Sensation and Representation

A Study of Intentionalist Accounts of the Bodily Sensations

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1990 [18 2000]
For my mother and father,
with all my love
Acknowledgements

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Thesis Abstract

SENSATION AND REPRESENTATION

A Study of Intentionalist Accounts of the Bodily Sensations

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There are good reasons for wanting to adopt an intentionalist account of experiences generally, an account according to which having an experience is a matter of representing the world as being some way or other—according to which, that is, such mental episodes have intrinsic, conceptual, representational content. Such an approach promises, for example, to provide a satisfying conception of experiences’ subjectivity, their phenomenal character, and their crucial role in constituting reasons for our judgements about the world. It promises this, moreover, without incurring the difficulties that face the adverbialist and the friends of such items as qualia and “private objects”. Still, even many of those who have been persuaded of that much are inclined to make an exception of the bodily sensations, since pains and the rest have traditionally been taken to be peculiarly “blank”—instances of brute, non-conceptual feeling.

In this study, I reject that tradition and argue that sensation experiences are indeed representational, and hence not in that respect exceptional. The idea that they are nevertheless distinctive in other ways vis-à-vis ordinary perceptual experiences has led intentionalists such as John McDowell to adopt an account of their content that is both mentalist and radically subjectivist: an account, in other words, that takes the items represented by such experiences to be mental and constitutively dependent on their being represented. To my mind, such subjectivism is both viciously circular—like the parallel view of colours—and at odds with the admirably intentionalist aspirations of these views. Hence I turn to consider objectivist versions of intentionalism, views that assimilate sensations to somatosensory perceptual experiences such as those that inform us of, for example, the position of our own limbs. Admittedly, these views not only risk losing the “interiority” of sensations, but I argue that they also cannot be combined with mentalism and that this generates considerable difficulties—difficulties that have either been ignored or underestimated by those working with less demanding conceptions of content. Nonetheless, I make a number of preliminary moves to show how such difficulties might be dealt with, and how the objectivist can register even the distinctively “inner” character of sensations—by, amongst other things, focussing on the peculiarities of somatosensory content. So the prospects for intentionalism about sensations are, I argue, good.
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I

Intentionalism and Its Alternatives

Pains, orgasms, and other bodily sensations certainly grab the attention of those having them. They also turn out to be surprisingly engaging from a philosophical perspective. Suppose you are inclined to endorse an “intentionalist” conception of experience. Suppose, in other words, you are inclined to think that all experiences have intentional content—they all purport to represent the world to their subjects—and that such content accounts for their qualitative character. There are good reasons for being so inclined. For one thing, you can eschew such problematic items as qualia by accounting for the phenomenal aspect of experiences in terms of their content—if, that is, you go in for a view on which they all have content. For another thing, if experiences do all have content, then they fit smoothly into a conception of the mind on which the mental in general is representational—on which, perhaps, the representational content of mental items is what their subjectivity or mentality consists in. Moreover, if experiences are to be the reasons for which we make judgements about the world, and about experiences themselves, then it can look as though they must be contentful; it can look as though having an experience must be a matter of the world’s seeming some way to a subject. Suppose, in any event, that you are indeed inclined to endorse an intentionalist conception of experience. In that case, what should you say about pains?

That is the question I engage in this study. It is made pressing by the continuing tradition that takes pains to be “representationally blank”, and by the formidable difficulties there are in supposing otherwise. I claim, against that tradition and in spite of those difficulties, that being in pain is a representational matter—indeed, entirely a representational matter. What it means to say this will become clearer as we proceed.

Now, in addition to pains and orgasms, the class of bodily sensations includes itches, tingles, tickles, prickling sensations, twinges, and so on. Though I concentrate almost exclusively on pains, it is reasonable to hope that at least a good deal of the discussion will generalise to the others. Still, being in pain, having a pain, feeling a pain in one’s foot, being aware of a pain, a body part’s hurting one, or its aching—these are the sorts of phenomena on which I focus. And I most particularly want to understand what I call “pain experiences”—that is, experiences of the type such that being in pain consists in having an experience of that type.
In this first chapter, I undertake five tasks. In §1, I introduce the topic, specifying which items I am calling "the bodily sensations", drawing attention to their more puzzling and interesting features, and saying more about the aims of the current study. In §2, I elucidate the particular notion of representational content with which the intentionalist, as I depict him, is working. In §3, this is incorporated into a more precise formulation of intentionalism, and in that context I set out the structure of this study. In §4, intentionalism is contrasted with two anti-intentionalist alternatives. This work is not primarily an argument from first principles for a broad intentionalist programme. I am more concerned to examine what forms intentionalism can take in the pain case, and to explore what dialectical options are open to the different versions. But it seems to me that there are good reasons to be attracted to intentionalism, and I begin to look at some of these in §5.

1. INTRODUCING THE BODILY SENSATIONS

_Bodily Sensations and their Peculiarities_

Here, then, are six preliminary remarks about the bodily sensations, drawing attention to their more puzzling and interesting features. I do not endorse everything in what follows; I just say that these things are apt to strike us, when first we start to think about sensations philosophically. To start with, the bodily sensations are phenomenally conscious; there is something it is like for one to be in pain, say, or to have an itch. In this respect, sensations resemble experiences belonging to what I call the five "traditional" or "ordinary" senses (sight, touch, hearing, smell, and taste), and they differ from beliefs and some other prepositional attitudes—though perhaps not from at least some occurrent thoughts and judgements. Relatedly, they are "hedonic": we find them pleasant or unpleasant.

Second, as I have mentioned, it is not at all obvious that the bodily sensations have representational content, that they genuinely represent the world as being some way or other. From the subject’s perspective, they can seem less “transparent” to the world, more “representationally blank”, than other mental items. The propositional attitudes, by contrast, are paradigmatically contentful. Moreover, even though some philosophers end up disallowing it, surely ordinary perceptual experiences—most obviously, visual experiences—possess content too. Plausibly, a visual experience as of a red cube, for example, represents to its subject that a red cube is in front of him. But it is much less clear that anything is

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1 That the domain of the phenomenological extends beyond the bodily sensations and perceptual experiences is increasingly remarked upon. See McCulloch’s MIW, McDowell’s OS and I&I, and Peacocke’s CSK.

2 Throughout this study, I use “items” entirely neutrally as between such metaphysical categories as individuals, events, states, properties, and so forth.
properly represented to him by dint of the fact that he is in pain. It can seem as though this is just a case of brute feeling. And this can be puzzling, if we are inclined to advert to a mental item's content in an account of its phenomenal character.

The point I am making here applies only to what Armstrong calls "the intransitive bodily sensations". In his terminology, since we distinguish between warmth and sensations of warmth, but not between pain and sensations of pain, sensations of warmth are transitive and sensations of pain intransitive (BS, 1). Amongst the intransitive sensations are the ones I listed at the outset—what I shall pick out by means of the unqualified terms, "bodily sensations" and "sensations". The transitive bodily sensations, by contrast, include sensations of the possession of a left leg, of its being crossed over the right leg, and of its moving relative to the rest of the body; sensations of one's ears being cold, of pressure against and within the body, of one's stomach being distended; sensations of one's heart beating, of one's throat being dry, and so forth. Arguably, such transitive sensations can be regarded as perceptual experiences belonging to a neglected sixth sense, a sense with which one perceives the condition of one's body "from the inside"—or, as I shall put it, they are "somatosensory experiences" belonging to "body sense". This suggestion is more natural for the transitive sensations, such as the sensation of warmth, than for intransitive sensations, such as pain, precisely because the former more obviously have representational content.

Third, and relatedly, we ascribe a curious class of properties to the bodily sensations. We characterise pains, for example, as being more or less intense, and as throbbing, pulsating, stabbing, burning, searing, tearing, nagging, stinging, racking, pricking, and so on. It is at least not obvious that in giving such descriptions we are somehow specifying objective, worldly conditions which the pains in question represent; though it is an interesting question what else we might be doing.

Fourth, one of the most intriguing features we ascribe to sensations is location. We speak of headaches and toothaches, and of a pain being in one's left foot, for example. Some transitive sensations may share this feature. But propositional attitudes and ordinary perceptual experiences do not: we don't speak of one's having a belief just above one's elbow, or of one's having a visual experience in one's eyes. "Bodily feelings" too lack location. Feeling fresh, tired, sleepy, faint, hungry, thirsty, dizzy and giddy—all these are sometimes classified as bodily feelings. Such feelings are not located about the body, and they also often seem to be more complex than bodily sensations in so far as they seem to have as ingredients propositional attitudes and sensations. Feeling hunger, for example, involves a desire to eat, and it also can—and perhaps conceptually must—involve at least some characteristic sensations such as the feeling of emptiness in the stomach and hunger pangs. And though these sensations are located, it arguably remains odd to ask "Where do you feel
hungry?" In any case, whether or not the class of bodily feelings turns out to be homogenous and importantly distinct from the class of bodily sensations, we would do well for the purposes of this investigation to set aside those feelings which seem not to have a bodily location.

Though we speak of pains as located, puzzles arise if we are led by such talk to suppose that they really are located in the way that physical objects are. For example, take the following two arguments:

(I) (Invalid)  
(1) A has a pain in her finger  
(2) That finger is in her mouth  
(3) Therefore, A has a pain in her mouth.

(II) (Valid)  
(4) A has a ring on her finger  
(5) That finger is in her mouth  
(6) Therefore, A has a ring in her mouth.

If pains were located in the way that rings are, then we might expect (I) to go through as (II) does. Yet it doesn't. Is the reason simply that when we speak of one's having a pain in one's mouth, we mean one's mouth wall, not the cavity; and that A’s finger might be in her mouth without being in her mouth wall? No. To see this, imagine (2) being made true by A’s inserting her finger into an incision made in her mouth wall; if an anaesthetic renders the incision painless, then it’s still the case that (1) and (2) might both be true without A’s having a pain in her mouth in the sense in which she would if, say, she were suffering from a mouth ulcer. So the difference between (I) and (II) persists; the challenge is to account for it.

And here is a related puzzle. Amputees will sometimes locate pains by pointing to a region of empty space beyond their stumps; they feel pains, as we say, in their “phantom limbs”. But when it seemed to Admiral Lord Nelson, for example, that he had pains in a right arm of his, even after his right arm had been amputated and destroyed, where were the pains? Ought we to think of them as mental objects, hovering in thin air near his chest, at the location to which Nelson would point if asked where his pains seemed to be? Since this is the sort of idea that makes many philosophers blush, there is pressure instead to say that Nelson’s pain experience was illusory or even hallucinatory. And yet, as we shall presently see, there is an opposing temptation to rule out illusions and hallucinations as of one’s own pains. Moreover, even if we allow illusions, where else were Nelson’s pains if not floating in thin air? Notice too that, though we may blush about pains in thin air, Nelson’s pains did at least seem to him to be located in a limb of his; indeed, arguably, pains never appear to their subjects to be located beyond the parts of sentient bodies. This is one of the reasons that we

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3 See Block’s MPC, 517; Tye’s RTP, 226 ff.; and Jackson’s PE, 76.
4 See Wittgenstein’s BB, 50.
5 Though not Jackson. See his PE, 54-5, and 77-8.
smile when Mrs Gradgrind remarks, "I think there is a pain somewhere in this room, but I couldn't positively say that I have got it". Why should pains be like this?

Faced with such puzzles about the location of pains, we might say that spatial vocabulary means one thing when applied to pains and another when applied to such items as rings and fingers. But then what does it mean in the former context? It might be suggested that it adverts to some non-representational phenomenological features of literally unlocated pains, features that are somehow associated with bodily locations. But not only would this view need to explain the phrase, "somehow associated", but it is anyway inconsistent with the intuition that we can have phenomenally indistinguishable pains in different locations: one in each ear, for example. Alternatively, it might be conceded that spatial vocabulary is univocal, but insisted that when we seem to apply it to pains, we really mean to be applying it to the causes of pains. But even if this suggestion would help with our puzzles, which is far from clear, it surely neglects cases of "referred" pains—cases precisely in which we distinguish between the location of the pain and the location of its cause, as when heart trouble causes a pain in a person's left arm.

Now, in the remarks above we have proceeded as though, when one is in pain or has a pain, there is just one thing: the sensation, the pain. But it may start to seem as though there are actually two items: one's act of sensory awareness of the pain and the pain itself. After all, we do talk of sensations or feelings of pain, and this can suggest the idea of one's sensing one's pains. Accordingly, we might divide the curious features of pains between two items. Perhaps, for example, it is the object which is located, but the act of awareness which is phenomenally conscious. This picture, however, introduces some curious features of its own.

For one thing—and this is the fifth point—the relevant acts seem rather peculiar. For one's acts of awareness of one's own pains seem to be infallible. It is difficult to make sense of the possibility of an illusory awareness of a pain: an awareness of a pain as a tickle, for instance. It is also difficult to imagine cases of hallucination, in which one has an experience as of a pain, though in fact there is neither a pain nor any other item of which one is aware. So, if they exist at all, such acts of awareness of pains—such episodes of "inner" awareness, or "sensings"—seem to be much more epistemically secure than putative perceivings of physical objects, including somatosensory experiences as of one's own body.

For another thing—the final point—the relevant objects too can strike us as peculiar. For it can seem to be the case that each pain is, necessarily, someone's pain; and that each pain, being somehow "self-intimating", is necessarily an object of someone's (the same

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6 From Dickens, HT, Book II, Chapter 9.
person's) inner awareness. Indeed, it is tempting to say that a pain's existence depends on its being sensed. Moreover, there is something enticing about the idea that each pain is private, in two respects: only one person can have it ("possessional privacy"), and only one person can sense it ("epistemic privacy"). These features seem not to be shared by physical objects. You can be perceptually aware of my skin, and a surgeon can be perceptually aware of my innards, but only I can have inner awareness of my pains. Naturally enough, then, this conception of pains has tended to engender the view that they are non-physical items. It is just not clear that physical items could be self-intimating, or private in either the epistemic or the possessional sense. Pains, according to this picture, have seemed to be the denizens of some non-physical, private, self-intimating, and infallibly accessible "region"—for short, some "inner realm", or "the Cartesian theatre". Indeed, this anti-physicalist tendency is encouraged by some of the other points made above. It is unclear, for example, whether physical items could have locations in the strange, shadowy way that pains seem to, or whether physical items could throb and sting in the way that pains do.

A First Pass at Intentionalism

These, then, are the bodily sensations, and some of the puzzles to which they give rise. As I said at the outset, the central question of this study is whether sensations have content, and if they do, whether their phenomenal features can be accounted for entirely in terms of their content. It can, as I have also said, seem obvious that they are not contentful at all. That, recall, is apt to seem to be a crucial respect in which pains and the rest differ from visual experiences, somatosensory experiences, and other perceptual experiences. Certainly Rorty is expressing a traditional and common attitude when he says that "the obvious objection to defining the mental as the intentional is that pains are not intentional—they do not represent, they are not about anything" (PMN, 22). In this work, I want to investigate a somewhat neglected set of views that oppose this tradition. According to these "intentionalist" views, sensations do after all represent the world as being some way or other, even if it is a very proximate part of the world—the subject's own body—that they represent.

The various incarnations of this approach, it turns out, are certainly not unproblematic. But that hardly sets them apart from other positions in this notoriously difficult area. In this study, I distinguish amongst a number of different versions of the intentionalist approach, and I work through their various motivations and difficulties. Though loose ends remain, the thrust of the discussion is that intentionalism about pain experiences can be vindicated. Moreover, interestingly, I suspect that many thinkers who

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7 See also McGinn, CM, 8; Searle, RM, 2; Block, CFC, 234; O'Shaughnessy, TW, i, 169-70; and, expressed as a worry about defining the mental in terms of intentionality, Davidson, ME, 211.
share my general philosophical commitments are apt to think that these commitments undermine precisely the version of intentionalism which emerges from the following investigation relatively unscathed. It is also worth remarking that, with the model of perceptual experience sharply in focus, the case of bodily sensations turns out to intersect in surprisingly extensive and illuminating ways with a number of other deep philosophical problems: problems about self-awareness, primary and secondary qualities, microphysical natural kinds, and the experiences and thoughts in which such items are represented. I shall draw out these connections as we proceed.

2. EXPERIENCE AND REPRESENTATIONAL CONTENT

The Lockean Tradition

A good way to start is by thinking about the relevant notion of representational content, and by thinking about it in connection with ordinary perceptual experiences. Notice first that, though I have said that visual and other ordinary perceptual experiences are more obviously contentful than the bodily sensations, even the thesis that visual experiences have representational content is reactionary by the lights of a certain tradition. Indeed, the intentionalist approach to sensations involves a pleasing and precise reversal of that tradition. For according to the tradition I have in mind, perceptual experiences are to be modelled on sensations, blankly conceived, whereas for the intentionalist sensations are to be modelled on perceptual experiences, intentionally conceived.

Saying a little more about this Lockean tradition (as I shall call it) will help us presently to elucidate the notion of representational content. According to that tradition, then, even perceptual experiences are conceived as "representationally blank". This is not to say that Locke and others denied that perceptual experiences provide subjects with information (and misinformation) about the world. It is rather to say that they modelled the informativeness of perceptual experiences on the informativeness of representationally blank sensations. These they considered informative only to the extent that, given knowledge of correlations between types of sensations and types of external circumstances, the subject can reasonably infer conclusions about the world from his sensations. On this view, then, sensations are informative only in these limited sorts of ways; they are informative, we might say, only extrinsically. And so too, according to the same tradition, are perceptual experiences.

8 The phrase is from Ayers, who convincingly argues against Yolton that this "blank effect" model ought to be attributed to Locke, citing amongst other things precisely this assimilation in Locke of "ideas" to pains, blankly conceived (LK, i, 63).
Representational Content Proper

The intentionalist view that perceptual experiences have representational content is not the view that they are informative only in those limited ways. Rather, it involves the assimilation of such experiences to beliefs and occurrent thoughts, at least in respect of the way in which these items represent the world. And how is that? Well, by enjoying representational content in the following sense:

Representational Content

A mental state or episode's having representational content is a matter of its being, of itself, either true or false, and its being accessible by its subject.

The content of a mental item is canonically expressed by a declarative sentence embedded as part of a "that"-clause within another sentence ascribing the item to a subject. Thus "A believes that lemons are red" ascribes to a subject, A, a belief with the false content, Lemons are red; the embedded sentence (which I italicise outside of "that"-clauses) gives the truth-condition of his belief, the state of affairs that would have to obtain in order for his belief to be true. So contentful states are either true or false. Notice, though, that their contents are not individuated merely according to the referents of the terms constituting the content sentence; the individuation of contents cuts finer than that, exploiting instead the sense of the relevant terms, the modes of presentation they express. A subject can believe, Hesperus is my favourite heavenly body, without believing, Phosphorus is my favourite heavenly body, even though the referent of both "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" is the planet Venus. This, anyway, is a thumbnail sketch of the notion of representational content that I intend when I speak of content or representation outside of scare quotes.

Two features of the above definition need emphasising. First, representational content is accessible by its subject; it is "personal-level" content. That is, roughly, a state's representational content is by definition a matter of the world's being represented in some way by a comprehending subject. By contrast, the "content" enjoyed by the computational states which cognitive psychologists characteristically invoke in order to explain certain sorts of behaviour is "sub-personal". To explain an organism's catching a ball, for example, the cognitive psychologist adverts to various states which "represent" mathematical equations and various complex data; but such "content" is not representational content, since a subject

9 Hopefully, even desires and other non-judgemental states and episodes can be said to be true or false in the relevant sense. If I desire that it be the case that I shall win the lottery, then my desire is false, if I shall not win the lottery. Another question is what to say about the belief that the present King of France is bald. On a Russellian line, though, we can simply answer that it is false. In any case, the formulation in the text will do for our purposes.

10 See Dennett's C&C, 93-6, for the original distinction between the personal and sub-personal levels.
(or his brain) can be in such a state without that state’s “content” being understood by him, without its being available for him to cite in rationalisations of his actions, for example.

The second important feature of the definition is that representational content is intrinsic content. If a state is true, for example, in the sense reflecting its contentfulness, then it must be true of itself, as opposed to the subject’s merely taking it to stand for some state of affairs which in fact obtains, or inferring something true from it, or having been caused by it to make some true judgement. A subject’s undergoing an episode that is contentful in my sense is itself a matter of his representing the world. The claim that experiences have genuine content is thus to be contrasted with a “two-component view”, which accounts for the “contentfulness” of a mental episode in terms of the obtaining of two circumstances: first, the subject’s undergoing the episode; and second, the episode’s causing, or becoming the object of, or becoming the grounds for some further representational episode.

So the intentionalist about perceptual experiences takes them to have representational content. By contrast, the Lockean thinks of such experiences as like pictures, or perhaps like the blips on a radar screen—that is, as items that represent something to a subject only by dint of his taking them in one way rather than another, or his inferring from them. Now some contemporary Lockleans, or “informationalists” as I shall call them, insist that such items as radar blips or the rings on tree stumps have “informational content” independently of their being inferred from, or being taken in some way. Rather, their having such “content” is simply a matter of the appropriate causal relationships obtaining between the types to which the blips or rings belong, on the one hand, and the “represented” types of circumstance, on the other. Experiences too, it will be said, have such informational “content” ; and, in their case, this is a matter of the appropriate correlations obtaining between, on the one hand, the experiences’ intrinsic mental features (for example, their qualitative features, on some versions of the view) and, on the other hand, external circumstances. Such a view is another incarnation of a two-component conception; for the subject’s “representing” the world requires the obtaining of two circumstances: first, his undergoing a mental episode; and second, there obtaining certain correlations between the episode’s intrinsic features and the “represented” subject matter.

I’ve no objection to the notion of informational “content”. But there is a problem in supposing it to be representational content. It takes the form of a dilemma. Either an experience’s having such “content” depends on its subject taking such causal relationships into account, or it does not. If we say (with traditional Lockleans) that it does, then the “content” is extrinsic; if we say (with contemporary Lockleans) that it does not, then the

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11 I do not mean to deny that having an experience with representational content requires having other states too.
"content" is surely sub-personal, for it becomes difficult to see how mere correlations could of themselves be relevant to what the subject is informed of by experiences whose intrinsic features are independent of those correlations. To sharpen the second horn of this dilemma, notice that a subject and his doppelgänger, situated in environments in which different correlations obtain, might in all mental respects be intrinsically the same, and yet differ in respect of their states' informational "contents". The crucial point is that such a difference, which makes no difference to the subjects' most fundamental mental characterisations, is not a difference in their personal-level psychologies; and hence it is not a difference in genuine representational content.\textsuperscript{12}

**Judgements and Conceptual Content**

That, in any case, is how we shall understand the notion of representational content. In passing, it is worth remarking on a final issue. If perceptual experiences have representational content like judgements and beliefs, does this mean that they just are judgements or beliefs? I don't think it does. For one thing, you can experience something you know to be false. For another thing, contra Armstrong (MTM, 140), an experience isn't even an inclination to believe. As Evans reminds us: "it is not the case that we simply find ourselves with a yen to apply some concept—a conviction that it has application in the immediate vicinity" (VR, 229). Rather, one makes a perceptual judgement on the basis of one's experience; one's making it is not the exercise of a disposition that is the experience.

But if perceptual experiences are not judgements, then in what does the difference consist? I am inclined to reject, albeit dogmatically, the following answer: that whereas if one makes a judgement, one must possess every concept which figures in the canonical specification of its content, no such requirement needs to be met in order for one to have a contentful experience. So I endorse what we might call "content conceptualism",\textsuperscript{13} rejecting the notion of non-conceptual content invoked by Evans and others. By my lights, if one's experience has the content This is F, then one must possess the concept F. After all, as Peacocke once put the conceptualist case, an experience "can hardly present the world as being [some] way [to a subject] if the subject is incapable of appreciating what that way is" (S&C, 7). So experiences, like judgements and thoughts, involve the operation of their subjects' conceptual capacities.

But this need not obliterate the distinction between experiences and thoughts. The content of experiences is far richer than the content of judgements. A further, crucial

\textsuperscript{12}I say more about informational "content" and two-component conceptions in Chapter 5, §1. See also Child's CIM, 148.

\textsuperscript{13}Closely related to "reason conceptualism", on which I say more in Chapter 2, §1.1.
difference, as we shall see in Chapter 2, is that experiences are passive in a way in which judgements are not: there is a sense in which we choose what to think, and do so on the basis of reasons, whereas such an idea seems quite inapplicable to experiences. This is related to experiences’ distinctive epistemological role. The reasons on the basis of which we choose what to think are, for a crucial class of judgements, experiences. Our thinking is rationally constrained by experiences—hence the significance of Evans’s point that in thought we do not “simply find ourselves with a yen to apply some concept”—and experiences can play this constraining role only because of their passivity.

With these elucidatory remarks about intentional content on board, it is time to sharpen our formulation of the intentionalist position.

3. VARIETIES OF INTENTIONALISM

So far, I have provided only a rough characterisation of intentionalism about sensations. Here is a better approximation of the view on which I shall focus, formulated for the case of pain experiences—that is, those experiences in virtue of which subjects are in pain.

Radical Intentionalism about Pain Experiences

(1) Complete Phenomenological Quality of Pain Experiences consists in Content
A pain experience’s phenomenological quality consists entirely in its having a certain representational content.  

This is the core of radical intentionalism, but I also take the radical intentionalist to be committed to the following three claims, the last of which follows from the preceding two:

(2) Pain consists in a Certain Phenomenological Quality
An experience’s being a pain experience wholly consists in its having a certain phenomenological quality.

(3) That “Pain” Quality consists in Content
An experience’s having that phenomenological quality wholly consists in its having a certain representational content.

(4) Pain consists in Content
An experience’s being a pain experience wholly consists in its having a certain representational content.

Three remarks are in order. First, notice that (1) goes beyond (3) and (4) by ruling out a pain experience’s having even those non-representational phenomenological features that are inessential to the episode’s being a pain experience. Second, although radical intentionalism about pain experiences says nothing about experiences of other types, it is a natural

14 I shall distinguish in Chapter 5, §3.3, between two notions of phenomenology. For now, I ignore such complications.
ingredient in what I call "broad radical intentionalism", a view on which the phenomenological quality of all experiences is entirely intentional. Third, radical intentionalism is, at least on its face, compatible with many different accounts of pain experiences on offer in the philosophical canon: behaviourist, functionalist, criteriological, interpretationist, neural reductionist, and dualist. All that is required is that these be understood as accounts of what it is for a pain experience to have its content and thereby, according to the radical intentionalist, its phenomenology.

Now, radical intentionalism is the view I shall have in focus for most of this study. But there is also space for a view I call "weak intentionalism". This view concedes that pain experiences have representational content, and perhaps that there is a content that all pain experiences must have, but it insists that these episodes' being pain experiences is at least partly a matter of their possessing phenomenological qualities that are non-representational. Evans can seem to be expressing a version of this account when he claims that a subject who is in pain "perceives (or appears to perceive) a part of his body in a way which is awful", its awfulness being a "non-informational" property of an "informational state" (VR, 230-31).

This view of Evans's, however, also enables me to enter a caveat about my terminology. Evans allows cases in which the "informational states" involved in a subject's being in pain have only "informational content", not representational content proper. Strictly, then, his view is not a version even of weak intentionalism. Having said that, it is worth noting that I shall not always be strict about this point. I shall sometimes speak of Tye's view, for example, as an intentionalist view, even though the species of "content" he thinks pain experiences enjoy falls far short of genuine representational content. What is crucial, however, is that when I come to defend intentionalism, I shall have in mind intentionalist views that are strictly so called, views that invoke the robust notion of content set out in §2 above.

Now, amongst radical intentionalist accounts of pain experiences, I want to draw two crucial distinctions. First, we can distinguish between "mentalist" and "non-mentalist" accounts: that is, between those which claim and those which deny that the content of pain experiences is to be specified, at least in part, by intuitively mental concepts like pain or hurting, as opposed to non-mental concepts like injury or nociceptor activity. (I postpone until Chapter 4, §2, the question what it is for a concept or property to be mental.) Second, we can draw a distinction between "subjectivist" and "objectivist" views: that is, between

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15 There is also room for a moderate intentionalism, intermediate between the radical and weak versions. It would claim against the weak intentionalist that experiences are pain experiences entirely in virtue of their content, and against the radical intentionalist that they nonetheless have further non-representational phenomenological features. This is, in other words, a view that rejects (1), but accepts (2), (3), and (4). For simplicity, though, I ignore it.

16 For more on the non-representational properties that the weak intentionalist goes in for, see §§5.3 and 5.4.
those which claim and those which deny that the subject matter of pain experiences is, at least in part, constitutively dependent on its being represented in such experiences. The first distinction is between two classes of view about what circumstances pain experiences represent; the second is between two classes of metaphysical view about what it is for those circumstances to obtain.

These two distinctions can seem naturally to coincide, the field thus being divided between mentalist subjectivists and non-mentalist objectivists. And that is the organising principle of this study: in Chapters 2 and 3, I discuss intentionalist views that are both mentalist and subjectivist; in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 I primarily focus on views that are neither. In addition, though, there are views that straddle this divide, combining mentalism with objectivism; I look at these in Chapter 4, §2, and in Chapter 6, §2.3.

In view of this plethora of options, it will be useful to have a map of the territory before we embark; so here, diagrammatically, is my taxonomy of radical intentionalist accounts of pain experiences:

Now let us consider the alternatives to intentionalism.

4. ANTI-INTENTIONALIST ACCOUNTS

4.1 The Traditional Act-Object Conception

The Lockean tradition is anti-intentionalist; it has also tended to incorporate the “act-object” conception of perceptual experience, the thesis—as Locke puts it—that the mind “perceives nothing but its own ideas” (ESS, 563/IV:4:3). Well into the twentieth century, this was the
dominant account of perceptual experience, but today it is largely eschewed, and rightly so. Nonetheless, it is worth our sharpening our grasp of what the act-object conception is, for a number of reasons. First, the act-object conception can seem particularly appealing in the case of sensation experience, as against ordinary perceptual experience. Second, it tends to be regarded as an anti-intentionalist conception, as an alternative to which the intentionalist approach has been developed. However—and this is the third point—we turn in the next chapter to McDowell’s intentionalist version of the act-object conception, and to understand McDowell it will be helpful to understand the traditional act-object conception from which he is departing. And finally, despite its faults, there is something right about the act-object conception, something that will be preserved in any good intentionalist account of ordinary perceptual experiences.

Articulating the Conception

Here, then, is the act-object conception of what it is for a subject to have an experience as of an F G (a red cube, for example), and an allied account of the perceptual relation:

The Act-Object Conception of Perceptual Experience

(1) In all cases (perception and hallucination, veridical and illusory) a subject’s having an experience as of an F G consists in there obtaining some relationship of awareness between the subject and some item, x, that is either (i) F-like and G-like or (ii) an F G.

(2) x is non-physical.

Indirect Realism

(3) When the experience as of an F G is involved in the subject’s perceiving an experience-independent (hereafter, throughout this study, “objective”) object, y, x is numerically distinct from y. Again, perceptual awareness of an objective object is always indirect in the sense that it involves one’s standing in some relationship of awareness to an item, x, distinct from the perceived object, y.

So, on this conception, one’s having a visual experience as of a red cube is a matter of one’s being aware of something distinct from any red cube: a non-physical red-like cube-like item, a “sense-datum” in Russell’s terminology. And if this relational state of affairs, the episode

\[\text{Notice that this is an account of what it is merely to have an experience as of a red cube. There are act-object accounts also of what it is for an experience to be conscious in a certain sense, and of what it is for one to introspect one’s experience. Though related to the act-object conception of perceptual experience, these views are not identical to it.}\]

\[\text{For Locke, it is the sense-datum (or “idea”) that is literally red, in the primary sense, not merely red-like. It is unclear what properties red-like and cube-like are, of course—let alone “bear-like”, which the sense-datum theorist might seem to be committed to in the case of experiences as of bears. One way of avoiding this last commitment would be to adopt a restrictive conception of what our experiences can be as of. I call this conception “minimalism”, and discuss it in §5.4 below and in Chapter 5.}\]
Chapter 1. Intentionalism and Its Alternatives

of "inner" awareness of a sense-datum, itself stands in an appropriate (perhaps causal) relationship to a physical object, then it will count as a perceiving of that object—a veridical perceiving if the object in question is a red cube. Notice, incidentally, that the relationship between the subject and the non-physical sense-datum is supposed to be one of awareness: a sense-datum is not supposed to be involved merely in some sub-personal explanation of an experience; and nor is a sense-datum, say, a state that the subject is merely in.19 The relevant notion of awareness is also factive: if one is aware of an item in this sense, then that item exists.

Disjunctivism and the Act-Object Conception

I said that there is something right about the act-object conception. I had in mind something it shares with the "disjunctive conception" of perceptual experience. Telegraphically, the disjunctivist says this: a taxonomy of psychological states capable of doing justice to the epistemological role and phenomenology of experiences will not count a veridical perceiving of a red cube and an hallucination as of a red cube as belonging to the same kind, even though they are both experiences as of red cubes, and even though the subject can sometimes mistake one for the other.20 Rather, what is crucial (in these respects) to the perceiving is its intrinsic content: This(y) is red. And since that content is object-involving—it is available only if the subject stands in the perceptual relation to that particular object, y—it is not shared by the hallucinatory experience. The perceptual and hallucinatory episodes, therefore, have no common ingredient. Now, the act-object and disjunctive conceptions are in one way radically opposed to one another: the act-object conception distances the mind from the world, while disjunctivism re-acquaints them. It is intriguing, then, that the disjunctivist can accept a claim that is in a way quite close to the act-object theorist's principal tenet, (1): he can accept the result of substituting in (1) the phrase "in the case of veridical perception" for the phrase "in all cases". In the case of veridical perception, that is, the disjunctivist just identifies the immediate object of awareness, x, and the perceived objective object, y, and therefore rejects (2) and (3). This reflects the fact that the act-object theorist and the disjunctivist share the following claim:

The Instantiation Claim

In the case of veridical perception, the phenomenal quality of an experience consists in the actual instantiation of certain properties by an item of which the subject is, in having

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19 So Sellars's "sense impressions" are not sense-data (see his EPM); nor are Russell's perceptual intermediaries, if Crane is right in interpreting Russell as making the bizarre claim that "the immediate object of perception ... is [not] necessarily phenomenologically detectable" (see Crane, CE, 3). See also Russell's PP, and McCulloch's VIP, 48, n. 7.

20 See Child's CIM, 143-46, for a more complete formulation and further references. Accepting this may be made easier by the distinction I draw between two notions of phenomenology in Chapter 5, §3.3.
that very experience, aware. (The experience’s quality is, as it were, inherited from the object of awareness.)

For the disjunctivist, this is just the point that the phenomenal quality of a perceiving is a matter of its content, and that the relevant content is object-dependent. Hence in the perceiving case, he agrees with the act-object theorist that the experience as of a red cube essentially involves the awareness of an object, and that its most basic, intrinsic characterisation adverts to that object. That is what I think it right about the act-object conception.

What is wrong is that the act-object theorist is persuaded of the following idea:

**The Non-Disjunctive Claim**
The explanations of the phenomenal quality of an episode of hallucination (or illusory perception), on the one hand, and any subjectively indistinguishable episode of veridical perception, on the other, must be precisely parallel.

On this basis, the act-object theorist embraces an extended instantiation claim, substituting the phrase “in all cases” for “in the case of veridical perception”. This extended claim paves the way from (1) to both (2) and (3): the claims about the non-physicality of the immediate object of awareness and about the indirectness of perception. To see this, start with the latter. If the extended instantiation claim is right that the quality of an hallucination as of a red cube is constituted by the subject’s awareness (in that very case) of items of just the same sort as those he is aware of in the case of veridical perception, then in neither case can those items be red cubes, since in the hallucinatory case there is by definition no red cube of which the subject is aware. Hence, even in the veridical perceiving case, x (the item which constitutively explains the experience’s quality) must be distinct from y (the red cube perceived). This is just the derivation of indirect realism, (3), via the argument from illusion. To recap:

**The Argument from Illusion**
(a) The instantiation claim
(b) The non-disjunctive claim
(c) Therefore, the extended instantiation claim
(d) Therefore, indirect realism—that is, claim (3) of the act-object conception

And what about (2), the claim about the non-physicality of the direct object of awareness? Well, the argument from illusion, formulated above for experiences as of red cubes, will apply to any type of experience—experience as of F Gs, say—that has hallucinatory (or illusory) instances; and it will require that all experiences of that type involve an immediate object of awareness other than an F G. So a class of items, the J Ks, can bring to an end this
positing of further objects of awareness only if there is no such thing as an hallucinatory experience as of a J K. One thing that makes claim (2) tempting, then, is the idea that any class of objects—red-like cube-like sense-data, perhaps—of which hallucinatory and illusory experiences are impossible can surely not be physical.21

Against the Act-Object Conception of Perceptual Experience

Shoemaker has said that if he is mistaken in “thinking that [the act-object] conception is wrong as applied to experiencing [pains], then the whole philosophical establishment has been mistaken in its rejection of the sense-datum theory of perception” (I&S, 136).22 I suggested at the outset that, on the contrary, the act-object conception can seem more plausible in the case of sensations than in the case of perceptual experiences; it can seem as though it might survive the rejection of perceptual sense-data. To see this, it is worth first rehearsing three problems with the conception in the perceptual case. First, the indirect realist conception of perceptual awareness embodied in the act-object conception is epistemologically problematic. If all that we are ever immediately aware of are sense-data, then how do we gain empirical knowledge about the objects we take ourselves to be perceiving? Perhaps if one knew about correlations between sense-data and worldly circumstances, then one might be able to infer from the sense-data that one encounters; but how could one possibly have knowledge of such a correlation? Second, it is particularly dubious to suppose that episodes of awareness of perceptual intermediaries could ever of themselves count as good, non-inferential, personal-level reasons for judgements about the objective world. After all, these are episodes of acquaintance with something other than the external world. Given that, indirect realism arguably threatens not only our knowledge of the external world, but also our capacity to so much as entertain thoughts about it.23 Finally, (2) raises the metaphysical hackles of most contemporary philosophers. They find such non-physical items as sense-data unacceptably mysterious. Now the thrust of these objections seems to me to be right, so the argument from illusion must be unsound. And indeed it is: some would reject even the limited instantiation claim, (a); disjunctivists such as myself will rather reject the non-disjunctive claim, (b), and the consequent extension of the instantiation claim to the hallucinatory case.

21 Perhaps we could make do with a special, infallible mode of awareness, without invoking special non-physical objects. But there are other motivations for (2). See Lycan’s C&E.

22 Shoemaker says “after-images”, rather than “pains”, but it is clear from the context that he has both in mind.

23 This suggestion is elucidated in the next chapter. The move blocks the idea that we can get to the external world via an argument to the best explanation. (See Child, CIM, 147.) Notice that it is an instructive theme in McDowell’s writings that these broadly epistemological problems face not only the act-object theorist, but any non-disjunctivist or (more generally) anti-intentionalist. See McDowell’s CDK, and also §5.3 below.
The Act-Object Conception of Pain Experiences

Consider now the act-object conception in the pain case.

The Act-Object Conception of One's Being in Pain

(1*) A subject's having a pain experience consists in this: there obtaining some relationship of awareness between the subject and a pain.

(2*) Pains are non-physical items. 24

This is the conception I mentioned in §1. It is more plausible than the parallel conception of perceptual experience for two reasons. First, in the sensation case, the act-object theorist does not need to invoke analogical properties such as “red-like” and “cube-like”; the item that explains the quality of the pain experience is, quite simply, a pain. 25 Second, nothing here corresponds to indirect realism. If the adherent of the act-object conception of pain experiences assumes that pain experiences never relate us perceptually to the world, then there is no perceptual relation which he need think of as indirect. 26 So if the view is intended in this way, then the broadly epistemological objections marshalled against the act-object conception of perceptual experience seem to be ineffective against the parallel conception of pain experiences. This is one reason why the latter view is more tenacious than the former.

But is the act-object conception of pain experiences also less motivated? In fact, I think the reverse is true. Admittedly, the argument from illusion does not even seem to motivate the idea of pains-as-objects: if pain experiences are not involved in episodes of perceptual awareness, then they are not involved in hallucinations either, and hence the argument from illusion get no purchase in this case. That is, pains-as-objects, unlike perceptual sense-data, are not introduced to account for the common character of episodes of perception and hallucination. Nevertheless, there are other motivations for them. 27

For one thing, we certainly speak as though there are pains, and as though we are aware of them when we are in pain. We talk, for example, not only of one's being in pain, but also of one's having a pain, and even of one's feeling or being aware of a pain. The act-object conception merely takes such talk at face value. For another thing, there is an intuition that in having a pain experience, one seems to be aware of something, and that therefore one surely must on some occasions actually be aware of something. This intuition is supported

24 I mention in Chapter 2, §3.1, a further phenomenological claim that can naturally be taken to be implicit in the act-object conception of pain experiences.

25 In this respect, the account resembles the disjunctivist's account of the veridical perception case, which also requires no such properties as red-like and the rest.

26 Notice that, for those who adopt an indirect realist conception of ordinary perception, there is a question why our pain experiences never count as perceptions of the objective world. The answer usually given is that those experiences are not related in sufficiently reliable ways to the world, or that they do not have qualities sufficiently analogous to those possessed by worldly items. See Chapter 2, §4.3.

27 I enlarge on these in the next chapter, §3.
both by ordinary language and by the extended instantiation claim. Now the parallel intuition about perceptual experience can be accommodated by the fact that, in having a perceptual experience, we are sometimes aware of something—precisely when that experience is a perceiving of some object. But in the case of pain experiences, it is less obvious that we can satisfy the intuition by adverting to episodes of perceptual awareness of physical objects—precisely because, as I put it in §1, pain experiences seem to be less "transparent" to the world than perceptual experiences. Rather, the intuition is simply that we are sometimes aware of pains. Pains can seem to be the only items available as objects of pain experience. So, not only does the act-object conception in the pain case lack the broadly epistemological difficulties it has in the case of perceptual experience, but it is advanced on different and theoretically simpler grounds.

So far, then, this alternative to intentionalism is faring rather well—worryingly well, it might seem, if you're an intentionalist. Here are two considerations to steady the nerves. First, even if pains do not pose the same epistemological problems as other sense-data, there is still the question of their peculiarities. Even independently of the argument from illusion, which gets no purchase in the pain case, there is a strong inclination to rule out illusory or hallucinatory sensings of pains, as we saw in §1, and this would seem to require them to be rather peculiar items. Moreover, pains-as-objects have other peculiar features: as we also saw, they can seem to be self-intimating, necessarily owned, and epistemically and possessionally private; moreover, unlike perceptual sense-data, they are located about bodies in a rather puzzling fashion, and they sting and throb and so on. Suffice it to say, for now, that the act-object conception of pains is some distance from being entirely unproblematic.

Second, to articulate a point that may have been pressing for some time, it may turn out that an act-object conception of pain experiences is available to the intentionalist anyway. After all, the act-object theorist takes pain experiences to involve a subject's awareness of pains. An intentionalist version of the act-object conception is precisely the view McDowell adopts, as we shall see in the next chapter. But care is needed here. For one thing, there is a clear sense in which the act-object conception of perceptual experience is anti-intentionalist. On that conception, after all, an experience as of a green cube informs its subject of the presence of a green cube only in the sense that it involves his being aware of something distinct from any green cube: a representationally blank sense-datum, which plays an epistemological role akin to a blip on a radar screen. So the relational episodes that the act-object theorist casts as ordinary perceptual experiences (and pain experiences) lack genuine representational content concerning the objective world. For another thing, when it comes to pain experiences, McDowell is quite clear that the traditional act-object account is anti-intentionalist here too, even as regards its conception of the sensings—the episodes of inner
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awareness. Still, there is room, McDowell thinks, to improve on the traditional approach, and to regard those episodes of inner awareness as properly intentional, not vis-à-vis the objective world, of course, but vis-à-vis the pains that are their objects. However this may be, many intentionalists are motivated by the desire to eschew the act-object conception, and that is the principal reason why I have sketched it here.

Particulars and Substances

Finally, a note about my formulation of the act-object conception. I have eschewed the common practice of characterising the conception in terms of its introduction of mental particulars. For in the sense in which “particular” is contrasted with “universal”, even those who would take themselves to oppose the act-object conception might concede that there are such particulars, for they might regard token mental events, attributes, or states as particulars. Nor would it be right to follow Shoemaker and Cassam in characterising the act-object conception as the view that pains or perceptual sense-data are substances. That characterisation does, admittedly, fit Hume’s view, on which “all our perceptions ... have no need of any thing else to support their existence” (THN, 233/I:4:5). But it does not fit Russell’s or Jackson’s views, nor the views of all the other act-object theorists who have insisted that sense-data depend on their being sensed. Hence my preference for the formulation above.

Having considered the act-object conception, I now turn to its most popular rival: adverbialism, a second anti-intentionalist account.

4.2. The Adverbial and State Theories

We certainly speak as though there are pains, and as though when one is in pain, one is aware of a pain. Similarly, we speak of having a green square after-image, for example, and even of seeing or experiencing such an after-image. The act-object conception, we noted, takes such talk at face value. Adverbialism does not. Where the act-object conception adverts to a relationship of awareness obtaining between a subject and various sense-data, the adverbialist talks instead of the ways in which subjects sense, where ways of sensing are not individuated in terms of any objects of sensing. This move is typically augmented by a re-casting of natural language: “A feels a pain in his left foot” becomes “A senses a-pain-in-his-left-foot-ly”, and “A experiences a green square after-image” becomes “A senses green-square-ly”.

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28 Though Steward opposes the idea that token states are particulars. See her OM.
29 Notoriously, Hume goes on to equivocate about the independence of perceptions.
30 See Russell’s PP, 6, Jackson’s PN, 53, and Valberg’s PE.
It’s not pretty, but it’s often thought to do the job: namely, to provide an alternative to the act-object account.31

In what follows, I present an act-object theorist’s objection to adverbialism: that is, Jackson’s “many properties” problem.32 I cannot do enough here to show that the objection conclusively dispatches adverbialism, but I can do enough to place a question mark over adverbialism, and thus to enable us to appreciate one of the merits of intentionalism: namely, its capacity to meet the many-properties challenge without indulging the act-object conception. So notice that I am presenting adverbialism, like the act-object conception, as competing with intentionalism. The adverbialist I have in mind does not think that the episode he describes as “sensing red-squarely” counts as such and has its phenomenal character—by virtue of its possession of some representational content, such as There is a red square in front of me.33 Again, the adverbialist will not, whereas the intentionalist will, take “red” to have its ordinary physical-object sense in “A has an experience as of a red square”. So my adverbialist is an anti-intentionalist.

Jackson’s objection can get rather involved, so let us set out the ingredients at the start:

I. (Invalid)
(1) A has (or feels), at t, a sensation which is in his left foot [F: is in his left foot]
(2) A has (or feels), at t, a sensation which is a pain [G: is a pain]
(3) Therefore, A has (or feels), at t, a sensation which is both in his left foot and a pain

II (Valid?)
(4) A senses, at t, in-his-left-foot-ly [F*: in-his-left-foot-ly]
(5) A senses, at t, a-pain-ly [G*: a-pain-ly]
(6) Therefore, A senses, at t, in-his-left-foot-ly and a-pain-ly
[(7) A senses, at t, in-his-left-foot-ly a-pain-ly]

III (Valid?)
(8) A sings, at t, wonderfully [F': wonderfully]
(9) A sings, at t, loudly [G': loudly]
(10) Therefore, A sings, at t, wonderfully and loudly.
[(11) A sings, at t, wonderfully loudly]

31 Notice, incidentally, that adverbialists will sometimes identify their target in a different way. Emphasising the re-casting of “A had a seductive smile” as “A smiled seductively”, they take themselves to be out to show that just as smiles do not exist, nor do pains or after-images. But that is unnecessarily provocative. Even the adverbialist opponent of the act-object conception can concede that if “A has a seductive smile on his face” and “A has a pain in his foot” are both true, then there is a sense in which smiles and pains exist. What he really wants to point out is not that pains do not exist, nor (merely) that they are not substances, but that they are not the objects of episodes of awareness which constitute our pain experiences.

