AFFECTIVE PERCEPTION

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Abstract

This thesis aims to present and defend an account of affective perception. The central argument seeks to establish three claims. 1) Certain emotional bodily feelings (and not just psychic feelings) are world-directed intentional states. 2) Their intentionality is to be understood in perceptual terms: such feelings are *affective perceptions* of emotional properties of a certain kind. 3) These 'emotion-proper properties' are response-dependent in a way that entails that appropriate affective responses to their token instances qualify, *ipso facto*, as perceptions of those instances.

The arguments for (1) and (2) appeal directly to the phenomenology of emotional experience and draw heavily from recent research by Peter Goldie and Matthew Ratcliffe. By applying Goldie's insights into the intentional structure of psychic feelings to the case of emotional bodily feelings, it is shown that certain of the latter—particularly those pertaining to the so-called 'standard' emotions—exemplify world-directed intentionality analogous to the perceptual intentionality of tactile feelings. Adapting Ratcliffe's account of the analogy between tactile feelings and what he terms 'existential feelings', it is argued that standard emotional bodily feelings are at the same time intrinsically intentional world-directed perceptual states (affective perceptions) through which the defining properties of emotional objects (emotion-proper properties) are apprehended.

The subsequent account of these properties endorses a response-dependence thesis similar to that defended by John McDowell and David Wiggins and argues that tokening an appropriate emotional affective state in response to a token emotion-proper property is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for perception of that property (Claim (3)). The central claim is thus secured by appeal both to the nature of the relevant feelings and the nature of the relevant properties (the former being intrinsically intentional representational states and the latter being response-dependent in a way that guarantees the perceptual status of the former).

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Recent decades have witnessed an explosion of philosophical interest in the emotions. A wealth of research has been undertaken into a vast range of issues. However, two questions, which have proved particularly intractable, have dominated the debate: 'What are emotions?' and 'What is the nature, status, and significance of feeling (affect)?'. The two are, of course, closely connected: no account of what emotions are—no 'theory of emotion'—would be complete without mentioning affect; and equally, any adequate account the nature, status, and significance of affect would no doubt inform a theory of emotion.

This thesis broadly concerns the second question. However, given the close connection between the two, the first will occasionally enter the purview of the investigation. Whilst I do not offer a comprehensive theory of emotion, the account I develop in these pages does much to elucidate the nature and structure of the emotions—or at least a subset of them. My central aim is to give an account of a particular type of affect. Taking as my focus those visceral bodily feelings characteristic of the so-called 'standard emotions', I argue that such feelings constitute intrinsically intentional representational states—'affective perceptions'—through which certain kinds of response-dependent emotional properties—what I term, following Goldie, 'emotion-proper properties'—are apprehended.

The central argument comprises three key claims: 1) Certain visceral bodily feelings (and not just so-called 'psychic feelings') are world-directed intentional states. 2)

Their intentionality is to be understood in perceptual terms: such feelings are affective perceptions of emotion-proper properties. 3) These properties are response-dependent in a way that entails that appropriate affective responses to their token instances qualify, *ipso facto*, as perceptions of those instances.

These claims are themselves intimately related. Defending any one of them requires saying a great deal about the other two. Consequently, the core arguments are not confined exclusively to individual chapters but are instead developed to some extent throughout the thesis. The largely cumulative nature of these arguments reflects not only the intimate connection between the three key claims but also the fact that they touch on a number of complex and difficult issues which themselves require extended treatment: for example, issues concerning response-dependence, the metaphysics of emotion-proper properties, and the conditions of perception. Furthermore, it reflects the fact that my primary aim in this thesis lies not simply with stating an argument but with developing a detailed account of a complex and widely misunderstood phenomenon—a task which requires both taking stock of what others have had to say on these and related issues and getting clear about the ways in which these issues themselves bear on the concept of affective perception.

The account I set out to develop is most clearly viewed within a particular context: that of the broader debate surrounding the two questions mentioned above. As we will see, it is only when viewed in juxtaposition with certain paradigmatic theories of emotion that the underlying motivation for the account comes to the fore, as these theories all provide answers to the first question which entail inadequate answers to the second. More specifically, the account is motivated by a deep dissatisfaction with

attempts by existing theories to say what affect is and how it relates to emotion; this coupled with a strong sense that such theories are incompatible with certain aspects of the phenomenology of emotional experience. This phenomenology, I shall argue, suggests a role for affect quite different to anything acknowledged by traditional theories. In particular, it suggests that emotional feelings are often felt towards their objects in such a way that the feelings themselves constitute states through which those objects are encountered. As claims (1) and (2) make clear, these feelings, far from being mere nonintentional states of the body, instead turn out to play an ineliminable world-revealing role in emotional experience, as states through which emotion-proper properties are perceived.

Argument Summary

In outline, the argument runs as follows.

Motivating Claim

> The phenomenology of certain bodily feelings—notably those pertaining to the standard emotions—suggests that they are felt towards those emotions' intentional objects in a way that is not explained or even acknowledged by traditional theories of emotion, but which clearly *ought* to be explained (assuming the absence of prima facie reasons for discounting the phenomenology) by any account seeking to provide answers to the two central questions of emotion theory.

Argument for Claim (1)

Taking the phenomenology at face-value requires conceiving of certain standard emotional bodily feelings as world-directed intentional states. However, an account is needed of what this purported intentionality amounts to. Peter Goldie defends an account in which certain bodily feelings 'borrow' their intentionality from intrinsically intentional mental states, typically psychic 'feelings towards', with which they are closely associated. However, this account fails to accord with the relevant phenomenology, which reveals that the former feelings, and not just the latter, have intrinsic intentionality.

The phenomenology suggests that the bodily feelings in question are *essentially* feelings of properties of emotional objects. The key to understanding how 'mere' bodily feelings can enjoy intrinsic intentional representational content lies in understanding the fact that—again as attested to by the relevant phenomenology—these feelings have phenomenal and intentional aspects which are entirely inextricable in a way that entails that part of what it is for a token intentional bodily feeling to be that very feeling is for it to include, as part of its phenomenal content, a *felt impression* of an emotion-proper property. In outline, phenomenality and intentionality are inextricable in that it is impossible for a token standard emotional bodily feeling to have precisely the phenomenal content it does without it also having precisely the intentional (representational) content it does, and vice-versa. More specifically, it is impossible fully to describe how the body feels—to capture the phenomenal content of the feeling—without making reference to

the impression made upon it by certain properties of the emotional object (emotion-proper properties); and it is equally impossible to state what the feeling is a feeling *of*—i.e. to capture its intentional or representational content—without making reference to how the body feels.

Argument for Claim (2)

The only other bodily feelings with similar intrinsic representational structure, for which intentional and phenomenal contents are in this way inextricable, are perceptual feelings, the paradigm case being tactile feelings. Tactile feelings clearly indicate how it is possible for a mere bodily feeling to be at the same time a feeling of something external to the body. Matthew Ratcliffe gives an account of tactile feelings which shows them to have a dual-aspect structure comprising a world-aspect (or object-aspect) and a proprioceptive body-aspect which are inextricable in a way that parallels the inextricability of the phenomenal and intentional aspects of standard emotional bodily feelings. What Ratcliffe's account establishes is that it is in virtue of this structure that bodily feelings can be at the same time perceptions of things external to the body, states through which objects and their properties are experienced.

Ratcliffe's account also demonstrates that this dual-aspect structure is not limited to feelings involving direct contact with a bodily boundary (as in typical cases of tactile feeling) but is also exemplified by a range of bodily feelings, including visceral feelings. Applying Ratcliffe's insights to the case of standard emotional bodily feelings, it is clear that these too have a dual-

aspect structure in virtue of which they are able to represent emotion-proper properties and at least partly in virtue of which they qualify as *perceptions* of those properties. The "at least partly" leaves room for conditions which, according to prevailing views of perception, have to be satisfied by any candidate perceptual state, such as the condition that the state be appropriately causally related to the object of perception. The details of how these conditions are satisfied are bound up with the issues of response-dependence which surround Claim (3).

Argument for Claim (3)

Emotion-proper properties are best viewed on analogy with a popular conception of secondary qualities, particularly colours, according to which these are response-dependent properties. The account which best captures the way in which colours, and by analogy emotion-proper properties, are response-dependent—and in particular, which best captures the sense in which these depend for their existence jointly on the natures of the objects which instantiate them and the natures of the subjects who perceive them—is the so-called 'no-priority' theory defended by John McDowell and David Wiggins. It is a consequence of this theory that a state which qualifies as a proper response to a response-dependent property qualifies, ipso facto, as a perception of that property. Further examination of the analogy with colour properties makes clear that certain standard emotional bodily feelings qualify as proper responses to token emotion-proper properties in a way that ensures that all the

conditions of perception, and not just those pertaining to response-dependence, are satisfied.

As indicated above, the cumulative nature of the argument and the complexity of the issues involved mean that its key claims cannot be neatly compartmentalised into individual chapters. However, the arguments for Claim (1) can be found predominantly in chapters 1 and 2; those for Claim (2) are largely confined to chapters 2 and 3; while those for Claim (3) mostly occupy chapters 3 and 4. More specifically, the individual chapters look like this.

Chapter Summary

Chapter 1: Three Paradigms of Emotion Theory

I begin with some preliminary remarks aimed at clarifying the terms of the discussion and locating it within the context of the debate surrounding the aforementioned two questions. I then introduce the three traditionally dominant paradigms of emotion theory by way of sketching those accounts which I take to be most exemplary of them: the affect theory of William James, the austere cognitivism of Robert Solomon and Martha Nussbaum, and the dual-component theory of William Lyons. I criticise all three accounts for being insensitive to, and for failing adequately to accommodate, the phenomenology of emotional experience, and for implicitly assuming that affectivity and intentionality are mutually exclusive properties of states. The upshot is that all three paradigms fail to account for the fact that certain feelings are *felt*

towards emotional objects in a way that requires reconceiving of them as world-directed intentional states.

Chapter 2: Affect and Intentionality

In discussing the phenomenology of affect, I present an alternative view of feeling to that traditionally sanctioned by Anglophone philosophers. The traditional view treats all feelings on the model of itches, pains, and tickles, as brute, unstructured sensations revealing nothing more about the world than—at best—the relative state of the subject's body. Against this, I argue that many feelings are complex, richly-structured, world-directed intentional states. In developing my argument, I draw from recent work by Peter Goldie and Matthew Ratcliffe. Goldie's account reveals an intriguing internal connection between emotional phenomenality and intentionality—a connection which suggests that certain emotional bodily feelings are structurally akin to tactile feelings. Chapter 2 aims primarily to elucidate this connection and demonstrate how the arguments of the two accounts can be marshalled in support of the claim that bodily feelings are capable of full intentionality. Here Ratcliffe's account is crucial, demonstrating how visceral feelings can at the same time function as world-revealing perceptual states despite the physical distance between them and what they reveal.

Chapter 3: Affective Perception and Emotion-Proper Properties

Chapter 3 contains my central arguments for the claim that bodily feelings can play a perceptual role in apprehending emotion-proper properties. This mode of

perception—affective perception—is analogous in many respects to aspect-perception and has much in common with both ordinary tactile experience and cases of tactile-visual sensory substitution. In order fully to elucidate both the structure of affective perception and the nature of emotion-proper properties, I locate the discussion within the context of a certain kind of emotional perception: that particular, emotionally-charged way of engaging with emotional objects which necessarily involves feeling emotion towards them and which represents them as instantiating emotion-proper properties. These properties, I suggest, are response-dependent in such a way that genuine and appropriate responses to them—including, most importantly, affective responses—qualify automatically as perceptions of them.

Chapter 4: Response-Dependence

Chapter 4 explores the response-dependence claim in detail. After first stating the claim more precisely using a model appropriated from McDowell (1998) and Wiggins (1998), I proceed to examine some of its most significant explanatory advantages. I then clarify what I mean by an appropriate emotional response and explore in more detail the perceptual—particularly the *affective* perceptual—nature of such responses.

Chapter 5: Issues, Objections, and Implications

With the central argument in place, I consider what I take to be the most powerful objections to it. After defending the account against these, I briefly address some outstanding issues before exploring the claims of two rival integrative theories—those of Louis Charland and Sabine Döring—to provide accounts of affective perception. I

argue that my account enjoys significant explanatory advantages over these accounts. Finally, I sketch two of the most important consequences of my account concerning the epistemology of value and the legitimacy of the cognition-affect distinction.

Conclusion

I end by briefly summarising and concluding the results of the investigation, and by noting the potential the account has to contribute to the myriad debates which have recently sprung up around many of the issues raised in this thesis.

CHAPTER 1

Three Paradigms of Emotion Theory

Introduction

The account set out in the following chapters is motivated largely by the inadequacies of the prevailing theories of emotion, particularly in respect of their treatment of affect. My aim in this chapter is to sketch the best-known of these theories with a view to exposing these inadequacies and making clear the motivations behind my account. The account itself is in part a reaction to those theories of emotion which either ignore affect altogether or radically misconstrue its relation to the intentional dimensions of emotion.

The accounts outlined below I take to be exemplars of the three dominant paradigms of emotion theory: affect theory, austere cognitivism, and dual-component cognition-affect theory. As exemplars, they embody the core claims that are definitive of each kind of approach and, as such, are susceptible to the key criticisms commonly levelled against the three approaches. It should be noted that many of these criticisms are not ones I myself endorse. (For example, I am particularly sceptical of the criticisms aimed at the standard interpretation of the James-Lange theory; and, indeed, of the interpretation itself.) However, including them serves a useful heuristic purpose, as it brings to the fore the issues and concerns which motivate each of the three paradigms

and have led proponents of each kind of approach to neglect the intentional capacity of feelings—and thus, inevitably, to misconstrue the epistemic significance of affect.

In what follows, then, after some preliminary remarks I briefly outline the central tenets of the three accounts. Starting with the affect theory of William James, before proceeding to the austere cognitivism of Robert Solomon, I locate each account within its critical context, citing the key reasons which led to its widespread decline in popularity. I then turn to the dual-component theory of William Lyons before presenting an objection which, whilst ostensibly targeted at dual-component theories in particular, goes to the heart of all three paradigms. As we will see, all three fail to get the phenomenology of emotional experience right; and all three rest on the fallacious assumption that affectivity and intentionality are mutually exclusive and ontologically independent properties of emotional states. The upshot is that all three paradigms fail to take account of the fact that emotional feelings are felt towards external objects in a way that requires reconceiving of them as world-directed intentional states that play an ineliminable role in experience of emotional objects.

Cognition vs. Affect

The history of analytic (and to some extent continental) philosophy of emotion has been largely shaped by attempts to explain two features which are widely regarded as essential properties of emotion: intentionality and phenomenality.[1] The debate about how each ought to be accounted for in relation to the other has been the most divisive in the history of emotion theory. The resulting dialectic has taken many forms over

[1] For a summary of this history, see Döring and Reisenzein (2009).

the years, but is most recently, and perhaps also most clearly, manifest in the dispute between cognitivism and affect theory—two broad camps which adopt radically different stances towards the issue of whether, or to what extent, cognition and affect ought to be accommodated by a theory of emotion.[2]

Recent philosophical tradition has, for the most part, observed a broad distinction within emotion theory between cognitivism and noncognitivism. The former includes any theory on which emotions essentially involve cognitions; the latter, any theory on which emotions do not essentially involve cognitions. Cognitive theories postulate intentional mental states and processes—usually evaluative judgements—as the core features of all emotions. They can be divided into two groups: austere reductive theories, and multi-component theories. According to the former, an emotion simply is—that is, is to be indentified with—an evaluative judgement of the appropriate kind. According to the latter, emotions also have additional necessary components: for example, affects, physiological changes, motivational impulses, and behavioural manifestations. By far the most popular versions of multi-component theory are what I term (following Döring and Reisenzein, 2009) 'cognition-affect' theories (often also called 'hybrid' theories). These postulate affects, often in combination with further features, as the additional elements. The cognitive element is typically taken to cause the affective element, with the emotion itself being identified with the resulting compound.

[2] What is meant by the term 'emotion'? Getting philosophers to agree even in principle about what emotions are is no simple matter; however, for the purposes of this discussion, it will suffice to define emotion extensionally, simply as the genus of which fear, anger, disgust, pity, envy, jealousy, pride, shame, remorse, guilt, and their kin, are species.

Cognition-affect theories can be further subdivided into two groups. 'Dual-component' cognition-affect theories conceive of the cognitive and affective aspects of emotion as substantive, ontologically distinct components.[3] These are contrasted with those 'integrative' theories which attempt to unite the intentional and phenomenal aspects of emotion in a more subtle way, without recourse to the postulation of two discrete components. While recent years have seen a sharp increase in the number of integrative accounts being put forward, particularly in philosophy, dual-component theories continue to enjoy popularity in both philosophy and psychology.

In contrast with cognitivism, non-cognitive theories do not view cognitions as essential constituents of emotions. Rather, the emotion is to be identified with something else entirely—usually the affects, physiological changes, or behavioural manifestations postulated by the multi-component theorist. Again, by far the most popular version of non-cognitivism—'affect theory'—identifies affect as the key ingredient. Thus, emotions are taken essentially to be kinds of (usually bodily) feeling. Together, austere cognitivism, affect theory, and dual-component theory form the three major paradigms of emotion theory. However, before considering examples of these paradigms, a few further terminological remarks are in order.

[3] I will say more about the sense in which the two components are conceived to be substantive and distinct later on. It should be noted that in using the term 'dual-component theory' in this way I am not referring to theories which postulate only two components as individually necessary and jointly sufficient for emotion. Indeed, I am aware of no theory for which this is the case. Most multi-component theories postulate further necessary components; e.g., Ben-Ze'ev (2004) identifies emotions with complexes which essentially involve cognitive, affective, motivational, and evaluative elements. Rather, and reflecting the fact that our focus lies with understanding the relation between the cognitive and affective dimensions of emotion, I use it to describe those theories which treat affect and cognition as substantive components which (in addition to any other features) are in some way central to (if not always strictly necessary for) the majority of emotions.

The terms ‘cognition’ and ‘affect’, along with their grammatical variants, have become notoriously equivocal, assuming a variety of different meanings in the work of different philosophers and psychologists. Consequently, in philosophical discussions of emotion, the terms are frequently left undefined or are given only very general elucidations. Nussbaum, for example, states that “by ‘cognitive’ I mean nothing more than ‘concerned with the receiving and processing of information’” (2001, p.23). ‘Affect’ is often given a similarly sparse definition, usually simply in terms of ‘emotional feeling’ (itself a dangerously vague and equivocal phrase). The consistent failure to arrive at a useful and robust account of these concepts has had a pernicious effect on the philosophy of emotion in general, and on the cognition-affect debate in particular. As we will see, part of the reason for this failure is that beneath these vague concepts lies a set of common, deep-rooted metaphysical assumptions about the relative status of cognition and affect and the relation between them. For, it is obvious from the literature that most commentators on the cognition-affect debate are (implicitly or explicitly) committed to understanding the concepts in a way that entails their mutual exclusivity. Cognition and affect, it is assumed, are mutually exclusive features of states. This assumption lies at the heart of the cognition-affect debate; and, as we will see, the debate itself is to a large extent set up around the apparent tension between the cognitive and affective dimensions of emotion. If the central arguments of this thesis are correct, then this assumption is false. Consequently, the entire agenda which seeks to define cognition and affect by setting them in opposition and treating them as incommensurable properties is fundamentally flawed. Instead, as I shall argue in Chapter 5, a more useful approach would seek to dissolve the cognition-affect distinction altogether.

That said, I am not against using the terms 'cognition' and 'affect' to describe emotions at an appropriately coarse-grained level, so long as their use does not imply commitment to an unwarranted exclusivism. To avoid begging any questions, I follow established philosophical tradition and use the terms only in their most general senses. As a first approximation, I take 'cognition' to be roughly synonymous with 'thought', referring to those mental states (the paradigm cases being beliefs and judgments) which are involved with the manipulation of concepts or, to echo Nussbaum, 'the receiving and processing of information' (on an appropriately broad construal of 'information'). And, again following standard philosophical practice, I take 'affect' simply to refer to any feeling, sensation, or other phenomenal state—whether bodily or purely 'psychic'—which features in emotional experience.[4] This much ought to be relatively uncontroversial. Nothing I say below requires commitment to more specific definitions of these terms; and nothing about this way of glossing the notions of cognition and affect is incompatible with the way the authors of the following three accounts characterise the concepts. With that out of the way, let us now consider the three accounts in turn.

Affect Theory

The most widely discussed and influential version of affect theory is the so-called James-Lange theory. At roughly the same time that William James published 'What is an Emotion?' (in *Mind*, 1884), the psychologist C. G. Lange was developing a highly similar account. The central thesis of both theories is this: emotion is essentially the *perception*—occasionally the 'awareness', 'feeling', 'consciousness', or

[4] Note that the term is often used in a narrower sense by modern psychologists to refer either to patterns of physiological change or to consciousness of those changes.

'experience'—of physiological changes caused by the subject's awareness of external stimuli. This thesis is contrasted with what James terms the "natural way" of thinking about emotions, according to which "the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and…this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression" (1884, p.189). For James this is to reverse the actual causal order of events; for it is not the emotion, caused by the perception of a stimulus, which engenders bodily changes; rather, the emotion itself just *is* the awareness of these changes (themselves provoked *directly* by the exciting perception) as they occur. As James famously puts it:

> My thesis…is that *the bodily changes follow directly the* PERCEPTION *of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur* IS *the emotion*. (1884, pp.189-190)

Thus, according to James:

> Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry, and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened, and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry, and strike… [T]he more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble… (1884, p.190)

Emotions, then, are feelings, pure and simple. Of course, James provides a thorough and articulate account of what he takes to be the psychological and physiological concomitants of emotion; but the emotion itself—the actual phenomenon considered in isolation—is, in essence, nothing more than a sensation of visceral disturbance triggered automatically by the perception of salient events or objects in the subject's environment. The perceptions themselves, along with the various physiological changes, may be causally necessary conditions of emotion, but they are not, on this view, part of the emotion proper.

The main argument James offers in support of his account—what he calls the "vital point" of his whole theory—is this:

> If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no "mind stuff" out of which the emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains. (1884, p.193)

James's thought-experimental methodology seems prima facie sound: subtract the sensations characteristic of a given emotion from the emotional experience and there seems to be nothing of the emotion left behind, no further mental residue, which might constitute its essence. According to James, any residual mental state or process would surely not merit the title 'emotion'; for, "Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colourless, destitute of emotional warmth" with the consequence that one could encounter a bear, for example, and judge that one ought to flee, or receive an insult and deem it appropriate to strike, but without actually *feeling* afraid or angry (1884, p.190). An encounter with a bear which included feelings "neither of quickened heart-beats nor of shallow breathing, neither of trembling lips nor of weakened limbs, neither of goose-flesh nor of visceral stirrings" would not, it seems, count as an emotional encounter, still less an episode of fear (1884, p.194). For, in the absence of such feelings, there does not appear to be anything left from which the emotion itself could be constituted. There thus seems, on this account, to be nothing essential to the concept of emotion over and above sensations of physiological change.[5]

[5] Of course, the subject need not be aware of them *as* sensations of physiological change. That they are feelings *of physiological change* need not be apparent in the experience.

Those emotions which involve 'waves of bodily disturbance' accompanying perceptions of exciting objects (including typical cases of fear, anger, surprise, lust, and the like) are what James calls the 'standard emotions': mental states with distinct bodily expressions or manifestations which are strongly characterisable 'from both within and without' (1884, p.189).[6] And whilst James makes it clear that his focus lies with the standard emotions, he insists his account applies equally to the more 'cerebral' emotions—the 'moral', 'intellectual', and 'aesthetic' emotions—such as those concerning intellectual curiosity or the experience of music, which appear prima facie to lack any bodily or affective characterisation. Thus, according to James, the 'bodily sounding-board' figures as much in the experience of these subtler intellectual emotions as it does in the coarser, more visceral emotions like fear and anger. In all cases, on this view, the essence of the emotion lies in the subject's affective awareness of certain reflexive bodily perturbations. And for all emotion-types, the affective experiences characteristic of them, and indeed the particular combinations of physiological disruptions which underpin them, will be unique. Thus, emotions of all types can be distinguished from one another and from non-emotional conscious states in virtue both of their unique physiological constitutions and their particular qualitative (affective) characters.

Despite its early popularity, by the end of the Twentieth Century James's account had become deeply unpopular with philosophers and psychologists alike,[7] not least amongst those for whom emotions comprised precisely the sorts of 'cognitive acts'

[6] Several philosophers have attempted to draw conceptual taxonomic distinctions between different sets of emotion-types. Damasio (1994/2006, 2000), for example, distinguishes evolutionarily hardwired 'primary' ("innate, preorganized, Jamesian") emotions from 'secondary' (conditioned, learned) emotions; LeDoux (e.g. 1996) and others (e.g. Ekman, 1999; cf. Griffiths, 1997, 2004) distinguish 'basic' from non-basic emotions along similar lines. As we will see, it is the standard emotions that my account is most concerned with.

[7] Although, for recent neo-Jamesian accounts, see Damasio (1994/2006) and Prinz (2004b).

which James dismissed as mere ‘pale’ and ‘colourless’ judgements and which for him were so starkly incongruent with the ‘warmth’ and ‘glow’ that he took to be self-evidently definitive of emotional experience as to be quite obviously unworthy of consideration as potential constituents of emotion. Indeed, for many of James’s critics, affect is not just not sufficient for emotion; it is not even necessary.

The objections commonly levelled against James’s account have been well-documented in the philosophical literature. However, as many of them are in no small part responsible for motivating the cognitivist accounts which became so dominant in Anglophone philosophy of emotion, it is worth briefly noting the most prevalent and influential of them. They are as follows. 1) Identifying emotions with conscious experiences (i.e. feelings of physiological change) precludes the possibility of non-conscious emotions—a consequence which contradicts the tenets of much psychoanalytic theory. 2) Such identification seems incompatible with the high degree of intelligence and conceptual sophistication exhibited by many emotions. Emotions often embody high levels of cunning, strategy, purpose, and goal-directedness, as well as degrees of information processing, inductive and deductive reasoning, concept manipulation, and other complex thought processes. Such ‘intelligence’ apparently tells against the hypothesis that emotions are ‘mere’ feelings of bodily change. Related to this is 3) emotions are often cognitively penetrable: they are susceptible to the influence of rational thought and the assimilation of salient information. Changes in relevant cognitive and conative states bring with them changes in the corresponding emotional states, again suggesting that the latter are not merely bodily feelings—for how can bodily feelings possibly be thus influenced by the likes of beliefs and desires?—but are themselves something akin to beliefs and desires. 4) Contra James,

for any emotion-type, it seems conceptually possible to experience the relevant affect without experiencing the relevant (or indeed any) emotion. Thus, whatever affective state-types (feelings of heat or constriction, pain and trembling, etc.) are purportedly identical with any given emotion-type, it seems possible to token those feelings (for example, as a result of drugs or illness) but without experiencing the relevant emotion. And conversely, 5) it seems possible to be in an emotional state without undergoing any of the relevant physiological changes or having conscious access to any of the physiological states that are supposedly responsible for the generation of emotion (indeed, emotions often outstrip their physiological manifestations; complex emotions like love can span decades). 6) Equating emotions with feelings cuts off an important avenue of behavioural explanation; for if emotions are feelings then it becomes extremely difficult to rationalise emotional behaviour and emotionally-sprung action. Not only that, but without postulating any sort of cognitive content for emotions, it is difficult to explain the apparently fundamental role (one attested to by a wealth of recent psychological research) played by emotion in reasoning and decision-making. And finally, 7) again contra James, bodily feelings do not appear to be fine-grained enough to distinguish between different emotion-types and between emotions and non-emotional bodily states, with the consequence that such feelings must apparently be conjoined with additional elements (e.g. judgements) in order for the emotions to be available for individuation.[8]

Now, it should be noted that the interpretation of James's position offered here is a gloss on what I take to be the 'standard', most widely endorsed interpretation which

[8] I here leave open questions concerning the fairness and effectiveness of these criticisms, which deal with wide-ranging and highly complex issues extending well beyond the scope of this thesis. However, I should note that, for my part, I happen to think that most, if not all, of these objections are misplaced. James's account is far more subtle and robust than it is usually given credit for. Properly understood, the account has resources sufficient to address, and arguably to overcome, all of these objections.

draws almost exclusively on James's 1884 and 1890 statements. However, it is an interpretation about which, in this thesis, I am happy to remain agnostic.[9] I cite it, firstly, because it enjoys such widespread credence. Secondly, it provides a clear, paradigmatic example of the affect theory. (Indeed, it is often cited as the archetypal affect theory: not only does it propose that emotions are nothing over and above certain kinds of feelings, it insists that these are bodily feelings comprising reflexive awareness of internal physiological changes; and this is just what affect, at least according to the most common *psychological* uses of the term, is supposed to be.) And thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, because it is the account *as thus interpreted* that led in no small part to the renaissance of philosophical cognitivism of the 1960s and 1970s.

However, the criticism which has traditionally proved most damaging to affect theory has not yet been mentioned. This is the worry that bodily feelings are incapable of accounting for the rich intentionality of emotions. It is almost universally agreed by emotion theorists that emotions are inherently intentional states: they are directed *towards* or are *about* certain objects (people, events, situations, states of affairs, etc.), whether real or imaginary, concrete or abstract. However, bodily feelings do not appear to be the kinds of things which can be intentional in the relevant sense. An icy feeling in the pit of one's stomach, for example, does not seem to be *about* anything at all. It does not appear to be the kind of state about which it makes conceptual sense to say that it has an intentional object of the kind involved in emotion. Such feelings, so the objection goes, are simply brute affects, experiences of bodily changes entirely devoid of intentionality. Of course, as James noticed, bodily feelings are often *caused*

[9] See Ratcliffe (2005b, 2008a) for a sympathetic interpretation of James. For alternative unorthodox readings see also Cooper (2002), Ellsworth (1994), Redding (1999), Reisenzein *et al* (1995), and papers in Donnelly (1992).

by appropriate events, people, and states of affairs, but we must resist the temptation of equating the intentional objects of emotions with their causes. My headache may be caused by excessive alcohol, but it does not follow that it is about the alcohol. It does not seem to be *about* anything at all. As we will see in the next chapter, some philosophers, for example Tim Crane (e.g. 2003), have argued that bodily feelings possess intentionality to the extent that they are 'directed towards' or 'represent' the parts of the body in which they are located. Thus, in a limited sense, my headache is about my head: it carries a degree of information about the state of my head. But this is not the relevant kind of intentionality. The intentionality involved in emotion is world-directed intentionality. It aims at objects beyond the boundaries of the body: lovers, rivals, relationships, road traffic accidents, etc.[10]

Austere Cognitivism

The assumption that bodily feelings are categorically incapable of world-directed intentionality underpins and motivates the most popular cognitivist theories. If emotions aim at objects in the world then they must, it seems, necessarily involve intentional mental states, the obvious candidates being beliefs, desires, and judgements. On the most austere versions of cognitivism, such as the reductive accounts of Solomon (1973/1980, 1976/1993) and Nussbaum (2001), emotions are nothing more than judgements of a particular kind. According to Solomon, emotions are normative judgements, or complexes of judgements, specifically concerning one's Self and one's status in the world. Against the James-Lange theory, with its

[10] Interestingly, some readings of James (e.g. Goldie, 2000; Reisenzein *et al*, 1995) deny that he is silent on the issue of emotional intentionality. In developing his account of 'derived' intentionality, Goldie takes his lead directly from James; while Reisenzein *et al* explicitly attribute to James a theory of derived intentionality. (See Chapter 2.)

conception of emotions as feelings triggered by external stimuli, Solomon argues that "a perception of an incident alone is never sufficient for emotion, which always involves a personal *evaluation* of the *significance* of that incident". He continues:

> How else could we account for the fact that different persons have very different "emotional reactions" to the same incidents? Of course, it can be correlated with and attributed to differences in background and "conditioning", but that explains only the genesis of the differences, not their nature. Those differences can be easily accounted for once we have given up the influential model of the emotions as passive "reactions". They are not reactions but interpretations. They are not responses to what happens but evaluations of what happens. And they are not responses to those evaluative judgements but rather they *are* those judgements. (1976/1993, p.126)

The equation of emotions with evaluative judgements also apparently enables a more satisfactory analysis of the intellectual emotions. Those emotions such as envy and resentment, which seem to involve a great deal of thought and strategy, do not seem to be adequately accounted for on the Jamesian model, despite James's insistence that they too constitute perceptions of bodily changes triggered reflexively by awareness of appropriate objects. For a start, they seem essentially to involve beliefs, desires, and evaluations. One cannot be envious of another person unless (as Hume, 1739/2000, famously pointed out) one believes that person to have something one desires. And insofar as one desires something, the desideratum is judged to be somehow *valuable*: it is invested with value and significance. On this view, these cognitive-evaluative components are essential for the emotion: one simply cannot *be* envious unless one has certain beliefs and desires, and makes certain evaluations. These features are logically required conditions of envy. And what is more, according to Solomon and Nussbaum, they can be subsumed under a single concept: that of evaluative judgement. In envy one judges that certain possessions belonging to another are valuable and desirable; just as in anger one judges oneself or one's kin (or

perhaps one's moral sensibilities) to have been offended. On this view, such evaluative judgements are no mere causally necessary conditions of emotion. They are constitutive of the emotion itself. Emotions *just are* judgements of the appropriate evaluative kind.

It is worth noting, even in outline, another advantage of the emotions-are-judgements thesis: its ability to account for what we might generically call the *intelligence* of emotion—specifically its context-, belief-, and information-sensitivity; its purported role in reasoning and decision-making; and its conceptual sophistication, 'logical' structure, and functional rationality. Ronald de Sousa (1980b, 1987, 2003a, 2007), John Elster (1999), and Patricia Greenspan (1988/1993, 2004) are among those who have explored in detail the rationality of emotion; while recent work by, for example, Calhoun (2004), Goldie (2002c), Koch (1987), and Solomon (2003), details the numerous ways in which emotions are capable of adapting to new information and tracking salient events with remarkable precision. Ben-Ze'ev (2004), Charland (1995a), Gordon (1987), Greenspan (1980), and Solomon (1976/1993, 1977) are among the many who claim that emotions are governed by their own discernable 'logic'. According to Solomon, for example, emotions embody a common system of rules, norms, and strategies. There are purported to be distinct principles of inference underlying emotional judgements, and intricate nomological relations between emotions, reasons, and actions. In sum:

> Emotions are not the brutish, unlearned, uncultured, illogical and stupid drives that they are so often argued to be. To the contrary, they are extremely subtle, cunning, sophisticated, cultured, learned, logical and intelligent. There is more intelligence in resentment than in the routine calculations of syllogizing; and there is far more strategy in envious Iago than in thoughtful Hamlet. (Solomon, 1977, p.46)

The intellectual properties of emotions are brought out sharply upon consideration of their ability to be rationalised and explained. We often tell people why they have no *reason* to be afraid, jealous, sad, etc. We provide rational justifications for people's emotions, or point out why they are wrong to have the emotions they do. As Aristotle had noted (e.g. in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1125b26-1126b9) emotions can be appropriate or inappropriate, warranted or unwarranted, justified or unjustified, according to the nature of their objects. Emotions seem, like beliefs and judgements, to aim at truth. We respect those emotions which approximate the truth and condemn those which deviate from it. Emotions, then, are not 'mere', 'unthinking' affects; many of them appear more like cognitive states which are highly sensitive to, and indeed intimately bound up with, our broader informational and conceptual capacities. This cognitive sophistication is easily accounted for on the hypothesis that emotions are or include evaluative judgements: complex cognitive states endowed with intellectual and conceptual structure. However, on these issues affect theories like James's remain largely silent, their conceptions of emotion apparently too impoverished to account for the psychological complexity and rational structure of emotional states.

Thus, according to the austere cognitivist, James was simply wrong when he claimed that, if we abstract from our consciousness of some emotion all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, we find no "mind stuff" out of which the emotion can be constituted, and that a "cold and neutral state of intellectual perception" is all that remains. What one is left with, according to the cognitivist, is a complex of intricate and highly sophisticated cognitive structures about which a great deal can be said. These structures turn out to be precisely the 'mere cognitive acts' which were so

summarily dismissed by James as self-evidently unemotional. On this view, feelings are not necessary, let alone sufficient, for emotion. Solomon argues that many emotions do not appear to have any characteristic feelings and that even for those emotion-types that do often involve feelings, these feelings are far from ubiquitous. Affects, then, are treated by the austere cognitivist as peripheral phenomena: the mere causal antecedents of emotions proper or the insignificant symptoms of prior emotional states. (Solomon again: “feelings no more constitute emotions than an army of fleas constitutes a homeless dog” (1976/1993, p.97).)

However, austere cognitivism is not without its problems, many of which have recently been the subject of rigorous debate. For example, many emotions simply do not appear to take the form of judgements. They often seem too reflexive, too immediate. Many tokens of emotions like fear appear, as James pointed out, to be automatic, evolutionarily pre-programmed bodily reactions exhibiting little or no intellectual structure—a fact apparently attested to by the relevant phenomenology. Consider, for instance, the case of John, an arachnophobe, who unexpectedly encounters a spider one day whilst cleaning the bathroom. John is busy scrubbing the tub when all of a sudden a spider scuttles out of the plughole. His emotional reaction is instant: he involuntarily shrieks and leaps back; his heart is pounding, and his stomach is doing summersaults. From John’s point of view, his experience of the spider does not strike him as the making of a judgement. Asked to describe his fear, John does not characterise his reaction as one which involves seeing the spider and then forming an evaluative judgement about it, e.g. to the effect that it is dangerous. Rather, he describes his fear in terms of the way its object appears: he describes *experiencing* the spider as being a certain way—namely, as being *scary*. And

characteristic of John's experience is the feeling of fear. It is the feelings—the affects—not the judgements, which appear overwhelmingly at the forefront of experience, and which for John are, along with the appearance of the object, definitive of the emotional episode.

Of course, the cognitivist might respond simply by claiming that this tells us nothing more than that some judgements are immediate, automatic, and unconscious; that some judgements—perceptual judgements being a case in point—are made automatically and without the subject being consciously aware of making them. This seems perfectly consistent with many definitions of judgement, for example Nussbaum's (2001) Stoic-inspired definition of judgement as an assent to (an endorsement of) an appearance: an acceptance (tacit or explicit) of things being the way they appear to be.

However, the objection goes deeper than this. For, many philosophers have argued that, even accepting that the relevant phenomenology is compatible with such notions of judgement, there are good reasons for thinking that the notion of judgement, however it is glossed, must be too strong to allow a wholesale reduction of emotions to judgements. The thesis that emotions are evaluative judgements is put under pressure by the fact that emotions appear to be subject to different epistemic norms and laws of rationality to those governing judgements and beliefs. For example, emotions can be, and often are, deemed 'irrational' insofar as the content of the supposed judgement is demonstrably not something the subject would assent to or in any way endorse as true. Phobias are an obvious example. No matter how harmless something is, and no matter how much the subject is aware of its harmlessness, it can

still figure as the object of a phobia. John might be perfectly aware that the spider is harmless and yet still persist in his fear. However, instances of cognitively impenetrable emotions seem to cast serious doubt on the thesis that emotions are evaluative judgements.[11] John's fear of the spider does not entail, let alone reduce to, a belief or judgement that it is dangerous. This seems to put immense pressure on the cognitivist thesis that emotions are just such evaluative judgements. After all, if emotions are judgements, they should be appropriately defeasible and cognitively penetrable. At least when the subject is reflectively aware of the judgements being made, those judgements ought to be open to revision in light of evidential or rational defeaters.

There are other problems too: including, for example, the fact that cognitivism seems unable to account for apparently objectless emotions and emotional responses to fiction; the claim that it is incapable of providing a substantive account of the differences between genuine emotions and non-emotional evaluative judgements (it seems possible to make all the evaluative judgements supposedly sufficient for emotion but without experiencing any emotion); as well as the charge that cognitivism neglects the roles of neurology, physiology, and behaviour in its analysis of emotion.[12] However, unsurprisingly, the most common complaint against austere cognitivism is simply that it completely ignores (or at least radically understates the significance of) affect.

[11] This point has been made in various ways by a number of philosophers, including Charles (2004), Döring (2007, 2009, 2010), Goldie (2000), and Roberts (2003). It is one that, for reasons that will become apparent, I happen to agree with. As we will see, emotions are typically more like *ways of perceiving* than ways of judging.

[12] Again, I do not necessarily agree with these objections. I happen to think that elements of each paradigm are accurate for certain token emotions but not for others. Recall, I am not here focussing on the question of what emotions are. Instead my aim is to provide an account of a particular kind of affect. Once this is in place, we will be in a much better position to tackle the 'First Question' of emotion theory (see Introduction).

Far from being the mere unimportant symptoms of prior emotional states, feelings have come to be considered by many as centrally important to the structures and identities of (if not all then at least most) emotions, both types and tokens. The difference between (merely) judging an object to be dangerous or frightening, for example, and actually *feeling fear* towards it could not be greater—a fact that will be obvious to anyone who has ever experienced genuine fear. As Goldie (2000, p.12) puts it: "Feelings are, as we all know, at the heart of emotion".

In the terms of James's thought experiment: upon subtracting all affect from the experience of an emotion, while one may not be left merely with a "cold and neutral state of intellectual perception", neither does one seem to be left with the 'essence' of emotion. For many of the reasons cited by the cognitivists—not least the fact that emotions are contentful intentional states—emotions do not appear to be 'mere' affects; but nor do they seem to be reducible to ('mere') cognitions. James's claim that, absent affect, we are left with pure intellectual perception is overly pessimistic. In the case of many emotions we are surely left with more than that; including, in most cases, a complex of normative evaluative judgements. But we seem to be left with *nothing more* than mere judgements: a series of bare cognitive states completely devoid of the qualitative characteristics which endow them with such significance and give them life as full-blown emotions. As James puts it with respect to rage and grief: absent all feelings (of physiological change), "The rage is as completely evaporated as the sensation of its so-called manifestations, and the only thing that can possibly be supposed to take its place is some cold-blooded and dispassionate judicial sentence, confined entirely to the intellectual realm, to the effect that a certain person or persons

merit chastisement for their sins. In like manner grief: what would it be without its tears, its sobs, its suffocation of the heart, its pang in the breast-bone? A feelingless cognition that certain circumstances are deplorable, and nothing more" (1884, p.194).

As the example of John's fear illustrates, feelings appear to play a central role in many emotions. And as James noticed, even the less visceral and more intellectual emotions such as jealousy often feature feelings as defining (if subtle) characteristics. In neglecting feelings, cognitivism, it seems, misses out something fundamental to emotion, at least as the concept is most commonly used. While affect does not appear to be sufficient for emotion, a long tradition in Western philosophy and folk theory suggests that, for many emotions, it may well be necessary. Indeed, emotions are commonly characterised *as feelings*. Following an emotionally-charged event we ask people how they feel, not which judgements they are currently making. Granted that many emotions seem necessarily to involve evaluative judgements, it is not at all clear that emotions should be simply identified with such judgements. Many emotion-types seem to owe their identity, at least in part, to their affective characteristics; and it is affect, not judgement, which, to a large extent, structures our emotional lives. It is the characteristic feelings of emotions such as guilt, shame, fear, and joy which define our emotional experiences—at least from a subjective point of view. The essence of emotion for the subject lies not in the judgements made but the *feelings* with which they are concomitant—feelings which often appear more salient and significant than the judgements themselves. From a phenomenological point of view, then, affect cannot be eliminated from an account of emotion. It is too definitive of what we all know and experience when we have emotions.

Certain emotions, it seems, are something over and above mere judgements—far more than just propositional attitudes. They are imbued with depth, colour, tone, and timbre. This point has been made in a variety of ways by different philosophers (compare James's evocative talk of emotions' 'colour', 'warmth', and 'glow'); but no matter how it is stated, as an intuitive claim it carries undeniable force: subtract pain from the conscious experience of guilt, distress from the experience of fear, pleasure from the experience of joy, etc., and the emotions themselves appear to vanish, leaving only cool, detached cognitive states in their place. The upshot of this argument is obvious: if one's account of emotion is to cohere in any reasonable way with lived experience, one must, it seems, be willing to concede the necessity of affect for many instances of emotion. Affect is not peripheral to emotion, some mere contingent concomitant or accidental by-product; rather, considered from the point of view of the subject, more often than not it takes centre-stage. In other words, while affect theory champions pure feeling to the exclusion of thought, cognitivism goes wrong in the opposite extreme, championing thought to the exclusion of feeling. The pendulum, it seems, has swung too far the other way.

In light of such considerations, recent philosophical accounts of emotion have converged on the centre ground, with most commentators (including arch-cognitivist Robert Solomon; see for example 2004, 2007) now favouring conciliatory hybrid accounts—'cognition-affect' theories—which, while still predominantly cognitive (maintaining that emotions essentially or at least typically involve cognitions), seek to incorporate affect in various ways.[13] With the rediscovery of the importance of

[13] Indeed, the recent special issue of *Emotion Review* (2009) is concerned primarily with this task. Ostensibly concerned with the topic of emotional experience, all ten contributions offer accounts which treat intentionality and phenomenality as key elements of emotion. All acknowledge the importance of

feelings, the question naturally arises as to exactly how the affective aspect of emotion relates to the intentional aspect. How are we to square the fact that emotions essentially involve intentional states (often seemingly complex cognitions) with the fact that they also involve feelings as central components? How do the intentional and affective dimensions of emotion connect? It is here, I believe, that many recent accounts of emotion have got it fundamentally wrong.

