistically - perceived universe -- which Baader carries out mainly by defining life as an expression of 'spirit' or freedom in synthesis with inorganic 'nature' as the contrary which it overcomes -- we return to the problem of pantheism. Knowing the danger that he runs by admitting the irreducible quality of life, Baader restricts his identification of the eternal nature and the objectified universal life of the created individuals or their World-Soul. Distinguishing the 'substance' or Wesen, he maintains that the God of the eternal nature, enjoying unique independence, is entirely perfect prior to the creation of individual 'substances', and creates not from need but from love and the desire to increase perfection. As explained by the myth of the multiple fall (chap. 3), sin represents separation from unity and a disorder in the living 'system'. Evil constitutes disease that comes into the world through the failure of the particular will to consolidate its own freedom by overcoming the necessary

temptation and reproducing 'in imagination' the image of God. By choosing the image of the nature that he as central member in a synergic hierarchy of causes is meant to spiritualize and integrate with the whole, man keeps the rest of creation alienated from its vital center, the realization of materiality, dualism, finitude, temporality, and all other limitations on perfection being understood as due to the single interruption in the creative process of alienation and return. In the theology treated in our final chapter, deification is dis-alienation through the restoration of the divinely human form or Mikrotheos. Once more we are asked to think 'spirit' and 'nature' together, for theosophy requires the concept of a Geistleib in order that the ideal self may truly incarnate the divine image and without all pantheist 'confusion'. Man's return to internal integrity and the integration of the whole is enabled by the 'physical power' of grace, and a doctrine of justification is also attempted in terms of the organic vision. Before concluding our essay with Baader's doctrine of freedom, we indicate three typical and related lines of speculation -- on the mysteries of the eucharist, love, and alchemy -- by which the theosopher defines 'reintegration' and its preparation through the dedication of the self to Christ. With Baader's theory of the mystic will, the general organic doctrine 'comes home' as the same principles and definitions that establish a mean between 'spiritualist' and 'naturalist' doctrines now produce an expression of the mean between divine omnipotence and human autonomy. Human freedom can only be achieved in relation. Man's egocentricity is his impotence and his disease, yet if it is overcome -- according to the theosophical construction of life -- it becomes the 'contrary' and the condition of a perfect freedom. Mystic self-negation and rebirth, the cardinal event around which the ethics and thus also the 'physics' or cosmology of Baader's theosophy centers, is finally represented by the same symbols that originally tell of the auto-evolution of the living Deity.

LIFE AND WORKS OF FRANZ VON BAADER



Dennis Osborn Leuer

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To Priscilla and Laura

Foreword

I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. H. G. Schenk. His profound knowledge of Romanticism and his human generosity have been my invaluable guides.

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I. DER REISEPHILOSOPH - A PORTRAIT OF BAADER'S LIFE

1.

(1765 - 1814)

Born at Munich in 1765, the third son of a court physician, Franz Xaver Baader was brought up in the climate of orthodoxy. His parents were devout Catholics, his elder brother Clemens and his paternal uncle were priests, and his mother's family were eminent fresco-artists of the Bohemian Baroque¹. At sixteen Baader followed his brothers Clemens and Joseph to Ingolstadt, where he studied chemistry and medicine. Undistinguished in the natural sciences, the University had been dominated by the Society of Jesus since the mid-16th century, and had taught primarily the elite classes along confessional lines. After the abolition of the Jesuits in 1773, the law professor Weishaupt led an ambitious campaign to establish the Enlightenment in Bavaria². Founded at Ingolstadt in 1776, his Order of the Illuminati, a secret literary society, circulated the banned writings of Voltaire, the encyclopédistes, and Rousseau. No less ritualistic and doctrinaire than the priestly orders they sought to supplant, the deistic and republican Perpetrators of Light soon degenerated into an anti-clericalist band. At the grand masonic congress at Wilhelmsbad in 1782, the Illuminati and their sympathizers confronted the illuminist, Rosicrucian, and Swedenborgian lodges in an effort to gain control of German Freemasonry. At the center of the fray was the theosophical doctrine of Martinès de Pasqually and Saint-Martin, which the Illuminati, merely overstating the opinion of enlightened Germany, stigmatized as 'obscurantist', 'jesuitist', and 'cryptocatholic'. The French Martinists affiliated with the German illuminist fraternities, and the mystic masons prevailed³. Become a 'state within the state', the Illuminati and other secret societies were banished from the Electorate in 1784-5 for collusion with Austrian officials. But

1. Baader, C., I, 126-138; Grassl, H., 403-418.

2. Kluckhohn, A., 344-399; cf., 313-343.

3. Le Forrestier, R., esp. 553-706.

in Bavarian public life a harsh polemical dichotomy had been established between secularist, 'atheistic' Illuminatismus, and clericalist, 'obscurant' Jesuitismus. Bereft of enlightened professors as well as Jesuit endowments, the University at Ingolstadt dwindled further in significance during the nepotistic and repressive regime of the Elector Karl Theodor.

Among the mystic masons there arose a diffuse movement dedicated to the foundation of a universal church that would act as "an impregnable dike against the sea of disbelief"¹. When Baader first became acquainted with the controversial thought of Saint-Martin (in Kleuker's survey of illuminism, Magikon), he recognized at once the premise of this mystic superdenominationalism: that 'whatever is true and closely related to religion comes from the one source'². Baader's early latitudinarian sympathies were fostered by the future Bishop of Ratisbon, J. M. Sailer. If not a thoroughly original thinker, Sailer was nonetheless an exemplary personality who ~~exemplified~~^{typified} a liberal and irenic trend in Bavarian Catholicism, and would become the most influential religious figure of Southern Germany. In his diaries, and in parallel letters to his chosen mentor, Baader displayed the religious attitude that Sailer encouraged: emphatic emotionalism, a distaste for Enlightenment theology, and an openness toward uncanonical expressions of belief³. No doubt at Sailer's instigation, Baader read the Protestants Herder, Matthias Claudius, and J. C. Lavater, the Zurich illuminist and creator of physiognomy⁴. Sailer's own instructor, Benedikt Stattler, was an outspoken foe of the Illuminati, yet also became known as a heretic for contesting the unconditional infallibility of the pope⁵. In 1794, ultraconservative ex-Jesuits deprived Sailer of his lectureship

1. Le Forrestier, R., 612 f.

2. XI, 127 f.; cf. XI, 130.

3. i, 158-192.

4. i, 191.

5. Stattler was the anonymous author of Das Geheimnis der Bosheit des Stifters des Illuminatismus in Baiern (München und Augsburg, 1787); A.D.B., XXXV, 498-507.

because of his affinities with Lavater's 'experimental mysticism', and suspected ties with superdenominational illuminist groups. At the turn of the century, several of Sailer's students were brought before ecclesiastical tribunals for their parts in the pietistic and 'separatist' "Erweckungsbewegung"¹.

Having studied medicine with Max Stoll at Vienna in 1782, and graduated from Ingolstadt in 1786, Baader joined his father's practice. Too emotionally susceptible for medicine, he decided upon a career in mining. He toured Bavarian mineworks and quarries in 1787, and in the following year began studies under Werner at the renowned Freiberg Academy of Mines². It is generally acknowledged that Abraham Werner, by insisting on his doctrine of geological succession, appreciably retarded the progress of modern geology. Until the 1830's German texts were dominated by his 'Neptunist' theories of a vast and tranquil sea, the "Urmeer", from which all minerals were deposited in 'formation suites' that began with the 'primal' granite. Werner was notoriously averse to writing. But it is said that in his speculative Geognosie he contemplated the effects of terrain on warfare, language, and customs, proceeding upon the assumption that the surface minerals of a given region constituted a kind of genius loci moulding human character and behavior. His enthusiastic reverence for nature and his encyclopedic, 'organic' approach inspired the generation of Romantic "Naturphilosophen". Herder, Goethe, Hegel, and G. H. von Schubert all adopted Wernerian theories, and among those who journeyed to Freiberg were Schelling, Steffens, Eschenmayer, and Novalis. Apart from the scientific (and mystic) commonplace of an 'original fluidity', Baader made extensive use of mineralogical or chemical (and alchemical) imagery, and was alive to the metaphorical potential of the miner's calling as bosom companion to the metals and ini-

1. Schiel, H., I, 79 ff., 114; cf. II, 38.

2. This paragraph is based upon: Beck, R.; Cuvier, E., ii, 111-134;

tiate into the mysteries of nature and the unconscious. In 1805 he wrote to Sailer:

As a miner, for years I have been digging underground, and hear nothing of the idle talk that dies away above me. I have uncovered a great deal of which the gossips know nothing, yet the best still lies beneath me ... per ignem ad lucem!¹

Alexander von Humboldt, who studied at Freiberg in 1791-2, then went on to refute Werner, recalled that Baader

worked hard in the shafts ... was more concerned with the practical side of mining than with Geognosie, thorough in observing facts, good-natured and satirical ... not intolerant toward heretics. ... His political leanings were liberal. It was the time of the Pillnitz Conference in our vicinity ... that called for political declarations.²

Having completed his studies, and written two professional treatises, Baader left Freiberg around Easter, 1792, to extend his practical knowledge in the mining districts of Southern Germany. Late that year he travelled via London to Edinburgh, where Wernerian geology prevailed, and where he could be reunited with his brother Joseph, an engineer and technological entrepreneur who would be remembered as one of the earliest proponents of railway development in Germany.³

The period in Britain represents an anomalous 'rationalist' phase in Baader's thought. In December, 1792, he wrote: "The recent events in the political world have impressed not only my mind but my heart... I feel a great reform within myself, -- the genius of age has touched me"⁴. Saint-Martin was to write of the Revolution as though it were not the work of man, but "une image abrégée du jugement dernier", God's punishment of the sovereigns as guardians of the popular morality⁵. But with Wordsworth, Hegel, and others of his generation, Baader at first regarded the creation of the First Republic as the triumph of Reason: "There

1) i, 242.

2. XV, ii f.

3. ^{see} Siber, I.

4. XI, 201.

5. Saint-Martin, L., Lettre, 12.

is only one principle in the being called man -- only one point of gravity for the aggregate of all his powers -- Reason'¹. Baader's free-thinking was nurtured by the English Francophiles Mary Wollstonecraft and William Godwin. Shortly after its publication in early 1793, Baader read and annotated Godwin's Inquiry Concerning Political Justice², wherein the former Quaker advanced a zealous doctrine of progressivism, utilitarianism, and social anarchism. As the basis for his psychology, ethics, and political science, Godwin took the single ultrarational axiom that 'sound reasoning, when adequately communicated, must always be victorious over error'³. Moved by Godwin's revelations of a secular paradise, Baader endorsed his thoroughgoing Illuminatism and entertained a radical anti-institutionalism that extended even to the Church⁴. Disillusioned by the Jacobin aftermath, Baader would later trace anarchy to apostasy. Fittingly, it was only in the initial stages of the Revolution that he ever questioned his own orthodoxy, and in one of the few letters remaining from this period, announced an imminent conversion to Quakerism⁵.

While in Scotland, Baader was supported by a Freiberg benefactor, by a grant from the Bavarian government, and its loan, which would spawn a wearisome correspondence spanning eighteen years. But one of his mining enterprises failed, ended in litigation, and left Baader destitute. For financial reasons, and reportedly in flight because of his political ideas, Baader sailed in July 1796 for Hamburg, where indebtedness did not interfere with prodigality⁶. He remained there half a year, until rescued by a further loan for which his somewhat desperate security was an arrangement to marry a girl he had never met, and

1. XI, 203.

2. XI, 210-284.

3. I, 26 f. Godwin, W., I, 26f.

4. XI, 263-5.

5. i, 195 f.; cf. XV, 274.

6. ii, 56, 57, 60.

apparently never would¹.

In Hamburg Baader met the popular philosopher F. H. Jacobi, and Matthias Claudius, the poet who had translated Saint-Martin's Des erreurs et de la vérité. Baader had read Jacobi's romantic novels in his early twenties, and had written in 1787 that they seemed to have a 'permanent effect' on his spirit². Newly returned to Germany, Baader seems also to have refound the roots of his mysticism, for the day after their meeting he wrote to Jacobi:

You (and Mr. Claudius ...) will soon see that (in the language of the enlightened gentlemen and sophists of our age), I am completely incurable, that I am a fanatic (Schwärmer), a fool, even in fact a Christian.

His 'rationalist crisis' over, Baader was again a Saint-Martin enthusiast, looked to the Cabbala for new directions in philosophy, and planned a voyage 'to seek out the purest form of masonry'³. In an undoubtedly perceptive account of their meeting in Hamburg, Wilhelm von Humboldt wrote that Baader belonged

to those men and minds who feel certain that until now a completely false and superficial way has been followed, and think that they are in possession of unique, profound ideas on the nature of things, but who, perhaps just because of their profundity, ... appear mystical to others ... He is amazingly vivacious, he hardly listens, and rarely have I⁴ known conversation so trying, because he ~~never~~ leaves off.

Jacobi, who became a close confidant, reviewed Baader's manuscripts and 'despite their brilliant contents', advised him to forestall publication⁵. But with the appearance in 1797 of his Beiträge zur Elementar-Physiologie, Baader immediately took his place among the creators of Naturphilosophie. While it was left to the bold poetic genius of Schelling to carry out the definitive synthesis of the metaphysics of mind and of nature, Baader's brusque, oracular essay fused mysticism and sci-

1. i, 204.

2. XI, 168.

3. XV, 164, 168 f.

4. Humboldt, W., XIV, 342 ff.

5. XV, 163-187; iv, 40.

entific theory in the way that would characterize the Romantic philosophy of nature. It had been in planning,^{prep.} furthermore, since 1793¹, and its motives were already present, although in a more rudimentary form, in Baader's thesis and his 'chemical' treatise from 1792. Together with the equally fragmentary Pythagoräisches Quadrat (1798), the Beiträge had a remarkable impact. The Naturphilosoph Steffens wrote that Baader, whose Beiträge appeared 'even earlier than Schelling's writings in Naturphilosophie ... appeared to us to be of presentient depth'². In his periodical devoted to the collective intellectual movement, Schelling criticized the editors of the Jenaische Allgemeine Zeitung for ignoring Baader's 'profound' works, and in a following edition, Eschenmayer's Spontaneität-Weltseele took its departure from Baader's hastily-expressed ideas³. The biologist Lorenz Oken came under the influence of Baader's early work, and it was Das pythagoräische Quadrat that prompted Hegel to undertake 'a theosophical investigation of the Holy Triangle'⁴. In the library left by Novalis were Baader's essays of 1797 and 1798, and in November, 1798, the poet wrote to Friedrich Schlegel:

one person I still would like in our community -- one, whom I compare to you alone -- Baader ... Could he not be invited, to the Athenaeum? ... You could accomplish prodigious things.⁵

One of the precious few scientists among the Naturphilosophen, Baader began his career in the Bavarian civil service in 1797, and by 1801 had been promoted to Chief Superintendent of Mines and elected to the Bavarian Academy of Sciences. As inspector of mines, quarries and mineral factories, he went in the Spring of 1800 to survey Bavarian-owned lands in Bohemia. In Prague he met Baroness Franziska von Reisky, proposed impulsively, and was married in June. Of their several children, only Guido (1801) and Julie (1804) survived infancy.

1. i, 195.

2. Steffens, H., W.i.e. VII, 398; IV, 78; cf. XV, 189.

3. Schelling, F., Zeitschrift, I, i, 94; II, i, 5 f.

4. Rosenkranz, K., 101 f. (We repeat this with due reservation.)

5. Novalis, IV, 263.

In the decade following 1798 Baader produced only four scant^{brief} philosophical essays, and a handful of articles in economics. Writing in the periodical Europa in 1803, Friedrich Schlegel called it 'a loss for philosophy' that such men as Baader should withdraw from literature¹. During these 'silent' years Baader absorbed himself in the study of the speculative mystics, above all Saint-Martin and Boehme. His early attachment to the French theosopher has already been mentioned, but it cannot be said exactly when Baader turned toward Boehme. On first reading, Baader was supposedly so enraged by Boehme's heady prose that he hurled the volume against the wall². By the early 1800's, however, he had begun the assiduous reading that would make him surely the foremost student of Boehme in his century -- Boehmius redivivus -- according to the cherished epithet given him by A. W. Schlegel³. When Ludwig Tieck visited Baader in 1804, 'the theme that lay nearest both their hearts was Jacob Boehme'. Indulging in a three-hour monologue, Baader showed 'a comprehensive erudition in this literature, richness of thought, and mystic profundity'. But even Tieck, who had encouraged both Novalis and Schlegel to read Boehme, could not follow Baader down 'the tortuous paths of his speculation'⁴. By 1803, Baader's researches had ranged as far as the English alchemist Robert Fludd⁵, and he had undertaken a comparative study of Saint-Martin and Boehme, a 'painstaking travail' which, like other projects Baader set himself, never came to fruition⁶.

With the accession of Max Joseph of Bavaria in 1799, there entered an era of radical public reform. The Foreign Minister Montgelas, a former Illuminatus, installed thoroughgoing mea-

1. Europa, I, 49.

2. XVI, 8.

3. Atterbom, P.142.

4. Tieck, L., I, 311.

5. Unpublished letter, Manuscripts Department, Wilhelm Humboldts Universität zu Berlin.

6. i, 241. Through A. W. Schlegel, Baader opened correspondence with the 'knight errant of theosophy', A. Divonne, and began a decade-long search for knowledge and manuscripts of the original Martinists: iv, 66-68, 142, 152 f.; XV, 330 f., 347, 359, 377, etc.; cf. Viatte, A., I, 100 ff.

asures to rationalize finances and administration, to secularize the monasteries, and in general to subordinate the ecclesiastical to the lay authority. After Karl Theodor's reign of 'Jesuitism' and 'obscurantism', it was thought necessary to infuse an enlightened and scientific spirit into learning in Bavaria, that had passed until then as the most Boeotian province in Germany. Leading Protestant intellectuals, including Baader's friend Jacobi, and F. W. Schelling, were summoned to strengthen the Academy (although not always with the desired effect). Several North German scholars also joined the University that was transferred in 1803 from Ingolstadt to Landshut, partially in order to dispel the lingering Jesuit influence.

When Schelling came to Munich in 1806, he and Baader formed a close though unlasting friendship. Shortly after his arrival, Schelling wrote to his father describing Baader as 'a great lover of mystical and theosophical writings ... a very learned man and a splendid human being ... a clear-sighted prophet and an excellent man'¹. For Caroline Schelling, Baader was 'a divinatory scientist ... one of the finest men not only in Bavaria but in all of Germany'². At Caroline's death in 1810, Baader foresaw the change that would come over Schelling, whose love for her was legendary: 'she was a woman of noble qualities, ... her husband has lost a great deal in her, and I fear that her loss will be irreplaceable for him'³.

Schelling, the son of a Protestant parson, had studied philosophy and theology at the famous Tübingen Seminary. While at Jena he had read Boehme carefully, and was versed in the theosophy of Oetinger, the 18th century Swabian Pietist theologian and 'rediscoverer of Boehme'⁴. Nonetheless, Schelling had been antipathetic to traditional Christianity, most patently so in

1. Schelling, F., Briefe, II, 101, 109, 162, 166.

2. Caroline, II, 491.

3. XV, 236.

4. Benz, E., Schellings ..., 231-303

his poignant Epikurisches Glaubensbekenntnis Hans Widerporstens, and it was first in Munich that he began to approach conventional belief. In a public letter addressed to Fichte, Schelling wrote a brief defense of religious fanaticism (Schwärmerei), as though to declare a conversion to Christian mysticism. 'In those words', Schelling's biographer wrote, 'one detects, though the names are not mentioned, the influence of Baader, and the spiritual proximity of Jacob Boehme'¹.

A mutual passion for the German mystic tradition formed the basis of Schelling's and Baader's philosophical alliance. Schelling acquainted Baader with the poetry of Angelus Silesius, obtained for him copies of Oetinger's works, and in 1809 presented him with a quarto edition of Boehme². He published Baader's theosophical essays of 1808 (in his Jahrbuch der Medizin!), and his central work on human freedom openly attests to the significance of the Bavarian mystic³. By all contemporary accounts, Baader dominated their relationship, less by virtue of his still meagre writings than by his celebrated brilliance in conversation⁴.

The Romantic physicist J. W. Ritter was called to the Bavarian Academy in 1805. In the closing years of the eighteenth century, a theosophical sect had gathered around Ritter to practise telepathy and postulate the synthesis of mysticism and science⁵. In a series of lectures at Jena in 1798, he had advanced the theory, of germinal importance to Naturphilosophie, that galvanism would provide the index to all biological activity. He discovered ultraviolet light, the principles of the Voltaic Pile and of the Ohmian law, but the 'marvellous and impenetrable obscurity' in which Ritter clothed his observations

1. Fischer, K.,

2. Schelling, Briefe, II, 162.

3. Werke, IV, 258 and n., 265, 268 n. et passim.

4. Varnhagen von Ense, Denkwürdigkeiten VI, 210; Ringseis, E., I, 68, 366.

5. Spenlé, E., 201 ff.; Steffens, H., W.i.e. VI, 90 ff.

made even these genuine accomplishments go unrecognized'.¹

'Ritter is a knight (Ritter)', wrote his friend Novalis, 'and we are but pages. Even Baader is only his minstrel'². On a personal level, however, it was apparently Baader who provided the 'orient' for the opium-taking, erratic, and sickly Ritter. In typically exotic language, Ritter wrote to Novalis's brother, Carl von Hardenberg, on the subject of Baader:

Continue with this correspondence as long and as intensively as possible. This man you will never find again ... to orient oneself to him is more rewarding than all other orientation, save that to women. He is more a mathematician than a physiologist of our₃ God, since he reckons that which others only take on faith.

Late in 1808, Ritter wrote: 'Death all around, only Baader is living'⁴.

After 1778, when Mesmer announced at Paris his discovery of a superfine fluid that penetrated and surrounded all bodies, every 'occult phenomenon' -- from hypnotic and somnabulistic states to clairvoyance and prevision -- came to be grouped under the generic term 'animal magnetism'. Making full use of accidents of language, theosophers and Naturphilosophen derived from 'animal magnetism' a religious, symbolic, and magical theory of nature that was intended to replace philosophical materialism. More than the activity of a mere subtle fluid, that might be accepted along with those of electricity and light, 'animal magnetism' represented an entire superior physics, and Ritter and Baader were masters of its theory. Beginning in 1806, the two scientists collaborated on a project to verify empirically the results of their speculations. Baader arranged for financial support and the limited sanction of the Academy for Ritter's Italian journey to experiment with the dowser Campetti₅. In Campetti's seeming ability to 'sense' hidden metals and

1. A.D.B., XXVIII, 676.

2. Novalis, IV, 263.

3. Ritter, J. W., Briefe, p. 41 f.

4. Ibid., 42.

5. XV, 197, 210 f.; i, 246.

water, Ritter saw a normal human faculty^{only} developed to an unusual degree¹. The world, in Ritter's lyrical vision, was originally totally organic, and the mineral veins were the fossil remains of its former living skeleton. By way of his central place in the 'Animal Universe', man's task as scientist was to resurrect the earth². The divining-rod shock as inorganic nature struggled to make itself an 'earth' revolving around man's 'sun', and the 'most perfect microcosm' thereby proved himself 'life-giver to all the rest of nature'³. As Schelling explained to Hegel, Campetti's talents demonstrated the dominance of man's 'magnetism' over that of nature⁴. Hoping to correlate the laws of rhabdomancy and electricity, Ritter measured voltaic oscillations against the rhythmic quiverings of the dowsing-rod. Not content with investigating other water-witches, Ritter himself mastered the art of the baguette divinatoria⁵. But the episode ended in scandal. At Jacobi's insistence, Ritter reported on Campetti before the Academy in August 1807, and his findings were soundly rejected by a committee headed by the distinguished anatomist Sömmering⁶.

Ritter's later science may have belonged only to the realm of poetry, and Baader may have been to blame for the fact that it entered the halls of the Academy. But it was an age when science was 'overgrown with aesthetics' and Goethe's theory of colours contended with Newton's, an age that appears to have been of significance mainly for the empiricist reaction that it engendered among scientists of the following generation⁷. Schelling lectured before the academicians on 'The Relation of the Plastic Arts to Nature' (1806), Ritter on 'Physics as Art',⁽¹⁸⁰⁷⁾ and the Campetti affair realized momentarily the yearned-after synthesis of science, art, and religion.

1. Ritter, J., Der Siderismus, 190.

2. Ritter, J., Fragmente, 9, 216 f.

3. Ritter, J., Briefe, 28.

4. Schelling, F., Briefe, II, 114 ff.

5. XV, 207 f.; Der Siderismus, 48.

6. See Caroline, 491 ff.; XV, 218 f., 227.

7. Du Bois-Reymond, E., Reden II, 161, 305, 364. In 1838, when the biologist Schwann was preparing to announce his cellular theory, he was cautious to phrase himself so that scientists

On a business trip to Nürnberg in 1809, Baader met the physician, Naturphilosoph, and author of homiletic novels, G. H. von Schubert. Recalling first impressions, Schubert called Baader

the master in the art of showing, through grand outlines of thought, the heights as well as the depths into which, spiritual knowledge as well as life ... may rise and fall.

In his Ansichten von der Nachtseite der Naturwissenschaft, Schubert's leitmotiv was the living unity of man and nature, and 'the relation of the present existence with a future, higher one, and how within the present the seed of the new future life gradually develops.'² Naturally, Schubert regarded somnambulism and prophecy as intrusions of the higher spiritual world. But sea-horses and dolphins -- since Nature returned to the sea to prefigure her highest creations -- also play their roles in Schubert's theories, intriguing theories that depend on equivocal ^{actions} and, as Coleridge noted, are "covered with a fine sandy mist over all"³. Continuing his exploration of nature's 'night realms', Schubert foretokened modern dream-analysis in his Symbolik des Traums. He procured rare books for Baader's growing library. In return, Baader encouraged Schubert's translation of Saint-Martin's L'Esprit des choses, that appeared in 1812 with Baader's foreword⁴.

The unorthodox literary and scientific pursuits notwithstanding, Baader achieved the summit of his profession in 1808 and was incorporated into the newly-created Order of the Civil Service. He had also bought a factory on the Bavarian Forest, and developed a method of manufacturing glass. Late in 1810 he departed for Austria to market his invention⁵, beginning a year-long episode which brings the picture of the lofty visionary in-

could not be put in mind of the speculations of the Naturphilosophen. J. Müller, 286; cf. H - D, 14 f., 20 f.

1. Schubert, G., Der Erwerb, II, 350.
2. Schubert, G., Ansichten, 329.
3. This was written by Coleridge on page 288 of his copy of Schubert's Ansichten, now in the British Museum Library.
4. I, 57 ff.
5. ii, 161-197.

to a Swedenborg-like contrast with that of the vexed and impertune man-of-affairs. Baader was denounced as a 'charlatan' and 'debaucher'. Suspected as an agent of the Bavarian arm of the Napoleonic Rheinbund, he came under the scrutiny of the Jacobin-phobic Austrian police. Perhaps he would have been spared these indignities, had he not been uncharacteristically reticent concerning his purpose -- evasive, rather, since he formally pledged allegiance to both Austria and Bavaria¹. In the issue, Austrian Emperor Francis I awarded 6000 gulden for the invention, a sum which Baader tried to augment in countless futile appeals². Embittered by the bureaucratic chicanery to which he had been subjected, Baader looked back upon his journey as 'a dark cloud' in his life, one that would flee 'like Job' were it not for the memory of his Viennese friends³. The most enduring of these would prove to be the mesmerist Dr. Malfatti, and Friedrich Schlegel, who stated in early 1811 that if Baader could write as he could speak, 'then the talk would no longer be of Schelling and Fichte ... Baader is without doubt the brightest and profoundest man I have encountered for some time'⁴.

Throughout the early nineteenth century, Baader took part in the often rancorous ideological strife that then divided Bavarian learned society⁵. Monteglas's rationalist reforms, including the importation of Protestant Northern academicians and scholars, engendered opposition among native Catholic intellectuals, and the old polemic between Illuminatismus and Jesuitismus was resuscitated. At the Landshut University, Catholics under the leadership of the tolerant Sailer resisted the imposition of enlightenment philosophy and theology. Particular in the medical faculty (where Naturphilosophie in general flourished), exponents of Baader's and Schelling's mysticized science

1. i, 270 ff.; ii, 449; 221 ff.; iv, 403, 410.

2. iii, 236-442.

3. Finke, H., 31.

4. Boiserée, S., 110, 94.

5. This treatment is based partly on Funk, P., esp. 113-163.

could also be counted among the adversaries of the Northern professors. Several of Baader's close correspondents were members of the 'Landshut Movement'¹, whose binding interests may perhaps be represented in the figure of Dr. Passavant. Having learned 'animal magnetism' from Dr. Malfatti at Vienna, Passavant was, although Protestant, a disciple of Sailer's mysticism, and in his science he attempted to combine medicine with the curing of souls². Naturphilosophie, which offered the alluring prospect of 'science and religion considered under a common viewpoint' appeared in such ways to unite 'organically' with indigenous mysticism in the Romantic movement at Landshut and Munich³. Writing of this period in Bavaria, the historian Prantl could distinguish a 'party of monks, mystics, and Schellingians' that withstood the innovations of Monteglas's rationalist 'liberal clan'⁴.

In 1809-10 the controversy between the two groups intensified when Jacobi, President of the Academy, brought action in libel against the Bavarian 'patriot' Aretin, who had published a defamatory political tract and an inelegant satire depicting the 'Swedish' Academy overrun by subversive foreign scholars⁵. The Saxon educationalist Thiersch, also reckoned among the 'Northern Lights', was the victim of an armed assault in 1810, and 'no one doubted which party was responsible'⁶. It was within recent memory of these partly political and personal incidents that the nominally theological debate broke out between Jacobi and Schelling (1812)⁷, ending in Jacobi's departure from Munich. Having sided openly with Schelling, Baader remarked curtly that his once dear friend Jacobi 'should have stayed at home'⁸.

1. Burke, G., 171 ff.

2. Helfferich, A., 30, 100-139, esp. 74 ff., 81-3. Passavant is the "Z" of Baader's letters in XV, 270-369.

3. Steffens, H. IV, 122; Funk, P. 58 f.

4. A.D.B. XIII, 577 f.

5. A.D.B. XIII, 605 f.; Jacobi, F. Briefe, 131 f.

6. A.D.B. XXXVIII, 10; XV, 235; Thiersch, L., 72 ff.

7. See below, pp. 102-8.

8. iv, 374; cf. I, 65; II, 24 n.; i, 281; ii, 449-61; Atterbom, P 146 f.

Baader first emerged as an activist with his plans for sweeping reform of the Academy, including the creation of philosophical departments. These proposals were greeted in Northern circles as 'Bavarian patriotic heaven-storming' attempts by that 'raging typhoon', Baader, to give a particularist and mystical imprint to the Academy¹. In concert with Schelling, Baader attempted to bring other leading Naturphilosophen to the Academy², and contributed his theosophy to the periodical that Schelling had dedicated 'to the moral renewal of the nation'³. At a public meeting of the Academy in 1813, Baader read a paper attacking (basically Kantian) rationalism in science and ethics, and expounding his own idiosyncratic speculations⁴. The oration met with a quick, strident reaction. Cajetan Weiller, an (oxymoronic) Kantian Catholic and 'Pope of the Liberal Party', decried Baader's speech as 'polemical, dogmatic, and unacademic', and it was ordered to be struck from the records⁵. It was in fact 'anti-academic'⁶, as Baader divulged privately, and its purpose, as he declared in an acrid address to the Academy, was 'to defend religion and science from the effrontery of an ethic that in recent times has divorced itself from them and made itself obnoxious'⁷. Throughout the next decade, Baader fulminated against the rationalist influence and the secularization of Bavarian public life. Writing to Crown Prince Ludwig, in whom he saw an ally, Baader complained that Bavarians and Catholics had no say in an Academy dominated by Protestants, while Montgelas would 'illuminate Bavaria with these Northern Lights'⁸.

Although questions of philosophy and religion were also questions of state, Baader's politics remain obscure. From the limited information, this seems due in part to cautious cir-

1. i, 251 ff., 277 f., 322; ii, 130 ff., 142.

2. Steffens, H., W.i.e., V, 301; i, 252; XV, 276.

3. II, 9-26; Plitt, J., II, 91.

4. V, 1-32.

5. Finke, H., 33; XV, 239, 250-4; ii, 486.

6. XV, 56; i, 284.

7. Sauter, J., 901; XV, 56 f., iv, 92.

8. Sauter, J., 911, 913 f.; cf. XV, 328.

cumspection; after all, Baader was accused as an Austrian agent, and because of the 'confusion' that his activities on behalf of mysticism had brought into religious and political affairs, 'a certain man' had wished him killed¹. As was now becoming clear, Baader's fundamental polemical motive was not in any case a political one, but rather the freedom and reascendence of religion. On this basis, he placed trust in the promises of liberal constitutions to be granted after the Northern-initiated War of Liberation², and wrote in 1812 regarding the Russian and French battles in the North:

The true God is indeed very far from us (as political unities), that is, our politics is very far from Him, since He allows us to undergo such horrors. And the attempt by present-day Protestants to divine the common weal, and in truly heathenish and despotic manner to sacrifice the individual to their state, has never shown itself more disgustingly and foolishly than now, when, practically everywhere we see "gouvernements sans prière".³

1. XV, 58 ff.; iii, 529-37; XV, 249, 257; i, 285.

2. XV, 245, 251; iv, 375; cf. ii, 173.

3. XV, 249.

2.

(1815 - 1824)

In the early post-Napoleonic period Baader enjoyed unanticipated influence as a moralist and political theorist. It is widely agreed that he contributed substantially to the original ideology of the Holy Alliance Treaty, signed 26 September 1815, the last attempt to base political relations in Europe upon a religious foundation.

No later than December 1814, Baader made his first attempt to communicate with Tsar Alexander I, through the Pietist popular writer, J. H. Jung-Stilling, then in close touch with the Tsar's inner circle. From Jung-Stilling's letter dated 12 January 1815, it is evident that the month before Baader had sent him proposals for the dissemination of theosophical thought in Russia, presumably through his own work on Boehme and Saint-Martin. In the reply, Jung-Stilling was discouraging:

In a confidential and very remarkable conversation that I had in private with Tsar Alexander this past summer, he complained to me that Martinism, a false mysticism, and a peculiar type of freemasonry stood very much in the way of pure, simple Christianity, and the struggle for the one thing that is needed in Russia ... I am therefore certain that the Tsar will not support, but rather will hinder the carrying-out of your plan. The Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs, Golitsyn, who is also President of the Holy Synod, is of the same mind ... Tauler, Ruysbroeck, Thomas à Kempis, Mme. Guyon, Fénelon, the divine Francis of Sales, etc. etc., will always be welcomed in the Russian Church, but Jacob Boehme, Saint-Martin and all such theosophers are still not in favour there.

A second opportunity to approach Tsar Alexander came in early April 1815, when Baader met Roxandre Stourdza, a young noblewoman in the retinue of Tsarina Elisaveta at Munich². From Vienna, in July 1815, she wrote to Baader extolling his religious ideas, and thanking him for the encouragement he had given her

1. iv, 93.

2. iv, 102; Geiger, M., 313; Stourdza, A., V, 42 ff.

sister, a melancholic person who took Baader as a spiritual guide¹. The letter is prudently imprecise, but its analysis by Hildegard Schaefer establishes that Mlle. Stourdza, an intimate of the Tsar, forwarded a letter and a memoir from Baader to Alexander, then recently departed for Heidelberg². Although the manuscript is lost, the main ideas of the memoir survive in the form of a pamphlet published later in 1815 with the title Ueber das durch die französische Revolution herbeigeführte Bedürfnis einer neuen und innigeren Verbindung der Religion mit der Politik³.

Insisting as it did upon the political rather than the merely private meaning of Christianity, Baader's essay bore striking resemblances to Alexander's first draft of the Holy Alliance Treaty⁴. Baader attributed the disunity of society to irreligiosity, and saw in the transcendental the source of civil justice and liberty. The ontological principle of love was to organize the life not only of individuals but of states:

It cannot well be denied that a religion which announced the message of the approach of the Kingdom of God among men has a cosmopolitan tendency, and although the Kingdom is not of this world, it is coming for and into it.⁵

Restressing the superdenominational character of the theocratic order he envisaged, Baader sent copies of his memoir to the Protestant King Frederick William III of Prussia and the Catholic Emperor Francis I of Austria, the other principal signatories to the Holy Alliance Treaty⁶.

No one would maintain that Baader alone inspired Alexander's idea of a divine international covenant. The influence of Jung-Stilling has always been presumed, and that of Mme. de Krüdener.

1. i, 289 ff. -- iv, 213; cf. iv, 118, 127 f.

2. Schaefer, H., 65 ff.

3. VI, 11-28.

4. For the ideological background of the Holy Alliance, see Schenk, H., esp. chaps. 1 and 2.

5. VI, 25; transl. Schenk, H., 16.

6. i, 496.

A Pietist proselyte, she was introduced to the Tsar in one of Mlle. Stourdza's pious 'tea-evenings', accompanied him throughout Europe, and was the first to suggest the name Sainte Alliance¹. Since his military and religious crisis of 1812, Alexander had consulted numerous mystics, and, as long as the biographical explanation is accepted, it may equally be that the main incentive for his hagiopolitics came from the Tsar himself². But Baader's thought and his wording are discernible in the Treaty, and it is at least likely that, forming the link between mystic Romantic theory and the real political struggle, he provided the most decisive intellectual stimulus toward the founding of the Christian Federation³.

Alexandre Stourdza, Roxandre's brother, joined Baader closer to the Russian administrative powers. A diplomatic attaché under the Secretary of State Capodistrias, Stourdza was directly involved in the events leading to the Second Peace of Paris and the Holy Alliance. His friendship with Baader, dating from April 1815, was based initially on common religious convictions, with the older theosopher once more acting as preceptor. From Vienna, in October, Stourdza wrote to Baader:

I have heard sublime truths from you ... I therefore cling to your kind promise to communicate to me in occasional letters the spiritual substance of which I am in such need, for otherwise my way of life makes my best life-hopes into empty dreams.

Moldavian in origin, and a cousin of the revolutionary Ypsilantis, Stourdza was throughout his diplomatic career an ardent proponent of the Greek cause. No doubt at Stourdza's request, by late 1815 Baader was made head of a chapter of the Society of the Friends of the Muses⁵. A non-political charity organized by Capodistrias and sponsored by the Tsar, the Society used its proceeds in order to bring Greek students to Germany. When the

1. Stourdza, R., 217 ff.; Saint-Beuve, C-A, 382-410.

2. Schaeder, H., 63; Stourdza, A., I, 346.

3. Schwarz, W., 63 f.; XV, 319.

4. iv, 109.

5. iv, 107, 109 f., 113 f., 127 f.

Society was transferred to Weimar in 1817, and Baader relinquished his post, it was discovered to his embarrassment that he had misplaced certain funds; still, in 1820 he was looking after Greek immigrants, and proposed to the Tsar that a Greek chapel and seminary be created at Munich¹.

Stourdza's pamphleteering helped form Baader's romanticized conception of the Eastern Orthodox Church. In his Considérations sur la doctrine et l'esprit de l'église russe (1816), with a flattering reference, Stourdza restated Baader's theme of the Religion of Love as the original socializing principle². He also accentuated the Church's tolerance, a point upon which other indications were perhaps not lacking. In 1814, both Tsar Alexander and Baader's correspondent Jung (his compound name was a tribute to the Pietist "Stille im Lande"), had expressed the opinion that the Moravian Brethren had developed the ideal religious organization³. As one of the Russian government's chief publicists, Stourdza only spelled out official policy when he wrote that

We live in a time when all Christians without distinction ought to unite their efforts in order to struggle against perdition and unbelief.⁴

Stourdza acted as intermediary between Baader and Prince Alexander Golitsyn⁵. One of the 'Holy Triangle' at St. Petersburg, and a leader of the religious renaissance that followed on the Napoleonic invasion, Golitsyn was Procurator General of the Holy Synod, and Minister of Ecclesiastical Affairs (des Cultes). He was also President of the Russian Bible Society, an offshoot of the superdenominational movement stemming originally from the Moravian Brethren :its establishment as a state institution in early 1813 was a clear sign that Russia was entering an era of religious liberalism⁶.

1. i, 308 f., 312; iv, 147, 154, 163.

2. Stourdza, A., IV, 14.

3. Jung-Stilling, H., 331.

4. Stourdza, A., IV, 2.

5. iv, 109; 131, 137, 147, 166; i, 313, 316, 344.

6. For the history of the Society, see Acherley, J.

Baader's above-mentioned essay had been printed as an address to Golitsyn, and late in 1815 he presented Baader with 5000 florins and the unlikely commission of writing a text for the Russian clergy¹. This 'new presentation of natural and divine wisdom', Baader's theosophical magnum opus, was never achieved. But the assignment alone was evidence that Jung-Stilling's warning -- 'all that which is called theosophy is irrelevant' -- was not to be taken seriously². The Lilienzeit that Boehme had foreseen seemed now to have arrived³.

The latitudinarian posture of the Russian Church was all the more appealing to Baader when uncanonical beliefs were not being tolerated by formal Catholicism in Germany. Since the late 18th century, the visionary and miracle-worker Martin Boos had preached the only saving faith -- "Christus für uns und in uns" -- before a large popular following, and had led a kind of Catholic Pietism of hospitals, poorhouses, and missions. Priests cleaving to Boos's Erweckungsbewegung were persecuted throughout Bavaria and Austria for teaching that the Catholic Church was degenerate, the papacy and priesthood devoid of value. At Augsburg, large conventicles had recently gathered to hear Ignaz Lindl, a cleric who had associated with the Moravian Brethren in Switzerland and received the 'kiss of awakening' from Boos's friend and disciple, Martin Gossner. Abandoning the use of sacraments and the doctrine of mortal sin, Lindl's sect professed a pietistical 'religion of the heart' and the invisibility of the true church. This Catholic popular mysticism formed only part of the vast and indistinct religious movement, mainly Protestant, that arose in Southern Germany during the early nineteenth century⁴.

The influential J. M. Sailer, who had been Boos's teacher and had nurtured Baader's own tolerant Catholicism, was known to be sympathetic toward the 'awakened' priests⁵. Kept aware of the

1. iv, 123; Sauter, J., 902; XV, 298, 301, 305, 313.

2. iv, 99.

3. XV, 280.

4. Aichinger, G., 259-327; Benz, E., Die abendländische Sendung, 563-714; Gossner, M., esp. 16 ff., 74 f.; Goyau, G., I, 251 f., III, 206-18; Ringseis, E., I, 219 f., 316-66.

5. Helfferich, A., 106; iv, 139; Ringseis, I, 308, 361.

opinions of Sailer (who read his essay on religion and politics), Baader was enthusiastic over the mystic movement in Catholicism. Both he and Schelling believed that Boos's miracle-cures were 'more than chimeræ', and Baader gave credence to the statement of his friend, G. H. von Schubert, that they were witnessing a religious movement greater than that of the Moravian Brethren.

In 1815 the Society of Jesus had lost its asylum in St. Petersburg and Moscow. Considered calumniators of the established faith, and 'separators of families' by conversion, the Jesuits had called forth defenses of Orthodoxy by the Moscow Archimandrite and by Alexandre Stourdza¹. Early in 1816, when Golitsyn entrusted Baader with the sending of young priests to replace the Jesuits, it was understood that they should come from among the Augsburg dissenters². The 'awakened' priests regarded the Scriptures as the sole source of faith and its sole guide. They therefore had naturally strong ties with the equally anti-sacerdotal Bible Society. In his reports to Golitsyn, who was convinced that 'the Gospel should be preached in all languages', Baader emphasized that the priests persecuted in Bavaria were those who propagated the reading of the Bible³. Writing to the mystic mesmerist Dr. Passavant in 1816 and 1817, Baader expressed accord with the religious point of view of the Erweckten. By its intolerance, the Mother Church had itself declined into a 'sect', whereas, Baader wrote,

I have always held the reading and promotion of the Bible to be the true dissolvent of all sectarianism. In this way only one blood flows throughout the multiform outer organism.

In 1818, having secured a refuge in Russia for priests of several denominations, including Lindl and Gossner, Baader helped to organize the mass migration of their congregations. A principle^a tenet of the Erweckungsbewegung was the imminent Return of the Saviour, an expectation common among German Pietists

1. iv, 114; Pinkerton, R., 39-63; Stourdza, A., I, 7, 62.

2. iv, 23; ii, 292 ff.

3. iv, 135 ff.; i, 147; XV, 304.

4. Helfferich, A., 106; XV, 318 f.; cf. iv, 142.

flocking to the traditional haven for religious discontents. The chiliasts were emboldened by the 18th century presages of the Swabian Pietist Bengel¹. More recently, Marie Kümmer and Jung-Stilling had evoked the messianic vision of the Tsar: just as the 'White Eagle' Alexander had delivered Europe from the Corsican Appolyon, so would he prepare the way for Christ and gather together His people². Even the place of the Second Coming was fixed -- 'between the Caspian and the Black Sea' -- and German millenarians on their way to Mount Ararat carried with them copies of Jung-Stilling's secret-society novel, Heimweh³. Chiliasm was rife among Baader's correspondents, notably G. H. von Schubert and Prince Golitsyn, but Baader personally seems to have shied away from literal millenarianism⁴. He stressed instead the mystic Return, the new dawn of piety that would find its place in Russia, and when he learned of the miseries of the Pietist emigrants in Bessarabia, he painted their plight in evangelical hues⁵.

Baader's relations with Russia were partially formalized in July 1817, when Golitsyn informed him of his nomination as Literary Correspondent of the Ministere des Cultes⁶. Baader had asked only to be made a corresponding member of the St. Petersburg Academy, a normal honour for foreign scholars. But the title he received (at the insistence of Tsar Alexander) was unusual, and when the Bavarian press carried the news, Baader felt obliged to write directly to King Max Joseph, requesting official sanction⁷. As Literary Correspondent, Baader was paid 1000 florins a year for sending monthly reports on recent developments in German opinion, particularly with regard to religion. Among their titles were: Prêtres catholiques persécutés en Bavière, Une chapelle grecque à Munich, La Sainte Alliance, Extrait d'un Journal d'une cure magnétique⁸.

1. Ritschl, A., III, 68.

2. Geiger, M., chaps 13-16, esp. 283-97; Benz, E., Die abend-ländische Sendung, 584-90.

3. Pinkerton, R., 149; Stecher, G., 42, 21 ff.

4. iv, 121, 136 f., 159 ff., 179; i, 302; iv, 38.

5. i, 296.

6. iv, 147. In March, the Ministry had assumed the direction of state relations with the orthodox as well as catholic and protestant churches, stressing ecumenical trends. Goltze, P., ~~577~~ Stourdes, A., I, 57-64.

Beyond latitudinarian convictions, a mutual veneration for the 'magnetic fluid' was the bond joining Baader with Russian and German religionists. Such an association of 'science and religion' was hardly fortuitous, inasmuch as scientifically heterodox mesmeric medicine was no longer distinguishable from faith-healing and the apostolic laying-on-of-hands -- an identification that appears to have fortified belief in a universal religious reawakening. The Swabian miracle-doctor of the Erweckungsbewegung, Martin Gassner, had first taught Mesmer's most illustrious disciple, Nicholas Bergasse, how to mesmerize without the aid of metal magnets but using only the hands as 'poles'. In 1815 the mesmerist adept Mme. Krüdener led Tsar Alexander to a gardener's cottage outside Paris to visit the same Bergasse, the man Metternich held partly responsible for the Treaty of the Holy Alliance¹. Dedicating an essay on mesmerism to Mme. Swetchine, Alexandre Stourdza wrote that his opinions were based

in part on the witness and ideas of superior persons I have had the fortune to know, such as Dr. Koreff ... the venerable Jung-Stilling, and "below all", the profound and religious Baader, whose acquaintance marks an epoch in my life.²

Dr. Koreff, who completes this brief gallery of mesmerists, was an attaché and personal physician to the Prussian Chancellor Prince Hardenberg, and evidently persuaded Friedrich Wilhelm III to subscribe to Baader's projected theosophical masterpiece³. By 1815 the mesmerist vogue was so pervasive that Baader had cause to complain of the current 'magnetic idolatry'.

