Regime Structures, Intra-Elite Factions and the Problem of Authoritarian Control: Repression and Redistribution after the 17 June Uprising in Socialist East Germany

Abstract:

Theories of authoritarianism assert that autocratic governments follow repressive and redistributive policies which impede mass mobilization and mitigate economic grievances to prevent regime instability. However, policy formulation and implementation remain opaque and under-theorized elements of authoritarian politics. I argue that the mix of repressive and redistributive policies chosen by a regime is a function of intra-elite conflict between hard-liners and soft-liners. The power of the two factions and their influence on policy evolve as members of the elite learn to judge the comparative advantages of the regime in repression and redistribution. Hard-liners will be ascendant in regimes with a comparative advantage in repression, while soft-liners will be ascendant in regimes with a comparative advantage in redistribution. I illustrate these arguments with an account of the East German regime's response to the June 17 uprising in 1953, including analysis of an original dataset on secret police informants and food supplies after the unrest.

How do authoritarian governments contain mass opposition and prevent regime instability? This question is at the center of theories of authoritarianism and democratization, and yet our understanding of how regimes solve this problem of authoritarian control is relatively incomplete.[1] Regimes are commonly characterized as implementing a mix of repressive and redistributive policies in order to mitigate the likelihood of popular opposition.[2] However, neither the process by which authoritarian leaders choose this mix of policies, nor the means by which their policy decisions are implemented, have been well theorized or researched in the growing literature on authoritarian politics. Instead, the governing elite and its bureaucracy are treated as a black box which efficiently and effectively transforms political threats into repressive and redistributive policy responses. This model does not fully explain the considerable variation in repressive and redistributive policies observed among authoritarian governments.[3]

In this paper, I argue that the interaction between intra-elite politics and regime structures explains variation in repressive and redistributive behavior among autocracies. Although these regimes respond to mass threats through policy shifts, there is not necessarily a unique equilibrium policy as both a repressive hard-line and a redistributive soft-line can be plausible alternatives to address popular opposition. The choice between these two policy options, or the mix of these options chosen, depend on the relative power of hard-line and soft-line factions within the elite, which in the long run depend on the ability of the regime's agencies to implement policy. When a government's repressive apparatus is less adept at suppressing the threat of mass mobilization, soft-liners are predominant and the regime relies more heavily on redistribution to ensure political stability. When a regime's economic system struggles to target redistribution to restive and threatening groups or has a comparative advantage in violence and surveillance, hard-liners are predominant and the regime relies more heavily on repression.

I illustrate these dynamics using the case of the socialist regime's response to the violent mass uprising of June 17, 1953 in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). This episode was the first real challenge to Soviet domination of East-Central Europe after World War Two and was a significant event in the history of the GDR and the Cold War.[4] First, by analyzing the composition of the Politburo and intra-elite debates, I show that there was significant variation in policy stances within the ruling party and this was important for policy outcomes. Policy in the period immediately surrounding the uprising was a function of conflict between the hard-line party leader Walter Ulbricht and a competing soft-line faction within the elite. Second, I show that both this initial conflict and the long-run trajectory of the regime were influenced by the regime's ability to target redistribution and repression. I analyze an original archival dataset on regional and local food supplies to show that the government's efforts to target higher consumption levels in restive areas were frustrated by the GDR's ineffective economic planning bureaucracy, making a soft-line redistributive policy stance unfeasible. On the other hand, a hard-line course was feasible due to the ability of security bureaucrats to reform the GDR's state security agency and effectively target mass surveillance and repression to prevent further unrest after 1953. I analyze an original district-level dataset on the development of the state security agency's informant network to show that it concentrated informants in areas which had been restive on 17 June.

Existing Literature: Repressive Sticks, Redistributive Carrots and Authoritarian Regime Durability

The conflict between a small elite and the larger population over which it rules defines authoritarian politics, and the challenge of managing popular opposition is the most pressing problem facing authoritarian leaders. For Boix and Acemoglu and Robinson, the threat of

mass unrest and revolution is the predominant problem facing dictators resisting democratization, while Svolik considers the task of authoritarian control of the masses alongside that of authoritarian power-sharing with rival elites.[5] Wallace argues that the danger of uprisings in large cities is the threat which dominates contemporary authoritarian regimes, and della Porta examines how mass protests lead to authoritarian regime instability and eventful democratization.[6]

However, despite its centrality to theories of authoritarianism and democratization, popular opposition only rarely causes regime collapse. This leads some scholars to conclude that "[t]he predominant political conflict in dictatorships appears to be not between the ruling elite and the masses but rather one *among* regime insiders".[7] On the other hand, most theories of authoritarian rule assert that mass uprisings only rarely bring down authoritarian governments because they are avoided at all costs. Potentially restive populations are controlled through repression, which raises the costs of collective action against the regime, and redistribution, which builds loyalty to the regime and mitigates economic incentives to revolt.[8] Acemoglu and Robinson, for example, see authoritarian elites constrained by a revolution constraint.[9] Elites attempt to maintain their position either by offering policy concessions in the form of economic redistribution, or engaging in repression. Similarly, Wintrobe argues that dictators attain the acquiescence of their populations by outlawing opposition, and providing economic rents to the population.[10]

These accounts provide an explanation for the lack of successful revolutionary uprisings under authoritarian governments. What is not well understood, however, is how authoritarian governments decide on their repressive and redistributive policies, and how these policies are implemented. Indeed, these elements of authoritarian politics are notably absent from theories of authoritarianism and democratization. For Acemoglu and Robinson, Boix, Svolik and Wallace, repression and redistribution depend directly on levels of inequality or urbanization

in a society.[11] Wintrobe argues that some regimes produce power more effectively through repression while others do so through redistribution, but does not give an explanation of where these capabilities come from.[12] Relatedly, Davenport and Gallagher and Hanson argue that repression is more likely to be used when alternative sources of power, such as material resources, are difficult for a regime to mobilize, but do not specify what conditions ease the mobilization of alternative sources of power and through what mechanism such structural factors affect elites' decision-making.[13] Studies of repression focus on interactions between states and dissidents, and although states which are less dependent on taxing the citizenry for economic resources are more repressive, such studies do not say much about the interaction between repression and redistribution.[14]

Intra-Elite Politics, Regime Structures and Authoritarian Learning: From Threats to Policy Outcomes

In this paper, I explore the determinants of regimes' repressive and redistributive capabilities, and elucidate the pathways through which these have effects on policy. My model of authoritarian policy-making can be summarized as in Figure 1. Policy inputs are the underlying causes of mass unrest: economic grievances and factors facilitating mobilization. These threats are translated by regimes into redistributive policies, which mitigate grievances, and repression, which impedes mobilization. Following the black box model outlined above, and presented in the upper panel of Figure 1, regimes carry out a homogeneous translation of threats into policy outputs, which go on to have predictable effects on political stability.