32 See Jackson’s EMO and PE, 60 and 64-8. See also Lycan’s CN and C&E for a somewhat similar objection.

33 If he did, then it is unclear why, given intentionalism’s superior performance with regard to such issues as the many-properties problem, the adverbialist would take his adverbial paraphrase to be more perspicuous than the intentional one.
The adverbialist wants to hold that (I) is equivalent to (II). The problem he faces is that (I) is invalid, whereas (II) seems valid, provided we have a model like (III) in mind. Think of the problem as follows. For the act-object theorist, the reason (I) is invalid is that F and G can be instantiated, respectively and simultaneously, by two distinct sensations-as-objects; F and G can be, as it were, “kept apart” from one another, even though (1) and (2) refer to only one subject and one time. When it comes to (II), by contrast, Jackson takes his adverbialist opponent to claim that sensings are “unitary”, not “relational”, states or events. For the moment, this means that if (4) and (5) both refer to the same subject and the same time, then there can be only one sensing at issue; so if A undergoes a sensing in-his-left-foot-ly at t, and also undergoes a sensing a-pain-ly at t, then it must be one and the same sensing that he undergoes in those two ways. Hence F* and G* can not be kept apart, and the conclusion follows: (II) is rendered valid, whereas the adverbialist needs it to be invalid, like (I).  

One adverbialist response to this problem is to deny that his proposed equivalent of (3) ought to have the conjunctive structure that (6) has, which seems to allow (6) to follow, problematically, from the relevant premises. For example, the adverbialist might suggest that (3) is equivalent not to (6) but to (7), where (7) is in turn to be understood on the model of (11). The claim would be that just as “wonderfully” in (11) modifies “loudly”, not “sings”, so “in-his-left-foot-ly” in (7) modifies “a-pain-ly”, not “senses”. This seems to help because the argument generated by substituting (11) for (10) is, like (I), invalid: A can sing wonderfully and reasonably loudly, without singing wonderfully loudly. Modelled on that argument, then, the argument produced by substituting (7) for (6) is plausibly invalid too; and that is what the adverbialist wanted. But this response fails. For notice that (1) follows from (3). Given this, the adverbialist needs (4) to follow from (7). But if (8) and (11) are respectively the models, then it does not: for as I myself could conclusively demonstrate, it does not follow from one’s singing wonderfully loudly that one sings wonderfully.  

Now one step that went by rather fast was Jackson’s assumption that the adverbialist will take sensings to be “unitary”. A unitary state of a person (or a unitary event of which he is the subject) is one “not essentially involving anything over and above that person” (PE, 59; EMO, 35). And this, Jackson says, is linked to the fact that “for a given person at a time, there cannot be more than one unitary state of a given kind” (op. cit.). For example, being warm is a unitary state, according to Jackson, whereas being warmer than is a relational

34 Jackson’s complement objection is a variation on this theme. To express it, replace the occurrence of “a pain” in (2) with “not in his left foot”; and replace the occurrence of “a-pain-ly” in (5) with “not in-his-left-foot-ly”. The point is that, whereas both (1) and (2) can be true, it is not the case that both (4) and (5) can be. If you cannot sing at t wonderfully and not wonderfully, then you cannot sense at t both in-your-left-foot-ly and not in-your-left-foot-ly.

35 It is another way of putting this point to say that, if “in-his-left-foot-ly” is used in (4) in the way it is in (7), then (4) makes as little sense as “A sang wonderfully” when “wonderfully” is taken as it is in (11), which would in turn be like saying “A sang allegedly” without saying how A allegedly sang. It would be problematic if (4) is senseless, of course, given the equivalence the adverbialist claims between it and (1).
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state. There cannot be more instances of a person's being warm in a room than there are persons; but I can be warmer than this glass of water, and warmer than that paper clip, and in that sense be in two simultaneous states of being warmer than. So, by Jackson's lights, the adverbialist faces the following dilemma. Sensings are either unitary or relational. If they are unitary, then the many-properties problem looms: that is, A can undergo only one sensing at a time, so F* and G* cannot be kept apart, and hence (II) ends up problematically valid. If they are relational, by contrast, then the adverbialist fails to make any ontological gain over the act-object theorist.

This latter horn of the dilemma requires some sharpening. It is one thing to agree with Jackson that a subject can simultaneously be in distinct states, of the same basic type (a notion he leaves opaque), only by dint of each state being a matter of the subject's standing in a relation to a distinct item: V-ing φ-ly with respect to x, and V-ing ψ-ly with respect to y, for example. But it is another thing to agree with Jackson that the only plausible candidates for x and y in the case of sensings are "mental objects" (PE, 69, 71). That further claim can seem too quick. Might one not hold that a subject can sense an-itch-ly with respect to his left foot, and sense a-pain-ly with respect to his right foot, and insist that these are separate sensings, given their different physical relata? Jackson's complaint against this suggestion is that in a phantom limb case, it is not plausible to take one's being in pain to be a matter of one's standing in some relation to a body part (PE, 54). Moreover, we might add on Jackson's behalf that if his opponent is a thoroughgoing adverbialist, then he will not want sensings to relate subjects even to non-mental objects or locations: the location of a sensation, or the location of an after-image in the visual field, will itself be accounted for by this adverbialist in terms of such adverbs as "in-his-left-foot-ly" or "next-to-ly" (PE, 65). Jackson's view, at any rate, is that the adverbialist can render (II) invalid only if he distinguishes the sensings reported in (4) and (5) by saying that they are sensings of distinct sensations—by, in other words, giving up adverbialism for Jackson's act-object conception.

But, as I shall illustrate in Chapter 4, Jackson neglects another option: namely, intentionalism. To anticipate, rather abstractly for now, the intentionalist will say that it is easy to keep the relevant properties apart from one another in the required cases not because there are two distinct sensings that can instantiate them, but rather because the relevant properties will be experientially represented as being apart, as being separately instantiated.

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36 Jackson's principle seems to be something like the following. "One subject at one time can be the subject of more than one state or event of a given basic type only if either the state or event itself, or the item it involves the subject standing in a relation to, belongs to a category of which the following is true: the claim that mental items belong to that category just amounts to the act-object conception." On this characterisation of the act-object conception, the crucial issue is not whether subjects are aware of mental items, but what metaphysical category they belong to—though Jackson nevertheless thinks we are aware of them.

37 This is what Jackson says in response to Aune's "relational" account of bodily sensations, an account that at times Pitcher also comes close to; see Aune's KMN and Pitcher's PP.
This suggestion is not entirely unlike Jackson’s, but it differs in allowing that in the hallucinatory case the subject will represent the relevant properties as being separately instantiated without his actually being related to separate objects, or indeed to any objects at all. Take, for example, a case in which a subject hallucinates a red square as being to the left of a green circle. In such a case, rather than worry whether there are one or two sensings that the subject is undergoing, and whether there being two requires that they be sensings of objects, the intentionalist can simply say that the subject is sensing no objects, even though it seems to him as though he is.\(^{38}\) That move allows the intentionalist to claim that when the subject really is related to objects—again, in the perceiving case—those objects need not be mental. So the adverbialist really faces a trilemma: amongst construing the relevant experiences as (i) unitary and representationally blank, or (ii) relational, or (iii) contentful. If Jackson can succeed in making the first of these horns unplayable, because of the many properties problem, then adverbialism must collapse into one or other of the remaining two views: the act-object conception or intentionalism.

Whether Jackson can make the many-properties problem truly troublesome for the adverbialist depends on some nice metaphysical issues that it would take us too far afield to look at properly. For our purposes, I have been fairly lax about the various metaphysical distinctions, such as that between events and states. Indeed, obscuring that particular distinction has been useful in so far as it reflects the following point: the dialectic above can be framed either for an anti-intentionalist adverbial view, on which the qualitative character of an experience is a matter of the way in which some intrinsically blank event happens, or for an anti-intentionalist state view, on which qualitative character is rather a matter of the non-representational properties of a state rather than an event. Intentionalism, in any case, is an alternative to both variants.

In this section, then, we have sharpened our grasp of the two principal anti-intentionalist accounts of sensations and perceptual experiences: the act-object conception and the adverbial theory. In subsequent chapters, it will emerge more clearly that part of the attraction of intentionalism in the pain case is that it enables us to avoid the problems associated with those two views. Let us turn back to intentionalism now, and ask what other considerations might motivate it.

\(^{38}\) Perhaps there is an issue about whether there is one experience with a content concerning a red square and another experience with a content concerning a green circle, or rather one experience with a content concerning a red square and a distinct green circle. The latter seems preferable (and of a piece with Ayers’s talk of an integrated sense field; see L.K, i, 187). But the point is that, for present purposes, it does not matter which side the intentionalist comes down on.
5. MOTIVATING INTENTIONALISM

Despite the difficulties it faces, the intentionalist approach to the bodily sensations is an attractive one, promising elegant and satisfying solutions to a number of difficult problems. Many of its virtues will emerge properly only in the context of the more detailed discussions of the different versions of pain intentionalism that shall occupy us for the rest of this study: its explanation of the puzzling nature of the location of sensations (Chapter 2), for example, and also of some of the other peculiarities of sensations which I mentioned in §1 (Chapter 6).

We shall also see how it enables us to meet the many-properties challenge (Chapter 4), and to extend to the pain case Evans's account of the self-ascription of experiences (Chapters 2 and 6). I want now briefly to survey some of the more general considerations that might be brought to bear. The following falls into three parts. First (in §5.1) I mention an intuitive argument for intentionalism specifically about pain experiences. Second (in §5.2) I look at considerations in favour of a broad intentionalism, on which the phenomenology of all phenomenal states requires (and at least partly consists in) their representational content. And finally (in §5.3 and §5.4) I attack both the idea of, and the motivation for, the non-representational phenomenal features invoked by the opponents of radical intentionalism.

In what follows it is worth keeping in mind the distinction between two opponents the radical intentionalist has: the weak intentionalist, who concedes that pain experiences have content, and the anti-intentionalist, who does not. Considerations that tell against one of these opponents may not tell against the other, and indeed I think some of the following considerations at best motivate weak intentionalism. Others, though, do support radical intentionalism.

5.1. The Intuitive Case for Pain Intentionalism

When a subject has a backache, something (a pain, an instance of hurting, an injury—something) seems to him to be “out there”, in his back, in the objective spatial world, albeit in a very proximate part of it. As Tye says, “the qualities I experience are experienced as features instantiated in some region of my back and not as intrinsic features of my experience” (RTF, 235).\(^{39}\) This sort of phenomenological consideration accounts for some of the force of intentionalism, I think. Nevertheless, the determined anti-intentionalist will at least try to accommodate it. After all, the anti-intentionalist will have introduced a range of non-representational features whose possession by experiences, he will say, is no less correctly expressed in terms of how things “seem” to the subject than is their representational

\(^{39}\) See also TP, 113, and Martin's BA, 269.
Indeed, there are anti-intentionalists who hold that even some apparently *spatial* features of experience can be accounted for non-representationally. Peacocke, for example, claims that the circumstance reported by the sentence, “There is a yellow elliptical region of the visual field next to a white square region” is actually a matter of an experience possessing properties that—though characterised by reference to physical space—are entirely non-representational (S&C, 20-21). (Recall also the thoroughgoing adverbialist on page 23 above.) So one can envisage a parallel position on which “the apparent location of a sensation” is held to be a matter of the “position” of a blankly sensational patch in a “bodily sensory field”, where the notion of such a field—and the quasi-spatial relations amongst its elements—is to be explained non-representationally.

Such suggestions strike me as puzzling in the extreme. But weak intentionalists may concede as much. They may concede that the spatial and bodily aspects of sensations have to be intentional, thus rejecting such quasi-spatial, phenomenological, yet non-representational features as the more extreme anti-intentionalist goes in for. But weak intentionalists may still insist on, say, an Evans-style account, according to which having a backache is a matter of having an *awful* experience as of one’s back, where “awful” expresses some blank quality of an otherwise contentful experience (VR, 230-31; see also §3 above). So the appeal to the spatial and bodily phenomenology of pain experiences arguably helps weak intentionalism, but it does little for the *radical* intentionalist specifically.

### 5.2. General Arguments for Broad Intentionalism

Is there a good argument for the thesis that the phenomenology of *all* experiences must consist in their representational content, either wholly or in part?

**Blindsight: The Absence of Both Phenomenal Character and Content**

Evans considers subjects of “blindsight”, who “display fairly normal responses to stimuli ... and yet have no associated conscious experience” (VR, 158). Conscious experience is present, he insists, only when the following is true:

> The sensory input is not only connected to behavioural dispositions ... but also serves as the input to a thinking, concept-applying, and reasoning system; so that the subject’s thoughts, plans, and deliberations are also systematically dependent on the informational properties of the input. When there is such a further link, we can say that the person, rather than just some part of his brain, receives and processes the information. (VR: 158; see also 226-7)

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[^40]: How one judges things to be can also be expressed in terms of “seems”, but the intentionalist can plausibly say this is not the sense which “seems” has in his statement of the phenomenological intuition.
So, according to Evans, the blindsight case involves both the absence of phenomenally conscious experience and the absence of experience with personal-level content, since a state’s having content would require its “informational properties” to constrain its subject’s thinking in a way that doesn’t happen in the blindsight case. So the two aspects are missing together: phenomenal character and personal-level content. And this, the intentionalist will say, is no accident: since content constitutes character, character is missing because content is. Though this is certainly one possible explanation, however, and though that should encourage the intentionalist, we have yet to be shown that it is the best explanation.41

Differences in Both Phenomenal Character and Content

Relatedly, here is a simple and intuitive line of thought. “The difference between experiences of red and experiences of green, for example, is a phenomenological difference; and since ‘of red’ and ‘of green’ express the respective episodes’ contents, it is also a representational difference. Thus differences in phenomenology and differences in content sometimes coincide. And again, this is no accident: since content constitutes character, there are differences in character because of differences in content.” One can prefer weak to radical intentionalism, however, and still advert to content in explaining these differences in character that coincide with representational differences. So the example fails to motivate radical intentionalism even about visual experiences, never mind any sort of intentionalism beyond the visual case. To do the former, we need at least to explain away putative cases of visual experiences differing in character but not content; to do the latter, we need to tackle putative cases of contentless experiences, such as pain experiences have been thought to be. I take up the former task in §5.4 below; the latter task is the project of this study as a whole. By themselves, though, the present considerations provide little support for radical intentionalism.

Tye and “What it is Like to Be ...”

Tye offers the following general argument. He claims that the context, “what it is like to be ...,” is intensional: “what it is like to be the subject of this backache is not the same as what it is like to be me” (TP, 133, my italics; see also RTP, 235). “What creates the intensional contexts,” he argues, “is the representational nature of phenomenal character”

41 Though it is not informational “content” that we are concerned with here, notice that the informationalist might say, conversely, that the state in the blindsight case lacks informational “content” because it lacks character, therefore lacking a “vehicle” for informational “content”—lacking, that is, the features in virtue of whose causal relations to the world informational “content” is explained.
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But this is a poor argument for a broad intentionalism. For one thing, it is hard to know what to do with Tye's putative example of intensionality. In the context of a discussion of phenomenal character, it is far from clear how to understand locutions such as "what it is like to be me", and hence also unclear how to take the results of substitutions for "me" of expressions such as "the subject of this backache". Since phenomenal character is a feature of experiences (and other mental items), it is more illuminating in this context to think of the "what it is like" construction as a way of speaking of the "what-it-is-like-to-be-had" features of experiences, if you like, rather than as a way of speaking of the "what-it-is-like-to-be" features of me or you or, say, a bat. So an example of the more perspicuous construction is this: "what it is like to have an experience of red". And this, notice, is not intensional. Without altering which phenomenal character is picked out, we can substitute co-referring expressions for "an experience of red". Pick your own candidates: "an experience of the type I had at midday today", perhaps, or (arguably) "a state which enables the non-inferential discrimination of the red things as red".

Strawson on the Concept of a Seeming

Strawson holds that the concept of an experience is the concept of a seeming, and that, as Cassam puts it, "the conceptual framework required to sustain the concept of a 'seeming'... must be one in which there is a contrast between 'This is how things seem' and 'Thus and so is how things objectively are'" (S&W, 100). Again, it is a concept which emerges in the context of one judgement correcting another: "what remains unaltered when the correction is made," Strawson says, "is the subjective experience, the 'seeming'" (BS, 106). Now, it is tempting to think that this requires that all experiences have representational content. For the claim can seem to be that, definitionally, an experience is what would remain unaltered, as it were, if a judgement endorsing the experience's content were corrected. But, in fact, it is not obvious that the idea of a judgement's being corrected requires the associated experience to have content. For example, I might judge that I am aboard a ship because I feel giddy, and when that judgement is corrected, I might insist that it nevertheless at least seems to me (experientially) as though I am aboard a ship. Arguably, this is at least one sort of context in which the concept of a seeming emerges. But if so, note that it might be that all I mean by "It seems to me as though I am aboard a ship" is that I am having the experiences that I would have if I were aboard a ship, experiences from which I

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42 Talk of what it is like to be a bat (see Nagel's WLB) may just be a way of speaking of what it is like to have experiences of the sort that bats have—for example, those caused by their echolocation systems. Similarly, "what it is it like to be the subject of this backache" may just be a way of speaking of what it is like to have this backache. I have no objection to such talk. But Tye treats "the subject of this backache" as co-referring with "me", not as a way of talking of the having of a certain sort of experience, and this is why he is misled about intensionality.
can infer that I am aboard a ship. This does not require that those experiences (feelings of giddiness, in this example) have the content, *I am aboard a ship*, nor that they have any content at all—though, of course, intentionalists will insist that they do.

**Theoretical Simplicity**

So it is difficult to make a water-tight case for a general intentionalism about phenomenal states on the basis of the very idea of experience or phenomenology. One straightforward claim we can make on behalf of intentionalism, however, is that it suggests a greater unity amongst mental phenomena than has often been suspected. And this, in turn, promises to simplify our accounts of the mind. For example, it is a common line that, though functionalism can accommodate the propositional attitudes, it cannot accommodate the non-representational phenomenal features held to be possessed by perceptual experiences and, paradigmatically, by sensations. But if one accepts a radical intentionalist account of the sensations, then it turns out that sensations do not possess such recalcitrant features after all, never mind paradigmatically. Another important view in the philosophy of mind is interpretationism, held by Davidson and Dennett, for example; but if, as Child says, this view is "an account of the propositional attitudes, and of other personal-level ... states with propositional content" (CIM, 10), then sensations fall outside its remit, unless intentionalism is true. And a final example: Davidson and Rorty, as we have seen, worry that sensations would be omitted by a criterion of the mental framed in terms of intentionality; intentionalists, by contrast, need have no such worries.

**McDowell and the Subjectivity of the Mental**

This last point connects with an idea running through McDowell's work: that what is distinctive and irreducibly subjective about the mental life is its being a matter of a subject's having a perspective on the world, his representing the world. Very roughly, the thought is that being a subject is not a matter of having access to peculiarly private or self-intimating or infallibly knowable items—to, that is, the denizens of the Cartesian theatre. It is rather a matter of one's being in states which constitute one's awareness of the objective world, one's perspective on it. If a pain, for example, is an essentially subjective item, then this is because its existence involves—unlike the existence of chairs and tables—the subject representing...

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43 See McDowell's OS, 295-6. Relatedly, Tye argues that though it has been thought that sensations fall outside the remit of cognitive psychology because cognitive psychology approaches the mind as a representational system, they do not—since, as it turns out, they possess "content" after all. See Tye's RTP, 223. Still, one could (as Tye does) accord the bodily sensations the sort of "content" that would bring them within the remit of cognitive psychology without crediting them with fully representational content, and so without being an intentionalist in my strict sense.

44 See Rorty, PMN, 22; and Davidson, ME, 211.
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something. These telegraphic remarks amount to more of a picture than an argument, but it is a compelling one, and I touch on it again in the next chapter.

McDowell and Rational Constraint

A final, related idea is that experiences must be contentful if they are to play their role in constituting reasons for our judgements. We have already encountered the idea that experiences play that role, in the shape of Evans's reminder that our perceptual judgements are not the results of a mere "yen to apply some concept" (VR, 229). Evans also adopts a position we might call "reason intentionalism", which links the notions of reasons and content: "The only events that can conceivably be regarded as data for a conscious subject are seemings—events, that is, already imbued with ... objective significance" (VR, 123; see also 158). If this is true, and if bodily sensations are "data for conscious subjects", then sensations must be seemings, they must have "objective significance". As we shall see in the next chapter, McDowell shares Evans's reason intentionalism—his idea that experiences must have content (though, McDowell thinks, not always objective content) in order to be the reasons for judgements. It is an idea that applies more obviously to traditional perceptual experiences than to sensations such as pains, and indeed Evans does seem to lose sight of it in the case of pain experiences, therefore embracing such "non-informational” properties as awfully (VR, 220-21). By contrast, McDowell, as we shall see, steadfastly applies reason intentionalism to both perceptual experiences and sensations. This is a crucial element in the case for radical intentionalism; and it will occupy us throughout this study: in §5.3 below, for example, and especially in the next chapter.

So these are some of the positive considerations that intentionalists exploit. We have seen that some of the arguments at this very general level are disappointingly thin. Still, there is enough here to allow even the radical intentionalist to assert his doctrine in good conscience and to shift the burden of proof, demanding that his opponent demonstrate, if only on a case-by-case basis, that there is a need for non-representational phenomenal features, or even that such features can be made good sense of. Pain experiences can seem to be the obvious case for the opponent of radical intentionalism to start with. But it is precisely the point of this study to undermine such an appeal to the pain case by trying to make a version of radical intentionalism about pain experiences seem acceptable, and indeed by arguing that

45 And Evans and McDowell also agree, conversely, that rationally constraining "a thinking, concept-applying, and reasoning system" (VR, 158) is a condition on states having personal-level content. This was evident in Evans's denial of content in the blind sight case.

46 He may also point to blindsight and the inattentive driver as cases in which there is contentful experience, but no phenomenal character, but the intentionalist would do well to argue, with Evans, that in these cases there really is no state with content.
the introduction of content in that case solves many more problems than it creates. Moreover, in general, non-representational phenomenal properties are not merely unhelpful but positively puzzling. I now draw this chapter to a close by developing this final point.

5.3. Qualia: Peculiarities and Problems

"Sensational properties", in Peacocke's terminology, are the "properties an experience has in virtue of some aspect—other than its representational content—of what it is like to have that experience" (S&C, 5). I shall also use "qualia" with precisely this sense, thus detaching that term from its myriad other senses in philosophy. Peacocke uses "primed predicates"—"red'", "green'", and so forth—to refer to such properties, rather as I have been using "red-like", "green-like", and so on (S&C, 20-21). Now the radical intentionalist denies there are such properties as qualia. Though I cannot launch a complete defence of that attitude here, I do want to bring out the peculiarity of the notion of qualia, and (in §5.4) the weakness of two central motivations for the idea that such items exist.

Two Opponents: Anti-Intentionalism and Weak Intentionalism

My first worry about the notion of qualia concerns whether a satisfying and plausible account can be given of the relationships amongst qualia, phenomenal character, and representational content. Take the following claims:

(1) Two experiences can have the same phenomenal character, yet differ in their content.
(2) Two experiences can have the same content, yet differ in their phenomenal character.

(1*) Two experiences can have the same qualia, yet differ in their content.
(2*) Two experiences can have the same content, yet differ in their qualia.

Regarding the issue of the existence of qualia, recall that the radical intentionalist has two opponents: first, the weak intentionalist who goes in for qualia, even though he also concedes that the phenomenal character of a contentful experience partly consists in its content; and second, those anti-intentionalists who hold that the phenomenal character of an experience never consists even partly in its content. Notice also that there is likely to be a difference in the role that these two opponents assign to qualia: the weak intentionalist, such as Peacocke, introduces qualia in order to account for some phenomenologically peculiar cases (of which, more later); the anti-intentionalist might rather expect qualia to serve as a "representational substrate": that is, he might expect qualia to figure in an account of the "informational content" of experiences—an account that exploits causal correlations between
certain qualia and certain types of objective circumstances. This distinction affects the vulnerabilities of the different views, as we shall see.

Anti-Intentionalism and Our Knowledge of the External World

Now those who embrace the thoroughgoing anti-intentionalist position seem to be committed to (1) and (2)—which, for them, are equivalent to (1*) and (2*). Such a theorist might allow, for example, that though the correlations between qualia and objective circumstances are in fact such that that red-like experiences represent the property redness, they might have been such that red-like experiences represented greenness; indeed, there might in fact be some other population on some other planet whose red-like experiences represent greenness by dint of the different correlational facts obtaining there. 47 This is precisely the point of Block’s “Inverted Earth”: a planet whose distribution of colours is inverted relative to Earth’s, but on which, for example, green things are normally experienced via red-like experiences, thanks to different perceptual circumstances obtaining there. 48

Suppose, then, that Ed is an Earthling, and Ned his doppelgänger on Inverted Earth. Block would say that even if Ed and Ned are both having red-like experiences, and indeed phenomenally identical experiences, as they look at their respective poppies (say), still Ed’s experience represents his poppies to him as red, whereas Ned’s represent his to him as green. That is precisely an instance of the alleged possibility (1).

To go along with that, and allow possibility (1), strikes me as epistemologically disastrous. 49 If things seem just the same to Ed and Ned, thanks to their having qualia-equivalent experiences, then those experiences’ difference in “content” is a difference that makes no difference to Ed and Ned. But then it is not a difference in personal-level content. This is a point to which I return in Chapter 5. Now perhaps the anti-intentionalist would just concede that his view undermines the personal-level content of experiences, but still insist that he can do without it, exploiting instead some such notion as the informational content of experiences. But, as I have already suggested (and as will emerge more clearly in the next chapter), it is epistemologically crucial that experiences have personal-level content—crucial, that is, that a subject’s experiences purport to inform him about whatever it is they represent. So the anti-intentionalist’s picture is, I suspect, ultimately incoherent. 50

47 See Chapter 5, §1.
48 See Block’s IE. The example presupposes that we do not identify colours with dispositions to cause certain qualia.
49 Subjectively indistinguishable episodes of perception and hallucination might seem to be obvious instances of (1). I set aside that hard case until Chapter 5, §3.3.
50 The point is closely related to the problems facing the act-object conception. See page 17 above.
Weak Intentionalism and the Puzzling Nature of Qualia

I shall not pursue the point here, though, for even if I am right, weak intentionalists, who go in for qualia, need not accept (1) anyway. Peacocke, for example, once held a position on which a contentful experience’s content is, along with its qualia, constitutive of its phenomenology. And so Peacocke can allow that experiences which differ in personal-level content will also differ phenomenologically. Hence the epistemological problems just canvassed seem far less threatening for Peacocke’s account, which is unsurprising in view of the different motivation he has for his sensational properties—as I put it above, to account for the phenomenological data rather than to provide a representational substrate. But to link content and phenomenology in Peacocke’s way is not yet to have adequately related content and *qualia*. And the demands of those thought experiments that are designed to show the need for qualia prevent any very close link. Peacocke, for instance, describes the cases he tries to accommodate as ones in which a phenomenal difference is either entirely intentional and not sensational, or entirely sensational and not intentional. For example, the difference between an experience before and after an aspect-switch, despite the subject’s sense that something has remained the same, is supposed to be an instance of the former case; and the difference between monocular and binocular visual experiences, and also between the experiences of a more distant and a more proximate tree (see §5.4 below) are supposed to be instances of the latter (S&C, 12-17). So Peacocke, in other words, endorses instances of both (1*) and (2*).

At the very least, this mutual autonomy of qualia and content brings out what puzzling items qualia are. The most common examples of qualia are those non-representational features thought to accompany visual experiences with *colour* content: experiences of red, experiences of green, and so on, where “of red” and “of green” express these states’ contents. Now, the inclination to use some syntactic variants of colour terms to name these non-representational properties—“red” and “red-like”, for example—encourages the already tempting thought that there is some non-arbitrary connection between each sensational property and a colour or colour-content. But, in fact, it is hard to see how there could be any such connection. Suppose I use “red-like” to name the quale which my current experiences of red instantiate, and “green-like” to name the quale which my current experiences of green instantiate. If (1*) is true, then it seems that my experiences of red and my experiences of green could just as well have both been red-like, while still representing different colours; indeed, perhaps they both are red-like, in which case I failed to fix the reference of “red-like” and “green-like” to different properties in the first place. Moreover, if (2*) is true, then presumably my experiences of red could equally well have been green-like.
Chapter 1. Intentionalism and Its Alternatives

Perhaps one day my experiences of red will be green-like; perhaps yours already are. Once we really think through the possibility of qualia and content floating free of each other in ways such as these, then the hypothesis of qualia comes to seem very strange indeed. What can at first seem like the familiar features of our perceptual experience come to appear much more recondite. Notice, after all, that the relatively straightforward case of colour-blindness does not make sense of qualia: a subject whose experiences of red are green-like is not thereby colour blind, for he might still see red things as red.

Perhaps the friend of qualia will respond by trying to impose some constraints on which representational properties can vary independently of which sensational properties. Perhaps he'll say that a red’ experience, for example, has to be of red. Now, on the one hand, Peacocke sometimes sounds as if he wants to say something like that—as when he implies that every experience with a sensational property is an experience as of a “secondary quality” (S&C, 45). But, on the other hand, Peacocke claims that, when a normal subject views a sheet of white paper through a pane of red glass, the subject will have an experience of white that nevertheless fails to instantiate white’ (S&C, 38-9). If so, it is surely tempting to say that it instantiates red’ instead—after all, what else, on Peacocke’s account, would distinguish that experience from one involved in the viewing of the white sheet through green glass? But in that case, we have an example of a red’ experience that represents whiteness, and not redness. So, I stand by the claim that the hypothesis of qualia is at least stranger than it might have seemed initially. It is troubling, then, that the phenomenological data marshalled by Peacocke seem to require that hypothesis, at least at first. I shall consider some of those data presently (§5.4). But first I turn to another respect in which qualia are problematic.

Qualia and Our Knowledge of Other (and Our Own) Minds

We have touched already on the broadly epistemological worry that qualia would undermine the proper representation of—and thereby knowledge of—the world. There is also a problem about the knowability of qualia themselves. Those of us who are sympathetic to some version of Wittgenstein’s idea that an “‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria” (PI 580) must worry that qualia have no obvious connection to their subjects’ behaviour. Peacocke is sensitive to such worries (S&C, 11), and he tries to meet them by describing behaviour whose explanation would advert to sensational properties. We might, he suggests, invoke “shape” qualia in order to explain a subject’s selection of those shapes.

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51 If, contrary to fact, we were considering informational “content” rather than content proper, this last hypothesis could be ruled out by saying the following: your green-like experiences are of the qualitative type caused in normal subjects (like me) by green things, and for that reason they cannot be experiences of red.

52 For a brief survey of the sorts of considerations I intend in quoting Wittgenstein, see Child, CIM, 36-7.
whose attachment to a pane of glass, perpendicular to the line of sight, would precisely obscure a perceived object (S&C, 22). Whether or not this is right, it is less clear what behaviour might be associated with "colour" qualia. Peacocke makes the following suggestion: that the concept of a contentless red experience is that of an experience which, "[were it] present in our experience with richer representational content, would allow the discrimination of objects as red" (COM, 107, n. 11). It is doubtful, however, whether this proposal gives red an explanatory role of its own, distinct from that of the content of red.\footnote{Ironically, Peacocke himself points out elsewhere that "there is ... an objection of principle to a counterfactual analysis of an intrinsic property of experience" (S&C, 18).} Notice, moreover, that all of Peacocke’s examples of behaviour involve the subject discriminating physical objects which instantiate “objective correlates” of the relevant sensational properties. The behaviour associated with red experiences involves red things, for example; that associated with square involves squares. So, if one were to propose that the phenomenal quality of a pain experience is a matter of the experience having some sensational property—call it “pain”—these epistemological considerations would seem to require that we locate some objective correlate. But, where red (allegedly) corresponds to redness, and square (allegedly) corresponds to squareness, what does pain correspond to?

In passing, let me anticipate the next chapter and say that it is not just our knowledge of others’ qualia that is problematic, but also our knowledge of our own. For if the judgements in which we self-ascribe them are to be knowledgeable—indeed contentful—then plausibly they must be based on reasons; and yet, as we saw in §5.2 above, there is an important reason intentionalist strain in the work of McDowell and Evans to the effect that blank items such as qualia cannot give their subjects the right sort of reason to judge one thing rather than another. Quite generally, then, qualia are epistemologically puzzling.

5.4. The Lack of Motivation for Qualia

Qualia and Sense Modalities

It would be nice to avoid these problems if we could. But can we? Or do we need qualia? For my part, I think the phenomenological data which are sometimes used to motivate the introduction of qualia can be accommodated in other ways. To suggest this, I concentrate on the two cases most relevant to the rest of this study: different sense modalities, and Peacocke’s two trees. First, then, the friend of qualia is apt to point out that what it is like to have a tactual experience of a cube is very different from what it is like to have a visual experience of a cube; and yet the two experiences have the same content. Or do they? It
Chapter 1. Intentionalism and Its Alternatives

seems to me that, in fact, the intentionalist can point to a number of intentional differences. For one thing, the visual experience will have colour content which the tactual experience lacks. For another, the tactual experience will have more detailed content concerning the cube’s texture, the visual experience more detailed and more determinate content concerning the cube’s overall shape. Of course, we do not express all this detail whenever we ascribe the experience or make a perceptual judgement on its basis, but the detail is there, and it is expressible.

Peacocke’s Trees

What about Peacocke’s trees? You are to suppose that you see two trees that are in fact of the same height, one further away than the other. As Peacocke describes the case, “your experience represents these objects as being of the same physical height and other dimensions; that is, taking your experience at face value you would judge that the trees are roughly the same physical size ... yet there is also some sense in which the nearer tree occupies more of your visual field than the more distant tree” (S&C, 12). Unlike the other examples, this case does not involve two experiences, but it is still supposed to be a case whose adequate characterisation requires sensational properties: since the experience represents two equally sized trees to its subject, the fact about those trees occupying differently sized regions of the visual field seems to be a second phenomenological fact, and one requiring some non-representational but still phenomenal level of description.

Though I think we should reject Peacocke’s account of this case, some intentionalist alternatives to it are unacceptable. Here is one such suggestion. Let us say that an account is “minimalist” to the degree that it is restrictive about which concepts can enter into the correct characterisation of an experience’s content. On one very minimalist position, for example, the content of our visual experience is exhausted by colour, shape, and size concepts. So a minimalist might say that the relevant experience in our case represents not two equally sized trees, but two differently sized green shapes; qualia would not be needed, therefore, to accommodate the “second phenomenological fact”. Now in Chapter 5, I shall argue against minimalism; for now, notice simply that the content that the minimalist insists on would be illusory, for in fact there are not two differently sized shapes facing the subject, but rather two equally sized trees. And given the ubiquity of our perceiving objects at different distances, a great deal of our experience would end up being systematically illusory on this minimalist account. It would surely be preferable to avoid this result if we can. Lycan and

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54 See also my discussion of the difference between body sense and vision in Chapter 6, §3.4.
55 For an argument against an intentionalist account of the differences between experiences belonging to different sense modalities, see Grice’s SRS.
others have recommended adding to this minimal layer of content another layer, specified in terms of the concept, *equally sized trees*: this further layer is veridical, but the illusory, more primitive layer remains in order to capture the "second phenomenological fact".\textsuperscript{56} For my part, though, I think we can avoid the illusory level of content altogether.

To do so, we can claim that the experience in question has the content, *That*[x] *tree is the same size as, but closer than, this*[y] *tree*. This seems to capture both aspects of the phenomenology.\textsuperscript{57} Moreover, there are related but more detailed differences in the representation of each of the trees. Consider, for example, the egocentric directions in which the subject experiences the edges of the closer tree, the directions in which he would *point* in order demonstratively to identify the edges as being "in that direction*[d]_1*" and "in that direction*[d]_2*". These directions are more radically different in the case of the closer tree. Care is needed in handling this point. We should *not* endorse the suggestion, sometimes made, that the relevant content is: *There are two equally sized trees subtending different visual angles from one another*.\textsuperscript{58} That is wrong, since the subject of the experience in question clearly need not possess the concept, *subtending a visual angle*. Nonetheless, something like that fact about angles is represented, but not under that mode of presentation. As Evans points out, our possession of the egocentric modes of presentation under which we experience the spatial relations of objects to ourselves is essentially related to what we can *do* (VR, 153-7). Notice, then, that if the subject were to point with each hand to the respective outer edges of the closer tree, and then to do the same thing in the case of the further tree, he would have to point in more radically different directions in the case of the closer tree than the further one—his two pointing hands would have to be further apart from one another. This is a truth about the egocentric *content* of the experience, and as such, it is capable of intentionally capturing the "second phenomenological fact" that we need to in the tree case.

Still, Lycan’s "layering thesis" is right to this extent: the content of our experience is very rich, and it may be illusory in respect of some aspects but not others. It may turn out that what the subject took to be two equally sized trees at different distances is in fact a visual trick, involving two differently sized cardboard cut-outs located at equal distances. If that is how things are, then the tree- and distance-aspects of our experience are indeed illusory; but the experience is still accurate to the extent that it has, for example, the content, *Those two objects are green,* and *The edges of that*[x] *object are in that direction*[d]_1* and in that direction*[d]_2*. In any case, the crucial point is that the tree example seems not to require

\textsuperscript{56} See Lycan's C&E, 144-53. See also Peacocke's STC, Chapter 3, and Tye's TP.

\textsuperscript{57} Bill Brewer helped to push me towards this sort of account.

\textsuperscript{58} See Tye's VQVC, 172-3; Harman's IQE, 38; and Peacocke's discussion of Rock and Boring, at S&C, 19-20.
qualia for its correct description. And that, of course, is congenial to the radical intentionalist.

Let us take stock. In the present chapter, I have introduced the aim of this study: to investigate whether a radical intentionalist account of pain experiences might be made acceptable. I have also gone some way towards motivating intentionalism—both in the pain case and in general—and towards undermining its alternatives: the traditional act-object conception, the adverbial theory, and relatedly the appeal to qualia or sensational properties. Now recall the distinction drawn in §3 between mentalist and non-mentalist forms of radical intentionalism about pain experiences. In the next two chapters, I want to turn to consider accounts of the former sort. In that context, some of the specific virtues of pain intentionalism will emerge, but so too will some of the formidable difficulties it faces.
Mentalism and Subjectivism

Intentionalists, recall, can be either mentalist or non-mentalist: they can hold either that the determining content of pain experiences is to be specified, at least in part, by means of mental concepts such as *a pain* or *hurting*, or that only non-mental concepts such as *injury* or *disorder* are involved. This chapter is concerned with mentalism, and particularly with subjectivist versions of that approach—views, in other words, on which the mental subject matter of pain experiences depends on its being represented.

In the first two sections, I present McDowell’s version of the act-object conception. Though, as we have seen, traditional versions of that conception are anti-intentionalist, McDowell’s involves the claim that pain experiences have conceptual, personal-level content—content concerning *pains*. In §1, I sketch a broadly epistemological motivation for McDowell’s intentionalist conception of experience generally, and pain experience in particular. In §2, I touch on McDowell’s subjectivism and its motivations. Throughout these first two sections, McDowell’s mentalism also emerges, and in §3 I turn to a comparison between this and other versions of mentalism. The most attractive of these is a view I call “hurting perceptualism”, and in §4 I favourably compare this with McDowell’s position.

The first two sections of this chapter are relatively exegetical. The reason for this is that, despite McDowell’s significance on the contemporary philosophical scene, his account of sensations has been largely ignored; and what is partly to blame, I suspect, is that his presentation of this part of his thought is heavily laden with Sellarsian and Kantian metaphors: “the space of reasons”, “the space of concepts”, “the realm of thought”, “the realm of law”, “the realm of sense”, “the realm of meaningful doings”, and so on. Here, I want principally to get clearer about what McDowell’s account is. This is worth doing not only for its intrinsic interest, but also because Chapters 4, 5, and 6 can be understood, to a great extent, as an attempt to see whether non-McDowellian accounts can meet the sorts of desiderata that those of us sympathetic to the overall tenor of McDowell’s philosophy will be inclined to impose. I am one of those who is sympathetic, and I try in what follows to indicate why; but it would take me too far afield to attempt a thorough defence of McDowell’s general motivations here.

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1 For McDowell’s view of sensations, see his OS (1989); I&I (1991); M&W (1994), especially 18-23 of Lecture 1 and 36-38 of Lecture 2. Roman numeral page references for M&W correspond to the introduction to the paperback edition.
1. MCDOWELL’S EPISTEMOLOGY: CONSTRAINT AND CONCEPTS

In the preceding chapter, I briefly surveyed some arguments for intentionalist conceptions of experience. One of these was McDowell’s: an argument about the broadly epistemological role of experiences, which he first works out in the “outer case” and then extends to bodily sensations. In this section, I provide a more detailed reconstruction of that argument. To do so, I too start in §1.1 with the more straightforward case of our outer, perceptual experience, before turning in §1.2 to our pain experiences.

1.1. The Outer Case

First Premise: Minimal Empiricism

McDowell’s intentionalist conception of perceptual experience issues from two premises. The first is “minimal empiricism” (M&W, xii):

**Minimal Empiricism**

A subject’s thoughts can have representational content only if the world—via the subject’s experiences of it—rationally constrains some of the subject’s judgements.

The idea here is that the notion of a subject’s having (to put it pleonastically) contentful thoughts requires that some subset of those thoughts—namely, in the first instance, his true perceptual judgements—be “rationally constrained” by the world. Evans, recall, points out that in perceptual judgement we do not merely “find ourselves with a yen to apply some concept” (VR, 229); McDowell is emphasising that in general we must not. Our perceptual judgements, that is, must not be guesses, and nor must they be merely the effects of the experiences that prompt them. Rather they must be rationally guided by those experiences. Let me elaborate on this basic idea in three ways.

First, minimal empiricism concerns the explanation of one’s perceptual judgements. The relevant judgements must, in particular, be rationalised by experiences; their being made must be rendered intelligible by citing certain experiences as the personal-level reasons for which the subject made them (M&W: 8, 53, 163, 165). Such explanations are to be contrasted with deductive-nomological or merely causal explanations—explanations in which things are made intelligible not by being revealed to be “as they rationally ought to be”, but

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2 I follow McDowell in using “epistemological” to cover considerations not merely about justification and knowledge, but also about the conditions on content.

3 At times, McDowell makes it sound as though the minimal empiricist imposes only the weaker requirement that judgements stand in normative relations to the world, in the sense that they can be correct or incorrect according to the way the world is. (See, for example, M&W xii and xvii.) But that judgements stand in normative relations of that sort is definitive of their having content (see Chapter 1, §2); it is not an interesting condition on their doing so.
"by representing their coming into being as a particular instance of how things generally tend to happen" (FAM, 328). In McDowell's terms, "the space of reasons" is to be contrasted with "the realm of law" (M&W, xv).

Second, McDowell requires not only that one's experiences enter into rationalisations, but that they be intrinsically capable of doing so. They must be capable of figuring in such rationalisations of themselves—not merely by way of their being the objects or causes of further episodes which in turn constitute the reasons for the subject's judging as he does. An experience would fall short of explaining a subject's judgement in the required way, for example, if the explanation were that he made the judgement on the basis of an inference from his experience (M&W: 144-5, 165).

Finally, minimal empiricism requires that judgements be rationally constrained not merely by experiences but by the world—that is, in the current case, by experience-independent facts. That does not mean that experiences are not required. They are. But just as I said above that experiences must rationalise otherwise than merely by causing or being the object of further episodes, so too objective facts must rationalise otherwise than merely by causing or being the object of world-independent experiences. A better conception, McDowell argues, has two components. First, we must appreciate that the experiences which "take in" objective facts are passive; they are determined by the world, and not chosen by us in the way in which thoughts are (M&W: 25, 10). Second, such experiences are to be understood according to the disjunctive conception, sketched in Chapter 1 (§4.1). On this conception, recall, a veridical perceiving is not merely the causal effect of the circumstance it represents, an episode of precisely the same intrinsic type that the subject might have enjoyed even if the relevant circumstance had not obtained—even if, for instance, the experience had been hallucinatory. Rather, for the disjunctivist, the perceiving's intrinsic content—for example, This[x] is thus[F]—is constitutively dependent on the objective circumstance it represents.

So the minimal empiricist requires that objective facts constitute the intrinsic content of veridical perceivings that intrinsically figure in the correct rationalisation of the subject's true perceptual judgements. The position, I think, has a good deal of intuitive force: one's thoughts can concern the world only if the world has some sort of influence on what one thinks (M&W, 25). Moreover, once we get into focus the idea that our thinkings are, of their very nature, essentially operations of conceptual capacities carried out on the basis of reasons, then it starts also to seem right that the experiences which influence our thoughts

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4 See M&W 26, 34, 42, 112 n. 2, and 144.
5 See also Chapter 1, §2.
6 See M&W, 25-9, 111-13, 139-40; STIS, 241; and CDK, 385-94.
must be amongst these reasons, rather than being mere causes. For one thing, a judgement's
giving me reason to make one rather than another further judgement is conditional on my
having reason for the rationalising judgement itself; and this initiates a regress of reasons
such that if experiences did not provide reasons for the lowest-level judgements, then all
judgements “based” on that “foundation” would be incapable of providing reasons for further
judgements.\footnote{Clearly McDowell’s position is in a sense foundationalist, but it is opposed to a position on which the foundation is comprised by infallible judgements about experiences, or alternatively a non-concept-involving “given”.
} If, as McDowell argues, thought is essentially a reason-governed enterprise, then what disappears from the resulting picture is not just knowledge, but thought itself. For
another thing, a subject’s experience having one rather than another representational
content—contrast informational “content”—must make some difference to him; and this will
surely be a difference that could constitute a reason for his judging one thing rather than
another.\footnote{See Brewer’s P&R, Chapter 3, for an illuminating argument for McDowell’s minimal empiricism.} Now, these are admittedly just sketches of arguments, but they will suffice for our
purposes.

Second Premise: Reason Conceptualism

McDowell labels his second premise “the equation between the space of reasons and
the space of concepts” (M&W, 125). If an item’s being “in the space of reasons” is a matter
of its being intrinsically capable of figuring in rationalisations, and if its being “in the space
of concepts” is a matter of its having conceptual content, then McDowell’s equation of those
two logical spaces amounts to what I call “reason conceptualism”:

**Reason Conceptualism**

Something can intrinsically be a personal-level reason *only if* it has conceptual content.

Concepts, for McDowell, are capacities that are paradigmatically exercised in thinking that
is—unlike perceptual experience—“active” or “free” in the sense that its subjects choose
what to think on the basis of reasons (M&W, 5). But why hold, with the reason
conceptualist, that only an episode that involves the exercise of such capacities could
constitute an intrinsic personal-level reason for a subject’s judgement?

Well at least one route to reason conceptualism can be sketched as involving the
following two steps: “reason intentionalism” and “content conceptualism”, as we might call
them. That is: (i) an item’s being an intrinsic personal-level reason for a judgement requires
its having intrinsic personal-level content; and (ii) only conceptual content is genuine
representational content. Let us take those two steps in order. (i) If a subject has a personal-level reason for his judgement, then he can explain his judgement by citing that reason. So, for example, he might say, “I judged that p because it is the case that p; look for yourself!” Or, perhaps: “I judged that p because I saw that p.” Moreover, whenever A gives his reason, what he is doing, it seems, is either expressing the content of the state which, intrinsically, is his reason for the judgement, or self-ascribing that contentful state itself. This is why it is sometimes said that the illumination of a subject provided by a rationalisation requires us to take up the subject’s perspective on the world: rationalisations, that is, inevitably display the subject’s thinkings or actings as carried out on the basis of how things seem to him, how he represents the world to be (FAM, 337). The most obvious threat to this claim might seem to be provided precisely by the case of pain experiences, and their rationalised self-ascription. But to insist on that point at this dialectical stage would be to beg the question against pain intentionalism—which is, after all, the position we are ultimately working towards. Instead, then, what about the example we encountered in Chapter 1, §5.2: namely, your judging that you’re on a ship because of your feelings of giddiness? Well, the reason intentionalist will say that what directly rationalises that judgement are two other judgements, I often feel giddy when I’m onboard ships and I feel giddy., the latter of which can itself be rationalised by the giddy feelings, provided these are contentful.

(ii) As for the second claim—content conceptualism—this too can be made plausible. If a subject’s state has personal-level content, if the world is represented to him as being some way or other, then surely he must understand what way that is; and such understanding is a matter of having certain capacities—not just for behaviour but also for active reason-governed thought—capacities, that is, of just the sort McDowell identifies with the possession of concepts. Again, we just encountered the suggestion that an episode must have personal-level content if it is to constitute a subject’s reason for making a certain judgement. But surely it is difficult to see how any episode could constitute a subject’s reason, if the subject himself lacks the concepts required in order to understand that content.

McDowell’s Conclusion: Disjunctivism and Content Conceptualism

The conjunction of these two premises—minimal empiricism and reason conceptualism—delivers the sort of motivation for intentionalism about perceptual experiences that we anticipated in Chapter 1: if such experiences are to constitute reasons

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9 Davidson advances a narrower version of reason conceptualism ("nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief") on something like these grounds in his CTTK, 311. For McDowell’s version of these grounds, see M&W, 162-66.
for our perceptual judgements—and they must—then they had better be contentful, and indeed *conceptually* contentful.