Baader's position with the Russian Ministry was ostensibly apolitical. Yet in several letters he identified himself with the measured liberalism of Capodistrias, whose mission it was to materialize the principles of the Holy Alliance. In 1816, two

7. iv, 137; i, 321, 363.

8. i, 294; iv, 154 f.

1. Darnton, R., 47 f., 139 f.; Schwarz, W., 369, Metternich, K., I, i, 216.

2. Stourdza, A., IV, 340.

3. Marietta, M., 41; iv, 134 (1817); XV, 67; i, 354.

years before its granting, Baader argued for a Bavarian charter as a defense against 'constitution-phobic Austria', and to ensure Bavaria's ascendancy as 'the representative of German morality and constitutionalism'¹. Having been sent by Prince Ludwig as emissary to Capodistrias, Baader went so far as to propose an anti-Austrian coalition with Russia². He believed that the anti-Austrian revolts in 1820 would succeed, and again advocated constitutions as the smaller nations' best protection against internal revolution and outside aggression: 'Whoever will master the Spirit of the Age must anticipate it'³.

The liberalism expressed by these proposals was prevalent in the various occultist fellowships with which, in unascertainable degrees, Baader associated. Formerly legitimist, but dissatisfied with the Bourbon Restoration, mystics and theocrats such as Mme. de Krüdener became radical after 1815, and their secret societies became gathering-places for political malcontents⁴. A similar coalescence of mysticism and political liberalism took place in Russian Freemasonry during the second half of Alexander's reign⁵: in fact, throughout Restoration Europe, masonry appears to have offered revolutionaries one of their few avenues of self-expression. That Baader was himself a mason or member of a Martinist lodge is hardly doubtful. He employed masonic symbolism throughout his writing, signed with the triangulated three dots of masonry, and, as one 'long acquainted with Freemasonry', in 1819 he petitioned Crown Prince Ludwig to allow the lodges to operate openly in Bavaria⁶. Finally, even the 'animal magnetism' movement had grown up in a milieu of social egalitarianism, both in pre-Revolutionary France and in the miracle-meetings of the Southern German Erweckungsbewegung⁷. Police and government au-

1. Sauter, J., 902.

2. i, 320 f.

3. Sauter, J., 915.

4. Viatte, A., II, chap. 3.

5. Pypin, A., I, 419-64 (esp. 438), 513 f.

6. i, 330 f. - Sauter, J., 902-4; cf. i, 347, 354. Thiersch wrote that Baader was a mason, and Varnhagen von Ense was under the impression that when Baader travelled to Russia in 1822, in order to petition Alexander for reinstatement of the lodges. Thiersch, H., I, 64; Varnhagen von Ense, K., Blätter, II, 168, cf. 223 ff.

7. Darnton, R., 83-105; Grassl, H., 454 ff.

thorities, Baader complained, were incompetent to pass judgment on the miraculous cures performed by a Bavarian peasant and the Prince of Hohenlohe: in an address to Golitsyn published in 1822, he compared the faith-healers to early Christians and the absolutist state to Rome¹.

In the secular and 'disbelieving' society of the early nineteenth century, theocratic idealism and pietistic fraternalism had implicit radical potential². In addressing the monarchs in 1815, Baader wrote that the goals of French anarchism -- 'true freedom and equality' -- were also those of a religiously-inspired polity. He blamed revolution equally upon 'despots' and 'slaves', and maintained that the conflict between ruler and ruled would be neutralized only when both submitted to transcendental authority³. More than Novalis's utopian Die Christenheit oder Europa, with which it is often compared, Baader's essay was admonitory. Giving his 'homeopathic' diagnosis, he stated that the advent of the pagan French Revolution, the "gouvernement sans prière", might fulfil a positive function if it excited, in an already diseased state, a 'concentration and greater strengthening (Potenzierung) of the spirit of true freedom, that is, religion'⁴. Christianity was to further political activism, not acquiescence. For there had been 'as yet, no truly Christian state' In passing, it might be added that this critical tendency -- including censure of the sovereigns -- was also present in Tsar Alexander's first version of the Holy Alliance Treaty, and absent, after Metternich's alterations, in the final version⁵.

It would so far appear that Baader's latitudinarian mysticism, by definition anti-institutional, was complemented by a clearly democratic opposition to political authority. Despite the vehe-

1. IV, 64; i, 360 f.

2. Cf. Schmitt, C., 81 f.

3. VI, 15 f.

4. VI, 23-5.

5. Geiger, M., op. cit., 336 ff.

mence of its expression, however, Baader's message was fundamentally equivocal. With the rational Kant and the Romantic Adam Müller, both political internationalists known to Baader, he advocated the German idea of social 'evolution'. A gradualist of unwavering monarchistic persuasions, he favored only limited popular representation, and apparently only in the presence of a strong middle class¹. In his memoir to Tsar Alexander, no matter how imbued with fraternalistic sentiment, 'equality' did not mean 'sameness'. Equal parts, plainly, could not 'organize' themselves, but only be 'heaped together'². According to Baader's 'evolutionary' and 'organic' concept of the state, with its ambiguous glorification of 'individualism' as well as continuity and harmony, progressive measures should not drastically alter the former distribution of power.

The equivocality that marks Baader's polemics was due not only to his desire to influence events, but to the idealism of the theocratic order he envisaged³. His plan for a political Patriarchy of Love was based on the Christian metaphysics of Macht und Liebe, the harsh immutability of the Law and the saving power of Grace. Without altering these transmundane premises, or the equivalent and equally ambiguous organistic ideology, Baader produced arguments that seemed now egalitarian and liberal, now paternalistic and conservative: the first "rather more" before 1822, the second "rather more" after 1822. (Correspondingly, historians tend to agree that Alexander's politique sacrée began as a liberal gesture and ended as the hypocritical rationale for autocracy⁴). If Baader remained uncommitted to lucid political objectives, it was in large part because his prime concern was always the return to, and reunion of, Christianity. An impressionable mind, he was given reason to believe that his faith in a truly religious Grande Alliance was shared by his Russian Corres-

1. XV, 373, 393. Cf. I, 22 and XV, 239.

2. VI, 25 f.

3. Cf. Schmitt, C., 224: "Wo die politische Activität beginnt, hört die politische Romantik auf." -

4. Schwarz, W., 95 ff.

pondents. Replying to Baader's report entitled La Sainte Alliance, Golitsyn wrote in 1820 on behalf of Alexander:

Nos idées là dessus sont très pures ... Qui peut douter que cela ne soit une inspiration Divine qui a tracé cette Alliance, l'on n'y trouve rien d'humain ...

To his regret, Baader was retired in 1820. Meanwhile, the glass-factory at Lambach was failing, eventually to be auctioned for debts. Despite his entreaties, the Ministère des Cultes never officially confirmed his title of Literary Correspondent. Golitsyn's reluctance was due in part to the unexpected imperilment of Baader's position after the murder of the dramatist Kotzebue. Also Golitsyn's Correspondent, Kotzebue had translated Stourdza's Considérations, and propagandized actively for Russian interests. At the turn of 1818-19, his edition of Stourdza's Aachen memoir touched off a dispute with the democratic, nationalistic Burschenschaften press. In contrast to Stourdza's church irenics, his inflammatory political memoir attacked 'demagoguery' in the German universities, and Romantic individualism in politics, thus confirming the students' conception of Russia as backward and of the Holy Alliance as a league for political suppression. The reaction fell on Kotzebue. Suspected as a Russian agent, in March 1819, he was stabbed to death by the theology student Sand, who justified his act by involved theories of treason, national unity, and autonomy². Eight days after Sand's execution, Baader wrote to Mme. de Krüdener's nephew, Baron von Berckheim, the Russian official who organized the Pietist colonization, and was now in charge of Baader's correspondence. Seemingly unaware of his own connection with the event, Baader deplored Sand's muddled notions of martyrdom, yet continued to attribute the widespread political upheaval to the irreligiosity of monarchy as well as populace³.

1. i, 294.

2. Varnhagen von Ense, K., Blätter, V, 89 ff.; Benz, E., Baader und Kotzebue; Steffens, H., Kotzebue; cf. XV, 79.

3. i, 339 f.

At Munich, Baader's relations with religious radicals in Germany and St. Petersburg were resented both by Bavarian Catholics and conservative Russian diplomats. As he became aware by 1820, 'for lack of a courier' his reports to Golitsyn were no longer being forwarded from the Russian Embassy. After a vacation with his family at Teplitz in June, 1821, when he formed friendships with Varnhagen von Ense and Rahel, Baader resolved on a journey to St. Petersburg. There he could speak face to face with the Tsar and Golitsyn, and at a moment that seemed auspicious. The Carlsbad Congress, where the German states agreed on reactionary internal politics, had forced the polarization of 'anarchism' and 'despotism'. By arrogating all powers to themselves, the monarchs had provoked the revolution from below, and only the independent, conciliatory force of religion could resolve this destructive dualism. With the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence, in 1821, Russia could be expected to set an example of international Christian solidarity by intervening on the side of the Orthodox revolutionaries¹. Accompanied by the young Baltic Baron von Yxküll, Baader set off in the Summer of 1822.

Although one must rely partly on statements made after the collapse of his mission, it is certain that from the outset Baader contemplated the founding of a Christian Academy at St. Petersburg. It would work toward the reunion of science and religion, and toward healing the breach in Christianity. The restoration of the lapsed unity of science and religion was a major theme of Baader's polemic in the Bavarian Academy, and he had now simply transferred to Russia his plan to institutionalize the synthesis. In order to accomplish that which the atheistic Frenche encyclopédistes had 'undone' (in dissevering science from religion), the Baaderian Academy would be informed by the speculative spirit that had given rise to theosophy and Naturphilosophie. When the two odd travellers arrived at Berlin, Baron von Yxküll invited his former teacher, Hegel, to join the expedition². As for the second project of his Academy, Baader

1. XV, 371-4; 378, 387; i, 339 f.

2. XV, 75-80; Benz, E., Die abendländische Sendung, 627.

believed that the furtherance of the reintegration of Christianity would thrive in Russia. Anticipating the arguments of the Slavophiles, he detected in Russia deep resources of religious instinct that could counterbalance Western Nihilismus¹. The 'philosophical-religious missionary institute' that he planned to erect would fill the place vacated by the Illuminati (irreligious and revolutionary) and the Jesuits (dogmatic and despotic)². Providing the locus for irenic religious and philosophical discourse, Baader's temple would secure the general faith. Forming a 'higher third' social estate, it could also arbitrate conflict and thwart the growth of 'despotism'³. As if there were still insufficient reason for a journey, Baader also hoped to repair his disastrous financial situation by finding a foreign investor for his glass-factory⁴. Another solution would have been the anticipated (but never realized) marriage of Baader's daughter to Baron von Yxküll, a Don Juan of the Baltic whose libertine memoirs have seen several publications⁵. Ultimately, as he disclosed to Varnhagen and his friend Yxküll, what drew Baader to Russia, more than any specific purpose, was an indefinite 'call', a dim prophetic sense of personal mission⁶.

In November 1822, soon after his arrival in Riga in Russian territory, Baader presented himself before Count Paulucci, Governor-General of the Baltic Provinces. An archconservative in religion, Paulucci had personally ordered the police persecution of Mme. de Krüdener. At once he denounced Baader to his face as a 'Krüdenerian' and an exagéré. Composing himself, Baader replied that he was a religious man, and thus of necessity an exagéré. Paulucci claimed to have read Baader's theosophical essay Ueber den Blitz als Vater des Lichtes, and assured the author that it contained nothing but nonsense. Baader was first told to proceed no further, then, on orders from St. Petersburg, to quit Russia entirely⁷.

1. XV, 68, 80 f.

2. XV, 378; cf. Sauter, J., 903.

3. XV, 69, 373.

4. XV, 361 ff.; i, 354 ff.

5. iv, 370.

6. Esp. iv, 354.

7. XV, 82; i, 362; iv, 179.

From Riga, and from the border town of Memel in East Prussia, Baader addressed appeals to Golitsyn, to Alexander, and to the Tsar's councillors Kochubei and Speransky¹. In order to dissociate himself from the fate of Mme. de Krüdener, he justly denied being her follower, and ^badjured, with less justice, any affiliation with Pietism. Over the winter of 1822-3, at Memel and at Yxküll's estate in Estonia, Baader wrote Parts II-IV of Fermenta Cognitionis. In the Fifth Part, dedicated to Golitsyn, he decried Pietism as anti-intellectual obscurantism, while condemning the separatism of the Erweckungsbewegung². Although Baader was fluctuating in order to salvage his mission, his sudden disapproval of Pietism had also resulted from personal exposure to 'the morose pietistic sanctimoniousness of the Stille im Lande' in East Prussia³. After seven anxious months at Memel, Baader received the letter from Golitsyn demanding that he not pursue his voyage to St. Petersburg, and telling him that his office as Literary Correspondent was abolished⁴.

Baader had fallen victim to the political and religious reaction in Russia that began to set in about 1819. Tsar Alexander, entering a more conservative religious phase, came to mistrust all forms of Pietism. In a document composed for the Tsar at the Congress of Troppau (late 1820), Metternich had apparently contributed to this change of policy, by berating the Pietist brotherhoods as anarchistic confederacies in Christian mask -- this, shortly before Mme. de Krüdener would speak out and prophesy in favor of the Greek revolutionaries, in the name of Christianity⁵. In the wake of legitimist fear of the Carbonari, all secret societies in Russia, with the exception of the Bible Society, were outlawed in 1822⁶. Golitsyn's final order to Baader had originated in a ukase signed that year by the Tsar at the Congress of Verona⁷. Conservatives in the Russian Orthodox Church had al-

1. i, 362-5, 350; iv, 176 ff.; XV, 390.

2. II, 322, 337, 340; iv, 237-42; XV, 393, 406.

3. XV, 396.

4. i, 368 f.; XV, 74.

5. Schwarz, W., 231 f.; Goetze, P., 49-55.

6. Pypin, A., 622.

7. i, 385.

so begun to reassert themselves, contending that the translation of sacred texts, and their distribution without commentary, led to the proliferation of sects and eventually to religious anarchy. In an intrigue enacted by the sinister monk Photius, a religious tract written by the 'awakened' priest Gossner was one document brought forward to discredit the foreign mystics and ultimately to assure that Golitsyn be deposed¹.

As early as 1820, conservative Russian officials had secretly accused Baader to King Max Joseph at Munich². From the moment he entered Prussia, Baader was under police observation and treated as a dangerous liberal 'demagogue' spreading constitutional ideals³. Suffering constant harassment, and without communicating with his family, Baader stayed on at Memel until forced to leave in October 1823⁴. 'If it is the lot of a prophet to be outwardly in Hell and inwardly in Heaven', he wrote, 'then I am such a prophet'⁵.

In Berlin, where surveillance was finally lifted, Baader visited Hegel, Schleiermacher, the Protestant theologian Marheineke, and Varnhagen von Ense, who commended his 'cheerful steadfastness' in the face of failure⁶. From Berlin, Baader directed letters to Frederick William III and to the Evangelical Bishop Eylert, protesting the waning from orthodoxy that he had witnessed in the Northern German universities, and pursuing the theme that was now firmly set in his mind: on the one side, religious philosophy had decayed into a 'destructive, annihilative neology'; on the other side, mysticism had degenerated into 'vapid modern separatist Pietism', with the combined result that science and philosophy were delivered into the hands of religion's enemies⁷. In public letters defending his St. Petersburg project, Baader

1. Goetze, P., 201-6.

2. iv, 406-11.

3. i, 497-505; cf. XV, 387; Baumgardt, D., 51 ff.

4. i, 367-72; XV, 83, 100, 114, 389, 396, 403; iv, 186.

5. XV, 402.

6. iv, 176, 184 f.; XV, 104 f.

7. XV, 67-70, 71-4.

also set out his (somewhat reformed) political convictions. Calling on the Restoration ideology of the Catholics Joseph de Maistre and Lammenais, he declared that his Christian Academy, -- that was 'no secret society' -- was to have supported the monarchic principle by strengthening traditional belief. By this time, he was prepared to draw the legitimist equation between religious and political schismatics¹.

Baader returned to Munich 'in deep despair'². Acutely conscious of a public humiliation, he tried repeatedly to restore his good name with his own countrymen and the Russian Court, and in a last letter before the death of Alexander, he reiterated his legitimist beliefs, and expressly denied any sympathies with the 'awakened' priests Lindl and Gossner³. The Russian débâcle even occasioned a final break with Schelling. On receiving Baron von Yxküll at Erlangen, Schelling spoke derisively of Baader as 'the prophet' who had 'compromised himself with Prince Golitsyn'. After hearing this, Baader wrote that Schelling 'is a brilliant man ... I loved him truly, and knew him well'⁴. But he was quite as vain as Schelling, and thereafter could find only caustic words for his once great friend.⁵

1. XV, 75-101, esp. 81.

2. XV, 412.

3. i, 385 f.; cf. i, 384; iv, 186 f.; XV, 439 ff.

4. XV, 420 f., iii, 242.

5. i, 401; XV, 485, 689, etc.

1.
(1825 - 1841)

The accession of King Ludwig I in 1825, when 'Romanticism ascended the throne'¹, promised an end to the secularist Illuminatismus in Bavaria. While preserving the basic structure of the government, Ludwig began his reign by reversing several 'anti-Catholic' measures, including limitations on public worship, that had been introduced under the previous regime. Baader had felt personally slighted by Montgelas, and even suspected that Bavaria's Illuminati had accused him before Tsar Alexander as a 'Jesuit' or 'cryptocatholic'². Now, one sign of the new official attitude was the fall from favor of Baader's old rationalist adversary, Cajetan Weiller, supposedly on account of his anti-Catholicism³. Under the leadership of Sailer, an educational reform was one central policy intended to imbue learning with the spirit of a reviving Catholic piety, and in letters to both Ludwig I and Sailer, Baader insisted upon the need to give pedagogy a positive religious foundation⁴. Ludwig's extensive cultural program, through which Bavaria succeeded Vienna as the intellectual center of German Catholicism, was given its symbol in the new University at Munich. Ignoring several of the rationalist professors at Landshut, the Minister Schenk invited a distinguished group of Catholic and Romantic scholars, including Görres, G. H. Schubert, Oken, and 'the highlight of the University', Schelling. Supported by J. M. Sailer, Baader was named (Honorary) Professor of Speculative Philosophy⁵. Desiring that the University show itself 'purely Catholic', he was pleased when Görres, partly on the strength of a Romantic tribute to Ludwig I, was asked to join the faculty, but he protested furiously over the odious 'naturalism' of Schelling and Oken⁶. In his inaugural lecture, laced

1. Huch, R., VI, 662 f.

2. iv, 205; Sauter, J., 907, 923; XV, 78, 93.

3. Thiersch, L., I, 318; Sauter, J. 914.

4. Sauter, J., 919-24; i, 381, 388; cf. iv, 413.

5. i, 413; XV, 442 f., 471.

6. XV, 438; Sepp, J., 386.

with customary expressions of Wittelsbach loyalty, he called for the union of scholars and priests, to reconcile modern research with the teaching of Catholicism¹. 'Philosophism', wrote one contemporary, was 'the sickness of the age', when the metaphysical systems of Hegel and Schelling had usurped the place of theology². Accordingly, Baader endeavoured in his teaching to reassert the philosophical principles of Christianity over those of modern Idealism. Apart from his lectures, which he hoped would provide 'a meeting place for Catholics and Protestants', he gave lessons on Boehme before a small number of devotees³.

Grouped around Baader and Görres, a Catholic literary circle began meeting regularly in a Lokal. Among its members were the Romantic physician Ringseis, the painters of the Nazarene School, Cornelius and Schlotthauer, and the Church historian Döllinger, who was influenced by Baader's philosophical approach to dogma⁴. Baader, Görres and Döllinger had all contributed to the resurging Catholic press, in France as well as Germany, and Baader hoped to see Munich in the vanguard of a European Catholic movement⁵. In this new, hyperorthodox phase of his religion, he wrote of the reunion of Christianity exclusively in terms of a return to the 'visible' Church of Catholicism, mocked 'a much-lauded tolerance', and even reproved Master Boehme for his invectives against the Church⁶. At the salon of the Swiss convert, Emilie Linder, -- to whom Baader dedicated his Vierzig Sätze aus einer religiösen Erotik (1831) -- 'only true believers and conservatives (such as Baader and Clemens Brentano) were welcome'⁷.

From the onset of Ludwig's reign, it was feared that the latitude allowed Catholics would prepare the way for an 'obscuran-

1. iv, 150 ff.; i, 392.

2. Perthes, F., I, 420.

3. Sepp, J., 162, 228; i, 377, 388, 390, 394, 398.

4. Ringseis, J., III, 58; Goyau, II, 182 ff.; Görres, J., III, 316; Friedrich, J., I, 149 f., 163 f.

5. i, 382, 388, 392.

6. VII, 209-222, esp. 219; VII, 56 f.; XIII, 59.

7. Liebenau, A., 210-15.

tist' revival. In Protestant and liberal quarters, Baader's and Görre's 'Round Table' Society was branded 'Jesuit' and linked with the clandestine French Congrégation¹. Baader's nature was such that the imputation of intrigue was enough to transform his informal circle into a tightly knit 'congregation'. Taking advantage of the liberalization of censorship, from the Spring of 1828 the group collaborated on the periodical Eos, the voice of a specifically Catholic consciousness. Although nominally a family magazine devoted to the fine arts, Eos was intended to have direct political influence. Its outlook was 'anti-revolutionary', that is, 'evolutionary'². The Catholics took as their premise the 'Christian pessimism' that divined a fatal process of social division having its source in the general apostasy. With articles by Baader, Adam Müller, Friedrich Schlegel, and J. M. Sailer, Eos defended the rights of the Church and advanced Romantic Restorationist arguments based on the principle omnis potestas a Deo³. Cornelius wrote on Dante, while Görres and Baader celebrated an idealized Christian-German past: the agrarian, decentralized 'corporative' society where religion was the foundation of community. The European states, it was held, had grown up within the Church, and Catholic states were called upon to renew the political life of Europe. Church and State should be 'joined inwardly' and relate 'as that which establishes to the principle which is established' (March, 1828); in other words, Church and State should be independent, yet joined by love (April 1828)⁴.

There had earlier been an alliance of Catholicism and liberalism, although a liberalism that could tolerate monarchy. Baader and Görres had written against absolutism and preached leniency, while recommending constitutions as the Church's best safeguard against encroachments by the State⁵. But Eos now took issue with

1. Friedrich, J., I, 192 f.; iv, 216; XV, 444, 454.

2. iv, 213.

3. Friedrich, J., I, 196-232; V, 343.

4. Lempfrid, W., 77 ff.

5. See Görres's essays of 1819-21: Deutschland und die Revolution; Europa und die Revolution; Die Heilige Alliance und die Völker auf dem Kongreß zu Verona, in Sepp, J.N.

'modern' liberalism by upholding the rights of the nobility and clergy, and opposing the division of large landholdings. By 'Restoration' Baader understood 'theocracy, monarchy, and aristocracy'. As against the 'social pantheism' of centralized representational democracies, his 'physiological' or 'corporative' state-theory allowed only monarchical constitutions, with class representation of the priesthood, nobility, propertied citizens, and farmers¹. Eos met the attacks of the liberal ('bureaucratic') press, while Döllinger descended into diatribes against Heinrich Heine and 'money-lenders'. (Much the abler controversialist, Heine would have the last word against Pfaffendöllinger, Görres, and their cohorts at Munich's Ecole Polytechnique des Obscurantismus.²) Simultaneously, Bavarian Catholic conservatives conflicted with the State on matters of parity, marriages, and education. In the outcome, even King Ludwig tired of Eos's priestly conservatism, and would hear no more of 'Eos-ists and Jesuits'. With a 'nod from above', in 1830 the author of the philosophical articles in Eos felt constrained to surrender its leadership³. Baader nonetheless continued as a spokesman for Sailer and the clerics in their dispute with the State over mixed marriages, and he remained implicated when the Second Chamber of the Diet undertook a witchhunt for the Bavarian Congregation⁴.

When, following the July Revolution, the Parisian L'Avenir proclaimed a new union of Catholicism with political liberalism⁵, Baader was the first to become a correlative enthusiast and active contributor. After the clergy had been compromised by its association with the nobility, l'Abbé de la Mennais and his collaborators broke openly with Gallicanism and the ideology of the Restoration. Lammenais saw Europe dividing into 'anarchism' and 'despotism', and conceived a 'third' progressive policy. While

1. iv, 202, 246; XV, 443; V, 250 ff., 312, 355; II, 288 f.

2. Heine, H., 179.

3. Friedrich, J., I, 236; Lempfrid, W., 80; XV, 451, 455; iv, 214; cf. Ludwig I, 103, 136, 184.

4. VI, 45 ff.; Aichinger, G., 449-61.

5. The background for this section is taken principally from Derré, J.-R., Vidler, A, and Spencer, P.

the Church accomodated itself to Louis Philippe's Bourgeois Monarchy, the Mennaisians urged an alliance of papacy with the popular democratic movements to which the future of Europe belonged. L'Avenir advocated government decentralization, press freedom, and ameliorization of the conditions of the lower classes, and in its final issue (15 November, 1831), l'Act d'Union proposed a sort of liberal Catholic International¹.

Baader, or so he felt, had anticipated by fifteen years the standpoint of L'Avenir -- Dieu et la liberté -- in having distinguished between a Christian and an anti-Christian liberalism². His writing 'created a sensation' in Paris, and copies of L'Avenir were sent to him daily. Its editors regarded him as one who did in philosophy that which they did in society: 'taking the offensive for Christianity'³. For his part, Baader adopted the Mennaisian maxim that 'if a revolution is inevitable, you should make it yours'.

Catholicism in France, Belgium, Ireland, and Poland will prevail⁴. This same Catholic religion, which the liberals raged against as an institution inimical to the liberation of society, has emerged in the dissolution of society, creating and forming revolution into evolution⁵.

In L'Avenir of 11 May, 1831, Baader wrote that the world could not be returned to God but through social liberty, and that, conversely, this liberty could not become part of the world except by God⁶. He defended Lammenais against 'misunderstandings at Rome', and in particular the criticism of P. Ventura, who was initially shocked at Lammenais's espousal of popular sovereignty⁷. By his timely translation of St. Martin's Lettre à un ami⁸, Baader even suggested that political revolu-

1. L'Avenir, VII, 183 ff.

2. iv, 219.

3. XV, 467, 477; i, 402.

4. iv, 217.

5. XV, 271.

6. VI, 29-44, esp. 34; L'Avenir, III, 240-9, esp. 242.

7. VI, 32; L'Avenir, III, 241; cf. i, 401-4; iv, 224; Derré, J.-R., 402.

8. VI, 33; L'Avenir, III, 242.

tion might lead to a purification of the Church itself. But he still did not subscribe to a program for revolution, and in his article in L'Avenir stated discreetly that it would be a mistake to think that the Mennaisians had simply traded the fleur de lis for a Jacobin's cap¹.

Baader was esteemed rather than influential among the Mennaisians. The young Count Montalembert wrote to convey Lammenais's gratitude for his support, and in the early 1830's the French sent novices to hear Baader and Görres lecture at Munich². In August 1832, on the return from their mission to the Vatican, Lammenais, Montalembert, and François-Alexy Rio -- the 'three pilgrims of God and Liberty' -- sojourned in Munich. They had expected much from their meeting with the Bavarian Catholics, since between the two schools there existed 'a kind of pre-established harmony'³. But if the French and Germans could concur on the main points of their social doctrines -- defense of the Church's freedom, and opposition to absolutism -- they found themselves at odds on matters of philosophy. Lammenais may have valued Baader as a polemicist, but thought his theosophy 'vague' and potentially 'dangerous'⁴. While Montalembert had admired Baader's essays in Paris, he now found him 'boring', alternately luminous and unintelligible⁵. But Lammenais's disciple Charles de Sainte-Foi had less difficulty with German than either Lammenais or Montalembert, and in his Souvenirs returns to the electrifying conversation of the man for whom the written word was an unpleasant necessity⁶.

At a farewell banquet given by the Munich Catholic leaders, Lammenais learned that the papal encyclical Mirari vos had repudiated the principles set forth in L'Avenir⁷. Never having shared Lammenais' extreme ultramontanism, Baader now took his

1. VI, 33; L'Avenir, III, 242.

2. iv, 221 f.; Boutard, C., I, 328.

3. Rio, F.-A., I, 360 f.

4. *Ibid.*, II, 199; cf. Lammenais, F., Lettres, 384, on Baader's 'sublime extravagance ... made us laugh'.

5. Lallemand, P., 56-63.

6. Sainte-Foi, C., 258-266, esp. 259. In the Révue Européenne, the successor to L'Avenir, Sainte-Foi published Baader's essays, and his own analyses of the philosopher who, for all

part in an article in the influential Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung, while voicing in private his discontent with Pope Gregory XVI¹. But when Lammenais published his prophetic, revolutionary Paroles d'un Croyant, Baader assailed the French thinker's 'Jacobinism' and his 'heresy'². Baader would not have Catholics give themselves to revolution in the mistaken belief that the will of the people is the will of God. But neither would he see 'a league of monarchs and popes', and after the papal condemnation of the Paroles, he continued his criticism of the Vatican. There is persuasive evidence that Baader shared Lammenais's view, confirmed only in this century, that the papal letters had been promulgated in an act of submission to temporal monarchy³.

The 'evolutionary' theory of Christianity and society that underlay these opinions was set forth in several essays written after 1831⁴. Although he depended somewhat upon Hegelian teleological historicism, Baader was scandalized at the notion of the political state, rather than the Church, as 'the embodiment of public morality'. 'Society' was intrinsically religious, and enclosed the state. As life, society was a process, continually 'putting itself into equilibrium with past and future'⁵. The 'transformational power of Christianity' originated social evolution, by infusing the state with the Christian principles of civil freedom, the delegation of power, and the public use if not the possession of property and authority⁶. The Christian state was by nature 'corporative', neither a despotism of the one (absolutism) nor of the many (democracy), since 'Christ is the unique head of his community'⁷.

his lack of logicality, could be placed even above Schelling and Hegel': Revue Européenne, I, 71-85, 298-305; II, 192-4, 332 f.; III, 64-76, 78, 182-201.

7. Lallemand, P., 156 ff.

1. iii, 262 f.

2. VI, 109 ff., esp. 117.

3. iv, 232, 238, 242; Vidler, A., 206 ff.

4. VI, 55-134.

5. VI, 59.

6. VI, 94.

7. VI, 87.

Baader's reforming urge was directed first toward the religious society, rather than the relatively 'static' political state. In 1831 he considered the socially-exclusive Jesuits to be on the decline, while the 'people's orders' were rising¹. By 1833, he perceived Catholicism in a 'crisis' to which the ideology of the Restoration was inadequate². The religious, no less than the civil society, suffered from 'evolutionary sickness' (1834)³. As he wrote in 1836, the 'purifying force' would not come from Rome, but from militant 'prophetic' religious orders⁴. Especially after 1835, Baader became markedly critical of Rome, illiberal in its doctrine as well as its administration⁵.

Tempering religious ('social') radicalism with political conservatism and a respect for monarchy, Baader's social doctrine finds its best expression in the essay Ueber das dermalige Missverhältnis der Vermögenslosen oder Proletaires zu den Vermögen besitzenden Classen der Societät ... (1835)⁶. The 'proletariat', whose only property was their labour, were being exploited by 'conspiracies' of the 'moneyed interests' in rationalized industrial states.

For with the progress and increase of industry, work becomes divided among a greater number, while the use and profit from this work is limited to continually fewer individuals.⁷

To prevent a cataclysmic revolution, the inevitable result of an 'inhibition of the free evolution of society', the proletariat would have to be incorporated into the legislative process. For this purpose Baader proposed the formation of a kind of 'proletarian Deaconry', since priests rather than liberal demagogues were the natural leaders of the people. Baader was able to draw on his experiences in highly-industrialized England, and although Charles de Coux, in L'Avenir⁸, had already ad-

1. iv, 224.

2. v, 364.

3. VI, 90 f.

4. iv, 280.

5. iv, 273.

6. VI, 125-43; cf. 417-9; iv, 253.

7. VI, 138; cf. XV, 530.

8. L'Avenir, VII, 86 ff.

dressed himself to the situation of the industrial working-class, it was without such force and clarity. In calling for an egalitarian and socially-committed priesthood (he coined the word christlich-sozial)¹, Baader hoped to avert what Pius XII was to call the great scandal of the nineteenth century -- that the Church lost the working class. But when it came to the actual reform of government, the religious prophet turned political priest. In his plan to correct 'a discrepancy in the normal evolution of society', Baader confined his priest-representatives to the 'advocacy' of legislation, while the law-making power remained with the propertied classes and the king².

At the University, Baader's philosophy could sustain but a few avid disciples. Although a genial conversationalist, he lectured poorly, and had to contend with the conscious rivalry of Schelling³. Nor was Baader on wholly firm ground with his fellow Catholics. His orthodoxy was questioned, and by 1833 he had come under the scrutiny of the nuncio⁴. Whereas he had been on close terms with the principal Catholic leaders of Munich, his contacts with them appear to have diminished as they gained influence with the increasingly autocratic and clericalist Ludwig I. The rise of the Ultramontane Party in Bavaria, a conservative alliance of throne and altar, coincided with the outbreak of the Cologne Controversy in late 1837: the state imprisonment of the Catholic Bishop Dröste-Vischerung for his refusal to sanctify mixed marriages, and the ensuing protest. When Görres and the Munich curialists came out with one voice in support of papal authority, Baader joined the paper warfare by disputing the reliance of Catholicism upon the Holy See. During the Erweckungsbewegung, he had already come to regard the papacy as a 'later

1. VI, 93; Hartl, F., 170 n.2.

2. VI, 137 f.; iv, 244.

3. Martensen, H., Leben, 159-61; iii, 270-85; XV, 466, 689, 702.

4. iv, 294; XV, 491.

development', and even in his 'Jesuit' and Mennaisian phases, Baader's curialism was muted¹. But he was now for the first time in the adversarial position of the Gallicans, or that of Lammenais after being alienated from Rome. At the height of the Cologne controversy, Baader wrote to Crown Prince Frederick William of Prussia, reviving the idea of a German National Church, that would protect priests opposed to Gregory XVI and emancipate Catholics from 'Roman servilism'. Catholicism, he wrote, should be a world 'corporation', since as a world 'monarchy' it was bound to conflict with princes². In a contemporaneous article, Baader accused Rome of following Lammenais's advice, by issuing a revolutionary challenge to state authority³.

Baader's first anti-papal writing criticized the 'autocratic' administration of Catholicism, and proposed a synodal constitution that would better reflect the Church's 'corporative' origins⁴. Published in Berlin in Hengstenberg's Evangelische Kirchenzeitung, a second article pursued the same themes, while charging the present Roman 'monarchy' with doctrinal intolerance⁵. As if to underscore Baader's contention, in 1838 the new Ultramontane Minister of the Interior introduced decrees denying laymen the right to teach theological subjects at Munich⁶. While Schelling eventually quit the University, Baader complied merely by changing the titles of his lectures and teaching even more theology than before⁷. But the liberal mood in Bavarian Catholicism, personified by the tolerant Sailer, had clearly passed, and Baader felt afflicted by the new 'inquisitorial' Ministry and by Ludwig's advisor, the Jesuit-instructed Reisach⁸.

Simultaneously with his anti-curial polemic, and his overtures

1. XV, 319, 429, 502; i, 320, 335, 390; iv, 215, 224, 273; Sauter, J., 911 f.

2. i, 430; iv, 343; cf. XV, 484, 578, 580, 615.

3. V, 383 ff.

4. V, 401 ff., esp. 402.

5. V, 369 ff.; cf. XV, 578, 585.

6. Prantl, K., I, 723.

7. iv, 334; XV, 595 ff.

8. i, 423; iv, 323 ff.

to the Prussian State, Baader evolved far-reaching ecumenical designs reminiscent of the era of the Holy Alliance. He had apparently been rehabilitated in Russia by 1832, inasmuch as his Vierzig Sätze was being published there¹, and he had become acquainted with Prince Elim Meschersky. A Franco-Russian poet and attaché of the Ministère des Cultes, Meschersky had associates both among the French Catholic publicists and the Moscow Jeunes des Archives, a Romantic literary society precursory in its ideology to the Slavophil Movement². Through Meschersky, Baader renewed contacts with Prince Golitsyn³, and became a correspondent of A. Uvarov, Golitsyn's successor as Ministre des Cultes⁴.

Baader's campaign for a German Catholic Church was apparently joined from the beginning with renewed plans for a reunification of Christianity under the aegis of the Russian Orthodox Church. By 1839, he had even acquired Russian government financing for his anti-papal tracts, copies of which were sent not only to Prussia, but to Uvarov, the Holy Synod, and Tsar Nicholas I, who supported the Prussian state over the Cologne Controversy⁵. In these writings, Baader voiced the hope that a separation of Catholicism might be the prelude to a 'free and quiet' development of religious union⁶. In his private communications, the same expectation was expressed less tentatively: the Pope would experience a 'schism' in Germany, once the Prussians had learned not to traffic with this 'Bride of Christ'; and through an imagined ecumenical conference at Augsburg, where the Church had divided, it would be reunited⁷. Recalling the theory of his earlier ecumenical efforts, Baader perceived Catholicism and Protestantism in a conflict that intensified continually: the mystic triangle, the

1. XV, 484; i, 410-3.

2. Koyré, A., Russie, 9, 33 f.

3. i, 413, 435.

4. i, 451-61; cf. XV, 571.

5. iv, 388, 394; i, 435, 442; XV, 578.

6. X, 22.

7. iv, 350, 399; XV, 630.

symbol of union, could arise only through the supervention of the Eastern Church¹. As Baader explained to Uvarov, the Orthodox Church was ideally suited for its mission of mediating between the antithetical Western Churches, since it eschewed both the obstinate dogmatism ('stagnation') of the Roman Church and the destructive neologies ('dissolution') of Protestantism. Only 'Eastern Catholicism', that possessed both the oriental and occidental elements, could provide the 'higher third' part in a religious rapprochement modelled on the Trinity: audiatur et tertia pars².

The subject of Eastern Orthodoxy had already been widely debated in Munich, for with a Bavarian King on the throne of Greece since 1832, Catholics had promoted the idea of an alliance of the Greek Church with Rome³. It was partially in order to counter the Catholic polemics that Baader, in conjunction with the Russian scholar Shevyrev, wrote Ueber morgenländischen und abendländischen Katholicismus (1841)⁴. In this final ecumenical work Baader argued from the Bible and the Patriarchs in order to disprove the primacy of Rome (148-203 and 219-253), theorized upon the relation of Church and State (89-111), compared the doctrines and constitutions of the two Churches (112-147), and expounded some of his own theosophical principles (passim). He saw in the priesthood of the Eastern Church the embodiment of his own mysticism and his ecclesiastical liberalism, and in its synodal constitution a reflection of Christianity's 'communal origins'. By returning to this 'corporative', rather than 'monarchical' or 'dictatorial' government, the Christian Churches could reunite 'organically' under the uniquely legitimate leadership of the invisible Christ. As he disclosed with somewhat less inhibition in his correspondence, Baader also cherished the hope that a 'corporation' of national churches on the collegiate model of Eastern Orthodoxy would form the basis for political internationalism⁵.

1. Steffens, H., W.i.e., IV, 401 f.

2. i, 451-61, 456; iv, 351, 354, 390; xv, 637.

3. X, 92 f. (92 n.), 156, 181, 198, 242; Benz, E., Die abendländische Sendung, 807-24; cf. Baader's statements on King Otto, iv, 341, 351, 354.

4. X, 89-253.

5. i, 439; xv, 582.

This, according to Baader's theory, would require that member-churches neither be governed, nor govern; that is, that there be neither a 'State-Church' (as under Charlemagne), nor a 'Church-State' (as under Gregory VII)¹. If Baader appears to have forgotten this principle by allying himself with absolutism, it is perhaps because he was misled by the representatives of the Protestant and Russian branches of his envisaged trinitarian union: by the Prussian Hengstenberg, who had disaffected political liberalism by manifesting the dependence of Pietism upon autocracy, and by Shevyrev², a disciple of Nicholas's reactionary despotism. Even if the Tsar, as Shevyrev wrote, kisses the hand of the lowliest priest in a miserable village³, the Russian Church, like Hengstenberg's Evangelical Church, fell under Baader's definition of a 'State-Church'.

Baader returned in his last writings to some of his first religious sources, evincing a certain continuity in his extensive thought on the form of the Church. In order to contend the exclusive legitimacy of Rome, he referred to the authority of Benedikt Stattler, who had formed Sailer's, and in turn Baader's own early latitudinarian beliefs⁴. Drawing on St.-Martin and Kleuker, whose theories he had approved continuously for fifty years⁵, in 1839 Baader presented Zehn Thesen einer religiösen Philosophie, the third of which read: 'there is only one religion, whose unity does not preclude its diversity'⁶. The ecumenical ideal that Baader sought to realize through his relations with the Russian Orthodox Church finds its definition in this formula of 'diversity in unity'. Baader argued for religious freedom, yet, as he made clear in a public denial of recreancy⁷, he had no intention to create a sect. He was moved by a vision of 'the downfall of Christianity in the West'⁸, and, despite his several

1. X, 107; V, 394; iv, 215.

2. X, 91 n.

3. X, 213.

4. X, 149 f.; cf. above, p. 2 f.

5. i, 186 f.; XI, 75, 88; iv, 104.

6. IX, 352, 367.

7. V, 494 ff. (1839).

8. i, 456; iv, 366 ff.

changes of face, his religious activism was informed by a constant desire to establish a universal church whose unity would be assured by its capacity to tolerate a degree of individualism in belief. Finally, one cannot mistake a more personal motive in Baader's affiliation with 'Eastern Catholicism'. The 'Roman Church', as he had long realized, was unreceptive to the theosophy -- the 'German Theology' -- that he professed, and this was the source of much of his discontent with the Vatican. But the Russian Church, he was given explicitly to believe, would support a religious union that still allowed churches their 'national differences'¹. As he never tired of saying about Boehme and Saint-Martin, Baader was 'a prophet unrecognized in his homeland'. His ideas, like theirs, would have to migrate. Hoping for the influence that he was actually to have among such prominent thinkers as Soloviev² and Berdaev, Baader proposed to Uvarov that Russian scholars be sent to Munich, in order to return with the teaching that could re-christianize philosophy and civil society³.

By his obloquies against Rome, Baader alienated himself from 'Görres and consorts', including his former disciple Döllinger, and his own son-in-law, the Romantic historian Ernst von Lasaulx⁴. Apparently already estranged from his wife, Baader was widowed in 1835, and in 1836 and 1838 his closest brothers Joseph and Clemens died⁵. Through the Danish theologian Martensen (of Kierkegaard's criticism), Baader met Lenau, 'a poet to incarnate his ideas', and among the last to fall under the spell of Munich's 'philosophical magician'⁶. After Caroline, Rahel, Görres, Rio, and still others, Lenau was also perhaps the last to use the image of lightning to describe the fulgurous brilliance of the theosopher's speech. Little more than a year before his death, Baader married the twenty-five-year-old Marie Robel; if we believe the love-letters to his precious Nachtviole, or the wryly cryptic eulogy by Lenau, this last romance of the 'Philosopher of Love' was a passionate one⁷.

1. X, 219.

2. Masaryk, T. G., II, 226, 257 ff.

3. i, 461.

4. iv, 320, 336, 350, 355, 358.

5. XV, 519; *Sainte-Foi*, c., 265; iv, 252.

6. ~~Lenau, 7 IV~~, 262 f. 7. XV, 622-9; Lenau, V, 55 f.

FROM NATURPHILOSOPHIE TO THEOSOPHY

With particular reference to Baader, Paul Kluckhohn suggested that, in the later and more openly religious phase of German Romanticism, Naturphilosophie had developed naturally into theosophy¹. This development will now be followed in Baader's works from 1786 to 1814, which contributed significantly to the general phenomenon. In the present treatment, Naturphilosophie does not mean specifically the 'system' of Schelling, nor generally 'natural philosophy'. It means, as it did to Kluckhohn (and to Baader), Romantic Philosophy of Nature as the self-aware intellectual movement that thrived during the two decades on either side of 1800. This collective endeavor found expression in poetry and descriptive science, as well as philosophy, and it claimed authors as divergent in genius as Baader and Goethe, or Novalis and Hegel. Since Baader's Naturphilosophie and his theosophy express fundamentally one world-view, there can be no question of distinct stages between them, but only of gradual transition. Both kinds of thinking have as their final object knowledge of the supersensible. In both, it is believed that this goal can be achieved by aid of a higher intuition transcending both reason and the senses. Consequently, Naturphilosophie and theosophy represent an intellectual attitude which, from the modern point of view, is either unrecognizable or unsettling. Indeed, it is almost universally agreed that the general development now under consideration, intimately a part of Post-Kantian Idealism, constitutes regress in the history of modern thought². At best, Naturphilosophie took place at the borderline of natural science. Similarly, as long as philosophy is regarded as a science in progress, any modern theosophy will remain outside its domain.

1. Kluckhohn, P., Ideengut, 21-7.

2. This position is cogently stated by Leonard Nelson in Fort-schritte und Rückschritte der Philosophie, which has been of greater value than all other general studies for understanding the well-established, but often merely conventional condemnation of the Idealist period in which Baader wrote.

1. The Beginnings of Baader's Naturphilosophie

i. Religion and Nature in the Tagebücher

Baader's journal's of 1786-93¹ are primarily, as he declares them to be², private documents of self-development. This is only formally contradicted by their semi-public character: they were seemingly modelled on contemporary confessions such as Lavater's (published) Geheimes Tagebuch³, and copies of Baader's rather studied étalage du moi were sent directly to his religious preceptor, J. M. Sailer. Secondly, Baader's journals are notebooks on his studies. If as a diarist he is often clumsy by being over-sincere, as a student he devotes too much effort to transcribing his sources and too little to considering their interrelations. For these reasons, and because of their dual character, the journals at first sight appear shapeless. Having said this much, and in awareness of the lack of coherence even in Baader's formal writings, his diary would seem an inauspicious place to begin organizing the fragments of his Naturphilosophie into an intelligible structure. But such early writings are normally understood in terms of the author's characteristic statements, that is, in terms of the ideas which survived. In this perspective, Baader's journals show not only the varied intellectual ambience of early Romanticism, but, in embryonic growth, the enduring major theme of Naturphilosophie. Stated briefly, that theme was the intuited unity of spirit (Geist) and nature (Natur). Once alleged, it spoke for the corresponding philosophical union of religion (or psychology) and natural science, which became the very task of Naturphilosophie.

1. Quotations are from one more accurate edition, Seele und Welt (1928), with parenthetical reference to corresponding pages in vol. XI of Baader's works, except for Baader's entries of 1793, (XI, 210-400), which were available only to the original editors.

2. SuW, 15 f., 39 (XI, 7, 41).

3. Lieb, F., 18.

Baader's religious convictions, which always dominated his theory of nature, were initially formulated in express opposition to the world-view of the Enlightenment. By this term was understood the thorough reliance upon unaided reason in directing life, and, in particular, the philosophical position that every religious truth had ultimately to be a truth of reason. On this premise, revealed religion could provide at best a primitive awareness of what eventually could be known clearly through thought alone, a conclusion upon which Lessing based his famous resolution of the conflict between faith and reason¹. Against this reduction to reason, Baader reacted with a volcanic passion worthy of Hamann, and a vituperativeness that would never disappear from his references to the ruling thought of the eighteenth century. Deism, the so-called 'natural religion' of the Enlightenment, was dismissed with scorn as the artificial product of a 'professorial age'². Especially in its metaphysical, 'constructive' form, the theology that sought its own standard in rationalist philosophy was disdained as irrelevant to the living religious experience that was always concrete.

