

Unravelled:
Why Awareness-raising Strategies Fail to Increase Women's Political Ambitions

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Abstract

In Western society, women are still socialised to manifest lower interest in political leadership roles compared to men (Lawless & Fox, 2010). Awareness-raising strategies are essential to combat the negative repercussions of a gendered political socialisation and increase diversity in political representation (Krook & Norris, 2014). Nevertheless, most of these strategies seem unfit to affect the political ambitions (i.e. interest for seeking political office) of women in the general population (Foos & Gilardi, 2020; Pruysers & Blais, 2018; 2019). This monograph aims to understand *why* these tools fail to produce desired results.

Specifically, this monograph begins with the identification of four attitudes associated with women's political ambition that play an active role for the effect of awareness-raising strategies. Subsequently, this monograph includes the first systematic study of the link between attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership and their political ambition based on original survey data from a representative sample of the British women. To account for different views of gender equality as a politicized topic, the sorting effect of political ideology is observed.

Based on two online survey experiments on representative samples of British women, the second and third empirical chapters of this monograph investigate the mechanism through which emblematic awareness-raising strategies affect women's political ambition. Specifically, the second empirical chapter observes that events exposing women to political role models determine heterogeneous effects on women's attitudes and political ambitions based on the content discussed in the event. Further evidence about the sorting effect of political ideology are produced.

Studying recruitment initiatives, the third empirical chapter highlights the presence of backlashes against women's political ambition produced by awareness-raising strategies. All in all, this monograph opens the way to a critical evaluation of the effect of these strategies on the interest in political leadership roles among women in the general population.

Keywords: awareness-raising strategies, political diversity, women's political representation, political attitudes

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Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to my loved parents, Mario and Silvana, my family and my friends for their unspeakable support.

It is not always easy to communicate what the work of a Doctoral Candidate is to those who are outside of the academic world. Yet, my loved ones supported me throughout the process of writing this monograph on the pure basis of their trust in me.

I am dearly grateful.

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Writing a DPhil thesis is a life changing experience. In barely three years, I challenged myself in uncountable ways to be on top of producing research of which I am proud.

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Contents

List of Figures **8**

List of Tables **10**

1 Introduction **12**
1.1 Research Focus . . . 12
1.2 Context of Analysis . . . 14
1.3 Monograph Contribution and Outline . . . 17

2 Literature and Theory **21**
2.1 Introduction . . . 21
2.2 Non-quota Strategies . . . 23
2.2.1 Awareness-raising Strategies . . . 26
2.2.2 Other Types of Non-quota Strategies . . . 31
2.3 Political Ambition . . . 31
2.4 Attitudes Towards Women's Suitability for Political Leadership . . . 34
2.4.1 A Snapshot on Women's Political Socialisation . . . 42
2.5 The Role of Political Ideology . . . 47
2.6 Other Explanations for Women's Political Under-representation . . . 50
2.6.1 Demand-side Explanations . . . 50
2.6.2 Personality-based Explanations (supply-side) . . . 51
2.6.3 Institutional Explanations (supply-side) . . . 52
2.6.4 Women and Motherhood (supply-side) . . . 53
2.7 Conclusions . . . 53

3 Mapping Attitudes Towards Women's Suitability for Political Leadership **55**
3.1 Aims and Objectives . . . 55
3.2 Literature and Hypothesis . . . 57
3.3 Methodology . . . 63
3.4 Results . . . 71
3.4.1 The Link Between Attitudes Towards Women's Suitability for Political Leadership and Political Ambition . . . 71
3.4.2 Left-right Political Ideology and Heterogeneous Effects . . . 74
3.4.3 What Explains the Variation in Perceived Attitudes to Women's Political Ambition? 75
3.5 Discussion . . . 77

4 Content Effect in Role Model-based Events **80**
4.1 Aims and Objectives . . . 80
4.2 Literature and Hypothesis . . . 82
4.3 Methodology . . . 87
4.3.1 Experimental Design . . . 87
4.3.2 Analytical Strategy . . . 90
4.4 Results . . . 95
4.4.1 Do Role Model-based Events Have Meaningful Effects on Women's Political Ambition? 95

4.4.2 Does Political Ideology Condition the Effect of Role Model-based Events? 98
4.4.3 Do Role Model-based Events Affect Women's Attitudes? 100
4.4.4 What About Role Model Effect? 101
4.4.5 Is the Effect on Political Ambition Mediated by the Effect on Attitudes? 102
4.5 Discussion 104

5 Backlashes in Recruitment Initiatives 107
5.1 Aims and Objectives 107
5.2 Literature and Hypothesis 109
5.3 Methodology 112
5.3.1 Experimental Design 112
5.3.2 Analytical Strategy 118
5.4 Results 122
5.4.1 Main Effects 122
5.4.2 Do Awareness-raising Strategies Create Backlashes? 124
5.5 Discussion 127

6 Conclusions 128
6.1 Summary 128
6.2 Limitations 135
6.3 Future Directions 137

References 139

A Appendix Chapter II 150
A.1 Further Onto Socio-psychological Explanation 150
A.1.1 Theory of Planned Behaviour and Attitudes Selection 150

B Appendix Chapter III 153
B.1 Data 153
B.1.1 Variable Description 153
B.1.2 Sample Statistics 154
B.1.3 Meaningfulness of Retrieved Effects 154
B.2 Preliminary Analysis 155
B.2.1 IQR for Ambition 155
B.2.2 IQR for Attitudes 155
B.2.3 Correlation Matrix 156
B.3 Main Analysis 158
B.3.1 Main Effect 158
B.3.2 Heterogeneous Effects by Ideology 159
B.3.3 Predictors of Attitudes 161
B.4 Robustness Checks 162
B.4.1 Ambition 1 to 6 162
B.4.2 Ambition - Not Standardised 163
B.4.3 Ambition Dummy 164
B.4.4 Attitudes on Tree-point Scale 165
B.4.5 Ambition Dummy Attitudes on Tree-point Scale 166
B.4.6 Controlling for Political Attention 167

C Appendix Chapter IV 168
C.1 Data 168
C.1.1 Pre-analysis Plan 168
C.1.2 Questionnaire 170
C.1.3 Sample Statistics 174
C.2 Preliminary Analysis 175
C.2.1 Balancing Checks 175

C.2.2 Drop-outs (Spontaneous and Attention-based) . . . 176
C.2.3 Level of Attention by Condition . . . 176
C.2.4 Ex-ante Power Analysis . . . 177
C.2.5 Post-hoc Power Analysis . . . 178
C.3 Main Analysis . . . 180
C.3.1 Main Effect . . . 180
C.3.2 Heterogeneous Effects . . . 182
C.3.3 Effect on Attitudes . . . 186
C.3.4 Effect of Role Model . . . 191
C.3.5 Mediation . . . 194
C.4 Robustness Checks . . . 195
C.4.1 Ambition Dummy . . . 195
C.4.2 Attitudes on a Three-point Scale . . . 197
C.4.3 Causal Trees . . . 199

D Appendix Chapter V **202**
D.1 Data . . . 202
D.1.1 Pre-analysis Plan and Variable Operationalisation . . . 202
D.1.2 Questionnaire and Experimental Procedure . . . 203
D.1.3 Sample Statistics . . . 205
D.2 Preliminary Analysis . . . 206
D.2.1 Balancing Checks . . . 206
D.2.2 Ex-ante Power Analysis . . . 206
D.2.3 Post-hoc Power Analysis . . . 207
D.3 Main Analysis . . . 209
D.3.1 Main Effect . . . 209
D.3.2 Heterogeneous Effects . . . 211
D.3.3 Moderation . . . 212
D.3.4 Heterogeneous Moderation . . . 214
D.3.5 Informational Message Vs Email Body . . . 218
D.4 Robustness Checks . . . 219
D.4.1 Ambition Dummy . . . 219
D.4.2 Attitudes on a Three-point Scale . . . 222
D.4.3 Causal Trees . . . 224

List of Figures

1.1 Female Representation in OECD Countries . . . 15
1.2 Progress in Female Representation in The United Kingdom . . . 16

2.1 Transaction Model of Representation - from Krook and Norris (2014) . . . 25
2.2 Mediation (Chapter 4): attitudes filter the effect of awareness-raising strategies on ambition 41
2.3 Moderation (Chapter 5): pre-existing attitudes affect the effect of awareness-raising strategies on ambition . . . 42
2.4 Awareness-raising Strategies Mechanism . . . 49

3.1 Gender Gap in the Distribution of Ambition . . . 69
3.2 Distribution of Ambition . . . 70
3.3 Distribution of Attitudes Towards Women's Suitability for Political Leadership . . . 71
3.4 Relationship Between Attitudes and Ambition . . . 73
3.5 Heterogeneus Effects by Political Ideology . . . 75

4.1 Effect of the Events on Ambition . . . 96
4.2 Effect of Segments on Ambition . . . 97
4.3 Heterogeneous Effect of Role model-based Events . . . 99
4.4 Heterogeneous Effect of Content . . . 99
4.5 Event Effect on Attitudes . . . 100
4.6 Mentor Effect on Ambition and Attitudes . . . 102

5.1 Mock Recruitment Email - Baseline with No Informational Message . . . 113
5.2 Email Treatment - Support for Women in Political Leadership . . . 115
5.3 Email Treatment - Support for Feminine Leadership Style . . . 115
5.4 Email Treatment - Support for Women in the Political Environment . . . 116
5.5 Email Treatment - Women's Political Qualifications . . . 116
5.6 Control Email . . . 117
5.7 Effect of Recruitment Campaigns on Ambition . . . 123
5.8 Moderation by Pre-Existing Attitudes . . . 125
5.9 Heterogeneous Moderation by Political Ideology . . . 126

6.1 Female Head of Government by State . . . 136

A.1 Theory of Planned Behaviour . . . 151

B.1 Correlation Between Attitudes (Chapter 3) . . . 156
B.2 Correlation Between Attitudes (Chapter 4) . . . 157
B.3 Correlation Between Attitudes (Chapter 5) . . . 157

C.1 Main Effect Sample Size . . . 178
C.2 Difference in Left-wing and Right-wing Voters . . . 179
C.3 Causal Tree - Mentoring Event (Full-lenght) . . . 199
C.4 Causal Tree - Content about Roles . . . 199
C.5 Causal Tree - Content about Styles . . . 200

C.6 Causal Tree - Content about Environment 200
C.7 Causal Tree - Content about Qualification 201

D.1 Main Effect Sample Size 207
D.2 Difference in Left-wing and Right-wing Voters 208
D.3 Causal Tree - Informational Message about Roles 224
D.4 Causal Tree - Informational Message about Styles 225
D.5 Causal Tree - Informational Message about Environment 225
D.6 Causal Tree - Informational Message about Qualification 226

List of Tables

3.1 Gender Gap in Political Ambition . . . 69
3.2 Drivers of Attitudes . . . 76

4.1 Mediation Analysis . . . 103

B.1 Sample Chapter III Statistics . . . 154
B.2 Main Effect . . . 158
B.3 Interactions by Ideology . . . 159
B.4 Subgroup Analysis . . . 160
B.5 Adding Gender in the Exploratory Analysis of Attitudinal Predictors . . . 161
B.6 Ambition from 1 to 6 . . . 162
B.7 Ambition (Non-Standardised) . . . 163
B.8 Ambition (Dummy) . . . 164
B.9 Ambition (Tricotomous Attitudes) . . . 165
B.10 Ambition (Dummy, with Tricotomous Attitudes) . . . 166
B.11 Ambition (Political Attention Control Included) . . . 167

C.1 Sample Chapter IV Statistics . . . 174
C.2 Balancing Checks . . . 175
C.3 Spontaneous and Attention-based Drop-out Rates . . . 176
C.4 Attention-based Drop-out per Condition . . . 176
C.5 Main Effects on Ambition . . . 177
C.6 Heterogeneous Effects on Ambition . . . 177
C.7 Main Effects on Ambition . . . 178
C.8 Heterogeneous Effects on Ambition . . . 178
C.9 Main Effects on Attitudes . . . 179
C.10 Main Effect (Full Treatment) . . . 180
C.11 Main Effect (Segments of Treatment) . . . 181
C.12 Heterogeneous Effects (Full Treatment) . . . 182
C.13 Heterogeneous Effects (Segments of Treatment) . . . 183
C.14 Heterogeneous Effects in Subgroups (Full Treatment) . . . 184
C.15 Heterogeneous Effects in Subgroups (Segments of Treatment) . . . 185
C.16 Effect on Attiudes (Roles and Styles) . . . 186
C.17 Effect on Attitudes (Environment and Qualification) . . . 187
C.18 Heterogeneous Effects on Attitudes (Roles and Styles) . . . 188
C.19 Heterogeneous Effects on Attitudes (Environment and Qualification) . . . 189
C.20 Bivariate Ordered Logit Models . . . 190
C.21 Multivariate Ordered Logit Models . . . 190
C.22 Bivariate OLS Models . . . 191
C.23 Multivariate OLS Models . . . 191
C.24 All Models with Robust Standard Errors . . . 192
C.25 Ordered Logit Models . . . 193
C.26 Attitudes Mediation . . . 194
C.27 Main Effect (Full treatment and segments of treatment) . . . 195

C.28 Heterogeneous Effects (Full treatment and segments of treatment) . . . 196
C.29 Main Effect on Attitudes (Roles and Styles) . . . 197
C.30 Main Effect on Attitudes (Environment and Qualification) . . . 198

D.1 Sample Chapter V Statistics . . . 205
D.2 Balancing Checks . . . 206
D.3 Main Effects on Ambition . . . 206
D.4 Heterogeneous Effects on Ambition . . . 207
D.5 Main Effects on Ambition . . . 207
D.6 Heterogeneous Effects on Ambition . . . 208
D.7 Main Effect (Full Treatment) . . . 209
D.8 Main Effect (Segments of Treatment) . . . 210
D.9 Heterogeneous Effects . . . 211
D.10 Moderation . . . 212
D.11 Moderation . . . 213
D.12 Heterogeneous Moderation (Left) . . . 214
D.13 Heterogeneous Moderation (Right) . . . 216
D.14 Message or Whole Package . . . 218
D.15 Main Effect . . . 219
D.16 Moderation . . . 220
D.17 Main Effect on Attitudes . . . 222
D.18 Moderation . . . 223

Chapter 1

Introduction

"Our finding suggests that these online recruitment campaigns, although well-meaning, are unlikely to do much in the way of combating low levels of political ambition among women. While such campaigns may help recruit some token women, they do not appear to have the ability to enact real and long-lasting attitudinal change among the recipient."

– Pruysers & Blais
(2018; p. 387) –

"One hypothesis arising from this study is that mentoring events can fail to motivate women to pursue a political career if [role models] discuss their experience bluntly instead of following a motivational script."

–Foos & Gilardi, 2020
(2020; p. 159–

1.1 Research Focus

In recent years, a large variety of non-quota strategies have been designed to counter the problem of women's political under-representation. Such strategies are intended to address the supply-side of the problem of women's political under-representation, in contrast to political gender quotas, which work on the demand-side (Piscopo, 2020; Pruysers & Blais, 2018; Sanbonmatsu & Dittmar, 2020; Schneider & Sweet-Cushman, 2020). Non-quota strategies can target women with different pre-existing levels of interest in political office by tackling different obstacles to their political candidacy (Krook & Norris, 2014). Thus, there are a wide variety of non-quota strategies, from fund-raising initiatives countering material obstacles to women's emergence as candidates (e.g. unevenly distributed resources between women and men campaigners, for example), to capacity building strategies that strengthen women's political skills, such as their public speaking skills (Krook & Norris, 2014; Shames et al., 2020).

This monograph focuses on non-quota strategies that target women with low levels of pre-existent political ambition and that aim to affect their perceptions suitability for political office through awareness-raising campaigns. For brevity, I refer to these as *awareness-raising strategies*. These types of non-quota

strategies tend to target the general population and aim to affect widely-held attitudes about women's lower suitability for political leadership roles compared to men. The shared understanding is that, on an aggregate level, if such attitudes are improved, women's interest in pursuing political leadership posts should also increase (Krook & Norris, 2014).

Nevertheless, the scholarly understanding of the mechanism by which awareness-raising strategies are supposed to produce their effect remains opaque (Shames et al., 2020, p.178), and research has produced discouraging evidence regarding the effectiveness of awareness-raising strategies (Foos & Gilardi, 2020; J. Preece, 2016; J. Preece & Stoddard, 2015; Pruysers & Blais, 2018, 2019; Schneider & Sweet-Cushman, 2020). By providing an answer to the research question, *"Why do awareness-raising strategies fail to produce desired effects on women's political ambitions?"*, this monograph takes up the challenge of (1) defining the mechanisms through which this type of non-quota strategy should produce an effect on women's political ambitions (here defined as women's interest in pursuing political leadership posts) and (2) understanding why they fail to deliver the desired results. It is hoped that the practical implementation of large-scale awareness-raising strategies will benefit from these insights.

More specifically regarding the definition of awareness-raising strategies, literature describe them as strategies that target eligible female candidates (i.e. female citizens of eligible age and without criminal convictions) with the aim of turning them into aspiring female candidates. Two emblematic examples of these non-quota strategies are (1) events making use of female political role models (which I label as role model-based events) and (2) recruitment initiatives (Krook & Norris, 2014; a detailed description of the many other types of awareness raising strategies is provided in *Chapter 2 - Literature and Theory*).[1] This type of non-quota strategy aims to combat the negative ramifications of gendered political socialization (Krook & Norris, 2014). It follows that the type of *political ambition* addressed by these strategies is the one hindered by socialization-induced negative attitudes about women's suitability for political leadership roles compared to men. These attitudes directly impede women's intention to seek political office (Sapiro, 1981), which literature has labeled *nascent political ambition* (see Lawless & Fox, 2010; a detailed description of the concept of nascent political ambition is provided in *Chapter 2 - Literature and Theory*).

The interest in non-quota strategies to combat the negative ramifications of a gendered political socialisation stems from recent observations that from a very young age, girls are socialised to view political leadership as a boys' task (e.g. Bos et al., 2022; Oxley et al., 2020: Lawless & Fox, 2010). This socialization process involves internalizing beliefs that inhibit women's ability to envision themselves as

[1] While they perform the task of encouraging women to seek political office, both these strategies, to different extents, can include contents that erode negative attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership (Krook & Norris, 2014).

political actors and develop political ambitions on a large scale (Lawless & Fox, 2010).[2]

In Western societies, the gendered political socialisation of women's political ambition has ramifications that are profound and widespread. Despite increases in women's political participation over time (see Lovenduski & Hill, 2018; Conway, et al., 1997), and despite gains in gender equality, men remain more politically ambitious than women across different political systems (Coffé & Davidson-Schmich, 2020) (Lawless & Fox, 2013). Research on the US context has shown that, while there has been a general increase in political ambition throughout the population between 2001 and 2011, men remain approximately 10% more likely to report political ambition than women (Lawless & Fox, 2013). Non-quota strategies that raise awareness about women's suitability for political leadership roles are therefore crucial in combating the supply-side problem of women's political under-representation, and thus, they are essential for obtaining political equality (Ruf, 2021).[3] By increasing gender diversity in political representation, these awareness-raising strategies would play a fundamental role in improving the quality of western democracy.

Having said that, it's worth to notice that women's nascent political ambition is not only affected by negative attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership roles. The barriers women face are not only attitudinal, but practical (e.g. with women still disproportionately managing caring activities in the household; see Teele et al., 2018). Such barriers are more effectively dealt with by different types of non-quota strategies than awareness-raising strategies (Krook & Norris, 2014). Similarly, women's political representation is still substantially damaged by demand-side factors, which are better taken care of by quota strategies and are therefore not the subject of this monograph (see *Chapter 2 - Literature and Theory* for further details).

1.2 Context of Analysis

In January 2021, Western democratic parliaments counted on average two male members for every female member. The context of analysis for the empirical chapters of this monograph is Great Britain, which represents a typical case of women's political representation among Western democracies (OECD, 2023).[4] In 2021, the percentage of female parliamentarians in the United Kingdom (which I here consider as a reference for Great Britain) was approximately equivalent to the OECD average (Figure 1.1; OECD, 2023).

[2] *Internalisation*: the process by which social actors absorb social norms and social roles, shaping their values, beliefs and attitudes (Mead, 1934).

[3] Political gender quota directly address the demand-side of women's political under-representation.

[4] The acronym OECD stands for "Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development", an international organization that consists of member countries from various regions around the world. OECD's primary goal is to promote policies that improve the economic and social well-being of people globally. It provides a platform for governments to work together, share experiences, and seek solutions to common economic, social, and environmental challenges (OECD, 2023).

Figure 1.1: Female Representation in OECD Countries



Percentage of women in OECD parliaments, 2021 or latest available. *Source*: Gender, Institutions and Development. Approximately 34% of MPs in the UK were women, while the OECD average was approximately 32%. Based on this parameter, the UK can be considered a typical case of women's political underrepresentation among OECD countries.

Specifically, in the United Kingdom, in January 2020, only 34% of the members of the House of Commons (HoC) were women.[5] This means that there are currently 220 female MPs in the HoC. As shown in a recent report by the Library of the HoC, *Women in Politics and Public Life*, this is an all-time high percentage (Figure 1.2). Since 1918, when Countess Markievicz became the first female member of the British Parliament, only 559 different women have been elected to the HoC. Of these, 31% were first elected as Conservatives, while 55% were first elected as Labour MPs. In November 2022, the cabinet was made up of six women, or 27%. The highest percentage of female cabinet Ministers ever achieved, between 2006 and 2007, is 36%. In the upper house, the House of Lords, there are currently 229 female members, making up 28% of the total seats. All in all, Great Britain seems to be somewhat distant from the goal of

[5]In Europe, among the first ranked for female representation in the Lower House, we find Sweden with 47% of MPs being women, while at the end of the ranking, we find Ireland and Greece with 21% and 22% of women MPs respectively; the European average is between 29.6% and 28% depending on whether we include the Nordic Countries. From a global perspective, the UK ranks 45th for the percentage of women in its Lower House (data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union Data Archive, updated to January 2021).

political gender equality—a situation that applies to a large proportion of Western democracies (Uberoi & Mansfield, 2023), and being a typical case of women's political under-representation in the West, the findings of this monograph informative about the mechanism of awareness-raising strategies across OECD countries.

Figure 1.2: Progress in Female Representation in The United Kingdom



Proportion of seats held by women in the House of Commons from 1997 until 2021. *Source*: Inter-Parliamentary Union data Archive. Data: Inter-Parliamentary Union data Archive Parliamentary-Union (2022).

In the UK Context, non-quotas strategies are carried out by both political and civil-society actors. For instance, the 50:50 Parliament is a non-partisan organisation operating in the UK that also uses a wide variety of non-quota and awareness-raising strategies, including recruitment initiatives (i.e. the #AskHerToStand campaign) (Parliament.co.uk, 2023). Recruitment campaigns will be, in fact, at the center of the study proposed in *Chapter 5 - Backlashes in Recruitment Initiatives*. Another of these organisations is the Fawcett Society which is a non-political organisation that has advocated for the improvement of gender equality across different aspects of British society, including women's political representation. The Fawcett Society runs the All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Women in Parliament, also organising events to raise awareness about women's suitability for political leadership with the participation of political role models (Fawcettsociety.org.uk, 2023). This type of awareness-raising strategy is also used by other organisations in the UK context (e.g. the Global Institute for Women's Leadership; see GIWL, 2023). This will be at the center of the study proposed in *Chapter 4 - Content Effect in Role model-based Events*. Women2Win is an organisation within the British Conservative Party that promotes the election of more Conservative women MPs and an increased involvement of Conservative women in public life

by using a large variety of non-quota strategies, from recruitment initiatives (i.e. the #AskHerToRun campaign) to role model-based programs (Women2Win.com, 2023). Finally, forms of awareness-raising strategies also appear in leadership programs offered within UK universities (e.g. the Cambridge Rising Women Leaders Programme and the Oxford Women's Leadership Development Programme; see Cambridge, 2023, and Oxford, 2023).

Before describing the outline of this monograph, I want to clarify that the proposed mechanism for the effect of awareness-raising strategies is built on a typical Western conceptualisation of gender roles and political leadership roles. Therefore, the theory proposed here does not claim validity in cultural contexts where political leadership is not portrayed as a stereotypically masculine activity, nor in contexts where gender expectations regarding masculinity and femininity differ wholly from typical Western norms. At the same time, it should be noted that even among culturally Western countries that have achieved gender parity in their parliaments, notions of political leadership as masculine may persist at a cultural level. In contexts where equality of representation has been reached by way of quotas, there might still be a gender gap in the supply of female candidates.[6] Even in such contexts, women who enter the political arena may face more and greater challenges when it comes to proving their suitability when compared to their male counterparts.[7]

1.3 Monograph Contribution and Outline

The overarching contribution of this monograph is to provide evidence on the mechanism by which awareness-raising strategies impact women's political aspirations, and to contribute to the scholarship systematically evaluating the effectiveness of these strategies. This contribution is motivated by the lack of knowledge about the mechanisms through which awareness-raising strategies affect women's political aspirations (Shames et al., 2020 p.178). I argue that without this understanding, it remains challenging to ascertain why these strategies fail to yield their intended results for women's political ambitions.

In addition to the overarching contribution, each chapter of this monograph provides several secondary contributions. *Chapter 2 - Literature and Theory* theorizes a plausible mechanism for the effect of awareness-raising strategies. Building on definitions of the core elements in this mechanism—including awareness-raising strategies, political ambition, and attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership—this chapter culminates in a core contribution to the theoretical understanding of women's

[6] Although this seems a sensible argument, unfortunately, I do not have data to substantiate this argument.
[7] Also in this case, unfortunately, I do not have data to substantiate this argument.

political ambition. Specifically, *Chapter 2* identifies four emblematic attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership: (1) support for women in political leadership roles; (2) support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style; (3) perceived support for women in the political environment; and (4) self-perception of qualification for the political activity. Note that while the third and fourth attitudes are labelled as perceptions, they effectively function as attitudes as well since they include a positive or negative evaluation (see Ajzen, 1985).

In the process of isolating these four attitudes, this chapter also engages with the literature on gender socialisation (e.g. Bos et al., 2022; Lawless & Fox; Oxley et al., 2020; Teele, 2018; 2019), stereotyping (e.g. Eagly & Karau, 1991; Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993a,b; Schneider, 2016), and discrimination against women in the political sphere (e.g. Krook, 2020). Following the identification of these attitudes, I suggest that they influence the effect of awareness-raising strategies on women's political ambition by filtering their effects (see *Chapter 4 - Content Effect in Role model-based Events*) or creating heterogeneity in their effect (see *Chapter 5 - Backlashes in Recruitment Initiatives*) depending on the focus of analysis (more details can be found in *Chapter 4* and *Chapter 5*, with a summary in the respective chapter descriptions below).

The chapter concludes with one final argument: women are a diverse group, and women see the problem of their gender inequality in heterogeneous ways. As gender equality has become a politicized issue, I propose that political ideology offers a means of evaluating heterogeneity in women's attitudes about women's fitness for political leadership. Specifically, political ideology can delineate which of these attitudes shape political ambition for different women's subgroups, versus those that do not.

Recent literature defines competing ideology-based framings for the topic of gender equality, showing that left-wing women are more concerned with structural and systematic barriers, while right-wing women are more focused on women's lack of opportunity to develop suitability (Sevincer et al., 2023). On these bases, I argue that, on the one hand, left-wing women are likely to experience a stronger relationship between their political ambition and attitudes associated with stereotypical gender roles and expectations, as well as structural barriers to women's gender equality (i.e. the first, second, and third attitude). On the other hand, right-wing women are more sensitive to attitudes associated with women having fewer chances to develop their political skills and networks (i.e. the fourth attitude) (see Sevincer et al., 2023).

Chapter 3 - Mapping Attitudes Towards Women's Suitability for Political Leadership tests the claims about the correlation between women's attitudes and their political ambition that I made in the previous chapter. I do so by presenting original survey data from a representative sample of British women (data collected by YouGov in June 2021). By providing an answer to the research question, *"Can attitudes explain the variation in women's political ambition?"*, this chapter contributes to the knowledge on the

variation in women's political ambitions. It does so by unifying attitudes into a coherent framework that allows for a comparison of their strength. I find that self-perceived qualification has a positive relationship with political ambition, but perceived support for women in the political sphere is a notable barrier solely for the political ambition of left-wing women. More specifically, a positive outlook on support for women in the political sphere correlates with higher political ambition for left-wing women, whereas right-wing women's level of this attitude does not appear related to their ambition. Furthermore, the support for a stereotypically feminine leadership style is also somewhat linked to the political ambition of left-wing women, who become more politically ambitious when they have a *lower* preference for a leadership style that is stereotypically feminine. This attitude is orthogonal to right-wing women's political ambition. It should be noted that studying political ideology-based differences is intended to support the "transposition" of this monograph's results into practical guidelines for awareness-raising strategies. As stated earlier, these strategies are frequently (but not solely) conducted by political groups with clear ideological positions (see Krook & Norris, 2014). This chapter also includes further analyses of the variation of attitudes based on individual-level sociodemographic characteristics.

The following two chapters apply the findings of *Chapter 2* to the investigation of why awareness-raising strategies fail to deliver their desired results. Both chapters are based on survey experiments of representative samples of British women.[8] Specifically, the first experiment is presented in *Chapter 4 - Content Effect in Role Model-based Events.* As suggested in the chapter's title, the context of analysis is that of events that use female political role models to increase women's political ambitions. In some contexts, these events are refereed to as mentoring events. However, those analysed in this monograph are webinars with little one-to-one interaction between the audience and role models, which weakens the similarity with traditional mentoring events (see Krook & Norris, 2014). By answering the research question, *"What is the effect of the content discussed in role model-based events on women's political ambition?"*, this chapter draws a causal link between the content of awareness-raising strategies and women's political ambition. I start by arguing that the purpose of the content of awareness-raising strategies is to erode the negative attitudes that are held towards women's suitability for political leadership. Nevertheless, the current literature only addresses attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership as a marginal part of the mechanism of role model events (e.g. Foos & Gilardi, 2020). Due to this shortcoming in the literature, it is not possible to assess whether the content of awareness-raising strategies is able to affect relevant attitudes in direction that is favourable to political ambition. Thus, the main contribution of this chapter is to test the influence of the content of awareness-raising strategies on both women's attitudes and political ambition.

[8]Representativity was achieved through quotas on participants' age, education, income, vote-choice, area they lived. Further details are provided in the chapters respective methodology sections.

I find that null effects of role model events can be explained by: (1) their limited positive influence on attitudes significantly predicting political ambition; (2) their significant positive effect on attitudes unrelated to women's ambition; and (3) discussing themes that decrease ambition despite aims to increase it. This empirical chapter therefore challenges the common conception of role model-based events as tools to increase women's political ambition. It does this by demonstrating these events could be more effective if only focused on shifting attitudes. I also provide evidence regarding the effects of role models in this context.

In *Chapter 5 - Backlashes in Recruitment Initiatives*, I focus on recruitment initiatives containing informational messages that attempt to increase women's perceived suitability for political leadership, and I provide further evidence of the backlash awareness-raising strategy content can create. By answering the research question *"Are awareness-raising strategies creating backlashes on women's political ambitions?"*, this chapter studies how the effect of recruitment initiatives including awareness-raising content varies based on women's pre-existing attitudes. The scope is to show that the strategy of using content to raise awareness can reduce political ambition in subgroups of women who, based on their attitudinal profile, could have been politically ambitious. I contribute to the current understanding of awareness-raising strategies by providing evidence that supports speculations in the literature about the potential problems associated with priming women to the idea of gender-based barriers in the political arena. Informational messages concerning this attitude have detrimental effects on the political ambition of sociodemographics that would otherwise have been inclined to consider a path in politics. This remains the case even when attention is drawn to the fewer environmental barriers facing women in today's political environment compared to the past. Furthermore, in producing this finding, I have also uncovered encouraging evidence that recruitment initiatives, which include messages about women's self-perception of qualification, can enhance the political ambition of their target audience.

Chapter 6 - Conclusions delves deeper into the reasons why awareness-raising strategies do not succeed in boosting women's political ambition, addressing the monograph's central research question: *"Why do awareness-raising strategies fail to affect women's political ambitions as intended?"* I contend that this is due to the dissemination of informational content that adversely influences women's perceptions of their suitability for political leadership, resulting in backlash effects, and the overall muted impact of these strategies on such perceptions. This conclusion discusses this monograph's academic implications, its external validity, and considers possible directions for future research.

Chapter 2

Literature and Theory

"It never featured in my mind that I can't be in politics because I'm a woman. It just didn't. But it did feature in my mind that I couldn't do it just because it was me. I did question my ability constantly, questioning whether or not I could take on the roles that people challenged me to take on. I see this kind of self-doubt in other women. So that makes me think that it's not just my own personality. There is something about our - and I'm making grand sweeping statements here - our level of confidence. You know, that old cliché around seeing a list of traits that you need to possess to take on a role and you only see the ones that you don't have, rather than the ones you do. For women, I think this is absolutely true."

Jacinda Ardern – Prime Minister of New Zealand 2017 - 2023
(Gillard & Okonjo-Iweala, 2020, p.90)

2.1 Introduction

Non-quota strategies are initiatives that encourage women to think about themselves as political actors and counter their reservations against seeking political office. In recent years, these strategies have grown in popularity (Piscopo, 2020). One of the reasons for this is that they are commonly thought to increase women's political representation, causing fewer backlashes than political gender quotas (Krook & Norris, 2014). Some go all the way to say that they are less prone than gender quota to favour women from dominant groups (Hughes, 2011), echoing British MP Diane Abbott, who dubbed Labour's quota the "all white women's shortlists" (Nugent & Krook, 2016). There is also evidence that, when used in combination with political gender quotas, they increase the effectiveness of the latter (Ruf, 2021). Most importantly, these strategies are able to directly tackle the problem of the gender gap in political ambition (i.e. the interest in seeking political office) (Ruf, 2021), which today is considered one of the major causes of women's political underrepresentation in the Western world (Lawless & Fox, 2010).

Scholars have documented a wide variety of non-quota strategies (Kreitzer & Osborn, 2020; Krook &

Norris, 2014; Piscopo, 2020) that provide a solution to women's political underrepresentation at different stages of the political pipeline (Krook & Norris, 2014). This monograph focuses specifically on those non-quota strategies which aim to turn *eligible female candidates* into *aspirant female candidates*. More specifically, the focus of this monograph is on non-quota strategies that target the general population of women with awareness-raising tools. These tools portray a more inclusive picture of political activity, aiming to make political leadership roles more appealing to them (Krook & Norris, 2014).

Despite being well intended, awareness-raising strategies do not succeed in increasing women's aspirations for a political career (Foos & Gilardi, 2020; Pruysers & Blais, 2018; 2016). At the same time, little is known about how non-quota strategies which use awareness-raising tools (from here onwards, awareness-raising strategies) produce their effects (Foos & Gilardi, 2020; Shames et al., 2020, p. 178). This monograph's primary contribution is to deconstruct the mechanism by which these strategies are intended to influence women's political aspirations, critically assessing their effectiveness or lack thereof, and setting the groundwork for future research aimed at enhancing their design.

Central to the mechanism proposed here is the role of attitudes regarding women's suitability for political leadership, to which the content of awareness-raising strategies should be connected. In this context, awareness-raising strategies must consider an additional layer of complexity: women's diverse perspectives on their political inequality. Consequently, awareness-raising content should not be regarded as universal. Women's political ideology plays a crucial role in deciphering and sorting their views on the obstacles to their political equality (Sevincer et al., 2023), and thus political ideology can serve as a proxy to develop more tailored content. As I will explain in more detail later, I propose that awareness-raising strategies impact on women's political ambition is associated with women's attitudes. As discussed in subsequent chapters, women's attitudes influence the effectiveness of awareness-raising strategies in two ways: as mediators, filtering their effect on ambition, and as moderators, where attitudinal predispositions may affect women's responses to awareness-raising efforts.

To justify the mechanism I summarized above, in this chapter, I present a review of the literature on key elements in the narrative of awareness-raising strategies. Specifically, *Section 2.2 - Non-Quota Strategies* defines the type of non-quota strategies at the centre of this monograph, placing them in comparison to other strategies that are used to increase gender diversity at different stages of the political pipeline. *Section 2.3 - Political Ambition* delineates the increase in nascent political ambition (i.e., women's intention to seek political leadership roles) as the appropriate objective for the awareness-raising strategies discussed here. *Section 2.4 - Attitudes Towards Women's Suitability for Political Leadership* identifies four distinct attitudes in the literature that represent obstacles to women's political aspirations. Here, I also provide further details on the topic of a gendered socialisation. *Section 2.5 - The Role of*

Political Ideology explains how political ideology determines which attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership are significant for the political ambition of different groups of women. Finally, *Section 2.6 - Other Explanations for Women's Political Under-representation* summarizes the causes of women's political exclusion that are not addressed in this monograph.

2.2 Non-quota Strategies

The 1995 Beijing Platform for Action indicates that quotas alone may not be sufficient for achieving gender equality in elected office. Quota strategies need the support of non-quota strategies to increase the supply of female candidates to enter the quota structures (Franceschet et al., 2012; Krook, 2010a; Krook & Norris, 2014). In contrast to the extensive literature on quotas (see Krook, 2010), non-quota strategies have been subject to less systematic documentation and research (see Krook & Norri, 2014; Shames et al 2020 as examples of these research). Reports show that non-quota strategies take a variety of forms and can be implemented by diverse sets actors (e.g. state and civil society channels), making their systematic study much more complex (Kreitzer & Osborn, 2020; Krook & Norris, 2014). While the popularity of these strategies increases, a scholarly interest in measuring their impact and developing scientific knowledge about their mechanism also grew (Foos & Gilardi, 2020; Kreitzer & Osbourne, 2020; Pruysers & Blais, 2018; 2016; Shames et al., 2020). Here, initial research on the impact of awareness-raising strategies suggests that these strategies do not produce their intended effects (Foos & Gilardi, 2020; Pruysers & Blais, 2018; 2016).

To address the issue of the limited effectiveness of awareness-raising strategies, I begin by offering a clear definition of these tools (see paragraphs below in this section). I then provide a detailed description of the strategies designed to enhance the appeal for potential female candidates by influencing women's attitudes about their suitability for political office, which is the focus of this monograph (*Section 2.2.1 - Awareness-raising Strategies*). Here are the three non-quota strategies that I will describe: awareness-raising campaigns, role model-based events, and recruitment initiatives. Note that the first non-quota strategy (awareness-raising campaign) is often embedded in the other two strategies; this means, ultimately, that two types of non-quota strategies will be investigated in this monograph. For completeness, I conclude this section by describing other types of non-quota strategies that have been documented in the literature but that are not at the center of this monograph (*Section 2.2.2 - Other Types of Non-quota Strategies*).

Broadly speaking, non-quota strategies have the same final goal as political gender quotas; that is, to increase women's political representation. In contrast to political gender quotas, however, non-quota

strategies aim to directly influence the *supply of* female political representatives rather than the *demand for* female political candidates (Krook & Norris, 2014). They are often (but not exclusively) utilized by political parties that collaborate with non-profit or grassroots organizations to jointly oversee their implementation (Hannagan et al., 2010; Guo & Musso, 2007; Teele et al., 2018; Teele, 2018). There are a wide variety of non-quota strategies (Kreitzer & Osbourne, 2020; Krook & Norris, 2014; Piscopo, 2020), and Krook and Norris's (2014) *transaction model* marks the sole attempt to organize them into a typology (Figure 2.1). Most up to date research, in fact, focuses on measuring the impact of one strategy at time (Foos & Gilardi, 2020; Pruysers & Blais, 2018, 2019). An exception is the work *Good Reasons To Run* (and especially part I, IV and V), which studies more than one non-quota strategy at time; however, its objective is not to organise them into a typology, and uses (mostly) case studies to understand their target, impact and structure (Shames et al., 2020).

Krook and Norris's (2014) transaction model builds around the metaphor of a political pipeline. It suggests that, beginning with a large pool of eligible political candidates, there are various phases in the transition to political representatives. Each phase could benefit from maintaining a larger pool of candidates through the application of the appropriate non-quota strategy or strategies. Hence, Krook and Norris sort non-quota strategies based on phases that are targeted in the transaction model.

The *first part of the transition* process aims to turn women from eligible political candidates into aspirant political candidates. Generally, this approach aims to target all citizens of a country who are of eligible age and without criminal convictions; the intent is to make a career in politics more appealing to them. The first part of the transaction from eligible to aspirant candidates generally focuses on overcoming perceptions that women do not belong in politics, bolstering women's interest and self-confidence in pursuing a political career (Krook & Norris, 2014). One way to achieve this is through awareness-raising campaigns that highlight the exclusion of women and emphasize how women can contribute to political debates (Krook & Norris, 2014). On top of awareness-raising campaigns, recruitment and outreach initiatives are also crucial in bolstering women's interest in pursuing the political career. Civil society actors and political parties are the primary entities involved in these initiatives. Additionally, this phase of the transition can be supported by reforms within parliaments to legislative working conditions. Such steps can make the political environment more "women-friendly" (Krook & Norris, 2014). These may include changes to address the double bind women face due to expectations for unequally distributed caring responsibilities (see Teele et al., 2018 for a discussion of political implication for unequally distributed caring responsibilities). Furthermore, state actors may implement policies to assist women in meeting the demands of caring activities which are expected of them (Krook & Norris, 2014; see Teele et al., 2018). State actors might also need to enact laws that penalize violence against women in politics, a significant

deterrent to women's aspirations when their personal safety is compromised (Krook & Norris, 2014).

The *second part of the transaction* aims to turn women who are already aspirant political candidates into potential political candidates. In other words, this part of the transition involves facilitating the candidacy of those women who have shown an interest in political leadership roles (Krook & Norris, 2014). Here, one of the goals is to compel party elites and political gatekeepers to revise their implicit or explicit biases against potential female candidates making potential female candidates visible (Krook, 2009). At the same time, women might be given further training that is spendable in a potential political post. A number of strategies can help in the process. For example, women's sections within parties can provide women with more leadership opportunities, as well as exposing male elites to women in the party. More broadly, measures in this part of the transition employ both direct and indirect strategies to challenge beliefs about women being unqualified candidates (Krook & Norris, 2014).

The *third phase of the transaction* involves creating support and resources for those women who are running for election so that they can succeed in obtaining political office. Such resources might not always be available through the party lines, so civil society groups may organize fund-raising networks to support female candidates in their campaigns (Krook, 2009). Similarly, parties and civil society actors can provide specific training for female candidates to support their electoral success (Krook & Norris, 2014; Shames et al., 2020).

Figure 2.1: Transaction Model of Representation - from Krook and Norris (2014)



Model of the transaction from eligible political candidate to political representative highlighting the various phases of the transaction. This model is taken from Krook and Norris (2014).

Finally, a *fourth part of the transition* involves supporting women while they are in office to facilitate their career progression and prevent early withdrawal. It is important to note that this fourth part extends beyond the scope of Krook and Norris's model (2014) and is not included in their framework.

As previously mentioned, this monograph is focused on the first part of the transition, aiming specifically to offer a scientific understanding of how awareness-raising strategies that target the general population of eligible female candidates can increase their aspirations for a career in politics. Therefore, this monograph does not address the role of non-quota strategies in the second, third, and fourth phases of

the transition due to the difference mechanism through which they deliver expected results. For the same reason, it does not explore reforms to legislative working conditions within parliaments or laws to combat violence against women in politics during the first phase of the transition. Below, I proceed to describe in details the awareness-raising strategies central to this monograph.

2.2.1 Awareness-raising Strategies

Among the strategies best equipped to counter the notions that women do not belong into politics and to boost women's interest in a political career, we have awareness raising strategies. A awareness-raising strategies this thesis identify three key approaches: (1) role model-based events that spotlight successful women in politics, (2) recruitment initiatives aimed specifically at encouraging women to run for office, and (3) awareness-raising campaigns that are frequently incorporated into the aforementioned strategies (Krook & Norris, 2014).[1]

Starting with *awareness-raising campaigns*, this strategy takes various forms but shares the common goal of casting women's political representation in a positive light and encouraging more women to run for office (Krook & Norris, 2014). An example of this was seen in the run-up to the 2006 Czech elections when the group Fórum 50% sponsored a poster campaign that drew attention to the challenges faced by female candidates in the political arena. The objective was to demonstrate that women are still excluded from politics, to the detriment of the democratic process.[2] Similarly, in Turkey, in preparation for the 2007 general elections, the Association to Support Women Candidates (KA.DER) designed posters showing well-known businesswomen and female artists wearing a tie or a moustache. The posters displayed the question in bold: "Is it necessary to be a man to enter parliament?". These campaigns aimed to highlight the gender biases in political participation and were used in later years as well (Krook & Norris, 2014).[3]

Data generation is also a powerful tool to raise awareness. The data produced by university research centers such as Rutgers University, by national organizations like The Fawcett Society in Great Britain, and international entities such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union, have been used both to demonstrate the extent of women's exclusion from politics and to highlight the progress made when gains have occurred (Krook & Norris, 2014).

Awareness-raising campaigns are indeed not unfamiliar in Britain. In the lead-up to the 2010 General Election, the media launched a campaign that drew attention to the significantly lower percentage of female MPs elected by the Liberal Democrats compared to Labour and the Conservatives. This dis-

[1]The decision to work on recruitment initiatives and role model-based events is in fact due to the observations that (1) these are popular strategies whose template in reproduced in many contexts and countries and indeed (2) they can incorporate awareness-raising campaigns.

[2]See http://www.5050democracy.eu/.

[3]See http://www.ka-der.org.tr/.

parity became the subject of negative media focus (Evans, 2011). Civil society organizations utilized awareness-raising campaigns to tackle stereotypes associated with womanhood that negatively impact the opportunities for women and young girls to access positions of power in society. For instance, the "Smash Stereotypes" campaign run by the Fawcett Society is an example of such efforts (Fawcettsociety.org.uk, 2023). However, emerging literature measuring the impact of awareness-raising campaigns around the globe has produced discouraging empirical evidence about the effectiveness of these strategies (see Bauer, 2015; Dhima, 2023; Gatto & Araújo, 2023; Jung & Tavits, 2023). To the best of my knowledge, this literature focuses exclusively on overseas contexts.

While the aim of awareness-raising campaigns is generally to influence widely held attitudes, to affect changes in political behavior, these campaigns tend to be combined with other strategies.[4] One example of strategies that incorporate awareness-raising goals with the aim of affecting political behaviour is that of *role model-based events*. In the context of women's political representation, role model-based events are strategies organized with the purpose of exposing an audience of women to female political leaders who share their experiences in politics (Krook & Norris, 2014).[5] The underlying intuition is that exposing women who are not currently political actors to successful examples of female political leadership can help demonstrate that women can indeed succeed in these masculine domains (Wolbrecht & Campbell, 2007). Consequently, this exposure should help dismantle old stereotypes that view political leadership roles as inherently masculine (Barnes & Burchard, 2013; Beaman et al., 2009, Matland, 1994; this intuition is also in line with implications stemming from findings about the role of contact in prejudice reduction discussed in Pettigrew and Tropp (2006)). On the surface level, we observe that women who are non-political actors may be inspired to follow the path of the role models presented to them (see Wolbrecht & Campbell, 2007; Lawless & Fox, 2010; Fridkin & Kenney, 2014; Mariani et al., 2015; Sanbonmatsu & Dittmar, 2020). This effect is labelled the *role model effect* (see Bandura, 1977).

On the role model effect, observational studies of real-world political occurrences show that the emergence of salient female political figures can, in fact, increase the number of women seeking political office in subsequent years (D. Campbell & Wolbrecht, 2006; Gilardi, 2015; Wolbrecht & Campbell, 2007, 2017). Encouraged by such promising findings, political and civil society actors have attempted to replicate the role model effect "on demand" through events. These events, which I refer to as role model-based events, are sometimes called mentoring events in the literature (Foos & Gilardi, 2020). The specific type of event addressed in this monograph is however distinct in that it limits the exchange between role models and

[4]However, there are notable exceptions where awareness-raising campaigns are designed with a more targeted approach. An example of this is the "Pink Battle Bus" campaign, which specifically aimed to increase women's voter turnout (See Campbell & Childs, 2015).

[5]Note that in this phase, women in the audience are not political elites and are not selected because of their pre-existing interest in seeking political office (Krook & Norris, 2014).

the audience—a key feature of mentoring events in their more "traditional form"—to a unidirectional flow of information from the role model to the audience.

In the United Kingdom, these events are commonly run by a large number of civil society organisations, such as the 50:50 Parliament, Elect Her, The Global Institute for Women's Leadership, The Fawcett Society (Parliament.co.uk, 2023; ElectHer.org, 2023; Fawcettsociety.org.uk, 2023; GIWL, 2023), as well as by partisan groups such as the conservatives Women2Win (e.g. Women2Win.com, 2023). In this onograph, this design choice was made to maximize the researcher's control over the mechanisms being assessed and to enhance the internal validity of the study proposed in *Chapter 4*. For this reason, the events analyzed in this monograph are given the broader designation of role model-based events.

To interpret the null effect of a role model event studied by way of field experiment, recent literature point out that women in the audience of role model-based events are not only stimulated by the exposure to a political role model, but also by the role model's words (Foos & Gilardi, 2020). Such observation agrees with the classification of role model-based events as part of a broader category of non-quota strategies, capacity-building strategies, which lie between the first and the second phase of the transaction (Krook & Norris, 2014). Capacity-building strategies aim to increase women's political ambitions by equipping them with greater confidence in their political skills (see Bernhard et al., 2020; Och, 2020; Schnider & Sweet-Cushman, 2020). While some capacity-building strategies, such as training programs, offer women the possibility of engaging in a large variety of practical activities, role model-based events have to build women's confidence in their political skills purely through the exposure and the words of the role model.[6] [7] [8]

Furthermore, the variation in the types of activities used to boost women's confidence—ranging from more or less practical—is aligned with the differing goals of these strategies. On one hand, training programs target women with high levels of pre-existing ambition to provide skills that bolster their confidence in seeking and holding political office. On the other hand, role model-based events taken alone aim at women with lower initial ambition levels, offering information to increase their confidence in their suitability for political leadership, thereby encouraging them to (at least) consider such roles (see also the socio-psychological explanation of role model effect provided by Bandura & Walters (1977) in social learning theory).

[6] My understanding is that training programs, which lie in the second phase of the transaction (see Bernhard, 2020), can afford be organised around practical activities that are more taxing in terms of the audience engagement because these women have high pre-existing levels of political ambition. By practical activities I refer to workshops on public speaking and networking skills or delivering knowledge on technical knowledge on the campaign process) that deliver textbook knowledge on how to pursue political office (Shames et al., 2020, passim). Note that, training programs often contain role model-based events, too, which increase women's confidence in their political skills through a normative path.

[7] Due to the characteristics of their audience, training programs can afford to be more demanding and require active engagement (Bernhard et al., 2020; Och, 2020).

[8] Training programs were found to be quite successful at obtaining their desired outcome (Shames et al., 2020; passim) even for diverse groups of women (Sanbonmatsu & Dittmar, 2020).

Building upon previous scholarly hypotheses, I posit that in role model-based events, both role models and content delivered should align positively for these strategies to enhance women's political ambition. However, to my knowledge, no research to date has investigated the effect of role model-based events as an interplay of these two dynamics. To fill this gap in the literature, this monograph evaluates the mechanisms behind role model-based events, examining, among other aspects, the effect of the role model's words after the initial role model effect has subsided. Key to the proposed mechanism is the effect of such words on the audience attitudes as it will be described in later sections (Bandura & Walters, 1977).

Moving forward, awareness-raising campaigns can also be combined with *recruitment initiatives* targeting the female population. These initiatives encourage women to see themselves as political actors, while also asking them to consider political office.[9] There are several examples of these strategies fielded both by political parties and non-partisan organisations. For instance, a non-partisan campaign was initiated in 2012 by the Center for American Women and Politics at Rutgers University (Krook & Norris, 2014).[10] And before the adoption of gender quotas, a few of these initiatives emerged in Sweden to boost the emergence of a female representation at the local and national level. In recent years, these strategies have been digitised, and email recruitment campaigns are the standard way to contact eligible female candidates. Notable examples are the Invite Her to Run Campaign promoted by the Liberal Party of Canada, or the recruitment campaign organised by the American organisation Women's Campaign Fund, both of which are large scale email recruitment campaigns targeting the female general population Dittmar (2015).