**McDowell's Intentionalist-Conceptualist Account of Outer Experience**

Some of a thinker's perceptual experiences must be veridical perceivings of experience-independent facts, perceivings that are conceptually contentful and can thus (of themselves and as such) rationally constrain the thinker's true perceptual judgements.

So if perceptual experiences are to be world-involving reasons, they must be conceived as, on the one hand, passive and world-involving ("operations of receptivity", McDowell tends to say) and, on the other, conceptually contentful ("operations of spontaneity", as McDowell puts it).

This conception can be elucidated by bringing into focus its opponents. On the one hand, there are Davidson and Sellars, both of whom McDowell presents as accepting reason conceptualism but denying minimal empiricism, and doing so as a result of their failing to see how experiences *could* have the conceptual content that reason conceptualism requires them to have in order for them to play the role in which minimal empiricism casts them (M&W, 139-46). On the other hand, there are the adherents of "the Myth of the Given"—such as, by McDowell's lights, Evans, Peacocke, and Quine—who accept minimal empiricism, but deny reason conceptualism and thus fail to see why experiences lacking conceptual content should not rationally bear on one's thought. Now, recall that the grounds for reason conceptualism were (i) that reasons require content and (ii) that content must be conceptual. Faced with these claims, some Givenists will deny the latter—content conceptualism—insisting that non-conceptual episodes can have the sort of personal-level content that equips them to be reasons. Others will instead deny the former—reason intentionalism—allowing that even representationally blank items can be reasons in the relevant sense.

With McDowell's case for intentionalism about perceptual experiences before us, we now have the backdrop against which to depict his account of sensations.

1.2. The Inner Case

When it comes to pain experiences, McDowell wants to apply much the same account as he applies in the outer case, and in part, for the same reasons.

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10 McDowell concedes that Davidson may go so far as to allow that a passive and world-involving experience and an experience capable of rationalising a judgement might be identical. But, as I interpret McDowell at M&W, 145, he takes Davidson still to be committed to the idea that the description under which such an experience is world-involving could not figure in a rationalisation. And so he thinks Davidson still falls short of minimal empiricism, since minimal empiricism requires (when fully spelled out) that impressions *as such* rationally constrain judgements. This is the point of "as such" in my formulation. See M&W, 98, 145-6, 175.

11 On Evans, see M&W, Lecture III; on Peacocke, M&W 162-70; and on Quine, M&W, 129-37, especially 136.
To give the impressions of "inner sense" the right role in justifying judgements, we need to conceive them, like impressions of "outer sense", as themselves already possessing conceptual content; to supply the necessary limit to the freedom of spontaneity, we need to insist that they are indeed impressions, products of receptivity... [again] passive occurrences in which conceptual capacities are drawn into operation... We should connect "inner experience" with conceptual capacities, so as to think about "inner sense" in parallel with "outer sense" to the fullest extent that is possible. (M&W, 21-22)

The considerations adduced here motivate two claims. First, and most generally, they motivate intentionalism about pain experiences. Notice that such utterances as "I am in pain" or "I feel a pain" are prompted by experiences, unlike, say, "I intend to go to the party". In light of this, the following idea is at least encouraged by the conjunction of minimal empiricism and reason conceptualism: if those utterances express judgements, as they seem to, then the judgements in question must be rationally constrained by the relevant experiences (that is, pain experiences), and those experiences must therefore be conceptually contentful. Admittedly, the "expressivist" denies that such first-person present-tense utterances as "I feel a pain" do express judgements, holding that they are rather akin to non-verbal behavioural manifestations of pain experiences such as grimaces; but McDowell thinks that there is no reason to be tempted by an expressivist account, once one recognises the availability of intentionalism about pain experiences (M&W: 22, 37).

Second, we can in this context also appreciate one of the virtues not merely of intentionalism about pain experiences, but also of mentalism. By comparison with some of the non-mentalist approaches that we shall encounter in the final three chapters, McDowell's parallel between "the inner" and "the outer" is, in the first instance, attractively simple. When one makes the perceptual judgement, \textit{This apple is red}, one simply endorses a visual experience with that content; one makes the judgement on the basis of an experience whose content provides the "material" for the judgement. Similarly, on McDowell's account, when one judges, \textit{This is a pain}, one simply endorses an inner experience with the relevant mentalistic content. In Chapter 6, I shall pose the problem for the non-mentalist of explaining why we use mentalistic terms such as "a pain" and "hurting" on the basis of our pain experiences; it is precisely this problem that a mentalist like McDowell avoids: his picture makes it quite clear why we use such terms, since on his account they simply express concepts that are implicated in pain experiences themselves, concepts that are therefore "taken up into" the quasi-perceptual judgements that endorse them.

12 See Wittgenstein's PI 244, where he at least comes close to such a claim.
So McDowell embraces both intentionalism and a version of the mentalist, act-object conception of pain experiences. Nonetheless, it was right to say in Chapter 1 (§4.1) that the traditional act-object conception is anti-intentionalist. And the point here is not just that the traditional conception takes pain experiences to lack representational content about the outer, objective world; rather, it fails to credit even the act of inner awareness with conceptual content. In other words, the traditional act-object conception is an inner version of the Myth of the Given, going in for episodes of non-conceptual awareness of pains. This is the opponent who most exercises McDowell in the sensation case; and, McDowell thinks, this opponent is the real quarry of Wittgenstein’s “private language argument” (I&I, 310). Given the inner Myth’s connections to the act-object conception—and also, as we shall see, to the notion of “interiority”—we ought to say a bit more about the Myth, and in particular we ought to distinguish between two versions which in McDowell’s discussion get somewhat tangled together.

1.3. The Myth, Uncritical Realism, and Interiority

Two Anti-Intentionalist Act-Object Conceptions

The first view is an inner version of the Myth, which rejects reason conceptualism, the idea that personal-level reasons must be conceptually contentful. In parallel with the outer Myth, this can take two forms: one version claiming that rationalising content can be non-conceptual (rejecting content conceptualism), the other insisting that reasons need not be contentful at all (rejecting reason intentionalism). Thus Peacocke, for example, has recently claimed that “the conscious pain itself... is reason-giving” (CSK, 72) even though it is utterly contentless (CSK, 75-6).

The second view is what I call an inner version of “uncritical realism”. On this view, as McDowell puts it, “the inner world” is comprised by “chunks of the ‘in itself’” (I&I, 308), items which are “brutely alien to concepts” (I&I, 307) and which therefore constitute, by this view’s lights, “a last and best resort against the insidious advance of the idea that world and thought are made for one another” (op. cit.). It will be useful to have a thumbnail sketch of the issues at which McDowell is gesturing here. (What follows is just a sketch, however; more than that would take us too far afield.) Let us start by returning to the outer case and considering critical realism. The adherent of that view denies that the world is, constitutively, absolutely independent of us and our concepts; rather it is structured in a way that is somehow beholden to us and our practices, and in a way that enables it to be represented conceptually. One characteristically critical realist idea, for example, issues from
Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations: as Child puts it, “how we find it natural to go on once trained plays some part in determining the categories we grasp and, therefore, in fixing what counts as going on in the same way” (CIM, 21). Now, by the uncritical realist’s lights, critical realism is essentially a version of idealism; we can escape such an idealism, the uncritical realist thinks, only by insisting that the world we represent in thought and experience is subserved by an “in itself”: a reality that is, contra the critical realist, either entirely unstructured or structured utterly independently of us and in a way that is alien to our concepts. Returning to the sensation case, then, the inner version of uncritical realism holds that pains-as-objects are constituents of this “in itself”.

I have merely gestured towards an extraordinarily deep and difficult set of issues, but the sketch suffices as background for my suggestion that the inner Myth and uncritical realism ought to be distinguished. Admittedly, it can be argued that the inner Myth and uncritical realism are interdependent. But it is at least exegetically useful to persist in distinguishing them, not least because such adherents of the Myth as Peacocke and Evans do not take themselves to be embracing uncritical realism; nor are they exercised by the phobia about idealism that traditionally motivates the uncritical realist. Now, to the extent that the Myth and uncritical realism are distinct views, there are two distinct anti-intentionalist act-object conceptions of pain experiences: one which construes “sensings” as episodes of non-conceptual awareness, and the other which adds to this the idea that the objects of such sensings—that is, pains—are “brutely alien to concepts” (I&I, 307). To use McDowell’s terminology, both views locate sensings of pains “outside the space of concepts”, but in different senses: Givenism denies they involve exercises of conceptual capacities; uncritical realism holds that they or their objects are “chunks of the ‘in itself’”.13

Uncritical Realism and the Interiority Intuition

McDowell sometimes envisages an opponent who cedes the outer world to the critical realist but retains uncritical realism in the case of “the inner world”. For uncritical realism, McDowell thinks, is especially tempting in the inner case, and it is especially tempting because the Myth is. To see this, start by considering Davidson’s objection to uncritical realism in the outer case. “We cannot,” Davidson says, “take up a stance outside our own ways of thinking” (MS, 160). In other words, we could be “acquainted” with an “in itself” only by episodes of non-conceptual awareness, but really there is no such awareness:

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13 This plasticity in the phrase “space of concepts” may be responsible for the blurring in McDowell’s discussion of the distinction between the Myth and uncritical realism. The positing of an ambiguity in this phrase also helps us to make sense of how McDowell could both contrast the space of reasons (and thus, by reason conceptualism, the space of concepts) with the realm of law (see, for example, M&W, 97) and insist that the space of concepts could be “unbounded” (see, for example, M&W, 97, again; and also M&W, Lecture II).
content proper (potentially rationalising content) is necessarily conceptual content.\textsuperscript{14} Now this Davidsonian complaint can seem to be undermined in the case of our awareness of sensations; for it can seem obvious, almost trivial, that the sensation case involves non-conceptual awareness.\textsuperscript{15} After all, sensations, as McDowell says, "undeniably make their presence felt" (I&I, 310); they are "not independent of our awareness of them" (OS, 284); "their percipi", as Strawson puts it, "seems to be nothing but their esse" (BS, 100). Hence pains-as-objects seem to have awareness built into them, as it were; they seem to be "in mind" already, merely by virtue of their existing. To insist on the involvement of classification and concepts can appear adventitious, for in this case the objects necessarily bring awareness with them; concepts seem "an optional extra, dispensable without disrupting the status of the episode as an experience" (OS, 285).

Another way of putting this is to say that "the interiority intuition" can appear to vindicate the inner Myth, and thereby clear the way for uncritical realism. The interiority intuition is the strong but inchoate idea that there is something rather peculiar about sensation experiences, something that sets them off from ordinary perceptual experiences, some sense in which they are peculiarly "inner" or "subjective". In particular, what can seem to vindicate the Givenist idea of non-conceptual awareness in the sensation case is the intuition that sensations are peculiarly self-intimating to awareness, or even awareness-dependent.\textsuperscript{16}

Interestingly, McDowell thinks that uncritical realism is also related to interiority more directly than this, not merely via the connection between interiority and the Myth. For another way of filling out the interiority intuition is in terms of the idea that sensations are radically (epistemically) private; and McDowell traces this idea back to the uncritical realist conception: "chunks of the 'in itself' can", he says, "present themselves, in the way that is supposed to reveal their alienness to concepts, only to the subject whose inner world they occupy" (I&I: 308, 311).\textsuperscript{17}

So, in some of its guises, the interiority intuition both encourages and is encouraged by Givenism and uncritical realism. Now the interiority intuition will be a central theme throughout this study, as we shall presently begin to see. Although McDowell rejects both Givenism and uncritical realism, he still tries to capture interiority; and the way in which he does so leads to the serious problems that I raise for him in the next chapter. In Chapter 6, I

\textsuperscript{14} See also McDowell’s I&I, 316; M&W, 39; OS, 287. And see Strawson’s BS, 100.

\textsuperscript{15} There is also a worry, of course, about what we are to say in the case of infants and non-human animals, if awareness of pains requires possession of concepts. I come to this question in Chapter 4, §4.

\textsuperscript{16} See also McDowell’s STIS, 240, on the Cartesian’s invocation of "transparency".

\textsuperscript{17} See also his, 336, on the Cartesian’s invocation of privacy, or privileged access.
suggest that there are yet other ways to accommodate interiority, distinct from both McDowell's and the Givenist's.

2. INTERIORITY AND SUBJECTIVISM

We have now seen two virtues of McDowell's act-object or "inner-sense" account. First, it is intentionalist, and thus allows us to think of the judgements made on the basis of pain experiences as rendered contentful in the same way as outer judgements—that is, by meeting the requirements imposed by the conjunction of minimal empiricism and reason conceptualism. Second, combining this intentionalism with a specifically mentalist account of the relevant contents allows the parallel between the inner and the outer to be taken further: just as perceptual experiences are endorsed in our perceptual judgements, experiences involving such concepts as *pain* are endorsed in judgements involving just the same concepts. For McDowell, however, the parallel has its limits. After all, our recent discussion of the Myth and uncritical realism pointed up another consideration that McDowell wants to accommodate: namely, the peculiarly inner character of sensations. And he wants to do justice to this without indulging Givenism or uncritical realism.\(^{18}\) His attempt to do so drives a fundamental wedge between our sensation experience and our objective perceptual experience.

2.1. Radical Subjectivism

McDowell's account of interiority is a version of what I call "radical subjectivism". As he puts it:

The objects of "inner sense" are internal accusatives to the awareness that "inner experiences" constitute; they have no existence independently of that awareness. (M&W, 21)

The object of this awareness is really nothing over and above the awareness itself [M&W, 120] . . . nothing other than the operation of sensibility itself. (M&W, 38)

So what distinguishes sensation experiences (experiences of "inner sense") from objective perceptual experiences is that the former *constitute* their subject matter.\(^{19}\) Pain experiences, for example, represent pains, on McDowell's mentalist account; and according to his radical

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\(^{18}\) He also wants to eschew other accounts of interiority: that pains and so forth are literally inside the subject's body (OS, 289, n.16; I&I, 312, n. 33; STIS, 244); that they play a peculiar functional role (STIS: 244, 246); that they are the objects of empirically privileged judgements (OS, 289, n. 16); and that they are peculiarly immaterial (M&W, 90, n.2, and STIS, 246).

\(^{19}\) This is not just the view that pain experiences constitute their subjects' being in pain. *That* simply follows from my definition of "pain experiences" as experiences in virtue of the possession of which a subject is in pain.
subjectivism, what it is for a pain to exist and to be a pain is for its subject to be aware of it as a pain. This is to suggest the converse of the order of dependence in the standard perceptual case: whereas outer impressions (disjunctively conceived) constitutively depend on their subject matter, the subject matter of pain impressions constitutively depends on (indeed, is "nothing over and above") the impressions.

So one point of radical subjectivism is to accommodate the idea that pain experiences are peculiarly inner. We can interpose another step here. It is tempting to fill out the idea of interiority by saying two things: first, pain experiences are infallible; and second, the items represented by such experiences are "self-intimating" (to pain experiences). In other words, assuming that pain experiences represent pains, it is tempting to say the following: if it seems to a subject as though this[x] is a pain, then this[x] is indeed a pain (that's the infallibility of pain experiences); and if this[x] is a pain, then it will seem to the subject as though it is (that's the self-intimating character of pains).20 Now, one of the attractions of radical subjectivism is that it explains these claims, rather than leaving them as basic data. It becomes intelligible why a pain experience cannot be hallucinatory: because on radical subjectivism an experience as of a pain determines the existence of the pain of which the experience purports to be an episode of awareness. And it becomes intelligible why a pain has to be experienced, why it is self-intimating: because on radical subjectivism the pain's being experienced (as a pain) is what it is for it to exist. So McDowell thinks that the Givenist is wrong in claiming that the self-intimating character of pains makes classification and concepts "optional extras" (OS, 285).21 Rather, self-intimation is simply the upshot of the fact that the pain is constitutively dependent on an episode of awareness, an episode which—despite the dependence—is intentional and indeed concept-involving.

One dialectical route, then, is from interiority (cashed out in terms of self-intimation and infallibility) to radical subjectivism. More generally, though, notice that interiority, radical subjectivism, and mentalism are three mutually supportive ideas: given any one of them, there is a plausible argument to any of the others. One might argue, for example, that if pain experiences have a radically subjective subject matter, then that subject matter must be mental; or that if pain experiences have a mental subject matter, then it must be radically subjective.22

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20 See, for example, Kripke's N&N, 152; Shoemaker's I&S, 134-5; and Smith's CTM, 274.
21 See page 48 above.
22 McDowell endorses an instance of the argument from mentalism to subjectivism in his I&I. It would, he says, be "utterly unattractive" to deny that "non-intentional inner states ... [and] goings-on" are "objects for consciousness" (I&I, 312, n. 34), but they must not be objects "in the way in which a perceivable state of affairs in one's environment is an object for consciousness", since if they were, they would lose their interiority and (what is the same thing?) "their entitlement to be regarded as mental processes" (I&I, 313). See also I&I, 311; FAM, 336; and M&W, 119-20.
Radical subjectivism is, in any case, the final ingredient in McDowell's intentionalist conception of pain experiences. I argue in the next chapter that this conjunction of intentionalism and subjectivism is highly problematic. For now, though, I turn to enter a caveat about the temptation to think that McDowell's view is just obviously true.

2.2. Anticipating Non-Mentalism and Objectivism

We have reached a good point at which to anticipate briefly two suggestions that I shall make in the final chapter. First, it can seem just obvious that, since there are pain experiences, and since it is highly plausible to agree with McDowell (against the expressivist) that such experiences rationally constrain inner pain judgements, it is clear that these experiences must have the sort of mentalist contents that McDowell assigns to them. That suggestion allows inner pain judgements to be construed on the model of outer perceptual judgements. But notice that we can accept a lot of this picture of pain experiences rationally constraining pain judgements, without accepting mentalism. The way to do so is not, as just suggested, to model inner pain judgements on perceptual judgements, which merely endorse the content of the experiences on which they're based, but rather to model them on self-ascriptions of perceptual experiences.

Consider this case: the judgements that might be rationalised by a visual experience with the content, *That apple is red*, include not only the perceptual judgement, *That apple is red*, but also the self-ascriptive judgement, *It seems to me as though that apple is red*; and, as we shall see in the next chapter (§2.2), there is no problem in thinking that the experience rationally constrains this self-ascriptive even though the self-ascriptive's content differs in certain respects from that of the experience itself—even though, in other words, there is no experience of the experience, no experience with the content, *It seems to me as though that apple is red*. Similarly, then, there is room for a view on which inner pain judgements involving concepts such as *a pain* and *hurting* are to be thought of not as perceptual judgements endorsing inner experiences which also involve those concepts, but rather as self-ascriptive judgements which alone involve those concepts.

Second, McDowell sometimes seems to suggest that radical subjectivism follows from mentalism. But notice that a form of radical subjectivism could not capture the sense in which intentions, say, are mental, since we surely should deny the idea that such propositional attitudes are constitutively dependent on inner experiences in which they are represented. In fact, as I anticipated in Chapter 1, McDowell himself elaborates in various

23 See Evans's VR, 227-8.

24 In other words, the two McDowellian points that I mentioned at page 45 above—rational constraint of sensation judgements and mentalism—can come apart from one another.
places a much more appealing general notion of mentality. This involves linking the mentality (or, as he also says, “subjectivity” or “interiority”) of an item to its intrinsic possession of conceptual content, its constituting a subject’s perspective on the world. “Nothing can count as an episode in a stream of consciousness”, McDowell says, “unless it has ... a conceptual shape, an articulable experiential content” (OS, 279). The moral of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mind, he says, is that “the mental life is lived in the space of reasons”; and he himself points out that this point is indifferent to the distinction between “sentience and sapience”, between experiences and propositional attitudes (OS, 296). In short, intentionalism by itself incorporates a conception of mentality or interiority that doesn’t invoke radical subjectivism. Given this, it is worth keeping in mind the fact that the objectivist too can say that pain experiences are mental (or inner or subjective), even if he says that their subject matter is not. For the objectivist can, and should, say that pain experiences themselves are conceptually contentful.25

This completes my presentation of the fundamentals of McDowell’s account—an account comprised by mentalism and radical subjectivism, and motivated both by an extension of his general epistemology to the sensation case and by the notion that the sensation case is peculiarly inner in some way. I now turn to an issue internal to mentalism: the choice between different mentalistic contents.

3. THE OBJECTUAL PHENOMENOLOGY OF PAIN EXPERIENCES

Here are four different contents that mentalists might assign to pain experiences:

(a) This is a pain (The act-object conception)
(b) It hurts (Feature-placing mentalism)
(c) I am in pain (In-pain mentalism)
(d) This left foot of mine hurts. (Hurting Perceptualism)

McDowell apparently embraces the first of these, which alone I count a version of the act-object conception. In having a pain experience, he suggests, one is “encountering a particular”, “the sensation itself”, “the pain” (OS, 284). “To put it in terms of item recognised and expression of what it is recognised to be”, he says, “what I feel is a pain” (OS, 286). These episodes involve concepts such as a pain or a toothache, not merely being

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25 It is in line with this that McDowell accuses the non-disjunctivist of failing to accommodate the subjectivity of perceptual experiences, for the non-disjunctivist evacuates such experiences of content. McDowell similarly takes the functionalist to task for failing to acknowledge "the Davidsonian irreducibility of the propositional attitudes", which "traces back to subjectivity ... [that is, to the fact that] the mode of understanding [that ascribing propositional attitudes] subserve[s] is a matter of comprehending the specific content of a particular subject's outlook on the world" (FAM, 337; my emphasis). So both Cartesianism and functionalism, McDowell thinks, end up with "an objectivistic conception of the mental" (FAM, 336).
in pain or having a toothache—not merely, that is, concepts instantiated by the person (OS, 284, n. 8). A restriction to the latter concepts would, McDowell thinks, be of a piece with an over-the-top suggestion of Wittgenstein's: that "if we construe the grammar of the expression of a sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant" (PI, 293). This Wittgensteinian claim is "overkill", by McDowell's lights, since its point is to undermine the Givenist version of the act-object conception, but we can do that without rejecting the act-object conception altogether—without, that is, losing pains-as-objects (OS, 284, n. 8; OS, 287). I take it, then, that McDowell would embrace the act-object conception and reject feature-placing mentalism, in-pain mentalism, and hurting perceptualism.

What sort of issue is this, though? How can we sharpen our grasp of the substantive difference between the act-object conception and other versions of mentalism? The following three suggestions are, I think, not particularly useful. First, one might say that McDowell ought to be taken as proposing the introduction of mental items belonging to a specific metaphysical category: particulars, say, or substances. But plainly McDowell does not think that pains are substances; and, as for mental particulars, it seems to me that hurting perceptualists and feature-placing mentalists could also be said to be introducing those: its hurting at midday on 1 January 2000, or my foot's hurting at midday on 1 January 2000 are, arguably, both mental particulars. Second, it might be suggested that the real issue is whether the relevant mental items are supposed to be objects of awareness. But other mentalists could agree with McDowell on this issue too: its hurting at midday on 1 January 2000 might be the object of one's experience, according to the feature-placing mentalist. Finally, then, one might just revert to the different content specifications, (a) through (d), and formulate the difference between the views in those terms: whereas the in-pain mentalist thinks that pain experiences represent their subjects' being in pain, for example, the act-object mentalist rather thinks that they represent pains. That is true, of course, but what would be helpful is a description, in somewhat different terms, of the features of the phenomenology of pain experience that are supposed to be best captured by the act-object mentalist's content specification. That is the task I pursue in this section, and in part of the next.

3.1. Three Elaborations of the Objectual Phenomenology of Pain Experiences

It is reasonable to suppose that the phenomenological intuition motivating McDowell is that when a subject is in pain, the mental item of which he is aware is presented as an object. That, it might be said, is the point of saying that pain experiences represent pains rather than, say, subjects being in pain. But the problem is to say what "object" means here, given the
difficulties just mentioned in taking it to mean “substance” or “particular” or “object of awareness”. So let us examine three suggestions that the act-object mentalist might make by way of drawing out “the objectual phenomenology” of pain experiences. These can be regarded as ways of adding a phenomenological condition to our formulation in Chapter 1 (§4.1) of the act-object conception of such experiences: so construed, the act-object theorist says not merely that being in pain is a matter of being aware of, if you like, some painful mental item; he further insists that the “painful item” is a pain, something that one is aware of as an object in the relevant sense.

(i) Shoemaker and Primary Objects of Perception

First, there is Shoemaker and Cassam’s idea that the act-object conception (which neither of them endorses) casts mental items in the role of “primary non-factual objects” of perceivings, or sensings.\textsuperscript{26} The thought (not necessarily a Givenist one) is illustrated by Shoemaker as follows: “one perceives a bending of a branch by observing a branch bending; and here the primary non-factual object of perception is a branch”, and not a bending of a branch (I&S, 125). The idea, perhaps, is that one can perceive a primary object of perception otherwise than by way of perceiving something else; and to deny that a subject perceives x by perceiving y is to say that (or at least implies that) the subject can perceive x without perceiving y. If pains are primary objects of sensings, therefore, then a subject’s sensing a pain is not effected by his being aware of any other item; and hence he can sense a pain of his without being aware—or, let’s add, even seeming to be aware—of himself or his body. Shoemaker says that “it hardly makes sense to suppose that there could be a mode of perception that has as its objects bendings of branches ... but never branches” (op. cit); the present point is that if pains like branches, but unlike bendings of branches—are primary objects of awareness, then inner sense is a mode of sensing which can have as its object a pain, without a subject or body.\textsuperscript{27}

(ii) The Spatial Content of Pain Experiences

The second elaboration of the objectual intuition adverts to the spatial content of pain experiences. The suggestion is that a subject’s pain experience presents the relevant mental

\textsuperscript{26} See Shoemaker’s I&S, 120, 123, and 125; and Cassam’s S&W, 106-7.

\textsuperscript{27} The traditional act-object theorist might well find this broadly phenomenological intuition congenial. For it would allow him to preserve two theses with which his conception is traditionally associated: the systematic elusiveness of the self and an indirect realist conception of our perceptual awareness of the external world (see Chapter 1, §4.1). First, if the self is elusive and hence not an object of inner sense, then the mental items which are had better not be experienced as, in Shoemaker’s term, “adjectival on” their subjects. Second, if no item in the external physical world—including the subject’s body—is ever an object of direct awareness, then it had better not be the case that the items that are (sense-data) can be objects of awareness only by way of the subject sensing his own body.
items as having their own locations and spatial boundaries—so, crucially, not just the subject's location and boundaries. In having a pain experience, the idea is, it seems to a subject as though he is presented with an item with its own spatial unity, an item whose spatial parts are contiguous, an item which "occupies" a region of space and is separated from other objects by its edges. Again, the suggestion is that the relevant mental items are presented as spatially bounded volumes of some stuff—of pain, perhaps. It may, for example, seem to a subject as though he is presented with more than one pain at different locations simultaneously. One of these pains may, perhaps, seem to be about a centimetre in diameter, and to "occupy" a region that is also, apparently, occupied by the surface of his shin; while the other pain may seem to be a more general ache, many centimetres in diameter, and spatially separate from the first, apparently "occupying" a region of space taken up by the flesh deep within his thigh. Moreover, the distance between these two pains may seem to grow as the pain in the subject's shin apparently moves—while preserving its spatial unity—towards his ankle. At one point, Wittgenstein appears to describe an intuition along those lines: "It positively seems to us as if pain had a body, as if it were a thing, a body with shape and colour" (Z, §482). Hence I shall sometimes refer to this as "the pain-as-body view". So, despite some important differences between the two cases, the idea is that there is some parallel between, on the one hand, the way in which pain experiences present pains and, on the other, the way in which visual experiences present physical substances.

(iii) Pains and Perceptual Demonstratives

A final and related way of elaborating the idea of an objectual phenomenology is to suggest that the spatial content of a pain experience enables its subject demonstratively to identify a pain in much the same way as the spatial content of his visual experiences enables him demonstratively to identify physical objects. To make this point, a little background will be useful concerning what I call the "know-which" and "know-where" requirements. Evans argues that the thinker of a perceptual-demonstrative thought meets the "know-which" requirement by virtue of his experience's ensuring he meets the "know-where" requirement: that is, he knows which object his thinking concerns by dint of his experience correctly placing the object in egocentric space. Cassam too appreciates the importance of the spatial

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28 I am exploiting here the fact that "pain" has both a sortal grammar ("I feel a pain in my foot") and a mass grammar ("There is some pain in my foot"). See Dennett's CFP, 196.
29 In particular, pains are not presented as impenetrable: this is why I put "occupies" in scare quotes above. For more on this, see page 63 below.
30 We might say that pains are, or are presented as being, "junior substances"—a phrase Ayer used to describe sense-data (quoted in Armstrong, WSOA, 30).
31 This is the simplest way of presenting Evans for my purposes, and it is certainly how McDowell understands him. (See PEDC.) But it may be that Evans requires only that the thinker's experience provides him with the exercisable ability to locate
content of experience to our perceptual-demonstrative thoughts. He particularly emphasises our awareness of the boundaries of objects (S&W, 139). So objects that are simultaneously seen to be at different locations are thereby seen to be numerically distinct. And that material objects are discriminated from one another in the very content of perceptual experience is, on this conception, what enables us to single them out under perceptual-demonstrative modes of presentation. So one point in talking of “objects” in the pain case might be to suggest the parallel idea: just as it is possible for a subject to see that physical objects x and y are distinct (at a time) when they are presented as spatially separate, so too it is possible for him to sense that two pains of his are distinct when they are presented as spatially separate; and this, it might be suggested, enables a subject to identify a pain demonstratively when he feels one.

In fact, there is a further point that the act-object theorist might make. Again, a little background will help. Some philosophers have suggested that in order to identify an experience demonstratively, a thinker needs to meet a “know-whose” requirement: he needs to know whose experience is in question. Some also hold, both in this case and in the different case of the demonstrative identification of physical objects, that a thinker needs to meet a “know-what” requirement: he needs to know what sortal concept the identified item falls under. Interestingly, in the case of the demonstrative identification of physical objects, Cassam lifts this know-what requirement, arguing that one does not need to know what sort of object is in question, since one can still meet the know-which requirement thanks to the fact that “physical objects are—and are generally perceived as being—‘unitary and discrete wholes’” (S&W, 109). Now, Cassam contrasts “experiences or states of consciousness” with physical objects in precisely this respect: “experiences or states of consciousness are not given individuals with sharply defined boundaries” (S&W, 109). And for this reason, in the case of experiences, he refuses to lift either the know-what or the know-whose requirements. But notice that, in the case of pains, the intuition we have been examining about pain experiences’ objectual phenomenology might involve saying that pains are given as bounded individuals. And so the act-object theorist might suggest, against Cassam, that in the case of pains—as opposed to, say, intentions or perceptual experiences—the know-what and know-whose requirements do indeed lapse. To focus on the second of these requirements, the idea might be not so much that one can sense a pain without knowing whose it is, but that it is in virtue of its spatial content that a subject’s pain experience

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32 For Evans on these two requirements, see his VR, 178 and 253, respectively. See also McDowell’s PEDC, 263.
33 For Cassam on the know-what requirement, see S&W 109, 123, 136-40, 143-5, and 150.
34 See his S&W, 109-10. The form of know-whose requirement that he commits himself to is, incidentally, quite weak.
enables him to identify a pain of his demonstratively; it is not in virtue of the experience informing him whose pain is in question.

So those are three ways of elaborating the phenomenological intuition that in having a pain experience one is presented with a mental object, a pain. Let us turn now to evaluate these suggestions.

3.2. The Bodily Content of Pain Experiences

Parts of these elaborations of the phenomenology of pain experiences are close to the truth, and these parts can point the way to identifying what is wrong about feature-placing and in-pain mentalism—though they leave hurting perceptualism untouched. Still, little of what was said is exactly right; and, moreover, some of it seems flatly inconsistent with commitments of McDowell’s, whose act-object mentalism it was which we were hoping to unpack. To explain these points, and to bring to light an important feature of the real phenomenology of pain experiences, I make the following three remarks.

First, it is doubtful whether McDowell could consistently appeal to the first or third ways of elaborating act-object mentalism, despite his willingness to assert against Wittgenstein that sensations are “objects of reference” (OS, 286). Regarding (iii)—the point about the subject demonstratively identifying his pains by dint of his pain experiences’ spatial content—notice that in at least one place McDowell is clearly sympathetic to Evans’s idea that meeting the know-which requirement in order to deploy the mode of presentation, this conscious state, does indeed require meeting the know-whose requirement (PEDC, 262); and he shows no sign of making an exception to this principle for pains. As for (i), it is arguably the case that, as Cassam and Shoemaker clearly think, only substances can be “primary non-factual objects of perception” (branches are, for example, branch bendings are not). If so, then that elaboration of the objectual phenomenology would require pains to be substances, which is clearly something that a radical subjectivist such as McDowell couldn’t endorse.

Second, (i) gets the phenomenology of pain experiences wrong anyway. According to (i), a subject can feel a pain without even seeming to be aware of his body. But this conflicts with the highly plausible idea that the spatial content of pain experiences is essentially bodily. To appreciate this important point, start with a case of seeing two material substances: my seeing a ring on my finger, for example. In that case, I see both the ring and my finger, and neither by way of the other: both are, if you like, primary objects of

35 See, for example, Shoemaker’s I&S, 123-5.
perception. I can, therefore, easily imagine a visual experience in which my finger disappears and the ring apparently remains, seeming to float in thin air, there, where it was before. But if, by contrast, I feel a pain in my finger, then it is difficult to imagine my feeling the pain without feeling my finger; it is difficult to imagine an experience in which it seems to me as if my finger is not there any longer, even though the pain apparently still is—floating in thin air, there, where it was before. (Remember Nelson and Mrs Gradgrind, in Chapter 1, §1.) The general point about the bodily content of pain experiences is twofold:

The Bodily Content of Pain Experiences

(I) In any pain experience, it essentially seems to the subject as though the represented item (a pain, or whatever candidate your favoured theory prefers) is located at a certain point in space.

(II) This apparent location of the represented item depends on its seeming to be in or at a part of a body that, in turn, seems to be at the location in question. Again, the place at which the subject of a pain experience feels the item to be is determined by the apparent location of the body part in which the item feels to be located. 36

This is an important fact, which any satisfactory account of pain experiences should accommodate. As we shall see, I think the accounts which best do so are not versions of the act-object conception.

Finally, then, what about (ii): the idea that the relevant mental items are presented in pain experiences as being located in space, and as having their own spatial boundaries, not just the boundaries of the subject as a whole? There is something to this, and it shows what is wrong with in-pain mentalism: namely, that when a subject has a pain experience, his experience presents to him the relevant item (a pain or whatever) as being at a certain point on or in his body, not as a state of himself, like his age or his weight or his simply being in pain. Indeed, a subject of a pain experience may simultaneously seem to be aware of more than one of the relevant items (a pain in his right foot, say, and a pain in his left), by contrast with his single state of being an octogenarian, or being twelve stone, or being in pain. This, as we saw in Chapter 1, is the idea that motivates Jackson’s view of mental objects, and there is something right about it. But to develop it in terms of a pain’s being presented as “a thing, a body with shape” again risks failing to accommodate the bodily content of pain experiences: in particular, the idea that the apparent location of the item represented by a pain experience depends on the apparent location of the body part in connection with which it is represented. If, that is, we were to endorse the “pain-as-body” version of the objectual intuition, (ii), then one ought to wonder why the items apparently presented by pain

36 See O'Shaughnessy, TW, i, 161-2. The point, incidentally, is not that when a subject has a pain in his left foot, he is given the location of the left foot independently of the pain experience and uses this to work out the location of the pain. Rather, in a pain experience, the location of the body part and the pain are given together, and interdependently. See O'Shaughnessy’s TW, i, 165.
Chapter 2. Mentalism and Subjectivism

experiences need to be experienced as located about a body at all: “Why,” we ought to ask, “can’t these bounded volumes of pain not seem to float free into thin air, like a ring from a finger?” One could, I suppose, just insist that it is a bare phenomenological datum that they cannot. But there is a different mentalist view with a better explanation: hurting perceptualism, to which I now turn.

4. HURTING PERCEPTUALISM

Hurting perceptualism is a mentalist view which analyses talk of subjects having and feeling pains in terms of their having somatosensory experiences in which body parts are represented as instantiating some mental property. The property in question is hurting, where what is intended is not the transitive sense of “hurting”, in which it means something like “injuring” or “damaging” or “causing pain”, but rather the intransitive sense.\(^{37}\) Now hurting perceptualism is often overlooked, but it is sometimes identified and to varying degrees endorsed—by, for example, Ayers, Cornman, Martin, and Peacocke.\(^{38}\) For our purposes, I formulate it as follows:

**Hurting Perceptualism**

1. A’s being in pain (feeling or having a pain) consists in his having a somatosensory experience as of a part of his body hurting.

2. A’s having or feeling a pain in a body part, O consists in

   (a) A’s undergoing a somatosensory perceiving with a content of the form, That part[O] of my body there[L] is hurting
   (b) O’s existing and being at L, and
   (c) the bodily and spatial content of the experience mentioned in (a) causally depending on O and on its being at L.

I say more about the details of this formulation in §4.2 below. For now simply notice that, like McDowell’s mentalism, hurting perceptualism is a genuinely intentionalist view. Hence it can hold that one’s pain judgements are rationally constrained by one’s conceptually contentful pain experience. Indeed, it can hold, attractively, that the judgement, *My left foot hurts*, is a straightforward perceptual judgement, simply endorsing the content of the pain experience on which it is based. Moreover, I suggest in §4.3 that the hurting perceptualist can adapt McDowell’s account of interiority. In short, hurting perceptualism preserves a lot of what seems good about McDowell’s view. It also, I suggest, improves on it.

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37 Even on a radical subjectivist account of hurting (see §4.3 below), “hurting” does not mean “causing pain”.
38 See Ayers’s LK, i, 63, 185, 214-16, Cornman’s MTAT, Martin’s BA, 268, and Peacocke’s, COM, 114-16.
4.1. Two Advantages of Hurting Perceptualism

Hurting perceptualism straightforwardly integrates two things that it can seem difficult for the act-object theorist to fit together: bodily experience, on the one hand, and the sensory awareness of mental items, on the other. On the one hand, then, the hurting perceptualist takes pain experiences to be a species of somatosensory experience: they are experiences implicated in the perception of one's own body "from the inside"; the referents (or constituents) of the singular components of their contents are body parts. Hence, in one respect, the third elaboration of the objectual phenomenology of pain experiences was right as against feature-placing mentalism: the spatial contents of pain experiences do indeed enable their subjects to identify objects demonstratively—it's just that, for the hurting perceptualist, the relevant objects are hurting body parts, not pains. So, in this respect, pain experiences, which were in the previous chapter classified as intransitive sensations, are held by the hurting perceptualist to resemble the transitive sensations, which I claimed to be perceptual experiences belonging to body sense. On the other hand, notwithstanding all of that, hurting perceptualism is still a form of mentalism. Though body parts are the referents (or constituents) of the singular components of the contents of pain experiences, hurting perceptualism holds that their predicative components, unlike the predicative components of transitive sensations, are intuitively mental. Now, this integration of bodily and mentalistic contents is an attractive feature of hurting perceptualism. And it lies at the root of many of its advantages over the act-object conception. In this section, I mention two relatively esoteric virtues of hurting perceptualism; in the next, I bring out a third, more central advantage it enjoys.

The Elusiveness Thesis

First, hurting perceptualism is implicit in an interesting argument that has recently been deployed against the venerable thesis that the self is systematically elusive. The tradition—running through Hume, Kant, Schopenhauer, Wittgenstein, and Shoemaker—claims that one is never aware of oneself both as a material object and as a conscious subject. Call this "the elusiveness thesis". Recently, Ayers, Brewer, and Cassam—and, less recently and more equivocally, Merleau-Ponty—have all insisted that body sense is at least one exception to this thesis: it, at least, is not eluded by the self, they argue; again, in bodily

39 That pain experience is somatosensory means that it cannot belong to "inner sense" in Kant's sense. As Cassam reminds us, Kantian inner sense is not spatial, and hence the apparent location of pains poses "a difficulty for the idea that pains are perceived by inner sense" (ISBS, 123).

40 For more on the elusiveness thesis, see Cassam's S&W, Chapter 1. For the recent attempts to resist the thesis, see Ayers's LK, ii, 285-88; Cassam's ISBS, ISA, and S&W, and Brewer's BAS. On Merleau-Ponty's attitude, see Cassam's ISBS, 114, and S&W, 9 and 72.
awareness one is aware of oneself both as a material object and as a conscious subject. It would take some work to formulate more precisely what this dispute comes to; but all I want to emphasise for now is that one central way in which body sense has been used against the elusiveness thesis depends on the claim that it is manifest to the subject of intransitive sensations that, as Brewer puts it, “the realm of the psychological itself extends physically into the extremities of the animal body” (BAS, 305). Again, the idea is that one is aware of one’s body as instantiating “properties of the body that are also necessarily properties of the basic subject of that very awareness” (BAS, 300). For this reason, it is thought, the very content of the intransitive bodily sensations supplies a powerful antidote to the Cartesian conception of the self, according to which the self—and the mental generally—is dualistically set over against the merely physical body. In short, this anti-elusiveness strategy requires that in having intransitive bodily sensations, one is aware of one’s body as instantiating mental properties. It seems to me, then, that hurting perceptualism is just the account of pain experiences needed by these anti-elusiveness theorists. So, if the elusiveness thesis strikes us as false, then hurting perceptualism may well appeal as a way of explaining why it seems false, and perhaps why it is false.

The Univocity Condition

The second advantage of hurting perceptualism relates to the deep and vexed issue how to explain psychological concepts’ univocity between their first- and third-person applications. Peacocke argues that we can understand how this condition is met by the concept, experience of red, provided we take it to be the concept of an episode that enables its subjects to discriminate non-inferentially the red things as red. Though understanding the concept in this way makes clear the relevance of the behavioural basis on which we apply it third-personally, however, it is not immediately obvious how it engages the worry about univocity that arises out of the intuitive difference between that basis and the basis (or lack of a basis) for our first-person applications. It seems to me, though, that Evans’s account of the self-ascription of perceptual experiences can be used to illuminate Peacocke’s suggestion. For Evans, a subject self-ascribes an experience of red in two stages: first, she determines what I call the “naïve judgement”, the judgement that she would make on the

41 See also BAS, 297 and 302 (contrast his SLA, 19); Ayers’s LK, ii, 286; and Cassam’s ISBS, 113-14, ISA, 328, and S&W, 57 and 77. Cassam also attributes something like this point to Husserl; see S&W, 57.
42 See his COM, especially 105-6, and his LJ, 478.
43 See McGinn’s reply to Peacocke, POM, 127.
44 The point I am about to make is at best implicit in Peacocke’s paper, though I take it to be suggested by his remark that he has provided a “higher-order classification of ways of thinking of [experiences of red]” (COM, 105); and in conversation he seems happy with the elaboration. For Evans on the self-ascription of perceptual experiences, see VR, 226-28.
basis of her experience, if she took it at face value (hence prescinding from any extraneous information she may have about, for example, the abnormality of the conditions); and second, she prefaces the content of the naïve judgement with the operator, *it seems to me as though*. The reason I think this illuminates Peacocke’s point is that the procedure by which the subject arrives at the naïve judgement can be thought of as follows: it is precisely a procedure by which she can determine, for example, whether or not she is having an experience that would, *in normal conditions*, enable her to discriminate the red things as red. So, although first- and third-person applications undoubtedly have different bases, it is intelligible to the subject that both bases are methods for determining the same thing: namely, whether she has an experience that would, in normal conditions, enable her to discriminate the red things as red. Arguably, that is a step towards explaining univocity.

But what about the concept *being in pain*? Generalising his account, Peacocke suggests that any concept of an experience type will meet the univocity condition only if it has "some actual or potential herald [concept]"—that is, some distinct concept, true of material objects, that stands to the experiential concept as red stands to *experience of red* (COM, 111-2). For, only if that is the case can self-ascriptions of the experiences in question be thought of on Evans’s model. Now, it is not obvious how to import this structure into an account of *being in pain*. Not obvious, perhaps, but possible—or so the hurting perceptualist will claim. For we could, he will say, take *being in pain* to be the concept, *having an experience as of a body part’s hurting*, and in turn understand this as the concept of a state enabling its possessor to non-inferentially discriminate her hurting body parts as hurting. And the suggestion is that this will allow him to carry over the point about univocity from the *experience of red* case. It is in precisely this context that Peacocke embraces something that at least looks rather like hurting perceptualism (COM, 114-16).

My suggestion, then, is that the possibility of mimicking in the pain case the structure of the colour case seems, at least at first, to be an advantage for hurting perceptualism. In particular, it can seem to be an advantage that the hurting perceptualist distinguishes between two concepts: an experiential concept, *being in pain*, applicable to subjects; and a potential "herald concept", *hurting*, applicable to body parts. But it might be said that this is a virtue of pain intentionalism in general, rather than an advantage specifically of hurting perceptualism over McDowell’s act-object conception; for McDowell also has available a distinction that could be exploited in order to mimic the structure of the colour case: that between the concepts *being in pain* and *a pain*. Even if the upshot of these considerations is merely a generally pro-intentionalist point, however, it is a useful one. But, anyway, I

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45 See my related worry in Chapter 1, §5.3, about whether there is an “objective correlate” for the sensational property, *pain*.
suspect that the hurting perceptualist can make the point more comfortably than McDowell can, since the idea of a subject’s behaviourally discriminating from amongst her body parts those that are hurting seems easier to model on the relevant behaviour in the colour case than is the subject’s behaviourally discriminating from amongst a set of inner objects those that are pains.

4.2. A Third Advantage: Bodily Content and the Location of Pains

I now turn to some further virtues of hurting perceptualism. Notice, to start with, that we should distinguish between the issues of, on the one hand, the spatial and bodily content of pain experiences and, on the other hand, the location of pains. For one thing, even an act-object theorist who thinks that pain experiences represent located pains need not think of pains as always (or ever) really being where the spatial content of pain experiences has them as being. For another thing, those intentionalists who reject the act-object conception don’t think that located (or unlocated) pains figure in the content of pain experiences anyway. So, again, the issue of where pains are is different from, though related to, the issue of the apparent location of whatever items pain experiences represent, even if they represent pains. Now, hurting perceptualism—and, I shall argue in later chapters, some other forms of intentionalism—can give a satisfying account of both issues. Here, I want to explain the account the hurting perceptualist can give, and in so doing to gesture towards some of the fascinating complexities to which these issues give rise.

Spatial and Bodily Content: The Cheshire Cat’s Grin and Ghostly Occupation

Here are two points about the bodily and spatial content of pain experiences that the hurting perceptualist can make. First, I suggested in §3.2 that the pain-as-body elaboration of the act-object conception seems to leave the following as an unexplained datum: that the items represented by such experiences cannot even seem to float free of a body into thin air. Hurting perceptualism’s explanation of this is, by contrast, attractively straightforward. For the hurting perceptualist, the relevant mental item is a property of body parts: hurting. And this is a property that, like the Cheshire Cat’s grin, cannot be represented independently of the apparent presentation of an appropriate substance in which it can at least seem to inhere.46

Second, I suggested in §3.1 on behalf of the “pain-as-body” view that an ache might seem to be deep within one’s thigh in the sense that it apparently “occupies” the region that is also occupied by the flesh of the thigh. Now, the reason for the scare quotes around

46 Even if some experiences can have feature-placing contents, such as It’s raining, pain experiences (and grin experiences) are not like that. For the Cheshire Cat’s grin, see Carroll’s AlW, Chapter 8, 91.
"occupies" was that the ache does not occupy that region in the way in which the thigh does: the ache seems somehow more ghostly and penetrable, since both it and the thigh can be—and can seem to be—there simultaneously. If this sense of "occupying" strikes you as mysterious, then hurting perceptualism may appeal. For the hurting perceptualist simply denies that one's experience presents an ache (that is, a particular) as either occupying or "occupying" that region. He rather claims that the experience presents the flesh that does (straightforwardly) occupy that region as aching (that is, as instantiating a property).

So hurting perceptualism promises a more plausible account of the spatial and bodily content of pain experiences than the act-object conception does—at least, if the act-object conception's phenomenological claims are elaborated in anything like the ways examined in §3.1 above. Interestingly, McDowell seems especially hard pressed to accommodate the apparent bodily locations of the items represented by pain experiences. For him, the relevant items are pains. But he also thinks that a pain is "nothing over and above the awareness itself" (M&W, 120). And yet the location of an episode of awareness is surely that of the subject as a whole, not of any particular parts of his body. So there is at least a risk that McDowell will have to claim that pain experiences incorporate a deep and systematic error, representing items that are, by his lights, states of a person, but representing them as substances (or at least substance-like items) located at various points around the subject's body.