God knows, how deeply and how often I have felt, with Pascal, that with all speculation and demonstration we are still without God ... Truly, your metaphysical God is such a pure, refined spirit-flamelet, that neither lights nor warms ...³.

Not only was deism bloodless, it was also futile. In this regard, Baader seems to have accepted without question that Criticism was dispositive of the claims of dogmatic rationalism. The main argument he derived from Kant was that if we try to have positive knowledge of the objects of religious experience, we never succeed. This is because all of our knowledge of existence is tied to sense experience. Our few valid metaphysical principles can tell us nothing about ultimate realities such as God and the immortal soul, which could never become objects of ex-

1. Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts (1780).

2. S.u.W. 58, 79, 89, 124 (XI, 59, 84, 95, 137). "Der sogenannte Deist ist Zweifler, Skeptiker, ohne es zu wissen, sein Gott ist ein Wort ohne Geist und Leben - Nichtchrist = Atheist!" (70 (XI, 74)).

3. S.u.W. 34 (XI, 30 f.); cf. 89 (XI, 95).

perience, and statements concerning which could never be verified. This annulation of logist metaphysics, above all in epistemology, was the single point treated in Baader's brief, enthusiastic report on the Kantian 'reformation of metaphysics'¹. The same critique of dogmatic rationalism was meant when Baader wrote, paraphrasing a passage from Kant, that the academic 'philosophers by trade', when they take their concepts to be things of flesh and blood, embrace only empty words, 'as Ixion embraced the clouds instead of Juno'².

Rather than in certain concepts, the truths of religion were grounded in certain feeling: 'The sole criterion of truth is the innermost consciousness of what we feel!'³. In the religious theory of the journals, if theory it is to be called, the 'separativeness' and artificiality of reason were set in contrast with the unity and vitality of spirit. Prior to reflection, the immortal soul was known directly by intuition⁴. The existence of good and evil was grasped at once by the 'natural' mind unclouded by abstraction. Conscience revealed God immediately, as project in relation to the undeniable inadequacy of individual morality⁵. In every instance, religious truth was intuited within a relation to emotion, above all in the passionate activity of the will, and never in mere ideas abstracted from a living context⁶. The heart and not arid reason was the source of truth, the unitive principle of human personality, and the 'great book' in which to read Divinity. Returning in essence to the anti-metaphysical religion of Pascal, the diarist wrote on nearly every page that the heart cannot act without God, and cannot preserve doubt born of concepts themselves misbegotten.

Despite his frequent appeal to 'experience', and his misleading praise of 'empiricism'⁷, Baader's incipient mystic epistemo-

1. XI, 405-34; cf. "... die ohnmächtige Führerin Vernunft ... diese Dame ohne Fleisch und Blut ...", 65, 77 (XI, 68, 71).

2. S.u.W., 88 (XI, 94); Kant, I., Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten, Werke, IV, 426; (Cf. XI, 307).

3. S.u.W., 45 (XI, 43).

4. Ibid., 28, 35 (XI, 22, 32 f.).

5. Ibid., 156 f. (XI, 140).

6. Ibid., 81 (XI, 86 f.)

7. Ibid., 109 (XI, 117, cf. 407).

logy is indeed far from 'empiricism' in the normal sense. That was the 'atomizing' philosophy wherein the mind was conceived as a tabula rasa that formed its ideas solely by the 'mechanical addition and subtraction' of ideas received from without. And, that philosophy led ineluctably to skepticism¹. Having excluded the theory that knowledge may come from thought alone, Baader hardly entertained the theory that all knowledge derives from sense experience. Rather, he treated the entire debate between rationalism and empiricism as a phantom combat conjured by metaphysicians, and one that had been brought to an end by Kant². Criticism itself he viewed not as a theory of knowledge, but as a prelude to one. That new theory was to be confidently initiated upon the assumption of a psychological source of the knowledge of ideals -- an 'inner sense'³ -- which, because of the dialectical impasse between empiricism and rationalism, had temporarily become unknown in philosophy. By 'empiricism' Baader really meant the investigation of this mystic 'sense'. By 'intuition' he meant the 'higher third' mode of knowledge that transcended both the senses and the intellect.

The term 'intuition', Anschauung,⁴ which would remain central in Baader's theory of religious knowledge, suffers from an ambiguity which the mystic continually exploits. When we say that we know something by intuition, we may mean that we know it immediately and clearly, as in sense perception, where we can point directly to the basis of our knowledge. This is the use of the term in Kant's expression 'empirical intuition' (sinnliche Anschauung), and it is undoubtedly not the use in Baader. By 'intuition' (Anschauung or Intuition) we may also mean that we apprehend some thought without the intervention of any reasoning process. We may even be incapable of drawing a proof, yet we are

1. 410-5.

2. "... der unseren Geist vom metaphysischen Fieber mit einemmal heilt ... und ihm zeigt, daß es mit dem Flug ins große Nichts ... dialektisches Blendwerk sei", 57 (XI, 58).

3. "Ich weiß es, fühle es nun ... es gibt in mir einen inneren Sinn ... Dieser mystischen Sinn, von dem ich redete, ist freilich nicht für alle ..."; 35, 64 (XI, 32, 62).

4. "Öffne dein Auge ... und du siehst. Sollte es auch mit der Offenbarung Gottes in unserem Inneren anders sein? ... auch mein inneres Auge öffnet sich und wenn die Erkenntnis die höchste Stelle erreicht hat, so ist es gleichfalls Anschauung dessen, was da ist", S.u.W. 136 (XI, 151). Cf. S.u.W. 140 (XI, 150-381 f)

equally unable to relinquish the feeling of certainty with regard to what is intuited. In both of these senses of 'intuition', what is indicated is the contrast with the conceptual. But in the second sense, if it is taken as an independent source of philosophical knowledge, 'intuition' does not tell us why some thoughts are or should be intuited rather than others. Because of the nature of what is claimed, there is no recourse to logical justification, and the way is open to mysticism. This 'intuition', Baader believes, is the truly natural mode of knowledge, that has been obscured by the contrivances of the Sophist in reason. But its uncorrupted basic truths appear to have been handed down in clandestine succession from time immemorial. Even in the course of discussing Criticism, Baader affirms a 'secret tradition', and the mode of thought that is at home only in mystic theology: 'intellectual intuition', the perfect angelic thinking in which knowledge and creation are identical: 'where we think things instead of their signs or images'¹.

The critique of logist metaphysics may have been borrowed from Kant. During his 'rationalist' interlude in England, Baader may even have adhered in his own fashion to Kantian ethics². But the radically different character of Baader's own religion, 'naive' by comparison, was unmistakable throughout. Where in Kant's 'practical deism' a rational metaphysic of morals was founded upon the self-evident concept of duty, Baader would translate every statement into the conventional language of mystic Christianity. Kant's practical reason, that of subjective necessity derived the ideas of God, freedom and the immortal soul as its 'postulates', became in Baader the 'hunger' and 'thirst' for afterlife³. This 'thirst' demanded belief in 'water', just as, in Baader's Platonic trope, the spiritual 'eye' testified to the existence of the spiritual 'light' for which it was made⁴. But nowhere is this shift of ground better seen than in the contrast

1. XI, 322, cf. S.u.W. 363: "Alle unsere Tätigkeit geht also darauf hinaus: Sachen zu denken."

2. See Baader's transcriptions and comments on Kant, XI, 290-364.

3. S.u.W., 121, 146 f. (XI, 134, 162 f.).

4. S.u.W., 99 ff. (XI, 107 ff.).

between Kant's sober paean to the 'Genius' of Duty (in the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft¹), and Baader's invocation -- exultant, tearful, schwärmerisch -- of the Genius of Divinity:

Und nun, o Herr! du großer, unsichtbarer Ungenannter! Du meiner und meines Geschlechtes dich göttlich erbarmender, göttlich-liebender, holder Genius! Erlaube mir, daß ich im Anblicke der unseligen Verblendung meiner Brüder eine blutige Träne des Jammers und des Mitleids in deinem Schoß weine!²

Only the conclusions of Criticism are used, and these only negatively. It was as though in Kant philosophy had turned upon itself to annul its own claims and return spiritual dominion to its 'mother' theology.

For the affirmative part of his Christian apologetics, Baader referred to Protestant theologians who had little more in common with Kant than the anti-speculative attitude, and perhaps the cultural heritage of inward-looking Pietism. Herder provided the outline of a theory of intuition, with its corollary that the supernatural was ever experienced in direct relation to feeling, and to the concrete and individual³. The Zurich mystic Lavater, in Nathanael, described a specifically religious sense -- "Nathanaelismus, Sinn für's Christentum"⁴ -- which was unreflective and highly personal:

Wer gewisse entschieden gute, ganz treffliche, unmittelbar einleuchtende Dinge nicht schnell sieht, sieht sie nie oder selten recht und ganz."⁵

Finally, the doxological poetry of Matthias Claudius⁶ exemplified the 'dovelike simplicity' that marked the ideally personal relation with Christ. From these preferred authors Baader derived the general conviction that the ideal stood always in relation to the individual soul, and that truth was, to use Herder's expression, always 'climatized'. In part, the factual component, the 'clothing'

1. Werke, V, 86.

2. S.u.W., 127 (XI, 140). If Baader is rendering some passage from his reading, it may be the dithyramb to Natur in Herder's Ideen "... großes Wesen, Du unsichtbarer, hoher Genius unseres Geschlechtes ...", Werke XIII, 11. All that is meant to be conveyed here is a sense of Baader's commitment to religious language; cf. S.u.W. 9 (XI,3): "Die gütige Natur oder vielmehr Gott ..."

3. S.u.W., 21, 81, 104 (XI, 26, 86, 110), and Herder, J.G. Vom Erkennen und Empfinden der menschlichen Seele, Werke, VIII, 99-102, 133 f. Compare also Herder's "... das Menschengeschlecht: es hängt an Bildern", Ideen, Werke XIII, 307, and Baader's "Bilder tun der Seele wohl", S.u.W. 31, (XI, 26).

4. Lavater, J.C., Werke, III, 226; cf. Baader's "momentanes Intu-

of the supersensible, was given by sacred history¹. But principally it was found in the heart, Baader's 'alpha and omega', where ideals were always tempered by emotion. Christianity thus internalized found direct expression in the more diaristic entries of the journals, where Baader undertook the imitation of Christ, made his soul the battleground of good and evil, and in passages now lachrymous, now hallelujous, testified to the 'certain feeling' of Deity .

The Natur of Naturphilosophie was not at all 'nature' as the wilderness, but 'nature' as the generalized object of natural science, 'nature' as the physical world conceived under natural law. As thinking about nature in this sense, Naturphilosophie dealt with the philosophical principles of science, and above all with the fundamentally modern concept of natural lawfulness. In the development of Baader's 'philosophy of science', once more the commonplace is born out that Romanticism began in reaction. For the Natur of the journals is defined negatively in relation to the scientific world-view of the Enlightenment, at least as this was represented by the popular histoires naturelles of the philosophes. One of the 'centaurs' born of Ixion's cloudy amours, Holbach's Système de la nature² typified a dogmatic fatalism derived without warrant from the principles of natural science. In Holbach's work, detested by Goethe³ as well as Baader, nature was considered exclusively in terms of mechanical causality. All explanations not in conformity with rational mechanics and materialism, and in particular any references to theological notions, were banished from the philosophy of nature⁴. The result was not only that man was alienated from nature, but that the sciences of

itionsgefühl", S.u.W., 100, (XI, 107).

5. Lavater, J. C., *ibid.*, 227.

6. E.g., S.u.W. 137 f., 152 (XI, 154 f., 170, 319).

1. S.u.W., 78, 120 f. (XI, 82, 133)

2. S.u.W., 88 (XI, 95).

3. Goethe, J. W., Dichtung und Wahrheit, Werke, Abt. I, vol. xxviii, 68.

4. Holbach, P., vol. I, chaps iv-xi.

the human spirit were drawn into the un-magic circle of mechanism. In Holbach's proto-scientism, 'naturalism' proved merely the prelude to anti-clericalism, and a sensationalist levelling of ethics "à la Helvétius und Compagnie" (sic)¹. Just as any appeal to spirit in comprehending creation was outlawed, so also the appeal to Christian morality in the study and regulation of individual life. In Baader's estimation, the origin of this irreligious philosophy lay in the conceptual fragmentation of experience, wherein creation was 'dismembered and artfully cut into sectiones et paragraphos'. To be more exact, the fault lay in a dualistic rationalism, that posed an absolute disjunction between nature and spirit.

In this way all action from without and all reaction outward is automatically out of the question, and so too the influence of higher intelligences and the inner tribunal.²

Viewing nature mechanistically, man came to see himself as a machine. The bête-machine of Descartes had led remorselessly to Lamettries infamous homme-machine.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine whether Baader was very correct in his impression of the eighteenth century French philosophy of nature. That may not have been truly represented by Holbach's pretentious materialism, but rather by the Newtonian renunciation of hypotheses regarding ultimate causes in nature³. Even the author of the scandalous L'Homme-machine may have intended it to be no more than a relativist hypothesis⁴. Regardless of any such judgments, in the thoughts of Baader and his Romantic contemporaries the scientific spirit of the Enlightenment was typified by materialistic and deterministic doctrines that took nature to be in reality as it was represented in physics, then applied this paradigm to every part of philosophy and every human concern⁵.

1. S.u.W. 88, (XI,95)

2. Ibid., 16 (XI,23)

3. Cassirer, E. chap. ii, 37-92. esp. 55 f.

4. Vartanian, A., 15-7.

5. Cf. I, 385.

The formative response to this world-view was found in Herder, to whom the Naturphilosophie of Baader's journals largely belongs. The work of a theologian rather than a natural scientist, Herder's Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit¹ was welcomed as an anti-Enlightenment systeme, a 'sublime insight into the plan of the Creation'² under which to order facts culled from every descriptive science. Its guiding principle was that nature should be regarded at all times as a totality, das Ganze -- which, as a synonym for nature, became beloved of every Romantic philosopher. Nothing was to be considered in isolation, but only in its relation to the whole. Yet the whole was fully and concretely expressed in the individual, which in this symbolic capacity was accorded a renewed dignity³. In Herder's adumbrated system, nature was organized as a continuous chain of individuals rising from the inorganic, through the transitional type of the organism, to the spiritual. Within this eminently intelligible whole, man occupied a favored position. In man culminated the series of beings extending from the inorganic, and in man commenced the series ascending toward angels⁴. He was the 'microcosm', the 'epitome', and the consummative 'sun' of creation⁵. Having begun with the thought of the totality of nature, one ended in 'Romantic' egocentrism. The scientific expansion of the universe could in this way be rendered to account, and man returned to his rightful place at the center.

Because man comprised all of nature within himself, nature ✓ could be studied by (^{beginning with} departing from) the study of man. Analogy, in Baader's Herderian vision, became the 'great law' to which all other laws were subordinated. 'All is produced by analogy', 'all

1. Books I and II, Werke, XIII.

2. S.u.W., 33 (XI, 29).

3. "Im Leben jeder einzelnen Pflanze ist das Leben des Ganzen sichtbar ..." (S.u.W., 72; XI, 75). Cf. Herder: "...so schließe ich, so ungeteilt ich kann, vom Ganzen aufs Einzelne, vom Einzelnen aufs Ganze... Denn alles Dasein ist sich gleich, ein unteilbarer Begriff; im Größten sowohl als im Kleinsten auf einerlei Gesetze gegründet." Werke, XIII, 14-6.

4. Ideen, I, Book 5, esp. chaps i, vi.

5. S.u.W., 74 f., 124 (XI, 78 f., 137) and Herder, G. H., Werke, XIII, 23.

acts by analogy', 'all reflects the law of analogy'¹. Thinking by analogy begins with the immutable certainty of Selbstgefühl. Arguing that a unique lawfulness pervades the whole, one concludes that nature too is be-souled². Certainly, we cannot experience the hidden essences of things. Just as our spirit is embodied and 'veiled', so too in nature there is 'no power without its organ' ("Ohne Organ keine Kraft")³. Yet, knowing that our soul is the force that directs our actions, we may admit for all outer activity an analogous 'force, life, inner impulse'.

With our self-feeling (Selbstgefühl) we animate all beings outside of us, and, without this, everything around us⁴ would be dead, only shells without life and inner spirit.

By analogy and proportion, with humanity as our measure, we come to know the essence of the universe as activity and pandynamistic life. By 'anthropomorphism'⁵, we see that the soul in nature, like the human soul, strives to ascend. In the plant reaching upward toward the sun, and in the soul in prayer, Baader reads 'the same eternal law',

A real influxus, that is proved by our self-feeling -- the one true philosophy and physics of prayer⁶ ... morality is only the higher physics of the spirit.⁷

The practice of inferring from one similarity to another is of course insufficient to distinguish Baader and his fellow Naturphilosophen from their more scientific predecessors. Analogy, although not analogy alone, also has its place with such a philosophie as Buffon⁸. Where Baader differs is in taking the Christian self as his constant referrent, and in the value that he places on the comparison. While in the inductive sciences -- or for that

1. S.u.W., 73, 91, 117 f. (XI, 77, 98, 127 f.).

2. S.u.W., 39, 153 f. (XI, 36, 172). Cf. S.u.W., 43 (XI, 41): "Endlich was in der Natur um und in uns lebt und webt, Summe und Grund alles Lebens und aller Kraft im Universum -- Gott -- allbelebender Weltgeist ...".

3. S.u.W., 148 f. (XI, 164), and Herder: "Keine Kraft in der Natur ist ohne Organ", Werke, XIII, 172.

4. S.u.W., 68 f. (XI, 71 f.).

5. "Analogie, Idealismus, Anthropomorphismus", S.u.W. 74 (XI, 78), and Herder: "Ähnlichkeit mit uns ... Analogie zum Menschen ... siehe die ganze Natur, betrachte die große Analogie der Schöpfung", Werke, VIII, 169 f., 200.

6. S.u.W., 16 (XI, 8).

7. S.u.W. 29 f. (XI, 24), and Herder: "Da Geist und Moralität auch Physik sind, und denselben Gesetzen ... nur in höherer Ordnung dienen", Werke, XIII, 20.

matter in common sense -- one might use analogy provisionally, Naturphilosophie uses analogy in order to make apodictic assertions. By relying on that presumptive reasoning, Baader separates himself from scientific thinking and draws nearer the theosophical tradition. In the Tableau naturel of Saint-Martin, Baader's Naturbuch¹, analogy is proposed as the most perfect form of knowledge². Knowledge of one thing makes possible that of all others; therefore, intimate self-knowledge is the key to intimate knowledge of the universe. 'By analogy with our inner powers', writes Saint-Martin, 'we can conclude just as certainly regarding those in nature'³. By analogy, the French theosopher finds correspondences between the physical and spiritual worlds, discovering nature to be ruled by a supernatural agency, "la Cause Active et Intelligente"⁴. Departing from and returning to religious man, this kind of analogy unites us, as the mystics say, 'with our correlatives', until we see nature as the 'garment', 'symbol', and 'organ' of the Divinity⁵. Even in its formation, Baader's Naturphilosophie is not concerned with verifiability, but vision.

In the Romantic view, which has well been called 'physiognomical'⁶, the face of nature expresses its soul for the simple reason that it is formed by the soul. But the soul cannot be recognized through the features in a determined fashion. It can only be intuited, for the unity of inner and outer is true unity, and can only be seen at a single glance. Anyone who picks up Lavater's Physiognomische Fragmente (and Baader did), will appreciate at once that it is not a table of necessary inferences, but a lesson-book in the art of seeing. In Lavater's text, where the face is divided into sections corresponding to psychological or (moral) divisions of the self, the eye is the unitive expression

8. Quoted Cassirer, E., 78.

1. S.u.W., 117 (XI, 127 f.).

2. Saint-Martin, L. C., Tableau naturel, I, 3 f., and 147, II, 109

3. Ibid., I, 3 f.

4. Ibid., I, 233 f.

5. S.u.W. 125 (XI, 138).

6. Gode von Aesch, A., 317 ff.

of the individual, 'the summary and centre of the whole'¹. For the student of physiognomy, the goal is to be able with his own eye to 'see through' the features into the soul.

In a simile that would recur throughout Baader's writing, the countenance of nature is made up of 'letters' and 'words'. The universe is disjecti membra poetae, until by analogy the jumbled words are resolved into poetry². After the human soul, nature is the second 'great book' in which to read Divinity. But the testament is written in hieroglyphs that need to be deciphered³. 'Poetry' is the key by which to 'spell out' and 'read' the meaning of nature, when 'to read would be to experience'⁴. According to the theosophical myth, there is a secret script, and there are 'masters in the art of reading'⁵. In Baader's translation of one of these masters, Saint-Martin, nature is written only in 'consonants' which the soul brings to meaning and life with 'vowels'. A mystic reverence for speech as the perfect union of soul and body leads to the statement, not found in Saint-Martin, that in studying nature one may learn not only to read, but 'to pronounce'⁶.

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1. Lavater, J., Physiognomische Fragmente, I, 17. Lavater expressly denies deterministic conclusions from unalterables such as the size of the eyes (III, 180), and concentrates instead on the influence of the imagination on gesture and facial expression (III, 152 ff.). By far the most frequently represented and studied physiognomy in Lavater's work is the exemplary one of Christ.
 2. S.u.W., 74 (XI, 78).
 3. S.u.W. 135 (XI, 149); X, 217 n.
 4. "Sind die sinnlichen Erscheinungen natürliche Zeichen (Worte) und führen sie ihren Sinn (ihre Bedeutung) mit sich, wie z.B. die Physiognomien der Menschen ihren Charakter in unsere Seele bringen? Lesen wäre Erfahren?" XI, 366 f.
 5. S.u.W., 68 (XI, 71).
 6. II, 129 n.2.

ii. Vom Wärmestoff: The Anatomy of the World-Soul

The analogical, 'physiognomical' approach to nature is set to work in Baader's thesis and his only book, Vom Wärmestoff¹, published in Vienna and Leipzig upon completion of his medical studies in 1786. As academic research, it was of some significance as one of the earliest German publications of Lavoisier's methods of obtaining the specific heats of molecules². As theory, it is turgid, although one should bear in mind that the general doctrine of chemistry was at that time still unsettled. As Romantic literature, Baader's thesis was precocious in applying Herder's insights to a specific set of scientific problems, in order to arrive at a closer 'analysis' of the structure of the World-Soul.

As it was at the creation, wrote Baader, there was need of an ordering spirit to brood over the chaos of doctrines regarding heat phenomena³. To begin, he reasonably divides all theories, both ancient and modern, into two classes: the mechanical theories of heat-motion and the chemical theories of heat-substance. The kinematic theory -- that 'cardhouse of mechanical vibration, impulse, and pressure' -- is abruptly dismissed as 'inconsistent and incomplete', while the mechanical laws of Newton are said assuredly to lack 'physical truth'⁴. 'Dogmatic physics' is thus roundly rejected in favor of the heat-substance theories then prevalent in chemistry, which had in fact developed somewhat independently of physics, particularly since the mid-eighteenth century. Its 'empiricism' seemed to Baader to have opened 'a new world of knowledge', revealing a more fundamental stage of activity in nature. As the exemplary science, it was to carry the

1. Vom Wärmestoff, seiner Verteilung, Bindung und Entbindung, vorzüglich beim Brennen der Körper. Eine Probeschrift von Franz Xaver Baader, der Arzneigelahrtheit Doktor (Wien und Leipzig, 1786), or III, 1-180. Because this and the next three works to be treated here are of some slight historical interest for the development of Naturphilosophie, quotations will be from original editions, with reference in parentheses to the corresponding - but often modified - passages in Baader's collected works.

2. V.W., 173-85 (III, 110-9).

3. V.W., Intro. (III, 8).

4. Ibid., 72 n. (III, 8, 10, 52 [n. 51]).

torch before its sister-disciple of physics, the rationalizing Schulphysiker being obliged to 'learn the letters' under the tutelage of chemistry before making bold 'to read in the great book: nature'¹.

The substance to which heat phenomena were formally attributed in chemistry was described as a fluid of extreme tenuity. Ubiquitous, mobile, expanding spontaneously, it was supposed to permeate the pores of matter. As it diluted matter, matter liquefied and vaporized, and its passage from one body to another, in search of equilibrium, accounted for changes in temperature². According to the eminent chemists Wilke and Black, the heat-substance was indestructible³. If it was not apparent, it still existed latently or 'bound' in the interstices of matter, capable of manifesting heat under changed conditions. The ability of any chemical molecule to absorb the heat-substance 'like a sponge' was called its 'specific heat'. Like the 'elective affinities' of elements and compounds, 'specific heats' could only be found experimentally. Having determined 'specific heats' by use of their newly-invented 'calorimeter', Lavoisier and Laplace had actually measured, indirectly, quantities of hidden heat-substance⁴.

Der Wärmestoff, which Baader found masterfully defined in Boerhaave's ignis, belonged generically to the qualitative theories that have gradually been dispensed with in modern science. Contrary to mechanistic theories, these do not explain modification in a body by assuming its parts have changed their arrangements or motion. Rather, it is assumed that to the substance of the body another, invisible substance, pre-existing elsewhere, has been added⁵. During the era of Naturphilosophie, such qualitative theories abounded in science, with electricity, light, magnetism and galvanism all having, like heat, their imponderable

1. V.W., Intro., (III, 10).

2. Ibid., 14-149 (III, 19-96).

3. Ibid., 150-72 (III, 97-110).

4. Ibid., 173-82 (III, 110-6).

5. See Meyerson, E., chaps 9 and 10.

fluids. Since these hypothesized entities escaped all consideration of mass, they could be allowed side-by-side with mechanical theories, and are considered to have been useful transitional concepts in the development of modern science¹. When Baader wrote, the qualitative theory of heat was still viable. Lavoisier's attack on phlogiston (Sur la chaleur, 1783) had fairly recently appeared, and the scientific debate over the Wärmestoff was culminating². In 'the last stand of phlogiston', the qualitative theories proved most tenacious in explanations of combustion, presumably because such a distinct and impressive phenomenon as fire could only with difficulty be pictured without a substantial substratum, and when Baader discussed combustion in his final chapter, he advanced his strongest arguments for the existence of the heat-substance. Concluding, he declared that the concept would survive the controversy³, as in effect it did, however briefly, in Lavoisier's imponderable calorique⁴.

Like the 'elemental fire' of Aristotle or the Paracelsian 'sulfur' from which it was derived, der Wärmestoff was a hypostasized sensation, bearing the qualities of warmth, light, and energy. By assuming this as the active force in heat phenomena, Baader was already a step closer to his intended unification of spirit and nature, and the overthrow of 'blind mechanism'. For mechanistic science does not take into account our sensations any more than it does our emotional values. In the heat-motion theory, there is no relation of kind between the sensation of heat and what causes it. But with a qualitative theory, one hypothesizes a generalized object, such as a heat-substance, that not only causes sensations but is of their own nature. Although Baader's phlogiston theory is soon to be discarded somewhat embarrassedly, his philosophy of nature will retain throughout this qualitative character. No explanatory concept, however general, will lack a component of sensation, some relation to feeling. In this respect,

1. See Williams, L. P., 52 ff.

2. See V.W., 234 n. (III, 148 n.2).

3. Ibid., 231-62, 274 ff. (III, 147-64, 171 ff.).

4. Partington, J., III, 337.

Baader's Vom Wärmestoff represents a preliminary stage that will be retained in the 'science' that explains nature according not only to qualities of sensation, but also of emotion, thought, and will.

Baader's heat-substance was Boerhaave's ignis, Kirwan's 'hydrogen', Stahl's or Scheele's phlogiston; in short, it was 'a principle of inflammability'. The author felt no need to be more precise, because he understood fire, heat, expansion, and 'animal heat' (a pabulum vitae¹) to be only particular effects of a primal substance (Urstoff²), which, like 'virgin earth and water'³, was never found in a pure state. Neither, however, did he delineate the general concept, except to say that der Wärmestoff was a Menstruum, a Fluidum, a universal dissolvent. In other words, it was a hybrid concept, midway between force and matter -- or, like Boerhaave's ignis, 'intermediate between mind and matter'⁴ -- and of a type that was acceptable in a chemistry still steeped in alchemy. But if Baader was unclear, it mattered little. This was his 'unripe work', and he had already begun to describe nature using a class of concepts adaptable to the passion, more poetic than scientific, for analogy and identification.

As the principle of life, pre-eminently the moral life, the soul was also thought of as a 'force'. It was this conception that directed Herder's psychological-physiological Vom Erkennen und Empfinden, leading to the analogical identification^{of the soul} with substantial forces and the visualization of nature as a dynamic whole⁵. Reasoning in a fashion that the materialist author of L'Homme-Machine would surely have understood, Baader stated in his journals that the question regarding the existence of subtile force-substances in nature was 'in reality, the same' as that

1. V.W., Intro., (III, 9).

2. V.W., 171 (III, 109).

3. Ibid., 234 (III, 177).

4. Lindeboom, G.A., Hermann Boerhaave, 325, quoted Partington, J., II, 750.

5. Werke, VIII, 180 "Psychologie muß auch Physiologie sein", 192: "Ein Reich unsichtbarer, inniger, aber minder heller und dunkler Kräfte ...", and below,

regarding the existence of a soul¹. Any scientist who adhered to the heat-motion theory, Baader concluded, was therefore 'at least on the way to materialism and forthwith to atheism'². Chemistry was to be praised because, in its 'empiricism', it admitted the presence of those 'forces' and 'powers' which, throughout several conceptual modifications, would remain the principle concern of Baader's Naturphilosophie and of Romantic science in general³. Furthermore, once heat had been conceived as an active aetherial stuff, it could be associated by analogy with the fluid-forces of magnetism, electricity, and light, by which scientists explained phenomena seemingly inscrutable to rational mechanics. By way of these hypothetical intermediaries, the heat-substance could then be joined with the vital forces of organisms and the human soul as only another manifestation of Herder's Bildungstrieb, the formative impulse that propelled inwardly nature's process of growth and individuation. Via 'the great way of analogy', der Wärmestoff could be ordered within a vision of the cosmos as a graduated series of forces, all components of a unique universal power -- the apotheosis of light and life -- that in perpetual movement and activity, as the All-Provider and All-Destroyer upon and within our globe, thus as a true World-Soul flows throughout everything and with its penetrating breath animates all.

Like the fluid-forces whose supposition in science made the Romantics' unitive conception of nature more feasible, the World-Soul of Baader's thesis and his journals had a bipolar structure. Complementing the expansive urge providing for vitality was 'Gravity', the 'cold' and formative 'urge to crystallize' (Crystallisations- und Configurationstrieb)⁵. Because all of the for-

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1. "... das für sich bestehende Dasein eines Wesens -- Kraft, Substanz (welche man unter Seele, Geist ordnet) ...", S.u.W., 147 (XI, 165).
 2. Ibid., 148 (XI, 166).
 3. Cf. Knight, D., 45.
 4. V.W., 33 (III, 30). Cf. Herder's primal Wärme.
 5. Ibid., 54 ff. (III, 41 ff.); cf. S.u.W., 71 (XI, 74): "Zwei Kräfte wirken sichtbar hiernieden. Die eine sammelt, bindet, die andere zerstreut, trennt, in der gesamten Natur, wie in sich beide. Schwerkraft, Krystallisations-, Configurationstrieb der toten Masse; Expansionstrieb, Bildungstrieb der lebendigen, jedem Kunstgebilde inwohnenden, in ihm hausenden, schaffenden, zerstörenden, assimilierenden Kraft.

ces of the World-Soul were more or less conscious or unconscious, that is, because the World-Soul was truly a soul, its impulses were analogous in quality to those of the human soul. Presaging the entire Romantic metaphysic of love, Baader wrote that an identical bond joined planets, chemical elements, and souls:

Liebe ist das allgemeine Band, das alle Wesen im Universum an und ineinander bindet und verwebt.

1. V.W., 39 (III, 33).

2. Atomism and the Dynamic Philosophy

When he wrote of atomism as anathema, Baader had in mind the prevalent eighteenth-century corpuscular theories of the kind put forth simply in the essay on Newton by Voltaire¹. According to such a theory, matter is composed ultimately of homogeneous, discrete, and indivisible corpuscles of pure Cartesian extension. Because these hypothetical units were all of one kind, they had nothing that could adequately explain individuality. Because they were impenetrable and discontinuous, their assumption destroyed the idea of real unity in nature. Because they were inanimate, being endued with nothing but gravity, one had to explain all activity by mechanical laws operating 'from without'. One ended by viewing nature, in Coleridge's disparaging phrase, as 'a moving congeries of dead pieces of matter'².

Baader took atomistic philosophy as a doctrine of substance. When related to questions of ethics, the theory of 'atoms and the void' stood as the 'physical' foundation of determinism. This association of ideas was not required of Baader, since in popular literature the basic notions of a mechanistic science had already been brought into the service of antireligious and fatalistic ideologies. Leibniz's 'two famous labyrinths', the problem of substance and that of free will, were made to interrelate. The first, which had been said to be the concern of philosophers alone, became, like the second, the concern of every individual. By a sort of philosophical synecdoche, the debate over atomism was treated as one over determinism.

The 'vile body' of Romantic science was not simply gainsaid.

1. Baader called even Leibniz's monads 'spiritless' (IX, 44), yet not Democritus's atoms (II, 313). -- Cf. Voltaire, Oeuvres, XXXI, 64-74. A survey, from a Romantic point of view, and a refutation of the 'atomo-mechanical' theory of matter, was given by the transplanted Naturphilosoph, the American G.B. Stallo, 49-61, and 62-128.

2. Coleridge, S. T., II, 287.

Its assumption seemed to have been invalidated by a thoroughly respectable authority. In the Dynamik of his Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, Kant had demonstrated that the theory of atoms was unnecessary to the laws of Newton, mechanics being independent of the underlying theory about the ultimate constitution of matter¹. Atoms and continua represented equally defensible hypotheses, neither of them conclusive. Having read Kant's work avidly², Baader opted without hesitation for the theory of continua. Anticipating Goethe's indignant outburst in the Farbenlehre, he also elected to explain light by continua, dismissing Newton's light-particle theory as 'quite absurd'³. Thereafter, the atom was no more than an 'object of belief'. Borrowing the rationalists' anti-mystic invectives, Baader reproached the whole of atomistic-mechanistic science with 'fanaticism' and 'obscurantism' (Schwärmerei).

The theoretical construction of matter presented in Kant's Dynamik established in a crucial respect the possibility of Romantic Naturphilosophie, at least along the lines it really took. In deducing the concept of matter a priori, Kant had explained its properties (gravity and extension, cohesion and elasticity) as due to a synthesis of irreducible attractive and repulsive forces (Grundkräfte)⁴. Beginning apparently with Baader⁵, the Romantic philosophers took this to mean that matter really was made up of centripetal and centrifugal forces. In this way originated the 'dynamic philosophy'⁶, the representation of all natural phenomena in terms of variances of these primordial opposites.

In 1792 Baader's Ideen über Festigkeit und Flüssigkeit appeared in Gren's prestigious Journal der Physik⁷. By now, Baader had

1. Werke, IV, 503-8, 530-5.

2. XI, 373 ff.

3. XI, 286.

4. Kant, I., Werke, IV, 513.

5. See next paragraph. R. Haym (650) and J. Neubauer (48) grant Eschemayer the questionable distinction of having first proposed the application in chemistry of Kant's Dynamik, in 1794. Despite Baader's article, Eschenmayer does deserve precedence for the important reason that Schelling gave him credit as the first, after Kant, to help in establishing the 'dynamic science'. (Werke, II, 716).

6. This is Kant's own term, Werke, IV, 532.

7. Leipzig, 1792, Bd 5, Heft 14, 222-46 (III, 181-202).

jettisoned the notion of a heat-substance, and criticized Lavoisier (in his Traité élémentaire de chimie) for having described solids, liquids, and gases as varying mixtures of atoms and the elastic fluid calorique. Ridiculing those scientific tendencies of which his own thesis had been a minor example, he observed that, with the recent proliferation of imponderable substances, one would soon be required to invent 'a matter-making matter'¹. Rather than by atoms and any subtle substances, argued Baader, scientists should explain changes in phase of chemicals as changes in the ratios of their inherent attractive and repulsive forces. Once this 'dynamic' philosophy of nature was adopted, all phases of a continuous matter could be understood as lying between two ideal absolutes, the solidity and fluidity of Baader's title -- all without resort to atomistic fictions. With this sketch of a new theory (whose main idea is paralleled in Novalis²), Baader thought to have found in Kant a formidable ally in the campaign against 'mechanistic' science. But this, the real point of Baader's article, owed rather less to Kant's Dynamik than to a hylozoistic interpretation that was contrary to that author's own intentions. 'As if with a beneficent breath of life', Baader wrote, Kant had 'annihilated' all mechanistic-atomistic 'Materie brute' (sic), and had proven that 'everywhere in nature there exists only Materie vive'³.

The word 'dynamic' had a second and equally vital connotation. Again it was based on a reading of Kant. In the first Kritik, Kant had asked whether a single event could have both a natural cause and an intelligible cause in freedom. As far as any event was considered within nature, it was thoroughly conditioned.

1. F.u.F., 227 n. (III, 186 n.).

2. Das allgemeine Brouillon, Chemische Hefte, Werke, III, 34 (1798): "Die Einteilung in Feste, Flüssige und Luftige ist nicht richtig. Besser in Feste und Flüssige."

3. F.u.F. 226 n. (III, 185 n.).

Viewed under concepts of understanding, nature including man was devoid of spontaneous causality or freedom. But, if it were realized that nature was only appearance, it could be maintained without contradiction that an event also had an unconditioned intelligible cause. If one did not 'insist obstinately upon the reality of the appearances', one could say that an event might have its real cause in freedom, while its apparent cause was not spontaneous but contingent. In its 'empirical character', an event would always be conditioned by preceding events according to the law of empirical causality. But in its noumenal character, as-it-really-was, it could still have a non-sensible cause outside the series of appearances. When viewed according to speculative reason, 'the causality of the cause' could be free, and Kant's example was of a moral subject who is able to freely initiate a series of events which nonetheless appears empirically conditioned. This 'transcendental proof' was intended to reconcile nature and freedom, not at all by establishing freedom, but only to the extent of showing 'that causality through freedom is at least not incompatible with nature'¹.

The principle of the law of causality was in Kant's terms one of the 'dynamic' principles, whose certain application was limited to the experience of nature. When Baader calls his Naturphilosophie 'dynamic', he is saying not only that he deals with forces, but that he speculates upon 'the causality of the cause', and the possibility that every apparently determined event has a real cause in freedom. His philosophy of nature has only to do with the noumenal character of things, not their empirical character, which remained for Kant 'the supreme ground of explanation'. Accordingly, Baader's 'dynamic' and purely metaphysical explanations should leave undisturbed the law of natural causality. As Baader wrote in his Ideen über Festigkeit und Flüssigkeit,

To the physicist who explains only mechanistically, such 'dynamic' researches (Naturforschungen) doubtless appear to be superfluous speculations, if not indeed wild imaginings (Schwärmerei). But they present no challenge to him, because

1. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 556-95, Norman Kemp Smith translation, 461-84.

they begin just where he leaves off.¹

Predictably enough, the distinction is not always upheld. Baader writes as if proving that behind every appearance there is a reality in freedom -- a 'spiritual' reality -- and as if Naturphilosophie had certain knowledge of things as-they-really-are.

By treating nature as appearance rather than essence, Kant is said to have discovered the modern idea that scientific theories have the character of models; that is, models make no assumptions about the real nature of things. On this analysis, Kant overturned two previous dogmatic views: the purely materialistic and the 'theologically grounded'². But the mystic Romantic analysed differently, and made his own use of the discovery that, in the construction of scientific concepts, a certain part is ascribable to human freedom. Characteristically of his use of Kant, Baader took to heart only the refutation of materialism and its concomitant, atomism. Kant, he wrote, had shown 'that the final goal and the limit of all explanations goes further than to molecules primitives'³, and that Kant had taught us to recognize an 'original fluidity'. Appropriating products of Kantian science without making their mode of production his own, Baader took the theory of central forces and continua as paradigmatic for his Naturphilosophie, the 'new science' that would prove to be grounded in theology.

1. F.u.F., 228 (III, 192).

2. Martin, G., 65-97.

3. F.u.F. 225 (III, 185).

3. Contributions to Elementary Science: A Universal Chemism

During his years in Scotland, the theosopher-to-be projected a Lebenslehre that would obviate ethics and physics (as well as religion and politics) as separate disciplines¹. As it began to emerge in Baader's essays of 1797 and 1798, that 'doctrine of life' relied at least superficially on the scientific thought of Kant, or more precisely, on vitalistic conclusions which (as Baader realized) Kant did not draw, and which (we believe) Kant could hardly have foreseen. As Baader wrote to Jacobi from Hamburg in 1796², Kant had set up an absolute law against such a Lebenslehre by demanding for every event in nature an external cause. Baader, to whom all 'separativeness' was inimical, judged this as a wilful separation of nature and man. Further, the hylozoism proscribed by Kant as the death of all sound natural philosophy³ was the death only of the already 'dead' mechanistic (Newtonian) philosophy. On the contrary, it was necessary to recognize objectively a source of spontaneous life and consciousness in nature, an 'inner sense' (eine analoge Untiefe) corresponding to our own.

In Baader's Beiträge zur Elementar-Physiologie⁴, the existence of this natural analogue to consciousness or spirit is demonstrated by redefining gravity in a peculiar way. To begin with, the weight of a body is independent of any other property, such as volume, and can only be determined by experiment. Furthermore, each body requires a minimum of force to set it in motion, while it can 'make use' only of a certain maximum of force. This, we are told, argues for a specific mechanical capacity in bodies, which Baader names 'gravity', and understands as an inherent force or 'internal power', one which confers 'individuality' upon everything in nature⁵. In effect, Baader says that the essence

1. XI, 314.

2. XV, 164 ff.

3. Kant, I., Werke, V, 544.

4. Hamburg, 1797 -- written October, 1796, in: III, 203-46. Physiologie was the nearest equivalent to the modern general terms 'physics' and 'science'. McFarland, J., 11 ('physics') and Weldon, T., 86 ('science').

5. Beiträge, 1-9 (III, 205-8).

of matter is activity. Even when a body is not manifest as resistance or impenetrability in interacting with other bodies, it nonetheless continues to 'act', at least in the sense that its ability to do so remains as a latent force, capable at every instant of exerting influence upon other bodies.

We can now define every mechanical reaction as an act. Pre-supposing the 'dynamic' construction of matter, every such act may be spoken of as a 'synthesis', since to describe it in a 'dynamic' way, we must think of a synthesis of forces. (Every effect of the theoretical gas particle, one is led to suppose, would be such a 'synthesis'). And with this 'synthesis', we have already found what is sought: an analogue to 'inner sense'. For, as Baader continues, the concept of force comes about only through 'a synthesis of the manifold of outer and inner sense' (Extension und Intension)¹. What occurs 'outwardly' by addition and subtraction occurs 'inwardly' by multiplication and division, exponentiation and the extraction of roots. This is because in the 'inner sense' the various forces are united 'synthetically' or systematically by a process Baader calls 'organic articulation' (Gliederung), which increases their potential geometrically by providing for a division of labour². Now one can easily see that

Whereas organic articulation is possible only through one principle (systematically), moreover, whereas the requisite permeation of a manifold cannot take place ... in the outer sense (in space, by juxtaposition), but only in the inner sense (in the unity of time through intussusception), therefore is the former (fact, (author's insertion)) our warrant for the reasonableness of nature as a creative power (its intelligibility), as is the latter (fact our warrant, (author's insertion)) for (the existence of, (author's insertion)) an inner nature, analogous to our inner sense-substance, in every physical structure.

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1. Beiträge, 21 (III, 213). This statement refers presumably to the facts: a) that mathematical expressions of force have terms for space and time; and, b) that in Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic space is defined as the 'form' (or condition) of outer intuition, and time as that of both outer and inner intuition.
 2. Ibid., 21-6 (III, 213-6). Cf. Novalis on "Baaders Gliederung", Werke, III, 486.
 3. Da nun Gliederung nur aus Einem Prinzip (systematisch) möglich ist, da ferner das hierzu erforderliche Durchgehen eines Vierterlei nicht im äusseren Sinne (im Raume per Juxta positionem) (sic) sondern nur im Innern (in der Zeit-Einheit per Intus susceptionem) stattfinden oder geschehen kann, so bürgt uns ersteres für die Vernünftigkeit der Natur als Bildnerin (ihre Vernehmbarkeit), so wie letzteres für Ein unserem Sinnenstoff analoges Innere in jedem Körpergebilde.

'Dead mechanism' defines the external as the objective, and the internal as the subjective, concluding that whatever is not extended in space is in the mind alone. But, argues Baader, all representations are 'internal', and that which is termed 'external' is really at the border between two interiorities -- with 'outwardness' resulting only from the 'imposition' of the object upon the subject. When, for example, the organic unity of mind and body is disrupted (as by disease), a new border between subject and object presents itself¹. As Baader explains it, the egoless body is distinguished from the one possessing a self not by the former being extended, but by its disunity, its lack of being 'centered', ('daß diese Mitte diesem Wesen nicht innewohnt")².

Defying Newton and Kant, Baader asserts that mechanical bodies are not at all indifferent to impact, motion, and rest. That we should think so results from a confusion of the notions of reason (Grund, Inhärenz) and 'cause in the narrower sense' (Ursache, Dependenz), which is in turn a confusion between 'heteronomy' and 'autonomy'³. In reality, the outer, mechanical cause is just the 'excitation, spark or seed' that

presents to the inner sense (the natural interior force, or imagination in the broadest sense), a schema in view of a pre-determined synthesis.

This 'interior (a-spatial) causality' appropriates matter and is 'enflamed' at its contact⁴.

At this stage of his 'argument', Baader has obviously borrowed his terms from Kantian ethics. 'Heteronomy', used originally in a political context, meant the subjection of the will to external rule (some non-moral 'interest', the passions). 'Autonomy' meant

1. Beiträge, 27-33 (III, 216-9); cf. Novalis: "siehe Baaders Theorie der Gliederung ... der Harmonie der Funktionen und der Disharmonie derselben (der Krankheit) ...", Werke, II, 530, 540.

2. (III, 219). This phrase is not in the original edition, which says on p. 32: "Eine Raum-Einheit (räumliches Individuum) qualifiziert sich als solche bloß durch die ihr als einem Vielerlei Aussereinander entsprechende (und solches bewirkende, vindizierende) Einheit Ineinander."

3. Beiträge, 13 ff. (III, 210 ff.).

4. Ibid., 35-7 (III, 220 f.); cf. Novalis, Schriften, II, 594: "Die äußere Sollicitation ist nur in der Ermangelung unserer Selbstheterogeneisierung und Berührung!!!! "

the freedom of the will to spontaneously assign its own laws¹. According to Kant's analysis of causality, it was possible that human freedom could cause a series of events that would nonetheless appear to be determined in the natural order. In his 'elementary science', Baader asks that we imagine in natural phenomena an analogous free and 'intelligible' causality (Grund as opposed to Ursache). He asks that, with reference to nature, we answer affirmatively Kant's rhetorical question:

... is it yet possible to regard one and the same event as being in one aspect merely an effect of nature and in another aspect due to freedom?²

The explanations provided by 'dead mechanism' are henceforth to be tolerated only in those cases where the interacting bodies completely lack autonomy, or the ability to act spontaneously, which makes them individuals -- in fact, räumliche Individuen. Such instances must be indeed rare, as, sanctioned by his definition of individuality, Baader discovers 'selves' in every manifestation of force. A solid moving in a liquid medium calls forth resistance -- a 'thou' (du) -- and by the same act first realizes its own full potential as ego. Even the formation of waves Baader sees as the creation and annihilation of selves.

The mechanistic philosopher applies his 'heteronomous' explanations to the operations of thought, with the result that the ego is deprived of all creativity and will³. Baader's intention is to reverse this procedure, divining in nature the pure form of mind, and a spontaneous 'inner' causality analogous to free will. Outer material nature and its phenomena are now thought to be only one side of reality. To every so-called 'outer' event a 'psychic' and 'inner' event necessarily corresponds. Statements about nature become statements about the self, and if autonomy and 'imagination' are discerned in physical nature, it is because they cannot be denied to the self.