Figure 1: Models of Repressive and Redistributive Policy-Making under Authoritarianism



I argue that two intervening factors, intra-elite politics and problems of policy implementation, have significant effects on policy outcomes and political instability. As the balance of power between hard-line and soft-line factions within the elite evolves, so will the mix of repressive and redistributive policies chosen by the government. In addition, agencies tasked with implementing government policy may not do so efficiently or effectively, having direct effects on outcomes. Linking these two factors, bureaucratic politics also have indirect effects on policy through the mechanism of authoritarian learning.[15] Able to observe policy outcomes, members of the elite will favor those which match their regime's revealed comparative advantages: hard-line elites will be relatively numerous and powerful in regimes which find it easy to mobilize and target repression, while soft-line elites will be ascendant in regimes which find it easy to mobilize and target economic resources to placate restive groups.

My account departs from structural theories of authoritarianism by disaggregating the ruling elite and assigning divergent policy preferences to its members. However, I do not follow O'Donnell and Schmitter in arguing that elite factions are based solely on pre-existing beliefs and political expediency.[16] Instead, I take the state-structuralist view that authoritarian elites have conflicting views on threats and policies which are based on differing assessments of the structural capacity of the regime. Variation in these assessments is the product of uncertainty, the substitutability of repression and redistribution, and learning processes. At a basic level, there is always uncertainty about the nature of the threats posed to a regime and the best way to negotiate them. By definition, authoritarian regimes lack institutional mechanisms for aggregating the preferences of their citizens, they find it difficult to identify their opponents and can attempt to manipulate the short-term costs of repression.[17] In addition, repressive and redistributive policies are not mutually exclusive. Most authoritarian governments are both

repressive *and* redistributive, and trade one policy tool off against the other while maximizing what Wintrobe calls a power production function.[18]

Uncertainty around the optimal policy course and the substitutability of repression and redistribution lead to regimes being faced with two distinct policy choices when managing popular opposition: a high-repression, low-redistribution *hard-line* policy and a low-repression, high-redistribution *soft-line* policy.[19] Both are at least plausible, and with some probability viable, solutions to the problem of authoritarian control, and can be considered points along a continuum of policies maximizing political stability according to the regime's power production function. Divisions within the ruling elite crystallize around these two policy options and result in the emergence of hard-line and soft-line factions. Membership can be a result of specific roles within the regime; for example we will see below that the Minister in charge of consumer provisioning in the GDR was a soft-liner due to her strong personal preference for greater redistribution which would enhance the effectiveness of her Ministry and prestige within the elite. Ideology and political expediency also play a role in determining soft- and hard-line faction membership. In the socialist dictatorships of East-Central Europe, the first generation of leaders such as Ulbricht in the GDR, Bierut in Poland or Rakosi in Hungary were Stalinist "Muscovites" who had spent the war in exile in Moscow and become committed to repressive and economically austere policies during this time. Committed to, and associated with, hard-line policies, they were reluctant to modify their views as doing so would undermine their positions of authority.

However, I argue that the membership and strength of each faction is more strongly predicted by a regime's revealed comparative advantage in repression and redistribution, which is structurally determined and an exogenous influence on the relative power of competing factions. Hard-liners can be expected to be relatively numerous and powerful in regimes with a comparative advantage in repression, while soft-liners can be expected to be relatively

numerous and powerful in regimes with a comparative advantage in redistribution. My model of authoritarian control departs from previous approaches by allowing for regime capacity and economic structures to co-determine authoritarian governments' comparative advantages in repression and redistribution. In economies which struggle to produce growth, where bureaucracies can only poorly target redistribution and where government agencies are very effective in repressing mass unrest – in planned economies, in those based on extracting resource rents and under military regimes – governments have a comparative advantage in repression.[20] Where the economy produces relatively high rates of growth and government agencies can efficiently and effectively target redistribution, governments have a comparative advantage in redistribution. [21] As members of the elite observe policy decisions and political outcomes, they learn the comparative advantages of the regime and the faction whose preferred policy matches the comparative advantage of the regime can be expected to grow in size and strength within the elite.

Problems of policy implementation are absent from the black box model of authoritarian politics, but they shape the policy outcomes and go on to influence elite faction formation. These problems under authoritarianism revolve around two main issues: delegation between elite principals and their agents, and bureaucratic capabilities. Because the ruling elite in authoritarian regimes – like elected officials in democracies – must delegate significant authority to bureaucrats, they have imperfect control over how policies are implemented.[22] The individuals staffing government ministries have their own goals – private political values, career objectives or an aversion to effort – which do not overlap with those of their principals in the cabinet or Politburo. These problems can be mitigated through monitoring institutions or installing allies as agents, but they remain essential features of authoritarian politics.[23] Bureaucracies may also simply lack the capabilities to implement authoritarian leaders' desired policies effectively, due to a lack of resources, technological change or

because of institutional and economic barriers. For example, changes in information technology and the organizational structures of intelligence agencies have had significant consequences for their abilities to gather and process information on both domestic and international actors.[24]

The capacity of bureaucracies to deliver desired outcomes also depends on their complementarity with economic structures. Socialist planned economies such as those in the GDR and the Soviet Union faced significant challenges in delivering higher standards of living to their citizens.[25] Their ideological commitment to heavy industry and the considerable problems involved in addressing consumer demand by central planners led to chronic shortages. Along similar lines, the evidence linking state oil rents and authoritarian durability is mixed: regimes have difficulty targeting redistribution of oil income to more diffuse groups, finding it easiest to distribute rents to rival elites and the military.[26] Market economies, which deliver higher growth and allow government agencies to more effectively manipulate incentive structures through the price mechanism, are more effective in targeting redistribution.[27]

Equilibrium levels of repression and redistribution depend not only on mass threats, but on the balance of power between hard-liners and soft-liners within the regime, and on its capabilities to mobilize and target repressive and economic resources. Shifts in this equilibrium can come from three sources. First, from unexpected outbreaks of mass unrest which cause fundamental re-assessments of regime capabilities and optimal policies of control. Second, from changes in economic structures which affect the regime's ability to deliver growth, for example recessions, shifts in international markets or adverse weather which affects output. Under conditions of increased scarcity, hard-liners will become more numerous and powerful and the regime will rely more heavily on repression as a tool of control. Third, from changes in technologies of repression, redistribution and mass

mobilization. As repressive institutions develop new techniques and technologies, for example new methods of surveillance or policing, they will become more effective in controlling mass threats, leading elites to advocate greater use of repression as a tool of control. Conversely, as development generates greater wealth, or market reforms lead to growth being more efficiently delivered to the population in the form of higher living standards, greater weight will be given to soft-liners' calls for emphasis on redistribution as a tool of control. However, it must be noted that technological advances can also positively affect the population's capacity for mass unrest, and negatively affect the efficacy of repressive institutions. In particular, the spread of mobile personal communications technology is enabling popular opposition to authoritarian governments, with ambiguous effects on the problem of authoritarian control.[28]

Hard-Liners, Soft-Liners and Responses to the 17 June Uprising in East Germany

Contrary to models of authoritarian politics which assume a unitary elite, or uniform policy preferences among the leadership, the East German regime was characterized by intra-elite factionalism and conflict over repressive and redistributive policy in the early 1950s. In this section of the paper, I show that the power of hard- and soft-line factions within the SED elite had strong effects on repressive and redistributive policy in the period surrounding the 17 June uprising in the country. Consider Figure 2, which shows the membership of the Politburo of the SED, the party's central decision-making body, between its inception in 1950 and the Fifth Party Congress in July 1958.[29] General Secretary Walter Ulbricht's Stalinist vision for the country during this period was based upon the swift development of heavy industry, totalitarian infiltration and control of society by the SED, and growing repression by the Ministry for State Security (*Stasi*).[30] He was supported by a hard-line faction within the