In the United Kingdom, the civil society group 50:50 Parliament employs a recruitment initiative called "Ask Her to Stand," which involves sending a standard email containing awareness-raising information to women. This email is triggered when private individuals submit the contact details of potential female candidates, encouraging them to consider engaging in political activity (Parliament.co.uk, 2023). Email recruitment campaigns often include a text that asks the receiver to consider seeking political office (as well as providing informational content, as discussed below), plus a series of hyperlinks that give to the receiver the opportunity to follow up on their political ambitions. Notably, these strategies are relatively easy to implement, which has boosted their recent popularity (Kreitzer & Osborn, 2019, 2020; Piscopo, 2020; J. Preece & Stoddard, 2015; Pruysers & Blais, 2018, 2019).

Nevertheless, like for role model-based events, literature shows that also recruitment initiatives are inconsistent in achieving the desired results in empirical studies, by often returning null (Pruysers & Blais, 2018) or mixed effects (Pruysers & Blais, 2019). Specifically, by way of survey experiment, most research

[9] Often, these strategies give women the opportunity to act upon their political ambitions by providing them with useful pieces of information on how to seek political office.

[10] See: https://youtube.com/watch?v=4Mn601QUwP0.

ascertain that recruitment initiatives struggle to produce significant effects on women's political ambition, with some exceptions. Namely, recruitment initiatives where the recruiter is a party leader have significantly higher chances to produce an effect on women's political ambition compared to contexts where the recruiter is a party officer (Pruysers & Blais, 2019). Similarly, significantly positive differences have also been identified when the recruiter has no specified gender compared to a men (Pruysers & Blais, 2019). Furthermore, women with certain personality traits (i.e. high levels of narcissism), seems to be more responsive to these initiatives (Pruysers & Blais, 2019). To the best of my knowledge, no test of the content of recruitment initiatives has been conducted, thus, more research is needed to understand the effectiveness of recruitment initiative.

In the text above, I have identified and described role model-based events and recruitment initiatives as two main strategies that can be combined with awareness-raising campaigns. Note that, crucially, the mechanism that underlies awareness-raising strategies has been scientifically investigated in a limited number of cultural contexts, and namely the USA (Kreitzer & Osborn, 2019; Shames et al., 2020; J. Preece & Stoddard, 2015), Canada (Pruysers & Blais, 2018; 2019) and Switzerland (Foos & Gilardi, 2020). Cross-national studies, such as Krook & Norris (2014), mostly focus on organising present strategies into a unified framework (i.e., the transaction model) and are not concerned with assessing their mechanism.[11]

To the best of my knowledge, although Great Britain is a typical case of women's political underrepresentation in the Western world and could inform a variety of other contexts, awareness-raising strategies have never been scientifically studied within the British context, nor has the mechanism through which they deliver their effects. Therefore, one of the contributions of this monograph is to extend scholarly knowledge on this subject to the British context. More in general, the scarcity of scientific research on the impact of awareness-raising strategies leads many organizers across the globe to base their designs on personal or collective experiences rather than proven effectiveness. This means there's often little certainty about how well these strategies work (Shames et al., 2020).

Before I provide a detailed description of the outcomes of awareness-raising strategies (i.e. nascent political ambition) and the type of content they should include (i.e. content related to women's attitudes towards their suitability for political leadership), for completeness, *Section 2.2.2 - Other Types of Non-quota Strategies* offer a brief description of the non-quota strategies pertinent to the second and third phase of the transaction which are not the focus of the studies proposed in the later chapters of this monograph.

[11] In the text above, I have not discussed other strategies in this phase of the transaction that cannot be combined with awareness-raising campaigns. Note that, due to the variety of non quota strategies in use around the globe, we can not exclude the possibility that awareness-raising campaigns could be found in combination with other strategies as well. A detailed description of these strategies is, however, beyond the scope of this monograph.

2.2.2 Other Types of Non-quota Strategies

This section describes other types of non-quota strategies, organising them on the basis of which phase of the transaction they target. Starting with the second part of the transaction, training programs have grown exponentially since the 1980s. They are typically organized by non-partisan networks, university centers, and even international organizations. In Grate Britain, the 300 Group was founded to assist women interested in pursuing a nomination for office (Krook & Norris, 2014). Many similar Programs exist in the US context, with many examples of these programs dedicated to training candidates from ethnic minority backgrounds (e.g., the Ready to Run program) (Shames et al., 2020). Training programs are sometimes "condensed" in events lasting from one to three days (Krook & Norris, 2014).

Focusing on the third part of the transaction, fundraising initiatives aim to ensure that women have the financial resources necessary to run a successful campaign (Shames et al., 2020). One of the most well-known initiatives of this type is the US-based EMILY's List, where "EMILY" is an acronym for "Early Money Is Like Yeast" – implying that contributions can help raise more funds ("make the dough rise") (Krook & Norris, 2014). In the Grate Britain, similar action is undertaken by the 50:50 Parliament group (Parliament.co.uk, 2023). Similar initiatives were also documented in many other countries, including Australia and Italy. Note that the proliferation of these initiatives can also be explained by their frequently strong political connotation, such that support is given to prospective candidates whose agenda aligns with that of the supporting group in a "do ut des" kind of fashion (Krook & Norris, 2014; Shames et al., 2020).

Furthermore, state actors can assist women in the second and third phases of the transaction by enacting new laws to combat violence against female politicians and by encouraging political parties to select more female candidates through positive and negative incentives. Typically, these incentives are tied to regulations on party funding and publicly provided campaign support (Krook & Noris, 2014).

AS previously stated, these non-quota strategies aim to increase the supply-side of female candidates through a different mechanism to awareness-raising campaigns, sometimes, also aiming for a different outcome. Section *2.3 - Political Ambition* below starts by introducing the concept of political ambition and then moves to define the specific sub-type of political ambition that I argue is the most appropriate target for non-quota strategies in the first phase of the transaction.

2.3 Political Ambition

Running for office is one of the most expensive forms of political participation, not only in terms of financial costs but also regarding time and energy expenditure, opportunity costs, and the psychological

and emotional stress involved (Shames, 2017). Nevertheless, the costs associated with having political ambitions appear to disproportionately affect women. The gender gap in political ambition is currently considered one of major cause of women's political under-representation in the Western world (Lawless & Fox, 2010). This is a supply-side problem that can only be tackled by non-quota strategies (quota strategies are an answer to the demand-side of women's political under-representation). In this section, I start by defining the broad concept of political ambition and its sub-types. I then establish a connection between the non-quota strategies examined in this monograph and nascent political ambition, which is the primary target of these strategies.

Political ambition is broadly defined as the desire to hold political office (Schlesinger, 1966). This label can refer to the desires of non-political actors to obtain office for the first time, as well as the interests of political actors in maintaining a career in politics (Schlesinger, 1966). Whereas sarlier research into political ambition saw the latter as the main research objective (Schlesinger, 1966), a growing interest in diversity in political representation has shifted the focus of political ambition research to the behaviour of non-political actors.[12] [13] As such, a significant research community has emerged to investigate the link between the gender gap in political ambition and women's political under-representation (Lawless & Fox, 2010).[14] Here, scholars suggest that there are two different stages in the development of political ambition among non-political actors (Lawless & Fox, 2010). Specifically, *nascent political ambition* can be thought of as an individual's intention to seek political office for the first time. *Expressive political ambition* is the behavioural expression of nascent political ambition that appears when individuals exercise their interest

[12]This research found that the support for left-wing parties or fringe parties is positively linked to political ambition (Allen & Cutts, 2018).

[13]Another key finding of this scholarship is that there's a link between the emergence of political ambition and non-political actors' level of income and education (Burns et al., 2001; Carnes & Lupu, 2016; Gulzar, 2021; Rule, 1981; Sapiro, 1982) which for women tend to be lower then men (Lawless & Fox, 2010).

[14]This scholarship argues that in the immediate after-war period when women's suffrage was introduced in many Western democracies, women participated less in politics simply because of women's lower level of education and income compared to men. As soon as women's level of education met that of men and their personal income grew, women's participation also increased (Burns et al., 2001; Verba et al., 1997). Note that, political science scholarship broadly defines political participation as "the activities by which members of a society share in the selection of rulers and, directly or indirectly, in the formation of public policy" (McCloskey, 1968, p.252), or "all voluntary activities by which individual citizens intend to influence either directly or indirectly political choices at various levels of the political system" (Kaase & Marsh, 1979, p.42). Also note that political leadership aside, women are today participating in politics to increasingly similar extents as men. Women tend to be registered voters more often than men (Lawless & Fox, 2010), they are more likely than men to sign petitions (Mellon et al., 2017), attend public meetings and protests (Kretschmer & Meyer, 2013), and write to elected officials (Conway et al., 1997). Even in the British context, women consume as much political information as men (Gennaro & Dutton, 2006) and vote at the same rate as men (R. Campbell, 2006), even more so in recent elections in which British women's support for left-wing parties increased (R. Campbell & Shorrocks, 2021). Similarly, when it comes to political interest and political knowledge, feminist scholars pointed out that women are not less interested or knowledgeable than men (R. Campbell & Winters, 2008), instead, there's a difference in the political themes and topics that women and men are interested in. Unsurprisingly, these themes and topics are often associated with gender expectations in our society (R. Campbell, 2004; R. Campbell & Winters, 2008; R. Campbell & Childs, 2015). A similar difference is also observed in the policy activity of female and male political leaders (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004) and broader political goals (Schneider et al., 2016). The specification is necessary due to the common argument that women's political participation is lower than men's, which pushes claims such as "women are less political than men" and this leads to women's lesser political leadership. Instead, women's political participation is entrenched with the consequences of political socialisation and women's complexity has often been overlooked in the literature (a notable example of academic research overlooking/having a blind spot for women's political participation is described by Paxton, 2000), or reduced to a lesser form of men's participation (Hancock, 2007).

in political leadership roles by seeking election or appointment. These two stages somewhat overlap with the first two phases in Krook and Norris's (2014) transaction model. Specifically, non-quota strategies in the first phase of the transaction model should aim to raise the general level of interest in political office among the (female) eligible population, namely, their nascent political ambition, while the second phase should focus on already aspiring political candidates to increase their expressive ambition.

Based on Lawless and Fox (2010), a further distinction between expressive and nascent ambition is represented by the different types of barriers hindering them. Since nascent political ambition represents social actors' *intentions* of pursuing political office (and not their actions per se), it is largely affected by perceived impediments and barriers to success. An individual's self-perception of suitability for political office, for example, is among those barriers. These barriers tend to be a product of individuals' political socialization and are observable in their attitudinal representation (O'Connor & Yanus, 2020). Expressive political ambition, on the other hand, may involve barriers of a more concrete sort (e.g., lack of time or funding, etc.). On this basis, I argue that strategies which aim to increase nascent political ambition should attempt to erode negative *attitudes* towards women's suitability for political leadership as developed by individuals during their political socialisation (the link between political socialisation and political ambition will be explored in later section).

On the flip side, a focus on nascent political ambition, as opposed to expressive political ambition, allows to explores the impact of awareness-raising strategies on their most likely outcome. Social-psychology scholars have long established the close link between attitudes and intentions (Ajzen, 1985) and thus, when negative attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership are eroded by awareness-raising strategies, intentions should be benefited. If awareness-raising strategies fail to do so, we might have to conclude that a small "nudge" coming from these strategies is not sufficient to ameliorate attitudes and ambitions.

In *Section 2.4 - Attitudes Towards Women's Suitability for Political Leadership*, I will proceed to identify what these attitudes are by examining the literature. Before defining attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership, however, it is important to note that while these attitudes are a major factor for the study of the mechanism of awareness-raising strategies, they should not be regarded as the sole cause of women's political under-representation.

First, demand-side problems are still a prevalent cause of women's political under-representation (Krook, 2010b; Teele et al., 2018). Here, demand-side factors affecting women's political under-representation include biases in candidate selection, placing women in less winnable constituencies, double standards in evaluation, and voter preferences for traditional candidate profiles (Ashe & Stewart, 2012; Norris & Lovenduski, 1993, 1995; Thomas & Wineinger, 2020). By definition, awareness-raising strategies are unsuited

to tackle these problems.

Second, supply-side factors are not only limited to attitudes (Haraldsson, 2022; Lawless & Pearson, 2008; Sanbonmatsu, 2020). Here, one should also consider social expectations about women's familial commitments, which play against the requirements of a full-time political career (Teele et al., 2018). Nevertheless, awareness-raising strategies have limited scope in supporting women in balancing their work-family life, which often calls for material support (e.g., structures and incentives supports women's child caring duties; see Fitzgerald, 2018). Therefore, these types of obstacles to equal representation along demand-side problems is put in the background.

Furthermore, still within the supply-side factors, literature in political psychology suggests that, on the one hand, women tend to be on average more risk- and conflict- adverse then men; on the other hand, competition and career instability and risk are core aspects of the political life (e.g., Buser et al., 2021; Bos & Schneider, 2017; Coffé & Davidson-Schmich, 2020; Kanthak & Woon, 2015; Preece & Stoddard, 2015; Schneider et al., 2016; Sweet-Cushman, 2016). In this vein, psychological tendencies can be considered as factors that affect women's lower interest in political posts compared to men, and these tendencies are acknowledged as contributing to the supply-side problem of women's political under-representation (Coffé & Davidson-Schmich, 2020). However, these psychological tendencies are difficult, if not impossible, to manipulate directly, and therefore, they are not the primary focus of non-quota strategies such as awareness-raising campaigns. All causes of women's political under-representation that are not central to awareness-raising strategies will be further explored in *Section 2.6 - Other Explanations for Women's Political Under-representation.* Below, I will proceed to identify what these attitudes are by examining the literature.

2.4 Attitudes Towards Women's Suitability for Political Leadership

In social science literature, there is general agreement that an attitude represents a summary evaluation of a psychological object. This evaluation is captured between the dimensions of good-bad, harmful-beneficial, pleasant-unpleasant, likeable-dislikeable, and so on (Ajzen, 1985, 2005). It is well established that attitudes affect intentions (see Ajzen, 1985; Kruglanski et al., 2015; Sheeran, 2002). Since nascent political ambition represents the interest in seeking political leadership roles at the level of intentions, it is understandable that negative attitudes about women's suitability for political leadership are among the main factors limiting women's nascent political ambition. In this section, I will further justify this statement by identifying four attitudes in the literature that I argue are linked to the effect of awareness-raising

strategies on women's political ambition. To identify these four attitudes, I will start by briefly introducing the concept of socialization, which is the process through which attitudes are developed. *Section 2.4.1 - A Snapshot on Women's Political Socialisation* takes a detour from describing the elements in the mechanism described in this thesis and further expand on the topic of a gendered political socialisation providing information to better contextualise the emergence of gendered attitudes.

Socialisation is the social process through which an individual internalises diverse types of information. Included among these are the *scripts* or roles that are socially acceptable for them to cover, given their social identity (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Goffman, 1959; Mead, 1934; Schütz, 1944). That a gendered political socialisation is linked to a gender gap in political ambition is a well-established fact (e.g. Bernhard, 2022; Bernhard et al., 2021; Bos et al., 2022, 2020; 2013; Lawless & Fox, 2010; Lay et al., 2021; Oxley et al., 2020; 2022; Teele et al., 2018). As part of this socialisation process, scholars have observed that social cues are often used by adults and peers to discourage young girls from taking part in political conversations (Lawless & Fox, 2010). Girls are also often discouraged from taking part in what could be called activities of early political leadership, such as running for student representative (Lawless & Fox, 2010).[15] [16] Following these observations, researchers suggested that, in Western society, individuals are still socialised to a stereotypically masculine image of political leadership (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993a; b). Scholars suggests that this type of socialisation affects adult women's perceptions of their suitability for political leadership roles (Bernhard, 2022; Bos et al., 2020, 2022; Lay et al., 2021; Teele et al., 2018).

One could argue that the purpose of awareness-raising strategies is to mitigate the negative consequences of gendered political socialization. A reasonable approach to counteracting such negative consequences is to erode the negative attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership that stem from a gendered socialization process. I identify four attitudes toward women's suitability for political office that are somehow related to women's political ambition in the literature, linking them to the effect of awareness-raising strategies. Note that, when I say that attitudes toward women's suitability for political leadership are connected to the effect of awareness-raising strategies, I mean that (1) awareness-raising strategies strategies should induce a change in the levels of these attitudes as they attempt to influence women's political ambition (Krook & Norris, 2014). Moreover, (2) in understanding why awareness-raising strategies might not achieve their intended effect, it's important to recognize that they confront individuals in the general population who may be predisposed to resist changing their views on women's political leadership (Eagly & Chaiken, 1995). Some groups might respond differently to the content of

[15]The reason why girls are socialised to abstain from political leadership roles is linked to a traditional division in social roles (see Alesina et al., 2013; Eagly et al., 2000; Goffman, 1959; 1963) and labours (Lovenduski & Hills, 1981; Sapiro, 1981b).

[16]The gender gap in participation to political activities that require lower levels of leadership is nowadays less significant (Allen & Cutts, 2018; Campbell & Childs, 2015; Teele et al., 2018).

awareness-raising strategies compared to the rest of the population, as suggested by literature indicating that an individual's predisposition can lead to resistance to campaign efforts (Eagly & Chaiken, 1995; Dhima, 2023; Gatto & Araújo, 2023; Jung & Tavits, 2023). This suggests that attitudes might not be as malleable as some scholars previously suggested (Eagly & Chaiken, 1995; Ajzen, 2005) and that they can both enables awareness-raising campaign effect, and limits it by creating resistance. One way to observe such resistance, therefore, is to observe the impact of these strategies as an effect of pre-existing levels of attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership.

To the best of my knowledge, the literature offers no fine-grained account of the informational content that is touched upon by awareness-raising strategies. Hence, it would be reasonable to assume that the content of awareness-raising strategies is comprised of information targeting the four attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership that these strategies aim to influence. These four attitudes are (1) support for women in political leadership roles, (2) support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style, (3) perceived support for women in the political environment, and (4) self-perception of qualification.

Starting with *support for women in political leadership roles*, literature has long suggested that the mismatch between women's social roles and the roles associated with political leadership affects women's political representation (Sapiro, 1981a,b; Teele et al., 2018). Literature also indicates that, as support for traditional gender roles has waned, there has been progress in the public's support for the equal suitability of women for political leadership roles (e.g., Streb et al. (2007); even though scholars point out that complete equality has not yet been reached. See Bos et al., 2022, 2020; 2013; Lawless & Fox, 2010; Lay et al., 2021; Oxley et al., 2020; 2022; Streb et al., 2007). This progress can be understood as part of a virtuous cycle between the emergence of women's political representation and the support for the attitude of gender equality in leadership roles. Initially, more equal political representation of women emerged in countries that reported comparatively progressive views on gender roles (Alexander, 2012; Inglehart et al., 2003). In turn, the increased presence of women in political roles helped to further improve attitudes towards women's political representation. This shift in public perception opened the way for more women to run for political office (Alexander, 2012).

Furthermore, social psychology scholars have long suggested that individuals tend to evaluate their suitability for different social roles based on their gender identity (Goffman, 1959, 1963). Hence, there's more than one reason to believe in some form of link between political ambition and attitudes towards gender roles and political leadership roles.[17]

Even though, to the best of my knowledge, no study investigating the British context has explicitly

[17]Note that many studies on this attitude are cross-country and/or longitudinal comparisons of their expression in the general population (e.g. Inglehart & Norris, 2003).

linked individual-level variation in attitudes toward women's suitability for political leadership to variations in political ambition, I contend that this attitude is likely connected to the impact of awareness-raising strategies. Therefore, if the content of awareness-raising strategies effectively enhances the audience's level of congruence between gender roles and political leadership roles, it might also influence their political ambition. Note that this would be a case of *mediation*, whereby the effect of awareness-raising strategies on women's political ambition is filtered by the improvement of such attitude. In other words, awareness-raising strategies would affect political ambition (whether partially or entirely) through their effect on this attitude. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, individuals come with pre-existing attitudinal predispositions when they are exposed to awareness-raising strategies. For example, individuals that have a negative attitude towards women's fitness for political leadership might be completely numb to awareness-raising efforts suggesting that women are indeed suitability for political jobs. The opposite can also be true, namely, individuals that never considered women as fit for political leadership might be particularly struck by the content of awareness raising efforts. Consequently, the initial level of such attitudes could moderate the effectiveness of awareness-raising strategies by defining variations in their impact. In this scenario, attitudes measured before exposure to awareness-raising strategies may still affect the magnitude of the strategy's effect on political ambition. While the distinction between the moderating and mediating roles of attitudes is discussed in further detail in subsequent chapters, for illustrative purposes, Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 would graphically represent the difference between these two relationships.

From a different angle, *support for a a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style* can also be linked to the gender gap in political ambition.[18] In Western society, women are generally expected to dress in a recognisably feminine way, to be polite, accommodating, nurturing, and so on; men, on the other hand, are expected to be strong, aggressive, and bold (Bourdieu, 1987, 2001; Eagly et al., 2000). Subsequent gender stereotypes may be represented by phrases like "women are nurturing" or "women are weak", and "men are strong" or "men are not emotionally intelligent".[19] Specifically regarding political leadership roles, similar to observations about women's gender roles, research in social and political psychology suggests that women's gender stereotypes are incongruent with the stereotypes of political leadership (e.g. see Huddy and Terkildsen's framework (1993a,b), Eagly & Karau's role congruity theory (1991) and Fiske's stereotypes content model (1993)in the section below). More precisely, scholars argue that politics and leadership have traditionally been connoted as masculine (1993b), and leadership skills are seen as necessary to hold political office at any level (Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993a,b). This has led to a

[18]Note that, while this attitude *can* be linked to political ambition, the connection has not yet been made explicitly in current literature.

[19]Note that gender stereotypes are often positively or negatively connoted (Dovidio et al., 2010).

widespread idea that female political leaders are less capable than men (Eagly & Karau, 1991; Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993a,b).[20]

Scholars studying political leadership stereotypes have categorized traits associated with gender stereotypes into two distinct leadership styles. The first style, known as the communal leadership style, aligns with stereotypically feminine traits. It encompasses qualities traditionally attributed to women, such as empathy, collaboration, fairness, and a strong emphasis on communication. The second style, referred to as the agentic leadership style, is associated with stereotypically masculine traits and includes characteristics typically ascribed to men, like assertiveness, toughness, and authoritativeness (Eagly & Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001). This scholarship suggests that the communal leadership style is seen as defective (Eagly & Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001). They also argue that women(men) political leaders are on average seen as more communal(agentic) regardless of their actual leadership style (Eagly & Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001); when women adopt a counter-stereotypical leadership style to mitigate the side effects of being seen as communal, they encounter severe backlash in the public eye (Eagly & Karau, 2002, see also Bernhard, 2021; Bernhard et al., 2020; Gillard & Okonjo-Iweala, 2021; Hargrave & Blumenau, 2022; Okimoto & Brescoll, 2010). Scholars also point out that individuals use these gendered stereotypes not only to evaluate the suitability of others for political leadership, but also their own suitability (Abele et al., 2016; Russell & Fiske, 2008; Wojciszke et al., 2009). Even though, to the best of my knowledge, this link is yet to be made explicit, I argue that weakening either the association between political leadership and the masculine leadership style, or between women and the communal leadership style, could potentially have effects on women' political ambition.

Recently, several pieces of literature point in the direction of an increasing preference for stereotypically feminine traits in political candidates (Anzia & Bernhard, 2022; Bernhard, 2022; Coffé & Bolzendahl, 2021; Coffé et al., 2022; Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson, 2008; Hinojosa, 2012; Vial & Napier, 2018). Such a preference is particularly noticeable among women and left-wing partisans (Eagly & Johannesen-Schmid, 2001; Viel & Napier, 2018). At the same time, scholars also show that female political leaders have become more agentic over time (Hargrave & Blumenau, 2022), and that women tend to think that agentic traits are in some way essential to success in political competitions (Bernhard et al., 2020). A possible interpretation of these findings is that, while a preference for the communal leadership style has become the current baseline, politically ambitious women will hold a slightly stronger preference for the agentic leadership style. In the framework of system justification theory, this relative preference for the agentic leadership style comes from the acceptance of the rules of the political game (see Jost & Banaji, 1994) All in all, the literature suggests that leadership style preferences are significant. Therefore, it is

[20]Note that a comparable underrepresentation of women in leadership positions is observed in other stereotypically masculine fields, e.g. managerial positions in the financial sector (Eagly & Karau, 1991).

plausible that the content of awareness-raising strategies could produce an effect on these associations and subsequently on political ambition. Attitudes towards a stereotypically feminine leadership style can be linked to the effect of awareness-raising strategies, potentially serving either as a mediator or as a moderator by the same logic described above, and as depicted in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3.

Note that the difference between support for women in political leadership roles and support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style is distinctive. Support for women in political leadership roles assesses the congruence between gender roles and political leadership roles as perceived by individuals, while support for a feminine leadership style gauges the alignment between expectations and stereotypes related to gender and political leadership. Although they are connected, social roles, expectations, and stereotypes are separate concepts that do not always coincide (Diekman & Eagly, 2000; more on this in *Section 2.4.1 - A Snapshot on Women's Political Socialisation*). Additionally, support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style is an attitude based on a collection of traits culturally linked to femininity or masculinity. Unlike support for women in political leadership roles, its measurement does not explicitly reference gender; thus, this attitude is likely to capture a broader spectrum of implicit biases against women candidates (see Mo, 2015; Teele et al., 2018).

Regarding *perceived support for women in the political environment*, it is not surprising that research has documented the influence of this attitude on women's levels of political ambition (Lawless & Fox, 2010). Scholars find that, in normal circumstances, women are more likely to run in political contexts that they find more friendly (e.g. Castle et al., 2020; Coffé & Davidson-Schmich, 2020; Lawless and Fox, 2010; Dittmar, 2020; Wylie, 2018). Even though overt sexism in politics seems to be in decline, female politicians still experience instances of gender bias, discrimination and violence (Krook, 2020). Moreover, women have historically denounced the "male culture" of Western politics (for Ireland and Australia, see Fitzgerald, 2018, and Gillard & Okonjo-Iweala, 2021, respectively. For the Great Britain see Currell, 1978; Hunter, 1980; Ranney, 1965). Researchers also point out that party gatekeepers often revert to sexist gender stereotypes when selecting candidates (Niven, 1998). Some scholars go all the way to argue that political institution that were developed during centuries of male dominance will need to change their structure to achieve diversity in representation (Mackay et al., 2010). Hence, one of the things captured by this attitude is women's perception of demand-side barriers to women's political representations.

The media is also responsible for spreading misogyny against women in politics (Krook, 2020; Pruysers et al., 2020). All these factors contribute to the public perception that, all else being equal, it would be more challenging for female candidates to emerge as political leaders compared to their male counterparts (Lawless & Fox, 2010; Thomas & Wineinger, 2020).[21] It would not be a coincidence if women who tend

[21] More generally, research has highlighted that an individual's political behaviour is affected by the individual's perception

to be more risk avoidant than men, tend to avoid investing their time in activities that they perceive as "a lost cause" (Sweet-Cushman, 2016).

In recent years, however, real-world efforts have been employed to counter the problem of sexism in politics (Castle et al., 2020); these efforts may have led to variable levels of perceived support for women in the political environment. In regard to the mechanism of awareness-raising strategies, I contend that if the content of these strategies enhances the perceived support for women in the political environment, it might also affect their political ambition. Similar to the points made above, the initial level of such an attitude could also *moderate* the effectiveness of awareness-raising strategies by determining variations in their impact (as illustrated in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3). Overall, this attitude is also connected to the effect of awareness-raising strategies on political ambitions.

The gender gap in *self-perception of qualification* is currently considered a major determinant of the gender gap in political ambition in the Western world (Heger & Hoffmann, 2021; Lawless & Fox, 2010; Niemi et al., 1991). Experimental manipulations of this construct have confirmed that individuals with higher self-perception of qualification, both men and women, are more likely to be interested in political leadership roles (Preece, 2016). Furthermore, there's a large body of literature that has found evidence of a significant link between self-perception of internal efficacy (a construct resembling self-perception of qualification) and political ambition (Campbell et al., 1954; Caprara et al., 2009). I argue that, through their content, awareness-raising strategies might affect women's perceptions of qualification for politics, making this a (last) relevant attitude for the mechanism that I have proposed here, potentially acting as both a moderator and mediator in the relationship between awareness-raising strategies and political ambition (as illustrated in Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3).

Note that the third and fourth attitudes are conceived as a positive-negative evaluation. So even if they are labelled perceptions, they are also effectively attitudes (see Ajzen, 1985). Also note that prominent theories of intention formation, such as Ajzen's Theory of Planned Behavior, support the selection of these four attitudes as defining factors for the emergence of women's political ambition. Specifically, Ajzen postulates that social norms, stereotypes about behavior, and individuals' perceptions of control over desired outcomes—which correspond to the four attitudes identified above—all contribute to intention formation (Ajzen, 1985; in the Appendix to this chapter, *Section A.1.1 - Theory of Planned Behaviour and Attitudes Selection* goes into details of how this theory support the selection of the attitudes towards

of the response they would receive from the political environment and the expected supportiveness of their input (Bandura et al., 1999; A. Campbell, 1954; Caprara et al., 2009).

women's political leadership here described).[22] [23] These same theories of intention formation point out that the relevance of attitudes is not the same across individuals (Ajzen 1985). In *Section 2.5 - The Role of Political Ideology*, I discuss how political ideology represents an important factor that defines which attitudes are relevant for the emergence of political ambition across different groups of women. Before that, for completeness, I expand on the topic of a gendered political socialisation which is at the basis of attitudes formations.

Figure 2.2: Mediation (Chapter 4): attitudes filter the effect of awareness-raising strategies on ambition



[22]Note that this theoretical model does not account for affective cognition (i.e. evaluations based on emotions). Thus, although it is reasonable to think that emotions could play a part in the explanation of variation in women's political ambition (e.g. Brader & Marcus, 2013). I have elected not to address emotions—a decision reflected in the choice of model. Similarly, I choose to disregard personality-based explanations for the emergence of political ambition (Holman & Schneider, 2018; J. Preece & Stoddard, 2015; Schneider et al., 2016).

[23]Taking Ajzen's Theory of planned behaviour, the theory also supports the intuition that attitudes should be the main predictors of nascent political ambition while material barriers are what hinder the transition of nascent political ambition into expressive political ambition.

Figure 2.3: Moderation (Chapter 5): pre-existing attitudes affect the effect of awareness-raising strategies on ambition



2.4.1 A Snapshot on Women's Political Socialisation

In this section I dive deeper in the aforementioned reasons behind the disassociation between women's gender roles and political leadership roles, as well as the enduring nature of this dissociation. The analysis begins by examining the role of socialization in shaping this dissociation process.

As previously mentioned, socialization is the social process through which individuals internalize diverse forms of information, including "scripts" that prescribe socially acceptable behaviors based on a person's given set of characteristics (Mead, 1934). Through the process of socialization, individuals internalize scripts that are associated with various aspects of their identity, including gender roles (whether they identify as male, female, or queer), leadership roles (whether they perceive themselves as leaders or followers), and political roles (whether they are politically engaged or not, and hold left-wing or right-wing political ideologies, among others). Scholars have long suggested that political socialization plays a significant role in shaping individuals' political engagement and political ideologies (Sears & Brown, 2013). It is believed that the process of socialization influences individuals' attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors in the political realm.

When examining the intersection of political roles and leadership roles, research has shown that socialization has an impact on individuals' interest in pursuing positions of political leadership and engaging

in politics through various forms of participation, including more "passive" activities like voting (Teele et al., 2018; Allen & Cutts, 2018). Considering the intersection of all three roles mentioned above, gender socialization specifically affects individuals' perception of their own suitability for political leadership. (Lay et al., 2021; Teele et al., 2018). Indeed, the assessment of suitability for political leadership is influenced by gender; individuals who are socialized into female gender roles tend to perceive themselves as relatively unsuitable for political leadership (Bos et al., 2020, 2022; Teele et al., 2018). This idea is supported by research findings that highlight the discouragement faced by young girls in engaging in political conversations or activities of early political participation. Studies have shown that young girls are often subtly discouraged (that is, through social cues) by adults and peers from participating in discussions that involve political topics or undertones. They may also face discouragement when it comes to running for student representative positions or engaging in similar activities of early political participation (Lawless & Fox, 2010). As a consequence of these socialization processes, gender has been found to have a systematic influence on women's lower levels of self-perception of qualification for political offices even in adulthood (Lawless & Fox, 2010; Niemi et al., 1991).

To understand the reasons behind the positive socialization of men for political leadership roles and the discouragement faced by women, it is important to examine the concept of gender roles. Gender roles represent just one facet of the various roles that individuals assume in their daily lives, yet they are often considered a fundamental dimension in the construction of personal identity (Goffman, 1959). Throughout history, labor division in agricultural societies, both in Europe and later in America, has been based on gender roles. Individuals were assigned specialized tasks believed to align with their biological sex. Women were typically associated with roles such as mother, caregiver, and healer, while men were associated with roles such as farmhand and soldier (Alesina et al., 2013). Traditionally, the division of labor based on gender roles has allocated social actors to either the private or the public sphere (Alesina et al., 2013; Sapiro, 1981b). Women have been associated with roles centered around the private sphere, primarily within the home, involving caregiving responsibilities for young and older individuals, as well as tending to the sick. Housekeeping tasks such as cooking and cleaning have also been predominantly assigned to women. On the other hand, men have been associated with roles within the public sphere, often involving resource procurement such as acquiring food or money (Eagly et al., 2000). It is important to note that in the public sphere, activities primarily associated with male gender roles have played a significant role in acquiring or maintaining social status, including cases of hereditary acquisition (Sapiro, 1981b).

Understanding the rigidity of gender roles requires recognizing their function in maintaining social cohesion. Social actors exert pressure on each other to conform to socially acceptable behaviors, often

through the risk of stigmatization and other forms of social consequences (Berger & Luckman, 1967; Eagly et al., 2000; Goffman, 1963). Consequently, the process of redefining gender roles can be a lengthy one (Alesina et al., 2013). However, societal interventions can expedite this process. Historical events such as wars, for instance, have acted as catalysts for reshaping the boundaries between the private and public spheres, thereby challenging established gender roles (Lovenduski & Hills, 1981). The impact of wars resulted in an unprecedented demand for female labor in Western society, leading to increased female engagement with politics. Consequently, there was a significant growth in the demand for female suffrage and subsequent institutional gains in the form of women's voting rights (Lovenduski & Hills, 1981; Teele, 2019). It is important to note that despite the changes brought about by wartime shocks, gender roles have persisted in relation to political leadership and leadership more broadly. As women entered the workforce and became politically active, their participation primarily occurred as workers and voters, rather than as entrepreneurs or political executives (Campbell & Childs, 2015; Lovenduski & Hills, 1981; Teele, 2018). This highlights the need for awareness-raising campaigns to facilitate the erosion of gender roles to their fullest extent.

Gender roles are a latent construct, making it unclear how to assess gender in a society. The approach I am taking here considers gender expectations and associated stereotypes. Gender expectations are defined as a set of prescribed behaviors, like a script, that individuals follow to perform their gender roles (Goffman, 1959; Schutz, 1944). Gender stereotypes, on the other hand, are generalized and simplistic beliefs about characteristics that women and men should possess or are expected to possess. These stereotypes are partly derived from gender expectations. In Western society, women are generally expected to dress in a feminine manner and exhibit traits such as politeness, accommodation, and nurturing qualities. Meanwhile, men are expected to display strength, aggression, and boldness (Bourdieu, 1987; 2001; Eagly et al., 2000). These expectations give rise to gender stereotypes, which are often expressed through phrases like "women are nurturing" or "women are weak," and "men are strong" or "men lack emotional intelligence." It's important to note that gender stereotypes can carry positive or negative connotations (Dovidio et al., 2010).[24]

Understanding the disconnect between identity-based stereotypes and stereotypes associated with specific societal roles is crucial in comprehending why women's gender roles are disconnected from political leadership positions. Scholars have introduced various models to aid in this endeavor, one of which is Fiske's *stereotype content model* (2002). This model categorizes identity-based stereotypes based on their alignment with societal roles. The model is built on the concepts of 'warmth' and 'competence', which constitute dimensions in which stereotypes can be assessed. 'Warmth' is representative of social

[24]In general, stereotypes are defined as a widely held but oversimplified image about a certain social role or person that is relatively stable in the mind of the beholder Dovidio (2010).

skills, trustworthiness, and friendliness, while 'competence' is representative of intellect, capability, and assertiveness. Both societal roles and individuals' identities are assessed in terms of these dimensions, and individuals are perceived as suitable to take on a certain role when the stereotypes associated with their identity align with those associated with that role. In practice, Fiske suggests that women are associated with the stereotypes of the 'warmth' dimension, though not typically the 'competence' dimension. Consequently, the assessment of women's suitability for activities in which one of 'warmth' or 'competence' is an important factor is likely to involve the corresponding biases (Fiske, 1993). Unsurprisingly, Fiske suggests that political roles fall under the 'competence' dimension, and thus the suitability of women for political jobs is likely to be underestimated. Note that the stereotype content model was not developed to explain gender stereotypes alone. Fiske's aim was to produce a model that would facilitate the comparison of stereotypes associated with different social groups (e.g., immigrants and locals).

Prior to the stereotype content model, scholars had developed theories to make sense of what happens when women enter spaces that would be typically associated with male gender expectations. The early, seminal work of Huddy and Terkildsen (1993a,b) provided evidence that women are stereotypically perceived as being less competent than men for political leadership jobs. The logic of their analysis is based on the notion that politics and leadership have been traditionally connoted as masculine (1993b), and, indeed, that leadership skills are a requirement of holding political office at any level (Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993a,b). Hence, the role of a "political officer", which combines politics and leadership, exists at the intersection of two activities that were historically associated with male gender expectations and continue to be associated with masculinity in that particular intersection today. It is important to note that a similar lack of representation of women in leadership positions can be observed in other traditionally male-dominated fields, such as managerial roles in the financial sector (Eagly & Karau, 1991).

Eagly has expanded upon the work of Huddy and Terkildsen, as well as Fiske, by developing a theory known as *role congruity theory* that specifically addresses women's leadership. This theory is built upon Mead's social role theory (1934) and draws inspiration from Goffman's dramaturgical model (1959). While heavily influenced by Fiske's stereotype content model, role congruity theory places gender as the central dimension of analysis. The theory focuses on the cognitive associations between femininity and masculinity with caring roles and public roles, respectively. It emphasizes the incongruity between women's gender roles and roles that demand high levels of "competence", similar to the insights provided by the stereotype content model. However, unlike the stereotype content model, though in alignment with the work of Huddy and Terkildsen (1993), role congruity theory first and foremost focuses on women who enter positions of leadership (Eagly & Karau, 1991; 2001). Consequently, it defines stereotypes that are associated with masculine and feminine leadership styles, selecting those that are easily adapted to the

study of the link between women's gender roles and political leadership roles. As previously mentioned, role congruity theory is based on the premise that there are distinct personal traits associated with gender stereotypes. According to this theory, women are often stereotypically perceived as having "communal" characteristics, such as being collaborative, empathetic, and focused on communal well-being. On the other hand, leadership roles are associated with "agentic" traits, including assertiveness, toughness, and authority. These agentic traits are typically seen as masculine, which aligns with similarities found in the stereotype content model and Huddy and Terkildsen's work. As a result of this incongruity, women are negatively associated with leadership positions (Eagly & Karau, 1991; 2002). This means that, on average, women who assume leadership roles face a disadvantage in terms of how their competence is perceived, regardless of their actual abilities (Eagly & Karau, 2002).

Further research in the theory demonstrates that women who adhere to the societal script of 'warmth' in their leadership roles tend to be perceived as less competent compared to men. Importantly, this perception is irrespective of their actual competence (Eagly & Karau, 2002). On the other hand, when women adopt stereotypically masculine roles and display traits associated with competence (as seen in examples like Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister or Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State), they often face negative perceptions of lacking femininity. These negative perceptions persist regardless of their actual characteristics or abilities (Eagly & Karau, 2002).[25] [26]

As previously suggested, social actors not only evaluate others in terms of the associations that are proposed by role congruity theory, but they also evaluate themselves. Thus, when considering the barriers to women's political ambition, role congruity theory provides a valuable framework for understanding how women evaluate their own suitability for political leadership roles (Abele et al., 2016; Russell & Fiske, 2008; Wojciszke, Abele, & Baryla, 2009). Moreover, role congruity theory can be applied to establish either positive or negative connections between the prescriptive norms of femininity and political leadership. By utilizing this theory, it becomes possible to leverage these associations to challenge and undermine the traditionally masculine perception of political leadership. Further elaboration on this point will be provided in the subsequent discussion.

It is crucial to keep in mind that gender roles, expectations, and stereotypes are not fixed or immutable (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). Additionally, it is important to recognize that there are variations, both significant and subtle, in the degree and manifestation of socialization into gender roles at the individual

[25]Note that gendered associations between competency and warmth seem to be rather automatic and hard to avoid to the extent that for a long time, scholarship had suggested that female political leaders with counter-stereotypical leadership styles would be penalised by the public regardless of what they do.

[26]The observed consequences of the theoretical proposition made by Eagly are several: first of all, it is harder for women to emerge as leaders and achieve success than men. Second, women that emerge as leaders face greater discrimination than men leaders. Note that "discrimination" is defined as the separation and exclusion (and often unjust treatment) of a certain group (here, women) based on stereotypes that are believed to be true based on one's social identity (Dovidio, et al., 2010, passim).

level. In fact, it is the diversity in women's internalized perspectives regarding the correlation between gender and political leadership that contributes, at least partially, to the variations in their perceptions of suitability for political positions. Attitudes can capture this variation; consequently, they can used to explain variation in political ambition. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the purpose of awareness-raising campaigns is to dismantle the association between male gender roles and political leadership—an association that has a significant influence on women's attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership.

In the following section, I discuss how political ideology represents an important sorting mechanism for which attitudes "manifest" the disassociation between gender roles and political leadership roles across different groups of women, and thus, which attitudes are relevant for the emergence of their political ambition.

2.5 The Role of Political Ideology

Political ideology summarises social actors' complex views of the world (Feldman, 1988; Lippmann, 2017; Sears & Brown, 2013); it therefore sorts social actors' views about gender inequality (Sevincer et al, 2023). Here, the concept of "sorting" is fundamental, as political ideology is considered a correlate to social actors' views about gender inequality, without implying a direction in this relationship. For instance, an individual might support a particular ideology because it aligns with their views on gender equality, while another might develop their understanding of gender equality based on the common rhetoric among individuals who share their ideology.

In this section, I discuss how political ideology can be one way to develop targeted awareness-raising content that reflects heterogeneous views of political gender equality and the relationship between attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership and political ambition. It is important to note that political ideology is one method, but not the only way, to develop targeted awareness-raising content. The choice to focus on this factor for heterogeneity is twofold: (1) often, awareness-raising strategies are developed by partisan organizations, and (2) there is an awareness that conservative women are particularly difficult to recruit for participation in politics.

Building from this foundation, I suggest that different types of content are utilized in awareness-raising strategies, which might be suitable for increasing ambitions among left-wing individuals but not among right-wing individuals, and vice versa. I conclude this section by claiming that ideology-based heterogeneity might dilute the effects of awareness-raising strategies, and therefore, they play a part in the observation of these strategies' null effects.

Initially, some scholars simply believed that the theme of gender equality was of greater concern for

the Left (Inglehart & Norris, 2003), while right-wing voters accepted inequality to minimise the risks associated with social change (Jost et al., 2003, 2007, 2009). Other scholars have suggested that, while left-wing individuals often exhibit an uncompromising support for egalitarian attitudes, the attitudes of right-wing individuals on this matter tend to be more mixed, or "melange" (Cochrane, 2010; Converse, 2006).[27] Radical accounts have suggested that attitudinal differences between right-wing and left-wing individuals are due to framing effects, rather than to actual differences in political views (Chong [Ch.4], and Valentino & Nardis [Ch. 18], in Huddy et al. (2013)).

In recent years, the theme of gender equality has become increasingly salient on both sides of the political spectrum (Kteily et al., 2017; Lancaster, 2020; Maxwell, 2020; Spierings, 2020). Following this development, left-wing and right-wing women's views about this theme acquired framings that are coherent with traditional ideological differences between the Left and the Right (Sevincer et al., 2023). Left-wing and right-wing individuals' *taste* for egalitarianism and individualism is key for the evolution of such framings (Jacoby, 2006).[28] On the one hand, the Left demands a greater level of intervention to erode the systemic and structural barriers that hinder equality of outcomes for women. The Right, on the other hand, demands growing opportunities for women who merit them (Sevincer et al., 2023). More precisely, studies on the various views of gender equality find that left-wing women are much more inclined to see gender inequality as a matter of structural barriers (Pratto et al., 1997; Ridgeway & Correll, 2004; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), systemic sexism (Glick & Fiske, 2001), and stereotyping (Jost & Kay, 2005). right-wing women, by contrast, are much more inclined to think of inequality in terms of an imbalance of opportunities between men and women (Sowell, 2019; Scruton, 1980; Sevincer et al., 2023).

Regarding the attitudes that are central to this monograph, it is not a coincidence that, compared to right-wing women, left-wing women were found to report greater support for women in political leadership roles (e.g. Inglehart & Norris, 2003), as well as greater support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style (e.g. Bernhard et al, 2022). Left-wing women were also found to report more negative perceptions of support for women in the political environment (Castle et al., 2020), which can be related to the idea of horizontal barriers, stereotyping, and sexism in the political arena. To the best of my knowledge, self-perception of qualification has not been explicitly associated with partisan ideology.

Based on these pieces of evidence, I argue that the relevance of attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership is likely to be sorted according to women's political ideology.[29] It follows that the relevance of attitudes for the effect of awareness-raising strategies on political ambition reflects this heterogeneity. Consequently, I argue that there are three possible reasons why awareness-raising strate-

[27] And then there are the "in-between" groups such as the libertarians that hold conservative attitudes on economic issues but liberal attitudes on social issues (e.g. Boaz, 1997; Ellis & Stimson, 2009; Feldman [Ch.19], in Huddy et al. (2013)).

[28] Here, egalitarianism and individualism can be described as a different prioritisation of moral regulation vs. individual freedom and meritocracy (Ashton et al. (2005); Feldman [Ch.19], in Huddy et al. (2013)).

[29] By sorted I mean that the relationship between attitudes and political ideology is likely endogenous.

gies fail to produce the desired effects: (1) The content of awareness-raising strategies addresses all four attitudes simultaneously without targeting a population that is homogeneous in terms of their political ideology, resulting in diluted (insignificant) effects; (2) The content of awareness-raising strategies may have negative effects (backlashes) on some women's political ambitions and a positive effect on others, so that what is observed on the surface is the zero-sum of these effects; (3) The content of awareness-raising strategies encounters both the problems described in point (1) and (2) depending on the attitude.

Figure 2.4: Awareness-raising Strategies Mechanism



Model of the proposed mechanism through which awareness-raising strategies might produce an effect on women's political ambition

Figure 2.4 is a graphical representation of the mechanism proposed in this monograph. As one can see, political ambition is affected by the four attitudes of interest, with their relevance being determined through political ideology. Awareness-raising strategies influence the levels of these attitudes and, simultaneously, their impact is influenced by pre-existing levels of attitudes. Unless stated otherwise, from here onwards, I will refer to nascent political ambition with the shorter label of *political ambition*.

2.6 Other Explanations for Women's Political Under-representation

For completeness, this section will explore explanations for women's political under-representation beyond attitudes toward women's suitability for political leadership. This includes demand-side explanations which address how the political market influences the representation of women, and supply-side explanations that consider factors internal to potential female candidates. Here I go in more details regarding supply-side factors as they are closer to the focus of this monograph. Specifically, among the supply-side factors listed here are personality-based explanations that look at why women on average may have lower political ambition, institutional explanations that focus on how political organizations and structures may deter women's interest in leadership roles, and the challenges posed by societal gender expectations and motherhood, often referred to as the double bind.

2.6.1 Demand-side Explanations

Demand-side factors are just as crucial in determining women's political underrepresentation as supply-side factors (Krook & Schwindt-Bayer, 2013; Paxton et al., 2007). Specifically, scholars have observed that women's representation is determined by the demands of gatekeepers and political recruiters, which are themselves shaped by the rules and procedures deriving from the legal, electoral, and party systems (Bjarnegård & Kenny, 2015; Kenny & Verge, 2016; Mackay et al., 2010; Norris, 1997). In other words, gatekeepers are sometimes found to prefer male candidates over female ones. Some scholars suggests that political institutions would need to become more-female friendly for gender diversity to really be possible (this is the prospective Mackay et al.' (2010) new institutionalism). Similarly, research finds that gate keepers have a biased perception of a candidate's suitability to deal with different issues; this perception might favour the candidates or disfavour them in the moment of political placement (e.g. see Anzia and Bernhard, 2022; Dolan, 2004). For example, when it comes to women, there is a biased perception that they are more suited to deal with education and healthcare-related issues than they are to those of finance and foreign affairs (Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993). These same biases also affect voters (e.g. see Anzia and Bernhard, 2022; Dolan, 2004; Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993).

Furthermore, cross-sectional research demonstrates that certain political factors, such as a proportional representation electoral system or the introduction of a national gender quota, are associated with higher levels of women's political representation (e.g., Rule, 1987; Paxton, 1997; Matland, 1998; Kenworthy & Malami, 1999; Tripp & Kang, 2008). Gender quotas are emblematic of the political system's attempts to increase the demand for female political representation. A *gender quota* is a rule set by parties or legislatures that mandates a certain percentage of women on candidate lists, within parliamentary assemblies, committees, or governments. Most governments and political parties that adopt quotas aim to

achieve a minimum representation of women—often targeting thresholds of 20 or 30 percent in parliament (Parliamentary-Union, 2022). However, quotas differ in their required representation levels, and state-mandated quotas may result in a more effective increases in the proportion of women elected compared to party quotas (e.g., Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2005; Tripp & Kang, 2008). However, scholars have noticed that, when this is this case, even when only a subset of parties adopts quotas, diffusion may lead other parties to increase their percentage of female candidates and representatives (Matland & Studlar 1996). Similarly, a gender quota on seats is more effective than a gender quota on the candidates list (IDEA, 2006), even though quotas on candidates lists can be designed to prevent parties from deliberately placing women at the bottom of party lists (Jones, 2004). Finally, when quotas are mandated in the absence of sanctions, party leaders may fail to comply with quota regulations (Dahlerup, 2006; Krook, 2003).

While awareness-raising strategies might benefit women's political representation by reducing biases among voters and gatekeepers, the primary focus of this monograph remains on women's political ambition.

2.6.2 Personality-based Explanations (supply-side)

Here I will discuss the personality-based explanations of women's political ambition. Research has suggested that competition and risk-taking are fundamental aspects of political activity, characteristics that women seem to hold to a lower degree than men (e.g., Buser et al., 2021; Bos & Schneider, 2016; Coffé & Davidson-Schmich, 2020; Kanthak & Woon, 2015; Sweet-Cushman, 2016). Women also tend to be relatively conflict-avoidant—another characteristic highly associated with political activities (e.g. Preece & Stoddard, 2015; Schneider et al., 2016). However, research has shown that when the costs of not running become too high, often motivated by a sense of urgency, women do emerge as candidates even in highly hostile contexts, such as those that are risky, highly competitive, and conflict-dense (Dittmar, 2020; Wylie, 2020). Additionally, women are generally less interested than men in gaining personal power. Scholars have found that framing political activity as oriented towards the attainment of the common good, as opposed to personal advancement, positively affects women's political ambition (Schneider et al., 2016; Pate & Fox, 2018). Similarly, others have argued that women run to make policy changes (Thomas & Wineinger, 2020).