1. Kant, I., Werke, IV, 399 f., 432, or V, 33 ff.

2. K.d.r.V. B, 565 (Kemp Smith, N., 466).

3. Beiträge, 67 f. (III, 235 f.).

By interpreting physics 'dynamically', Baader is also interpreting it 'chemically'. This turn in the discourse depends once again upon a statement of Kant, wherein thinking is compared with chemistry on the basis that a chemical reaction may join different elements into a new synthetic unity¹. Baader takes Kant's metaphor in earnest, writing that chemical processes are 'of the highest order' because in them one body is 'assimilated' and 'penetrated' by the other so that 'new individuals' emerge:

Wie die Natur manch widerwärt'ge Kraft
verbindend zwingt und streitend Körper schafft.²

Before, chemistry was significant because it dealt with soul-like forces. Now it is singled out because chemical solutions, like living individuals, are organized unities. Like the unity of the self, 'dynamic' and 'chemical' unities are constantly being renewed, the appearance of matter resulting from an incessant reproduction by positive and negative forces, by 'inner and outer', by 'male and female principles'³. As Baader confided to Jacobi, his Beiträge 'reduced all art and nature to the double-process of the sexual impulses'.

During the early Romantic period, chemical products were widely held to be part of organic nature. As Friedrich Schlegel wrote, chemistry had shown that the inorganic was 'alive'⁴. Pushing these suggestions further, Baader stated that

just as Reason, in thinking, proceeds chemically, nature outside of us (ausser uns) proceeds rationally in its chemical⁵ operations, which are the fundamental ones of all formation⁵.

Now, chemical products, like other spontaneous formations in nature, are said to resemble works of art, because of their organization. And art, being a product of the human will, has the character of the morally good⁶. Inasmuch as nature is an artist, it may be inferred that nature is therefore also a moral agent⁷.

1. K.d.r.V., B xxi n. (Kemp Smith, N., 24.)

2. Beiträge, 5 n. (III, 206 n.).

3. XV, 169.

4. Philosophy, 86.

5. Beiträge, 70 f. (III, 237 f.).

6. *Ibid.*

7. Cf. Novalis, Schriften, III, 253: "Kann die Chemie Kunst werden? Hauptfrage. Sie solls durch Moralität werden."

In Baader's visionary 'chemistry', special importance is attached to fluidity as the element of all change. In chemical reactions, deliquescent bodies are capable of 'nourishing' others in the process of formation. All generation, transformation, and destruction takes place in the 'middle stage' of fluidity¹. Here Baader is again making use of a common idea, but the fluid he has in mind is nothing like an arrangement of discrete molecules. It is a mystic version of Kant's 'original fluidity', a prima materia, or 'a matter which is, in the narrower sense, not matter'. It is 'the inner sense which permeates nature and man',

der zartere Schleier am Gewande der Mutter Isis² ... eine Weltseele oder ein Weltgeist.³

This is metaphysical intoxication, to be sure. One would like to say that language has run riot. Yet Baader's main idea is almost simple. On the authority of Kant's Dynamik, it is presumed that matter consists in forces, and that these are united in any mechanical or chemical reaction. Merely because the unity is spontaneous and 'synthetic', it is said that nature executes organizing-functions analogous to thinking -- 'operations' that cannot even be grasped without such an analogy. Once the whole of nature (and not only organisms and man) is construed as acting 'imaginatively' and spontaneously, it is said to share the definite attributes of the human spirit. Nature too has its Untiefe, its soul.

But more than analogy is required before one achieves a raptu-

1. Beiträge, 46-8 (III, 226).

2. Ibid., 48 (III, 226).

3. III, 226 n. (only). The idea of an 'original fluidity' would be retained throughout Baader's speculation. Just how vague it was from the outset may be judged from two footnotes in this and the following essay. The first refers to a theory of Th. Sömmering whereby the soul was a liquid in the cranial cavity, and to a letter from Kant to the anatomist warning against a metaphysical misuse of that theory, Beiträge, 46 n. (III, 227 n.). As Baader doubtless knew, and no doubt to his fascination, the doctrine of Saint-Martin from which he drew inspiration also knew a fluid medium of the soul, Tableau, I, 110 f. The second note, in Das pythagoräische Quadrat, draws attention to Werner's Neptunist theory, which Baader says should be given a broader meaning, 46 n. (III, 265 n.1). A wide recognition of the fluid state in general as genetically prior (an opinion also found in Kant) made 'immaterial fluidity' a natural metaphor for Baader's spiritualistic World-Soul, with the specific theories mentioned tending only to support that idea. In Baader's later work, Kant's continua (as primal fluid) would be related to the first matter of

rous appreciation of nature's 'inner sense'. One needs 'enthusiasm' and 'devotion', those motives which Baader, thinking probably of Paracelsus, claimed to be the source of the greatest chemical discoveries¹. As Baader intimated to Wilhelm von Humboldt, only the mystic 'inner sense' could seek out its analogue in nature and aspire to a deeper, 'chemical' knowledge of things². In the Beiträge, an even greater role is granted to human freedom, when Baader braves the suggestion that, by altering the faculty of perception, one might thereby alter the phenomenal world (Körperwelt).

That is, in order to transform at once its physiognomy (the form and quantity of these individuals), all that is required is an altered moment of the force of apprehension in my mind (Organ).

Was this not the leading idea of Novalis's 'Magic Idealism', and the 'magic' to which he referred in this joyous tribute to Baader?

Seine Zauber binden wieder
Was des Blödsinns Schwert geteilt.⁴

Paracelsus and the alchemists (VIII, 97 ff.; IX, 172 n.; X, 320 f.), before finally being referred back to Thales (IX, 197 n.). As J. Neubauer mentions (48), with his imagery identical to that of the Beiträge Novalis too must have had in mind a prima materia; cf. E. Spenlé, 175, on Novalis's Eau-mère.

1. Beiträge, 68 (III, 236 f.).
2. Above, p. 7, n.4.
3. Beiträge, 39 (III, 221 f.), cf. *ibid.* 30 n. (III, 228 n.).
4. Werke, IV, 273. Dilthey, W., 325, traces Novalis's term 'magic Idealism' to Baader's Vom Wärmestoff, III, 74 ff. The present passage, however, seems to contain the idea. Cf. Novalis, Schriften, II, 587: "Modification unseres Werkzeugs ist Modification der Welt."

4. Naturphilosophie and the Mystic Tradition

Baader's essay has been discussed at some length because it exemplifies all in his writing that is intriguingly dense, imaginative and -- even thus reconstructed -- tumultuously obscure. With the Beiträge one meets the rough texture of the Romantic philosophy that must often be vaguely described as postulating 'the identity of mind (or spirit) and nature'. It remains to be said what is meant by 'identity' in such a phrase, for it is surely not identity in the normal sense. It is not the vacant logical identity of a thing with itself, but a significant irrational identity of opposites.

In studying Kant Baader seems to have been struck with the fact that the Critical Philosophy found the same limitations on knowledge of nature and knowledge of the soul. Both were known mediately, through representations. In both cases, knowledge was of appearances only, not of the thing as-it-really-is. To know the noumena, the things-as-they-really-are, would require the 'marvelous' faculty of intellectual intuition, something incomprehensible.

In Baader's mystical philosophy, however, 'intellectual intuition' of the immortal soul was never brought into doubt. Baader began in belief in the soul. When this was given, it was possible to assert that, 'behind' and 'above' appearances, nature must also be a soul, a World-Soul. In this manner, the noumena that would all have been uncognizable without mystic 'intuition' could be set in a relation of identity. This was no mere logical possibility, but an existential need. For man really was part of nature, and in studying nature he was also studying himself. To put it differently: where Kant had shown that self-consciousness requires a relation with external objects, Baader concluded that consciousness of the soul requires a relation with an identical, external soul.

... unser Vernunftsinne wäre denselben Moment verschwunden in welchem jene₁ Geistesform in der uns umgebenden Körpurnatur verschwände.

The definitions of the ideal self and ideal nature were codeterminative. The art of Naturphilosophie and theosophy was to direct the mind from the appearance of nature to nature as-it-really-is, to lead thought from nature's 'visible signs' to its creative soul.

In Fichte, as Baader took him, the 'dogmatic' assumption of nature as noumena was dropped, and natural law deduced entirely from the analysis of self-consciousness and the primal act of 'positing'. In some last-minute additions to the Beiträge, that essay in fact moves in the terminology of the Wissenschaftslehre, when, in perfectly Fichtean terms, one (mechanical) self is said to 'call forth' another as object (Nicht-Ich) in order to become itself a subject (Ich)². But Fichte's idea of nature as an obdurate field upon which the mind imposes its natural law and ultimately its moral projects -- and in the Fichtean mythology, man thus 'creates' nature -- seemed to Baader to lead inescapably to subjectivism and skepticism. The Fichtean view appeared to have deprived nature of independent reality, thereby excluding any real community between nature and man. For in this 'Ficht-ichean' system the ego was the only spontaneous and creative agent, while nature remained passively hostile. With this point in mind, Baader spoke for decades of Fichte's 'egoism' and his declaration of a bellum internecim between nature and man³.

It was with Schelling that the Romantic philosophy of nature acquired a somewhat definite form. In his works of 1797-1801 he addressed himself primarily to 'the great problem lying before philosophy', namely, the 'dynamic construction of nature', where 'dynamic' meant 'from absolutely first causes' and 'according to

1. XV, 183.

2. Beiträge, 33, 54 n., 84 f. (III, 219, 229 n., 244).

3. XI, 178, 367; II, 331, 445; VIII, 109; IX, 34 ff.

speculation'¹. In the solution which Schelling proposed in Von der Weltseele (1798), the central forces of Kant's physics became the basic polar elements of a protean World-Soul which structured the totality of nature and its every component. Nature was conceived as a graded and absolutely unified series of types that through the interplay of the dynamic forces and their analogues advanced in complexity, vitality, and spirituality. Under the general headings of these quasi-sexual contraries, various contrasts were exchanged at will: subject and object, intuition and reflection, infinite and finite, intelligence and matter, freedom and nature. Undoubtedly, these were mere comparison-formulae,² since it was not made clear in what way the contrasts were comparable. Nevertheless, they were all called the relation of the ideal to the real, a relation which was taken to explain all things. For all of the differences we come across in nature are, according to Schelling, due to the admixture of ideal and real².

In Schelling's Naturphilosophie, nature was viewed in its state of constant productivity, as natura naturans³. The process by which nature evolved its forms was dialectical. Light was the active force that through its own inner propulsion gave over into its opposite, gravity, which it joined in creating a new synthesis. To regard nature as thus 'in its becoming' was to think by intellectual intuition (intellektuelle Anschauung) or by reason, that is, according to nature's underlying ideas which were none other than its dynamic forces. As the motive power in dialectic, intuition or reason corresponded to the primal force of light as positive, illuminating, and creative. To gravity, as negative, dark, and static, there corresponded reflection or understanding. This latter thinking knew nature only as product and effect, natura naturata, and could not refer the real to the ideal. It demanded for every natural event an 'external' cause, and generated the a-

1. Schelling, F. W. J., Werke, II, 274 f.: "Das Dynamische ist für die Physik eben das, was das Transcendentale für die Philosophie ist ..." Cf. *ibid.*, 719 f.

2. *Ibid.*, I, 425-46.

3. *Ibid.*, II, 280-6, 293; I, 662 ff.

tomistic and mechanistic view of nature¹. In Schelling, and intermittently in Baader, the faculty of reflection or ünderstanding came to have all of the negative connotations that had earlier belonged to Reason. When he wished to name his philosophical adversaries, Baader now spoke less of Vernunftmänner than of the philosophers of ünderstanding.

Unlike Fichté's 'egoism' (and his own earliest philosophy²), Schelling's Naturphilosophie did not claim to derive natural law purely from the operations of the ego. By his daring Durchbruch zur Realität, Schelling proclaimed spirit and nature to be the obverse sides of one ideal process:

Die Natur soll der sichtbare Geist, der Geist die unsichtbare Natur sein.³

When ~~one~~ thought dialectically and 'dynamically', one thought along with nature, by thinking the ideas that actually created nature's visible form. Given this, one can appreciate the claim that in Naturphilosophie mind and nature no longer stood in the relationship of subject and object. For the idea of nature was the same as the idea in nature, and an idea must be identical with itself. As Schelling wrote, natura naturans was not nature as object (which was natura naturata), but nature as subject⁴. Now the task of natural philosophy was to unfold in thought the dialectical process of creation, thereby expressing all of the possible gradations between the ideal and the real. To think thus naturphilosophisch was to think 'genetically', 'genially', 'poetically'. But this ideal 'organic' and 'dynamic' science called for a suitable form, which was itself poetic and increasingly mythological, as Naturphilosophie took on the aspect of a creation-story in the grand manner of the mystic cosmogonies.

The affinity between Naturphilosophie and theosophy was not only 'archetypal', but was established by direct literary links between

1. Schelling, F. W. J., Werke, I, 668: "Sie sind im Mechanismus ihres Denkens und Vorstellens begriffen: Ich habe diesen Mechanismus durchgebrochen. Wie wollen sie mich verstehen?"

2. Ibid., I, Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie, esp. 110-9.

3. Ibid., I, 706; cf. I, 689.

4. Ibid., II, 284, 737.

Romanticism and the mystic tradition. As he said, Baader was a coryphant of Naturphilosophie, and his work represents the confluence of certain innovative tendencies of Post-Kantian Idealism and the intuitional philosophy of mysticism.

Baader's Beiträge are prefixed with a motto from Saint-Martin: En effet, si la Nature élémentaire nous est nuisible, c'est lorsque nous nous laissons asservir par elle, et non lorsque nous en pénétrons les vertues ... la connaître, c'est la vaincre, et nous élever au dessus d'elle.

The writings of the French theosopher are replete with references to 'the domination of man over nature'. As man was the 'seal' of Divinity, his 'ministry' was to mediate between God and nature by recognizing in nature the form of his own divine humanity.

Il faut expliquer la nature par l'homme, et non pas l'homme par la nature.²

The reverse process, the explanation of man according to nature, meant to turn away from God, and, in the language of the prophets, it was 'prostitution' and 'adultery'³. According to Saint-Martin, all knowledge began in the mystic intuition of the Divine Intellectual Faculty. By analogy with the spirit so revealed, one drew conclusions regarding the creative spirit in nature. Movement between the two worlds was accomplished through unitive symbols, "les forces primitives des éléments (forces actives, forces vivantes)". Permanent components of the dynamic and chemical organization of both the psyche and the physical universe, these were not like the dead atoms of the philosophes, but 'powerful centres of energy manifesting themselves by the struggle that is always resolved into harmony in the bringing forth of life'⁴. Theosophically speaking, these 'virtues' were 'the helpers to arrive with certainty at physical knowledge of the Active and Intelligent Cause'⁵, the unifying Word of God in nature and in man.

The consanguinity of Saint-Martin's theosophy and the Naturphilosophie of Schelling was immediately visible. Like Saint-Mar-

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1. Beiträge, frontispiece (III, 305).
 2. Des erreurs, 9; Tableau naturel, frontispiece; and Baader, Seele und Welt, 68 (XI, 72, 233, 422 n.).
 3. Kleuker, J., Magikon, 55 ff.
 4. Seckrecka, M., 49 ff.
 5. Kirchberger in Saint-Martin, Correspondences, 1 f.

tin, Schelling began in the 'intellectual intuition' of pure spirit, then contemplated in nature the operation of laws analogous to those of inner experience. As far as Baader was concerned, Saint-Martin's vertues and forces were virtual equivalents of the primordial bipolar elements by the aid of which Schelling organized the whole¹. In both philosophies, what was claimed was a privy knowledge of creation. The natura naturans that Schelling intuited at the vital core of both 'inner and outer nature' was little more than another name for the theosophical 'divine spirit' or Saint-Martin's demiurgic Cause active. Similarly, the Absolute of Schelling's (later) philosophy -- that to which everything was referred and that through which everything was -- was functionally akin to the Godhead of the doctrinal mysticism that had reappeared in the thought of Saint-Martin. Furthermore, Schelling's Naturphilosophie evinced the same reverential attitude toward nature that had informed Baader's own science from its beginning in Vom Wärmestoff, where, in his self-confessed Schwärmerei, he had embraced the fire-doctrine of the Stoics, whose 'theology was physics'². Like Baader's, Schelling's science was also fundamentally qualitative; at least, this is part of what we take Schelling to mean in his affirmation of identity:

Nach unserer Weise zu reden, können wir also sagen: alle Qualitäten seien Empfindungen, alle Körper Anschauungen der Natur -- die Natur selbst eine mit allen ihren Empfindungen und Anschauungen gleichsam erstarrte Intelligenz.³

Finally, as Schelling proceeded to 'systematize' his intuition of the World-Soul, he openly adopted Baader's Martinist-inspired ideas; including (and with specific reference to the Beiträge in Von der Weltseele), the idea of a 'primal fluidity' from which all things in nature arose through ceaseless chemical re-creation by the radical polar forces⁴.

Again with a heading from Saint-Martin, Das pythagoräische

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1. This particular association may have been aided by the fact that, as Faivre noticed, Kleuker's Magikon translated Saint-Martin's vertue as Kraft, Faivre, A., 171; cf. XV, 164.
 2. Beiträge, 34 n. (III, 30 n.2).
 3. Werke, II, 711.
 4. Ibid., I, 567, 614.

Quadrat in der Natur oder die vier Weltgegenden¹ opens with an homage to Schelling's Von der Weltseele, a favor that was re-re-turned in several of Schelling's ensuing works. 'Like the messenger of a coming Spring', Baader wrote, Schelling had announced 'the awakening of physics from the death-sleep of atomism'. The new philosophy of nature had rightly assessed the dualism and 'inner conflict' of nature. But beyond the polarity of noon and midnight, it had still to 'orient' itself to the other 'cardinal points' of twilight and dawn².

It was of great merit, continued Baader, to have recognized the original duplicity of fundamental forces (Grundkräfte), whose 'incessant strife and struggle create the life of visible nature'³. But the Naturphilosophen ('beginning with Kant') had only revived the ancient doctrine of primitive fire and water, and two principles alone were insufficient to explain any natural thing. To these the ancients added 'earth' as the third quality giving nature permanence, 'damming the flow of fire and water': one principle raises action, a second modifies it, and the third 'realizes' it. Developing imagery he had encountered in the Naturphilosoph Eschenmayer⁴, Baader represented his idea by the symbol of a fulcrum and lever, with the ends of the lever signifying the opposing forces, and the fulcrum 'earth' or 'gravity'⁵. It was time, Baader declared, that 'gravity' be recognized 'as that which generates the fulcrum of the lever of nature' ("als das den Trag- oder Halt-punkt Erzeugende am Hebel der Natur")⁶.

The presence of this third principle is established by statements no less sybilline than those of the Beiträge. Perhaps it will suffice to say that Baader adds to the mathematical formula for impact (MC) a third term called 'energy' (now, MEC), which is an immeasurable force secretly impelling mechanical reactions⁷.

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1. Tübingen, 1798. (III, 247-66).
 2. Pyth. Quad., v-vi (III, 249).
 3. *Ibid.*, 33 ff. (III, 262 ff.).
 4. And in Schelling, Werke, I, 576.
 5. Pyth. Quad., 17 n. (III, 254 n.).
 6. *Ibid.*, 42 (III, 263).
 7. *Ibid.*, 14 (III, 253).

As in the Beiträge, this third element of 'energy' may also be called 'gravity', and is intended to replace extension and 'passive' or 'inertial' gravity in the definition of substance. As before, it performs an organizing and unifying function (Gliederung) that is analogous to life¹. In this anti-mechanistic meaning, 'gravity' is the 'immediate expression of individuality' that joins and systematizes nature, uniting all Raum-Individuen into the Individuum par excellence that is our planet.²

Such a superfluous term is undoubtedly to be expected when one explains 'the lower by the higher' and the simpler by the more complex. Far from appearing frivolous, however, occult 'energetic gravity' was received by the Naturphilosophen as an important scientific principle. With this theory, Baader is even credited (and to all appearances rightly) with having lead Schelling out of dualism into a metaphysics of 'universal triadicity'³. But the present concern is not with the somewhat private terminologies of any of Schelling's 'systems'. It is with Baader's use of religious symbolism in advancing his project of the philosophical fusion of science and religion. In that regard, once he had 'proven' nature's trinitarian structure in physics, he could join other mystical schemes with his own. Most aptly, he could bring in the qualitative chemistry of Paracelsus, whose elements or principles of salt, sulfur, and mercury composed the world⁴. The Paracelsian symbolism, which resurfaces periodically throughout Baader's writing, was appealing not only because it employed a sacred number, but because it represented an understanding of nature antithetical to that of modern science. In the Paracelsian doctrine, the three qualitative Prima made up every thing (and every chemical), but only one governed or tempered it, providing its 'nature', its 'tincture', or, as Baader frequently

1. "Gliederung oder Individualisierung ... Einheit = Gliederung = Schwere", Pyth. Quad., 45 f. (III, 264 f.).

2. Ibid. 26 and n. (III, 257 and n.).

3. Fischer, K., 421 ff.; Knittermeyer, H., 142 f.; Schelling, F. W. J., Werke, II, 242 n., 265 n., 267 n., 313 n.

4. Pyth. Quad., 44, 48 n., 50 n. (III, 264, 266 n. n.); Beiträge, 3 n. (III, 206 n.). For the Paracelsian doctrine, see above all: Pagel, W., 98 ff., 317 f.

wrote, its 'synthesis'. On this type of theory, things were as they were, and acted as they did, because of their individual 'nature', much as in the Aristotelean science where Paracelsus's elements had their parentage in earth, fire, and water. This runs counter to the mechanistic theory, which says that all bodies are indistinguishable in their basic properties, differ only in regard to position, and are all subject to laws which treat them indifferently. With his renewal of qualitative science, Baader was endeavouring to return to physical nature its 'individuality' and the esteem that it had undeservedly lost. Not only individual elements would be restored to dignity through Baader's 'chemistry', but also the cosmic individual in its three great realms: the minerals being predominantly 'earth', the plants 'water', and the animals 'fire'¹. With a sympathetic understanding of the purpose of Das pythagoräische Quadrat, Friedrich Schlegel wrote in the Athenaeum that it was

... a very propitious sign, that a scientist -- the profound Baader -- has arisen from the midst of the physical sciences to vindicate poetry, to honour the elements as organic individuals, and to signify the Divine at the heart of matter.²

In the theosophy of Paracelsus, the three Prima were psychological no less than chemical elements, corresponding to the theological resolution of the self into body, soul, and spirit. Among the followers of the Paracelsus-Weigel tradition, this symbolic pattern survived as a 'secret science' and mystic psychology. By its use, Baader is looking for the possibility that nature can be organized by the same symbols that organize the religious self. This 'most ancient concept of the elements', he writes, is as indispensable to 'the physiology of the outer sense' as it is to that of the inner sense ('psychology')³. Such thoroughgoing panpsychism prompted Novalis to write:

Baader is a real psychologist (realer Psycholog) and speaks the genuine psychological language. Real psychology (Reale Psychologie)⁴ is perhaps also the field for which I am destined.

1. Pyth. Quad., 44 f. (III, 264).

2. (1800), III, 21. Cf. A. W. v. Schlegel, quoted Fischer, K., 38: "... es ist einmal Zeit, daß Luft, Feuer, Wasser, Erde, wieder poetisiert werden."

3. Beiträge, 3 n. (III, 206 n.).

4. Schriften, II, 378.

Novalis's statement once spurred a minor critical debate¹, which may shed light on the present subject. To Dilthey, Novalis meant 'psychology' in the normal sense (des Einzellebens). Olshausen contradicted this, saying that since all of Baader's early writings dealt with constructions of the World-Soul, reale Psychologie could only mean 'the science of the macrocosm'. To this Dilthey replied that the Beiträge (to which must be added Das pythagoräische Quadrat) contained reale Psychologie in his sense. But were both not clearly right, and at the same time wrong? Baader, at any rate, intended specifically to accommodate both interpretations, although not separately, by showing the 'psychology' of man the microcosm to be really that of the universe, the Macroanthropos.

From Baader's title, one knows that to the three elements there will be added a fourth. Arguing by force of imagery alone, Baader states that the three, having become 'centralized', would still produce nothing by themselves, but achieve only 'equilibrium'. As in the philosophy of the ancients, they need the 'fourth', 'ensouling air'. The totality of nature may now be symbolized by the figure of a triangle with a point at its center: the sides representing the bipolar forces, the base earth or 'gravity', and the central point the divine animating 'air'². Thinking by analogy, one arrives at the four directions of the compass, the four seasons, and the four divisions of the day.




This opulent symbolism was derived, at several removes, from the Pythagorean mathematical philosophy, which adopted number as the principle for the explanation of the universe -- according to its ratio and form. In Baader's sources -- Saint-Martin and the Magikon of Kleuker -- this and other archaic philosophies of nature had been taken up into the notoriously eclectic 'secret tra-

1. Dilthey, W., Appendix 2.

2. Pyth. Quad., 50 n. (III, 266 n. 3).

dition', and there given their illuminist interpretation. In Saint-Martin, as in Baader's essay, the tetrad was divided into a group of three -- the elements composing nature -- and a superior, all-embracing fourth¹. The first group further corresponded to a tripartite division of the creation into the divine, intellectual, and physical realms, with the fourth (sometimes 'mercury') granting passage among them. In the 'eternal medicine' of Paracelsus, there is also a 'fourth', rather, a quinta essentia that was a heavenly 'aether', the 'life' of a thing, and of the four elements, 'the perfect one'². Saint-Martin's Des erreurs and his Tableau naturel, the 'primary' sources of Baader's essay, both incorporated the Paracelsian natural philosophy and the three-element theory of the self, (where 'earth' corresponded to the physical body). To Saint-Martin, these 'triangular' conceptions conformed to things in states of corruption that should be transformed, purified, and made whole by the recognition of God in nature and the self, a process begun by the realization of the divine image in man³.

The latter-day Pythagorean counted from three 'through ten' to four. By depicting the 'square' as a triangle, Saint-Martin and Baader brought to mind the tetrakys, the sum of the first four numbers represented by dots forming a triangle: . In the Pythagorean lore, the tetrakys was regarded as the sacred symbol and source of all numbers, 'the spring having the rest of ever-flowing nature in itself'⁴. Post-Renaissance spiritualist literature associated the tetrakys with the Cabbalistic doctrine of the ten Sephiroth, which were the 'reflections' or 'realms' of God and, at the same time, his 'agents' or 'channels' in the creation. Finally, the comprehensive Magikon of Kleuker had traced Saint-Martin's notion of the immense virtue of the quaternary to the same revered corpus of the Cabbala⁵. If one follows Baa-

1. Des erreurs, 135-162, 207; cf. Susini, E., I, 256 ff.

2. Darmstaeder, E., 30.

3. Tableau naturel, I, 242-53 et passim.

4. Quoted in Nahm, A., ⁵³48. For Goethe's relation to the Pythagorean 'Quaternary', and to Baader's essay, see Zimmerman, R., 221 ff.

5. Kleuker, J., Magikon, 286 ff.

der's musing with a good heart and some acquaintance with the literary 'secret society' which he addressed, it thus appears that by his 'squared' triangle he joined the numbers three and four with ten. In this last, he united the ideas of the tetrakys (nature) and the tetragrammaton or 'ineffable name of God', asking that one recognize 'inner and outer nature' as disclosures of the Divine. Not only the 'universal cipher', but the totality of nature that surrounds him -- and this was also Schelling's interpretation of the essay¹ -- is animated and sustained by the 'fourth' Urprinzip of 'absolute spontaneity' or spirit ("der Aushauch von oben), and Baader means to 'orient'² the reader to this 'zenith' of all existence.

Naturphilosophie is now pure poetry and symbol, those vehicles by which, as Baader wrote to Jacobi, 'the revelation of the eternal in nature and man is primarily expressed'³. With this essay, Baader has emerged into arithmosophy and a layering-on of imagery that defeats analysis and renders many of his writings extremely confused. In this unrestricted usage, analogy has innumerable referents, and symbolism defies any unchanging interpretation. Das pythagoräische Quadrat is, in the words of the Bergmann Novalis,

nichts, wie derbe, gediegene Poesie, aber freilich in grobe⁴ Bergarten eingesprengt und schwer zu säubern und auszuhauen.

1. Schelling, F. W. J., Werke, II, 735.

2. Pyth. Quad., 51 (III, 263).

3. XV, 183.

4. Schriften, IV, 273.

5. Baader and the Romantic Doctrine of the Organism

In Baader's Romantic idiom, no word is more richly connotative than Organismus. By it was understood a complex of ideas, and it came to express in one ambiguous word what we have called Baader's guiding intuition of unity between spirit and nature. Although they were thought inseparably, these elements of the collective idea as it appears in Baader may be distinguished: unity, vitality, and purposiveness. Each of these characteristics of organisms seemed to be beyond the grasp of 'the mechanistic philosophy' and to militate against its validity. Each was thought explicable only by reference to principles that in dualistic thinking would be classed as ideal, spiritual, or supernatural. Definitions relevant to a general Romantic biocentrism could therefore also serve a mystic philosophy venerating nature and above all life as revelation, and could be incorporated by Baader with the body-mysticism of Boehme, where the predominant feature again was vitalism.

By definition, organisms are organized unities whose parts are possible only in relation to the whole. To Baader, the fact that organisms are something more than the sum of their parts appeared alone fatal to the atomistic-mechanistic theory. As seen previously, this 'something more' was ascribed to the operation of a principle, which Baader called Gliederung (Organisierung)¹ and understood as a power, since it enabled a new dimension of ^{complexity and} activity. By virtue of this principle of life, the components of the organism were not mere separable portions or parts (Teile), but real organs, members, and limbs (Glieder). The 'secret of life' was 'that only in being many or particular and at the same time one, do organs constitute an organism'². Correcting Goethe's

1. IX, 170 n.1; above, p. 76; II, 5; VII, 389 n.

2. VIII, 111.

trochaic maxim,

Kein Lebendiges ist ein Eins,
Immer ist's ein Vieles,

Baader defined the organism as at once a multiple unity and a unified multiplicity, both Vieleins and Einsvieles¹. Oneness and plurality, Einheit und Gliederung defined one another mutually, each essential, either empty in the absence of the other. Organic unity was made up of contraries which, by being coordinated and subordinated to the whole, ceased being contraries as their different properties were utilized by the whole in order to intensify the common life. Treated generally, the organic one-multiple and the idea that strength emerges in diversification provided Baader with his individualist concept of 'entity'. Insofar as it was real, every being was such a multiple unity, and the more real it was, the more developed was each of these terms.

Jedes Seiende oder Daseiende ... ist ... notwendig zugleich Vieleins und Einsvieles, weil nur das Viele Eins, nur das Eine Vieles ... sein kann.²

In Baader's 'magic circle of life', the whole caused the parts, which in turn caused the whole, and could do so because every part of the organism was itself totally organic³. Unlike the crystal, which had its form only in the whole, the idea of the organism was in every part, which therefore symbolized the whole: "Im Organismus ist aber in jedem Teil das Ganze dargestellt"⁴. Epitomized in the well-known botanical aphorism of Goethe, Alles ist Blatt, and in Oken's analogous Alles ist Darm, organic thinking was fundamentally circular, saying that what is true of the whole must be true of each part, which is also a whole. In the 'two-fold circulation of life', this reciprocal causality held not only between parts and whole, but also among the parts that 'come into being, subsist, and evanesce together', that depend, feed, and 'live upon' one another⁵. Their community, due only to the

1. II, 160 f.; I, 196; cf. IX, 333 n.

2. I, 317; cf. XV, 170; III, 421; IV, 316 f.

3. II, 8; VIII, 43; IX, 412.

4. VIII, 74. As in Novalis, Schriften, II, 552.

5. II, 5, 232, 238, 278, 286.

relation of each to the whole, was again evidenced by structural similarities among organs, as in Goethe's morphology, where the cranium was an 'extended vertebrae' for the same reason that the pistil was a 'contracted leaf'.¹

The formal unity of the organism was said to transcend space and time. As Novalis observed,

Ein organischer Körper gehört in Rücksicht seiner innigen Gemeinschaft -- und seines Grundsatzes -- alle für Einen, und Einer für alle --²nicht ganz in die Welt -- er ist ein gemischtes Produkt.

The same 'combined' character was indicated when Baader wrote of the organism as a one and a many, 'distributed in two regions'³, the transcendent realm of spirit and that of physical nature. As defined through one prevailing metaphor, life was not so much a 'combination' as the 'innermost marriage' of the contrasting 'fluidity and solidity', a continuous epigenesis of confluence and coherence⁴. Once established, the idea of the organism as a mediation of spirit and nature could in effect yield endless sets of opposites: infinite and finite, form and essence, eternity and time, universal and particular, and so forth, all of which were said to be abstractions until they gave one another concreteness in the form of the living individual⁵. Arbitrary correlations, perhaps, but what Baader wished to define he could define only as the mean between contraries that were there just for their negation. 'No philosopher is less a dualist than Baader'⁶, and when he surmounted the dualism of spirit and nature the theosopher did so principally by use of a doctrine that was common currency in a Romantic Naturphilosophie defined by its attention to life. The organism stood not only as the limiting case for mechanistic science, but for philosophical dualism as well, inasmuch as every

1. As in Baader, VIII, 73; IX, 118 f.

2. Schriften, II, 555.

3. VIII, 111.

4. III, 270-2; X, 223, 320 n.3.

5. E.g., II, 325, 521 f.; V, 267; IX, 273.

6. Susini, E., I, 454.

living being was said to be a refutation of the principle of contradiction.

Das Leben steht überall in der Mitte zwischen der abstrakten Einheit, welche man Einfachheit nannte und dem Charakter des Geistes beilegte, und dem Zusammengesetztsein, welches man der Natur zuschrieb.¹

While Gliederung conveyed the idea that organisms are what they are because of their form, Intussusception named the 'physical process' by which an hypostatized life-force interjoined and vitalized the parts of an organism -- the 'workings' of what Schelling called das Band linking the finite to the infinite. Although pervasive in Baader's speculation, it remains one of his terms whose definition can only be suggested indirectly. Originally it had a biological meaning: the ingestion of a foreign matter and its conversion to organic tissue². But in Kant, Schelling, and Baader, the word also connoted the interpenetration of solvent and solute in chemical solutions³. Resting on this usage, and knowing from his 'dynamic' science that matter was continuous and infinitely penetrable, Baader used Intussusception to describe how two things could occupy the same space at once, that is, how an immaterial vital principle could be present in the inorganic matter that it 'penetrated', 'dissolved', and 'elevated' to life⁴. Contrasted with mechanical Transfusionismus, it further designated the inner causality or 'growth from within' (ab intus-productio) which belonged to Baader's class of dynamic, chemical, and organic processes that were independent of any continuity of space or time, and were not to be reduced by a 'mechanistic superstition' to causality from without⁵. Baader's 'fundamental principle of life', and a model of mystic obfuscation, Intussus-

1. VIII, 163.

2. E.g. Hegel, G., Enzyklopädie, sec.351.

3. Kant. I., Werke, IV, 531; Schelling, Werke, II, 166 ff., 241, 499.

4. E.g. I, 317; II, 171, 262, 386 n.; III, 279 ff., 295; IV, 125; IX, 56 n., 273, 275 n. Because organic transformation destroyed yet preserved the inorganic, Baader cited Hegel's Aufhebung as the direct equivalent of his own Intussusception or Durchdringung, II, 297; III, 384 f.; IX, 206, n.7. Like Organismus and Gliederung, Baader's term had a meaning for every occasion in his doctrine of life, and was misleadingly if not disingenuously extensive and vague.

5. Pyth. Quad., 24 (III,211); II, 22 n.3, 52, 171, 262; IV, 319 f.; IX, 275.

ception was in brief a word-symbol in which several meanings were joined, and which stood for the animistic doctrine that a soul upholds organic functions through a sustained spontaneity.

According to the Romantic axiom stated in Herder's Gott, 'all the forces of nature function organically'¹. This was shown to be true in Baader's Beiträge, when the inorganic was presented as potentially or figuratively living, and the whole of nature thus endowed with a uniform structure. For Schelling, as well, the problem met by speculative physics was 'to give the construction of organic beings and of inorganic nature a common form of expression'², the paradigm of course being life rather than death. By an intellectual process of Intussusception³, inorganic nature was taken up in Naturphilosophie and converted into life by being explained as a lower form of the organic. The initial characteristic of organisms, their irreducible unity, could then be transferred to the whole of nature as the Allgemeine Organismus, whose interdependent organs were animated by a unique, infinite life, and whose unity and order was based, as Schelling wrote, outside nature's sphere, 'in a higher order'⁴. In their form, the organs would continue to mimic the whole, so that in a universal sense it could be said that 'the original relations of one organism are repeated throughout the whole'⁵. In the cosmic organism, as in any other, it would also be possible to discern structural similarities among the parts that were joined, not contiguously, but by their 'organic connections'⁶ such as gravity and the sun. If this corollary of the organism doctrine led to tangible results such as Goethe's discovery of the vestigial intermaxillary bone⁷, the mimetic theory of the universe -- which is said to be

1. Herder, J., Werke, XVI, 569.

2. Schelling, F., Werke, II, 306.

3. E.g. VIII, 71; X, 117.

4. Schelling, F., Werke, II, 193.

5. Carus, C., Organon der Erkenntnis, quoted in Bernouilli and Kern, 197. Cf. IX, 315 n.

6. II, 263.

7. "Ich habe mir's auch in Verbindung mit deinem Ganzen gedacht.." Goethe to Herder, Briefe, Bd. 6, 258.

the key to all of Novalis's philosophy¹ -- led with equal ease to a 'science' of free and poetic association, facilitated by such analogical devices as the Paracelsian psycho-chemical symbolism.

Organic teleology -- in which every organ and every stage of development was explained by final causes in the functional design of the whole -- was of unique importance to the unification of the theories of nature and of spirit. Through a common teleological principle, both the panorganic doctrine of nature and the ethical doctrine of ends were joined within a mystic cosmology of final causes -- one in fact that included nature as well as the human spirit, and the bodies as well as the souls, in its idea of Christian regeneration. As we summarize Baader's progression by leaps from the teleological component of the organism doctrine to a guiding tenet of his theosophy, we testify once again to the intimidating authority that Kant represented in the eyes of even the most mystical of Romantic philosophers. In the Kritik der Urteilskraft², Kant had considered whether the 'internal' or 'absolute' purposiveness displayed by ~~the~~ organisms as end-seeking systems could establish the use of teleological principles in natural science. As systems, organisms seemed to imply prescience, which in turn implies consciousness. They could not be accounted for in physicalist terms, but required instead to be judged as though due to the operation of an intelligent cause. Moreover, once teleological principles were admitted in judging organisms, the whole of nature might be judged as if it were the creation of a divine idea and the instrument of a divine purpose -- the 'Architectonic Understanding' -- thus leading to the 'theology of final causes' that Kant judged most favourably among the failed attempts to establish faith other than upon the only sure

1. I.e., Novalis's "Wechselrepresentationslehre des Universums", Schriften, III, 231; Haering, T., 9, 189 f., 376 f.

2. Part II and Appendix (in Werke, IV), 362 ff.; this paragraph rests also on the account by McFarland, J.

basis of practical reason. As if anticipating the precepts of Naturphilosophie, Kant suggested in some celebrated inspiring passages¹ that teleological principles were conditions of our experience of organisms in the way that mechanical principles were of nature generally, and he seemed there to have introduced an order of explanation that contradicted his own philosophy of natural necessity. But he placed what commentators agree to have been a decisive limitation upon the use of teleological maxims. They could not be used to explain nature, but were allowable only provisionally as heuristic or 'regulative' principles, while the causal principles of physico-mechanical science remained 'determinative' or constitutive of nature as experience.

Baader recognized this fundamental qualification and rejected it. Extracting (typically) from critical analysis in order to make a mystic declaration, he wrote that organic teleology was not at all 'subjective' or regulative but 'objective' and so constitutive of nature². The assertion had the same import, and expressed as succinctly the program of Naturphilosophie as did Schelling's classic words: that the idea of the organism was not merely contributed by human reason in judging nature, but resided 'in the organism itself'³. Teleological principles were now to be held even worthier the name of 'knowledge' than were mechanical principles, while by the same token there was attributed to nature a form of intelligent purposiveness. Per Intussusception, the organism transformed the inorganic and shaped its own end in conformity with an inborn Urtypus, thereby exhibiting purposeful activity analogous to that of the human will that could overcome its desires, and impose its moral projects on its environment, while forming itself in accordance with an innate ideal. Once speculation had accomplished this much, it could be claimed that the whole of panorganic nature was a teleological system, a 'system of freedom'. In the universal organism, dynamic organization from the stones and stars to the plants and animals was taken as proof of a parallel striving in all of creation.

1. Especially, *ibid.*, sec. 75, 400.

2. V, 9; cf. XV, 165.

3. Werke, I, 690 f.

All that would be needed to adapt this Romantic theory of a developing organic universe to the theosophical perspective would be to assign the divine nature as telos of the cosmic organism. Natural like human purposiveness would thereby be said to have its final cause in deification, which is what theosophy proposes within its narrative of the creation from and return to of all things to the Divinity. The teleological principles of Naturphilosophie could then be brought to serve the theme, dear also to Boehme and Saint-Martin, that all of the creatures long for rebirth. Explicit reference having been made to the basic tenets of speculative mysticism, further 'structural' affinities between the doctrine of the organism and theosophy would appear. Like organic thinking, theosophy treats every part of nature as the symbol of a higher unity, that is, as a theophany. Theosophy also recognizes a kind of reciprocal causality between that transcendent unity and its organs, in the sense that the creatures can 'cause' the Absolute by revealing it, and in the sense that 'this' world and 'this' body are the bases of a future divine life: "denn eben diese Natur soll das Göttliche gebären"¹. It would then be no gratuitous juxtaposition, but a meaningful opposition, when Baader joined Kant's neutral definition of organic causality,

Im Organismus bringe die Ursache ihren Effekt hervor und dieser wird wieder zur Ursache,

with a timeless mystic evaluation of the creation:

Denn jeder Ausgang, sagt Tauler, ist nur des Wiedereingangs willen, und das exoterische Leben ist nur Baugerüste des esoterischen.

Baader's theosophical transformation of the Romantic doctrine of the organism culminated in his essay Ueber die Begründung der Ethik durch die Physik (1813). There he departed from the discussion of teleology in the Third Critique, which he had taken in a more absolute sense than its author as Kant's means of joining the philosophies of nature and of freedom into a whole³. It

1. V, 20.

2. II, 8; cf. IX, 412; X, 113, 305.

3. V, 14; Kant, I., Werke, IV, 176 ff.; Schelling, F., II, 349: "... die Teleologie ist also jener Vereinigungspunkt der theoretischen und praktischen Philosophie."

is the Architectonic Understanding, wrote Baader, Who 'posits both subject and object', revealing himself equally in the consciousness of human freedom (im Faktum des Gewissens) and as the formative principle in organic nature (als Prinzip der Plastik)¹. Neither is to be explained by the other, but only by reference to God as its primal and final cause, its beginning and end. Informed by an analogous spontaneous urge, and tending by their 'ethical and physical teleology'² toward deification, man and nature shared in the system of divine freedom, as indeed there could be no system that did not include them both.

1. V, 8, 10; cf. IX, 103, 111.

2. V, 7.

6. Baader and the Pantheism Controversy

Because of his association with F. H. Jacobi, and because their doctrines diverged, Baader became peripherally involved in the generation-long Pantheismusstreit. Its first stage had been initiated by Jacobi in the early 1780's, and centered on the rationalism of Spinoza. Owing largely to its hostile treatment by Bayle¹ and Wolff, Spinoza's Ethics had been disappreciated during the eighteenth century in Germany, until its rediscovery by writers of the pre-Romantic period. Jacobi made it his mission to resist the resurgence of Spinozism, because he was in basic agreement with Bayle's interpretation. In their reading, criticism was directed to Spinoza's theorem of a unique, infinite and all inclusive substance, Deus sive Natura, of which thought and extension were predicated and of which all the finite minds and bodies were modes. This seeming identification of God with the universe, as the whole to the parts, was held to constitute the purest form of pantheism, which was accounted as atheism. Although it has apparently always been argued that the God of Spinoza is not the personal God of faith, that his 'nature' is not the creation, and that the religious epithet 'pantheism' cannot apply to his philosophy, Jacobi took the words in their primary theological meanings. As Voltaire wrote of Bayle in defending that already widely-criticized appraisal of the Ethics, Jacobi saw Spinoza's 'frenzy' in making God 'a star and a pumpkin, thought and smoke, beating and beaten'². But Jacobi also found Spinoza's logic unassailable. He was left to conclude that any sound metaphysics would have to end in pantheism³. Understandably, he was shocked when in his presence the great Lessing avowed adherence to Spinozism. With the published report of their conversation, Jacobi inaugurated the Pantheismusstreit that was to engage, seem-

1. For an entertaining discussion of Bayle's role in establishing Spinoza's reputation, see the first conversation of Herder's Gott : Einige Gespräche, Werke, XVI.

2. Le philosophe ignorant, Oeuvres, XXXII, 109.

3. I, 166 n.; VIII, 223.

ingly without exception, the leading philosophically-interested writers of Germany¹.

In his own religious philosophy, orientated to the Kantian model, Jacobi differentiated unconditionally between two principal powers of thought. The faculty of understanding applied to nature as the sole object of knowledge. Any attempted transcendent knowledge through its concepts resulted inescapably in pantheism and the effective denial of the transcendent God. 'A God that could be known', wrote Jacobi, 'would not be a God'². Understanding revealed only nature as the fatalistic system of Spinoza, in which all was necessary and natural, and good and evil were illusions. The supersensible faculty of reason, which was somewhat confusingly associated with 'feeling' or 'sentiment', alone revealed a 'personal' God and the ethical system of freedom. And between these two systems there could not be a third. By his epistemological dualism, Jacobi separated science from faith, and like Kant, he denied knowledge in order to make way for belief³.

'Swearing by the holy Pythagorean quaternary', Baader wrote in 1798 to Jacobi:

If Herr Fichte counts only one, then I already count four, namely: just as I find a thou opposite my ego, so do I also find one that is above me and one that is below me, without being able to set either of these on a level with myself, or⁴ to explain it away by saying that it proceeds out of my ego.

In less esoteric terms, Baader separated himself from the 'egoism' of Fichte's and Schelling's Idealism, while affirming his faith in the transcendent God and his certainty that a principle of evil (das deorganisierende Du) was indispensable to a philosophy grounded in the person of Christ (das organisierende Du)⁵ -- traditional beliefs he held in common with Jacobi and that would remain fundamental in his theosophy. But he took issue with the position, (which he knew in part from Jacobi's letters concerning Spinoza)⁶,

1. Jacobi, F., Hauptschriften, esp. 123-201, 240-7, 263-79.

2. Quoted Böllnow, F., 119; and Baader, I, 204.

3. Ibid., 137.

4. XV, 178; cf. II, 331; VIII, 34 f.

5. XV, 172-8.

6. XV, 169.

that these Christian truths were exclusively matters of feeling that could not be supported by any systematic knowledge of God (über mir) and nature (unter mir). Jacobi seemed to have reduced the content of religion to a minimum. With oblique reference to Jacobi's Gefühlsabsolutismus, Baader argued (in Ueber Bewunderung und Ehrfurcht, 1804) that the affective approach should be complemented by a religious understanding of nature as God's miraculous work: 'Like the heart in piety encircled with love, so does the mind rest in wonder'¹. When Jacobi had come to Munich in 1806 to assume the leadership of the newly-reconstituted Academy, Baader continued his argument by writing that no theology could exclude knowledge of God.