Dual-Component Theory

I began by noting that it has long been a central task of the philosophy of emotion to explain both the apparent phenomenality and intentionality of emotion. The extreme reductivist paradigms, of course, are the exception. We have seen how the affect theorist focuses on the former to the exclusion of the latter, while the austere cognitivist is guilty of the reverse. Uniting the intentional and affective dimensions of emotion is now a major concern among philosophers of emotion, and one which explicitly motivates cognition-affect theory.[14] It is important in what follows to bear in mind the distinction made earlier between the two kinds of cognition-affect theory. 'Dual-component' theories, recall, are those which conceive of the cognitive and affective aspects of emotion as separate, ontologically distinct components; while 'integrative' theories are those which attempt to unite the intentional and phenomenal dimensions of emotion in a more subtle way, without recourse to the postulation of

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both, and all, to some extent, seek to explain how the one relates to the other within emotional experience.

[14] Döring and Reisenzein conclude their introduction to the special issue by remarking that "the two central properties of emotional experiences—their special phenomenality and intentionality—have given rise to two different and partly conflicting traditions of theorizing about emotions, the feeling theory and the cognitive theory. Looking back at the fate of the two theoretical traditions, we find that, under the pressure of theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, they have moved increasingly closer to each other. Although the question of how best to integrate the two theories is still debated, the convergence of views documented in this special issue is encouraging" (p.10).

two substantive components.[15] While the last few years have seen a dramatic increase in the number of theories seeking to provide more nuanced accounts of the relation between cognition and affect, it is the former kind of theory that has traditionally dominated—and indeed continues to dominate—the field of emotion theory and to which we now turn.

According to the most popular versions of dual-component theory, emotions are compound phenomena consisting of cognitive states, such as evaluative judgements, conjoined—usually causally via sets of physiological changes—with affective states, such as visceral bodily feelings. The exact details of this relation differ between theories; as do the claims about the modal strength of the relation between the two components. Some accounts (e.g. Ben-Ze'ev, 2004; Schachter, 1964) insist that cognition and affect are necessary components of all emotions. Others—including arguably the best-known and most widely discussed dual-component theory, that propounded by William Lyons in *Emotion* (1980)—insist that both cognition and affect are centrally important, defining characteristics of all emotion-types, but deny that affect is a *conceptually* necessary condition of emotion found in all tokens of all types.[16] However, all dual-component theories have in common a conception of

[15] Classic examples of dual-component theory in philosophy include Ben-Ze'ev (2000, 2004), Davis (1988), Elster (1999), Gordon (1987), Lyons (1980), Marks (1982), Oatley (2009), Pitcher (1965), and Thalberg (1977). See, for example, Haugeland (1981), Lazarus (1991), and Schachter (1964) for classic statements in psychology. Recent integrative theories include Charland (1995a, 1995b, 1997), Döring (2003, 2007, 2009), Goldie (2000, 2004a, 2009), Greenspan (2004), Helm (2001a, 2001b, 2009), Prinz (2004b), Solomon (2004, 2007), Stocker (1996), and Zagzebski (2003). I discuss the most relevant of these in Chapter 5.

[16] Whilst Lyons acknowledges the central importance of feelings, he falls short of claiming that they are conceptually necessary conditions of all emotions, suggesting the possibility of making an appropriate evaluation which triggers abnormal physiological changes while being so absorbed in the experience of the object as to fail consciously to register (to *feel*) those changes (1980, p.58). According to Lyons, such a subject would be in an emotional state but one which failed to include feelings. Personally, I do not regard such scenarios as counterexamples to the claim that affect is necessary for emotion, as I am happy to allow the possibility of unconscious affect, or at least the possibility that affect might be part of a subject's overall experiential state without registering at the forefront of conscious experience. Goldie (e.g. 2009) and Ratcliffe (e.g. 2008a) are among those who

emotions as *compound states*: conjunctions of two discrete components or elements that are externally related and which together comprise the central features or defining characteristics of emotions. The intentional element is taken to be a distinct, intrinsically intentional token state (usually a state of cognition) that is in some way related to a separate, intrinsically phenomenal token state (usually a state of bodily feeling). Both states are thus treated as independent, entirely extricable components.

According to Lyons, emotions are occurrent states in which an evaluation triggers abnormal physiological changes which are (at least typically) experienced as bodily feelings. Thus, while emotions involve feelings of physiological change, these are not caused directly by perceptions (cf. James) but rather by the evaluations postulated by the austere cognitivist.[17] On this view, the relevant evaluations are sufficiently fine-grained to differentiate between emotion-types, while the addition of discrete physiological changes and their affective manifestations is sufficient to distinguish genuine emotions from non-emotional judgements. This seems successfully to wed the feeling component of emotion which was so conspicuously absent from austere cognitivism with the intentional component which was so conspicuously absent from the James-Lange theory. It seems, in other words, to avoid the problems whilst retaining the strengths of each extreme reductive position. However, as we will see, Lyons's account, along with all dual-component theories, is fundamentally flawed. For reasons that will become apparent, all such theories radically (and inevitably)

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claim that not all feelings need to be foregrounded in consciousness in order to count as feelings (see Chapter 2). Thus, it would be a small step for an advocate of Lyons's position to include affects as necessary conditions of emotion on the grounds that, arguably, such feelings are always present, even if the subject is not paying attention to them at the time.

[17] Precisely how they are caused Lyons does not tell us. Instead he says: "I do not think it is a weakness in this or any other theory that I cannot give an account of *how* an evaluation can cause physiological changes" (1980, p.62).

misconstrue the nature of the relationship between the intentional and affective dimensions of emotion.

A Phenomenological Lacuna

The essence of my objection to the dual-component theory is this: whilst it succeeds in incorporating the intentional and affective elements of emotion, it does so in a way that cannot be squared with the phenomenology of emotional experience. For, such experience testifies that emotional feelings are *felt towards* their objects in a way that is precluded by the dual-component account. The affective dimension of emotion is often bound up with the intentional dimension in a way that renders the two experientially indistinct: experience of emotional feelings is often not phenomenologically separable from experience of the emotional object being a certain way.

Take our earlier example of John's encounter with the spider and his subsequent episode of fear. On Lyons's account, the structure of the emotion is such that upon seeing the spider John makes an evaluative judgement to the effect that it is dangerous, which in turn triggers a set of bodily changes which are experienced as feelings of fear. However, a first-person account of John's experience would tell a different story. For, careful phenomenological reflection would reveal not an external, causal connection between the intentional and affective aspects of the experience, but an *internal* connection in which world-directed intentionality and affect are

inextricable, the one bound up with, and ultimately inseparable from, the other.[18] In other words, experience tells us that the world-directed and feeling aspects of an emotion are often phenomenologically indistinguishable. John's fear is felt towards the spider; it is not merely some nonintentional phenomenal state triggered by and simply accompanying a prior, more 'appropriately intentional', state. From John's point of view, experience of the spider has a distinct bodily dimension which not only accompanies but shapes the intentional content of the emotion. The affective character of the experience is imbued with intentional structure; and equally, the intentional content of the emotion is permeated with affective colouration, shot through with qualitative character. The same state, then, seems to satisfy both intentional and affective descriptions, being concurrently a state of emotional affect and directed towards an object. And assuming the absence of prima facie reasons for discounting this phenomenological evidence, this is a fact which clearly ought to be accommodated by any account purporting to answer the two central questions of emotion theory. Dual-component theories thus leave a phenomenological lacuna: they fail to acknowledge—let alone explain—the fact that certain emotional bodily feelings are concurrently affective and intentional in such a way that they are felt towards external objects.

My aim in subsequent chapters is to explore and elucidate this phenomenological insight, demonstrating precisely how it is possible for bodily feelings to be so

[18] Precisely what this 'internal' connection amounts to will be discussed at length in Chapter 2. It should be noted that my objection to the causal connection claim is not (at least not primarily) that it renders the relation between affect and intentionality contingent (cf. Döring, 2007, p.374), as a causal relation between two events can still be at least physically necessary if the two are appropriately nomologically related. Rather, my objection is to the claim that such a connection renders the relation entirely *external*: it treats the nature of the one as utterly separate from the nature of the other. Thus, irrespective of nomological connections, the dual-component model is indeed guilty (as Döring rightly points out) of rendering affect and intentionality 'merely' metaphysically (and perhaps conceptually) contingent. To this extent, I agree with Döring that this is an unacceptable consequence of such accounts.

thoroughly bound up with emotional intentionality. As we will see, there is no barrier to taking the phenomenology at face-value. For reasons that will be discussed in chapters 2 and 3, there are excellent reasons for treating emotional bodily feelings as fully-fledged intentional states. Most emotions do not consist of two separate components which are causally related, but rather of a single experiential state that is both intentional and affective, exemplifying both representational and phenomenal characteristics.

Two Assumptions

With this claim on the table we are now in a better position to draw out the assumptions which motivate dual-component theory and which to a large extent underpin both austere cognitivism and affect theory. Firstly, lying behind Lyons's stipulation that affect be caused by cognition is the assumption that one and the same state cannot be concurrently intentional and affective. It is implicitly assumed that feelings, especially visceral bodily feelings, are simply not the kinds of states about which it makes sense to say that they are capable of exemplifying world-directed intentionality, let alone representational or cognitive content. Feelings, it is supposed, are just not—and indeed could not possibly be—like that. This assumption is of course not peculiar to the various versions of dual-component theory but has instead proved pervasive in analytic philosophy. It is widely assumed that a state's being qualitative precludes its being intentional, and vice-versa.[19] It is assumed, in other words, that there is no possible token state that is both intentional and phenomenal,

[19] These remarks by David Rosenthal typify the prevailing view: "There are two broad categories of mental property. Mental states such as thoughts and desires…are said to have intentional properties, or intentionality. Sensations, such as pains and sense impressions, lack intentional content, and have instead qualitative properties of various sorts" (Rosenthal, 1994, p.349).

that instantiates both intentional and phenomenal properties. And, indeed, in the case of bodily feelings, it is hard to see how things could be otherwise. As mentioned above, according to many philosophers, a pain in one's head does not seem to refer to or be about anything in the world; not even, many would argue, the state of one's head. And it seems difficult to see how anything different could be said about emotional feelings.

The second, and closely related, assumption is that (as mutually exclusive properties of states) affect and intentionality are substantive, ontologically distinct properties, to the extent that it is in theory possible always to provide a complete account of an emotion's intentionality without mentioning affect, and vice-versa. If such an account were possible, it would imply that affect and intentionality are necessarily, to borrow a phrase from Hume, 'distinct existences': they are properties that are existentially independent of each other. But furthermore, it would imply that they are such that the *nature* of the one in no way depends on the nature of the other. As we will see, this assumption is open to serious challenge. For many emotions, I shall argue, it is not possible to capture intentionality independently of phenomenology. In other words, as potential features of one and the same emotional state, affect and intentionality are often existentially inextricable in such a way that it is impossible to give a full account of an emotion's intentionality without including important aspects of its phenomenology, and it is equally impossible to provide a complete characterisation of that emotion's phenomenology without incorporating aspects of its intentional content. The reason for this is that intentional content and phenomenal content are

really just different aspects of *one and the same content*, where the nature of the one aspect is determined in part by the nature of the other.[20]

Consequently, as will become apparent, attempting to account for the intentionality of emotion without reference to feelings, for example by postulating judgements as the central features, misses out something essential: it misses out the fact that emotions have phenomenology which is essentially bound up with the way objects are presented, *from the subject's point of view*, in emotional experience. In order properly to capture the intentional content of emotions, phenomenology must be incorporated *at the level of intentionality*. It cannot be divorced from the intentional content of emotional feelings. Characterising emotions as judgements, or as conjunctions of cognitions and affects, thus fails to capture an important aspect of everyday emotional experience: the phenomenology, the 'what-it-is-like', which is inseparable in experience from the presentation of the object. This claim will prove vital in enabling a proper understanding of the role of affect in emotional experience.

The assumptions just mentioned are partly at work in motivating the dual-component theorist's claim that affect and cognition are both necessary for many emotions, required to account for both their intentional and phenomenal aspects. Affect alone, it seems, is insufficient to account for the world-directed intentionality of emotion, while cognition alone appears insufficient to account for its phenomenality. (Of course, these assumptions are also instrumental in motivating the commitment of both

[20] The reasons for this inextricability—which will be explored at length in Chapter 2—have to do with the (perceptual) structures of certain states of bodily feeling. To summarise: the phenomenal content of such states contains a felt sense or impression of the intentional object, and the specific manner or mode in which that intentional object is captured is felt or phenomenological—it is a state of *feeling*: a feeling *of* or *towards* that intentional object. That single state of feeling thus has content that is both qualitative and object-directed. Phenomenal and intentional descriptions of such states are thus not exclusive: both kinds of description can be equally accurate characterisations of one and the same state.

affect theory and austere cognitivism to exclusive forms of reductionism—a reductionism which favours affect (to the exclusion of cognition) in the case of the former, and which favours cognition (to the exclusion of affect) in the case of the latter.) With the assumption firmly in place that feelings are entirely devoid of any kind of intentional or representational content, it comes to seem as though the only way of accounting for both the phenomenal and representational aspects is by treating them as independent phenomena, providing a substantive analysis of each component and then simply subsuming the two under some general, usually causal, nomological description. Thus separated, it becomes much easier to provide seemingly comprehensive analyses of each component by postulating standard affective and cognitive states—brute sensations and evaluative judgements, respectively—to occupy the phenomenal and intentional roles.

Furthermore, the conception of feelings as the causal consequents of cognitions, coupled with the assumption that the two are to be analysed separately (notwithstanding their causal connection), has led to a conception of emotion that is inherently biased towards cognition. Emerging as they did out of the recent tradition of austere cognitivism, dual-component theories have inherited a view of emotions on which cognition forms what Lyons calls the ‘hard core’ of emotion: the component which does all the work in relating subject to object and in playing a central role within the wider mental economy. Dual-component theories recognise that feelingless cognitive accounts fatally ignore affect, and in an awkward concession to this fact simply add on the feelings as an after-thought. On this view, feelings are important from a subjective point of view, being required to account for the qualitative character of emotional experience; but when it comes to explaining the functional role of

emotion, including its intimate connections to behaviour, value, agency, reasoning, rationality, and so on, it is cognition, and not affect, that matters.

In this respect, the theories of Lyons and Ben-Ze'ev capture the prevailing attitude amongst philosophers and psychologists. Throughout his authorship, Ben-Ze'ev explicitly separates the affective and intentional dimensions of emotion (e.g. 2004, p.259), insisting that the feeling component entirely lacks intentionality. For example, he claims that, in emotion, "We can discern several types of intentional reference: cognition, evaluation, and motivation. Not all mental capacities involve these types of intentional reference. Sensation, which is the most primitive mental capacity, lacks any of these types; it is not intentional" (2004, p.252); and later: "The feeling dimension is a primitive mode of consciousness associated with our own state. It is the lowest level of consciousness; unlike higher levels of awareness, such as those found in perception, memory, and thinking, the feeling dimension has no significant cognitive content. It expresses our own state, but is not in itself directed at this state or at any other object" (ibid.).

Lyons too argues that feelings do not refer to or represent any object, claiming that "one labels a feeling as of some particular emotion only after causally correlating it with the core or defining aspect of that emotion, namely the evaluation…though one can attach labels to feelings—labels such as 'twinge' or 'itch'—just by reference to the content or qualities of the feeling itself" (1980, pp.211-212). On this view, then, the feeling lacks any association with an object until it is causally correlated with an appropriate cognition. And it is the cognition, not the affect, which constitutes the

‘core’, ‘defining’ aspect of the emotion. The latter—mere ‘twinges’ and ‘itches’—are simply ‘added on’ (as Goldie, 2000, puts it) to this core.

Of course, on the dual-component view, affect is still a central feature of our emotional lives insofar as it is feelings—and not judgements, calculations, evaluations, etc.—which are foregrounded in our emotional experiences. After all, we are seldom aware of the mental tasks being performed (usually at a subconscious level) during an emotional episode. However, if the dual-component model is correct, then it is the cognitive structures which lie behind ‘mere’ feelings which form the substance of the emotion and which are philosophically interesting, being epistemically significant, playing a role in intentionality, reasoning, rationality, and agency, the formation of beliefs and desires, and moral deliberation; which enjoy intimate links to imagination, the construction of narrative, the use of language, and the formulation of social rules, norms, and principles; and so on. In short, it is cognition, and not affect, which, on the dual-component view, demands the attention of philosophers.

If what I have to say in the remainder of this thesis is accurate, then the cogency of this model will be thrown into serious doubt. If my account of affective perception is correct, then bodily feelings, far from being mere after-effects of cognition, will be central to the structures of many emotions. Indeed, much of the intellectual work that has traditionally been attributed to cognitive states will be attributable instead to affect. Affect too is contentful, epistemically significant, intentional, central to an understanding of emotional agency, belief-formation, moral deliberation, and so on. This is not to say that my account leaves no room for cognition traditionally

conceived. Cognition is still a central component of many emotions; and in many cases it will still to a large extent play these roles. However, they will not be *exclusively* played by cognition. Instead, a proper understanding of the nature and status of affect will see the workload shared on a case-by-case basis. The more reflexive, visceral, perception-based ('standard') emotions—including many instances of fear, disgust, and anger—will be largely 'affective', with affect playing a crucial role in the life of the emotion; while the more contemplative and intellectual emotions (pride, envy, jealousy, shame, guilt, remorse, pity, etc.) will predominantly feature cognitions in these evaluative functional roles. Affect is no mere causal consequence of cognition. From a philosophical perspective, it is important not only in understanding our everyday experience of emotion, but in answering the most fundamental questions about what emotions are, where they figure in the wider mental economy, and how they relate us to—and indeed *engage us with*—the world and its objects.

Summary

All three major paradigms of emotion theory are fatally flawed. Jamesian affect theory (on standard interpretations) apparently has nothing to say about the intentionality of emotion. Austere cognitivism fails to acknowledge that (at least most) emotions are essentially affective. And dual-component theory radically mischaracterises the relationship between the intentional and affective dimensions of emotion, misinterpreting the phenomenology of emotional experience in the process. Furthermore, all three paradigms rest on the mistaken assumption that phenomenality and intentionality are mutually exclusive properties of states, with the result that all

three fail to acknowledge the fact that certain emotional feelings enjoy world-directed intentionality. Considered from the subject's perspective (and not, for example, from the impersonal functionalist perspective that has become so integral to contemporary philosophy of mind), feelings are definitive of emotional experience: they structure experience of objects in a way that cannot be explained away by accounts which treat emotional feelings as 'mere', 'brute', affects entirely separable from the intentional and contentful aspects of emotion.

In sum, I agree with Döring and Reisenzein (2009, p.201) when they say that "both the feeling theory and the cognitive theory of emotion seem to contain important insights. On the one hand, it is hard to deny that paradigmatic emotions—joy and sadness, hope and fear, anger, guilt, pride, and so on—depend on cognitions and desires: the way we take the world to be, and the way we want it to be. Also, there is the strong intuition that emotions themselves are intentional, that they truly relate us to things in the world. On the other hand, the intuition that "emotion dissociated from all…feeling is inconceivable" (James, 1890/1950, p.462) likewise seems irresistible… [Hence] the challenge is to get (the right) feelings into emotions in the right way". This is precisely what I set out to do in the following chapters.

CHAPTER 2

Affect and Intentionality

Introduction

In the last chapter I claimed that all three of the major philosophical paradigms of emotion theory fail to get the phenomenology of emotional experience right. Emotional feelings, I have suggested, are *felt towards* external objects. They thus enjoy an intentionality that dual-component theories—and, by extension, austere cognitivism and affect theory—are simply unable to accommodate. My aim in this chapter is to develop and support this claim. More specifically, it is to argue a) that certain bodily feelings (and not just so-called 'psychic feelings') enjoy intrinsic world-directed intentionality (as per Claim (1); see Introduction), and b) that this intentionality ought to be understood on a perceptual model, as analogous in certain crucial respects to the perceptual intentionality of tactile feelings (as per Claim (2)).

The discussion proceeds as follows. I begin by sketching the fallacious and deeply entrenched picture of feeling which underpins all three paradigms of emotion theory. On this view, feelings, particularly Jamesian bodily feelings, are conceived as mere manifestations of phenomenal properties, devoid of intentional content. Against this, Peter Goldie has argued that bodily feelings are capable of acquiring a kind of second-hand, or 'derived', intentionality which they borrow from other intentional states with

which they are closely associated; whilst the other class of emotional feelings, psychic feelings, are capable of full-blown non-derived intentionality.

After presenting Goldie's theory in some detail, I argue that whilst it offers an interesting and insightful analysis of psychic feelings, it fails to provide a satisfactory account of bodily feelings. For, although the theory succeeds in providing an accurate description of the phenomenology of such feelings—one that acknowledges their status as feelings towards external objects—its *analysis* of that phenomenology, couched in terms of derived intentionality, fails to accord with the phenomenology itself. Careful phenomenological reflection reveals that bodily feelings are just as capable of genuine world-directed intentionality as psychic feelings. To show this, I take Goldie's key claim about the relationship between the intentional mode and content of psychic feelings and apply it to the case of bodily feelings, adapting it to show that for certain such feelings mode and content are inextricable in a way that reveals the feelings themselves to be intrinsically intentional representational states. These feelings contain, as part of their phenomenal content, *felt impressions* of emotional properties.

The remainder of the chapter begins the task of demonstrating just how such intentionality is possible and why such states ought to be understood on a perceptual model. Building on recent research by Matthew Ratcliffe (again discussed in detail), I argue in the final part of the chapter that these feelings ought to be conceived as world-revealing perceptual states through which certain properties of emotional objects are experienced. Central to my account is the claim that emotional bodily feelings are structurally similar in certain crucial respects to tactile feelings.

Tactile feelings—which are the only other bodily feelings with anything like this intrinsic representational structure, for which intentional and phenomenal contents are in this way inextricable—provide a clear illustration of how it is possible for a 'mere' bodily feeling to be at the same time a feeling of something external to the body. Ratcliffe demonstrates that tactile feelings have a dual-aspect structure, comprising a world-aspect and a proprioceptive body-aspect (which are inextricable in a way that parallels the inextricability of the phenomenal and intentional aspects of the emotional bodily feelings at issue) and in virtue of which they are able to function as perceptions of external objects. It also demonstrates that this dual-aspect structure is not limited to those feelings involving direct contact with a bodily boundary (as in typical cases of tactile feeling) but is instead exemplified by a range of bodily feelings, including visceral feelings. Applying Ratcliffe's insights to the case of emotional bodily feelings, I argue that certain of these also have a dual-aspect structure in virtue of which they are able to represent certain kinds of emotional properties and at least partly in virtue of which they qualify as perceptions of those properties.

Intentionality and Feeling

Feelings have proved to be a relatively neglected topic in analytic philosophy. On the rare occasions that they have not been completely ignored, they have typically been treated as a homogeneous class, with the various and subtly different kinds of feeling being lumped together and viewed on the model of 'simple' sensations like pains. However, this neglect and oversimplification has had a damaging effect on many areas of philosophy, not least the philosophy of emotion.

Treatment of all feelings on the model of pains has led to the conception of them as mere instantiations of phenomenal properties—brute, structureless sensations of which the subject is conscious as qualitatively discrete occurrences confined to particular phenomenological locations. Joel Marks (1982, p.228), for example, talks of the feeling of love as "a particular type of tickle"; while Lyons, recall, talks of emotional feelings as "twinges" and "itches". Ben-Ze'ev, as we saw, reduces all feelings to sensations, claiming that sensation is "the most primitive mental capacity" and "the lowest level of consciousness" (op.cit.); while Colin McGinn (1982, p.8) asserts that "bodily feelings do not have an intentional object in the way that perceptual experiences do. We distinguish between a visual experience and what it is an experience of; but we do not make this distinction in respect of pains… [V]isual experiences represent the world as being a certain way, but pains have no such representational content". Feelings, it is frequently maintained, are devoid of content and intentionality; and while they are of course are endowed with qualitative character, few would go so far as to call this a form of content. Qualia are themselves taken to be 'structureless'—irreducible, brute properties of experience devoid of anything that could be analysed as content and characterised independently of the experience itself. In this sense they are also usually taken to be irreducibly nonintentional. Feelings, it is said, are not *directed towards* anything at all. They do not represent, refer to, or aim at any object.

Unquestioning adherence to this model is largely responsible for the popularity of the dual-component variety of cognition-affect theory and the prevalence of the two false assumptions which motivate it. If the position for which I am arguing is correct, this

picture must be abandoned. Whilst it may be true that pains are not *about* anything at all, it is neither true that they therefore lack intentionality nor that all bodily feelings ought to be treated on the model of pains. However, before considering the evidence against this picture and in favour of the thesis that some feelings have intentional structure, let us look in more detail at the concept of intentionality. For if it is to be shown that emotional bodily feelings are intentional, it would be useful to have at least a working account of intentionality on the table.

Simply put, the concept of intentionality is that of the mind's ability to represent, be about, or aim towards, its objects. My belief that Aristotle tutored Alexander, for example, represents, is about, or aims towards Aristotle, Alexander, and the relation between them. Now, intentionality remains a contentious subject in the philosophy of mind, with different philosophers offering various ways of analysing the structure of intentionality and delimiting the scope of intentional content. Direct reference theories, for example, offer a very different account of intentionality to those more traditional theories which endorse what might be described as a broadly Fregean view. Clearly, entering into the debate in any depth would mean deviating considerably from our current topic of emotional feeling. However, fortunately, there is nothing in my account which requires me to commit firmly to any one school of thought. What I have to say is compatible with the major theories of intentionality. However, for heuristic purposes I endorse a generalised version of what I take to be the most widely held view of intentionality: the traditional (broadly Fregean) view. Versions of the position I have in mind have been propounded by Crane (e.g. 1998, 2001, 2003, 2007), Searle (1983, 1994), and Tye (1995a, 1995b), amongst others.[21]

[21] Goldie (2004a, p.93), for example, seems to endorse something like this view.

All have in common the postulation of three key criteria that a state must satisfy in order to qualify as intentional.

Firstly, intentional states necessarily have objects: insofar as they are essentially representational or object-directed states, there is always some thing which they represent, some object towards which they are directed. 'Object' is here understood in a broad sense to encompass anything which features as the grammatical subject of a proposition characterising the content of an intentional state, including physical things, people, events, situations, relations, states of affairs, and so on (he believed *x*, perceived *y*, desired *z*; or, to take emotional examples: he feared *p*, loved *q*, was angry with *r*).

Secondly, it is generally acknowledged that intentional objects have a certain perspectival presentational property: as they figure in subjects' mental states, they are presented in specific, fine-grained ways to the exclusion of others. They have what Searle (1983, 1994) calls 'aspectual shape'—a concept approximating Frege's 'sense'. In thinking about the Morning Star, for example, the object of my thought is presented under the aspect 'morning star' (and not, say, 'evening star'). Intentional states thus have a form of (intensional) content. Following Crane (e.g. 1998, 2003) we might say that a state's having the intentional content it does is a matter of its having a particular intentional object presented under an aspect.

The third feature is what Searle (1983) calls intentional mode. This is the form in which the aspectually-shaped content is related to the subject: belief, desire, hope,

judgement, perception, and so on.[22] And it is mode, in conjunction with content, that distinguishes one intentional state from another. The identity and individuation of any intentional state will be fixed by a combination of mode and content. That is: by the type of 'attitude' the subject holds towards the content.[23]

Intentional states, then, are generally acknowledged to instantiate the key properties of being object-directed and having aspectually-shaped content falling under a given mode of presentation.[24] Now, as Crane points out (2003, p.39), while this much is relatively uncontroversial there remains a degree of flexibility when it comes to specifying what qualifies as a mode and what counts as content such that the possibility remains open that there is sufficient conceptual space in which to argue for the intentionality of feeling. As will become apparent, I agree with this assessment. However, my reasons for doing so are importantly different from Crane's.

Crane is among those who reject the traditional picture of feelings as 'mere sensations'. According to Crane, *all* bodily feelings—indeed, all mental states (types and tokens)—from itches and tickles to pains and butterflies, are intentional, as all are capable of meeting the above criteria. However, on Crane's account, feelings possess only body-directed intentionality: they have intentionality in virtue of being directed

[22] There is an issue here about perception in particular, and about whether perceptions qualify as intentional states (see Crane, 2000). Adherents of certain theories of perception (e.g. adverbial theories) may want to claim that they do not. Again, this is an issue which we lack the space to explore in this thesis. Suffice it to say that on the broad account of intentionality sketched here, perceptions clearly meet the three criteria, having aspectually-shaped content falling under a given (perceptual) mode.

[23] Crane assumes that mode and content are always separable such that it is always possible for a subject to have different attitudes towards the same content. However, this obscures the fact that there are cases, such as those I shall be focussing on, for which mode and content are internally related in such a way as to be entirely inextricable.

[24] If anything, these criteria represent a fairly rigid conception of intentionality (although one that enjoys general currency). It is questionable, for example, to what extent aspectual shape is an essential feature of intentionality. It is, I believe, a strength of my account that on it emotional bodily feelings are able to satisfy even these demanding criteria. (Of course, I am here skating over a number of issues that discussions of intentionality inevitably raise; but these have no significant bearing on my arguments for the intentionality of affect.)

at or towards the body or its parts.[25] Bodily feelings, it is claimed, have intentional structure to the same degree as perceptions. Indeed, on Crane's account, they are themselves a kind of perception: they are perceptions of one's body as being a particular way. For Crane, the strongest reasons for viewing sensations as intentional states derive from the fact that they are always felt to have a bodily location: a pain in the foot is *felt* to be in the foot. Attending to sensations is a matter of attending to where they are felt to occur. Why call this intentionality?

> What this perceptual theory says is that in bodily sensation, something is given to the mind, namely the body, or a body part. Calling this phenomenon 'intentionality' classifies it together with the case of outer perception, where the perceived portion of the world is 'given' to the mind; and with thought, where some object, property or state of affairs is 'given' to the mind. What is in common between these different states of mind is expressed in Brentano's formulation: 'in the idea something is conceived, in the wish something is wished'. And in the sensation something is sensed: the body. (Crane, 1998, p.238)

The fact that attending to a sensation is partly a matter of being conscious of its phenomenological location is already sufficient, Crane maintains, to satisfy the conditions of intentionality. For, in attending to a sensation, the subject is presented with an intentional object under a given intentional mode. The content is the presentation of the object—the foot (the phenomenological location of the sensation)—presented *as* one's foot (and not, say, a collection of muscle, tissue, tendons, etc.) under the mode of *feeling*, or more accurately, *hurting*. Sensations thus have intentional objects presented under specific aspects in particular modes.[26]

[25] See Martin (1995) and Tye (1995a, 1995b) for a similar view.

[26] Crane (2003), p.44. I here leave open the question of whether Crane's arguments for the body-directed intentionality of all feelings are successful. Whilst bodily feelings often do have such intentionality, I am inclined to agree with Matthew Ratcliffe (2005a, 2008a) that some feelings are not themselves objects of immediate awareness but are instead relatively unconscious states *through which* external objects are experienced (see below).

We here lack the space to explore Crane's account in any detail, but these brief remarks are sufficient to show that it fails to allow for the kind of intentionality the phenomenological argument demands. Whilst it allows body-directed intentionality, it says nothing about the ways in which feelings are capable of referring beyond the body to external states of affairs. Thus, whilst Crane's account makes a move in the right direction, rejecting the traditional model of feelings as mere unstructured, uninteresting states of the body—"instantiations of purely subjective, monadic properties" (1998, p.245)—it does not go far enough. For, as the phenomenological evidence indicates, the intentional scope of feeling does not end with the boundaries of the body but extends beyond the skin to encompass the world and its objects.

An account which does recognise the potential world-directedness of feelings is proposed by Peter Goldie. Goldie's account is important for two reasons. Firstly, it provides a phenomenologically sound alternative to those theories which both underestimate the philosophical importance of feelings and fail to acknowledge that emotional feelings are felt towards their objects in a way that implies that affect and intentionality are in an important sense inextricable. The account thus marks a significant point of departure from both the traditional view of feelings and the established philosophical tradition epitomised in the three paradigms discussed in the previous chapter. And secondly, in providing an accurate account of the phenomenology of emotional *psychic* feelings, Goldie's account provides a key insight into the structure of emotional *bodily* feelings. As we will see, while Goldie correctly ascribes world-directed intentionality to bodily feelings, he incorrectly identifies this as derived intentionality of a kind that fails to accord with the phenomenology of emotional experience. However, once Goldie's insight into the

phenomenology of psychic feelings is correctly applied to the case of bodily feelings (and modified accordingly) a picture emerges which indicates that certain emotional bodily feelings ought to be understood on a perceptual model, as genuinely intentional states analogous in certain crucial respects to ordinary sense-perceptions. This forms the groundwork for the claim—developed in detail in the next chapter—that such feelings are themselves perceptions of particular kinds of emotional properties: namely, emotion-proper properties.

Goldie's Account

Goldie (2000, 2002c) draws a distinction between two kinds of affect. 'Feelings towards' (what Stocker, e.g. 1996, and others have termed 'psychic feelings') are necessarily intentional: they are feelings which are directed towards the world or parts of it.[27] These are contrasted with bodily feelings: those visceral sensations that James identified as the essence of emotion and to which Crane ascribes body-directed intentionality. Goldie endorses Crane's perceptual account of the intentional structure of such feelings (2002c, p.236; 2004a, p.93). However, for Goldie this is not the whole story; for while bodily feelings, being mere perceptions of physiological changes, do not themselves exemplify genuine world-directed intentionality, they are capable of possessing what Goldie terms 'borrowed' or 'derived' intentionality: intentionality that bodily feelings may come to possess in virtue of their bearing a certain close connection to other intentional states, particularly feelings towards.

[27] Stocker's (1996) account concentrates almost exclusively on psychic feelings, sharing with Goldie's the assumption that bodily feelings are incapable of playing the relevant intentional role.

According to Goldie, bodily feeling involves consciousness of bodily changes (e.g. hormonal changes, musculoskeletal changes, and changes to the autonomic nervous system). Bodily feeling is thus consciousness, as it were, 'from the inside' of the condition of one's body. In addition to the body-directed intentionality postulated by Crane, Goldie argues that such feelings also exemplify a form of world-directed intentionality—an intentionality that is not had intrinsically but which, so to speak, 'piggybacks' on the intentionality of related states. The exact nature of this relation is difficult to spell out, as Goldie himself notes (2000, p.54), but it can be intuitively captured using a phrase borrowed from William James. Goldie cites James's claim that when an object is perceived by the senses and gives rise to an immediate change in some state of the body, "these alterations, apperceived like the original object…combine with it in consciousness and transform it from an object-simply-apprehended into an object-emotionally-felt".[28] For Goldie, the phrase 'combine with it in consciousness' captures an important sense in which bodily feelings can be felt to be about emotional objects as a consequence of their being so closely bound up with the presentation of them in emotional experience. This is most obvious from the first-person phenomenological perspective—especially regarding those emotional experiences which, in Goldie's words, "are more *passionately* felt". Thus,

> …when we talk, taking James's own example, of a grieving person feeling a pang in the breastbone, we want to say that the pang is a pang *for* the one who is being grieved over; although it is undoubtedly a feeling of something bodily, and can be pointed to as being in the chestbone, what makes it a pang of *grief*, rather than any old pang in the breastbone, is surely that it has been, as James says, 'combined in consciousness' with the object of the emotion. (Goldie, 2000, p.55)

[28] James (1884), cited in Goldie (2000), p.55.

For Goldie, to deny bodily feelings any world-directed intentionality is to run up against the phenomenology of emotional experience, which is often experience of 'the entire mind and body' being engaged in a unified experience—of all feelings being 'united in consciousness' in being directed toward the intentional object of the emotion. Thus, sexual desire, for example, "is felt with the whole being—body and soul—*for* the one we desire. And, likewise, our whole being aches in grief *for* the one we have lost" (ibid.).

Of course, it is not intentionality per se that is borrowed by bodily feelings. Rather, it is the *world-directed* aspect which, on Goldie's account, needs to be derived from an association with other states. In particular, this comes from an association with feelings towards—a relation described by Goldie as being "an association of ideas very much along Humean lines" (2002c, p.247). Again the reasons cited in support of this view appeal largely to phenomenology and commonsense psychology: the phenomenology of emotional experience is taken to be such that bodily feelings and feelings towards are often experienced more or less as one, while our folk theory apparently supports this phenomenology, revealing that we conceive of emotional experience as unified in this way—a fact that is also supposedly reflected in the narrative structure of emotional experience, which commonly takes the form of an idiographic explanation of a unified emotional state (see Goldie, 2002c, and Goldie and Spicer, 2002). Goldie suggests that we follow this common conception in thinking of an emotion as a *substantial event*: an event which, although exhibiting certain manifest features—thoughts, feelings, bodily changes, expressions, etc.—is held together as a unity in such a way as to merit saying of the whole emotion, qua substantial event, that it has world-directed intentionality. According to Goldie:

> No doubt some of these features will be paradigmatically mental and others paradigmatically material, but there will be much that cannot be said to be obviously the one or the other; but they are united in the substantial event, which itself has a certain kind of unity, and this unity in turn can be partly explained by the nature of the event. Then, with this notion in play of an emotion as a substantial event, we can go further with the idea of borrowed intentionality: we can say that the emotion itself, qua substantial event, is directed towards the world beyond the body; not just those paradigmatically mental features, the thoughts and feelings that are involved, but also the bodily condition, bodily changes and expressions of emotion, as well as the actions that flow from the emotion. (2002c, pp.247-248)

On this view, then, the unity itself, and not just certain of its salient features, can be directed towards objects in the world.

Feelings Towards

So, what then are feelings towards, and in virtue of what are they supposed to have world-directed intentionality? According to Goldie, emotional feeling often involves feeling towards an emotional object *as being a particular way*; that is, as having certain properties or features. Feelings towards thus have content: they are feelings that are *of* or *about* objects—objects which, from the subject's point of view, are individuated in a sufficiently fine-grained way to capture the aspects under which they are presented. They are thus capable of instantiating full-blown world-directed intentionality. But how can mere feelings enjoy such rich intentional content? The answer lies with the intentional mode of such states, which according to Goldie is not feeling but a form of thought. Feeling towards is essentially '*thinking of* with feeling': it is thinking of an object in an essentially affect-involving way. In particular, it is a way of thinking of an object as possessing certain determinate and determinable features. In feeling fear towards the spider, for example, John's feelings are directed

towards some perceived or imagined property which it is taken to have—its threatening appearance, say—and in virtue of which it is perceived to be scary. In thinking of the spider in this determinable way (as being dangerous or threatening) John's attention is thus focussed on certain of its most salient determinate features—features which ground its scariness: fangs, spindly legs, danger-markings, etc.

Thinking of is related to seeing an aspect. For example, seeing the famous duck-rabbit picture under either aspect is partly a case of thinking of the picture as being a particular way. However, crucially, it is not the case that if one comes to think of object O as having the determinate or determinable features characteristic of a given emotion then one will automatically come to have the feelings associated with that emotion (or, indeed, to have that emotion). Thinking of is not sufficient for feeling towards. Thinking of a situation as dangerous, for example, is not sufficient for fear. According to Goldie what makes the difference is not merely the presence or absence of affect, it is the way in which the object itself is apprehended—a way that involves a difference not merely in intentional mode but in *content*.

On the dual-component theory, recall, the difference between merely thinking of O as dangerous and actually being afraid of O is simply a matter of whether the perception of O triggers, or at least accompanies, the relevant bodily feelings. The theory seeks to divorce the affective and intentional dimensions of emotion based on the false assumption, firstly, that affect cannot be appropriately intentional (as affect and intentionality are supposedly substantive and exclusive properties of states), and secondly, that intentionality, in the case of the emotions, can be fully captured in a

way that makes no reference whatsoever to phenomenality. But this of course gets the phenomenology completely wrong. Goldie puts it thus:

> What I want to expand on here is how emotions are not like the add-on [dual-component] theory suggests; rather, emotional feelings are inextricably intertwined with the world-directed aspect of emotion, so that an adequate account of an emotion's intentionality, of its directedness towards the world outside one's body, will at the same time capture an important aspect of its phenomenology. Intentionality and phenomenology are inextricably linked. Moreover…the phenomenology is neither specifically an aspect of the attitude nor of the content: phenomenology infuses both attitude and content . (2002c, p.242)[29]

Key to understanding the sense in which, on this account, intentionality and phenomenology are inextricably linked is the idea that the difference between emotional feeling towards and 'mere' (unemotional) thinking of is a difference not simply in attitude but in content. Compare John's emotionally-charged experience of the spider with a parallel case in which he sees the spider, perceives the salient determinate features, and comes to think of it as appropriately dangerous but without feeling fear towards it. Exactly the same features are perceived in each case. Where then lies the difference? The difference lies not in the features perceived but in the *way of thinking* of them. The content itself is different in the same way that perceiving the same features of a drawing in a different way can result in a different perceptual content, as in the case of gestalts like the duck-rabbit. It is Goldie's contention that this difference in the emotional case is not only a difference in content considered in purely representational terms, but is also a difference in phenomenology: the whole way of experiencing or being conscious of the content is *felt* to be different. Thus:

[29] Cf. Goldie (2004a), p.97.

> The difference between thinking of *X* as *Y* without feeling and thinking of *X* as *Y* with feeling will not just comprise a different attitude towards the *same* content—a thinking which earlier was without feeling and now is with feeling. The difference also lies *in* the content… (2000, p.60)

On this view, then, the feeling dimension of the thought is *internally* related to the thought content. Phenomenology and intentionality are entirely inextricable: a thought's being the thought that it is—its having the content that it does—is partly a matter of its feeling a particular way, of its having that particular qualitative character. And the content itself, captured from the subject's perspective, is essentially emotion-involving insofar as there could not be that content captured in that way without the subject feeling as she does—i.e. without her experiencing that particular affect (and, indeed, without her experiencing the relevant emotion).[30] The intentional content of feeling towards, then, is inextricable from its qualitative character in the sense that one cannot separate out a state of feeling towards into two components: a feeling component and an intentional component. There is not one (intentional) state of thought to which some further affective (phenomenal) component is added. Rather, the two are aspects of one and the same indivisible sate. The same content cannot figure in a different state under a different psychological mode (belief, say) without feeling, as it would not be precisely the same content.

To illustrate the point, Goldie (2000, 2002c) borrows the following example from Stocker (1983). Before falling on some ice, I had what might be termed a purely

[30] Zagzebski (2003) offers an account of emotional experience which is similar in certain respects to Goldie's. For Zagzebski, an emotion is a psychic state in which the subject feels a certain characteristic way about the object of the emotion perceived as falling under a certain thick 'affective concept' (a concept the descriptive and affective aspects of which cannot be separated). On Zagzebski's account, emotions are not mere responses to objects perceived in terms of their thick affective concepts. Rather, and echoing Goldie's account, it is only through these perceptions that objects can be seen in terms of these concepts at all. Thus: "The feeling of offense that is directed at an object seen as rude is a distinctive way of feeling offended" such that "no one can feel *that* way without seeing something as rude, and no one can see something *as* rude without feeling that way" (2003, p.115).

‘intellectual’ appreciation of its dangerousness. However, after experiencing the fall, I came not only to perceive the dangers—in some emotionally detached, dispassionate way—but to *feel* them. I not only thought ‘That ice is dangerous’; I also felt fear towards the ice; although, both thoughts, with their different contents (emotionally-loaded in the one case and emotionally neutral in the other) are accurately captured by the same proposition in English (viz. ‘That ice is dangerous’). Despite having the same propositional content, the non-propositional content of the two thoughts is importantly different. The dangerousness is grasped—and the determinate properties which ground it made salient—in a completely new way, in the same way that experiencing the duck-aspect of the duck-rabbit does not involve seeing the rabbit-aspect with some new content added on, but instead involves an entirely new way of seeing. On Goldie’s account, then, the difference between perceiving an object as dangerous and actually feeling fear towards it is a difference in the way the world is ‘taken in’ in experience. The feelings are inextricably bound up with the presentation of the object in such a way that emotionality itself is an integral part of that emotion’s perceptual content—an integral part of what is taken in by the subject.

Even from this brief sketch it is obvious that Goldie’s account enjoys certain advantages over the traditional paradigms. To begin with, it succeeds in undermining the traditional picture which treats all feelings on the model of simple sensations. Emotional feelings, on Goldie’s account, are revealed to be significantly complex and structured phenomena. Feelings figure in emotional experience in complex ways, most notably as contentful intentional states directed not merely at the body but at the world. Thus, Goldie’s account provides effective arguments against the dual-component theorist’s claim that affect lacks world-directed intentionality. In addition

to citing phenomenological reasons for this view, Goldie provides a detailed account of the purported structure of this intentionality. Feelings towards have 'direct' or 'full' intentionality in virtue of being a species of thought. Contrary to dual-component theory, the intentional aspects of emotion are often inextricable from the affective aspects. Rather than postulating two substantive components, Goldie demonstrates how one and the same state can be concurrently intentional and affective in a way that holds true (more or less) to the phenomenology of emotional experience.