Other scholars have suggested that the gender gap in political ambition might be due to lower "emotional stability" in women—the capacity to maintain one's emotional balance under stressful circumstances—which is on average higher among men (Gerber et al., 2011). The link between emotional stability and political ambition was not corroborated in the British context, where scholars found that more extroversion, and also openness to new experiences, favour political ambition (Allen & Cutts, 2020)

but not emotional stability. Hence, the relationship between personality traits and political ambition seems to be context-dependent (Dietrich et al., 2012). Furthermore, even though narcissism and machiavellianism have been found to be associated with higher levels of political ambition among both men and women, narcissism appears to be particularly important for the emergence of an interest in political ambition among women (see Allen & Cutts, 2018; Pruysers & Blais, 2019; Dietrich et al., 2012)

All in all, an individual's personality and their personality traits are relatively stable over time and are difficult to modify—more so than attitudes, as Ajzen (1985) notes. Therefore, women's personality traits cannot be easily influenced by awareness-raising strategies, and as a result, personality-based explanations for women's political ambition are not central to this monograph.

2.6.3 Institutional Explanations (supply-side)

In developing a theory of political ambition, most scholars in the first wave of research have employed a rational choice paradigm to examine the decision to enter specific political contests. The rational-choice framework conceptualises political ambition as primarily a strategic response to a "political opportunity structure". Within this framework, formal cost-benefit models of political ambition have been proposed, investigating the cases of men and women collectively (Maestas et al., 2006; Schlesinger, 1966). Aspiring candidates, both men and women, tend to be more likely to seek office when they face favourable political and structural circumstances (e.g., the number of open seats, term limit requirements, levels of legislative professionalisation, the partisan composition of the constituency, party congruence with constituents, and political geography; Prinz (1993)).

Second-wave scholars tailored these principles to the case of women's political ambition by merging institutional explanations with psychology-related findings. Carroll & Sanbonmatsu (2013) represent the most complete analysis of how women's political ambition can be affected by strategic choices. Incorporating both the psychological lessons described above and rational-choice theory, they suggest that women would be more inclined to pursue political office if and when they could run in districts that offer them considerable chances of winning against the competition (e.g., female-friendly districts. See also Shames et al., (2020) - Chapter 8). Coffé and Davidson-Schmish, (2020) build on this idea and suggest that women would also be more likely to run in an electoral system where there is more diversity among candidates in terms of their socio-demographic background and other symbolic traits. They discuss the case of the mixed-member electoral system as an example of an electoral system with greater diversity among candidates and more women candidates.

Both these explanations, however, might suffer from reverse causality. Furthermore, institutional explanations are primarily useful for studying expressive political ambition rather than nascent political

ambition (see Lawless & Fox, 2010). In the initial step of the candidate emergence process, interest in seeking elective office is likely motivated not by the political opportunity structure, but by attitudinal dispositions and personal experiences that affect whether an individual can picture themselves in a certain office. Hence, institutional explanations based on district competition and electoral systems will not be considered in this monograph.

2.6.4 Women and Motherhood (supply-side)

Lastly, scholars suggest that motherhood and income-earning responsibilities may suppress candidate emergence, even among the most qualified and motivated women. Recent studies in the U.S. context have found that breadwinner women are significantly less likely to report political ambition than women who have a partner whose personal income is greater than theirs, or when the partner is the main source of income for the household (Bernhard et al., 2021). Others find that both elites and voters prefer candidates with traditional household profiles, such as being married and having children.Thus, for women, having a traditional family structure still results in a double bind due to the social expectation that they should dedicate more time and thought to family care. This expectation limits the time they can devote to developing their political profiles and pursuing their ambitions in the political arena (Teele et al., 2018). Furthermore, research suggests that as women have more children, they may become more "traditionalist" in their views, which can lead to them being more likely to oppose political gender equality (Inglehart & Norris, 2003). Altogether, these findings seem to suggest that women's political ambition is negatively affected in the context of a traditional view of family and gender roles. Research specific to Great Britain confirms that the expectations associated with motherhood influence both women's willingness to present themselves as candidates and the criteria used by gatekeepers to select potential candidates (Iglehart & Norris, 2003; Norris & Lovenduski, 2010). As previously mentioned, awareness-raising strategies do not directly affect the problem of this double bind. For this reason, caring activities and household duties will not be considered in this monograph.

2.7 Conclusions

Non-quota strategies are popular tools to counter the problem of women's political under-representation (Krook & Norris, 2014). These strategies have been shown to work well when used in conjunction with quota strategies (Ruf, 2021), and they are thought to produce fewer backlashes compared to quotas (Krook & Norris, 2014). Non-quota strategies can be categorized into different types based on which phase of the transaction from eligible to prospective female political candidates they target (Krook & Norris, 2014). This monograph focuses on those non-quota strategies that aim to transform eligible female

candidates into aspirant ones, specifically targeting the first phase of the transaction model—labeled awareness-raising strategies (Krook & Norris, 2014). The interest in awareness-raising strategies stems from empirical research findings that these strategies often fail to produce the desired effects (Foos & Gilardi, 2020; Pruysers & Blais, 2018; 2016), despite being one of the most direct solutions to the supply-side problem of women's political under-representation (Krook & Norris, 2014). Hence, the purpose of this monograph is to define the mechanism through which awareness-raising strategies should produce their effect on women's political ambition, and to understand why they fail to deliver target results.

To define this mechanism, I begin by arguing that the effect of awareness-raising strategies on women's political ambitions (see Lawless & Fox, 2010) is mediated by the erosion of negative attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership—attitudes that are often developed during women's political socialization. I maintain that there are four attitudes that could be linked to the effect of awareness-raising strategies. These are (1) support for women in political leadership roles, (2) support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style, (3) perceived support for women in the political environment, and (4) self-perception of qualification for the political activity. I have also posited that political ideology sorts the relevance of these four attitudes based on women's beliefs about the causes of gender inequality. The heterogeneity of the audience's political ideology is crucial for understanding whether the impact of different components of the content of awareness-raising strategies is weakened or even provokes backlash. It is plausible that attitudes toward women's suitability for political leadership need to be influenced to have an effect on political ambition. Moreover, it is likely that pre-existing levels of such attitudes will shape how awareness-raising strategies are received.

In the following chapter, I proceed to test the correlation between attitudes toward women's suitability for political leadership and women's political ambition, as well as the heterogeneity defined by political ideology, using original survey data on a representative sample of British women. During this process, I aim to produce updated evidence about attitudes toward women's suitability for political leadership within a coherent framework—so that the strength of attitudes can be compared—and in a relatively understudied context, which is the Great Britain.

Chapter 3

Mapping Attitudes Towards Women's Suitability for Political Leadership

"All the battles I have fought on this political journey were bolstered by the fact that they were waged in a plural, collective manner. And non-solitude gives you hope and faith, sharing an idea helps you transmit it. I always say this: alone I am not enough, I don't believe in a man or a woman alone at the helm. I believe in the power of a collective mobilisation that can truly change things."

Elly Schlein – Leader of the Italian Democratic Party, March 2023 - current; *Progressive*
(Federico, 2023)

"I did get a particular feeling when I went to meetings of the cabinet and everyone else was a man. I had established myself as someone of strength and that is where the term "iron lady" came from, because on fiscal matters I was quite strong. They respected me but they didn't really see me as part of the team. I was the stranger commanding things."

Ellen Johnson Sirleaf – President of Liberia, 2006 - 2018; *Conservative*
(Gillard & Okonjo-Iweala, 2020, p.160)

3.1 Aims and Objectives

In the previous chapter, I introduced the overarching aim of this monograph: to investigate the mechanism through which awareness-raising strategies produce their effects on the political ambition of women in the general population. I also argued that the lack of knowledge about the mechanism through which these strategies should affect women's political ambitions makes it hard to understand the reasons for their limited effectiveness. To understand this mechanism, I suggest that awareness-raising strategies aiming to boost women's political aspirations might focus on eroding negative attitudes about women's suitability for political leadership. I proceeded to identify recurrent attitudes that, according to the literature, could be linked to variations in women's political ambition and therefore could be considered as attitudes affected by awareness-raising strategies. They are: (1) support for women in political leadership roles, (2) support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style, (3) perceived support for women in the political

environment, and (4) self-perception of qualification. Furthermore, I claim that political ideology serves as a fundamental filter through which individuals shape their general conception of inequality (Feldman, 1988), and more specifically, gender inequality (Inglehart & Norris, 2003). Precisely, political ideology distinguishes whether gender inequality is perceived as a result of systematic and structural barriers or as a consequence of a lack of opportunities (Sevincer et al., 2023). Tn the previous chapter, I therefore also argued that, in order to understand how awareness-raising strategies produce their effects, it is fundamental to account for heterogeneous links between attitudes and political ambition.

Building on the previous chapter, the present chapter investigates the relationship (correlation) between attitudes about women's suitability for political leadership and women's political ambition. More precisely, the present chapter has three objectives: The first objective is to determine the existence of a link between attitudes and political ambition using recent data on British women. Some attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership have not been directly linked to changes in women's political ambition (i.e., not used as explanatory factors), while others have only been associated with women's political aspirations in countries that are atypical cases for women's political representation, such as the United States, which limits the generalizability of the findings (e.g., Castle et al., 2020; Lawless and Fox, 2010; Dittmar, 2020; Wylie, 2018; Preece, 2016). The investigation into the presence of a link between attitudes about women's suitability for political leadership and women's political ambition includes understanding the direction of such a link. In essence, the first objective of this empirical chapter is to provide the literature on women's political ambition with an updated and comprehensive overview, assessing all attitudes about women's suitability for political leadership simultaneously within the same sample, in a relatively understudied context.

The second objective of this chapter is to explore whether women's political ideology affects the relevance that the attitudes that are held about women's suitability for political leadership has upon the mechanism defined here. As I previously mentioned, it is important to recognize that women across the ideological spectrum are concerned with gender equality, although they express their concerns in ways that align with their worldviews and are crystallized in their political ideologies (Sevincer et al., 2023). Nevertheless, the study of heterogeneous views about gender equality has not been applied to the specific case of gender equality in politics; neither did it engage with the topic of women's political ambitions. Therefore, the second contribution I am making in this chapter is to evaluate the varied connections between women's attitudes about their suitability for political leadership and their political ambition.

The third and final objective of this chapter is to explore which socio-demographic characteristics account for variations in women's attitudes toward their suitability for political leadership. The primary aim is to validate the choice of women's political ideology as a key factor explaining these variations in

attitudes, while also paving the way for future research that seeks to evaluate the diversity in attitudes toward women's suitability for political leadership arising from socio-demographic factors other than political ideology.

Data for this chapter were collected through an original online survey that I designed and fielded through YouGov in June 2022. The sample is a representative sample of British women.[1] [2] I discovered that three of the four attitudes toward women's suitability for political leadership are significantly associated with political ambition. Specifically, consistent with prior literature, women's self-perception of their qualification into, and the perceived support for women within, the political environment both correlate with variations in political ambition. Additionally, political ambition is linked to a relative preference for a masculine leadership style, or put differently, a lesser degree of support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style. However, a progressive view of women's gender roles does not show a significant connection to variations in political ambition.

With regards to ideology-based heterogeneity, I find that women's political ideology defines a significant difference in the link between attitudes and political ambition. Specifically, the political ambition of right-wing women is related solely to their self-perception of qualification. In contrast, the political ambition of left-wing women is also associated with their perceptions of support for women in the political environment and a reduced endorsement of a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style. Therefore, women's political ideology determines the significance of attitudes toward women's suitability for political leadership in relation to political ambition. The respondents' level of education and ethnicity are the only other socio-demographic factors that relate to these attitudes. However, education levels and ethnicity are less stable predictors of this variation when compared to political ideology—that is, they predict a narrower range of attitudes toward women's suitability for political leadership.

3.2 Literature and Hypothesis

Based on the existing literature, four attitudes are responsible for a variation in women's political ambition. In Chapter 2, I identified them as follows: (1) *support for women in political leadership roles* (short label: Roles), (2) *support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style* (short label: Styles), (3) *perceived support for women in the political environment* (short label: Environment), and (4) *self-perception of qualification* (short label: Qualification).

Starting with support for women in political leadership roles, several studies have documented the

[1] The sample was weighted on census data to be representative of the British population of the following demographics: gender, age, education level, income, ethnicity, and vote choice in the 2019 general election.

[2] Additional data on the male population in Great Britain were collected with the aim of (1) defining the gender gap in political ambition, and (2) exploring how gendered socialisation affects the variation in attitudes about women's suitability for political leadership barriers to seeking political office.

tendency of girls (e.g. Bos et al., 2022, 2020; 2013; Lawless & Fox, 2010; Lay et al., 2021; Oxley et al., 2022) and women (e.g. Lawless & Fox, 2010; Teele et al., 2018) to associate political leadership roles with male gender roles (e.g. Bos et al., 2022, 2020; 2013; Lawless & Fox, 2010; Lay et al., 2021; Oxley et al., 2022; Teele et al., 2018). Furthermore, the average level of congruence between women's gender roles and political leadership roles has been linked to the emergence of women's political representation (Alexander, 2012; Inglehart & Norris, 2000). Nevertheless, in Great Britain, variations in this attitude at the individual level have never been related to the emergence of a personal interest in becoming a political representative. Beyond political science, social psychology research suggests that individuals assess their suitability for a given roles on the basis of their social identity (Abele et al., 2016; Russell & Fiske, 2008; Wojciszke, Abele, & Baryla, 2009). In other words, women would consider themselves as suited to political leadership roles only if they thought that the social identity of womanhood was suitable for it. Therefore, there are multiple reasons to anticipate that the congruence between women's gender roles and political leadership roles would result in a variation in political ambition. Specifically, I contend that women who report a higher level of support for women in political leadership roles should also exhibit higher levels of political ambition. The first sub-hypothesis in this chapter is therefore expressed as follows:

Hypothesis 1a: There is a positive relationship between the level of support for women in political leadership roles and political leadership roles and political ambitions.

Regarding support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style. Several pieces of evidence point towards a stronger preference for more stereotypically feminine traits in political candidates (Anzia & Bernhard, 2022; Bernhard, 2022; Vial & Napier, 2018). Such a preference is particularly noticeable among women (compared to men) and left-wing partisans (compared to right-wing partisans) (Eagly & Johannesen-Schmid, 2001; Viel & Napier, 2018). Note that this finding appears to be robust across different countries and political systems (Coffé & Bolzendahl, 2021; Coffé et al., 2022; Escobar-Lemmon & Taylor-Robinson, 2008; Hinojosa, 2012). Scholars also show that this preference is stronger now than it was in the past (Anzia & Bernhard, 2022; Bernhard, 2022; Bernhard et al., 2020). Therefore, the finding that female MPs in the House of Commons have become more agentic over time might come as a surprise (Hargrave & Blumenau, 2022). Similarly, research also documented that, despite preferences for a communal leadership style, women tend to think that agentic traits are in some way essential to success in political competitions (Bernhard et al., 2020). I argue that, although a preference for the communal leadership style may be the baseline, a relative preference for the agentic leadership style is associated with

political ambition. Therefore, the second test conducted in this chapter concerns the negative relationship between support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style and political ambition, as outlined in the following sub-hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1b: There is a negative relationship between support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style and women's political ambition.

If this hypothesis were to be confirmed, system justification theory could offer a potential explanation for why women might join the bandwagon and become more ambitious when they show a preference for a strategically masculine leadership style. System justification theory is a theory within social psychology that system-justifying beliefs serve a psychologically palliative function. It proposes that people have several underlying needs, which vary from individual to individual, that can be satisfied by the defense and justification of the status quo, even when the system may be disadvantageous to certain people (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Therefore, it is plausible to observe politically ambitious women internalizing a preference for a leadership style that they perceive as required by the status quo, even if it contradicts traditional gender expectations for women. The adoption of such a leadership style may be rationalized by a mindset that says, "this is how things work," suggesting that one must either conform to the stereotypically masculine expectations of political leadership (the status quo) or refrain from seeking political leadership positions.

Regarding the perceived support for women in the political environment, the literature indicates that women are generally more inclined to run for political office in contexts where they anticipate greater support for women candidates (Fitzgerald, 2018; Lawless & Fox, 2010).[3] [4] This finding is robust across different national contexts (Dittmar, 2020; Wylie, 2020) and political systems (Coffé & Davidson-Schmich, 2020). Unfortunately, the real-life experiences reported by women still often indicate the prevalence of gender-based bias within the political environment (Butler & Preece, 2016; Fitzgerald, 2018; Fox & Lawless, 2010; Gillard & Okonjo-Iweala, 2021). Expressions of gender bias can be seen in the physical, psychological and verbal abuse that female politicians endure (Krook, 2020). At the same time, in recent years various initiatives aimed at reducing the unfair treatment of female politicians have emerged, which could, in some instances, enhance women's perceptions of support within the political environment. Consequently, a potential variation in the level of this attitude is justified in being related to a variation in political ambition. To echo political psychology literature stating that women find tend to be more

[3]This is true until the costs of not running are perceived as higher than the costs of running (Dittmar, 2020; Wylie, 2020).

[4]By normal circumstances, I refer to contexts where there is no policy threatening the status quo of women's rights (see Clayton et al., 2023).

risk-adverse then men (Bos & Schneider, 2016), it is even more sensible to expect women to be more politically ambitious when they expect lesser barriers to their ambitions. In the next sub-hypothesis, I argue that a more positive perception of support for women in the political environment would facilitate the emergence of women's political ambition. I express this expectation as follows:

Hypothesis 1c: There is a positive relationship between women's perceptions of support in the political environment and their political ambition.

Finally, in relation to women's self-perception of their suitability for political roles, (i.e. the extent to which they consider their experiences and qualifications suited for acting in politics), the literature within the United States context specifically examines how this perceived qualification acts as an obstacle or facilitator to the emergence of political ambition (Coffé & Davidson-Schmich, 2020; Lawless & Fox, 2010; Preece, 2016). Specifically, how women perceive their own eligibility for political office is a significant factor in determining their interest in running for political positions (Lawless & Fox, 2010). American literature suggests that women's self-perception of qualification is not necessarily an accurate reflection of their actual level of qualification, such as relevant experience; rather, it is significantly influenced by a gendered political socialization process through which women internalize a sense of unsuitability for engaging in political activities (Lawless & Fox, 2010; Preece, 2016). Even though the primary context of analysis has predominantly been the United States, there is no compelling reason to believe that the relationship between women's self-perception of qualification and their political ambition would not be similar in Great Britain. Therefore, I anticipate that in this study as well, there will be a positive association between women's self-perception of qualification and their political ambition. I express this expectation as follows:

Hypothesis 1d: There is a positive relationship between self-perception of qualification and women's political ambition.

As I previously stated, the second objective of this chapter is to identify the conditioning effect of women's political ideology on the relationships between attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership. Political science literature has long suggested that gender equality was exclusively an issue for the left (Inglehart & Norris, 2000; 2004). However, today the left-right placement no longer determines who is concerned with gender equality in absolute terms, but rather how the obstacles to gender

equality are framed (Kteily et al., 2017; Lancaster, 2020; Maxwell, 2020; Spierings, 2020). Following this development, the perspectives of left-wing and right-wing women on this theme are framed in such a way that align with traditional ideological distinctions between the Left and the Right (Sevincer et al., 2023). The *taste* for egalitarianism and individualism among left-wing and right-wing individuals is pivotal for the evolution of such perspectives (Jacoby, 2006). On the one hand, the Left demands greater interventions so as to erode systemic and structural barriers hindering the equality of outcomes for women. On the other hand, the Right demands growing opportunities for women who merit them (Sevincer et al., 2023). More precisely, studies on gender equality find that left-wing women are much more inclined to see gender inequality as a matter of structural barriers (Pratto et al., 1997; Ridgeway & Correll, 2004; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), systemic sexism (Glick & Fiske, 2001), and stereotyping (Jost & Kay, 2005); right-wing women are instead much more inclined to think of inequality in terms of an imbalance of opportunities between men and women (Sowell, 2019; Scruton, 1980; Sevincer et al., 2023).

In fact, compared to right-wing women, left-wing women reported greater support for women in political leadership roles (e.g. Inglehart & Norris, 2003), as well as support for a a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style (e.g. Bernhard et al, 2022). Left-wing women have reported more negative perceptions regarding support for women in the political environment (Castle et al., 2020), which can be related to the idea of structural barriers, stereotyping and sexism in the political arena. To the best of my knowledge, there has not been an established association between self-perception of qualification and an individual's partisan ideology. Consequently, the subsequent hypothesis integrates this observation into a comprehensive analysis of the diverse relationship between attitudes regarding women's suitability for political leadership and political ambition as defined by political ideology. I anticipate that, owing to the distinct frames through which these issues are viewed, the relationship between attitudes toward women's suitability for political leadership and the variation in political ambition will differ across ideological groups. I express this expectation in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: relevant attitudes for women's political ambition are sorted by women's political ideology.

While the current literature may not provide sufficient evidence to propose a definitive hypothesis about which ideological group's political ambition will be most influenced by specific attitudes, informed conjecture regarding these variable effects is still feasible. Specifically, it can be hypothesized that when an attitude is more salient for one ideological subgroup, its association with political ambition will be correspondingly stronger. For instance, if perceived support for women in the political environment is found to be significantly related to political ambition, and considering the notably lower levels of this attitude

among left-wing women as reported in prior studies, it is reasonable to suggest that this attitude would have a stronger correlation with political ambition for left-wing women compared to right-wing women.

Applying the same reasoning to other attitudes, let's consider support for women in political leadership roles. The literature often associates a progressive stance on gender roles with egalitarian ideals and left-wing ideology (Inglehart & Norris, 2003). It is plausible that variations in this attitude could have a more pronounced impact on the political ambition of left-wing women. Nevertheless, from a socio-psychological perspective, since the compatibility between women's gender roles and political leadership roles is seen as a psychological precursor for the emergence of political ambition (Abele et al., 2016; Russell & Fiske, 2008; Wojciszke et sl., 2009), it is also conceivable that a supportive attitude toward women in leadership is equally necessary for both left-wing and right-wing women.

Regarding support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style, research has shown that women on the Left are more likely to support a communal leadership style (Anzia & Bernhard, 2022; Bernhard, 2022; Viel & Napier, 2018). However, as hypothesised above, I expect that a relative preference for an agentic leadership style is linked to political ambition. Given that the Right tends to have a "natural" inclination towards a stereotypically masculine leadership style, it might be that a preference for this style of leadership could more significantly impact the political ambition of individuals on the Right than those on the Left.

The attitude towards women's self-perception of qualification is centered on beliefs about individual merit and skills (Lawless & Fox, 2010). Therefore, this attitude might prove to be a more significant determinant in the development of political ambition among right-wing women, who often emphasize individualism and personal achievement. However, given the consistent findings highlighting the critical importance of this attitude for political ambition, it is also plausible that self-perception of qualification is an influential factor for women across the ideological spectrum.

As discussed in the previous chapter, evaluating the heterogeneous relationship between attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership and political ambition, based on ideological lines, is instrumental in identifying a way to tailor factors that contribute to variations in political ambition. This tailoring ensures the delivery of the right content for a given population, which can often be categorized by ideological beliefs. This approach is particularly useful given that awareness-raising strategies are frequently employed by partisan organizations. Moreover, it's also true that non-political organizations will benefit from understanding which type of content resonates with women across the ideological spectrum.

The third objective of this chapter is to examine the influence of women's socio-demographic characteristics on the variation in attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership and how this relates to their political ambition. This aspect of the chapter is exploratory, and as such, I will refrain

from formulating any hypotheses in this regard. I will now proceed to outline the methodology employed to conduct the analyses proposed here.

3.3 Methodology

To test the above hypotheses, I designed and ran an original online survey of British women (n=965). I also collected an additional sample of 713 men; this was done in order to conduct a preliminary analysis of gender differences in political ambition and attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership. Based on the most recent British census of adult residents in Great Britain (18+ y.o.), the sample had quotas to represents individuals' age, income, education, ethnicity, geographical distribution and vote-choice in the 2019 British General Election. During the data analysis, weights were directly introduced into the model.[5] The survey was fielded by YouGov in June 2022.

To test Hypotheses 1a to 1d, I started by running three variations of an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model-based on equation (1); it followed three different specifications: The first specification was a model expressing the relationship between political ambition (dependent variable) and the four attitudinal variables (explanatory variables) without the inclusion of controls. In the second and the third specifications, I included socio-demographic controls. However, while the second specification used normal standard errors, the third specification used robust standard errors.

$$(1) Ambition_{\text{i}} = a + b1 * Roles_{\text{i}} + b2 * Styles_{\text{i}} + \\ + \text{b3*Environment}_{\text{i}} + b4 * Qualification_{\text{i}} + b5 * [controls]_{\text{i}} + e.$$

Regarding the operationalisation of the main dependent variables, *Ambition* was measured by asking participants: "How likely is it, if at all, that in the future you will seek political office". Answers were reported on a 1 to 5 Likert scale, going from "not at all likely" (1) to "very likely" (5). In order to eliminate any ambiguity in the construct, any participants currently seeking or holding political office could select an additional option. Namely: "I am already doing this". For the main analysis, I merged responses to this sixth category and responses to the fifth category in the same category, both representing the highest level of a one-to-five Likert scale. As a robustness check, I replicated my analysis with an alternative coding of this variable, in which participants that are in the process of or already holding political office

[5] I have then used the original weights assigned by YouGov. See Appendix III for further info on the sample's demographics.

represented the highest level of a one-to-six Likert scale.[6] [7] Variations of the same question have been largely used by previous research on political ambition (e.g. Schneider et al., 2016). Therefore, the construct for the political ambition variable has been sufficiently validated.[8]

As for attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership, respondents' the level of support for women in political leadership roles (short label: *Roles*) was measured through a variation of the construct that was utilised by Inglehart and Norris (2003) as part of the widely-used postmodernism scale. Respondents had to report their level of agreement to the statement "men make better political leaders than women do". They did so on a one-to-five Likert scale. The levels of this scale went from "I strongly disagree" (1) to "I strongly agree" (5). Adopting a widely used question ensured the construct validity of this item.

To measure respondent's support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style (short label: *Styles*), I presented participants with a list of eight leadership attributes derived from Role Congruity Theory. This informs the notion of gendered leadership styles, of which four are stereotypical of the communal leadership style (i.e. empathy, ability to cooperate, good communication skills, ability to bring out the best in people), and four are stereotypical of the agentic leadership style (i.e. authority, ability to assign tasks, being goal-oriented, competitiveness) (see Eagly & Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001). More precisely, I asked respondents: "Which of the following, if any, do you think are the most important characteristics that a political leader should have? Please choose FOUR". The items were presented in a random order. I derived a 1 to 5 five scale from the respondents' answers. They represented, from zero to four, the number of stereotypically feminine traits selected. The construction of the measure of support for a communal leadership style compliments the support of an agentic leadership style. The logic here is that the value of support for an agentic leadership style is equal to five, minus the value of support for a communal leadership style. This measure is derived from Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt (2001).

Respondents' perceptions of support for women within the political environment (short label: *Environment*) were gauged using a questionnaire that commenced with the prompt "To what extent, if at all, do you agree or disagree with each of the following?" This was followed by the specific statement "The political environment is favorable towards people of my gender" to operationalize the concept. Answers were measured on a 1 to 5 Likert scale, going from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree". This operationalization represents a tailored version of similar constructs' measures, adapted to suit the specific requirements of this data collection process.[9] Additionally, the operationalization of the current construct

[6] Results are reported in Appendix III.

[7] Ex-post, 7 people belonged to the sixth category.

[8] The slight modifications to this item were necessary to meet the requirements of the data collection, where several items had to be included in the same battery. See the exact questionnaire in Appendix III.

[9] In this online survey, I was constrained to include both this item and the self-perception of qualification item in the same battery on perceived barriers to one's political ambitions.

is beneficial as it avoids priming respondents with any specific environmental factors that may limit support for female political actors, such as various forms of discrimination, biases, or physical violence. This approach leaves room for personal interpretation. This item, along with the series of questions it is part of, was developed with input from YouGov survey experts to ensure the wording is clear and direct. Consequently, I do not foresee any issues arising from the use of a modified measure for this construct. However, future research may still wish to conduct further tests to verify the validity of this item.

Finally, as for the variable above, self-perception of qualification (short label: *Qualification*) was operationalised through an additional item in the same battery. Namely: "I am qualified to get into political office". Answers were measured on a 1 to 5 Likert scale, going from "not at all qualified" to "highly qualified". This measure is derived from Lawless and Fox (2010).[10]

In my effort to optimize the comparability of results across different chapters, I standardized the measure of Attitudes and Ambition (analysis using non standardised measures are reported in the Appendix). In the model following equation (1), I included all attitudes in the model simultaneously. This was so as to examine the effect of each predictor while controlling for the effects of the others. Studying the correlation of different attitudes between each other, I found that the four attitudes are weakly correlated. This result legitimises the inclusion all four attitudes in the same model without incurring multicollinearity problems.[11] The presence of a weak correlation between attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership underscored the appropriateness of treating the four attitudes within the model individually, as opposed to consolidating them into a singular index. This observation of weak correlation was a consistent finding throughout all three empirical chapters of the monograph, indicating that these four barriers act as independent variables influencing variations in political ambition. Moreover, for the sake of robustness, I estimated equation (1) using an Ordered Logit estimator. This methodological choice was made because Ordered Logit models are especially suited for ordered dependent variables, though they come with the downside of making the interpretation of results less straightforward. In the results section, I presented the outcomes from the models based on equation (1) using both the OLS and the Ordered Logit estimations in a comparative format. If these results had shown a consistent pattern, I would have proceeded to report only the findings from the OLS estimator in the main body of this chapter, due to their greater ease of interpretation.[12]

Regarding the controls included in the estimation of equation (1). I start by discussing the operationalisation of women's *political ideology* (later also used as a factor for heterogeneity as expressed in

[10]It may be noted that an effort was made to phrase all of the items described to this point in as gender-neutral a manner as possible, to be suitable for the measurement of the related attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership of both male and female respondents.

[11]See Appendix III for the results of these analysis.

[12]The results of the Ordered Logit models are available in Appendix III.

hypothesis 2). This variable was derived from a categorical variable reporting respondents' vote choice in the 2019 General Election. Respondents could choose one option among the following: Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, Scottish National Party (SNP), Plaid Cymru, Brexit Party, Green, or Other. There was also an "I Don't know" option. The item followed the typical phrasing of vote-choice questions in the British context. Based on the participants' vote choice, I then created a categorical variable that assumed value 0 for voters of right-wing parties (i.e. Conservatives and Brexit party voters), 1 for voters of left-wing parties (i.e. Labour, Liberal Democrat, Scottish National Party (SNP), Plaid Cymru, and Green party voters), and 2 if participants reported voting for Other parties, or if they did not know what party they voted for. The categorization of political parties within this variable is predicated on the assumption that voters for the Conservatives and Brexit-oriented parties are, on average, more likely to hold socially conservative views on gender equality than Labour voters. This assumption is supported by research indicating that in Great Britain, individuals who hold traditional views on gender equality are more inclined to vote for the Conservative Party and were also more likely to have voted Leave in the 2016 Brexit referendum (De Geus et al., 2022). To maximise the power of the study through sample size, I decided to collapse voters of every other party in the left-wing category, with an exception made for voters of Other parties, for which it is not possible to make speculations on their stance regarding gender equality.

Beyond political ideology, my models also controlled for the socio-demographic characteristics that Allen and Cutts (2018) found to be associated with a variation in political ambition in Great Britain, and which Inglehart and Norris (2004) found to determine variation in support for gender equality in politics. Namely, these are *age, income, level of education, ethnicity* and *dwelling* (i.e. urban or rural).

The decision to model political attention—the self-reported level of attention individuals pay to political matters—as a control variable is contingent upon the theoretical framework we use to understand its relationship with attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership and political ambition. Let's consider three scenarios. First, based on theories of intention formation, such as those proposed by Ajzen (1985), political attention can be viewed simply as a background factor that influences individuals' attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership. In this framework, if ambition is assumed to be affected solely through these attitudes, then incorporating political attention directly into the model would be redundant. This is because political attention's impact on political ambition would be fully mediated by attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership. The second scenario posits that political attention acts as a predictor of both political ambition and attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership. In this scenario, it would be appropriate to control for political attention to avoid omitted variable bias. The third scenario suggests that political attention is a consequence of individuals'

attitudes, with the notion being that women who hold relatively positive attitudes towards barriers may report higher levels of political attention. Should this be the case, including political attention as a control would lead to post-treatment bias. Therefore, it would be advisable not to control for political attention. Given these considerations and the resulting ambivalence, I have opted not to include political attention as a control in the main analysis. Instead, I will incorporate this control in a separate replication of the analysis for comparison. The variable for political attention was operationalized by asking respondents to rate their attention to politics on a Likert scale from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates "I pay no attention to politics" and 10 signifies "I pay a great deal of attention to politics."

Finally, the respondents' *gender* was measured through a categorical variable that was operationalised in three categories: male, female, and other. No respondent selected the third of these options. As I will discuss later, this variable was used to divide my data into subsets so that I could focus my analysis on the female sub-sample.[13] All controls were operationalised with the phrasing that is typical of academic surveys in the British context.

To test Hypothesis 2, I used an OLS estimator. In this model, I included an interaction term between respondents' attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership and a dummy variable that represented their political ideology. The analysis was structured according to equation (2) as specified in the study. Also in this case, the model was presented in three variations: first, a specification without controls; then a specification including socio-demographic controls and normal standard errors; and, finally, a specification including socio-demographic controls and robust standard errors. As a robustness check, I also ran the first and second specification of the model with and without controls using Ordered Logit models.

$$
\begin{aligned}
(2) Ambition_{\mathrm{i}} = a + b1 * Roles_{\mathrm{i}} * Left_Party_{\mathrm{i}} + b2 * Styles_{\mathrm{i}} * Left_Party_{\mathrm{i}} + \\
+ \text{b3*Qualification}_{\mathrm{i}} * Left_Party_{\mathrm{i}} + b4 * Environment_{\mathrm{i}} * Left_Party_{\mathrm{i}} + \\
+ \text{b5*Roles}_{\mathrm{i}} + b6 * Styles_{\mathrm{i}} + b7 * Qualification_{\mathrm{i}} + b8 * Environment_{\mathrm{i}} + \\
+ \text{b9*Left_Party}_{\mathrm{i}} + b10 * [controls]_{\mathrm{i}} + e.
\end{aligned}
$$

The operationalisation of the variables in this model follows the same operationalisation described for the test of Hypothesis 1 (i.e. 1a to 1d). Note that Left_Pary was operationalised as a dummy, with the category representing voting for Other parties or "I don't know" appended. This choice was made in order to commit to focussing on the comparison between the two categories linked to my theoretical expectations.

[13] See Appendix III for a list of all control variables and their respective operationalisations. Note that respondents always had the opportunity to report a cental position (scale question) or answer "I don't know" (multiple choice question). In the latter case, this responses were coded as NAs.

Participants who reported voting for Other parties, or not knowing for which party they voted in the 2019 General Election, were excluded from the analysis. I replicated the analysis proposed by equation (1) on subsets of left-wing and right-wing women in order to estimate the actual coefficient for this relationship in different women's subgroup. The coefficient of interest is the coefficient associated with the interaction term between a given attitude and the Left_Party dummy, which, if significant, suggests that the effect of an attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership varies significantly between individuals supporting left-wing or right-wing parties.

Finally, I explored the link between the respondents' demographic characteristics and attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership. This was achieved by running four models where, one by one, the attitudes were set as the dependent variable, and participants' socio-demographic characteristics (i.e. the controls mentioned above) were set as explanatory variables. These models were based on equation (3). I ran these models with and without robust standard errors.

$$(3)[Attitude]_{\mathrm{i}} = a + b1 * Gender_{\mathrm{i}} + b2 * Age_{\mathrm{i}} + b3 * Education_{\mathrm{i}} + \\ + \mathrm{b4{*}Ethnicity_i} + b5 * Income_{\mathrm{i}} + b6 * Urban_{\mathrm{i}} + b7 * Left_Party_{\mathrm{i}} + e.$$

I will now proceed to provide the results of several preliminary tests. I ran these to contextualise the findings presented in *Section 4 - Results*. The first preliminary analysis regards the evaluation of gender-based differences in political ambition in the British population. Table 3.1 reports the results that were yielded from the estimation of the gender gap in political ambition by way of a multivariate model using an OLS estimator. There is a statistically significant gender gap in political ambition that favours men (of approximately 0.2).[14] The size of the coefficient is consistent with previous findings on the gender gap in political ambition in the United Kingdom (i.e. Allen & Cutts, 2018). The magnitude of the gender gap in political ambition is consistent throughout the three empirical chapters in this monograph. The strategies for raising awareness discussed in this monograph are designed to mitigate the impact of gendered political socialization, which contributes to the existing gender gap in political ambition. The objective of these strategies is to elevate women's political ambition to match that of their male counterparts, thereby narrowing the gender disparity in political aspirations. Consequently, the significance of any effect resulting from awareness-raising strategies will be assessed based on their ability to elevate women's political aspirations to the level of men's. This assessment will provide an indication of the strategies' effectiveness in achieving gender parity in political ambition. Unsurprisingly, Figure 3.1 shows

[14]See Appendix III for the extended version of the table with reported coefficients for each control variable. This table also shows that the gender gap in political ambition is larger between left-wing voters but that the partisan gap in political ambition makes right-wing voters on average less politically ambitious.

that women's data points are more dense at the lowest level of this variable.[15]

Figure 3.1: Gender Gap in the Distribution of Ambition



Distribution in political ambition (non-standardised variable) in men and women. The violin plot shows that the difference is stronger at lower levels of ambition, with women's data points being more dense at the lowest level of ambition.

Table 3.1: Gender Gap in Political Ambition

Dependent Variable	Estimated Difference	Standard Error	Observations	P-Value
Women	0.2	0.07	1441	0.009

Gender-gap in political ambition estimated by way of OLS multivariate model. Controls are the respondents' age, education, income and ethnicity. Gender differences in political ambition are statistically significant, with men reporting higher levels of ambition.

In general, as would be expected from the literature on political ambition, the Ambition variable is skewed to the Left (for the British context, see Allen and Cutts, 2018; 2020) (Figure 3.2). In fact, the interquartile range analysis on the female subsample reveals that all the variation of the Ambition variable is concentrated in less than 25% of the data. Such a skewed distribution raises concerns regarding the estimation of the relationship between attitudes and political ambition by OLS regressions, which I have addressed as follows: (1) I included robust standard errors in the model to adjust for heteroskedasticity problems with the error term; (2) as a robustness check, I replicated the analysis using a dummy version of the Ambition variable, taking value 0 when respondents reported the lowers levels of Ambition, and 1 when they report any other level of Ambition; (3) I replicate my analysis using Ordered Logit models,

[15]The controls I included are the same as those described for the test of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.

which do not rely on the assumption that Ambition is a continuous distribution.

Splitting by partisanship, only 5% of women reporting above median political ambition support right-wing parties (i.e., the Conservative party and the Brexit party), compared to politically ambitious women of left-wing parties, which are about 12% of the sample, thus determining a 7% ideology-based gap (for men, these figures are 15% and 10% with a 5% ideology-based gap).

Figure 3.2: Distribution of Ambition



Distribution in women's political ambition (non-standardised variable). The x-axis represents increasing levels of political ambition, going from 1 to 5, left to right. The y-axis represents the number of observations for each level of ambition. Approximately 800 observations (more than 75% of the full female sample) report the lowest level of ambition. The distribution of political ambition is highly skewed, and it is difficult to find any interest in the pursuit of political office among women in the general population.

Regarding women's suitability for political leadership, Figure 3.3 displays the distribution of the four variables measuring attitudes in the female sample (scale before standardisation). Performing an interquartile range analysis, I found that the level of support for women in political leadership roles has limited variation, and more than 50% of women report a level around the median value (3) (see Roles in Figure 3.3). Based on this observation, we might speculate that this attitude is more informative of macro-level mechanisms as opposed to micro level mechanisms (i.e. across countries variation, as shown in previous literature, such as Inglehart and Norris (2003), as opposed to individual level variation) There is greater variation in responses regarding the support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style (see Styles), with a slight leftward skew in the distribution, and a median value of 4, suggesting that there is an overall appreciation for stereotypically feminine leadership traits (see Bernhard et al., 2021). The distributions of perceived support for women in the political environment (see Environment) and self-perception of qualification (see Qualification) exhibit a more leftward skew compared to those of the

prior two attitudes analyzed. Respectively, the median level for these two attitudes is 2 and 3.[16]

Figure 3.3: Distribution of Attitudes Towards Women's Suitability for Political Leadership



Distribution in attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership in the female sample. Each histogram separately reports the distribution of attitudes towards gender equality in politics (non-standardised variables), starting with Roles and proceeding with Styles, Environment, and Qualification. From left to right, the x-axis reports increasing levels of attitudes from 1 to 5. The y-axis reports the number of observations for each level of attitudes. For Roles, most observations are centred around the middle of the scale. Levels of Styles indicate generally high support for the communal leadership style, as the distribution of this attitude is slightly skewed to the right. Levels of Environment indicate a generally low level of this attitude, with the distribution being slightly skewed to the Left. Similarly, levels of Qualification indicate a generally low level of this attitude, and it is slightly skewed to the left.

As a robustness check, I re-coded all attitudes to assume the following: value 0 around their median value, value -1 when respondents reported a level below the median value, and value + 1 when respondents reported a level above the median value. I then re-ran the tests of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 using this variation in the operationalisation of attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership.[17]

3.4 Results

3.4.1 The Link Between Attitudes Towards Women's Suitability for Political Leadership and Political Ambition

Three attitudes are significantly related to women's political ambition: self-perception of qualification, the perception of support for women in the political environment, and the support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style. On one hand, women's political ambition increases with an increase in self-perception of qualification (i.e., Qualification) and with a more positive outlook on the support for women

[16] In Appendix III, I report the interquartile range analysis for the full sample.
[17] Results are reported in Appendix III.

in the political environment (i.e., Environment). As these perceptions improve, so does political ambition among women. On the other hand, a preference for a feminine leadership style (i.e., Styles) is associated with a decrease in political ambition. This suggests that those who favor a feminine leadership style may be less inclined to engage in political pursuits. Therefore, Hypothesis 1d, Hypotheses 1c and Hypothesis 1b are somewhat supported. However, the respondents' support for women in political leadership roles does not seem to related to political ambition.

Figure 3.4 shows in more detail by way of OLS models that, once we control for respondents socio-demographic characteristics, the coefficients of the robust model for perceived support for women in the political environment (i.e., Environment) and self-perception of qualification (i.e., Qualification) achieve traditional levels of statistical significance (i.e., this coefficient is significant for an alpha level of 0.05 and of 0.01, respectively). The coefficient of the model for support for a feminine leadership style (i.e., Styles) reaches traditional levels of significance only before robust standard errors are included (i.e. after the inclusion of robust standard errors, this coefficient is only significant for an alpha level of 0.1).[18] Based on Figure 3.5, we can see that the Ordered Logit estimator finds the same patterns. In this case, the variable for the perceived support for women in the political environment (i.e., Environment) approaches traditional levels of significance without fully achieving it, while the variable for support for a feminine leadership style (i.e., Styles) is fully significant (i.e., the alpha level is of 0.05 for Styles and only of 0.1 for Environment).[19] The patterns of these results are robust when considering the different operationalisation of Ambition (i.e., Ambition taken as a dummy or as a one-to-six scale) and attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership (i.e., attitudes taken on a three-point-scale).[20] The analysis of the full sample indicates that self-perception of qualification is a consistent correlate of political ambition. In contrast, the associations with a preference for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style and perceived support for women in the political environment are less stable. The significance of these relationships is contingent upon how they are operationalized. This observation aligns with existing literature, which robustly suggests that women's self-perception of qualification is a primary factor contributing to the gender gap in political ambition. Additionally, the results remain stable even when political attention is included among the covariates.[21]

[18] See Appendix III for a table with the coefficients for all control variables.
[19] See Appendix III for a table with the coefficients for all control variables.
[20] Results of the robustness checks are reported in Appendx III.
[21] See Appendix III for robustness checks.

Figure 3.4: Relationship Between Attitudes and Ambition



The first figure displays the results (the significance of the coefficients) of three different specifications of the OLS model. They are based on equation (1), representing the relationship between women's political ambition and their attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership (with 95% confidence intervals). Coefficients are categorized according to the explanatory factor (i.e., Roles, Styles, Environment, Qualification). Within each category, the first coefficient corresponds to the model specification without controls; the second coefficient corresponds to the model specification with controls and conventional standard errors; the third coefficient corresponds to the model specification with controls and robust standard errors to address issues of heteroscedasticity. The second figure presents the outcomes from two different specifications of the Ordered Logit model-based on Equation (1), which depicts the same relationships. Coefficients are similarly categorized by the explanatory factor. For each group, the first coefficient pertains to the model specification without controls, while the second coefficient pertains to the model specification that includes controls and conventional standard errors. The data belongs to a representative sample of British women. Significant coefficients are those with confidence intervals that do not cross the zero line (alpha <0.5). If they barely pass it (with alpha <0.1), then they are said to approach statistical significance. Hence, the OLS estimator finds significant effects of the Environment and of the Qualification barrier, and somewhat significant effects of the Styles barrier. The Ordered Logit estimator finds results that are somewhat similar.

Regarding the effect size, the coefficient of the relationship between women's political ambition and their self-perception of qualification is by far the largest in the model. The relationship between this attitude and ambition is significant throughout the three types of models presented here. Specifically, if

we consider the effect of attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership to be uniform across the political ambition scale, a one-unit increase in women's self-perception of qualification results in a corresponding increase in political ambition that nearly eliminates the gender gap. To achieve a similar closure of the gender gap in political ambition, the perception of support for women in the political environment would need to double. On the contrary, support for a feminine leadership style widens the gender gap in political ambition by one-quarter of its original size.[22] Finally, as previously observed, the greater support for women in political leadership roles does not seem to relate to Ambition. The coefficient expressing this relationship is, in fact, approximating zero (and insignificant) across the three specifications of the model. This is also the case when this variable is operationalised as a three-point scale. This result agrees with the limited variation in the distribution of this variable discussed in the Methodology section.

3.4.2 Left-right Political Ideology and Heterogeneous Effects

Women's political ideology affects which attitudes hinder the emergence of women's political ambition, therefore supporting Hypothesis 2.[23]

Figure 3.5 shows that the perception of support for women candidates in the political environment (i.e. Environment) increases the political ambition of left-wing women to a significantly greater extent than right-wing women. This finding is consistent with prior analyses, demonstrating that this attitude significantly affects political ambition only when respondents' socio-demographic characteristics are considered. Additionally, subgroup analysis—conducting the same analysis separately on subsets of left-wing and right-wing women instead of using interaction terms—reveals that the perception of support for women in the political environment significantly relates to political ambition solely within the subset of left-wing women.[24] This outcome corroborates earlier hypotheses about the strong connection between this attitude and the ideas of inequality held by left-wing women, drawing on Sevincer et al., (2023). The results remain consistent across various operationalizations of Ambition and attitudes and when using an Ordered Logit estimator.[25] When Ambition was operationalized as a dummy variable, similar patterns were observed, though the levels of significance differed. I argue that this discrepancy does not threaten the validity of the findings due to the changed scope of the dependent variable, which, in this case, measured the probability of a rare event—specifically, political ambition—taking place. Moreover, the results maintained their robustness with the inclusion of political attention among the covariates.[26] Figure 3.5 shows that while support for women in political leadership roles (i.e., Roles), support for a

[22] See Appendix III for computation behind this statement.
[23] See Appendix III for the table with the coefficients for all control variables.
[24] See Appendix III.
[25] See Appendix III.
[26] See Appendix III.

(stereotypically) feminine leadership style (i.e., Styles), and perceived support for women in the political environment (i.e., Environment) are not related to political ambition in right-wing women, only support for women in political leadership roles (i.e., Roles) is unrelated to political ambition among left-wing women.

Figure 3.5: Heterogeneus Effects by Political Ideology



There is a change in the relationship between attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership and women's political ambition depending on women's political ideology. Each figure represents the relationship between ambition and attitudes, taken one by one. Top to bottom, left to right, the four subfigures refer to Roles, Styles, Environment and Qualification. The x-axis reports increasing levels of attitudes (standardised variable). The y-axis reports increasing levels of political ambition (standardised variable). There is a significant difference between women of different political ideologies in the relationship between their perception of support in the political environment and their political ambition. Specifically, the political ambition of left-wing women is significantly more influenced by a positive perception of support for female political actors in the political environment. Furthermore, there is a difference among women with varying political ideologies in how their perception of support in the political environment relates to their political ambition. Specifically, left-wing women's political ambition is more strongly associated with a preference for a masculine leadership style than that of right-wing women.

3.4.3 What Explains the Variation in Perceived Attitudes to Women's Political Ambition?

The exploratory analysis confirms that political ideology is a key factor influencing the variation in attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership, based on individuals' demographics and attitudes.[27] Table 3.2 indicates that, relative to right-wing women, left-wing women report significantly

[27]See Appendix III.

higher levels of support for women in political leadership roles (Roles), significantly greater support for a feminine leadership style (Styles), and a significantly lower perception of support for women in the political environment (Environment). Additionally, left-wing women appear to have higher levels of self-perception of qualification compared to right-wing women, although this difference is not significant.

Table 3.2: Drivers of Attitudes

	Roles (1)	**Styles (2)**	**Environment (3)**	**Qualification (4)**
Age	-0.0001	-0.0003	0.008***	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education	0.071	0.079**	-0.005	0.278***
	(0.046)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.041)
Income	0.004	-0.009	-0.004	-0.005
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Minority	0.111	-0.342**	0.044	-0.047
	(0.172)	(0.150)	(0.134)	(0.152)
Urban	-0.045	0.038	0.008	-0.009
	(0.058)	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.051)
Left_Party	0.296***	0.309***	-0.364***	0.059
	(0.087)	(0.076)	(0.068)	(0.077)
Robust SE	✓	✓	✓	✓

Results of four models regarding the analysis proposed in Equation 3 on a representative sample of British women and using OLS models. The coefficients reported in column (1) relate to a model where women's sociodemographics are regressed over Roles (this model uses robust standard errors). The coefficients reported in column (2) relate to a model where women's socio-demographics are regressed over Styles (this model uses robust standard errors). The coefficients reported in column (3) relate to a model where women's socio-demographics are regressed over Environment (this model uses robust standard errors). The coefficients reported in column (4) relate to a model where women's socio-demographics are regressed over Qualification (this model uses robust standard errors). Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Regarding other socio-demographic factors, higher educational attainment (Education variable) is associated with greater support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style. This factor is also the sole predictor of variance in women's self-perception of qualification, with a higher education level corresponding to increased self-perception of qualification. Being part of an ethnic minority (Minority variable) correlates negatively with support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style. While the age variable might initially appear to be significantly associated with a more positive view of support for women in the political environment, its coefficient is near zero, indicating that age does not actually explain variations in any attitude. These results could be attributed to what has been termed the "Thatcher Effect," where British women who became politically conscious during Margaret Thatcher's rise to leadership of the Conservative Party (from 1975) exhibit levels of support for gender equality in politics that predate those seen in other countries, spanning across the entire political spectrum. (Saha & Weeks, 2022). Thus, this same effect might be responsible for cancelling out a cohort effect, one that in other national contexts would have seen older strata of the population report more conservative attitudes

about female political representation.[28]

To evaluate the connection between gender and attitudes towards women's aptitude for political leadership, I conducted the same analysis on the entire sample of respondents, incorporating gender as one of the explanatory factors for variations in political ambition. The findings reveal that, in comparison to men, women are significantly more likely to express higher levels of support for women in political leadership roles (Roles) and significantly less likely to perceive high levels of support for women in the political environment and to have high self-perception of qualification (Environment and Qualification variables, respectively). This outcome provides evidence of gendered political socialization.