Kant (like all of his followers) dealt men a deathblow when he forbade them to strive for higher knowledge ... We can never completely renounce the higher faculty of knowledge -- the knowledge, the recognition of what is higher ... With heart and mind I proceed to make my God understandable to myself ... Without mysticism, (in whatever form it takes), there is no morality. Religion at all times unites them.²

Naturphilosophie was the mystic thinking that brought the unconditionable^{ed} into relation with knowable nature. Its 'vision of a higher in and through a lower' was achieved primarily by the doctrine of the organism, in which living systems -- and in principle all of nature consisted in these -- were said to be animated by a 'dynamic' causality, and the whole said to have its final cause in deification. The same signifying-function was performed by the natural symbolism through which the Naturphilosoph uncovered the presence of the Divine in nature and saw there the analogues of his own inbred divinity and his moral striving. Theoretically, both symbolism and organic form mediated the ideas of reason, the supersensible religious faculty, with the concepts of understanding, the faculty for natural knowledge -- and throughout Baader the name of a faculty was a metonym for that which is comprehended. In the 'technical' phraseology of the following letter to Jacobi, Baader explained that without Naturphilosophie, spiritual faith could not be sustained.

1. I, 29, 31 n.; cf. X, 118.

2. XV, 204.

But the symbol is nothing other than the organic form, which is the token of the revelation of the higher life. If through a miracle one could extinguish the symbolic form of nature around and under us, then reason's knowledge in man would doubtless perish, should reason no longer be able to find itself in this nature.

In Naturphilosophie, Natur meant nature conceived as an organized totality under natural law, and by reforming the metaphysics of science, Naturphilosophie sought to change the concept of natural law. In the 'dynamic' and 'chemical' philosophy, natural law was construed analogously to spiritual freedom and Natur conceived not as a material and mechanistic system, but as a system of living forces and the organ of a divine creative power. Thus 'resurrected from the dead'², nature as the cosmic organism was nature under a religious aspect. In order to win Jacobi over to the new philosophy, Baader stressed its deeply Christian character.

A long conversation yesterday with Schelling has given me hope that I may yet be the copula between him and Your Honour ... The particular merit of this Naturphilosophie is that it once more reveals nature itself, which in the modern age, since the time of Descartes, Newton, etc., and since the suppression of the chemical view of nature by the stupid mechanistic-atomistic one ... has been completely denied and forgotten in favour of matter. But whoever is oblivious to the nature that is in matter, finds it all the easier to deny man and in him God.³

Several days later Jacobi wrote to a friend:

Baader has taken it into his head to bring about a transfusion of my theology with Schellingian Naturphilosophie ... this evening he wants to visit me accompanied by Ritter, and I am to withstand an onslaught of Naturphilosophie. I enjoy this kind of affair, as long as it doesn't become too malicious.⁴

But there would be no 'copula' between Jacobi and the Naturphilosophen, for the idea of a God that could be conceptualized, studied in nature, and known in a process of 'becoming' was incompatible with the idea of a transcendent 'personal' God as disclosed only to Jacobi's supersensible reason. Keeping to the conviction with which he had entered the Pantheismusstreit, Jacobi insisted

1. XV, 199 f.

2. XV, 202.

3. XV, 200 f.

4. Jacobi, F., Nachlaß, II, 15.

that knowledge and faith be disjoined. To Baader:

You shall not make yourself an image or any likeness. What does this mean? It means, you shall not attempt to make visible the invisible; to embody the incorporeal (not even by Naturphilosophie) -- to debase the Holy.... You become an idolator,¹ and entice yourself into whoring, when you do such a thing.

While Jacobi, Schelling, and Baader were active within the Bavarian Academy, the Pantheismusstreit reflowered². In the virulent polemic between Jacobi and, above all, Schelling, the main issues were those contended in the foregoing passages from letters. Jacobi maintained that Schelling's systematic knowledge of the Absolute was an irretrievably pantheistic celebration of nature as God. To speak of God as nature's final cause contradicted belief in the Supreme Being, since in Schelling's teleological framework God would have to await His completion in the future. Countering, Schelling argued that ontological superiority did not necessarily mean priority³. Because Schelling had taken the stance that 'theosophy and naturalism go together'⁴, Baader sided openly against Jacobi, while his own essay of 1813 on 'ethics and physics' was attacked within the Academy on the general grounds of Jacobi's objection to Schelling: Baader's doctrine of 'a developing God' and his 'German naturalism' were as bad as the French world without God⁵.[#] Abhorring no less than Jacobi the vituperative epithet 'pantheism', Baader formulated his theosophy in contradistinction to two very broadly defined alternatives. The first, wherein Kant and Jacobi joined company with Pietists and other affective mystics, was the 'supernaturalism' or 'spiritualism'⁶ that consigned religion to the variously-defined domain of the subjective. Representing a basic attitude that affected every area of doctrine, 'spiritualism' denied both knowledge of

1. iv, 57.

2. This second stage is summarized by Weischedel, W., Jacobi und Schelling, with the important quotations.

3. Ibid., 62 f.

4. I, 65; II, 24 n.

5. ii, 486.

6. E.g., III, 331f.

the supersensible and knowledge of the divine through sensible nature -- a single issue in the epistemological statement of the general religious problem. By that 'separation of spirit and nature', that 'divorce of reason and understanding'¹, man was alienated from the physical world and his heart from his mind. As Baader repeated throughout his ^{recurrent} permanent critique of Jacobi, without a science of God and knowledge of the natural correlatives of a religious self-image, the human spirit, thrown back on a baseless subjectivity, would end in Nihilismus². Speaking realistically, heart and mind could not be separate, but religion should engage the total human phenomenon, that needed not only the warmth of the sun but its light³ -- leaving us to add that, if there is much in Baader's doctrine that we do not hesitate to call 'primitive', he is nonetheless able to produce a psychological justification that is immediately understandable. Dualistically opposed to doctrinal 'supernaturalism', the second extreme to be discriminated was 'naturalism', which included 'fetishistic' pantheism as well as straightforward materialism, and which Baader, taking up Jacobi's words, called 'whoring after foreign gods'⁴.

But there was a third philosophy of spirit and nature that had its analogue in marriage⁵ -- one that recognized the 'personal' God of Jacobi, yet understood and venerated nature as revelation, while in possession of concepts to reconcile the diametrical views -- and this alone constituted true Christianity. The symbolic metaphysics of Boehme, that harmonized the 'spiritualist' and 'naturalist' doctrines, wed 'esoteric' with 'exoteric ethics'⁶, and even seemed to have anticipated the role of science in the new Christian mythology, would form the 'copula' between Jacobi and Schelling. Naturphilosophie would be purged of pantheistic error, Jacobi would see that not all consistent 'rationalism'

1. XV, 203.

2. I, 58 f., 166 and n. 312; II, 103, 371; VIII, 14, 25, 223.

3. V, 109 f.; X, 1 f.; cf. II, 371.

4. I, 46.

5. I, 46; VI, 352.

6. V, 16.

ended in the fatalistic 'naturalism' of the fallible Spinoza, and there would emerge the higher third system which, as all Romantic philosophers save Jacobi agreed, was a vital need for Germany.¹ To the extent that this ambition ever took form outside Baader's own unruly doctrine, it must be in the principal writing of the later Pantheismusstreit, Ueber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, which is laden with references to Baader and is Schelling's version of the theosophy of Boehme.

We seem to have come full circle. It may be recalled that in his journals, partly in response to Kant, and influenced partly by Herder, Lavater, and the Gefühlsphilosophie, Baader had ridiculed all conceptual religion. At that time, morality was engendered 'not by systems but by morality'². Now Baader has emerged with the project of a metaphysical system no less 'arrogant' than the rationalist ones he had so freely criticized. What remains of the spirit of those pre-Romantic meditations? Above all, the emphasis upon life. As has been said, Baader understands nature exclusively in terms of life, and, as it remains to be said, he understands God as essentially life. The organism is throughout the mediating concept, and Baader's entire theosophy is grounded in an intuition of the coincidence of spiritual and natural, of unitive and plural, of divine and mundane that was represented in every living being.

1. Esp. IX, 157-60.

2. S.u.W., 139 f. (XI, 156 f.).

III. THEMES OF BAADER'S THEOSOPHY

1. Theosophical Understanding

i. Introductory: Philosophical Mysticism

To all literary appearance Baader was a genuine mystic. When young he wrote as though vouchsafed the beatific vision, and in later years showed fascination for those experiences which his friend Görres classified in his Christliche Mystik as 'natural' and 'diabolical' as opposed to 'divine' mysticism: divination, theurgy, and possession. His constant exhortation in private and public writings was to 'love, union, and communion with God'¹, and he exemplified 'the preponderance in religious consciousness of its irrational (or suprarational) features'². As a biographical question, Baader's mysticism does not want to be pursued. But an idea of his mysticism is what should emerge from the examination of his work. For the 'consciousness of illumination'³ that William James took as the essential mark of all mystical states is the source and desire of Baader's theosophy.

Rather than the identification of all mysticism, we consider worthwhile an approach based in a recognition that the experience of 'mystic harmony' may in different individuals give rise to disharmonious ideas about God and the world⁴. A specific definition is demanded by the theosopher himself, who took the greatest pains to distinguish his own mysticism from the other varieties⁵. He was no purgative ascetic, and neither humble nor pure. He was not a quietistic or contemplative mystic⁶. Far from being convinced of the ineffability of mystical experience, always a paradoxical claim, he was known above all for his copious eloquence. Unlike that of Thomas à Kempis, who disparaged philosophy, Baader's mystic union did not generate primarily a feeling of per-

1. This defines the indefinite desire of mysticism in Zaehner, R., 308.

2. This characterizes mysticism in Otto, R., 22 f.

3. James, W., 408 n.

4. That this should deserve saying is shown by R.C. Zaehner's criticism of the levellers of mystical religion, above all in his Concordant Discord and Mysticism: Sacred and Profane.

5. See esp. V, 330; IX, 162 n.

6. These are terms from W.M. Inge's Christian Mysticism, although their meaning is sufficiently self-evident.

sonal sanctity, but knowledge. Mysticism was for Baader the source of speculation in religion, and therefore of all that is 'genial, spontaneous, and free'. For

Religion and religiosity have their origin and place in the innermost part of man, in his thought, and therefore neither merely in imaginative presentation (Hegel) nor in feeling (Schleiermacher).

Baader chides the theopathic mystics for whom religion is solely a matter of the heart, the 'coy' and sentimental Pietists². In turn, Pietistic religiosity in the person of Mme de Krüdener was inclined to fault Baader's system-building when true religion was the knowledge accorded to little children³. As a speculative rather than a devotional or practical mystic, Baader is not to be grouped with the quietistic Fénelon or Mme. Guyon. He belongs instead with Eckart and Tauler, Paracelsus and Weigel -- the creators of the Teutsche Theologie that he tried to revivify and extend. His intellectual structures bear family resemblances to those of Neo-Platonism, Christian Gnosticism, and Cabbalism, and elements of each of these were incorporated in his writing. To a greater extent he drew from Saint-Martin and the syncretistic secret doctrine of French Illuminisme. But his closest kin -- it bears resaying -- was Jacob Boehme, with whom his doctrinal identification was virtually complete.

It was axiomatic among the Idealists that philosophy as a whole should form a system. Not unexpectedly, the theosopher's concept of system was that of the organism as an integrated unity⁴.

The true Gnosis is a circle, that is not apprehended step by step, but only suddenly ... The systematic nature of Gnosis proves itself in that every concept relates to the center, and the center leads again to all the other concepts.⁵

Intuiting a unique lawfulness that is established in God and pervades the whole of being, Baader habitually joins disparate subjects through their common subordination to a divine archetype.

1. I, 155; VIII, 198 f.

2. II, 322, 331, 343, etc. Baader criticized equally the subjectivist tendencies in Catholicism, particularly in the 'liberal' periodical Stunden der Andacht, VII, 58, 115 etc.

3. iv, 405.

4. I, 302 f.

5. XIV, 160; VIII, 11.

The relation of soul and body is that of spirit and nature, of Einheit und Gliederung, of eternity and time, and all such relations are ultimately referrable to a primal relation within the Absolute. Analogies are invariably drawn, the movement from particulars to universals is invariably made, and as the doyen of Baader scholars, Eugène Susini wrote, the theosopher's thought moves 'in concentric circles'¹. Baader personally had no doubt about that which every reader must question -- the inner coherence of his theories² -- and, in the end, it cannot be thoroughly denied. Despite the bewildering involution, the famously barbarous prose, and despite that all is in Gärung, one comes to perceive what the other notable writer on Baader, David Baumgardt, called a 'latent system'³. Eventually one admits that Baader's corpus, although it is composed only of fragments, is organic in the sense that each fragment embodies the whole. An effort to elicit that latent system, the following outline reconstructs major doctrines and symbols of Baader's theosophy, in a thematic organization clearly foreign to the original, and without being comprehensive. Recognizing that in mysticism it is futile to search for clarity, this imitative representation cannot intend to be definitive but only truthful.

1. Susini, E., I, 39.

2. IX, 13.

3. Baumgardt, D., 242 f.

ii. The Way to Divine Knowledge

Baader is too great a believer to seek proof of the existence of God. All such proofs, he insists, begin in doubt, which is to say that they begin in denial, for 'not to begin with God is to deny Him'¹. All proofs attempt to demonstrate the existence of the Absolute from non-absolute existence, whether by human concepts or the evidence of design in nature, and the attempt is vain in every sense of the word. In the order of thought as well as being, there is none higher nor more comprehensive than God, and therefore nothing from which His existence could possibly be derived². Rather than reviving long-discredited ontological and cosmological proofs, Baader welcomed the invalidation of all projects to establish faith by rational argument and in effect by the suspension of faith. Since all proofs end in the doubt with which they begin, it is Baader's declared intention to overturn the premise of Descartes by beginning with the thought of God³.

Baader's theosophy is a philosophy of faith, and maintains that belief determines thought in an original manner. The most certain existence is that of God, which establishes all other existence and is for that reason probative rather than amenable to proof. Baader's mystic epistemology makes this statement when it defines self-consciousness as 'being thought' by God, and when it finds the beginning of knowledge in 'being known' by God⁴. Demonstration now proceeding, as it 'should', from the ontologically supreme, 'being thought' establishes one's thinking and being: cogitor ergo cogito et sum⁵. Christian self-consciousness is that of oneself as a created being in a derivative relation to the Cre-

1. VIII, 339.

2. I, 262 f., II, 499.

3. VIII, 16 n., 203; IX, 33 ff., 381 n. "Es ist mein Beruf, dem Cartesianismus ein Ende in der Philosophie zu machen", XV, 643n.

4. Typically: "... daß das Selbstbewußtsein des Geschöpfes das Wissen seines Gewußtseins von einem Höheren (Höchsten, dem Absoluten einschließt ...", IV, 240; cf. VIII, 231.

5. I, 370, 395; IX, 191 n.3; XII, 238.

ator -- of being known 'in, by and from'¹ the Creator -- and the various formulations of Baader's cogitor are neither proofs nor arguments but testimonies.

Ich bin gesehen (durchschaut, begriffen), darum sehe (begreife) ich, ich bin gedacht, darum denke ich, ich bin gewollt, (verlangt, geliebt), darum bin ich wollend, verlangend und liebend ...

Although God cannot be proven, this does not mean that God cannot be known. Theosophical understanding is knowledge of God, the mystical union is cognitive, and, as it has already been said in another context, knowledge is essential to faith. Baader's doctrine, for which he obstinately repeats that Criticism has prepared the way³, reconciles knowledge and belief, not by their separation, but by their interdependence: 'only in knowing do we believe, and only in believing do we know'⁴. Faith engenders knowledge, and knowledge is necessary in order to define belief.

The claim to transcendent knowledge rests upon a doctrine of divine illumination that is set forth in terms which, like Baader's cogitor, stress the receptive and dependent character of human thought. As the absolute spirit and absolute self-consciousness, God cannot be known in the way that one knows other objects, or objects at all, and if the theosopher uses the categories of objects when he speaks liberally of the Absolute, it is only because of the limitations of a merely human capacity for expression. God exists as an object only for Himself, and the access that human thought has to the Divine is only by partaking in the free self-revelation of God in the mind.

God as absolute self-consciousness or spirit is not merely a knowable object that would be known to others without His own help, in which case one would be able to know God without God, that is, without His self-revelation. But God is self-knowing, or His own object, and can only be known, through participation (teilhaft werden) in His self-knowledge.⁵

1. IV, 383; IX, 68. Baader's God is the Urselbstbewußtsein, (V, 95 f.) and Urpersönlichkeit (IV, 95 n.2), that establishes all other self-consciousness and personality.

2. I, 349.

3. VI, 323.

4. I, 339-56; VIII, 13-33, 29 n., 358.

5. I, 109 n.2 and V, 53 f.

While the awareness of God is given in self-consciousness, and while it is not 'separate' from the self-consciousness of God, neither should the two be 'confused'. Man can take part in (teilnehmen, teilhaft sein) but not become part of (Teil werden) the self-knowledge of God¹. As Meister Eckart said about the love of God: in the same love in which God loves Himself, He loves me also, and in the same love I love Him as well, for where else would I get this love? In the same way, I know God by taking part in the same knowledge in which He knows Himself and knows me, for where else would I get this knowledge²? Yet in love there is 'differentiation' as well as identification. So, also, there is differentiation in the knowledge of God, and Baader is always careful to qualify identification by stating that the idea of God is always accompanied by a sensation of infinite distance³.

In the same faith that communicates knowledge of the Divine, Baader's theosophy finds its approach to objective knowledge of all being. For God, thought is creation and knowledge is being. God knows by creating, the moment that God thinks something it comes into being, and by taking part in the creative thinking of God, the theosopher gains definitive knowledge of reality. Revoicing the Idealist premise that what is, is known, Baader referred that postulated coincidence of being and knowledge to their original unity in God and explained theosophy as a dependent species of the primal 'genetic thinking'⁴. We repeat Baader's ciphers: God knows Himself through a form; the form is the Word that He speaks to define Himself; the same Word that mediates God's 'immanent' knowledge is the form of His divine nature (Urform), in which all 'emanent' being is constituted; the science of that form is 'logic' or the science of the (Johannine) Logos as a power of formation, and it yields metaphysical knowledge of things according to the way they are formed. In the way that God knows and forms Himself,

1. I, 181, 369 ff.; V, 43, 53 f.

2. I, 202.

3. I, 243-5. Cf. I, 169 and n.

4. I, 183-95; XII, 177.

He knows and forms all being, and in knowing the one, the theosopher knows the other¹. From this general doctrine Baader derives his maxim that 'the theory of knowledge should correspond with the theory of creation'², and the purpose of the doctrine seems partly that of ensuring the 'objectivity' of an Idealist knowledge of being. In Baader's theosophy, however, Idealism is always joined, if somewhat incongruously, with positive Christianity, and even when he affirms an absolute knowledge of things, he makes the same distinction between divine and human knowledge as between divine and human self-consciousness and existence, the one being original and the other derived. All thinking, insofar as it corresponds with reality, is a reflection upon and a rethinking (Nachdenken) of God's original creative thinking (Urdenken)³. All true speech is a repetition (Nachsprechen) of the primal speech (Ursprechen) and a resaying of God's creative word (Urwort)⁴. Like human love, human reason is not a predicate but an 'adjective'⁵.

God is reason, man has it -- from God -- that is, he is only 'reasonable', and partakes in that reason, and is not a part of it, in just the same way that God is love, and man only takes part or can take part in that love.

Echoing Hamann, Baader writes that reason (Vernunft) is not created by man, but (like speech) it is through a reception or 'listening' (Vernehmen)⁷. Reason is his through its immanence in him, his through love itself, and his by virtue of an inspiration which Baader likens to prayer⁸.

Theosophy bases its knowledge of nature upon that of the divine nature. In doing so, it makes a radical distinction between the way in which one knows God 'above' and that in which one knows nature 'below'. Knowledge of God is only through an act of God, and accessible only through an attitude of intellectual openness.

1. I, 315-9; II, 520-4.

2. I, 112; X, 113.

3. I, 211, 312 f.; II, 331 f.

4. I, 316; VIII, 107; IV, 226 n.1. Thus, the divine Ursehen, I, 369; II, 103.

5. V, 273; cf. VII, 126; I, 137 f.

7. I, 319; IX, 109. For Hamann, see Alexander, W., 163

8. I, 137 f., 293, 400 f.; VIII, 271; IX, 221 n.

6. II, 455; cf. I, 137 f.

With regard to nature, however, the theosopher again turns Idealist with his emphasis upon the active and 'creative' role of human thought in constituting its world¹. Like God, we only know what we bring forth². But again, man's creativity and his epistemological dominion is derived, for man knows and creates only in being known and created by God³. All of his creative activity is an 'imitation' (Nachtun), and when he recreates nature he does so by seeing it as the self-expression of God, 'to bear' (zeugen) meaning 'to bear witness' (Zeugnis geben)⁴. By declaring submission to divine thinking, theosophy shows itself Christian, certifies the universality of its own perceptions, and still serves the purposes of Naturphilosophie, as the theosopher frees himself from nature by knowing it from the point of view of a creator. With his 'dynamic' rethinking of creation, he brings nature into the sphere of his own epistemological influence, establishes his Imperium in naturam through a deeper knowledge of things⁵, and raises himself above nature, where he belongs. By mirroring the thought of God ('speculieren from speculum'), he makes nature his own mirror and the reflection of his thought⁶. By the immanence of the Word in man, he gains the creative power of the Word and fulfils the divine function of seeking the formative idea in every created thing⁷. As the emissary of God, man's duty is to act as the organ of divine thinking by knowing nature according to the purpose for which it is formed, and since the purpose of creation is the self-revelation of the Absolute, it follows that nature known theosophically will express the form of its Creator.

Wie aber der Mensch durch Aufgabe und Ueberlassung seines Willens an Gottes Willen in diesen letzteren tritt, so dass nun Gott durch ihn und in ihm will, so tritt er durch Ueberlassung seines eigenen Sehens und Wissens in das Sehen und Wissen Gottes, so dass nun Gott durch ihn und in ihm, und er durch und in Gott sieht.⁸

1. I, 41 f., 256 f.

2. II, 105 and n., 109; IV, 388 ff.; IX, 164.

3. I, 105 f., 219, 316.

4. (testis, testiculare), IV, 240.

5. I, 194; IX, 63.

6. VIII, 352; IX, 99; IV, 95 n.2; I, 227.

7. I, 316; II, 429.

8. XV, 299 f.

By its own terms, theosophy has a moral dimension and has its beginning in an act of the will. It defines itself as participation in divine thinking. Yet divine thought is also a will and a creative act, although not in a human manner and not separately in a human manner¹. In the divine illumination which is the source of theosophy, intellection must therefore be inseparable from volition. The theory of knowledge in general must also correspond with the theory of the will, and in Baader they are analogous in all significant respects. But had not Kant also said that thought had the character of the will, when he called reason spontaneous? The difference is that Baader's theory of knowledge and of the will is based in a Christian conviction that all knowledge, all freedom, and all creative power originates in God. God alone is capable of making an absolutely new beginning, and human thought and will are not spontaneous as Kant defined them to be, but only insofar as one chooses to give oneself to God and partake in a generalized thought and will that is already existent². To the extent that it is true, knowledge is not original. Nor, to the extent that it is genuine, is human freedom. Any philosophy that does not make such a recognition is by Baader's criteria not Christian. It is the same claim to autonomy to say that human reason can define the good as well as determine itself for the good in an original way, and to say that what is true is so, not because God thinks it, but because a universal yet human faculty of reason is so constituted as to think in that way, without regard to what is true for an absolute intellect³. To claim independence for pure reason means the same as to claim it for practical reason. Self-legislation in epistemology as well as ethics makes human reason autonomous, and autonomy makes man a God⁴. Autonomy in the theory of knowledge is the original sin of self-affirmation, and for Baader it is immaterial whether this intel-

1. I, 286; V, 251.

2. I, 278 ff.

3. VIII, 202 f.; 230 f.

4. I, 256, 308, 326 f.; IV, 86 and n.; V, 46. On the heresy of political autonomy, either the absolutism of the regents or the democratic liberalism of the subjects, see e.g. I, 84 n.2, 88 f (n.4); VI, 85.

lectual egocentricity shows itself in 'affected'¹ attempts to prove the existence of God out of human thought, or whether it does so by declaring God unknowable and by its consequent indifference toward transcendent knowledge. Although Baader declared himself not only against Kant but against the other leading philosophers of his period, it was always the assertion of a Christian philosophy, holding human knowledge, will, and existence to be derivative, against a principle of philosophical autonomy: against Fichte as one who had made a cult of subjectivism², and against Hegel as one who made the other atheistic error of failing to differentiate between divine and human knowledge³. Without question, Baader's approach is dogmatic -- he said as much -- and his contentiousness is unappealing. But it should also be granted that his argument is valid when he says that any philosophy that is grounded in a principle of autonomy, and that does not differentiate, is not Christian. That is what we understand Kierkegaard to have meant when he wrote:

God and man are two qualities between which there is an infinite qualitative difference. Every doctrine which overlooks this difference is, humanly speaking, crazy: understood in a godly sense, it is blasphemy.

By attempting to render intelligible Baader's doctrine of divine illumination by reference to a doctrine of the will, we do not intend to reduce theosophy to ethics. Not only all freedom and all 'reason' are from God, but also all spirit, all nature, all power, love and life. All of these in their worldly forms stand in the same derivative relation to the Absolute. The organic character of nature, analogous to human freedom, does not have its final explanation in human thinking, nor in the 'subject' of nature as World-Soul, but only in the divine nature as the source of all order and growth -- and, with the necessary changes, the same is true for all that is valued positively in Baader's theosophy. His doctrine is a doctrine of the will, but also a doctrine

1. II, 208.

2. I, 211; IX, 94 f.

3. I, 319; VIII, 189.

4. Kierkegaard, S., The Sickness unto Death, 207.

of Logos, of spirit, love, and life. It is all of these at once by virtue of the Boehmian symbolic system that he rebuilt gradually in his essays and in which all that is valued positively may be represented by the symbol of light. It would therefore be contrary to Baader's intentions to say his doctrine is a doctrine of the will and that light symbolizes the will of God and symbolizes life, love and spirit only in an incidental or illustrative manner. Nonetheless, even if theosophy is not to be reduced to ethics, the problem of the will is central in Baader. With his theosophical knowledge of God as an absolute reason, will, and creative power, Baader knows that, with regard to any of these, man cannot be autonomous, and this thoroughgoing denial of autonomy may first become meaningful when related to the Christian doctrine of the will. In the ^{present} ~~instant~~ case, Baader's theory of divine and natural knowledge may be made more 'understandable' by reference to his conviction that man has no freedom of his own except insofar as he defines himself by a movement toward the Absolute. Man has no knowledge of his own, and no reason, except that he has it from God. He gains knowledge of God and of creation by renouncing the sin of an illusory autonomy which is also the source of his error. But he cannot do so without the epistemological mediation of Christ as Logos, who restores human reason to its capacity for determining itself in conformity with absolute reason¹. Although man has reason only from God, and by 'retracting his own lie', it is still not without an effort on his own part. Theosophical inspiration is receptive, but it is not passive. It is a gift (Gabe) but also a duty (Aufgabe), a duty to 'reconstruct' (nachconstruieren) in the way that one reconstructs a mathematical equation in the mind². Man thus has knowledge only in renouncing his own false knowledge, by an act of his own intellect, and the difficulty that Baader has in making this clear is the same difficulty that he has in making clear how, by an act of one's own will, one surrenders that will and for the first time gains true freedom.

1. I, 246-8; II, 166.

2. I, 170, 318; VII, 279.

Baader described theosophical thinking variously as participation in 'central intuition', as 'luminous perception', 'magic', and 'ecstasy'¹. By any other name, the source of insight claimed was what Kant had called 'intellectual intuition'², the 'godly thinking' that produces its own objects. By definition, the noumenal objects of that hypothetical miraculous faculty were uncognizable, human knowledge being bound to sense-intuition. They functioned rather as ideals or 'bordering concepts' given only formally and without content in speculative reason. But that which Kant offered -- a 'kingdom of ends' as the postulate of practical reason -- was for Baader insufficient to replace what had been taken away: the objective knowledge of ideals. Yet he felt more than obliged to take into account what Kant had said, and what people were saying that he had said. The theosopher's response was to ascribe the deficiency of knowledge to the fall. As he explained in his turbid Ueber Kants Deduktion der praktischen Vernunft und die absolute Blindheit der letzteren, reason was not originally blind, and epistemology had to be complemented by the Christian teaching of a 'reawakening of the lost vision or Logos'³. As he carried out the merger, Baader translated the critical distinction between noumenal and phenomenal as the mystic distinction between celestial and mundane, then availed himself of the conclusion that the divine-noumenal was unknowable entirely because of the fallen human faculty that could not comprehend it or 'border its concept'⁴. He then might have said that the noumena were to be recognized in the act of faith. But that would have left him with Jacobi 'in separation', and he wanted knowledge as well as belief. In the theory to which he addressed himself, however, knowledge was only of possible sense-experience. What else than to say that the senses too are fallen, and to affirm an in-born faculty of transcendent sense-intuition -- an 'inner' yet 'objective' sense -- that could even evolve in 'this' life⁵? Acceding

1. E.g. VIII, 349-51; XIV, 72 f.

2. See esp. I, 305-7; IX, 122.

3. I, 4 n., 5, n.2.

4. I, 6.

5. I, 6, n.2; IV, 93-106, 98.

to the requirement that knowledge be of experience, Baader replied that the philosophers had defined experience too narrowly when they said it was always conditioned by time and space, and -- like his fellow pneumatologist Jung-Stilling¹ -- he took the critical theory of time and space as a bridge to mysticism and a means of absorbing the rational assault upon traditional mystic doctrine. Space and time were fallenness, and if reason did not know that of which it could have an idea, it was because reason was 'not at home' in this mundane sensory existence². But as every Naturphilosoph knew, there was another kind of experience, identified with 'magnetic' ecstasy, and it was this kind to which transcendent knowledge applied. Subjects reported a suspension of time and space, yet still had memorable experiences, and it was all there to be read in Jung-Stilling's tales of clairvoyance or Justinus Kerner's³ renowned studies of somnambulism. As Baader theorized in an extended series of articles⁴ based on those sources and on his own experimentation, somnambulism was a fleeting glimpse into a prelapsarian and future eternal sensory existence where we are naturally 'more at home'⁵. Although miraculous in relation to the everyday, it was so only to the extent that life was a miracle to the inorganic⁶. Reason was 'supermaterial' or super timely and superspatial, but it was not for that 'supernatural' or supersensible⁷. Somnambulism represented intuition of a transcendent nature -- one perhaps like the spirit-bodies in which the dreamers felt themselves clothed, but one in any case which could ultimately be known -- and so there was justified the position that visionary experience could generate what in philosophy was called knowledge. To make the unthinkable more familiar, Baader

1. Lütgert, W., I, 213.

2. IV, 32; II, 524; X, 138-42; XIV, 52.

3. E.g. X, 277 ff. (From Jung-Stilling's Theorie der Geisterkunde) and IV, 141-6, 243-56 (on Kerner's publications), a thesis concerned largely with the same Seherin von Prevorst of Kerner began the literary career of Carl Jung. For both Jung and Baader, those reports from the Nachtgebiete der Natur helped establish the reality of the archetypes of integration, although of course 'reality' in different senses. Jung, C.G., I, 3-88.

4. The phenomenon of ecstasy preoccupied Baader from about 1804 (I, 29) onward, and volume IV of his works is devoted almost entirely to the theme.

5. IV, 32.

6. IV. 4 f.

7. I, 271; III, 350-5.

proposed that for the distinction between ideal and real philosophers substitute that between 'magical' and real¹. What we call ideal is real, but magical to us because we have lost the senses to perceive it. When these are regained, we will know our magical world as real, while that which was real will appear to us as magical. Now if it still seemed impossible to imagine a science of transcendence, then that was only due to a philosophical dualism that disjoined spirit and nature, which for the theosopher was the same false disjunction as that between ideal and real, which was in turn the same as that between noumenal and phenomenal and between that which could only be believed and that which could be known. For the scientific theory of the supermaterial, he turned to the pre-Cartesian metaphysics of Boehme, who had achieved intellectual beatitude and who therefore did not separate, but recognized that every ideal has its corresponding reality, the soul like God has its body, every spirit has its nature, and all that can be believed can also be known. On the model of grace, Baader's Christianity teaches a regeneration of the senses and the intellect with the will, and a progressive clarification in 'this' life of the supreme reality now known only magically. For there is not a speculative reason and a practical reason, but only one reason, and it is not inherently God-blind². It can achieve its cognitive goals with the same certainty which Kant allowed one-sidedly, and then half-heartedly, for its moral projects, and it can inherit not only a kingdom of ends but a kingdom of absolute knowledge. Against what he considered an abject view of human reason condemned to strive endlessly toward the knowledge of ideals without hope of fulfillment³, Baader offered the theosophical prospect of a perfect intellection for the reawakened spirit: the noumenal being-as-it-really-is (das Sein an sich) was that of which religion said that it 'is, was, and ever shall be'⁴.

1. II, 420; IV, 4, 11. Alternatively, one could use the terms fi-gürlich and wesenhaft to distinguish between 'bodiless' and 'substantial' experience of things, I, 105 f.; II, 296 f., 418. As usual in Baader, we are dealing with a set of expressions.

2. I, 4, 191, 285.

3. I, 257.

4. I, 272-4; II, 71 f., IX, 24 n., 61 f. nn., 192 n., 308, n.2.; X, 160; IV, 221-42, 309 f.; VIII, 23 n.

In a final version of the dichotomy of powers of thought, reason is often displaced by understanding as the faculty for the Absolute¹. This is natural enough, inasmuch as one speaks more easily of a divine understanding than of a divine reason. Besides, Boehme's Verstand corresponds to Hegel's Vernunft as the power to grasp the coincidence of opposites, the organic unity-in-differentiation and the dialectical process². The reversal of names further conveyed contempt for that 'dualistic' Kantian terminology wherein reason was the faculty of ideals. Ideals were empty, and reason had no knowledge of its objects. Understanding had its application in the knowledge of sense-experience, but its shortcoming was that it was deterministic and dualistic, like the negative menschliche Vernunft that Boehme forever ridiculed and whose divisiveness he called Naturschiedlichkeit³. In the theosophical Verstand, these faculties were comprehended in a 'marriage of the intellect and the senses'⁴ informed by that other Verstand, the Architectonic Understanding for Whom thought and creation, intellection and intuition are one. Where the dualists place human reason 'above' human understanding, Baader therefore puts it 'below' the Architectonic Understanding⁵. Reason then acquires the real content it has hitherto lacked, understanding is reconstituted for knowledge of transcendent and non-dualistic reality, and the theosopher takes part in intellectual intuition, his knowledge agreeing with things as they are. He sees spirit and nature, God and creation together, each in its place, the one above the other simultaneously.

Schelling wrote that whoever speaks directly out of visionary experience

is at one with the object, to a third person like the object itself, and therefore not master of his own thoughts. ...Here is the difference between theosophy and philosophy, a distinction that the science-loving man will want to preserve.⁶

1. I, 270 ff.; IV, 66-71.

2. II, 306; VIII, 259.

3. VII, 99.

4. IV, 114; V, 352.

5. VIII, 180n.; IX, 120 f., 128. Therefore, also, das göttliche architectonische Sehen as well as der architectonische Sinn to which the theosopher submits, VIII, 241 f.

6. Schelling, W., Werke, IV, 580.

In a passage thought to refer to Baader (less because he was a miner than because he was a theosopher), Schelling wrote:

I know a man who is by nature a subterranean man, in whom knowledge has become substantial and achieved being ... This man does not know, but is rather a living,¹ constantly active and complete personification of knowledge.

The receptiveness of an inspirational philosophy, the magic of being the organ of a higher wisdom obviates responsibility and seems to entail the prophetic consciousness. Beginning in apparent modesty, treating his knowledge as secondary and derived, the theosopher arrives at the greatest speculative boldness.

On occasion Baader describes his doctrine as a theosophical version of anamnesis. Rather than a tabula rasa, the mind is eine rasierte Tafel². Innate ideas are retrievably lost, and the theosophical process is a reminiscence³. The ideas are embodied in the myth and symbolism of sacred texts -- the collective traditions-mère⁴ -- and in the mystic interpretative tradition which Baader embraces. As the documents of transcendent experience, religious symbol and mystery are treated as original and irreducible: 'the so-called mysteries are themselves the principles of religious knowledge'⁵. The deficit in human reason is only the general condition of fallenness, and the desire to dissolve into a lover's arms is only the general desire to dissolve into eternal life, which is the real thing held only in the religious symbol. Rather than subject the positive content of religion to any psychological or philosophical reducing-mechanism, theosophy organizes, interprets and elaborates upon the primary symbolism, while any reduction that takes place returns other knowledge to a religious expression. No discord is perceived in the simultaneous use of orthodox, sectarian, and non-Christian symbols. On the

1. Ibid. IV, 181 and Baader, XV, 59. Schelling could write this because he too spoke from 'intellectual intuition', for which reason Jaspers concluded that Schelling's philosophy was, from beginning to end, Gnosticism or theosophy, Jaspers, K., 107, 165 ff., 231 et passim.

2. II, 133; cf. IX, 292 n.

3. IV, 95 n.2.

4. I, 170; V, 47.

5. V, 273; VI, 73; IX, 109 ff.

premise that they all derive from a unique primal revelation, they may all be ordered under their archetypes in the theosophical exegesis.

But Baader's theosophy is no mere story-telling. Religious symbol and mystery interact with rational discourse as the language of Idealism is used to organize the symbols and to speculate upon their metaphysical content. Mysteries do not represent impenetrable but only veiled truths¹, and they are not absolutely but only conditionally unfathomable². A major problem with Baader is in fact his semi-conceptual character. The symbol is never clearly distinguished from what is symbolized, and symbolism as a means of clarifying experience is on an equal footing with discursive thinking. The mystic doctrine of numbers is not at all a product of free association, but has an inherent necessity in which the number ten is 'the intellectual form' of unity³, (If this appears capricious, it is not because of the emptiness of the numbers themselves, but because our minds are closed and we only 'count' (rechnen, compter) where we should 'number' (zählen, nombraer)⁴). While he attempts an explanation of symbols according to the ideas that they embody, Baader preserves the symbol itself as an integral part of the philosophical process. As a Christian, he accepts the independence of sacrament, symbol and mystery. As a philosopher, he speculates upon them in search of their ideal meaning.

With his speculation, the self-defined mystic assumes a paradoxical relation to Catholic dogma. In Baader's adaptation of a well-worn dialectical aesthetic, dogma corresponds to a given classicism in religion, and speculative mysticism to the Romantic genius that freely evolves new forms⁵. As such, mysticism does not oppose religious authority. It functions analogously to and acts from the same divine inspiration as poetic creativity and the 'geniality' of organic nature, neither of which contradicts

1. I, 243.

2. II, 328.

3. II, 342, 350, 363.

4. II, 335; V, 351.

5. I, 174; VIII, 34 f., 40.

but vitalizes what went before. Just as the organism has its Ur-typus in accordance with which it grows, mysticism has in dogma its Urbild¹. Like that of living nature, the genius of mysticism only brings to a fuller expression that which is already present though undeveloped in the primitive form. The concept of dogma is in fact that of the organism, which does not grow by the addition of new parts but by proportional accretion and the consequent strengthening of the whole². Evolution takes place in the parts, and the religious institution gains its unity and vitality through the defined freedom which it allows to the individual mystic conscience in order to internalize dogma and to articulate all potential variations of the laws of the whole. When he expounds the metaphysics of Boehme, Baader is therefore evolving the idea of Catholicism, and does not propose alternate dogma any more than he ever proposed to create a new church. Speculation is even a divine commandment, inasmuch as revelation, like all else that comes from God to man, is both a gift and a duty³, a duty to investigate and thus to strengthen, since 'faith is engendered only in the free activity of the intellect'. As he shoulders 'the cross of speculation', Baader finds the cardinal mysteries 'unfathomable' and takes this discovery as itself 'something fathomed'⁴. When mystery is so recognized, faith then allows the intellect to be truly free, for it provides speculation with a positive ground⁵.

The religious symbol is capable of revealing 'a perspective in which heterogeneous realities can be articulated together or even integrated into a 'system', and it 'allows man to discover a certain unity in the world and at the same time to become aware of his own destiny as an integral part of the world'⁶. The multivalence of religious symbolism and its existential value were no less evident to Baader than they are to modern depth-psychology or the com-

1. II, 158; IX, 106.

2. V, 291 ff.; VIII, 13-20.

3. VIII, 318 f.

4. IX, 161.

5. I, 142; Generally, I, 133-50.

6. Eliade, M., Mephistophélès et l'androgynie, 257.

parative study of religions. But his attitude toward the system that he adopts or re-creates is strikingly unmodern. Symbolism is rarely 'aesthetic' and analogy never playful. The theosopher does not regard his metaphysical-symbolical structures as results of a purely subjective activity. When he arrives at his notion of the divine nature (as the original of 'this' nature), or the analogous notion of a spirit-body (as the original and future human form), these become the bases for explaining the actual condition of nature and man. Derived anthropomorphically and from the pattern of nature (God as organism), the theosophical construction of the Deity provides the model for both trinitarian nature and theomorphic man, the explanation of humanity out of Adam and of the inorganic out of the organic being only special applications of the procedure of explaining all things out of God.

In the symbol-making operation, all sensuous reality becomes a sign and a wonder. But immediately this ability of symbols to point beyond themselves is understood in an unqualified manner, and symbolic knowledge treated as the product of observation and analysis. Symbols, such as the Boehmian fire or the filial relation of the Persons of the Trinity, are taken as adequate notions. When they are speculated upon and systematized, there results 'the science of God'. What Kant spoke of as 'an abyss'¹, the unattainable in knowledge, becomes the point of departure in Baader's theosophy. Because he objectified the ciphers of transcendence, and believed in the ~~experimentable~~^{envisable} reality of the preternatural, Baaderian scholars have reached for such formulations as Ideal-Realismus² and platonischer Aristotelianismus³ to define his doctrine. What is 'real', however, is what is valued, the Absolute is the absolutely real, and Baader's knowledge does not have its source in philosophy but in the traditions of the closed community. By way of symbols he grasps an objectivity in the Absolute, and from this explains, reasons, and refutes.

1. Kant, I., K.d.r.V., B 643 (Kemp Smith, N., 515).

2. Hoffmann, F., in Baader, VIII, xvii.

3. Sauter, J., 14. With enviable enthusiasm, Sauter wrote of Baader's 'triumph over Kant' (ibid. vii, 601 ff.). Just to write a serious book entitled Baader und Kant shows daring, for even if Baader's work does appear to us to be something of a protracted anti-Kant, their constant juxtaposition reminds us too often that in a critical sense Baader is always asking us to think the unthinkable.

iii. Mystical Philosophy

While he did not shun the title of theosopher any more than that of holy fool, Baader defined himself as a 'religious philosopher', in contrast not only to irreligious philosophers but also 'philosophers of religion'. The self-appellation enclosed a judgment about the relation of religion and philosophy. Because it derives from a superior source, 'all true philosophy is necessarily religious philosophy'. There is for Baader 'no philosophy without God'¹. Given the historical situation, his purport is clear. In the universities of Germany, philosophy had supplanted theology as Queen of the faculties. On the one side, rational philosophy had long since deprived systematic theology of the prestigious name of knowledge, so that philosophers of religion either confined themselves within the limits of reason alone (the Kantians), or sought a non-intellectual basis of belief (Jacobi, Schleiermacher). On the other side, the comprehensive systems of post-Kantian Idealism had made the Absolute the province of philosophy. Schelling projected a 'philosophical religion', and in Hegel's system the religious dimension was to be transcended and all but forgotten in the final philosophical illumination.

Baader regarded all philosophies as rival theologies, and he defended the sovereignty of revealed religion. Not only did he mean to preserve Christianity from its invalidation, or, alternatively, from its transcendence by secular philosophical thought. He also intended that philosophy should take its irrational or suprarational principles from religion, and should use Christian doctrine and symbol in the very texture of its arguments, as in his own speculation, where philosophy became a mystic game. Regarding the function of philosophy, he did share the conviction that it should provide an encyclopaedic view and refer all special knowledge to general principles. The natural sciences were specifically included through a Christian Naturphilosophie, and it is

1. I, 155, 169 f., cf. I, 321-38.

particularly in the justification of this branch of his 'religious philosophy' that Baader revealed an underlying recognition of the separation of science and religion as the fundamental characteristic of modern philosophy. Rather than finding the cause of their separation in the independent rise of the natural sciences, he laid blame upon both scientific and religious philosophy, both 'physics and ethics'. For its part, modern 'physics' had established a mechanistic theory of nature upon which certain 'rude or ruthless minds' had founded a world-view that negated the claims of religious 'ethic' (1). Since all the main symbols of metaphysics were derived from physics², a false physics chained man and exerted its corruptive influence upon every spiritual endeavour³. Yet ethics, resigned to subjectivism, renounced a religious doctrine of nature and was then left impotent to resist 'the devourment of ethics by physics'⁴. As philosophy had first separated physics from ethics, it was to philosophy that the task of their reconciliation belonged. In their metaphysical marriage, physics was in effect thoroughly subordinated to ethics, as Baader returned all scientific thought to the matrix of theological notions. Physics and ethics went hand in hand in a thinking which recalled the age when all so-called natural knowledge had no independent validity but was referred to the authoritative truth of Church and faith, and when philosophy existed in order to validate doctrine based on the interpretation of revelation. For his science the theosopher found his models in thinkers like Paracelsus and Kepler, whose theories were imbued with theology, then carried out the same process of reference using modern science. Kant's scientific ideas, for example, were adopted, treated with a rough hand, then introduced into the corpus of mystic doctrines, so that in a perhaps unexpected way one sees verified the opinion that the Romantics were not so much influenced by Kant as that they made of him what they would⁵. The resulting physics was a verbal rather than mathematical science, a non-science that consciously disdained ethical

1. V, 5.

2. XI, 407; XV, 201.

3. See III, 287-310, 331-56, esp. 316 (objection to calling only the physical sciences 'exact'), and 334 (Baader's desired harmonia naturae et gratiae).

4. V, 5 f.; cf. I, 383 f. (the 'life and death struggle between dynamic-chemical-organic philosophy and mechanism'); II, 97 (a doctrine of nature as the 'weapon' of religion).

5. Cf. Huebner R., VI, 147-51.

neutrality and illustrated a definitively¹ mystic inability to separate emotional importance from scientific validity. In acknowledgment of the distinctive interplay of modern and archaic perspectives in Baader's thought, it should be said that he did not necessarily contradict rational and utilitarian science, but only the claim that it exhausted the meaning of nature. 'Modern astronomy', as he wrote, 'can inform us of the movements of the heavenly messengers, but it is incapable of telling us their message'². The theosopher's physics, on the other hand, was pure message, and did not explain but valorized nature in an attempt to divest science of the 'false' independence that had proven injurious to religion and the ethical concern.

Baader's commitment to religious philosophy came to the fore in a dialogue with Hegel that began to form along somewhat definite lines in Fermenta Cognitionis (1822-5), where Baader criticized Hegel's relegation of religion to what could not be interpreted otherwise than as a lower level of intelligence. In his Enzyklopädie (1817), Hegel had distinguished revealed religion from philosophy by the presence in religious consciousness of the moments of 'feeling' and 'imaginative presentation', and by the corresponding presence in religious self-expression of the 'poetry' of its historical and symbolical content³. Religion had these elements in common with art, which it followed as another former stage in the evolutionary journey of the Absolute Spirit, when reason had not yet come to full consciousness of itself in the clarity of (Hegelian) philosophy. Religious, unlike philosophical thinking, did not generate its truths out of itself, but treated them as something given and 'external', and while philosophy could admit the identity of their subject-matter and recognize its own categories in the religious form of knowledge, theology was incapable of doing the same with regard to philosophy⁴.

Baader began his Fermenta Cognitionis by commending Hegel for

1. Russel, B., 187.

2. III, 291 n.

3. Hegel, G., Enzyklopädie, secs. 1-5, 553-71.

4. Ibid., sec. 573.

having ignited 'the dialectical fire', that auto da fé in which so much philosophical presumptuousness had perished. But he continued by saying that Hegel's own thought could only be purified by being led through that same fire, and proceeded to execute the sentence by showing that all that Hegel had to say had already been said by Boehme -- and better said, for the Theosoph had differentiated and avowed with humility that the absolute knowledge to which Hegel aspired was only from God¹.