Politburo centered on his eventual successor, Erich Honecker. In opposition to the General Secretary's policies stood a soft-line faction, which was led by Stasi chief Wilhelm Zaisser and Rudolf Herrnstadt, editor of the party newspaper *Neues Deutschland*. These communists were wary of Ulbricht's dictatorial leadership style within the party and worried that low living standards due to a lack of investment in food and consumer goods production were endangering the stability of the government. Herrnstadt succinctly described their soft-line alternative for containing mass opposition thus: "Comrade Ulbricht underestimates the possibility that a dramatic improvement can be made ... above all by satisfying the legitimate need of the working people to see that work has an impact on their living conditions."[31] As I show in Figure 2, the soft-line faction within the Politburo was large and even constituted a majority in the months surrounding June 17th. However, after July 1953, Ulbricht was able to purge most soft-liners from the party leadership and re-establish his control of the regime. The remainder of this section argues that these developments had important implications for redistributive and repressive policy in the country.

Figure 2: Soft- and Hard-Line Members of the SED Politburo, 1950-1957



Note: Bars indicate length of tenure in Politburo. Hard-liners shown in black. * Indicates non-voting candidate member.

As the East German population became increasingly restive under conditions of economic austerity and growing repression in the early 1950s, support for soft-liners grew within the Politburo. Minister for Trade and Provisioning Elli Schmidt, for example, expressed her support for Zaisser and Herrnstadt by complaining in May 1953 of rising levels of discontent and the government lacking the capacity to satisfy consumer demand: "our ministers don't go shopping in order to see for themselves what our population lacks in the most important manufactured consumer goods."[32] Almost simultaneously, Ulbricht passed an ill-conceived measure which increased workers' output quotas by ten percent with no corresponding increase in wages. Discontent among the population thus grew further by early June, leading the General Secretary to be ordered to appear at a meeting in Moscow and subjected to a barrage of criticism from the Soviet leadership, who demanded that he back down from his hard-line economic policies.

Summoning the East German leadership to Moscow was a departure from previous Soviet policy, which had little effect on developments in the East-Central European satellite states during the last months of Stalin's life and the leadership struggle directly following his death. Despite economic crises and growing political unrest across the region, these were discussed only rarely and superficially in Moscow. No consensus on a direction for these states was reached until at least May 1953, when the Soviet leadership decided that a wholesale departure from Stalinist hard-line policies was needed. In the preceding months, a lack of clear policy directives generated a permissive environment. Governments such as that in East Germany dealt with their internal economic and political problems without a great deal of guidance from Moscow and even directly contradicted its relatively rare recommendations for economic reforms.[33]

Given growing unrest in the country and Ulbricht's weakened backing from Moscow, the hard-line faction shrank further still in the East German elite during the month of May.

Politburo members criticized what they saw as misguided policies which were perpetuated by a cult of personality around the General Secretary. They called for greater emphasis on higher living standards, a reduction of his personal power and intra-party democratization. These demands were supported by the Soviet representative in East Berlin, who attended critical Politburo meetings in early June and made personal attacks on Ulbricht's leadership.[34] At a meeting on 9 June, soft-liners were predominant, with only Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl and Erich Honecker speaking up in Ulbricht's defense.[35]

Faced with growing discontent among the population at large and an increasingly powerful soft-line faction within SED leadership, Ulbricht was forced to soften his hard-line policy stance somewhat before the June 17 uprising, in the form of the economic "New Course". This watering-down of the regime's commitment to swift industrialization and the creation of a totalitarian state promised to increase living standards by raising wages, lowering prices, abandoning agricultural collectivization and transferring resources to the production of consumer goods. However, ultimately his hard-line stance was reasserted and many of the New Course's measures were either never fully adopted, poorly implemented or quickly reversed.[36] The reason for the short lifespan of the New Course in the GDR was the reassertion of Ulbricht's power within the Politburo after the brief ascendency of the soft-line faction.

On June 17 1953, party offices, police stations and even prisons across the country were stormed during mass protests involving hundreds of thousands of citizens. The government and its security forces, caught completely by surprise, were overwhelmed and only through the speedy and violent action of the occupying Soviet armed forces were order and the rule of the SED restored. The June 17 uprising was a direct consequence of the regime's austerity policies, in particular its wavering on economic policy and failure to reduce piece-work

norms in the New Course, and the SED's lack of an effective coercive apparatus contributed decisively to the extent of unrest.[37]

Ulbricht's hold on power within the SED became tenuous in the aftermath of the crisis. The soft-line faction, already numerically predominant in the Politburo, turned on the General Secretary and his supporters, blaming the failings of the party leadership for workers' grievances and the unrest. Soviet officials in East Berlin and Moscow blamed him for the events of 17 June and were convinced of the need for his dismissal and drastic economic reforms to restore political stability to the country.[38] Ulbricht was under considerable pressure to change his hard-line stance, but instead insisted that the events of June 17 could have been prevented by more effective repression. He blamed Stasi chief Zaisser for not detecting and apprehending the western saboteurs and unreformed fascists who he argued were responsible for the uprising.[39] During the month directly following June 17, soft-liners around Zaisser and Herrnstadt drafted measures to reform party institutions, abolish Ulbricht's position of General Secretary, and to fully commit the government to investments in higher living standards under the New Course.[40] These measures were supported by the most senior Soviet advisors to the SED.[41] At a dramatic Politburo meeting on the night of 8 July, Ulbricht was directly and personally criticized by almost the entire party leadership, and essentially agreed to stepping down as party leader to be replaced by a soft-line alternative. However, Ulbricht traveled to Moscow the following morning, where he was able to consolidate his support from the Kremlin, discredit the soft-liners within the Politburo and lay the foundation for a purge of soft-liners which made the resumption of his hard-line policies inevitable.