The Location of Pains: Painful Fingers in Mouths

So much for the bodily and spatial content of pain experiences; what about the location of pains? Does the fact that the hurting perceptualist rejects pains as objects of awareness prevent him from giving an account of this matter? No. Clause (2), after all, allows talk of one's having or feeling a pain in one's left foot: it's just that this circumstance obtains by dint of one's experiencing not a pain, but rather one's foot hurting. But can the hurting perceptualist help us with any of our puzzles from Chapter 1: puzzles about painful fingers in mouths, for example, and about phantom-limb and referred pains? I think he can.

Recall the first of these puzzles:

(I) (Invalid)  
(a) A has a pain in her finger  
(b) That finger is in her mouth  
(c) Therefore, A has a pain in her mouth.

(II) (Valid)  
(d) A has a ring on her finger  
(e) That finger is in her mouth  
(f) Therefore, A has a ring in her mouth.

The puzzle was to explain why (I) is invalid, despite the fact that (II) is valid. The answer, according to the hurting perceptualist, is that (I) is (very roughly) equivalent to:
(III) (Invalid)
(a*) A has a somatosensory experience with the content, *That finger is hurting*
(b*) That finger is in her mouth
(c*) Therefore, A has a somatosensory experience with the content, *My mouth is hurting*

This argument's invalidity is straightforwardly intelligible. We do not need to posit any ambiguities in spatial vocabulary. Rather the point is simply that what we speak of as the location of a pain is really the location at which hurting is *represented*, and it does not follow from a subject's representing one bodily location as hurting that she represents another as hurting, even if the former is *inside* the latter.

**The Location of Pains: Phantom Limbs and Floating Pains**

But what does hurting perceptualism say about the case of Nelson's phantom-arm pains? It says simply that Nelson has an experience as of a right arm of his hurting, which experience is entirely hallucinatory. Contrast this with the act-object conception. Act-object theorists tend to deny that experiences as of pains can be hallucinatory.47 Hence, in whatever way they try to integrate pain experiences and somatosensory experiences, such theorists will tend to claim that even when the latter are hallucinatory, as in Nelson's case, the former require pains as objects.48 Jackson is quite explicit about this, and its implications. On his view, even when Nelson only seems to be aware of a right arm of his, and his experience is to that extent hallucinatory, he remains *actually* aware of a pain, a pain which must therefore be hovering in thin air (PE: 54-5, 77-8). Now, admittedly, it is not obvious that the act-object theorist ought to be embarrassed by the idea of mental items floating in thin air, if he gives a radical subjectivist account of such items rather than thinking of them as self-standing mental substances. But for those who remain inclined to blush at the very idea of mental items floating in thin air, hurting perceptualism will seem to be at a distinct advantage. For the hurting perceptualist need not indulge that idea. Since there was no right arm whose hurting was experienced by Nelson, and since hurting is a property, the instance that Nelson *seemed* to be aware of did not exist either: no instantiator, no instantiation.

So, according to hurting perceptualism, Nelson's experience is entirely hallucinatory. Moreover, clause (2) rightly implies that he does not have a pain in a right arm of his, since he lacks such an arm (and *a fortiori* is not perceiving one). Crucially, though, notice that clause (1) nonetheless implies that his experience is sufficient for him to be *in* pain. What is

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47 Even McDowell, so this is not motivated by a general failure to see the possibility of a disjunctive account of subjectively indistinguishable experiences.

48 This is not to say that pains-as-objects are introduced as sense-data needed to account for the bodily phenomenology common to hallucinatory and non-hallucinatory somatosensory experiences. (As I said in Chapter 1, §4.1, the act-object conception is not motivated by the argument from illusion.) To account for that, non-disjunctivists will have to introduce bodily sense-data; disjunctivists, of course, will not.
required for *that* is not an actual perceiving but merely an experience as of a hurting body part.

But what about the idea of a pain hovering in thin air near Nelson’s chest? We have seen that the hurting perceptualist denies that an instance of *hurting* is there, but what will he say about whether a *pain* is there? Presumably, he will explain “*There is a pain in a body part, O*” in terms of “A subject *has* a pain in O”, and “*There is a pain at a spatial location, L*” in terms of “A subject *has* a pain in a body part at L”. Given their most central and natural interpretations, the suggestion is, the first of each of these pairs is true if and only if the second is, in *its* central and most natural sense—that is to say, in the sense explained by clause (2) of hurting perceptualism. So the notion of a subject’s *having* a pain in a body part is the primary notion. It is not as if there could be a pain in B’s limb simply by dint of his placing that limb where it seems to A as though he has a hurting right arm. What is rather required for there to be a pain in B’s limb is that a subject *have* a pain in it, and what is required in turn for *that* is not only that the limb exist and be in the right place, but—amongst other things—that a subject’s pain experience constitute a *perceiving* of it. This condition imposes various causal requirements, which are made explicit in condition (2c) and to which we shall return. It also imposes other requirements. For example, plausibly there is some requirement of “fit” between, on the one hand, the descriptive aspects of the singular content of a perceiving and, on the other hand, the perceived object. Hence it is at least not clear whether a pain experience with the content *This leg of mine is hurting* could have as its object an *arm*. Moreover, given that body parts are represented in pain experiences as one’s own, it is also not clear whether a body part of B’s could ever be an object of a pain experience of A’s. In any case, on this interpretation of the notion of there being a pain in a body part, or at a location, the possibility of pains floating in thin air is ruled out.

But what if one insisted that there are further senses of “*There is a pain at a location, L*” and “*There is a pain in a body part, O*” in which the former is true if a subject has an experience as of a body part of his there[L] hurting, even if there is no body part there[L]; and the second is true if there is a body part there, even if it is not perceived by means of the pain experience? I think very little hangs on what the hurting perceptualist says about this suggestion. As I have noted, some will be worried about the notion of pains floating in thin air. But whatever force this worry has concerning the pains of the act-object conception, it seems not to be a real concern when it comes to hurting perceptualism’s pains. For hurting perceptualism says that talk of pains is to be analysed *away*, as it were, in terms of talk of apparent instances of hurting. Now, what *is* worth insisting on is a point made in §3.2 above:

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49 I say more about what it is to experience a body part as one’s own in Chapter 6, §3.4.
that the relevant mental items are never presented in pain experiences as being located in thin air; they are always presented as being in body parts. But the hurting perceptualist can take that point on board and still allow that there may be some sense of “There is a pain at L” in which there might be a pain in thin air, near Nelson’s chest, simply because it seems to Nelson as though he has a hurting right arm there[L]. However, for our hurting perceptualist, this is certainly not the core sense of “There is a pain at L”; whether he allows that it is nonetheless a sense the sentence sometimes has, or rather a sense stipulatively introduced by the theorist, will simply depend on his ordinary language intuitions.

**The Location of Pains: Near-Phantoms and the Host Limb’s Location**

In addition to phantom-limb pain experiences, there is a closely related set of cases that has been neglected in the literature. Call them “near-phantom cases”. It may help, before describing them, to emphasise something that has so far been implicit: that the locations of a subject’s body parts are presented in his somatosensory experiences under egocentric modes of presentation, modes of presentation essentially connected to what he can do. Somatosensorily, I experience my arm as there[L], for example, where this mode of presentation is essentially connected to my ability to point to, or otherwise act on, that location, L. I do not experience it as, say, one metre from the northern wall of my room. With this reminder on board, consider a case in which (i) A has an experience as of a left arm of his there[L] hurting, (ii) unlike in the phantom case, he has a left arm, but (iii) neither his arm nor any other part of his body is there[L]. Again, it seems to A as though his left arm is at a location where, in fact, it is not; and the location at which the hurting seems to him to be is not where the arm really is, but rather where the arm seems to be, or (we might say) where the apparent arm is. I suspect we would in this case deny that A has a pain in his left arm, even though he has such an arm. Hurting perceptualism accommodates this, on my formulation: if you think that the description of the case precludes its involving A’s somatosensorily perceiving his left arm, then the case fails to meet clause (2a); in any event, clause (2b) is certainly not met. 50

**The Location of Pains: Unanchored Cases, Referred Cases, and Perception**

If (2b) is enough to explain why A does not have a pain in his left arm in the near-phantom case, then isn’t condition (2a) otiose? Moreover, isn’t it too much to require that A actually perceive his left arm, somatosensorily, in order to have a pain in it? Consider, for example, a case in which A does not perceive his left arm, even though (i) he has an experience as of a

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50 Some may think that (2a) implies (2b); for those who don’t, I include (2b) separately.
left arm of his there[L] hurting, (ii) unlike the phantom case, he has a left arm, and (iii) unlike the near-phantom case, his left arm is in the appropriate location: namely, there[L]. Isn't this sufficient for A to have a pain in his left arm?

The answer, I think, is No. To see this, consider two ways in which the case described might develop: the "unanchored cases", as I call them.

\[
\begin{array}{ccc}
\text{t}_1 & \quad & \text{t}_2 \text{ (first case)} & \quad & \text{t}_2 \text{ (second case)} \\
L & \quad & L & \quad & L \\
H & \quad & \quad & \quad & H \\
& \quad & L^* & \quad & L^* \\
\end{array}
\]

The solid boxes in this diagram represent A's real left arm; the dotted boxes represent his apparent left arm. At time \( \text{t}_1 \), things are just as described above. But at time \( \text{t}_2 \), A tries to move his left arm from \( L \) to \( L^* \). In the first case, A's arm remains where it was at \( \text{t}_1 \), but the apparent arm "moves", as it were, to \( L^* \). (Suppose the real arm is paralysed and without afferent connections to the central nervous system.) In the second case, conversely, the real arm moves to \( L^* \) but the apparent arm "remains" at \( L \). The represented hurting follows the apparent arm in both cases: that is, at \( \text{t}_2 \) in the first case, A has an experience as of a left arm there[\( L^* \)] hurting, and at \( \text{t}_2 \) in the second case, he has an experience as of a left arm there[\( L \)] hurting. Notice that at \( \text{t}_2 \) in both cases a near-phantom situation has developed. The question is: before that happens, at \( \text{t}_1 \), does A have a pain in his left arm?

Intuitions may differ here, but my own inclination is to say "No". For it seems in these cases as though the relationship between the real arm, on the one hand, and the apparent hurting arm, on the other, is too accidental for A to have a pain in the real arm by virtue of how things seem to him regarding the apparent arm. Again, for A to have a pain in his arm, it is arguably not enough that he happens to have an apparent hurting arm where the real arm is. If the apparent arm is not also "anchored" in the real arm—if, that is, the apparent arm and its apparent location do not causally depend on the real arm and its real location—then even at \( \text{t}_1 \) the situation seems too close to the near-phantom cases to say that A has a pain in his arm. To avoid saying that, the hurting perceptualist needs at least (2c), which requires just such a causal connection between the real arm and the apparent arm. Admittedly, this falls short of showing the need for (2a), which further requires that the pain experience constitute the subject's perceiving the real arm. Now, I suspect (2a) is needed, as

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51 To the extent that it may be thought a condition for action that an apparent limb be "anchored" in the real one, this second case is less obviously intelligible than the first.
is reflected by my finding intuitive the requirements of "fit" that I suggested it introduces. But not much hangs on this, for our purposes. If you disagree with the requirement, then amend hurting perceptualism as follows: for A to have a pain in his left arm there[L], all that is required in addition to (2b) and (2c) is that he have an experience as of a left arm of his there[L] hurting, not that this experience constitute a perceiving of that arm.

Notice, incidentally, that (2a) and (2c) do not preclude A's having a referred pain in his left arm by dint of a pain experience caused by a heart condition. All that (2c) requires is that its seeming to A as though a left arm of his there[L] is hurting must causally depend on his left arm, if it is to determine that there is a pain in that arm. That does not rule out the experience's also depending on other body parts of his—which is a good job, since all of A's experiences depend, for example, on his brain. It is useful to think of the referred case as follows: A has an experience with the content, This left arm of mine is there[L], which is dependent on his arm, and on its being at L, and not on the disordered state of his heart; but the disordered state of his heart is in part responsible for his experiencing that arm as hurting.

**Spatial and Bodily Content: The Sliding Arm Case**

All of this puts us in a position to appreciate one final issue. Consider the following diagram:

The two figures represent a single forearm arm at two times: t₁ and t₂. Let x and y be two parts of that forearm, and let H, E₁, and E₂ be fixed points in space. Now suppose that, between t₁ and t₂, A moves the forearm towards his body, the elbow moving from E₁ to E₂, or equivalently, from a position five centimetres from H to a position 15 centimetres from H. Suppose further that at both t₁ and t₂ A has a veridical pain experience, and that on both occasions the location at which it seems to A as though there is hurting is H. The question is this: does it seem to A as though there has been a change, between t₁ and t₂, in the position at which the hurting seems to be?

The answer is surely Yes, even though the location at which it seems to A as though there is hurting is, at both times, H. What does this show? That in order to capture this phenomenological difference, it is not enough to say that it seems to A at t₁ as though there is
hurting there[H]. For, at that level of description, the characterisation of A's experience at $t_2$ will be just the same. It is not enough even to say that it seems to A as though a part of his arm that is there[H] is hurting—since, again, the characterisation will be the same at $t_2$. (This would not be so, given our assumption of veridicality, if at $t_2$ A's hand, rather than his arm, came to be located at $H$; but that is not the case described.) So how do we capture the change in phenomenology? Perhaps like this: it seems to A at $t_1$ as though a part of his arm that is there[H], and also that[H to $E_1$] distance from his elbow, is hurting, whereas it seems to him at $t_2$ as though a part of his arm that is there[H], and also that[H to $E_2$] distance from his elbow, is hurting. By that[H to $E_1$]distance and that[H to $E_2$] distance, I intend two egocentric modes of presentation of distances, rather like the modes of presentation I invoked in the case of Peacocke's trees in Chapter 1. Notice, incidentally, that my account requires that pain experiences have some quite specific descriptive content concerning body parts.\footnote{This was also required by my solution to the problem of painful fingers in mouths.}

Suppose they didn't have such content, and the following alternative account was suggested: at $t_1$, it seems to A as though what is hurting is a part of his body that is there[H], and also that[H to $E_1$] distance not from his elbow specifically, but from another part of his body. At that level of description, we again lose the difference between $t_1$ and $t_2$, since this less specific content is true at both those times. So we need to include elbow and arm and the like in the content of pain experiences.

This account in terms of the representation of distances might seem unnecessary. It might be suggested that we can simply say that at $t_1$ A experiences that this[x] part of his arm is hurting, and at $t_2$ that[y] part of his arm is hurting, and since x and y are different parts of A's arm, these perceivings differ in their singular content. But notice that we could construct a purely hallucinatory version of the sliding arm case, and its phenomenology too needs to be adequately described. It might be suggested that we can just say in the hallucinatory case that at $t_1$ it is for A as if he were perceiving this[x] part of his arm as hurting, and at $t_2$ as if he were perceiving that[y] part of his arm as hurting. But this suggestion raises the following worry: if the subject is perceiving neither x nor y, then it is unclear that he can be having experiences as of those very parts of his arm. To illustrate the general point, suppose that after a period in which you are veridically perceiving an apple, z, the apple is removed but you are caused by some neural tinkering, say, to continue to have a now-hallucinatory experience as of a qualitatively identical apple. It is arguably the case that this experience no longer concerns that very apple, z, as opposed to any other qualitatively identical apple, given that z is not causing the experience you are having.\footnote{I don't say this on the sort of non-disjunctivist grounds that Ayers seems to have in mind at LK, i, 192.} Yet another suggestion, then, back in the hallucinatory sliding arm case, would be that A's hallucinatory
experiences at \(t_1\) and \(t_2\) respectively single out the two parts of A's arm, \(x\) and \(y\), descriptively. But it is surely implausible to suppose that hallucinatory pain experiences involve descriptive content that is sufficiently specific to distinguish \(x\) and \(y\): which are both parts of A's forearm, after all, and parts that are close together. For that reason, it seems necessary to speak instead of A's having in the hallucinatory case an experience as of a body part that is there[H] hurting. And this creates the need for my claim that the location must be represented also as standing in certain spatial relations to other body parts.

Finally, returning to the perceptual version of the sliding arm case, what should we say about whether there is a difference, between \(t_1\) and \(t_2\), in the location of the pain in A's arm? The simple and adequate answer is surely that relative to the rest of A's body, there is a difference; but relative to (say) the walls of the room he's in, there is not. It is crucial, though, that we do not let the propriety of this second answer blind us to the fact that the way things seem to A in his pain experience between \(t_1\) and \(t_2\) has certainly changed.

Once you scratch the surface of issues about the spatial content of pain experiences and the location of pains, a myriad of interesting and bizarre cases begins to press for attention. Enough has been done here, however, to suggest that the hurting perceptualist is able to give satisfactory accounts of both issues. But could an intentionalist version of the act-object conception offer a parallel account of these matters, or does the hurting perceptualist really do better than the act-object theorist? I suspect he does better. For one thing, I have already suggested that the hurting perceptualist does make better sense of the bodily content of pain experiences than the act-object theorist does, and this bodily content is invoked, after all, in his account of the location of pains. For another thing, it is not clear that a theorist does anything much to elucidate the idea of a pain's location if his attempt to do so adverts to experiences which represent, precisely, located pains. And yet that would be the structure of an act-object theorist's intentionalist account of the location of pains. So I continue to suggest that hurting perceptualism offers the better account.

4.3. Radical Subjectivism Again

Adapting McDowell's Subjectivism

Does McDowell's "inner sense" account at least retain the following advantage over hurting perceptualism: that its radical subjectivism captures the peculiar interiority of pain experiences? On the contrary, it seems to me that if the hurting perceptualist is impressed by

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54 This is, in effect, a version of my circularity objection against radical subjectivism. See Chapter 3, §3.
McDowell's radical subjectivism, then the hurting perceptualist can adopt a suitably tailored version of it for himself:

**Hurting Perceptualism's Radical Subjectivism**

(3) The hurting of a body part, $O$ consists in

- (a) a subject's undergoing a somatosensory perceiving with a content of the form, *That part*[$O$] *of my body there*[L] *is hurting*
- (b) $O$'s existing and being at $L$, and
- (c) the bodily and spatial content of the experience mentioned in (a) causally depending on $O$ and on its being at $L$. 55

The rough idea is that a body part's hurting consists in its being somatosensorily perceived as hurting. Now, as with McDowell's radical subjectivism, the motivation here can be approached in a variety of ways. But one relatively straightforward point is this: radical subjectivism seems to explain the intuitive claim that experiences of hurting body parts enjoy what we might call "predicative" infallibility and a self-intimating subject matter. The intuition is twofold. First, necessarily, if one has an experience as of a certain body part hurting, then if it exists (and he perceives it) it hurts. (The condition that the part exist is what makes this only predicative infallibility.) Second, necessarily, if a subject's foot hurts, then he will experience it as hurting (self-intimation). Subjectivism explains these claims, and these claims, it will be suggested, capture interiority; so we do not need to resist the idea that pain experiences are somatosensory.

**Hurting and Colours: Subjectivism and Dispositionalism**

Notice, incidentally, that there is some overlap in form and motivation between subjectivist versions of mentalism—most obviously, hurting perceptualism—and a certain conception of colour. The comparison of pain and colour is a venerable one, but the two points that traditionally issue from the comparison are respectively a misassimilation and a relatedly mishandled contrast. On the one hand, the misassimilation is the modelling of the "phenomenal colour" of visual experiences on the allegedly blank qualitative feel of pain experiences. This led Locke and others to claim that just as the primary or proper use of sensation terms is for qualities of experience rather than of physical objects, so too is the

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55 It is worth noticing straightaway that the resemblance between the right-hand sides of the radical subjectivist claim, (3), and the hurting perceptualist's second claim, (2), is so close that the hurting perceptualist who endorses (3) seems committed to some sort of equivalence between the left-hand sides of those two propositions. But this is unproblematic. The view could be, for example, that a subject's having a pain at $L$ consists in $L$'s hurting that subject, and that this in turn consists in $L$'s being experienced by that subject as hurting.
primary or proper use of colour terms. By the intentionalist's lights, this assimilation ignores the point that pain experiences are not blank, and indeed that "sensation terms" such as "hurting" do seem to be used to predicate properties of physical objects—in particular, of parts of sentient bodies. The mishandled contrast, on the other hand, is the one that so puzzled Locke: that we are inclined, rightly or wrongly, to attribute colours but not pains (or instances of hurting) to physical objects beyond sentient bodies. By the intentionalist's lights, this contrast is mishandled by those (such as Locke) who overlook the obvious explanation: that, whereas all physical objects are experienced as coloured, only sentient bodies are experienced, somatosensorily, as hurting. Those who miss this point tend to offer an alternative explanation in terms of the absence in the pain case of useful correlations between external types and the production of pain experiences—as if, were these facts alone different, we would attribute pains and instances of hurting to external objects. The relevance of how things seem to the subject of pain experiences goes entirely unnoticed.

So much, then, for the infelicities of the usual comparisons between colours and pains. The comparison I had in mind was different and more illuminating: that there is a parallel between radical subjectivism and a view on which an object's being red, say, consists in its being disposed to cause experiences of red. Though radical subjectivism takes hurting to be more directly experience-dependent than the dispositionalist takes colours to be, both advert, in a constitutive account of a property F, to experiences as of F. Moreover, both are sometimes motivated by a desire to capture the subjectivity of the respective subject matters. This is a parallel to which we shall return in the next chapter (§3).

This concludes my introduction of two central forms of mentalism: McDowell's act-object conception and hurting perceptualism. We have examined some motivations for intentionalism and for mentalism in particular. From McDowell, we derived the idea that intentionalism enables us to make sense in a non-Givenist way of the rational constraint our pain experiences exert on our pain judgements, and the idea that mentalism in particular enables the theorist to effect an especially close parallel between pain judgements and

56 for a defence of this interpretation of Locke, see Ayers’s LK, i, 207. Something like this view was also held before Locke by Galileo, Descartes, and Boyle; and since him, by (for example) Mackie, Velleman, and Boghossian. Contrast, for example, Wittgenstein's PI 273 ff.

57 See, for instance, Locke’s ESS 138/II:4:18; and 137/II:8:16. Notice that the contrast I have formulated here is real and requires explanation. Other formulations are more contentious: for example, that we use "red" (even if only in a secondary sense) for the disposition of objects to cause experiences of red and yet have only compound adjectives such as "pain-causing" for the disposition of objects to cause pain experiences (see Bennett's LBH, 110); or that, by contrast with colour terms, we never use sensation terms of physical objects.

58 Ayers makes the point nicely, at LK, i, 63 and 214-5.

59 See, for example, Grice's SRS. Wittgenstein can seem to be doing this at PI 312. But I take it he thinks merely that we might extend the use of "pain" (or as he sometimes suggested, "painy") to refer to the disposition of external objects to cause subjects to be in pain—that is, according to the hurting perceptualist, dispositions to cause experiences that represent the subject's own body as hurting. This is not to say that we would in those circumstances attribute either being in pain or hurting to such objects. For some helpful (and some confusing) comments about this remark, see Hacker's A&R, 135-7, and Anscombe's MPM, viii.
ordinary perceptual judgements—judgements that merely endorse the contents of the experiences on which they are based. From the discussion of hurting perceptualism, we derived further motivations for intentionalism: concerning self-awareness, the conceptual problem of other minds, the location of pains, and, principally, the bodily content of pain experiences. These considerations provided some reasons, moreover, for preferring hurting perceptualism over McDowell’s act-object version of mentalism. Nonetheless, what matters most in the next chapter is not the differences between McDowell’s conception and hurting perceptualism, but rather their similarities: that is, the strong temptation for the adherents of each view to conjoin their version of intentionalism with a radical subjectivist account of the relevant subject matter. That, I shall now argue, is a highly problematic mixture.
Problems for Radical Subjectivism

We have now seen the attractions of conjoining intentionalism with radical subjectivism, a conjunction inherent both in McDowell's version of the act-object conception and in the version of hurting perceptualism we looked at above. This conjunction promises a view which enjoys all the virtues of an intentionalist approach to pain experiences—meeting McDowell's epistemological desiderata, effecting an attractive parallel between the inner and the outer, and enabling a satisfying account of the spatial content of pain experiences and the location of pains—while at the same time doing justice to the idea that pain experiences are peculiarly inner or subjective. Unfortunately, however, the conjunction of intentionalism and radical subjectivism is also highly problematic—or so I argue in this chapter.

According to McDowell's radical subjectivism, a pain's existing and its being a pain consists in its being experientially represented as a pain; similarly, for those hurting perceptualists who embrace subjectivism, a body part's hurting consists in its being experientially represented as hurting. There are two principal complaints I want to press against such claims. The first, "the dependence problem", questions the coherence of the idea that an experience might both represent an object as being F and at the same time constitutively determine the object's existence and its being F. The second, "the circularity problem", is the more general worry that, in any illuminating constitutive account of a property F, the theorist better not advert to that very property (except in special cases) and thus he better not advert to experiences that are essentially characterised in terms of their representation of that very property. This is a point made against the version of dispositionalism about colours that we encountered in the previous chapter (§4.3), and I suggest in §3 below that much the same point can be made against subjectivist views of hurting. Before that, though, I start in §§1 and 2 with the dependence problem.

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1 See §3.3 below on courage and virtue.
At one point, McDowell raises what he calls Strawson’s “highly instructive worry” (OS, 284): if the objects of inner experience are not independent of episodes of awareness of them, how are we to preserve the “particular/general or subject/predicate structure” of those episodes, their recognitional or classificatory character? Here and elsewhere, McDowell is clearly in the neighbourhood of the sort of dependence problem that I have in mind. In what follows, though, I want to argue that neither of the two problems that McDowell ends up directly engaging in his defence of subjectivism—what I call the “generality” and “integration” worries—is the most intuitive and threatening form of the dependence problem. First of all, let me explain these two worries that McDowell does directly engage.

I start with the integration problem. For McDowell, we have seen, a subject’s possessing concepts is a matter of his possessing capacities to engage in thinking that is “spontaneous” in the sense that he chooses what to think, and does so on the basis of reasons. Thoughts are supposed to contrast, in just this respect, with experiences, which are passive. Given the contrast, the idea that experiences involve concepts might seem threatened. For his part, McDowell thinks the idea is intelligible, in the case of both outer and inner experiences, but only because we appreciate that those conceptual capacities involved in experience are also “integrated into spontaneity at large” (M&W, 37)—again, we appreciate that those capacities “could also be exercised in active thinking ... in ways that do provide a good fit for the idea of spontaneity” (M&W, 11). In other words, we understand that they satisfy what might be called “the integration requirement”.

Now the integration problem arises when we focus on the inner case and notice that one’s first-person present-tense pain judgements fail to provide a good enough “fit for the idea of spontaneity” to constitute a context in which it becomes intelligible that one’s pain experiences involve the concept of a pain. For it is hard to think of one’s judgements that oneself is in pain—judgements prompted by one’s pain experiences—as judgements that

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2 For Strawson’s discussion of this question, see BS, 100 ff. I formulate the problem so as to avoid the presuppositions on which McDowell remarks at OS, 284.

3 See M&W, 36-38 and 119-121; OS, 284-5; and I&I, 310-12.

4 See, above, Chapter 1, §2, and Chapter 2, §1.1.

5 Some of McDowell’s remarks relate the integration requirement to the demand that in order to possess concepts of objective items, one must grasp “a simple theory of perception”, which explains one’s veridical perceivings as the upshot of two factors: the represented circumstances obtaining, and the satisfaction of various enabling conditions. (See, for example, M&W, 13, 32, and 36.) But clearly he can’t think the requirement imposes precisely the same demand in the inner case.
could ever issue from a process of deliberation, and thus it is hard to think of them as judgements one chooses to make on the basis of reasons. One can clearly deliberate whether or not to endorse a visual experience with the content, *This apple is red.* For on the one hand, there are circumstances in which one might endorse the experience’s content; and on the other, there are circumstances in which countervailing considerations will give one a good reason rather to reject the content, or to suspend judgement altogether. But radical subjectivism seems to render inapplicable the parallel picture in the pain case: if one’s pain experiences constitute their own veridicality conditions, then one is—as it were—obliged to endorse their contents, if one considers the matter at all. That can seem to rule out the idea that the relevant pain judgements are rational or “active” in the right way, which in turn undermines the notion that the use of the relevant pain concept in *those* judgements amounts to “integration into spontaneity at large”; and that threatens the idea that there is a genuine concept here at all.

McDowell’s response to this problem is straightforward. It is simply to remind us of *other* pain judgements—beyond those in the first-person present-tense mode—that constitute the context in which it becomes intelligible that conceptual capacities are implicated in pain experience: namely, third-person or past-tense pain judgements. As McDowell puts it, the concept involved in pain experiences is indeed “integrated into spontaneity”, but in a different way from the concepts involved in perceptual experiences: not, that is, by being implicated in judgements in which one endorses the content of one’s current experiences while remaining alive to the possibility of considerations that might have led one not to endorse them, but rather by being involved in judgements that aren’t based on any current pain experiences at all (M&W, 37). For instance, a subject’s judgements that *another* is in pain, based on observations of his behaviour, provide a better “fit for the idea of spontaneity” than his first-person present-tense pain judgements (M&W, 11). As McDowell puts it, “the distinction between ‘seems right’ and ‘is right’ opens up” from the third-person point of view” (I&I, 311). These judgements, therefore, provide a context in which it makes sense after all to suppose that the subject has a genuine conceptual capacity that is exercised in his pain experiences, notwithstanding those experiences’ passivity or the fact that they constitute their own subject matter.

McDowell plainly thinks that the subject’s ability to make such third-personal applications of pain concepts is required *anyway*, by “the generality constraint”. The subject must, he says, “understand her being in pain as a particular case of a general type of state of affairs” (M&W, 37). This brings us to the second of the dependence problems McDowell seems to have in mind. The basis of the generality constraint is the idea that, if the thought
that \( b \) is \( F \) has a subject-predicate \textit{structure},\(^6\) then the subject's conceptual capacity \( F \) must be distinct from his capacity \( b \); it must be general. Hence A can think \( b \) is \( F \) only if he can also think \( \phi \) is \( F \), for every appropriate singular concept \( \phi \) that he possesses.\(^7\) Strawson and Evans apply this constraint to the psychological, arguing that one can self-ascribe mental states only if one is also capable of other-ascribing them;\(^8\) and this in turn requires, they think, that a subject's grasp of the content, \textit{I am in pain}, not be "exhausted by his capacity to decide, simply on the basis of how he feels, whether or not it is true" (Evans, VR, 208).\(^9\) Now McDowell apparently thinks that radical subjectivism can seem to threaten the satisfaction of this requirement; and that is what I am calling "the generality problem". He is not explicit why radical subjectivism should be thought to have this upshot, but one idea would be that a thinker could not acknowledge what Strawson calls "logically adequate" behavioural criteria for telling in the case of others whether or not there obtains a circumstance of the type that, in his own case, his pain experiences represent (IND, 105) \textit{while} at the same time crediting such experiences with infallibility; for surely (the thought goes) he could not rule out the possibility of the two "criteria"—his experience and his behaviour—pulling in different directions in his own case. Anyway, whatever its precise formulation, McDowell thinks the generality problem can be overcome. Crucially, he thinks, the fact that radical subjectivism renders the \textit{circumstance} of one's being in pain constitutively dependent on one's pain experience does not prevent one's \textit{idea} of the circumstance from having "an independence of [one's] awareness of it" (M&W: 38, 120).

\textit{Evaluating McDowell's Response}

Now a number of issues arise concerning McDowell's treatment of these problems. It is interesting, for example, that much of his discussion is framed in terms of the concept, \textit{being in pain}, not \textit{a pain}. What the subject must understand as an instance of a general type of state of affairs is \textit{her being in pain}, he says, not \textit{this pain's being a pain}. The shift is natural, given his desire to make so much of third-person ascriptions, but it leaves one wondering how the discussion bears on his act-object mentalism. The point that I most want to stress, however, is that neither the integration problem nor the generality problem is the

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6. See page 76 above.

7. That is the generality constraint with respect to the predicate concept (requiring the "spinning" of subject concepts). It is also required, with respect to the subject concept, that the thinker be able to think \( b \) is \( \phi \), for every applicable concept \( \phi \) he has—that is, spinning predicative concepts.


9. In order to meet the parallel requirement in the case of concepts of \textit{objective} items—namely, that there be some "distance" between one's grasp of a certain concept and one's deploying it on the basis of experiences—the thinker must possess a simple theory of perception. See n. 5 above, and Chapter 4, §2 below.
most intuitive or threatening worry that one might have about radical subjectivism; moreover, McDowell’s responses to those two problems, even if they find their targets, arguably leave the intuitive anxiety unalleviated. Let me expand on this point.

Here are two very general categories of dependence problem, two sorts of worry one might have about the direct, constitutive dependence that the radical subjectivist thinks pains (or instances of hurting) have on the experiences in which they are conceptually represented. First, there is the worry that the dependence in question makes it unintelligible that the subjects of such experiences possess the relevant concepts, and also the worry that it is therefore problematic to suppose that those concepts are implicated in the experiences in question. Second, one might alternatively suspect that radical subjectivism more directly threatens the idea that the relevant experiences could be properly classificatory or representational.

It seems to me that the problems to which McDowell is responding both fall into the first category. The worries about integration and generality are both worries that a description of a subject’s merely responding to his pain experiences with utterances of “I am in pain” is insufficiently rich to count as a depiction of his possession of a concept, and that it is therefore insufficiently rich to make intelligible the idea that the subject’s pain experiences are concept-involving. What is directly threatened is the subject’s possession of the concept, being in pain. So those are both instances of the first sort of problem. But there are, I want to suggest, more direct concerns with subjectivism than that. McDowell seems to be insensitive to such worries. Having enriched the picture of the subject responding to his experiences with “I am in pain” by reminding us of the subject’s capacity to make third-person pain judgements, thereby vindicating the idea that the subject possesses a genuine conceptual capacity after all, McDowell seems to think that there are no further problems posed by radical subjectivism. Those of us gripped by worries of the second sort, then, are apt to be left feeling short-changed by McDowell—those of us, that is, whose concern is that any experience that putatively constitutes its own subject matter just could not be genuinely classificatory or representational, or perhaps could not genuinely involve concepts, however genuine the concepts were, or however unproblematic the idea that the subject in question possesses them. Let us turn, then, to ask whether this concern is justified.

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10 The immediate worry about whether inner experiences could be representational or conceptual may in turn threaten the possibility of an adequate account of pain concepts themselves. If that sort of circuitous worry about pain concepts is one which McDowell has in mind, then it is beside the point for him to respond by adverting to third-person judgements and the like in an effort to persuade us that an adequate account can after all be given of the relevant concepts, while neglecting to speak directly to the issue about dependence and the involvement of concepts. It would miss the point because the reason for the circuitous worry about pain concepts has nothing to do with our having forgotten about their involvement in third-person judgements, nor with anything of that sort.
1.2. Motivating and Defending the Independence Requirement

Is there really something problematic about the idea that an episode of conceptual, experiential awareness of an item x as being F might constitutively determine x’s existence and its being F? My own inclination is that there is. I endorse, in other words, what we might call “the independence requirement”. Now we are so close here to the philosophical foundations that it is far from clear what sorts of considerations can be brought to bear on either side. Still, I have already made some relevant moves, arguing that McDowell’s responses to the integration and generality problems do not speak to the independence requirement. In what follows, moreover, I want to gesture towards the very general sorts of considerations that seem to favour that requirement, and also to respond to some of the objections that are apt to be made against it.

Many philosophers have made demands reminiscent of the independence requirement: from Armstrong’s insistence that “subject and object” must be “distinct existences” and that, therefore, a “mental state cannot be aware of itself any more than a man can eat himself up”, to—in a different tradition but a similar vein—Sartre’s remark that “to be conscious of something is to be confronted with a concrete and full presence which is not consciousness”. Perhaps the most familiar echo of the independence requirement—albeit regarding, in the first instance, linguistic performances rather than experiences—is Wittgenstein’s insistence on the necessity of a distinction between its seeming right to apply a term and its being right. As he puts it, if we feel compelled to say that “whatever is going to seem right to me is right”, then “that only means that here we cannot talk about ‘right’” (PI, 258). To put the point in terms of judgements, the claim is that a judgement’s being made cannot constitutively suffice for its being true; its being made cannot be what the state of affairs being judged to obtain consists in. Adherents of the independence requirement— “independence theorists”, as I call them—make much the same point in the case of conceptually contentful experiences: a pain’s existing and its being a pain, for example, cannot consist in a subject’s experiencing it as a pain.

One way of trying to justify this attitude is to claim that the correctness of an experience is to be thought of as a relationship of fit between it and the world—a congruence between experiential content and subject matter—and that this precludes the possibility that the mere having of an experience might constitutively suffice for its truth. But we must be careful here. If the demand suggested by this remark is that an experience and the state of

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11 For this theme in Armstrong, see his MTM, 100-115 (especially 107); MTM, Chapter 15, especially 324; and BS, 78-80. Sartre’s remark is quoted by McCulloch at US, 104. Despite this claim, Sartre apparently does think that colours and some other properties are, to some degree, mind-dependent; see McCulloch’s US, 111-13.

12 See Wright’s SPI, 132 and 134.
affairs experienced must, constitutively, be independent of one another, then that is too radical a requirement to impose. After all, I expressed sympathy in Chapter 1 for the disjunctive conception of perceptual experience (§4.1), and yet that is a conception on which an experience in the veridical case represents this[x] as being thus[F], say, even though the experience’s content constitutively depends on this[x] and its being thus[F]. So the disjunctive conception is incompatible with a picture of veridical representation which requires, in complete independence of each other, representational items on the one hand, and represented items on the other.

Nevertheless, disjunctivism is compatible with the independence theorist’s following thought: that any episode of veridical awareness necessarily involves a subject’s responding to an item in the world with a concept—in other words, a subject’s classifying it—in a way that counts as classificatory only because the subject could have responded to the same item not with that concept, but with other concepts, concepts that perhaps fail to apply. If a veridical experience is genuinely classificatory, the idea goes, if it really involves the exercise of conceptual capacities, then when the subject responds to the item in question, it ought to be the case that he could have responded differently—as when one experiences a red object as being green. If he could not have responded differently, while leaving the subject matter the same, then the supposed correctness of his experience is not any sort of accomplishment, it involves no measurement of the world, and it is hard to see how it could involve any sort of classificatory mechanisms. That is the sort of thing that the independence theorist insists on in every case of a veridical episode of awareness, and it is something that is missing in the radical subjectivist’s conception of the pain case. After all, for McDowell, that there is a pain at all consists in the fact that the subject deploys the concept of a pain; it is not as though he could have instead responded to the pain with a concept that failed to apply. Similarly, on the subjectivist variant of hurting perceptualism, one could not have responded to a hurting body part with any other concept than hurting, for the body part’s hurting consists in the fact that one responds to it with that concept. It is hard to think of these, I suggest, as episodes of genuine classificatory awareness at all.

Notice, incidentally, that just as this point does not require that we hold (against the disjunctivist) that perceptual experiences are constitutively independent of the circumstances they represent, nor conversely does it require that we hold that the circumstances represented are utterly independent of human experience (or language or thought). It does not, in other words, require uncritical realism. After all, we all reject radical subjectivism about the shapes of objects, without our all being uncritical realists.

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13 See Chapter 2, §1.3.
Chapter 3. Problems for Subjectivism

It might be objected that whereas Wittgenstein’s remark that “here we cannot talk about ‘right’” was framed in terms of linguistic performances, and can be happily re-expressed in terms of judgements, our interest is rather in experiences. An opponent might suggest that there is no reason to think that the same principles extend to experiences; for as we have seen, experiences are not judgements: they are passive and, in particular, belief-independent. I admit that this challenge does undermine some ways of trying to motivate an independence requirement on experiences. For example, in his account of Wittgenstein’s private language argument, Pears derives the requirement of an is-right/seems-right distinction for one’s linguistic performances from the fact that speaking a language is—like marksmanship, and unlike blinking in a bright light—an acquired skill, an intentional performance, something one can try to do or aim at doing correctly. And it is indeed hard directly to transfer that motivation for independence to the case of experiences, precisely because experiences are not intentional in that sense; they are, to repeat, passive occurrences. Nonetheless, there are two points that the independence theorist might make at this stage.

First, my own attempt to motivate the independence requirement exploited the idea of classification rather than the idea of intentional action; and though experiences are indeed not intentional actions, conceptualists such as myself are committed to the view that they are, like judgements, essentially classificatory nonetheless. Strawson appreciates this, and also the requirement it seems to impose:

There can be no experience at all which does not involve the recognition of particular items as being of such and such a general kind. It seems that it must be possible, even in the most fleeting and purely subjective of impressions, to distinguish a component of recognition ... which is not simply identical with, or wholly absorbed by, the particular item which is recognised. (BS, 100)

Second, to the extent that experiences and judgements are dissimilar, the dissimilarity may in some respects work to the advantage of the independence theorist about experiences. I have in mind here the play I made above with the idea that episodes of veridical awareness are essentially responses to items in the world, the idea that they are passive impressions. Notice, crucially, that passivity is not enough for perceptual experiences to play the epistemological role McDowell accords to them. Dreams, for example, are passive, but they do not constitute reasons for judgements endorsing their contents—that is, perceptual

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14 Thus Wright claims that there is no conflict between the is-right/seems-right requirement and the claim that we are necessarily aware of sensations, since sensations occur in subjects “who lack the conceptual wherewithal to judge and classify them” (SPI, 132). As a conceptualist, however, McDowell could hardly endorse these grounds.

15 See FP, i, 55 and FP, ii, 333. See also Wright’s DPI, 257.
judgements. Rather, to constitute reasons for judgements of that sort, experiences have to be not merely passive, but "reality-claiming"—as they are, surely, when they are construed as the impressings of objective facts on a subject. Now, we have seen that McDowell wants to carry over to the inner case the picture of impressings rationalising judgements endorsing their contents, but without the idea that the facts impressed are independent of the experiences. But that's a big "but". The disanalogy obscures what it would be to carry the picture over. For though McDowell is apt to say that even pain experiences are "impressions" (MW, 22), his subjectivism makes it unclear what that means—except that pain experiences are passive (causally dependent on injury and the like), which is surely not enough for McDowell's purposes. So, again, I am inclined to think that when an experience rationalises a judgement about the experience's own subject matter—as opposed, say, to rationalising its own self-ascription—it can do so only by dint of its being an impression in a way in which McDowell's pain experiences are not.16

The various considerations I have mentioned in this section admittedly do not prove that there is a serious problem for the radical subjectivist. But they do, I hope, go a little way towards describing a reasonable and natural perspective from which radical subjectivism seems problematic, and some way towards defending that perspective against objections. In the next section, I want to continue this defence, for there are cases outside of the context of pain experiences that, on their face, suggest that it cannot be problematic in general for a representational episode to determine constitutively the existence and character of the item it represents. There are, that is, putative counterexamples to a generalised version of the independence requirement; and it is to these that I now turn.

2. DIFFICULT CASES FOR THE INDEPENDENCE REQUIREMENT

Take a generalised independence requirement, on which it is problematic for any episode representing an item as being F to determine constitutively the existence of that item and its being F. Now, in order to press the objection that the independence requirement on experiences is too strong, one might argue that at least this generalised version is clearly too strong, since it would rule out some obvious and straightforward cases in which representational episodes do constitute their objects. If these examples are intelligible, the objection goes, then why claim that radical subjectivism in the case of pain experiences is not? I shall consider three versions of this charge.

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16 On the rationalising of self-ascriptions of perceptual experiences, see below, §2.2.
2.1. Performatives

You can promise to go to a party by uttering the words "I promise to go to the party". This performative case seems to be one in which someone's saying that p constitutes its being the case that p, or more generally, as Heal puts it, a case in which "the occurrence of a representation of a state of affairs is itself what constitutes that state of affairs" (MP, 21).\(^\text{17}\) The question for the independence theorist is this: if one's promising on a certain occasion can just consist in one's saying that one does, then why shouldn't a pain's existing and its being a pain consist in its being so experienced?

Could the independence theorist respond by denying that one's saying that one promises ever constitutes a promising? Certainly, Austin would reject that idea in favour of the following two claims: first, *uttering* the sentence "I promise to go" counts as one's promising by dint of some convention to that effect; and second, precisely because the utterance counts as the performing of such an action, it cannot at the same time be the expressing of a truth-evaluable content, a saying-that. But the problem with this "non-cognitivist" alternative to Heal's account is that, grammatically and inferentially, "I promise to φ" behaves just like a self-description; it behaves like what it looks like: a first-person transformation of the straightforward third-person description, "He promises to φ". Thus Heal insists against the non-cognitivist that competent and "happy" utterances of "I promise to go" really are assertions with the content *I promise to go*, assertions that do indeed constitute their subject matter.\(^\text{18}\)

If the non-cognitivist response fails, does the promising case show the independence requirement to be too strong? I am not convinced it does. For the promising and pain cases are quite different from one another. Here are four points in that connection. First, Austin is arguably right in at least one respect: promising is a *conventional* matter.\(^\text{19}\) And that marks a striking contrast with the pain case, for the radical subjectivist does not claim that it is by dint of some social convention that one's left foot *counts* as hurting if and only if one experiences it as such. Now, for her part, Heal denies that promising is conventional, except in the sense that linguistic conventions or rules enable one to use "I promise" rather than some other syntactic construction to say that one promises. She denies, in particular, that the promising

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\(^{17}\) In some of what follows, I make use of Heal's unpublished FPA, which she kindly made available to me. It should be emphasised that a considerable amount of that paper fails to represent her current thinking on the issues in question.

\(^{18}\) For Heal's version of the point in the promising case, see her EPU, and her FPA, 12. Geach makes a parallel point against more radical expressivist theories of ethical language (more radical because they give expressivist accounts of all uses of such language). See his ASN. For a parallel point against expressivism in the psychological case, see Hacker's I&L, and Wright's SK, 35-7.

\(^{19}\) It is interesting in this connection that one can promise by uttering "I promise to go", but perhaps not by uttering "I am promising to go". If a speaker uttered "I am promising to go" to someone while he wrote in an RSVP "I promise not to go", then he would arguably have said something false.
case is one in which two conventions focus (accidentally, as it were) on one act of noise-making, which is determined by one of the conventions to count as the saying that one promises, and by the other to count as the promising itself. But it seems to me that this point of Heal’s does not rule out a claim of conventionality; for it leaves open the possibility that a convention is involved, only one that links promisings to sayings that one promises rather than to noise-makings or utterances of “I promise”. Moreover, it is plausible that such a convention is indeed involved. After all, things surely could have been such that we promised by, for example, holding up a red flag when the thing to be promised was mentioned, rather than by saying that we promise. So there is at least that contrast between the pain and promising cases.

Second, it has been suggested by some philosophers that we should, in effect, split the difference between Heal and Austin, conceding Heal’s claim that “I promise to go” expresses a truth-evaluable content, but insisting with Austin that it nonetheless cannot be used to assert that content. 20 After all, the aetiology of an utterance of “I promise to go” is not the usual aetiology of an assertion: its basis is not some evidence or experience or theoretical reason, but rather a decision of the speaker’s as to whether or not he ought to promise. In any case, suppose that making sense of the promising case does indeed require us to deny those utterances the status of assertions. Perhaps that is fine. But, if the parallel way of accommodating dependence in the pain case is to deny pain experiences the status of “reality-claiming” impressions, as I put it earlier, then that is not fine. Or at least it is not compatible with preserving McDowell’s view of things, for it would amount to giving up the idea that pain experiences rationalise pain judgements which endorse their contents.

Third, recall that one of the things that can seem puzzling about subjectivism in the pain case is its implication that, if one is aware of a pain, one could not have failed to classify it as a pain in one’s awareness; and that, if one is aware of a hurting body part, then one could not have failed to classify it as hurting. Now, take a case in which a subject promises by saying that she does. We can think of this as a case of a person conceptually classifying herself as promising. But notice that in this case she could have promised without saying that she did. For, as Austin pointed out, the performative character of some utterances is merely implicit. You can promise to go to the party, for example, merely by uttering, “I shall go to the party”, and this does not involve saying of yourself that you promise. So in this relevant respect too, the promising case differs from the subjectivist construal of the pain case.