In addition, this account offers several key insights into the structure of emotional experience and the intentionality of affect—insights which I hope to build upon in what follows. As we will see, these insights, once applied to emotional bodily feelings, are fundamental to a proper understanding of their nature and status. However, the account is not without its deficiencies; for while it succeeds both in capturing the core features of psychic feelings and in recognising that bodily feelings too are intentional, it fails (or so I shall argue) to provide an adequate account of their intentionality, and consequently to capture the true relationship between bodily feelings and the intentional dimensions of emotion. As we will see, the notion of derived intentionality faces serious problems. However, once it is acknowledged that emotional bodily feelings have a structure akin to that of feelings towards, it will be clear precisely what the intentionality of bodily feelings amounts to.

'Borrowed' vs. 'Full' Intentionality

That Goldie's account fails to acknowledge the structural parallels between feelings towards and bodily feelings is indicative of a broader failure to acknowledge even the

possibility that bodily feelings might exemplify genuine world-directed intentionality comparable to that enjoyed by psychic feelings. Bodily feelings, recall, are taken to be capable of a form of world-directed intentionality thanks to their being united in experience with fully intentional states like feelings towards. A pang in the breastbone can accurately be described as a pang of grief, specifically a pang of grief felt *for* the loss of a particular person, thanks to the way in which it is combined in emotional experience with related, more appropriately intentional, states. The world-directed intentionality of such feelings, then, is borrowed from these additional states. Divorced from this phenomenological association, the intentionality of bodily feelings becomes circumscribed by the bounds of the body, the only available intentional objects being the body or its parts. However, this account is deficient in at least two respects. Firstly, it is not at all clear in what sense the bodily feelings themselves gain intentionality when united in consciousness with other intentional states. It appears, rather, that the feelings merely *seem* to gain intentionality from the subject's point of view. And secondly, even if intentionality was conferred on bodily feelings, this would still not provide us with the appropriate kind of intentionality. For, as I shall argue in the remainder of the chapter, bodily feelings are as capable of genuine world-directed intentionality as feelings towards, judgements, and any other mental state-types invoked to capture emotional intentionality.

The relation between bodily feelings and the states from which intentionality is purportedly borrowed is, by Goldie's own admission, obscure. The most we have to go on is the claim that it is as a result of being 'united in consciousness' with appropriate states by an association of ideas 'very much along Humean lines' that intentionality is conferred on bodily feelings. However, Goldie does not spell out

what talk of 'Humean lines' amounts to. Is he endorsing a version of projectivism according to which the intentional objects of emotions are, when thought about in the appropriate way, somehow 'gilded and stained' with bodily affect, imbued with the warmth and colour of emotional feeling?[31] Or is there a more realist way of interpreting these remarks? Either way, one wants to know (among other things): What precisely is going on when a bodily feeling is combined in consciousness with another state? In virtue of what are the states united at all? And how is it that a state that is not intrinsically intentional can come to gain intentionality purely by association with intentional states?

Goldie's answer seems to come down to facts about phenomenology. It is phenomenology that unites the states: one's consciousness of these states is consciousness of a single, indivisible, unified state of perception. And it is thanks to this phenomenological unity that intentionality is supposedly transferred from one state to the other. But it is not clear how phenomenology alone can confer intentionality on a bodily feeling. Is the fact that the states are experienced as a unity supposed to be sufficient for intentionality to be conferred? This reading would seem to be equally compatible with a Mackie-style error theory of emotional phenomenology, on which the phenomenology suggests that bodily feelings have intentionality in virtue of some such association with other intentional states, but on which the phenomenology is ultimately erroneous.[32] What is needed, then, is an

[31] Or do 'Humean lines' have more to do with Hume's analysis of what he calls the 'indirect passions'? On Charland's (2010) reading of Hume, for example, "These arise from a 'double relation of impressions and ideas' in a manner that strongly suggests that the objects to which those passions 'direct their view, when excited' are also part of the 'content' of these passions… On this view, indirect passions are not simply feelings but rather combinations of feelings and ideas that function as a unified causal whole in explanations of mental processes and the generation of behaviour. Thus indirect passions are complex affective states that inextricably implicate ideas in a manner that goes beyond the primitive feelings involved in token instances of emotion" (2010, p.242).

[32] See Mackie (1990).

account of the route by which bodily feelings can gain genuine (if still only borrowed), as opposed to *merely apparent*, intentionality. In other words, the phenomenology alone is not enough. Without an account of how this transference of intentionality is able to take place, we are left with phenomenological evidence that is equally compatible both with the claim that intentionality merely seems to be conferred on bodily feelings and with the claim that such feelings actually gain genuine intentionality. We are left with no way of drawing a substantial is/seems distinction for the purported intentionality of bodily feelings.

It is unclear, then, how much work is supposedly being done by the phenomenology—a fact which Goldie himself admits:

> Is this idea of borrowed intentionality *just* a matter of phenomenology? I find this question difficult to answer. On the one hand I am tempted to say Yes: it is through association of ideas that it comes to seem as if our bodily feelings are directed towards the object of our emotion. But on the other hand I am tempted to say No: for although some emotional feelings are just bodily and entirely lack any intentionality beyond their directedness towards one's body, and others are clearly just feelings towards with no bodily feeling, there seems to me no reason other than dogma to insist that all emotional feelings must be simply one or the other, and cannot have features of both. (2000, p.56)

In the same paragraph, Goldie appears to hint at a connection to the claim that emotions are substantial events:

> …the bodily feeling is thoroughly infused with the intentionality of the emotion; and, in turn, the feeling towards is infused with a bodily characterization…; the two feelings come together in consciousness so that the bodily feeling becomes, through borrowed intentionality, directed towards the…[emotional object]. It may, then, be right that this happens through association of ideas between the two elements of the emotion's narrative—the feeling towards and bodily feeling. But to leave it at that, adding perhaps that it is *just* a matter of association of ideas, is to fail to do justice to the phenomenology: emotions are felt, as I have said, with the whole being, body and soul. (2000, p.57)

But this is equally mysterious. How can a composite event like an emotion be intentional *qua* composite event? How can a complex of causally related states itself be intentional? This would seem to imply a very different notion of intentionality from the one I sanctioned earlier. Indeed, assuming for now that our current theory of intentionality is sound, there is nothing on Goldie's account to suggest how the bodily feelings might acquire genuine intentional content, comprising intentional objects presented under specific aspects, rather than such content being instantiated purely by the associated states. Of course, Goldie might dispute my generalised account of intentionality, opting instead for criteria of intentionality that are more easily satisfied by complexes of nonintentional states. However, even taking some alternative notion of object-directedness as the touchstone of intentionality, it is difficult to see how a nonintentional state could become object-directed, in any philosophically interesting or substantial sense, merely through association with object-directed states, or how a substantial event itself can gain intentionality simply in virtue of having one or more intentional states as constituent parts.[33]

So, Goldie's account fails to provide any handle on how it is that otherwise nonintentional states can come to acquire intentionality when experienced in conjunction with intentional states. It has nothing to say about the *structure* of this intentionality. As things stand, then, it is not clear whether Goldie's account precludes an error theory or not. And while I myself want to argue against an error theory, in the absence of positive reasons for thinking that intentionality is (as opposed to merely *seems to be*) borrowed from feelings towards, there is nothing in Goldie's account to tip the balance.

[33] For similar criticism see Döring and Reisenzein (2009, p.199). For alternative objections to the notion of derived intentionality, see Green (1992) and Marks (1982).

However, even if it can be shown that an error theory is ultimately incompatible with Goldie's account, a further problem remains; for even if bodily feelings can be shown to acquire borrowed intentionality, this is still not intentionality of the appropriate kind. Consider the following passage from Goldie (2000):

> It follows from the world-directed intentionality of feeling towards that it is not bodily feeling, for bodily feelings lack the required 'direct' (as contrasted with 'borrowed') intentionality. No degree of bodily feeling can alone reveal to you what your emotion is about; the association of ideas is, initially, *from* the feeling towards *to* the bodily feeling, and thus, if you do not know what your thoughts and feelings are directed towards, you cannot find out merely through introspection of your bodily feelings. (p.58)[34]

From this it is clear that Goldie conceives of the distinction between feeling towards and bodily feeling at least partly in terms of the kind of intentionality each is capable of instantiating. Now, while I do not dispute the distinction between two broad categories of emotional feeling (recognising more than one kind of affect is a positive step away from the traditional picture), I do dispute the restrictions on intentionality that follow from the *way* the distinction is drawn. In particular I dispute the underlying assumption that bodily feelings simply are not the kinds of states that are capable of direct intentionality. The assumption itself is pervasive in analytic philosophy of emotion and a relic of the traditional picture. After all, it is said, how

[34] Cf. Goldie (2004a), p.96. Compare what Goldie says in one of his most recent papers (2009). After setting out what might be called his established position (as detailed in Goldie, 2000, 2002c, 2004a, 2004b, and outlined above), he says the following: "If it is accepted, as I have been urging, that there can be feelings towards—emotional feelings directed towards aspects of the world—there arises a further question, of whether there can be *any* bodily feelings (emotional or otherwise) that are *merely* feelings of the body" (2009, p.235); adding "most of what I call feelings towards the world are not feelings towards the world in isolation from the body" (2009, p.235). Goldie also endorses Ratcliffe's claims (see below) that to try to account for bodily feelings and for feelings towards often involves a kind of "double-counting", and that feelings towards are not distinct from how the body feels. On the face of it, these remarks—which appear explicitly to claim that feelings towards can be bodily feelings—constitute a radical departure from his established position, which conceives of feelings towards as a kind of psychic feeling to be contrasted explicitly with bodily feeling. However, whilst Goldie neither develops the claim nor indicates how it relates to his established position, I assume, given his previous writings, that these bodily feelings towards still enjoy only *derived* intentionality.

can a feeling alone be about or directed towards an external object? How can a pang in the gut or the breastbone be about a worldly state of affairs without its intentionality being in some way parasitic upon a substantive thought-like state or process? The key to answering these questions lies in understanding the roles played by certain bodily feelings in our experience of external objects.

I shall argue that certain bodily feelings constitute perceptions of what Goldie calls emotion-proper properties: e.g. the property of being fearsome, lovable, pitiable, enviable, and so on. However, in order to do this, I must show two things: 1) that bodily feelings are the kinds of states that are capable of exhibiting full world-directed intentionality—specifically, that they are capable of playing a perceptual role in world-experience; and 2) that emotion-proper properties are the kind of properties that are capable of being detected in this way by bodily feelings. The remainder of the chapter is concerned with the first of these tasks. The second is the concern of chapters 3 and 4. As mentioned, a key insight into the potential world-directedness of bodily feelings comes from Goldie's account of the structure of feeling towards, and in particular from the claim that, in feeling towards, the affective dimension of the emotion is inextricably connected to the thought content.

The Inextricability Claim

The inextricability claim, as I shall call it, features at several points in Goldie's authorship (e.g. 2000, 2002c, 2004a, 2004b) as part of his general account of the structure of feeling towards. However, the claim itself remains relatively underdeveloped. In precisely what way are intentional content and phenomenality

'inextricable' on Goldie's account? The answer would seem to lie in the analogy with seeing aspects and Stocker's ice example. Both are designed to illustrate the fact that there is an important difference in content between thinking of an emotional object O with feeling and thinking of O without feeling, where the feeling is part of the intentional content itself. To have a thought with precisely that content necessarily feels a certain (emotionally-charged) way. Such thoughts are essentially emotion-involving insofar as there could not be that particular content captured in that way without the thought instantiating that particular qualitative character, with the result that an adequate account of that emotion's intentionality (its intentional content) must include reference to its phenomenology (its qualitative content). The internal connection between affect and thought-content is thus secured by the fact that it is only thoughts of the appropriate kind—i.e. those in which relevant sets of emotion-invoking determinable and determinate features figure in an appropriate way—which instantiate the relevant affective phenomenality. That this is so is perspicuous in the phenomenology of everyday emotional experience.

This is correct as far as it goes. Phenomenology suggests that psychic feelings towards do indeed have this structure. However, Goldie's account fails to recognise that something importantly similar applies in the case of emotional bodily feelings; for it is not just psychic feelings that are inextricably bound up with the way emotional objects are experienced, but bodily feelings too. Thus, it is not enough to say that experiencing an object in a way that entails being frightened is just a matter of having thoughts endowed with the appropriate qualia. Phenomenology testifies that, in many cases, experiencing an object in an emotion-involving—specifically affect-involving—way involves more than simply having appropriately qualitative

thoughts about that object, or even having them in combination with certain bodily feelings which then appear to share in their intentionality. Rather, phenomenology suggests that the bodily feelings involved are themselves intrinsically intentional states: it is integral to their nature and identity that they refer to aspects of emotional objects. Such feelings are just as fundamental to the experience of the object as any concomitant psychic feelings; and they are just as intimately bound up with its presentation. One cannot, on this reading of the phenomenology, experience an object in a way that entails feeling an emotion towards it without undergoing the relevant bodily (as well, perhaps, as psychic) feelings, as an adequate account of that emotion's intentionality must include reference to the phenomenal content of those bodily feelings. Indeed, part of what it *is* for a token feeling of this kind to be that very feeling is for it to include, as part of its phenomenal content, a *felt impression* of an emotion-proper property. Simply put, the phenomenal and intentional aspects of these feelings are inextricable in the sense that it is impossible for a token feeling to have precisely the phenomenal content that it does without it also having precisely the intentional (representational) content that it does, and vice-versa.

But how can bodily feelings possibly enjoy such an intimate connection with the intentional contents of emotions? Psychic feelings stand in this relation thanks to their status as intentional mental states endowed with intrinsic phenomenality. What is it about bodily feelings that secures this connection? The answer lies in the fact that, for many of the bodily feelings that are constitutive of emotional experience, it is impossible to characterise the phenomenology of such feelings independently of the emotion's intentional content, and it is equally impossible to capture or define intentional content without making reference to the phenomenology of the relevant

bodily feelings. In other words, a description of how the body feels is not separable from a description of how the intentional object appears to the subject. A description of the phenomenal content of the bodily feeling makes essential reference to a description of the presentation of the object. One cannot fully describe how the body feels without describing the impression made upon it by the object of the emotion. And equally, it is impossible to describe that intentional object—to characterise fully its aspectual shape, the way it is taken in by, or presented to, the subject—without saying something about the way the body feels.

Take our earlier example of John and the spider. Asked to describe his emotion, John would describe having feelings of fear directed towards the spider, where these feelings include various visceral bodily sensations: e.g. sharp icy sensations in the gut, feelings of constriction and tension in the chest, sudden dizziness, increased heart-rate, sweaty palms, and so on. Not all of these, perhaps, will be ubiquitous among experiences of fear, but the most, as it were, visceral of them—particularly the feelings of penetrating cold and constriction—will be typical of most cases of fear. Now, these standard, visceral, feelings of fear are not merely bare, unstructured sensations which just happen to accompany experience of the spider. Rather, as we saw in the previous chapter, they are, in a very immediate and obvious sense, *felt towards* the spider: experience of it is to a large extent defined by these feelings; the experience itself is imbued, permeated, shot through with affective colouration. The content of the experience is shaped, at least in part, by them. This much is common ground between Goldie's account and the account I am proposing; as is the claim that such feelings have intentional content in addition to phenomenal content. Where I depart from Goldie is in claiming that the intentional content of such feelings is

intrinsic to them—built into their very structure—rather than merely borrowed from additional states.

On my view, these feelings are essentially feelings *of* the spider: feelings which, to some degree, *represent* it as being a particular way (viz. as *scary* or *fearsome*). Were John asked to introspect in detail his feelings of fear, he would find that the visceral bodily feelings he experienced (provided the act of introspection itself did not significantly distort their structure) were just as inextricable from the content of the experience as any concomitant psychic feelings. He would find it impossible to describe the feelings without describing them as feelings *of* the spider, particularly its fearsome quality. He would find, in other words, that he could not characterise their phenomenal content—the way they felt to him—without describing their intentional content—how they represented some aspect of the world as being. And equally, he would find that he was unable to describe the precise way in which the spider appeared to him during the experience (in terms of its fearsome quality) without making reference to the effect it had on him; and in particular, without making reference to the way his body *felt*. This is because, as the intentional mode of his experiential state is that of feeling, the object is not merely an 'object-simply-apprehended' but, to borrow James's phrase, an 'object-emotionally-*felt*': it is an object as *felt, as experienced by the feeling subject*, and thus *as represented by bodily feeling*. Consequently, the spider is experienced as being frightening not because it is somehow 'gilded and stained' with bodily affect; nor because experience of it is mingled in consciousness with certain bodily feelings; nor still because it is thought about in an appropriately affect-involving way. Rather, it is *experienced* in an affect-

involving way—as being such that the fearsomeness is itself a felt property of the spider—because it is being experienced through the intentional mode of feeling.

Such feelings are feelings of the body being *affected* by the object in determinate ways. John's fear comprises feelings of being in some way *impinged* upon by the fearsomeness of the spider. Experiencing fear is typically like being impaled by a cold object: broadly speaking, it is a visceral feeling of being, in a particular determinate way, disrupted, disturbed, even pained, by the object of fear.[35] Similarly for other emotions: feelings of disgust are typically feelings of one's body viscerally *reacting to* the disgusting object—of one's insides being churned up *by* its disgusting quality. Feelings of disgust are feelings of (one's visceral body, one's constitution) being disrupted or violated by the object.[36] They are feelings of the body encountering, being confronted by, an instance of disgustingness. In the same way, experience of grinding poverty can involve the feeling of being viscerally struck by the pitifulness of the situation. Even love can be experienced as a bodily feeling of being affected

[35] Ratcliffe (2008a) seems to be making a similar point when he discusses Nussbaum's (2001) description of her experience of hearing about her mother's illness and subsequent death. Nussbaum describes how receiving the news "felt like a nail suddenly driven into my stomach" (2001, p.184) and how her body "felt as if pierced by so many slivers of glass" (2001, p.185). Ratcliffe's interpretation of the experience emphasises the inseparability of bodily feeling and intentionality. Thus, "what felt like a nail driven into the stomach was not a bodily state but the recognition of a state of affairs external to the body. The feeling seems indistinguishable from the manner in which that state of affairs is experienced. It is the objects of emotion that *hurt* us. The nail being driven in *is* the emotional apprehension of a situation; the intentionality and bodily nature of the emotion are entangled" (Ratcliffe, 2008a, p.27).

[36] Indeed, this is no surprise given that (from a psychoevolutionary perspective at least) feelings of disgust quite literally serve to register the potential for violation of the body by infection. I conjecture that visceral emotional feelings, and the physiological events and processes which give rise to them, serve a general evolutionary purpose by preparing the body for action, readying the subject, and in particular her *body*, for fight or flight (in the case of fear), avoidance behaviour and vomiting (in the case of disgust), and a host of other emotional actions appropriate to particular emotion-types.

(overpowered, gripped) by some (usually ineffable, ethereal) quality of the loved one.[37]

The ability emotional objects have viscerally to affect the body is reflected in ordinary language. We talk of feeling a stab of jealousy, a pang of grief, of being gripped by fear, racked by guilt, and so on. Such talk is not just metaphorical (although often it is clearly also that): it captures a visceral, bodily, and distinctly passive phenomenology—a phenomenology of the body being affected in a visceral way *by* the object of emotion. These locutions reflect experience of certain qualities of emotional objects literally impinging upon, to the extent of being *felt*—registered, perceived, experienced—by the feeling body.

Thus, once again we see that emotional bodily feelings are not the bare, unstructured sensations—the mere 'itches' and 'twinges'—they are often assumed to be. The visceral, gut-churning feelings characteristic of disgust, or the icy feelings characteristic of fear, for example, are not experienced as isolated sensations, accompanying but entirely separate from the experience of the disgusting or frightening object. Rather, experience of the object is in part defined by those feelings. The way it appears to the subject in experience is intimately bound up with them. It was partly this fact, I suspect, that Goldie was trying to account for with the concept of derived intentionality. However, this, of course, does not do the phenomenology justice. For, it is intrinsic to the nature of such feelings that they contain a sense of things being thus and so in the world. It is not that they acquire this reference in virtue of being somehow mingled in consciousness with perceptions or

[37] Crucially, as we will see, the claim that such feelings are feelings of being *affected by* certain qualities of the object is entirely compatible with the claim that, under a different description, they are primarily feelings *of the qualities themselves* (and not, say, merely feelings *of the body*).

feelings towards; rather, this reference is internal to the content of the feeling: subtract the reference to the emotional object, and the content of the feeling, and indeed its very structure, would be irrevocably altered. It would cease to be precisely that feeling. (Thus, affect and intentionality are not only inextricable in definition or description but in *existence*: the one cannot exist the way it does without the other existing the way it does; and the nature of the one is determined, at least in part, by the nature of the other.) Such feelings, then, come with intentional objects; they come laden with representational content—content which represents properties of external objects, not just internal bodily states.[38] And it is this representational structure which explains how it is possible for such feelings to bear an internal connection to the intentional content of the emotion; for, the representation of the object which constitutes the emotion's intentional content is in part a phenomenological representation attributable to bodily feelings.

The phenomenological evidence, then, points directly to a conception of such feelings as feelings *of* emotional objects, or at least certain of their properties. Everything about their phenomenology suggests that they are not discrete, isolated sensations, completely removed from the experience of emotional objects, but are instead feelings of certain aspects of those objects: felt impressions of things being thus and so in the

[38] Recall Lyons's claim that "one labels a feeling as of some particular emotion only after causally correlating it with the…evaluation…though one can attach labels to feelings—labels such as 'twinge' or 'itch'—just by reference to the content or qualities of the feeling itself" (op.cit.). (Compare Goldie's remarks (2000, p.58), cited above.) My account contradicts this, not just by arguing that affects are far more than mere twinges or itches, but by denying that one only labels a feeling as being of a particular emotion after correlating it with a cognition. Rather, that the feeling is a feeling of fear, and furthermore directed towards a frightening object, is often entirely perspicuous in the experience. It is integral to the phenomenology of the feeling that it is a feeling of the fearsomeness of an object (although, of course, it might not be possible, simply by introspecting the phenomenology, to determine which *particular* object instantiates that property). That the feeling has an object, and that the object is an emotion-proper property of a particular kind, is built into the feeling itself, written into its very content. Dual-component theories, of course, fail to take account of the relevant phenomenology. These accounts render bodily feelings entirely external to the experience of emotional objects, leaving them completely cut off from the way those objects are presented to subjects.

world. More specifically, they have built into them an impression of the defining properties of emotional objects. John's feelings towards the spider are not just feelings *of fear*, falling under the sensation-type 'fear', but are instead feelings of its *fearsomeness*—feelings of a manifest property of the spider.[39] Talk of emotional feelings as feelings *of* fear, disgust, pity, and so on, is importantly ambiguous. John has feelings of fear both in the sense that they are accurately characterised according to their qualitative characters as being of fear (as opposed to being, say, feelings of hunger), and in the sense of being feelings of fearsomeness, in the sense of being representations of an emotion-proper property. In the same way, a stab of guilt or regret is not just a guilt-type or regret-type feeling—it is a feeling of *being affected by* guilt or regret. It is the guilt which thrusts itself into one's consciousness, the regrettableness which is experienced as penetrating one's body.

Introspective reflection on everyday emotional experience reveals, then, that emotional bodily feelings are characterised by a representational phenomenology. And the fact that certain emotional bodily feelings have this structure—whereby phenomenality and intentionality are in this way inextricable—raises the possibility that such feelings actually function as perceptions of features of emotional objects. For, as we will see, perceptual bodily feelings—tactile feelings being the paradigm case—have precisely this structure. For tactile feelings, it is impossible to separate the intentional and phenomenal dimensions, as any account of the way the body feels in tactile experience necessarily includes an impression of something external to the body. The identity of a token intentional state, recall, is fixed jointly by its intentional

[39] Compare Sartre's description of experiencing horror at some object: "The horrible is now in the thing, at the heart of it, is its emotive texture, is constitutive of it. Thus, during emotion an overwhelming and definitive quality of the thing makes its appearance… The 'horrible' means indeed that horribleness is a substantial quality, that there is horribleness in the world… We are living, emotively, a quality that *penetrates into us*, that we are *suffering*" (1930/2004, p.54; emphasis added).

content (object presented under an aspect) and its intentional mode (feeling, belief, desire, etc.); and in both the tactile and emotional affective cases, as the intentional content is the content of a *feeling*, it is essentially qualitative, with the result that intentional content must also necessarily include phenomenal content.

In this respect, I shall argue, emotional bodily feelings are indeed best understood as a species of perceptual feeling importantly analogous to—although not identical with—tactile feelings. Cold, stabbing feelings of fear are phenomenologically and experientially analogous to being stabbed in the gut with a cold, sharp instrument. Felt awareness of a blade penetrating one's innards is such that the feeling of the blade and its properties—for example, being cold, hard, and smooth—is inextricable from how the body feels; and equally, how the body feels is inextricable from how the blade is encountered by the feeling body, how it is *experienced*. Experience of certain properties of emotional objects is similarly inextricable from how the body feels.

We can now see precisely where lie the differences between the two versions of the inextricability claim (viz. Goldie's regarding psychic feelings and mine regarding bodily feelings); and we can also see that while Goldie's description of the phenomenology was accurate (he recognised that in emotional experience certain feelings are felt towards their objects in such a way that intentionality and phenomenality are inextricable), his analysis of that phenomenology was importantly incomplete. For, it is not just psychic feelings that enjoy this structure, but certain bodily feelings too; and for such feelings intentional content is built into phenomenal content in such a way as to render the two entirely inseparable. Consequently, even if

the notion of derived intentionality could be shown to stand up, it would still be insufficient to capture the intrinsic intentional content of emotional bodily feelings.

So, while psychic feelings appear, as Goldie claims, to be intentional mental states with intrinsic qualitative character, if my arguments for the perceptual status of emotional bodily feelings are correct, then bodily feelings too are intentional mental states with intrinsic qualitative character. In the case of psychic feelings, phenomenology and intentionality are internally related because psychic feelings are essentially thoughts that necessarily feel a certain way. The phenomenal property is intrinsic to the thought, as it is impossible to have the same thought (that is, the same thought-type, an exactly similar thought) with exactly the same content but minus the affect, as it would, ipso facto, fail to be precisely the same thought (-type). Now, as perceptions, emotional bodily feelings are intrinsically intentional states (as, by their very nature, all perceptions are): they represent states of affairs in particular ways. A perceptual object is presented to the subject in a certain way (as fearsome, loveable, enviable, etc.) and via a certain intentional mode (that of feeling). But they are also intrinsically phenomenal states (as, by their nature, all feelings are). And it is integral to a perceptual feeling's being that exact feeling that it has precisely the (phenomenal) content that it does. (A feeling which had a different phenomenal content—i.e. which felt a different way—would not be exactly similar in respect of content, and so would not be precisely the same type of feeling.) And in the case of perceptual feelings, the phenomenal content—the way it feels to the subject—*is identical with* (i.e. is one and the same content as) its perceptual (intentional, representational) content. For perceptual feelings, intentional content and phenomenal content necessarily just is one and the same. A description of how the body feels *is* a description of intentional

content—a description of an impression (a felt impression) of things being a certain way.

But how is it possible for visceral bodily feelings—e.g. sharp pangs of guilt or fiery flushes of anger—to function as perceptions? The phenomenology suggests that they have this structure, but in the absence of an account of how it might be that bodily feelings can play this perceptual role, it is difficult to see how we can take the phenomenology at face-value. My aim in the next chapter is to provide an account which vindicates the phenomenology—an account which shows exactly how it is possible for bodily feelings to play a perceptual role in the apprehension of emotional properties. Key to this account is the analogy with tactile feelings mentioned above. An account which explores the parallels between visceral bodily feelings such as those found in emotional experience and tactile feelings is given by Matthew Ratcliffe; and it is this account to which we now turn. As we will see, Ratcliffe's arguments show that visceral bodily feelings are just as capable of exemplifying perceptual structure as tactile feelings.

Ratcliffe's Account

Matthew Ratcliffe (2005a, 2008a) shares with Goldie and me the view that emotional feelings are felt towards their objects in a way that cannot be squared with the dual-component theorist's conception of them as merely the brute, nonintentional consequents of antecedent cognitive states.[40] However, he goes further than Goldie,

[40] See Ratcliffe (2008a) for criticism of Ben-Ze'ev (2004) and Brewer (2002) along similar lines, and for specific criticism of conciliatory or 'hybrid' accounts by Lyons (1980), Prinz (2004b), and Solomon (2003a).

extending the notion of full emotional intentionality to encompass bodily as well as psychic feelings. For Ratcliffe, the intentionality of bodily feelings is not restricted to the borrowed intentionality which Goldie postulates, or the body-directed intentionality proposed by Crane; instead, bodily feelings are just as capable of 'full' (non-derived, object-directed) intentionality as beliefs, desires, judgements, and any other paradigmatically intentional states.

Ratcliffe cites these familiar remarks by Ben-Ze'ev as epitomising the conception of bodily feeling currently popular within philosophy of emotion:

> …unlike higher levels of awareness, such as those found in perception, memory, and thinking, the feeling dimension has no significant cognitive content. It expresses our own state, but is not in itself directed at this state or at any other object. Since this dimension is a mode of consciousness, one cannot be unconscious of it; there are no unfelt feelings… Despite the importance of feelings in emotions, equating the two is incorrect since emotions have an intentional component in addition to the feeling component.[41]

Clearly, this is a manifestation of the traditional picture. Feelings are taken to be nothing more than 'expressions' of bodily states. According to Ratcliffe, this view makes three assumptions about bodily feelings that are unwarranted. These are:

(1) Bodily feelings do not have intentionality.

(2) Bodily feelings are expressions or perceptions of bodily states. In other words, when one has a bodily feeling, one has an awareness of one's body being a certain way.

(3) One is always conscious of bodily feelings.

[41] Ben-Ze'ev (2004), pp.252-253, cited in Ratcliffe (2008a), pp.26-27.

Against these assumptions, Ratcliffe argues that:

(1) Bodily feelings are part of the structure of intentionality. They contribute to how one's body and/or aspects of the world are experienced.
(2) There is a distinction between the [phenomenological] location of a feeling and what that feeling is *of*. A feeling can be *in* the body but *of* something outside the body. One is not always aware *of* the body, even though that is where the feeling occurs.
(3) A bodily feeling need not be an object of consciousness. Feelings are often that *through* which one is conscious of something else.[42]

According to Ratcliffe, then, bodily feelings are part of the structure of intentionality: they are neither nonintentional 'mere' affects, nor states that can take only the body or its parts as their objects. Experience of bodily feeling is not necessarily just experience of the parts of the body where it is felt to occur; it can also be feeling *of* things beyond the body. The feeling, in short, can be a way in which something other than the body is experienced, rather than itself being the sole object of experience. The feeling body can act as a medium *through* which the world is experienced.

In demonstrating how bodily feelings can themselves be intentional, Ratcliffe considers the perceptual modality of touch, noting how, in the case of touch, "bodily feeling and experience of the world are inextricable" (Ratcliffe, 2005a, p.47). In illustrating this point, the following example is used. Consider holding a glass of cold

[42] Taken from Ratcliffe (2005a), p.44. It should be noted that such uses of the term 'feeling' (and often also 'experience') are to some extent act/object ambiguous. It is not always clear whether Ratcliffe is referring to the act of feeling or the content of the resulting state. However, this occasional ambiguity does not appear to cause any problems for his account.

water. The glass feels cold. But isn't it really one's *hand* that feels cold, rather than the glass? No: attention is directed towards the glass rather than one's hand. The hand is a medium *through* which the glass is experienced. Now consider instead holding a snowball. Again, it feels cold; but the focus of attention soon shifts from the feeling of the snow to the sensation of cold in the hand. One is now acutely aware of a dull ache in one's hand, and is no longer vividly conscious of the tactile properties of the snowball. The object of perception has now shifted: it is no longer the snowball but the hand. What started off as a vehicle of perception through which the snowball was experienced has now become the object of perception: it is now the hand that is felt, not the snowball. Of course, there is no change in the location of the sensation: it is and was in the hand. Rather, what has changed is the object of experience. Ratcliffe is quick to point out that before the shift there were not two feelings—one *in* the hand and the other *of* the snowball. There was one feeling which was simultaneously *of* an object and *in* the body. Thus:

> To touch is to experience a relation between one's body and an object it comes into contact with. Yet which side of the relation, if either, is the object of experience depends on the quality of the feeling and on what one is attending to at the time. (2005a, p.48)

Ratcliffe draws two points from the example: (1) "a differentiation between self and non-self is integrated into the feeling of touch. This might not be sufficient to determine a specific intentional object but it is part of the *structure* of intentionality". And (2) "the bodily location of a feeling does not determine what it is a feeling *of*". He continues:

> These related points can be generalised to encompass various other, non-tactile bodily feelings. Commonplace philosophical divisions between bodily feelings and intentionality assume that where X is located is also what X is a feeling of. However, although the body or parts of it is sometimes the object that is felt, one can be aware of a feeling *as* something occurring in one's body or *as* a way in which the world appears. Feelings of the body and feelings towards objects in the world are two sides of the same coin, although one or the other will usually be foregrounded in experience. (2005a, pp.48-49)

According to Ratcliffe, then, bodily feelings are capable of intentionality in virtue of being states *through which* the world and its objects can be experienced. In touch, for example, objects are revealed through tactile bodily feelings. Experience of such feelings is experience of the properties of the objects touched. However, these feelings have a double aspect: depending on where the focus of attention lies, they can be experienced as feelings of external objects or as feelings of states of the body (or, indeed, both); and it is thanks to this double aspect that tactile feelings function as perceptions of external properties.

The term 'bodily feeling', then, is importantly ambiguous: "In one sense, a bodily feeling *is a feeling that has the body as its object*. In another, it is *a feeling done by the body that has something other than the body as its object*… [W]hat we have is neither the perception of two objects…nor of one object that can be attended to in two different ways, facilitating perception of 'inside' and 'outside'". Instead, "How the touching body feels is inextricable from how an object is felt" (2008a, p.88). One and the same state of feeling, then, can be both body- and world-directed, depending on which side of the feeling-felt relation is foregrounded in experience. Attention can be focussed on the body-aspect of the feeling, the world-aspect, or both, with neither occupying the experiential foreground.

As the snowball example illustrates, the structure of such feelings is not immutable: whilst during non-reflective tactile experience there is typically a single perceptual content with two aspects—the world-aspect being the one that occupies attention—it is possible to alter the structure of the experience in order to bring the body-aspect into focus, thus changing the content of the experience. Given the inherent dual-aspect nature of tactile feelings, how is the relation between the two aspects—the two sides of the coin—to be understood? Indeed, why talk in terms of a single state of feeling with different aspects, rather than in terms of different states? After all, the perceptual content would appear to change along with the shift in attention, being now the hand which holds the snowball, now the snowball itself. The reasons Ratcliffe cites for talking in terms of a unitary state of feeling are largely phenomenological. According to Ratcliffe, phenomenology reveals the two aspects of tactile feeling to be inextricable in such a way as to preclude any experiential distinction being drawn between them. Experience of a unitary state of feeling is more phenomenologically *primitive* than experience of either aspect in isolation from the other. This unitary structure is due to the fact that the world-directed and body-directed aspects of tactile experience are phenomenologically inseparable insofar as it is impossible to have felt experience of a non-bodily object without there being some bodily dimension to the experience. Thus, according to Ratcliffe, for many bodily feelings:

> World-experience is not distinct from how one's body feels; the two are utterly inextricable. The experiential entanglement of body and world is more phenomenologically *primitive* than experience of either in isolation from the other, by which I mean that even in cases where *either* the body *or* some other part of the world appears to be the sole content of an experience, that experience retains an underlying structure where body and world are inseparable—to experience one is to experience the other. (2005a, pp.1-2)

In other words, while touch and proprioception are not identical (it seems possible to have the latter without the former), they are inextricable in the sense that it is impossible to have the former without the latter. (As we might put it, there could not be perceptual content without phenomenal content, as the perceptual mode is feeling, and so its content must be *felt* content.) There may of course be non-phenomenological ways of distinguishing touch and proprioception, and of individuating bodily feelings, but from a phenomenological perspective there is just one state of feeling, albeit one with a relational structure. The bodily and non-bodily sides of the experience are aspects of a single perception, not two distinct perceptions. Thus, it is wrong to think in terms of experience being always of one aspect rather than the other. There is often no phenomenological distinction between them, and all that can be experienced is the relation between the part of the body doing the touching and the object touched. And experience of this relation is unitary.

It is clear from Ratcliffe's discussion of these points that the experiences in question are unitary both in the sense that there is only one experience (one feeling), individuated in terms of content, and in the sense that there is only one (phenomenologically distinct) act or process of feeling (see footnote above). That there is one content with more than one aspect is significant as it allows the possibility that a single feeling (qua state with determinate content) can refer beyond the body to provide information about the external world. The relational content of tactile feelings allows for the world-aspect, the body-aspect, or the relation between the two to be the most salient feature of the experience (or, perhaps, for all three aspects to be equally salient).

This touches on an important and subtle point, and one which, properly understood, helps to dissolve a prima facie tension which appears to attend several of Ratcliffe's claims. For example, Ratcliffe's claim (point 3 above) that a bodily feeling need not be an object of consciousness (being rather that through which one is conscious of something else) seems explicitly to contradict his claim that all feelings—including those which are world- rather than body-directed—are essentially feelings of the body, admitting of an ineliminable bodily characterisation. In other words, Ratcliffe's initial claim that one need not always be conscious of bodily feelings seems to jar with his claim that all world-revealing feelings also admit of a bodily (proprioceptive) aspect. However, once Ratcliffe's claims are properly unpacked the tension dissolves, as it becomes clear that all such remarks are subject to qualification in light of what he says about the structure of experience. For, it is clear that whilst on Ratcliffe's account non-reflective consciousness of objects typically features a clear object of focus, occupying, as it were, the foreground of awareness, such experience also features characteristics which, whilst not the primary objects of attention, are nevertheless there 'in the background'. Thus, it is true to say both that the subject is not consciously aware of these characteristics (insofar as these happen not to be what she is paying attention to) and that they form part of the content of the experience (insofar as they are present in the background). Consequently, while the bodily aspect of tactile feeling is indeed to some extent always present in the experience—and while one is thus *in a sense* necessarily conscious of it—it need not feature at the forefront of conscious awareness, and so need not be the object of attention, what the subject is conscious *of*.

Crucially, on Ratcliffe's account, it is not just tactile feelings that are capable of world-directed intentionality. Rather, a host of bodily feelings—including those associated with emotions, moods, and what he terms 'existential feelings'—share this intentional structure.[43] Visceral bodily feelings, such as sharp, icy sensations of fear felt in the pit of the stomach, are just as capable of playing a world-revealing experiential role as tactile feelings. A key step towards understanding how non-tactile bodily feelings can be capable of full intentionality involves showing how feelings other than those situated at bodily boundaries can act as perceptions. Initially, it seems that the body-world duality of tactile feeling—i.e. the ability for a feeling of touch to act as a perception either of body or of world—is applicable only to feelings located at bodily boundaries, such as the skin. However, according to Ratcliffe, the object of feeling need not be in physical contact with the body. Thus:

> What is seen is not located in the same place as the organs of sight and what is heard is not experienced as residing in the ears. In the case of touch too, although the body perceives, it is not usually the object of perception and what is perceived need not be in physical contact with the body. There are plenty of cases where the objects of touch are not located at the physical boundary between body and world. (2008a, p.90)

Ratcliffe cites the example of a blind person's use of a cane. Here the cane is an 'organ of perception', rather than an object encountered by the hand. The cane is an instrument through which the immediate environment is experienced; but the cane itself disappears in the experience. The same goes for numerous other examples. Ihde (1973/1983), for instance, describes running a pencil along the surface of a desk, thereby perceiving the texture of the desk through the pencil. In such cases the experience is, primarily, *of* the object (environment, desk) as disclosed through the

[43] It should be noted that Ratcliffe's primary concern lies not with emotions but with existential feelings (see Ratcliffe, 2005a, 2008a): e.g. feeling 'disconnected', 'distant', 'at home in the world', 'watched', 'helpless', etc. However, it is emotional feelings which concern us here.

medium of the instrument (cane, pencil). It is the texture of the object that occupies the experiential foreground—not the feeling of pressure against the skin caused by the intermediary. In other words, the experience is *of the environment*, in the case of the cane, and *of the desk*, in the case of the pencil—not of the tactile impressions made on the skin.

For Ratcliffe, these thoughts carry over from tactile feelings to other kinds of bodily feeling, thus leaving open the possibility that the bodily feelings characteristic of many kinds of emotion are capable of playing similar perceptual roles. Consequently:

> That there is sometimes a physical distance between what feels and what is felt allows for the possibility that feelings internal to the body, such as visceral feelings, structure experience of things outside the body. One might have a visceral feeling, such as a sinking feeling in the stomach, but the areas of the body in which that feeling is phenomenologically localized need not be the primary object of the feeling, what is *felt*. It is the body or parts of it that *do* the feeling. (2008a, p.106)

The perceptual role of visceral feelings is not mitigated by the fact that they are not feelings of direct contact between a bodily boundary and a physical object. The possibility of their functioning as perceptual states remains open despite there being a physical distance between the object and the phenomenological location of the feeling. According to Ratcliffe, then, there is no in-principle barrier to taking visceral bodily feelings to be feelings of external objects. However, so far these remarks still only apply to instances of (extended) tactile experience, while the bodily feelings playing a perceptual role in emotional experience function in a way that is analogous to but not identical with the role played by tactile feelings. Thus, I am interested primarily in Ratcliffe's claim that what has just been said regarding tactile feelings

can be made to apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to other bodily feelings. Again, the reasons in support of this view are largely phenomenological.

According to Ratcliffe, phenomenology reveals that many non-tactile bodily feelings have a structure that parallels that of tactile feelings in certain crucial respects. In particular, non-tactile feelings are capable of instantiating the same dual-aspect structure as tactile feelings, being both feelings of the body and ways in which aspects of the world are experienced. The phenomenology of such feelings is a phenomenology of world-experience. Indeed, even feelings that might be considered paradigm cases of perceptions of bodily states are often experienced primarily as world-directed feelings. For example, feelings of tiredness, sickness, and fatigue might be experienced as feelings of the world appearing in particular ways. Ratcliffe cites Sartre's example from *Being and Nothingness* of reading whilst having sore eyes, describing the way in which, before the eye strain is noticed and made an object of conscious awareness, the feeling of tiredness *just is* the way in which the words appear on the page: distorted, trembling, and difficult to interpret. The feeling of aching eyes is that through which the world is experienced. Before becoming the object of reflective awareness, the eyes are what do the feeling, rather than what is felt.

In the same way, any number of visceral feelings are such that, prior to becoming objects of reflective consciousness, their phenomenological structure is that of world-perception, not body-perception. The hollow feeling of depression felt deep in the stomach is a feeling of the limitedness of the world, the feeling of a world suppressing, not facilitating, one's plans, projects, goals, and activities. Such feelings

of suppression and constraint are not feelings felt in addition to bodily feelings; they *are* bodily feelings. There is just one feeling that can be described in different ways. The structure of such feelings is most obvious in pathological cases where the body relates the subject to the world in unusual and debilitating ways, such as in cases of psychiatric illness. (See Ratcliffe, 2008a, for detailed discussion of the perceptual role of bodily feelings in psychiatric illness.) In such cases, feelings of being isolated, estranged, depressed, or detached from reality, for example, are not distinct from how the body feels. Rather, they themselves constitute ways in which the world appears. It is integral to the natures of such feelings that they have this relational body-world structure. To experience the hollow feeling of depression deep down in the stomach is to experience the world as being a particular way. It is through this feeling that the world appears as it does, just as it is through the tactile impressions of the cane that the world appears as it does to the blind person.

Towards an Account of Affective Perception

Recent philosophical tradition has emphasised the body-aspect of feeling to the near-total exclusion of the world-aspect—a consequence, I suspect, of unquestioning adherence to the traditional picture of feeling. The assumption that the phenomenology of bodily feelings is a solely bodily phenomenology is damaging not only because it neglects the sense in which some bodily feelings are feelings of external objects, but also because it leads to the imposition of a stark division between bodily and non-bodily phenomena—a division that severely mischaracterises the experiential structure of many bodily feelings. As Ratcliffe argues, and as my analysis of the phenomenology of emotional bodily feelings indicates, a complete description

of the phenomenology of certain feelings must make reference to their worldly objects—to the ways in which they connect the subject, via the feeling body, to the world. For, phenomenological reflection reveals that it is part of the structure of many feelings that they necessarily refer beyond the body to include an inherent sense of the world's being a particular way. It is of the essence of such feelings that they are feelings of aspects of the world—that they include a sense of certain things being thus and so.

However, this is only part of the story. So far we have seen that certain bodily feelings, including certain visceral feelings, are intrinsically intentional representational states. But this is not enough to secure the conclusion that they are full-blown perceptions of the kind I suggest. These feelings, I want to argue, are perceptions of emotion-proper properties; they are not merely 'ways the world seems' to individual subjects.[44] However, the above arguments pave the way for such an analysis, laying the groundwork required to overturn the traditional picture and escape the deep-rooted conception of bodily feelings as mere brute sensations incapable of playing a significant world-revealing role in the epistemology of emotional experience.