It is important to note that there is no significant difference between women's and men's support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style.[29] In summary, the analysis suggests that political ideology is as significant as gender when it comes to influencing attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership.

3.5 Discussion

Attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership are a significant obstacle to the emergence of female political ambition, and they significantly vary based on women's political ideology. I reached this conclusion after the analysis of original survey data on a representative sample of Britain women. More specifically, in line with evidence coming from the USA context, British women's self-perception of their qualification is significantly linked to their political aspirations. Upon asking women whether their qualifications would be a barrier to their success were they to seek political office, I found that the more positive responses were associated with higher levels of political ambition. In this case, results are consistent, despite women's political ideology. Self-perception of qualification is, in fact, the only attitude that is significantly linked to both right- and left-wing women's political ambition. I speculate that this attitude fits with right-wing women's concern for the lack of opportunities for them to develop their political skills (Sevincer et al., 2023). This attitude can therefore be targeted to increase political ambition in the female population at large; this can be done without having to worry about heterogeneous effects due to women's political ideology. An increase in self-perception of qualification by one point is sufficient to close the gender gap in political ambition. In line with present literature, I also found men to report significantly higher levels of self-perception of qualification, which is first considered as a symptom of a gendered political socialisation (Bos et al., 2022, 2020; Lawless & Fox, 2010; Lay et al., 2021; Oxley et al., 2020; Teele et al., 2018).

[28]These models use robust standard errors. In Appendix III find the models using normal standard errors.
[29]See Appendix III for the results of the models on the full sample including gender as an explanatory factor.

Women's perception of support for women in the political environment is associated with their political ambition. Initially, this attitude appeared to be a significant factor influencing the development of political ambition regardless of women's political affiliations. Upon further examination, it becomes clear that left-wing women are primarily responsible for this effect. It is also noteworthy that left-wing women report a lower baseline level of this attitude compared to right-wing women. I speculate that this gap could be linked to the interaction of two contextual factors: (1) more salient female political leaders emerging from right-wing parties, which increase right-wing voters' perception that the political environment *is not* hostile (i.e. what scholars have labelled "Thatcher Effect"), but also by (2) the recent salient examples of violence against left-wing female politicians (i.e the murder of MP Jo Cox), which increases the perception among left-wing voters that the political environment *is* hostile. Improving this attitude would do quite a lot to close the gender gap in political ambition among left-wing voters; however, in contrast to self-perception of qualification, the effect of such an improvement does not go all the way to closing it. No other demographic characteristics explain a variation in this attitude bar political-ideology. Unsurprisingly then, compared to women, men on the Left and the Right side of the political spectrum feel significantly less discriminated against based on their gender, rendering this variable a significant element which can be linked to a gendered political socialisation.

Despite left-wing voters' relatively higher preference for a more feminine leadership style—a finding consistent with previous literature from the USA context (see Anzia & Bernhard, 2022; Bernhard, 2022)—the support for a stereotypically masculine leadership style emerges as a critical factor for the development of political ambition among these women. When women were asked to select from a list of attributes that they believe an ideal political leader should possess, it was found that many traits typically associated with women's stereotypes are considered important for a political leader, particularly among left-wing voters. However, it is the relative preference for a stereotypically masculine leadership style that is linked to higher levels of political ambition.

Right-wing voters have a stronger preference for a stereotypically masculine leadership style throughout, regardless of their level of political ambition, making this an irrelevant barrier to right-wing women's political ambitions. Compared to men, women do not hold a significantly stronger preference for a stereotypically feminine leadership style, making this the only attitude which does not differ between men and women. All in all, the findings related to the Styles barrier contribute to the existing literature. It does so by drawing a link between leadership styles preference and political ambition, one that has hitherto not been drawn. An insightful point for the discussions in subsequent chapters is the potential benefit of awareness-raising strategies that highlight how women leaders can effectively adopt a stereotypically masculine leadership style. This approach might be more advantageous than portraying women leaders

solely in a stereotypically feminine manner.

Finally, a greater support for women in political leadership roles is not significantly linked to ambition. This might be due to the little variation in this attitude both on the Left and on the Right of the political spectrum. Nevertheless, we can still see that female respondents reported significantly more progressive gender roles compared to men, and left-wing voters were shown to have a significantly more positive outlook on women's suitability for political leadership roles when compared to right-wing voters.

In conclusion, this chapter shows that women's attitude are heterogeneously linked to political ambition. In general, there are three the attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership which could underpin political ambition. Note, however, that this study is neither designed to produce evidence about a directed effect nor to make any claim about the causality in the relationship between attitudes and women's political ambition. Indeed, the possibility of a third variable influencing both attitudes and political ambition is an important consideration for robust analytical conclusions. The example of being born into a political dynasty illustrates how an external factor can simultaneously affect one's political ambition—likely increasing it—due to factors such as familiarity with the political process, access to resources, and networks, as well as one's self-perception of qualification, which might be heightened by the legacy and expectations associated with the dynasty. Without the ability to observe counterfactual scenarios where all potential alternative explanations are controlled or "neutralized," we cannot exclude the possibility that a factor like being born into a political dynasty might introduce an omitted variable bias. Additionally, reverse causality poses a risk in observational studies; for instance, an individual's attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership may be influenced by their own political ambitions. To overcome these issues, I will employ a randomized control trial design in the following chapters to estimate causal relationships and avoid problems with omitted variables or endogeneity.

Chapter 4

Content Effect in Role Model-based Events

"A few years ago, I was in a lift in the House of Commons and there was a young woman, and I commented that she had a nice pair of shoes on, and she said, "Your shoes got me into politics." She saw somebody, me, who she viewed as human, because I am known to like shoes. And that's what got her watching politics. And there she was working in the House of Commons?"

Theresa May – Prime minister of the United Kingdom, 2016 - 2019
(Gillard & Okonjo-Iweala, 2020, p.140)

4.1 Aims and Objectives

Academic research has showed that observing successful examples of female political leadership has positive effects on women's political participation (Beaman et al., 2009, 2012; Fridkin & Kenney, 2014; Ladam et al., 2016; Lawless & Fox, 2010; Wolbrecht & Campbell, 2007, see also a minority of studies that found mixed results Broockman, 2014; Clayton, 2015; Gilardi, 2015; Mariani et al., 2015). Based on this optimistic evidence, political and civil-society organisations were inspired to recreate the positive influence of visible political role models "on demand". Whether a stand-alone initiative or part of larger initiatives, such as training programs, role model-based events are a common awareness-raising strategy, employing the role model effect to inspire women to greater political engagement (Krook & Norris, 2014; see also Shames et al., 2020, passim). In Great Britain, many political and civil society actors employ these strategies (e.g. Parliament.co.uk, 2023; Fawcettsociety.org.uk, 2023; GIWL, 2023)

Nevertheless, while similar awareness-raising strategies, such as training programs, were found to inspire a positive effect on women's interest in pursuing political office (these are individuals that have high levels of pre-existing ambition Bernhard et al., 2020, see also Shames et al., 2020, passim), role model-based events were found to be unsuitable in increasing the political ambition of their audience.[1]

[1]The difference between role model-based events and training programs is discussed in the Theory Chapter. Briefly, training programs are programs studied to inspire the elite of the population to seek political office and that includes, among other activities, role model-based events.

Consequently, academic literature has deemed role model-based events to be ineffective in increasing the political ambition of women in the general population. At the same time, this academic literature's concedes that there is still little knowledge about the mechanism through which role model-based events are supposed to produce their effects. Furthermore, to the best of my knowledge, no study of this kind has ever been run in the "generalisable" context of Great Britain. There is, therefore an urgent need to develop our understanding of the content of role model-based events which drives their overall effectiveness (Foos & Gilardi, 2020).

This chapter aims to address the shortcomings of the existing literature by elaborating on a mechanism that explains how role model-based events influence women's political ambition. Note that this chapter specifically focuses on digital role model-based events, which minimize interaction between the audience and mentors. These events rely on unidirectional content, where role models describe their experiences in politics. As a result, digital role model-based events provide an ideal environment to isolate the influence of content on attitudes towards women's suitability for politics in the mechanism of awareness-raising strategies.

This chapter serves five objectives to achieve its aim. The first objective of this chapter is to assess the content of role model-based events and understand how it directly influences political ambition. To gain a comprehensive understanding of the relevance of these strategies' content, I not only examine the overall impact of role model-based events but also delve into the specific effects of individual pieces of content that address attitudes towards women's suitability for politics separately. The second objective of this chapter follows the analytical pattern of the previous chapter and aims to assess whether political ideology plays a role in sorting the relevance of the content of these strategies on political ambition (Sevincer et al., 2023). For the third objective, this chapter takes a step back and assesses whether role model-based events, while aiming to increase political ambition, can erode women's negative attitudes towards women's suitability for politics. The chapter culminates with further exploratory analysis related to the fourth and fifth objectives. The fourth objective of this chapter is to determine whether the effect of role model-based events is solely attributable to their content or if it is a combination of both the role model effect and the content effect. The fifth and final objective of this chapter serves as a preamble to the subsequent chapter. It explores whether the impact of role model-based events on political ambition is mediated by their influence on the related attitudes. Overall, this chapter contributes to the understanding of why awareness-raising strategies often fail to yield the desired effects on political ambition. It highlights that the content of these strategies does not generate a significant positive impact on attitudes, thereby resulting in minimal or even discouraging effects on women's political aspirations.

The tests presented in these chapters are based on a survey experiment that I designed and conducted

on a representative sample of the female population in Great Britain (n = 1500, approximately).[2] The design of this experiment was pre-registered, and it contains three different comparisons. For the first comparison (objectives one, two, three and five), I randomly presented female participants with either the recording of a full-length digital role model-based event, or they were presented with no recording at all. In order to enhance the ecological validity of the treatment, the recording was developed in collaboration with a real-world female politician who shared her personal experiences in politics. In the second type of comparison, female participants were randomly exposed to various segments of the main role model-based event. Each segment focused on a distinct piece of content related to the four attitudes towards women's suitability for politics. The participants were assigned to either view these segments or not have any recording at all. In the third type of comparison, female participants were randomly presented with two variations of the recording. The first variation featured the full-length role model-based event where the role model was a woman, while the second variation consisted of the same recording but with a male role model.

The evidence gathered suggests that the content of role model-based events plays a crucial role in determining the null effects of these strategies. Specifically, promoting a stereotypically feminine image of female leadership had a significant negative impact on the political ambition of women in the audience. Moreover, further analyses indicate that this negative effect is primarily driven by left-wing women. Additionally, I found that the negative effects of role model-based events can worsen when the role model effect is removed and content regarding attitudes towards women's suitability for politics is conveyed by a male role model. However, there is a silver lining in that role model-based events can have a positive influence on women's attitudes towards women's suitability for politics, particularly in terms of support for women in leadership roles within the political arena. Furthermore, I observed that the effect of role model-based events on political ambition is significantly mediated by the effect of women's perceived support for women in the political environment, particularly in the case of content addressing this specific attitude.

4.2 Literature and Hypothesis

Foos and Gilardi(2020) is, to the best of my knowledge, the only attempt to assess the impact of role model-based events on the general population. This study is a field experiment in which female students at an anonymous Swiss university students are invited to attend an event with female politicians discussing their experience in politics (the format of the event is in person but the conversation flows unidirectional).

[2]The sample was weighted on census data to be representative of the British population of the following demographics: age, education level, income, ethnicity, and vote choice in the 2019 general election.

Foos and Gilardi (2020) find that attending this event had no significant impact on the audience political ambition. To direct future research, they speculate that the words of the politician might have plaid a role in producing such null findings. Overall, being this a field experiment, the study focused on providing externally valid evidences about the impact of this strategy rather than unpacking the mechanism behind their effect. One can say, the mechanism through which role model-based events can effectively increase women's political ambitions and the reasons behind their empirical failure in doing so remain relatively unexplored in the literature (Foos & Gilardi, 2020). This chapter aims to address this gap by investigating the impact of role model-based events as a combination of their content and the role model effect, with specific emphasis on the influence of the strategies' content.

Unlike other awareness-raising strategies that may impact women's political ambition through more complex mechanisms, role model-based events, due to their specific structure, primarily rely on the effects of content and role models. For instance, literature has shown that training programs can increase women's political ambitions by organising practical activities that enhance women's confidence in their political skills (Shames et al., 2020; passim. Kreitzer & Osbourne, 2020).[3] [4] In contrast, the primary focus of mentoring events is to address and diminish women's negative attitudes towards women's suitability for politics, with the goal of fostering a mindset that enables them to develop political aspirations and, ultimately, take action based on those aspirations.

Indeed, determining the "correct content" for role model-based events can be a challenging endeavor. However, this chapter makes a valuable contribution to the existing literature by conducting tests to explore how different types of content directly influence political ambition and attitudes towards women's suitability for politics. Building on the literature regarding attitudes towards women's suitability for politics and their impact on political ambition, I expect that specific content variations will have distinct effects. Firstly, content addressing support for women in the political environment is anticipated to increase women's political ambition (e.g., Dittmar, 2020). Secondly, I expect content on women's political qualification to have a positive effect on women's political ambition (Preece, 2016). Additionally, it is plausible that content aimed at supporting women in political leadership roles would positively affect women's political ambition (e.g., Alexander, 2012), despite the finding that, in normal circumstances, this attitude is not significantly linked to individual-level variations in political ambition. Conversely, content about support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style should be found to negatively affect women's political ambition (e.g. Hargrave & Blumenau, 2022). As discussed in previous chapters, a relative preference for stereotypically masculine traits tents to be associated with greater political am-

[3] As it was discussed in the theory chapter, this is a awareness-raising strategy that often includes political role models in their activities.

[4] However, engaging in practical activities is taxing, and for this reason training programs attract individuals with high pre-existing levels of nascent political ambition (Bernhard et al., 2020) with the aim of increasing their expressive ambition (Krook & Norris, 2014).

bition. This is due to politically ambitious women "acceptance" of the "rules of the political game" in the framework of system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Therefore, advocating in favour of a feminine leadership style might produce undesirable effects. This is even more the case if support for a stereotypically feminine leadership style is promoted in such a way that makes the act of stereotyping evident (see Dovidio, 2010). I express these expectations in the following set of sub-hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1a: the content discussing support for women in political leadership roles has a positive effect on women's political ambition

Hypothesis 1b: The content discussing a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style has a negative effect on women's political ambition.

Hypothesis 1c: the content discussing perceived support for women in the political environment has a positive effect on women's political ambition

Hypothesis 1d: The content discussing self-perception of qualification has a positive effect on women's political ambition.

Considering the previous finding that support for women in political leadership roles is not a significant barrier to political ambition, reservations arise regarding the significant effect of content based on this attitude, which the test of the above hypothesis aims to clarify.

It is plausible that the effect that single pieces of content have on women's ambition will vary based on women's political ideology and, consequently, on the relevance of attitudes. In fact, as previously mentioned, Sevincer et al., (2023) found that women tend to see gender (in)equality as either an outcome of systemic and structural barriers, or as an outcome of a lack of opportunities (i.e. chances of developing the Right networks or developing the necessary skills for the job). While the former view is associated with the political ideology of left-wing parties, the latter is associated with the political ideology of right-wing parties (Sevincer et al., 2023). Aligning with Sevincer et al., (2023), the previous empirical chapter demonstrated that the relevance of attitudes varies according to women's political ideology. I argue, therefore, that the effectiveness of the content in these strategies, which revolves around and is influenced by attitudes, will vary depending on women's political ideology. The second contribution of this chapter is to examine the expectation that women's political ideology will condition the effect of role model-based events. This expectation is expressed in the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Women's political ideology conditions the effect of role model-based events on political ambition.

Based on the findings of the previous chapter, I speculate that content priming a feminine leadership style will have a relatively less favorable effect on left-wing women. Conversely, content focusing on perceived support for women in the political environment is expected to have relatively better effects on women who vote for left-wing parties. Additionally, content emphasizing women's qualifications should positively influence women's political ambition regardless of their political ideology. Lastly, the content aimed at support for women in political leadership roles is not expected to have differential effects based on women's political ideology.

The objective of the non-quota strategy is not only to impact political ambition but also attitudes towards women's suitability for politics (Krook & Norris, 2014). However, existing literature on role model-based events has primarily examined attitudes towards women's suitability for politics as a pre-treatment covariate (Foos & Gilardi, 2020). Building on literature suggesting that attitudes towards women's suitability for politics are an outcome of role model-based events (also see Bandura, 1997), I anticipate that this awareness-raising strategy will positively influence women's attitudes. This expectation is formulated as the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: Role model-based events have a positive effect on women's attitudes towards women's suitability for politics.

It is plausible that role model-based events will have a positive effect on various attitudes, including support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style. However, this positive effect on attitudes may potentially translate into a decrease in political ambition due to the negative relationship between this attitude and women's political ambition.

As previously suggested, this chapter posits that role model-based events impact political ambition through a combination of the content effect and role model effect. It is widely recognized that gender is a significant factor in the audience's identification with their role model (Pruysers & Blais, 2016). To gain a better understanding of how role model-based events influence women's political ambition, I compare the effect of the same audio event by altering the gender of the role model. Changing the gender of the role model, from female to male, approximates a scenario where we "lift" the role model effect. The expectation is that, due to the role model effect, a role model-based event where the role model and audience share the same gender will have a stronger positive impact on women's political ambition and attitudes towards women's suitability for politics, compared to events where the role model is male. This

expectation is stated in the following hypothesis.:

Hypothesis 4: The effect of role model-based events is stronger when the content is delivered by a female role model.

I will not only explore the effect of a role model's gender on women's political ambition but also their effect on different attitudes towards women's suitability for politics. I do so in order to provide a rounded understanding of how a role model's gender affects the mechanism through which role model-based events change women's political ambition.

Finally, social psychology literature has often pointed out that role models affect intentions *through* a change in attitudes (Bandura & Walters, 1977). Based on this literature, it is expected that attitudes towards women's suitability for politics act as a "mediator" in the relationship between role model-based events and women's political ambition. Specifically, part of the effect of role model-based events on political ambition is attributed to the influence of attitudes towards women's suitability for politics. Moreover, considering that the relationship between attitudes towards women's suitability for politics and political ambition is influenced by women's political ideology, it is anticipated that, for left-wing women, the effect of role model-based events on political ambition can be mediated by (1) support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style, (2) perceived support for women in the political environment, and (3) self-perception of qualification. In contrast, it is expected that the effect of role model-based events on political ambition may only be affected by women's self-perception of qualification. These expectations are expressed as follows:

Hypothesis 5a: for left-wing voters, the effect of role model-based events on political ambition is mediated by the effect had on support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style

Hypothesis 5b: for left-wing voters, the effect of role model-based events on political ambition is mediated by the effect had on women's perceived support for women in the political environment

Hypothesis 5c: for both left- and right-wing voters, the effect of mentoring events on political ambition is mediated by the effect had on women's self-perception of qualification

Given that support for women in political leadership roles is not significantly related to the political ambition of women, I do not expect that this attitude will mediate the effect of role model-based events. This study of mediation establishes a connection between this chapter and the subsequent chapter, where

the variation of the effect of awareness-raising strategies is examined based on attitudes towards women's suitability for politics. The aim is to further define the backlashes which are due to the content of awareness-raising strategies. In the next chapter, attitudes towards women's suitability for politics will be treated as a pre-treatment variable in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of the role of these attitudes in the mechanism. This experiment focuses on examining the effect of awareness-raising strategies on attitudes, considering them as post-treatment variables.

4.3 Methodology

4.3.1 Experimental Design

To test the hypotheses in this study, I designed and ran a survey experiment on a representative sample of British women (n = 1463). To ensure representativeness, census data has been utilized and quotas have been defined to replicate the distribution of the British population across key demographic factors such as age, education level, income, partisanship, and geographic location (specifically, the area in Great Britain where participants reside).[5] [6] [7]

The treatment was represented by the audio recording of a role model-based event in which a female political role model discusses her experience in politics. The role model-based event was recorded expressly for this experiment. An interviewer facilitated the discussion, directing the conversation towards the four attitudes towards women's suitability for politics and their impact on political ambition, as identified in the previous chapters of this monograph (see Script 1 for the transcript of the full-length role model-based event).

Script 1: Transcript of the full-length audio recording of the role model-based event. Participants were only exposed to the audio version of the treatment

Please, read the transcript from an interview that was edited for this study. It is of vital importance for this study that you read this transcript until the end—this survey will be over shortly, after a few more questions.

Imagine an interview scenario with two women speaking...

[Roles Segment:]

INTERVIEWER: Hi! Thank you so much for being here today. I will start with an icebreaker: do you think that women, in general, can be successful in politics?

[5] I also collected data from a sample of 450 men to estimate the gender gap in political ambition in this sample.

[6] I independently wrote the experiment using the Qualtrics software and participants were recruited through the Lucid survey company.

[7] Throughout the survey, participants are always given the chance to answer "I don't know" questions where they can not select a neutral position on a scale. This type of answer is recoded as a missing value. Hence, the effective number of available observations is smaller than the sample size counting all recruited participants.

POLITICIAN: Well, I know that women can be successful in politics. There are many examples of women who have been in powerful positions within different political parties in parliamentary systems. And, indeed, they've changed many things as politicians, which is the most important thing –not only being in a powerful position but using it to change the world.

[Styles Segment:]

INTERVIEWER: OK, that's great! Now, clearly, you have a lot of experience with British politics, which leads me to my next question: Do you think that female politicians have a different leadership style from male politicians?

POLITICIAN: I think that there can be differences, to the extent that women often are more collaborative. They can also be –to be quite frank– more emotionally intelligent which sometimes helps to build the networks that are necessary for being successful in politics. Of course, many men can have these skills as well, but we find that often women have them. So, I think that in this context being a woman can be of benefit.

[Environment Segment:]

INTERVIEWER: Fantastic! Now, my next question is, are there still gender-based barriers that can hinder the success of women in politics? and I'd like to continue the question by asking if, in your experience, you've observed support networks among women that have entered politics.

POLITICIAN: Yes, clearly a lot of the structural barriers and of the formal barriers have gone –for instance, very discriminatory restrictions that would have prevented women from standing; these kinds of things clearly have been removed. Arguably, there are still sometimes less formal mechanisms that impact women and I would say, particularly in the area of social media. However, a lot of activities have been undertaken to try and combat remaining informal barriers and there's a lot of practical solidarity between the people impacted by this kind of thing.

[Qualification Segment:]

INTERVIEWER: Thank you for sharing this. Now, this question is a bit of a stand-alone: is there any inherent difference between women that decide to go into politics and women in the general population? In other words, are women that are successful in politics outliers, or can any woman pursue a career in politics to that level?

POLITICIAN: I definitely don't think there's any kind of qualitative difference between women that get elected formally into politics and what a lot of other women might be doing informally but which is also making a difference. I would also say that often women are already driving practical changes in their communities before they know it, for example, arguing for improvements in regard to their kid's schools or making their area safe. I personally would view this as political.

The treatment's role model-based event adopts the format of digital role model-based events, such as webinars. It is worth noting that even outside of the experimental setting, these events typically involve minimal one-on-one interactions between the role models and the audience. For the recording of this role model-based event, I partnered with a British female politician. In agreement with the politician, I developed the recording, paying particular attention to avoiding cues that would make the politician identifiable to the audience. Specifically, I instructed the role model to omit any information from the conversation that could be used as a cue to infer her identity, partisan affiliation, age, or ethnic background. Furthermore, I selected this specific politician to impersonate the role model in the event because she speaks in a standard British accent (i.e., "BBC English") that does not suggest her provenance or class.

It is important to note that maintaining the anonymity of the role model is fundamental to avoid priming the respondents with identity cues that could affect their bond with the role model. Also, please note that the role model developed her answers to the interviewer autonomously. However, the acting role model and I agreed that the conversation should discuss general aspects of the politician's experience in British politics, which can be representative of the experience of most female political actors. Having said that, I cannot exclude the possibility that the treatment might still reflect the politician's personal views on the experience of women in political leadership roles.[8]

The full-length recording (4 min. approximately) was cut into different segments which are approximately 1 minute long. I also produced an alternative version of the same full-length recording of the audio event; here, the same content was voiced by a male role model. Female participants were allocated, with the same probability, into either: (1) the experimental group exposed to the 4-minutes-long role model-based event with a female role model; (2) one of the four experimental groups treated with a 1-minute-long segments; or (3) the experimental group exposed to the 4-minutes-long role model-based event with a male role model. Finally, one-seventh of the female sample was allocated to the experimental group that was exposed to no audio treatment, thereby representing the control group. Men were automatically sent to the control group. Upon power analysis, I estimated that 200 (female) participants in each condition would have allowed us to achieve an experimental power of 0.8. The reference effect size is approximately d = 0.4, which corresponds to the (medium) effect size of the 2016 study by Schneider et al., which uses informational treatments to alter women's political ambition.[9]

Before exposing participants to the audio recording, I collected information regarding their socio-demographic characteristics and partisanship.[10] After being exposed to the role model-based event audio, participants answered a series of questions measuring their level of attention throughout the experiment.[11] Subsequently, I assessed participants' levels of attitudes towards women's suitability for politics. It is important to highlight that these attitudes were measured after participants were exposed to the audio of the role model-based event. In this study, attitudes towards women's suitability for politics are considered both an outcome of the treatment and an indicator of political ambition. Finally, I measured the level of the participants' political ambition. Exclusion criteria were applied both at the moment of selecting participants and during the collection of their demographic data. I excluded individuals under 18 years of age, and those who are not British citizens, because they are not eligible to run for political office.[12]

[8] All pieces of information discussed in the role model-based event are truthful information representing the politician's experience in British politics. No deception has been used in the recording of the role model-based event audio treatment and the experiment conforms to the highest standard of ethics in experimental research employed by the Center for Experimental Social Sciences at the University of Oxford.

[9] See Appendix IV for sample size calculation.

[10] See the questionnaire in Appendix IV.

[11] Individuals who have not passed attention checks were not allowed to complete the experiment.

[12] For privacy reasons, I did not ask participants if they were ex-convicts, another reason that would make them ineligible for political office.

Individuals self-reporting as neither men nor women were also excluded from the experiment. This is because I do not have a theoretical explanation regarding their political behaviour. Furthermore, individuals who have not passed attention checks were also excluded.[13] The design of this experiment is pre-registered on the Open Science Framework.[14]

4.3.2 Analytical Strategy

To test Hypothesis 1a to 1d, I ran three variations of an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model following equation (1). The first specification was a bivariate model assessing the effect of the full-length treatment over political ambition, done without controlling for participants' socio-demographic characteristics. The second specification of this model included controls and used normal standard errors. The third specification of this model included controls and used robust standard errors

$$(1) Ambition_{\mathrm{i}} = a + b1 * Treatment_{\mathrm{i}} + [controls]_{\mathrm{i}} + e.$$

The dependent variable, *Ambition*, is measured based on the response to the question: "How likely is it, if at all, that in the future you will seek political office?" Participants rate their likelihood on a 1 to 5 Likert scale, ranging from "not at all likely" (1) to "very likely" (5). This question has been widely used in previous research studying political ambition (Foos & Gilardi, 2020; Schneider et al., 2016; Schneider & Sweet-Cushman, 2020).

To ensure comparability across different chapters, the Ambition measure was standardized. In the results section, the variable representing political ambition is consistently labeled as Ambition.

The main explanatory factor, referred to as *Treatment*, is initially set as a dummy variable representing the assignment to either the full role model-based event (with the female role model) or the control groups. To examine the impact of individual content pieces on the entire sample (Hypothesis 1a to Hypothesis 1d), I replicated the models associated with equation (1). The main exploratory factor in these models was a categorical variable representing the assignment to one of the four groups exposed to content about the four attitudes towards women's suitability for politics separately, compared to the control condition. In order to enhance the precision of the treatment effect estimation, I included control variables in my

[13] In Appendix IV, I show that (1) there is no significant difference between the treatment and the control group in terms of the number of individuals who drop out, and (2) shows that there is no significant difference between the treatment and the control group in terms of the number of individuals who were excluded from the experiment because they did not pass attention checks. Furthermore, I show that there is no significant difference in dropout due to failing attention checks that can be explained by the treatment assignment.

[14] The hypotheses in this study were not registered as a key study for their formulation (i.e. Sevincer et al., 2023) was published around the same time as data collection.

models. These controls encompassed standard socio-demographic characteristics such as age, education level, income, ethnicity, dwelling, and whether individuals voted for left-wing, right-wing, or other parties in the last general elections. Upon conducting randomization checks post-analysis, I discovered significant differences in participants' age and income across different treatment groups. These findings further justify the inclusion of controls in my models, enabling correction for any bias in the treatment effect resulting from the imbalance in socio-demographic characteristics among experimental groups.[15] The coefficient of interest in this context is the coefficient associated with the categorical variable representing the treatment. If significant, it indicates which content significantly influences the level of women's political ambition compared to the control condition. To ensure the robustness of the analysis, I conducted a replication using political ambition operationalized as a dummy variable or as a behavioral outcome.[16] I also replicated this analysis using an Ordered Logit estimator instead of the OLS estimator.

In order to test the conditioning effect of partisanship on the effect of role model-based events (Hypothesis 2), I ran three variations of the model as specified in equation (2). Using the same specifications, I described for the test of the previous hypothesis:

$$(2) Ambition_{\mathrm{i}} = a + b1 * Treatment_{\mathrm{i}} + b2 * Left_Party_{\mathrm{i}} + b3 * Treatment_{\mathrm{i}} * Left_Party_{\mathrm{i}} + [controls]_{\mathrm{i}} + e.$$

The Ambition variable was measured in the same way described above. The *Left_Party* variable is a dummy representing whether participants voted for a left-wing or a right-wing party during the last elections. Those who voted for Other parties, or answered "I don't know" to this question, were excluded from this part of the analysis as I don't have a theoretical explanation for their political behaviour.

The Treatment variable was initially operationalized as a dummy variable, representing the assignment to the full-length audio of the role model-based event compared to the control condition. I then replicated the analysis by substituting the dummy form of the Treatment variable with the categorical form. This categorical Treatment variable allowed for the assessment of the effect of each segment of content, conditioned on participants' political ideology, compared to the control condition. The controls used in the multivariate models are the same as described concerning the test for Hypothesis 1a to 1d.

During this phase of the analysis, the main coefficient of interest is the interaction between participants' vote for left-wing parties (compared to right-wing parties) and the treatment assignment. This interaction term captures the variation in the treatment effects based on individuals' political ideology.

[15] A full description of the controls used in this model is reported in Appendix IV.
[16] See Appendix IV for further details on these two alternative operationalisations of the Ambition variable.

Also in this case, as a robustness check, I replicated this analysis using political ambition operationalised as a dummy or as a behavioural outcome, and using an Ordered Logit estimator instead of the OLS estimator.[17]

To test the effect of the role model-based event on women's attitudes towards women's suitability for politics (Hypothesis 3), I conducted three variations of the analysis represented in equations (3) using the same model specifications described above:

$$(3)[Attitude]_{\mathrm{i}} = a + b1 * Treatment_{\mathrm{i}} + [controls]_{\mathrm{i}} + e.$$

In the above equation, *Attitude* is a placeholder for a measure of one of the four attitudes towards women's suitability for politics taken as dependent variables. Regarding their operationalisation, participants level of *support for women in political leadership roles* (short label: *Roles*) is measured as the level of agreement with the statement "Men make better political leaders than women do", which is the same construct used by Inglehart and Norris (2004), now the standard measure for norms about women's suitability for political leadership roles. As I discussed in the previous chapter, this operationalisation benefits from good construct validity.

Women's level of *support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style* (short label: *Styles*) is measured by counting the number of traits associated with a stereotypically feminine leadership style that participants desire to see in a political leader. The count goes from 0 to 4; I therefore then converted to a 1 to 5 scale. The specific phrasing of the question regarding Style is "Which of the following, if any, do you think are the most important characteristics that a political leader should have? Please choose FOUR". Based on Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt (2001), the list is composed of four traits associated with a stereotypically feminine leadership style and four traits associated with a stereotypically masculine leadership. As I discussed in the previous chapter, this operationalisation benefits from good construct validity.

Women's *perceived support for women in the political environment* (short label: *Environment*) is measured by asking participants "In case you ever consider seeking political office, would you find that the political environment is supportive of candidates of your gender group?". Responding 1 means that a participant expected no support at all; responding with 5 means that a participant expected strong support from the political environment. As I discussed in the previous chapter, this item is inspired by

[17] See Appendix IV for further details on these two alternative operationalisations of the Ambition variable.

previous literature and asks a relatively clear question. Nevertheless, its phrasing was fitted to serve the purpose of this monograph with the aim of avoiding priming participants with any specific barrier women could find in the political environment. Because of the "originality" of this item, its construct validity is comparatively weaker.

Women's *self-perception of qualification for politics* (short label: *Qualification*) is measured through the question "In case you ever consider seeking political office, would you find yourself qualified for the post?". This question is a variation of Lawless and Fox's (2010) measure of self-perception of qualification. Here, 1 meant that a participant perceived themselves to be not at all qualified, and 5 meant that a participant perceived themselves to be highly qualified for a political post. As I discussed in the previous chapter, this operationalisation benefits from good construct validity. Finally, in the effort of optimising the comparability of results across different chapters, I standardized all the measures of attitudes towards women's suitability for politics.

Also in this case, the Treatment variable was operationalized in two ways: as a dummy variable (comparing the full-length audio of the role model-based event to the control condition) and as a categorical variable (comparing each segment of content conditioned on the control condition). As a result, the analysis presented in equation (3) was replicated twice, once for each variation of the Treatment variable. The controls used in the multivariate models are the same as described concerning the test for Hypothesis 1a to 1d. Here, the coefficient of interest is that which is associated with the Treatment variable, which, if significant, identifies a significant change in the level of women's attitudes towards women's suitability for politics compared to the control. As a robustness check, I replicated this analysis, operationalising attitudes towards women's suitability for politics on a three-point scale.[18] I also replicated this analysis using an Ordered Logit estimator instead of the OLS estimator.

To investigate whether the gender of the role model contributes to the effect of role model-based events (Hypothesis 4), I conducted three variations of the model specified in equations (4) and (5), maintaining the usual three specifications:

$$(4) Ambition_{\mathrm{i}} = a + b1 * Male_Role_Model_{\mathrm{i}} + [controls]_{\mathrm{i}} + e.$$

$$(5) [Attitude]_{\mathrm{i}} = a + b1 * Male_Role_Model_{\mathrm{i}} + [controls]_{\mathrm{i}} + e.$$

Political ambition was measured in the same way as described above. Likewise, the Attitude variable is a placeholder for one of the measures of attitudes towards women's suitability for politics that I described

[18] See Appendix IV for further details on this alternative operationalisation.

above. In both equations, the main explanatory variable *Male_Role_Models* is a dummy variable that represents the assignment of the role model-based event to the full-length recording with the male speaker vs. the full-length recording of the role model-based event with the female speaker. The controls used in the multivariate models are the same as described concerning the test for Hypothesis 1a to 1d. The coefficient of interest is the coefficient associated with the Male_Role_Model dummy, which, if significant, identifies a significant change in the level of women's political ambition or attitudes towards women's suitability for politics (compared to the control) when the role model effect is lifted. To ensure the robustness of the analysis, I conducted a replication using alternative operationalizations of the variables. Specifically, I replicated the analysis by operationalizing attitudes towards women's suitability for politics on a three-point scale, and political ambition as a dummy variable or as a behavioral outcome.[19] I also replicated this analysis using an Ordered Logit estimator instead of the OLS estimator.

Finally, to test whether the effect of role model-based events on women's political ambition is mediated by the relevant attitudes towards women's suitability for politics, I used a two-staged equation following Tingley et al.'s method (2013). In this phase, I ran my analysis on subsets of left-wing and right-wing voters to avoid using interactions that were hard to interpret. Equation (6) represents the two-stage equation, which is the last step in Tingley et al.'s method (2013).

$$(6) Ambition_{\mathrm{i}} = a + b1 * [Attitude]_{\mathrm{i}} + b2 * Treatment_{\mathrm{i}} + [controls]_{\mathrm{i}} + e;$$
$$[\mathrm{Attitude}_{\mathrm{i}}] = a + b1 * Treatment_{\mathrm{i}} + [controls]_{\mathrm{i}} + e.$$

Based on this method, the first step was to test if the treatment had a significant effect on the mediator. The Treatment variable was the dummy variable, juxtaposing the full-length recording of the role model-based event (female role model) with the control group. The second step is to test whether the mediator is significantly linked to the outcome, namely Ambition (which was operationalised to test Hypothesis 1a to 1d), in a model controlling for the exogenous factor, namely the Treatment.[20] If both the direct relationship between the exogenous factor (i.e., Treatment) and the mediator, as well as the relationship between the mediator and the outcome (i.e., Ambition), are found to be significant, it is possible to employ a two-stage equation to evaluate the mediated effect of the exogenous factor on the outcome. The coefficient of interest in this case is associated with the mediator. If it is significant, it indicates a considerable difference in the relationship between treatment and political ambition based on the effect

[19] See Appendix IV for further details on these alternative operationalisations.

[20] In other words, this model corresponds to the assessment of the link between attitudes towards women's suitability for politics and political ambition in the control group.

of attitudes towards women's suitability for politics. Note that, based on the results of the previous chapter, potential mediators for left-wing women could be (1) support for women in political leadership roles, (2) support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style, and (3) perceived support for women in the political environment. For right-wing women, on the other hand, the only potential mediator was self-perception of qualification. In this model, I used the same controls that I used used in the tests of the previous hypothesis, and I used normal standard errors.[21]

4.4 Results

4.4.1 Do Role Model-based Events Have Meaningful Effects on Women's Political Ambition?

On the whole, role model-based events have somewhat positive yet insignificant effects on the political ambition of participants (Figure 4.1). When the effect of the individual pieces of content is observed in isolation, I found there to be a significant negative effect when it came to priming women to stereotypical images of female political leadership. Overall, only Hypothesis 1b is supported.

More precisely, Figure 4.1 shows the insignificant effect of the full-length role model-based event, which I label here as TreatmentFull (F Speaker). While the coefficient remains insignificant across all three model specifications (model without controls, model with controls and normal standard errors, and models with controls and robust standard errors), the magnitude of the treatment effect is also much smaller than than that which was accounted in the ex-ante power analysis. Therefore, in this scenario, we cannot conclude that the absence of a significant effect is solely due to the treatment having no actual effect. Rather, it is likely attributable to the smaller effect size and limited power of the experiment under the specific parameter being examined.[22] After conducting a post-hoc power analysis, it has been determined that a sample size of approximately 2600 participants (with 1300 participants in each condition) is necessary to assess the significance of a treatment with such a small effect. This sample size would provide a level of certainty of 80% (or an experimental power of 0.8) in detecting the effect.[23] One should hereafter assume that treatment effects which do not reach significance are thus underpowered and not unequivocably ineffective (unless otherwise stated).[24] All in all, this result consolidates the notion that role model-based events should reach large populations if they are to optimize their chances of success. Furthermore, note that the small effect retrieved here should be seven times stronger were it to close the gender gap in political ambition. Remember that the gender gap in political ambition approximates 0.2

[21] For this step, I used the "mediation" function of the homonyms package Tingley et al. (2014).
[22] See Appendix IV.
[23] See Appendix IV.
[24] In Appendix IV, I report the computation of ad-hoc power analysis for each test performed in this chapter.

points across all data collections in this monograph. [25]

Figure 4.1: Effect of the Events on Ambition



The average effect of the full-length role model-based event (TreatmentFull (F Speaker)) on women's political ambition, with 95% confidence intervals, is significant. Specifically, there is evidence of a small and insignificant positive effect on women's political ambition. Significant coefficients are those with confidence intervals that do not cross the zero line (alpha <0.5), if they barely pass it (with alpha <0.1) then they are said to approach statistical significance. In this case, no significant effects are retrieved.

Finally, I would like to note that once the participants' demographic characteristics are taken into account, the coefficient representing the treatment effect further decreases in size when compared to the model not containing any controls. One plausible explanation is that some demographics experience more positive effects than others; when this heterogeneity is accounted for, the effectiveness of role model-based events may decrease.[26] In *Section 4.4.2 - Does political ideology condition the effect of role model-based events?* I will investigate this possibility by exploring heterogeneous effects due to partisanship.

Figure 4.2. shows the effect of individual pieces of content on women's political ambition. I find that the content about women's feminine leadership style (i.e., TreatmentStyles) has a significant negative effect on women's interest in seeking political office. In a context of limited experimental power, this finding should be seen as a sign of the overwhelming negative influence had when priming women with stereotypes about their leadership. The content regarding the other attitudes towards women's suitability for politics has a somewhat positive, albeit insignificant, effect on the political ambition of women as a whole. This is true across all three specifications of the model presented here.[27]

[25] Appendix IV reports the coefficients for every control in this analysis.

[26] Using causal trees I find that significant factors in the heterogeneity of the role model-based event are dwelling and age. Specifically, individuals above 34 years of age living in urban areas are the most affected by the role model-based event. See Appendix IV.

[27] Using causal trees I find that left-wing, younger people with a level of education equal to or higher than the fifth category

Figure 4.2: Effect of Segments on Ambition



The image above shows the average effect of the four segments on women's political ambition, with 95% confidence intervals. From left to right: the first group of coefficients concerns the content on support for women in political leadership roles (TreatmentRoles); the second group of coefficients concerns the content on support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style (TreatmentStyles); the third group of coefficients concerns the content on the supportiveness of the political environment (TreatmentEnvironment); and the fourth group of coefficients concerns the content on women's qualification (TreatmentQualification). Significant coefficients are those with confidence intervals that do not cross the zero line (alpha <0.5); if they barely pass it (with alpha <0.1), then they are said to approach statistical significance. There is evidence of a significant negative effect had by the content upon support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style.

Note that the effect of the content about the support for women in the political environment (i.e. TreatmentEnvironment) should be ten times stronger were it to close the gender gap in political ambition. The content about women's qualification for political office, the most effective (i.e. TreatmentQualification), should be more than four times stronger in order to close the gender gap in political ambition.[28] The content regarding support for women in political leadership roles (i.e. TreatmentRoles) approximates zero and therefore won't be subject to any comment on its meaningfulness.[29] [30] [31] [32] [33]

are the ones to most suffer from the content about support for a feminine leadership style (this result aligns with the findings of previous chapters). On the other hand, right-wing individuals, especially those with an educational obtainment below the fifth category benefit from the support for a feminine leadership style content the most. See Appendix IV.

[28] Using causal trees I find that significant factors in the heterogeneity of the content about perceived support for women in the political environment are age and Education. Specifically, individuals below 45 years of age are the most benefitted from this content, with some positive effects also on older participants with a level of education below the third category. On the other hand, individuals above 45 years of age with a level of education below the third category are the least benefited from this content. See Appendix IV.

[29] In Appendix IV, I report the exact computation on which I based this claim.

[30] Note that while the audio of the full role model-based event is four minutes long, the segments related to individual contents are about one minute long each. Thus, the two treatment effects are incomparable due to the additional effect of a variation in the length of exposure.

[31] Appendix IV reports the coefficients for every control in this analysis.

[32] Using causal trees I find that significant factors in the heterogeneity of the content about support for women in political leadership roles are dwelling, income and age. Specifically, individuals above 34 years of age, living in urban or suburban areas, and with a personal income equal to or higher than the second category are the ones to most benefit from the content on support for women in political leadership roles. See Appendix IV.

[33] Using causal trees I find that the only significant factor in the heterogeneity of the content about self-perception of

Note that the pattern of effect sizes somewhat resembles the pattern found in the previous chapter regarding the relationship between attitudes towards women's suitability for politics and political ambition. The largest positive effect size is observed in the content related to women's qualification for politics. This is followed by the content concerning support for women in the political environment. Lastly, the content focused on support for women in political leadership roles shows an effect size close to zero. These results remain robust when considering different operationalizations of the Ambition variable (as a dummy variable and as a behavioral outcome). Additionally, the use of an Ordered Logit estimator, instead of an OLS estimator, does not significantly alter the findings.[34]

4.4.2 Does Political Ideology Condition the Effect of Role Model-based Events?

The political ambition of left-wing women is significantly impacted by the content-priming of stereotypical ideas of female political leadership. Despite the overall slightly positive effect of role model-based events on political ambition, left-wing women experience the greatest negative effect. Hence, Hypothesis 2 is only supported concerning support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style.

Figure 4.3 displays the insignificantly stronger effect of the full-length role model-based event on the political ambition of left-wing women compared to right-wing women (TreatmentFull (F Speaker): Left_Party.[35] [36] It is worth noting that this test benefits from full experimental power, indicating that the lack of a significant result is a true negative. Nonetheless, Figure 4.4 reveals that content priming stereotypical ideas of female leadership has a significantly more negative impact on the political ambition of left-wing women compared to right-wing women. In fact, left-wing women are not affected negatively by it.[37] This is true across all three specifications of the model presented here.

The remaining content seems to have a more positive, yet insignificantly different, effect on the political ambition of left-wing women compared to right-wing women.[38] These results remain robust when considering the different operationalisation of the Ambition variable, both as a dummy variable and as a behavioural outcome, and to the use of an Ordered Logit estimator (instead of an OLS estimator).[39]

qualification is Education (this aligns with the findings of previous chapters). Specifically, individuals with a level of education above the seventh category are the ones to benefit the most from this content, followed by individuals with a level of education above the third category. See Appendix IV.

[34] See Appendix IV.

[35] Appendix IV reports a table with the coefficients for every explanatory variable in this analysis.

[36] In Appendix IV, I show the replication of these results using subgroup analysis which confirms that the effect of the role model-based event is stronger on left-wing women's political ambition, yet insignificant.

[37] Appendix IV reports the coefficients for every control in this analysis.

[38] In Appendix IV I report the effect of subgroup analysis which confirms these patterns.

[39] See Appendix IV.

Figure 4.3: Heterogeneous Effect of Role model-based Events



This image shows heterogeneous effect of role model-based events based on women's political ideology (with 95% confidence intervals). From left to right, the first group of coefficients is a reminder of Figure 4.1, which reports the effect of the role model-based event on the full sample (TreatmentFull (F Speaker). The second group of coefficients represent the different effects had by the role model-based event upon left-wing women compared to right-wing women (TreatmentFull (F Speaker):Left_Party). The significant coefficients are those with confidence intervals that do not cross the zero line (alpha <0.5); if they barely pass it (with alpha <0.1), then they are said to approach statistical significance. This plot shows no significant relationships.

Figure 4.4: Heterogeneous Effect of Content



This image shows heterogeneous effect of content based on women's political ideology (with 95% confidence intervals). From left to right: the coefficients in the first group pertain to the content on support for women in political leadership roles (TreatmentRoles: Left_Party); the second group of coefficients relates to the content on support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style (TreatmentStyles: Left_Party); the third group of coefficients corresponds to the content on the supportiveness of the political environment (TreatmentEnvironment: Left_Party); lastly, the fourth group of coefficients pertains to the content on women's qualification (TreatmentRoles: Left_Party). Significant coefficients are those with confidence intervals that do not cross the zero line (alpha <0.5); if they barely pass it (with alpha <0.1), then they are said to approach statistical significance. Significant evidence indicates a difference between left-wing and right-wing women concerning the effect of the content on support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style. This effect becomes even more discouraging for women's political ambitions.

4.4.3 Do Role Model-based Events Affect Women's Attitudes?

Although there is no evidence of a significant positive effect of role model-based events on women's political ambition, it is still possible for these events to influence women's attitudes towards the suitability of women in politics.Specifically, this is the case of (1) support for women in political leadership roles, (2) perceived support for women in the political environment, and (3) self-perception of qualification. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is somewhat supported.

Figure 4.5: Event Effect on Attitudes



This image shows the average effect of the full-length role model-based event (TreatmentFull (F Speaker)) on women's attitudes towards women's suitability for politics (with 95% confidence intervals). From left to right, the first group of coefficients pertains to the effect of the role model-based event on women's support for women in political leadership roles (Roles). The second group of coefficients relates to the effect of the role model-based event on support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style (Styles). The third group of coefficients concerns the effect of the role model-based event on perceived support for women in the political environment (Environment). Lastly, the fourth group of coefficients examines the effect of the role model-based event on women's self-perception of qualification (Qualification). Significant coefficients are those with confidence intervals that do not cross the zero line (alpha < 0.5). If they barely pass this threshold (with alpha < 0.1), they are considered to approach statistical significance. Thus, there is evidence of a significant effect of role model-based events on support for women in political leadership roles and a nearly significant effect on perceived support for women in the political environment and qualification.

Figure 4.5 shows that role model-based events can significantly increase women's level of support for women in political leadership roles. Furthermore, these events can enhance women's perception of support in the political environment. The effect on self-perception of qualification approaches traditional levels of statistical significance (i.e., it is only significant for an alpha level of 0.1). Women's support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style, on the other hand, does not shift after exposure to the role model-based event. Thus, role model-based events can have a general positive effect on women's political socialisation even when they do not achieve their purpose of increasing women's political ambition. It

is important to note that while perception of support in the political environment and self-perception of qualification have been identified as predictors of political ambition in the previous chapter, Figure 4.2 does not demonstrate a noticeable improvement in the level of political ambition associated with these attitudes. This could be attributed to the limited power of the present experiment, indicating that the positive effects on these attitudes may not be sufficient to yield a significant enhancement in ambition. In the case of women's support for women in political leadership roles, the experiment achieves full experimental power (i.e. this result is a true positive). The results are robust (both in terms of patterns and significance) regarding the operationalisation of attitudes towards women's suitability for politics on a three-point scale and the switch to an Ordered Logit estimator.[40]

4.4.4 What About Role Model Effect?

In contrast to a female role model, when a male role model influences women's attitudes towards women's suitability for politics, it often has an opposite effect that is not beneficial for women's political ambitions. Hypothesis 4 is partially supported in relation to (1) support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style, (2) perceived support for women in the political environment, and (3) self-perception of qualification.

More precisely, Figure 4.6 shows that, in fact, the male role model increases women's preference for a feminine leadership style, and it decreases women's perception of support in the political environment and their self-perception of qualification. The estimates of these relationships approach common levels of statistical significance with an alpha level of 0.1. The male role model, however, seems not to affect women's political ambition or support for women in political leadership roles. We can therefore conclude that role model-based events produce a more desirable effect when the audience and the role model share the same gender. At the same time, significant differences in the effect of role model-based events based on the gender of the role model indicate that the impact of these events is a combination of both the content effect and the role model effect.

It is plausible that a male role model might come across as less suited to discuss women's qualifications for politics, or to discussing gender-based barriers in the political environment, because these two attitudes are not normative (i.e. they reflect personal and collective experiences of women). It goes without saying that men never experience these problems from a female perspective, and the audio segments might be perceived as having a "paternalistic" tone when delivered by the male role model. Further studies are necessary to speculate on the reason for the different effect had by male and female role models when it comes to support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style. Overall, the male role model appears to have less influence on the attitudes towards women's suitability for politics, which need to be improved

[40] See Appendix IV.

to enhance women's political ambitions in the general female population. Additionally, the male role model seemingly has less impact on political ambition itself. The results remain robust when considering different operationalizations of attitudes towards women's suitability for politics on a three-point scale and political ambition as both a dummy variable and a behavioral outcome.[41] Further studies are indeed necessary to establish a theoretical understanding of the effects identified with male mentors, particularly to understand the different meaning of a message as it is delivered by speakers of different genders.

Figure 4.6: Mentor Effect on Ambition and Attitudes



The above image displays the effect of the full-length role model-based event when a role model is a man (TreatmentFull (M Speaker)) compared to a female role model (with 95% confidence intervals). Dependent variables set to Ambition and attitudes towards women's suitability for politics. Significant coefficients are those with confidence intervals that do not cross the zero line (alpha <0.5); if they barely pass it (with alpha <0.1), then they are considered to approach statistical significance. Thus, there's evidence of an effect (approaching significance) of the male role model on (1) support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style, (2) perceived support for women in the political environment, and (3) self-perception of qualification, moving in the direction that damages political ambition.