Not only in his Fermenta Cognitionis but with increasing aggressiveness throughout his subsequent writings, Baader assailed Hegel's misinformed notion of religion as dualistic and therefore itself unphilosophical. Whereas Hegel regarded Christian doctrine as merely given and external, it was in reality both inner and outer, both a gift and a duty, and religion had always taught that the outward revelation had to be completed mystically through a second, inward revelation². Calling Christianity the Religion of the Idea³, Baader invoked his incarnationist formula -- "vis ejus integra si conversus fuerit in terram"-- in order to define the interdependent relation of philosophy and religion. The notion was revealed historically and in symbolical form for feeling and imagination, and was then elucidated philosophically. The notion was thereby made 'free' of its outward form, and metaphysics from revealed religion, but not by being 'without it', since only the notion that is integrated with feeling and imagination and only the conviction that has defined itself in relation to authoritative tradition can be truly free⁴. By ignoring this, Hegel's approach represented a direct attack upon religion, and when the Hegelian theologian D.F. Strauss proposed in his infamous Leben Jesu to de-Christianize Christianity by doing away with belief in the miraculous advent of the Son of God, that was only a logical outcome that confirmed Baader's mistrust of the Idealism that would 'mystify religion into a philosophical myth'⁵.

1. II, 206 f., 306, 332.

2. II, 282-4; see esp. VII, 247-58, 241-6.

3. II, 305; VIII, 199.

4. II, 326-32; V, 45-9.

5. VII, 259-70, 266 n.; IX, 129-32.

Finally, the symbolic and historical element of religion, like the faculties of feeling and imagination to which it directly appealed, remained an inexhaustible source of philosophical insight, and should therefore be retained as an indispensable component of any intellectual process. Baader's entire Fermenta Cognitionis is a document to his belief that the most profound knowledge of existence comes about only through the mutual penetration of religious symbolism ('poetry') and metaphysical speculation .

Endlich ist es wohl kein Widerspruch, wenn der Eine * behauptet: der Begriff entstehe nur durch Aufhebung des Gefühls und der Vorstellung, und der Andere*: dieser Begriff entstehe nur durch ununterbrochene Alimentation aus Gefühl und Vorstellung ... Wie nämlich der Begriff aus Gefühl und Vorstellung sich erzeugt ... so öffnet er sich eine nun bleibende Quelle derselben in sich, und wenn es eine Poesie gibt, die nur in Träumen und Ahnen des Begriffs, d.i., in seiner Abwesenheit ihr Wesen treibt, so gibt es auch eine andere, welche nur mit der Vollendung des Begriffs, als Zeugin und Verkündigerin dieses Begriffs, auftritt, und deren Abwesenheit schon die Impotenz und Unwahrheit des letzteren beweiset.¹

With apparent reference to Baader's defense of the priority of 'religious philosophy' in Fermenta Cognitionis and in their conversations in Berlin, Hegel wrote in 1825:

Ich denke, wir sind über die Hauptsache einverstanden; einige Bedenken über etliches, was Sie von mir anführen, würden sich wohl leicht heben lassen; bei der Art, wie ich von der Verschiedenheit der Religion und Philosophie spreche, reducire ich alles auf den Unterschied in der Form der Erkenntnis; und, bei der nicht nur Gemeinschaftlichkeit des Inhaltes der Wahrheit, sondern bei der Dieselbigkeit desselben in beiden, dem der (heilige) Geist Zeugnis gibt, d.i., frei ist, bezeichne ich die Form der Religion mit dem Ausdruck Vorstellung vornehmlich -- einer Weise, wodurch das relig. Bewusstsein als mit einem Aeusserlichen, Gegebenen u.s.f. zu tun hat; weil die Religion für alle Menschen sein soll und ist, nicht bloss für die denkend gebildeten, soll ihr Inhalt, so zu sagen, von der Vorstellung aus, von der Weise unseres gewöhnlichen Bewusstseins, ins Herz gehen, ohne von wissenschaftlichem Begriff bearbeitet zu sein -- und nach dieser Seite, sage ich, ist die denkende₂ Vernunft in solchem als nur Vorgestellten nicht bei sich selbst.²

Hegel again tendered a reconciliation in the Introduction to the second edition of his Enzyklopädie (1827), where, at ingratiating

* Meaning, respectively, Hegel and Baader.

1. II, 141; cf. III, 334 n.; I, 117 n.

2. iv, 184.

length, and with the utmost regard for Baader's accomplishments in having elucidated the notional content of Boehme's theosophy, he specified his reasons for thinking 'the Gnosis of Herr Baader' to be unphilosophical. Hegel's two principal distinctions were: firstly, the above-mentioned difference between religion and philosophy in regard to their form¹; and, secondly, that Baader's theosophy presupposed what it offered to demonstrate². Acknowledging the proposal of a left-handed marriage between philosophy and theology, Baader replied that he and Hegel were indeed in basic agreement -- about the foolishness of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling³. And Hegel was again correct in saying that Baader assumed what he set out to show. But this could not distinguish theosophy from philosophy, for Hegel did the same in his own 'spiritualistic' logic, which presupposed the world-process to be the development of the Idea, was motivated by the same principle of 'progress and regress', and was equally circular. The only real difference between the two was that Baader's philosophy began in knowledge of the existing God, then understood nature as His self-revelation, and while theosophy thus saw creation in a divine light, this did not represent a 'proof' but only proved the truth of the old saying that one can only end with God if one begins with God:

Der Unterschied ist nur, dass Hegel mit Nichts (dem Absoluten Leeren des Gedankens) beginnt, und also auch in dieses Nichts wieder regrediren muss, wogegen ich mit dem Vollen beginne und in dasselbe regredire. Dieses ist allerdings ein circulus, aber darum nicht vituosis, sondern ein circulus vitae, dass man die Sonne nur durch sie sehen kann, und das Sehen derselben sie schon voraussetzt.

1. Hegel, G., Enzyklopädie, xiii.

2. Ibid., xvii (n. xvi) "... dass sie den absoluten Inhalt als 'Voraussetzung' hat, und aus derselben erklärt, räsonniert, und widerlegt."

3. X, 307.

4. X, 306 f.; cf. II, 322.

2. Creation

1. The Divinity

Like proof of God, and for identical reasons, proof of the act of creation is impossible. But, again for the same reasons, the primal act (der Uract der Schöpfung) is capable and in need of 'descriptive presentation'¹. The account of both is in fact single, as Baader describes a cosmology that is at the same time a theogonic process. In theosophy, which may for this reason be called 'onto-theology'², the 'system' in God (as Urwesen and Ursein) is that of the totality of being, therefore the basis of a knowledgeable description of creation. Immediately a kind of dramatic tension arises, because it is known beforehand that the terms God and creation cannot be at all equivalent, even though they imply one another mutually. God is not the creation, although it is His creation and has its explanation only in Him. As the narrative progresses, the idea of a transcendent 'personal' God, perfect prior to creation, will have to be reconciled with the idea of His visibly imperfect creation. This task is already anticipated in the first stages of the theosophical drama, as Baader describes, not the creation of the world, but the self-creation of God as a coming to self-awareness through His own being.

Rewriting and rethinking Boehme, Baader begins with the idea of a 'personal' God and investigates 'the conditions of the possibility of his realization'³. In such a 'reconstruction', the very first principle which is to explain all things, cannot have in itself anything that belongs to the world. Otherwise, it could not be God. By the subtraction of every predicate, by taking 'the negative way', one arrives at a total lack of determination. From this first principle, on the other hand, all possible determinations must also derive. One principle, which by deduction must be nothingness, must nonetheless also be the origin and explanation of all being. At the

1. V, 13 f.

2. Heidegger, M., 58-69, 62.

3. XIII, 25.

beginning of his theogony, Baader posits the realized contradiction -- Alles und Nichts¹ -- in which absolute indetermination and infinite potentiality coincide. The primary cipher for this 'abyssal' principle is the Boehmian Ungrund. But, theosophy being an original knowledge, Baader desires to show that in every true mystic system there is a corresponding word to betoken God's unrevealed being: the Gottheit of Meister Eckart, the Deitas of classic German mysticism, the Ensoph of Cabbalism². The accumulation of names does not make the concept clearer, and to be truthful, the Ungrund is not always distinguished from the Father or Monas, or, for that matter, the unmanifest Trinity. Beyond all affirmation, this 'Esoteric One' may be described only in antonyms of words connoting appearance or action: 'hidden', 'calm', 'unspoken', 'invisible'³.

The Ungrund is only a phase of the developing theosophical Deity. In order that something may come from nothing, and the many issue from the One, Baader postulates a process of immanifest divine gestation whereby God brings Himself forth into mysterious life. The godly evolution originates as the Ungrund introduces at its center a distinction. As if the Divine Nothing and All had partially voided itself, creating a distinct nothingness to which it could contrast its being⁴, the negation of God takes place within Himself. In one ingenious version of this theosophical enigma, and one to which Baader frequently refers -- the centripetal Cabbalistic Zimzum⁵ -- the first thing to proceed in God is a withdrawal. By a movement of self-attraction, the Deity is imagined to 'gather itself, so that it may create itself', and 'contract in order to expand'⁶. In the primary symbols, the Ungrund engenders a Grund through which to act. As the companion-term to Ungrund, God's Grund is that which He opposes to Himself in His creative self-subjugation. Only by making, comprehending, and entering into His Grund can God be causally effective⁷. In general, Grund signifies both basis and cause. It is that

1. III, 392.

2. I, 189; II, 3; VIII, 255 n.; XIII, 106.

3. II, 3, 146, 340, 351; XIII, 204.

4. III, 324.

5. IX, 176; XIII, 204.

6. II, 3 n., 340, 352.

7. VII, 78, 180; VIII, 278 f.; IX, 169 f., 176, n.2, 180, 233 ff.;
 XV, 340, 635.

from which something emerges, and that which governs over what emergesⁱⁿ this way; therefore, the creatures all have their Grund in God¹. The Ungrund, however, is the absolutely first cause, and so creates the Grund that reveals Him. To put this mystery in different terms, the primal consciousness (Urbewusstsein), like our own, requires a relation with an object, and needs to ground itself in an object if it is to become aware of itself². But, unlike human consciousness, the Ungrund forms its own Grund as it gains knowledge of itself by coming into being. As the only absolute autonomy³, God alone is self-grounded. In the teleological cycle of eternity, God is His own cause and product, His own subject and object, and even Baader does not claim to make comprehensible the manner of God's aseitas as causa sui⁴. We cannot know the manner (das Wie) of creation, or we would ourselves be able to create⁵. This matter is unfathomable, even if the recognition that it is so is itself 'something fathomed'. Yet, without explaining the manner, Baader has already found the cardinal notion of his theosophy in the antinomial relation of Ungrund and Grund. In consciousness as well as creation, in the order of thought as well as being, the idea of opposition is central. Baader's onto-theology is based throughout on the recognition of a given Urduanism, which, he says, also directs our thinking as 'our own emergence process'⁶. All creation takes place by opposition, each stage of development reflecting the primal generation in which God opposes Himself to Himself and produces the germ from which He grows.

Baader narrates several theologies: that of the Word, that of vision, that of understanding. All of these forms and powers of expression are already latent in the Ungrund, only unexpressed and undifferentiated, like a Chaos⁷. In their movement toward manifestation, all undergo the same process of opposition and union by which

1. I, 271; VIII, 121, n.2 (Grund as 'the Law'), 182-4.

2. VII, 31 f., 87 f.

3. VI, 324; VIII, 273.

4. II, 154 n.

5. II, 352; IV, 387.

6. V, 11.

7. II, 242 f.

God becomes His Grund. Furthermore, all are counterparts of and subordinated to the principal theology, that of the will or spirit, with its symbolism of darkness, fire, and light¹. As the Absolute Being, both in relation and position, the first predicate of the Ungrund is absolute independence. The Father or Ungrund is an Ur-wille that is the foundation of itself and all other beings, and invariably precedes in perfect freedom the birth of the Grund. When Grund has, as it does frequently, the meaning of rational cause or 'sufficient reason', the evolution of the divine will provides the model for a suprarational structuring of all being, and the basis of a 'philosophy of freedom'. Will is the prius, except that for the divine will no distinction can arise between the formation of the will and the will itself. Because reasons must be above that which chooses, there is, strictly speaking, no reasoning and no determination of the will before it acts. The Father does not take counsel with Himself and 'decide' to create. Interpolating a passage from Boehme, Baader states that there is in God 'no (reasoned and considered) intention as such', there is only spontaneous birth: "denn da ist kein Vorsatz, sondern eine Geburt"². God is conceived as an eternal will with a desire for self-comprehension through His own existence. In order to be really effective, a will must be a will for something, and a will to overcome something. Since the divine will can only want itself, and only overcome itself, it engenders a determined will, determined by itself to want itself and to overcome its own desire³. What the will wants to be is spirit, which is its own innermost self, and in Baader's and Boehme's vocabulary the paramount expression for spirit is light. Willing Himself forth as light, God makes Himself an obscure desire which he surmounts and makes his Grund, for what is light without the negation of darkness? In parallel manner, the theogonies of the understanding, of speech, and of vision progress by the same cyclic movement of alienation and reconciliation.

1. II, 302-4, 403; XIII, 196-9.

2. I, 213; VII, 37; Boehme, J., Von der Gnadenwahl, chap. iv, sec. 42.

3. VIII, 136, 153-5.

Theosophy finds in God the structure of all being. God must therefore have opposition and negativity within Himself. In the inner self of God, however, contrariety is not realized but only 'figurative' or potential, and antithesis is always closed by synthesis. Darkness and light, but also all other distinctions are not in conflict but in harmony and amorous union -- in der Temperatur¹. In God the dark basis or Grund is eternally overcome and ruled by light in the synthesis of a fire that gives only light. One should therefore not mistake the 'subordination' that is 'already implied' in Baader's Urduanismus². In the divine coincidence of opposites, God eternally conquers a contrary which is never allowed to exist for itself but only as an unrealized opposite whose subordination is necessary for the realization of spirit. It would therefore be wrong to suggest, as Schelling did, that there really is an Abgrund, a dark side or a principle of evil in God³. In itself, the hidden Ungrund is neither darkness or light, but if it were either, it would be light, for God wills only the spirit and light that is identified with the good. Neither does the introduction of movement into the Godhead present a stumbling-block to the theosophical understanding. The auto-evolution of ^{the} Deity does not occur in time, but in that 'real time' wherein past and future are comprised in an 'eternal present'⁴. To depict the process as a sequence, beginning with God's self-occultation, is easily misleading, and necessitated only by the limitations of our descriptive capacities, which cannot limit God in any way. Just as there are no realized distinctions in God, so are there no periods of development. The archetypal world that Baader describes belongs in what has been called 'sacral time', where things do not 'happen' but only 'take place'⁵. In following Baader's narrative, we are thus asked to picture an intemporal evolution in which the generation of principles is not successive but simultaneous, and in which the Ungrund does not disappear but abides in perpetual gestation.

1. III, 425.

2. V, 11; VII, 169 f.

3. XIII, 148; XIV, 39.

4. II, 71-5 and nn., 403, 531; VIII, 68; X, 347.

5. Eliade, M., Images, 73-119, 74.

The form of the Trinity is the inborn and irreducible element of theosophical knowledge upon which Baader builds his speculative system. Unable to be deduced, it is that from which all else is deducible, and that which determines any true thought of God and altogether of being. Willing Himself into being, the Father wills the Son as pure light, and in so doing becomes a darkly wrathful force, as the interior structure of the will gives the Triune God. In the symbolic opposition of darkness and light, one recognizes the distinction between the First Person, as the God of lawfulness, harsh judgment, and absolute power, and the Second Person as the God of redemptive love and grace. Numinous and totally other, the theosophical Father is the God of wrath, and the Son or interior Christ is the already more intimate God of love. Since God wills only spirit and manifests only light, the Son is the 'godly' in God, that which he truly is, and the Word which he speaks when He defines Himself.

The Holy Spirit is for Baader the most problematical of the Three Persons. When the Father speaks Himself as the Son or Word, the Holy Spirit is, in a sense, the utterance itself. It stands in relation to Father and Son as their unified expression, their 'power' and their 'synthesis'¹. As the achieved unity of darkness and light, the Holy Spirit is imagined as a fire, a fire that subdues darkness and produces only light, as in the inner Deity His law is tempered by His grace, and Zorn eternally transformed into Liebe. In this symbol Baader finds the law governing the way in which anything comes into being, and he ascribes to it an absolute priority. The trinitarian mystery is the origin not only of the metaphysics of Boehme, but of 'modern philosophy' as well. In the various triadic constructions of Schelling, and in the dialectical ontology of Hegel, Baader sees only the paler reflections of the true Boehmian and Christian doctrine². Theosis is the development of the Idea, that proceeds by thesis, antithesis and synthesis, or by the three principles of light, darkness and fire.

1. I, 220-4; II, 240 f., 304 f.; X, 302; XIII, 172, 200.

2. I, 397 f.; II, 101, 332, 348; IX, 117; XIII, 81, 172.

From the delineation of the trinitarian mystery there arises not only the law of opposition and union, giving the Boehmian three principles, but also the speculative concept of organic unity. The two are in fact nearly interchangeable, so that it would have been equally proper to begin with Baader's definition of the Trinity as the ideal organism. By either set of terms and symbols, he describes a unity that embraces opposition. There are, he explains, three kinds of unity: 1) monadistic or abstract; 2) (polytheistic) composition; and, 3) the synthesis of these in the form of multiple unity¹. The first cannot define the living God, inasmuch as what lives is always complex. Unity, if it is not empty, is reciprocally determined by multiplicity; therefore, the one gives itself out into the many, just as being reveals itself by its contrary. The living God is multiple, although not a mere composition, not an aggregate without assimilation, but a unity incorporating a division. Rather than of division or opposition, however, it is more correct to speak of Gliederung in God². Like the organism -- rather, in this the organism resembles God -- the Trinity is so formed that differentiation does not contradict unity³. On the contrary, unity advances at an equal rate with plurality, as in the organism that lives by its ability to differentiate itself and perform diverse functions simultaneously. Yet unlike the organism that we know, which is inorganic in comparison with the theo-organism⁴, God's unity and his plurality are both developed to an absolute degree, so that the greatest individuality of each of the Persons corresponds at once to the highest unity of the Absolute Personality, the Tri-Identity⁵.

The Triune Deity that has so far evolved is still only a 'figurative' Tri-Identity⁶. In order to further its process of self-revelation, the 'Threefold Active Personality'⁷ produces a 'mirror' in which to reflect itself: the Divine Wisdom or Sophia. As he analyses the psyche of the Absolute, Baader generally distinguishes not only

1. VIII, 159 f.; cf. 64 f.

2. II, 242, 277 f., 452; X, 259.

3. III, 385; X, 309.

4. IX, 325 (n. 324).

5. VIII, 71-3, 76; IV, 239.

6. II, 242; VII, 36 n.

7. IX, 414; cf. XIII, 189, 205, 273; XV, 447.

three but four moments or phases: e.g., der ungrundliche Wille, the will that finds itself, or the Father; 2) the will engendered from the Ungrund, that is, the Son; 3) the Holy Spirit as their synthetic unity; and 4) the expressed form, or Sophia¹. Yet Sophia is not a fourth Person of the Trinity. Whereas the Ungrund or Father is the uncreated Creator, and the Son and the Holy Spirit are both created and creative, Sophia is only created, not creative, and only expressed, not expressive². She is the Idea of God, and mirrors the virtual image of the Trinity that sees itself as one. She is, we might say, the perfectly accurate ego-image of the Absolute, in which He knows Himself and the image that He wants to recreate. She mediates between His self-awareness and His self-expression, like the artist's idea that mediates between his imagination and his work, or the 'inner speech' that mediates between the thought and the spoken word³. Yet she is also the organ of God's self-manifestation -- and, if you like, His Grund -- and also the 'glory' of God, like the Gnostic doxa or the 'fulness' of His powers⁴. Above all, Sophia is the eternal feminine in Deity, and corresponds as matrix to the Hebrew Shekinah, the Chochma, or the Wisdom of the Apocrypha. She is God's helper and His consort (and, after all, a genetrix), when God 'imagines into' Sophia and the Spirit relates to its Wisdom 'as man to wife' in the hieros gamos and creation of the paradisiacal world⁵. Where many ideas are vague, none is vaguer than this. Because she is the intermediary between God and the heaven He creates, Sophia appears to have the ontological status of both and of neither. But the idea is no clearer in Boehme, and the relatively lucid Gottfried Arnold devoted an entire book to Sophia without making the symbol transparent⁶. It is simply that the disciple failed to surpass his masters.

As Baader's genesis unfolds, however, and the form of God comes to be reflected in creation, the figure of Sophia will gain signifi-

1. IX, 414; cf. XIII, 189, 205, 273; XV, 447.

2. II, 530-2; III, 395 ff. and nn.

3. IV, 279 ff.; IX, 24 f., 219 f.

4. II, 247, 520 f.; VIII, 112 n.

5. IV, 235, n.2, 314 n., 350 n.; VII, 235 n.; VIII, 112 n.

6. Das Geheimnis der göttlichen Sophia (1700).

cance. Just as the Trinity is perfected through its self-reflection in a 'fourth', all being is said to be completed in four variously-named phases¹. Every trinitarian thing achieves its own ideal when it expresses the divine image through a fourth movement of its being, and this it can accomplish only by virtue of its relation to the God Who with unique independence has already acquired ^{such} ~~this~~ formal perfection. In the individual religious consciousness, where these theological structures take on real meaning, man's trinitarian form is first realizable when the beautiful maiden Sophia appears as mediatrix between the undisclosed Trinity and the mystic self. The fourth is throughout the number of wholeness, and completion is always indicated when 'the Quaternary reduces the Trinity to Unity'². Beyond this, we cannot ourselves speculate, but only refer to that archetypalists in a different spirit, Carl Jung, who observed with Baader that 'the fourth always makes a triad into a totality'³.

1. E.g. VII, 24; VIII, 63-9, 78 f.

2. II, 42 n.2, 102-5; VIII, 84.

3. Jung, IX, 184, cf. 159. For the same statement with regard to the Indian tradition, see Eliade, M., Images, 81.

ii. The Divine Nature

The self-reflected Trinity is still unmanifest and unalive, neither darkness or light. But Baader seeks symbolic knowledge of a real and not 'magical', a personal and not an abstract Deity. Part of what it means to be real and personal -- to be an 'individual' -- is to have form and body. In order that God should not need to create 'this' world for His shape and content, theosophy requires that He have an eternal nature or Centrum¹. 'God, as eternal life, is an eternal being and an eternal becoming at once'². If the Trinity is God's interior and his being, then the Centrum is his exterior and the living form of His becoming. If the occult God is spiritual and ideal, then the Centrum represents a complementary nature and reality. As the 'contrary that serves creation'³, the eternal nature is the Grund which God as absolute spirit opposes to Himself in order to become: 'the means of transition from that silent, magical, being to manifest pure life'⁴.

The eternal or divine nature or life, the Ternar,^{Mitte,} physis, Centrum or Naturcentrum: it is the crucial symbol of Baader's Boehmian theosophy and the doctrine by which he hoped to solve all of the problems which vex the attempt to know God and His relation with the visible world. Let us therefore try to be more explicit. God is absolutely real, and has in an absolute degree all that we mean by reality: He has an absolute substance (Wesen) or nature, without which 'He would not be known or even exist'⁵. God is the absolute spirit, but that would be effectively nothing without an absolute nature, for a spirit without nature, like a soul without a body, is unimaginable and its concept 'monstrous'. God is the highest value, or life in an absolute degree, and 'life is incomprehensible without its corporality'⁶. Prior to the creation of 'this' world, it must therefore be

1. II, 305, 308, 364, 378; IV, 23 f.

2. II, 21.

3. VII, 88, 262; XIII, 224.

4. II, 3-5; X, 312 f.; XIII, 72.

5. XIII, 142, cf. 171 "Ternar = Element = Wesenheit = Leiblichkeit Gottes", 196, 207; VII, 34 (n.33).

6. IV, 347.

thought that God completes Himself with a vital center - a Centrum -- that is at once his own organic body and the source of the life of 'this' world.

Ueber den Blitz als Vater des Lichtes (1815)¹ has been rightly placed by nearly all commentators at the center of Baader's doctrine. It provides a 'construction' of the eternal nature, according to the seven nature-principles or nature-forms of Boehme². Joined together in a relation of multiple-unity, they form the pleroma or Gnostic 'plentitude', the sum of God's powers and His heavenly emanations. In the Centrum, which is God's center of speech, the seven are the letters bearing the divine name of spirit. In this same eternal nature, which is God's celestial body, the seven principles are the organic limbs (Glieder) that give substantiality. Not unlike Sophia, they seem to inhabit two realms. While they make up the eternal nature as God's form or His 'glory', they also function as realized values and qualities, sources of the values and the qualities of 'this' world.

The number seven, like three, has its own sanctity. In Baader's scholarship and speculation, this is not returned to some non-religious origin, but to a timeless holy idea. When ^{for example,} the astronomical explanation is considered, the sacred character of the seven planets is found to have its genealogy not in observations relating to agriculture, but in religion³. As he traces the pedigree of his symbol, Baader passes through Boehme, Paracelsus, and their alchemical epigone, the Orphic, Chaldean, and Egyptian mysterians, and arrives at 'the Hebrews', in whom he finds 'the source of all religion and science'⁴. Cited with the same reverence as the Bible and Boehme, the Jewish mystic Cabbala is accepted as an authoritative document

1. II, 27-46; cf. II, 305; VII, 125, 190; XIII, 84-9, 102, 117.

2. The doctrine of these idea-forces, these Urgestalten, Quell-Geister, Eigenschaften or Qualitäten is to be found in Boehme's Aurora (chaps. 8-11), his Von der Gnaden-Wahl (chap. 3), (which Baader considered the Theosoph's clearest work), and of course throughout. We give here only an abstract of Baader's voluminous commentary. This does not necessarily mean a third-hand treatment, for Baader is generally recognized, for example, by Martensen and Koyré, as invaluable for the study of Boehme, and particularly because of his emphasis on Boehme's 'personalism' or 'theism'.

3. VIII, 334 f.

4. VII, 36 n.; VIII, 51, 300.

of theosophical understanding. There the Naturgestalten have their counterparts in the Sephiroth, the equivocal divine numbers and letters that give God both his spoken form and his power of speech in creation, the ten heavenly spheres or regions that constitute God's body and the 'secret workshop' of his creation¹. Somewhat as in Boehme, the Sephiroth may be grouped into three 'immanent' or inactive members, and seven 'emanent' or active. This said, we have another number, ten, to symbolize the perfect God. Further accord is to be found in the arithmosophy of Martinès de Pasqually, supposed Sephardi and the teacher of Saint-Martin. In his Traité de la réintégration, one is the first principle of unity, three the number of earth and man (because they are made of salt, sulfur and mercury), four the famous 'quatriple essence divine'; and ten the final nombre divin². Clearly, the symbol fits the idea, for God must be a unity who expresses Himself through the plentitude of digits in order to realize Himself as a totality, which the founder of Martinism and after him Baader expressed not only as 10 but as ①³. By introducing Pasqually, we do not intend primarily to adduce another literary influence, but rather to remark that Pasqually's doctrine grew out of magical practices whose purpose was like that served by Baader's intellectualizing of mystical experience. Pasqually's Traité is a theurgic manual written in order to formalize and provide the ideological complement to a complex round of ritual acts which were intended to procure communication with beneficent spirits and by their aid effect the reintegration of the soul with God⁴. While Saint-Martin left the theurgic lodges in order to pursue the inner way, and while Baader concentrated on the exploration of animal magnetism and the magical interpretation of the sacraments, the theosophy of both appears motivated by a somewhat theurgic desire to gain access to and a species of dominion over the spiritual world, not so much through symbolic acts as through symbolic knowledge. When Baader in one breath cites Pasqually, Saint-Martin, Boehme and the Cabbala, his intent is to indicate the universality of

1. VII, 190-2; IX, 239 n.; Sholem, G., 206. G. Sholem writes that, during the nineteenth century, interest in Cabbalism, which had been discouraged by Orthodox scholars since the Enlightenment, was kept alive by Christian religious scholars, among whom he singles out Baader's friend F.J. Molitor. Jewish Mysticism, 414 n.

2. Pasqually, M., 79 f., 120-6, 323-6 et passim.

3. Ibid., 122; II, 350; cf. IV, 83, cf. 115-32.

4. Le Forestier, R., 72-154; Viatre, A., 45-54.

that knowledge. The cross-reference of religious symbols in this case is not meant to show that Pasqually learned the virtue of the number ten from Boehme, nor (as Baader doubted), that Boehme's literary source was the Cabbala. Rather, it establishes a theosophical archetype, a 'ten-fold a priori'¹. If, in this way, the inclusion of the digits seven and ten in the mystic reckoning-system is useful, it can also prove embarrassing. Does the Trinity actually have seven numbers made up, let us say, of an 'active ternary' and a 'resting four'². Or do the seven 'serve the three', leaving us with a heaven numbering ten³? As he attempts to correlate his own calculations and systematize the science of transcendence, Baader is led to exalt still further numbers, from sixteen to forty-nine⁴, and involves himself in ^{an} inextricable confusion. In the end, the numbers seven and ten remain secondary symbols, dominated by the primary doctrine of trinitarian form which underlies the essay Ueber den Blitz and is either assumed or reiterated with variations in every one of Baader's works.

The seven Naturgestalten enclose a 'double-ternary' and a middle number of transmutation⁵, so that there are still three terms: a principle of darkness, a principle of light, and a third as the locus of transition from the former to the latter. While it may be precarious to assert, as Baader does, that Boehme's doctrine of the three principles of the divine nature is patterned on the Trinity⁶, this nonetheless holds for Baader's own doctrine. In the way that God creates His inner self, by the production of a contrary which He makes the vehicle of His will, so does He create all other things. As the symbolical God progresses from hiddenness to total manifestation, darkness poses ever more outwardly a contrary which the light continually masters and makes it Grund. Rather than by a vertical descent of qualities from greater to lesser perfection, creation takes place through the dialectical evolution of darkness, light,

1. XIII, 158.

2. I, 224 f.; X, 13 n.

3. II, 32; III, 421; XIII, 119, 124.

4. VII, 187 f., 320 f.

5. XIII, 84.

6. Koyré, A., 410 and n.

and fire, and these same three principles structure and interjoin God's spirit, His eternal nature, and finally the ideal and soul of 'this' world.

Abandoning quiescence, God first awakens to eternal life in a contraction, that gives rise to an expansion, and results in the rotation of the two forces. These three Naturgestalten make up the 'negative ternary' and are cold, bitter, and sharp¹. Forming the basis of the eternal nature, this collective principle of negativity and obscurity is the Centrum Naturae. Just as God's eternal nature is His Centrum, within that nature there is ^{thus} another Centrum. It is a principle of absolute differentiation through which the spirit passes in order to articulate itself (gliedern), and which it dominates as a unity. It is a darkness which God wills to overcome as light, as the complete trinitarian symbolic pattern is repeated within the eternal nature itself. Considered abstractly and apart, the Centrum Naturae is the opposite of light, will, and spirit. Whereas the Trinity was absolute unity (Dreieins), the negative ternary is absolute disunity (Dreiuneins)². Evolved from within God by His own dark basis of desire, the Centrum Naturae is a symbol of perpetual inachievement. Desire, lacking will, can desire only itself. Yet it is itself entirely nothing. As it seeks itself, its incapacity to achieve its own existence makes it a dread and agony (Angst, Qual, Angstqual). Hungering for itself, it is only tantalized (Tantalusqual). In its movement for what it cannot have, it revolves upon itself, going nowhere, like a wheel of dread (Angstrad). As the wheel turns, it burns like the fiery wheel of Ixion (Ixionsrad) upon which the adulterer was timelessly punished by Jove. At the basis of the eternal nature, there is a fire-dread-wheel (Feuerangstrad)³. In his descriptions of the Centrum Naturae and its negativity, Baader develops his most complex imagery. It is as though, like Milton's Lucifer, the dark principle had more character.

1. XIII, 89, 205; Boehme, J., Mysterium Magnum, vii.

2. VII, 80; IX, 345 n.1; XIII, 339.

3. II, 33, 99-102, 300-2; III, 326-30; IV, 311; X, 194; XIII, 173 f.

In the final three Naturgestalten, which form the 'positive ternary', the qualities of the first ternary are made mild or bright and its movements, as it were, reverse their directions. Only the seventh is ^{almost} ~~rather~~ "unique". It signifies completion of the divine substance¹, and with that signification symptomatic difficulties arise. Since the instantaneous transition from darkness to light takes place in the fourth quality, the numbers seven and four are inevitably confounded as symbols of achievement, although the difficulty is again of secondary importance in the symbolic system dealing basically with three principles. In the accomplished eternal nature, the ternary of light dominates the Centrum Naturae, and, having gained substance and definition by the subordination of its contrary, it experiences the joy of fulfilment that comes with self expression: "In der Ueberwindung ist Freude"². Like the Son in the Trinity, the light is that which is totally expressed in the eternal nature, the 'life' of the eternal life³.

In Boehme's Aurora, the fourth principle and the central one of the seven is named Hitze or Blitz⁴. As Baader's title says, lightning is the Father of light. The sudden illumination that transfigures the Centrum Naturae comes from the Ungrund, out of Whom the darkness first arose. But if its power is that of the Father, the eternal nature is nonetheless distinct from the interior Trinity of darkness, fire, and light. It forms instead a 'secondary Trinity', a second abode of spirit, and God's tool for creating 'this' world⁵. It is, in other words, a middle term between God and the creation. Because it is a power, the Boehmian eternal nature has been called a 'spirituous potency'⁶. Because it is the immaterial element of the physical universe, it has been likened to aether⁷. ^{And} As a kind of demiurgic Elohim, its use in Baader was criticized by Hegel as an interpolation that explained nothing⁸. While it is doubtless all of

1. II, 40 (39 n.3); IX, 234 f.; XIII, 108.

2. II, 101; VIII, 36n.2

3. I, 188; II, 403, 43, 46 n.

4. Boehme, J., Aurora, viii, esp. 79-84.

5. II, 247.

6. Martensen, H., 63; cf. IV, 281.

7. Koyré, A., 320.

8. Hegel, G., Enzyklopädie, xvii n.

these, the symbol functions primarily as the ideal of nature¹, and throughout Baader the ideal of nature is life. The eternal nature is thus a theosophical construction of life itself, as the only possible intermediary between spirit and nature, or between God and the creation. God is life, as Baader writes, and what is life but fire²? At the basis of every fire there is a darkness which it must overcome. Yet without that darkness, by which we are also to imagine the material that it burns³, the fire would die. Life too can only be conceived as a movement between contraries and their mediation. At the basis of the vital flame there is an inorganic substratum⁴, the fuel which the organism consumes and without which it would perish from inanition. Life, the fire in which all begins and all ends⁵, is a constant overcoming of its opposite and an instantaneous transformation of nature into spirit and of darkness into light.

1. VIII, 172.

2. I, 60; XIII, 181; the symbol, as Karl Joel wrote, was pervasive in Romantic poetry.

3. V, 39; IX, 249 f.

4. X, 206 n.2.

5. XII, 192.

iii. Nature

Baader's Ueber Sinn und Zweck der Verkörperung, Leib- oder Fleischwerdens des Lebens is headed with the 'Hermetic' rubric: "vis ejus integra si conversus fuerit in terram"¹. The formula, which recurs in various wordings and with various attributions throughout Baader, epitomizes the evaluation of creation in a system where nothing is random and nothing without its 'moving cause and purpose'². As the theosopher conceives it, spirit as such is endowed with an instinct to take root (Wurzeltrieb), a desire for flesh (Sucht nach Fleisch), a longing for completion through its own embodiment: "denn Leib gibt Kraft"³. Only in corporalization is the positive force fully achieved: "vis ejus integra si conversus in corpus"⁴. If the expression is recondite, the idea is not. God is originally a perfect freedom identified with the good. But freedom is perfect only when it is exercised, and virtue realized only in an act; therefore, God's genitus is his goodness. It is the same with consciousness, that knows itself only when it finds itself reflected in an object. God knows Himself by creating, and, like the artist, creates in order that He may rest in reflection on His own idea actualized in His work⁵. In the same way that we grasp more profoundly our own meaning when we speak, God understands Himself in creating, and the more complete His creation, the more complete His self-comprehension⁶. In the creation by division that Baader imagines, there is spagyrio both inside and outside of God, an interior as well as an exterior evolution⁷. Interiorization advances at an equal rate with exteriorization, and the self-awareness of the Creator conforms in its degree with His outward 'grounding' or manifestation.

In Baader's version of the Neoplatonic Circuit of the All, every

1. II, 3; cf. i, 348.

2. XII, 133.

3. I, 44-6, 60 and n.; V, 26 n.2.

4. IX, 427.

5. VIII, 93; IX, 235 n.3.

6. VIII, 76-8, 102, 170, 320.

7. XIII, 179, 196; I, 224-7; XIV, 118.

outwardly-directed act is completed by an opposite return movement that corresponds to the moment of self-realization. The outward phase is an 'occultation' and the inward phase a 'clarification'. Creation begins with a descent, to whose depth there corresponds the height of the ascent¹. When He creates, God relinquishes some perfection or power, intending that the creature 'raise itself to power'. With these and other such formulae, there is expressed a kind of reciprocity. By creating, the Father seeks the birth of His own image in His son, and for their part, all of the creatures strive to give birth, and want to be like the Father². In every case, alienation is for the sake of the return: "Der Ausgang bedingt den Eingang"³. Creation begins in a form of kenosis, and ends in a form of assumption. Its meaning and purpose lies in the basic Christian doctrine of verbum caro factum, without which the entirety of 'physics' as well as 'ethics' will remain, to put it somewhat rustically, stumm und dumm⁴. In short, Baader's cosmology is Christology in its most abstract form, according to which every created thing undergoes incarnation, passion, and resurrection.

When we begin, as we do here, with the idea that God is the unique authentic being, all particulars in which the creation consists must be 'negations'. In order that there may be a world of particulars, God divorces Himself from His self-contained oneness and reenacts outwardly the gesture of self-denial whereby He first posed an inner negation which He mastered and made His Grund. By being other than God, the particulars must therefore be, in themselves, 'nothing'⁵. In the return movement of 'grounding', however, that particularity which isolates the creatures from God is itself negated, and they become for the first time, 'something'. They become determinations of God's authentic being. God alienates Himself from

1. "... jeder Ausgang (Descensus) bedingt einen Wiedereingang (Ascensus), dessen Höhe (Innerlichkeit, Intensität) jener Tiefe (Äusserlichkeit, Extensität) entspricht. Die höchste Glorie (Majestät) Gottes vermag nur durch die äusserste Schöpfung zu Stande kommen, das klareste Licht nur durch die tiefste Finsternis ...", XV, 350. Cf. III, 391 n. (Einhüllung/Enthüllung); VIII, 225 n. (Disintegration/Reintegration); IX, 412 (Progress/Regress).

2. VIII, 255 f. (n.); IX, 167; II, 410.

3. VII, 95; XIII, 122.

4. XV, 309.

5. VII, 89.

Himself, and by 'the negation of a negation'¹ the purpose of the grounding of life is effected as He returns to Himself in the form of His own likeness. If this is so, it only follows that the creatures or the particulars are not negated entirely in the reflex movement, but retain something of their uniqueness in order to increase the self-expression, power, knowledge and virtue of God. There must remain in God, as it were, a memory of self-alienation that deepens and enriches the awareness of His own being.

With this scheme of creation that he proposes, Baader is able to controvert the principle of Spinoza that all particularity or finitude, insofar as it limits God's oneness, is an imperfection: "omnis determinatio est negatio". Whether we are speaking of arithmetic or grammar, two negatives always make a positive. When the complete process of creation is taken into account, both the Ausgang and the Eingang, the converse of Spinoza's statement is therefore true: "omnis determinatio est positio", or, "omnis determinatio est negatio negationis"². The real principle of identity, as Baader explains, is not $A = A$, but rather $A = -(-A)$ ³. The creation is not, as Hegel would have us believe, a disintegration of the Idea ('ein Abfall aus der Idee')⁴. It is a more profound realization of the Idea, as God poses a contrary by which, nonetheless, He expresses Himself. Only in this way is it possible to reconcile the idea of an absolutely perfect God with the idea of a purposeful creation. In a process that is prejudged, and where nothing happens in vain, all particulars shed the imperfections that alienate them from God, become 'reintegrated' with the Absolute, and by virtue of that relation first achieve their own authenticity. Although God is still the unique authentic being, He can extend a relative authenticity to the creatures, each of which is able to act the Grund that serves God's auto-realization. With this dialectical scheme, one does not have to decide between a God that is self-sufficient and a God that needs creation, any more than one has to decide between God and the world of particulars as his negations. One needs only to accept that there are degrees of absolute perfection. The immanifest Ungrund

1. II, 102, 241 ; "Dieses Ja und Nein bedingt das Aus und Ein", III, 422.

2. VIII, 171; II, 520 n.; cf. VIII, 42.

3. IX, 235.

4. XIV, 170; cf. VII, 266 ('ein Abfall aus Gott'); Hegel, G., Enzyklo-
~~pedie~~, sec. 68 ('ein Zerfallen des ewigen Geistes').

that remains anterior in the sense that it is the limit to our thoughts, is nevertheless not superior. Nor, it seems, is the self-completed God of the eternal nature. On the principle that the greater differentiation preconditions the greater unity, the highest God is the God that is fully expressed in creation. As unity rounds through division to reunion, and the deepest darkness is rendered into clearest light, the theosophical God moves from absolute perfection to more absolute perfection, and becomes by virtue of His creation a kind of super-Deity¹.

To describe the reunitive movement of return, Baader's most versatile, if not most original word-symbol is that of 'centering'. It seems to develop from the idea, found already in Plato's Timaeus, that the sphere is the most perfect and uniform figure, since all points of its surface are equidistant from its centre². God is spherical because that form is best, or least inadequate, to represent the Divinity. According to the classical theological analogy, which Baader (with Herder and Schelling) repeats, God is an intelligible sphere whose centre is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere³. In Boehme (although perhaps more frequently in Weigel), God is Zentro, while for Baader God is Centrum or Mitte and nature his 'periphery'. God is the only center, meaning that God alone has self-sufficient being. Particulars have no centers of their own, but first become centered in their reintegrative relation with the Absolute. More exactly, Baader distinguishes two centres. The first, symbolized by the obscure Centrum Naturae, means dualism, division, and particularity as such, all of which amount in fact to the lack of being centered. The second and true centre is represented as light, and signifies the transcendence of dualism and particularity in being centered around the Absolute. As Baader imagines it, 'every created revelation has at its basis a dualism which needs perfecting by a relation to the centre'⁴. Every created thing is born in the first center, and if it is to fulfil its allotted destiny, it must be

1. The expression is that of Kolakowski, L., 595.

2. Plato, 44 f.

3. VIII, 283 and ff., cf. 65 ff.

4. VII, 78 f., 95-9; II, 36 f.; X, 61.

reborn in the second. As the term 'centering' implies, the rebirth of the creature does not mean its total assimilation into the God-head. Things are not, as Baader took Hegel to mean, 'annihilated' (aufgehoben). Rather, they are 'elevated' (erhoben, emporgehoben)¹ to a state of perfection by taking their positions in an order willed by God. In 'centering' or 'reintegration', which are different words for the 'second' phase of the 'double negation', particularity is not totally denied, but rather subordinated to the purposes of the whole. By the same act, particulars achieve a higher level of being -- they achieve 'individuality' -- in the way that mere parts become Glieder in the organism. Each thing is capable of perfection when it conforms to its own ideal, and that ideal consists in its orientation within a system². The ideals of things are unique, and Baader preserves, even glorifies individuality by defining the creation on the model of the godly organism in which differentiation and the independence (vita propria) of the organs keeps pace with the unity of the whole³. The purpose of creation is accomplished not by the monotonous repetition of a single note (Unisono), but by the concordant expression of many (Accord)⁴, when God (or the center) finds in nature (or the periphery) the augmentation of His own perfect harmony. Like that of Boehme, Baader's God is not a God of sameness but of order. He creates particulars so that each may express Him in a unique way and contribute to 'the heavenly music when each one sings according to its quality'⁵, and this is obviously not possible if each reintegrated and centered thing relinquishes the quality that makes it different. In the centered cosmos, the plentitude of natural things is the prism which refracts the colours hidden in clear light, and each thing is an instrument which the wind produces in order to provide its latent tones with voices⁶.

If we wish a symbol of centering or reintegration, we need only observe the solar system through mystical eyes. First we must sus-

1. IV, 387; VI, 80 f.; IX, 299, 327.

2. VIII, 190, 280.

3. VIII, 73 f., 114, 159, 162, 185; XIV,

4. I, 270.

5. Boehme, J., Aurora, xii, 23.

6. VIII, 82, 215, 358; XIII, 233-5.

pend our Newtonian prejudices and recognize like the ancients a celestial physics that differs from the terrestrial. The gravity of the heavens, which is better called 'attraction' or 'centrality', is not a relation of constraint, but one of freedom. Like all real freedom, it is not boundless but measured, being the synthetic union of centrifugal and centripetal forces¹. To perpetuate a venerable theosophical untruth, we might add that Newton (who in fact read Boehme) based his theory of central forces on the Görlitz cobbler's visions of the Centrum Naturae.² Worse than that, Newton miscopied the idea 'dualistically', as if there were only universal gravitation, and as if God had given a mechanical shove to the planets, that want to flee the sun that tries to swallow them. Relying upon true knowledge of Boehme, we may continue by saying that the centrality of the solar system is the reconciliation of two contrasting impulses, either of which if left to itself would only destroy.

Were the planets ruled only by the centripetal force of abnegation, if they renounced their individuality and approached too near the axis, they would be consumed by the superior gravitational force of the sun. If, however, the planets were infected by a centrifugal pride, and declared themselves particular centres, they would be hurtled into the void. Realizing that they owed their integrity to the sun, they would experience horrors of deprivation in their distance from the only source of attraction and light. But the planets elect to remain in their orbits, not indeed in the indifferent manner in which a stone falls to the ground, but owing to their good sense³. They observe the mean between self-annihilation and autonomy, and are not servile but humble, not proud but noble. When the opposite forces thus complement each other, the inward pull of the system performs the unitive organic function of Intussusception (Gliederung), while the outward drive accomplishes the equally necessary function of organic differentiation (Ausscheidung). To complete our description in these familiar terms, we may call the

1. III, 319-21, 336 f.; cf. II, 61 n.2, 108, 312. For the same idea applied to Kant's 'central forces', see VII, 352.

2. The myth originates with Law, and is succinctly related by Jammer, M., 129 ff.

3. III, 291-3; IX, 41 f.

plantes the organs, and the sun their vital principle¹. Gravity is itself a super-temporal and super-spatial organizing principle, whose law instructs us regarding the harmonious organic relation of particulars to the Absolute, and shows us that freedom is not rectilinear but circular². Still, the planetary system that we contemplate is, like all natural referents, an abstract and imperfect figure. Whereas the planets are now in elliptical orbits, their destiny, according to a theory attributed to Kepler, will be fulfilled only when the ellipse is resolved into an actual circle³.

The dialectical evolution of the three principles that gives birth to the divine nature gives birth again to 'this' nature as its copy⁴. 'This' nature expresses light, darkness, fire, and all of the variations among them, and every natural thing may be read as the sensible representation of the eternal and more spiritual nature that is its formal and its final cause.