[44] According to Ratcliffe, it is through bodily feelings that the subject acquires a sense of the world being a particular way. However, this sense, while akin to a form of perceptual appearance, does not permit the drawing of a clear distinction between appearance (qua *mere* appearance) and reality. The bodily feelings that constitute existential feelings do not support the kind of is/seems distinction upheld by other perceptual states. Obviously, there is always the possibility of being wrong in one's ordinary perceptual judgements (for instance, as a result of hallucination, illusion, or simple misperception). But the difference is that in the case of existential feeling there is often no *question* of distinguishing how things are independently of the subject from how things merely *appear* to her to be. Take Sartre's tired eyes example: according to Ratcliffe, the way the words appear on the page is not distinct from the feeling of tiredness around the eyes. The words are unfocussed, their meaning difficult to discern; and their appearing this way is inextricable from the feeling of soreness. And yet the words are not actually unfocussed or detached from their ordinary meaning. This is where, for Ratcliffe's account, the touch analogy is slightly misleading. The feelings in which I am primarily interested, on the other hand, have the power reliably to reveal not just appearances but, as in the tactile case, actual properties of objects.

To begin with, Ratcliffe's account provides a powerful way of understanding just how it is that mere bodily feelings can at the same time be states through which things external to the body are experienced. Earlier we saw that certain emotional bodily feelings have phenomenal and intentional aspects which are inextricable in a way that entails that part of what it is for a token feeling to be that very feeling is for it to include within its phenomenal/intentional content a felt impression of an emotion-proper property. This suggests an obvious parallel with tactile feelings which are intrinsically intentional representational states comprising two inherently inextricable aspects. Ratcliffe's analysis of the intentional structure of tactile feelings suggests that it is in virtue of their dual-aspect structure that they are able to function *both* as feelings of the body *and* feelings of external objects. It also suggests that this structure is shared by a number of bodily feelings, including various visceral feelings. This provides a way of understanding further the representational structure of the emotional bodily feelings on which I have been focussing, which are typically such that their intentional aspects—their world- or object-aspects—are foregrounded in experience, rather than their bodily, proprioceptive aspects. (Of course, as with the case of tactile feelings, this structure is not immutable: a shift in reflective attention can bring the body-aspect into focus to the exclusion of the world-aspect.)

Also as is the case for tactile feelings, the two aspects are features of one and the same state of feeling: they are inextricable aspects of a single phenomenal/intentional content rather than separate states in their own right; and experience of the phenomenal unity of the two is more phenomenologically primitive than experience of either aspect in isolation from the other (even though one or other aspect—typically the intentional aspect—will usually be foregrounded in experience).

Ratcliffe's account thus appears to map neatly onto the phenomenological evidence adduced in support of my own inextricability claim, with the result that the inextricable phenomenal (affective) and intentional (representational) aspects of emotional bodily feelings can be reconceived as the (equally inextricable) body- and world-aspects of world-revealing perceptual states.

Ratcliffe's account further illustrates the potentially perceptual nature of non-tactile bodily feelings by showing a) that world-experiential feelings need not involve contact between an object and a bodily boundary, and b) that the phenomenological location of a feeling does not determine what it is a feeling *of*; a feeling can be felt to occur in the gut but be of or 'about' something entirely external. As we saw, deep feelings of depression can be feelings through which the world is experienced in determinate ways: as oppressive, bleak, suffocating, and so on. Of course, unlike such cases of existential feeling, the tactile cases are such that certain conditions of perception are clearly met. For example, whilst it is true that perceptual feelings need not involve direct contact with a bodily boundary, it is at least possible in the case of tactile feelings to identify an appropriate causal chain linking these feelings, if only *indirectly*, to their objects. If token emotional bodily feelings are to qualify as genuinely perceptual states rather than being simply non-veridical impressions of *merely apparent* properties, then they must be shown to be *caused* in an appropriate way by genuine instances of the properties.

Furthermore, it must be shown that the properties in question are of a kind that it is *possible* for us to perceive, and perceive through precisely the kind of bodily feelings in question. The properties disclosed in tactile experience are clearly amenable to

perception: they are intrinsic physical qualities or certain secondary qualities like heat and cold—properties which our tactile perceptual faculties are naturally capable of detecting. But it is not at all clear at first glance that the properties involved in affective perception are even remotely of a kind that it is possible to perceive, let alone perceive through a particular type of bodily feeling. Perhaps they are more like the secondary qualities that are *not* amenable to tactile perception. After all, while it is possible to perceive relative hotness and coldness through tactile bodily feeling, one cannot tactilely perceive colours, smells, or flavours. Perhaps emotion-proper properties are more like these latter properties in being simply not the kinds of properties that are susceptible to perception through bodily feeling.

As we will see, emotion-proper properties turn out to be very much like secondary qualities of this kind. However, this is no barrier to perceptibility; for it is precisely *in virtue of* their similarities to secondary qualities like colour that emotion-proper properties are available to perception through bodily affect. Indeed, the key to understanding why bodily feelings of the relevant kind ought to be understood as genuine perceptions, and not merely as representations which may or may not correlate with reality, lies in understanding certain epistemological implications of the metaphysical status of their proper objects, emotion-proper properties. More specifically, it lies in understanding the fact that these properties are *response-dependent*. For, it is in virtue of this fact that the bodily feelings in question meet all the criteria of perception—including the causal connection criterion—and thus qualify as genuine affective perceptions. These feelings are appropriately causally related (if still only, in a sense, indirectly) to their objects, and these objects are such that they can be perceived through such feelings—indeed, are such that they can *only* be

perceived through affective emotional experiences of the relevant kind. It is only through such states that they are available to human epistemology at all, these properties being response-dependent in a way that both precludes experience of them independently of the relevant feelings and qualifies the feelings themselves as perceptions of the properties.

I would like to end the chapter on a note of caution; for, as will soon become apparent, unpacking these claims is not a straightforward matter. As indicated in the Introduction, the issues surrounding my three central claims are not only complex but intimately bound up with one another, with the result that my arguments for these claims—especially those for claims (2) and (3)—are largely cumulative and spread over a number of chapters. As we will see, the final details of these two claims will only emerge in Chapter 5. In particular, the precise nature of the causal relation between token emotion-proper properties and the affective states through which they are perceived can only properly be understood once certain details of the response-dependence claim have been set out in full. Consequently, it is only in the final chapter that a complete picture of the genuinely perceptual nature of affective perceptions will emerge.

Summary

In this chapter we have seen how phenomenology tells against the dual-component and austere cognitivist positions and in favour of a rejection of the traditional picture of feeling. Feelings are not simple unstructured sensations, mere instantiations of phenomenal properties, but are instead capable of rich intentionality that extends

beyond the body to encompass external objects. We saw that while Goldie's account does well to recognise the world-directed intentionality of both psychic and bodily feelings, it falls short of capturing the full extent of affective intentionality by failing to accord direct intentional status to the latter. The structure of this intentionality is revealed in the fact that, for certain bodily feelings, affect and intentionality are inextricable in a way similar to that described by Goldie in respect of psychic feelings. In the former case, the internal connection between intentional mode and content suggests that these feelings have a representational structure: their phenomenal and intentional aspects are inextricable in a way that entails that part of what it is for a token feeling of the relevant kind to be that very feeling is for it to include, as part of its phenomenal content, a *felt impression* of an emotion-proper property. This impression is built into the feeling itself. We saw that the only other bodily feelings with similar intrinsic representational structure are tactile feelings.

The case of tactile feelings provides a clear illustration of how bodily feelings can at the same time be feelings of things other than the body. Ratcliffe's analysis of tactile feelings reveals them to have a dual-aspect structure comprising an object-aspect and a body-aspect which are inextricable in a way that parallels the inextricability of the phenomenal and intentional aspects of emotional bodily feelings. This analysis suggests a) that it is partly in virtue of this structure that bodily feelings can function as perceptions of things external to the body, and b) that this structure is not limited to those feelings involving direct contact with a bodily boundary but is instead exemplified by a range of bodily feelings. Emotional bodily feelings too have a dual-aspect structure in virtue of which they are able to represent emotion-proper properties and at least partly in virtue of which they qualify as *perceptions* of those

properties. My aim in the next chapter is to build on these insights into the world-revealing nature of bodily feelings, using them as the foundation on which to construct an account of the perceptual role of affect vis-à-vis emotional objects and their emotion-proper properties.

Regarding my three central claims, then, we can now see that Claim (1) is well established: emotional bodily feelings of the kind described above are intrinsically intentional representational states. However, I shall briefly return to the issue of intentionality in the next chapter in order to show that on the account of affective perception to be developed there, these feelings satisfy all the criteria of intentionality. Chapter 3 will also continue to argue for Claim (2) (the claim that these feelings qualify as perceptions of emotion-proper properties), and will go some way towards establishing Claim (3) (that the perceptual status of the former is guaranteed by the response-dependence of the latter). Finally, Claim (3) itself will be developed at length in Chapter 4, and will be fully established, along with Claim (2), in Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 3

Affective Perception and Emotion-Proper Properties

Introduction

By now it will be clear that a central claim of my account is that certain bodily feelings constitute a form of perception—what I term 'affective perception'—of a particular kind of property, an emotion-proper property, instantiated by emotional objects. It is through such feelings that subjects are made aware of these properties: objects are *felt* to have them by way of affective perception. And affective perception constitutes a central and largely misunderstood ingredient of much emotional experience. My aim in this chapter is to give an account of the perceptual role of bodily feeling in apprehending emotion-proper properties. However, given that a large part of this account is bound up with issues of response-dependence, some of what I say here will be in outline only. I defer more detailed discussion of the relevant issues to chapters 4 and 5.

I begin with some remarks on emotion-proper properties. I then introduce the response-dependence claim before considering the nature of these properties, arguing that they have objective grounds perception of which must be distinguished sharply from perception of the properties themselves. In analysing the structure of affective perception I draw two analogies: one with aspect perception, familiar from Goldie's

account of feeling towards, and one with cases of tactile-visual sensory substitution, which draws on the pioneering work of psychologist Paul Bach-y-Rita. I end by briefly revisiting the issue of intentionality in order to show how the arguments of this chapter bear on it.

Before we begin, I would like to reiterate two points that ought to be borne in mind throughout the discussion. (1) When talking about affective perception I am talking exclusively in terms of perception through *bodily* feeling. In particular, I do not intend the term to encompass anything like psychic feelings towards. (2) My focus in this thesis lies with the 'standard emotions': those typical cases of emotions like fear, anger, and disgust in which the subject is directly perceptually engaged with an immediate object, and which are characterised jointly by the appearance of the object and the immediate (typically visceral) affective response of the subject. (Although, of course, on the account I am proposing, these two aspects—appearance and response—turn out to be inextricable.) My reasons for focussing on these cases are two-fold. Firstly, to a large extent I am following established philosophical tradition. Since at least James's time, the standard perception-based emotions—particularly certain kinds of fear, disgust, and anger—have received by far the most attention from emotion researchers in both philosophy and psychology, with the more intellectual emotions (envy, jealousy, pride, remorse, guilt, shame, and so on) being treated often as complex variants on these 'primary' or 'basic' emotions. And secondly—and more importantly—it is these which provide the clearest and most straightforward examples of affective perception.

Emotion-Proper Properties

The concept of an emotion-proper property propounded by Peter Goldie (e.g. 2004b) approximates the scholastic notion of a formal object which has become a common feature of discussions of emotional intentionality.[45] All instances of fear, it is said, in addition to aiming at particular objects (spiders, snakes, etc.), aim at the formal object of fearsomeness. Similarly, all grief aims at loss, all anger at offence, all disgust at disgustingness, and so on. As Döring puts it:

> Each emotion type has a formal object, corresponding to truth as the formal object of belief; it restricts and thereby determines the class of intentional objects which a particular type of emotion can be directed at. The formal object is the property which the subject of an emotion must necessarily ascribe to that emotion's intentional object in order to make his emotion intelligible as a token of a particular emotion type. (2009, p.243)

However, this notion of a formal object is rarely given a satisfactory analysis.[46] Little is said about what *kinds* of things these formal objects are supposed to be; and those who do say something on the matter often find themselves in disagreement. Are they relational properties, as Prinz (2004b) suggests? Or are they axiological correlates (Mulligan, 2010), or value properties (de Sousa, 1987)? Other philosophers eschew talk of formal objects in favour of alternative, although largely parallel, notions such as 'formal properties' (Salmela, 2006), 'affective categories' (Charland, 1995b, 1997), and 'thick affective concepts' (Zagzebski, 2003). The interpretation I favour is one that aligns the notion of a formal object with that of an emotion-proper property, essentially identifying formal objects not with categories, concepts, or relational

[45] See for example de Sousa (1987), Döring (2009), Helm (2009), Kenny (1963), Lyons (1980), and Prinz (2004b).
[46] Although, for detailed discussion see Teroni (2007).

properties, but with real (response-dependent) properties predicated of and (what is more) actually *instantiated by* emotional objects.

On the account to be defended, not only is it the case that formal objects (emotion-proper properties) must be *attributed* to emotional objects in order for the emotion to be in this way intelligible, it is also the case that emotional objects actually instantiate these properties. It is for this reason that I favour the notion of an emotion-proper property to that of a formal object: the latter concept obscures the fact that formal objects (at least on the account I want to recommend) are not mere abstract entities—theoretical postulates required to rationalise emotional behaviour—but are instead real properties exemplified by emotional objects. Now, whether Goldie intended his concept of an emotion-proper property to coincide with that of a formal object thus understood is unclear.[47] Consequently, and given the lack of agreement over what formal objects actually are, to avoid confusion, in what follows I shall leave the notion of a formal object to one side and talk primarily in terms of emotion-proper properties.

According to Goldie:

> An emotion-proper property is the property that is proper to, or 'belongs to', a type of emotion. For example, being frightening is the emotion-proper property for fear. Other examples are being disgusting (proper to disgust), being shameful (proper to shame), being enviable (proper to envy) and being worthy of pride (proper to pride)…

[47] Cf. Teroni (2007), fn. p.398, pp.410-411.

He continues:

> When we are confronted by things in the environment, and respond emotionally to them, we also, as part of the same experience, typically *perceive* those things as having the emotion-proper property. For example, if, as a caring parent, you see the out-of-control toboggan hurtling straight for your child, you feel fear, and you see the toboggan as *being frightening*. Or if you feel disgust at a maggot-infested piece of meat, you see the meat as *being disgusting*… Our ability to perceive things as having these emotion-proper properties will be more or less a matter of training and experience, depending on all sorts of factors…(recognizing maggot-infested meat as disgusting takes little training or experience; recognizing the offensiveness of certain linguistic expressions or certain ways of behaving at table are things that a child has to be taught). (2004b, pp.252-253)

Emotional objects, then, are typically perceived as instantiating emotion-proper properties. A disgusting object such as a piece of rotten meat is perceived in terms of its disgustingness; just as a frightening object, a spider for example, is perceived as having the emotion-proper property of fearsomeness. And our ability to perceive emotional objects in terms of their emotion-proper properties is largely a matter of having undergone the relevant training and experience.

Unsurprisingly, the key reasons in support of the claim that emotion-proper properties are perceptible through emotional experience are phenomenological: phenomenology tells us that emotional experience is indeed as Goldie claims. In feeling fear towards an object, one typically perceives that object as being frightening, as having the emotion-proper property of fearsomeness. However, Goldie does surprisingly little to explicate the concept of an emotion-proper property. The ontological status of such properties is left entirely unspecified. So too is their epistemological status. Again, Goldie tells us very little about what it is about them that makes them perceptible through emotional experience, and about what it is about us and our emotional states that makes perception of them an integral part of such experience. I hope that my own

position on these matters will be clear by the end of the chapter. However, a good place to start in addressing these issues is with a paper of Goldie's which takes moral perception, rather than emotion-proper property perception, as its focus.

Phenomenological Immediacy and Non-Inferentiality

Goldie (2007a) argues that it is possible literally to perceive evaluative and deontic facts; and although he does not do so, the arguments he presents can be fruitfully applied in the case of emotion-proper properties. Key to understanding the sense in which, on Goldie's account, evaluative and deontic facts (and, on my account, emotion-proper properties) are perceptible is the notion of a non-inferential perceptual belief or judgement. Goldie defines such belief (and, mutatis mutandis, judgement) in terms of two conditions which are individually necessary and jointly sufficient. Firstly, the belief must be "a belief that something has a certain property, from the way it appears, relative to one or more sense modality", and secondly, it must be a belief that "arises in a way that is phenomenologically immediate; in other words, it must not be the product of a conscious process of inference" (2007a, p.348).[48] Importantly, by stipulating that the belief not be the product of a *conscious* process of inference, this definition does not rule out the possibility of non-conscious or 'sub-personal' reasoning. It also leaves room for a certain sort of epistemic justification. A subject whose perceptual belief is phenomenologically immediate and non-inferential

[48] For similar accounts, see Brandom (2002), Döring (2008), McDowell (1998), and Millar (2000). On emotions and epistemic immediacy, see in particular Dohrn (2008) and Hookway (2003, 2008). Prinz (2004b, p.225) claims that "One has to do a lot of mental work before one can detect the presence of a demeaning offence, or a loss, or a danger" but points out that much sense-perception is like this also, noting that "On our best theories of vision, for example, multiple inferences are needed to go from the luminance arrays provided by the eyes to the three-dimensional structural descriptions provided by high-level vision" (pp.225-226). In both cases the cognitive processes involved will occur well below the level of consciousness.

might still appeal to certain inferences in order to justify her belief after the event, or to a third party, for example by pointing out certain features of the object which support the belief that it has the property in question. In other words, a belief's being arrived at non-inferentially in the phenomenological sense does not preclude its being justified or post-rationalised by appeal to inference (i.e. does not preclude its being inferential in the epistemic sense).

What are we to make of this definition? I for one find it intuitively appealing: Goldie's criteria do indeed capture two conditions that are fundamental to our commonsense understanding of what it means directly and non-inferentially to perceive something. Goldie argues that the scope of this definition extends far enough to encompass evaluative and deontic facts, plus facts about others' emotional states (e.g. about whether someone is angry, sad, etc.). I want to make the further claim that it also reaches far enough to encompass emotion-proper properties, so that one can non-inferentially perceive (form a non-inferential perceptual belief or judgement about) emotion-proper properties such as fearsomeness, offensiveness, disgustingness, and so on. In order to show this, then, it must be shown that perceptual beliefs about such properties satisfy the two criteria. On the face of it, this is quite easily done. John's belief that the spider is fearsome, for example, is a perceptual belief that something (the spider) has a certain property (that of being fearsome), where this belief arises in a way that is not the product of any conscious process of inference but is instead phenomenologically immediate. The spider instantly strikes John as being fearsome. He does not simply perceive it and then somehow deduce the fact that it is frightening. Rather, its fearsomeness is immediately apparent: it is a defining feature of the content of the perception. However, crucially, the spider's appearing

frightening to John is not simply a matter of its *looking* a certain way to him. Rather, it is more fundamentally a matter of its *feeling* a certain way. The property itself is perceived not relative to vision but to feeling—more specifically, as we will see, to bodily feeling.

Perceptibility and Response-Dependence

Now, if the account I am proposing is correct, then the claim that emotion-proper properties are perceptible is subject to a rather large caveat: to perceive an emotion-proper property one must be in an appropriate emotional state. (Indeed, in standard cases, being disgusted—tokening the emotion of disgust—*just is* perceiving affectively the emotion-proper property of disgustingness—perceptually taking in an object in a way that necessarily involves feeling disgust towards it. In such cases, taking in (engaging with, being receptive to) emotional objects not only entails, but is one and the same thing as, feeling emotion towards them.) The reasons for this are bound up with the fact that emotion-proper properties are response-dependent; and while I develop the response-dependence claim in detail in Chapter 4, it will be helpful throughout what follows to have at least the bones of the claim on the table.

The terms ‘response-dependence’ and ‘response-dependent property’ have been used in a number of ways by different philosophers. However, in its simplest form response-dependence can be defined as follows: a property is response-dependent iff it is part of what it is for something to have the property that it stands in a certain relation to a certain response to that property. This is necessarily vague: ‘certain response’ and ‘certain relation’ are type/token ambiguous; the modal strength of the

claim is left unspecified; and there is no indication as to what is to count as a response. However, it will suffice as a general schema. I provide a more detailed account of what I mean by response-dependence vis-à-vis emotion-proper properties later on.

As we will see, the version of response-dependence I want to recommend has much in common with a popular conception of secondary qualities. John McDowell (e.g. 1998) and David Wiggins (e.g. 1998) are among those who provide response-dependence analyses of colour properties according to which what it is for something to be, for example, red is for an object to be such as to cause red sensations in normal perceivers under standard conditions. On this view, then, there is nothing more to being red than being disposed to cause a certain type of response in suitable subjects in appropriate conditions. I want to defend a similar claim regarding emotion-proper properties. To be frightening, I will argue, just is to be such as to cause a fear response in normal subjects under standard conditions.

An important corollary of the version of response-dependence I advocate is that, insofar as a given response-dependent property is perceptible at all (that is, is the kind of property that it is possible to perceive), its perceptibility is dependent on the subject's ability to respond in the appropriate way to instances of the property. That is to say, it is a necessary condition of perceiving a response-dependent property of this kind that the subject has the response appropriate to (or 'proper to') the property, where the response is a mental state which represents the property in question. Thus, in the colour case, it is a necessary condition of perceiving the property of redness that a subject has a qualitatively appropriate red-type experience in response to a red

object. And in the emotional case, it is a necessary condition of perceiving the property of fearsomeness that a subject has an appropriate (in a sense of 'appropriate' yet to be specified) fear-type experience in response to a frightening object.

On the account I am proposing, these emotional responses are forms of what might be termed 'emotional perception': that distinctive emotionally-charged way of engaging with an emotional object which necessarily involves feeling emotion towards it and which represents it as instantiating an emotion-proper property. A number of philosophers have provided accounts of what such perception might amount to. We have already seen how Goldie conceives of this distinctively emotional mode of experiencing, or perceptually 'taking in', objects partly in terms of feelings towards. Other common accounts make similar moves, invoking parallels with aspect perception to capture the differences in content between emotional and unemotional ways of experiencing objects.[49] As we will see, I myself favour this line of explanation—but only to a limited extent. Whilst the analogy with aspect perception is useful up to a point, I want to make claims that go beyond those the analogy itself supports; for, crucially, it fails adequately to accommodate the fact that the way an emotion-proper property is taken in is primarily bodily and affective, requiring a bodily affective response which itself represents the property. What rival accounts miss out, and what the analogy fails to illustrate, is the sense in which perceptually engaging with an emotional object is typically not just a matter of construing it in a certain way, nor of having certain psychic feelings towards it (although it may certainly be these as well), but is primarily a matter of *affectively perceiving* the emotion-proper property through certain kinds of visceral bodily feelings: taking it in

[49] See especially Calhoun (2004), de Sousa (1987), Döring (2007, 2008, 2009), Goldie (2000), and Roberts (2003).

in such a way that these feelings play an ineliminable perceptual role, as intrinsically intentional perceptual states.

Indeed, on the present account, one's *seeing* the disgustingness of rotten meat is a matter of taking in the meat in a way that involves *affectively* perceiving its disgustingness. John only *sees* the spider as being frightening by *feeling* (affectively perceiving) its fearsomeness. In other words, the distinctively emotional way of taking in an object that Goldie explicated in terms of feeling towards is more fundamentally a way of taking it in in a way that involves affective perception. Whatever else a standard emotional response encompasses—evaluative judgements, psychic feelings, motivational impulses, behavioural manifestations, and so on—at its heart will be an intrinsically intentional bodily affective perception of an emotion-proper property. It is this fact that is conspicuously absent from other perceptual accounts and which I shall strive to elucidate in this chapter.

Affect-Dependence

Many—indeed, I would say *all*—emotional episodes involve affect. And of course it is affect which, on my account, plays a central and ineliminable perceptual role in the apprehension of emotion-proper properties. Phenomenology tells us that it is largely through our gut feelings that objects are experienced as frightening, disgusting, enviable, pitiful, offensive, and so on. It is through the sensations of icy constriction and the flush of adrenaline that one experiences the fearsomeness of a rampaging tiger; or through the feelings of rising bile and suffocating queasiness that one is aware of the disgustingness of rotten meat. Indeed, disgust appears to be an obvious

example of an emotion-type for which all conceivable tokens seem necessarily to involve affect. One cannot imagine being disgusted at some disgusting object without necessarily feeling a certain way—regardless of what cognitive states one also happened to be in at the time. It is of the essence of disgust that the subject experiences certain feelings; for a state which failed to incorporate such feelings would not, it seems, qualify as a state of disgust. Fear and joy are other relatively uncontroversial examples. As we have seen, it is a consequence of the response-dependence claim that emotion-proper properties can only be experienced through the relevant emotional responses; and for these emotion-types at least, the relevant responses are essentially affective. Let us call emotion-proper properties for which the proper response is necessarily at least partly affective 'affect-dependent properties'. I suggest—although I do not expect my view to be universally shared—that all emotion-proper properties are affect-dependent: it is a metaphysically necessary condition of objects' instantiating emotion-proper properties that they be such as to cause appropriate affective responses in suitable subjects under standard conditions, and it is an epistemically necessary condition of perceptually grasping these properties that subjects token the relevant affective perceptual states in response to them.

Is affect an essential feature of all tokens of all emotion-types? Whilst I here lack the space required to defend such a claim in any detail, my principal reasons for maintaining it can be summarised along the lines of James's thought experiment: subtract affect from emotional experience and whatever is left behind seems undeserving of the title 'emotion'. However, the present account suggests more than this; for even though in many cases one may still be left with a host of cognitive-

evaluative states, if my account of the perceptual structure of affect is correct, then it is not just the bare qualitative features of the experience—the 'mere' qualia—which vanish, but *an entire mode of engaging with the object*. An entire epistemic avenue would no longer be available to the subject, and the proper objects of emotion, the emotion-proper properties, would cease to figure in the content of any residual representational states. Thus, in standard cases, the very idea of simply subtracting affect in a way that leaves behind emotionless but otherwise structurally and functionally identical representational and evaluative states is incoherent. The absence of affect would entail a radical change not only in the qualitative character of the experience, but in its epistemic, intentional, and evaluative content and structure.

Emotional Perception

That bodily feelings play a fundamental and ineliminable role in emotional epistemology, as states through which emotional properties are experienced, has been consistently missed by philosophers of emotion, particularly—and perhaps surprisingly—by those championing so-called perceptual theories. Roberts's view is typical:

> …what we are aware of in feeling an emotion is our self… In this the emotion differs from the feeling: Whereas the feeling is always of the self-as-in-a-given-state, the emotion is often or typically directed 'outward', toward things other than the self… The sensations that are concomitant to emotions are bodily sensations, in the sense that they are (phenomenologically) *of* one's body, rather than of something 'external'… [T]he feeling of embarrassment or anger is an awareness of a state of oneself, rather than of something external—even though what one is embarrassed or angry about may be in large part something external to oneself. (2003, p.323)

While perceptual theories like Roberts's have consistently failed to recognise that emotional feelings are felt towards external objects, they are nevertheless correct to point out that there are very good reasons for taking emotions themselves to be—or at least to be like, or to involve—perceptions. Whilst I am not here concerned to present a perceptual theory of emotion as such, it is worth pointing out some of the many commonalities between emotion and sense-perception. For example, both have intrinsic intentionality and intrinsic phenomenality, where the two are inextricable; and the intentionality and phenomenality in both cases pertains to representation. Furthermore, the phenomenology of affective emotional perceptions is distinctive in a way that resembles the phenomenology of sense-perceptions. Perceptions of blue, for example, feel different to perceptions of red; and emotional perceptions of fearsomeness feel different to perceptions of pitifulness. Also, in both cases, the phenomenology is that of discovery or revelation: of the 'lighting up' of real external properties. As we will see, the content of both emotions and perceptions is similarly holistic, structured, and organised: one perceives fearsomeness and disgustingness just as one perceives picture-ducks and picture-rabbits. And in both cases, the ability to perceive such things sometimes requires training and experience and sometimes does not.

Furthermore, emotions, like perceptions, can act as sources of information and even knowledge. They encapsulate information in a way that mimics the informational encapsulation of perception (de Sousa, 1987). However, unlike the paradigmatic cognitive states, emotions are not always cognitively penetrable. In particular, they often persist in light of countervailing beliefs and judgements. Phobias provide an obvious example: John's belief that the spider, being an ordinary house-spider, is

harmless, and his judgement that his fear is thus unmerited (unwarranted, inappropriate), does not prevent him from experiencing it *as frightening*. Such recalcitrance is shared also by many perceptions.[50]

Much has been made recently of the fact that emotions involve 'conflict without contradiction' in a way that parallels the conflict that can exist between the content of a perception (e.g. perception of the Müller-Lyer lines) and a belief (e.g. that the lines, despite appearances, are of equal length),[51] and a host of related issues: e.g. the fact that emotions are largely subject to the same norms and principles of rationality as perceptions (cf. beliefs and judgements) in a way that helps explain the possibility of ambivalent emotions, the fact of their phenomenological immediacy and non-inferentiality, the phenomenon of emotional akrasia, the broader epistemic role of emotion, and the role emotions play in non-inferentially rationalising and justifying other mental states and actions, amongst others.

Ought we to conclude from all this that emotions *are* perceptions, as some have claimed?[52] Or simply that they involve,[53] or are like or analogous to perceptions?[54] Whilst I do not wish to speculate about whether *all* emotions are, or can be reducible to, perceptions (I happen to think they are often far too complex and multifaceted for that), I suggest that, for those cases where there is demonstrably *nothing more* to the emotion than an affective emotional perception, then the emotion can be usefully

[50] On this and a host of related points, see for example D'Arms and Jacobson (2003), Deigh (1994), Deonna (2006), de Sousa (1987), Döring (2003, 2007, 2009), Goldie (2000, 2009), Greenspan (1988/1993), Helm (2001), Prinz (2004b), Roberts (2003), Robinson (2005), Rorty (1980), Salmela (2006), and Tappolet (2003, 2010).
[51] See especially Döring (2003, 2007, 2009) and Goldie (2000, 2009) on this.
[52] E.g. Deonna (2006), Döring (2007), Roberts (2003).
[53] E.g. Charland (1995a, 1995b, 1997), Prinz (2004b).
[54] E.g. de Sousa (1987), Döring (2009), Elgin (1996), Goldie (2000, 2007a, 2009), Tappolet (2003, 2005).

identified with the perception of the emotion-proper property. And in all standard cases at least, affective perceptions qualify, for reasons that will become clear throughout the thesis, as genuine perceptions.

Perceiving vs. Perceiving *That*

Given that emotion-proper properties are response-dependent in a way that precludes perception of them through the ordinary sense modalities, in discussing the perceptibility of emotion-proper properties, we must be careful to distinguish cases in which a genuine emotion-proper property is perceived from those in which objects are perceived merely to have the property but in which the property itself does not figure appropriately in the content of the perception. A distinction must therefore be drawn between perceiving *that* some emotional object O has emotion-proper property p and actually (affectively) perceiving p.

Emotion-proper properties, I shall argue, are grounded in objective properties: what I call, taking Goldie's lead, emotion-invoking determinable and determinate features. And cases of affectless perception of apparent emotion-proper properties turn out to be cases in which these features are the proper objects of perception, not the emotion-proper properties themselves. The latter, being response-dependent, can only be perceived through the relevant emotional states. Thus, whilst it still makes sense to say that one can unemotionally perceive *that* object O has emotion-proper property p, where this is a perception of the relevant lower-level features, it does not make sense to say that one unemotionally perceives p, the property itself. On this view, the

property does not figure appropriately in the content of the perception; only its grounds do.

Emotion-proper properties are analogous in many respects to visual aspects (indeed, visual aspects too are in a similar sense response-dependent). In particular, both are perceptible properties that are grounded in lower-level features. In the case of visual aspects, these features are physical qualities which combine to present a certain appearance to the viewer who is appropriately sensitive to such appearances. In the case of emotion-proper properties these are emotion-invoking determinable features—the determinable features in virtue of which the object has the emotion-proper properties that it does. I find it useful also to talk in terms of emotion-invoking *determinate* features: token lower-level features which ground the higher-level determinable types (and thus ultimately the emotion-proper property itself), and on which these higher-level properties supervene.[55] Thus, to take our earlier examples, the emotion-proper property of fearsomeness instantiated by the spider will be grounded in the determinable quality of dangerousness, which will in turn be grounded in determinate features such as fangs, threatening appearance, rapid movement, etc.[56] Similarly, the disgustingness of the meat will be grounded in

[55] It should be noted that my use of the determinate/determinable distinction is designed (as, I take it, is Goldie's) primarily to capture the structure of the relation between the different levels of features. In using it, I do not intend to make any strong metaphysical claims about the nature of these features qua determinate or determinable properties. For present purposes, any controversy surrounding the distinction can be set aside. Several philosophers have invoked Bernard Williams's (e.g. 1985) distinction between 'thick' and 'thin' evaluative terms or concepts in order to capture the relation between the different levels of emotion-relevant properties (e.g. Elgin, 2008; Salmela, 2006; Zagzebski, 2003; cf. Goldie, 2008c). On these views, the concept of being frightening is a relatively 'thinner' evaluative concept than that of being dangerous, although both are generally quite (evaluatively and descriptively) thick concepts.

[56] Incidentally, it is commonly assumed that the only determinable property grounding fearsomeness is dangerousness (e.g. Prinz, 2004b). Indeed, danger is commonly identified as the formal object of fear. Granted, dangerousness is the most obvious and general determinable property for fear, but there are others. Fear of clowns, for example, or of monsters in horror films, is not grounded in the perceived dangerousness of the objects but rather in their freakishness, grotesqueness, weirdness, or even (for want of a better word) 'disturbingness'. For examples of those who correctly identify fearsomeness as

features having to do with the perceived potential for causing infection, illness, and disease, or even just in determinate features like sliminess, decay, being maggot-infested, and so on.

So, perceiving emotion-proper properties is akin to seeing aspects. In both cases the property being apprehended is grounded in certain lower-level features; and while perception of these features is not sufficient for perception of the aspect, so too perception of emotion-invoking determinable or determinate features is insufficient for perception of an emotion-proper property. One can see the rapidly advancing tiger and its razor-sharp claws, and one might further grasp the dangerousness of the situation, but one may fail to be afraid; and the reason for this is likely to be that one fails to perceive the fearsomeness of the tiger. Seeing the features which ground the fearsomeness is neither sufficient for nor identical with a perception of the fearsomeness itself; just as perceiving the relevant features of the duck-rabbit picture—the determinate lines, hues, shapes, contours, etc.—is insufficient for perception of either aspect. Seeing the duck- or rabbit-aspect and perceiving the emotion-proper property of fearsomeness require having appropriate responses and experiencing the object in a particular way.

It is important to note that, just as the duck-aspect (that is, the 'duckiness', the quality of being duck-like) does not suddenly appear in some discrete, clearly delineated portion of the visual field, so too in the case of emotion-proper properties it is the content of the experience as a whole—the entire way in which the object is taken in in

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the formal object or emotion-proper property of fear, see D'Arms and Jacobson (2003), de Sousa (1987, p.122), Goldie (2004a, p.94), McDowell (1998, pp.143-144), Salmela (2006), and Tappolet (2010). Salmela, for example, claims that "it is fearfulness which is the phenomenal and perceptual quality of particular objects in actual experiences of fear" (2006, p.386).

experience—that is different. Compare the experience of seeing a black and white photograph of a rose lying on a black and white chessboard with the experience of seeing the same photograph in colour. The only experiential difference is the addition of a certain property (a colour) to a clearly demarcated region of the visual field (that occupied by the rose). Perception of emotion-proper properties is not like this. Such properties are not simple additions to otherwise emotion-neutral perceptions. They are not simply added on in experience. Rather, the entire way of apprehending the object is different. Indeed, just as, following a gestalt switch, perception of a visual aspect cannot be decomposed into an old (e.g. duck-like) way of perceiving with some new (rabbit-like) way added on, so too perception of emotion-proper properties is similarly indivisible. Perception of an emotional object as instantiating an emotion-proper property cannot be decomposed into a non-emotional way of perceiving with some bodily feelings added on. Rather, the entire experience is different. The bodily feelings are integral to the way the object is taken in by the subject.[57]

There is a sense, then, in which seeing that O is frightening (or whatever) is ambiguous between seeing the features in virtue of which it is fearsome and seeing the (property of) fearsomeness itself. To illustrate the distinction, consider the following example. A rookie soldier comes across a badly mutilated body on the battlefield. He feels intense disgust towards it and in so doing he perceives its disgustingness: its disgustingness is vividly apparent to him, at the forefront of his perceptual experience. Standing next to the young soldier is an experienced, battle-

[57] The content of affective perception, like that of perception in general, is typically holistic. Braille dots, for example, are not just confronted in tactile experience, but are instead read as meaningful symbols, just as words are heard as meaningful units of speech, and pictures are viewed as ducks, rabbits, and so on. Similarly, the visceral bodily feelings involved in affective perception are not merely brute, unstructured sensations but are instead interpreted as contentful states disclosing emotion-proper properties. These properties are perceived—*felt*—immediately and non-inferentially.

hardened general. The general, having seen such sights many times before and consequently been conditioned against such feelings, does not share anything like the young soldier's experience. For him, from his perspective, the body does not appear disgusting: it is just another body. But this does not prevent him from being able to place himself in the rookie's shoes and appreciate his point of view. After all, there was a time when he too would have felt disgust towards such things.

Just as one can be taught, as Goldie noted, to be sensitive to the offensiveness of certain kinds of remark or types of behaviour, so too one can become gradually *insensitive* to certain emotion-proper properties. In the same way, listening repeatedly to a piece of music can leave one unable to discern the subtleties of composition to which one was once receptive; and habitually construing the duck-rabbit exclusively under either aspect can leave one blind to its counterpart. In other words, the general's experiences of combat have rendered him 'aspect-blind' regarding certain forms of disgustingness.[58] However, there is a sense in which the general is still able to see *that* the corpse is disgusting: he can see that it exemplifies qualities which normal observers under standard conditions are apt to find disgusting. He is thus able to say both that he sees that the corpse is disgusting in this qualified sense and that he is not disgusted by it.

[58] Given that, in the next chapter, I go on to draw a comparison with secondary qualities like colour, an analogy with colour-blindness rather than aspect-blindness will prove to be equally apt. This, incidentally, is why perceiving the offensiveness of certain remarks or ways of behaving at table is often not a simple matter like perceiving primary qualities, but is instead more like seeing aspects. Acquiring the 'correct' or 'appropriate' responses which enable one to become sensitive to emotion-proper properties is often largely a matter of experience and training. Of course, a great deal of 'ordinary' perceptual experience is like this also. Accurately perceiving the speed and trajectory of an approaching cricket ball is something that requires training and skill. Perceiving in the arrangement of pieces on a chessboard an opening in an opponent's defence, or seeing in the numbers and equations the solution to a mathematical problem are other examples. Examples abound also in aesthetics. One can come with training to perceive the elegance in a composition or discern a theme in a Beethoven symphony. Similarly, the blind person can be taught to 'read' the Braille dots; and the would-be connoisseur can with experience come to discern the subtle flavours of a good wine.

Or, to take a different example, a special effects artist, upon putting the finishing touches to her latest horror film creation, is able to say both that the monster is fearsome—in the sense of instantiating features which many are disposed to find frightening—and that she is not frightened by it. This allows the possibility that a perceptual judgement to the effect that something is fearsome, on the one hand, and the emotion of fear, on the other, can come apart whilst denying the possibility of genuinely perceiving an emotion-proper property without tokening the emotion proper to (the perception of) that property. In other words, one can judge or even see *that* O is fearsome without feeling fear, but one cannot non-inferentially perceive the fearsomeness of O whilst remaining emotionally neutral. (Compare the case of Jackson's Mary, who might, on her black and white television monitor, be able to see *that* an object is red—from its particular shade of grey, for example—without seeing the *redness* of the object. In both cases, the property itself does not feature directly, in a way that is phenomenologically immediate and non-inferential, in the representational content of the perception.[59]) On this view, emotion-proper properties

[59] As Zagzebski puts it: "I cannot see something as rude without feeling offended in the characteristic way that goes with rudeness, but I can see or judge that something is rude without feeling offended. I can do that in a way that roughly parallels the way in which I judge colors. I cannot see something as red without seeing red, i.e., without having a sensation of red, but I can see that something is red without a red sensation. I can do that if I see signs of its redness" (2003, p.119). Cf. Döring (2008). Like me, Döring claims that the content of 'affective perception' (although she uses the term differently) is gestalt-like such that it cannot be inferred from the presence of its lower-level features. One cannot infer the amusingness of a scene, for example, from the fact that it is, say, over-the-top irritating, as this does not follow as an inference. According to Döring, to see the amusingness of the scene, the subject must experience it the right way for herself, so as to form an immediate and non-inferential perceptual judgement (2008, p.90). Döring also points out (2007, p.382) that the same goes for the perception of picture aspects. When viewing the young-woman/old-woman gestalt exclusively as a young woman, it is impossible to infer the experience of the old-woman aspect. Even more interesting, however, is Döring's subsequent claim that "It is not implausible to assume that this characteristic feature of properties like being amusing is due to the fact that they are phenomenal properties, the analysis of which must necessarily appeal to how an object perceptually appears (cf., e.g., McDowell 1985 [1998]; Wiggins 1987 [1998]). Although I agree with this assumption, I shall here refrain from qualifying and defending it" (2007, p.382; cf. Döring, 2008, pp.92-93; I discuss Döring's account in more detail in Chapter 5). As we will see, such a view is not only not implausible, it is the *most plausible* way of understanding the status of such properties and of elucidating their intimate connection to affective emotional responses.

are, like redness, sweetness, and the other secondary qualities, phenomenal properties: they are defined by how they are felt or perceived, by their qualitative characters, what it is like to experience them. One cannot perceive these properties without undergoing the relevant phenomenal experience; and furthermore one cannot know what perception of redness or fearsomeness phenomenally feels like without oneself experiencing redness or fearsomeness.

Indeed, to a large extent, claims to perceive such properties as fearsomeness and disgustingness in an entirely emotion-free way strike an intuitively wrong note. One wants to know: If one does not, as one claims, feel genuine fear, then in what sense does one *really* find the thing frightening? Compare the person who claims genuinely to see the beauty of a sculpture but not to find it beautiful; or the person who claims to see the wrongness of an act but not to feel disapprobation.[60] This intuition is brought out more clearly by a slight change in terminology. Instead of talking in explicitly perceptual terms, it might be helpful to frame the point initially in the more primitive language of experience, so the claim becomes that one cannot *experience* the disgustingness of the rotten meat without feeling disgust towards it; and in the same way one cannot experience the beauty of a sculpture without finding it beautiful.[61] Put

[60] It has been suggested that clinical psychopathy—a condition in which subjects are incapable of feeling guilt or remorse for wrong actions—may be largely explicable in terms of a diminishment of affect (see especially Damasio, 1994/2006, 2000). Subjects are in effect rendered morally blind by a pathological inability to experience appropriate affect in connection with what are generally acknowledged to be wrong actions, the suggestion being that the capacity for certain kinds of feeling is necessary for the exercising of accurate moral judgement. If the account I am proposing is correct, this is partly to be explained in terms of a diminished capacity to perceive response-dependent moral properties by means of affective perception. (On this see in particular Prinz, 2007.) The work of neurologists like Damasio, for example, suggests that people with particular kinds of brain damage are perfectly capable of perceiving the relevant descriptive lower-level features in virtue of which something is, for example, pitiful, but they are incapable of—as I would put it—perceiving the *pitifulness* itself—that is, the higher-order emotion-proper property (see Zagzebski, 2003, for a similar claim). Their inability to take in the situation in the relevant way is bound up with their inability to feel pity.

[61] See Charles (2004) for an account which takes the notion of experience, rather than perception, as basic. Doing so allows that the notion of experiencing something as, for example, frightening already

this way the claim carries more intuitive weight; for it seems prima facie much harder to separate the experience of a property from the relevant emotional response. However, any apparent gap between perception of an emotion-proper property like disgustingness and the corresponding emotion diminishes completely when it is acknowledged that, in the contexts that concern us, such experience can only really be understood in perceptual terms. To say that one *experiences* the disgustingness (or fearsomeness, pitifulness, or whatever) of an object is surely just to say that one *perceives* that property (and vice-versa).[62]

As we have just seen, phenomenology testifies that experience of emotional objects is primarily experience of their emotion-proper properties—not the features in virtue of which they have those properties. Indeed, it is such that the lower-level determinate features need not figure consciously in the content of the experience at all. John's experience of the spider as frightening need not contain any conscious awareness of its fright-inducing characteristics. To the extent that these form part of the experiential content at all, they will likely figure only, as it were, in the background, as features which are there to be noticed, but which typically are not noticed. Compare: the physical features of a picture, such as patterns, lines, shades of colour, etc., will be part of the experience in some sense—insofar as they are represented in the visual

encompasses the notion of being repelled by it (pp.133-134). On this account, "the experience of something as frightening cannot be decomposed into two separate phenomena: an experience of the object as being a certain way and a separate pro-attitude towards actions of the avoidance type. For one cannot…characterize the relevant experience as of a frightening object without referring to the fact that the experiencer is repelled by it. Indeed, part of what it is to experience something as frightening is to be affected in this way" (p.134). As we will see in the following chapters, the present account has the same consequence, although for reasons largely surrounding the response-dependence claim and the internalist conception of motivation that goes with it.