The fate of Ulbricht and the New Course in the GDR were therefore linked to the post-Stalin succession struggle in the Soviet Union. Until the aftermath of June 17, Soviet policy had favored the creation of a unified Germany under the strong, if not exclusive, influence of

Moscow. However, the policy of reunification was abandoned after the purge of Beria, with whom a policy of German unity was most closely associated, in late June 1953. Elites in Moscow had almost universally favoured a radical revision of policy towards the New Course and the removal of Ulbricht from power less than a month previously. However, the purge of Beria and associated shift in Soviet preferences towards an independent socialist GDR led these same elites to give their full backing to Ulbricht's leadership.[42]

Both East German and Soviet elites were deeply skeptical of the feasibility of Zaisser and Herrnstadt's soft-line policies which relied on liberalizing economic reforms to increase living standards and mitigate citizens' grievances against the regime. The existing central planning apparatus could not target redistribution, and the dangers of fundamental economic reform in the country appeared too great, as it was feared that liberalizing the economy would start a process which could lead to regime collapse and a unified, capitalist Germany.[43] After mid-July, Soviet leaders and hard-line East Germans decisively threw their lot in with Ulbricht. As I show in Figure 2, by 26 July he was able to eject Zaisser, Herrnstadt and four of their soft-line allies from the Politburo and replace them with three of his own hard-line allies. The three soft-liners who remained in the Politburo had been the least vocal in their criticism of Ulbricht. Thus, the fate of the redistributivist New Course was sealed. Because it was so closely linked to the soft-line faction within the Politburo, its main economic policy measures were quietly reversed or never implemented as hard-liners around Ulbricht resumed their ascendancy.[44]

The shift to a coherent hard-line policy, which combined continued consumer austerity with greater levels of repression, took longer than the defeat of the soft-liners in economic policy. After June 17, Ulbricht was careful to limit his criticism to the leadership of the Stasi – that is, to Zaisser – and not to criticize the organization as a whole, especially not his close ally and Deputy Minister of State Security, Erich Mielke. Zaisser's replacement, Ernst

Wollweber, took office on 23 June as the preferred candidate of the Soviet government, not Ulbricht.[45] With some reluctance, he followed the General Secretary's instructions to carry out "concentrated strikes" on western agents and their alleged co-conspirators in the GDR, which led to a series of prominent arrests and show trials. However, despite these measures, Wollweber was in reality a soft-liner. He reduced the brutality of Stasi repression, ending the harshest arrest and interrogation tactics such as beatings and sleep deprivation.[46] He placed greater emphasis on the collection and reporting of intelligence, opposed mass surveillance of the population and distanced himself from the creation of heavily armed police units and militias in the wake of June 17.[47] When under huge pressure to deliver scapegoats for the 17 June uprising, he stalled.[48] These policy preferences eventually brought him into conflict with Ulbricht. His removal from office in October 1957 was the first step in a renewed purge of the upper echelons of the SED which signalled Ulbricht's remarkable ability to survive the political shockwaves resonating across Eastern Europe after Stalin's death in 1953. Wollweber was replaced by his deputy Erich Mielke, the hard-line secret policeman who was to run the Stasi until the collapse of the SED regime in 1989.[49] The power struggle between hard-liner Ulbricht and the soft-liner Wollweber led to variation in the size and growth of the secret police apparatus from the mid- to late-1950s.[50] In the period of Wollweber's leadership directly after the 1953 uprising, the GDR's Ministry of State Security staff levels first stagnated then shrank by around 80 from 1955 to 1956. After Ulbricht had removed Wollweber from his position at the Ministry of State Security and replaced him with hard-liner Erich Mielke in 1957, the Stasi resumed growing at a rate of around 1,500 employees a year.

Contrary to models of authoritarian politics which posit a unitary elite with uniform preferences over repressive and redistributive policies, the East German elite was riven by rivalries between hard-liners and soft-liners during the period leading up to, and following,

the June 17 uprising. The regime's response to the threat of mass unrest during this time cannot be explained without reference to the policy preferences of these groups and their relative strength within the Politburo. The redistributive New Course was conceived during a period of soft-liner ascendency, but as Ulbricht reasserted himself within the elite, its implementation was halted. Subsequently, Ulbricht's desired shift to a hard-line policy of more harsh repression was delayed by the presence of the Soviet-backed soft-liner Wollweber as the chief of the Stasi. East Germany, then, is a unique case because it witnessed mass unrest in 1953 and an abortive regime change from Ulbricht to the soft-line faction, whereas other socialist states witnessed either unrest and a soft-line leadership transition (Hungary, Poland), or unrest and a transition from one hard-line leader to another (Czechoslovakia). In Romania, hardliners defeated "soft-liners", but without popular unrest; in Bulgaria one hardliner handed power to another without unrest, and in Albania there was no change of leadership.[51]

Structural Constraints on Redistribution: Targeting Consumer Supply in the East German Planned Economy

The East German elite factions who had a decisive impact on policy choices did not make decisions in a vacuum; they carefully judged the success of their repressive and redistributive levers of authoritarian control and recalibrated their methods in the face of growing unrest leading up to, and following, June 17. Importantly, the levers themselves – that is, the capacity of the regime to mobilize and target repressive and redistributive resources – were a major factor in their policy calculations. A shift away from Ulbricht's preference for investment in heavy industry and consumer austerity depended on the regime's ability to target scarce supplies of food and consumer goods to the most demanding segments of the

population. This task was beyond the GDR's economic planning bureaucracy, leading to widespread shortages and supply bottlenecks which undermined attempts to placate mass opposition through increased standards of living. Without fundamental reform of the economy, targeted redistribution was impossible in the GDR, making hard-liners' advocacy of repression as a tool of authoritarian control compelling and soft-line alternatives unrealistic.

Consumer supply planning in the GDR was carried out by the Ministry for Trade and Provisioning (*Ministerium für Handel und Versorgung*) in Berlin. There, officials put together annual plans for commodity supplies and retail sales; lists of goods to be made available to the population by region, measured in units of weight, quantity or volume. The basic guidelines for consumer supply were generic consumption levels derived from pre-war figures and what was deemed possible under the five-year-plan, and Order no. 234, by which the Soviet Military Administration had decreed that a greater calorie intake was to be assured to laborers in mining, heavy industry and transportation, as well as those in the government bureaucracy. The industries and factories deemed by the SED to be most central to the economic development of the country were given privileged access to resources, as were their employees, who received greater supplies of food and consumer goods, and in many cases access to free meals in their workplaces.[52] A rationing system was in place for most products until 1949 and for some until 1958, although it must be emphasized that the Ministry's supply plans reflected the state of real living standards far more accurately than individuals' rations, which were frequently not filled.[53]

The task confronting the Ministry for Trade and Provisioning in the 1950s was a challenging and thankless one. Through the manipulation of rations, supply and retail plans, wages, prices and taxes, bureaucrats in Berlin sought to efficiently allocate resources under conditions of endemic scarcity. Inevitably, they were unsuccessful, and the regime's policies were not

successfully implemented. This was in part due to the magnitude and difficulty of the task with which they were faced: staff did not have the information they needed to construct their plans, had no systematic market research strategy for collecting it, and were nonetheless "drowning in [their] own paperwork".[54] Staff at the Ministry for Trade and Provisioning tended to be inexperienced in commerce, and selected on the basis of political loyalty to the SED rather than qualifications in relevant fields. In addition, oversight of local planners at the district level confounded planners at the center. Not only did local planners deviate from the plans laid out in Berlin, but local networks of friendship and patronage determined access to food and consumer goods as much as did the plans of district or Berlin bureaucrats.[55]

In order to test the efficacy of the planning apparatus's response to the 17 June uprising, I collected a range of regional- and district-level data on the supply of food and consumer goods in 1955 and 1956. These data, which were classified as secret under the SED regime and are now available in German archives, have never been subject to quantitative analysis. Reports by the Ministry of Trade and Provisioning in Berlin show the outcomes of economic planning at the center, which can be compared to data from reports by regional planning agencies showing policy outcomes at the local level.[56] Analysis of this data reveals a regime struggling to allocate economic resources by any rational system, let alone one which strategically targeted especially needy or restive groups.