Und ist kein Ding in der Natur, das geschaffen oder geboren ist, es offenbart seine innerliche Gestalt auch äusserlich ... das Äussere ist seine Signatur.⁵

According to the Paracelsian doctrine of signatures, the inner virtue of things, in particular the medicinal properties of plants, were recognizable by their outer appearances⁶. In the theosophical extension of this principle, everything in the visible world is said to bear the mark of the invisible world that created it and lies latent within. This kind of sacramentalism differs somewhat from that in which naturalistic symbols are totally generalized, as for example in the Eckartian symbol of the rose that wilts even as it begins to bloom. There the symbol is thoroughly subordinated to the idea, and symbolical only with reference to a single property. Any other flower or any other perishable thing, regardless of its particular form, would equally well express the transience of this existence. With the Baaderian and properly theosophical vision, by contrast, more complex and formalistic images appear. Nature becomes a

1. Cf. II, 396; IV, 70.

2. II, 340; IX, 230-2.

3. II, 300; III, 317.

4. VIII, 100; XIII, 91.

5. Boehme, J., De Signatura Rerum, i, 15; ix, 3; cf. II, 130 ff., 338.

6. Ibid. viii, 40. Pagel, W., 148 f.

system of signatures and runes that in its entirety and in each of its parts mimics the specific form of the Divinity. It is not as Haller wrote:

Ins Innre der Natur dringt kein erschaffener Geist:
Glücklich! wem sie nur die äussere Schale weist.

That view, to which Kant's may be joined, is 'the shallowest'. The appearances or superficialities of things are there for their removal and the revelation of the hidden Ding an sich, the godly form. The inner essence is no inaccessible, bodiless spectre, but the image of the eternal life, and the mage conversant with Hermetic science can recognize that divine structure in the organic nature that he knows as an epiphany. Giving his own meaning to Jacobi's maxim that the function of philosophy is 'to disclose and reveal existence',² the theosopher completes the process of creation when he 'penetrates' the properly-named apparitio³ and in his speculation returns to God His own self-image.

In tritirinate crystallization, in the trifurcation of branches and blood vessels, and in three-pronged lightning, Baader discerned the presence of the triform God. The composition of magnetism and electricity revealed a formal 'trialism' constituted by the negative and positive poles with the energetic phenomenon as the synthetic third. Throughout several versions of one Romantic orthodoxy, the doctrinal constant was that animal like human psychology should be divided into three faculties. Even disease had a threefold structure that, in the magical medicine learned from Dr. Malfatti, required 'a trinitarian cure'.⁴ But these were relatively static images, and it was more in its dynamic organization of the whole of nature that the conceptual apparatus of Naturphilosophie seemed prepared to confirm that the principles of darkness, fire, and light are the permanent governing components of the world, and that 'this' nature holds in Figur the eternal nature from which

1. I, 287 f.; IV, 385; VIII, 182.

2. IX, 164; Jacobi, F., Hauptschriften, 190.

3. I, 105-9. Always desiring^{ous} of countering Kant, Baader writes that the symbol functions for reason 'like schemata for the understanding'; that is, by providing a form through which reason may realize knowledge of the thing-in-itself, Beiträge, 36 n. (II, 220, n2)

4. II, 31; VII, 160; III, 339 n. cf. VIII, 241 ff.; IX, 117 f.

it issued and to which it will return¹, As he submitted contemporary teleological systems to the standard of Boehme, showing that their polar terms and their formulae for process were only offspring of the Theosoph's dialectic of the divine, Baader's own doctrine took on the appearance of the Christian evolutionism of a Teilhard de Chardin. But, quite apart from the prescientific assumption of natural types, this appearance remains largely deceptive. For if 'this' nature reveals the divine life 'in its becoming', the completion of the process of creation can still take place only in that eternity against which the realized temporal order represents not so much the antithesis as an illusion -- and an illusion which, like 'materiality', is finally explicable only as a product of the fall. When the theosopher finds the divine form in the whole of nature made symbolically alive, it is therefore always with the qualification that the future which nature contains in germ can never be achieved in time. Baader's evolutionism is in other words the atemporal circuit of the Neoplatonists or Boehme, and his comparison with the Hegelian or other modern systems grounded in notions of temporal process is largely for the sake of their criticism by contrast with the timeless mystic schemes. Because what is natural can correspond to its ideal only when eternalized and transformed, the theosophical signification becomes necessarily equivocal: something is defined through an archetype to which it is not only inadequate but with which it as 'corruptible' is irreconcilable. The equivocality, moreover, is entirely symptomatic, and is met again in Baader's definition of the particular will which, once it becomes self-will, no longer represents the required 'negation' or outward movement of creation but rather the illusory anti-divine which has no place at all in the auto-revelatory process of God. Yet in the mystic self, however fallen, the conditions for deification persist. So also in nature, however 'disorganized', the theosopher finds the semblance of the divine structure that constitutes the basis for regeneration. As Baader's metaphysics becomes thoroughly Boehmian, and the 'dynamic' perspectives of his early Naturphilosophie are retained but

1. I, 162; II, 114; V, 37; VII, 84 f.

hardly broadened, the divine form of the whole of nature is represented primarily by the Cabbalistic symbol¹ of the tree or plant, whose root, stem, and crown are the counterparts of darkness, fire, and light. For the plant, the first thing is the death of the seed in the ground, and for the temporal order, once there is such an order, Baader's theosophy requires that the darkness precede the light. Like the plant, the whole of nature is rooted in the inorganic, which is synonymous with death, and which provides the objective correlative of the psychological death of dread. As Baader states in Ueber den Urternar, consciousness or spirit is the crown, but it is not the deepest thing in creation². The most profound is in the human sphere anxiety, in the physical world inorganicity or 'objective dread', and in both the potential for self-extinction: "Angst ist das Radical des Lebens"³. In Baader's exoteric psychology, where psychic and physical processes mirror one another, life emerges from death, consciousness arises from the unconscious, and as Erasmus Darwin said, sensibility develops from pain⁴. Nature engenders grace, the mother or earth gives birth to the son or life who is 'nobler than she', virtue rises out of sin, the plant grows up from its root, and every single thing continues to bear death in its innermost being⁵. Dread or inorganicity threatens incessantly to assert itself, and is so intimately joined with life that the latter can be defined only as its own 'stopped disappearance'⁶. Life is a constant confrontation with its opposite, a dialectical encounter with death. Yet in this periculum vitae the theosopher finds life's condition. If the seed does not fall into the ground, if minerals do not nourish the plant, if death does not give up its body, nothing will live⁷. The dread that for the eternal life is only potential first becomes actual in 'this' life, where it again serves the function of the contrary in whose vanquishment death is transfigured into life and melancholic dread into joy.

1. II, 105; IX, 305 n.

2. VII, 31-4 and nn.; cf. XV, 349 f.

3. II, 300-2; XIII, 38, 102.

4. II, 302; VIII, 264.

5. II, 101, 254; XIV, 51.

6. II, 100.

7. II, 74 f., 210; III, 297; V, 111; VIII, 121 n.; XV, 657.

On the model of the cosmic organism, which was incorporated as though effortlessly with the symbolic metaphysics of Boehme, there were not different forces in nature, but different manifestations of one force. Natural phenomena, like organs, had no energy of their own but only insofar as they partook of the generalized and objectified vital force, and in the symbolic line that we are now following that force is identified with the sun. In every plant, it is the sun that makes it grow. The plant has already 'something sunlike' in it, 'a seed of the sun', and in the process of growth it is the sun that 'becomes'¹. As the sun distributes life among the creatures, it does not diminish its own energy, but only increases the abundance of its products. As it descends and particularizes itself, it endows itself with definition and substance, in much the same way that the flame, which is but a solar process in miniature², creates light by overcoming darkness.

For the theosopher, the splendour of the physical sky is only the visible representative of the splendour of the spiritual sky. Favoured by the resemblance of the words sun and Son³, Baader orders the vital principle of the universe under its original in the light generated eternally in God. Life, which earlier had its analogue in human freedom and in the striving for immortality, is now presented as a subordinate form of 'life' in the Christian sense. Christ is the sun and the principle of organic construction (Ge-staltungs-oder Bildungstrieb), Christ the informing spirit of creation (nisus formativus), Christ the World-Soul⁴. Life, which has in itself a hyper-physical character⁵, is not created by particular creatures but by the power of Christ as the Mediator not only between God and the individual soul but between physical life and death as well. Christ, Who in history subjected Himself willingly to death and conquered it, raises nature from the inorganic to life, which in Romantic theory also represents a triumph over the

1. II, 38 n., 108; VIII, 134 f., 174, 284; XIII, 186.

2. II, 231.

3. II, 13, 311; X, 5 n.2.

4. II, 99, 114, 117.

5. II, 97; cf. IX, 343.

death of 'mechanistic' natural law. Rather than in deviation from nature, the presence of the Divinity is recognized in the phenomenon of life as the subordination of an inorganic Grund and the 'miracle of constant overcoming'¹. Creation is not a clockwork which God makes and, exhausted, He abandons. It is unremitting process, as under the form of the vitalistic Christ the Creator acts in His creation as its formative genius and principle of evolution. The language of Naturphilosophie is the language of Christianity, and life is a continuous eucharist². In a repetition of the subjugation of the Centrum Naturae, life is accomplished in the 'fourth' moment of the instantaneous Blitz. Here, 'as in every region of nature', life is the act of the Ungrund³, and the moment of 'triumph over the flesh' is accompanied by the Boehmian word Schrack that announces 'the joy of growth in the universe'⁴. To venerate life, then, is not, as Jacobi would have it, a form of idolatry. It is Christolatry⁵, and in this worship all life-functions are sanctified, including nourishment, growth, and above all procreation⁶. The Second Person is the principle not only of life but of love, and as the organic symbolism shades imperceptibly into that of the erotic, the ontological Christ nearly merges with the superpersonal Platonic figure of Eros. Love is the organizing principle of the cosmos, and the energy that binds is erotic⁷. Life is a marriage of opposites, of male and female, father and mother, spirit and nature. Even in the prelife phenomena of 'half-forces', magnetism and electricity, their energy is their union, their child, their androgyne. Life is a copulation of contraries, Christ is the 'copula' between God and creation, and His act of life is an act of love. In the conjugal embrace of spirit and nature, the reproductive 'fourth' moment and the exaltation to a higher state of being is experienced as 'excitation' and 'ecstasy', as the underlying strife is neutralized through 'the orgasm of creation'⁸.

1. I, 113; IX, 343.

2. II, 299; III, 293; IV, 404; V, 39; XIV, 111; XV, 309.

3. II, 240, 256, 423; IV, 404.

4. I, 122 f.; V, 17; VII, 33 n.2; Boehme, J., Von der Gnaden-Wahl, iii, 15-6.

5. II, 24 f., cf. XV, 206 (Ritter-to Baader): 'every process goes the way of the flesh'.

6. II, 101; XV, 635.

7. I, 59 f.; XV, 270.

8. I, 64; II, 102; III, 300 n.; IX, 47 n., 312.

iv. The Paradox of Pantheism

From the moment that Baader's Boehmian doctrine attempts to bring the ideas of God and the universe into intimate and non-antithetical relation, and does not, like Jacobi, renounce the speculative venture, that doctrine courts an unenviable fate. It may suffer the accusation of 'pantheism' and be surely discredited in the eyes of German religious contemporaries known for their obsession with that nebulous term. As Baader anticipates and contradicts the charge -- theosophy is theism -- he must show that the problems pointed out by Jacobi as inherent in the conceptual approach to religion are not insuperable. In his refutation, during the course of which he liberally applies the epithet 'pantheism' to distinguish and impugn other doctrines, Baader is obliged to clarify, to an extent, the fundamentals of his own thought.

Pantheism is normally defined as the doctrine that identifies God with the universe, or spirit with nature, thereby denying God's personality and transcendence. But a preferable statement of the doctrine joins this thesis with its antithesis; namely, that God is not identical with the universe¹. This much should be obvious for the reason that, in any religious context, the meaning and the emotional force of the identification of God with the universe stems from the acknowledgement that the two cannot be the same. Otherwise, the identification would simply amount to naturalism or materialism². Yet this still leaves us with an inadequate definition, for Baader too finds identity between God and the universe ($A = -(-A)$), yet he is a theist. God and nature, center and periphery are identifiable because the theosophical ordering-process never identifies without placing in a hierarchy of values, never confuses but always distinguishes what it unites, and does not use the term 'identity' logically but rather to indicate a relation of identity-in-difference. When this use of language is accepted, it

1. Cf. Stace, W., 212, 242.

2. Cf. Kolakowski, L., 624 f.

may be said that the error of pantheism lies in its failure to properly limit the identity, while Baader's theism is demonstrated when he defines identity in such a way that he preserves the transcendence of spirit and does not, in elevating nature, degrade the Divinity.

To begin with, Baader's approach to his task is not by way of the spatial trope, as if it were pantheistic to write that God is 'in' the creation, but theistic to write that He is 'above' or 'outside' it, or that it is 'in' Him. If we rely on that tropological definition, Baader quickly reduces us to perplexity. In a single sentence of his Speculative Dogmatik, he writes of three simultaneous relations of God to the universe: All-in-One, One-in-All, and One-with-All¹. With perfect adherence to the theosopher's terminology, it might have been said in the foregoing section that God is 'outside' the world as its primal cause and 'inside' as the World-Soul. God, we may also read, is 'in' man, yet we all live, as Saint-Martin says, 'in God as our element'². If the God of pantheism is intramundane and the God of theism extramundane, we do not know what to think, all the more so because we cannot imagine God 'in' the world or vice versa except 'mechanistically', in the way that a liquid, for example, is 'in' a vessel³.

Baader's effective definition of pantheism is independent of the spatial or any other particular metaphor, and is at once more comprehensive and functional. It is that pantheism allows the dependence of God on His creation⁴, or, in the fuller antinominal form, a relation of mutual dependence between God and creation. If it is inferrable that God stands in any relation of need, there is denied the absolute autonomy from which all other perfections follow, and God is reduced to the ontological status of His creation, which proves to be the real error of pantheism. Under this definition, there is nothing pantheistic about the declaration that God

1. IX, 22.

2. I, 58.

3. Cf. I, 118.

4. Cf. VIII, 187; IX, 298-336, 309, 311, 334; XIII, 169.

is 'in' nature, as long as it is qualified by the statement that it is not out of need. In Baader's diction, to be 'in' nature is in fact to be 'above' it, that is, have power over it. The pantheistic character of the metaphor vanishes, and it may now be used to express the equally necessary idea that dependence flows in the opposite direction. The theosophical God of absolute power is needed 'in' nature to organize, sustain, and evolve the creation that depends upon Him for its life in the way that the sun depends upon no other life but all life depends upon the sun.

Within the main symbolic system, pantheism is obviated by showing that God does not depend for His reality upon the creation of 'this' finite nature. Undeniably, spirit requires nature in order to be real: the light needs darkness, the organism needs its Glieder, consciousness needs an object, ideal and real stand in need of one another. But Baader recognizes a God both ideal and real, both absolute spirit and absolute nature, by way of their irrational closure or 'marriage' in the symbol of the divine life, the Centrum which God as spirit overcomes. God is 'free' of nature (naturfrei), but He is not for that 'without' it (naturlos)¹. He is free of nature in the sense in which only the possession liberates. The pantheists, however, do not know of the divine nature as Boehme intended it. They confuse it with materiality and finitude, and consequently speak as though God and nature were reciprocally dependent. Hegel, for example, is a pantheist because he knows of no way in which the Idea could become concrete other than historically². Schelling is another pantheist who confuses God and creation because he has no higher concept of nature than that of 'this' temporal and material order³. Even in the revered German Theology, Baader discovers the same pantheistic fallacy. The tenet "deus est in se et fit in creaturis"⁴, which he cites as authority in 1822, is assigned as error some years later when the Boehmian divine life has become immutable if not pellucid doctrine. For it suggests

1. II, 15 n.2; III, 323, 390; IV, 301.

2. I, 393; VIII, 189; XIII, 193 f.

3. I, 271; XIII, 192; VIII, 246.

4. II, 145 (As noted, there, the source of the statement is Scotus Erigenes).

('like Hegel's doctrine') that the Deity which it distinguishes 'in Himself' has only a potential or magical being, and first acquires complete and actual existence by His expression in the creation¹. Because the theosopher posits a timeless development of the eternal nature, he can say that God does not have to subject Himself to the temporal and spatial limitations of 'this' nature in order to fully evolve, and if He does so it is only out of love. On the same basis -- that they tend to deny dependence -- one may 'understand' a further class of statements by which Baader distinguishes his theosophy from pantheism. The Deity is not principe d'être, but être-principe, and not the principle of nature but the nature-principle². That is, God's being and His nature are complete antecedently to the totality of particulars of which He is the 'quintessence', not the mere collective term³.

The theosophical, non-pantheistic God is independent by being 'total' and in possession of nature or substance. For this reason, it is vital not to mistake God's 'supersubstantiality' (Ueberwesentlichkeit) for a lack of substance (Wesenlosigkeit)⁴. The theological term Wesen, translatable either as 'substance' or as 'essence', is that which is the most fundamental in any being. When the identity of God and the universe is delimited by subtracting those scholastic attributes which they cannot have in common, das Wesen is invariably eliminated from the equation. There is no housousie -- no identity of Wesen -- between God and creation⁵. Even in their return movement of reintegration, particular things do not become cosubstantial (einwesig) with God, but first become in their own right substantial (wesenhaft). They do not become part (teilwerden) but rather take part (teilhaft werden) in the formal perfection of His eternal life⁶. In this context, uniquely, Baader restricts the beloved analogy of the organism, for it is one of the cardinal errors of pantheism to say that the creation constitutes the organs when the organism is God⁷.

1. XV, 447.

2. IV, 322; VII, 268, 279 n.; IX, 334 and n.

3. "Als Inbegriff -- im Unterschiede zum pantheistischen Collectivbegriff -- ist der Allesseiende der über Allem Seiende", IX, 22n.

4. II, 297 ("als Wesen aller Wesen").

5. II, 400; V, 272 n.3; IX, 50.

6. IV, 347 f.; VIII, 124; IX, 45, 412; XIII, 173; XIV, 70.

~~7. VIII, 264~~ XIII, 163; XIV, 85, 118.

If, like Spinoza, one should admit only a single substance and call it God, the result would be pantheism as Baader defines it. Or, in an argument taken from Hegel, and which turns the usual religious complaint upside-down, it would be acosmism, since only God would really exist¹. In either case, one would be left with Spinoza's misconception of the Absolute as a 'centaur', half infinite and half finite, half God and half non-God, and always in need of the creation for the completion of His being². On the grounds that they assume a continuity of substance, Baader rejects as pantheistic all mystic doctrines of emanation. He understands that the doctrine of creation, definitively theistic, presupposes to the contrary a plurality of substances, and the theosopher's conviction even seems to have influenced his view of the Cabbalism that he held in high regard. Like other symbolical texts, the Sohar appears susceptible of opposing interpretations of its doctrinal content. D. Joel read it as a doctrine of creation in which the naming of the Sephiroth was merely an imaginative portrayal of the creative act whose manner could not be understood³. J. Kleuker, the eighteenth-century religious scholar and author of Magikon, saw in the same procession of divine attributes the prototype of all emanationist doctrines⁴. Knowing both general interpretations, Baader was of the opinion that emanationism represented a degenerate form of Jewish mysticism. In fact, he accepted the influential thesis that Spinoza had taken his philosophy of substance from the Cabbala, then modified it by saying that Spinoza's pantheism had developed from the later, corrupt stage, and was itself a 'petrefact' and 'caricature' of the original doctrine⁵. True Cabbalism was theistic⁶, and taught an absolute beginning, not indeed 'from nothing'⁷, but by a God self-endowed with a creative Centrum.

Let us return to our original statement that pantheism and theo-

1. VIII, 227; cf. Hegel, G., Enzyklopädie, sec. 50.

2. IX, 22; XIII, 197 f.

3. Joel, D., 147, 155, 168-74, 193 ff.

4. Kleuker, J., Emanationslehre bei den Kabbalisten, 4 and 78.

5. II, 210, 399-402; III, 383; VIII, 51.

6. According to Professor Isaiah Tishby of Jerusalem, whose work on the Sohar is now being translated into English, Baader (and Joel) had their facts backwards. The 'theistic' tendencies that they discovered were products of the 15-16th century renaissance of Cabbalism and the so-called 'Christian Cabbala' of such as Pico ~~and Reuchlin~~.

sophy both admit an antinomial relation of identity-in-difference between God and the universe. The characteristic distinction turns out to be that in theosophy the identification is not allowed to extend to a shared substance, and while the Creator does not depend upon the creation for His substance, the creatures depend upon Him for theirs. But why do the pantheists make the mistake? Although it is told at length, Baader's reason may in our view be retold in a few words, even without trivializing, because it follows from the law of the generation of contraries and their synthesis that is symbolized in the divine life and repeated throughout his cosmology, and because it seems that in this ~~case~~ to restate an idea in different terms would not bring it nearer intelligibility. The error of the pantheists is that in one way or other they follow Descartes and conceive spirit and nature dualistically¹. If they are 'spiritualists' like Hegel or Swedenborg, they think that spirit has no substance or body². They separate what they should unite, and are forced to say that the creation fills out God's being. If they are 'naturalists' like Schelling or Spinoza, they think correctly that spirit and nature are one, but incorrectly that 'this' is the only nature³. They confuse what they should distinguish, and identify the universe with God. In both cases, the result is the same dualism, for the philosophers cannot think God as spirit and nature at once, not merely as the future term in a notion of temporal process, but as the 'eternal becoming'. They do not understand that in Himself God is both absolute spirit and absolute nature, both 'center' and 'periphery', and not in a way that can be conceived dualistically. He is spirit 'over' a nature, an organic unity that subordinates its Glieder, a light that masters darkness in the synthesis of fire. With some familiarity, we confess that we

7. IV, 366; X, 28 f., 46; XIII, 167, cf. esp. II, 165 f., 310.

1. II, 109 ("Kein Geist ohne Wesen"); III, 357-436, nos. 4, 8, 9, 12; IV, 297, VII, 262; VIII, 190 f.; X, 83; XIV, 38 f.

It was of course this same dualism that led to the false separation of religion and science: X, 96-102; cf. III, 347 and n., 371 n.

2. II, 305 f.; IV, 401 ff.; VII, 88 f., 255 f.; IX, 29 n., 47 n.

3. I, 169, 352 f.; II, 520 n.2, 526-8; III, 295, 344 n.2; IV, 68 n.; VI, 265 ff.; X, 117; cf. I, 388; IV, 301 f., 393.

do not understand it either, except to the extent that we can grasp it through the subtle medium of the symbol. Once the model of the synthesizing spirit is accepted, however, Baader's self-referential system reveals a certain coherence, and is even able to give a fairly comprehensible account of how the whole of creation is dependent upon God for its substance or its being. For what it means in this doctrine to have substance and to be is to be eternally alive, and only God is capable of achieving it independently¹. The creatures begin in particularity: they must, for differentiation is necessary to the organism and to God's revelation². They have no substance and they are 'nothing', for a nature without a spirit or a distinction without a unity is not alive and not real at all. In their instantaneous movement of return, the creatures abandon this character of incompleteness and for the first time gain real being. They do this by taking their designated positions in an organic cosmos, since organs are only alive and only have 'body' by virtue of their relation to the whole. Within the same closed 'organism' set of definitions, Baader can also explain in what way the Word is incarnate in creation: in its organic form or image³. Because organic form is inseparable from vitality, and because the eternal nature is the symbolic source of all physical energy, the theosopher can at the same time give an idea of how God accomplishes this 'immanence of His image' in creation. By the force of the light of His Centrum He confers life upon the dependent substances that He has created. They become copies of His trinitarian structure, share the organic form⁴ that seems even more intimate to God than His substance, and still the individuality of both God and creature is preserved. Form, substance, personality, life, and the representation of the divine are all mutually defining⁵, and are all 'defined' by the unitive symbol of the eternal nature in which Baader thought to have found the basis for a system of perfect circularity.

1. "Gott ist ... die alleinige Substanz (als der allein Selbständige)", II, 210; cf. IV, 241; IX, 23-7, 48 f., 233-6.

2. IX, 315 f.; X, 312 f.; XIII, 19 f.

3. "Was sohin diese Einheit hervorbringt ist nicht sie selbst, sondern nur ihr Bild und Gleichnis", II, 355; cf. VI, 354 f.; VIII, 93 f. (Innewohnung im Bild), 240 f. ("Immanent im Wesen, emanent im Bilde").

4. "Organismus ist Gleichnis und Spiegelung des absoluten Lebens", II, 278 f.; cf. X, 338: "omnis determinatio est organisatio"; X, 312 n.; "omnis determinatio est formatio"; XIII, 170; "so daß alles in und zum Sohne (als organisches System) geschaffen ist", II, 223 241 260; IX, 330 340 n.

3. Fall and Reintegration

i. The Fall

The Fall is taken consciously as the 'fundamental principle'¹ of Baader's religious philosophy. Like the act of creation, it is a fact without an explanation, but one that is explanatory. It explains the reality of evil, and the existence of this material world with its finitude and dualism. It tells us why our cognition is imperfect, so that knowledge of the Divine and the divinely human is only 'figurative' and 'magical', and why, in every other sense, the condition of man is one of inachievement. That is a great deal to ask of one event, it is true. But all that has so far been described as the creation is considered by Baader to be necessary and 'rational', while the fall represents nothing less than irrationality.

The meaning of the fall is embodied in a myth, which for Baader's purposes and ours cannot be de-mythologized too far. That it is a myth, however, does not mean that it is shallow and without philosophical or psychological truth. As Kierkegaard wrote, the fall only represents as outward that which occurred inwardly², and, for the mystic Romantic, poetry and myth alone could convey those deeper insights that were lost to a fallen and divided intelligence. Baader's myth is begun with the biblical account, enlarged upon by traditional mystic interpolations, and completed by the retrovisionary speculation that the theosopher considered a duty with regard to revelation. Within the grand theosophical scheme of creation, the fall represents an irrational interlude. Interrupting the timeless and circular pattern of alienation and return, it begins a finite, linear, and sharply-contoured drama having a beginning, middle, and end: the Christian plot of fall, passion, and apocalypse.

1. VIII, 36 ff., 46.

2. Kierkegaard, S., The Concept of Dread, 42.

To the first question regarding the fall -- how it could occur when all power belongs to God and God wills only good -- Baader has prepared a reply in the general part of his speculation. Creation is the self-delimitation of God with the purpose of His self-relevation. God created freely and wanted to express Himself from the fulness of His being. He did not want slaves but children, free like Him, so He relinquished part of His power willingly. He placed Lucifer at the throne of nature and delegated to him the duty to deny darkness and to complete creation by speaking the name of God. All creation is a naming, and since all creative power belongs to God, all creation is in His name. All creation takes place by fire, and the sin of Lucifer was that he usurped the 'fire-speech' of God, enquired into the manner of creation, and desired to create in his own name¹. This rebellion in the intellectual world upset the harmony of the physical world, as nature materialized in order to halt the boundless spread of evil². By the meaning hidden in words, this part of the story may be retold: arrêter is to stop, and its reverse anagram is terra, which means, like the Hebrew word Arrez, the earth; therefore, the material world was created in order to contain evil³. Despite what Schelling and Hegel think, matter is not primitive and it is not 'nature'⁴. It is not even an educt, but the product of a cosmic chemical dissolution at Lucifer's fall. In opposition to the Gnostics, Baader does not identify matter with evil as the 'furthest' from God in a hierarchy of being. Although it may serve evil, matter also limits evil, in the way that the physical body checks the evil passions in a man. In itself, matter is neither good nor evil, but binds them equally, and it is not perdurable (nor impenetrable), but shares its transient destiny with evil⁵.

1. II, 462; VII, 265 n. 3; IX, 87 f. (n.).

2. IV, 345 f.; VII, 194, 198, 201 f., 204.

3. II, 522 n.2; XIII, 201; cf. VIII, 130.

4. IX, 38-41, 51 f., 148, cf. 411 (Edukt and Produkt); III, 273.

5. Whether 'matter' is defined as extension or mass ('gravity', III, 335 n.2; VII, 203), these are for Baader only 'modes' or illusions underlying which are the permanent 'dynamic forces' and universal (non-gravitational) 'attraction'. His 'speculative physics' is meant to buttress the doctrine here presented as a myth, by proving that there need be no residue when the resurrected body and physical universe rejoin the divine life, or by disproving what he called "die Radical Häresie der Unzerstörbarkeit der Materie", V, 401.

By this stage of the myth, Baader has already corrected the error of the Manichaeans -- "im Anfang war der Teufel" -- while affirming the reality of evil in this world¹. In the beginning, creation was an harmonious organic order of spirit over nature, that needed only to be confirmed by God's representatives in the universal articulation of the 'system' of the divine life. The fall of the angels was accompanied by the fall of the dynamic physical world, and the emergence of the tohu va bohu described in Genesis². At once there appeared, 'bound in matter', the real contrariety of good and evil, a real Angst at the basis of life, and the poison that pervades every existence. ^{ein Gift in allem Leben.} Although evil is not original, but has its history, there does rage in this world the dualistic conflict of darkness and light that the Manichaeans describe³.

1. IX, 271 n.2; XIII, 175-7.

2. II, 119; IX, 24, 83 and n.

3. IV, 418; to 'this' world, then, the Boehmian motto applies: "In Ja und Nein bestehen alle Dinge"; IX, 189, 275.

Whereas life is Natur, evil is Unnatur¹, a kind of anti-organism. It is the egocentricity of a particular that attempts to maintain its false centrality against the will of the whole. Because the only effective will is the will of God -- because, that is, the life of each part of the organism is only the life of the whole -- evil is doomed to be an unaccomplished non-life and an exasperated will for what it cannot be. Evil remains subjective and cannot embody itself -- even matter hinders it -- or as Saint-Martin says, "le mal ne peut jamais prendre nature"². Lest the Boehmian theory be misunderstood, evil is not simply dualism or particularity. It is not the principle of differentiation that preconditions unity, or the inorganic root of life, nor is it the nature that is needed for spirit or the occultation that serves the revelation of the light. Evil appears when particularity, the inorganic, nature, or darkness no longer serve by their subordination, or when the Centrum Naturae that bases all positive existence begins to assert itself for itself³. Evil then becomes a real power, and one that cannot be defined as the mere privation of good, for there is no neutral ground. Taking Die Farbenlehre for metaphysics, as its author invites, Baader reproached Goethe's listless depiction of darkness as the abstract opposite that diluted light in helping to create a colourful world⁴. In the same vein, he criticized the figure of Mephistopheles as inadequate to characterize evil. The devil is not the spirit that always denies, but the spirit that always lies and tries to 'posit' itself as God. Evil is not the principle that, in spite of itself, serves the purposes of creation, but it is a principle of destruction⁵. Although defined as an unrealizable egocentric urge,

1. IX, 206 and n.; cf. 87 n. (Ungeist).

2. II, 44 n.; XIII, 236. Evil has no Wesen (VIII, 133), for it cannot make the 'fourth' movement that signifies substantial being (II, 103; VII, 185).

3. Evil is 'abstraction from God's unity' (VIII, 174), a 'refusal to be subordinated' (XIII, 175), and a consequence of 'dislocation' in the universal order (IX, 318). For the first time, there is a rupture in the synergic hierarchy of causes, and the same principle that was good in its place becomes bad (IX, 308 n., 319).

4. IX, 317-19.

5. II, 343; VIII, 173.

evil is nonetheless an active power, a power against life. Where light is evolutionary, the thing that hates it is revolutionary. Where life is an ordering-process that empowers, evil is a disorder that disempowers and moves to a lower level of organization, as though an animal were to become a plant or the plant a crystal¹. Whereas the organism increases its capacities geometrically, evil 'factors negatively ($1/2 -- 1/4 -- 1/8 \dots$)'². Evil has its own dynamic and has, like good, its own degrees of advancement: its apprentices, its journeymen, and its 'masters' who fantasize their freedom when they are thoroughly enthralled³. From his Tagebücher to his final writings, Baader insisted that evil was a real force that had to be understood 'objectively' and as a 'personality'. He wrote openly of demonic possession, and in his least palatable essay reported a 'magnetic cure' during which an unlettered somnambulist had groaned the names of thirteen devils known in Jewish mysticism⁴. Yet Baader hesitated throughout to allow that evil could ever manifest itself fully or 'corporalize' since the power of 'grounding' or revelation was reserved exclusively for God. Evil had therefore an incomplete yet certain existence that was given its enduring definition when Baader called evil a disease⁵. Evil is a pathological growth, and that is not merely the absence of health but something positively destructive. It is 'a life in itself', but a bodiless life that wastes the organism with its famished desire to take form. Evil is a parasite⁶, a tapeworm having no substantial life of its own that devours the body of the host with which it dies. Evil is an egocentric, virulent disease of the entire organism, and Baader felt a peculiar disgust at the thought of the infusoria, the unicellular protozoa that are so named because they appear in solutions of decaying organic tissue.

1. II, 79; VII, 198; IX, 59, 108 n.

2. VIII, 192.

3. V, 355.

4. IV, 40-60, 56 ff. (1818); VIII, 159; IX, 17, 323 (on the real 'personality' of evil).

5. III, 283 f.; V, 37 n.; VIII, 192; IX, 314 f. (n.). Baader meant thereby an actual correspondence of psychic and somatic states, therefore, exorcism as medicine, and, during the 'magnetism' vogue, a new literal meaning to the idea of Christ as the Doctor. The general idea is Paracelsian.

6. I, 17 n., 103; XV, 684. Do they not mimic the very form of the Angstrad, those Infusorien-Rädchen? IV, 37-9; II, 430; VIII, 192.

Contrary to modern biblical scholarship¹, the theosophical exegesis reads the two accounts of the creation of man as a single story telling of a double fall. In the narrative gap between the two first books of Genesis, Baader rebuilds the mystic myth of the original man which was already outlined in Cabbalism and completed in the doctrine of Boehme. Told piecemeal and with ample self-contradiction, this more elaborate tale of Adam allows richer speculation on the notion of the ethical self.

Entrusted with the creative power of the word and sent as God's representative in the created world, the primal man was born in effective rapport with the creatures. His names for them were based on real knowledge, and gave him magical dominion over them, for they obeyed him when he called them by their rightful names. His mission was to use his speech to bring the creatures to life, reintegration and wholeness by defining them for the purposes of the Creator². Created in God's own image, the Urmensch was a single being, both man and woman and neither. Unlike its caricature, the hermaphrodite, it did not have the outer organs of both sexes, but their inner transcendent union, 'a coincidence of opposites', in one sublime immaterial body³. The androgyne could reproduce, and its power of reproduction was its imagination. In Paracelsus, where the theosophical doctrine of Imagination appears to originate, the word had an immediate sexual connotation. A man first wills, then desire arises in his imagination, and desire generates the seed. But the desire must be kindled by the image of a woman⁴, an image which the will receives, writes Baader, 'in the way that a woman receives from a man'⁵. Since it is the same for a woman and her ovum, procreation begins with a mutual impregnation by images, and, 'imagination' meaning 'appetition', it is understandable that adul-

1. VII, 226.

2. IV, 299; VII, 110, 222, 314 f.; IX, 63 f. (n.); XV, 293.

3. II, 313 ff.; III, 305 n. For the 'original' of Baader's doctrine of the androgyne, see Boehme, J., Mysterium Magnum, xvii-xviii.

4. Paracelsus, Werke, Abt. I, Bd. 1, 254-7; Bd. 7, 203; Pagel, W., 111 ff. and Baader, e.g. II, 218 f., 260 f.; IV, 307 f., IX, 341n.

5. VII, 36 n.

tery should already be complete when it is imagined¹. With the help of etymology -- Imagination giving Imago and Magie² -- the language of imagination modulates easily into that of magic, whose efficacy also lies in its use of images. In Paracelsus, Baader tells us, all creation is a magic gestation, and in Boehme's philosophy of the might of magic in nature, 'magic is the mother of all things'. According to the Boehmian William Law, we will gain entrance into the meaning of many passages of Boehme if we translate the word 'magic' as 'the will'³, and that it is the way that Boehmius redivivus renders Imagination and Magie, as Wille.⁴ Imagination is the power of the will that engages all strata of the human personality, and the sexual language describes the process by which the primal man wills his own image and his image of the physical world. Magically, the will projects itself outward to imbue itself with the image of what it desires, for a will needs an image upon which to act⁵. Through its image the object of desire exercises a 'magnetic' attraction and awakens its qualities in the will as it generates its seed⁶. Admittedly, the account of the sexual-volitional act is obscure. But it is difficult to explain how one could gestate in his imagination the very image in which he is constituted, and impossible to make coherent the active-passive formulation of the mystic will, by which man allows the divine will to be born in him and himself to be created in the image of God.

The maiden Sophia was man's playmate and his betrothed. Androgynous and virginal, she was the perfect image of the Trinity, become 'personal' for the first time in relation to original man⁷. In the eidetic imagination of Boehme, this beautiful companion was

1. II, 453; III, 300 f.

2. XIII, 217, 219; cf. 139: "Imagination ist magische Gestaltung".

3. Law, W., 143 f.

4. I, 163, 225.

5. VIII, 96 f., 107, 127; IX, 200 ff., 227 n.; cf. IV, 50: "A man is a magnet who has that which attracts him as his steel".

6. II, 353 f., cf. 281; Again etymology informs: Magia/Imaginatio/Magnes/Macht, X, 31 n.; cf. II, 268.

7. IV, 311 n., 353 f.; VIII, 291 f. and n.; IX, 200 ff., 209 ff.

the Idea of God, and in Gottfried Arnold she was the diaphonous form of a beatific vision¹. She appeared to Adam magically, and it was up to him to make her real, for she was still his bride and not his wife. When he spoke for her and consummated their imaginative marriage, Sophia would give birth to the divine image in him. His origin would be confirmed, and he could fulfil his mission to bestow the benediction of life and accomplish the marriage of spirit and nature in the created world. But man had also an image of the creatures -- how else could he perform magic upon them? -- and he longed after their manner of reproduction. He told a lie, gave in to Phantasie, and was shaped in the image of the world that he desired. As his forsaken bride retreated into aether, man slept, which is the state of transition, and awoke man and woman, like the dualistic physical nature that had also fallen from androgyny².

The first sin was adultery, the first division that of male and female, and history begins not with sensuality but with sexuality. Yet the fall was still 'magical', inasmuch as the first stage of formation always takes place in the imagination³, and it did not become real or substantial until man had failed the temptation. Eve was seduced by the snake of self-will, Adam received from her the image of evil -- the 'serpent-seed' -- and what Adam willed, Eve did⁴. Not only the will, but the mind and body fell. Adam and Eve materialized, as the inner event now happened outwardly. With the awakening of the Paracelsian Archeus their 'belly-life' began, and with the immaterial transmission of the 'false body' or Evestrum, the spirit of sickness entered their bodies⁵. They lost the power of magic procreation, so that birth became painful, and Eve, whom Adam had borne in imagination and body, now bore him. Speech was lost, so that we no longer know the real names of things, and the

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1. The historian-poet in his Bericht von einer Nacht records a nocturnal visit of this "Heilige Geist in foeminia", Arnold, G., 310.
 2. III, 273, 371 f.
 3. The second stage is in the will, or 'living spirit', and the third in the body, VIII, 103-5, 153-5.
 4. II, 189; VII, 227 n., 229-31; IX, 323; cf. Boehme, J., Aurora, xvi, 29.
 5. IV, 350 ff.; VII, 371; XIV, 94. The Evestrum is an astral body that connects the spirit with the stars, and, like all else that joins man with nature, it produces disease only when allowed improper influence.

non-divine world that had appeared to the mind only magically now became real, as the eternal world that should have been real turned magical.

Although the events by which man came to experience himself as 'a deficit' may be told mythically, it is also the function of Baader's theosophy to analyse the myth and to incorporate it within his latent system. From the analysis it emerges that the pivotal act and Baader's 'fundamental principle' was not so much the fall as the temptation. While the fall was contingent, the temptation was necessary, and in a way that accords with the general principle motivating Baader's entire theory of creation. At every stage of manifestation, the light requires the possibility, but only the possibility of darkness. Likewise, virtue implies the possibility of an evil choice which it surmounts by its effort. Like the hidden Deity, the Ungrund, the soul of man begins in a state of Temperatur, neither good nor evil¹. That is just its weakness, that it is neither. For innocence is ignorance, and ignorance is vulnerable. In its 'untried being', the soul remains 'inflammable' and capable of being 'aroused' by fire. If it is to determine itself for good, it must carry out the primal birth-process, and must itself undergo 'the fire-baptism of temptation' -- not so that it is 'enflamed', but in order that its 'inflammability' may be destroyed by fire². Nescience is disvalued, but the theosopher does not mean that the soul must learn vice on its way to purification. Although 'inflammability' is the condition of virtue, sin is no more necessary than an actual darkness in God or the outbreak of evil in the created world. The moral act implies a temptation, but this requires only that the soul confront a choice. In the confrontation, virtue gains power over evil, gains the power of evil without being itself evil, which was the purpose of the tree of temptation in Genesis: 'to empower the tempted'³. Every temptation is a 'solicitation' to enter the Angstgestalt, the dark matrix, or the earth and the dualistic realm

1. II, 146; IX, 312 f.

2. II, 100, 248; VII, 176; IX, 240-4; X, 35. Sin is thus an 'inflammation sickness', I, 143.

3. VII, 227, 231 ff; cf. III, 324; above, p. 11, n.3.

of good and evil. Man had to withstand that 'solicitation', had to resist his own desire to become part of that nature, and in this test to consolidate his mastery over 'the negative will of nature'. Man had to affirm God over nature, and in so doing he would represent Him. But he had to do so freely, as God had created freely. Charged with his own freedom, man had to substantiate it on his own account, had to give real content to his freedom by its exercise. Virtue, the only possible content of freedom, had to be won in the way that life surmounts its inorganic basis¹, and in the way that God dominates His obscure desire in becoming an absolute freedom and light -- by an act of the will. It was therefore necessary that man be tempted, but not that he fall.

It was for this theory of moral validation that Kierkegaard referred to Baader in The Concept of Dread². But 'the necessity of temptation' is only an important application of the more general theory by which the concept of dread becomes, in our opinion, as deeply rooted in Baader's thought as in that of Kierkegaard. What tempted man was Angst, an unrealizable and anguished self-will definable only as the absolute incapacity to define oneself, which underlies, and whose constant confrontation gives substance to the self-definition of belief. When man fell, he fell into Angst, which now accompanies him, as evil accompanies good, and will do so as long as the soul is bound to the temporal conditions of 'this' world.

1. For the inorganic represents a 'temptation' to life just as much as egocentricity does to the holy will. XIV, 108 f., 112. For both kinds of life, the process of temptation is the struggle for formation that can only be resolved through Gliederung, IX, 312.

2. Kierkegaard, S., The Concept of Dread, 36 n., 53.

Time represents a lapse in the eternity toward which Baader's mysticism is entirely oriented. 'This' successive time is the inauthentic mode of Unnatur, and its appearance, like that of matter, was operated by the fall¹. Belonging to the outward movement of 'grounding' -- the self-alienation of eternity -- time was to be negated in the instantaneous movement of return, since only its potentiality and not its actuality was needed for creation. The duty to establish eternity by the denial of time was Lucifer's, then that of man who followed him in failure². Time is fallenness, and if man is bound to time, it is because he is guilty of time. Like all that pertains to 'this' nature, time is dualistic, having only the dimensions of past and future, which always appear together. Youth is accompanied by age, and the moment that something is born it begins to die. In this 'abstract' time, man feels himself imprisoned and expatriated. Lost in a fantastical game, his projects never final, l'homme du torrent can be nothing other than peaceless and irresolute³.

Because this is a time of dread (Angstzeit), whose agony is that 'what should endure perishes and what should perish endures', Baader was repulsed by Fichte's proposition that consciousness altogether was impossible without time, and he abhorred even more Schopenhauer's vision of the perpetuity of this world⁴. As for the mystic's nemesis, Kant had made time 'incomprehensible' by treating it as the irreducible condition of experience, instead of explaining it as a breach in what the theosopher called true 'time a priori': eternity⁵. With each of these statements, Baader expressed a theocentric repugnance, or his 'irony, compassion and melancholy' in the contemplation of time, and each served in its way to exalt eternity by debasing temporality. But with Kant in particular he felt the need to meet a philosophical challenge to the traditional Christian notion of immortality. While the idea of continuing progress

1. XIV, 34 ("eine Suspension der Ewigkeit"), cf. 41.

2. X, 50; XI, 80.

3. II, 51-6; III, 271; VI, 101.

4. III, 328; XIV, 56; XV, 675.

5. IV, 287 f. and n.; XIV, 65 f.

also appealed to Baader's predilection for concepts of striving and growth, he recognized a distortion of meaning in Kant's theory that the immortality of the soul should be assured by its endless asymptotic approach toward holiness. For Kant's proof premised an indefinite duration of time, which would mean that the soul was, rather than liberated, condemned 'like the wandering Jew' to seek and never find eternal beatitude. The theory of 'deathlessness as the endless continuation of time' was hardly a consolation, and it must be agreed that Kant's conception did not correspond to what is normally understood as the immortality -- which has to mean the eternality -- of the soul.¹

Eternity is 'concrete' or 'real' time, and only eternity is 'the present'. In every regard it is the reverse of this 'abstract' and dualistic time, for in eternity 'what should perish and what should endure'² do so. But in defining eternity Baader meets a rather unusual degree of difficulty, for he cannot, as he does with matter, make a simple negation of time. He has already described God as an eternal life, and in his Romantic and Boehmian biocentrism he wants to include the ideas of movement, process, and development in his concept of eternity. Yet all of this is indescribable without words directly connoting time. There seems no other choice than to define by a kind of 'double negation', making valiative every determination involving time, then negating movement, process, and development unless they are divine. In time there may be movement, but since it accomplishes nothing it is really stasis. The completion of creation will be a sabbath and calm, yet the calm of eternity is really the highest activity³, because there striving is continually fulfilled. Like particularity and nature, time is not to be annihilated in the return movement of 'grounding'. The reintegrated eter-

1. II, 52 n.2; VIII, 26. This is only the objection that Beck makes to Kant's argument for life after death, viz., that the premise for the eternity of the soul includes the idea of continuous change, which is a temporal and not an eternal mode. If, as Beck writes, the objection would not have troubled Kant (because the theory of the supersensuous did not concern him), it was obviously of supreme importance to the theosopher (because the theory of the supersensuous was his domain), Beck, L.W., 265-71, 270 f.

2. III, 351; VII, 136, 188 f.

3. IX, 71; cf. 24 n., 60 n., 164.

nal spirit is 'free' of time not by being 'without' it, but by its organic subordination of past and future in such a manner that the 'constant renewal' that seems to require them as its moments may be achieved without being subject to death¹. There is thus no unmediable dichotomy between eternity and time, any more than between spirit and nature, Einheit und Gliederung, or Creator and creation. Even this 'false' time is not totally disvalued. Although it is a period of punishment, it is also a period of grace. Of the same genus as matter, it is itself of limited duration, and performs, like matter, a redemptive function². It limits evil, while it arbitrates man's virtue, allowing him to fulfil the divine commandments and to prepare himself for the eternity which time holds 'as the bud holds the flower'³.

Since no choices made in time are final, the fall is not determinative for once and all, but the conditions of temptation persist. As the second fall made man more the image of this world, with each successive sin he falls more deeply into time and matter, and falls until he is able to ground himself by an act of the will. Even then his moral existence is not secure, but like life it must be won through 'constant overcoming' and, even more than life, it is threatened by the periculum vitae and ruled by the law that not to progress is to regress⁴. In Baader's diffused judgments of history, this dynamic ethical dualism is transferred without alteration to a racial dimension. History represents ideally a circular return to a more profound state of grace. Innocence cannot be regained, the entrance to the Garden is guarded, and innocence in any case is not virtue. Only through a passion of increasing consciousness can the collective individual achieve the moral and intellectual freedom that belonged to a more natural age; and, predictably enough, Baader felt that the journey was nearer its end than its beginning. Yet

1. II, 519-23, 533 n.

2. VII, 203 f.; VIII, 119.

3. VI, 61 f.

4. II, 52, 112; IV, 344 ("non progredi est regredi, non elevari est labi")

history could not be unequivocal progress, and history despite Hegel could not be a theodicy, because time perpetuates dualism. Nor could history be grasped only rationally, for there was much in it that was irrational, or evil¹, and in Baader's qualified Manichaeism good and evil are intertwined in conflict as long as there is history at all. Among the most perplexed of his longer works, Vom Segen und Fluch der Creatur seems written largely in order to establish this single point: that evil also evolves. Baader's plot is that the 'spiritual man' must retrace the steps of his fall -- in body, soul, and spirit -- as he prepares himself for judgment, and that the reascent is outlined in the scriptural three ages of the world. In the antedeluvian age, evil made its primary abode in the body or in 'nature', which was cleansed by the flood. Evil then 're-acted' in the soul, which then was redeemed by the final blood-offering ^{at} Golgotha. Yet evil fled to the human spirit, and continues to intensify until the final confrontation of the apocalypse². Like its characteristic disease, every epoch has its evil, and if the modern age is the age of spirit -- what Idealist could deny it? -- the spirit of error makes itself known in philosophy, in materialism and neology, rendering the temptation philosophical.