4.4.5 Is the Effect on Political Ambition Mediated by the Effect on Attitudes?

The impact of content related to perceived support for women in the political environment on women's political ambition is significantly influenced by this attitude, particularly among left-wing voters. As a result, Hypothesis 5 is supported, specifically concerning the perceived support for women in the political environment.

More precisely, Table 4.1 shows the results of the mediation analysis in three steps. The first step involves determining the circumstances in which attitudes towards women's suitability for politics could

[41] See Appendix IV.

significantly impact women's political ambition in the absence of a treatment (i.e., control group). My analysis reveals consistent patterns that align with the findings discussed in the previous chapter. Specifically, women's preference for a feminine leadership style, perception of support in the political environment, and self-perception of qualification are all, to some degree, associated with political ambition. The second step involved determining the circumstances in which attitudes towards women's suitability for politics are significantly influenced by exposure to the role model-based event. As described in Section 4.4.3, role model-based events impact women's self-perception of qualification and perception of support in the political environment. Therefore, without repeating my analysis, I considered only these two variables as potential mediators. For the same reason, we can already exclude women's preference for a feminine leadership style from the list of potential mediators. This is because role model-based events do not have a significant effect on the level of this attitude. I ran the full mediation model and found that for left-wing women (but not right-wing women), the effect of role model-based events on political ambition was mediated by its effect on the perceived support for women in the political environment. Women's self-perception of qualification, on the other hand, did not mediate the treatment effect. In this case, the effect of the role model-based event and self-perception of qualification directly influenced political ambition.[42] This means that somehow, the observed effect of the content on self-perception of qualification on political ambition does not flow through the improvement of this attitude. Yet as, previously stated, the current experiment does not have sufficient power to capture such an effect. A better powered experiment might also be able to exclude that a direct effect is a type II error.

Table 4.1: Mediation Analysis

	First Stage DV: Ambition IV: Environment		Second Stage DV: Environment IV: Treatment		Mediation DV: Ambition M: Env. IV: Treat.	
	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right
	0.335***	0.185***	0.262*	0.020	0.08*	0.000368
	(0.064)	(0.070)	(0.137)	(0.149)	[0.01;0.02]	[-0.05;0.05]
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Robust SE	×	×	×	×	×	×

Results of the first stage (first and second column), the second stage (third and fourth column) and full mediation analysis (fifth and sixth column) for the effect of the role model-based event dummy on political ambition as filtered by the effect on perceived support for women in the political environment. These models regarding the analysis proposed in Equation 5 and run on a representative sample of British women using OLS models. For each part of the analysis, coefficients are first presented for the subgroup of left-wing voters; then they are presented for the subgroup of right-wing voters (This model uses normal standard errors). Both the left-wing and the right-wing subgroups have a significant first stage, yet only the second stage of left-wing women approaches significance. I still performed mediation analysis on both groups in order to show the difference. I found that the Environment attitude mediates the effect of the treatment over ambition, thereby approaching traditional levels of significance. Significance levels: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

In other words, when role model-based events manage to shift women's perceptions of the barriers

[42] See Appendix IV.

they encounter as women in the political environment, the effect of those events is significantly stronger. I propose that this could occur due to two reasons: (1) The content about the support for women in the political environment may impact certain individuals differently, with some showing no response (i.e., their reaction to the content remains flat), and those who do respond exhibit a positive effect, as indicated by the retrieved coefficients. Or (2) some participants respond positively to the content addressing this attitude, leading to an improvement in their political ambition, while others react negatively to the content, resulting in a decline in their political ambition. Given the available data, it is not currently possible to ascertain which alternative more closely approximates the actual mechanism. This limitation arises from the fact that the data on attitudes were collected only after the treatment was made. It is worth noting that scholars have previously speculated that content discussing barriers in the political environment could have a depressing effect on political ambition (see Foos & Gilardi, 2020). This finding opens the door for an exploration of potential heterogeneous effects *within* women's perception of support of the political environment, which is the topic of the following chapter. Additionally, it should be noted that, possibly due to the limited number of individuals who experience a positive change in their perceived support in the political environment as a result of the role model event, I have found that an improvement in this attitude does not lead to a significant enhancement in political ambition within this context.

4.5 Discussion

In this chapter, I explored a plausible mechanism for the effect of role model-based events on women's political ambition, focusing on the effect of the content to which they are exposed. To do so, I partnered with a real-world female politician to design an original survey experiment that I ran on a representative sample of British Women.

I found that the content that primes women to a stereotypical image of female political leadership significantly decreases women's political ambition. Furthermore, this effect is conditioned by women's political ideology, with left-wing women experiencing significantly more negative consequences than right-wing women. Hence, one possible explanation for the ineffectiveness of role model-based events in fostering women's political ambition is that the content of these events, despite being well-intended, may inadvertently diminish women's interest in pursuing political office. This outcome can occur even among women who would typically exhibit higher levels of ambition, such as left-wing women. Further research is however necessary to ascertain that what brought such significant negative effect is the act of overt stereotypes and not other information in the segment regarding this attitudes.

There is, however, a silver lining. Role model-based events appear to have a positive impact on women's political socialization, as they seem to improve three out of four attitudes towards women's suitability

for politics. This effect is particularly strong on women's support for women in political leadership roles. However, as mentioned in the previous empirical chapter, this improved attitude towards women's suitability for politics does not appear to be strongly associated with political ambition. This finding supports the observation that, despite the positive impact on attitudes, role model-based events do not significantly enhance women's ambitions. Moreover, while the perception of support in the political environment and self-perception of qualification were identified as predictors of political ambition in the previous chapter, here, the improvement in these attitudes did not result in a significant increase in the level of political ambition. This could be attributed to the limited power of the current experiment, which may have impacted the ability to detect such changes.

It is important to acknowledge that the effect of role model-based events is not solely attributed to their content but also to the role model effect. However, when considering the role model effect in conjunction with the content, we observe a significant decline in the effects on the three core attitudes towards women's suitability for politics: women's preference for a feminine leadership style, the perception of support for women in the political environment, and women's self-perception of qualification.

Finally, it is observed that the impact of role model-based events on political ambition can vary depending on whether these events successfully improve attitudes towards women's suitability for politics. Specifically, it is found that the effect of role model-based events is significantly mediated by women's perception of support in the political environment. It is important to note that this mediation effect is contingent upon women's partisanship. However, it is worth noting that due to the limited number of individuals who experience a positive change in their perceived support in the political environment as a result of the role model event, the improvement in this attitude does not lead to a significant enhancement in political ambition within this particular context. These findings open the way an the exploration of heterogeneity within attitudes, which is the topic of the next empirical chapter.

In summary, the effects obtained from this experiment were smaller than initially expected, highlighting the need for increased statistical power in many cases. Subsequent studies should consider replicating specific aspects of this experiment in a properly powered setting to mitigate the risk of type II errors. That being said, to the best of my knowledge, this experiment represents the first endeavor to investigate the mechanism by which role model-based events can generate favorable effects on women's aspirations to increase the representation of female political candidates in the general population. Consequently, this experiment begins to establish causal relationships between political ambition and the four attitudes identified in the previous chapters.

In the next chapter, I will delve deeper into the understanding of the mechanism behind awareness-raising strategies. Specifically, I will examine the heterogeneous effects that may arise based on women's

initial levels of attitudes towards women's suitability for politics. Additionally, I will explore the outcomes when awareness-raising strategies employ content with a more "neutralized" framing. It is important to note that a different type of awareness-raising strategy might be more effective in bringing about changes in attitudes towards women's suitability for politics. Recruitment initiatives, for instance, can incorporate informational messages that are tailored to present factual information while simultaneously working towards the erosion of negative attitudes.

Chapter 5

Backlashes in Recruitment Initiatives

"I rise to oppose the motion moved by the Leader of the Opposition [...] The Leader of the Opposition said "If it's true [...] that men have more power generally speaking than women, is that a bad thing?" And then a discussion ensues, and another person says "I want my daughter to have as much opportunity as my son." To which the Leader of the Opposition says "Yeah, I completely agree, but what if men are by physiology or temperament, more adapted to exercise authority or to issue command?" Then ensues another discussion about women's role in modern society, and the other person participating in the discussion says "I think it's very hard to deny that there is an underrepresentation of women," to which the Leader of the Opposition says, "But now, there's an assumption that this is a bad thing..." [...] This motion should be rejected and the Leader of the Opposition should think seriously about the role of women in public life."

Julia Gillard – Prime Minister of Australia 2010 - 2013
Parliamentary speech of the 9th of October, 2012

5.1 Aims and Objectives

Recruitment initiatives have become a popular method to encourage women in the general population to become aspiring political candidates. In recent years, there has been a growing trend towards digitalized recruitment initiatives, with email-based campaigns gaining popularity due to their cost-effectiveness and ability to reach a large portion of the population (Pruysers& Blais, 2018; 2019). For example, the Liberal Party of Canada implemented an online campaign called the "Invite Her to Run" campaign, which aimed to recruit women candidates leading up to the 2015 general election. Similarly, the American organization Women's Campaign Fund has sent over 200,000 invitations to women across the United States as part of their mission to enhance gender diversity in political representation. Additionally, Vote Run Lead, another American organization, sent nearly 10,000 invitations in their first year of operation alone (Dittmar, 2015). In Great Britain, 50:50 Parliament organized a similar campaign called "Ask Her to Stand," focusing on encouraging women to consider running for political office (Parliament.co.uk, 2023). These are only some examples of recruitment initiatives. In Western countries many more groups have used similar techniques to encourage women to seek political office.

As was the case for role model-based events, however, academic research on recruitment initiatives (whether email-based or not) produced little to no evidence regarding the effectiveness of these strategies in increasing women's political ambitions (Pruysers & Blais 2018; 2019). In the Canadian context, Pruysers and Blais run two studies via survey experiment to test the effect of recruitment email on women's political ambition. They find no significant positive effect in the first study (2018), and, in the second study, a significant difference in the effect of the same email when sent by a male or gender-neutral recruiter, as well as a significant difference when the recruiter is a party leaders or a party officer (2019). Overall, both studies agreed that recruitment initiatives have limited effectiveness on increasing women's political aspirations. [1] As it was for role model-based events, there is still limited knowledge of the mechanism through which email based recruitment initiatives produces an effect on women's interest in seeking political leadership roles. Furthermore, to the best of my knowledge, no study of this kind has ever been run in the British context. The purpose of this chapter is to integrate the evidence obtained from the study of role model-based events with new findings derived from the examination of email-based recruitment initiatives. While the previous chapter primarily concentrated on identifying the effects of different content types used in awareness-raising strategies, this chapter focuses on deepening our understanding of the potential backlash that these strategies may have on political ambition.

This chapter aims to achieve three objectives in order to fulfill its purpose. Firstly, it seeks to evaluate the overall effectiveness of email-based recruitment initiatives in enhancing women's political ambition. This test contributes to the existing academic knowledge by providing evidence on the effectiveness of these initiatives, considering different informational messages related to attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership embedded in the email content. The second objective of this chapter is to investigate whether the effectiveness of recruitment emails varies based on the initial levels of attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership among the recipients. This test aims to deepen our understanding of potential backlashes that awareness-raising strategies may have on women's political ambition, building upon the findings from the previous chapter of this monograph. The third and final objective of this chapter is to explore the heterogeneity in the impact of recruitment initiatives based on women's political ideology, while taking into account the pre-existing levels of attitudes.[2] This test contributes to a comprehensive understanding of how women's perspectives on gender equality in politics intersect with their responses to awareness-raising strategies.

To fulfil the objectives of this chapter I run a survey experiment on a representative sample of the

[1] See also Foos & Gilardi (2020).

[2] Note that compared to the role model-based event featured in the previous chapter, the recruitment initiative studied in this chapter applies a more "neutral" framing (i.e. it neither won't reflect the political view of a specific individual nor their political views) to the information discussing attitudes –the purpose is of levelling the discrepancy in effectiveness due to women's political stance. First and foremost this neutral framing is going to be applied to the content related to leadership style to avoid the significant negative effects produced in the previous experiment.

female population in Great Britain.[3] Participants were randomly allocated into one of six experimental conditions, and they were exposed to one of six variations of a recruitment email. The six variations of the recruitment email were created by incorporating informational messages about factual aspects of women's political representation into the main body of the email. To ensure ecological validity, the structure and format of the recruitment email followed the template used by the Canadian Liberal Party, with necessary modifications to suit the British political context. The findings reveal that when women are primed with gender-based barriers present in the political environment, it leads to a backlash among individuals who would have otherwise been more inclined to pursue political office. Upon closer examination, in line with the results from previous chapters, this negative effect is predominantly observed among left-wing women. In general, these awareness-raising strategies exhibit sporadic positive effects on the political ambition of women participants. Notably, the recruitment email that emphasizes women's qualifications for political office has the most significant impact on political ambition, with the potential to narrow the gender gap in political aspirations.

5.2 Literature and Hypothesis

Researchers generally agree that recruiting women for political office can be difficult (Butler & Preece, 2016; Lawless & Fox, 2010; J. Preece & Stoddard, 2015; J. R. Preece et al., 2016; Pruysers & Blais, 2018, 2019). Existing literature predominantly presents null findings regarding the effectiveness of these initiatives, both among the general population (Pruysers & Blais, 2018) and political elites, such as activists (Preece & Studdord, 2015). So far, scholars have mostly tried to explain the origin of these null results by focusing on the effect of the messenger (i.e., is the recruiter a party leader or a lower-ranked party official? Is the recruiter a man, a woman or neither?) (Gimenez Aldridge et al., 2020; Pruysers & Blais, 2019). However, as I have argued in previous chapters, extensive digital recruitment campaigns targeting the general population are not reliant on interpersonal interactions and must instead rely solely on the campaign content. In these cases, recruitment campaigns can incorporate informational messages designed to diminish negative attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership. By doing so, they aim to put women in a mindset that is receptive to positive responses to recruitment efforts. Consequently, I anticipate that a recruitment email containing informational messages about attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership can have a favorable impact on women's political ambition. Note however, that, in order to avoid intentionally diminishing women's political ambition with information about a stereotypical feminine leadership style, the informational message about this attitude

[3]To define the gender gap in political ambition and evaluate the magnitude of any positive effect on women's political ambition, I also collected data from a smaller –but still representative– sample of the male population in Great Britain.

refrains from engaging in explicit stereotyping. Instead, it emphasizes a different characteristic of feminine leadership compared to the previous chapter, namely, the ability to collaborate. Previous research has demonstrated that dissociating political power from competition significantly enhances women's political ambition. (Schneider et al., 2016). It is therefore hoped that this new framing will be able to achieve the same result.[4] Thus, the first hypothesis proceeds with the following set of hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1a: women's political ambition is positively affected by the recruitment email which includes informational messages about support for women in political leadership roles

Hypothesis 1b: women's political ambition is positively affected by the recruitment email which includes informational messages about support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style

Hypothesis 1c: women's political ambition is positively affected by the recruitment email which includes informational messages about perceived support for women in the political environment

Hypothesis 1d: women's political ambition is positively affected by the recruitment email which includes informational messages about women's qualification for political office

It is plausible that the impact of individual informational messages on women's ambition may vary, aligning with the patterns observed in *Chapter 3* regarding the strength of the connection between attitudes and political ambition. In other words, I hypothesize that the most potent recruitment email will be the one containing an informational message about women's qualifications for political leadership. Following that, the recruitment email including information about support for women in the political environment, stereotypically female leadership styles, and support for women in political leadership roles is expected to have a significant impact.

Moving forward, it is important to note that research has discovered that awareness-raising efforts focused on promoting gender equality do not consistently yield uniformly positive effects (Dhima, 2023; Gatto & Araújo, 2023). In fact, some research has speculated that while some people might answer positively to awareness-raising efforts, others might have the opposite reaction (Dhima, 2023; Gatto & Araújo, 2023; Jung & Tavits, 2023). As mentioned earlier, raising awareness about women's suitability for political office carries the risk of priming women to the obstacles they still encounter when pursuing political candidacy (Foos & Gilardi, 2020; Preece, 2016). I also argue that the positive effects of recruitment campaigns may not be evenly distributed across the population.

[4]Furthermore, to minimise the risk of hurting women's ambition, the writing of this informational message, as much as the other informational messages, was supervised by an organisation that work in the field of non-quota strategies. Nevertheless, further research is necessary to ascertain is discussing women's tendency for collaboration actually prevents negative effects of stereotyping.

I examine the potential risk of backlashes by assessing how the effect of informational messages varies across different pre-existing levels of attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership. The underlying logic is as follows: informational messages that do not create backlashes will consistently result in the treated group reporting higher levels of political ambition compared to the control group. It is important to note that the effectiveness of recruitment emails may still differ, such as by producing a stronger effect on individuals with lower pre-existing levels of a particular attitude, while still adhering to this premise. On the other hand, informational messages that do create backlashes may have one of two outcomes: 1) they significantly decrease the political ambition of the treatment group compared to the control group across all participants (this is the type of backlash observed in the previous chapter), or 2) they may also diminish the political ambition of the treated group specifically among certain subgroups that possess pre-treatment characteristics associated with political ambition, such as certain attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership. The second type of backlash, specifically addresses the risk of backlashes resulting from the content of recruitment campaigns, is the focus of the present chapter. The chapter will delve into this issue by testing the following general hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: recruitment email including informational messages can create backlashes that damage women's political ambition

Literature has suggested that discussions about the progress made in reducing discrimination against women in the political sphere could unintentionally prime women to the biases they may still encounter as aspiring candidates. This might be the case when women who were not conscious about the presence of any barrier to women in the political environment, once receiving such new information became more negative to their opportunity in the political sphere. As shown in the previous chapter, a more positive outlook on the support for women in the political environment tends to be associate with higher levels of political ambition; thus, the effect of information on present environmental barriers might make ambitious women's level of interest in the political career drop, resulting in their ambitions "meeting" the (lower) level of ambitions of those women who were already negative about this attitude.

Building upon the findings from the previous chapter, which demonstrated that the impact of mentoring events on political ambition varied significantly depending on their effect on the perception of support for women in the political environment, I posit that informational messages aimed at influencing the perception of support for women in politics are particularly susceptible to backlashes.[5]

[5]In this case, the effect retrieved in the previous chapter should be read as the difference in the effect between those that react well to the content about this attitude (and thus see an improvement in political ambition), and those who react badly to the content about this attitude (and thus see a deterioration in their political ambition). The alternative scenario is that (for some unexplored reason) the content about the support regarding this attitude only affects some individuals and not other (i.e. their reaction to the content is flat) which would exclude the presence of backlashes.

Considering the impact of political ideology on women's varied perspectives regarding the barriers to gender equality (Sevincer et al., 2023), it is plausible that backlashes may arise when recruitment initiatives address attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership that are politically relevant to women's political ambition. In other words, I anticipate that political ideology serves as a determining factor for the occurrence of backlashes, and I express this expectation as follows:

Hypothesis 3: recruitment emails containing embedded informational messages create backlashes based on attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership that align with women's political ideology

I speculate that left-wing women may experience backlashes as a result of the recruitment email containing informational messages about support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style, perceived support for women in the political environment, or self-perception of qualification. On the other hand, right-wing women are anticipated to only encounter backlashes related to their self-perception of qualification, as it is the sole relevant barrier to their political ambition. Overall, I expect that left-wing women will be the most susceptible to experiencing backlashes.

5.3 Methodology

5.3.1 Experimental Design

In order to test the hypotheses provided above, I have conducted a survey experiment on a representative sample of the British female population (n = 956).[6] To ensure representativeness in the study, census data was utilized to establish quotas that mirror the distribution of the British population across essential demographics such as age, education level, income, partisanship, and geographic location within Great Britain. During the analysis, the observations were weighted based on the demographics of the British population. This weighting process aimed to guarantee that the results accurately represent the broader population. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of six conditions, which included a control group.[7]

The survey began by collecting demographic information from the participants. This was followed by a battery of questions aimed at assessing their attitudes toward women's suitability for political leadership.

[6] In Appendix IV I report the power analysis and sample size estimation for this experiment.

[7] I have also collected data from a representative sample of the British male population (n = 737) to establish the gender gap in political ambition, and men were allocated to the control condition even though they were never included in the analysis here proposed.

Participants assigned to the treatment groups were subsequently presented with a simulated recruitment email, which commenced with the following text: *"In recent years, a few organisations have been reaching out by email to women who have been identified by members of their community, asking them to consider running for political office. Imagine you have just received the following email. Read the text and answer the following questions"*. The mock email utilized in this study, tailored for a British context, is a conservative adaptation of the email employed in the Canadian Liberal Party's Invite Her to Run campaign. Figure 5.1 illustrates the baseline email treatment, with the general formatting (font, color, and overall design) resembling that of the original campaign. However, certain modifications were made to the content to ensure its appropriateness for the British context. Given the close resemblance between the mock email and its real-world counterpart, the findings of this study can be assumed to possess strong ecological validity.

Figure 5.1: Mock Recruitment Email - Baseline with No Informational Message



Email treatment formatted as the recruitment email used in the Invite Her to Run Campaign and altered to fit the British political context. Treatment one of six, with no informational message about attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership.

The mock email was presented in five different variations, corresponding to the different treatment conditions. Four of these variations included an informational message specifically designed to enhance attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership, with each message focusing on a different aspect. The messages represented true information that was defined in partnership with non-governmental organisations that are invested in the topic of gender diversity in political representation. To develop informational messages, I consulted with members of Women For Election, an organisation aiming to

facilitate bespoke training programs, events and mentoring support to help women get elected to local and national government. Women For Election also leads advocacy programs to increase diversity in access to politics.[8] Overall, the selection of informational messages was guided by two principles: 1) their connection to attitudes regarding women's suitability for political leadership, and 2) their representation of recurring themes addressed by organizations and political parties advocating for increased female representation in politics.[9]

The informational message associated with the support for women in political leadership roles was as follows: *"Did you know that today, women that run for office are as likely to be elected as their male counterparts?" (see Figure 5.2).* The inclusion of evidence demonstrating women's electoral success aims to challenge the prevailing expectations that consider women less suited for political leadership positions compared to men (see Lawless & Fox, 2010). To affect support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style, I selected the following informational message: *"Did you know that today, female politicians are striving to make the political environment more collaborative?"* (see Figure 5.3). To mitigate the potential negative effects associated with this attitude, as observed in the previous chapter's experiment, the chosen approach for this informational message was to frame it in terms of the trait of collaboration. Collaboration emerged as a widely supported characteristic emblematic of the communal leadership style (see also Hargrave & Blumenau, 2022; Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993a). This information suggests that the stereotypical female trait of collaboration is now promoted and supported in politics. Moreover, the message used in this context explicitly avoided language that could be seen by participants as an act of stereotyping.

To affect the perception of support for women in the political environment, I selected the following informational message: *"Did you know that today, the barriers that women face in pursuing politics are publicly denounced?"* (see Figure 5.4). This information suggests that barriers to women's success in politics are recognised in the public consciousness. Furthermore, it imples that the political environment is sensitive to the obstacles that women face in their pursuit of a political career. In order to affect the attitude associated with women's self-perception of qualification, I selected the following informational message: *"Did you know that today, women who are more than adequately prepared for a political career tend to underestimate their qualifications?"* (see Figure 5.5). The intention of this information is to challenge women's tendency to underestimate their suitability for political office in terms of experience and qualification (see Lawless & Fox, 2010).

[8]Note that the email appeared on the survey screen - I did not use real emails. It was not possible for participants to open link in the email body and leave the survey page.

[9]Treatments were subject to the scrutiny of the research ethics committees of my University and the email treatments were approved for the experiment for not including any deception.

Figure 5.2: Email Treatment - Support for Women in Political Leadership



XXX-XXXX
Someone's inviting you to get involved
To: You
Reply-To: XXX-XXXX

Inbox abcd@cdef

Hello [Your First Name Your Last Name],

The UK needs many more talented and experienced women, from all backgrounds, making decisions in our politics. We're writing to you today because [the name of someone close to you] thinks you have what it takes to be one of those women!

Did you know that today, women that run for office are as likely to be elected as their male counterparts?

[Your First Name Your Last Name], despite the fact that women make up over 50% of the UK population, only 221 of the 649 seats in the House of Commons are held by women -- that's only 34%. We want to change that, and we're encouraging women to get involved in all levels! Whether it's running for office, volunteering, getting involved with your local riding or playing a key role on campaign teams, it's important for more women to feel empowered to get involved.

Please, follow the links below to learn more about:

Women's representation in the HoC ⇨

getting Involved locally ⇨

[Our Organisation] ⇨

[This Initiative] ⇨

If you have any questions, or need more information, please don't hesitate to email abcd@cdef.xx.

Thanks for being a leader,

Treatment two of six. Informational message associated with support for women in political leadership roles.

Figure 5.3: Email Treatment - Support for Feminine Leadership Style



XXX-XXXX
Someone's inviting you to get involved
To: You
Reply-To: XXX-XXXX

Inbox abcd@cdef

Hello [Your First Name Your Last Name],

The UK needs many more talented and experienced women, from all backgrounds, making decisions in our politics. We're writing to you today because [the name of someone close to you] thinks you have what it takes to be one of those women!

Did you know that today, female politicians are striving to make the political environment more collaborative?

[Your First Name Your Last Name], despite the fact that women make up over 50% of the UK population, only 221 of the 649 seats in the House of Commons are held by women -- that's only 34%. We want to change that, and we're encouraging women to get involved in all levels! Whether it's running for office, volunteering, getting involved with your local riding or playing a key role on campaign teams, it's important for more women to feel empowered to get involved.

Please, follow the links below to learn more about:

Women's representation in the HoC ⇨

getting Involved locally ⇨

[Our Organisation] ⇨

[This Initiative] ⇨

If you have any questions, or need more information, please don't hesitate to email abcd@cdef.xx.

Thanks for being a leader,

Treatment Three of six. Informational message associated with support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style.

Figure 5.4: Email Treatment - Support for Women in the Political Environment



XXX-XXXX
Someone's inviting you to get involved
To: You
Reply-To: XXX-XXXX

Inbox abcd@cdef

Hello [Your First Name Your Last Name],

The UK needs many more talented and experienced women, from all backgrounds, making decisions in our politics. We're writing to you today because [the name of someone close to you] thinks you have what it takes to be one of those women!

Did you know that today, the barriers that women face in pursuing politics are publicly denounced?

[Your First Name Your Last Name], despite the fact that women make up over 50% of the UK population, only 221 of the 649 seats in the House of Commons are held by women -- that's only 34%. We want to change that, and we're encouraging women to get involved in all levels! Whether it's running for office, volunteering, getting involved with your local riding or playing a key role on campaign teams, it's important for more women to feel empowered to get involved.

Please, follow the links below to learn more about:

Women's representation in the HoC ⇨

getting Involved locally ⇨

[Our Organisation] ⇨

[This Initiative] ⇨

If you have any questions, or need more information, please don't hesitate to email abcd@cdef.xx.

Thanks for being a leader,

Treatment four of six. Informational message associated with perceived support for women in the political environment.

Figure 5.5: Email Treatment - Women's Political Qualifications



XXX-XXXX
Someone's inviting you to get involved
To: You
Reply-To: XXX-XXXX

Inbox abcd@cdef

Hello [Your First Name Your Last Name],

The UK needs many more talented and experienced women, from all backgrounds, making decisions in our politics. We're writing to you today because [the name of someone close to you] thinks you have what it takes to be one of those women!

Did you know that today, women who are more than adequately prepared for a political career

tend to underestimate their qualifications?

[Your First Name Your Last Name], despite the fact that women make up over 50% of the UK population, only 221 of the 649 seats in the House of Commons are held by women -- that's only 34%. We want to change that, and we're encouraging women to get involved in all levels! Whether it's running for office, volunteering, getting involved with your local riding or playing a key role on campaign teams, it's important for more women to feel empowered to get involved.

Please, follow the links below to learn more about:

Women's representation in the HoC ⇨

getting Involved locally ⇨

[Our Organisation] ⇨

[This Initiative] ⇨

If you have any questions, or need more information, please don't hesitate to email abcd@cdef.xx.

Thanks for being a leader,

Treatment five of six. Informational message associated with self-perception of qualification

The control group was presented with an email that shared the same formatting in terms of length, appearance, and tone as the treatment email. However, the content of the control email focused on an unrelated topic (the benefits of sleep) to ensure consistency in the experience of reading an email across all experimental groups. Figure 5.6 represents the control email.

Figure 5.6: Control Email


XXX-XXXX
Someone's inviting you to get involved
To: You
Reply-To: XXX-XXXX

Inbox abcd@cdef

In the UK, many people associate sleeping with a loss of time. We're writing to you today because research found that sleeping at least eight hours per night can make you more efficient!

[Your First Name Your Last Name], even though sleeping has positive effects on happiness, health and ones' overall quality of life, many people in the UK report sleeping six hours a night – if not less. We want to change that, and we hope that by spreading the voice about the benefits of sleep, people in the UK will rethink their sleep routine! Whether it's anticipating your bedtime, putting aside possible disturbances or fighting back anxieties that keep you awake, you must claim time for yourself and get proper rest.

Please, follow the links below to learn more about:

The Benefits of Sleep ⇨

Put Aside what Disturbs Your Sleep ⇨

[Our Organisation] ⇨

[This Initiative] ⇨

If you have any questions, or need more information, please don't hesitate to email abcd@cdef.xx.

Thanks for taking care of your sleep,

Treatment six of six: control condition. Email discussing the benefits of sleep

Following the treatment, participants were asked a series of questions to assess their level of attention. Subsequently, their political ambition was measured. The experiment concluded and participants were thanked for taking part in the study.[10] Based on power analysis, it was determined that having approximately 200 participants in each condition would yield a desired experimental power of 0.8. The reference effect size chosen for this study is approximately d = 0.4, which aligns with the effect size observed in the 2016 study conducted by Schneider et al. This prior research utilized informational treatments to modify women's political ambition.[11] The experiment was pre-registered on the Evidence in Governance and Politics (EGAP) repository after I received approval from the ethics committee at my affiliated institution during the time of the experiment.

[10] In Appendix V, I report a detailed description of the experimental procedure.
[11] See Appendix V for sample size calculation.

5.3.2 Analytical Strategy

To test Hypotheses 1a to 1d, I conducted an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model analysis using equation (1) with three distinct specifications: bivariate, multivariate with normal standard errors, and multivariate with robust standard errors:

$$(1) Ambition_{\mathrm{i}} = a + b1 * Treatment_{\mathrm{i}} + [controls]_{\mathrm{i}} + e.$$

The outcome variable, *Ambition*, was measured on a scale from zero to ten. A score of zero indicated a very low likelihood of having political ambition, while a score of ten indicated a very high likelihood of having political ambition. To ensure construct validity, I operationalized political ambition using the following question: "How likely is it, if at all, that you will run for political office at some point in your life?". This question has been used before by other scholars in the field (Schneider et al., 2016; Holman & Schneider, 2014, 2018). To enhance comparability of results across different chapters, the results sections present findings based on a standardized measure of Ambition. The primary independent variable is represented by the *Treatment* dummy variable, which indicates the assignment to either the control group (0), comprising women exposed to the email about the benefits of sleep, or any of the treatment groups that received informational messages. The baseline email without informational messages is here excluded from the analysis. (1).[12]

Therefore, a significant coefficient of interest indicates a higher level of political ambition among participants in the treatment groups compared to participants in the control group. To improve the precision of the estimated treatment effect, I controlled for individual socio-demographic characteristics that have been previously associated with variations in political ambition (i.e., age, income, education level, ethnicity, Left_Party vote, and dwelling) (see Allen & Cutts, 2018).[13]

To assess the effect of each recruitment email with informational messages, I re-ran the same model as represented in equation (1) in all three of its specifications. I used a categorical version of the treatment variable as the main explanatory variable. The categories represent the different treatment assignments compared to the control group.

As a robustness check, I replicated the analysis by treating political ambition as a dummy variable. It was coded as one for individuals reporting the lowest level of political ambition and zero for all other cases. As I previously stated, political ambition is hard to find; across the three data collections of this

[12]Note that differently from the Full Treatment in the previous experiment, I was able to collapse all variations of the Treatment into a dummy because they only differ in the informational messages they contain and not in other characteristics that could correlate with the effect, such as the length of the audio treatment.

[13]Section 1 in Appendix V reports a full description of the controls.

monograph, 75% of respondents reported the lowest level of political ambition.[14] I also replicated this analysis using an Ordered Logit estimator instead of the OLS estimator. As an additional check, I will conduct these analyses using the categorical form of the treatment variable. In this case, I will set the email without informational messages as the baseline condition, rather than the control email discussing the benefits of sleep. The dependent variable will remain political ambition. This step will offer further clarity on the nature of any significant effect of the treatment on political ambition. It will help determine whether the effect is solely driven by the informational message itself or by the combined effect of the email and the informational message.

To test Hypothesis 2, I conducted an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model analysis using equation (2) with three different specifications: bivariate, multivariate with normal standard errors, and multivariate with robust standard errors:

$$(2) Ambition_{\mathrm{i}} = a + b1 * Treatment_{\mathrm{i}} + b2 * [Attitude]_{\mathrm{i}} + \\ + \mathrm{b3{*}Treatment_i} * [Attitude]_{\mathrm{i}} + [controls]_{\mathrm{i}} + e.$$

Ambition is operationalised as described in regards to equations (1). Regarding the main independent variable, I conducted the analysis using the treatment variable in both its dummy and categorical form, as described in the operationalization for equation (1). In equation (2), *Attitude* is a placeholder for each of the four attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership. These attitudes were examined individually and interacted with the email containing the corresponding informational message.

The attitude of *support for women in political leadership roles* (short label: Roles) was operationalized by measuring the level of agreement with the statement "Men make better political leaders than women." Participants were asked to respond on a 1 to 5 Likert scale, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The attitude of *support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style* (short label: Styles) was measured using the question, "Which of the following, if any, do you think are the most important characteristics that a political leader should have? Please choose 3 from the list below." Participants were provided with the following options: 1. Empathy, 2. Ability to cooperate, 3. Communicational skills, 4. Fairness, 5. Authority, 6. Ability to assign tasks, 7. Be goal-oriented, and 8. Competitiveness. Additionally, respondents had the options of selecting "None of these" or indicating "Don't know." Any responses falling into these categories were recorded as NA. For each participant, items representing a communal leadership style (items 1 to 4) were assigned a value of one, while items representing an agentic leadership style (items 5 to 8) were assigned a value of zero. This variable thus ranged from 1 to 4, where

[14] see Appendix V for further details on these alternative operationalisations.

a value of 1 indicated that individuals only selected items associated with an agentic leadership style, and a value of 4 indicated that individuals only selected items associated with a communal leadership style.

The attitude of *perceived support for women in the political environment* (short label: Environment) was assessed through an item presented within the context of a scenario. Participants were asked to imagine a situation where they were considering running for political office. They were then asked to rate the extent to which they agreed whether "some sort of bias in the political environment, or the idea that someone of my gender would not be welcomed in the political environment" represented a significant obstacle to their election. Responses were recorded on a Likert scale ranging from zero to ten. A score of zero indicated that it was not perceived as a significant obstacle, while a score of ten indicated that it was perceived as a very significant obstacle. The direction of the scale was inverted to indicate an outlook on Environment that went from negative to positive.

Finally, the attitude of *self-perception of qualification for politics* (short label: Qualification) was measured using an item that was introduced in the same manner as the perceived support for women in the political environment (as described above). Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they agreed with the statement that "[their] lack of qualification and experience" was a significant obstacle to their participation in politics. Responses were recorded on a Likert scale ranging from zero to ten. A score of zero indicated that it was not perceived as a significant obstacle, while a score of ten indicated that it was perceived as a very significant obstacle. Similar to the previous attitude measure, the scale was inverted to represent the outlook on self-perception of qualification, with higher scores indicating a more positive perception.

The coefficient of interest refers to the coefficient associated with the interaction term between the treatment variable and the corresponding pre-existing attitude. If this coefficient is statistically significant, it indicates that the effect of the treatment varies significantly among individuals based on their pre-existing levels of the specific attitude. Depending on the direction of the coefficient sign we can then identify potential backlashes. Furthermore, findings significantly less positive effects on individuals with lower (more negative) attitudes, can be considered evidence that individuals with negative predisposition towards women's suitability for political leadership "resist" to awareness-raising efforts. To facilitate direct comparisons of coefficients not only within the empirical chapter but also across the entire monograph, the variables representing the four attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership were standardized. This standardization process involved transforming the variables to a suitable range based on their sample mean and standard deviation, thereby enabling the direct comparison of coefficients. It is important to note that due to ethical considerations and the internal policy of the data collection provider, participants were provided with the option to select "I don't know," "none of these,"

or equivalent responses for certain questions. As a result, there may be a relatively high number of NAs in the data. However, this approach strengthens the construct validity of the study, as it is more likely that participants who provided a positive answer to a specific question did so sincerely. Models included the same controls listed for the test of Hypothesis 1a to 1d. As a robustness check, I replicated this analysis by operationalising attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership on a three-point scale. Specifically, this variable assumes a value of 0 around the median level of the attitude, -1 below its median level, and 1 above its median level. I also replicated this analysis by operationalising political ambition as a dummy (operationalised with the same logic described above for the test of Hypothesis 1a to 1d) and using an Ordered Logit estimator.[15]

To test Hypothesis 3, the analysis reported for Hypothesis 2 was replicated specifically on a subsample of women, based on their political ideology. The criterion for dividing the sample into subgroups was the value of the "*Left_party*" variable. This variable is a dummy variable that indicates whether a participant voted for a left-wing or a right-wing party during the 2019 general elections. Participants who reported voting for other parties or indicated that they didn't know were omitted from this particular part of the study. The coefficient of interest pertains to the interaction term between a treatment and the corresponding pre-existing attitude within different subgroups. If this coefficient is significant, it indicates that the effect of the treatment varies significantly based on the pre-existing levels of the specific attitude within the given subgroup.

The data collection for this study was conducted through a YouGov Omnibus survey that was fielded in July 2021. After conducting a thorough examination of participants' demographic characteristics across different conditions, including age, education level, income, ethnicity, political ideology, and geographic location, I have determined that the randomization checks have been successful. The treatment and control groups exhibit statistical similarity in terms of these demographic variables.[16] On a final Note, due to limit in data collection, it was not possible to measure post-treatment levels in participants' attitudes. Hence, this study complements the study proposed in the previous chapter but does not attempt to reproduce them.

[15] see Appendix V for further details on these alternative operationalisations.
[16] see Appendix V for the table where I report the result of randomisation checks.

5.4 Results

5.4.1 Main Effects

Overall, the recruitment initiative has a generally positive effect on women's political ambition. However, when taken individually, only the recruitment email containing an informational message specifically about women's qualification for political office demonstrates a significant increase in women's political ambition, approaching traditional levels of significance. Therefore, only Hypothesis 1d is somewhat supported.

The results are consistent across all three different specifications of the model associated with equation (1).[17] In Figure 5.7 the first coefficient of each group refers to the model specification, not accounting for the variation due to participants' demographics; the second coefficient refers to the model controlling for participant's demographics and using normal standard errors; the third coefficient refers to the model controlling for participant's demographics and using robust standard errors.[18] Robustness checks show that results improve when using the Ordered Logit extimator. In this case, the effect of both the overall recruitment campaign and the recruitment email including informational messages about women's qualification for political office reach full significance. Upon further exploration, I have also noticed that this significant effect is due to the significant increases on the few individuals with relatively high levels of ambition.[19] Other than this mismatch, the remaining robustness checks confirm the resulting pattern of the OLS model that are reported here.[20]

The email including informational messages about women's political qualification closes the gender gap in political ambition. The fact that this email has a much stronger effect than that of the other emails confirms findings in the literature which point to women's self-perception of qualification as being a major factor for political ambition. When women perceive their qualification to be less of an obstacle for their political success, they report greater political ambition (e.g. Lawless and Fox, 2010).[21] Upon further analysis, I find that there is no significant difference in the effect of the recruitment email without informational messages and the recruitment email including information about women's *Qualification*.[22] Therefore, the informational message about Qualification increases the overall effectiveness of this recruitment strategy (by approximately one-eighth of its overall effectiveness). However, this message does not define the effectiveness entirely, as there is no significant difference in the effect on political ambition

[17] See Table 2 in Section 3 - Extended version of the tables in the main body of Appendix V for the coefficients of each control.

[18] Note that results do not change if I run separate models where I compare each recruitment email to the control group.

[19] See Appendix V.

[20] Using causal trees I find that income and age are both significant factors in the heterogeneity of the email about Qualification. Specifically, individuals with a personal income above the seventh category are the ones to benefit the most from this content. Individuals with a personal income below the seventh category and younger than 66 years of age are the least benefited from this email. See Appendix V.

[21] See Appendix V for the coefficients of each control.

[22] See Appendix V.

between the email with informational messages about qualification and the email without such messages.Note that it is the inclusion of this informational message that allows this version of the recruitment email to reach overall significance and close the gender gap in political ambition.

Figure 5.7: Effect of Recruitment Campaigns on Ambition



Average effect of the recruitment campaign (with 95% confidence intervals). The first group of coefficients compare the effect of receiving any of the recruitment emails or receiving the control email. The remaining coefficient compares the average level of political ambition in the control group with the level of political ambition after receiving one of the recruitment emails containing informational messages individually. Significant coefficients are those with confidence intervals that do not cross the zero line (alpha < 0.5); if they barely pass it (with alpha <0.1), then they are said to approach statistical significance. The coefficients regarding *TreatmentQualification* and *Treatment_D* (i.e., the coefficient for the overall recruitment campaign) approach significance.

It is worth noting that, compared to the previous experiment, the framing used for the informational message related to the barrier of feminine leadership style no longer has a significant negative effect (backlash) on political ambition.[23] It is important to acknowledge that in cases where statistical significance is not achieved, it does not necessarily indicate the absence of a relationship between the input and output variables. Instead, it may be attributed to the limited power of this experiment, which may not be sufficient to detect small-sized effects. It is worth noting that the sample size calculation was conducted based on the expectation of a medium-sized effect. Given the small effect size observed, a larger sample size would be required to assess the significance of a treatment with a reasonable level of certainty, such as 80% power. To achieve this level of power, an approximate sample size of 2,500 participants would be necessary, with 500 participants in each condition.[24] To reduce the occurrence of Type II errors in future

[23]Using causal trees I find that there's a significant difference in the effect of the email with informational messages about Styles. Specifically, individuals with educational attainment above or equal to the 15th category in the Environment variable are significantly more benefitted by this email. See Appendix V.

[24]See Appendix V for the estimation of *Cohen's D* of the various tests performed in this chapter and related ad-hoc power analysis.

analyses, it is advisable to assume that non-significance should be attributed to a lack of statistical power rather than absolute ineffectiveness of the strategies, unless explicitly stated otherwise.[25] [26]

5.4.2 Do Awareness-raising Strategies Create Backlashes?

Recruitment emails that include informational messages aimed at reducing negative attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership may lead to backlashes specifically in the case of informational messages about the support for women in the political environment. The observed effect is primarily driven by the negative repercussions experienced by left-wing women. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 are somewhat supported.[27]

Figure 5.8, specifically *subfigure c*, illustrates that the impact of the recruitment email containing informational messages regarding the support for women in the political environment (short label: Environment) exhibits significant variation across different levels of the related attitude (Environment (A)).[28] At high levels of the pre-existing attitude, which reflect an optimistic outlook on the support for women in the political environment, individuals who were exposed to the recruitment email discussing this attitude exhibit significantly lower levels of political ambition compared to the control group. Consequently, we observe a backlash effect of this recruitment email, dissuading individuals who would otherwise be inclined to seek political office. No other evidence of backlashes is observed, as the treated units consistently reported higher levels of political ambition than the untreated units, although these higher levels are not statistically significant. Additionally, it is noteworthy that the effect of the treatment is stronger among individuals with lower levels of pre-existing attitudes, where there is "greater space for improvements", and so, w find no significant sign of resistence to awareness raising efforts. This suggests that awareness-raising strategies, as they are, can somewhat be beneficial but only on specific subset of politicians. An exception is the recruitment email addressing women's qualification for political office which shows consistent effectiveness across all levels of pre-existing attitudes. These patterns are further supported by robustness checks.[29]

[25] Using causal trees I find that significant factors in the heterogeneity of the Roles email are dwelling and Income. Specifically, individuals living in rural areas with an income below the ninth category are the least benefitted from this recruitment initiative. See Appendix V.

[26] - Environment Treatment: Using causal trees I find that there's a significant difference in the effect of the email with informational messages about Environment. Specifically, left-wing individuals with educational attainment above the 11th category are the most benefitted from this email. Right-wing individuals with above 11 education attainment and younger than 43 years of age are the ones to benefit the least from this email (even less than individuals with an educational level above the 11th category). See Appendix V.

[27] Note that controlling for pre-existing levels of attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership, I find that only the recruitment email including informational messages about women's political qualification still preserves a significant result. This result aligns to the finding that this that is the strongest treatment.

[28] See Appendix V for the coefficients of each control.

[29] See Appendix V.

Figure 5.8: Moderation by Pre-Existing Attitudes



Effect of each recruitment email based on pre-treatment levels of the related attitude. The x-axes shows the pre-treatment level of each attitude. The y-axis reports post-treatment levels in political ambition. There is a significant backlash in relation to the recruitment email containing informational messages about the support for women in the political environment.

Figure 5.9 (c) shows that the backlash observed regarding this recruitment email is significantly driven by the negative effects it has on left-wing voters.[30] Once more, right-wing voters are not affected by this attitude. Other than this, even accounting for women's ideological differences, I found no other sign of backlash. I also found no other significant difference in the effect of the campaign based on ideology more in general. The experiment would have been fully powered to capture a difference if there were such an effect.[31] The patterns observed in the results remain robust when employing different operationalizations for the Ambition variable, utilizing alternative variables to represent attitudes, and employing an Ordered Logit estimator.[32]

[30]See Table 7 and Table 8 in Appendix IV.

[31]I tried to understand if there is a significant lower level in perception of support for women in the attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership in young left-wing women who voted for the first time in 2019 after Jo Cox murder, and I found no cohort effect.

[32]see Appendix V.

Figure 5.9: Heterogeneous Moderation by Political Ideology



Effect of each recruitment email based on pre-treatment levels of the related attitude. Results are defined by partisanship: on the Left, subfigures a, c, e, g are based on the subset of left-wing women; on the right, subfigures b, d, f, h are based on the subset of right-wing women. The x-axes depicts the pre-treatment level of each attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership. The y-axis reports post-treatment levels in political ambition. For left-wing women, there is a significant backlash in relation to the recruitment email containing informational messages about the support for women in the political environment.

5.5 Discussion

The objective of this chapter was to contribute additional evidence regarding the mechanism by which awareness-raising strategies may influence women's political ambition, specifically by examining the presence of backlashes resulting from informational messages about women's attitudes towards their suitability for political leadership. To achieve this goal, a survey experiment was designed and conducted on a representative sample of the female population in Great Britain.

As part of the experiment, I assessed the effect on political ambition of four variations of a recruitment email which included informational messages about attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership. The findings indicate that the informational messages intended to prime women to the challenges they may face in the political environment resulted in a backlash effect on women's political ambition. The analysis reveals that the recruitment email has a diminishing effect on political ambition among individuals who already hold a positive outlook on the support for women in the political environment. These individuals, who would typically be more inclined to report political ambition, thereby experienced a decrease in their ambition levels. It can be concluded that one of the reasons why awareness-raising strategies may fail to achieve their intended effects is that they inadvertently serve as a reminder to women that their gender continues to be a source of biases within the political environment. This type of backlash is particularly detrimental to left-wing women, as they have a stronger association with this particular attitude. There is a silver lining here. The email specifically addressing women's qualification for political office has a significant positive impact on women's political ambition, thereby effectively narrowing the gender gap in political ambition. Furthermore, the recruitment initiative demonstrates greater effectiveness among individuals with lower levels of attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership. Thus, we find no significant resistance to the efforts of awareness raising strategies. This finding supports the notion that, in their current form, awareness-raising strategies can play a role in initiating cultural change.

Overall, the experiment yielded effects that were smaller than anticipated, indicating that in many cases, it lacked sufficient statistical power. Consequently, future studies should aim to replicate the analysis of specific aspects of this experiment using adequately powered samples to avoid Type II errors. In the next chapter, I will further elaborate of the connection between the findings of this chapter and those of previous chapters.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

- TRIGGER WARNING -

"An MP has died after she was shot and stabbed in a "horrific" assault in her constituency, police have said. Jo Cox, Labour MP for Batley and Spen, was left bleeding on the ground after the attack in Birstall, West Yorkshire. A man was arrested nearby."

BBC News, on the day of the attack
– 16 June 2016

"The murder of British MP Jo Cox - shot and stabbed yesterday on the streets of her constituency - has made front page news in papers all over the world. The 'assassination' of the Labour MP was on the front page of newspapers in France, Belgium, Germany, Australia, New Zealand and Japan and also featured heavily on online news websites."

The Mail Online, on the day after the attack
– 17 June 2016

6.1 Summary

Awareness-raising strategies are popular initiatives to counter the problem of women's political underrepresentation. Their popularity is due to their potential to directly affect the causes of women's political underrepresentation in the western world (Krook & Norris, 2014; Ruf, 2021).[1] In the British context, they are widely used by both partisan (e.g. Women 2 Win) and non-partisan organisations (e.g. Parliament 50:50, The Fawcett Society, the 300 Group). Nevertheless, empirical research finds that these strategies do not always increase women's political ambition (Foos & Gilardi, 2020; Pruysers & Blais, 2018; 2016). At the same time, little is known about the *mechanism* through which they should produce such an effect (Foos & Gilardi, 2020). This monograph represents the first scholarly attempt to propose and test a mechanism through which awareness-raising strategies influence women's political ambitions

[1] Due to the large variety of non-quota strategies in use today, this monograph only investigates those non-quota strategies that aim to turn eligible female candidates into aspirant female candidates (Krook & Norris, 2014).

and, consequently, contributes to the understanding of current research's predominantly null findings.

In *Chapter 2 - Literature and Theory*, I started by arguing that the effect of awareness-raising strategies which aim to boost women's political aspirations rely on the erosion of negative attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership. Here, attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership are identified as barriers that women develop during their political socialization, which represent an obstacle to women's self-perception of suitability for political leadership (see Lawless & Fox, 2010). Consequently, the effect of awareness-raising strategies aiming to "undo" the negative effects of a gendered political socialization is linked to attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership. By stating that attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership are linked to the effect of awareness-raising strategies, I am suggesting that (1) awareness-raising strategies should induce a change in the levels of these attitudes while attempting to impact women's political ambition. Moreover, (2) to understand why awareness-raising strategies fail to produce their intended effect, it is also crucial to acknowledge that when targeting the general population, these strategies meet individuals who might be negatively predisposed to changing their opinion on women's suitability for political leadership (Eagly & Chaiken, 1995; Dhima, 2023; Gatto & Araújo, 2023; Jung & Tavits, 2023). Therefore, one way to observe such resistance is to measure the impact of awareness-raising strategies as influenced by pre-existing levels of attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership.

Following up on this argument, I have identified in the literature four attitudes that could be linked to the effect of awareness-raising strategies. These four attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership are: (1) support for women in political leadership roles, (2) support for a (stereotypically) feminine leadership style, (3) perceived support for women in the political environment, and (4) self-perception of qualification. I then argued that political ideology can be a good proxy to sort which attitude should be the focus of awareness-raising content. Being that the theme of equality is politically connoted, women's views about gender equality are sorted through their political ideology apparatus (Sevincer et al., 2023). I therefore argue that political ideology creates heterogeneous links between awareness-raising strategies and attitudes towards women's political leadership. Consequently, I argue that one of the reasons why awareness-raising strategies fail to produce their results might be that they attempt to affect an attitude that is not central to the political ambition of a given ideological group.