Finally, not only can one promise without saying that one does, but one can also say that one does without doing so—as, for example, when one is on a theatrical stage. So,

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20 See, for example, Wright’s SK, 36.
sayings that one promises are not *infallible*. In light of this, and the previous point that promisings are not (if you will) *self-intimating* to sayings that one promises, the following seems highly plausible: we are not going to be compelled to embrace a general, radical subjectivist account of what it is to promise that ineliminably adverts to episodes of saying that oneself promises. This point will be of some significance when we come to the circularity problem, for it undermines the idea that the promising case constitutes a counterexample not only to the independence requirement, but also to the anti-circularity line I take in §3 below.

### 2.2. Intentional Self-Knowledge

Here is a second putative counterexample to a generalised independence requirement: our self-ascriptive *judgements* about our intentions, beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes. Some philosophers will claim that this case exhibits features at least somewhat like infallibility and self-intimation, and that it is to this extent parallel to the case of pain experiences and their subject matter. Certainly there is a phenomenon of first-person authority, enjoyed by some self-ascriptive judgements; and there is also a tendency to find cases of ignorance about one's own intentional states more puzzling than ignorance about, say, the physical objects in one's environment. In order to explain these facts, some philosophers have at least come close to endorsing a radical subjectivist account of intentions, beliefs, and the like.

Wright's "constitutive" approach is a case in point. He rejects two reasons-based epistemologies for our intentional self-ascriptions: one on which self-ascriptions are based on inference, and one on which they are based on an inwardly directed mode of observation. Instead, he favours a view which substitutes a constitutive for an epistemic connection between a subject's higher-order judgements and his lower-order intentional states (SPI, 142). The view seems to be (at least at times) that a subject's judgement as to what he intends, for example, can suffice to *determine* the truth of the matter (SPI, 146; SK, 29). So, again, the question for the independence theorist is this: if that constitutive account is the best option in the case of self-ascriptive judgements about intentional states, why should the parallel point regarding experiences of one's own pains (and hurtings) be any more problematic?

I certainly cannot do justice to the issue of intentional self-knowledge here, but I shall suggest the following rejoinders: first, that there are important differences between the cases of intentional self-knowledge and pain experience; second, that the subjectivist

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21 See, for example, Wright's SPI, 142-6; SK, 26-33, 38-45, especially 42; WRF, 250-54.
account in the case of intentional self-knowledge is problematic anyway; and finally, that it is certainly not compulsory.

Differences Between the Cases of Pain and Intentional Self-Knowledge

I start with parallel versions of the points with which I finished my discussion of performatives (§2.1). Notwithstanding the epistemological peculiarities of our intentional self-ascriptions, it remains the case that (i) a subject can intend to \( \phi \) without judging that he does, and (ii) he can judge that he does without its being so—as, for example, in a case of self-deception or inattentiveness, or perhaps a case of "self-interpretation" where one self-ascribes on the basis of observations of one's own behaviour. The first of these points marks a crucial contrast with the subjectivist account of the pain case. For even if one correctly classifies oneself as intending to \( \phi \), one could have intended to \( \phi \) while not classifying oneself as doing so, and this makes it easier to think of the self-ascriptive judgement as an episode of genuine classification. Moreover, points (i) and (ii) together mean that, whatever else we say about intentions and their self-ascription, it looks highly unlikely that we are going to be left with no alternative but to embrace a general, radical subjectivist account of what it is to intend to \( \phi \), one that ineliminably adverts to judgements about oneself intending to \( \phi \). And that point undermines the idea that the self-knowledge case will provide a counterexample to the line that I shall be taking when we come in §3 to the circularity problems for subjectivism.

Problems for the Constitutive Account of Intentional States

Second, even in a case in which one's self-ascription of an intention to \( \phi \) is correct and authoritative, there are reasons to resist the idea that the self-ascriptive judgement constitutes the intention—to resist, that is, the idea that the intention fails to be a "distinct existence". The first two such reasons come from Martin (EDO, 107-8). (i) The constitutive account is motivated by a desire to explain first-person authority, yet Martin points out that it does nothing to explain the first-person authority of judgements to the effect that one does not intend to \( \phi \). (ii) Moreover, an intention is clearly distinct from any self-ascriptive judgement in the case in which the subject either fails to self-ascribe, or self-ascribes in error-permitting circumstances. Given this, Martin argues, we should prefer an

22 Wright concedes as much at SPI, 143. Nonetheless, he does at times seem to think that what it is for one to intend to \( \phi \) is for one to be disposed to judge, in certain optimum conditions, that one intends to \( \phi \). See his "provisoed biconditional" at WRF, 252.

23 See Wright's SPI, 143, for something like that idea.

24 I have transposed his discussion from the case of beliefs to intentions.
account on which even authoritatively self-ascribed intentions are distinct from self-ascriptions. After all, he points out, the intentions are of the same fundamental type as between the authoritative and non-authoritative cases.25

To formulate a further worry about the constitutive account, (iii), let us now focus on beliefs. If self-ascriptions of first-order beliefs constitute those beliefs, then it is hard to see how such ascriptions could be based on them, how they could be rationalised by them.26 Wright and others may claim to welcome this consequence: for surely, they will say, intentional self-ascriptions are indeed groundless. But, on the face of it, given the McDowellian principles we encountered in the previous chapter, an absence of rational constraint threatens to undermine our self-ascriptions’ status as knowledgeable, or indeed contentful, judgements. If we can accommodate the idea that self-ascriptions are made for reasons, then I think we should do so. The constitutive account cannot; but there are, I shall argue, promising alternatives to it that can.

Moreover, even downplaying the notion of reasons, there is another worry, (iv), about the direction of the determination of content: that it surely goes from the first-order to the second-order episode, not conversely as the constitutive account would have it.27 The parallel point is clear on Evans’s account of the self-ascription of perceptual experiences. Recall the following milestones on the route Evans describes from having a perceptual experience to self-ascribing it:

Evans on the Self-Ascription of Perceptual Experiences

(1) x is red (Objective Fact)
(2) It seems to A as though: This[x] is red (Perceptual Experience)
(3) A judges: This[x] is red (Naive Judgement)
(4) A judges: It seems to me as though: This[x] is red (Exper. Self-Ascription)

There are two crucial stages. First, effecting a transition from (2) to (3), the subject determines the content of the naïve judgement: the judgement which the subject would make on the basis of his experience when taking it at face value. And second, moving from (3) to (4), he prefaces that content with the operator, it seems to me as though. Now suppose my self-ascription has the content, It seems to me as though this[x] is red. Clearly, on Evans’s account, the (underlined) embedded content is explained by the self-ascription’s being based on an experience with that very same content. Again, that component of its content is

25 Mightn’t a similar consideration, focusing on constitutive relations going in the other direction, motivate us to reject a disjunctive conception of perceptual experiences? No, because a perceiving and a subjectively indistinguishable hallucinatory experience are precisely not of the same fundamental type, according to disjunctivism.

26 See Peacocke’s CSK, 83, and STC, 151. This is not quite the point the independence theorist makes against subjectivism in the pain case, for pain experiences—by contrast with self-ascriptive judgements—are not supposed to be rationalised by their subject matter.

27 Peacocke makes this point at SOC, 160-62, though not in quite these terms.
inherited from the self-ascribed episode. One would like to say much the same thing in the case of the self-ascription, *I believe that this [x] is red*: the embedded content of the self-ascription is inherited from the first-order belief.\(^{28}\) The constitutive theorist, however, would implausibly have to put things the other way around. And thus he would be left having to give some different account of the content of the second-order state.

**Alternatives to the Constitutive Account**

Finally, let's turn to the point that there are viable alternatives to the constitutive account of intentional self-knowledge. Here too Evans's conception of the self-ascription of perceptual experiences is useful. In particular, we can extract from it the following two points. First, it is an account of a *rational* transition from a mental episode to its self-ascription that involves the subject neither inwardly *observing* the mental episode nor making an *inference* concerning it. To the extent that the account is right, then, it ought to make us question the exhaustiveness of Wright's dichotomy, for reasons-based accounts of self-knowledge, between observation and inference.\(^{29}\)

Second, Evans's approach might also point us in the direction of an alternative account of first-person authority. Some self-ascriptions of perceptual experience are, Evans thinks, infallible (VR, 229). One way of taking his explanation of this is as follows: a subject's being inclined to judge *This is red* on the basis of an experience of *green*, say, would be constitutive of her lacking the concept *red*, and if she lacked that concept, then she would be incapable of making either the naïve judgement or the self-ascription; hence a thinker successfully making a self-ascription via Evans's method *could not* have mistaken her own experience of green, say, for an experience of red. This explanation also suggests the possibility of explaining first-person authority more generally, by attending to the possession conditions of *psychological* concepts.\(^{30}\) If, for example, one disqualifies oneself from possession of the concept belief by putatively being inclined to endorse *I believe that p* on the basis of some state other than a belief that p, then—by definition, as it were—this would rule out one's confusing some other state for a belief that p.\(^{31}\) Though accounts of this sort need to

\(^{28}\) This is most obvious when the embedded content of the self-ascription contains perceptual demonstratives.

\(^{29}\) A point that Peacocke makes nicely at CSK, 82.

\(^{30}\) With a view to explaining the authority not just of the *embedded* content of the self-ascription, but also the *unembedded* content—again, explaining one's authority not just with respect to the *content* of the first-order state, but also with respect to the type of first-order state.

\(^{31}\) Peacocke and McDowell both suggest accounts along these lines. For some psychological concepts, McDowell says, "mastery includes the ability to apply the concepts to oneself in a way that meshes with, for instance, one's subsequent performance in the manner required for the self-conception in question to help make sense of one, but without one's needing to wait and make sure of the mesh before one can know the concept applies" (I&I, 319). See also Peacocke's CSK, 83-4. Interestingly, Peacocke once adapted from Wittgenstein a similar account of the self-ascription of pains: "it is a necessary condition of someone's possessing the concept of pain that his pains have in him, when the question arises, the effects which are constitutive of the present-tense judgement that he is in pain" (W&E, 24).
be sophisticated enough to allow for cases of self-interpretation, self-deception, and so forth, it is reasonable to hope that here we have the seeds of an acceptable conception of first-person authority. And yet the account does not claim that self-ascriptions ever constitute the states self-ascribed. Rather, to the extent that these views assert a constitutive connection at all, it goes the other way around, from the state to the self-ascription, via an account of the psychological concepts involved.

All of this only skims the surface of a fascinating and complex issue, of course; but enough has been done to suggest that whatever else it is, intentional self-knowledge is not a straightforward reductio of the independence requirement.

2.3. The Contingent A Priori

Here is a final objection to the independence requirement. Take the following claim:

(T) Necessarily: If one thinks, I am thinking this very thought, then one is thinking that very thought.

Surely, the opponent will object, T is true, and it is true because the thinking of the content in question constitutes the truth of that content. Its being the case that you are thinking that very thought consists in you thinking that you are. So, again, if this is intelligible, then why is radical subjectivism not? 32

This case is difficult to assess. It certainly needs to be handled with care. For one thing, the case appears to exploit the idea of a demonstrative mode of presentation of a thought; and that idea seems out of place, whether “this very thought” is taken as “this dateable, token mental event” or as “this representational content”. Even setting that point to one side, though, there is a problem about determinacy. Suppose “this very thought” does mean “this very content”. In that case, it is not clear that a determinate content has been specified; for on the one hand, the determination of the whole content depends on the determination of the referent of “this very thought (that is, content)”, and on the other hand, the determination of that referent depends on the determination of the content as a whole. So suppose, instead, that “this very thought” means “this dateable, token mental event”. Even so, a similar worry arises; for such an event will be individuated partly in terms of its content, but that content is individuated in terms of the event. 33 So I suspect that this sort of self-referential trick does not provide much succour to the radical subjectivist.

32 Evans is not convinced it is intelligible; see VR, 213. What about this case: if A judges I am thinking, then A is thinking? Well, it could remain true that one is thinking, while one instead applied to oneself some concept other than thinking; and this marks an important difference with the subjectivist account of the pain case.

33 What if we replace “this very thought” with “the thought of which I am now the subject”, or “the content which I am now thinking”? Under these interpretations, (T) becomes rather like the case mentioned in n. 32 above.
Let us take stock. In these first two sections, I have suggested that it is difficult to think of pain experiences as genuinely classificatory episodes, especially reality-claiming impressions capable of rationalising judgements about their subject matter, if they are constitutive of that subject matter. If, in experiencing a pain, one could not have deployed in one’s experience some other concept instead, then it is hard to make sense of this as a piece of genuine conceptual classification at all. That, anyway, is the intuition that I have defended against various objections: against, for example, the suggestion that it is undermined by McDowell’s response to the integration and generality problems, and the suggestion that, outside the context of pain experiences, there are obvious examples of representational episodes that suffice for their own truth, examples which would make it unreasonable for the independence theorist to prohibit such a thing in the sensation case.

That concludes my presentation of the dependence problem. I now want to move to a related but distinct worry: that the radical subjectivist account of the subject matter of pain experiences is viciously circular.

3. CIRCULARITY PROBLEMS

I remarked in Chapter 2 (§4.3) on both the resemblance and the difference between a radical subjectivist account of hurting, on the one hand, and an intentionalist dispositionalist account of colours, on the other:

(RS) The hurting of a body part, O consists in

(a) a subject’s undergoing a somatosensory perceiving with a content of the form, That part[O] of my body there[L] is hurting
(b) O’s existing and being at L, and
(c) the bodily and spatial content of the experience mentioned in (a) causally depending on O and on its being at L.

(DT) A physical object’s being red consists in its being disposed to cause visual experiences of its being red, in normal subjects in normal circumstances.

The dependence problem seems to threaten dispositionalism less than it does radical subjectivism, because of the following difference between them: the dispositionalist does not claim that any actual experience of an object as red constitutively makes it red. Nevertheless, dispositionalism notoriously faces a vicious circularity objection; and we shall see that,
regarding that problem, radical subjectivism and dispositionalism are on all fours. So, if DT is viciously circular, then so too is RS.

It is important to notice that DT is really only a schema for a view. Filling it out properly would require more detail about what is intended by the phrases “experiences of red”, “normal subjects”, and “normal circumstances”. I return to the latter two below, but as for “experiences of red”, I should say at the outset that the version of dispositionalism that I have in mind is intentionalist. There are two points to emphasise here: (i) DT uses “experiences of red” to characterise a class of experiences in terms not of their qualia, but of their content, the colour property that they all represent; and (ii) it takes “red” to have the same sense and reference within that phrase as it does without, and so the same sense and reference as it has, for example, on its left-hand side. 34

And there’s the rub. The concept that occurs on the right-hand side of DT is precisely the concept that occurs on its left-hand side: the concept red, the “target concept”. In this sense, DT is circular. Now it would once have been counted an obviously good objection against DT that it is circular in this way; it would have seemed obvious that such circularity is vicious. But, over the past few decades, there has emerged amongst many philosophers a new insouciance about DT’s circularity, by the lights of which the charge of viciousness seems like mere “cyclophobia”. 35 So, bracketing the pejorative connotations, the battle lines on the issue of colour can be drawn between the “cyclophobes” and the “cyclophiles”. Amongst the cyclophobes are Blackburn, Boghossian, Hacker, Price, Stroud, Velleman, perhaps Peacocke, 36 and recently McGinn; amongst the cyclophiles are McGinn again, in his earlier work, Evans, Humberstone, Johnston, McDowell, Wiggins, and Wright. 37 In this section, I side with the cyclophobes. Though I concentrate on colour, recall that the point is more general: if the subjectivist account of colour is viciously circular, then the radical subjectivist account of hurting surely is too.

34 Though the view I call “intentionalist dispositionalism” accepts both, notice that (i) doesn’t imply (ii). To see this, consider an account of the property nauseating on which it consists in a disposition to cause experiences of nausea, where these are united by their representing a property, but not the property nauseating.

35 The term is Humberstone’s. See his TTC, 9.

36 I say “perhaps Peacocke”, for on the one hand, his adoption of a non-intentionalist dispositionalism (framed in terms of the property, red’) might well reflect a conviction that intentionalist dispositionalism is viciously circular; but on the other hand, the circularity charges he actually presents in his S&C seem, at least sometimes, to be directed against intentionalist accounts of the possession conditions of the concept, red, rather than against intentionalist accounts of what it is for an object to be red. See §3 3 below.

37 Since, as we shall see, there are a number of distinct circularity objections, of which the theorist might endorse one but not another, this division of the field is somewhat rough and ready, though for the most part it will do. Note, however, that though McGinn currently makes what I classify as a circularity objection against DT (see his ALC, 543-4), he also continues to defend DT against another circularity objection (see his ALC, 549-50). In any case, for the cyclophobes, see Blackburn’s CFB, Boghossian and Velleman’s CSQ and PTC, Hacker’s A&R, Price’s TPP, Stroud’s IRAC and COPC, Peacocke’s S&C, and McGinn’s ALC; and for the cyclophiles, see McGinn’s SV, Evans’s TWM, Humberstone’s TTC, Johnston’s OR, McDowell’s VSQ, Wiggins’s TML and SS, and Wright’s T&O.
3.1. How Not to Understand DT: The Cyclophile's Provisos

So that our opponent is not a straw man, it is important to recognise that, if certain provisos are not met, many cyclophiles themselves concede that intentionalist dispositionalism is viciously circular. If there are better versions of dispositionalism available, it is no good our attacking a version that violates these provisos, a version that even the cyclophile would reject. Here are three requirements cyclophiles are apt to impose: first, that DT not be interpreted as a "reductive analysis"; second, that it avoids what Wright calls "whatever-it-takes" specifications; and third, that the target term occur on DT's right-hand side only safely insulated within an intensional context. I think that, even given these conditions, DT is problematically circular. First, though, each of the provisos needs a little more explanation.

The First Proviso: Not a Reductive Analysis

The cyclophile's first proviso is that DT not be interpreted as a traditional reductive analysis. He tends to concede that, so interpreted, DT would fail, by contrast with a paradigmatic analysis such as the following:

(V) Something's being a vixen consists in its being a female fox.

One can learn from the right-hand side of V all of the following: the referent of the target term, "vixen", the sense or concept it expresses, and also the structure of that concept. By contrast, precisely because of its circularity, DT could not play those pedagogical roles. For the occurrence of the target term "red" on DT's right-hand side makes its right-hand side unintelligible to those who do not already understand that term. Moreover, the formulae on DT's left- and right-hand sides surely do not express the same concept anyway. After all, "red" occurs as a proper part of "disposed to cause an experience as of an object's being red in normal subjects in normal circumstances", and the other parts surely make at least some semantic contribution. So if a good reductive analysis of a concept or term will be capable of imparting to the uninitiated what concept that term expresses, and capable of displaying the structure of that concept, then DT is clearly not a good reductive analysis.

But cyclophiles are happy to concede as much. The renewed popularity of their position is due to a post-Quinean suspicion of the very project of reductive analysis, or at least due to the associated realisation that it can be the business of philosophers to give, for various concepts or properties or terms, accounts of some alternative sort. Taken in one of these non-analytic ways, the suggestion is, DT need not be undermined by its circularity.
So what are these non-analytic ways of taking philosophical accounts? Amongst the different explanations philosophers give of what they are up to, a good illustration is provided by the difference between Socrates' and Euthyphro's interpretations of the following biconditional (Plato, EU):

\[(E) \text{ Something is good iff it is loved by the gods.}\]

Whereas Socrates is inclined to assign priority to the left-hand side of E, Euthyphro holds that the biconditional admits of, as the jargon goes, "a right-to-left reading". For Socrates, that is, E is true because something's being good (and only that) will cause it to be loved by the gods. For Euthyphro, on the other hand, the explanation is non-causal and it proceeds in the other direction: something's being loved by the gods determines that it is good. There are other ways of putting such a right-to-left reading: for example, the right-hand side states, what it is for something to be good; or what something's being good consists in; or what constitutively explains something's being good; or what all and only good things really have in common, at some more fundamental or illuminating level than goodness itself. In any case, Euthyphro's right-to-left reading is a paradigmatic example of a non-analytic philosophical account. It is, incidentally, frequently taken to be a mark of a biconditional's admitting of such a reading that it be not merely true, but also necessary and a priori.\(^{39}\)

So, to repeat, presenting a biconditional in this light is supposed to be an alternative to construing it either as a reductive definition or as a merely contingently true biconditional that perhaps reflects some causal relationship like the one Socrates suggested regarding E. And again, provided we distinguish such constitutive accounts from reductive analyses, their circularity is supposed not to matter. E, as it happens, isn't circular anyway; but the DT biconditional is:\(^{40}\)

\[(DTb) \text{ An object is red iff it is disposed to cause experiences that it is red in normal subjects in normal circumstances.}\]

Assuming his other provisos are met, the cyclophile will be relaxed about this circularity, provided that the claim is that the biconditional admits of a right-to-left reading—in other words, that it is necessary and a priori, and that its having these features reflects a

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38 I'm substituting "good" for "pious"
39 See Wright's T&O, 113-17.
40 Notice I am drawing a distinction between the DT biconditional (DTb) and DT itself (see page 91).
constitutive truth: namely, to reiterate DT itself, that an object’s being red consists in its being disposed to cause experiences of red.

The Second Proviso: No Whatever-It-Takes Specifications

For a biconditional legitimately to be understood as reflecting such a constitutive truth, however, its apriority and necessity may be necessary, but they are certainly not sufficient. For example, the DT biconditional would be a priori and necessary without that reflecting any constitutive truth, if it employed what Wright calls “whatever-it-takes” specifications of any of the three crucial ingredients: the relevant experiences, the relevant subjects, or the relevant circumstances (Wright, T&O, 112). Consider, for example, the following version of the DT biconditional:

(1) An object is red iff it is disposed to be experienced as red by normal subjects in whatever circumstances are such that in those circumstances red things are experienced as red by normal subjects.

Claim (1) is obviously a priori and necessary, but it is also clear that the source of its apriority and necessity is its whatever-it-takes specification of “normal circumstances”. 41 Two more biconditionals dramatise the point:

(2) An object is a lion iff it is disposed to be experienced as a lion by normal subjects in whatever circumstances are such that in those circumstances lions are experienced as lions by normal subjects.

(3) An object is red iff it is disposed to cause roaring in lions in whatever circumstances are such that in those circumstances red things cause roaring in lions.

Claim (2), about lions, perfectly parallels (1) about redness; so like (1), it is necessary and a priori. But the king of the jungle, of all creatures, is clearly not experience-dependent. Rather, the necessity and apriority of (2) are consequent upon the artful specification of the circumstances. The lesson is reinforced by (3), which substitutes for “experiences of red” and “normal subjects” in (1) “roaring” and “lions” respectively. This shows not that redness is roar-dependent, but that any account preserving the whatever-it-takes specification of the

41 Whatever-it-takes specifications are available also for the relevant subjects (“whatever subjects are such that those subjects experience red things as red in normal circumstances”) and the relevant experiences or responses (“whatever response is such that it is caused by red things in normal subjects in normal circumstances”).
circumstances will preserve the apriority and necessity of the original biconditional, regardless of how we characterise the relevant subjects and responses.\footnote{More generally, of the three factors—response, subjects, circumstances—once one is given a whatever-it-takes specification, no specification of the remaining two will affect the apriority and necessity of the claim.}

So the cyclophile’s second proviso is that such whatever-it-takes specifications be excluded. The more circumspect of the cyclophiles will concede, in other words, that whatever-it-takes circularity is indeed vicious, in the sense that no deep constitutive truth will be reflected by the apriority and necessity of biconditionals that are circular in that way. But that does not mean, he will insist, that all circularity is vicious. For although whatever-it-takes biconditionals are all circular, not all circular claims are whatever-it-takes biconditionals. It does mean, however, that the dispositionalist is committed to holding that there is some more substantive specification of, in particular, “normal subjects” and “normal circumstances”. But, though meeting this requirement can generate its own difficulties for the dispositionalist, they are not the ones I want to concentrate on here.

\textit{The Third Proviso: Intentionally Insulating the Target Term}

The final proviso imposed by some cyclophiles is that the right-hand side occurrence of the target term be within an intensional context. The DT biconditional seems to meet this condition: “red” occurs on its right-hand side only within the context created by “experiences that”. Whatever-it-takes specifications don’t meet this proviso, but its point is not simply to rule out those specifications. Its point is rather to forestall a residual and, these cyclophiles concede, legitimate concern which the cyclophobe might have about even those accounts that do not indulge the whatever-it-takes trick. We shall return to this proviso in §3.4.

To summarise, then, cyclophiles claim that, provided DT meets these three provisos, its circularity ought not to worry us. I turn now to the suggestion that, on the contrary, it ought to: that is, the case for so-called cyclophobia.

\textbf{3.2 The Case for Cyclophobia}

Clearly, the circumspect cyclophile is right that DT better not be understood as a reductive analysis or as involving whatever-it-takes specifications. But it is much less clear that, once those two interpretations are indeed eschewed, and once we emphasise that the right-hand side occurrence of “red” is within an intensional context, then DT’s circularity becomes entirely innocent.
Here is one way of coming at the problem. DT aims to explain the property redness in terms of a dispositional property: the disposition of objects to cause experiences representing objects as being red. Certainly, that is in fact a determinate disposition: poppies have it, for example. But it is not clear that it is a disposition available to be appealed to by the adherent of DT. For it is not clear that it would be a determinate disposition if DT were true. This is because the way in which the adherent of DT—who is, don't forget, an intentionalist—must understand this specification of the relevant disposition as follows: the disposition to cause experiences which represent, under some appropriate mode of presentation, this very disposition. Is that a determinate disposition? On the face of it, the identity of the disposition constitutively depends on the identity of the experiential mode of presentation; the identity of that mode of presentation depends on the identity of its referent; and that depends on the identity of the disposition, which is where we started. The worry here is not one about how we are to pick out the relevant disposition, nor about how our colour experiences do so. Rather, the worry is whether, on DT, there is a determinate disposition to be picked out. And, arguably, there is not—given the way the determinative relations take us in a circle, perpetually postponing determinacy from one cycle to the next.

Here is a closely related point. DT fails as an explanation of the unity of the red things, and of the difference between the red things and, say, the green things. For it is entirely unilluminating to be told that the unity of the red things is to be explained in terms of their all sharing a relationship to experiences of red, and then to have the unity of experiences of red explained in terms of the unity of the red things. Nor has anything been explained if we are told that the difference between the red things and the green things consists in the difference between the types of experiences they are disposed to cause, if we are then told that the difference between the types of experiences they are disposed to cause is determined by the difference between the things themselves.

Relatedly, recall the way I specified the dispositionalist's putative disposition: namely, as the disposition of objects to cause experiences which represent, under some appropriate mode of presentation, this very disposition. Even if this formula succeeded in specifying a determinate disposition, it is hard to see how there could be more than one disposition with that structure; and in view of the evident plurality of colours, that would be a serious problem. 43

It is tempting to respond at this stage by denying that any explanation is needed of the unity of the red things, or of their difference from the green things. As we shall see in the next chapter, Cornman, Campbell and others happily allow that there is no explanation, other

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43 One might use Peacocke's "discrimination principle" (see his LII) to articulate a closely related worry about the distinctness of the concepts, red and green—if DT were true.
than to say that the red things are red ("this colour[red]") and the green things green ("that colour[green]"). Indeed, I myself find that attitude appealing. But it is unclear whether it is available to the dispositionalist. One way of taking his account, after all, is precisely as an explanation of what fundamentally constitutes the unity of the red things and their collective distinctness from the non-red things. Moreover, whether or not he indulges these explanatory idioms, once he gets as far as saying that an object's being red consists in its being disposed to cause experiences of red, and an object's being green consists in its being disposed to cause experiences of green, then the only place he leaves for a difference between red and green to reside is in the difference between experiences of red and experiences of green. So if he wants to throw up his hands and refuse to give any further explanation of the difference between red and green, he must do so by refusing to explain the difference between those experience types. But, again, don't forget that our dispositionalist is also an intentionalist, and as such he is committed not to throwing up his hands at this point. And once he acquiesces, his intentionalist explanation of the difference between experiences of red and experiences of green sends us right back to where we started: the distinction between red and green. Thus our progress around the circle continues.

So it strikes me that legitimate worries about the coherence of DT, and about the illumination it could provide, persist even when we consider a version of DT that meets the cyclophile's various provisos.

### 3.3. Defending Cyclophobia

As in the case of the independence theorist, however, the cyclophobe is apt to strike some as advancing a ridiculously strong position, one that rules out far too much. Anticipating this worry, when discussing the cases of promising and intentional self-knowledge above, I suggested reasons to suspect that we shall not be compelled to accept circular accounts of promising or intending (see §2.1 and §2.2). But there are other cases one might worry about. I consider three.

**Courage and Virtue**

Take the following claim:

(C) Someone's having courage *consists in* his being disposed to act courageously.

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44 See Campbell's SVC, Stroud's IRAC and COPC, and Hacker's A&R.
In their discussion of dispositionalist views of colour, Velleman and Boghossian argue that we can reject DT without ruling out C, since the “definition of courage invokes courage in an ordinary extensional context, whereas the right side of [DT] invokes red in an intentional context expressing the content of a visual experience” (CSQ, 89). Curiously, then, though various cyclophiles think that intensionality (with an “s”) gets the dispositionalist off the hook, Velleman and Boghossian think that intenrionality (with a “t”) is precisely the source of DT’s problems—or, at least, that the source resides in DT’s use of the particular intentional context, “experiences that”. Thanks to its use of “red” in that context, Velleman and Boghossian think, DT invokes the very experiential content they think it “purports to explicate” (op. cit.). And, in their view, this feature of DT undermines not just its pedagogical usefulness, but also the informativeness of colour experiences themselves, the idea that these experiences so much as tell us “which colour an object has” (op. cit.). For Velleman and Boghossian think DT implies that to see something as red is to see it as disposed to produce visual experiences with the content that it is red (CSQ, 90); it is to see it as having a property which the visual experience represents under the italicised mode of presentation. But since the underlined component of that mode of presentation is precisely the content which DT “purports to explicate”, DT is committed to replacing it with either of two things: first, the whole italicised predicative content itself (VSQ, 90), generating the mode of presentation, disposed to produce visual experiences with the content that it is disposed to produce visual experiences with the content ... and so on; or second, a demonstrative concept referring to the whole predicative content (PTC, 83), generating the mode of presentation disposed to produce visual experiences with this very content. Either way, the upshot is that the mode of presentation is indeterminate.

This doesn't seem to me to be the best way of prosecuting the case against DT. For one thing, the cyclophile’s first proviso suggests that the dispositionalist need not take himself to be attempting to “explicate” the content of experiences of red, except in so far as he is giving a philosophical account of the referent of that content. Admittedly, by using “experience of red”, the dispositionalist invokes a mode of presentation of redness; but he might nevertheless resist the idea that his is an account of that mode of presentation. He may, in particular, reject Velleman and Boghossian’s interpretation of him as claiming that redness is visually experienced under the descriptive mode of presentation, the disposition to produce visual experiences with the content red. So, just as I shall suggest in §3.4 that intensionality (with an “s”) does not of itself prevent vicious circularity, I am hereby suggesting that the case has not been made why intentionality (with a “t”) should make an otherwise benign circularity vicious. Hence if we are to follow Velleman and Boghossian in taking differing attitudes to the circularity of DT and C, then another rationale must be found for doing so.
To identify such a rationale, we should start by asking why Velleman and Boghossian think that C is circular anyway. The answer, I take it, is that C is an account of courage (or the courageous person) in terms of courageous acts, and Velleman and Boghossian suspect there is no prospect of an account of courageous acts that does not mention the virtue of courage. That seems right, and the point is redolent, as Velleman and Boghossian may well intend, of McDowell’s Aristotelian account of virtue (see McDowell’s V&R). Drawing on McDowell, then, I suggest that the inevitability of one’s referring back to the courageous person in one’s account of courageous acts is due to what McDowell calls “the uncodifiability of rationality”: the idea that there is no fixed and universal set of principles that could enable us to deduce precisely what ought to be done in any given circumstances (V&R, 57). This makes vain any hope that our idea (or the courageous person’s idea) of which actions are courageous might be “susceptible of capture in any universal formula” (V&R, 58). Still, even if this background elucidates C, it is not obvious why these considerations should excuse C’s circularity.

To do that, I think it is useful to point out that, given any particular courageous action that we encounter in some concrete set of circumstances, an account can be given of what made that action courageous in terms that do not directly refer us back to the notion of a courageous person. One might even think of the reference back to the courageous person in a general account of the courageousness of actions as, if you like, a place-holder for the enumeration of all the particular accounts of courageous acts—albeit a place-holder that the uncodifiability of rationality will prevent from being replaced by any reduction of the notion of a courageous act. All of this marks an important difference between C and DT. DT gives an account of redness in terms of experiences of red, and intentionalism tells us that there is no prospect of an account of experiences of red except in terms of redness. This has nothing to do with the uncodifiability of rationality. And, crucially, even given a particular experience of red, there is no prospect of an account of what it is for it to be an experience of red that does not refer back to redness. Our conception of experiences of red does not have even a case-by-case independence of the property in the account of which those experiences are being invoked. For that reason, I think, DT is peculiarly vacuous.

45 For a very useful account of the considerations here, see Child’s CIM, 58-60.
46 I am indebted to Bill Brewer for discussing this sort of point with me. See also Wiggins’s SS, 195, and McDowell’s VSQ, 146. Since Wiggins and McDowell both accept DT, however, notice that they cannot be putting the point to the use that I do. Notice, finally, that you might have to be courageous (to a degree) in order to give an account of what makes some given action courageous; but that does not mean that your account refers back to the courageous person.
Chapter 3. Problems for Subjectivism

Concept Possession Conditions

A second difficult case for the cyclophobe is posed by the following account:

**Possession Condition for Red (PCR)**

The concept red is that concept $C$ such that:

- A thinker’s possession of $C$ consists in his being disposed to judge *This*[$x$] *is* $C$ when and for the reason that he experiences $x$ as red.

Though certainly incomplete, PCR allows me to raise the problem: it is an account of the concept red that embeds an apparently circular account of the possession of that concept. For on the right-hand side of the embedded account is a use of red in a context in which, by the conceptualist’s lights, its role is to specify the conceptual content of a class of experiences—experiences, therefore, whose subjects must possess the very concept whose possession conditions are being explained. Thus Peacocke, for example, argues that conceptualism renders PCR viciously circular (SOC, 9).

The problem for the cyclophobe is that, notwithstanding this alleged circularity, there are reasons to want to retain both conceptualism and (a more sophisticated version of) PCR. But if the cyclophobe does so, then he must explain why he is more hostile to the circularity of DT. Now, why should one want to hold on to conceptualism and PCR? Because none of the three ways of rejecting it is appealing: either rejecting conceptualism; or amending PCR so that it adverts not to experiences of red but to red’ experiences; or just rejecting out of hand all such accounts of possession conditions. The first two strategies are ruled out by Chapters 1 and 2 above. But what about the third? Why is it unattractive? After all, if it can be defended, then there is no threat from this quarter to the consistency of the cyclophobe’s position.

But the third strategy, of rejecting such accounts as PCR out of hand, does seem too extreme, given that Evans and others have developed many apparently illuminating accounts along these lines of what it is to possess this or that concept. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that the rejection of such accounts can seem to be required by McDowell’s defence of “modest” theories of sense. It is also useful for us to note this, since though I think it turns out that McDowell’s view does not require the rejection of such accounts—again, it does not vindicate the third strategy for the cyclophobe—the terms McDowell uses to articulate his view can suggest a defence of the cyclophobe’s relatively hostile attitude to DT as against the conjunction of conceptualism and PCR. Let’s take these points in order.

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47 For it fails to require non-observational applications of the concept.

48 Contrast Dummett’s claim that grasping the concept square is at least being “able to discriminate between things that are square and those that are not” (quoted by McDowell at IDM, 91). There “square” is used only in a straightforwardly extensional context.
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We ought to be satisfied, McDowell thinks, with a theory of sense that is composed of axioms that display—rather than specify, or give some constitutive account of—the sense of the primitive terms of the language: for example, "'Hesperus' stands for Hesperus" (SR, 173). These axioms are not trivial, McDowell emphasises (SR, 176-7), and we ought not to hold out for anything less modest, such as the "immodest" or "full-blooded" accounts at which Dummett is gesturing when he claims that a possessor of the concept square must be disposed at least to "treat square things differently from things that are not square". In the case of "red", then, perhaps we should reject PCR for an axiom such as "'Red' stands for red", or perhaps "'Red' stands for that colour[red]".

Actually, however, it's unclear that McDowell's defence of modesty really does require the rejection of PCR and its ilk. Rather, when we are more precise about what an immodest theory of sense would be, PCR can come to seem positively virtuous by McDowell's standards. An immodest clause in a theory of sense is one whose right-hand side either (i) eschews all intentional terms (APM, 110-11) or (ii) at least avoids using the target term in an intentional context in which its sense is "displayed in its role as a determinant of content" (IDM, 91). PCR, however, has neither of these marks of immodesty. And this, by McDowell's lights, should be to its credit. So if PCR does not need to be rejected as immodest, then we are back with our original problem: why is the apparent circularity of the conjunction of PCR and conceptualism acceptable, if the circularity of DT is not?

In fact, I think it is not obvious that PCR is circular; and this is where the terms McDowell uses become useful for us. For PCR's right-hand side displays the concept red "in its role as a determinant of content"; it does not, even in the context of "experiences", refer to that mode of presentation, or to its possession. Again, to explain what is required in order to grasp the mode of presentation red, PCR uses a term, "red", that expresses that mode

49 See also APM, 108; and see Evans, VR, 26.
50 Quoted by McDowell at IDM, 91.
51 There a question about whether the use of the demonstrative, "that colour[red]", could display the sense of the non-demonstrative, "red", as there is about McDowell's suggestion that the clause "'Atla' stands for that mountain[Atla]" would—but for its impractical context-sensitivity—be an acceptable axiom in a theory of sense. See SR, 184.
52 Dummett's gesture towards a possession condition for square meets both (i) and (ii); Peacocke's "non-circular" possession conditions meet (ii).
53 McDowell seems to accept as much in Mind and World, where he appears happy to embrace accounts of the possession conditions of concepts, and expresses the virtue of modesty in terms of his general insouciance about circularity (M&W, 170). (In the text, I suggest, in effect, expressing it in different terms.) See also SR, 109, where he relates the "deep-seated" difference in sense between "Hesperus" and "Phosphorous" to the fact that "Hesperus" is conventionally uttered in response to evening appearances of Venus and "Phosphorous" in response to morning appearances. "Such connections", he says, are "partly constitutive of a shared language" (SR, 189). See also IDM, 102.
54 Admittedly, the concept's possession is a pre-requisite of a subject's undergoing the experiences to which the account does refer, but I am not sure that this need introduce a vicious circularity. The use of the concept displays the way in which the relevant experiences present redness; it is a further step to claim—as we indeed should—that one must possess the concept in order to have those experiences.
of presentation. Grasp of the mode of presentation consists in the thinker's undergoing suitably related episodes (experiences and judgements) that present the world in just that way—the way displayed, but not referred to, by the use of the concept in question. This is different from DT, for DT is an account of the property, redness, and yet that is precisely what is referred to by the use of "red" on its right-hand side. In trying to make sense of the right-hand side of DT, then, we are sent directly back to the property for which we were being offered an account. So, on the face of it, the cyclophobe about DT can in good conscience accept PCR—or at least some more sophisticated variant.

No-Priority Views

Here is a final challenge for the cyclophobe. As Velleman and Boghossian point out, there is nothing wrong with the claim, "Sam = the father of Sam's children", even though "Sam" is a proper part of the description on the right-hand side of the identity sign (CSQ, 89). Nor, we should add (with Velleman and Boghossian in mind), is there anything wrong with "Sam = the person thinking that Sam is handsome", despite the intentional context on the right-hand side. Does this show that our worries about dispositionalism are empty? Well, neither of these claims about Sam is a constitutive account; neither is an explanation of what it is for a thing to be Sam. And in this important respect, they differ from the dispositionalist's biconditional, at least on the "right-to-left" reading.

However, some dispositionalists will disavow that reading, arguing that we should reject it for a "no-priority" version of DT. In one form, this is the claim that "redness" and "the disposition to cause experiences of redness" simply co-refer, though neither concept has any priority. In another form, it is the claim that it is just an explanatorily basic—if necessary and a priori—fact that the properties redness and having the disposition to cause experiences of redness are co-instantiated everywhere, that "the two properties are ... conceptually yoked together in all possible worlds" (McGinn, ALC, 546). It would be disappointing, however, if DT were no more illuminating than that. Indeed, returning for a moment to hurting, recall that one of the motivations for introducing radical subjectivism in the case of that property was precisely to explain why instances of hurting are self-intimating with respect to experiences, and why experiences of hurting are (predicatively) infallible. To adopt a no-priority construal of radical subjectivism would be precisely to give up the explanation for a mere statement of the phenomena we wanted to have explained.  

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55 See also Johnston, OR, 125.
56 Construing radical subjectivism as a straightforward identity claim (though a "deeper" identity claim than the one about Sam) might seem helpful, but it would re-introduce the worries about determinacy.
3.4. Returning to the Third Proviso: Intensional Insulation

Finally, let us return to the cyclophile’s third proviso. Far from making DT problematically circular, as Velleman and Boghossian suggest, the intentional (or at least intensional) context on DT’s right-hand side has been argued by some philosophers to save DT from vice. That, recall, was the idea behind the third proviso. It emerges in the writings of two cyclophiles: Wright and McGinn. What they say in this context is rather opaque, but they seem to defend the proviso in related ways. I shall focus on McGinn. 57 He claims that DT is saved by the fact that the property, redness, occurs in the specification of the relevant experiences “only qua represented, not qua instantiated” (ALC, 550). That is significant, McGinn argues, because it means that the experiential dispositions invoked by DT are explained by reference to the property redness, not by reference to its instantiations, whereas what those dispositions are invoked in turn to explain are instantiations of that property, not the property itself.

“There is”, McGinn says, “no vicious circularity in explaining the instantiation of [a property] P in objects by reference to mental states in the identification of which the property P requires to be mentioned: presupposing the existence of the property ... is not the same as presupposing its instantiation” (MC, 14; my emphasis).

Given the significance McGinn attaches to the question whether experiences of red require the instantiation or merely the existence of redness, it is unsurprising that he thinks that DT would be viciously circular were it combined with an informationalist theory of perceptual content—that is, were it the case that experiences of red represent redness only by dint of instances of that experiential type normally being caused by (crucially) instantiations of redness (MC, 13). 58 What, by McGinn’s lights, makes that informationalist theory render DT viciously circular seems to be its commitment to the following externalist idea: that notwithstanding the intensionality of the context in which “red” characterises experiences of red, the having of such experiences implies the existence not merely of redness, but of red things—instantiations of redness.

Now I do not propose to work through the many issues raised by Wright’s and McGinn’s suggestions: precisely how they are supposed to meet our determinacy worries, for example; or whether McGinn’s distinction between a property and its instantiation can bear the sort of weight he wants it to. But I do want to make a point worth noting if you do think that this distinction between a property and its instantiations is crucial in the present context: namely, that there are more promising views of perceptual content than the informationalist’s that nevertheless share the informationalist’s commitment to the externalist

57 For Wright’s defence, see T&O, 120-23, and 132-5.
58 See Chapter 1, §2, above.
idea that, notwithstanding the intensionality of the context in which “red” characterises experiences of red, the having of such experiences implies the existence of red things, not merely redness.

Consider, for example, a view on which experiences of red are those episodes that enable their possessors to discriminate non-inferentially the red things as red.\(^{59}\) Since this account too involves the externalist idea, surely McGinn ought to think that it too would generate a viciously circular position if combined with DT. If that is right, then we are left with the following question. Which should we renounce: DT or the account of perceptual content that connects colour experiences to discriminatory capacities? It seems to me that the account of perceptual content is on the right lines. And, curiously, McGinn seems to agree, at least in the case of our experience of shapes: “when it comes to a competition between action and environment, in the fixation of perceptual content,” he says, “action wins” (MC, 66)—though, admittedly, he also tries to soften the externalist implications (MC, 68). When it comes to colour experience, however, the same principles surely hold, only more so: that is, behaviour is just as important, and the obligation to construe it in a thoroughly world-involving way is even stronger. Perhaps the externalist implications in the case of primary quality experience can be softened à la McGinn, by pointing out that one can move “square-wise” without there existing square objects; but what behaviour could be (if you will) “red-wise” other than the behavioural discrimination of objects that are red—objects, in other words, that instantiate redness? So, faced with the choice between giving up DT or externalism, I suggest that it is DT that has to go.\(^{60}\)

To recap, then, Wright and McGinn seem to share the idea that the intensional context on the right-hand side of DT safely “insulates” the occurrence of the target term, since—as Wright puts it—the context implies that the experiences thus characterised make “no demands” on the extension of red. I have speculated that the point Wright and McGinn have in mind presupposes an internalist conception of the colour content of visual experiences. And if that is so, it ought to be pointed out that internalism is hardly delivered merely by the fact that, in the phrase “experience of red”, “red” occurs in an intensional context. The informationalist account is hopeless, admittedly, but there are other forms of externalism, and they are alive and well.

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\(^{59}\) See Chapter 2, §4.1.

\(^{60}\) We are in the neighbourhood here of Stroud’s argument in his unpublished IRAC: that for someone to believe dispositionalism, he must possess the concept experience of red, which requires him to be able to apply it in third-person ascriptions, which requires him to attribute categorical redness to objects in his environment, which would manifest his failing to believe dispositionalism after all. However, Stroud’s point seems to me to be more potent against the error theorist than against the dispositionalist.
So it seems to me that the circularity charge against dispositionalism remains strong, and that a parallel charge threatens subjectivism in the pain case. The central message of this chapter, then, is that radical subjectivism faces serious objections from two related quarters: first, from the independence requirement, and second, from a discriminating cyclophobia. But with what should we replace it? That question is the subject of the final three chapters.

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61 It strikes me, incidentally, that closely related problems threaten to undermine some of the advantages that in the previous chapter (§4.1), the subjectivist adherent of hurting perceptualism claimed to enjoy over the subjectivist act-object theorist. It is unclear, for example, whether the subjectivist allows the concept hurting to be sufficiently independent from the concept being in pain to play the role of its “anchor” or “herald” in the way it was suggested it might in the discussion of univocity. Moreover, subjectivism seems to be precisely a version of the “projectivism” that Brewer argues is not the way to vindicate his opposition to the elusiveness thesis (BAS, 303).
Might it be that the subject matter of pain experiences is constitutively independent of them? This is the obvious question to ask, given the problems we have now seen to arise from the combination of an intentionalist account of pain experiences and a subjectivist conception of their subject matter. It is also the topic of the final three chapters of this study.

Here is one very general way of looking at what I want to do in these chapters. For reasons that we shall come to in a moment, objectivists tend to be non-mentalists, and in particular to embrace some form of what I call "injury perceptualism". Now it seems to me that injury perceptualists tend to underestimate the problems their approach faces. To some extent, this is because many of them do not endorse the conditions that someone with my commitments will want an account of pain experience to meet: conditions about the interiority of sensations, the conceptual character of experiential content, the untenability of informationalist accounts of such content, the significance of the distinction between the personal and sub-personal, the minimally empiricist idea that experiences rationally constrain thought, and so forth. Being insensitive to these considerations, many injury perceptualists fail to appreciate the problems generated for their view, problems that no doubt lurk in the back of the minds of those who reject that view out of hand. In what follows, I want to raise a number of these problems, and to investigate how the injury perceptualist might respond to them. Though the difficulties are serious, and though question marks remain over certain versions of injury perceptualism, what is interesting is the extent to which injury perceptualism can be made to meet even the desiderata that someone such as McDowell is inclined to impose. That is a central theme of these final chapters.

In §1 of this chapter, I return to my taxonomy of views in order to present the variety of objectivist positions available. Though objectivists tend to be non-mentalists, there is logical space for mentalist versions of objectivism. In §2, I briefly look at these, but find them problematic. In the remainder of this study, therefore, I turn to non-mentalism—and, in particular, to injury perceptualism. I flesh out that view somewhat in §3, and advertise its virtues. Finally, in §4, I discuss a dilemma that it faces.
1. THE RANGE OF OBJECTIVIST OPTIONS

Let us start by abstracting from our formulation of hurting perceptualism a general schema for intentionalist views of pain experiences:

(1) A’s being in pain \textit{consists in} his having a somatosensory experience as of a part of his body being P.

(2) A’s having or feeling a pain in a body part, O \textit{consists in}

(a) A’s undergoing a somatosensory perceiving with a content of the form, \textit{That part} [O] \textit{of my body there} [L] \textit{is} P

(b) O’s existing and being at L, and

(c) the bodily and spatial content of the experience mentioned in (a) causally depending on O and on its being at L.

The two central questions to which different versions of intentionalism will give different answers are these: What is the property P? And under what mode of presentation is it represented in pain experiences? An account is objectivist, if its answer to the first question involves taking P to be constitutively independent of pain experiences. But that leaves room for a range of views.