In Berlin, policy allocated resources to regions characterized by higher levels of blue-collar employment and areas which had been restive on 17 June. I calculated correlation coefficients between regional blue-collar employment, unrest on June 17 and a variety of per-capita consumer provisioning outcomes.[57] The correlations between blue-collar employment and the provision of butter, meat, milk, eggs and flour are positive, and range from moderate ($r = 0.34$, flour) to strong ($r = 0.76$, eggs). Neubrandenburg, a region with only around 25% blue-collar employment in 1950, was allocated only 5.25kg of butter and 12 eggs per person

in 1956 while Chemnitz, with 49% blue-collar employment, was allocated 7.5kg of butter and 48 eggs per person. East Berlin was far more privileged than any other region, receiving 11kg of butter and 175 eggs per person in 1956. An overall positive relationship can also be observed between restive regions and food provisioning. Areas such as Schwerin and Neubrandenburg, which were relatively calm on 17 June, received lower per-capita provisions of butter, eggs, meat and milk in 1956 than restive regions such as Leipzig, Potsdam and Rostock. Again, it must be noted that East Berlin received dramatically higher provisions of food than less restive areas – 58kg equivalent of milk and cream versus 29kg in Schwerin, for example. At the national level, these correlations suggest that in 1956 the SED regime and its bureaucrats did attempt to direct greater resources to areas with greater demand and where the population had been more restive on June 17.

However, central planners were not solely responsible for the provisioning situation in the country. Instead, they worked together with regional provisioning planners in smaller cities across the country, with whom they collaborated to draw up the supply plans for each region and its smaller districts. I collected data on planned food provisions from these plans for fifty districts in the regions of Potsdam, on the southwest border of Berlin; Cottbus, around 120km southeast of the capital in Brandenburg; and Halle, around 200km southwest of the capital near Leipzig. These regions contain a substantial degree of variation between urban and rural districts, and in distance from the capital, and are a good sample for drawing inferences on the 216 total East German districts. I ran ordinary least squares regressions on the total supply figures for butter, meat, milk, eggs, flour and sugar.

The results of these models are presented in Figure 3 and show that the economic planning bureaucracy was far more successful in targeting redistribution at the center than at the local level. Although at the regional level there was a positive correlation between food provisions and blue-collar employment, and also with unrest on 17 June, there is no equivalent

correlation at the local district level. Areas with greater blue-collar employment did not enjoy significantly better provisioning with any of the basic foods examined here, not even butter or eggs which were supplied at much higher levels to more blue-collar regions. Blue-collar employment is significantly correlated only with greater supplies of milk. Similarly, there is no strong correlation between unrest and food supplies across products. Unrest is only significantly correlated with greater supplies of flour across districts. A completely calm district was supplied 104 tons of flour less, on average, than a district which experienced very intense unrest – a difference of only one kilogram of flour per head in the average district.

Figure 3: Regressions of District Food Supplies on Unrest and Demographic Data



Note: Coefficient name in grey box, model names in legend. Graphs show coefficients and 90% confidence intervals for OLS models of each product. Variables standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one, except dummy variables. See Table 1, supplementary materials, for full model results.[58]

Large and statistically significant differences in food supplies are seen in relation to the size of the agricultural sector. Given the conditions of scarcity confronting central planners in the GDR, it is unsurprising that rural districts were systematically under-supplied, due to their capacity to raise their own food. Thus, all models in Figure 3 show a negative sign on the coefficient for agricultural employment, except the model for sugar. For meat and flour this coefficient is large and statistically significant. Districts with the observed minimum level of agricultural employment (2%) received twice as much fresh meat as districts with the observed maximum level of agricultural employment (28%), for example.

This analysis shows that the GDR's planned economy was incapable of targeting economic resources in a rational manner, and this point was not lost on soft-line elites who understood that fundamental economic reform would be a necessary precondition for a less repressive, but stable, political system. Before June 17, Herrnstadt argued that local administrative institutions had lost touch with the population and that the bureaucracy responded only to the demands of party functionaries rather than economic realities. He called for a program which would cut bureaucracy and delegate greater planning authority to local authorities, and after June 17 even proposed state support for small private enterprises and a move to a mixed economy in order to improve the supply of consumer goods and raise living standards. These proposals, which effectively suggested the dismantling of the GDR as a socialist economy, were too radical and risky for many within the Politburo who feared they would destabilize the entire regime and potentially lead to reunification with West Germany. Faced with this uncertainty, and with the Soviet Union moving to back Ulbricht for related reasons, the Politburo rallied around the General Secretary's Stalinist economic development strategy after he re-asserted himself within the party.[59]

Learning New Technologies of Repression: Targeted Surveillance as a Tool of Authoritarian Control

By the end of July 1953, the hard-liner Ulbricht had reasserted himself within the Politburo, the fate of the redistributionist New Course was sealed and it was clear that no move would be made to liberalize the East German planned economy. The population of the GDR would, therefore, continue to be faced with low living standards. This raised a pressing question for the ruling elite: how to maintain political stability under economic conditions which obviously promoted the opposite outcome? The answer, as I will show, was a move to a new strategy of repression which would facilitate authoritarian control. Under the hard-line Erich Mielke the Stasi would grow to become a "sprawling, barely manageable security bureaucracy with diverse tasks, enormous personnel resources and an unparalleled network of informants, narks and agents".[60] I present new evidence showing that although it may have been large, the Stasi was able to target repression, by growing its informant network in areas which had experienced unrest on June 17. It was this Stasi which would help prevent another June 17 in the GDR and strengthen the hard-line faction within the Politburo through its efficacy in restraining opposition.

The Stasi had, since its inception in the late 1940s, maintained a network of spies and informants within the GDR. However, before June 17 their primary target had been the domestic political opposition and counter-espionage against western agents. After June 17, and particularly under Mielke, the focus of the Stasi shifted towards the suppression of dissent in the population of the GDR, and within the SED itself. Through massive surveillance of all areas of life, non-conformity with the party line was to be pre-empted, detected and punished.[61] In this task, secret informants – or "unofficial employees" (*Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter*, IMs) in Stasi jargon – collected information and provided logistical support for regular Stasi officers. They became, in the words of Mielke, the Stasi's "main

weapon against the enemy."[62] The IMs were regular East German citizens who had reached a secret but formal agreement with the Stasi to assist the Ministry with its work; by 1989 around two percent of the population were either Stasi employees or informants, a level far exceeding that in the other People's Democracies and surpassed only by the contemporary North Korean dictatorship.[63] The use of such a high density of informants in the population was a new and effective tool of authoritarian control and can be accredited, to a large extent, to Erich Mielke, the Minister of State Security from 1957-1989.[64]

There is considerable debate among historians over the extent to which IMs were effective sources of intelligence for the Stasi, and thus whether raw numbers of informants are a good indicator of levels of repression in the country. On the one hand, some informants were unreliable, producing little information or nothing of any operational use.[65] On the other hand, the IMs were the main source of intelligence for the relatively small number of active Stasi officers across the country, who were continually seeking to increase the effectiveness of their informant networks and assiduously followed up all accusations of political incorrectness, whether these resulted in imprisonment, dismissal or lesser forms of persecution.[66] In this study, I am agnostic on whether IMs were all effective suppliers of intelligence, and assume a random distribution of effective informants within the pool of IMs. I examine the geographical distribution of these informants across the GDR after June 17 and whether the Stasi was able to target its informant network at restive areas.