[62] The case is made more convincing when the non-visual sense-modalities are considered; for the illusory sense that a perception of an emotion-proper property can be divorced from experience of the relevant emotion is amplified, perhaps, by the physical distance separating subject and object. This is not the case for tactile experiences or olfactory experiences, for example. One would not, for instance, so readily claim to taste, smell, or feel the disgustingness of the meat without undergoing the relevant affective experience. Intuitively, tasting or smelling disgustingness *is*, or at least entails, being disgusted by it—i.e. tokening the emotion of disgust.

field, perhaps—but they will not necessarily be experienced *as* those features, and they will not necessarily be features of which the subject is fully aware. Rather, they are the properties in virtue of which the picture has the content—the appearance—that it does. Of course, there is a sense in which they must still have been 'taken in' or 'registered' by the subject: they may be available to memory and other cognitive functions after the event, in such a way that, pressed about what properties an emotional object had, a subject may be able, retrospectively, to cite the correct features; but these need not have formed part of the conscious experience at the time. They need not, to borrow Ratcliffe's terminology, have occupied the 'experiential foreground'.

Thus, in feeling fear towards the spider, John's emotion represents the spider as being frightening. Asked what it is about the spider that he finds frightening, or what particular features are responsible for its frightening appearance, he may well be unable to produce an answer, perhaps claiming simply that he cannot help but see it that way. Of course, there *will be* a reason John finds the spider frightening—one that has to do with its physical qualities.[63] There will be determinate features which ground the property and on which it supervenes (for instance, its hairy legs, mandibles, rapid movement, etc.).[64] (In the same way, one might see the duck-aspect without being conscious of the particular features in virtue of which it has that appearance and without being able to identify them.) Again, an instructive analogy can be drawn with aesthetic experience. Just because one has conscious experience of

[63] Being phenomenologically immediate and non-inferential, recall, does not preclude unconscious processing of the kind which can be appealed to in order to post-rationalise a perceptual judgement after the event.

[64] Thus, just as awareness of lower-level determinate and determinable features is insufficient for awareness of the higher-order emotion-proper property, so too the reverse is true: awareness of the higher-order property is insufficient for awareness of the lower-level features in virtue of which it has that property.

an aesthetic property like beauty (or elegance, balance, and so on), one is not necessarily aware of the features in virtue of which it has that property, even though in all aesthetic cases those features will—given the appropriate training and experience, and perhaps the aid of a critic—be accessible to the subject.

So, to recapitulate: emotion-proper properties can only be perceived through appropriate emotional—specifically affective—states. To see the fearsomeness of the spider, John must experience it in an appropriately fear-involving way. Perceiving the emotion-proper property is not simply a matter of perceiving *that* it has the property of being such as to cause fear; nor of perceiving the features *in virtue of which* it has that property. It is a matter of experiencing the property itself. Having thus spelled out the analogy with aspect perception, I shall proceed to make explicit the ways in which a full appreciation of the perceptual nature of bodily affect must go beyond the analogy. This is the sense in which—as other perceptual theories have failed to realise—emotional perception is predominantly not a case of seeing (as the analogy with aspect perception might initially suggest) but of *feeling*. More specifically, it is the sense in which seeing *is* feeling: perceiving an emotional object in the emotion-involving (affect-involving) way means taking it in in such a way that involves affectively perceiving its emotion-proper properties.

Affective Perception and Sensory Substitution

The sense in which we see emotion-proper properties by feeling them is well illustrated by way of analogy with cases of tactile-visual sensory substitution. From the 1960s onwards, psychologist Paul Bach-y-Rita and his colleagues conducted so-

called ‘sensory substitution’ experiments to discover the extent to which it is possible to ‘see’ through feeling.[65] The results proved remarkable. In a typical experiment, a subject was fitted with a small head-mounted video camera the output of which was fed into a matrix of four-hundred tiny vibrators which was attached to the subject’s back, covering a ten-square-inch area of skin (recent versions of the experiment replaced the vibrator matrix with an electro-stimulation matrix). Each vibrator stimulated a single point on the skin, corresponding to a portion of the ‘visual field’ (the image captured by the camera). After a few hours’ practise, blind subjects could recognise an array of common objects, identify their location, and judge their distance and absolute size. With sufficient training, subjects could discern scenes of remarkable detail, recognising faces and describing complex states of affairs (Bach-y-Rita, 1972, 2002). To take an example, the verbalised description of one subject’s experience went like this: “This is Betty; she is wearing her hair down today and does not have her glasses on; her mouth is open, and she is moving her right hand from her left side to the back of her head” (Bach-y-Rita, 1972, p.6).

Crucially, the phenomenology of such experiences was that of world-experience: in the default mode, what subjects attended to were not the sensations on the skin, but the scenes before them. Objects were experienced as being ‘out there’, not as behind them, pressing up against the skin of their backs. Thus:

> The subjective localization of the information obtained through the television camera is not on the skin; it is accurately located in the three-dimensional space in front of the camera, whether the skin stimulation matrix is placed on the back, or the abdomen, on the thigh, or changed from one of these bodily locations to the other. (1972, p.ix)[66]

[65] See in particular Bach-y-Rita (1972, 2002, 2003, 2004) and Bach-y-Rita *et al* (1969).
[66] Similar results are reported in Bach-y-Rita (2002, 2003, 2004).

Indeed, for practised subjects, the sensations typically were not part of the conscious experience at all. Attention was focussed on the objects of awareness, not the bodily feelings (2002, p.500; 2003, p.543; 2004, p.86). It was the appearances of objects which occupied the experiential foreground; the feelings themselves, despite being the media through which the objects were experienced, were typically confined to the background of awareness. According to Bach-y-Rita, "unless specifically asked, experienced subjects are not attending to the sensation of stimulation on the skin of their back, although this can be recalled and experienced in retrospect" (1972, p.107).[67]

Bach-y-Rita also draws parallels with examples discussed in the previous chapter of tactile perception through intermediaries such as canes and writing instruments, which he refers to as primitive sensory substitution devices. Thus, "a person writing with a pen does not perceive the contact as being in the fingers, but rather locates it subjectively on the page" (2002, p.500); and similarly in the cane example: "the experience is externalized to the point of contact between the object and the cane. Typically, in sensory substitution…there is no perception of stimulation at the site of the HMI [Human-Machine Interface]" (2003, p.542).

These cases of sensory substitution provide excellent analogues of affective perceptions, supplying concrete examples of external perception through bodily feeling where the feeling necessarily is not located at the same place as the object perceived. What such examples illustrate is that the physical location of a sensation

[67] Interestingly, Bach-y-Rita has no qualms about referring to such perception as 'visual' (1972, pp.ix-x). Of course, in the sensory substitution case, there is a clear causal chain hooking the perceptual states up to the objects of perception. In Chapter 5, I provide an account of the analogous causal chain involved in the affective perceptual case. As we will see, the two are largely parallel.

does not significantly circumscribe the range of its objects. Feelings which actually occur on the skin of the back are, phenomenologically, feelings—*perceptions*—of objects located in front of the subject, just as visceral bodily feelings are, both intentionally and phenomenologically, feelings of properties of external objects.[68] The subject perceives emotion-proper properties through discrete sets of bodily feelings which typically are not themselves objects of awareness. Rather, they are relatively unconscious states through which the properties are experienced. As Ratcliffe pointed out in the cases of tactile and existential feeling, the bodily feelings often to a large extent disappear in the experience: as states necessarily comprising two aspects, the bodily proprioceptive aspect is always present to some degree, but attention is typically focussed on the world-aspect: on the object itself (in this case, the emotion-proper property).[69] Phenomenologically speaking, then, experience of such feelings is typically, in the first instance (in, as Bach-y-Rita puts it, the 'default mode'), experience of token properties instantiated by emotional objects; it is only secondarily experience of bodily feelings *qua* bodily feelings.

[68] Of course, the content of affective perception is typically less fine-grained than that of tactile perception, reflecting, I suspect, the fact that its physiological substrates pertain to various chemical and biological processes governing the maintenance and regulation of the body rather than to a dedicated sense-organ (the skin) which is packed with nerve-receptors and has evolved as a task-specific perceptual system.

[69] Indeed, there is no requirement on my account for the bodily feelings involved to be ones of which the subject is *reflectively* aware. Both Goldie (2009) and Ratcliffe (2008a) point out that feelings can figure as important constituents of experience without them necessarily occupying the foreground of conscious awareness. (See Prinz, 2004b, pp.201-205, for related arguments for the possibility of unconscious feelings.) Thus, visceral bodily feelings can play an ineliminable perceptual role in emotional experience without the subject being aware at the time that she is experiencing such feelings. Compare the case of someone engaged in some tactile activity whose hands reveal the texture of a surface but whose attention is focussed elsewhere (perhaps she is absentmindedly stroking a cat whilst watching television). In such cases, the subject can have tactile experience but be unaware of it at the time: the feelings structure her experience of, and engagement with, the object, but they do not feature at the forefront of consciousness. Furthermore, insofar as she is aware of the feelings, she need only be aware of their objects, of what they reveal, and not of the fact that she is having those feelings. In other words, she need only be aware of the content of the experience, she need not be second-order aware of being in such an experiential state. This helps bolster the claim that all cases of emotion-proper property perception (indeed, all token emotional states generally) involve feelings, as the kinds of feelings in question might be ones which the subject is not, in the strict sense, consciously aware of having. They might be feelings *through* which the emotional object is experienced but of which the subject has no second-order awareness.

Affective Perceptual Content

At this point I would like to explore in more detail the content of affective perception; for there is an important disanalogy between the cases of sensory substitution and aspect perception on the one hand and the case of emotion-proper property perception on the other. This disanalogy pertains to the fineness of grain of the content of the respective states and suggests that, when it comes to characterising the phenomenal/intentional content of affective perceptions, a secondary-quality analogy is in some respects more suitable.

As we saw, in cases of both emotion-proper property and aspect perception, phenomenology reveals experience in which higher-level properties, and not the features which ground them, take centre-stage. The same, of course, is true of colour perception, the phenomenology of which reveals experience in which colours, rather than their microphysical base properties (whatever these turn out to be), feature in perceptual content. However, in the cases of aspect perception and emotion-proper property perception described above, the subvenient properties—lines, hues, shades of colour, and so on, and emotion-invoking determinate features, respectively—are themselves typically available to perception (despite usually featuring only subliminally, in the background of the representational state). However, irrespective of whether these features are noticed by the subject or not, they will form no part of the *affective* perception itself, the content of which will include only a representation of the emotion-proper property. At the level of ordinary sense-experience, a spider might appear frightening *in a dangerous way*—or more precisely, frightening *in a*

mandible-bearing, fast-moving, hairy-legged kind of way—as these are the features in virtue of which it has the property of fearsomeness (i.e. this is the determinate way in which it is fearsome). But when it comes to the affective perceptual dimension itself, the emotion-proper property alone features in the representational content of the state. In the same way, microphysical surface properties will not feature in the representational content of a perception of redness. In both cases, the features are responsible (in a way to be elucidated along the lines of program explanation; see Chapter 5) for producing the representational state but they do not themselves feature anywhere in the content of that state.[70]

The proper objects of affective perceptions, recall, are not emotional objects per se but their 'formal objects': emotion-proper properties. Where macro-level emotional experience involves encounters with spiders, corpses, insulting remarks, and so on, the representational content of affective perception features only the emotion-proper property itself. (John's feelings of fear came with an inbuilt impression of fearsomeness, not an inbuilt impression of a spider instantiating the property of fearsomeness.) Strictly speaking, then, affective perceptions aim at particular emotional objects only by representing their defining properties. This, then, is the sense in which they are felt towards those objects: they are felt towards emotional

[70] Incidentally, I take the present account to be compatible with both representationalist (or 'HOT') theories of consciousness (e.g. Lycan, 1996, 1998; Rosenthal, 1986) and direct realist theories (e.g. McDowell, 1998, 2002). Talk of affective perceptions, and perceptions generally, having representational content is not to be taken as commitment to representationalism in this strong sense. Rather, it is designed merely to capture the sense in which the intentional content of perceptual states is representational content: that is, it is content which presents the world or aspects of it as being a certain way. Whilst I claim that some intrinsically phenomenal states can be *relatively unconscious*, in the sense of failing to be the main focus of attention or the sole object of awareness, I do not claim that it is a condition of consciousness that a phenomenal or representational state be the object of a second-order state of awareness or 'internal monitoring'. Taking phenomenology as a starting point, it appears that in the case of both touch and affective perception what one is aware of is the object or property itself—not the state of representing the object or property. Of course, this simple observation risks begging the question against strong representationalism: the phenomenology may turn out ultimately to be compatible with the claim that this first-order state of awareness only becomes conscious once it has been noticed by the subject (i.e. second-order represented).

objects in virtue of being perceptions of the very properties which account for their status *as* emotional objects—the properties which rationalise, justify, and explain the emotion itself.

Again, instructive parallels are available on the secondary-quality analogy. For example, imagine being blindfolded and given various wines to taste and smell. Placing one's nose near the glass, there is a sense in which one does not smell *the wine* (the wine itself does not feature in the representational content of the olfactory perception) but only its olfactory *properties*: the honey notes, fruitiness, and so on. And similarly for its gustatory properties: what one is presented with are the qualities of sweetness, zestiness, acidity, and so forth. Insofar as one perceives these properties through taste and smell, they are represented in the contents of these sense-perceptual states in a way that the 'object' which instantiates them—the wine—is not. However, there remains a sense in which these sense-perceptions also have the wine as their object, insofar as the properties are only encountered (as it were) *via* the wine, as properties *of the wine*. The same applies in the case of affective perceptions, which, whilst representations of emotion-proper properties, are also in a sense feelings *of* or *towards* the objects which bear them.

The analogy also makes clear the fact that affective perceptual content is in a sense *generic*. Due to the visceral nature of affective perception, there is a limit to the level of detail its content is able to achieve. All affective perceptions of fearsomeness, for example, will feel qualitatively very much alike; and their content will not be fine-grained enough to pick out particular objects as the bearers of that property. In this respect, affective perception more closely resembles secondary-quality perception

than aspect perception (despite the various other similarities between them): the properties of tasting sweet, feeling cold, and looking red, for example, are more or less generic, varying only slightly with their different token instances. In tasting wine, I am aware of its various qualities of flavour: its sweetness, zestiness, slight acidity, and so on. But my experience of these properties is of the same generic nature as experience of other token properties of the same types. My experience of the sweetness of sweet things is all largely the same; sweet things taste much alike, just as cold things all feel alike (they feel cold), and red things—or at least some determinate shade of red, such as scarlet or crimson—all look similar in respect of their redness (scarletness, crimsonness).

However, it does not follow from this that the proper objects of affective perceptions are property-*types*—i.e. the abstract class (or perhaps the concept) of 'the fearsome', 'the disgusting', and so on. A token affective perception of fearsomeness, for example, is not a perception of the type 'fearsome'; it is a perception of a *token* instance of that type, a token instantiation of the property.[71] John's feelings of fear are caused by, directed towards, and (at least to this extent) representative of a particular instance of the property. They are perceptions of *that* property instantiated by *that* particular spider. Although, of course, that they aim at that token property instantiated by that particular spider will not be part of the representational content of the feelings.

[71] Cf. Ralph Wedgwood's criticism of Mark Johnston's (2001) position, to the effect that on it affective states are capable of representing only *general* evaluative facts or principles rather than *particular* objects or particular exemplifications of properties (Wedgwood, 2001, pp.222-223). For a similar criticism of the accounts of Damasio, Prinz, and Robinson (discussed in Chapter 5), see Deigh (2010), pp.36-37. De Sousa (1987, pp.96-106) proposes a conception of intentionality according to which there are three distinct levels of intentional reference, with the capacity for singular reference being the highest. It is not clear whether, on the account just given, affective perceptions will satisfy this condition. Whilst such states qualify as perceptions of token properties on my account, their ability to pick out token properties is largely down to facts about their aetiology, rather than their intrinsic representational content. It is debatable both the extent to which these aetiological facts are sufficient to achieve singular reference and the extent to which the capacity for singular reference is a condition of full intentionality, at least on the popular conception of intentionality described in the previous chapter.

The point concerns merely the aetiology of the states. Thus, there is nothing in the content of the state that identifies it as a perception of this rather than that token property of fearsomeness. Differences between perceptual feelings of fear will be largely differences in causal history and in their roles within the wider experiential state, with only minor differences in phenomenal content.[72]

Of course, this account is far from complete. Affective perception, like all perception, cannot take place in a vacuum. In order to qualify as a response to, and perception of, a token property, a representational state must be appropriately causally related to it. The property itself must be appropriately responsible for bringing about the state. And while, as we saw, this relation need not involve direct contact with a bodily boundary, it must involve some analogous perceptual structure. Part of this structure is intrinsic to the feelings themselves. As we saw, certain bodily feelings have built into them, as part of their phenomenal/intentional content, an affective awareness or felt impression of certain properties of emotional objects. Emotion-proper properties figure directly in their contents in such a way that to remove the impressions of them would be irrevocably to alter the contents of the states. However, phenomenology alone is not enough to guarantee perception. There must also be an appropriate causal chain hooking the feelings up to their objects. In general, the existence of such a chain is guaranteed by the fact that the feelings are part of an appropriate response to an emotional object. (According to the response-dependence thesis, being an 'appropriate response' itself entails being appropriately causally related to the object

[72] Recall Goldie's assertion that "no degree of bodily feeling can alone reveal to you what your emotion is about" (op.cit.). Taken as a claim about particular emotional objects, my account concurs. That an affective perception is about or directed towards a particular object will not be apparent in the content of the feeling itself. But that is because affective perceptions do not purport to *represent* particular emotional objects (although it is certainly true that they are *felt towards* them); what they represent are token emotion-proper properties.

of emotion; and being an appropriate response is itself sufficient for being a perception.) As we will see, in the standard perception-based cases I have been focussing on, this causal relation is guaranteed by the fact that the subject is perceptually engaged with the object in a way that *programs for* perception of the emotion-proper property. However, the details of this process can only properly be understood once the response-dependence claim has been set out in detail. Consequently, I discuss it in Chapter 5.

Intentionality Revisited

It is generally agreed that perceptions are intentional states; and affective perceptions are no exception. I would like to close by briefly noting the ways in which affective perceptions meet all the criteria of intentionality set out in the previous chapter. Recall that in order to qualify as intentional a state must feature in its content an object with a given aspectual shape. As we saw, while the intentional content of an affective perceptual state will not include a representation of the emotional object as such, but only its *formal object*—an emotion-proper property—these cases still involve an intentional object (the emotion-proper property) presented under a given aspect (that of being fearsome in the case of fear, disgusting in the case of disgust, etc.) and via an intentional mode (that of feeling). The content of my feeling of pity, for example, will be the pitifulness of the object of my pity. And the mode of this state of pity will be the mode of bodily feeling; or, more precisely, the mode of affective perception. Emotional bodily feelings are thus capable of full intentionality. Their intentionality not only goes beyond the body to encompass external objects (contra Crane), it does

so in a way that requires no assistance from psychic feelings or any other more 'suitably' intentional states (contra Goldie).

Summary

This chapter sought to develop a detailed account of affective perception by focussing largely on the nature of its proper objects, emotion-proper properties. I suggested (although I have yet to argue in detail) that emotion-proper properties are response-dependent in a way that entails that they can only be apprehended through appropriately affective emotional states. In order further to shed light on the nature of affective perception, I drew two analogies: one with aspect perception and another with certain cases of tactile-visual sensory substitution. The former helped elucidate the nature of affective perceptual content, which was shown to represent emotion-proper properties only rather than their grounding features or instantiating objects, while the latter further illustrated the sense in which, as already shown by Ratcliffe's account, the intentional content of a visceral emotional feeling—what it is a feeling of—often has little to do with its phenomenological location. Together, these analogies demonstrate that, properly understood, emotional perception—i.e., that particular emotionally-charged way of perceptually taking in an object that entails feeling emotion towards it—is primarily not a case of seeing, as is commonly assumed, but of *feeling*. To a large extent, emotional seeing *is* feeling. More specifically, perceiving an emotional object in this way means taking it in in such a way that entails *affectively perceiving* its emotion-proper properties.

I ended by spelling out the ways in which affective perceptions satisfy all the criteria of intentionality described in the previous chapter. This rounds off my argument for Claim (1). However, my arguments for the other two key claims remain importantly incomplete. Completing them requires going into greater detail about the response-dependence nature of emotion-proper properties. This I shall do in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

Response-Dependence

Introduction

With an account of affective perception sketched out, we can now address a claim which underlies much of that account but which has so far been left unsubstantiated: the claim that emotion-proper properties are response-dependent. The response-dependence claim is central to my account not only because it enables a rich and explanatorily powerful analysis of emotion-proper properties, but because it provides solid support for the thesis that affective states can play a central role in emotional experience as states through which emotion-proper properties are perceived. It will be recalled that there are roughly two parts to my account. The first, which was the business of the preceding chapters, concerns the nature and status of the perceptual bodily states involved in affective perception, while the second, which will occupy us in this chapter, concerns the nature and ontological status of the properties which are the proper objects of these states. Uniting the two is the claim that emotion-proper properties are response-dependent in a way that guarantees the perceptual status of the bodily feelings through which they are experienced.

In the first half of the chapter, I sketch one of the most widely discussed response-dependence accounts: the so-called no-priority view championed by John McDowell

and David Wiggins. I then proceed in the second half to a more detailed discussion and analysis.

Subjectivity and Response-Dependence

Response-dependence, recall, is most commonly understood as follows: a property is response-dependent iff it is part of what it is for something to have the property that it stands in a certain relation to a certain response to that property.[73] (I also defined affect-dependent properties as a subset of response-dependent properties such that a property is affect-dependent iff it is part of what it is for something to have the property that it stands in a certain relation to a certain *affective* response to that property.) The debate about response-dependence has traditionally focussed on the question of whether or to what extent moral qualities (such as moral rightness or wrongness), and value properties more generally, are response-dependent. Consequently, much of the debate has been framed in moral or value-theoretical terms. And whilst my interest lies primarily with emotion-proper properties, in order fully to understand the concept of response-dependence—at least as this has traditionally been understood—it is necessary also to appreciate the issue as it pertains to ethical and aesthetic properties. As we will see, my arguments for the response-dependence of emotion-proper properties have much in common with those advanced by McDowell, Wiggins, and others in support of the thesis that value properties are response-dependent. Central to both accounts is an analogy between value properties

[73] It is usual to stipulate that the response in question be a mental response (e.g. Wedgwood, 1998). I do not disagree. Bodily feelings, on my account—being typically conscious phenomenal and intentional states—clearly qualify as appropriately mental representational states (despite the epithet 'bodily'). The fact that their phenomenology pertains to the body does nothing to preclude mentality.

or emotion-proper proper properties on the one hand and secondary qualities like colour on the other.

No-priority theory is commonly contrasted with theories at the two poles of the age-old realist/antirealist debate in metaphysics.[74] At one extreme lies projectivism and other antirealist accounts, according to which certain types of property, including value properties, are not 'real' in any objective sense, but are instead merely the product of the sensibilities of sentient subjects. At the other extreme lies realism: value properties and their kin exist 'out there' as objective (i.e. subject-independent) properties of objects. No-priority theories occupy (part of) the middle ground: on the version I am advocating, emotion-proper properties are real properties capable of being perceived by us, but they are also intimately related to our own human sensibilities. They are thus subjective in the sense of being subject-dependent: while they exist 'out there' as real properties—as part of what Mackie calls the 'fabric of the world'—they are not objective: they are not substantive properties independent of, and separable from, the affective, evaluative, and conative aspects of our constitution.

Emotion-proper properties, then, are subjective (but still very real) properties. According to McDowell:

[74] As we will see, my reasons for favouring a *no-priority* version of response-dependence in particular have largely to do with the fact that it captures perfectly a) the sense in which both secondary qualities and emotion-proper properties seem to depend for their existence equally on the natures of the objects which instantiate them and the subjects who perceive them, and b) the sense in which there is no causal priority between properties and responses insofar as it is equally true that something is, for example, fearsome because we fear it *and* that we fear it because it is fearsome (i.e. is the kind of thing that merits fear).

> A subjective property, in the relevant sense, is one such that no adequate conception of what it is for a thing to possess it is available except in terms of how the thing would, in suitable circumstances, affect a subject—a sentient being. (Think of affective properties like amusingness, or sensory secondary qualities like colours according to a familiar conception in which what it is to *be*, say, red is not adequately conceived independently of the idea of *looking* red; this would preclude identifying the property of being red with a categorical ground for something's disposition to look red in suitable circumstances.) What is objective, in the relevant sense, is what is not subjective. (1998, pp.113-114)

Thus, on this formulation, a subjective property cannot be reduced to or identified with a set of objective properties which ground a disposition for something's appearing to have the property in question. Colour properties, for example, if they are to qualify as genuine subjective properties, must not be reducible to micro-structural properties of surfaces, or any other candidate features purporting to constitute categorical grounds for something's appearing coloured. Similarly for emotion-proper properties: the property of being frightening must not be reducible to sets of emotion-invoking determinate features.

McDowell's target here is Mackie's projectivism.[75] While Mackie acknowledges that the phenomenology of value experience suggests that values are confronted directly (i.e. 'detected' in some sense), he claims that the phenomenology is misleading and erroneous: despite appearances, values are not detected but projected by us. However, Mackie falsely assumes that what is *objective* is the same as what is *real* (in the sense of being part of the fabric of the world). He assumes that, as subjective properties, secondary qualities must be mere figments of the states which purport to be experiences of them. However, if the no-priority view is correct, then the conflation of the 'objective' and the 'real' is unwarranted: something can be part of reality without

[75] See Mackie (1990).

being objective.[76] This opens up the conceptual space required to allow the possibility that subjective properties, such as emotion-proper properties, enjoy real existence in such a way as to vindicate detectivism of the kind sanctioned above—and thus allow the possibility of veridical phenomenology regarding value experience: i.e. allowing the possibility that the phenomenology be understood as incorporating a sensitivity to real properties or features of the world.

As McDowell notes (1998, p.131; cf. p.117), when it comes to analysing subjective properties, the seemingly detectivist tenor of the phenomenology makes appeal to a perceptual model virtually irresistible. And, of course, it is a perceptual model that I have been advocating thus far. However, we need not follow Mackie in supposing that such a model necessitates an analogy with *primary*-quality perception. Clearly, treating subjective properties like amusingness, fear, and beauty on a par with such brutely real intrinsic qualities as shape is not an attractive proposition. Subjective properties like redness and fearfulness are essentially phenomenal properties: properties that can only be understood in terms of their qualitative and experiential characteristics. Furthermore, such a move would invite all the objections traditionally levelled against value-property realism.[77] Clearly, an analogy with secondary qualities is far more promising. According to McDowell:

[76] See McDowell (1998) for arguments in support of the claim that the objective and the real can come apart in this way.

[77] It is perhaps worth spelling out the reasons for favouring a response-dependence account over an absolutist conception of emotion-proper properties. Again, instructive parallels can be drawn with secondary qualities. For example, on Campbell's account of colour (e.g. 1993), colour properties are to be identified with the grounds of the dispositions of objects to appear certain ways to perceivers. They are intrinsic, irreducible, mind-independent, non-natural properties of surfaces. Could something similar be said in the case of emotion-proper properties? Could it be that they are completely mind-independent, i.e. objective in Mackie's sense? There are many reasons to think not, many of which will be apparent in the above discussion, and many of which parallel the reasons given by proponents of the response-dependence model for sanctioning a secondary-quality analogy. However (to oversimplify matters greatly), the main reason is that, to my mind, it simply makes no sense to reduce emotion-proper properties (or colour properties, for that matter) to objective grounds when they clearly depend

> Secondary-quality experience presents itself as perceptual awareness of properties genuinely possessed by the objects that confront one. And there is no general obstacle to taking that appearance at face value. An object's being such as to look red is independent of its actually looking red to anyone on any particular occasion; so, notwithstanding the conceptual connection between being red and being experienced as red, an experience of something as red can count as a case of being presented with a property that is there any way—there independent of the experience itself. And there is no evident ground for accusing the appearance of being misleading. What would one expect it to be like to experience something's being such as to look red, if not to experience the thing in question (in the right circumstances) as looking, precisely, red? (1998, pp.133-134)

Given the conception of subjective properties in play here it is not hard to see how emotion-proper properties would qualify. Like amusingness and redness, emotion-proper properties, it seems, cannot be characterised independently of human affective sensibilities and responses. Just as what it is to be amusing or red cannot be adequately conceived independently of the idea of seeming amusing or looking red, so too what it is to be, for example, frightening, cannot be conceived independently of the idea of appearing frightening. Even given a complete understanding of the principles of colour vision and the microphysical features responsible for producing appearances of colour, it is unlikely that a reductive account of colour could be given. This is because the concept of colour is the concept of a property which has particular and very specific effects on human subjects. Emotion concepts are exactly like this. There is no comprehending the concept of fearfulness independently of the concept of a propensity to engender feelings of fear (and other clearly specifiable responses) in humans and similar animals.

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for their existence not only on the qualities of objects but on the epistemic constitutions and experiential dispositions of the beings who perceive them. There is simply no saying what redness, fearfulness, and so on, *are* without saying something about their effects on human observers. Indeed, no-priority subjectivism is able to explain, in a way that the simple view never could, the apparent reality of emotion-proper properties, aesthetic properties, and so on—the fact that they appear to be there to be encountered in experience—whilst also appeasing the intuition (equally forceful) that these properties depend for their existence on the nature of human observers.

As we saw in Chapter 3, an important corollary of the no-priority view is that subjective properties can only properly be grasped from a point of view *internal* to the propensity to feel certain things in encountering certain objects. In other words, a being which did not share this propensity and which was not endowed with the relevant affective capacities would be categorically precluded from accessing the features of reality in question. Absent the relevant experiential capacities, such properties would remain beyond their epistemic reach. This suggests an obvious parallel with Mary, whose inexperience of colours seems to imply an inability fully to grasp colour concepts. In the same way, it might be suggested, one's incapacity for emotional experience would seem to render one incapable of fully grasping emotion terms. Knowledge of what it means for something to be frightening would not be available to such a being. Of course, they might well become a competent user of emotion language, being able reliably to identify things people are generally disposed to find disgusting, for example. (Recall the earlier discussion of the general and his inability to perceive the disgustingness of the corpse.) But despite getting the extension of the predicates right, they would lack the kind of deep appreciation of meaning that is so distinctive of a complete grasp of subjective-property terms. Such understanding is available only to those with the appropriate sensibilities because the properties those sensibilities serve to illuminate—inherently subjective, *affect-dependent* properties—are not globally available, but rather perception of them is conditional on the deployment of the appropriate affective sensibilities.

That the tokening of an appropriate response is a necessary condition for the perception of an emotion-proper property follows from the fact that emotion-proper

properties, as response-dependent properties, are characterisable as dispositions to affect subjects in certain ways. Property and response (that is, property-type and response-type), on the no-priority view, are thus internally related: the former is existentially dependent upon the latter; and tokening the latter is a necessary condition of perceiving a token of the former. Being so related, the response can only properly be understood as a response to a property of that particular type; and the property, in turn, can itself only be understood in terms of its effects on perceiving subjects. This internal connection ensures that the response is not only necessary for perception of the property but is also sufficient: having the right kind of appropriately caused response is all that is required for the state to count as a perception of the property.

Thus, in the colour case, the property of being red is existentially dependent on the dispositions of appropriately constituted subjects to token phenomenally appropriate responses to red objects. In this sense, being red *just is* being disposed (in virtue of certain theoretically specifiable lower-level features) to cause red sensations in normal observers under standard conditions. And tokening the appropriate response—roughly speaking, having an appropriately caused red sensation—is both necessary and sufficient for perceiving the property redness. In the same way, being frightening just is being disposed to cause an appropriate fear response in normal subjects under standard conditions; and tokening such a response to appropriate objects under such conditions is both necessary and sufficient for perceiving the property fearfulness.[78]

[78] Note that I am not claiming that token emotion-proper properties or token colour properties are existentially dependent upon token responses. Something's being red or frightening depends upon global or community-wide, not merely individual, dispositions to respond. As McDowell noted, something's being red is independent of its appearing red to any given observer on any given occasion.

The internal connection between property and response is indicative of the lack of causal (and thus explanatory) priority between them. The two are conceptually inextricable: the one cannot be adequately conceived except in terms of its relation to the other, where this relation is one of mutual dependence and reciprocity, not of causal priority, of the one causing the other. Simon Blackburn notes that a realist "holds that the moral features of things are the parents of our sentiments, whereas the Humean [projectivist] holds that they are their children".[79] McDowell, of course, suggests a third way: features and sentiments are 'siblings'. David Wiggins (e.g. 1998) endorses a similar position, according to which value properties and the corresponding psychological states are to be seen as interdependent and inextricable: 'equal and reciprocal partners'. Wiggins cites Aristotle's claim that 'we desire the object because it seems good to us, rather than the object's seeming good to us because we desire it', asking "Why should the *because* not hold both ways round? …Surely it can be true both that we desire *x* because we think *x* is good, and that *x* is good because *x* is such that we desire *x*. It does not count against the point that the explanation of the 'because' is different in each direction" (1998, p.106).

The traditional no-priority view, like my own account, relies heavily on the illumination supplied by phenomenology. Both McDowell and Wiggins are quick to point out that the phenomenology of value experience points decidedly to the 'discovery' or 'lighting up' of real properties, genuine features of reality. And yet a key component of that phenomenology pertains to bodily feeling—a fact that is neither fully acknowledged nor accommodated by the traditional no-priority view.[80]

[79] Blackburn (1981), pp.164-165.
[80] Although I shall not argue for it here, I suggest that bodily feelings—and not just psychic feelings—form a central strand in the phenomenology of all value experience, playing an essential and

Also missing from these accounts is any attempt whatsoever to explain how it is that feelings themselves are capable of playing the epistemic role attributed to them by the no-priority theory. McDowell, Wiggins, and their followers have nothing to say about what the perceptual structure of such feelings amounts to. McDowell himself was well aware of this lacuna. For example, he closes his paper 'Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World' (in McDowell, 1998) by observing that his account of the connection between the experience of aesthetic value and pleasure "generates a problem…which might be summed up in the following question: how can a mere *feeling* constitute an experience in which the world reveals itself to us?", claiming that all he has done "is to try to cast doubt on a line of thought that would prevent us from finding this question, and similar questions, so much as worth raising" (1998, p.130).

Of course, McDowell's question—viz. 'How can a mere *feeling* constitute an experience in which the world reveals itself to us?'—is precisely the kind of question to which the present account provides much needed answers. So far, we have seen very good reasons for thinking that such questions, at least in the emotional case, are not only worth raising but are capable of being comprehensively answered in a way that sheds considerable light on a number of important issues. Indeed, the main respect in which my account goes beyond McDowell's is in its ability to give real content to the claim that the feelings had in response to response-dependent properties are themselves perceptions of those properties. McDowell's account has it that a feeling (or more generally a 'sentiment') of disapprobation had in response to a wrong act constitutes a perception of its wrongness, just as a feeling of fear had in response

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ineliminable role in the epistemology of value—one that directly parallels the role played by bodily feelings on the account of emotional experience outlined above.

to a fearsome object constitutes a perception of its fearsomeness. However, it entirely lacks the explanatory resources required to show how it is possible for a *mere feeling* to be a perception of anything, let alone the property of wrongness or fearsomeness. It has nothing to say about what qualifies such feelings as perceptions at all.

According to the account I have been developing, emotional experience comprises a bodily dimension which, far from being of negligible philosophical importance (as too many have assumed), is central to a proper understanding of the structure of emotional experience and the nature of emotional knowledge. Indeed, McDowell's question applies to many different forms of experience, most notably value experience. And it is in this respect, amongst others, that my account has the potential to make considerable progress. For the question of how a 'mere feeling'—a brute, bodily feeling at that—can reveal important and profound features of reality (e.g. fearfulness, and even perhaps, by extension, beauty and goodness) is precisely the question to which my account provides a firm answer. The feelings with which we are concerned are not 'mere' at all. They are complex and highly structured perceptual states through which important aspects of the world are disclosed and rendered salient.

The Response-Dependence of Emotion-Proper Properties

The no-priority model of value properties, premised largely on an analogy with secondary qualities, provides the basic framework for a response-dependence account of emotion-proper properties. Let us now consider in more detail what such an

account might look like, starting with the reasons for thinking that emotion-proper properties are response-dependent.[81]

The reasons for taking emotion-proper properties to be response-dependent are largely parallel to those given by McDowell in support of his own account. This account, recall, was partly motivated by dissatisfaction with the theories at the two polar extremes of the realism/antirealism debate in ethics. This disquietude, shared also by Wiggins, amongst others, stemmed primarily from the worry that neither naïve realism nor projectivism accurately captures the ontological status of the referents of value predicates. This concern can be expressed as a worry to the effect that the theories in question fail accurately to capture the sense in which value predicates, such as those denoting ethical and aesthetic properties, must succeed in picking out real properties, but ones which are somehow, as it were, *less objective* than primary qualities and natural kinds. Value properties seem, on the one hand, to be available to a form of experience, as cognitively graspable features of reality, and yet on the other to be somehow parasitic upon—or at least inextricably bound up with—the affective sensibilities of human agents.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, when it comes to understanding emotion-proper properties, the motivating concerns are largely parallel. Properties like fearfulness and disgustingness seem to exhibit the same ambivalence, being concurrently real and yet fundamentally non-objective properties. The primary virtue of the secondary-quality

[81] For accounts which provide response-dependence analyses of formal objects see D'Arms (2005), D'Arms and Jacobson (2000a, 2010), Elgin (2008; cf. Wild, 2008, pp.130-131), Salmela (2006), and Zagzebski (2003). For a variation on the response-dependence thesis, see Greenspan's (1998) account of social (or 'two-level') response-dependence. An account which comes close to endorsing something like a response-dependence view of formal objects is proposed by Helm (2000, 2001a, 2002, 2009). See Chapter 5 for further discussion.

analogy is that it captures both the subjective and objective aspects of emotion-proper properties. It provides a way of cashing out the intuition that disgustingness, like redness and sweetness, is both a real property of things, existing out there to be encountered and experienced as part of the 'fabric of the world', and yet is inseparable from the faculties of perceiving subjects. The no-priority model provides an intuitive and powerful way of explicating this ambivalence. And it does so whilst remaining faithful to the phenomenology of emotional experience. We have already seen that response-dependence analyses of both emotional and value properties have strong phenomenological motivations. Both secondary-quality experience and emotional experience have an intrinsically perceptual structure. These are experiences in which an object is perceived to have a certain property; and their phenomenology is the phenomenology of property detection—not of judgement, inference, calculation, etc. The experience is experience of the property as it is instantiated by the object. It is like seeing that a picture has a certain content rather than, for example, inferring that it has that content from a description of the composition. Even Mackie recognised that the phenomenology of value experience points decidedly to the discovery of real properties; and as we saw in chapters 2 and 3, there are very good phenomenological reasons for viewing emotion-proper properties in the same light, as real properties instantiated by emotional objects and encountered in emotional experience. However, just as Mackie propounded an error theory of value-property experience, so too one might be tempted to press for an error theory in the emotional case. What reasons do we have for taking the phenomenology of emotional experience to be veridical? After all, we have already seen how on Ratcliffe's account the phenomenology of certain kinds of bodily feeling often fails to reflect any actual (or even possible) world experience.

Against this stands the secondary-quality analogy and the claim that emotion-proper properties are response-dependent in a way that ensures at least the possibility of veridical perceptual experience. If the response-dependence analysis is sound, then it will only be through appropriately emotional experiences that emotion-proper properties can be experienced at all; and furthermore, those very experiences, if they are indeed genuine responses to appropriate emotional objects, will qualify automatically as experiences of those very properties. Of course, this is not to claim that emotional feelings are always veridical. All forms of perception are open to error; and the possibility of misperception is just as real for affective perception as it is for other kinds. One might experience an object as frightening when in reality it bears no such property. Perhaps a trick of the light caused it to give off an impression of fearfulness, making it appear dangerous or menacing, for instance. This would be a case of *misperception*—of an experience representing an object as having a property, in this case an emotion-proper property, which in reality it lacks. However, we have no reason for thinking that all emotional experience is like this. When the evidence points to an experience's being appropriately caused by an encounter with an emotional object, then, ceteris paribus, and in the absence of countervailing reasons, we are entitled to assume that a given emotional experience is veridical.[82]

[82] Several authors have argued that we are entitled to rely on our emotional responses as prima facie sources of information. For a small sample, see Elgin (2008), de Sousa (1987), Döring (2003, 2007), Goldie (2000, 2004a), Johnston (2001), Prinz (2004b), and Roberts (2003). Johnston argues that affect has a certain kind of 'authority', while Gibbard (1990) claims that the perceptual content of emotional experience is self-justifying in a way that enables us to take its content at face-value. Similarly, Goldie notes that "in the typical case, the emotional response, combined in phenomenology with the perception of the object as having the emotion-proper property, will involve the experience of the emotion as being *reasonable* or *justified*" (2004a, p.97).

It is worth noting that, throughout the literature on response-dependence, emotion-proper properties are often treated as paradigmatic and relatively uncontroversial examples of response-dependent properties. Indeed, the response-dependence of emotion-proper properties is frequently taken as the basis for analogy with more controversial candidates, usually value properties.[83] In this illuminating passage, McDowell himself discusses fear as a paradigm case (its scope and detail merit, I think, a lengthy quotation).

> On the face of it, [fearfulness] might seem a promising subject for a projectivist treatment… At any rate the response that, according to such a treatment, is projected into the world can be characterised, without phenomenological falsification, otherwise than in terms of seeming to find the supposed product of projection already there. And it would be obviously grotesque to fancy that a case of fear might be explained as the upshot of a mechanical…process initiated by an instance of 'objective fearfulness'. But if what we are engaged in is an 'attempt to understand ourselves', then merely causal explanations of responses like fear will not be satisfying anyway. What we want here is a style of explanation that makes sense of what is explained (in so far as sense can be made of it). This means that a technique for giving satisfying explanations of cases of fear—which would perhaps amount to a satisfactory explanatory theory of danger, though the label is possibly too grand—must allow for the possibility of criticism; we make sense of fear by seeing it as a response to objects that *merit* such a response, or by seeing it as the intelligibly defective product of a propensity towards responses that would be intelligible in that way. For an object to merit fear just is for it to be fearful. So explanations of fear that manifest our capacity to understand ourselves in this region of our lives will simply not cohere with the claim that reality contains nothing in the way of fearfulness. Any such claim would undermine the intelligibility that the explanations confer on our responses. (1998, pp.143-144)

This passage touches on a number of important points, which I shall now consider. First, however, it is worth briefly pointing out that McDowell's claim that fearfulness "can be characterised, without phenomenological falsification, otherwise than in terms of seeming to find the supposed product of projection already there" is not incompatible with my phenomenological arguments for the reality of emotion-proper

[83] E.g. McDowell (1998), Prinz (2007).

properties. Much emotional experience cannot be characterised in terms of direct confrontation with emotion-proper properties. However, careful attention to the phenomenology of *certain kinds* of emotional experience (such as the standard perception-based cases) suggests that experience of the kind we have been focussing on cannot be characterised without phenomenological falsification otherwise than in terms of direct confrontation with emotion-proper properties.

Explanation and Intelligibility

One of the points McDowell raises concerns the kind of explanation that a response-dependence analysis affords us. According to McDowell, if what we are engaged in is an attempt to 'understand ourselves', then 'merely causal' explanations of responses like fear will not be satisfying. What we want are explanations that cohere with our natures as rational agents. Part of what this means is that our emotional responses will be open to criticism and explanation of the kind which makes direct appeal to real properties of objects—properties which, as we saw, are not there 'objectively', i.e. independently of our sensibilities, any more than colours are, but which are nevertheless there, as colours are, independently of any particular apparent experience of them. We make sense of fear by treating it as a response to objects that merit a fear response, where an object's being such as to merit fear just is for it to be frightening. And those explanations which deny that reality contains anything amounting to real fearfulness fly in the face of our critical and explanatory practices which only get going on the assumption of an implicit realism about emotional properties.

Emotional objects, in virtue of their emotion-proper properties, are not just such as to elicit certain responses; they are such to *merit* those responses.[84] A rampaging tiger merits fear; it does not merely cause it. It merits fear because it is fearsome, where this fearsomeness is the product both of our common propensity to fear certain, for example, dangerous things and of the emotion-invoking determinate features which underwrite that object's dangerousness. For any purported experience of an emotion-proper property there will be demonstrable reasons underpinning the experience which can be pointed to as evidence for the existence of the property—reasons having to do with the emotion-invoking determinable and determinate features which ground it. These reasons will be objective in the sense that they provide independent grounds—grounds which do not make essential reference to the sensibilities of the perceiving subject—explaining and justifying ascription of the property to an object. (The account of non-inferential perceptual belief sketched in the previous chapter, recall, allows room for the fact that while such beliefs are not arrived at through a process of conscious inference, they can be justified or post-rationalised by appeal to such inferences.)