To appreciate the possibilities, consider once again the case of colours: redness, for example. On the one hand, some non-dispositionalists take redness to be (identical to) a microphysical property of objects. Of these microphysicalists, some take the red things to constitute a microphysical natural kind, rather like the things instantiating the property, \textit{being 80° centigrade}; others, impressed by the failure of physics to come up with a suitable non-disjunctive microphysical property for redness, take the red things to constitute a disjunctive kind.\(^1\) So some think that \textit{being red} is a matter of \textit{being R}, and others that it is a matter of \textit{being F or G or H ...}, where “R”, “F”, “G”, “H” and so forth are my place-holders for whatever suitably esoteric terms the microphysicalist will employ—once the necessary science has been done—to refer to the appropriate microphysical properties. Now, by contrast with microphysicalism, Campbell and others have adopted what Campbell calls “the simple view”.\(^2\) As the simple theorist might put it, colours are irreducibly themselves: not microphysical properties, nor sensory dispositions, but rather “transparent” objective properties that \textit{ground} the relevant sensory dispositions.\(^3\)

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1 For the failure of physics to reduce colours to microphysical natural kinds, see the discussions of “mondrians” and “metamers” in Keith Campbell’s DARC, Hardin’s CFP, and Sack’s AM. For disjunctive microphysicalism, see Lycan’s C&E, 72-4, Dennett’s CE, 375-83, Armstrong’s RTC, 271-3.

2 See Campbell’s SVC, Stroud’s IRAC, COPC, and QR; Hacker’s A&R; and Cornman’s MTA.

3 I have much more to say in the next chapter about what “transparent” means in this sort of context.
Chapter 4. Introducing Objectivism

So when it comes to P, the property represented by pain experiences, the following two possibilities correspond to these objectivist accounts of colour:

(I) P is a microphysiological property, non-disjunctive or disjunctive
(II) P is some macro-level property akin to a colour on the simple view.

And here is a third possibility, not matched by anything in the colour case:

(III) P is some macro-level physiological property.

To illustrate, the following are examples of each of those three types, respectively:

(a) O's having P = O's having its local nociceptors firing
(b) O's having P = O's hurting
(c) O's having P = O's being “disordered”—that is, its being in (or nearly being in, or developing) a physiologically pathological condition; again, its having (or nearly having, or being in the process of acquiring) something physiologically wrong with it.

Now views (a) and (c) both generate versions of what I call “injury perceptualism”. The injury perceptualist casts some distinctive physiological state as the referent of the predicative content of pain experiences. View (a) generates a version of “micro-IP”, since it takes P to be some microphysiological property, some condition picked out in the arcane terms of the physiologist, terms that refer to microscopic items and structures; whereas (c) is a version of “macro-IP”, since it takes P to be a rather less recondite physiological property, such as being disordered.

As for (b), this is a version of a view which we have already encountered in Chapters 2 and 3: hurting perceptualism. Here, however, (b) is suggested as an example of an objectivist account, one on which hurting is a property akin to a colour on the simple view. So that is one objectivist form of mentalism. And there are others. One might, for example, combine hurting perceptualism and injury perceptualism, asserting the identity of hurting and some physiological property, and insisting that P is that property: for a body part to hurt just is for it to possess that physiological condition. So, although I moved quickly in Chapter 2

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4 Where nociceptors are physiologically and functionally distinctive neural receptors located about the body, which involve, gratifyingly (for those philosophers who thought this was a myth), c-fibres, and also a-fibres. See Wall, PSS, and Campbell, PMN.

5 See Pitcher’s PP, 371.

6 Though they do not explicitly draw the distinction, Armstrong and Pitcher seem to be adherents of, respectively, micro- and macro-IP. Armstrong says that the “bodily disturbance perceived in the case of pain will simply be stimulation of the pain-receptors” (MTM, 315; see also 319). Pitcher, by contrast, uses the term “disordered” in much the same way as I have defined (PP, 371).
(§§2.4 and 4.3) to conjoin mentalism with subjectivist accounts of the represented mental items, I am now registering the logical space for objectivist versions of mentalism. Such accounts are tempting ways of avoiding the difficulties of both subjectivism and non-mentalism (of which, more later). Again, as long as objectivist mentalism remains available, it will seem to be overkill to respond to the problems discussed in the previous chapter by giving up both subjectivism and mentalism; perhaps only subjectivism has to go.

Let us now ask whether that is so.

2. MENTALIST OBJECTIVISM: CORNMAN’S VIEW

Two versions of objectivist mentalism have just been mentioned. According to both, P is the property, hurting. But on the first, hurting is to be conceived on the model of colours, as understood by the simple view; whereas on the second, hurting is identical to some sort of physiological property. In this section, I focus on the first view; I say more about the second in the final chapter (§1.3). Now, Cornman is an adherent of the first view. He holds that pain experiences represent body parts as hurting (MTA, 29); and hurting is, he thinks, a “sensible quality” of body parts (MTA, 30), a quality he compares to colours, which in turn he seems to conceive according to the simple view (op. cit.). As I understand him, then, Cornman conceives hurting as an objective property whose nature is “transparent” to pain experience, a property which is therefore identical neither to a sensory disposition nor to a microphysiological property, but which nevertheless grounds a sensory disposition.

Evans’s Objection to the Simple View of Colour and Pains

Interestingly, Evans objects to the simple view of colour by comparing it to what he regards as an untenable simple view, not of hurting, but of pains (TWM, 272-4). Conceiving colours as objective, on the one hand, and yet transparent, non-microphysical, and non-dispositional, on the other, inevitably involves an attempt, Evans thinks, to extract a concept of something objective immediately from one’s experience: a “direct ... leap from subjective experience to objective property” (TWM, 272). The attempt is doomed, he thinks, and at best one ends up with a conception of something subjective: “a property of experience”, “colour-as-we-see-it” (TWM: 272, 273). Evans compares this to our trying to conceive pains as objective items other than by simply taking the word “pains” to pick out dispositions to cause pain experiences. As in the colour case, he argues, if we adopt a view of pains as non-dispositional and transparent, we commit ourselves to a conception of them as subjective—a conception that renders it absurd to suppose that such items could exist objectively, as if

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7 This is related to my remarks on Evans’s and Strawson’s use of the generality constraint, in Chapter 3, §1.1.
"something awful" could be going on even though "there is no one who is hurt" (TWM, 273). Now, Evans doesn't imagine that anyone would suggest conceiving of pains as objective; his point is just that if anyone did, he would fail. But Cornman does want to hold that hurting is objective; so if Evans is right, Cornman is in trouble.

However, I think Evans's point fails as an objection to the simple view of colour, and so it cannot be used against the simple view of hurting either. Starting with the colour case, the idea that the simple view involves a "direct ... leap from subjective experience to an objective property" suggests the complaint that a simple view cannot take our conception of objective colours to be subserved by what Evans calls "a simple theory of perception", a theory which distances our conception of colours from our colour experience by explaining that experience (in the veridical case) as the upshot of two sorts of factors, only one of which is the instantiation of the colour in question (TWM, 262). But it is unclear why a simple view cannot exploit a simple theory of perception. Notice that Evans is not complaining about the absence of an account of what it is for a colour to be instantiated. In the case of shape properties, that is the role of a simple theory of mechanics (TWM, 269); and in the colour case, we do indeed lack such a mechanics. But what Evans is complaining about is the absence of an account of what it is for a thinker to have an objective conception of a colour. That is the role of the simple theory of perception, and I can see no reason why the simple view of colour cannot invoke it, nor any reason to think that it would be insufficient for the purpose.

Problems for the Simple View of Hurting

I think Evans is right that the simple view of pains is problematic. But if what I have said is correct, he is right for the wrong reason. The real reason turns not on a similarity between the colour and pain cases, as Evans has it, but on a difference: namely, that we want pains to be inner; we want them to be self-intimating, for example, or at least to entail the existence of conscious subjects. And this goes for hurting too. So Cornman's view is implausible not because he leaps from his pain experience directly to hurting as an objective property, but because he leaps to hurting as an objective property at all.

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8 "Hurt" here means "suffering" or "having a pain experience".
9 The second sort of factor is the satisfaction of various enabling conditions, regarding such circumstances as the spatial relations between the object and the subject, the lighting conditions, and so forth. Hence the difference between supposing that x's redness is unperceived and supposing that x fails to instantiate redness is that the former supposition carries with it the commitment that the enabling conditions are not met. This point is important if Peacocke's "discrimination principle" is to be met; see his LI.
10 Especially if we demand that the thinker with a conception of objective colour must possess, in addition, shape and other concepts for which, by contrast, a mechanics is required. Notice too that Campbell certainly makes extensive use of the idea of a simple theory of perception in his SVC. Evans's mistake runs through TWM, 272-3. Smith, in my view, makes the same mistake in his CTM. (Notice, incidentally, that it is a distinct problem with the simple view that Evans has in mind at TWM, 273; I think it is met by the considerations Campbell mentions at SPEC, 354-6.
Chapter 4. Introducing Objectivism

What is wrong with thinking of hurting as an objective property? Well, on the face of it, if the simple view is true, then we have to concede that an object can hurt without its being experienced as doing so, without its even requiring a conscious subject. If the simple view has that consequence—and let us assume for a moment that it does—then it is unclear in what sense hurting would even be a mental property, and hence unclear in what sense an account invoking the simple view would be a version of mentalism.11 Recall McDowell’s conception of mentality, after all, on which an item’s being mental is, roughly, a matter of its involving a subject taking up a perspective on the world.12 How is hurting mental in anything like that sense, if its instantiation does not even require a conscious subject?

But does it matter, if hurting on Cornman’s conception turns out not to be a mental property? It does if the real property hurting is intuitively mental, self-intimating, and a property that requires a conscious subject. Moreover, that hurting intuitively has those features was part of the motivation for hurting perceptualism: namely, that taking pain experiences to represent hurting is a matter of assigning to them an “inner” subject matter.

A closely related point can be made by recalling the mentalist objection to the elusiveness thesis, which we considered in Chapter 2 (§4.1). The objection is that, contrary to the elusiveness thesis, we are aware of ourselves as subjects in somatosensory perception, since we are aware of our own bodies as instantiating mental properties, “properties of the body that are also necessarily properties of the basic subject of that very awareness” (Brewer, BAS, 300). Now I said in Chapter 2 that hurting perceptualism is just the account of pain experience that this argument needs. But notice that, if hurting can be instantiated without that implying the existence of a conscious subject, then, on the contrary, hurting perceptualism turns out to be useless to these opponents of the elusiveness thesis.

But perhaps we should re-examine the assumption I’ve been making: that Cornman has to give up both self-intimation and (worse) the requirement of a conscious subject. Is this really true? Certainly, as I have presented it, the simple view denies the subjectivist claim that what it is for a body part to hurt is for it to be experienced as hurting. The question is whether Cornman can yet maintain that a body part can hurt only if it is experienced as hurting, or at least only if a conscious subject exists. Although he countenances the renunciation of each feature (MTAT, 36-7), he admits the inclination to try to accommodate both. But how? The more difficult is the stronger claim: self-intimation. If an object’s hurting does not consist in its being experienced as doing so, then it will just have to be a

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11 Cornman says hurting is mental because its instances are normally perceptually available to only a single subject, and in that sense they are the objects of “privileged access” (MTA, 36). But on Cornman’s account privileged access holds only contingently and for the most part; he concedes, for example, that Siamese twins may be exceptions. So it is doubtful that a satisfactory conception of mentality lies in that direction.

12 See Chapter 1, §5.2, and Chapter 2, §2.2.
basic datum for Cornman that an object can hurt only if it is so experienced. Suffice it to say that it would be nice to have more than this, to have some sort of explanation.

What about the weaker claim: that a body part’s hurting at least implies the existence of a conscious subject, even if it does not require that each instantiation of hurting be perceived? Certainly, there are moves that Cornman could make to accommodate this idea. In order to explain why hurting can be instantiated by an object only if that object is in fact the body of a conscious subject, he could, for example, claim that it would be a simple category mistake to apply “hurting” to anything else, a mistake akin to saying that the number three is red. But, again, whereas we can go some way towards explaining why it is absurd to speak of a red number (for example: numbers are abstract objects; they have no extent, no surfaces to be red), it is less clear why it is a category mistake to speak of a recently severed leg as hurting—if hurting is as Cornman conceives it. Cornman does appeal to biological complexity in order to restrict the set of things that can hurt, and perhaps an explanation of this restriction would provide the explanation of the category mistake for which we are looking. But Cornman himself offers no explanation of the restriction. And notice that the explanation cannot be that (i) the hurting of some part of a thing consists in that thing’s experiencing a part of itself as hurting and (ii) the thing must be complex (more complex than a severed leg) in order to be capable of doing that. For that is just to re-introduce radical subjectivism. Cornman might alternatively appeal to the role of hurting, arguing that its function is to alert a conscious and complete organism to injury. But this is also the role of firing nociceptors, yet that does not make it unintelligible to suppose that the nociceptors in a severed arm are still firing. Again, then, we might hope for something more satisfying.

So this simple version of mentalism without subjectivism is unappealing. And, on the face of it, much the same points would count against a hybrid of hurting perceptualism and injury perceptualism. So, if both subjectivist and objectivist forms of mentalism are untenable, we have little choice but to turn to consider injury perceptualism, interpreted as a view that is neither mentalist nor subjectivist. That task will occupy us for the remainder of this study.

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13 Bill Brewer and Bill Child impressed this on me.
14 Though see Chapter 6, §1.3.
3. NON-MENTALIST OBJECTIVISM: INJURY PERCEPTUALISM

3.1. Formulating Injury Perceptualism

The injury perceptualist would fill out the schema in §1 as follows:

Injury Perceptualism
1. A’s being in pain (feeling or having a pain) consists in his having a somatosensory experience as of a part of his body being in some physiological state, P.

2. A’s having or feeling a pain in a body part, O, or O’s hurting, consists in

   (a) A’s being the subject of a somatosensory perceiving with a content of the form, That part[O] of my body there[L] is P
   (b) O’s existing and being at L, and
   (c) the bodily and spatial content of the experience mentioned in (a) causally depending on O and on its being at L.

The adherents of views along these lines include Armstrong, Harman, Lycan, Pitcher, and Tye. I start with two remarks about injury perceptualism’s formulation. First, notice that the reason for the distinction between (1) and (2) is the same as in the case of hurting perceptualism: (1) allows that the subject of a phantom-limb pain experience is still in pain; (2) prevents him from having a pain in the limb he does not possess. Moreover, (2) also explains the sense in which a pain is located when the limb is in place, and indeed the sense in which the limb hurts, but notice that it analyses such claims about pains and instances of hurting in terms of perceptual experiences whose contents are entirely objective, concerning as they do the subject’s body and the physiological states it is in.

The second point about formulation is that injury perceptualism’s first clause is best framed in terms not of perceivings, but of perceptual experiences. In his well-known exposition of injury perceptualism, Pitcher gets this wrong. He holds that “to feel a pain is to perceive ... an objective state of affairs ... just as to see or hear something is to perceive” (PP, 373). The problem with that formulation is that one can be in pain, or feel a pain, without perceiving a body part at all, and a fortiori without perceiving the disordered state of a body part. Pitcher is aware of this problem, but he attempts to save his perceptual model by distinguishing between standard and non-standard cases of pain: standard cases are perceivings, and though non-standard cases are not, they nevertheless count as pains (or pain experiences) by virtue of their being just as unpleasant as the standard cases. A far simpler

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15 See Armstrong’s BS and MTM; Pitcher’s PP and RTC; Harman’s IQE; Lycan’s C&E; and Tye’s RTP and TP. Intriguingly, Pears also makes some remarks suggestive of injury perceptualism, at FP, ii: 399, 401, 404, n. 26.

16 See page 117 below.
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suggestion, however, is that one’s being in pain always consists in one’s having a certain sort of perceptual experience, even though it will not always involve bodily perception.\(^\text{17}\)

Let us turn now to three ways in which injury perceptualists tend to augment this core component of their view. First, I have just mentioned the unpleasantness of pain experiences. This is a feature of which injury perceptualists tend to offer an account. Two issues here are these: (i) Are pain experiences essentially unpleasant? (ii) What is it for them to be so? Armstrong is typical amongst injury perceptualists. He steers a middle course regarding (i), concluding that it is of the essence of pains that in typical cases they are unpleasant (MTM, 311, 312). Thus he allows instances of pain experiences that are not unpleasant: for example, the pain experiences of masochists, perhaps, or the pain experiences of those who have had pre-frontal lobotomies, morphine, or certain bizarre forms of brain damage.\(^\text{18}\)

As for (ii), Armstrong suggests that the unpleasantness of pain experiences consists in what he calls “the pain reaction”: namely, the subject’s “immediate and interested desire that the pain should stop” (BS, 93-4).\(^\text{19}\) For Armstrong, the strength of this desire (or dislike) also constitutes one aspect of the intensity of such experiences, the other being constituted by the intensity of the represented disturbance (MTM, 318-19).\(^\text{20}\)

So the injury perceptualist has something to say about these further aspects of pain experiences, all of which fits with his broader intentionalist aspirations.

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\(^\text{17}\) It may seem as though Pitcher agrees, and that the distinction between standard and non-standard cases indicates merely that he is thinking of the relevant somatosensory experiences disjunctively. Given that Pitcher was writing in 1970, before philosophers were self-consciously embracing disjunctivism, it is intriguing that he does seem to be groping for this sort of point. But it is not what he ends up with. He is explicit that there is no parallel for vision of his claim that perceptual and non-perceptual cases are both cases of pain. We do not count visual hallucinations as seeings, he points out, despite their subjective indistinguishability. By contrast, he says, we do say that one feels a pain in phantom-limb cases, rather than talking of pain hallucinations, since such cases are not merely subjectively indistinguishable from the perceptual cases, but are also equally unpleasant. If Pitcher were on top of the disjunctivist point, what he would have to say about the visual case is that we do count visual hallucinations and seeings alike as visual experiences; indeed we understand that notion disjunctively in terms of the other two. The inapplicability to the visual case of considerations about the pleasantness or unpleasantness of such experiences would be irrelevant. See PP, 384-386.

\(^\text{18}\) However, the data in many cases in which a lobotomy has been given for intractable pain suggest that what the lobotomy has reduced is the patient’s anxiety about the continuing pain, not the pain’s unpleasantness. Hence while such patients post-operatively claim to find the continuing pain newly tolerable, they still wince and complain if, say, jabbed with a pin. See Trigg’s P&E, Chapter 7. On the effects of morphine, see Dennett’s CFP, 208; and for one of the bizarre cases of brain damage, see Trigg, P&E, 69-72. Pitcher remains unimpressed by all such cases; see his AP.

\(^\text{19}\) See also Armstrong’s BS, 107-9, and MTM, 312-13; Pitcher’s PP, 380; and Tye’s RTP, 228, and TP, 116. Pitcher and Tye complicate things by, at times, building the unpleasantness or undesirability of pain experiences into their first-order content. See Pitcher’s PP, 373, and Tye’s RTP, 228. Notice also that if such desires constitute the unpleasantness, incidentally, then it seems that we cannot say that one has such desires because of the unpleasantness of the experience. Finally, notice that Tye gets himself into a bit of a mess in this area. He is unsympathetic to the idea that the content of propositional attitudes, such as desires, can constitute phenomenology; so he thinks, for example, that the effect of a desire (that the pain experience should stop) on the phenomenology can only be causal. (He thinks its effect is to open a “gate” in a receptor pathway in the spinal column, allowing the pain experience to embody more information and thus be more intense.) Despite this, he insists that such a desire constitutes the pain experience’s “painfulness”. This commits him to the odd view that the “painfulness” of the pain experience is not a phenomenal matter. See TP, 135, and 114-5.

\(^\text{20}\) Faced with the claim that the unpleasantness of pains is different from the unpleasantness of various olfactory, gustatory, and other sensation experiences that we also dislike having, Armstrong replies that in normal cases a pain experience is disliked more than these other experiences. I think he would be better advised to advert to the fact that the content of a disliking (or a desiring-to-stop) of a pain experience is different from the content of a disliking of any other sort of experience.
Second, injury perceptualists are apt also to extend their approach in order to give some account of the other peculiar terms we use to describe our pain experiences, such as “throbbing”, “stabbing”, and “stinging”. They suggest, for example, that such adjectives describe pains partly in terms of their intensity and their temporal features—for example, how sudden they are (Armstrong, BS, 118-19). But they also argue that some of these predicates pick out aspects of those experiences’ contents. According to Armstrong, for example, a throbbing pain represents “some sort of pulsation in the part of the body where the pain is” (BS, 119). A stabbing pain, he suggests, represents to the subject that his “flesh is being disturbed by some sharp-pointed thing” (BS, 119); alternatively, according to Tye, it represents “damage over a ... well-defined bodily region”, one “represented ... as being the shape of something sharp-edged” (TP, 113). Perhaps one could alternatively say, regarding some of these terms, that although they are used to speak of some feature of the content of a pain experience, they do so by adverting to the sort of external circumstance that might normally cause an experience with that content.

The final way in which the injury perceptualist is apt to extend his approach is to try to give parallel accounts of the other intransitive bodily sensations. Tickles, tingles, hunger sensations, and the rest are all assigned straightforwardly objective contents. For Armstrong, then, tickles represent something lightly touching one’s skin, tingles represent “a multitude of small motions or disturbances”, and hunger pangs represent contractions of the stomach walls. And what about orgasms? Despite protesting that his books are family publications, Lycan responds to a challenge from Block by spelling out the content of the male orgasm in terms of the representation of “warmth, squeezing, throbbing, pumping, and voiding” (C&E, 137). This raises the following question: if the injury perceptualist must blushingly say that sort of thing—and in public—then why should anyone ever want to be an injury perceptualist? Well, there are good reasons, as we shall now see.

3.2. Virtues of Injury Perceptualism

Taking Over the Benefits of Hurting Perceptualism

Many of the virtues of hurting perceptualism are clearly preserved by the injury perceptualist’s account. Like the hurting perceptualist, the injury perceptualist is an intentionalist, and this opens up at least the prospect of his supplying an adequate account—

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21 Armstrong’s suggestion seems to commit him to saying that the pain experience is illusory when no sharp-pointed thing is involved.

22 On these cases, see Armstrong’s BS, 112-15, and Tye’s TP, 116-20. On giddiness and dizziness, see Armstrong’s BS 104-5, and MTM, 316-7.
Chapter 4. Introducing Objectivism

if more complex than the mentalist’s—of the rationalising relations between one’s pain experiences and the judgements they prompt. The injury perceptualist also holds that pain experiences are somatosensory experiences, experiences in which parts of the subject’s body are presented as instantiating certain properties, and this promises a satisfying account of the spatial and bodily features of the phenomenology of pain experiences. He too can say, for example, that the reason that the items of which we seem to be aware in our pain experiences (for him, instances of bodily disorder) cannot, like the Cheshire Cat’s grin, even apparently “float free” of the body is that they are properties of body parts, and thus are experienced only as instantiated, apparently, by body parts. And finally, as we have seen, the injury perceptualist can straightforwardly take over from the hurting perceptualist his account of the location of pains. Indeed he can extend this account to cover the location of instances of hurting, since unlike the hurting perceptualist, he does not cast hurting as the represented property, P, and so he can use “hurting” on the left-hand side of his crucial second claim without generating a version of subjectivism. Injury perceptualism promises all of this, then, and it does so very straightforwardly, without needing to invoke any mental objects of awareness dotted about the body, or any items that are constituted by our experience of them.

Meeting Jackson’s Many-Properties Challenge

Further, recall the suggestion in Chapter 1 that the intentionalist can meet Jackson’s many-properties challenge, the challenge that undermined adverbialism. Notice that the injury perceptualist can exploit this solution without following Jackson in positing mental objects, and without even following the hurting perceptualist in positing experienced mental properties. To see this, consider the following two arguments:

I. (Invalid)
(1) A has (or feels), at t, a sensation which is an itch [F: is an itch]
(2) A has (or feels), at t, a sensation which is a pain [G: is a pain]
(3) Therefore, A has (or feels), at t, a sensation which is both an itch and a pain

II (Valid?)
(4) A senses, at t, an-itch-ly [F*: an-itch-ly]
(5) A senses, at t, a-pain-ly [G*: a-pain-ly]
(6) Therefore, A senses, at t, an-itch-ly and a-pain-ly

Recall, the challenge for any view is to ensure that (1) comes out invalid by giving an account of the possible truth of its “counterexample set”—that is, the set of propositions comprising (1), (2), and the negation of (3). Jackson argues that the adverbialist fails this challenge,

23 This is why “hurting” appears on the left-hand side of (2) in our formulation of injury perceptualism on page 114 above, but not on the left-hand side of (2) in our general intentionalist schema on page 108.
since the adverbialist holds that (I) is equivalent to (II), which is apparently valid—apparently valid because it follows from the way the adverbialist thinks of sensings that if (4) and (5) refer to the same subject and the same time, there can be only one sensing at issue, in which case F* and G* cannot be “kept apart”. We saw that the act-object theorist, by contrast, meets the challenge simply by taking (I) at face value: (I) comes out invalid because F and G can be instantiated, respectively and simultaneously, by two distinct sensations-as-objects.

But the injury perceptualist too can give an account of (I)’s invalidity, an account of how to preserve the possibility of the relevant predicates being separately instantiated. Suppose, for instance, that the injury perceptualist takes it that itch experiences represent the instantiation of some physiological property, C, and pain experiences represent some physiological property, P. In that case, the injury perceptualist may interpret (I) as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
(7) & \text{A has, at } t, \text{ an experience representing that a body part of hers is } C \\
(8) & \text{A has, at } t, \text{ an experience representing that a body part of hers is } P \\
(9) & \text{A has, at } t, \text{ an experience representing that a body part of hers is } C \text{ and } P.
\end{align*}
\]

And, agreeably, (III) is invalid like (I). That is, the injury perceptualist can keep the relevant predicates, “is C” and “is P”, apart—not because it is possible for A to have simultaneous but distinct sensings, and not because it is possible for her simultaneously to sense distinct inner objects, but rather because it is possible for A to have an experience as of the simultaneous but distinct instantiation of C and P—that is, the simultaneous instantiation of C and P by distinct body parts. It is tempting to describe the point as follows: Jackson thinks the counterexample set for (I) describes a situation in which A is related to distinct mental objects, whereas the injury perceptualist describes a situation in which A is related to distinct body parts. But that’s not quite right. Rather, the distinction that the injury perceptualist introduces to account for (I)’s invalidity is an apparent distinction, a putatively represented distinction: it is the distinction not between sensings or sensations or even body parts, but between apparent body parts. Hence one instance of the counterexample set for (I) is a situation in which it seems to A as though her left foot is C and her right foot is P, even though both of her feet have, let’s suppose, been amputated.

So these various virtues of injury perceptualism go a long way towards motivating the view. In addition, of course, one of its signal attractions is that it eschews the problems that we have seen to attend the various forms of mentalism—both subjectivist and objectivist. Unfortunately, though, injury perceptualism has problems of its own. I turn now to those.
4. A DILEMMA FOR INJURY PERCEPTUALISM

Many injury perceptualists fail to notice the following dilemma. Either the content of pain experiences is sufficiently detailed and complex to distinguish it from the content of all other types of experience, or it is not: if it is not, then it can hardly be the definitive content of pain experiences; if it is, then there is a danger that the content will be too sophisticated, being composed of concepts whose possession it would be too demanding to require of every subject of a pain experience. Put another way, there are two problems for the injury perceptualist: first, to articulate a content possessed by all and only pain experiences, a content that determines them as pain experiences; and second, to ensure that the content in question is not composed of concepts whose possession we would be loath to demand of all subjects of pain experiences. The trick is to get an account on which these problems can be simultaneously solved.

First Horn: Insufficient Specificity

Let us take the two horns of the dilemma in turn. The first horn, less abstractly, is simply this: an experience’s being a pain experience could hardly consist in its representing some part of the subject’s body as being in a certain physiological state if it is possible for the very same content to be shared by experiences which are not pain experiences. And it can look worryingly probable that any proposed content will be shared by experiences of other types. If pain experiences represent a part of one’s body as disordered, for example, then it is at least prima facie problematic that one can see that one’s own body is disordered without thereby being in pain, as when one looks down at one’s bleeding foot. Moreover, it might seem as though the content proposed for pain experiences is also likely to be needed by the intentionalist in order to be assigned to some other types of intransitive sensation. What if, for example, our best account of a certain type of itch experience is that it too represents the relevant body part as disordered? If so, we seem to have lost our intentional contrast with pain experiences. So the problem, quite simply, is that we need specific contents for specific experience types.

For the mentalist, this problem is relatively easy to deal with. For he has to hand a great stock of mental items to assign as contents: pains or hurting for pain experiences, tingles or tingling for tingling sensations, itches or itching for itch sensations, and so forth. For the non-mentalist, though, the problem is more serious. Nevertheless, it is frequently underestimated. Armstrong, Pitcher, and Tye, for example, all claim that the subject of a pain experience frequently cannot say anything very specific about what physiological condition his experience represents. And yet all three philosophers are quite relaxed about this. At
various points, for example, Pitcher suggests that the subject of a pain experience simply feels that something is going on which he does not like, and Armstrong goes even further, suggesting that it feels to the subject of a pain experience as if something "quite unspecific" is going on: "Why", he asks, "could we not have the feeling that something is going on, without being able to say what?" (BS, 116). Well, for the following reason. The intentionalist needs specific contents for specific sensations, and given the link between personal-level content and the ability to articulate it, this means that he needs the subject of a pain experience and of an itch experience to be able to say something different, on those respective bases. This condition is failed, if all that the subjects can say on the basis of each is that something seems to be going on.

Injury perceptualists respond to this problem in various ways, but all seem inadequate by the lights of the sort of conceptualist intentionalism with which we have been concerned. Tye, for example, suggests that it is of "no significance" what the subject can or cannot say, since sensations are "sensory experiences, not conceptual states" (TP, 117). Relatedly, he claims that the difference between the content of pain experiences and of visual experiences of one's body being injured is that the former is non-conceptual and the latter conceptual (RTP, 237, n. 8; TP, 118). Now, both of these points of Tye's are ruled out straightaway on the sort of conceptualist account of sensation content to which I have been sympathetic. A second strategy would be to invoke pain-qualia and itch-qualia, but this would amount to giving up on radical intentionalism altogether. Third, some will suggest that the difference between pain experiences and visual experiences is just that they belong to different sense modalities. And the injury perceptualist might also try to distinguish amongst sensation types in this way: although all are somatosensory experiences, on his account, he might still insist that pain experiences and itch experiences are associated with different receptors and to that extent different sense modalities. But, for one thing, it is not clear how a difference of receptor could of itself account for differences of modality between hallucinatory experiences. For another thing, I argued in Chapter 1 that the radical intentionalist can and must give a representational account of the different sense modalities. To the extent that the injury perceptualist wants to embrace such an intentionalism, he cannot hold that there is a difference only of cause, and not of content, between phenomenologically different experiences. The final strategy for ensuring a distinction between different sensation types is to invoke, in Armstrong's terminology, the sensations' characteristic "reactions": pain experiences cause the pain reaction, itches cause the itch reaction. But the problem here is that some pain experiences do not cause the pain reaction: some pain

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24 See PP, 373, 381, and 384.
experiences, that is, do not give rise to desires that they should cease. So the question persists at least in the following form: what does the difference between a very mild itch and a very mild pain consist in?

Hence the first horn of the dilemma remains threatening. The contents available for the injury perceptualist to assign to pain experiences can seem insufficiently specific. Here, though, is a more promising response to the problem: we should endorse micro- rather than macro-IP, and thus make available to ourselves a bountiful stock of arcane microphysiological properties to assign to each of the sensation types: nociceptor activity for pain experiences, some other sort of receptor activity for itch experiences, and so forth. But now we risk impaling ourselves on the second horn of the dilemma: that the demands being made on the subject of pain experiences are too stringent. Put another way, if the subject of a pain experience can lack the concept, nociceptor activity, then how can the referent of that concept be what his conceptually contentful pain experiences represent?

Second Horn: Excessive Difficulty (and Non-Conceptual Beings)

Of course, for a non-conceptualist such as Tye, this second horn of the dilemma is not at all threatening. On Tye's injury perceptualist account, the neural vehicles of pain experiences represent the types of circumstance they do simply by virtue of their causally covarying with them (TP, 100-105, 113, 121). No demands at all are made on the subject's conceptual resources. Once again, though, if we want to retain McDowell's idea that experiential content is conceptual, then clearly we cannot agree with Tye at this point.

Now, before I suggest a different way of dealing with the dilemma's second horn, I ought to acknowledge that a number of philosophers will think that Tye's response is the only one available, since they will argue that the second horn fatally impales any conceptualist approach to pain experiences—whether mentalist or non-mentalist, whether a version of micro-IP or macro-IP. For the following train of thought can seem compelling: pre-linguistic infants and non-human animals lack concepts altogether, yet sometimes they are in pain, and therefore it cannot be the case that pain experiences have conceptual content. One might reject the first premise and insist that dogs, infants and the rest do have concepts after all. But given the sense of "concepts" that is important to us, that is an unappealing strategy: it is quite implausible that dogs have the capacity to think thoughts deliberately on the basis of reasons, reasons on whose status they can reflect; yet that is what it is to have a repertoire of concepts in the relevant sense. It may well be, moreover, that such a capacity requires that the thinker possess a language. So there really is a problem for the conceptualist here.

25 McDowell mentions the train of thought at M&W, 49-50, and OS, 293-5, and Wright endorses it at SPI, 131.
Following McDowell, I suggest that our response has to be that, though dogs share with us the capacity to be in pain, and though it may be that "pain" is not ambiguous between applications to dogs and to us, nonetheless this capacity takes a very different form in the case of conceptual beings such as ourselves.26

There are two further points to make here about the problem of non-conceptual beings. First, it is not a problem only for those conceptualists who embrace intentionalism about pain experiences. If the content of visual and tactual experiences is also conceptual, then the parallel worry arises that dogs and infants are debarred from enjoying those experiences too. So, since the problem is quite general, it is not especially incumbent on the intentionalist about pains to overcome it. Having said that—and this is the second point—it is a weakness of McDowell's approach to pain experiences that it makes his attempt to do justice to the sentience of animals more straightforwardly applicable to ordinary perceptual experiences than it is to bodily sensations (M&W, 114-21).27 This requires some explanation.

Regarding perceptual experiences, McDowell takes over from Gadamer an account of what he calls "the proto-subjectivity of animals", which describes animals as being perceptually sensitive to an environment rather than as being properly aware of a world. The idea takes some spelling out, but for my purposes I only want to emphasise McDowell's concession that, given his act-object conception of pain experiences, we cannot tell an exactly parallel story about proto-subjectivity in the sensation case (M&W, 120). For, given how McDowell's conception of sensations incorporates both conceptualism and subjectivism, it follows that if an organism is incapable of concept-involving episodes of awareness, then he simply has no "inner world" to which he could be in any way sensitive. After all, as McDowell insists, it is a mistake for any conceptual subject in pain to think, "what this pain really is must be the pain I would ... have felt, in consequence of this wound, even if I had never learned to talk" (OS, 294).28 Moreover, McDowell concedes that it is unclear what it would mean in the inner case to introduce as a surrogate an "inner environment" (M&W, 120). So here the injury perceptualist is at an advantage over the subjectivist mentalist, being able more directly to extend the notion of proto-subjectivity to the pain case than McDowell. For according to injury perceptualism, the world to which we conceptual beings are sensitive in our pain experiences is composed of our bodies and their physiological states, and this world, a part of the outer world (or environment), is steadfastly.

26 See McDowell's OS, 294, n. 24; M&W, 64, and 119-21.
27 See also I&I, 311, n. 29, and 313, n. 34; M&W, 63-65, and 69-70.
28 This is related to McDowell's explanation at M&W, 21, of why Givenism is especially tempting in the inner case.
there to be responded to by animals and conceptual beings alike—albeit, in their different ways.

Sketchy as those remarks about animals and infants are, I want now to return to the question I posed for micro-IP: even if it is not too much to demand that the subject of a pain experience possess some concepts, still, given that the subject need not possess such an arcane concept as *nociceptor activity*, how could the referent of *that* concept be what her conceptually contentful pain experiences represent?

At this stage, an interesting idea suggests itself: that our pain experiences could represent nociceptor activity without representing it as nociceptor activity; again, it could be that the relevant microphysiological state is represented in pain experiences under a mode of presentation other than *nociceptor activity*. In light of this suggestion, anxiety about the second horn of the dilemma can seem merely to reflect a forgetfulness of the importance of the second of the two questions I distinguished at the outset to §1: not, “What property is P?”, but rather, “Under what mode of presentation is that property represented in pain experiences?”

Yet again, the colour case is a useful model. We have seen that some philosophers take redness to be (identical to) a microphysical property of the surfaces of objects—a property that is the referent of some esoteric scientific concept for which I’m using the placeholder, “R”. So such microphysicalists will, if they are intentionalist, insist that experiences of red represent R. But of course this is not to say that in order to enjoy an experience of red one must possess the concept, R. Rather one experiences red/R under some other mode of presentation: red, perhaps, or to adapt a suggestion of McDowell’s, the following predicative and yet demonstrative-recognitional concept, which is available to one in the presence of an appropriate sample: *this colour*[R]. Hence redness is in a certain sense “opaque” to experiences of red, on these accounts: it is a complex microphysical property, and yet one’s experience of it neither informs one of its microphysical nature nor requires that one possess the theoretical concepts belonging to the science that has (or will) delineate that nature.

So this is the sort of thing that the adherent of micro-IP might say about pain experiences in order to escape the second horn of the dilemma. Perhaps, that is, the content of a pain experience is something like the following: *My left foot is undergoing that sort of process/nociceptor activity*.

So is micro-IP tenable? Some philosophers, I suspect, would claim it is precisely its association with microphysicalism that reveals its fault—namely, according to those philosophers, its incapacity to accommodate the “transparency” of the subject matter of

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29 See his M&W, 56-60, and 170-74.
30 See below, Chapter 5, §3.2.
sensation experiences, a transparency that colours share, and that microphysicalism fails to capture. I turn in the next chapter to the question whether this is so.
5

Transparency

In their discussions of colour, Velleman and Boghossian object to the microphysicalist on the basis that he fails to meet some important "epistemological constraints" (PTC, 85). In the terms that others use in this connection, Velleman and Boghossian's claim is that colours are transparent to the person who sees them, in a way that microphysicalism is unable to accommodate. If this is right, then a closely parallel point might well be effective against micro-IP in the pain case, for if colours ought to be transparent, then arguably the subject matter of the bodily sensations should be too. In discussing this objection, then, I shall devote considerable attention to the colour case, as I did when discussing the circularity objection against subjectivism in Chapter 3. But the point in doing so, as before, is to reveal the implications for the pain case.

Is the transparency objection sound? As it turns out, there is more than one. Velleman and Boghossian run together a number of different versions of such an objection, and beyond those which they consider, there are others still. In §1, I discuss two that emerge from their discussion; and in §§2 and 3, I consider two of the others. Though I am not myself a microphysicalist about colours, the remarks I make throughout are intended to blunt these objections. But let me say right now that I am not absolutely convinced that there is no threat to micro-IP from this general quarter, and for that reason, I shall in the next chapter allow macro- rather than micro-IP to take centre stage. Even so, I think that once we are precise about what the transparency objections are, it emerges that a number of them involve misconceptions that it is quite generally illuminating to expose.

1. DESCRIPTIVISM AND THE TWO-COMPONENT CONCEPTION

Velleman and Boghossian's Epistemological Objection to Microphysicalism

Velleman and Boghossian's objection to microphysicalism about colours is that it would render mere reflection on our colour experience insufficient for knowledge of certain things for which such experience does in fact suffice (PTC, 86), things for which an "investigation into the physical causes and correlates of your visual experience" is not required (PTC, 90). This structure needs to be fleshed out somewhat. Here, to start with, are three of the relevant items of knowledge: (a) that the experiences which we call "experiences of red" represent the
property red; (b) that those experiences represent a distinct property from that represented by experiences of orange or blue; and (c) that those experiences do at least represent some property or other. The reason Velleman and Boghossian think that microphysicalism prevents colour experience from yielding such knowledge is that it implies that “visual experiences ... represent colours only as a matter of contingent fact”, indeed “only by virtue of facts incidental to [the experiences’] internal features”; and hence “an experience internally indistinguishable from your experience of seeing something as red might fail to represent its object as having that colour” (PTC, 87).1

Two Versions of Microphysicalism: Descriptivism and Informationalism

Velleman and Boghossian think their objection undermines at least the following two versions of microphysicalism. Both versions hold that an experience is an experience of red only if it represents R—the arcane property with which the microphysicalist identifies redness. They differ only regarding how experiences of red represent R. The first view, which I call “descriptivist microphysicalism”, holds that one’s experiences of red/R have the conceptual content, *This object has the property that normally causes experience of this type* red', the (underlined) descriptive content denoting red/R.2 Even though this particular incarnation of the view adverts to a quale, red', there are other versions of the approach that don’t; and moreover, even this version is an instance of intentionalism, albeit weak intentionalism, since the descriptive content which partly determines the experience’s phenomenology is supposed to be proper conceptual content.3 Now the second type of microphysicalism, which I call “informationalist microphysicalism”, holds that experiences of red/R represent red/R in a different way: namely, by dint of there contingently obtaining some causal correlation between red/R and some relevant experiential feature: either a quale, a neural feature, or the tokening of a “term” of “mentalese”.4

Two Objections: Epistemological and Anti-Two-Component Concerns

So what, in more detail, is Velleman and Boghossian’s objection to these views? It is *not* an objection to qualia per se—which, after all, Velleman and Boghossian embrace (CSQ,

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1 This is supposed to be the case, recall, on Block’s Inverted Earth, mentioned above in Chapter 1, §5.3.
2 See their PTC: 75, 82, 87.
3 Notice that it somewhat simplifies the proposal that you couldn’t have an experience with the descriptive content in question unless it also was a red' experience, given that the reference to the quale is demonstrative.
4 Notice, incidentally, that both descriptivist and informationalist microphysicalists have the following choice: they can take it to be not merely necessary but also sufficient for an experience being an experience of red that it represent red/R; or, alternatively, they can impose further necessary conditions, such as the requirement that the experience represent red/R via the right description, or that the experience also be red', and so on.
94). Rather, it is an epistemological objection. If either of these two versions of microphysicalism were true, notice, then the types of colour experiences we undergo—experiences of red, of orange, of blue, and so forth—would differ from each other in respect of both their colour qualia and their descriptive contents. Microphysicalism implies, Velleman and Boghossian think, that for all that we know on the basis of these experiences, it might be that none of them is an experience of red/R, or perhaps that all of them are. Because, for all that we know on that basis it could be that no single property normally causes the experiences we call “experiences of red” (that is, those with the appropriate quale or descriptive content), or it could be that the property that does so also normally causes colour experiences of all the other types that we enjoy. Now, I find these examples unconvincing. For the microphysicalist could remind us of the possibility of disjunctive properties, and argue that it is reasonable to infer from our colour experiences that a single—even if disjunctive—property causes the experiences we call “experiences of red”, and that the same property does not (in the same circumstances) cause experiences of other types. Velleman and Boghossian are on firmer ground, however, when they point out that even if red/R alone normally causes exactly one type of experience (for example, red’ experiences), it might have been a distinct property that did so, or it might come to be a distinct property that does so. For the microphysicalist, this means that those experiences might have represented some distinct property, or that they might come to, even though “in all respects internal to [us, they] would remain unchanged” (PTC, 89-90).

In fact, I think this final point suggests two somewhat separate problems for microphysicalism. The first is explicit in Velleman and Boghossian’s discussion. Their explicit argument is that the possibilities just mentioned have various epistemological consequences that in the peculiarly transparent colour case we should be loath to accept: that we cannot know that any of our experiences represent red/R rather than some other property, for example. But surely there is a second and more fundamental point, at least in the case of the informationalist version of microphysicalism: if the subject’s experiences could have been just the same from his perspective—if they could have been phenomenologically just the same—while representing properties distinct from those that they in fact putatively represent, then it is unintelligible after all that they represent any property. In other words, it

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5 For this reason Armstrong would no longer say, as he does at MTM, 289, that if colour experience is “a matter of irreducibly diverse causes in the physical surfaces bringing about different colour-appearances”, then “we would have to conclude that colour is a pseudo-quality”. These days he would conclude simply that colour is a disjunctive quality. See his RC.

6 We could also object that green’ experiences with the predicative content, has the property that normally causes experiences of this type[green'] could have represented (or could come to represent) red/R. But that objection works only if the descriptivist does not make it a further necessary condition of an experience being an experience of red that it is red’, or involves the predicative content, has the property that normally causes experiences of this type[red’]. See n. 4 above.

7 See Chapter 1, §2 and §5.3; Chapter 2, §1.1; and below, §3.3.
is not just that if informationalist microphysicalism were true we would lose some items of knowledge that we have in the colour case; we would lose the very content of our colour experiences. For such microphysicalism is a version of what I earlier called “the two-component conception” (Chapter 1, §2). On this picture, what an experience represents is determined by two factors: first, the experience’s possession of intrinsic features (Velleman and Boghossian’s “internal features”) that are both constitutively independent of the items represented and constitutive of what it is like for the subject to have that experience; and second, there obtaining some contingent relation between these features and the items represented. The problem with this conception is that it has an unintelligible consequence: that the personal-level content of an experience could have been different (or could change) without that making any difference to the subject. As Evans puts a complaint along these lines: “the reference of a state cannot be regarded as an ancillary question, to be left to some mechanism outside the subject’s ken” (VR, 203).

It is good to be clear about the distinction between these points for two reasons. First, though both points undermine the informationalist, the anti-two-component point is, by contrast, ineffective against descriptivist microphysicalism. The informationalist has to allow that, between the subjectively indistinguishable actual and counterfactual cases, there is a common phenomenology but a difference in content. The descriptivist, by contrast, can allow that, though there is a difference in the denotation of the relevant descriptive content (the property that causes experiences of this type [red]) between the two cases, there is no difference in the descriptive content itself; so there is not a common phenomenology co­existing with a difference in content. To object to this descriptivist proposal, then, we need some further point. And amongst those available, some merely epistemological point of the sort Velleman and Boghossian mention may well be appropriate. If descriptivism were true, after all, the experiences the subject calls “experiences of red” (that is, those with the appropriate descriptive content) could come to denote some property other than red/R; and given this, how could the subject know that those experiences denote red/R now? More generally, however, we might just point out that if descriptivism were true of our colour experiences, then it would also be true of our colour thoughts, but surely we are not bound to think of colours only under descriptive modes of presentation, and certainly not under the descriptive mode of presentation in question. After all, there is no irrationality in a subject’s thinking that x is red while doubting that x has the property that normally causes experiences

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8 See McDowell, on “the composite picture”, in his STIS 250-52 and 256-8; and in his and Pettit’s introduction to Pettit and McDowell, STC. He discusses neural versions of this picture at STIS, 250, and descriptivism in STIS, §9.
of this type[red]; and given that, the italicised description cannot express the mode of presentation under which one thinks of redness when one thinks that an object is red.  

A Response

The second reason why it is good to keep the anti-two-component point clearly in focus is that doing so points the way towards a reformulation of microphysicalism, one that seems to escape Velleman and Boghossian’s attention. For if descriptivist and informationalist versions of microphysicalism are problematic, the obvious thing to do is to embrace a non-descriptivist and non-informationalist version. There are, after all, other modes and models of mental representation; and we have yet to be shown why these are unavailable to the microphysicalist. The two proposals I mentioned at the end of the preceding chapter would seem to be to the purpose here. McDowell, recall, argues that some colour experiences involve the demonstrative-recognitional mode of presentation, this shade[red], a mode of presentation available when some red sample is perceptually present to the subject and for at least a short time thereafter (M&W: 56-60, 170-74). On the face of it, the microphysicalist could co-opt this proposal, arguing that the referent of that experiential mode of presentation is the microphysical property, R.  

This is, manifestly, neither a descriptivist nor a two-component proposal. Nor is the alternative claim that we experience red things just as red, and that red’s referent is R. Experiences involving these modes of presentation would intrinsically represent red/R: there would be no counterfactual or future circumstances in which experiences that are just the same from the subject’s perspective represent some distinct property. And, moreover, there would be no obvious epistemological problem: the subject would, for example, express a knowledgeable—if not infallible—claim by uttering on the basis of his colour experience, “It seems to me as though this object is that shade[red/R].”