Other socialist regimes in East Central Europe did not experience the sorts of intra-elite shifts witnessed in the GDR, and therefore did not see such a dramatic growth in their state security institutions after Stalin's death. In Figure 4, I present data on the number of state security staff and informants in East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia from 1950-1967.[67] These data clearly show the importance of the intra-elite power shifts in these countries described above for the development of their repressive institutions. Contrasting with the swift growth

of the East German Stasi, the period of transition from the hard-liner Bierut to the more soft-line Gomulka is associated with a clear reversal in the growth of the staff and informant numbers of the *Służba Bezpieczeństwa*, the Security Service of the Polish Ministry of the Interior. This agency became much smaller than its equivalent in the GDR, despite Poland's considerably larger population. In Czechoslovakia, the staff and informant numbers of the *Státní Bezpečnost* (StB) continued their previous growth trajectory as the leadership exhibited greater stability than in East Germany or Poland; the StB became a much smaller organization in absolute and per capita terms than its equivalent in the GDR as the hard-liner Mielke grew the Stasi through the Cold War.

Figure 4: State Security Staff and Informants in East Central Europe, 1950-1965



To analyze the targeting of repression in the GDR, I collected district-level data on the informant network in the 1950s, in the late 1960s, and in the late 1980s, directly before the fall of the SED regime.[68] I regressed the number of informants per district in each year on an indicator of the level of unrest experienced in a district on June 17. The results of four models are presented in Figure 5. Under Zaisser in 1952, before the uprising, the informant network of the nascent State Security apparatus was relatively small, with a district average of five informants per ten thousand inhabitant. Informants had been recruited at somewhat higher rates in areas which proved to be more restive on June 17, though these differences are not statistically significant. By December 1954, one and a half years after the uprising and Wollweber taking office, the informant network was twice as dense, with an average of 10 informants per ten thousand inhabitants. Although the maximum density of informants across districts had not much increased under the new Stasi chief, the Stasi had targeted growth in the districts which experienced the greatest unrest on June 17. As shown in the upper-left panel of Figure 5, by 1954 the Stasi informant network was significantly denser in areas which had experienced greater unrest.

Figure 5: Regressions of Local Informant Density on 1953 Unrest and Population Data



Note: Dependent variable is number of informants per district. Graphs show OLS coefficients and 90% confidence intervals. Variables standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one, except dummy variables. See Table 2 in supplementary materials for full model results.

In the first few years of Mielke's tenure, the Ministry for State Security developed a much denser but relatively uniform network of informants. He took over the Ministry in mid-October 1957, and by the end of 1959 the informant network was twice as dense as in 1954, with a district average of 21 informants per ten thousand inhabitants. Variation across districts decreased under Mielke; the range of informants was from 12 to 28 per ten thousand inhabitants in 1959, versus 3 to 24 in 1954. The informant network in 1959 was less targeted at restive areas than in 1954. In 1959, there was no longer a significant correlation between unrest on 17 June and informant numbers across districts. There are organizational reasons for the initial loss of targeting in the informant network under Mielke. Although the Stasi did concentrate its work in areas known to be centers of political opposition, it was organized formally in territorial units which gave incentives for growth in officer and informant numbers across the country.[69] After Mielke took over the agency, its rate of growth led to high staff turnover in district offices and new, inexperienced officers entering the service.[70] In general, it can be said that the early years of Mielke's tenure involved maximizing quantity, rather than quality, of informants as the Minister swiftly built the size of the agency in order to prepare it for the invasive role which he foresaw for it in East German society. [71]

By the end of the 1950s the Stasi had grown into a far more omniscient and effective repressive device, and with its help the SED regime had consolidated its hold on power. The Ministry increased its budget and staffing levels throughout the 1960s as it took on new responsibilities and successfully contained political opposition. Major increases in the density of the informant network came in the wake of the Prague spring in 1968, and after a decade of consolidation of the GDR's repressive apparatus Mielke had formed it into a targeted repression mechanism. From 1959 to 1969 the network of informants had increased its average density from 21 to 24 per thousand inhabitants, and its maximum density of informants dramatically from 28 to 74 informants per thousand inhabitants. In contrast to the

initial period of Mielke's tenure, the Stasi informant network by 1969 was targeted at the areas which had proved restful in 1953, as the significant positive coefficient on the unrest variable in the lower-left panel of Figure 5 shows. By 1969, areas which had experienced high levels of unrest in 1953 had over 130 informants more than districts which had been calm on June 17, holding all else constant; an increase of over one standard deviation.

Analysis of the Stasi's informant network at the end of the 1980s shows that, despite significant hurdles in developing and managing the security bureaucracy, the Stasi was successful in developing a rational and targeted system of repression until the downfall of the regime. I collected data from 1987 on the distribution of three types of informants: "unofficial employees" (IMs); "leadership IMs" (*Führungs-IM*, FIMs) who were coordinators for several regular IMs; and "defense IMs" (*IM der Abwehr*, IMB) who were engaged in counter-espionage against people and groups who the Stasi had classified as enemies of the state.[72] The density of the regular IM network was far higher in 1987 than in 1969; the average density had increased by fifty percent from 24 to 36 informants per thousand inhabitants, while the maximum observed density had doubled from 74 to a staggering 154 informants per thousand inhabitants. I regressed the number of each type of informant, and the total of all these groups, on indicators of unrest in 1953, population and population density, whether each district bordered West Berlin or West Germany, and in the case of coordinators the number of regular IMs in each district.[73] The results of all models are presented in Table 2 in the supplementary materials. The model of regular informants shows that the Stasi informant network in 1987 continued to be a function of the unrest of June 1953. There is a significant positive correlation between the level of unrest experienced in a district in 1953 and informant numbers in 1987. Increasing the level of unrest which a district experienced in 1953 from the minimum to the maximum results in an increase in the number of informants in 1987 from 216 to 270, holding all else constant. This is an increase of a little

less than half a standard deviation. Districts with greater population densities also had greater densities of informants, on average, which also is a sign that the Stasi was targeting potentially restive areas as population density is a strong predictor of unrest under authoritarian governments. Around 12% of the GDR's districts were on the West German border, and these districts also had greater densities of informants on average; this is unsurprising given the Stasi's ongoing concern with foreign infiltration and collaboration with western agents.

Turning to the model of informant coordinators, or FIMs, a different but nonetheless rational pattern of informants emerges. The number of coordinators in a district is not associated directly with its population but increases as a linear function of the number of regular informants present: one coordinator is added for every twenty IMs, on average. Districts bordering West Germany contained four more FIMs on average, while those bordering West Berlin contained five less FIMs, holding all else equal. Informants engaged in counter-espionage against identified targets, the IMBs, were distributed relatively uniformly across the country, correlated only with district population. This is unsurprising, considering that "enemy" targets can be expected to have also been relatively randomly distributed in the population.