Properties like fearfulness, despite being irreducibly subjective, have objective *roots*: they are grounded partly in natural features, such as determinate features of the determinable property of being dangerous (sharp teeth, deadly bite, etc.); just as colour properties, for example the property of being scarlet (a determinate of the determinables red and, at a coarser-grained level of description, coloured), will be grounded in micro-physical features of surfaces. As we will see, if the present account is correct, it is just such features which ultimately justify and render intelligible both

[84] This insistence that responses are merited or not depending partly on the nature of the object highlights one of the main differences between my account and Ratcliffe's: existential feelings are not merited in the way that emotional affective responses are.

the subject's emotional experience and (what amounts to the same thing) her ascription of the property.[85] These features can be invoked retrospectively in justifying explanations, in the same way that an art critic is able to cite the particular features of an artwork in virtue of which it possesses a certain aesthetic property. (She might, for example, point out the smooth lines and flowing curves which are responsible for the elegance of a statue.)

This ability to cite publicly accessible reasons which ground the ascription of the property and which ultimately make intelligible the emotional response is an advantage shared by both realism and no-priority subjectivism over projectivist accounts. One of the key objections to antirealist accounts such as a Mackie-style projectivism is that they deny our emotional responses (or responses to value or whatever) a level of intelligibility to which they seem, due to the nature of the experience, to be entitled. In claiming that value experience is systematically erroneous, Mackie deprives his account of a dimension (or at least a degree) of intelligibility that would render value experience perspicuous vis-à-vis the actions and motivations that spring from it. For, the view that value experience involves nothing more than the projection of attitudes leaves entirely mysterious the normative force such experience is supposed to confer on consequent actions and beliefs. The same is true of emotional experience. How, on the projectivist account, ought emotional behaviour and emotionally-sprung action to be rationalised? As we have seen, what

[85] The relationship between the reasons which justify emotional feelings and the feelings themselves is elucidated in detail by Goldie (see especially 2004a, 2004b). According to Goldie, "the reasons that justify the ascription of disgustingness to [a] piece of meat (the fact that it is maggot-infested, etc.) are the *very same* reasons that make feeling disgust justified on this occasion" (2004b, p.255). In other words, the objective features in virtue of which the meat has the emotion-proper property of disgustingness constitute the very reasons why ascription (and indeed perception) of the property is objectively justified.

seems to be required of value experience, emotional experience, and the like, is that they be at least capable of being veridical.

For any given emotional response, that response will be evaluable against a standard of correctness, depending on whether or not the object properly merits the response—depending, in other words, on whether the object actually instantiates the property. This correctness condition typically comprises two dimensions: appropriateness and proportionality.[86] And in order for a response to count as 'correct', it must satisfy both conditions. The response appropriate to a frightening object, for example, is one of fear (and not, say, envy); and the intensity of the reaction must be proportional to the degree of fearsomeness of the object, which is fixed by the underlying determinate and determinable features. (A mild panic when confronted by a ravenous, rampaging tiger would probably not qualify as a proportionate response; just as a total nervous breakdown would likely constitute a disproportionate response to the sight of a harmless house-spider.) The existence of a standard of correctness for emotional experience is reflected in our everyday practice of criticising people's emotional reactions and predispositions (others' as well as our own)—a practice which only makes sense on the assumption that emotional experience involves a sensitivity to real properties.

The advantage of being able to appeal to an objective standard of correctness, and of being able to analyse emotional experience in terms of responses to real properties, is that it permits straightforward analyses of emotional behaviour—analyses which function at the same level of description at which the subject herself would explain

[86] Compare D'Arms and Jacobson's (2000a, pp.73-74) talk of the appropriateness of emotions being partly a matter of their 'size' and 'shape'.

her actions if asked to report on them autobiographically, from a point of view internal to the agent-perspective. Thus, the possibility of citing the detection of real properties in an explanation of emotional behaviour provides a far more satisfying account of that behaviour than an account to which such explanation was denied in virtue of the ability of such explanation to accord with what subjects take themselves to be doing in reacting emotionally to appropriate stimuli. Contrary to the prevailing forms of cognitivism, analyses of fear in terms of danger, or of disgust in terms of a propensity to cause infection, do not accord with explanations that subjects themselves give of their behaviour and action. Asked why he reacted with fear to the spider, John will say that he reacted as he did because he found the spider to be *frightening*—an explanation that accords both with his own understanding of his behaviour and with the phenomenology of the experience, which can accurately be characterised in terms of his having had felt experience of the spider *as frightening*.

This view is well supported by research in psychology. Charland (1995a, 1995b), for example, cites a wealth of evidence—drawn from the work of Ekman (1980), Hebb (1946), Leeper (1948), Panskepp (1982), Pylyshyn (1984), and Zajonc (1980)—in support of the claim that there is no way to provide a satisfactory account of subjects' emotional responses without taking these to be responses to exemplifications of real 'affective categories' ('the fearsome', 'the disgusting', etc.). Charland's so-called 'argument from generalisations' relies on the fact that affective categories have such diverse token realisations that, nomologically speaking, they have nothing in common under a purely physical description. The upshot is that there is no principled way of linking subjunctive and counterfactual tokens of emotion-types with the

corresponding token physical events without adverting to special affective representational categories (emotion-proper properties):

> In other words, if we are to capture all the required regularities governing behaviour…then we must sometimes suppose that there *are* frightening circumstances, that persons can and often do correctly *represent* them as such, and that behaviour is sometimes *representationally governed* by special affective principles of rationality and action. (Charland, 1995a, p.62)

According to the evidence adduced by Charland, then, for any token emotional episode, it is a condition of its being psychologically intelligible that it include a representation of its particular object as an instantiation of a certain affective category. The point is not that in addition to capturing subjects' representational states at the level of physics, or at some alternative lower explanatory level (including that of emotion-invoking determinable and determinate features), those states can also be captured at the level of emotion-proper properties; it is that those states can *only* be captured at the level of the representation of such properties (as we have seen, a representation of danger is neither necessary nor sufficient for fear).

On my account, representing an object as an instantiation of an affective category-type is a matter of representing it as instantiating an emotion-proper property, which itself entails representing *the emotion-proper property itself*. It is important here to bear in mind an ambiguity inherent in talk of experiencing something *as* frightening, or perceiving something *as being* disgusting. For, on my account, such locutions are to be taken as indicating representations which actually feature token emotion-proper properties in their intentional representational content, not merely as experiences or perceptions *that* some object is frightening/disgusting (in the sense of being such that people will typically find it frightening/disgusting). As we saw in Chapter 3, only the

former type of perception is sufficient for emotion, and thus for explaining, rationalising, and justifying emotional action and behaviour. (Recall the general who failed to feel disgust, and to be moved accordingly, when he noticed merely *that* the corpse is disgusting. Seeing-as, on my account, is not synonymous with seeing-that, in the sense pertaining to the general's experience of the corpse.)

Indeed, this is partly why I favour talk of emotion-proper properties over talk of formal objects, affective categories, and so on. Talk of objects *as falling under categories* is problematically opaque in just this respect. It obscures the representational commitments being made by such phrases. Talk of perceiving real properties avoids such problems by making it entirely perspicuous what is included in representational content. As the analogy with seeing aspects makes clear, talk of seeing-as entails that emotion-proper properties actually figure in representational content. Seeing *that* this combination of lines is such as to produce a duck-like appearance is quite different to perceiving the duckiness itself—i.e. the actual property of being duck-like, the determinate way in which the picture resembles a duck.

Rationalisation, Justification, and Motivation

It will be recalled that, according to austere versions of cognitivism, emotions are nothing more than cognitive states, usually evaluative judgements; and it is supposedly in virtue of their cognitive status that emotions figure at the heart of our rational, evaluative, and conative lives. However, as we saw in Chapter 1, the claim that emotions are judgements simply does not cohere with the relevant

phenomenology. The reductive agenda of austere cognitivism dictates that fear be reduced to (be analysed solely in terms of) a judgement to the effect that danger is imminent; that disgust be reduced to a judgement that some object is likely to cause infection or disease; that anger be reduced to a judgement that one has been slighted; etc. However, at least in the cases that concern us, such judgements do not seem to feature at all in the content of emotional experience. (The last thing a subject will tell you is going on when she reacts with disgust is that she is in the process of judging the object to pose a risk of infection.) Yet without postulating some kind of evaluative content containing reference to the dangerousness (etc.) of scary things, or the potential infectiousness of disgusting things, it seems impossible to explain the obvious normative role played by such emotions in action-motivation, reasoning, and decision-making, as well as in our general evaluative and social practices.

The present account offers an alternative. For, whilst emotions do appear to play the normative role attributed to them by the cognitivist, this role can be incorporated into our concept of emotion without resorting to the inclusion of explicit evaluative judgements—a move which goes against what careful phenomenological investigation tells us about the structure of much emotional experience. On the present account, in place of some kind of detailed evaluative judgement stands an affective emotional perception of an emotion-proper property. However, whilst the explicit content of this perception is the property itself, implicit in this content will be precisely those emotion-invoking determinable features which cognitivism postulates as the proper content of the emotion. The perception necessarily contains reference to these properties, but they are not foregrounded in the experience. As the subvenient grounds of the emotion-proper property, they figure implicitly in the content of the

perception (see previous chapter), but they are not, or at least need not be, the objects of any explicit cognitive appraisal on the part of the subject. Thus, when it comes to rationalising emotional experience (and consequent behaviour), there is no need to postulate evaluative judgements; it is enough that the subject is conscious of the object's emotion-proper properties, which are themselves underwritten by the features the judgements are invoked to capture.

This account has the advantage—shared by a host of recent integrative, and particularly response-dependence, accounts of emotion (see especially Zagzebski, 2003, and Tappolet, 2003, 2010)—of being able to vindicate motivational internalism.[87] As McDowell had argued, a sensibility theory of value-property experience (such as a no-priority response-dependence view) which treats such experience as a form of perception of value properties, has the great advantage of being able to explain the intrinsically motivating nature of value (including moral and emotional) judgements. Several recent authors—including, for example, Charland (1995a, 1995b, 1997), de Sousa (1987), Döring (2003, 2007), Gordon (1987), and Zagzebski (2003)—have argued that the traditional Humean psychological model of action motivation, which appeals to a conjunction of cognitive and conative states (where these are assumed to be necessarily 'distinct existences'), is insufficient to explain certain types of behaviour, and that emotions are ineliminable in the explanation of such behaviour. Zagzebski, for example, argues that:

[87] For detailed discussion of the rationalising and motivating power of the emotions (indeed, the emotions qua 'affective perceptions'), particularly regarding motivational internalism, see Döring (2003, 2007, 2008, 2009).

> Emotions are potentially motivating because they combine affectivity and intentionality. Unlike non-intentional affective states such as sensations and moods, in an emotional state there is something specific in the world around us towards which affect is directed and which leads us to respond in ways characteristic of the emotion. So in a state of pity someone is seen as pitiful and given the opportunity to respond, the feeling of pity motivates us to take action to stop the suffering towards which the pity is directed. (2003, pp.115-116)

This same advantage is enjoyed by my own account. Simply put, emotions can motivate action because as perceptions of inherently evaluative properties they already embody reasons for action (they are underwritten by reasons concerning, for example, the implicit dangerousness of frightening objects), and their inherently affective quality ensures that these reasons register with the subject in such a way that recommends, and indeed primes her for, action of an appropriate sort.[88] Fundamentally, this is what explains the difference between emotional and non-emotional action. In affectively perceiving an emotion-proper property one necessarily feels emotion towards the object which instantiates it. One is thus *emotionally engaged with the object*; and it is only when so engaged that certain potentialities for thought and action become available. In the case of fear, for example, it is only when one is thus engaged that one becomes poised to take defensive or evasive action.

As representational states, affective perceptions can non-inferentially justify beliefs and judgements, which in turn justify actions.[89] Thus, affective perceptions can play

[88] Cf. Döring (2003), p.224, and Zagzebski (2003), p.116. Cf. also Charles (2004, p.134).

[89] Cases of irrational emotion cannot of course be justified in the same way as merited (appropriate, warranted) emotions as they are perceptions of merely apparent emotion-proper properties: they are perceptions of objects *as if* they had the property in question, but in reality these are mere appearances (as we saw, a genuine is/seems distinction can be drawn by appealing to the grounding emotion-invoking determinable and determinate features). Fear of frogs can be rationalised—in the sense of being rendered intelligible—qua misperception of an illusory, merely apparent, emotion-proper property, because frogs demonstrably do not instantiate any of the features required to ground the property of being fearsome.

the same role as sense-perceptions. And by taking their content at face-value, they can figure in a similar way and to a similar extent within the wider web of beliefs, judgements, desires, decisions, calculations, and so on, that make up the fabric of purposive mental life—the life of human agents who are, as Solomon (2004b) puts it, "engaged with the world". Indeed, it is commonly said—usually with James in mind—that feelings are insufficient for motivating action, and that appeal to feelings alone is insufficient to rationalise or explain an action. But my account is able to show how the contentful nature of emotional bodily feelings allows them to play this role. The feelings themselves have representational content—content which is underwritten by appropriately evaluative reasons. Of course, the objective features described by these reasons only tell half the story. There is no possibility of effecting a reduction of emotion-proper properties to these lower-level properties. A complete analysis of emotional properties would have to appeal essentially to human sensibilities: specifically our affective and emotional capacities. Emotion-proper properties thus remain irreducibly subjective: they are anchored in the real world by emotion-invoking determinate features but they depend equally for their existence on the capacities of perceiving subjects.

Despite this dual dependence—on the sensibilities of subjects on the one hand, and on lower-level determinate features on the other—it is still correct, I believe, to talk in terms of supervenience. Emotion-proper properties depend on the shared affective sensibilities and responsive dispositions of communities of subjects, but they are rooted firmly in determinate (and, at a higher level, determinable) features of emotional objects. The dependence in question, in both cases, will be a form of weak—and at minimum, nomological—supervenience: emotion-proper properties

depend, in law-like ways, on factors of both kinds in such a way that any two emotional objects exactly similar in respect of their determinate properties and available to a given community of perceivers will—at least in this possible world and for that community of perceivers—be identical in respect of their emotion-proper properties; and furthermore, any change at the level of emotional properties will, ceteris paribus, entail a change in determinate properties and/or a change in the responsive dispositions of that community.

In claiming that the kind of dependence in question is law-like, two points ought to be borne in mind. First, this does not mean that the relevant laws or regularities are *generalisable* in a way that involves an entailment relation between lower-level features and higher-order emotion-proper properties. Whilst it is true that all token emotion-proper properties are grounded in token emotion-invoking determinate features, the former are not entailed by the latter. And secondly, being at least nomologically supervenient does not preclude the availability of stronger (e.g. metaphysical and possibly even logical/conceptual) supervenience relations. As we will see in the next chapter, emotion-proper property terms can be taken to rigidly designate in a way that ties properties to the responses of actual subjects in the actual world.[90]

Despite this essential tie to the actual responses of actual subjects, the supervenience in question must be relatively weak if it is to allow for multiple realisability. This is doubly true if we want to allow, as I do, that some emotion-proper properties, such as

[90] On the rigidified version of the supervenience claim, any change at the level of emotion-proper properties will entail a change in determinate properties *only*. A change (real or counterfactual) in the corresponding responsive dispositions will not be enough to alter the extension of the relevant predicates, as these will be fixed by the actual responses of the community in question in the actual world.

fear, can supervene on a range of not only determinate but determinable properties. A theory that tied types of emotion-proper properties one-to-one to types of determinate or determinable features would be unable to account for the fact that properties like fearsomeness can be instantiated in a range of determinable ways (e.g. being dangerous, being threatening) which themselves admit of diverse determinate manifestations (e.g. having sharp teeth, behaving aggressively).

Elucidation: Tracing Out the Circle

The inherent unavailability of a reductive account may strike some as something of a flaw in the response-dependence project. After all, a consequence would seem to be that analyses of concepts describing response-dependent properties are rendered vacuously and unavoidably circular, with the explanations they foster being incapable of capturing the essence of the phenomena. The only available analysis of fearfulness, for example, is something like: '*x* is fearful iff *x* is such as to cause a fear response in suitable subjects under appropriate conditions'. Similarly for red: Crispin Wright, for example, gives the 'basic equation' for red as '*x* is red iff for any subject S: if S were perceptually normal and were to encounter *x* in perceptually normal conditions, S would experience *x* as red'.[91] These formulations unavoidably employ the term 'red' on both sides of the biconditional, and so cannot, it seems, function as any kind of informative qua reductive analysis.

However, far from rendering emotion-proper properties and their kin ontologically opaque and mysterious, a response-dependence analysis actually serves to elucidate

[91] See Wright (1988), p.14.

the nature of such properties in a strikingly simple and insightful way. This is because if we are striving, as McDowell put it, to 'understand ourselves' in this area of our lives, then the kind of explanation we are after will not necessarily be reductive. Rather, it will seek to shed light on the intimate connections between the properties we encounter in emotional (and similar) experience and the affective, valuational, and conative aspects of our makeup. As Wiggins notes:

> Circularity as such is no objection…provided that the offending formulation is also *true*. But what use (I shall be asked) is such a circular formulation? My answer is that, by tracing out such a circle, the subjectivist hopes to elucidate the concept of value by displaying it in its actual involvement with the sentiments. One would not, according to him, have sufficiently elucidated what value is *without* that detour. (1998, p.190)

Thus, being non-reductive does not entail being explanatorily vacuous. An analysis of fearfulness in terms of a propensity to engender a fear response can be informative in virtue of its making explicit the internal connection between property and response. Thus, whilst analyses of response-dependent concepts are necessarily circular, the circularity is wholly benign.[92] Again, emotion-proper properties, being affect-dependent, are intrinsically phenomenal properties: they can only be characterised in terms of their effects on sentient subjects. As such, it is wholly unsurprising that they are not fully analysable in naturalistic terms.

The Nature of Response

It is commonly said that there is no single, unified analysis capable of capturing all of what we ordinarily call emotions. Different emotion-types, and different tokens of the

[92] A similar point is made by Johnston (1989, pp.147-148) and (in a slightly different context) Helm (2001a, pp.62-63), amongst others.

same type, are said to be structurally and compositionally diverse, involving a range of elements in various configurations. Indeed, that emotions are too heterogeneous to form a natural kind has become something of a platitude in recent years.[93] However, from what has been suggested so far there are good reasons for thinking that the concepts of the various emotion-types are response-dependent concepts: they are such that they make essential reference to the responses of human subjects. There is no understanding what envy is, for example, without reference to the common disposition to respond in certain ways to certain (enviable) states of affairs. This seems to be true of all emotion-type concepts. It is essential to understanding what fear is that one understand the kinds of responses scary things are disposed to engender in human subjects; just as there is no comprehending what anger is without making reference to the way people are disposed to react when offended.

However, it is important to bear in mind a distinction between response-dependent concepts and response-dependent properties.[94] The former are concepts which, in capturing the essence of the phenomena, make essential reference to the responses of suitable subjects. The latter are properties which are at least partly existentially dependent upon the dispositions of those subjects to respond in certain ways to instances of those properties. Now, while we must not assume that just because a concept is response-dependent in this sense the property it denotes will be an appropriately response-dependent property, there are good reasons for thinking that all emotion-proper properties are response-dependent.[95] For any emotion-type, it

[93] See e.g. Goldie (2000), Griffiths (1997, 2004), Rorty (1980b, 2004); cf. Prinz (2004b) and Charland (1995a).
[94] See Ralph Wedgwood (1998) on the distinction.
[95] This definition of response-dependent concepts leaves open the possibility that such concepts might not necessarily be concepts of response-dependent properties. Alternative formulations might not allow for such a gap. On this broad formulation, the concepts of being poisonous and nauseating, for

seems that tokens of that type are necessarily (at least partly) existentially dependent on the responsive dispositions of human subjects. It is impossible for an object to be pitiful, for example, without it being such as to cause feelings of pity. And the reason it qualifies *as* pitiful is precisely that it is such as to cause people to respond in this way. The same goes for all paradigmatic emotion-types. Emotion-proper properties appear to be subjective in precisely the sense suggested by the secondary-quality analogy: they are such as to cause people to respond in suitable ways, and their having this disposition is responsible, along with people's dispositions to respond to them in precisely those ways, for the existence of the properties.

What then counts as a suitable response? So far we have seen that properties of certain types merit the corresponding types of response: fearful objects merit a fear response; enviable objects merit envy; disgusting objects merit disgust; embarrassing objects embarrassment; pitiful objects pity; etc. And there is indeed a sense in which, up to a point, the answer to the question 'What counts as an appropriate fear (envy/disgust/embarrassment/pity/etc.) response?' is simply 'Whatever we, as a community of language users, usually class as the emotion fear (envy/disgust/ embarrassment/pity/etc.)'. This much is trivially true on the response-dependence account. However, there would appear to be at least two criteria that must be met by a state of any kind if it is to qualify as a genuine response to a response-dependent

example, will be response-dependent concepts, as there is no comprehending what it is for something to be poisonous or nauseating without making reference to the effects of poisonous and nauseating things on suitable subjects; however, the properties of being poisonous and nauseating are not response-dependent in the appropriate (McDowellian) sense (the sense which accords with the secondary-quality analogy), as will become apparent shortly.

property. Firstly, the state must represent the object as having the property; and secondly, it must be appropriately caused by the property.[96]

The latter criterion requires an extended treatment, and so cannot be addressed here. I shall return to it in Chapter 5. Regarding the former, we have already seen that the affective states involved in emotional perception are intrinsically representational of emotion-proper properties. However, it is also worth noting that there are many properties which are picked out by response-dependent concepts and which appear to have all the hallmarks of response-dependent properties but which are nevertheless importantly disanalogous to the secondary-quality cases which serve as paradigms of the McDowellian model. Take, for example, the properties of being poisonous and being nauseating. Both reliably cause certain responses and are in a sense existentially dependent on the propensities of their objects to cause such responses. There is nothing more to being nauseating than being such as to cause feelings of nausea; and there is nothing more to being poisonous than being such as to poison. And in each case, while there will be determinate lower-level features which are responsible for something's being poisonous or nauseating, the concept cannot be reduced to an analysis of these determinate features. Ralph Wedgwood makes two points that capture the traditional way of thinking about response-dependence, both of which I endorse:

[96] This causal criterion precludes the possibility of affective emotional 'responses' being caused by drugs or other inappropriate means. Only those responses which arise as part of a suitable causal chain hooking the subject up to the emotion-proper property, within the context of an emotional experience, will qualify as appropriate responses, and thus as perceptions.

> First, the response-dependence approach claims that objects are red, or good (or whatever), at least partly *in virtue of* some relation to some type of mental response on the part of thinking subjects; and, second, the type of mental response in question involves some sort of recognition or representation of something's being red or good. (So, for example, if nausea does not essentially involve any sort of recognition or representation of something's being nauseating, then nausea is not a response of the appropriate kind.) (1998, p.34)

Thus, in order for a property to qualify as response-dependent in the appropriate sense, the response must represent the object as having the property; and neither feelings of nausea (cf. disgust) nor the fact of being poisoned are representational in anything like this sense.[97] Of course, as we have seen, the same is not true of emotional experience, in which the emotion-proper property figures directly in the content of experience, as part of the representational content of the affective state. As perceptions of emotion-proper properties, certain affective states are necessarily appropriately representational.

Of course, being appropriately caused and being appropriately representative of the property are not sufficient for being an appropriate response (although they are individually necessary). We also saw that it is necessary, if somewhat trivial, that the response be a response of an appropriate *kind*: a fearful object merits a fear response, just as a red object merits a red-type response. And where the appropriateness of colour experience is determined by phenomenality—by the qualitative character of the sensation—the criteria of appropriateness are somewhat more complex in the emotional case (although, of course, in the emotional case too, appropriateness will be largely determined by phenomenality). Specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions of the various emotion-types is no easy task. Indeed, I happen to think that

[97] Smith (1993) makes a similar point in respect of the nauseating and the disgusting. (Cf. also Zagzebski, 2003, on the grammatical distinction between concepts like *nauseating* and those like *rude*.)

providing a definitive analysis of any emotion-type, not to mention providing a unified account of the concept of emotion, may prove ultimately to be impossible. I have suggested that all emotional episodes necessarily involve affect, for example, but this is notoriously difficult to argue for; and it may or may not be the case that all emotions—that is, all token episodes of all types—necessarily involve cognitions. However, we saw reason for thinking that instances of the Jamesian standard emotions must to a large extent admit of a common structure; and this structure typically has, at its core, an affective perceptual state with determinately representational phenomenal/intentional content.

Prospects for a Unified Account: A Brief Aside

All emotions, as we saw, are intentional states: they meet all the criteria of intentionality outlined in Chapter 2. Given the account I have been developing, it might be tempting to assume that all emotions—and not just the standard ones—are, or at least include, responses to emotion-proper properties. On this assumption, all instances of fear, for example, would be responses to the fearsomeness of fearsome objects. After all, given that emotion-proper properties are response-dependent and much emotional experience involves direct confrontation with emotion-proper properties, the possibility seems open of securing a unified analysis premised on the claim that all emotions involve responses to emotion-proper properties.[98] Needless to

[98] I happen to think that some episodes of standard emotions like disgust and fear are entirely reducible to affective perceptions, in the sense that there is often nothing more to one's disgust or fear than one's affectively perceiving something to be disgusting or fearful. However, I very much doubt that a reductive account of this kind is available for all emotions. There is surely far more to love, jealousy, guilt, shame, and so on, than mere perceptions, in whatever sense, of emotion-proper properties. And whilst episodes of these emotions might at some stage *involve*, or be manifest as, such perceptions—e.g. perceptions of the loveliness of one's spouse—it would take very special pleading indeed to claim that complex emotions like spousal love could simply be *reduced* to such perceptions.

say, this is a difficult issue. It is also one about which, I believe, I am entitled to remain agnostic. Nothing in my account compels me to endorse a global claim of this kind, insisting that all tokens of all emotion-types can be analysed in response-dependence terms. However, I would like to offer some seminal thoughts which might lead one to think that such an analysis could in fact be given.

As we have seen, many emotional episodes necessarily involve responses to emotion-proper properties. This is especially obvious, of course, for the perception-based cases on which I have been focussing. But what about the non-perception-based cases? Consider the following scenario. John is at home, reading, when he realises he is having to re-read the same lines several times: he is having trouble concentrating. It is then that he realises he is anxious about something. For some reason he keeps looking out the window. He is particularly aware of the state of the weather: the howling wind, lightening, and heavy rain. Then he notices that his wife, Jane, is late coming home from work. He thinks he must be anxious about her safety, given that she is probably driving home right now through the storm. He has a bad feeling—a 'gut instinct'—that something is not right. An hour later, and his anxiety levels have soared. He is pacing the room, biting his nails. Then he hears on the news about a series of fatal accidents on nearby roads. Anxiety becomes fear. That icy feeling creeps into his stomach. Numerous scenarios flash through his mind: scenarios where Jane has been involved in a crash; where her car has been hit by a falling tree; where the roads have flooded; and so on. The more time goes by, the more intense his fear becomes.

Here the object of John's emotion is a situation rather than a concrete object, and one that is at a physical distance from the subject. John's fear, consisting of thoughts (doubts, judgements, worries, concerns, etc.), feelings, and a host of additional elements, arises slowly and by degrees. Does this emotional episode count as a response to the fearsomeness of the situation? I believe it does. For a start, John's fear is only intelligible on the assumption that the situation somehow seems to him to merit fear. As an intentional state, the object of his fear is presented under specific aspects. In this case, the object (the situation) is presented as one in which his wife (someone of great personal value and significance) is threatened. However, in being so represented, it is also represented as something that is *fearsome*. Emotional objects are not presented under emotionally neutral aspects. Objects of envy are presented as meriting envy—as *being enviable*—while pitiable objects are presented as pitiable, disgusting objects as disgusting, and so on. Were they not so presented, the subject's emotion would not be intelligible in the way that rational, justified emotions clearly are intelligible: as responses to enviable, pitiable, disgusting, etc., things.

So, insofar as an emotion like fear necessarily has an intentional object—one which has a particular aspectual shape and is presented in an emotionally-loaded way, as having an emotion-proper property—the emotion may reasonably be thought of as a response to the object, considered in terms of its emotion-proper properties. This is so regardless of the distance between subject and object. An emotion which is appropriately intentional has an object which instantiates an appropriate emotion-proper property; and it is to this object bearing this property that the subject may be said to be responding in reacting emotionally. There is a sense, then, in which the property may be said to cause the response, and in which the response may be said to

represent that property. However, inherent in this approach is the danger of spreading the notion of response—and consequently that of perception—too thin. As we will see shortly, avoiding this danger requires differentiating between different kinds or strengths of perception.[99]

Response qua Perception

Now, a crucial claim on the McDowellian model of response-dependence is that all genuine responses to response-dependent properties, such as moral properties, qualify as perceptions of those properties. An appropriately caused sentiment of moral disapprobation constitutes a perception of the wrongness of an act to which the sentiment is a response, just as an appropriately caused red-type sensation constitutes a perception of the redness of the object to which the sensation is a response. This is supposed to do justice to the detectivist tenor of the relevant phenomenology whilst avoiding recourse to a dubious intuitionism. Part of the motivation for this claim comes, of course, from the account of the properties themselves—in particular from the analogy with secondary qualities. As Wright puts it:

[99] Even granting this differentiated notion of perception, there remain any number of reasons which might lead one to resist any unified theory of emotion premised on a purportedly universal property-response structure. For example, while it may turn out at least to be plausible that all emotional episodes share a common property-response structure, this structure may prove to be simply too abstract to constitute anything like the 'essence' of emotion. Given the sheer diversity of possible emotional responses, the class of emotional episodes may ultimately be too heterogeneous to allow a substantial and informative analysis along response-dependence lines.

> If we think of secondary qualities in the broadly dispositional way canvassed by McDowell, then we have to think of the colour, e.g., of an object as consisting in a disposition to induce a certain sort of visual experience which, *ceteris paribus*, constitutes a perception of that very quality. And some, including McDowell, who have wanted to defend—at least up to a point—an analogy between moral and secondary qualities, seem to have had it in mind to recommend precisely the transposition of this combination to the moral case: the claim is that our faculty of moral judgement may illuminatingly be thought of as a *perceptual* capacity with moral qualities as its proper objects. The moral quality of a situation is to be thought of, broadly, as a disposition to induce a certain sort of distinctive experience, the having of which will count, *ceteris paribus*, as the perception of that very quality. (1988, p.4)

For McDowell, it follows from the nature of moral properties that they are perceptible through the very experiences which constitute their proper responses. And on the present account, exactly the same is true in the emotional case: it follows from the very nature of emotion-proper properties that they are perceptible through those (affective) experiences which constitute their proper responses, with the consequence that our common emotional (affective) capacity may illuminatingly be thought of as a perceptual capacity with emotion-proper properties as its proper objects. However, as we have seen, it remains unclear what notion of perception McDowell has in mind here. For while it seems pretty straightforward in the case of colour experience to claim that the relevant responses count as perceptions of the relevant properties, things are less simple when it comes to the perception of emotional properties. An account is needed of *how* our emotional experiences are capable of playing a genuinely perceptual role in apprehending the relevant kinds of properties. How can complex and diverse states like emotions—and, more to the point, how can 'mere *feelings*'—possibly succeed in representing anything?

It has been a central task of this thesis to explain how such representation is possible. We have seen that, in the case of perception-based emotional episodes at least, the

emotional state has a clear representational structure in virtue of having an intrinsically representational affective state at its core. Emotional responses are essentially affective, and the relevant affective states are essentially representational: they are *affective perceptions*—visceral bodily feelings which are intrinsically representative of emotion-proper properties.

As we will see, this ability to spell out precisely how it is that emotions (specifically their constituent affective perceptions) can be perceptions in the fullest sense—that is, the sense of being phenomenally and intentionally rich perceptual states with complex representational content—is a great advantage enjoyed by my account over rival theories. However, much turns on what is meant by the terms 'perception' and 'representation'. I want to end this chapter by looking again (although not for the last time) at the issue of perception, particularly with respect to the non-perception-based cases of emotional and moral experience, which are often less obviously and straightforwardly representational in character. McDowell's claims about the epistemology of moral experience have been criticised by a number of authors; and whilst it is not my concern to defend the content of McDowell's claims as they relate to moral properties, I am concerned to block any parallel arguments that might be levelled against my account of emotional experience.

Simon Blackburn is amongst those who accuse McDowell of playing fast and loose with the notion of perception. For example, he claims that:

> …there is nothing to prevent a projectivist from *speaking of* the perception of moral properties… We speak of the perception of every single category of thing and fact that we ever communicate. We speak of perception of numerical truths, truths about the future, truths about the past, possibilities, other minds, theoretical entities of all kinds. We speak of perception whenever we think of ourselves as properly indicating the truth… It is as if someone thought that they could seriously provide a theory of mathematical truth that based itself on the idea that we perceive that 7+5=12, and then simply turned its back on the disanalogies between such knowledge and ordinary sense perception. (1993, pp.161-162)

However, such criticism is misplaced, especially in the emotional case; for we can accept that talk of perception can be misleading, allowing for different strengths or gradations of perception, whilst maintaining that there are nevertheless cases in which our emotional reactions are strongly perceptual in a way that allows for a substantial perceptual theory of emotional properties.[100]

In claiming that a judgement of moral wrongness or an emotional reaction to an imagined event constitute perceptions of moral or emotional properties, the notion of perception in play is undoubtedly a rather thin one—one more akin to arithmetical perception, say, than ordinary sense-perception. But this does not mean that there are no 'thick' cases of moral or emotional perception: cases which make reference to an appropriate causal story, and in which the state involved admits of a rich perceptual structure and is endowed with a phenomenology comparable to that of sense-perception. As we have seen, this is certainly the case for standard emotional

[100] There is some disagreement over whether McDowell intended his perceptual claims to be taken literally (as Blackburn, Wright, and others have assumed), or whether he is merely using perception in an analogous or metaphorical way (as, e.g., Salmela, 2006, claims). My own view is that McDowell equivocates on this but ultimately commits to the claim that moral, emotional, and aesthetic responses are, quite literally, perceptions of response-dependent properties. Of course, he says little about what this claim, taken literally, amounts to; but that is because his account lacks the resources required to say in any detail *how it is* that sentiments—and, in particular, feelings—are capable of representational structure of the kind suggested by the secondary-quality analogy. D'Arms and Jacobson warn against taking talk of perception too literally, claiming that "the essence of the perceptual metaphor is simply that our emotional experience presents us with a non-inferential basis for evaluative judgment" (2010, p.594). Whilst I do not consider such talk to be merely metaphorical, I do of course agree that emotional experience provides a non-inferential basis for evaluative judgment.

episodes. Even those episodes which are not perception-based, which are not so richly structured or endowed with a thoroughly perceptual phenomenology, might still be justifiably deemed perceptual, although not in as strict a sense. As a genuine response to a genuinely frightening situation I want to say that John's fear for Jane still constitutes a perception of fearfulness; however I would want to distance such cases from the more richly perceptual episodes involving direct confrontation with an emotional object. John's perception of the storm's fearfulness is perhaps more akin to 'perceiving' the possibility of check-mating an opponent in three moves, or construing a cloud as a smiley face. That is, it is perceptual in a more *intellectual* and less sensual sense.

The nature of perception remains a hotly contended and controversial topic in the philosophy of mind; and it is one which we lack the space to get into here. Suffice it to say that, whether or not all responses to emotional properties ultimately turn out, on an ideal philosophical analysis, to qualify as perceptual states is not my concern here. It is enough that, on the present analysis, the standard cases can be thought of as perceptual in a robust and intuitive sense. Our commonsense concept of perception allows for a continuum of cases, extending between more intellectual kinds of state at one end, and more sensual states at the other. And if the above analysis is correct, then the possibility is open that all cases of emotional experience can be located somewhere on the continuum, as perceptions, to some degree, of emotional properties. Thus, while not all emotional episodes will be 'thickly' perceptual in the way that standard episodes are (the way that parallels ordinary sense-experience), they may nevertheless qualify as 'thinly' perceptual in something like the sense just indicated. This notion of thin perception, whilst admittedly less impressive than its

counterpart (at least from an epistemological point of view), is still far from being a vacuous concept or a mere relabeling of a species of thought. Viewing even those cases of emotional experience which are not obviously perceptual as cases of thin perception of emotion-proper properties allows analysis of such experience in a way that has interesting epistemological implications, as well as implications for those theories seeking to provide unified accounts of emotion along perceptual lines.

It should be noted that this distinction between thick (richly structured, sense-like) perceptions and thin (loosely structured, thought-like) perceptions is not intended to be in any way rigid or exclusive. States can be both sense-like and thought-like to varying degrees. Much visual experience, for example, is to a degree concept- or theory-laden; and the content of much sense-experience is determined by the delicate interplay between the sensual, intellectual, and imaginative faculties. Seeing the duck-rabbit under either determinate aspect is often a matter of actively construing it in terms of a duck or a rabbit; and discerning a tune in a badly played piece of music is helped greatly by knowledge of what the piece is supposed to sound like. As Goldie (2000) has noted, the perceptual character of many emotions has a lot to do with the role of imagination in shaping the content of experience. However, as I nevertheless want to defend a rather strong claim about the perceptual status of those bodily feelings which pertain to the standard emotions, claiming that they are 'genuinely' (thickly) perceptual in a way that manages to avoid such Blackburn-style objections, it may be useful to spell out more clearly what the two strengths of perception in play here amount to. In order to do this, I shall return to the notion of non-inferential perceptual belief, introduced in the previous chapter.

Recall the two conditions which, according to Goldie, must be satisfied if a state is to qualify as a non-inferential perceptual belief: firstly, the belief must be to the effect that something has a certain property from the way it appears relative to one or more sense-modality; and secondly, it must arise in a way that is phenomenologically immediate, rather than being the product of a conscious process of inference. How do the more intellectual cases stack up? Well, it seems that while the more strongly perceptual ('standard') cases are clearly relative to the modality of bodily feeling *and* are phenomenologically immediate, many of the more intellectual cases appear to fail this second criterion (despite their objects always, or at least often, being experienced via the modality of bodily feeling). Thus, whilst it may be true to say that John's fear for Jane involves affectively perceiving the scariness of her predicament through visceral feelings of fear, the fact that these feelings do not arise in a way that is phenomenologically immediate—that is, in a way that presents the emotion-proper property as an immediate object of awareness, unmediated by conscious inferential processes—disqualifies them from the class of genuinely perceptual states. After all, John's feelings would appear to be the product of numerous inferential and other broadly 'cognitive' processes—including, perhaps, calculations, imaginings, judgements, evaluations, and appraisals—rather than being states through which an immediate object is non-inferentially 'taken in by' or 'presented to' the subject.[101]

The notion of non-inferential perceptual belief thus facilitates the drawing of a sharper conceptual distinction between the thick and thin cases, providing a useful general

[101] Of course, it is also debatable the extent to which such cases of purported intellectual perception admit of an authentically perceptual phenomenology. Are the relevant feelings *felt towards* the emotional objects in a way that accords with the standard perceptual cases? I happen to think so (although, admittedly, such cases leave greater room for interpretation). For even a pang of grief felt for a dead-and-buried relative is (as Goldie saw) accurately characterised as a pang of grief felt *for*, or *towards*, the loved one. This intentionality is as integral to the phenomenal/representational content of such feelings as it is the content of those feelings which are felt towards immediate objects.

schema for determining whether emotional episodes constitute or include genuine perceptions of emotion-proper properties. Blackburn's objection, then, does not threaten my claim that some emotions—more accurately, their constituent bodily feelings—are capable of being richly perceptual. Standard emotional feelings are phenomenologically, epistemologically, and structurally highly similar to sense-perceptions; and for that reason I have no problem calling them perceptions.

Summary

In this chapter, I have argued that emotion-proper properties are response-dependent in something like the way suggested by McDowell's account of moral properties. This enables us to see not only what emotion-proper properties are, in terms of their ontological status as subjective but real properties instantiated by emotional objects, but how they relate to—in the sense of being both constituted and apprehended by—our epistemic and emotional capacities. In particular, the above account sheds considerable light on the issue of emotion-proper property perception, providing further evidence in support of the claim that standard emotional bodily feelings constitute genuine perceptions. As we saw, affective emotional responses (affective perceptions) are such that, qua responses to response-dependent emotion-proper properties, they qualify automatically as perceptions of those properties. This completes my argument for the third of my key claims. The only thing that remains to be done in order to secure Claim (2)—and thus to secure the central claim that certain bodily feelings are world-directed intentional perceptual states with emotion-proper properties as their proper objects—is to demonstrate that affective perceptions are appropriately causally related to their particular objects. This I do in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

Issues, Objections, and Implications

Introduction

This final chapter aims to strengthen and expand the account of affective perception set out in the preceding chapters. It does this in four key ways: firstly, by pre-empting potential objections to it, setting out both what these might be and how they can be overcome; secondly, by clarifying certain key issues arising from previous chapters—issues which either could not be given a full treatment at the time at which they were first raised or which only came into focus once subsequent arguments were in place; thirdly, by comparing it with alternative theories, illustrating some of the key advantages it enjoys over its rivals; and fourthly, and finally, by sketching in outline two of its most significant implications.

More specifically, the chapter looks like this. I begin by considering further objections to the response-dependence model. I then turn to Prinz's account of emotional bodily feelings as perceptions of 'core relational themes'. After outlining Prinz's argument, I criticise it for relying on a phenomenologically impoverished account of representation. I then take up a key issue left hanging from previous chapters: that of the causal connection between token emotion-proper properties and token affective perceptions. Following this, I canvass some recent seminal work in emotion theory which acknowledges the response-dependence of emotional properties. After briefly

comparing this work with my own, I explore alternative accounts of affective perception by Sabine Döring and Louis Charland, arguing that while both purport to be theories of 'affective perception' they are in certain crucial respects explanatorily inferior to my own. Finally, I consider the implications of the account for two central topics of emotion theory: emotional epistemology and the tenability of the cognition-affect distinction.

Objections to the Response-Dependence Claim

In this section I want to consider some more potential objections to the response-dependence claim. Given that the debate has traditionally focused on moral properties, many of the most pressing objections to the McDowellian model are couched in that idiom; however, I shall limit discussion to those which carry over directly into the emotional domain. The most threatening of these pose a challenge for two aspects of my account in particular: 1) the claim that genuine responses constitute (intrinsically motivating) perceptions through which emotion-proper properties are disclosed; and 2) the general claim that these properties are response-dependent. I shall begin by considering objections to (1) before turning to those targeting (2). My responses to these objections are designed not only to defend these aspects of the theory and bolster my overall position, but also to develop the account itself, adding flesh to the bones of some of its less well-developed claims.

For the most part, the following objections seek in various ways to undermine the analogy with secondary qualities. My response to these will be, firstly, to show that certain of the alleged disanalogies do not stand up to scrutiny, and secondly, to

demonstrate that the few genuine disanalogies are wholly benign (and, indeed, entirely predictable) and are readily explained by my account. More generally, my overall strategy will be to defend the analogy on the assumption that *if* secondary qualities are response-dependent and perceptible in the ways spelled out in the previous chapter, *then*, ceteris paribus, the same will hold true for emotion-proper properties. With the exception of my response to Objection 4, I will not here attempt to defend the antecedent. It will suffice for my purposes that the secondary-quality version of the response-dependence thesis is both highly plausible and widely accepted.

Objection 1

In addition to the perceptual objection discussed in the previous chapter, Blackburn details several apparent points of disanalogy between moral properties and secondary qualities.[102] One of these targets the inherent normativity of moral-property perceptions. Blackburn points out (1993a, p.160) that it is up to individual subjects whether or not they care about particular secondary qualities, the implication being that if morality consisted in the perception of qualities there would be a theoretical space for a culture which perceived the properties perfectly but paid no attention to them; however, the practical, normative nature of morality is clearly intrinsic to it and this theoretical space does not exist.

Does this constitute a significant point of disanalogy? It seems hard to deny that perceptions of moral and emotional properties are intrinsically normative in a way

[102] See Blackburn (1993a), pp.159-161.

that perceptions of secondary qualities are not; and to this extent it certainly qualifies as a disanalogy. However, it is wholly benign; for the fact that the two kinds of property differ in respect of their motivational force reflects nothing more than the fact that a) we are set up, for a host of complex evolutionary and sociological reasons, to care more deeply about the one kind of property than the other, and b) moral and emotional properties are essentially tied to our conative and evaluative capacities where secondary qualities are tied instead to our sense-perceptual capacities.