1. II, 330.

2. VII, 71 ff., esp. 143 f., cf. 170, 174. This general theme was developed, at greater length and from a different approach, in Vorlesungen über eine künftige Theorie des Opfers, surely the most perplexing of Baader's longer works (although we still hesitate to call his collections of fragments 'works'). There he attached to the three stages of reintegration (and his three biblical ages) a particular form of blood-offering: the Levitical animal sacrifices, the crucifixion, and the mystics spiritual 'shedding of blood'. What interests us here is Baader's theory that every sacrifice not properly fulfilled, instead of purging evil, allows it to enter more deeply into the texture of existence (the Periculum and Maleficium des Opfers), and the complementary theory that each manifestation of God's grace provokes a reaction from the power of evil, that thus progresses throughout history, to the ultimate point of Incarnation Diaboli, VII, 271 ff., esp. 299, 306 f., 328-30; 346; cf. IX, 354 f.

ii. Reintegration and the Mystic Will.

The ideal self of Baader's theosophy is not Mikrokosmos but Mikrotheos. Its ontological structure incorporates all of the elements of the triune God: a light or spirit, a fire or soul, and a darkness or body. In Baader's premodern theological psychology, the self has three corresponding capabilities: one thinks, wills, and acts¹. At least, this is the basic terminology, upon whose regular application it would be futile to insist. In order to portray Baader's concept more accurately, however, one should say that the self is not at all 'composed' of three 'elements'. The terms 'spirit', 'soul', and 'body' may distinguish 'organs' or 'powers', but the theosophical self is a many and a one whose concept is lost as soon as any of its terms is isolated in thought². To be still truer to Baader's meaning, the self is a synthesis of the spiritual and the bodily sustained in the soul. Unity and differentiation are always resolved in a mediative term or Mitte³, a synthesis always requires a third term, and for the ideal self this 'concrete' unity is its soul. The Mikrotheos can be identified with neither of its extremes, but is just their synthesis that reposes in the soul⁴. If it were ~~just~~ this straightforward, however, it would not be Baader. He writes not only of the soul, but of the spirit as the unitive and therefore 'higher' faculty, making that the Mitte or 'concept' of the self⁵. This circumstance, that the higher faculty is at times called 'the spirit' and at times 'the soul', is nothing unusual in speculative mysticism, and it must often result from unwillingness and not only inability to separate the two evocative terms for man's divine character. With Baader, at any rate, there seem to be two good reasons for using the terms 'spirit' and 'soul' rather indis-

1. VIII, 59, 251 ff.; cf. VI, 293.

2. IV, 153 f., 240 f., 274; VIII, 186; X, 84.

3. II, 326; VIII, 65; IX, 185 f., 190 f.

4. IV, 350 ff.; XII, 99.

5. IV, 373 f. (n.); cf. esp. X, 334-42, 41 f.

tinguishably. One is that he seeks a truly unitive concept of the self, and for this purpose rigid adherence to any inherited faculty-theory is inapt; as seen before, he exchanges the terms Verstand and Vernunft somewhat at will, yet always in order to indicate their coalescence in a total thinking, and it is a similar result that he pursues here. Another reason for the weakness of the distinction between soul and spirit is the nature of the theorized unity, modelled as it is upon the divine coincidence of opposites. Like the living God of Baader's speculation, the Mikrotheos is a synthesis in which one of the terms is dominant. God is essentially spiritual, but He first 'becomes' actually so in mastery over what is natural in Him. Life again is spirit in synthesis with the inorganic matter which it subordinates and transforms into itself. In an analogous manner, the mystic self may be identified with the soul, but since there is no self any more than there is life without spirit, and since what is expressed in both is spirit, the self may equally well be identified with the spirit. The difficulty in giving clear expression to this idea -- that the self is a synthesis of the spiritual and the bodily in which the spiritual predominates -- is the same difficulty that was encountered with the theosophical concept of the Trinity and that of the divine nature. 'Resolving' the difficulty as before, it may be said that, quite in the way that the Son is the 'godly' in God, and spirit the 'life' of the eternal life, its spirit is the 'self' of the Mikrotheos that in its structure reproduces the triform God.

The term in Baader's organic concept of the self that one should expect to be the most recognizable -- the body -- is perhaps the least so. But the principle which requires its inclusion is so basic to Baader's Boehmian doctrine that one cannot get through theosophy without it. In this regard like the Absolute, the particular spirit is not alive, not totally real, and not in full possession of itself unless it is embodied. A will needs a means of self-expression, thought requires sensibility,

life needs matter to sustain it, and spirit must be joined with nature in order to be complete. If one wants to include the full meaning of life in the idea of eternal life, and if like Oetinger¹ one wants to base the hope for immortality not upon the monadistic simplicity of the soul, but rather upon its powers of generation or 'imagination', then all of this is incomprehensible without a body. What is true of God both as absolute spirit and as the Creator is therefore also true of his representative creation: "vis ejus integra si conversus in corpus"². As the theosopher reasons, nothing emerges 'in' or 'from' nothing, a soul or spirit must be 'in' something, and that is its body³. But for the ideal self -- which is to be sure the self as it came from the hands of God, and as it is to exist in eternity -- that body is not earthly flesh and blood. It is a corpus pneumaticum or Geistleib, a body of the finest corporality, like the 'astral body' of Paracelsus's theory, the Tincturleib of Boehme, or the Nervengeist of the visionary of Prevorst⁴. 'Clarified' and 'transparent', that subtle body makes up the 'substance', Wesen, or Natur of the eternal spirit, the 'outwardness' which reveals the spirit as 'inner' and ensures its concrete existence. Intermittently, and by analogy with the Aristotelean definition of a sensible substance as a form imbedded in matter, Baader likes to call the immortal self as a whole the 'substance' or Wesen, and then distinguish between its Geist as the term corresponding to 'form', and Leib as the term corresponding to 'matter'. The subtle body is in that case the 'matter' of the immortal self, or its 'mother', inasmuch as the word materia derives from mater, and inasmuch as the spirit is a son of God who like every other son needs a mother to bear and sustain him -- which is just the function of the Geistleib without which the will of the immortal spirit would be impotent

1. II, 310; IX, 44 f. Zinn, E., 11-24.

2. IX, 427; cf. I, 263; IV, 297 f.

3. X, 46 f., 231.

4. II, 269; IV, 315-8, 239; VIII, 368; IX, 60, 209, 220;

XIII, 173.

and its personality non-existent¹. When Baader actually comes to define that body or matter, he engages in his most arduous 'dynamic' speculations in order to prove that matter does not require for its concept either extension or 'gravity', but may do even better with forces, powers, or what he calls 'the immaterial elements of matter'. When, in reaching for a higher concept of selfhood, he analyses the relation of the spirit to its subtle stuff, he lands in all of the problems of a metaphysics that offers to explain how form and matter exist together in a substance. Any desire to disentangle these speculations and find a coherent Baaderian doctrine of substance must be forlorn, for Baader remains an inconsistent thinker and uses the terms Wesen, Substanz, Natur, Leib, Essenz and Materie without regular distinction. All of the definitions of the Geistleib do however follow a rule, all being restatements -- only with reference to particular 'entities' or substances -- of the theosopher's guiding intuition of a complex unity of spirit and nature. The rule is that soul and body, form and matter, spirit and nature and so forth, are not to be conceived dualistically, but only as a ^{synthetic} unity in which ~~nonetheless~~ the first terms predominate². Spirit and nature are to be distinguished without being separated, united without being confused, and always in such a way that spirit subordinates nature. Without this 'concept', the dualities can only be seen in hostile opposition, which explains why, with the unique exception of Boehmian theosophy, every metaphysics from Plato and Aristotle onward -- and in the end every philosophy is a failed theology -- has been unable to give an adequate speculative account of eternal life³. With that Boehmian-inspired 'concept', however, Baader feels that he can explain just how the soul may be eternally alive: life may be eternally recreated by the spirit that is 'free' of its body but not 'without' it, the spirit may rise 'above' and yet not 'separate' from the body that it regenerates, and the spirit

1. X, 33 n.2; I, 159 n., 307; XII, 219.

2. IX, 271-88; X, 36-41; V, 213 n.

3. IX, 271; IV, 316.

may incessantly transform its 'matter' or body into pure energy or life. The 'body' of the Mikrotheos is finally nothing other than the term Natur which has been seen to be necessary to the concept of Geist, or the differentiation indispensable to organic unity, and although every true Naturweisheit will make this its serious concern, we do not know how we can effectively say more about the Geistleib, except that it is an individual reproduction of the pleroma as a 'multiplicity of forces', the divine body whose symbolism we have tried faithfully to reconstruct¹.

If so far one might discern only an effort to establish a priori a doctrine of the resurrection of the body, the evasive concept of the Geistleib is nevertheless the key element without which Baader considers it impossible to build a consistent 'theistic' theosophy. As previously stated, the point of the creation of a universe of particulars is to extend the manifestation of the thought and will of the Creator through a plenum of individuals. In the consolidation of that purpose by the return of all created things to the Centrum, particulars do not lose but first gain authentic 'substantiality', and if the centered human souls had no Leib they could not constitute substances in any sense of the word. When completed, the cosmos as a whole is organic and consists entirely of organisms. 'Organism' being a kind of coordinate individual through which Baader refers to the human as well as the non-human members of the envisaged 'system', the teleology of the whole would be frustrated if the mystic soul did not have the matter or body without which an organism simply cannot be thought. If the body is specifically included in the doctrine of the regenerated self, it is therefore not only because the 'concrete' concept of spirit demands it, nor only because there would otherwise remain an unincorporated residue which by its mere existence would be antagonistic to God and a limitation on His power; rather, it is

1. IV, 230-2; VIII, 367 f.

for the very sound reason that the creation would otherwise be meaningless. On necessarily related grounds, pantheism would be unavoidable, and pantheism is the problem to which the theoretician of mysticism returns again and again. In Baader's theosophy proper, his speculative knowledge of the Absolute, he has already shown that the doctrine of the divine body or eternal life is necessary in order to obviate the unqualified identification of 'this' nature with the body or Wesen of God. Although now as an individual reproduction of that eternal life -- which, without diminishing itself, increases its products through myriad variations on its paradigmatic form -- it is again the 'body' that saves religious metaphysics from the hybris of pantheism. It is not so much in order to avoid the 'naturalistic' version of pantheism that Baader insists upon the eternality of the individual body, although the danger of that 'confusion' is here greater simply because the analogy between Creator and creation is pushed further in the case of man. Rather, it is primarily in order to avoid 'spiritualism', the pantheism that for Baader represents the peril more grave because more subtle. The 'spiritualist' mystics identify the self with the spirit alone, and despise as inherently evil their bodies, their passions, their 'nature', and in short all that is particular, created, and therefore different from God¹. By their same persuasion, they define God as absolute spirit or pure thought devoid of nature -- therefore not only as the absolute but as the sole value -- and they seem thereby to do Him the greatest worship. Like Mme. Guyon, they are led to imagine the return of their souls to God as the return of drops of water to the sea with which they become indistinguishably assimilated², and for them the mystic reunion takes on the character of suicide³. But if they seek self-annihilation, it is only in order to glorify themselves. For by denying the body in all of its Baaderian connotations, they have done away with the one thing that can distinguish them

1. IV, 213; VII, 115; XII.

2. II, 227 and n.

3. II, 354; XIV, 85 f.

as individuals from God. If they hate themselves for their part that is created, they love themselves for their part that is divine, and end by identifying without qualification the ego and the Absolute. That is why for Baader abnegation and pride are always found together, and why he writes that 'it is only vanity to be without a body'¹. That ambivalence, that 'paradox of pantheism' is for Baader the great intolerability, and it can only be avoided by the Boehmian doctrine of an archetypal nature which in uniting the Deity and the created individual also keeps them safely distinct². But once in possession of that doctrine, Baader can set out all of his formulae for 'identity in difference' in order to define the relation of the mystic self to God. No more than the other creatures does man become 'cosubstantial' with the Creator by taking part in the eternal life. The soul does not become 'one' with God -- for God is no Saturn who devours his children³-- but rather the soul becomes 'at one' with God and so united within itself⁴. It is not His 'corporality' but His 'constitution' that God shares with man⁵, and as Baader signifies that 'immanence of God's image' he brings into play all of the mystic devices that define abstractions by way of symbols and of interrelationships among the symbolic objects. If, for example, spirit is the 'centre' and nature the 'periphery', ideal communion is achieved not when either of these terms of the individual is exchanged for that of God, but when the circles are 'superimposed' and the human figure in its internal proportions attains the perfect symmetry of the Divine⁶. Or, in a metaphor drawn from Ruysbroeck, the soul is an iron in which the heavenly fire glows, although their 'natures' do not commingle⁷. Finally, while it is beyond our limitations to discuss in detail the Munich theo-

1. II, 15.

2. IV, 355 n.: The 'image' (Bild) ensures 'unity' and 'non-confusion'; IV, 344: "Teilhafwerden ist Leibwerden".

3. II, 307; X, 327: "Teilhafsein ist nicht Tilgung".

4. XV, 277.

5. IX, 44.

6. IV, 298; VIII, 284 n.

7. II, 224.

sopher's doctrinal attitudes toward the major figures in the history of German speculative mysticism, it may be said in general that he refers to them mainly in order to express or defend the Boehmian doctrine that specifically includes the perfected human body and the physical universe in its ideas of Christian regeneration, the doctrine that in maximizing the worth of the Creator does not want to minimize the worth of His creation. Thus, in all of his admiration for the great Scholastic mystic, when Baader calls upon Meister Eckart for authority he frequently interprets, and consistently to the effect that those statements usually understood as identifying the divine spark with God, while rejecting all that is natural or non-divine, are to be taken only in a relative sense; that is, to mean that the creatures are not totally devalued, but only to the extent that they oppose the revelation of God through them¹. Again it is in order to safeguard the Boehmian theory of a 'total' God Who creates not out of need but of love, out of perfection and the desire to magnify perfection -- that Baader quotes and as often qualifies the celebrated couplet of the 'pantheist' poet Angelus Silesius:

Ich weiß, daß ohne mich Gott nicht ein Nun kann leben.

Würd ich zu Nicht', er müsst' von Noth den Geist aufgeben.

That, Baader says, is not meant to confuse God with the creature but only to confirm man's capacity to participate in the infallibility of God².

As a complex unity of spirit and nature the Mikrotheos reproduces and uniquely varies the figure of the Deity. Who is in Himself both spirit and nature at once, and first 'becomes' these for the creature, that is, in human conceptions³. God is the original synthesis of spirit 'over' nature, and He alone is capable of sustaining such a synthesis independently. Only in dependent relation to the 'objective' God does man -- who as 'subject' has his unity in another⁴ -- achieve his own image and selfhood. As Baader was not overmodest to say, he thought

1. VII, 90; cf. XIII, 229.

2. IX, 50 n.; II, 228f.

3. IV, 241 f.; VIII, 330; X, 37.

4. IX, 131 n.3, 190 n.; VIII, 330.

it one of his positive accomplishments to have joined the concepts of 'image', 'location', and 'law'¹. Keeping in mind that nothing exists in isolation, the sense of such a statement is clear: man acquires his god-image by taking his position in the systematically-ordered cosmos, whose ideal organization is ordained by the will of God, which is synonymous with the law. It was his law, his position, and his image that man was duty-bound to validate by marrying his imagination with Sophia. When he omitted to fulfil the law, he fell from position, lost the image of spirit-nature androgyny, and is properly speaking no self at all. Displaced and disfigured, he is a disembodied spirit and a despiritualized body, two contraries and their 'composite' misrelation, a Dreiuneins², and he cannot even think his image, for dualism pervades his conceptions and his philosophy is Cartesian. Man's disunity is his Angstgestalt and his state of sin, since sin is separation, and evil like good results from a position in relation to the law. Fallen from Organismus into Mechanismus, man is neither integrated with the whole nor within himself, and in this perception Baader finds the basis for a theology that will surpass all others: Christianity is 'reintegration', and the Christian is the reintegrated man³. Grace in Baader's theosophy is not merely a revelation but a magic-metaphysical law according to which the individuals in the panorganic series of being maintain their existence by the exercise of powers commensurate with their function in relation to the whole, and disuse brings malfunction and atrophy. Restoration to 'normality' is no longer in their power⁴, but requires action on the part of the principle that originally orders the whole. Since the interruption of organic function represents something new, the ordering-principle takes on a new form, and produces as it were a new ontological category, just as though there were a disease to which the vital force had to

1. VIII, 226n.; VII, 132, 271; IX, 319.

2. II, 160-3; IX, 159; XII, 101.

3. III, 306-9.

4. II, 518, cf. 166 f.; VII, 185.

'conform' in order to heal. 'Only love has the power to give up its freedom and take it back again'¹, and only the light that creates the universe can once more overcome darkness, although this time a real darkness or evil that it did not engender. In such a way there begins to emerge a rationale -- which for the reason just mentioned need not be in name a theodicy -- by which the fall may be incorporated within an onto-theology that understands the purpose of existence to be the self-realization of the God Who in Himself is love. For the love that creates and sustains the universe now restores the fallen members to a position from which, although under different conditions, they may be reintegrated, and in doing so the principle of love expresses itself more fully. Because man falls from the center to the periphery, love makes 'a peripheral appearance'², the historical Christ. Although the fall is itself unnecessary, it thus leads to a yet more perfect self-manifestation of God, on the principle that the brightest light follows the deepest darkness, that the depth of the descent preconditions the height of the ascent, and that there is more joy in heaven over the redeemed sinner than over one who has never sinned at all³. But reintegration cannot be necessary except at the cost of justice and of human freedom. In pursuit of the flawless doctrine of justification, Baader therefore carries his speculation beyond the apocalypse. During this limited Gnadenzeit, which for its 'mixed' character is identified with purgatory⁴, the fallen souls decide whether they will accept grace. At the judgment, the 'system' will be restored. Above, there will be heaven and light. Below, there will be hell, and the impenitent who inhabit it will find their torment in knowing that they do not belong in darkness. Overall, harmony will prevail. The self-expression of the God Who is light 'over' darkness remains ineluctable, and it is up to the creatures how they will 'sign' themselves and express Him. But in this Boehmian resolution there is a contradiction, and

1. VI, 308.

2. II, 8, 24, 61; VIII; 173.

3. II, 422 f.

4. VII, 194.

Baader saw it. It follows from what he considered to be Boehme's great discovery: that the same thing which in subordination is good, in rebellion 'becomes' evil. Evil cannot have been original, for then God must be part evil, or there must be a second God. Nor can evil be a negation, for that serves creation, and to call it evil would mean there is none. So, evil 'results' from a 'dislocation' or usurpation of place¹. Like a 'product' in the chemical sense, it is not exactly created, but it 'becomes' and attains thereby an intermediate existence that is enough to make it a power, like a disease. Assume that there are souls in hell, not those chthonic spirits who are 'in their element' and therefore happy in darkness, but human souls intended for the light. If hell is eternal, then those souls will be always out of place, disorder will be in order, and evil will share eternity with a good and loving God. For all of his desire not to contravene the Catholic dogma that none will be redeemed from hell, Baader is thus led to speculate that, although in hell justice will precede mercy, and the souls that emerge therefrom will be least worthy in the eyes of God, in some far off infinity even hell may have an end².

If the manner of the incarnation remains as mysterious as that of the creation, man must still know das Wie of his reintegration, and Baader has a theory. After the 'substantialization' that sanctified the fallen world of space and time, God did not return to Himself in full, but sustains a partial kenosis. Even because of his violent death, He remains in His 'secondary life-principles'³ as the mystical World-Spirit or das Band. This mediative principle is a power like life that joins the new antithetical worlds of spirit and nature, and it is by taking part in that power that man is conducted to reintegration. He avails himself of grace by a kind of sympathetic magic, as he produces in his imagination -- always the first stage of formation -- a similitude⁴ of the figure of Christ as the achieved domination

1. IX, 254 n. , 308n., 318f.

2. IV, 361 f.

3. II, 354; X, 37; VII, 196 f., 387 f.; II, 287 f.

4. II, 427 f.

of nature by spirit. His means of doing it are the sacraments, principles^{al} among which is the eucharist, the 'outer' ritual which, whatever Hegel may say¹, complements and embodies the 'inner' belief. Subordinating the act to its idea, Baader takes a speculative departure from the dietetic maxim of Paracelsus: "Bist was du ißt"². Surely, the food must have something in it like the one who eats it, or how could it sustain? But then it must also make what consumes it like itself. Nourishment in this way resembles the workings of the imagination, by which an object arouses its own qualities in the one who desires or imagines it. In a literal sense, you are what you eat because the food transforms you, even consumes you. Now hunger is only natural, and was meant for heavenly food. But man imagined into nature itself, and the world now eats our flesh, drinks our blood³, and perpetuates our attachment to this existence until the sacrament of the eucharist redirects a blameless urge to its proper object. In the host, as in the incarnation, God becomes a 'substance' fitting to man, but only in order to 'incorporate' man into His true body or corpus mysticum, making man a 'substance' like Himself⁴. If the production of a similitude is thus mutual, so too is the sacrifice, for reintegration demands that man give up his present constitution or 'body' and reciprocate the self-immolation of Christ. Yet human individuality is not thereby annihilated, but rather first achieved, analogously to the transformation of Teile into Glieder in the organism. The concept of the eucharist, or the concept of reintegration, is after all the concept of life, or Intussusception, while the concept of universal organic unity is only that of the eucharist, or Alimentation⁵. In any living system, the interdependent members mutually sustain and 'feed upon' one another, which also holds among men, so that as Baader writes we are all ('in a good or a bad sense') anthropophagues⁶. Inasmuch as the

1. VII, 252.

2. VII, 66-9, 257; X, 234; IV, 226 f.

3. VII, 4, 7, 12.

4. VII, 383-6; X, 74.

5. II, 231; IV, 238; VII, 383-6; VIII, 171.

6. IV, 221 ff.

Glieder of an organism are joined in harmony only through their common vital force, it follows that Christ is the unique principle of community among men, and also that the Church is the only institution that can join the nations in peace. All of these relations are defined by the eucharist, and all are consecrated by the sacrament, as the communion that is first established 'in the vertical' then extends 'in the horizontal' to society, and finally 'downward' to include nature in the one organic order. If hunger may be either sacred or profane, then this is even truer of sexual love. In the same passion one can see that the desire to procreate and the lust to destroy are nearly allied¹, making it all the more a duty of theosophical speculation to 'sacramentalize' the erotic by showing that the urge the lovers feel is really that to reproduce the divine image and rejoin eternal life. Their arms elongated ribs, they seek to form one body, but their 'materiality' separates them². The 'marriage' that is in every love (if love is not in every marriage), can only begin, like all other formation, in the imagination. As in body, man and woman are in will and imagination each half-beings, and the principle that each represents has been perverted by separation. The nobility belonging to the more spiritual male has turned to pride, and the humility of the more natural female has turned to servility. As they marry, each performs a sacrifice of that configuration of the will, and by the way that imagination functions, each is inseminated by the image of the other. In fact it is the images that join to form one body in which, each tempered by union with its contrary, the male becomes again noble and the female humble³. Their relation is the child of the lovers, and its concept is that of the Trinity, for the love-child is a reconciliation of contrarities in which the spiritual dominates, although not the man, since there are no sexes in paradise. Love even mimics the creation as it moves from indifference to self-alienation to harmony, and if the lovers experience a fall, their love is held

1. VII, 236 f.

2. IV, 292.

3. VII, 233; X, 337; IV, 185, 194.

all the more dear in reunion, like a child who is lost and re-found, or like the children of God who return from fallenness to redemption¹. But if they love when they form the androgyne, man and woman still do not create that love, but they are 'priests of a higher Eros'. For the lost bride of man's youth, Sophia, returned in a new aspect, when Mary clothed the divine in human form to enable its rebirth in man. Eva has become Ave, the prophesied Weibessame has conquered the Schlangensame, and the way of man's fall has become the way of his salvation. In the androgynous figure of Christ, woman finds her animus and man his anima, as it is Christ who fecundates their love and ensures that they give birth². Sexual love is just a remembrance and prefiguration of divine love, the reproductive organs are on that account 'the highest', and because theosophy understands the mystic union with God to be 'intellectual', Baader discovers the analogy between the drive to procreate and the drive to know, each of which begins in pain and ends in ecstasy³. In the inevitable completion of speculation, the concept of love becomes that of reintegration, or of self-sacrifice and return in the image of God. As with the identical concept of the eucharist -- for Mahl and Vermählung mean the same -- Baader intends that the sacrament of marriage encompass all relations. It not only transforms 'the fire in the loins' into light, sanctifying the love that may be carnal without being carnally-minded, but it also extends to love among all men and the love of man toward nature.

Maistryefull merveyulous and Archimastrye
 is the tincture of holi Alikimy,
 A wonderfull Science, secrete Philosophie,
 A singular grace & gifte of th'almightie:
 Which was never founde by labour of Mann,⁴
 But it by Teaching, or Revelation begann.

Alchemy, 'cheef of the artes selcouth': after the scholarly work of this century and in particular the monumental interpretative labours of Carl Gustav Jung, the spagyric art hardly remains in the realm of the esoteric. The meanings of the word

1. VIII, 155; X, 343; II, 360; VII, 134; IV, 173, 197.

2. VII, 235, 270, 290.

3. I, 39 ff.; II, 113, 223, 363.

4. Norton, T., 13.

'alchemy', however, do remain bewilderingly varied, and the majority of the literature going properly under that name -- including early chemistry, the secret recipes of metallurgical guilds, and all stories of real gold-seekers -- falls outside Baader's definition and therefore ours. Nor do we intend to include in our meaning Hermetism, the literary tradition based in those Neoplatonic writings that were attributed to the legendary King Hermes Trismegistus, were rediscovered during the humanistic researches of the Renaissance, and were cultivated by Christian mystics from Giordano Bruno to Pasqually. It is true that Hermetism is closely associated with the alchemy to which we shall refer, providing a major part of its 'metaphysics', and in excluding it from our definition we do part with Baader, who felt the Hermetic corpus to be of the greatest antiquity and profundity. Indeed, the "formula vis ejus integra si conversus fuerit in terram", which we have introduced as Baader's doctrine of creation but which he also uses in theorizing upon the 'embodiment' of God and of the individual soul, was set down by 'The Thrice Great Hermes' on his Emerald Table ¹, the brief text that with the Poimander forms the basic sacred literature of Hermetism. From the same source, the phrase 'as above, so below' is also accepted with proper modifications in the theosophy that recognizes no law for the creation that is not originally in God. But Hermetism forms only a tributary of the dauntingly vast mystic tradition from which Baader draws. Although to a lesser extent than the Bible or even Boehme, it represents something original or revelatory, there not to be criticized but to be cited, ^{interpreted} exegeted, to an extent 'rationalized', and ideally to be drawn up into the single, inachievable Gnostic system; therefore, to include Hermetism in our definition of Baader's 'alchemy' would be to include therein too much of his general doctrine. In speaking of Baader's 'alchemy', then, we limit ourselves to his relation with the Christian symbolist mysticism that appropriated to its own uses the terminologies of qualitative chemistry and the myth of the trans-

1. Hermes, T., 8; IV, 427.

mutation of baser metals into gold. Further, we take into consideration only these two essential themes: first, Baader's use of alchemical symbolism to chart out the experience of religious rebirth; second, the metaphor of transmutation as modified in the theosopher's theory of a cognitive transfiguration of nature.

The 'physical' doctrine that serves Baader's allegory of renewal is basically Paracelsian, meaning partly that of Bombast von Hohenheim, 'who saw the three as one', but also that of a host of imitators, including the kind that delight in attributing their creations to great religious, or in this case ^{great} medical men. In that Naturphilosophie of inner essences, where the three qualitative elements of salt, sulfur, and mercury were the body, soul, and spirit of all beings and their analogical links with God, Baader saw a past achievement of the desired union of religion and science, and in the figure of Paracelsus, 'eagle among the physicians', he saw personified his ideal of the authentic man of science who is at the same time a man of God¹. The malleable terms and theories of the Paracelsian doctrine, which seem in their original context to have confused rather than correlated scientific discovery and religious belief, were adopted by Boehme and used less to establish than to illustrate and lend credence to a vision of nature that had already acquired its general form. Through Paracelsus, Weigel, Boehme, and the secondary channels of theosophical tradition, those same terms and theories found their way into Baader's writing, although to be given there another new treatment. For since the time at least of Boehme, the primary meaning of alchemy, both the supporting qualitative theories and the myth of transmutation, has become the mystical one, and this is already no great secret. Baader's task then becomes not ^{completely} thoroughly unlike that of Jung, as he brings the conventions at least part way from a symbolical to a conceptual form, and half interprets, half exploits the alchemical expressions in setting forth his own ideas.

1. VIII, 251 ff.; X, 299. Paracelsus, Die neun Bücher de Natura Rerum, Werke, I, xi, 318.

The alchemical work is the production of the unified theosophical 'substance' or Geistleib that will be the vehicle of the spirit in eternity. Born from this body as its 'mother', and 'nobler than she', the hermetic child is not a new creation, but like a seed harboured in the soul that needs cultivation, or an earth-encrusted gold that needs reduction by the mage's art¹. In Baader's alchemical narrative, which we are given like all else in fragments, the rebirth of the mystic self is analogous to the birth of the divine eternal nature of which it is a reproduction. As with that archetypal process, there emerges confusion among the significant numbers, a confusion which is moreover exactly paralleled in the Paracelsian natural philosophy that knows three elements or Prima (salt, sulfur, and mercury), four compounds (earth, fire, water, and air), and seven noble metals or stages of transmutation. As before, generation may be simplified into three stages: a darkness, the 'fourth' moment of transition, and the sudden completion of the 'light-body' in the seventh number. Unlike that of the divine, however, the darkness with which the alchemical process begins is real and genetically prior. If it is to acquire a new form, the self 'in sin' must cease to be in the form that it has until now known. Its elements must be returned to the prima materia, the invisible element from which all things emerge, and according to Baader this takes place by fire in the athanor of the human heart. As if the false self had to be exaggerated in order to perfect contrition, and to intensify the suffering that comes before the joy of rebirth, man's own particularity -- his Naturangstfeuer -- is the 'distillation apparatus' in which his personality is blackened into the alchemical nigredo that always precedes sublimation and the production of the alchemical gold². Brought to a Radicalsolution and the liquid state of all transformation, the soul is returned to the Temperatur in which it was born, therefore also to a state of danger, like the somnabulists who in a similar 'dissolution' of psyche and soma are vulnerable to both good and evil spirits.

1. II, 260; VII, 184.

2. II, 13, 156 f., 243, 424-6; XIII, 208.

At the propitious moment, transmutation must be brought about by the introduction of the Tinctur or image of Christ, the philosopher's stone that acts as a leaven to transform the self to its own nature and qualities, in much the same way that the magnetic healer brings the somnabulist to his own state of health¹. As the element of water, Christ stills the fire in the soul, and without changing its elements gives it a new form in which it is no longer 'signed' by the salt or body, but by the spiritual mercury, an androgynous being both solid and liquid, like the alchemists' dissolvent and the messenger between heaven and earth. Metamorphosis is completed when the spirit is 'embodied' in its Tincturleib by the incarnation of Christ in the mystic self, and since in Baader's metaphysical law of becoming such completion always occurs in the 'fourth' stage, that is also the stage of alchemical transmutation. Because we also know from Baader that the number four is the number of the cross, we can see that the way of alchemy is that of the cross, the way of suffering and of release from suffering through grace².

That which Jung called 'projection' -- the early alchemist's involuntary objectification of a psychological process of 'individuation' by his operations intended to bring dead matter to life³-- is taken for granted by Baader as the completion of the meaning of alchemy. But for the theosopher at the fringe of Idealism, the alchemical consonance between psyche and physical world has taken on a purely cognitive meaning, and has become voluntary, while the order of the process has been reversed, the mystic rebirth coming first to consciousness and then transforming perception of physical nature. Through the metaphor of 'alchemy as the transmutation of the earth', there reappears the central theme of Baader's earliest Naturphilosophie, although by now it has been situated within the Boehmian metaphysical doctrine by way of the theosophical myth of the fall.

1. VII, 115; IX, 46; X, 150, 283: Christ Magnetiseur.

2. II, 46 n.; IV, 346; VIII, 129. Paracelsus, *ibid.*, 354: "Nun ist tinctura ein gar edle materi, darmit man tingirt die metallische und menschliche corpora und die bessert in ein vil edlers wesen und reinikeit colorit alle ding nach seiner farb und natur. Cf. VIII, 157; IX, 323 n.3.

3. Jung, C.G., XII, 233, 455-62.

When the universe, according to that myth, was brought to dualism, finitude, and 'materiality' by the rebellion of Lucifer, man was sent as intercessor to redeem the guiltless yet fallen creation. Richer in his ontological structure than the other creatures, he had the power to speak for mute nature, and had in his own image the mediation of heaven with the earth¹. When man forsook that image, the responsibility for the condition of creation devolved entirely upon him, and if nature is now in darkness it is because it lies in man's shadow. By his cognition man gives nature its character of dualism and finitude, and yet that is for him a beneficent illusion that hides from his sight the real character of evil. When Christ exorcises the evil in man and cures him of the disease, man does the same for the rest of creation, as the illusion that is no longer needed is dispelled. For it is not only man's form and his will that is reduced in the alchemical process, but his Verstand² is also 'rendered fluid' and reconstituted for a different experience of nature. 'When the father is in the son, the son is in the mother'³, or when the divine image is born in man he transforms not only his own body but its ontological equivalent in physical nature. As God comes to self-awareness in man, man undergoes an analogous process of auto-realization in the world which he did not create, but of which he is in an epistemological sense the guardian, and toward which he acts as midwife in 'helping bring it to birth'⁴. Man's ethical relation to God is thus of such importance that he is made responsible for all of nature, which is why his fate is forever interwoven with that of his mother earth, and why Paul wrote that 'the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now'⁵. Although the disalienation of the creatures from man and God may have to await the end of time, like man's own return it may

1. I, 396; IV, 299; VIII, 289.

2. I, 65; IV, 66.

3. IV, 228.

4. V, 39; II, 116-21, 194; IV, 331.

5. Romans, 8,22; XIV, 92.

nonetheless be anticipated 'in the human imagination', and this is what Baader does in his theosophy; that is, he performs 'alchemy, or man's duty toward the earth'¹. He does it when he acknowledges man's divine form, then with his 'magic' knowledge penetrates the veil (Maya) to see that form in nature; when in his speculation he renders nature totally organic and finds a spontaneous religion in the phenomenon of life; when he recognizes dualism and finitude as only the outward phases of creation and in his mind negates them; and when he admits the perfectibility of nature in his theory and raises it from innocent corruption to its final sanctification and 'sabbath'. It is this project that joins Baader's Naturphilosophie with his theosophy, and it represents an intellectual orientation counter to that expressed in Kant's famous statement in admiration of 'the starry heavens above' and 'the moral law within'². For the philosopher, those 'two awesome things' stood for an unmoral nature and an unnatural morality, two realms of reason that were no longer to be confused. For the mystic, in avowed opposition to Kant's 'dualism', the two realms were always to be united by theosophical speculation, so that the Mikrotheos could know in organic nature the counterpart of his own moral striving and desire to reveal the Divinity, know that the planets in their orbits make a Figur of human freedom, and know that natural and moral law are established by the single law in God. Although in a more sophisticated expression and age, Baader's intuition of the universe and man's place remains that intuition made graphic in an etching on the cover of Law's Life of Boehme, the one mentioned by Yeats in A Vision: an illustration of the human form where one lifts a flap to discover both the human entrails and the starry firmament.

True to his disdain for all that 'separates', Baader does not conceive the human will as an isolated psychological function. He considers a wilful resolution inconceivable without a plurality of tendencies and motives³, themselves initially dis-

1. IV, 123; VIII, 128.

2. Kant, I., Werke, V, 161 f.

3. II, 161 f.

cordant, of which it is the unified result. The resolution of the will is indeed that which in Baader's theory unifies the personality, joining the intellect, the senses, and all of its powers 'organically'. With the proviso, then, that in theory the will is no simple phenomenon, we may proceed to outline Baader's ethical doctrine proper. To begin with, the good will is not found in any particular moral capability. It is not reason that makes a man good, as Baader argued early on in his 'strife of the faculties' with Jacobi. Addressing the Bavarian Academy, Jacobi had spoken of reason as the moral faculty that set man apart from the animals who shared with him the natural faculty of understanding. Reason, as Baader argued in his published response, must in that case be able to cast man below the animals, for he is capable of evil as well as good while they are capable of neither¹. Conversely, it was not in the instincts, passions, or inclinations that man's evil lay. Such was the basis of Baader's defense of the sacraments, of his argument with 'spiritualistic' mysticism, and of one facet of his criticism of Kant. As Baader well knew, Kant had defined morality exclusively in terms of the self-determination of the will to act according to the moral imperative as this was disclosed to reason in its practical capacity. Inclinations and desires were rejected as heteronomous motives which, like the empirical character of an act (what was done) could not contribute to its morality, which resided only in the conscious conformity to duty. As carefully as possible, Kant had avoided the implication of any violent opposition between desire and duty, as if it would be duty to act against one's inclinations. For Kant the instincts were neither good nor evil, and so Baader generally understood him. The theosopher's strenuous objection was that, by excluding passion or 'feeling' from the concept of morality, Kant had not only ignored Christian love, compassion, and mercy, but in his 'erotophobia' had deprived morality of all joy².

1. I, 36 f.; VIII, 174.

2. X, 253. Kant had already answered this objection (Werke VI, 23 n.), but Baader's criticism went rather deeper than this, as follows.

In the concept of virtue for which Baader strove, the passions and instincts were specifically incorporated. They provided the driving force and the sensual component of moral acts, just as in Baader's theory of the sacraments hunger and the sexual instinct provided the drive to share in God's love and to reproduce His image. Like the 'desire' in the symbolical God of Boehme, the desires in a man gave 'substance' to the will by their subordination, and if the passions directed toward nature could bring man into darkness, when dedicated to God they endowed his morality with strength and joy. If good was not in man's reason alone, neither was evil in his passions, but rather every faculty of the human organism had a potential both for the divine and for the diabolical. Good and evil did not therefore exist 'subjectively' in man, but 'objectively' in that which by the unitive act of the will man chooses, or that which he 'imagines'.

It is quite true for Baader that as Kant maintained there is nothing good in the world except the good will, and the truth is that the good will belongs only to God¹. The good is not self-created in man, but his only by participation in the categorical will that is author of the cosmos and of that particular human will which knows moral freedom not 'in the imperative' but 'in the dative'². The entire apparatus of Baader's Boehmian theosophy, his 'ethos of being', seems constructed primarily in order to establish this single truth, by tracing all life, force, unity, and in effect all that is valued positively to a unique 'Architectonic Will', and by demonstrating that the universe in its systematic organization constitutes a refutation of the principle of autonomy. Only by taking part in the divine will does the particular will become effective and therefore free, so that the self has not only its unity but its freedom in God. Pauline in its basic perception, Baader's doctrine of human freedom begins with the idea that God is freedom and the law at once, and only 'becomes' these separately for the creature, that is, in the determination of the human will. Apart from

1. IX, 356, 366; cf. VIII, 137, 273 ; XIII, 212f.

2. VIII, 136.

the will of God the human will has no freedom, not even in the negative sense, for when it attempts to turn away and assert itself as separate it expresses the law as a constraint and a judgement¹. The particular human will is not however evil, for evil like good was created before man, and there for his choice, on which grounds Baader criticized Kant for having written of an inborn or radical evil in man². To call evil 'radical' was in any case a poor choice of expression from Baader's point of view, since das Radical represented to the theosopher a necessary phase of creation: the urge to particularize that in its subordination serves the will of God, and only 'becomes' evil when it tries to establish itself as autonomous³. Das Radical is man in self-will, the illusion of a freedom apart from God, the freedom of which it may be said that only in its abandon is one free. But the very act of relinquishing that false and impotent will is a necessary moment in the development of true freedom. For virtue untried is not virtue, and freedom is the one thing that could not be created complete and still be perfectly itself. In the way that the inorganic provides an antithetical substratum in support of life, that egocentric and illusory freedom provides the needed obstacle which in being surmounted gives content to the positive achievement of moral freedom. When that 'temptation' is overcome, the independence that so far seems to have been withdrawn is restored in full measure, as the individual comes into possession of a freedom which if not absolute is nonetheless perfect. When he makes the will of God his own, man becomes free in the only way possible. He becomes free not by being 'without' the law, but by being, like God, 'free' of the law which he embodies and which does not exist as such for him⁴. Undeliberated, he becomes a moral genius⁵ through whom the creative force acts as spontaneously as it does in the poet and in the 'evolution' of biological forms. Nor is man's individuality ineffective.

1. II, 291-3; VIII, 187.

2. IX, 200; II, 344; cf. Kant, I., Werke, VI, 19ff., 37.

3. VIII, 172 f.; XI, 84 f., 205 n.; VIII, 121 n.1.

4. VII, 334; II, 293-4.

5. IX, 109, 299; cf. II, 348.

Autonomy was never individuality, freedom needs a ground, and man is self-goal, not as Kant would say 'and nothing more', but only insofar he realizes God's ^{teleology} teleology¹. He can become himself only when his will (although the same may be said of his cognition and his action) becomes a unique expression of his Creator. Although man cannot limit God, he can still extend God's self-realization when he does not vie but 'cooperates' with the Urgenius for Whom freedom and the law are one. But man suffers from a constitutional deficiency, and in his weakened condition he is no longer able to fulfil the law and find therein his own freedom. Only in Christ is man restored to a position of strength, as the juridical relation is replaced by that of mystical love. Through Christ as the life-force, the magician, doctor, and lover, the spirit of God becomes immanent in man and overcomes the harshness of its own law. And yet the religion of love does not nullify but completes the religion of the law. For when freedom is returned to man 'in the optative', God only expresses Himself more perfectly, as not only the law but the possibility of its fulfilment comes from Him². Nor is human responsibility at an end. For if grace is a constant state man must still 'cooperate'³ and must still open his imagination to allow the birth of Christ's image in him. This is in brief the 'philosophy of freedom' which Baader relates in terms of 'images, magic, and imagination', more in terms of organic powers and participation in divine organic powers, and principally in terms of the symbolic metaphysics of Boehme, with whom he deeply identified and whose doctrine he made every effort to revive. But the doctrine now had a new reference. It was directed largely against Kant, as one who had treated prayer as a 'fetish'⁴, who had treated evil as alone human and therefore within man's power, who had treated ethics as a sufficient religion and belief as altogether subjective, and above all as one who had treated man as adequate to his own salvation, therefore representing in Baader's eyes the modern

1. IV, 4; VIII, 280; X, 229 (n.228).

2. II, 67, 297 f.; VII, 368 ff.; IX, 262.

3. II, 83 n., 354; XIII, 178.

4. II, 346; VIII, 34; cf. Kant, I., Werke VI, 51-3.

rational Pelagian¹. Boehme on the other hand had written against the predestinarian doctrine of Calvin². The same symbolic metaphysics was thus brought forward by the two theosophers to oppose what seem to be two doctrinal extremes: by its 'creator' to refute a doctrine of the powerlessness of man, by Boehmius redivivus to counter a 'doctrine' of the all-powerfulness of man, and by both to prove the impotence of man without Christ, and man's power with Him.

But how does the human will surrender itself and come for the first time to full use of its own powers, and how elect grace? Or how does the creature abandon its particularity and become an individual in the godly system, finding its Grund in God and thereby becoming itself a Grund of God's self-revelation? How, that is, does Baader describe it? He does so by the same or analogous symbols which first describe the inner birth of the God Who negates Himself in order to reveal Himself, the symbols and word-symbols around which the theosopher groups his abstractions and which give his writings whatever inner coherence they possess. Let us therefore recapitulate the development of the archetypal life. It is spirit which, seeking the 'repose' of self-completion, awakens its Ungrund and Abgrund, and overcomes it to discover joy: "In der Überwindung ist Freude"³. But the act of confronting its opposite is, for the 'normal' life, not as though it really happened. For if there is one will, all will do one thing, and there will be no conflict⁴. With the development of the 'abnormal' human life, however, a real contrariety and a new term appears: the Abgrund or abyss. Although like the Ungrund in being inaccessible to human reason, it is its absolute antithesis. The Ungrund or 'nothingness' in God is in fact the fulness of His being, only unknowable. But the Abgrund is a real nothingness, and it first comes about in man⁵. Whereas the Ungrund is 'the innermost' in being, the Abgrund is 'the outermost'⁶ phase in creation and the ex-

1. I, 285; V, 85; VII, 55 f.

2. Boehme, J., Aurora, xx, 76: "Du mußt nicht denken, wie Johannes Calvus oder Calvinus gedacht hat, der Leib Christi sei ein unallmächtig Wesen." Cf. VIII, 134 n.1.

3. II, 99 f.

4. Boehme, J., Mysterium Magnum, xl, 8.

5. II, 286, 520.

6. VII, 303 n.

treme in alienation from God. It is not man's individuality or ego, his Ich¹, but man when he tries to constitute himself as an autonomous existence apart from God, and gazes into the emptiness of his own being. It is when he affirms himself as an absolute or Ichheit, and that can only be done by denying the Gottheit which establishes man's own being². Then he discovers the void, learns opposition without reconciliation, division without union, and all of the other forms of inachievement that are represented by the obscure Centrum Naturae, which can also be 'opened' only by man. Every quality (Qualität) that in its latence or 'occultation' serves as a source (Quelle) of individuation and thereby of revelation becomes for him an agony (Qual)³. He experiences the dread of mere finitude, of particularity without more, the dread of his own nature in isolation, or his Naturangst, the dread of the wheel of birth and death, the Naturrad, Angstrad, or the Ixionsrad, as within this context the Baaderian imagery of Ixion, seen twice before, is made complete: for the mythical parent of the centaurs, the adulterer doomed to revolve forever on a burning wheel, was also the first patricide⁴. If man will turn away from that Abgrund, and if he will free himself for individuality, he has to negate his own Angstgestalt, and that sacrifice by which he becomes a self can happen only in his soul. The soul is a fire, and as every blazing flame shows, fire ascends. But since we are 'in dualism', in order to understand ourselves we should separate' the substance of fire into a light, and a darkness that contains all of its power but also all of its destructiveness. Then when we imagine such a fire without its light, we have an idea of the hell in the soul that deprives itself of God. Its illumination and embodiment takes place in the instantaneous 'fourth' movement of the Boehmian and Baaderian Blitz, yet the

1. I, 199 f., 209 f.; II, 354; VIII, 171: "Nicht aber die Selbheit überhaupt sondern die falsche Selbheit ist das Gift."

2. VIII, 310; IX, 270; XIII, 183.

3. II, 302; IV, 274 f.; cf. VII, 192, VIII, 135; IX, 176 n.2; X, 193.

4. IX, 132, 192; XIII, 339.

soul that is in darkness can no longer withstand the force of that elementary lightning. It needs to be tempered by water, the water from the wound of Christ, the tears of contrition, and the medium of baptism, ablution, and absolution. That water quiets the raging fire, neutralizes the power of lightning and allows its passage, as in the 'fourth' moment outside time the God-Trinity and the man-trinity meet, and the soul is surrounded by light¹.

1. II, 27 ff., 101, 240, 297, 391, 422 f.; IX, 40, 245 f.

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