Unable to target effectively target economic resources in order to prevent mass unrest, the SED could rely on the Stasi to construct a rational, targeted and effective system of mass surveillance which provided a key tool in the regime's solution to the problem of authoritarian control. Under the soft-liner Wollweber, in the direct aftermath of the June 17 uprising, the Ministry's network of informants was made denser in districts which had experienced greater unrest. His hard-line successor Erich Mielke, who conceived of a state security agency which suppressed all dissent through massive surveillance of every sphere of East Germans' lives, moved in the late 1950s to dramatically increase the density of its

informant network across the entire country and sacrificed targeted surveillance in the process. However, over the next three decades of stable leadership and institutional structures, not to mention generous funding from the SED, Mielke constructed a Stasi which, with its dense but targeted and rationally planned informant network, was without parallel in socialist Eastern Europe.

Discussion and Conclusion

Most theories of authoritarianism assume a unitary elite confronting mass opposition using a mix of repressive and redistributive policies determined by socio-economic factors such as inequality or urbanization. In this paper, I argue that this assumption ignores crucial intra-regime dynamics which have independent effects on repression and redistribution under authoritarian governments. Firstly, I argue that the sorts of intra-elite divisions between hard-liners and soft-liners which were so important in determining the SED regime's policies leading up to and responding to the June 17 uprising should be expected to have decisive effects on policy under most regimes. Secondly, the capacity of authoritarian government agencies to implement redistributive and repressive policies should not be assumed to be absolute or constant across space and time. The East German regime was incapable of mobilizing and targeting both redistribution and repression before 1953, and relied on the Soviet army to restore order during the uprising. Thereafter, however, through a significant increase in the level and efficacy of repression the SED was able to create a system of authoritarian control which suppressed opposition despite the ineffectiveness of the planned economy. Finally, I argue that these types of regime capacities have effects on intra-elite factional conflicts, with increases in repressive capacity strengthening hard-liners and increases in redistributive capacity strengthening soft-liners.

My approach is a call to break open the black box which elites and their bureaucracies are reduced to in many theories of authoritarianism. However, I do not advocate ad-hoc theorizing which associates elite factions with specific policies in a tautological manner. Instead, I argue that the regime's institutional structures and its socio-economic context interact to shape the balance of power between hard-liners and soft-liners within the elite, as they learn to take advantage of the regime's comparative advantages in repression and redistribution. This approach provides a framework for generating significant insights into crucial regime dynamics. Elite factionalism and authoritarian learning give concrete mechanisms for the transmission of mass threats into policy. The question of regime capacity and its interaction with economic structures raises important questions around the relationship between development, repression and democratization. For example, it is possible that market liberalization and democratization are correlated because market reforms make targeted redistribution a more plausible strategy of authoritarian control. My approach also provides a framework for analyzing the effects of technological change and international collaboration on authoritarian regimes. New technologies of repression or redistribution change elites' assessments of their regimes' most feasible strategies of control, as do strategies learned both directly and indirectly from the experiences of other regimes.

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[1] The term "authoritarian control" is due to Milan Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[2] See, for example, the prominent accounts of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, *Economic Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Carles Boix, *Democracy and Redistribution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Ronald Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of Dictatorship* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998) and more recently Svolik, *Authoritarian Rule*, and Mary Gallagher and Jonathan K. Hanson, "Coalitions, Carrots and Sticks: Economic Inequality and Authoritarian States" in *PS: Political Science and Politics* 42:2 (October 2009), 667-672.

[3] On variation in repression under authoritarianism, see Christian Davenport, "State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace" in *Journal of Peace Research* 44:4 (July 2007), 485-504. On redistribution under authoritarianism see, for example, Cullen Hendrix and Stephan Haggard, "Global Food Prices, Regime Type and Urban Unrest in the Developing World" in *Journal of Peace Research* 52:2 (March 2015), 143-157; and Jeremy Wallace, *Cities and Stability: Urbanization, Redistribution and Regime Survival in China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

[4] Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, *Der 17. Juni 1953* (Munich: C.H Beck, 2013); Mark Kramer, "The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe: Internal-External Linkages in Soviet Policy Making (Part 1)" in *Journal of Cold War Studies* 1:1 (Winter 1999).

[5] Acemoglu and Robinson, *Economic Origins*; Boix, *Democracy and Redistribution*; Svolik, *Authoritarian Rule*.

[6] Wallace, 2014; Donna della Porta, *Mobilizing for Democracy: Comparing 1989 and 2011* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

[7] Svolik, *Authoritarian Rule*, 5.

[8] Another prominent strand of literature examines the role of authoritarian institutions in maintaining regime stability. I focus exclusively on repression and redistribution here. See Thomas B. Pepinsky, "The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism" in *British Journal of Political Science* 44:3 (July 2014), 631-653.

[9] Acemoglu and Robinson, *Economic Origins*, 173-220.

[10] Wintrobe, *Political Economy of Dictatorship*, 43-76.

[11] Acemoglu and Robinson, *Economic Origins*; Boix, *Democracy and Redistribution*; Svolik, *Authoritarian Rule*; Wallace, *Cities*.

[12] Wintrobe, *Political Economy of Dictatorship*.

[13] Davenport, "State Repression"; Gallagher and Hanson, "Coalitions, Carrots and Sticks".

[14] Will H. Moore, "The Repression of Dissent: A Substitution Model of Government Coercion" in *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44:1 (February 2000), 107-127. Jacqueline H.R. DeMeritt and Joseph K. Young, "A Political Economy of Human Rights: Oil, Natural Gas and State Incentives to Repress" in *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 30:2 (April 2013), 99-120.

[15] I define learning here as "a change or development in beliefs, skills or procedures as a result of observation and interpretation of experience". Jack S. Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield" in *International Organization* 48:2 (Spring 1998), 283.

[16] Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 15-16.

[17] See, for example, Jason Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Sheena Chestnut Greitens, *Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016); and Henry Thomson, "Landholding Inequality, Political Strategy and Authoritarian Repression: Structure and Agency in Bismarck's 'Second Founding' of the German Empire" in *Studies in Comparative International Development* 50:1 (March 2015), 73-97.

[18] Wintrobe, *Political Economy of Dictatorship*.

[19] The distinction between hard-liners and soft-liners is due to O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions*. However, in their account hard-liners are members of the regime opposed to democratization at any cost while soft-liners are open to democratizing reforms. I use the same terminology to refer to members of the regime who favor repression and redistribution as the predominant tools of authoritarian control, respectively.

[20] Davenport, "State Repression", finds that regimes ruling over less developed economies are more likely to violate civil liberties, as are military regimes and Cold War-era single-party regimes.

[21] On redistribution through food policy in market economies see Henry Thomson, "Food and Power: Agricultural Policy under Democracy and Dictatorship" in *Comparative Politics* (forthcoming 2017).

[22] For a classic treatment of principal-agent problems in political science, see Terry M. Moe, "The New Economics of Organization" in *American Journal of Political Science* 28:4 (November 1984), 739-777. Applications to the control of internal security forces include Greitens, *Dictators*.

[23] On internal and external monitoring of authoritarian coercive institutions, see Pablo Policzer, *The Rise & Fall of Repression in Chile* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009).