It would be odd, to say the least, if we were programmed to care as deeply about the colours of objects as we do about their moral, aesthetic, or emotional values. It is of the essence of a valuable object to be valued, a fearsome object to be feared, etc. It is not at all surprising that moral and emotional properties are such that we care so deeply about them given that they exist precisely *because* we care about them and our caring about them is what enables us to be sensitive to them in the first place. As Wright puts it, "If there are moral states of affairs which may be believed, or even perceived, to obtain, then they will be, of their very nature, states of affairs to know of which is to acquire certain moral concerns, and certain potential reasons for action. Moral perception, if there is such a thing, will precisely *be* perception of a cause for concern" (1988, p.8). There is a theoretical space for a community of perceivers who notice secondary qualities but do not care about them because secondary qualities are not essentially tied to our motivational and evaluative responses in the same way. They are tied instead to our visual, olfactory, tactile, etc., responses. Thus, Blackburn's objection simply begs the question against response-dependence. Indeed, it is as question-begging as the following parallel argument against secondary-quality perception: if secondary-quality experience consisted in the perception of secondary

qualities, there would be a theoretical space for a culture which perceived the properties perfectly but which failed to have red-, blue-, yellow-, etc., type experiences; but the phenomenal nature of secondary-quality experience is clearly intrinsic to it, and this theoretical space does not exist.

Objection 2

Consider next these remarks by Wright which echo Blackburn's earlier point (see previous chapter):

> …I do not think that the strictly *perceptual* aspect of the proposal is happy. Of course, it is harmless to think of value as 'perceived', if that means no more than: correctly judged. The extra, which is not harmless, is the idea of moral judgement as possessing a distinctive phenomenology, as encompassing a distinctive kind of experience(s)… If our experience of secondary qualities provides a model for anything, then it is of a notion of experience which is, up to a point at least, *raw*… What I doubt is whether we can find anything of sufficient rawness in the phenomenology of moral judgement to give the notion of 'moral experience' any serious work to do. (1988, pp.11-12)

Of course, transposed to the emotional case this point runs up against the phenomenology of experience and the cumulative arguments of the preceding chapters. As we have seen, appropriate experience of emotional objects *does* have a distinctive phenomenology—one which testifies to the perceptual role of affect. The model recommended by such phenomenology is precisely that of secondary-quality perception. As Wright himself notes, the secondary-quality analogy "requires that we think of the caring emotion as standing to the value in the cognitive mode in which the experience of red stands to the colour" (ibid.). The model of emotional experience recommended by the relevant phenomenology is *precisely* one which, to paraphrase Wright, requires that we think of the emotional experience as standing to the emotion-

proper property in the cognitive mode (in this case, affective perception) in which the experience of red stands to the colour. In other words, it is a model which unavoidably treats emotional affective responses as perceptions.

However, Wright further notes that there is often a 'delicate interplay' between the manifest character of an experience and the subject's concepts and understanding such that there is an experience available to viewers of the duck-rabbit who possess the relevant conceptual resources required to construe it in terms of one or other aspect that is unavailable to those lacking these resources, the point being that if secondary-quality perception is to be the paradigm then not everything in the manifest character of the experience can be attributed to the concepts brought to bear on the experience: the phenomenology ought to be sufficiently raw so that a subject lacking all emotional or moral concepts could still have a phenomenologically appropriate experience of the relevant properties.

What are we to make of this? Well, firstly, it should be noted that not all emotional (or moral) perception is concept- (training-/experience-/knowledge-) dependent. Perceiving the fearsomeness of certain objects (snakes, spiders, rapidly advancing tigers, etc.) is something we are all naturally capable of (the same goes for the other basic emotions). However, given that, as we saw in Chapter 2, many emotion-proper properties are only accessible to those with the relevant conceptual resources, how damaging is this to the secondary-quality model? The answer, perhaps surprisingly, is 'not very'. To begin with, a great deal of secondary-quality experience is not as 'raw' as Wright seems to assume. Many secondary qualities themselves require training and skill to discern. It takes a fine palate to discern the most delicate flavours of a good

Bordeaux and a good ear to discriminate the various timbres and tones of a forty-piece orchestra. Or, take the well-known 'sorites' colour cases featuring borderline blue-green (or red-orange, pink-purple, etc.) colour samples: research suggests that knowledge of the *context* in which the sample is placed (e.g. in a chart containing only blue or only green samples) has a bearing on whether the sample is perceived to be blue or green. Furthermore, the perceptual cases of emotional experience still have a distinctive phenomenology: a *perceptual* phenomenology. And this is certainly sufficient to give the notion of emotional experience 'serious work' to do. Just because such experience is essentially tied to our ability to perceive something in a certain way, this does nothing to diminish the qualitative rawness of the experience. Perceptions of emotional properties are just as phenomenologically raw as any other perceptual states.

Objection 3

Blackburn (1993a, p.160) points out that the receptive and causal mechanisms involved in secondary-quality perception are well-known objects of scientific study, whereas those involved in moral (or affective) perception are not. Retinal defects resulting in colour-blindness, for example, involve clear and well understood receptive and causal mechanisms. Those resulting in defective emotional perception do not. Furthermore, if our secondary-property-detecting mechanisms fail, we would expect to know this immediately: it would present itself as a loss of immediately felt phenomenal quality, just as it does when light fails. There is no such loss when we become emotionally deficient. We cannot become emotionally deficient overnight, and usually we cannot tell when we have done so.

To take the first part of the objection: the present account has detailed quite clearly the receptive and causal mechanisms involved in emotion-proper property perception (although, for more on the causal processes involved, see below). And given what has been said about them so far, it is not at all surprising that they are unlike the ordinary senses. After all, the five senses specialise in detecting primary and secondary qualities; and emotional properties are not primary or secondary qualities—although they are of course analogous, in certain respects, to the latter. And the having of a sense-organ as the proper method of detection is not a crucial respect. It is enough that we have specialist faculties for detecting them—what we might broadly call our emotional or affective-perceptual capacities—even if these are not modular sense-organs akin to eyes or ears. Indeed, as Roberts rightly points out in response to a similar point by D'Arms and Jacobson:[103]

> The point about dedicated organs is true only if we restrict "organs" to the outer surface of the body, as common sense might restrict the organs of sense perception. But in truth the visual apparatus is not limited to eyes; vision is accomplished partly by dedicated parts of the brain. And the neuroscience of emotion is showing more and more that parts of the brain are analogously dedicated to emotion-production, and even more narrowly to the production of particular emotion-types. (Roberts, 2010, fn. p.571)

Regarding the second part of the objection: if the present account is correct, we would indeed expect to know immediately if our emotion-proper property-detecting mechanisms suddenly failed. Such a failure would present itself as a loss of immediately felt phenomenal quality. If, for example, I suddenly lost the ability to feel pity towards pitiful objects—and thus to perceive the pitifulness of things—I

[103] See D'Arms and Jacobson (2000), fn. p.67.

would expect this to present itself as an immediate change in qualitative character: my experience of pitiful objects would be strikingly different.

Moreover, whilst it may not be possible to become corrupt overnight, as Blackburn points out, it is possible to become emotionally defective, even emotionally blind, overnight.[104] Indeed, recent research in the field of psychopathology suggests that neurological defects, such as those resulting from severe cerebral trauma, can cause immediate impairment of subjects' emotional capacities (see in particular Damasio, 1994/2006), resulting in an immediate loss of affective awareness. As a consequence, subjects are in effect rendered clinical psychopaths, incapable of feeling guilt, shame, pity, remorse, sympathy, empathy, and a host of other emotions. Such subjects are consequently incapable of seeing emotional objects in their true light, as instantiating emotion-proper properties.

Objection 4

A very different criticism of the perceptual aspect of the analogy comes from Mark Johnston. Johnston's target here is not so much the analogy per se, but the very idea that response-dependent properties of any kind are, or could ever be, perceptible. The objection finds perhaps its most detailed expression in Johnston (1998); and whilst I here lack the space to discuss the objection in detail, it can be summarised as follows. According to the McDowellian model, response-dependent properties are to be identified with various dispositions. The property of being red, for example, just is the property of being such as to cause red-type sensations in suitable subjects under

[104] It is of course true that if our secondary-quality-detecting mechanisms failed, we would know this immediately, but only if the failure was itself immediate. Monet slowly lost the ability to view colours correctly; smokers gradually lose their sense of taste and smell; and hearing often diminishes with age.

standard conditions. The problem is that, being a disposition, the property itself cannot be the object of perception, at least not in the sense that it is what causes the subject's response and figures in the content of an experience. My perception of a red object features redness in its content; it does not feature a disposition *qua* disposition; nor does it feature the grounds of a disposition. Indeed, if the dispositional account is correct, then it is not the property of redness itself which causes our red-type sensations, but the physical properties which ground the (supervenient) property of redness. The property itself (qua disposition) is not causally efficacious in producing the response. As supervenient properties, secondary qualities thus appear to be causally inert, mere epiphenomena. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, in the case of emotion-proper properties. On this view, then, response-dependent properties are categorically imperceptible: despite appearances (the subject's experience certainly seems to her to be a perception of the redness of an object), the subject's state cannot be genuinely perceptual given that it is not the higher-order property of redness which causes the state but its subvenient grounds.

Campbell (1993) frames the point in terms of competition for a single 'explanatory space'. Both the base properties and the higher-order secondary qualities are competing to play the same causal role, and thus figure in a causal-explanatory analysis of the production of the subject's experience. It seems that, on pain of causal overdetermination, both sets of properties cannot be equally productive in bringing about the subject's perceptual state; and it seems that, in the case of both secondary qualities and emotion-proper properties, there is no possibility of the higher-order properties doing the necessary causal work. They must, it seems, cede the explanatory space to their lower-level base properties: i.e. microphysical properties of surfaces, in

the case of colours, and emotion-invoking determinate features, in the case of emotion-proper properties.[105]

This does indeed appear to be a damaging objection. After all, the main purported advantage of the secondary-quality analogy is its ability to provide a perceptual role for our emotional, and in particular our affective, capacities. Yet it seems that, if Johnston is correct, any such role is merely illusory. Indeed, it is not only moral and emotional properties which are rendered imperceptible by this objection; all secondary qualities, including colours, are rendered equally 'invisible'. Thus, contrary to both commonsense and the phenomenology of colour experience, when we are presented with an image of a red rose, we are not actually perceiving the redness of the rose at all. Rather, we are simply being affected by certain of its surface features in such a way as to cause in us an appropriately representative red-type experience. In the same way, when we appear to perceive the fearsomeness of an object, rather than being in direct epistemic contact with an emotion-proper property, we are simply being affected by the object in a way that makes it merely *seem* to us as though we are perceiving a manifest property. We are left once again facing the prospect of an error theory of emotional experience.

However, this problem can be overcome using a line of defence proposed by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit.[106] Jackson and Pettit draw a distinction between properties which are causally *efficacious* in producing a response and those which are merely causally *relevant*, claiming that not only the former but also the latter are capable of figuring in perception in a way that allows them to be the objects of genuine

[105] This parallels the so-called 'causal exclusion' problem of mental causation (see, e.g., Kim 1993a, 1993b, 1998).
[106] See especially Pettit (1991), and Jackson and Pettit (1989, 1990).

perceptions. The distinction in effect enables both higher-level and lower-level properties to occupy the same explanatory space.

According to Pettit:

> For any sensation that a colour produces, it is true that that sensation will be attributable to more basic, microphysical properties of the object and of the light that falls on the object. But we can think of the colour as having a higher-level causal relevance to the sensation, provided that the object's having that colour more or less ensures that no matter how things are disposed at the microphysical level, they will be disposed so as to produce the sensation. The colour may not "produce" the sensation in the most basic sense available for that term but it will be causally relevant provided that it "programs" for a process of basic production. (Pettit, 1991, p.614)[107]

This notion of program explanation is perhaps best illustrated by way of example (see Pettit, 1991). We explain the inability of a square peg to pass through a round hole by appeal to the rigidity of the peg and board, and the dimensions of the peg and hole. On the most basic level, the blocking is produced by this or that overlapping part; but the squareness of the peg is still causally relevant. Given the dimensions of the peg and hole, the squareness ensures that there will be some overlapping part which prevents the peg from entering the hole. The squareness programs for the blocking, even if it does not produce it directly. In the same way, the redness of an object is causally relevant to the perceptual state of a subject in virtue of the fact that it programs for the production of the state: it ensures that this or that set of microphysical properties will be actually causally efficacious in bringing about the subject's perceptual state, even if the (supervenient) property of redness itself is only,

[107] Importantly, such explanation leaves open the possibility that a wide (perhaps infinitely wide) range of lower-level features may potentially be responsible for grounding a higher-level state. This is significant as it accords with the notion that the range of potential emotion-invoking determinate features pertaining to any given emotion-type is in principle unlimited, thus bolstering the intuition that we cannot provide an exhaustive list of what makes something fearsome (and perhaps scotching the notion that such mysterious and wonderful concepts as beauty can ultimately be reduced to finite, theoretically specifiable sets of properties, rules, or formulae).

in a sense, indirectly causally responsible for producing the state. In other words, the causal story told at the level of subvenient properties does not exclude any that might be available at the level of supervenient properties. Both levels of explanation are compatible and mutually supporting. And both are happily accommodated within the available explanatory space.

Exactly the same can be said in the case of emotion-proper properties. The fearsomeness of an object will be causally relevant to the subject's fear in virtue of the fact that it programs for the production of the state by ensuring that this or that set of emotion-invoking determinate features will be causally active in its production. The scariness itself will thus be sufficiently causally relevant (if not, in the most basic sense, directly efficacious) in producing the emotional state to merit calling the resultant state a perception of that object's fearsomeness.[108]

Of course, it is open to the opponent of such a view to challenge the claim that this notion of causal relevance is sufficient to secure a genuinely perceptual role for higher-order properties. It might, for example, be argued that causal efficacy alone, and not causal relevance, is the only notion of causation germane to the metaphysics of perception. This is a complex issue, and one which we have insufficient space to address here. Suffice it to say that, if secondary qualities ultimately turn out, on ideal philosophical analysis, to be imperceptible epiphenomena, they will be just as

[108] Furthermore, as Terrence Cuneo (2001) points out, just because moral qualities are characterisable as dispositions, we should not expect this fact to figure in ordinary moral experience. Indeed, the claim that response-dependent properties are dispositions is importantly ambiguous. Calling them 'dispositions' or 'powers' is one way of characterising them; it is just not an appropriate way of describing them *as they figure in experience*. They do not feature in experience *as* dispositions because what we experience are their *manifestations*. Thus, whilst it is true that one cannot see a dispositional property qua dispositional property—one cannot see its 'dispositionalness'—one can nevertheless be perceptually non-inferentially aware of it via its manifestations.

'perceptible' (to avoid begging any questions: pseudo- or quasi-perceptible), in the folk-psychological sense, as secondary qualities like colour. Thus, whether experience of emotion-proper properties is *ideally* perceptual or not, if epistemic access to them remains on a par with that of secondary qualities, the analogy will remain both instructive and insightful.[109]

Objection 5

Where the above objections primarily targeted the perceptual aspect of the analogy, this next point (and subsequent points) poses a challenge for the response-dependence claim in particular. According to Blackburn:

> …if we were to change so that everything in the world that had appeared blue came to appear red to us, this is what it would be for the world to cease to contain blue things… The analogy with moral properties fails dramatically: if everyone comes to think of it as permissible to maltreat animals, this does nothing at all to make it permissible: it just means that everybody has deteriorated. (1993a, p.160)

There are two possible directions of response to such objections. The first is simply to concede the point and accept that if we were to change in the relevant way, this would indeed rid the world of blue things or make it acceptable to maltreat animals.[110] And indeed, in the emotional case this would be a relatively harmless concession (although it is admittedly less attractive in the moral case). If a global change in human

[109] Indeed, there are deep reasons pertaining to the nature of causal explanation in general for thinking that something like the programmatic notion of causal relevance must be true if our wider practices of causal analysis are to remain unscathed by the objection. For, as Jackson and Pettit (1990, pp.111-113) point out, the assumption that only causally efficacious properties ought properly to figure within causal explanation in general entails that the only explanatorily relevant properties are those postulated by basic science. If higher-level properties were necessarily causally inert, then all explanation in the social sciences, not to mention economics, history, and commonsense, would ultimately be redundant and all analysis would collapse into reductive description of the causal interactions of the postulates of physics. The same can be said for those explanations seeking to capture the events featuring in the production of a perceptual state.

[110] Prinz (2007), for example, takes this line in respect of moral properties.

emotional disposition meant that things that previously appeared disgusting now appeared scary (say), there is nothing prima facie threatening in the implication that this would rid the world of disgusting things.

However, the other alternative, which involves challenging Blackburn's original claim about the secondary-quality case, serves our intuitions better. On this line, we need not accept the assumption that a global change in colour responses is sufficient to alter the extension of colour predicates. Recall that, on the response-dependence view of secondary qualities, an object has a property p iff it is such as to cause an appropriate p-type response in suitable subjects under standard conditions; and surely there is room within the notions of appropriate response, suitable subjects, and standard conditions to allow that a global change in the nature of the human visual system would preclude a shift in the extension of p. On this view, each of the constraints specified on the right-hand side of the biconditional with respect to responses, subjects, and conditions, is available to be filled out in a way that rigidifies to *actual* responses, *actual* subjects, and *actual* conditions. Thus, one or more of these parameters may be rigidified in such a way as to preclude any changes of the kind envisaged by Blackburn.[111] We might, for example, specify standard conditions for the perception of blueness to be those which *actually* obtain when normally functioning subjects view objects in good light, with unimpaired visual apparatus, etc.

[111] Lebar (2005, pp.189-193) discusses the prospects of securing reference to actual responses by rigidifying various of these three conditions, noting that the rigidified version of the moral biconditional has become standard, largely for reasons having to do with the avoidance of just such objections. Wright (1988), arguing against Blackburn, proposes an argument along similar lines, suggesting that the notion of a suitable or 'appropriately receptive' subject be understood in rigidified terms.

The notion of a 'suitable subject' and an 'appropriate response' are similarly open to qualification in a way that rigidly fixes them to accord with the actual responses of actual subjects. In particular, given the McDowellian model's insistence that response-dependent properties be such as to *merit* certain responses, and not just cause them, we might appeal to the grounds of such properties to determine whether or not a given response is appropriate. If we were to change so that we no longer saw fearsome things as fearsome or felt anger towards offensive things, this would not alter the fact that such things would still properly *merit* fear or anger in virtue of exhibiting the relevant emotion-invoking determinable and determinate features. In the same way, blue objects would still properly merit blue-type responses in virtue of possessing the kinds of microphysical base properties which formerly caused subjects to perceive such things as blue. Thus, if we interpret certain of the conditions on the right-hand side of the biconditional rigidly, there will be no possibility of global deviant colour experiences altering the extension of colour predicates; and likewise for moral and emotional predicates. Should global colour inversion ever occur, the result would not be a shift in the extension of colour predicates but a situation in which everyone was simply wrong about the colours of affected objects. Something like an error theory would then be required to explain the seeming veridicality of certain colour experiences.[112]

[112] Indeed, contra Blackburn, this is the way our intuitions ought to lead us. As Wright puts it (1988, p.9): "We do not, for instance, believe that, were we all to become colour blind, red and green things would change in colour, preferring to describe such a situation as one in which we should lose the capacity to make a distinction which is there anyway, whether we draw it or not" (cf. McGinn, 1983, p.151).

Objection 6

A related objection is made by McGinn, who claims that response-dependence accounts render the notion of *error* particularly problematic as the standard of correctness for property-ascription "is set by the phenomenal character of perceptual experience—and this is infallibly given" (1983, p.150). Consequently,

> …if moral truth consists in facts about moral reactions, as the comparison with secondary qualities alleges, then clearly differences of moral reaction will give rise to a relativity in moral truth; moral differences will not be interpretable as moral disagreement. (1983, p.153)

This objection chimes with a common complaint against theories seeking to establish a standard of emotional truth. It is somewhat of a platitude amongst folk-psychological conceptions of emotion that emotional truth is, to echo McGinn, infallibly given: emotional reactions are supposedly immune from criticism in the same way that colour experience is said to be critically immune on the dispositional account of colour properties that, according to McGinn and Blackburn, falls out of the secondary-quality analogy.[113]

The problem, of course, is that such criticism fails to take into account the fact that subjects' responses are not privileged in the required way. On the no-priority view, objects are not simply blue- or fearsome-for-subject-S1; they are blue or fearsome *simpliciter*, depending on whether they are disposed, in standard conditions, to affect appropriately constituted subjects in the appropriate way in this the actual world. The objection thus rests on the mistaken assumption that the standard of correctness for

[113] See Prinz (2004b, pp.61-67), for a similar argument against the response-dependence of emotional properties. Cf. Teroni (2007, p.397).

property-ascription is determined solely by the subjective states of subjects rather than being determined *jointly* by the nature of the response *and* the nature of the object. Indeed, this is the essence of the no-priority version of response-dependence (and one of the reasons I initially retained the 'no-priority' terminology). An object is blue or fearsome or whatever if it *merits* a blue or fearsome or whatever response. This is why we are able to criticise phobic reactions and praise or condemn people for having appropriate or inappropriate emotional responses.[114]

Objection 7

The fact that our emotional reactions can be warranted or not, depending on whether they are in the relevant sense appropriate, is pertinent also to another of Blackburn's supposed points of disanalogy. According to Blackburn (1993a, p.160), moral practices vary with the forms of life of different communities where secondary-quality experiences do not. Now, whilst there may well exist cross-cultural differences in moral practice and emotional experience (different cultures may find different things disgusting, enviable, offensive, and so on), given what has been said so far, one of two things would appear to be the case: either such differences will constitute genuine disagreements that are ultimately resolvable, or they will prove simply to be brute differences that can only be settled relative to particular communities. Determining which of these is the case depends on determining whether moral and emotional properties are fixed relative to the species as a whole or merely

[114] This is also partly why cognitive therapy is largely successful in treating phobic disorders. However, very good reasons also become available on the present account for the only *partial* success of cognitive therapy. Making correct judgements about the emotion-proper properties a given object exemplifies can only get the subject so far. What is also required is that they come to *experience* the object in the appropriate way (cf. Charles, 2004), where this notion of experience encompasses affectively perceiving the relevant properties.

to the responsive dispositions, practices, and customs—in short, the 'forms of life'—of smaller communities. Needless to say this is no easy task; and to a large extent it is one which the philosopher is ill-equipped to deal with. In some respects, the social anthropologist stands a greater chance of success.

The reason such disagreements (apparently) do not even so much as arise in the case of secondary qualities (although, see below) is that these are phylogenetically fixed by facts pertaining to human biology, rather than being fixed merely at a community level by facts about shared sociocultural practice, moral education, and social conditioning (as would presumably be the case for certain non-basic emotion-proper properties). Bearing in mind the notion of 'appropriate receptivity' that goes with the stricture that subjects be 'suitably constituted' so as to be sensitive to response-dependent properties, we can see that becoming an accurate perceiver of non-basic emotion-proper properties would likely require undergoing extensive training and experience and being thoroughly inculcated into a particular form of life so that one naturally assumes a viewpoint internal to the habits, practices, customs, and so on, of that particular community. Indeed, it is not unreasonable to suppose that becoming an accurate perceiver of certain emotional properties requires a measure of experience and training akin to that required for accurate aesthetic judgement. Being able accurately to 'read' a complex emotional situation takes skill and aptitude; and as Goldie (op.cit.) pointed out, becoming appropriately receptive to emotion-proper properties is often a matter of undergoing the relevant training and experience.

Learning to discern the offensiveness of certain remarks requires training, experience, and knowledge (e.g. of customs, practices, etiquette, and so forth) *relative* to a

particular culture and social group, and so relative to social norms and behavioural principles that are particular to that group. Cross-cultural disagreements concerning the ascription of such properties are thus unlikely to be resolvable by appeal to the notion of an ideal observer and absolute standards of correctness. However, such variation poses no problem for the response-dependence account. Indeed, I consider it to be a great strength that it is able to accommodate such relativity between groups and across times whilst also being able to explain the detectivist tenor of the relevant experiences and retain a realist ontology of properties.

Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that responses to certain emotion-proper property-types are universal amongst the species. A wealth of recent research in evolutionary psychology and anthropology suggests that so-called basic emotions (fear, disgust, anger, and so on) are to a large extent pan-cultural, these being phylogenetically fixed by our shared genetic makeup to enable us to track certain survival-relevant features of the environment, with clear evolutionary advantages.[115] Thus, whilst social norms (e.g. those governing table manners) are largely responsible for determining emotion-invoking determinable features (e.g. offensiveness), which in turn fix emotion-proper properties relative to social groups and cultures, certain other response-dependent properties will be fixed relative to the species as a whole. Of course, in the case of colour perception we as a species have evolved in such a way that the majority are born with excellent secondary-quality-detecting mechanisms: namely the five senses. But even then, as noted above, few can claim to be ideal observers in the secondary quality stakes. Were we all ideally constituted, we would have no need whatsoever for

[115] On this account, receptivity to emotion-proper properties enables subjects to track evolutionarily relevant properties such as the determinable features which underwrite disgust, fear, and so on (danger, potential to cause infection, etc.). On basic emotions see, for example, Charland (1995b), Ekman (1980, 1999), Griffiths (1997), Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1992), Panskepp (1982), and Prinz (2004c).

piano-tuners, critics, connoisseurs, and the like, as we would all be equally capable of discerning the subtlest differences of pitch, tone, colour, flavour, scent, and so on. Perhaps surprisingly, then, in both the secondary quality and emotional cases there is plenty of scope for disagreement among those who perceive differently.

Objection 8

Another problem commonly raised against response-dependence theories is the instability problem.[116] The problem is actually a cluster of related problems taking a variety of forms. However, all have in common the charge that response-dependence theories are unable to account for the fact that people's responses to emotional objects lack consistency and uniformity across individuals, cultures, and periods of time. One form of the problem, highlighted for example by D'Arms and Jacobson (2010, pp.588-590), is exemplified by the fact that emotional responses are notoriously fickle: whereas a red rose still looks red on the hundredth viewing, the joke stops being funny after the second or third hearing (cf. Millgram, 1999, p.253) and the horror film is less scary the second time around. Such inconsistency would seem to tell against the claim that emotional responses constitute disclosures of real properties.

However, this reflects nothing more than the fact that subjects can and often do become conditioned against having certain responses. And such conditioning is a familiar, normal, and completely understandable fact of human experience. The general's blasé response to the rotting corpse, recall, reflects not a shift in the extension of the predicate 'disgustingness' but the fact that he has become insensitive

[116] See in particular D'Arms and Jacobson (2000b) and Elgin (2008).

to a property to which he was once highly receptive. And just as he could still see *that* the corpse is disgusting, so too the listener is still aware that the joke is funny and the cinemagoer is still aware that the film is scary. In all cases the objects merit the emotional responses for demonstrable objective reasons.

A similar process of conditioning often occurs with respect to various secondary qualities. For example, the vagrant who takes shelter in a dustbin soon becomes immune to its stench, not just in the sense of learning to live with it, but in the sense of being actually incapable of smelling it. Indeed, talk of desensitisation, far from counting against a response-dependence theory actually works in its favour; for it implies that the properties to which subjects become desensitised are real properties. For example, talk of soldiers becoming desensitised to the horrors of war implies that war really is horrific. Such talk is implicitly normative: it implies that soldiers *ought* to find war horrific; that the general *ought* to react with disgust; and so on.

Another form the problem takes is that of conflicting emotions, where different subjects token different responses to the same object. For example, what one subject, or group of subjects, finds offensive (and so deserving of anger) another might consider benign or even amusing (or any number of things). Where these differences are fixed relative to cultures, either at different times or during the same historical period, we have already seen that such relativity does not count against a response-dependence account. Cross-cultural differences in response reflect differences in attitude that are either resolvable through debate and criticism or are fundamentally relative to those particular cultures. If the former, then certain objects will merit certain responses or not depending on whether the object is such as to cause

appropriate responses in suitable subjects under standard conditions. (Of course, the notion of a 'suitable' or 'normal' subject itself needs to be fixed, but that is another matter.) However, it is reasonable to assume that while certain properties, including perhaps moral properties, are determined at a species level (genocide is wrong, many would argue, for all cultures at all times), this will not be the case for all response-dependent properties—including certain emotion-proper properties—many of which will be fixed relative to cultures, communities, and historical periods.

The fact that our emotional (and other) responses are fixed relative to the forms of life of particular communities reflects the essentially perspectival nature of those responses. However, as Elgin (2008, pp.38-41) points out, emotional responses can vary hugely even within a community. The same object can elicit any number of different emotions in different subjects, and even in the same subject. Two subjects (or a single ambivalent subject), it seems, can 'owe' the same object different responses. Where you see the offensiveness of a remark, I might see its wittiness. However, response differences of this kind do not pose a problem for response-dependence theories; for we do not have to look too hard to find cases where an emotional object has both purported features. A joke might be concurrently offensive and witty, for example. This has parallels in ordinary perception. Where I see only a fuzzy blob on an X-ray, an oncologist might see a tumour; yet neither of us is wrong: we merely perceive the same object under different aspects.

The same applies to cases of emotional ambivalence in which an object elicits different responses in the same subject as a result of instantiating multiple emotion-proper properties. Just as it is possible to construe an image both as a fuzzy blob and

as a tumour, so too it is possible for an ambivalent subject to perceive multiple emotion-proper properties by tokening different affective responses. She might, for example, affectively perceive both the offensiveness and wittiness of the remark, responding with both anger and amusement (the one perhaps tempered by the other).

Prinz's Objections

Further objections come courtesy of Jesse Prinz (2004b). It is a central tenet of Prinz's overall account of emotions that these are representational states the objects of which are certain types of 'organism-environment relations': what he terms (following Lazarus, 1991) 'core relational themes'. The concept of a core relational theme approximates that of a formal object, or in some cases an emotion-invoking determinable feature (examples include danger, loss, and offensiveness). According to Prinz, it is a condition of a state's being a representation of something that it be reliably caused by instances of that thing. Are emotions reliably caused by the same kinds of things? At first glance the answer appears to be no. As we have seen, people often have different emotional responses to the same stimuli. However, Prinz notes a sense in which there is implicit uniformity amongst responses:

> All people are frightened by scary things, angered by offensive things, disgusted by disgusting things, and elated by pleasant things. We may disagree about what counts as scary, but we are all afraid of what is scary *to us*. The "to us" is important. It implies that emotions are elicited by things as they relate to us. This suggests that emotions represent relations between external states and our selves. They represent organism-environment relations. (2004b, p.60)

On this model, then, fear represents whatever is scary to me. However, Prinz is quick to note the obvious circularity inherent in this approach. The claim that fear represents whatever people find scary amounts to nothing more than the vacuous claim that fear

represents whatever causes fear. However, before setting out his own solution to the circularity problem, Prinz considers another approach—one that involves treating emotions as (or at least as analogous to) representations of secondary qualities. This approach has its advantages, as we have seen, including the ability to avoid a problematic circularity (see Chapter 4). However, according to Prinz there are three problems with such a move.

> First, the proposal that fear represents things that cause a certain kind of experience in us does not reveal anything about what those things have in common. Why do certain things and not other [sic] arouse fear? (2004b, p.61)

The answer should by now be obvious. Those objects that arouse (warranted) fear will do so because they instantiate the property of fearsomeness—a property grounded jointly in the common dispositions of suitably constituted subjects, and the relevant emotion-invoking determinable and determinate features.

> Second, there is an important difference between fear experiences and color experiences. The conscious feelings associated with mental states that represent colors are projected out into the world. When we experience redness, we experience it as if it were out there on the surfaces of objects. Not so with emotions. The feeling of rage, for example, is not projected onto the object of rage; it is experienced as a state within us. (2004b, p.61)

Again, enough has been said in earlier chapters to guard against this line of attack. While some token emotions may seem to point more towards our own internal states, the majority admit of a thoroughly object-directed phenomenology. Affective perceptions are directed (felt) towards external objects: their emotion-proper properties are experienced as being 'out there', just as our colour experiences represent colours as properties of external objects.[117]

[117] Cf. Goldie's remarks (2006b, p.456): "The second objection is strange. There may be many disanalogies between colour properties and emotion-related properties, but this is not one of them. Of course we could agree that the *feeling* of rage is not projected onto the object of rage, but then neither is

Prinz's third objection targets the response-dependence status of secondary qualities (although it will be noted that Prinz employs a different notion of response-dependence to the one I have been discussing—one that ties properties to token responses rather than shared responsive dispositions).

> A third concern stems from the fact that the secondary qualities are response-dependent properties in a strict sense. A response-dependent property, P, is one that would not exist without being represented as P by a human experience, judgement, or other mental state. Being red is sometimes thought to be a response-dependent property. Something cannot be red without being represented as red (under ideal conditions). I do not think that emotions represent response-dependent properties in this strict sense. If I am right, this shows a weakness in the seemingly tautological claim that fear represents the property of being scary. The property that fear represents is not response dependent. (2004b, p.61)

Prinz argues this by outlining an alternative to the secondary-quality view premised on the fact that emotions have formal objects. His concern is that it is formal and not particular objects which are represented in emotional experience. As he puts it:

> While there is a sense in which emotions are directed at particular events, that does not mean that they represent those events, or anything else for that matter. The events are represented by mental states that combine with emotions. When I am sad about the death of a child, I have one representation of the child's death and I have sadness attached to that representation… The sadness doesn't represent the death… I can continue to think about the death after my sadness subsides, and I can continue to be sad after my thoughts of the death subside. The mental representation of an emotion's particular object can be doubly dissociated from the emotion it elicits. (2004b, p.62)

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the *experience* of redness projected onto the surface of things; this would be seriously confused. But if we feel rage at someone's infuriating behaviour, it is surely precisely right that we do experience the infuriatingness as being a property 'out there' of the person's behaviour, just as we experience the redness as being a property 'out there' of the object in the world; in neither case is our focus on the 'state within us'". Smith (1993b, pp.242-248) presents an interesting argument for the parallel claim regarding moral properties, exploiting a now familiar distinction between the nauseating and the disgusting to show that where talk about and experience of the former is subject-directed, phenomenology and discourse pertaining to the latter is distinctly world- or object-directed. His arguments reveal a spectrum of cases between the clearly representational (e.g. experience of disgustingness) and the non-representational (e.g. feelings of nausea).

If emotions do represent their formal objects, it is easy to see how circularity can be avoided whilst leaving open the possibility that emotions represent organism-environment relations. Loss and dangerousness are not intrinsic properties. They are relational. Something can only be a loss if it is a loss *for* someone; and something can only be dangerous if it is dangerous *for* or *to* someone. And neither being a loss nor being dangerous is a response-dependent property. According to Prinz, all emotions represent similar relational, rather than *response-dependent*, properties.

Clearly, much depends on the notion of representation in play here. The theory of representation endorsed by Prinz is borrowed from Fred Dretske (1981). According to the theory, a mental representation is a state that satisfies two conditions: it carries information and the information it carries can be erroneous (there is at least the possibility of it being mistaken or false).[118] This notion of carrying information is understood in terms of covariation, which typically involves causation. A state carries information about that which reliably causes it to occur or with which it reliably co-occurs. Smoke carries information about fire, tree-rings about age, symptoms about disease, etc. And the notion of error is glossed in terms of 'proper function': a state is erroneous when it fails to satisfy its proper function—what it has been 'set up' to do, or been set up to be 'set off' by. The concept 'spider' is set up—i.e. learned—in order to represent spiders. That is its proper function. And it is reliably caused by (encounters with) spiders. A mental state which represented a spider but which was caused instead by a clump of hair in the plughole would have been activated in error. Similarly for other natural functions: the heart, for example, has evolved to pump blood, and it errs when it fails to do so. (Smoke carries information about fire but does

[118] See Prinz (2002, 2004b, 2006a).

not *represent* fire, as it does not make sense to say that smoke can be wrong or false. Carrying information is not sufficient for representation.) So, on this teleosemantic view, a mental state *x* represents a state of affairs *y* iff *x* a) is reliably caused by *y* and b) has the function of being caused by *y*. Thus, fear represents danger iff it is reliably caused by danger and has been set up, presumably by evolutionary and learning processes, to be so caused. Similarly, sadness represents loss iff it reliably tracks, and has the function of detecting, loss.

Despite the brevity of this sketch, it is sufficient to convey the bones of the account which underpins Prinz's third objection. However, the overarching problem with the account is already clear: it completely ignores phenomenology. On this charge, Prinz's account is doubly guilty. For, not only does it completely dissociate the phenomenology of emotion from its intentionality, ignoring the fact that emotions are essentially *felt towards* their objects, it also fails to take account of the fact that its version of how and what emotions represent is completely at odds with the phenomenology of emotional experience. As Ratcliffe points out (2008a, p.29), on this account the criteria of representation are so generous that all manner of unlikely candidates apparently qualify as intentional. A smoke alarm has the purpose of reliably detecting smoke, and so when it sounds can be said to be 'about' or 'representing' smoke. However, as Ratcliffe puts it:

> Any account that applies equally to human cognition and smoke alarms will not cast light on the nature of emotional experience or experience more generally, given that state X can meet all the requirements for representing Y without having any phenomenology. The account does not have the conceptual resources with which to address the phenomenology of feeling because it has nothing at all to say about experience… 'Intentionality', characterized as a relation between two objects in the world (one of which represents the other) and without any reference to the structure of experience, is either a misleading abstraction from the richness of experience or something else entirely. (2008a, pp.29-30)

Emotions might, in Dretske's sense, 'represent' core relational themes such as loss and danger, but from the point of view of a phenomenological investigation, this tells us practically nothing about the structure and epistemology of emotional experience. True, emotions might reliably *track* core relational themes; but they are representations—indeed, *perceptions*—of emotion-proper properties. On any account of representation that is even remotely concerned with phenomenology and the structure of experience, it will be obvious that the contents of affective representations are not organism-environment relations but emotion-proper properties. The properties corresponding to Lazarus's core relational themes—danger, loss, threat, etc.—are emotion-invoking determinable properties and so need not figure in the content of the representation at all. For all the reasons discussed above, emotions involve representations of emotion-proper properties, where the relevant underlying theory of representation is any (phenomenologically) adequate theory of the representational structure of perception.

Thus, Prinz's claim to have shown that emotions do not represent response-dependent properties (by arguing that they instead represent relational properties) is wrong on two counts. Firstly, it is not at all clear that the conception of representation invoked by Prinz is adequate. A theory of emotional representation which fails even to

acknowledge, let alone explain, the relevant phenomenology is of questionable merit. And secondly, even if it is adequate, the claim that emotions reliably track organism-environment relations remains perfectly compatible with my claim that, as attested to by the relevant phenomenology, emotions constitute perceptions of emotion-proper properties. Perceptions of red reliably track low-level surface properties responsible for reflecting light of the appropriate wavelength, but experiences of red are representations, in the phenomenological sense—i.e. the sense having to do with the aspectually-shaped content of experience—of redness itself.

That said, something like Prinz's Dretskeian account of representation is useful in understanding one sense in which emotional feelings are perceptual. This is the sense pertaining to those more intellectual cases—what I termed 'thin' cases—of emotion-proper property perception. Recall Dretske's strictures on representation: a mental state must firstly carry 'information' (broadly construed); secondly, it must be capable of being false (i.e. of misrepresenting); and thirdly, it must have the 'proper function' of carrying information. All three conditions are satisfied by my account: affective perceptions carry information about emotion-proper properties, are capable of misrepresenting these properties (as in cases of phobic fear, for example), and are set up (by evolution or learning) to perform this function (our affective-perceptual capacities have developed to enable us to perceive such properties). Of course, this is phenomenologically impoverished, but it is representative of the thin cases at issue—cases where the subject can be said to gain acquaintance with the emotion-proper properties of physically removed or temporally distant emotional objects but where the phenomenology is not one of detection (of being presented with an instance of a

property) as it is in those standard cases involving direct perceptual encounters with immediate objects.

Prinz seems to take the relative austerity of his Dretskeian account to have an advantage over other theories of representation: the fact that on it something extremely complex, like a core relational theme, can be represented by something simple and structureless. The state doing the representing does not have to be equally complex as or structurally isomorphic with the thing it represents. The beep of the smoke alarm 'represents' smoke, on this view, but has no discernable representational structure. However, to my mind, as an account of *intentionality* this consequence is more to be taken as a sure sign that representation in this sense *cannot* be sufficient for intentionality in anything like the philosophical sense we have been concerned with in this thesis. An intentional state must have content. It must have structure. Prinz's account, by contrast, sucks all the richness—all the *content*—out of the notion of intentionality. For me, recall, the task is to explain how emotional affects can be *felt towards* objects; but Prinz's account says nothing whatsoever about this. It does nothing to acknowledge, let alone address, this fact. If a state does not have phenomenological structure, it will not qualify as intentional in the sense demanded by the motivating claim: viz. the claim that emotional bodily feelings are ineliminably felt towards aspects of emotional objects.

Perception Revisited

Having defended the response-dependence claim against what seem to me to be the most serious objections, and having thus addressed some of the issues left over from

the previous chapter concerning emotional representation and the perception of response-dependent emotion-proper properties, I would like now to return to another feature of the perceptual claim that remains unaddressed. For, details of the causal relationship between property and response have so far been sketchy. In particular, not enough has been done to secure the claim that affective perception arises in a way that allows for the existence of an appropriate causal chain between object and affect.[119] By filling in some of those details, I hope to answer any remaining questions about how perceptual feelings relate to the properties they detect—and thus, finally, to establish in full the second of my original key claims.

How precisely are emotional bodily feelings caused? Well, experience tells us that such feelings often arise immediately and automatically upon encountering an appropriate stimulus. John's terror upon seeing the spider was instant and unbidden: the moment he registered its presence, he felt instant fear towards it. This suggests that the process of visually registering an appropriate stimulus (or registering a stimulus via some other sense-modality) is intimately causally related to the production of the somatic states awareness of which constitutes emotional bodily feeling. I hesitate to use the term 'perception' here, opting instead for the less question-begging 'registering', as it is not clear that such processes themselves qualify as perceptions; at least, they are not perceptions in, as it were, the phenomenological sense: there is nothing it is consciously like to have them, and in having them the

[119] Clearly there is a debate to be had about the conditions a state must meet in order to qualify as a perception. The question of how best to understand the metaphysics of perception and the nature of perceptual content has long been a controversial and divisive topic. However, again, it is one which we lack the space to explore here. Whilst I do not have a 'theory of perception' to offer, I take it that the existence of an appropriate causal chain (at least where the notion of appropriateness encompasses programmatic causal explanations) is a criterion demanded by most theories of perception. After all, 'causal theories' of perception, of various sorts, enjoy by far the greatest popularity in both philosophy and psychology.

subject need not be aware of their content (of what they are perceptions of). Rather, they are in a sense pre-perceptual: they are the reflexive cues or triggers of bodily processes, operating below the level of consciousness at which sense-perception usually operates. They are thus very different to the kinds of perception we have been focussing on: viz. those featuring content that is intrinsically both intentional (representational, aspectually-shaped) and phenomenal. In order to distinguish them from perceptions in the phenomenological, contentful, sense let us call them 'emotion-eliciting perceptions'.

I conjecture that these reflexive emotion-eliciting perceptions are innate or culturally conditioned responses to environmental saliences. At least in the case of perception-based emotional episodes, then, they are the product of evolutionary and social pressures, and are thus either a hard-wired component of human biology or are learned as the result of training and experience. Thus, whether ontogenetic or phylogenetic, these responses are the result of the fact that we are psychologically 'set up' in such a way that certain environmental cues reflexively trigger specific somatic processes. In the case of standard or basic emotions, a great deal of psychological and scientific research has been undertaken into the mechanisms involved in this triggering process. And whilst to a large extent the exact details of this process are not important (being the subject-matter of evolutionary psychology and neurophysiology), given that it is incumbent on my account to demonstrate the existence of an appropriate causal chain hooking the relevant bodily feelings up to the emotion-proper properties they purport to represent, I am compelled to say something, if only briefly, about what I think this triggering process involves.

One of the clearest, most comprehensive, and most empirically persuasive theories of basic emotion-elicitation is the 'neo-Jamesian' account put forward by Antonio Damasio (1994/2006, 2000).[120] In this passage Damasio provides a condensed characterisation of the steps leading from emotion-eliciting perception to emotional feeling:

> 1. Engagement of the organism by an inducer of emotion, for instance, a particular object processed visually, resulting in visual representations of the object. The object may be conscious or not, and may be recognized or not, because neither consciousness of the object nor recognition of the object are necessary for the continuation of the cycle. 2. Signals consequent to the processing of the image of the object activate neural sites that are preset to respond to the particular class of inducer to which the object belongs (emotion-induction sites). 3. The emotion-induction sites trigger a number of responses toward the body and toward other brain sites, and unleash the full range of body and brain responses that constitute emotion. 4. First-order neural maps in both subcortical and cortical regions represent changes in body state… Feelings emerge. (2000, p.283)[121]

Damasio's earlier work (e.g. 1994/2006) provides a similar account, according to which one does not need to *recognise* the object as being of a particular type (a bear, say) in order for the emotion to be triggered. Rather, all that is required "is that early sensory cortices detect and categorize the key feature or features of a given entity (e.g., animal or object), and that structures such as the amygdala receive signals concerning their *conjunctive* presence" (1994, pp.131-132). Charland (1997) explicitly endorses this account, claiming, for example, that the eliciting features are primitively and non-conceptually recognisable features like size, shape, and movement-type (pp.570-571). Similarly, Zajonc (1980, pp.151-175) claims that emotional affective reactions can exist before and independent of cognitions and do

[120] Prinz's own neo-Jamesian account (2003, 2004a, 2004b) draws heavily from Damasio's work. A similar view is also propounded by Robinson (2005).