In *Chapter 3 - Mapping Attitudes Towards Women's Suitability for Political Leadership*, I showed that three out of the four attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership are significantly correlated with women's political ambition. I also found that attitudes towards women's suitability for

political leadership that are linked to political ambition significantly vary depending on women's political ideology. The perception of support for women in the political environment is significantly linked to left-wing women's political ambition, who report a lower baseline level in the attitude compared to right-wing women. I speculated that the difference between left-wing and right-wing women could be linked to the interaction of two contextual factors: (1) the emergence of more salient female political leaders from the Conservative Party, which increases the perception among right-wing voters that the political environment *is not* hostile, and (2) recent instances of violence against left-wing female politicians (e.g., the murder of MP Jo Cox), which heighten the perception among left-wing voters that the political environment *is* hostile. Improving this attitude significantly narrows the gender gap in political ambition among left-wing women. However, an increase of one unit in this attitude does not fully close this gap. It should be noted that men, whether on the Left or the Right of the political spectrum, feel significantly less gender-based discrimination compared to women. This difference makes this variable another notable indicator of gendered political socialization.

Despite the widespread preference for a more feminine leadership style in the general population (finding that aligns with previous literature coming from the USA context; Anzia & Bernhard, 2022; Bernhard, 2022), a relative support for a stereotypically masculine leadership style is key to the emergence of political ambition among left-wing women. Specifically, by asking women to select from a list of attributes that an ideal political leader should possess—some stereotypically associated with female leadership and others with male leadership—I found that, on average, many traits associated with female stereotypes are deemed important for a political leader. However, individuals who select fewer traits associated with female stereotypes report higher levels of political ambition. Regardless of their level of political ambition, right-wing voters have a stronger preference for a stereotypically masculine leadership style. For them, this attitude is irrelevant to political ambitions. Note that there is no significant difference between men and women in their preference for a stereotypically feminine leadership style, making this the only attitude that does not differ between the genders.

British women's self-perception of qualification is significantly associated with the development of political ambition in women across the political spectrum, both left-wing and right-wing. Specifically, when women are asked whether they feel their qualifications could be a barrier to success in seeking political office, I found that a more positive response to this question correlates with an increased level of political ambition. This is not only the sole attitude to be connected to women's political ambition irrespective of their political ideology, but self-perception of qualification is also the only attitude significantly associated with the political ambition of right-wing women. It is not a coincidence that, according to Sevinser et al. (2023), this attitude aligns with right-wing women's emphasis on the importance of greater opportunities

for personal advancement of political skills. I also found that men report significantly higher levels of self-perception of qualification compared to women which I consider a symptom of a gendered political socialisation (Lawless & Fox, 2010). This is finding in line with the present literature. An increase of one level in self-perception of qualification is sufficient to close the gender gap in political ambition. This makes it the most powerful attitude related to women's suitability for political leadership in terms of bridging the gender gap in political ambition.

Finally, greater support for women in political leadership roles is not linked to a variation in political ambition. I have found that there is little variation in this attitude across the political spectrum, both on the Left and on the Right, which supports the notion that this attitude may be more reflective of macro-level mechanisms of gender equality (cross-country variation) rather than micro-level (individual-level) mechanisms (see Inglehart & Norris, 2003). Nevertheless, female respondents still report significantly more progressive views on gender roles compared to men, and left-wing voters hold a significantly stronger support for women in political leadership roles compared to right-wing voters.

Altogether, *Chapter 3* showed that women's attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership are correlated to political ambition in heterogeneous ways. From this point, I argued that the first reason why awareness-raising strategies fail to produce the desired effects on women's political ambition is that by not taking into account heterogeneous effects, they might result in "diluted" effects. However, the study in this chapter was not designed to provide evidence regarding the direction of the link between attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership and political ambition, nor to make any claims about causality in the relationship between attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership and women's political ambition. Therefore, I proceeded to address these limitations in the subsequent chapters.

In *Chapter 4 - Content Effect in Role Model-based Events*, I tested the effect of the content of awareness-raising strategies in the context of role model-based events. To enhance the ecological validity of the study, I conducted an interview with a real-world politician, discussing her authentic experiences in British politics. Information was selectively included to ensure her experiences were representative of those encountered by many other female politicians in British politics, while also preserving the anonymity of the politician to prevent any potential "pollution" of the role model effect (further details are provided in the relevant chapter). In an online survey experiment, I identified four reasons why events based on role models fail to increase women's political aspirations. Firstly, their content, even when well-intentioned, can inadvertently create backlashes against women's political ambition. Specifically, content that primes women with a stereotypical image of female political leadership significantly reduces the political ambition

of women in my experiment. This depressant effect of such content is found to be significantly stronger among left-wing women.

A second reason is that role model-based events mostly affected attitudes that are unrelated to political ambition. Specifically, their effect is particularly strong on the reported level of support for women in political leadership roles. Nevertheless, as I reported in the previous empirical chapter, this attitude is not a pathway to increasing political ambition. Therefore, maybe counter-intuitively, role model-based events might be better suited to bringing overall cultural changes regarding western connotations of political leadership roles, instead of inspiring women to seek political office.

Thirdly, the content of role model-based events do not have an evenly distributed effect. I found that there is a significant difference in the effectiveness of role model-based events on political ambition depending on whether or not these strategies succeed in improving women's perception of support for women in the political environment. In those cases in which role model-based events succeed in improving this attitude. This finding lays the groundwork for exploring the heterogeneous effects of awareness-raising strategies arising from different levels of attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership (e.g. do we find variations in the effect of content about women in the political environment because the effect of this content is affected by women's pre-existing positions towards this attitudes?). This exploration is the focus of the final empirical chapter of this monograph. Notably, in alignment with the findings of the previous chapter, any effect on this attitude is specific to left-wing women, for whom perceptions of support for women in the political environment are connected to the effectiveness of awareness-raising strategies.

Finally, a fourth reason is that the overall effect of role model-based events is much weaker than anticipated. This implies that these strategies need to maximize their reach to produce the desired outcomes, a conclusion that holds true across the awareness-raising strategies evaluated in this monograph. *Chapter 4* also revealed that the impact of role model-based events stems not only from their content but also from the role model effect itself. When the role model effect is factored in, and content is delivered by a male role model, there is a significant decline in the levels of three core attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership: the perception of support for women in the political environment and women's self-perception of qualification, while preference for a feminine leadership style actually increases.

In *Chapter 5 - Backlashes in Recruitment Initiatives*, I provided further insights into the problem of backlashes to awareness-raising strategies. Recruitment initiatives are the context of the present study, and this includes informational messages about women's attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership. Here, I began by testing the effect of four variations of a recruitment email, which included

informational messages designed to erode negative attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership. The email was crafted based on a template from an actual recruitment email (i.e. the recruitment email used by the Canadian Liberal Party), and any changes to this email were cross-checked with political organizations that use these tools in the real world to maximize the ecological validity of the treatment.

I discovered that the recruitment email aimed at boosting women's perception of support within the political environment may also prime women to the hostility they might still encounter if they choose to run for political office. The informational message contained in this recruitment email was formulated as follows: "Did you know that today, the barriers that women face in politics are publicly denounced?" As illustrated, despite the intention to convey a positive message, this informational message was honest and unadulterated. A complex picture emerges: women with a positive outlook on the support for women in the political environment were primed to the difficulties faced by women in political office, and their political ambition was consequently damaged. Women who held a negative view of the support for women in the political environment were reassured by messages highlighting the efforts to combat current discrimination, which in turn positively influenced their political ambition. However, it is important to note, in light of the findings from *Chapter 3*, that women with a positive perception of the support for women in the political environment are significantly more likely to consider running for political office. Therefore, for a non-quota strategy focused on increasing women's political participation, failing to convert these "predisposed" women into aspirant political candidates could represent a missed opportunity.

Reflecting on the findings of the previous chapter—where the content of role model-based events was shown to increase women's political ambition only when there was an improvement in women's attitudes—it is reasonable to hypothesize that in the context of role model-based events, the significant boost in ambition might particularly affect those women with low initial levels of supportive attitudes. Note that, in the experiment involving role model-based events, there was no measure for pre-existing levels of attitude barriers, which limits the ability to draw definitive conclusions. Further research should investigate the extent to which positive outlooks on the support for women in the political environment are a matter of rational optimism or disinformation. The aim would be to determine whether the content of recruitment initiatives simply brings forward the type of backlash that women might eventually face when seeking political office. Needless to say, the backlash caused by this treatment email was specifically felt by left-wing women and not by right-wing women, which adds more evidence to the thesis that ideology has a sorting effect. All in all, these types of backlash can be considered a fifth and final reason for the failure of awareness-raising strategies as recorded by empirical research.

A silver lining is that the recruitment email containing informational message about women's political

qualifications seems to have a significant effect on women's political aspirations. Furthermore, it was able to close the gender gap in political ambition for both left-wing and right-wing women. Note that in this experiment, to avoid deliberately causing negative effects on the political ambition of my participants, I choose to frame the informational message about the feminine leadership style, making a more subtitle reference to gender stereotypes. The message was built around the trait of *collaboration*, which is a largely appreciated trait for political leaders and thought to be less likely to prime negative stereotypes.

Taking together, the findings of these chapters contribute to the understanding of awareness-raising strategies and their lack of effectiveness. Awareness-raising strategies are more likely to succeed when they target women's self-perceptions of qualification. And there is no difference in the effect of this contents between left-wing and right-wing women. Indeed, the existing literature, including this monograph, has yet to clarify what the "right" content is to effectively address this particular dimension of women's attitudes toward their suitability for political leadership. Previous research indicates that strategies aimed at increasing women's perception of their own qualifications by emphasizing their psychological traits (for example, by persuading them that they possess inherent traits conducive to success in political office) have less impact on their self-perception of qualification compared to strategies that focus on their political knowledge and expertise. Here, I find that telling women their experience in everyday activities, such as participating in decision-making at their children's schools, transfers to the political context does not significantly impact their political ambition, although it still positively influences their attitude. Conversely, informing women that they tend to underestimate their qualifications compared to men yields somewhat significant effects on their ambition.

Awareness-raising strategies that focus on dimensions other than women's qualifications for political office may incur a higher risk of backlashes. On the one hand, a preference for a stereotypically masculine leadership style seems to boost women's political ambition. On the other hand, suggesting that women's empathetic abilities are beneficial in political leadership roles significantly diminishes women's political ambition. This effect is particularly noticeable in left-wing women, whose ambition is found to be significantly related to this attitude. The good news is that informing women about the active engagement of female political leaders to increase collaboration—a trait associated with the feminine leadership style—does not trigger a significant backlash on women's political ambition. However, this content still fails to produce significant positive effects on women's political ambitions.

Similarly, awareness-raising strategies that focus on the support for women in the political environment run a high risk of backlash among women who already have a positive outlook on this issue. As previously discussed, further research should explore what contributes to a positive outlook on support for women in

the political environment. Potential factors include, but are not limited to, optimism related to actions aimed at reducing discrimination against women in politics or misinformation about the challenges female politicians face while in office.

All this considered, awareness-raising strategies still seem to positively affect the "culture" surrounding women's political representation. They appear to improve attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership, particularly among individuals with strongly negative views on this matter. Exposure to successful female political leaders during role model-based events significantly boosts support for women in political leadership roles. However, while these improvements in attitudes towards women's political leadership offer "cultural" benefits, they do not necessarily translate into an increase in women's participation in political leadership. Surprisingly, role model-based events may be more effective in changing attitudinal aspects of women's political underrepresentation rather than directly influencing women's political ambitions.

6.2 Limitations

This monograph has several limitations, five of which I consider particularly relevant. First, the experimental studies in this monograph were, in most cases, underpowered, capable only of detecting the larger effects in the mechanisms being tested. The absence of significant effects in this study does not imply that the relationships identified could never be significant; rather, it suggests that the effect size may be too small to be captured with the sample employed.

Secondly, in the study of role model-based events (*Chapter 4 - Content Effect in Role Model-based Events*), participants were exposed to a real-world politician discussing her actual experiences in British politics. The information provided by the politician was not only a truthful account of her political journey but was also carefully selected to be representative of many female politicians' experiences in British politics. The interview's format was also indicative of real-world role model-based events, except that this interview was much shorter. Therefore, while this treatment was designed to embody role model-based events, enhancing the ecological validity of the experimental findings, it requires a leap of faith to assume that the results will generalize to other role model-based events where different political leaders discuss their experiences and the conversations are typically longer, sometimes exceeding an hour. Further replications of this study, with different political actors discussing their personal political experiences, would be beneficial in order to shed light on the robustness of the results yielded here. Similarly, it would also be beneficial to replicate this study through (field) experiments that expose women to events longer than the four-minute long conversation tested here.

Figure 6.1: Female Head of Government by State



Figures are through March 1, 2023. Data is limited to heads of government for the 193 United Nations member states. *Source*: Pew Research Center analysis of data from the Council on Foreign Relations and independent sources.

Thirdly, survey experiments like those proposed in this monograph carry a relatively high risk of experimental demand effects. This is because there is a low cost associated with providing "dishonest" responses to attitudinal questions in order to please the researcher or to report what might be perceived as "appropriate" answers (Zizzo, 2010). Nevertheless, when conducting these experiments, all efforts were made to obscure the experiment's objective. For instance, the role model-based event experiment was presented as a study on intention formation, and the terms "gender" and "politics" were never linked to the treatment content. Additionally, participants never met with me, the researcher, which I believe further reduces the risk of experimental demand effects. Moreover, most of the quantities of interest in these experiments are estimated by comparing treatment effects with each other, which limits concerns about the bias that experimental demand effects might introduce. The understanding is that if demand effect is present it would equally affect the estimated effect for each treatment group so that only the comparison between treated with the untreated unites would be unreliable, while comparison between treated unites would still show unbiased difference.

The fourth limitation relates to the theme of replications. The measure of support for women in the political environment represents a relatively novel operationalization of this concept. Results regarding attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership have been consistent across the three data

collections in this monograph, indicating a uniform understanding of the concept among the samples. Nevertheless, the construct validity of this measure could be enhanced by further research, for example, by comparing the operationalization used here with alternative operationalizations of the same concept.

Finally, this monograph selected Great Brtain as a context because it is a typical case of women's political underrepresentation among OECD countries. However, Great Britain also possesses contextual idiosyncrasies that require a second leap of faith regarding the generalizability of the monograph's findings. Most notably, Great Britain has had three female political leaders, which exceeds the number found in many other countries it is meant to represent (see Figure 6.1). On the one hand, this unique aspect of the British context has been shown to influence pre-existing support for female leadership among right-wing voters compared to countries like the United States (Saha & Catalano-Weeks, 2020). On the other hand, with all female Heads of Government in Great Britain being leaders of the Conservative Party—while the Labour Party has never produced a female leader—it is possible that partisanship-based heterogeneity in the perception of support for women in the political environment was accentuated. It is therefore conceivable that in countries with a more pronounced absence of female leadership at the Head of Government level, partisanship-based heterogeneity regarding the perception of support for women in the political environment would be less marked. In summary, this final limitation suggests the need for a comparative study across countries with varying degrees of female leadership presence at the Head of Government level.

6.3 Future Directions

Building over this monograph findings and limitations, I foresee four other possible avenues for future research. First, the findings of this monograph indeed suggest a need for additional research into the types of content that most effectively represent and influence the four attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership that have been addressed. On the flip side, further research is also necessary to ascertain what created the different effects of the manipulations of support for a stereotypical leadership style in *Chapter 4* and *Chapter 5*. Such research would benefit greatly from the expertise of scholars in political communication.

Second, and similarly, future research might want to replicate the studies that are proposed here by changing the format of the awareness-raising strategies that are investigated (e.g., from digital to in-person). Further replications of these studies in this way would be beneficial to shed light on the robustness of the results yielded here. One area of particular interest is the examination of how different modes of delivery may be affected by inter-generational digital divides, which could influence the effectiveness of

awareness-raising strategies.[2] For instance, digital role model-based events may be less daunting for non-digital natives than email recruitment campaigns because the presence of real people in the strategy is more apparent. Moreover, understanding the ideal target audience for various awareness-raising strategies is crucial—beyond simply comparing the mode of delivery, such as digital versus in-person. For example, I previously suggested that role model-based events are apt for altering the perception that political leadership aligns with women's gender roles. It is highly likely that the influence of the role model contributes to this effect. Future research could directly compare post-treatment support for women in political leadership roles between role model-based events and other non-quota strategies to examine this hypothesis. Additionally, further research could explore how the persuasive power of recruitment emails with informational messages varies among recipients with different levels of education.

Third, current research indicates that women are more likely to run for political office in environments they perceive as supportive of female leaders (Castle et al., 2020; Lawless & Fox, 2010; Dittmar, 2020; Wylie, 2018). However, evidence also shows that when the costs of not running surpass the costs of running, this tendency no longer applies (Dittmar, 2020; Wylie, 2018). Often, this principle breaks whether the problem of women's political under-representation is framed as an urgent matter. As I previously mentioned, future research might want to investigate how to use pieces of information about support for women in the political arena to encourage them to pursue political office, especially under conditions of urgency, to preempt potential backlashes related to this attitude.

Fourth, further studies with repeated measure of both the outcomes of political ambition and attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership are necessary to evaluate how long lasting the effect of an awareness-raising strategies are.

[2] In this case, this study will probably benefit from being run in other formats then that of a survey experiment to avoid underestimating digital divide problems.

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Appendix A

Appendix Chapter II

A.1 Further Onto Socio-psychological Explanation

A.1.1 Theory of Planned Behaviour and Attitudes Selection

In this section, I delve into how the Theory of Planned Behavior, the most popular theory of intention and behavior formation, can serve as a guiding framework to identify the four key attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership that can be targeted by awareness-raising strategies.

Ajzen's Theory of Planned Behavior is a widely utilized psychological model that aims to explain intentions and subsequent behaviors through the lens of attitudes, beliefs, and other background factors. According to this theory, an individual's intentions are influenced by a series of predispositions, which set off a chain reaction of effects.[1] These predispositions lead to the development of certain beliefs;[2] [3] beliefs subsequently form attitudes; attitudes then form intentions. While intentions can serve as an inspiration for behavior, they are not the ultimate outcome of the theory. However, in the context of this monograph, intentions will be the final focus. The present study aims to examine women's emerging political ambition, specifically targeting the non-quota strategies assessed in this monograph, and assesses how these strategies contribute to the formulation of intentions regarding political engagement.[4] [5]

Note that the theoretical model of the Theory of Planned Behaviour does not account for affective cognition (i.e. evaluations based on emotions). Thus, although it is reasonable to think that emotions could play a part in the explanation of variation in women's political ambition (Ajzen, 1985), I have elected not to address emotions—a decision that is reflected in my choice of model. Similarly, I choose to disregard personality-based explanations for the emergence of political ambition (Holman & Schneider, 2018; Preece & Studdard, 2015a; Schnider et al., 2016). Furthermore, as previously mentioned, Ajzen recognizes that the relevance of attitudinal predictors is not constant for all people (Ajzen 1985). One of the purposes of this monograph is to compare the relevance of different attitudes in predicting political ambition. However, the relationship between attitudes and political ambition is influenced by various factors that contribute to heterogeneity, such as political ideology.

The Theory of Planned Behavior identifies three types of attitudes that predict intentions. These include attitudes towards norms, which involve evaluating abstract normative statements (e.g., assessing agreement with the statement "men are better political leaders than women"). Attitudes towards behavior

[1] These predispositions are here labelled as background factors, which can be of a personal nature –one's personality–, a demographic nature –gender, race, age, education or income– or an informational nature –one's exposure to and knowledge of a certain topic and the schemas most easily recalled to elaborate information, including political ideology and political stance (Ajzen, 1985).

[2] In social psychology, beliefs are defined as a conviction that things or ideas held in the mind are true (Dovidio et al., 2010).

[3] These beliefs can be normative beliefs –e.g. politics is a man's job–, behavioural beliefs –e.g. good political leaders are assertive, tough and able to subordinate tasks–, and control beliefs –e.g. a career in politics is risky and dominated by uncertainty (Ajzen, 1985).

[4] This choice is motivated by the fact that behavioural control interposes intentions and behaviour; behaviour is shaped by material considerations, which are not of concern in this dissertation.

[5] Actual behavioural control can be thought of as the level of gender bias in the recruitment process summed up as the inherent uncertainty in the result (Ajzen, 1985).

involve evaluating prescriptive statements about how individuals should act in specific contexts (e.g., assessing agreement with the statement "assertiveness is more suitable for politics than collaboration"). Lastly, self-perception of behavioral control relates to an individual's assessment of their ability to control and carry out certain behaviors (e.g., assessing agreement with the statement "if I decide to run, I won't be taken seriously because I am a woman").

Based on the three central attitudes of the Theory of Planned Behaviour, and with the aid of the principles of Role Congruity Theory, I now proceed to define the relevant attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership for predicting the emergence of political ambition.

The first attitude towards women's suitability for political leadership, derived from Ajzen's attitudes towards norms, is rooted in the concept of norms as socially enforced rules or expectations. It reflects the notion that, as a group, women are considered less suited for political leadership compared to men. This attitude highlights the disconnect between traditional gender roles assigned to women and their perceived fit within leadership positions in politics. This attitude towards women's suitability for political leadership is measured by the extent of agreement with statements such as "men make better political leaders than women." The relationship between egalitarian values, attitudes towards women's suitability for political leadership, and women's political representation has been extensively investigated in the literature. Studies consistently demonstrate that as societal perspectives on gender roles shift and traditional views erode, there is a significant rise in the level of disagreement with statements that define such attitudes (e.g. Streb et al., 2008).

Figure A.1: Theory of Planned Behaviour



Theoretical model of the Theory of Planned Behaviour on the basis of Ajzen (1985).

The second attitude stems from the Theory of Planned Behavior's attitudes towards behavior. Attitudes towards behavior can be seen as a practical extension of attitudes towards norms, representing the connection between expected behaviors of a political leader and gender stereotypes. Role Congruity Theory is particularly relevant in defining this attitude. Specifically, Role Congruity Theory outlines two stereotypical leadership styles associated with femininity and masculinity (Eagly & Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001). The leadership style stereotypically attributed to men is referred to as agentic. It is characterized as aggressive, ambitious, dominant, forceful, independent, daring, self-confident, competitive, assertive in tone, influential, task-oriented, and focused on problem-solving (Eagly & Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001). On the other hand, the leadership style stereotypically ascribed to women is labeled communal. It is described as affectionate, helpful, kind, sympathetic, interpersonally sensitive, nurturing, gentle, receptive to others' suggestions, supportive, and focused on resolving relational or interpersonal issues (Eagly & Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001).

Traditionally, research on leadership style has indicated a preference for the agentic leadership style among political leaders, as perceived by both the general population and political actors. This preference persists despite women generally expressing an appreciation for the communal leadership style (Eagly & Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001). As a result, women in political positions face a dilemma. They can either conform to the agentic leadership style, which historically they have been encouraged to adopt despite facing social consequences for deviating from gender expectations (Okimoto & Brescoll, 2010) Alternatively, they can embrace the communal leadership style, but this choice may potentially lead to their competence being questioned by the political audience. However, recent research reveals a more nuanced picture. On one hand, the communal leadership style has gained increasing appreciation among the general public, particularly among left-wing women (Gillard & Okonjo-Iweala, 2021; see Bernhard, 2021 for left-wing women). On the other hand, female political leaders have increasingly adopted an agentic leadership style over time. Notably, in the United Kingdom, a growing number of women Members of Parliament (MPs) have successfully employed an agentic leadership style (Hargrave & Blumenau, 2022). In this context, although women appear to have gained greater freedom to employ a leadership style that counters traditional stereotypes, it is important to recognize that political leadership remains associated with the agentic style. Recent research has also highlighted a disconnect between women's perception of the ideal traits for political leadership and the traits that are actually necessary for success in political campaigns (Bernhard et al., 2020). In fact, it is suspected that while there may be a broader appreciation for the communal leadership style today, politically ambitious women may not necessarily strongly support it (this hypothesis will be further explored as an expected finding in empirical research).

Attitudes towards behavioural control is the third attitude set in the Theory of Planned Behaviour. An attitude towards behavioural control is defined as an individual's perception of their ability to achieve a goal if they engage in the certain, well-defined behaviours. Political science literature refers to this same concept by the term 'self-efficacy' (e.g. Caprara et al., 2009). Political self-efficacy is defined as the feeling that one's political actions are meaningful. Indeed, political self-efficacy plays a crucial role in differentiating between individuals who actively engage in the political process and those who do not (Campbell et al, 1954). The literature on self-efficacy distinguishes two dimensions of the concept—namely, internal self-efficacy and external self-efficacy (Bandura et al., 1999). Both are employed here.

Internal self-efficacy is defined as an individual's perception of their competence to interact with the political process insofar as taking the steps necessary to obtain office. Within the gender and politics literature, the concept of political self-efficacy aligns with Lawless and Fox's notion of "self-perception of qualification" for holding political office (2010; 2013). Therefore, from this point forward, I will refer to the internal aspect of perceived behavioral control, or internal self-efficacy, as "Qualification" for the sake of simplicity. Lawless and Fox's research demonstrates a significant association between Qualification and political ambition. They also find that gender plays a predictive role in this context, with men generally reporting higher levels of self-perception of qualification compared to women (Lawless & Fox, 2010).

External self-efficacy can be understood as an individual's perception of the political environment's openness towards their actions. Regarding women's political ambition, an aspect of self-perception of external efficacy can be understood through the perception of gender-based barriers that hinder the election of women to political office. This perception encompasses the recognition of gender bias in the recruitment and election processes, such as biases in candidate selection or voter preferences. [6] Even though overt sexism is now declining in the political recruitment process of Western countries, female politicians still experience instances of gender bias, discrimination and violence (Krook, 2020); moreover, women have historically denounced the "male culture" of Western politics and the prejudice against women found in Western political culture (for Ireland and Australia, see Fitzgerald, 2018 and Gillard & Okonjo-Iweala, 2021, respectively). The media is also responsible for spreading misogyny against women in politics (Krook, 2020; Pruysers et al., 2020), while party gatekeepers revert to sexist gender stereotypes when identifying eligible candidates (Niven, 1998).

In summary, the Theory of Planned Behavior, along with other complementary theoretical approaches, can serve as a valuable resource for designing an effective mechanism to enhance the impact of awareness-raising strategies.

[6]Note, that while I here focus on women's perception of gender based barriers, future research might want to explore how other factors than sexism affect women's perception of environment support (i.e. family support, institutional support, presence of financial means).

Appendix B

Appendix Chapter III

B.1 Data

B.1.1 Variable Description

Here, I describe the operationalisation of the adjustments that I will include in my multivariate models and the reason for choosing different adjustments' specifications. The age variable is operationalised as a continuous variable.[1]

Ethnicity is a categorical variable and its breakdown follows the standard categories of the British census. From this variable, I have then created a dummy variable, ethnic minority, to make the juxtaposition of the results regarding ethnic minorities versus white British respondents easier. In the main analysis, I used the ethnic minority dummy instead of the ethnicity variable.

Respondents' level of education is a categorical variable. The breakdown in different educational levels follows the standard breakdown used in British census data. For the main analysis I have then aggregated the levels of this variable into a more "compact" categorical variable with four levels (i.e., no qualification, GCSE or equivalent, A-Level or equivalent, university degree or higher) and I labelled this variable Education.

The partisanship variable derives from a question asking respondents about the party they voted for in the 2019 General Election. Even if this construct does not perfectly overlap with partisanship, it is a good approximation of it. Partisanship includes the following answer options: Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrat, Scottish National Party (SNP), Plaid Cymru, Brexit Party, Green, Other and I Don't know. In the main analysis, I use the vote for the Tories as the baseline, as both left-wing parties and fringe party supporters are supposedly more politically ambitious than supporters of the Tories (Allen & Cutts, 2018).

The rural variable is represented through the following categories: Urban, Town and Fringe, and Rural. Income is a categorical variable using breaking points that are common to surveys on the British population. Social grade is a categorical variable that follows the standard breakdown used in surveys specific to the British population.

Finally, political attention is a self-report measure of respondents' level of political attention on a 0 to 10 Likert scale. Zero meant "I pay no attention to politics" and Ten meant "I pay a great deal of attention to politics". Note that it is up for debate whether political attention should be considered an outcome or an explanatory variable and if its inclusion in models of political ambition generates post-treatment bias. On the one hand, political attention can be seen as an outcome variable if we consider that it is likely predicted to a similar extent by the same socio-demographic factors that also predict political ambition. On the other hand, following Ajzen's (1985) political attention can be thought of as a background factor that predisposes individuals to develop certain attitudes about political gender equality and thus it would affect political ambition. Because of this ambivalence, I will run my analysis with alternative models in which political attention is either included as an exogenous control or excluded. In the main analysis,

[1] In my data, I have coded "don't know" as NAs in every case bar partisanship, as in this case, it is plausible that there's a meaningful difference between respondents that avoid answering that question and all the others.

political attention is excluded from the list of adjustments, while in Table 18 (Appendix) I report the results of my models as robust to its inclusion. Table 29 below reports the exact categories for each variable.

B.1.2 Sample Statistics

Table B.1: Sample Chapter III Statistics

Variable	Value
Gender (%)	43.5% (M) / 56.5% (F)
Mean Age	51
Median Education	Secondary
Median Income	£45,000 to £49,999 per year
Ethnicity (White %)	92%
Rural/Suburban/Urban (%)	Urban: 76%, Suburban: 12%, Rural: 12%
Party (%)	Conservative 43% Labour 31% Other Parties 26%
Left Party (%)	Left: 59%, Right: 37%

B.1.3 Meaningfulness of Retrieved Effects

Full sample: given that the gender gap in political ambition is approximately 0.2: (1) when women's self-perception of qualification increases by 1, the gender gap in political ambition shrinks to approximately 0.03; (2) when women's perceived support for women in the political environment increases by 1, the gender gap in political ambition shrinks to approximately 0.13. If perceived support for women in the political environment was to increase by two with the same angular coefficient then the gender gap in political ambition shrinks to approximately 0.03; (3) when women's support for a stereotypically feminine leadership style increases of 1, the gender gap in political ambition increases to approximately 0.26; (4) when women's support for women in political leadership increases of 1 we would observe no visible improvement in Ambition.

Left-wing voters: given that the gender gap in political ambition is approximately 0.2: (1) when left-wing women's self-perception f qualification increases by 1, the gender gap in political ambition shrinks to approximately 0.03; (2) when left-wing women's perceived support for women in the political environment increases by 1, the gender gap in political ambition shrinks to approximately 0.07. If perceived support for women in the political environment was to increase by two with the same angular coefficient then we would observe a gender gap in favour of women of approximately 0.06; (3) when left-wing women's support for a stereotypically feminine leadership style increases of 1, the gender gap in political ambition increases to approximately 0.3; (4) when left-wing women's support for women in political leadership increases of 1, the gender gap in political ambition shrinks approximately 0.19 and thus support for women in political leadership should increase approximately twenty times to close the gender gap in ambition, which is not possible based on the current operationalisation of support for women in political leadership.

Right-wing voters: given that the gender gap in political ambition is approximately 0.2: (1) when right-wing women's self-perception of qualification increases by 1, women's political ambition becomes equal to men's and the gender gap in political ambition completely disappears; (2) when right-wing women's perceived support for women in the political environment increases of 1, the gender gap in political ambition increases to approximately 0.22; (3) when right-wing women's support for a stereotypically feminine leadership style increases of 1, the gender gap in political ambition increases to approximately 0.23; (4) when right-wing women's support for women in political leadership increases of 1, the gender gap in political ambition increases to approximately 0.4 which is approximately twice its original size.

B.2 Preliminary Analysis

B.2.1 IQR for Ambition

The average level of political ambition across the sample is below 0.4, on a scale going from 0 to 5, which confirms the expectation of a relatively low political ambition in the British Population (Allen & Cutts, 2018). The interquartile range for this variable shows that more than 75% of responses report the lowest level of ambition.

Observing the gender gap in political ambition, the mean political ambition is approximately 0.4 for men and 0.3 for women. This difference is significant for the T-test with a p-value lower than 0.01. Performing an interquartile range analysis on the men and women subsample separately, we can observe that responses are differently distributed based on the participant's gender. For men, 50% of responses report a political ambition equal to zero, the following 25% of respondents report a political ambition between 0 and 1, and the last 25% of responses report a political ambition between 1 and 5. For women, the reported level of political ambition is more skewed and all the variation is concentrated within the last quartile which goes from 0 to 5.

Looking at the highest levels of ambition, less than 2% of men and more than 1% of women have high aspirations for political office in the future (1.6% and 1.2% precisely, thus a gender gap of 0.4%). Note that, splitting by partisanship, only 5% of women reporting above median political ambition support right-wing parties (i.e., the Conservative party and the Brexit party), compared to politically ambitious women of left-wing parties which are about 12% of the sample and thus determining a 7% ideology-based gap (for men, these figures are 15% and 10% with a 5% ideology-based gap).

B.2.2 IQR for Attitudes

In this data collection, all attitudes are measured on the same scale varying between 1 and 5. For women, the mean support for women in political leadership is approximately 3.2 and 3 for men, with a gender-based difference that is significant for the T-test with a p-value lower than 0.01. The mean support for a stereotypically feminine leadership style is 2.8 in the case of the female sample –2.7 for the male one; this difference is not significant. The mean self-perception of qualification is 2.1 for women and 2.6 for men. This difference is significant when performing a T-test with a p-value lower than 0.01. Finally, the mean perceived support for women in the political environment is 2.5 for women and 3.4 for men. Also, in this case, the difference is significant when performing a T-test with a p-value lower than 0.01

Looking further at the distribution of the data for support for women in political leadership in the sample of both men and women, one can see that most of the observations are around 3 (which is also the median). Only the bottom 25% of data varies between 1 and 3, and the top 25% varies between 3 and 5. This is the same distribution that we also have for both the male and the female samples. To simplify, one could say that most of the people in the sample believed that men and women have equal suitability for political leadership (3rd position) while only a small part thought that either men or women are more suited than their counterparts –this is true regardless of respondents' gender. The data distribution for support for a stereotypically feminine leadership style is also the same between men and women, and therefore also in the general sample. The bottom 25% see a discrete variation between 1 and 3. The following 25% of data varies between 3 and 4. Most of the data points will be around four while only 25% of data will range between 4 and 5. Compared to support for women in political leadership, the values representing support for the communal leadership style vary more across the distribution with a slightly higher portion of respondents reporting low support. In other words, compared to respondents' support for women in political leadership respondent's support for the communal leadership style vary more across the distribution with a slightly higher portion of respondents reporting low support.

Regarding self-perception of qualification, the data distribution looks slightly different. In the general sample, the first 50% of data varies between 1 and 2. Most of the variation happens in the second 50% of data, and specifically, the first 25% of data on the upper half ranges between 2 and 3 and the top 25% of data includes all data points between 3 and 5. This distribution is driven by the female sample for which the observations are distributed in the same way as the general sample. Regarding the male sample instead, the lower 50% of data ranges between 1 and 3, suggesting in general higher values than for the female sample. The following 25% of data ranges between 3 and 4, and the final

25% of data ranges between 4 and 5. In general, one could comment that self-perception of qualification varies in distribution depending on respondents' gender. Even though most people don't report a high self-perception of qualification, more men report a higher self-perception of qualification than women.
Finally, the data distribution for perceived support for women in the political environment is similar to the distribution of data for self-perception of qualification as the sample including both men and women reports the same distribution of the female subsample, while the distribution for the male subsample differs. Specifically for women (and in the general sample), the first 25% of data ranges between 1 and 2, the top 25% of data ranges between 3 and 5, while the rest of the sample reports a perception of support for the political environment of 3. Men report a much higher perception of support for the political environment. With the lower 25% of data ranging between 1 and 3 –most of the data report levels of support that are equal to or above the median. In the top half of data, the first 25% of observations range between 3 and 4, while the top 25% of data ranges between 4 and 5.
All in all, men report a much higher perception of support for the political environment than women that in above 75% of the data represent a somewhat positive perception of support for their gender in behalf of the political environment. For women, however, more than 25% of women report a somewhat negative perception of support for their gender in the political environment and less than 25% of women report the highest perception of support available.

B.2.3 Correlation Matrix

Figure B.1: Correlation Between Attitudes (Chapter 3)



Figure B.2: Correlation Between Attitudes (Chapter 4)



Figure B.3: Correlation Between Attitudes (Chapter 5)



B.3 Main Analysis

B.3.1 Main Effect

Table B.2: Main Effect

	Dependent variable:				
	Ambition (OLS)		*coefficient test*	Ambition (OL)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Roles	−0.005	−0.002	−0.002	0.055	0.065
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.088)	(0.105)
Styles	−0.143***	−0.073**	−0.073	−0.367***	−0.204*
	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.050)	(0.083)	(0.113)
Environment	0.024	0.096**	0.096*	0.013	0.227*
	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.111)	(0.136)
Qualification	0.271***	0.191***	0.191***	0.779***	0.737***
	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.047)	(0.094)	(0.121)
Age		−0.013***	−0.013***		−0.050***
		(0.002)	(0.003)		(0.008)
Education_l		−0.018	−0.018		−0.024
		(0.038)	(0.045)		(0.141)
Income		−0.001	−0.001		−0.009
		(0.006)	(0.007)		(0.024)
Minority		0.363***	0.363*		0.672*
		(0.129)	(0.192)		(0.357)
Left Party		0.087	0.087		0.220
		(0.063)	(0.089)		(0.216)
Urban		−0.030	−0.030		−0.159
		(0.040)	(0.034)		(0.162)
Constant	1.026***	1.657***	1.657***		
	(0.034)	(0.179)	(0.262)		
Observations	965	691		862	630
R^2	0.086	0.128			
Adjusted R^2	0.082	0.116			
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.3.2 Heterogeneous Effects by Ideology

Table B.3: Interactions by Ideology

	Dependent variable:				
	Ambition (OLS)		*coefficient test*	Ambition (OL)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Left Party	0.271***	0.092	0.092	0.702***	0.352
	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.094)	(0.206)	(0.227)
Roles	−0.014	−0.012	−0.012	−0.056	−0.016
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.165)	(0.177)
Styles	−0.076	−0.075	−0.075	−0.304*	−0.281
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.089)	(0.181)	(0.194)
Environment	−0.046	−0.012	−0.012	−0.255	−0.057
	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.208)	(0.229)
Qualification	0.226***	0.222***	0.222***	0.982***	1.004***
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.062)	(0.179)	(0.198)
Age		−0.013***	−0.013***		−0.049***
		(0.002)	(0.003)		(0.008)
Education_l		−0.023	−0.023		−0.042
		(0.037)	(0.045)		(0.143)
Income		−0.005	−0.005		−0.004
		(0.006)	(0.007)		(0.024)
Minority		0.447***	0.447*		0.678*
		(0.128)	(0.197)		(0.361)
Urban		−0.006	−0.006		−0.145
		(0.045)	(0.043)		(0.162)
Left Party:Roles	0.028	0.017	0.017	0.241	0.121
	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.183)	(0.207)
Left Party:Styles	−0.051	−0.017	−0.017	0.017	0.091
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.107)	(0.183)	(0.210)
Left Party:Environment	0.141*	0.162**	0.162*	0.451*	0.361
	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.095)	(0.239)	(0.261)
Left Party:Qualification	0.008	−0.016	−0.016	−0.366*	−0.348
	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.082)	(0.192)	(0.213)
Constant	0.849***	1.677***	1.677***		
	(0.049)	(0.175)	(0.264)		
Observations	698	664		667	630
R^2	0.087	0.153			
Adjusted R^2	0.075	0.135			
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.4: Subgroup Analysis

	Dependent variable:			
	Ambition		Ambition	
	(OLS)	*coefficient test*	(OLS)	*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Roles	0.006	0.006	−0.005	−0.005
	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Styles	−0.092*	−0.092*	−0.075	−0.075
	(0.049)	(0.055)	(0.047)	(0.089)
Environment	0.148***	0.148*	−0.011	−0.011
	(0.056)	(0.080)	(0.055)	(0.050)
Qualification	0.205***	0.205***	0.223***	0.223***
	(0.049)	(0.062)	(0.050)	(0.068)
Age	−0.013***	−0.013***	−0.013***	−0.013**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Education_l	−0.020	−0.020	−0.023	−0.023
	(0.057)	(0.054)	(0.047)	(0.069)
Income	−0.011	−0.011	0.001	0.001
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Minority	0.501***	0.501**	0.160	0.160
	(0.152)	(0.229)	(0.280)	(0.309)
Urban	−0.008	−0.008	−0.005	−0.005
	(0.069)	(0.072)	(0.058)	(0.049)
Constant	1.827***	1.827***	1.612***	1.612***
	(0.240)	(0.338)	(0.242)	(0.389)
Observations	355		309	
R^2	0.164		0.126	
Adjusted R^2	0.142		0.100	
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.3.3 Predictors of Attitudes

Table B.5: Adding Gender in the Exploratory Analysis of Attitudinal Predictors

	Dependent variable:							
	Roles	Styles	Environment	Qualification				
					coefficient test			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Gender	0.223^{***}	0.026	-0.858^{***}	-0.405^{***}	0.223^{***}	0.026	-0.858^{***}	-0.405^{***}
	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.059)
Age	0.001	0.002	0.005^{**}	0.004^{**}	0.001	0.002	0.005^{**}	0.004^{*}
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Education_l	0.052^{*}	0.091^{***}	0.046	0.308^{***}	0.052	0.091^{**}	0.046	0.308^{***}
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.032)
Income	0.011^{*}	0.0005	−0.001	−0.0004	0.011^{*}	0.0005	−0.001	−0.0004
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Minority	−0.074	-0.277^{**}	−0.095	-0.248^{**}	−0.074	-0.277^{*}	−0.095	-0.248^{*}
	(0.115)	(0.109)	(0.113)	(0.112)	(0.129)	(0.150)	(0.137)	(0.131)
Urban	−0.064	0.017	−0.021	0.049	-0.064^{*}	0.017	−0.021	0.049
	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.046)	(0.045)
Left Party	0.325^{***}	0.346^{***}	0.151^{**}	0.092	0.325^{***}	0.346^{***}	0.151^{**}	0.092
	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.062)
Constant	-0.627^{***}	-0.510^{***}	0.996^{***}	-0.279^{*}	-0.627^{***}	-0.510^{**}	0.996^{***}	−0.279
	(0.171)	(0.164)	(0.168)	(0.168)	(0.189)	(0.213)	(0.218)	(0.189)
Observations	1,182	1,182	1,182	1,182				
R^2	0.052	0.050	0.182	0.135				
Adjusted R^2	0.046	0.044	0.177	0.130				
Note:								*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.4 Robustness Checks

B.4.1 Ambition 1 to 6

Table B.6: Ambition from 1 to 6

	Dependent variable:					
	Ambition			Ambition		
	(OLS)		*coefficient test*	(OLS)		*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Roles	−0.003	−0.001	−0.001	−0.014	−0.012	−0.012
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.041)
Styles	−0.143***	−0.071**	−0.071	−0.074	−0.073	−0.073
	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.087)
Environment	0.022	0.094**	0.094*	−0.045	−0.012	−0.012
	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.049)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.047)
Qualification	0.264***	0.186***	0.186***	0.220***	0.217***	0.217***
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.061)
Age		−0.013***	−0.013***		−0.013***	−0.013***
		(0.002)	(0.003)		(0.002)	(0.003)
Education_l		−0.017	−0.017		−0.023	−0.023
		(0.037)	(0.044)		(0.036)	(0.044)
Income		−0.001	−0.001		−0.005	−0.005
		(0.006)	(0.007)		(0.006)	(0.007)
Minority		0.354***	0.354*		0.436***	0.436**
		(0.126)	(0.187)		(0.125)	(0.192)
Left Party		0.085	0.085	0.212***	0.089	0.089
		(0.061)	(0.087)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.092)
Urban		−0.029	−0.029		−0.006	−0.006
		(0.039)	(0.033)		(0.044)	(0.042)
Roles:Left Party				0.027	0.016	0.016
				(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.064)
Left Party:Styles				−0.049	−0.017	−0.017
				(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.105)
Left Party:Environment				0.138*	0.158**	0.158*
				(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.093)
Left Party:Qualification				0.008	−0.016	−0.016
				(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.080)
Constant	0.021	0.636***	0.636**	−0.152***	0.655***	0.655**
	(0.033)	(0.175)	(0.256)	(0.048)	(0.171)	(0.257)
Observations	965	691		698	664	
R^2	0.086	0.128		0.087	0.153	
Adjusted R^2	0.082	0.116		0.075	0.135	
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.4.2 Ambition - Not Standardised

Table B.7: Ambition (Non-Standardised)

	Dependent variable:					
	Ambition			Ambition		
	(OLS)		*coefficient test*	(OLS)		*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Roles	−0.004	−0.001	−0.001	−0.012	−0.010	−0.010
	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.035)
Styles	−0.118***	−0.060**	−0.060	−0.063	−0.061	−0.061
	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.073)
Environment	0.020	0.079**	0.079*	−0.038	−0.010	−0.010
	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.041)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.040)
Qualification	0.222***	0.157***	0.157***	0.186***	0.183***	0.183***
	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.051)
Age		−0.011***	−0.011***		−0.011***	−0.011***
		(0.002)	(0.002)		(0.002)	(0.002)
Education_l		−0.015	−0.015		−0.019	−0.019
		(0.031)	(0.037)		(0.030)	(0.037)
Income		−0.001	−0.001		−0.004	−0.004
		(0.005)	(0.006)		(0.005)	(0.006)
Minority		0.299***	0.299*		0.367***	0.367**
		(0.106)	(0.158)		(0.105)	(0.162)
Left Party		0.071	0.071	0.178***	0.075	0.075
		(0.052)	(0.073)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.077)
Urban		−0.025	−0.025		−0.005	−0.005
		(0.033)	(0.028)		(0.037)	(0.036)
Roles:Left Party				0.023	0.014	0.014
				(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.054)
Left Party:Styles				−0.042	−0.014	−0.014
				(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.088)
Left Party:Environment				0.116*	0.133**	0.133*
				(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.078)
Left Party:Qualification				0.006	−0.013	−0.013
				(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.067)
Constant	1.389***	1.907***	1.907***	1.243***	1.923***	1.923***
	(0.028)	(0.147)	(0.215)	(0.040)	(0.144)	(0.217)
Observations	965	691		698	664	
R^2	0.086	0.128		0.087	0.153	
Adjusted R^2	0.082	0.116		0.075	0.135	
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.4.3 Ambition Dummy

Table B.8: Ambition (Dummy)

	Dependent variable:					
	Ambition			Ambition		
	(OLS)		*coefficient test*	(OLS)		*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Roles	0.029	0.034	0.034	−0.0004	0.012	0.012
	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.042)
Styles	−0.122***	−0.066*	−0.066	−0.055	−0.044	−0.044
	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.040)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.062)
Environment	0.0002	0.057	0.057	−0.040	0.005	0.005
	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.049)
Qualification	0.303***	0.239***	0.239***	0.267***	0.255***	0.255***
	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.058)
Age		−0.014***	−0.014***		−0.014***	−0.014***
		(0.002)	(0.003)		(0.002)	(0.003)
Education_l		−0.024	−0.024		−0.033	−0.033
		(0.038)	(0.038)		(0.039)	(0.039)
Income		−0.001	−0.001		−0.002	−0.002
		(0.006)	(0.007)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Minority		0.284**	0.284*		0.335**	0.355*
		(0.130)	(0.170)		(0.135)	(0.176)
Left Party		0.064	0.064	0.217***	0.098	0.098
		(0.063)	(0.070)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.086)
Urban		−0.041	−0.041		−0.027	−0.027
		(0.040)	(0.032)		(0.047)	(0.043)
Roles:Left Party				0.059	0.030	0.030
				(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.068)
Left Party:Styles				−0.084	−0.053	−0.053
				(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.085)
Left Party:Environment				0.081	0.076	0.076
				(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.085)
Left Party:Qualification				0.014	0.001	0.001
				(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.078)
Constant	−0.013	0.746***	0.746***	−0.161***	0.719***	0.719***
	(0.032)	(0.181)	(0.221)	(0.051)	(0.185)	(0.227)
Observations	965	691		698	664	
R^2	0.107	0.147		0.108	0.158	
Adjusted R^2	0.103	0.134		0.096	0.140	
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.4.4 Attitudes on Tree-point Scale

Table B.9: Ambition (Tricotomous Attitudes)

	Dependent variable:					
	Ambition			Ambition		
	(OLS)		*coefficient test*	(OLS)		*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Roles	−0.045	−0.010	−0.010	−0.062	−0.063	−0.063
	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.076)
Styles	−0.123***	−0.058	−0.058	−0.001	0.004	0.004
	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.058)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.080)
Environment	0.028	0.119**	0.119*	−0.040	0.013	0.013
	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.061)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.058)
Qualification	0.298***	0.204***	0.204***	0.241***	0.234***	0.234***
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.055)
Age		−0.013***	−0.013***		−0.013***	−0.013***
		(0.002)	(0.003)		(0.002)	(0.003)
Education_l		−0.017	−0.017		−0.020	−0.020
		(0.038)	(0.044)		(0.037)	(0.044)
Income		−0.001	−0.001		−0.006	−0.006
		(0.006)	(0.007)		(0.006)	(0.007)
Minority		0.375***	0.375**		0.455***	0.455**
		(0.129)	(0.189)		(0.127)	(0.192)
Left Party		0.079	0.079	0.215***	0.063	0.063
		(0.063)	(0.089)	(0.079)	(0.081)	(0.103)
Urban		−0.029	−0.029		−0.006	−0.006
		(0.040)	(0.035)		(0.045)	(0.044)
Roles:Left Party				0.107	0.105	0.105
				(0.134)	(0.133)	(0.134)
Left Party:Styles				−0.139	−0.130	−0.130
				(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.112)
Left Party:Environment				0.202*	0.165	0.165
				(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.116)
Left Party:Qualification				0.006	−0.012	−0.012
				(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.078)
Constant	1.006***	1.640***	1.640***	0.844***	1.664***	1.664***
	(0.037)	(0.180)	(0.259)	(0.053)	(0.177)	(0.263)
Observations	965	691		698	664	
R^2	0.080	0.125		0.085	0.151	
Adjusted R^2	0.076	0.112		0.073	0.133	
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.4.5 Ambition Dummy Attitudes on Tree-point Scale

Table B.10: Ambition (Dummy, with Tricotomous Attitudes)

	Dependent variable:					
	Ambition (OLS)		*coefficient test*	Ambition (OLS)		*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Roles	0.046	0.091	0.091	−0.033	−0.011	−0.011
	(0.063)	(0.069)	(0.073)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.090)
Styles	−0.116***	−0.057	−0.057	−0.002	0.017	0.017
	(0.040)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.064)
Environment	−0.009	0.070	0.070	−0.036	0.033	0.033
	(0.047)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.066)
Qualification	0.340***	0.265***	0.265***	0.294***	0.275***	0.275***
	(0.032)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.054)
Age		−0.014***	−0.014***		−0.013***	−0.013***
		(0.002)	(0.003)		(0.002)	(0.003)
Education_l		−0.027	−0.027		−0.036	−0.036
		(0.038)	(0.038)		(0.038)	(0.039)
Income		−0.001	−0.001		−0.003	−0.003
		(0.006)	(0.007)		(0.007)	(0.007)
Minority		0.307**	0.307*		0.370***	0.370**
		(0.130)	(0.168)		(0.133)	(0.173)
Left Party		0.057	0.057	0.184**	0.047	0.047
		(0.063)	(0.070)	(0.082)	(0.085)	(0.090)
Urban		−0.039	−0.039		−0.025	−0.025
		(0.040)	(0.033)		(0.047)	(0.044)
Roles:Left Party				0.223	0.180	0.180
				(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.147)
Left Party:Styles				−0.154	−0.141	−0.141
				(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.097)
Left Party:Environment				0.117	0.061	0.061
				(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.109)
Left Party:Qualification				0.016	0.015	0.015
				(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.077)
Constant	−0.048	0.715***	0.715***	−0.172***	0.715***	0.715***
	(0.035)	(0.181)	(0.219)	(0.055)	(0.185)	(0.225)
Observations	965	691		698	664	
R^2	0.112	0.151		0.115	0.167	
Adjusted R^2	0.108	0.138		0.103	0.149	
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.4.6 Controlling for Political Attention

Table B.11: Ambition (Political Attention Control Included)

	Dependent variable:					
	Ambition (OLS)		*coefficient test*	Ambition (OLS)		*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Roles	0.003	0.001	0.001	−0.013	−0.011	−0.011
	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.043)
Styles	−0.131***	−0.070**	−0.070	−0.078	−0.075	−0.075
	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.088)
Environment	0.021	0.094**	0.094*	−0.045	−0.012	−0.012
	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.049)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.049)
Qualification	0.288***	0.195***	0.195***	0.233***	0.224***	0.224***
	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.064)
Age		−0.013***	−0.013***		−0.013***	−0.013***
		(0.002)	(0.003)		(0.002)	(0.003)
Education_l		−0.012	−0.012		−0.020	−0.020
		(0.038)	(0.044)		(0.037)	(0.044)
Income		−0.001	−0.001		−0.005	−0.005
		(0.006)	(0.007)		(0.006)	(0.007)
Minority		0.359***	0.359*		0.445***	0.445**
		(0.129)	(0.194)		(0.128)	(0.198)
Left Party		0.083	0.083	0.216***	0.091	0.091
		(0.063)	(0.088)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.094)
Urban		−0.030	−0.030		−0.006	−0.006
		(0.040)	(0.034)		(0.045)	(0.043)
Attention	−0.029**	−0.010	−0.010	−0.014	−0.007	−0.007
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.020)
Roles:Left Party				0.029	0.017	0.017
				(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.065)
Styles:Left Party				−0.042	−0.014	−0.014
				(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.109)
Environment:Left Party				0.136*	0.159**	0.159*
				(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.095)
Qualification:Left Party				0.009	−0.015	−0.015
				(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.082)
Constant	1.211***	1.703***	1.703***	0.948***	1.705***	1.705***
	(0.084)	(0.190)	(0.305)	(0.110)	(0.186)	(0.311)
Observations	965	691		698	664	
R^2	0.092	0.129		0.088	0.154	
Adjusted R^2	0.087	0.115		0.075	0.134	
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix C

Appendix Chapter IV

C.1 Data

C.1.1 Pre-analysis Plan

Hypotheses:

Confirmatory:

HP 0: the treatment of the female political role model increases women's political ambition.