[24] See Peter Jackson and Jennifer Siegel, *Intelligence and Statecraft: The Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society* (Westport, CT: Praeger), and Jens Gieseke, *Mielke-Konzern: Die Geschichte der Stasi, 1945-1990* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2002).

[25] Janos Kornai, *The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).

[26] Joseph Wright, Erica Frantz and Barbara Geddes, "Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival" in *British Journal of Political Science* 45:2 (April 2015), 287-306.

[27] Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, "Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion under Dictatorships" in *Economics and Politics* 18:1 (March 2006), 1-26.

[28] Larry J. Diamond and Mark F. Plattner, *Liberation Technology: Social Media and the Struggle for Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012).

[29] Peter Grieder, *The East German Leadership, 1946-1973: Conflict and Crisis* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999) and *Mark Landsman, Dictatorship and Demand: The Politics of Consumerism in East Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 109-111.

[30] Mary Fulbrook, *Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR, 1949-1989* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Klaus Schroeder, *Der SED-Staat: Geschichte und Strukturen der DDR 1949-1990* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2013).

[31] Grieder, *East German Leadership*, 60.

[32] Landsman, *Dictatorship and Demand*, 110.

[33] Mark Kramer, "Succession Struggle (Part 1), 9-11, 31-32.

[34] Kramer, "Succession Struggle", 32-33.

[35] Nadja Stulz-Herrnstadt (Ed.), *Das Herrnstadt-Dokument* (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1990), 62-66.

[36] Landsman, *Dictatorship and Demand*.

[37] See, for example, Karl Wilhelm Fricke and Roger Engelmann, *Der "Tag X" und die Staatssicherheit: 17. Juni 1953 -- Reaktionen und Konsequenzen im DDR-Machtapparat* (Bremen: Temmen, 2003); Jonathan Sperber, "17 June 1953: Revisiting a German Revolution" in *German History* 22:4 (October 2004), 619-643; Henry Thomson, "Economic Grievance Attribution and Mass Unrest under Authoritarianism: Evidence from June 1953 in Socialist East Germany", Unpublished Working Paper, Nuffield College, Oxford. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2597070; Kramer, "Succession Struggle (Part 1)", 40-55.

[38] Mark Kramer, "The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe: Internal-External Linkages in Soviet Policy Making (Part 2)" in *Journal of Cold War Studies* 1:2 (Spring 1999), 8.

[39] Fricke and Engelmann, *Der "Tag X"*, 147.

[40] Grieder, 1999, 71-85 and Christian F. Ostermann, "This is Not a Politburo, But a Madhouse. The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, Soviet Deutschlandpolitik and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German and Hungarian Archives" in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 10 (1998), 61-110.

[41] Mark Kramer, "The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe: Internal-External Linkages in Soviet Policy Making (Part 3)" in *Journal of Cold War Studies* 1:3 (Fall 1999), 15-16.

[42] Kramer, "Succession Struggle (Part 3)", 15-18.

[43] See Fricke and Engelmann, *Der "Tag X"* and Grieder, *East German Leadership*.

[44] Landsman, *Dictatorship and Demand*; Jens Schöne, *Frühling auf dem Lande? Die Kollektivierung der DDR-Landwirtschaft* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2005).

[45] Jan von Flocken and Michael F. Scholz, *Ernst Wollweber: Saboteur – Minister – Unperson* (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 1994), 144-145.

[46] Gieseke, *Mielke-Konzern*, 62-67.

[47] Fricke and Engelmann, *Der "Tag X"*, 179-187.

[48] von Flocken and Scholz, *Ernst Wollweber*, 147.

[49] Roger Engelmann and Silke Schumann, "Kurs auf die entwickelte Diktatur. Walter Ulbricht, die Entmachtung Ernst Wollwebers und die Neuausrichtung des Staatssicherheitsdienstes 1956/57" in *BF Informiert* 1 (1995).

[50] See Jens Gieseke, "German Democratic Republic" in Krzysztof Persak and Lukasz Kaminski, *A Handbook of the Communist Security Apparatus in East Central Europe 1944-1989* (Warsaw: Institute of National Remembrance, 2005), 163-220.

[51] See, for example, Ted Hopf, *Reconstructing the Cold War: The Early Years, 1945-1958* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Ekiert, *The State Against Society*; Kramer, "Succession Struggle (Part 3)"; A Kemp-Welch, *Poland under Communism: A Cold War History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Kevin McDermott, *Communist Czechoslovakia, 1945-1989: A Political and Social History* (London: Palgrave, 2015).

[52] Andrew I. Port, *Conflict and Stability in the German Democratic Republic* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 244-253.

[53] For a more complete description of the consumer supply system, see Landsman, *Dictatorship and Demand.*

[54] Ibid., 83.

[55] Ibid. See also Port, *Conflict and Stability*, 244-253.

[56] The regional-level data on food provisions and deliveries of luxuries and consumer manufactured goods are actual delivered quantities for all 14 regions of the GDR (*Bezirke*) in 1956. District-level data on food provisions are planned quantities for 50 districts (*Kreise*) in 1955. See supplementary materials.

[57] Census data are from an unpublished 1950 census. Unrest is measured on a 0-9 scale. See supplementary materials.

[58] See supplementary materials.

[59] Grieder, *East German Leadership*, 53-91 and Landsman, *Dictatorship and Demand*.

[60] Gieseke, *Mielke-Konzern*, 69.

[61] Fricke and Engelmann, *Der "Tag X"* and Gieseke, *Mielke-Konzern*, 73-75.

[62] Helmut Müller-Enbergs, *Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter des Ministeriums für Staatsicherheit: Richtlinien und Durchführungsbestimmungen* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2002), 7,12.

[63] Greitens, *Dictators*, 5.

[64] Wilfriede Otto, *Erich Mielke – Biographie: Aufstieg und Fall eines Tschekisten* (Berlin: Karl Dietz Verlag, 2000), 219-244; and Engelmann and Schumann, "Kurs auf die entwickelte Diktatur".

[65] See, for example, Gary Bruce, "Participatory Repression? Reflections on Popular Involvement with the Stasi" in Uwe Spiekermann (Ed.), *The Stasi at Home and Abroad: Domestic Order and Foreign Intelligence* (Washington, DC: The German Historical Institute, 2014), 47-58.

[66] See the discussion in Port, *Conflict and Stability*, 97-111.

[67] Data for Hungary are not available. Data collected from Persak and Kaminski, *Handbook of the Communist Security Apparatus*.

[68] The Stasi data are from Helmut Müller-Enbergs and Susanne Muhle, *Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit. Teil 3: Statistiken* (Berlin: BStU, 2008). In the 1950s, IMs were called "secret informants" and "secret employees" (*Geheime Informatoren*, GIs and *Geheime Mitarbeiter*, GMs). Their roles were very similar to IMs. Data on unrest and socio-economic characteristics of districts are from 1950.

[69] Gieseke *Mielke-Konzern*, 133-135.

[70] Müller-Enbergs, *Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter*, 16.

[71] Gary Bruce, *The Firm: The Inside Story of the Stasi* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Jens Gieseke, "The Stasi and East German Society: Some Remarks on Current Research" in Spiekermann, *The Stasi at Home and Abroad*, 59-72.