To summarise, then, some versions of microphysicalism about colours seem immune to the transparency objections made so far: the anti-descriptivist and anti-two-component

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9 For this last—and other—objections to a closely related descriptivist proposal, see Brewer’s P&R, 60-63, especially 62. Incidentally, one can object to the idea that all representation is descriptive by advertinge the possibility of what Strawson calls “massive reduplication”, but that can be overcome without eradicating all descriptive reference, and in any case, the threat of reduplication is a threat to singular reference, whereas we are here concerned with the predicative component.

10 Velleman and Boghossian consider something that looks rather like this demonstrative-recognitional proposal, but it turns out to be a two-component view, with the subject’s narrowly individuated behavioural dispositions serving as the inner component (PTC, 87). Notice also that Velleman and Boghossian call all non-descriptivist views “Russellian”, and say that such views deny “that colours are seen under any mode of presentation at all” (PTC, 77). Though this is true of the two-component view, it is not true of the view whose availability I’m registering. Velleman and Boghossian seem to be labouring under the misapprehension that all modes of presentation are specifcatory.

11 Although, see §3.3 below.

12 Although, see §2 below.
objections. Hence micro-IP's association with microphysicalism is nothing for it to be embarrassed about just yet. This is not to say that no versions of micro-IP have been ruled out. Tye's is obviously a two-component version, and as such it ought to be rejected. Nor is it to say that microphysicalism is entirely out of the woods. It is not, for there are other transparency objections, to which I now turn.

2. MANIFEST RESEMBLANCES AND SENSIBLE SURFACES

Velleman and Boghossian's objection to microphysicalism was glossed above as the claim that colours are transparent to visual experience in a way that microphysicalism is unable to accommodate. Two senses of "transparency" have now emerged: an item that is represented in experience is transparent in the first sense just in case it is not merely the contingent denotation of some descriptive mode of presentation implicated in the experience; it is transparent in the second sense just in case it is not left, as it were, on the far side of a constitutively independent, internal level of experience, a level invoked in some two-component conception of the subject's cognitive relation to the item in question. I suggested, in effect, that this second sense comes down to this: that a represented item is transparent to an experience just in case it is genuinely represented in that experience. With these two senses spelled out, I suggested that, for all that has been shown, even the microphysicalist can accommodate the claim that colours are transparent in both senses.

At this stage the microphysicalist's opponent might try to articulate a third sense in which colours are transparent, and to argue that at least that sense is beyond the reach of microphysicalism. This third sense in which colours are said to be transparent is precisely the sense in which many philosophers tend to think that microphysical natural kinds are not transparent, where these philosophers understand the relative opacity of natural kinds according to something like the following metaphor: distinct natural kinds can have the same "sensible surface"; two samples may, for example, share the same sensible properties—colour, shape, texture, consistency, taste, smell, and so forth—even though, by virtue of microphysical features "concealed" beneath this shared "surface", the samples belong to distinct natural kinds. The two objections to microphysicalism that I examine in this section and the next are apt to be framed in terms of just this metaphor, in which microphysical essences are depicted as being concealed beneath "sensible surfaces". These two problems for microphysicalism are not inconsiderable, and again I hesitate to say that

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13 Actually, it is not clear that Tye's is a version of micro-IP, but it is certainly a two-component injury perceptualism.
14 The third sense of "transparency" is linked to the second. For if one imposes the sorts of requirements on representation that two-component conceptions flout, then it can seem problematic how we could ever represent kinds that failed to be transparent in the way that natural kinds fail. See Brewer's P&R, 67-91, for two responses to this sort of problem.
they could not be formulated in more threatening ways; but here I want to suggest that once we downplay the metaphor, and some associated misconceptions, they start to seem considerably less potent than at first.

2.1. A Reductio of Microphysicalism

The first objection is again taken from Velleman and Boghossian (PTC, 91-7). They allege yet another costly epistemological consequence of microphysicalism: that our colour experience would fail indefeasibly to inform us that red essentially resembles orange more closely than it does blue. As I understand it, the point is a *reductio*:

(I) A Reductio of Microphysicalism about Colours

1. Red, orange, and blue are (identical to) microphysical properties R, O, and B, properties that are, in some sense, complex.
2. These properties are represented in our colour experience.
3. Our colour experience indefeasibly informs us *that* red essentially resembles orange more closely than it does blue.
4. Therefore, our colour experience enables us, at least in principle, to specify *how* red essentially resembles orange more closely than it does blue.

Velleman and Boghossian think this conclusion is false. But they also think the argument is valid and that a premise must therefore be rejected. Assuming intentionalism, (2), it follows that if we do not reject (1) then we must reject (3): that colour experiences indefeasibly inform us about resemblance relations amongst colours. But surely, Velleman and Boghossian think, we do not want to deny that. Hence we better reject (1): namely, microphysicalism. And, notice, if microphysicalism about colours can be rejected in this way, then there is at least the worry that there may be a parallel argument to dispatch microphysicalism about the subject matter of sensations.

Is the argument really valid? The general principle on which it is supposed to go through is as follows:

(VB) IF (i) two items are complex, and (ii) they are represented in a subject’s experience, and (iii) that experience indefeasibly informs the subject *that* they essentially resemble each other, THEN (iv) he must in principle be able to say on that basis *how* they essentially resemble each other.15

This principle is far from being clear, let alone clearly true. But we can say at least this in its defence: the most obvious putative counterexamples turn out to be based on misunderstandings. For example, on first glance you might worry that this principle implausibly implies that we must be able spell out the respects of resemblance amongst

15 This is never explicitly stated by Velleman and Boghossian. They come closest to it at PTC, 93.
colours; but of course it does so only if (i), (ii), and (iii) are true of colours, and Velleman and Boghossian think (i) is not true. You might worry then that the principle implausibly implies that we must be able to spell out the respects of resemblance between any two microphysical kinds represented in our experience, since (i) will be true of such kinds; but in fact it does so only if (iii) is true of the experiences in question, and plausibly (iii) often is not true. Finally, it might seem as though Armstrong has supplied a counterexample when he points out that an experience can indefeasibly inform its subject that two faces resemble one another, without enabling the subject to specify what the resemblance consists in. But this is a genuine counterexample only if the experience fails to enable the subject even in principle to spell out the resemblance. And plausibly the experience does not fail to do that. Perhaps the subject is in fact no good at spelling out such resemblances; but arguably, he is in principle able to do so, in the sense that his experience supplies him with the content he would need if he were any good that sort of thing: content concerning the shapes and spatial relationships of the various features of the faces.

So the idea behind VB, I take it, is that if (i) and (ii) are true, then (iii) can be true—the experience can indefeasibly inform the subject of resemblance relations—only because the experience provides the subject with a detailed layer of content concerning the complex composition of the items in question. And if the subject’s experience has that detailed level of content, then (iv) must be true too: he must be able to spell out the respects of resemblance. Conversely, if (iv) is false about two complex items represented in our experiences—if, that is, the experience does not enable the subject to spell out the respects of resemblance—then it can be false only because his experience fails to have a detailed layer of content concerning the complex composition of the two items; but if it fails to have that layer of content, then if it informs him of resemblance relations at all, it can do so only defeasibly; and hence (iii) is false. Now, in the faces case, our experience has that level of detailed content: it gets “below” the simple fact that the items are faces, and represents the features in virtue of which they look the way they do. That is why we are informed indefeasibly of the resemblance, but it is also why we are enabled to spell out the respects of resemblance. In the colour case too, if red and orange were microphysical natural kinds represented in our experiences, then we would have to say that those experiences had that detailed level content, if we were to explain how they could indefeasibly inform us of the resemblance between the complex properties, red and orange. But if they had that level of content, if they succeeded in getting below the “sensible surfaces” of those colour properties to their essential structure, then the experiences ought to enable us also to spell out the

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16 See Armstrong’s MTM, 275-80; BS, 117.
respects of resemblance. And yet they do not. Hence we must deny that colours are complex, microphysical kinds represented in our experience.

2.2. Assessing the Reductio: The Temperature and Sensation Cases

Does this objection to microphysicalism work? I would be loath to rest much on it. For one thing, VB would need more clarification and defence than I (or Velleman and Boghossian) have supplied. The relevant concepts of, for example, complexity and essential resemblance are hardly crystal clear. For another thing, consider the case of temperatures. Suppose a subject touches three steel balls, which are 20°C, 30°C, and 100°C respectively; and as he holds them, suppose he argues as follows:

(II) A Reductio of Microphysicalism about Temperatures

(1*) This first temperature[20°C], this second temperature[30°C], and that third temperature[100°C] are complex microphysical properties.

(2*) These properties are represented in my temperature experience.

(3*) My temperature experience informs me indefeasibly that the first essentially resembles the second more closely than it does the third.

(4*) Therefore, my temperature experience must, in principle, enable me to spell out how the first essentially resembles the second more than it does the third.

Temperatures are interesting because both of the following claims are plausible: our tactual experience represents them (under, for example, demonstrative-recognitional modes of presentation); and yet, as the current orthodoxy has it, they are microphysical natural kinds. What (II) shows is that the current orthodoxy is threatened by a reductio that parallels the one Velleman and Boghossian deploy in the case of colours, since I see no reason for rejecting (4) but not (4*). If, like me, you do not want to give up the orthodoxy, then you should either reject the reductio in both cases, or find some relevant difference between them. Either way, the adherent of micro-IP will be encouraged. For if both reductios are rejected, then more power to microphysicalism generally; alternatively, if (II) alone fails, then the adherent of micro-IP will still be encouraged to the extent that he can model the subject matter of pain experiences on microphysical temperatures rather than on colours.

The temperature case also allows us to make a suggestion as to where it is that some of these reductios go wrong. The pressure on the microphysicalist premise, (1*), for example, is diminished by noticing that it is at least not obvious that (3*) is true. Suppose

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17 Certainly we can spell out the respects in which water resembles some other microphysical natural kind, in the sense that both might be clear liquids, for example. But I take it Velleman and Boghossian would point out that this is not to spell out an essential resemblance between the two kinds. See PTC, 85 and 93.

18 See Kripke's N&N, 99, for example.

19 Hacker would instead reject (2*); see his A&R. But this move will not encourage micro-IP, which claims that the relevant microphysiological properties are represented in pain experiences.
the subject who touches the three steel balls was living before the development of thermometers, conventional temperature scales, or the kinetic theory of temperature. He judges that the first temperature essentially resembles the second more than it does the third, but does his experience *indefeasibly* inform him of these resemblance relations? Arguably not. Arguably, for this subject, the following is an epistemic possibility (something that science might, for all he knows, go on to reveal): This temperature[20°C] more closely resembles that third temperature[100°C] than it does this second temperature[30°C]. As things have turned out, science did not reveal that.20 But that doesn’t matter: only the *epistemic* possibility bears on the assessment of (3*).

Naturally, there is room for reservations about this. The suggested epistemic possibility can be made hard to stomach by the easily accessible collateral effects of temperatures (such as their causing water to evaporate at different rates, for example), in respect of which the first two steel balls will resemble one another more than the third. But it is inessential that microphysical kinds have such “wide cosmological roles”,21 so even if one defended (3*) in the temperature case by appealing to such collateral effects, it is not obvious that there will be a similar defence of the parallel claim in the pain case. Another complication in the temperature and colour cases is that temperatures and colours fall on continuous scales: when one is looking at the colour spectrum, for example, it can be especially hard to suppose that science might one day reveal red to resemble blue more than it does orange. But, if it helps, we could stipulate that the world we are considering when we assess (I) and (II) has only three colours, or only three temperatures. For, recall, the actual colour and temperature cases are not of interest to us *per se*; they are of interest only in so far as they bear on accounts of the subject matter of sensation experiences; and in the sensation case, there is nothing *precisely* like a continuous scale on which the represented circumstances can be ranked.22

So it is not clear that *reductios* (I) and (II) upset microphysicalism about colours or temperatures, and it is even less clear that a parallel *reductio* would upset micro-IP. But we are not out of the woods yet, for there is a final set of worries.

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20 As we can see from the square-bracketed specification of the temperatures in terms of values on the centigrade scale, and our knowledge of how values on that scale have been explained in terms of the kinetic theory of temperature.

21 See Campbell’s SVC for the terminology.

22 Although you may think of the intensity of sensations as locating them on a scale. Notice too that a final worry about using the *reductio* to upset micro-IP in the sensation case concerns whether in that case we would have to reject the parallel to (4) and (4*). After all, a subject *can* go some way towards spelling out the respects of resemblance and difference between the conditions represented when he has an ache in his tooth, when he has a soreness in his foot, and when he has a tingle in his elbow. Admittedly, he won’t be able to do so by using the esoteric concepts of the physiologist. But he may still be able to use demonstrative-recognitional concepts to formulate, at least for himself, how “this condition” resembles “this second condition” more than “that third one”.

3. IMITATION, MINIMALISM, AND SENSIBLE SURFACES

The metaphor of microphysical natural kinds being concealed beneath "sensible surfaces" suggests itself most obviously in the case of those microphysical kinds, like gold and water, that have imitative or ersatz forms. For gold, there is fool's gold: a stuff which has much the same colour, texture, and consistency as gold, and yet is not gold. And for water, there could be "twater", on Putnam's Twin Earth, where twater is a stuff that has the same colour, taste, and consistency as water, and yet is not, having chemical composition XYZ rather than H₂O (Putnam, MM). Given these models, the claim that the subject matter of pain experiences is some arcane microphysical item like gold or water can seem inevitably to violate what we are apt to impose as a condition of adequacy: that it not be possible for the subject matter of pain experiences to have imitative or ersatz forms, in the way that it is possible for gold and water.

3.1. The Objection

Ertsatz Experiences

There are two ways of developing the problem: one in terms of experiences, the other in terms of concepts. The first problem is the suspicion that ersatz subject matters generate ersatz experiences. Consider the case of water. It might be suggested that the experience that Ed (an Earthling) normally has on seeing a glass of water is just the same as the experience that Ted (a Twin Earthling) normally has on seeing a glass of twater. That is, the predicative content of their two experiences might be thought to be identical, being exhausted by such concepts as transparent and liquid. This is certainly suggested by the metaphor of "sensible surfaces": after all, if the microphysical respect in which the two samples differ is concealed beneath identical "sensible surfaces", then the difference can hardly make any difference to how things seem to Ed and Ted.

This position is a form of what I called "minimalism" in Chapter 1 (§5.4). Theorists are minimalists, recall, to the extent that they are restrictive about the range of concepts that might specify the content of whatever perceptual experiences are in question; so minimalists about microphysical kind concepts hold that no such concepts enter into (or specify) the content of perceptual experiences: thus we never see water as water, on such view, but only as a clear liquid. If minimalism is true, then the fact that Ed and Ted respectively lack the concepts twater and water does not prevent their normally having experiences with just the same predicative content as each other when they look at their respective samples. Moreover, even those who disavow such extreme minimalism are apt to persist with only a marginally weaker position—one that concedes that Ed and Ted's experiences differ in so far
as Ed's involves the concept water and Ted's twater, but insists that a difference in respect of concepts such as these is not as phenomenologically salient as a difference in respect of, say, colour or shape concepts. It is, such a theorist might say, more like the difference between subjectively indistinguishable episodes of perceiving and hallucination (on which, however, see §6.3 below).

Turning back to the pain case, recall that the adherent of micro-IP holds that P, the property represented by pain experiences, is some microphysiological kind, a kind that is the referent of some demonstrative-recognitional concept, thus[P], a concept that is claimed to be involved in pain experiences. Now suppose that just as there is no water on Twin Earth, so too P is never instantiated there. Rather, parts of Ted's body instantiate a different property, TP, in just the same circumstances as those in which parts of Ed's body instantiate P. Now suppose that P and TP share a "sensible surface". That encourages the relevant form of minimalism, the idea that neither thus[P] nor thus[TP] enter into the content of any somatosensory experiences, and this would straightaway rule out the sort of micro-IP that we have been looking at. Moreover, even if one resists this minimalist view, there is still some temptation to say that if P and TP share a "sensible surface", then even if Ed and Ted's experiences differ in so far as Ed's involves thus[P] and Ted's thus[TP], this is not a phenomenological difference, or not at any rate a sufficiently great difference to justify the verdict that Ed is in pain whereas Ted is not. And this would be disastrous for micro-IP, since micro-IP cannot allow that Ted is in pain, given that his experience does not represent the microphysiological property, P.

The point, then, is this: just as the anti-two-component considerations in §1 should make us want to rule out the idea that differences between P and TP might be concealed from the subject by "blank" experiences (that is, experiences conceived as—in themselves and from the subject's perspective—neutral regarding whether they represent P and TP), so too we should want to rule out the idea of a difference between P and TP being concealed from the subject by a common "phenomenal surface"—a layer of sensible properties, out there in the world, intervening between the subject and the arcane, microphysical subject matter of his experiences. Perhaps we can allow this second sort of concealment in some cases, the objection goes, but not in the pain case—and arguably not in the colour case either.

*Ersatz Concepts*

Now there is also a second way of making the complaint about ersatz subject matters: this time in terms of concepts. Here it will be useful to have before us two senses in which a concept, C, may be observational.
(a) To possess C, some of the thinker’s deployments of C need to be suitably sensitive to those of his experiences that involve C.23

(B) If a subject putatively perceives some non-C as C, then either the perceptual circumstances are imperfect, or his perceptual systems are malfunctioning, or he fails to possess C. Again, C cannot be involved in “fault-free” illusions; it is, in that sense, a recognitional concept.24

For the moment, the former notion—α-observationality—is the more important. Start with the water case. It might be argued that even if one can possess the concept water only if one is capable of certain perceptual experiences, water is not an α-observational concept. For it may seem, in view of some of the broadly minimalist considerations above, that the experiences in question do not (or at least need not) involve the concept water itself, as opposed to the concepts that specify water’s “sensible surface”: transparent, liquid, and so forth.25 Since these latter concepts are available to Ted as well as to Ed, so are the relevant experiences; and hence, the suggestion goes, his concept twater and Ed’s concept water share their “experiential component”, differing only in respect of their referents. Similarly, then, in the pain case, one might suggest that if P and TP share a “sensible surface”, then the experiences required for thus[P] need not involve thus[P] itself, as opposed to concepts that specify P and TP’s “sensible surface”. But that opens up the possibility that thus[P] and thus[TP] share their experiential component. And if that is true, then it can seem implausible to insist, with micro-IP, that experiences involving thus[P] are pain experiences, while experiences involving thus[TP] are not.26

3.2. Responding to the Objection

So these are the final transparency objections to micro-IP. Like their predecessors, I want to suggest, they are flawed—at least as I have developed them here. In particular, I want to suggest two preliminary moves that are available to micro-IP: first, rejecting minimalism; and second, drawing a crucial distinction between two different microphysical cases—water and temperatures. I take these in order.

23 See Chapter 3, §3.3.
25 It is sometimes thought that no natural kind concepts require such sensitivity to a type of experience, as if they all are entirely theoretical concepts. But that is wrong, as Kripke and Peacocke recognise: see Kripke’s N&N, 131; and Peacocke’s S&C, 91-92.
26 Two further worries. First, if thus[P] is not α-observational, then this would undermine one explanation of the claim that, to possess the concept being in pain, one needs to have been in pain, to have had pain experiences. The explanation under threat is this: being in pain is equivalent to having an experience as of a body part being thus[P], and to possess thus[P], one needs to have had experiences involving it—that is, pain experiences. Second, there is also the worry that, even if water is α-observational, water and twater figure in just the same epistemic possibilities as one another, and in that sense have the same “cognitive roles”. See Peacocke’s S&C, 94, for this idea.
Minimalism Again

To start with, the adherent of micro-IP should query the minimalism that the metaphor of a "sensible surface" encourages. Admittedly, some of the claims that one might have in mind in deploying that metaphor are true and important. Here are two, for example, framed in terms of the water case:

(i) There are necessary truths about the intrinsic nature of water that one cannot learn simply by virtue of experiencing it—like, for example, that it is composed of molecules comprising two hydrogen atoms bonded to one oxygen.

(ii) Water is not β-observational. That is, one can illusorily perceive a stuff that is not water as water, without him or his circumstances being imperfect, and without his possession of the concept water being in question. Ed, for example, does not reveal himself to lack the concept water, when he travels to Twin Earth and mistakes twater for water; nor does a subject reveal himself to lack gold, when on Earth he mistakes fool's gold for gold. The reason for this, it seems to me, is that in our perceptual tracking of water a crucial role is played by our perceptual tracking of properties other than being water itself, such as transparency and liquidity. So when some stuff coincides with water in respect of such properties, the subject can be, as it were, forgiven for mistaking it for water, rather than being denied the relevant concept.

These claims seem right—by contrast, arguably, with parallel claims about colours and shapes.27 And there is no particular harm in expressing them in terms of the metaphor of a "sensible surface"—no harm except that the metaphor can also suggest the following:

(iii) Minimalism regarding the concepts of microphysical kinds is true: that is, such concepts never enter into our perceptual experience.

By contrast with (i) and (ii), I see no reason for accepting (iii). Certainly, none is supplied by (i) and (ii) themselves.28 That there are things we cannot find out about water just by looking at it does not mean we never experience water as water. Nor does the possibility of fault-free illusions of water, or the role played by our perception of further sensible properties in our tracking of water. After all, one way of accommodating this last point about tracking is by saying the following: our perception of these other properties—liquidity, transparency, and the like—explains why we perceive a given sample as water, rather than as crude oil, say. And this way of putting the point actually presupposes that minimalism is false; it presupposes that water does enter into perceptual contents. This is important because if minimalism is indeed false, then that allows us to say that Ed and Ted's experiences differ:

27 Although a parallel to (i) in the case of shapes would also be plausible.
28 Ayers seems to slide from something like (ii) to something like (iii). See his LK, i, 191.
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Ed’s involve \textit{thus[P]} and Ted’s \textit{thus[TP]}. Hence we can say, with micro-IP, that Ed is in pain even though Ted is not.

Nonetheless, as anticipated above, there is still some temptation to downgrade the phenomenological relevance of \textit{this} difference in content. After all, in the water case, the suggestion goes, surely things seem \textit{more or less} the same to Ed and Ted, even if Ed’s experiences involve \textit{water} and Ted’s \textit{twater}. Whether or not that is true, I think that at this point the adherent of micro-IP might profitably complain about his opponent’s excessive concentration on the water case. Instead, he might suggest that we attend—as we did in §2—to the features of a different and neglected case: temperatures.

\textit{The Temperature Case Again}

I have already claimed that temperatures are interesting because they seem to be microphysical natural kinds that are represented in perceptual (tactual and somatosensory) experiences.\footnote{Much of what I say about heat would go for colour too, if we accepted the idea (as I am not inclined to) that colour concepts are concepts of microphysical kinds. It is sometimes easier to put the example in terms of colour, because the heat case is unfortunately complicated by the fact that those temperature terms, such as “hot”, that are both (i) non-demonstrative (contrast, “this temperature”) and (ii) not too specific (contrast, “87° centigrade”) can seem relativistic. I shall not pursue such worries here.} What I now want to make explicit is an important and neglected contrast between the case of temperatures, on the one hand, and the case of water, on the other. We might express the point by saying that temperatures lack “sensible surfaces”. What, after all, would constitute the “sensible surface” of 100°C? Samples of water characteristically possess a range of properties—transparency, liquidity, tastelessness, and so on—but what sensible properties do the 100°C things characteristically have, except that they are 100°C? Moreover, it therefore seems unlikely that our tactual tracking of temperatures is to be explained, on a par with the water case, by our perceptual tracking of some further properties. It is not as though we tactually feel a thing to be \textit{that temperature}\[100°C\] because of our perception of any of its further properties; we simply feel it to be \textit{that temperature}\[100°C\].

Temperatures are a better case than water for micro-IP to model the property P on. First, minimalism’s tug is much weaker in the temperature case. Whereas in the water case, there is some temptation to say that \textit{liquidity} and \textit{transparency} enter into the content of water experiences \textit{instead of} the concept \textit{water}, what concepts might seem to be good surrogates for \textit{heat} or \textit{this temperature}\[100°C]\? None leaps to mind: it is not at all tempting to suppose, for example, that any amount of tactual representation of textures or degrees of solidity will add up to the feeling of heat.

Second, supposing one allows the notion of \textit{twin-heat}, there is less temptation to think that Ed’s experiences of heat and Ted’s experiences of twin-heat will even be
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substantially similar. In the water case, even the non-minimalist would concede that Ed and Ted’s water and twater experiences share a substantial chunk of content: namely, that chunk involving the concept transparent liquid. But there is no parallel component that we should expect Ed and Ted’s heat and twin-heat experiences to share.

Indeed, we should be careful about what twin-heat is even supposed to be. After all, twater is supposed to be a stuff distinct from water that nonetheless shares water’s “sensible surface”; but heat doesn’t have a “sensible surface”. Perhaps twin-heat is supposed to be a property, TH, distinct from heat, such that the TH things on Twin Earth feel hot. But if Ted on Twin Earth lacks the concept hot, then Ted cannot feel anything to be hot. (As intentionalists, after all, we do not want to construe feeling a thing to be hot as a matter of its causing in us some blank, non-conceptual heat sensation.)

Perhaps the idea in calling TH “twin-heat” is that Ed, not Ted, would (illusorily) feel the TH things to be hot, if he were to travel to Twin Earth, despite the fact that perceptual conditions there are just the same as at home (except in so far as we include amongst these conditions the fact that “there” is Twin Earth). But why think that it is even possible that Ed feel the TH things to be hot in these circumstances? To cast doubt on this possibility, it is admittedly not enough to say—although it is true—that heat is a recognitional concept (a β-observational concept), by contrast with water, and thus that whatever Ed feels in normal circumstances to be hot is hot. This is not enough because arguably Ed’s circumstances are not normal in so far as he is now on Twin Earth and not at home. But, given the absence of any “sensible surface” in the heat case, it is nevertheless hard for an intentionalist to see how Ed could illusorily perceive TH as heat: after all, he possesses the concept heat, the conditions on Twin Earth are otherwise normal, he is functioning as he ever did, and there is no set of tactual properties that TH things characteristically share with hot things. Perhaps, then, if we want to speak of twin-heat, we better mean only the following: that Twin Earth property that shares with heat its “wide cosmological role”.

Notice one upshot of this brief discussion of what twin-heat is supposed to be. I tentatively suggested that Ed would not tactualy experience twin-hot things as hot, when he travels to Twin Earth. If that is so, then one might also be able to resist the suggestion that Ed would experience TP as P after the same journey (and after some surgery to make his body instantiate TP rather than P). And that point can help to assuage the opponent’s worries

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30 Kripke, by contrast, often writes as though sensations of heat are representationally blank. See his N&N.
31 Ayers says: “if a cold object feels hot, then I conclude that there is something wrong with me, or something special in the circumstances” (LK, i, 191).
32 Bill Child impressed this on me.
33 See page 134 above.
about the alleged resemblance of P and TP. It is also worth noticing, however, that even if Ed would experience twin-heat as heat, this is not to say that experiences involving heat or this temperature [100°C] are phenomenologically the same as experiences involving twin-heat or this twin-temperature [100 twin-degrees].

Returning to Ersatz Concepts

To return briefly to the second way of putting the objection to microphysicalism—framed in terms of the ersatz concepts—notice that the preceding considerations can also help to weaken the force of that approach. For, whatever we say about the concept water, it seems clear that heat (or this temperature [100°C]) is α-observational.34 Or rather: though there are concepts of heat that are not α-observational, there is also a concept of heat that is—one for whose possession the thinker’s judgements need to be sensitive to experiences involving that very concept. So heat does not share its “experiential component” with some distinct concept, twin-heat, which Ted might possess.35 And nor, by the same token, need thus[P] share its experiential component with thus[TP]. Hence, the worry about these concepts being too similar to effect a distinction between pain and non-pain experiences begins to lose its bite.

So, I hope to have shown that micro-IP is not without the resources for some preliminary moves against these objections concerning ersatz experiences and concepts. The dialectic here could be taken much further and, perhaps, down the line, things would become stickier for micro-IP. I shall not pursue the point, however, since I shall presently suggest that there are versions of injury perceptualism for which these problems—interesting as their general implications are—do not arise. First, though, a brief but very important digression.

3.3. Perception, Hallucination, and Subjective Indistinguishability

We must return briefly to the claim I put in the mouth of the adherent of micro-IP in §3.1: that a difference between two experiences in respect of concepts such as water and twater is non-phenomenological, like the difference between subjectively indistinguishable episodes of veridical perceiving and hallucination. The reason it is important to return to this is that the claim makes explicit a general worry about intentionalism that I have suppressed since Chapter 1. To make the worry vivid, suppose that a subject, A, seems to perceive a red apple

34 Perhaps water is too. In his S&C, Peacocke focuses on tomato. He suggests, on the one hand, that the experiences on the basis of which a possessor of tomato will deploy it are experiences involving that very concept, tomato; on the other hand, he seems to think that a distinct concept may have the same “cognitive role”, while requiring only experiences as of red, round, tomato-like objects. See S&C, 91-2. On heat being α-observational, see S&C, 89.

35 A fortiori, there is no reason to expect heat and twin-heat to share cognitive roles. See n. 26.
over a period composed of times $t_1$, $t_2$, and $t_3$. At $t_1$, A veridically perceives $x$ as a red apple; at $t_2$, a qualitatively identical apple, $y$, is rapidly swapped for $x$ without A noticing; and at $t_3$, a scientist rapidly removes $y$ without replacing it, while probing A's visual cortex so that things continue to seem to her as though she is seeing such an apple. The worry for the intentionalist is that the phenomenology of A's experience at $t_1$, $t_2$, and $t_3$ is the same, even though its content changes, and that this is incompatible with intentionalism. The phenomenology is the same, allegedly, because the three episodes are, as the jargon has it, "subjectively indistinguishable"; yet, according to the disjunctivist, their contents differ: the first has the content, \textit{This apple}[x] is red, the second, \textit{This apple}[y] is red, and whatever content the third has, it is neither of those, since at $t_3$ neither $x$ nor $y$ is in view.

We can put the objection in terms of two notions of phenomenology: Cartesian phenomenology and epistemic phenomenology.

\textbf{Cartesian and Epistemic Phenomenology}

(i) Two experiences of A's differ in Cartesian phenomenology (they are "subjectively distinguishable" in that sense) iff necessarily, A would notice a transition from one to the other, if she reflected on the matter.

(ii) Two experiences differ in epistemic phenomenology (they are "subjectively distinguishable" in that sense) iff things can legitimately be said to seem different to A in the two experiences, whether or not she would notice a transition from one to the other.

To be an intentionalist certainly involves claiming that any difference in content corresponds to a difference in \textit{epistemic} phenomenology. But the present challenge to intentionalism exploits the notion of \textit{Cartesian} phenomenology. For the disjunctivist intentionalist does not dispute the following:

(1) A reflects on but fails to notice any change in her experiences over $t_1$, $t_2$, and $t_3$.

(2) Nevertheless, there are changes in the content of her experiences over that period.

It follows from (1) and (2) that A's three successive experiences share their \textit{Cartesian} phenomenology, even though they differ in respect of their content.\footnote{For example, McDowell says, at STIS, 248, that "how things seem for the subject" remains the same between the perceptual and hallucinatory cases.} And that can seem to show that radical intentionalism is false.

At this stage, intentionalists are apt to make two important points. First, whatever we say about Cartesian phenomenology, the three experiences certainly differ in respect of their \textit{epistemic} phenomenology, and they do so in virtue of their difference in content. Moreover,
this really is a *bona fide* notion of phenomenology, a notion of how things seem to the subject. For there really is a sense in which we can say that things seem different to A between \( t_2 \) and \( t_3 \), for example, notwithstanding her failure to *notice* the difference. After all, how things are with A at \( t_2 \) can be specified by saying that it seems to her as though *this apple* is red, yet that cannot be how things seem once the apple is removed from view at \( t_3 \). Second, this epistemic notion of phenomenology is crucial in making intelligible our capacity to know or even to represent the world—hence the label, “epistemic phenomenology”. Our grasp of how perception could constitute awareness of the world, for example, crucially requires that we understand that things are different *for the perceiver*—subjectively, mentally, intrinsically—between the case in which she veridically perceives the world and the case in which she hallucinates it, even though her judgements as to which of those cases obtains are fallible. Again, by contrast with any two-component conception of the situation, the perceptual and hallucinatory cases are not to be distinguished merely in terms of the aetiology of mental conditions that are intrinsically (subjectively, mentally) the same.

These two points about epistemic phenomenology are indeed crucial, but they do not entirely undermine the force of the objection. For the opponent can concede both points, and still say that *pain* intentionalism is supposed to be an account of *Cartesian* phenomenology. Again, he will say that the difference between a subject’s being in pain and her not being in pain is certainly a difference of Cartesian phenomenology: that is, the reflective subject would *notice* the transition from being in pain to not being in pain, unlike the more elusive transition amongst her apple-experiences over \( t_1, t_2, \) and \( t_3 \). So the difference, to repeat, must at least be one of Cartesian phenomenology. But since the possibility of subjectively undetected hallucination demonstrates that it is possible for experiences to share their Cartesian phenomenology while differing in their content, intentionalism fails as an account of the relevant sort of phenomenology. Indeed, the opponent might persist, it is precisely because the allegedly intentional difference between an hallucinatory experience and a perceiving is *not* reflected in the Cartesian phenomenology that the circumspect injury perceptualist identifies pain experiences with a class of perceptual *experiences* rather than a class of *perceivings* (see Chapter 4, §3.1).

In response, I think the intentionalist ought to make two further points: a general remark, and a point about the pain case in particular. To start with the general remark: to be an intentionalist, you do not need to hold that every difference in experiential content corresponds to a difference in Cartesian phenomenology—again, that every difference in

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37 For related points, see page 127 above, and Chapter 1, §4.1.

38 Although see Williamson’s discussion of “luminosity” in his KL, Chapter 4.
experiential content is such that a reflective subject must notice it. (You must, by contrast, hold that every difference in experiential content corresponds to a difference in epistemic phenomenology.) To be an intentionalist, you need only hold that in specifying even the common Cartesian phenomenology of A's experiences at $t_1$, $t_2$, and $t_3$, for example, we have to advert to the content of certain experiences, and to nothing but their content. From A's perspective, at $t_1$, $t_2$, and $t_3$, for example, it is in each case as though she is veridically perceiving a red apple. In other words, she is on each occasion having an experience that either is or is mistakenly for an experience that (i) has some apple as the referent (or constituent) of its demonstrative singular content, and (ii) includes red, apple, and so forth in its predicative content. There is no other way of properly expressing the Cartesian phenomenology of A's experience than this way, which involves essential reference to the contents of experiences; there is no need, for example, to refer to blank qualia. This is enough for the view to be intentionalist.

The second, more specific point is that even though some differences in experiential content do not correspond to differences in Cartesian phenomenology, nevertheless some do. So there is no problem in the pain intentionalist holding both that the difference between a pain experience and a non-pain experience is a difference in respect of their predicative contents and that the difference between a pain experience and a non-pain experience is one that is guaranteed to be noticed by a reflective subject—there no problem, that is, provided the pain intentionalist is able to extend this guarantee to the difference in predicative content. And on the face of it, he can—because, to repeat, at least some transitions in predicative content (by contrast with the transitions in singular content in the apple case) do seem to be such that they are guaranteed to be noticed by the reflective subject. It is hard to imagine, for example, a reflective subject failing to notice that an experience in which she was representing something as very hot has been immediately succeeded by an experience in which she represents something as very cold—which, incidentally, is not to deny that one can misperceive a cold thing as hot, as when a very hot steel ball in one's hand is swiftly replaced with a very cold one. 39

39 Though, again, see Chapter 4 of Williamson's KL.

(i) The claim that such a difference must be noticed by the reflective subject would not be tenable if we adhered to a two-component conception of temperature experiences; but, of course, I do not. (ii) Notice too that, for the current point, I need only one case to work in the way I claim the temperature case does. So, for this point, I do not need to deny (though I might do so) that a reflective subject's experiences might represent a sample as water and then as water without her noticing the difference. (iii) Finally notice that the broad intentionalist might even hold that any difference in the predicative content of two experiences corresponds to a difference in Cartesian phenomenology. For though the apple case makes it clear that differences in singular content need not be noticed by reflective subjects, it is harder to come up with examples of unnoticed differences in predicative content. An opponent might suggest the following case: the sample for the subject's demonstrative-predicative content, this shade[burnt sienna], is removed from view at just the same time that the scientist fiddles with the subject's brain so that it seems to her as though the sample is still there. Isn't that a case of an unnoticed change in predicative content? Not necessarily: for the demonstrative-recognitional concept will, McDowell argues, persist at least for a short time after the sample disappears, and hence so might the predicative content.
Let us take stock. In this chapter and its predecessor, we have examined versions of objectivism, views which hold that the circumstances represented by pain experiences are constitutively independent of the experiences in which they are represented. The mentalist versions examined in the preceding chapter (§2) are, I argued, implausible. But the non-mentalist versions—versions, that is, of injury perceptualism—have proven to be more durable. For example, micro-IP suggested itself in the previous chapter as one way of responding to the problem about how to meet the demands of specificity without making it too difficult for a subject to have pain experiences. Nevertheless, micro-IP faces a whole battery of transparency objections. And though I hope to have gone some way in this chapter towards blunting the force of those charges, I have cautiously refrained from saying that my responses conclusively rule out an effective objection from that quarter. For this reason, it is important to recall that macro-IP, unlike micro-IP, does not go in for the idea that pain experiences represent microphysiological kinds. According to the adherent of macro-IP, pain experiences represent injury or disorder. So, when faced with the objection, for example, that Ted can surely be in pain even if nothing on Twin Earth, including his own body, ever instantiates some favoured microphysiological property, P, the adherent of macro-IP will respond that, by his lights, such microphysiological matters are irrelevant: provided Ted has the right concept of physiological disorder, he can be in pain, whatever the microphysiology of the denizens of his world.41

Whether it is micro- or macro-IP that we have in mind, though, the most obvious objections to injury perceptualism have yet to be considered. I turn to those in the final chapter.

41 For various reasons (some of which emerge from the present discussion; see, for example n. 26) it will be required by some philosophers that the concept disorder be both α-observational and β-observational, if it is to be implicated in pain experiences. Whether or not this ought to be a condition of adequacy, it seems to me that it can be met: that there is a pain-experience based concept, disorder, and that there are not fault-free illusions of disorder.
In the previous two chapters, we rejected various versions of objectivism. Cornman’s mentalist version was rejected in Chapter 4 (§2), and in the last chapter we rejected descriptivist and two-component versions of injury perceptualism. But, for all that’s been said, those non-descriptivist versions of micro- and macro-IP that are properly conceptualist forms of intentionalism have not yet been ruled out. Nor, however, has it been plain sailing for them. Macro-IP still faces the question how to steer between the Scylla of insufficient specificity in accounts of the content of pain experiences, and the Charybdis of imposing overly strenuous demands on the subjects of these experiences. Micro-IP faces a raft of objections centring on various notions of transparency—objections, though, to which I have made some preliminary responses on its behalf. Moreover, regarding both forms of injury perceptualism, we have not yet considered those crucial objections that arise out of the motivations for mentalist and subjectivist views: first, that a non-mentalist view like injury perceptualism could not account for the apparent occurrence of mental concepts in the judgements we make on the basis of our pain experiences; and second, that an objectivist view like injury perceptualism could not capture the peculiarly inner character of pain experiences and their subject matter.

My principal aim in this final chapter is to see how far injury perceptualism can respond to those two charges. Again, I think it can do surprisingly well. After considering in §1 some further worries, I turn in §§2 and 3 to these crucial issues of mentalistic idioms and interiority.

1. PRELIMINARY ISSUES

The problems concerning mentalistic idioms and interiority are perhaps the most significant facing the injury perceptualist. But there are, of course, other charges likely to be made against the perceptualist, and it is worth saying at least something about these, if only in passing.

It may, for example, be pointed out against macro-IP that we cannot say all physiological disorder is somatosensorily perceptible, whatever its location and whatever its type. Disorder in the brain eludes body sense, for example, as do cancerous changes within cells. That is true, but it is also true that we do not see physical objects when our eyes are, as
it were, in the wrong place. And this parallels one way of handling the two cases just cited: we do not perceive disorder in the brain or within cells simply because we have no nociceptors in those locations. It may, conversely, be remarked that, when—as we would put it—the pain from an injury radiates out, episodically, to the neighbouring flesh, the disorder itself is not radiating out. Again, that is true, but we can still say in such cases that disorder is nonetheless *represented* as radiating outwards. This probably does require the injury perceptualist to admit that illusion is more frequent and extensive in the case of pain experiences than in the case of experiences of other types. But that, I expect, is a bullet that he can bite.³

Others may be troubled by the following features of micro-IP in particular: it assigns as the subject matter of pain experiences—firing nociceptors, for example—episodes that only ever occur beneath the skin of sentient bodies, episodes that are in that sense literally private. This might seem problematic if you think that the behaviour “criterial” for the third-person ascription of perceptual experiences of this or that type ought to be “triangulatable”,⁴ in the way that the discrimination of coloured objects is: that is, you might require that both the behaviour and the subject matter to which that behaviour is a perception-mediated response be, at least sometimes, independently accessible to third parties. The adherent of micro-IP might deny this requirement, however. And, anyway, even if there really is a problem specifically for the injury perceptualist here—rather than merely some version of the important but quite general issue about how we know and think of other minds—then it is surely not a problem that the adherent of macro-IP need find particularly pressing. For he assigns as the subject matter of pain experiences states of disorder, and these frequently are publicly accessible.

Another way in which it is alleged that pain behaviour is different from colour-experience behaviour is that the former is somehow more “automatic”, harder to think of as the deliberate and intentional discrimination of objects of certain types. Pain experiences seem to be inherently and irresistibly motivational in a way that colour experiences, for example, are not.⁵ It should be pointed out, however, that there is pain behaviour and pain behaviour: admittedly, yelps and screams are “wrung” from us (Wittgenstein, PI, 546), but our drawing to a doctor’s attention those body parts that feel as though they have something

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¹ On the absence of nociceptors in the brain, see Greenfield, HB, 166; on cancer, see Wall, PSS, 88-89.
² Paul Snowdon made this point to me.
³ He does not have to admit that there is an illusion every time that we are in pain without being actually injured. Disorder, recall, is a concept that covers not only actual injuries, but also conditions in which the body is approaching a pathological state. See Chapter 4, §1.
⁴ The metaphor is Davidson’s. For discussion, see Child, CIM, 20-22, and McDowell, ORP, 307.
⁵ See Pears, FP, ii, 398, 401, 403; and Armstrong, MTM, 311.
wrong with them more nearly fits the colour model. Anyway, though there is doubtless something interesting and important about the initial point, I do not see that it poses insuperable problems for the injury perceptualist, and certainly not for him specifically.

I won’t pause here to consider further what to say about the idiosyncrasies of pain behaviour, except to make one small suggestion arising out of the claim—which both Armstrong and Pears come at least close to making—that those idiosyncrasies reflect the fact that pain experiences actually represent the behaviour in which they issue. It strikes me as highly implausible that being in pain is a matter of having an experience that represents to you that you are about to engage in behaviour of a certain sort. Nevertheless, as an account of itch experiences, it seems to me that a point in the same neighbourhood might be more promising: namely, that such experiences represent a body part as needing to be scratched. Admittedly, Armstrong is right to reject the view that itch experiences are simply desires to scratch (BS, 96). But I am making a different suggestion: again, that the itch sensation is indeed an experience—not a desire or thought—but nevertheless an experience that represents to a subject what needs to be done to a certain part of the body.

That is only a tentative proposal, but it brings us back to the issue of how to respond to the dilemma with which Chapter 4 closed: that it can seem as though our account of pain experiences will either impose too strenuous demands on their subjects or fail to give those experiences a sufficiently specific content to set them apart from other experience types—both normal perceptual experiences (visual, tactual, and so forth) and other sensations. Micro-IP promised one way of responding to this dilemma. But suppose one wants to avoid micro-IP: perhaps because of worries about its implications for the publicity of pain experiences (see above); or because one is impressed by some version of the transparency objections (see Chapter 5); or because one thinks its invocation of demonstrative modes of presentation will prove to be problematic (see below, §2.3). In that case, injury perceptualism depends specifically on macro-IP being able to respond to the dilemma. Here are two points in connection with the two categories of experience from which macro-IP has to distinguish pain experiences: other sensations and ordinary perceptual experiences. First, to ensure that the content one assigns pain experiences is not also needed for another sensation type, one would have to give an account of all the sensation types together; and

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6 See Ayers, LK, i, 203-4; and Martin, SMSP, 208.

7 Pears says, at FP, ii, 398, “feeling pain necessarily involves a felt tendency to [pain] behaviour”. See also FP, ii, 401. See also Armstrong, MTM, 316. It is interesting, if confusing, that Pears also says things about the pain case that are very suggestive of injury perceptualism. See FP, ii, 399, 401, 404, n. 26.

8 It might also seem to be entirely unilluminating if the idea is that the experience represents the relevant behaviour merely as pain behaviour. But I hesitate to press that point, since I sympathise with McDowell’s strictures against “objectifying” conceptions of human behaviour. See, for example, McDowell’s CDK, 384.

9 Perhaps Pears has a similar suggestion in mind at FP, ii, 401, n. 19. See also Evans, VR, 230-31.
though I cannot do that here, I have just now gestured towards a distinct account of itches, and it strikes me that tickling, tingling, and twinging sensations can also all plausibly be assigned contents that do not implicate the concept of disorder. Second, as for the need to contrast sensations with ordinary perceptual experiences, that is just an aspect of the injury perceptualist’s problem of interiority. And that is precisely the issue I take up in §3.

For now, though, I turn to the central problem the mentalist in apt to press: how is the injury perceptualist to explain the content of the judgements we make on the basis of our pain experiences?

2. MENTALISTIC IDIOMS

2.1. Introducing the Problem

To appreciate the problem for injury perceptualism, recall first the milestones on an Evans-style route from having a colour experience to self-ascripting it.10 (Though nothing crucially depends on doing so, I present the colour case in the microphysicalist’s terms, since that seems to provide the most promising model for at least some forms of injury perceptualism.)

I. Microphysicalism about Colour

(1r) This apple is R (Perceived fact)
(2r) It seems to A as though: This apple is [R] (Perceptual Experience)
(3r) A judges: This apple is [R] (Perceptual Judgement)
(4r) A judges: It seems to me as though this apple is [R] (Exp. Self-Ascription)

Now consider this: what might the injury perceptualist cast as parallel milestones in the pain case?

II. Injury Perceptualism

(1p) My left foot is P (PF)
(2p) It seems to A, somatosensorily, as though: My left foot is [P] (PE)
(3p) A judges: My left foot is [P] (PJ)
(4p) A judges: It seems to me as though my left foot is [P] (SA)

III. Mentalist Judgements

(3m) A judges: My left foot hurts, or I have a pain in my left foot
(4m) A judges: I’m in pain, or It seems to me as though my left foot hurts (or has a pain in it)11

10 On Evans’s account of self-ascriptions of experiences, see VR, 227-8; and see above, Chapter 2, §4.1, and Chapter 3, §2.2.

11 A quick reminder about R and P. R is whatever property the microphysicalist ends up taking experiences of red to represent; P is whatever property pain experiences represent—that is, for the injury perceptualist, whatever physiological property they represent. So “R” and “P” are, for me, place-holders for whatever terms the microphysicalist and injury perceptualist respectively opt for—a scientific term, in the case of microphysicalism at least, one that may be available only once the necessary science has been done. I enclose these place-holders in square brackets within the intentional contexts above so that those formulations remain neutral as to the mode of presentation under which R and P are represented in the relevant experiences and judgements.
If (I) represents the route to a self-ascription of an experience of red, then the injury perceptualist might naturally propose (II) as the route to a self-ascription of a pain experience. Suppose he does. The problem is that (II) can seem to fail to capture the judgements that we in fact make on the basis of our pain experiences—that is, those apparently expressed by what we actually say when we’re in pain. In particular, (3p) and (4p) seem to do less justice to the ordinary situation than (3m) and (4m) do. Where the injury perceptualist might expect the subject to express a pain-based perceptual judgement with the utterance, “My left foot is [P]”, for example, she is arguably more likely to say, “My left foot hurts”. And if the latter really does express a perceptual judgement—a judgement in which the subject simply endorses the content of her experience—then the hurting perceptualist surely must be right in claiming against the injury perceptualist that *My left foot hurts* is the content of a pain experience. In short, it can seem both that what the injury perceptualist would have us judge, we don’t, and that what we do judge (which we express in mentalistic vocabulary) the injury perceptualist is unable to account for.  