Confirmatory:

HP 1a: The treatment manipulating equality support will increase the perception of equality of male and female political leaders

HP 1b: The treatment manipulating leadership style preference will increase the preference for a communal leadership style

HP 1c: The treatment manipulating self-perception of qualification will increase women's self-perception of qualification

HP 1d: The treatment manipulating perception of environmental support will increase women's perception of environmental support

Exploratory (hypotheses are competing):

HP 2a: the treatment manipulating equality support has the strongest effect

HP 2b: the treatment manipulating leadership style preference has the strongest effect

HP 2c: the treatment manipulating self-perception of qualifications has the strongest effect

HP 2d: the treatment manipulating perception of support in the political environment has the strongest effect

Confirmatory:

HP 3a: the treatment where a man discusses women's suitability for politics has a somewhat positive effect on women's political ambition

HP 3b: the effect of the treatment on women's political ambition is much stronger when the gender of the role model and the audience coincide.

Design Plan

Study Type: Experiment - A researcher randomly assigns treatments to study subjects, this includes field or lab experiments. This is also known as an intervention experiment and includes randomized controlled trials.

Blinding: For studies that involve human subjects, they will not know the treatment group to which they have been assigned.

*Study design:*This is Randomised Control Trial experiment where participants are allocated either to a treatment group or a control group. The experiment is embedded in an online survey. The treatments are represented by different audio messages that were extracted from an interview with a British politician that were modified for the purpose of the experiment. See attached document for the transcription of the audio treatments

Randomization: This is a random control trial experiment with conditioning on gender. Men will only be allocated to the control group and to a condition where a male politician is discussing the experience of British men in politics. Women in the sample will be randomly allocated to a control group, a group with a male politician discussing the experience of British women in politics, and a series of conditions in which a female politician is discussing the experience of British women in politics.

Sampling Plan

Existing Data:

Registration prior to creation of data

Data collection procedures: My semple is a quota sample designed to represent the British population in terms of gender, education level, age, income, partisanship, area in which they leave and whether this area is rural or urban.

I will exclude from my semple individuals for which I do not have a theory of political ambition, or that can not be used as a comparison benchmark (e.g., individuals that do not consent to take part in my study at my conditions, individuals that state that they will not be able to listen to my treatment, non-British citizens, individuals that do not live in Great Britain, individuals who previously held political office, individuals that are less than 18 years of age, or that do not identify as either male or female).

Sample size: The total sample size will be 2000 individuals (approximately) with women being over-sampled compared to men (due to the treatment characteristics). There will be approximately 1556 women in my sample and 444 men.

Variables

Outcomes:

-*political ambition (intention):* a variable ranging from 1 to 5 measuring how likely it is that a participant will run for political office at some point in their life (1 means “Very unlikely” and 5 means “Very likely”).

-*political ambition (office):* a categorical variable where a participant can select the position they would most like to hold if they were to run for political office. The answer options are (order is randomised): Councillor; Mayor; Metropolitan Mayor; Member of the U; Parliament; Cabinet Member; Prime Minister; Member of the Scottish Parliament/Welsh Parliament; First Minister of the Scottish Parliament/Prime Minister of the Welsh Parliament; Other; Don’t know.

-*political ambition (behaviour):* a dummy variable measuring whether individuals have ticked the box saying "tick this box if you’re interested in receiving a brief leaflet on the steps to effectively pursue political office (at all levels)"

-*political participation:* a variable ranging from 1 to 5 measuring how important are following activities are for the participant: (i) taking part in a protest and/or signing petitions, (ii) following politicians on social media, (iii) reaching out to your local representative to bring attention to matters that affect them and the people close to them, (iv) being a member of a political party, (5) canvassing for my preferred candidate in elections, (6) voting, (7) being up to date with the latest political news. Here, 1 means "Not important at all" and 5 means "Very important".

-*equality support (first attitudinal outcome):* scale variable measured via a question asking participants to select "which of these statements best represents your view" from the following list: 1) Men make the best political leaders; 2) men make somewhat better political leaders than women; 3) men and women make equally good political leaders; 4) women make somewhat better political leaders than men do; 5) women make the best political leaders. This item is equivalent to a 1 to 5 Likert scale. In the survey questionnaire used for data collection, the order of items will be randomised.

-*communal leadership style (second attitudinal outcome):* scale variables obtained through presenting participants with a list of eight leadership attributes of which four are stereotypical of communal leadership (i.e., empathy, ability to cooperate, communicational skills, ability to bring out the best in people) and four are stereotypical of agentic leadership (i.e., authority, ability to assign tasks, be goal-oriented, competitiveness). I asked them "which of the following if any, do you think are the most important characteristics that a political leader should have? Please choose FOUR". The order of the items in the list will be randomised. Respondents will select four items or none. From their answers, I will derive a 1 to 5 five variable that represents from zero to four, how many stereotypical traits of the communal leadership style were selected. Note that because of how this measure is constructed, support for the

communal leadership style is complementary to support for the agentic leadership style following the logic: support for the agentic leadership style = 5 – support for the communal leadership style.

-*perception of support of the political environment (third attitudinal outcome):* scale variable operationalised with the question "please, report the extent to which you agree with the following statements: the political environment is favourable towards people of my gender". Answers will be measured on a 1 to 5 Likert scale going from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree".

-*self-perception of qualification (fourth attitudinal outcome):* scale variable operationalised through the question "how qualified are you to run for public office". Answers were measured on a 1 to 5 Likert scale going from "not at all qualified" to "highly qualified". Note that both attitudes are measured in a way that allows both women and men to read the question as if they were asked about their gender.

Attention Checks: a variable asking to select among a list the topic of the audio recording. The list offers the following options: politics, finance, education, and healthcare. Plus a variable that asks to select a specific number from a list of numbers. Participants that do not pass attention checks might be excluded from the experiment.

Covariates: Age, Gender, Ethnicity, Education level, Income, Urban/Rural, Political ideology, Attention to politics.

Analysis Plan
Statistical models
Randomization Check:
Treatment = a + ß*[covariate] + e ;

Treatments Effects Estimation:
[outcome] = a + ß*Treatment + e ,
[outcome] = a + ß*Treatment+ [covariates] + e,
[attitudes] = a + ß*Treatment + e,
[attitudes] = a + ß*Treatment + [covariates] + e ;

C.1.2 Questionnaire

Block 1:
Questions order to be randomized
Demographic questions:

- Q1) age:
  - Multiple choice question.
  - QUESTION: "What is your year of birth?":
  - Participants can select their year of birth from a list.
- Q2) ethnicity:
  - Multiple choice question.
  - QUESTION: "What do you consider your main ethnic group or nationality group?"
  - OPTIONS: White British; Any other white background; White and Black Caribbean; White and Black African; White and Asian; Any other mixed background; Indian; Pakistani; Bangladeshi; Any other Asian background; Black Caribbean; Black African; Any other black background; Chinese; Other ethnic group; Prefer not to say.
- Q3) education attainment:
  - Multiple choice question.

  - QUESTION: "What is the highest educational or work-related qualification you have?"
  - OPTIONS: No formal qualifications; Youth training certificate/skill seekers; Recognised trade apprenticeship completed; Clerical and commercial; City and Guilds certificate; City and Guilds certificate - advanced; ONC; CSE grades 2-5; CSE grade 1, GCE O level, GCSE, School Certificate; Scottish Ordinary/ Lower Certificate; GCE A level or Higher Certificate; Scottish Higher Certificate; Nursing qualification (e.g. SEN, SRN, SCM, RGN); Teaching qualification (not degree); University diploma; University or CNAA first degree (e.g. BA, B.Sc, B.Ed); University or CNAA higher degree (e.g. M.Sc, Ph.D); Other technical, professional or higher qualification; Don't know Prefer not to say.

- Q4) political ideology:
  - Scale question.
  - QUESTION: "In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on the following scale?"
  - ANSWER: 0 to 10 where 0 means left and 10 means right.

- Q5) income:
  - Multiple choice question.
  - QUESTION: "What do you think your total income will be this year for yourself and your immediate family?"
  - OPTIONS: under £5,000 per year; £5,000 to £9,999 per year; £10,000 to £14,999 per year; £15,000 to £19,999 per year; £20,000 to £24,999 per year; £25,000 to £29,999 per year; £30,000 to £34,999 per year; £35,000 to £39,999 per year; £40,000 to £44,999 per year; £45,000 to £49,999 per year; £50,000 to £59,999 per year; £60,000 to £69,999 per year; £70,000 to £99,999 per year; £100,000 to £149,999 per year; £150,000 and over; Don't know; Prefer not to answer.

- Q6) interest in politics:
  - Scale question;
  - QUESTION: "In general terms, how interested in politics are you?"
  - ANSWER: scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means "not at all interested" and 5 means "very interested".

- Q7) urban/rural:
  - Single choice question;
  - QUESTION: "Which of the following best describes where you currently live?"
  - ANSWER OPTIONS: Urban, Suburban, Rural, Remote.

Random allocation of participants in one out of the eight assignments

TREATMENT

Block 2:

- Q8) attention Check (a):
  - Multiple choice.
  - QUESTION: "What topic was discussed in the audio you just heard?"
  - ANSWER OPTIONS: Politics; Education; Healthcare; Finance.

- Q9) attention Check (b):
  - Multiple choice.
  - QUESTION: "Please, select the number 130"
  - ANSWER OPTIONS: 13, 46, 130, 1000.

Block 3:
Questions order to be randomised

- Q9) attitude norms:
  - Multiple choice
  - QUESTION: "Which of these statements best represents your view?":
  - OPTION 1: "Men make the best political leaders";
  - OPTION 2: "Men make somewhat better political leaders than women";
  - OPTION 3: "There is no difference in abilities to be a political leader between men and women"
  - OPTION 4: "Women make somewhat better political leaders than White people"
  - OPTION 5: "Women make the best political leaders".
- Q10) attitude towards behaviour:
  - Multiple choice question.
  - QUESTION: "Which of the following, if any, do you think are the most important characteristics that a political leader should have? Please choose FOUR".
  - ANSWER OPTIONS (to be randomised):
  - 1. Empathy;
  - 2. Ability to cooperate;
  - 3. Communicational skills;
  - 4. Ability to bring out the best in people;
  - 5. Authority;
  - 6. Ability to assign tasks;
  - 7. Be goal-oriented;
  - 8. Competitiveness;
  - The first four characteristics are of a Communal Leadership Style (stereotypically feminine), while the last four are of an Agentic Leadership Style (stereotypically masculine) (From Eagly and Karau, 2002).
- Q11) internal self-perception of outcome control:
  - Scale question.
  - QUESTION: "How qualified are you to run for public office?".
  - ANSWER: 1 to 5, where 1 means "Not at all qualified" and 5 means "Highly qualified".
  - From Fox and Lawless (2011)
- Q12) external self-perception of outcome control:
  - Grid question.
  - QUESTION: "Please, report the extent to which you agree with the following statements. If I were to run for political office, I would find that...":
  - ITEM 1a: "The political environment is favourable towards people of my gender";
  - ANSWER: 1 to 5, where 1 means "Strongly Agree" and 5 means "Strongly Disagree".
  - Items order to be randomized.
- Q13) subsidiary ambition - political participation:
  - Grid question.

  - QUESTION: "How important to you, if at all, is participating in the following activities?":
  - ITEM 1: "Taking part into protest and/or signing petitions";
  - ITEM 2: "Follow politicians on social media";
  - ITEM 3: "Reach out to your local representative to bring attention to matters that affect you and the people close to you";
  - ITEM 4: "Being a member of a political party";
  - ITEM 5: "Canvassing for my preferred candidate in elections"
  - ITEM 6: "Voting";
  - ITEM 7: "Being up to date with the latest political news".
  - The order of the items will be randomised.
  - ANSWER: 1 to 5, where 1 means "Not important at all" and 5 means "Very important".

- Q14) political ambition (a):
  - Scale question.
  - QUESTION: "How likely is it, if at all, that you will run for political office at some point in your life?"
  - ANSWER: 1 to 5, where 1 means "Not likely at all" and 5 means "Very likely".
  - From Holman and Schnider 2018; Lawless and Fox, 2005; Schneider et al., 2016.

- Q15) political ambition (b):
  - Multiple choice question.
  - QUESTION: "Please imagine a scenario where you are considering running for political office, which of these positions would you most like to hold?"
  - ANSWER OPTIONS (to be randomised): Councillor; Mayor; Metropolitan Mayor; Member of the UK Parliament; Cabinet Member; Prime Minister; Member of the Scottish Parliament/Welsh Parliament; First Minister of the Scottish Parliament/Prime Minister of the Welsh Parliament; Other; Don't know.
  - Adapted from Lawless and Fox (2004).

- Q16) political ambition (c):
  - Yes/No Question
  - "Are you interested in receiving a brief leaflet on the steps to effectively pursue political office (at all levels)?"

C.1.3 Sample Statistics

Table C.1: Sample Chapter IV Statistics

Variable	**Value**
Gender (%)	42.5% (M) / 57.5% (F)
Mean Age	51
Median Education	Post-secondary
Median Income	£40,000 to £44,999 per year
Ethnicity (White %)	90%
Rural/Suburban/Urban (%)	Urban: 77%, Suburban: 11%, Rural: 12%
Party (%)	Conservative 44% Labour 31% Other Parties 25%
Left Party (%)	Left: 56%, Right: 49%

C.2 Preliminary Analysis

C.2.1 Balancing Checks

Table C.2: Balancing Checks

	Dependent variable:						
	Treatment						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Age (25-34 years old)	−0.007						
Age (35-44 years old)	0.013						
Age (45-54 years old)	−0.131						
Age (55-64 years old)	−0.234						
Age (65+ years old)	−0.324						
Region		0.009					
Education			0.001				
Income				0.047			
Ethnicity					−0.030		
Party Number						0.035	
Attention (A little)							−0.015
Attention (A lot)							−0.134
Attention (A moderate amount)							0.016
Attention (None at all)							−0.047
Constant	3.993	3.851	3.902	3.798	4.072	3.781	3.937
Observations	1,463	1,463	1,463	1,463	1,463	1,463	1,463
Note:							*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.2.2 Drop-outs (Spontaneous and Attention-based)

Table C.3: Spontaneous and Attention-based Drop-out Rates

	Dependent variable:	
	Control	Control
	(1)	(2)
Attrition	0.012	
	(0.213)	
Attention		−0.049
		(0.035)
Constant	0.226	0.285***
	(0.214)	(0.034)
Observations	2,030	2,266
R^2	0.00000	0.001
Adjusted R^2	−0.0005	0.0004
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

C.2.3 Level of Attention by Condition

Table C.4: Attention-based Drop-out per Condition

	Dependent variable:
	Attention
Roles (T)	0.030
	(0.020)
Styles (T)	0.007
	(0.020)
Qualification (T)	−0.031
	(0.020)
Environment (T)	0.013
	(0.021)
Full (T)	0.028
	(0.020)
Constant	0.919***
	(0.011)
Observations	1,807
R^2	0.005
Adjusted R^2	0.002
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.2.4 Ex-ante Power Analysis

Table C.5: Main Effects on Ambition

	Sample Size	**Effect Size**	**Experimental Power**	**Significance Level**	**One-sided/ Two-sided**
Full Event	n = 78	d = 0.4	p = 0.8	a = 0.5	One-sided
Segments	n = 99	d = 0.4	p = 0.8	a = 0.5	Two-sided

In "Sample Size", "n" is for each condition.

Table C.6: Heterogeneous Effects on Ambition

	Sample Size	**Effect Size**	**Experimental Power**	**Significance Level**	**One-sided/ Two-sided**
Full Event	n = 78	d = 0.4	p = 0.8	a = 0.5	One-sided
Segments	n = 99	d = 0.4	p = 0.8	a = 0.5	Two-sided

In "Sample Size", "n" is for each condition.

C.2.5 Post-hoc Power Analysis

Table C.7: Main Effects on Ambition

	Effect Size	**Sample Size**	**Experimental Power**	**Significance Level**	**One-sided/ Two-sided**
Full Event	d = 0.1	n = 200	p = 0.25	a = 0.5	One-sided
Segments	Roles = 0.02; Styles = 0.02**; Environment = 0.05; Qualification = 0.08	n = 200	Roles = 0.05; Styles =0.5; Environment = 0.07; Qualification = 0.1	a = 0.5	One-sided
Mentor	d = 0.07	n = 200	p = 0.1	a = 0.5	One-sided

In "Sample Size", "n" is for each condition. **Ad-Hoc power analysis** reveals that the sample size per condition should have been 1237 to achieve full experimental power. Note that **every experimental comparison was underpowered**.

Figure C.1: Main Effect Sample Size



Table C.8: Heterogeneous Effects on Ambition

	Effect Size	**Sample Size**	**Experimental Power**	**Significance Level**	**One-sided/ Two-sided**
Full Event	d = 0.4	n = 100,	*p = 0.9*	a = 0.5	One-sided
Segments	roles = 0.1; Styles = 0.07**; Environment = 0.15; Qualification = 0.15	n = 100	Roles = 0.1; Styles =0.1; Environment = 0.2; Qualification = 0.2	a = 0.5	One-sided

In "Sample Size", n = sample in each condition. Note that **every experimental comparison was underpowered**, bar from the comparison based on the Full Event treatment.

Figure C.2: Difference in Left-wing and Right-wing Voters



Table C.9: Main Effects on Attitudes

	Effect Size	**Sample Size**	**Experimental Power**	**Significance Level**	**One-sided/ Two-sided**
Full Event	Roles = 0.3**; Styles = 0.001; Environment = 0.1*; Qualification = 0.2*	n = 200	*Roles = 0.8;* Styles =0.05; Environment = 0.3; Qualification = 0.6	a = 0.5	One-sided
Segments	Roles = 0.2; Styles = 0.1; Environment = 0.02; Qualification = 0.02	n = 200	Roles = 0.6; Styles =0.3; Environment = 0.06; Qualification = 0.6	a = 0.5	One-sided
Mentor	Roles = 0.1; Styles = 0.2; Environment = 0.2; Qualification = 0.2	n = 200	Roles = 0.15; Styles =0.6; Environment = 0.6; Qualification = 0.6	a = 0.5	One-sided

In "Sample Size", "n" is for each condition. Note that **every experimental comparison was underpowered**, bar the treatment directed to affect Roles.

C.3 Main Analysis

C.3.1 Main Effect

Table C.10: Main Effect (Full Treatment)

	Dependent variable:				
	Ambition (OLS)		*coefficient test*	Ambition (OL)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Full Treatment (F Speaker)	0.102	0.043	0.043	0.159	0.054
	(0.096)	(0.093)	(0.091)	(0.210)	(0.219)
Age (25-34 years old)		0.100	0.100		−0.079
		(0.175)	(0.175)		(0.365)
Age (35-44 years old)		−0.060	−0.060		−0.446
		(0.175)	(0.167)		(0.376)
Age (45-54 years old)		0.089	0.089		−0.094
		(0.185)	(0.186)		(0.396)
Age (55-64 years old)		−0.213	−0.213		−0.832*
		(0.191)	(0.170)		(0.439)
Age (65+ years old)		−0.390*	−0.390***		−1.386**
		(0.208)	(0.148)		(0.541)
Education		0.009	0.009		0.027
		(0.021)	(0.021)		(0.048)
Income		−0.005	−0.005		−0.045
		(0.039)	(0.037)		(0.092)
Ethnicity		−0.137***	−0.137***		−0.252***
		(0.033)	(0.044)		(0.071)
Left Party		0.102	0.102		0.187
		(0.091)	(0.083)		(0.217)
Rural		0.101	0.101		0.170
		(0.069)	(0.070)		(0.162)
Constant	−0.090	0.334	0.334		
	(0.065)	(0.369)	(0.404)		
Observations	398	398		398	398
R^2	0.003	0.106			
Adjusted R^2	0.0003	0.081			
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.11: Main Effect (Segments of Treatment)

	Dependent variable:				
	Ambition			Ambition	
	(OLS)		*coefficient test*	(OL)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Roles Treatment	0.020	0.020	0.020	−0.017	0.001
	(0.087)	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.202)	(0.208)
Styles Treatment	−0.171*	−0.204**	−0.204***	−0.486**	−0.597***
	(0.089)	(0.086)	(0.078)	(0.218)	(0.225)
Environment Treatment	0.048	0.030	0.030	−0.012	−0.049
	(0.090)	(0.087)	(0.090)	(0.209)	(0.214)
Qualification Treatment	0.083	0.046	0.046	0.149	0.097
	(0.088)	(0.085)	(0.088)	(0.199)	(0.204)
Age (25-34 years old)		−0.054	−0.054		−0.205
		(0.106)	(0.121)		(0.233)
Age (35-44 years old)		−0.277**	−0.277*		−0.601**
		(0.106)	(0.117)		(0.241)
Age (45-54 years old)		−0.311***	−0.311**		−0.828***
		(0.114)	(0.126)		(0.269)
Age (55-64 years old)		−0.400***	−0.400***		−0.949***
		(0.118)	(0.123)		(0.282)
Age (65+ years old)		−0.541***	−0.541***		−1.576***
		(0.129)	(0.119)		(0.357)
Education		0.046***	0.046***		0.098***
		(0.012)	(0.013)		(0.031)
Income		0.013	0.013		0.018
		(0.021)	(0.020)		(0.053)
Ethnicity		−0.065***	−0.065**		−0.139***
		(0.021)	(0.025)		(0.045)
Left Party		−0.048	−0.048		−0.128
		(0.052)	(0.048)		(0.132)
Rural		0.104***	0.104***		0.251**
		(0.039)	(0.039)		(0.099)
Constant	−0.090	0.024	0.024		
	(0.062)	(0.217)	(0.245)		
Observations	1,081	1,081		1,081	1,081
R^2	0.009	0.084			
Adjusted R^2	0.005	0.072			
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.3.2 Heterogeneous Effects

Table C.12: Heterogeneous Effects (Full Treatment)

	Dependent variable:				
	Ambition (OLS)		*coefficient test*	Ambition (OL)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Full Treatment (F Speaker)	0.052	−0.022	−0.022	0.146	0.013
	(0.156)	(0.152)	(0.118)	(0.387)	(0.399)
Left Party	0.362***	0.220	0.220*	0.879***	0.612*
	(0.134)	(0.136)	(0.117)	(0.317)	(0.336)
Age (25-34 years old)		0.091	0.091		−0.123
		(0.181)	(0.182)		(0.375)
Age (35-44 years old)		−0.038	−0.038		−0.395
		(0.182)	(0.177)		(0.385)
Age (45-54 years old)		0.084	0.084		−0.110
		(0.191)	(0.193)		(0.404)
Age (55-64 years old)		−0.182	−0.182		−0.757*
		(0.197)	(0.179)		(0.446)
Age (65+ years old)		−0.381*	−0.381**		−1.391**
		(0.213)	(0.159)		(0.548)
Education		0.006	0.006		0.019
		(0.021)	(0.022)		(0.049)
Income		−0.006	−0.006		−0.045
		(0.040)	(0.038)		(0.093)
Ethnicity		−0.145***	−0.145***		−0.267***
		(0.034)	(0.044)		(0.072)
Rural		0.076	0.076		0.093
		(0.071)	(0.072)		(0.164)
Full Treatment (F Speaker):Left Party	0.064	0.087	0.087	−0.00003	0.007
	(0.199)	(0.195)	(0.172)	(0.465)	(0.482)
Constant	−0.288***	0.418	0.418		
	(0.104)	(0.377)	(0.411)		
Observations	385	385		385	385
R^2	0.042	0.126			
Adjusted R^2	0.035	0.097			
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.13: Heterogeneous Effects (Segments of Treatment)

	Dependent variable:				
	Ambition (OLS)		*coefficient test*	Ambition (OL)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Roles Treatment	0.158	0.115	0.115	0.220	0.142
	(0.144)	(0.140)	(0.118)	(0.367)	(0.375)
Styles Treatment	0.065	0.027	0.027	0.168	0.093
	(0.148)	(0.144)	(0.109)	(0.375)	(0.384)
Environment Treatment	0.163	0.100	0.100	0.339	0.231
	(0.149)	(0.145)	(0.130)	(0.369)	(0.378)
Qualification Treatment	0.205	0.156	0.156	0.471	0.403
	(0.152)	(0.148)	(0.132)	(0.372)	(0.380)
Left Party	0.362***	0.207	0.207*	0.870***	0.534
	(0.131)	(0.129)	(0.116)	(0.316)	(0.327)
Age (25-34 years old)		−0.049	−0.049		−0.205
		(0.111)	(0.127)		(0.241)
Age (35-44 years old)		−0.208*	−0.208*		−0.556**
		(0.112)	(0.124)		(0.247)
Age (45-54 years old)		−0.298**	−0.298**		−0.792***
		(0.120)	(0.133)		(0.275)
Age (55-64 years old)		−0.394***	−0.394***		−0.949***
		(0.124)	(0.129)		(0.291)
Age (65+ years old)		−0.537***	−0.537***		−1.564***
		(0.134)	(0.126)		(0.361)
Education		0.047***	0.047***		0.096***
		(0.013)	(0.014)		(0.031)
Income		0.007	0.007		0.004
		(0.022)	(0.021)		(0.054)
Ethnicity		−0.067***	−0.067***		−0.142***
		(0.021)	(0.026)		(0.046)
Rural		0.103**	0.103**		0.238**
		(0.041)	(0.041)		(0.101)
Roles Treatment:Left Party	−0.256	−0.184	−0.184	−0.430	−0.284
	(0.183)	(0.178)	(0.166)	(0.442)	(0.454)
Styles Treatment:Left Party	−0.413**	−0.406**	−0.406***	−1.071**	−1.137**
	(0.188)	(0.183)	(0.153)	(0.466)	(0.479)
Environment Treatment:Left Party	−0.206	−0.132	−0.132	−0.561	−0.456
	(0.190)	(0.185)	(0.180)	(0.450)	(0.464)
Qualification Treatment:Left Party	−0.202	−0.183	−0.183	−0.495	−0.474
	(0.190)	(0.185)	(0.181)	(0.443)	(0.456)
Constant	−0.288***	−0.092	−0.092		
	(0.102)	(0.233)	(0.252)		
Observations	1,041	1,041		1,041	1,041
R^2	0.021	0.093			
Adjusted R^2	0.012	0.077			

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.14: Heterogeneous Effects in Subgroups (Full Treatment)

	Dependent variable:					
	Ambition (OLS, left)		*coefficient test*	Ambition (OLS, right)		*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Full Treatment (F Speaker)	0.116	0.061	0.061	0.052	0.003	0.003
	(0.138)	(0.136)	(0.129)	(0.121)	(0.123)	(0.109)
Age (25-34 years old)		0.228	0.228		−0.476	−0.476
		(0.224)	(0.204)		(0.337)	(0.327)
Age (35-44 years old)		0.092	0.092		−0.519	−0.519*
		(0.233)	(0.213)		(0.320)	(0.286)
Age (45-54 years old)		0.254	0.254		−0.522	−0.522*
		(0.242)	(0.229)		(0.336)	(0.308)
Age (55-64 years old)		−0.069	−0.069		−0.616*	−0.616**
		(0.284)	(0.244)		(0.318)	(0.284)
Age (65+ years old)		−0.498*	−0.498***		−0.649*	−0.649**
		(0.298)	(0.168)		(0.335)	(0.276)
Education		−0.008	−0.008		0.032	0.032
		(0.030)	(0.030)		(0.028)	(0.028)
Income		−0.029	−0.029		0.046	0.046
		(0.054)	(0.046)		(0.056)	(0.060)
Ethnicity		−0.143***	−0.143***		−0.127**	−0.127*
		(0.045)	(0.053)		(0.054)	(0.071)
Rural		0.132	0.132		−0.004	−0.004
		(0.098)	(0.096)		(0.099)	(0.105)
Constant	0.073	0.465	0.465	−0.288***	0.792	0.792
	(0.094)	(0.517)	(0.529)	(0.080)	(0.533)	(0.676)
Observations	236	236		149	149	
R^2	0.003	0.116		0.001	0.085	
Adjusted R^2	−0.001	0.077		−0.006	0.019	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.15: Heterogeneous Effects in Subgroups (Segments of Treatment)

	Dependent variable:					
	Ambition (OLS, left)		*coefficient test*	Ambition (OLS, right)		*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Roles Treatment	−0.098	−0.068	−0.068	0.158	0.101	0.101
	(0.118)	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.134)	(0.128)	(0.116)
Styles Treatment	−0.349***	−0.372***	−0.372***	0.065	0.024	0.024
	(0.120)	(0.118)	(0.108)	(0.139)	(0.133)	(0.112)
Environment Treatment	−0.044	−0.030	−0.030	0.163	0.116	0.116
	(0.121)	(0.119)	(0.124)	(0.139)	(0.135)	(0.131)
Qualification Treatment	0.004	−0.019	−0.019	0.205	0.165	0.165
	(0.118)	(0.116)	(0.122)	(0.143)	(0.137)	(0.131)
Age (25-34 years old)		0.004	0.004		−0.258	−0.258
		(0.128)	(0.140)		(0.264)	(0.290)
Age (35-44 years old)		−0.178	−0.178		−0.385	−0.385
		(0.129)	(0.138)		(0.263)	(0.277)
Age (45-54 years old)		−0.157	−0.157		−0.657**	−0.657**
		(0.144)	(0.157)		(0.266)	(0.273)
Age (55-64 years old)		−0.355**	−0.355**		−0.598**	−0.598**
		(0.157)	(0.151)		(0.265)	(0.272)
Age (65+ years old)		−0.519***	−0.519***		−0.699**	−0.699***
		(0.171)	(0.149)		(0.274)	(0.267)
Education		0.027	0.027		0.080***	0.080***
		(0.017)	(0.018)		(0.019)	(0.020)
Income		−0.007	−0.007		0.033	0.033
		(0.028)	(0.027)		(0.034)	(0.032)
Ethnicity		−0.051**	−0.051*		−0.119***	−0.119**
		(0.026)	(0.029)		(0.042)	(0.054)
Rural		0.115**	0.115**		0.076	0.076
		(0.053)	(0.051)		(0.063)	(0.064)
Constant	0.073	0.048	0.048	−0.288***	0.320	0.320
	(0.086)	(0.280)	(0.300)	(0.095)	(0.397)	(0.467)
Observations	660	660		381	381	
R^2	0.018	0.076		0.008	0.145	
Adjusted R^2	0.012	0.058		−0.003	0.114	
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.3.3 Effect on Attitudes

Table C.16: Effect on Attiudes (Roles and Styles)

	Dependent variable:					
	Roles			Styles		
	(OLS)		*coefficient test*	(OLS)		*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Full Treatment (F Speaker)	0.245**	0.226**	0.226**	0.0003	0.028	0.028
	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.092)	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.103)
Age (25-34 years old)		0.063	0.063		0.167	0.167
		(0.177)	(0.174)		(0.190)	(0.190)
Age (35-44 years old)		0.253	0.253		0.489**	0.489***
		(0.177)	(0.169)		(0.189)	(0.182)
Age (45-54 years old)		0.164	0.164		0.243	0.243
		(0.188)	(0.183)		(0.201)	(0.208)
Age (55-64 years old)		0.062	0.062		0.554***	0.554***
		(0.190)	(0.168)		(0.203)	(0.187)
Age (65+ years old)		−0.173	−0.173		0.504**	0.504**
		(0.208)	(0.181)		(0.222)	(0.206)
Ethnicity		0.549	0.549		0.265	0.265
(Black/African/Caribbean)		(0.379)	(0.487)		(0.405)	(0.469)
Ethnicity (Mixed two or more)		0.388	0.388		0.168	0.168
		(0.358)	(0.470)		(0.383)	(0.426)
Ethnicity (Arab or any other)		−1.214**	−1.214		−0.094	−0.094
		(0.566)	(1.016)		(0.606)	(0.372)
Ethnicity (Prefer not to say)		−0.117	−0.117		0.215	0.215
		(0.691)	(0.302)		(0.738)	(0.230)
Ethnicity (White)		−0.044	−0.044		0.123	0.123
		(0.188)	(0.277)		(0.201)	(0.203)
Ethnicity (White,		1.376	1.376***		0.527	0.527**
Black/African/Caribbean)		(0.950)	(0.316)		(1.016)	(0.245)
Education		−0.048**	−0.048***		−0.032	−0.032
		(0.021)	(0.018)		(0.023)	(0.023)
Income		−0.050	−0.050		−0.005	−0.005
		(0.039)	(0.038)		(0.042)	(0.040)
Rural		0.024	0.024		−0.094	−0.094
		(0.071)	(0.065)		(0.076)	(0.070)
Constant	−0.042	0.125	0.125	−0.022	−0.059	−0.059
	(0.064)	(0.359)	(0.412)	(0.068)	(0.384)	(0.369)
Observations	398	398		398	398	
R^2	0.017	0.085		0.00000	0.051	
Adjusted R^2	0.014	0.049		−0.003	0.014	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.17: Effect on Attitudes (Environment and Qualification)

	Dependent variable:					
	Environment			Qualification		
	(OLS)		*coefficient test*	(OLS)		*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Full Treatment (F Speaker)	0.124	0.156	0.156	0.204**	0.171*	0.171*
	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.098)	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.100)
Age (25-34 years old)		0.285	0.285		0.064	0.064
		(0.185)	(0.177)		(0.190)	(0.176)
Age (35-44 years old)		0.341*	0.341*		0.156	0.156
		(0.184)	(0.174)		(0.189)	(0.170)
Age (45-54 years old)		0.612***	0.612***		0.125	0.125
		(0.196)	(0.196)		(0.202)	(0.187)
Age (55-64 years old)		0.311	0.311*		0.023	0.023
		(0.198)	(0.178)		(0.203)	(0.179)
Age (65+ years old)		0.632***	0.632***		0.146	0.146
		(0.217)	(0.203)		(0.223)	(0.201)
Ethnicity		−0.952**	−0.952**		−0.748*	−0.748
(Black/African/Caribbean)		(0.395)	(0.390)		(0.406)	(0.465)
Ethnicity (Mixed two or more)		−0.910**	−0.910***		−0.909**	−0.909**
		(0.373)	(0.311)		(0.384)	(0.353)
Ethnicity (Arab or any other)		−0.309	−0.309		−0.906	−0.906**
		(0.591)	(0.769)		(0.607)	(0.455)
Ethnicity (Prefer not to say)		−1.913***	−1.913***		−0.271	−0.271
		(0.721)	(0.223)		(0.741)	(0.380)
Ethnicity (White)		−0.312	−0.312		−0.857***	−0.857***
		(0.196)	(0.196)		(0.202)	(0.249)
Ethnicity (White,		−2.300**	−2.300***		−1.771*	−1.771***
Black/African/Caribbean)		(0.991)	(0.234)		(1.019)	(0.282)
Education		0.018	0.018		0.033	0.033
		(0.022)	(0.024)		(0.023)	(0.024)
Income		0.011	0.011		−0.011	−0.011
		(0.041)	(0.039)		(0.042)	(0.042)
Rural		0.147**	0.147**		0.060	0.060
		(0.074)	(0.074)		(0.076)	(0.078)
Constant	−0.163**	−0.761**	−0.761**	−0.144**	0.280	0.280
	(0.067)	(0.374)	(0.373)	(0.068)	(0.385)	(0.402)
Observations	398	398		398	398	
R^2	0.004	0.091		0.010	0.073	
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.055		0.008	0.037	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.18: Heterogeneous Effects on Attitudes (Roles and Styles)

	Dependent variable:					
	Roles			Styles		
	(OLS)		*coefficient test*	(OLS)		*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Full Treatment (F Speaker)	0.188	0.219	0.219*	0.109	0.167	0.167
	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.126)	(0.165)	(0.165)	(0.158)
Left Party	0.216	0.283**	0.283**	0.171	0.363**	0.363***
	(0.131)	(0.136)	(0.132)	(0.141)	(0.147)	(0.130)
Age (25-34 years old)		0.100	0.100		0.142	0.142
		(0.182)	(0.182)		(0.196)	(0.199)
Age (35-44 years old)		0.321*	0.321*		0.488**	0.488***
		(0.183)	(0.177)		(0.197)	(0.188)
Age (45-54 years old)		0.236	0.236		0.224	0.224
		(0.193)	(0.188)		(0.208)	(0.216)
Age (55-64 years old)		0.238	0.238		0.642***	0.642***
		(0.199)	(0.185)		(0.215)	(0.202)
Age (65+ years old)		−0.064	−0.064		0.550**	0.550***
		(0.214)	(0.189)		(0.231)	(0.211)
Ethnicity		0.158	0.158		0.041	0.041
(Black/African/Caribbean)		(0.396)	(0.393)		(0.427)	(0.492)
Ethnicity (Mixed two or more)		0.403	0.403		0.162	0.162
		(0.356)	(0.478)		(0.384)	(0.434)
Ethnicity (Arab or any other)		−1.157**	−1.157		−0.076	−0.076
		(0.562)	(0.934)		(0.606)	(0.337)
Ethnicity (Prefer not to say)		−0.188	−0.188		0.212	0.212
		(0.685)	(0.361)		(0.739)	(0.251)
Ethnicity (White)		−0.021	−0.021		0.100	0.100
		(0.189)	(0.284)		(0.204)	(0.208)
Ethnicity (White,		1.251	1.251***		0.514	0.514**
Black/African/Caribbean)		(0.941)	(0.334)		(1.015)	(0.255)
Education		−0.055**	−0.055***		−0.038	−0.038
		(0.021)	(0.018)		(0.023)	(0.023)
Income		−0.046	−0.046		−0.025	−0.025
		(0.040)	(0.039)		(0.043)	(0.041)
Rural		−0.006	−0.006		−0.107	−0.107
		(0.072)	(0.064)		(0.077)	(0.070)
Full Treatment (F Speaker):	0.095	0.045	0.045	−0.227	−0.261	−0.261
Left Party	(0.195)	(0.196)	(0.181)	(0.210)	(0.212)	(0.206)
Constant	−0.174*	−0.033	−0.033	−0.127	−0.167	−0.167
	(0.102)	(0.365)	(0.422)	(0.109)	(0.394)	(0.371)
Observations	385	385		385	385	
R^2	0.036	0.098		0.004	0.062	
Adjusted R^2	0.029	0.056		−0.003	0.019	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.19: Heterogeneous Effects on Attitudes (Environment and Qualification)

	Dependent variable:					
	Environment			Qualification		
	(OLS)		*coefficient test*	(OLS)		*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Full Treatment (F Speaker)	−0.010	−0.039	−0.039	0.114	0.081	0.081
	(0.165)	(0.162)	(0.149)	(0.167)	(0.166)	(0.156)
Left Party	−0.243*	−0.295**	−0.295**	0.146	0.114	0.114
	(0.141)	(0.145)	(0.135)	(0.143)	(0.149)	(0.132)
Age (25-34 years old)		0.299	0.299		0.060	0.060
		(0.193)	(0.184)		(0.198)	(0.181)
Age (35-44 years old)		0.317	0.317*		0.174	0.174
		(0.194)	(0.182)		(0.199)	(0.180)
Age (45-54 years old)		0.597***	0.597***		0.127	0.127
		(0.204)	(0.204)		(0.210)	(0.195)
Age (55-64 years old)		0.234	0.234		0.050	0.050
		(0.212)	(0.190)		(0.217)	(0.191)
Age (65+ years old)		0.606***	0.606***		0.157	0.157
		(0.227)	(0.206)		(0.233)	(0.207)
Ethnicity		−0.921**	−0.921**		−0.674	−0.674
(Black/African/Caribbean)		(0.420)	(0.435)		(0.431)	(0.486)
Ethnicity (Mixed two or more)		−0.918**	−0.918***		−0.968**	−0.968***
		(0.378)	(0.313)		(0.387)	(0.354)
Ethnicity (Arab or any others)		−0.319	−0.319		−0.909	−0.909**
		(0.597)	(0.786)		(0.612)	(0.409)
Ethnicity (Prefer not to say)		−1.957***	−1.957***		−0.355	−0.355
		(0.728)	(0.228)		(0.746)	(0.350)
Ethnicity (White)		−0.332*	−0.332		−0.887***	−0.887***
		(0.200)	(0.205)		(0.206)	(0.250)
Ethnicity (White,		−2.308**	−2.308***		−1.907*	−1.907***
Black/African/Caribbean)		(0.999)	(0.250)		(1.025)	(0.287)
Education		0.016	0.016		0.032	0.032
		(0.023)	(0.025)		(0.023)	(0.024)
Income		0.017	0.017		−0.015	−0.015
		(0.042)	(0.041)		(0.043)	(0.044)
Rural		0.161**	0.161**		0.030	0.030
		(0.076)	(0.075)		(0.078)	(0.079)
Full Treatment (F Speaker):	0.203	0.294	0.294	0.134	0.129	0.129
Left Party	(0.210)	(0.208)	(0.202)	(0.213)	(0.214)	(0.201)
Constant	−0.010	−0.591	−0.591	−0.207*	0.361	0.361
	(0.110)	(0.388)	(0.383)	(0.111)	(0.398)	(0.414)
Observations	385	385		385	385	
R^2	0.011	0.098		0.021	0.085	
Adjusted R^2	0.003	0.056		0.013	0.042	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.20: Bivariate Ordered Logit Models

	Dependent variable:			
	Roles	Styles	Environment	Qualification
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Full Treatment (F Speaker)	0.729^{***}	-0.073	0.194	0.330^{*}
	(0.254)	(0.193)	(0.185)	(0.189)
Observations	385	385	385	385
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.21: Multivariate Ordered Logit Models

	Dependent variable:			
	Roles	Styles	Environment	Qualification
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Full Treatment (F Speaker)	0.740^{***}	0.015	0.277	0.277
	(0.261)	(0.199)	(0.191)	(0.194)
Age (25-34 years old)	0.564	0.411	0.499	-0.078
	(0.493)	(0.372)	(0.361)	(0.366)
Age (35-44 years old)	0.982^{**}	1.020^{***}	0.587	0.338
	(0.495)	(0.377)	(0.365)	(0.367)
Age (45-54 years old)	0.897^{*}	0.498	1.055^{***}	0.213
	(0.521)	(0.401)	(0.391)	(0.390)
Age (55-64 years old)	0.871	1.274^{***}	0.441	0.094
	(0.543)	(0.413)	(0.388)	(0.401)
Age (65+ years old)	-0.032	1.181^{***}	1.034^{**}	0.233
	(0.566)	(0.436)	(0.419)	(0.424)
Ethnicity (Black/African/Caribbean)	0.557	-0.208	-1.878^{**}	-1.216
	(0.969)	(0.884)	(0.848)	(0.823)
Ethnicity (Mixed two or more)	1.477	0.419	-1.733^{**}	-1.505^{**}
	(0.940)	(0.768)	(0.706)	(0.703)
Ethnicity (Arab or any others)	-2.360^{*}	-0.171	-0.149	-1.299
	(1.383)	(1.052)	(1.248)	(1.036)
Ethnicity (Prefer not to say)	-0.467	0.312	-15.434^{***}	-0.448
	(1.787)	(1.271)	(0.00000)	(1.141)
Ethnicity (White)	0.047	0.220	-0.646^{*}	-1.540^{***}
	(0.543)	(0.390)	(0.385)	(0.395)
Ethnicity (White, Black/African/Caribbean)	2.309	0.862	-15.560^{***}	-15.741^{***}
	(1.797)	(1.737)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)
Education	-0.160^{***}	-0.067	0.037	0.063
	(0.058)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.044)
Income	-0.169	-0.022	0.023	-0.051
	(0.106)	(0.081)	(0.079)	(0.083)
Rural	-0.006	-0.187	0.289^{**}	0.025
	(0.189)	(0.146)	(0.144)	(0.148)
Left Party	0.958^{***}	0.504^{**}	-0.299	0.304
	(0.287)	(0.215)	(0.205)	(0.209)
Observations	385	385	385	385
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.3.4 Effect of Role Model

Table C.22: Bivariate OLS Models

	Dependent variable:				
	Ambition	Roles	Styles	Environment	Qualification
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Full Treatment (M Speaker)	−0.071	−0.088	0.187*	−0.181*	−0.199**
	(0.103)	(0.098)	(0.104)	(0.099)	(0.101)
Constant	0.012	0.202***	−0.022	−0.039	0.060
	(0.075)	(0.071)	(0.076)	(0.072)	(0.073)
Observations	382	382	382	382	382
R^2	0.001	0.002	0.008	0.009	0.010
Adjusted R^2	−0.001	−0.0005	0.006	0.006	0.008
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.23: Multivariate OLS Models

	Dependent variable:				
	Ambition	Roles	Styles	Environment	Qualification
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Full Treatment (M Speaker)	−0.044	−0.078	0.180*	−0.188*	−0.161
	(0.101)	(0.101)	(0.106)	(0.102)	(0.101)
Age (25-34 years old)	−0.055	0.012	0.016	0.149	−0.027
	(0.185)	(0.186)	(0.195)	(0.188)	(0.185)
Age (35-44 years old)	−0.129	0.069	0.185	0.139	0.118
	(0.186)	(0.186)	(0.196)	(0.189)	(0.186)
Age (45-54 years old)	−0.187	−0.086	0.141	0.117	−0.142
	(0.204)	(0.204)	(0.215)	(0.207)	(0.204)
Age (55-64 years old)	−0.467**	0.082	0.369*	0.200	−0.158
	(0.212)	(0.212)	(0.223)	(0.215)	(0.212)
Age (65+ years old)	−0.433*	−0.290	−0.082	0.436*	0.254
	(0.240)	(0.241)	(0.253)	(0.244)	(0.240)
Education	0.028	−0.013	−0.033	0.021	0.051**
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Income	−0.006	−0.022	−0.081*	0.044	−0.012
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Ethnicity	−0.146***	−0.024	0.074**	−0.019	−0.115***
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Rural	0.133*	−0.133*	−0.140*	0.025	0.060
	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.081)	(0.080)
Left Party	0.160*	0.071	0.169*	−0.003	0.144
	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.101)	(0.098)	(0.096)
Constant	0.352	0.800*	0.094	−0.350	0.208
	(0.410)	(0.411)	(0.431)	(0.416)	(0.410)
Observations	382	382	382	382	382
R^2	0.124	0.023	0.062	0.027	0.091
Adjusted R^2	0.098	−0.006	0.034	−0.002	0.064
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.24: All Models with Robust Standard Errors

	Dependent variable:				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Full Treatment (M Speaker)	−0.044	−0.078	0.180*	−0.188*	−0.161
	(0.102)	(0.100)	(0.107)	(0.103)	(0.101)
Age (25-34 years old)	−0.055	0.012	0.016	0.149	−0.027
	(0.202)	(0.183)	(0.176)	(0.181)	(0.182)
Age (35-44 years old)	−0.129	0.069	0.185	0.139	0.118
	(0.200)	(0.179)	(0.170)	(0.177)	(0.193)
Age (45-54 years old)	−0.187	−0.086	0.141	0.117	−0.142
	(0.209)	(0.206)	(0.212)	(0.197)	(0.196)
Age (55-64 years old)	−0.467**	0.082	0.369*	0.200	−0.158
	(0.192)	(0.195)	(0.201)	(0.192)	(0.201)
Age (65+ years old)	−0.433**	−0.290	−0.082	0.436**	0.254
	(0.194)	(0.216)	(0.229)	(0.207)	(0.239)
Education	0.028	−0.013	−0.033	0.021	0.051**
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.023)
Income	−0.006	−0.022	−0.081**	0.044	−0.012
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.042)
Ethnicity	−0.146***	−0.024	0.074**	−0.019	−0.115***
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.042)
Rural	0.133	−0.133*	−0.140*	0.025	0.060
	(0.083)	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.082)	(0.087)
Left Party	0.160*	0.071	0.169*	−0.003	0.144*
	(0.084)	(0.103)	(0.097)	(0.089)	(0.086)
Constant	0.352	0.800*	0.094	−0.350	0.208
	(0.445)	(0.424)	(0.394)	(0.392)	(0.433)
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.25: Ordered Logit Models

	Dependent variable:				
	Ambition	Roles	Styles	Environment	Qualification
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Full Treatment (F Speaker)	0.517	−0.356	−0.247	0.469	0.276
	(0.474)	(0.428)	(0.337)	(0.323)	(0.340)
Left Party	1.025**	−0.079	0.333	0.165	0.477
	(0.415)	(0.375)	(0.294)	(0.281)	(0.297)
Age (25-34 years old)	−0.171	0.252	0.101	0.298	−0.118
	(0.385)	(0.461)	(0.366)	(0.359)	(0.365)
Age (35-44 years old)	−0.283	0.036	0.345	0.346	0.222
	(0.392)	(0.465)	(0.366)	(0.361)	(0.371)
Age (45-54 years old)	−0.365	−0.138	0.416	0.298	−0.272
	(0.444)	(0.514)	(0.414)	(0.395)	(0.406)
Age (55-64 years old)	−1.056**	0.305	0.685	0.366	−0.220
	(0.505)	(0.524)	(0.421)	(0.400)	(0.421)
Age (65+ years old)	−0.979*	−0.764	−0.044	0.774*	0.514
	(0.572)	(0.604)	(0.465)	(0.444)	(0.460)
Education	0.073	−0.051	−0.046	0.056	0.092**
	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.046)
Income	−0.066	−0.018	−0.132	0.049	−0.034
	(0.097)	(0.102)	(0.081)	(0.079)	(0.084)
Ethnicity	−0.248***	−0.041	0.149**	−0.044	−0.211***
	(0.072)	(0.089)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.071)
Rural	0.164	−0.330*	−0.208	−0.008	0.016
	(0.181)	(0.195)	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.161)
Full Treatment (F Speaker):Left Party	−0.494	0.906*	−0.198	−0.234	−0.003
	(0.547)	(0.529)	(0.417)	(0.403)	(0.417)
Observations	368	368	368	368	368