[121] A variety of work undertaken in a number of related fields paints a similar picture. For example, LeDoux (1998), Maclean (1980), Panskepp (1982), and Zajonc (1980) are among those who provide similar accounts of how perceptions of environmental stimuli trigger somatic responses via preset neural pathways mediated by subcortical structures.

not depend on inferential judgement or belief. LeDoux (1988, p.68) makes a similar claim. In describing the pathways by which the amygdala can be activated, he describes a 'higher' cortical route that is cognitive and a 'lower' ('quick-and-dirty') perceptual route that bypasses the cortex. The latter is neurologically hardwired and such that the emotional reactions are triggered pre-perceptually in a way that bypasses consciousness.[122]

What all of this suggests is that reflexive emotion-elicitation is not a matter of first perceiving (either consciously or unconsciously) an emotion-proper property and then coming to experience the relevant emotion, but is rather a case of lower-level determinate features *automatically triggering* certain pre-organised physiological processes which are consciously experienced as (characteristically emotional) bodily feelings.[123] On my account, of course, these feelings are not bare sensations but intrinsically intentional representational states. What is registered or taken in during these initial emotion-eliciting perceptions, then, is not the emotion-proper property itself (this being available only to affective perception), but merely the relevant determinate features. Only when the relevant bodily changes are experienced by the subject, or when *through them* she experiences the emotion-proper property, does the process become a full-blown perception.

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[122] Cf. Robinson's (2004, 2005) account of 'affective appraisal', according to which these reflexive affective responses 'evaluate' the stimulus in terms of a few simple appraisal-categories such as 'This is an offense!', 'This is a threat!', and so on. Robinson (2005) presents a compelling account—one which draws on much of the psychological research mentioned above—of the way in which affective emotional responses are automatically triggered by certain kinds of emotionally-salient stimuli, including not only the objects of sense-perception, but also those of thought, imagination, and memory.

[123] Cf. James's account (see Chapter 1). Of course, there is a further question as to why some perceptions of determinate properties happen to trigger affective emotional responses while others do not (cf. the general and the rookie); but this is an empirical, psychological matter concerning the way the stimulus-response tie has been set up in the subject. It will thus depend on a range of facts about emotional history, conditioning, mood, character, psychological predisposition, and so on (cf. Robinson, 2004, p.40).

The object qua intentional object is presented in a way that necessarily involves bodily feeling, in the guise of affective perception. However, the object qua *stimulus* of those feelings is not 'presented' in any such way: it is not an intentional object at all but a mere mechanistic environmental trigger. Thus, the fact that our nervous systems are programmed reflexively to trigger certain bodily changes in response to certain saliences does not mean that the feelings of those changes are in any way divorced from the way the objects are presented *at the level of experience*—that is, the level of representational, aspectually-shaped content. This has the important corollary that the perceptual belief that the object has the emotion-proper property arises in a way that is phenomenologically immediate and—as the triggering process is automatic and unconscious—does not rely on any conscious process of inference, thus ensuring that the second criterion of non-inferential perceptual belief is met.

There is here a clear analogy with the cases of tactile-visual sensory substitution discussed in Chapter 3. There we saw that the video camera which receives the initial ('visual') information from the stimulus is, like the emotion-eliciting sense-perception, part of the causal chain connecting the stimulus with the conscious experience of the object. This triggering perception itself at no point features within the content of the experience. Rather, from a phenomenological perspective, the subject is aware of the object *directly* and *non-inferentially* through bodily feeling. In both cases, it is the bodily feelings—not the eliciting 'perceptions'—which are phenomenally and intentionally rich perceptual states through which the objects (physical objects and emotion-proper properties, respectively) are experienced.

It might here be objected that this account of the causal relation between object and affect fails to connect the bodily feelings to the relevant features of the object. For on it, the emotion-eliciting perceptions necessarily do not feature emotion-proper properties, but only emotion-invoking determinate features. It is only subsequently that the emotion-proper properties themselves become available to (affective) perception. Thus understood, the emotion-proper properties do not appear to feature as causes of the bodily feelings at all; only their lower-level base properties do. However—and this is crucial—the fact that the causal connection between bodily feelings and emotion-proper properties goes only via emotion-invoking determinate features does nothing to mitigate the claim that such feelings constitute perceptions of the former, rather than the latter, type of property. This is because the emotion-proper properties *program for* the production of appropriately representational affective states by ensuring that they will arise as a result of having direct causal contact with their grounding properties.

As we saw, response-dependent properties are such that, by their very nature, their causal efficacy in bringing about the corresponding representational states is necessarily mediated by their subvenient base properties. Strictly speaking, the property of being red is only indirectly responsible for causing the corresponding red sensation. The higher-level property programs for production of the sensation by ensuring that its grounding properties will be efficacious in producing the appropriate red-type response. In the same way, emotion-proper properties work only via their lower-level determinate features to ensure production of the appropriate affective response. The property of being fearful, for example, programs for production of the affective fear response by ensuring that the determinate features on which it

supervenes are causally responsible for triggering the appropriate bodily feelings. The fearfulness itself is causally active—if only indirectly—in producing the affective state which constitutes both a proper response to it and (what is the same thing) a perception of it in virtue of the fact that its subvenient base properties are directly causally responsible for producing that perceptual response.

Incidentally, we can now understand more clearly the relation between justifying reasons (those concerning the underlying emotion-invoking determinate features) which underwrite warranted affective responses and the responses themselves. If the programmatic model is correct, then the representational contents of warranted affective perceptual states will be underwritten by reasons concerning emotion-invoking determinate features in virtue of the fact that these very features are causally responsible (along with the higher-level emotion-proper properties themselves) for producing those feelings. Both the emotion-invoking determinate features and the emotion-proper property are causally active (causally relevant) in producing the bodily feelings, and while these feelings are experienced as intrinsically representational perceptions of the latter, they are underwritten by (make essential reference to) objective reasons pertaining to the former.

We are also now much better placed to see exactly what it means to 'take in' an emotional object in a way that entails feeling an emotion towards it. This rather general notion of 'emotional perception', which I earlier glossed in terms of affective perception, thus turns out to be a case of a subject encountering an appropriate object in a way that (for whatever deep psychological reasons) certain of its emotion-invoking determinate features automatically trigger particular somatic states which

function, on a phenomenological level, as affective perceptual representations of emotion-proper properties. Taking in an emotional object in this specific, emotion-involving way thus amounts to perceiving affectively a supervenient emotion-proper property in such a way that the property programs for production of the state by ensuring that this or that set of subvenient emotion-invoking determinate features actually triggers the relevant somatic states in the subject.[124]

Alternative Theories

Having now set out my position in as much detail as space will allow—and having finally established in full my original key claims—I want briefly to say something about its rivals, starting with those theories which endorse similar response-dependence claims regarding emotional properties.

Alternative Response-Dependence Accounts

It is perhaps worth noting, first of all, that surprisingly few philosophers of emotion appear even to countenance the possibility that emotional properties or formal objects are response-dependent, let alone propose accounts of such properties along response-dependence lines. (As indicated earlier, there is a general dearth of literature devoted to analysing the formal properties of emotions. Surprisingly little has been done to elucidate the metaphysics and epistemology of these properties.) That said, several

[124] It is also worth noting that to some extent the causal chains connecting visceral bodily feelings with their target objects are no less 'direct' than those connecting ordinary sense-impressions with their objects. An account of the physiology of touch, for example, must make reference to mechanisms by which nerve receptors in the skin and tissue, when appropriately impacted by an object, send signals to the relevant parts of the brain where complex neurological machinery somehow interprets them as tactile impressions.

accounts mention response-dependence (or at least similar notions; see e.g. Helm, 2001a) in relation to emotions, and a handful have something substantial to say about how such properties might figure in an epistemology of value.[125] However, even these latter accounts fail to develop anything like substantial theories of emotional properties or formal objects qua response-dependent properties, and not one provides an account of where bodily feelings might figure in such a theory as responses to such properties. Few details are given of the *relation* between property and response beyond, typically, a hasty endorsement of a secondary-quality analogy and a token mention of the accounts of McDowell and Wiggins. It thus remains unclear precisely what kinds of response-dependence accounts these authors take themselves to be endorsing.[126]

Also missing from these accounts is any explanation of how emotions can themselves qualify as fully intentional perceptual states, as the response-dependence thesis requires. For example, Tappolet asserts that: "Emotions, like perceptions, have correctness conditions. Thus both have a certain type of content. It is therefore possible to maintain that emotions allow us in certain cases to be aware of values. Whether or not representation is a matter of causal correlation emotions represent values" (cited in Mulligan, 2010, p.482). Döring (2008, p.98) similarly claims that "To say that [both emotions and perceptions] have a representational content is to say that they are subject to a correctness condition. The correctness condition is provided

[125] The former include D'Arms and Jacobson (2000a, p.66), Mulligan (2010, p.489), Prinz (2004b, pp.61-64), Teroni (2007, p.397), and Tappolet (2010, p.328). D'Arms (2005), D'Arms and Jacobson (2010), Elgin (2008), Salmela (2006), and Zagzebski (2003) are among the latter (see below for further discussion).

[126] Although, see D'Arms and Jacobson (2010). While they provide a broad response-dependence account of emotional properties, they explicitly distance their position (fn. p.586) from the no-priority theories of McDowell and Wiggins by claiming priority for the sentiments (and thus endorsing something which more closely resembles a Humean projectivist account).

by the formal object which corresponds to each emotion type and each type of perception". This typically swift move from 'emotions have correctness conditions' (or something similar) to 'emotions (therefore) are representations' leaves a great deal unsaid about how it is that emotions (whatever these turn out to be) can themselves *represent* emotional or value properties.[127] Indeed, as Tappolet's and Döring's remarks illustrate, insofar as any theory of representation is in evidence in these accounts, it would seem necessarily to rely on just the sort of phenomenologically impoverished notion of causal correlation that belies Prinz's account.

In the absence of a substantial theory of how emotions can be said to represent (as opposed merely to track) response-dependent emotion-proper properties, these theories remain importantly deficient. The notion of tracking (or some variant of it)—no matter how nuanced and how thoroughly spelled out—will never be sufficient to account for the rich intentionality of emotions, let alone the rich intentionality of emotional bodily feelings. The lack of a substantial account of what emotional representation might amount to is a serious shortcoming, and one which, it is hoped, the present account goes some way towards rectifying. Indeed, I take the primary virtue of my account to be its ability to explain precisely how it is that emotional bodily feelings can be richly intentional perceptual states. This is an advantage it enjoys over not only these few rival response-dependence accounts of emotional properties but alternative integrative accounts of emotions in general, including, as we will see, two which also claim to provide accounts of 'affective perception'.

[127] See Crane (1992c) for a clear statement of the view Tappolet and Döring are endorsing. According to Crane (p.139): "To say that any state has content is just to say that it represents the world as being a certain way. It thus has what Peacocke [1992a] calls a 'correctness condition'—the condition under which it represents the world *correctly*. It is in this minimal sense of 'content' that perceptions, the states of the visual system, and the tree's rings all have content".

Prinz's (2004a, 2004b) account of emotion typifies the recent trend in Anglophone philosophy of emotion towards what I have broadly classed as integrative cognition-affect theories: those accounts which acknowledge a fundamental role for affect whilst honouring both the cognitivist's commitment to the intentional, evaluative, and perceptual aspects of emotion and the phenomenology of emotional experience, which, as we have seen, suggests a conception of emotion on which intentionality and affect are somehow inextricably linked rather than merely externally and substantively related. Indeed, since work began on this thesis, and during the years immediately prior, a number of articles have appeared endorsing a variety of integrative theories (which I shall not even attempt to canvass here).[128] The reasons which motivate many of these accounts appear largely similar to those which motivate my own position; and the most promising of them are, to my mind (and for obvious reasons), those which accord affect a representational or perceptual role. Such accounts are relatively few; and whilst they all have some interesting and insightful things to say about the role of affect in emotional experience, none is able to provide a satisfactory account of *how it is* that affect—not least *bodily* affect—can be genuinely representational or play a genuinely perceptual role. None is able to say what such representation or perception amounts to—at least not in a way that accords with the phenomenology of emotional experience and explains how emotional feelings are felt towards their objects.

[128] Among these I count Döring (2007, 2008, 2009), Goldie (2004a, 2009), Greenspan (2004), Helm (2009), Prinz (2004b), Solomon (2004, 2007), and Zagzebski (2003), to mention but a few.

Alternative Accounts of Affective Perception

Sabine Döring proposes what she calls an account of 'affective perception'; however, her usage of the term is different from mine. Döring holds that emotions are perceptions in a quite specific sense:

> First, this is not to say that emotions are sense perceptions. There are a number of obvious disanalogies between emotions and sense perceptions. None of them undermines the analogy as all that my perceptual model requires is that both sense perceptions and emotions have an intentional content of a certain kind thanks to which they play a noninferential role in the rationalisation of other mental states and actions. To distinguish emotional perception from sensory perception, I shall characterise it as 'affective perception', due to the nature of its phenomenology which is that of feeling or affect. (2007, p.376)[129]

On Döring's account, then, emotions qualify as perceptions in virtue of the role they play in non-inferentially rationalising and justifying other mental states and actions; and they qualify as *affective* perceptions thanks to the distinctively affective nature of their phenomenology.

This claim—that emotions are perceptions with a distinctively affective phenomenology—is strikingly similar to Goldie's claim that emotions involve feelings towards: world-directed intentional mental states with intrinsic affective phenomenality.[130] And, indeed, Döring herself draws significant parallels between her

[129] Cf. (2009), p.241, and (2008), p.85.

[130] A similar account is put forward by Linda Zagzebski (2003), according to whom "an emotion is a state of affectively perceiving its intentional object as falling under a "thick affective concept" A, a concept that combines cognitive and affective aspects in a way that cannot be pulled apart. For example, in a state of pity an object is seen as pitiful, where to see some thing as pitiful is to be in a state that is both cognitive and affective" (2003, p.104). However, it is clear that Zagzebski's account too is much closer to Goldie's account of psychic feeling towards than it is my account of affective perception. By affectively perceiving, Zagzebski means nothing more than seeing something in an emotionally (affectively) charged way *as falling under* a thick affective concept, where this way of seeing necessarily involves tokening certain psychic feelings. Zagzebski makes no mention whatsoever of bodily feelings.

account and Goldie's. In particular, she agrees with Goldie (and me) that emotional affect is by its nature intentional and world-directed: it is inherently bound up with the way the emotional object is presented—i.e., with the intentional representational content of the emotion. Thus, she notes that:

> Goldie has it that emotional feelings are not nonintentional bodily feelings, but are directed towards an object which is the emotion's intentional object. Thus an emotion's intentionality cannot be separated from its phenomenology but is build [sic] into it: what an emotion is about—its intentional content—is part of its conscious, subjective character, i.e., of what it is like to experience the emotion…

She continues:

> I am here starting from the assumption that Goldie's approach to emotional intentionality is correct so far: emotional intentionality essentially is affective intentionality… On my account, and I here depart from Goldie…, an emotion's intentionality is best understood by analogy with perception. This is at least so if it is agreed that a perception also possesses both phenomenology and intentionality, and that its intentional content is also part of its conscious, subjective character… (2007, pp.375-376)

This much, of course, I agree with. However, whilst Döring's stipulation that emotional affect is best understood on analogy with sense-perception marks a clear point of departure from Goldie's account—one shared also by my account—I depart from both Döring and Goldie in claiming that the relevant affect is bodily and not purely psychic. Indeed, Döring is explicit in distinguishing intentional (psychic) feelings towards from any bodily feelings which might also accompany emotional experience, asserting:

Johnston (2001) similarly claims that "affect is akin to perceptual experience" (p.189); and that it can make true "immediate (i.e. non-inferential) judgement" (p.205); and further that "since affect is also motivating…it follows that…the one who makes the judgement will have an appropriate action-guiding orientation toward the thing judged valuable" (p.206). However, once again, it is clear that the notion of affect in play here "is not bodily sensation" (p.211) but rather something akin to psychic feeling.

> Let us be clear…that Jamesian (1884) bodily feelings are to be distinguished from what I mean by an emotion's 'feeling' or 'affect'. The latter is best understood in terms of what Peter Goldie…describes as an '(emotional) feeling towards'. While a bodily feeling is the awareness of internal bodily changes…emotional feelings towards are directed at something in the external world. In particular, a feeling towards is insolubly linked with the evaluation that an emotion contains. (2007, p.373)[131]

From this it is clear that Döring too fails to notice that the inextricabilist phenomenology characteristic of psychic feelings towards is characteristic also of certain 'Jamesian' bodily feelings, and thus that such bodily feelings too are insolubly linked to emotional evaluative and intentional content. Döring's account of affective perception, then, has much more in common with Goldie's account of feeling towards, and much less in common with my own account of affective perceptions as bodily feelings.

Louis Charland (1995a, 1995b, 1997) proposes an account of 'affective perception which draws heavily from research in psychology and is in many ways similar, and in others importantly different, to my own. On the one hand, it provides a general account in favour of taking affect to be a form of representation of emotional objects; but on the other hand, being an account which is designed to operate at a general level, it has nothing substantial to say about *how* affect might be a form of representation. More specifically, it has nothing to say about the way in which emotional affects are felt towards their objects.

Charland (1997) sets out to defend what he terms the 'representational theory of emotion' ('RTE'), according to which emotions represent their objects as falling under specific 'affective categories', a concept approximating emotion-proper

[131] Cf. Döring (2009), p.244.

properties (Goldie), formal objects (de Sousa), thick affective concepts (Zagzebski), and core relational themes (Prinz).[132] In this respect, it has much in common with several other broadly 'perceptual' accounts of emotion: e.g. those of de Sousa (e.g. 1987), Döring (e.g. 2003), and Prinz (e.g. 2004b).

According to the RTE, emotional information-processing takes place on two levels, corresponding to two modular representational systems, which operate in parallel: a cognitive doxastic representational level, where processes are typically conscious, cognitively penetrable, and open to scrutiny; and an infradoxastic affective representational level, where processes are typically unconscious, cognitively impenetrable, and inscrutable (1997, p.568). According to the psychological evidence, the perceptual representational component of emotion pertains to the latter level. So, what does this affective perceptual system consist of? According to Charland, the evidence suggests a conception of affect as a 'two-channel representational system', such that:

> One channel, the *exteroceptive* one, is designed to pick up and register affective information about the external world. The other, the *interoceptive* one, is designed to pick up and process affective information about an organism's inner physiological states and processes. The exteroceptive affective perceptual channel is the means by which an organism picks up and processes the information that, say, something is fearsome. The interoceptive affective perceptual channel is the means by which that organism is made internally aware of its internal physiological and somatic responses to external affective stimuli (e.g., the heightened pulse rate, and increased neurochemical and hormonal discharges normally associated with the 'perception' of fearsome things). Therefore, feelings face two ways. They face outward (what you are scared *of*), and they face inward (what you feel *in* your 'gut'). Although both of these sorts of feeling involve representation, the mechanisms and explanatory generalizations involved are very different. (1995b, p.276)[133]

[132] Charland refers to affective categories as the "empirical descendents" of formal objects (1995a, p.66). However, he notes that "Clearly, the epistemological and ontological status of…affective categories is extremely problematic" (1995b, p.280).

[133] Whilst I agree that bodily feelings can represent both internal states (Chapter 2) and external objects, including properties (Chapter 3), I disagree with Charland's characterisation of affect as a

This looks to be very similar to Prinz's account, on which emotional bodily feelings constitute perceptions of both (interoceptive) somatic states and (exteroceptive) core relational themes. However, where Prinz provides an account (albeit a deficient one) of what this representation amounts to, Charland fails to commit to any theory of representation, stating that his account is entirely neutral with respect to conditions of representation (1997, p.563). This neutrality reflects the relatively modest aim of his arguments: that of establishing the initial tenability of an account on which affect constitutes a representational system in something like a modular (Fodorian) symbol-processing sense. By his own admission, a great deal more work would have to be done to secure such an outcome (1995a, p.60; 1997, p.577). Consequently, the account primarily operates on a somewhat abstract level, as a highly generalised psycho-theoretical functional account of how emotion might be conceived in formal computational terms as a modular perceptual information-processing system. Concrete details of what such a system consists of and how it operates are extremely thin (this in contrast to the wealth of information Charland provides about the formal *structure* of such a system).

Part of the reason for postulating an affective representational system stems from the very basic thought that the grammar of feeling words suggests a conception of feelings as in some sense necessarily intentional. For example, Charland notes several diverse uses of the term 'feeling' (borrowed from Kenny, 1963, and Ryle, 1949/1970), such as 'feeling sick', 'feeling that the moment was wrong', 'feeling like

'two-channel' system. Given the dual-aspect structure of emotional bodily affect, it is difficult to square talk of two channels with the unitary phenomenology of emotional experience, which, as we saw, suggests a single state of feeling with two aspects rather than two substantive 'channels' pointing in opposite directions.

a lord', 'feeling like a drink', 'feeling in good spirits', and so on, claiming that "there is an important lesson to be drawn from the above examples. This is that feelings are invariably *representational*" (1995b, p.294), adding shortly after that "feelings are never just feelings *simpliciter*. They are always experienced as feelings of this or that sort, or feelings *of* this or that. In conclusion, there is no feeling without representation. Feeling *is* a kind of representing" (1995b, p.295; cf. 1995a, p.73).

Of course, this tells us nothing of *how it is* that feelings can possibly be intentional. It tells us nothing of what might be going on when one affectively perceives something. However, like me Charland explicitly endorses Damasio's (1994/2006) account of the neurophysiological processes governing emotion-elicitation (1997, pp.570-571). On this view, perception of an appropriate stimulus triggers a bodily affective response which is said to carry 'information' about the affective category-type of the stimulus. To this extent, the response purportedly *represents* the object as falling under an affective category. The upshot seems to be that the triggering of the relevant affective states just *is*, on Charland's account, the mechanism for representing the eliciting object as, say, fearsome. That is, the affective state represents the eliciting object as fearsome in virtue of being set off by a perception of (certain salient features of) the object.

Obviously, my account shares certain similarities with Charland's. However, there are also clear differences. Three in particular deserve special attention. Firstly, where Charland claims that bodily feelings constitute representations of objects as falling under particular *affective categories*, my account makes the importantly different claim that such feelings constitute representations of actually instantiated token

properties, where such properties are not mere abstracta (affective perceptions do not represent categories or kinds) but are real (response-dependent) properties of objects. One does not merely perceive *that* the object is fearsome but instead perceives the actual property *fearsomeness*. (My account also has much to say about the metaphysics and epistemology of such properties where Charland is silent on the parallel issues concerning affective categories.)

Secondly, affective perceptions, on my account, are not representations of *objects* (either as falling under affective category-types or as instantiating emotion-proper properties). Properly speaking, only the emotion-proper property itself features in the representational content of the affective state.

And thirdly, where I provide a detailed account of the nature of affective perceptual representation, Charland is largely silent on the matter.[134] I have shown *how it is possible* for affective states to be genuinely perceptual in the full intentional, phenomenological sense (and not merely in the barest information-processing sense of reliably tracking affective categories). From the little Charland does say on the matter, the kind of representation he has in mind appears to be closer to that sanctioned by Prinz. For example, he talks of affective representations being "*reliably covariant* with their putative token physical realizations in the world" (1995a, p.62; emphasis added). This is borne out also by the very fact that Charland advocates a computational information-processing model on which affect constitutes something like an 'input system' in Fodor's sense. The claim to perception boils down to the claim that affect reliably tracks or registers (presumably by virtue of causally

[134] Charland is fully aware that his account is incomplete in this respect. See e.g. (1995a), p.74.

correlating with) token objects perception of which automatically elicits specific types of physiological response in such a way that, in order for certain psychological generalisations to be rendered explicable, the subject must be said to subsume the eliciting object under a particular affective category-type.

This is largely correct (notwithstanding the first two points), as far as it goes; but again, what is missing is any mention of *phenomenology*: of the rich phenomenal/intentional content that is so characteristic of affective perception. Affective perception on Charland's account is simply not representational in anything like the phenomenological, intentional sense that concerns us. It is not the kind of representation which explains how emotional feelings are felt towards their objects. Indeed, to a large extent the perceptual capacity of affect is merely a theoretical posit invoked to show that emotions fit a computational theory of mind. By Charland's own lights, the RTE itself provides nothing more than "a general metatheoretical framework" (1997, p.577).

However, despite these disparities, Charland's account of this general framework is nevertheless extremely complimentary of the account proposed in this thesis. And whilst admittedly it cannot provide a phenomenologically informed account of affective perception, it nevertheless provides a solid general account—one grounded in a wealth of psychological research—of the theoretical space within which a theory of affective perception must operate. It thus serves to illuminate the psychological backdrop to much of what has already been said in this thesis.

So, to sum up: neither Döring's nor Charland's accounts are able to give an explanation of what, in intentional/representational terms, affective perception actually amounts to. While both have interesting and important things to say, they remain crucially incomplete. Charland's account omits the fact that emotional feelings do not just 'track' or 'register' states of affairs but actually *represent*, in the fullest sense (the sense of having rich phenomenal/intentional content), properties of emotional objects. It also fails to explain the fact that emotional feelings are felt towards their objects. And while Döring's account both acknowledges and seeks to explain this fact, it fails to acknowledge that it holds true not only of psychic feelings but *bodily* feelings too. Indeed, Döring fails to explain what affective perceptions actually amount to beyond the fact that they stand to other mental states in similar justifying and rationalising relations as sense-perceptions. Like Charland, she thus fails to show how affect itself could possibly have representational structure.

Implications

I want to end by briefly spelling out just some of the many implications my account has for two issues in particular: the epistemology of aesthetic and moral properties, and the dissolution of the cognition-affect distinction. However, it is worth noting also the main advantages my account enjoys over those theories pertaining to the three paradigms discussed in Chapter 1. Perhaps most obviously, it retains the affect theory's core insight that emotions are by their nature felt states whilst also accommodating the many ways in which emotions appear to be, or to involve, cognitions; and it does so in a way that avoids recourse to a simplistic dual-component theory.

On the present account, emotions—at least in the most common cases—can be usefully viewed as, or at least as involving, feelings, specifically bodily feelings. I have argued that these feelings are affective perceptions of emotion-proper properties. They are thus inherently intentional representational states. They are also inherently *evaluative*.[135] Affect, on my account, has built into it not only intentional/representational structure, but evaluative and (as it were) 'cognitive' structure. Much of the cognitive-evaluative workload traditionally attributed to beliefs and judgements is already taken care of by affective perceptions. Indeed, their proper objects are, *by their very nature*, properties that we care about in some way. They are necessarily, in a broad sense, value properties; and they are *essentially* tied to human sensibility and concern.

Perceptions of emotion-proper properties, although immediate and non-inferential, are underwritten by reasons which ground their value. They thus embody the core features postulated by the austere cognitivist in a way that explains many of the intimate links between emotions, reason, and rationality, as well as explaining the role they play in the wider mental economy. Most significantly, the fact that emotions typically involve affective perceptions explains their status as world-directed intentional states. And it does so in a way that accords perfectly with the relevant

[135] Cf. Greenspan's claim that "Affect evaluates!" (Greenspan, 2004, p.132). According to Greenspan, emotions are "*feelings* with evaluative thought *content*" (2004, p.133). However, she does little to say what this claim actually amounts to; and from what she does say the account appears to rely on a highly impoverished notion of representation premised on the postulation of a mysterious correlation or 'association' between comfortable or uncomfortable feelings and certain evaluative propositions, where the former are said to 'mark', 'register', or 'convey' the latter. Greenspan claims that positive or negative affects "can be said to have" the evaluative content of the corresponding propositions without saying anything at all about *why* they can be said to have such content. The same applies to Robinson's account in the same volume: in claiming that reflexively-triggered affective responses constitute 'appraisals' she gives no reason at all for thinking these enjoy anything like evaluative or representational *content*.

phenomenology. The fact that bodily feelings are felt towards the objects of emotion is explained by the fact that they are perceptions of those objects' emotion-proper properties. Affective perceptions are bodily feelings with intentional representational content. They are thus states which exemplify both the property of world-directed intentionality and that of intrinsic phenomenality. Moreover, they are states for which these two aspects are inextricably linked: phenomenality is an intrinsic feature of intentional content and vice-versa. This contradicts the dual-component theorist's implicit separatism, which sought to reduce emotions to conjunctions of phenomenal and intentional states which are only externally (and, notwithstanding any causally necessary connection, contingently) related.

Epistemological Implications

Recall the account given in Chapter 4 of the ability affective perceptions have to rationalise and justify emotional behaviour and action. This account of the justifying relations between lower-level features, higher-level properties, and emotional responses has the great advantage of being able to vindicate the age-old mantra that, in certain spheres of experience—such as those pertaining to our emotional, evaluative, and moral lives—we are often justified in trusting our 'gut feelings'. It is often said that having a certain emotion or tokening a certain affective state can provide a prima facie reason for holding certain beliefs about the world—for example, the belief that there is danger nearby, consequent on a feeling of fear. One may not

even know what one is afraid of, but feeling fear can give one a (defeasible) reason for believing there are dangerous (or equivalent) things in the vicinity.[136]

My account agrees with these claims up to a point: emotions, particularly emotional bodily feelings, often do play this role in alerting us to the possible presence of emotion-invoking determinable features. However, qua affective *perceptions*, the properties emotional bodily feelings disclose are revealed immediately and non-inferentially. To the extent that they supply reasons for holding certain beliefs, they usually do so not by merely alerting us to the fact that there might be objects instantiating certain determinable properties nearby, but by acting as states through which higher-order emotion-proper properties are *perceived*. It is in their capacity as full-blown perceptions that emotions, specifically their constituent bodily feelings, provide a 'quick-and-dirty' route to knowledge of the world. The properties they disclose are revealed immediately and non-inferentially, without the need for mediation by the 'usual' slow and inefficient cognitive processes and faculties. This perceptual mode of accessing emotional objects bypasses conscious thought, judgement, and deliberation, and so is quicker (but perhaps more prone to error) than judgement and the rest. On balance, this confers a clear evolutionary advantage and is likely part of the reason we evolved the capacity for emotions in the first place. Thus, where Goldie (e.g. 2004a), for example, claims that bodily feelings provide only an indirect epistemic route to knowledge of the world, this is a very different route to the direct, perceptual one I am proposing.

[136] Of course, this is not to claim that emotions always serve us well in providing prima facie justification for emotional beliefs. As Goldie has shown in detail (e.g. 2002a, 2004a, 2008b), the emotions are also capable of systematically misleading us, 'skewing the epistemic landscape', and 'distorting perception and reason', resulting in inappropriate and unwarranted emotions which lack the requisite grounding reasons (cf. Elgin, 1996).

Nevertheless, my account shares with other accounts a conception of emotions as states which 'tune us into the world' (Goldie, 2004a; Elgin, 1996; Ratcliffe, 2008a): they attune us to matters of value, revealing saliences and disclosing values. Indeed, ultimately I want to recommend the expansion of my account of affective perception to encompass all value properties. All, I suggest, are response-dependent properties that are apprehended at least partly through a process of bodily affective perception. Moral and aesthetic judgement involves emotional engagement with real response-dependent properties; and it essentially involves affect.[137] Such properties are perceived largely in virtue of being *felt*. My account explains how it is that, as Jacobson (2005, p.393) puts it, "*we see the demands of kindness by feeling them*".

McDowell claims to have shown how the cultivation of certain feelings can issue in a sensitivity to moral properties in a way that avoids recourse to a mysterious intuitionism which, it is alleged, illicitly "borrow[s] the epistemological credentials of…perception" (1998, p.162). Yet, as we saw, he fails to give any content whatsoever to the claim that it is through mere *feelings* that the virtuous are sensitive to such properties. If the perception of reasons to act is at the same time a way of *feeling* the demands of reason, then there is a story to be told about *what* such feelings consist of and *how* they can possibly be states through which moral properties are disclosed. My account plugs precisely this explanatory gap, demonstrating exactly how to avoid intuitionism in allowing for the fact that 'mere' feelings lie at the heart of our experience—and ultimately our knowledge—of matters of value. It is obvious

[137] We do not have to look far to find evidence for the claim that moral and aesthetic properties have much in common with emotion-proper properties. Indeed, there is considerable overlap between the classes of emotional and aesthetic properties. Disgustingness, for example, can belong to both; and many moral and aesthetic properties can be the objects of warranted emotional responses. See Prinz (2006, 2007) and Zagzebski (2003) for response-dependence emotion-centred accounts of moral-property perception.

that such experience somehow involves the body. The power of my account lies partly in its ability to explain precisely what role the feeling body plays in perceiving the subjective properties that correspond to a range of value predicates. Indeed, it goes a considerable way towards explaining the sense in which, as Hume famously noted, 'morality is more properly felt than judged of'. Moral judgements often take the form of affective perceptual judgements; and moral experience is felt experience of moral properties.

Moral affective perception constitutes our most direct mode of access to moral properties, and thus, ultimately, moral knowledge. Indeed, on the response-dependence account, moral properties can *only* be accessed through the appropriate (and appropriately affective) responses. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, for certain aesthetic properties. As affective perceptions of response-dependent properties, bodily feelings are capable of disclosing facets of reality that we would otherwise be incapable of accessing. In other words, it is only if one is disposed to react appropriately to instances of axiological properties, and thus to perceive them affectively, that one can truly judge, and thus in the fullest sense *know*, that, for example, *x* is good or *y* is beautiful. We have already seen why this is the case for emotional properties; and the case for both moral and aesthetic properties is exactly parallel. As D'Arms and Jacobson point out (2010, p.592), this serves to elucidate what was essentially right about Kant's claim (in *The Critique of Judgement*) that judgements of taste must necessarily be made *firsthand* by the one judging.

Thus, whilst one can come to know, in a limited sense, that something is scary, good, or beautiful by cognitive, inferential means—say, by calculating the possible presence

of the higher-level property based on the presence of certain lower-level features, or by relying on someone else's testimony—one cannot know this in the fullest sense: one cannot truly *judge* that the object is scary, good, or beautiful, as these properties are response-dependent, and so can *only* be known through the appropriate (affective) responses. Any inferential 'bottom-up' route to beliefs about these properties cannot be authoritative. To the extent that the property can be inferred at all, the inference will only be speculative and defeasible in lieu of an authoritative perception. This *essential* reference to genuine responses also explains why beauty and its kin cannot be reduced to sets of objective rules or formulae. The potential grounds are too diverse—indeed, potentially infinitely diverse—to be subsumable under any generalisable principles invoked to capture the supervenience relations between natural and value properties.[138] (As Aristotle noted, even the best generalisations in ethics hold only for the most part.) For the same reasons, the account may tell against Kantian approaches in ethics (for example, those advocating categorical imperative tests) and in favour of an emotion-centred moral particularism. Whilst I here lack the space to argue for these claims, it is clear that if moral and aesthetic properties are sufficiently similar in the relevant respects to emotion-proper properties, then my account supplies a ready-made theory of affective moral and aesthetic perceptual judgement.

[138] Elgin (1996) points out that the class of (e.g.) disgusting things is so broad there are virtually no unifying features beyond being such as to cause (for myriad possible reasons) feelings of disgust. There are no rules—at least none that it would be practical for us to formulate—to enable us to infer the disgustingness of an object based on the presence of certain emotion-invoking determinable or determinate features. Compare McDowell: "the search for an evaluative outlook one can endorse as rational becomes, virtually irresistibly, a search for a set of principles: a search for a *theory* of beauty or goodness". He continues: "we need a conception of rationality in evaluation that will cohere with the possibility that particular cases may stubbornly resist capture in any general net… [T]he explanatory capacity that certifies the special objects of an evaluative outlook as real, and certifies its evaluative responses as rational, would need to be exactly as creative and case-specific as the capacity to discern those objects itself" (1998, pp.149-150).

Indeed, my account implicates the *body* in the detection of value properties in an intriguing way, and in so doing elucidates the normative role of feelings in a way not available to rival theories. Feelings have long been denigrated as insignificant 'mere' affects, especially when compared with the 'pure light of reason'. However, my account accords certain kinds of feelings a degree of normative force comparable to that enjoyed by value judgements and sense-perceptions. Certain affects have a measure of authority (cf. Johnston, 2001) that is seldom acknowledged, let alone explained, by analytic philosophers. On the present account, this authority derives from their status as evaluative perceptions which encapsulate objective justifying and rationalising reasons.

Dissolving the Cognition-Affect Distinction

Helm (2009, p.249) makes a similar claim to the one Goldie and I endorse, asserting: "the distinction between phenomenal and intentional states is not mutually exclusive; indeed…emotions have the phenomenology they do precisely because they have the sort of intentional objects they do". Helm's is one of several recent accounts (see, e.g., Goldie, 2000, 2009; Zagzebski, 2003) seeking, at least to some extent, to undermine the traditional cognition-affect distinction by appealing to the intentional objects of psychic feelings. However, mine is one of the few theories to attempt something similar with respect to bodily feelings. I want to end by briefly outlining the ways in which the account challenges the traditional cognitive-affective divide (discussed in Chapter 1) as it pertains to bodily feelings—more specifically, as it pertains to bodily affective perceptions. It will be obvious by now that such perceptions do not fall neatly into one or other category: they are intentional representational feelings that

embody evaluations. The affective perception of offensiveness which constitutes anger, for example, implicitly contains reference to a host of social norms and evaluative and normative principles, despite at the same time being a bodily feeling. Feelings, on this account, enjoy intentional representational content equal to that of many paradigmatic 'cognitions' such as beliefs and judgements. Indeed, as affective perceptions, these feelings are states that instantiate both phenomenal and intentional properties, where these are entirely inextricable—indeed, where they are one and the same property described in different ways. As just mentioned, affect, thus conceived, can do much of the work traditionally attributed to cognition (intentionality, representation, evaluation, and so forth), whilst playing a similar role in the mental economy (for example, in receiving and processing information, informing decisions, instigating action, and in its general interconnections with other cognitive states and processes).

It is clear, then, that traditional assumptions about the exclusivity of cognition and affect are mistaken. And it is in this respect that I want to recommend abandoning the distinction altogether—or at least those formulations of it that imply that what is cognitive cannot be affective, and vice-versa.[139] As I stated in Chapter 1, 'cognition' and 'affect' are themselves relatively useful terms. What I want to get away from here are the assumptions which lie behind an exclusivist distinction which sets the one in tension with the other, treating them as incommensurable properties. Thus, I am happy to allow use of the terms within the context of a *general* debate about the features and functions of the emotions, so long as they are used with due care and sensitivity.

[139] Cf. Ratcliffe (2005a, 2008a).

It must also be borne in mind that, whilst it is not difficult to secure a loose grip on these terms, we still lack tight and clear definitions of them. Arguably the best definition of cognition currently available is Prinz's. Prinz (2004b) defines cognitions as states and processes which "exploit representations that are under organismic control", where "a representation is under organismic control if the organism has activated it or maintains it in working memory" (2004b, pp.45-46). According to Prinz, the main candidates for playing this role are concepts, which he takes to be mental representations that are under organismic control (2002, 2004b). Whilst this definition of cognition does better than most (see 2004b, pp.41-49, on advantages over rival definitions), I find it unsatisfactory for the simple reason that it distinguishes percepts from concepts in a way that automatically excludes perceptions from the class of cognitive states (see especially Prinz, 2002), these being states which, according to Prinz, do not fall under organismic control. I find this unsatisfactory not least because I want to allow the possibility that affective perceptions are representational states that are also—being modes of apprehending emotion-proper properties—intrinsically evaluative. Again, affective perceptions encapsulate evaluations of their objects, and so perform much of the work traditionally attributed to cognitions; and for that reason, any definition of cognition which excludes such perceptions a priori excludes features which many, including the traditionalists, would happily label cognitive.

In closing: The traditional assumption that cognition and affect form very separate strands in the emotional fabric led naturally to the question of how a theory of emotion might eventually weave them together. However, what the present account

makes clear is that the unification of cognition and affect within emotion is effected not by conjoining the one with the other, but by denying that there is any significant *ontological* distinction between them to begin with. Affective perceptions, as we have seen, are intrinsically intentional, phenomenal, and evaluative in a way that renders any such distinction entirely spurious.

Summary

This chapter aimed both to strengthen and to broaden my account of affective perception. It began with a defence of the account against what were considered to be the most powerful objections facing it. It then revisited the issue of perceptual content and structure, and deployed the notion of program explanation in order to illustrate the nature of the causal relation between token emotion-proper properties and token affective perceptual responses—thus completing the argument for Claim (2). It then proceeded to consider some rival theories, including two purported accounts of affective perception, and to highlight the similarities and differences between them and my account. We saw that Döring's account focuses exclusively on the sense in which psychic feelings towards can be said to function as affective perceptions.

The accounts of Prinz and Charland both contribute important insights into ways in which emotional bodily feelings can act as informational inputs—states which purport to represent emotional properties or categories. However, the concepts of representation and perception available to these accounts were shown to be significantly impoverished and inadequate to the phenomenology of emotional experience, which instead demands a richer notion of representation—one which is

able to accommodate the fact that emotional bodily feelings are felt towards appropriate objects rather than being merely reliably caused by them.

The final section looked at two of the most significant and interesting implications of the account: those concerning the role played by affective perception in the experience of value properties, and the sense in which a proper understanding of the nature of affective perception reveals the widely accepted cognition-affect distinction to be inadequate and misleading. I ended by recommending that the distinction, at least in its exclusivist form, be dissolved.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis has been to present and defend an account of affective perception. The central argument comprised three key claims: 1) Certain visceral bodily feelings are world-directed intentional states. 2) Their intentionality is that of perception. Such feelings are affective perceptions of emotion-proper properties. 3) These properties are response-dependent in a way that entails that appropriate affective responses to them qualify, ipso facto, as perceptions of them. Arguing for these claims was a task of two halves: where arguments for (1) and (2) concerned the nature of the feelings themselves, and sought to establish that they are intrinsically intentional representational states, arguments for (3) concerned their proper objects, and sought to show that their status as appropriate responses to response-dependent properties guarantees their status as genuine perceptions.

The account itself grew out of a dissatisfaction with the traditional paradigms of emotion theory and a recognition of the need to take seriously the phenomenology of emotional experience—which, as Peter Goldie noticed, is typically experience of emotional feelings being *felt towards* objects in a way that cannot be accounted for by traditional theories. This was the focus of Chapter 1. Chapter 2 explored in detail two accounts, put forward by Peter Goldie and Matthew Ratcliffe, which take positive steps away from traditional theories. By developing Goldie's arguments concerning psychic feelings and the inextricability of their intentional and phenomenal aspects, I argued that certain bodily feelings too have a similar structure—one which suggests they are perceptual feelings analogous in many respects to tactile feelings. Ratcliffe's

account provided a way of developing this analogy, and demonstrated how it is that feelings located in the gut can at the same time be feelings *of* external objects. Chapter 3 built on these insights to produce an account of the nature and content of affective perception and its status as a mode of apprehending emotion-proper properties. Chapter 4 looked at the response-dependence nature of these properties and argued that this nature itself guarantees that the feelings in question, qua appropriate responses, will qualify as genuine perceptions. Chapter 5 defended the account and considered its merits in relation to alternative theories. Having shown that it enjoys clear advantages over its rivals—pertaining primarily to its ability to provide a sufficiently rich account of the intentional/representational content of bodily feelings—it then proceeded to sketch out two of the account's most significant implications.

In its present form, the account is far from comprehensive. Limitations on space meant that, as is inevitably the case with a project of this nature, almost as much relevant and interesting material was left out of the final draft as was kept in. Fortunately, this leaves significant scope for further research into a number of fascinating issues. That these are of significant interest to others working in the field is evidenced by the sheer quantity of literature devoted to them that has emerged since work on the thesis began several years back. When I first started exploring the idea that affect might constitute a mode of perception of emotional properties, integrative theories were scarce. The dominant position in both philosophical and psychological emotion theory was dual-component theory. Mainstream philosophers of emotion—with the notable exception of Döring, Goldie, Prinz, Ratcliffe, and one or two others—were committed to conceiving of cognition, or at least intentionality, and

affect as discrete and substantive components—separate states which are somehow united within emotion. Several years later and integrative theories have become the norm. The collective focus has shifted from the question of what emotions are to the question of how affect and intentionality are to be reconciled in an appropriately integrative manner. As a consequence, a great deal of attention is being paid to the kinds of issues that motivated and concerned me when I first began working in this area and which are discussed throughout the thesis.

This recent surge in interest is reflected in the arrival, in 2009 and 2010 respectively, of two major publications in the philosophy of emotion: the journal *Emotion Review* and *The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Emotion* (edited by Peter Goldie). The accounts presented in these works, in addition to myriad others, reflect both a growing trend towards integrative theories and a growing interest in issues surrounding the possibility of affective intentionality, the response-dependence of emotional properties, the role of emotion in action-explanation, its relevance to ethics and aesthetics, and many more of the issues discussed above. And while many of these accounts arrived too late to play a formative role in the development of my argument, they demonstrate clearly the relevance of my project and the potential it has to contribute to this burgeoning area of philosophy. It is hoped that the preceding account of affective perception will provide a new angle onto many of these issues, supplying a platform for future research into the metaphysics and epistemology of emotional, and similar, experience.

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