It would be silly, notice, to make the parallel objection against microphysicalism about colours: that the content of a perceptual judgement made on the basis of an experience of red cannot be *This apple is [R]*, since what we actually say on the basis of such an experience is “This apple is red”. The microphysicalist’s answer to that charge, of course, will simply be that on his view “red” refers to R, so the content expressed by “This apple is red” is just an instance of *This apple is [R]*. In the pain case, however, there is no parallel response. Or at least, there is no parallel response if we were right in Chapter 4 to reject mentalist versions of objectivism: and not just Cornman’s simple view of hurting, which I considered in detail, but also the view on which “hurting” refers to some physiological property—a hybrid view which I have so far mentioned only in passing. If we were not right to reject those views, then even the objectivist might be able to make a straightforwardly mentalist response to the problem of mentalistic idioms. I return briefly to that possibility in §2.3 below. But first I want to suggest a more promising non-mentalist response available to the injury perceptualist.

### 2.2. First Response: Experiential Self-Ascriptions and Blurred Vision

Here, then, is the first and better of two ways in which the injury perceptualist might respond to the problem of mentalistic idioms. Start by recalling the full formulation of the injury perceptualist view:

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12 A version of the second problem arises for the mentalist too, interestingly enough. Suppose the hurting perceptualist is right that the content of our pain experiences is to be specified in terms of the concept hurting. Why, then, is the concept pain involved in the content of some of the judgements we make on the basis of such experiences?
Injury Perceptualism

(1) A’s being in pain consists in his having a somatosensory experience as of a part of his body being in some physiological state, P.

(2) A’s having or feeling a pain in a body part, O, or O’s hurting, consists in

(a) A’s being the subject of a somatosensory perceiving with a content of the form, That part[O] of my body there[L] is P
(b) O’s existing and being at L, and
(c) the bodily and spatial content of the experience mentioned in (a) causally depending on O and on its being at L.

Now recall, crucially, that, the injury perceptualist can—having rejected the idea that hurting just is the property P—use “hurting” on the left-hand side of (2) without thereby generating a version of subjectivism. He can claim, in other words, that a left foot’s hurting consists in the subject experiencing it as being P, where P is some non-mental physiological property. And this allows the injury perceptualist to respond to the charge that he cannot account for the putative perceptual judgement, “My left foot hurts”, as follows: it is in fact not a perceptual judgement at all, but rather a self-ascription of an experience—to the effect, roughly, that one perceives one’s left foot as being P. Again, it reports the circumstance on the right-hand side of (2). Moreover, since it is the self-ascription of an experience, rather than a judgement about some objective circumstance, it is less surprising that it would otherwise be (for a non-mentalist) that “My left foot hurts” should involve the intuitively mentalistic term, “hurts”.

That should help to meet the opponent’s point about the putative perceptual judgement. But there are still concerns. For one thing, questioning the injury perceptualist’s denial that “My left foot hurts” is a perceptual judgement, his opponent will point out that it looks very much like one. For another, the involvement of such mentalistic terms as “in pain”, “a pain”, and “hurting”, even in self-ascriptions of experiences, might continue to appear strange, given the injury perceptualist’s claim that none of these terms expresses a concept figuring in the content of pain experiences—indeed, none even refers to a property represented by those experiences.

Here I think the injury perceptualist can profitably advert to an interesting parallel case: blurred vision. Suppose that a teary-eyed subject sees a pencil and reports, “The pencil is blurred” or “The pencil looks blurred”. Here are three plausible claims. First, “The pencil is blurred” and “The pencil looks blurred” are equivalent: it would be odd to say, after all, “The pencil is blurred, though it does not look it” or “The pencil looks blurred, though it

13 This paragraph makes the point anticipated in §2.2 of Chapter 2.
14 Armstrong gestures towards the parallel at BSE, 103.
isn’t”. (Interestingly, it would be less odd to say this about a photograph). Second, at least part of the role of both sentences is to express self-ascriptions of experiences. Third, the content of the experiences they self-ascribe does not involve the concept blurred, nor any concept whose referent is the property blurred. For his part, Armstrong suggests that the content of blurred experiences is, “The light has become dimmer, the outlines of things have begun to waver physically, the air has become mistier” (BS, 103). For my part, I find this more plausible as an account of what causes things to look blurred than as a specification of the content of the experiences in which they do so. It would be better to say that the relevant feature of the experiences reported by “blurred” is that their spatial content is incomplete or indeterminate and does not enable the subject accurately to ascertain the object’s edges.15 (Relatedly, the sense in which a photograph might, to a teary-eyed subject, look blurred without being blurred is that it might look as though it has spatially indeterminate “content” and yet actually be quite fine grained.) But the crucial point, either way, is that the experiences reported by “blurred” or “looks blurred” do not represent a property blurred. Nor, incidentally, is “blurred” the name for some distinctive, blank quale which such experiences instantiate (as Velleman and Boghossian think: CSQ, 96).16

If this account of blurred vision is correct, then it ought to steady the nerves of the injury perceptualist. For here we have phenomena that parallel those that he has to tolerate in the pain case. For one thing, “The pencil is blurred” looks like an expression of a perceptual judgement, but it isn’t; and this is just what the injury perceptualist has to say about “My left foot hurts”. For another thing, “blurred” is used to self-ascribe experiences of a certain sort, even though it refers neither to a property represented by the relevant experiences nor to some quale that such experiences instantiate. And, again, this is just what the injury perceptualist has to say about such mentalistic vocabulary as “in pain”, “a pain”, and “hurting”.

Admittedly, the steadfast opponent of injury perceptualism may want more: in particular, he may want an explanation of why we sometimes use “blurred” and “hurting” to report the relevant experiences, rather than using terms whose referents those experiences...
represent. Perhaps, though, the reason in the pain case is just that the sentence “I am somatosensorily perceiving my left foot as disordered” is a bit of a mouthful; and since what is often most urgent when one has a pain experience is that one has the experience,\(^\text{17}\) rather than whether it is veridical, we have adopted “hurts” as a convenient shorthand for its self-ascription. Whatever the details of the right account, though, I hope at least to have diminished the force of the problem of mentalistic idioms.

So much for the judgements that we clearly do make on the basis of our pain experiences. What about the charge that we don’t make those judgements the injury perceptualist would have us make? The injury perceptualist can resist that too. For he need not concede that we never report pain experiences by means of a term that refers to P. The adherent of micro-IP, for example, might make use of the notion of demonstrative predicates.\(^\text{18}\) For although one need not have the concept, firing nociceptors, in order to be in pain, one might be able to think of what are in fact firing nociceptors as that process\([firing nociceptors]\). Hence, the following might be offered as expressions of pain-based perceptual judgements and self-ascriptions that plausibly we do make: “My left foot is undergoing that process\([P]\)”, and “It seems to me as though my left foot is undergoing that process\([P]\)”. Alternatively, the adherent of macro-IP might suggest the following: “My left foot has something wrong with it”, and “It seems to me as though there is something wrong with my left foot”.

So I have resisted the idea that our use of various mentalistic idioms on the basis of our pain experiences should immediately drive the injury perceptualist back to a mentalistic construal of the content of those experiences.


Now I turn to a different response to the question of mentalistic idioms: namely, a defence of a mentalist version of injury perceptualism. Admittedly, I argued against Cornman’s mentalist objectivism in Chapter 4 (§2) that it fails to do justice to the self-intimating character of hurting, being unable to rule out the possibility of unperceived instances of that property, or even the possibility of instantiations of hurting by severed limbs. I suggested in passing that the same considerations seem to count against a different mentalist version of objectivism: a hybrid between injury perceptualism and hurting perceptualism, on which the physiological property P is the referent of the concept hurting. There is a way of developing the hybrid view, however, that can seem to escape that worry. As things turn out, I think it

\(^{17}\) This is related, presumably, to the fact that, in having a pain experience, one experiences one’s body as oneself, or at least as one’s own body. See §3.4 below.

\(^{18}\) See McDowell’s M&W, 56-6, and 170-74.
fails, but it is worth mentioning for two reasons: first, the way in which it fails raises a
problem even for non-mentalist micro-IP; and second, its general strategy for
accommodating interiority is suggestive, and can be implemented in other ways, ways that I
pursue in the next section.

The response to my worry about the hybrid view is to take the concept *hurting* to be
something in the way of a demonstrative predicative concept, a concept whose constitutive
links to the thinker's pain experiences are so tight that it is available for him to deploy only if
he is currently in pain—indeed, only if he is currently perceiving an instance of P
somatosensorily. The initial attraction of this proposal is its consequence that, if I am not
somatosensorily perceiving an instance of P, then I cannot judge that a part of my body is
currently hurting, even if it is the case both that a part of my body is instantiating P and that
the concept *hurting* (when it is available) has P as its referent. It can seem as though this
captures something rather like self-intimation, and hence as though we finally have here an
acceptable objectivist version of mentalism, one that will allow us to say that *hurting* is
implicated in the content of pain experiences and that "My left foot is hurting" is therefore
just what it looks like: a perceptual judgement.

Unfortunately, however, the proposal faces two serious problems: it is at once too
restrictive and too permissive about the application of *hurting*. The first problem—its being
too restrictive—is in fact a difficulty for all versions of injury perceptualism that claim that a
subject's pain experiences represent P under a mode of presentation available to him only
when he is somatosensorily perceiving P. It may, therefore, be a problem for micro-IP, which
exploited the demonstrative concept, *thus*[P]. To put the worry in terms of the current
proposal, if a consequence of the hybrid view is that the concept, *being in pain*, is the
concept, *having an experience in which one's body is represented as hurting*, and if the
(underlined) component concept, *hurting*, is available to a thinker only when he is
somatosensorily perceiving P, then it seems as though the concept of which that is a
component—namely, *being in pain*—must be subject to the same constraint. And in that
case, how is B, who is not in pain, to think of A's being in pain now? And how is A even to
think of himself, at a time when he is not in pain, as *having been* in pain? Indeed, how is A to
think of himself as currently being in pain, when he is in pain by dint of its merely being for
him as if he were perceiving P—as in a phantom limb case? So these are the problems that

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19 The advocate of this view may still allow that there is another concept of hurting: *hurting*, say, where this is by contrast
captured by clause (2) of injury perceptualism above. That second concept will be available, he may claim, even on those
occasions when I am not in pain. (However, I think this last claim is threatened by the points I go on to make about the concept,
*being in pain*.)

20 If this were merely an instance of a quite general, conceptual problem of other minds, then perhaps it would be unfair to make
too much of it. But I do not think it is. For the same problem does not arise concerning how B comes to apply to A the concept,
visually experiences something as this-colour[red], since the demonstrative concept, this-colour[red], is available to B as well
as to A.
arise if the link is made too tight between the concept *hurting* (and hence *being in pain*) and the current somatosensory perception of P. And notice that if the injury perceptualist responds to this problem by loosening the connection between *hurting* and the thinker’s current pain experience—perhaps by thinking of *hurting* more as a recognitional than as a demonstrative concept—then his view loses its signal virtue: the consequence that when I am not in pain, I cannot judge that a part of my body is *hurting* since the concept *hurting* is then unavailable to me.\(^{21}\)

Second, even without loosening the connection between *hurting* and the thinker’s pain experience, it is not clear that the hybrid view can deliver what was wanted, for it can also seem too permissive. Admittedly, the hybrid view does attractively imply that I cannot judge that parts of my body hurt, if I am not somatosensorily perceiving an instance of P; but it also seems to imply that, if I am somatosensorily perceiving an instance of P, then not only can I apply *hurting* to my own body, but I can apply it to parts of my body that I am not perceiving, parts that are anaesthetised, and perhaps even to a severed limb. It is one thing to claim that *hurting* is available to the thinker only if he perceives an instance of P, and quite another thing to say that he can apply it, when it is available, only to the part of the body that he perceives to be instantiating P. Similarly, it may be that the demonstrative predicative concept, *this shade [burnt sienna]*, is available to me only when I see something of that shade; but while I continue to perceive the sample, I can—thus empowered—surely judge of something not currently present to me (even something that I have never seen) that it is *this shade [burnt sienna]*.

It is a pity that this mentalist version of injury perceptualism faces such difficulties. For there is something attractive about the structure of its approach to the peculiar interiority of pain experiences. Their peculiarity, it says, has nothing to do with the property represented by pain experiences: neither (as the Cartesian would have it) that its instances are private to the subject whose body instantiates it; nor (as the subjectivist would have it) that its instances are constituted by experiences representing them. Rather, what is peculiar about pain experiences, the proposal says, is that they make available to their subject a special *mode of presentation* of the property in question, one unavailable to onlookers who are not somatosensorily perceiving it—who, that is, are not in pain. There is, as I say, something promising about the general suggestion that the Cartesian and subjectivist accounts of interiority involve, if you like, a “projection error”, locating at the level of reference (the property P itself) peculiarities that really belong at the level of sense (the concept under which instances of P, or perhaps the body parts instantiating P, are

\(^{21}\) Parallel problems affect the suggestion that blurred be construed as demonstrative mode of presentation of some complex physical condition.
experienced). Nonetheless, I shall not try to salvage the hybrid view’s implementation of this strategy, for two reasons. First, I have already presented, in §1.2, an alternative way of defusing the problem of mentalistic idioms, focusing on the blur model. And second, I will suggest presently that there are non-mentalist implementations of the same general strategy.

Before moving on to those suggestions, it is worth briefly recalling the idea that these problems for the hybrid view seem to threaten even standard micro-IP. That view may be starting to seem an unfortunately vulnerable version of injury perceptualism, raising as it does the transparency worries, the concerns about pain behaviour, and now these new problems. However, though I do think that macro-IP may be the safer bet, there continue to be moves available to the adherent of micro-IP. First, he could point out, quite rightly, that of the problems facing the hybrid view, only the first is even a prima facie threat to his own account. Second, even regarding that first worry, which arises out of an overly tight connection between current pain experiences and the predicative concept they involve, notice that the adherent of micro-IP can afford to loosen this connection more than the hybrid view can. For the hybridist to do so—perhaps by stressing the relevant concept’s recognitional aspect more than its demonstrative aspect—would be for him to lose his view’s signal virtue: the consequence that I cannot apply hurting to a body part of mine when I am not in pain. But the concept that micro-IP ties to pain experiences—for example, this process[nociceptor activity]—is not the concept hurting anyway, and so he need not eschew the possibility that one can apply it to oneself when not in pain. To be sure, we still may worry that such demonstrative recognitional concepts as micro-IP goes in for are too transitory to do all that he needs them to do; but I shall not pursue the point further here.

3. INTERIORITY

It is time to return to the idea of interiority. “The interiority intuition”, recall, is the compelling if inchoate thought that there is something idiosyncratic about the bodily sensations, some way in which they or their objects are “inner” or “subjective”, some way in which the relationship between them and their subject matter is more intimate than the relationship between ordinary perceptual experiences and theirs. One traditional means of capturing this idea has been to assert that the subject matter of pain experiences is radically private: necessarily, only I can have access to my pains; only you can have access to yours. Another way of accommodating interiority, we have seen, is to claim that pain experiences constitute infallible (or at least, predicatively infallible) episodes of awareness of a self-

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22 The other difficulty concerned how, if P is its referent, hurting can be prevented from being correctly applied to severed limbs and the like; but micro-IP does not think that P is the referent of hurting, so the worry does not arise.
intimating subject matter; and making sense of that can in turn seem to require the suggestion that the subject matter of such experiences is mental and radically subjective.\(^{23}\)

Being an objectivist view, injury perceptualism seems comparatively hard pressed to say anything about interiority, except that the circumstances that the subject represents in his pain experiences are sometimes \textit{literally} interior to his body, and consequently that his first-person judgements based on those experiences are, in point of empirical fact, more authoritative than anyone else's.\(^{24}\) Hence McDowell complains against such objectivist views that since they make the subject matter of pain experiences "objects for consciousness only in the way in which a perceivable state of affairs in one's environment is an object for consciousness, [those objects] lose their interiority" (I&I, 313).\(^{25}\) In short, the injury perceptualist risks making pain experiences and their subject matter seem rather ordinary.

However problematic this seems, it ought to appear less problematic than the same renunciation of self-intimation and infallibility by the simple theorist about hurting. For, as we saw in Chapter 4 (§2), the simple theorist has to concede that an intuitively \textit{mental} circumstance—a body part's hurting—can fail even to require a conscious subject. By contrast, there is nothing perplexing in itself about the idea of the unperceived instantiation of \(P\), given the injury perceptualist's physiological candidates for that property: disorder, say, or firing nociceptors. The anxiety is only that the possibility of such failure seems to disqualify those objective circumstances from plausibly being cast as \(P\).

So can the injury perceptualist do justice to the interiority intuition? I think he can. He can \textit{certainly} do better than adverting merely to the literal interiority of the subject matter of pain experiences. For one thing, I argue in §§3.2 and 3.3 that by focusing on the way in which we talk about our sensation experiences, and on the relationship between those experiences and not their subject matter, but their self-ascription and the attention, the injury perceptualist can acknowledge significant peculiarities in the pain case—peculiarities, moreover, that he can plausibly accuse his opponent of having \textit{mistaken} for self-intimation and infallibility. In §3.4, furthermore, I argue that by emphasising the fascinating peculiarities of somatosensory \textit{content}, he can advert to differences between the ways in which pain experiences and visual experiences \textit{represent} their respective subject matters, without invoking the idea that the subject matter in the pain case is private, subjective, self-intimating, or infallibly accessible. Together, I shall argue, these moves demonstrate the surprising degree to which injury perceptualism can accommodate the interiority intuition.

\(^{23}\) See Chapter 2, §2.1 and §4.3.
\(^{24}\) See Armstrong's MTM, 325.
\(^{25}\) See also M&W, 37. For McDowell's opposition to literal construals of interiority, see OS, 289, n. 16; I&I, 312, n. 33; and STIS, 244.
and in a way that is far more sophisticated than merely pointing out that physiological disorder is sometimes literally internal. So let me turn to this task.

3.1. The Problem: Losing Infallibility and Self-Intimation

The injury perceptualist can't accommodate the idea that pain experiences are infallible experiences of a self-intimating subject matter. To start with self-intimation, the injury perceptualist might hope that even some objective property could be such that, necessarily, when it is instantiated, it is experienced. But I suspect this is a vain hope. Admittedly, we could rule out P being instantiated by a severed limb, if P were the property, being disordered and an attached part of a whole sentient body. And we could rule out P being instantiated by an unexperienced body part, if P were the property, being disordered in such a way as to become the object of the subject's attention. But neither of these properties is such that, necessarily, when it is instantiated, it is represented. That, I suspect, will be true only of those putative properties of which we give some sort of radical subjectivist account. 26

What about the alleged infallibility of pain experiences? One objectivist way of trying to accommodate that would be to exploit the idea that pain experiences involve demonstrative contents. Suppose, for example, that the injury perceptualist claims that the content of a veridical pain experience is, This[A's left foot] is thus[P], where the referent of the demonstrative predicate is determined by the state of the perceived foot. Given the world-dependent character of demonstrative contents, it follows from a subject's having an experience with that content (and its referent being fixed in the way specified) that this[A's left foot] is indeed thus[P]. However, that is not enough to make pain experiences infallible. After all, the view would presumably say that in the phantom limb case, the subject is in pain by dint of its being for him merely as if he were having an experience with such a content—from which it would not follow, of course, that some given body part is P. Similarly, it does not follow from the claim that a veridical experience of red might have the content, This[x] is thus[red], that all experiences of red are guaranteed to be veridical.

Hence I think the injury perceptualist has to concede that pain experiences on his view are not infallible episodes of awareness of self-intimating items. So, if he is to accommodate interiority, then that had better not be the only way of articulating interiority.

26 For example: being disordered in such a way as to cause an experience as of this very property.
3.2. Talking the Talk of Infallibility and Self-Intimation

The injury perceptualist is debarred, I have just said, from allowing self-intimation and infallibility, as his opponent construes them. This can seem problematic, given the plausibility of the following claims:

(1) A’s foot *is* hurting iff. A’s foot *feels* to be hurting
(2) There *is* a pain in A’s foot iff. there *feels* to be a pain in A’s foot
(3) A *has* a pain in his foot iff A *feels* a pain in his foot

But as soon as we reflect on the following, the problem seems less serious:

(4) The pencil *is* blurred iff. the pencil *looks* blurred
(5) A has an experience of red *iff* A *experiences* an experience of red

After all, claim (4) is true, but not because blurred experiences are episodes of infallible awareness of a self-intimating property, *being blurred*. Rather, as I suggested in § 1.2, it is true because the sentences on its right- and the left-hand sides are just different ways of saying the same thing. So too with (5). It is not that one’s having an experience of red consists in that experience being the object of some further experience. Rather, just as we talk not only of one’s having a smile (or smiling), but also of one’s smiling a smile, so too we speak not only of one’s having an experience (or experiencing), but also of one’s experiencing an experience.27 This is just a fact about ordinary language, not the high road to inner sense, let alone to claims about infallible experiences with self-intimating subject matters.

Now, surely the injury perceptualist can make the same move regarding (1), (2) and (3), claiming that their left- and right-hand sides are just different ways of saying the same thing, and idiomatic ways of saying it. (They are, he will say, all ways of expressing the left-hand side of the second clause of my formulation of injury perceptualism.) This requires that the injury perceptualist allow that just as “experiences” in “A experiences an experience” is not functioning in the way it is in “A experiences the pencil”, so too “feels to be” in “A’s foot *feels* to be hurting” is not functioning in the way it is in “A’s foot *feels* to be hot”.28 But the

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27 See Tye’s TP, 86.
28 By counting these sentences as idiomatic, I mean to avoid the following, different diagnosis: “experiences” is ambiguous and, on the right-hand side of (5), it means “has”, not “is aware of”. That might seem acceptable for (5), but there is no parallel one-word translation for “feels” that the injury perceptualist could appeal to on the right-hand sides of (1) and (2), for example. Notice, incidentally, that the left-hand sides of (1), (2), and (3) are also idiomatic for the injury perceptualist; and again, this is better than assuming, as Tye and Pitcher sometimes seem to, that “a pain” really means “a pain experience”—as if, “I have a pain in my foot” means “I have a pain experience in my foot”.

injury perceptualist can allow just that. So to the extent that the interiority objection complains that the injury perceptualist cannot accommodate claims such as (1), (2), and (3), it is mistaken: he can. Hence, while the plausibility of such claims might explain his opponent’s commitment to self-intimation and infallibility, they do not vindicate it.

3.3. Surrogates for Traditional Interiority

Below, I shall return to the strategy, mentioned a couple of times now, of locating interiority at the level of sense rather than reference. Now, though, I want to suggest a strategy with a similar shape: that is, locating such phenomena as subjectivity, self-intimation, and infallibility not in the relationship between pain experiences and their subject matter, but rather locating them at the level of the experiences themselves, or in the relationship between the experiences, on the one hand, and their self-ascription and the attention, on the other. There are four points to make under this head.

(i) Subjectivity, Interiority, and Mentality

First, recall that, when he is not considering sensations specifically, McDowell elaborates the “mentality” or “subjectivity” or “interiority” of the mind in terms of the claim that its states and episodes possess conceptual content, that they essentially constitute their subjects’ perspectives on the world, something that cannot be captured in terms that are objectivistic—that is, non-intentional, non-perspectival terms. So it is worth underscoring the fact that our injury perceptualist credits pain experiences with conceptual content. He takes such experiences to constitute a subject’s perspective on the world, or a part of it: the subject’s own body. So the injury perceptualist ought to resist any suggestion that, by giving up the idea of experience-dependent objects of awareness, he prevents himself from saying that being in pain is an essentially subjective matter. That charge of “objectification” may be fair against some versions of injury perceptualism: Armstrong’s, for example, in view of his functionalism; or Tye’s, in view of his informationalist conception of somatosensory content. But it is not fair against our injury perceptualist, who retains the idea that pain experiences are irreducibly contentful, and gives up only the idea that the items they represent are constitutively dependent on them.

29 See especially FAM, 336-7; and see, above, Chapters 1 (§5.2) and 2 (§2.2).
(ii) Self-Ascriptions and Surrogates for Infallibility and Self-Intimation

Consider now the following plausible claim:

(3) A has a pain iff it seems to A as though he has a pain.

Like (3) in §2.2 above, SA can look like a straightforward statement of the problematic idea that pain experiences are episodes of infallible awareness of a self-intimating subject matter, especially if one insists on interpreting “seems as though he has a pain” in the way the injury perceptualist refused to allow in the case of “feels a pain” in (3) above—that is, as genuinely expressing a representational episode with a mentalist content. Even under this interpretation, however, the injury perceptualist can accept SA while still rejecting the problematic idea of infallible experiences of self-intimating items. For he can take the representational episode expressed by “seems” on SA’s right-hand side to be a self-ascriptive judgement, not an experience, and then say that even though pain experiences are not infallible, self-ascriptions of them may be. After all, if we are infallible about at least some of our perceptual experiences, as we arguably are, then why not about those that are pain experiences?\(^3\)

Much the same point goes for self-intimation: to whatever extent other perceptual experiences intimate themselves to self-ascriptive judgements (contrast: to inner sense), pain experiences can too. So, if the opponent of injury perceptualism merely insists on the truth of SA, he has failed to say anything that the injury perceptualist needs to deny.

(iii) Surrogates for Experience-Dependence and Privacy

Consider these final two claims:

(SU) There are no objective (experience-independent) pains, nor any objective instances of hurting. Every pain, and every instance of hurting, must be had or felt or experienced by some subject.

(PR) No one else can have or feel my pains, or the instances of hurting that I feel.

These claims too can seem inimical to injury perceptualism, for they are easily taken to suggest that pains are subjective and logically private objects of awareness. But SU and PR also admit of interpretations more congenial for the injury perceptualist. Regarding SU, which suggests the subjectivity of pains, the injury perceptualist can make at least three conciliatory remarks. First, since pain experiences are indeed experiences, they, at least, are

\(^3\) On the infallibility of self-ascriptions of perceptual experiences, see Evans’s VR, 228-9.
never objective (experience-independent). Second, there are indeed no objectively hurting objects. One’s left foot can be (or feel to be) hurting only if there is some way it is experienced as being; it’s just that the way the left foot must be represented as being, in order for it to be hurting, is disordered, not hurting. Here again, the model of blurs is illuminating. For there are no objectively blurred objects either: things can be blurred only if they are visually represented, even though it is not as blurred that they need to be represented. Third, experiences are events whose subjects are conscious persons; and so, since they are a type of event which is never subjectless, we can say that every pain experience (or pain feeling) must be had (or experienced, or felt—as the idiom allows) by someone. All of this the injury perceptualist can accept, without being in any way committed to pains as subjective objects of awareness.

About PR too—the claim which suggested privacy—the injury perceptualist can be conciliatory. For one thing, if pain experiences are events, then token pain experiences are plausibly individuated according to their subjects, in which case it is true that no one else can have (or feel, or experience—as the idiom allows) my pain experiences. For another thing, if my left foot is hurting by virtue of being perceived by me as disordered, and if that perceiving could not have had anyone else as its subject, then this is a sense in which that instance of hurting could not have been felt by anyone other than me. But neither of these concessions commits the injury perceptualist to pains as private objects of awareness.

(iv) Engaging the Attention: Another Surrogate for Self-Intimation

It might seem tempting for the injury perceptualist to gesture towards interiority in another way by claiming that, though the subject matter of pain experiences is not necessarily self-intimating to such experiences, it is in fact self-intimating. The idea would be that the relevant physiological condition, P, is in fact such that whenever it is instantiated by a subject’s body, it is perceived by means of a pain experience. Now this point lies in the direction of something interesting, but it is not quite right. It is not quite right because if we assign any of the usual injury perceptualist candidates for P—disorder, say, or firing nociceptors—then P sometimes will go unperceived: as when one applies a local anaesthetic to an injury, for example, or (arguably) when in the heat of battle the seriously wounded soldier feels no pain at all. Admittedly, when the enabling conditions for the perception of

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31 In Woody Allen's *Deconstructing Harry*, there is a “blurred man”, who is horrified to discover that he looks blurred to everyone, in normal conditions, and even when surrounded by objects that do not look blurred. Even in this case, though, he is blurred only because he looks some way or other.

32 See Wall’s PSS.
P are met, then one will perceive P; but that goes equally for any object of any mode of perception.

A better point lies in this direction, though: it requires that we draw a distinction between, on the one hand, something's being an object of attention, where this is just the notion of an item's being perceived, and on the other hand, something's engaging or occupying one's attention, where one's attention may be engaged by any number of things: one's thinking about a philosophical problem, for example, or the perceiving of some material object, or one's hallucinating such an object. A subject may perceive many things at once, and yet his attention be engaged by his perception of only one of them—or perhaps not by any of his perceivings, as when he is lost in thought. By drawing this distinction, and shifting our focus from P to experiences of P, we can formulate the point as follows: what is peculiar about somatosensory experiences as of the instantiation of P is that they almost always occupy the attention, distracting the subject from other things that might otherwise have done so. P is, if you like, the bodily equivalent of a loud bang or a sudden flash of light: not that instances of P clamour more than any other property for perceptual representation, but that once they get it (or seem to), the experiences representing P tend to fully engage our attention. There is a contrast here with many ordinary perceptual experiences: one's experiences of red, for example, are not so automatically engaging. Admittedly, one's tingling sensations aren't either, and that undermines the idea that the present point applies to sensations generally. But notice that the opponent's notion of self-intimation is most often pressed in connection with the pain case anyway; and perhaps the present point partly explains why. It also explains, and perhaps excuses, the very first sentence of Chapter 1.

3.4. The Peculiarities of Somatosensory Experience

I now return to the strategy of locating peculiarities of sensation experiences at the level of sense rather than reference. Beyond subjectivity, privacy, infallibility, and self-intimation, another gloss I put on the notion of interiority was that there is intuitively an important difference between the way in which pain experiences and ordinary perceptual experiences represent their respective subject matters—a difference between, on the one hand, one's feeling a pain in one's left foot, and on the other hand, one's seeing that Nelson's Column is

33 Something very like this distinction is drawn by Peacocke in his CSK. It is tempting to say that what occupies the attention is the perceived object itself, not the perceiving of it. I resist that move for two reasons. First, it is not needed in order to avoid the notion of inner sense, since we are dealing here with the occupation of attention, not its object. Second, at least in the hallucinatory case we surely want to say that an experience can occupy one's attention, since in that case there may be no perceptual object to do so.

34 The soldier in the heat of battle is not an exception to this claim, if it can be said of him that, during the period that he is otherwise engaged, he is not somatosensorily perceiving his injuries. Otherwise, we might say that the rule is only general.
tall, for example, or even one's *seeing* that one's own left foot is disordered. When one *sees* one's injured foot, after all, one is not thereby in pain. The worry was that the injury perceptualist can't explain why not, and more generally, that by assimilating pain experiences to perceptual experiences he risks making the former seem rather ordinary.

I want to argue that the injury perceptualist can avert this danger by exploiting the distinctiveness of somatosensory experiences in general. Descartes is well aware of this distinctiveness, and he registers it in precisely the case that interests us: "I am not only lodged in my body, like a sailor in a ship," he says, "[for if I were then] when my body is hurt ... I should not on that account feel pain ... but would perceive the damage purely by the intellect, just as a sailor perceives by sight if anything in his ship is broken" (M, 56). Descartes is right: being in pain is quite unlike being a sailor who sees the damaged state of his ship—or even the damaged state of his own body. But, again, I think the injury perceptualist can accommodate that by focussing on the peculiar modes of presentation involved in somatosensory experiences generally. To think otherwise—to think that registering the peculiarities of the bodily sensations requires subjective or private objects—is to commit what I earlier called a "projective error": it is to try to explain at the level of reference (the objects and properties of which pain experiences constitute awareness) peculiarities that in fact belong at the level of sense. In particular, the present suggestion (unlike the proposal in §1.3) is that we attend to the mode of presentation under which the relevant *individuals* are represented in pain experiences: persons, their bodies, and their body parts.

But precisely how should the injury perceptualist articulate these peculiarities of somatosensory experiences? One strategy in trying to give an account of the idiosyncrasies of such experiences would be to focus on the idea, mooted in Chapter 2 (§4.1), that body sense is an exception to the elusiveness thesis—the thesis which holds, recall, that subjects are never aware of themselves both as material objects and as conscious subjects. I mentioned that Hume, Wittgenstein, Kant and others have tenaciously endorsed this thesis, whereas recently Ayers, Brewer, Cassam and others have come to reject it, partly on the basis that whatever we say about other modes of perception, at least body sense is not eluded by the self. Now, it takes some work to formulate more precisely what this dispute amounts to; but on the face of it, might the denial that the self eludes body sense be the point the injury perceptualist needs?

There are two problems with thinking that it is. First, as I also mentioned in Chapter 2, almost all of those who deny that the self eludes body sense use an argument that depends on mentalism. For example, Brewer argues that the mentality of the bodily properties of which we are aware when we have sensations means that they are "properties of the body that
are also necessarily properties of the basic subject of that very awareness” (BAS, 300). And this, he thinks, provides a sense in which sensations constitute awareness of our bodily selves as subjects.35 Being a plainly mentalist strategy, however, this point is unavailable to our injury perceptualist.36 By contrast, one of Cassam’s arguments against the elusiveness thesis is, promisingly, non-mentalist. But here a second problem arises: Cassam’s argument leads him also to deny that the self eludes visual experiences. And if that is right, then we have lost our desired contrast between body sense and vision.

Despite these difficulties, we are on the right tracks. What we need is a point that is non-mentalist and yet preserves the contrast between sensations and visual experiences. In what follows, I suggest two ways of elaborating such a point. Notice, incidentally, that these points about the distinctiveness of somatosensory experiences should be of general interest—even to those who are not tempted to assimilate pain experiences to somatosensory experiences, and indeed even to those who deny pain intentionalism altogether.

**Being Aware that the Object of Experience is Oneself**

What does Cassam mean in claiming that the self eludes neither body sense nor vision? He means that both visual and somatosensory experiences ground first-person judgements that are, as the jargon has it, “immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person”. Call these, for short, “FP-immune judgements”. Take, for example, a somatosensorily based self-ascription: “My legs are crossed”. To say that this judgement, made on the basis of the subject’s somatosensory experience, is FP-immune is to say that it is impossible for it to be mistaken in the following way: though the thinker knows on the basis of that experience that someone’s legs are crossed, he is mistaken in judging that it is his legs that are crossed. This is impossible because when one gains knowledge somatosensorily that someone’s legs are crossed, one does so precisely by gaining knowledge that one’s own legs

35 See also Brewer’s BAS, 297 and 302; Ayers’s LK, ii, 286; and Cassam’s ISBS, 113–14, ISA, 328, and S&W, 57 and 77. Cassam also attributes something like this point to Husserl; see S&W, 57.

36 Since this idea is unavailable to the injury perceptualist, it is tempting to accuse the injury perceptualist of what (in another context) McDowell calls “displacing the concept of a human being from its focal position ... and replacing it with a philosophically generated concept of a human body” (CDK, 384). Cassam comes close to this accusation at S&W, 57, but it strikes me as harsh. If one is ever aware of one’s body as a subject, as Cassam thinks one is, then this would surely not be prevented if one were capable of enjoying, from amongst the bodily sensations, only transitive sensations—which clearly represent straightforwardly non-mental properties, such as one’s temperature and heart rate and so on—and not intransitive sensations. (Such a case would be quite different from the “deafferented” subject considered by Brewer at BAS, 301–3.) It is another way of putting this point to say that even those opponents of the elusiveness thesis who are not injury perceptualists will want additionally to endorse non-mentalist arguments against that thesis, if they agree that having intransitive sensations is not required for awareness of oneself as a subject. In Cassam’s, S&W, the points discussed below about “FP-immune” judgements figure as part of such a non-mentalist argument.
are crossed. Hence, it would be unintelligible in such a case for one to wonder: "Someone's legs are crossed, but are they my legs?". 37

As I said before, though, this point about FP-immunity cannot capture the distinctiveness of somatosensory experiences, since Cassam rightly extends it to a certain class of visually-based judgements. The spatial content of visual experiences is, he points out, egocentric: their objects are presented as standing in spatial relations to their subjects. You see Nelson's Column as in front of yourself, for example, or to the right of yourself. 38 Correlatively, Cassam argues, when you see Nelson's Column, even though you do not in the most straightforward sense see yourself, you are nevertheless aware of yourself as located at a certain place vis-à-vis the Column. And, Cassam continues, your judgements about your own location, based on this awareness, are FP-immune. It is, for example, impossible for you to know on the basis of such awareness that someone is in front of Nelson's Column, yet to be mistaken in thinking that it is you who is located there.

We need not be side-tracked by the question that is central for Cassam: which, if any, of the following notions can really be unpacked in terms of FP-immunity—experiencing yourself as yourself, or experiencing yourself as a subject, or experiencing your body as your body? 39 Instead, I shall use all three phrases simply to mean “experiencing yourself (or your body) in a way that grounds FP-immune judgements”. What is important for our purposes is the FP-immunity, not the notions that Cassam uses it to unpack. And the problem facing us is that both visual and somatosensory experiences ground FP-immune judgements; hence the sought-after contrast between these experiences still escapes us.

Nonetheless, I think there is a contrast. And it is this: only in somatosensory experiences is it manifest that the object of one's experience is, or is a part of, oneself—or, if you prefer, a part of one's own body. The best way to elucidate this suggestion is to contrast a somatosensory experience that has the feature in question with two visual experiences that lack it: in the first case, because the object of one's experience is neither oneself nor a part of oneself; and in the second, because it is not manifest that it is. So the three examples have the following structure:

37 See Cassam's S&W, 59-60. The notion of immunity to error is drawn from Wittgenstein (BB, 66-67), Strawson (BS, 164-5), Shoemaker (SRA), and Evans (VR, 179-91; 215-24). Admittedly, we can imagine a case in which A's brain is wired to B's body, and hence in which A wrongly judges on the basis of his experience that it is his own legs that are crossed, when in fact it is B's. But, to apply a point Evans makes in parallel cases (VR, 184-8; 221), such a situation would be sufficiently bizarre to undermine the claim that A knew at all that someone's legs were crossed in that case, and so the claim that his judgement is FP-immune remains untouched. (See also Cassam's S&W, 62-3). These cases call for caution in using the intelligibility of "Someone's legs are crossed, but are they mine?" as a test for FP-immune judgements; see Evans's VR, 189-90.

38 See Cassam's S&W, 45. See also Evans's VR, 143-4. Husserl too makes a lot of this idea; see Cassam's S&W, 52-3.

39 Brewer moves from my body to me, courtesy of a mentalist interpretation of intransitive sensations. See BAS, 302.
First, then, recall the example in which you see Nelson’s Column. In this case, you are aware of yourself as a subject, and perhaps as a material object too. But I still would want to say that in this case, unlike the somatosensory case, you are not the object of your experience. That might seem paradoxical, after I have agreed with Cassam’s point that in this visual case “one literally experiences the bodily self as located in the perceived world” (S&W, 53). But there clearly is some sense in which the object of your experience in this case is not you (or a part of you, or your body), but Nelson’s Column. For one thing, your experience of Nelson’s Column enables you to make a perceptual-demonstrative judgement about it, but not about yourself. That is at least one way in which you are “in the wings of the scene … never quite getting on to the stage” (Brewer, SLA, 17). And it is also one respect in which the awareness of yourself that you have when you see objects other than yourself is different from the awareness of yourself that is available somatosensorily.

Moving to the second example, suppose you’re in the bath and you look down to see your legs and feet. It is tempting to describe this as the converse of the preceding example: a case, that is, in which you are the object of your visual experience but are not aware of yourself as its subject. But this is too quick: for I think you are aware of yourself as its subject. Admittedly, some visually based self-ascriptions in the bath case will not be FP-immune: if you judge “My left foot is muddy”, for example, it might turn out (if the bath is big enough) that the foot you’re looking at, sticking out above the dirty water, is somebody else’s. However, other visually based judgements will be FP-immune: “Part of me is above that foot”, for example, thought as you look down towards your foot. So we should concede that in this case you are both the object of the experience and aware of yourself as its subject. But, even so, the experience crucially differs from a somatosensory experience in the following way: it is not manifest that the object of your experience is, or is a part of, you. To put it less contentiously, one judgement that crucially is not FP-immune in the bath case is

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40 See Cassam’s S&W, 70-71.
41 See Evans’s VR, 232.
this: "That left foot is my left foot". After all, recall that in the case of the shared muddy bath, the foot might turn out to be somebody else's.

So, in the first of these two visual cases, the object of your experience is neither you, nor a part of you, nor even a part of your body; in the second, it is not manifest that it is. Now let us return to somatosensory experiences. How does a somatosensory case differ from these two visual cases? Well, when you have a somatosensory experience, not only are you aware of yourself as yourself (as in the Nelson Column case), and not only are you the object of your awareness (as in the bath case), but it is manifest that you are. Again, the crucial point can be put in terms of FP-immunity. Suppose, for example, that you have a pain in your foot. In that case, not only does your experience ground both the perceptual-demonstrative judgement, That left foot is disordered, and the FP-immune judgement, My left foot is disordered, but it grounds the following FP-immune judgement: That left foot is my left foot. In this case, in other words, it would be unintelligible for you to wonder, "That left foot is someone's left foot, but is it my left foot?". And therein lies the distinctiveness of somatosensory experiences, unpacked in a non-mentalist way—and hence a way available to the injury perceptualist. Moreover, this seems to do justice to one of my earlier glosses on the idea of interiority: that the relationship between sensation experiences and their subject matter is somehow more intimate than the relationship between visual experiences and their subject matter. For the suggestion is that, when one is in pain, one somatosensorily represents oneself, and somatosensorily representing oneself is a matter not of one's merely having a sense of oneself as located yet "never quite getting onto the stage", nor of one's merely being the object of one's awareness, but rather of its being manifest that the object of one's experience is oneself. Again, you don't merely experience disorder there, or in that left foot: that would indeed be like being Descartes's sailor in a ship. Rather, you are confronted with something as a disordered part of yourself.

Martin and the Sense of Ownership of One's Body

Martin has explained the contrast between somatosensory and ordinary perceptual experiences in a way that is, I think, related to my own.\footnote{See his BA, 269-70, and SMSP, 206, and 209-10.} He speaks of a subject's somatosensory experience presenting her body as her body, rather than presenting herself as herself or herself as a subject. But, as before, what most concerns us are the terms used to explain these notions, not the unpacked notions themselves. So, what does Martin mean in
claiming that when a subject is somatosensorily aware of a body part, she is aware of it as a part of her own body, whereas when she sees it or touches it she is not?

Somatosensory experiences, like visual experiences, give us a sense of the boundary of our own bodies, and of something lying beyond them. What Martin thinks is distinctive about somatosensory experiences is the way in which they present that boundary. They present it as a limit to the region of which the subject can have somatosensory awareness, a region enclosed within a larger space of whose remainder she cannot be aware in that way. When a subject is aware, somatosensorily, of the position of her two raised arms, for example, she is aware of them as displaced across a space in which she has no somatosensory awareness (BA, 271; SMSP, 212). Again, when she has a sensation in her arm, she is aware of it—or, as the injury perceptualist will prefer, aware of its subject matter—as internal, in the sense that it is experienced as being within a region in which she has somatosensory awareness, that region being presented as set against a larger space in which she does not (SMSP, 212; S&T, 203, 209-10). By contrast, when she sees the boundary of her own body, this is a matter of her seeing both the body and what extends beyond it. She does not see her body as set against a space of which she can have no visual awareness; nor does she feel it, when touching it, as set against a space of which she can have no tactual awareness (SMSP, 214). So she does not see or tactually feel her body as being her own in Martin’s sense. Rather, when she perceives her body in those modes she can at best identify it as her own from amongst the other potential objects of her awareness. And this is where Martin’s account makes contact with mine: for I should want to point out that such identification that is involved in the visual case brings with it the possibility of misidentification, thus preventing “This is a part of my body” from being FP-immune.

Without invoking subjective, private, self-intimating, or infallibly accessible objects, then, the injury perceptualist can formulate in this way too an important sense in which the subject matter of pain experiences is presented as inner. When I am in pain, I experience disorder as located within a boundary of whose exterior I can have no similar awareness; I am aware that a part of my body—not just that body—is disordered. Pain experiences represent one’s own body in a way in which ordinary perceptual experiences never do.

Given these two ways of capturing the peculiarities of pain experiences at the level of somatosensory modes of presentation, rather than at the level of the experienced objects themselves, and given the preceding discussion of the ways in which we talk about pain experiences, and of their relationship to self-ascriptions and the attention, I think the injury

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43 See SMSP, 206, 209; S&T, 201.
perceptualist is well within his rights to claim that he has now discharged his responsibilities
vis-à-vis interiority; and what's more, he has gone some way towards explaining what led
his opponents astray.

4. CONCLUSIONS

That discussion of interiority brings this investigation of intentionalist accounts of the bodily
sensations to an end. Let us briefly take stock of our position.

We have seen a number of reasons for wanting to be intentionalists about
experiences, both in general and in the pain case. It was suggested, for example, that such an
approach promises not only to simplify our conception of mental phenomena, but also to
capture the subjectivity of experiences, to account for their qualitative or phenomenal
character, and moreover to enable them to play the crucial rationalising roles that the most
plausible theories of knowledge and content require them to play. Furthermore,
intentionalism promises all of this without incurring the difficulties that face the adverbialist
and also the friends of such items as qualia and private inner objects. By the lights of such
aspirations, however, the intransitive bodily sensations are apt to appear frustratingly
recalcitrant. For amongst the peculiarities and puzzles that I mentioned at the outset is the
fact that sensations have seemed—at least to philosophers, if not to others of their subjects—
to be representationally blank, to be instances of brute non-conceptual and uninformative
feeling. That attitude has become ingrained in the philosophical imagination, being held even
by many who have freed themselves from a Lockean conception of ordinary perceptual
experiences—even, that is, by many who have stopped modelling visual and other
experiences on sensations blankly conceived. So that was the conundrum that faced us.

The present study suggests, however, that it is realistic to hope that we might free
ourselves even from the presupposition of the Lockean tradition—to hope, in other words,
that there might be some satisfactory intentionalist account even of sensation experiences.
Such accounts would make available to us in the sensation case the benefits mentioned
above. Moreover, the non-mentalist versions of pain intentionalism that have, in this study,
seemed the most promising enable us to get along without the idea that we ever experience
private, or self-intimating, or infallibly accessible mental items. And those non-mentalist
versions of intentionalism are also ways of registering what ought to have seemed an obvious
fact about sensations—that, with respect to at least one subject matter, they must certainly are
informative: namely, our own bodies. Indeed, the content of such experiences is, I have
suggested, essentially bodily. We can be blinded to that by the traditional mantra that
sensations are blank.
Some of this might seem to caricature the intentionalist's opponent, for doesn't one version of the traditional view allow that we are aware of something when in pain: namely our pains, and perhaps even their being dotted about our bodies? Certainly. But as McDowell has shown us, the traditional incarnation of that idea exploits a notion of awareness—and of inner objects—that cannot be indulged by an intentionalist working with our demanding notion of intrinsic, conceptual, representational content. Though it ought to be resisted, the temptation to go in for something less demanding in the sensation case—to, in other words, embrace some form of Givenism—is understandable, since it both reflects and can seem to explain the idea that the subject matter of sensation experiences is peculiarly inner. For his part, while having no truck with the notion of non-conceptual awareness, McDowell tries to hang on both to the idea that people in pain are aware of pains and to the notion that pains are inner in some interesting, non-literal sense. But the radical subjectivist way in which he elaborates this last notion is, I argued, not only problematically circular, but also inconsistent with his intentionalism—with, that is, his idea that sensation experiences are conceptually classificatory episodes.

For my part, I have pursued the idea that we can nevertheless have much of what McDowell wants, even while renouncing his subjectivism. To be sure, having renounced subjectivism, I have argued we cannot retain McDowell's mentalism—or indeed, any version of mentalism. And that does complicate matters. It raises, for example, the following questions: What concepts might figure in the content of pain experiences, if not mentalistic concepts such as pain and hurting? How are we to ensure that the relevant contents are sufficiently specific and yet not too demanding? How are we to explain the fact that the judgements which pain experiences rationalise involve mentalistic concepts? And how are we to accommodate the idea that those experiences' objects are in some important sense transparent? But, though these are very real problems for an injury perceptualist operating with our full-blooded notion of content, and hence more serious problems than many injury perceptualists have appreciated, I have nevertheless made some preliminary moves in these final three chapters to suggest how such difficulties might be dealt with. And if they can successfully be dealt with, then, as I say, the injury perceptualist can have much of what McDowell wants: not only the thoroughgoing intentionalism—and thus, crucially, the satisfaction of our broadly epistemological desiderata—but also the idea that sensations are peculiarly inner and, in particular, quite unlike ordinary perceptual experiences. For I have just suggested that we can, in various ways, accommodate as much of that idea as we need to, without thinking of the subject matter of sensations either as radically private or as radically subjective.
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