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.3.5 Mediation

Table C.26: Attitudes Mediation

	Dependent variable:			
	Environment	Ambition	Environment	Ambition
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Environment		0.335***		0.185***
		(0.064)		(0.070)
Full Treatment (F Speaker)	0.262*	−0.016	0.020	−0.010
	(0.137)	(0.130)	(0.149)	(0.122)
Age (25-34 years old)	0.443**	0.054	−0.235	−0.385
	(0.224)	(0.213)	(0.407)	(0.332)
Age (35-44 years old)	0.426*	−0.096	−0.099	−0.518
	(0.235)	(0.223)	(0.385)	(0.314)
Age (45-54 years old)	0.628**	0.020	0.164	−0.509
	(0.244)	(0.234)	(0.405)	(0.330)
Age (55-64 years old)	0.129	−0.130	−0.029	−0.611*
	(0.289)	(0.273)	(0.383)	(0.312)
Age (65+ years old)	0.519*	−0.723**	0.362	−0.717**
	(0.299)	(0.284)	(0.403)	(0.329)
Ethnicity (Black/African/Caribbean)	−1.385***	−0.243	1.273	−0.187
	(0.484)	(0.465)	(0.952)	(0.782)
Ethnicity (Mixed two or more)	−1.228***	−0.860**	0.205	−1.212**
	(0.453)	(0.434)	(0.709)	(0.579)
Ethnicity (Arab or any others)	0.425	−1.024	−1.560	−0.909
	(0.759)	(0.717)	(0.951)	(0.784)
Ethnicity (Prefer not to say)	−1.920*	−0.815	−1.736*	−0.629
	(1.071)	(1.018)	(0.948)	(0.783)
Ethnicity (White)	−0.413*	−0.792***	0.054	−0.777***
	(0.248)	(0.235)	(0.351)	(0.286)
Ethnicity (White, Black/African/Caribbean)	−2.351**	−1.000		
	(1.053)	(1.005)		
Education	0.007	−0.005	0.037	0.028
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.027)
Income	0.075	−0.040	−0.065	0.059
	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.068)	(0.055)
Rural	0.208**	0.064	0.075	0.005
	(0.099)	(0.095)	(0.121)	(0.099)
Constant	−1.100**	0.888*	−0.303	0.776
	(0.500)	(0.477)	(0.622)	(0.508)
Observations	236	236	149	149
R^2	0.150	0.237	0.125	0.153
Adjusted R^2	0.092	0.182	0.034	0.058
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.4 Robustness Checks

C.4.1 Ambition Dummy

Table C.27: Main Effect (Full treatment and segments of treatment)

	Dependent variable:					
	Ambition			Ambition		
	(OLS)		*coefficient test*	(OLS)		*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Full Treatment (F Speaker)	0.024	−0.005	−0.005			
	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.046)			
Roles Treatment				−0.016	−0.015	−0.015
				(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.043)
Styles Treatment				−0.096**	−0.110**	−0.110***
				(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.041)
Environment Treatment				−0.016	−0.023	−0.023
				(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Qualification Treatment				0.031	0.015	0.015
				(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.044)
Age (25-34 years old)		−0.077	−0.077		−0.062	−0.062
		(0.087)	(0.096)		(0.053)	(0.058)
Age (35-44 years old)		−0.164*	−0.164*		−0.141***	−0.141**
		(0.087)	(0.094)		(0.053)	(0.058)
Age (45-54 years old)		−0.100	−0.100		−0.185***	−0.185***
		(0.093)	(0.101)		(0.057)	(0.062)
Age (55-64 years old)		−0.230**	−0.230**		−0.191***	−0.191***
		(0.096)	(0.101)		(0.059)	(0.063)
Age (65+ years old)		−0.302***	−0.302***		−0.281***	−0.281***
		(0.104)	(0.099)		(0.064)	(0.062)
Education		0.009	0.009		0.017***	0.017***
		(0.010)	(0.011)		(0.006)	(0.006)
Income		−0.014	−0.014		0.001	0.001
		(0.019)	(0.018)		(0.011)	(0.010)
Ethnicity		−0.050***	−0.050***		−0.030***	−0.030***
		(0.017)	(0.018)		(0.010)	(0.011)
Left Party		0.028	0.028		−0.021	−0.021
		(0.045)	(0.043)		(0.026)	(0.024)
Rural		0.026	0.026		0.045**	0.045**
		(0.035)	(0.034)		(0.020)	(0.019)
Constant	0.313***	0.638***	0.638***	0.313***	0.432***	0.432***
	(0.032)	(0.184)	(0.193)	(0.031)	(0.108)	(0.113)
Observations	398	398		1,081	1,081	
R^2	0.001	0.078		0.008	0.069	
Adjusted R^2	−0.002	0.051		0.005	0.057	
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.28: Heterogeneous Effects (Full treatment and segments of treatment)

	Dependent variable:					
	Ambition			Ambition		
	(OLS)		*coefficient test*	(OLS)		*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Full Treatment (F Speaker)	0.026	0.0003	0.0003			
	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.069)			
Roles Treatment				0.021	0.004	0.004
				(0.071)	(0.069)	(0.062)
Styles Treatment				0.026	0.014	0.014
				(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.065)
Environment Treatment				0.057	0.037	0.037
				(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.068)
Qualification Treatment				0.082	0.065	0.065
				(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.070)
Left Party	0.180***	0.122*	0.122*	0.180***	0.116*	0.116*
	(0.066)	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.062)
Age (25-34 years old)		−0.101	−0.101		−0.068	−0.068
		(0.091)	(0.100)		(0.055)	(0.062)
Age (35-44 years old)		−0.166*	−0.166*		−0.138**	−0.138**
		(0.091)	(0.099)		(0.055)	(0.061)
Age (45-54 years old)		−0.116	−0.116		−0.185***	−0.185***
		(0.096)	(0.104)		(0.059)	(0.065)
Age (55-64 years old)		−0.227**	−0.227**		−0.196***	−0.196***
		(0.098)	(0.105)		(0.062)	(0.066)
Age (65+ years old)		−0.315***	−0.315***		−0.282***	−0.282***
		(0.106)	(0.103)		(0.066)	(0.065)
Education		0.008	0.008		0.016***	0.016**
		(0.011)	(0.011)		(0.006)	(0.006)
Income		−0.016	−0.016		−0.002	−0.002
		(0.020)	(0.019)		(0.011)	(0.011)
Ethnicity		−0.053***	−0.053***		−0.032***	−0.032***
		(0.017)	(0.018)		(0.011)	(0.012)
Rural		0.011	0.011		0.043**	0.043**
		(0.035)	(0.035)		(0.020)	(0.020)
Full Treatment (F Speaker):Left Party	−0.013	−0.021	−0.021			
	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.092)			
Roles Treatment:Left Party				−0.080	−0.050	−0.050
				(0.090)	(0.088)	(0.086)
Styles Treatment:Left Party				−0.216**	−0.217**	−0.217**
				(0.093)	(0.091)	(0.086)
Environment Treatment:Left Party				−0.131	−0.110	−0.110
				(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.089)
Qualification Treatment:Left Party				−0.088	−0.087	−0.087
				(0.094)	(0.092)	(0.092)
Constant	0.217***	0.677***	0.677***	0.217***	0.387***	0.387***
	(0.051)	(0.188)	(0.196)	(0.050)	(0.116)	(0.120)
Observations	385	385		1,041	1,041	
R^2	0.033	0.096		0.022	0.080	
Adjusted R^2	0.025	0.067		0.014	0.064	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.4.2 Attitudes on a Three-point Scale

Table C.29: Main Effect on Attitudes (Roles and Styles)

	Dependent variable:					
	Roles			Styles		
	(OLS)		*coefficient test*	(OLS)		*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Full Treatment (F Speaker)	0.122***	0.122***	0.122***	0.038	0.038	0.038
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.071)
Age (25-34 years old)	0.091	0.091	0.091	0.159	0.159	0.159
	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.087)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.124)
Age (35-44 years old)	0.135	0.135	0.135	0.355***	0.355***	0.355***
	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.084)	(0.131)	(0.131)	(0.127)
Age (45-54 years old)	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.203	0.203	0.203
	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.140)
Age (55-64 years old)	0.055	0.055	0.055	0.355**	0.355**	0.355***
	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.083)	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.135)
Age (65+ years old)	−0.062	−0.062	−0.062	0.369**	0.369**	0.369***
	(0.103)	(0.103)	(0.092)	(0.154)	(0.154)	(0.142)
Ethnicity	0.272	0.272	0.272	0.133	0.133	0.133
(Black/African/Caribbean)	(0.187)	(0.187)	(0.202)	(0.281)	(0.281)	(0.369)
Ethnicity (Mixed two or more)	0.258	0.258	0.258	0.229	0.229	0.229
	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.256)	(0.265)	(0.265)	(0.245)
Ethnicity (Arab or any others)	−0.366	−0.366	−0.366	−0.244	−0.244	−0.244
	(0.280)	(0.280)	(0.334)	(0.420)	(0.420)	(0.295)
Ethnicity (Prefer not to say)	−0.018	−0.018	−0.018	0.183	0.183	0.183
	(0.341)	(0.341)	(0.135)	(0.512)	(0.512)	(0.163)
Ethnicity (White)	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.097	0.097	0.097
	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.125)	(0.139)	(0.139)	(0.135)
Ethnicity (White,	0.874*	0.874*	0.874***	0.325	0.325	0.325**
Black/African/Caribbean)	(0.469)	(0.469)	(0.138)	(0.705)	(0.705)	(0.165)
Education	−0.025**	−0.025**	−0.025***	−0.018	−0.018	−0.018
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Income	−0.031	−0.031	−0.031*	0.006	0.006	0.006
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Rural	0.018	0.018	0.018	−0.035	−0.035	−0.035
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.051)
Constant	0.0004	0.0004	0.0004	−0.398	−0.398	−0.398
	(0.177)	(0.177)	(0.199)	(0.266)	(0.266)	(0.251)
Observations	398	398		398	398	
R^2	0.086	0.086		0.042	0.042	
Adjusted R^2	0.050	0.050		0.004	0.004	
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.30: Main Effect on Attitudes (Environment and Qualification)

	Dependent variable:					
	Environment			Qualification		
	(OLS)		*coefficient test*	(OLS)		*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Full Treatment (F Speaker)	0.114	0.114	0.114	0.148*	0.148*	0.148*
	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.084)
Age (25-34 years old)	0.149	0.149	0.149	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.133)	(0.161)	(0.161)	(0.150)
Age (35-44 years old)	0.207	0.207	0.207	0.102	0.102	0.102
	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.137)	(0.160)	(0.160)	(0.149)
Age (45-54 years old)	0.353**	0.353**	0.353**	0.078	0.078	0.078
	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.151)	(0.171)	(0.171)	(0.164)
Age (55-64 years old)	0.136	0.136	0.136	0.037	0.037	0.037
	(0.157)	(0.157)	(0.142)	(0.172)	(0.172)	(0.163)
Age (65+ years old)	0.357**	0.357**	0.357**	0.075	0.075	0.075
	(0.172)	(0.172)	(0.167)	(0.188)	(0.188)	(0.171)
Ethnicity	−0.580*	−0.580*	−0.580**	−0.527	−0.527	−0.527
(Black/African/Caribbean)	(0.313)	(0.313)	(0.294)	(0.344)	(0.344)	(0.375)
Ethnicity (Mixed two or more)	−0.611**	−0.611**	−0.611***	−0.599*	−0.599*	−0.599**
	(0.296)	(0.296)	(0.215)	(0.325)	(0.325)	(0.287)
Ethnicity (Arab or any others)	0.128	0.128	0.128	−0.417	−0.417	−0.417
	(0.469)	(0.469)	(0.545)	(0.514)	(0.514)	(0.480)
Ethnicity (Prefer not to say)	−0.967*	−0.967*	−0.967***	0.158	0.158	0.158
	(0.572)	(0.572)	(0.177)	(0.627)	(0.627)	(0.388)
Ethnicity (White)	−0.222	−0.222	−0.222	−0.599***	−0.599***	−0.599***
	(0.156)	(0.156)	(0.155)	(0.171)	(0.171)	(0.168)
Ethnicity (White,	−1.252	−1.252	−1.252***	−1.474*	−1.474*	−1.474***
Black/African/Caribbean)	(0.786)	(0.786)	(0.182)	(0.862)	(0.862)	(0.197)
Education	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.033*	0.033*	0.033*
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
Income	0.002	0.002	0.002	−0.029	−0.029	−0.029
	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Rural	0.097*	0.097*	0.097*	0.016	0.016	0.016
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.062)
Constant	−0.596**	−0.596**	−0.596**	0.124	0.124	0.124
	(0.297)	(0.297)	(0.288)	(0.326)	(0.326)	(0.318)
Observations	398	398		398	398	
R^2	0.061	0.061		0.061	0.061	
Adjusted R^2	0.024	0.024		0.024	0.024	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

C.4.3 Causal Trees

Figure C.3: Causal Tree - Mentoring Event (Full-lenght)



Causal tree displaying heterogeneous effects of the full-length audio of the mentoring event on the basis of participants demographic characteristics. For the production of this tree I used Professor Susan Athey's method .

Figure C.4: Causal Tree - Content about Roles



Causal tree displaying heterogeneous effects of the audio segment about Roles on the basis of participants demographic characteristics. For the production of this tree I used Professor Susan Athey's method .

Figure C.5: Causal Tree - Content about Styles



Causal tree displaying heterogeneous effects of the audio segment about Styles on the basis of participants demographic characteristics. For the production of this tree I used Professor Susan Athey's method .

Figure C.6: Causal Tree - Content about Environment



Causal tree displaying heterogeneous effects of the audio segment about Environment on the basis of participants demographic characteristics. For the production of this tree I used Professor Susan Athey's method .

Figure C.7: Causal Tree - Content about Qualification



Causal tree displaying heterogeneous effects of the audio segment about Qualification on the basis of participants demographic characteristics. For the production of this tree I used Professor Susan Athey's method .

Appendix D

Appendix Chapter V

D.1 Data

D.1.1 Pre-analysis Plan and Variable Operationalisation

General Information About the Study

*Title of Study:*Will She Run? Women's Political Ambition, Attitudes About Women's Suitability to Politics and Emails Inviting Women to Run for Office

EGAP Registration ID: 20210719AA

Timestamp of original registration: 2021-07-19 10:15:00 -0400

Is this Registration Prospective or Retrospective? registration prior to any research activities

Date of start of study: Understood as first date of treatment assignment or equivalent for observational study 07/20/2021

Is there a pre-analysis plan associated with this registration? Yes

Registration Data

Background and explanation of rationale. The gender gap in political ambition seems to be today among the major causes for women's political under-representation. In my broader research project, I propose that attitudes about women's suitability to politics can explain the variation in the political ambition of women in the general population. Furthermore, previous research suggests that women tend not to run for political office unless they are asked to, and regardless of their predisposition. With this experiment, I aim to positively affect women's political ambition through one of the most common ways used in the real world to ask women to run (i.e., through recruitment emails), and I develop different emails to account for different attitudinal predispositions as defined in my broader research project.

What are the hypotheses to be tested/quantities of interest to be estimated? (HP1) the treatments positively affect the political ambition of the women in my sample; (HP2) the positive effect is moderated by pre-existing attitudes towards women's suitability to politics.

How will these hypotheses be tested? First of all, these hypotheses will be tested by way of an online survey experiment, on a representative sample of the female population in Great Britain. Once data will be collected, I will proceed to test my hypothesis through different statistical models (see related pre-analysis plan document: "Pre Analysis Plan for "Will She Run? Women's Political Ambition, Attitudes About Women's Suitability to Politics and Emails Inviting Women to Run for Office").

*Country:*Great Britain

Sample Size (number of units): app. 800 women; further 800 men in the control condition

Was a power analysis conducted prior to data collection? Because of a severe lack of information the power analysis was only approximated

Has this research received Institutional Review Board (IRB) or ethics committee approval? Under review (ethics committee approval)

Will the intervention be implemented by the researcher or a third party? YouGov

Experimental Design

Description: with a survey Experiment, I test the effect of recruitment emails on women's political ambition in Great Britain. These emails are designed to manipulate different attitudes that, in theory, affect women's political ambition.
*Date registered:*September 15, 2021
Date created: September 15, 2021
Associated project: osf.io/qzpm9
*EGAP Registration ID:*20210719AA
*Internet Archive link*https://archive.org/details/osf-registrations-ugd8j-v1
*Registration DOI*https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/UGD8J
*Subjects:*Social and Behavioral Sciences
License: MIT License
*Citation:*osf.io/ugd8j

D.1.2 Questionnaire and Experimental Procedure

- Pre-treatment Covariates: collected when participants will begin to answer the online survey questionnaire
- Pre-treatment Moderators: collected before the treatment
  - Q1) attitude towards women's suitability to the public sphere:
    - Every Participant.
    - Grid question.
    - QUESTION: " To what extent, if at all, do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?":
    - ITEM 1: "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women";
    - ITEM 2: "Men make better political leaders than women";
    - ITEM 3: "It is a man's job to earn money and a woman's job to take care of the home and family".
    - ANSWER: Strongly agree/ Tend to agree/ Neither agree nor disagree/ Tend to disagree / Strongly disagree.
  - Q2) attitude towards leadership style:
    - Every Participant.
    - Multiple choice question.
    - QUESTION: "Which of the following, if any, do you think are the most important characteristics that a political leader should have? Please choose 3 from the list below".
    - ANSWER OPTIONS (to be randomised):
    - 1. Empathy; 2. Ability to cooperate; 3. Communicational skills; 4. Fairness; 5. Authority; 6. Ability to assign tasks; 7. Be goal-oriented; 8. Competitiveness; None of these; Don't know.
  - Q3) self-perception of (internal and external) efficacy:
    - Every Participant.
    - Grid question.
    - QUESTION: "Please imagine a scenario where you are considering running for political office, to which extent would the following be a significant obstacle to your election? Please, report the extent to which you agree with the following statements":
    - ITEM 1: "Some sort of bias in the political environment, or the idea that someone of my gender would not be welcomed in the political environment";
    - ITEM 2: "My personal lack of qualification and experience";
    - ITEM 3: "I simply would not be interested in embracing a career path with a high degree of uncertainty and as high risk as politics".
    - ANSWER: 0 to 10, where 0 means "Not a significant obstacle" and 10 means "Very significant obstacle" + "Don't know".

- Randomization into treatment groups: 1/6th of the sample will be assigned to the control group; 1/6th of the sample will be assigned to Treatment_1; 1/6th of the sample will be assigned to Treatment_2; 1/6th of the sample will be assigned to Treatment_3; 1/6th of the sample will be assigned to Treatment_4; 1/6th of the sample will be assigned to Treatment_5.

- The Treatment is Displayed:

  the control is introduced by the following message (male participants and 1/6 of female participants): "In recent years, a few organisations have been reaching out by email to people in the UK to raise awareness about the benefits of sleep. Imagine you've just received the following email. Read the text and answer the following questions"

  OR

  the treatment is introduced by the following message (only for participants in the treatment condition) (5/6 of female participants, 1/6 to each condition): "In recent years, a few organisations have been reaching out by email to women who have been identified by members of their community, asking them to consider running for political office. Imagine you've just received the following email. Read the text and answer the following questions"

  [one of the picture representing the treatment is displayed here]

  - Q4) attention check: Grid question.
    - QUESTION: "On a scale from 1 to 5,...": *treatment Group:* how relevant is the email you have read above to the topic of the benefits of sleep? (1 means "not relevant at all" and 5 means "completely relevant"). Participants in the treatment group (i.e., 5/6 of female respondents).
    - *OR control Group:* how relevant is the email you have read above to the topic of women in politics? (1 means "not relevant at all" and 5 means "completely relevant"). Participants in the control group (i.e., male respondents and 1/6 female respondents).

- Post-treatment Outcomes Variables:

  - Q5) political ambition (a):
    - Every Participant.
    - Scale question.
    - QUESTION: "How likely is it, if at all, that you will run for political office at some point in your life?" (from Lawless and Fox, 2010).
    - ANSWER: 0 to 10, where 1 means "Very Unlikely" and 10 means "Very Likely".
  - Q6) political ambition (b):
    - Every Participant.
    - Single choice question.
    - QUESTION: "Please imagine a scenario where you are considering running for political office, which of these positions would you most like to hold? Please, select your favoured option".
    - ANSWER OPTIONS (order to be randomised):
    - Councillor; City Mayor; Metropolitan Mayor; Member of the UK Parliament; Cabinet Member; Prime Minister; Member of the Scottish Parliament/Welsh Parliament; Don't know.
  - Q7) subsidiary ambition:
    - Every Participant.
    - Multiple choice question.
    - QUESTION: "In recent years, a few organisations have been reaching out to women who have been identified by members of their community, asking them to consider running for political office. Imagine you know an inspiring woman that could be a great political leader. How likely, if at all, would you be to reach out to an organisation and recommend that they contact the woman you have in mind?".

    - ANSWER: 0 to 10, where 0 means "Not at all likely" and 10 means "Very much likely".
  - Q8) Manipulation (a):
    - All Participants.
    - Scale Question
    - QUESTION: To what extent, if at all, would you say that their gender is a barrier to women entering politics?
    - ANSWER: A great deal / a fair amount / not very much / not at all / DK.
  - Q9) Manipulation (b):
    - All Participants.
    - Multiple Choice question.
    - QUESTION: Which of the following, if any, do you think are the main reasons why women are under-represented in politics? Please choose up to four.
    - ANSWER OPTIONS: <1> Women not feeling qualified; <2> Women not feeling able to balance a political role with their home life; <3> Politics being seen as a 'man's job'; <4> Cost of campaigning; <5> Abuse and harassment of women currently in politics; <6> The belief that women's tendency to collaborate is not suited for the political environment; <7> Women tend to be less successful in elections than men; <8> Not knowing the 'right people'; <9> Women not being interested in politics; <10> Other; <11> Don't know; <12> Not applicable – women are not under-represented in politics

- End of the Survey Experiment

D.1.3 Sample Statistics

Table D.1: Sample Chapter V Statistics

Variable	**Value**
Gender (%)	42.5% (M) / 57.5% (F)
Mean Age	51
Median Education	Post-secondary
Median Income	£40,000 to £44,999 per year
Ethnicity (White %)	90%
Rural/Suburban/Urban (%)	Urban: 77%, Suburban: 11%, Rural: 12%
Party (%)	Conservative 44%) Labour 31% Other Parties 25%
Left Party (%)	Left: 56%, Right: 49%

D.2 Preliminary Analysis

D.2.1 Balancing Checks

Table D.2: Balancing Checks

	Dependent variable:									
	Treatment									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Age	−0.003									
Region		0.013								
Social Grade			0.024							
Education				−0.008						
Income					−0.020					
Ethnicity						−0.028				
Religion							0.001			
Party								0.001		
Attention									−0.003	
Urban										−0.079
Constant	3.654	3.440	3.438	3.611	3.647	3.570	3.508	3.444	3.537	3.627
Observations	956	956	956	836	713	949	929	771	956	952
Note:										*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D.2.2 Ex-ante Power Analysis

Table D.3: Main Effects on Ambition

	Sample Size	**Effect Size**	**Experimental Power**	**Significance Level**	**One-sided/ Two-sided**
Overall Campaign	n = 78	d = 0.4	p = 0.8	a = 0.5	One-sided
Informational Messages	n = 99	d = 0.4	p = 0.8	a = 0.5	Two-sided

In "Sample Size", "n" is for each condition.

Table D.4: Heterogeneous Effects on Ambition

	Sample Size	**Effect Size**	**Experimental Power**	**Significance Level**	**One-sided/ Two-sided**
Overall Campaign	n = 78	d = 0.4	p = 0.8	a = 0.5	One-sided
Informational Messages	n = 99	d = 0.4	p = 0.8	a = 0.5	Two-sided

In "Sample Size", "n" is for each condition.

D.2.3 Post-hoc Power Analysis

Table D.5: Main Effects on Ambition

	Effect Size	**Sample Size**	**Experimental Power**	**Significance Level**	**One-sided/ Two-sided**
Overall Campaign	d = 0.1*	n = 200	p = 0.25	a = 0.5	One-sided
Informational Messages	Roles = 0.1; Styles = 0.1; Environment = 0.04; Qualification = 0.2*	n = 200	Roles = 0.4; Styles =0.4; Environment = 0.1; Qualification = 0.7	a = 0.5	One-sided

In "Sample Size", "n" is for each condition. **Ad-Hoc power analysis** reveals that the sample size per condition should have been 500 and 2000 (controls and treatment group, respectively) to achieve full experimental power. Note that **every experimental comparison was underpowered**.

Figure D.1: Main Effect Sample Size



Table D.6: Heterogeneous Effects on Ambition

	Effect Size	**Sample Size**	**Experimental Power**	**Significance Level**	**One-sided/ Two-sided**
Overall Campaign	d = 0.4	n = 130, 600	p = 0.45	a = 0.5	One-sided
Informational Messages	Roles = 0.14; Styles = 0.4; Environment = 0.2**; Qualification = 0.25	n = 100	Roles = 0.3; *Styles =0.9;* Environment = 0.45; Qualification = 0.7	a = 0.5	One-sided

In "Sample Size", n = 130 for the control condition and n = 600 for the treatment groups. Otherwise n = sample in each condition. Note that **every experimental comparison was underpowered**, bar from the comparison based on the email containing the informational message about women's leadership style.

Figure D.2: Difference in Left-wing and Right-wing Voters



D.3 Main Analysis

D.3.1 Main Effect

Table D.7: Main Effect (Full Treatment)

	Dependent variable:				
	Ambition (OLS)		*coefficient test*	Ambition (OL)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Treatment (dummy)	0.135	0.164	0.164	0.255	0.180
	(0.091)	(0.111)	(0.104)	(0.289)	(0.428)
Age		-0.013^{***}	-0.013^{***}		-0.050^{***}
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.012)
Education		0.006	0.006		-0.005
		(0.011)	(0.012)		(0.043)
Income		0.011	0.011		0.016
		(0.014)	(0.014)		(0.049)
Ethnicity		-0.018	-0.018		-0.087
		(0.020)	(0.012)		(0.102)
Urban		0.112^{*}	0.112		0.340
		(0.068)	(0.076)		(0.221)
Left Party		0.007	0.007		-0.142
		(0.094)	(0.098)		(0.352)
Constant	-0.127	0.214	0.214		
	(0.081)	(0.300)	(0.327)		
Observations	799	415		799	415
R^2	0.003	0.069			
Adjusted R^2	0.002	0.053			
Note:					*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.8: Main Effect (Segments of Treatment)

	Dependent variable:				
	Ambition			Ambition	
	(OLS)		*coefficient test*	(OL)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Roles Treatment	0.141	0.143	0.143	0.397	0.199
	(0.114)	(0.141)	(0.135)	(0.346)	(0.520)
Styles Treatment	0.134	0.150	0.150	0.264	0.097
	(0.115)	(0.143)	(0.133)	(0.356)	(0.545)
Qualification Treatment	0.219*	0.252*	0.252*	0.333	0.394
	(0.114)	(0.146)	(0.151)	(0.349)	(0.533)
Environment Treatment	0.046	0.117	0.117	−0.014	0.023
	(0.114)	(0.142)	(0.134)	(0.372)	(0.545)
Age		−0.013***	−0.013***		−0.051***
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.012)
Education		0.006	0.006		−0.005
		(0.011)	(0.012)		(0.043)
Income		0.010	0.010		0.013
		(0.014)	(0.014)		(0.049)
Ethnicity		−0.017	−0.017		−0.086
		(0.020)	(0.012)		(0.103)
Urban		0.105	0.105		0.331
		(0.068)	(0.075)		(0.222)
Left Party		0.012	0.012		−0.125
		(0.095)	(0.100)		(0.354)
Constant	−0.127	0.231	0.231		
	(0.081)	(0.301)	(0.329)		
Observations	799	415		799	415
R^2	0.006	0.072			
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.049			

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D.3.2 Heterogeneous Effects

Table D.9: Heterogeneous Effects

	Dependent variable:					
	Ambition			Ambition		
	(OLS)		*coefficient test*	(OLS)		*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment (dummy)	0.153	0.065	0.065			
	(0.139)	(0.165)	(0.177)			
Roles Treatment				0.179	0.010	0.010
				(0.173)	(0.204)	(0.193)
Styles Treatment				0.033	0.032	0.032
				(0.181)	(0.216)	(0.199)
Qualification Treatment				0.117	0.061	0.061
				(0.176)	(0.214)	(0.240)
Environment Treatment				0.310	0.194	0.194
				(0.192)	(0.228)	(0.261)
Left Party	0.213	−0.133	−0.133	0.213	−0.134	−0.134
	(0.174)	(0.197)	(0.176)	(0.175)	(0.198)	(0.176)
Age		−0.013***	−0.013***		−0.013***	−0.013***
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)
Education		0.005	0.005		0.006	0.006
		(0.011)	(0.012)		(0.011)	(0.012)
Income		0.010	0.010		0.009	0.009
		(0.014)	(0.014)		(0.014)	(0.014)
Ethnicity		−0.018	−0.018		−0.017	−0.017
		(0.020)	(0.012)		(0.020)	(0.012)
Urban		0.116*	0.116		0.115*	0.115
		(0.068)	(0.076)		(0.069)	(0.077)
Treatment (dummy):Left Party	−0.064	0.181	0.181			
	(0.196)	(0.223)	(0.207)			
Roles Treatment:Left Party				−0.041	0.258	0.258
				(0.244)	(0.282)	(0.260)
Styles Treatment:Left Party				0.130	0.216	0.216
				(0.250)	(0.288)	(0.262)
Qualification Treatment:Left Party				0.049	0.359	0.359
				(0.251)	(0.294)	(0.311)
Environment Treatment:Left Party				−0.405	−0.082	−0.082
				(0.257)	(0.291)	(0.292)
Constant	−0.258**	0.304	0.304	−0.258**	0.297	0.297
	(0.122)	(0.320)	(0.348)	(0.122)	(0.322)	(0.357)
Observations	611	415		611	415	
R^2	0.010	0.071		0.019	0.079	
Adjusted R^2	0.005	0.053		0.004	0.046	
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D.3.3 Moderation

Table D.10: Moderation

	Dependent variable:	
	Ambition	
	(OLS)	*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)
Roles Treatment	0.166	0.166
	(0.142)	(0.137)
Styles Treatment	0.075	0.075
	(0.144)	(0.125)
Qualification Treatment	0.297**	0.297**
	(0.146)	(0.150)
Environment Treatment	0.196	0.196
	(0.144)	(0.138)
Roles	−0.052	−0.052
	(0.048)	(0.047)
Styles	−0.067	−0.067
	(0.061)	(0.071)
Environment	0.004	0.004
	(0.016)	(0.013)
Qualification	0.019	0.019
	(0.016)	(0.015)
Age	−0.013***	−0.013***
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Education	0.005	0.005
	(0.012)	(0.012)
Income	0.017	0.017
	(0.014)	(0.014)
Ethnicity	−0.018	−0.018*
	(0.021)	(0.011)
Left Party	−0.013	−0.013
	(0.084)	(0.081)
Urban	0.110	0.110
	(0.069)	(0.078)
Constant	0.501	0.501
	(0.402)	(0.460)
Observations	392	
R^2	0.084	
Adjusted R^2	0.050	
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table D.11: Moderation

	Dependent variable:		
	Ambition		
	(OLS)		*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Roles Treatment	0.205	−0.087	−0.087
	(0.747)	(0.872)	(0.958)
Styles Treatment	0.025	0.428	0.428
	(0.764)	(0.966)	(0.868)
Qualification Treatment	0.293	−0.325	−0.325
	(0.742)	(0.907)	(1.086)
Environment Treatment	−0.112	0.862	0.862
	(0.805)	(0.979)	(1.063)
Roles	−0.113	−0.195*	−0.195**
	(0.097)	(0.110)	(0.097)
Styles	−0.025	0.059	0.059
	(0.106)	(0.129)	(0.136)
Environment	0.013	0.046	0.046***
	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.017)
Qualification	0.035	0.022	0.022
	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.018)
Age		−0.012***	−0.012***
		(0.003)	(0.003)
Education		0.003	0.003
		(0.012)	(0.013)
Income		0.016	0.016
		(0.014)	(0.014)
Left Party		0.005	0.005
		(0.087)	(0.080)
Ethnicity		−0.020	−0.020
		(0.022)	(0.012)
Urban		0.118	0.118
		(0.071)	(0.080)
Roles Treatment:Roles	0.070	0.120	0.120
	(0.125)	(0.143)	(0.127)
Styles Treatment:Roles	0.072	0.132	0.132
	(0.133)	(0.152)	(0.126)
Qualification Treatment:Roles	0.147	0.225	0.225
	(0.135)	(0.166)	(0.173)
Environment Treatment:Roles	0.236*	0.282*	0.282*
	(0.136)	(0.157)	(0.149)
Roles Treatment:Styles	−0.177	−0.131	−0.131
	(0.157)	(0.186)	(0.187)
Styles Treatment:Styles	0.022	−0.146	−0.146
	(0.160)	(0.197)	(0.170)
Qualification Treatment:Styles	−0.150	−0.013	−0.013
	(0.156)	(0.195)	(0.253)
Environment Treatment:Styles	−0.061	−0.332*	−0.332
	(0.160)	(0.192)	(0.206)
Roles Treatment:Environment	−0.002	−0.009	−0.009
	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.042)

Styles Treatment:Environment	−0.060	−0.069	−0.069***
	(0.043)	(0.050)	(0.024)
Qualification Treatment:Environment	−0.021	−0.057	−0.057
	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.048)
Environment Treatment:Environment	−0.067	−0.114**	−0.114***
	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.035)
Roles Treatment:Qualification	0.047	0.037	0.037
	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.041)
Styles Treatment:Qualification	0.011	−0.019	−0.019
	(0.042)	(0.051)	(0.033)
Qualification Treatment:Qualification	−0.029	0.001	0.001
	(0.044)	(0.054)	(0.049)
Environment Treatment:Qualification	−0.042	−0.043	−0.043
	(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.036)
Constant	0.202	0.455	0.455
	(0.521)	(0.680)	(0.722)
Observations	678	392	
R^2	0.046	0.129	
Adjusted R^2	0.011	0.057	
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D.3.4 Heterogeneous Moderation

Table D.12: Heterogeneous Moderation (Left)

	Dependent variable:		
	Ambition		
	(OLS)		*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Roles Treatment	−0.572	0.278	0.278
	(1.215)	(1.375)	(1.179)
Styles Treatment	−1.120	0.570	0.570
	(1.289)	(1.450)	(1.217)
Qualification Treatment	−0.798	−0.188	−0.188
	(1.285)	(1.476)	(1.303)
Environment Treatment	−1.815	0.547	0.547
	(1.341)	(1.592)	(1.670)
Roles	−0.224	−0.131	−0.131
	(0.166)	(0.183)	(0.119)
Styles	−0.519***	−0.207	−0.207*
	(0.167)	(0.193)	(0.114)
Environment	0.061	0.066	0.066***
	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.021)
Qualification	0.082*	0.062	0.062***
	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.024)
Age		−0.009**	−0.009**
		(0.004)	(0.004)
Education		0.011	0.011
		(0.016)	(0.015)
Income		0.017	0.017

		(0.020)	(0.020)
Ethnicity		−0.018	−0.018
		(0.027)	(0.015)
Urban		0.235**	0.235**
		(0.102)	(0.118)
Roles Treatment:Roles	0.127	0.024	0.024
	(0.207)	(0.223)	(0.176)
Styles Treatment:Roles	0.117	−0.040	−0.040
	(0.240)	(0.245)	(0.221)
Qualification Treatment:Roles	0.227	0.203	0.203
	(0.249)	(0.283)	(0.190)
Envrionment Treatment:Roles	0.219	0.040	0.040
	(0.221)	(0.234)	(0.219)
Roles Treatment:Styles	0.209	−0.008	−0.008
	(0.250)	(0.278)	(0.243)
Styles Treatment:Styles	0.473**	0.213	0.213
	(0.232)	(0.264)	(0.163)
Qualification Treatment:Styles	0.164	−0.148	−0.148
	(0.247)	(0.279)	(0.260)
Environment Treatment:Styles	0.566**	0.138	0.138
	(0.266)	(0.306)	(0.204)
Roles Treatment:Environment	−0.068	0.012	0.012
	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.077)
Styles Treatment:Environment	−0.092	−0.110	−0.110***
	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.034)
Qualification Treatment:Environment	−0.075	−0.036	−0.036
	(0.077)	(0.084)	(0.066)
Environment Treatment:Environment	−0.103	−0.115*	−0.115***
	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.039)
Roles Treatment:Qualification	−0.020	−0.018	−0.018
	(0.069)	(0.075)	(0.071)
Styles Treatment:Qualification	−0.065	−0.064	−0.064
	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.047)
Qualification Treatment:Qualification	−0.033	0.096	0.096*
	(0.077)	(0.083)	(0.050)
Environment Treatment:Qualification	−0.104	−0.078	−0.078
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.048)
Constant	1.904**	0.251	0.251
	(0.876)	(1.086)	(0.692)
Observations	284	206	
R^2	0.110	0.202	
Adjusted R^2	0.027	0.071	
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.13: Heterogeneous Moderation (Right)

	Dependent variable:		
	Ambition		
	(OLS)		*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Roles Treatment	−0.163	−0.394	−0.394
	(1.111)	(1.391)	(1.487)
Styles Treatment	0.188	0.450	0.450
	(1.205)	(1.673)	(1.462)
Qualification Treatment	−0.667	−1.705	−1.705
	(1.188)	(1.502)	(1.795)
Environment Treatment	−0.469	−0.120	−0.120
	(1.224)	(1.693)	(1.549)
Roles	−0.152	−0.260	−0.260
	(0.140)	(0.160)	(0.160)
Styles	0.170	0.215	0.215
	(0.162)	(0.201)	(0.258)
Environment	0.009	0.016	0.016
	(0.043)	(0.053)	(0.032)
Qualification	0.022	0.001	0.001
	(0.043)	(0.049)	(0.026)
Age		−0.012**	−0.012**
		(0.006)	(0.006)
Education		−0.006	−0.006
		(0.021)	(0.025)
Income		0.018	0.018
		(0.025)	(0.021)
Ethnicity		−0.021	−0.021
		(0.044)	(0.028)
Urban		0.130	0.130
		(0.125)	(0.112)
Roles Treatment:Roles	0.230	0.167	0.167
	(0.183)	(0.213)	(0.194)
Styles Treatment:Roles	0.083	0.263	0.263
	(0.201)	(0.235)	(0.168)
Qualification Treatment:Roles	0.228	0.264	0.264
	(0.201)	(0.249)	(0.288)
Environment Treatment:Roles	0.557***	0.770***	0.770***
	(0.213)	(0.271)	(0.251)
Roles Treatment:Styles	−0.424*	−0.192	−0.192
	(0.246)	(0.303)	(0.293)
Styles Treatment:Styles	−0.191	−0.455	−0.455
	(0.269)	(0.347)	(0.342)
Qualification Treatment:Styles	−0.0001	0.259	0.259
	(0.257)	(0.324)	(0.420)
Environment Treatment:Styles	−0.275	−0.469	−0.469
	(0.245)	(0.320)	(0.331)
Roles Treatment:Environment	0.051	−0.006	−0.006
	(0.066)	(0.075)	(0.051)
Styles Treatment:Environment	−0.021	−0.035	−0.035
	(0.066)	(0.081)	(0.037)

Qualification Treatment:Environment	−0.004	0.024	0.024
	(0.066)	(0.079)	(0.077)
Environment Treatment:Environment	−0.096	−0.242**	−0.242**
	(0.075)	(0.114)	(0.103)
Roles Treatment:Qualification	0.080	0.057	0.057
	(0.061)	(0.069)	(0.049)
Styles Treatment:Qualification	0.024	0.003	0.003
	(0.066)	(0.089)	(0.042)
Qualification Treatment:Qualification	−0.040	−0.086	−0.086
	(0.064)	(0.080)	(0.071)
Environment Treatment:Qualification	−0.020	−0.059	−0.059
	(0.072)	(0.082)	(0.075)
Constant	−0.243	0.730	0.730
	(0.790)	(1.133)	(1.426)
Observations	254	169	
R^2	0.114	0.232	
Adjusted R^2	0.022	0.072	
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D.3.5 Informational Message Vs Email Body

Table D.14: Message or Whole Package

	Dependent variable:		
	Ambition		
	(OLS)		*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Roles Treatment	0.038	−0.076	−0.076
	(0.115)	(0.147)	(0.148)
Styles Treatment	0.031	−0.054	−0.054
	(0.116)	(0.150)	(0.155)
Qualification Treatment	0.116	0.057	0.057
	(0.115)	(0.151)	(0.163)
Environment Treatment	−0.057	−0.108	−0.108
	(0.115)	(0.146)	(0.149)
Age		−0.011***	−0.011***
		(0.003)	(0.003)
Education		0.021*	0.021*
		(0.012)	(0.011)
Income		0.003	0.003
		(0.014)	(0.014)
Ethnicity		−0.024	−0.024*
		(0.023)	(0.014)
Urban		0.031	0.031
		(0.071)	(0.076)
Left Party		−0.022	−0.022
		(0.087)	(0.083)
Constant	−0.024	0.342	0.342
	(0.082)	(0.292)	(0.335)
Observations	798	426	
R^2	0.003	0.053	
Adjusted R^2	−0.002	0.030	
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D.4 Robustness Checks

D.4.1 Ambition Dummy

Table D.15: Main Effect

	Dependent variable:					
	Ambition			Ambition		
	(OLS)		*coefficient test*	(OLS)		*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment (dummy)	0.088**	0.104**	0.104**			
	(0.039)	(0.050)	(0.047)			
Age		−0.009***	−0.009***		−0.009***	−0.009***
		(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.001)	(0.001)
Education		0.010**	0.010**		0.010**	0.010**
		(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.005)
Income		−0.001	−0.001		−0.001	−0.001
		(0.006)	(0.007)		(0.006)	(0.007)
Ethnicity		−0.011	−0.011		−0.010	−0.010
		(0.009)	(0.007)		(0.009)	(0.007)
Urban		0.016	0.016		0.011	0.011
		(0.030)	(0.029)		(0.031)	(0.030)
Left Party		0.045	0.045		0.048	0.048
		(0.042)	(0.042)		(0.042)	(0.042)
Roles Treatment				0.073	0.083	0.083
				(0.049)	(0.063)	(0.060)
Styles Treatment				0.111**	0.098	0.098
				(0.049)	(0.064)	(0.060)
Qualification Treatment				0.142***	0.168**	0.168**
				(0.048)	(0.065)	(0.067)
Environment Treatment				0.026	0.072	0.072
				(0.048)	(0.064)	(0.061)
Constant	0.184***	0.469***	0.469***	0.184***	0.482***	0.482***
	(0.035)	(0.135)	(0.138)	(0.034)	(0.135)	(0.137)
Observations	799	415		799	415	
R^2	0.006	0.136		0.014	0.141	
Adjusted R^2	0.005	0.121		0.009	0.120	
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.16: Moderation

	Dependent variable:		
	Ambition		
	(OLS)		*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Roles Treatment	0.080	0.148	0.148
	(0.317)	(0.395)	(0.367)
Styles Treatment	0.104	0.379	0.379
	(0.324)	(0.438)	(0.392)
Qualification Treatment	0.233	−0.285	−0.285
	(0.315)	(0.411)	(0.410)
Environment Treatment	−0.294	0.086	0.086
	(0.342)	(0.444)	(0.397)
Roles	−0.055	−0.052	−0.052
	(0.041)	(0.050)	(0.045)
Styles	−0.003	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.045)	(0.058)	(0.055)
Environment	0.017	0.033**	0.033***
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.012)
Qualification	0.024*	0.017	0.017
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.013)
Age		−0.009***	−0.009***
		(0.002)	(0.002)
Education		0.009	0.009
		(0.005)	(0.005)
Income		0.001	0.001
		(0.006)	(0.007)
Left Party		0.040	0.040
		(0.039)	(0.038)
Ethnicity		−0.008	−0.008
		(0.010)	(0.008)
Urban		0.016	0.016
		(0.032)	(0.032)
Roles Treatment:Roles	0.037	0.021	0.021
	(0.053)	(0.065)	(0.059)
Styles Treatment:Roles	0.029	−0.011	−0.011
	(0.056)	(0.069)	(0.065)
Qualification Treatment:Roles	0.044	0.065	0.065
	(0.058)	(0.075)	(0.077)
Environment Treatment:Roles	0.147**	0.134*	0.134**
	(0.058)	(0.071)	(0.063)
Roles Treatment:Styles	−0.043	−0.011	−0.011
	(0.067)	(0.084)	(0.079)
Styles Treatment:Styles	0.025	0.0003	0.0003
	(0.068)	(0.090)	(0.078)
Qualification Treatment:Styles	−0.026	0.084	0.084
	(0.066)	(0.088)	(0.098)
Environment Treatment:Styles	−0.005	−0.064	−0.064
	(0.068)	(0.087)	(0.082)
Roles Treatment:Environment	−0.023	−0.034	−0.034*
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.020)

Styles Treatment:Environment	-0.044^{**}	-0.051^{**}	-0.051^{***}
	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.018)
Qualification Treatment:Environment	-0.034^{*}	-0.049^{**}	-0.049^{**}
	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.021)
Environment Treatment:Environment	-0.038^{**}	-0.058^{**}	-0.058^{***}
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Roles Treatment:Qualification	0.020	0.013	0.013
	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Styles Treatment:Qualification	0.010	0.005	0.005
	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.020)
Qualification Treatment:Qualification	-0.003	0.049^{**}	0.049^{**}
	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Environment Treatment:Qualification	-0.009	-0.006	-0.006
	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Constant	0.231	0.464	0.464
	(0.221)	(0.308)	(0.297)
Observations	678	392	
R^2	0.077	0.228	
Adjusted R^2	0.043	0.164	
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D.4.2 Attitudes on a Three-point Scale

Table D.17: Main Effect on Attitudes

	Dependent variable:					
	Ambition			Ambition		
	(OLS)		*coefficient test*	(OLS)		*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment (dummy)	0.135	0.164	0.164			
	(0.091)	(0.111)	(0.104)			
Age		-0.013^{***}	-0.013^{***}		-0.013^{***}	-0.013^{***}
		(0.003)	(0.003)		(0.003)	(0.003)
Education		0.006	0.006		0.006	0.006
		(0.011)	(0.012)		(0.011)	(0.012)
Income		0.011	0.011		0.010	0.010
		(0.014)	(0.014)		(0.014)	(0.014)
Ethnicity		−0.018	−0.018		−0.017	−0.017
		(0.020)	(0.012)		(0.020)	(0.012)
Urban		0.112^{*}	0.112		0.105	0.105
		(0.068)	(0.076)		(0.068)	(0.075)
Left Party		0.007	0.007		0.012	0.012
		(0.094)	(0.098)		(0.095)	(0.100)
Roles Treatment				0.141	0.143	0.143
				(0.114)	(0.141)	(0.135)
Styles Treatment				0.134	0.150	0.150
				(0.115)	(0.143)	(0.133)
Qualification Treatment				0.219^{*}	0.252^{*}	0.252^{*}
				(0.114)	(0.146)	(0.151)
Environment Treatment				0.046	0.117	0.117
				(0.114)	(0.142)	(0.134)
Constant	−0.127	0.214	0.214	−0.127	0.231	0.231
	(0.081)	(0.300)	(0.327)	(0.081)	(0.301)	(0.329)
Observations	799	415		799	415	
R^2	0.003	0.069		0.006	0.072	
Adjusted R^2	0.002	0.053		0.001	0.049	

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table D.18: Moderation

	Dependent variable:		
	Ambition		
	(OLS)		*coefficient test*
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Roles Treatment	0.173	0.154	0.154
	(0.136)	(0.161)	(0.183)
Styles Treatment	0.046	0.005	0.005
	(0.139)	(0.161)	(0.141)
Qualification Treatment	0.141	0.142	0.142
	(0.138)	(0.159)	(0.164)
Environment Treatment	0.040	0.077	0.077
	(0.144)	(0.169)	(0.158)
Roles (tricotomous)	−0.147	−0.236**	−0.236**
	(0.109)	(0.119)	(0.113)
Styles (tricotomous)	0.045	0.047	0.047
	(0.124)	(0.142)	(0.159)
Environment (tricotomous)	0.080	0.148	0.148**
	(0.109)	(0.120)	(0.068)
Qualification (tricotomous)	0.129	0.075	0.075
	(0.098)	(0.112)	(0.062)
Age		−0.013***	−0.013***
		(0.003)	(0.003)
Education		0.004	0.004
		(0.012)	(0.012)
Income		0.014	0.014
		(0.014)	(0.014)
Left Party		−0.0005	−0.0005
		(0.087)	(0.078)
Ethnicity		−0.019	−0.019
		(0.021)	(0.012)
Urban		0.131*	0.131
		(0.071)	(0.080)
Roles Treatment:Roles (tricotomous)	0.060	0.115	0.115
	(0.148)	(0.169)	(0.157)
Styles Treatment:Roles (tricotomous)	0.126	0.172	0.172
	(0.151)	(0.172)	(0.144)
Qualification Treatment:Roles (tricotomous)	0.149	0.241	0.241
	(0.151)	(0.172)	(0.185)
Environment Treatment:Roles (tricotomous)	0.300**	0.353**	0.353*
	(0.152)	(0.173)	(0.180)
Roles Treatment:Styles (tricotomous)	−0.241	−0.104	−0.104
	(0.179)	(0.206)	(0.228)
Styles Treatment:Styles (tricotomous)	−0.072	−0.157	−0.157
	(0.181)	(0.211)	(0.194)
Qualification Treatment:Styles (tricotomous)	−0.122	0.133	0.133
	(0.179)	(0.218)	(0.265)
Environment Treatment:Styles (tricotomous)	−0.141	−0.330	−0.330
	(0.182)	(0.207)	(0.234)
Roles Treatment:Environment (tricotomous)	0.006	0.009	0.009
	(0.154)	(0.169)	(0.168)
Styles Treatment:Environment (tricotomous)	−0.268*	−0.277*	−0.277***

	(0.148)	(0.167)	(0.097)
Qualification Treatment:Environment (tricotomous)	−0.075	−0.187	−0.187
	(0.150)	(0.174)	(0.146)
Environment Treatment:Environment (tricotomous)	−0.256*	−0.400**	−0.400***
	(0.149)	(0.167)	(0.121)
Roles Treatment:Qualification (tricotomous)	0.111	0.049	0.049
	(0.136)	(0.156)	(0.121)
Styles Treatment:Qualification (tricotomous)	−0.014	−0.059	−0.059
	(0.135)	(0.160)	(0.096)
Qualification Treatment:Qualification (tricotomous)	−0.031	0.066	0.066
	(0.138)	(0.164)	(0.139)
Environment Treatment:Qualification (tricotomous)	−0.084	−0.152	−0.152
	(0.138)	(0.158)	(0.124)
Constant	−0.083	0.244	0.244
	(0.097)	(0.318)	(0.302)
Observations	678	392	
R^2	0.047	0.138	
Adjusted R^2	0.012	0.067	
Note:			*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

D.4.3 Causal Trees

Figure D.3: Causal Tree - Informational Message about Roles



Causal tree displaying heterogeneous effects of the informational message about Roles on the basis of participants demographic characteristics. For the production of this tree I used Professor Susan Athey's method.

Figure D.4: Causal Tree - Informational Message about Styles



Causal tree displaying heterogeneous effects of the informational message about Styles on the basis of participants demographic characteristics. For the production of this tree I used Professor Susan Athey's method.

Figure D.5: Causal Tree - Informational Message about Environment



Causal tree displaying heterogeneous effects of the informational message about Environment on the basis of participants demographic characteristics. For the production of this tree I used Professor Susan Athey's method.

Figure D.6: Causal Tree - Informational Message about Qualification



Causal tree displaying heterogeneous effects of the informational message about Qualification on the basis of participants demographic characteristics. For the production of this tree I used Professor Susan Athey's method.